Greg Jones: Washington's "Comprehensive Solution" to Iran's Nuclear Program: Destined to be Neither
Negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program are continuing in an effort to produce a follow-on agreement, termed the “Comprehensive Solution,” to the November 2013 “Joint Plan of Action” (JPA). Much of the discussion of the Comprehensive Solution has focused on the terms such an agreement should include to prevent Iran from being able to produce nuclear weapons. However, this objective will not be attainable unless the agreement addresses key aspects of Iran’s nuclear program, fixes the flaws in the JPA which seriously constrain any agreement and recognizes fundamental problems with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards as currently implemented.
Working Papers & Monographs

National Review Online Posts NPEC Analysis, "Iran's Arak Reactor and the Plutonium Bomb"
On March 13, 2014, NRO posted an article by NPEC's Senior Researcher, Greg Jones, that argues that the U.S. should insist that Iran never complete the Arak reactor, that it destroy the components for this reactor, export the 100 metric tons of heavy water that Iran has already produced, and shut down and dismantle the heavy-water-production plant at Arak.
Op-Eds & Blogs

Jan 28, 2014

NPEC's Senior Researcher Testifies on Implementation of the Iran Nuclear Deal
Prepared testimony of NPEC's senior researcher to a January 28, 2014 hearing of the House Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade and the House Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, "Implementation of the Iran Nuclear Deal." For a full list of witnesses and video of the hearing, click here.
Audio & Video; Testimony & Transcripts

The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists Posts NPEC Analysis on the Iran Interim Agreement
The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists published a piece by Victor Gilinsky and Henry Sokolski that argues that after the interim agreement, which allows Iran to enrich to 5%, the U.S. will find it much more difficult to gain “gold standard” civilian nuclear agreements that require other states to forego any uranium enrichment. Additionally, the interim agreement does not take into account the fact that light water reactors can also be used to produce plutonium and therefore require more inspection.
Articles

Greg Jones: Tehran Could Get Its First Bomb Now in Just Six Short Weeks
In various papers since 2008, this author has outlined how Iran’s growing centrifuge enrichment program could provide it with the ability to produce Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and thereby the ability to manufacture nuclear weapons. On August 28, 2013, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) published its latest safeguards update which shows that Iran is continuing to expand its enrichment program.
Working Papers & Monographs

The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC), is a 501 (c)3 nonpartisan, nonprofit,
educational organization
founded in 1994 to promote a better understanding of strategic weapons proliferation issues. NPEC educates
policymakers, journalists,
and university professors about proliferation threats and possible new policies and measures to meet them.