The articles and essays in this blog range from the short to the long. Many of the posts are also introductory (i.e., educational) in nature; though, even when introductory, they still include additional commentary. Older material (dating back mainly to 2005) is being added to this blog over time.

Friday, 4 September 2015

Putnam on the Normativity of Meaning

Although
Hilary Putnam was broadly seeking a naturalist philosophy he also
stressed the importance of normativity in various areas of
philosophy.

This
is Putnam on normativity:

“[Charles
Travis] very often uses the notion of what a reasonable judge would
say. That seems tome, even in a very traditional sense, a normative
notion.”[2005]

Bringing
the notion of what a “reasonable judge would say” makes it very
clear what normativity is. It's about the judgement of what's right
and wrong in philosophy, not just in ethics.

For
example, what are the correct concepts to use and how should we use
them? What should we say are the standard conditions of correctness
in justification? How should we interpret people’s utterances;
especially in they speak another language? And so on.

Thus
the normative philosopher (whether in epistemology or elsewhere) is a
kind of judge who sits in judgement on our philosophical concepts and
even on our philosophical behaviour. More relevantly, meaning itself
is a normative notion or even a normative property. Putnam writes:

“The
crucial point being made here is that if meaning is normative –
that is to say, if it relies to a certain extent on judgement, rather
than just 'facts' – several popular theories about meaning are
ruled out.”

If
meaning has nothing much to do with “just facts” (or even facts
at all), then we can never say that what we state about meaning is
true. There are no “facts of the matter” (as Quine put it) about
meaning: only our judgements as to what we should say about meaning
(or what we should take meaning to be). There will be no facts -
natural or otherwise - which will conclusively settle the issue or
even play any part in the discussion. Of course we can say (as many
do) that normative issues (or even normative facts) actually
‘supervene’ on non-normative facts. However, this is still an
acknowledgement of non-natural properties when it comes to meaning.

We
can say that a normative judgement on meaning (or on anything else)
may well rest on non-normative facts; though that judgement is still,
nonetheless, not natural or factual in nature.

Putnam
finishes the sentence above by saying that if meaning is a normative
notion, then “several popular theories about meaning are ruled
out”. There have been many philosophers who wouldn't have said that
meaning is normative at all. Indeed they would have believed that
it's factual (even if they didn't actually use that word).

For
example, Platonists and Fregeans would surely have said that meaning
is not normative in nature. That is, it has nothing to do with our
judgements or what we take meaning to be. However, this doesn't
automatically mean that they also took meaning to be a natural
phenomenon. If meaning is non-natural, then it's non-natural in a
factual kind of a way. (Although all this will depend on how we
interpret the word ‘factual’ or ‘fact’.)

A
Causal Theory of Meaning

Putnam
gives his own example of a theory of meaning that's “ruled out”
if one accepts the normative nature of meaning. He says:

“At
the time [in the early 1970s] people were very optimistic about
characterising the meaning of words, especially nouns, in terms of
what they’re causally connected to. There the normativity cuts
strongly against that.”

For
a start, it seems to be Saul Kripke's “causal theory of reference”
Putnam has in mind: his . That's why Putnam says that this causal
theory of meaning is “especially [about] nouns”. In Kripke’s
case, that means proper names (or, as he called them, “rigid
designators”). Clearly, if meaning is all about what words are
“casually connected to”, then this seems like a thoroughly
naturalistic position on meaning. Indeed even a scientific one. After
all, we can't really make judgements about the causal relations (or
interactions) between our words and and the world. Causality doesn’t
“come under a description” (as Davidson put it). Causation isn't,
in itself, even explanatory. We can make it explanatory (as it were);
though it's not in itself explanatory. Indeed, according to many
causal theorists of meaning, the causal relation between our words
(especially nouns or names) and things seems utterly
non-cognitive in nature. Thus it can hardly be normative in any way.

Perhaps
we still need to make decisions as to what is connected to what.

If
our name ‘Tony Blair’, for example, is causally connected to,
well, Tony Blair, then perhaps it's also causally connected to
his nose, his shoe or even to Mrs Blair (especially if she were
always contiguous with Tony Blair). In addition, our name ‘Tony
Blair’ may well be connected to Tony Blair; though we don’t
always have to use that name or even use it (consistently) at all. We
may prefer to call Tony Blair by the name ‘Tony Boy’ instead.
Surely these decisions are normative in nature. Indeed the very
choice of a causal theory of reference must be normative in nature.
That is, even if there are causal relations between our words and
what our words refer to, we may not choose to account for that
relation in terms of its causal nature. We may simply ignore it or
see it as, say, “crudely scientistic”.

Thus
even the causal theory of reference is normative in some ways. The
philosopher must make a decision of some kind (which would be a
normative issue) as to which theory to adopt (even if this theory is
philosophically or scientifically kosher). There may even be other
true theories of meaning that the causal theorist simply chooses
(another normative notion) to ignore. It may be the case that these
other theories (or what it is they describe) work in parallel with
the causal facts of the matter when it comes to meaning or reference.

For
example, a theory which emphasises social practices or history when
it comes to establishing the meanings of our words doesn't
necessarily contradict (or contradict at all) what the causal
theorist of meaning has to say. After all, one must assume that
social practices (as well as the relations between words and things
which are part of them) are thoroughly causal in nature. However,
even if they are thoroughly causal, the fact that they're social
practices means that normative factors can’t help but be part of
the picture. Social practices aren't simply forced on us by the
causal nature of the world or even by the causal relations between
our words and what our words refer to (or are about).

