Chapter XVII. Guarding Against the
Interior1

The difficulty of the lord of men lies in his
confidence in men. Confiding in men, he is restrained by men.

Ministers, in relation to the ruler, have no
kinship, but, solely because constrained by force of circumstances, serve him.
Therefore, those who minister to a ruler, always watch the mental condition of
their master without stopping even for a moment; whereas the lord of men
remains idle and arrogant over them. This is the reason why the world sees
cases of ruler-molestation and regicide.

If the lord of men has much confidence in his son,
then wicked ministers will utilize his son to accomplish their selfish
purposes. For illustration, Li Tai, while assisting the King of Chao, starved
the Father Sovereign.

If the lord of men has much confidence in his
spouse, then wicked ministers will utilize his spouse to accomplish their
selfish purposes. For illustration, Actor Shih, while assisting Princess Li,
2 murdered Shên-shêng
3 and placed Hsi-ch`i
4 in his stead.
5

Indeed, even the spouse who is so near and the son
who is so dear to the sovereign are not trustworthy, much less can anybody else
be trustworthy.

Besides, whether he be a ruler of ten thousand
chariots or a ruler of one thousand chariots, the queen, the concubine, or the
crown prince, even though he be the legitimate son, might hope for his early
death.

How do I know it is so? Indeed, man and wife,
having no kinship between them, are intimate when mutually in love and distant
when not in love. Hence the saying: "If the mother is loved, the son is held in
the arms." If so, the contrary must run like this: "If the mother is unloved,
the son is cast aside." Men fifty years old are as fond of women as usual, but
women only thirty years old are falling off in beauty. If women falling off in
beauty have to serve men still fond of the fair sex, then they will be
neglected
6 and their sons will doubt if they will remain heirs
of their fathers. This is the reason why queens, princesses, and concubines
crave the death of the rulers.

It is only when the mother is the queen dowager and
the son is the sovereign that decrees never fail to prevail and prohibitions
never fail to function. Then she finds as much pleasure between man and woman
as at the time when the late ruler was still alive, and under no suspicion can
she have all the powers of the ruler of ten thousand chariots to herself. For
such a reason, poisoning with wine and hanging in secret are practised.

Hence it is said in T`ao-wu's7Spring and Autumn Annals: "Of the lords of men, those
who died of illness were not even half of
those that died." If the ruler is ignorant of such a danger, seeds of disorder
will multiply. Hence the saying: "If those who will profit by the ruler's death
are numerous, then the lord of men is in danger."

Thus, Wang Liang liked horses, and Kou-chien, King
of Yüeh, liked able-bodied men, merely for driving and fighting purposes. The
physician sucks patients' cuts and holds their blood in his mouth, not because
he is intimate with them like a blood relation, but because he expects profits
from them. Likewise, when the cartwright finishes making carriages, he wants
people to be rich and noble; when the carpenter finishes making coffins, he
wants people to die early. Not that the cartwright is benevolent and the
carpenter is cruel, but that unless people are noble, the carriages will not
sell, and unless people die, the coffins will not be bought. Thus, the
carpenter's motive is not a hatred for anybody but his profits are due to
people's death. For the same reason, when the clique of the queen, the
princess, the concubine, or the crown prince, is formed, they want the ruler to
die early. For, unless the ruler die, their positions will not be powerful.
Their motive is not a hatred for the ruler, but their profits are dependent on
the ruler's death. Therefore the lord of men must specially mind those who will
profit by his death.

For illustration, though the sun and the moon are
surrounded by haloes, the causes of their eclipses are inside themselves.
Similarly, though the ruler guards against what he hates, the causes of his
calamity consist in what he loves.

For this reason, the intelligent sovereign
8 would neither carry out any
untenable task,
9 nor eat any inordinate food, but would listen from all round
and observe everybody closely in order thereby to scrutinize the faults of the
interior and the exterior,
10 and
reflect on pros and cons so as to know the line of demarcation between
different factions, compare the results of testimony, and thereby hold every
utterance responsible for an equivalent fact, hold the consequent in
correspondence with the antecedent, govern the masses in accordance with the
law, and gather causes of different affairs for comparison and observation; so
that nobody shall receive any undue reward and overstep the limits of his
duties, and that every murderer shall be sentenced to proper penalty and no
convict shall be pardoned. If so, there will be left no room for wicked and
villainous persons to accomplish their self-seeking purposes.

If compulsory labour service is frequent, the
people will feel afflicted; if the people are afflicted, powerful and
influential men will appear to the fore; if powerful and influential men make
their appearance, exemptions will multiply; and if exemptions multiply, the
nobles will, by accepting bribes from the people exempted from labour service,
become wealthy. To afflict the people and thereby enrich the nobles and to
vacate the august position and let ministers utilize it, is not a permanent
advantage to the world. Hence the saying: "If compulsory labour service is
rare, the people will feel safe; if the people are safe, the ministers will
gain no extra power; if the ministers have no
extra power, powerful and influential men will be extinguished; and if powerful
and influential men disappear, all credit will be due to the sovereign."

Now, take for illustration the truism that water
overpowers fire. Yet, when a tripod-kettle goes
between them, then the water will be heated and boiled till it dries up over
the fire while the fire can flame with vigour and continue burning beneath the
water. Indeed, the fact that government forbids wickedness is still clearer
than this. Yet, when ministers who ought to uphold the law play the part of the
tripod-kettle by standing between ruler and subject, then the law, however
clear in the sovereign's mind, has already lost its reason to forbid
wickedness.

According to the sayings handed down from remote
antiquity, as recorded in the Spring and Autumn Annals,
whoever violates the law, launches an insurrection, and thereby commits high
treason, comes from among the high and noble ministers. Yet what laws and
orders guard against and penalties censure is always among the low and humble.
That being so, the people give up all hope of salvation and find nobody to
petition for relief. The chief vassals form juntas, obscure the ruler
en bloc, and maintain their intimate relationship in
secret but pretend in the open to mutual hatred in order to prove their
unselfishness, and work as the ears and eyes of one another in order to watch
for the sovereign's unguarded moments. Thus, surrounded and deluded, the lord
of men has no way to get news from outside and retains the sovereign's title
but not the reality while ministers have all laws to themselves and carry them
into effect at their discretion. Of such a ruler the Sons of Heaven of Chou
were good examples. In short, if the power and
influence of the Throne is deputed to any minister in particular, high and low
will displace their posts; which amounts to saying that no minister should be
allowed to utilize the power and influence of the ruler.
11