Raymond Dean Brown was convicted after a jury trial of being a felon in
possession of a firearm, unlawfully possessing a machine gun, and carrying a
machine gun during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 922, 924, and 18 U.S.C. § 2. He was sentenced to 115 months for
the
first two counts and 360 months for the third, to be served consecutively. On
appeal, Mr. Brown asserts (1) there was insufficient evidence to convict him of
carrying a machine gun during and in relation to the manufacture of
methamphetamine; (2) the district court's jury instructions constructively
amended the indictment to permit conviction for an uncharged crime of using a
gun during and in relation to the underlying drug trafficking offense; (3) the
court erroneously failed to suppress, or grant a hearing regarding, statements Mr.
Brown made in exchange for an implicit immunity agreement with state
authorities; (4) the court erred in leading potential jurors in the Pledge of
Allegiance prior to the commencement of his trial; and (5) the court failed to
consider Mr. Brown's challenge to various convictions listed in his presentence
report. We affirm Mr. Brown's conviction and remand with directions that the
district court vacate Mr. Brown's sentence and resentence him.

I.

Mr. Brown met Kirsten Lee Worrell in August 1999, in Missouri. As Ms.
Worrell later testified at trial, shortly after they met Mr. Brown showed Ms.
Worrell and others his machine gun and permitted them each to fire it. Mr.
Brown also mixed and cooked materials to manufacture methamphetamine at or
near the trailer Ms. Worrell shared with her former boyfriend, Ricky Huggins.
The parties stipulated Mr. Brown used the "anhydrous ammonia method" to
manufacture methamphetamine, which involves mixing ephedrine or
pseudoephedrine tablets, lithium from batteries, and anhydrous ammonia with
other materials.

Ms. Worrell, Mr. Huggins, Mr. Brown, and his girlfriend subsequently
traveled to California. En route, the group stayed in a trailer owned by Mitchell
Thomas, which was located near Rock Springs, Wyoming. Mr. Brown and his
girlfriend eventually parted ways and he continued on the journey to California
with Ms. Worrell and Mr. Huggins. At some point, Ms. Worrell and Mr. Huggins
also parted ways. Mr. Brown ultimately traveled back to Rock Springs with Ms.
Worrell. They arrived in Wyoming by the end of October 1999, and again stayed
with Mr. Thomas in his trailer. Ms. Worrell testified that Mr. Brown
manufactured methamphetamine in Mr. Thomas' trailer, which Mr. Thomas
verified. Mr. Thomas also reported seeing Mr. Brown's machine gun sitting by
the back door of the trailer, near where Mr. Brown was cooking
methamphetamine. Carmen Kittelson, an acquaintance of Mr. Thomas, testified
that she visited the trailer once and discovered Mr. Brown sitting on the couch
with the machine gun in his lap. Mr. Brown and Ms. Worrell eventually moved
into a motor home owned by Mr. Thomas and relocated it to the nearby Flaming
Gorge Reservoir area. Mr. Brown continued to manufacture methamphetamine in
the motor home.

Ms. Worrell testified that Mr. Brown manufactured methamphetamine
almost continuously from the time they returned to Wyoming at the end of
October until they were arrested in mid-November. Ms. Worrell, Mr. Brown, and
Mr. Thomas took road trips to gather supplies necessary for producing the
methamphetamine, sometimes traveling out of state to collect materials. Ms.
Worrell testified that Mr. Brown always had his gun with him during this time
period.

While shopping for supplies at an Albertsons grocery store in Rock Springs
on November 14, 1999, Mr. Brown and Ms. Worrell noticed police cars in the
store parking lot. Although Mr. Brown's initial instinct was to escape via
Albertsons' back exit, Ms. Worrell convinced him to return with her to her van.
Once inside the van, they were surrounded by police, who were seeking Ms.
Worrell on an outstanding arrest warrant. Detective Craig Jackson testified that,
during the police confrontation, he saw Mr. Brown repeatedly reach down
between the seats where Mr. Brown's machine gun was later found in an
unzipped bag and loaded with two magazines of bullets. Ms. Worrell testified
that Mr. Brown had wanted to retrieve the gun and shoot his way out, but she
convinced him otherwise and he surrendered.

Ms. Worrell was arrested, told the police about the methamphetamine
manufacturing operation, and guided them to the motor home in Flaming Gorge.
Mr. Brown was also arrested. While he was being questioned by the police, he
tried to escape out of a window at the police office. He was captured after he
hurt himself during the escape and was taken to the hospital, where a one-gram
package of methamphetamine was recovered from his sock. Pursuant to a
warrant, the police conducted a search of the Flaming Gorge location. They
found coffee filters containing methamphetamine residue, acids and solvents
commonly used during methamphetamine manufacture, and a fire pit containing
several burned starter fluid cans and lithium battery wrappers. They also
detected a strong smell of ether. Detective Jackson testified they found a cooler
containing a biphase liquid, with chalky material at the bottom and clear fluid on
top, that consisted of methamphetamine produced via the anhydrous ammonia
method.

