Except in the case of documents with numbered
paragraphs, when it is obvious from the numbering that material has been
omitted, diamonds (♦) are used to indicate the omission of one or
more paragraphs.

Chapter XIV:

Military Expediency Is Not the Whole Story

Graduates of Charlottesville had once known how to define civil affairs and
its function. That was at Charlottesville; now, in Italy, they could no longer
be sure. Before they tackled the job, it had seemed beyond question that their
mission was to conduct civilian life in such a way as to serve military
expediency. But if military expediency meant largely, as they had once been
told, making the foreign country a benefactor and not a beneficiary of the
occupying army, what was the meaning of the present situation? The Allies were
using precious little of Italy's local resources but they were straining their
own shipping resources by importing for Italians huge quantities of food and
agricultural rehabilitation supplies. To obtain those supplies AFHQ had had to
certify to the supply and shipping authorities that they were a military
necessity. Evidently the meaning of military expediency and necessity had
greatly broadened since the military government manual had been published. But
what of the meaning of civil affairs itself in the light of the present facts?
Did being in civil affairs mean working for the Army, for the Italians, or for
the better world all hoped would some day come? The CAO's could well have been
confused because, depending on which of their many objectives they had in mind,
they could have answered any or all of these questions in the affirmative.

One thing was clear-certain of their enterprises extended beyond the range
of military expediency even in its broadest sense. Yet, from the beginning, they
had been in accordance with Allied policies in Italy.

These policies, all illustrated in the documentation of the present chapter,
reflected the fact that in Italy, for the first time in the history of
belligerent occupation, military government had been saddled not only with the
job of serving an Army's needs but also with implementing political, economic,
and humanitarian policies that were of civilian and national rather than of
military import. The military government handbooks had not altogether
overlooked this contingency because in setting forth the functions of military
government they had supplemented the reference to military expediency with a
mention not only of international law but also of national policy as arbiters
of the duties of military government. But even the most recent manual had been
drafted before anyone could have foreseen how far military government in this
war would have to serve in a twofold role-part military, part political-and
before field operations had shown how difficult if not sharply conflicting
service to two masters would be. Not only the CAO's but the highest
headquarters were at times troubled, but the more patient among them accepted
with

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resignation the fact that the directives which came to them through the CCS
often reflected civilian rather than military aims. The principal civil affairs
problem had really become the job of working out the best possible accommodation
between military and political interests. Unfortunately, neither the CCS nor
any other authority outside Italy was giving much if any help in solving this
problem.

The more military authorities understood how the political leaders
themselves had been forced by history and circumstances into adopting an
ambivalent national aim in this war, the more tolerant they were of the
difficulties being imposed upon them. The Moscow Declaration of October 19.3,
for example, announced the politically imperative intent of the signatory
powers to restore free institutions to Italy. The basic declaration destined to
make the war in Italy as elsewhere a political as well as military enterprise
was, of course, the Atlantic Charter, which envisaged a better international
order embracing the defeated Axis powers as well as all others. The intention
proclaimed therein of destroying Nazi tyranny was construed to apply to Fascist
tyranny also when the United States and Great Britain later came to consider the
question of policy toward Italy. Even before this policy was formulated in a
directive, the civilian departments had begun to study the implementation of
Allied war aims under prospective military government, and the Office of
Strategic Services, in conjunction with other civilian agencies, had begun to
prepare civil affairs guides for all countries expected to be occupied by the
United States. In announcing broad political war aims the Allies in World War
II were simply following the precedent set in World War I, but in intending to
have fulfilment of these aims started under the military government the
political authorities were blazing a new trail. Changes in the basic polity of an occupied country had been regarded as contrary to
traditional concepts of international law; in any case, military governors had
never undertaken or thought it necessary to prepare their personnel for such a
task. The legal issue seems to have been overlooked or considered a secondary
technical matter which skilful jurists could be depended upon to somehow clarify
satisfactorily. The difficulty for military government officials in reconciling
their duties to the Army with their duties to political objectives seemed
sufficiently mitigated by the decision to turn over the conduct of civil affairs
at an early stage to civilian agencies. The CCS directive for Sicily authorized,
as far as was compatible with military needs, a policy of defascistization so
broad as to apply not only to all Italian administrators but also to Italian
laws and institutions.

As though the implementation of this policy were not staggering enough, the
CCS directive, in accordance with the President's desire, contained another
principle which it was novel for military government authorities to adhere to
in an enemy country-the principle of benevolence. All of America's wars had been
regarded as leading to benevolent results for the enemy, once defeated, and all
had been conducted with such benevolence as is required by the restraints or
duties of international law. But to make benevolence, even as qualified by
military expediency, an explicit criterion of the policies of occupation
required the President's unconventional imagination, his appreciation of the
still strong bonds between Americans and the Italian people, and possibly too a
prescience that this enemy would change into a cobelligerent. The President had
so habituated Americans to novelties that no American at AFHQ was surprised. However, Lord Rennell, Chief of AMGOT, did point
out with courageous candor that to emphasize benevolence in the instructions to

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troops might weaken the sternness of spirit required for a fighting job. His
proposal to change the instructions could not be carried out because it did not
accord with the CCS directive nor with the new attitude toward civilian values
in general.

During the assault and all the more active combat phases even the CAO's had
to be quite practical, but once these were over, the Chief of AMGOT could not
control the excessive or untimely benevolence of many and, indeed, did not
always try to. For example, in Sicily the CAO's spent weeks rescuing from
Italian jails wretches who had long been languishing there without benefit of
trial, while others pondered and worked hard over the problem of reopening the
shattered schools. All this had its reflections in organizational developments.
No educational advisers had been present in the planning period, but some were
soon brought in, and especially as plans developed for ACC, were followed by a
host of experts in other welfare specialities. Because American cultural
organizations had made Secretary Stimson see the importance of taking all
possible measures to minimize damage to Italy's historical monuments and art
treasures, advisers in the fine arts joined the staff, to undertake an
unprecedented job in the history of warfare. There were also labor specialists,
well aware of what the American labor organizations wished to see done toward
institution of free Italian labor unions. Nor could benevolence, if it was to
be extended to an ex-enemy, be denied in any measure to the refugees from United
Nations countries or even from the cobelligerent Yugoslavia of Tito. The CCS
directed AFHQ to provide care for all of them until the governments concerned,
mostly in exile, could resume responsibility. Accordingly, a Displaced Persons and Repatriation Subcommission was developed in ACC.

At best, it is hardly possible to serve two masters without confusion. It is
true that the directives always stated that military necessity was the overriding
master, but this left quite unanswered the question how much of one's service
could be devoted to the more amiable master if the claims of benevolence did not
conflict with military necessity too greatly and clearly. The American CAO's
had been fully prepared by Charlottesville to expect confusion in the foreign
countries to which they would be assigned, but they had not been prepared for
the confusion in their own minds. An example of such confusion is evident in the
plight of the lawyers who served as judges in the Allied military courts-the
only instruments of justice until the Italian courts could be reopened with a
purged judiciary. They knew that Allied courts had to protect the Army's
interests, but they had also been told to impress the Italian people with the
quality of Anglo-American justice. Since Fascist courts had been notorious for oversevere sentences GAO's tended to mete out only mild sentences-until
Headquarters admonished them that for the sake of military installations in
Italy harsher punishment should be given out as a deterrent. After several
months of such troubles in all spheres, British authorities decided that
benevolent idealism must at least be held in reasonable check, and they
accordingly opposed the American proposal to introduce civilian agencies into
the theater. Informally they admitted their apprehension of "starry-eyed"
civilians "running loose," that is, being under civilian directors instead of
military orders. American civilian agencies acquiesced and one cannot help
wondering whether this unexpected attitude was not the result of an unavowed
belief that acquiescence had its advantages. The agencies may have deduced that
if they remained altogether in Washington not only would they be less fettered in
continuing to propose idealistic policies, but also they would have much
quicker access

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to both the White House and the War Department and could thus do more for the
military government effort at home than abroad.

But so far as the civilian departments being able to influence policy in the
way that it now needed to be influenced is concerned, their reasoning was
wrong. It was only in the field and from the lessons of field experience that
they could learn how far it was necessary to modify the political aims they had
imposed upon military government, not only from the point of view of military
expediency but also from that of successful implementation of their own aims as
well. The War Department, and especially military operational authorities, had
contributed very little in the policy forming stage by way of a practical point
of view which is always needed to temper somewhat a political ideal. Partly
responsible was the fact that the CCAC, the subcommittee of the CCS wherein
the accommodation between civilian and military points of view could best have
been made, had not even come into existence when the directive for Italy was
drafted; CAD was in existence, but it considered that its function was
co-ordination and final drafting rather than actual participation in civilian
policy deliberations on purely political problems.

Ensuing troubles were inevitable, and they are most apparent in the effort to
carry out the objective which American civilians took more seriously than any
other-defascistization. The ideal conflicted with military expediency in
attainment of the Army's most vital goal-the continuation of Italian
administration so that military operations would not be disturbed by disorder in civilian life. By its directive to liberate the people
from its fascist regime, and other provisions whether mandatory or contingent
upon military discretion, the CCS authorized a broad defascistization. This
broad scope was premised in some measure upon an assumption which proved to be false-that
Fascist officeholders were just about as fanatical and inimical as the officials
of Nazi Germany. Even, however, if Allied leaders had known the true situation,
the sweeping nature of the program was probably inevitable politically, because
political beliefs of this nature are largely emotional in their origin and do
not yield to reason in much degree until the harsh problems of application are
encountered. Thus it was only after some difficulty that the President had been
dissuaded from his original requirement that top Sicilian officials be replaced
by Allied officers.

The initial assumption that Fascist officials were as dangerous militarily
as they were bad politically applied generally only to officials of the Fascist
Party who were also administrative officials. Such party officials, however, in
most instances fled before the Allied armies neared, and those who remained
were quickly ferreted out and arrested by military intelligence units. AMG's
task, then only beginning, was ferreting out and then dismissing, either at
once or as soon as possible, all "active and influential party members." (AMGOT GAI 2.) A just determination of these was not easy, nor was the task of finding
enough or sufficiently qualified replacements in areas remote from the centers
of Italian political talent. The CAO's seem quickly to have concluded that the
remaining Fascist officeholders fell generally into three classes of which only
the third raised a security problem. First there were the nonpolitical
conformists (who had joined the Party to keep their job) ; second, the political
opportunists (who had joined primarily to get a job); third, the presumptive
scoundrels. The last were not determined to be scoundrels by technically correct
judicial process but by popular indictment: especially in the smaller towns,
the Italian populace tended to riot or to threaten riot

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if certain Fascist officials were not promptly dismissed. The CAO's, feeling
that most Italians were basically not only long-suffering but just, believed
that their demonstrations had merit except possibly when directed against tax
collectors. The "scoundrels" were not known to be inimical to the Allies-indeed
they would probably have gratefully co-operated in return for Allied
protection-but their dismissal was certainly necessary to military security
insofar as this called for preventing public disorder or commotion.

But headquarters knew that if it avowed that its criterion of the
objectionable Fascist officeholder was the hostility of fellow Italians,
civilian departments at home could well feel that the defascistization
directive was being applied either ironically or quite naively. It also knew
that there were other political considerations which in the long run would
outweigh the expediency in not taking epuration too seriously. The conformists
and the opportunists might give AMG docile service, but while untainted
Italians might not riot over their remaining in office, they would feel bitter
and disillusioned if the Allies kept too many of "the old gang" to lead Italy
toward the realization of democratic ideals. Thus AMG had to find some formula
which promised the dismissal of enough to show its political sincerity, but not
so many as to threaten administrative breakdown. One formula after another was
tried and abandoned because it. dismissed either too few or too many. At
one point the standard adopted presupposed almost divine omniscience in CAO's
because, on the basis of a questionnaire, they were to determine whether the
officeholder had joined the Party from base inclinations or merely from
necessity. One CAO, whether from a feeling of omniscience or because he felt
headquarters would rather see too many than too few kicked out of office, distinguished himself by
suspending nine hundred officeholders in one province alone, thereby temporarily
disrupting the administration.

Many Italian liberals, however, thought that CAO's were dismissing too few,
and AMG was immeasurably relieved when the Italian Government completed
preparations for its own epuration program and was thus in a position to assume
the burden itself. In a certain sense reverting to what many CAO's had felt the
most practicable and democratic procedure in the first place, AMG in all the
more settled areas let Italians decide whom to dismiss not, indeed, by popular
clamor, but by the formal device of provincial Italian committes which were
appointed by AMG but which rendered judgments in accordance with the
government's legislation. Even before the government completed its legislation
some such solution as this could have been worked out, and probably would have
been except for one thing. AMG knew that much attention in the United States was
centered on this political issue and that it could not afford to take any
initial step which would have seemed at all like an evasion of responsibility.

It only remains to note briefly, for whatever light this may throw upon both
the equities and the practical considerations inherent in the issue, what the
Italians did with the problem once it was placed in their lap. They immediately
found that it was difficult to progress any faster than had AMG. After a time
they called in to their aid Count Sforza, the most eminent of the Italian
liberals. As High Commissioner for Epuration he studied the problem and
concluded that the best course was to make quick examples of the worst cases and
then let the entire painful issue die clown. Needless to say, at the end of

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Allied occupation the number of former Fascists still in office was greater
than the number dismissed.

As with the job of epuration, so for all other tasks requiring AMG/ACC to
serve both military expediency and politico social amelioration, a formula of
compromise could not be found which satisfied both. It is a little hard to
conclude that this was because soldiers, with a bias in favor of expediency,
were the administrators. Even Lord Rennell, who had warned against
overbenevolence, did not practice what he preached. Certainly he showed no
sentimentality in his account of the interned Yugoslav refugees at Ferramonte
whom all his officers, because suffering does not tend to ennoble, found
"difficult." But though the refugees at times seemed more intent on getting
special dispensations than on showing gratitude, Rennell did not decrease but increased their preferential treatment. AFHQ promised
funds to Tito's partisans if they would aid the escape to Italy of still more
Jews threatened by the Germans. But the theater's facilities became so overtaxed
that for a time-until a camp in French North Africa could be opened up-the
policy of active aid in escape had to be suspended. To cite quickly some of the
frustrations in other matters, not all laws reflecting Fascist doctrines could be abrogated, because in some cases the doctrines were too closely intertwined with essential regulations which
had to stand until the Government changed the statutes in entirety. Labor was
given the right to organize but in wartime it could hardly be given the right to
strike; schools were reopened with purged textbooks but without teachers
qualified to teach democracy or even to use modern pedagogical methods; higher
military levels were furnished maps and instructions designed to minimize
damage to historical monuments and works of art, but it was often impossible,
through too small a special staff, to get the word of this objective down to the
officers and troops in charge of the guns.

At best, military government is an unnatural form of government in an
abnormal context. Even when it is oriented entirely toward military
expediency, the most that can be expected of military government is that it keep failures clown
to a reasonable minimum. But in World War II the difficulties were compounded
by the unprecedented requirements that military government destroy totalitarian
systems and begin the rebuilding of democracies. This of course had advantages
far outweighing the difficulties, and it may well be that the Allied occupation
of Italy will mark the beginning of a new epoch in the conception of the
soldier's role in military government.

♦ ♦ ♦ You will administer to the best of your ability with a sense of
impartiality and justice, without fear or favour. In administration and
especially in the administration of justice, all men and women must be equal for
you.♦ ♦ ♦

(39) Civilians charged with offenses against the law of Military Government
will be brought before Allied Military Courts. Allied Military Courts will comprise General Military Courts,

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Superior Military Courts and Summary Military Courts.

General Military Courts will consist of not less than three officers, at
least one of whom shall be a judicial Officer of AMGOT. Superior Military Courts
will consist of one or more officers at least one of whom shall be a judicial
Officer of AMGOT, if available. Summary Military Courts will consist of one
officer who shall be a Judicial Officer or a Civil Affairs Officer of AMGOT, if
available. Every officer of AMGOT who is a qualified lawyer is a Judicial
Officer for the above purposes.

Establishment of Courts

(40) In areas where AMGOT is functioning under the orders of a Task Force
Commander, acting for the M.G., Allied Military Courts will be established under
the authority of such Commander; and in areas where AMGOT is functioning under
the orders of the C.C.A.O., acting for the M.G., Allied Military Courts will be
established under the authority of the C.C.A.O....

Powers of Courts

(41) General Military Courts will try serious offenses including all cases
involving the death penalty. Superior Military Courts will try offenses meriting
punishment of not more than 10 years. Summary Military Courts will try minor
offenses and may not impose a sentence of more than one year's imprisonment. ♦ ♦ ♦

Section I. Public Sessions. The proceedings of every Allied Military Court
shall be public except when otherwise ordered by the Chief Civil Affairs Officer
or the Court.

Section 2. Rights of Defendants. Every defendant before an Allied Military
Court is entitled

(a) To have in advance of trial a copy of the charges upon which he is to be
tried, if he so desires;
(b) To consult a lawyer before the trial and have a lawyer or other
representative of his own choosing defend him at the trial, except that the
Chief Legal Officer or any Court may at any time prohibit any lawyer or other
person from appearing in any court. In any case, the Court may at the request
of the defendant or otherwise, assign to him an officer to assist in the defense of the case;
(c) To apply to the Court for further time to prepare his defense, which
application the Court may grant or deny in its discretion;
(d) To bring with him such material witnesses as he may desire or have them
summoned by the Court at his request;
(e) To give evidence on his own behalf at the trial, but he may not be
compelled to do so;
(f) To have the proceedings translated for his benefit when he is unable to
understand them otherwise.♦ ♦ ♦

THE PUBLIC LIKES OUR INITIAL LIGHT SENTENCES
[ Rennell Rpt, sec. I ]

20. . . . Allied Military Courts are functioning in all provinces but General
Courts are only convened by special order when needed. The sessions of all
courts are public and are frequently well attended by the public. The public
comment is favourable. The courts have, as a whole, a tendency to administer too
light sentences. I am attempting to correct this, but if unsuccessful I shall
have to consider recommending the establishment of minimum sentences. ♦ ♦ ♦

5. The Chief Civil Affairs Officer is concerned about the smallness of
sentences imposed for grave offences where the accused has been found "guilty."
The attention of all officers who sit on Allied Military Courts will be drawn to
the fact that sentences must riot only be assessed on the circumstances in which
the offence was committed, but also on the gravity of the offence, the
frequency with which the offence occurs and its effect on Military Security. As
an example, illiterate peasants have frequently been committting the grave
offence of cutting off pieces of Military telephone wires. This offence has
generally been committed openly to obtain binding wire and with little or no
knowledge of the possibilities of its results on the Allied Forces.
Nevertheless, the offence must be punished severely as it is a grave offence, is
very prevalent and the whole security of the Army may be jeopardized by it.

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THE APPEARANCE AS WELL AS THE FACT OF JUSTICE IS IMPORTANT
[ACC Exec Memo 6, 10 Feb 44, ACC files, 10000/109/1577]

3. (1). ... Attention is called to the statement in Special Administrative
Instructions Legal No. I that "It is as important that justice should seem to be
done as that it should be done." Every care should be taken

(a) To ensure not only that the judges are impartial, but that they appear to
be impartial alike to prosecution and defense. No officer who has taken part in
the investigation of any case (other than merely determining whether the case is
suitable for trial by a General, Superior or Summary Court) is eligible to hear
that case;
(b) To ensure that the evidence is fairly and accurately interpreted,
particularly where evidence for the prosecution is given in a language other
than Italian. The judge should address his remarks directly to the witness and
the interpreter should interpret literally the judge's words. Interpreters
should not be allowed to frame questions themselves nor to give merely the
purport of questions and answers. ♦ ♦ ♦

Yesterday some Rangers who are quartered near here wanted meat and shot a
cow. The cow belonged to Maria Barbusca, who is the mother of a farmer called
Francesco Petralia and lives in Enna at 224 Via Donna Nuova. They skinned and
gralloched the beast in the field of another farmer whose name I do not know but
who is very displeased. The kill was made near Villarosa station.

Donna Maria's son resented the slaughter of his mother's cow and was handed
one of the notes attached. Donna Maria herself also objected and was handed the
other.
I cannot help feeling that the recklessness with which the Fifth Battalion of
Rangers commit the .. . American Consul to two payments for one cow should be
visited with reproval.

Instances of drunkenness, assault, looting and rowdyism were continually
being reported.

The Italian police were powerless to deal with Allied soldiers, who
frequently seized the weapons of CCRR and Metropolitani or released civilians
who had been arrested for crime.
Many cases were reported of soldiers selling illegally large quantities of
cigarettes, rationed foodstuffs and Army petrol, which quickly found their way
on the black market.

A favorite pastime was the "requisitioning" of vehicles, articles of
furniture or other property by handing the owner a slip of paper, usually signed
in a facetious manner. Most of this requisitioning amounted to plain theft. For
too much license was allowed to individual officers who had genuine grounds for
requisitioning and it is recommended that the very strictest control be
exercised in the future to prevent wholesale abuse.

