regarding
law enforcement interaction with the Branch Davidians in Waco,
Texas

submitted
by Nancy T. Ammerman

September
3, 1993

The
following report and recommendations are based largely on oral
briefings conducted on July 1-2 at the Justice Department, as well
as on August 3 at the Treasury Department and at the FBI Training
Academy at Quantico. In addition, I have had access to a number of
other sources. We were supplied with background information on
many of the persons in the Investigative Support Unit, and I was
supplied with a list of the experts consulted by the FBI during
the affair. I have consulted with academic colleagues and have
reviewed a good deal of the academic literature on New Religious
Movements. Various political and lobbying groups have sent me
information. I talked with Glenn Hilburn at Baylor, and I spent
two hours with Pete Smerick and Gregg McCrary at the FBI Academy.

I do not
pretend that this represents a full accounting of what happened at
Waco. That has not been my aim. Rather, what follows attempts to
assess the nature and quality of the expert advice available to
the agencies involved in this situation and to make some
suggestions about how that advice might better be utilized in the
future.

I. What
information sources were available in the Waco affair?

A. The
Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms. In the months that led
up to the February 28 attempted "dynamic entry" at the
Branch Davidian compound, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms (BATF) apparently failed to solicit any social science
background information about the nature of the group with which
they were dealing. BATF has no internal behavioral science
division and did not consult with any other behavioral science
persons within the government. Nor did they consult with outside
persons in religious studies, sociology of religion, or psychology
of religion. There were, for instance, persons in the Baylor
University Department of Religion who had studied this particular
group for much of its history; they were not consulted.
Investigators reviewing the Waco incident have repeatedly told us
that BATF simply did not consult with anyone who might be
considered an "expert" on this group or groups like it.

In their
attempt to build a case against the Branch Davidians, BATF did
interview persons who were former members of the group and at
least one person who had "deprogrammed" a group member.
Mr. Rick Ross, who often works in conjunction with the Cult
Awareness Network (CAN), has been quoted as saying that he was
"consulted" by the BATF. My suspicion is that he was
merely one among many the BATF interviewed in its background
checks on the group and on Koresh. However, it is unclear how
information gained from him was evaluated. The Network and Mr.
Ross have a direct ideological (and financial) interest in
arousing suspicion and antagonism against what they call "cults".
These same persons seem to have been major sources for the series
of stories run by the Waco newspaper, beginning February 27. It
seems clear that people within the "anti-cult" community
had targeted the Branch Davidians for attention.

Although
these people often call themselves "cult experts," they
are certainly not recognized as such by the academic community.
The activities of the CAN are seen by the National Council of
Churches (among others) as a danger to religious liberty, and
deprogramming tactics have been increasingly found to fall outside
the law. At the very least, Mr. Ross and any ex-members he was
associated with should have been seen as questionable sources of
information. Having no access to information from the larger
social science community, however, BATF had no way to put in
perspective what they may have heard from angry ex-members and
eager deprogrammers.

B. The
Federal Bureau of Investigation.

1.
Outside consultants. After the failed raid, handling of the
crisis passed to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). They
had a much broader array of information available, although they
still failed to consult a single person who might be recognized by
the social science community as an expert on the Branch Davidians
or on other marginal religious movements (sometimes called
"cults"). The official list of outside experts
consulted, compiled by the investigative team, includes three
persons in the field of psychiatry who have been regular
consultants to the FBI on other cases (Murray Myron, Syracuse
University; Joseph Krofcheck, Yarrow Associates; Park Dietz,
University of California San Diego). From my conversations with
the persons in the National Center for the Analysis of Violent
Crime (NCAVC) who worked with the negotiators at Waco, I believe
that these three persons were the most frequently consulted
experts throughout the siege. Dietz assisted in writing the
profile of Koresh. Others apparently assisted in recommending
strategies to the negotiators and tacticians.

It is
unclear which of these consultants (if any) recommended the
psychological warfare tactics (Tibetan chants, sounds of rabbits
dying, rock music, flood lights, helicopters hovering, etc.). None
of the persons associated with NCAVC with whom I have talked
claims to have favored these tactics, but no one was willing to
say who recommended them or how the decision was made to use them.

