Wednesday, August 16, 2017

Russia
continues to masquerade as an effective anti-ISIS actor in order to lure the
U.S. into a counter-terrorism partnership in Syria. Russia seeks to leverage this
partnership to expedite an American withdrawal from Syria, removing the U.S. as
an obstacle to continued Russian build up and force projection in the Middle
East. Russia may achieve short-term territorial gains against ISIS, but will
ultimately undermine U.S.-led anti-ISIS efforts in Eastern Syria. The
Russian-backed campaign will fail to decisively defeat ISIS and al Qaeda in
Syria, however. Russian airstrikes in ISIS-held terrain regularly targeted
civilian infrastructure such as mosques, schools,
and medical centersfrom July 17 - August 13, according
to local activists. Russian airstrikes also reportedly targeted an internally-displaced persons (IDP)camp in Zour Shamar in Eastern Raqqa
province on July 23 - 24. Russia’s punitive strikes against vulnerable Sunni
populations will exacerbate local grievances, increase sectarian tension, and
pave the way for the resurgence of ISIS, al Qaeda, and other jihadist groups in
areas recently seized from ISIS. Moreover, pro-Bashar al Assad regime forces’ rapid advance in
Eastern Syria may indicate the regime is not allocating sufficient time or
manpower to conduct effective clearing operations. Incomplete clearing
operations could permit ISIS to leave behind latent attack cells or create
ISIS-permissive zones along the Euphrates River Valley. The pro-regime
coalition currently lacks the manpower required to secure and hold these areas
in the long-term.

Iran and the Assad regime are already exploiting nascent U.S.-Russian cooperation to expand their control into Eastern
Syria at the expense of the U.S. and its partners. Russian airstrikes primarily
targeted ISIS-held areas from July 17 - August 13 in support of Iranian and
Assad regime advances. Pro-regime forces backed byRussia and Iran
recaptured Sukhna, which sits on the Palmyra - Deir ez Zour Highway, from ISIS
on August 13 following a wave of ISIS counterattacks against the city from
August 8 - 10. Russian airstrikes also targetedvillages along the southern bank of of the Euphrates River in
southeastern Raqqa Province, allowing therecapture of al Numaysah, al Jaber, and al Kumaysah towns by pro-Iranian and regime forces. These gains were
facilitated by manpower freed from recent de-escalationzones brokered by Russia in Southwest Syria, the EasternGhouta suburb of Damascus, and
northwestern HomsProvince. Russia, Iran and Assad seek to
leverage these gains to constrain the freedom of action of the U.S.-led
anti-ISIS coalition in Syria. Pro-regime positioning along the Euphrates River
could block the advancement of the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)
southeast from Ar-Raqqa City after the completion of Ar-Raqqa City clearing
operations. Russia’s gains against ISIS in Syria’s East will ultimately
embolden Iran and the Bashar al Assad regime, rather than constrain them.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, statements by Russian and Western officials, and documentation of Russian airstrikes through social media. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties. The graphic likely under-represents the extent of the locations targeted in Eastern Syria, owing to a relative lack of activist reporting from that region.

High-Confidence Reporting.ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated by documentation from opposition factions and activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible that demonstrate a number of key indicators of Russian airstrikes.

Monday, August 14, 2017

This series of graphics marks the latest installments of our Syria SITREP Map made possible through a partnership between the Institute for the Study of War andSyria Direct. These graphics depict significant developments in the Syrian Civil War from July 27 to August 9, 2017. The control of terrain represented on the graphics is accurate as of August 8, 2017.

Special credit to Matti Suomenaro and Sana Sekkarie of the Institute for the Study of War for their contributions to the text and graphics of this series of Syria SITREP Maps.

Friday, August 4, 2017

This
series of graphics marks the latest installments of our Syria SITREP Map made
possible through a partnership between the Institute for the Study of War
and Syria Direct. These graphics depict significant developments in the
Syrian Civil War from June 29 to July 27, 2017. The control of terrain
represented on the graphics is accurate as of July 6 or July 16, 2017.

Special
credit to Matti Suomenaro and Sana Sekkarie of the Institute for the Study of
War for their contributions to the text and graphics of this series of Syria
SITREP Maps.

