Every offence shall ordinary be
inquired into and tried by a court
within whose local jurisdiction it was
committed.

16/08/2018 22:58:23 :::HCHP 12

178. Place of inquiry or trial.–(a) When it is
uncertain in which of several local
areas an offence was committed, or

(b) where an offence is committed partly

.

in one local area and party in another,

or

(c) where an offence is a continuing
one, and continues to be committed in

more local areas than one, or

(d) where it consists of several acts
done in different local areas, it may be
inquired into or tried by a Court having
jurisdiction over any of such local

areas.

181. Place of trial in case of certain
r offences.–

(1) Any offence of being a thug, or
murder committed by a thug, of

dacoity, of dacoity with murder, of
belonging to a gang of dacoits, or of
escaping from custody, may be inquired
into or tried by a Court within whose
local jurisdiction the offence was

committed or the accused person is
found.

(2) Any offence of kidnapping or

abduction of a person may be inquired
into or tried by a Court within whose
local jurisdiction the person was

kidnapped or abducted or was
conveyed or concealed or detained.

(3) Any offence of theft, extortion or

robbery may be inquired into or tried by
a Court within whose local jurisdiction
the offence was committed or the stolen
property which is the subject of the
offence was possessed by any person
committing it or by any person who
received or retained such property
knowing or having reason to believe it
to be stolen property.

(4) Any offence of criminal
misappropriation or of criminal breach
of trust may be inquired into or tried by

16/08/2018 22:58:23 :::HCHP 13

a Court within whose local jurisdiction
the offence was committed or any part
of the property which is the subject of
the offence was received or retained, or
was required to be returned or

.

accounted for, by the accused person.

(5) Any offence which includes the
possession of stolen property may be
inquired into or tried by a Court within

whose local jurisdiction the offence
was committed or the stolen property
was possessed by any person who
received or retained it knowing or
having reason to believe it to be stolen
property.”

16.

Close scrutiny of aforesaid provisions of law

clearly suggests that Section 177 Cr.P.C. lays down a general

rule with regard to place where a case can be inquired into

and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was

committed, whereas Sections 178 and 181 Cr.P.C. are

exception to the aforesaid general rule contained in Section

177 Cr.P.C. Sub-section (c) of Section 178 Cr.P.C. provides

that where an offence is a continuing one, and continues to

be committed in more local areas than one, it may be

inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any

of such local areas. Sub-section (4) of Section 181 Cr.P.C.

lays down that any offence of criminal misappropriation or of

criminal breach of trust may be inquired into or tried by a

Court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was

committed or any part of the property which is the subject of

16/08/2018 22:58:23 :::HCHP 14

the offence was received or retained, or was required to be

returned or accounted for, by the accused person.

17. In the case at hand, bare perusal of FIR lodged

.

by respondent-wife clearly suggests that all the alleged

incidents with respect to cruelty, voluntary causing hurt and

breach of trust, had allegedly occurred at Jallandhar (Pb)

and not at Nalagarh (HP). Similarly, cruelty and humiliating

treatment, alleged to have been given by the petitioner-

husband to respondent-wife on account of bringing less

dowry, is also alleged to have taken place at her matrimonial

home at Jallandhar (Pb) and not at Nalagarh (HP). FIR in

question nowhere reveals that demands of money, gifts and

jewellery were ever made at Nalagarh, rather as per own case

set up by respondent-wife she was allegedly given beatings

by her husband and other family members at Jallandhar

and subsequently the matter on the complaint of

respondent-wife came to be referred to the Women Cell at

Jallandhar. As per contents of FIR, on 17.8.2014 and

thereafter on 24.8.2014, Women Cell at Jallandhar, called

both the petitioner-husband and respondent-wife for

reconciliation and subsequently on 27.8.2014, respondent-

wife lodged complaint with SHO, Police Station, Nalagarh,

which ultimately came to be forwarded to Women Cell,

Baddi. Though respondent-wife has alleged in the FIR that

on various occasions, petitioners demanded money and

16/08/2018 22:58:23 :::HCHP 15

jewellery and abused her, but all such alleged incidents

allegedly happened at Jallandhar (Pb) and not at Nalagarh

(HP). Respondent-wife also alleged in the FIR that during

.

