INternational Journal of Criminal Justice
Sciences

Vol 3 Issue 2 July - december 2008

This
is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of
the
Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial-Share Alike
License,
which permits unrestricted non-commercial use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided
the original work is properly cited.
This license does not permit commercial exploitation or
the creation of derivative works without specific
permission

This
paper examines targeted policing as a form of
evidence-based policing. The paper reviews eight
experimental studies related to targeted policing. The
main objectives of this paper are (1) to discuss the
theoretical perspective for implementation of targeted
policing; (2) to discuss empirical evidence for
implementation of targeted policing; and (3) to assess
the impact of programs that are based on targeted
policing philosophy; the focus will be to answer the
question: does targeted policing reduce crime? This is
assessed by using the Maryland Scientific Methods Scale
(1 to 5 point SMS scoring system) to determine the
scientific rigor of each study that has evaluated one or
more of the proactive police tactics/strategies such as,
“hot spots,” “second response,” and “crackdowns.” The
overall agenda in this paper is to judge – through an
extended literature review – whether targeted policing
(as a proactive crime prevention approach) reduces
crime, and based on the aggregate results of the eight
experimental studies included in this research paper, to
make appropriate recommendations for the criminal
justice agencies in terms of allocating their resources
to the most active crime-prone places and most active
offenders by the type of offense.

Targeted policing came about as a result of lack of
police resources while the police departments were
trying to maintain the adequacy of crime prevention. In
this context, many police departments have had limited
resources to fight crime; thus, by focusing on
high-crime areas, the police could better utilize their
limited resources in fighting crime.

Targeted policing can be defined as an element of
successful policing; a form of policing that is
evidence-based. The term “evidence-based” suggests the
use of empirical evidence (scientific evidence) to make
informed decisions about certain policies, programs, or
projects in policing (Sherman, 1998; MacKenzie, 2000;
Sherman et al., 2006; MacKenzie, 2006). Targeted
policing, as a form of evidence-based policing, “uses
research to guide practice and evaluate practitioners;
it uses the best evidence to shape the best practice”
(Sherman, 1998, p. 4). A more universally acceptable
definition of targeted policing is a form of policing
that is place-specific, offense-specific,
offender-specific, and time-specific. The primary role
of targeted policing is to get the police department to
focus on what causes a particular incident rather than
the incident itself; basically an analysis of the
symptoms of the incidents. In other words, the public
expects the police to look at the causes of problems and
then find the cure for those problems. Generally, this
means the police should focus on high-crime places and
high-risk offenders (repeat offenders) that are the
facilitators of crime. Reiteratively, when implementing
targeted policing, a great deal of police work is
dedicated to identifying and diagnosing the locations
and the types of the problems, and then take all
necessary measures to solve those problems (Weisburd et
al., 2008). Locations of the problems suggests that
“crime does not occur evenly across urban landscapes;
rather, it is concentrated in relatively small places
[and that involves a relatively small number of
repeat/chronic offenders] that generate more than half
of all criminal events” (Braga, 1999). However, targeted
policing is not only focused on crime places, it also
includes proactive interventions that are aimed at
preventing certain crime problems by focusing on
preventing victimization. This includes collaborative
efforts between the police and social services with an
objective aimed at reducing victimization, whether that
is domestic victimization, random victimization, or
situational victimization.

In summation, targeted policing that focuses on criminal
places and specific types of crimes has come about as a
result of an effort of criminal justice agencies to
proactively identify and target criminal areas that will
prevent crime (by using police tactics and strategies
that, based on empirical evidence, work) while at the
same time reducing police spending (Sherman, Farrington,
Welsh, & MacKenzie, 2002; Sherman et al., 2006; Braga,
2001).

Theoretical Perspectives of Targeted Policing

There are three theoretical explanations of criminal
places that link location, opportunity, and motivation
to crime. Theories that are suitable to explain the
spatial and temporal relationships of crime include: the
Routine Activities Theory, the Rational Choice Theory,
and the Incapacitation Theory (incapacitation is mainly
related to criminal justice policy). The discussion of
theories in this paper is justified based on the fact
that targeted policing relies heavily on the
explanations that these theories provide about criminal
operations since these theories can be applied to
prevention programs. These theories guide the research
in this area.

Rational Choice Theory

According to the Rational Choice Theory, individuals who
commit criminal acts operate by rational decisions
expected to maximize their profit and minimize their
loss (Lilly, Cullen, & Ball, 1995, 2006). For this
reason, “criminals do not move randomly through
neighborhoods – a predictable pattern usually exists”
(Baker & Wolfer, 2003, p. 48). Furthermore, rational
choice theory tells us that offenders are capable of
making rational choices and they are aware of the
criminal opportunities they have. “A criminal who is
motivated to commit crimes uses cues to locate,
identify, and target sites and hot spots” (Baker &
Wolfer, 2003, p. 48), places in which he is likely to
succeed (commit crimes and not get caught) (see Laub,
2004; Cullen & Agnew, 2006). This suggests that there is
a connection between opportunities for offending, the
environmental conditions, and the calculation of success
that makes the offender ready to engage in criminal acts
(Baker & Wolfer, 2003; Williams & McShane, 1994; see
also Cornish & Clarke, 1986; also see Cohen & Felson,
1979; Clarke, 1997; Agnew, 2005). Thus, engaging in
criminal activities, from this point of view, is a
calculated decision. At least, we can say that the
decision for the involvement in criminal activities, to
some extent, is related to some form of calculating the
costs and the benefit (Bennett, 1986). Although choice
may not entirely be at the offender’s conscience, the
calculation of success in committing a crime is taken
into account. Furthermore, it is also the experience
that provides the offender with serial cues associated
with environmental opportunities and risks. For example,
awareness of the surroundings and familiarity with
neighborhood reinforces criminal patterns (Baker &
Wolfer, 2003). Consequently, offenders plan potential
crimes and make decisions based on the information they
posses about the neighborhood (Cornish & Clark, 1986;
Akers, 1990; Satz & Ferejohn, 1994). Specific
crime-prone places thus provide criminals with the
opportunities – offenders that operate in those places
(when the opportunity is presented to them they) select
their targets to maximize the benefits and minimize the
costs while counting on feelings that they can commit
crimes with less chance of being detected (Cornish &
Clark, 1986; Baker & Wolfer, 2003). The ability to
calculate the chance of being detected is a part of the
rational thinking process.

