“We Have Lived in Darkness”

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Summary

In June and November 2010, the Guinean people went to the
polls and for the first time since the country’s independence from France
in 1958, elected their president in an atmosphere largely free of intimidation,
fear, or manipulation. Many Guineans viewed these hugely significant elections
as having the potential to end over 50 years of authoritarianism, human rights
abuse, and corruption.

To sustain the momentum generated by the elections and
fulfill the expectations of Guineans, Guinea’s new president, Alpha
Condé, must take decisive steps to address the profound human rights and
governance problems he has inherited. These problems—a culture of
impunity, weak rule of law, endemic corruption, and crushing poverty—have
blighted the lives and livelihoods of countless Guineans. In the coming months,
the new president and his government should implement policies that ensure
Guinea’s successful transformation from an abusive state into one that
respects the rule of law and guarantees the rights of its people.

Since independence, Guinean presidents Ahmed Sékou
Touré (1958-1984), Lansana Conté (1984-2008), and Captain Moussa
Dadis Camara (2008-2009) have relied on ruling party militias and security
forces to intimidate and violently repress opposition voices. Thousands of
Guineans—intellectuals, teachers, civil servants, union officials,
religious and community leaders, and businesspeople—who dared to oppose
the government have been tortured, starved, beaten to death by state security
forces, or were executed in police custody and military barracks. Other
Guineans have been abducted from their homes and places of work and worship, or
gunned down as they demonstrated for better governance or the chance to freely
elect their leaders. Their bodies have been hanged from bridges, stadiums, and
trees, strewn across roads and meeting places, or simply disappeared without a
trace. Countless Guineans were forced to flee their homeland.

Guinea’s judiciary, which could have mitigated some of
the excesses, has been neglected, severely under-resourced, or manipulated,
allowing a dangerous culture of impunity to take hold. As perpetrators of all
classes of state-sponsored abuses and human rights crimes have rarely been
investigated, victims have been left with scant hope for legal redress for even
the most serious of crimes. Meanwhile, those who are accused of crimes by the
authorities endure grossly inadequate due process guarantees, including chronic
extended pre-trial detention and abysmal detention conditions.

Corruption within both
the public and private sectors in Guinea has long been endemic. From the petty
corruption and bribe-solicitation perpetrated by frontline civil servants to
the extortion, embezzlement and illicit contract negotiations that take place
in the shadows, those involved in bribery and various forms of corruption are
rarely investigated, much less held accountable. Guinea’s past rulers
have also largely mismanaged, embezzled, and squandered the proceeds from the
country’s abundant natural resources, thereby denying the majority of the
population access to even the most basic health care and education. As a result,
Guinea is one of the world’s poorest countries and suffers some of the
world’s highest rates of infant and maternal mortality and adult
illiteracy, despite its natural resources.

To end Guinea’s history of abuse and impunity, the new
administration must adequately support and reform the judiciary as a key
institution that can protect basic civil and political freedoms. The
administration must also ensure that those responsible for past abuses—most
urgently, the security forces responsible for gunning down and raping
demonstrators in 2007 and 2009—are brought to justice. The government
should establish a truth-telling mechanism to expose less well-known
atrocities, notably those committed during the reign of Sékou
Touré, and to explore the dynamics that gave rise to and sustained
successive repressive regimes, and make recommendations to prevent their
recurrence. To promote a culture of respect for human rights, Guinea’s
new leadership must also ensure the independence of the national human rights
institution it established on March 17, 2011.

Condé’s government must also rein in,
professionalize, and reform the security sector, and stop using the security
forces for partisan ends, as has been past practice in Guinea. Behaving more as
predators than protectors, soldiers have been allowed to get away with abuses
ranging from isolated criminal acts to crimes against humanity. Members of the
ill-trained and undisciplined police force have also been widely implicated in
the torture of criminal suspects and unlawful behavior ranging from extortion
to drug trafficking. Officials should adopt a zero-tolerance policy on such
abuses, and create, staff, and support disciplinary structures to investigate,
prosecute, and punish abusers. The Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) and United Nations have proposed a promising roadmap for reform to
reduce the size of the army, bolster its civilian oversight, and reinforce
discipline within the ranks. To create a more rights-respecting environment, the
new government should implement their pertinent recommendations.

The new government should ensure that Guinea’s
population can materially benefit from the country’s abundant natural
resources by improving economic governance, establishing an independent
anti-corruption commission empowered to investigate, subpoena, and indict those
who siphon off public resources, and by providing stringent oversight over the
budget and natural resource contracts.

Lastly, in order to ensure oversight of the executive and
provide for adequate political representation of the Guinean people, President
Condé should formulate, promulgate and adhere to a concrete timetable
for legislative elections; ensure they are conducted in a free, fair and
transparent manner; and take concrete steps to address the lack of neutrality
demonstrated by the security forces during the elections which brought him to
power.

The political future of Guinea hangs in the balance. The
actions that President Condé and his government take, or fail to take,
will either usher in urgently needed human rights improvements for
Guinea’s population or reinforce a dangerous and painfully disappointing
status quo in which the new government and the people they serve remain trapped
in the excesses and abuses that have characterized Guinea’s recent past.

Recommendations

To the New
Government of Guinea and President

To Address
Accountability for Past Abuses and Create a Culture of Respect for
Human Rights

Prosecute in accordance with international fair trial standards
members of the security forces responsible for the killings, rapes, and other
serious human rights violations committed against pro-democracy protestors in September
2009, regardless of position or rank—including those liable under command
responsibility for their failure to prevent or prosecute these crimes.

Ensure that Guinean investigating judges and other judicial
personnel tasked with adjudicating the September 2009 crimes are adequately
resourced, protected, and supported by the Ministry of Justice.

Seek international assistance if authorities find themselves
lacking adequate capacity to carry out justice, involving credible, impartial
and independent investigations and prosecutions, for the September 2009 crimes.

Re-establish the national Independent Commission of Inquiry into
the 2007 strike-related violence with a view toward making recommendations on accountability.

Establish a truth-telling mechanism to expose less well-known
atrocities, explore the dynamics that gave rise to and sustained successive authoritarian
and abusive regimes, and make recommendations aimed at ensuring better
governance and preventing a repetition of past violations.

Support and guarantee the independence of the national human
rights institution mandated by Guinea’s new constitution, promulgated on
April 19, 2010 and established by presidential decree on March 17, 2011. The
commission should be established in line with the UN Principles relating to the
Status of National Institutions (the Paris Principles).

Formulate, promulgate and adhere to a concrete timetable for free
and fair legislative elections.

Enact legislation to abolish the death penalty, given its
inherent cruelty and contradictions with Guinea’s obligations under
international law.

Adopt national implementing legislation for the International
Criminal Court’s Rome Statute, ensuring, in particular, the inclusion of
crimes against humanity provisions in Guinean law.

Implement into domestic law the Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, ratified by Guinea
in 1989.

To Strengthen
the Judiciary

Ensure the Ministry of Justice has sufficient support to address
deficiencies in the working conditions of judges and other key staff that
severely undermine the dispensation of justice and rights of victims and the
accused.

Improve court and caseload management through the prompt
establishment of recordkeeping, court reporting, and information control
systems.

Ensure the prompt establishment and independence from government
control and direction of the 17-member Superior Council of Judges (Conseil
supérieur de la Magistrature) tasked with the discipline, selection,
and promotion of judges.

Ensure all citizens accused of a crime have access to adequate
legal representation of their choosing, regardless of their means.

Establish a law reform
commission to review the Penal Code, Code of Procedure, and Civil Code, among
other principal legal instruments, and recommend the repeal or amendment of
domestic laws that contradict international and regional human rights standards.

Conduct regular and thorough reviews of all pre-trial detainees
and provide increased resources to manage and prioritize their cases, in
accordance with Guinean and international law limiting time allowed in pre-trial
detention.

To Address
Indiscipline and Impunity within the Security Forces

Introduce a zero-tolerance policy on criminal behavior and human
rights abuses by the army, police, and gendarmes. Investigate and prosecute, in
accordance with international standards, members of the security forces against
whom there is evidence of criminal responsibility for abuses.

Implement without delay a comprehensive reform of the security
sector. Begin with the formation of a steering committee on security sector
reform and use as a roadmap the recommendations contained in the report by the
ECOWAS/UN-led security sector reform initiative.

Adequately support and resource the military tribunal so that it
becomes a functional institution, mandated to try military personnel implicated
in military crimes (treason, abuse of authority, desertion, disobedience, and
insubordination). Ensure that officers of the court, including prosecutors, and
defense counsel are fully independent of the military chain of command and of
governmental interference.

Establish a 24-hour telephone hotline, staffed by both civilians
and members of the military police, for victims and witnesses to report acts of
indiscipline, intimidation, criminality, corrupt practices, and other abuses
committed by members of the security forces.

To Address
Endemic Corruption

Declare a zero-tolerance policy on corruption and the use of
state funds for personal enrichment by public officials at all levels.

Establish a 24-hour telephone
hotline, staffed by members of the anti-corruption commission, to provide information
about corrupt practices committed by public officials.

Ensure complete transparency in the negotiation of contracts
between the Guinean government and foreign and Guinean mining companies by
providing public access to information on government revenues, and by
eliminating confidentiality clauses from contracts before their ratification.

Ratify and domesticate the African Union Convention on Preventing
and Combating Corruption and the United Nations Convention against Corruption,
which Guinea signed in December 2003 and July 2005, respectively.

Enact and rigorously implement a procurement legislation that is
in line with international standards especially in terms of disclosure and
transparency.

Publish the national budget and issue regular updates that
accurately detail expenditures. Information on government revenues and
expenditures should be made easily accessible and presented in a form that can
be understood by the public.

To the International
Contact Group on Guinea

Maintain pressure on all relevant actors to ensure free, fair and
transparent legislative elections, the implementation of a comprehensive
security sector reform program, accountability for the September 2009 violence,
and the strengthening of crucial rule of law institutions.

To Guinean
Civil Society and Human Rights Groups

Undertake comprehensive campaigns to educate detainees about
their due process rights.

Pressure the government to
abolish the death penalty and to implement into national law the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court and the Convention against Torture.

To the
European Union, the United States, France, China, International Financial
Institutions and Other International Partners

Frequently, consistently, and publicly press the new government
to prioritize the fight against impunity, to improve its human rights record,
and to ensure accountability for the serious human rights violations committed
in 2007 and 2009.

Improve coordination of efforts for security sector reform in
support of the ECOWAS/UN-led initiative.

Provide financial and technical support for the judiciary,
including through the establishment of a case management system, witness
protection program, and forensic capability.

Provide financial and technical support for anti-corruption
efforts, including an anti-corruption commission.

To the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

Continue to press the Guinean government to improve its human
rights record.

Extend the mandate of the ECOWAS special representative for
Guinea.

Push for the arrest and extradition from ECOWAS or AU member
states to Guinea of Aboubacar Sidiki Diakité for whom an
Interpol Red Notice was issued on January 19, 2011 based on a national arrest
warrant issued in Guinea, and any other individual later subject to a warrant
for suspected involvement in serious international crimes.

To the
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

Continue to monitor and report on ongoing human rights abuses,
and ensure that findings are published.

Train security service personnel and relevant criminal justice
agents on legal interrogation techniques, crowd control, appropriate use of
force, and international standards relating to investigations and prosecutions.

Advise the government on the establishment of an independent
national human rights institution that will comply with the Paris Principles
and on the drafting of a national action plan for the promotion and protection
of human rights.

Provide technical assistance to enhance the expertise of national
authorities, including judges and lawyers in the investigation, prosecution,
and defense of crimes under international law.

Provide technical assistance to the Guinean government for the
establishment of a witness protection unit and to develop forensic expertise.

Methodology

This report is based on over 200 interviews conducted by
Human Rights Watch in Guinea during February, April, August and October 2009,
and June 2010, as well as in Dakar, and Washington DC in August and September
2010. This research has been supplemented with dozens of telephone interviews
conducted throughout the period and between October 2010 and April 2011. Human
Rights Watch interviewed Guinean lawyers, judges, legal clerks, and Ministry of
Justice personnel; victims of, and witnesses to, human rights crimes; remand
and convicted prisoners and prison officials; members of the army, gendarmerie,
and police force; and Ministry of Finance personnel and businessmen. Human Rights
Watch also interviewed national and international humanitarian organizations;
members of civil society, victims’ associations, and human rights
defenders; political party representatives; security sector analysts; Guinean
and Dakar-based diplomats; officials from the United Nations, Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and international financial
institutions; and drivers, petty traders, and market sellers, among others.

Names of many of those interviewed have been withheld at
their request to protect their identity, privacy, and security. Monetary
figures throughout this report are calculated using the rate of 6605 Guinean
francs (GF) to the US dollar.[1]

I. Background:
Decades of Impunity from Independence to the Fourth Republic

Guinea is a West African country of approximately 10 million
people. For over 50 years, successive authoritarian regimes systematically
denied Guineans the realization of their basic human rights and allowed a
climate of impunity for all classes of violations to flourish.