pregnancy, she had stomach-ache and her mother made her

consume some medicines, as a consequence of which child

in her womb died, but, such incident, if any, also happened

at Jallandhar. There is no narration of incident, if any,

occurred at Nalagarh. Respondent-wife has alleged that on

account of beatings given by her husband to her at

Jallandhar, her father got her medically examined at Chawla

Hospital, Mohali on 5.8.2014 and Women Cell, Baddi (HP),

taking note of aforesaid alleged incident of beatings, which

had happened at Jallandhar (Pb), got respondent-wife

medically examined by Medical Officer in Himachal Pradesh

and thereafter added Section 325 IPC in the FIR.

18. Having carefully perused the contents of FIR

lodged with Police Station, Nalagarh, dated 7.8.2014, this

Court is persuaded to agree with contention of Shri R.K.

Sharma, learned Senior Counsel representing the petitioner-

husband, that since none of the alleged incident of cruelty,

criminal breach of trust and voluntary causing hurt had

taken place at Nalagarh and, as such, Nalagarh Police had

no jurisdiction to investigate into the FIR. True, it is, that

respondent-wife subsequently on 7.10.2014, got her

supplementary statement recorded under Section 161

16/08/2018 22:58:23 :::HCHP 16

Cr.P.C., (Annexure R-3, annexed with the reply of

respondents No.1 and 2), alleging therein that on 26.8.2014

her husband Akashdeep Singh, father-in-law Yadwinder

.

Singh, mother-in-law Ranjit Kaur and Devar (brother-in-law)

Gaurav visited her parental house at Nalagarh and asked her

to resolve the matter amicably by way of compromise, but,

when she told them that she has filed complaint before the

police, they got adamant and started hurling abuses on her

and also extended threats to her to do away with her life.

But, now question, which remains to be adjudicated, is

whether allegations contained in supplementary statement of

respondent-wife, recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., can be

read in continuation to FIR dated 7.10.2014. Admittedly

respondent-wife in her initial statement under Section 154

Cr.P.C. chose not to allege that on 26.8.2014, her husband

Akashdeep Singh, father-in-law Yadwinder Singh, mother-in-

law Ranjit Kaur and Devar (brother-in-law) Gaurav, hurled

abuses and extended threats to her at Nalagarh. Needless to

say, investigating agency can make addition or deletion in

FIR, on the basis of investigation, and, as such, there

appears to be no force in the arguments of Shri R.K.

Sharma, learned Senior Counsel, that supplementary

statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. cannot be

read as a part of FIR, dated 7.10.2014, filed at the behest of

respondent-wife at Nalagarh. Careful perusal of record,

16/08/2018 22:58:23 :::HCHP 17

especially statement of parents of respondent-wife recorded

at the time of lodging FIR on 7.10.2014, nowhere suggests

that alleged incident of 26.8.2014 was ever reported to the

.

police at first instance, even if, for the sake of arguments, it

is presumed and accepted that respondent-wife forgot to

mention aforesaid alleged incident of 26.8.2014, while

lodging FIR, dated 7.10.2014, but, it cannot be accepted that

parents of respondent-wife, whose statements were also

recorded at the time of lodging FIR on 7.8.2014, also

inadvertently failed to state with regard to alleged incident of

26.8.2014.

r Documents adduced on record, especially

reply/status report filed by investigating agency, while

opposing bail of bail petitioners, nowhere suggests that

alleged incident, if any, happened/occurred on 26.8.2014

was ever brought to the notice of Court, who was dealing

with the application for grant of bail made on behalf of the

petitioners. Apart from above, there is no mention, if any, of

aforesaid incident of 26.8.2014 in the other proceedings

initiated by respondent-wife against the petitioner-husband

under Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005

and under Section 125 Cr.P.C. for maintenance. Even in the

statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., respondent-

wife simply alleged that on 26.8.2014, she was extended

threats and hurled abuses by the petitioners, but there is no

allegation that the petitioners demanded dowry and when

16/08/2018 22:58:23 :::HCHP 18

their demand was not fulfilled, they insulted her, rather

respondent-wife has stated that the petitioners asked her to

get the dispute settled amicably.