All reports of crimes by Allied soldiers were forwarded to the Provost
Marshal General concerned (and in suitable cases to Allied Claims Commission),
but in almost every case the injured party was unable to give a description of
the culprit which would lead to his identification.
It was apparent that insufficient Military Police were available to deal with
the troops. Close contact was maintained with the Military Police and among
other measures the following were adopted:

a) Notices were distributed to all Military barracks worded: "TO ALL ALLIED TROOPS THE GERMANS LOOTED ITALY THESE PEOPLE TRUST YOU"
b) Hours of drinking by troops were restricted and curfew imposed.
c) Certain areas were placed out of bounds to troops.
d) Soldiers sent to rear areas were forbidden to carry weapons.
e) Joint patrols by Military Police and CCRR were inaugurated in Naples.
f) Requests were made for unit commanders to warn troops about their
behaviour, to caution them against the danger of venereal disease and of
drinking liquor sold on the streets.
g) Publicity was given to the number of arrests made for selling adulterated
liquor. ♦ ♦ ♦

This seems an appropriate moment to draw to your attention the extremely
important question

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of policy which arises with regard to the attitude in respect of unoccupied
territory of the purely military organizations operating in Italy and Sicily,
15th Army Group, FLAMBO and its Districts 1 & 2 and their subareas and the
various boards (e.g. communications, internal transport, local resources) set up
by them.

The attitude of these bodies is from a purely military standpoint quite
understandable. Whatever may be the legal and political concept of unoccupied
territory, the purely military mind quite reasonably sees a de facto occupation
by the military of large areas even in unoccupied territory, e.g. Bari, Brindisi
and Taranto and the execution by them of many administrative matters in such
territory, e.g. control of shipping, railways and telephones and even the repair
of telephone lines. In consequence it is difficult for them to appreciate the
essential difference between occupied and unoccupied territory and this is
already leading to misconceptions, e.g. in the right of arrest and disposal of
persons offending against Allied Forces, a faulty approach to the problem of
telecommunications, high handed action in dealing with employees of the Bari
Radio Station, the treatment of the whole of Italy as "occupied" by the
Transportation Committee, and so on. ♦ ♦ ♦

It is suggested therefore that this Commission should take up with the
Military Bodies I have mentioned above this important question and ask them to
make it plain to all officers the essential difference between occupied and unoccupied territory....

3. The two undersigned while in pursuit of their duties of inspection in
Albano were contacted by [Fernando] Lucidi and taken to his wine repository.
His story is this: He had vast quantities of wine in his shop in large
hogsheads. He had walled them up and painted the stones white, so that the
Germans might not know of this stock and in this way they were successfully
deceived. When the first Allied troops, he said Americans, came through, he was
so overjoyed that he tore down part of the wall, stuck a hose attached to a hand
pump in one of the hogs heads and proceeded to dole out free wine to these
first soldiers who came by his place. The word spread rapidly among the outfits
coming through Albano and soon his yard was crowded with vehicles carrying demijohns, water flasks, barrels and other types of containers. He told
Capt. Keller that to this point, 7 June 1944, they had taken 22,000 litres of
wine without paying or giving a receipt. He was in despair and asked advice.

4. This is what Capt. Willcox and Capt. Keller saw: There were one or two
American soldiers with small litre flasks. There were many British soldiers with
a weapons carrier loaded with demijohns, gasoline cans, and large gasoline
barrels. Lucidi was looking on as his Italian helper worked the hand pump under
the direction of the British soldiers. The receptacles were practically all
full and the last one or two were being filled.

5. a. This is what Capt. Willcox and Capt. Keller did in reference to Lucidi:
Questioned Lucidi as to whether he had taken his case to the CAO. He had not.
Due to the rapidity of the movement of the Army and the early date, the CAO must
have had several communes to look after, therefore, being difficult to reach. He
was not in town in mid-afternoon 7 June 1944. The undersigned advised Lucidi to take from the vehicles that came in the
designation of their outfits. This he had already done and he had a long list
pencilled on scraps of paper. These he was told to submit to the CAO at the
earliest moment together with his story. The undersigned left their names with
Lucidi for future testimony. The claims service was explained to him.

b. This is what Capt Willcox and Capt Keller did in reference to the soldiers
on the spot: Capt Willcox took down in his notebook the name of the soldiers'
outfits and the names of their Commanding Officer. The intention of the
undersigned officers was to give this information to the CAO, but he was, as
stated above, not to be found. The soldiers were advised of the Rules of Land
Warfare on this particular point and were told gently but firmly that they were
performing an illegal act in taking the wine without paying or leaving a
receipt. The soldiers, British as has been stated above, with the exception of
the two Americans, said they had been ordered by their officers to come for the
wine. They had not been ordered to pay or leave a receipt. The undersigned
officers carefully explained the situation to them and again that they were
performing an act outside the law. They saw the point.

6. Though the greatest amount of wine taken was by British soldiers in sight
of the undersigned officers, the list of outfit designations in the possession
of Lucidi indicated that the

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Americans had visited and taken in force also. Though not asked for, it is
the opinion of the undersigned officers that Lucidi should be given some
recompense for the loss of his wine.

7. The above is the sworn statement of the undersigned regarding claim of
Fernando Lucidi.

ii. c. Immediate action was necessary in regard to persons awaiting trial,
many of whom were found to have been in detention for months and even years. In
these cases arrangements had to be made with the Italian legal authorities for
the grant of provisional liberty where further delays were likely to occur in
bringing the accused to trial. A further stream of applications for conditional
liberty or for clemency flowed in from persons already convicted and serving
sentences, but with an Italian Government now in existence, it should be
possible in other areas to divert the stream into the proper channels....

[Cons of Public Safety, AMG Rgn 3, Rpt on Activities to 15 December 1943, p.
17]

xxii. Political PrisonersPolice were instructed to discontinue the Italian practice of holding
civilians in jail pending investigation, which resulted in persons being
imprisoned for long periods without trial. They were told to comply with
Proclamation 13, Article I, which prohibits detention without specific charge.

♦ ♦ ♦ Italian law provided that the Questore had the authority to jail
without charge anti-Fascists under his "disposition of the Questore" power. It
was reported to AMG that this official, apparently laboring under a perverted
sense of Mosaic justice, was imprisoning Fascists under this power. He answered
an inquiry by the simple reply that during the Fascist regime he had used his
power to jail anti-Fascists and it was only fair that now he should use it to
jail Fascists. Despite the logic of his reasoning, his victims were released,
pending investigation by our security police. ♦ ♦ ♦

7. The Regional Commissioner shall be responsible for investigating the
circumstances of all prisoners held in jail without trial and for investigating
all cases of complaint by prisoners that they have been unjustly condemned for
their political views. The Regional Commissioner shall forward to Headquarters
ACC his recommendations for release of all such prisoners and may pending
receipt of orders thereon grant provisional or conditional liberty or release,
on parole, after consultation with the appropriate Italian Judicial Official.
Investigation will also be made of persons charged with crimes and never brought
to trial because of political connections and report made to Headquarters, ACC. ♦ ♦ ♦

14. In order to expedite the hearing of trials of persons detained in jail
for an alleged offence against Italian law and to reduce the number of persons
in jail awaiting trial, two Regional Orders (Numbers 30 and 30 have been made.
Regional Order No. 30 required all Italian Courts to sit at least six hours a
day and, in Courts having both criminal and civil jurisdiction, to devote
approximately three fourths of their time to criminal trials. Calendars are to
be so arranged that no judge is ever without work to do. Regional Order No. 31
appoints a Lieutenant Colonel of AMG, a Councillor of the Court of Appeal and a
substitute Procurator General as a Commission to investigate the state of the
jails within Region III and to report to the Regional Commissioner thereon. The
Order empowers the Commission (a) to order the release of any person who has
been in gaol for more than 10 days and who has not had a formal charge made
against him; if the Commission is of the opinion he has been in jail for a
period not less than the sentence he would have received for the crime of which
he is charged, and (b) to order the release of any persons who have been in
jail for more than 30 days without a formal charge made against them. An order
under (a) requires confirmation by a judicial officer appointed by the Regional
Commissioner; an Order under (b) does not require confirmation. The Commission

[379]

has no power to order the release of persons detained by the Allied Forces,
AMG or ACC on a charge of infringing any proclamation, regulation or order
issued by AMG or ACC.

1. On 20 March 1944, I conferred at Ozieri with the President of the Court of Appeal, Signor Volpe, and the Procuratore
Generale, Signor Spallanzani. I discussed with them in detail the necessity for
re-establishing the Courts at Cagliari,
1 and the various problems connected
therewith. These gentlemen expressed their desire to co-operate and to resume
their work at Cagliari as soon as arrangements could be made.

8. On 25 March 1944, I endeavored to ascertain what progress had been made
with respect to the establishment of the mess at the Palace of Justice and the
requisitioning of quarters for the court personnel.

I went to the court building with the Chief Architect, Signor Valente, and
found that while the masonry work had been completed, no cooking facilities had
been installed, nor had any messing equipment been made available. I found also,
that while living quarters had been found which appeared to be suitable, the
necessary requisitioning formalities had not been fulfilled. I conferred with
Judge Cardia the same day. Since he was the Member of the Tribunale who had been
left in Cagliari to take care of housing and feeding arrangements, it was his
duty to superintend the details of these matters. I told him that he was
expected to see that the requisitioning formalities were complied with; and
that a more speedy effort should be made to install the mess. Judge Cardia
appeared to have been occupied with other matters, and said that the person who
had been chosen to supervise the mess had gone to Sassari to procure some wine.
He also stated that he had been unable to find any plates, knives or forks or
dining room furniture. Judge Cardia agreed to visit the Prefect to obtain his
assistance in procuring the necessary mess equipment.

I spent a considerable amount of time with Signor Valente searching for
cooking apparatus since it appeared that the apparatus previously promised by
the Prefect was not available. We then determined that a coal stove made of
masonry and tiles would have to be constructed, and that we could not expect to
procure any cooking apparatus ready to install. Incidentally, we visited a number of
public buildings which had been bombed, and searched through the debris for
suitable kitchens and for suitable cooking fixtures, but found that whatever
was left was damaged beyond repair. We subsequently visited two iron foundries
where we arranged to have certain necessary stove parts and cooking utensils
manufactured.

[Continuation of report, written 12 April 1944] 2. A mess for the Judges and
court employees has been in full operation in a section of the basement of the
Palace of justice since 5 April 1944. The establishment of the mess was a source
of considerable anxiety and inconvenience, as the court officials did not
receive the co-operation they had been led to anticipate from the Office of the
Prefect and the local Italian officials. After several days of fruitless
discussion which resulted only in the release of requisition slips which were of
no practical value, a committee of the court officials . . . called on me at the
offices of the Commission and placed the problem in my hands. This matter was
one of great importance to the officials involved and to the court employees
receiving small salaries. . . . I went to the offices of a number of Italian
officials charged with the distribution of food, in order to complete the
formalities, necessary for the recognition of the mess for future allotments for
foodstuffs. Captain Sullivan and I delivered to the Palace of justice a quantity
of dehydrated vegetables as an advance against the allotments about to be made,
and I negotiated with a mess officer of an American regiment billeted nearby to
procure some residue kitchen fats. I also procured an allowance of olive oil. I
cannot overemphasize the good will and gratitude shown by the court personnel
to the Commission and me as a result of these efforts....

1. Lack of transport for the indispensable needs of the Military Government
Courts has become so grave that the program now in operation is definitely
jeopardized.

After weeks of patient effort, the net succor this office has enlisted is as
follows:

(a) One taxi-cab with tires of ancient vintage.
(b) Three motorcycles without drivers.
(c) The intermittent use of a motor car and driver obtained from Naples
Province on a

[380]

day [to day] request that is degenerating into a raw function of nerves and
personalities.

(d) A civilian automobile for use of the Provincial Legal Officer equipped
with inner tubes that cannot be relied upon with any degree of certainty. Dire
necessity requires that this car be used in process serving in addition to the
use originally intended.

2. It is fantastic to expect such equipment to meet the realistic
requirements of a metropolitan area of the size of Naples. Resort to makeshift
methods [has] been used until now but cannot continue indefinitely; the human
mind and body have a point of saturation beyond which they cannot absorb. This
point definitely has been reached. ♦ ♦ ♦

2. I have quite properly been requested to assist in attempting to
"condition" Peninsular Base Section to the inevitable day when Naples Province
will be handed back to the Italian government (or legal officers now employed
here will be withdrawn) and the Base Section will have to look to the Italian
courts for punishment of civilian offenders except in most crucial and
aggravated cases.

3. It is difficult to accomplish much along this line in the face of an
expanding court structure and a growing volume of cases tried by military
courts, which to the outsider evidence intent by the Commission to enlarge,
rather than contract, the scope of its operations in the administration of
justice. ♦ ♦ ♦

All in all, it seems to me that the more prudent course would be to start at
once to reverse the present trend and force more cases into the Italian courts.
This may be painful to all parties concerned, but the "headaches" involved are
going to be aggravated in direct proportion to the length of tine for which we
permit the present policy to continue.

As you know, one of my principal difficulties in the judicial field lies in
the inadequate supply of Italian judges and legal officers. . . . I understand
that a considerable number could be found in the ranks of prisoners of war held
by us.
If you can obtain sanction I would like to send General [Francesco] Traina,
who is approximately JAG of Italian Army, to North Africa in the first instance to see
what personnel is available....

Grateful if you would let me know earliest possible your reactions to this
proposal. It is very necessary to explore every possibility of finding
reinforcements for the Italian judiciary as the problem will inevitably become
acuter the more territory we transfer to Italian administration.
2

♦ ♦ ♦ Civilian
courts continue to move in a very slow manner. Procedure in most grain cases is
in motion. As a result of habit, it is difficult to impress legal bodies of the
importance of their duty in imposing heavy penalties on small grain violators,
since these constitute a great majority of black market sources. ♦ ♦ ♦

1. During the 7 weeks of my tenure of office as Regional Chief Legal Officer
for the Southern Region, I have particularly concentrated all the available
energies of my Division upon the task of securing a maximum of efficient effort
from all Italian Courts functioning in the Region.3

3. Wherever I have gone, I have stressed the undermentioned considerations:
a. The supreme importance of giving priority to all cases in which Allied
interests directly or indirectly are involved.
b. The supreme importance of forgetting the rights of individual offenders as
apparently entrenched in the ordinary peacetime practice of taking into account
the sociological desirability of reforming offenders and the supreme necessity
of imposing sentences which will deter by their exemplary character other
persons from committing those crimes which cannot have other

[381]

wise than an adverse affect upon the Allied war effort.

c. Pointing out clearly and firmly that rapidity of judicial action
following upon police complaint is the keynote of all judicial effectiveness in
the handling of crime, I have repeatedly endeavored to convince the Italian
judiciary that it is just as important that justice should appear to be
administered as that it in fact is.
d. Dealing with matters of intention as they affect the destruction of Allied
supplies of all sorts, I have constantly reiterated the doctrine that a man must
be held to intend the reasonable consequences of his acts, that no one not an
idiot in interfering with ammunition for example, could believe that he was not
deteriorating its effectiveness as ammunition.

4. The general impression that I have gained as a result of all these
personal efforts and of consultations with my officers is that the above
propositions have met with receptions passing from an apparent enthusiastic
concurrence in them, through the various grades of lip service, and passive
acceptance coupled with a mental reservation that they cannot be translated into
action and ending with a thinly disguised hostility. Almost everywhere I have
been accorded a patient and outwardly courteous hearing and everywhere, where I
have raised matters of inadequacy of sentences, tardiness in bringing offenders
to justice and the ever rising tide of judicial congestion in cases affecting
the interests of the Allies I have been met with some one or more of the following excuses:

♦ ♦ ♦ 1. Since the last meeting [ May ], it was proposed that the Italian courts
be allowed to carry on their work. Policy in Military Government territory is
to turn over as much as possible to Italian courts even in early stages in order
to reduce the pressure on the very limited number of legal officers and to lay
the groundwork for restoration of territory to the Italian Government.

2. In the Commune of Naples, still under Military Government, the bulk of
cases is handled successfully by Italian courts. Virtually all the normal cases
are tried by the Italians except cases of a serious nature.

4. In all newly occupied provinces, Italian Courts have been kept open or
reopened. Politically suitable judicial personnel found locally have been put to
work and many refugee officials have been restored to their proper posts. ♦ ♦ ♦

♦ ♦ ♦ The entire Fascist party leadership, that is, party officials and other
active and influential party members, from the top down to the local
secretaries, should be removed from any posts of authority in the civil
administration. This should include Federal Secretaries who are ex-officio
members of various administrative departments.

Since all holders of important governmental
posts are members of the Fascist party they may
not be removed at once without breakdown of
the administrative system. The following general principles will, however, serve as a guide:
(a) Prefects of provinces known to be strong Fascists will be removed but subordinate officials will carry on under
supervision. Some senior civil servants, including pro-Fascist officials, may
be found in the appointments of prefects, etc. These may be allowed to carry on
if co-operative.
(b) The same applies to mayors, etc. of larger cities.
(c) The Prefects Council, the Provincial Giunta and the Provincial Rettorate
should be retained provisionally but should not meet or take action until their
membership and composition have been considered.
(d) The Consulta of Communes may be retained but should not meet or take
action until further orders.
(e) Fascist militia as a military or semi military body should be abolished
or disbanded.

[382]

If in military formation, the members should be treated as prisoners of war.
Military or party uniforms will not be worn.
(f) Members of the militia organization who are working personnel of docks,
railways and communications, may be retained on good behavior in their ordinary
employ but not as militiamen.
(g) Carabinieri will continue civil police functions on good behavior. If
they refuse to do so they will be treated as military prisoners of war since
they are an armed and uniformed body.
(h) The Corpo degli Agenti will be retained as local police body on good
behavior.
(i) The Polizia Municipale will be retained on good behavior.
(j) It should be made clear to all administrative officials that their
continuation is solely on the basis of satisfactory co-operation, performance
and behavior. Officials whose performance is not satisfactory should be
discharged and their pay will then cease. If they are influential and considered
dangerous or suspect they should be apprehended. ♦ ♦ ♦

1. The disturbances which have taken place in various communes appear to have
been in the main directed against the retention in office of local officials
appointed under the fascists regime.
4

2. Where it is obvious that local officials are cordially disliked and
mistrusted by the population, C.A.O.'s should take immediate steps to replace
them. There appears to have been some misunderstanding in this matter, and
C.A.O.'s, in some cases, appear to be under the impression that unless otherwise
instructed they should retain the sitting mayor. They should, however, before
recommending to me the removal of any mayor, have a candidate ready to replace
him. ♦ ♦ ♦

BUT AT FIRST HOUSE-CLEANING IS MAINLY ON TOP LEVEL
[Lt Col Poletti, SCAO, Palermo Province, Rpt for Sep 43, ACC files, 10000/100/652]

I. The month of September saw the completion of the administrative machinery
of the Province of Palermo, the establishment of a firm administrative and governmental foundation based on liberal ideals, and the complete
elimination of Fascist restrictions and super-impositions. An acting Prefect, S.
E. Francesco Musetto, was appointed by order dated 10 September 1943. This appointment was greeted with
satisfaction from all quarters, as Musetto had a long and clear record of
Anti-Fascism. There followed the appointment of a Sindaco and Giunta for the
Commune of Palermo by order dated 27 September 1943. . . . and subsequently,
that of a Provincial President and Council on 30 September 1943. . . .
Realizing that the Commune and Province of Palermo and its administration would
be the subject of great scrutiny and that action taken here would have
reverberations throughout the Island, all of the above appointments were made
only after the most thorough consideration and consultation with leading
liberals and representatives of all classes within the Province. ♦ ♦ ♦

♦ ♦ ♦ In the first phases of occupation, AMG officers usually had to use
"rule-of-thumb" judgments in determining who were and who were not "Fascists."
In many instances, information was furnished by CIC and Field Security
(British), but often the only accusations against individuals were of such a
character that CAO's and CAPO's were faced with the alternative either of doing
the individual an injustice or of taking no action at all against persons who
may have been real Fascists but against whom the evidence was not at all clear.

The dependence upon CIC, FSS, or other existing military intelligence was
necessarily limited in time and scope since those agencies' mission was
primarily one of concern with military security of an immediate character
rather than with the long-range necessities of military government. After the
first phases, CIC and FSS units generally moved on with the combat armies.
Thus, no matter how useful a job such units had done with respect to Fascists
arrested for reasons of military security, the problem of removing the real
Fascists from public office--and the renewing of cases of persons arrested as
Fascists-remained with the AMG officers. Moreover the necessity of keeping in
operation the existing administrative machinery of provinces and communes
often permitted of no changes in official

[383]

personnel until a period of greater stability had been reached.

The Political Intelligence Section was thus established as an Headquarters
Staff unit to serve both Headquarters divisions and field offices. Its mission
was (a) to draw up specific criteria which would lead to a more precise and just
conclusion with respect to the degree to which any given public official-or
other outstanding individual was in fact the type of Fascist whose elimination
was desirable from AMG's point of view; (b) to provide a method for utilizing
such criteria in the provinces and communes and, where necessary, at
Headquarters; (c) to co-ordinate information based on these criteria with other
available intelligence information, and (d) to make studied recommendations
based on such co-ordinated information.

The first immediate results of this assignment were:
(1) The drawing up of a questionnaire (Scheda Personale) for distribution to
all Provincial SCAO's and by them to communal CAO's.
5This questionnaire contained about 50 items which answered in YES or NO form
and taken under oath, would provide much more specific information about public
officials than it had been possible to obtain previously.

