We apologize for the error that occurred in printing the photo of Dr. Marquart in the July/October 2006 issue ofCTQ (page 194). The Editors

CTQ 71 (2007): 3- 28

The Challen ge of History: Luther's Two Kingdo ms Theolo gy as a Test Case Cameron A. MacKen zie The task of historical theology is interroga tion-to ask questions of the past by investigat ing the writings of theologian s and the experience s of the Church for what they can teach today. Even when the historian does not explicitly justify his work by asserting its contempo rary relevance, nonethele ss it always reflects the concerns of his own times. What motivates the historian now determine s the course of his work; if he wants anyone to read it (let alone publish it), it has to reflect the interests of today even as it presents the record of yesterday. This truism has special relevance when studying great men, especially great thinkers, and particular ly in a seminary like ours that has committed itself to historic continuity with the Church through the ages. For we have pledged ourselves not only to the Scriptures but also to the creeds and confession s of our church. When we consider contempo rary questions, therefore, we look for answers in these document s and also in those who wrote them as well as in those who confessed them in succeedin g times and generation s. The result is that theology in a church like ours always has a strong historical dimension to it. We want to know what the Scriptures , the Confessio ns, Martin Luther, and C. F. W. Walther all had to say, for example, about worship practices and sexual practices, about war and politics, about the role of women in the Church. Obviously, this presents great opportuni ties for historical theology, but also great challenges since we are often asking questions that our predecess ors never answered; or, if they did, they were answering them in far different contexts. As a result, the perennial temptatio n is to read the evidence selectively in a way that may very well answer the question but does so by distorting the history. The distortion s can be deliberate but usually are not. Instead, they simply reflect the tyranny of the present over the past.

An example of such historical distortion that is frequently present in the literature of The Lutheran Church-M issouri Synod has to do with Church

Cameron A. MacKen zie is the Forrest E. and Frances H. Ellis Professor for the Period of the German Reformation and Chairman of the Department of Historical Theology at Concordia Theological Seminary, Fort Wayne, Indiana. This article was presented as a public lecture on January 10, 2007, in conjunction with Dr. MacKenzie 's appointment as the first holder of this endowed chair.

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and state relationship s, namely, how are these two God-given institutions connected and how should they interact? Appropriate ly enough, Luther and the Confessions are usually cited by synodical sources when discussing such relationship s, but not so appropriate ly they are often cited partially and sometimes tendentious ly. A good illustration of this is the 1995 report of the Commission on Theology and Church Relations (CTCR), entitled Render Unto Caesar ... and Unto God: A Lutheran View of Church and State.1 In many respects, this is a very fine piece and I have no particular objection to its conclusions. Indeed, as a matter of full disclosure, I must admit to having been a member of the CTCR when it was adopted. But in reviewing this statement, I was struck by how much it demonstrate s the challenges of employing history in the service of theology.2 Now, as one might expect from a document that treats political questions, it makes extensive use of Luther's "two kingdoms" or "two government s" theology and cites especially his 1523 treatise, Temporal

The Lutheran Church-Miss ouri Synod Commission on Theology and Church Relations (CTCR), Render Unto Caesar . . . and Unto God: A Lutheran View of Church and State (St. Louis: The Lutheran Church-Miss ouri Synod, 1995). include 2 Other works that reflect the same view of history that I criticize in this paper 35-36, 18-19, 3-4, (1936): 45 Witness Lutheran The State," and Church of "The Separation 50-51: "There is no disagreement regarding the proposition that Lutherans teach the separation of Church and State" (p. 3); Theodore Hoyer, "Church and State" in T11e Abiding Word: An Anthology of Doctrinal Essays, ed. Theodore Laetsch, vol. 2 (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1947), 562-607: "Luther knew what the right relation between Church and State is. Had he been able, he would have organized a Church like ours, congregations like ours . .. . Not until the United States of America was established did the world see a land in which this right and natural and Scriptural relation between Church and State exists-separa tion" (p. 590); C. F. Drewes, "Luther and Liberty," Theological Quarterly 13 (1909): 89-101: "He [Luther] also stood for total separation of Church and State, for a free and independent Church and a free and independent State, for freedom of conscience and worship, and against all external force and violence in matters religious" (p. 89); C. F. W. Walther, "Earthly Authorities II: 26th Western Dish·ict Convention, St. Paul's Church, Concordia, Mo., Begimling Oct. 14, 1885" in Essays for the Church (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1992), 2:270-289: "During its initial period . . . the Lutheran Church held firmly to the doch'ine that the government has neither the right nor the power to assume conh·ol of the church" (p. 281); and J. Solm, "Der Staat, die Bibel, und das Papsttum," Verha11dlungen des KanadaDistrikts der Synode van Missouri, Ohio u. a. St., 1909: "Before Luther's thoughts concerning the right form of an independent church of Jesus Christ could be realized, the princes infringed the rights of the church and so forced upon the church the consistory ... . But here in America we find the right form of the church . .. as Luther had conceived it" (p. 29). 1

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d, 3 for in this work Luthe r AuthorittJ: To What Exten t It Should be Obeye

the state by ascrib ing distin guish es quite clearly betw een the Chur ch and out to each one. The discre te funct ions and the mean s for carry ing them Conf essio ns opera te with CTCR docu ment then argue s that the Luth eran Conf essio n (CA XVI; CA burg Augs this same distin ction and quote s the suppo rt. In none of this in 2-3) XXVIII, 1-14) and the Apol ogy (Ap XVI, is also true that it does it but does Render Unto Caesar disto rt the evidence, "a Luth eran view of late not prese nt all the evide nce as it attem pts to articu Chur ch and state. " r Unto Caesar that Many histo rians share the persp ectiv e of Rende e in unde rstan ding rtanc impo al Luthe r's "two kingd oms" theor y is of critic 4 It is also true that his 1523 treati se is one of his attitu des towa rd the state. ing in this area and thus Luthe r's most delib erate expos itions of his think theology. 5 In this work , an impo rtant docu ment for revea ling Luthe r's s in two very differ ent Luthe r argue s that God relate s to huma n being al life and the other is ways : one is tlu·ough the Chur ch for the sake of etern s find their origin s and throu gh the state for this life. Both instit ution autho rity in God.6 ations of Luthe r in this essay are Unles s otherw ise noted, citations of English h·a11sl Helm ut T. Lehm ann, eds., Luther's from Jaroslav Jan Pelikan, Hilton C. Oswal d, and Conco rdia Publis hing House , Works, 55 vols. (Phildelphia: Forh·ess Press; St. Louis: age texts, see Martin Luther, langu al origin the 1955-1986); hereaf ter cited as LW. For vols. (Weimar: H . Bohlau, 1883Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamta11sgabe [Schriften], 65 ihJ, see LW 45:81-129; WA Autlwr ral 1993); hereaf ter cited as WA. For Luthe r's Tempo 3

With respec t to his spiritu al rule, God deals with people by means of the gospel, that is, he calls them into his service by the messa ge of Christ , crucif ied and raised for the sake of sinners. Respo nding in faith by the power of the Holy Spirit, believ ers enter into a new relatio nship with God that is based upon the righte ousne ss of Christ impar ted to them as a giftfree and compr ehend ing all that they need to becom e one with God, namel y, the forgiv eness of sins, life, and salvat ion. Thus liberat ed from bonda ge to the law, its punish ments , and its threats , believ ers lead a life of love direct ed both towar d God and their fellow men. Transf ormed by the Holy Spirit, they willin gly expen d thems elves in servic e to those who need them. Thus, in God's spiritu al kingdo m, he create s a people for himse lf whose lives are charac terized by faith and love.7 This is not the only way, howev er, that God relates to human ity; indeed , Luthe r believ ed that only a relatively small portio n of human ity ever experi ences his spiritu al rule. In his mercy God also exerci ses tempo ral author ity over manki nd, a rule for this life and for regula ting the things of this life. On accou nt of man's sinfulness, people would contin ually tear each other apart if God had not appoin ted some means to contro l them. Therefore, in order to rule sinner s in this world and to check the worst outbre aks of evil, God has institu ted govern ment. Here not the gospel but the law prevai ls, known not only from the Script ures but also by reason and from nature ; this author ity is coercive, for God author izes those who gover n to use force in punish ing the wicke d and promo ting the good .B

University Press, 2003), 309-310. Especially helpful analyse s are Per Frostin, Luther's Two Kingdoms Doctrine, and Paul Althaus, TI1e Ethics of Martin Luther (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972), 43-82. Bernha rd Lohse summa rizes the 1523 h·eatise and later discusses the concep t of the two kingdo ms more compre hensive ly in Martin Luther's Theology: Its Historical and Systematic Deve/op111ent (Minneapolis: Forh·ess Press, 1999), 153-157, 314-324. 7 "[T]hese people need not tempor al law or sword . ... They would serve no purpos e, since Christi ans have in their heart the Holy Spirit, who both teaches and makes them to do injustice to no one, to love everyone, and to suffer injustic e and even death willingly and cheerfully at the hand of anyone ." LW 45:89; WA 11:249, 36-250,4. s "All who are not Christians belong to the kingdo m of the world and are under the law. There are few h·ue believers .. . . For this reason God has provid ed for them a different govenm1ent beyond the Christi an estate and kingdo m of God. He has subjected them to the sword so that, even though they would like to, they are unable to practice their wicked ness .... In the same way a savage wild beast is bound with chains and ropes so that it cannot bite and tear as it would normal ly do, even though it would like to." LW 45:90; WA 11:251,1-11.

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Unlike many medieval theologians and papal defenders in Luther's time who placed the state under the Church as the temporal is subordinate to the spiritual,9 in this treatise Luther distinguished sharply between the two and contended that each had its own unique responsibilities as instituted by God. To spiritual authority God assigned matters cmmected with the soul and enh·usted it with his word; to temporal authority he assigned everything that has to do with human beings relating to one other in the affairs of this life. In Luther's experience, however, the two authorities often neglected their proper spheres in order to interfere in that of the other. 10 In spiritual matters, Luther found no place for law or coercion or government, but in the affairs of state he also found no place for the gospel. Indeed, if each form of authority does not keep to its own sphere and employ its own means, the result will be the corruption of both and the failure of each to accomplish the purposes for which God had established them in the first place. Laws and coercion in spiritual affairs mislead people into false belief or hypocrisy, burden consciences, and destroy souls. 11 Gospel in temporal affairs unleashes sinners and leads to rebellion and uproar.12 Therefore, failing to distinguish the two kingdoms and to assign to each its proper competence and means results in both temporal and spiritual calamity.

9 Perhaps the most exh·eme expression of this idea is Boniface VIII's Unn,n Snnctnm (1302). In more moderate forms, even sixteenth-century supporters of the papacy like Francisco de Vitoria and Robert Bellarmine persisted in it. See Robert Bireley, The Refnshioning of Cntholicism, 1450-1700 (Washington, DC: Catholic University Press, 1999), 78-81. For the Middle Ages, see Joseph R. Sh·ayer, ed., Dictionnry of the Middle Ages (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1982-1989), s.v. "Two Swords, Doctrine of." 10 "For my ungrncious lords, the pope and the bishops, are supposed to be bishops and preach God's Word. This they leave undone, and have become temporal princes who govern with laws which concern only life and property .... They are supposed to be ruling souls inwardly by God's word .... Similarly, the temporal lords are supposed to govern lands and people outwardly. This they leave undone.... [T)heir temporal rule has sunk quite as low as that of the spiritual tyrants. For this reason God so perverts their minds also, that they rush on to the absurdity of trying to exercise a spiritual rule over souls." LW 45:109; WA 11:265,7-18. 11 "Where temporal authority presumes to prescribe laws for the soul, it encroaches upon God's government and only misleads souls and desh·oys them." LW 45:105; WA 11:262,10-12. 12 "If anyone attempted to rule the world by the gospel and to abolish all temporal law and sword . . . what would he be doing? He would be loosing the ropes and chains of the savage wild beasts and letting them bite and mangle everyone." LW 45:91; WA 11:251,22-27.

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Given these basic assertions regarding the two kingdoms in Luther's Temporal Autlwrihj, one can readily see how easy it is to read the confessional documents from the same perspective as found in Render Unto Caesar.13 Against the Anabaptists, the Augsburg Confession affirms the divine institution of government for the sake of this life- "It is taught among us that all government in the world and all established rule and laws were instituted and ordained by God for the sake of good order" and permits Christians to serve in govermnent offices in which they would "render decisions and pass sentence according to imperial and other existing laws, punish evildoers with the sword, engage in just wars, [and] serve as soldiers" (CA XVI, 1-2).14 Later, also as cited in Render Unto Caesar, the Augsburg Confession uses "two kingdoms" theology to describe the office of bishop and to correct medieval corruptions: Many and various things have been written in former times about the power of bishops, and some have improperly confused the power of bishops with the temporal sword. Out of this careless confusion many serious wars, tumults, and uprisings have resulted because the bishops, under pretext of the power given them by Christ ... have ... presumed to . . . depose kings and emperors according to their pleasure. (CA XXVIII, 1-2) Instead of interfering in the temporal realm, the bishops, according the Augsburg Confession, are to exercise spiritual power by spiritual means: Our teachers assert that according to the Gospel the power of keys or the power of bishops is a power and command of God to preach the Gospel, to forgive and retain sins, and to administer and distribute the sacraments. . . . Inasmuch as the power of the church or of bishops bestows eternal gifts and is used and exercised only through the office of preaching, it does not interfere at all with government or temporal authority. Temporal authority does not protect the soul, but with the sword and physical penalties it protects body and goods from the power of others. (CA XXVIII, 5, 10-11)

Render Unto Cnesnr, 34-41. Unless otherwise indicated, quotations from the Lutheran Confessions are from Theodore G. Tappert, ed., The Book of Concord: The Confessions of the Evnngelicnl Luthemn Church (Philadelphia: Forh·ess Press, 1959). For the original language versions of the Lutheran Confessions, see Die Bekenntnisschriften der ev1111gelisch-/11therischen Kirche, 11th ed. (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1992). 13

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de with the Finally, the Render Unto Caesar citatio ns from Article 28 conclu ral, are not insiste nce that "the two author ities, the spiritu al and the tempo comm ission to to be mingl ed or confus ed, for the spiritu al power has its , it should not preach the Gospe l and admin ister the sacram ents. Hence e kings .. ." depos and up set not should invade the functi on of the other, (CA XXVIII, 12-13). ent that Now, none of these citatio ns is inappr opriat e in a docum onal citatio ns addres ses questi ons of Churc h and state; nor are the additi Unto Caesar from the Apolo gy (Ap XVI, 2-3, 4, 6) also used by Render spiritu al and h Churc that case the inappr opriat e since they too make entirel y are ity author ral tempo author ity are one thing while the state and differe nt. 15 in Render There is a proble m, howev er, with the treatm ent of this topic s not choose ent docum the that story the of Unto Caesar, and that is the part of all pass encom to ent docum CTCR a to tell. Of course , one canno t expect cite to h enoug it is but state, Luthe r's writin gs that pertai n to Churc h and n Ameri can only the eviden ce that appea rs most congr uent with moder ostens ibly an ting notion s of separa ting Churc h and state when presen that, know to tant "Luth eran" view of the questi on? Is it not also impor relied and both before and after his treatis e of 1523, Luthe r encou raged h and thus to upon the territo rial rulers of his day to reform the Churc icism?16 Is it establ ish Luthe ranism as the replac ement for medie val Cathol r came to the not also releva nt to point out that, subseq uent to 1523, Luthe e it was becaus n religio false ss suppre convic tion that godly rulers should not be may data Such 17 order? blasph emous and subve rsive of the social al to integr is it but ons, helpfu l in answe ring our churc h/ state questi t respec with ssions Confe Luthe r's own theolo gy and that of the Luthe ran is Render Unto Cnesnr, 41. of the Ger111n11 Nntion See, for example, Luther' s 1520 Address to the Christian Nobility to this positio n on came He (LW 44:123-217; WA 6:404-469), which is discuss ed below. he referred to the and church the reform to ties accoun t of the failure of church authori govern ment to upon relied he eless, Neverth ." bishops ency "emerg territor ial rulers as logy and His Ecclesio r's "Luthe effec t the Luther an Reformation. See Lewis W. Spitz, James M. and , 113-141 : (1953) 22 History Church of," Concep t of the Prince as Notbisch Lutheran Q11nrterly ation," Reform the in ity Author Secular of Role the on r Estes, "Luthe 17 (2003) : 199-225. 2; WA 31.I:1891 7 See, for exampl e, his 1530 interpr eta tion of Psalm 82 (LW 13:42-7 came to this Luther how 218), which is also discussed below. For a good analysis of Wolgast, Die Eike and ity," Author Secular of conclusion, see Estes, "Luthe r on the Role Gutnc/1te11 Luthers zu Studien Stiinde: ischen evnngel der Politik die und ie Wittenberger Theolog 64-75. 1977), Mohn, i11 politischen Fmgen (Gi.itersloh: Gutersl oher Verlags haus 16

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to the "two kingdo ms." Luthe r drew the line betwe en them at a far differe nt place from that of our own contem porary institu tions. Render Unto Caesar states that Luthe r "acqui esced" in the asserti on of author ity by the prince s to carry out church visitat ions and that he "perm itted" them to take contro l of the church in Germa ny while also assert ing that Luthe r "recog nized that tempo ral power , with its coerci ve power s, was funda menta lly ill-sui ted for preser ving and protec ting the Gospe l." 18 The implic ation then is that institu tional Luthe ranism someh ow took shape in sixtee nth-ce ntury Germa ny in oppos ition to Luthe r's funda menta l ideas regard ing Churc h and state. But this is hardly the case. Luthe r was active, not passiv e, in solicit ing help from the prince s, and he offere d a theological ration ale for doing so.19

Furthe rmore , with respec t to the Confe ssions , beside s the citatio ns to which Render Unto Caesar refers, is it not also releva nt to the topic of "a Luthe ran view of Churc h and state" to includ e Melan chthon 's appea l to Empe ror Charle s in the Apolo gy? There Melan chthon wrote,

It is your specia l respon sibilit y before God to maint ain and propa gate sound doctri ne and to defend those who teach it. God deman ds this when he honor s kings with his own name and calls them gods (Ps 82:6), "I say, 'You are gods." ' They should take care to maint ain and propa gate divine things on earth, that is, the Gospe l of Christ . (Ap XXI, 44) Simila rly, a few years later, when Melan chthon penne d his Treati se on the Power and Prima cy of the Pope, he includ ed this statem ent regard ing Christ ian rulers: Especially does it behoo ve the chief memb ers of the church , the kings and the prince s, to have regard for the interes ts of the church and to see to it that errors are remov ed and consciences are healed . God expres sly exhort s kings, "Now , therefo re, 0 kings, be wise; be warne d, 0 rulers of the earth" (Ps 2:10). For the first care of kings should be to advan ce the glory of God. (Tr 54)

Even Luther, in the Preface to the Small Catechism, tells pastors and preachers to warn those who refuse to learn the Catechism "that the prince is disposed to banish such rude people from his land" (SC Preface, 12).20 Such statements provide important evidence for understandi ng the " two kingdoms" theology in its original historical context. Far from excluding rulers from concerns about the Church or simply "acquiescing " to some sort of power grab by the state over the Church, Luther and his colleagues insisted that Christian rulers have a positive obligation to use their authority on behalf of the Church. Indeed, contra Render Unto Caesar, they believed that temporal authority in Christian hands was well-suited for "preserving and protecting the Gospel."21 In the course of the Reformation, the first Lutherans resorted again and again to temporal authorities in order to advance the cause of true religion, as is evident in the charter of Lutheranism itself, the Augsburg Confession. In addition to what Render Unto Caesar cites from Articles XVI and XXVIII regarding "two kingdoms" theology, there is more evidence. For one thing, any interpretatio n of what the Augsburg Confession has to say about Church and state must take into account the political nature of the document itself. After all, it was seven territorial princes and the mayor and council of two imperial cities who presented the Augsburg Confession to the diet of the Holy Roman Empire in the first place. Unless the confessors were perpetrating a fraud or were deluding themselves, they did not understand their own description of civil government in Article XVI-which dealt with good order, enforcing the law, punishing the wicked, and engaging in just wars - in such a way as to preclude them from participatin g in a council called by the emperor for the purpose of restoring religious unity in his realm. Nor did they understand it as precluding them from presenting a statement of their faith in such a context, "setting forth how and in what manner, on the basis of the Holy should not 20 At the same time that Luther was acknowledgin g that "we cannot and compel anyone to believe," he justified compulsory religious insh·uction on the grounds that "anyone who desires to reside in a city is bound to know and observe the laws under whose protection he lives." SC Preface, 13. was 21 Render Unto Caesar, 36. According to James M. Estes, in 1521 Melanchthon only Luther but religion of care the in government for role positive a for already arguing gradually came to this conviction; nevertheless, by the end of his life he had endorsed Melanchthon' s view. See "Luther on the Role of Secular Authority," 221, and "The Role of the Godly Magish·ates in the Church: Melanchthon as Luther's Interpreter and Collaborator," Ch urch History 67 (1998): 468. For a more comprehensive treahnent of both men together, see his Pence, Order and the Glory of God: Secular AuthorihJ and the Church in the Thought of Luther and Melnnchtlwn, 1518-1559 (Leiden: Brill, 2005).

