Note: More than 11,500
attorneys are eligible to practice law in Oregon. Some of them share
the same name or similar names. All discipline reports should be
read carefully for names, addresses and bar numbers.

In 1995, while employed as a deputy district
attorney for Clackamas County, Gustafson represented the state in
a juvenile court matter. In her preparation for the trial, Gustafson
collected a large amount of documentary material, including binders,
exhibits and notes. After the juvenile case was dismissed by the
court, Gustafson requested permission from the district attorney
to keep her juvenile court trial materials for use in defending
herself in a bar disciplinary matter that arose from her conduct
during the juvenile case.

In May 1995, the juvenile's lawyer moved
to expunge the juvenile court record. The motion was delivered to
the juvenile court counselor who asked Gustafson to oppose the motion.
Thereafter, the court contacted Gustafson and asked if she would
be opposing the expunction motion. Gustafson replied that she would
not. The expunction motion was granted by the court which ordered
that all records held by any agency, including the district attorney's
office, to be physically destroyed within 21 days. A copy of the
expunction order was delivered to Gustafson.

After the juvenile's records were expunged,
Gustafson did not notify the court or the juvenile's lawyer that
she possessed records subject to expunction, nor did she destroy
the juvenile court records in her possession.

The juvenile's lawyer later filed a motion
with the court to determine whether Gustafson had complied with
the juvenile records expunction statute. In the course of that proceeding,
a subpoena was issued to Gustafson to produce to the court all records
in her possession relating to the juvenile. In response to the subpoena,
Gustafson produced a small number of documents to the court and
testified that she had no more records relating to the juvenile
in her possession and that she had not kept any documents knowing
that an expunction order had been entered. After further questioning
by the juvenile's counsel, Gustafson produced several additional
boxes of material, which the court determined were subject to expunction.

The supreme court found that Gustafson possessed
records that were subject to expunction and released them unlawfully
in violation of DR 1-102(A)(2) (criminal conduct reflecting adversely
on honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness to practice law). The court
also found that Gustafson violated DR 1-102(A)(4) (conduct prejudicial
to the administration of justice) by failing to inform the court
she had expunged records in her possession, failing to destroy them
and releasing them to third persons, and DR 7-106(A) (disregarding
ruling of a tribunal).

The court further found that Gustafson gave
false testimony concerning whether she possessed records relating
to the juvenile case and whether she knew that an expunction order
had been entered. The court concluded that this conduct violated
DR 1-102(A)(2), DR 1-102(A)(3) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation), DR 1-102(A)(4), DR 7-102(A)(5) (knowingly
making a false statement of fact) and DR 7-102(A)(8) (knowingly
engaging in illegal conduct).

MacNair engaged in the private practice of
law and personally handled all financial business of the practice.
Between about May 1996 and into 1998, MacNair received funds for
legal services from several clients. Incorrectly believing he was
entitled to the funds upon their receipt, he failed to deposit them
in his lawyer trust account. MacNair did not have a written agreement
with his clients expressly stating that fees paid in advance constituted
a non-refundable retainer, earned on receipt. He also failed to
prepare and maintain complete records reflecting his receipt, deposit
and disbursement of the client funds and failed to account to his
clients for the funds. Those accounting records MacNair maintained
contained several errors. Ultimately, all client funds were accounted
for. MacNair did not collect fees that he did not earn.

In another matter, a client consulted and
retained MacNair concerning a tort claim against a police department
for excessive force. MacNair admitted that he failed to provide
competent representation and neglected the client's legal matter.
He accepted the client's case when he did not have any knowledge
or experience with such matters. MacNair failed to consult with
or associate an attorney or refer the client to an attorney who
was experienced with tort claim cases; failed to review the tort
claim statutes and failed to conduct other research; failed to give
the required notice of tort claim to the public body within the
time required; incorrectly identified the statute of limitations
and advised his client not to worry about the statute of limitations
and failed to take other action to protect or pursue the client's
claim.

MacNair was admitted in1996. He had no prior
record of discipline.

WENDI K. WEISS
OSB #92154
Portland
Form B resignation
Effective April 16, 2002, the Oregon Supreme Court accepted the
Form B resignation of Portland lawyer Wendi K. Weiss. At the time
of the resignation, a formal complaint had been filed against Weiss
for violations of DR 1-102(A)(2), DR 1-102(A)(3), DR 7-102(A)(8)
and ORS 9.527(1). The charges arose from allegations that she improperly
converted funds from her law firm partnership and then tried to
conceal the deception and theft from the firm.

Weiss did not desire to defend or contest
the bar's allegations. In the resignation, Weiss specified John
Ostrander of Portland as custodian of her client files.

NAME WITHHELD
Eugene
Dismissal
On Dec. 12, 2001, a disciplinary board trial panel filed an opinion
finding a lawyer not guilty of violating DR 1-102(A)(4) (conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice) and dismissing the
bar's complaint.

The lawyer was charged with violating the
rule based on his failure to disclose certain information to the
court concerning the defendant in a civil case in which the lawyer
sought and obtained an order of default. The defendant had been
committed to and continued to reside at the state mental hospital
at the time of service, a fact not disclosed to the court.

The majority of the trial panel concluded
that the bar failed to prove the allegations of misconduct. Specifically,
the majority found that the defendant was not incapacitated or otherwise
incapable under the law of responding to the lawsuit. Accordingly,
there were no special service or disclosure requirements imposed
upon the lawyer. One trial panel member disagreed and filed a dissenting
opinion.