> Date: Fri, 17 Mar 2000 12:21:03 +0200 (IST)
> From: Eli Turkel <turkel@math.tau.ac.il>
> Subject: Israeli purim humor
<<humor alert !
The chinuch says that women are exempt from parshat zachor because they
don't participate in wars.
Therefore a yeshiva bochur should not read parshat zachor as he has an
army exemption.>>
Exemption from the Israeli army does not constitute exemption from
mechiyas Amalek. Afilu choson mechedro, etc.
Or are you suggesting that "shono rishonaniks" are potur from parashas
zachor?
Gershon
gershon.dubin@juno.com

"I understand BNHO as meaning that the world was created
especially for me, but not to the exclusion of others. It's all mine,
but it's all everyone else's too. Kind of what we lawyers would call
"joint tenancy with rights of survivorship" or "tenancy by the
entireties" depending on the jurisdiction. Anyone else have a
different understanding?"
I understand it to be both an "ego booster" and a mechayav.
A person should never allow themselves to sink
because they are worthless. ( I remember reading a book years
ago titled "Despair is not a Jewish Word")
On the other hand this means I have an immense responsibility - my
actions, tov v'ra, mean something - and not just to me, but to the
"world" as well.
The challenge is to maintain an equilibrium - not to be crushed by the
responsibility, and not to become a baal gaivoh over the "bishvili".
kol tuv
Sender Baruch

In Avodah 4#443, CSherer wrote:
> ...what does BNHO mean? How are we meant to understand it? <
My $0.02: CHaZaL emphasized, in so many ways, how vital each soul
is to the existence of the entire world (as well as how each person's
actions can affect the entire world, etc.). I think of BNHO as
part and parcel of that message: I have a (an? :-) unique
contribution to make to the world at-large, etc. Believing that
BNHO means we can be m'nuvalim is, in my mind, similar to
believing that "chosen people" means we can consider non-Jews
as 2nd-class citizens of the world.
All the best (including wishes for a great and
memorable Shabbos & a wonderful Purim celebration) from
Michael Poppers * Elizabeth, NJ

richard_wolpoe@ibi.com wrote:
>
> It makes sense to me, I just do not know for sure.
>
> I venture a guess that more congregations used to make a similar disctinction;
> but that over time that disctinction was lost or obscured, and that the minhag
> to say it loud in one place was transferred to the other place.
I have doubts. Sotah 49a - Rashi suggests that Uva Lezion was
incorporated into our tefillot so that even the illiterate could learn a
minimum of Torah every day. By saying kedushah in Hebrew and Aramaic
(which everyone understood, even if they didn't know Hebrew) they
fulfilled that obligation.
Sefer Ha'eshkol offers an entirely different reason. He says that there
was a time when the gov't decreed that we couldn't say Kedushah during
tefillah, and posted guards in the batei kenisiot to enforce it. To get
around it, another Kedushah was added after tefillot, and after the
guards had left.
(As a side note, many of these gezerot seem to be Helenic, not Roman,
though that's an entirely different topic of discussion.)
I have also heard a third reason, though I have no text to back it up.
This theory states that the Kedushah desidra was instituted for the
latecomers who had missed Kedushah during hazarat ha-shatz. This doesn't
make much sense to me, though, as it doesn't account for the fact that
it's said BEFORE tha Amidah at Shabbat minhah, and there's no kedushah
to make up for at Arvit Moza'ei Shabbat. But then that would invalidate
Sefer Ha'eshkol also. Unless I'm missing something. Ideas?
---sam

>>Am I the only one who thought it was obscene?(Or is no one else willing to
admit reading the Yated?)Is it any wonder that many Chareidim demonsratratively
show their lack of hakaras hatov on Yom Hazikaron:Why get upset about a bunch of
snapped ropes and cracked buckets?Is it any wonder that there is resentment by
non-Chareidm of this?>>
I didn't see the article and am relying on your description.
Why are you so upset about a metaphor? It is not meant literally only
symbolically. IIRC, the concept of people being keilim can be found in Michtav
Me'Eliyahu and applies there to all non-tzaddikim. Was R. Dessler obscene also?
