Iran

Missile
Last updated: June, 2015

The Islamic Republic of Iran has numerous programs for the development of ballistic and cruise missiles and long-range artillery rockets, and currently possesses the largest number of deployed missiles in the Middle East. [1]

Iran's ballistic missile program began during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), when Iraq's air superiority prevented Iran from striking from ranges greater than 150km. In response, Iran acquired the Soviet R-17 (R-300; NATO: Scud-B) from Libya, resulting in the War of the Cities. [2] Since the late 1980s Tehran has actively sought to develop an indigenous missile program, relying heavily on missile components imported from North Korea in the 1980s and 1990s to establish this capability. [3] Iran is outside of international regimes to prevent missile proliferation, such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and has instead commonly been an object of international efforts to limit the spread of sensitive dual-use missile technology. Despite these control efforts, Tehran has continued to utilize a number of foreign suppliers to develop a missile production infrastructure. To date, Iran claims to have developed five liquid-propellant ballistic missiles, (the Shahab-1, Shahab-2, Shahab-3, Ghadr-1 and Qiam); the Safir space launch vehicle (SLV); and the solid-propellant Sejjil missile.

Missile Table for Iran

While the purpose of Iran's nuclear program is unclear and remains hotly disputed, many nonproliferation analysts are especially concerned that Iran's development of more advanced long-range ballistic missiles may be motivated by the desire to establish a nuclear weapons delivery capability. Regardless of the veracity of these assertions, Tehran indisputably possesses a formidable weapons delivery capability, and its ongoing missile program poses serious challenges to regional stability.

Nearly all of Iran's deployed ballistic missiles utilize liquid-propellant engines. The Shahab series of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) provides the foundation for Iran's arsenal, including the Shahab-1, Shahab-2, and Shahab-3 variants. The Shahab-1 and Shahab-2 are identical to the Soviet R-17/R-300 (Scud-B) and R-17M (Scud-C), respectively, and the Shahab-3 is identical to the North Korean Nodong missile. [4] While exact numbers are unknown, Iran reportedly possesses 200 to 300 Shahab-1s and Shahab-2s with 12-18 launchers, and 25 to 100 Shahab-3s with 6 launchers. [5] These numbers, however, are based on imported missiles, and do not account for Iranian domestic production. [6] Iran has the capacity and infrastructure to assemble all of its Shahab missiles, though it is dependent upon foreign assistance for advanced components such as engines and guidance systems. The Shahab-3 is the cornerstone of Iran's arsenal, and is capable of reaching all of Iraq, Afghanistan, and western Saudi Arabia. The Shahab missiles are road-mobile and would be capable of carrying chemical, biological, or nuclear warheads. [7]

The maximum range of the Shahab-3 is 1000 km, the approximate distance from the westernmost point of Iran to Israel. Due to operational security concerns Iran is unable to deploy the Shahab-3 close to its western border. With an operational need for a longer range missile Tehran sought to modify the Shahab-3, and in 2004 successfully tested the new Ghadr-1 missile. The Ghadr-1 is a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) with a range of 1,600km. Iran utilized the Shahab-3 engine, but increased the length of the airframe and fuel tanks to allow for more fuel, thus increasing the missile's range. [8] Iran's modification of the Shahab-3 to achieve its strategic objective showed significant commitment and adeptness, but the modification was basic in nature and does not demonstrate any major technological advancement of Iran's capabilities. Furthermore, Iran has reached the maximum feasible threshold for modifying the Shahab-3 and Ghadr-1 to achieve greater ranges. [9] To further increase the range of its arsenal Iran will need to utilize more sophisticated techniques. These may include missile staging or the development of more advanced components, such as higher energy propellants. In February 2014, Iran launched a Barani missile, which experts suggest is a variant of the Ghadr-1. Iran claimed the missile, "was capable of carrying multiple re-entry vehicles. However, analysts from Jane's Defense dispute this capability on technical grounds. [10]

