pentagon acquisition reform

The US Navy is accelerating upgrades to the nuclear warhead for its arsenal of Trident II D5 nuclear-armed submarine launched missiles -- massively destructive weapons designed to keep international peace by ensuring and undersea-fired second-strike ability in the event of a catastrophic nuclear first strike on the US. – Scout WarriorDisposing of the world’s first nuclear-powered aircraft carrier is turning out to be more of a challenge than the Navy bargained for. Officials from Naval Sea Systems Command announced [yesterday] that they’re canceling a request for proposal to perform a commercial recycling of the non-nuclear elements of the USS Enterprise, CVN 65, which was decommissioned after 55 years of service Feb. 3. – Military.com

Complex Adaptive Operations on the Battlefield of the FutureFrom Aaron Bazin, Modern War Institute: “Although the military must continually operate in a confusing and dynamic context, it tends to organize units in a rigid hierarchical structure where strict orders are given and followed. Discipline, unity of command, and an industrial organizational structure all have their advantages. However, they have disadvantages as well, as mechanical systems are easier to predict and less resilient to change. These facts raise an important question: If we accept that armed conflict is a complex adaptive system, then how could the US military possibly take advantage of this by adopting a complex adaptive approach to operations?” ​

Blitzkrieg Redux: The Coming Warbot RevolutionFrom Brian M. Michelson, Strategy Bridge: “In May 1940, the Allied and German Armies squared off in what was expected to be an extended campaign for the conquest of France. Six weeks later, the victorious German Army marched down the Champs-Elysees in Paris. How was it that the Germans, with fewer tanks, fewer trucks, fewer troops, less artillery and access to roughly equivalent technologies, managed to accomplish such a remarkable feat? While leadership, luck, and a host of other factors were at play, the decisive factor was the remarkable way in which a few German inter-war military thinkers envisioned and developed a new way of warfare, known to the Allies as the blitzkrieg. German doctrine successfully integrated current technologies in aircraft, radios, and tanks into a coherent and integrated way of fighting and then applied it to great effect. The result was amplified because the Germans fought an enemy that in many cases failed to account for the possibilities enabled by the new combination of these technologies.” ​

Trump's Defense Budget Won't Yield a Serious Military BuildupFrom Mackenzie Eaglen, The National Interest: “President Trump’s budget team said Monday that he will seek to increase the defense budget by $54 billion next fiscal year in 2018. This sounds like a lot, but it will not be sufficient to undertake any kind of military buildup. This is more like digging out.”

Marine Corps Aviation: The 75 Percent SolutionFrom James Hasik, Atlantic Council: “About 75 percent of the fighter and attack aircraft in the US Marine Corps—AV-8B Harriers, F-18A+/B/C Hornets, and EA-6B Prowlers—are out of service. The Marines are loving their F-35Bs so far, but the Lightning IIs are very expensive aircraft, particular when thrown against enemies who lack air forces—or even high-altitude air defense. As quotidian bomb trucks, they have far greater range than Hornets and Harriers, but that approach will put Marine Corps Aviation back into the same cycle of destruction it has experienced over the past 15 years. So what now? The alternative is to move towards a mix of attack aircraft tailored for two classes of enemy, in wars small and large. In the short term, that means buying fixed-wing gunships. In the mid-term, it means buying tilt-rotor gunships, including drones. Both aircraft types are better suited for the small wars in which the Marine Corps has been engaged for most of the post-Cold War era. For now, that might seem to destroy Marine Aviation, but to save it in the long term for the big wars.” ​

Senate Democrats are pronouncing President Trump's budget blueprint dead on arrival, arguing that its $54 million increase in defense spending with corresponding cuts to domestic programs in the same amount would never pass muster with their colleagues when it comes time to pass spending bills in Congress. – Washington ExaminerMackenzie Eaglen writes: Placed in context, President Trump’s defense increase is looking smaller by the hour. Most of the money will go to plugging readiness gaps, but that will lead to an imbalanced force. If today’s modernization is tomorrow’s readiness, Trump will need to spend much more than the $54 billion in this plan to both restore readiness and recapitalize the services fleets and inventories. And he’ll need to find a way to pay for it that has bipartisan support. Otherwise, $54 billion will be zero for defense. – The National Interest

If Congress was skeptical of bombers and fighters doing Close Air Support, how will they react to MQ-9s doing the toughest CAS mission around — taking out targets in the close confines of an urban fight? Gen. Hawk Carlisle, the soon-to-retire head of Air Combat Command, told reporters that the Reaper is performing urban missions and doing a very fine job of it too. – Breaking Defense

CHINA: The Coming of China's Second Aircraft CarrierFrom Dave Majumdar, The National Interest: “Compared to the Liaoning—which was rebuilt from the decaying hulk of the Soviet Kuznetsov-class Baku—the Beijing’s new Type-001A will be much improved. Particularly, the Chinese have improved the crew spaces—which have never been a priority onboard Russian vessels.”

