Contents

Prelude

The Romans, greatly alarmed and dismayed by Tiberius Sempronius Longus’ defeat at
Trebia, immediately made plans to counter the new threat from
the north. Sempronius returned to Rome and the Roman Senate resolved to elect new consuls the following year in 217
B.C. The new consuls were Gnaeus Servilius Geminus and
Gaius Flaminius, the latter under threat
with recall from the Senate for leaving Rome without carrying out
the proper rituals upon being elected consul.[3] The
Senate commissioned Servilius to replace Publius Cornelius Scipio and
take command of his army, while Flaminius was appointed to lead
what remained of Sempronius’s army. Since both armies had been
weakened by the defeat at Trebia, four new legions were raised. These new forces,
together with the remains of the former army, were divided between
the two consuls.[4] After
the battles of Ticinus and Trebia, Flaminius' army turned
south to prepare a defence near Rome itself. Hannibal immediately
followed, but marched faster and soon passed the Roman army.
Flaminius was forced to increase the speed of his march in order to
bring Hannibal to battle before reaching the city. Another force
under Servilius was due to join Flaminius.

Before this could happen, Hannibal lured Gaius Flaminius' force
into a pitched battle, by devastating the area Flaminius had been
sent to protect. Polybius
wrote that Hannibal calculated that he could draw out Flaminius
into battle and that "no sooner had he left the neighbourhood of
Faesulae, and, advancing a short way beyond the Roman camp, made a
raid upon the neighbouring country, then Flaminius became excited,
and enraged at the idea that he was despised by the enemy: and as
the devastation of the country went on, and he saw from the smoke
that rose in every direction that the work of destruction was
proceeding, he could not patiently endure the sight."[5] At the
same time, Hannibal tried to sever the allegiance of Rome’s allies,
by proving that the Republic was powerless to protect them.
However, Flaminius remained passively encamped at Arretium. Unable to goad Flaminius into battle,
Hannibal marched boldly around his opponent’s left flank and
effectively cut Flaminius off from Rome (thereby executing the
earliest recorded deliberate turning movement in military history).
Still, Flaminius stubbornly kept his army in camp. Hannibal decided
to march on Apulia, hoping
that Flaminius might follow him to a battlefield of his own
choosing.[6]

Flaminius, eager to exact revenge for the devastation of the
countryside, and facing increasing political criticism from Rome,
finally marched against Hannibal. Flaminius, like Sempronius, was
impetuous, over-confident and lacked self-control.[7] His
advisors suggested that he send only a cavalry detachment to harass
the Carthaginians and prevent them from laying waste to any more of
the country, while reserving his main force until the other consul,
Servilius, arrived with his army. However, it proved impossible to
argue with the rash Flaminius. Livy wrote that "Though every other
person in the council advised safe rather than showy measures,
urging that he should wait for his colleague, in order that joining
their armies, they might carry on the war with united courage and
counsels ... Flaminius, in a fury ... gave out the signal for
marching for battle." [8]

Battle

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Tactical
disposition

Lake Trasimene battlefield, from the lake. Hannibal's army was
arrayed along the nearer wooded ridge

As Hannibal passed Lake Trasimene, he
came to a place very suitable for an ambush, and hearing that
Flaminius had broken camp and was pursuing him, made preparations
for the impending battle. To the north was a series of heavily
forested hills where the Malpasso Road passed along the north side
of Lake Trasimene. Along the hill-bordered skirts of the lake,
Hannibal camped where he was in full view of anyone entering the
northern defile, and spent the night
arranging his troops for battle. Below the camp, he placed his heavy infantry
(Iberians, Celts, and Africans) upon a slight
elevation. Here, they had ample ground from which they could charge
down upon the head of the Roman column on the left flank, when it
should reach the position.[9] His cavalry and Gallic infantry were concealed in the hills in the
depth of the wooded valley from which the Romans would first enter,
so that they could quickly sally out and close the entrance,
blocking the retreat route of the Romans. Then he posted his light troops at
intervals along the height overlooking the plain, with orders to
keep well hidden in the woods until signalled to attack. In
addition, the night before the battle commenced, Hannibal ordered
his men to light campfires on the hills of Tuoro, at a considerable
distance, so as to convince the Romans that his forces were further
away than they actually were.

Events

From the Department of History, United States Military
Academy

The next morning, the Roman troops marched eastward along the
road running near the northern edge of the lake. Eager for battle,
Flaminius pushed his men hard and hurried up the column in the
rear. Hannibal then sent a small skirmish force to draw the
vanguard away from the front of the line, in order to split the
Roman forces. Once all the Romans had at last marched through the
foggy, narrow defile and entered the plains skirting the lake,
trumpets were blown, signalling the general attack.

The Carthaginian cavalry and infantry swept down from their
concealed positions in the surrounding hills, blocked the road and
engaged the unsuspecting Romans from three sides. Surprised and
outmanoeuvred, the Romans did not have time to draw up in battle array, and
were forced to fight a desperate hand-to-hand battle in open order.
The Romans were quickly split into three parts. The westernmost was
attacked by the Carthaginian cavalry and forced into the lake,
leaving the other two groups with no way to retreat. The centre,
including Flaminius, stood its ground, but was cut down by
Hannibal's Gauls after three hours of heavy combat.

In less than four hours, the Roman army was annihilated. The
vanguard saw little combat and, once the disaster to their rear
became obvious, hacked their way through the skirmishers and out of
the forest. Of the initial Roman force of about 30,000, about
15,000 were either killed in battle or drowned while trying to
escape into the lake (including Flaminius himself who was slain by
the Gaul, Ducarius). Another 10,000 are reported to have made their
way back to Rome by various means, and the rest were captured.[10].
Hannibal's losses were 2,500, plus "many" who died of their
wounds.[11] About
6,000 Romans escaped, under the cover of fog, only to be captured
by Maharbal the following
day. Both Livy and Polybius wrote that Maharbal promised safe
passage ("with a garment apiece") if they surrendered their weapons
and armour, but Hannibal had them sold into slavery irrespective of
the promise made.[12]

The disaster for Rome did not end there. Within a day or two, a
reinforcement force of 4,000 under the propraetor Gaius Centennius
was intercepted and destroyed.[13]

Aftermath

Other battles

Hannibal, emerging from another brilliant victory, had
successfully planned and executed the greatest ambush in
history.[14] News
of the defeat caused a panic in Rome. Quintus Fabius Maximus was elected dictator by the
Roman Assembly and adopted the "Fabian strategy" of avoiding
pitched conflict, relying instead on low-level harassment to wear
the invader down, until Rome could rebuild its military strength.
Hannibal was left largely free to ravage Apulia for the next year, until the Romans ended
the dictatorship and elected Paullus and Varro as consuls. The result
would be the Battle of Cannae, the worst defeat the
Romans would suffer throughout the Second Punic War.

Notes

Livy states that so terrible was the massacre at Lake
Trasimene, that neither army was aware of the occurrence of an
earthquake, which at the very moment of the battle "overthrew
large portions of many of the cities of Italy, turned rivers, and
levelled mountains with an awful crash."[15]

An ancient tradition says that because of the blood, which for
over three days filled the water, that the name of a small stream
feeding the lake was renamed Sanguineto, the "Blood
River".[16] In
the surroundings of Lake Trasimene, there are further areas which
retain a particular meaning, including Ossaia
("Charnel House, Place of Bones"), Sepoltaglia ("Place
of Burial"), Caporosso ("Cape red"), Piegaro ("Subdued Place),
Preggio (from "Peggio", "Worse"), Pugnano ("Place of
battles"), and Pian di Marte ("Field of Mars").