In August 2005 the German newspaper Bild alleged that Iran had imported Musudan intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) kits from North Korea. [11] The missile kit, dubbed the BM-25, is based on the Soviet R-27 (NATO: SS-N-6) submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM). [12] The BM-25 has a range of 3500 km, which would give Iran the capability to reach Germany and portions of France. However, the BM-25 has not been displayed publicly in Iran, and many experts assess that it is unlikely the alleged transfer occurred. As the International Institute for Strategic Studies observed, Iran's choice to utilize the Ghadr-1 as stage one of the Safir space launch vehicle (SLV) suggests that a more powerful engine (such as the BM-25's), was not available. [13] Iran used R-27 steering engines on the Safir SLV, which confirms that Tehran at least received components of the R-27. This may have led to the speculation that Iran received fully operational BM-25s. [14]

Solid-propellant missiles

In addition to its liquid-propellant missile program, Iran is actively pursuing solid-propellant missiles. Solid-propellant missiles offer a number of advantages. Solid propellant has a longer storage life than liquid propellant and is less combustible, thereby reducing worker safety risks and enabling fuel to be stored in the missile. This eliminates the several day fueling process required for liquid-propellant missiles prior to any launch decision, offering significant response time and other strategic advantages (e.g., solid-propellant missiles are less likely to be detected by an adversary pre-launch, because of the absence of major preparatory activities). Furthermore, solid-propellant missiles accelerate faster than liquid-propellant missiles, and are thus less vulnerable to interception during takeoff.

Iran currently has one known solid-propellant missile in development, the Sejjil, previously known as the Ashura. The Sejjil is an indigenously developed MRBM capable of reaching Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey from deployments deep within Iranian territory. If Iran were to deploy the Sejjil closer to its northwestern border with Turkey, it could reach areas as distant as Italy and Poland.

Iran successfully tested the Sejjil in November 2008, December 2009, and February 2011, with unsuccessful tests in November 2007 (under the name Ashura), September 2009, and October 2010. [15] An additional test was conducted in May 2009, but the focus was on guidance and navigation systems. [16] The successful tests of the Sejjil mark significant strides in Iran's solid propellant development; however, Iran still faces numerous hurdles before the Sejjil could be used as an effective military weapon. Solid-propellant missiles require more precise guidance and control systems than liquid-propellant missiles, and in the absence of such systems, need increased testing to ensure accuracy. Iran has only tested the Sejjil five times, a relatively low number of tests for such a new technology. The limited number of tests conducted may indicate Iran is experiencing difficulties in acquiring requisite advanced components (e.g., due to sanctions), or engineering difficulties in overcoming problems experienced in previous tests, or to minimize perceived interference with the P5+1 nuclear negotiations. [17] Iran has not tested the Sejjil since 2011. The low number of tests strongly suggests that Iran is still a few years away from deploying a test-proven Sejjil MRBM. However, Iran displayed 20 Sejjil transporter erector launchers (TELs) in a parade in 2013, indicating that development of the Sejjil is still continuing, even though testing appears to have stopped.

Currently, all of Iran's ballistic missiles are road-mobile and deployed on transporter erector launchers (TEL); however, in June 2011 during the "Great Prophet," military exercise, Iranian state television broadcast images of a Shahab-3 in a missile silo and announced the location of silos at the Tabriz and the Imam Ali missile bases. [18] Silos protect missiles from the environment and provide them with a permanent vertical launch position, thereby decreasing launch preparation time. Since these advantages are minimal, however, Iran's likely reason for developing silos is to prepare for the future deployment of larger missiles, such as an ICBM, that would require a fixed launch site. Fixed site silos also offer a degree of secrecy as compared with external launch pads, hiding launch preparations from view and potentially decreasing a site's vulnerability to a preemptive strike. To date, Iran has not test launched a missile from a silo, and it is unclear whether its silos are operational.

Cruise missiles

In September 2012, Iranian Brigadier General and Director of the Defense Ministry Aerospace Organization Mehdi Farahi announced that Iran has or is developing fourteen different cruise missiles. [19] Iran's cruise missile program began in 2001, when Tehran imported 12 X-55 (NATO: AS-15 Kent) air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM) from Ukraine. [20] The X-55 is launched exclusively from heavy bombers, which Iran does not possess, making it likely that Iran acquired the missile exclusively for research, design, and feasibility studies. In March 2015, Iran revealed a new ground-launched cruise missile known as the Soumar, which reportedly bears close resemblance to the X-55 and possesses a range of more than 2,000 km. [21]

