This study discusses the E1 plan, its great
for injured
the State
people importance
died and scores were
on of Israel,
1994,
in onethat
of Tel Aviv’s
busiestwould
and its vicissitudes over the years. It October
refutes19,the
claim
the plan
streets. (AP Photo, Jerome Delay)
hinder the two-state solution, or prevent linkage between the populations
of the northern and southern West Bank. It describes the longstanding
consensus in Israel about the future of Maale Adumim and the vital link
between Jerusalem and Maale Adumim, of which the E1 plan is an integral
aspect; the place of the Adumim bloc in the concept of metropolitan
Jerusalem; and the place of that concept in Israel’s approach to security
Yehiya Ayyash, the mastermind of
and settlement.
Palestinian suicide bus bombings, who was
killed on January 5, 1995, by explosives
in a cellphone
he answered. to
The study also explains why avoidingplanted
building
in E1 isthat
dangerous
(AP Photo)

Israel’s interests, and likely to result in Maale Adumim and Jerusalem
being severed from each other. At the same time, the report strongly
criticizes the Israeli authorities’ failure over the years to eradicate the
phenomenon of illegal Palestinian building in the area between Maale
Adumim and Jerusalem. While this stems from concern for the reaction of
the international community, it is gradually constricting Israel’s options in
an area so vital for its future integrity.Waving Hamas flags, mourners carry the
coffin with the remains of Yehiya Ayyash
during his funeral procession on January
6, 1996. (AP Photo, Khaled Zighari)

Contents
Why This Study Was Written
The Essential Points
The Metropolitan Jerusalem Concept
The Security Component of the Metropolitan Jerusalem Concept
The City of Maale Adumim
The E1 Area
The Palestinian Bypass Road
Illegal Palestinian Building in the Maale Adumim Area
The Neglect of Illegal Palestinian Building
Maale Adumim and E1: The Heart of the Israeli Consensus
Israeli Diplomatic Behavior on the E1 Issue: A Dual Message?
Conclusions

4
6
10
14
16
19
24
28
33
38
40
42

List of Illustrations
Maps
1. Oslo Agreement Map of Jerusalem Area Showing E1 Located in Area C (Israeli)
and Not in Area B (Palestinian)
13
2. E1 Area Connecting Jerusalem and Maale Adumim
18
3. Google Earth Map â&#x20AC;&#x201C; View from Jerusalem to the Dead Sea
20-21
Photos
1. The E1 Area - between Maale Adumim and Jerusalem
8-9
2. View of the E1 area and Maale Adumim as seen from Jerusalem
19
3. Maale Adumim and the Israel Police station in the E1 area
23
4. Section of Palestinian bypass road linking northern and southern West Bank 24
5. Aerial photos: Palestinian Construction Encroaching on the Jerusalem-Maale
Adumim Highway (1989 vs. 2012)
28
6. Israeli-built permanent community for Bedouin near Abu Dis
29
7. Illegal Palestinian building in the Mishor Adumim area, next to Route 1
31
8. Water meter at illegal Bedouin construction site
31
9. Water tanks at illegal construction site supplied by foreign groups
32
10. Illegal building by Bedouin next to Route 1
35

PA G E â&#x20AC;˘ 3

Why This Study Was Written
The Israeli building program known as E1 (East-1), situated between Jerusalem
and Maale Adumim, has been on the Israeli and world agenda for twenty years. It
is subject to a severe Israeli-Palestinian dispute and prompts strong international
opposition. As a result, it has yet to be implemented.
On November 30, 2012, after long years in which Israel had almost completely
frozen the program, a scaled-down forum of nine ministers of the Israeli
government met and decided to renew the planning, approval, and construction
processes in the E1 area. This decision was part of Israel’s reaction to the UN
General Assembly resolution on recognizing the State of Palestine as an observer
state that is not a full member of the United Nations.
Many countries displayed a total lack of understanding for Israel’s decision and
condemned it, sometimes harshly. The White House spokesman, for example, said
the program contravened U.S. policy and damaged the chances for a two-state
solution. The Israeli ambassadors in Britain, France, Sweden, Spain, and Denmark
were summoned for reprimands.1 In addition, fourteen of the fifteen members of
the UN Security Council declared that the organization opposed Israel’s plans to
build in E1. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said Israel had taken a “dangerous
path.”2
PA G E • 4

At the beginning of January 2013, a group of Palestinians, with the backing of the
Palestinian Authority, set up a protest encampment in E1. Israel waited a few days
and then, with Supreme Court approval, evacuated it.
The Israeli government and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu rejected the
criticism over the decision to build in E1. The Prime Minister’s Office affirmed that
Israel would “continue to act in accordance with the vital interests of the State of
Israel even in the face of international pressures, and there will be no change in
the decision that has been taken.” Israel’s decision was also taken in light of the
fact that, according to every past Israeli government, Maale Adumim must be
retained by Israel, and the Palestinians have agreed to this in past negotiations.
Therefore, the connection of Maale Adumim to Jerusalem needs to be addressed
when planning the future of the area.
At the beginning of December 2012, the Supreme Planning Council for Judea and
Samaria, part of the Civil Administration, began to implement the government’s
decision. It decided to deposit the construction plans for two of the E1 residential
neighborhoods for public approval, a significant stage in the succession of
approvals that still await the plan. At the last minute, however, an order by the
Prime Minister’s Office put a halt to this procedure, and so far the plan has not
been deposited for public approval.

This study discusses the E1 plan, its great importance for the State of Israel, and
its vicissitudes over the years. It refutes the claim that the plan would hinder the
two-state solution, or prevent linkage between the populations of the northern
and southern West Bank. It describes the longstanding consensus in Israel about
the future of Maale Adumim and the vital link between Jerusalem and Maale
Adumim, of which the E1 plan is an integral aspect; the place of the Adumim bloc
in the concept of metropolitan Jerusalem; and the place of that concept in Israel’s
approach to security and settlement.
The study also explains why avoiding building in E1 is dangerous to Israel’s
interests, and likely to result in Maale Adumim and Jerusalem being severed from
each other. At the same time, the report strongly criticizes the Israeli authorities’
failure over the years to eradicate the phenomenon of illegal Palestinian building
in the area between Maale Adumim and Jerusalem. While this stems from concern
for the reaction of the international community, it is gradually constricting Israel’s
options in an area so vital for its future integrity.
As the study shows, the E1 area is located in Area C, the portion of the West Bank
in which Israel has the powers of zoning and planning according to the Oslo II
Interim Agreement. In the last year, the Palestinian Authority has nonetheless
undertaken development projects in Area C, some with EU financing. Thus the
situation on the ground is not static, and Israel will have to find a way to protect its
vital interests, especially in this sensitive area, to the east of its capital.

PA G E • 5

The Essential Points
1. The site for the E1 building plan extends over an area of about 12,000 dunams,3
most of it state land, northward and westward of the Jerusalem-Maale Adumim
road. Through this plan, Israel wants to link Maale Adumim – a city established
east of Jerusalem about thirty years ago, in which about 40,000 people now
live – with the ridge of Mount Scopus within Jerusalem’s municipal jurisdiction.
So far, owing to the opposition of the Palestinians and the international
community, the plan has not been implemented.
2. Three residential neighborhoods, as well as an area for commerce, industry,
and hotels, are envisaged for E1. So far only two residential neighborhoods
totaling 3,500 housing units have been planned. An additional residential
neighborhood, the northern one, and the commercial-industrial zone, which
is supposed to link E1 to Jerusalem, are frozen for planning and legal reasons
unconnected to the political controversy over the program. A police station
and a network of roads and infrastructure have, however, already been built in
E1.

PA G E • 6

3. All Israeli governments since Yitzhak Rabin’s second tenure as prime minister
in the 1990s have supported the program, appreciating the need to create an
Israeli urban continuity from Jerusalem to Maale Adumim, leading out to the
Dead Sea and the Jordanian border. That need is incorporated in the Israeli
security and urban planning concept, which views Jerusalem and its nearby
Jewish communities as a single metropolitan space – “metropolitan Jerusalem.”
4. The plan is, of course, embroiled in an intense international dispute centering
on the position of the Palestinians, who seek to prevent what they call the
bisection of the West Bank – which, they claim, would torpedo the option of a
Palestinian state and preclude a sovereign and urban continuity between the
northern and the southern West Bank.
5. The United States backs the Palestinian position and acts to prevent Israel from
building at the site, so long as a permanent settlement has not materialized.
6. The Palestinians oppose both the plan and the solution that Israel proposes
for ensuring transportation continuity between the northern and southern
West Bank. The solution Israel is offering the Palestinians is the use of what is
effectively a bypass road (the literal Hebrew term is “fabric-of-life road”). This
road would pass between Maale Adumim to the east and Jerusalem to the
west, allowing the Palestinians free movement from the Ramallah area to the
Bethlehem area.
7. The opposition to building in E1 and to the bypass road is unacceptable to
Israel for the following reasons:

a. In the area between Maale Adumim and Jerusalem, along the JerusalemJericho road and in the E1 area, a considerable amount of illegal Palestinian
building is in progress. This illegal activity has already significantly
narrowed the corridor along which the central arterial road between
Jerusalem and Maale Adumim runs – from two kilometers to one kilometer.
The illegal building already threatens to sever and, in the future, preclude
Israeli continuity between the two cities.
b. Under the Oslo Agreements, zoning and planning in these areas (Area C)
is under the jurisdiction of Israel. Thus, Palestinian construction without any
building permit along a main Israeli artery of this sort is a violation of the
signed bilateral agreement and is thus illegal.
c. Israeli avoidance of creating settlement continuity between the
Jerusalem area and the Maale Adumim area will inevitably give rise to
another, competing, Palestinian continuity running north to south.
d. Even today Israel has great difficulty counteracting such continuity
because of the international community’s stance, which opposes any
measures against the extensive illegal building in the area.
e. One practical manifestation of the Israeli weakness is the lack of resolve
of the State Attorney’s Office and the Civil Administration in the face of this
illegal building. This, among other things, is clearly evident in reports of the
Civil Administration Central Supervisory Unit.
8. The bypass road will have two lanes. First, there is a lane for vehicles that
have come out of the Israeli security envelope and, therefore, there is no
concern that they could pose a security risk. Second, there is a lane for
traffic coming out of the Palestinian security envelope, which Israel cannot
be certain about from the standpoint of security. This separation of traffic
into two lanes is not based on religious, ethnic, or national distinctions
since Palestinian Arab residents of Jerusalem and Israeli Arabs will be
expected to use the lanes for Israeli traffic.
9. Where the traffic from both security systems mixed together on one road,
the Palestinian vehicles would have to undergo time-consuming security
checks at roadblocks. The bypass road is thus designed to allow for rapid
north-south movement in the West Bank with no interference from Israeli
security authorities.
10. The Palestinian opposition to the bypass road is based on the claim that having
only a transportation link between the northern and southern West Bank is
unsatisfactory.

PA G E • 7

a. This is an unreasonable argument because it ignores the reality that
emerged in the wake of the Oslo accords. As part of this reality, the roads in
the West Bank became essential arteries for both the Palestinian and Jewish
populations, with a dual use: for common transportation, and to create
separation and prevent friction between the communities.
b. The basic concept of a road as something not only intended for
transportation purposes but also as a solution to political problems was, in fact,
initially accepted by the Palestinian Authority:
yy

yy

In the framework of the Oslo accords, representatives of the PA agreed to
the creation of the “safe passage” between Gaza and the West Bank. This
was to be a wide road serving as a land link from the West Bank to Gaza,
and a substitute for territorial continuity.
The Palestinians and the Israelis compromised on the “safe passage” issue,
each conceding a principle: the Palestinians gave up contiguity between
the West Bank and Gaza, while Israel agreed to the creation of a passage
with some attributes of foreign land within its own territory.

11. Despite what the Palestinians claim, the building in E1 that has been approved
so far, and has not even begun, does not interrupt any existing Palestinian
continuity of construction.
PA G E • 8

12. The linking of Jerusalem to Maale Adumim is an overriding Israeli interest for
several reasons:
a. Israel cannot allow Maale Adumim to become like Mount Scopus in the
1948-1967 period, when the mount was an isolated Israeli enclave under UN
custody with only a road connecting to it.
b. Israel cannot allow a situation to emerge of security and urban discontinuity
between Jerusalem and Maale Adumim, or the reversion of Jerusalem to
a border-town status (as was the case before the Six-Day War) that would
preclude the city’s eastward development.

The E1 Area - between Maale Adumim and Jerusalem

c. Israel cannot tolerate a threat to the Jerusalem-Jericho road, on which the
Palestinian construction is encroaching. This artery is of supreme strategic
importance to Israel. In time of war it would enable moving large quantities
of troops to the Jordan Valley and northward, as Israel mobilized its forces to
contend with a possible “eastern front.”
d. The area of Maale Adumim, including E1, is part of the strategic depth that
Israel requires in the context of defensible borders – again, in the face of an
eastern front, and to make it possible to defend its capital, Jerusalem.
e. The area of settlement around Jerusalem, including Maale Adumim,
constitutes part of the metropolitan area of Jerusalem. This area incorporates
both settlement and security as two vital, complementary components of the
Israeli national interest.
13. There is an almost complete Israeli consensus on the need to link Maale
Adumim to Jerusalem via construction in E1, and on the need to retain this
territory under Israeli sovereignty within the country’s permanent borders.
14. Six prime ministers, from Rabin to Netanyahu, declared publicly that they
would build in E1. Yet, except for the construction of the Judea-Samaria District
police station, the process has not even begun because of the international
community’s opposition.
15. Time after time, Israeli leaders proclaim their commitment to Maale Adumim
and the building of E1. These same leaders, however, show great deference to
the position of the United States, which currently seeks to prevent construction
in this area. This behavior entails a built-in contradiction: on the one hand,
the message is conveyed that Israel will build in E1 because it is so vital to its
interests; on the other, through nonpublic diplomatic channels, world leaders
receive another message – that meanwhile Israel will bow to the international
community’s opposition to this construction. This behavior makes it very
difficult for those involved in Israeli public advocacy to address the world’s and
the Palestinians’ objections to the E1 plan.

PA G E • 9

The Metropolitan Jerusalem Concept
During Israel’s initial 19 years (1948-1967), Jerusalem was divided by a wall and
its “eastern” part was under Jordanian occupation. Over the past 45 years, under
Israeli sovereignty, the city has been undivided, all residents have enjoyed free
movement, and despite the national conflict and its associated problems, there
are multiple elements of cooperation and understanding between the two
populations.4
Immediately after 1967, aiming to reinforce the status of united Jerusalem as
Israel’s capital, Israel built a series of neighborhoods and satellite towns in the
environs of the city. The purpose was both security and settlement.
The State of Israel and the Zionist movement have always posited a link between
settlement and security. From David Ben-Gurion to the present day, the country’s
leaders have believed that settlements established in the area of Israel’s security
borders would ensure those very borders. To maintain security borders that
would enable the defense of Jerusalem and of the country as a whole, a line of
fortifications, or weaponry, or strategic depth in themselves would not suffice; it
was necessary to settle these areas, thereby anchoring Israel’s security presence in
a permanent civilian presence.
PA G E • 10

That approach was taken in the Galilee and the Negev in the earliest years of the
state. It was also taken by Israeli governments regarding the large settlement
blocs that were created in the West Bank after 1967, and in the Jerusalem area
as well. This security-settlement combination is to a large extent the DNA that
has flowed through the veins of Zionism since its inception – before and after
the establishment of the state. Settlement and security are seen in Israel as two
elements that mutually legitimize each other. The combined approach affirms that
there is no security without settlement and no settlement without security.5
In the context of this approach, two concomitant processes emerged in the
aftermath of the Six-Day War:
a. Jerusalem was united and expanded. Israeli sovereignty was applied to
areas north, south, and east of the old jurisdictional borders (comprising
about 70,000 dunams). In these areas (which the world has been calling “east
Jerusalem” for years), a string of Jewish neighborhoods were set up that
currently number about 200,000 residents.
b. Along the new borders of Jerusalem, or in what is called metropolitan
Jerusalem, Israel built an additional series of towns and settlements.
Decisions by the government and by governmental committees, along with

various experts’ committees, referred to this outer circle as “metropolitan
Jerusalem.”6 That term drew its formal validity from the many interactions,
in various areas of life, between Jerusalem and the surrounding area (the
“Jerusalem environs”).
With the change in political conditions, the escalating waves of Palestinian terror
at the start of the 2000s (in what came to be called the Second Intifada), the
worsening of security, and the building of the security fence around many parts
of Jerusalem (aimed at obstructing suicide bombers and weapons smuggling),
tight security restrictions were imposed on the Palestinian population’s freedom
of movement within the metropolis. As a result, the links and interactions between
the city and the surrounding area were weakened in the Arab sector. For the
Jewish sector, whose freedom of movement was not restricted, the strong links
and interactions between Jerusalem and the surrounding settlements were
maintained in various domains such as transportation, employment, society, and
family.
Those linkages, and the perception of Jerusalem as the heart of a metropolis,
were a new development. Up to 1967, Jewish Jerusalem had functioned as a
border town, hampered and constricted in the economic, commercial, and social
areas of life. In almost every regard, functionally speaking, the city in those years
was confined to a narrow corridor extending to the west, hemmed in by political
borders on its three other sides. Added to all this was the security distress of a
divided city threatened by terrorism and the Jordanian army.
After the war, of course, the situation changed completely. Israel acted out of
intense fear that if it did not quickly settle the area surrounding the city, Jerusalem
would once again revert to border-town status in the future. Hence, the country
embarked on extensive settlement activity.
Today, about a million people live in the Jerusalem metropolis. About 800,000
reside within the Jerusalem municipality, including about 500,000 Jews and about
300,000 Arabs.7 In addition, in the greater metropolis, another approximately
200,000 Jews live in four settlement blocs:
yy

The western settlement bloc (almost all within the Green Line), which
includes Mevasseret Zion, Har Adar, Beit Zayit, Motza Illit, Even Sapir,
Ora, and Aminadav, totaling about 40,000 people.

yy

The southern settlement bloc (mostly over the Green Line), which
includes the settlements of the Gush Etzion Regional Council, Efrat,
Betar Illit, Mevo Betar, and Tzur Hadassah, totaling about 80,000 people.

