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2.
Table of Contents
features
ON THE COVER
Protracted, or “frozen,” conﬂicts present a
challenge to stability and security. Moving
away from the status quo while protecting
18 Answering
against the potential of renewed violence
the distress call
Civil-military cooperation is a
is not a simple endeavor. Finding common
must in emergency response to
ground upon which all parties can agree has
man-made and natural disasters.
proven a nearly impossible task.
26 A balanced view
p. 10 of the Balkans
Some believe the Balkan conflict
is over, but others warn it is on
the brink of erupting again.
The myth of 'frozen conﬂicts' 32 Resolving
post-Soviet
Regional and international support for
stabilization could lead to lasting solutions 'frozen conﬂicts'
Cover illustration: per Concordiam staff in places such as the South Caucasus. A strong foundation must be
in place for effective regional
integration.
38 Russia and the
post-Soviet space
Taking other interests into
account will help Moscow
regain a leadership role.
2 per Concordiam

3.
52
p.
departments
4 Director's Letter
5 Contributors
6 In This Issue
7 Letters to the Editor
8 Viewpoint
64 Book Review
66 Calendar
COOPERATION SECURITY POLICY
44 On Corruption's 52 Olympic effort 60 Kazakhstan faces
Front Lines Nations collaborate to secure OSCE hurdles
Reforms help T ajikistan international sporting events. Its new role raises eyebrows,
look to the future. but the nation promises results.
56 Transnistria:
47 Friends Mark A black hole? 62 EU with one voice
The EU must develop a solid The new president aims to boost
Mutual Victory policy to resolve the dispute. the union’s world affairs role.
NATO troops march in Red
Square during V-E Day parade
48 NATO’s new
momentum
Renewed EU support is vital
to success in Afghanistan.
50 Jackal Stone ’09
Croatia shines as the host
of its first NATO exercise.
p. 62
p. 50
per Concordiam 3

4.
DIRECTOR'S LETTER
Welcome to per Concordiam
On behalf of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Stud-
ies, I am pleased to present the second issue of our quarterly journal, per
Concordiam. We at the Marshall Center take great pride in presenting our
readers with a quality journal that addresses defense, policy and security
issues confronting Europe and Eurasia.
Marshall Center alumni are critical in contributing unique regional
perspective to the ongoing dialogue of relevant security and defense
themes. In the first issue of per Concordiam, we asked you to consider pro-
viding your thoughts and opinions to our editors. Your input has been
incredible, and the response to the first issue has been overwhelmingly
positive. We are confident that future issues will be no different.
The theme of this issue focuses on domestic security concerns and
frozen conflicts that have regional and international implications. When
examining the European and Eurasian security landscape, one need not
look far to find an example of a domestic security issue that is of concern Director, George C. Marshall Center
at a regional level. This issue of per Concordiam is devoted to such topics,
and it is my hope that the ideas captured in these pages will generate John P. Rose is the director of
constructive dialogue among those in a position to effect change. The the George C. Marshall European
Marshall Center has the privilege to bring this important issue to the Center for Security Studies
forefront of discussion for security practitioners in Europe and Eurasia. in Garmisch-Partenkirchen,
We have every confidence that those able and willing to resolve these Germany. A retired U.S. Army
security issues will strive to do so. brigadier general, he has 34
Those of you who have participated in Marshall Center resident pro- years of international, operational,
grams and outreach events have a unique perspective of the dilemma academic, business and strategic
that frozen conflicts and domestic security problems create at the re-
planning expertise. He holds
gional level, and you may be able to provide insight not previously con-
master’s and doctorate degrees
sidered. With this in mind, we encourage each of you to reach out to one
from the University of Southern
another, and to our editorial board, to ensure your voice is heard so that
decision-makers are presented with your novel ideas. California, Los Angeles, and
It is our hope that you find the ideas in these pages thought-pro- attended the Harvard University
voking, interesting and relevant to your work. Now, more than ever, it is John F. Kennedy School of
vital that we work together to promote democratic institutions, build en- Government in Cambridge, Mass.
during partnerships and promote an environment of peaceful security His published works include The
cooperation to resolve the significant security issues that face Europe Evolution of U.S. Army Nuclear
and Eurasia. Please enjoy this issue of per Concordiam and continue your Doctrine, 1945-1980 and
contributions to this important discussion. 10 journal articles on nuclear
strategy, military doctrine and
Sincerely, long-range planning.
John P. Rose, PhD
Director
4 per Concordiam

5.
CONTRIBUTORS
Suren Grigoryan Col. Viktor V. Sapon
is a senior specialist on is head of the Journal of European Security
international military Sevastopol City and Defense Issues
cooperation at the Public Assistance and
Armenian Ministry of Information Service
Defense. He also does vio- in Ukraine. He has Domestic Security
lence risk assessments on served in a variety of Volume 1, Number 2
countries in the Common- military and civilian June 2010
wealth of Independent positions in an emer-
States for the London- gency management George C. Marshall European
based company Exclusive capacity, including the Ministry of Emergency
Analysis. He was a troop
Center for Security Studies
Situations as an expert on the consequences
commander in the Armenian military and an ad- LEADERSHIP
of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster.
visor on the legal aspects of international military He has commanded at the battalion and
cooperation. Since 2001, he has held several se- company levels, and served as the chief of Dr. John P. Rose
curity positions at the Defense Ministry. He earned service for chemical, biological and radiologi- Director
a master’s degree in comparative politics in 2009 cal protection in the Ukrainian armed forces.
at the London School of Economics and Political He is a graduate of the Military Academy of Hermann Wachter
Science and a bachelor’s degree in law and mili- Chemical Defense of the Soviet Armed Forces
tary command. He is a graduate of the Marshall German Deputy Director
and a 2000 graduate of the Marshall Center's
Center's 2010 Security, Stability, Transition and Senior Executive Seminar.
Reconstruction course, and the 2004 Program on Dr. James C. MacDougall
Advanced Security Studies. U.S. Deputy Director
Dr. Matthew Rhodes
is a professor of
Dr. Vardan national security MARSHALL CENTER
Grigoryan studies at the Marshall
The George C. Marshall European
is deputy director Center. He has written
Center for Security Studies is a German-
of the Institute numerous articles and
of Armenian American partnership founded in 1993.
book chapters on U.S.
Studies, a research foreign policy and
The staff of this security studies institute
center at Yerevan security dynamics in furthers the vision of the post-World War
State University, Central and Southeast II Marshall Plan into the 21st century.
Armenia. He served Europe. He earned a The center promotes dialogue and under-
as Armenia’s doctorate in political standing between European, Eurasian,
deputy minister science from the Uni- North American and other nations. The
of education and versity of Wisconsin. theme of its resident courses and out-
science from 2000 to 2002, as a diplomat reach events: Most 21st century security
at the Armenian Embassy in Moscow challenges require international, intera-
from 1997 to 1998 and as chief editor of the Dr. Filon Morar is a
gency and interdisciplinary response
weekly magazine Epoch from 1989 to1997. diplomatic counselor
and cooperation.
He earned a doctorate in philological at the Romanian
sciences from the V. Brusov Linguistic Ministry of Foreign
University at Yerevan, where he taught Affairs now serving CONTACT US
from 1980 to 1983. on an EU electoral
assessment mission Per Concordiam editors
in Iraq. He specializes George C. Marshall Center
Dr. Dragan Lozancic in transition to
Gernackerstrasse 2
is a Marshall Center democracy studies
and worked on 82467 Garmisch-Partenkirchen
professor of secu-
rity studies. He is electoral technical Germany
on leave from the assistance and post-conﬂict stabilization
Croatian Ministry missions in Iraq, Algeria and Georgia with the Per Concordiam is a professional journal
of Defense, where United Nations and EU. He was a deputy chief published quarterly by the George C.
he has held several of Field Ofﬁce Tbilisi with the EU Monitoring Marshall European Center for Security
senior civil service Mission in Georgia. He was an assistant Studies that addresses defense and
posts in international professor at the University of Bucharest political security issues in Europe and Eurasia
cooperation and science department and has published four for military and security practitioners
defense policy and books and several articles on political science and experts. Opinions expressed
planning. He has extensive interagency ex- and international relations. He has a doctorate in this journal do not necessarily
perience in Croatia’s EU accession process, in political philosophy and a master’s degree represent the policies or points of
relations with NATO and development of key in political science. He is a 2001 graduate of view of this institution or of any other
the Marshall Center Program on Advanced agency of the German or United States
national security strategy and policy docu-
Security Studies. governments. All articles are written by
ments. He was a defense diplomacy scholar
per Concordiam staff unless otherwise
at Cranﬁeld University, United Kingdom, and
noted. Opinions expressed in articles
earned a master’s degree in global security Dr. Mykola Kapitonenko is an associate written by contributors represent those
studies. He also earned a bachelor’s degree professor at the Institute of International of the author only. The secretary of
from the New York Institute of Technology, Relations at Kyiv National Taras Shevchenko defense determined that publication of
and master’s and doctorate degrees from University, Ukraine, and executive director of this journal is necessary for conducting
Columbia University in New York City. the Centre for International Studies. public business as required of the U.S.
Department of Defense by law.
per Concordiam 5

