Hon. Charles Pinckney (one of the delegates of the Federal
Convention) rose in his place, and said that, although
the principles and expediency of the measures proposed
by the late Convention will come more properly into discussion
before another body, yet, as their appointment
originated with them, and the legislatures must be the instrument
of submitting the plan to the opinion of the people,
it became a duty in their delegates to state with conciseness
the motives which induced it.

It must be recollected that, upon the conclusion of the
definitive treaty, great inconveniences were experienced,
as resulting from the inefficacy of the Confederation. The
one first and most sensibly felt was the destruction of our
commerce, occasioned by the restrictions of other nations,
whose policy it was not in the power of the general government
to counteract. The loss of credit, the inability in
our citizens to pay taxes, and languor of government,
were, as they ever must be, the certain consequences of the
decay of commerce. Frequent and unsuccessful attempts
were made by Congress to obtain the necessary powers.
The states, too, individually attempted, by navigation acts
and other commercial provisions, to remedy the evil.
These, instead of correcting, served but to increase it;
their regulations interfered not only with each other, but,
in almost every instance, with treaties existing under the
authority of the Union. Hence arose the necessity of some
general and permanent system, which should at once embrace
all interests, and, by placing the states upon firm and
united ground, enable them effectually to assert their
commercial rights. Sensible that nothing but a concert of
measures could effect this, Virginia proposed a meeting of
commissioners at Annapolis, from the legislature of each
state, who should be empowered to take into consideration
the commerce of the Union; to consider how far a uniform
system in their commercial regulations might be necessary
to their common interest; and to report to the states
such an act as, when unanimously ratified by them, would
enable Congress effectually to provide for the same. In
consequence of this, ten states appointed delegates. By accident,
or otherwise, they did not attend, only five states
being represented. The gentlemen present, not being a
majority of the Union, did not conceive it advisable to proceed;
but in an address to their constituents, which was
also transmitted to the other legislatures, acquainted them
with the circumstances of their meeting; that there appeared
to them to be other and more material defects in
the federal system than merely those of commercial powers.
That these, upon examination, might be found
greater than even the acts of their appointments implied,
was at least so far probable, from the embarrassments
which mark the present state of national affairs, foreign
and domestic, as to merit, in their opinions, a deliberate
and candid discussion in some mode which would unite
the sentiments and councils of all the states. They therefore
suggested the appointment of another convention,
under more extensive powers, for the purpose of devising
such further provisions as should appear to them necessary
to render the federal government adequate to the exigencies
of the Union.

Under this recommendation the late Convention assembled;
for most of the appointments had been made before
the recommendation of Congress was formed or known.
He thought proper concisely to mention the manner of
the Convention's assembling, merely to obviate an objection
which all the opposers of the federal system had used,
viz., that, at the time the Convention met, no opinion was
entertained of their departing from the Confederation--that
merely the grant of commercial powers, and the establishment
of a federal revenue, were in agitation;
whereas nothing can be more true, than that its promoters
had for their object a firm national government. Those
who had seriously contemplated the subject were fully
convinced that a total change of system was necessary--that,
however the repair of the Confederation might for a
time avert the inconveniences of a dissolution, it was impossible
a government of that sort could long unite this
growing and extensive country. They also thought that the
public mind was fully prepared for the change, and that
no time could be more proper for introducing it than the
present--that the total want of government, the destruction
of commerce, of public credit, private confidence, and
national character, were surely sufficiently alarming to
awaken their constituents to a true sense of their situation.

Under these momentous impressions the Convention
met, when the first question that naturally presented itself
to the view of almost every member, although it was never
formally brought forward, was the formation of a new, or
the amendment of the existing system. Whatever might
have been the opinions of a few speculative men, who either
did, or pretended to, confide more in the virtue of
the people than prudence warranted, Mr. Pinckney said
he would venture to assert that the states were unanimous
in preferring a change. They wisely considered that,
though the Confederation might possess the great outlines
of a general government, yet that it was, in fact, nothing
more than a federal union; or, strictly speaking, a league
founded in paternal and persuasive principles, with nothing
permanent and coercive in its construction, where the
members might, or might not, comply with their federal
engagements, as they thought proper--that no power existed
of raising supplies but by the requisitions or quotas
on the states--that this defect had been almost fatally
evinced by the experience of the states for the last six or
eight years, in which not one of them had completely complied;
but a few had even paid up their specie proportions;
others very partially; and some, he had every reason to
believe, had not to this day contributed a shilling to the
common treasury since the Union was formed. He should
not go into a detail of the conduct of the states, or the
unfortunate and embarrassing situation to which their inattention
has reduced the Union; these have been so often
and so strongly represented by Congress, that he was sure
there could not be a member on the floor unacquainted
with them. It was sufficient to remark that the Convention
saw and felt the necessity of establishing a government
upon different principles, which, instead of requiring the
intervention of thirteen different legislatures between the
demand and the compliance, should operate upon the
people in the first instance.