(2) The fact [is] that the questionnaires could be used not only as a basis
for action against public officials or other outstanding individuals (such as
Corporative, Syndical, Agrarian or banking officials) but also in reviewing the
cases of political prisoners. Many such prisoners, ailed or put in detention
camps before AMG's arrival and in some cases by AMG itself-while technically
Fascists in the sense of belonging to the party or holding minor party offices
were often not of a character requiring their detention in custody. Many had
been arrested on mere allegations that they were Fascists or reported to be
dangerous Fascists without specification. With the view that the questionnaires
would provide a more complete analysis of the cases of these political
prisoners, the CAO, Palmero Province, requested a review of 211 internees in the
Palermo jail. ♦ ♦ ♦

SHORTAGE OF OFFICERS AT FIRST RETARDS EPURATION ON THE MAINLAND
[Hq AMG, Rpt for Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/101/501]

185. Because of the extreme shortage of C.A.O.'s and C.A.P.O.'s, there being
an average of approximately one for each 20 communes, and because of the necessity of detailing
one C.A.O. to each of the five provincial capitals and using some of them for
civilian supply duty, it was impossible to visit each commune quickly and
overhaul its administration with respect to the removal of Fascist and
incompetent officials.

The people in many of these communes were eager to rid themselves of these
Fascist officials. In several cases they became impatient and, it is believed
usually under Communist Party leadership, organized demonstrations and forced
resignation. This was, in a way, merely a continuance of similar actions which
had occurred prior to the arrival of AMG officers on the scene.

187. An ingenious method of reconciling this popular desire for the removal
of Fascists with the shortage of personnel was worked out for Potenza province.
A committee of highly respected known anti-Fascists was formed and it was
announced that this committee was sitting under the chairmanship of an AMG
officer and would hear any complaints against former Fascists. If the evidence
presented warranted prosecution, prompt action was promised. The formation of
this committee and its purpose was widely advertised throughout the province and
the demonstrations ceased. ♦ ♦ ♦

♦ ♦ ♦ The
banks in accordance with instructions, kept blocked all accounts of fascist
organizations, prominent fascists and those of a government and semi-government
nature.♦ ♦ ♦

One of the principal problems of the Division was the arrest and internment
by C.F.O. of Giuseppe Frignani, head of the Bank of Naples. He was known to have
been prominent in the fascist party in the past and also believed to have been
fairly active in promoting co-operation with the Germans. This fact was reported
on arrival in Naples. On the other hand, he was said to have more or less
withdrawn from politics in recent years and devoted himself exclusively to
banking. He was without a doubt the most capable banker in the Region,
co-operated 100% and was of considerable help to the Division. The Finance
Division felt, looking at it from a banking, rather than a political viewpoint,
that the best interests of AMG would be served by allowing him to remain in
office, especially as

[384]

his bank would have to go through trying times and if anything should happen
to the bank at a later date the Allies might be subject to criticism for
removing the head of the bank. The Finance Division had no information which
would indicate that he was a threat to security....
6

♦ ♦ ♦ Giffoni (Valle Piana)-This little township, where I stayed from 26/9/43
until 4/10,/43, is gradually returning to normal, although the food situation is
still somewhat precarious. Salt, oil, "Pasta," soap and clothing are totally
lacking. Certain medicinals, such as antityphoid injections, bandages, etc., are
required. The main point of interest, however, is the general voice of
discontent at the fact that the "old gang" (fascist authorities) are still in
power and until these have been removed and replaced by anti-fascist elements,
no satisfactory solution to Giffoni's present troubles will be found.♦ ♦ ♦

17. . . . In this [Potenza] Province two riots took place; one, also, prior
to the occupation of the village of Irsina and subsequent to the departure of
the German troops. Here also an organized mob assault led to the Carabinieri
being hemmed in to their police post while another section of the mob killed the
Communal Secretary who was also the Chief Fascist and maltreated the female
members of his family, who, however, have not succumbed to their injuries. Here,
five ring-leaders have been arrested and are now in prison awaiting trial. At
the village of Meschita in the Northern part of the Province, within the last
few days a mob of people stating that they were anti-Fascist proceeded to
destroy the tax rolls and Communal records. A patrol of troops was sent to the
village which had a quieting effect and the ring leaders have been removed
under arrest.

There is evidence in these three cases and in a number of other cases
reported from the forward Eighth Army areas by Group Captain Benson's staff that
we may expect anti-Fascist demonstrations of considerable violence on an
increasing scale the further north the occupation goes. Unless C.A.O.'s and
troops can enter inhabited localities directly after their evacuation by German
troops, there is likely to be a repetition of scenes of violence and possible
bloodshed on an increasing scale. It must be borne in mind that Fascism played
little part on the whole in Sicily where its adherents were relatively few, and
too few to indulge continuously in the graver acts of oppression. From Lucania
north this will no longer be the case and when we get to the industrial centres
of Central Italy, I shall expect to see considerable violence and this, in spite
of the fact that in many Provinces the Fascist Prefects and some of the more
important Fascist officials have already been removed by the Badoglio
Government, as in the Province of Potenza and Matera where Badoglio's nominees
are now in office.♦ ♦ ♦

1. This directive indicates the policy for "screening" Italian officials
which will be carried out by all Regions.

2. The screening will be the responsibility of the R.C.A.O. and will be
designed to eliminate officials of the following categories:
(a) Fascist and Nazi sympathizers;
(b) Those who have actively helped the enemy;
(c) Those potentially dangerous to the security of the Allied Armed Forces
or to Allied Government administration;
(d) Passive resisters;

♦ ♦ ♦ 6. . . . (b) In the case of minor Officials who are members of a National
Agency, the S.C.A.O. may decide to retain them in office, but, if in his opinion
they should be dismissed, the consent of the head of the appropriate specialist
or Technical Division at Regional Headquarters must be obtained. ♦ ♦ ♦

1. Referring to the memorandum of this Headquarters of 14 December 1943
pertaining to the removal of certain categories of fascists from public office,
it has now been determined that the directive shall become effective on I
January 1944. You are accordingly instructed to deliver

[385]

on or before 31 December 1943, the following communication to each of the
Prefects of the provinces of Naples, Avellino and Benevento:

a. In accordance with the instructions of the Regional Civil Affairs Officer
for the Region of Campania and Naples, you are directed, commencing the first
day of January 1944, to take the following action:

(1) All
- Squadristi
- Marcia Su Roma
- Sciarpa Littorio
- Gerachi, and other fascists guilty of attacks against personal liberties, shall be removed
from the positions they now occupy in the government or any administration
directly or indirectly controlled by the government.

(2) All cases of persons previously discharged or placed on `unlimited
leave' because of their political views and all cases in which deserved
promotions have not been made because of such political views shall be
carefully examined; and such persons shall be reinstated or promoted, unless
there be urgent reasons against such action, in which case a full report shall
be made to the Senior Civil Affairs Officer.

(3) All Italian subjects who are holders of decorations granted by the German
or Japanese Governments shall be scrutinized, and all those who have
unquestionably received such honors because of their assistance in furthering
the Fascist cause shall be removed from public office as aforesaid.

(4) All promotions which have been made principally because of activity in
behalf of the Fascist cause shall be annulled.

b. You will immediately communicate these instructions to the heads of all
governmental departments and administrations and will inform these officials
that they will be held personally responsible for the faithful execution
thereof.
c. A weekly report shall be made of any action taken pursuant hereto.

2. Every effort should be made to collect as many Schede Personale as
possible, duly filled out, before 1 January 1944, after which the purpose for
which the information is required will be known.

♦ ♦ ♦ Great difficulty is experienced in finding suitable persons to replace
former Fascist officials who are acceptable to the people. In this connection mention should
be made of the numerous denunciations with which every C.A.O. is instantly
faced. These usually prove to have no other foundation than the personal
interest of the individuals concerned.♦ ♦ ♦

REASONS FOR APPOINTMENT OF FASCISTS
[Rpt, Hq ACC, for Mar 44]

. . . the bulk of officials were and had to be Fascists to earn their daily
bread. The appointment of an efficient man nearly always means the appointment
of a Fascist in some degree, with resulting criticism from both press and
people. ♦ ♦ ♦

1. This directive indicates method which will be followed in occupied
territory for the "Screening" of Italian officials.

2. This investigation, an explanation of which follows, will be the
responsibility of the R.C. and is designed to eliminate officials who from their
past record and character appear to be unsuitable to hold public office under
the aegis of Allied Military Government. It is intended primarily to expel
those individuals who through their own choice and inclination were ardent or
prominent members or supporters of the Fascist Party.

3. The principle of this scheme is that each official is considered
individually according to his personal merits and not in accordance with
arbitrary criteria. Each investigation begins with the personal background of
the official in his own locality and opportunity is afforded for the opinion of
Allied Security and Military Government Officers who are on the spot and
therefore in the best position to judge.

4. Unless such officials have already been investigated to the satisfaction
of the R.C., the following measures will be adopted.

5. The R.C. will classify the officials to be investigated into two groups.
List "A" indicating the Senior Officials and List "B" indicating those of lesser
importance. . . . [Lists omitted.]

6. Priority of attention will be given to List "A" on the principle that if
the senior officials

[386]

are bona fide, they themselves will be likely to see that their subordinates
are equally trustworthy. ♦ ♦ ♦

1. This report is a summary of comment sheets on letters from all parts of
liberated Italy, Sardinia and Sicily since the first of the year, about the
effectiveness of the removal of Fascists from public offices.

2. The continuance of Fascist politicians in government positions is
variously reported to have the following effects.
a. Loss of faith in the liberators.
b. A continuance of corruption and bribery in office along with lack of
interest in the welfare of the people with regard to food and protection against
crime.
c. Use of their positions by Fascists to secure the appointment to office of
other Fascists (and the exclusion of anti-Fascists), and to steal rations from
the public warehouses and sell them on the Black Market.
d. Use of Government police and postal powers to suppress opposition.
e. Sheltered organization of units devoted to the restoration of the
Fascists' Empire. Redistribution of confiscated civilian guns to Fascists.
f. Apathy and even opposition to the Allied cause in the Royal Italian Army.
g. Use by Fascist officials of their position to secure military information
about the Allies to relay to the enemy.
h. Mockery of Allied Government as "feeble" and "confused."

At the Italian Advisory Council's 10 Meeting, held on 21 April, the Soviet
representative, [Alexander E.] Bogomolov, proposed that a recommendation be made
to General Wilson expressing dissatisfaction about the Sardinian situation,
particularly the failure to eliminate Fascist officials and the large number of
people waiting to be tried, and asking for immediate action, on the theory that
the Allied Control officials are not sufficiently energetic in carrying out the
armistice terms. General [Mason-] MacFarlane explained that . . . there had been
some progress in correcting the situation in Sardinia, which had been under
administration. by Italians since prior to the armistice and not under Allied
military control, so that the Italians themselves and not the Control Commission
were the ones to remove the Fascists, and that it is hard to find adequate
technical personnel to replace the Fascists.
9

DISMISSAL OF ALL OFFICIALS OF MUSSOLINI'S FASCIST GOVERNMENT IS PLANNED
[Ltr, Chief Cmsr, ACC, to SCAO's Fifth and Eighth Armies and RC's, Rgns IV
and V, 24 May 44, ACC files, 10000/136/327]

1. We must differentiate between Italian officials encountered during our
present Northward advance and those who we found in office during our initial
occupation of Southern Italy.

2. North of the line where operations remained static for several months
Italian officials have been serving the Republican/Fascist government throughout
a period when liberated Italy under a properly constituted Government was
cobelligerent with us.

3. It is to be anticipated that many of these officials will flee before our
advance but a proportion will doubtless remain and these should all be dismissed
from their posts automatically and replaced by anti-Fascist personnel. As we
move North the possibility of finding suitable anti--Fascist personnel should
become much greater than it has been hitherto.♦ ♦ ♦

1. In as much as the Directive and the separate Memorandum of the Chief
Commissioner both dated 24 May 1944 have given rise to a few questions, the
following constitutes a revised and consolidated directive, designed to meet
these questions and possibly to forestall others.

2. Many of the Italian officials in the area north of the line marking the
beginning of the recent

[387]

offensive were placed in office by so-called Republican Fascist Government or
by the Germans. Others, however, despite their hostility to the Fascist
Government, have been compelled through coercion to remain in office or through
devotion to duty may have chosen to remain and serve their people.
10 ♦ ♦ ♦

3. The object of ACC is to rid the country as we go through it of the
important fascists and of persons put in office by the Republican [Fascist]
Government. While many important fascists are not necessarily men who are now
holding important administrative posts considerations of expedience make it
necessary for SCAO's and RC's to confine themselves to an examination of those
holding the more important posts. [See Executive Memo No. 45, above.]

5. Officials (as well as any other persons) regarded as potentially
dangerous should in addition be locked up immediately....

8. SCAO's and RC's have full discretion in exceptional cases to retain as a
purely temporary expedient a fascist in office where the immediate
administration of any locality renders this essential. In all such cases the
work of the individual should be closely supervised and application should be
made at once for a replacement to the appropriate Subcommission.

1. This revised Executive Memorandum No. 67 is issued in the light of
experience gained in the working of the original Memorandum No. 67 of 5 July 1944, which is hereby cancelled. The policy and the principle of operation remain the same.

2. Our object is to remove from territory, immediately on liberation, all
leading fascists from important posts, especially those collaborationists put in
office by the Republican Fascist Government. This Memorandum is intended as a
guide for such an initial purge.
It will be followed by a more detailed purge under GO 35 and ultimately by
the procedure under DLL 179 and amending decrees and therefore this Directive
is not concerned with minor posts or minor fascist officials; they can be dealt with later.
11 The Allies
must create a sound impression by quickly removing the leading fascists from
the important posts.

3. Many officials will have been placed in office by the Republican Fascist
Government; others will have taken the oath of allegiance to the Fascist
Government; on the other hand, others will be career officials who have
considered it their duty to stick to their posts in the interests of the civil
administration; others, again (it is understood from reliable reports), have
remained at their posts at great peril and have refused to take the oath of
allegiance. Wholesale dismissals are, therefore, to be avoided as much injustice
may be done quite apart from rendering it difficult to carry on the
administration.

It is safe to assume that the worst fascists will be removed by CLN's before
arrival of the Allies; the remainder of those in office will be dealt with in
accordance with this directive.

6. If there is any doubt as to the fascist background of any person holding
an office . . . he may be required to complete a Scheda Personale. The
Provincial Commissioner may, if he considers it desirable, consult the prefect
or CLN [Comitate di Liberazione Nazionale] on any particular case. No
attention will be paid to anonymous communications.

7. Persons suspended under this Memorandum, except those mentioned in
paragraphs 8 and 9, will be paid on the same basis as persons suspended under
DLL 159. Temporary employees, whether employed on a day-to-day basis or on a
fixed term basis, e.g., 6 months, will, however, be dismissed.

8. Lists of persons suspended under this Memorandum, specifying the offices
from which they have been removed, will be submitted to HQ AC for attention of
the appropriate SubCommission or where none is appropriate to the Civil Affairs
Section.

9. In addition to the foregoing, all Italian administrative organizations
whose continued existence is inconsistent with the sovereign rights of the
Italian National Government, or which have

[388]

been abolished by decrees thereof, are deemed no longer to exist; the holders
of offices in such organizations will probably have fled, but if any such are
found purporting to hold any office or to exercise any executive functions in
connection therewith they will be removed from office.

Such bodies include:
a) All Ministries and Departments of the Republican Fascist Government;
b) National, Federal, Provincial and Communal organizations of the fascist
party, of the Chamber of Fasci and of Corporations; of Fascist Syndicates and
Federations;
c) The Fascist Militia, the National Republican Guard and OVRA;
d) Presidi, Vice Presidi and Rettorati of Provinces; Consulte of Communes;
e) The Tribunals Speciali, the Tribunali Straordinari Provinciali and the "Brescia"
Court of Cassation.

10. Officials (as well as any other persons) regarded as potentially
dangerous will in addition to suspension be taken into custody immediately. They
may be interned or on the request of the Italian Government to AC be handed over
to the custody of that Government. Whenever a person is interned a report will forthwith be made to HQ AC.

11. It is emphasized that in carrying out the important duty of ridding the
country of fascists nothing herein is intended to prejudice the right of SCAO's
and RC's to dismiss and/or intern individuals at their discretion without
reference to their present official position or past fascist office.

12. SCAO's and RC's have discretion in most exceptional cases to retain as a
purely temporary expedient a fascist in office where the immediate
administration of any locality renders this essential and no local replacement
can be found. In all such cases the work of the individual should be closely
supervised and application should be made at once for a replacement to the
appropriate Sub-Commission. In the North, however, it should seldom, if ever, be
necessary to exercise this discretion.

6. It will be seen therefore that AMG for various reasons, has not made very
great progress in screening Italian officials and removing those of strong
fascist background.

By ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

28 Dec-A. The Italian Government issued a decree (which was later amended in
Apr) for removing from office officials who had held certain positions in
fascist organizations or had taken part in certain fascist activities. For the
purpose of achieving this, the existing Council of Ministers was to deal with
officers down to Grade VI, i.e. down to the equivalent of Vice Prefect; lower
officials were to be dealt with by Ministerial Commission under Presidency of
[Dr. Adolfo] Omodeo. ♦ ♦ ♦

C. So far as is known, neither the Council of Ministers nor the Ministerial
Commission have ever sat, the Ministerial Commission has never even been
appointed.

26 May-D. A decree for punishment of fascist offences was published making
the taking part in certain fascist activities a crime punishable for certain
offences by death, for others by imprisonment up to a life term.

E. A few persons have been arrested; investigation of their cases is
proceeding as is investigation of other cases. No trial has yet taken place.
Work has been suspended pending the issue of the new decree. ♦ ♦ ♦

H. No measures yet have been issued dealing generally with the property of
business activities of the so called parastatal concerns, suggestions have been
made to the Italian Government but no reply has as yet been received.

[389]

DELIVER US FROM THE RESULTS OF SUCH OVERZEALOUSNESS
[Notes of Mtg Between Brig Upjohn and Italian High Cmsr for Epuration, 5 Feb
45, ACC files, 10000/105/819]

Brig Upjohn said that at Perugia there had been an AMG officer who had not
clearly understood his instructions and who had ordered an exceptional number of
suspensions of Administrative Officials. In the one province he had suspended about
900 persons.
There was little doubt that a large number of persons had been suspended on
insufficient grounds and also the local services had been disorganized. He was
anxious that the re-consideration of these cases should be proceeded with very
quickly, firstly to end any injustice and secondly so that the services could be
re-established. . . .

INITIAL UNCERTAINTY OVER THE BEST WAY TO HANDLE THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATIVE
STATE MACHINERY
[Force 141, Appreciation and Outline Plan, 25 Mar 43 (See above, Chapter
VII), CAD files, HUSKY]

(128) Under usage of international law occupying forces are presumed to
recognize and act through existing administrative organizations.
13 It is also
necessary to do so to conserve personnel. However, in this territory, a part of
the administrative organization, particularly on the economic side, is the
corporative state machinery, which is the heart of the fascist system. To what
extent will the Allied Forces work with or through agencies such as the
corporation . . . and the federation of employers and employees . . . ? The
question is bound to arise early as in continuing salaries of officials, or
obtaining labor for the occupying forces. In the latter case the authorities
through whom it may be most convenient to work will be federation officials.
There are several possible courses:

a. Publicly announce at the outset the dissolution of these agencies.
b. At the other extreme, disregard their fascist origin and work through them
where it is useful to do so. This would involve continuing to pay officials who
hold office only by reason of the fascist system and might be subject to comment
or attack.
c. Eliminate gradually by order or decree the agencies which serve no useful
purpose, making the test on a military rather than a political basis. This
question cannot be answered finally at this stage but the general line to be
taken should be determined. ♦ ♦ ♦

ITALIAN LAW TO CONTINUE IN EFFECT EXCEPT AS CHANGED BY PROCLAMATION OR
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
[AMGOT Plan for Mil Govt of Sicily, p. 14.]

(55) ...Italian law, both civil and criminal, will be recognized as
continuing except provisions which are repealed or superseded in the
application of the above general principles [of defascistization ].

(56) Laws which are to be annulled or suspended will be specified in
proclamations of the M.G. or rendered ineffective by administrative action of
AMGOT.

Whereas it is the purpose of the Allied Powers to deliver the people of Italy
from the Fascist Regime, now, therefore, I [General Alexander], General Officer
Commanding the Allied Forces in Sicily and Military Governor of the Occupied
Territory hereby proclaim as follows:

Article I
Dissolution of the Fascist Party

The organization known as the Fascist Party (P.N.F.) in the Occupied
Territory is hereby dissolved and declared to be illegal. The property and
assets of the said organization shall be taken by or delivered to officers of
the Allied Military Government appointed for that purpose in accordance with
directions which will be issued by the Chief Civil Affairs Officers.

[390]

Article II
Organizations Affiliated With the Fascist Party

The Chief Civil Affairs Officer will from time to time issue Orders either
dissolving the organization of any body or activity which appertains to,
depends from or is in any way affiliated to or controlled by the Fascist Party
or declaring that the same or any branch thereof shall be carried on as being
for the benefit of the people of the occupied territory but under such control
or supervision and in accordance with such modification of rules, procedure and
objects as the Chief Civil Affairs Officer may direct. Any such Order may make
provision for the taking or safeguarding of the property or assets of any such
organization and provide penalties for failure to observe and perform any
provision of the Order.