6.
IN THIS ISSUE
The March 2010 publication of the inaugural issue of per Concordiam
was an extremely rewarding process for our editorial staff. The
feedback we have received from readers, and their expressed
desire to contribute to future editions of the magazine, is extremely
gratifying. As we work and plan for future issues, we are conﬁdent
that the excitement seen thus far will continue.
The focus of this edition is domestic security issues with broad regional
security implications. Our contributors address important security
questions about so-called frozen or protracted conflicts, examining
challenges faced by nations engaged in seemingly irreconcilable conflicts.
In the cover story, “The Myth of 'Frozen Conflicts': Transcending
Illusive Dilemmas,” Dr. Filon Morar examines protracted conflicts. He
argues that failure to address them in a strategic and concerted way
simply supports the status quo and will ensure that reconciliation and
resolution do not occur.
Marshall Center professors Dr. Matthew Rhodes and Dr. Dragan
Lozancic address the contemporary situation in the Balkans in their
article, “ Balanced View of the Balkans.” The authors discuss conditions
A
that contributed to success in resolving conflicts in the Balkans and
provide analysis about some of the obstacles to resolving contentious issues
in this region.
In the article “Russia and the Post-Soviet Space,” Vardan Grigoryan and
Suren Grigoryan discuss some of the circumstances that have contributed
to current interstate relations in the post-Soviet space.
In “Resolving Post-Soviet ‘Frozen Conflicts’: Is Regional Integration
Helpful?” Dr. Mykola Kapitonenko examines frozen conflicts in terms of
challenges unique to the former Soviet Union and offers suggestions on
how to address these issues effectively.
Consequence management in the aftermath of natural and man-made
disasters is of great importance in the current period. Victor Sapon,
in “
Answering the Distress Call,” concludes that, given the increasing
complexity and severity of such disasters, there is a much greater need
to work cooperatively at a regional level to ensure that disasters and
emergencies can be effectively confronted and managed without risk of a
domestic security issue growing to one that is regional in nature.
The next issue of per Concordiam will focus on terrorism. We are hopeful
that we will continue to receive the same level of quality submissions from
Marshall Center alumni, the organizations and governments for whom
they work, and academics and scholars with an interest in security and
defense issues in Europe and Eurasia. Your contributions will ensure that
per Concordiam remains a relevant and quality journal.
All articles in this edition and future journals will be available online
on the Marshall Center Web site: www.marshallcenter.org/mcpublicweb/en/
nav-main-ap-publications.html.
We welcome and encourage your feedback. We look forward to hearing
from you.
— per Concordiam editorial staff
6 per Concordiam

7.
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
T
he aim of per Concordiam
magazine is to address security
issues relevant to Europe and
Eurasia and to elicit a response
from readers. We hope that the
publication of our first issue did
that and that it also helped stimulate debate and
an exchange of ideas. We welcome your feedback.
So please share your thoughts with us in the
form of letters to the editor that we will publish
in this section. Please keep your letters as brief as
possible, and specifically note the article, author
and magazine edition to which you are referring.
We reserve the right to edit all letters for language,
civility, accuracy, brevity and clarity.
Send feedback via e-mail to:
editor@perconcordiam.org JUPITER
ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS We’ll publish an article on a single country
The intent of per Concordiam is to be a moderated journal with the if the subject is relevant to the region or the world.
best and brightest submitted articles and papers published each The vast majority of per
quarter. We welcome articles from readers on security and defense Concordiam readers are from Europe and Eurasia. We’re less
issues in Europe and Eurasia. likely to publish articles that cater to a U.S. audience. Our mission
is to generate candid discussion of relevant security and defense
Here’s how to submit an article: topics, not to serve as an echo chamber for U.S. foreign policy.
First, e-mail your story idea to editor@perconcordiam.org in an Not everyone is a
outline form or as a short description. If we like the idea, we can specialist in a certain ﬁeld. Ideas should be accessible
offer feedback before you start writing. to the widest audience.
We accept articles as original contributions. If your article or
similar version is under consideration by another publication, or And be prepared to document statements. We fact check
was published elsewhere, tell us when submitting the article to us. everything we publish.
If you have a manuscript to submit but are not sure it’s right for Contributors will retain their copyrighted work.
the quarterly, e-mail us to ask if we’re interested. However, submitting an article or paper implies the author grants
license to per Concordiam to publish the work.
As you’re writing your article, When submitting your article, please include a short
please remember: biography and a high-resolution digital photo of yourself of at
We are looking for articles with a unique least 300 dots per inch (DPI) resolution.
approach from the region. We probably won’t publish articles
on topics already heavily covered in other security and foreign E-mail manuscripts as Microsoft Word
policy journals. attachments to: editor@perconcordiam.org
per Concordiam 7