The eastern settlement bloc (over the Green Line) – relevant to our
concerns here – which includes the city of Maale Adumim and the area
of the E1 plan. This bloc comprises about ten communities and totals
about 65,000 people.

About three-fourths of the 200,000 residents of metropolitan Jerusalem live
within the area of the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) and about one-fourth
within the Green Line.8 In addition, some 50,000 Arabs live in communities within
metropolitan Jerusalem, in the part of the Wet Bank designated as Area C. At the
end of the 1990s, the Israeli government sought to institutionalize the natural link
between Jerusalem and the surrounding Jewish communities. The first Netanyahu
government sought to create a common, overarching municipality for the city of
Jerusalem and its metropolitan communities. Professional reports provided an
outline for their joint administration. However, for political reasons – primarily U.S.
opposition – the decision was not implemented. Washington disapproved any
Israeli application of powers for such a municipality over communities beyond the
Green Line.9
PA G E • 12

Oslo Agreement Map of Jerusalem Area Showing E1 Located in Area C
(Israeli) and Not in Area B (Palestinian)

PA G E • 13

Map of 1995 Oslo II Interim Agreement showing eastern approaches to Jerusalem. Areas marked in yellow
are “Area B” where the Palestinian Authority has full civilian jurisdiction including zoning and planning
authority. White areas in the West Bank are “Area C” where Israel has full security responsibility and
civilian authority over zoning and planning. The main connection between Jerusalem and Maale Adumim
must clearly run north of Abu Dis and Azariya, which is precisely where E1 is located. Unfortunately, the
Palestinians have been building illegally in Area C close to the main road connecting Jerusalem and Maale
Adumim, thereby narrowing the corridor between them. If Israel fails to build in E1, the area will be taken
over by Palestinian construction.

The Security Component of the Metropolitan Jerusalem
Concept
Former prime minister Yitzhak Rabin said that forgoing the construction of E1
would mean severing Maale Adumim from Jerusalem and probably changing Maale
Adumim into what Mount Scopus was from 1948 to 1967. In those years Mount
Scopus was an Israeli enclave in the heart of an Arab area. Only a narrow road
provided access to it, and Israel was dependent on the mercies of the Jordanian
regime and the United Nations to preserve even such a minimal connection. Rabin
expressed apprehension that if Israel were to fail to link Jerusalem to Maale Adumim
with a continuity of Jewish settlement, the latter city would indeed experience the
same fate as Mount Scopus.10 Rabin was the first Israeli prime minister to promote
the E1 plan, aimed at creating that very continuity.

PA G E • 14

In 1996, Shimon Peres, Rabin’s successor as prime minister, discussed with the head
of the IDF Central Command, Gen. Ilan Biran, and chief of staff Gen. Amnon LipkinShahak, the security-settlement concept regarding Jerusalem. Biran explained,
“Without territorial continuity in the areas surrounding Jerusalem, it will be hard
to ensure Israeli rule. Everything must be done to create a continuity of Jewish
settlement between Maale Adumim to the east, Givat Zeev to the north, and Har
Gilo to the south.” The Biran plan spoke, among other things, of paving roads and
arteries between all the points of Jewish settlement, thereby creating continuity
to the east between Maale Adumim and Mount Scopus (the E1 area), to the north
between Givat Zeev and Neve Yaakov, and to the south between Har Gilo and
Jerusalem. During the presentation, Biran emphasized that if such Jewish territorial
continuity was not created, then the Arab settlement blocs surrounding the capital
would create their own continuity and “strangle” Jerusalem.11
In essence, Biran outlined a minimal version of the “defensible borders” doctrine,
which is a necessary condition for Israel’s security. A slightly more developed
version was presented later by Gen. Yaakov Amidror, formerly head of the Research
and Assessment Division of IDF Military Intelligence and currently Israel’s national
security adviser.12 He, too, specified the area between Jerusalem and Maale Adumim
as vital to defending the country.
In the early 2000s, an extra-governmental team of experts, composed mainly of
professionals in the urban-planning and military fields, also recommended to the
government that it design the borderline of Jerusalem in a way that would ensure
the urban continuity of the Jewish neighborhoods. A secret document that the
team submitted to the Sharon government, which at that time became a sort of
political master plan for the Israeli leadership, stated:
Between the border that is outlined in the agreement and the border that
is not outlined in the agreement, Israeli Jerusalem and most of the Jewish
satellite settlements that surround the city (Maale Adumim, Givat Zeev,
and smaller community settlements) will be situated. The course of the
borderline must ensure quantities of land for the continued growth of the
Jewish population in the areas of metropolitan Jerusalem....The borderline

must be capable of withstanding changing situations of security tensions,
and must enable, to the extent that is required, control, impenetrability, and/
or separation between the populations....The borderline of Jerusalem will
include within it, as much as possible, areas that topographically control
Jewish neighborhoods....The borderline of Jerusalem will ensure the physical
continuity of Jewish neighborhoods.
The recommendations adopted by the political echelon also stated: “One must
enable the Palestinian population to maintain a continuous transportation
connection between Bethlehem and Ramallah outside the borders of Jerusalem.
According to need, use should be made of bridges or tunnels without
transferring ownership of the land above the tunnels or under the bridges.” This
recommendation is of great importance; it touches directly on the claim that the
E1 plan interrupts Palestinian continuity between the northern and southern West
Bank, a subjected addressed at length below.

Israel’s Need for Strategic Depth
Israel’s need for strategic depth as a component of defensible borders is endorsed
today by most Israeli military and security professionals. This strategic depth must
include sufficient combat space to deploy defensive forces that will be able to
maneuver within it, a reserve force capable of mounting a counterattack if needed,
and sufficient distance from the strategic home front.
The area between Maale Adumim and Jerusalem, along with the area to the east in
the direction of the Dead Sea, is essential to providing Israel with strategic depth
in case of the reemergence of threats to the east. In a time of regional instability
marked by regime changes, but also in quieter periods, it is forbidden to dismiss the
possibility of an eastern front that threatens Israel again taking shape. Hence, the
strategic depth provided by the area from Jerusalem through Maale Adumim to the
Dead Sea must be regarded as vital for defending the borders of the State of Israel.
In the 1980s, security officials noted that “the spatial dimension in the security
context of defending Jerusalem must be such that it can make a contribution to
military victory in time of need.” They further asserted:
It therefore must include territorial features that will help the IDF cope with
the maximum possible war scenarios, from a surprise on the part of the
enemy to an offensive initiative by the IDF. Those features must give the
IDF a containment capacity on the ground and in the air at the outskirts of
Jerusalem, without the city itself being harmed.13
Gen. Amidror has noted that, in case of a future war, Israel must ensure Jerusalem’s
security in two regards:
1. Control of the access roads to the city must remain in Israel’s hands.
2. Any war over the city must be waged on the way to it and not within it.14

PA G E • 15

The City of Maale Adumim
Maale Adumim was established by a decision of the Israeli government in 1977.
The cornerstone-laying ceremony for the first residential quarters was held two
years later, and three years after that, in 1982, the first residents entered the new
neighborhoods. In 1991, the state recognized Maale Adumim as a city, the first
Israeli settlement in the West Bank to attain such status since Jewish construction
there was renewed in the wake of the Six-Day War. Today Maale Adumim numbers
about 40,000 residents. A revision of the city’s master plan carried out in recent
years updated its aims. The new population target for the city is 103,000 residents,
compared to the previous target of 70,000.
At the same time, because of political constraints and the resulting decrease
in construction, the city’s rate of growth in recent years has been very modest.
Instead of about 500 housing units per year, in recent years no more than a few
dozen new units have been built annually.

Location and Nature

PA G E • 16

Maale Adumim is located on about seven square kilometers east of Jerusalem
on the Jerusalem-Jericho road, close to the northern Jerusalem neighborhoods
of Pisgat Zeev, French Hill, and Ramat Eshkol. The city’s buildings extend to the
Judean Desert, 450 meters above sea level. Despite being situated at the edge
of the desert, the city and its buildings do not have a desert-like nature. Instead,
there are broad boulevards, squares, and numerous wide open public areas.
Buildings are constructed in the stone-faced Jerusalem style. Maale Adumim’s
dependence on Jerusalem for employment, commerce, culture, and education,
and the lack of a significant urban center in the city, make Maale Adumim in many
regards a suburb of Jerusalem.

The Link between Jerusalem and Maale Adumim15
Between Maale Adumim and Jerusalem lie a number of Arab villages: Abu Dis,
Azariya, A-Zaim, and Isawiya. The road that connects Jerusalem and Maale
Adumim is Highway 1, which ends at the entrance to Maale Adumim. Access to
Highway 1 from Jerusalem is in the French Hill area and also via the newer Mount
Scopus road. Using that road, one can get from Jerusalem to Maale Adumim in
about five minutes.
Despite their physical separation, the two cities’ geographic proximity makes
them mutually visible. Maale Adumim can be seen clearly from Mount Scopus and
the Mount of Olives. From Maale Adumim one can see Jerusalem with the three
towers that adorn its skyline: the Hebrew University tower, the Augusta Victoria
tower, and the tower of the church in A-Tur.

