08TBILISI1988, GEORGIA: LACK OF ACCESS KEEPS HOTSPOTS HOT

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TBILISI 001988
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR GEORGIA MONITORING GROUP AND EUR/CARC
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2018
TAGS: PGOVPRELMOPSRUGG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: LACK OF ACCESS KEEPS HOTSPOTS HOT
TBILISI 00001988 001.2 OF 004
Classified By: CDA KENT LOGSDON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).
¶1. (C) Summary and comment. Georgia has so far avoided
major provocations since Russian troops withdrew from most
undisputed Georgian territory, but several potential sources
of friction remain. Among them are Akhalgori; ongoing
tension along the administrative boundaries of South Ossetia
and Abkhazia; Perevi; and the ever-present rumor mill.
Increased EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) activity has helped
deter troublemakers, but the inability of the EUMM and the
OSCE to enter South Ossetia reduces their ability to monitor
events and encourage real restraint. UNOMIG is receiving
less and less cooperation from de facto forces, thereby
losing some of its ability to deter trouble. The Georgian
side is publicizing what it sees as ongoing aggression in
Akhalgori and elsewhere, leading to confused and sometimes
inaccurate reporting, such as the late October 24 reports of
200 armed South Ossetians coming across the border -- a story
that appears to be a misreporting of a botched carjacking in
a border village of Didi Kurvaleti by 15-20 Ossetians. The
Georgian press continues to cover Russian statements about
the EUMM's inability to provide security, when contrasted
with Russian intransigence in providing access north of the
boundaries. A renewed push for EUMM and OSCE access to South
Ossetia, and EUMM and unrestricted UNOMIG access to Abkhazia
-- in order to ensure restraint on both sides of the
boundaries -- must continue to be a priority for the U.S. and
the EU. End summary and comment.
AKHALGORI
¶2. (SBU) International observers agree that Akhalgori
remains a potential source of real difficulty. The Interior
Ministry told post October 23 that Russian forces had sent 40
additional armored vehicles to Akhalgori, along with an
unknown number of troops. The EUMM and OSCE were unable to
confirm this information, but both observed that Russian
forces had reinforced their southernmost checkpoint on the
road to Akhalgori, just north of Odzisi. Local residents are
still able to travel in and out of Akhalgori, but entry is
restricted for anyone else. Press reports suggest the fee
for non-residents to enter is 1,000 lari, although some say
no one without residence can enter anymore. An Embassy staff
member reports he is unable to visit his family's ancestral
home in Akhalgori because he is not resident there. Recent
press reports suggest ethnically Georgian young men in
Akhalgori are now subject to Ossetian conscription, which
would encourage them to abandon the town.
¶3. (SBU) The Russian motivation for retaining and apparently
strengthening control over Akhalgori remains a subject of
debate. Various Georgian officials have suggested the
primary interest is strategic, because access to the
Akhalgori Valley provides access to the hills to the east,
which overlook the A-301 north-south highway (the old Russian
military highway) and potentially enable Russian forces to
close off that artery. Another possible interest is
political; no the valley lies within the South Ossetian
administrative boundary, and Russia may want to help its de
facto friends establish a firm claim to the entire territory.
EUMM officials have suggested the Russians may be holding
Akhalgori as an eventual bargaining chip. One local
QAkhalgori as an eventual bargaining chip. One local
commentator offered a more ominous spin on this
interpretation, warning that Russia's intention was to use
Akhalgori and other specific points of contention to tie up
international negotiations and deflect them from more
fundamental issues.
¶4. (C) The Georgians, meanwhile, may not be sitting idly by.
On October 16 the EUMM reported to diplomatic colleagues that
it had observed about 20 Georgian military forces (as opposed
to Interior Ministry forces) north of Bazaleti, not far to
the east of the Akhalgori Valley. On October 23, the EUMM
reported observing construction between the villages of
Bantsurtkari and Ananuri, also east of Akhalgori, of what it
believes could be new barracks for the Georgian military (the
EUMM has not been able to confirm the purpose of the
construction). The presence of a mere platoon of soldiers or
the construction of barracks by themselves might be
innocuous, but he location so close to Akhalgori could raise
tensions.
TROUBLESPOTS ALONG THE BOUNDARIES
¶5. (SBU) The administrative boundaries put residents of both
undisputed Georgian territory and the breakaway regions, as
well as their respective officials and law enforcement
TBILISI 00001988 002 OF 004
bodies, in close proximity. In many cases the boundaries lie
along open fields, with no effective boundary control, and
m
ovement in both directions is easy, especially at night.
