Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Section 482 - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Section 320 - An offence is not compoundable under Section 320 IPC is by itself no reason for the High Court to refuse exercise of its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. That power can be exercised in cases where there is no chance of recording a conviction against the accused and the entire exercise of a trial is destined to be an exercise in futility.

J U D G M E N T

T.S. THAKUR, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal arises out of an order passed by
the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam, whereby Criminal M.C. no. 3715 of 2010
filed under Section 482 of the Code of CriminalProcedure, 1973, with a prayer
for quashing criminal proceedings in FIR No.6/2010 alleging commission of
offences punishable under Sections 354 and 394 of the IPC, has been dismissed.
The High Court has taken the view that the offences with which the appellants
stand charged, are not 'personal in nature’ so as to justify quashing the pending
criminal proceedings on the basis of a compromise arrived at between the first
informant-complainant and the appellants. The only question that, therefore,
arises for consideration is whether the criminal proceedings in question could
be quashed in the facts and circumstances of the case having regard to the settlement
that the parties had arrived at.

3. Respondent-Radhika filed an oral complaint in
the Police Station at Nemom in the State of Kerala, stating that she had accompanied
her husband to see a site which the latter had acquired at Punjakari. Upon
arrival at the site, her husband and brother Rajesh went inside the plot while
she waited for them near the car parked close by. Three youngsters at this
stage appeared on a motorbike, one of whom snatched the purse and mobile phone
from her hands while the other hit her on thecheek and hand. She raised an
alarm that brought her husband and brother rushing to the car by which time the
offenders escaped towards Karumam on a motorcycle. The complainant gave the
registration number of the motorbike to the police and sought action against
the appellants who were named by her in the statement made before the
Additional Police Sub- Inspector attached to the Nemom Police Station. FIR No.6/2010
was, on the basis of that statement, registered in the police station and
investigation started. A charge sheet was, in due course, filed against the
appellants before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Neyyattinkara,
eventually numbered CC 183/2010.

4. During the pendency of the criminal
proceedings aforementioned, the parties appear to have amicably settled the
matter among themselves. Criminal M.C. No.3715 of 2010 under Section 482
Cr.P.C. was on that basis filed before the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam
for quashing of the complaint pending before the Judicial Magistrate First
Class, Neyyattinkara. That prayer was made primarily on the premise that
appellant No.1 Shiji @ Pappu who also owns a parcel ofland adjacent to the
property purchased by the respondent- Radhika, had some dispute in regard to
the road leading to the two properties. An altercation had in that connection
taken place between the appellants on the one hand and the husband and brother
of the respondent on the other, culminating in the registration of the FIR
mentioned above. The petition further stated that all disputes civil and
criminal between the parties had been settled amicably and that the respondent
had no grievance against the appellants in relation to the access to the plots
in question and that the respondent had no objection to the criminal
proceedings against the appellants being quashed by the High Court in exercise
of its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The petition further stated that the
disputes between the parties being personal in nature the same could be taken as
settled and the proceedings put to an end relying upon the decision of this
Court in Madan Mohan Abbot v. State of Punjab (2008)
4 SCC 582. An affidavit sworn by the respondent stating that
the matter stood settled between the parties was also filed by the appellants
before the High Court. The High Court has upon consideration declined the
prayermade by the appellants holding that the offences committed by the
appellants were not of a personal nature so as to justify quashing of the
proceedings in exercise of its extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Section 482
Cr.P.C.

5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties
and perused the impugned order. Section 320 of the Cr.P.C. enlists offences
that are compoundable with the permission of the Court before whom the
prosecution is pending and those that can be compounded even without such
permission. An offence punishable under Section 354 of the IPC is in terms of Section
320(2) of the Code compoundable at the instance of the woman against whom the
offence is committed. To that extent, therefore, there is no difficulty in
either quashing the proceedings or compounding the offence under Section 354,
of which the appellants are accused, having regard to the fact that the alleged
victim of the offence has settled the matter with the alleged assailants. An
offence punishable under Section 394 IPC is not, however, compoundable with or
without the permission of the Court concerned. The question is whether the High
Court could and ought to have exercised its powerunder Section 482 Cr.P.C. for
quashing the prosecution under the said provision in the light of the
compromise that the parties have arrived at.

6. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted
that the first informant-complainant had, in the affidavit filed before this Court,
clearly admitted that the complaint in question was lodged by her on account of
a misunderstanding and misconception about the facts and that the offences of
which the appellants stand accused are purely personal in nature arising out of
personal disputes between the parties. It was also evident that the complainant
was no longer supporting the version on which the prosecution rested its case
against the appellants. According to the learned counsel there was no question
of the Trial Court recording a conviction against the appellants in the light
of what the complainant had stated on affidavit. That was all the more so, when
the other two prosecution witnesses were none other than the husband and the
brother of the complainant who too were not supporting the charges against the
appellants. Such being the case, continuance of criminal trial against the
appellants was nothingbut an abuse of the process of law and waste of valuable
time of the Courts below. Exercise of power by the High Court under Section 482
Cr.P.C. to prevent such abuse is perfectly justified, contended the learned
counsel. Reliance in support was placed by the learned counsel upon the
decision of this Court in Madan Mohan
Abbot’s case (supra).