China's Passive Management StrategyFrom Stratfor: “China could influence the behavior of its neighbors, but it did so as often as possible by demonstrating power but rarely using it. So long as the neighbors did not fundamentally counter China's core interests, they were largely left to their own devices. In this manner, China could remain central to a regional system while expending little in time, effort or resources to enforce its will. In short, most countries, most of the time, largely accepted the arrangement, both for cultural reasons and because the cost of direct challenge was often too high.”

The Imperative of Chinese History and GeographyFrom Morgan Deane, Strategy Bridge: “Chinese behavior in the South China Sea is viewed by many as implacably aggressive. China contends it is consistently defensive and even pacifistic. To cut through the rhetoric we can look at the combination of geography and history in the past 150 years to explain Chinese behavior. As Stratfor has noted, China has core geographic imperatives. Western powers (and Japan after adopting Western weapons and attitudes) penetrated these core territories during a long period of weakness that lasted from about 1840 to 1950. As a result, since 1950 Chinese leaders have fought offensive and often preemptive wars with each one of their neighbors, but they’ve been able to claim these are defensive measures. A careful look at the history suggests there is some merit to Chinese positions, but most often they are used as rhetoric to justify aggression.” ​

CHINA: China to Build Third Aircraft Carrier U.S. StyleFrom NDTV: “China is building a third aircraft carrier based on American models as it seeks to fortify its claims in the disputed South China Sea and dominate the larger Indian Ocean region to realise its blue water aspirations. Chinese experts said China is on course to build 5-6 aircraft carriers.”

Kelly Magsamen writes: [C]oherent national security strategy is profoundly influenced by three key institutional relationships — between the White House and the Pentagon, between civilians and the military inside the Pentagon, and between the State Department and the Pentagon. What follows are some recommendations for how the Trump team can try to reach a healthy equilibrium in all three. – Foreign Policy’s Shadow Government

Trump’s promised defense budget boost probably won’t materialize, the former Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs said today, so we can’t afford to grow a larger military. Instead of more ships and troops, retired Adm. James Winnefeld said in a rare public appearance, the military should prioritize investment in new ideas. – Breaking Defense

The Tactical and Strategic Significance of Interpersonal LearningFrom Strategy Bridge: " In the military, human interactions carry tactical and even strategic significance. Whether leading a team, planning with a staff, or partnering with a foreign force, so much of our success hinges on our ability to communicate, understand, learn and grow with others. Encounters like the one with my crew chief are commonplace in our personal and professional lives. Yet the messages we send to others with our actions and words are often lost in translation. When this happens—when we sense a breakdown or a void in communication—both parties in the interaction are left with a choice. Explore or retreat. Learn or guess. Play tennis together…or walk away from the court. As we describe below, to “play tennis” is to deliberately engage in interpersonal learning. Understanding how to promote a healthy tennis match and the power and limits of interpersonal learning can add productivity to our interactions with others and nuance to the ways we address and solve tough problems."

Does the Human Domain Matter?From Patricia DeGennaro, Small Wars Journal: “Understanding and engaging in the human domain is essential if you are trying to change, inform or shape human behavior. In this context, the Secretary of Defense reminds us that, “We must recognize that the essential ‘key terrain’ is the will of a host nation’s population…[This] permits us to gain the trust of skeptical populations, thus frustrating the enemy’s efforts.” The world’s populations are becoming more interactive which can potentially help or harm international security. With ever increasing information mediums and venues, previously unconnected persons can connect and act in seconds. Interaction between people ignited the Arab Spring, allowed the Islamic State (IS) to boost recruiting efforts worldwide, and sparked further fragmentation in Iraq after the U.S. intervention. These emerging human geography trends, responses to social and cultural grievances, adversarial patterns, and diverse community reactions continue to cause problems for U.S. forces and mission success. Knowing the human domain, therefore, gives commanders the ability to see, sense, anticipate, and maneuver through the complexity of peoples.” ​

