Wednesday, October 23, 2019

In my last post I discussed Commerce Ins. Co. v. Szafarowicz,
__ N.E.3d __, 2019 WL 4774348 (Mass.), a case in which the SJC upheld the legitimacy of settlement/assignment agreements, but only to the extent that the settlement is reasonable including in light of the available insurance coverage.

A settlement/assignment agreement generally consists of three parts:

1. The plaintiff and insured defendant agree to a settlement amount.2. The plaintiff agrees not to enforce the agreement against the defendant but only against the defendant's insurer.3. The defendant assigns his or her own rights against the insurer to the plaintiff.

In his post Dennis asked me, if I understand him correctly, to comment on the courage of the insurer, Commerce, and its attorneys in holding fast in fighting what could have been a multi-million dollar loss far exceeding the policy limit.

In reading the case the first thing that jumped out at me was that the attorneys for all the parties seem to have done a stellar job of protecting and advocating for
their client’s interests -- and the trial court and SJC made decisions that showed a broad
understanding of the competing interests. I wrote about how the parties' interests overlapped and diverged in my last post.

As far as the positions that Commerce took, Dennis seems to be implying that there may have been a lot of pressure on Commerce to settle the claim because of the settlement in the underlying case in which both sides agreed that the insured driver had been negligent, and that the damages vastly exceeded the policy limit.

To understand why Commerce resisted the settlement, we need to acknowledge that the primary purpose of the settlement agreement was to get insurance coverage for the loss. If the insured driver, Matthew Padavano, intentionally struck David Szafarowicz with his vehicle, resulting in David's death, there was no coverage under the policy. There seemed to be plenty of evidence that Matthew did act intentionally and eventually the trial court so found in the declaratory judgment action. The settlement agreement providing that Matthew had acted negligently was an effort to protect the assets of Matthew and his family and to provide insurance funds to David's survivors. It was not proof, or even evidence, of negligence as opposed to an intentional action.

The only reason that the case was complicated was because of the weird quirk of the insurance policy that required Commerce to pay interest on the entire amount of the underlying multimillion dollar judgment. That clause exists to encourage settlements -- but there are times when an insurer is justified in holding firm even in the face of the high risk of a big price tag when it does so. The policy exclusion for intentional acts -- insurance doesn't pay damages when a policyholder murders someone, for example, which the declaratory judgment trial court found is what happened here -- exists for very good reasons. I'm terribly sorry for David's family, who have suffered an unimaginable loss. But insurance simply cannot cover murder, and I applaud Commerce for holding firm on that, despite the fact that ultimately the company would have saved money if it had simply settled the case.

Matthew pleaded guilty to voluntary
manslaughter.David’s
mother brought a
wrongful death action against the Padovanos in Superior Court, claiming that
David’s death was caused by Matthew’s gross negligence in operating a motor
vehicle that was negligently entrusted to him by Stephen.

Commerce acknowledged its duty to
defend.It acknowledged its duty to
indemnify up to the $20,000 compulsory limit.It reserved its rights to deny a duty to indemnify under the $480,000 optional coverage if it was
determined that David’s death was caused by Matthew’s intentional act and was therefore
not an “accident” that was covered by the optional portion of the policy.It then filed a
declaratory judgment action on that issue.

Thus, the stage was set.

To understand this case you have
to understand how the interests of the three parties (the Padovanos, David's estate, and Commerce Insurance) were in conflict and how they
overlapped.

The conflict arose because the
optional portion of the Commerce auto policy does not cover intentional injuries.Commerce’s theory was that Matthew had
intentionally hit David, so that there was no optional coverage for the loss.It appropriately agreed to defend the Padovanos while reserving its right to
deny a duty to indemnify (in other words, to refuse to pay a judgment or
settlement because of a determination that the loss is not covered under the
policy).

The Padovanos and David’s
estate would both benefit from a finding that the accident had been a result of
negligence and was not intentional. That way David's estate would recover, but Commerce rather than the Padovanos would pay the judgment. Commerce’s interest was in a finding that
Matthew had acted intentionally, so that it would not have to pay the judgment.

