The ultimate goal of this provision is to protect people’s right to privacy and freedom from unreasonable intrusions by the government. However, the Fourth Amendment does not guarantee protection from all searches and seizures, but only those done by the government and deemed unreasonable under the law.

To claim violation of Fourth Amendment as the basis for suppressing a relevant evidence, the court had long required that the claimant must prove that he himself was the victim of an invasion of privacy to have a valid standing to claim protection under the Fourth Amendment. However, the Supreme Court has departed from such requirement, issue of exclusion is to be determined solely upon a resolution of the substantive question whether the claimant's Fourth Amendment rights have been violated, which in turn requires that the claimant demonstrates a justifiable expectation of privacy, which was arbitrarily violated by the government.

In general, most warrantless searches of private premises are prohibited under the Fourth Amendment, unless specific exception applies. For instance, a warrantless search may be lawful, if an officer has asked and is given consent to search; if the search is incident to a lawful arrest; if there is probable cause to search and there is exigent circumstance calling for the warrantless search. Exigent circumstances exist in situations where a situation where people are in imminent danger, where evidence faces imminent destruction, or prior to a suspect's imminent escape.

On the other hand, warrantless search and seizure of properties are not illegal, if the objects being searched are in plain view. Further, warrantless seizure of abandoned property, or of properties on an open field do not violate Fourth Amendment, because it is considered that having expectation of privacy right to an abandoned property or to properties on an open field is not reasonable. However, in some states, there are some exception to this limitation, where some state authorities have granted protection to open fields. States can always establish higher standards for searches and seizures protection than what is required by the Fourth Amendment, but states cannot allow conducts that violate the Fourth Amendment.

Where there was a violation of one’s fourth amendment rights by federal officials, A bivens action can be filed against federal law enforcement officials for damages, resulting from an unlawful search and seizure. Under the Bivens action, the claimant needs to prove that there has been a constitutional violation of the fourth amendment rights by federal officials acting under the color of law.

A seizure of a person, within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, occurs when the police's conduct would communicate to a reasonable person, taking into account the circumstances surrounding the encounter, that the person is not free to ignore the police presence and leave at his will.

Two elements must be present to constitute a seizure of a person. First, there must be a show of authority by the police officer. Presence of handcuffs or weapons, the use of forceful language, and physical contact are each strong indicators of authority. Second, the person being seized must submit to the authority. An individual who ignores the officer’s request and walks away has not been seized for Fourth Amendment purposes.

There are investigatory stops that fall short of arrests, but nonetheless, they fall within Fourth Amendment protection. For instance, police officers can perform a terry stop or a traffic stop. Usually, these stops provide officers with less dominion and controlling power and impose less of an infringement of personal liberty for individual stopped. Investigatory stops must be temporary questioning for limited purposes and conducted in a manner necessary to fulfill the purpose.

An officer’s reasonable suspicion is sufficient to justify brief stops and detentions. To determine if the officer has met the standard to justify the seizure, the court takes into account the totality of the circumstances and examines whether the officer has a particularized and reasonable belief for suspecting the wrongdoing. Probable cause gained during stops or detentions might effectuate a subsequent warrantlessarrest.

There is no general exception to the Fourth Amendmentwarrant requirement in national security cases. Warrantlesssearches are generally not permitted in exclusively domestic security cases. In foreign security cases, court opinions might differ on whether to accept the foreign security exception to the warrant requirement generally and, if accepted, whether the exception should extend to both physical searches and to electronic surveillances.

Under the exclusionary rule, any evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment will be excluded from criminal proceedings. There are a few exceptions to this rule.

VI. ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

In recent years, the Fourth Amendment's applicability in electronic searches and seizures has received much attention from the courts. With the advent of the internet and increased popularity of computers, there has been an increasing amount of crime occurring electronically. Consequently, evidence of such crime can often be found on computers, hard drives, or other electronic devices. The Fourth Amendment applies to the search and seizure of electronic devices.