If non-Chareidim are incapable of understanding the world in terms of metaphor,
that our primary purpose in the world is spiritual and the physical is a tool
for increased spirituality, then perhaps Chareidim should speak in better "sound
bytes".
Your reaction is reminiscent of the reaction to Dr. Lamm's comment about
cavemen. Since "cavemen" has a negative connotation many weren't willing to
look beyond the surface and realize that they would probably be honored to be
associated with Rashbi.
Gil Student
gil.student@citicorp.com

Date: Fri, 17 Mar 2000 06:47:05 +0200
From: "Carl and Adina Sherer" <sherer@actcom.co.il>
Subject: Re: Moshe Rabenu
<<Ain hachi nami. But if that's the case, can a melech be machzir
grushoso? >>
He can. The reason for the isur of marrying a melech's almanah is "ein
mishtamshin besharvito shel melech". This does not apply to another
melech, certainly not to himself. There is no chiyuv besulah as with a
kohen gadol.
Gershon
gershon.dubin@juno.com

FWIW R. Dr. E. Kanarfogel concurred that the chataf kamatz is due to it being a
proper name - and alluded to it being derived from Mardoch, and therefore
essential.
Richard_wolpoe@ibi.com
______________________________ Reply Separator _________________________________
Subject: Mordochai and More; medical alert
7. Now for Mordochai. He remarks that he can see no grammatical
reason for this chataf and conjectures that it may have something to
do with fact that it is a name. However, in fact, this chataf qometz
anybody still awake out there?
Mechy Frankel W: (703) 588-7424
frankemj@acq.osd.mil H: (301) 593-3949
michael.frankel@dtra.mil
___________________________________________________________________
To get your own FREE ZDNet Onebox - FREE voicemail, email, and fax,
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I fail to see the connection between your point and my point.
To restate my point, KAJ makes a disticntion between the Uva litziyon keudsha -
which IS said aloud
And the v'atoh Kaddosh Kedusha (said usually on motzo'ei shabbos) which is
recited silently - iow no chazan k'hal response.
I added taht I thought this distinction betwen the 2 forms might have existe
elsewhere, but was obscured by some congregations who blurre the disticntion and
trasnferred th out loud version to v'ta kaddosh.
Now if that is clear, how is this related to that disticntion or lack thereof?
Richard_Wolpoe@ibi.com
______________________________ Reply Separator _________________________________
Subject: Re: Diyyuk Redux
Author: <avodah@aishdas.org> at tcpgate
Date: 3/17/2000 11:07 AM
richard_wolpoe@ibi.com wrote:
>
> It makes sense to me, I just do not know for sure.
>
> I venture a guess that more congregations used to make a similar disctinction
;
> but that over time that disctinction was lost or obscured, and that the minhag
> to say it loud in one place was transferred to the other place.
I have doubts. Sotah 49a - Rashi suggests that Uva Lezion was
incorporated into our tefillot so that even the illiterate could learn a
minimum of Torah every day. By saying kedushah in Hebrew and Aramaic
(which everyone understood, even if they didn't know Hebrew) they
fulfilled that obligation.
Sefer Ha'eshkol offers an entirely different reason. He says that there
was a time when the gov't decreed that we couldn't say Kedushah during
tefillah, and posted guards in the batei kenisiot to enforce it. To get
around it, another Kedushah was added after tefillot, and after the
guards had left.
(As a side note, many of these gezerot seem to be Helenic, not Roman,
though that's an entirely different topic of discussion.)
I have also heard a third reason, though I have no text to back it up.
This theory states that the Kedushah desidra was instituted for the
latecomers who had missed Kedushah during hazarat ha-shatz. This doesn't
make much sense to me, though, as it doesn't account for the fact that
it's said BEFORE tha Amidah at Shabbat minhah, and there's no kedushah
to make up for at Arvit Moza'ei Shabbat. But then that would invalidate
Sefer Ha'eshkol also. Unless I'm missing something. Ideas?