Routine Activities Theory

According to the Routine Activities Theory, in order for
a crime to occur, three necessary elements should be
present: an offender, a victim, and a location. Those
three elements thus form a crime triangle (Cohen &
Felson, 1979; Barker & Wolfer, 2003; Miller, Schreck, &
Tewksbury, 2006; Lilly, Cullen, & Ball, 2006; Cullen &
Agnew, 2006). Above all, there must be some form of
motivation taking place before a crime can occur. In
other words, an offender identifies the clues to locate
and target sites (as rational choice theory explains to
us), but unless that offender is motivated to commit a
criminal act, no crime will occur. However, “being in a
situation where the advantages of crime appear to be
great, means that the odds are higher and even the most
moral person will get into trouble” (Miller, Schreck, &
Tewksbury, 2006, p. 82). This translates that
crime-prone areas, in themselves, present the situations
in which there are opportunities for crimes that
motivate potential offenders and convince them that an
involvement in crime is worth their time. Thus, by
eliminating the opportunity that those crime-prone areas
offer to potential motivated offenders, the police can
prevent crime before it happens or can prevent the
repetition of its occurrence (Weisburd & Braga, 2006;
Sherman, Gartin, & Buerger, 1989). This can be done
through a proactive crime prevention approach that in
this paper is referred to as “targeted policing.”

Furthermore, according to the routine activities theory,
even if there is a motivated offender and a suitable
target, crime will not occur unless the target is poorly
guarded (Cohen & Felson, 1979). Thus, an effective
guardianship (i.e., police visibility, frequent police
patrols, and or proactive arrests) intercepts the crime
triangle and makes the crime more risky and thus less
likely to occur (Miller, Schreck, & Tewksbury, 2006).
Reiteratively, crime-prone places provide the
opportunity and motivation to offenders to engage in
crimes; however, effective proactive police intervention
(the presence of effective guardianship) will intercept
the necessary conditions for the crime to occur.

Incapacitation Theory

Incapacitation theory in this paper relates mainly to
chronic offenders or repeated offenders, as well as
crime-prone places. Incapacitation theory is based on
the idea that a small portion of criminals commit a
disproportionate number of crimes (MacKenzie, 2006;
Martin & Sherman, 1986; Sherman, Farrington, Welsh, &
MacKenzie, 2006). Thus, by focusing specifically on
repeated offenders (by arresting them), the criminal
justice system can take away their capacity to commit
further or future crimes, at least for the time that
they will be in incarcerated. Taking away their ability
to commit further or future crimes is not only referred
to individual offenders but also to crime-prone places.
That is, by eliminating crime-prone places, obviously
the criminal justice agencies (the police, through
proactive police tactics and strategies) can take away
the capacity of these places to produce/generate crime.

In short, incapacitation theory helps us answer the
question: why focus on crime-prone areas or on specific
types of crimes? Statistically, residential locations
can generate as much as 85% of the repeat calls for
service (Sherman, 1992; Sherman, 1995). Moreover,
research shows that in many communities, more than 50%
of the calls for service come from only 3% of the
locations (see Sherman, 1989; Sherman, 1992; Sherman, et
al., 1992). Thus, by identifying these locations through
crime analysis and by implementing a proactive crime
prevention approach, the police can eliminate those
crime-prone places (a meso-level [secondary] crime
prevention); and by apprehending repeat offenders, the
police can restrict their opportunity to commit further
or future crimes (a micro-level [tertiary] crime
prevention).

Inclusion Criteria of (Eight) Experimental Studies

There are many studies that have evaluated police
proactive crime fighting strategies, but not all of them
meet the inclusion criteria that support the purpose of
this paper. Thus, this paper includes only a limited
number of studies. These are studies that (1) were at
least quasi-experimental in nature with a control or
comparison group; (2) their outcome measures included
crime prevention and/or reduction of citizens’ fear of
crime; (3) the police undertook a proactive approach to
reducing or eliminating crime; (4) and that there were
alternative strategies in dealing with the same types of
crime problems. Such strategies include the
implementation of reactive rather than proactive
policing. And finally, (5) studies included in this
paper are those that specifically focused on high-crime
areas, high-risk offenders, and or specific types of
offenses.