Three other
persons were apparently called in for specific, limited,
consultations. Because he was examining the children who were
leaving the compound, Bruce Perry, a Baylor Medical School
psychiatrist, was consulted. A pastor in Virginia (Douglas
Kittredge) was consulted on one occasion, offering assistance in
interpreting the scriptural references being used by Koresh. And
CBN talk show host Craig Smith was consulted regarding the airing
of the Koresh tape.

Finally,
one person in religious studies was consulted by the Bureau--Glenn
Hilburn, chair of the Religion Department at Baylor. He was
contacted about one week after the initial raid and was asked
especially for help in interpreting Koresh's ideas about the
"seven seals." He offered the negotiators basic tools
for interpreting scripture (a set of commentaries and
concordances) and consulted with them on a number of occasions
about various biblical interpretations. While Hilburn is a
reputable scholar in church history, he would never claim to be an
expert on the Davidians or on other marginal religious movements.
He often offered to help the Bureau get in touch with others who
might offer such expertise, but he was not asked to do so. For
instance, Prof. Bill Pitts, also of the Baylor faculty, had
studied the history of the Davidians, but was not consulted by the
FBI. Nor did they seek Prof. Hilburn's help in locating others,
outside the Baylor faculty, who might help.

In my
judgment, this list of outside consultants is sorely wanting. The
psychiatrists who were most intimately involved are undoubtedly
experienced in helping the FBI understand "the criminal
mind." This however, was a very different situation, and we
have no evidence that any of these men had background or
experience in dealing with a high-commitment religious group. The
only experts in religion that were consulted lacked the kinds of
expertise necessary for understanding the dynamics of a marginal
religious movement.

One of the
dilemmas faced by the Waco negotiators was the problem of
assessing the potential helpfulness of outside experts. Agents on
the scene in Waco described their situation as information
overload. One person referred to the threat of "fax
meltdown." Not only were they receiving constant information
about the situation as it unfolded, they were also being bombarded
with offers of help from all sorts of unknown sources. Many of
these were judged to be "crack pots." Others were
probably legitimate and potentially helpful persons. However, the
persons on the scene had no way to evaluate this information. With
no one in the scholarly community at their disposal to help
evaluate the credentials and experience of these persons, they
were forced simply to discount everything they received.

Conclusions.
Since the BATF consulted no outside experts and the FBI consulted
only a limited roster, both agencies were then relying primarily
on their own internal capabilities. As we have seen, BATF has no
internal behavioral science personnel. As a result, all of their
planning was based on building up a legal case against the group
and planning a para-military type assault on the compound. In that
atmosphere, I believe, it became easy to lose sight of the human
dynamics of the group involved, to plan as if the group were
indeed a military target. It also discouraged the BATF from
seeking other forms of intervention in the group. Quite simply,
the agency pursued the line of action--armed assault--for which
they were best equipped. If they had been better equipped to
pursue interventions based on human science advice, they might
have acted differently.

2.
Internal advice. The FBI, on the other hand, did have solid
Behavioral Science advice available internally. The Behavioral
Science Services Unit, especially its Investigative Support Unit,
at the NCAVC, houses a number of people with considerable working
knowledge of marginal religious groups. For instance, Gregg
McCrary, in the Criminal Investigative Analysis subunit, is
well-informed in this area and was on the scene in Waco throughout
much of the siege. While no one there would be considered an
"expert" by the usual standards of scholarship (academic
credentials and publication, that is), several have done
sufficient reading to have a good basic knowledge of the nature of
religious groups. They know that religious beliefs have to be
taken seriously, and they know that it takes more than
understanding an individual personality to understand the dynamics
of a group. They could benefit from additional training and from
access to reliable outside experts (about which I will say more
below), but they had the basic social science knowledge they
needed to analyze this situation.

In the
early days of the siege, Pete Smerick (along with outside
consultant Park Dietz) put together a profile of David Koresh and
of the group. They used materials gathered by the BATF, but knew
they should weigh carefully the reports from former members.