---sam

In a message dated 3/17/00 11:04:13 AM Eastern Standard Time,
MPoppers@kayescholer.com writes:
<< In Avodah 4#443, CSherer wrote:
> ...what does BNHO mean? How are we meant to understand it? < >>
I always understood it in tandem with the other "pocket" (I'm only dust and
ashes) as being part of what I think the Rav(YBS) would describe as the
dialectic with which we live. One vacillates between these 2 poles depending
on the circumstances (e.g., Esther couldn't say I'm only dust and ashes and
thus how could I approach the king to save the Jews nor could she say BNHO
and thus why should I approach the King if I'm likely to be saved anyway).
Shabbat Shalom
Joel Rich

In message , Eli Turkel <turkel@math.tau.ac.il> writes
> Chana/Heather Luntz writes
>
>>> The same is true of choshen mishpat. While traditional Zionist thinking
>>> held that nothing happened between the destruction of the Beis Hamikdash
>>> and the founding of the State of Israel, those of us more rooted in our
>>> tradition know that not to be true.
>
>>> You clearly haven't read siman 2 of Choshen Mishpat in the Tur, as I
>>> suggested you should in a previous posting on the subject. The Tur
>>> includes in his long list of punishments that can be meted out at all
>>> times and all places (ie not just by those with smicha in Eretz Yisroel)
>>> with or without halachic witnesses or strict halachic justification
>>> imprisonment in a house of imprisonment (b'beis ha'asurim) and to remain
>>> there against his will.
>
>If you would spend more time with logical arguments than insulting people your
>point might be better received. I strongly suspect that zionist rabbis can learn
>better than you can and don't need your condescending attitude!
I thought the reference would be clear, but since it isn't - in the
early periods of the Zionist movement, it was felt by the dominant non
religious sector that the period of galus was a shameful period in our
history, and best forgotten in building the new Jew/Israeli. For that
reason, the first history chiloni textbooks went from Bar Kochba to the
founding of the Zionist movement.
This approach was fiercely fought by the religious elements within the
Zionist movement (who are presumably the same Zionist Rabbis to whom you
refer). In fact, some of the matters to which I refer were used in the
argument by such rabbis and others for the value of that period.
However, the religious were not dominant in the Zionist movement as a
whole, and hence, when I use the term Zionist, without modification for
religious Zionist, I would assume people would understand non religious
Zionist.
>I strongly suggest you read the 3 volume set HaTorah VeHamedina by Tzomet
>to see that even zionist rabbis know what has happened the last few
>hundred years. Before you write any article there are a number of articles
>in volume I that deal with hilchot melech, dina demalchuta and takanat hakahal
>in terms of modern day Israel.
While I am fully aware that a lot has been written on Dina D'Malchusa
Dina (although I still think it hard to beat Shmuel Shilo's work on the
subject) and Din Melech (and as I have tried to indicate below, there
has been a fair amount written on takanat hakahal as well), what I
certainly have not seen has been done is anybody comparing and
contrasting the different justifications for the validity of the State
among the different segments of the religious community - partly, I
suspect, because everybody is so convinced that *their* way is the right
way. If you know of such a comparision of outlook, I would be interested
to read it.
>As to your nasty comment about siman 2 of Choshen Mishpat in the Tur it is
>completely irrelevant to the discussion. As the Tur makes perfectly clear he
>is discussing "horaat shaah" - emergency matters. He explicits states that one
>cannot legislate any of these matters and they can be decided only on an
>individual basis. Hence, these rules are useless for ruling a state!
>The Bach goes further and states that these emergency matters apply only to
>matters that involve issurim "lemigdar milta" and not for the benefit of any
>group. Hence, these emergency rules cannot apply to ordinary crimes .
>Thus, I repeat that kippa as a punishment for crimes without witnesses is not
>valid under halachah. In fact the whole purpose of emergency rules is that they
>supercede what is in the rest of shulchan Arukh.
>
I think problem here is that you are understanding the term ho'raas
sha'a as used by the Tur here as something unusual, uncommon and
exceptional.