He repeated, that the necessity of having a government
which should at once operate upon the people, and not
upon the states, was conceived to be indispensable by every
delegation present; that, however they may have differed
with respect to the quantum of power, no objection was
made to the system itself. They considered it, however,
highly necessary that, in the establishment of a constitution
possessing extensive national authorities, a proper distribution
of its powers should be attended to. Sensible of the
danger of a single body, and that to such a council the
states ought not to intrust important rights, they considered
it their duty to divide the legislature into two
branches, and, by a limited revisionary power, to mingle,
in some degree, the executive in their proceedings--a provision
that he was pleased to find meets with universal approbation.
The degree of weight which each state was to
have in the federal council became a question of much agitation.
The larger states contended that no government
could long exist whose principles were founded in injustice;
that one of the most serious and unanswerable objections
to the present system was the injustice of its tendency
in allowing each state an equal vote, notwithstanding their
striking disparity. The small ones replied, and perhaps
with reason, that, as the states were the pillars upon which
the general government must ever rest, their state governments
must remain; that, however they may vary in point
of territory or population, as political associations they
were equal; that upon these terms they formally confederated,
and that no inducement whatsoever should tempt
them to unite upon others; that, if they did, it would
amount to nothing less than throwing the whole government
of the Union into the hands of three or four of the
largest states.

After much anxious discussion,--for, had the Convention
separated without determining upon a plan, it would
have been on this point,--a compromise was effected, by
which it was determined that the first branch be so chosen
as to represent in due proportion to the people of the
Union; that the Senate should be the representatives of
the states, where each should have an equal weight.
Though he was at first opposed to this compromise, yet he
was far from thinking it an injudicious one. The different
branches of the legislature being intended as checks upon
each other, it appeared to him they would more effectually
restrain their mutual intemperances under this mode of
representation than they would have done if both houses
had been so formed upon proportionable principles; for,
let us theorize as much as we will, it will be impossible so
far to divest the majority of the federal representatives of
their state views and policy, as to induce them always to
act upon truly national principles. Men do not easily wean
themselves of those preferences and attachments which
country and connections invariably create; and it must frequently
have happened, had the larger states acquired that
decided majority which a proportionable representation
would have given them in both houses, that state views and
policy would have influenced their deliberations. The ease
with which they would, upon all occasions, have secured a
majority in the legislature, might, in times less virtuous
than the present, have operated as temptations to designing
and ambitious men to sacrifice the public good to private
views. This cannot be the case at present; the different
mode of representation for the Senate will, as has
already been observed, most effectually prevent it. The
purpose of establishing different houses of legislation was
to introduce the influence of different interests and principles;
and he thought that we should derive, from this
mode of separating the legislature into two branches, those
benefits which a proper complication of principles is capable
of producing, and which must, in his judgment, be
greater than any evils that may arise from their temporary
dissensions.

The judicial he conceived to be at once the most important
and intricate part of the system. That a supreme federal
jurisdiction was indispensable, cannot be denied. It is
equally true that, in order to insure the administration of
justice, it was necessary to give it all the powers, original as
well as appellate, the Constitution has enumerated; without
it we could not expect a due observance of treaties--that
the state judiciary would confine themselves within
their proper sphere, or that general sense of justice pervade
the Union which this part of the Constitution is intended
to introduce and protect--that much, however,
would depend upon the wisdom of the legislatures who
are to organize it--that, from the extensiveness of its powers,
it may be easily seen that, under a wise management,
this department might be made the keystone of the arch,
the means of connecting and binding the whole together,
of preserving uniformity in all the judicial proceedings of
the Union--that, in republics, much more (in time of
peace) would always depend upon the energy and integrity
of the judicial than on any other part of the government--that,
to insure these, extensive authorities were
necessary; particularly so were they in a tribunal constituted
as this is, whose duty it would be not only to decide
all national questions which should arise within the Union,
but to control and keep the state judicials within their
proper limits whenever they shall attempt to interfere with
its power.

