CHAPTER 7
DIVERSITY AND ENGAGEMENT: A PARLIAMENT THAT MIRRORS CANADA

The second principle in the Committee’s mandate, “Engagement,”
calls on the Committee to identify measures that “encourage voting and
participation in the democratic process, foster greater civility and
collaboration in politics, enhance social cohesion and offer opportunities for
inclusion of underrepresented groups in the political process.” Furthermore,
the mandate stipulates that the Committee was to “develop its consultation
agenda, working methods, and recommendations on electoral reform with the goal
of strengthening the inclusion of all Canadians in our diverse society.”[416]

With these instructions in mind, the Committee considered a wide
range of views and concerns regarding the inclusiveness of the electoral
system. This chapter summarizes views expressed to the Committee on the
representation of women, visible minorities, Indigenous Canadians and Canadians
with disabilities.

The Committee heard significant testimony regarding the diversity
of members of Parliament (MPs). Much concern was raised to the Committee with
respect to Canada’s poor ranking in terms of women’s representation in the
House of Commons, compared to lower houses in other countries. Currently, with
26% women MPs, the Inter-Parliamentary Union ranks Canada 64th overall in the world in terms of women’s representation.[417]

Many Canadians expressed the desire for, and the value of, having a
House of Commons that mirrors the population. Donna Dasco said:

Why do we care? Women's voices have to be there.
It's a matter of democratic representation. Decisions are made in our
Parliaments. Women have to be there.[418]

Victor Tootoo in Iqaluit
echoed this view when he stated:

I think that our decisions are better made by a
collective that reflects what we look like and the discussion among us. Without
that equal representation on a gender basis, we don't get those decisions.

In Canada, women running for office are only slightly less likely
than men to be elected, and as Melanee Thomas said “we have no
evidence to suggest that voters discriminate against candidates on the grounds
of gender or race.”[419]

The Committee heard diverging views concerning why
women and visible minorities are underrepresented and to what extent electoral
reform can resolve this issue. Two distinct opinions emerged: some experts
and individuals contended that electoral systems are a key factor influencing
the electoral prospects of women, whereas others were of the view that the
effect of electoral system design on women and minorities representation is
less significant than is often claimed. The latter group held that electoral
systems cannot be understood as the single most important factor to ensure or
increase women’s and minorities’ representation in Parliament. Other factors,
such as the nomination process and political parties, play a significant role. Electoral
systems are one factor among many that may impact women’s political
representation in legislatures.

A common view expressed to the Committee was that the
first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system poses problems for the election of
women and minority groups, particularly in comparison to proportional electoral
systems. Brian Tanguay suggested that the FPTP system does a “very poor job” at
producing a parliament that mirrors the population and that it poses “significantly
high barriers to the election of women.”[420] Madeleine Webb echoed this point, and stated:

In a plurality system, women and minorities are
less likely to be on the ballot. It's not because they're not electable; it's
because in the nomination process parties have historically favoured white male
candidates as the best choice for the winner-take-all competition. White men
are often considered to be a more acceptable candidate, and thus there's a
disincentive to choose women to run.[421]

Donna Dasco added that electoral reform could provide a solution to
under-representation. She stated:

[M]ajority systems, including first past the post,
are poor at electing women.… PR systems are best for women, and such mixed
systems as MMP are somewhere in between.… Even on their own, PR systems, I
would argue, make it more likely that women will be elected.[422]

Michael Gallagher also noted that countries with PR systems tend to
have more women in parliament than those that do not.[423] Miriam Anderson added, at an open-mic session, that many of the countries that
rank better than Canada in terms of the representation of women use PR
electoral systems. She stated:

Many of the systems that rank near the top have
some form of proportional representation. It's also easier to ensure that there
are more women running with some kind of list. When parties have to put forward
a full list, then they can guarantee that a certain percentage are of each
gender, which is easier than dealing with just single-member electoral
districts.[424]

As discussed in Chapter 4 (on electoral systems), a number of
witnesses suggested that the use of party lists can be helpful in making
Canada’s electoral system more inclusive and diverse. Mercédez
Roberge mentioned how party lists would give political parties a certain level
of control over the types of candidates on the list, and suggested that rules
could be established requiring parties to present no less than 40% and no more
than 60% of candidates of a given gender.[425]

Pippa Norris noted that electoral systems can have an impact on the
diversity of MPs, but added that there are other relevant factors. She stated:

Proportional representation has the strongest
representation for women overall. Under the mixed member system, women get in
through the party list. Under the first past the post, it becomes more
difficult at the selection or recruitment stage for women to get selected, and
therefore to get elected.[426]

Conversely, other witnesses and individuals told
the Committee that the electoral system is not the root cause of
underrepresentation, that electoral reform is not necessary to increase the
representation of certain groups, and that the implementation of a proportional
electoral system would not be sufficient in improving underrepresentation.
Melanee Thomas stated:

