Provision of grants to communities for financing priority, demand driven, village and ward-level sub-projects (social and economic) including capacity building and matching grants for income generating activities identified through participatory processes. About five percent of the costs of the Community Development Facility was earmarked to a sub-component "Good Governance Facility" This financed grants to NGOs, community organizations and other civil society groups on a demand-driven basis to support capacity building in areas related to community development.

B. Strengthening Capacity for Community Development. (Expected costs at appraisal (base costs without contingencies) - US$ 6.10 million. Actual costs by closing - US$ 6.30 million.) Capacity building through training and consultancies for, in particular, communities and wards in participatory processes, and planning for community driven development; and capacity building for Local Government Authorities and sector specialized government agencies (e.g. agriculture, environment, water and sanitation ministries).

There were no changes to the Community Driven Development Project's (CDDP)’s Objectives. CDDP approval was on August 31st, 2006, and the project became effective on November 2nd, 2007, 14 months after approval. The original closing date was April 30th, 2012 and was extended by six months to October 31st, 2012 resulting in a total project period of 6 years, 2 months (Board approval to closure).

Total project costs estimated at appraisal (base costs without contingencies) were US$ 18.1 million, and at completion actual costs were US$ 18.75 million. Financing was from IDA (US$12.0 million), the borrower’s counterpart funds (US$ 2.20 million), and PHRD grants from Japan of US$ 4.80 million. About US$ 0.9 million of the Japanese grant was for funding technical assistance and training during project preparation, and the rest was for financing project implementation.

3. Relevance of Objectives & Design:

a. Relevance of Objectives:

The project's objectives are restricted to describing four activities that rural communities are intended to undertake to develop their priority social and economic investments: planning, implementing, maintaining, and partnering with local governments. All four are processes, and do not indicate the outputs and higher level outcomes/goals that the project is intended to contribute towards. This is particularly illustrated in the logical framework (PAD, Annex 3), which lacks reference to a higher level goal, and therefore also lacks a logical chain concerning how the outputs and objectives will contribute to such a goal.

To some extent, the project's broader goals could be considered implicit given the strong poverty orientation in various strategy documents. Thus, faced with pervasive poverty (in 2007, two-thirds of the Republic of the Gambia's population lived below the poverty line and almost 40 percent of households were food poor), poverty alleviation was the evident core development need for the country, and this is reflected in both the Gambia's.Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper: 2007-2011, issued in 2006, the year of the project's approval; and in the Second Joint Partnership Strategy for the Republic of Gambia: 2013-2016 (CAS) issued on March 11, 2013, shortly after the project's closure. The 2013 CAS enunciates three focus areas - growth, social services and transparency - in support of a growth and poverty alleviation strategy. Grass roots social and economic development and government decentralization are also highlighted. The project's decentralized, community empowerment approach for small-scale investments in social or economic activities is broadly consistent with this strategy. Also, the PAD refers to growth and poverty in its sector discussion. Nevertheless, this background limits relevance to the overarching issues of the CAS goals of growth and poverty alleviation. A more project specific articulation would have been desirable related to the welfare and sustainability of the community organizations created under the project.

The articulation of the project's objectives would have been better if the following changes had been made: first, at least a mention of the longer term goal (presumably to alleviate poverty with an effective and sustainable CDD program); second, in the text, a discussion of how the Community Driven Development (CDD) program would specifically help in this regard and how it would fit within the Gambia's longer-term and broader CDD development program; and third, providing in the results framework a causal logical chain between the processes and overall project goal. which would also likely trigger changes in some design features such as choice of monitorable indicators and M&E.

In conclusion, given that the objectives are only the carrying out of processes, without causal reference to the broader goals that they are specifically intended to contribute towards, and that this appears to have influenced several shortfalls such as M&E in project design (refer below), the Relevance of the project's Objectives is assessed Modest.

This evaluation will assess achievements regarding all four processes. However, this will be within the broader context of the benefits from such processes; in particular the project's impact on poverty and the sustainability of the infrastructure and community organizations created.

b. Relevance of Design:

If we take as given that the project's central thrust is focused on establishing - using effective planning, implementing, maintaining and government partnership processes - a network of CDD based sustainable village infrastructure to help alleviate poverty, most of the project's design features were relevant.

