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EXIT STRATEGIES?
Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter, reason 1.5 (B/D).
1. (C) This is an action message; see paragraph 11.
2. (C) Summary. ECOWAS Executive Secretary Kouyate invited
Ambassador to his office June 18 to discuss President Taylor
of Liberia and the regional response to Taylor's government.
Kouyate suggested either an attempt at an "internal dialogue"
consisting of prominent Liberians interacting with Taylor on
national reconciliation, or pressure toward early
Presidential elections. He agreed that any ECOWAS effort
toward "dialogue" could be easily manipulated by Taylor, and
arouse great suspicion by Conte of Guinea (who was in
"direct contact" with Liberian dissidents operating on the
border, said Kouyate). Kouyate also agreed that early
elections would also be problematic; Taylor exercised such
tight control over the Liberian state, a free and fair
process would be unlikely. Evincing considerable
frustration and uncertainty, Kouyate acknowledged that "no
one has an answer to Taylor." On reflection, we believe that
an "internal dialogue" of credible Liberian parties, held in
Abuja and specifically excluding Taylor, would send the
Liberian President a strong message and foster greater
cohesion within the opposition. We will commend this course
of action to Kouyate and to the GON unless Washington or
Monrovia state objections. End Summary.
3. (C) ECOWAS Executive Secretary Lansana Kouyate invited
Ambassador to his office on short notice June 18 to discuss
President Taylor of Liberia and potential regional responses
to his government. Kouyate told Ambassador upon arrival that
President Konare of Mali was due in later that afternoon to
discuss Taylor with Nigerian President Obasanjo. Kouyate had
been invited to sit in on the meeting. "They will ask me for
my opinion," said Kouyate, "and I would like yours."
4. (C) In describing regional attitudes generally to Taylor
and the situation in Liberia, Kouyate said: "We are in a
waiting mode." Taylor continued to claim that dissident
forces inside Liberia had been supplied with "British" arms,
that he had proof of this, and that this proved British and
American efforts to overthrow him. Kouyate dismissed these
claims, but noted the continuing efforts by Taylor to
manipulate regional opinion and cast himself and his
government as victims. One possible avenue away from the
present unpleasant reality of a recalcitrant Taylor and
continuing pressure from the international community, said
Kouyate, would be some form of "internal dialogue" consisting
of prominent Liberians, inside and outside the country,
interacting with the Taylor government. A preliminary list
of participants had been drawn up by Togba-nah Tipoteh, a
leading dissident political activist Another possibility
would be early elections in Liberia, with the hope if not the
expectation that Taylor would lose. "We need to find an exit
for Charles Taylor," said Kouyate. (Comment: Tipoteh just
spent three days in Abuja, and called twice on President
Obasanjo, an old friend from their days together in the
African Leadership Forum. Tipoteh also met with the
Ambassador and complained bitterly about Taylor's
authoritarian ways. He also said that Taylor continues his
support for the RUF, including harboring Sam Bocherie, whom
he claims is still in Nigeria, based at Camp Nama. End
comment).
5. (C) Kouyate agreed with Ambassador that early elections
would hardly be free and fair given the tight grip Taylor
exercised over all organs of government, including his feared
security services. He equally agreed that any form of
"dialogue" with prominent Liberians could be easily
manipulated, particularly if it occurred inside Liberia. Any
guarantees from Taylor on the return of prominent exiles
could not be trusted. He noted that Konare had asked him
several times to go to Monrovia and meet with Taylor, and
each time he "resisted," arguing that a trip to Liberia with
no important change or concession in prospect would be
pointless, if not counter-productive. Taylor's motivations
would always be suspect in any attempt at reconciliation, and
Taylor would never share power or agree to step down
peacefully, he acknowledged. Ambassador advised that any
effort at dialogue should be done outside the country to
limit Taylor's ability to manipulate, divide, and perhaps
even harm participants.
6. (C) Kouyate also freely acknowledged that any move
toward "dialogue" with Taylor could be easily misinterpreted
by President Conte of Guinea, who would assume that an
unearned rehabilitation of Taylor would result, with no gain
for regional peace and security, particularly on his border
with Liberia. Conte, whom Kouyate said was in "direct
contact" with Liberian dissidents on the border, had to be in
agreement or efforts at reconciliation would fail. In a side
note, Kouyate agreed that Alhaji Kromah, now travelling in
the region and seeking a hearing and support from regional
interlocutors, was hardly a factor within his own ULIMO
faction these days, and that Conte had much the greater
influence. In fact, Conte believed that the current
offensive against Taylor would finish the Liberian President,
evidenced by his recent remark to Kouyate that "this time we
have him (Taylor)."
7. (C) Kouyate argued that the Nigerian Government was no
less committed to continuing pressure on Taylor than the
international community. He noted that Ambassador Ralph
Uwuechwe, Obasanjo's Advisor for Conflict Reconciliation, had
made an unhelpful statement (saying, in effect, that Nigerian
does not support sanctions). But it was not at all clear
that Uwuechwe's statement represented the GON position on the
issue. Further, Kouyate could not recall a single time, when
Obasanjo met face to face with Taylor, when the two men did
not violently disagree. "Obasanjo knows who he is dealing
with," said Kouyate. Nigeria was never against sanctions
Kouyate said, but he did harbor the belief that the threat of
sanctions would be more effective.