While state charges were pending, Mr. Brown and his lawyer met with a
state prosecutor in February 2000 in order to determine whether Mr. Brown
would be given consideration for providing information. According to Special
Agent Dennis Claman, the state prosecutor told Mr. Brown that although any
information he provided would not be used against him in state court, the state
could not bind federal authorities. Before Mr. Brown's attorney advised him to
say nothing more about his gun, Mr. Brown provided information to the state
agents about a man in Chicago who made and sold guns similar to the one he
owned. Special Agent Claman later told federal agents Mr. Brown might have
information of interest to them. On March 15, 2000, Mr. Brown pled guilty in
Wyoming state court to possession of a controlled substance and operation of an
unlawful clandestine laboratory. He received concurrent sentences of twelve
months, and three to five years.

The week following his state proceedings, a federal grand jury returned an
indictment charging Mr. Brown with three weapons offenses, spanning the time
period of October 1999 through November 14, 1999. Mr. Brown moved to
suppress the statements he made at the February 2000 meeting with the state
prosecutor, arguing that the use of those statements would violate his Wyoming
immunity agreement. The district court stated in a written order that it believed
Mr. Brown understood the agreement did not apply to federal authorities, but
reserved making a ruling until it heard testimony from the law enforcement
personnel involved. Mr. Brown did not renew his suppression motion at trial and
the government presented his statements through the testimony of Special Agent
Claman without any defense objection.

Before the commencement of Mr. Brown's trial, the district court asked the
prospective jurors to join in reciting the Pledge of Allegiance. At the
culmination of the proceedings, the court instructed the jury, without objection
from the defense, that it could convict Mr. Brown if he "used or carried" a gun.
The jury ultimately convicted Mr. Brown of all the charges against him.

Finally, before he was sentenced, Mr. Brown objected to the presentence
report because, inter alia, he claimed that several convictions used to calculate
his criminal history had been dismissed. Without addressing these objections, the
district court sentenced Mr. Brown to 115 months for the first two counts and
360 months for the third count, to be served consecutively. Mr. Brown now
appeals.

II.

Mr. Brown challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his
conviction for carrying a machine gun during and in relation to the manufacture
of methamphetamine, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). To support Mr.
Brown's conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), the government had to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) Mr. Brown committed the underlying drug
offense, in this case "manufacturing methamphetamine," in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); (2) he "carried" the machine gun; and (3) his carriage of the
machine gun was "during and in relation to" his drug trafficking crime. 18
U.S.C. § 924(c).

We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. United States v.
Castorena-Jaime, 285 F.3d 916, 933 (10th Cir. 2002). "'[W]e ask only whether
taking the evidence­both direct and circumstantial, together with the reasonable
inferences to be drawn therefrom­in the light most favorable to the government,
a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.'"
United States v. Radcliff, 331 F.3d 1153, 1157 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting United
States v. McKissick, 204 F.3d 1282, 1289 (10th Cir. 2000)). We do not assess
the credibility of witnesses or weigh conflicting evidence since these tasks are
exclusively those of the jury. Castorena-Jaime, 285 F.3d at 933. We may
reverse "'only if no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" United States v. Haslip, 160 F.3d 649,
652 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 1462-63
(10th Cir. 1995)). This "standard requires this court to review the trial record to
determine if there is evidence to support the verdict." United States v. Austin,
231 F.3d 1278, 1283 (10th Cir. 2000).

Mr. Brown has conceded the government proved he manufactured
methamphetamine at Mr. Thomas' trailer and at his motor home. Aplt. Br. at 21,
23. Indeed, the evidence proving this fact was overwhelming.

First, the results of the police search executed on Mr. Thomas' motor home
at the Flaming George Reservoir demonstrated the existence of an ongoing
methamphetamine manufacturing operation. The police recovered coffee filters,
acids, solvents, and fluid wrappers from lithium batteries, all of which are used in
the methamphetamine manufacturing process. Most damaging, the officers
located a batch of methamphetamine ­ the biphase liquid methamphetamine in
the cooler ­ that was in the process of becoming the finished drug product.
Second, Mr. Thomas testified he witnessed Mr. Brown manufacturing
methamphetamine on several occasions. He also reported that he made road trips
to the Flaming Gorge Reservoir to re-supply Mr. Brown with necessary supplies
to continue his drug processing endeavor.