The project's design as a participatory community development program, significantly involving local governments, and using a community driven development approach, was appropriate to Gambia's conditions, as the top-down development efforts of the past had generally been ineffective in stimulating rural development and reaching the poor. Empowerment of local communities to take responsibility for choosing the type of investment they wanted, and for implementing and subsequently operating and maintaining their assets, was an internationally tested development approach and could work providing that planning and monitoring processes fostered transparency and social inclusion. The choice for the project of a large capacity-building program at all levels of government, civil society and villagers, was particularly important for Gambia, which had little experience in community driven development. Thus, in its core features the project was a practical means of reaching the objectives.

CDDP's design was also well tailored to Gambia's conditions. Design took account in its managerial and capacity-building activities to fit within Government's decentralization agenda and institutional framework. A potential risk of overlap of activities with other development agencies was avoided by agreements on each agency's respective activities, and the design was in essence one activity - promoting community driven development with intensive technical assistance and capacity building. Such a streamlined design held better chances of working in the still inexperienced decentralized Government institutions.

There were several weaknesses in design. None of the monitorable indicators was related to poverty alleviation or other social impacts, and there was a similar gap in the design and implementation of the M&E program (monitorable indicators and M&E are both discussed in section 10). Similarly, there is no reference in the logical framework related to poverty impact and the inclusion in decisions and benefits of the poor, women and other vulnerable groups.

The TTL has advised IEG that the design of the processes through which each sub-project is approved and implemented, largely safeguard against social exclusion and inequality. In particular: each community must prepare a development plan; their proposed sub-project is screened for environmental and social impact; and decision and participation processes must follow the guidelines in the Project Implementation Manual and the Decentralization Act. However, it would have been better if social indicators had been specifically articulated in the log frame as a reference, and if social inclusion indicators (such as attendance at meetings, share of benefits, female participation) had been explicitly established.

Nevertheless, in most respects, the project's design was a good basis for reaching the objectives, and the gaps in the monitoring framework originate primarily from the weaknesses in the project's objectives. Thus, taken overall, the project's Relevance of Design was Substantial.

4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy) :

The discussion below is organized by the four elements of the Objective:(i) Planning; (ii) Implementing; and (iii) Maintaining the community assets, and (iv) the Partnership with Local Governments. The review responds to these four processes in the context of the broader vision of poverty alleviation, and establishing a sustainable approach for community driven development The review is preceded by the physical achievements of the project.

Physical Achievements

The project financed 1428 sub-projects, 30 percent more than the initial target of 1098. The proportion of the sub-project types chosen by communities was: (i) for "productive" types of sub-project; agriculture - 75 percent; fisheries - 0.5 percent; and shops and markets - 3 percent, together making up 79 percent of the total sub-projects; and (ii) "Social" sub-projects which made up the balance 21 percent: water and sanitation - 11.9 percent; education (schools, literacy and community centers) - 2.3 percent, health clinics and other facilities - 3.2 percent and small roads and solar electrification - 4 percent.

(i) Planning Social.and Economic Sub-projects

Planning followed a process that is reported in the ICR to have been fully adhered to. All participating villages and wards had to submit a village or ward development plan following criteria laid out in the Project Implementation Plan. The Borrower in it's ICR highlights the empowerment of each community as an important achievement of the project. In principle, these required processes, and adherence to the Implementation Manual, could provide mechanisms for inclusion of the poor and women (refer Section 3 b); but the degree to which the development and implementation plans actually achieved this is not clear from ICR data. Nevertheless, the Task Team has advised IEG that the processes and screening used to select sub-projects has been effective in benefitting minorities: at least 25 percent of a sub-project committee had to be women; nearly as many women as men received capacity building training; and there is a requirement at sub-project approval stage that the sub-project must meet one or both of: (i) the sub-project must benefit the whole community; and/or (ii) enable the poorest to participate. The Task Team has also advised that an "Impact Survey" has been carried out and that it broadly confirms that the sub-projects were generally socially inclusive. Assuming the survey methodology was sound (IEG has not been provided with this report, and there are data inconsistencies with another report, refer below), project planning appears to have enabled sub-project designs that are rigorous and socially equitable. Efficacy was Substantial