Article III
Disposal of Property of Fascist Organizations

The Chief Civil Affairs Officer will make orders as to the disposal of any
property acquired by the Allied Military Government under this Proclamation and
may in his discretion as a part of any such order direct that the same property
or any part thereof shall be applied by the Allied Military Government for the
benefit of the people of the Occupied Territory in such manner or through such
organization as he may direct.

Article IV
Repeal of Laws

The Chief Civil Affairs Officer will by Order annul, amend or render
inoperative any law in force in the Occupied Territory which relates to a
Fascist organization or any dependent or allied organization thereof or which
affects prejudicially the United States or Great Britain or their nationals or
any other of the United Nations or their nationals and any law which
discriminates against any person or persons on the basis of race, colour or
creed, and lie may also by any such order provide penalties for the failure to
observe or perform the same.

Article V
Offences

No person shall
(1) promote, assist or attend at any public or private meeting of the Fascist
Party or any organization designed to replace it;
(2) use or permit to be used any building or other premise for the purposes
of conducting any meeting, business or other affairs of the Fascist Party;
(3) print, publish or circulate or have in his possession with intent to
publish or circulate any printed or written matter by or on behalf of the
Fascist Party;
(4) wear or have in his possession any badge or insignia of the Fascist
Party, or attire himself in such a manner as to suggest membership of the
Fascist Party;
(5) make, collect or receive any subscription to the funds of the Fascist
Party;
(6) take or receive any oath or give or receive any undertaking or promise
to the Fascist Party;
(7) do any other act whatsoever intended or likely to promote or sustain the
Fascist Party.

For the purpose of this Article the Fascist Party shall include any
organization designed to replace it and any organization declared to be illegal
under an order of the Chief Affairs Officer made under Article II hereof.

The following institutions are hereby created
(a) A Regional Labour Office for Sicily;
(b) A Provincial Labour Office for each of the Provinces of Palermo, Messina,
Catania, Trapani, Ragusa, Siracusa, Agrigerto, Caltanissetta and Enna.

Article III
Rules and Regulations

Rules and Regulations will be issued by the Allied Military Government to
enable the Regional Labour Office for Sicily and the Provincial Labour Offices
hereby established to fulfil their objects and perform and carry out their
powers, duties and functions.

Article IV
Objects of The Regional Labour Office for Sicily

Subject to the Rules and Regulations to be issued as aforesaid, the Regional
Labour Office for Sicily will have the following power, duties and functions
within the Island of Sicily

(a) To consider forthwith the most practicable and expeditious method of
re-establishing and assuring freedom of labour organization and representation
throughout the Island of Sicily;
(b) The co-ordination of the work of and the information and statistics
compiled by the Provincial Labour Offices;
(c) The compilation of similar information and statistics for the Island of
Sicily;
(d) The issuing of periodical reports and bulletins on labour questions for
issue to the public or otherwise;
(e) To act as conciliator, mediator or arbitrator in labour cases which are
of special economic significance or of interest to the entire region;
(f) Generally to do all such other things in connection with labour matters
within the Island of Sicily as may be required. ♦ ♦ ♦

I. . . . As . . . demonstration of the avowed intention of the Allied
Military Government to eradicate all evidence of Fascist doctrines, an order was
issued dated 24 September . . . to the effect that all references to racial
origin were to be eliminated from official documents. A further order dated 28
September ... established a Provincial Commission to investigate all property illegally diverted by the
Fascists to their own use and to ensure that all property and funds so obtained
were to be placed to the credit of the State. Another blow at the Fascist
structure was the order, dated 9/3/43, abolishing all labor Syndicates and
Unions. ♦ ♦ ♦

Nearly every Italian law was either inextricably interwoven with Fascism or
had been so administered for the past many years as to support Fascism. It was
obviously impossible to repeal all these laws until it was possible to
substitute new statutes in their place. As a military occupant is not supposed
under international law to change the fundamental laws of the country any more
than absolutely necessary, on account of the temporary nature of his occupancy,
this could not have been properly undertaken by AMG even if there had been a,
sufficient staff of trained legislative draftsmen to undertake such a Herculean
task. It was decided that generally speaking, the only thing that could be done
was to suppress obviously discriminatory statutes and obviously pro-Fascist
institutions, either by decree or administrative action, and to wait the
formation of an Italian Government capable of tackling the major problem of
rewriting Italian law so as to completely eradicate all traces of Fascism.

The following is a very brief survey of legislation passed . . . by the
Italian Government since the fall of Fascism [aiming at the re-establishment of
civil and political rights of Italian citizens].14

1. Right to be tried by an ordinary court.a. Special tribunal for defense of the State set up by the Fascist regime to
try political and

[392]

certain other offenses has been abolished by Royal Decree Law of 29 July
1943, No. 668.

2. Right to elect a legislative body.a. Decree Law of 2 August 1943, No. 705 dissolved the Fascist Camera dei
Fasci e delle Corporazioni and provided for an election of a new Chamber of
Deputies to be held four months after the cessation of the present state of war.

3. Equality of all citizens.a. The entire body of provisions discriminatory against bachelors in public
service, in the armed forces, etc., has been abolished by Royal Decree Law of 2 August 1943, No. 707
b. R. [Royal] Decree Law of 20 January 1944, No. 25 restored civil and
political rights "to Italian citizens and aliens formerly declared or considered
to be of Jewish race." The law expressly repealed the series of discriminatory
provisions reducing Italian Jews to second rate citizenship and abrogated "any
other provision or rule in whatever form enacted which has a racial character or
is in any way contrary to or incompatible with this decree." ...
c. R. Decree Law of 6 January 1944, No. 9 provides for readmission into State
and other public or quasi-public service of any employee:

(1) dismissed in pursuance to racial law
(2) dismissed because of his refusal to take oath of allegiance to the
Fascist regime
(3) dismissed in consequence of a condemnation for political crimes or of a
confinement for political motives
(4) who can prove that his dismissal was due exclusively to political
considerations

4. Right of labor to freely organize.The central organizations of the corporative structure have been abolished
and the right to free organization of labor union has been introduced in
practice. ♦ ♦ ♦

1. Since the Royal Decree Law of 2 August 1943 No. 704 providing for the
suppression of the "Partito Nazionale Fascista" which was published in Rome,
there has been no further legislation of this character.

3. Briefly, the effect of the main decree under para (1) above was to
suppress the Party itself and with it the central and provincial offices whilst attributing the activities and assets of the affiliated bodies to
various departments of state. Some of these organizations have been converted
into local bodies under the existing governmental set up, such for instance as
the assistance branches of the N.P.A. which were handed over to the communal
assistance boards for relief work.

4. The remaining Fascist associations, legions, institutes, groups and
committees were allotted for liquidation to various departments of
administration, as for instance the "Gioventu Italiana del littorio" (G.I.L.)
which was divided between the Ministries of War and Education.

5. The Legal Subcommission has enquired on many occasions from the Ministry
of justice as to the progress made with the dissolution of the remaining
organizations and has communicated to the Italian Government lists of fascist
bodies reported to be still in existence in the provinces by the various
subcommissions, notably Public Safety.

6. The latest information called for from the Minister of Justice regarding
the point as to what further steps are contemplated by way of legislation or
otherwise, elicits the reply that each department of state is engaged actively
on this matter and is in the process of issuing individual administrative
instructions, which will be communicated to this subcommission in due course.

THE GOVERNMENT ALLEGES NON-FASCIST AGENCIES HAVE BEEN ABOLISHED UNDER AMG
[Met-no, Council of Ministers, transmitted by Badoglio to Chief Cmsr ACC, 13
Apr 44, ACC files, 10000/105/609]

♦ ♦ ♦ 1. Administrative Organization

It has happened that the Allied authorities have suppressed in the
territories under their control, agencies and institutions of fundamental
importance to the Italian administrative organization such as the Economy
Provincial Councils, which are only the old Chambers of Commerce; and, as for
instance, in Sicily they have established in some regions new offices which
have nothing to do with the administrative organization of the remaining
provinces of the Kingdom.

In order to secure unity of directive in the administration of free Italy, it
would be desirable if the Italian and the Allied Governments should consult one
another before issuing ordinances that might have differing effects upon the
organization of the public administrations. ♦ ♦ ♦

4.. . . d. So far as the Consigli Provincials dell'Economia . . . are
concerned this Subcommission has had numerous conferences on the subject with
the Industry and Commerce Subcommission and with the two former Ministers of
Finance. . . . The statement that "suggests that these organizations are the
continuation of the old Camere di Commercio, nonpolitical and existing since
1862," is extremely misleading. ♦ ♦ ♦

.... We feel that far from being "non-political" these organizations were the
powerful foundations of the entire Fascist system of control of the entire
economic life by the Central Government. Since the abolition of these bodies in
Sicily and Region II local merchants and industrialists have organized Chambers
of Commerce to fulfill the legitimate functions for the economy of the Region
formerly under the control of the Consigli. The Italian Government has made
determined efforts to abolish these democratic organizations and return to the
familiar, Fascist way of doing things....

5. We feel that the advice of the Council of Ministers to your Subcommission
is one more evidence that regardless of which government is in political power
at any given moment, the Italians think of the corporative way of doing things
as the normal way. This necessarily involves that measure of central government
control which is described as Fascism. It is submitted that both the Italian
Government and the Allied Control Commission are obligated by the Armistice
Terms and the Directives, respectively, to wipe out Fascism in Italy. Our policy
could probably have been more direct in this respect. The policy of the
government discloses a high degree of lack of comprehension of the problem. ♦ ♦ ♦

In a memorandum dated 22 June the Minister of justice sent to the Allied
Control Commission

a. a list of fascist societies which it was proposed to dissolve and
b. a list of societies which were under consideration by the Cabinet.

I have not yet received any news of the actual dissolution of the bodies
referred to in list (a) and I shall be glad to hear from you when I may expect
to receive from you a draft decree effecting this.

I shall also be glad to hear of your intentions in regard to the bodies in
list (b)-their epuration and future conduct.

(a) Eight (8) hours shall constitute a work day exclusive of meal time and
time required to travel to and from work.
(b) Time and one half shall be paid for work in excess of eight (8) hours in
a given day. However, over time work shall be discouraged in the interest of
efficiency and employment of surplus labor; and shall be permitted only in case
of emergency.
(c) No extra compensation shall be paid for Sunday or Holiday work.
(d) Civilian labor shall be employed at minimum rates for a probationary
period of one week. Thereafter, the rates of pay may be revised within the
maximum limit of the discretion of the employing Arm or Service.
(e) Wage rates in existing services, e.g. railroad, public utilities, etc.,
shall be continued unchanged until further notice. In cases where such services
are actually taken over by the Armed Forces, civilian personnel of the
particular organization involved shall not be placed on the Military payroll.
(f) All branches of the Allied Armed Forces, and all civilian contractors
engaged to work for the Armed Forces, shall be bound by the provisions
contained herein.

[394]

(i) Branches of the Armed Forces which employ labor directly shall not be
responsible for benefit payroll deductions directed and authorized by law.
Responsibility for payment of such deductions shall be that of the individual
employee.

(ii) Civilian contractors engaged to work for the Armed Forces shall be
responsible for making such employee payroll deductions and benefit payments as
may be directed or authorized by law. ♦ ♦ ♦

(c). (i) There was no free labor movement or industry association under
Fascism. State labor industry control was the key to the Fascist theory of
government and was accomplished through the Corporative Syndical System. The
syndicate was the base cell of the Fascist social and economic concept. Workers
and employees within certain occupations were organized into separate syndicates
and permitted to function by positive law....

(iii) After examination of the Corporative Syndical System, conferences with
pre-Fascist labor leaders, anti-Fascist groups, government representatives,
employers, and workers, and after an intensive survey of the Island, it became
clear that the system should be abolished. Revision was impossible. It would
have meant appointing administrators of syndicates, financing them, and hence
complete government regulation and control. Continuation of the system meant
continuation of Fascism. It was therefore decided that each group should be
left to build for itself what it thought Would best serve its purposes, the
social and economic welfare of the Island, and its sense of freedom and liberty.
To this end, the Fascist Corporative Syndical System was dissolved and all
Fascist officials removed.

(v) To assure stability during the period of transition from the old system
to the new freedom, Administrative Instruction-Labor No. 2 was issued.... It
provided for continuation of the substantive hour, wage, and condition of employment provisions of existing
collective agreements pending opportunity for revision. ♦ ♦ ♦

AMGOT-SICILY HAS ESTABLISHED A FRAMEWORK FOR DEMOCRACY IN LABOR AND INDUSTRY
[Morse Rpt]

3.
a. By 26 October 1943 AMGOT had accomplished the following in the field of labor:
(1) Established a uniform wage scale for Sicily governing civilians employed
by branches of the Armed Forces.
(2) Completed a study of the Italian wage structure and system with
recommendations for revision and adjustment.
(3) Completed a cost of living study for Sicily....
(4) Concluded the task of procuring and supplying labor to branches of the
Armed Forces.
(5) Abolished the Fascist Corporative Syndical System.
(6) Substituted civilian government agencies for handling labor problems
subject to A.M.G. guidance and supervision.
(7) Consolidated under the Regional Labor Office for Sicily previous Fascist
functions which were found to be of benefit to workers and the public; having
eliminated those which were found objectionable.
(8) Provided a machinery for present and future self determination of labor
disputes and contracts.
(9) Assured a framework for a free labor and trade association movement.
(10) Initiated a study of co-operatives, workmen's compensation, and public
health systems.

b. As of 26 October 1943 there was considerable unrest among the workers who were asking for wage increases to meet the
higher cost of living. Several unions had been organized on the Island. The
most prominent [was] in Palermo. . . . The public was voicing itself in the
first free press that they have had in 25 years, on questions relating to labor.
There had been no strikes or lockouts. There had been four important labor
disputes between employers and employees, all of which were resolved by
agreement between the parties after reference by employer and employee
representatives to the new Regional Labor Office. The outstanding grievances
were scarcity of food, the growing black market, and rising cost of living.

c. A framework for democracy in labor and industry has been established in
Sicily. The third phase will answer the question of whether or not

[395]

the Sicilians will responsibly accept their new challenge of freedom. Much
will depend upon the ability of the population and the Allies to meet the need
for procurement and supply of food, eliminating the black market, and arresting
the rise in cost of living. ♦ ♦ ♦

ACC ACTIVATES A LABOR SUBCOMMISSION WITH SOCIAL AS WELL AS MILITARY AIMS
[Memo, Dir, Labor Subcom, ACC, for Office of Econ Dir, Hq AMG, 10 Nov 43,
ACC files, 10000/146/19]

1. The Mission of this Commission is conceived to encompass the following:

a. To formulate the policy and to supervise the organization and
administration of the supply and distribution of labor (of all types) on demand
by other branches to services essential to:
(1) the successful prosecution of the war, and
(2) the rehabilitation, life and well being of the Community.
b. To supervise industrial relations and determine the policy and procedure
to be followed for the formation of free associations of employers and for
arbitration between them.
c. To ensure that approved standards of safety and welfare are adopted in
factories and workshops.
d. To secure the reinstatement in each occupied Province, as far as they are
acceptable or feasible, of pre-war Labor Laws controlling hours of work and
employment of women and children.
e. To study, promulgate and enforce wage standards in each industry and
Province.
f. To participate with other branches in the proper collection and just
distribution of Social Insurance premiums and benefits, and to supervise the
organization and operation of benefit payment procedure.

The Major Functions of this commission are:

a. To ensure the accurate and complete registration of manpower (including
womanpower where necessary) and the smooth working of an unbiased "placing"
machine through which all vacancies shall be filled.
b. To determine, in co-operation with the services and branches responsible
for manufacture and production of war materials, Agriculture and Fisheries,
Public Works, Utilities and Fuel, etc., priorities , in " the demand for labor
in short supply.
c. To plan, in co-operation with the Italian authorities, for the absorption of demobilized Italian soldiers into Italian
economic life, and for the proper co-ordination of the rate of demobilization
with the rate of maximum absorption.
d. To ensure, in collaboration with other branches concerned, the welfare of
employed and unemployed and their dependents.
e. To supervise the performance of these duties by the Italian Government and
record facts and progress.
f. To advise on legal and executive changes necessary.

THE RIGHT OF ORGANIZATION IS RETURNED TO LABOR
[AMG GO 17, 18 Jan 44, ACC files, 10000/142/940]
16

Labor Relations

Whereas in Sicily by General Order No. 8 [sec. 3, above] and in Calabria,
Lucania and the Province of Salerno by Regional Order No. 5, the Fascist
Corporative Syndicate System was dissolved and a method provided for
reestablishing and assuring freedom of labor organization.
Now, therefore, in furtherance of the objectives of said General and Regional
Orders, I, Charles M. Spofford, Colonel, GSC, Deputy Chief Civil Affairs
Officer, hereby order as follows

Article IRight of Organization

Employees shall have the right to organize, hold meetings, and select
representatives of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining with respect to all
matters pertaining to or connected with their employment, including such matters as concern hours,
wages, working conditions, grievances, disputes and mutual social and economic
assistance.

Article IIEffective Date

This Article will become operative in Sicily, Calabria, Lucania, and the
Province of Salerno on the date hereof.

a. Wages, Hours and Conditions of Employment. All tactical units must be furnished with a tentative wage scale and
instructions concerning hours and conditions of employment which must be applied
uniformly to all civilians employed by the Armed Forces. The scale should be
tentative, and carefully adjusted to the normal civilian scale, and subject to
early and equitable revision in the field after consultation with Advance Main
Headquarters so that proper co-ordination can be effected....

b. Careful consideration must be given to Cost of Living and the economy in
which employment is being offered so as to avoid economic dislocation, and
control the forces of inflation insofar as possible. In the latter connection,
firm controls, actually and severely exercised, must be set up to combat the
black market in commodities. Soldier spending must be limited, and strictest
supervision given to retail merchant prices.

c.Civilian Wages (as distinguished from wages paid to persons employed by
Armed Forces) and Commodity Prices to be frozen upon occupation, and then
adjusted in relation to each other as economic circumstances warrant. Wages or
prices must not be acted upon separately, and must also be considered in
relation to the Armed Forces Wage Scale. .. .

d.Issue of Food to Persons Employed by Armed Forces should not be
undertaken until necessary, must be uniform, paid for by the individual worker,
and where possible, eaten on the job. Function of supply should be to balance
subsistence ration to entire civilian personnel. Over and above this, extra
rations should be issued in cases of operational necessity and essential war work. Stress
uniformity in type of ration issued, amount, and charge to individual worker. .
. .

e.Central Labor Offices should be established by Labor Officers in their
respective areas, and all labor for Armed Services supplied there from. If
able-bodied persons refuse employment, they should be denied relief and
rationing benefits.

f.Continue Social Security Functions. Take immediate steps to eliminate objectionable political features.

h. Elimination or Revision of Totalitarian Systems will be essential....

i. Must Be Central Co-ordination of work of all bases, districts, and other
unit Labor Offices (Army and Navy), so that uniformity in labor relations is
achieved and maintained. This principle is essential to any successful
operation. If the plan is one of Military Government, co-ordination and control
should be by the Labor Division, otherwise by a Staff Labor Officer attached to
the Advance Main Headquarters. ♦ ♦ ♦

♦ ♦ ♦ A. Stabilization of wages is a primary condition of inflation control.
Maladjustments in the wage structure must, of course, be corrected and there
should be latitude in the application of the policy. It is to be expected that
in the process of adjusting wages to take care of individual problems, there
will be a net effect of an increase in the wage level. However, the policy, or
objective, should he to maintain to the maximum extent possible the existing
level of controlled wages.

B. An effective wage control should be extended over as wide a section of
the working population as is possible. In particular, this policy should apply
to Italian employees of the Allied Armed Forces and to agricultural labor so far
as possible.

C. At the present time the improvement of living conditions which may be
demanded by labour organizations or the Italian Government should be
accomplished by general increases in the rationed distribution of commodities at
controlled prices, and not by increases in money wages apart from those which
merely involve removing maladjustments of one wage group as against another.

This policy should be continued until the time arrives when the ration available to the general public at controlled prices
provides a basic minimum for subsistence, i.e., a ration of 2,000 calories of food per day, and a
reasonable amount of clothing, boots/shoes. After this ration has been achieved,
a formula for the determination of wage levels should be applied which will
adjust wages in accordance with an index measuring the increase in the price of
the rationed and controlled commodities (including rent). So long as

[397]

rations are below the basic minimum the application of such a formula should
not be attempted.

In general, wage policy should be such as will not provide increases in wages
to compensate for price increases in the uncontrolled commodity markets.

D. One of the principal problems now being encountered in wage settlements is
that of hidden wage increases. There are over 4o elements in the wage of Italian
government workers. Private employers use such devices as fictitious loans. It
is therefore almost impossible to know what a man's wage is or what effect a
given increase would have. For one reason or another increases in one or more of
these elements are continually being advocated, and in most cases it is
impossible to obtain from the Government or the employer concerned a complete
statement of the total income now received by the workers in question. The wage
policy must include simplification of the wage structure.♦ ♦ ♦

The following institutions are hereby created:
(a) A Regional Labour Office for each of such Regions as may be established
in Military Government Territory;
(b) A Provincial Labour Office for each Province in Military Government
Territory, subordinate to the Regional Labour Office.♦ ♦ ♦

1. The suppression of the Fascist Party has made inevitable the abolition of
the Corporative Syndical System, which was perhaps the most characteristic
feature of the Fascist Regime.