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Scriptures, these things are preached, taught, communicated , and embraced in our lands, principalities, dominions, cities, and territories" (CA Preface, 8). Although written principally by theologians, the Augsburg Confession is a declaration by temporal authorities of what they have established as true religion in their territories.22 Thus, whatever the two kingdoms theology meant for Luther and his contemporaries , it did not mean excluding temporal authority from the affairs of the Church. In fact, it meant quite the contrary, for the main use of this theology in the Confessions is not to separate the state from the Church but the Church from the state. Going back again to Article XXVIII of the Augsburg Confession, one can see that the confessors apply their teaching only to an aggressive Church and not to the state. For after maintaining that "the two authorities . . . are not to be mingled or confused," the document proceeds only to indict spiritual authority for invading the sphere of the other (CA XXVIII, 12). It "should not set up and depose kings, should not annul temporal laws or undermine obedience to government, should not make or prescribe to the temporal power laws concerning worldly matters" (CA XXVIII, 13). Even at this point, however, while insisting that church officials not presume to interfere in the affairs of state, the document concedes that the same man may exercise authority in both realms as was still true of many bishops at the outset of the Reformation. One might have thought that the confessors would insist that such arrangements be terminated on the basis of two kingdoms theology, but that was not the case. The Augsburg Confession is content with asserting that when bishops exercise temporal authority, they do so by human arrangement only and may not claim that such authority is inh·insic to the office of bishop: "In cases where bishops possess temporal authority and the sword, they possess it not as bishops by divine right, but by human, imperial right, bestowed by Roman emperors and kings for the temporal administration of their lands. Such authority has nothing at all to do with the office of the Gospel" (CA XXVIII, 19-20). So even when a bishop employs it, temporal authority remains temporal and therefore subject to the oversight of other temporal 22 For historical background to the Augsburg Confession, see The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Reformation s.v. "Augsburg Confession"; Wilhelm Maurer, Historical Co111111entary on the Augsburg Co11fession (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986), 3-57; Franz Lau and Ernst Bizer, A History of the Refor111ation in Ger111any to 1555 (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1964), 74-83; and Johann Michael Reu, The Augsburg Confession: A Collection of Sources with Historical llltroduction (Chicago: Wartburg Publishing House, 1930).

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authorit ies, the princes, who must see to it that justice is done and that peace prevails even in episcop al realms. Neverth eless, distingu ishing the two kingdom s does not demand excludi ng the clergy from the exercise of political authorit y. Only when they claim that such power is inheren t in 23 their church offices do they violate the confess ional teaching. But what about tempora l authorit y? If Luther and the Confessions insist upon restricti ng church authori ty to spiritua l matters even if church officials can by human arrange ment also wield the tempora l sword, do they insist that tempora l authori ty restrict itself to tempora l matters ? The answer is yes - but a highly qualifie d yes. For when God has placed tempora l authori ty into the hands of Christia ns, rulers need to exercise that authori ty in the interest s of the Church . One often misses this feature of Luther' s thought by relying too much on g Luther' s 1523 freatise on tempora l authori ty. Althoug h clearly revealin Luther' s basic convict ions about Church and state, one should also rememb er that he was address ing a political situatio n in which the enemies of the gospel were everyw here in power. Prior to its compos ition, various political entities had taken steps to suppres s Luther, his followers, and their message . In May of 1521, the empero r had issued his Edict of Worms declarin g Luther an outlaw and orderin g his books to be burned; in January of 1522, the Imperia l Council of Regency had condem ned religiou s innovat ions like commu nion in both kinds and clerical marriag e; and, in Novem ber of 1522, Luther' s neighbo r, Duke George of Saxony, had s issued a decree comma nding his subjects to turn in their copies of Luther' German New Testament.24 No wonder , then, that in his treatise Luther was insisten t that tempora l authorit y has no power over faith or conscience and that the believer is free to disobey tempora l authori ty when it orders complia nce to false religion: If your prince or tempora l ruler comma nd you to side with the pope, to believe thus and so, or to get rid of certain books [presum ably Christia n ones], you should say, "It is not fitting that Lucifer should sit at the side of God. Graciou s sir, I owe you obedien ce in body and propert y .... But if you comma nd me to believe or get rid of certain books, I will not obey; this See also Luther's letter to Melanch thon (July 21, 1530) in which he discusses though even ents, governm the as just separate, persons the keep to very point: "I want pastor and the same man can represen t both persons, and the one Pamer can be a parish a and Franconi of duke is , Thungen von Conrad a householder. . .. So the same man, of bishop be cannot a Franconi of duke the though even g, Wi.irzbur bishop of Wi.irzburg." LW 49:383-384; WABr 5:492,19-24. 24 LW 45:77-78, 84 n. 11. 23

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for then you are a tyran t and overr each yours elf, comm andin g wher e you have neith er the right nor the authority."25 At a time when Luthe r had come to believ e that temp oral ruler s were "gene rally the bigge st fools or the wors t scoun drels on earth " and that "ther efore , one must const antly expec t the wors t from them and look for little good , espec ially in divin e matte rs whic h conce rn the salva tion of souls,"26 the refor mer had every reaso n for delin eatin g a theor y of gove rnme nt that woul d restri ct politi cal autho rity as much as possi ble to the earth ly realm . And so he did. In fact, in this treatise, when Luthe r wrote abou t the unlik ely case that a ruler is a Chris tian -whi ch he descr ibed as "the most preci ous token of divin e grace upon that land" 27 even then the princ e shou ld not use force again st false teach ers and heretics. That is the job of the bisho ps who are to empl oy God' s word . "God 's word must do the fighti ng," Luthe r conte nded . "If it does not succe ed, certai nly the temp oral powe r will not succe ed either , even if it were to drenc h the world in blood."28 Even if a Chris tian princ e is not supp osed to use violence again st false teach ers, that does not mean he shou ld avoid using his autho rity to advan ce the Chris tian religi on. This is only hinte d at in this treatise, but it is an impo rtant part of Luth er's unde rstan ding of temp oral autho rity in the conte xt of the two kingd oms. When in Part 3 of his treatise Luthe r turne d to the situa tion of a temp oral ruler who is a Chris tian, he argue d that such a ruler shou ld exercise his autho rity in a Chris tian mann er, that is, motiv ated by love, he shou ld devo te himse lf to the well- being of his peop le. The scope of love in Luthe r's descr iption is comp rehen sive, "[Wo rks] are done in love ... when they are direc ted whol ehear tedly towa rd the benefit, hono r, and salva tion [Heil] of other s, and not towa rd the pleas ure, benefit, hono r, comf ort, and salva tion of self." 29 Altho ugh Luthe r did not here elabo rate on all the possi ble work s of love that ruler s could do for their subjects, he hardl y envis ioned a situa tion in whic h a Cluis tian princ e woul d not use his powe r in the intere sts of the Chur ch.

erity more genera lly and not just eterna l salvat ion, the point of my argwn ent is that Luthe r used a compr ehens ive term and not one that must be consh ·ued narrow ly as physic al well-b eing only.

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Quite the contrary. Both before and after his 1523 treatise, Luther called upon rulers to advance the cause of true religion in their lands. In one of his more important, earlier writings, his Address to the Christian Nobility (1520),30 Luther created a theological framework for relying upon the princes to reform religion in their territories. Frustrated by the failure of the bishops and the papacy to undertake needed changes, Luther articulated a doctrine of the priesthood of all believers in this work. This means that all of the faithful-clergy and laity alike-enjoy the same status before God and are recipients of the same blessings and same spiritual privileges. What distinguishes them from each other is vocation, a Godgiven calling by which they exercise their talents and responsibilities in the service of others. Although ordinarily it is the vocation of clergy to reform the Church, when they fail to do so and instead erect obstacles to the proclamation of the gospel, lay Cluistians have the right and duty to take the necessary steps.31 As Luther envisioned it at the time he wrote Address to the Christian NobilihJ, what Cluistendom needed was a Church council to take up the issues that were plaguing the Church. Over against the papacy that claimed the exclusive right to summon such a council, Luther asserted that all believers have this right. "When necessity demands it," he wrote, "and the pope is an offense to Christendom, the first man who is able should, as a true member of the whole body [of the Church], do what he can to bring about a h·uly free council." 32 But who in the Church could actually do it? Knowing that the first several councils in church history were summoned by emperors, Luther had no h·ouble in relying upon the Christian princes: "No one can do this so well as the temporal authorities, especially since they are also fellow-Christians, fellow-priests, fellow-members of the spiritual estate, fellow-lords over all things. Whenever it is necessary or profitable, they ought to exercise the office and work which they have received from God over everyone." 33 Even though this work was written well before Luther's first-hand experience with the princes at the Diet of Worms, namely at a point when he still had confidence that many of them were Christians, nonetheless he LW 44:123-217; WA 6:404-469. The classic discussion of Luther's doctrine of vocation is Gustaf Wingren, The Christian's Ca/li11g: L11ther on Vocation (London: Oliver and Boyd, 1957), but see also Althaus, Ethics, 36-42, and Kenneth Hagen, "A Critique of Wingren on Luther on Vocation," L11thera11 Quarterly 16 (2002) : 249-273. 32 LW 44:137; WA 6:413,27-29. 33 LW 44:137; WA 6:413,29-33. 30

3t

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was still operating with a distinction between temporal and spiritual authority inasmuch as there were some items that he thought the princes could change on their own while there were other points that church authorities had to address in a church council.34 Nevertheless, for our purposes, the main point is that Luther believed that rulers who were Christian had an obligation to use their temporal power for the sake of the Church. Luther was still thinking this way in 1524 when he had to deal with Andreas Carlstadt who, after his failures in leading the reform movement in Wittenberg while Luther was in hiding at the Wartburg, had broken with Luther. In fact, Carlstadt left Wittenberg in order to become a parish pastor in Orlamtinde. This meant not only abandoning his post at the university but also ousting the lawful incumbent in Orlamtinde. For Luther, this was a matter that involved the temporal authorities who were responsible for such arrangements, so he called on the elector to intervene and he charged Carlstadt with violating the rights of the prince. In other words, at a time very close to his composition of his h·eatise on temporal authority, Luther was relying heavily on that authority for the support of church offices. Moreover, in Carlstadt's activities Luther began to see a connection between what he viewed as false teaching and social disruptions. 35 Then, during the Peasants' War, this connection became all the clearer. False religion - itself an indication of the devil's activities - led to rebellion and violence. Writing in 1525 against Carlstadt, who was not advocating bloodshed, Luther explained that his erstwhile colleague was nonetheless encouraging rebellion:

34 For example, Luther urged the secular authorities to abolish payment of aimates, appoinhnent to benefices by Rome, and obtaining the bishop's cloak from Rome, but at the same time he maintained that the local bishops - not the temporal rulers - should administer benefices ai1d consecrate other bishops. LW 44:156-158; WA 6:427-429. See Herma1m Sasse, "Church Government and Secular Authority according to Lutheran Doch·ine," in The Lonely Way: Selected Essays and Letters, vol. 1, h·ans. Matthew C. Harrison et al. (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 2001), 190-192. 35 See especially Luther's Against the Heavenly Prophets, Part I (1525), LW 40:100-117; WA 18:85-101. Already in a letter to George Spalatin (Wittenberg, MaTch 14, 1524), Luther talked about having to arraign Carlstadt before the prince if he did not return to his duties in Wittenberg. LW 49:73; WABr 3:254,15-17. For Luther's dealings with Carlstadt in these years, see Martin Brecht, Martin Luther, h·ans. James L. Schaaf (Minneapolis: Forh·ess Press, 1985-1993) 2:157-172.

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does not If it were really true, and I could believe, that Dr. Karlst adt has a he that say to have still would intend murde r or rebelli on, I n wanto with ues contin he as long rebelli ous and murde rous spirit ... as that see well I f. himsel to image breaki ng and draws the unruly rabble rous weapo n he neithe r sh·ikes nor stabs, but since he carries the murde murde rous the By and does not put it aside, I do not trust him . ... the law of of weapo n I mean the false interp retatio n and under standi ng arouse d to Moses. Throu gh it the devil comes and the masse s are boldne ss and arroga nce.36 teachi ng A Christ ian prince could hardly be indiffe rent to those whose ity. For author encou raged disres pect and disobe dience for consti tuted s by heretic ing Luther , therefo re, this came to mean not only oppos the sword to teachi ng and preach ing the word of God, but also by using Luthe r saw an suppre ss and punish them. Thus, after the Peasan ts' War, heres y- like ore theref and on; rebelli and inexor able tie betwe en heresy light of his the In . prince ian Christ other crimes - had to be addres sed by the the ruler that 1523, of n positio experi ence, Luthe r could not mainta in his becau se but , heresy was it e should not oppos e heresy . Not howev er becaus ss suppre must state of its social conseq uences , Luthe r believ ed that the false teachi ng.37 a prince does Initially, Luthe r was carefu l to disting uish betwe en what may do to prince an Christi a as the holder of tempo ral author ity and what rt of the suppo in y activit advan ce the interes ts of the Churc h. Gover nment t in eviden is This Christ ian religio n presup poses a Christ ian ruler.38 39 a marks which Luthe r's prefac e to the Instructions to the Visitors, in es ran church milest one in the develo pment of the territo rial Luthe LW 40:105-106; WA 18:88,22-30. Wolgast, Die Wittenberger Theologie, 64-75. about kings in his Treatise on the Power 38 This is the point of Melanc hthon's remark it behoov e the chief 111e111bers of the church, does ially "Espec 1537: Pope, and Primac y of the of the church and to see to it the kings and the princes , to have regard for the interest s emphas is added. C. F. W. 54, Tr " healed. are nces that errors are remove d and conscie and state in defense of Church on essay 1885 his in nt argume major a this Walthe r made held firmly to the Church an Luther the propos ition that" during its initial p eriod ... the conh·ol of assume to power the nor right the neither has doch·ine that the govern ment 277tion," Conven Dish·ict n the church. " Walthe r, "Earthl y Author ities II: 26th Wester on ed exercis rulers an Christi that power 284. But this is unconv incing, seeing that the . Church the of rs membe as not mlers, as power their behalf of the Church was Melanc hthon wrote the In structions, Luther 's 39 LW 40:269-320; WA 26:195-240. While of Saxony, showed his suppor t for them. John preface, written at the request of Elector LW40:266. 36

37

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Germa ny. In 1527, Elector John the Consta nt author ized an official visit of the church es in his domain . This obligat ion traditio nally belong ed to the bishop s who were exercising their author ity to superv ise the faith and morals of the people in their dioceses. With the ongoin g opposi tion of the hierarc hy to the Reform ation, the evange lical princes, led by John, began to carry out such episcop al functio ns for the sake of their people.40 Alread y by that time, Luther had long been import uning the elector to use his author ity on behalf of the church . In Octobe r of 1525, for examp le, Luther had written the elector to reques t his help in mainta ining the pastors and parishe s of Saxony. Otherw ise, Luther wrote, "in a short time there will not be a parson age, a school, or pulpit functio ning, and thus God's Word and worshi p will perish. " 41 The matter might be tempo ralfinding the money to pay the preach ers - but the conseq uences were certain ly spiritua l. One of Luther 's friends and disciples, Nichol as Hausm ann, appare ntly was the first to urge Duke John to conduc t a visitati on, but it was a sugges tion with which Luther heartil y concur red in a letter to the elector in Novem ber of 1525: "Your Electoral Grace should have all the parishe s in the whole territor y inspect ed." 42 Once again, Luther was concer ned with financial suppor t of the minish-y, but it was for the sake of the gospel, he wrote, that "thus a true ministr y of the gospel would be given to the people , whom the pastors ought to nourish ."43 Duke John sent teams of visitors into the parishe s of Saxony in 1527-1 528 to inquire not only into the materia l well-be ing of the parish but also into the doch·ine being taught and the life being lived in the name of the Christi an faith. Melan chthon wrote up instruc tions for the visitors that specifi ed parame ters for their inquiry , includi ng what people were being taught about religion, and Luther wrote a preface to justify the entire initiative. In his preface, Luther was clear that the visitati on derived not simply from the fact that Elector John exercis ed tempor al author ity but that he was a Christian with tempor al authori ty. Given the conditi on of the For the story of the visitation, see Brecht, Martin Luther, 2:259-27 3, and Karl Triidinger, Luthers Briefe und Gutnchten nn weltliche Obrigkeiten zur Durchfiihrung der Reformntion (Miinster Westfalen: Aschendorffsche Verlags buchhan dlung, 1975), 68-77. 41 Martin Luther to Elector John, Wittenberg, October 31, 1525. LW 49:135-136; WABr 3:595,44-46. 42 Martin Luther to Elector John, Wittenberg, Novemb er 30, 1525. LW 49:138; WABr 3:628,7. 43 LW 49:139; WABr 3:628,27-28. 40

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Christian Church in Germany-" confused, scattered, and torn" - Luther maintained that he and his colleagues "would like to have seen the true episcopal office and practice of visitation re-established because of the pressing need," but they lacked the requisite call and authority to do so.44 Therefore, they appealed to the elector as a Christian to use his authority in this cause: Preferring to follow what is certain and to be guided by love's office (which is the common obligation of Christians), we have respectfully appealed to the illustrious and noble prince and lord, John, Duke of Saxony, . .. our most gracious lord and prince, constituted of God as our certain temporal sovereign, that out of Christian love (since he is not obligated as a temporal sovereign) and by God's will for the benefit of the gospel and the welfare of the wretched Christians in his territory, His Electoral grace might call and ordain to this office [of visitor] several competent persons.45 Luther did not understand the visitation as something that a ruler as ruler was obligated to do, but he did think that Christian love obligated a Christian ruler to use his authority on behalf of the gospel. Given the circumstances, Luther called on his prince to sponsor the visitation and expressed the hope that this would "become a happy example which all other German princes may fruitfully imitate."46 Significantly, Luther also justified the visitation by referring to the temporal disadvantages of religious dissent in the prince's territories: "While His Electoral grace is not obligated to teach and to rule in spiritual affairs, he is obligated as temporal sovereign to so order things that strife, rioting, and rebellion do not arise among his subjects."47 It was for this reason, Luther argued, that Constantine summoned the Council of Nicaea: "since he did not want to tolerate the dissension which Arius had stirred up," so he constrained them "to preserve unity in teaching and faith."48 Similarly then, the elector needed to take steps for the preservation of such unity. After all, argued Luther, "the devil has become neither pious nor devout this year, nor will he ever be so. So let us be on guard and anxious to keep ... the spiritual unity in the bond of love and peace."49 Indirectly

but still necessarily, a ruler who is Christian maintains temporal peace by establishing religious unity in his lands. Once Luther became convinced that religious dissidents threatened the peace, he abandoned his 1523 position about a ruler tolerating false believers. Instead, Luther came to rely upon the state to suppress heresy and false doctrine. A good example of Luther's new thinking in this regard comes from his 1530 interpretation of Psalm 82,50 in which he once more distinguished the two kingdoms but insisted nevertheless that godly rulers should advance true religion. 51 That also raised the following question, "Since the ... rulers ... are to advance God's Word and its preachers, are they also to put down opposing doch-ines or heresies . . . ?" 52 While admitting that "no one can be forced to believe," Luther sketched four situations in which Christian government should suppress heretics on accow1t of the temporal consequences of their teaching. 53 First of all, there were heretics who explicitly advocated disobedience to temporal rulers and the abandonment of secular callings. "These teachers," maintained Luther, "are immediately and without doubt, to be punished by the rulers, as men who are resisting temporal law and government (Rom. 13:1, 2). They are not heretics only but rebels."5 4 In Luther's second instance, he equated heresy with blasphemy and blasphemy with crime. He wrote, "Rulers are in duty bound to punish blasphemers as they punish those who curse, swear, revile, abuse, defame, and slander." 55 With no modern sensitivities regarding "freedom of speech," Luther held that government should punish words directed against God as well as those against men.56 While still maintaining that a person can believe what he wants, Luther argued that he cannot teach what he wants. False teaching, Luther thought, is a crime against the community in which it occurs: "For so LW13:39-72; WA 31.I:189-218. "For if God's Word is protected and supported so that it can be freely taught and learned, and if the sects and false teachers are given no opportunity and are not defended against the teachers who fear God, what greater h·easure can there be in a land?" LW13:52; WA 31.1:199,7-11. 52 LW 13:61; WA 31.I:207,33-36. 53 LW 13:61; WA 31.I:207,35-36. 54 LW13:61; WA 31 .1:208,4- 8. 55 LW13:61; WA 31.I:208,18-20. 56 For Luther, blasphemy included conh·adicting "an article of faith clearly grounded in Scripture and believed throughout the world by all Christendom." LW 13:61; WA 31 .1:208,11-15. Although it is not completely clear which doch'ines Luther had in mind, he explicitly mentioned the divinity of Christ, the resurrection of the body and everlasting life, and the vicarious atonement. LW 13:62; WA 31.I:208,22-28. 51