Based on
that assessment, Smerick (with Special Agent Mark Young) wrote on
March 5, in a memo to his superiors (the Special Agents in Charge
at Waco and people in headquarters in Washington),

...For
years he [Koresh] has been brainwashing his followers for this
battle [between his church and his enemies], and on February 28,
1993, his prophesy came true.

As
of March 5, 1993, Koresh is still able to convince his followers
that the end in near and, as he predicted, their enemies will
surround them and kill them.

In
traditional hostage situations, a strategy which has been
successful has been negotiations coupled with ever increasing
tactical presence. In this situation, however, it is believed this
strategy, if carried to excess, could eventually be counter
productive and could result in loss of life.

Every
time his followers sense movement of tactical personnel, Koresh
validates his prophetic warnings that an attack is forthcoming and
they are going to have to defend themselves. According to his
teachings, if they die defending their faith, they will be saved.

On March 7,
Smerick and Young listed the psychological warfare tactics
available to the FBI, but cautioned that these options "would
also succeed in shutting down negotiations and convince Koresh and
his followers that the end is near." On March 8, the same
pair cautioned that the Mt. Carmel compound was for the Davidians
sacred ground, something they were likely to defend against the
intrusions of people they considered evil (the federal
government). Summarizing the arguments of people using primarily
"criminal" or psychological categories to explain
Koresh, they wrote,

It
has been speculated that Koresh's religious beliefs are nothing
more than a con, in order to get power, money, women, etc., and
that a strong show of force (tanks, APC's, weapons, etc.) will
crumble that resolve, causing him to surrender. In fact, the
opposite very well may also occur, whereby the presence of that
show of force will draw David Koresh and his followers closer
together in the "bunker mentality", and they would
rather die than surrender.

They go on
to detail the way in which FBI actions are playing into the
prophetic scheme of Koresh, warning that "we may
unintentionally make his prophesy [death, or the "fourth
seal"] come true, if we take what he perceives to be hostile
or aggressive action." They note that "mass suicide
ordered by Koresh cannot be discounted." Then, following
their logic through to its conclusion, they point out that "one
way to take control away from him is to do the opposite of what he
is expecting. Instead of moving towards him, we consider moving
back. This may appear to be appeasement to his wishes, but in
reality, it is taking power away from him. He has told his
followers that an attack is imminent, and this will show them that
he was wrong."

It is my
belief that this understanding of Koresh's ideas was basically
accurate and that their assessment of his likely behavior was on
target. While outside experts might have refined this picture and
added nuance to the assessment, the basic direction of the FBI's
own behavioral analysts was sound.

II. How
was behavioral science advice utilized in Waco?

Clearly the
advice of these agents was not heeded. Why? The answer to that
question takes us first to the structure of command and second to
the culture and training of the Bureau itself.

Most
basically, people representing the Behavioral Sciences Unit were
out-ranked and out-numbered. Within the command structure, people
from the Hostage Rescue Team carried more weight than people who
were negotiators. In addition, it is evident that people from the
tactical side were simply trusted more and more at home with the
Special Agents in Charge (SACs) in Waco.

As I
understand it, the SACs for this operation were chosen on the
basis of proximity, not on the basis of any special training or
experience for an operation like this. Understandably, their
primary skills are in the apprehension of criminals and in the
management of personnel. Under normal circumstances, they can
count on key assistance in apprehension of criminals from their
SWAT teams and from Hostage Rescue Teams, and predictably they
listened most closely to people who spoke the language of forceful
tactics. This was the territory in which they were most
comfortable, possibly the direction in which they perceived the
most potential rewards. There was an understandable desire among
many agents in Waco to make Koresh and the Davidians pay for the
harm they had caused. Arguments for patience or unconventional
tactics fell on deaf ears.

Those ears
were deaf for a number of reasons, many of which have to do with
the training and culture of the Bureau. In all likelihood, these
SACs had had no behavioral science training since their very early
days training as agents. And then, they were very unlikely to have
heard anything about religious belief systems of group dynamics.
Their entire professional world has been constructed
(understandably) around understanding and out-maneuvering
criminals. They think (again, understandably) in terms of
individual behavior (hence the near exclusive focus on Koresh,
rather than on the group) and on criminal wrong-doing (hence the
label sociopath for someone seen as dangerously at odds with
society's norms). Little, if anything, in their previous
experience prepared them for the kind of situation Mt. Carmel
presented them.

