Tuesday, December 13, 2011

Yesterday, I made some comments about Luke Meuhlhauser's objective moral pluralism - the view that several moral theories may be correct because people adopt different meanings for their moral terms. It is "objective" given the fact that adopting a given language does not change what is true in the world. The diversity in our uses of moral terms suggests that it might not be productive to debate which moral theory is correct. In fact, it might be better to simply drop moral terms and focus on the facts of the matter - to "replace the form with the substance".

With this in the background, I would like to look again at the issue of "altruistic mice" as an answer to the theists' concern with the relationship between atheism and immorality. I am referring to claims that evidence if altruistic mice can answer the theist's assertions about the possibility of morality without God.

Bringing Luke's ideas into play suggests a different order to those responses.

(1) The theist's concern with immorality without God cannot be answered by examining the altruism of a rat.

You can't use this research to prove that humans will never be cruel to each other because we have some innate altruism that will simply cause kind behavior. A long and bloody history of cruelty proves that to be false. What the theist is interested in is preventing that type of cruelty that is far too common. Evidence of altruistic rats simply misses the point.

Here's the question. Without belief in God and fear of punishment in an afterlife, how do we get people to choose not to do the kinds of cruel actions they often do? How does your altruistic rat prove that I need not worry about my children bring raped, my bank account being drained, or being thrown into slavery or into a death camp? Are you trying to tell me that the rat's altruism proves that these types of things will not happen? If you are, you are more the fool than I have ever imagined.

(2) What makes altruism moral?

We have evidence of mice behaving altruistically, but gave altruism the quality of being moral? Can you give me a genetic test for the morality of altruism?

One option, clearly, is that when God created altruism then God gave altruism the quality of being moral. If God did not put morality into altruism, how did it get there?

(3) Can it be wrong to have a particular genetic makeup? Are certain genes obligatory?

If we are going to talk about a genetic basis for morality, this has one of two mutually exclusive implications. Either we have to say that people are morally obligated to have certain genes and prohibited from having other genes. Or we are adopting a theory of morality that simply has no place for moral obligation and prohibition.

Given that, so far, we have no ability to choose our genes, it seems we are stuck with the latter option. In other words, yes, rats may be genetically disposed to behave morally, but that is a sense of morality that makes no use of the concepts of obligation and prohibition.

On the other hand, the morality that theists talk about is a morality that is filled to the brim with talk of prohibition and obligation. It's not the same thing.

Once again, the claim that there is a morality found in the behavior of the rat does not answer any of the theists' concerns about atheism and immorality, because the rat's morality is not a morality of obligation and prohibition, and the theist's concern is with a morality filled with obligations and prohibitions.

(4) Rat morality would be a moral system where we determine the moral guilt or innocence of the accused by conducting genetic tests on the accusers.

Is homosexuality immoral? Does committing a homosexual act make it the case that one deserves to be put to death? Is it morally obligatory to stone a young girl to death for the crime of being raped?

If we take the claim that we get our moral code from our genes seriously, it implies that we can determine the answer to these questions by conducting genetic tests on the accusers. If the accuser is genetically disposed to feel moral outrage at those who have gay sex to the point that he wants them killed, then homosexual couples deserve to die. It is not just that he will seek to put homosexual couples to death. They deserve to die - because we get our moral code from our genes. This means that if our genes tell us that homosexual couples deserve to die, then they deserve to die.

This also raises a host of other moral questions. Which chromosome do we look at to determine the amount a person is obligated to give to charity? What genetic test should we conduct to determine if animals or zygotes or Jews are "people"? Where is the genetic marker for the wrongness of slavery and how did it spread through a the whole of society in just a couple of generations?

What happens if a person with a genetic disposition to view homosexuals as deserving to die meets one disposed to want the death of those who condemn homosexuality? Is there a way out of this situation other than a fight to the death? And what if one of them also has a gene that says that it is wrong to settle moral disputes through combat?

(5) Genetic morality faces the Euthyphro Dilemma

Against divine command theory, atheists argue (following Socrates), “Is X good because it is loved by God, or is X loved by God because it is good? If the first, then anything loved by God would be good. If God was turned on by having children raped and murdered, it would be good. If, on the other hand, it were the latter, then goodness remains a quality independent of what God likes. We still would not have an answer to the question of what makes something good.

Is X good because it is loved by our genes, or is X loved by genes because it is good? If the first, then anything loved by our genes would be good. If our genes were turned on by having children raped and murdered, it would be good. If, on the other hand, it were the latter, then goodness remains a quality independent of what loved by our genes. On this option, we still would not have an answer to the question of what makes something good.

Conclusion

The difference between this report and the previous report is that we are not going to argue here which moral theory is correct. We are simply going to look at the objective statements that are a part of each theory and see if there are any conflicts.

When we do this we see that those who apply moral concepts to the behavior of the altruistic rat are talking about something entirely different from those who worry about a link between atheism and cruelty. This essay identifies a number of ways in which the two subjects simply talk past each other. The speakers are using the same words, but talking about two different things.