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from God and the Chris tians by so doing , he [a false teacher] woul d take them this injur y unde r their do their doctr ine and word , and he woul d all have in comm on .. . . He own prote ction and by mean s of the thing s keep the law of the city, and who make s a livin g from the citizens ough t to out."57 not defam e and revil e it; or else he ough t to get actua l judg es over doctrine. Luth er's third circu msta nce make s the ruler s hers are preac hing again st This is the case when papi st and Luth eran preac but there is no possi bility of one anoth er and both claim the Scrip tures , er advis ed, " Let the ruler s eithe r side leavi ng off the deba te. Then, Luth and that party to keep take a hand . Let them hear the case and comm 8 tures ."5 Thus , the temp oral silence whic h does not agree with the Scrip dispu te. So how did Luth er autho rities will actua lly adjud icate a doctrinal doms ? On acco unt of the justif y this appa rent "min gling " of the king is not a good thing that temp oral cons eque nces of such division: "It g the peop le of the same contr adict ory preac hing shou ld go out amon hatre ds, and envy ings ders, paris h. For from this arise divisions, disor whic h exten d to temp oral affairs also."59 two sets of preac hers are It is simil ar in Luth er's fourt h case -wh en Scrip ture such as "tons ures, publi cly clam oring over items not foun d in the unne cessa ry thing s."60 The ar simil holy wate r, the bless ing of herbs , and peace, "for love and peac e autho rities shou ld orde r both sides to keep the 1 6 If this does n't help, then the are far more impo rtant than all cerem onies ." side to be silen t whic h woul d ruler s must take the next step and orde r that as nece ssary to salvation. bind men' s consciences and insis t on cerem onies er made it clear that the Thro ugho ut this discu ssion , therefore, Luth r again st anyo ne who orde temp oral autho rities are to main tain law and mer insis ted that refor the threa tens it in the name of religion. Again, ," but he may likes he what "any one may read what he likes and believe and secre t hing zed preac certa inly not advo cate it by unau thori er said, "but not all are cerem onies .62 "All Chris tians are priests," Luth a Chri stian and pries t but pasto rs. For to be a pasto r one must be not only call and comm and make must have an office comm itted to him. This

57

advan ced this opini on in his Preface to LW 13:62; WA 31.I:208,32 -37. Luthe r also

pasto rs and preac hers." 63 Those who preac h witho ut such autho rizati on are "sure emiss aries of the devil." 64 They shoul d be turne d over to the autho rities for, in Luthe r's thinki ng, their purpo se is "to start a rebellion, or worse , amon g the people."65 In this entire discu ssion regar ding the need for a Chris tian ruler to suppr ess false teachi ng, one can see that Luthe r conne cted such false teach ing to the prope r spher e of tempo ral autho rity. Far from oppos ing state interv ention in the affairs of the Churc h, Luthe r dema nded it, while at the same time maint aining the two kingd oms frame work. Obvio usly, this could play into the hands of rulers lookin g for oppor tuniti es to enhan ce their own powe rs. By involv ing tempo ral autho rity so heavi ly in ecclesiastical affairs, Luthe r went far towar d makin g the institu tional Churc h a protec torate of the prince. This is not the whole story. For Luthe r was not only conce rned that Chris tian prince s act on behal f of the Churc h; he was also troub led by tempo ral rulers who overs teppe d the bound s of their autho rity to act unjus tly or to interf ere with the work of the Churc h. As we have alread y seen, in his 1523 treatise Luthe r place d clear limits on the obedi ence owed to tempo ral autho rity. Since tempo ral autho rity has no powe r over faith or conscience, the believ er must disob ey when the ruler make s dema nds of his peopl e that violat e the word of God. 66 Perha ps even more significantly, Luthe r went beyon d simpl e disob edien ce in such cases to recom mend actua lly resist ing an unjus t gover nmen t, but not by force. Rather, he wrote , "By confession of the truth [sondern nur mit Bekenntnis der Wahrheit]." 67 One shoul d not use violence again st a super ior, but one shoul d speak out

LW13:65; WA 31.I:211,17-20. LW13:65; WA 31.I:211,26-27. 65 LW 13:66; WA 31.I:212,4-5. 66 LW 45:111-112; WA 11:267,1-8. Interestingly, Luther extend ed the obliga tion to disobey beyond the strictly religious, at least in one instanc e, to the comm and of a ruler to fight an unjust war. If a ruler is "in the wrong," then his people are not bound to fight on his behalf, for "it is no one's duty to do wrong; we must obey God (who desires the right) rather than men (Acts 5:29)." LW 45:125; WA 11:277,28-31. See also Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved, where Luther repeat ed this advice. LW 46:130-131; WA 19:656,21-657,10. 67 LW 45:124; WA 11:277,3-4. Later, convin ced by jurists, Luther would agree that in the Holy Roman Empir e lesser magist rates had the right to use force in order to protec t their subjects from a tyrannical emperor. See Wolgast, Die Wittenberger Theologie, 165185, and Brecht, Martin Luther, 2:411-415. 63

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against unjust and wicked rulers. In this matter, Luther definitely practiced what he preached.68 When, for example, the Peasants' War was brewing, Luther publicly rebuked the princes for their sins against their subjects. He wrote, "You [princes] do not cease to rant and rave against the holy gospel . . .. In addition, as temporal rulers you do nothing but cheat and rob the people so that you may lead a life of luxury and exh·avagance. The poor common people cannot bear it any longer."69 Although Luther had no use for rebellion by the people, nonetheless he saw it as inevitable that God would punish tyrants with violence and bloodshed. "Both Scripture and history are against you lords," he warned them, "for both tell how tyrants are punished. Even the heathen poets say that tyrants seldom die a dry death, but are usually slain and perish in their own blood." 70 This he ascribed to God's judgment upon their wickedness. Throughout his career, Luther leveled some of his harshest attacks against princely enemies of the Reformation. 71 He used the two kingdoms theology to do so. For example, in his Vindication against Duke George's Charge of Rebellion (1533), he rejected the accusation that he was advocating insurrection among the Duke of Saxony's subjects, but contended instead that he had counseled obedience except when the duke overstepped the limits of temporal authority to interfere with the faith of his people. 72 At that point, Duke George no longer had authority but had become an "apostle of the devil [des Teufels Apostel]."73 Still Luther did not counsel insurrection. The faithful were to disobey an unjust command - in this case

68 According to Gordon Rupp, "The passages in which Luther criticizes the crowd are far outnumbered by those in which he delineates the vices and temptations of the Princes." The Righteousness of God: Luther Studies (New York: Philosophical Library, 1953), 304 69 Ad111onition to Peace, LW 46:19; WA 18:293,29-34. 70 LW 46:41; WA 18:329,29-32. 71 See, for example, Against Hanswurst, LW 41:185-256; WA 51:469-572. The title alone was an insult to Henry of Braunschweig. In a table talk, Luther accused George of Saxony of having committed the sin against the Holy Ghost. LW 54:60; WATR 1:168,2628 (no. 388). 72 Vernntwortung der aufgelegten Aufruhr von Herzog Georg, WA 38:96-127. Although it is not available in LW, there is a modern German version in D. Martin Luthers Sii111mtilic/1e Schriften, hernusgegben von Dr. J. G. Walch, neue rev. stereotypausg., 23 vol. in 25 (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1880-1910) 19:1826-1841. For background to this work, see Brecht, Martin Luther, 3:65-70. 73 WA 38:99,19-20. In this work Luther explained why George was truly an "apostle of the devil" who enjoyed the same "honor" as Pilate, Herod, and Judas.

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to receive communion in the old way (one kind)-and then accept the punishment of exile that the authorities were imposing. Luther also continued using two kingdoms theology to rebuke princes who dared to interfere with preaching. In the late 1530s, for example, Luther accused some rulers of intruding temporal authority into the realm of the Church by mandating what the preachers should preach. In a 1538 sermon on the "cleansing of the temple" in John 2, Luther discussed the two kingdoms again, this time distinguishing between the "fisted sword [das Faustsclnuert]" given to princes and the "oral sword [das miindliche Schwert]" given to preachers of the gospel.74 Once again, Luther insisted that the two swords "must be kept apart and separate, so that the one does not infringe on the province of the other," and he charged the Anabaptists, Thomas Mi.intzer, the pope, and the bishops with grasping at the temporal sword. 75 He also warned the princes against interfering with their spiritual counterparts, and he protested those rulers who wanted to control the Church's message: "The civil governments - the princes, kings, the nobility in the country, and also the judges in the villages - take it upon themselves to wield the oral sword and to tell the pastors what and how to preach and how to administer their congregations."76 As in 1523, Luther had in mind primarily temporal authorities who were not really Christian at all, since he referred to princes who were "expelling from the church ... the true teachers and preachers." 77 "Stern edicts and mandates," Luther wrote, "are nailed to all the church doors, ordering the laity to receive Holy Communion only in one kind and commanding the clergy to preach what pleases them."78 Even so, however, it is important to note that the line Luther drew between temporal and spiritual authority in LW22:225; WA 46:735,1-3. LW 22:225; WA 46:735,5-8. 76 LW 22:225-26; WA 46:735,10-13. In 1543, Luther also complained about the mixing of the kingdoms when the secular authorities of a now reformed ducal Saxony were setting up regulations for church discipline. See Martin Luther to Daniel Greiser, Wittenberg, October 22, 1543. WABr 10:436. Also Lau and Bizer, A History of the Reformation in Germany, 133; Brecht, Martin Luther, 3:294-295; and Eric W. Gritsch, "Luther and the State: Post-Reformation Ramifications," in Luther and the Modern State in Germany, ed. James D. Tracy, Sixteenth Century Essays and Studies 17 (Kirksville, MO: Sixteenth Century Journal Publishers, 1986), 53. In a table talk from 1545, Luther complained about government authorities who were giving orders regarding ceremonies, apparently unacceptable ones. WATR 5:647-648 (no. 6407), and WATR 5:617-618 (no. 6354). 77 LW 22:227; WA 46:737,6-7. 78 LW 22:227; WA 46:737,8-10. 74

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this work has to do with preaching and teaching and not with the support and protection of the Church. After all, these remarks occurred roughly contemporaneous with Luther's preparations for the publication of the Schmalkald Articles, which he had written upon the request of his prince for presentation at a meeting of the Schmalkald League that temporal authorities had organized to defend the Reformation.79 Nevertheless, Luther's language in his 1538 sermon was categorical; the problem he cited was not bad rulers but mixing the kingdoms. Quite simply, princes should not confuse the two realms by insh·ucting preachers in what to preach. Luther concluded his admonition in emphatic fashion: After the abolition of the Law [of Moses] the secular emperors, kings, and princes were entrusted with the sword of iron, and the oral sword was assigned to the apostles and to us preachers. This distinction must remain intact .... But if the princes continue to jumble the two, as they are now doing, then may God in His mercy shorten our lives that we may not

witness the ensuing disaster. For in such circumstances everything in the Christian religion must go to wrack and ruin. This is what happened in the papacy when the bishops became secular princes. And if the secular lords now become popes and bishops and insist on sermons that defer to their wishes, then let the devil preach to them; for he preaches too. But let us pray that neither the spiritual nor the secular realm abuses its office that way/BO Luther's highly charged language demonstrates his willingness to speak truth to the powerful. For him, "mixing" the kingdoms did not occur when rulers promoted and protected preachers of the gospel nor when preachers rebuked temporal rulers for transgressing the legitimate bounds of their authority. As far as Luther was concerned, "two kingdoms" theology was no reason for silence in the face of wickedness in high places. Once again, Luther was probably thinking about Duke George of Saxony in this sermon when he railed against princes who insisted on obedience while interfering with preaching and administering the sacraments.Bl When George died the very next year and his brother, Duke Henry, 79 Written at the end of 1536, the Sclunalkald Articles were published in 1538. See William R. Russell, 771e Sclunnlknld Articles: Luther's 11ieologicnl Testn111e11t (Miimeapolis: Forh·ess Press, 1995), 18-19. Although Russell's main point is that Luther wrote these articles in view of his impending death, he still recognizes the role of the elector in requesting a statement from Luther for potential use at a church council. For the political circumstances surrounding their composition, see also Lau and Bizer, A History of the Refor111ntio11 in Ger111n11y, 123-131. 80 LW 22:228, emphasis in origiI1al; WA 46:737,24-738,3. 81 LW 22:227 n. 20.

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succeeded him, Luther adopted an entirely different tone regarding political intervention into the affairs of the Church.82 In fact, he wrote to the new ruler of ducal Saxony about his duty to abolish the mass. Referring both to the Old Testament kings and to Christian rulers like Constantine and Theodosius, Luther argued that the princes and lords of his day were just as responsible for maintaining true religion in their territories as their predecessors. 83 Duke Henry proceeded to follow Luther's advice by authorizing a visitation; for this he used Melanchthon's instructions with a slightly altered version of Luther's introduction, in which the reformer commended the duke for taking steps to spread the pure Christian doctrine and prayed God that his actions would be an example for all the other German princes to follow. 84 Later, Luther wrote again to the duke about measures to follow. It was not enough, he said, to do away with abuses. One also had to examine the teaching of the pastors, install capable people, and pay them. Luther wrote that "the furtherance of the Gospel and the maintenance of the Church are the highest worship of God, to which especially princes and potentates are commanded." 85 Clearly, Luther still did not see a ruler's promoting true religion in his territory as a violation of the "two kingdoms" theology that he had described in his sermon just the year before. Furthermore, Melanchthon' s new version of the Augsburg Confession, the so-called Variata, that he prepared for the evangelical princes and which they employed as their platform at the Colloquy of Worms (1540),86 still included the "two kingdoms" theology of the first version in Articles XVI and XXVIII. Although Melanchthon modified the confession in other respects to accommodate a new situation, apparently he felt compelled by none of the political changes since 1530 to amend what he had previously written about the scope of each kingdom or the dangers of mixing them. 87 82 For Luther's role in Duke Hemy's reformation, see Brecht, Martin Luther, 3:287-295, and Trtidinger, Briefe und Gutachten, 87-92. 83 Martin Luther to Duke Hemy, Wittenberg, July, 1539. WABr 8:482-84. 84 WA 26:197, note regarding the omission of I. 26 (that the prince is not obligated to act as a temporal ruler but only out of ClU'istian love) in a still later printing, and WA 26:198-199. The second version does not appear in LW but it is in the St. Louis edition 10:1632-1633. 85 Martin Luther to Duke Hemy, Wittenberg, July 25, 1539. WA 8:507,38-40. 86 The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Reformation, s.v. "Augsburg Confession." 87 For the text of the Variata, see Die augsburgische Konfession, ed. Theodore Kolde (Gotha: Friedrich Andreas Pe1tes, 1896), 170-224. Melanchthon revised Article XVI slightly, but he still affirmed that the government (politia) is an ordinance of God in which one is free to participate and which one must obey unless sin is conunanded.

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However, in Article XXVI, "The Marriage of Priests," Luther's associate directly asserted the responsibility of rulers for the Church with these words: It belongeth not to the bishops alone, but also to the godly princes, and most of all to the Emperor, to understand the Gospel in its purity, to judge of doctrines, to be watchful that no godless opinions be received or confirmed, and to make every effort to abolish idolatry .... The proper gifts that kings are to bestow upon the Church are to search out true doctrine, and to see that good teachers be set over churches; to pay attention to the correct decision of ecclesiastical controversies; not to take away godly doctrine, but to raise it up and propagate and defend it; and rightly to order and maintain the peace of the Church.BB Of course, from Melanchthon's (and Luther's) point of view this statement described what the evangelical princes were actually doing; now in his revised version of the Augsburg Confession, Melanchthon stated that such tasks belonged also to the emperor. Indeed, Melanchthon wrote, Christ "required [requirit]" them of the emperor in response to the Church's need. 89 Clearly, such a statement constitutes just one more piece of evidence that, throughout the Reformation period, no one understood the two kingdoms theology as requiring a Christian ruler to refrain from establishing authentic Christianity in his state. Indeed, quite the opposite, temporal rulers were supposed to support and maintain the Church. Obviously, then, the first Lutherans drew the line between the two kingdoms in a far different way from what we know today as the separation of Church and state in the United States. For Luther, temporal Melanchthon also revised Article XXVIII, but all of the beginning paragraphs regarding the distinction of the two powers and the necessity of not mixing them ("Non igitur commiscendae sunt potestates, ecc/esiasticn et civilis") remain essentially the same. For an English version of the Variata, see Hem-y D. Jacobs, ed., TI1e Book of Concord: or, the Sy111bolicnl Books of the Evangelical Lutheran Church with Historical Introduction, Notes, Appendixes and Indexes, (Philadelphia: G. W. Friedrick, 1893) 2:103-147. 88 Jacobs, The Book of Concord, 144; Kolde, Die augsburgische Konfession, 2:207-208. 89 Jacobs, TI1e Book of Concord, 144; Kolde, Die augsburgische Ko11fession, 2:208. Similarly, at the conclusion to Part One, the doch·inal articles, Melanchthon urged the emperor to follow the examples of Constantine and Theodosius in the smrunoning of a church council and described the emperor's duties with these words: "We desire that Caesar both may undertake the care of the Church when reformed, and may resh·ain the unjust cruelty." Jacobs, The Book of Concord, 123; Kolde, Die augsburgische Konfession, 2:189. See also Lau and Bizer, A History of the Reformation in Germany, 95

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rulers who promoted true religion even to the point of punishing heretics were not mixing the kingdoms but those who took measures that inhibited the gospel were. In our times, therefore, we cannot really use this instance of historical theology very effectively as a model for structuring our relationships between Church and state. Luther and the Confessions help us to identify the essential functions of each but do not permit us to draw the conclusion that we must rigorously separate them. While clergy must preach the gospel and administer the sacraments, they may also exercise temporal power by human arrangement. While rulers must use their power to punish evildoers and to protect the lives and property of their people, as Christians they should also use their authority to establish and care for the Church in their lands. If then we wish to use the two kingdoms theology as the first Lutherans conceived it, we must do so very modestly. We can be clear about what both Church and state must do. Depending upon circumstances and institutional arrangements, however, each may do a great deal more.