First Republic: Ahmed Sékou
Touré’s Reign of Terror

Ahmed Sékou Touré, a charismatic labor union
leader, ruled Guinea from independence in 1958 until his death in 1984.
Touré made Guinea a one-party dictatorship, maintained a stranglehold on
all aspects of political and economic life, and used state-sponsored terror
ruthlessly to suppress all real and perceived political opponents.[2]

Touré employed a vast network of informants, members
of the secret police, party militia from his Democratic Party of Guinea (Parti
démocratique de Guinée, PDG), and, to a lesser extent,
members of the military to reinforce his authority under which thousands of
real and perceived government critics were detained, tortured, and executed in
public places, unofficial detention facilities and barracks.[3]
The most notorious of these was the Camp Boiro National Guard Barracks in
Conakry, Guinea’s Gulag, where hundreds if not thousands are believed to
have perished. Oppressed by the atmosphere of paranoia and repression that
prevailed in the Touré era, tens of thousands of Guineans fled the
country.[4]

The abuses under
Touré’s rule were concentrated around the state response to
numerous plots—the majority believed to have been contrived—to
overthrow his regime.[5] According to academics and
historians, Touré used the plots to deflect criticism of his regime and
its economic and social policies and eliminate real or perceived opponents.[6] After each reported plot, security forces
and government officials carried out a wave of arbitrary detentions,
disappearances, show-trials, and, in several cases, public executions. During
one particularly bloody plot, the Complot peul, or Fulbe plot of
1976-77, well-respected Peuhl[7] intellectuals, including
Boubacar Diallo Telli, the former secretary general of the Organization of
African Unity, and countless others, were imprisoned, executed, or died in
detention.[8] The violence provoked a mass
exodus from Guinea of members of the Peuhl ethnic group and created a painful
legacy of mistrust between the Peuhl and Guinea’s second largest ethnic
group, the Malinké, to which Touré and many of his key political
allies in the PDG belonged.[9]

Committees largely comprising senior PDG officials, and in
some cases Touré’s relatives, determined the guilt or innocence of
those accused of conspiring against him. The committees forced defendants, who
were often tortured, to confess and were not able to appeal death sentences,
which were frequently carried out within hours or days.[10]
For example, on January 23, 1971, in the aftermath of a real plot,—namely,
the military incursion by Portuguese troops based in Guinea-Bissau[11]—the
Supreme Revolutionary Tribunal ordered 29 executions, 33 death sentences in
absentia, and 68 life sentences of hard labor of Guinean government and
military officials alleged to have supported it.[12]
On January 25, 1971, following the ruling of the Tribunal, many of the alleged
plotters were publicly hanged or executed in military camps, including four
high-level government officials who were infamously hanged from an overpass in
Conakry.[13]

To date not one individual implicated in the atrocious
violations that characterized the 26-year regime of Sékou Touré
has been held accountable in a credible judicial proceeding.[14] This
impunity set the stage for further abuses, for which Guineans have not yet seen
justice done. Mohamed Sampil, who completed his term as President of the
Guinean Bar in January 2011, told Human Rights Watch:

Those who committed the [Touré-era] crimes were
protected afterwards by the state system. Everyone knows there were many violations
of human rights committed during this period, but there was never a trial. Why?
Because the crimes were perpetrated for political reasons and with political
protections: ‘justice’ was not independent; it was just for the
service of the political regime. Continuing impunity set the stage for abuses
of power in the following regime and transitional government. Now we must ask
whether we will see it continue as before in Guinea’s future. In terms of
this tradition of impunity, so far there has not been the political will to
change.[15]

Second and Third Republics under Lansana
Conté: Entrenching Impunity and Making the Criminal State

Shortly after Touré’s sudden death from heart
trouble in March 1984, Army Colonel Lansana Conté took over in a coup
d’état the following month. Despite initial promises to ensure
better respect for human rights, President Conté presided over another
quarter century of state-sponsored abuses and repression, albeit far less
extreme than those of his predecessor. From 1984 until his death in office in
December 2008, also of natural causes, Conté’s regime was
punctuated by excessive use of force against unarmed demonstrators, torture of criminal
suspects in police custody, prolonged pre-trial detention, arrests and
detentions of opposition leaders and supporters, and harassment and arrests of
journalists. While Conté made some initial progress on moving Guinea
from a single-party dictatorship to multi-party democracy, these efforts were
undermined by deeply flawed and non-transparent presidential polls in 1993,
1998, and 2003, designed to ensure Conté held on to political power. [16]

In response to worsening levels of corruption, poverty, and
government abuses, various civil society and professional organizations at
various times staged demonstrations across the country, many of which were
violently repressed by Conté’s security forces. In June 2006
security forces shot dead at least 13 protestors in Conakry.[17]
In January and February 2007 security forces, notably the Presidential Guard,
fired directly into crowds of unarmed protestors participating in a nationwide
strike against deteriorating economic conditions and bad governance, resulting
in at least 137 dead and over 1,700 wounded.[18]

Conté and his government also presided over an
increasing criminalization of the state in which members of the ruling party,
his family, and security forces engaged in frequent criminal acts ranging from
theft and embezzlement to drug trafficking.[19] By the end of
Conté’s regime, Guinea had become a major transit hub in West
Africa for narcotics being trafficked from South America to Europe.[20]

The latter years of Conté’s regime gave rise to
a corrupt patronage network, which siphoned off resources that could have been
used to address key economic rights such as basic healthcare and education.[21]
The illicit benefits enjoyed by the military’s upper echelons led to a
series of revolts by younger army officers, payoffs designed to placate them,
and threats of further instability.

Despite symbolic gestures at the behest of Guinean civil
society and the diplomatic community, Conté made no meaningful effort to
hold those responsible for abuses to account. The gross neglect and
politicization of the judicial sector further entrenched the impunity that had
taken root under Sékou Touré. Like his predecessor, Conté
and his government failed to bring to justice even one member of the security
forces credibly implicated in killings and other serious abuses.[22]
According to Kpana Emmanuel Bamba, President of the Guinea Chapter of Lawyers
Without Borders (Avocats Sans Frontières):

Throughout Guinea’s recent history, the security
services have appeared to benefit from total protection. Those who committed abuses
have not been sanctioned or judged in accordance with the law. There has been
total impunity for the abuses under the Conté regime. His army was well
paid, well protected: and not worried about any possibility of accountability
measures. In the end, they were right: they were never held accountable.[23]

This concern was reiterated by the United Nations Special
Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide after a mission
to Guinea in March 2010:

“Impunity is the norm; perpetrators of past violence
and human rights violations have gone unpunished, including those responsible
for massive human rights violations committed during the previous regimes of
Sékou Touré and Lansana Conté.”[24]

Fourth Republic: The “Dadis Show”

The bloodless coup in the hours after the death of President
Conté on December 22, 2008, by a group of military officers calling
themselves the National Council for Democracy and Development (Conseil
national pour la démocratie et le développement, CNDD)
brought hope for improvement in Guinea’s chronic human rights problems.
The coup leaders, led by self-proclaimed president Captain Moussa Dadis Camara,
pledged to hold elections in 2009 and to root out corruption.[25]

However, this hope was extinguished as the military
government consolidated control of the country’s political and economic
affairs, embezzled large amounts of state funds, failed to hold free and fair
elections as promised, and steadily and violently suppressed the opposition.
Throughout its one-year rule, the CNDD presided over a steady crescendo of abuses
that culminated in the bloody September 2009 massacre of some 150 people and
the public rape of over 100 female pro-democracy protesters.[26]

Throughout the CNDD’s year in power, heavily armed
groups of soldiers engaged in widespread acts of theft, extortion, and violence,
including raiding and robbing shops, warehouses, medical clinics, and homes in
broad daylight and at night. Dadis, as he is commonly known, ruled by decree,
undermining and sidelining the national judicial system. The CNDD obliged
former government ministers and others accused of embezzling state funds or
engaging in drug trafficking to appear in televised confessions, colloquially referred
to as the “Dadis Show,” because of the CNDD president’s
frequent appearances to conduct interrogations personally.

CNDD officials called for vigilante justice against suspected
thieves and, on several occasions, overtly intimidated members of the judiciary
in an attempt to influence the outcome of proceedings.[27]
The CNDD also set up a parallel judicial system within Camp Alpha Yaya Diallo,
a military camp that served as the ad hoc seat of government, where, as part of
the “proceedings,” armed soldiers “invited” the accused
and witnesses to stand before a panel of military officers. Hundreds of
decisions for civil and criminal cases were pronounced and fines and penalties
were assessed.[28]
Meanwhile, the CNDD failed to investigate or hold accountable soldiers
implicated in all classes of abuses.

As opposition parties increased their campaign activities in
anticipation of promised elections, the CNDD increasingly restricted freedoms of
assembly and expression by imposing bans on political activity, mobile phone
text-messaging and political discussions on radio phone-in shows. The CNDD
summoned to a military camp and reprimanded opposition leaders who criticized
it.[29]

The September 28, 2009 massacre of opposition supporters was
both the signature atrocity and defining moment of Dadis Camara’s regime.
Responding to what had been a peaceful demonstration by tens of thousands of
protestors gathered at the main stadium in the capital to protest continued
military rule and Camara’s presumed candidacy in planned elections,
members of the Presidential Guard and other security units opened fire on the
crowds, leaving about 150 people dead. Many were riddled with bullets and
bayonet wounds, while many others died in the ensuing panic.[30]
Security forces subjected over 100 women at the rally to brutal forms of
violence, including individual and gang rape and sexual assault with sticks,
batons, rifle butts, and bayonets. Subsequently, the armed forces
systematically attempted to conceal the evidence of the crimes by removing
numerous bodies from the stadium and hospital morgues and allegedly burying
them in mass graves.[31]

Guinea’s international partners harshly denounced the
September 2009 violence. ECOWAS and the European Union (EU) imposed arms
embargoes and the EU, United States, and the African Union (AU) imposed travel
bans on CNDD members in addition to freezing their assets.[32]
Speculation about whether the international condemnation and isolation of the
CNDD regime would have forced Dadis Camara to step down was rendered moot by an
assassination attempt by another military officer on December 3, 2009 that left
Dadis Camara largely incapacitated.[33]

After the medical evacuation of Dadis Camara from Guinea,
the more moderate General Sékouba Konaté, then-Vice President and
Minister of Defense, assumed power and began to bridge the increasingly
volatile cleavages along ethnic, generational, and political lines within the
army. Over the next 11 months, Guinean actors—including General
Konaté and other members of the military and civil society who were determined
to freely and fairly elect their leaders—ushered in, with the support of
the international community, the political process leading to the presidential
election of November 2010.

While the crisis of political transition set in motion by
the CNDD coup has largely been addressed, it remains to be seen how seriously
Guinea’s new government will provide redress for the victims of
state-sponsored crimes committed in the recent past and how swiftly they will
move to ensure that impunity does not find a home in Guinea’s Fifth
Republic.

II. Accountability for Past Abuses

If the abuses under the First Republic of Sékou
Touré had been dealt with—not through the execution of
Touré supporters[34]
but through proper trials—history would not have repeated itself during
the Second and Third Republics [of Lansana Conté]. The September 28
[2009] violence of Dadis’s Fourth Republic is the direct result of the
impunity of those who preceded him. Look at those who killed in September ‘09…they
were the same ones who killed in 2007, who learned from those who had killed
political opponents years before, who apprenticed and were party militants
under Sékou Touré … it happened because they were never
stopped. It’s time all this came to an end.
—A family member of a victim of the Sékou Touré era[35]

The historical failure by
successive regimes to ensure accountability for very serious crimes in large
part served to embolden generations of perpetrators responsible for subsequent
human rights abuses. Dismantling the architecture of impunity that has
characterized Guinea’s violent history since independence and building a
society based on the rule of law must be at the top of the agenda for both the
new administration and Guinea’s international partners.

Importantly, the new government must bring to justice those
responsible for the gross abuses of the past, most urgently the security forces
responsible for the killing and raping of demonstrators in September 2009. It
must also promptly re-establish and adequately support the national commission
of inquiry responsible for investigating the 2007 killing of demonstrators that
left some 140 dead.

To this end, Guinea’s international partners, notably
the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR),
which opened a country office in Guinea in July 2010,[36]
and the EU, which has taken the lead in reinforcing and reforming the judicial
system, should advise and assist the Guinean government in establishing a
witness protection unit, developing forensic expertise, and strengthening the
independence of judges and prosecutors. Overall, these partners should work to
enhance the expertise of national authorities and the domestic legal community in
the investigation, prosecution, and defense of crimes in accordance with international
standards.

Justice for the Victims of the 2009 Stadium Massacre,
Sexual Violence and Other Crimes

Human Rights Watch and the United Nations-led International
Commission of Inquiry concluded that the killings, rapes, and other abuses
committed by the security forces on and after September 28, 2009, were part of
a widespread and systematic attack, and as such they very likely constituted
crimes against humanity.[37]
The violence appears to have been premeditated and organized by senior
officials of the then CNDD government.

