Some €20 billion ($27.7 billion) of orders were said to have been placed from 550 investor accounts to scoop a piece of the 4.95% yield up for grabs on the €3 billion five-year deal. A stunning bond-market return by any measure.

But Greece still has its detractors. Here are the views of a few investors who chose to skip the Greek bonds party.

Colm McDonagh, head of emerging-market debt at Insight Investments:

“We passed on the opportunity to participate in the deal as we do not find Greece particularly attractive at these levels. We recognize that Greece has made a lot of progress in recent years, but we are not sure the yield adequately compensates us for the underlying credit quality.”

Martin Harvey, fixed income fund manager at Threadneedle Investments, said he didn’t buy any Greek bonds:

“It is difficult to pin-point fair value for Greek bonds given the specific nature of that market. There is no curve out to 10 years, and it has an extremely low credit rating. If the improving nature and strong performance of other programme countries is used as a reference, then yields should continue to tighten as conditions normalise. For more flexible accounts this may be an attractive prospect. However, the low credit rating and questionable long-term fundamentals will still prohibit more conservative accounts from involvement.”

“Some will cite Greece issuing five-year bonds at less than a 5% yield as marking the end of the euro-zone debt crisis. Others would argue that central bank behaviour in recent years has created colossal moral hazard, where the promise of seemingly infinite liquidity and the perception that almost nothing can be allowed to default has pushed investors to ignore risks and chase returns. Those who are buying into Greece’s new issue will no doubt flag Greece’s primary surplus as a major reason, but while the turnaround in the Greek economy is impressive, it’s worth noting that the IMF forecasts Greece’s gross public debt/GDP ratio to end 2015 north of 170%, and that’s based off what again seem to be fairly heroic growth assumptions. Liquidity is no substitute for solvency, and I don’t believe that Greece is solvent, which makes the new issue an easy one to avoid.”

“We looked at it but it came in with a yield well below what we thought was reasonable given the level of risk inherent. You have to look at comparable situations. It’s not just the fact Greece has a junk credit rating, it’s also the fact Greece belongs to a relatively small group of countries for whom acute default risk is at present a concern. Investors are lumping together all of the periphery in one go and they’ve ceased to make a differentiation between Portugal and Greece or between Spain and Greece. There’s a world of difference between the economic potential, their recovery and their sustainability. My guess is that many investors may have exhausted their gains in Spain and Portugal and are looking to rotate into something higher yielding.

“The vast majority of [outstanding Greek] debt is owed to its European partners and you could argue that the incredibly generous terms of a very low interest rate, a very long maturity just reflect the view that the debt still looks unsustainable and that the terms are indicative of a situation that will only be solved at some stage by a further debt restructuring. Any such event though is probably years away and thus the most likely outcome for this new bond issue is that it will be repaid long before [its international creditors] consider what action to take with their loans.”