8.
VIEWPOINT
MIKHAIL EVSTAFIEV/OSCE
Why the OSCE’s Approach
to Conﬂict Prevention and
Conﬂict Management
Remains Important
Ambassador Herbert Salber
Director, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe's Conflict Prevention Centre
Ambassador Herbert Salber,
Director of the Organization for
The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Security and Co-operation in
Europe, or OSCE, is first and foremost a regional security Europe’s Conﬂict Prevention Centre.
organization, an inclusive forum with 56 participating
states spanning the Eurasian and transatlantic divides. A
bridge-builder, the OSCE has linked a diverse geographic
space, a varied group of states and their societies, as well as
different cultures, religions and national identities.
The OSCE foundation was laid down engagement on conflict prevention,
ROEL JANSSENS/OSCE
30 to 35 years ago — an ambitious crisis management and post-conflict
endeavor that continues to be a work rehabilitation. Taking a broad approach
in progress, reflecting the changing to conflict prevention, OSCE activities,
security needs of its participating particularly through the organization’s
states as well as the evolving context field operations, have included early
of European and international affairs. warning and preventive action in the
During the Cold War, the Confer- emerging phases of a conflict as well
ence on Security and Co-operation as crisis management and preventing
in Europe, the OSCE’s forerunner, the re-emergence of conflicts. Among
conceived and adopted a concept of the OSCE’s post-conflict rehabilita-
common, comprehensive, coopera- tion efforts, honed in the aftermath In 2008, the Organization for
tive and indivisible security with three of the wars in the former Yugoslavia, Security and Co-operation in
complementary parts: politico-military, are capacity and institution building Europe assessed the Ak-Jol/
economic-environmental and human such as democracy building and good Korday border crossing between
dimensions. The OSCE continues to governance, the training of a multieth- Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The
be an organization based on principles nic police force, educational reforms organization was preparing a
and commitments that its participat- or guaranteeing and safeguarding handbook on best practices for
border crossings.
ing states agreed upon as early as 1975 national minority rights.
with the accord known as the Helsinki The OSCE can rely on an extensive
Final Act. toolbox of conflict resolution instru-
Although it did not develop into a ments: regular political dialogue and
pre-eminent pan-European security exchange of views among its participat-
organization in the aftermath of the ing states in the Permanent Council;
Cold War, as so many had envisioned, the network of OSCE field operations;
the OSCE emerged as one of the permanent institutions like the Office
leading European organizations in of the High Commissioner on National
advancing new thinking and active Minorities; the Office for Democratic
8 per Concordiam

9.
Institutions and Human Rights, or ODIHR; the Office of missions, as in the case of the Border Monitoring Mission to
the Representative on Freedom of the Media and the OSCE Georgia in the late 1990s and the Military Monitoring Offic-
Parliamentary Assembly. These tools are complemented ers after the war in Georgia in August 2008; the Office of the
by various ad hoc mechanisms applied whenever needed: High Commissioner on National Minorities for purposes of
special/personal representatives of the chairman-in-office, early warning and prevention in the area of national minority
fact-finding missions, task forces or steering groups. rights; the ODIHR for monitoring human rights violations;
Also, the OSCE has a number of mechanisms and proce- or specific mechanisms and procedures, including confidence
dures related to early warning, conflict prevention and crisis and security building measures, such as those contained in
management. These include a series of confidence-building the 1999 Vienna Document.
and security measures that can be used in situations of inter- The search for constructive and meaningful ways to en-
state conflicts but also in the case of conflicts within states to hance the OSCE’s mandate for conflict prevention and con-
foster confidence and cooperation among different political, flict management in a new European security environment
ethnic and religious communities. continues into the 21st century — a positive sign there is still
When it comes to some of the best practices in conflict room for innovative and policy relevant approaches. This is
prevention and resolution from the OSCE perspective, evident in the ongoing dialogue on the future of European
there are several things to emphasize. First, from a historical security and with it, Russia’s proposal for a European secu-
perspective, the OSCE itself is a model of conflict prevention rity treaty, known as the Corfu Process after the meeting of
and peace building in practice. Second, many of the OSCE’s OSCE participating states’ foreign ministers in 2009 on the
best practices in conflict prevention and conflict resolution Greek island of Corfu.
are well-tested: the creation of specialized field presences as a It is a crucial dialogue, coming at a time when there is
response to crisis and conflict situations, including preventing a need to consider our way forward on how to prevent and
spillover of armed conflicts; the deployment of monitoring resolve long-standing conflicts.
The Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe conducted
a program in the Georgian-South
Ossetian conﬂict zone to collect
and destroy weapons that were
voluntarily handed over.
OSCE
per Concordiam 9

10.
The Myth of
'FROZEN
CONFLICTS'
Transcending Illusive Dilemmas
Dr. Filon Morar
he pernicious character of the term “frozen conflicts” is
T striking. Yet it is still largely employed even if manifestly
inappropriate. Embracing the term frozen conflicts could
amount to a hypocritical approach that claims the situation is frozen
while the post-conflict effects are visible and evolving, an ostrich
approach that pretends we cannot see the imminent danger, or
a cynical approach that assumes that insofar as the conflict is not
imminently re-erupting, this is someone else’s problem.
10 per Concordiam

