What China really wants

About the Author

Peter BrookesSenior Fellow, National Security AffairsDouglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy

China's foot-dragging on getting tough with North Korea and Iran
at the U.N. Security Council has been giving the United States and
others fits recently - and for good reason.

Beijing's unwillingness (and Moscow's) to tag either country
with economic sanctions under U.N. Charter Chapter 7 has only
served to spur on Tehran and Pyongyang's outlaw behavior.
(Saturday's U.N. vote on North Korea's missile launches is a
positive step, but it only bars missile-related trade - a
concession to Beijing to prevent its veto of the resolution.)

In fact, if the United Nations had already taken a muscular
stance with both parties, we likely wouldn't be facing Iran's
current adventurism in Lebanon or Pyongyang's continued saber
rattling.

Be that as it may, Beijing is playing a prominent role in
dealing with both, making it a good time to take a look at what
informs and motivates Chinese international behavior.

In theory, China's foreign policy is still based on the guidance
of former leader Deng Xiaoping (d. 1997), who gave direction in his
famous "28-Character Strategy" of the early 1990s: "Observe calmly;
secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our
capabilities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low
profile; never claim leadership; and make some contribution."

Of course, debate occurs among Chinese elites about the
strategy, which suggests downplaying China's ambitions and
capabilities in the short term to maximize its long-run options.
It's clear that some other imperatives also drive Beijing's
thinking.

Nationalism: The belief that the nation
suffered 150 years of humiliation at the hands of "foreign devils"
(western colonialists and Japanese imperialists) animates Chinese
foreign policy. In Beijing's view, it's time to wipe away this
disgraceful period of history by returning China to its rightful
place atop the international pecking order as the historic "Middle
Kingdom."

China already sees its ascension as a certainty, and demands the
respect and courtesies afforded a great power - meaning it won't be
"bullied" at the United Nations on weighty issues like Iran or
North Korea.

Development: Beijing realizes that economic
progress is vital to getting to the top of the world political
order.

Having seen the Soviet Union, for all its political and military
power, land in the dustbin of history, dragged down by economic
weakness, Beijing vowed not to make that mistake - and committed
itself to a grand strategy that makes economic development a
priority.

Today, China is the world's fourth largest economy, having grown
at near double-digit rates for a decade - and it holds the world's
second-largest foreign currency reserves, too, including our
greenbacks.

And that economic strength is translating to political and
military power, as planned - yielding kowtows from world leaders
and captains of industry alike, and fueling a troubling military
build-up as well.

In recent years, Beijing has identified access to energy
resources as vital to its drive to secure rapid economic growth.
The priority now dominates Chinese foreign policy.

Thus, the unwillingness to punish Iran over its nuclear program
stems from Beijing's understanding that U.N. economic sanctions
would cut the flow of Iranian oil to Chinese factories. China now
gets 15 percent of its oil from Iran, its No. 2 supplier, and will
buy $100 billion in Iranian liquid natural gas over the next 25
years.

Security: Instability is bad for economic
growth, so China's grand strategy requires tranquility from the 14
nations that ring its periphery. This includes getting along with
regional big boys like Russia and India. Plus avoiding a knockdown,
drag-out fight with the United States - at present the biggest
obstacle to Beijing's global preeminence.

It accounts for China's stubbornness over North Korea, too.
Slapping broad sanctions on Pyongyang could cause the rickety
regime to crumble, leading to war or refugee flows into China.

And it gives Beijing another reason to cuddle up to Tehran - to
ensure the mullahs don't export their brand of Islamic radicalism
to China's western province of Xinjiang, home to 55 million restive
Muslims.

Bottom line? China's rise may be "peaceful and harmonious," as
Beijing asserts. But its ambitions far exceed its historical sphere
of influence. Aspiring to replace the United States as the lone
superpower, it will inevitably use its growing global influence to
balance - if not thwart - U.S. interests whenever necessary.

Peter
Brookes, a senior fellow at The Heritage
Foundation, is the author of "A Devil's Triangle: Terrorism, WMD
and Rogue States."

About the Author

Peter BrookesSenior Fellow, National Security AffairsDouglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy