Chapter 3: Air War, 1939-41

The unique capabilities of air power, merely suggested in the
small-scale aerial activity of World War I, were effectively
demonstrated in the conflict which broke out in 1939, for World War II
was characterized from the outset by extensive use of the air weapon.
Numerous forecasts of such a development had been voiced since the end
of the earlier conflict, both in the aggressor nations and in those
nations which became the victims of aggression. in 1919 an American
aviation mission, sent to Europe by President Woodrow Wilson to study
the future of military aviation, found "that any future war will
inevitably open with great aerial activity far in advance of contact
either upon land or sea, and that victory cannot but incline to that
belligerent able to first achieve and later maintain its supremacy in
the air."1
For a variety of reasons, some of which have been suggested in the
preceding chapter, full recognition was not accorded to this finding in
the postwar development of our national defense. Only the fact of a
second war, world-wide in its implications and holding forth from the
first the prospect of our won eventual involvement, created again
conditions favorable to a full exploration of the potentialities of the
air weapon. Consequently, at least a brief account of the major
belligerent air forces and their activities in the period prior to
December 1941 must precede any attempt to describe the expanding role
of the Air Corps after 1939 in our feverish preparations for war.

From the attention given to the development of air power in Japan,
Italy, and Germany, it was clear by 1939 that those nations recognized
the airplane to e a redoubtable weapon in achieving their expansionist
ends. But the three countries varied in the doctrine, materiel, and

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organization which characterized their air arms; different
strategic and tactical concepts, reflecting in part differences in
geographic position and productive capacity, gave peculiar shape to
each of the totalitarian air force. Similar considerations determined
the status of air preparations in Great Britain, France, and other
nations opposing the Axis powers. In the military air doctrines
developed by major world powers prior to the outbreak of World War II,
and in the practical application of those doctrines during the first
two years of conflict, lay significant clues as to the eventual viceroy
of defeat of the several nations. even if the clues were not obvious at
the time, it was at least evident that air power would be an
important--perhaps decisive--factor in the outcome of the conflict.

The totalitarian nations had tested their air forces in combat
during the years immediately prior to 1939, and their action in the
localized struggles preceding the world conflict revealed trends and
policies which were to characterize their later conduct of the war. In
the Far East, Japan's undeclared war against China, prosecuted
vigorously after 1937, and Russo-Manchurian border fighting in 1939
gave the Japanese air forces an opportunity to gain valuable combat
experience. In Europe, the members of the Rome-Berlin Axis seized upon
the Spanish civil war of 1936-39 as a proving ground for their weapons,
while the Italian conquest of Ethiopia in the mid-thirties also
involved the use of warplanes in tactical experiments. These
experiences gave the totalitarian powers an initial advantage over the
Allies. The U.S. Army Air Corps made such efforts as were possible to
keep informed of developments among its potential enemies and allies
and to assimilate the lessons which penetrated the veil of censorship.
That veil was particularly effective in concealing the activities and
potentialities of the Japanese air forces, and American air officials
tended to underestimate those forces.

Japanese Air Power

The Japanese air forces, divided into separate army and navy air arms,
had developed under the influence of foreign aviation. In 1911 two
Japanese army officers received air training in France, and they were
followed by a few more officers during the next two years. In 1919 a
French mission comprising some sixty airmen arrived in japan to assist
in army air training; in the same e army established an aviation
section. By 1920 the first military aviation school had been

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opened near Tokyo; two additional schools were established
in 1922. Organizational changes came with the expansion of the Japanese
Army Air Force, which soon occupied a place along with the infantry,
field artillery, and cavalry. Before the end of the 1930's the post of
Inspector General of Military Aviation had been created, making one
commander directly responsible to the Emperor for the training of the
air force.2

The Japanese Navy Air Force had a similar history in its origin,
development, and gradual assumption of importance. Naval officers who
had received aviation instruction in France and in the United States
established a training school at Oppama near Yokosuka in 1912. The
first Japanese aircraft carrier was completed in 1920, but little
progress in training and organization was until 1921 when a British
mission of retired RAF officers and others arrived in Japan to assist
in reorganizing the naval air arm. later British missions instructed
the Japanese force in aircraft inspection, tactics, gunnery, and
armament. Though the London Naval Treaty of 1930 placed restrictions on
Japanese naval construction, the Japanese continued to expand their
naval air force, and four "replenishment plans" were approved during
the thirties. Night carrier training was begun in 1933, and both
carrier and shore-based strength of the naval air force continued to
grow.

The functions of the two Japanese air forces were clearly divided.
The army air force was designed solely to support the army ground
forces, while the l air force, in addition to supporting the fleet, was
responsible for coastal defense, convoy protection, and sea and
antisubmarine patrols. There was apparently little co-operation between
the two forces, for they had developed independently and they were
under the direction of respective army and navy commanders who showed
little desire to coordinate the activities of the air arms. Despite the
foreign influence which had aided in the establishment of the air
forces, the Japanese concept of air power and of the role of the
separate air arms did not constitute an exact copy of any foreign
nation. In organization and theory, as well as in the design and
manufacture of aircraft, Japan adapted Western ideas to her own needs,
and the resulting mixture of Oriental and Western strains, while
bearing resemblances to the air forces of other nations, did not
duplicate any one of them.3

In the period of 1937-41, Japanese air power received its first
extended

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test in combat. In 1931 the Japanese army had moved into
Manchuria, and from that stronghold drove into China in the summer of
1937. The air forces of the aggressor had virtually an open sky, for
the weak Chinese Air Force was unable to offer strong opposition. Under
the stimulus of civil war, from 1911 to 1928, the several factions in
China had developed air services consisting of a few obsolete aircraft
purchased from abroad. Upon establishment of the central government in
1928, a more stable program was possible, and during the thirties an
expansion and improvement of Chinese military aviation was accomplished
with the aid of foreign technical advisers. But the Chinese Air Force
was in no sense prepared to meet the relatively modern air force with
which the Japanese opened the war in 1937. By the end of the year the
Chinese Air Force had been almost completely destroyed. Assistance from
the Soviet Union and other nations enabled the Chinese to continue
their air opposition, but their efforts were ineffectual. lack of a
modern training program, inadequate maintenance and repair facilities,
and deficiencies in organization accounted for much of the weakness of
the Chinese force.4

At the outbreak of the conflict in 1937, air combat on both sides
was poorly executed, although there was no question as to the courage
of either Chinese or Japanese pilots. Bombing was inaccurate, but the
Japanese improved with practice and they revealed a talent for
modifying their tactics in order to meet changing tactics of their
opponents. The Chinese, forced to fight a defensive war on their own
territory, concentrated on improving their interceptor aviation. in the
early days of the fighting, Japanese bombers without pursuit protection
made daylight attacks on Nanking and other cities, but following a few
disastrous encounters with Chinese pursuit planes, the bombing halted
until pursuit planes could be brought from Japan to provide the
necessary protection. Japanese bombing formations, which at first
numbered about nine planes, soon increased to an average of
twenty-seven planes per wave of bombers. The attacks, against both
Chinese troop concentrations and Chinese cities, were usually preceded
by one or two reconnaissance planes which gathered weather information
and intelligence of enemy air dispositions. Carrier- and shore-based
planes of the naval air force operated against the Chinese,
particularly in attacks on Chungking and in support of ground troops in
the Shanghai and Tsingtao areas. The air force of the Japanese army
participated

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on a larger scale, and personnel were rotated frequently in
order to give combat experience to more airmen.5

In thr Russo-Manchurian order fighting which broke out in May
1939, the Japanese Army Air Force received a much more severe and
devastating test of its strength. The Soviet Sir Force, designed
primarily as an immediate support to the Red Army, administered a
resounding defeat to the Japanese force, which committed almost its
entire strength to the engagement and post approximately 500 planes and
150 pilots. According to the Japanese, their losses were worthwhile
because they brought about important changes in organization, training,
and tactics. These changes, however, were accompanied by no marked
departure from existing concepts of air warfare, and the chief
development came in an accelerated rate of expansion.6

As the border fighting ended in September 1939, the poor record of
the Japanese Army Air Force led foreign observers to conclude that the
army's force was inferior in both training and efficiency to the naval
air force. There was some justification for such a belief. Training in
the army flying schools was devoted almost exclusively to pilots, and
training of other air crewmen was largely neglected until their
assignment to tactical units. The navy, on the other hand, gave closer
attention to the training of all members of the crew, and by 1941 its
training program was designed to turn out annually some 2,500
navigators, bombardiers, gunners, and flight engineers. At the same
time, the navy was training about 2,000 pilots a year, while the army
was turning out pilots at the rate of approximately 750 a year. In
equipment, too, the army air force lagged behind the navy air force.
The latter possessed some excellent four-engine patrol bombers, while
the army had nothing heavier than a two-engine bomber. Prior to 7
December 1941 the army air force flew almost exclusively over land, and
its longest-range bombers had an operational radius of only some 500
miles. The navy's force had been trained to operate over water with a
radius of about 800 miles. Both forces, however, had a number of
well-tried torpedo bombers, dive bombers, and level bombers,
reconnaissance and transport planes, and several models of the Zero
fighter--a fast, highly maneuverable but somewhat vulnerable plane with
a maximum speed of approximately 350 miles per hour.* The

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planes were hybrids of foreign designs, with German
influence being particularly notable after 1936 when Japan threw in her
lot with Germany by signing the Anti-Comintern Pact.7

By 7 December 1941 Japanese air strength consisted of some 2,7000
aircraft assigned to fully trained air units. Approximately 6,000
pilots had been graduated from air schools or training units, 3,500 of
which were assigned to the navy and the remainder to the army. About 50
per cent of the army pilots had been in combat either in China or in
the border fighting against the Soviet Air Force, while 10 per cent of
land-based navy pilots had participated in the Chinese operations. Some
600 of the best navy pilots were assigned to aircraft carrier units. In
contrast to the 200 hours in primary, basic and advanced training then
being given to Air Corps cadets in the United States, the Japanese
pilots were receiving about 300 hours in training units before being
assigned to tactical units. The average first-line Japanese pilots in
1941 had about 500 flying hours, and the average pilot in the carrier
groups which were destined to begin hostilities against the United
States had over 800 hours. Though somewhat discounted by officials of
other nations, the Japanese air forces had now reached a peak of
efficiency, at any rate in their first-line strength, which gave them a
commanding position in the Pacific.

There were, however, certain fundamental weaknesses. In their
approach to the problems of air warfare, the Japanese took a limited
view of its possibilities. To the ground force officers who commanded

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army air units, the airplane was chiefly a tactical weapon
for supporting ground troops at short range. While the navy's concept
was broader, it did not encompass the necessity of desirability of
long-range, sustained air attacks on rear areas. There was nothing to
indicate that the Japanese comprehended the logistical possibilities of
transport aircraft, either for troop-carrier or for supply-dropping
purposes. The lack of co-operation between the army and navy forces did
not augur well for a war which might demand joint operations.
Furthermore, the division of the forces extended into the production
realm, where the army and navy competed for production facilities and
raw materials and failed to provide for the exchange of information so
vital to the efficiency of the Japanese aircraft industry.

Actually, the Japanese possessed neither the economic potential
nor the extensive technical skill necessary for developing and
maintaining a first-class air force. if other nations erred in
underestimating the strength of Japanese air power in 1941, the
Japanese high command for its part failed to appreciate the disparity
between Japan's air potential and that of prospective opponents. In
1941, for example, the aircraft industry in Japan turned out only 5,088
planes, while the United States, though only in the initial stages of
its conversion to a wartime economy, produced 19,445. In comparison
with the 11,000 pilots trained by the U.S. Army and during 1941, the
Japanese training programs turned out about 3,000. The Japanese also
seemed to have had little appreciation of the problem of replacements,
for they sacrificed safety factors in aircraft to performance, and they
made relatively little provision for air-sea rescue of highly trained
personnel. In the matter of airfield construction and maintenance of
aircraft, the Japanese had only rudimentary conceptions problems
involved; no system had been developed for the rapid construction of
airfields, while only small supplies of spare parts were kept on hand
and the number of depots for major repairs was inadequate for extensive
operations.8

The Japanese air forces were not prepared for a war of long
duration. Their major dependence would be placed on the element of
surprise and on a few well-trained airmen in the execution of
skillfully laid plans. Confident of an early victory, they discounted
the potential strength of their enemies.

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The Italian Air Force

In the theory of aerial warfare and in the organization of their air
forces the Italians were much further advanced than the Japanese.
Following World War I, Italian aviation had sunk to a low level of
efficiency and strength. By 1922 their first-line aircraft,
approximately 100 in number, were becoming obsolete. But when Mussolini
came to power in that year, he instituted a series of changes designed
to build a powerful air arm. Making the air force independent of the
army and the navy, Mussolini established a separate air ministry with
himself as Air Minister.9
The new office, which had control over the placing of all orders for
aircraft in Italy, encouraged the development of new models and began
to place into production the two most promising designs offered in any
one competition. By 1939 some twenty-nine firms in Italy were producing
aircraft, while six firms were manufacturing aircraft engines.10 By this time
the Air Ministry had steered the Regia Aeronautica (Italian Air Force)
through a number of reorganizations to meet the expanding demands of
Italy's aggressive policy. When the country became an active
participant in World War II, the Regia Aeronautica was organized into
four parts: an independent air force, army operation units, a naval air
service, and a colonial air force.11

For their air doctrines, the Italians depended almost entirely on
the thinking of their noted Gen. Guilio Douhet. It was Douhet's belief
that the airplane had revolutionized the nature of war. As opposed to
land and sea operations, in which the defensive attitude was easier
than the offensive, aerial operations were carried out in a medium
which facilitated offensive action. No longer would warfare be confined
to armies on the field of battle or to vessels on the high seas;
according the Douhet, the total population now became the belligerents,
and victory could result only from the total application of a nation's
material and moral resources and the exhaustion of those resources of
the enemy. He emphasized the necessity for swift and decisive
destruction from the air, the rapidity of the successive attacks not
allowing for material repairs or recovery of morale. This doctrine
reflected Italy's economic weakness and a vulnerable geographic
position; for while her position in the Mediterranean was potentially
dominating, it was also dangerously exposed, and her economic resources
were decidedly limited. Italy's best chance of success in warfare
therefore seemed to lie in a

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short, swift war, the victory to be achieved largely
through the paralyzing effect of strategic bombardment.12 IN the
matter of organization, Douhet advocated the establishment of the air
forces as a separate arm and the co-ordination of air, army, and navy
forces through a department of national defense. This last part of the
Douhet doctrine was closely followed by the Italians, for after the
establishment of the Air Ministry all Italian forces were reorganized
and Marshal Pietro Badoglio became chief of staff of the United Armed
Forces.13
But, when the test came, the Regia Aeronautica proved itself incapable
of carrying out either a short or a long war against any reasonably
determined opposition.

In its first "combat" test during the thirties the Italian Air
Force faced no real opposition. In the war against Ethiopia, 1935-36,
Italian bombers gained experience in the use of various types of
projectiles, and experiments were conducted in dropping ammunition,
food, and water Italian ground forces; even fresh meat was supplied for
the troops by the dropping of live goats and sheep which parachuted to
the desert and took up the march with the army until they were needed
for food. Most of the planes used were obsolete, through the few
Savoia-Marchetti bombers employed were of latest models. But in a
country as primitive as Ethiopia there could be no chance to test
Douhet's theory of strategic bombardment; the air force was employed
almost exclusively in giving close support to Italian ground forces.14

A more thorough test of Italian air materiel and doctrine was
provided by participation, beginning in 1936, in the Spanish civil war.
Again the opposition was slight. Russia, as well as Germany and Italy,
too, an active part in the contest, but Soviet assistance to the
Loyalists was limited, and the few obsolete aircraft which the
Republicans acquired from France were quickly shot down or wrecked. The
bombing by both factions in the conflict was largely tactical, although
the Italians claimed to have accomplished a considerable amount of
effective strategic bombing. Italian air units, based on the Balearic
islands, Sardinia, and the mainland of Italy, at times operated as an
independent force against cities and harbors; and the bombing,
performed at heights ranging from 16,000 to 20,000 feet, was reported
by the Italians to be "remarkably accurate." According to Gen. Guiseppe
Valle, addressing the Chamber of Fasci and Corporations on 5 May 1959,
the war in Spain had demonstrated "the importance of the air arm in
independent strategic action." He pointed to the case of Barcelona,

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where port facilities capable of handling as much traffic
in one day as all the other Catalonian ports in ten days had been
paralyzed, according to him, in a systematic offensive carried out by
thirty bombers over a period of several months. But when all is said,
there would appear to be more reason for regarding the Nationalist
victory as an indication of the weakness of Loyalist forces than as
proof of the tactical and technical soundness of the Italian Air Force.15

The U.S> Army Air Corps, at least, saw nothing in the aerial
warfare in Spain or in China to suggest the advisability of change in
its own doctrines. In both conflicts the combatants employed relatively
small numbers of aircraft, and the bomber appeared to be regarded
chiefly as a means of intensifying artillery fire and of increasing its
range. In the few instances of strategic bombing, the number of planes
employed was mall as to preclude the possibility of really significant
results. As for the matter of individual technique, little emerged from
the fighting in Spain or in China that was not already known as a
result of the aerial activity of World War I.16 The Italian Air Force,
closely watched by air strategists in the United States and elsewhere,
again had failed either to prove or to disprove the doctrines of
Douhet.

When Italy entered World War II in June 1940, just a few days
prior to the collapse of France, Mussolini hoped that the Regia
Aeronautica with its approximately 2,600 first-line aircraft would
prove a dominating factor in control of the Mediterranean. The hope was
not fulfilled, for numerous weaknesses in the Italian Air Force rapidly
came to light, and the force began its descent from the fairly
respectable reputation which it had held among the air forces of the
leading world powers. Italy's aircraft industry was unequal to the
demands of large-scale warfare; production of combat types never
exceeded 300 aircraft a month. The pattern of air force organization
proved to be unstable and unwieldy in widespread operations. Training
and morale were on a low level, and the temperament of the Italian
airman tended to stress individual exploits rather than accomplishments
of the group. Much of the equipment of the air force was obsolescent,
while poor maintenance kept many of the planes on the ground. A great
portion of the strength of the Regia Aeronautica was committed to the
fighting in Africa, where the Italians attempted in vain to rout the
British from their positions in the northern part of the continent.
Initial Italian successes in the campaign were soon followed by the
disintegration of Italian East Africa, and in the first retreat in
Libya the Italians lost

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approximately 1,200 aircraft. The Italian Air Force clearly
had not been prepared for the defensive war which it was forced to
fight. Although the efficiency of the force thereafter increased
slightly under the stimulus of its working partner, the German Air
Force, the Regio Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be
decisive in the outcome of prolonged hostilities. The fundamental
weakness of the Italian Air Force was not in its theory of air power,
which later events proved to be essentially sound, but rather in its
inability to make proper application of that theory.17

The German Air Force

Germany possessed by far the most formidable air force of the three
totalitarian nations. Following World War I, German aviation had been
virtually abolished by the Treaty of Versailles. Determined to rebuild
their military aviation, however, the Germans found ways of
circumventing and then openly violating the terms of the Versailles
agreement.18
Since the treaty had not prohibited German manufacture of commercial
aircraft except for a brief period of six months, the German aircraft
industry soon began to revive. In 1922 and again in 1924 limitations
were placed on the number of civil aircraft which the Germans might
manufacture, and representatives of the allied nations also laid down
more specific rules defining the term "military aircraft" as used in
the Treaty of Versailles. These restrictions had little effect, for
German aircraft manufacturers promptly established subsidiary companies
in neutral countries, where the production of aircraft could proceed
without regard to limitations. Factories were built by Junkers in
Russia, Sweden, and Turkey, by Rohrback, in Denmark, by Heinkel in
Sweden, and by Dornier in Italy and Switzerland. The lid was officially
removed in May 1926, when the Paris Air Agreement withdrew all
limitations on the number and size of commercial aircraft which Germany
might build, though the bans n military aviation and on the
subsidization of sporting aviation remained.19

It was therefore under the guise of commercial aviation that the
German Air Force began its recovery. The German Republic established a
ministry of transport with an aviation department which had authority
over all civilian aeronautics. Headed by a former officer of the German
Air Force, the aviation department sought to promote the growth of
"civilian" airlines, the advancement of aeronautical science, and the
development of interest in aviation among the German people.