As a result of tremendous domestic and international
pressure, the government of Guinea committed to investigate and bring to
justice the perpetrators of the September 2009 violence. On October 20, 2009, the
then-Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexandre Cécé Loua affirmed
that the Guinean national judiciary was “able and willing” to
render justice for the crimes committed,[38] and in early 2010 appointed
three investigating judges to the case.[39]

Pressure to investigate the violence was likely encouraged
by the October 14, 2009 confirmation by International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor
Luis Moreno-Ocampo that the situation in Guinea was under preliminary
examination by his Office.[40]
In February 2010, the then-head of the Jurisdiction, Complementarity, and
Cooperation Division of the Office of the Prosecutor, Béatrice le Fraper
du Hellen, declared: “there is no alternative: either they [the
government] must prosecute or we will.”[41]

At the time of writing there has been scant information
regarding progress on the investigation and no evidence of government efforts
to locate the over 100 bodies believed to have been disposed of secretly by the
security forces. Unfortunately, the military hierarchy failed to put on
administrative leave, pending investigation, soldiers and officers known to
have taken part in the September 2009 violence. Human Rights Watch is also
concerned about President Condé’s appointment of two individuals
implicated in the September 2009 violence into government positions: Lt.
Colonel Claude Pivi who is the Minister of Presidential Security (Ministre
chargé de la sécurité présidentielle) and Lt. Colonel
Moussa Tiégboro Camara who serves as Director of the National Agency
against Drugs, Organized Crime, and Terrorism (Directeur de l’Agence
nationale à la présidence chargé de la lutte contre la
drogue, les crimes organisés et le terrorisme).[42]

From September 28, 2009 video footage given to Human Rights
Watch. Top to bottom:(1) Opposition supporters in Guinea demanding a return to
civilian rule march on September 28, 2009, toward Conakry’s main stadium.
(2) Security forces near the entrance to the September 28 Stadium in Conakry
clash with protesters. (3) Survivors of the September 28, 2009 massacre tend to
victim's bodies. (4) Guinean security forces beat an opposition supporter
taking part in a march and rally. (5) Opposition supporters flee
Conakry’s main stadium on September 28, 2009, after security forces
stormed and opened fire on rally participants. (6)This image taken
immediately following the September 28, 2009 massacre in Guinea shows bodies of
victims lying at the entrance to Conakry’s main stadium.

However, officials from the ICC Office of the Prosecutor who
visited Guinea in February, May, and November 2010, and March 2011, to assess
progress made in national investigations praised both the technical ability of
the investigating judges and their demonstrated independence and freedom from
government interference. In May 2010, the ICC officials reported that
investigating judges had already interviewed 200 individuals and were satisfied
with progress made in the investigation.[43] Guinean sources
interviewed in June 2010 told Human Rights Watch that as of that time, two
individuals had been detained for their alleged involvement in the September
2009 crimes.[44]
Since then, a third person has been charged with crimes related to the
September 2009 killings and rapes[45]
and on January 19, 2011, Interpol issued a Red Notice (red notices allow an
already issued domestic warrant to be circulated worldwide with the request
that the wanted person be arrested with a view to extradition) for Aboubacar
Sidiki Diakité, the then-head of the Presidential
Guard, or red beret troops, who Human Rights Watch and the international
Commission of Inquiry identified as one of those most directly implicated in
the September 2009 crimes.[46]

On April
1, 2011, following a visit to Guinea, Bâ Amady, head of international
cooperation in the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor, issued a declaration
recognizing the cooperation of the Guinean authorities and the new
government’s commitment to bringing perpetrators to justice. However, he
urged the government to increase accountability efforts and reiterated the ICC’s
responsibility to take action if the government fails to do so promptly and
adequately.[47]

There is considerable disagreement among Guinean human
rights defenders, victims, and others about whether the Guinean judiciary or the
ICC should assume responsibility for investigating and trying those responsible
for the September 2009 crimes. Guinea ratified the Rome Statute, the
ICC’s founding treaty, on July 14, 2003. As such, the ICC has
jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide possibly committed
in Guinea or by nationals of Guinea, including killings of civilians and sexual
violence.[48]
However, it is a court of last resort; under the principle of complementarity,
it intervenes only when national jurisdictions are unwilling or unable to
investigate or prosecute such crimes.[49]

Some members of the Guinean judiciary and Guinean Bar
Association told Human Rights Watch they were confident in both the political
will and the technical ability of the Guinean judiciary to deliver justice for
the September 2009 crimes. As noted by a high-level Guinean judicial official
familiar with the investigation, “[w]e are capable of ensuring justice is
served in this matter. Rest assured we will leave no stones unturned in this
investigation; we are looking at everyone—near and far.”[50]

However, this optimism is not shared by many Guinean human
rights defenders, victims, and others who firmly believed the ICC should take
responsibility for the case. A representative from a group of the September
2009 victims noted that “[t]here are too many things working against a
sound and neutral judgment here in Guinea… We have our hopes in the ICC.”[51]
Others were more cynical: “The government is neither capable nor willing
to try the case. The three judges were appointed to avoid the case going to the
ICC until the international community was distracted or lost interest; to make
the world believe they’re serious about the case, but they’re not.”[52]

Human Rights Watch believes that the primary obligation to
provide accountability for the perpetrators of the September 2009 violence
rests with national authorities in Guinea. The ICC’s authority to act
only when national authorities are unable or unwilling respects the principal role
of national courts and encourages the development of credible and independent domestic
judicial systems. Holding trials in Guinea would also provide the communities
directly affected by the crimes access to the proceedings and serve as a
deterrent to would-be perpetrators. This point was supported by several Guinean
judges, lawyers and human rights defenders, one of whom noted that “[s]eeing
the military humbled before a court of law would be very important for ordinary
Guineans who have thus far seen them get away scot free.”[53] A
Guinean judge reiterated this position:

Having the trial here in Guinea would serve as a stark
reminder to currently serving military [officers] about what awaits them if
they abuse human rights. It would also allow us as a people to regularly
reflect on the role the judiciary should play in a proper democracy.[54]

Human Rights Watch has nevertheless identified several key
challenges to ensuring that domestic investigations and prosecutions are
conducted fairly, impartially, independently, and effectively. These challenges
include deep-seated weaknesses within the judicial system, lack of adequate
security for judicial personnel, the absence of a witness protection program,
existence of the death penalty, and lack of a domestic law within the Guinean
criminal code against crimes against humanity and torture. In order to ensure
justice for the serious international crimes committed in 2009, the Guinean
authorities must promptly and credibly address these challenges. Human Rights
Watch believes Guinea and its international partners should push for the simultaneous
progression of the investigation and trial of those responsible for the 2009
violence and much-needed improvements in the judicial system and the legislative
framework which underpins it.

Weaknesses within the Judiciary

Weaknesses within the Guinean judicial system that could
undermine the quality of the investigation and prosecution of those implicated
in the September 2009 violence include lack of independence from the executive,
inadequate material resources to the judiciary, which renders personnel
vulnerable to manipulation and corrupt practices, and inadequate knowledge of
international law. These weaknesses are largely the result of a pattern of
neglect and manipulation of the judiciary by successive governments and are
dealt with in detail in a subsequent section of this report.

Dr. Thierno Maadjou Sow, president of the Guinean
Organization of Human Rights (Organisation guinéenne de
défense des droits de l’homme et du citoyen, OGDH), described
his concerns about the ways in which these problems could undermine efforts to
achieve accountability for the September 2009 crimes:

We have serious doubts about the ability of the Guinean judiciary
to handle this dossier. The technical ability of our judges to handle
international crimes with respect to law and procedure is not there. The
perpetrators will have very strong defense lawyers, and the Guinean government
needs to be prepared, or else they will lose the case and our efforts to combat
impunity would backfire. There are so many things which undermine the
independence of our judges including their conditions of service; they are very
poorly paid which leaves them open to being bought off.[55]

Judicial personnel interviewed by Human Rights Watch
acknowledged these weaknesses but believed they could be addressed through a
combination of better funding and management of the judiciary together with
technical assistance, training and funding from Guinea’s international
partners. Several judicial personnel specifically noted the urgent need for a
witness protection program, increased capacity in forensics, notably
laboratories and expertise in ballistics and conducting exhumations to identify
victims, and training in investigating and adjudicating international crimes.[56]
They saw the 2009 case as an opportunity to make much-needed improvements in a
judiciary that has suffered for decades from extreme state neglect.

Security of Judicial Personnel and Witnesses

Human Rights Watch is concerned about what appears to be
inadequate security provided to judges and witnesses, and urges national
authorities to address this problem immediately. The potential threat would
likely come from members of the security forces who were either directly
implicated in the September 2009 violence or who were opposed to their
colleagues being tried. The threat would likely take the form of threats and
intimidation, or the destruction of evidence.

Judicial personnel, human rights defenders, and those close
to the investigation echoed this concern, highlighting the ways in which the
vast majority of officers and soldiers implicated in the September 28, 2009
violence are still members of the army and gendarmerie. A Guinean human rights
defender explained:

We know very well the problems with military who can throw
around a lot of influence. Do you really think those judges could convoke to
testify the likes of Captain X or Major X? Things may seem calmer now, but
those boys are still lurking around. We don’t want our people to be
double victims – of both the stadium violence and then on account of
talking to the judges.[57]

Trials of serious international crimes are extremely
sensitive and can generate considerable public emotion, as well as attract
interference in the judicial process. These considerations underscore the
importance of adequate security, including at the facilities where proceedings
are being conducted, for staff working on the proceedings, for accused and defense
counsel, and for witnesses.

The Ministry of Justice must adequately resource, protect,
and support the three investigating judges, any judges who may conduct trials
or other hearings, and other judicial personnel involved in the cases related
to the September 2009 violence. Protective measures for judges are particularly
vital to preserve their independence and ensure the integrity of the judicial
process. Any perception that the judges are at risk may have a potential
chilling effect on others who might participate in the proceedings, including
victims and witnesses. Inadequate security could thus undermine the
effectiveness of proceedings, as well as derail efforts to establish the rule
of law in the long term.

The establishment of an
effective witness protection program must be a top priority for the government
of Guinea. This need has, until the present, been addressed informally by
foreign diplomatic missions[58] and humanitarian
organizations, which have provided protection, funding, and evacuation to those
in need. A formal witness protection program should be implemented through a
legal framework that satisfies key criteria including risk assessment, as well
as provision of physical and psychological protection outside the court at all
points before, during, and after testimony. The legal framework should also
facilitate appearance before the court, including protective measures such as the
use of pseudonyms and provision of private courtroom sessions to protect both
the witnesses and defendants’ right to a fair trial; and measures to
protect the confidentiality, integrity, and autonomy of the proceedings.[59]

The Need for Legal Reforms

Ministry of Justice personnel affirmed that those implicated
in the September 2009 violence would be tried for the crimes of murder,
assassination, rape, and destruction of property, among others.[60]
Some judges and lawyers interviewed believed these charges were sufficiently
serious to represent the seriousness of the crimes. As noted by one Guinean
judge: “Our penal code can pronounce the death penalty for some of the
infractions the alleged perpetrators of the September 2009 crimes will be
charged with. You ask about gravity of the crime; is this not a reflection of
how serious these crimes are? How much more serious can we get?”[61]

The seriousness of these charges highlights the need for
legislative reform to address two key issues: the existence of the death
penalty and the lack of a domestic law that criminalizes crimes against
humanity and torture and establishes liability for the 2009 crimes, among
others. Human Rights Watch urges the new government, human rights groups, and
Guinea’s international partners to push for these much-needed reforms.

Human Rights Watch opposes the death penalty in all
circumstances due to its inherent cruelty. In addition, imposing the death
penalty can send the message that the Guinean judiciary is exacting vengeance
rather than rendering justice. Moreover, international human rights law, as
codified in Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR), favors the severe restriction, if not the outright abolition of
capital punishment.[62]

Recent state practice recognizing that the death penalty
violates basic human rights has fuelled a growing movement around the world to
eliminate it.[63]
The statutes of various international and hybrid international-national justice
bodies, as well as the Rome Statute, do not permit the death penalty. The
divergence of these international standards with the Guinean penal code
regarding the death penalty could mean that in the case of an ICC investigation
in Guinea, those prosecuted as “persons bearing the greatest
responsibility” by the ICC would receive less severe sentences than
lower-level perpetrators prosecuted at the domestic level.

Lack of Law Criminalizing Crimes against Humanity
or Torture

Existing Guinean law does not adequately capture the nature of
crimes committed in September 2009. To ensure that charges can be brought that
reflect the scope and responsibility of the crimes committed, Guinea should act
swiftly to enact legislation implementing the Rome Statute—including its
core crimes and modes of liability, such as command responsibility—and
codify a specific crime of torture.

As defined under international law, crimes against humanity
go beyond multiple criminal acts such as murder and rape and are committed as “part
of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population.”[64]

Furthermore, the
prosecution of such grave international crimes as though they were merely
serious ordinary crimes does not sufficiently address the conduct and
responsibility of those involved in their commission and would fail, among
other things, to expose the criminal structure beneath. Appropriate conceptions
of criminal responsibility, for example “command responsibility,”
are necessary for accountability at all levels, including for those whose responsibility
extends beyond physical commission of the crime. For example, the concept of “command
responsibility” enables military commanders and others in positions of
authority to be held criminally liable when crimes are committed by forces
under their effective command and control, when they should have known about
the crimes, and when they fail either to prevent the crimes or prosecute those
responsible. Guinea’s current penal codes are not adequately developed
with respect to these international and human rights law concepts, presenting
an additional judicial challenge for September 2009 accountability trials.

Independent National Commission of Inquiry into the 2007 Violence

The new government should
also re-establish the now-defunct Independent National Commission of Inquiry
into the 2007 violence. Once this commission has completed its work and drafted
its recommendations, those perpetrators deemed most responsible should be held
accountable in accordance with international fair trial standards.

During the 2007 violence security forces fired directly into
crowds of marching demonstrators protesting against bad governance and
deteriorating economic conditions, and at demonstrators gathered near Conakry’s
November 8 Bridge. Security forces later ransacked the offices of the trade
unions that organized the strike and arbitrarily arrested, beat and threatened
to kill journalists, union leaders, and many others. Security forces killed an
estimated 130 people and wounded about 1,700 others.