The friction along these contact points has not yet erupted
in renewed hostilities, but it could at any time. Although
international monitors are not always able to make an
authoritative determination of events, and in some cases
disagree on what likely occurred, the following incidents
reflect some of the sensitivities that any particular
incident could ignite.
¶6. (SBU) One of the primary sensitivities is the presence of
Georgian Interior Ministry personnel near the boundaries.
From the Georgian perspective, the Interior Ministry presence
is crucial to maintaining order and deterring attacks. For
its part, the EUMM does not consider its mandate as providing
security directly, but rather monitoring the provision of
security by the appropriate agencies -- in particular, the
Georgian Interior Ministry. The EUMM recently noted that
some previously unmarked Interior Ministry vehicles now had
"POLICE" (in English) written on the side, providing
increased transparency (post personnel have observed some
such vehicles near the boundary still without markings). The
EUMM has also expressed its satisfaction that the Interior
Ministry carries appropriately low-caliber weapons near the
boundary. (Embassy Note: We will urge the EUMM to make more
of these observations public in order to demonstrate that the
Georgian side is not in violation of the ceasefire. End
note.) The EUMM would like to provide the same monitoring of
local law enforcement in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but
currently does not have the access or the contacts to do so.
¶7. (SBU) On October 21, a Georgian Interior Ministry vehicle
was damaged by a mine near the village of Avlevi, southwest
of Tskhinvali and northwest of Gori. One officer was
slightly injured. The location of the attack was outside
South Ossetia, but only about 500 meters from the boundary.
The OSCE reported the mine was a Russian MON-50, an
anti-personnel device similar to a Claymore. The EUMM
determined the explosion was detonated remotely by wire,
meaning that those responsible were within several dozen
meters of the vehicle when they detonated the device. The
EUMM noted that traffic had traveled on the road in question
throughout the day without incident, suggesting this one
particular Interior Ministry vehicle was singled out as a
target.
¶8. (SBU) The evening of October 17 and the morning of October
18, gunfire was reported on both sides of the administrative
boundary just south of Tskhinvali, near Zemo Nikozi (outside
South Ossetia) and Gujabauri (inside); no one was injured.
The Georgian Interior Ministry claimed in both cases it was
drunken soldiers firing into the air on the South Ossetian
side; Russian forces claimed the October 18 shooting was
aimed at a Russian checkpoint just inside South Ossetia. The
EUMM and OSCE received conflicting reports and were unable to
confirm either version. Russian forces informed the OSCE of
the October 18 shooting shortly after it occurred, indicating
they had been prepared to return fire, but refrained from
doing so to give the OSCE a chance to investigate. Russian
forces did not allow the OSCE across the boundary to conduct
Qforces did not allow the OSCE across the boundary to conduct
an investigation there, however.
¶9. (SBU) The morning of October 19, the town of Khurcha,
north of the Enguri River but outside Abkhazia, came under
attack; no one was injured. UNOMIG believes rockets hit the
town, citing pictures of impacts that show greater damage
than rifle- or machine gun-fire could produce; the EUMM has
questioned whether rockets struck, suggesting some of the
damage could have been from previous attacks. UNOMIG noted
the presence of a Russian BMP-1 armored vehicle across the
administrative boundary at the time, which carries a weapon
that can shoot the projectile UNOMIG believes was fired (a
SIG). Locals reported to the EUMM that the attack was caused
by a local criminal dispute. A house hit in the attack,
which UNOMIG believes to be the main target based on the
number of impacts near the house, had recently been chosen as
a local headquarters for the Georgian Interior Ministry.
THE PROBLEM WITH PEREVI
¶10. (SBU) Both EUMM and OSCE monitors agree the Russian
checkpoint at Perevi is outside South Ossetia. (Although the
EUMM would like to locate an authoritative map to confirm
that finding, the best information it has at the moment -- a
map from the Georgian Geographic Institute -- supports that
conclusion.) The location of the checkpoint, at a fork in
TBILISI 00001988 003 OF 004
the road, allows Russian forces to control movement both into
the village of Perevi (which is outside South Ossetia) and
into South Ossetia. Although the Russian side officially
contends the checkpoint is inside the boundary, Russian
forces at the checkpoint itself conceded to the OSCE it is
outside the boundary, but said there was no other suitable
location for it -- presumably to control the movement on both
roads. Moving the checkpoint into South Ossetia would
prevent the Russians from controlling the road leading into
Perevi, which loops back into South Ossetia after passing
through the village.