Method
of Analysis

For this study, the researcher has used the SMS scoring
system; a scale developed by researchers at the
University of Maryland in 1997 (see Farrington et al.,
2002; Sherman et al., 2002, 2006). The SMS scoring
system is a two-step procedure that is used to draw
conclusions about what works, what doesn’t work, and
what’s promising in terms of creating new or changing
existing crime prevention policies by challenging their
achievements.

The first step of this procedure deals with assessment
of each individual study for the quality of research
design and methodology. At this stage, the researcher
determines the scientific rigor of each study by looking
at the research design, selection problems, attrition,
statistical analysis, statistical controls, and the
sample size and then decides for inclusion of that study
in the analysis. During this assessment, a scientific
rigor score (levels 1 to 5 on SMS) is given to each
study that meets the criteria specified in step one of
the SMS scoring procedure. This criterion is specified
as follows: “level one studies” are those with poor
research design that can only demonstrate a correlation
between independent variable and the dependent variable
– usually cross-sectional designs. “Level two studies”
are those that have a pre-test and a post-test but
without a comparable group. “Level three studies” are
those studies that have a pre-test, post-test, an
experimental and a comparable group. “Level four
studies” are those studies that have multiple
experimental and comparison groups, with pre and
post-tests. And “level five studies” are those studies
that follow the principles of a true (randomized)
experiment. They are the most rigorous studies.

In step two of this procedure, the researcher determines
the number of studies (level three or above – at least
quasi-experimental in nature) that meet the criteria of
what works, what doesn’t work, and what’s promising. To
determine the degree to which, in this case, a police
tactic, strategy, or program works, the researcher
should have a minimum of two studies (level 3 or above)
showing the effectiveness of police tactics, strategies,
or programs with statistical significance usually at p >
.05 (two experimental studies that have tested the
police tactic, strategy, or program). Police strategies,
tactics, or programs that do not work, on the other
hand, should have a minimum of two studies (level 3 or
above) showing ineffectiveness with statistical
significance at p > .05; otherwise, the researchers are
required to conclude that there is not enough scientific
evidence to declare a police strategy, tactic, or
program as ineffective (Farrington et al., 2002; see
also Sherman et al., 1997; Sherman et al., 2002, 2006;
Walsh & Farrington, 2005; MacKenzie, 2006).

A Brief
Review of Eight Targeted Policing Studies

The moving force behind the development of the targeted
policing was largely fueled by the research findings of
the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment that was
conducted from October of 1972 through 1973, in
Missouri. A short summary of this experimental study is
presented below followed by the review of the seven
other experimental studies that are included in the
comparative analysis (see Table 1).

In 1972, the police foundation supported the first
comprehensive and scientific research on police patrol
effects that perhaps set the stage for subsequent
evaluations of police effectiveness. This experiment is
known as Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment (KCPPE).
The experiment was conducted by the Kansas City police
department, Missouri. The main focus of this
experimental study was on two fundamental questions: (1)
Is preventive police patrol effective? (2) What effects
does police visibility have on the residents’ feelings
of safety? (Kelling, Pate, Dieckman, & Brown, 1974;
Purpura, 1996). Consequentially, this study was aimed at
finding out the usefulness of preventive (non-directed)
random police patrols.

Methodologically, this was an experiment with the
treatment group and the control group. Fifteen beats
(designated as the experiment area) out of twenty-four
beats were scientifically selected and divided in three
matched groups of police patrol. The fifteen beats were
divided as follows: (1) Five Reactive Beats – no
preventive patrol – police entered the area only to
respond to citizen calls and emergencies; (2) Five
Proactive Beats – the police doubled and even tripled
the frequency of patrols and the number of patrol
officers; and (3) Five Control Beats – the police
department operated at the same level of patrol as they
used to patrol in those beats before the experiment. It
should be noted that a random pattern was established
between the proactive beats, the reactive beats, and the
control beats. The duration of this experiment was one
year.

During the implementation of the experiment (during the
treatment) the community was kept uninformed of the
experiment (of the changes in patrol) because of the
fear that it might affect the experiment and the fear
that it might have had in the community. It was assumed
that if the community knew there were no officers on
patrol (in the reactive beats) the citizens’ fear of
crime would increase as well as the crime rates, due to
the opportunities available to (or in favor of)
criminals to commit crimes (Bohm & Haley, 1997; Purpura,
1996).

Surprisingly, the findings of this experimental study
showed that there were little or no changes in crime
rates, rates of reporting crime to the police, people’s
fear of crime, and opinions about police effectiveness
by either an increase or decrease in preventive patrols
(Purpura, 1996). That is, the citizens did not notice
the difference when the frequency of patrols was
changed; also frequency of patrols had no significant
effect on residential or commercial burglaries, auto
theft, larcenies involving auto accessories, robberies,
or other vandalism crimes (Kelling, Pate, Dieckman, &
Brown, 1974, pp. 347-355).

Overall, this study suggests that frequent police
preventive/proactive patrols (non-directed police
patrols) have little effect in preventing crime or
making citizens feel safe and that the resources
normally allocated to preventive patrol activities could
be allocated elsewhere. Consequently, this study
provided some evidence that police visibility or police
presence has no significant impact on crime. Thus,
proactive police patrols have little value in preventing
crime and as such, they are ineffective. As Carl
Klockers, from University of Delaware, puts it, “…it
makes about as much sense to have police patrol
routinely in cars to fight crime as it does to have
firefighters patrolling routinely in fire trucks to
fight fire.” Nevertheless, since this police study was
the first of this kind, perhaps the findings suggested
other strategies for reducing crime and citizens’ fear
of crime – it suggested the implementation of targeted
crime prevention strategies (Kelling, Pate, Dieckman, &
Brown, 1974), which will be discussed below.
Additionally, it suggested that the resources allocated
to random patrol activities (non-directed police
patrols) should be allocated to targeted policing
strategies, and the focus of the police activities
should be on crime-generating places – on “hot spots”
and “hot times” associated with hot spots.