CTQ 71 (2007): 29-55

From Divin e Sover eignty to Divin e Conversation: Karl Barth and Robert Jenson on God's Being and Analo gy Piotr J. Malysz Tautolog ically speaking , God is that to which theology seeks to give expressi on. Contemp orary Christian theology, no less and perhaps even more than the theology of ages past, appears by and large to be preoccup ied with speaking of God as God, with letting God be God. It conceives of this task, however , in its own peculiar way. This should come as no surprise. Theology in general, regardle ss of what it consider s its objectives specifically to consist in, can never afford to lose sight of its context without degenera ting into sterility. Consequ ently, contemp orary theology remains acutely aware of the post-Enl ightenm ent criticism of the older metaphy sics, especially the latter's na'ive construa l of humans' epistemo logical relation to their world. It likewise cannot ignore the sweepin g socio-po litical and cultural changes that have radically altered the face of Western societies. Neither can it simply overlook the history of confessio nal divisiven ess, which has accompa nied, and not infreque ntly spurred, the theological enterpris e since its inception - divisiven ess often brought about by the elevation of theological construc ts to the status of inviolabl e and absolute truth. Hence, contemp orary theology 's preoccup ation with idols, as it seeks to prevent human concepts from taking the place of the divine. In today's world, theology seems to have taken it upon itself to assure that God is spoken of as God; theology sees its task as that of letting God be God. Inconsist ently, in this task it presume s to know what or who God is, even as it denies that any such idolatrou s hypostat ization is possible. 1 This denial results from the fact that being has Interesting in this context is Jacques Derrida's statement, "Indeed it must have been ' possible to speak [about God] in order to allow the question 'How to avoid speaking? Godof cessation and God-talk of silencing radical the of t proponen to arise." A one thought, Derrida criticises apophatic ism for its inability to do justice to God: on the do to seeking other, the on but thought, of hand, it pushes God beyond the boundary speak to compelled feels s, nonetheles it, lexeme, the of prevalence curious the justice to ed. about God. See "How to Avoid Speaking: Denials," Derrida and Negative Theology, 1992), Press, York New of University State (Albany: Harold Coward and Toby Foshay today, 99. Cf. Eberhard Junge!: " [W]e counter the obvious thesis, so frequently advanced human of leness questionab radical of the origin of the question about God in the 1

become a suspect category; language has been exposed as inherently fallible, but silence is not an option. Eberhard Ji.ingel has diagnosed the contempo rary situation pithily: "At the end of the history of metaphysi cs, God appears to have become unthinkab le," while at the same time being "talked to death ... silenced by the very words that seek to talk about him." 2 Whatever it is that specifically drives the currently fashionabl e hypertrop hic hyper-apo phaticism , 3 this study will not attempt to present the latter's genealogy . Rather, having set forth the broader context, the goal will be to analyze a much less trendy contempo rary alternative. Keeping seriously in mind human proneness to idolatry, I hope to give an account of how God can, neverthele ss, be thought without falling into the inconsiste ncy of both presuming to know God and simultane ously denying his thinkability. In particular , this paper seeks briefly to compare Karl Barth's and Robert W. Jenson's doctrines of God, with special emphasis on their ascription of being to God, as well as human epistemic and linguistic capacity to give expression to this divine being. 4 For all the far-reachi ng affinity between Barth and Jenson, it will be demonstra ted that, while the former avoids the potential charge of idolatry by rigorously maintaini ng God's sovereign lordship over being, knowledg e, and language, Jenson organicall y joins the three categories by exegeting the manner of God's being, as it is spoken of in the church's confession, in terms of divine narrativity and drama. He thus arrives at a more elegant understan ding of the difference / distance between God and humanity in terms of conversati onal distance-n earness.

existence with the phenomenologically more obvious assertion: God can be asked about only because there has already been talk about him." God as the Mystery of the World: On the Foundation of the I11eologtJ of the Crucified One in the Dispute Between I7ieism and Atheism, h·ans. Darrell L. Guder (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1983), 248. 2 Junge!, God as the Mystery of the World, vii. 3 In the words of Karl Barth: "a stream of formless inundation. " Church Dogmatics, h·ans. G. T. Thomsonn, 14 vols. (Edinburgh : T&T Clark, 1936-1977), II/1, 232. Hereafter, abbreviated to CD, followed by the volume number/pa rt number and page reference. 4 For an attempt to couch the doctrine of God with no recourse to the (idolatrous) concept of being altogether, see Jean-Luc Marion, God without Being, h·ans. Thomas A. Carlson (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991). Marion's concerns do, to some degree, overlap with those expressed in this paper, even though, as will be seen, neither Barth nor Jenson seek a wholesale rejection of the category of being, but rather its theological reconstitution.

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I. Soverei gnty: Karl Barth

Spectatorship and the Idol of Being A systema tic theolog ian who was keenly aware of the paths trodden and n blind alleys explore d by his predece ssors, Barth voices his deep suspicio n "criterio the into of the concept of being, in particul ar when it is exalted correct tedly of all things" (CD II/1, 243) . On the one hand, it is undoub to that theolog y must let God be God by systema tically giving express ion the of y God's actualit y and, in so doing, must also undersc ore the actualit world as the work of God, who actually is the world's creator. In other words, theolog y as speech about God must seriousl y take into conside ration the reality of both God and the world. But therein lurks the y danger. For, on the other hand, as human speech about God, theolog divine from ing conclud ically always runs the risk of illicitly and simplist and human actualit y to "a being commo n to God and man which finally and properl y establis hes and upholds the fellows hip between them" (CD II/1, 243). In Barth's opinion , this conclus ion on the part of the theolog ian cannot but show itself to be arbitrar y and self-abs orbed. Proceed ing chiefly and in the first place through the concept of being creates the illusion that God's actualit y is being upheld, wherea s, in fact, it is the human actualit y that inevitab ly become s the standar d of all else. And ty knowle dge of God which takes as its starting point the being of humani "Our onomy: self-aut l deceitfu in can only be empty specula tion rooted suppose d idea of God, the object of our most intimate feeling, will always be the idea of the world and in the last resort of man. It will always be our own reflection, the hyposta tization of our thought and speech" (CD II/1, 228; cf. 63, 71-72). In short, epistem ically to privileg e the idea of shared being (howev er this shai·ing is envision ed) is to misund erstand both God and humani ty.5 Let us look at the nature of this misund erstand ing further. Barth blames sevente enth-ce ntury Protesta nt Orthod oxy- both Luthera n and Reform ed- for uncritic ally borrow ing the concept of being from mediev al scholast icism, thus unwitti ngly laying the foundat ion for the naturali stic and anthrop omorph ic reductio nism to which the of Enlight enment and post-En lightenm ent · eras subjecte d the doctrine speech al analogic of view dt's Quenste s God. In his discuss ion of Andrea se about God,6 Barth notes that Quenst edt (1617-1 688)-w ho otherwi objects" "God is not God if he is consider ed and conceived as one in a series of like together but God, from apart himself know not must and cannot Man " (CD 11/1, 15); with God as his 'opposite '" (CD 11/1, 10). More examples appear below. 6 CD 11/1, 237-243. 5

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maintain s a strong Lutheran emphasi s on the theologic al centrality of the doctrine of the justificat ion of sinners through faith in the cross inadvert ently and inconsist ently makes not a single reference to God's gracious self-disc losure in Christ as fundame ntally constitut ive of the knowled ge of God. Instead, Quenste dt first rejects, and rightly so, the analogia inequalitatis and the analogia proportionalitatis, only, however , to affirm humans' natural mode of knowing God on the basis of the analogia attributionis construe d as an intrinsic property . The analogy of inequalit y is not a viable mode of predicati on because it assumes that the analogan s and the analogat um are both species of the same genus, which can never be true of both God and humanit y. Similarly , the analogy of proportio nality, which consists in the similarit y of two or more entities through the agreeme nt of some of their determin ations and the disagree ment of others, is unaccept able as an expressio n of humans' status vis-a-vis God and their knowled ge of him. By conh·ast, the analogy of attributio n expresse s a similarit y between two objects, whereby what they share in conunon is primaril y and properly possesse d by the one and is only derivativ ely, through depende nce, either ascribed to or apprehe nded by the other (in the analogy' s extrinsic variety) or possesse d by the other (i.e., intrinsica lly present). By opting for the intrinsic interpret ation of the analogy of attributio n, Quenste dt, accordin g to Barth, posits a knowled ge of God which the creature, in that it exists, possesse s in itself apart from God's revelatio n, despite the creature' s alleged sinfulness.7 Even when Quenste dt is led to distingui sh, on the sh·ength of his view of analogic al predicati on, between humans' relative being and God's absolute being, this being is "withou t question identical in God and in us" (CD II/1, 241). Put different ly, being has emerged as the fundame ntal and constant category in which both God and humans participa te.a The fact of this participa tion cannot but be known to humanit y. As a result, the being of God is in fact knowabl e and accessible to human beings apart from God, through selfexamina tion. Unfortun ately, this situation not only presents the subseque nt reality of God's special revelatio n with an epistemi c straightja cket but, at best, essential ly falsifies the characte r and import of God's revelatio n and, at worst, makes the latter redunda nt.

7 "[R]evelat ion is not necessary to make us participan ts of the truth of God. We are so already, to the extent that we are, if only relatively, what God is absolutely" (CD 11/1, 241). s "[T]he criterion of all h·uth .. . is not God at all, but the being in which God and man- the former absolutely, the latter relatively -participa te" (CD II/1, 241).

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Thus, for Barth, Quenstedt' s doch·ine of analogy is, in fact, coextensive with the Roman .C atholic doch·ine of the analogy of being, to whichbecause of its seeming Christological indifference - Barth refers in no uncertain terms as "the invention of Anticlu·ist" (CD I/1, x; II/1, 82) . In that, by proceeding from human being, it posits being as the overarching category, the analogia entis necessarily raises a host of speculative issues that then must lead to other questions concerning the transition from possibility to actuality. Put differently, the analogia entis must first deal with abstract considerations before it can be applied.9 Absh·act resolutions, however, can be little more than arbih·ary. Thus Barth recognizes that the general question of God's know ability can be posed. But such a question can have only a human point of departure: "a preconceived idea about the transcendence and supramundanity of God" (CD II/1, 15), "even [about] God as the incomparably real being" - preconceived, because this idea is grounded in the claim that, "[a]s himself a being, man is able to know a being as such ... [and thus] all being" (CD II/1, 84). In the end, therefore, the question whether God is knowable will likewise have only a human answer, or rather will lack an answer altogether. Any decision concerning the knowability of God, rooted in general epistemological considerations, leads to doubt, for as such it necessarily arises as only one possibility among many. This situation is hardly remedied by radically separating God and humans within the conceptually delineated spech·um of being through qualifying their respective being as absolute and relative, or tlU'ough ascribing to God transcendence, supramundanity, or incomparable reality. 10 When all is said and done, the product of human Cf. CD II/1, 84. Jilngel points out that the late Barth's suspicion of the analogia entis did not consist in the analogy's seeming relativization of the qualitatively infinite difference between God and humans. Rather, Barth feared that the analogia en tis "would not do justice to the difference between God and man by overlooking the 11earness of God." God as the Mystery of the Word, 282. If my interpretation of Barth's understanding of the analogia entis is correct, then what Jilngel seems to overlook is that Barth's fear had an even deeper motivation. Its source was not so much the analogy's inability to account for God's nearness, but rather the analogy's arbih·ary radicalization of the separation between God and humans in an attempt to save God from the multiple possibilities, the ambiguity and the absh·action inherent in the analogy's speculative sh·ucture. This renders a part of the Roman Catholic defense of the analogia entis simply misdirected. For example, the allegation that "Aquinas' analogy does not rest on a preconceived epistemology, but remains valid both in a natural and in a revealed epistemology" misses the point that it is rather the epistemology's arbih·ariness, absh·action and revelation-neuh·al character that Barth finds objectionable. Barth's own epistemology is, in a sense, very much a pre-conceived one-more on this below. Likewise, to say that "Aquinas' analogy does not desh·oy the infinite qualitative 9

10

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questioning after the possibility of knowing God is a certainty always and everywhere riddled with uncertainty, a knowledge which knows Godeven in his lordship, even in his creatorship-only as ambiguous and so as ultimately unthinkable. 11 When the question whether God is known is asked, there can be no actual answer but a persistent question mark that leads to self-deception or despair.12 In keeping with his criticism of Quenstedt, Barth's denial of the natural knowledge of God through the concept of being appears to be largely hamartiological in character. To ask after the possibility of knowing God cannot but be self-serving: "the attempt of man to answer the riddle of his own existence and of that of the world, and in that way to master himself and the world" (CD II/1, 85).13 Barth is emphatic: in knowing God, we can never be mere "spectators ... on neuh·al ground" (CD II/1, 26, 81), seeking to assure God's Godhood, seeking to know God as the god whose definition we have already arrived at on the basis of, and from within, our existence, regardless of how different, even infinitely different, from us we might have made him. Neither can we act interestedly, in "the attempt to preserve and affirm [ourselves-which] is not only the possibility but the deepest reality of [human] existence" (CD II/1, 135). In brief, to ask whether God exists is to misconstrue God and to render him arbih·ary; at bottom it is to misinterpret oneself, to distort one's being, and so, by departing from the wrong place, to arrive at a vacuum, an idol,14 characterized by being and transcendence.

The Lord Who Knows Himself and Gives Himself to Be Known What then is Barth's alternative? According to the Swiss theologian, in coming to know God, we do not proceed from the establishment of a difference between God and man, because it simply asserts the priority of God over man with respect to the perfections of both God and man" is to overlook the fact that it is the positing of this "infinite qualitative difference" and of the "priority of God over man" as a defense against indeterminacy that leads Barth to reject the analogia entis. For the Roman Catholic citations, see Battista Mondin, The Principle of Analogy in Protestant and Catholic Theology, 2nd ed. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), 169-170. The question whether or not Barth really understood Aquinas is beyond the scope of this article. 11 Cf. CD II/1, 70, 80. 12 Cf. CD II/1, 91. 13 Our analogies (e.g., of lordship) "do not point us to God, but to ourselves, to our God-alienated souls, to our threatened life on this side of death, to a merely possible lordship set in the sphere of our choosing" (CD II/1, 76) . 14 Cf. CD II/1, 86.

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possibility to the identificatio n of an actuality- an enterprise which is necessarily arbitrary and open to questioning. Rather, "[k]nowledg e of God can always proceed only from the knowledge of his existence in the twofold sense that we always have this knowledge and that we must have it from God Himself in order consequentl y to know him" (CD II/1, 39). It is the actuality of God-more specifically, of God's self-disclos ure-that unambiguou sly determines its own possibility. 15 This proposition underlies not only Barth's entire ontology, 16 but is also of fundamenta l epistemolog ical significance. It asserts that "[t]he knowability of God can be known only in the real knowledge of God" (CD II/1, 65) . Consequent ly, we do not ask whether God is known, but only in what manner and how far he is known.17 We shall now look at these questions in light of Barth's criticism of the concept of being and of the doctrine of analogy as it was elaborated by Roman Catholic and Protestant scholasticism. Because it is rooted in God's revelation, "[t]he knowledge of God," holds Barth, "takes place, not in a free choice, but with a very definite consh·aint . . . the constraint of God's Word" (CD II/1, 7). Therefore, only where this word is proclaimed in faithfulness to the biblical witness does the possibility of knowing God present itself. And there is only one such place: the church of Jesus Christ. "The Gospel of the Church of God is . .. of necessity a defined, circumscrib ed and limited message ... It explains, not an idea of God, but His name revealed in His deeds" (CD Il/1, 20, emphasis added). The actuality of the church is itself a revelatory deed of God, the work of his Word-the church exists solely through the proclamatio n of Jesus Christ. Thus, the actuality of the church is itself a witness to the actuality of God's revelation and the correspondi ng possibility of knowing God. In short, for Barth, h·ue knowledge of God arises from the church and serves the church.IS Now, because the church exists thanks to the gospel and by proclaiming the gospel (even though the gospel, and within it God himself, is that which the church makes available), God in his revelation remains the Lord of the Church. Put differently, in the church's confession, God gives himself as an object to be known by humans: "Biblical faith lives upon the 1s

"Where the actuality exists there is also the corresponding possibility" (CD II/1, 5). So Eberhard Ji.ingel, God's Being is in Becoming, h·ans. John Webster (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2001), 33. 17 Cf. CD II/1, 4-5, 63. Hence, Barth notes, the doch'ine of the knowledge of God ca1mot be considered as an independent prolegomenon to the systematic-the ological task; rather, it is an inh·insic part of the doctrine of God itself (cf. CD II/1, 32). 1s Cf. CD II/1, 63, 180. 16

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objectivity of God" (CD 11/1, 15). But he remains, at the same time, the subject and the sole initiator of this knowledge of himself: "Biblical knowledge of God is always based on encounters . . . in which God exercises in one way or another His Lordship over man" (CD II/1, 23). This manner of God's being known by humans as the subject of his own objectivity is of tremendous significance for the interpretatio n not only of Barth's understandi ng of the divine - human relationship , but also of God himself. As the subject of his knowledge, "God is known by God, and what is more, by God alone" (CD II/1, 233; cf. 65-66, 183), Barth avers. But as the object of his knowledge, God gives himself to be known by humans, who in his objectivity come to know him as the subject. This is the content of God's revelation; this is the church's proclamati on- beyond it there is no God but an ambiguous and endless string of impossible possibilities. To show how easy it is to relapse into this abstraction in interpreting Barth's principle "God is known only by God," we may take as an example one of Barth's Roman Catholic critics who maintains that the principle necessarily breaks down. "If it is false, somebody else besides God knows Him. If it is true, there is at least another being besides God, namely Karl Barth, that knows something about God." 19 Against such a one- sided construal of God's self-knowle dge and human knowledge of God, Barth holds, in keeping with his emphasis on actuality, that God's "revelation is characterise d as revelation of the truth beside which there is no other and above which there is none higher" (CD II/1, 51, emphasis added). How is one then specifically to unpack the principle that God alone knows himself and, at the same time, believe that God can himself be truly known in what the church witnesses to? To answer this question, we must continually remind ourselves to keep God's actuality as our premise. The church's witness is to Jesus Christ as the man in whom God has become a human being. Now, if the man Jesus is God and in him God truly knows himself, this actuality means that such self-knowle dge is possible for God, and therefore must exist as an actuality already in God himself. It means, therefore, that God simply is the Father, whom Jesus, as the Father's eternal Son, proclaimed. In short, God corresponds to himself-is himself- in his revelation. To express this corresponde nce, Barth distinguishe s, therefore, between God's primary and secondary objectivity: "God is objectively immediate to himself [primary objectivity], but to us He is objectively mediate ... clothed under the sign and veil of other objects different from Himself. His secondary

objectivity is fully true for it has its corresponde nce and basis in His primary objectivity" (CD II/1, 16). It must be noted at this point that the distinction between God's primary and secondary objectivity does not mean that they can ever be separated, that the subjectivity and objectivity of God can ever be considered, let alone exist, apart from each other. Rather, both are a fact of God's revelation.20 Their togetherness is inseparably enclosed within one proposition : God reveals himself (that is, gives himself to be known), as the Lord (that is, as none other than God), who, as God, alone knows himself, and so can give himself to be known. In this way, the humanity of Christ is not accidental or external to God's very being and self-knowle dge. To press further the issue of the inseparabili ty of God's secondary and primary objectivity, one must place Barth's assertion, "God is known by God," side by side with his affirmation of divine sovereignty , "God ultimately wills Himself," he wills his glory. This "willing is primarily a determinati on of the love of the Father and the Son in the fellowship of the Holy Ghost" (CD II/2, 169). In this apparent self-seeking, the seeking of his glory,21 God desires, however, to find himself together with a particular man, identifiable by a name and a story. Only as this theanthropic totality does God' s willing constitute God's primal decision: "[i]n this primal decision God did not remain satisfied with His own being in Himself" but rather "has caught up man into the sovereign presupposin g of Himself" (CD II/2, 168, 176). So much so that the Logos, the second mode of divine subsistence, is and remains a stopgap if "it" is considered without the humanity of Jesus of Nazareth. What this means is that God's being is decision (CD II/2, 175), a decision for otherness, for creatureline ss made in the loving freedom of God. Consequent ly, just as God's self-willing is not a self-seeking, neither does God's self-knowle dge have the form of closed unknowabil ity. On the contrary, both will and knowledge represent and implement God's openness to the creature, the permanence of which is underwritte n by God's (and therefore no one else's) free (and therefore committed) initiative. For it is in willing himself that God eternally comes to know himself. And so, on account of his loving decision, God does not know himself without humanity: "the only begotten Son of God and So Jtingel: " precisely in order to understand the objectivity of God in his revelntion, Barth infers from this objectivity a ' primary objectivity' of God in God's i1merh·initaria n being, differentiated from God's objectivity in revelation. [But] Barth understands this 'i1mertrinitarian inference' ... as itself knowledge of revelntion (and not metaphysical speculation!)." God's Being is in Beco111ing, 63; emphasis added. 21 Cf. CD II/2, 142, 178. 20

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therefore God Himself ... has become the bearer of our flesh, and does not exist as God's Son from eternity to eternity except in our flesh. Our flesh is therefore present when He knows God as the Son the Father, when God knows Himself. In our flesh God knows Himself" (CD II/1, 151). In short, the being-in-wil ling of God is the foundation of the historical existence of humanity; at the same time the self-knowle dge of God underlies the possibility of our knowledge of God as the one who loves us in his freedom. There is in Barth an "intrinsically divine basis of God's revelation" (CD II/2, 97, emphasis added) . Because, in God's knowledge of himself in our flesh, God's being and his revelation - if they are truly to be God's being in the actuality of his revelation - are inseparably conjoined, these two must be explicated further and explicitly through the lens of the Son's assumption of the flesh into his divinity. Since we have been implicitly following the order of coming to the knowledge of God, let us begin with revelation. According to Barth, "[r]evelatio n means the giving of signs ... revelation means sacrament" (CD II/1, 52). Now, since God reveals himself uniquely in the humanity of Jesus by knowing himself in it, "[t]he humanity of Jesus Christ as such is the first sacrament, the foundation of everything that God instituted and used in His revelation as a secondary objectivity both before and after the epiphany of Jesus Christ" (CD II/1, 54). 22 Briefly put, the humanity of Jesus determines the general incarnationa l pattern of God's self-disclosure, both in the history of Israel and of the church. This pattern is one of veiling and unveiling. God veils himself in what is "foreign and improper to Himself . . . . the conceal[ing] of His objectivity by the quite different objectivity of the creature" (CD II/1, 55). Yet even in this concealmen t "the knowledge of God is unlike all other knowledge in that its object is the living Lord of the knowing man" (CD II/1, 21). The reason God thus lowers and veils himself is that in h is good-pleasu re God desires "to be known by us according to the measure of our own human cognition ... in a temporal way" (CD II/1, 61). Consequent ly, revelation is never identical with God himself. 23 It discloses God himself as a mystery.24 Nonetheless , because God actually desires to be known and, on account of his good-pleasu re, discloses 22 On the consh·ual of the pre-incarnate Logos as a 'stop-gap' for Jesus' humanity, see CD II/2, 96. See also Jtingel's comments in God's Being is in Beco111i11g, 95, and 78-80 for a discussion of Barth's concept of God's immanent being as "ours in advance," selfconsistent and self-correspon ding. 23 Cf. CD II/1, 211. 24 Cf. CD II/1, 40.

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himself in earthly temporality, God is "who He is even in the sphere of our apprehension" (CD II/1, 244), he "is who He is in His works" (CD II/1, 260). Thus we can cleave to God only by cleaving to his work that takes place in the creaturely sphere.25 It ought to be obvious at this point that divine veiling and unveiling are not equally balanced: "the relationship between veiling and unveiling is not synuneh·ical equivocal, vacillating or obscure, nor is it a reversal and alternation dependent on the arbitrariness of God and man," rather, both concepts refer to the grace of the revelation of God (CD II/1, 236; cf. 199, 215). For Barth the simultaneity of God's veiling in unveiling constitutes a teleologically ordered dialectic of incomprehensi bility amidst definiteness. 26 What all this amounts to is that, because God' s self-disclosure happens in the manner of divine condescension and acconunodatio n, it can be apprehended but not understood. Moreover, on account of both its mam1er and its object, the knowledge of God arising out of his self-disclosure can never exhaust the depth of God's being. Only God knows himself. Yet, despite the inexhaustibility of God's being, in his revelation God shows himself to be self-same: "The fact that God gives to us only a share in the truth of His knowledge of Himself cannot mean that He does not give Himself to be known by us as the One He is" (CD II/1, 52). Barth does not deny that "a further knowledge of God" is possible, but it can only be intensive in nature and so "will only lead us deeper into just this entirety of His being" (CD II/1, 52). In short, because God unveils himself by veiling himself, he discloses himself as God, the Lord whom the knowing humans can never objectify or possess, but who in all his self-possession gives himself to be known by them as an object. We now move on to God's being and the way it is to be understood, as a fact of revelation, through God's secondary objectivity. God reveals his divine lordship in his being " the Father of His own eternal Son and with Him the source of the Holy Spirit" (CD II/1, 48). These three modes of God's actuality are disclosed in his knowledge of himself in the man Jesus, and so, in that in Christ God corresponds to himself, God is likewise actually triune in his eternal self. Triunity is an occurrence in God himself which gives sh·ength to our knowledge of God. Consequently, in knowing God, humans can never bypass his triune being: The illegitimate encroachment on our part is to resist the divine encroachment when we have to do with the truth of the truth itself, and

2s 26

Cf. CD II/1, 53. Cf. CD II/1, 232-233.

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to ask after a h·uth which is superior to the opem1ess between the Father and the Son by the Holy Spirit, as if this openness were not the original and real openness, the source and norm of all others, and as if there were a higher criterion than the fact that God is God and that in His revelation is also God among us and for us. (CD II/1, 68) . As Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, God is thus determinate, even though the possibility corresponding to the actuality of his being Father, Son, and Holy Spirit must remain hidden and inexhaustible. 27 Therefore, in this definiteness, albeit full of hiddem1ess and inexhaustibility , these names for the modes of God's being must not be regarded as illustrative but interpretative in nature. 28 As the words of God's self-demonstra tion, they give authoritative (on the authority of God's use of them) expression in human language to God's revelatory self-correspond ence. In this function they thus gain a new meaning, a revelatory meaning, that can now inform their subsequent use. In sum, by so consh·uing the doch·ine of the Trinity, Barth does not reject the concept of being as a determinative, and so also constraining, category. Recall that he criticized the application of this concept to God in his discussion of the analogia en.tis, but he did so not because the concept was inherently idolatrous, as contemporary theology appears to think, but because in its application it was arbitrarily elevated to the status of an overarching category whose antlU'opocentric abstraction could never form the foundation of the divine-human fellowship. Here, however, Barth reclaims being in reference to God, showing its determinatenes s to be one of God's self-knowledge in the mutual objectivity of the Father, the Son, in whom the Father knows himself in the flesh, and their Spirit. Proceeding from God's revelation, Barth shows God's being to be one of determinate, though incomprehensi ble, revelation-orie nted becoming. 29

Displaced Knowers We began our discussion of Barth's alternative to the ambiguity and arbih·ariness that characterizes the knowledge of God arrived at through the analogia entis by pointing to the actuality of the church as the witness to the actuality of God's revelation. The existence of the church, however, 27 "The hiddermess of God is the inconceivability of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit; of the one h·ue God, our Creator, Reconciler and Redeemer, who as such is known only to Himself, and is therefore viewable and conceivable only to Himself, and alone capable of speaking of Himself aright, i.e., in h·uth" (CD II/1, 197). 2s Cf. Junge!, God's Being is in Beco111i11g, 24. 29 To this, see Junge!' s paraphrase of Barth's doch·ine of God.

ne Con vers ation Malysz: From Divi ne Sove reign ty to Divi

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its Lord , but also the pres ence impl ies not only the reve lator y pres ence of s hims elf as the object of their of the peop le of God , who , in him that offer 3 . 0 Bart h's hars h rejection of the know ledg e, know and glorify their Lord ratin g that "[w] e poss ess no anal ogy of bein g was aime d at dem onst bein g of God as the Lord can anal ogy on the basis of whic h the natu re and use God cann ot "be adde d to be accessible to us" (CD II/1, 75). It is so beca osed to be anal ogou s to Him " give cont ent and subs tanc e to wha t is supp hims elf in the hum anity of the (CD II/1, 76). Yet, in that the Fath er know s s Christ] .... In Him the fact Son, "we do not stan d outs ide but insid e [Jesu God Him self, not only betw een that God is know able is true not only for (CD II/1, 151). Thus "Go d's the Fath er and Son, but for man , for us" s of the mov eme nt of thou ght reve latio n brea ks thro ugh the emp tines II/1, 74). In this reve latio n" our whic h we call our know ledg e of God " (CD defin ite perm issio n" (CD II/1, know ing receives the char acter of a very 243) .

hum an bein gs indif feren t. God This perm issio n, how ever , does not leav e s of his reve latio n, but rathe r does not allow hum ans to be mere spec tator atory, and rede mpti ve lord ship discloses to them his re-creative, reconcili h·uth of God himself.31 God 's in whic h they can be truly hum an in the t the sinn ers' disp lacem ent, reve latio n, as it touc hes sinne rs, bring s abou they cann ot only truly inter pret, mov ing them into a posi tion from whic h cosmos, who is conf ronte d with but also truly be, themselves: "Ma n in the conf ronte d by God 's reve latio n, God 's reve latio n ... becomes, as the man in the who le com pass of his objectively anot her man .. . nam ely one who owle dge the migh t and glory of existence can now know and has to ackn no long er reall y exists as such or this God ," who in his self- unde rstan ding ding " (CD II/1, 110, 112; cf. "exis ts only in one mon sh·ou s misu nder stan in Jesu s Chri st and in Him alon e" 27). In God 's reve latio n, "[m] an exists

(CD II/1, 149). the prio r know ledg e of God Now , beca use sinn ers are so disp laced , all to naug ht as self-serving and they migh t think they had mus t com e 32 initially seem sh·ange, give n idola trous . It cann ot be built on. This may Cf. CD II/1, 180. of an alrea dy existing subject to an object "Kno wled ge of God is not the relati onshi p obed ient to the laws of his spher e. On the that enter s into his sphere and is therefore subject of its know ledge by comi ng into the s create conh·ary, this know ledge first of all the pictu re" (CD II/1, 21; cf. 39). eye and ce, exam ine the same star with the naked 32 So Mond in: "I may, for instan ly and clear more I shall see the star much with a telescope. Certainly with the telescope God that know may one arly, same . Simil completely, but the star alway s rema ins the 30

31

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that Barth claims elsew here that our true know ledge of God is neve r exha usted , that God alone h·uly know s hims elf. Note , howe ver, that in the case of revel ation , our know ledge is alwa ys correct, havin g God as its obje ct-it simp ly may not be inten sive enou gh. By contr ast, the sinne r's own know ledge , estab lishe d throu gh the analo gy of being , has the wron g poin t of depa rture , beca use it is prior to the displ acem ent of faith. It is exten sivel y wron g, in that it is grou nded on arbit rary and abstr act deter mina tion. The silme r's know ledge is an objec tless know ledge . This, howe ver, does not mean that belie vers' know ledge of God is some thing that beco mes their s to do with as they please. Rather, know ledge of God alwa ys happ ens in the humi lity of faith, name ly, in the recog nitio n of the lords hip of the Fathe r, who, by know ing hims elf in the flesh of the Son, lovin gly know s the creat ure. Know ledge of God happ ens in the recog nitio n of one's creat ureli ness. Now , beca use this know ledge is by God' s graci ous perm issio n and beca use it is a know ledge of the Lord by the creat ure, it is neve r posse ssed. 33 "The know ledge of God is whol ly and utter ly His own readi11ess to be know n by us, grou nded ill His being and activ ity" (CD II/1, 66) . Wha t this mean s is that "read iness on the side of man . . . can have only a borro wed, medi ated and subs eque nt indep ende nce. It can be comm unica ted to man only as a capa city for grati tude and obed ience " (CD Il/1, 66). Yet, beca use this "obe dienc e is not that of a slave but of a child " (CD Il/1, 36), thus, even thou gh the know ledge of God is not posse ssed, it is lovil lgly and "con tinua lly rene wed and re-es tabli shed by its object" (CD II/1, 24) . This is true gaill, for- in the displ acem ent to a posit ion ill whic h we can be ourse lves and from whic h we can see ourse lves in the true light of God' s revel ation as the revel ation of our mak er-w e are freed from ourse lves. In short , beca use we do not begin with ourse lves, we, there fore, are not doom ed to end with our puny capacity.34 In know ing God "we are not lost ill that ascen ding and desce ndill g mov emen t but held -hel d as by the merc y of God but for that reaso n really held" (CD II/1, 75), as "God allow s us our time in orde r that He may alwa ys have time for us, revel ation time" (CD II/1, 62). To summ arize , i11 their smfu lness hum ans cann ot know God at all beca use they are displ aced from themselve s. None thele ss, as believers, they can know God only beca use he bring s them, as they are ill their exists witho ut know ing that He is triune, yet it is h·uly God one know s." The Principle of Annlogtj in Protestant nnd Catholic Theology, 160-161. 33 Cf. CD II/1, 182, 188. 34 Cf. CD II/1, 43.

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creaturelin ess, to the discernme nt of his relational and revelatory activity. Redeemed creation is God's creation, not a godless one. Therefore, rather than annul the distance between God and itself, on account of God's constant relating to the world, it humbly upholds the infinite ontologica l distance between the creator and the creature. To express this relationsh ip of distance in nearness, Barth's alternative to the analogia entis as the basis of human knowledg e of God is the analogy of faith (analogia fidei) .35 God is knowable only because he actually relates to humanity, but he is known in this relationsh ip only through faith. Faith discerns his presence in the objects of the world and in human language but, because it never possesses its knowledg e of God, it does so only "looking back from God's revelation " (CD 11/1, 229). This is an important qualification, for it constitute s the reason why Barth does not in principle reject the concept of the analogy of being, provided it should signify participat ion in being through God's gracious revelation apprehend ed in faith.36 Conseque ntly, in the first place, if being is understoo d as following upon the works of God, 37 then, through faith, which recognizes God's relationsh ip to humanity, humans become extrinsic analogues of God.38 Further, as a re-creative and redemptiv e displacem ent of the sinner, faith confesses that, just as God displaces the sinner into his divine being in order that the latter might know him as Lord, he likewise sacrament ally and incarnatio nally claims earthly objects as vehicles of his unique objectivity . Finally, in the same manner, God lays hold of human language as the analogical medium of his revelation.39 Before concludin g this discussion of Karl Barth, let us briefly consider this linguistic aspect of God's self-disclo sure. Despite his reservatio ns, Barth does not discard the concept of analogy because, although human words correspon d to and agree with the being of God, they are never on a par with that being-" that would mean the annulmen t either of the deity of God or of the manhood of man" (CD 11/1, 233). In order to preserve this revelatory distinction , Barth therefore rejects univocalit y, as obliteratin g the distinction altogether (veiling), and equivocali ty, as doing away with Cf. CD II/1, 82; "the analogy of grace and faith . . . which is made accessible to us in incomprehe nsible reality" (CD II/1, 85). 36 Cf. CD II/1, 82. 37 Cf. CD II/1, 83. in the veracity of the 38 "What converts the creature into an analogue of God lies only object known analogously in the knowledge of God, and therefore in the veracity of God himself" (CD II/1, 239) . 39 Cf. CD II/1, 224-5, 229-230. 35

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God's self-sam e determin ateness (unveiling) in his revelation.40 He states: "In distinctio n to both likeness and unlikene ss 'analogy ' means similarity, i.e., a partial correspo ndence and agreeme nt (and, therefore, one which limits both parity and disparity between two or more different entities)" (CD 11/1, 225). Barth's adoption of the tradition al category is, however , also an adaptatio n, as ought to be obvious from our discussio n so far. First of all, he emphasi zes that analogy as a concept is insufficient, in that, while God gives himself as an object, he is not an object among other objects to be subjected to the prior rules of analogy.41 Analogy is further insufficient because "[t]o designat e the positivity and truth of the relations hip between [God and humanity ] we use the concept of similarit y and therefore of a partial correspo ndence and agreeme nt" (CD 11/1, 234). Yet neither "the one, entire and indivisib le being of God, who has umeserv edly made Himself accessible and imparted Himself to us in His revelatio n without reservati on," nor the human being, entire and indivisib le in its creaturel iness and sinfulness, is calculable (CD 11/1, 234) . "For in this relations hip man is confront ed by God" (CD 11/1, 234; cf. 235-236). Second, instead of the "static" doctrine of analogy based on the concept of being (nature), Barth puts forth a dynamic concept of analogy 42 revolvin g around God's veiling and unveilin g in his revelator y relating to the world (grace). In his understa nding, Barth emphasi zes the fact that God, by disclosin g himself through claiming worldly objects and human language and through displacin g sinners, reveals that the world belongs to him as its creator and that it is rightly his own. Thus, in the same way that God's revelatio n discloses our creaturel y inability to know God and yet makes him known to us, God's revelatio n also discloses our inability to speak of God and simultan eously opens up our lips. God claims and justifies human thinking and speaking , as well as upholdin g those who think and speak of him in humility before him. In short, God justifies the entirety of human existence in Christ.43 In conclusio n, Barth maintain s the distinctio n between God and humans by construi ng God's revelator y nearness as the actual establish ment of his 40 "We are forced to decide against the 1111ivoce because it conflicts with the confession of God's veiling in His revelation, and against the aequivoce because it conh·adicts the confession of His unveiling; against the one as against the other because it cannot be united with the confession of God's grace in his revelation" (CD Il/1, 240). 41 Cf. CD II/1, 226. 42 Cf. CD II/1, 231. 43 Cf. CD II/1, 193, 214.

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indifferent. "We cann ot spea k of the lord ship . As such it can nev er leav e us ibility. For it is concretely real ised kno wab ility of God as an absh·act poss the Son by the Hol y Spir it" (CD 11/1, by God Him self, in the Fath er and in er, who kno ws him self in the hum an 68). God 's lord ship is that of the Fath that proc eeds from both . It is a reflesh of his divi ne Son by the Spir it se natu re is beco min g and thro ugh crea tive and rede mpt ive lord ship , who r existence, also beco me wha t they whi ch hum ans, with the tota lity of thei ts his triun e lord ship by disp laci ng h·uly are. Specifically, God man ifes n and into part icip atio n in his grace. hum anit y from its sinf ul self- dece ptio an inhe rent ly idol ah·o us category, In this Bart h show s that bein g is not rmin ed by the actu ality of God 's prov ided that its con tent is dete lord ship by offe ring and uph oldi ng reve latio n. Furt her, God man ifes ts his he reclaims hum an lang uag e and true kno wle dge of him self . Finally, ess him. In all this, the over arch ing end ows it with the capa city to expr is and mus t rem ain the life-cenh·e of prin cipl e rem ains that "Ch risto logy theo logy " (CD 11/1, 242) . stological (and ham artio logi cal) Yet, desp ite this unp aral lele d chri ther Bart h's rein terp reta tion of the emp hasi s, one is left won deri ng whe the lens of God 's objective lord ship conc epts of bein g and anal ogy thro ugh muc h of the arbi trari ness of the has not inad vert entl y reta ined too conj oin God 's actu al kno wab ility with scholastic doct rine . In his atte mpt to doe s Bart h not juxt apos e objectivity the fact that it is God 's kno wab ility , eptu ally they beco me the oute rmo st and lord ship to such a deg ree that conc een? Is not lord ship then sim ply a limi ts of the infinite spec trum in-b etw 44 to esca pe the imp ress ion that even subs titut e for tran scen denc e? It is hard h is abov e all the agen t of an infinite in the actu ality of Christ, God for Bart an actu ality who se natu re it is to inte nsiv ely-prog ress ing with draw al, aps the conc ept of lord ship mer its a elud e hum an gras p. If it is so, perh al vestiges than Bart h offers, so that mor e thor oug h purg ing of the anal ogic so doin g app ears to take hum anit y the Lord who gives himself, and in and also so that the disp lace men t of serio usly , may actu ally be rece ived , e t acro ss the hum anly unb ridg eabl hum ans may be true disp lace men ert Rob to turn s in min d, we now onto logi cal divi de. Wit h these ques tion Jens on. II. Conversation: Robert W. Jenson rch Dogmatics for its "par ade of Rob ert Jens on prai ses Karl Bart h's Chu mod ern theo logy had answ ered in trini taria n solu tion s to ques tion s that ed ciliation, Barth seem s to have reco gniz In his treat men t of the doch·ine of recon and IV /2, 224. some of this dang er; cf. CD IV /1, 186 44

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unita rian fashion."45 At the same time, as a Luth eran more inclin ed to espou se the Catholic (and catholic!), rathe r than Prote stant, answ ers to divis ive theological quest ions, 46 Jenso n is less intere sted in upho lding God' s revel atory lords hip as an expre ssion of the ontic and episte mic distan ce, even if it be only a distan ce in nearn ess, betw een God and huma nity. It appe ars that for Jenso n sover eignt y ough t not to be main taine d in as rigid a fashio n if one really want s to do justice to the dyna mic of God' s self-disclosure. Now, since God' s self-disclosure is that of the Trinity, the notio n of God being God over all and over every thing must be given a more explicitly trinit arian form. Jenso n thus differs from Barth in the way he triune ly const rues God' s being and hidde nness , and with those the huma n capac ity to know and speak of God. This will now be explo red in more detail.