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An air sport association encouraged the formation of flying
clubs throughout Germany, which gave flying and gliding training to
thousands of members. In addition, pilot training schools were set up,
ostensibly for airline pilots; but at the end of the usual three years'
schooling, which was conducted in a strictly military manner, the
pilots were actually qualified to operate bombers. Many former pilots
of the German air force assumed controlling positions in the civilian
airlines, while other pilots went to foreign areas, South American in
particular, where they established commercial aviation companies.

In 1926 all German airlines, with the exception of one operating
to Russia, were consolidated into the Deutsche Lufthansa, a heavily
subsidized company which soon was extending its lines throughout
Europe. The aircraft manufactured in Germany were still "civilian"
aircraft, but they had been designed with a view to conversion for
military purposes. Even at the time of its initial organization, the
Lufthansa could have furnished the Reichswehr with at least two fighter
squadrons, one bombardment squadron, and one auxiliary squadron of
bombers. The extension of Lufthansa into other countries was
accompanied by the establishment of German training centers outside
Germany proper and by the assignment of officers to a number of foreign
air forces for observation and training. By 1931 the German Air Force,
officially nonexistent, was composed of four fighter, three heavy
bomber, and eight reconnaissance-bomber squadrons, not including German
units in Russia. As an indication of the rate at which airmen were
being trained, in 1932 the air sport association (Deutscher
Luftsportverband) alone trained 1,500 pilots and had under training
3,00 power pilots and 15,000 glider pilots.20

The military complexion of the clandestine Luftwaffe became much
more obvious after Hitler's assumption of power on 30 January 1933.
Within three days the new chancellor placed Hermann Goering in charge
of all civil aviation and air raid protection, which previously had
been under the Ministry of Transport. members of all flying clubs of
the air sport association were immediately put into uniform, and a
large-scale flying training program was inaugurated among the members.
Students in training under the Lufthansa were also placed in uniform,
and "commercial" schools were expanded considerably. An extensive
construction program of modern airdromes was begun in secret. The
aircraft industry was greatly enlarged, not only by the expansion of
existing plants, but also by the conversion of many companies

--8-6-

engaged in automotive, locomotive, and steel construction.
And in May 1933 the German Air Ministry was established, Goering
assuming the office of Air Minister.21

With the boldness and audacity which characterized the Nazi regime
from the outset, Germany soon threw off all pretense concerning her
rearmament, and it became evident that the German Air Force would have
an important role in accomplishing Hitler's plan of territorial
aggrandizement. in March 1935 the Germans officially announced the
formation of the Luftwaffe. Goering, who continued to head the Air
Ministry, was made commander in chief of the Luftwaffe with Erhard
Milch as his administrative deputy. The "new" air force was then
composed of approximately 1,000 aircraft and some 20,000 officers and
men. Its reserve supply of airmen was of course very considerable as a
result of the training programs of previous years.

The decree of 1935, which officially brought the Luftwaffe into
existence, stipulated that it was to be a third element of the
Wehrmacht, independent of the army and the navy. The air force with its
commander, Goering, thus came under the jurisdiction of Gen. Werner von
Blomberg, Minister of Defense and head of the Wehrmacht. Goering, then
reputed to be the second most powerful man in the Nazi regime, did not
enjoy taking orders from von Blomberg, and the relations between the
two men were far from harmonious. Personal differences, moreover, were
reinforced by differing concepts of the place and role of the air
force. Goering wished to make his Luftwaffe a completely independent
organization, in control of its own supplies, recruiting,
communications, and finances. he wanted to control all activities which
were even remotely related to air, and with such power he hoped to
direct the aircraft industry and the allocation of personnel to the
advantage of the air force. The dominant influence within the
Wehrmacht, however, naturally tended to be that of the old-line general
staff of the German army, which strongly opposed the idea of an
absolutely independent air force. neither the prospect of competition
with it for manpower and materiel nor the idea of complete dependence
upon Luftwaffe commanders for air-ground co-operation appealed to the
army chiefs. Furthermore, the army remained for a time less an
instrument of the Nazi party than was the Luftwaffe, and this fact was
reported to be reflected to some extent in the attitude taken on issues
raised by the air force.

Leaders of the Luftwaffe advocated a powerful strategic air force
in

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keeping with the theories of Douhet, but official policy
regarded the airplane primarily as a tactical weapon for use in support
of ground forces. The doctrinal position of army chiefs did not
overlook the possible be provided by independent strategic operations,
but such efforts definitely came second to air support for the ground
forces; and, at a time when plans were being drafted for a quick
conquest and exploitation of neighboring countries, there naturally
existed a disposition to frown upon proposals for destruction by
strategic bombardment of targets which otherwise might be promptly
converted into German assets. Indeed, some question remains as to how
far the German en themselves explored in their thinking the problems
and potentialities of strategic bombardment. in any case, their job was
first to act as an advance striking force, then to operate in direct
support of an invading army. For that job they were well equipped,
trained, and organized. though the Luftwaffe hardly proved to be so
overwhelming a force as its advance notices indicated, it was without
question a tough and skillful enemy.22

Following a series of retirements, including that of von Blomberg,
Hitler in February 1938 assumed direct command of all the German armed
forces. Under this arrangement the Luftwaffe, along with the army and
navy, had direct access to the Fuehrer, while the Defense Ministry and
the German Supreme Military Staff became Hitler's advisers. But this
change brought no essential alteration in the air force mission.23
Operationally and administratively the Luftwaffe had been organized on
a geographical basis, and in February 1938 four air fleets were
established, each composed of a number of air divisions. Each of these
air divisions constituted a balanced force of bomber, fighter, and
reconnaissance units and could be shifted from one fleet to another as
the occasion required. in administration, supply, and maintenance, the
provisions reflected an emphasis on operational mobility.24 German
aircraft were generally satisfactory and some possessed outstanding
qualities, but they were mainly fighters, transport planes, and bombers
suited to the requirements of close support for ground armies.25 In the
fighter class the Messerschmitt 109 was the main reliance, though a few
squadrons had been equipped with the longer-ranged and speedier
twin-engine Me-110. There were no four-engine bombers comparable to the
American B-17 or the British Stirling; German bombers were two-engine
mediums, chiefly the Heinkel 111 and the Dornier 17, and to these was
added the Junkers 87, the

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highly publicized dive bomber of Stuka, Goering had
successfully opposed the navy's desire for its own separate air arm,
and the Luftwaffe held responsibility for coastal patrol, overwater
reconnaissance, and other activities in conjunction with naval forces.