The Art of Leading Unit-Based Professional Military Education From Mick Ryan, Modern War Institute: “In 1962, the renowned solider-scholar Sir John Hackett noted in his Trinity College speeches on the profession of arms that “the bearing of arms for the purpose of fighting is found as far back as we can see. It has become profession, not only in the wider sense of what is professed, but in the narrower sense of an occupation with a distinguish-able corpus of specific technical knowledge and doctrine, and an educational pattern adapted to its own needs.” While Hackett’s words may be half a century removed from the contemporary world, they remain highly relevant to current and future military leaders.” ​

Acquisition in TransitionFromIrv Blickstein, RealClearDefense: “For the Department of Defense (DoD) the bulk of acquisition regulations derive from procurement and acquisition laws enacted by Congress. From the Packard Commission in the mid-1980s to the Goldwater-Nichols Act in the late 1980s, the acquisition reform initiatives in the 1990s to the Weapons Systems Reform Act of 2009, new institutions, bureaucracies, and regulations were instituted. In 2016, after the military service chiefs testified that they were not a part of the acquisition system, the Congress passed the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that gave those positions limited but powerful voices in the process.” ​

Discussing the Continuities of War and the Future of WarfareFrom H.R. McMaster, Small Wars Journal: “Many of the recent difficulties we encountered in strategic decision-making, operational planning, and force development have stemmed, at least in part, from the neglect of history and continuities in the nature of war, especially war's political and human dimensions. To compound the difficulties we encountered in Afghanistan and Iraq, we may be missing an opportunity to learn from those experiences. That is because four fallacies about future war have become widely accepted; these fallacies promise that future war will be fundamentally different from those that have gone before it.” ​

What Mattis Needs to Do As Defense SecretaryFrom Kathleen Hicks, The Cipher Brief: “The arcane art of measuring the health of civil-military relations is experiencing a renaissance. Although it is welcomed by those who practice it, the reasons for the renewed focus are less so. Contributing factors include 15 years of continuous wartime deployments and the lack of a shared experience between the general public and the small percentage of Americans who have served or whose family members have served. Add on to that more recent tension over the obligation of military personnel to obey presidential orders regardless of legality, as well as the role of retired senior military officers in the electoral process, presidential transition, and in populating the Trump administration, and you have the makings of a potential civil-military crisis.”

Black: Insurgency and CounterinsurgencyFrom Brian C. Darling, Strategy Bridge: “There have been a great many books published on the subjects of insurgency and counterinsurgency since the inception of the Global War on Terror (or “current, ongoing overseas contingency operations”, if you prefer); a number of these have focused on the U.S. Army’s mistakes in Vietnam or on the efforts on the United States and its allies in Iraq and Afghanistan. Jeremy Black’s recent contribution, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: A Global History, offers more insight; it is a comprehensive history of insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare that is not limited in scope to the efforts of Western powers.” ​

Where Are the Women? The Unfortunate Omission in the Army’s Coin DoctrineFrom Megan Anderson, Modern War Institute: "Counterinsurgency operations have been infamously described as “armed social work; an attempt to redress basic social and political problems while being shot at.” The foundations of COIN rest entirely on the population—the objective is to win over the hearts and minds of the people. The major literature concerning counterinsurgency places a significant emphasis on the need to engage local populations; however, most work neglects to acknowledge gender as a factor that can influence an operation’s success. Drawing from experiences in Indochina, Greece, and Algeria, French military officer David Galula concluded that in counterinsurgency, the aim of war is to gain support of the population rather than to gain territory. It was Galula’s observations that ultimately inspired then-Lt. Gen. David Petraeus to lead a workshop that would result in the US Army’s counterinsurgency field manual (FM 3-24). Drawing upon the fundamental concepts laid out by Galula, FM 3-24 firmly establishes population-centric operations at the center of the Army’s COIN doctrine. Among the manual’s key principles, securing the population and establishing government legitimacy are the most prioritized objectives. To this day, Galula’s work serves as the primary foundation for contemporary COIN theory and remains largely unchallenged."