The
tendency to discount the influence of religious beliefs and to
evaluate situations largely in terms of a leader's individual
criminal/psychological motives is, I believe, very widespread in
the Bureau. In our initial briefings with Daniels, Johnson,
Wright, Noesner, and Uteg, the consensus around the table was that
when they encountered people with religious beliefs, those beliefs
were usually a convenient cover for criminal activity. While they
were willing to consider that this case might have been different,
they were still not convinced that Koresh was anything other than
a sociopath who had duped some people into helping him carry out
aggressive criminal activity. They continued to refer to the
people in the compound as hostages, failing to recognize the free
choice those people had made in following Koresh.

Behavior
science advice, then, failed to get an adequate hearing. In the
culture of the law enforcement community, neither training nor
experience prepares agents for taking behavioral scientists
seriously. And in the crisis situation, behavioral scientists are
out-ranked and out-numbered. As a result, those in charge dealt
with this situation as if it were one more familiar to them--a
criminal committing illegal acts for personal gain for whom the
threat of force is a significant deterrent.

III.
What, in hindsight, should the BATF and the FBI have taken into
consideration in dealing with the Branch Davidians?

1. They
should have understood the pervasiveness of religious
experimentation in American history and the fundamental right of
groups like the Davidians to practice their religion. On that
score, they might have benefitted by reading Jon Butler's Awash
in a Sea of Faith: Christianizing the American People
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), in which he gives a
detailed portrait of the breadth of religious belief and practice
in early America. Catherine Albanese's America: Religion and
Religions (Wadsworth, 1992) does the same up through the
present. We have simply been a very religious people, and there
have always been new and dissident religious groups challenging
the boundaries of toleration.

And
alongside all that religious fervor and experimentation has been
our First Amendment guarantee of religious liberty. Only when
there is clear evidence of criminal wrong-doing can authorities
intervene in the free exercise of religion, and then only with
appropriately low levels of intrusiveness. For a critical look at
the regulatory issues raised by new and marginal religious groups,
an article by David Bromley and Thomas Robbins, "The Role of
Government in Regulating New and Nonconventional Religions"
(Pp. 205-241 in The Role of Government in Monitoring and
Regulating Religion in Public Life, edited by James Wood and
Derek Davis. Waco, Texas: Baylor University Press, 1992) might
have proven helpful to agents planning a raid on the Waco
compound.

2. They
should have understood that new or dissident religious groups are
often "millennialist" or "apocalyptic".
That is, they foresee the imminent end of the world as we know it
and the emergence of a new world, usually with themselves in
leadership roles. Among the many books and articles that would
have helped agents understand such beliefs are Paul Boyer's When
Time Shall Be No More: Prophecy Belief in Modern American Culture
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992); Susan J. Palmer and
Natalie Finn's 1992 article "Coping with Apocalypse in
Canada: Experiences of Endtime" (Sociological Analysis
53(4, winter):397-415); and Roy Wallis's edited book Millennialism
and Charisma. (Belfast: Queen's University, 1982), especially
the chapters by Balch and by Wallis.

3. They
should have understood that the usual fate of new religious
movements is quiet extinction through natural causes. Only a
fraction of those that begin survive as a group more than a few
years, and an even smaller fraction make it through the crisis
that is precipitated by the natural death of the leader. For
helpful background on factors in the success and failure of such
groups, I would suggest the articles by Stark and by Wilson in
David Bromley and Phillip Hammond's edited volume The Future of
New Religious Movements (Macon, Georgia: Mercer University
Press, 1987).

