There will surely be a lot of soul-searching in L.A. about whether something is rotten at the Clippers’ core. There’s a chance the early exit this time could bring about a seismic personnel shift for a team that has enjoyed more top-end continuity than any club since 2013.1

Whatever is to blame, though, has nothing to do with point guard Chris Paul.

Those gaudy postseason numbers are also in line with his career postseason averages and his regular-season averages. He’s this good all the time. If his greatness flies under the radar a bit, it’s likely because he excels in areas that aren’t as sexy or noticeable in today’s game. In a league that has fully embraced the 3-point shot, he was by far the NBA’s best midrange shooter this season. At a time when players are piling up assists while collecting a ton of turnovers, Paul has maintained a 4-to-1 assist to turnover ratio. And even though he plays a position where not much is expected defensively these days, his career steal percentage2rivals that of John Stockton’s. Add all that together, and Paul is, somewhat shockingly, neck and neck statistically with Michael Jordan by someadvancedmetrics.

Yet, with Sunday’s loss, Paul has now gone an NBA-record 76 postseason games without making the conference finals. The Clippers, too, have made history: No other team has won at least 60 percent of its games in six straight seasons and failed to make the conference finals, according to the Elias Sports Bureau.

Paul’s critics will more than likely hold these past six postseasons against him, saying that even if he’s the key reason the Clippers have been successful for this long, he should get more blame than anyone for the team’s failure to get past the second round. And it’s certainly fair to wonder whether point-guard led clubs — especially ones led by more traditional floor generals — are generally at a disadvantage and whether that has hindered the Clippers to some extent. But this club has had plenty of other weak spots.

The Clippers’ personnel problems rest with Rivers, who doubles as the team’s president and coach. The Clippers have been far too top-heavy for years, and Rivers arguably made the problem even worse by committing so much long-term money to Crawford, who was 36 years old when the team agreed to a three-year, $42 million deal with him. Far worse: The club has routinely gotten virtually nothing from its cheapest talent; contenders usually rely on those less-expensive players because they’re often over the salary cap and therefore unable to bring in star players via free agency.

Consider the fact that since Rivers took over in 2013, the Clippers have garnered just 0.42 win shares per rookie acquired through the draft,6 the third-fewest in the NBA over that span, according to data pulled by Mackenzie Kraemer, a researcher with ESPN Stats & Information Group. In fact, the only draft pick that the Clippers have made since then who has produced more than 0.1 career win shares over that time is Reggie Bullock, a player they traded7 a year and a half into his career.8

DRAFT YEAR

PLAYER

PICK NUMBER

CAREER WIN SHARES

2016

Brice Johnson

25th

0

2016

David Michineau

39th

DNP

2016

Diamond Stone

40th

-0.1

2015

Branden Dawson

56th

0

2014

C.J. Wilcox

28th

0.1

2013

Reggie Bullock

25th

2.5

The Clippers’ draft acquisitions haven’t been great under Doc Rivers

Analysis looked at all rookies drafted since 2013 and which teams they ended up on before the start of their first season, as opposed to looking solely at which team initially held their draft rights.
Doc Rivers became responsible for the team’s picks in 2014.

Source: ESPN Stats & Information Group

Then there are the picks that were given away like candy as the Clippers sought a starting-caliber wing player (one it still doesn’t really have). Rivers unloaded a first to get rid of Jared Dudley and then parted ways with another first-rounder when he sent Lance Stephenson packing9 for Jeff Green. All in all, the cycle of trades, particularly the mismanagement of them, left the Clippers without the assets necessary to trade for someone like Carmelo Anthony, who could’ve given them a spark as they began to prepare for the postseason.

But still, even with all the managerial misfires and mistakes, it’s hard to believe the Clippers never managed to make the conference finals. Some of that seemingly came down to bad luck, mostly in the form of injuries. Blake Griffin got hurt this series, and last season, both Griffin and Paul suffered injuries in the same playoff game10 that would sideline them the rest of the postseason. In other instances, the Clippers simply couldn’t slam the door shut. In 2014, they blew a 13-point lead with four minutes to play that would’ve given them a 3-2 series lead over Oklahoma City. And even more notably, the Clippers blew a 3-1 series lead against Houston in 2015.

Whatever the reasons, consider this: The probability that the Clippers would reach the conference finals at least once in the past six seasons, with as much regular-season success as they had, was 85 percent,11 according to FiveThirtyEight’s NBA win projection model.

The question now is whether it makes sense to bring back the majority of the team’s core — including Paul, Griffin and JJ Redick — given its failures. Some organizations might have the courage to say “no” and blow things up. But when you’re the Clippers, who’ve never won anything meaningful and have the talent to potentially contend if healthy, that’s a far tougher pill to swallow than holding onto the status quo and merely hoping for the best.

Footnotes

According to ESPN Stats & Information Group, Chris Paul, JJ Redick, Blake Griffin and DeAndre Jordan have logged 3,877 regular-season minutes together over the past four seasons, about 1,100 more minutes than the next-closest NBA foursome over that span.

According to Basketball-Reference.com, steal percentage estimates the percentage of the opponent’s possessions that end with a steal by a particular player.

Jordan holds the third-lowest free-throw percentage in NBA history among players with at least 1,000 career attempts. His free-throw totals dropped sharply this season, after the NBA put a rule in place that penalizes teams for intentionally fouling poor free-throw shooters away from the ball.

According to effective field-goal percentage, among players who’ve taken at least 500 career postseason shot attempts.

This season, he logged one of the lowest total-rebounding rates in NBA history among guards 6-foot-5 or taller.

To cut through the confusion of picks being sent elsewhere on draft night, our draft-acquisition analysis looked at all drafted rookies since 2013 and where the players ended up before the season began, as opposed to looking solely at which team initially held their draft rights. For instance, it makes more sense to count Andrew Wiggins towards Minnesota’s player development as opposed to labeling him as a Cleveland draft pick, since Wiggins was dealt for Kevin Love before ever suiting up for the Cavs.

For Rivers’s son Austin no less.

In fairness, the Clippers have posted great records, so they haven’t drafted any higher than 25th. But of the 71 draftees who have produced at least 3 career win shares over this span, 24 were drafted in the No. 25 slot or later.

The timing here was particularly bad. Just one day earlier, Stephen Curry’s knee injury seemed to provide an opening for the Clippers to survive a potential second-round matchup with Golden State.

They entered the 2011-12 postseason with a 13 percent chance of reaching the conference finals and had an 18 percent chance in 2012-13, a 39 percent chance in 2013-14, a 55 percent chance in 2014-15, a 13 percent chance in 2015-16 and an 11 percent chance this season.

Chris Herring is a senior sportswriter for FiveThirtyEight. @herring_nba