And the executive, he said, though not constructed
upon those firm and permanent principles which he confessed
would have been pleasing to him, is still as much so
as the present temper and genius of the people will admit.
Though many objections had been made to this part of the
system, he was always at a loss to account for them. That
there can be nothing dangerous in its powers, even if he
was disposed to take undue advantages, must be easily discerned
from reviewing them. He is commander-in-chief of
the land and naval forces of the Union, but he can neither
raise nor support forces by his own authority. He has a
revisionary power in the making of laws; but if two thirds
of both houses afterwards agree notwithstanding his negative,
the law passes. He cannot appoint to an office without
the Senate concurs; nor can he enter into treaties, or,
in short, take a single step in his government, without their
advice. He is, also, to remain in office but four years. He
might ask, then, From whence are the dangers of the executive
to proceed? It may be said, From a combination of
the executive and the Senate, they might form a baneful
aristocracy.

He had been opposed to connecting the executive and
the Senate in the discharge of those duties, because their
union, in his opinion, destroyed that responsibility which
the Constitution should, in this respect, have been careful
to establish; but he had no apprehensions of an aristocracy.
For his part, he confessed that he ever treated all
fears of aristocracies or despotisms, in the federal head, as
the most childish chimeras that could be conceived. In a
Union extensive as this is, composed of so many state governments,
and inhabited by a people characterized, as our
citizens are, by an impatience under any act which even
looks like an infringement of their rights, an invasion of
them by the federal head appeared to him the most remote
of all our public dangers. So far from supposing a
change of this sort at all probable, he confessed his apprehensions
were of a different kind: he rather feared that it
was impossible, while the state systems continue--and continue
they must--to construct any government upon republican
principles sufficiently energetic to extend its influence
through all its parts. Near the federal seat, its
influence may have complete effect; but he much doubted
its efficacy in the more remote districts. The state governments
will too naturally slide into an opposition against the
general one, and be easily induced to consider themselves
as rivals. They will, after a time, resist the collection of a
revenue; and if the general government is obliged to concede,
in the smallest degree, on this point, they will of
course neglect their duties, and despise its authority: a
great degree of weight and energy is necessary to enforce
it; nor is any thing to be apprehended from them. All
power being immediately derived from the people, and
the state governments being the basis of the general one,
it will easily be in their power to interfere, and to prevent
its injuring or invading their rights. Though at first he
considered some declaration on the subject of trial by jury
in civil causes, and the freedom of the press, necessary,
and still thinks it would have been as well to have had it
inserted, yet he fully acquiesced in the reasoning which
was used to show that the insertion of them was not essential.
The distinction which has been taken between the nature
of a federal and state government appeared to be
conclusive--that in the former, no powers could be executed,
or assumed, but such as were expressly delegated;
that in the latter, the indefinite power was given to the
government, except on points that were by express compact
reserved to the people.

On the subject of juries, in civil cases, the Convention
were anxious to make some declaration; but when they reflected
that all courts of admiralty and appeals, being governed
in their propriety by the civil law and the laws of
nations, never had, or ought to have, juries, they found it
impossible to make any precise declaration upon the subject;
they therefore left it as it was, trusting that the good
sense of their constituents would never induce them to
suppose that it could be the interest or intention of the
general government to abuse one of the most invaluable
privileges a free country can boast; in the loss of which,
themselves, their fortunes and connections, must be so
materially involved, and to the deprivation of which, except
in the cases alluded to, the people of this country
would never submit. When we reflect that the exigencies
of the government require that a general government
upon other principles than the present should be established,--when
we contemplate the difference between a
federal union and a government operating upon the people,
and not upon the states,--we must at once see the
necessity of giving to it the power of direct taxation. Without
this, it must be impossible for them to raise such supplies
as are necessary to discharge the debts, or support
the expenses, of the Union--to provide against the common
dangers, or afford that protection to its members
which they have a right to expect from the federal head.
But here he begged leave to observe that, so far from apprehending
danger from the exercise of this power, few
or no inconveniences are to be expected. He had not a
doubt that, except in time of war, or pressing necessity, a
sufficient sum would always be raised, by impost, to defray
the general expenses. As to the power of raising troops, it
was unnecessary to remark upon it further than merely to
say, that this is a power the government at present possesses
and exercises; a power so essential, that he should
very much doubt the good sense or information of the
man that should conceive it improper. It is guarded by a
declaration that no grants for this purpose shall be longer
than two years at a time. For his own part, notwithstanding
all that had been said upon this popular topic, he could
not conceive that either the dignity of a government could
be maintained, its safety insured, or its laws administered,
without a body of regular forces to aid the magistrate in
the execution of his duty. All government is a kind of restraint.
We may be told, a free government imposes no
restraint upon the private wills of individuals which does
not conduce in a greater degree to the public happiness;
but all government is restraint, and founded in force. We
are the first nation who have ever held a contrary opinion,
or even attempted to maintain one without it. The experiment
has been made, and he trusted there would hereafter
be few men weak enough to suppose that some regular
force ought not to be kept up, or that the militia ever can
be depended upon as the support or protection of the
Union.

