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... there were serious problems with accident management and with risk communication and crisis communication that need to be examined.... there were serious problems with accident management and with risk communication and crisis communication that need to be examined. Poor communication engenders mistrust and anger and intensifies fear and stress, the effects of which can be long term. Indeed, there were missteps on the part of the Japanese government and TEPCO. E necessaria una analisi critica degli aspetti di comunicazione per trarne insegnamenti M.C.Cantone, Varese,

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Risk Communication and Crisis Communication address different audiences at different times. Risk communication Risk communication is a two-way process of information exchange that includes multiple types of information with multiple purposes. As an important benefit, risk communication has the potential to build public trust. Crisis communication Crisis communication is used to help governments and companies respond to and recover from a crisis. A key part of crisis communication is using risk communication to build public trust. In essence, risk communication is a continual process of public education and awareness. Crisis communication leverages risk communication programs to manage misinformation and speculation that typically occur during a crisis. ANS Committee Report, March 2012 M.C.Cantone, Varese,

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Nella Crisis Communication emergono 3 domande 1) What happened 1) What happened – and what are you doing to respond to it, and what should we (the public) do? 2) Whats likely to happen next 2) Whats likely to happen next – and what are you doing to prepare for it, and what should we do? 3) Whats not so likely but possible and scary, your credible worst case scenario – and what are you doing to prevent it (and prepare for it in case prevention fails), and what should we do? The Futurist Interviews Crisis Communications Expert Peter Sandman on the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Meltdown in Japan, April, 2011 Moreover: How the crisis will affect me (my health, my family, my home, my income, my community). M.C.Cantone, Varese,

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South Korean environmental activists demonstrate to oppose nuclear power in Seoul on Monday By Michael Hanlo, 21 Feb 2012 Nobody, to date, has died as a result of radiation leaks at Fukushima Dai-ichi. Nobody, to date, has died as a result of radiation leaks at Fukushima Dai-ichi. Peter Slovic, Univ Oregon nuclear bombs, weapons Nuclear Fear: A History of Images (Spencer Weart, 1989) M.C.Cantone, Varese,

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una situazioni di criticità, che mette in gioco delicati equilibri di fiducia e consenso dellopinione pubblica. Diversi sono stati gli atteggiamenti delle istituzioni e dei media nellaffrontare levento di Fukushima, visto come una situazioni di criticità, che mette in gioco delicati equilibri di fiducia e consenso dellopinione pubblica. In riferimento alla fiducia, quale immagine emerge?!! "This has the potential to set the nuclear industry back globally "We need to ensure the anti-nuclear chaps and chapesses do not gain ground on this. We need to occupy the territory and hold it. We really need to show the safety of nuclear. Government officials launched a PR campaign to ensure the accident at the Fukushima nuclear facility in Japan did not derail plans for new nuclear power stations in the UK. The Guardian, 30 June 2011 Revealed: British governments paln to play down Fukushuma We know how safe our plants are and that we do not face a threat from such a serious earthquake or violent tidal wave M.C.Cantone, Varese,

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Un punto di grande controversia sul Sistema per la predizione diffusione radiazione –SPEEDI ( System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency ) le informazioni non arrivarono al PM. Japans Fukushima Nuclear Disaster Narrative, Analysis, and Recommendations - Kenji E. Kushida, June 2012 In 1993 it had been developed for domestic local range accidents and was in the process to scale up to a national scale emergency response program linked to local governments. Data on the dispersal of radioactive materials were provided to the U.S. forces by the Japanese Ministry for Science already a few days after 11 March. The Japanese public got these official data almost two weeks later on 23 March (Wikipedia Radiation monitoring in Japan) "The government should've announced the SPEEDI findings earlier than Wednesday" "Deciding on a circular evacuation area and then gradually expanding it can hardly be called scientific." ( March ) Daily Yomiuri on line ) M.C.Cantone, Varese,

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Post-Fukushima, una NUOVA ERA Post-Fukushima, una NUOVA ERA nella gestione della comunicazione in emergenza Sept 2011 timely, clear, factually correct, objective and easily understandable information potential consequences, including analysis of available information and prognosis of possible scenarios based on evidence, scientific knowledge and the capabilities The IAEA Secretariat to provide Member States, international organizations and the general public with timely, clear, factually correct, objective and easily understandable information during a nuclear emergency on its potential consequences, including analysis of available information and prognosis of possible scenarios based on evidence, scientific knowledge and the capabilities of Member States. IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety Enhance transparency and effectiveness of communication and improve dissemination of information Enhance transparency and effectiveness of communication and improve dissemination of information M.C.Cantone, Varese,