7. This Court has, in several decisions, declared
that offences under Section 320 Cr.P.C. which are not compoundable with or without
the permission of the Court cannot be allowed to be compounded. In Ram Lal and Anr. v. State of J & K (1999) 2 SCC 213, this Court referred to Section 320(9) of the Cr.P.C. to declare that
such offences as are made compoundable under Section 320 can alone be
compounded and none else. This Court declared two earlier decisions rendered in
Y. Suresh Babu v. State of Andhra Pradesh,
JT (1987) 2 SC 361 and Mahesh
Chand v. State of Rajasthan, 1990 Supp. SCC 681, to be per incuriam in as much as the same permitted composition of
offences not otherwise compoundable under Section 320 of the Cr.P.C. What is
important, however, is that in Ram
Lal’s case (supra) the parties had settled the
disputeamong themselves after the appellants stood convicted under Section 326
IPC. The mutual settlement was then sought to be made a basis for compounding
of the offence in appeal arising out of the order of conviction and sentence
imposed upon the accused. This Court observed that since the offence was
noncompoundable, the court could not permit the same to be compounded, in the
teeth of Section 320. Even so, the compromise was taken as an extenuating
circumstance which the court took into consideration to reduce the punishment awarded
to the appellant to the period already undergone. To the same effect is the decision
of this Court in Ishwar Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh
(2008) 15 SCC 667; where this Court said:

“14. In our considered opinion, it would not be appropriate to order
compounding of an offence not compoundable under the Code ignoring and keeping aside
statutory provisions. In our judgment, however, limited submission of the
learned counsel for the appellant deserves consideration that while imposing substantive
sentence, the factum of compromise between the parties is indeed a relevant
circumstance which the Court may keep in mind.”

8. There is another line of decisions in which this Court has taken
note of the compromise arrived at between the partiesand quashed the
prosecution in exercise of powers vested in the High Court under Section 482
Cr.P.C. In State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy &
Ors. (1977) 2 SCC 699 this Court held that
the High Court was entitled to quash the proceedings if it came to the
conclusion that the ends of justice so required. This Court observed:

“…..Section 482 of the new Code, which
corresponds to Section 561-A o the Code of 1898, provides that:

“Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to
limit, or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as
may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code or to prevent abuse
of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.” In the
exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a
proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to
continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of
justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High
Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters is designed to achieve
a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be
permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal
case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the
material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would
justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice.
The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got
to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling
necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of
the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers
of the High Court to do justice between the State and its subjects it would beimpossible
to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction.”

9. In Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia and Ors. v. Sambhajirao
Chandrojirao Angre and Ors. (1988) 1 SCC 692,
this Court held that the High Court should take into account any special
features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient
and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue or quash the
prosecution where in its opinion the chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak.
This Court observed:

“7.
The legal position is well settled that
when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be
applied by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made
prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the court to take into consideration
any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it
is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue.
This is so on the basis that the court cannot be utilised for any oblique
purpose and where in the opinion of the court chances of an ultimate conviction
are bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing
a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may while taking into
consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though
it may be at a preliminary stage.”

10. In B.S Joshi and Ors. v. State of Haryana, (2003) 4 SCC 675, the question that fell for consideration before thisCourt was whether
the inherent powers vested in the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. could be
exercised to quash non-compoundable offences. The High Court had, in that case relying
upon the decision of this Court in Madhu
Limaye v. The State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SC 551, held that since offences under Sections 498-A and 406 IPC were not compoundable,
it was not permissible in law to quash the FIR on the ground that there has
been a settlement between the parties. This Court declared that the decisions
in Madhu Limaye’s case (supra) had been misread and misapplied by the High Court and
that the judgment of this Court in Madhu
Limaye’s case (supra) clearly supported the view that
nothing contained in Section 320(2) can limit or affect the exercise of inherent
power of the High Court if interference by the High Court was considered
necessary for the parties to secure the ends of justice. This Court observed:

“8. It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye case (1977) 4 SC 551 does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of
quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482
of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the
ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a
bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is,however, a different matter
depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not
such a power.

15. In view of the above discussion, we
hold that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal
proceedings or FIR or complaint and Section 320 of the Code does not limit or
affect the powers under Section 482 of the Code.”