Commerce filed motions to intervene
in the wrongful death trial and to stay the trial until after the dispute
over insurance coverage was resolved.Although
it lost those motions, the trial court ruled that after the wrongful death
trial Commerce could seek a determination about whether the issue in the
wrongful death trial that related to coverage – whether Matthew’s actions had
been negligent or intentional – had been fairly litigated and, if not, to
relitigate it.

The Padovanos and David’s estate
countered by entering into an three-part agreement.First, the parties stipulated that Matthew’s
actions had been negligent (rather than intentional).Second, in what was perhaps a move to prevent
a ruling that the settlement was unreasonable, they agreed that the wrongful
death damages would be determined by a judge.Third, David’s estate agreed to release the Padovanos and that it would
collect damages only from Commerce.

The judge found damages in the
millions of dollars, many times the $500,000 policy limit.

Now Commerce was in a
particularly difficult situation, because of a policy term (as required by
Massachusetts law) that provided that Commerce was liable for post-judgment
interest on the entire judgment, not just the policy limit.The verdict was so high that the annual
interest would exceed the policy limit.The only way Commerce could avoid the interest would be to pay the
policy limit, but that would mean that it was giving up its argument that there
was no coverage under the policy because Matthew had acted intentionally.

The court noted that the interest policy provision, which is set by state law, has
been revised so that under current auto policies the insurer is only required
to pay post-judgment interest on an amount of a judgment up to the policy
limit. But that revision did not apply to Commerce in this case.

Commerce tried to limit interest
by offering to put the policy limit in a separate fund, but the court denied
that motion.

In the meantime, the trial court
ruled that for the purposes of the coverage dispute, Matthew’s actions had been
intentional.But that still did not get
Commerce out of the interest payments on the entire amount of the damages found
by the court in the wrongful death action.

The SJC revisited the
reasonableness of the settlement agreement for the purposes of insurance
coverage.The first part of the
agreement, in which the parties stipulated that Matthew’s actions had been
negligent and not intentional, had already been held by the trial court not to
apply to Commerce.The SJC examined the second
part of the agreement – that the damages would be determined by a trial court
judge.The SJC held that that part of
the agreement was per se unreasonable, because the trial court’s damages
assessment exceeded the insurer’s liability limit.It remanded the case for a reasonableness
hearing to determine what would have been reasonable under the circumstances
(with a strong implication that the only reasonable amount would be the policy
limit).The court held that Commerce
would have to pay retroactive interest only on that amount.

Finally, the court held that in
future cases, a judge who finds that a settlement/assignment agreement is not
reasonable should “invite” the parties to renegotiate an agreement to an amount
that “might’ prove reasonable.

One takeaway from this
case is that while Massachusetts courts will continue to uphold
settlement/assignment agreements, the settlement amounts in those agreements
had better be within the applicable insurance policy limit.Of course, that does not limit the ability of
the parties to a tort case to request that the court determine the amount of
damages – as long as the settlement agreement provides that the upper limit of
damages is the policy limit.

But it is worth noting that there will be times when it is not in the interests of the parties to settle within the policy limits. In this case it seems quite clear that Commerce's reservation of rights and refusal to settle was reasonable, given the strong evidence that Matthew's actions had been intentional. But there are times when the plaintiff wants to preserve the possibility of an excess judgment -- a judgment over the policy limit. That could happen when a policyholder has sufficient assets to pay an excess judgment. It can also happen when an insurer has arguably acted in bad faith in not protecting its policyholder from an excess judgment by settling the case. In that situationion the insurer can be liable to the policyholder under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A for the excess amount, and for treble damages. In the past, a policyholder has been able to settle the claim for the excess judgment amount in exchange for a release against the policyholder and an assignment of rights against the insurer. In Szafarowicz the court does not address what a reasonable settlement would be in that situation.

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I have been an attorney in Massachusetts since 1994. I practice in general litigation and focus on insurance coverage issues. I am available to assist claimants, insureds, and insurers who have a dispute over motor vehicle, homeowners, general liability, and other insurance policies. I also draft briefs and provide other litigation services to fellow attorneys on a subcontract basis.
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