In 2009 and 2010, the legislative bodies of Jefferson County, Jefferson City, and Dandridge enacted resolutions requesting that the Jefferson County Chamber of Commerce create a non-profit corporation to be called the Jefferson County Economic Development Oversight Committee (EDOC). Its purpose was to promote economic development in the county. In 2013, a group of citizens filed this action seeking a declaration that EDOC is subject to the provisions of the Tennessee Public Records Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-503 (2012), and the Open Meetings Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 8- 44-101 et seq. (2016). After a bench trial, the court denied the plaintiffs’ requested relief. They appealed. We find and hold that the undisputed facts establish that EDOC performs a governmental function, recieves a substantial amount of taxpayer funding, and is significantly involved with and regulated by the governing city and county legislative bodies. In light of our duty to broadly construe and interpret the Public Records and Open Meetings Acts in favor of governmental transparency and accountability, we hold that the EDOC is subject to these acts. The judgment of the trial court is reversed.

This is a divorce case involving numerous pleadings. Because the order appealed is not final in that it fails to adjudicate husband’s petition for contempt and motion for sanctions, this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a). Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

This is a post-divorce child custody action involving two children, who were sixteen and seventeen years of age at the time of the most recent trial. The parties were divorced by order of the Sullivan County Law Court (“divorce court”) in July 2001. Concomitant with the divorce decree, the divorce court entered a permanent parenting plan designating the father as the primary residential parent. Although the permanent parenting plan was modified in 2003 and 2007, the divorce court had most recently modified the permanent parenting plan in February 2009 (“2009 PPP”) upon the parties’ stipulation that a material change in circumstance had occurred. The divorce court maintained the father’s designation as the primary residential parent and awarded to the father 268 days of annual residential co-parenting time as compared to Mother’s 97 days. At some point following entry of the 2009 PPP, the mother relocated to Texas, and the father and the children relocated to Washington County, Tennessee. Upon the mother’s request, the case was transferred to the Washington County Circuit Court (“trial court”) in April 2014. On March 20, 2015, the mother filed a motion in the trial court to modify custody and child support, as well as a motion for civil and criminal contempt against the father, alleging various violations of the 2009 PPP. Following a hearing regarding the contempt allegations, the trial court entered an order on June 30, 2015, finding the father in “technical contempt” and directing him to pay an expert witness fee as a sanction. Following participation in mediation, the parties announced an agreement, which the trial court ratified in a permanent parenting plan order entered on June 30, 2015 (“2015 PPP”). The 2015 PPP maintained the father’s designation as the primary residential parent and provided the mother with 85 days of residential co-parenting time, a great part of which was to be exercised at her residence in Texas. On October 2, 2015, the mother filed an “emergency motion” for modification of the 2015 PPP, as well as for criminal and civil contempt against the father, averring violations of the 2015 PPP. The parties subsequently filed competing “emergency” motions concerning physical custody of the younger child, who under one temporary order entered by the trial court in October 2015, was to reside primarily with the mother. Following a two-day bench trial in October 2015, the trial court maintained the prior designation of Father as the primary residentialparent for both children pending further order, but the court took the custody matter under advisement pending receipt of a court-ordered assessment of the parties and the children by a forensic psychologist. Upon receipt of the psychologist’s report, the trial court conducted a second two-day bench trial in June 2016, ultimately finding that this was a case of severe parental alienation in which the father had actively supported the children’s alienation from the mother without reasonable cause. The court awarded exclusive custody of the children to the mother and directed that the children participate with the mother in a workshop in California that had been recommended by the forensic psychologist as a therapeutic methodology for parental alienation at an estimated cost of approximately $28,000.00. The court directed that the workshop costs, including a mandatory post-workshop vacation for the mother and the children, would be substantially paid by the father. The court further found, inter alia, that the father was in contempt of court for failing to follow certain provisions of the 2015 PPP and sentenced the father to eight days in jail, with the sentence suspended provided no further violations occurred. Also finding that the mother was entitled to attorney’s fees, the court reduced the $38,594.99 fee amount requested by the mother to an award of $20,000.00 to offset the amount paid by the father toward the workshop. The father has appealed. Having determined that the father was not provided with sufficient notice of criminal contempt charges pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(b), we vacate the trial court’s order finding the father in contempt. We remand for a determination of whether the amount of attorney’s fees awarded to the mother was appropriate given our vacation of the contempt finding against the father. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. The mother’s request for attorney’s fees on appeal is denied.