As noted, Maale Adumim does not provide all the public services that its residents
need. There is no hospital in the city. Cultural amenities are relatively limited, and
most of the public transportation from Maale Adumim goes to Jerusalem. Hence,
Maale Adumim’s residents are to a large extent reliant on Jerusalem, which also
contains many of the government offices that residents sometimes need.
In addition, 80 percent of the city’s manpower is employed in Jerusalem. There
are, however, also a number of ways in which Maale Adumim serves or will serve
the residents of Jerusalem. Among these are the Mishor Adumim industrial zone,
where thousands are employed. The garbage dump for metropolitan Jerusalem
is also located within Maale Adumim’s jurisdiction and is under its responsibility.
This dump is now being shut down. The long-term plan for the area is to establish
a center for service, employment, and business in the E1 area that will serve both
Jerusalem and Maale Adumim residents.

Other Attributes of Maale Adumim
Maale Adumim’s jurisdiction extends over about 65,000 dunams. These include
residential areas, afforestation areas, an industrial zone, leisure areas, and other
locations. Much of the territory within the Maale Adumim master plan cannot be
used for residential building. Some of this territory is used for IDF firing ranges;
other parts are intended for roads and other public services.
Eighty-three percent of the residents are native Israelis; 81 percent are secular
and traditional and 18 percent are religious. Some 8,300 children attend the city’s
schools, and 2,000 are in its nursery schools and kindergartens. There are 9,000
residential units in the city.

PA G E • 17

E1 Area Connecting Jerusalem and Maale Adumim

PA G E â&#x20AC;˘ 18

The E1 Area
The site known as E1 encompasses an area of about 12,100 dunams (4.6 sq. miles),
most of it state land, to the north and west of the Jerusalem-Maale Adumim road. In
1991 during the Shamir government, then-defense minister Moshe Arens signed a
document transferring part of this area to the Maale Adumim Local Council.16
In January 1994, the Settlement Subcommittee of the Supreme Planning Council
for Judea and Samaria issued a new plan that widened the previous Maale Adumim
master plan. This plan constituted the basis for the future E1 plan, and then-prime
minister Rabin ordered his housing minister, Benjamin Ben-Eliezer, to begin planning
a neighborhood to be situated in E1. Since then the planning procedures for the
E1 neighborhood have advanced very slowly due to international and Palestinian
opposition.
The E1 area extends over the hills between Maale Adumim and Jerusalem, which
dominate the main roads in the area.17 E1 includes areas north of Highway 1 (the
Jerusalem-Jericho road) and a small piece of land south of it. The boundaries of E1
(in the area designated for industry and commerce) verge on those of municipal
Jerusalem. To the southeast, E1 is bordered by Highway 1, Azariya, Abu Dis, and lands
of the Jahalin Bedouin tribe. To the west it is bordered by Issawiya, the eastern slopes
of Mount Scopus, A-Zaim, and Anata. The northern boundary is Road 437 in the area
of the Hizme checkpoint.
PA G E â&#x20AC;˘ 19

View of the E1 area and Maale Adumim (on right) as seen from Jerusalem (Har Hatzofim).

Google Earth Map – View from Jerusalem to the Dead Sea

PA G E • 20

PA G E • 21

The E1 plan has several parts, not all of which have been approved:
a. The E1 residential quarter (east), which was approved, designates an
area of 1,271 dunams for a residential neighborhood with 2,182 apartments.
Also planned in this framework are a commercial center, gardens and parks,
a school, a community center, synagogues, a mikveh (ritual bath), and a
public institution. The intention is to implement this plan in two stages of
967 apartments and 1,215 apartments.
b. The E1 residential quarter (south), which was approved, designates an
area of 829 dunams for a residential neighborhood with 1,250 apartments.
Also planned in this framework are an elementary school, kindergartens, day
care centers, synagogues, a mikveh, parks, and public gardens.
c. The E1 residential quarter (north), comprising an area designated for
the construction of about 1,500 homes of the “build your own home” type.
This plan has not advanced because the topography in the area is extremely
difficult, and connecting the area to the existing and planned road networks
is also difficult.

PA G E • 22

These three residential neighborhoods would extend to the north of Maale
Adumim and north of Highway 1. They would not interrupt any existing
continuity of Palestinian construction, despite reports to the contrary.
d. A Metropolitan Center for Work and Business will encompass 1,345
dunams for joint activity between Jerusalem and Maale Adumim in the
economic realm. The plan for this center, which was submitted by the
Ministry of Industry and Trade, was approved in 2002 and all its building
permits are in force. The center is intended to provide employment to both
Palestinians and Israelis. This project has, in effect, been suspended after a
reassessment of the cost of the land. It turned out that many of its sections
are privately owned by Palestinians. Hence the project is viewed, at least
at this stage, as impractical. If, in the future, a way is found to implement it,
this part of the plan will make it possible to link the jurisdictional areas of
Jerusalem and Maale Adumim. That linkage, if and when it is created, also
will in no way interrupt any existing continuity of Palestinian building.
Indeed, the opposite is closer to the truth: southwest of the area of the
proposed Metropolitan Center – which for now is frozen – the Palestinians
have been trying for years to create a continuity of building and to link Anata
to the north with A-Zaim to the south. Such a continuity, if created, will
leave Maale Adumim as an enclave behind an unbroken string of Palestinian
settlements, and Maale Adumim will remain connected to Jerusalem only by
a road.

Recently, the area on the eastern slopes of Mount Scopus, which the two
Arab settlements seek to reach and link up with, was declared a national park
where all building is prohibited, whether by Jews or Arabs. The area of the
national park, which in earlier plans was marked as a green area, comprises
about 700 dunams. The area, which is of high scenic value, constitutes the
eastern entrance to Jerusalem. It contains about 80 antiquities sites, caves,
cisterns, churches, and burial sites from the Second Temple and Byzantine
periods, along with an attractive landscape that features habitats for desert
and Mediterranean flora, as well as about 40 different species of birds.18
Apart from all that, the planners do not conceal the fact that its designation
as a construction-free national park will prevent a linkup between Anata and
A-Zaim, which would entail severing Maale Adumim from Jerusalem.
e. The Headquarters of the Judea and Samaria District Police was
relocated to the E1 area in 2006 on a tract of 179 dunams designated for this
purpose. Around the headquarters an extensive network of roads and water
and electricity infrastructure was prepared, which are to serve the residential
neighborhoods along with other future uses in the context of the E1 plan.
However, the sewage infrastructure has not yet been built. Every few weeks
a large truck arrives to empty the large septic tank that serves the E1 police
station.
f. Over 50 percent of the E1 lands are defined and planned as green areas.

Maale Adumim (right) and the Israel Police station (left) in the E1 area. E1 is meant to connect Maale
Adumim to Jerusalem.

PA G E â&#x20AC;˘ 23

The Palestinian Bypass Road
The main charge of the Palestinians and the international community against
Israeli building in E1 is that it will prevent the state of Palestinian from having
territorial continuity and a link between the northern and the southern West Bank,
thereby thwarting any attempt to arrive at a permanent settlement.
Israel is offering a feasible solution to the problem in the form of a bypass road,
which is already partially paved. The route of the completed road will run from
north to south, between Jerusalem and the Adumim Bloc, linking the northern
West Bank to the southern part as an alternative to other existing roads. The
Palestinians reject this solution.

PA G E • 24

A completed section of the Palestinian bypass road. Its final completion will enable transportation
continuity between the northern and southern West Bank, similar to other existing “fabric of life” roads
built for the Palestinians.

In September 2007, Israel expropriated 1,408 dunams of the lands of Abu Dis,
A-Sawahra a-Sarkia, Nebi Musa, and Khan al-Ahmar for the purpose of paving the
bypass road to connect Ramallah to Bethlehem.19 The section of the road from
Hizme to the A-Zaim checkpoint has already been paved, at a cost to Israel of close
to NIS 300 million, passing through a tunnel under the Jerusalem-Maale Adumim
road. Thus the Palestinians can have transportation continuity without breaking
Israel’s link between Maale Adumim and Jerusalem.

The road has yet to be completed due to budgetary constraints and opposition by
the United States and the Palestinians. The Palestinians fear that paving the road
will vitiate their claim about the severance of the northern and southern West
Bank, which is at the heart of their campaign against Israeli building in E1. Part
of the already-existing bypass road is divided by a wall in the middle, separating
Israeli and Palestinian traffic.
The bypass road, when completed, stands to provide a good and fair solution to
the problem that the Palestinians raise. Israel cannot accept the opposition to the
building of E1 and the bypass road for two main reasons:
1.

In the area between Maale Adumim and Jerusalem, along the
Jerusalem-Jericho road and in E1, Palestinians are engaged in illegal
building on a large scale that threatens to diminish and even interrupt
and preclude Israeli continuity between Jerusalem and Maale Adumim.
(See the section below on “Illegal Palestinian Building in the Maale
Adumim Area.”) If Israel refrains from creating continuous settlement
between Jerusalem and Maale Adumim, the inevitable outcome will be
a different, competing, Palestinian continuity running north to south.

2.

The Palestinian opposition to the bypass road, based on the contention
that they cannot settle only for a transportation link between the
northern and southern West Bank, ignores the reality that has emerged
since the Oslo accords. In this reality, the roads in the West Bank became
important arteries for both the Palestinians and the Israelis, with a
dual use. In addition to ordinary transportation use, the roads create
separation between the communities and prevent friction between
them.