In the same month that Hitler issued decrees effecting the
reorganization of the Luftwaffe, he asserted that the Reich would
expand to include ten million Germans beyond her borders. Within one
month Austria had become the first victim of Nazi aggression. During
their occupation of Austria the Germans used approximately 400
aircraft, more than one-fourth of the number being transport aircraft
which brought 2,000 soldiers to Vienna. The Luftwaffe soon absorbed the
small Austrian Air Force and was again employed by Hitler in September
1938 when some 500 German aircraft assisted in the invasion of the
Sudentenland. A year later the might of the Luftwaffe was released in
open warfare. By that time, September 1939, the German Air Force was
equipped with approximately 4,000 first-line aircraft, of which some
1,800 were bombers and 1,200 were fighters. Behind it stood an aircraft
industry then capable of producing approximately 1,100 aircraft a
month, but actually producing each month about 500 aircraft of all
combat types.26
Clearly, it was not anticipated that the venture now about to be
launched would involve too heavy a commitment. In its internal
organization the Luftwaffe seemed to have achieved most of its
objectives, and it was ready to prove its worth as a co-ordinate member
of the Wehrmacht.

On 1 September 1939 the Luftwaffe and German army forces
inaugurated a lightening-like campaign which saw the virtual
annihilation of the Polish army within twenty days. The German Air
Force, which had 1,000 bombers and 1,050 fighters in operational
condition, met no affective opposition from the polish Air Force, which
consisted of less than 500 planes of all types, most of them
obsolescent. The Luftwaffe was used both to eliminate the air
opposition and as an advance striking force for the army. So successful
was the Polish campaign that the Germans saw no need for major change.
Army commanders felt that the results justified their conception of the
air force as a tactical weapon to be used primarily in support of the
ground forces, while Luftwaffe chiefs took satisfaction in the
performance of their fighters and dive bombers. There was no demand for
the creation of new types of aircraft or for an increase in aircraft
production.27

--89--

In the Scandinavian and western campaigns which followed
during the first half of 1940, the Luftwaffe continued to perform with
skill and success [in] its established missions. The German invasion of
Norway was swiftly executed in April 1940 with an excellent
demonstration of airborne operations and of the potentialities of air
power in controlling limited sea lanes. The Luftwaffe employed some 800
tactical planes in the brief campaign, while an additional 250 to 300
transport aircraft operated between Germany, Denmark, and Norway to
establish air bases in a record time at strategic points in Norway.
Reconnaissance and sea rescue work also figured in Luftwaffe
operations. The badly outnumbered Norwegian air forces could offer only
slight resistance.

The western campaign, which began on 10 May 1940, saw the
continued success of the German forces as they sped across the Low
Countries and France. Two air fleets of the Luftwaffe, comprising some
,00 planes, were more than sufficient to wipe out the weak air
opposition of the invaded countries and to provide support for German
army forces. For the first time, German parachute troops were
successfully employed when the Nazi forces invaded Holland. The
Netherlands army ceased resistance within four days. Leading the
rapidly advancing Panzer divisions through the Low Countries, the
Stukas bombed troop concentrations and installations of the defending
forces, while German transport aircraft evacuated many of the wounded
and carried supplies to air force units which quickly moved into bases
in southern Belgium and northern France. most of the German air effort
during May was directed toward close support of the army forces as they
raced toward the Channel ports. At Dunkirk the Luftwaffe momentarily
yielded supremacy to the RAF, which was able to gain the local air
superiority necessary to allow most of the battered British
Expeditionary Force to be evacuated from the port. The Luftwaffe then
turned to completion of the drive against France, which proved to be a
not very difficult task.28

The French Air Force, in particular, was ill prepared for the
German onslaught.29
It had failed to fulfill the promise which it exhibited during the
years immediately after World War I, when France had spent large sums
on her air force and had been a leader in the field of aviation. A
separate air ministry was established in 1928, but lack of continuity
in leadership resulted from frequent changes in the French cabinet.
With nine changes in the position of air minister

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within ten years, and with frequent changes in the chief of
staff, French aviation had little opportunity to develop in accordance
with a definite, long-range program.

Until mid-1934 French army aviation, which like the German was
used chiefly for army co-operation, was under the jurisdiction of the
War Ministry, while naval aviation was controlled by the Ministry of
Marine. In July 1934, the Armée de l'Air (French Air Force) was
established by government decree as "an independent army capable of
participating, on the one hand, in aerial operations and in the air
defense of territory and, on the other hand, in combined operations
with the land and sea forces." In keeping with French military
traditions, however, the air force remained closely attached to the
army. The reorganization of 1934 did not affect commercial or naval
aviation. Two years later another reorganization assured the French Air
Force of autonomy, if not complete independence. In order that command
of air units might be separated from command of territorial units, a
decree of September 1936 established a unified command for all air
units other than naval. The aircraft industry was nationalized at about
this time, and a subsequent slump in production saw the output of
military airplanes reduced within less than two years to the negligible
rate of ten planes per month this time the combat efficiency,
organization, morale, and equipment of the French Air Force had dropped
to an unprecedented low.

Hurried attempts to rebuild the French Air Force were made after
the Munich conference in 1938. Both local production and foreign
purchases of aircraft were increased, but the revival came too late.
France entered World War II with an air force which was deficient in
every respect. Besides the low level of morale which characterized all
the French forces, the air force did not have a sufficient number of
bombers for offensive action, and it lacked sufficient fighter strength
for defense against the Germans. Ground troops did not have adequate
air support, while the lack of liaison and reconnaissance aircraft
constituted a further deficiency. If any thought had been given to the
use of the French Air Force as a strategic weapon, it had failed to
materialize. The weaknesses of the French Air Force contributed
substantially to the success of the Luftwaffe in the spring of 1940.
After French surrender on 22 June, only the RAF remained for the
Luftwaffe to conquer.