Minneapolis Hot Spots Patrol Program

In 1995, Sherman and Weisburd (1995), in collaboration
with Minneapolis Police Department, in Minnesota,
conducted a field experiment of police patrol in
high-crime areas known as “hot spots.” The purpose of
this experiment was to challenge the conclusions of the
Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment that was
conducted in 1973, in Missouri, that showed that the
police patrol has little to do with preventing or
controlling crime. Furthermore, the hypothesis of this
experimental study was that an increase of uniformed
police patrols (in the experimental group) patrolling
the streets, will prevent or lower the crime rates – a
proactive approach. However, this police program has
used a different strategy in reducing crime. The focus
of police patrols was targeted; that is, the frequency
of police patrol was increased in certain areas labeled
as “hot spots.” Thus, an increased police presence in
those “hot spots” areas will have a deterrent effect on
crime (Sherman, 1995; Sherman & Weisburd, 1995).

Methodologically, the Minneapolis study met the criteria
of a true experiment. It had the control and treatment
groups of 110 identified hot spots (there were 55 hot
spots randomly allocated to each group). The 110
identified hot spots comprised of address clusters that
experienced a high volume of citizen calls for service
(Sherman & Weisburd, 1995; Braga, 2001; Braga, 2006).
The Minneapolis hot spots patrol experiment provided 3
hours a day of intermittent, unpredictable police
presence to 55 randomly selected hot spot intersections
in the city (the experimental group). Another 55 hot
spots (the control group) received the normal patrol
coverage (Sherman, 1995; Braga, 2001). The duration of
this experiment was a year long. During this time, the
police experienced twice as much patrol presence in the
experimental area as compared to the control area.

The results of this study indicated that while the
impact on all reported crime was small, it was
statistically significant at 13 percent and even greater
for more serious crimes. Further analysis indicated that
the frequent rotation of the hot spot patrols (directed
police patrols), rather than long spells of patrol at
one hot spot was more effective (Koper, 1995). The
analysis also showed that the longer the police stayed
at one hot spot, the lower the crime rate would dip – up
to a point. This would change however if the police
presence in hot spots was for more than fifteen minutes.
In other words, more than fifteen minutes of police
presence in one hot spot produced retreating effects.
This experimental study thus suggested that, “the
optimal way to use police visibility may be to have the
police travel from hot spot to hot spot, and staying for
about ten [to fifteen] minutes at each one” (Sherman,
1995). The final results of this experimental study
showed that during the 12 months of the implementation
of this research experiment, there were significant and
stable differences in criminal activities between the
experimental group and the control group. That is, the
number of citizen calls for crime and disorder
significantly decreased comparing to the control group.
Therefore, this program (frequent police patrols
directed at specific areas at specific times) appeared
to work in preventing crime (Sherman & Weisburd, 1995).

Jersey City Drug Markets Analysis Program

In 1993, Weisburd and Green (1995), in collaboration
with the Jersey City Police Department, in New Jersey,
conducted an experimental research as a part of the
problem-oriented policing strategy. The focus of this
experiment was on whether the application of problem-
oriented policing strategy in drug markets would lead to
more effective drug policing than that of more
traditional policing methods (proactive vs. reactive
approaches in dealing with drug and gun-related
problems). This innovative drug enforcement strategy
focused specifically on “hot spots” of drug activities (Weisburd
& Green, 1995). The experiment was initiated as a part
of the evaluation of Drug Market Analysis Program (DMAP)
sponsored by the National Institute of Justice, in
response to the need of determining if a more proactive
approach would work better for the police in dealing
with drug-related crimes.

For a period of six months prior to the experiment, as
part of preparation for the execution of this
experiment, the police managed to identify 56 drug “hot
spots” in the Jersey City. These “hot spots” were
identified by using narcotics sales arrests,
drug-related emergency calls for service, and narcotics
tip-line. Then those 56 hot spots were randomly divided
into two groups. Six narcotics squads of the Jersey City
Police Department were then randomly assigned to
experimental and control hot spots. Furthermore, what’s
positive about this research design is that the two
groups of hot spots (experimental group [28 hot spots]
and control group [28 hot spots]) have similar
characteristics (Weisburd & Green, 1995; Braga, 2001).

The treatment that the experimental group received
consisted of three stages: planning, implementation, and
maintenance. In the planning stage, the police officers
mainly collected information about drug-related
activities by talking to business owners and residents.
During the second stage (during the implementation
stage), the police officers started the crackdown
operation with the intention of closing down
drug-related activities. And during the last stage, the
police officers maintained the progress they gained in
the implementation stage. This progress was maintained
by increasing the police presence (i.e., foot patrol,
surveillance, etc.) in the area. Conversely, in the
control group (control hot spots area), the police
continued their traditional (reactive) drug enforcement
strategies i.e. arrest-oriented enforcement (Weisburd &
Green, 1995).

