"Our basic objective will be the destruction of Israel. The Arab
people want to fight."

Gamel Abdel Nasser,
May 3oth 1967.

"From the Ammunition Hill to Bint Jbail"

- Eviathar H. Ben-Zedeff - Global-Report

We were standing near our jeeps between the huge palm trees at
the entrance to El-Arish. Captain Shimon, commander of our infantry
reserves Recce, returned without Lieutenant Danny, his deputy. All the
men were quiet, shocked. Many cried silently

There, forty years ago, we heard about the liberation of
Jerusalem. We were entrenched in the sand and our agony, and wanted to cherish
Danny's memory.

In 1967, I was a war correspondent with the veteran Recce Company. My brothers-in-arms
were old guys. I was barely eighteen years old. Most of them were much older
than me, and served as my mentors.

Since then, I have been trying to understand the military lessons of the
battle to liberate Jerusalem.

Background

The Battle of Jerusalem in the 1947-48 Israeli War of Independence is a
sad story of a partial Jewish defeat in which the Jewish Quarter of the
Old City was conquered by Jordan.

Following the armistice, the Etzioni 6th Brigade was reorganized into the
IDF's 16th Infantry (Reserves) Jerusalem Brigade. The 16th Brigade managed
the confrontation line with Jordan, including the bi-weekly convoy to supply
the Israeli enclave on Mount Scopus.

During a tense incident in July-August 1961, an Israeli plan was created
to send the 1st Infantry Golani Brigade and 35th Paratroopers Brigade to
seize a passage to Mt. Scopus through the Sheikh Jerakh quarter held by
Jordan.

The operation was aborted, but the Jordanians identified their vulnerability,
and fortified their posts in northern Jerusalem to prevent any Israeli military
movement in this direction. As a result of the Jordanian fortifications,
the Israeli plans were changed. Israeli troops, accompanied by Sherman tanks,
would move south, and envelop the old city from the Government House northwards.

On June 5 1967, Major-General Uzi Narkiss, the Commanding Officer of the
IDF's Central Command, had forgotten the revised plan. Colonel Motta Gur,
commander of the IDF's 55th Para (Reserves) Brigade, did not know of the
revised plan since he was slated to lead an airborne operation to take El-Arish
on the Sinai Mediterranean shore.

Unfortunately, Gur remembered the summer 1961 plan to seize a passage to
Mt. Scopus, and his men executed that plan despite the heavy Jordanian fortification
of the northern line in Jerusalem. The 55th headquarters did not accept
advice, data, intelligence, or maps offered by the officers of the 16th
Infantry. The 55th headquarters officers preferred to conceive and conduct
the operation by themselves.

An Unnecessary Battle

Assigned to take the Jordanian post on the Ammunition Hill, the IDF's 10th
Armored (Reserves) Harel Brigade had stood only about 400 yards off the
Jordanian post. The 10th was led by a regular company riding Centurion tanks
from the IDF's famous 7th Armored Brigade. Had the leading tanks gotten
the orders, they would have turned and attacked the Jordanians from the
East – their unfortified side. At a range of about 400 yards, Jordanian
targets would have been easy to kill.

The IDF could have penetrated the Jordanian line by other routes and by
other means. Penetrating a fortified urban line is much easier when the
attacking forces are supported by heavy weapons and aircraft. Yet, the commanders
of the 55th did not use the tanks that accompanied their own brigade, or
the neighboring tank battalions from the 10th. They did not call for close
air support, artillery, or their own 120mm heavy mortars. Thus, the commanders
of the 55th made the battle tougher than it should have been. The brave
men of the 55th won the battle by showing the highest valor, courage, and
sacrifice.

Lack of Professionalism

The IDF prefers create and tell mythical stories about its battles. From
the battle for the Ammunition Hill in June 1967 to the battle for Bint Jbail
in July 2006, IDF troops have used bravery to compensate for inadequate
plans approved by incompetent commanders. To compound this sad situation,
the IDF refrains from studying its campaigns and learning their lessons.
And, thus, the IDF repeats its operational failures by approaching new campaigns
with the old failed methods.

After a famous battle in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the commanding officer
of an Armored Brigade said, "We were nuts, and therefore, we were forced
to be brave." Unfortunately, this is the succinct summary of the last
four decades of Israeli military history.

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