The success of the Luftwaffe up to this point seemed to indicate

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that German air power was invincible; indeed, the very name
inspired dread an d fear, as the Germans had intended it should. But
the triumphs of 1939 and early 1940 had all been scored against weak
opposition, and there were limitations to German strength which time
would increasingly reveal. Satisfied with the performance of their
aircraft for the purposes in mind, leaders of the Luftwaffe had put
various models into early mass production; the emphasis tended to be
placed on numerical strength rather than on technical superiority. At
points, perhaps too much faith had been placed in speed at the cost of
armament. The Luftwaffe, moreover, seems to have been lulled into a
false sense of security by its early successes. Though its commanders
explained the British escape at Dunkirk by pointing to the unfavorable
weather and a failure of supply resulting from the speed of the German
advance, the success of the RAF at Dunkirk indicated that British
aircraft possessed technical advantages that in all-out combat might
prove decisive. That test soon came in the Battle of Britain.

The RAF and the Battle of Britain

The German bombing of Britain in World War II was not unexpected by the
British, nor was it without precedent. During the conflict of 1914-18,
the Germans had made 52 air raids against the British Isles, dropping
73 tons of bombs which killed 857 persons and injured 2,058. These
raids helped to bring the Royal Air Force into existence as an
autonomous force, for the enemy's action had pointed up the weakness of
British air defenses and the desirability of carrying the air war to
the German homeland. At the same time, British leaders in search of a
strategy that would break the long and exhausting stalemate on the
western front had by 1918 assigned to the air force an independent
mission of strategic bombing. Accordingly, in March 1918 the air
forces, theretofore divided between the army and navy, were unified in
the Royal Air Force as a third and co-ordinate branch of the armed
services, under the administrative control of the Air Ministry.
Termination of hostilities that autumn did not permit the full
development and execution of plans for a strategic offensive against
Germany, [see above, pp. 15, and
37] but, unlike the American Air
Service, the RAF emerged from World War I with its independent mission
and separate organization officially recognized.30

--92--

As was the case with military aviation in the United
States, however, the survival and growth of the RAF after 1918 was
accomplished only with difficulty. In addition to postwar demands for
retrenchment, the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air
units, while the army attempted to regain control of land-based
aviation. But the lessons of World War I as they pertained to aviation
were more deeply impressed on the British mind that they were on the
American. Moreover, Britain's geographic position and relatively small
population with reference to Germany lent continuing validity to a
doctrine of strategic bombardment which promised a means of striking at
the very heart of the enemy and thus of avoiding the loss of life which
in the first war had well-nigh bled England white. The RAF retained is
autonomy; but, even so, sentiment for many years, like that in the
United States, was hardly conducive to full military preparedness, and,
after the new German menace became apparent, the RAF was forced to work
against a decided disadvantage of time. Fortunately, the emphasis was
placed upon quality. From 1935 forward, the Air Ministry proceeded with
the development of long-range, heavy bombers--the twin-engine
Manchester and the four-engine Stirling and Lancaster, the latter
developed from the earlier Manchester. For the urgent needs of defense,
the Hurricane and the Spitfire, two superlative fighter planes, were
put into production after 1936. Production in quantity came slowly, for
adequate manufacturing facilities were not immediately available. By
September 1938, the month of Munich, only one squadron in the RAF had
been equipped with Spitfires.

In its pilot and aircrew training, as in its equipment, the RAF
demanded a high level of achievement.31 British air officials
recognized that the geographic position of the British Isles was at
once vulnerable and potentially threatening to any continental enemy.
The situation demanded not only technical excellence of the air force
but also an organization designed to facilitate the defensive and
offensive functions which a European war would thrust upon the RAF.
Accordingly, the RAF was organized into bomber and fighter commands. To
these organizations there would be added later a coastal command,
charged with special responsibilities for the protection of shipping.32

By autumn of 1939 the RAF possessed a modest but well-trained
force of airmen. Its bombers, fighters, reconnaissance planes, and
flying boats were few in number but efficient in operation, and "shadow

--93--

factories" were ready to go into production to supplement
the existing aircraft industry. At the moment the British did not
possess the means to carry out a strategic offensive against Germany,
but it was hoped that the badly outnumbered RAF would be able to hold
off any German air assault until its own offensive could be
inaugurated. The initial burden of the air war with Germany therefore
fell to the Fighter Command.

By the summer of 1940 the breath-taking advance of German forces
had destroyed all effective resistance in France and seemingly
presented to the Nazis an inviting opportunity to establish beyond
question their control of all western Europe by invasion of an
ill-prepared Britain. In fact, the Germans were less well prepared to
seize the opportunity that lay before them than were the British to
fend off such attacks as came. Though the Luftwaffe urged an immediate
invasion, its commanders could not promise security for supply lines
across the English Channel against the Royal Navy. The German navy was
unable to provide such a guarantee, and, moreover, it lacked necessary
equipment for moving an invading force across the intervening waters.
The army itself, caught unprepared, required time for preparation and
was reluctant to move without more adequate assurance from naval and
air forces.33
Immediate invasion appearing therefore to be inadvisable, the Germans
decided to use the Luftwaffe as a strategic air force against the
British Isles, with the hope that Britain would surrender or that at
least an invasion would be made less difficult.

Preliminary to the battle, the Germans made sporadic raids during
July and the first week of August 1940 in order to feel out British
defenses.34
The Luftwaffe by this time was equipped with 1,100 fighters and 840
bombers in operational condition, and the German aircraft industry
continued to turn out approximately 500 combat

--94--

aircraft a month. For their bombing of England the Germans
used four main types of bombers: the Junkers 87, the Junkers 88,
several models of the Heinkel 111, and the Dornier 17 (sometimes known
as the Dornier 215), with a fighter escort usually by Messerschmitt
109's and 110's. The entire strength of the Luftwaffe was not thrown
into the campaign at once. On 8 August the attacks began on a moderate
scale, and during the next ten days mass formations of German bombers,
accompanied by similar formations of fighters, made daylight assaults
on shipping and southern ports. The effective opposition of Hurricanes
and Spitfires, assisted by ground defenses, caused the Germans to call
a brief halt after 18 August, on which day they sustained losses of
seventy-one planes destroyed and twenty-three damaged. For the period
extending from 8 August to 23 August total Luftwaffe losses were 403
destroyed and 127 damaged.* In contrast the RAF
announced the loss of 153 planes.