U.S. Strategy for Maintaining a Europe Whole and FreeFrom Eric Edelman, Whitney M. McNamara, CSBA: “From the mid-1930s through the Cold War, Europe was critical to U.S. strategic thinking, which developed around the assumption that foreign domination of Europe was inimical to U.S. national security. With the end of the Cold War, the United States sought to forge a Europe that was “whole and free.” However, since Putin has returned to office, he has launched a determined effort to reassert Moscow’s influence in areas formerly under Soviet control. Russia’s objective is to overturn the European security order that emerged after the end of the Cold War. As Russia continues to invest aggressively in modernizing its military, many NATO countries continue to pursue policies of disarmament, divest themselves of key capabilities, and struggle to meet NATO’s 2 percent of GDP defense spending requirement. Europe’s political disunity, lack of leadership, and absence of appetite for confrontation with Russia, as well as the weakest United States military presence in Europe since World War II, allow the Kremlin to exploit its growing military capabilities along its periphery. The dwindling presence of NATO forces is now running the risk of failing to deter Russian aggression.” ​

Reviving Cold War Doomsday Devices Could Patch America’s Broken Nuclear ControlsFrom Elaine Grossman, War Is Boring: “The triad leg widely seen as most vulnerable to attack — ground-based ballistic missiles — ironically might have the best chance of retaining a wartime link to the commander in chief. All Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles launch control centers are fitted with Milstar EHF and UHF receivers. They can even send verification messages back, said Guy Michael, who heads Air Force Global Strike Command’s ICBM nuclear command and control office.” ​

Most Red Flag coverage so far has focused on a statistic we’ve all heard. The F-35As at the Air Force’s toughest combat training exercises are killing enemy aircraft at a rate of 15-1. But one of the pilots flying the F-35s — Lt. Col. George Watkins, 34th Fighter Squadron commander — says: “The kill ratio isn’t that important. We are more focused on the SAM and IADS threat.” The Russian-made S-300s, 400s and – Breaking Defense

Innovation - and Other Things That Brief Well From Joshua Waddell, Marine Corps Gazette: “I am now thoroughly convinced there is something deeply wrong with the part of the Marine Corps occupying the I-95 corridor leading to the Pentagon. What has become painfully apparent to me is the drastic difference between the mindset of the Operating Forces and the Supporting Establishment. While I grant that, in the case of the former, the prospects of being shot, blown up, or otherwise extinguished tend to be wonderful motivators to constantly improve and perform, the Marine Corps Supporting Establishment is filled with senior officers whose backgrounds include extensive experience in combat within the Operating Forces. Why then is there such a divide between the organizational energy and innovative agility of our Marines and the depressive stagnation found within the Supporting Establishment? I believe I know a big part of the answer: self-delusion.”

If the Pentagon must contend with a year-long continuing resolution that keeps funding levels flat — or if Congress can’t pass a supplemental defense budget this fiscal year — two of the Navy’s 10 carrier air wings will go dark, and two more will be reduced to bare minimum capacity, the service’s number two officer told lawmakers Wednesday. – DOD Buzz

Why America's Military Misses the F-14 TomcatFrom Dave Majumdar, The National Interest: "While the requirement for a carrier-based long-range strike capability is a frequent subject of discussion around Washington, the U.S. Navy’s need for improved air superiority capabilities is often neglected. The service has not had a dedicated air-to-air combat aircraft since it retired the Grumman F-14 Tomcat in 2006."

The Standard for Missile Defense CooperationFrom Abel Romero, RealClearDefense: “Over the weekend, the United States and Japan completed the first intercept test of the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IIA. SM-3 Block IIA is being developed cooperatively by the United States and Japan to defeat ballistic missiles up to the intermediate-range and features several upgrades that improve upon previous variants. This test not only demonstrates a significant increase in U.S. missile defense capability but an outstanding example of cooperation with a critical ally. The SM-3 Block IIA project represents the best case study of equal funding and engineering on a missile defense system that will benefit both the United States and Japan.” ​

Adaptive Warhead Limits for Further Progress on Strategic Arms ControlFrom Aaron R. Miles, RealClearDefense: “Strategic arms control will soon reach a point where it must be adapted or abandoned as a core element of the U.S.-Russian security relationship. A new approach based on adaptive warhead limits offers a way for the United States to re-engage Russia on previous calls for further reductions in deployed strategic warheads. Adaptive warhead limits would allow the United States to account for Russian concerns without changing U.S. policy on ballistic missile defense (BMD). Notionally, the treaty would limit each side’s deployed nuclear stockpile to the larger of 1000 warheads or 10 times the number of BMD interceptors deployed by the other as part of its national missile defense system. In addition to providing a possible path to further nuclear warhead reductions, this initiative would strengthen strategic stability and provide increased transparency regarding missile defense programs."