4. They
should also have understood that new groups almost always provoke
their neighbors. By definition, new religious groups think old
ways of doing things are at best obsolete, at worst evil. Their
very reason for existing is to call into question the status quo.
They defy conventional rules and question conventional
authorities. Not surprisingly, then, new groups often provoke
resistance. A number of social scientists have examined the
relationship between marginal religious groups and the surrounding
society. Among the most helpful are Charles Harper and Bryan F. Le
Beau's 1993 article, "The Social Adaptation of Marginal
Religious Movements in America." (Sociology of Religion
54(2, summer):171-192); James T. Richardson's 1993 article
"Definitions of Cult: From Sociological-Technical to
Popular-Negative" (Review of Religious Research 34(4,
June):348-356); and the book Richardson edited with Joel Best and
David G. Bromley, The Satanism Scare (New York: Aldine de
Gruyter, 1991). These sources help to put groups like the Cult
Awareness Network in context. Such groups are organized
"anti-cult" responses that make predictable charges
(such as child abuse and sexual "perversion") against
groups that are seen as threatening. It is important to see that
new religious groups are usually more threatening to cherished
notions about how we all ought to order our lives than to our
physical well-being.

The
corollary to their provocation of neighbors is that they
themselves are likely to perceive the outside world as hostile.
This almost always takes the form of rhetoric condemning the evil
ways of non-believers, and that rhetoric can sometimes sound quite
violent. It may also be supplemented by rituals that reinforce the
group's perception that they are surrounded by hostile forces
(thus reinforcing their own sense of solidarity and
righteousness). It is at least possible that rhetoric about
the BATF as the Davidians' arch-enemy, the purchase of guns, and
practicing with those guns served just such rhetorical and ritual
purposes. That is, as the group talked about the evils of the
federal government and went through the ritual motions of
rehearsing a confrontation with their enemies, they may have been
reinforcing their own solidarity more than they were practicing
for an anticipated actual confrontation. The irony, of course, is
that their internal group rhetoric and ritual did eventually come
true.

5. They
should also have understood that many new religious movements do
indeed ask for commitments that seem abnormal to most of us, and
those commitments do mean the disruption of "normal"
family and work lives. Most of us are accustomed to seeing
religion as relevant only to portions of our lives, with wide
areas of decision-making (from marriage partners to what we do at
work) kept neatly out of the reach of religious authorities.
However, throughout much of the world and throughout much of human
history, such neat divisions have not been the norm. People have
lived in tightly-knit communities in which work, family, religion,
politics, and leisure (what there was of it) fell under one
domain. Taking the long view, not belonging to such a
community is more abnormal than belonging to one. No matter how
strange such commitments may seem to the rest of us, they are
widely sought by millions of people. A number of social scientists
have written accounts of everyday life in such religious groups,
and those accounts can help readers to understand the sense of
coherence and belonging that outweigh, for the believers, any
freedom of choice they give up. One such recent book is David Van
Zandt's Living in the Children of God (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1991).

6. They
should also understand that the vast majority of those who make
such commitments do so voluntarily. The notion of "cult
brainwashing" has been thoroughly discredited in the academic
community, and "experts" who propagate such notions in
the courts have been discredited by the American Psychological
Association and the American Sociological Association. While there
may be real psychological needs that lead persons to seek such
groups, and while their judgment may indeed be altered by their
participation, neither of those facts constitutes coercion.

An review
of the legal issues surrounding allegations of brainwashing can be
found in James Richardson's 1991 article, "Cult/Brainwashing
cases and freedom of religion" (Journal of Church and
State 33:55-74). Alternative views on the process of joining
(and leaving) new religious movements can be found in David
Bromley and Anson Shupe's 1986 article, "Affiliation and
Disaffiliation: A Role Theory Interpretation of Joining and
Leaving New Religious Movements" (Thought 61:197-211);
Stuart Wright's Leaving Cults (Washington: Society for the
Scientific Study of Religion, 1987); and Eileen Barker's
award-winning 1984 book The Making of a Moonie: Choice or
Brainwashing? (Oxford: Blackwell).

7. They
should have understood the ability of a religious group to create
an alternative symbolic world. Ideas about "logic"
as we know it simply do not hold, but that does not mean that the
group has no logic. The first dictum of sociology is "Situations
perceived to be real are real in their consequences." No
matter how illogical or unreasonable the beliefs of a group seem
to an outsider, they are the real facts that describe the world
through the eyes of the insider.