(ii) Implementing.Social.and Economic Sub-projects

(Note: There is considerable uncertainty regarding the quality of the data in this sub-section. Data sources in the ICR are seldom mentioned, other than general reference to a beneficiary survey, focus group discussions and a stakeholder workshop at the end of the project. Further, there is no description of the sampling and data collection processes, and some data in the main text of the ICR is different to data reported in Government's ICR at Annex 7.). It appears from text references that the ICR data is primarily from an impact assessment report, and that Government figures are from a survey done for Government's completion report (described by Government as "an evaluation contribution to the project completion report to provide fresh evidence on the cost effectiveness and changes in the quality of life indicators .... as a result of the project." ) (IEG was unable to obtain a copy of either report.

In terms of the number of sub-projects implemented, achievement was well above (by 30 percent) the planned number of sub-projects.

In terms of quality, the ICR results framework reports that 92 percent of sub-projects were functional two years after completion (although the main text, page 17, has a figure of 88 percent) which suggests that the bulk of the sub-projects were implemented to satisfactory quality. The ICR also reports that 99 percent of communities were "satisfied" with the results of their sub-projects.

A different assessment is in Government's ICR (page 59 of the Bank's ICR) which refers to 70 percent of the sub-projects being "useful and effective." Also suggestive of modest impact is the Government report's comment that "More than half of the interventions in agriculture generate positive rates of return (financial and economic)" which, hence, infers that a large portion of the sub-projects were not viable. A more positive assessment is in Government's comment that "Over 80 percent of all respondents .... agree that life without the project would have been unbearable."

Faced with significant contradictions on the benefits for communities of the sub-projects, substantial socio-economic impact cannot be assumed with confidence. Hence the Efficacy from implementing the social and economic sub-projects is rated Modest.

(iii) Maintaining the Community Investments

Over 90 percent of sub-projects were still operative two years after completion (the target had been 70 percent). While it is too early to draw firm conclusions, these data suggest a reasonable start and prospects for sustained benefits for most of the communities. Efficacy was Substantial.

(iv) Local Government Authorities Partnering the Communities

The six Local Government Authorities played an important role in the community development program. The project provided substantial training to technical, procurement and financial staff in the Local Government Authorities, and gave the authorities responsibility for strategic planning, monitoring village development plans and managing and accounting for funds provided to the villages. They also facilitated the assistance to the project by the specialist ministries. Fund transfers to villages were within several days of receiving the request. Hence, a decentralized institutional structure was created capable of carrying the CDD program forward for the benefit of additional communities. Efficacy was Substantial.

Broader Outcomes

The Project's Impact on Poverty and Sustainable Community Development

The project's poverty alleviation impact cannot be ascertained empirically as the ICR has limited data related to incomes and welfare. Nevertheless, there is various data which point to improved welfare, notably the continued functionality of most of the sub-projects, suggesting that they are regarded as beneficial and are therefore maintained, and the apparently good "satisfaction" of the community (between 70 and 99 percent depending on data source), also suggesting improved welfare. Then there are the decision making and participation processes used under the community driven development (CDD) program, which are designed to be inclusive, and would normally facilitate social equity. The ICR also contains a variety of remarks on benefits from the project depending on the type of infrastructure created (such as improved farm productivity and food supply, improved access to water and education, improved health from potable water, reduced absenteeism). There is no data to back up these remarks, although, based on international experience, all are attainable if CDD sub-projects are well designed and implemented. These indicators point to a positive impact on welfare, although the degree of impact is not clear.

5. Efficiency:

Rate of Implementation and Physical Achievements. From the perspective of rate of implementation, and attainment of physical targets, the project did well. It was implemented (Board approval to closure, including the six-month extension) in just over 6 years, which for a project requiring extensive grass roots action and community participation is, based on Bank experience, expeditious. Moreover, the number of sub-projects that were completed significantly exceeded targets.

Cost Effectiveness of Social Infrastructure. For "social" infrastructure such as water, education and health facilities (about 21 percent of the total sub-projects implemented under the project), the ICR assesses efficiency on the basis of cost-effectiveness. Unit costs for the social sub-projects were between 20 to 60 percent lower than average costs of government constructed works for similar facilities.