Putnam
then makes a Wittgensteinian point about why causation alone can't
tell us everything we need to know about meaning. He says:

“You
can’t just look at what causes you to use a word. You also have to
look at the whole context in which it’s used.”

Of
course we can say that ‘context’ too can be seen as causal.
However, what we take to be context may be a normative choice.
Clearly we can't take in the total causal context of a particular
word or utterance. That means that we must make a decision as to what
context is relevant or salient. The disregarded contexts will still
nevertheless by both causal and contextual to the word or utterance.
The thing is that we simply choose to ignore them or see them as
irrelevant. Why we take them to be so will be a normative.

In
any case, if causation were everything, perhaps a red duck once
caused me to use the word ‘quantum’ or ‘liberty’. That may be
a peculiar fact about me. However, that red duck still caused me
to use the word ‘quantum’. Even if I'm caused by something
relevant to the word to use that word, say, 'cow' when I see a horse
(as with Fodor’s ‘asymmetry’ example), that horse still caused
me to use the word ‘cow’. Even a punch in the face may cause me
to use the word ‘cow’ - that would still be a cause of some kind.

Quine
on Meaning

This
stress on the normativity of meaning falls within the larger context
- yes, context - of the philosophical tradition of thinking
that meanings - and even language generally - is a scientific (not
even quasi- scientific) object. Putnam says:

“I
don’t think meanings are scientific objects. There’s a big
question, then, whether that means that they don’t exist. In a
sense, that’s Quine’s conclusion – that we can go on talking
about meanings but they don’t really exist at all.”

To
me, the very idea that “meanings are scientific objects” seems
ludicrous. How could they be? They're abstract and also
non-spatiotemporal. They can't be observed, tested, refuted or become
the objects of quantification. They're not subject to universal or
exceptionless generalisations. They don't take part in natural laws.

However,
all this depends on whether or not meanings are taken to be abstract
in the first place. So what happens when they're cashed our in
thoroughly naturalistic terms? Realists would themselves say that
this isn't possible. For a start, the normativity of meaning that
we've just been talking about rules this out. Realists about meaning
would also rule out such a ‘reduction’ (if it is a reduction).
Even supervenience theses of meaning wouldn't allow a complete
reduction to naturalist facts – by definition.

What
if meanings are simply natural things or facts? What if meanings are
simply examples of “overt behaviour” (Quine) or what we say and
write? Then the realist would simply use the classic Moorean
response. He would say:

You say that meaning
is nothing more than X. Thus we can always ask if meaning = X.
Consequently, we can say that there's always the possibility of
asking whether or not meaning really is X.

Those
questions make sense. And because they make sense, meaning surely
can't be equal to X.

For
example, if the meaning of the word ‘cat’ is explained or
described by its causal connection to cats, we can always ask:

Is that causal
connection really what the word ‘cat’ means? How can a simple
causal connection between a word and a thing be the actual meaning of
that word? That's ridiculous.

Similarly,
if meaning is seen in terms of a word’s context of use, we can
still ask:

Is the meaning of the
word ‘cat’ really its context of use? How can the context of use
of the word ‘cat’ be its meaning? That's ridiculous!

Normative
questions still keep on arising. Either that, or we must accept that
meanings are abstract and perhaps also sui generis. There is,
of course, another option, the one that Quine preferred. That is to
say that meanings (however we construe them) simply don't exist at
all. Perhaps that’s precisely why we have been debating this issue
for such a long time without having got very far. After all, it’s
hard to be right (or wrong) about something which doesn't in fact
exist. It's the non-existence of meaning that has caused all the
problems and kept the debate going for so long. That very longevity
and insolubility should have given us a reason for suspecting the
very existence of meaning or meanings.

Incidentally,
Quine believed, according to Putnam, “that we can go on talking
about meanings” even if “they don’t exist at all”. There’s
nothing outrageous about this. We talk about Superman; though he
doesn’t exist. Of course, in terms of the word 'Superman'
philosophers would dispute such an “empty reference” and thereby
posit some kind of being that Superman has. In any case, Quine
(regardless of his position on meaning) has to use the English
language even when denying the existence of meaning. He has no choice
but to do so. Quine could even have said:

The sentence “Meanings
are abstract entities” has no meaning.

Quine
wouldn't have contradicted himself. It simply depends on what he
meant by ‘meaning’ or what he committed himself to when he used
that word. More precisely, Quine did believe in the adjectival use of
‘meaningful’ or ‘meaningless’; though not in the noun
‘meaning’. However, not even that may matter much in the context
of his having to use the words which the English language (or even
all languages) gives him. Similarly, elimitivist materialists can
quite happily and without self-contradiction use the words ‘belief’
and ‘believe’ without scruples. They too must use the English
language – especially when debating with propositional-attitude
realists. Again, it depends on how Quine construed meaning or his use
of the word ‘meaning’. If it's suitably construed, then there's
no problem.

If
the definition of is: meaning = X. Then meaning is nothing
more than X. Thus why not substitute the word ‘meaning’
and put in its place the word/letter ‘X’? Quine would have been
happy to do this. However, it would have created problems when it
came to communicating with other people – even other philosophers -
simply because ‘meaning’ is so entrenched in the language. In
addition, if we were to flesh out the word ‘X’ (a substitute for
‘meaning’), that fleshing out may make things inordinately
complex and therefore incomprehensible (at least in all
non-philosophical contexts). Thus Quine, at least in
non-philosophical contexts, would have simply needed to stick with
the word ‘meaning’ or ‘meanings’. He had no choice but to do
so. Either that or he could have given up on effective communication
altogether.