In recent years, this has led to the creation of a number of roads that are either
for Israeli or Palestinian traffic only. Palestinian communities that supposedly are
severed from each other by the presence of Israeli communities are in fact linked
by such roads, even if traffic is sometimes restricted for security reasons. Likewise,
Jewish communities that seemingly are cut off from each other by existing
Palestinian communities are, in fact, connected by roads. Even if this reality is not
always convenient for the two sides, they accept it as an existing fact of life.
Linkages of this kind exist, for example, between Jewish communities such as
Avnei Hefetz, Einav, and Kedumim; between Kedumim and Yitzhar; from Maale
Ephraim and the Jordan Valley to the Tapuach Junction and Ariel; between
Ateret, Ofra and Shiloh; between Tekoa and Efrat; between Telem and Adora; and
between Gush Etzion and Kiryat Arba. The connection from Jerusalem south to
Gush Etzion also passes through the “tunnel road,” part of which has become a
transportation corridor through Palestinian communities. After the Oslo accords,
numerous bypass roads were paved for the Jewish population. These circumvent

PA G E • 25

Palestinian population concentrations and enable safer movement for Jews, even
if, not infrequently, travel time has been lengthened.
Traffic between Palestinian communities and hubs of life and work are subject to
security restrictions because of past acts of terror. It will be possible to ameliorate
this situation in the future when the security situation permits doing so.
In any case, there is separate Palestinian traffic, for example, on the underpass road
between Bidu and el-Jib in the Givat Zeev area. Road 443 between Jerusalem and
Modiin, which mostly serves the Jewish population, is crossed by passageways
that serve Palestinians only. The old Road 60, running north-south along the
central mountain ridge from the Wadi Harima area southward to the Beit El and
Ramallah areas, currently serves Palestinians only. The section of old Road 60
from Karmei Tzur in the direction of Halhoul also serves Palestinians only, as does
the road eastward from Ofra through Taibe in the direction of Kochav Hashachar
and Rimonim, and the passage through Beitin (between Ofra and Beit El). Nor,
today, are Jews allowed to travel on the old Jerusalem-Hebron road that passes
Solomon’s Pools and Deheishe; only Palestinians may use it.

PA G E • 26

It is important to emphasize that these separate roads are currently operating
and are not “apartheid” roads. Rather, they provide direct and convenient
transportation links that enable both Israelis and Palestinians to reach their
desired destinations without having to unnecessarily pass through areas that
would complicate and lengthen their travel time.
In recent years the IDF has formulated a plan for paving new roads for exclusive
Palestinian use. The plan includes parallel roads and roads to replace those now
blocked by the separation fence.20
These roads are considered bypass (“fabric of life”) roads. The website of the
Military Advocate General’s Office, which frequently has to defend the roads in the
Supreme Court, explains that the bypass roads are
an inseparable part of the security-fence project and are intended mainly
to replace roads whose access has been severed or disrupted by the
building of the fence. These roads are paved by the defense establishment
for the Palestinian population and their purpose is to allow the Palestinian
residents, whose flow of movement and “fabric of life” linkages have been
compromised, movement that is as continuous as possible, and convenient
linkage between their communities and the main towns in the area. A ruling
by the Supreme Court recognized the great importance of the “fabric of life”
roads as an important and inseparable component of the building of the
security fence.

A similar concept is embodied by the planned bypass road linking the northern
and southern West Bank – the road whose completion the Palestinians now
oppose.
It is important to recall that the basic principle of the road as a tool not only for
transportation, but also for solving political problems, was initially accepted by
the Palestinian Authority. In the framework of the Oslo accords, its representatives
agreed to the creation of a “safe passage” between Gaza and the West Bank.
That arrangement was not implemented, since Israeli-Palestinian negotiations
ran aground. In principle, however, the sides agreed, and have not abjured this
agreement, to a land passage from the West Bank to Gaza that would constitute
a substitute for territorial continuity. (Although Israel and the Palestinians remain
divided on the course and nature of the Israeli presence in the passage, agreement
prevails regarding its creation as part of the permanent settlement.)
The bypass road that is planned to enable Palestinian traffic from north to south
is not fundamentally different from the safe passage route between the West
Bank and Gaza. These two areas of Palestinian settlement, which are relatively
distant from each other, would be linked only by a road rather than have territorial
continuity. On the safe passage between Gaza and the West Bank, the Palestinians
and the Israelis compromised. The Palestinians gave up land continuity and
settlement continuity between Gaza and the West Bank; the Israelis agreed to the
creation of a passage that in some ways turned some of its territory into an exterritory. A similar understanding could be reached regarding the link between
the northern and the southern West Bank. The nature of the road, and the traffic
arrangements on it, could be decided through negotiations.

PA G E • 27

Illegal Palestinian Building in the Maale Adumim Area
By delaying its implementation of the decision to build E1, Israel incurs a
double cost. First, the linking of Jerusalem and Maale Adumim, to ensure that
this strategic area will remain part of Israel, is yet to be achieved. After years in
which a consensus prevailed on keeping this an Israeli territory in the context
of the permanent settlement, the delay erodes this national consensus. Second,
Palestinian and Bedouin settlement is encroaching on this space all the time, the
great majority of it illegal: that is, this Palestinian construction is executed without
any building permit. According to the Oslo II Interim Agreement, the territory
between Jerusalem and Maale Adumim has been designated as Area C, meaning
that the powers of zoning and planning were retained here by Israel. Illegal
Palestinian construction enables the takeover of vitally important land, some of it
within the E1 area.

The West Bank town of A-Zaim (at bottom) and the Jerusalem neighborhood of A-Tur (at top) taken in
1989 (left) and in 2012 (right). The photos illustrate how the expansion of Palestinian construction over the
years has constricted the area around the Jerusalem-Maale Adumim highway, effectively constricting the
corridor connecting these two Israeli cities. This is precisely the challenge Israel faces all along this route
including in the area of E-1.

Israel has refrained from tackling this phenomenon, particularly because of
international pressure and activity by leftist movements that provide support to
this illegal settlement activity. Even Israel’s attempt to fulfill the letter of the law
and settle the illegal interlopers, after evacuations, within permanent and legal
settlement sites – such as the one set up at the end of the 1990s on the outskirts
of Abu Dis – has not gone well. More recently, the Bedouins of the Jahalin tribe –
who are under the sway of the Palestinian Authority and European organizations –
rejected two further Israeli offers to create two additional permanent sites for their
settlement, one south of Jericho and the other north of it (most of the Jahalin live
in Jericho).
Moreover, some of the interlopers who in the past vacated lands in the area of
Maale Adumim-Jerusalem and settled, in an arrangement with the state, at the
permanent site in Abu Dis, sold their houses to others and went back to illegal
building in their previous area of residence.21

PA G E • 29

Israel built this permanent community for Bedouin on the outskirts of Abu Dis. Some sold their apartments
and returned to illegal construction sites in the Adumim area.

A tour of the area to observe the illegal Palestinian settlement activity reveals the
following picture:

The Palestinians’ invasion and illegal construction begins within municipal
Jerusalem north of Highway 1 at a site called Sha’ar Mizrach. This is mostly Jewishowned territory occupying about 180 dunams in the Anata area. Although this
tract of land has potential for linking Jerusalem to E1, currently the state is not
allowing the land’s owners to exercise their ownership and also is not taking
action against the illegal Palestinian building there.
A visit to the police station in the heart of E1, looking westward, reveals a further
concentration of illegal Palestinian building, widely dispersed on rocky land. There
are a hundred buildings made of iron, wood, blocks, and cement, with laundry
lines hung between them. Some are covered with cloth, apparently for purposes
of camouflage. Also visible are horses, goats, a water tank, and a mobile restroom.
Not far away is a smaller cluster of more improvised and temporary structures
made of tin, wood, and iron.
Such a “landscape” is typical of many of the dozens of illegal Bedouin-Palestinian
outposts in the area. Such concentrations, each having individual structures
sometimes numbering in the dozens, can also be found near the sewage
purification plant south of Road 437 in E1, and also north of this road, as well as
northwest of the Mahane Yishai junction, north of Highway 1.

PA G E • 30

Not all of these concentrations may be characterized as “spontaneous” building.
Sometimes the building is supported by European organizations or by elements
associated with the Palestinian Authority – and also, according to military sources,
by the PA itself. Not infrequently in these clusters of illegal housing, new, clothcovered structures appear. One also sees large water containers, and restroom
structures of a kind not typical of Bedouin communities.

Prefab buildings brought in without permits by Bedouin in the Mishor Adumim area, next to Route 1.

PA G E â&#x20AC;˘ 31

A water meter installed by Mekorot, Israelâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s national water company, next to an illegal Bedouin
construction site near Nahal Og.

The areas that are attractive for illegal Palestinian settlement are those along
Highway 1. Palestinians from Areas A and B can easily enter and build along this
artery. The “magnet” is a spring that never runs dry: the pipeline of Mekorot, the
Israeli water corporation. Many hundreds of pirate hookups have already been
seen along this pipeline. Whoever travels on the road immediately grasps the
situation: there are pick-up points for students and residents at every intersection,
tractors that move at slow speed along a major highway, herds of goats crossing
the road. The state and the Public Works Authority have invested many millions
to build a road of the highest safety standards, a wide highway that connects
Jerusalem to the Dead Sea area. Mountains were moved for this purpose; yet if
the present process continues, soon this splendid road will wend its way through
a large Bedouin village. The state is not dealing with the plague of pirate hookups
and theft of water from the Mekorot pipeline; on the contrary, it is passively
acquiescing. Recently, Mekorot installed a faucet with a meter, and the PA has
been paying for the water that the Bedouins consume.
Another notable phenomenon is the Palestinians’ illegally accessing electricity
by linking up to the street-lighting poles along the road, which has become
widespread.

