Chapter 9. First Phase of the Battle

The 302nd
ENGINEERS

by,
Gilbert H. Crawford
Thomas H. Ellett
John J. Hyland

CHAPTER IX.

FIRST PHASE OF THE BATTLE

FOR the 77th Division and the 302nd Engineers, the first
phase of the Argonne-Meuse Battle lasted from the 26th of
September to the 10th of October. During this time the
line moved forward from the "jump off" at le
Four de Paris and La Harazee to the Aire River, in front
of Marcq. Many noteworthy incidents took place during
these two weeks of battle.

On the first day of the attack, the 2nd Platoon of Co.
"Y', under Lieutenant O'Donnell, became lost in the
old German positions of the forest and got ahead of the
Infantry in the vicinity of the battlefield of Bagatelle.
This detachment encountered a party of German machine gun
snipers, whom they promptly engaged with the resulting
capture of seven of the enemy. It was in this action that
Pvt. Bergen R. Seaman, Co. "F", and Pvt. Louis
Doerr were killed.

Divisional citations were awarded the following for their
share in the affair:

Lieutenant O'Donnell, Sergeant 1st Class Solomon,
Corporals De Biase, Boniak and Giordano and Privates
Doerr, Koch and Bieringer.
On the 28th, Captain Harder of Co. "C" and his
acting lieutenant, Sergeant Cavalieri, were both wounded
while Co. "C" was preparing to advance with the
infantry, just south of the Carriere des Meurissons.
Lieut. Frederick Weston of Co. "B" was assigned
to the command of Co. "C" and served with that
company during the remainder of the campaign.

The battle line of the Division advanced slowly until the
1st of October from the 1st to the 9th there was
practically no movement. It was during this period that
Major Whittlesey of the 308th Infantry became detached
from his brigade with several hundred men, was surrounded
by the Boches, refused to surrender, and fought off all
attacks until relieved by our advancing infantry on the
evening of the 7th.

Meanwhile, the Engineers were busy repairing the very
poor roads of the forest, and rebuilding the narrow-gauge
railroads that had been abandoned by the Germans. The
area in the rear of the 154th Brigade did not at this
time contain a single road on which to bring up supplies
or evacuate the wounded. The 2nd Battalion of the 302nd
Engineers was operating in this area, and orders were
given that the French narrow-gauge railroad near La
Harazee be connected up with the German narrow-gauge
system in the forest. This work was carried on with such
energy and spirit that by the 2nd of October, the advance
infantry was supplied with food and ammunition, and the
wounded were evacuated over this hastily organized
railway. The grades were so steep and the roadbed so
rough that it was impossible to use locomotives (and none
were available), so the traction was supplied by the U.
S. Army mule, all animals that could possibly be spared
being mobilized for this work. This railway was of the
utmost use to the 154th Brigade, because without it the
supplies could only have been sent forward by hand and
the evacuation of the wounded would have been delayed
many hours.

In describing the advance of the 77th Division, General
Alexander wrote as follows in regard to this railway
line:

"It will be observed that the circulation in the
forest itself was recognized beforehand as being most
uncertain, and no provision could be made therefor. For
the left flank (154th Brigade), it was found that the
proposed route via BINARVILLE was entirely impracticable,
and in anticipation of such a development, preparation
was made to utilize the Boche railway system in the
forest, which information from maps and otherwise,
indicated to be most complete and far-reaching.

"This scheme was carried out by the divisional
engineers. A connecting link between the French system at
LA HARAZEE and the Boche system at the head of the
FONTAINE aux CHARMES -was constructed so rapidly that by
the third or fourth day of the operation that route was
used for all supply and evacuation on the left of the
divisional sector. No locomotives were available, but a
few Boche freight cars were picked up from day to day and
these were utilized, being drawn by animals on the
railway referred to. I will say here that had it not been
for this connecting link and the consequent supply of the
troops thereby, a continued advance in the forest-on the
left at least-would have been found entirely
impracticable. Our difficulties in the way of
transportation, at least as concerned rolling stock, was
greatly alleviated by the capture of the DEPOT des
MACHINES on the 28th of September. At this point, some
sixty freight ears in serviceable condition were found
and at once put to work. Effort was made to secure
locomotives, but for some reason unknown to me, it was
impracticable to secure them until the operation reached
such a point that the urgent necessity for them had in
great part passed. The first call for these locomotives
was made by me on the 26th of September, as a result of
the developments on my left flank.

