The first part of a two-part interview with Daniel Goldstein, MD, an oncologist who also studies the influence of business interests on healthcare—from treating patients to conducting drug trials to holding health-related events. In the first part of this interview, we talk about capitalism and healthcare, what motivates physicians, and the effectiveness of healthcare systems in the U.S., the U.K., and Israel.

A new Stigler Center case study chronicling the story of Chile’s first crowdfunding platform and its early regulatory challenges illustrates how financial regulations can be effectively used by incumbents to stifle competition.

New Stigler Center working paper: “To the extent that legislators represent majority opinion, it happens largely because legislators share the opinions of their constituents, not because legislators seek to reflect constituent opinion.”

PwC took over as auditor of the corruption-plagued global football body last year, with the intention of reforming it. So how is it that PwC is now accused of allegedly covering up a misappropriation of funds by FIFA’s new secretary general?

A new Stigler Center working paper looks into the effects of referendums and public initiatives on public policy and finds that direct democracy better represents the will of the majority, and therefore might also be better able to counteract the power of special interests over policymaking.

Between January 2009 and December 2015, White House officials met with corporate CEOs 2,286 times. A new study, to be presented at the upcoming Stigler Center conference on the political economy of finance, shows that access to the White House has several economic benefits.

A look at the Big Four’s congressional lobbying activity shows the auditors and their trade association taking advantage of the “Trump” window to roll back the 2002 reforms that changed their business.

Two new reports concerning the Wells Fargo scandal suggest that the bank’s senior management, its board of directors, and the regulators all knew about the bank’s toxic practices, yet for years did nothing to stop them.

The unprecedented divide between the way that Democrats and Republicans perceive the state of the economy may be linked to two important theories in economics and political science: Rational Ignorance and Rational Irrationality.

When regulation protects narrow interests – usually the interests of the incumbent industry – at the expense of the public interest. Capture occurs in various ways: from straightforward bribes and threats, to more implicit quid pro quos such as the lucrative future employment (revolving door), to softer forms of cognitive/cultural capture.

“… as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit.” George Stigler – The Theory of Economic Regulation (1971)