Sunday, September 25, 2016

In this appeal from a conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, we address the question of whether the holding in State v. Cain, 224 N.J. 410 (2016), should be applied retroactively to cases still pending on appeal.

Based upon our review of the language used by the Supreme Court in Cain and in State v Simms, 224 N.J. 393 (2016), as well as other post-Odom decisions by the Court, we conclude Cain's holding must be given pipeline retroactivity, and applied to all cases pending on direct appeal.

Defendant was indicted on a single count of fourth-degree operating a motor vehicle during the period of license suspension for a second or subsequent conviction for driving while intoxicated, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b). The State appeals from the order of the trial court which admitted defendant into PTI over the prosecutor's veto. We reverse. The prosecutor's decision to reject defendant's application for admission into PTI did not constitute "a patent and gross abuse of discretion" as defined by the Supreme Court in State v. Roseman, 221 N.J. 611, 625 (2015).

However, we reject the prosecutor's characterization of the fourth degree offense under N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b) as falling within the crimes that by their very nature carry a presumption against admission into PTI.

In this appeal and cross-appeal, we address the issue of whether a juvenile was entitled to credit on his suspended sentence for the time he spent in a residential community home program as part of his probationary sentence to the Juvenile Intensive Supervision Program ("JISP"). We also consider whether the juvenile should have been granted credit on his sentence for the period during which he participated in the JISP following his completion of the community home program.

Based upon our review of the record and applicable law, we hold that the juvenile was not entitled to credits for either of these periods. Therefore, we affirm the trial judge's decision denying the juvenile's request for credits for his time in the community home program, and reverse the judge's decision granting the

Monday, September 12, 2016

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. DHARUN RAVI
A-4667-11T1/A-4787-11T1(CONSOLIDATED)

Defendant was convicted of multiple counts of invasion of
privacy, bias intimidation, hindering prosecution, and tampering
with evidence. The jury found defendant guilty on four counts
directly predicated on N.J.S.A. 2C:16-1(a)(3), a now
constitutionally defunct law pursuant to the Supreme Court’s
holding in State v. Pomianek, 221 N.J. 66, 69 (2015). The State
conceded that the convictions under these four counts are void
as a matter of law.

Defendant raises an issue not addressed in State v. Hudson,
209 N.J. 513, 517 (2012). We consider whether defendant, who
received a second extended-term sentence for a crime he
committed while on bail awaiting trial on the offense for which
he received his first extended-term sentence, was "in custody"
within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5b when he committed the
second offense. Because we conclude defendant was "in custody"
within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5b when he committed the
second offense, we reject his claim that his second extended
term constituted an illegal sentence.

This civil forfeiture action concerns the seizure of $846,000, $722,000 of which represented "entry fees" to participate in sports pools. The claimant admitted operating sports pools for approximately twenty years but denied the pools were illegal. The New Jersey Constitution prohibits the Legislature from authorizing gambling except through referendum and several exceptions established by the Constitution. The pools operated by claimant did not fall within any of these exceptions. We further conclude the State met its burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) there was a direct causal connection between the money seized and the promotion of gambling and (2) the promotion of gambling involved constituted an indictable offense under N.J.S.A. 2C:37-2. We further reject claimant's argument that the court erred in failing to allocate

the funds seized between illegal and legal purposes, noting claimant failed to present sufficient credible evidence in response to the State's motion for summary judgment to permit such an allocation. Finally, we reject claimant's argument that the State violated the notice provision of N.J.S.A. 2C:64-3 by failing to give notice to the players whose entry fees had been deposited into the joint accounts held by claimant and were part of the funds seized.