AN 2.67 - Bodhi translation wrote:"Bhikkhus, there are these two kinds of happiness. What two? The happiness with taints and the happiness without taints. These are the two kinds of happiness. Of these two kinds of happiness, the happiness without taints is foremost."

If there can be "two kinds of happiness" where "the happiness without taints is foremost", why cannot it also be so for Right View?

mikenz66 wrote:...sorting out which statements can or can not be directly attributed to the Buddha.

Of those statements that accord with the essence of Dhamma, it can never be known which statements are directly attributed to the Buddha. There was a time or various times when the teachings were compiled, not by Buddha, but by third parties. All that can be known is liberation of mind & which statements accord with liberation of mind. If a statement accords with liberation of mind (dukkha nirodha) it is Heartwood Dhamma.

Does the meritious view that "I have benefactors; I have mother & father; I have been the beneficiary of gifts & sacrifices; that I have done good karma & I have avoided bad karma; etc" bring liberation from suffering? For example, when mother & father die, will the meritorious right view free the mind from the suffering (sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief & despair) that can arise with aging-&-death of mother & father? A matter for investigation.

mikenz66 wrote:...sorting out which statements can or can not be directly attributed to the Buddha.

Of those statements that accord with the essence of Dhamma, it can never be known which statements are directly attributed to the Buddha. There was a time or various times when the teachings were compiled, not by Buddha, but by third parties. All that can be known is liberation of mind & which statements accord with liberation of mind. If a statement accords with liberation of mind (dukkha nirodha) it is Heartwood Dhamma.

Well, of course, I agree, and therefore I value the wisdom of the compilers, commentators, and ancient and modern teachers, and I measure their advice against the sort of criteria you speak of.

However, as you will be aware, there are some who put a lot of emphasis on determining what exactly is or is not "Buddha-Vaccana". And I have see it argued that certain suttas are obviously late additions or distortions of the Buddha's teachings. Usually this criticism is levelled at the more mythical-sounding suttas, so it is interesting to see a very practical sutta coming under the same scrutiny.

Another case involving central doctrinal points was discussed here: http://www.dhammawheel.com/viewtopic.php?f=29&t=11630" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;
In that case the question is whether some Theravada suttas were doctored to bolster the tradition's assertion that arahantship is permanent (unlike some other early schools).

Whether or not one is convinced by the arguments in these cases is beside the point I am trying to make. The point is that if one is interested in sorting the "Buddha-Vaccana" from "the additions", such analyses have to be taken seriously. Of course, having taken it seriously, it is still possible to not agree with the analysis...

If this was a debate, I might feel compelled to, but it's not, so don't expect too much.

MN 117 itself is "backup" enough in my opinion, but I have no interest in expending energies trying to convince you of its legitimacy.

For what it's worth, the 2nd paragraph of JhanaStream's last post is pertinent to this matter...

... as is the rebuke that Sariputta received from the Buddha for teaching a man on his death-bed how to reach heavenly realms (through an inferior right view) when there was an opportunity to teach him how to attain nobility (through a superior right view).

On one occasion the Buddha mildly reproved Sariputta for not having carried his teaching far enough. When the brahman Dhanañjani was on his deathbed he was visited by the Venerable Sariputta. The Elder, reflecting that brahmans are bent on the Brahma-world (or "union with Brahma") taught the dying man the way to it through the Brahma-viharas. As a result, it is said, the brahman was in fact reborn there.

When the Venerable Sariputta returned from the visit, the Master asked him: "Why, Sariputta, while there was more to do, did you set the brahman Dhanañjani's thoughts on the inferior Brahma-world, and then rising from your seat, leave him?" The Venerable Sariputta replied: "I thought: 'These brahmans are bent on the Brahma-world. Should I not show the brahman Dhanañjani the way to the communion with Brahma?"

"The brahman Dhanañjani has died, Sariputta," said the Buddha, "and he has been reborn in the Brahma-world."

This story, which is found in the Dhanañjani Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya (97), is interesting as an illustration of the undesirability of rebirth in an inferior Brahma-world for one who is capable of bringing rebirth entirely to an end. For while the Buddha himself sometimes showed only the way to Brahma, as for example in the Tevijja Sutta, it seems probable that in the case of Dhanañjani the Master saw that he was fit to receive a higher teaching, while the Venerable Sariputta, lacking the capacity of knowing others' hearts (lokiya-abhiñña), was not able to discern that fact. The result is that Dhanañjani will spend an incalculable period in the Brahma-world and will have to take human birth again before he can achieve the goal.

Sekha wrote:
I have even seen recently a sutta where the Buddha says one can kill, steal etc. while feeling sukha (I will provide the exact reference on my next connection here)

here it is..

MN 46

ekacco sahāpi sukhena sahāpi somanassena pāṇātipātī hoti, pāṇātipātapaccayā ca sukhaṃ somanassaṃ paṭisaṃvedeti
someone destroys life with sukha and joy, and feels the sukha and joy that is dependent on destroying life

retrofuturist wrote:
MN 117 itself is "backup" enough in my opinion, but I have no interest in expending energies trying to convince you of its legitimacy.

Do you mean to say that just because something is written in a Theravada sutta that makes it the Truth? I am disappointed.

retrofuturist wrote:
... so unless you're going to say that Sariputta taught Dhanañjani wrong view, there are indeed different gradings of right view, with commensurate results.

we agree on that, my friend.

My point is this:
1) every right view is a factor of the path
2) saying that there is a right view 'saasava' is in contradiction with statements made in other suttas

The right view that may have lead that brahman to the Brahma world is a factor of the path, and it will lead him to Nibbana, even though another type of right view may have led him to Nibbana faster. It is not the right view itself that is saasava. It is the person endowed with that right view an many other views some of which are sasava.

Sekha wrote:Do you mean to say that just because something is written in a Theravada sutta that makes it the Truth? I am disappointed.

Well, your disappointment is your own doing... because when you said you wanted me to "back up" what I was saying, you were basically excluding my personal testimony from your range. I told you how it is, and that was insufficient for you, so I found additional support in the texts for what I had told you.

Sekha wrote:Do you mean to say that just because something is written in a Theravada sutta that makes it the Truth? I am disappointed.

Well, your disappointment is your own doing... because when you said you wanted me to "back up" what I was saying, you were basically excluding my personal testimony from your range. I told you how it is, and that was insufficient for you, so I found additional support in the texts for what I had told you.

yeah... our personal experience may or may not be distorted. We must back up what we say by statements easily traceable in the suttas, otherwise we are merely discussing personal interpretations, and there is no end to that. But if you do it by hammering the sutta that is currently under discussion, that merely makes you sound completely dogmatic. And as for JhanaStream's quote, it is not in contradiction with my statements, so...

A difference between the Vedic and the early Buddhist oral traditions that has important ramifications for the Buddhist oral transmission is that, whereas .... Brahmin youths memorised texts without understanding their meaning, the Buddhist reciters memorised texts whose meanings they would for the most part have understood. ... This difference acquires considerable significance when considered in the light of the modern day academic research on textual memory. This research has shown that textual memory does not work in a way comparable to a tape recorder.... Memory, far from being merely reproductive, is rather of a constructive nature. At the time of trying to recall, the mind constructs the information anew. .... at the time when something is heard or read is to be memorised, information is not simply taken in. Rather, the information is stored in the mind together with inferences made by the reader or listener. ... In view of this, it would only be natural if with the early Buddhist reciters the process of drawing inferences were to leave its mark on the material transmitted. ... In terms of modern research on textual memory, it therefore seems that the early Buddhist reciters involved in the transmission of the discourses tended to "draw inferences". Because of this tendency to draw inferences, the material would have been stored together with those inferences and on retrieval was "re-constructed".

summarised and extracted from pp 870 - 873

Perhaps the anasava and lokuttara descriptions in MN 117 and its 2 SA parallels represent the intrusion of the inferences of its early reciters. I think it is more fruitful to ask - are those inference consistent or inconsistent with the rest of the early doctrines?

Sekha wrote:as for JhanaStream's quote, it is not in contradiction with my statements

I have to correct myself. I have read my article again and I did find out that some teachings of the Buddha, although they ultimately lead to Nibbana, may lead in between to attachment to *favorable* rebirth. Just the same way as the path uses desire (chanda) as a basis for the four right strivings that lead ulti;ately to the cessation of desire. So that means I have to delete a small part of my article, but that doesn't change anything to the general conclusion, as there are so many other evidences.

1) 'sāsava' correctly means 'connected with the āsavas' (ie. mental impurities or corruptions of the mind).

I note that "sa-" in bahubbīhi compounds always connote accompaniment or possession. Your explanation of this compound as a relation of "connection" is usually served by the suffix -ika, -ima or -iya, but no such āsava compound exists. Might you be able to point me to where your explanation of sa- might be attested?

Moreover, at AN 10.139, it is said:
AN 10.139
Katamo ca, bhikkhave, sāsavo dhammo? Micchādiṭṭhi, micchāsaṅkappo... micchāsamādhi, micchāñāṇaṃ, micchāvimutti: ayaṃ vuccati, bhikkhave, sāsavo dhammo. Katamo ca, bhikkhave, anāsavo dhammo? Sammādiṭṭhi, sammāsaṅkappo... sammāsamādhi, sammāñāṇaṃ, sammāvimutti: ayaṃ , bhikkhave, anāsavo dhammo ti.
And what, bhikkhus, are the states connected with the mental impurities? Wrong view, wrong thinking... wrong concentration, wrong knowledge, wrong liberation: these are called, bhikkhus, states connected with the mental impurities. And what, bhikkhus, are the states disconnected from the mental impurities? Right view, right thinking... right concentration, right knowledge, right liberation: these are called, bhikkhus, states disconnected from the mental impurities.
This directly contradicts any claim that there could be a right view connected with the mental impurities (ie. 'sāsava'). If any view is connected per se with the mental impurities, it is a wrong view. So this makes clear that this use of the word 'sāsava' in this context is a complete nonsense.

I believe AN 10.139 needs to be translated differently. Note that the sutta contrasts 2 sets of 10 factors. The analysis, as is typical of sutta analyses of sets, is to apply the predicate to the whole set, and not to its individual members. Note that ayaṃ is in the singular (= this), as is the verb vuccati, reinforced by dhammo (nominative singular). Your translation would have required the Pali to have been "ime vuccanti, bhikkhave, anāsavā dhammā ti". Clearly, the singular demonstrative pronoun, verb and noun are referring to each set of 10, rather than each of the 10 members of the set.

Sylvester wrote:
Perhaps the anasava and lokuttara descriptions in MN 117 and its 2 SA parallels represent the intrusion of the inferences of its early reciters. I think it is more fruitful to ask - are those inference consistent or inconsistent with the rest of the early doctrines?

Sure, it seems reasonable that there would be considerable development and elaboration in suttas such as this, as well as in the abhidhamma and commentaries. Dave gave an interesting theory of how this sort of thing developed back here: http://www.dhammawheel.com/viewtopic.ph ... 92#p212651" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

Indeed, Dave's theory is plausible and will probably explain some of the Mahavihara tradition creeping into the Pali Canon. It will not however explain some of the phenomena noted by Norman which go the other way, ie the Commentators resisting the loss of original meanings with the advent of Sanskritisation in the Pali texts.

Norman believes that the Reciters and the Commentators were 2 seperate bodies, thus accounting for the Commentators' ability to "audit" the Reciters' Sanskrit-influenced readings. Ven Analayo disagrees (vehemently!) with Norman on this. I suppose Ven Analayo has the advantage of reading Chinese and Tibetan and could therefore come to the conclusion that the Reciters and Commentators were one and the same.

We need to be careful with the notion of "Commentators". Ven Analayo's work would indicate that we should not inexorably conflate "Commentators" with the Mahavihara Commentators. The commentary began well before the ascendance of the Mahavihara. To this, he points to the Agamas containing more "commentarial" material than the Nikayas. This suggests the Sarva and Mulasarva Reciters were probably a tad more liberal in their redaction process than the Pali Reciters were. There is therefore the possibility that perhaps there was even a pre-sectarian Commentarial tradition, until the schools went their separate ways.

I guess I had the impression that Buddhaghosa back-translated that early commentary that you speak of into Pali. In the Visuddhimagga he sometimes compares the "reciters" of the different nikayas:

VIII. 179. In discerning [the meditation subject the formation] is gross, and it is subtle
[by comparison] in the first-jhána access; also it is gross in that, and subtle [by
comparison] in the first jhána; in the first jhána and second-jhána access it is gross,
and in the second jhána subtle; in the second jhána and third-jhána access it is
gross, and in the third jhána subtle; in the third jhána and fourth-jhána access it is
gross, and in the fourth jhána it is so exceedingly subtle that it even reaches cessation.This is the opinion of the Dìgha and Saíyutta reciters. But the Majjhima reciters
have it that it is subtler in each access than in the jhána below too in this way: In the
first jhána it is gross, and in the second-jhána access it is subtle [by comparison, and
so on]. It is, however, the opinion of all that the bodily formation occurring before the
time of discerning becomes tranquilized at the time of discerning, and the bodily
formation at the time of discerning becomes tranquilized in the first-jhána access ...
and the bodily formation occurring in the fourth-jhána access becomes tranquilized
in the fourth jhána. This is the method of explanation in the case of serenity.

Sekha wrote: My point is this:
1) every right view is a factor of the path
2) saying that there is a right view 'saasava' is in contradiction with statements made in other suttas

Hello Sekha

I would encourage you to find a sutta that explains the 1st sort of right view ends the asava. MN 60 is a discourse about the 1st sort of right view & I do not recall it mentioning ending the asava. Instead, I recall it explaining the 1st sort of right view results in the Three Skilful Actions and rebirth in heaven.

I can only recollect sutta that explain the 2nd sort of (lokuttara ) right view (such as the Four Noble Truths or the Three Characteristics) as the means of ending the asava.

When the mind was thus concentrated, purified, bright, unblemished, rid of defilement, pliant, malleable, steady, & attained to imperturbability, I directed it to the knowledge of the ending of the mental fermentations. I discerned, as it had come to be, that 'This is stress... This is the origination of stress... This is the cessation of stress... This is the way leading to the cessation of stress... These are fermentations... This is the origination of fermentations... This is the cessation of fermentations... This is the way leading to the cessation of fermentations.' My heart, thus knowing, thus seeing, was released from the fermentation of sensuality, released from the fermentation of becoming, released from the fermentation of ignorance. With release, there was the knowledge, 'Released.' I discerned that 'Birth is ended, the holy life fulfilled, the task done. There is nothing further for this world.'

MN 4

And what is the development of concentration that, when developed & pursued, leads to the ending of the effluents? There is the case where a monk remains focused on arising & falling away with reference to the five clinging-aggregates: 'Such is form, such its origination, such its passing away. Such is feeling, such its origination, such its passing away. Such is perception, such its origination, such its passing away. Such are fabrications, such their origination, such their passing away. Such is consciousness, such its origination, such its disappearance.' This is the development of concentration that, when developed & pursued, leads to the ending of the effluents.

AN 4.41

He discerns that 'This mode of perception is empty of the effluent of sensuality... becoming... ignorance. And there is just this non-emptiness: that connected with the six sensory spheres, dependent on this very body with life as its condition.' Thus he regards it as empty of whatever is not there. Whatever remains, he discerns as present: 'There is this.' And so this, his entry into emptiness, accords with actuality, is undistorted in meaning, pure — superior & unsurpassed

MN 121

Sekha wrote:I have to correct myself. I have read my article again and I did find out that some teachings of the Buddha, although they ultimately lead to Nibbana, may lead in between to attachment to *favorable* rebirth. The right view that may have lead that brahman to the Brahma world is a factor of the path, and it will lead him to Nibbana

This view is new to me, which appears to explain mere morality will ultimately lead to Nibbana. My understanding is only the extinguishing of craving & self-view can leads to Nibbana. It is my understanding that it is impossible for only the morality factors in the 1st sort of right view to result in Nibbana.

Sekha wrote:Just the same way as the path uses desire (chanda) as a basis for the four right strivings that lead ultimately to the cessation of desire.

My understanding is the four right strivings can be lokuttara dhamma, as they are fulfilled with vimamsa , which is a wisdom factor. The 4 right strivings are including with the 4 satipatthana, the 4 right efforts, the 5 faculties, the 5 powers, the 7 factors of enlightenment & the 8 fold path in the 37 bodhipakiyadhammas, i.e., the 37 enlightenment dhammas.

Chanda is not necessarily craving & can be lokuttara. My recollection is the discourse about chandha ending chanda was spoken by Ananda, who was prone to error. Nibbana is the destruction of craving (tanha) rather than the destruction of chanda (zeal; path devotion).

Sylvester wrote:
I note that "sa-" in bahubbīhi compounds always connote accompaniment or possession. Your explanation of this compound as a relation of "connection" is usually served by the suffix -ika, -ima or -iya, but no such āsava compound exists. Might you be able to point me to where your explanation of sa- might be attested?

Sylvester wrote:
I believe AN 10.139 needs to be translated differently. Note that the sutta contrasts 2 sets of 10 factors. The analysis, as is typical of sutta analyses of sets, is to apply the predicate to the whole set, and not to its individual members. Note that ayaṃ is in the singular (= this), as is the verb vuccati, reinforced by dhammo (nominative singular). Your translation would have required the Pali to have been "ime vuccanti, bhikkhave, anāsavā dhammā ti". Clearly, the singular demonstrative pronoun, verb and noun are referring to each set of 10, rather than each of the 10 members of the set.

Quite correct. But I guess I took upon myself to do this simplification because 'this is the dhamma saasava' sounds a bit odd, it might have been sometime around 2 am when I was not clearly awaken yet. I should correct this. Thanks for the report

JhanaStream wrote:
I would encourage you to find a sutta that explains the 1st sort of right view ends the asava. MN 60 is a discourse about the 1st sort of right view & I do not recall it mentioning ending the asava. Instead, I recall it explaining the 1st sort of right view results in the Three Skilful Actions and rebirth in heaven.

I will look for that, but no guarantee there is one.

JhanaStream wrote:
This view is new to me, which appears to explain mere morality will ultimately lead to Nibbana. My understanding is only the extinguishing of craving & self-view can leads to Nibbana. It is my understanding that it is impossible for only the morality factors in the 1st sort of right view to result in Nibbana.

well, morality accompanied with buddhe, dhamme, sanghe aveccappasada results in sotapatti... see the sotapatti samyutta. and I think there is one sutta where the Buddha states that whoever is virtuous enough gets whatever he longs for. I shall try to find which sutta it is. It is quoted on the back cover of the first book there: http://www.sasanarakkha.org/publication.html" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

JhanaStream wrote:

Sekha wrote:Just the same way as the path uses desire (chanda) as a basis for the four right strivings that lead ultimately to the cessation of desire.

My understanding is the four right strivings can be lokuttara dhamma, as they are fulfilled with vimamsa , which is a wisdom factor. The 4 right strivings are including with the 4 satipatthana, the 4 right efforts, the 5 faculties, the 5 powers, the 7 factors of enlightenment & the 8 fold path in the 37 bodhipakiyadhammas, i.e., the 37 enlightenment dhammas.

Chanda is not necessarily craving & can be lokuttara. My recollection is the discourse about chandha ending chanda was spoken by Ananda, who was prone to error. Nibbana is the destruction of craving (tanha) rather than the destruction of chanda (zeal; path devotion).

We are saying the same thing. The Buddha uses mental defilements to end mental defilements. And chanda, tanha, lobha etc. all cease with Nibbana. So, the path leads to the cessation of them all.

I guess I had the impression that Buddhaghosa back-translated that early commentary that you speak of into Pali. In the Visuddhimagga he sometimes compares the "reciters" of the different nikayas:

Hi Mike

Clearly, the Commentaries that Ven B had to work with were the Sinhalese ones. Those would have contained both the Mahavihara stuff, as well as the stuff that can be found in the Agamas. I think one of the axioms of Textual Criticism suggests that the more frequent the occurence of a text across different editions, the older the attestation. So to the extent that Buddhaghosa records Commentarial ideas that can found in the Agama sutras, Textual Criticism would say those Commentarial memes are old stock. Unless you were one of those wicked naysayers like Schopen who believes that the distribution of memes across the North and South were due to "levelling".

Yup, he does refer to the different reciters. I think he noted the Digha reciters' seeming dissent to the Abhidhamma deserving its own Pitaka (but my recollection of that might be faulty...). But by the time of Ven B, I think he was recording the contemporary status of the reciters according to how the Pali Canon was organised. Norman's and Ven Analayo's references to the "reciters" would have been to the reciters of the proto-Nikayas/Agamas, that elusive Ur-Canon of pre-sectarian Buddhism.

The Sarvastivadins and the Sautrantikas argued over certain dhammas (prapti, aprapti) while the Theravada, "probably outside this argument", ended up positing bhavanga to address the same issue. (Dharma: Its Early History in Law, Religion, and Narrative, by Alf Hiltebeitel, p. 145-6)

Additionally, the Pali Vinaya doesn't seem to have to deal with dharmasastra laws, while the other Vinayas do - so, it's possible that Sri Lanka was becoming isolated from mainland Indian Buddhism earlier and more thoroughly than we might otherwise have expected.

"And how is it, bhikkhus, that by protecting oneself one protects others? By the pursuit, development, and cultivation of the four establishments of mindfulness. It is in such a way that by protecting oneself one protects others.

"And how is it, bhikkhus, that by protecting others one protects oneself? By patience, harmlessness, goodwill, and sympathy. It is in such a way that by protecting others one protects oneself.