Habeas; Ineffective Assistance of Counsel; Whether Petitioner's Conviction
of Reckless Manslaughter Following Reversal of his Murder Conviction Deprived the
Petitioner of his Right to a Trial by Jury. The petitioner was convicted
of murder in connection with the death of an eighteen month old baby. In State
v. Carpenter, 214 Conn. 77 (1990), the Supreme Court overturned the
murder conviction, finding that the evidence adduced at the petitioner's trial
was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had the specific
intent to cause death. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court with
direction to modify the judgment to reflect a conviction of the lesser included
offense of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §
53a-55 (a) (3), noting that the petitioner would not be prejudiced by such
modification because the jury's guilty verdict on the murder charge necessarily
included a determination that all the elements of § 53a-55 (a) (3) had been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The petitioner brought this habeas action claiming
that his conviction of manslaughter in the first degree on remand was unlawful in
that he had been deprived of his right to have a jury determine whether every
element of that offense had been proven. The habeas court denied the petition,
finding that it had no authority to disturb the Supreme Court's order and rejecting
the claim that the petitioner's appellate counsel had rendered ineffective
assistance in failing to seek reconsideration of the Supreme Court's decision.
The petitioner appeals. He claims that, as the crimes of murder and reckless
manslaughter involve mutually exclusive and inconsistent mental states - intent
to cause death for murder and recklessness for manslaughter in violation of §
53a-55 (a) (3) - the jury's guilty verdict on the murder charge was not based
on the factual findings necessary to support a conviction of manslaughter. The
petitioner claims, therefore, that the Supreme Court's direction that he be
convicted of manslaughter deprived him of his constitutional right to a jury
determination that every element of that crime had been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. The petitioner also claims that the habeas court wrongly
determined that his appellate attorney made a reasonable tactical decision in not
challenging the Supreme Court's decision to remand the case with direction to
convict on the lesser included offense. He contends that, at the time the
Supreme Court rendered its decision, reasonably competent counsel would have
been aware that the jury's verdict on the murder charge did not determine that
all the elements of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of § 53a-55
(a) (3) had been proven.