11.
The term frozen conflicts is deceiving; it erroneously necessarily positively contribute to conflict resolu-
suggests that a conflict could be put on hold as one tion and protracted conflicts are constantly germi-
could press the pause button of a remote control. nating new outcomes and realities, which foments
Nothing remains unaltered ad infinitum in either the new instances for discontent and conflict.
physical world or in the political world, either in a The term protracted conflicts is often used to
home refrigerator or in the Black Sea-South Cauca- describe the disputes in the extended Black Sea area:
sus area. The very existence of any form of life ines- Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Nagorno-
capably involves alteration and is manifestly placed Karabakh. There are other territorial disputes that
under the sign of change. Territorial conflicts with- haven’t been resolved, such as the Western Sahara
out lasting solutions could not escape the alterability issue in the decolonization context, the Palestinian
of a lingering situation in which almost all sides, issue or Cyprus. Nonetheless, these cases have their
far from idly waiting, are attempting to differently own historically, geographically, demographically
affect a status quo that all directly involved parties and politically distinctive traits. The Black Sea-South
equally find unattractive and distant to their ultimate Caucasus protracted conflicts, while having their own
goals. This profound discontent seems not to have a peculiarities, share a number of common denomina-
natural tendency to act as stimuli for negotiation and tors. The most important are that the four entities
compromise as some players find this blurred situa- declared their independence after violent wars at the
tion to their interest. beginning of post-Soviet era; all share a Soviet past;
Entities with ambiguous legal, regional and inter- all experience the current reality of the paramount
national status describe rather a protracted conflict regional influence of Moscow in overtly or indirectly
with a high likelihood to be abruptly “de-frozen” supporting the secessionists; and all find themselves
without effectively transcending the “grey zone” at a confluence point between different regional
condition, as has been the case with South Ossetia and international actors’ interests. The conflicts that
in 2008. In fact, since all directly involved parties arose in newly recognized states after the dismantling
feel disappointingly served by the status quo, the so of the Soviet Union pitted inevitably fragile states
called frozen conflicts are just postponed conflicts. against separatist entities supported by Russia (and
There is a high probability of reigniting the conflict Armenia in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh).1 Where-
after years of time lost by dragging feet. as parallels with other cases could be inapt, nonethe-
Starting from this standpoint, the paper aims at less it is not enough that some countries declare a
addressing four points: case like Kosovo sui generis when there were signs that
1. What do protracted conflicts share as core others will consider it rather a relevant precedent.2
elements? What features essentially
distinguish them? DECODING PERVASIVE MYTHS ON
2. What are the implicit propositions of the illusive FROZEN CONFLICTS
dilemmas regarding protracted conflicts? There are striking discrepancies as one compares the
3. What are the main impediments and conflict moments and the post-conflict times. Usually,
obstructive factors? Who are the spoilers? external actors, states and nonstate, international
4. What solutions could be imagined? and regional organizations rush to stop the violence
or limit the escalation of the conflict in the first
TERMINOLOGY AND DEFINING TRAITS stage (Rwanda and other cases notwithstanding).
Alternative language has been put forward to Subsequently, there is a certain complacency that
describe the phenomenon: unsolved, protracted, annihilates further enthusiasm for decisive actions
stagnant, enduring, gridlocked or prolonged con- toward a durable solution. Resolution is delayed for
flicts. Terminology will not lead to solutions through another, more hopeful time under the pressure to
semantics, as taxonomies alone will not advance us put an end to the immediate political turmoil and
much in interpretation. Then what is the benefit the humanitarian urgency. Far from being resolved,
of a debate about the term frozen conflicts? The the conflict becomes more pervasive and insidious. It
utility of questioning the term is that the expression carries on below the radars of the international me-
frozen conflicts encapsulates the very essence of the dia or international relations and will never cease to
unfortunate stereotypical approach to unsolved con- generate outcomes and new realities even if classified
PER CONCORDIAM ILLUSTRATION
flicts: The conflict remains on ice until a solution as a frozen conflict. The first false dilemma is how to
emerges. Two powerful interdependent myths foster transcend the post-conflict external actors’ paralysis
this unrealistic approach: (1) solutions appear by when faced with parties having such conflicting aims
themselves while (2) the motionless actors await the and strong resentments. How do you explain this
miracle. What could really help is acknowledging lethargy beyond the facile justification of interna-
that frozen conflicts are not anodyne in their appar- tional fatigue or scarcity of resources easily perceived
ently polar stationary appearance. Time does not in similar cases in Africa or Asia?
per Concordiam 11

12.
First, protracted conflicts are complex conflicts. the protracted conflicts’ narratives and on what it
This implies they are not easy to resolve and require perceives as expansionist tendencies of other organi-
time to address all intricacies of the case. This raises zations or states in its “legitimate sphere of influ-
the question of how to overcome a frozen framework ence.” Moscow’s strategic policy paradigm concern-
when conflicting parties are reluctant to bridge their ing the protracted conflicts has been described as a
differences. Moreover, how do you achieve reconcili- “controlled instability.” 3
ation and confidence building when there is no trust Consequently, other actors, mainly the EU, U.N.,
or will to engage? Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Second, all these protracted conflicts share the Europe, or OSCE, Council of Europe and individual
inescapable influence of a protector state enjoying states should strive to create an environment condu-
overwhelming regional clout and diverse and histori- cive to stimulate not only the conflicting parties, but
cal leverage on various local actors. The corollary of also the protector power to generate multifaceted
the second trait, and equally the traditional reason- solutions originated from several centers, not only
ing, is that no solution could circumvent the will and from a unilateral stand. To that end, the regional and
the interest of the protector regional power, i.e., the international actors genuinely interested in conflict
Russian Federation. resolution should multiply contacts, condition eco-
The first argument on complexity is generally val- nomic assistance, and apply political pressure instead
id. However, it tends to ignore that time could work of shielding themselves in an illusory protective
in the sense of augmenting the complexity, not nec- retractile mood, hoping that parties or the protector
essarily easing it in a natural, quasi-mechanical way. power will find the solution.
In the absence of adequate actions, trust and rec- In fact, it is very unlikely that directly involved
onciliation do not present themselves unprovoked. parties will reach a solution as they have divergent
On the contrary, propaganda on both sides could aims, often with irreconcilable perspectives. Here the
deepen the cleavages. The external actors commonly difficulty comes from the fact that the protector state
tend to limit official contacts with entities, while the argues that it is not officially involved on the side of
parent states usually have pursued an isolation policy one party, and pretends a neutral status. For exam-
regarding separatists. Azerbaijan, Georgia and the ple, once the Russian peacekeeping forces in South
Republic of Moldova hope that isolation will engen- Ossetia and Abkhazia were relabeled after August
der the failure of the separatist regimes and prompt 2008 as Russian military and border police forces,
the collapse of the de facto states. Quite the opposite, the international community faced a new paradigm:
it inevitably turned the separatists toward illegal The protector state was acting at the request of the
ways to get resources, undermining the parent state separatist regimes, which are now officially recog-
consolidation. It also strengthens the indispensability nized by it. The protector state claims to be tempo-
argument of the protector state and its control of the rarily assisting the separatists to protect themselves.
situation. The expectative and the reserved attitude Even if one cannot simultaneously be judge and
of the international community with respect to of- party, Russia is the only accepted security guaran-
ficial or unofficial contacts with separatists further tor in South Ossetia and Abkhazia because the two
strengthened the reality of a dilemmatic impasse. separatist entities mistrust intervening organizations
Hence, a better approach for external actors and such as the EU Monitoring Mission, or EUMM, and
parent states regarding separatists would be finding the U.N. Observer Mission in Georgia, and thus
ways to engage with the population and the politi- limit their roles. EUMM, the only international actor
cal actors in the entities, thus creating the capacity remaining in Georgia, does not monitor the ceasefire
of leverage and multiple dependencies more likely agreement beyond the administrative separation
to lead to a mediated, largely accepted cohabitation line between the two separatist provinces and has a
formula or compromise. limited role through the Incidents Prevention
The second argument is a misleading approach Mechanism as it is confined to Georgia-controlled
to a false dilemma. Sensibly, Russia cannot be eluded territory. Simply, de facto governments and Rus-
in finding a durable, mutually acceptable solution to sia are interpreting EUMM’s mandate as covering
many regional protracted conflicts. Yet, it has to be only Georgia proper. The expression “throughout
encouraged to participate in finding one. It would Georgia” from the ceasefire agreement is interpreted
be self-delusionary to expect that the protector state by Russia and separatists through the prism of South
that guarantees the very existence of the separatist Ossetia and Abkhazia now being recognized states
entity will not act in a conservative manner toward its with security guarantees provided by Russia.
own and the protected entity’s interests. The patron
state seems to have strong reasons in maintaining the DETERRING FACTORS FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION
status quo as it finds the current situation maximiz- 1. The prestige inhibition
ing its capacity to keep control on the unfolding of One dissuasive argument for dealing with protracted
12 per Concordiam

