A Modern Take on Modern War.

2 posts categorized "Religion"

2010.05.05

“Operation Moshtarak not only failed to win the hearts and minds of the people of Marjah, but it has actually driven them further away from the international community.”

That is the conclusion of this report from the International Council on Security and Development (ICOS) in its analysis of the NATO and ANA assault on the town of Marjah in Helmand Province.

ICOS’s own research demonstrates that the operation has had an overall negative effect on the situation in that area. Their research showed that 68% of Afghans interviewed believed that the Taliban would return to the region, when NATO/ANA forces withdrew. This is particularly alarming when you consider that, according to ICOS, 96% of people surveyed believed that over the last year, more young Afghans have joined the Taliban, and that 78% of people said that they “often or always feel angry.” (page 10) The report makes no bones about the fact that this led to “legitimate grievances.” These kinds of figures don’t bode well for the counterinsurgent forces and the progress of the counterinsurgency operations there.

Another key phrase ‘agreement on ends but not means’ dominates the report. “[L]ocals do not want the Taliban to return but they also do not want to endure unnecessary suffering as part of NATO’s response to the insurgency.” (page 3) This presents a difficult situation for NATO, as it seeks to withdraw its troops and leave a sturdy Afghan security force, capable of keeping the Taliban unpopular and out of business. However, there are ways out. The ICOS report suggests that the Taliban have been able to sell NATO as invading and, worse from the point of view of a Muslim, crusading force. As Boris Johnson pointed out in his twodocumentary series on the rise of the Roman Empire, and his book, The Dream of Rome, Muslims are averse to the term 'Crusade' for obvious reasons.

It is with this in mind that ICOS report's suggestion that "Restoring Mosques and Shrines ... would also work to counteract the Taliban propaganda, which always portrays Westerners as anti-Muslim and seeking to destroy Afghanistan's cultural and religious heritage," is inspired. Coupled with this, the report also calls for a "Quran Distribution Programme," suggesting that "[p]ossesion of copy of the Holy Quran is highly valued among rural Afghans yet unattainable to many because of widespread poverty." And that this programme "would directly counter the Taliban propaganda that accuses NATO of pursuing an anti-Islamic, 'crusader' agenda." (page 24) As P.W. Singer said in his book Wired for War, “The message you think you are sending is not always the one that the other side actually receives.” (page 305) In understanding that clarity of message is vital to successful COIN, this kind of activity, restoring key facets of the Muslim faith, seems extremely important.

The report suggests the use of what it calls non-violent security instruments (NVSIs), “including measures such as refugee aid, effective counter-narcotics policies, the preparation of suitable refugee camps and medical assistance,” (page 12) were missing from the follow-on operations. Although these were, as the report points out profusely, meticulously planned, it seems that they were somewhat lacking in the application. The focus instead was on

In terms of future operations, the ICOS report suggests that these lessons must be learned quickly, before the planned NATO operation in Kandahar this summer. In concert with the assertions in the ICOS report, is this Asia Times Online article suggesting that “across the border in Pakistan, the tribal areas are not, as had been planned, cleared of militants.” This sort of mission creep is a key factor in the ‘balloon effect’.

NATO risks, indeed is, pushing the Taliban over the border into Pakistan and having to chase the problem there. The controversial drone war there is leading to significant diplomatic tensions.

Lessons need to be learned before Kandahar. Fortunately, some lessons appear to be being learned on the way. Perhaps one day they'll get the hang of it. However, both this blog and The Full Force of the Wind criticised Moshtarak in COIN terms. While provision was promised from the outset, it wasn't forthcoming.

2010.05.02

Or perhaps a move to becoming more focused. I think that this blog will continue to focus on the future of conflict, but it is also likely to become far more concerned about the role of narcotics in conflict; particularly in the conflict in Afghanistan.

This might be because I am about to embark on eighteen months of researching and writing about those topics, but it's also because this is what I think that I have been called to do. And from a second reading of Steven Pressfield'sThe War of Art, I feel like it is more important than ever that I take this up.

Pressfield's book suggests that the more "Resistance" one feels towards a particular goal, whatever it may be, the more important it is for one to pursue it. Although this might sound counter-intuitive, a lot of what he says makes a lot of sense. This post is part of the first steps to creating a better life for myself (I'll be honest with that from the outset) but also, it will be about improving the lives of people all over the world.

This is all done in the name of something unnameable, but bigger than myself. These words are not preplanned. I am simply moving my fingers on the keyboard.