Economic Viability. For "productive” infrastructure such as agriculture, fisheries, and markets (making up 79 percent of all of the sub-projects), an ERR was calculated, estimated at 23 percent. (It should be noted, however, that the rate of return is highly sensitive to decreases in benefits (a five percent reduction brings the ERR down to minus 3 percent); and, as noted in Section 4, the quality of data is unclear.

Summary. The project was implemented expeditiously, was cost-effective and achieved a larger number of sub-projects than targeted. Data problems introduce some uncertainty concerning the economic rate of return, but taking the point estimate as the only quantitative assessment available, and considering the project's expeditious implementation and cost-effectiveness, the project's overall Efficiency is rated Substantial.

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR)/Financial Rate of Return at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:

Rate Available?

Point Value

Coverage/Scope*

Appraisal:

Yes

15.3%

58%

ICR estimate:

Yes

23%

58%

* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated

6. Outcome:

The relevance of the project's objectives was modest, as the objectives were all processes and did not relate to a higher level outcome, and a causal chain between project outputs and the intended outcome was not established. Nevertheless, taking poverty alleviation as the implicit goal, the project's design was substantially relevant. The community driven approach to small scale rural investments used the Bank's experiences with community development approaches in other countries. Involving local governments was appropriate as it fitted the Gambia's decentralization agenda; and grass roots support for the communities was necessary to help them invest in community assets.

The project's efficacy was uneven. Planning, maintenance, and the decentralized partnership, had substantial efficacy. But there is little and even conflicting information on the welfare impact of the sub-projects, hence the efficacy of implementation is rated modest. Efficiency was substantial as it was cost-effective, carried out expeditiously, exceeded physical targets, and (based on the limited data available), was economically viable.

The project was satisfactory in most respects, but, with a modest relevance of objectives, a modest efficacy for one of the sub-objectives, and an impact on poverty that is not clear, the project's Outcome was Moderately Satisfactory.

a. Outcome Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

7. Rationale for Risk to Development Outcome Rating:

The decentralized institutions are gaining in capacity, and providing that a coordination apparatus such as the project's Coordinating Team is continued, Government capability, especially at local government level, should progressively strengthen. The main concern is the sustainability of the sub-project institutions. Some 92 percent of the sub-projects were fully functional two years after completion, but the situation four or five years after completion will be a more meaningful test. For assets to survive, a community group will need to function, funds for maintenance collected, and inclusive practices maintained. For the local governments, they will need to decide the degree of continued technical assistance that they should provide. As currently planned, after 3 years, most of the project support structure for a community will be moved on to other villages. Whether this will work and whether the community institutions will retain their strength is an open question. Risk to Development Outcome is Significant.

a. Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Significant

8. Assessment of Bank Performance:

a. Quality at entry:

The relevance of the objectives was flawed in being entirely based on processes, without reference to an outcome. Also, and, likely deriving from this, a causal chain between the implicit ultimate outcome - poverty alleviation - was not articulated in the results framework, monitorable indicators were limited to project outputs, and the M&E program included few indicators for assessing the quality of the sub-projects and their impact on welfare - areas fundamental to a community development project.

In other respects, quality at entry was sound. Choosing and then designing a decentralized and participatory approach to rural development was an appropriate decision. There was a critical need to find ways to enhance welfare of the poor, especially in rural areas where inequality was greatest; and Gambia's experience was that top-down, centralized approaches to rural development were ineffective. Also, Gambia had little experience with community mobilization. Preparation therefore involved detailed design of the complex institutional structures, processes, community procurement, and other features of a CDD program. Further, preparation involved a major outreach, motivation and training program for communities and all levels of government administration. These intensive activities were supported by an experienced Bank team, and the time was taken (preparation was over three years) for stakeholders (villagers, local governments and others) to become self-motivated. By appraisal, the project was in most respects ready for implementation of the first batch of sub-projects.

Taking account of both the gaps in the establishment of a monitorable results framework and M&E, and the otherwise strong design and preparation of the project, Quality at Entry was Moderately Satisfactory.