The Hidden IdentitlJ of God's Being and Work As with Barth, the actua lity of churc h's confe ssing procl amati on, accor ding to Jenson, prese nts huma ns with the possi bility of know ing of God. It is so becau se the churc h not only is itself found ed on Chris t's work , or becau se in its existence Chris t's origin al incar natio nal sacra ment ality is vario usly replic ated. More than that, the churc h in its entire ty is the prese nce of Chris t himse lf in such a way that the totus Christus is Christ, as the secon d ident ity of God, toget her with his churc h.47 The histo ry of the churc h, of the entire peop le of God, thus serve s not mere ly as a frame work withi n whic h God can be locate d in a deter mina te way, but this histo ry is itself God' s ident ity: "the phras e 'Fath er, Son, and Holy Spirit' is simu ltane ously a very comp resse d telling of the total narra tive by whic h Scrip ture ident ifies God and a perso nal name for the God so speci fied" (I:46). In fact, the name and the narra tive are ident ical (I:46). 48 In them God conv eys himself in such a way that there is no other or highe r God beyo nd these "tem poral and 'limit ing' mode s of exper ience " (I:46) . Cons equen tly, "we are stuck with the name s and descr iption s the biblical narra tive conti ngent ly enforces, whic h seem desig ned alway s to offen d

somebo dy."49 We are stuck with them because, even though we cannot go as far as dissolvi ng God in his narrativ e identity , the syntax of these descript ions, God's eternal decision to be God in this narrativ e, triune way and in no other, is hidden from us. We can neither identify synony ms, nor make translat ions. To do so would be to depart from the actualit y of divine self-dis closure into abstract specula tion, from God into man-ma de fiction. Jenson could not be more emphati c: "God does not traffic in fiction" (1:120). Jenson bemoan s contem porary theolog y's preoccu pation with this sort of fiction in the name of human agendas : "It can only be an occasio n of bitter amusem ent that recent demand s to bypass the name and the biblical habits of discour se and imagini ng and form more ideologically accepta ble languag e directly on the abstract formula s are made, of all things, in the name of experie nce and concreti on" (1:93). We must recall in this context Barth's frequen t references to God as creator, reconciler, and redeem er. For Barth, howeve r, these are not synony ms for God's triune name and, therefore, are not on a par with God's three modes of being. Rather, they refer to the totality of God's work, which does not exhaust the nature and 50 being of God, despite his selfsam eness in his revelation. In other words, God is Father, Son, and Spirit-s elf-sam e in his primary and seconda ry objecti vity- and only then, in the totality of his triune being, is he creator, reconciler, and redeem er, but these aspects of God's work cannot as such do justice to the depth of God's self-sam e triune being, to "His name s reveale d in His deeds" (CD 11/1, 20). Note, in addition , that Barth conjoin s describe likewise the three action-d esignati ons with that of Lord, which this into ces God in his total being.s1 The modific ation that Jenson introdu interpre tation, as will be further explain ed below, is his emphas is that Father, Son, and Spirit are exhaust ively descript ive of both God's being and work, because the two are the same. Hence, in revealin g himself, God does not traffic in fiction or even the possibil ity thereof. Such a strong stateme nt of God's actualit y leads Jenson to part ways with Karl Barth in regard to both God's hiddenn ess and the way God's being ought to be constru ed in relation to human being. We begin with God's hiddenn ess. "It is vital," Jenson undersc ores,

to avoid the great contem porary denial of Nicea: the supposi tion that God's hiddenn ess is quantita tive, constitu ted in the metaph ysical distance from us .... God is not hidden because we can see only some of him through the metaph ysical distance s. He is hidden because his very presenc e is such as at one altogeth er to reveal and altogeth er to hide him. (II:161) Thus far this is in accord with Barth: God's hidde1m ess is a correlat e of his presence.5 2 Jenson goes on to assert, contra Barth, that "[t]he scriptur al hiddenn ess of God is not primari ly a matter of our epistem ic weakne ss or God's ontolog ical uniquen ess."53 Jenson criticizes Barth for separat ing God's being and nature from his "encroa chment ." Barth does this by appropr iating hiddenn ess primari ly to the Father, who, in the humani ty of the Son, unveils himself as the one who ca1mot be unveile d. For Barth the inner trinitari an possibil ity related to the actualit y of God's self-dis closure in Christ means the existenc e of the Trinity. Nonethe less, in that the asymm etry the dialectic of divine veiling and unveilin g corresp onds directly to God's modes of being, Barth's doctrine , Jenson is led to conclud e, "is ironical ly afflicted by a subtle subordi nationis m." 54 To avoid this, Jenson appeals to the biblical narrativ e in claimin g that God is hidden precisel y by his narrativ ely underst ood triunity ; specifically, "the locus of God's hiddenn ess is his reality as a moral agent involve d with other agents, his history with us."55 The persons of the Trinity are each both veiled and unveile d in the particul ar mam1er of each. What this means specifically is that, in the Father's case, his Fatherh ood is the ultimate fact, and because it is ultimate , there is God. The Father, as the origin of the Trinity, termina tes all searchin g behind himself for reasons and other explana tions. He is the source of all being, even of God himself . "And that God is thus in God a source of God is the [ultimat ely incomp rehensib le] possibil ity of God being also the source of things other than himself , of creature s, and the impossi bility of there being anythin g other than God that is not created by him ... because there is the Father, theodic y is finally impossi ble." 56 The unsearc hablene ss of the Father also Jenson, "The Hidden and Triune God," 6. Jenson, "The Hidden and Triune God," 9. 54 Jenson, "The Hidden and Triune God," 8. 55 Jenson, "The Hidden and Triune God," 9. 56 Jenson, "The Hidden and Triune God," 9. Addressi ng himself to Luther's understa nding of God's hiddenne ss, Jenson elaborates: "We ca1mot make God's providen ce morally compreh ensible. We carmot justify his ways. Our praise of God will always falter if hard pressed, not because he is not good but because we ca1mot say so 52

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t an "othe rwise " in God, acco unts for why it make s no sense to ask abou led hims elf in any other way name ly, abou t whet her God could have revea ant, from who m the Spiri t, as then the Fath er of his Son, the Suffe ring Serv ss of God in the Son is the from the Fathe r, proc eeds . Now , the hidd enne the peop le of Israel and the hidd enne ss of God in hum an flesh: the flesh of ls in a deter mina te way the flesh of one Israelite, Jesus.57 Jesus Chri st revea being , or non- being , of triun e being of God. To ackn owle dge any other ss the being of God in the God is thus idola try, but it is not idola try to confe evad e the Exile and the cross Son is of the Fathe r. "For it is as we seek to Spirit, who, Jenso n notes , is 5 the that we creat e idols ." 8 Finally, there is e he wills . The Spiri t is hidd enne ss almo st by definition, blow ing wher that, as the third ident ity of God' s freed om and open ness to the futur e, in and the Son for each other , God, by his "self -givi ng [he] frees the Fath er of the Suffe ring Serv ant and frees the Fath er to find hims elf in the other it may. " 59 In sum, God' s frees the Son to be the Fath er's serva nt, cost what uely ascri bed to each of the revel atory hidd enne ss is prop erly and uniq lly orien ted hidd enne ss in ident ities of God' s self-disclosure. It is a mora as God. the mids t of whic h God revea ls hims elf precisely God -The Mov emen t of Conv ersat ion core is the prop er locus Because for Jenso n h·init arian teach ing at its very sure as revealing his isclo self-d of God' s hidd enne ss, the mov emen t of God' s revea ls hims elf as God identity: hiddenness, and so his Godh ood, is his very that he rema ins in and en, Fathe r, Son, and Spirit, and so he rema ins hidd od. To unde rstan d God in hidd en, he h·uly is Fathe r, Son, and Spir it-G a sligh t chan ge of accen t visany other way is for Jenso n idola trous . This is iling (even thou gh ultim ately , a-vis Barth 's subtl e privi legin g of God' s unve asis seem s to get rever sed) . throu gh his cons trual of lords hip, the emph n is, there fore, led to reject None thele ss, in the same way as Barth, Jenso ), as necessarily some thing any ascri ption of "she er being " to God (1:211 time, like Barth, he does same over and abov e God' s tri-pe rsonh ood. At the in fact reaso nable respo nses to God's witho ut stutte ring. Athei sm, or sheer anger, are gy shoul d say all that, in public . That gover nance of his creation. The church's theolo ing an angui shed ' Never theles s!"' follow ed affirm God is the good Creat or can only be Theological Significance," in Dona ld K. Robert W. Jenson, "Luth er's Conte mpor ary Luther (Cambridge: University Press, McKim, ed., Tile Ca111bridge Co111pa11ion to Martin 2003), 279. to rection neither replaces nor is simpl y added 57 "Iden tifica tion by the Resur ic igmat parad its s verifie iption descr fying identification by the Exodus; the new identi prede cesso r." Jenso n I:44. ss Jenson, "The Hidd en and Triun e God," 10. e God," 11. 59 Jenson, "The Hidde n and Trim1

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not consi der the conce pt of being as inher ently idola trous . With its poten tial for deter mina tenes s, being may be profi tably utiliz ed, once it has been reinte rpret ed in order to accom moda te the gospel. 60 Now, what the gospe l exhibits are "thre e ident ities of one being " (I:106). These, as ough t to be evide nt from Jenso n's rejection of "shee r being " as an unde rlyin g ident ity-le ss ousia, are not to be unde rstoo d in a moda list sense, but rathe r in terms of a dram atic move ment from a point of origi n to a goal. Acco rding ly, Jenso n defin es a divin e ident ity as" a persona dramatis dei who can be repea tedly picke d out by a name or ident ifying descr iption or by prono uns, alway s by relati on to the other two" (I:106 ). What this mean s is that the Trini ty is not an ident ity: "the triun e God is alway s ident ified by refere nce to one or sever al of the three ident ities" (I:119). This is not to say, howe ver, that the Trini ty could not be regar ded as a comp lex perso nalit yafter all, there is only one God. To expre ss this interp enetr ating onen ess of the triun e personae, Jenso n appea ls to conte mpor ary const ruals of perso nhoo d as self-t ransc endin g, social openn ess. "God is not perso nal in that he is triun ely self-sufficient; he is perso nal in that he triun ely open s himse lf" (I:124). In sum, as Trini ty God rema ins his own unsea rchab le groun d, exhib iting self-s amen ess of being and a coher ence of actio n, that is, a self-consistent perso nal histor y, but at the same time this selfconsi stent perso nal histo ry can be interp reted deter mina tely and specifically only throu gh its dramatis personae. Let us look furth er at how Jenso n unde rstan ds this peric horet ic perso nality of God. In fact, it is from Hans Urs von Balth asar that Jenso n borro ws the idea of dram atic coher ence as the found ation of God' s triune ness.61 What he mean s by it is that God' s self-i denti ty is, like his perso nhoo d, an openn ess, becau se it is neces sarily estab lished from the end, from its outco me. "The biblical God is not etern ally himse lf in that he persi stentl y instan tiates a begin ning in whic h he alrea dy is all he ever will be; he is etern ally himse lf in that he unres tricte dly antic ipate s an end in whic h he will be all he ever could be" (I:66). As a dram atical ly coher ent move ment , God' s being is, therefore, chara cteriz ed by his own space and his own time. 62 In this space and time, the person ae dramatis, as selftrans cende nt, social agents, keep on comm unica ting, and so are const ituted as perso ns. For Jenso n being is conve rsatio n; 63 the Trini ty is Jenson 1:212. Jenson 1:55. 62 Cf. Jenson 1:95-96; 11:45-46. 63 Jenson 11:49. 60

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conversation.64 Language, however, is not merely a neutral exchange of some information. Rather, language consists of words that are themselves events and so makes possible both the recognition, and thus constitution, of others as persons, as well as the dramatic movement itself.65 Now, in that God's being is conversation, it means that others can also be invited to take part in it. The existence of the world, therefore, presupposes God's triunity. According to Jenson, "for God to create is for him to make accommodation in his triune life for other persons and things than the three whose mutual life he is. In himself, he opens room, and that act is the event of creation" (11:25). Creation happens through speech, because it is anticipated by the word of inner command in God.66 And so, "to be, as a creature, is to be mentioned in the triune moral conversation, as something other than those who conduct it" (11:35). Briefly put, "there is other reality than God because he speaks" (11:6); he speaks already within himself and, more importantly, speaks from what is and will be the common divine-human future . Given, therefore, God's nature, it is no surprise that God creates not a thing but history (11:14, 47)-a reality that is temporal and spatial. This construal of creation as a divine making room for truly other conversation partners thus raises questions of language and being in general. Having discussed the being of God, we now move on to Jenson's view of the creatures' capacity for participating in and expressing that being.

UnivocitrJ through God's Address We have already noted that God's being is not "sheer being" but rather dramatic conversation that allows for other partners. Jenson explains this further in a trinitarian fashion: "the Son mediates the Father's originating and the Spirit's liberating, thereby to hold open the creatures' space in

64 "The h·inity is . .. a conversation .. . that can never collapse into dialogue and monologue, because the three who make its poles are the conversation." Jenson 11:26. 65 Cf. Jenson I:171. Louis-Marie Chauvet's h·eahnent of the "symbolic" aspect of language may be helpful in understanding the implications of this conversational emphasis. The "efficacy of speech" makes it a vehicle of recognition, in that what is corrununicated is very often secondary to the fact that in communication one recognizes one's interlocutor as a subject, a conversation partner. The gratuitousness of this conversational recognition and the concomitant closeness are at the same time prevented from being overwhelming by a gracious difference in which recognition of genuine otherness can take place. So used, language assigns positions; it maintains difference in nearness. See The Sacraments: I7ie Word of God at the Mercy of the Body, h·ans. Madeleine Beaumont (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 2001), especially 110-125. 66 Cf. Jenson 11:8.

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being" (II:27). Creation is God's self-communication (II:7), and so the communication of God's being. Thus, in that, room is made by God in himself for others. Humans not only are participants in being; more than that, "creaturely being .. . answers to the simple occurrence of the triune being" (II:38) . The implications of this can hardly be overstated. When God says, "Let there be ... " (Genesis 1), whatever God means by 'be' is exactly what it means for a creature to be; in deed the utterance 'Let there be ... ' is itself the positive relation of creature to Creator, is itself the comparability of the fact that God is and that others than God are. Therefore insofar as 'being' says something about God or creatures, 'being' must after all be univocal rather than analogues. (II:38) This may look like a willful plunge into the ambiguity of the analogia entis on Jenson's part. However, nothing is farther from the truth. His construal of the being of God and humans as univocal is only an application of the principle that God does not traffic in fiction. As such, it need not mean that the difference between creator and creature has been obscured or obliterated. Jenson, in seeing creation as originated by God's speech and, consequently, in regarding being as univocal, is able to maintain the difference between God and humans by introducing a disparity on the level of language. In creation God speaks the world into being and then addresses the creature. To begin with, Jenson's exposition challenges Barth's claim that human words can only correspond to and agree with the being of God but are never on a par with that being, since, as Barth fears, that would annul the deity of God or the manhood of man. On the contrary, as one and the same language, human and divine words have the same meaning. Then, however, having stated the sameness of divine and human language, Jenson returns to his earlier point that language does not merely communicate. When God speaks humans into being and then addresses them, his words have the character of a "personal speech of commission" conversation (II:15-16). Thus, divine language is performative and commanding speech par excellence. God' s words are word-events. Human language can likewise be performative, even commanding, but in a different way: When we say "God is" ... we acknowledge om· entire dependence on a primary cause and reason of our being. . . . When God says, "God is" . .. in the infinite perichoresis of the triune life, he declares himself both as the one who is sufficient reason for his own being and as the one who has that reason. Or again, when we say, "Creatures are," we give thanks,

is anc e betw een God and hum ans . It In all, ther e is thus an actu al dist ly itab inev we ns of our fini tude that "no t mer ely bec ause of the limi tatio ly ve' us, usin g wha t we are like ima gine God as 'bey ond ' or 'abo rse reve 'me re' pict ures ; it is sim ply the mis lead ingl y to call 'me taph ors' or e of God " (II:47). Yet it is not the dist anc of the fact that we are bey ond for 's hed for its own sake or by us for God the analogia entis, arbi trar ily esta blis d by epis tem olog ical dist anc e nec essi tate sake. Nor is it the onto logi cal and e of anc dist a is it er, his lord ship . Rath God 's hidd enn ess for the sake of ans hum and God een mun icat ion betw add ress in whi ch perf orm ativ e com God of e enc pres true nearness: the is trul y possible. This dist anc e is thus of God 's peo ple in his history. e enc with his peo ple, as wel l as the pres analogia entis. It is not only roo ted in Like Barth, Jens on is critical of the 9; ld's bein g as som ewh at divi ne (1:20 Gre ek thou ght, whi ch pos its the wor nt age very "[e] that e plat onic prin cipl cf. II:47), but is also base d on the neo f in that resp ect in whi ch it acts as itsel to ilar prod uce s effects that are sim of logo usn ess, let alon e univ ocal ity, age nt" (II:36). The fact of the ana an hum of nev er form the prem ise hum an bein g to God 's bein g can ld, ality of God 's hist ory in the wor thin king abo ut God . Onl y the actu and prem ise. Tha t hum an thin king reco gniz ed for wha t it is, can be this be selv es, will prov e futile seem s to hum an lang uag e, in and of them they God add ress ing hum ans in Clu·ist gua rant eed by the fact that with out self r thei ine erm und ion. In this they are ben t on idol atro us self-possess as ch, whi ch, spee own with it thei r tran scen ding , social pers onh ood , and con vers atio nal ack now ledg eme nt. ual mut in orig inal ly divi ne, tlu·ives only e are add ress ed by God and if we hav By con tras t, "if we exist bec ause we sess pos not resp ond to God , then we do our specific iden tity as thos e who s: to resp ond and so to be ourselve ours elve s" (II:63); we are thus free our s atio nal parh1ers . Fre edo m bec ome pers ons , by God 's grace his con vers of e our lives hidd en in the free dom shar e, bec ause as beli ever s we hav our the gua rant ee of a goo d end ing to God 's Spirit, who , non ethe less , is

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story. 67 This is remi nisce nt of Bart h's princ iple of "loo king back from God 's reve latio n." Whe re Jens on appe ars to diffe r from Barth, how ever , is that in Bart h it is not only sinfu lness , disp laced self- dece ption , that prev ents hum ans from know ing God from the fact that they exist; it is their very crea turel iness that stan ds in the way of such know ledg e.68 In cont rast, Jens on's view s seem to be a caut ious affir mati on of a natu ral theo logy that, how ever , rema ins only a poss ibilit y cut shor t entir ely by the impo ssibl e poss ibilit y of sin. Now , beca use it mak es no sens e for us to deal with an "oth erwi se" in God , this poss ibilit y appe ars to be likewise unde rcut by the very bein g of God. Con side r that for Jens on crea tion and rede mpti on are parts of one and the same story of God 's spee ch reac hing out beyo nd himself. Since God is who he is in the open ness of his own futur e, in the conc lusio n of his etern al histo ry he can be know n only from the mess age of the esch aton . Mor eove r, the iden tifica tion of the esch aton takes place only thro ugh the narr ative of Jesus, 69 and neve r in the unse arch able ness of the Fath er, as if the Fath er were with out the Son. Apa rt from Chri st there is no know ledg e of God . In conclusion, Jens on espo uses a stron ger view of God 's actua lity in cont rast to Barth, whic h dete rmin es God 's iden tity thro ugh the histo ry of Israel, Christ, and the chur ch. God 's bein g is, for Jenson, cons titut ed and reve aled in its very iden tity, in a more spec ific kind of beco ming , nam ely, a thoro ugh- goin gly trini taria n mov eme nt of God 's reve lator y hidd enne ss. In this trini taria n mov emen t, God 's bein g emer ges as a histo ry and conv ersat ion whic h mak es direc tly poss ible othe r histo ries and othe r conv ersat ion partn ers. Crea tion is thus take n to shar e univ ocal ly in God 's bein g and lang uage . This, acco rding to Jenson, is not the annu lmen t of God 's divin ity and the crea turel iness of creation, so feare d by Barth, beca use conv ersat ion itself impl ies not only dista nce, and so mak es inco mpa rably conc rete the notio ns of both dista nce and near ness , but also diffe rent mod es of lang uage use. Thus God emer ges as God with out the nece ssity to appe al to his onto logic al and epist emo logic al hidd enne ss to assu re the sove reign ty of his lords hip. III. Con clusi on This stud y had as its goal the pres enta tion of an alter nativ e to the way muc h of cont emp orar y theo logy conceives of, and attem pts to avoi d, Cf. Jenso n, "The Hidd en and Triun e God," 11-12. Barth describes man as " doub ly hidde n ... (by our creatu reline ss and our sin) ." CD 11/1, 229. 69 Cf. Jenso n 1:170. 67

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idolah-y. In these attempts, it shies away from such concepts as being and even from thinking and speaking of God, for fear of imposing an illicit constraint on God. Inconsistently, in this speculative exercise, it cannot avoid thinking of God and speaking of him. It thus lapses in its own way into use of the analogy of being. It thinks God from the premise of human fear of idolatry, and then, in an attempt to avoid the consequences, it removes him to the end of the spectrum of human thought, and, as it seems to believe, even beyond. The alternative that this paper took up was found in the theologies of Karl Barth and Robert W. Jenson, both of whom place a strong emphasis on the actuality of God's self-disclosure and the corresponding engendering of faith which must take place in those that seek to speak and think God aright, if God is not only to be God, but also their God, and only so God. I have demonstrated that whereas Barth seeks to give expression to God's Godhood by asserting his sovereign lordship over all real and potential sources of idolatry, such as being, knowledge, and language, Jenson subsumes all those under a dramatically dynamic doctrine of God's triunity. In so doing, the latter theologian establishes a knowability of God, based on the reliability of his revelation in determinate distance-nearness. Both Barth and Jenson are at pains to let God be God, but, whereas Barth seems to be more focused on letting God be God, Jenson, through ironic jibes at contemporary theology, simply lets Godbe God.