Finally, Ms. Worrell testified the methamphetamine manufacturing
operation was constant and continuous from the time she and Mr. Brown returned
to Rock Springs from California in late October until their arrest in November.
According to Ms. Worrell, there was always some step in the manufacturing
process taking place during this time period.

Q [prosecutor]: How often would the defendant cook
methamphetamine from the time you came back from California in
approximately Halloween of 1999 to the time that you were arrested?

A [Ms. Worrell]: There was usually something going the entire time.
I mean, if it wasn't sitting ­ like you can have it sit, and it'll just like
kind of cook itself a little bit. If it wasn't that, then there was stuff
drying out . . . there's always a step going on from that time until we
got busted. . . .

Q: When you say "always a step going on," would you explain what
you mean to the jury?

A: There's steps you have to take in order to - to manufacture
methamphetamine, and it can take anywhere from a couple hours to
do it to a couple days . . . . [T]here was always something going on.
If it wasn't separating pills to get the ephedrine, it was mixing the
lithium batteries in with the ephedrine and pouring the ether on it.
There was always something happening, always.

Rec., vol. V, at 546-47. It is thus clear that Mr. Brown was manufacturing
methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).

Conviction under the "carry" prong of § 924(c) requires "possession of a
firearm through dominion and control, and transportation or movement of the
weapon." United States v. Richardson, 86 F.3d 1537, 1548 (10th Cir. 1996).
Mr. Brown has conceded there was testimony he "carried" his machine gun on
various occasions throughout the period alleged in the indictment. Aplt. Br. at
23-26. In fact, Mr. Brown admits he was "carrying" the gun within the meaning
of § 924(c) in Ms. Worrell's van on the day of his arrest. Aplt. Br. at 26; seealso Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 137-39 (1998) (carrying a
firearm within the meaning of § 924(c) includes transporting it in a vehicle, even
in a locked glove compartment or trunk). Again, Mr. Brown's concession is
supported in the record by overwhelming evidence.

Mr. Brown was observed driving Ms. Worrell's van into the Albertsons'
parking lot on the day of his arrest. Following Ms. Worrell's arrest, Mr. Brown's
loaded machine gun was discovered between the front seats of the van. As a
result, there is no doubt Mr. Brown carried the machine gun within the meaning
of § 924(c) on the day he was arrested.

In addition, Ms. Worrell's testimony demonstrated that no matter what Mr.
Brown was doing, he always had the gun close at hand:

Q [prosecutor]: Did he have the gun with him, by the way, the entire
time from Missouri to Wyoming?

A [Ms. Worrell]: Yes, he did.

Q: Where was it?

A: It was usually never too far from his reach. I mean, it's usually
just like an arm's length away. . . .

Q: Where was the machine gun, Government Exhibit Number 2,
when you went to California?

A: It was with Ray.

Q: When you say "it was with Ray," can you describe where it was?

A: Well, it was always in the black bag, and the black bag was
always by the seat. If we were in the van, it was under his seat or on
the seat next to him or somewhere really close to him. . . .

Q: During . . . [the] two weeks from Halloween 1999 until
November 14, 1999. Where was Government Exhibit Number 2, the
gun?

A: It was with Raymond.

Q: When he was manufacturing methamphetamine out at the motor
home, where was the gun?

A: It was with Raymond.

Q: Where?

A: [I]t was pretty close to him. I mean, it was never pretty far from
him. If he was back in the bathroom [manufacturing
methamphetamine], it was back there with him.

Thus, the sole issue before us is whether the government proffered
sufficient evidence to prove Mr. Brown carried the machine gun "during and in
relation to" manufacturing methamphetamine, as required by § 924(c). Mr.
Brown argues that because he was not actually manufacturing methamphetamine
in Ms. Worrell's van while he was "carrying" the machine gun, and he was not
actually "carrying" the machine gun in Mr. Thomas' motor home or trailer when
he was manufacturing methamphetamine, the government's evidence fails to
establish the necessary nexus between his carriage of the weapon and the charged
drug trafficking offense. We disagree.

A firearm is carried "during and in relation to" the underlying crime when
the "defendant avail[s] himself of the weapon and . . . the weapon play[s] an
integral role in the [underlying offense]." United States v. Lampley, 127 F.3d
1231, 1240 (10th Cir. 1997) (quotations omitted). The "during and in relation
to" standard requires the government to prove a direct nexus between the
defendant's carrying of a firearm and the underlying drug crime. Id. at 1240-41;
see also United States v. Iiland, 254 F.3d 1264, 1274 (10th Cir. 2001) ("our
cases make clear that the 'during and in relation to' requirement of section 924(c)
necessitates some direct connection between the firearm and the drug offense").
To establish this nexus, we require evidence that the defendant intended the
firearm to be available for use in the offense. United States v. Shuler, 181 F.3d
1188, 1190 (10th Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted). "There is no requirement,
however, that the drug trafficking crime be the sole reason for the possession of
the gun." United States v. Radcliff, 331 F.3d 1153, 1158-59 (10th Cir. 2003)
(citing McKissick, 204 F.3d at 1293-94).