The national commission of inquiry into the 2007
strike-related violence was established by the National Assembly in May 2007,
for which 19 commissioners were sworn in. However, according to the commission’s
well-respected chair, Mounir Hussein, the Guinean government did not fund it or
provide logistical support.[65]
The commission’s mandate expired in January 2009. It did not conduct any
investigations.

III. Truth-Telling Mechanism

Guineans need to critically evaluate the behavior and
abuses committed by each and every regime, and explore why history is repeating
itself. A truth commission would help arrest the gangrene; it would help us put
to one side what divides us, and reflect on what unites us. We must also take a
closer look at the issue of ethnicity, which for decades has been used to
control, divide, and sow mistrust and hatred among Guineans. We must also look
at the role economic crimes and profiteers, who have operated throughout every
regime, have played in benefitting from Guinea’s resources at the expense
of the population.—Gadiri
Diallo, executive member of the Guinean Human Rights Organization (OGDH)[66]

Human Rights Watch believes the new administration should
establish a truth-telling mechanism for several key reasons. First, it could
help illuminate under-exposed atrocities committed since independence, notably
during the reign of Sékou Touré. Second, this mechanism could
explore the dynamics that gave rise to and sustained successive authoritarian
and abusive regimes. Third, it could make recommendations aimed at ensuring
better governance and preventing a repetition of past violations. Civil society
leaders, human rights activists, and ordinary citizens interviewed by Human
Rights Watch supported the establishment of a truth-telling mechanism.[67]
One civil society leader expressed concern about what he referred to as “Guinea’s
memory problem” and how a truth commission could help address it:

No one talks about what happened during the Touré
years, or Conté’s killing of all those demonstrators in 2007; I
went to an anniversary memorial for the victims of 2007 and hardly anyone
showed up; people had already forgotten about it! Even now, no one, not even
civil society is actively pushing for justice for the stadium massacre! I used
to think there should be a line in the sand between what happened during our
painful past and the future, but now I’m convinced we need to talk about,
not forget, these things.[68]

The period of history most shrouded in secrecy and which
could most stand to benefit from a truth-telling exercise is the regime of
Sékou Touré. Although this period ended more than a quarter of a century
ago, Sékou Touré’s 26 year reign left an indelible mark on
Guinea and created a legacy of distrust and fear for those attempting to call
their government to account. One family member of a victim noted how, in the
2007 and 2009 episodes of violence, “the images of demonstrators being
gunned down in the streets or stadium flew around the globe via the internet
and mobile phone,” whereas the extent of what happened during the
Touré years “remains largely hidden.”[69]

Members of the Guinean Camp Boiro Victim’s Association
(L’Association Guinéenne des Victimes du Camp Boiro, AGVCB),
which represents the victims of the Touré era, noted that “the
views and needs of the victims of the atrocities committed during the
Sékou Touré years have never been properly considered. There is
no monument to the victims; no official recognition, no report. We want
recognition of who the perpetrators were, of who the victims were, of where
their remains are, and of how they and their families have suffered.”[70]

One man, whose father disappeared during Sékou
Touré’s regime, supported the idea of a truth-telling commission,
not only to uncover hidden truths, but also to remind younger Guineans of what
occurred during the Sékou Touré regime:

Our children are forgetting. They need to know people were
hanged from bridges; that two sons of the same mother were killed on the same
day; that countless people were tortured to death inside Camp Boiro and elsewhere while others were forced to eat rats, even their own feces, to survive.
They need to be reminded so they will never allow history to be repeated.[71]

The era’s persecution of members of the Peuhl ethnic
group in particular left a legacy of anger and distrust, which played out with
deadly consequences during the presidential elections. As recently as October
2010, ethnic tensions erupted following a report that Malinké supporters
of presidential candidate Alpha Condé had been poisoned by Peuhl
supporters of opposing candidate Cellou Dallein Diallo. The inter-communal
violence, which left several dead, spread to a number of cities and continued
into November 2010.

One young woman described why she believes a truth commission
could help Guineans address what she characterized as “the banality of
violence:”

When I was child in Labé, I recall so well rushing
to see the bodies of two men hanged near the stadium. They remained there all
day. We as children ran to see them and watched as people whacked them with
sticks and swore at them. At the time, I was shocked, but over the years the
killing of our people has became less shocking. We wipe our memory of it and
accept that it’s just one of those things. Over time the fear is transformed
into passivity. As we’ve seen, living without memory is dangerous.[72]

Truth commissions can serve important needs of
accountability and reconciliation that are not addressed by prosecutions alone.
For example, South Africa’s truth and reconciliation commission has been
heralded as a vital aspect of national healing and the country’s
successful transition out of apartheid. Sierra Leone’s truth commission
was credited with helping identify some of the issues that gave rise to that
country’s brutal armed conflict. As such, they are held up as an exemplar
of the benefits of restorative and transitional justice mechanisms, which can
respond to victim and community needs in ways that punitive justice alone may
not. Nonetheless, as a matter of both treaty and customary international law,
there is a duty to prosecute serious international crimes and pursue individual
criminal responsibility. While truth commissions can be a meaningful
complementary process, they are, by themselves, an inadequate response to grave
human rights abuses.

IV. Strengthening the Guinean Judiciary

We in the judiciary lack even the most basic things
needed to conduct an investigation or manage a case. It is easy to accuse a judge
of being corrupt but what is he to do when he needs to buy paper, pens and
dossier folders, to photocopy documents, or fuel his vehicle? All this affects
the ability of judges to remain impartial; to conduct themselves
professionally.
–Kpana Emmanuel Bamba, President of the Guinea Chapter of Lawyers Without
Borders[73]

The marginalization, neglect, and manipulation of the
Guinean judiciary has led to striking deficiencies in the sector and served to
fuel the impunity enjoyed by the perpetrators of all classes of abuses and
human rights crimes. As observed by a lawyer interviewed by Human Rights Watch,
“The Guinean judiciary has very serious problems of legitimacy,
accessibility, speed, capacity and impartiality.”[74]

The Guinean judicial system is broadly based on the French
civil law system. There are three levels within the hierarchy of courts hearing
cases involving crimes (as opposed to lesser offenses equivalent to
misdemeanors [contraventions and délits]).[75] A
first instance court for crimes is called cour d’assises. Its
decisions may be appealed to the cours d’appel (appeals court) and
finally to the Cour Suprême (Supreme Court). There are only two cours
d’assises and two cours d’appel in Guinea, one each in
Kankan and Conakry. The single Supreme Court sits in Conakry and has until now
been the Supreme Court for all legal matters, including administrative,
financial, and judicial. Guinea’s new constitution further provides for a
constitutional council (conseil constitutionnel), audit court (cour
des comptes), and judicial supreme court (cour de cassation).[76]

The civil law system’s courtroom consists of a panel
of judges (juges du siège), assisted
by a jury at the cour d’assises level. The case against an accused
is presented by public prosecutors (juges du parquet) acting on behalf
of the State and answerable to the Ministry of Justice. Defense attorneys (avocats
de la défense) represent the accused. A case is initiated upon
completion of either a police investigation or a judicial investigation (information
judiciaire) led by investigating judges (juges d’instruction).[77][78]

Based on interviews with members of the Guinean Bar,
magistrates, judicial personnel, UN and EU personnel, Human Rights Watch
identified the following key problems within the Guinean judicial system. In
order to facilitate accountability for past abuses and deter future ones, the
new government must take urgent steps to address them.

Insufficient Budget for the Judiciary

According to Ministry of Justice personnel, national budgetary
allocations for the judiciary and the corrections sector have, for several
years, stood at less than 0.5 percent.[79] The 2010 budgetary
allocation was a mere 0.44 percent,[80]
with similar allocations in previous years – 1.32 percent, 0.37percent, and
0.23percent, respectively for 2009-2007.[81] According to
Ministry of Finance personnel interviewed by Human Rights Watch, as well as an
in-depth study of the judiciary by the European Union, the disbursement rate to
the Ministry of Justice of this very limited allocation is furthermore very
low, with some jurisdictions going years without receiving any budgetary funds.[82]

A regional expert on justice sector reform noted that an
acceptable budget allocation to the judiciary should be at least 5 percent,
adding, “less than one percent is low, even for this region [West
Africa].”[83]
As noted by a high-ranking official from the Ministry of Justice, “I
think it’s pretty obvious; the Ministry of Justice is the bottom of the
ladder in terms of state priorities.”[84]

Several members of the legal profession interviewed by Human
Rights Watch believed that the low budgetary allocation to the judiciary was
strategic. As noted by Mohamed Sampil, the outgoing president of the Guinean
Bar: “Successive governments have shamefully neglected the needs of the
MOJ…We don’t believe this chronic underfunding is an accident.”[85]
Another lawyer explained why: “The political elite has for years
benefitted from a weak judiciary. If judges could resist corrupt payoffs, if
the judiciary were strong, it is these people—the ministers and those who
benefit from their patronage network—who would be on trial!”[86]
A vast array of other problems identified by those interviewed emanated from
the insufficient fiscal support of the justice sector.

Inadequate Funds for Operations, Staffing and
Infrastructure

In conversations with Human Rights Watch, judges, lawyers,
legal clerks, and correction workers complained bitterly of inadequate funds to
conduct judicial investigations; adequately staff, supply, and run their offices;
and feed, care for, and transport prisoners to court. They said Guinea also
needed additional courtrooms, forensic labs, and a legal library.

The dire need to modernize operations, evidenced by the lack
of computers, disorganized or non-existent record keeping, and the “archaic”
method of court reporting (done by hand) was largely credited with creating
huge backlogs and contributing significantly to the high numbers of detainees
in extended pre-trial detention. Furthermore, many courthouses throughout the
country are in need of repair or renovation after being pillaged, burned,
damaged, or destroyed during protests or the 2000-2001 cross-border incursions
by armed groups from Sierra Leone and Liberia.

Those interviewed by Human Rights Watch agreed that these
chronic deficiencies adversely impact Guineans’ access to justice. According
to Kpana Emmanuel Bamba, president of the Guinea Chapter of Lawyers Without
Borders:

The court system has become a simple calculation of costs:
They don’t have the money to transport the victims and accused to the
trial, to pay clerks to take notes of the proceedings, to hire guards for the
security of the courtroom, the list goes on and on. Proper organization and
performance of the trials requires more expenditure by the State, and the
Ministry of Justice doesn’t have enough in its budget allocation to
support this. Even the two criminal courts do not have the financial resources
to operate functionally. The State thus far apparently feels fair trials aren’t
important enough and has been satisfied to keep the accused in prison
indefinitely instead.[87]

Mohamed Sampil, the outgoing president of the Guinean Bar,
added:

It is fundamentally a financial and logistical problem. The
justice sector in Guinea cannot pay for justice! The budget allocated by the
government is too low a percentage, so that the courts have become an
institution that doesn’t have the infrastructure and logistical support
to function properly. For example, there isn’t enough money even to transport
the accused to the courthouse. Without dedicated vehicles, judicial personnel
are often obliged to bring detainees to trial in a taxi. The Ministry of
Justice cannot financially afford to bring the cases awaiting trial, and so
people languish in prison. The national budget must be reformulated to carry
out justice properly, including the creation of better jurisdictional
accessibility—such as more courts sitting for trials closer to those who
need them—and free legal counsel for those who cannot pay.[88]

Guinea is also in dire need of a case management system. Humanitarian
workers and lawyers said that many cases of extended pre-trial detention occur
because of ill-kept records. One man, who was detained, charged with assault,
tried in absentia because the prison lacked a vehicle to transmit him to trial,
and ultimately acquitted in 2005, nevertheless spent two and a half years in
jail after his acquittal because the paper authorizing his release was never
transmitted to the prison by the court.[89] Prison clerks demanded
bribes from detainees to investigate their complaints. Other prisoners spent
extra months or years in detention after having served their sentences due to
what one lawyer described as “a combination of poor record keeping,
incompetence, indifference, and corruption on the part of court and prison
officials.”[90]

Numerous judicial personnel noted that the need for additional
courthouses and trained personnel to staff them, was most urgent within the
criminal court (cour d’assises), which deals with criminal
offenses that carry a maximum sentence exceeding five years.[91] Those
interviewed also stressed the need for the existing courts to sit more
regularly, as mandated by law. At present, the two cours d’assises—in
Conakry and Kankan—often go years without sitting for a session. The
resulting extended pre-trial detention and case backlogs represent dire obstacles
to access to justice. As Mohamed François Falcone
of the anti-corruption commission said:

Each year, the cours d’assises are supposed to
have special sessions to judge all crimes committed during a given period of
the year. But in practice these sittings are very irregular. The budget
allocation to the justice sector is clearly to blame. The irregularity in court
sitting clearly translates into irregularity of justice, with procedural delays
leading to prolonged detention. When someone has to wait two years to go to
trial, it is a clear human rights abuse. The judiciary must better protect
detainees. This has to begin with strengthening the judiciary’s capacity
to actually hear cases, otherwise no justice is possible for Guinea’s
citizens.[92]

While few ministries in
Guinea’s government are well resourced, the dire lack of funds for the
criminal justice system means that Guinea’s residents are denied the most
basic civil and political rights protections, including due process.