I can’t help but
conclude that introducing more proportionality into our electoral institutions
on its own will probably not meaningfully increase representational diversity
in Canadian politics.[427]

She added:

There are powerful,
informal barriers that work to keep women out of politics, people who are not
white out of politics, and people who are [I]ndigenous out of politics. Simply changing the electoral system is not
going to address any of these informal barriers that are in place.[428]

Ann Decter noted how numerous other factors,
beyond the electoral system, impact women’s decision to run as candidates. She
suggested, “[w]omen have reported that the cost, lack of predictability, and
lack of transparency of nomination processes are for some a major
disincentive.”[429]

A number of witnesses and individuals were of the view that the
party nomination process is the most significant barrier to the election of
women and minorities. Emmett Macfarlane submitted that “the
most effective way to get there is to change our political culture and to
change how candidates are selected in parties.”[430]

Nomination procedures vary considerably among Canada’s federal
political parties and furthermore, they vary considerably from riding to
riding. Some of the federal parties have very few nomination rules, while
others have formal nomination processes that must be followed by every riding
association.[431] Kelly Carmichael described how the nomination processes within ridings are
carried out almost completely independently of each other:

If you think about
our ridings, the way that they are silos right now, we vote for certain
members, and we don't know outside of our silo if a party is running a lot of
men or a lot of women.[432]

Former Chief Electoral Officer Jean-Pierre Kingsley noted that “[c]urrently,
the structure of parties and how local associations operate discriminate
against the participation of women.”[433] Melanee
Thomas went so far as to say that embedded in the recruitment process are
sexist and racist perceptions of the ideal candidate. She stated:

The one that concerns me most in terms of informal
barriers for electoral reform is implicit assumptions about what makes a good
candidate and who’s the best candidate. I think built into recruitment policies
and into how we approach the political system is a lot of latent sexism and
latent racism, this idea that a good candidate or a good politician looks a
certain way.[434]

Amanda Bittner echoed this argument and suggested
that:

Part of the problem is recruitment. Part of the
problem is that senior party officials have this idea that women and racialized
minorities are not successful candidates, even though there’s no evidence to
suggest that this is the case. All the evidence shows that when women run, they
do win. So really, the issue is about recruitment.[435]

Many believe there
is more that political parties can do to produce more representative
parliaments. As Paul Thomas suggested, “There are things parties can
do without having to change the electoral system in a fundamental way.”[436] Finally
Melanee Thomas concluded that focusing on electoral reform as the solution to
the underrepresentation of women, minority groups and Indigenous Canadians “is
giving the people who are recruiting candidates a pass.”[437]

A variety of barriers prevent potential candidates from running for
office, such as the financial burdens associated with campaigning across large
geographic areas, the cost of child care and other personal expenses. For
example, former Member of Parliament, Jack Anawak described the financial
burdens faced by candidates running in vast, particularly northern, ridings. He
explained that in Nunavut:

A person considering running for office here has
to consider forgoing income for the duration of the campaign. While this is
true in many ridings, we have high costs for food, housing, electricity,
heating fuel, and child care. For us, choosing to run for office usually means
living off our savings in the most expensive riding in the country.[438]

Melanee Thomas noted that
becoming an MP may not appear as an attractive career option for some women
because there are “work-life
balance and things like commuting … the nature of political work itself doesn’t
lend itself to maternity or parental leave, which is challenging.”[439] She explained how one significant way
to help increase the representation of women and other underrepresented groups
would be to consider policies focused on the nomination process. Examples
include limiting the amount of money that can be used in a nomination contest,
focusing on developing diverse personal networks within riding associations to
recruit potential candidates, and funding child care and related expenses at
the nomination stage in order to remove some of the barriers that may prevent
otherwise strong candidates from running:

I think money matters most for women at the
nomination stage. This is one of the things you talked about. Regulating how
much people can spend on nominations does a lot for historically
under-represented groups.

Something that should be noted for the record is
that networks matter. They matter for money, but they matter as much for
recruitment. Electoral district associations [EDAs] that have women on their
executives, especially women as their EDA presidents, are much more likely to
run women as candidates, simply because you have somebody with a network who
knows a woman and can do that kind of recruitment.