Mr. Brown's first argument is that there was insufficient evidence to prove
he was actually manufacturing methamphetamine while he admittedly was
carrying the gun in Ms. Worrell's van. To support this contention, Mr. Brown
notes that the term "manufacture," as defined by 21 U.S.C. § 802(15), does not
include mere possession of ingredients that might be used to manufacture the
controlled substance. In addition, Mr. Brown asserts Congress could not have
intended that the mere possession of precursor materials be synonymous with
"manufacture," or possession of precursor materials would not be a separately
punishable offense. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) (prohibiting possession of
listed
chemicals with intent to manufacture a controlled substance).

If Mr. Brown's underlying drug trafficking crime had constituted a "point-in-time"
offense, such as the discrete distribution of a controlled substance, his
argument might be persuasive. United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S.
275, 281 (1999). As we detailed above, however, the evidence overwhelmingly
established not only that Mr. Brown manufactured methamphetamine, but that
Mr. Brown's methamphetamine manufacture was a continuous and ongoing
operation from late October 1999 until the day of his arrest. The question before
us then is not whether the evidence demonstrates the machine gun was directly
connected to any particular drug transaction or point in the methamphetamine
production process, but whether the firearm was sufficiently connected to the
"continuing offense" as a whole.

Supreme Court precedent is instructive on this point. In Rodriguez-Moreno,
the Court was faced with the issue of the proper venue for a § 924(c)
offense. 526 U.S. at 276. The defendant had kidnaped his victim in Texas and
transported him to New Jersey and then to Maryland. Id. at 276-77. Once in
Maryland, the defendant brandished a firearm during and in relation to the
kidnaping. Id. at 277. The government conceded that there was no evidence the
defendant used the gun in New Jersey. Id. at 281. Nonetheless, the trial was
venued in New Jersey, and the defendant was convicted. Id. at 277. On appeal,
the defendant argued that the proper venue for the § 924(c) violation was not
New Jersey since he did not use the gun while committing a crime in that state.
Id. at 281. The Supreme Court agreed that the venue should be based on where
acts making up part of the crime took place, but ultimately ruled against the
defendant. Id. at 281-82. The Court reasoned that the § 924(c) offense had
two
basic conduct elements: (1) "using and carrying" a gun, and (2) the underlying
offense. Id. at 280. Section 924(c) could not be classified as a point-in-time
offense where the underlying crime was a continuing offense. Id. at 281. The
underlying crime before the Court was a kidnaping, which continued until the
victim was released. Id. Thus, venue of the § 924(c) offense was proper
anywhere that a part of the kidnaping took place. Id. at 282.

Applying the tenets of Rodriguez-Moreno, we hold Mr. Brown "carried"
the machine gun "during" his commission of the underlying crime, i.e.,
manufacturing methamphetamine. The government presented overwhelming
evidence that the methamphetamine manufacturing operation was ongoing and
continuous from late October 1999 until Mr. Brown's November arrest. Thus,
Mr. Brown's concession that he "carried" the machine gun within the meaning of
§ 924(c) on the day of his arrest alone forecloses any argument that the
government failed to prove he carried a firearm "during" the manufacture of
methamphetamine. Moreover, the evidence before the jury supported the
inference that Mr. Brown also "carried" the gun throughout the period alleged in
the indictment in connection with his road trips out of state to obtain anhydrous
ammonia, and to Rock Springs for re-supply of ephedrine pills, lithium batters,
starter fluid, and other such items. These trips occurred "during" the ongoing
and underlying crime; indeed, they were essential to the maintenance of Mr.
Brown's continuous methamphetamine manufacturing enterprise.

Mr. Brown further contends that even if the government did prove he
"carried" a firearm "during" the commission of the drug trafficking crime, the
evidence was not sufficient to show that the firearm was carried "in relation to"
that crime. The Supreme Court has held that the phrase "in relation to"

is expansive . . . . [A]t a minimum, [it] clarifies that the firearm must
have some purpose or effect with respect to the drug trafficking
crime; its presence or involvement cannot be the result of accident or
coincidence. As one court has observed, the "in relation to"
language "allay[s] explicitly the concern that a person could be"
punished under § 924(c)(1) for committing a drug trafficking offense
"while in possession of a firearm" even though the firearm's
presence is coincidental or entirely "unrelated" to the crime.
Instead, the gun at least must "facilitate, or have the potential of
facilitating," the drug trafficking offense.

Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 237-38 (1993) (citations omitted). We are
convinced this test is satisfied here.

"One recognized theory that explains how a gun facilitates a drug
trafficking crime is that the gun deters interference with the crime." Radcliff,
331 F.3d at 1159; see also United States v. Lott, 310 F.3d 1231, 1248 (10th Cir.
2002). This court has held that

the placement of a loaded, semi-automatic weapon on the driver's
seat of the car in which the instrumentalities of methamphetamine
manufacturing were also found is sufficient evidence from which a
jury could conclude that the purpose of the gun was to provide
defense or deterrence in furtherance of attempting to manufacture
methamphetamine.

Lott, 310 F.3d at 1248. In this case, Mr. Brown's loaded machine gun was found
by police in between the front seats of Ms. Worrell's van. Also found in the van
were various materials used in the manufacturing of methamphetamine, including
an anhydrous ammonia tank, recently purchased lithium batteries, and empty cans
of starter fluid. Given the ongoing manufacturing process in which Mr. Brown
was engaged, his carriage of the machine gun in between the front seats of a van
in which the instrumentalities of methamphetamine manufacturing were also
found is evidence from which a jury could conclude that the purpose of the gun
was to provide defense or deterrence "in relation to" manufacturing
methamphetamine.

Other facts also support a reasonable inference that Mr. Brown intended
his weapon to deter interference with his methamphetamine manufacturing
operation. For instance, Ms. Worrell testified Mr. Brown kept his machine gun
by his side or within arms reach at all times when involved in manufacturing
methamphetamine. Her statement was corroborated by Mr. Thomas, who testified
that while Mr. Brown was cooking methamphetamine in the backroom of his
trailer, he witnessed the machine gun propped against a door a mere two to three
feet away from the defendant.

Moreover, the evidence concerning Mr. Brown's actions regarding the gun
on the date of his arrest strongly supports the inference that he carried the
weapon for defense and deterrence in relation to the underlying drug offense.
Ms. Worrell testified that after she and Mr. Brown returned to her van in the
Albertsons parking lot and were surrounded by police:

Ray had the gun between the seats, and he said he was going to
shoot at the cops and he was going to kill them all. And I just kept
telling him, "No, no; you know, everything will be okay". . . . And
he just kept going for the gun.

Rec., vol. V, at 557. A detective at the scene of the arrest reported he

could see some type of commotion inside the vehicle. Mr. Brown is
. . . looking around, trying to figure out where these officers are in
exact relationship to where he's at. There's a conversation going on
between Mr. Brown and Ms. Worrell inside the vehicle . . . his hands
come down off of . . . the steering wheel down in between the seats.
Something is going on down here on the floor. Then the hands come
back up again.

Rec., vol. IV, at 242. This evidence demonstrates Mr. Brown had every intention
of using his machine gun to prevent interference with his drug crimes and as a
means of defense, particularly when confronted by law enforcement. For the
foregoing reasons, we hold the evidence was sufficient to support Mr. Brown's §
924(c) conviction.

III.

Raising an issue for the first time on appeal, Mr. Brown also contends the
jury instructions constructively amended his indictment, possibly resulting in the
jury convicting him on an uncharged crime. Mr. Brown was indicted for
carrying a gun under § 924(c), but Instruction 34 directed the jury to convict
him
if he either used or carried a gun. It stated: "Mere possession of a machine gun
is not a sufficient nexus or connection to establish guilt . . . the government must
prove . . . [that the defendant] used or carried a firearm." Rec., vol. VI,
at 746
(emphasis added).

The instruction at issue was given to the jury in a series of instructions
related to the specific offense. First, the district court set forth the charge as
formulated in the indictment.(1) The court
then gave Instruction 32, providing the
statutory definition of the offense, which included the phrase "uses or carries."(2)
It then gave Instruction 33, which defined one element of the offense as "the
defendant knowingly carried a firearm during and in relation to that crime."(3)Id.
at 745-46. Finally, Instruction 34 concluded: "If the government does not prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant possessed the firearm during and in
relation to a drug trafficking crime, you must find the Defendant not guilty of
Count Three."(4)Id. at 746
(emphasis added).