8. The
agents should have understood that "charisma" is not
just an individual trait, but a property of the
constantly-evolving relationship between a leader and followers.
The leader is a prophet only so long as members believe him (or
her) to be so. And those beliefs are sustained by the constant
interplay between events and the leader's interpretation of them.
So long as the leader's interpretations make sense of the group's
experience, that leader is likely to be able to maintain
authority. These interpretations are not a fixed text, but a
living, changing body of ideas, rules, and practices. Meaning
emerges daily in the interaction of sacred texts (in this case the
Bible), events, and the imagination of leader and followers. Only
in subsequent generations are religious prescriptions likely to
become written orthodoxies.

Among the
sources that might have helped in understanding charisma is
Timothy Miller's edited book, When Prophets Die: The
Postcharismatic Fate of New Religious Movements (Albany: SUNY
Press, 1991). In his introductory essay in that volume, J. Gordon
Melton writes that the first generation of a new group is "a
time of experimentation and rapid change. The leader must discover
the right elements to combine in a workable program, generate
solutions to unexpected obstacles, choose and train capable
leaders, and elaborate upon the initial ideas or vision that
motivated the founding of the group....The group formally or
informally gives feedback in the form of approval or disapproval
of the leader's actions. The most successful leaders are
continually adjusting and reacting to that feedback" (p. 11).
Other essays in that book examine the relationship between groups
and their charismatic founders, from the Shakers to the Moonies.

Understanding
that the relationship between leaders, followers, and practices is
a fluid one might have led agents to take more seriously the
possibility of suggesting alternative apocalyptic interpretations
to Koresh. Such a strategy was suggested (and attempted) by
Houston theologian Phillip Arnold and University of North Carolina
professor James Tabor. In "The Waco Tragedy: An
Autobiographical Account of One Attempt to Avert Disaster"
(forthcoming in From the Ashes: Making Sense of Waco,
edited by James R. Lewis and published by Rowman and Littlefield),
Tabor writes that after considerable study of the interpretations
being offered by Koresh, they concluded that alternative
scenarios--still within his system of symbols--were
possible. They hoped that he might reinterpret the "little
season" of Revelation 6:11 as an extended period of time,
that he might see himself as the writer of the "little book"
mentioned in Revelation 10:11--and, most importantly, that he
might use those reinterpretations to ask for a delay while he
wrote down his insights about the seven seals. Koresh's response
to their radio broadcast and tape indicated that he indeed had
taken up this interpretive possibility and had begun to work on a
book. In a letter sent out on April 14, he said that "as soon
as I can see that people like Jim Tabor and Phil Arnold have a
copy, I will come out and then you can do your thing with this
beast." That he was indeed working on such a book is
demonstrated by the existence of a computer disk brought out by
one of the survivors who had been typing for him on the day before
the fire. Ironically, it was the actions of the FBI on April 19
that evidently forced Koresh to return to his earlier
interpretation of the texts--namely that the next event in the
unfolding prophetic calendar would be death for his group, rather
than a delay while he wrote his book.

8. And,
of course, as soon as the possibility of mass martyrdom became
evident, they should have reviewed the events of Jonestown.
There, too, an exceptionally volatile religious group was pushed
over the edge, inadvertently, by the actions of government
agencies pushed forward by "concerned families". The
best account of the Jonestown tragedy is John R. Hall's 1987 book,
Gone from the Promised Land: Jonestown in American Cultural
History (New Brunswick: Transaction). Also helpful is David
Chidester's 1988 account of the religious dynamics of the People's
Temple, Salvation and Suicide: An Interpretation of Jim Jones,
the Peoples Temple and Jonestown. (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana
University Press).

9.
Finally, they should have understood that any group under siege is
likely to turn inward, bonding to each other and to their leader
even more strongly than before. Outside pressure only
consolidates the group's view that outsiders are the enemy. And
isolation decreases the availability of information that might
counter their internal view of the world. In this case, the
federal government already enjoyed a particularly condemned place
in the group's worldview. Taking that fact seriously might have
changed the minds of federal agents who argued that using outside
negotiators is always a mistake. Persons other than federal agents
might have been able to assume a genuine third-party position in
this case, translating and mediating between Koresh and the
outside world. It is ironic to note that the one similar situation
the FBI could point us to, in which they successfully negotiated a
peaceful surrender, involved the use of an outside negotiator.