8. (C) Kouyate noted that French Foreign Minister Vedrine
would visit Nigeria at the end of the month, and this would
be a good opportunity to seek a common policy on Taylor with
the French. Both Obasanjo and Kouyate would see Vedrine and
look for common positions. Ambassador interjected that
accelerated timber sales from Liberia now constituted a key
component of Taylor's revenue stream, and timber sales had
been excluded from sanctions at French request. This needed
to be brought up. (Comment: Kouyate has noted before that he
also looks to the U.S. to put pressure on the French to
desist from GOF support for Taylor. End comment).
9. (C) Kouyate closed by saying that the present political
and economic situation in Liberia was "terrible," and the
prospect of more refugees and internally displaced persons
would only grow. Sanctions had not been intended to hurt the
average Liberian, but they were hurting them, he implied.
While there was no point to dialogue with Taylor that only
divided ECOWAS, and thereby helped Taylor, some effort needed
to be made.
10. (C) Comment. Kouyate, normally confident in his
opinions and incisive in his analyses, appeared to us to be
genuinely at a loss for workable solutions, and seeking
advice for a difficult situation for which he has no ready
answers. He also seemed well aware of the potential for
decisions by ECOWAS regarding Taylor that could be unhelpful,
if not downright counter-productive. The USG will need to be
sensitive to the urge toward "solutions" within ECOWAS while
focusing on the specific problems of any potential
initiatives. We look forward to a read-out from Kouyate on
the Obasanjo/Konare meeting. End comment.
11. (C) On reflection, we believe that an "internal dialogue"
involving credible Liberian political players could be a
welcome development. This dialogue should pointedly exclude
Taylor and should take place outside of Liberia, perhaps in
Abuja if the Nigerians agree. A dialogue excluding Taylor
should not alienate Conte and would send the Liberian
President a message that the region is willing to engage his
opposition, particularly those with democratic credentials.
The Embassy proposes to recommend this course of action to
ECOWAS and to the Nigerian government, if Washington and
Embassy Monrovia perceive no objection. Please advise.
Jeter

Raw content

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001437
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2011
TAGS: PREL, NI, SL, LI, ECOWAS
SUBJECT: ECOWAS: KOUYATE ASKS ADVICE ON TAYLOR -- ANY GOOD
EXIT STRATEGIES?
Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter, reason 1.5 (B/D).
1. (C) This is an action message; see paragraph 11.
2. (C) Summary. ECOWAS Executive Secretary Kouyate invited
Ambassador to his office June 18 to discuss President Taylor
of Liberia and the regional response to Taylor's government.
Kouyate suggested either an attempt at an "internal dialogue"
consisting of prominent Liberians interacting with Taylor on
national reconciliation, or pressure toward early
Presidential elections. He agreed that any ECOWAS effort
toward "dialogue" could be easily manipulated by Taylor, and
arouse great suspicion by Conte of Guinea (who was in
"direct contact" with Liberian dissidents operating on the
border, said Kouyate). Kouyate also agreed that early
elections would also be problematic; Taylor exercised such
tight control over the Liberian state, a free and fair
process would be unlikely. Evincing considerable
frustration and uncertainty, Kouyate acknowledged that "no
one has an answer to Taylor." On reflection, we believe that
an "internal dialogue" of credible Liberian parties, held in
Abuja and specifically excluding Taylor, would send the
Liberian President a strong message and foster greater
cohesion within the opposition. We will commend this course
of action to Kouyate and to the GON unless Washington or
Monrovia state objections. End Summary.
3. (C) ECOWAS Executive Secretary Lansana Kouyate invited
Ambassador to his office on short notice June 18 to discuss
President Taylor of Liberia and potential regional responses
to his government. Kouyate told Ambassador upon arrival that
President Konare of Mali was due in later that afternoon to
discuss Taylor with Nigerian President Obasanjo. Kouyate had
been invited to sit in on the meeting. "They will ask me for
my opinion," said Kouyate, "and I would like yours."
4. (C) In describing regional attitudes generally to Taylor
and the situation in Liberia, Kouyate said: "We are in a
waiting mode." Taylor continued to claim that dissident
forces inside Liberia had been supplied with "British" arms,
that he had proof of this, and that this proved British and
American efforts to overthrow him. Kouyate dismissed these
claims, but noted the continuing efforts by Taylor to
manipulate regional opinion and cast himself and his
government as victims. One possible avenue away from the
present unpleasant reality of a recalcitrant Taylor and
continuing pressure from the international community, said
Kouyate, would be some form of "internal dialogue" consisting
of prominent Liberians, inside and outside the country,
interacting with the Taylor government. A preliminary list
of participants had been drawn up by Togba-nah Tipoteh, a
leading dissident political activist Another possibility
would be early elections in Liberia, with the hope if not the
expectation that Taylor would lose. "We need to find an exit
for Charles Taylor," said Kouyate. (Comment: Tipoteh just
spent three days in Abuja, and called twice on President
Obasanjo, an old friend from their days together in the
African Leadership Forum. Tipoteh also met with the
Ambassador and complained bitterly about Taylor's
authoritarian ways. He also said that Taylor continues his
support for the RUF, including harboring Sam Bocherie, whom
he claims is still in Nigeria, based at Camp Nama. End
comment).