.

19. Having carefully perused the contents of the FIR

including supplementary statement recorded under Section

161 Cr.P.C. of respondent-wife, dated 7.10.2014, this Court

has no hesitation to conclude that Police of Police Station,

Nalagarh, has/had no jurisdiction to conduct investigation of

allegations as recorded in FIR because all the alleged

incidents, as narrated in the FIR, actually occurred/

happened at Jallandhar and not at Nalagarh and it is only

Police Station at Jallandhar, who has/had the jurisdiction to

conduct investigation, pursuant to complaint, if any, lodged

by respondent-wife at Jallandhar (Pb). At this stage, it

would be appropriate to place reliance upon judgment

rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in Amarendu Jyoti’s case

supra, wherein it has held as under:-

“5. Aggrieved by the rejection of the application
Under Section 482 of the Code, the Appellants

have approached this Court by way of special
leave to appeal. The main contention on
behalf of the Appellants was that the F.I.R.
did not disclose a continuing offence. The
offence, if any, was alleged to have been
committed only at Delhi and there was no
question of any offence having been
committed after Respondent 2 went to stay at
Ambikapur. The learned counsel for the
appellants relied on the decision of this Court
in Manish Ratan v. State of M.P., (2007)1 SCC 262.

16/08/2018 22:58:23 :::HCHP 19

6. In Manish Ratan case, in the complaint, the
incident was said to have taken place in
Jabalpur. The wife had left her matrimonial
house and started residing at Datia. The
criminal revision filed by the accused,

.

questioning the jurisdiction of the Court at

Datia, was dismissed opining that the offence
was a continuing one, and therefore, the
Datia Court had jurisdiction to take
cognizance. The High Court held that the

Court at Datia also has jurisdiction to try the
case since the harassment to the wife
continued at the place where she was
residing with her father “since she was forced
to live at her father’s place on account of the
torture of the in-laws and as such it can

safely be said that there was also a mental
cruelty.” This conclusion of the High Court
was dubbed as curious by this Court since the
High Court found earlier that “there is
nothing in the complaint to show that any

maltreatment was given to the Appellant at
Datia. The allegations, which I may repeat

here, are that the maltreatment was given
within a specific period at Jabalpur.” After
looking at the decided cases on the point i.e.
Sujata Mukherjee v. Prashant Kumar
Mukherjee, (1997)5 SCC 30, State of Bihar v.

Deokaran Nenshi, (1972)2 SCC 890, Y.
Abraham Ajith v. Inspector of Police, (2004)8
SCC 100 and Ramesh v. State of T.N., (2005)3
SCC 507, this Court held that the order of the
High Court was unsustainable, and therefore,

set it aside. It is not only that in the interest
of justice, while setting aside the order of the

High Court, this Court also directed the
transfer of the criminal case pending in the
Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Datia,
where the wife was staying with her father to

the Court of the Judicial, Jabalpur (vide para

18).

7. Relying on the judgment of this Court in
Manish Ratan case , the learned counsel for
the appellants contended that the offence in
the present case cannot be considered to be a
continuing offence, if any, and must be taken
to have been complete at Delhi and no cause
of action can be said to have arisen at
Ambikapur. As must necessarily be, the
application of law and the consequences
must vary from case to case.