Inadequate Remuneration of Judges

Monthly salaries for Guinean judges range from about 300,000
GF (US $45) to 1,000,000 GF (US $151), with the median around 500,000 GF (US
$76).[93]
The monthly cost of living in Conakry for a family of four is estimated to be about
1,520,000 GF (US $230). In some instances, judges’ salaries are lower than
those for equivalent government posts in other sectors, such as the executive
or legislature, or even of their technical subordinates, the judicial police.[94]
However, in most sectors civil servants have approximately the same salaries,
in accordance with their level of training and education. Their salaries are in
stark contrast with those of members of the military. According to Mohamed François Falcone of the anti-corruption commission, the
highest salaries in Guinea go to the army: “an average salary in the army
is about 2,000,000 GF [US $302], meaning they are paid more than twice that of
the highest paid judge. Civil servants, including judges, are paid too low to
do their job correctly and survive. They turn to corruption instead.”[95]

Judicial sector workers interviewed explained that the lack
of adequate compensation for judges both undermined their independence and left
them open to the solicitation or taking of bribes.[96]
One judge with 36 years of service complained: “…my salary of 1
million GF (US $151) per month is simply not enough to support a man and his
family; to pay the electricity, the water, and school fees. If one day a judge’s
child is sick, it is not just temptation or weakness of character that makes
him engage in unprofessional behavior.”[97]

Kpana Emmanuel Bamba, president of the Guinea Chapter of
Lawyers Without Borders, further explained:

Judges are not sufficiently paid. The military, however, is
paid well—twice as much as judges—and regularly, including bonuses
such as five sacks of rice each month! The salaries of judges are archaic and
their offices are in poor conditions because of inadequate finances. It leads
to corruption in the justice system, with judges accepting payment for deciding
a case a particular way. Judges are not paid enough to pay rent, educate their
children, take a car to go to the office, etc. The State is responsible for
paying them and if it paid them adequately, they would be able to carry out
justice transparently. Corruption is thus not just the judges’ fault but
also the State’s. We must make this a priority in Guinea now, otherwise
will keep seeing violations of justice and human rights.[98]

The outgoing president of the Guinean Bar Association said:

Judges insufficient salaries are completely derisory and
corrupting, because judges feel the only option they have absent a decent
salary is to turn to corruption if they want to keep their families alive. This
doesn’t justify corruption, of course; the position of judge is guided by
oath and virtue, but it is hard to be true to it given the current levels of
pay. For the justice system to be fair and functional, judges’ salaries
must be increased. The failure to correct this problem leads to endemic
corruption and will have enormous implications for good governance.[99]

Lack of Funds for Defense

Insufficient support for the judiciary also impacts the
right to defense. There are no criminal defense lawyers affiliated with the
Ministry of Justice. Any indigent adult defendant accused of a more serious
crime and children accused of any class of crime have a legal right to defense
counsel provided by the Guinean Bar, which by law is supposed to be remunerated
by the Ministry of Justice. In practice, defense lawyers are rarely made
available, largely because the Bar itself is under-resourced, having rarely
been allocated funds by the Ministry of Justice.[100]
Lawyers are supposed to receive 500,000 GF (US $76) per dossier.[101]
However, according to several lawyers interviewed by Human Rights Watch, the
sum is far too low for the work they claim is required for the cases, and
lawyers are rarely paid. One lawyer noted, “Indeed it’s considered
by us to be more like a gratuity.”[102] More typically,
defense lawyers are paid only if the client can afford it. Kpana Emmanuel
Bamba, president of the Guinea Chapter of Lawyers Without Borders, said the
right to defense is often ignored: “The Ministry of Justice has grossly
inadequate funds for judicial assistance. The absence of legal representation
for indigent citizens is a real problem in Guinea; lawyers are rarely being
paid for this function, a safeguard of the people’s rights.”[103]

This impacts directly on the quality of any defense counsel
received by a defendant which many human rights defenders characterized as
sorely lacking. A lawyer who worked within the Maison Centrale in 2007
cited as an example the case of a man on death row who said he had met his
assigned lawyer for the first time at his trial. “His lawyer had never
even bothered to meet with or interview him before the trial. At the trial the
man was convicted and sentenced to death.”[104]
Meanwhile, those tried for less serious crimes at the lower courts (the vast
majority of cases) rarely have legal representation.[105]

Independence of the Judiciary

Poor conditions of service and political interference
regularly conspire to undermine the independence of the judiciary in both civil
and criminal matters. Judges, prosecutors, and other lawyers told Human Rights
Watch that during both the Conté and the CNDD regimes, they were
regularly subjected, and in many cases, succumbed to pressure on how to act in
a given case by members of government, the military, or businessmen.[106]
This has contributed to the widely held perception that the powerful are above
the law. Judicial personnel refusing to succumb to the pressure have at times
been “punished” through transfers to other jurisdictions, often far
from their home.[107]
One judge explained that: “Under Conté we frequently got calls or
they sent someone—at times a member of the army or a minister—to ‘discuss’
a case and let us know of their desired outcome.”[108]
A lawyer representing a businessman from a mining company who had won a case
against a competitor, said he received threatening phone calls, was followed by
the military, and a group of armed soldiers stormed his office and threatened
to detain him, his wife and his children unless he stopped representing his
client, whose case was on appeal. The military similarly threatened the judge
in the case, which occurred during the CNDD administration.[109]

The potential for independence of the judiciary will be
increased once the Superior Council of Judges (Conseil supérieur de
la Magistrature), responsible for the discipline, selection, and promotion
of judges, is established.[110]
Human Rights Watch urges the government to constitute this body as quickly as
possible.

Insufficient Numbers of Lawyers

The rights of those who have been victim to or are accused
of crimes, or who otherwise encounter the Guinean justice system are often left
unprotected due to the limited number of lawyers, particularly outside of the
capital Conakry. According to the head of the Guinean Bar Association, there
were at this writing only 187 members of the bar, all but 10 of whom were based
in the capital.[111]
Nzérékoré, Guinea’s second largest city with a
population of 225,000 has four lawyers, while Kankan, Guinea’s third
largest city with a population of 200,000, has only three.

There are no focused legal aid clinics or other centralized
providers in Guinea. Several NGOs help victims and detainees access free legal
aid, but this is usually done intermittently, often with insufficient resources
and only when the case falls into a particular group’s subject-matter
mandate. As a result, many victims are discouraged from taking their cases to
court. Furthermore, a detainee whose right to legal defense is not met by the
State has no obvious recourse to a known legal aid clinic or group.[112]

Need for Revision of Laws and Training

Guinea needs to embark on a process to reform, codify into
national law, revise or replace outdated laws that do not meet international
human rights standards. Lawyers interviewed by Human Rights Watch gave as an
example Guinea’s very limited treatment of sexual abuse, which does not
codify sexual harassment or other forms of aggression beyond rape. While Guinea has signed and ratified (or acceded to) nearly all major international laws and
treaties, it has yet to codify many of them into national law. This is also
true for many legal revisions of Guinean law and constitutional provisions that
were never integrated into national law by way of an organic law or décret
d’application. A key example is the 1991 law that created the
Superior Council of Judges or Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature,
which aimed to make the judiciary independent but has never functioned because
it lacks implementing law. Lawyers and judges also noted that their colleagues
at times make decisions based on outdated laws, illuminating the need for
training in Guinean law.[113]

Detention-Related Abuses

Severe shortages of judicial personnel, poor record keeping,
insufficient infrastructure and resources, and unprofessional conduct by
individuals working in the judiciary and corrections sector has led to
widespread detention-related abuses, notably prolonged pre-trial detention and
dreadfully poor prison conditions.

Extended Pre-trial Detention

An estimated 80 to 90 percent of those held in Guinea’s
largest prison, Maison Centrale in Conakry, have not been brought before
a judge or been convicted of the offense which led to their detention; many
have been held for more than five years without trial.[114]
According to the Guinea chapter of Avocats Sans Frontières, about
half, if not more, of detainees in the central prisons in Kindia, Faranah, and
N’Zérékoré were being held in pre-trial detention as
of April 2011. In Kindia, 108 out of 198 detainees were in pre-trial detention
(54.54%); in Faranah, 18 out of 23 (78.26%); and in N’Zérékoré,
63 out of 134 (47.01%).[115]
In 2006, Human Rights Watch interviewed a detainee who had been held for 15
years without trial.[116]
The Guinean Code of Penal Procedure allows for those charged with more minor
offenses or délits to be held in pre-trial detention for four
months, while those charged with the most serious offenses or crimes can be
held for six months.[117]

According to Dr. Soraya
Laghfiri, representative of the Support Association for Refugees, Displaced
Persons, and Detainees (Association de Soutien aux Refugiés,
Personnes Deplacées et Detenus, ASWAR) only 168 out of the 998
detained at the time of writing in Guinea’s Maison Centrale have
been tried, convicted and sentenced. The situation is reported to be similar
country-wide. Dr. Laghfiri described some of the more memorable cases:

We have people who’ve been in extended pre trial
detention for four, five even six years for things as small as the theft of a
chicken, a cell phone, or a pair of shorts. One man was here for so long we
used to call him Nelson Mandela; he was in for 18 years on pre trial detention!
A child was in for several years for stealing a mango. Another was in here for
many years for stealing a small sack of charcoal, which he had returned.[118]

A major contributing factor to the problem of prolonged
pre-trial detention is that, under Guinean law, individuals accused of a
serious crime such as armed robbery, murder or rape may only be tried before the
cour d’assises. Under Guinean law, a cour d’assises
is required to hold a session once every four months and can sit for as long as
needed. However, despite the growing caseloads, the cours d’assises
meet very irregularly—several years in the last decade passed without a
single session[119]—hearing
only a small number of cases per session. Some 115 cases were programmed to be
judged in 2010, however by November 2010, only one had been completed.[120]
As a result, individuals accused of a serious crime are often made to wait years
for a trial.

Inadequate Prison Conditions

Prisons and detention centers in Guinea have for years been
severely overcrowded and operate far below international standards for adequate
nutrition, healthcare and sanitation.[121] Guinea’s
largest prison, the Maison Centrale,was built in 1930 for 250 to
300 detainees, but at this writing holds approximately one thousand detainees.
Lawyers said in recent years it has been as high as 1, 400.[122]
Representatives from ASWAR noted that prison officials in the Maison Centrale
receive only three sacks of rice per day to feed the entire prison population;
they said the high number of deaths in detention—35 in 2009 and 15 between
January and November 2010—is in large part a result of chronic
malnutrition, which leaves detainees unable to fight off often treatable
illnesses.[123]
While recent efforts by international organizations have led to improvements in
health conditions in the Maison Centrale, conditions elsewhere remain
deplorable. In a 2009 report, Doctors Without Borders (MSF) reported that one
in three adult male prisoners held in the Guéckédou Prison, in
south-eastern Guinea, suffered from malnutrition, with one in five suffering
severe malnutrition.[124]
Across the country, prisoners suffer from appalling hygienic conditions, which
lead to rampant skin and respiratory infections.[125]

Other concerns include the failure by prison officials to
separate pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners, men from women, and, in
some centers, children from adults. All prisons in Guinea house all categories
of inmates together. During a visit to the Maison Centrale in June 2010,
a Human Rights Watch researcher observed children as young as 13 milling about
in the general prison courtyard with men who told her they had been convicted
of capital crimes, including murder.[126] In
Géckékou, MSF observed overcrowded cells housing minors together
with adults and prisoners suffering from tuberculosis.[127]

Guinea’s prisons were for many years staffed almost
entirely by “volunteer” guards, several of whom told Human Rights
Watch that they compensated themselves largely by extorting money from
prisoners and their families. About 10 guards interviewed by Human Rights Watch
in June 2010 confirmed this practice; most of them said they had not been paid
by the Ministry of Justice, under whose authority they fall, for between seven
to ten years.[128]
While a corps of 600 professional prison guards was established in July 2010,
they only began receiving monthly salary payments in December 2010.[129]
According to sources in the anti-corruption commission and the Guinean Bar
Association, however, these payments have now been regularized.[130]

President
Condé’s Minister of Justice,
Christian Sow,
has readily
acknowledged the many serious problems within the judiciary.[131] From March
28-30, 2011, the Ministry of Justice organized a national forum (Etats
Généraux de la Justice) which brought together justice
ministry personnel, lawyers, judges, police, religious leaders, and
international partners to analyze the current state of the judiciary. The forum
concluded with numerous relevant and promising recommendations to improve the current
state of affairs, including the prompt establishment of the Superior Council of
Judges, an increase in the budget for the Ministry of Justice to address the
low remuneration and insufficient
material support for judges and other personnel, the establishment of two new criminal courts (cours d’appel) in Labé and N’zérékoré,
and other measures to address corruption
and lack
of judicial independence.[132] Human
Rights Watch urges the government to waste no time in implementing these very
pertinent recommendations.[133]

V. Independent National Human Rights Institution

Articles 146-148 of Guinea’s new constitution,
promulgated on April 19, 2010, mandates the establishment of Guinea’s
first-ever independent national human rights institution, responsible for the
promotion and protection of human rights. The composition, organization, and
precise duties are to be established by future legislation.[134]

An independent and impartial national human rights
institution can play an important role in strengthening a culture of respect
for human rights as Guinea transitions from a largely authoritarian government
to one based on the rule of law. Not only can it monitor and report on any
ongoing human rights violations, but also make recommendations to improve more
chronic problems, such as the mistreatment of criminal suspects, substandard
prison conditions, and abuses associated with child labor, trafficking, and
mistreatment. The establishment of an official state body devoted to human
rights can also create an official space for human rights discourse, build a
bridge between local human rights groups and the government, and extend an
umbrella of protection to human rights defenders.