In the second phase of the campaign, from 24 August through 6
September, the Luftwaffe revised its tactics. Bomber formations were
reduced in size, while fighter escorts were increased. The attacks were
directed mainly against airdromes and aircraft factories instead of
shipping and harbors in an apparent attempt to knock out the RAF. As in
the first phase, German losses were so heavy that the direction of the
assault was again changed. The third phase, from 7 September to 1
October, saw the peak of the German air effort, which was directed
toward industrial areas in general and London in particular. By the end
of September the RAF had asserted its control of the air over the
British Isles. During the third phase the British destroyed 435 planes
and damaged 161, and total German losses since 10 July now amounted to
1,408 planes destroyed. Unable to sustain such losses, the Germans
instituted still further changes in their tactics. Nearly all the
so-called long-range bombers were withdrawn, while fighters and
fighter-bombers continued the campaign with a decreasing number of
daylight attacks and an increasing number of attacks at night. London
was still the principal target, and the British suffered heavy
casualties and extensive material damage, particularly during the night
assaults when their fighter protection was not so effective as it was
during the hours of daylight. nevertheless, the Luftwaffe

* These are the revised figures, based
on German records, announced in May 1947 by Mr. Philip Noel-Baker,
British Secretary of State for Air (See Flight and Aircraft Engineer
[London], 22 May 1947, p. 482, for complete table.)

--95--

had failed to achieve its objectives, and the aerial blitz
was gradually reduced to intermittent attacks which continued
throughout the spring of 1941. The Luftwaffe had sustained its first
major defeat and Britain had been saved, for an invasion was contingent
first of all upon defeat of the RAF.

It will take no credit from the RAF's outnumbered "few" to suggest
that the Luftwaffe had been unprepared for the opportunity offered in
the summer of 1940. Except for a few raids against French factories,
the force had never been employed in a strategic effort of its own.
Trained and equipped for another mission, the Luftwaffe lacked a
heavily armed long-range bomber capable of carrying large bomb loads;*
it tended to underestimate the bomb weight required to accomplish its
ends; its fighters were not only technically inferior to the British
but were at times misused; and faulty strategic planning was reflected
in a tendency to shift targets before the completion of a sufficiently
prolonged and concentrated effort.

The effect which the Battle of Britain had on subsequent planning
of the German and British air forces was both characteristic and
prophetic. True to their belief in the essentially tactical and
supporting role of air power, the German army leaders felt that the
results of the Luftwaffe's independent effort over Britain vindicated
their position, and with this opinion Hitler seems to have agreed. No
insistent demand was made for new and improved types of aircraft nor
was there any immediate program for increased plan production or pilot
training.35
Organizationally, the Luftwaffe continued to hold its independent
position among the German armed forces, but operationally it remained
an auxiliary arm. For a time the German Air Force intensified its
operations against shipping in the eastern Atlantic and tin the Irish
and North seas. The attempted air blockade achieved a moderate degree
of success, but the action of British fighter patrols and the arming of
merchant vessels by mid-1941 appeared to be interfering considerably
with Luftwaffe plans. Moreover, intensification of German air activity
on other fronts in 1941 resulted in withdrawal of much of the Luftwaffe
strength from the west.

For some months, Axis operations in North Africa, the
Mediterranean, and eastern Europe received far more attention that did
the dwindling assault on the British Isles, and the Luftwaffe and the
RAF

* Its four-engine FW-200 (military
version of the Focke-Wulf Condor) was employed almost exclusively in
antishipping patrol.

--96--

became engaged in bitter aerial fighting on several fronts.
Hitler had assumed personal control of all German military operations
after 1940; in entering the desert fighting of North Africa, in
sweeping through the Balkans, and in opening the eastern front the
Fuehrer made extensive and effective use of the German Air Force in its
accustomed role. By January 1941 the Luftwaffe had moved approximately
330 aircraft into Italy and Sicily, and on 18 January the Germans
inaugurated the first of a long series of heavy air attacks on the
island of Malta, a strategically located base for British operations in
the Mediterranean. Before the end of the year, the island had
experienced its one-thousandth air alert but continued to withstand the
aerial pounding from the Axis.36 By using advanced bases in North
Africa, the Luftwaffe also began to strike at British forces in the
Suez Canal area and to participate more actively in the Western Desert
campaign. Early in April 1941 bombers were moved into the Balkans in
preparation for the next blitzkrieg. From bases in Hungary, Bulgaria,
and southern Germany, the Luftwaffe on 6 April began extensive
operations in support of German ground forces against Yugoslavia and
Greece. British and Imperial forces, though fully occupied in North
Africa, came to the aid of Greece; as in the Flanders campaign of the
previous spring, however, the German onslaught overpowered all
opposition, and Axis victories followed in rapid-fire succession. By
the end of April, most of the British forces had been evacuated from
Greece, the Germans had entered Athens, and Luftwaffe units had quickly
moved forward to prepare for an airborne attack against Crete. That
attack came on 20 May with a spectacular and successful demonstration
glider-borne and parachute troop operations. After seizing key
airdromes, the advance German forces were supplied and reinforced by
Junkers 52 troop carriers, while Luftwaffe bombers attacked the British
who were attempting to evacuate the island. But he first of June the
British had been forced to yield Crete to the invaders. With new bases
in Greece and Crete, the German Air Force was able to bring more
strength to bear against British forces in the Western Desert; and,
upon the opening of a British offensive in mid-June, the Luftwaffe for
a brief period increased its support of German ground forces in North
Africa.37

Undoubtedly spurred by successes in the Balkans and in the
Mediterranean, the Germans on 22 June 1941 turned against the Soviet
Union and inaugurated an offensive along the 2,000-mile Russian

--97--

front. Because Hitler was convinced that the Russian
campaign would be concluded within a very short time, he was opposed to
the destruction of Russian factories by bombing, and upon his
insistence the Luftwaffe was used primarily as an extended form of
artillery in support of ground forces. A similar employment of the
Soviet Air Force as made by the defenders, but the opposition by that
force was stronger than the Germans had anticipated and was more
impressive than the performance of Russian air units in the Spanish
civil war.

Soviet aviation, organized into a small naval air force and a
larger army air force, had originated during the days prior to World
War II and had been strongly influenced during the 1920's by the
Germans.38
The Soviet government had given considerable attention to the
stimulation of popular interest in aviation and to the development of
an aircraft industry, but at the time of the German attack in June 1941
the Soviet Air Force was reported to be inferior to the German Air
Force in standards of aircraft and personnel. Perhaps because of the
nature of the fighting which developed in the summer of 1941, the
Russians employed their air strength almost entirely as a tactical
force in co-operation with ground forces. Production of fighters and
short-range bombers received major emphasis. During the early weeks of
the hostilities, the Soviet Air Force suffered tremendous losses in
combat with the Luftwaffe. In addition, the rapid German advance
disrupted the air supply and maintenance system and a large part of the
Soviet aircraft industry. But the Russians displayed a remarkable
ability to continue their defense under the most adverse circumstances.
In late 1941 the IL-2, or Stormovik, was put into action along the
front, where it proved to be outstanding in attacks against enemy
ground forces. During the summer and fall of 1941 the Soviet Air Force
was completely reorganized, some assistance began to arrive from other
nations opposed to the Axis, and the regenerated air force, operating
in close co-operation with the Red army, continued to hold up against
all the aerial might which the Germans could throw into the battle.