Petition for writ of certiorari; inmate appeals the trial court’s order affirming the Tennessee Board of Parole’s decision to rescind its earlier grant of parole and deny parole. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Jerome V. and Teresa V. (“Petitioners”) appeal the May 26, 2015 order of the Circuit Court for Sumner County (“the Trial Court”) dismissing their Petition for Adoption and Termination of Parental Rights (“the Petition”) based upon Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-119. We find and hold that Petitioners have shown good cause why the Petition should not be dismissed, and we vacate the Trial Court’s May 26, 2015 order, reinstate the Petition, and remand this case for further proceedings.

Jerry Thigpen sued the Trousdale County Highway Department and two individuals, alleging damage to his home caused by roadway resurfacing. The trial court dismissed the lawsuit, concluding that the claims were barred by the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”). We affirm.

Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of his claims against all three defendants and the award of $400 to defendant Master Muffler on its counterclaim following a bench trial. We affirm the trial court in all respects.

The plaintiff, an inmate proceeding self-represented, filed a “Petition for Declaratory Judgment” (“Petition”) on June 24, 2016, alleging that the Hardeman County Correctional Facility (“HCCF”) staff had failed to follow numerous policies established by the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”). In conjunction with the Petition, the plaintiff filed a motion seeking a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. The plaintiff subsequently filed a document entitled, “Complaint.” On September 12, 2016, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, asserting, inter alia, that the plaintiff’s action was statutorily barred. The trial court entered two orders on October 7, 2016, respectively denying the plaintiff’s request for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction and granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The plaintiff filed a notice of appeal. Determining that the trial court did not err in dismissing the plaintiff’s claims, we affirm.

This appeal arises from a lawsuit filed by plaintiffs Shay and Brian Simpson (“the Simpsons,” collectively, or “Ms.” or “Mr. Simpson,” respectively) against defendants National Fitness Center, Inc. and National Fitness Center, LLC (“National Fitness,” collectively). Ms. Simpson and National Fitness orally contracted to allow the Simpsons “a couple of weeks” additional time to consider whether to cancel their club membership. After more than two weeks elapsed, the Simpsons elected to cancel but National Fitness refused to accept the cancellation. This case was tried before the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court found that National Fitness breached the contract and committed a deceptive act under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”). The Trial Court ordered “a return of all monies paid [by the Simpsons] to [National Fitness] . . .” and awarded attorney’s fees to the Simpsons. National Fitness appealed to this Court. We affirm the Trial Court in its determination that the Simpsons effectively exercised their right to cancel and that they were entitled to a refund of any monies paid. However, we reverse the Trial Court in its determination that National Fitness violated the TCPA. We, therefore, reverse the award of attorney’s fees. We affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, the judgment of the Trial Court.

This is a medical malpractice action1 in which the plaintiff filed suit against the hospital and her physicians following the death of her newborn son hours after his delivery. The case proceeded to a jury trial. The jury found in favor of the defendants. Following the denial of post-trial motions, the plaintiff appeals, claiming the trial court erred in excluding testimony and when it gave a jury instruction on the sudden emergency doctrine. We reverse and remand for a new trial.

In this divorce action, Father contends the trial court erred by adding substantive restrictions to the parties’ agreed upon Permanent Parenting Plan that, inter alia, imposed “paramour” and “lifestyle” restrictions on Father that were not imposed on Mother. We have determined that the trial court unilaterally imposed substantive and material restrictions on Father’s activities during his parenting time without affording him an evidentiary hearing. We have also determined that some of the restrictions placed on Father are too vague to be enforceable and that the Statement of the Evidence does not provide a factual basis for the restrictions placed on Father. For these reasons we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The petitioner sought a writ of certiorari seeking redress for the respondents’ failure to schedule an initial parole hearing prior to his release eligibility date. The trial court dismissed the petition as moot, finding that a parole hearing was conducted following the filing of the petition and that any challenge relating to the parole hearing was untimely. The petitioner appeals. We affirm.