PA G E • 32

Also helping to entrench the illegal permanent presence of the Bedouin in the
area is UNRWA (the United Nations Relief and Works Agency), which provides
them with food and winter equipment while tending to their medical needs as
if they are refugees. European organizations support the schools the Bedouin
have set up and, with help from the PA, supply them with buildings and water
containers.

Water tanks at an illegal construction site in the Maale Adumim area, supplied by the humanitarian
organization ACF and the European Union.

The Neglect of Illegal Palestinian Building
The state does not automatically open files on illegal building in the area.
Occasionally it does so, and even issues demolition orders for buildings created
without permits. The main problem is reluctance to implement these orders. In
almost all cases the transgressors, with the help of various organizations, petition
the Supreme Court against the Civil Administration, which issues the demolition
and work-stoppage orders. The petitions present supposedly factual claims
and various legal claims. The petitioners request that the demolition order be
canceled, and succeed in delaying its implementation until the court rules on the
petition. Because the demolition of a building is an extreme and irreversible step,
the court usually accedes to the request. The judges issue an interim order until
making a further ruling, and request the state’s response to the petition.
This is where the problem begins: the state submits repeated requests to defer
the date and thereby drags out the case for years, until the patience of the
court registrars runs out. The file is then canceled on grounds of inaction, and
the interim order blocking demolition remains in force. Hence, in effect, the
demolition orders that the Civil Administration issues are nullified, without serious
discussion of the petitioners’ claims.
The Civil Administration’s Central Supervisory Unit became aware of this problem
and reported in 2006:
The petitions to the Supreme Court have unfortunately become “part of the
statutory process.” The phenomenon emerged and became increasingly
common because of the slow, very slow, treatment, to the point of total
suspension of activity, by the Supreme Court Division of the Justice
Ministry….
The illegally-building Palestinian population was well aware that when
submitting a petition to the Supreme Court, the illegal-building file usually
goes to the archive and the chances of reviving it are close to zero. The
Palestinian population, of course, makes use of this time to complete the
construction and to populate it so as to hinder or thwart the demolition.
The report of the Civil Administration Central Supervisory Unit for 2008 (published
in 2009) made similar observations:
There are hundreds of illegal-building files from recent years that in fact
do not receive appropriate treatment, owing to manpower limitations of
the Attorney General’s Office and the State Attorney’s Office. The result is

PA G E • 33

that we are forced to remove from the agenda dozens of illegal-building
files that prompted a petition to the Supreme Court, despite the fact that a
considerable part of them are apparently in areas of importance, which also
are defined as such in the priorities (p. 4).
The report also states:
The year 2008 was characterized by an almost total freeze of enforcement
with regard to the illegal Palestinian building. Freezing the demolitions and
other enforcement actions pertaining to infrastructure transmits a negative
message to the population and enables the creation of facts that we will
have difficulty coping with in the future (p. 1).
The State Attorney’s Office, in addressing these claims in the reports of the Civil
Administration Central Supervisory Unit, stated that the policy of the Supreme
Court Division reflected the general priorities for enforcement in this sphere.22 In
other words, there apparently is no reason to pursue the case in court and have
the petition rejected when, in any case, the enforcement authorities (that is, the
Civil Administration) have no intention to demolish the buildings because of
priorities related to a shortage of resources.

PA G E • 34

On May 1, 2011, the Supreme Court held a hearing on a petition (Supreme
Court 9815/09) submitted by the Regavim movement, calling for the renewal of
procedures on all the petitions of this kind that had been canceled or delayed
because of inaction, while leaving the interim orders in force. (Regavim is a
public movement that works for the preservation of state lands and assets and
the prevention of their illegal takeover by various actors.) In the framework of
this petition, the positions of the Civil Administration and the State Attorney’s
Office were clarified. The discussion allowed the justices to hear the state’s
defense against the charges, including an affidavit on the issue by the head of
the infrastructures unit of the Civil Administration. The judges ruled that the
phenomenon the petition called into question – the suspension of the cases – was
no longer occurring and the petition was out of date.23
Yet a further inquiry, based on information obtained through the Freedom
of Information Law, revealed that no significant change had occurred in the
treatment of the demolition-order cases for illegal structures in the West Bank,
in general, and the Maale Adumim area, in particular. According to an inquiry
conducted in 2011,24 at that time, in the Supreme Court there were 162 petitions
pending that had been submitted by Palestinians beginning in 2008, and on
which interim orders had been issued forbidding the Civil Administration to
demolish structures built in the West Bank without authorization.
In many cases, it turned out, more than ten consecutive requests had been
submitted – in some of the cases, sixteen consecutive requests – to defer the
date of the state’s response to the petition. In many instances the Supreme Court
registrars had issued four or five warnings before cancellation on grounds of
inaction, and in some cases seven such warnings had been issued. In these cases

no discussion was held on the petition, the state having refrained from submitting
its response to the petition and to the interim order. In such cases the interim
order remains in force and, in effect, prevents the demolition. The upshot of
these cases, like hundreds of others, is the effective cancellation of hundreds of
demolition orders against illegal Palestinian building that have been issued in the
West Bank, in general, and in the Maale Adumim area, in particular.

PA G E • 35

Illegal building by Bedouin next to Route 1.

The Role of the State Attorney’s Office
The State Attorney’s Office is deliberately delaying action on these demolition
orders. This behavior may be explained in statements by former Deputy Attorney
General Malkiel Blass, written in the name of the attorney general, on April 11,
2009, in response to an earlier petition by the Regavim movement.
In his letter, the deputy attorney general writes that he has not found any problem
in the state attorney’s conduct when declining to renew the procedures in the
demolition cases for illegal Palestinian building. Blass explains that “in the area
of planning and construction in Israel and the West Bank, there is a gap between
the quantity of the demolition orders for structures that were not built according
to the law, and the actual implementation of the demolitions,” and that “under
these circumstances there is a need to determine orders of priority for carrying
out the demolitions.” In the West Bank, he notes, “the considerations are quite
complex....The attorneys are not the ones who set the priorities in carrying out

the demolition and many state authorities are involved in setting the order of
priorities.” In sum, he states that “the issue requires the consideration of many
other officials in the Israeli public administration and it is more complex than the
consideration accorded by the attorneys in their handling of a certain case.”
A possible explanation is that political considerations are preventing the
demolition of the illegal structures. Presumably, the root cause is pressure from
the international community. In other words, Israel does not have the political
latitude to demolish hundreds of illegal structures in the Adumim area and
thousands more elsewhere in the West Bank. The Palestinian population is, of
course, well aware of this reality, leading to still more illegal construction.

PA G E • 36

Because of pressure by groups like Regavim and various publications in the
media, the state’s longstanding policy of avoiding demolition of illegal buildings
has moderated somewhat in recent years. Yet the state is still far from dealing
effectively with even half of these violations. On November 15, 2011, a meeting
was held by the director of the Supreme Court Division of the State Attorney’s
Office, attended by the head of the Civil Administration, the director of the Civil
Administration Central Supervisory Unit, and representatives of the attorney
general, to discuss the state’s position on cases (which were submitted to
the Supreme Court) where work-stoppage and demolition orders were not
implemented. It was decided that in such cases court injunctions should be issued
“in accordance with the orders of priority of the responsible parties.”25
Nevertheless, in an event covered extensively in the media,26 when in January
2013 members of the Palestinian “Popular Committees” set up a protest
encampment in E1, after the government’s decision to advance the planning
processes for construction there, the state acted quickly, with the approval of the
Supreme Court, to evacuate the encampment.
Over the years this situation, in which Israel has had difficulty coping with
extensive illegal building, has reduced the width of the corridor between
Jerusalem and Maale Adumim from about two kilometers approximately fifteen
years ago to one kilometer and even less at present. This also constricts the
possibilities for building in E1 and the adjacent areas.
Security officials, who concur with this assessment, warn that if Israel does not
take significant steps to stop the Palestinian takeover of these areas, in the future
it may be impossible to carry out the E1 plan as envisaged, particularly in the
northwestern area that abuts Anata. Security officials believe that some of the
Bedouin migration into the E1 area stems from fear of being left outside the
route of the separation fence, which is intended to incorporate the Adumim bloc
(including E1) into Israeli territory.