¶11. (SBU) On October 20, the Russian checkpoint did not allow
a World Food Program shipment of 12 tons of foodstuffs to
pass into Perevi. Previous WFP shipments had successfully
reached Perevi; it may have been the absence of the Russian
commander from the checkpoint that led his deputy to block
the delivery. French Foreign Minister Kouchner objected to
the lack of access to Perevi in his remarks at the October 22
donors conference in Brussels, and the WFP successfully
delivered the shipment October 24; the EUMM attributed the
Russian change of heart to Kouchner's intervention.
¶12. (C) One potentially troubling element of the Perevi
situation is the EU's apparent hesitancy to press the point
with the Russians. The EUMM has not yet committed to a final
determination that the checkpoint is outside South Ossetia,
although it has located fairly authoritative maps, and it is
unlikely to find anything more authoritative. French
Ambassador Eric Fournier suggested to the Charge that
Kouchner did make the point firmly and publicly in Brussels,
but in fact, the foreign minister's prepared comments
(emailed to EUR/CARC) only objected to the lack of access to
the village of Perevi, not the location of the Russian
checkpoint. Finally, recent EU public statements (e.g., EU
High Representative Solana's October 10 statement on the
withdrawal of Russian forces and the EUMM's October 17
statement on unexploded ordnance) seem to suggest that Russia
has complied with its obligations to withdraw from undisputed
Georgian territory, not leaving the EU much room to object to
the Russians' continued presence outside South Ossetia
without revision of
its previous public statements.
THE RUMOR MILL
¶13. (C) October 23 and 24 reports of the presence of
increased Russian forces in South Ossetia in general, and
Akhalgori in particular, have heightened fears of Russian
intentions and possible provocations. An October 22 report
in the press that women and children were evacuating
Tskhinvali, which both de facto South Ossetian officials and
the Georgian Interior Ministry refuted, also raised concerns.
The Interior Ministry reported to post that a story was
circulating in South Ossetia that the Georgian side was
planning to attack on November 1 in order to try to help
Senator McCain in the U.S. presidential election. The
evening of October 24, a breathless MOIA official reported
that 200 armed South Ossetians were crossing into the
Georgian village of Didi Kurvaleti; EUMM and OSCE monitors
later clarified that 15-20 South Ossetians had crossed into
the village and attempted to hijack a car. After failing,
the Ossetians threatened to return. EUMM monitors remain on
the scene.
INCREASING RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENTS IN ABKHAZIA
QINCREASING RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENTS IN ABKHAZIA
¶14. (SBU) In recent days, access in and out of Abkhazia has
become increasingly difficult. The morning of October 24, a
pedestrian bridge along a railway bridge was blown up just
north of Zugdidi, near Shamgona, destroying a basic link
between Zugdidi and Gali. Another pedestrian bridge a few
kilometers away was rendered impassable by an apparent rocket
attack on October 19. The Russian checkpoint at Pakhulani
began blocking all access into Abkhazia around October 21.
UNOMIG patrols have heard numerous stories from locals that
access into Abkhazia has become more difficult, more
expensive, or no longer possible at certain crossing points.
UNOMIG itself has experienced an increased amount of
resistance from Abkhaz officials, who in some cases have not
allowed UNOMIG patrols to pass and in other cases have either
not spoken with the patrols or expressed keen disapproval
with them. UNOMIG has experienced such fluctations in
cooperation before, and is therefore not ready to pronounce
this recent friction a long-term trend, but notes that the
level of cooperation does seem to have deteriorated in recent
days.
TBILISI 00001988 004 OF 004
¶15. (SBU) UNOMIG also reports an increasing amount of
excavation activity at Abkhaz and Russian checkpoints.
COMMENT: WE'RE MORE THAN HALF BLIND
¶16. (C) Much of the tension and mistrust currently
threatening the administrative boundaries could be alleviated
by access to the other side of the boundaries for the EUMM
and the OSCE. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov has been
quoted in the press as blaming the EUMM for not doing enough
to provide security. To a large extent, this accusation
stems from a fundamental disagreement between Russia and the
EU about the nature of the EUMM. Although we may not be able
to resolve that difference of opinion, one simple way for the
Russians to enable the EUMM to do more to ensure security --
if that is in fact Russia's aim -- is to allow the mission to
monitor both sides of the border. If Russia continues to
refuse access to the EUMM, it will have difficulty arguing
with a straight face that the diminished security along the
boundaries is the EUMM's fault. The same logic applies to
Russia's attitude toward the OSCE. The international
community will have exponentially less ability to prevent
renewed hostilities without access north of the boundaries.
We should continue to make that access -- and a similar quest
by the EU for that access -- a primary focus of our
diplomatic efforts.
LOGSDON

The information recorded on this site has been extracted from http://Wikileaks.org (Georgia) database..

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