The parents of a minor child filed a petition to change the first and middle names of their child but not the surname. The trial court denied the petition without a hearing on the ground: “The Petition fails to state a valid reason for the name change, especially in light of the fact that Petitioners seek to change someone else’s name.” The parents filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment. They supported their motion with letters written by the sixteen-year-old child, the child’s doctor, the child’s therapist, and one of the child’s teachers, each explaining why the name change was in the child’s best interest. Without ruling on the motion, the trial court set the matter for an evidentiary hearing during which the mother, father, and child testified, and the letters from the doctor, therapist, and teacher were admitted into evidence. Thereafter, the trial court denied the motion to alter or amend because “the controlling law has not changed,” no “previously unavailable evidence became available,” and “Petitioners have not shown that there was a clear error of law or that an injustice occurred.” The trial court also ruled on the merits of the petition and denied and dismissed the petition. This appeal followed. We have determined that the trial court erred by denying the motion to alter or amend the initial order because the petition stated a claim for which relief could be granted. As for the court’s ruling on the merits of the petition following the evidentiary hearing, we have determined that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that Petitioners failed to show that it was in the child’s best interest to change his first and middle names. We have also determined that the court’s legal conclusions were based on an erroneous assessment of the law. Having determined that (1) Petitioners complied with and satisfied all procedural and legal requirements for a name change, (2) the preponderance of the evidence established that changing the child’s first and middle names was in the child’s best interest, and (3) there is no legal basis upon which to deny the petition, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand with instructions to enter judgment approving the petition to change the child’s name as requested in the petition.

The personal representative, on behalf of the decedent’s estate, brought this negligence action against the defendant based, inter alia, on the defendant’s alleged acts of displaying and failing to properly store and prevent accessibility to the firearm with which the decedent ultimately committed suicide. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, determining that he owed no duty of care to the decedent and that her suicide was an independent, intervening cause that broke the chain of causation. The estate has appealed. Based upon the applicable balancing test, we conclude that the defendant owed a legal duty of care to the decedent and that summary judgment was improperly granted in the defendant’s favor on the basis of lack of duty. We further determine that the estate’s evidence at the summary judgment stage was sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial regarding causation. We therefore vacate the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We affirm, however, the trial court’s determination that no special relationship existed such as to impose liability for nonfeasance.

Appellant appeals the denial of its Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 24 motion to intervene in the underlying lawsuit. Because the order appealed is not final, this Court has no subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a). Appeal dismissed.

This is a termination of parental rights case. Mother/Appellant appeals the termination of her parental rights to the minor children on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by an incarcerated parent by wanton disregard; (2) abandonment by willful failure to provide a suitable home; (3) failure to substantially comply with the reasonable requirements of the permanency plan; and (4) persistence of the conditions that led to the children’s removal from Mother’s home. Mother also appeals the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights is in the children’s best interests. Father/Appellant appeals the termination of his parental rights to the minor children on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by willful failure to provide a suitable home; (2) failure to substantially comply with the reasonable requirements of the permanency plan; and (3) persistence of conditions that led to the children’s removal from Father’s home. Father also appeals the trial court’s finding that termination of his parental rights is in the children’s best interests. Because grounds for termination of both Mother’s and Father’s parental rights are met by clear and convincing evidence, and there is also clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights is in the best interests of the children, we affirm.