Over the years the Palestinians, for their part, have not concealed their goal of
preventing Israeli building in E1. Faisal Husseini, the Jerusalem-based Palestinian
leader who died in 2001, stated forthrightly that unauthorized building in the
Jerusalem area was one of the Palestinians’ weapons in the struggle against
Israel.27 As far back as 1993, Muhammad Nahal, an expert in urban planning at the
Institute for Arab Studies that was part of Orient House, prepared a plan for the
construction of three cities in the Jerusalem area that would surround the Jewish
neighborhoods built in the Jerusalem area after 1967. One of the cities that Nahal
planned was supposed to occupy lands of the villages of Azariya and Abu Dis, and
its purpose was the encirclement of Jerusalem from the east.28
From an Israeli standpoint, then, the E1 building plan is virtually the only obstacle
to the endeavor described in Nahal’s plan, since the international community
does not allow Israel to act extensively and effectively against the illegal-building
phenomenon.
While Ehud Barak was prime minister, the Palestinians indeed formally requested
that the E1 area be transferred to their control as part of Area B (where they have
full civilian rule while security control remains in Israel’s hands). Their request was
refused.29 At present, the Palestinian Authority provides support to illegal building,
in general, and in the Maale Adumim area, in particular. In an event held at the
illegal building site known as Khan al-Ahmar, Palestinian Prime Minister Salam
Fayyad called the residents “the Bedouin land guardians.”30
After Israel evacuated the protest encampment at E1 in January 2013, the Fatah
movement called this dismantlement a “crime” and averred that “this is not the end
of the campaign to assert the Palestinian right to all of the Palestinian lands.”31

PA G E • 37

Maale Adumim and E1: The Heart of the Israeli Consensus
During a Knesset session on October 5, 1994, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin
declared: “United Jerusalem would also encompass Maale Adumim as well as
Givat Zeev as the capital of Israel under Israeli sovereignty.” Six months earlier,
in April, it was Rabin who submitted the documents for the annexation of E1 to
Maale Adumim Mayor Benny Kashriel.32 After Rabin’s assassination, Prime Minister
Shimon Peres reaffirmed the government’s position that Israel would claim
the application of Israeli sovereignty to Maale Adumim in the framework of a
permanent settlement.33
At the beginning of April 2005, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon stated: “E1 is a plan
ten years old, and the aim is to continue it.”34 Likewise, the defense minister in the
Sharon government, Shaul Mofaz, said during a tour of E1 that he supported the
plan to create Jewish continuity between Jerusalem and Maale Adumim.35 A public
information video by the City of Maale Adumim36 shows major figures, over the
past decade, affirming their belief in Maale Adumim and E1 and explaining their
significance:
Ariel Sharon (former prime minister): “Maale Adumim will continue to be
built as a permanent part of the State of Israel. I foresee a great future for
Maale Adumim.”
PA G E • 38

Ehud Barak (former prime minister and defense minister): “Our possession
of the E1 corridor must be translated into action. Unless we are prepared
to build a continuity that will link Mount Scopus to Maale Adumim, Maale
Adumim is in danger. If we do not embark immediately on political action,
by establishing facts on the ground, we are at risk of losing Maale Adumim.”
Ehud Olmert (former prime minister): “I see in my vision, not as something
distant but as a reality of life, all the way from Maale Adumim to Jerusalem
and all the way from Jerusalem to Maale Adumim as a single urban
continuity, which does not stop. There are things that are beyond all debate,
beyond all controversy, and all the area surrounding Jerusalem will forever
remain part of Jerusalem and the State of Israel, and Maale Adumim is part
of this area.”
Benjamin Netanyahu (prime minister): “We want to create the continuity
of metropolitan Jerusalem from west to east and the Palestinians want to
create a continuity of construction from north to south, and someone will
prevail over someone. They will not give in. They seek to strangle Jerusalem
from one side and to separate it from Maale Adumim from the other. We
have to prevail over them and build E1.”

Silvan Shalom (former foreign minister): “The linking of Maale Adumim to
Jerusalem in the long term is inevitable.”
Knesset Member Tzahi Hanegbi (former chair of the Knesset Foreign Affairs
and Defense Committee): “No prime minister or government will dare raise a
hand against Maale Adumim, a city that protects Jerusalem. A city in which
many people live. Maale Adumim has passed the point of no return. Don’t
worry.”
Knesset Member Reuven Rivlin (former speaker of the Knesset): “The E1 plan
is a mission we will never abandon....If Yitzhak Rabin were alive he would
give an unequivocal order to implement E1.”
Meir Porush (former deputy housing minister): “If you want to strangle
Jerusalem, don’t build E1.”
In past Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, the Israeli team insisted on Israel retaining
E1 and the connection between Jerusalem and Maale Adumim. This was also part
of the peace proposal made by former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to Mahmoud
Abbas.

PA G E • 39

Israeli Diplomatic Behavior on the E1 Issue: A Dual
Message?
Along with the frequent declarations of commitment to Maale Adumim and
the E1 building plan, all recent prime ministers have acceded to requests by U.S.
administrations and agreed to freeze, or to coordinate with the United States,
the actual building in E1. Israeli leaders, too, after announcing that the planning
processes for E1 would go forward, made clear that the plan had not yet reached
the implementation stage.
This dual behavior pattern is marked by a built-in contradiction. On the one hand,
domestic audiences hear the message that Israel is going to build E1, a location
extremely vital to the country’s interests. On the other hand, world leaders receive
another message through private diplomatic channels – that Israel will meanwhile
heed the position of the international community. This behavior inevitably makes
it very difficult for Israel to respond to international and Palestinian protests
against the E1 plan.

PA G E • 40

The result on the ground is that the plan is not implemented, and despite the
talk of “advancing” it, it has not even approached the implementation stage.
Even after the December 2012 decision of the Supreme Planning Council for
Judea and Samaria to deposit the plan for public approval (a decision not yet
carried out), a long path still lies ahead. Many months must pass until the publicapproval process is completed. The council then has to decide whether to accept
all of the objections that are raised, reject all of them, or accept some of them.
Assuming that the plan passes, the council then has to authorize it. Only then can
the Housing Ministry prepare tenders for marketing the land for construction.
Publication of the tenders also requires approval by the political echelon.

The Palestinian Decision to Fight over E1
It was immediately after the Taba talks in January 2001 that the Palestinians
decided to fight the E1 plan and recruit the world to the struggle. During the
talks, Israel showed the Palestinian delegation a map of Maale Adumim that
included the E1 area. Up to that time, the Palestinians had tended to agree to
Israeli annexation of most of the settlement blocs, including Maale Adumim, in
the context of territorial swaps. The Israeli assertion that the Maale Adumim bloc
included E1, as well as land further east toward the Dead Sea, prompted a shift in
the Palestinian position, and they retracted their prior agreement regarding Maale
Adumim.37

The 2001 Taba talks, then, were the point at which E1 became a red flag for the
Palestinians, even though previously they had not opposed it. And they indeed
were able to harness the international community to their cause. Nevertheless, the
dual message of the Israeli leadership – on the one hand, strong declarations on
E1; on the other, delays and deference to the international community – has made
it very hard to realize the supreme Israeli interest in building E1.
Already in Rabin’s day, Israel had refrained from carrying out the construction
plans for the area because of an understanding with the Clinton administration
that its fate would be determined in negotiations.38 Netanyahu, in his first
term, tried to promote the plan and even initiated a decision to create a joint
municipality for Jerusalem and the settlements surrounding it, but this too was
stymied by U.S. opposition. Prime Minister Barak also spoke in favor of continuity
and linking Jerusalem and Maale Adumim, but he allowed Israel’s negotiating
team to discuss the future of this area in the framework of the permanentsettlement negotiations with the Palestinians.
The prime minister who succeeded Barak, Ariel Sharon, also supported continuity
between Jerusalem and Maale Adumim and building in E1, but he, too, came
up against U.S. opposition and in fact promised not to build there without
coordinating with Washington. As his close adviser Dov Weisglass described it,
there was never an Israeli commitment not to build, but it was agreed that such
building would be announced in advance and carried out in coordination with the
Americans.39
It was Sharon’s successor, Ehud Olmert, who gave the United States an explicit
undertaking on this matter. In an interview to the Jerusalem Post in September
2005, Olmert publicly confirmed that Israel had promised the U.S. administration it
would not build between Maale Adumim and Jerusalem. “The State of Israel made
a commitment to freeze construction...therefore, we would be acting irresponsibly
if we were to build there.” At the same time, Olmert, too, emphasized that this did
not mean the plan had come to an end. He made similar statements to Mayor
Kashriel of Maale Adumim in meetings held in recent years.

PA G E • 41

Conclusions
1. It is necessary to speed up the approval process of the E1 plan immediately
with the aim of implementing it, or at least reaching a situation of immediate
preparedness to do so.
2. In parallel, a public information campaign must be launched in Israel and
abroad that, among other things, will use material from this study, with the aim
of countering and mitigating the predictable international onslaught against the
promotion and implementation of the plan.
3. Even if the plan is not implemented at this stage, Israel must act immediately
against the illegal building in the Maale Adumim-Jerusalem area, while
overcoming the obstacles in the Civil Administration, the State Attorney’s Office,
and on the political level that so far have prevented effective measures against this
phenomenon.
4. The paving of the bypass road should be renewed immediately, so that it can
be fully built and made available to the Palestinians. The laying of the road should
be accompanied by explanations of why this road constitutes a solution to the
“continuity problem” as the Palestinians portray it, citing similar precedents that
already exist.
PA G E • 42

5. The linking of the E1 area to metropolitan Jerusalem can already begin. The
building authorizations for the Metropolitan Center for Work and Business have
been valid for some time. A joint legal team should be created for the Jerusalem
and Maale Adumim municipalities, to be tasked with solving the legal problems
that are delaying the work on constructing the Metropolitan Center. In the joint
employment area on the seam line between Jerusalem and Maale Adumim, similar
to the Barkan industrial zone in Samaria, both Jews and Arabs are to be employed,
and this is a point to be emphasized.
6. The international community has been acting with a lack of good faith when
it complains that Israel is violating international law just over its announced
intention to build in E1, while maintaining silence regarding Palestinian conduct
in the area. The international community should be expected to honor signed
agreements, and if the Oslo Agreements are still considered to be in force, then
the Palestinians are forbidden to build in Area C. The Palestinians, as well, must
honor the agreements under whose framework the Palestinian Authority was
established, which controls more than 95 percent of the Palestinian population.