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This publication is published as part of the IAEAs Emergency Preparedness and Response series and complements the Manual of First Responders to a Radilogical Emergency in the parts related to the tasks of public information officers. It takes account of the lessons learned from past emergencies, including the accident at TEPCO s Fukushima… Communicating effectively with public about radiation emergencies is key to successful emergency management. It will help mitigate the risks, support the implementation of protective actions, and contribute to minimizing negative psyco- logical impacts. Post-Fukushima, una NUOVA ERA Post-Fukushima, una NUOVA ERA nella gestione della comunicazione in emergenza M.C.Cantone, Varese,

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G-8 leaders call for stronger nuclear regulation, May 28, 2011 G8 Nuclear Safety and Security Group Summit, May 19, NSSG welcomes and endorses the IAEAs Action Plan, as it provides the most comprehensive roadmap for coordinating international efforts to strengthen and enhance existing nuclear safety programs in all countries in light of the Fukushima accident. M.C.Cantone, Varese,

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11 March in parte da 14:46M9.0 earthquake 14:50 approax tsunami hits Fukushima Daiichi During the initial time of crisis:neither TEPCOs chairman (he was in China for a mission, and the was back abaut 20 h afte the disaster), widely considered the center of power, nor the president (he was ivacation in Nara, and he was back after 24 h), were at TEPCO headquarters 15:00 approax, the plant manager in charge, Yoshida, sent faxes to TEPCO headquarters and NISA (located within METI), officially declaring that a nuclear emergency was likely to occur 16:30 he sent another message upgrading it to emergency in progress, a status that automatically triggers an evacuation order.Yoshida noted that they were unable to cool the reactors and could not monitor the water levels of Reactors 1 and 2. The implications were serious, since the reactor fuel cores needed to be immersed in water; if the hot core evaporated all the water, the core would be exposed, and fuel core rods would overheat and become damagedthe phenomenon commonly known as a meltdown. 16:40 Reactor 1 core meltdown begins (estimated) 16:54 the Prime Minister Kan Naoto issued a two minute statement at the press room saying that the nuclear reactors had stopped and no radiation leakage had been observed.

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While Kans statement was true, it did not acknowledge that a report of nuclear emergency in progress had been issued by the Fukushima Dai- Ichi plant. 19:00 Kan declared a nuclear emergency to the nationthe first time such a declaration had been made. This should have triggered an evacuation order, but Kans staff were unable to effectively orchestrate evacuation procedures Chief Cabinet Secretary Edano Yukio advised the public not to panic and flee, but to stay indoors and wait. 20:50 (around four and a half hours after the nuclear emergency in progress was declared) the Fukushima prefectural government took matters into its own hands. It announced that residents within a 2 km radius of the Fukushima Daiichi plant should evacuate. 21:23 the Kan government announced a 3 km radius for evacuation, ordering People to stay indoors in the radius between 3–10 km; this was three hours after Kan had declared an emergency. It was later determined that by around 17:00, four hours earlier, Reactor 1s core was already exposed, and by 17:50 p.m., the radiation monitor began showing increased radiation levels. 23:50, the plant manager Yoshida faxed another report to NISA: radiation levels within the reactor building were rising.

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All the while, the political leadership was unaware that TEPCO executives were not in command at headquarters. Kan and his aides were clearly frustrated at the lack of information from TEPCO 23:50 approax, Yoshida discovered that the pressure containment vessel in Reactor 1 had reached an internal pressure of 600 kilopascals (kPa), well exceeding its maximum design of 427 kPa. Yoshida decided to vent the reactor. Without electricity, neither worked. Therefore, they would have to be opened manually. Yet, nobody in the operations headquarters knew the exact design or location of the manual open hatches. Yoshida had to send staff with flashlights into the destroyed operations rooms in search of design schematics showing whether the vents could even be opened manually. At the Prime Ministers Residence, in the underground emergency operations center, Kan, Kaieda, Edano, Fukuyama, Hosono, the head of NISA, and a senior official of TEPCO debated the venting procedure. 12 March 3:12 Chief Cabinet Secretary Edano announces venting to press 5:44 an evacuation order within 10 km 6:00 a high level of Fukushima plant is reported 10:12 started the vent operation for Unit 1 14:00 finally they were able to vent Reactor 1almost fourteen hours after Yoshidas decision, and eight hours after Kans legal order. The reactor pressure, designed for a maximum of 427 kPa, had risen over 840 kPa at one point. 15:29 radiation reading at FD border exceed 500 microSv/h 15:36 a hydrogen explosion in Unit 1 Five months later, TEPCO revealed that radiation levels near an exhaust duct between Reactors 1 and 2 at this time read 10 sieverts (Sv), or 10,000 mSv, an hour, with 5 Sv an hour inside Reactor 1s building pipes (enough to kill a person in forty minutes.) mmm 16:48 an evacuation order within 10 km 18:00 Kan strongly advocated injecting seawater into the reactors. Yoshida had already begun injecting seawater at around 19.