An utterance can have Intentionality, just as a belief has Intentionality, but whereas the Intentionality of the belief is intrinsic the Intentionality of the utterance is derived.
John Searle | RefcardPDF↑

2

Berkeley had a liberal element in the student body who tended to be quite active. I think that's in general a feature of intellectually active places.
John Searle | RefcardPDF↑

3

I want to block some common misunderstandings about "understanding": In many of these discussions one finds a lot of fancy footwork about the word "understanding."
John Searle | RefcardPDF↑

4

I will argue that in the literal sense the programmed computer understands what the car and the adding machine understand, namely, exactly nothing.
John Searle | RefcardPDF↑

5

In many cases it is a matter for decision and not a simple matter of fact whether x understands y; and so on.
John Searle | RefcardPDF↑

6

My car and my adding machine understand nothing: they are not in that line of business.
John Searle | RefcardPDF↑

7

Our tools are extensions of our purposes, and so we find it natural to make metaphorical attributions of intentionality to them; but I take it no philosophical ice is cut by such examples.
John Searle | RefcardPDF↑

8

There are clear cases in which "understanding" literally applies and clear cases in which it does not apply; and these two sorts of cases are all I need for this argument.
John Searle | RefcardPDF↑

9

We often attribute 'understanding' and other cognitive predicates by metaphor and analogy to cars, adding machines, and other artifacts, but nothing is proved by such attributions.
John Searle | RefcardPDF↑