The majority of Tehran's cruise missile arsenal consists of anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM). The Kosar (range = 3-15 km), Nasr (range = 8-35 km), Noor (range=120 km), Ghadir (range = 200 km) are all short-range subsonic platforms with high explosive (HE) warheads, primarily intended for coastal defense (land to sea) and ship-to-ship warfare. [22] These missiles are currently deployed along Iran's coast and on various naval ships including frigates, corvettes, and coastal and inshore patrol vehicles (such as speedboats), in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. In particular, the Iranian navy announced in April 2014 that both destroyers and missile launching warships have been outfitted with Ghadir cruise missiles. [23]

Iran has one medium-range subsonic ASCM, the Ra'ad, reportedly based on the Chinese HY-2 airframe. [24] The Chinese HY-2 can carry a 500kg warhead, indicating that a similarly designed Ra'ad derivative could hypothetically carry a well-designed nuclear warhead up to a range of 105km. [25] However, the limited range makes such a scenario unlikely. The Ra'ad is deployed for coastal defense on various naval vessels and along the Iranian coast.

In September 2012, General Farahi announced that Iran would soon unveil a 2,000km long-range cruise missile, Meshkat. [26] Farahi stated that the missile could be launched from air, sea, and land platforms. [27] Iranian officials claimed that the Meshkat or a similar missile will be released by March 2014, but at the time of writing it has not been officially revealed. [28] At a May 2014 exhibition, Iran introduced the "Ya Ali" ALCM with a reported range of 700 km, which according to analysts at IHS Jane's "is similar to the Chinese YJ-62." [29]

Space Program

Iran has an active space development program, which it claims is for civilian purposes. Iran successfully launched three satellites into space in February 2009, June 2011, and February 2012 using the Safir SLV. [30] The Safir is a two-stage rocket with a modified Ghadr-1 for stage-1 and a Soviet R-27 vernier steering engines for stage-2. [31] With each successful launch, media reports assert that Iran is closer to attaining an ICBM; however, Tehran still faces significant obstacles before the Safir technology could be used in an ICBM.

The East-West Institute asserts that, "The Safir upper stage is not likely to be suitable for carrying a nuclear warhead of roughly 1,000kg weight because the thrust of its rocket motor may be too low and because its structure may not be strong enough to support such a heavy payload during flight." [32] Uzi Rubin, the former head of Israel's missile defense program, David Montague, the retired president of the Missile Systems Division at Lockheed Martin, and Stanford University's Dean Wilkening, while disagreeing with the conclusions of the East-West report, agree that a ballistic missile based on the Safir would require substantial modifications to the second stage of the missile (e.g., a lighter but stronger airframe, and a more efficient rocket engine) before it could be utilized as an ICBM. [33] Iran faces significant additional technical hurdles if it intends to produce ICBMs. It would need to design and produce a reentry vehicle, and if it were to develop nuclear weapons in the future, Iran would need to significantly miniaturize any nuclear warheads before mounting them on an ICBM. While the success of the Safir does not equate to an ICBM capability, however, its development demonstrates significant Iranian progress in the exploitation of stage-separation technologies, which are critical to the development of longer-range ballistic missiles. [34]

Estimates about Iran's indigenous technical capabilities vary, and significant divides exist within the expert community on this subject. Rubin, Montague and Wilkening believe that recent Iranian missile tests have demonstrated Iran's ability to overcome many of the problems associated with the development and production of IRBMs and ICBMs, and is "well along in mastering each of the necessary steps" to such technologies. [35] Other experts, including Stanford's David Holloway and MIT's Theodore Postol, believe that Iran will have trouble overcoming many of the remaining technical issues associated with ICBMs. [36]

In October 2014, Hamid Fazeli, deputy head of the Iran Space Agency, announced Iran would begin using a new SLV the Simorgh-3 to launch three satellites over the coming Iranian calendar year, which begins in March 2015. [37] According to Jane's Defense, "hardware and models displayed by Iran suggest that [the Simorgh-3] will be based on North Korea's Taepo Dong 2." [38] Iran intends to launch this SLV from a new facility at the Khomeinei Space Center, but Jane's reported in January 2015 that construction "is far from complete," and "Iran consequently will not be able to attempt to put a satellite into orbit using a Simorgh rocket for several months." [39] While the liquid-fueled Simorgh-3 can, in theory, reach ICBM ranges, Iranian media reports note it can only accommodate a payload of about 100 kg, and thus is unlikely to contribute to the development of long-range missiles. [40]

Whether Iran can or will produce an ICBM remains to be seen. Iran has definitively demonstrated its commitment to such efforts, and its innovation in using available resources to modify existing missiles. What Iran has not shown is an ability to produce more advanced technologies and components, such as higher-energy fuels and guidance systems. As a result, Iran remains highly dependent on foreign suppliers for missile development and production, an ongoing challenge to the program given the isolating effect of current international sanctions.

