15篇文章贯通六级词汇Unit09-Part1

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[00:00.00]UNIT9
[00:13.00]Chinese-American Relations: A History(Ⅱ)
[00:17.38]The Cold War to the Present
[00:19.57]The Cold War
[00:21.20]After the war, a new war
[00:24.49]of international tension, intrigue
[00:26.89]and political posturing, called the Cold War,
[00:29.20]forced the U.S. to scrap
[00:31.16]any thoughts of the false comforts
[00:33.13]of official isolation. It joined
[00:35.98]the United Nations (UN) and other
[00:38.49]international organizations, such as
[00:40.68]the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
[00:42.87]the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
[00:46.04]and the General Agreement on Tariff
[00:48.67]and Trade (GATT). It was determined
[00:50.96]to play a major, if not
[00:52.61]dominant role, in post war
[00:54.36]international affairs. The world
[00:56.87]was the stage for intense rivalry
[00:58.51]between the Communists, on one side,
[01:00.70]and democratic Capitalists on the other.
[01:03.33]It fostered close scrutiny
[01:05.41]of each other, as well as
[01:07.16]a brisk interchange of often fabricated
[01:09.68]and distorted propaganda between
[01:11.75]the polarized sides. It injected
[01:14.49]the fear that if one side blinked,
[01:16.68]a nuclear war would be triggered.
[01:18.65]The world, seemingly, was always
[01:21.49]on the verge of warfare.
[01:23.13]This environment placed the United States
[01:25.21]and China on opposite sides
[01:27.18]once the Communists took power
[01:28.82]in China in 1949. This constant
[01:31.56]friction jeopardized chances for
[01:33.85]meaningful political interaction and intercourse.
[01:36.37]This atmosphere of distrust and fear
[01:39.21]left little incentive for the
[01:41.18]different sides to talk seriously.
[01:42.93]By the end of the Second World War,
[01:46.32]or during the last year or
[01:48.42]two of the war, the world stage
[01:49.83]was being set for the Cold War.
[01:51.26]President Truman's attitude toward China hardened.
[01:54.32]American policy was explicit that
[01:57.60]only one China, Nationalist China
[02:00.23]led by Chiang Kai?shek, on the island
[02:02.53]of Taiwan, was the official China.
[02:05.04]The Americans made it abundantly clear,
[02:07.45]that Mao Tsetung's Communist Regime,
[02:09.75]on mainland China, would not occupy
[02:11.94]China's permanent seat in the United Nations
[02:14.56]Security Council.
[02:16.31]The outbreak of war on
[02:18.06]the Korean Peninsula brought about
[02:20.46]an abrupt change of focus
[02:22.11]in American foreign policy.
[02:23.42]The new American strategy was
[02:25.61]to militarily isolate or alienate
[02:28.67]China in Asia. To accomplish this,
[02:31.85]the United States established bases
[02:34.58]in East Asia and mutual defense
[02:36.33]treaties in East Asia. Treaties
[02:38.63]were negotiated with Japan, the Philippines,
[02:41.25]Australia, and New Zealand. American
[02:44.87]President Eisenhower later expanded
[02:47.82]these to include South Korea,
[02:49.35]Pakistan, and Thailand. To cap off
[02:52.74]this anti?China strategy, the US
[02:55.37]strengthened ties with Taiwan or
[02:57.33]Nationalist China, with which
[02:59.31]the former had official diplomatic ties.
[03:01.49]In the 1950s, American power and
[03:05.87]credibility deteriorated somewhat
[03:08.38]in the Cold War. Its own people,
[03:10.35]who began to oppose McCarthyism
[03:12.87]and the blunt anti-communist policies
[03:15.28]of John Foster Dulles, the American Secretary
[03:18.56]of State in the Eisenhower Administration,
[03:20.64]helped to undermined national prestige.
[03:24.14]In 1953, Josef Stalin,
[03:28.08]the Soviet leader, died. These events
[03:30.92]helped to bring about a shift
[03:33.22]in direction in American foreign policy.
[03:34.86]The United States began to
[03:36.80]look more to Asian events as
[03:38.78]major threats to America's national security.
[03:40.85]The Iron Curtain was firmly established
[03:44.57]in Europe, and NATO forces provided
[03:46.65]secure protection on the western side
[03:48.94]of the curtain. For the time being,
[03:50.92]things looked fairly stable in Europe.