In its initial assault against Russia, the German army had been
supported by 3,300 aircraft out of a total strength of approximately
5,900 operational and nonoperational aircraft. in the drive toward
Moscow in the autumn of 1941, the Luftwaffe deployed almost 60 per cent
of its strength along the eastern front, and it suffered extremely
heavy losses. yet the Russian operations caused no immediate increase
in

--98--

German aircraft production; the German High Command,
apparently still convinced that the hostilities could be concluded in
short order, seemed to feel that no great expansion in the Luftwaffe
was necessary. The operations in eastern Europe, the Mediterranean, and
North Africa necessitated the use of so large a proportion of German
air strength that air attacks against England and against British
shipping in the west dwindled almost to the point of cessation. During
the last six months of 1941 no night attack against Britain exceeded 15
per cent of the maximum scale of effort made during the autumn of 1940.
The Luftwaffe was assuming a defensive attitude in the west. Hitler was
said to have promised Luftwaffe leaders that the air offensive against
Britain might be resumed after the defeat of Russia.39 But the opportunity had
come and gone in 1940, and the future held for the Luftwaffe in the
west only a defensive mission.

Operations of the RAF after the fall of 1940 were as widely
dispersed as were those of the Luftwaffe. The RAF had heavy commitments
in North Africa, where it was joined by units of the Royal Australian
Air Force and of the South African Air Force, and there were defensive
responsibilities in the Mediterranean and in the Far East as well as in
the home islands and over the sub marine-infested waters about Britain.
These commitments, however, did not prevent British air chiefs from
developing a central strategic focus in their war plans. Tactical
employment of air power was one method f aerial warfare, and a very
necessary one, but the core of RAF thinking was expressed in the simple
statement that the "bomb is the primary weapon of air power; the bomber
is the chief means of conveying it to it target; an air striking force
composed of bombers is the chief means by which a nation wields its air
power."40
The aggressive cast of RAF thinking had not led to neglect of the air
defensive, as the performance of Fighter Command revealed in the Battle
of Britain. But RAF doctrine stipulated that its defensive aviation
should be no larger than was necessary to provide a reasonable defense
against air attack. The emphasis belonged to the air striking force.

Nothing in the Battle of Britain had shaken the strong conviction
with which these principles were held by RAF leaders, who saw in the
German effort the power of the air weapon even when misused. They knew
too how near the Luftwaffe had come to the achievement of its
objectives, that had Goering been willing or able to continue the
bombardment in spite of tremendous losses, the RAF must ultimately

--99--

have been overwhelmed. They believed that a strong British
offensive against vital German objectives was the real answer to
whatever renewal of the attack the Germans might plan. Only in this way
could the enemy be placed on the defensive and forced to divert to
defensive purposes, as in the manufacture of fighters at the cost of
bombers, the resources that would otherwise be used to punish Britain.
England, driven from the continent and deprived of allies, could reach
her enemy only by the air.

For some months Bomber Command was obliged to aid Coastal Command
and to use most of its slim resources in attacking the so-called
invasion ports. But plans for a systematic and growing offensive
against German targets were at the same time carried forward. Excellent
bombers had been developed with an emphasis n range and bomb load;
during the year following the Battle of Britain, the first-line
strength of the bombing force would be increased by 50 per cent.41 The scale of
the bombing effort, now directed chiefly against the industrial Ruhr,
remained relatively small in the fall of 1941, but British officials
anticipated a monthly production rate of 500 heavy bombers by 1943 and
looked forward to mounting ultimately an offensive at least fifty times
greater than the existing scale of effort.42

On America's entry into the war the AAF, with its own emphasis on
strategic bombardment, would find in the RAF a stout and understanding
ally. It is true that there were differences which distinguished the
two forces: British experience had led to a preference for night and
area bombing rather than the daylight, precision bombardment emphasized
by the AAF. But these were differences of tactics rather than of
strategy, of method and not of principle. Indeed, the differing methods
favored were potentially complementary rather than irreconcilable.

*.
The Japanese made no use of the manufacturer's name in the designation
of their aircraft, possibly because two or more manufacturers not
uncommonly produced the same type plane. Their type numbers instead
corresponded to the last one or two digits of the year of issue
according to the Japanese calendar, by which the year 1940 was the
Japanese year 2,600. Thus the planes brought into use during 1939 were
designated as type 99 and those issued in 1940 were type 0. At first
only one type 0 aircraft--the Mitsubishi type 0 single-engine fighter
used by both the Japanese army and navy--was widely known to American
pilots and called the Zero. When, in the fall of 1942, the
Americans began to meet other type 0 aircraft, however, they gave up
identification by serial numbers in favor of short, easily pronounced
code names. By this nomenclature the more important of Japan's tactical
aircraft came to be known as follows: the Mitsubishi type 0
single-engine fighter (made also by Nakajima) became the Zeke,
its float-plane counterpart the Rufe; the Nakajima type 97
single-engine army and navy fighter the Nate; and the Nakajima
type 1 single-engine fighter the Oscar; the type 97 bomber made
by both Nakajima and Mitsubishi became the Kate, the type 99
Aichi dive bomber was called the Val; and the Mitsubishi
twin-engine medium bombers types 96, 97, and 1 were named the Nell,
Sally, and Betty; the types 97 and 98 Mitsubishi
light bombers became the Babs and Sonia; the two
principal four-engine flying boats in use during 1942, the types 97 and
2 Kawanishi, were designated as the Mavis and Emily;
and the type D-2 transport (the Douglas DC-2 adaptation) was named the Tess,
while the Mitsubishi type 0 transport became know as the Topsy.

7. Ibid.; MIS, Japanese
Ground and Air Forces, Info. Bulletin,
14, 1 May 1942; Organization of the Japanese Army and Navy Air Forces,
pp. 2-4.

27.
USSBS, Over-all Report (European War); The German Campaign in
Poland, September 1 to October 5, 1939, WD Digests and Lessons of
Recent Military Operations, 31 Mar. 1942.

28.
Arps and Quigley report; Notes on the German Air Force; USSBS, Over-all
Report (European War).

29.
Notes on the French Air Force, n.d., in special file cited in n. 9.

30.
Col. John M. Harlan and Lt. Col. Leslie H. Arps, The Creation of the
Air Ministry and the Royal Air Force as a Separate Branch of the
British Military Services, 1 May 1944, in special file cited in n. 9.;
Hilary St. George Saunders, Per Ardua: The Rise of British Air
Power, 1911-1939 (London, 1945), pp. 210, 259, 317-21.