Upon the whole, he could not but join those in opinion
who have asserted that this is the best government that has
ever yet been offered to the world, and that, instead of
being alarmed at its consequences, we should be astonishingly
pleased that one so perfect could have been formed
from such discordant and unpromising materials. In a system
founded upon republican principles, where the powers
of government are properly distributed, and each confined
to a separate body of magistracy, a greater degree of
force and energy will always be found necessary than even
in a monarchy. This arises from the national spirit of
union being stronger in monarchies than in republics: it is
said to be naturally strong in monarchies, because, in the
absence both of manners and principles, the compelling
power of the sovereign collects and draws every thing to a
point; and thereby, in all common situations, effectually
supplies their place. But in free countries it is naturally
weak, unless supported by public spirit; for as, in most
cases, a full spirit of national union will require that the
separate and partial views of private interest be on every
occasion sacrificed to the general welfare, so, when this
principle prevails not, (and it will only prevail in moments
of enthusiasm,) the national union must ever be destroyed
by selfish views and private interest. He said that, with respect
to the Union, this can only be remedied by a strong
government, which, while it collects its powers to a point,
will prevent that spirit of disunion from which the most
serious consequences are to be apprehended. He begged
leave, for a moment, to examine what effect this spirit of
disunion must have upon us, as we may be affected by a
foreign enemy. It weakens the consistency of all public
measures, so that no extensive scheme of thought can be
carried into action, if its accomplishment demand any long
continuance of time. It weakens not only the consistency,
but the vigor and expedition, of all public measures; so
that, while a divided people are contending about the
means of security or defence, a united enemy may surprise
and invade them. These are the apparent consequences of
disunion. Mr. Pinckney confessed, however, that, after all
that had been said upon the subject, our Constitution was
in some measure but an experiment; nor was it possible
yet to form a just conclusion as to its practicability.

It had been an opinion long established, that a republican
form of government suited only the affairs of a small
state; which opinion is founded in the consideration, that
unless the people in every district of the empire be admitted
to a share in the national representation, the government
is not to them as a republic; that in a democratic
constitution, the mechanism is too complicated, the motions
too slow, for the operations of a great empire, whose
defence and government require execution and despatch
in proportion to the magnitude, extent, and variety of its
concerns. There was, no doubt, weight in these reasons;
but much of the objection, he thought, would be done
away by the continuance of a federal republic, which, distributing
the country into districts, or states, of a commodious
extent, and leaving to each state its internal legislation,
reserves unto a superintending government the
adjustment of their general claims, the complete direction
of the common force and treasure of the empire. To what
limits such a republic might extend, or how far it is capable
of uniting the liberty of a small commonwealth with
the safety of a peaceful empire; or whether, among coördinate
powers, dissensions and jealousies would not arise,
which, for want of a common superior, might proceed to
fatal extremities,--are questions upon which he did not
recollect the example of any nation to authorize us to decide,
because the experiment has never been yet fairly
made. We are now about to make it upon an extensive
scale, and under circumstances so promising, that he considered
it the fairest experiment that had been ever made
in favor of human nature. He concluded with expressing
a thorough conviction that the firm establishment of the
present system is better calculated to answer the great ends
of public happiness than any that has yet been devised.

Elliot, Jonathan, ed. The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution as Recommended by the General Convention at Philadelphia in 1787. . . . 5 vols. 2d ed. 1888. Reprint. New York: Burt Franklin, n.d.