[03:53.32]In the East, because of
[03:55.40]the end of the Korean War and
[03:56.82]the exodus of the French from
[03:58.47]Indo-China, things were not
[04:00.43]as stable. The American political
[04:02.73]elite contended that the foremost
[04:04.70]problem was the vacuum left
[04:06.89]by the French withdrawal from Indo-China.
[04:08.97]To officials in the United States,
[04:13.12]this void must not be filled
[04:15.10]by another communist regime.
[04:16.95]The realization of objectives
[04:19.14]of the domino theory (the essence
[04:21.55]of which was, that if not checked,
[04:23.63]countries in an given area
[04:25.38]will all gradually fall to
[04:27.02]communist rule) could not be
[04:29.87]allowed to perpetuate. The Chinese Revolution
[04:32.27]had established a communist regime
[04:34.35]in the most populous country
[04:35.77]in the world, and the tensions
[04:37.30]between North and South Korea
[04:39.17]were not going to go
[04:40.70]away overnight. Success of
[04:42.87]the domino theory looked more likely
[04:45.27]in Asia than in Europe.
[04:47.25]The United States felt that
[04:49.32]it needed to concentrate its energies
[04:50.96]and resources in Asia.
[04:52.72]American policies, during the 1960s
[04:55.78]and early 1970s, essentially were
[04:59.93]to prevent communist takeovers in Asia,
[05:03.07]in particular, particularly in South Vietnam
[05:06.59]and Taiwan. American policy
[05:09.45]was to contain communism where
[05:11.53]it already existed, while simultaneously
[05:14.16]coexisting peacefully with its cold war
[05:17.01]communist rivals. Military expenditures
[05:20.72]increased as defense budgets went
[05:22.69]sky high with democratic and communist
[05:25.31]bureaucracies building huge arsenals
[05:28.16]or inventories of high velocity,
[05:30.24]even supersonic destructive nuclear weapons,
[05:33.52]in a very fragile polarized world.
[05:36.49]Even China tested a thermal
[05:38.68]nuclear weapon in the early 60s.

[ti:]
[ar:]
[al:]
[by:]
[00:00.00]UNIT9
[00:13.00]Chinese-American Relations: A History(Ⅱ)
[00:17.38]The Cold War to the Present
[00:19.57]The Cold War
[00:21.20]After the war, a new war
[00:24.49]of international tension, intrigue
[00:26.89]and political posturing, called the Cold War,
[00:29.20]forced the U.S. to scrap
[00:31.16]any thoughts of the false comforts
[00:33.13]of official isolation. It joined
[00:35.98]the United Nations (UN) and other
[00:38.49]international organizations, such as
[00:40.68]the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
[00:42.87]the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
[00:46.04]and the General Agreement on Tariff
[00:48.67]and Trade (GATT). It was determined
[00:50.96]to play a major, if not
[00:52.61]dominant role, in post war
[00:54.36]international affairs. The world
[00:56.87]was the stage for intense rivalry
[00:58.51]between the Communists, on one side,
[01:00.70]and democratic Capitalists on the other.
[01:03.33]It fostered close scrutiny
[01:05.41]of each other, as well as
[01:07.16]a brisk interchange of often fabricated
[01:09.68]and distorted propaganda between
[01:11.75]the polarized sides. It injected
[01:14.49]the fear that if one side blinked,
[01:16.68]a nuclear war would be triggered.
[01:18.65]The world, seemingly, was always
[01:21.49]on the verge of warfare.
[01:23.13]This environment placed the United States
[01:25.21]and China on opposite sides
[01:27.18]once the Communists took power
[01:28.82]in China in 1949. This constant
[01:31.56]friction jeopardized chances for
[01:33.85]meaningful political interaction and intercourse.
[01:36.37]This atmosphere of distrust and fear
[01:39.21]left little incentive for the
[01:41.18]different sides to talk seriously.
[01:42.93]By the end of the Second World War,
[01:46.32]or during the last year or
[01:48.42]two of the war, the world stage
[01:49.83]was being set for the Cold War.
[01:51.26]President Truman's attitude toward China hardened.