On March 17, 2011 President Condé issued a
presidential decree establishing the National Human Rights Commission (Commission
Nationale des Droits de l’Homme) and appointing as ChairmanMamady
Kaba, former president of the Guinea chapter of the African Assembly for the
Defense of Human Rights (RADDHO).[135]

While Human Rights Watch encourages the president’s
commitment to a national human rights body, especially as called for by the new
constitution, there are significant concerns about the decree process and its
implications for independence and transparency. Notably, Human Rights Watch is
concerned that the commission was established by the president rather than by
parliament and in the absence of a proper consultative process with civil
society, in contravention of the United Nations Principles relating to the
status of national institutions (the Paris Principles).[136]

Human Rights Watch urges the new government to ensure
independence from the presidency in making the commission operational,
including in appointments and financing, in compliance with the Paris
Principles and best practices of human rights commissions. The creation of a
strong, independent, and sufficiently-financed and impartial body can play a
meaningful role in helping develop a culture of respect for human rights and
the rule of law in Guinea.

VI. The Security Sector:
Vector of Instability or Guarantor of Security?

During the Conté and CNDD years, the military
were everywhere—patrolling the streets, within the officers of ministers,
sitting on the boards of public companies, doing financial deals on extractive
resources, controlling legitimate and illicit businesses. The political and
economic power they had fueled impunity; their actions were accountable to few
and had little to do with their mandate—defense and security. At present,
the army is confused about what their new role in society should be—if it
is purely defense, then what are the threats, and how many soldiers do they
really need to respond? The army needs to do a lot of thinking about what they
should and should not be doing in a truly democratic Guinea.
—Security sector reform expert on the Guinean military[137]

President Condé has inherited a security sector
steeped in a culture of unprofessionalism, indiscipline, and impunity. The
security services—the army, the gendarmerie, and the police—have in
recent years been more of a vector of instability than guarantor of national
security. They have also enjoyed near-complete impunity for the very serious
crimes in which they have been frequently and credibly implicated, including
extortion, banditry, theft, kidnapping, racketeering, and excessive use of
lethal force.[138]

Security sector analysts, members of the military,
policemen, and civil society leaders signaled the historical use of the army
for partisan ends as a key dynamic that the new administration must address.
They noted how Guinea’s authoritarian presidents used the security
services to consolidate their political control by repressing political
opponents, influencing the outcome of elections, and intimidating the
judiciary. As senior officers were made ministers, governors, and prefects, and
others were rewarded with contracts or business opportunities to ensure their
loyalty to the political elite, the upper echelons of the military hierarchy
grew to wield an inappropriate degree of influence on the economic and
political life of the country.[139]

Most recently, the security forces demonstrated a lack of
neutrality when responding to election-related violence in October and November
2010. During the violence, many soldiers, gendarmes, and policemen, very few of
whom come from the Peuhl ethnic group, appeared to disproportionately crack
down on members of Peuhl ethnicity, which largely supported candidate Cellou
Dallein Diallo. Additionally, they frequently used ethnic slurs against Peuhls,
collaborated with civilian mobs from ethnic groups that largely supported
Condé, and in several cases looted and stole property from people who
were perceived to have supported Diallo during the violence.[140]
Although the security forces may have sought to quell the violence that seized Guinea, they failed to provide equal protection to all Guineans.

Two other dynamics appear to have contributed to the
persistent levels of abuses committed and impunity enjoyed by the security
forces: the rapid growth of the army and the lack of political will to ensure
discipline and accountability for abuses.

Rapid Growth of the Army

Since 2001 the Guinean army has swelled from 10,000 troops
to its current estimated size of 45,320.[141] A large number of
soldiers who joined the army during this period of rapid expansion did not go
through the established recruitment procedures and received inadequate, if any,
training, including on human rights norms.[142] The largest
increases followed a series of cross-border attacks on Guinea by Sierra Leonean
rebels and Liberian government forces (2000-2001), during which there were “waves
of unregulated recruitment.”[143]

While the 2000-2001 threats undoubtedly necessitated some
growth, analysts interviewed by Human Rights Watch believed that the insecurity
was in large part used to further consolidate the ruling party’s hold on
political power and justify unnecessary increases in military expenditures to
secure that power.[144]
One international security sector expert told Human Rights Watch that Guinea
simply does not need a military of this size.[145]
Interestingly, Senegal, whose population is two million more than Guinea’s
10.8 million[146]
and has been fighting a separatist movement off and on since 1990, has only
18,620 troops (including paramilitaries).[147]
Uganda, whose population is three times that of Guinea[148]
and is still grappling with a vicious insurgency, has an estimated 46,800
troops (including paramilitaries), roughly the same size as the Guinean
military.[149]

Largely as a result of this rapid growth, the army has
consumed a large portion of the national budget. This disparity with justice,
health and education is clearly illuminated in the relative budgets of these
sectors. While the military was allocated 33.5 percent (2010), 24 percent
(2009), 12.65 percent (2008) and 12.12 percent (2007) of the annual national
budget over the past four years, the Ministry of Justice received about
one-hundredth of these amounts: 0.44 percent, 1.32 percent, 0.37 percent, and
0.23 percent respectively for 2010-2007. With similarly low allocations in
2010, health care received just 1.7 percent and pre-university education 7
percent of the national budget.[150]

The army’s rapid growth, combined with deep cleavages
between poorly paid junior officers and better-paid senior officers resulted in
a disintegration of effective command and control within the ranks. Junior
officers accused their superiors of embezzling substantial sums of the budget
that could have gone to improve the conditions of service for the rank and
file. To address the inequity, younger officers used mutinies and threats of
violence to leverage pay increases and promotions,[151]
which were not tied to merit, years in service, training, or coursework.[152]

The vicious cycle of army
revolts, payoffs designed to placate officers, and threats of further
instability has contributed to an entrenched culture of indiscipline and
insubordination by the rank and file and younger officers. For their part,
senior officers have been reluctant or unable to discipline their subordinates,
much less refer them to the national judiciary for prosecution for acts of
indiscipline, criminality, or other abuses, while the overarching climate of
impunity has led to the involvement of senior officers in serious crimes like
drug trafficking.

Inadequate Political Will to Ensure Discipline and
Accountability for Abuses

The legal framework for investigating and sanctioning
soldiers who engage in indiscipline, common crimes, and military offenses has
rarely been utilized, reflecting a lack of political will to address
lawlessness and impunity within the ranks. The result is a profound sense by
ordinary Guineans that members of the security services are simply beyond
reproach.

Lawyers and human rights
defenders interviewed by Human Rights Watch said they were unaware of a single
case in which a soldier implicated in a theft, beating, murder, or rape of a
non-combatant had been held accountable by a court of law.[153]
Victims of crimes perpetrated by soldiers explained that the only practical way
for them to obtain some semblance of justice was by appealing informally to a
superior officer who could wield influence over the alleged perpetrator.[154] For example, during the year of CNDD rule,
a Human Rights Watch researcher visiting the Alpha Yahah military camp spoke
with over a dozen civilians attempting to meet with senior officers to advocate
for the return of their cars, computers, building materials, and other
merchandise that armed men in uniform had stolen.[155]

In principle, members of
the military who commit common crimes should be held accountable within the
Guinean judicial system, while those that commit crimes such as treason, abuse
of authority, desertion, disobedience, and insubordination, should be tried by
a military tribunal, established by law in 1985.[156]
In practice, the fear of reprisal from soldiers and lack of confidence in the
judicial system prevents the vast majority of victims from reporting crimes to
the judicial system. These factors, combined with the intimidation of
plaintiffs and judicial personnel by members of the military and their allies,
has resulted in few, if any cases of common crimes committed by soldiers,
coming before the national courts.[157]

Meanwhile, authorities have never staffed, funded or made the
military tribunal operational. As a result soldiers accused of military
infractions are almost always arbitrarily detained in formal or informal
detention centers—usually within gendarme or military camps—and denied
access to due process.[158]
Those accused of less serious crimes of indiscipline or insubordination are typically
held for a number of days or weeks to penalize them, the “sentence”
determined informally by their superiors.

Detained military personnel are typically subjected to
physical abuse and inhumane conditions.[159] Those detained
for committing more serious offenses like treason were, according to soldiers
and lawyers, typically tortured or even extra-judicially executed.[160]
An example was the torture and killing of at least seven soldiers allegedly
implicated in the December 3, 2009 assassination attempt against Dadis Camara.
Human Rights Watch interviewed about 25 soldiers detained in connection with
this crime who described how they witnessed seven of their colleagues beaten,
knifed, or strangled to death and were themselves beaten and tortured inside
Camp Alpha Yayah. Several had scars on their elbows, back, and elsewhere that
they said were a result of the torture.[161]

Police

Guinean policemen and women engage in frequent
unprofessional and often criminal behavior including extortion, soliciting
bribes from detainees, and excessive use of force, including torture. The
police, which fall under the authority of the Ministry of Security (Ministre
de la Sécurité et de la Protection Civile) is characterized
by the same lack of internal and external oversight as the army. A Police
Disciplinary Council, mandated to discipline and sanction policemen and women,
is largely dysfunctional, as explained by the Director General of Police,
Mohamed Gharé:

Members of the police
force are severely underpaid, compared with other members of the security
services, and we are in great need of training. These problems give rise to
both moral and professional corruption. We have problems with discipline which
are supposed to be addressed through a Disciplinary Counsel which can even
relieve a policeman of his duties. However, this system has functioned very
poorly; very few are disciplined, much less fired. These are some of the things
we need to urgently deal with.[162]

Because of the small number of policemen—only
10,588—and chronic lack of logistics, they are unable to perform many
traditional police functions: routine traffic checks, immigration formalities,
and investigating organized crime and drug trafficking. The gendarmerie and
military have taken over some of these functions, leading to demoralization in the
police force and consequent strengthening of military control over state
affairs.[163]

Police officers have also been victimized by the military.
Ironically, a 2008 police mutiny for better conditions of service was violently
put down by the same military that one month earlier had launched its own
successful mutiny for the same reason. In the process, at least eight policemen
were killed, many others were beaten and tortured, and several police stations
were looted.[164]

Need for Security Sector Reform

In 2009 ECOWAS, the UN, and the AU launched a security
sector reform initiative envisioned to identify problems and recommend ways to
address these problems The effort is broadly aimed at subjecting the security
services to civilian oversight, reducing the bloated numbers of the army, and
ensuring fiscal transparency. Findings by the group were presented in a report
to the Guinean transitional government in May 2010. The report’s over 150
well-founded recommendations to professionalize the sector are meant to serve
as the operational roadmap for reform.

While the Guinean military has agreed in principle on the
need for change within the security sector, there is a lack of consensus
between international and Guinean actors about the precise definitions and
goals of the reform effort. Many in the army who stand to lose from downsizing
and the closure of erstwhile avenues of illicit enrichment are ambivalent about
change and prefer to see the reform effort as a way to increase material
resources to soldiers, including barrack refurbishment and upgrades in
logistics and equipment. Others, long suspicious of civilian rule in general,
are deeply opposed to subjecting the fiscal, operational, and policy aspects of
the army to civilian control.

The new government should act quickly to build on the momentum
created by the ECOWAS/UN-led initiative and recent efforts to improve
discipline. Failure to address the impunity and indiscipline within the
security services will not only embolden soldiers to commit continued abuses
against civilians, but may also threaten Guinea’s fragile transition to
civilian rule and squash the chance for ordinary Guineans to be free of the
state-sponsored abuses that have so tragically characterized the recent past.

VII. Impunity for Economic Crimes

Every contact we have with the state involves the
illicit transfer of money. From the moment I step out of my house until the
time I return I pay bribes. When I drop off my children at [the State] school
the teacher says, “Don’t forget a nice little present or they may
not get good marks.” To get into a meeting with an official, I have to
pay the clerk. To get the paper I came to get, I have to pay the secretary.
When I move from office to office, I get stopped and have to pay the police.
When my cousin died, we had to pay the morgue attendant to take his body. In
order for my wife to get a job at the ministry I had to pay 3 million [Guinean
francs, or US$454], no receipt. It’s relentless. If you’re an
honest, moral man, you can’t survive in this system. It’s only God
looking out for us. —Guinean
businessman[165]

For decades Guineans’ access to basic health care,
education, and other economic rights has been impeded by endemic corruption and
the gross mismanagement of revenue from Guinea’s vast natural resources.
From the petty corruption and bribe-solicitation perpetrated by frontline civil
servants to the extortion, embezzlement, and illicit contract negations that
take place in the shadows, the perpetrators of economic crimes are rarely
investigated, much less held accountable.

Guinea’s new leaders and international partners must
ensure that efforts to address impunity extend as well to the perpetrators of
economic crimes. To do this, the new president must establish, adequately fund,
and empower a credible and independent anti-corruption commission. He must also
take preventative measures by demanding complete transparency in the negotiation
of contracts between the Guinean government and foreign and Guinean mining
companies; setting up effective revenue accounting mechanisms; and signing on
to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), a voluntary
international effort to promote reporting of company payments and government
profits from oil, gas, and mining resources through a coalition of governments,
private companies, civil society groups, investors and international
organizations.[166]
The new government must also ensure information on government revenues and
expenditures are made easily accessible and presented in a form that can be
understood by the public.