Women tell us that money becomes a barrier also at
that nomination stage, and it matters in ways that don't matter for men. It's
not just about getting money for getting on the ballot and mounting a campaign,
but for things like after-hours child care. It's for things like hair and
clothes and the whole presentation in which women are required to engage in
ways that men aren't.…

When
it comes to actually helping women's numbers, though, being able to regulate
and have clear pathways for things like nominations and recruitment is where
the money really matters for gender parity in terms of elections.[440]

Another option would be to tie the campaign
reimbursements that a political party is eligible to receive to the diversity
of its candidates, as Melanee Thomas explained:

A great deal of political parties' election-based
financing comes from campaign reimbursements. You spend a certain amount, and
then you can get 80% of it back. That should be, in my view, docked depending
on how few women or visible minorities a party fields. Something tells me that
if you tie diversity to the money, parties will solve the problem overnight.
They just will.[441]

In a similar vein, Mercédez
Roberge suggested:

In order for public funds to be used to achieve
our objectives of equality, inclusion and non-discrimination in a broad sense,
the reimbursement of election expenses should be increased based on the
performance achieved, the percentage of women elected and the percentage of
racialized persons elected.[442]

Numerous witnesses spoke to the need for greater Indigenous
representation in Parliament. Charles Smith noted that he believes that “reform to a more proportional system has the potential to transfer
voice and power to Indigenous communities, both on reserve and in urban
centres, so that these voices can be heard.”[443] Some suggested that a certain number of seats should be
reserved for Indigenous Canadians. For example, David Blain recommended in his
brief that:

Electoral reform should also make provision for
First Nations who have been under represented in the House of Commons. In the
process of electoral reform we should set aside seats for First Nations based
on population. These seats will be filled with First Nations elected by First
Nations.[444]

Kirk Cameron made a similar suggestion. He stated:

In our Canada of today, we have set as a very high
priority working to find a path of reconciliation with the first peoples of this
country—first nations, Métis, and Inuit peoples.

One avenue that is open to you to contribute to
this reconciliation is to consider some form of guaranteed representation in
the House of Commons for [A]boriginal
peoples.[445]

James T. Arreak also posited that guaranteed representation for Indigenous
peoples should be part of any electoral reform, and that such representation
should ensure that Canada’s three Aboriginal peoples – First Nations, Inuit and
Metis – have direct representation in the House of Commons.[446] He specified that representation “in the range of two to four
representatives from each of Canada's three Aboriginal peoples would roughly
track the New Zealand precedent. Aboriginal peoples' representatives should be
elected by Aboriginal electors.”[447] He also added
that:

There is no reason that [A]boriginal peoples' representatives need to be elected on the
occasion of federal general elections. For reasons of continuity of
representation, it would be a considerable advantage to have such
representatives elected for fixed terms.… In the absence of elections being
tied to overtly partisan general elections, there would be an enhanced argument
for us for using a ranked ballot system to ensure at least 50% support.[448]

In order for the Canadian electoral system to be truly inclusive, a
number of witnesses and participants noted that there ought to be greater representation
of Canadians with disabilities in the House of Commons. Diane Bergeron indicated:

I
would suggest that the issue of having fewer people with disabilities or people
with sight loss participating in political life is less reliant on the electoral
system and more on the attitude of the political parties, the attitudes of
people in general, and the stereotyping of people with disabilities as not
being as capable or competent. If we change the attitudes, no matter what
electoral system we use, we're going to find more people with disabilities,
more women, and it's going to be more proportional regardless of how that
system works out.[449]

Marcia Carroll noted that incentives should be put in place to
pressure political parties to run candidates with disabilities. Such incentives
could include mandated targets for diversity, requirements to comply with
targets or justify missed targets, financial incentives and/or penalties for
meeting targets. She held that:

[I]ncentives could be imposed to encourage people
with disabilities to run as well and be engaged in the electoral system.
Currently, we know that people with disabilities in this country are some of
the poorest and most disenfranchised. To have those individuals run against
somebody in their community who is known to one of the parties in power in our
first-past-the-post system is very frightening.

We hear that all the time from the people we talk
to when it comes time for elections. We really encourage people with a
disability to go through a nomination process and try to be represented on the
ballot. More often than not, they don't want to go against one of the other
parties and they're not encouraged within our two-party system to be their
candidate.[450]

An additional topic that the Committee heard about throughout its consultations
was the per-vote subsidy, a source of public funding that was available to
political parties until it was phased out in 2015.[451]

The Committee heard from a number of witnesses who stated their
preference for reinstating the per-vote subsidy, in accordance with the
principles of fairness and equity. Jean-Pierre Kingsley recommended a return to
the formula, stating:

That is a more equitable way to proceed, even
though it's not perfect. It is not possible to establish a perfect mechanism to
maintain fairness within the electoral system. Invariably, some people benefit
and others are disadvantaged. It's a matter of minimizing that inequality and
making the situation acceptable from the perspective of a reasonable Canadian.[452]

This position was supported by Paul Howe, who stated that the
current system of individual donations to political parties is less equal as
donations vary greatly between Canadians of different socio-economic levels.[453]

Others stated that a return to the per-vote subsidy would also help
Canadians feel like their vote has an effect, as it would directly impact the
party they supported.[454] Melanee Thomas discussed the per-vote subsidy in her testimony, arguing that
public financing of political parties, in addition to being of benefit to
Canadian voters, is also more democratic:

In the literature on party and campaign finance
internationally, most countries do have some form of public financing. It's
broadly seen to be a good thing, because the political party is a key
institution linking representative institutions and the voting public.... [The
per-vote subsidy] struck me as a democratic way of doing party financing. It
also struck me as a way of being able to tell people who thought their votes
were wasted because they weren't necessarily voting for the winner that their
vote was actually contributing to something. I think it would be worthwhile to
re-engage in this kind of discussion about what kind of public financing the
parties need.[455]

The Committee recommends that any electoral reform seek to enhance
the likelihood of improving voter turnout and to increase the possibilities for
historically disenfranchised and underrepresented groups (i.e. women, persons
with disabilities, Indigenous peoples, visible minorities, youth, and Canadians
of lower economic means) to be elected. [Note that this recommendation applies
to both Chapter 7 and Chapter 8]

Recommendation 8

The Committee recommends that the Government amend the Canada
Elections Act to create a financial incentive (for example through
reimbursement of electoral campaign expenses) for political parties to run more
women candidates and move towards parity in their nominations.

I do not know if New Zealand's chief
electoral officer spoke to this unique aspect of the New Zealand parliamentary
system, but they have had guaranteed seats for the Maori dating back,
interestingly enough, to 1867. Today there are seven Maori seats in its House
of Representatives, which is determined through a mixed member proportional
system. There are two rolls, one for Maori voting. Maori can choose whether
they wish to vote on a general or on a specific Maori roll.

I'm not
suggesting this particular model. It's only to say that this is an example of
where a parliamentary system has embraced a unique approach so that a first
people—in the New Zealand case, the Maori—can, quote, see themselves
represented directly in the system.

I am reminded
of Jean-Pierre Kingsley's presentation to you. The fifth point that he asked
you to consider is that the “Canadian reality must be reflected in the system
of representation.” As well, “Canadians must be able to see themselves in their
representatives and in the system by which they choose them.”

I believe
there is no better way to achieve this than by your committee actively engaging
with [A]boriginal representative groups such as the Assembly of First Nations,
and Inuit and Métis organizations, among others, to determine if there is an
avenue forward that would achieve this principle for the [A]boriginal peoples
of our country. I do not know if you have hearings set with these groups, but
if not, I would suggest that you reach out to them.

I note there
is [A]boriginal interest in reform at the parliamentary level that would build
linkages between our [A]boriginal citizenry and Parliament. You may be aware that
in 1996 the Royal Commission on Aboriginal [p]eoples recommended that a house
of first peoples be established as a third chamber of Parliament. The details
on its role and responsibilities are set out in the commission's report. In
brief, it is recommending a chamber with legislative responsibility over bills
that have substantive impact over Canada's [A]boriginal peoples.

The Committee wishes to indicate that
it had invited various organizations that were unfortunately unable
to appear.

[451] In 2011,
the Government of Canada introduced Bill C-13: An Act to implement certain
provisions of the 2011 budget as updated on 6 June 2011 and other measures,
which became the Keeping Canada’s Economy and Jobs Growing Act, S.C. 2011,
c.24. The legislation was enacted to phase out the per-vote subsidy to
political parties (sometimes referred to as the quarterly allowance) by January
2015. Before the reductions, the amount of the subsidy was $0.4375 per vote
received, per quarter, adjusted annually for inflation. The first stage in the
reduction became effective 1 April 2012, when the subsidy was reduced to
$0.3825 per vote received in the 2011 general election. The amount was reduced
to $0.255 per vote effective 1 April 2013. As of 1 April 2014, the amount was
reduced to $0.1275 per vote. Finally, the allowance was terminated after the
fourth instalment of 2014 was paid on 1 January 2015. See: Dara Lithwick and
Sebastian Spano, The
Canadian Electoral System, Publication No. 2013-81-E, Parliamentary
Information and Research Service, Library of Parliament, Ottawa,
22 October 2015.

[453] ERRE, Evidence,
1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 7 October 2016, 1940 (Paul
Howe, Professor, Department of Political Science, University of New Brunswick, as
an Individual):

Every single Canadian is able to provide
for the party they wish through their vote, whereas, when you look at the
system of individual donations … you find that, although we've moved to a
system where the maximum has gone down considerably to what seems like a rather
low level, wealthier Canadians are definitely more likely to give the maximum
or near the maximum. The total amount of money they are giving is substantially
more than what those at the lower end of the economic spectrum are giving.

[454] ERRE, Evidence,
1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 31 August 2016, 1905 (Jane
Hilderman, Executive Director, Samara): “I think that is the appeal behind the
notion of a per vote subsidy, in that everyone at least gets to makesome
donation to a party. It's compelling as an incentive to think that your vote
counts for something more. I also think it helps parties maybe think a little
differently about their fundraising direction.”