Степанян Դավիթ Stepanyan Ստեփանյան David Давид

Burcu Gultekin Punsmann: Russia’s military operation in Syria has direct influence on Turkey

The downing of the Russian warplane by
the Turkish Air Force did not at all meet the logic of the Russian-Turkish
relations. What could be the real reason of such an abrupt turnabout in the
Turkish policy and what may the escalation in the Ankara-Moscow relations
result in?

'Syria' is not
just a regional crisis like, say, the Ukrainian or even the Karabakh crisis. The
Russian military intervention into Syria
has direct influence on Turkey.
Turkey and Russia could have prevented the regional crises
(Karabakh, Crimea and Ukraine)
together and this might have influenced their bilateral relations. However, Russia preferred to sacrifice its bilateral ties
with Turkey
and today both sides should act more cautiously. Russia
could have understood Turkey's
sensitivity to Syria
and to the Turkish-Syrian border-zone. I think that maintenance of good
relations with Turkey
should have been more important than the few kilometers that might return
Bashar al-Assad's regime to power. The Turkish-Russian crisis is no longer
bilateral. In this light, the most important task is to stop the war,
strengthen the borders and create favorable conditions for voluntary return of
the refugees to Syria.
The government is holding insufficient negotiations on this issue. Certainly, the Syria, from which Arabs, Sunnis and
Turkmens have been transferred to the Turkish frontier services and are almost
completely maintained by Turkish funds, is unacceptable to us.

Moscow believes that Ankara’s
ban on the Russian Air Force flights over the Turkish territory creates a
dangerous precedent of uncontrolled military activities. To note, the flights
are stipulated by a relevant international agreement. Why do you think the
Turkish leadership has taken such a decision?

I do not understand
the question. Nor do I understand why the NATO member state should permit any
Russian reconnaissance operations on its own territory.

On
Feb 4, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov once again blamed Ankara for supporting
international terrorism. Does Moscow have real
levers of influence on Ankara and do you think Armenia is one
of such levers?

I think Russia has not
got many real levers. As regards energy, it is not taken into account as a
weapon. I have recently heard that about 20% of Gazprom's revenues were from Turkey. A
possible military threat against Turkey will result in a Russia-NATO
conflict. I do not understand how Armenia
can be a lever given that Turkey
lacks relations with Armenia.
Armenian leaders should not afford being too dependent on the anti-Turkish
discourse of Russia.
One should not accuse the state, which defends its air space and which has
become the first country in the world to give shelter to the refugees, of
imperialism. The total number of Syrians in Turkey
will shortly be equal to the population of Armenia. I would like to note that both
Syria and Iraq should pay
more attention to the mid-term outlook, when the Russian and Iranian soldiers
will be acting on their territories. We can also expect serious Turkish-Russian
military escalation in case Russia
continues its air campaign in Aleppo.
This will increase the flow of refugees towards the Turkish border. At the same
time, we certainly see some prospects for normalization of Turkey-Russia
relations. I think the Turkish diplomacy will become more and more pragmatic
given that Turkey
is losing part of its maneuver effectiveness. Moscow
should also take into account the price of the loss of direct communication
with Ankara on
regional issues.

Turkey actively participates in creation of a military bloc
with Georgia and Azerbaijan. What
can such a bloc be directed against?

I do not think that
Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan are establishing a
military bloc. The matter concerns just Turkey-Georgia-Azerbaijan military
cooperation aimed at defending the east-west corridors: gas pipelines, roads
and trunk railways. The specified infrastructures have repeatedly proved their
significance in the context of Russian sanctions against Georgia and Turkey. Certainly, the given
cooperation helps Georgia
and Azerbaijan raises their
profiles in case of bigger attention by Russia. Armenia
poses no military threat to Turkey.
At the same time, I am convinced that even if Armenia
suddenly starts posing a threat, Turkey
will need no support from Azerbaijan
or Georgia in a conflict
with Armenia.

The EU has recently approved 3 billion euros in
funding for Turkey
to cope with the record number of migrants. Several analysts think that Ankara purposefully contributes to formation and growth of
the inflow of migrants to Europe, first of all, to Greece. What can you say about
this?

I have no idea of
such a policy. I can only analyze the Syrian refugee crisis basing upon a year
of work in Antalya
within an international humanitarian mission. Today Turkey has the second biggest
number of Syrian citizens on its territory. The total number of Syrians in Turkey will shortly be equal to the population
of Armenia.
I think the European Union has finally realized that it cannot be isolated from
the consequences of the shocks in the Middle East or in the Caucasus.
The EU has also understood that Turkey
is not a buffer for Europe. I think further
developments in Syria will
play a crucial role in increasing the number of refugees, because if Russia continues its air campaign in Aleppo, it will inevitably
increase the flow of the refugees towards the Turkish border.