11. That brings to the decision of this Court in Madan Mohan Abbot’ case
(supra) whereby the High Court had declined the prayer for quashing of the
prosecution for offences punishable under Sections 379, 406, 409, 418, 506/34
IPC despite a compromise entered into between the complainant and the accused.
The High Court had taken the view that since the offence punishable under
Section 406 was not compoundable the settlement between the parties could not
be recognized nor the pending proceedings quashed. This Court summed up the approach
to be adopted in such cases in the following words:

“6. We need to emphasise that it is perhaps advisable that in
disputes where the question involved is of a purely personal nature, the court
should ordinarily accept the terms of the compromise even in criminal proceedings
as keeping the matter alive with no possibility of a result in favour of the
prosecution is a luxury which the courts, grossly overburdened as they are,
cannot afford and that the time so saved can be utilised in deciding more
effective and meaningful litigation. This is a common sense approach to thematter
based on ground of realities and bereft of the technicalities of the law.

7. We see from the impugned order that the learned Judge has
confused compounding of an offence with the quashing of proceedings. The outer
limit of Rs 250 which has led to the dismissal of the application is an irrelevant
factor in the later case. We, accordingly, allow the appeal and in the peculiar
facts of the case direct that FIR No. 155 dated 17-11-2001 PS Kotwali, Amritsar
and all proceedings connected therewith shall be deemed to be quashed.”

12. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Nikhil Merchant v. CBI 2008(9) SCC 677 where relying upon the decision in B.S.
Joshi (supra), this Court took note of the settlement
arrived at between the parties and quashed the criminal proceedings for
offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 read with Section
120-B of IPC and held that since the criminal proceedings had the overtone of a
civil dispute which had been amicably settled between the parties it was a fit
case where technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way of quashing
of the criminal proceedings since the continuance of the same after the
compromise arrived at between the parties would be a futile exercise. We may
also at this stage refer to the decision of this Court in Manoj Sharma v. State and Ors. (2008) 16 SCC 1. This court observed:

“8. In our view, the High Court’s refusal
to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing
the criminal proceedings cannot be supported. The first information report,
which had been lodged by the complainant indicates a dispute between the
complainant and the accused which is of a private nature. It is no doubt true
that the first information report was the basis of the investigation by the
police authorities, but the dispute between the parties remained one of a
personal nature. Once the complainant decided not to pursue the matter further,
the High Court could have taken a more pragmatic view of the matter.

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9. As we have indicated hereinbefore, the exercise of power
under Section 482 CrPC of Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary to
be exercised in the facts of each case. In the facts of this case we are of the
view that continuing with the criminal proceedings would be an exercise in
futility…..”

13. It is manifest that simply because an offence
is not compoundable under Section 320 IPC is by itself no reason for the High
Court to refuse exercise of its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. That power can
in our opinion be exercised in cases where there is no chance of recording a
conviction against the accused and the entire exercise of a trial is destined
to be an exercise in futility. There is a subtle distinction between compounding
of offences by the parties before the trial Court or in appeal on one hand and
the exercise of power by the High Court to quash the prosecution under Section
482 Cr.P.C. on the other. While a Court trying an accused or hearing an appealagainst
conviction, may not be competent to permit compounding of an offence based on a
settlement arrived at between the parties in cases where the offences are not compoundable
under Section 320, the High Court may quash the prosecution even in cases where
the offences with which the accused stand charged are non-compoundable. The inherent
powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are not for that purpose
controlled by Section 320 Cr.P.C. Having said so, we must hasten to add that
the plenitude of the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. by itself, makes it obligatory
for the High Court to exercise the same with utmost care and caution. The width
and the nature of the power itself demands that its exercise is sparing and
only in cases where the High Court is, for reasons to be recorded, of the clear
view that continuance of the prosecution would be nothing but an abuse of the
process of law. It is neither necessary nor proper for us to enumerate the
situations in which the exercise of power under Section 482 may be justified.
All that we need to say is that the exercise of power must be for securing the
ends of justice and only in cases where refusal to exercise thatpower may
result in the abuse of the process of law. The High court may be justified in
declining interference if it is called upon to appreciate evidence for it
cannot assume the role of an appellate court while dealing with a petition
under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Subject to the above, the
High Court will have to consider the facts and circumstances of each case to
determine whether it is a fit case in which the inherent powers may be invoked.

14. Coming to the case at hand we are of the view
that the incident in question had its genesis in a dispute relating to the access
to the two plots which are adjacent to each other. It was not a case of broad
day light robbery for gain. It was a case which has its origin in the civil
dispute between the parties, which dispute has, it appears, been resolved by
them. That being so, continuance of the prosecution where the complainant is
not ready to support the allegations which are now described by her as arising
out of some “misunderstanding and misconception” will be a futile exercise that
will serve no purpose. It is noteworthy that the two alleged eye witnesses, who
are closely related to the complainant, are also no longersupportive of the
prosecution version. The continuance of the proceedings is thus nothing but an
empty formality. Section 482 Cr.P.C. could, in such circumstances, be
justifiably invoked by the High Court to prevent abuse of the process of law
and thereby preventing a wasteful exercise by the Courts below.

15. We accordingly allow this appeal, set aside
the impugned order passed by the High Court and quash the prosecution in CC
183/2010 pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class,
Neyyattinkara.