The findings of this experimental research indicated
that in the targeted hot spots (in the experimental
group), the number of public disorder calls for
suspicious persons, drug-related activities, and other
public moral-related crimes (i.e., prostitution, liquor
violations, gambling, etc.) decreased after the
experiment. The number of calls were measured 7 months
prior to the intervention and 7 months after the
intervention. Furthermore, the number of narcotics calls
also decreased, in most of the experimental hot spots
areas and the displacement of narcotics calls
surrounding the hot spots was minimal (Weisburd & Green,
1995).

Overall, this study suggests the importance of
implementing a proactive approach in dealing with
specific types of crime in specific places at specific
times. Thus, the police need to employ different tactics
in dealing with different types of crime – by using a
proactive approach.

Kansas City Gun Experiment

In 1991, Sherman, Shaw, & Rogan (1995), in collaboration
with the Kansas City Police Department, in Missouri,
conducted an experiment in an effort to determine the
effectiveness of a police program that was aimed at
reduce gun-related crimes and improve citizens’
satisfaction with the police, as well as reducing the
fear of crime. The main goal of this police experiment
was to seize as many illegal firearms as possible. The
second goal of this study was based on the idea that if
the police remove guns off the street, then there would
be fewer gun-related crimes. One of the main objectives
of this police experiment was to reduce the number of
gun-related crime from 20 times higher than national
average (at the time when the experiment started) down
to normal by the end of this experiment (a twenty-nine
weeks later). The second outcome objective of this study
was aimed to find out whether greater enforcement of
existing laws against carrying concealed weapons via
safety frisks, during traffic stops, plain view, etc.
would reduce gun-related crimes (Sherman, et al., 1995;
Braga, 2001).

Methodologically, this was a quasi-experimental design
with the non-equivalent control group. However, the
target beat matched the control beat with nearly
identical level of drive-by shooting but they were not
matched on other characteristics. The target beat was
chosen on an 80-by-10 block area in Kansas City. Both
the target beat and the control beat were considered as
“hot spots” where the concentration of crime was high.
In this experiment, the hot spot locations were
“identified by a University of Maryland computer
analysis of all crimes in the area” (National Institute
of Justice, 1995, p. 4). The duration of the experiment
was 29 weeks. During this time, the police made
intensive patrols in the targeted beat aimed at seizing
as many guns as possible.

The findings of this experimental study indicated that
during the extra patrol period, gun crime decreased
significantly in the target beat and just slightly
increased in the control beat (Sherman & Rogan, 1995).
Moreover, the target area showed a significant decrease
of both drive-by shootings and homicides during this
extra patrol period. On the other hand, there were no
significant changes in drive-by shootings and homicides
in the control beat and the target’s neighboring beats.
Furthermore, neither the target nor the control areas
showed any significant changes in non-gun-related
offenses (Sherman, Shaw, & Rogan, 1995; National
Institute of Justice, 1995; Braga, 2001; Braga, 2006).
Additionally, an improvement of citizens’ satisfaction
with the police was also shown when measured before and
after the intervention during the 29 week-experiment
(Shaw, 1995).

Based on the findings of this study, the outcome
objectives were partially met. One outcome objective was
to reduce gun-related crimes. The findings show that
this objective was met. Evidently, the number of gun
crimes (per 1,000 persons) in the target beat decreased
from 37% to 18.9%, at the same time, the number of guns
seized (per 1,000 persons) increased from 9.9% to 16.8%
in the target beat. Comparatively, the number of gun
crimes (per 1,000 persons) in the comparison beat went
up by 1%, while the number of guns seized (per 1,000
persons) went down from 10.4% to 8.8% (see Exhibit 1, p.
1 in National Institute of Justice, 1995).

The tactics that were used to seize the guns were meant
to satisfy the second outcome objective. That is,
through enforcement of existing laws against carrying
concealed illegal weapons (by implementing specific
police tactics) the police would be able to seize guns
and thus reduce the number of gun-related crimes. This
outcome objective was partially achieved. The data shows
that the police seized illegal guns, but not all police
tactics proved to be effective in maximizing the number
of guns seized. For instance, door-to-door gun patrols
did not prove to be effective. Also police special
training in the body language was thought to enhance
police ability to recognize persons who might be
carrying weapons. But it did not help increase the
number of guns seized, so as such it was unsuccessful
(National Institute of Justice, 1995; Sherman & Rogan,
1995). On the other hand, traffic stops (listed as one
of the means to achieve the second objective) showed to
be the most productive in finding illegal guns (National
Institute of Justice, 1995).

Overall, this study suggests that a small increase in
the number of guns seized can have a substantial impact
on the percentage of gun crimes. An important secondary
conclusion is that the “police can increase the numbers
of guns seized in high gun crime areas at relatively
modest cost” (National Institute of Justice, 1995, p.
9). However, since this experiment was designed to test
the hypothesis that gun seizures and gun-related crime
are inversely related, it could not eliminate all
alternative explanations of the results (a lot of
intervening variables) and could therefore not prove
that an increase of gun seizures results in reduced gun
crime. Thus, regardless of the positive results, the
conclusions are questionable.