Key Takeaway:Ukraine’s efforts to integrate with the West yielded important progress in the past two months. Nevertheless, Ukraine’s overall pro-Western reformist movement grew more vulnerable to internal destabilization and Russian subversion. Stalling reforms, a poor economy, and an increased focus on the 2019 presidential and parliamentary elections in Ukraine provide momentum to populists and pro-Russian political elements, as well as additional opportunities for the Kremlin to exploit as it aims to return Ukraine to its sphere of influence. The Kremlin continued its military aggression in the east and expanded its subversion campaign throughout the country, focusing on low-visibility methods, such as paying individuals to conduct protests. The Kremlin will intensify these efforts in order to destabilize the Ukrainian government as Kyiv prepares for elections in 2019. The U.S. implemented a package of sanctions on August 02 that may restrain the Kremlin’s aggressive behavior in Ukraine and elsewhere. However, the U.S. must also provide full support to Ukrainian reform efforts or risk creating a permissive environment for Kremlin subversion in Ukraine.

Ukraine achieved noteworthy successes in deepening its integration with Western political, economic, and military structures, while the U.S. signaled a more active stance. The E.U. officially implemented a visa-free travel agreement with Ukraine on June 11, and the E.U, ratified an economic association agreement with Ukraine on July 11. Both steps will help Ukraine shift away from Russia’s economic and social spheres in the long term. The U.S. also signaled an interest in playing a larger role in resolving the Russia-backed war in Ukraine following a meeting between Ukrainian President Poroshenko and President Trump on June 21 and through the appointment of former NATO Ambassador Kurt Volker as U.S. Special Representative for the Ukraine . Volker indicated that the U.S. may supply lethal defensive arms to the Ukrainian Armed Forces following a visit to the Donbas frontline on July 24. Volker’s statement was reinforced on August 1 when the Pentagon announced a draft plan to provide defensive aid to Kyiv. Ukraine took important steps toward potentially integrating its military with Western military structures. President Poroshenko signed a bill on June 8 to articulate Ukraine’s intent to apply for NATO membership in 2020. The Armed Forces of Ukraine and the U.S. also conducted large-scale naval exercises in the Black Sea on July 10-22 with numerous NATO member-states.

The reform progress inside of Ukraine began to stall while political actors increasingly focus on positioning for the 2019 presidential and parliamentary elections. The Ukrainian parliament adjourned for the summer without passing many expected reforms, including healthcare reform, a new law on national security, the creation of an anti-corruption court, and others. Meanwhile, President Poroshenko revoked the Ukrainian citizenship of his political opponent Mikheil Saakashvili on July 26. Many Ukrainian reformists condemned Poroshenko’s move as one that undermines the democratic ideals of the Euromaidan Revolution. Other political players in Ukraine are also beginning to prepare for the upcoming elections. Populists, including pro-Russian elements, are likely to gain traction while Ukraine’s political reforms and economy stagnate. The combination of these factors makes the government and the reform movement in Ukraine vulnerable to internal destabilization and the Kremlin’s subversion, which will remain true until the Poroshenko administration takes decisive steps to reinvigorate the reform process and economy.

Russia continues to destabilize Ukraine through a variety of low- visibility subversive methods designed not to trigger a major international reaction. The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) asserted that Russia conducted a major cyber attack against state and private entities via the malware “NotPetya” on June 27. The attack effectively destabilized many Ukrainian government networks marking the largest cyber attack in Ukraine’s history. The SBU also implicated Russian-backed elements in the assassinations of two top Ukrainian intelligence officers on June 27 and 28. Russia continued its attempts to drive a wedge between Ukraine and its EU allies. Protest participants claimed that Russia-backed elements paid them to instigate anti-Polish Ukrainian nationalist protests at the Polish embassy in Kyiv on July 7. Ukrainian and Polish officials recently accused Russia of conducting additional similar schemes in an effort to inflame nationalist tensions between Poland and Ukraine. The Kremlin’s proxies in Eastern Ukraine continued to conduct offensive operations against Ukraine’s Armed Forces in violation of the Minsk II ceasefire agreements. The Kremlin’s extensive collection of low-visibility tools, designed to conceal its ongoing campaign to destabilize and eventually remove Ukraine’s pro-Western government, will continue to pose a serious threat Ukraine’s stability and sovereignty if Kyiv’s Western partners do not support efforts to counter them.