[01:54.32]American policy was explicit that
[01:57.60]only one China, Nationalist China
[02:00.23]led by Chiang Kai?shek, on the island
[02:02.53]of Taiwan, was the official China.
[02:05.04]The Americans made it abundantly clear,
[02:07.45]that Mao Tsetung's Communist Regime,
[02:09.75]on mainland China, would not occupy
[02:11.94]China's permanent seat in the United Nations
[02:14.56]Security Council.
[02:16.31]The outbreak of war on
[02:18.06]the Korean Peninsula brought about
[02:20.46]an abrupt change of focus
[02:22.11]in American foreign policy.
[02:23.42]The new American strategy was
[02:25.61]to militarily isolate or alienate
[02:28.67]China in Asia. To accomplish this,
[02:31.85]the United States established bases
[02:34.58]in East Asia and mutual defense
[02:36.33]treaties in East Asia. Treaties
[02:38.63]were negotiated with Japan, the Philippines,
[02:41.25]Australia, and New Zealand. American
[02:44.87]President Eisenhower later expanded
[02:47.82]these to include South Korea,
[02:49.35]Pakistan, and Thailand. To cap off
[02:52.74]this anti?China strategy, the US
[02:55.37]strengthened ties with Taiwan or
[02:57.33]Nationalist China, with which
[02:59.31]the former had official diplomatic ties.
[03:01.49]In the 1950s, American power and
[03:05.87]credibility deteriorated somewhat
[03:08.38]in the Cold War. Its own people,
[03:10.35]who began to oppose McCarthyism
[03:12.87]and the blunt anti-communist policies
[03:15.28]of John Foster Dulles, the American Secretary
[03:18.56]of State in the Eisenhower Administration,
[03:20.64]helped to undermined national prestige.
[03:24.14]In 1953, Josef Stalin,
[03:28.08]the Soviet leader, died. These events
[03:30.92]helped to bring about a shift
[03:33.22]in direction in American foreign policy.
[03:34.86]The United States began to
[03:36.80]look more to Asian events as
[03:38.78]major threats to America's national security.
[03:40.85]The Iron Curtain was firmly established
[03:44.57]in Europe, and NATO forces provided
[03:46.65]secure protection on the western side
[03:48.94]of the curtain. For the time being,
[03:50.92]things looked fairly stable in Europe.
[03:53.32]In the East, because of
[03:55.40]the end of the Korean War and
[03:56.82]the exodus of the French from
[03:58.47]Indo-China, things were not
[04:00.43]as stable. The American political
[04:02.73]elite contended that the foremost
[04:04.70]problem was the vacuum left
[04:06.89]by the French withdrawal from Indo-China.
[04:08.97]To officials in the United States,
[04:13.12]this void must not be filled
[04:15.10]by another communist regime.
[04:16.95]The realization of objectives
[04:19.14]of the domino theory (the essence
[04:21.55]of which was, that if not checked,
[04:23.63]countries in an given area
[04:25.38]will all gradually fall to
[04:27.02]communist rule) could not be
[04:29.87]allowed to perpetuate. The Chinese Revolution
[04:32.27]had established a communist regime
[04:34.35]in the most populous country
[04:35.77]in the world, and the tensions
[04:37.30]between North and South Korea
[04:39.17]were not going to go
[04:40.70]away overnight. Success of
[04:42.87]the domino theory looked more likely
[04:45.27]in Asia than in Europe.
[04:47.25]The United States felt that
[04:49.32]it needed to concentrate its energies
[04:50.96]and resources in Asia.
[04:52.72]American policies, during the 1960s
[04:55.78]and early 1970s, essentially were
[04:59.93]to prevent communist takeovers in Asia,
[05:03.07]in particular, particularly in South Vietnam
[05:06.59]and Taiwan. American policy
[05:09.45]was to contain communism where
[05:11.53]it already existed, while simultaneously
[05:14.16]coexisting peacefully with its cold war
[05:17.01]communist rivals. Military expenditures
[05:20.72]increased as defense budgets went
[05:22.69]sky high with democratic and communist
[05:25.31]bureaucracies building huge arsenals
[05:28.16]or inventories of high velocity,
[05:30.24]even supersonic destructive nuclear weapons,
[05:33.52]in a very fragile polarized world.
[05:36.49]Even China tested a thermal
[05:38.68]nuclear weapon in the early 60s.