5. (C) Kouyate agreed with Ambassador that early elections
would hardly be free and fair given the tight grip Taylor
exercised over all organs of government, including his feared
security services. He equally agreed that any form of
"dialogue" with prominent Liberians could be easily
manipulated, particularly if it occurred inside Liberia. Any
guarantees from Taylor on the return of prominent exiles
could not be trusted. He noted that Konare had asked him
several times to go to Monrovia and meet with Taylor, and
each time he "resisted," arguing that a trip to Liberia with
no important change or concession in prospect would be
pointless, if not counter-productive. Taylor's motivations
would always be suspect in any attempt at reconciliation, and
Taylor would never share power or agree to step down
peacefully, he acknowledged. Ambassador advised that any
effort at dialogue should be done outside the country to
limit Taylor's ability to manipulate, divide, and perhaps
even harm participants.
6. (C) Kouyate also freely acknowledged that any move
toward "dialogue" with Taylor could be easily misinterpreted
by President Conte of Guinea, who would assume that an
unearned rehabilitation of Taylor would result, with no gain
for regional peace and security, particularly on his border
with Liberia. Conte, whom Kouyate said was in "direct
contact" with Liberian dissidents on the border, had to be in
agreement or efforts at reconciliation would fail. In a side
note, Kouyate agreed that Alhaji Kromah, now travelling in
the region and seeking a hearing and support from regional
interlocutors, was hardly a factor within his own ULIMO
faction these days, and that Conte had much the greater
influence. In fact, Conte believed that the current
offensive against Taylor would finish the Liberian President,
evidenced by his recent remark to Kouyate that "this time we
have him (Taylor)."
7. (C) Kouyate argued that the Nigerian Government was no
less committed to continuing pressure on Taylor than the
international community. He noted that Ambassador Ralph
Uwuechwe, Obasanjo's Advisor for Conflict Reconciliation, had
made an unhelpful statement (saying, in effect, that Nigerian
does not support sanctions). But it was not at all clear
that Uwuechwe's statement represented the GON position on the
issue. Further, Kouyate could not recall a single time, when
Obasanjo met face to face with Taylor, when the two men did
not violently disagree. "Obasanjo knows who he is dealing
with," said Kouyate. Nigeria was never against sanctions
Kouyate said, but he did harbor the belief that the threat of
sanctions would be more effective.
8. (C) Kouyate noted that French Foreign Minister Vedrine
would visit Nigeria at the end of the month, and this would
be a good opportunity to seek a common policy on Taylor with
the French. Both Obasanjo and Kouyate would see Vedrine and
look for common positions. Ambassador interjected that
accelerated timber sales from Liberia now constituted a key
component of Taylor's revenue stream, and timber sales had
been excluded from sanctions at French request. This needed
to be brought up. (Comment: Kouyate has noted before that he
also looks to the U.S. to put pressure on the French to
desist from GOF support for Taylor. End comment).
9. (C) Kouyate closed by saying that the present political
and economic situation in Liberia was "terrible," and the
prospect of more refugees and internally displaced persons
would only grow. Sanctions had not been intended to hurt the
average Liberian, but they were hurting them, he implied.
While there was no point to dialogue with Taylor that only
divided ECOWAS, and thereby helped Taylor, some effort needed
to be made.
10. (C) Comment. Kouyate, normally confident in his
opinions and incisive in his analyses, appeared to us to be
genuinely at a loss for workable solutions, and seeking
advice for a difficult situation for which he has no ready
answers. He also seemed well aware of the potential for
decisions by ECOWAS regarding Taylor that could be unhelpful,
if not downright counter-productive. The USG will need to be
sensitive to the urge toward "solutions" within ECOWAS while
focusing on the specific problems of any potential
initiatives. We look forward to a read-out from Kouyate on
the Obasanjo/Konare meeting. End comment.
11. (C) On reflection, we believe that an "internal dialogue"
involving credible Liberian political players could be a
welcome development. This dialogue should pointedly exclude
Taylor and should take place outside of Liberia, perhaps in
Abuja if the Nigerians agree. A dialogue excluding Taylor
should not alienate Conte and would send the Liberian
President a message that the region is willing to engage his
opposition, particularly those with democratic credentials.
The Embassy proposes to recommend this course of action to
ECOWAS and to the Nigerian government, if Washington and
Embassy Monrovia perceive no objection. Please advise.
Jeter

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