Pittsburgh Firearm Suppression Patrol Program

In 1998, the Police Department in the City of Pittsburg,
Pennsylvania, launched the Firearm Suppression Patrol (FSP)
program. The purpose of this program was to confiscate
as many firearms as possible through directed patrol
effort. This program was intended to be implemented in
selected high-crime areas in the City of Pittsburgh. The
unique aspect of this program was that the police
patrols were launched on some days of the week
(Wednesday through Sunday) and not on the others. The
major question this program was designed to answer was:
How can the police prevent young men from shooting one
another? The assumed answer to this question was that
if the police increases the risks of carrying guns
illegally, then it would have a deterrent effect on
future firearm crimes. In other words, the goal of this
program was to deter high-risk people from carrying or
misusing guns in public places through targeted patrols
(to proactively searching for illegally carried guns).
This experimental study attempted to evaluate the
effectiveness of the FSP program. The research question
that this experimental study sought to answer was: How
effective is the Firearm Suppression Patrol program in
preventing the misuse of firearms by young people?
(Cohen & Ludwig, 2003). The Pittsburgh program was
constructed to proactively confiscate illegal firearms,
and it was also constructed with the concern of not
violating individuals’ rights while maintaining the
police-community relationship. Special attention was
given to the guidelines issued to the police about
pat-down safety frisks as they were searching for
illegal firearms.

Methodologically, this was a quasi-experimental design
with a treatment and a non-equivalent control group. The
treatment group included the areas that the program was
implemented in, and the control area included areas of
the city that the authors could use to compare the
trends in crime rates between the treatment and control
areas (before and after the police patrols were
launched). The comparison was focused on gun misuse
during the on-days (Wednesday through Sunday) in the
treatment and the control areas. The data on “shots
fired” for this study was obtained from Pittsburgh’s 911
Emergency Operation Center. This data allowed the
researchers to determine whether the incidents occurred
in the treatment zone or the control zone. And the
outcome measure was strictly focused on measures that
captured illegal carrying and criminal misuse of
firearms in the City of Pittsburgh. The duration of this
quasi-experiment was six weeks long (Cohen & Ludwig,
2003). The effectiveness of the FSP program was done
based on the analysis of the data (comparison of the
trends in crime rates) that were collected during the
six weeks of the treatment and fourteen weeks of
post-treatment.

The findings of this study indicated that the gun
assault injuries declined significantly in treatment
zone. Furthermore, the findings of this study showed
that targeted policing program against carrying illegal
firearms, according to the authors, “may have reduced
shots fired by 34 percent and gunshots injuries
[hospital-treated assault gunshot injuries] by as much
as 71 percent in the targeted areas” (Cohen & Ludwig,
2003, p. 238).

Overall, this study suggests that targeted policing
program (proactively searching for illegally carried
guns) appears to be effective in reducing/discouraging
illegal gun carrying in public places and thus reduces
gun injuries. If properly implemented (and if the
resources are available), programs such as FSP have a
deterrent affect on crime and criminal behavior and
therefore they work.

Washington D. C. Repeat Offender Project

In 1982, the Metropolitan Police Department of
Washington, D. C. created a Repeat Offender Project (ROP)
aimed at increasing the rate of apprehending repeat
offenders. The purpose of this project was to
proactively identify repeat offenders. To test the
effectiveness of ROP project (whether ROP increased the
likelihood of arrest for targeted repeat offenders), the
Metropolitan Police Department of Washington, D. C.
launched a field quasi-experimental study. This
experimental study focused on three fundamental
questions: (1) How did assignment to ROP affect the
officers’ arrest productivity? (2) Did the offenders
that were arrested by ROP have longer and more serious
criminal histories? And (3) Were ROP officers’ arrestees
more likely to be prosecuted, convicted and incarcerated
than offenders arrested under routine police operations?
The theoretical justification of this experimental study
was based on the fact that “a small proportion of
criminals commit a disproportionate number of crimes”
(Martin & Sherman, 1986, p. 7); thus, it is necessary
for the criminal justice system to focus its resources
on the most active and dangerous chronic offenders. By
adopting a proactive targeting approach to apprehend
repeat offenders, the system would take away the
capacity of repeated offenders to commit further/future
crimes. This is consistent with the incapacitation
theory (Martin & Sherman, 1986).

Methodologically, this was a quasi-experiment with a
nonequivalent control group. The control group (which
included several groups of police officers) was used to
compare the number and seriousness of the arrests made
by the ROP group (the experimental group or the
proactive group of police officers). The criterion for
selecting targets (repeat offenders) was to arrest
persons who were believed to have committed five or more
Part I offenses per week. The sample size in this
experimental study was about 500 sworn officers. They
were randomly assigned to the experimental group and the
control group. Additionally, there were two types of
offenders they were looking for. They were categorized
as “warrant targets” (those who already been wanted by
the police) and ROP-initiated targets. These two
categories then were randomly assigned (by coin toss) to
experimental group and control group, to be
investigated. However, since this criterion was
difficult to be met, it was left up to the ROP officers
to determine target selection. The repeat offenders were
mostly identified by undercover work. The duration of
the experimental study was two years. During this time,
there were 212 pairs of randomly assigned targets
investigated (Martin, 1986; Martin & Sherman, 1986).

The findings of this study showed that Repeat Offender
Project was effective in partially accomplishing its
goal. Thus, ROP substantially increased the likelihood
of arrest of the persons it targeted – repeat offenders
(or career/chronic criminals). Those offenders who were
arrested by ROP officers had longer and more serious
prior arrests histories than a sample of those arrested
by other non-ROP officers. ROP officers did not,
however, make as many arrests as non-ROP officers, but
arrests made by ROP officers included more serious
repeat offenders (Martin, 1986; Martin & Sherman, 1986).
After all, their focus was on making quality arrests;
that means, only arresting those chronic offenders.