In this
case, federal negotiators had a difficult time convincing Koresh
to take them seriously. But even when they did, their talking
strategies were constantly undermined by the actions of the
tactical teams. Any success negotiators had in winning the group's
confidence was completely undermined by continuing application of
tactical pressure. If such pressure had been a specific response
to a specific failure of Koresh to respond to negotiating
proposals, it might have had some coherent psychological effect.
However, such was never the case. Pressure from encroaching tanks,
psychological warfare tactics, and the like, continually worked at
cross-purposes with the negotiating strategies. This outside
pressure only increased the paranoia of the group and further
convinced them that the only person they could trust was Koresh.

IV. What
outside experts might they have consulted?

I am
attaching to this report a copy of a letter from the Society for
the Scientific Study of Religion which includes several names and
addresses of people recognized by that academic organization as
experts on new, marginal, and high-commitment religious groups. I
am also including in that appendix several additional names of
persons whose research I have found helpful.

In
addition, to help in locating experts and in evaluating the
credentials of volunteer "experts", law enforcement
agencies can turn to the American Sociological Association, the
American Psychological Association, the American Psychiatric
Association, the Association for the Sociology of Religion, or the
Society for the Scientific Study of Religion.

V.
Conclusions. Knowing these things might not have changed the
outcome in Waco. It is unclear to me whether any negotiating
strategy could have succeeded in getting most or all of the
members to leave the compound. However, paying attention to these
basic facts about the nature of religious groups would at least
have enabled federal agents to have a clearer picture of the
situation they were in. They were not in a hostage rescue
situation. They were in a tragic stand-off with a group for whom
they were already the enemy foretold to destroy them.VI.
Recommendations. In order for this sort of thinking to become
available in future situations, several modes of access seem
important.

1. Basic
training. The training for all agents should include units in
the behavioral sciences and units that give attention to the
nature of political and religious groups. These units should
emphasize both the rights of such groups to exist unhindered and
the characteristics of high-commitment groups that may be relevant
to future efforts at law enforcement. Such units should be aimed
not so much as making every agent an expert as at sensitizing
agents to the complex human dimensions of the situations in which
they may find themselves. When they hear behavioral scientists
advising them later, it will not be the first time they have heard
such voices in the law enforcement community.

2.
Advanced training. Incidents like Waco are, fortunately,
relatively rare. Not everyone in federal law enforcement needs to
be an expert on such situations. However, it appears that there is
a need for a standing group of specialists in managing this sort
of crisis. Rather than turning to whoever happens to be the local
SAC, the FBI (and similar federal agencies) should have a small
corps of crisis managers available. These persons should have
received advanced training both in the various tactical measures
at their disposal and in the insights available to them from the
behavioral sciences.

3.
Training and expertise for other federal agencies. An expanded
Behavioral Sciences unit, perhaps not lodged in a single agency,
might make a broader pool of behavioral science information
available on a regular basis to all federal law enforcement
agencies. I was particularly struck by the fact that ATF has no
such unit. No one ever had the responsibility of imagining what
the people in the compound were like, how they might be thinking,
etc. With dozens of federal law enforcement agencies, it would not
be cost effective to set up behavioral science units in each one,
but all of them need such expertise available to them.

4. A
broader pool of "experts" who can be consulted. Not
all sorts of expertise are needed all the time. But agencies
should not be caught in a moment of crisis wondering who to call
and how to assess the credentials of those who call them. It is
essential that behavioral scientists inside federal law
enforcement and behavioral scientists in the academic community
forge expanded working ties. People in law enforcement have for
too long distrusted the "ivory tower" position of
academics who do not have to make "real world"
decisions. They have too long insisted that only someone who is
really an insider to law enforcement can give them advice. For
their part, academics have for too long discounted the experience
and wisdom of persons working in law enforcement because it did
not come in standard academic packages. It is my sense that this
incident provides an opportune moment for overcoming both those
problems. Law enforcement people are more aware than ever of the
need for additional insight and training, and academics are more
aware of their obligation to the public.

