Moralistic fallacy to the left of me, naturalistic fallacy to the right...

Somehow I find it tacky to blog about other blogs - the navel-starring just gets to me. However, I have been unable to forget evolutionary psychologist Satoshi Kanazawa's post, Two logical fallacies that we must avoid: If what I say offends you, it is your problem, about the naturalistic and the moralistic fallacies.

Both are logical fallacies, and they get in the way of progress in science in general, and in evolutionary psychology in particular. However, as [Matt] Ridley astutely points out, political conservatives are more likely to commit the naturalistic fallacy (“Nature designed men to be competitive and women to be nurturing, so women ought to stay home to take care of the children and leave politics to men”), while political liberals are equally likely to commit the moralistic fallacy (“The Western liberal democratic principles hold that men and women ought to be treated equally under the law, and therefore men and women are biologically identical and any study that demonstrates otherwise is a priori false”).

Really? This is true? Assuming it is (and wit that I am free from having to actually look it up ;), that's pathetic. I count myself as a liberal in America (in Denmark I would not, as the political spectrum is different), but the moralistic fallacy is so absurd that I swear I would never commit it in a thousand years*. It's not that I would commit the naturalistic fallacy either, but I'd like to argue that it isn't quite as batshit insane in its logic as the moralistic fallacy. I mean, what is real could be imagined to have a bearing on how we view life, the universe, and everything, but how we view that could never ever in any way affect what is real.

The big difference in committing these two logical fallacies is that the naturalistic fallacy (in this context equal to the is/ought fallacy [see a discussion of that in Massimo Pigliucci's blog, Rationally Speaking]) at least makes it explicit that the (wrong) step from what is to what ought to be is made. The moralistic fallacy, as much as I have identified it in arguments, is never made explicit, and is therefore much more (... dangerous is a strong word, so thank the saurus) pestilential (I love it!). The view of how things ought to be is sort of kept secret (because as people aspiring to be rational, we all know that this should have no bearing on an argument about what is), and will of course be vociferously denied in case it is identified by any of those pesky republicans (or well-meaning but naive liberal scientists):

Since academics, and social scientists in particular, are overwhelmingly left-wing liberals, the moralistic fallacy has been a much greater problem in academic discussions of evolutionary psychology than the naturalistic fallacy. Most academics are above committing the naturalistic fallacy, but they are not above committing the moralistic fallacy. The social scientists’ stubborn refusal to accept sex and race differences in behavior, temperament, and cognitive abilities, and their tendency to be blind to the empirical reality of stereotypes, reflect their moralistic fallacy driven by their liberal political convictions.

It is actually very easy to avoid both fallacies – both leaps of logic – by simply never talking about what ought to be at all and only talking about what is. It is not possible to make either the naturalistic or the moralistic fallacy if scientists never talk about ought. Scientists – real scientists – do not draw moral conclusions and implications from the empirical observations they make, and they are not guided in their observations by moral and political principles. Real scientists only care about what is, and do not at all care about what ought to be. [Emphasis added.]

Here I am, then, going to have to disagree with Kanazawa. It is indeed possible to commit the moralistic fallacy without talking about ought, because political or ideological conviction need not be clarified for people to express what their conformation bias makes them conclude.

8 comments:

"Scientists – real scientists – do not draw moral conclusions and implications from the empirical observations they make, and they are not guided in their observations by moral and political principles."

Wow, I love it when people claim that they are amoral and apolitical truth-gathering machines.

Well, at least some people have unbridled access to reality and absolute truth. Must be nice!

"...political liberals are equally likely to commit the moralistic fallacy ('The Western liberal democratic principles hold that men and women ought to be treated equally under the law, and therefore men and women are biologically identical and any study that demonstrates otherwise is a priori false')."

Hmm... Isn't "straw man" another fallacy? I'm pretty familiar with political liberalism and western liberal democratic principles but I'm not aware of very many people who claim that men and women are biologically identical. I just believe it's more commonly held that observed behavioral differences are neither as broad nor as biologically determined as Satoshi ("Are Russian Women More Likely to be Whores," "I haven't taken a biology class since high-school") Kanazawa persistently asserts his research says they are.

