Richard Spencer is one of the Daily Telegraph's Middle East correspondents. Married with three children, he was previously news editor, and then China correspondent for six years. He is based in Cairo.

It's Russia, not America, that has most to fear in Syria

As time passes, the more it becomes apparent, as it should have been from the start, that the Russian "triumph" over America on the chemical weapons deal in Syria was an illusion. Vladimir Putin is driving Russia ever deeper into a mire in Syria. The conflict is repeatedly compared to the Iraq war, but the comparison with Afghanistan is much closer. Some have called it "Iran's Vietnam" but there's a chance it may become Russia's Afghanistan all over again. President Obama's decision to call off air and missile strikes in return for a chemical weapons deal may have been a short-term tactical win for Mr Putin, in that America was stopped, for now, from intervening in Russia's "patch" (though such an intervention was beginning to look less and less likely anyway). That is one stated goal of Mr Putin. His longer-term goal is to frustrate American expansionism (what Washington likes to see as the spread of Western democratic values).

However, a tactical victory is not the same as a long-term strategic victory, and even a series of tactical wins – occasionally frustrating American impulsiveness – is not a strategic victory. There is little evidence that Putinism is a more popular or successful creed than it was before, and now it is responsible in the eyes of the world for the chemical weapons arsenal of one of the bloodiest dictatorships of the last decade. Look at where Russia now is and where it once was. Syria, Russia's closest ally in the Arab world – perhaps its only true ally now – is on its last legs, hated, divided, riddled with rebels and al-Qaeda. If you want to think about what this means for Russia in the long-term, consider this video:

The observant among you will notice that the man with the red beard is talking Russian (as are the captions). Who is he? He is the leader of a particularly brutal al-Qaeda offshoot, Jaish al-Muhajireen wa Ansar, operating in Syria and he's a Chechen, as are a number of his men. This group is responsible for some of the nastier things, such as beheadings, and the capture of two Aleppo bishops, that you may have seen coming out of Syria, and it's done so much to harm the cause of the rebels that a number of them claim that in part or whole the group is run by the Russian intelligence services specifically for that purpose. That's probably nonsense, but from the Russian point of view, all the worse if it is. We have been told in Britain to worry about hardened jihadists returning from Syria (or Somalia) to strike back home. Yet we are no longer such a target as we were, having pulled out of Iraq, and being about to pull out of Afghanistan. Yet jihadists are being regularly told to focus on the insurgencies in those parts of the Russian Caucasus home to Muslim populations, such as Chechnya, Ingushetya and Daghestan. Remember Beslan? And this is before Russia is sucked militarily into the conflict. A good opportunity for that will come if, as its foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov has promised, it provides troops to defend the chemical weapons inspectors tasked with dealing with the chemical weapons programme under the UN-sponsored deal.

Ah yes, chemical weapons. Back to that deal: Russian prestige in its announcement depended on the outside world listening to two very strong messages – without noticing that they were contradictory. One, repeated by Vladimir Putin in his article for The New York Times, was that President Assad was innocent of using chemical weapons and that it was the opposition's doing. The second was that Russia had scored a hit in persuading Mr Assad to give up his chemical weapons. There will be some who are so determined to deny Mr Assad's guilt that they will insist that this was some act of extraordinary benevolence by both leaders – a supreme example of turning the other cheek, to be the victim of a chemical weapons attack and give up your own in response.

However, if that is the case, the implicit agreement must be that Russia will defend Assad to the end, having taken away its ultimate deterrent, and that Russia has tied its own fortunes to the regime, as it unwittingly did in Afghanistan in the 1980s. It is far more likely, it seems to me, that Russia is convinced that the Aug 21 attack was the work of Mr Assad and that giving up his chemical weapons was its own (despairing) demand in return for continued support. There's an interesting anecdote (among many) in a New Yorker profile this week of the head of the Iranian al-Quds force in which US intelligence agencies in December saw Assad troops loading up chemical weapons, and, via Russia and Iran, had the attack stopped. It's unverifiable – of course – but it makes much more sense to see Russia as also tearing its hair out over its Syrian protégé (even Putin has given hints of that). Now Mr Putin has been handed the Syrian brief, but it is one he cannot now win. Russia will be vilified for Assad's crimes; but if Assad somehow wins – or at least stays in some sort of power – it is Iran whose interests will be preserved. It is not clear, any more, what interests Russia has in Syria, other than pride, and it can't have a lot of that, can it?

So much for Syria, but that's just one strategic loss suffered by Mr Putin. It is often said that he is more determined to oppose a UN resolution over Syria because he allowed one over Libya and felt cheated when the West used it to help topple Col Gaddafi. This argument has always seemed odd to me since it was perfectly obvious at the time that this was the intention of the UN resolution Britain and France pushed through, but it remains the case that the fall of Gaddafi also represented the death of someone else who – like Saddam before him – was an albeit eccentric and unreliable part-client of Russia (at least of its arms industry). Of course it needs to defend Assad – from Ceaucescu to Gaddafi, the final moments of Russian proteges have not been pretty. Meanwhile, while Mr Putin's attention was turned elsewhere, he's losing elsewhere too: see this Economist article) for how Russia is being replaced by China as the leading influence in Moscow's former Central Asian colonies.

There is little evidence, to me, that by the time Mr Putin does eventually retire, he will have restored Russia's place in the world. Much more likely, that his macho posturing will be seen to have obscured Russia's continuing decline, and prevented action to prevent it. The worst that can be said of President Obama meanwhile is that he is making the same mistake in Syria as President George Bush senior (allegedly) did in Afghanistan. Mrs Thatcher's famous warning about Mr Bush ("don't go wobbly, George!) could certainly apply to his current successor. By standing aside as Syria burns in the fallout from the growing inability of Russia to control its fiefdoms, he may well be setting aside trouble for later. Assad is unlikely to win back his northern kingdom, which could easily become a lawless centre for al-Qaeda operations, as Afghanistan did. But the truth is that strategically America has little to lose. It still has its key Middle East allies – Israel, the Gulf states. If a consensus with Iran is formed, unlikely I know but not to be ruled out, it could find its position strengthened, even if conflict continues in Syria. It will not be lost on Russia that if some sort of deal is done allowing Iranian oil back on to the market, prices will fall and its own oil-dependent economy will be in jeopardy. And what of Assad? Will he not be strengthened by this deal? It hardly seems likely. The rebels are still as near to the centre of Damascus as they were on Aug 21. They still control large parts of the country. That video I linked to earlier – it showed that Chechen group inspecting its conquest at Airbase 66 near Hama: another regime loss, ever closer to its heartland.