Because "using" a gun was not defined for the jury, Mr. Brown asserts the
jury may have thought it was permissible to convict him for some activity other
than carrying the gun, such as having the gun readily available, displaying it, or
brandishing it. He argues that this error requires an automatic reversal or at least
constitutes plain error. The government concedes that the instructions are
somewhat less than precise since they incorporate both the terms "use" and
"possession" in addition to "carrying." Nonetheless, the government maintains
that the instructions do not constitute plain error.(5)

An indictment is "constructively amended if the evidence presented at trial,
together with the jury instructions, raises the possibility that the defendant was
convicted of an offense other than that charged in the indictment." United States
v. Apodaca, 843 F.2d 421, 428 (10th Cir. 1988) (citing Stirone v. United
States,
361 U.S. 212, 215-19 (1960)). This doctrine is rooted in the Fifth Amendment
right to be tried only for charges upon indictment by a grand jury. U.S. Const.
amend. V. Mr. Brown failed to object to the jury instructions or present the
constructive amendment argument to the district court. We review claims of
constructive amendment raised for the first time on appeal under the plain error
standard. United States v. Cavely, 318 F.3d 987, 999 (10th Cir. 2003).(6) Under a
plain error review, reversal is only warranted if there is: (1) an error; (2) that is
plain; (3) that affects substantial rights; and (4) that seriously affects the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Olano,
507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). There is little doubt Mr. Brown can satisfy the first
two prongs of the plain error analysis, and we need not decide whether he can
satisfy the third prong because the fourth prong is dispositive. United States v.
Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 632-33 (2002) ("[W]e need not resolve . . . [the third
prong of the plain error review], because even assuming respondents' substantial
rights were affected, the error did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of judicial proceedings); Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S.
461, 469-70 (1997) (same).

In Johnson and Cotton, the fourth prong of plain error review
was
interpreted to prohibit recognition of plain error when evidence of a defendant's
guilt on the charged crime is "overwhelming" and "essentially uncontroverted."
See Johnson, 520 U.S. at 469-70 (finding that error did not satisfy the fourth
prong); see also Cotton, 535 U.S. at 633-34 (same).(7) Therefore, if overwhelming
and essentially uncontroverted evidence exists in the record to support Mr.
Brown's guilt on the charged crime of carrying a gun under § 924(c), the
alleged
constructive amendment cannot satisfy the fourth prong of plain error review.
As detailed earlier in this opinion, after a comprehensive review of the record, we
are confident the government introduced overwhelming and essentially
uncontroverted evidence proving Mr. Brown carried his gun during and in
relation to the underlying drug offense, i.e., manufacturing methamphetamine.(8)
"In light of this evidence, the proceedings resulted in a 'fair and reliable
determination' of [Mr. Brown's] guilt and, even assuming plain error, a reversal
would be unwarranted." United States v. Fabiano, 169 F.3d 1299, 1305 (10th
Cir. 1999). Indeed, because of the overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence in
this case, "the fairness, integrity, or reputation of the judicial proceedings would"
be threatened if we vacated Mr. Brown's § 924(c) conviction. Cotton, 535
U.S.
at 634 (internal quotation omitted). Therefore, we hold Mr. Brown's alleged
constructive amendment does not warrant reversal.

IV.

Mr. Brown next claims the district court should have suppressed statements
that he made to Wyoming state authorities on February 3, 2000, and should have
held a hearing on the derivative use of the statements. He maintains that state
authorities implicitly promised, in exchange for his providing information, not to
facilitate other jurisdictions in using the statements against him. He claims that
the state nevertheless passed along his statements to federal authorities, and that
they essentially formed the basis of federal charges against him. Mr. Brown
claims Special Agent Claman's recounting of his statements at trial helped prove
Mr. Brown knew the gun was a machine gun for the purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 922.(9)
Although Mr. Brown filed a motion to suppress the statements, the district court
reserved making a ruling and Mr. Brown did not renew the motion at trial or
object to the introduction of the statements. We therefore engage in plain error
review.

An exhibit filed by the government in response to Mr. Brown's motion to
suppress included a report by Special Agent Claman, who was present during Mr.
Brown's discussion with the state. The report noted Mr. Brown was informed
that the purpose of the discussion was to assess what consideration he would be
provided in exchange for his information, and that:

DCA [Deputy County and Prosecuting Attorney] Howard advised
BROWN that information provided would not be used against him in
state court proceedings. DCA Howard specifically stated that the
terms of the proffer/interview were not binding on federal authorities
nor authorities in any other state. DCA Howard further stated he had
no authority to grant immunity in any charges that may be brought by
federal authorities or authorities in any other state. DCA Howard
did state that any state crimes that BROWN admitted to would not be
prosecuted with the exception of any crimes of violence.

