The Syrian Wedge Between the U.S. and Russia

By Ariel Cohen

In another blow to President Obama's "reset policy" with Russia,
Moscow and Beijing imposed a double veto at the U.N. Security Council
resolution that would have condemned the Syrian government for killing
civilians. In an unprecedented rhetorical escalation, U.S. ambassador
Susan Rice announced
that the United States was "disgusted" by the veto: "The international
community must protect the Syrian people from this abhorrent brutality,
but a couple members of this council remain steadfast in their
willingness to sell out the Syrian people and shield a craven tyrant."

The gathering diplomatic clouds have produced a thunderbolt. A
contretemps this week between the foreign ministers of the United States
and Russia reflects the growing tensions between the two countries, not
to mention the two officials. According to State Department spokesman
Victoria Nuland, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton tried repeatedly on
Tuesday to reach her Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov. He avoided her
calls for twenty-four hours. Meanwhile Lavrov, who was in Australia,
said State gave him an inconvenient time frame for the conversation,
which didn't work as he had scheduled meetings with high officials in
the Australian government. When asked why the Americans were
complaining, he replied, "Probably this is due to her manners."

This remarkable give-and-take between the two foreign ministries
certainly confirms that U.S.-Russian relations are not in good
shape--and, further, that there is no love lost between those two high
governmental officials. However, the immediate pretext for the latest
deterioration of relations between the two countries is Syria.

The Russian Interest

Russia has a lot at stake in Syria, and it does not want another
Libyan scenario in which an old ally takes a bullet. Nor does it want
radical Islamists to take over the Arab state that hosts the last
Russian naval base in the Mediterranean. Hence, Lavrov says, the Kremlin
is not supportive of regime change in Damascus. But it may have no
choice.

Moscow considers the uprising in Syria to be, to some extent, the
handiwork of the United States and its European allies. This perception
is fundamentally wrong: Assad's is an oppressive, minority-Alawi regime.
It came to power via a 1970 coup. In 1982, the current dictator's
father, then president Hafez al-Assad, brought artillery and killed over
twenty thousand Islamist rebels in the town of Hama. The son is less
efficient and likely to lose power.

Peaceful protests against Assad's dictatorship started last spring.
Since then, the regime's response to these protests has claimed more
than five thousand lives and triggered a campaign of violence from the
majority Sunnis that includes a growing Islamist element and takes in
Muslim Brotherhood, Salafi and even al-Qaeda-affiliated factions.

Despite President Obama's "reset" policy, Russia continues to support
Bashar al-Assad's brutal regime. But in a rare admission of reality, a
senior Middle East hand acknowledged that Russia must step back. Mikhail
Margelov, chair of the upper house's foreign-affairs committee, admitted that Russia has "exhausted its arsenal" of support available to Assad.

The USSR had close relations with Syria since the days of United Arab
Republic. The UAR included Egypt, Syria and Iraq. Driven by Arab
nationalists, it was socialist, anti-Israel and anti-Western
alliance--everything the Soviets could desire.

The relationship with Syria has thrived under Putin--but at a cost to
Russia. Moscow has forgiven almost three-quarters of Damascus's massive
debt in order to lure lucrative weapons orders. Not long after the
United States imposed sanctions on Syria in 2004 for supporting Islamist
terrorism and for allowing al-Qaeda fighters to cross into Iraq, Russia
agreed in principle to sell Damascus a massive weapons package, which
included war planes, short-range air-defense systems and anti-tank
weapons.

President Medvedev signed a formal military agreement in May 2010
expanding arms sales. In the last decade, Russia has sold well over a $1
billion in arms to Syria, including anti-tank missiles, surface-to-air
missiles and MiG 29/31 fighter aircraft.

Russia also plans to construct a nuclear-power plant in Syria. This
is despite Israel's destruction of a suspected covert nuclear reactor in
the middle of the Syrian desert in September 2007.

Now, the Assad regime appears to be in the end game--and it is losing.
But despite the regime's growing isolation, Russia continues to supply
it with weapons and nuclear technology. In 2010, Moscow Russia decided to deliver SS-N-26 Yakhont antiship cruise missiles to Damascus.

These sales are destabilizing and dangerous. In 2006, Hezbollah used
Russian anti-tank rockets provided by Syria against Israeli forces.
Russia has continued to deliver weapons to Syria, despite pressure from
the U.S. and Israeli governments. Iran also funnels arms and trainers to
Hamas and Hezbollah via Syria.

Blinded by the Reset

Syria is just another shipwreck resulting from Obama's reset policy
hitting the reefs. The conflicting Russian and U.S. interests in the
Middle East are coming to the fore. A longtime sponsor of terror and
Iran's close ally, Syria has aided and abetted attacks on American
troops and U.S. allies in Lebanon and Iraq. From the Kremlin's
perspective, the practically inevitable collapse of the Assad regime
would constitute a net loss.

Russia still clings to the rogue actor, once again highlighting the
fact that the Kremlin's first priorities are not cooperation with the
United States or stability in the region but opposing Washington,
increasing arms exports and expanding its own influence.

This year, a small Russian flotilla led by the Moscow's only
aircraft-carrying cruiser--the Admiral Kuznetsov--paid a visit to Syria.
This public support of the embattled Assad regime clearly demonstrated
Russia's defiance of U.S. interests and its disregard for the Obama
administration's reset policy. But it also signaled the limits of
Russian power.

Yet there is a lesson learned. Russia's current protection of Syria
is not unlike what it provides to Iran. The Kremlin is hoping against
hope for the preservation of Assad. The emergence of a new Sunni,
pro-Russian regime in Damascus appears unlikely. But Moscow analysts
tell me that if Assad goes down, the Kremlin will earn a reputation of
supporting allies--something the United States lacks after letting the
Mubarak regime go down quickly. The real question is whether Russia will
keep the Soviet-era naval base in Tartus on Syria's Mediterranean
coast.

While the disagreement on Libya led to Russia's abstention in the
Security Council and was soon forgotten, the spat over Syria will poison
Moscow's relationship with Washington, its European allies and Sunni
Arab states.

The Obama administration, which is consistently behind the curve
in Syria, should stop boasting about the "successes" of the Russia
reset policy and hold Moscow accountable for actions that threaten U.S.
interests: destabilizing arms transfers, nuclear-technology sales and
support for massive human-rights violators such as Syria and Iran.