Germany risks overplaying its hand

The lingering euro debt crisis has underscored the two main stories of the moment in Europe: Berlin’s move into the driving seat of European integration, and the widespread uneasiness in other European capitals about that development. However, beyond all the chatter about a German Europe, a different thread emerges.

The signs are there for all to see, pointing to a Germany that wants to bring Washington and London in on the design of Europe’s evolving economic and political architecture. Berlin’s calls for a transatlantic trade and investment partnership (TTIP) are particularly telling. In stark contrast to the imagery of a centralized, continental and inward-looking Europe (à la Charlemagne), TTIP plays up the US connection and conveys the image of a more open, Western-oriented and outward-looking Europe. In doing so, it speaks to David Cameron’s vision of a flexible and multi-networked Europe.

TTIP is also about reinvigorating the West in a global context increasingly defined by the “rising rest”. Besides helping stimulate the global economic competitiveness of Europe and the US, TTIP could serve to reassert the West’s position in an Atlantic Basin writ large – one including Africa’s western seaboard, Latin America and the Arctic. These regions present great demographic, economic and energy potential and are being increasingly wooed by China and other emerging powers.

Opposition to TTIP cuts across national boundaries and finds resonance on both sides of the Atlantic. But perhaps France is at the greatest risk of losing out. The kind of market-oriented ideas championed in Washington, London or Berlin are often at odds with the more protectionist approach that characterises Paris. Additionally, the very notion of a transatlantic economic compact challenges France’s status as a natural bridge between Germany in the East and Britain and the US in the West.

The one thing TTIP has in its favour is timing. It comes against the backdrop of the US turning towards Asia, Germany’s rise in Europe, and Britain’s political distancing from the European Union. References to an ‘economic NATO’ are not so far off the mark. After all, TTIP is as much about keeping the Americans, the British and the Germans ‘in’ – in Europe, the EU and the West respectively – as it is about keeping the West going globally.

The push on TTIP must be placed in the context of a broader “accommodationist” turn in German foreign policy. Last January, Cameron’s denunciation of an increasingly centralized and supranational EU was met by Angela Merkel’s calls for British concerns to be taken seriously. Should the situation come down to a choice between a more centralized EU without the UK and a flexible and multi-speed one with London on board, Berlin may well settle for the latter. Merkel’s invitation to Cameron and his family to a Prussian castle last month did suggest that some form of British-German understanding over Europe is developing.

While François Hollande’s absence from the Cameron-Merkel family gathering was conspicuous, France should not be written off just yet. For one thing, the very prospect of a British-German duopoly setting the European policy agenda may lead other Europeans (and even the US) to look to France for much-needed balance. For another, Paris’s relationship with London and Berlin remains much deeper than the links those two capitals have with each other.

France and Britain are Europe’s only serious military powers, and agree more often than not on security matters. The volatility of North Africa and the Middle East only serves to underscore France’s relevance. And so does the EU’s political crisis. For all its problems, the EU remains a cornerstone of German foreign policy, and the Germans are fully aware that fixing it will require some form of reconciliation with the French.

Berlin can play more than one game at a time. Its overtures to Washington and London bring Merkel the kind of diplomatic leverage she may be tempted to exploit in her conversations with the French over the EU’s future. But that very thought could lead many in London to mistrust Berlin’s intentions. Conversely, Cameron’s vulnerability at home means a rapprochement with Britain does not come risk-free for Germany. At the end of the day, longstanding suspicion may well prove to be the most serious obstacle to an Anglo-German alignment.

Luis Simón is a fellow at the Institute for European Studies at Vrije Universiteit Brussel.