Guinea hosts one of the world’s largest reserves of
bauxite, the raw material used to make aluminum, and billions of dollars worth
of iron ore, diamonds, and gold.[167]
In September 2010 an oil exploration company suggested that its Guinea
concession might hold some 2.3 billion barrels of prospective oil resources.[168]
Despite these resource riches and its relatively small population, Guinea is
one of the world’s poorest countries, ranked 156th out of 169
countries on the United Nations Human Development Index[169]
Guineans also suffer some of the world’s worst quality-of-life
indicators: adult literacy is only 29.5 percent,[170]
while nearly one in 10 infants dies in its first year.[171]

These striking levels of poverty and Guinea’s dismal
infrastructure, in a state of near total collapse, suggest that the wealth
derived from Guinea’s resources has largely been squandered by a corrupt
political elite. Guinea is one of the world’s most corrupt countries and
the seventh most corrupt country in sub-Saharan Africa, according to
Transparency International.[172]

Ministry of Finance officials, foreign diplomats,
businesspeople, and ordinary Guineans interviewed by Human Rights Watch
described exceedingly high levels of corruption within both the public and
private sectors. Guinean men and women described having to bribe civil servants
in order to obtain birth certificates, land titles, driving licenses, and
building permits. They also pay to secure entrance for children into public
school, receive treatment in a public clinic, secure employment or file a
police report.

Ministry of Finance personnel and high-level government
officials described how senior government civil servants, including ministers,
embezzled huge sums of money, sometimes instructing payers to make deposits
directly into their personal bank accounts.[173] They cited
incidents that they alleged demonstrated falsification of receipts, ghost
workers on the public payroll, and widespread failure by ministry officials to
comply with procurement regulations. Officials from the finance and audit
ministries complained that many contracts are decided without study or approval
by the director of public procurement but rather, are “dished out in
flagrant violation of the codes and on the basis of friendship, ethnicity, and
political expediency.”[174]

They noted how the military budget in particular has for
many years suffered from a complete lack of transparency: there have been no
audits or record-keeping and there is no oversight of military spending from
the Ministry of Finance and Parliament.[175] Contracts to
purchase military equipment and uniforms and to improve infrastructure are
rewarded without adherence to legal procurement procedures.[176]
Ministry of Finance officials told Human Rights Watch that on several occasions
military officers, serving under the regimes of both President Conté and
Dadis Camara, withdrew money directly from the Central Bank, completely devoid
of procedure.[177]

Meanwhile negotiations for huge natural resource contracts
are often negotiated and signed without due adherence to the established
procedure, which includes oversight by the Ministry of Finance and ratification
by the National Assembly.[178]
For their part, businesspeople said officials at all levels often demand
bribes.[179]
A foreign diplomat described yet another manifestation of corruption—the
lack of control over public property:

When Conté died, many of his former ministers and
their employees simply stole all the cars, computers, and office equipment they’d
been using. When the CNDD came in, they had nothing. Then when the CNDD left,
many of its people did the same. There is no control. We are loath to support
the government’s demands for more aid when we see former ministers from
consecutive regimes running around in the state vehicles we donated the last
time![180]

The complete lack of financial control that is seen in
Guinea today has been decades in the making. As noted by a senior civil servant
who has worked within the Ministry of State Control, “During the latter
years of Conté’s time, corruption set in to such a degree—it
was like the state was rotting from the inside out. Everyone was
involved—members of government, the first family, the military. It was
too much; there was nothing we could do to stop it.”[181]

In large part as a result of pressure applied by the
diplomatic community and international financial institutions, by 2009 Guinea
had established many protocols, procedures, and laws to improve its economic
governance. In terms of international protocols, Guinea has signed but not
ratified the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption
and the United Nations Convention against Corruption.

Many of the reforms were put in place with a view toward
relieving its international debt under the Heavily Indebted Poor Counties
Initiative (HIPC). These reforms included codes to govern public expenditures,
public procurement, and negotiation of mining contracts. However, ministry personnel
often circumvented and disrespected the protocols. As noted by a Ministry of
Finance official:

We have a mining code, a code which governs procurement, an
inspector general of finance, a ministry in charge of state expenditures, Court
of Audit (Chambre des comptes) and a Good Governance
Commission—all of the institutions a Francophone system usually has to
ensure good economic governance. But they are ignored. No, it is the political
will to abide by them faithfully, and most importantly enforce them, which we
lack.[182]

By late 2008 the International Monetary Fund acknowledged
some progress on strengthening economic governance, including the publication
of the audited accounts of the central bank, but remained concerned about the
procedures involved in large procurement contracts.[183]
Efforts to revise the “deeply flawed” public procurement code
eventually fell flat.[184]
In 2005 the government established a Steering Committee for the EITI, but
again, insufficient progress has been made toward becoming a compliant country.[185]

While the CNDD vowed to address corruption, the party
ironically went on an extra-budgetary spending spree that by and large
benefitted the military and included the construction of barracks, vehicle
purchases, across-the-board promotions for all soldiers, and travel for coup
members. According to one international economic expert on Guinea, the CNDD “oversaw
a veritable collapse of fiscal control.”[186] “When
the transitional government took over in early 2010, the national debt had more
than doubled.”[187]

Guinea’s 2010 constitution included several
encouraging articles, which, if implemented, could improve governance and
transparency. Article 36 requires public asset declarations by both the
president, within 48 hours of taking his oath, and his ministers upon taking
office and at the end of service. It also provides for a Court of Audit (Cour
des comptes), a quasi-judicial body mandated to conduct yearly financial
audits of public institutions, which reports to the parliament any
irregularities in the handling of public money, and is vested with authority to
exercise judicial power to prosecute those involved in financial crimes. At the
time of this writing, the new President and a number of his ministers had
declared their assets before the Supreme Court, which heard the declarations in
the absence of a fully constituted constitutional court mandated by the new constitution
to hear such declarations in the future. The Court of Audit has also been
established but is not yet functional, with interim members pending Supreme
Court’s approval.[188]

These measures and
bodies, once fully established, can be complemented by the establishment of a
truly independent anti-corruption commission. Guinea’s current
anti-corruption body—the National Agency for the Promotion of Good
Governance and the Fight Against Corruption (l’Agence nationale de
promotion de la bonne gouvernance et de lutte contre la corruption)—lacks
the necessary independence, powers, and funding to effectively deter economic
crimes. The commission, formed by decree by late President Conté at the
behest of Guinea’s donors, has been restricted by executive control and
largely relegated to the uncontroversial role of public education. It was
attached to the office of the president until 2004, and at present functions
under the Ministry of Audits and State Control (Ministère de contrôle de l’État).
Since its formation, only six cases of large-scale corruption investigated by
the commission were sent to the judiciary. Of these six, only one was
adjudicated.

According to the anti-corruption commission’s
executive director, Mohamed François Falcone, the commission is severely
hampered by the lack of independent powers to subpoena witnesses and relevant
evidence and prosecute matters on its own, rather than through the Office of
the Procureur Géneral (Attorney General equivalent).[189]
It is also limited by a restricted budget, currently 450,000,000 GF [US
$68,130] per year. Falcone has sought to address these deficiencies in a draft
law that proposes the creation of an entirely independent commission. The draft
law also expands the definition of corruption-related offenses, extends the
mandate to cover the conduct of political parties and elections, and provides
for a review by the proposed commission of all natural resource contracts.[190]

Human Rights Watch urges the new government and Guinea’s
international partners to take every opportunity to underscore both privately and
publicly the importance of an effective anti-corruption commission and to
address the continuing problem of corruption within the Guinean government.
Guinea’s vast natural resources must not continue to be plundered, but
instead be used to address the very pressing economic needs of Guinea’s
population. As noted by a taxi driver, whose younger brother was killed during
the 2007 demonstrations in Conakry, June 2010:

For 52 long years, the people of Guinea have really
suffered from the effects of impunity and corruption. We have lived in
darkness—no electricity, no water, no opportunities for our children.
Those in power have ruined the lives of generation after generation. The
families who lost their sons and daughters during the Sékou Touré
time, then in 2007, and again in 2009, have yet to finish crying. Those who
have done this to us, to our country must know that they can’t continue
on as before.

The National Assembly (L’Assemblée
Nationale)

Legislative elections in Guinea are long overdue. The most recent legislative elections took place on June 30th,
2002 and were characterized by multiple delays, major opposition party
boycotts, low voter participation, and strict governmental control.[191]
Since the 2002 elections, the subsequent legislative election cycle, which was
originally planned to take place in June 2007, was delayed several times.
Following the December 23, 2009 coup, the Council for Democracy and Development
(CNDD) suspended the constitution and dismissed the National Assembly.[192]

In January 2010, an ad hoc legislative body called the
National Transition Council (Conseil National de Transition, CNT), was
put in place under the government of General Sékouba Konaté. The
CNT is comprised of representatives from political parties, unions, civil society,
defense and security forces, youth organizations, the press, religious leaders,
and Guineans living abroad, and it was mandated to issue recommendations on
institutional reforms and assist in drafting legislation. In 2010, the CNT
promulgated a new constitution with several provisions for increased respect
for human rights and good governance. However, the ad hoc, appointed-based
nature of the CNT meant it never acted as a fully functional, representative
parliament. Thus, the previous dismissal of the National Assembly has
effectively left the country without a legislative institution since 2008.[193]

In order to ensure
adequate political representation of the Guinean people, as well as oversight
of the executive, President Condé should formulate, promulgate and
adhere to a concrete timetable for free and fair legislative elections. Condé
and his government should ensure that Guineans are able to campaign and vote in
an atmosphere free of fear, manipulation, and intimidation, including by taking
meaningful steps to address the lack of neutrality demonstrated by the security
forces during the elections that brought him to power.

Acknowledgments

This report was
researched and authored by Corinne Dufka, senior West Africa researcher. It was
reviewed by Rona Peligal, Africa deputy director; Babatunde Olugboji, deputy
program director; Clive Baldwin, senior legal advisor; Balkees Jarrah, counsel,
and Elizabeth Evenson, senior counsel in the International Justice Program.
Thomas Gilchrist, senior associate in the Africa division, and Marianna
Enamoneta, associate in the Africa division, provided research, editorial, and
production assistance. Tess Borden and Darcy Milburn, interns, provided
invaluable research assistance. The report was translated into French by
Françoise Denayer. Vetting for a faithful translation was provided by
Marianna Enamoneta and Peter Huvos, French website editor. The report was
prepared for publication by Grace Choi, publications director; Anna Lopriore,
creative manager; and Fitzroy Hepkins, mail manager.

Human Rights Watch
thanks the many Guinean lawyers, judges, clerks, and Ministry of Justice
personnel; members of the army, gendarmerie, and police force; Ministry of
Finance personnel and businessmen; political party representatives; security
sector analysts; Guinean and Dakar-based diplomats, including those from the
United Nations Office for West Africa, Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights, and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); and many
petty traders, market sellers, prisoners, and victims and witnesses to abuses
who shared their views, stories of abuse, and hope for a rights-respecting
Guinea.

Several
individuals deserve special mention including Kpana Emmanuel Bamba, President
of the Guinea Chapter of Lawyers Without Borders; Mohamed Sampil, former
President of the Guinean Bar Association; Mohamed François Falcone, executive director of the
government-appointed national anti-corruption agency; Mamadou Aliou Barry, president of the Guinean
National Observatory for Democracy and Human Rights (ONDH); Dr. Thierno Maadjou
Sow and Abdoul Gadiri Diallo from the Guinean Human Rights Organization (OGDH);
Hadiatou Barry Touré and Ahmadou Tounkara of the Camp Boiro Victims
Association (AVCB); Dr. Soraya Laghfiri, representative of the Support
Association for Refugees, Displaced Persons, and Detainees (ASWAR); Mrs. Asmao
Diallo of AVIPA; and, especially, Mohamed Barry.

Human Rights Watch
expresses its gratitude to individuals and organizations who have generously supported
itswork on West Africa.

[1]
This conversion is current as of April 15, 2011. The rate of the Guinea franc
fluctuates significantly and over the past year has ranged between about 5000
to 7500 GF to the US dollar.

[7]Guinea’s 10 million
inhabitants are from three major ethnic groups—the Peuhl, representing
approximately 40 percent of the population; the Malinké, about 30
percent; and the Sousou, about 20 percent—as well as several smaller
ethnic groups, including the Guerzé, Kissi, and Toma, which constitute
the remaining 10 percent and live predominantly in the forest region in the
southeast. See Minority Rights Group International, “World Directory of
Minorities and Indigenous Peoples: Guinea Overview,” undated,
http://www.minorityrights.org/5503/guinea/guinea-overview.html (accessed
February 16, 2011).

[11]
The Portuguese Invasion, a real plot in 1970, involved Portuguese colonial troops
and exiled Guinean dissidents who launched a failed bid to overthrow
Touré and dislodge independence fighters from Guinea-Bissau,
Portugal’s then colony to Guinea’s north, who were based in Guinea.
It was followed by massive purges, during which nearly the entire cabinet, many
senior military officers, countless other PDG officials and others were
convicted of complicity.

[18]
For more on the government response to these protests, see Human Rights Watch, Dying
for Change: Brutality and Repression by Guinean Security Forces in Response to
a Nationwide Strike, vol. 19, no. 5(A), April 2007,
http://www.hrw.org/node/10974.

[20]
Human Rights Watch interview with UNODC official, Dakar, Senegal, July 29,
2009. UNODC, Drug Trafficking as Security Threat in West Africa,
November 2008,
http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Drug-Trafficking-WestAfrica-English.pdf
(accessed September 17, 2010). Regarding official state involvement during the
Conté era, the UNODC has described how “the presidential guard,
commanded by one of the president’s sons, appears to have been involved
in drug trafficking, alongside a number of high-ranking public security
officials, making use of diplomatic pouches and passports to move drugs.”
UNODC, World Drug Report 2010,
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/WDR-2010.html (accessed
September 17, 2010), p. 244.