Quality-at-Entry Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

b. Quality of supervision:

The Bank supervision team was experienced in rural development and community driven development, and was supplemented by procurement and financial management specialists. The team was thus well suited to help Gambia to implement a community driven development program, allied with an ongoing decentralization of government administration. Supervision was oriented to problem solving, which was appropriate given the many start-up problems that could be expected as Gambia and the Bank progressed in this new approach. Large-scale community driven development was new for Gambia, and the team was generally effective in providing the technical advice needed. Involvement of procurement and financial management specialists responded well to the inexperience in these areas at project start-up. Supervision Performance was Satisfactory.

Quality of Supervision Rating: Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

9. Assessment of Borrower Performance:

a. Government Performance:

Government was committed to the project and worked in close partnership with the Bank throughout the project's preparation and implementation. It provided a supportive environment for implementation; with necessary legislation and adaptations as needed for institutional processes. A difficulty at the beginning of the project in attracting financial staff was resolved by increasing salaries and the use of consultants. Government applied a problem solving approach, with actions implemented expeditiously. It maintained good contact with all project institutions, and dialogued with other development agencies to ensure complementary rather than overlapped programs. Nevertheless, a key performance issue was in provision of Government's counterpart contribution to project costs. Counterpart funding was short throughout implementation, although it rose to 87 percent by project closure. Government Performance was Moderately Satisfactory.

Government Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

b. Implementing Agency Performance:

The implementers were the local governments, the line agencies providing specialist services, and the Project Coordination Team. The project team was highly committed to the project, and staff were quick learners in the needs and processes for a CDD program. The team was effective in building partnership with the other government agencies, which in turn progressively learned the outreach and fiduciary processes of the project. The Project Coordination Team and local governments were field oriented and fostered the participatory approaches characterizing community development. The Performance of the Implementing Agency was Satisfactory.

Implementing Agency Performance Rating: Satisfactory

Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

10. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization:

a. M&E Design:

The design of the project's M&E system contained a critical flaw which was reflected in the quality and utility of the M&E program from the project's outset to closure - the information needed was not thought through adequately, resulting in information gaps that have made evaluation difficult, and may have resulted in missed opportunities to improve the project's performance. The gaps in M&E may in large part be a reflection of the project's objectives and results framework. As the objectives did not include poverty alleviation as a goal, measuring impacts on poverty and social inclusion would not be a significant thrust in identifying monitorable indicators. As the Results Framework did not include a logical process linking the overarching goal of poverty alleviation with inputs, and steps in the chain that could be identified for monitoring, the M&E design lacked a strategic base. Particularly weak areas were in information on social impacts and incomes. Also, the M&E system had few qualitative indicators, being primarily oriented to numerical achievements.

An operationally integrated MIS system was targeted at appraisal, and was subsequently developed during project implementation.

b. M&E Implementation:

M&E coordination was done by one officer in the project team, an arrangement which the ICR comments was not realistic given the number of institutions involved (some 600 villages as well as the local governments). Nevertheless, basic data was obtained from the local governments. The limited provisions at design stage for the monitoring of qualitative and social aspects of the project remained, although an "impact survey" including social analysis was done at the end of the project.The MIS was fully developed and installed in all local government offices, the project management unit and concerned line agencies. Local governments collected village level data. MIS progress reports were issued regularly. The MIS was embedded within the local government administrative structures, enhancing the capacity of local governments and providing a more sustainable arrangement than if it had been under a separate unit.

a. M&E Utilization:

The MIS system became a regularly used management tool for monitoring progress and informing meetings for all implementing entities; in particular the local governments, line ministries and project coordination team. There was enough information from the M&E system to report basic project achievements against the log-frame indicators, but, as indicated above, the paucity of data reported in the ICR on the project's social impacts and on the quality of project achievements, limits the broader utility of the project's M&E system.

Overall Assessment M&E provided the information required to assess achievement against the monitorable indicators, but the capacity of the M&E system to assess project impacts on welfare, or the quality of the project's achievements, was limited. Overall performance of M&Ewas Modest.