Blackmail Under a Nuclear UmbrellaFrom Paul Bracken, War on the Rocks: “The idea of nuclear blackmail fascinated analysts early in the atomic age. It offered an especially vivid nightmare scenario: Some new Hitler demanding concessions but this time armed with nuclear weapons. Hitler’s cold-blooded demands backed with force made Britain and France back down in one crisis after another in the Rhineland, Austria, and Czechoslovakia. The first generation of strategists thought that a “nuclear Hitler” would present nearly impossible challenges to the West. Fortunately, such fears never materialized in the Cold War, as the superpowers lacked the daring drive of the Fuëhrer. They were much more conservative and cautious.” ​

Defense Buildup: More Money for Existing Systems, Less for Next-Generation WeaponsFrom Sandra I. Erwin, National Defense Magazine: ““Complex new start R&D programs will require much more funding to reach production maturity than the fiscal year 2017 budget assumes,” said Berenson. Considering the Pentagon’s track record in underestimating the cost of research-and-development programs, Avascent concluded that funding increases over the next five years will focus on “keeping existing programs moving.”

CRS: 355-Ship Navy Would Require 57 to 67 New Ships From Richard R. Burgess, Seapower Magazine: “In the new report, “Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress,” Ronald O’Rourke, a specialist in naval affairs with the CRS, analyzed the FSA and the issues that would govern achievement of a 355-ship fleet, an increase over the 308 ships identified as a requirement in the previous goal announced in March 2015. The battle force today numbers 274 ships.”

The US Navy’s F/A-18 Hornet and Super Hornet strike fighters are the tip of the spear, embodying most of the fierce striking power of the aircraft carrier strike group. But nearly two-thirds of the fleet’s strike fighters can’t fly – grounded because they’re either undergoing maintenance or simply waiting for parts or their turn the aviation depot backlog. – Defense NewsBuilding the Navy’s 355-ship fleet will be even harder than we thought, according to a new study from the Congressional Research Service. Veteran Navy expert Ronald O’Rourke estimates that, even if US shipyards work 50 percent faster than today, we wouldn’t have enough aircraft carriers until roughly 2030 — 14 years from now — and enough attack submarines until late in that decade. – Breaking Defense

U.S., SOUTH KOREA: U.S.-ROK Mil-to-Mil Relations and the Republic of Korea 2017 Defense BudgetFrom Christopher Lee, RealClearDefense: “U.S. President Donald Trump will be sending his Secretary of Defense, James “Mad Dog” Mattis to the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan to demonstrate his commitment to the region and perhaps to revive Mr. Obama’s failed pivot towards Asia. This is Secretary Mattis’ first trip abroad, and it is no surprise that the Trump Administration has chosen the Northeast Asia region. The trip is to further strengthen US-Japan partnership, underscore a robust US-ROK security relationship, and to keep Beijing and Pyongyang in check. Although the details of the proposed meeting have yet to be released, pundits suspect Mattis to bring up the deployment of U.S. Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), nuclear brinksmanship of North Korea, and defense cost sharing issues when he meets his counterpart, ROK Defense Minister Han, Min-Koo.”

The Slow Creep of Russian Military AccessFrom Schuyler Moore, Strategy Bridge: “The U.S. and Russia have boundaries of military mobility and power projection in the Middle East shaped by decades of wars and alliances. However, the ongoing conflicts throughout the region have opened the door for players to rearrange the game board.” ​

Making the F-22 Even More Stealth From Dave Majumdar, The National Interest: “Lockheed Martin and the United States Air Force have been working on improving the performance of the F-22 Raptor’s stealth coatings. While the Raptor is by far the most capable air superiority fighter ever built, its Achilles’ Heel since it entered service has been maintenance. The F-22’s sensitive radar absorbent coatings have proven to be costly and difficult to repair, but the Air Force and Lockheed have been working on improving the performance.”

Of the three variants of Lockheed Martin’s F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, only the carrier-launched F-35C is at risk of being replaced by Boeing’s F-18 Super Hornet, the Marine Corps’s top pilot said today. It’s not on the table to substitute Hornets for either the land-based F-35A variant or the vertical-takeoff-and-landing F-35B, Lt. Gen. Jon Davis, deputy Commandant for aviation said today. – Breaking Defense