That new
cooperation might take a number of forms. The various training
facilities for federal law enforcement might host a series of
consultations in which a small group of academics and a small
group of agents work together for 2-3 days on problems and
potential problems facing law enforcement. Academics, for their
part, might organize sessions at annual professional meetings at
which such questions are raised and to which law enforcement
people are invited. In addition, people teaching in the various
academies should be encouraged to read more widely and to draw in
outside experts whenever possible. Such on-going collaboration
would have the benefit of acquainting the two communities with
each other so that each would be better prepared for cooperation
in a time of crisis.

Most
concretely, it is essential that federal law enforcement develop
an expanded list of experts on which it can call. These people
need not be on contract. They simply need to be people the
agencies already know to be legitimate, reliable, and willing to
cooperate with them. The sorts of activities I am suggesting above
would aid in the development of such a list. In addition, the
various professional associations could also be helpful. It is
essential that persons in federal law enforcement use this
occasion to think pro-actively about the kinds of situations they
are likely to encounter in the future and to seek out now
the expertise they will need in confronting those situations.VI.
A last word.

Finally,
the presence of expert knowledge is of no use if behavioral
scientists are kept marginal to the actual decision-making being
done. For knowledge about human behavior to have any effect,
scientists must be involved early and often. They must have at
least as much "clout" in a situation as the person
commanding the firepower. And, it is my sense that it may be
important for the behavioral scientists to have some autonomy, to
be something of an outside eye. Once a team of enforcement persons
has begun to formulate a plan for dealing with a group, that plan
is likely to take on a life of its own. The same dynamics that
hold the religious group together also hold the enforcement group
together. They are as determined to stick together against their
"enemy" as is the group they are facing. Having a
built-in "yellow flag" can sometimes avoid catastrophe.

Additional
experts on new and marginal religious groups

Prof.
Robert BalchDepartment of SociologyUniversity of
MontanaMissoula, MT 59801

Since
completing my report, I have received additional information from
Steven Zipperstein regarding the experts consulted during the
siege in Waco. He was able to supply an expanded list of persons
consulted and, for several of them, background on the nature of
the consultation. While none of this information causes me to
alter my basic assessment of the situation of my recommendations,
it does warrant this brief addendum to my report.

1. During
March, agents on the scene received communication from several
persons who claimed biblical expertise and urged the negotiators
to take Koresh's beliefs seriously. In all cases, it appears, the
information was taken down, passed along, and ignored. For
instance, the logs from March 17 make clear that agents on the
scene did not take seriously the possibility that Dr. Philip
Arnold's broadcast discussion of biblical prophecy might be useful
to their negotiations. They recognize that Arnold is a reputable
scholar, but had apparently not talked with him or listened to the
broadcast themselves.

Some of the
theologians who got through to Waco were of doubtful credentials,
but they were uniform in their suggestions that successful
negotiations would require meeting Koresh on his own biblical
ground. However, in the log of March 15, negotiators report that
they will start being "more firm with the group - no more
Bible babble...".

2. The
interview transcripts document that Mr. Rick Ross was, in fact,
closely involved with both the ATF and the FBI. He supplied ATF
with "all information he had regarding the Branch Davidian
cult," including the name of an ex-member he believed would
have important strategic information. He also supplied information
to the Waco newspaper and talked with the FBI both in early March
and in late March. He clearly had the most extensive access to
both agencies of any person on the "cult expert" list,
and he was apparently listened to more attentively. The ATF
interviewed the persons he directed them to and evidently used
information from those interviews in planning their February 28
raid. In late March, Ross recommended that agents attempt to
publicly humiliate Koresh, hoping to drive a wedge between him and
his followers. While Ross's suggestions may not have been followed
to the letter, such embarrassment tactics were indeed tried.

The FBI
interview report includes the note that Ross "has a personal
hatred for all religious cults" and would willingly aid law
enforcement in an attempt to "destroy a cult." The FBI
report does not include any mention of the numerous legal
challenges to the tactics employed by Mr. Ross in extricating
members from the groups he hates.

Both the
seriousness with which agents treated Ross and the lack of
seriousness with which they treated various theologians
demonstrate again the inability of agents on the scene to make
informed judgements about the information to which they had access
and their inability to seek out better information. It also
demonstrates the preference given to anti-cult psychological
tactics over strategies that would meet the group on grounds that
took faith seriously.