Overall, this study suggests that larger police
departments, if not all police departments, would
benefit from proactive repeat offender units such as ROP.
Since the results show that ROP increased the likelihood
of arrest of targeted repeat offenders, the program is
considered as promising in preventing crime. However,
proactive police interventions – programs such as ROP –
should address specific local problems while considering
the departmental resource.

Richmond Second Response Program

In 1998, the Police Department in Richmond, Virginia, in
collaboration with Police Foundation, conducted a
quasi-experimental study attempting to test the
effectiveness of The Second Responder Program (SRP).
Specifically, this experimental study evaluated whether
the program actually reduced domestic victimization. The
purpose of this SRP program was to educate or encourage
victims of domestic violence to seek help when needed.
The program itself was in principal a partnership
between the Richmond Police department and the
Department of Social Services. In essence, this was a
victim re-contact program, thought to be a proactive
approach involving the police and social services in
reducing domestic violence. This victim re-contact
strategy that SRP ran was an attempt to reduce fear of
repeat-crimes following victimization (Greenspan,
Weisburd, Lane, Ready, Crossen-Powell, & Booth, 2005).

Methodologically, this was a quasi-experimental design
with non-equivalent control group. Of the four
precincts, two of them were assigned to the treatment
group and the remaining two precincts were assigned to
the control group. According to the police records, the
difference between the treatment groups and the control
groups was not statistically significant. “The
evaluation of the SRP program was based on two waves of
interviews” (Greenspan, Weisburd, Lane, Ready, Crossen-Powell,
& Booth, 2005). The first-wave interviews were conducted
within five days of the domestic violence incident; and
the second-wave interviews were conducted after six
months elapsed from the first domestic violence incident
(after the first police intervention) (Greenspan et al.,
2005).

The findings of this experimental study showed that the
victims of domestic violence reported more positive
attitudes toward the police and strongly recommended
(79%) SRP intervention in their own situation. Only 12%
of the victims expressed their dissatisfaction with the
program. As mentioned earlier, the goal of SRP was not
only to change women’s perceptions about the police
service but also to prevent re-victimization.
Consequently, the subjects in the experimental group
reported that they experienced less abuse than the
subjects in the control group during the six months
after the first intervention. (Greenspan, Weisburd,
Lane, Ready, Crossen-Powell, & Booth, 2005). However, to
determine whether this type of program works or doesn’t
work, the authors suggested that more research is
needed.

Overall, this study suggests that the police
performance is better when social workers are present
and that women who receive an immediate social service
response at the time of the incident may experience less
chances of repeated violence.

Redlands Second Response Program

In 2007, following the Richmond’s experimental study,
the Police Foundation sponsored another randomized
experimental study to further test the effectiveness of
The Second Response Program (SRP). The study, at this
time, took place in Redlands, California. As mentioned
earlier, the purpose of this program was to educate
victims of domestic violence about the options they had
when faced with domestic violence and to connect them
with counseling, relocation, civil legal assistance, and
other services that can help them reduce their
dependency on the abusers. Additionally, the second
response officers offered practical assistance by
working with the victims of domestic violence to develop
safety plans (Davis, Weisburd, & Hamilton, 2007).

Methodologically, the study was a randomized
experimental design, with the experimental and control
group. The units of analysis were the households who
reported domestic incidents. Thus, the police
intervention in this program was focused on the type of
offense (domestic incidents). Furthermore, there were
three experimental conditions to which the households
were randomly assigned to: (1) second responders were
dispatched to the crime scene within twenty-four hours;
(2) second responders visited victims’ homes one week
after the call for service; and (3) no second response
occurred (the control group) (Davis, Weisburd, &
Hamilton, 2007).

The findings of this study indicated that the one-day
response (second responders that were dispatched to the
crime scene within twenty-four hours) generated more new
incidents (about 32 percent more) compared to the
seven-day response group (about 23 percent). In other
words, the two second response groups combined together
(one day and after seven days) generated more new
incidents (28 percent) compared to the control group (24
percent). Based on this fact alone, it can be seen that
The Second Response Program (SRP) is ineffective in
preventing domestic violence, despite the fact that the
results were not statistically significant. The only
positive outcome of this study, in favor of SRP, is the
fact that “victims in the second response group
[contacts made with the victims after seven days] were
somewhat more likely to report having seen the abuser
since the original incident” (Davis, Weisburd, &
Hamilton, 2007, p. 6). In other words, the reporting
behavior towards the police increased.

Overall, this study suggests that there is no evidence
(statistically significant evidence) that the
intervention offered by SRP helps reduce domestic
victimization. In fact, the evidence this study produced
suggests that “the intervention increased abusive
incidents” (Davis, Weisburd, & Hamilton, 2007, p. 7).
The findings of Redlands’s experimental study produced
some contradicting evidence about the effectiveness of
SRP compared to that of Richmond’s study discussed
above.