Rec., vol. I, doc. 104, ex. 2 at 32-33. During Mr. Brown's plea discussion in
state court, the parties engaged in the following dialogue with the court:

MR. PROKOS [prosecutor]: While under Wyoming law, your Honor,
we can't specifically grant immunity, there ­ there was an agreement
that we would not prosecute for any acts or wrongs that is use or
derivative use of immunity that Mr. Brown testif[ied] to during his
proffer or provided information regarding during his proffer. We
won't prosecute him for any of those acts that he's admitted to.

COURT: Is he facing any federal charges?

MR. NELSON [defense counsel]: . . . we've had the matter for four
months, and none have come forward, but he certainly could be
charged federally . . . .

COURT: Mr. Brown, is this your understanding of the plea
agreement?

DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor, it is.

Id., ex. 5 at 5.

The record thus demonstrates the state prosecutor told Mr. Brown that any
information he provided would not be used in state proceedings in Wyoming, and
that Mr. Brown would not receive protection from federal charges. Mr. Brown
expressly acknowledged that he understood these terms. His theory that the
state's active role in passing along information in the face of its informal
immunity agreement with him constitutes a violation of the plea agreement is not
persuasive; here, disclaimers about the lack of federal immunity were clearly
provided and Mr. Brown stated his understanding of such.(10) The district court
therefore did not err by permitting testimony regarding the relevant conversation
or by failing to grant a hearing regarding its derivative use.

V.

Mr. Brown argues the district court's decision to lead prospective jurors in
the Pledge of Allegiance, with its recitation of loyalty to the "flag of the United
States of America and the Republic for which it stands," caused the jury to favor
the prosecution. He claims that directly after the pledge was recited, the district
court called the case and asked if the "United States of America" was ready to
proceed. Rec., vol. III, at 5. Mr. Brown acknowledges that we ruled in United
States v. Wonschik, 353 F.3d 1192, 1198-99 (10th Cir. 2004), that such a claim is
without merit because a jury's pledge of fealty to the Constitution and our laws
"could just as likely benefit a defendant as to prejudice him." He nonetheless
advocates we depart from Wonschick and rule in his favor. However, because
one panel of this court cannot overrule another, United States v. Lopez, 327 F.3d
1207, 1212 n.6 (10th Cir. 2004), Mr. Brown cannot succeed on this claim.

VI.

Mr. Brown's final contention is the district court erred, under Fed. R.
Crim. P. 32(i)(3), in accepting the presentence report's assessment of his criminal
record without ruling on his objections that some of his prior charges had in fact
been dismissed. The sentencing transcript nowhere shows that the district court
weighed these objections or sought further hearings regarding them. The
government agrees the district court should have resolved Mr. Brown's
objections before sentencing him and that this case should be remanded for
resentencing. Since the disputed charges could result in a reduction of Mr.
Brown's criminal history category, and thus his sentence, we agree that remand is
appropriate.

VII.

For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM Mr. Brown's conviction but
REVERSE and REMAND the case for resentencing.

FOOTNOTESClick footnote number to return to corresponding location in the text.

Count Three of the indictment charges that on or about October
1999, through and including November 14, 1999, in Sweetwater
County, in the District of Wyoming, the defendant, Raymond Dean
Brown, knowingly carried a firearm (sic); namely a Norinco MAK90
rifle, bearing Serial number 53438, during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime for which
he may be prosecuted in a court in the
United States; that is, manufacturing methamphetamine.

Rec., vol. VI, at 745 (emphasis added).

2.In full, Instruction 32 stated: "Section
924(c)(1) of Title 18 of the United
States Code provides, in pertinent part, that: . . . whoever, during and in relation
to any crime of violence or drug-trafficking crime, uses or carries a firearm shall
be guilty of an offense against the United States . . . ." Rec. vol. VI, at 745
(emphasis added).

In order to sustain its burden of proof for the crime of carrying a
firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime as charged
in Count Three of the indictment, the United States must prove the
following two essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

One: That the defendant committed the crime of manufacturing
a controlled substance; and

Two: That the defendant knowingly carried a firearm during
and in relation to that crime.

As to Count Three of the indictment, Title 18, United States Code,
Section 924(c)(1)(B)(ii), reads: Mere possession of a machine gun is
not a sufficient nexus or connection to establish guilt. For you to
find the defendant guilty of Count Three of the indictment, therefore,
the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant, Raymond Dean Brown, used or carried a firearm and that
the firearm played an integral role in the underlying offense by
furthering the purpose or the effect of the underlying crime and that
its presence or involvement was not the result of coincidence. If the
government does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant possessed a firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime, you
must find the defendant not guilty of Count
Three.

Rec., vol. VI, at 745-46 (emphasis added).