The reason why I suggested you read Siman 1 of the Tur, as well as Siman
2 (despite the fact that Siman 1 is just not applicable today) is so you
can see the contrast. The point being that, as Siman 1 sets out,the
basic requirements al pi haTorah, are:
a) smicha; and
b) residence within Eretz Yisroel.
Since we do not have a) today, and throughout most of our more recent
history b) has not applied either - on what basis do we have betei din
fulfilling the role they do at all?
The answer is given by the Tur in Siman 2 - and much of that answer is
linked to hora'as sha'a. When the Jews landed up in Bavel and were then
given a certain degree of autonomy, there was a problem - namely a power
vacuum (of the sort you identify vis a vis the State of Israel). This
led to problems of what to do with criminals, how to resolve other kinds
of disputes, how to govern etc. One of the mechanisms employed to solve
this problem is hora'as sha'a - remember, the whole principle of hefker
beis din hefker is learnt out from Ezra and what was clearly a hora'as
sha'a (the situation of intermarriage that Ezra found on his return)
In fact the whole idea that a beis din can take away people's property
is clearly only to be used in hora'as sha'a occasions ie where beis din
sees it as being necessary (often it may be limited to the cases of two
litigants) Otherwise you would have the scenario of beis din goes
around taking away property in an indiscriminate manner. Similarly
criminal sanctions were not, as set out in the Tur, to be imposed in a
mandatory manner, in the form of Torah law (eg, if you have two
witnesses and violate the shabath etc then this consequential punishment
follows in all cases and in all times). Rather, it was encumbant on the
beis din of each city to judge what was appropriate for the people
within their jurisdiction, and therefore the Tur gives them the
*discretion* to exercise a wide range of criminal sanctions as the need
of the times dictates.
Because each beis din therefore had to judge what was appropriate for
their time and place, ie there were no universal principles (as there
are for hilchos shabbas), there are, by definition, going to be fewer
shailas asked, and teshuvas written regarding what should be done in
individual circumstances. With hilchos shabbas, if I ask a question
then there is a good chance that the answer will be appropriate for you
as well, and hence it makes sense to publicise the teshuva, but if we
are talking about beis din discretion, one we have established the
discretionary principle, and asked the shailas that surround that
discretionary principle there may not be that much more to say.
Similarly with takanas hakahal, periodlcally there were challenges to
the way that these takanas were promulgated, or a challenge to their
content, but once the general principle of their authority is
established, what more is it appropriate to ask the gadol hador?
Especially as, the whole idea that the particular judicial decision is
to be based on the needs of the place and time means that we are
specifically instructed *not* to learn from the case in one city to the
case in another, because maybe the needs of the second city are
different. That is why the Tur codified the requirements as he did. ie
the general principle that a wide variety of discretionary judicial
remedies and punishments are available, without any prescription as to
when and how they are to be used. On the other hand it would be a
little strange, would it not, to codify something that only happens in
extremis (would you make a whole song and dance in codifying that, if
the priest of Baal challenge you, you are permitted to sacrifice outside
the beis hamikdash? At most you would say, "and don't think that
because Eliyahu did this you can do it too, because this is a rare case,
but the general rule is ...").
So much for the theory, but there is also a wealth of historical
evidence which demonstrates that this is how the practice operated. ie
Battei din (our modern sort not the smicha/Israel sort) did mete out a
wide variety of punishments at various periods, as they saw fit given
the needs of the time and what was available (including what the non
Jewish authorities permitted).
Because of this many of the Zionist rabbis involved with the foundation
of the State (generally those without a messianic bent) saw this (tried
and tested) model as the appropriate one for the state. As I think I
indicated, Rav Hertzog (the first Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi of the State of
Israel) was a strong proponent of this, and you can see his discussion
of these questions in his work "t'chuka l'yisroel al pi hatorah". As
can be clearly seen from his work, there were a number of new issues to
be faced (what do you do about incorporating the Arabs, for example),
but you can also see how much of these questions we not regarded by him
as new at all.