Thursday, August 3, 2017

Key Takeaway:The U.S., Russia, Jordan “de-escalation zone” in Southwest Syria
advances the interests of U.S. enemies and adversaries, including Iran and al
Qaeda. The U.S. likely sought to leverage
the agreement to drive a wedge within the Russo-Iranian Coalition, while
reducing violence and testing a potential partnership with Russia to improve
security in Syria. The deal has temporarily reduced violence, but at great cost
to long-term U.S. interests in Syria. The Russo-Iranian coalition is exploiting the agreement to consolidate in the
south. Al Qaeda will likewise leverage the deal and the recent cut to U.S.
support to vetted Syrian opposition groups to preserve and expand its influence
in Southern Syria.

The de-escalation zone brokered by the U.S., Russia, and
Jordan does not meaningfully constrain Iranian build up in Southern Syria and
along the Golan Heights. The deal is rumored to include an “exclusionary
zone” that requires Iranian and other non-Syrian forces to maintain a 30-40 KM distance from the Jordanian border.
Iran and Hezbollah flaunted a large re-deployment away
from frontlines in Dera’a City
immediately after the de-escalation zone went into effect on July 9 in order to
falsely demonstrate Iranian commitment to such an exclusionary zone to the
United States. Most of the pro-Iranian forces relocated to areas just outside
the exclusionary zone – including in the town of Sanamayn located approximately 50 KM from the Jordanian border – and to
areas just outside Dera’a City, such asAthman. Hezbollah and other pro-Iranian
forces retained many of their longstanding
positionswithin the de-escalation zone
and likely maintain some latent forces within Dera’a City, itself. Notably, the
deal did not affect the historic pro-Iranian build up on the Golan Heights, a concern
voiced by Israel in the weeks following the ceasefire. Iranian and pro-regime
capabilities in the south remain largely unchanged. These local re-deployments
and troop rotations still allow for Iran to quickly re-deploy to frontlines against
anti-Assad forces as necessary.

The de-escalation zone agreement secures the freedom of
movement of Russia, Iran, and the Assad regime at the expense of U.S. partners.
The deal has allowed Iran to
temporarily shift assets away from previously contested frontlines like Dera’a
City to reinforce other active fronts against the U.S. and partnered forces.
Pro-Iranian and regime forces with Russian air supportlaunched operations
against historically U.S.-backed opposition groups in Northern Suwayda and
Eastern Rif Dimashq Provinces following the start of the ceasefire. The deal
has freed up the pro-Assad coalition to continue to further project force into
Eastern Syria. Pro-regime forces backed by Russia and Iranadvanced to theoutskirts of Sukhna along
the ground line of communication (GLOC) between Palmyra and Deir ez Zour City
on July 28. Iran, Assad, and Russia seek to reopen this GLOC to besieged
regime-held areas of Deir ez Zour. These advances would ultimately constrain
the freedom of action of the U.S.-led Anti-ISIS coalition in Eastern Syria and could
block further advances by the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) along
the Euphrates River Valley.

Russian
build up along the frontline stands to deepen the Russo-Iranian coalition’s
penetration in Southern Syria.The deal lacks a legitimate, neutral enforcement mechanism and
primarily relies upon Russian, Chechen, and Ingush forces to guarantee the
agreement along the line of contact between regime and opposition forces.
Russia cannot and will not restrain Iran and Assad. Russia deployed hundreds of
military police
including Ingush units
to man observation points along the line of contact. The Russian force is
positioned to protect -- not push back -- Iranian positions within this zone.

The ceasefire deal allows al Qaeda to preserve its strength and
expand its influence in Southern Syria.Al
Qaeda had begun to reinvigorate its campaign to transform the Syrian opposition
in its own image prior to the declaration of the de-escalation zone. Al Qaeda dispatched approximately thirtysenior
officials to Southern Syria in May 2017. Al
Qaeda likely seeks to replicate its recent success in Idlib Province in the South.
The ceasefire deal will provide Al Qaeda with time and space to further network
itself within the opposition, including through local governance and security
structures. U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to halt some covert support to
vetted opposition groups in Western Syria will only accelerate al Qaeda’s potential
rise in the south. Syrian rebels have expressed dissatisfaction overU.S.
demandsto abandon the
fight against President Assad and decreased U.S. support to rebels. Al
Qaeda will exploit these grievances and attempt to fill the vacuum. Al Qaeda
will position itself to eventually spoil the agreement, but will do so in a
timeframe that supports its own interests.

Special credit to Matti Suomenaro
and Sana Sekkarie for their research contributions to this publication.