13.
Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin meets with
GETTY IMAGES
nurses during an August 2009 visit to Sukhumi,
the capital of Georgia’s breakaway Abkhazia
region. Putin pledged Russian military support to
Abkhazia in any new conﬂict with Georgia.
conflicts is the no glory expectation. For external ac- 2. Inﬂuence of and relationships with the
tors, who could play a role in obtaining a settlement, protector power
the intricate protracted conflicts pose the challenge The separatist entities in the Black Sea and Caucasus
of investing time and resources without high likeli- area play a front-line role in the geopolitical grand
hood of extracting international credit easily convert- design in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet
ible in domestic political capital. Leaders of states or Union. Moscow’s once-undisputed hegemony in
organizations could find appreciation if they end a the region is now challenged by international and
conflict or successfully mediate a crisis. Dealing with regional actors (United States, NATO and EU) and
protracted conflicts is less likely a glorious path as by regional powers (Turkey and Iran). The post-1989
it does not guarantee immediate success. Moreover, clash of interests and projection of influence in
the potential accord will likely take place behind the Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union be-
scenes, far from media coverage, and be the result tween Russia and the West have been manifest in both
of several actors’ endeavors over an extended period antagonistic expressions (Russia reaffirming its strate-
of time. As preventing a crisis from erupting into gic “near abroad” interests and denouncing Western
violent conflict is less spectacular, ending a pro- interferences) and in terms of mutual interests (co-
tracted conflict seems to be less heroic than ending operation against terrorism and trafficking). Against
an active conflict that could be displayed as a major the backdrop of a declining regional power, whose
accomplishment to the national constituency or to place is claimed by another established or emergent
the member states. power, a peaceful transition of power in international
Nevertheless, manifest dividends can be grasped relations is less likely to occur across “security com-
by state actors’ bureaucracies, or international munities” (those sharing different political and social
or regional organizations less placed than politi- organizational paradigms) but is more probable
cians under the sign of ephemeral gains, and more within “clubs sharing similar values and institutions”
concerned about the symbolic geopolitical display (inducing collective identities and trust).4 As Russia
of capacity to persuade and exert power pressure. attempts to recreate its own “security community”
Because these organizations are also under the and the separatist entities break away from Western-
inescapable weight of the member states’ collec- oriented parent states, it seems that the secessionist
tive decision-making process, the EU, U.N., NATO disputes are in the core of the new competitive geo-
and OSCE could assume greater roles. At the same politics in Eurasia.5 Nevertheless, there is no reason
time, neighboring countries are concerned less with to believe in an inescapable conflict between the West
prestige bonuses and primarily preoccupied by the and Russia over separatist entities. On one hand, the
security in their proximity areas — therefore, directly ideological divide is not dramatic: Russia, despite the
and strongly attached to the idea of conflict resolu- alleged recent democratic regress, is far from being a
tion through a lasting mutually agreeable solution to totalitarian state and its reassertion of past glamour
protracted conflicts. is a way to overcome domestic economic problems as
per Concordiam 13

14.
Sida Gazaryan visits her husband’s tomb in Nagorno-Karabakh’s main
city of Stepanakert in October 2009. Her husband, Ararat, died in
ﬁghting between forces from Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1993. Since
the end of the war in 1994, peace has been elusive in the region.
REUTERS
well as its own separatist issues in the North Russia’s support of separatist regimes thus far
Caucasus. On the other hand, the EU is not yet a allows them to subsist, but not to flourish.6 The
global or regional political and military power match- kleptocratic regimes benefiting from the unclear
ing its own economic strength. From this perspective, international status of the enclaves they run some-
further democratic developments inside Russia and times despotically are not in a rush for a definitive
an engaging strategy by the Euro-Atlantic commu- solution as they think time plays in their favor.7 The
nity could generate acceptance of a shared influence opposition in Transnistria states that the non-recog-
in the area based on common interests, as has hap- nition is a “golden paradise” for separatist leaders
pened in the Asia-Pacific region. That could set up who control industry revenues and own lucrative
a more promising prospect for protracted conflicts’ businesses.8 After the war in South Ossetia, there
resolution but will not automatically bring a solution. were allegations that its leader, Eduard Kokoity,
Both the secessionist regimes and political and and his acolytes diverted money from Moscow into
economic segments of the parent states entertain a private pockets instead of investing in reconstruction.
complex network of ties with the former hegemon. Although Russian-led investigations were launched,
One can notice a certain ambiguity and duplicity of Moscow seems to have accepted the fact that there
former communists and special services in Moldova is no other alternative to the loyalty of the former
when it comes to the management of relationships wrestler turned president.
with the West and Russia, and with separatist Tran- The EU also has an ambiguous stand on protract-
snistria. It seems unavoidable that some leaders in ed conflicts as various member states adopt differ-
the parent state have double allegiances marked by ent attitudes toward the protector state. Post-Lisbon
close ties to the legacy Soviet apparatus and contem- Treaty common foreign policy should bring more
porary business interests. However, after the Rose action-oriented strategies on the Eastern
revolution in 2003, a more trenchant (yet less effec- Neighborhood policy. One important step EU lead-
tive) attitude has been adopted by the Georgian ers Catherine Ashton and Herman van Rompuy
government toward Russia and the secessionist should embark upon is to extend and enforce the EU
claims. Azerbaijan opened toward the West, but delegations in the countries in the region. A passive
preserved political and oil ties with Russia, which can European Union merely acknowledging the Russian
influence Armenia on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. capacity to influence the protracted conflicts is in fact
14 per Concordiam