Somebody with similar leanings is the former Supreme Court Justice
Menachem Elon. I highly recommend his magnum opus, Mishpat Ivri (Hebrew
University Press) in which you will find a wealth of detail on these
questions.
>For the same reason reliance on dina demalchuta is a cop-out. It again basically
>says that if halacha can't handle lets go the goyim. Like a shabbos goy.
>It may work in practice outside of Israel but it is hardly a philosophic
>underpinning.
I do not see Dina D'malchusa Dina as a cop out. It is a logical
outgrowth of a position which did not support the Zionist enterprise (eg
the Aguda prior to the founding of the State) but then has come to
terms with its reality. On the other hand, for somebody within the
Zionist camp, whether its more pragmatic of messianic portion, it is a
less likely position to adopt - because it does imply conflict between
the "Zionist" side and the "religious" side, whereas either of the other
two approaches more easily allows for harmony.
Regards
Chana
>More importantly, dina demalchita does not apply in the state of Israel where
>there is no foreign government. No nonzionist posek would accept dina demalchuta
>based on the Knesset (though I know of piskei halacha that use it for custom in
>hilchot shechenim).
>
I believe the argument goes that since Israel was really set up by the
United Nations, the Knesset is in fact a form of non Jewish government
that happens to be staffed by Jews.
>Kehilot of the past were a more homogenous group with organized crime.
>What worked in the shtetl of Eastern Europe will not work in Tel Aviv. Plenty
>of groups will use the din of gerama to cause damage to opponents without
>being responsible. A curse of"mi shepara" is not very effective for someone
>that owes a million dollars.
As I have tried to indicate, these were only some of the discretionary
remedies available to the beis din. Of course, if cherem or a mi
shepara works, there is no need to go further. But if it doesn't then
imprisonment or the death penalty was available (depending on the needs
of the time). If the community is in fact homogeonous (I think you are
overestimating the degree of homogenity, but anyway), there there is no
hora'as sha'a to use more drastic penalties. When it is not, the needs
of the time indicate their use.
> It is no big secret that if one looks at
>teshuvat of the last few hundred years in monetary matters they all deal
>either with interest laws or fights between neighbors.
Not to mention payment of taxes and other small business concerns,
because that is what there were. (I fell over a fascinating document in
Polish documenting proceedings of the Beis Din of Shavel and surrounding
cities, including Zagare, that were under its jurisdiction during the
1770-1800). I doubt that the English courts were handling any different
cases at that time.
> No major business
>complaints were brought to a bet din. A major fight between corporations
>today requires months if not years of litigation. No bet din has the
>capability to handle such a case.
There is no reason why it could not in theory though. A hundred years
ago, the English courts (regarded as the foremost commercial courts in
the world) were not handling major fights between corporations. The
Judges developed their skill in case management from experience.
>Of course the fact that no bet din can
>enforce its decision is another reason for lack of teshuvot in this matter.
It depends where. In many places they could (the Beis Din in Shavel, I
believe could, in fact its authority was extended during the period in
question from just the town of Shavel to include the other four cities).
Now the only reason I can bring you evidence from Shavel is because the
Av Beis Din in question was a certain Yechezkel Luntz, and I have a
genealogical interest. But there is a wealth of historical information
out there on this subject that is wider than one city in Lithuania.
>Hence, I claim that in fact there is a tremendous paucity of responsa
>dealing with real monetary problems compared to the number of responsa
>dealing with shabbat or kashrut. In a self enforcing society I would
>expect that choshen mishpat questions would be the main job of a bet din.
>
>For a sefer with a full discussion of kinyanim I would suggest "dinei mamanot"
>by Rav Batzri. As One sees from his sefer all modern takanot are severely
>limited
>when they contradict issues in the Gemara and shulchan Arukh. Thus, for example
>one cannot legislate that one no longer needs a kinyan. According to maybe
>poskim
>one cannot invent new kinyanim and "samtuta" is very limited. Based on kim li
>the other side other loses and so in practice I don't see how a wire transfer
>done by computers without human intervention can be validated.