2. It stands to reason that the abolition of this System gives rise to the
necessity of providing new machinery and procedure as well as a democratic form of Trade Union
organization which would effectively enable the Allied Military Government to
cope with social and juridical problems in the labor field.

6. No reference whatever has been made in the present General Order [GO 28]
of such labor matters as are dealt with by separate legislation.

This "Labor Relations" General Order [GO 28], however, must be interpreted in
the light of Italian legislation that has a bearing on labor matters and has not
been rescinded and of other legislation promulgated by Allied Military
Government separately. Thus, Strike and Lock-out remain illegal instruments for
the settlement of Labor disputes, Collective Contracts remain in force, wages
remain frozen and any readjustment on a basis of comparison with similar
industries and at a lower ceiling than wages of employees with the Armed
Forces-such readjustments becoming operative only on the approval of A.C.C.
Labor Subcommission.

7. General Order No. 28 may be regarded as a temporary measure. A draft
Decree "Abolishing the Fascist Syndical-Corporative System, reinstituting the
freedom of Trade Union Organization, authorizing the institution of Labor
Offices and governing Labor Relations" is now in the final stages of preparation
by the Italian Government. It is proposed to make this Decree operative in
Military Government territory, thus providing a uniform labor system for the
whole of Italy.

There has not been an important strike in liberated Italy since the Allied
landings. Strikes have been threatened and there have occurred a number of
"white strikes" as demonstrations of the demand for additional food rations or
higher wages. Field and Headquarters representatives of the Labor Subcommission
have held numerous conferences with union leaders and independent workers
concerning demands and complaints, and have served as mediators in
employer-employee meetings where strikes were threatened. Insofar as is
possible, all disputes have been referred directly to the Italian Labor Offices
both in Military Government territory and in Italian Government territory. In
Italian Government

[398]

territory the recommendations of the Labor Offices are acted upon by the
Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Labor with the approval of the Labor
Subcommission.♦ ♦ ♦

I recognize that military considerations are paramount. Subject to this,
however, my recommendation is that as much encouragement and stimulation as
possible be given to the growth of free labor unions in liberated territory;
that this advice should be given by moderate and recognized agencies in order
to avoid capture of these unions by subversive elements, and that so far from
prohibiting intercourse by letter, or otherwise, with these newly established
unions, there should be officially recognized Trade Union organizers who should
he allowed to forward and arrange the development of the unions on a proper
basis....

3. There is a divergence of practice between that followed by Fifth Army and
that followed by Eighth Army on labor questions. Fifth Army posts General Order
No. 28 and operates on its terms. This allows free association of workers in
democratic trade unions as distinct from the Fascist-controlled syndicates. It
also establishes Labor Offices to handle civilian labor questions including
arbitration and negotiations. The result is that, when in due course, Fifth
Army military territory is transferred to AMG/AC, there is a smooth transition
having already initiated action on the lines of the policy which will
eventually be followed by AMG/AC.

Eighth Army does not post General Order No. 28. Within the last few months,
owing to the assignment of a Labor Officer from Labor Subcommission
Headquarters (such assignment being an innovation), Orders have been made which
provide for the abolition of the Fascist syndicates and the establishment of
Labor Offices. This goes some way towards uniformity with Fifth Army. As
distinct from the provisions of General Order No. 28, however, no recognition is given to the establishment of free trade unions nor is their organization
encouraged.

6. . . . it is desirable that Eighth Army should be invited to conform with
the terms of General Order No. 28....

THE SEQUEL TO GENERAL ORDER No. 28 Is PROMOTION OF A DEMOCRATIC ITALIAN
LABOR MOVEMENT
[Labor Subcom, AC, Final Rpt, Mar 46, ACC files, 10000/109/480]

♦ ♦ ♦ With the Order as a basis, Labour Subcommission concentrated, from
January 1945, on building up a strong, democratic and representative machinery
of labour relations. The Italian General Confederation of Labour
[Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (C.G.I.L.); had been formed early
in 1944 and unity of the workers, with collaboration of the three Left wing
political parties (Socialist, Communist and Christian Democrat) had been
confirmed in the Pact of Rome of 4 June 1944. The first general meeting of the C.G.I.L. was held in Naples from 28 January to 1 February
1945, and membership was then estimated at 1,200,000. With the liberation of
the North, the movement received a new impetus, A.M.G. fostered its development,
the local offices of the movement (Camere del Lavoro) were encouraged, and by
October, 1945, membership of 5,000,000 workers was claimed. The C.G.I.L. made a
favourable impression at and a useful contribution to the meeting of the
International Labour Office held in Paris in Autumn 1945. Whilst the co-operation of the three Left Wing political parties in the labour field in Italy may not always
have been perfect it has, for a continuous period of two years, been the most
striking, if not the only, example of continuous collaboration in Italy, where
multiplicity of political parties has led to unsettlement in the political
field and to many crises.

The corollary, in joint bargaining procedure, to a strong workers'
organization, is an equally strong and representative employers' association.
The four Fascist Employers' Confederations were dissolved by Decree No. 369 of
16 December 1944, and Labour Subcommission has fostered the development of the
General Confederation of Italian industry, the Italian Confederation of Traders,
the Italian Confederation of Agriculturists, the National Confederation of
Direct Cultivators, and the National Bankers' Association. ♦ ♦ ♦

♦ ♦ ♦ No planning was done in the field of education as no officer was
available in this field until the campaign was over in August. It is believed
that this omission was serious, as in dealing with a country in which the
educational program has been debauched for political reasons some substitute
program should be available as soon as possible after operations cease. This
involved the preparation of textbooks and instructions to teachers and a
program for vetting all important educational officials. ♦ ♦ ♦

1. It is the policy of the Military Government to open the public schools as
rapidly as is consistent with security. To wait for a general re-opening of the
schools before opening schools which are ready to open now or in the near
future, would cause unnecessary hardship and defeat our general purpose. The
following directive, therefore, sets out the conditions under which the Provveditore may open one or more schools subject to your approval.

2. This Headquarters must approve first:
a. the appointment of the Provveditore;
b. the appointment of the Ispettore within whose jurisdiction the school falls;
c. the appointment of the director of each school in question.

3. The Provveditore must show to the satisfaction of the SCAO that the
building in which it is proposed to hold classes has at least minimum facilities
for the holding of successful classes.

4. The Provveditore must agree to assume full responsibility that:
a. there will be no Fascist or anti-ally propaganda or doctrine in the
school, and no Fascist forms, ceremonies, or organizations;
b. none of the state test books will be used in the first five grades, except
those specified in the directive concerning text books, and then only after the
pages specified in that directive have been removed; only text books which have
been specifically approved by this headquarters will be used in the Media Schools; Gymnasia; Liceos, etc. ♦ ♦ ♦

THE REOPENING IS BOTH A POLITICAL AND AN ADMINISTRATIVE CHALLENGE
[Review of Educational Activities, prepared by Educational Adviser, Hq AMG,
4 Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/154/317]

♦ ♦ ♦ 10 September. ". . . The C.S.O.... has put clearly the immediate
morale and political grounds which necessitate an early opening of the schools."

"In addition we must also regard the early opening of the schools and
colleges from the point of view of Allied long-time policy. It is a generally
accepted principle that we must banish the will to war from Italy and Germany,
and this has been implanted by many years of perverted education. The immediate
heart-sickness of the Italian people may have temporarily obscured the results
of this teaching. But it is to be feared that with the rigors of war passing
into the background of memory the results of the ideological teachings of
Fascism and Nazism will reassert themselves in some new and undesirable form ..
. consequently we must set our hopes on reeducation if we are to restore the
peoples of Italy and Germany to political and social sanity."

I. All SCAO's be informed that all schools and colleges be reopened as soon
as possible.

II. SCAO's to set up provincial Educational Committees. Among other purposes
for establishing these committees were that they should begin to learn to take
responsibility in local education, and also begin to provide the Allied
Military Government with their views on the kind of education they required.

III. The SCAO's should submit to the Educational Adviser the names of all
teachers so that their political backgrounds could be examined. These are handed
to the Political Intelligence
Section (under Major Raffa) for examination.

IV. Permission of the Educational Adviser to be sought before any text books
are brought into use.

V. All extraordinary expenditures to be sent to the Educational Adviser for
his approval. (This refers, in the main, to the rebuilding of war-devastated
buildings.)

These recommendations were concurred in and strongly recommended for approval
by the Chief of Staff Officer, Colonel Spofford. On 14 September orders were sent to
SCAO's covering

[400]

the major items, and on 18 September Lt. Colonel Gayre reported in part as
follows:

... Not only have we the physical problem of opening the actual school
buildings and the big task of examining the history of each teacher so as to
exclude all ardent Fascists, but we have not a single text book which can be
used. Furthermore, the Italian teacher virtually cannot teach without a text
book, so reliant had he become upon this method. . . . Therefore it is
necessary to begin working on a set of temporary text books immediately. I
propose therefore establishing a small committee of prominent Italian
educationalists to produce the texts for books to be used in 1943-14
The C.S.O. has recommended approval of the appointment of the committee, and
a study of the printing and paper problem.

The following report shows, in brief summary, the results of the
investigations and actions to date.♦ ♦ ♦

Report on Present Status AMG Education

1. School buildings. Many damaged. Whole ones often used for billeting troops
and for evacuees. Standards of light, equipment, and hygiene usually deplorably
low. Repairs necessary to prevent danger and damage are officially authorized.
SCAO's to submit estimates of cost and time to make damaged buildings usable for
school purposes.

2.. Opening of schools. I December has been set for the opening of schools,
but it is realized that all cannot open at this time, and some can open
earlier-and, indeed, have already done so. In Pantelleria the schools have
already opened in private homes and they are trying to get texts from Malta or
Cairo.

3.. State examinations. These have been authorized, to be held some time
between 3-16 November and arrangements are underway.

4. Personnel. The selection of a Provveditore for each of the nine provinces
of Sicily is underway. . . . Appointment is by Regional Education Director,
after vetting.

5. Education Committees. By authority of the CCAO all SCAO's have been
instructed to form Provincial Education Committees composed half of approved representatives of
the Provveditore, half of such persons as representatives of universities, important schools
and colleges, .. .

7. Liaison. It is recognized that work of such fundamental importance cannot
be carried out without consent of the Italian people and so liaison is being established
with the Badoglio Government in order to obtain their agreement.

8. Definition of Authority-Regional and National. Instructions have already
been set out as follows:
(a) Rectors of Universities and University Professors will be nominated by
the Regional Directors of Education subject to approval by the Advisor in
Education and official appointment by the CCAO.
(b) Teachers, school directors and inspectors will be appointed by the
provveditori, after approved by the Regional Director of Education. GAO's and
SCAO's may temporarily suspend and may recommend dismissal of school personnel
provided they send a full statement as to cause through the SCAO to the Regional
Director of Education for review and final decision. CAO's and SCAO's may freely
nominate properly qualified school personnel for appointment of school positions
by the Provveditore. The Provveditore alone is authorized, subject to the
approval of the Regional Director of Education, to make the actual appointments
after determining the fitness of the candidate for the position. ♦ ♦ ♦

The elementary schools of Italy were all required to use a state series of
text books. Every one of these books was impregnated with fascist propaganda.
18 Furthermore, a supply of these books had not been printed for this school year.
It is impossible for the schools of Italy to function without text
books-first because children cannot learn to read without books to read and
second because the poorly prepared teachers of Italy are wholly dependent on
text books.
It therefore has been evident from the beginning that a series of textbooks
for the elementary schools would have to be published. The shortage of materials
and transportation and the necessity of assuring that the new textbooks be free
from fascism, made it essential that this work be done under the supervision of
the Allied Military Government and Allied Control Commission.

2. Action Taken

With verbal approval from Lord Rennell and later from General McSherry, the
Education

[401]

Division of AMG (later, the Education Subcommission of ACC) took the
following steps:

a. Each book in the former state series of elementary school textbooks was
carefully examined and every passage containing fascist or anti-ally propaganda
was marked.
b. A Commission of reliable non-fascist teachers and school directors was
formed in Palermo in October, with the help of the local Provveditore agli Studi
[Provincial Superintendent] and his Chief Inspector. The members of that
commission rewrote, under the supervision of the Education Division AMG, all the
objectionable passages, substituting appropriate non propaganda material.
c. Arrangements for publishing the books were made in Palermo in November and
in Naples in January, it being decided to print in Palermo for Sicily and
Calabria as had been done in the past and in Naples for the balance of occupied
Italy south of Lazio.

1. The Education Subcommission is publishing for immediate use a series of
elementary school textbooks, consisting of the state series of last year with
non-fascist material substituted for the fascist propaganda. The publication of
these books is essential to the functioning of the schools.

2. The lack of local paper makes it necessary to use imported newsprint for
these hooks. This has already been supplied for the books being printed in
Palermo for Sicily and Calabria. A supply of about 168 tons, not yet allocated
to any particular Division of ACC, exists in Naples, in the custody of P.W.B.
Seventy-five tons of this are urgently needed by the Education Subcommission
for the printing in Naples of textbooks for all occupied Italy (including
Puglia) outside of Sicily and Calabria.

3. You are therefore respectfully requested to authorize the Economic and
Administrative Section to release 75 tons of imported newsprint paper to the
Education Subcommission for the printing of text books for the elementary
schools. ♦ ♦ ♦

2. It took about two months from mid-September when this Division came into
existence until the middle of November to get a start on school personnel, procedures, courses of
study, and textbooks. . . .

3. The one obstacle that has impeded and still impedes the opening of schools
has been the unavailability of school buildings. In a number of cases this has
been due to war damage. Whenever that damage had been reparable steps have been
immediately taken to recondition the building. In many cases, however, the chief
difficulty has been the occupation of the buildings by troops, or, less often,
by refugees, hospitals, etc. Each Regional Director of Education has
persistently worked to get troops out of buildings, using every type of appeal
possible. But since A.M.G. has not had authority to order troops evacuated, we
have been entirely dependent on the voluntary co-operation of army commanders.
Sometimes these commanders have been co-operative; almost always they have been
courteous; but in many instances they have said that any move was impossible.

Sec. V.
The inadequacy of staff all through this operation has been responsible for
delays that would have been calamitous had the occupation of Italy proceeded
with more speed....

It is essential that constant visits be paid to Educational Establishments by
both Headquarters and Regional Officers. The weeding out of staffs can only be
done by personal investigation, and phases of the reorganization of education
need constant personal attention....

In the early part of the occupation the civilian educational authorities were
completely stunned and they expected drastic measures to be taken. These they
would have accepted readily. But even mild measures carried out at a later
period are much more difficult. By that time a spirit of resistance has grown
up, a knowledge of the A.M.G. machinery has been gained, and the possibilities
of intrigue developed....

The freeing of institutions from fascist influence should have been done
early, but that would have needed an adequate staff. Actually the position in
the early days was-for two months, no staff at all and for a long time
thereafter, an Education Adviser with only one clerk and an interpreter. The
lack of a number of officers to work as intelligence officers for Education has
been felt severely. There are over ten thousand scholastic officials in Sicily
alone.

[402]

New members have new been added to the staff in sufficient numbers to care
for Regions I to IV. If additions may be depended on at the same rate for future
regions all will be well. ♦ ♦ ♦

LONG HOLIDAY OF ITALIAN SCHOOL CHILDREN IS ABOUT OVER
[Rpt, Gayre, Educational Adviser, Education Subcom, ACC, Feb 44. ACC files,
10000/105/709]

Estimates by Provveditori agli Studi (Provincial Superintendents) indicated
that in Sicily about three fourths of the children were in school by early
December. At the end of December the Director of Education of Region I stated
that schools in Messina could not be opened for several months; that almost no
schools were yet opened in Catania, but there was hope of gradually opening
there; that it was hoped to get schools open in Siracusa in January; and that
fifteen schools in Palermo were not yet open. All these cases are due solely to
unavailability of buildings, and, except in Messina, primarily to occupancy of
the buildings by troops, etc. Throughout the rest of Sicily schools are
generally open and functioning.

Schools in Region II reported to be now generally operating.

In Matera first openings took place 3 January
Potenza openings took place 17
January
Reggio openings took place 25 January
Cosenza openings took place 25
January
Catanzaro openings took place 1 February

A number of schools are not able to operate owing to lack of premises which
are (a) war damaged, (b) occupied by troops, (c) occupied by refugees.
Window glass has been unobtainable. Help has been asked from Supply Officer by
Regional Director. ♦ ♦ ♦

1. A cable has been received from General Hilldring in Washington stating
that the State Department has been approached by the Apostolic Delegate to the
United States for information pertaining to Italian Schools.

2. Specific information is requested on the following points:
a. Is religious teaching in schools conforming with the terms of the Lateran
Treaty of 1929.
b. Are newly adopted text books in conformity with Catholic principles.
c. Are present teachers hostile to the Catholic Church or religion in
general. ♦ ♦ ♦

2. (a) Religious teaching in schools continues without change, the only
teaching reforms which have been made in material are those involving the
elimination of the teaching of fascism.
(b) New text-books are in conformity with Catholic principles. Books will be
forwarded to you as published in accordance with your previous requests.
(c) Without the aid of a complete survey of the religious opinions of
teachings, a formidable task which has not been undertaken, the attitude of
teachers to the Church or to religion in general cannot be stated with any
accuracy. However, the proportion of teachers replaced is small, and therefore
the general body of teachers may be assumed to hold the same religious beliefs
as they did before the Allied occupation.

3. Copies of Plans of Study for the use of teachers are enclosed. All of
these have been discussed with representatives of the Church before publication
and are in conformity with their suggestions.

The work of the Education Subcommission falls into two distinct but closely
interrelated parts. First, there is the immediate, emergency job of getting
schools open on a non-fascist basis, to get children off the streets and to
prevent serious unrest among the parents by seeing that the children do not
lose more schooling and are decently cared for. Second, there is the assisting
of the Italian Government in its attempt to organize its schools in a way which
will foster healthy living, good citizenship, decent world attitude, and
economic efficiency, while preserving the best cultural traditions.

I

The emergency job is that which has had to take precedence during the past
year, and still is the dominant work in Military Government. It is not yet
finished even in Italian Government territory. ♦ ♦ ♦

II

The foregoing is so obviously the immediate mission of the Education
Subcommission, and

[403]

the needs and results are so tangible, that justification would be
superfluous. The longer range program is less readily seen to relate to military
needs and the purposes of the Allied Commission. But the morale of the people
is recognized as an essential responsibility of military government, the
welfare of the people is included among the basic charges of military
government, and the elimination of fascism, a fundamental goal in this war,
involves the uprooting of the causes of fascism, the substitutions of some
degree of democracy for dictatorship, and the preparation of the people for a
peaceful participation in world affairs rather than militarism and imperialism.
In these terms the following long-range activities of the Education
Subcommission are clearly a part of its mission.

A. The Italians recognize that this educational system is inadequate-only a
third to a half of the children complete the five years of elementary education;
only about one in ten completes the next three years of education; only about
one in thirty gets a secondary school education.
19

It is recognized by the Minister and other Italian educators that those who
do go to school get almost no training in health and hygiene, little or no
training in even the most rudimentary economics, and no training in citizenship
or world outlook. The Minister of Public Instruction and his associates, aware
of these gaps, are attempting to do something about them. But they realize that
they have been completely cut off from world thought, experience, and scientific
investigations in the field of education for nearly a quarter of a century. They
want contact with the rest of the world to help them approach the problems
wisely. And they turn to the Education Subcommission for such contact. In
accordance with the expressed desire of the Minister of Public Instruction,
therefore, this Subcommission is taking steps toward answering this need in the
following ways:

(1) Selecting the most significant books in the field of education, getting
rights for translation and publication in Italy, and supervising this
translation. This work is well under way.

(2) Getting books and periodicals from Great Britain and the United States
for the leading Universities, scientific organizations, learned societies and
libraries-this work is just beginning.

(3) Arranging for post-war travel fellowships for Italians to study in the
American, British, and European countries. This is still necessarily in the
early planning stage.

(4) Arranging to bring specialists to Italy, after the war for consultation
and expert advice. This, too, is, of course, in a preliminary stage of
planning. ♦ ♦ ♦

♦ ♦ ♦ We undertook little . . . and achieved less, to effect the teaching of
precisely right things. Our mission, to repeat, was negative: we came to Italy
to destroy fascism, not this time officially "to make the world safe for
democracy." Not only was there immediate reaction on the part of the highest
authorities in Italy-ecclesiastical, civil, pedagogical positivity. "It would be
unwise," said the American Foreign Secretary, "for this government to undertake
to apply, much less to impose, a foreign program for the placement of American
teachers in the schools of these countries, or for the preparation of textbooks
in the United States in such schools." (In terms of policy, Italy was always on
the way to being a "liberated country," even if in initial fact it was a
conquered country.) But it was anthropology rather than bureaucracy which
effectively kept our program negative. Schools require teachers, and teachers
cannot teach democracy until they are taught democracy. It requires a generation
to make teachers who can, if they can, remake society. ♦ ♦ ♦

1. The Education Subcommission was the first to take a strong stand against
its officers accepting honorary degrees, etc., from Italian universities and
learned societies....