History

The Shah's Rockets: 1977 to 1979

Iran's missile program originated in the late 1970s under Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. Beginning in 1975, the Iranian Defense Industry Organization began developing and testing the Arash 122mm system, a short-range unguided rocket based on the Russian Bm-11. [41] The Shah initiated a massive military modernization program in order to supplant the United Kingdom as the traditional military protector of the Sunni Gulf Monarchies, believing that his alliance with Washington and access to U.S. military technology would allow him to control the Strait of Hormuz and shipping access to the Indian Ocean. [42] Despite the Shah's close relationship with the United States, however, open source evidence does not suggest that the United States played a significant part in the Shah's missile program. Instead, the United States provided the Shah with a number of advanced fighter aircraft, including the F-4 Phantom, the F-14 Tomcat, and the F-5A Freedom Fighter, aircraft that remain integral to Iran's air force today. [43]

The Shah relied on Israel for assistance in establishing a missile program. Iran and Israel partnered in a multi-billion dollar project to modify advanced Israeli surface-to-surface missiles for sale to Iran. [44] The project, codenamed "Flower," was one of six "oil for arms" contracts Iran and Israel signed in 1977. [45] Project Flower reportedly aimed to extend the range of an Israeli Gabriel anti-ship missile by replacing American-supplied parts with Israeli-manufactured components, which would have enabled Israel to re-export the missile to Iran without violating American export control laws. [46] To support this project, a team of Iranian experts began construction of a missile assembly facility near Sirjan, in south-central Iran, and a missile test range near Rafsanjan. [47]

Revolution and the War of the Cities: 1979 to 1988

Missile developments under the Shah were short-lived, as the Iranian Revolution significantly changed Iran's international standing. With the Shah's overthrow and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomenei's assumption of power in 1979, Israel cancelled all military cooperation with Iran. While Tehran's missile program initially slowed significantly, the Iran-Iraq War forced Iran to import new missile systems.

Iraq's air and missile superiority greatly advantaged it during the war, enabling Iraq to roll back the progress previously made by Iranian forces in the ground war, ultimately recapturing the strategic Al-Faw peninsula in Iraq. [48] Iran's inability to counterstrike deep within Iraq's territory prompted Iranian officials to import a small number of Scud-B missiles from Libya. Iran used these missiles to target Baghdad, which had previously been outside the range of Iran's artillery. [49] From March 1985 until June 1985, Iran and Iraq engaged in the "War of the Cities," during which each continuously bombed the other's capital with R-17 missiles.

While the Scud-B was militarily insignificant due to its poor accuracy, Tehran perceived the missile as a strategic success given that it enabled Iran to strike deep within Iraqi territory. This led Tehran to seek additional Scud-Bs from Libya in the late 1980s. However, the Soviet Union prevented Libya from selling additional missiles, forcing Iran to turn to North Korea (DPRK). In June 1987, Iran and the DPRK concluded a $500 million arms agreement, which included between 90 and 100 Scud-B's, and North Korean construction of a missile production facility inside Iran. [50] Iran designated the imported Scud-B the "Shahab-1," and first deployed it with the special Khatamol-Anbya force attached to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), which successfully attacked a number of Iraqi cities in 1988. [51] Duncan Lennox, editor of Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems, believes that Iran launched 120 Shahab-1 missiles at Iraqi cities between 1987 and 1988. [52]

Post-War Expansion: 1988 to 2002

The Iran-Iraq War demonstrated the inferiority and inadequacy of Iran's military. With poor technology, equipment, and training, the Iranian military relied primarily on undertrained volunteers and human wave attacks to counter Iraqi forces, resulting in between 350,000 and 400,000 Iranian deaths. [53] Following the war, Iranian officials sought to consolidate the defense industry and modernize the military. Iran acquired conventional heavy arms from the Soviet Union, but was forced to rely heavily on China and North Korea for missiles and missile components. [54]