[21]
For discussion of patronage under Conté in his later years, see
International Crisis Group, Guinea: Change or Chaos, Africa report no.
121, February 14, 2007,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/guinea/121-guinea-change-or-chaos.aspx
(accessed September 20, 2010), pp. 2-5.

[24]
UN Office of the Special Adviser on Genocide, “Report of the Special
Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide on his Mission
to Guinea from 7 to 22 March 2010,”
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/osapg_mission_report_guinea_mar_2010.pdf
(accessed March 23, 2010).

[30]
See Human Rights Watch, Bloody Monday: The September 28 Massacre and Rapes
by Security Forces in Guinea, ISBN: 1-56432-584-9, December 2009,
http://www.hrw.org/node/87190; and UN Security Council, Report of the
International Commission of Inquiry mandated to establish the facts and
circumstances of the events of 28 September 2009 in Guinea, S/2009/693,
December 18, 2009, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4b4f49ea2.html (accessed
September 20, 2010).

[32]
For international denunciations of the violence, see “Guinea: Statement
of the African Union on Events in Conakry,” African Union press release,
September 29, 2009; “Guinée: ‘On ne peut plus travailler
avec Dadis Camara’, selon Kouchner,” Agence France-Presse, October
4, 2009; and “Remarks With Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood
Qureshi After Their Meeting,” United States Department of State transcript,
October 6, 2009, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/10/130314.htm
(accessed November 24, 2009). ECOWAS imposed an arms embargo on Guinea at a
special summit convened on October 17, 2009 to discuss the situations in Guinea
and nearby Niger. ECOWAS, “Final Communiqué,” Extraordinary
Summit of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government, Abuja, October 17, 2009. The US
imposed travel restrictions on top Guinean leaders on October 23. “Guinea:
Travel Restrictions,” United States Department of State press release,
October 29, 2009, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/oct/131047.htm
(accessed September 20, 2010). The EU and the AU followed by imposing
comprehensive sanctions, including travel restrictions, an arms embargo, and
asset freezes, on October 27 and 29, respectively. See “EU slaps arms
embargo, sanctions, on Guinea junta,” Agence France-Presse, October 27,
2009; and “African Union imposes sanctions on Guinea junta,”
Reuters, October 29, 2009.

[36]
Following a recommendation contained in the December 2009 report of the
UN’s commission of inquiry into the September violence, the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights inaugurated an office in Guinea in July, to “support
the Government’s efforts to protect human rights, to fight against
impunity, which has bedeviled Guinea for decades, and to empower the Guinean
people in the realization of all their rights, including economic, social and
cultural rights.” “New UN human rights office to open in Guinea to
help prevent abuses,” UN News Centre, May 5, 2010,
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=34606&Cr=conakry&Cr1
(accessed September 9, 2010).

[37]
Human Rights Watch, Bloody Monday: The September 28 Massacre and Rapes by
Security Forces in Guinea, ISBN: 1-56432-584-9, December 2009,
http://www.hrw.org/node/87190; and UN Security Council, “Report of the
International Commission of Inquiry mandated to establish the facts and
circumstances of the events of 28 September 2009 in Guinea,” S/2009/693,
December 18, 2009, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4b4f49ea2.html (accessed
September 20, 2010).

[40]
“ICC Prosecutor confirms situation in Guinea under investigation,”
ICC Office of the Prosecutor press release, October 14, 2009,
http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/office%20of%20the%20prosecutor/comm%20and%20ref/guinea/icc%20prosecutor%20confirms%20situation%20in%20guinea%20under%20examination
(accessed September 13, 2010). The ICC prosecutor undertakes a so-called “preliminary
examination” in order to determine whether to open an investigation into
a given situation or specific set of events. Other situations currently under
preliminary examination by the Office of the Prosecutor include Afghanistan,
Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Georgia, and Gaza.

[42]
Pivi has been credibly implicated in acts of torture committed in 2008,
including of Guinean police officers, and criminal acts including theft and
beatings. More recently, following the December 2009 assassination attempt
against Dadis Camara, he was implicated in the killing of at least two soldiers
close to Lt. Diakité. For his part, Lt.-Col. Tiégboro, in June
2009, publicly called on youth groups to mete out vigilante justice and “burn
all armed bandits who are caught red-handed committing an armed robbery.”
He also has been implicated in illegally detaining suspects, some of whom have
been abused and in several cases tortured, in the ad hoc detention center within
Alpha Yaya Diallo military camp under his direct command. See “Guinea:
Coup Leaders Undermining Rights,” Human Rights Watch news release, July
8, 2009; “Guinea: Ensure Redress for Stadium Massacre Victims,”
Human Rights Watch news release, March 4, 2010.

[48]
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute), A/CONF.183/9,
July 17, 1998, entered into force July 1, 2002, art.5. (Crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court) and art. 11 (Jurisdiction ratione temporis).

[49]
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute), A/CONF.183/9,
July 17, 1998, entered into force July 1, 2002, art. 17 (Issues of
admissibility, commonly referred to as “complementarity”).

[59]
Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Right to
the truth, July 28, 2010, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/15/33 (2010),
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/15session/A.HRC.15.33_en.pdf
(accessed November 16, 2010).

[63]
Moratorium on the Use of the Death Penalty, adopted December 18, 2008, G.A.
Res. 63/168, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/168 (2008); Moratorium on the Use of the
Death Penalty, adopted December 18, 2007, G.A. Res. 62/149, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/62/149 (2007).

[77] Investigating judges are an inheritance of the
French criminal law system. They work for the state but are less subject to
instructions from the Ministry of Justice than the public prosecutors and
perform their investigations with, theoretically at least, relative
independence. They have the authority to interview any person, call on the
police for assistance, issue warrants, take statements, appoint experts, carry
out searches and seizures, order telephone tapping, etc. Their investigations
are usually for more serious crimes and complex situations beyond the scope of
a normal police inquiry. Investigations are initiated based on the
investigating judges’ own information or upon request by the police
department or victims. At the end of the investigation, if there is enough
evidence for a case, the investigating judge hands the file to the public
prosecutors at the cour d’assises for the trial.

[78]It
should be noted that the term juge (literally “judge”) does
not necessarily mean the individual makes the final judgment. Rather, it refers
to the necessary training the individual has undergone. Thus, bench judges (juges
du siège), public prosecutors (juges du parquet) and investigating
judges (juges d’instruction) all have attended the same type of
educational institution, therefore qualifying them as “judges,” but
only the former category actually judges the case as in, for instance, the
American system’s conception of “judge.” Defense lawyers
notably attend a different type of school. The term juge is sometimes
replaced with magistrats (magistrates), as in magistrats du
siège: the two terms are interchangeable.

[93]According
to UNDP’s 2009Human Development Report, the estimated average earned
income in Guinea is US$1,356 for men and US$919 for women ,. Human Development
Report 2009 - Guinea Country Factsheet,” United Nations Development Fund,
http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/data_sheets/cty_ds_GIN.html (accessed
November 10, 2010).

[114]
Human Rights Watch interviews with lawyers, judges and local and international
humanitarian organizations, Conakry, June 2010. Extended pre-trial detention
violates Guinea’s obligations under international law. International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted December 16, 1966, G.A.
Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966),
999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force March 23, 1976, ratified by Guinea January
24, 1978, art. 9(3) (“Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge
shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to
exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time
or to release.”); and African [Banjul] Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21
I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force October 21, 1986, ratified by Guinea
February 16, 1982, art. 7 (“Every individual shall have […] the
right to be tried within a reasonable time by an impartial court or tribunal”).

[117]
Guinea Code of Penal Procedure, Law no. 037/AN/98 of December 31, 1998, sec.
VII, arts. 142- 1 (on correctional matters) and 142-2 (on criminal matters).
Extensions by the investigating judge for additional time (four months for
minor offenses and six months for serious crimes) can be requested, but this is
very rarely done.

[126]
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile
Justice, adopted November 29, 1985, G.A. Res. 40/33, rule 13.4, which states: “that
Juveniles under detention pending trial shall be kept separate from adults and
shall be detained in a separate institution or in a separate part of an
institution also holding adults.”

[134]
A former body created under President Conté, the National Observatory
for Democracy and Human Rights was envisioned to be a precursor to a national
human rights commission. However, it was plagued with lack of funding,
logistical support and political will and was never made operational.

[138]
For a history of the Guinean military’s involvement in the apparatus of
the state, particularly during the Sékou Touré era, see Mohamed
Saliou Camara, “From Military Politization to Militarization of Power in
Guinea-Conakry,” Journal of Political & Military Sociology, vol. 28,
no. 2, 2000.

[139]
Human Rights Watch interviews Conakry; and see Mohamed Saliou Camara, “From
Military Politization to Militarization of Power in Guinea-Conakry,”
Journal of Political & Military Sociology, vol. 28, no. 2, 2000.

[141]
“Rapport d’évaluation du Secteur de Sécurité
en Guinée: Avant-projet de rapport,” Joint Project of the ECOWAS,
African Union, and United Nations, May 2010, author’s possession, art. 72
(The national armed forces are divided into three branches—the Army, the
Navy (Armée de Mer or Marines Guinéennes, which includes
Marines), and the Air Force (Force aérienne de Guinée)). The
report noted the current numbers within the security sectors as follows: 2,675
in the army, 2,703 in the air force, 2,806 in the navy, and 13,059 in the
national gendarmerie. Regional security sector analysts suggest these
estimates, given by Guinean military officers, may be exaggerated in anticipation
of recommendation to downsize; Human Rights Watch interview, Dakar, September,
9 2010.

[142]
Human Rights Watch interviews with soldiers and military analysts, Conakry,
April-October 2009 and June 2-9, 2010; and Dakar, September 9, 2010.

[144]
Human Rights Watch interviews with Guinean military officers and military
analysts, Conakry, June 4 and 8; and Dakar, September 9, 2010. See also Alexis
Arieff, Still Standing: neighborhood wars and political stability in Guinea,
Journal of Modern African Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009),
pp. 340-342.

[147]
International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2009 (New
York: Routledge, 2009), p. 316. A 2001 ceasefire and peace deal between the
government of Senegal and the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC)
resulted in a significant reduction in hostilities. However, after the MFDC
split, also in 2001, low-level fighting has continued in the region.

[148]
The population of Uganda is 33.8 million as of mid-2010. Population Reference
Bureau, “2010 World Population Data Sheet,”
http://prb.org/pdf10/10wpds_eng.pdf (accessed September 8, 2010).

[151]From
2007 through November 2009, the military received no less than four collective
promotions (and corresponding pay rises); in July 2010, a subsequent promotion
by one rank of corporals through majors was given to reward the military for
maintaining discipline during the first round of the elections. “Guinea
gives soldiers boost after peaceful election,” Reuters, 4 July 2010.

[152]
For example, in1996, several thousand malcontent troops shelled and set on fire
the presidential palace. In response, then-President Conté increased
their salaries and benefits. In May 2008, junior officers staged another mutiny
during which they took the official in charge of army finances hostage and
demanded that all of the generals resign. In response, the government agreed to
an immediate payment of one million Guinean francs (about 146 Euros or 226 USD)
per soldier with promises of further increases. United States Department of
State, Bureau of African Affairs, “Background Note: Guinea,”
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2824.htm (accessed September 9, 2010); “Guinea
Soldiers Hold Paymaster in Mutiny,” VOA News, May 27, 2008,
http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2008-05-27-voa48-66648257.html
(accessed September 21, 2010).

[183]Guinea was expected to reach the completion point
under the HIPC initiative aimed at providing debt relief amounting to US$2.2
billion in mid-2009. However, this was delayed by the December 2009 coup that
brought the CNDD to power. “Statement by an IMF Mission to the Republic
of Guinea,” IMF press release, no. 08/232, October 2, 2008, (accessed
September 21, 2010); and Human Rights Watch interview with Ministry of Finance
official, Conakry, June 4, 2010.

[191]The
Conté government did not use an independent election oversight
institution for the 2002 elections, and performed all registration and election
procedures, including vote-counting. United States Department of State, Bureau
of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices: Guinea,” February 28, 2005,
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41607.htm (accessed February 22,
2011).

[192]
Ibid. For more information see, Congressional Research Service report dated 30
September 2009 (Arieff, A. & Cook, N. 2009, “Guinea’s 2008
Military Coup and Relations with the United States,” Congressional
Research Service Report for Congress, Federation of American Scientists
website, 30 September, pp. 9-12, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40703.pdf
(accessed February 22, 2011).

[193]
The Guinean legislative body, the National Assembly (L’Assemblée
Nationale), is made up of 114 members. National Assembly elections utilize
a mixed voting system: 38 members are elected by simple majority in
single-member constituencies, and 78 members are chosen by proportional
representation from a national list of candidates. Members of parliament serve
5-year terms, although frequent election delays have been known to extend
legislators’ terms for several years. United States Department of State,
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices: Guinea,” March 31, 2003, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18207.htm
(accessed February 22, 2011).

Corrections

The English version of the Guinea report of May 2011 entitled “We Have Lived in Darkness” contained an error in the description of ECOWAS. The correct spelling of the description of ECOWAS is “Economic Community of West African States”. (May 31, 2011)

In the English and French versions of the report, the name of the author of the article published in the Journal of Modern African Studies, Still Standing: neighborhood wars and political stability in Guinea, was misspelled. The correct spelling her name is Alexis Arieff. (July 15, 2011)