15.
deceiving itself as it awaits a conflict settlement from the parent state and uses time in its favor in order to
existing Russian-dominated negotiation mechanisms, consolidate de facto authority. This impedes the par-
despite the fact that it recognizes that the protector ent state from fulfilling its democratic responsibilities
state has little interest in finding solutions.9 and may result in the government yielding to the
3. New realities, old problems temptation to use state resources to undermine the
The separatist entities’ resemblance of statehood, opposition in the name of the fight against the sepa-
with governments, constitutions, elections, armies, ratists, thereby hindering achievement of its political
etc., creates new realities that are strong impediments cooperation agenda. In addition, the economic ef-
for conflict resolution. The time legitimacy created fects of protracted conflict include economic regress
by such actions is a predictable corollary.10 and redirection of resources committed to security.
The post-2008, five-day war in South Ossetia cre- 4. Inconsistency and hesitations
ated a new reality, but did not profoundly change the Hesitation by external actors and parent states to
situation in its essence: The frozen war was refrozen engage in extended dialogue with separatists and
after five hot-war days. The new reality features the protector power is justified by reservations for
Georgia controlling less territory than before, Russia a de facto recognition. Faced with the dilemma
recognizing the two separatist entities and overtly of balancing the involvement and engagement
being involved in supporting their regimes and of separatists with the political considerations of
enforcing its footprint in their territories. These are legitimacy and de facto recognitions of separatists,
only the recent effects. parent states and external actors have generally
South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transnistria and opted for isolation strategies.
Nagorno-Karabakh are simulating quasi-independ- Separatist governments have been in place for
ence and statehood by creating new realities and almost 20 years. To overcome this apparent dilemma,
pushing into derision the false impression suggested one has to admit that frozen conflicts cannot be
by the term frozen conflicts. The Transnistrian sepa- solved through an approach based on the belief of
ratist government accumulated a $1.8 billion debt to a convenient self-fulfilling prophecy. Therefore, it
Gazprom,11 which will likely have some effect in the would be productive to acknowledge their existence.
event of reunification with Moldova. Russia has more While not amounting to recognition, admitting their
than 7,000 troops stationed in Abkhazia and South existence and increasing assistance and contacts
Ossetia, and 1,500 in Transnistria. Moscow will build with civil society and certain political entities in the
or extend military bases in Ochamchire and Gudauta secessionist entities seems the most reasonable way to
in Abkhazia and in Kanchaveti in South Ossetia. overcome the current stalemate.
Abkhazia conceded its railway system to Russia for 10 The apprehensions and reservations of parent
years. The separatist de facto governments allegedly states are justified. Yet they have to acknowledge that
allowed properties of the displaced to be transferred neither force, nor political intransigence and isola-
to other people, making return problematic, if not tion could bring about a viable and lasting solution.
impossible. The demographics of South Ossetia and It makes acrimonies bitter and enroots the feeling
Abkhazia changed radically. The U.N. High Commis- that the separation is the unique solution, while
sioner for Refugees estimates that there are 230,000 legitimizing the protector state’s influence. Isola-
displaced persons currently in Georgia.12 More than tion proves also to be counterproductive as it pushes
800,000 Azerbaijanis were displaced from Nagorno- the separatist entities further in the direction of the
Karabakh and the other six districts occupied by protector state. Isolation strengthens the status quo
Armenia after the war; 230,000 Armenians who as both sides are further inescapably entrenched into
lived in Azerbaijan are trying to rebuild new lives. their “fortified” clashing positions. The role of inter-
Moreover, hundreds of incidents are reported each national actors in this context is also sensitive. Inter-
year, such as shelling, shootings, kidnappings, explo- national stabilization missions have only operated on
sions and mines placed along the administrative Georgian territory, thus providing arguments
separation lines. Concerning Nagorno-Karabakh, to the de facto governments in Sukhumi and
in March 2009 alone, cross-boundary incidents Tskhinvali that the EU and other Western entities
claimed the lives of 16 people.13 According to EUMM are biased in favor of Georgia.
records, there were 173 security related occurrences
in December 2009 on the administrative separation ENDING PROTRACTED CONFLICTS
lines between Georgia and the separatist regions. In Compared to the reforms and transformations it
addition, Russia issued passports to a large number induced in Eastern Europe and the Balkans with the
of people living in the separatist territories, thus self- prospect of EU and NATO integration, the EU has
imposing the duty to protect its citizens. a more limited maneuverability in its new Eastern
Hence, the protracted conflicts produce various neighborhood. The EU still has the option of in-
effects. The political effects range from legitimiza- creasing its political mediation efforts and economic
tion a contrario of the separatist regime that opposes assistance. As the first instrument has not proven
per Concordiam 15

16.
itself to be effective, the EU should consider focus- concerns of the people in the separatist entities to
ing on supporting further economic development in such an alternative. Furthermore, parent states must
Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus and South Caucasus in resist the temptation to respond to nondemocratic
exchange for extended democratic reforms in these de facto entities by transforming themselves into
countries. In return, this could become attractive such regimes by using the “unity against separatists”
for separatist entities and generate benign models rhetoric to justify deviations from democracy.
to resolve protracted conflicts in the eastern EU’s Second, the support of the international com-
neighborhood. munity should not be limited to refusing to recog-
In addition to political mediation, economic as- nize the separatists, but also to extend the support
sistance, human rights and humanitarian assistance, for democratization and institutional development
the EU should continue to push to be a part of the of the parent state in order to create the premises
peacekeeping missions or extended civilian monitor- for a rayonnement in the region, and to be attractive
ing missions. It should thus assume a greater security to separatists. At the same time, together with the
role within a consistent conflict resolution strategy parent state, it should try to encourage democracy
in its eastern neighborhood. EUMM is not the best and genuine pluralism in the separatist entities. This
example to follow since it has no access to Abkhazia approach of winning hearts and minds is preferable
and South Ossetia. The EU Neighborhood Policy to unofficially doing business with separatists without
could be seen as a mechanism through which risks gaining any political leverage on the democratic path
are diminished by promoting and supporting wide and undermining the possibility for the parent state
reforms that would transform the neighboring coun- to create benign interdependencies with separatists.16
tries according to a normative EU framework.14 To The precondition then would be for the parent state
that end, allotted resources should match promises. to adopt a constructive approach, not to try to isolate
A solution that is not mutually agreed upon is and cut all contacts with people in separatists’ con-
worse than delaying resolution as it is not sustain- trolled territory.
able, yet the indefinite postponement consolidates a The separatist leaders should not be presumed
non-agreed solution. Both options are perilous and irrational actors susceptible to irresponsive actions:
unlikely to bring stability. The risk of a confronta- They have much at stake, particularly those that
tional approach toward the regional major power came to power in the recent past. They may feel they
and protector state is to engage in a zero-sum game, have not been offered enough incentives to negoti-
from a position of inferiority, not having the pros- ate, or that they still feel threatened in their vital
pect to match its capacity for obstructionist moves. interests of survival and privilege. The vast majority
Consequently, the EU should gradually consolidate of the population did not benefit from the de facto
its capacity of influence, which requires greater quasi-independence, and could be attracted by good
involvement, including separatist entities. examples from the parent state. The international
A viable and enduring solution seems less likely community should also consistently support the par-
to surface from a coercive approach than to emerge ent state by marginalizing the patron state’s interven-
from two interlinked agendas. First, the parent state tion in separatist entities. The end result should be
should be able to exert an irresistible attraction in a power-sharing formula and inclusivity that would
terms of respect for individual liberties, rights, and alleviate the apprehensions of persecution and guar-
living standards that can diminish the separatist ap- antee secessionists participation or large autonomy
petite.15 The parent state has to focus on developing rather than sovereignty.
economically and strengthening democratic institu-
tions and practices to marginalize propaganda used CONCERTED STRATEGY
by separatists to discredit the parent state. Citizens in South Ossetia provides an illustrative and tragic ex-
the separatist entity will then wield impressive pres- ample that contradicts the hypothesis that solutions
sure on the separatist leaders for a rapprochement to frozen conflicts could be postponed sine die, oper-
that eventually could lead to a lasting solution. The ating with the presumption that time will naturally
underlying dilemma surrounds effectively navigat- fix the issue.
ing between not officially endorsing the secessionist Unresolved conflicts are not socially or politi-
regime or de facto recognizing it, while simultane- cally neutral. They constantly create new effects,
ously creating opportunities to attract separatists by consolidating a new situation. The term frozen
allowing a certain level of mutual trade, travel and conflicts per se is a preposterous oxymoron because
property rights that will create a mutual-interest the association it proposes between “conflicts,” by
network. The alternative is that the secessionists will their nature dynamic, and “frozen,” a physical state
increasingly rely on a protector state and increase suggesting immobility. An entire new generation of
alienation in relation to the parent state. A prosper- voters in breakaway regions knows only the reality
ous and democratic parent state would alleviate the of separation.
16 per Concordiam