Results
– Comparative Analysis

Table 1 below summarizes eight research studies used to
determine the effectiveness of the three dimensions of
targeted policing; namely, place-specific,
offender-specific, and offense-specific. There were four
place-specific studies (Kansas City Gun Experiment,
Jersey City Drug Market Analysis Program, Minneapolis
Hot Spots Policing Program, and Pittsburgh Firearms
Suppression Program with SMS scores level 3 and above)
that showed the effectiveness of police tactics and
strategies in dealing with place-specific crimes. One
experimental study, included in this paper (Repeat
Offender Project, SMS level 4), tested offender-based
police tactics. The results of this study showed that
these types of police tactics are “promising;” but more
studies needed to conclude that they are effective. And
lastly, two studies included in this paper were
offense-based, with focus on domestic victimization
(Second Response Programs, SMS level 3 and level 5).
This review shows that SRP strategies produced mixed
results.

The effectiveness of targeted policing, as a proactive
policing approach, according to the findings of the
eight research studies included in this paper, is
confirmed. That is, based on the aggregate results of
these eight research studies and the SMS scores that
each one of these studies received, we can conclude that
there is enough empirical evidence to identify targeted
policing among other crime prevention tactics as
“working.” Furthermore, based on the aggregate results
(see Table 1), it is evident and perhaps reasonable to
suggest that the government has good reasons to continue
implementing targeted policing programs because as
strategies and yet as a set of on-going proactive
tactics, targeted policing can reduce crime and it has a
positive impact on citizens’ feeling of safety.

Table 1.
Experimental Studies that Have Evaluated Targeted
Policing

Study

Place

Duration of the Study

Research Question(s)

SMS Score

Major Findings

Kelling et al., (1974)

Sherman, Shaw, & Rogan, (1995)

Weisburd & Green, (1995)

Sherman & Weisburd. (1995)

Kansas City

Kansas City

Jersey City

Minneapolis

1 year

29 weeks

15 months

12 months

Is preventive patrol effective? What
effects has police visibility on residents’ feelings
of safety?

Does removing guns off the streets
reduce gun-related crimes?

Does a proactive police approach
work better in dealing with drug-related crimes?

Victims reported more positive
attitudes toward the police. Positive results but
more research needed.

The Second Response Program was
ineffective in reducing domestic victimization.

Discussion and Conclusion

In this paper, eight experimental studies have been
evaluated to understand the effectiveness of targeted
policing. Essentially, in this paper the researcher has
included studies that have evaluated three dimensions of
targeted policing as a proactive crime prevention
approach; namely, place-specific, offender-specific, and
offense specific. All studies that have been included
for review in this paper have something in common; they
attempt to answer one question: Does proactive crime
prevention approaches such as place-specific,
offense-specific and offender specific reduce crime?

Of the eight experimental studies evaluated in this
comparative study, three of them focused on proactive
police patrols in crime-prone areas. That is, this crime
prevention strategy operates under the assumptions that
police visibility and frequency of police patrols in
high-crime areas (hot spots) will intercept the crime
triangle (as explained by routine activities theory) and
as such it will have a positive effect in reducing crime
rates. Two studies evaluated police effectiveness in
preventing crime by removing guns off the streets. The
general idea of this proactive police approach (in
dealing with firearm-related crimes) was that by
confiscating illegal guns through intensive police
patrol, the police will increase the risk of carrying
guns illegally; thus, discouraging those offenders who
might potentially carry guns illegally. Hence, is the
offenders do not possess firearms, no crime would occur,
or no crimes that involve the use or misuse of firearms
would occur (as explained by incapacitation and rational
choice theories). Two other studies included in this
review dealt with police proactive intervention in
reducing domestic victimization. The main purpose of
this crime prevention tactic was (through a proactive
intervention) to reduce the fear of crime and increase
citizens’ satisfaction with the police, making them more
inclined to come forward and report crimes to the
police. One study evaluated a proactive police strategy
that was aimed at proactively identifying repeat
offenders. As mentioned earlier, similarly to the crime
places, a small number of offenders commit a
disproportionate number of crimes; thus, by proactively
identifying and arresting them, there would be a
decrease in crime rates (as explained by incapacitation
theory).

The aggregate results of these eight studies suggest
that targeted policing becomes more effective when it is
implemented using: (1) crime analysis to identify
hot-crime areas or “hot spots;” and high-risk offenders
(repeat offenders); and (2) by clearly defining
intervention strategies that target specific offenses
and specific offenders at specific locations at specific
times. Based on the SMS rating score for each study (see
Table 1), it appears that we have sufficient evidence to
conclude that targeted policing as a proactive crime
prevention approach works. As a set of proactive police
tactics and strategies, targeted policing meets the
criteria defined by the researchers who developed the
evaluation scale (SMS) to evaluate what works, what
doesn’t work, and what’s promising. In fact, we have
more than two level three studies that support this
conclusion. Furthermore, based on the aggregate results
of these eight experimental studies (included in this
paper), it is reasonable to recommend, and in fact,
embrace targeted policing as a successful crime fighting
strategy and it should be replicated nationwide because
it is a form of cost-effective policing that works and
that is empirically supported. Crime prevention
strategies that are evidence-based are rational hence
they suggest using available police resources wisely.
Additionally, those police agencies that implement
targeted policing – an evidence-based police practice –
should continuously evaluate police tactics and
strategies for their effectiveness (i.e., what works and
what doesn’t work), and by eliminating those that do not
work, the police resources can be allocated to maintain
or increase the use of police strategies that work or
develop new police tactics and strategies.