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This book has argued that justice is a member of the fittingness family of concepts. There is still work to be if this account of the concept of justice is to be used to develop a conception of justice, an account of what justice requires. To accept justice as fittingness is to accept that there are two main sources of disagreement over substantive issues of justice. First, disagreements as to what one's actions mean (that is, disagreements in interpretation), feed through into disagreements as to what must be avoided if he/she is not to act unjustly. A satisfactory defence of substantive...

This book has argued that justice is a member of the fittingness family of concepts. There is still work to be if this account of the concept of justice is to be used to develop a conception of justice, an account of what justice requires. To accept justice as fittingness is to accept that there are two main sources of disagreement over substantive issues of justice. First, disagreements as to what one's actions mean (that is, disagreements in interpretation), feed through into disagreements as to what must be avoided if he/she is not to act unjustly. A satisfactory defence of substantive principles of justice must include an account of what counts as treating as a member of a particular category. Second, disagreements as to what justice requires may reflect disagreements as to which attributes one has and which attributes are status-affecting. That one is free and rational is generally accepted, but to be reliable, caring, whole, and so on, is to have a superior status.