17.
A woman attends a February 2009
religious service in Tbilisi, Georgia,
to commemorate victims of the 2008
conﬂict in Georgia. Hundreds were
killed and about 160,000 displaced.
REUTERS
3. Vladimir Socor, The Frozen Conflicts: A Challenge to Euro-Atlantic Interests
Cryogenics cannot be considered a viable re- (report prepared by the German Marshall Fund on the occasion of the NATO
sponse to protracted conflicts, which are perpetuated Summit 2004, “ New Euro-Atlantic Strategy for the Black Sea Region”): 2.
A
4. For the last case, the transfer of power from the British Empire to U.S. dur-
through a deceptive ember fire. The volcanic pres- ing the late 19th and early 20th century is considered paradigmatic. Charles A.
sure of a protracted conflict could erupt anytime; a Kupchan, Emanuel Adler, Jean-Marc Colcaud and Yuen Foong Khong, Power in
Transition: the Peaceful Change of International Order (United Nations University
dormant volcano is not necessarily extinct. Contrary Press, 2001), 138-158. See also Emanuel Adler and Michael N. Barnett, Security
to the natural phenomena, the social and political Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
5. See for example http://www.rferl.org/content/Moldova_Rebel_Region_
spheres could escape implacability. Not acting to find Says_Belongs_With_Russia/1811866.html about Moldovan situation with
a mutually agreeable solution to prolonged conflicts Transnistria.
6. Russia sent 2.5 billion rubles, or about $80 million, to support the Abkhaz
amounts to irresponsibly waiting for the inevitable budget in 2009. Ellen Barry, Putin Promises Abkhavia Economic and Military
to happen. There was nothing inevitable in the flare- Support, The New York Times, August 12, 2009;
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/13/world/europe/13russia.html. See also
up of the August 2008 conflict in Georgia that killed Vladimir Socor, Moscow, Tiraspol Sidelining the West From Negotiations on
hundreds and displaced 160,000. Transnistria Conflict, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 6, Issue 61, March 2009.
7. International Crisis Group, Moldova: Regional Tensions Over Transdniestria,
Thus, the international community is not really Report no. 157, June 2004, notes that a complex web of businessman from
facing a dilemma concerning the protracted con- Transnistria, Ukraine, Russia and Moldova “constitute a well financed lobby
that wishes to uphold the status quo.”
flicts. The myth of frozen conflicts, conflicts that 8. Gregory Feifer, No End of Frozen Conflict in Moldova’s Transdniester, Radio
in fact tend to thaw and perpetuate, is an illusion. Free Europe Radio Liberty (August 18, 2009): http://www.rferl.org/content/
No_End_Of_Frozen_Conflict_In_Moldovas_Transdniester_/1802579.html.
Reconciliation and mutually acceptable compromise 9. Socor, The Frozen Conflicts, 5.
settlements are not emerging by themselves. In fact, 10. Reuters news service, Moldova Rebel Region Says Belongs With Russia, Radio
Free Europe Radio Liberty (September 1, 2009): http://www.rferl.org/content/
not seeking to solve the conflict means supporting Moldova_Rebel_Region_Says_Belongs_With_Russia/1811866.html.
the status quo. Nevertheless, a concerted strategy 11. Socor, Moscow, Tiraspol Sidelining the West.
12. United Nations Office of High Commissioner in Georgia, October 2009
combining sustained regional and international sup- report: 1, 5.
port for further stabilization and democratization of 13. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2009 – Nagorno-Karabakh (July 2009),
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a645299c.html.
the parent states, pressure on the protector state and 14. Thierry Balzacq, “La politique européenne de voisinage: un complexe de
engaging separatists could work. sécurité à géométrie variable,” Cultures and Conflits, no. 66 (2007) : 31-59.
15. Stuart J. Kaufman, “Spiraling to Ethnic War,” (International Security, Vol.
1. Nicu Popescu, “Outsourcing”de facto Statehood: Russia and the Secessionist Entities 21, 1996): 108, 130-131, cited in The Association of the Bar of City of New
in Georgia and Moldova, CEPS Policy Brief (July 2006). York City report, Thawing a Frozen Conflict: Legal Aspects of the Separatist Crisis in
2. Ceslav Ciobanu, Political Economy of “Frozen Conflicts” in ex-Soviet States: Moldova (2005): 49.
Challenges and Prospects for U.S. and Russia (paper presented at Virginia Social 16. Pridnestrovie.net, “Market-based Economy Grows 209.6% Over 5 Years,”
Science Association, June 29, 2007): 2, 14. http://pridnestrovie.net/marketeconomy.html.
per Concordiam 17

18.
Soviet special military units decontaminate
trees near the Chernobyl nuclear power plant
in Ukraine. The plant’s reactor exploded in
April 1986, destroying the reactor core and
setting off one of the biggest man-made
disasters of the 20th century.
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE
18 per Concordiam

19.
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS DURING
EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT
Collaborated response minimizes the impact
COL. VIKTOR SAPON
Head of the Sevastopol City Public Assistance and Information Service
n April 26, 1986, at 1:23 a.m., an accident evacuation of more than 500,000 residents from
O occurred at unit #4 of Ukraine’s Chernobyl
Nuclear Power Plant during a routine
shutdown for repairs after two years of
operation. The reactor exploded, destroying the
reactor core. This was one of the biggest disasters of the 20th
century, and hundreds of thousands of people suffered as a
result; 100,202 people were evacuated from the disaster area.
New Orleans.
August 2009: An accident at Russia’s Sayano-
Shushenskaya power station caused the deaths of
75 people and the partial destruction of the station,
with damage running into the billions.
There is also a new factor causing disasters — inter-
national terrorism. These horrific acts of terror are
The cleanup following the catastrophe continues to this day. but a few examples of events that required signifi-
Throughout the end of the 20th and the beginning of cant emergency management:
the 21st centuries, the world has seen a series of both natu- Sept. 11, 2001: Terrorist attacks in the United States
ral and man-made disasters and emergencies. killed more than 2,800 people.
June 1997 and November 1999: Massive flooding in March 11, 2004: Terrorist attack in Madrid, Spain,
Europe, with loss of human life and major material killed 200 people and injured more than 1,500.
damage. Sept. 1-3, 2004: Terrorist attack in Beslan, North
June 1998: A cyclone in India claimed more than Ossetia, Russia, where more than 1,200 children
10,000 lives. and adults were held hostage, killed 331 people,
June 1998: Catastrophic flooding of China’s Yangtze including 186 children; more than 500 people
River killed 3,000 and caused an estimated $30 were injured.
billion in damage. The probability of disasters and emergencies is greatly
Dec. 26, 2003: A magnitude 6.35 earthquake struck increased by phenomena such as rapid technical progress,
Bam, Iran, killing around 40,000 people and industrial development, a swelling planetary population,
injuring another 30,000. discontent, ethnic conflicts, ultranationalism and intrastate
April 22, 2004: T goods trains carrying liquid fuel
wo feuding, the world financial and economic crisis of 2008-
and gas collided in Ryongchon, North Korea, and 2009, and acts of terrorism. This article proposes a review of
the resultant explosion destroyed a nearby passenger the approaches to civil-military relations in the management
train, the station itself and the surrounding village, of disasters and emergencies.
killing 157 and wounding more than 1,300. National disasters and emergencies
Dec. 26, 2004: An earthquake struck Southeast Asia, Civil-military relations are of great importance in the
killing more than 230,000 people, while hundreds management of disasters and emergencies. State legisla-
of thousands went missing and millions were left tion often provides for a variety of approaches to engage
homeless. the armed forces and other militarized units in emergency
August 27, 2005: Hurricane Katrina destroyed management. National disasters, those that occur within the
thousands of buildings and homes, killed an borders of a state, and other emergencies pose a number of
estimated 790 people, injured hundreds of problematic issues for a nation’s government in organizing a
thousands, caused massive flooding, and forced the response and cleanup, such as:
per Concordiam 19