M&E Quality Rating: Modest

11. Other Issues:

a. Safeguards:

The project was assessed as Category B, and triggered three safeguard policies: Environmental Assessment (OP 4.01), Pest Management (OP 4.09), and Involuntary Resettlement (OP 4.12). An Environmental and Social Management Framework, which included a Pest Management Plan, and a Resettlement Policy Framework were prepared. These formed the basis for mandatory environmental and social screening for each sub-project, but there were initial delays because local government staff required training. For the first batch of projects, prior screening was not done, and the sub-projects had to be screened ex-post. Thereafter, screening became a routine part of sub-project preparation. The main problems encountered were inadequate guidelines for contractors, and increased use of pesticides for horticulture (a pest management plan helped address this problem.

b. Fiduciary Compliance:

The ICR advises that initially, monitoring of expenditures was weak, but that this improved over time when a computerized financial management system was installed. Procurement was generally satisfactory - correct processes were learned through a comprehensive training program financed under the project. Financial audits were submitted on time and were unqualified. This, however, does not apply in full at village and local government levels. A survey of randomly selected sub-projects and local governments found that 90 percent of villages and local governments were fully in compliance with technical, financial and procurement audits, the remaining 10 percent had errors, mostly in processing procedures and documentation.

c. Unintended Impacts (positive or negative):

d. Other:

12. Ratings:

ICR

IEG Review

Reason for Disagreement/Comments

Outcome:

Satisfactory

Moderately Satisfactory

Objectives focused on processes without reference to a higher objective (poverty reduction). Project impact on poverty is not clear.

Risk to Development Outcome:

Moderate

Significant

The sustainability of sub-projects beyond the initial two years is not known.

Bank Performance:

Satisfactory

Moderately Satisfactory

Objectives are based on processes and lack anchoring in a higher level outcome. Poor M&E.

Borrower Performance:

Satisfactory

Moderately Satisfactory

Shortfalls in Government provision of counterpart funds.

Quality of ICR:

Satisfactory

NOTES:
- When insufficient information is provided by the Bank for IEG to arrive at a clear rating, IEG will downgrade the relevant ratings as warranted beginning July 1, 2006.
- The "Reason for Disagreement/Comments" column could cross-reference other sections of the ICR Review, as appropriate.

13. Lessons:

The following lessons are derived from the project's experience, of which Lessons 1 and 2 are from IEG, and lessons 3 and 4 are adapted from the ICR:

1. A community driven development program needs attention to the qualitative and social aspects of community development. Welfare impacts and assessment of the performance of sub-projects received little attention in the results framework and M&E, and the ICR has limited information on the degree to which sub-projects improved the welfare of communities.

2. A project that concerns improving processes or services, should indicate in the objectives the higher level goal intended.The project's objectives were to improve four processes without indication of what the intended outcome was to be. Specific reference to poverty alleviation would have set a goal within which to better focus design, and to implement and monitor the processes

3. In a Community Driven Development Project, especially when Government responsibilities are devolved to local administrations, capacity-building at all levels is a key need.The CDD program was new for all parties, whether local governments, villagers or line agencies. Comprehensive training and other capacity building actions was provided for all such stakeholders, and took up one-third of the project's total costs..

4. Strong political will and commitment to reform is needed for introducing a community driven development program.Government was committed to the reform program, passed enabling legislation for decentralization and community development, and resolved bottlenecks as project experience developed.

14. Assessment Recommended?

No

15. Comments on Quality of ICR:

The ICR is comprehensive, and the results log-frame covers the issues and indicators identified at appraisal. The lessons are well-founded in the ICR's diagnostic, but there could have been more analysis (and, likely, accompanying lessons) of the sub-projects' social impacts, as well as a more probing discussion of sustainability and sub-project quality. While data in these areas is limited, more qualitative discussion of the perceived issues and impacts would have been helpful. Some useful information and data provided to IEG by the TTL would have merited inclusion in the ICR as well. The sources of key data could also have been noted, and, in the text or as an annex, some remarks on survey sampling, methodology and implementation would have provided the reader with better judgement on the likely quality of data. But, taken overall and within the data limitations that were faced, the ICR provides a thoughtful discussion of the project experience, and the issues that it encountered. The Quality of the ICR is rated Satisfactory.