Anybody who claims that these are the same concepts – that altruistic rat morality addresses the concerns about a possible link between atheism and cruelty. It is not a matter of which theory is correct. Both sets of claims could be right. Any impression that there is a conflict is merely an illusion, caused by using the same words but giving them different meanings.

The fact is, altruistic rats have nothing at all to tell us about how to address the issue of preventing the cruelties that history itself tells us that humans are very much able to inflict. Altruistic rats do not prove that theist concerns over human cruelty are baseless. They have not been baseless in the human past, and there is no reason to believe that they are baseless concerns about the human future.

Atheists look like fools when they point to altruistic rats as proof of something that the theist is actually concerned about.

9 comments:

Alonzo> "Given that, so far, we have no ability to choose our genes, it seems we are stuck with the latter option."

This brings up a long time question I've had ever since first learning about Desirism. What happens the day we can choose our genes? When parents have the ability to change the innate biological desires of their offspring? It seems, then, that this is a much more powerful way of altering behavior than using the social tools of praise and condemnation. Would it then be good to use those genetic tools? Should we do it, in other words?

i will try to adress all of your points individually. i am afraid i still don't quite understand.

3&5 - he we agree. a working theory of morality is not based on genetics. there is no choice involved, there is no malleability, there is no way to jump from what my genetics say i should do in a situation to the claim that i should actually do that action.

4 you claim that "rat morality" is purely genetic. that the rats are acting only on genes and not on malleable desires. why? why do you claim that the rats can only act for genetic reasons and not malleable desires? is there something in humans that allow our desires to be malleable that is missing in rats? are rats not trainable? don't they react to praise and condemnation, in ways that affect their behaviours? on what basis do you assume that theories of rat morality are purely genetic but human morality is not? do you think that scientists could not change the behavior of the rat with cheese or electric shocks to make the rat more or less likely to free a confined rat? i assert that neither theories of rat morality or theories of human morality should be based on genetics unles you have some proof of the difference between the two. some proof of the non-malleable quality of rat desires. until that point i will not arbitrarily use two different standards to judge a rat's morality and a human's.

if a rat has a desire which a good mouse would have (that maximizes the utility of desire fullfillment) i.e. to free a confined mouse. and this desire is great enough that the rat acts upon it. then the rat has acted morally. in the same way that if i replaced the words "a/the rat" with the word Bob" and mouse with the word human in the last sentence i assume you would fine nothing wrong with it. (beyond grammar)

on point 1. i think only a fool would try to claim that: there is a being x in set Y(all rats) that acted morally once; therefore all beings in set B(humans) act morally at all times. anyone who uses that argument should be condemned. luckily i don't see anyone doing that....

the point of contention is not that the theist argues that "some humans do bad things and sometimes a religion will convince someone that was going to do bad things to do good things." even the most militant athiest would agree that that is a true statement and that it probably happened at least once in history.

the point of conention is when a theist claims that "without religion there is nobody that could possibly act morally. that without the tenets of religion guiding someone's malleable desires those desires will not be the desires of a good creature." this statement is false if you can show one instance in which any creature had good desires and was not religous. we point out these instances in humans all the time. but the theist replies by saying that since the atheist was raised in a religous society that she has internalized religous values and thus the morallity came from religion all along. by pointing to mice behaving morally it is easy to presume that the mouse did not derive it's values from any form of religious dogma.

2. i don't understand what you mean by altruism. but i would assume it to be the difference between a shop owner that does not cheat customers only becuase he has a desire not to be cuaght and a shop owner that does not cheat custmoers becuase he desires to run a fair buisness. if that is the difference then altruism is just another way of labeling an action that comes from good desires as opposed to actions that seem congruent with actions that would be taken by a person with good desires but actually stems from non-praiseworthy desires.it is a lack of alterior self serving desires for which the actions of the shop clerk could alternatively be accounted for that earns him the label of altruistic.

It is important to remove alterior desires from the mouse as best we can so as to judge more easily if the rat is performing the action becuase it has good desires or becuase it has other desires that happen to produce the same actions. the scientists must try to limit the variables in the experiment so as to control for other desires that would create congruent actions within the rat. otherwise they could not claim that the rat was acting from good desires with any degree of accuracy.

Points 2-5 share the common assumption that rats have genetically fixed desires and genetically stereotyped behaviors. As Kristopher suggests, this is a factual claim that can be resolved by studying rats, and extensive evidence shows it to be simply false. Rats have malleable desires and learned behaviors. Responses to rat research predicated on the assumption that rats are "genetically programmed" are as irrelevant as responses to fire research based on phlogiston theory.

As to point 1: whatever it was that motivated those rats to act altruistically, they did in fact do so. And surely their motivation wasn't a belief in God! The point atheists take from the experiment isn't that creatures without God-belief will always be virtuous; it's that God-belief is not necessary for virtuous behavior.