20.
REUTERS
Russian special
Is it necessary to engage the armed forces in a For the cleanup of the forces attempt to
rescue operation? Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, or evacuate hostages
Which specific armed forces units should be NPP, accident in 1986, the largest taken by Chechen
engaged, and in what numbers? radiation catastrophe of the 20th separatists and held
What tasks should they be given? century, the government of the in a school in Beslan,
Who will be in command of these armed forces former USSR deployed not only North Ossetia, in
units, and to whom will they report during the individual units of the Soviet armed September 2004.
rescue operation? forces, but entire formations. Under The two-day siege
Who will organize measures for the material a special order of the USSR Council resulted in hundreds
of deaths.
and technical support of troops, and how? of Ministers, army aviation units
What social guarantees will be provided by (helicopters) were deployed in the
the state for those participating in a rescue days immediately following the accident. Mobilization
(or reconstruction) operation: military of radiation, chemical and biological protection, and
servicemen and their families? civil defense units began, mainly consisting of reservists.
Though this list is by no means exhaustive, world Subsequently, all of these units were concentrated
experience and practice in the management of both in a 30-kilometer zone around the accident site. In
natural and man-made disasters and emergencies order to organize, lead and manage the execution of
allow us to offer generalized answers to most of these measures and tasks to clean up the accident, a special
questions. By reviewing specific examples from various government commission was created, which coordinated
countries, where the management of man-made and the activities of all organizations engaged in the accident
natural disasters and emergencies was organized with cleanup. The immediate management and command of
the engagement of armed forces units, an attempt to troops deployed was effected via the USSR Operational
systematize responses to the questions posed above can Civil Defense Group, placed under the command of
be made. a general and subordinate to a special government

21.
committee. The main tasks and measures performed the spillage of hazardous chemicals at the Lisichansk
by the troops were: railroad station (Lugansk region, Ukraine) in
1991, extinguishing fires on multiple occasions in
identification and demarcation of districts and Lugansk region, and in a number of other rescue
local areas, as well as premises, contaminated with and reconstruction operations. In connection with
radioactivity. reforms of the Ukraine Armed Forces, this unit was
Removing radioactive graphite and other disbanded in 2003.
radioactive materials from the roofs of During the summer of 1997, there was heav-
buildings and installations of the third unit ing flooding in the Vistula and Odra river basins in
and territory of the NPP. Poland. The flooding was caused by three waves of
Decontamination operations across the NPP torrential rain. The first flood reports appeared on
territory, including contaminated areas, July 6, 1987. T days later, the Polish government es-
wo
roads, buildings, installations and residential tablished a crisis committee that issued a resolution to
buildings. mobilize army, police and fire units. A total of 75,000
Performing dosimetric monitoring of people men and women serving in the military, police and
and equipment. fire services supported rescue operations, utilizing a
Guarding restricted areas in contaminated large number of river-borne equipment, boats, road
areas. vehicles, helicopters, winged aircraft and other special
Units of the armed forces deployed for cleanup equipment. The disaster zone covered more than 30
operations at the Chernobyl NPP used standard-issue percent of Poland’s total landmass, a zone from which
arms and equipment to perform the tasks delegated 160,000 people were evacuated. Fifty-four people died
to them. Material and technical stocks, fuel and lu- during the initial days of the disaster, and the material
bricants, and food for personnel were provided from damage amounted to around $5 billion. In a period of
state sources. six hours, the water level rose 6 meters. According to
The government used calculations provided by experts, this was the largest military-civilian operation
civilian specialists in the field of nuclear energy to since World War II. The command and management
establish the maximum period of radiation exposure of the forces deployed, including military units, were
for personnel, the maximum radiation levels and performed by the Crisis Committee.
the degree of radioactive contamination of food, as On August 27, 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck
well as uniforms, special protective clothing, equip- the southern U.S. states of Louisiana, Alabama and
ment, technical equipment, etc. Subsequently, as the Mississippi, bringing widespread destruction and
situation stabilized and the level of radiation fell, flooding. Louisiana suffered most, with approxi-
the government established the maximum time for mately 30 percent of New Orleans under water three
personnel to be present in the cleanup zone. In order days later. Power supply, communications, water and
to provide social protection for people who partici- sewer systems had failed; a large number of build-
pated in the cleanup of the Chernobyl NPP accident, ings, installations and homes had been destroyed or
on February 28, 1991, Ukraine passed a law “On the heavily damaged; and more than 500,000 residents
Status and Social Protection of Citizens who Suf- remained in the city. Chaos reigned in New Orleans:
fered as a Result of the Chernobyl Disaster,” which convicts who had not been evacuated managed to
also stipulates concessions and other social protection escape from the local jails, and there were cases of
measures for military servicemen who participated in looting and a threat of infectious diseases. Rescue ef-
the cleanup. forts, as well as the distribution of drinking water and
Based on the experience of the Chernobyl food to victims, were hampered by flooding over large
cleanup, a special order of the USSR Council of areas as the water depths reached 6-8 meters in some
Ministers in 1988 confirmed the decision to create places. From the first days of the catastrophe, the
several new units, the main purpose of which was to government resolved to involve the National Guard
be management of accidents at nuclear power plants and the U.S. Coast Guard in the rescue operation. In
and other facilities posing radiation hazards. One the initial stage of the operation, the main task of the
such unit, a self-standing mobile radiation, chemical military units was to perform rescues and organize
and biological protection brigade, was deployed in the evacuation of affected city residents. As the situa-
an area of Ukraine where there are five nuclear tion worsened and cases of looting became more fre-
power plants. The personnel in this formation quent, the government resolved to introduce martial
received special training. The activities of units are law in New Orleans. In addition to the tasks of rescu-
regulated by a specially-developed manual. During ing people and organizing the evacuation of flood
the period of their existence, from 1988 to 2003, the victims, the military was also tasked with maintaining
units of this formation participated in the practical public order, fighting looters, and providing security
cleanup of the Chernobyl NPP, an accident involving and escorts for shipments of humanitarian aid for the
per Concordiam 21