2. The stand taken by us was quickly followed by a general AC directive to
the same effect applying to all AC officers, and more recent orders have
strengthened the first one.

3. Now I find officers in the Education Subcommission in an embarrassing
dilemma. I have just received a communication from the University of Rome,
stating that the Academic Senate had, on 9 November 1944, proclaimed "Grandi Benemeriti" (great well-deservers) of the University of Rome, Brig. Gen.
Hume, Lt. Col. T. V. Smith, Capt. Volla, and me. This is not an honorary degree,
but it is, in a certain sense,

[404]

an honor. It was voted to us without any knowledge on our part, and there is
no action that we can take to accept or reject it. Nothing is offered to us-the University simply records formally, that it considers these
officers to have benefited it and that it honors them for it. ♦ ♦ ♦

INTERNEES MUST BE GIVEN CARE IF NOT RELEASED
[Msg, CCS to AFHQ, 21 Jul 43, CAD Msg files, CMOUT 8478]

Subject to military necessity and security and the interests of the
individuals concerned, . . . the following principles will be applied to Allied
and neutral civilian internees, a large number of whom may be on Lipari Islands:
20

As soon as military situation permits, they should be given medical and
mental examinations, identified, and their personal and financial situations
determined. Existing camps may be continued or moved to new locations within
your discretion, living and sanitary conditions being made adequate. Work should
be provided where practicable. Those for whom other provision is not available,
such as release to relatives or friends who will provide for them, should be
held in restricted residence until other arrangements for their care or
repatriation can be made. Internees should not be released, particular reference
to those who may later become political agitators, until it is established that
they can be cared for. To the extent feasible a census of the names and
nationalities should be taken for transmission to the Combined Chiefs of Staff
in order that interested governments may be informed....

Jovan Dononovich, delegate Yugoslav Government for the Near, Middle East and
North Africa, has made representations concerning 70 [thousand] to 80,000
Yugoslavs in 68 concentration camps in Italy, of which 30 [thousand] to 40,000
are fit for Military Service. He makes the following specific proposals:

1. To incorporate in the Italian surrender terms that the Yugoslav prisoners,
internees, and confinees must be left in the places where they now are. ♦ ♦ ♦It is assumed that we should assume direct responsibility for emergency
relief of civilian internees released in enemy territory. Are we to -assume
continuing direct responsibility or are we to assist the government concerned in
caring for them?
In the light of our shipping problem it is presumed that we would agree to a
minimum in transporting these persons from the areas in which they are found. ♦ ♦ ♦

3. The direct responsibility of the Theater Commander for emergency relief
of civilian internees released in occupied enemy territory is to continue until
such time as the government concerned can assume responsibility for its own
subjects.

4. Any key men amongst the liberated personnel who are specially asked for
by the Government-in-exile concerned, are to be dispatched to the desired
destination.

5. While any movement within your Theater will be at your discretion and with
the shipping available to you, no movement outside your area is to be permitted
without the concurrence of the government concerned. ♦ ♦ ♦

LITTLE FOOD AND LESS CLOTHING ARE AT HAND
[Notes on Mtg Held at MGS, AFHQ, 4 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/743]

Supply4. So far as food was concerned it was pointed out that local resources would
have to be used to the full and that AMG would, in default of special
arrangements only be able to supplement them to the extent of the commodities
for which bids had already been made. This would not of necessity produce a
balanced diet or one which

[405]

could be regarded from a medical point of view as satisfactory for the
building up of persons who for a long time may have been receiving an
impoverished diet. . . .

Health5. The question of the provision of medical stores for use in the camps was
raised. Brigadier Davis stressed that while the army would naturally do all it
could the stores normally carried by field force units were based on minimum
army requirements and were not designed to provide a surplus for civilians. On
the other hand it was evident that AMG medical officers could not carry large
stores of medical supplies with them in the initial stage. ♦ ♦ ♦

1. All displaced persons will be originally retained in the camps in which
they are found. American, British, and French Prisoners of War are the only
persons originally to be excluded from the category of "displaced persons."

3. Displaced persons will be cared for in the initial emergency stage by AMG
assisted by such advanced Headquarters (including American and British Red
Cross personnel) and so far as is possible by the PW Subcommission and by
Surgeon and DMS.

4. As soon as possible displaced persons will be transferred to sole control
of Displaced Persons Subcommission which will deal with all enquiries and under
which Red Cross personnel have agreed to serve.

5. It is intended that if possible all displaced persons other than enemy
nationals will eventually be screened by an accredited representative of their own government,
under the supervision of intelligence officers.

6. After screening, such persons as are PW's of United Nations will be handed
over to PW Subcommission.

7. Food supplies will be provided through the supply channels either of AMG
or Allied Commission.

8. Surgeon and DMS will, where possible, include in the allocation of
medical supplies for forward troops a proportion of medical supplies for
displaced persons.

2. The subcommission performs the following staff functions:
a. Obtains as complete information as possible regarding internees and
displaced persons in Italy, enemy or enemy occupied territories and forwards it
to the Political Vice President for submission to the Allied Intelligence Staff
at AFHQ when necessary.
b. Arranges with the appropriate authorities for the provision of
accommodation, food, clothing, welfare and health services for such persons.
c. Arranges with the appropriate authorities for the provision of as much
employment for such persons as is possible subject to instructions of AFHQ.
d. Assists accredited representatives of foreign governments in respect of
their nationals, subject to the instructions of AFHQ.
e. Arranges for any movements of internees and displaced persons as may be
ordered or become necessary, subject to the policy of AFHQ.♦ ♦ ♦

3. The subcommission directly performs the following functions:

a. Supervises the work of the Italian government and of approved agencies dealing with foreign internees and displaced
persons. These agencies include the American and British Red Cross.
b. Assists the Prisoner of War organization in respect of Displaced Persons
subsequently

[406]

found to be Prisoners of War, particularly with any necessary technical
instructions and information.

The camp is situated in a valley leading to Cosenza near the township of
Tarsio on somewhat malarial ground which has been the subject of reclamation
and improvement by the Italian Government. The ground, however, is not and has
not, for a long time been swampy and it would be an exaggeration to describe the
camp as being otherwise than in reasonable surroundings or fair farm land
inhabited by Italians engaged in farming....

The camp was constructed by a firm of contractors and consists of hutments
which were enclosed within a barbed wire fence guarded on the perimeter by
Fascist Militia and inside by plain clothes officers of the Public Security
organization. . . . Given reasonable maintenance I consider the hutments to be
at least as good as can be expected and very much better than I had expected.
The internees had no complaints regarding the design or type of hut
accommodation. ♦ ♦ ♦

When the Allied troops occupied the Province of Cosenza the Italian Militia
guard on the perimeter of the camp disappeared; the commander of the Militia,
an officer reputed to be of Tuscan origin, also disappeared and is believed to
have found his way back to Tuscany. The Public Security officials of the Italian
Government were withdrawn and the management of the camp was taken over by a
Camp Committee headed by a Yugoslav Jew, Professor Mirski, by profession a
conductor of orchestras. His appointment was ratified by my officers and the
Camp Committee is recognized as the governing body of the organization. ♦ ♦ ♦

Since the occupation of the Province of Cosenza, the guards on the perimeter
of the camp have been withdrawn and the inmates are free to take exercise and
walk around the countryside. A number of those who dispersed themselves to the
hills have since returned to the camp on account of financial difficulties in
procuring a livelihood. The figure of 16oo inmates in the camp includes those
who have thus returned.

The majority of the inmates in the camp were Jews of whom 350 were refugees from Yugoslavia to Italy who arrived mainly
in April 1940. Many of these were helped by Italian military authorities both to
escape from Yugoslavia and to enter Italy. ♦ ♦ ♦

The inmates of the camp have been described by all my officers who have had
contact with the camp as being very difficult. The internees had expected with
the Allied occupation of Cosenza, not only to be set free but to be transported
to all the various destinations to which they expected to go or to be otherwise
looked after. That they had to live in the camp for a day longer than they had
expected would be the case after our occupation immediately became a source of
grievance. ♦ ♦ ♦

I found that the internees at the time of my visit were being provided with
the same rations as were provided officially to the local population. I told the
Prefect at Cosenza and my C.A.O. there that the ration of bread which for the
local people has been fixed at 100 grams, was to be increased to 300 grams and
that meat was to be provided with the ration three times a week together with
suitable local produce in the form of vegetables and potatoes, etc. which are
not in short supply. I told the Prefect in categorical terms that the refugees
in this camp would receive priority of treatment over the local Italian
population. I have arranged for certain supplies of captured German clothing
and equipment to be made available through the Supply Officer of Region 2 to the
poorer inmates of the camp but I cannot guarantee under the present camp
management that this clothing will necessarily find its way to the proper
beneficiaries. I have further given directions that certain captured enemy
supplies are to be used to supplement the local produce on the scale which I
have laid down, but here again I cannot guarantee that the internal camp [board]
will ensure that every member of the camp gets his fair share....

I have asked for a detachment of the British and American Red Cross organization to be sent to take charge of the camp in
order to avoid so far as possible the semblance of military jurisdiction which
would associate the less educated minds in the camp with the internment
conditions with which they had been familiar for so long. . . . But I venture
to prophesy that under the conditions of liberty in which the internees are free
to live and wander about, a general dispersal is likely to take place unless a
final destination can be found for these unfortunate people and their journey to
that destination organized. ♦ ♦ ♦

3. It is competent for the Allied Control Commission to determine a
reasonable schedule of relief payments for United Nations nationals, to be paid
out of AMFA funds if necessary and to be charged against the Italian Government.
This schedule need not conform to that currently being followed by AMG or by the
Italian Government with reference to needy Italians. Such relief payments are
distinct from the advances provided for British and American nationals in TAM
70, or which could be provided for its nationals in Italy by any other United
Nations government.

4. It is noted that in your judgment the current scale of relief payments to
United Nations nationals in Italy is so low as to reduce the income of such
persons below the subsistence level, consequently tending to increase their
demands for camp care, and that you prefer the continuance of a relief scale
which will encourage United Nations nationals to remain at large. Your proper
course of action is to determine, in consultation with Headquarters AMG, 15 Army
Group, a scale of relief payments which you judge would achieve your objective,
and to arrange that proper instructions are issued....

I have studied with concern the Minutes of a conference on this subject, held
at Headquarters No. 2 District [British Army logistical area] on 7 January 1944. My attention is particularly drawn to the following extract from paragraph 6 of the Minutes of this
conference:

"The main points which emerged, however, was that the Displaced Persons
Sub-Commission was only prepared to assume partial responsibility, and that
consequently a large proportion of the task would remain an army liability:
sufficient information had been produced to assess this liability, but its
acceptance must be subject to confirmation by FLAMBO."

I wish to make it quite clear that the organization of the care and disposal
of civilian refugees cannot be accepted as a military responsibility. I have
offered to assist to the extent possible in relation to military requirements as
regards the provision of stores and the execution of Engineer work, and I am prepared to
continue this assistance.

Meanwhile, G.O.C. No. 2 District, in view of the inability of the Displaced
Persons Sub-Commission to carry out its task, has provided an organization
staffed by military personnel to handle refugees arriving from Yugoslavia. Part
of this personnel is being withdrawn now. The remainder is liable to be
withdrawn at any time. . . .

I further note that the feeding of Yugoslav refugees is at present being done
from Army resources and through Army channels. I do not regard this as
satisfactory and request that you will make arrangements to feed these refugees
through a civil organization and from civil supplies at as early a date as
possible.

I agree entirely that the organization of the care and disposal of civilian
refugees is not a military responsibility. It is the responsibility of A.C.C. ♦ ♦ ♦

As you are probably aware, it must take a little time for me to produce an
adequate organization. Up to date the Displaced Persons SubCommission has been
grossly understaffed and incapable of carrying out this task without military
assistance. I would like to assure you that I am getting on with the job as fast
as I can and the Sub-Commission is now being reinforced by personnel who have
just arrived from North Africa. I cannot work miracles but will do my best to
reduce my requests for military help to the minimum until such time as the
SubCommission is capable of tackling the whole job. ♦ ♦ ♦

1. The need for an organization which will control and handle communications
with Displaced Persons, and also enquiries concerning their welfare and
whereabouts, has been appreciated. Requests for the formulation of such a body
have been received both in London and Washington, and the importance of
establishing a system whereby communications and enquiries may be

[408]

rapidly transmitted is emphasized by the fact that a procedure for their
transmission has already been instituted in enemy occupied Italy. Furthermore,
its operation will have an appreciable effect on morale both in Italy and
overseas, and the benefits of an accurate and complete system of records which
such an organization would require will be of value at this time in the
administration of these persons, and in the future will be essential in
arranging for their eventual repatriation or evacuation.

3. It is therefore proposed that:
(a) There should be a set up under the Displaced Persons Sub-Commission a
Records Bureau, to be known as the "Displaced Persons Records Bureau, Italy."
(b) The Bureau to be responsible for all records necessary to the
administration of Displaced Persons, excluding Italians, and to be staffed as
far as possible, subject to the requirements of security, by displaced persons
in Allied hands.
(c) All communications to Displaced Persons, and all enquiries concerning
them, to he channelled through the Bureau which will maintain details of
addresses. ♦ ♦ ♦

1. It is appreciated that this Sub-Commission was despatched into the field
inadequately staffed and equipped to undertake the tasks with which it was
immediately faced and that personnel and equipment which were subsequently
provided were not entirely adequate and served only to satisfy outstanding
needs. Now that the Sub-Commission has had sufficient time in which to gauge the
extent of its duties, and to estimate with a reasonable degree of accuracy its
shortcomings both in personnel and equipment necessary to the efficient
conduct of those duties, it is desired that steps shall be taken which will
provide the organization with all available requirements, and permit it to
function on a sound basis in the future without resort to makeshift and
temporary expedients.

3. It should be noted that the present ceiling of British personnel in this
Theater cannot be exceeded, and that neither can new units be formed nor
additional personnel provided without a corresponding decrease in existing
establishments. ♦ ♦ ♦

1. It will be appreciated that the problem of Yugoslav nationals in Italy is
already complicated by reason of the following factors:
A. The Yugoslavs are far from being a united nation.
B. There has recently been strife in Italy, although measures have been
initiated to deal with the present situation, between Partisans and Chetniks.
C. Supplies, accommodation, clothing, and medical facilities for displaced
persons in Italy is overstrained.

2. In view of the foregoing and our need, if possible, to reduce demands on
accommodation, clothing, and supplies at present required for displaced persons
in Italy, and particularly having regard to the prime need for operational
security, neither proposal specified in your message is recommended. It is
further considered that such action might create a precedent, which would lead
to other demands and the influx of larger numbers of additional refugees for
which we would not be able to provide.

3. It is recommended, therefore, that no direct assistance or funds be
provided for these refugees, but that should they be able to reach Italy by
their own efforts we shall continue to care for them as heretofore. ♦ ♦ ♦

[Msg, WD to AFHQ, 22 Dec 43, CAD Msg files, CMOUT 8575]

The Secretary of State has been informed that, pursuant to your
recommendation, it has been determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the
military situation does not permit the military authorities to render any direct
assistance at this time to these refugees. ♦ ♦ ♦

[Msg, CCS to AFHQ, 15 Mar 44, AFHQ Msg files, FAN-NAF 347]

♦ ♦ ♦ I. Ask Yugoslav Partisans to furnish local currency to refugees
enabling latter to arrange their escape to Italy, such expenditures to be
reimbursed in U.S. dollars or such funds as the Partisans request.

2. If Partisans cannot furnish funds, ask them to aid refugees escape by
guaranteeing to boat owners and other persons assisting refugees to escape that
they will be compensated by Ameri-

1. . . . The type of Yugoslav has changed during the last month or
so-previously they were received from Dalmatia but are now coining through the
German lines. The latter are mostly orphans, women with children and old men and
women. Refugees are now in such a condition as to require more medical
attention. go orphans were received on one ship alone....

2. Higher headquarters estimated that the Yugoslav refugee problem would
cease. There were 4,500 per month in February and March. During the first week
of April 2,000 were received. They are not kept in camps. We have moved 16,249
Yugoslavs to Middle East, and of these approximately 5,000 were moved during
March.

3. Organization of Sub-Commission is still on insecure foundation.

4. Methods of feeding, source of feeding and accommodation stores are
problems.

5. There are two hospitals at present with 100 beds in each occupied all the
time. Red Cross has rendered valuable welfare and nursing assistance. There has
been some support from the army, but they have been taking personnel away.
Yugoslavs, Czechs, Poles and Italian Army doctors are being trained to carry on
the work.

6. With reference to accommodation stores, the ACC has set up no means of
supplying. Army initially supplied these, but they are becoming less and less a
source of supply and we will have to make our own arrangements. We have helped
ourselves as much as possible but will need some assistance in the matter of
material.

7. The ration is inadequate for small children, nursing mothers, etc. This is
helped somewhat by hospital comforts. The Army does not consider it their job,
thus the Italian substance ration is all that they have to fall back on....

2. Complete stoppage evacuation refugees to Italy impracticable but we are .
. . not providing transportation except where impossible to refuse. This
restriction to remain until further notice.

3. Increasing numbers refugees cannot be maintained Italy. Alternative areas
for reception are Mideast and French North Africa (FNA). Proposal accept
refugees FNA under examination but cannot be effected immediately as security
screening arrangements in Italy inadequate in absence additional facilities
here and question of maintenance etc. yet to be worked out.

The President's War Refugee Board, composed of Secretaries Hull, Morgenthau,
and Stimson, considers it necessary that the board appoint, without delay, a
full-time special representative with headquarters in Bari, Italy. This
representative would investigate for the board all possibilities which may
exist in areas adjacent to Italy for the rescue and relief of minority groups in
enemy occupied territory who are now in imminent danger of death. Accordingly,
it is requested that permission be granted for this purpose.

SACMED has granted permission for appointment of special representative for
territories adjacent Italy. As in the case of representative under governmental
Committee, representative of board will be attached to headquarters ACC but may
establish headquarters at Bari.

The President sent the following cable to Ambassador Robert Murphy in
Algiers:

A. Information available to me indicates that there are real possibilities of
saving human lives by bringing more refugees through Yugoslavia to Southern
Italy. I am also informed that the escape of refugees by this route has from
time to time been greatly impeded because the facilities in Southern Italy for
refugees have been overtaxed....

B. I understand that many of the refugees in Southern Italy have been and are
being moved to temporary havens in areas adjacent to the Mediterranean, and that
efforts are being made to increase existing refugee facilities in these areas. .
. .

C . . . . I feel that it is important that the United States indicate that it
is ready to share the burden of caring for refugees during the war. Accordingly,
I have decided that approximately 1,000 refugees should be immediately brought
from Italy to this country, to be placed in an emergency refugee shelter to be
established at Fort Ontario.... New York, where under appropriate security
restrictions they will remain for the duration of the War. These refugees will
be brought into this country outside of the regular immigration procedure just
as civilian internees from Latin American countries and prisoners of war have
been brought here....

G. . . . It is desired that you co-operate fully with the Ambassador in
effecting the prompt removal and transportation of refugees selected to be moved
to the United States....

FRENCH NORTH AFRICA OPENS UP AND MORE YUGOSLAVS MAY NOW ESCAPE TO ITALY
[Memo, G-5, AFHQ, to a Mil Mission, 22 Jun 44, ACC files, 10000/164/583]

1. During his recent visit to AFHQ General Velebit urged that assistance
should be given to Yugoslav nationals who, by reason of enemy oppression or from
causes connected with military operations in Yugoslavia, were compelled to leave
their homes and to seek asylum in Italy. The difficulties involved in
maintaining large numbers of refugees in Southern Italy in areas where military
requirements must be pre-eminent were explained to General Velebit who, in agreeing that refugees should be evacuated from Italy to Mideast expressed the
wish that should it be possible they might be accommodated in other localities
where climate conditions were more favourable.

2. Due chiefly to an acute shortage of medical personnel in Mideast for the
care of refugees, this Headquarters was reluctantly compelled on 5 May to issue
instructions restricting the evacuation with Allied assistance of such persons
from Yugoslavia. At the same time endeavours were made to find suitable
alternative areas where refugees might be accommodated. An appropriate site by
sea for large camps has now been chosen near Phillippeville in French North
Africa, and preparations are in hand as a matter of urgency to provide
accommodation initially for 10,000 with a fully equipped hospital for 600.
These facilities are expected to be ready by the end of July.

3. In expectation that UNRRA medical assistance will be available in Mideast
within a period of 4 weeks, and that facilities near Phillippeville will be
prepared by the date indicated, directions have been given to SOMTO [Subversive
Operations, Mediterranean Theater of Operations] that the restriction on
evacuation of refugees to Italy from Yugoslavia should be lifted as from 14
June....

1. The accepted principle of this Headquarters is that delicate children
should be retained in Italy during the hot weather.

2. I understand from your letter that Major Murray Wood has passed the
children under reference as fit for evacuation. Major Murray Wood is doubtless
correct in his finding, if he has given it on broad administrative lines.

