After a month has passed since the opposition in Lebanon began its protests,
any objective observer can put forth a number of observations.

First, the opposition's success in setting off a large-scale mobilization of the
masses while keeping it strictly peaceful should be noted, because no violence
against public or private property has taken place during the last month. It is
no secret that this was due to the ability of Hezbollah, the backbone of the
current mobilization of the masses, to control its supporters and prevent
emotion from turning into street confrontation, despite the provocative
rhetoric.

Further observation would suggest that the mobilization has not lost impetus, in
the sense that the opposition is still capable of repeating the scene of mass
demonstrations, capitalizing on the wide public appeal of Hezbollah among its
sect, as well as the Party's long past experience in organizing massive street
action that is undisputedly controlled and disciplined.

This does not negate the participation of other sides in the action,
particularly the Michel Aoun movement. However, consistent tracking of the
events of the past month would reveal that Hezbollah's masses are the actual
center of this public action, and that it is Hezbollah's agenda that is
governing and controlling the drive.

Furthermore, after a month of mass mobilization, unbiased observers will be able
to conclude that the opposition still maintains the same strength it displayed
at the beginning of the protests, and that it has succeeded in attracting
citizens from outside its original camp.

At the same time, it is also clear that the other camp is now stronger than it
was when the protests broke out, as the march of the masses to the presidential
palace, which was accompanied by threats to storm it, led to an unprecedented
fueling of sentiments, and generated an equally unprecedented show of support
for Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora among his own ranks, in addition to
his followers' base from within the ranks of the March 14 Forces.

The same applies to MP Saad Hariri, who experienced a surge in popularity among
the ranks of the March 14 Forces.

As the opposition enters its second month of protests and sit-ins, opposition
leaders must be aware of the significant and extensive deterioration witnessed
during the past month in the Sunni-Shiite relations, which has not been seen
since the independence of Lebanon.

Accordingly, it would be wise to assume that it is no longer possible for the
opposition to clash with PM Siniora without also clashing with his sect,
especially when taking into account that the opposition's rejection of street
action that aimed at overthrowing President Emile Lahoud, and even threatened to
take action against any attempts of that sort.

Therefore, when it convenes to approve the plans for the next stage of its
action, the opposition will have no choice but to direct its attention to new
elements, as the first month of protests led to an impression by Arab and
international capitals that equates any victory by the Lebanese opposition with
the success of the large-scale offensive waged by Iran in the region.

This impression was also among the key factors that consolidated the standing of
the Siniora government on the Arab and international levels.

The opposition would also be better off taking into consideration the fact that
the savage, vindictive execution of Saddam Hussein has added fuel to the fire of
sectarian strife in the region, and has further heated the debate regarding the
looming 'Iranian threat'.

The opposition in Lebanon is anything but marginal; it is a force that stands to
represent half, or a little less than half, of the nation. Therefore, it would
be fair to expect from it a rational review of lessons resulting from its action
over the past month, as it, too, has a responsibility toward the nation and its
stability, and toward protecting the nation from the storms of sectarian feuds,
even if the price is in the form of lowering demands or accepting compromises it
previously rejected.

At the same time, no one can claim the right of keeping the nation under the
threat of sectarian sedition or civil war, or of pushing the nation toward the
brink of total collapse, just because peaceful means have failed to topple PM
Siniora.

Just as the government is expected to exert serious effort to open the door to
the possibility of reaching resolutions and settlements, the opposition is also
required to review the local and domestic scene before taking any escalatory
steps.

Any reasonable and acceptable settlement remains a far better choice than
keeping Lebanon hanging in a region that faces a bleak future.