Peter Goodspeed: Japan feared post-tsunami 'devils chain reaction'

As they downplayed the risks of the Fukushima nuclear crisis, Japanese officials were already worrying about a nightmare scenario of nuclear explosions that might force the evacuation of Tokyo, an independent probe said

As they constantly reassured people and downplayed the risks of the Fukushima nuclear crisis, Japanese officials were already worrying about a nightmare scenario of a “devil’s chain reaction” of nuclear explosions that might force the evacuation of Tokyo, an independent probe into the meltdowns said Tuesday.

A 400-page report, issued by a team of 30 investigators assembled by the Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation, says three days into the disaster, triggered by the powerful March 11, 2011, earthquake and tsunami, Japanese officials were already looking at scenarios that might threaten their country’s very existence.

“I had this demonic scenario in my head that nuclear reactors could break down, one after another. If that happens, Tokyo will be finished,” Yukio Edano, the chief cabinet secretary, told investigators.

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Mr. Edano, then Japan’s top government spokesman, said he feared a “devil’s chain reaction,” in which nuclear reactors at Fukushima Daiichi, Fukushima Daini and Tokai might spiral out of control, threatening the Japanese capital and its metropolitan area, home to 35 million people.

At one point, the report says, there were discussions about forming a “suicide squad” of workers aged 65 and up, to go into the stricken nuclear power plant to determine how badly it was damaged.

Rebuild Japan’s blue-ribbon panel spent more than six months looking into the country’s worst nuclear accident. It interviewed 300 people, including top nuclear and government officials, as well as reviewing data and documents generated during the crisis.

The panel, headed by Koichi Kitazawa, former chairman of Japan’s Science & Technology Agency, blames systematic failures by Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO), operator of the stricken plant, and weaknesses in government for the disaster.

Virtually no one involved escapes unscathed.

TEPCO’s failings amounted to “systematic negligence” and its safety practices before the accident are characterized as “irresponsible.”

“TEPCO used to make light of the culture of nuclear safety,” the report says.

The report also accuses the office of Prime Minister Naoto Kan of contributing to the confusion and a collapse of command.

The Prime Minister’s Office’s first response to the meltdowns at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant “increased the risk of worsening the situation through stress and useless confusion,” it says, while “grandstanding led to badly muddled crisis management measures.”

By touring the disaster site by helicopter, Mr. Kan may have hampered attempts to come to grips with the crisis earlier, it adds.

The report also criticized the prime minister for trying to micromanage the crisis, saying his attempts to contain the emergency “only caused unnecessary confusion and increased the risk of aggravating the situation.”

At one point, there was a dangerous delay in using seawater to cool the overheating nuclear reactors because Mr. Kan’s office insisted on using fresh water.

In the end, a manager at Fukushima’s No. 1 reactor, ignored the orders of the prime minister’s office and TEPCO, and went ahead without authorization to use seawater.

The report says government officials lacked basic knowledge of how to respond to the disaster and the prime minister so distrusted TEPCO officials he appointed friends as advisors during the crisis.

At the height of the disaster, things were so chaotic Mr. Kan and his aides had difficulty using their cellphones to communicate with an underground crisis management centre at the prime minister’s office.

The report credits Mr. Kan with avoiding a more serious crisis by refusing to allow TEPCO to withdraw work crews from the crippled Fukushima plant.

Four days into the disaster, as it became obvious the nuclear plant’s safety systems had failed, Masataku Shimuzu, the TEPCO head, called Mr. Kan and asked him to withdraw all 600 staff at the site.

A furious Mr. Kan refused and threatened to “demolish” TEPCO if it went ahead.

A core group of 50 TEPCO employees — dubbed the “Fukushima 50” — remained at the plant and cooled down the reactors, preventing a total meltdown.

At the time, Mr. Kan’s office was considering creating a compulsory evacuation zone within 170 kilometres of the plant and a voluntary evacuation zone of 250 km that would include most of Metropolitan Tokyo.

Foreign governments had urged the creation of an 80-km exclusion zone, but Japan’s initial reaction was to establish only a 10-km evacuation zone.

The Rebuild Japan report says the government, in a desire to prevent panic, withheld information about the full danger of the disaster and failed to inform allies like the United States of all the risks involved.

The study concludes the crisis was essentially a man-made disaster, not the inevitable result of a catastrophic magnitude 9.0 earthquake.

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