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CTQ 71 (2007): 57-70

The Rich Monotheism of Isaiah as Christological Resource Dean 0. Wenthe The canonical corpus of the prophet Isaiah is remarkable for many reasons. One of the most notable aspects of this prophetic witness is its unqualified critique of any alternative claim to divine status. What makes this claim so expansive is that it is embedded in the larger Torah narrative that has the entire world as its landscape. Isaiah, as well as the entire Old Testament, stands as an unequivocal challenge to any hint of implied or explicit pluralism. The pluralism of the twenty-first century makes Isaiah's message particularly applicable and poignant. This study will demonstrate that it was the wider prophetic narrative of Isaiah that was foundational for early confessions of Christ's identity and work, not only isolated prophecies that are explicitly cited in the New Testament.1 I. The One God of Isaiah

Isaiah stands out in the canonical collection as the voice with rigorous and timeless clarity on the uniqueness of the one God of Israel. In a series of rhetorical questions, the prophet distinguishes and delineates the character of Yahweh as qualitatively different from any other claimant. In chapter 40, the question is repeatedly posed in a manner that requires the answer, "No one ... absolutely no one." The beauty of Isaiah's own words - his elegant and precisely framed rhetoric - cannot be surpassed. He proclaimed: Who has measured the waters in the hollow of his hand, or with the breadth of his hand marked off the heavens? Who has held the dust of the earth in a basket, or weighed the mountains on the scales and the hills in a balance? Who has understood the mind of the Lord, or instructed Him as his counselor? (Isa 40:12-13) To whom, then, will you compare God? What image will you compare Him to? As for an idol, a craftsman casts it, and a goldsmith overlays it with gold and fashions silver chains for it. A man too poor to present 1 For a recent study of the use of Isaiah within the New Testament, see Steve Moyise and Maarten J. J. Menken, eds., Isninh in the New Testament (London and New York: T & T Clark, 2005) .

Dean 0 . Wenthe is President of Concordia Theological Seminary, Fort Wayne, Indiana, and is also Professor of Exegetical Theology.

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such an offering selects wood that will not rot. He looks for a skilled craftsman to set up an idol that will not topple. (Isa 40:18-20) In chapter 44, the prophet brackets his critique of every idol with majestic claims for the true God's character and actions toward his people. Isaiah provides the following creedal description of God: This is what the Lord says - Israel's King and Redeemer, the Lord Almighty: "I am the first and I am the last; apart from me there is no god. Who then is like me? Let him proclaim it. Let him declare and lay out before me what has happened since I established my ancient people, and what is yet to come-yes, let him foretell what will come. Do not tremble, do not be afraid. Did I not proclaim this and foretell it long ago? You are my witnesses. Is there any God besides me? No, there is no other Rock; I know not one." (Isa 44:6-8) In this passage, God's character as creator, controller of history, and covenant initiator is exhibited as distinctive and exclusive. The people, if their eyes perceive rightly, are witnesses to these truths embedded in the personal agency of the true God. This confession frames one of the most incisive and extensive critiques of idolatry in any literature. The prophet uses several literary devices -from declaratory statements, to rhetorical questions, to satire. It is worthy of a fresh reading: All who make idols are nothing, and the things they treasure are worthless. Those who would speak up for them are blind; they are ignorant, to their own shame. Who shapes a god and casts an idol, which can profit him nothing? He and his kind will be put to shame; craftsmen are nothing but men. Let them all come together and take their stand; they will be brought down to terror and infamy. The blacksmith takes a tool and works with it in the coals; he shapes an idol with hammers, he forges it with the might of his arm. He gets hungry and loses his strength; he drinks no water and grows faint. The carpenter measures with a line and makes an outline with a marker; he roughs it out with chisels and marks it with compasses. He shapes it in the form of man, of man in all his glory, that it may dwell in a shrine. He cut down cedars, or perhaps took a cypress or oak. He let it grow among the trees of the forest, or planted a pine, and the rain made it grow. It is man's fuel for burning; some of it he takes and warms himself, he kindles a fire and bakes bread. But he also fashions a god and worships it; he makes an idol and bows down to it. Half of the wood he burns in the fire; over it he prepares his meal, he roasts his meat and eats his fill. He also warms

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himself and says, "Ah! I am warm; I see the fire." From the rest he makes a god, his idol; he bows down to it and worships. He prays to it and says, "Save me; you are my god." They know nothing, they understand nothing; their eyes are plastered over so they cannot see, and their minds closed so they cannot understand. No one stops to think, no one has the knowledge or understanding to say, "Half of it I used for fuel; I even baked bread over its coals, I roasted meat and I ate. Shall I make a detestable thing from what is left? Shall I bow down to a block of wood?" He feeds on ashes, a deluded heart misleads him; he cannot save himself, or say, "Is not this thing in my right hand a lie?" (Isa 44:9-20) The other bookend for this inclusion is a sh·iking contrast to the emptiness and futility of idolatry. Isaiah invites his audience to remember: Remember these things, 0 Jacob, for you are my servant, 0 Israel. I have made you, you are my servant; 0 Israel, I will not forget you. I have swept away your offenses like a cloud, your sins like the morning mist. Return to me, for I have redeemed you. Sing for joy, 0 heavens, for the Lord has done this; shout aloud, 0 earth beneath. Burst into song, you mountains, you forests and all your trees, for the Lord has redeemed Jacob, he displays his glory in Israel. This is what the Lord says- Your Redeemer, who formed you in the womb: I am the Lord, who has made all things, who alone sh·etched out the heavens, who spread out the earth by myself. (Isa 44:21-24) Here is commentary that expounds the basic creedal statement: "I am the Lord your God, who brought you out of Egypt, out of the land of slavery. You shall have no other gods before me" (Exod 20:2-3) . Not only does the rich Torah tapestry provide Isaiah with an exposition of God's creative role, it also exhibits how the nations are utterly at his disposal to move about as he wishes. So, this chapter concludes with the specific prophecy of Cyrus as the instrument that God would call upon to restore his people to Zion, to Jerusalem, to city, and to temple: [I am the Lord] ... who carries out the words of his servants and fulfills the predictions of his messengers, who says of Jerusalem, "It shall be inhabited," of the towns of Judah, "They shall be built," and of their ruins, "I will restore them," who says to the watery deep, "Be dry, and I will dry up your sh·eams," who says of Cyrus, "He is my shepherd and will accomplish all that I please"; he will say of Jerusalem, "Let it be rebuilt," and of the temple, "Let its foundations be laid." (Isa 44:26-28) This text is a definitive articulation of the solitary nature of the Godhead. There is not only no competition - there is no entity that inhabits the same

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category. Here the Torah story is expounded in greater fullness. Moses, conh·ary to the fashionable view in some circles that he was at best a henotheist, was a monotheist. M. W. Chavalas rightly states: Nowhere does the Pentateuch imply that the 'gods' have fundamentally the same nature as Yahweh. Thus Moses could have penned a statement such as Exodus 15:11 'Who is like you, 0 Lord, among the gods?' and still have been a true monotheist. The prohibition of worship of other gods and of divine images in Israel appears to be unique in the ancient Near East. 2 The inherited critical orthodoxy that such strict monotheism could not have existed in the second millennium BC cannot survive crossexamination. The eminent Egyptologist Kenneth A. Kitchen has recently written: "That a monotheistic belief might be found as early as the fourteenth/thirteenth centuries is no problem whatsoever. Akhenaten of Egypt instituted precisely such a religion during circa 1350-1340, promoting worship of the sun god as Aten to the exclusion of all other deities in Egypt."3 Against such an inclusive claim, therefore, it is noteworthy and striking that Isaiah's corpus describes this solitary God not as an undifferentiated monad, but as a solitary God whose character is rich and multifaceted. In these sixty-six chapters the character of God takes on dimensions of personality and c01mnunity that are nonetheless one. This dense portrait of the God who stands utterly alone and without peer is the very heart of God's revelation. It is at the same time mysterious and beautiful. It requires a certain humility to be read rightly; no single attribute and action can be weighted at the expense of the others. One is placed in the position of simply receiving and beholding the wonder of such an exclusive and simultaneously profound God. In such a context, Isaiah's portrait of God provides content for a truly textual Christology. Or, perhaps a more appropriate analogy would view the prophet as weaving a rich tapesh·y that displays the contours of God's work in such a way that the work of God, the presence of the God's Spirit, and the face of Christ can all be distinguished. 2 M. W. Chavalas, "Moses," in Dictionary of the Old Testament: Pentateuch, ed. T. Desmond Alexander and David W. Baker (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2003), 576. 3 Kenneth A. Kitchen, On the ReliabilihJ of the Old Testament (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2003), 330-331. For a sustained critique of the "no monotheism until the exile dogma," see W. H . C. Propp, Ugarit-Forschungen 31 (1999/2000): 537-575.

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II. Readin g Christology from Isaiah The abiding critique that Christia ns, followin g the "mistak en" lead of the evangel ists and other New Testam ent writers, are simply reading these , contour s back into the texts must now be cross-ex amined. As an example , apostles ent Testam New conside r the Qunuan texts. These texts, like the r. delivere future a and expoun d Isaiah as a resourc e for future delivera nce For example , the pesher on Isaiah (4Qpisa) underst ands Isaiah 11:1-5 to speak of a Davidic Messiah. John Collins summar izes his study of this text: "The pesher clearly envisag es a role for the Davidic messiah in the final battle against the Kittim." 4 More broadly , James Vander Kam and Peter Flint have recently written : "Return ing to our survey of messian ism in the scrolls, as several of the passage s we have surveye d indicate , the covenan ters expecte d a war in the future and that the Davidic Messiah would lead the forces of good to victory and execute the leader of the armies of evil."5 There is, howeve r, a more decisive point to make about the proprie ty of viewing Isaiah as a rich tapestry where the face of Christ is clearly and rightly display ed. In Luke 24, the resurrec ted Lord expoun ds for the Emmau s disciple s and for the apostles all the things concern ing himself: He said to them, "How foolish you are, and how slow of heart to believe all that the prophet s have spoken! Did not the Christ have to suffer these things and then enter his glory?" And beginni ng with Moses and all the Prophet s, he explain ed to them what was said in all the Scriptu res concern ing himself. (Luke 24:25-27) He said to them, "This is what I told you while I was still with you: Everyth ing must be fulfilled that is written about me in the Law of Moses, the Prophet s and the Psalms." Then he opened their minds so they could underst and the Scriptures. (Luke 24:44-45) Thus, the Old Testam ent is the Lord's catechetical choice in teachin g the disciple s about himself, even after the resurrec tion. Walter Moberl y keenly observe s about these passages: "This risen Jesus offers no new visions from heaven or mysteri es from beyond the grave but instead focuses on the and John Joseph Collins, The Scepter and the Star: The Messiahs of the Dead Sen Scrolls 57. 1995), ay, Other Ancient Literature (New York: Doubled Their s James C. VanderK am and Peter W. Flint, The Menning of the Dead Sen Scrolls: : Francisco (San hJ Christinni Significan ce for U11derstnnding the Bible, Judaism, Jesus, and The also see essays, of collection g interestin an For HarperSanFrancisco, 2002), 272. orth Messiah: Developments in Earliest Judaism and Christinnihj, ed. James H. Charlesw (Miirneapolis: Forh·ess Press, 1992). 4

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patient exposit ion of Israel's Scripture. The crucial truth lies there, not in some hidden heavenl y revelati on." 6 Thus the apostolic writers draw on dominic al instruct ion for their exposit ion. R. T. France has aptly capture d the pivotal place of Jesus in providi ng the apostles ' their hermen eutical lens: "The school in which the writers of the early church learned to use the Old Testam ent was that of Jesus." 7 Over against the Jesus' Semina r's fanciful interpre tation of a persona lity created by their hypothe tical Q-sourc e and combin ed with the secondcentury Gospel of Thomas, sober New Testam ent exegete s have recogni zed the historic al Jesus as the source of the apostoli c vision and constru al of texts like Isaiah. The cautiou s, but clear, commo n-sense languag e of the Cambri dge scholar C. F. D. Moule is appropr iate: A more satisfac tory approac h, perhaps , is to rely on the total impress ion gained, cumula tively, by putting side by side the various portrait s that are present ed by the traditio ns of Jesus in his various activities: teaching, healing , disputin g, training his disciples, and so forth. Withou t attempt ing any more than a rough-a nd-read y sifting, leading to the rejection of only the most obvious ly late accretions in each categor y, the general effect of these several more or less impress ionistic porh·aits is to convey a total concept ion of a persona lity striking , original, baffling, yet illumina ting. And it may be argued that it is difficult to account for this except by postula ting an actual person of such a characte r.s The initial point is the integrat ion and coheren ce of Isaiah's tapestry . While proof-te xting has its utility, it has robbed many a reader of pleasur e and theological fulfillment. Put rather simply, Isaiah's corpus is not a clothesl ine on which he has hung a series of discrete Messianic prophec ies. Just as removin g all the blue threads from a tapestry does not reflect how that color is used in the whole pattern, so to isolate several texts is to present their claims partially and inadequ ately. No, Isaiah's program of restorat ion is a beautifu lly woven cloth that requires the reader to keep in view the whole pattern.

h III. The Mess iah and the Mess ianic Age in Isaia the comi ng Chris t and Thus , the patte rn of Isaiah 's tapeshsy expo unds consi derat ion. It entai ls his deliv eranc e, and this patte rn deser ves a fresh only possible to place a the whol e of the sixty-six chapt ers, thoug h it is ed this patte rn, it will porti on of it here in the foreg round . Havi ng mapp les cite passa ges that by then be helpf ul to turn to how Jesus and the apost age of the proph et. mess r large their very natur e assum e and expo und the is that of the Mess iah The porti on of Isaiah 's tapes try consi dered here these texts and textu al and the Messianic age. Cons ider this patte rn in summ aries : The Messiah

4:2

7:14

9:6, 7

11:1, 2

be beaut iful and "In that day the Bran ch of the Lord will

and glory of glorio us, and the fruit of the land will be the pride the survi vors in Israel." The virgi n will "The refor e the Lord himse lf will give you a sign: will call him be with child and will give birth to a son, and Imma nuel. " given , and the "For to us a child is born, to us a son is will be called gove rnme nt will be on his shoul ders. And he r, Prince of Wond erful Coun selor , Migh ty God, Everl asting Fathe there will be Peace. Of the incre ase of his gove rnme nt and peace kingd om, his over and e thron d's no end. He will reign on Davi eousn ess right and e justic estab lishin g and upho lding it with ghty Almi Lord the of zeal from that time on and forever. The will accom plish this." his roots a "A shoot will come up from the stum p of Jesse; from on him rest will Lord the of Branc h will bear fruit. The Spirit couns el of t Spiri the ding, the Spirit of wisd om and of unde rstan of the fear the of and and of powe r, the Spiri t of know ledge Lord. "

42:1- 4 49:1- 13

him. God upho lds his serva nt and besto ws his Spiri t upon and gathe rs in The serva nt is the "idea l" Israel who reach es out faithful Israel.

The serva nt will do God' s will faithfully. for the sins of the peop le 52:13 -53:12 The serva nt will vicar iousl y atone and cause them to be right eous. 50:4- 9

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The Messianic Age 2:1-5

The Temple , Zion, and Jerusal em are exalted . God will teach many people s in a peacef ul epoch. The house of Jacob will walk in the light of the Lord.

4:3-6

The people will be holy. God will dwell in Mount Zion as he dwelt in the taberna cle. Zion will be a refuge for the faithful.

9:1-7

It shall be an epoch of peace, joy, justice, and righteo usness .

11:1-11

It shall be an epoch of peace, righteo usness , and justice. Creatio n

25:1-9

is restore d. The earth will be full of the knowle dge of the Lord. There will be an eschato logical banque t on Zion for many. Death will be no more. Tears will be wiped away.

35:1-10

The blind will see; the lame will walk; and the deaf will hear. The desert will be watere d and a highwa y will run throug h it.

40:1-8

The glory of the Lord will be reveale d to all human ity. God's Torah will give life. An epoch describ ed by wonde rfully glad tidings .

42:1-7

An epoch of faithfu lness and justice will come. The blind will see. Captiv es will be release d. Nation s will be include d.

49:1-13

God's glory will shine and salvati on will arrive. The Holy One of Israel is there. There will be no hunger and no thirst. There will be a highwa y in the desert.

50:4-9

The servan t will display and do God's will in the face of opposi tion.