Following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, Congress and the President enacted legislation to strengthen the intelligence gathering community’s ability to combat domestic terrorism. Entitled the USA Patriot Act, the legislation’s provisions aimed to increase the ability of law enforcement to search email and telephonic communications in addition to medical, financial, and library records.

One provision permits law enforcement to obtain access to stored voicemails by obtaining a basic search warrant rather than a surveillance warrant. Obtaining a basic search warrant requires a much lower evidentiary showing. A highly controversial provision of the Act includes permission for law enforcement to use sneak-and-peak warrants. A sneak-and-peak warrant is a warrant in which law enforcement can delay notifying the property owner about the warrant’s issuance. In an Oregon federal district court case that drew national attention, Judge Ann Aiken struck down the use of sneak-and-peak warrants as unconstitutional and in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See 504 F.Supp.2d 1023 (D. Or. 2007).

The Patriot Act also expanded the practice of using National Security Letters (NSL). An NSL is an administrative subpoena that requires certain persons, groups, organizations, or companies to provide documents about certain persons. These documents typically involve telephone, email, and financial records. NSLs also carry a gag order, meaning the person or persons responsible for complying cannot mention the existence of the NSL. Under the Patriot Act provisions, law enforcement can use NSLs when investigating U.S. citizens, even when law enforcement does not think the individual under investigation has committed a crime. The Department of Homeland Security has used NSLs frequently since its inception. By using an NSL, an agency has no responsibility to first obtain a warrant or court order before conducting its search of records.

Another aspect of the Patriot Act, which has been highly confidential was the Telephone Metadata program, which under § 215 of the Patriot Act, had allowed the NSA to collect data about Americans’ telephone calls in bulk, was reviewed by the Second Circuit in ACLU v. Clapper, in which the court held the Telephone Metadata program illegal under the Congress’ original intent under the §215.

The Patriot Act has expired in mid-2015, and since June 2nd, 2015 has been repackaged under the USA Freedom Act. Although it remains to be seen how the Freedom Act will be interpreted, with respect to the Fourth Amendment protections, the new Act selectively re-authorized the Patriot Act, while banning the bulk collection of data of American’s telephone records and internet metadata and limited the government’s data collection to the “greatest extent reasonably practical” meaning the government now cannot collect all data pertaining to a particular service provider or broad geographic region.

VIII. FORTH AMENDMENT AND SUPERVISED RELEASE/PAROLE

Probationers—convicted criminal offender who is released into the community under supervision of a probation officer in lieu of incarceration; or parolees—convicts who have served a portion of his judicially imposed sentence in penal institutions, and is released for the remainder of the sentence under supervision of a parole officer for good behavior—can also assert fourth amendment rights, creating a potential confrontation between fundamental constitutional guarantee and the society’s legitimate interest in correctional programs to prevent the convicts from lapsing back into a crime.

Traditionally, courts have struggled with various theories of parole and probation to justify the complete denial of fourth amendment rights to the convicts on supervised release or probation. The most prevalent of the theories was the “Custody Theory,” under which an offender was said to be entitled to no more liberty than he would have enjoyed had he been incarcerated. Recently, however, this rationale was rejected by Morrissey v. Brewer, which emphasized that the parolee’s status more closely resembles that of an ordinary citizen than a prisoner. While the Court noted that since parole revocation only changed the type of penalty imposed on an already-convicted criminal, the Court need not afford the parolees “the full panoply of rights” available under the fourteenth amendment to a free man facing criminal prosecution, the Court held that certain procedural protections must be guaranteed to the parolees facing revocation of the parole. In general, the released offenders now have been afforded full Fourth Amendment protection with respect to searches performed by the law enforcement officials, and warrantless searches conducted by correctional officers at the request of the police have also been declared unlawful.

However, in reviewing the searches undertaken by the correctional officers on their own initiative, some courts have modified the traditional Fourth Amendment protections to accommodate the correctional officers’ informational needs, developing a modified “Reasonable Belief” standard, under which the correctional officer is permitted to make a showing of less than probable cause in order to justify the intrusion of privacy into the released offender.