"As a matter of interest, I may
add here that during the time the Boche railway system
and connecting link were operated by animals of the 77th
Division, eight hundred and fifty tons of supplies of all
kinds were carried into the forest by that route and
about five hundred sick and wounded evacuated thereby.
The railroad was used in this manner until the tranverse
road, BINARVILLE-la VIERGETTE, fell into our control on
the 7th of October."

The 1st Battalion was at this time busily engaged in
keeping the vitally important le Four de Paris Road in
condition for heavy traffic and in repairing the German
narrow -gauge railroads in its area. This system was
connected with the 2nd Battalion south of Bagatelle, but
because of the lack of locomotives it was not used by the
Americans until later.

In the area occupied by both battalions were several old
German material depots or "dumps". The Depot
des Machines and the depot discovered by Co.
"A" each contained millions of dollars worth of
material. Every conceivable article needed by military
engineers was included in these dumps, and they were of
utmost value to the American Army in the advances that
took place from that time on. The very poor condition of
the rearward roads, which had deteriorated very rapidly
as the corps and army troops had followed the divisional
troops, made it nearly impossible to bring up vitally
necessary engineer supplies. These well supplied German
"dumps" were, therefore, a God-send to the
engineers. From this time until the Armistice, the
Regiment relied almost exclusively on the material
abandoned by the enemy. And curiously enough he never
failed us. Time after time "dumps" were
discovered that could easily have been destroyed by
burning or demolition. No more convincing testimony was
needed to show that the Germans "stood not upon the
order of their going."

It was noticeable that the enemy engineers made very few
demolitions of any kind in the forest itself. Hardly a
road blowout was attempted except at la Besogne. Even the
railroads were injured only by shell fire. It seemed
strange at the time, but was explained later by the very
extensive demolitions north of -the Aire which were
encountered between the 1st of November and the
Armistice. All the enemy engineers had doubtless been
withdrawn for this work, while his infantry was fighting
the Americans south of the Aire.

Few details need be given of the engineer activities in
the forest. Life was a series of hard- worked days, cold,
wet nights, and scant food. It required constant work to
keep the roads open at all, and the platoons with the
infantry underwent all the dangers of the front line,
making themselves useful as pathfinders and carriers a n
d occasionally formed the actual battle line, as did Co.
"D" on the 27th of September.

One incident of note was a personal and hazardous
reconnaissance made by Lieutenant-Colonel Giesting during
this period. Accompanied by two men from Co.
"B", he advanced along the Haute Chevauchee (or
as the Boche called it the Nord-Sud Strasse) for over
one-half mile in front of the American outposts, thus
gathering valuable information as to the condition of
this road long before the troops advanced.

As has already been suggested, everything in the
Engineer's life seemed to lead to bridges. So it was,
that on the l0th of October the advance of the 77th
Division brought it south of the Aire River between
Grandpre and Chevieres. The dreary monotony of the
roadwork in the Argonne Forest was instantly changed for
the far more interesting and dangerous work of bridging
the Aire. The river was somewhat wider than the Vesle,
but it was fordable in places. These fords it was the
duty of -the Engineers to find.

On the afternoon of the l0th, Captain Howry of Co.
"A", accompanied by Lieutenant Weston of Co.
"C" and Lieutenant Macqueron of the French
Army, set out on a personal reconnoissance of the Aire
where it passed through the village of Chevieres. This
deserted village was located on the southern bank of the
river and the American outposts were situated half a
kilometer south of it. This party operated in broad
daylight between the lines. The north bank was held by
enemy snipers who made the reconnaissance very difficult.
The information required was, never the less, speedily
obtained and all the officers returned unharmed.

In spite of the deter-mined efforts of Cos.
"B", "C", "E", and
"F" from the l0th to the 14th of October, all
attempts made to bridge the Aire failed because of the
strength of the enemy defence. On the night of the 11th
of October, Captain Howry of Co. "A",
accompanied by a detachment from that company, set out to
find fords across the river. Before returning this party
located six fords less than waist deep between Chevieres
and St. Juvin. These fords were marked by stretching wire
across the river. This most creditable piece of work was
carried on in front of our infantry outposts, and had to
be done in absolute silence as the north bank was
infested with enemy outposts.