Between 1990 and 1991, Iran and North Korea concluded several new agreements involving the Scud-B and Scud-C. While exact numbers are unknown, it is estimated that Iran imported between 100 and 300 Scuds during this time. [55] Iranian military commanders dubbed the Scud-C the Shahab-2. The missile's range was still rather limited, forcing the IRGC to deploy Shahab-2's along the Iranian coast and border, a deployment that made the missiles vulnerable to preemptive attack. [56]

In 1993, Iranian delegations reportedly made six trips to North Korea to discuss ballistic missile cooperation. [57] Iran provided North Korea with a significant amount of money to fund its ballistic missile program in exchange for development and operational training, complete missile systems, and infrastructure for missile production. [58] The immediate result of the meetings was the purchase of complete NoDong missiles, which Iran renamed the Shahab-3. The full scale and scope of North Korean-Iranian missile cooperation is unknown.

From 1993 to 1999 Iran sought to increase its missile capacity through cooperative agreements with North Korea, China, Russia, and Syria. While Iran imported complete missile systems and missile kits, a focus was placed on developing indigenous capabilities. North Korea and China, in particular, helped Iran establish missile production and assembly plants, and in 1998 President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani stated, "Missile production has truly become a local technology in Iran.... we have reached the level we needed to get to...Iran is today a proper missile producer which does not need any country, not China, not Russia and not others." [59] By 1998 Iran was domestically producing the Shahab-1 and Shahab-2, and by 2003 the Shahab-3. [60] Despite Rafsanjani's assertions about indigenous production capabilities, however, Tehran continued to import critical components from foreign suppliers.

Military Exercises, Space Program, and Solid Fuel: 2006 to the Present

From 31 March to 6 April 2006, Iran conducted the Great Prophet-1 military exercises, testing multiple ballistic and cruise missile systems. The Great Prophet-1 series represented a new kind of testing for Iran, in which missile tests were integrated into conventional land, sea, and air military exercises. Such exercises display how the use of ballistic and cruise missiles can be integrated into defense doctrine and strategy. Since the initial Great Prophet tests, six additional exercises have occurred (November 2006, July 2008, September 2009, April 2010, June 2011, and July 2012). The specific missiles tested, and the exact number of tests from each exercise is unknown.

In April 2003 the Iranian Parliament officially established the Iranian Space Agency (ISA), with the goal of launching a satellite into space. In February 2007 Tehran announced the successful launch of a sounding rocket, although the rocket only reached an altitude of 150km. One year later in February 2008 during the Ten Days of Dawn celebrations, which mark the anniversary of the Iranian Revolution, the ISA launched the Kavoshgar-1 sounding rocket. Following the launch, Defense Minister Mostafa Mohammad Najjar said that a satellite would be launched in May or June. [61] The Safir SLV was launched on August 17 without a satellite. The head of the Aerospace Organization Reza Taghizadeh said, "the firing paved the way for placing the first Iranian satellite in orbit." [62] The Omid satellite was successfully launched in February 2009 to coincide with the 30th anniversary of the Iranian Revolution, making Iran the ninth country to domestically launch a satellite into space.

In January 2000 Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani announced that Iran was "self-sufficient" in producing solid fuels, and was developing a solid-fueled version of the Shahab-3, the Shahab-3D. [63] The announcement reflected a major shift in Iranian missile development away from liquid-propellant engines to solid motors, which subsequently marked a shift away from foreign assistance to more domestic research and development. In May 2005, Shamkhani announced that Iran had successfully completed a static test-firing of the Shahab-3D motor. [64] Then, in November 2007, Defence Minister Mostafa Najjar announced a 2,000km range solid propellant missile, the Ashura. [65] However, no videos or images of the new missile were released until the November 2008 test launch under the new name, Sejjil. From November 2008 to January 2013 Iran tested the Sejjil seven times, with the last test occurring in February 2011. However, Tehran has not publically declared the missile operational.