"I wouldn't take like that, Ryan. Being amoral and apolitical is the goal that he aspires to."

And that's a good goal to aim for. That doesn't mean, however, that the pursuit of objective science is free from its own political motives and repercussions. His notion that "real" scientists are somehow able to rise above politics strikes me as somewhat overstated, at best.

"On the other hand, he says nothing whatsoever about having "unbridled access to reality", and absolute truth is not scientific in the first place, so there I think you are being unfair."

Actually, he does:

"Real scientists only care about what is, and do not at all care about what ought to be."

Claiming to know what "is" is an absolute truth. Claiming to understand a given event or occurrence based upon the data at hand is more the kind of science that I am used to. Our knowledge is pretty conditional, and that's how science is supposed to work. Isn't that how science works? So I agree with you that scientific knowledge has nothing to do with absolute truths, yes.

He sounds amazingly objective and apolitical. He presumes that he is able to understand reality without any interference from the subjective flak of politics. Maybe, but I have my doubts.

By saying that he is not swayed by any moral or political forces, he seems to insinuate the idea that he is dealing with some objective and pure version of reality. He seems to imply that nothing is getting in his way of how he understands the data that he deals with. I have my doubts when people make truth and objectivity claims of this order, especially when they start talking about who the "real" scientists are. That's all.

Also, his characterization of social scientists and the "moral fallacy" was pretty off the mark, but I suppose it made him feel better about his claim to science or something. Who knows, but it was a pretty bad evaluation of the situation. Maybe his objectivity meter was out of calibration that morning.

Last thing: if scientists only care about what "is," and not what "should be," then why do they apply their research and ultimately end up shaping the world around them? Just a question about morals, politics, and motives. I tend to think there is more to science than just objectively recording and analyzing what is out there--despite what some folks claim.

Figleaf, I don't think Kanazawa's objection is a straw man. First, he is citing someone else (Ridley), and second, both Marxism and feminism are cases in point. No, they may not claim that men and women are biologically identical, but some do claim that we are psychologically identical, and that biology (i.e. genetics) do not affect our behavioral differences, but that they are (nearly) exclusively culturally induced.

Claiming to know what "is" is an absolute truth

I took that as meaning "the data that is".

He presumes that he is able to understand reality without any interference from the subjective flak of politics.

Again, I think it means that is a goal he aspires to, and I suspect that whenever he discovers himself to be affect by politics or ideology, he moves to correct that. (Also, rather than claiming to know Kanazawa's mind, I myself identify with my understanding of what he wrote.)

Last thing: if scientists only care about what "is," and not what "should be," then why do they apply their research and ultimately end up shaping the world around them? Just a question about morals, politics, and motives. I tend to think there is more to science than just objectively recording and analyzing what is out there--despite what some folks claim.

Good point. I would say that scientists aren't scientists 24 hours a day. Doing research, and communicating that research, they should not talk about what should be, but that doesn't mean they as human beings can't have opinions. And of course those opinions are modified by scientific facts. Basically, whenever a person talks about what should be, then they are no longer speaking as a scientist, but as a "regular" person who is well informed about some subject. They should make that clear (and that's my non-scientist opinion).

"Again, I think it means that is a goal he aspires to, and I suspect that whenever he discovers himself to be affect by politics or ideology, he moves to correct that. (Also, rather than claiming to know Kanazawa's mind, I myself identify with my understanding of what he wrote.)"

I definitely understand that intention. Scientists should try to obtain an objective standpoint. That's an honorable goal. At the same time, I do not think that this is accomplished as simply as it sounds. I am not sure if biases and motives can simply be set aside by implementing some abstract control in research, etc.

It seems to me much of science is pretty political, whether or not its practitioners want to accept that or not. The whole idea of science as a mode of investigation can be seen as a politically and ideologically motivated endeavor.

To me, scientists are a part of the worlds they study, and they do affect/shape the data in any number of ways. Of course they try to correct for that and control it, but I am not sure if they can ever do that 100 percent. Also, there is the ever present issue of interpretation and placing meaning upon results.

To me, that's why scientific knowledge is always conditional.