16/08/2018 22:58:23 :::HCHP 20

8. The core question thus is whether the
allegations made in the FIR constitute a
continuing offence.

9. We find from the FIR that all the incidents

.

alleged by the complainant in respect of the

alleged cruelty are said to have occurred at
Delhi. The cruel and humiliating words
spoken to the 2nd respondent, wife by her
husband, elder brother-in-law and elder

sister-in-law for bringing less dowry are said
to have been uttered at Delhi. Allegedly,
arbitrary demands of lakhs of rupees in
dowry have been made in Delhi. The incident
of beating and dragging Respondent 2 and
abusing her in filthy language also are said

to have taken place at Delhi. Suffice it to say
that all overt acts, which are said to have
constituted cruelty have allegedly taken
place at Delhi.

10. The allegations as to what has happened at
Ambikapur are as follows:

“No purposeful information has been received
from the in-laws of Kiran even on contacting
on telephone till today. They have been
threatened and abused and two years have
been elapsed and the in-laws have not shown

any interest to call her to her matrimonial
home and since then Kiran is making her
both ends meet in her parental home. To get
rid of the ill-treatment and harassment of

the in-laws of Kiran, the complainant is
praying for registration of an FIR and
request for immediate legal action so that

Kiran may get appropriate justice.”

11. We find that the offence of cruelty cannot be
said to be a continuing one as contemplated

by Sections 178 and 179 of the Code. We do
not agree with the High Court that in this
case the mental cruelty inflicted upon
Respondent 2 “continued unabated” on
account of no effort having been made by the
appellants to take her back to her
matrimonial home, and the threats given by
the appellants over the telephone. It might be
noted incidentally that the High Court does
not make reference to any particular piece of
evidence regarding the threats said to have
been given by the appellants over the
telephone. Thus, going by the complaint, we
are of the view that it cannot be held that the

16/08/2018 22:58:23 :::HCHP 21

Court at Ambikapur has jurisdiction to try
the offence since the appropriate Court at
Delhi would have jurisdiction to try the said
offence. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed.”

“8. Sections 177 to 186 deal with venue and
place of trial. Section 177 reiterates the well-
established common law rule referred to in

Halsbury’s Laws of England (Vol. IX para 83)
that the proper and ordinary venue for the
trial of a crime is the area of jurisdiction in
which, on the evidence, the facts occur and
which are alleged to constitute the crime.

There are several exceptions to this general
rule and some of them are, so far as the

present case is concerned, indicated in
Section 178 of the Code which read as
follows:

“Section 178 Place of inquiry or trial.–

(a) When it is uncertain in which of several
local areas an offence was committed,
or

(b) where an offence is committed partly in
one local area and partly in another, or

(c) where an offence is continuing one, and
continues to be committed in more local
areas than one, or

16/08/2018 22:58:23 :::HCHP 33

(d) where it consists of several acts done in
different local areas, it may be inquired
into or tried by a Court having
jurisdiction over any of such local
areas.”

.

9. “All crime is local, the jurisdiction over the

crime belongs to the country where the crime
is committed”, as observed by Blackstone. A
significant word used in Section 177 of the
Code is “ordinarily”. Use of the word indicates

that the provision is a general one and must
be read subject to the special provisions
contained in the Code. As observed by the
Court in Purushottamdas Dalmia v. State of
West Bengal, (AIR 1961 SC 1589),

law and exceptions may be provided by law
on consideration or may be implied from the
provisions of law permitting joint trial of
offences by the same Court. No such exception
is applicable to the case at hand.

10. As observed by this Court in State of Bihar v.

Deokaran Nenshi and Anr. (AIR 1973 SC 908),
continuing offence is one which is susceptible
of continuance and is distinguishable from

the one which is committed once and for all,
that it is one of those offences which arises
out of the failure to obey or comply with a

rule or its requirement and which involves a
penalty, liability continues till compliance,
that on every occasion such disobedience or
non-compliance occurs or recurs, there is the

offence committed.

