Assailed
in this petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the June 28, 2007 Decision[1] and
the September 18, 2007 Resolution[2] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 94016. The relevant antecedent facts and proceedings follow.

In
1999, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 215 a
complaint for specific performance with damages docketed as Civil Case No.
Q-99-37219. On motion of respondents, the complaint was dismissed. The appellate
court later affirmed the dismissal in CA-G.R. SP No. 69573. This Court,
however, in its decision in G.R. No. 160753 on September 30, 2004, reversed and
set aside the order of dismissal and remanded the case to the trial court with the
instruction that the same be heard and tried with deliberate dispatch.[3] On
June 28, 2005, the Court denied with finality the motion for the reconsideration
of the said decision.[4]

RTC,
Branch 215, of Quezon City,
thus, proceeded to hear Civil Case No. Q-99-37219. On February 23, 2006, however,
petitioner filed his motion for the inhibition[5] of
the presiding judge, Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla, allegedly to preclude doubts
or apprehensions of partiality and to give the parties breathing space and
peace of mind in the course of the adjudication of the proceedings.

After
respondents filed their opposition, the RTC judge issued the March 7, 2006
Order[6]
declaring that she was voluntarily inhibiting herself from hearing the case and
that she was granting the motion in order to dispel any doubt and perception of
bias, and so that the faith and confidence in the justice system would not be
eroded.

Disagreeing with the trial judge, respondents,
on April 10, 2006, filed before the CA their Petition for Mandamus with Prayer
for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction.[7] Respondents
contended in the main that there was no sufficient ground for the trial judge
to inhibit herself from hearing the case.

On June 28, 2007, the CA rendered the
assailed Decision[8] granting
the petition for mandamus, reversing and setting aside the inhibitory order
issued by the trial court, and directing the said court to hear and decide the
civil case with deliberate dispatch. It ruled, among others, that the allegations
of preconceived bias and partiality thrown against the trial judge were more
imaginary than real; that the records bore no suspicious circumstances that would
create doubt on the impartiality, fairness and objectivity of the trial judge;
that no extrinsic evidence appeared on the records to establish that the trial
judge acted with bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose all throughout the
proceedings; and that there was no just and valid cause for the
disqualification of the trial judge from presiding over the case.

The appellate court, in the further
assailed September 18, 2007 Resolution,[9] denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Aggrieved, petitioner brought the
matter to this Court via the instant Rule 45 petition.

The Court denies the petition.

Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of
Court provides that—

Section 1. Disqualification
of judges.—No judge or judicial officers shall sit in any case in which he,
or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or
otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of
consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed
according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any
inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without
the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon
the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion,
disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than
those mentioned above.

The first paragraph of the section relates
to the mandatory inhibition of judges; the second, to their voluntary
inhibition.

The discretion referred to in the
second paragraph is a matter of conscience and is addressed primarily to the
judges’ sense of fairness and justice.[10] Indeed,
as this Court has held in Pimentel v.
Salanga,[11] judges
may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. However, when
suggestion is made of record that they might be induced to act with bias or
prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstances reasonably capable of
inciting such a state of mind, they should conduct a careful self-examination. Magistrates
should exercise their discretion in a way that the people’s faith in the courts
of justice is not impaired. They should, therefore, exercise great care and
caution before making up their minds to act or withdraw from a suit. If, after
reflection, they resolve to voluntarily desist from sitting in a case in which their
motives or fairness might be seriously impugned, their action is to be
interpreted as giving meaning and substance to the second paragraph of Section
1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court.[12]

Nonetheless, while the rule allows
judges, in the exercise of sound discretion, to voluntarily inhibit themselves
from hearing a case, it provides that the inhibition must be based on just or
valid reasons. In prior cases interpreting this rule, the most recent of which
is Philippine Commercial International
Bank v. Spouses Wilson Dy Hong Pi, etc., et al.,[13] the
Court noted that the mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground
for inhibition, especially when the charge is without basis. Acts or conduct
clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice has to be shown. Extrinsic
evidence must further be presented to establish bias, bad faith, malice, or
corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be inferred from the
decision or order itself.[14]Stated differently, the bare allegations of
the judge’s partiality will not suffice in the absence of clear and convincing
evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his noble
role of dispensing justice in accordance with law and evidence, and without
fear or favor. Verily, for bias and prejudice to be considered valid reasons
for the involuntary inhibition of judges, mere suspicion is not enough.[15] Let
it be further noted that the option given to a judge to choose whether or not
to handle a particular case should be counterbalanced by the judge’s sworn duty
to administer justice without fear of repression.[16]

In the case at bar, petitioner, aside
from his bare allegations, has not shown that Judge Quijano-Padilla had been
biased and partial against a particular party in the proceedings in Civil Case
No. Q-99-37219. The judge even acknowledged in the inhibitory order that the
motion for her disqualification contained no statement of specific act or acts
that would show her partiality or bias in the treatment of the case. Her
voluntary inhibition was only on account of dispelling any doubt and perception
of bias on the part of petitioner. Clearly, therefore, no just and valid reason
supports the inhibition of Judge Quijano-Padilla.

The fact that Judge Quijano-Padilla ruled
adversely against petitioner in the resolution of the motion to dismiss, which
this Court later reversed in G.R. No. 160753, is not enough reason, absent any
extrinsic evidence of malice or bad faith, to conclude that the judge was
biased and partial against petitioner. As this Court has emphasized in Webb v. People,[17]
the remedy of erroneous interlocutory rulings in the course of a trial is not
the outright disqualification of a judge, for there is yet to come a judge with
the omniscience to issue rulings that are always infallible. The courts will
close shop if we disqualify judges who err, for we all err.

Finally, the Court notes that if it
were to affirm the inhibitory order in this case, then it would be opening the
floodgates to a form of forum-shopping, in which litigants would be allowed to
shop for a judge more sympathetic to their causes.[18]

WHEREFORE,premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The June 28, 2007 Decision and
the September 18, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
94016 are AFFIRMED.

SO
ORDERED.

ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate
Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I
attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.

CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate
Justice

Chairperson,
Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant
to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.

[14]Id.see,
however, Gutang v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 124760, July 8, 1998, 292 SCRA 76, in which the Court considered as a
just and valid reason for voluntary inhibition the distrust and skepticism that
may possibly cloud the decision, order or resolution the judge will render.