Hopefully you do not take this the wrong way. This is not meant to be some attack on science. I have great respect for biologists and others in the "hard" sciences. Absolutely. I suppose I have a hard time accepting some of the broad claims of the logical positivist types of people though. The idea that humans can somehow turn themselves into objective recording machines at will strikes me as somewhat unrealistic.

We all do our best, but we have our limits. Interestingly, what is considered scientifically "correct" shifts in subtle ways over time.

"I would say that scientists aren't scientists 24 hours a day."

Agreed. And when do they start and stop being scientists? Is this a mental decision? How do they make that decision? How can they know when they are in the right mode?

"Doing research, and communicating that research, they should not talk about what should be, but that doesn't mean they as human beings can't have opinions."

But even the choice of a research project does not come from a lottery or from a vacuum, does it? The choice of a project, and the decision to put time and effort into learning more about a certain subject, can of course have some ideological or political roots. People get interested in certain subject for a reason, right?

"Basically, whenever a person talks about what should be, then they are no longer speaking as a scientist, but as a "regular" person who is well informed about some subject. They should make that clear (and that's my non-scientist opinion)."

So when biologists start talking about impacts of smoking on health, and suggest behavior modifications, they are not actually being scientists? When ecologists and biologists start talking about the effects of pollution on a particular environment they are no longer speaking as scientists? When engineers make recommendations about improving structures to withstand earthquakes they aren't speaking as scientists?

So scientists are merely detached observers with no vested interests in the work they are doing? And they have no interests in how their work affects society?

So when biologists start talking about impacts of smoking on health, and suggest behavior modifications, they are not actually being scientists? When ecologists and biologists start talking about the effects of pollution on a particular environment they are no longer speaking as scientists? When engineers make recommendations about improving structures to withstand earthquakes they aren't speaking as scientists?

Whenever they talk about what should be done, then that is not the scientist speaking. That's policy-making. All the examples above are not of that. They are merely stating what they have learned, namely that this or that can be done to improve health, the environment, and buildings. If they then conclude that we should improve those, then that's a different story (and a different "person").

So scientists are merely detached observers with no vested interests in the work they are doing? And they have no interests in how their work affects society?

As scientists they should have no interest in anything but learning about their subject. That doesn't mean they can't have that as persons. The bottom line is that personal beliefs, ideologies, and other views should never interfere with scientific research (including communicating it).

My experience has roughly supported a weaker version of Kanazawa's characterization, namely, "Conservatives are somewhat more likely to commit the naturalistic fallacy than are liberals, and liberals are somewhat more likely to commit the moralistic fallacy than are conservatives." Again, this is only just my experience, so I can't support this, and there are exceptions out the wazoo, but I think it's somewhat of a fair characterization.

Two exceptions that come to mind are characteristically liberal approaches to food ("GMO is bad because it's unnatural!") and characteristically conservative AGW denialism ("Unbridled capitalism is always good, therefore it can't possibly cause global warming!"). But when it comes to gender, race, intelligence, criminal tendencies, etc., Kanazawa has a point.

Heh, although it suddenly hits me that on the topic of homosexuality, conservatives are currently in the process of switching fallacies. It used to be, "homosexuality is bad because it is unnatural." Now, with overwhelming evidence that it is natural, the argument is more and more becoming "homosexuality must be unnatural because it is bad." heh....

So I suppose based on this we might argue that any tendency to commit one fallacy over the other is simply based on whether nature agrees or disagrees with one's political agenda. And in this light, perhaps it's no surprise -- and even a bit flattering -- that liberals, i.e. "progressives", would be more liable to commit the moralistic fallacy: We seek to "progress" beyond the hand that nature has dealt us.

Pleiotropy comes from the Greek πλείων pleion, meaning "more", and τρέπειν trepein, meaning "to turn, to convert". It designates the occurrence of a single gene affecting multiple traits, and is a hugely important concept in evolutionary biology.

I'm a postdoc at UC Santa Barbara.

All Many aspects of evolution interest me, but my research focus is currently on microbial evolution, adaptive radiation, speciation, fitness landscapes, epistasis, and the influence of genetic architecture on adaptation and speciation.