11. A similar plea relating to continuance of the
offence was examined by this Court in Sujata
Mukherjee (Smt.) v. Prashant Kumar
Mukherjee (1997 (5) SCC 30). There the
allegations related to commission of alleged
offences punishable under Section 498-A, 506
and 323 IPC. On the factual background, it
was noted that though the dowry demands
were made earlier the husband of the
complainant went to the place where
complainant was residing and had assaulted

16/08/2018 22:58:23 :::HCHP 34

her. This Court held in that factual
background that clause (c) of Section 178 was
attracted. But in the present case the factual
position is different and the complainant
herself left the house of the husband on

.

15.4.1997 on account of alleged dowry

demands by the husband and his relations.
There is thereafter not even a whisper of
allegations about any demand of dowry or
commission of any act constituting an offence

much less at Chennai. That being so, the
logic of Section 178 (c) of the Code relating to
continuance of the offences cannot be
applied.

12. The crucial question is whether any part of

the cause of action arose within the
jurisdiction of the Court concerned. In terms
of Section 177 of the Code it is the place
where the offence was committed. In essence
it is the cause of action for initiation of the

proceedings against the accused.

13. While in civil cases, normally the expression
“cause of action” is used, in criminal cases as
stated in Section 177 of the Code, reference is
to the local jurisdiction where the offence is
committed. These variations in etymological

expression do not really make the position
different. The expression “cause of action” is
therefore not a stranger to criminal cases.

14. It is settled law that cause of action consists

of bundle of facts, which give cause to
enforce the legal inquiry for redress in a

court of law. In other words, it is a bundle of
facts, which taken with the law applicable to
them, gives the allegedly affected party a
right to claim relief against the opponent. It

must include some act done by the latter
since in the absence of such an act no cause
of action would possibly accrue or would
arise.”

34. Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment referred

hereinabove has categorically held that it is settled law that

cause of action consists of bundle of facts, which give cause

to enforce the legal inquiry for redress in a Court of law. In

16/08/2018 22:58:23 :::HCHP 35

other words, it is a bundle of facts, which taken with the law

applicable to them, gives the allegedly affected party a right

to claim relief against the opponent. It must include some

.

act done by the latter since in the absence of such an act no

cause of action would possibly accrue or would arise. Most

importantly in the judgment referred above Hon’ble Apex

Court has categorically held that in terms of Section 177, it

is the place where the offence was committed and in essence

it is the cause of action for initiation of the proceedings

against the accused. In the case at hand, there is not even a

whisper of allegation about the demand of dowry much less

at Nalagarh, as such, this Court has no hesitation to

conclude that the logic of Section 178(c) of the Code relating

to continuance of the offences cannot be applied in the

present facts and circumstances of the case.

35. Having closely examined/analyzed the facts of

the case at hand, it is amply clear that exceptions to the

general rule, as provided in Sections 178 and 182 Cr.P.C.,

are not applicable in the case in hand. Police Station at

Nalagarh has/had no jurisdiction to conduct investigation of

the allegations levelled in the impugned FIR. Jurisdiction, if

any, to inquire into the contents as contained in FIR, is/was

with police station at Jallandhar, as all the incidents

happened/occurred at Jallandhar (Punjab) and not at

Nalagarh (Himachal Pradesh). Since respondent-wife before

16/08/2018 22:58:23 :::HCHP 36

lodging FIR at Nalagarh had lodged complaint at Women

Cell, Jallandhar, she could pursue the same at Jallandhar

and definitely, on the basis of allegations contained in FIR in

.

question lodged at Nalagarh, no case could be registered

against the petitioners at Nalagarh.

36. As far as another contention of Shri Ramakant

Sharma, learned Senior Counsel that since the proceedings,

consequent to lodging of FIR in question at Nalagarh, are

pending adjudication before competent Court of law at

Nalagarh, the instant petition, is not maintainable, also

deserves to be rejected because once it stands established on

record that Police Station, Nalagarh, has/had no territorial

jurisdiction to inquire into the contents of FIR lodged at the

behest of respondent-wife, no consequential proceedings

pursuant to the investigation carried out by Police at

Nalagarh in the FIR can be allowed to sustain. Since, this

Court has arrived at definite conclusion that Police has/had

no territorial jurisdiction to investigate contents of impugned

FIR, Court at Nalagarh is/was not competent to take

cognizance of investigation/challan filed by the police and as

such same also deserves to be quashed and set aside.