52:13-53:12 Righte ousnes s will charac terize the people throug h the agency of the servant . 56:1-12

Templ e and Sabbat h will be restore d and availab le to all. 60:1-62:12 Zion will be exalted. God's glory and light will be display ed. 65:17-25 A restora tion of creation: new heaven s, new earth, and peace. 66:12-23 It shall be an epoch of peace due to God's comfor ting presence. God's glory will be display ed. These two pattern s of the Messia h and the Messianic age are woven togethe r with a typolog y of judgm ent and destruc tion for those who have rejected the charac ter and exclusive claim of Yahwe h as the only h·ue God. The Torah story provid es the motifs, rationa les, and vocabu lary for both

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restoration and judgment. The best commentato rs from the church fathers to the present have recognized this wonderful coherence and integration of Isaiah's message. 9 A classic Lutheran commentary , in many respects still the best available, is that of August Pieper. He writes: Isaiah stands on that peak of the developmen t of the kingdom of God in the Old Testament from which he discerns clearly that the Sinaitic pedagogy of the Lord has ended in the complete apostasy of His chosen people, 1:2; 5:2££., etc., and that any further application of this kind of rearing by the Law is useless, 1:5. There is no longer any possibility of change for the better that might lead to salvation (1 :16ff). Only destruction is now in order (1 :24 ff.). The house of Jacob has been rejected (2:6££; 5:6££., etc.). Therefore a wholly different Royal Child must appear and establish a new kingdom-H e who is Wonderful, Counselor, Power, Hero, Everlasting Father, Prince of Peace, who will prepare and establish His kingdom with a judgment and a righteousne ss of another kind.10

For pah·istic exposition, see Steven A. McKinion, Isaiah 1-39, Ancient Clu·istian Commentary on Scripture, Old Testament 10 (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2004). McK.inion summarizes: "The most important theme in the early Clu-istian interpretation of Isaiah is messianic a1mouncement. The prophecy of Isaiah occupied a central position in the early Christian proclamation of Jesus of Nazareth as the promised Messiah." Isaiah 1-39, xx. E. Kowalke 10 August Pieper, Isaiah II: An Exposition of Isaiah 40-66, h·ans. Erwin commentaries recent More 31. 1979), House, Publishing Northwestern WI: (Milwaukee, that recognize and develop the integrated character of Isaiah's prophetic corpus are: J. Alec Motyer, The Prophecy of Isaiah : An Introduction & Commentary (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1993); John N. Oswalt, The Book of Isaiah, Chapters 1-39 (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1986), and The Book of Isaiah, Chapters 40-66 (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1998). A helpful summary of the Messiah' s work that incorporates the multiple dimensions of Isaiah's description is that of Gerard van Groningen: "The Messianic message, or better said, Yahweh's revelation concerning the Messiah, contains the following elements. First, the One of whom Isaiah prophesies is the ministering Agent of Yahweh serving in place of the covenant people who have failed to carry out their covenant responsibilities .... Second, the ministering Messiah is the Mediator of the covenant. Promised as a covenant seed and Agent he mediates between Yahweh the Husband and Judah the unfaithful bride. In fact, he reconciles them. He restores, renews, enriches, and assures everlasting continuity of this covenantal relationship. Third, the ministering Messiah mediates for the nations as well. He is a substitute witness to them and he becomes the focal point to which they are drawn. Fourth, the ministering Messiah is able to carry out all his duties because he is anointed by Yahweh through the bestowal of the Spirit upon him. Fifth, the messianic concept in its narrower view is proclaimed. The ministering Messiah is a person of royal ancestry, a leader, and conU'Hander. In other words, he functions as a royal Shepherd. Sixth, the tlu-eefold office 9

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From the pah·istic period to the present, this holistic interpretation of Isaiah most accurately exhibits the rich Christology within the unity of the one God. More than that, this manner of exegesis has its origin in the Lord and his apostles. They did not quote select texts, as though they were isolated punctiliar promises, but rather these texts served as shorthand for the whole Isaianic program of redemption and restoration. They selected and quoted material with the assumption that the hearer would know the larger plot and schema in which the specific text was embedded. A rough parallel might be the manner in which John 3:16 is sometimes used as a summary of the entire Scriptures. That single text can hardly be understood aright without a significant awareness of what it means in the framework of John' s Gospel, and indeed, within the witness of Scripture as a whole. IV. Isaiah in Early Christology

The contours of the apostolic use of Isaiah shall be considered next. In turning to the pages of Matthew's Gospel, what does one find? What is striking is the mam1er in which Isaiah, featured so prominently by Matthew among the prophets whom he cites, provides pivotal content to his Christology. In Matthew's birth narrative, 1:22-23, Isaiah 7:14 is appealed to: "All this took place to fulfill what the Lord had said through the prophet: 'The virgin will be with child and will give birth to a son, and they will call him Immanuel' which means, 'God with us."' Matthew is communicating not simply this text, but the whole witness of the so-called "Book of Immanuel," that is, Isaiah 7-12. Another use of this section of Isaiah supports such a suggestion. In Matthew 4, Isaiah 9:1-2 is used to expound on Jesus' movement: "Leaving Nazareth, he went and lived in Capernaum, which was by the lake in the area of Zebulun and Naphtalito fulfill what was said through the prophet Isaiah: 'Land of Zebulun and land of Naphtali, the way to the sea, along the Jordan, Galilee of the Gentiles - the people living in darkness have seen a great light; on those living in the land of the shadow of death, a light has dawned"' (Matt 4:1316). included in the messianic concept is proclaimed. As king, priest, and prophet he comes and labors on behalf of the covenant people and the nations. Seventh, the wider view of the messianic concept is described by the work the ministering Mediator performs. He seals the sure mercies promised to David; he functions as Yahweh's arm bringing deliverance and restoration, establishing justice and righteousness, and executing the vengeance of Yahweh as Judge . . .. Eighth, the ministering Messiah assures that Yahweh's eschatological program will become a reality." Messianic Revelation in the Old Testament, 2 vols. (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1990), 2:663-664.

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Again, there is a fascinating use of Isaiah 53:4 in Matthew 8:16-17: "When evening came, many who were demon-possessed were brought to him, and he drove out the spirits with a word and healed all the sick. This was to fulfill what was spoken through the prophet Isaiah: 'He took up our infirmities and carried our diseases."' It is noteworthy that the apostle understands Jesus as the suffering servant of Isaiah 53 early in his ministry, as he bears the suffering and reverses the brokenness of a fallen crea tion. 11 One more Matthean example will show how the apostle has Isaiah's whole program of redemption and restoration in view. In Matthew 11:1-6 there is a striking usage of Isaiah 35:5-6 and Isaiah 61:1. John the Baptist is in prison and requires proof that Jesus is "he who is to come." In response, Jesus points to his words and deeds as the fulfillment of these two prophecies: the one a prediction of eschatological blessing (Isaiah 35), and the other a specifically Messianic prediction (Isaiah 61). Isaiah 61:1 is employed in a deliberate statement of Jesus' status and mission. God's time of salvation has come, and Jesus is the one anointed to be the bringer of that salvation. As R. T. France accurately states: Isaiah 61:1-3 describes a figure closely similar to the Servant as depicted in Isaiah 42:1-7: both are endued with the Spirit of Yahweh, open blind eyes, and bring prisoners out of darkness. Both are, in other words, sent and equipped by Yahweh to deliver the oppressed and wretched, and both are characterized by their gentleness .. . . If this is not the Servant, it is a Messianic figure of similar character and status. That it was so regarded in the time of Jesus is indicated by Matthew 11:5, where Jesus' use of the passage depends on the recognition by John the Baptist that it describes 'him who is to come'; that Jesus himself so interpreted it we shall see from his use of it.12 Turning to the Gospel of Mark, several texts exhibit the foundational role of Isaiah in describing the work of the Messiah. Mark 10:45 reads: "For even the Son of Man did not come to be served, but to serve, and to give his life as a ransom for many." Again, R. T. France aptly describes the clarity of this use of Isaiah 53: The fact that the allusion occurs almost incidentally, as an illustration of the true nature of greatness, far from indicating that the redemptive role 11 For additional comments, see Bernd Janowski and Peter Stuhlmacher, eds., 77ie Suffering Servant: Isaiah 53 in Jewish and Christian Sources (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2004). 12 France, Jesus and the Old Testament, 132-133.

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of the Servant was not in mind (for it is specifically the redemptive aspects of Isaiah 53 to which Jesus alludes), is in fact evidence of how deeply His assumption of that role had penetrated into Jesus' thinking, so that it emerges even in an incidental illustration. 'It is as if Jesus said, "The Son of Man came to fulfil the task of the ebed Yahweh ."'13 In Mark's account of the Last Supper we read: "This is my blood of the covenant which is poured out for many" (Mark 14:24; see also Matt 26:28 and Luke 22:20). Although Exodus 24:8 is the background for "the blood of the covenant" language in the words of institution, Isaiah 53 is the probable source for Jesus' atonement language, "poured out for many"; "because he [the servant] poured out his soul to death and was numbered with the transgressors; yet he bore the sins of many" (Isa 53:12) . As RT. France states: His work is to re-establish the broken covenant, but this can be done only by fulfilling the role of the Servant in His vicarious death. To make this point Jesus chooses words from Isaiah 53 which are as deeply imbued as any with the redemptive significance of that death, in that they highlight its vicarious nature. Thus here, if anywhere, we have a deliberate theological explanation by Jesus of the necessity for his death, and it is not only drawn from Isaiah 53, but specifically refers to the vicarious and redemptive suffering which is the central theme of that chapter.14

In the Gospel according to Saint Luke, both the beginning of Jesus' ministry and its end are described with pivotal and defining texts from Isaiah. We read at the inception of Jesus ministry: Jesus returned to Galilee in the power of the Spirit, and news about him spread through their synagogues, and everyone praised him. He went to Nazareth, where he had been brought up, and on the Sabbath day he went into the synagogue, as was his custom. And he stood up to read. The scroll of the prophet Isaiah was handed to him. Unrolling it, he found the place where it is written: "The Spirit of the Lord is on me, because he has anointed me to preach good news to the poor. He has sent me to proclaim freedom for the prisoners and recovery of sight for the blind, to release the oppressed, to proclaim the year of the Lord's favor." Then he rolled upon the scroll, gave it back to the attendant and sat down. The eyes of everyone in the synagogue were fastened on him, 13 14

putti ng the matte r is to sugge st that what is contin gent abou t Paul' s letter to Phile mon- name ly, the likely flight of Ones imus and the resul ting debt whic h Paul prom ises to pay carte blanc he - is intim ately conne cted also to Paul' s coherent unde rstan ding of the gospel, as prom inent in Phile mon as one finds anyw here else in Paul' s writi ngs.5

I. Paul's Promise to Make Ame nds Not every one accepts the interp retati on that Ones imus stole from Phile mon and ran away , 6 but maki ng that assum ption leads reade rs to appre ciate one of the most brilli ant facets of the gospe l in Phile mon: the idea that Paul himse lf assum ed Ones imus ' dama ges and paid them off. Here is all that Paul hims elf revea ls abou t the matte r, altho ugh his brief word s must speak volum es: "[and ] if he has wron ged you at all, or owes you anyth ing, charg e that to my accou nt" (Phlm 18 RSV; d BE n ~liLKTJOEV OE ~ 6cpd1EL, i:ofrco kµot kU6yC1.). Notice, then, that Paul shifts Ones imus ' infidelities to a cond itiona l clause ("if . . ."), as thoug h the main part of the sente nce were reser ved to mollify the maste r Phile mon' s pain and anger at what had been Ones imus ' theft and flight. The word l:U6yC1. (" charg e that!") const itutes the main verb in the sente nce and so sets forth its main idea; what Paul inten ds to do in the impe rative kU6yC1 . is direc t Phile mon' s atten tion away from what must have been an all-en gross ing atten tion to Ones imus ' past crime s to the prom ise that Paul shall pay for every thing , no matte r what: "I, Paul, write with my own hand : 'I will repay "' (Phlm 19a; kyw IfouJ..oc; Eypm\JCl , fl kµfl XELPL. l:yw a1To,[aw ). The impli cit basis for such an asser tion must rest with the atoni ng sacrif ice of Christ, not simp ly with Paul' s gener osity . Elsewhere, indee d, Paul write s of Chris t that he is

alread y presen t and active before the huma n story began, even active in the creati on of the univer se (cf. 1 Cor. 8:6; Col. 1:15-17). In Paul's view, one is alway s in dange r of saying too little about Jesus Christ, not too much ." Paul's Narrative Thought World : The Tapestry of Tragedy and Triumph (Louisville, KY: Westm inster /John Knox Press, 1994), 3. s For the under standi ng that so-called "cohe rence" and "contingency" domin ate Paul's thinking, see Johan Clu·ist iaan Beker, TI1e Triumph of God: TI1e Essence of Paul's Thought, trans. Loren T. Stuck enbru ck (Mim1eapolis : Fortress Press, 1990). "By coherence I mean the uncha nging compo nents of Paul's gospel , which contai n the funda menta l convictions of his gospel .. . the term contingency denote s the chang ing, situati onal part of the gospel, that is, the diversity and partic ularity of sociological, economical, and psychological factors that confro nt Paul in his church es and in his missionary work and to which he had to respon d." The Triumph of God, 15-16 . 6 For the extrem ely influe ntial views of the scholar John Knox who in so many ways challe nged the traditi onal interp retatio n of Philem on, see Nordling, Philemon, 9-19.

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NIV), a passa ge with the "sacri fice of atone ment [U,ao,~pLOv ]" (Rom 3:25 many instru ctive parall els.7 on if he was a How could Paul have made such a prom ise to Philem impec uniou s? Some "priso ner" (6foµLOc;, Phlm 1, 9) and so presu mably c ploy" that strove to sugge st that Paul engag es here in a kind of "comi recom pense .8 Most comp el Phile mon to take Onesi mus back witho ut his own liabili ty for comm entato rs, howe ver, affirm that Paul pledg ed theft and flight. 9 In mus' Onesi of dama ges Phile mon sustai ned as a result (~OLKT)OEv, Phlm 18a) the admis sion that Onesi mus had "wron ged" 18a), Paul allud esPhilem on and " owed " him some thing (ocjiELAEL, Phlm been substa ntial. have albeit subtl y- to Onesi mus' dama ges which could and ocjiE(l w ("I owe," The two verbs-a6LKEW ("I wrong ," cf. ~OLKTJOEV in 18a) desig nate the illega l cf. ocjiELAEL in 18a) - occur in ancie nt docum ents that so incur crimi nal activi ties of peopl e who refuse to pay debts and lains, "I am being prose cution . In one papyr us, a certai n Attalu s comp a failed debt. 10 In of r matte the in wrong ed" (a6LKouµaL) by Ptolem aios st sever al guara ntors anoth er, a certai n Deme trios takes legal action again olive oil and wine. 11 for mas who owe (ocjiE(lwv) thous ands of unpai d drach

In a third, a certai n Pyrrh os subm its to an oath where in he swear s that he owes neithe r corn nor money: µE [µ~] ocjJELAELV µE a(wv (µ)~,E ap(yu)pL(o)v. 12 The point is that Paul promi ses to pay Onesi mus' dama ges comp letely , even as he appar ently paid other sums of mone y in the cours e of his aposto lic career.13 Paul's usual habit consi sted in his bearin g the entire cost of the aposto lic minis try himse lf by plyin g his tentm aking skills in whate ver city his wide- rangin g travel s took him (for exam ple, OKT)VOTIOLot in Corin th, Acts 18:3).14 At times he tappe d other sourc es of income, too, as when Epaph roditu s revive d Paul by bring ing to the apostl e ample gifts from Chris tians at Philip pi (Phil 4:18). Perha ps the writte n prom ise in Phile mon could indica te Paul's expec tation that "the Lord would provi de," just as he alway s had. 15 These parall el exam ples sugge st, in any event , that Paul possib ly had the mean s at his dispo sal to pay Onesi mus' dama ges in full and so mode l for Philem on his famou s self-sufficien cy: "His pay was to receiv e no pay. His work was betwe en him and God; he would not be paid for it."16 These stand ard expla nation s, howe ver, still do not adequ ately accou nt for what must consti tute the theological significance of Paul's prom ise to assum e Onesi mus' dama ges. Paul would not have locate d himse lf so cenh·ally in the repay ment of Onesi mus' debt were not his very perso n intend ed to serve Philem on and the congr egatio n as a kind of blank check.17 Not only was his writte n obliga tion (Phlm 19a) significant,18 but so 12 [Michigan Papyri:] Zenon Papyri 1:58,13-15; Philad elphia, 248 BC. For more eviden ce of the type provid ed here and in the preced ing two footno tes, see Peter Arzt-G rabner , Philemon, Papyro logisch e Komm entare zum Neuen Testam ent 1 (Gottingen: Vande nhoeck & Ruprec ht, 2003), 237-238. 13 For examp le, Christi ans in Jerusa lem urged Paul to pay for the expens es of four men at the temple (Acts 21:23-24). Felix expect ed that Paul would pay him a substa ntial bribe (Acts 24:25-2 6) . Paul lived in Rome in a rented house (Acts 28:30). 14 See Todd D. Still, "Did Paul Loathe Manua l Labor? Revisiting the Work of Ronald F. Hock on the Apostl e's Tentm aking and Social Class," Journal of Biblical Literature 125 (2006): 781-79 5. 1s So Bruce, The Epistles to the Colossians, to Philemon, and to the Ephesians, 220. 16 P. W. Barnett, "Tentm aking, " in Dictionan; of Paul and His Letters, ed. Gerald F. Hawth orne, Ralph P. Martin, and Daniel G. Reid (Down ers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1993), 927. 17 The name (Dau1.oc;), the repeat ed and empha tic person al pronou n (eyw ... eyw), and the first person singul ar verbs (Eypmjm . . . cbrnrlow) constit ute a virtual incarn ation of Paul himsel f in the text of the letter at this point. Elsewh ere in Philem on Paul emplo ys simila r techniques, for example, Dau1.oc; 6e'oµLOc;, 1; roLOurn c; wv we; Dau1.oc; nprn~ur ric;, 9. Howev er, in no other place- as it seems -does Paul as strikin gly inject his person ality into a letter (althou gh for still other examp les of this kind see 2 Car 10:1; Gal 5:2; and 1

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too was Paul's expectatio n that he would receive hospitality soon upon his forthcomi ng visit to Philemon 's house (Phlm 22a). Suppose, then, that the two verses were intended by Paul to be connected : the purpose of Paul's visit alluded to in verse 22a was for the apostle to deliver a generous monetary gift to Philemon and his household to fulfill the binding pledge announce d in verse 19a.19 A temporary residence in Philemon' s home could have impressed not only the recompen se upon Philemon and the others, but also modeled for them - and, indeed, for all the world - how God works in Christian congregat ions according to the gospel. Luther, albeit in a non-relate d matter, provides the powerful insight that God's greatest gifts to sinners usually consist of a non-mone tary type:

If I had gone .. . and seen and heard a poor pastor baptizing and preaching, and if I had been assured: "This is the place; here God is speaking through the voice of the preacher who brings God' s Word" -I would have said: "Well, I have been duped! I see only a pastor." We should like to have God speak to us in his majesty. But I advise you not to run hither and yon for this .... Christ says: "You do not know the gift" Un. 4:10]. We recognize neither the Word nor the Person of Christ, but we take offense at his humble and weak humanity. When God wants to speak and deal with us, he does not avail himself of an angel but of parents, of the pastor, or of my neighbor.20 Whenever Paul's residency occurred, then, the apostle would have presented himself to Philemon and the congregat ion as the type of "poor pastor" (to paraphras e Luther) who was content to proclaim nothing but Jesus Christ and him crucified (1 Cor 2:2), an activity that models well the Thess 2:18). Philemon 18-19a becomes, in effect, a promissory note wherein the dramatic elements of Paul's personality combine with the type of highly technical, legally binding language that would have obligated Paul to pay off Onesimus' debts in full. So Bruce, The Epistles to the Colossians, to Philemon, and to the Ephesians, 220. 1s " With this ' receipt,' Philemon could have required damages of Paul in the courts." Markus Barth and Helmut Blanke, The Letter to Philemon, Eerdmans Critical Commentary (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2000), 483. 19 It would have been analogous to the way Paul gathered a collection among the Gentile Christians in order to deliver an impressive gift "for the poor among the saints in Jerusalem" (Rom 15:26). So Wayne A. Meeks, The First Urban Christians: The Social World of the Apostle Paul (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 110. For more on the Gentile offering, see Romans 15:25-28; 1 Corinthians 16:1-4; and 2 Corinthians 8:1-15. 20 Martin Luther, "Sermons on the Gospel of St. John, Chapters 1-4,'' in Luther's Works, American Edition, 55 vols., ed. Jaroslav Jan Pelikan, Hilton C. Oswald, and Helmut T. Lehmann (Philadelphia: Fortress Press; St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1955-1986), 22:526-527. Hereafter cited as LW.

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office of the holy ministry. Hock supposed that it would have been difficult to imagine Paul not bringing up the gospel as he engaged with fellow-workers , slaves, customers, and others who would have frequented the sort of leather-workin g shop with which Paul was familiar (see Acts 18:2-3).21 In an even greater way, Paul's residency with Philemon (Phlm 22a) would have impressed his hosts with the incalculable wealth of Christ and the gospel by the actual repayment of the money Onesimus had squandered, by the contribution to Philemon' s wealth which Paul's tentmaking skills afforded, and (certainly not least) by Paul's preaching of the gospel while resident with Philemon and his workers. The apostle's crushing poverty, therefore, would make many rich in Christ22 and more than cover all the debts incurred by Onesimus. This recompense from Paul would mimic - however imperfectly- the atoning sacrifice of Christ crucified, risen, and ascended, who in his death on the cross paid all debts to God.23 II. Paul Embodies Christ in Philemon

From the first Paul presents himself as "a prisoner of Christ Jesus" (Ilau11.°'; ofoµLD

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