The signature of the JCPoA in 2015 has rightly been hailed as a major diplomatic success for the international community and the nuclear non-proliferation regimes. The rationale behind the agreement was simple, on the one hand Iran would abandon its nuclear program and accept a strong regime of inspections, on the other hand all nuclear related sanctions at the level of the UN, EU and US would be lifted and Iran would find its place back in the global trade flows. But after the election of Donald Trump, the entire deal seems to be in jeopardy. Trump, who never hid his disdain for the deal, issued an ultimatum to Iran and the other partners of the JCPoA, threatening to terminate US participation if it was not “fixed”. This Analysis aims to expose what the US see as “flaws” in the JCPoA and what are the Iranians claims about what they see as US violations of the deal. It will also put the role the Europeans into perspective, should the US walk away from the deal...

The standards and procedures of EU Member States to strengthen arms export controls, including preventing and countering diversion, are considered to be among the highest in the world. Yet today, not a month goes by without a Member State being questioned about its export decisions. The publication of cases of diversion - suspected or proven - of European weapons in the Middle East is increasing, and now from countries that are considered as allies and among the best customers of the EU countries. This Analysis presents some of the challenges in preventing and combating the diversion of weapons that EU Member States face when authorizing exports.

When the regime of Muammar Gaddafi collapsed under NATO bombs, in 2011, France and the United Kingdom, the main instigators and actors of the Libyan campaign, were far from understanding that Libya would become the theater of a never-rending and complex conflict, much like those who torment the Middle East.

The difference in Libya, however, is that the European Union and its members play a leading role. In spite of conflicting policies and interests, they have been able to preserve a certain unity. The relationship between Italy and France in the Libyan case, however, remains marked by mutual mistrust and misunderstanding

(Photo credit: On 25 July, Emmanuel Macron invited Fayez Sarraj, President of the Presidential Council of the Government of National Accord, and Khalifa Haftar, commander of the Libyan National Army. Source: Elysee.fr)

Since its creation, the Ukrainian defense industry has kept very close ties with its Russian counterpart. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the support from the Russian Federation to separatist in Eastern Ukraine forced a brutal and rapid disconnection between the two industrial complexes. UkrOboronProm, the umbrella company for Ukrainian state-owned defense companies has set itself several objectives: provide the Ukrainian army with modern gears, replace Russia as a provider of components for the defense industries and important customers, reform the defense industry to make it competitive and finally move towards the adoption of NATO standards. The Ukrainian industry is also switching from a “Russian-inspired model” to a western model that involves a bigger share of private initiative. In order to succeed in this transition, the Ukrainian military industrial complex will need a great deal of internal and external political support, strong quality control mechanisms and the capacity to rebuild its reputation from the Ianoukovitch era.

This quarterly monitoring, published by GRIP since 2011, aims to monitor the security situation in West Africa with a focus on Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Niger and Senegal. It examines in particular broad internal security issues, regional tensions, and cross-border and transnational crimes...