This is exactly what I have been complaining to Bruno about. He
does not see several things that are problematic.

1) Godel numberings are not unique. Thus there is no a single
abslute structure of relations, there is an infinity that cannot be
reduced.

On the contrary, I insist on this. That's part of the domain of the
1-indeterminacy, all working coding will do their work, if I dare to
say. We already know this, and is part of the problem that we try to
just formulate clearly.

Dear Bruno,

Oh, right, I missed that implication, but do you see my point as
well? The diagonalization applies to everything, even your result.

?

Dear Bruno,

On the contrary, everything I say depends on the fact that
diagonalization does not apply to computability.

Then how do we explain Godel numbering schemes? The ability of one
string of numbers to "stand for" some other is the essence of
computational universality, no?

The point that I am trying to emphasize is that we can never "be at"
the ultimate level,

I can' agree more, given that the "ultimate level" (the one we can
mistake with primitive matter) consists in a sum on infinitely many
computations (how ever we solve the measure problem).

But this statement implies a contradiction that you do not address!
To say that "at some ultimate level there is something, even a "sum on
infinitely many computations" is to simultaneously also claim, "and
nothing else". At the ultimate level the ability to distinguish "X is
true" from "X is false" cannot exist. Thus we cannot make claims of some
type of "something", here "computations", at the ultimate level and thus
implying that there are no "not-computations" without explaining the
means by which they are distinguished from each other. You seems to just
saying that there is "nothing except computations" and offer no
explanation as to how the "computations" are excluded from the
"non-computations" at the ultimate level.
You have to invoke a plurality of levels in order to have
distinguishability, "difference" itself vanishes at the ultimate level.

we can at best point at it and approximate/represent it.

OK. It is the comp "truncateness".

Please elaborate!

Any approximation will have dual aspects, one partly logical and
abstract and the other concrete an physical.

In our setting "physical" needs to be (re)defined.

I agree.

The reasoning for this is that meaningfulness is 3p, it is never just
1p (if we assumed that it was 1-p we would get a degeneracy condition
and only have a "bet of its truth" and nowhere to cash in if it where
true by many other 1-p's).
The concept that some people have used for this is the notion of
a "witness" in the sense that it is not sufficient for me to know
that X is true, X must be true to at least two witnesses that are not
under my control. This explanation is very crude still, my apologies.

Yes, it is hard to make sense.

Witnesses have to be, in some way, independent of influence or
control; so how would you explain this in your thinking? For example, we
claim that "1+1=2" because all possible examples of such are true and
discount the false claims as improper coding or reference. This makes a
witness something that has in its 1p a model of 1+1=2 and there are many
different witnesses that are accessible to us that believe that 1+1=2.

2) the physical implementations of the representations cannot be
abstracted away without making the entire result meaningless.

This is correct for human perception, but with comp the physical
implementations that you need at that level are explained by a non
physical (and somehow deeper) phenomenon.

Yes, but I am still trying to salvage comp as I do not see it as
completely inconsistent with panprotopsychism. It is only your rejection
of the necessity of physical implementations that causes the divorce, IMHO.

and has a 1-p, my conjecture is that the UD "rides" on the unitary
evolution of the QM system and thus each and every QM ssytem is an
observer and has some level of awareness. It is for this reason that
I am motivated to assume that the universe is quantum and that the
classical picture is just an image that the universe generates via
our interactions with each other.

You abandon comp to come back to physicalism, but then you lost the
comp explanation of both consciousness and matter. Comp gives both a
conceptual explanation of the "coupling" matter/consciousness, and a
way to test it from the solution of the measure problem (already
mathematical for the measure "one" which give already the quantum-like
logics).

No, I see comp as a consistent theory of consciousness if the
separation claim is dropped.