>Similarly, davar shelo ba leolam cannot be overcome by new legislation by a
>kahal. This is especially severe according to Rabbenu Tam that a kahal can
>never introduce new legislation at someones expense. This is somewhat less of
>a problem according to Raviayah but there are still limits on takkanat hakahal.
>
>As a topical example of a problem in criminal law is the problem of rape which
>somehow has become a common occurence in Israeli news. According to halachah
>if the girl is over 12 1/2 (bogeret) there is no major crime involved and
>the punishment is mainly based on the physical damage. This is even more serious
>for date rape where there are no witnesses (though any crime rarely has two
>kosher witnesses). As discussed above a rapist can be punished as an
>individual case beyond the normal limits of the law. This becomes more
>difficult as the number of such cases increases.
>
>The gemara tells us that when murder became too prevelant the Sanhedrin stopped
>judging these cases. This may be fine from the philosophical stanpoint but is
>not very satisfying from a practical viewpoint. Of course in the real world the
>Romans would handle such cases. However, such an attitude becomes a serious
>drawback in trying to govern a modern secular society.
>
This is pure din Torah. We are not discussing din Torah, which, as
indicated needs Eretz Yisroel and Smicha as a precondition.
I am not familiar with this particular rabbi or his work. So it is not
clear to me whether he is in fact ignoring large slabs of our history or
saying that people like Rav Hertzog and others involved with Mishpat
Ivri are making things up, or deliberately restricting his discussion to
the limitations of din Torah (on the grounds that hopefully soon that
will become operative).
I admit that, leaving aside the position of the Ran (and possibly the
Rambam), it is not clear to me how it is envisioned that these two
different kinds of judicial systems will work in parallel, when they are
both functioning. The Ran would appear to envision two parallel court
systems. One run by the Sanhedrin and dispensing din Torah, and the
other run by the Melech and dispensing this kind of justice. However,
my impression is that others may see them as folding into one.
In any event, this is a moot question until the reinstatement of smicha.
>kol tuv,
>Eli Turkel
>
Shabbat Shalom
Chana
--
Chana/Heather Luntz

In a message dated 3/17/00 12:19:57 PM US Central Standard Time,
Chana/Heather@luntz.demon.co.uk writes:
<< Because of this many of the Zionist rabbis involved with the foundation
of the State (generally those without a messianic bent) saw this (tried
and tested) model as the appropriate one for the state. As I think I
indicated, Rav Hertzog (the first Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi of the State of
Israel) was a strong proponent of this, and you can see his discussion
of these questions in his work "t'chuka l'yisroel al pi hatorah". As
can be clearly seen from his work, there were a number of new issues to
be faced (what do you do about incorporating the Arabs, for example),
but you can also see how much of these questions we not regarded by him
as new at all. >>
Rav Hertzog had a number of reasons to regard most legal issues as old hat.
He was extremely well-versed in the English common law (via Ireland, I
believe) as well as several non-Jewish ancient Middle Eastern legal codes.
His most well-known work, "The Main Institutions of Jewish Law" (still in
print from Soncino Press and worth every penny, believe me), constantly
stresses the universality of certain types of legal inquiry and the ability
of common-law reasoning (for the Talmudic analogue see, i.e., the analysis
found in Tosafos) to resolve most issues judicially rather than
legislatively.
Rav Hertzog does not, however, reject the idea that democratic expression
requires legislative solutions to certain legal problems. Such solutions
can't be had by extracting lessons from Gemorrah. The issue of what model one
should follow to enact such expression into law is a very important one.
Israel, alas, chose to imitate the British parliamentary system, which makes
sense in a caste-like society with homogeneity within each caste, but makes
no sense at all if legislation is to be made by a room full of Jews. Israel
would've been better off had it adopted a system designed to balance the
views of a contentious, competitive, heterodox, and non-feudal society --
like that of the United States. Had Israel adopted the American
constitutional system with its three co-equal branches of government, it
might actually have succeeded in self-governance.
David Finch