During the evening of the 13th, the 153rd Brigade received orders to maneuver to the east, thus relieving
part of the 82nd Division, and to attack St. Juvin (north
of the Aire) on the morning of the 14th. This difficult
movement was accomplished during a wet, cold night.
Details from Co. "A", under command of Captain
Howry, advanced to the river during this night and
repaired three partially demolished Boche foot bridges.
Men from Co. "A" were then sent to the infantry
to act as guides to these bridges and to the fords which
had been wired on the night of the 11th.

On the morning of the 14th, the 306th Infantry attacked
St. Juvin and after an all day battle took the village
with several hundred prisoners. During the afternoon of
the 14th, two platoons of Co. "B" built one
foot bridge in the rear of the infantry near Martincourt
Farm. This bridge was used almost immediately by the
advancing infantry, but not by the troops of the 306th
Infantry who so gallantly captured St. Juvin.

Starting at 8:00 P. M., 14th of October, Captain Howry
with details from all companies of the 1st Battalion
attempted to build an artillery bridge across the Aire
between Marcq and St. Juvin. Material for this bridge was
carried to the bridge site by hand for a distance of
about one-half kilometer from a large engineer dump which
had been discovered by Lieutenant Glenn of Co.
"B" while on a reconnaissance on the morning of
the 13th. Heavy bombardment prevented the completion of
this bridge. About twenty men were wounded during this
operation.

On the morning of the 15th, Captain Crawford with fresh
details from the companies of the 1st Battalion, took
over this artillery bridge work. The site was changed by
Major Per-Lee to a demolished German pile bridge near St.
Juvin. Work on rebuilding this bridge continued for eight
hours under heavy shell fire including much gas. The
bridge was completed at 4:00 P. M. on the 15th of
October.

During the night of the 15th, Captain
Howry with men from the companies of the 1st Battalion
practically finished another artillery bridge at the site
originally chosen. Before morning, however, the 77th
Division was relieved by the 78th Division; so this
latter bridge was completed by details from the 303rd
Engineers.

During the day of the 15th, Lieutenant Walsh with a
platoon from Co. "F" proceeded toward Chevieres
to construct a footbridge. There had been no advance by
the left brigade; so Chevieres was still in front of the
American outposts. Leaving his platoon in a sheltered
position a kilometer south of the Aire, Lieutenant Walsh
accompanied by Sergt. William Thomas of Co.
"D", made a daylight reconnaissance of the
river. In so doing both were killed. The Distinguished
Service Cross (posthumous) was awarded to Lieutenant
Walsh and Sergeant Thomas.

The 77th Division having been relieved, the 302nd
Engineers retired into the heart of the Argonne Forest,
expecting a well-earned rest with a clean-up, new
equipment and clothing. That was the program, but the
Regiment had no sooner settled itself in the comfortable
Boche dugouts in the vicinity of the Abri du Crochet,
than orders were received that called half the Regiment
to the front again. The Corps Commander had decided to
build a position of security about three kilometers
behind the front line. The divisional (303rd) engineers
were too much occupied by their own front line work to do
this, with the result that the resting 302nd Engineers
were again ordered forward. Co. "B" and two
platoons of Co. "A" took over the right half of
this work, which extended from the Cote de Maldah to the
heights behind Marcq. A detachment consisting of one-half
of each company in the 2nd Battalion took the other half
of the sector from the left of the 1st Battalion to the
Bois de Negremont. This work consisted in trench digging
performed by the reserve infantry under engineer
supervision, and in wiring. The latter was done by the
engineers; in all, several miles of trenches and wire
were constructed, this work lasting until nearly the 1st
of November.

On the 12th of October the Regiment lost its original
commander, Col. C. 0. Sherrill, who was made Chief of
Staff of the 77th Division, which post he held until the
Armistice. No one who has ever come in touch with Colonel
Sherrill will fail to realize the immense influence he
had upon the Regiment. It was his energy and genius which
made the 302nd Engineers the fine organization it was,
and to him every officer and man owes a debt of
gratitude.

Lieut.-Col. Frank A. Giesting, who had been with the
Regiment from the time of its organization, succeeded
Colonel Sherrill, and he remained in command until
demobilization. In November he was promoted to be colonel
and, so far as is known, was the only Engineer Reserve
Corps officer with a combat division to attain that rank.