5.The government also argues that Mr. Brown's
counsel invited any error
because he agreed to the "use or carry" language during a discussion about
Instruction 34 with the district court and is therefore barred from challenging it
on appeal. We disagree that defense counsel invited the addition of the word
"use" in the jury instructions. The record demonstrates the discussion was
focused on other language in the instruction at the time the "use or carry" phrase
was erroneously inserted. There is neither evidence of inducement of the district
court, United States v. Johnson, 183 F.3d 1175, 1179 n.2 (10th Cir. 1999), nor a
stipulated agreement by defense counsel, Quigley v. Rosenthal, 327 F.3d 1044,
1064-65 (10th Cir. 2003), to add the "use or carry" language. Indeed, the error
appears to be inadvertent.

6.Tenth Circuit precedent establishes some
uncertainty as to whether a
constructive amendment of an indictment by jury instructions to which the
defendant did not object is reversible per se or reversible only where the
amendment constitutes plain error and seriously affects the fairness, integrity or
public reputation of judicial proceedings. Compare United States v. Levine, 41
F.3d 607, 617 n.13 (10th Cir. 1994) (reversible per se) withUnited
States v.
Cavely, 318 F.3d 987, 999 (10th Cir. 2003) (applying plain error standard without
citing Levine). After Levine but before Cavely, the
Supreme Court decided
United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002). In Cotton, the Court
declined to
notice plain error in a situation where the indictment lacked any reference to
threshold drug quantities, a defect of constitutional magnitude after Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). See id. at 627-28. The indictment alone
would
have yielded a maximum sentence of twenty years, yet the defendants were
sentenced to at least ten years above the maximum due to the district court's
finding of 500 or more grams of cocaine base. Id. Because the defendants had
not objected below, the Court engaged in plain error review. Id. at 631
(distinguishing Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212 (1960), on basis that
constructive amendment claim there was raised in district court); see also 3
Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure: Criminal 3d §
516 at 51 & n.16. Although there was constitutional error that was plain and
resulted in substantially increased sentences for the defendants, the Court upheld
the sentences because the uncharged drug quantity was supported by
overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence. Cotton, 535 U.S. at 634. The Court
ruled the "fairness, integrity and public reputation of judicial proceedings" would
be threatened if the sentence were overturned. Id. It is clear, therefore, that the
automatic reversal rule of Levine no longer applies in a constructive amendment
plain error case, ie., where the defendant failed to object in the district court.

7.The crime charged in Johnson
was violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623, which
proscribes "knowingly mak[ing] any false material declaration" under oath before
a grand jury. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 461 (1997). The
error in
Johnson was the district court's failure to submit an element of the
offense,
materiality, to the petit jury. Id. at 465. Because the evidence of materiality was
"overwhelming" and "essentially uncontroverted" at trial, the Court held that
there was "no basis for concluding that the error 'seriously affect[ed] the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.'" Id. at 469-70. The crime
charged in Cotton was conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to
distribute a "detectable amount" of cocaine and cocaine base. Cotton v. United
States, 535 U.S. 625, 627-28 (2002). The error in Cotton was the
omission of
drug quantity, an element of a § 841(b) offense, from the indictment.
Id. at 628.
The evidence on the record that the conspiracy involved at least 50 grams of
cocaine base was "overwhelming" and "essentially uncontroverted," id. at 633,
and the Court therefore held the error did not seriously affect the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id.

8.We note there is also overwhelming evidence
that Mr. Brown "used" his
gun. "Use" of a gun requires actual employment and can involve displaying or
brandishing it. United States v. Bailey, 516 U.S. 137, 143, 148 (1995). Mr.
Brown's carriage of the gun in this case involved actively displaying or
brandishing it, since it was visible to others and since the evidence indicates his
purpose was to employ the gun for deterrence and defense. Moreover, Mr.
Brown's contention that he might have been convicted for merely having the gun
readily available, which is not necessarily a crime under Bailey, see 516
U.S. at
149, is unavailing in light of the overwhelming evidence of the greater offenses
of both using and carrying the gun.

9.Knowledge that a gun is a machine gun is not
an element of the third count
against Mr. Brown for carrying a gun during and in relation to a drug trafficking
crime. See United States v. Eads, 191 F.3d 1206, 1212-14 (10th Cir. 1999)
(stating that type of firearm carried is not an element of § 924 offense, but a
sentencing factor).

10.Mr. Brown's reliance on United
States v. Barone, 781 F. Supp. 1072
(E.D. Pa. 1991), does not help him. In Barone, the defendant's nonprosecution
agreement with federal authorities was violated by their assistance in a state
prosecution because the court found that the defendant was not warned of his
lack of state immunity by his attorney or the court and that he did not understand
he could still be subject to charges in other jurisdictions. 781 F. Supp. at 1075,
1078.