This is Father’s second appeal of the termination of his parental rights to the two children he had with his former wife (“Mother”). Father and Mother separated in 2008 when she moved from Alaska to Tennessee with the children, and they were granted a divorce in 2009. Father has not seen nor spoken with the children since 2008, and has not provided any financial support since November 2009. The petition to terminate Father’s parental rights was filed by Mother and her husband in 2012. In Father’s first appeal, we remanded the case in order to obtain a sufficient record for this court to review on appeal. In re Ian B., No. M2015-01079-COA-R3-PT, 2016 WL 2865875 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 11, 2016). On remand, the trial court found that the petitioners had proven grounds of abandonment for failure to visit and support and that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the children. This appeal followed. Having determined that the record in this second appeal is sufficient for this court to conduct a proper review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this post-divorce action, Wife filed a Petition for Civil Contempt and Other Relief, including a request to recover her attorney’s fees, alleging Husband violated five provisions in the marital dissolution agreement (MDA). Husband denied the allegations and filed a separate petition to decrease his child support obligation, which Wife opposed. Before trial, but after protracted proceedings, Husband complied with three provisions in the MDA, leaving two to be decided by the court. Following an evidentiary hearing, the court found Husband in civil contempt for violating the remaining MDA provisions, denied Husband’s petition to decrease child support, and ordered Husband to pay Wife’s attorney’s fees. Specifically, the court found that Husband violated the MDA by refusing to transfer to Wife one-half of the “non-retirement” account at T. Rowe Price and by concealing and withholding two paychecks he earned during the marriage that the parties agreed to divide equally. The trial court found that Husband did not offer sufficient proof of his current income to support a reduction in his child support obligation. The trial court also determined that Wife was entitled to recover her attorney’s fees pursuant to the enforcement provision in the MDA and pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-103(c) as the attorney’s fees pertained to the child support decree. Husband appealed. We have determined that the MDA provision concerning the “non-retirement” account was not sufficiently clear, specific, and unambiguous to sustain a finding of contempt; therefore, we reverse this finding of contempt. However, we affirm the finding of contempt for concealing and withholding two paychecks. We also affirm the trial court in all other respects, including the award of attorney’s fees incurred by Wife in the trial court and the denial of Husband’s petition to reduce child support. As for Wife’s request to recover the attorney’s fees she incurred in this appeal, we find she is entitled to recover her fees and remand this issue for the trial court to determine the amount she is entitled to recover.

This appeal results from a post-divorce criminal contempt conviction the plaintiff mother received for failing to adhere to a parenting plan that prohibits both parents from making disparaging remarks about the other parent. The trial court held that the plaintiff received sufficient notice under Rule 42(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure and that she was guilty of criminal contempt beyond a reasonable doubt for two separate instances of disparaging remarks made about the father in the presence of their children. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

This is an appeal from a successful petition for a writ of certiorari involving land use. The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners after finding that the location approved for the proposed power station violated an applicable zoning ordinance. After the trial court’s decision, the City of Mount Pleasant amended its ordinance to clarify that the zoning ordinance did not apply to public utilities. The City of Mount Pleasant Planning Commission thereafter approved the construction of the power station under the amended ordinance. The petitioners filed no writ of certiorari of the approval under the amended ordinance and therefore ask that this appeal be dismissed as moot. Because this case no longer serves to offer any meaningful relief to the parties and no exceptions to the mootness doctrine are present, we dismiss this appeal as moot.

This is a post-divorce matter. Having reviewed the record transmitted to us on appeal, we observe that the case appealed from is not final. Given the absence of a final judgment, we dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Appellant appeals the circuit court’s dismissal of its petition for writs of certiorari and supersedeas for a de novo review of an unlawful detainer action originally filed in general sessions court. The circuit court granted Appellees’ Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02 motion, dismissing Appellant’s petition on the ground that it was not timely filed pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-18-129 and Appellant did not have a sufficient excuse for filing the petition outside the 30 day statutory time period. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal involves the decision of the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance (the “Commissioner”) to impose a civil fine and revoke the license of insurance agent Charles E. Cunningham (“Cunningham”), after concluding that Cunningham committed six (6) violations of applicable statutes in connection with his insurance practice. Cunningham filed a petition for review in the Chancery Court for Davidson County challenging the sufficiency of the evidence relied on by the Commissioner. The trial court found that the record supported the Commissioner’s decision and choice of penalty. Cunningham appealed to this Court. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

David C. Jayne (“Jayne”) appeals the trial court’s entry of a judgment against him for breach of contract for failure to pay Bass Annie Cosmetic Boat Repair (“Bass Annie”) for repairs made to his boat. Jayne entered into a contract with Bass Annie for the repair of his damaged boat. Before the agreed-upon repairs were completed, Jayne went to Bass Annie to check on the boat. After inspecting the boat, Jayne instructed Bass Annie to stop the repairs and return the boat to him. An argument ensued, and Jayne alleges he was assaulted by a Bass Annie employee. Both parties filed claims in the general sessions court which were subsequently appealed to circuit court. Following a de novo trial in the circuit court, the trial court dismissed Jayne’s claims and awarded Bass Annie damages for breach of contract for the work completed on the boat. Jayne appeals. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.