7. The dual message that Israel conveys on the E1 issue – we will build the
neighborhood vs. we will acquiesce to the world’s position and not build – makes
it very difficult to explain the Israeli interest in developing E1. If the plan is so
vital, why is it not being implemented despite the international community’s
opposition? If the plan can be delayed, then perhaps it is not so vital? If there is
indeed an intention to build, the time to act is now; but if the real aim is to keep
deferring to international sensitivities, one should state this plainly and at least
reap the dividends of doing so.

PA G E • 43

About the Author
Nadav Shragai is a senior researcher at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. He
served as a journalist and commentator at Ha’aretz between 1983 and 2009, is
currently a journalist and commentator at Israel Hayom, and has documented the
dispute over Jerusalem for thirty years.
His books include The “Al-Aksa Is in Danger” Libel: The History of a Lie (Jerusalem
Center for Public Affairs, 2012); Jerusalem: Correcting the International Discourse –
How the West Gets Jerusalem Wrong (eBook) (Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs,
2012); Demography, Geopolitics, and the Future of Israel’s Capital: Jerusalem’s
Proposed Master Plan (Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 2010); Jerusalem: The
Dangers of Division - An Alternative to Separation from the Arab Neighborhoods
(Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 2008); At the Crossroads: The Story of Rachel’s
Tomb (Gates for Jerusalem Studies, 2005); The Temple Mount Conflict (Keter, 1995);
and the essay: “Jerusalem Is Not the Problem, It Is the Solution,” in Mr. Prime
Minister: Jerusalem, Moshe Amirav, ed. (Carmel and Floersheimer Institute, 2005).

PA G E • 44

Notes
1

Barak Ravid and Natasha Mozgobia, “The United States Harshly Condemns the Intention to Build in E1,”
Ha’aretz website, December 3, 2012 (in Hebrew).

2

“Catherine Ashton: ‘The Building around Jerusalem Is Unprecedented,’” Maariv-nrg website, December
20, 2012.

3

A dunam is equal to one thousand square meters, or roughly one-fourth of an acre.

4

See the video by the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, “Indivisible Jerusalem,” http://www.youtube.
com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=98DMPOC-dUQ.

5

Conference on settlement and security with the participation of members of the Settlement Division
of the Jewish Agency, security officials, and those involved in the planning of settlements, held at the
Jewish Agency at the end of the 1990s.

6

For elaboration on this concept, see the report “Metropolitan Jerusalem: Master Plan and Development,”
prepared for the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Housing, the Israel Land Administration, and the
City of Jerusalem, 1994 (in Hebrew). Research team headed by Shmarya Cohen and Adam Mazor in
cooperation with the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies. Nadav Shragai, “Jerusalem: The Dangers of
Division,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 2008, pp. 24-25.

The data are based on the book by Aryeh Hess, Jerusalem and Her Daughters, self-published, 2009, pp.
28-30 (in Hebrew). However, the numbers were updated with the help of the database of the Interior
Ministry and the relevant local and regional councils, and they are accurate as of the end of 2011.

9

Shragai, “Jerusalem,” pp. 24-25.

10

See, e.g., statement by former Knesset Speaker Reuven Rivlin on words in this spirit by Rabin and past
leaders of the Labor Party, on the Megaphone site, article by Zvi Singer, “The Government Unanimously
Rejected the UN General Assembly Resolution,” December 2, 2012 (in Hebrew).

For elaboration on the issue of defensible borders in general and in the area east of Jerusalem in
particular, see “Defensible Borders: A Necessary Condition for Israel’s Security,” Jerusalem Center for
Public Affairs, 2005, article by Yaakov Amidror, “Israel’s Requirements for Defensible Borders,” and the
appendix: “Military-Strategic Aspects of the Topography of Judea and Samaria for Israel’s Security” (in
Hebrew; versions in English also available).

13

Appendix 7 of “Jerusalem: Links and Borders,” prepared by a professional team for the Ministerial
Committee for Jerusalem Affairs during the 1980s (in Hebrew).

14

A lecture by Gen. Yaakov Amidror at the Lander Institute in 2007, at a conference on the unity of
Jerusalem.

15

The facts presented at the beginning of this section are based on a survey prepared by the engineer of
the Maale Adumim municipality, Gadi Brandeis.

Letter by Amir Fisher, attorney for Regavim, to the director of the Supreme Court Division of the Justice
Ministry, Attorney Osnat Mandel, December 25, 2011 (in Hebrew).

25

From the response of the State Attorney’s Office, December 18, 2011, to the request of the Regavim
movement to participate in Supreme Court Case 9715/07 (in Hebrew).

26

See, e.g., Chaim Levinson, “The Police and the IDF Evacuated within Hours the Palestinian Encampment
Set Up in E1,” Ha’aretz, January 14, 2013 (in Hebrew).

27

Husseini said at the time: “The most important Palestinian activity at this time is construction and even
without a license.” See Nadav Shragai, “Jerusalem Is Not the Problem but the Solution,” in Moshe Amirav,
ed., Mr. Prime Minister: Jerusalem (Carmel and the Floersheimer Institute, 2005) (in Hebrew).

28

A report in the local paper Jerusalem during that period. See also in Hagai Huberman, “The Battle for
Mevasseret Jerusalem,” Makor Rishon, December 14, 2007 (in Hebrew).

The Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs is
a leading independent research institute
specializing in public diplomacy and foreign
policy. Founded in 1976, the Center has
produced hundreds of studies and initiatives
by leading experts on a wide range of strategic
topics. Dr. Dore Gold, Israel’s former ambassador
to the UN, has headed the Jerusalem Center
since 2000.

Jerusalem Center Programs:
Defensible Borders Initiative – A major
security and public diplomacy initiative that
analyzes current terror threats and Israel’s
corresponding territorial requirements,
particularly in the strategically vital West
Bank, that Israel must maintain to fulfill its
existential security and defense needs. (www.
defensibleborders.org)
Jerusalem in International Diplomacy –
Dr. Dore Gold analyzes the legal and historic
rights of Israel in Jerusalem and exposes the
dangers of compromise that will unleash a new
jihadist momentum in his book The Fight for
Jerusalem: Radical Islam, the West, and the Future
of the Holy City (Regnery, 2007). Adv. Justus Reid
Weiner looks at Illegal Construction in Jerusalem:
A Variation on an Alarming Global Phenomenon
(2003). Researcher Nadav Shragai assesses the
imminent security threats to Israel’s capital
resulting from its potential division, and offers
alternative strategies for managing Jerusalem’s
demographic challenge in his monograph
Jerusalem: The Dangers of Division (2008).
Iran and the New Threats to the West –
Preparation of a legal document jointly with
leading Israeli and international scholars
and public personalities on the initiation of
legal proceedings against Iranian President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for incitement to
commit genocide and participate in genocide.
This program also features major policy studies

by security and academic experts on Iran’s
use of terror proxies and allies in the regime’s
war against the West and its race for regional
supremacy.
Institute for Contemporary Affairs (ICA) –
A diplomacy program, founded in 2002 jointly
with the Wechsler Family Foundation, that
presents Israel’s case on current issues through
high-level briefings by government and
military leaders to the foreign diplomatic corps
and foreign press, as well as production and
dissemination of information materials.

This study discusses the E1 plan, its great
for injured
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of Tel Aviv’s
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and its vicissitudes over the years. It October
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claim
the plan
streets. (AP Photo, Jerome Delay)
hinder the two-state solution, or prevent linkage between the populations
of the northern and southern West Bank. It describes the longstanding
consensus in Israel about the future of Maale Adumim and the vital link
between Jerusalem and Maale Adumim, of which the E1 plan is an integral
aspect; the place of the Adumim bloc in the concept of metropolitan
Jerusalem; and the place of that concept in Israel’s approach to security
Yehiya Ayyash, the mastermind of
and settlement.
Palestinian suicide bus bombings, who was
killed on January 5, 1995, by explosives
in a cellphone
he answered. to
The study also explains why avoidingplanted
building
in E1 isthat
dangerous
(AP Photo)

Israel’s interests, and likely to result in Maale Adumim and Jerusalem
being severed from each other. At the same time, the report strongly
criticizes the Israeli authorities’ failure over the years to eradicate the
phenomenon of illegal Palestinian building in the area between Maale
Adumim and Jerusalem. While this stems from concern for the reaction of
the international community, it is gradually constricting Israel’s options in
an area so vital for its future integrity.Waving Hamas flags, mourners carry the
coffin with the remains of Yehiya Ayyash
during his funeral procession on January
6, 1996. (AP Photo, Khaled Zighari)