A common thread in Christian moral theories is that moral behavior is a uniquely human characteristic-- only humans are moral because humans have souls, or because they have a relationship with God, or because Adam and Eve ate the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge, etc. This study provides evidence against that claim. It's also catchy and memetic, like the gay penguins in the San Francisco zoo, making it useful for popularizing atheistic moral arguments. "If a rat can be altruistic without God-belief, why not a human? Surely we can do better than rats!"

The point atheists take from the experiment isn't that creatures without God-belief will always be virtuous; it's that God-belief is not necessary for virtuous behavior.

My point is that calling this behavior "virtuous" is a misuse of the term - compared to what theists are concerned with.

A theist does not need to hold that virtuous behavior can't exist without God. It is sufficient to argue that belief in God makes it more common. It reduces the risk of each of us being harmed by vicious behavior.

You call this rat's behavior "virtuous" - but it is not virtuous in the sense that theists are intereseted in. You're using the term in an entirely different way. The theist sense of virtue consists of avoiding the temptation to do that which is cruel and destructive when one is tempted to do so - as all of us are from time to time.

the point of conention is when a theist claims that "without religion there is nobody that could possibly act morally."

I hold that you wold be hard pressed to find a theist who holds that, without religion, every human action is the most ultimate evil.

The theist concern is with the very real, observed fact that humans are capable of being increadibly cruel and destructive, and we need a way to reduce that cruelty and destructiveness.

Altruistic rats do not disprove the thesis that humans are capable of cruel and destructive behavior. Nor does it challenge the proposition that we are safer from this type of behavior when surrounded by people who believe in a God.

Of course, I think that arguments CAN be brought against that claim, but when I see atheists point to "altruistic rats" and say, "See, there's your proof," I see the theists shake their heads in disbelief that the atheist will take THIS as important to the conversation.

"Look, we have an observed fact of humans behaving in a cruel and destructive manner. We wish to reduce this. Belief in a God that condemns this behavior and threatens punishment of those who practice it in the afterlife - even if they get away with it in this life - reduces that cruel and destructive behavior and makes us safer. Now, get with the program."

Points 2-5 share the common assumption that rats have genetically fixed desires and genetically stereotyped behaviors.

No. Points 2-5 show some of the implications of attaching moral concepts to genetically fixed desires and genetically stereotyped behavior.

It is perfectly consistent with 2-5 that rats have malleable desires. It is further consistent with 2-5 that rats can use social behavior - praise and condemnation, rewards and punishment - to alter the behavior of other rats in ways useful to the rat in question.

In other words, I am in full support of the hypothesis that you can find real moral systems in the animal kingdom.

But moral concepts do not apply to genetically fixed desires or genetically stereotyped behavior. It belongs to learned desires and socially conditionable behavior.

You call this rat's behavior "virtuous" - but it is not virtuous in the sense that theists are intereseted in. You're using the term in an entirely different way. The theist sense of virtue consists of avoiding the temptation to do that which is cruel and destructive when one is tempted to do so - as all of us are from time to time.

I don't think I am using the word differently. From the article:When given the opportunity to eat chocolate treats first, rats were as likely to release their companions first, and even shared the chocolate with them.That sounds very much indeed like some of the rats resisted temptation and some did not.

I don't want to draw too many conclusions from a single sentence, but that is consistent with learned, and not genetically stereotyped, behavior. Sphex wasps do not sometimes "resist temptation" to paralyze and capture living larvae of other insects to feed their offspring, and sometimes "succumb to temptation."

Points 2-5 show some of the implications of attaching moral concepts to genetically fixed desires and genetically stereotyped behavior.

Then points 2-5 are not relevant to the "altruistic rat" experiment-- which does not concern genetically stereotyped behaviors, but learned ones. They might address, say, Darwin's famous quote-- "I cannot persuade myself that a beneficent and omnipotent God would have designedly created the Ichneumonidae with the express intention of their feeding within the living bodies of Caterpillars, or that a cat should play with mice." (I don't know whether cats instinctively "play" with mice or learn to do so.)

regardless of how many theists argue it. the atheists who hold the rats up as evidence are holding it up to refute the claim that morality comes solely from religion. and it is evidence against that claim.

on the argument of whether or not religion does more harm thangood. (promotes or curbs immoral behavior in a general population) than the rat experiment is indeed not a fact that could be used as evidence to sway the argument one way or another. at the most one could claim this to be one in a series of experiments that could tell us the answer.

if we ran the same experiment as the rat population also in human populations, rich and poor, educated and uneducated, different cultures, and different religous affiliations. perhaps we could find a correlation with religion and greater or lesser morality shown in society. quite frankly i think such an experiment would come out neutral on modern religion. i think buddhist monks would score pretty well, they spend alot of time actively practicing the resistance of temptation. while christains seem to emphazise forgivness after one indulges.

About Me

When I was in high school, I decided that I wanted to leave the world better off than it would have been if I had not existed. This started a quest, through 12 years of college and on to today, to try to discover what a "better" world consists of. I have written a book describing that journey that you can find on my website. In this blog, I will keep track of the issues I have confronted since then.