During a recent ACS panel discussion, constitutional law experts discussed Miranda’s future in light of the recent court rulings, such as Berghuis, and the administration’s announcement that it would seek a broad exception to the Miranda rule, established in the 1966 landmark ruling in Miranda v. Arizona.

Article 31, UCMJ, formed part of the thinking when Miranda were decided. Interestingly, in light of the on off discussions of the use of foreign law in U. S. appellate considerations, the Court referred also to self-incrimination practices in Britain, Scotland, India (under British rule), and Ceylon.

The English procedure since 1912 under the Judges’ Rules is significant. As recently [384 U.S. 436, 487] strengthened, the Rules require that a cautionary warning be given an accused by a police officer as soon as he has evidence that affords reasonable grounds for suspicion; they also require that any statement made be given by the accused without questioning by police. 57 [384 U.S. 436, 488] The right of the individual to consult with an attorney during this period is expressly recognized. 58

The safeguards present under Scottish law may be even greater than in England. Scottish judicial decisions bar use in evidence of most confessions obtained through police interrogation. 59 In India, confessions made to police not in the presence of a magistrate have been excluded [384 U.S. 436, 489] by rule of evidence since 1872, at a time when it operated under British law. 60 Identical provisions appear in the Evidence Ordinance of Ceylon, enacted in 1895. 61 Similarly, in our country the Uniform Code of Military Justice has long provided that no suspect may be interrogated without first being warned of his right not to make a statement and that any statement he makes may be used against him.

Ah yes, the Judges Rules (prior to the Police Evidence Act). Now how did that go, “I must caution you that you are not obliged . . . “