37. Reliance placed upon judgment of Hon’ble Apex

Court in State of Bihar and another etc. etc. vs. Shri P.P.

Sharma and another etc. etc., AIR 1991 SC 1260 is wholly

mis-placed and it does not fit into the present facts and

16/08/2018 22:58:23 :::HCHP 37

circumstances of the case and as such same cannot be

applied.

38. In the case supra, Hon’ble Apex Court observed

.

that mere allegations of mala-fide against the informant

based on the facts after the lodging of the FIR were of no

consequence and could not be made basis for quashing the

proceedings. Hon’ble Apex Court further held that simply

because the Investigating Officer, while acting bonafidely

ruled out certain documents as irrelevant, cannot be ground

to assume that he acted malafidely. No doubt, in the present

case Hon’ble Apex Court held that when the police report

under Section 173 Cr.P.C. is forwarded to the Magistrate

after completion of investigation and the material collected

by the investigating officer is under the gaze of judicial

scrutiny, the High Court would do well to discipline itself not

to undertake quashing proceedings at that stage in exercise

of its inherent jurisdiction, but the aforesaid observation

made by the Hon’ble Apex Court is altogether in different

context and in peculiar facts and circumstances of the case.

39. In the case before Hon’ble Apex Court there were

allegations of malafide against the informant and

investigating officer and Hon’ble Apex Court held that the

same cannot be basis for quashing the proceedings because

non-annexing of certain documents being irrelevant by the

investigating officer cannot be a ground to assume that he

16/08/2018 22:58:23 :::HCHP 38

acted malafidely. Hon’ble Apex Court, on the basis of

material before it, arrived at a conclusion that the dominant

purpose for registering the case against the respondents was

.

to have an investigation done into the allegations contained

in the FIR and in the event of there being sufficient material

in support of the allegations to present the charge sheet

before the court. Similarly, there is no material to show that

the dominant object of registering the case was the character

assassination of the respondents or to harass and humiliate

them. Hon’ble Apex Court set aside the judgment passed by

High Court
r of Patna, wherein it had quashed the

proceedings. But, in the present case when it is quiet

apparent that police at Nalagarh had no jurisdiction to look

into the allegations contained in the FIR, consequential

proceeding, if any, initiated pursuant to report presented

under Section 173 Cr.P.C. by the police at Nalagarh cannot

be allowed to sustain, hence aforesaid judgment relied upon

by the learned Senior Counsel has no application. Had the

Police at Nalagarh(HP) jurisdiction to look into the contents

of FIR lodged at the behest of respondent-wife and on the

basis of investigation carried out by the police challan was

presented in the competent Court of law, definitely aforesaid

judgment could be applied and it could be concluded that

since challan stood filed, Court cannot interfere while

exercising powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. But in the

16/08/2018 22:58:23 :::HCHP 39

present case facts are otherwise as has been discussed

hereinabove and as such this case has no application.

40. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Shri P.P. Sharma’s

.

case supra held as under:-

“33. The above order was brought to the notice of
the Patna High Court but the High Court

refused to be persuaded to adopt the same
course. We are of the considered view that at
a stage when the police report under S.173
Cr. P.C. has been forwarded to the Magistrate
after completion of the investigation and the

material collected by the investigating officer
is under the gaze of judicial scrutiny, the
High Court would do well to discipline itself
not to undertake quashing proceedings at
that stage in exercise of its inherent
jurisdiction. We could have set aside the High
rCourt judgment on this ground alone but

elaborate argument having been addressed by
the learned counsel for the parties we
thought it proper to deal with all the aspects
of the case.”