3. I have, however, a detailed knowledge of the conditions affecting the
lives of these two boys and of their health during the past eight months. They
have fought as children for their country, have been mutilated and have both
been seriously ill; the younger is still delicate. There is no doubt that they
will benefit greatly, if they can avoid a hot climate this summer.

4. I would therefore request you to retain these children in Italy, unless
there are categorical administrative reasons for their evacuation. ♦ ♦ ♦

[411]

THOSE ASKING FOR REPATRIATION ARE TOLD A WAR IS ON
[ Memo, Col C. B. Findlay, Dir, Internees and DP Subcom, ACC, for Political
Sec, ACC, 28 Jul 44, ACC files, 10000/164/583]

♦ ♦ ♦ I have invariably told all non-Italian Nationals in Italy who ask if they
can be sent "home" as follows:
(a) There is a "War on"
(b) Only those essential for war purposes can be sent home. ♦ ♦ ♦

SACMED Is ASKED NOT TO BE TOO INFLEXIBLE IN HIS POLICY ON REPATRIATION
[Paraphrase of Msg, CCAC, to Gen Alexander, 16 Sep 44, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT
31959]

. .. the indicated fact which prompted you to recommend that only those
civilian nationals in liberated Italy who are deemed essential to the war effort
be considered for repatriation is appreciated by CCAC.
23

SACMED, however, is requested to reconsider along the following lines and to
advise whether, within military needs, arrangements could be made for the
repatriation or evacuation of I8oo individuals mentioned in MAT 246 or such
among them as are judged worthy cases by you. The conditions would be as
follows: a-that early repatriation of nationals of other United Nations and of
friendly enemy-occupied nations who have been stranded in Italy and who desire
to be repatriated should, subject to military security, be accepted in
principle; b-that actual repatriation should remain entirely subject to
military considerations which remain paramount and to the discretion of
SACMED....

SURVEY AFTER THE PROBLEM OF CARE IS UNDER CONTROL
[Address of Director of the Displaced Persons and Repatriation
Sub-Commission Before the Advisory Council for Italy, 30 Nov 44, ACC files,
10000/136/236]

♦ ♦ ♦ There are at present in Liberated Italy some 23,000 Displaced Persons.
Of these 9,000 live in camps and 14,000 are living in private residence. These
14,000 are entitled to certain financial allowances from the Italian Government and also, in many cases, to
allowances from the countries to which they belong. The nationals of the United
Nations are also entitled to rations on a more generous scale than the ordinary
Italian civilian ration. The Sub-Commission administers and pays these
allowances and distributes the ration cards for the additional rations.

The Army is not interested in the repatriation of Displaced Persons, but for
political, economic and ethical reasons, the Allied Governments desire to
secure the safe return of their own nationals, to return to their own countries
nationals who have been forcibly evacuated and to find homes for the stateless
and persecuted. All such persons are in Italy in the charge of this
SubCommission. Nobody can be more suitable to plan their repatriation so this
duty, which does not arise from military necessity, has been appended to the
functions of the Displaced Persons Sub-Commission and it has become the
Displaced Person and Repatriation SubCommission. ♦ ♦ ♦

So here, at all the camps, there is a camp staff formed from the nationals there housed; at hospitals they have their own
doctors and nurses; the children are taught by their compatriots, welfare work
and entertainment is all self-organized; they do their own cooking and
housework, conduct their own repair and other work-shops, keep their own
stores, etc.

Similarly the Commission is assisted in its work and by way of supplies and
by advice by many and various bodies, such as the Inter-Governmental Committee
on Refugees, the American Friends Service Committee, the War Refugees Board, the
American, British and Italian Red Cross, the American Joint Distribution Board,
and, shortly, UNRRA will relieve it of responsibility for the camps in Southern
Italy.

It is also assisted by military missions from ten of the Allied countries who
advise on many matters but also screen the persons from the security angle. ♦ ♦ ♦

There are many . . . problems such, for instance, as providing exchange for
repatriation. Nine hundred Jews are shortly to leave for Palestine. CCS have
been approached for instructions as to how much money they may take and how any
balance remaining in this country shall be dealt with.

... An attempt is being made to obtain salvage clothing from the Armies and
repair shops are being set up to deal with such salvage as may be obtained. The
scale of the problem can be grasped when it is said that 100,000 blankets and
75,000 boots are required at once for present

[412]

urgent needs and other items on the same scale. ♦ ♦ ♦

Lastly there is the problem which is the problem of the whole AC;
insufficiency of Transport-the problem of providing further transport is urgent
and acute.

1. In order to permit the release of Allied Commission military personnel
for duty elsewhere and to launch UNRRA in actual relief operations in Italy,
the plan evolved in recent discussions with representatives of UNRRA (Italy),
Allied Commission and this headquarters, as hereinafter set forth, will be
implemented as soon as possible....

2. Notwithstanding problems which remain to be solved before transfer of
administrative responsibility can be effected, Allied Commission will provide
forthwith for the infiltration of UNRRA (Italy) personnel and for their
participation in administration at the specified centers and installations....

UNRRA officially assumed responsibility for 3 of the Southern Camps. The
other 2 Camps housed Dissident Yugoslavs and these are still working well under
a Military manager with great help from UNRRA welfare, etc., personnel.

1st May to 1st August 1945

UNRRA trucks gradually became available and military trucks returned. Food is
still being entirely supplied from military resources. Accommodation stores,
blankets, etc., are still mainly those handed over by D.P.R.S.C., A.C.
24

It is felt that the great loss suffered in the past because local archives in
cities and towns have been destroyed can be avoided in this war if special care
is taken to preserve such archives. The President is anxious that every effort
possible be made for their preservation at the time of initial occupation and
during the period of occupation, and all appropriate commanders in the field
will be directed to issue the necessary instructions to prevent damage to
archives in localities occupied.
25

1. For the purpose of these Instructions the term "monument" will designate
any site, building, or other structure, whether public, ecclesiastic, or private, whose historic,
cultural, artistic, traditional, or sentimental value render its protection
and preservation a matter of public interest. Such monuments include ruins,
museums, libraries, churches, memorials, palaces, and the like.

2. As soon as practicable after occupation, the CAO should inspect all
monuments within the area under his charge to determine what measures are
necessary for their protection and preservation.

3. Monuments of necessary daily use, as churches, public offices, private
residences, or the like, should be kept open and provisions made for existing
custodians to be continued in office or new ones found. Necessary funds should
be provided from local sources.

4. The CAO should use his discretion whether to keep open or to close
monuments not of necessary daily use, as museums, libraries, archeological
sites, or the like. Where custodians and funds are available and the monument is
in good repair, it should probably be left open. Otherwise it should be closed,
a notice posted

[413]

to the effect that it has been closed by military authority, and measures
taken to ensure its protection and preservation by posting of guards, frequent
inspection, or the like.

5. In his inspection, the CAO should note damages sustained by monuments in
the course of occupation. He should render a report on such damage through
channels to the CAO. He should include recommendations with respect to repairs,
cost, available funds, available skilled labor, and the like. Where delay in
repair would jeopardize the preservation of the monument, he should see to the
execution of the repairs on his own authority. Costs of repairs should be
charged to local funds save in very exceptional cases.

6. The CAO should take steps to prevent damage or defacement of monuments by
military or local personnel. Such steps might include, besides ensuring
adequate protection, posting of notices in English and Italian, requesting
tactical commanders to warn troops against acts of nuisance, defacement or
disrespect, and the like.

7. The CAO should see that all charges of damage or disrespect to monuments
which come to his attention are promptly investigated by himself or by
appropriate civil or military authorities and, if proven, are duly punished.

8. During the first phases of occupation, the CAO will probably not be
concerned with the protection, care, and control of movable objects of art other
than through steps taken to protect museums, etc. Instructions will therefore be
issued later on this subject. The CAO should, however, attempt to prevent the
removal of objects of art, archaeological fragments, and the like. He should
also see to the proper preservation of such objects as may come to light in the
course of military operations, repairs to buildings, or the like. ♦ ♦ ♦

♦ ♦ ♦ I doubt if there is need for any large specialist staff for this work,
since it is at best a luxury and the military will not look kindly on a lot of
art experts running round trying to tell them what not to hit. However, the
Adviser (for Sicily, one perhaps enough, for larger spheres probably several)
should have rank enough to carry weight in staff councils and to be able to get
things done in the field....
26

AMERICAN COMMISSION SUPPLIES THE ARMY WITH PRECISE DATA AND MAPS
[Ltr, McCloy to Finley, Vice Chairman, The American Coin for the Protection
and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in Europe, 9 Oct 43, CAD files,
000.4 (3-25-43) (1)]

♦ ♦ ♦ The
information you have furnished concerning the location of important artistic
monuments in Italian provinces should prove invaluable. In order that this
information can be utilized to the fullest extent possible, I have sent a copy
of your letter to General Eisenhower by officer courier, with the request that
it be made available to the appropriate museums and monuments officers in the
area mentioned.♦ ♦ ♦

The specifically prepared maps which your Commission has furnished to the
Civil Affairs Division and the Army Air Forces have been distributed to the
appropriate theaters of operations, except one photostatic copy which has been
retained for file. So far as military operations permit, these maps are used
for the protection of the monuments, museums and other buildings plotted on the
maps.

I am advised by the U.S. Army Air Forces that your assumption that the maps
are used in its planning of aerial operations is correct. In this connection,
your attention is called to the fact that the R.A.F. also participates in aerial
operations. Your Commission may wish to discuss this subject with the State
Department, with the view to bringing the use of these maps to the attention of
the appropriate agency of the British Government.

As you know, the War Department has recognized the urgent necessity for
taking special measures to prevent black markets in cultural treasures looted by
the enemy, as well as to protect local archives, historic monuments and objects
of art. We look to your Commission for advice and guidance in implementing these
policies. . . .

TO WHAT EXTENT IS PROTECTION OF MONUMENTS COMPATIBLE WITH MILITARY NECESSITY?
[Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 14 Oct 43, CAD Msg files, CM-OUT 6000]

Protection of artistic and historic monuments in Italy is subject of great
concern to institutions and societies. Realizing the impracticability of
declaring open the cities in which most treasures exist, following three points
submitted for consideration: (I) By the use of radio, leaflets, and any other
means available to you advise Italian people to remove all movable works of art
from

[414]

cities and localities subject to damage by military operations. (2) Avoid
destruction of immovable works of art insofar as possible without handicapping
military operations. (3) Declaration of isolated cities as open when they come
under our control and have no military value. Example: Assisi. ♦ ♦ ♦

[Msg, Eisenhower to WD, 22 Oct 43, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 13405]

Appreciate great concern as to protection of Italian artistic and historic
monuments.... Ref para I. Italian people will be told that our air attacks are
directed against the Germans. Ports, airfields, communications all kinds
especially road and rail centers used by the Germans as well as all areas
occupied by Germans are liable to attack and all movable works of art in such
localities should be removed to place of safety or localities obviously less
liable to air attack. For security reasons not prepared to designate definite
localities where air attacks will be made. Is warning considered necessary with
respect to obvious advance of ground troops?
Ref para 2. Concur, this policy already in effect.
Ref para 3. Agree that this might be done without prejudice to military
operations provided that necessary publicity measures are taken to ensure that
the declaration of militarily unimportant art center as open city may not set
precedent likely to prove embarrassing later when art centers essential for
military use are not so declared.

EXPERIENCE IN SICILY HAS TAUGHT LESSONS
[Memo, Capts Hammond, Adviser, and Maxse, Deputy Adviser on Fine Arts and
Monuments, to Advisory Comets. on the Preservation of Monuments and Works of Art in London and Washington,
1 Nov 43, CAD files, 000.4 (3-25-43) (1)]

1. . . . As of 24 October 1943, AMGOT has become Allied Military Government
(hereafter AMG) and enters a new phase.

3. In the new organization, at the level of AMG General Hq. (which will
presumably become ACC), the Sub-commission for Monuments, Fine Arts, and
Archives (hereafter MFA&A) will be separated from that of Education and is
under the acting Directorship of Major [P. K.] Baillie Reynolds, formerly
Inspector of Monuments for the Office of Works in England....
27

4. Attention is called to the suggested need of having Advisers on MFA&A more
closely in touch with the initial phases of occupation than they were in Sicily.
AMGOT Headquarters collected a considerable and authenticated file of damage to
property and sequestration of goods both by civilians and by troops during the
first, uncontrolled, days of the occupation of Sicily. Fortunately the harm to
monuments and works of art was not great. However, libraries, archives, and
scientific institutions suffered considerable damage and loss of equipment. Much
of this could have been prevented had there been some officer on the scene
specially charged with initiating precautions against it.

5. Reasonable precautions, which would not interfere with military needs,
might be the following:
(a) Issuance by the Commanding General of an order requiring the posting of
guards on places of artistic or cultural importance; the avoidance of the use
of such places for the billeting of troops if other equally suitable places are
available; and the protection of the contents of such places from damage or
loss if it proves absolutely necessary to billet troops in them.
(b) Presence at Group and Army Headquarters of officers (one at each)
charged with the responsibility of advising commanding officers as to what
artistic or cultural places need protection and of inspecting as soon as
possible after occupation to see that necessary protective measures have been
taken. The ordinary CAO has no time for this task, amid his many other duties.
The Advisers found in Sicily that it was much easier to secure co-operation in
avoiding billeting in artistic or cultural places than to get troops out once
they were in. They also found that troops billeted in such places respond
readily to reasonable suggestions for the conservation of the structure or its
contents since most damage or loss occurs from ignorance and carelessness rather
than through deliberate malice. Civilian looting, naturally, requires adequate
police guard.

7. In the second, or AM(,, phase, the Adviser will be responsible for the
necessary steps to reactivate the local administrative machinery responsible
for monuments and works of art and for securing funds to finance the most urgent
work of conservation....

8. One major problem in conservation of monuments has been the shortage of
building ma-

[415]

terials. Damage to roofs is extensive and tiles, though manufactured locally,
are in great demand and scarce. Glass for broken windows is unobtainable and
the openings must be blocked with wood or brick. Wood itself is becoming
impossible to obtain for scaffolding, roofs, and other uses. . . . It is
suggested, however, that the Committees attempt to send at the earliest
possible moment one or more dismountable and movable steel tubing scaffolds;
wood, particularly plywood; light and easily laid roofing material; and some
sort of transparent, weather-proof paper or cellulose, perhaps made up in
sliding panels for insertion in otherwise boarded up window spaces. It goes
without saying that these materials, essential for temporary measures of
conservation, are also desperately needed for general housing.

10. During the second, or AMG, phase it is suggested that Advisers, at the
same time that they initiate practical measures for immediate conservation,
begin the spade-work for eventual restoration. Damage can be assessed, value of
restoration judged, and estimates secured. The material collected at the
regional level can be co-ordinated and digested at the level of General
Headquarters. Consultation and co-operation with Advisers on Education will be
close. As AMG goes into the third, or Allied Control Commission, phase the
direct administration will pass to the Italian government. Regional advisers
will probably vanish, and ACC Advisers will turn more and more attention to
general planning and to advising and assisting the Italian government.
28

♦ ♦ ♦ The following protective measures were taken for the safeguarding of
monuments and fine arts:

♦ ♦ ♦ 2. a. A list of monuments was furnished the Adjutant General, Region III AMG, on 3 November 1943 which included (a) buildings in Naples which should
never be requisitioned for military purposes and (b) monuments which are
occupied by troops and for which requisitions should be lifted.
b. A list of monuments in the forward areas was furnished the Adjutant
General, Region III, AMG, for guidance of combat units.
c. On 11 November 1943, trucks were furnished the Superintendents of Museum for the removal of their office
equipment, library and museum files from the Castel Nuovo where it was being
ransacked and looted by occupying troops.
d. On 14 November 1943, accompanied by an officer from the Inspector General's Department of Headquarters Fifth Army to the
Academia and Palazzo Reale to investigate looting by occupying troops which
had been reported by Italian authorities.
e. Periodic visits have been made to all monuments in Naples occupied by
troops to check on the safety of collections and libraries still in place.

3. Funds were authorized to be put at the disposal of the Royal
Superintendents of Museums for the following projects of a purely protective
nature:
a. Church of the Gerolomini: project to construct temporary roof and
scaffolding to hold up damaged coffered ceiling....
b. Church of San Giovannia Carbonara: project to erect temporary roof over
entire church, choir and chapel....
c. Church of San Paolo Maggiore: project to construct temporary roof over
church and chapels....
d. Palazzo Reale of Naples: project to wall up repository of state owned
furniture...
29
e. Museo Provinciale Campano at Capua: project to salvage and remove to
safety part of collection buried in section of building demolished by bombs....
f. Excavation of Pompeii: project to erect temporary protection over sections
exposed by bombing, to strengthen weakened frescoes and to recover monuments
buried by bombing....
g. Amphitheatre at Pozzuoli: project to erect temporary walls and
custodian quarters destroyed by bombing, in order to safeguard monument.♦ ♦ ♦

THINGS ARE GOING BADLY IN NAPLES AND MORE SAFEGUARDS ARE NEEDED
[Sec of Education and Fine Arts, AMG Rgn III, Report on Activities to 15
December 1943, ACC files, 10000/129/168]

5. The major effort of this Section has been devoted to the task of
attempting to safeguard

[416]

monuments which, in the early days of the occupation of Naples, were
indiscriminately requisitioned to billet troops. These requisitions are still
in effect and museums, the University, royal palaces and libraries are occupied
by troops. Many sections of these buildings still contain important and valuable
works of art, books, furniture, and state documents. It has been impossible to
confine troops to the sections allotted to them and the majority of the
Superintendents of the various monuments have reported many instances of the
pillage and vandalism of works of art and books. Wherever possible the vandalism
was investigated, detailed reports written, an investigation has been held by
the Inspector General Section of Headquarters Fifth Army, but the occupation by
troops continues in every instance and the Superintendents continue to report
vandalism. It would seem that the only solution to this grave problem is to
secure from the highest authorities the assurance that certain monuments can
not be requisitioned for military purposes.

6. The historic University of Naples, the largest in Italy, has been
occupied by Allied Forces since early in October. At the request of the Rector,
Dr. Adolfo Omodeo, I inspected the buildings on 19 November 1943 with the Rector
and several faculty heads. In many places there were visible evidences of
inestimable damage done to libraries, laboratories, collections of specimens and
optical instruments. It was claimed the major part of this was done by the
occupying troops. A detailed report was submitted at once. To date the
University is still occupied.

7. Information was received on 17 November 1943 that the Museo Nazionale had
been requisitioned by 10 Base Depot (British) as a depot for medical stores and
for the quartering of troops. A large part of the world famous collection is
still in the Museum and there seemed no reason to believe it would escape the
damage noted in Paragraph 5. The requisition was reported at once, every effort
was made to have it lifted, alternate space was suggested but to no avail. As
far as is known, the building will be occupied in the near future.

15. In the light of experience here, the following recommendations are made:
a. That, before the occupation of an area, the head of the Section of Fine
Arts have an opportunity to meet with other officers of the Region; especially
SCAO's and CAO's to explain the functions and aims of this Section.
b. That the head of the Section of Fine Arts reach an occupied area at the
earliest possible moment and that, if feasible, his advice be sought by requisitioning authorities to prevent the indiscriminate use of
historical monuments for the billeting of troops.
c. That every effort be made to secure from the highest authorities the
approval of a compiled list of monuments which may never be used for military
purposes except with the permission of the Commanding General.

Today we are fighting in a country which has contributed a great deal to our
cultural inheritance, a country rich in monuments which by their creation
helped and now in their old age illustrate the growth of the civilization which
is ours. We are bound to respect those monuments so far as war allows.

If we have to choose between destroying a famous building and sacrificing our
own men, then our men's lives count infinitely more and the buildings must go.
But the choice is not always so clear cut as that. In many cases the monuments
can be spared without any detriment to operational needs. Nothing can stand
against the argument of military necessity. That is an accepted principle. But
the phrase "military necessity" is sometimes used where it would be more
truthful to speak of military convenience or even of personal convenience. I do
not want it to cloak slackness or indifference.

It is a responsibility of higher commander to determine through AMG Officers
the locations of historical monuments whether they be immediately ahead of our
front lines or in areas occupied by us. This information passed to lower
echelons through normal channels places the responsibility on all Commanders of
complying with the spirit of this letter.

238. Since most damage to historical and artistic objects was done by our
troops rather than by the enemy, the representatives of this SubCommission
should be sent forward with the troops to prevent damage. Brig. Lush said that
he thought that it was the Lines of Communication troops that did the damage
and not the fighting troops. The Chairman said that he thought that it was a
question of constantly educating the troops as to the objects and buildings
which must be preserved. Lt. Col. (Aaron E.] Harris stated that in Region IV
Allied property was posted by the R.C.A.O. indicating that it was out of bounds
to troops, and that a similar program might be used in respect of historical or
artistic monuments. ♦ ♦ ♦

♦ ♦ ♦ Mr. Matthews had the following comments about Monte Cassino. The 36th
Division was making the main effort in this attack. The attack was progressing
fairly well, and we had occupied some of the terrain features to the left of
Monte Cassino. Mr. Matthews personally saw the G-2 of the Division and spoke to
him about the very historic structure which the Division was about to take. The
G-2 said "What's that?" Mr. Matthews then told him about Monte Cassino-it was
the first he had ever heard of it. Mr. Will Lang of Time Magazine talked to the
General commanding the artillery in front of Monte Cassino and learned that he
had no particular orders and had never heard of the historic significance of
the structure. Mr. Matthews then determined that no information had been given
the G-2 of the 36th Division or the Artillery commander as to the sacred
character of Monte Cassino.