Recent Developments and Current Status

Iran's determination to possess a robust and indigenously sustainable missile program is a result of its experience in the Iran-Iraq War, current threat perceptions vis-à-vis states such as Israel, and its unique regime politics. Iranian leaders bolster support for their own political continuity by portraying much of the rest of the world as enemies to Iran, and seeking to rally the population around nationalist causes such as programs to increase Tehran's military power. The clerical elite view Iran's asymmetric military assets as the most vital dimension of Tehran's national security policy, and place great importance on indigenous weapons production. [66] Ayatollah Khamenei's push for indigenous missile capabilities is likely rooted in his understanding of the four key tenets of the Islamic Revolution: (1) Justice, (2) Self-Sufficiency, (3) Independence, and (4) Islamic Piety, as described by Karim Sadjadpour. [67] Khamenei believes that technology can insulate Iran from foreign domination and contribute to its economic and political independence, [68] a position evident in such statements as the following excerpt from a February 2010 speech to Iran's Air Force Staff:

"This country with its great capabilities in missile technology, biology, nuclear and laser technology - which you have heard about - and various other areas is the same country that had to import the most basic weapons at the beginning of the Revolution. Our country had to borrow from different countries. We had to buy the most basic things from abroad, and they refused to sell them to us. We had to pay several times more than the real price, and we had nothing of our own. The same Army, the same Armed Forces, and the same Air Force have now made these achievements. And the same academic, scientific, and technological units have now achieved this position." [69]

Additionally, Iran has steadily ramped up its investment in cruise missile technologies. One core component of Iran's asymmetric military strategy has been the procurement, production, and deployment of coastal defense cruise missiles, addressed as an issue of U.S. concern in the April 2010 congressionally directed Unclassified Report on Military Power of Iran. [70] In the event of any conflict with the United States, Iran would likely use HY-2 cruise missiles to attack American warships in the Persian Gulf and to close the Strait of Hormuz. [71]

Iran's rapidly improving missile capabilities have prompted concern from international actors such as the United Nations, the United States, and Iran's regional neighbors. The United Nations has responded to Iranian proliferation with numerous sanctions, the most recent being UNSCR 1929, which bans Iran from conducting any activities relevant to ballistic missile development. [72] The United States has also implemented a range of unilateral sanctions and executive orders targeting Iran (such as the Iran Sanction Act), and continues to develop and test various components of a proposed ABM shield. [73] Israel has responded to Iran's weapons programs by improving its Arrow Missile Defense system and working closely with the United States to prevent Iranian acquisition of sensitive missile technology. The media frequently reports on the possibility, supported by regular vaguely threatening statements from Israeli leaders, that Israel will feel compelled by Iran's activities to unilaterally bomb Iranian nuclear facilities. [74] Iran's Arab neighbors are also feeling pressured by its weapons programs and are improving their own capabilities in response. For example, the United Arab Emirates signed a $3.3 billion dollar agreement with Raytheon and Lockheed Martin to purchase Patriot missile interceptors and radar. [75]

Despite efforts by the international community to stall Iranian missile development, Tehran's ballistic and cruise missile capabilities continue to grow. Iranian engineers have extended the range of Iran's missiles from 600km in the late 1980s, to at least 1,500km today. [76] However, Iran has not yet developed a long-range ICBM, a failure that underscores the reality that such missiles are considerably more challenging to develop than assumed by the Rumsfeld Commission's 1998 report on the ballistic missile threat to the United States. [77] Iran's development of increasingly sophisticated missiles worries analysts concerned that such missiles could be intended as delivery vehicles should Iran decide to develop nuclear weapons. The IAEA has repeatedly asked Tehran to clarify allegations concerning "Iran's undisclosed activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile." [78] Ali Asghar Soltanieh, Iran's representative to the IAEA, has denounced the documents supporting these alleged activities as forgeries. [79]

The Joint Plan of Action Agreement between the P5+1 and Iran deals indirectly with the threat posed by the Iranian ballistic missile program in that the comprehensive agreement must include "addressing UN Security council resolutions." [80] In this sense, not only sanctions imposed by UN Security Council resolutions dealing with curbing Iran's nuclear program are covered by the agreement, but also UN resolutions addressing Iran's ballistic missile program (e.g., UNSCR 1929). United States Undersecretary of State Wendy Sherman reiterated this during questioning in front of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. [81] Iran considers ballistic missiles "a legitimate means of self-defense" and at one point stated that the "first-phase agreement made no mention of missiles." [82] However, the U.S. State Department issued a White Paper that stated the UN Security Council would draft a new resolution to include restrictions on Iranian conventional arms and ballistic missile activities as part of a final agreement. [83]

This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, or agents.