41. There cannot be any quarrel with the argument

advanced by Mr.Ramakant Sharma, learned Senior Counsel

that by now it is well settled that High Court while exercising

power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. though has wide powers

but those are to be exercised sparingly, carefully or with

caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests

specifically laid down under Section 482 Cr.P.C. itself.

Mr.Sharma in support of aforesaid submission also placed

reliance upon the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court

in Ghanshyam Sharma vs. Surendra Kumar Sharma and

Others, (2014)13 SCC 401 (para-8), Suresh Chandra Swain vs.

16/08/2018 22:58:23 :::HCHP 40

State of Orissa, 1988 Crl.L.J. 1175 (para-11(3)) and Varala

Bharath Kumar vs. State of Telangana and Another, (2017)9

SCC 413 (para-7). Since in all the judgments referred

.

hereinabove similar principle of law has been laid down by

the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court would only be dealing

with the latest judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in

Varala Bharath Kumar’s case supra.

42. In the aforesaid judgment Hon’ble Apex Court

has held that extra ordinary power under Article 226 or

inherent power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure can be exercised by the High Court, either to

prevent abuse of process of the court or otherwise to secure

the ends of justice. Hon’ble Apex Court though in the

aforesaid judgment has observed that while exercising power

under Section 482 or under Article 226 in such matters, the

court does not function as a Court of Appeal or Revision but

held that inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code

though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully or with

caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests

specifically laid down under Section 482 itself. It is to be

exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial

justice, for the administration of which alone courts exist.

The Hon’ble Apex Court further held that the Court must be

careful and should see that its decision in exercise of its

power is based on sound principles. The inherent powers

16/08/2018 22:58:23 :::HCHP 41

should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution.

But, on the top of everything, Hon’ble Court has categorically

held that no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to

.

cases in which the High Court will exercise its extra ordinary

jurisdiction of quashing the proceedings at any stage. It

would be profitable to take note of following paras of the

aforesaid judgment:-

“6. It is by now well settled that the
extraordinary power under Article 226 or
inherent power under Section 482 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure can be exercised by the
High Court, either to prevent abuse of process

of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice. Where allegations made in the First

Information Report/the complaint or the
outcome of investigation as found in the
Charge Sheet, even if they are taken at their
face value and accepted in their entirety do
not prima facie constitute any offence or

make out the case against the accused; where
the allegations do not disclose the
ingredients of the offence alleged; where the
uncontroverted allegations made in the First

Information Report or complaint and the
material collected in support of the same do
not disclose the commission of offence

alleged and make out a case against the
accused; where a criminal proceeding is
manifestly attended with mala fide and/or
where the proceeding is maliciously

instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and with
a view to spite him due to private and
personal grudge, the power under Article 226
of the Constitution of India or under Section
482 of Code of Criminal Procedure may be
exercised.

7. While exercising power under Section 482 or
under Article 226 in such matters, the court
does not function as a Court of Appeal or
Revision. Inherent jurisdiction under Section
482 of the Code though wide has to be
exercised sparingly, carefully or with caution

16/08/2018 22:58:23 :::HCHP 42

and only when such exercise is justified by
the tests specifically laid down under Section
482 itself. It is to be exercised ex debito
justitiae to do real and substantial justice,
for the administration of which alone courts

.

exist. The court must be careful and see that

its decision in exercise of its power is based
on sound principles. The inherent powers
should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate
prosecution. Of course, no hard and fast rule

can be laid down in regard to cases in which
the High Court will exercise its extra
ordinary jurisdiction of quashing the
proceedings at any stage.”

A very good judgement by the HOn’ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh. Very well explained as well to avoid any chances of doubt. It is a must for the society, when the misuse of such laws has risen to a great extent, which is subsequently damaging the family structure of India. It has been remarked by the Hon’ble Apex court at many instances about the same and has been recommended to the Parliament as well for considering to bing about somechanges in such laws, but Parliament and other administrative oraganisation are hardly paying any heed to the importance of changes much needed.