Following this incident Mr. Matthews wrote a personal letter to General
Eisenhower and conferred with General Smith of General Eisenhower's staff.
Orders were issued to the 15th Army Group but by the time they got through
the various echelons of command, Mr. Matthews continued, it never reached `'the
man who fired the gun." ♦ ♦ ♦

Mr. Matthews, at the request of the Public Relations Office, gave a talk
about Monte Cassino to the troops in the rear areas just before the attack. That
was the first they had heard of it. ♦ ♦ ♦

12. . . . there is as yet no evidence that the members of the Allied Forces
have attempted to export works of art improperly and it is felt that there is
far greater risk of this occurring through smuggling by civilians. Nevertheless,
it is felt that the issuance of an order . . . and the initiation of appropriate
control measures would be a wise precaution to take against the possibility of
some flagrant instance occurring and exposing the Allied Force Headquarters to
the charge of not having taken proper steps to prevent it.
31

1. I have now, I think, in hand up to a point the preparation of a list of
places where Archives are or should be deposited....

5.... I called attention to the special danger to which Archives are
subject owing to their unique character, to their easy destructibility, to the
fact that they may be damaged almost as irretrievably by dispersal as by actual
destruction, and to the general ignorance even among men who might be expected
to appreciate the possible value of a picture or sculpture, of the possible
value of stores of papers or registers; especially when these are not obviously
antique.

6. I took the opportunity of a conversation with Brigadier Lush yesterday to
press strongly this point: because I see no possible way of dealing with the
danger, in view of the enormous quantity of such Archives, except the
preparation of a very short and simple explanation of the possible value of old
papers and a similarly brief explanation of the way in which, with little
trouble, they may be safeguarded when they are found in buildings which have to
be occupied for military purposes; coupled with strict orders for the execution
of such recommendations. Brigadier Lush asked me to prepare some note of this
kind to be added to an order which, as I understand, is actually in preparation
concerning the protection of Ancient Monuments. ♦ ♦ ♦

1. The effective work of the Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives Subcommission
depends very largely on the personal inspection of monuments by its officers and
on their liaison with a large number of widely scattered military units. . . .

2. The Subcommission has in the past been very seriously hampered by lack of
transport facilities. In practice it has proved that neither Regions nor AMG 5
and 8 Armies are very likely to be in a position to allocate transport for such
purposes. In rear areas hitch-hiking affords a slow and tedious, but usually
practical, solution. In forward areas on the other hand the time factor is
vital, and it is essential for the proper exercise of their duties that
Monuments and Fine Arts Officers should have transport at their disposal to
enable them to get on the ground at the very earliest moment that operations
permit.

3. The minimum needs of the Subcommission are three small vehicles (Jeeps or
P.U.'s), one for each of the officers with 5 and 8 Armies and one for general
inspections by the Director or by visiting specialists.....32

1. MissionTo prevent as far as possible destruction of and damage to historical
monuments, buildings, works of art and historical records of Italy; to safeguard
and preserve them, and to give firstaid in repairs when needed; and to assist
in the recovery and restitution to their rightful owners of any works of art
which have been looted, removed or otherwise misappropriated.

2. Major Functions(a) Advises on orders to be issued by Cornmanders to their troops for the
protection and safeguarding of monuments, buildings, works of art, etc.
(b) Maintains liaison with ground and air forces in order to furnish them
with information concerning historical monuments within their respective
theaters of operation.
(c) Formulates and distributes plans and directives.
(d) Collaborates with other Subcommissions, including Public Safety, Public
Works, Property Control, and Education.
(e) In collaboration with Public Relations prepares and/or approves publicity
relating to monuments and fine arts within its jurisdiction.
(f) Acts in advisory capacity to Italian Ministry of Education.
(g) Submits periodic reports on matters relating to preservation and
protection of monuments and art objects.

3. Operational Functions
(a) Prepares regional and provincial lists of monuments, etc. to be safeguarded, and distributes same to
Regional Commissioners and to units in the field.
(b) Provides measures to safeguard monuments, etc. in
regions occupied by Allied forces.
(c) Advises unit commanders on matters pertaining to requisition of national
monuments.
(d) Collects information regarding the damages of war to monuments, etc.
(e) Investigates reports of alleged looting or other unlawful appropriation
of art or historical objects, and recommends appropriate action for
restitution of same.
(f) Aids Italian government agencies concerned with respect to preservation,
including urgent repairs necessitated by war damage to national monuments,
protection of works of art and historical records, including salvage,
collection, housing, and restitution to rightful owners of same.
(g) Prepares guide-books for military personnel and co-operates with the Red
Cross and Special Services in arranging tours for same.

1. Attention is directed to the personal letter to all Commanders issued by
the GOC-in-C dated 17 February 44 on the above subject.
34 The following instructions are issued as a guide to Com-

[419]

manders and in amplification of the letter above referred to.

2. Tactical considerations must obviously influence the occupation of
historical buildings, etc., during actual fighting, but a rigid control over
such occupation will be imposed by Commanders as soon as fighting has ceased.

3. It is not proposed to forbid the occupation by troops of any specific
buildings except that churches will NOT be used for normal troop accommodation.
In cases of extreme necessity churches may be used temporarily to shelter
wounded personnel awaiting evacuation. This authority is not to be interpreted
that they may be used as Casualty Clearing Stations or Hospitals. The
responsibilities for decision as to whether an historical building is to be
occupied or not is delegated to Commanders, not below the rank of Divisional
Commander or officer of equivalent status, except that during actual fighting,
in cases of extreme operational urgency, lower Commanders may have to act.

4. To assist Commanders in their decisions ACC/AMG have prepared lists of the
principal historical monuments, deposits of important documents (archives), and
artistic treasures of Italy, with the degree of their importance indicated by
stars. These lists will be known as "Lists of Protected Monuments" and will
supersede the lists printed in the Zone Handbook of Italy, and AFHQ General
Order No. 68 of 29 December 1943 insofar as it refers to the Zone Handbook. . .
.

5. All buildings listed in the "Lists of Protected Monuments" will be deemed
"historical buildings" and will not be occupied when alternative accommodation
is available or without the express authority in writing of the appropriate
commander as laid down in paragraph 3 above.

6. As by far the greater part of the damage is likely to occur between the
time the battle moves forward and the time reserve formations and administrative
units assume full control, it will be the responsibility of commanders to place
guards on all historical buildings during this phase, insofar as their resources
allow, so that their eventual occupation will be planned and orderly.

7. Whenever it is found essential for operational reasons to occupy any such
buildings, the commander of the occupying troops will be responsible for seeing that ACC/
AMG are informed at the earliest opportunity and that every reasonable
precaution is taken to prevent careless or wilful damage and especially souvenir
hunting. In the case of museums, galleries, libraries, repositories of documents and other cultural institutions, the
contents will be stored separately from the parts occupied, communicating doors
between the occupied and unoccupied parts of the building will be blocked, as
will also all unnecessary entrances from outside whether to the occupied or
unoccupied parts. Notice boards will be erected, and all troops billeted in the
building will be issued passes and will be the only troops permitted to enter.

Responsible Italian officials will, if available, be consulted when such
measures are being considered.

8. Partial occupation of a large historical building, i.e., the occupation
of only a small corner, or occupation by troops of more than one Allied Nation
will be avoided wherever possible. In the past buildings so occupied have
suffered a high proportion of loss and damage, not necessarily attributable to
the occupying unit (s).

9. ACC/AMG has a staff of officers with expert knowledge of such matters who
should be consulted in all cases of doubt. Where such officers rule that
specific items, e.g. furniture, should be included in those stored separately,
their ruling will be binding subject to the right of appeal of the occupying
unit to this Headquarters through the normal channels.

10. In addition to the monuments, etc. mentioned in the lists, there are
known to exist repositories to which the more valuable treasures of museums and
galleries have been removed for safety. The sites of such repositories are not
at present known: when found they are to be regarded as starred monuments, and
their location reported.

11. In the case of written papers and books it is to be noted that even
those which do not appear to be ancient may be of great importance, not only
historically but as containing information necessary for the practical purposes
of war. Casual destruction or dispersal of such collections, wherever found,
will not be permitted.

12. All Operation and Administrative Orders involving the occupation of
territory containing historical buildings will contain clear and specific
instructions to troops on the lines indicated in this instruction.

1. Add new para 13 -
There are possibilities of art treasure repositories, as yet unknown to the
Allied Armies, being discovered in the course of future operations. In order to
safeguard such repositories, it is essential that the commanders of units and

[420]

sub-units in the field should be aware of the procedure detailed below.

Whenever any unit or individual discovers what appears to be a collection of
art treasures, privately or publicly stored for safeguarding, this repository
will be reported at once through normal staff channels to the Monuments, Fine
Arts and Archives Officer with AMG at Hq Fifth or Eighth Army, whichever is
applicable, and treated in accordance with para. 10
above. ♦ ♦ ♦

There have not escaped your attention the damages inflicted upon Italian
buildings and monuments of high artistic value during their occupation by Allied
units and officers. To the solemn declarations of the responsible political
heads of Great Britain and United States, there have followed the definite
orders issued by General Eisenhower and later by General Alexander for the
respect to the artistic buildings which the Allied troops were obliged to use
because of war necessity. Nevertheless, many irreparable damages have been
inflicted and continue to be committed. The frequent contacts between the
officer of the Italian Government and the members of the Fine Arts
Sub-Commission do not seem to have brought concrete results.

I shall limit myself to mention, among the most serious damages, those
inflicted at the Palazzo Reale at Naples from which large quantities of
furniture, paintings, books and tapestries have been carried away: similar fate
has befallen the Palazzo Reale at Caserta and the Academia dl Belle Arti of
Naples, to mention only the principal cases.

In order to obviate in the future such serious occurrences (and in the very
near future we hope to find ourselves in cities such as Rome, Firenze, Siena,
Assisi, etc., where the artistic treasures are innumerable), I have summed up in
the enclosed Memorandum several measures which could be taken in common
agreement between the ACC and the Italian Government, and later made known to
AFHQ in Italy for the execution of the consequent instructions. ♦ ♦ ♦

Memorandum [Incl to above Letter]

1. Renewal of absolute prohibition to occupy and requisition for military use
buildings of high monumental, archeological and artistic importance.
A list of such buildings (beginning with those of the region of Rome) shall
be drawn up in agreement between the Subcommission of Fine Arts and the R.
Sopraintendenza Belle Arti of Naples.

Such buildings, gradually as the Italian cities become occupied, should be
closed and watched over by the Military Police and by the Royal Carabinieri.

2. Always in agreement, compilation of a list of historical buildings which
could be used only in case of absolute necessity, only with certain precaution.

In these the objects of art shall be removed and turned over to local
Sopraintendenze delle Belle Arti or to the technical offices of the Communes.
The furniture of artistic value shall be assembled in an enclosure which shall
be walled. There will remain in effect the prohibition to carry away the
tapestries and other accessories.

7. Marshal Badoglio's proposals for action against repetition of damage in
the future. In addition to the letters written by General Eisenhower (29 Dec 43)
and General Alexander (17 Mar 44),
35 AAI Administrative Instruction No. 10
[above], which was issued on 30 Mar 44 after consultation with MFA&A and
embodies the general recommendations by the Commission of Enquiry, specifically
covers all the points raised by the Marshal, except that (as already clearly
defined by General Eisenhower) it is considered that no absolute prohibitions to
occupation can be made.

a. Lists of buildings, graded by importance, have been drawn up. These
buildings may only be occupied under certain very clearly defined conditions and
authority from a Major General or Officer of equivalent rank. Printing of these
lists was necessarily withheld until the final approval of the Administrative
Instructions covering them, but the first list (Lazio-Abruzzi) is now in proof.
b. The Italian Superintendents have already been consulted over the
preparation of these lists.
c. Where it is found necessary to occupy a listed monument, provision is made
for the dispersal of contents on the lines suggested.
d. Police arrangements are covered in general terms and have already been
prepared in detail for Rome.

[421]

8. Liaison with the Italian Superintendents in Naples has throughout been
close, continuous, and cordial. ♦ ♦ ♦

SOMEONE NOT THE "SCHOLARLY MOUSE" TYPE HAS BEEN SENT TO GET THE WORD DOWN TO
THE TROOPS
[Draft of Ltr, Hilldring, Dir, CAD, to Gen Holmes, Chief, MGS, AFHQ, 25 May
44, CAD files, 321 (12-21-43), sec. 5]

... I will admit that Colonel Newton is ebullient, aggressive and full of his
subject.
36 On the other hand, if he hadn't possessed these qualities, I wouldn't
have selected him for this work. You and I have already tried the "scholarly
mouse" type. We had fifteen or twenty of them rambling noiselessly around the
Mediterranean Theater and they didn't do a damn bit of good, because the word
didn't get down to the troops as to what General Eisenhower wanted. . . . Some
very important Americans, including the President and Mr. Stimson, are
intensely interested in this project and are not at all satisfied with our first
efforts and results in this field. . . . This is a new venture with soldiers,
including those wearing stars, and unless some aggressive fellow devotes his
time to preaching the policy of the U.S. and U.K. with regard to this matter, it
will never get down to the troops, where it must get if anything is to happen.

4. Rome is unrivaled in the world in its possession of ancient buildings,
museums, Art galleries, etc. These treasures may almost be regarded as an
international possession. It is in the interests of all civilized peoples that
they are preserved.

5. Firm steps will be taken to ensure that these treasures are not despoiled
either by the Allied troops or by civilians.

6. The Commander of the forces occupying Rome will ensure the guards are
posted on all such places. A.M.G. will provide copies of an order signed by the Commander in Chief, to be posted on these places, putting
them out of bounds until such time as controlled visits may be allowed.

♦ ♦ ♦ By the time of the occupation of Rome some of the University buildings had
already been taken over by the Third Division. On the whole, the Division had
avoided putting its troops in libraries or laboratories. At the suggestion of AMG, other installations were put off limits in order to complete the protection
of all cultural and scientific equipment. It must, however, be added that any
use of the University buildings for housing of troops is considered most
undesirable by AMG. ♦ ♦ ♦

On the day of our arrival, the Fine Arts officer discussed with Prof. Van
Buren of the American Academy in Rome, the general situation which is extremely
favourable in Rome, though considerable damage has occurred in the immediate
vicinity at such places as Tivoli, Frascati and Nemi. Guards have been posted on
all monuments and museums. ♦ ♦ ♦

(c) The Archives of the Ministero delle Corporazioni (Rome) were ordered to
be thrown out of the windows and removed for pulping by the officer responsible
for the clearing of the building for use as Headquarters of The Allied
Commission. This was only prevented by the intervention of the Archives
Officer, Rome Region.
(d) The occupation of the Ministero dell' Aeronautica (Rome) by the
Headquarters of AAI resulted in looting by troops. Repositories were broken into
and the contents of filing cabinets scattered on the floor in a search for
souvenirs. Photographic records in particular were thrown into hopeless
confusion. ♦ ♦ ♦

Report has been received from O.C. 20 Court Martial and Holding Centre that a
sentence of go days field punishment and pay stoppages of 95 has been passed on
a soldier who mutilated one of the pictures in the Palace at Caserta.

MFA&A Officers with our Armies should be advised of the impending tactical
operations. It is essential that the MFA&A Officers do their advance planning
the same as any other staff section if they are to properly accomplish their
mission. I am under the impression that this is not being done, resulting in
MFA&A Officers being rushed into a situation without time for adequate planning.
. . .

b. Photographic Record

My instructions from the War Department gave emphasis to the question of
photographic records. All officers on duty with the Sub-Commission are
unanimous in the opinion that photographs should be made of all historic
buildings and structures so that there will be a permanent record of their
condition at the time they fell into Allied hands. . . .

c. Transportation

. .. Of necessity our Officers must cover a great amount of territory in the
execution of their work and I feel that adequate transportation is absolutely
mandatory. I recommend that each MFA&A Officer assigned to the Fifth and Eighth
Armies be provided with transportation and that transportation be made available
to the Officers assigned to the various Regions.

d. Italian Official Transportation

As the work progresses the Sub-Commission is placing more responsibility upon
the officials of the Italian Government. They are, however, handicapped by lack
of transportation or when transportation is available, by lack of gasoline and
tires. This condition has resulted in a definite delay in the rehabilitation
program of the area generally between Rome and Naples with the resulting
possibility of severe damage to historic structures during the coming winter. It
is recommended that essential Italian Officials, when approved by the
Subcommission, be provided with facilities for adequate transportation.

e. New Divisions

There does not seem to be any method of indoctrinating the officer personnel
of new divisions with the policies of the Supreme Commander on matters of
MFA&A. Upon the relief of a division in the line it is customary to turn

over orders, documents, etc. to the staff of the
incoming division. The work of MFA&A is quite unique in its character and its
importance and many ramifications are of such a nature that I feel there should
be liaison between MFA&A Officers and such divisions before they go into the
line. This can be accomplished by officers especially detailed from the
Headquarters of the Sub-Commission or by MFA&A officers on duty with the
respective armies.

f . Personnel

The T/O [Table of Organization] for the Sub--Commission of MFA&A in this
theater (Italy) has been established at twelve (12) Officers. In my opinion
this is an insufficient number to accomplish the mission....

g. Documents

The War Department (U.S.) has provided and furnished copies of the
ASFM-M-353-I7 "Civil Affairs Handbook-Italy" as well as WDP No. 31-103
"Civil Affairs Information-Field Protection of Objects of Arts and Archives." It
is recommended that these documents be distributed to Tactical Commanders down
to and including Brigades, Regiments and other similar Tactical Sub-Divisions.♦ ♦ ♦

When I was in Florence recently I had a talk with the head of our Monuments
and Fine Arts Sub-Commission who is a little perturbed at the apparently rather
ruthless methods employed by the DCRE in the area. It would be very greatly
appreciated if this officer, Lt. Col Harris, could be asked to restrain his zeal
in clearing up Florence and other antique areas, if the use of bulldozers, etc. is not absolutely necessary. An instance was
given of the destruction of the Guelph Tower on the Ponte Vecchio which was
brought down with great difficulty and, I am assured, unnecessarily. ♦ ♦ ♦

[Memo, Coxwell-Rogers for Lush, 4 Oct 44, ACC files, 10000/145/71]

I fully appreciate the importance of avoiding unnecessary damage to the
monuments and other works of art that are in such abundence in this country.
There are, however, difficulties which are not always appreciated by local
antiquarians and members of our Monuments and Fine Arts

[423]

Sub-Commission. The area round the Ponte Vecchio provides a good instance of
the difficulties. The whole area was strewn with mines of all natures. Owing to
debris, detection by normal means was impossible without risking a considerable
number of soldiers' lives. Clearance of the area was a necessary preliminary to
the repair of the water-main supplying the part of the town north of the River
Arno. The employment of bulldozers was the only method which would reduce the
chance of loss of life and make the early repair of the water main possible.♦ ♦ ♦

♦ ♦ ♦ Saving the facades and a tower in Via Guicciardini and Via Por Santa
Maria has been an up and down affair, but I hope to have successfully completed
the work so well begun by Enthoven [MFA&A Officer]. The Army Engineers wouldn't
risk their men's lives with their heavy machines in between dangerous-looking
walls, so the Soprintendenza, took over the whole responsibility for shoring
and clearing. Then, as soon as we had got properly going, with men working like
ants to get the work done up to the Engineers' time, they change their minds and
there we found them pushing their machines in after all, without first pulling
down the walls they were so afraid of. So much the better for everybody, but it
upset the administrative side a bit.

Now I am going round all the villas on a list supplied by the Soprintendenza
and checked to some extent by Hart and Enthoven. The list contains every blessed
house that had an antique stone in it, including one that had been used as a
stable and fattoria and completely neglected for years, and one that had been
completely rebuilt so that there wasn't an old stone left in it. We are only
putting "Off Limits" notices on those where damage, if it occurred, would be irremediable. A procession of people comes to the office to wangle Off-Limits
notices. I have only met one who offered the house disinterestedly. ♦ ♦ ♦

1. Character of the Work. The formidable military obstacle offered by the Arno Valley was responsible for over two months of intensive operational
activity in an area approximately 150 kilometres in length, following the curve
of the River. This zone is richer in cultural monuments and works of art than
any area of comparable size in the world.

2. The consequent damage to monuments of importance by bombs, shells, mines,
fire, vandalism and theft has been incalculable. Prompt action and intensive
labor will be necessary during the immediate future to keep the war damage from
being greatly increased by weather.

3. The problems have been aggravated by the fact that enormous collections of
works of art, normally concentrated in Florence, Pisa, Pistoia and Prato have
been scattered over a very wide area in order to save them from damage by air
action, thus exposing them to damage by artillery and troops.

4. MFA&A officers in the area have had therefore:
a. To locate, examine and safeguard deposits of works of art.
b. To visit and examine monuments, and take necessary steps for first aid in
case of damage.
c. To cope with endless problems of movement control, supply,
transportation, etc., arising from the absolute necessity of getting the proper
civilian personnel to work repairing monuments in an area which was still highly
operational. ♦ ♦ ♦