The First Structural Adjustment Credit Project had the following ratings: outcome was moderately satisfactory; sustainability was likely; institutional development impact was modest; Bank performance was satisfactory; and borrower performance was satisfactory... 更多显示The First Structural Adjustment Credit Project had the following ratings: outcome was moderately satisfactory; sustainability was likely; institutional development impact was modest; Bank performance was satisfactory; and borrower performance was satisfactory. The Economic Recovery Credit Project had the following ratings: outcome was highly satisfactory; sustainability was likely; institutional development impact was not evaluable; Bank performance was unsatisfactory; and borrower performance was satisfactory. The Economic Management Credit Project had the following ratings: outcome was moderately satisfactory; sustainability was likely; institutional development impact was modest; Bank performance was unsatisfactory; and borrower performance was satisfactory. The Third Structural Adjustment Credit Project had the following ratings: outcome was moderately unsatisfactory; sustainability was likely; institutional development impact was modest; Bank performance was unsatisfactory; and borrower performance was satisfactory. The main lessons learned from this review are: 1) Country ownership matters very much. The components of the loans that were owned by the country, such as the public resource management and some of the structural adjustment components were generally successfully implemented; 2) As a general rule, it would be very useful for the Bank to listen better and to go to extra lengths to explain it s positions, and to solicit views and seek genuine agreement with country authorities. This could improve country ownership of programs; 3) It is important to keep a good and substantive dialogue with the main development partners; again by listening better to their view points, keeping them better informed about those of the Bank, and seeking to reach agreements when possible; and 4) As has happened already with the Fourth Structural Adjustment Credit, it would be preferable to keep the design of adjustment operations simple and focused on a limited number of key policy areas, whose implementation can be realistically expected within the short disbursement period dictated by an adjustment operation.
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