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POST-GAZETTE, FEBRUARY 18, 2011
The first test came quickly,
on April 30. Rome&apos;s defenders
numbered around -7,000 men:
2500 defecting Papal troops
and Carabinieri; Garibaldi's
First Italian Legion, about
1300 men; some 1400 men
from Roman volunteer regi-
ments; and an assortment of
inexperienced National
Guards, citizens and stu-
dents, armed with whatever
they could Find. Garibaldi had
been put in charge of defend-
ing the Janiculum -- Rome's
'eighth' hill and its highest,
most crucial point, being west
of" the Tiber bordering the
Trastevere district, but inside
the city walls• Should it fall,
the French attackers could
bombard the city below at
their leisure. Finally, un-
armed citizens built ramparts
and aided the wounded, par-
ticularly the revolutionary
Princess Cristina Bel-gioioso,
who took charge of the hospi-
tals. One of her first acts was
to put Margaret Fuller, whom
she had met previously, in
charge of the Fate Bene
Fratelli hospital sited on an
island in the Tiber River.
On the other side were the
French -- also with about
7,000 fully-equipped troops,
confident that with their first
cannonade, Rome's defenses
would melt like so much but-
ter. So cocky were the invad-
ers that they brought field
artillery but no siege-guns or
scaling ladders. Their plan
was to enter by the Porta
Pertusa, unaware that that
gate no longer existed. Gari-
baldi, meantime, saw that,
due to the high ground out-
side the wails, batteries there
could easily bombard defend-
ers below, so he set his de-
fenders outside the critical
San Pancrazio gate, on the
high ground of the Villa
Corsini and the Pamfili Villa
behind it. Thus, when Gen-
eral Oudinot's forces reached
the non-existent Pertusa
gate, they had to change
plans and attack the Porta
Cavalleggieri farther south.
This meant they had to move
downhill and over a thousand
yards of open country- eas-
ily fired upon by troops on
the wall and batteries near
St, Peter's. By around noon,
the initial French attack was
stalled, though not driven
away.
Now it was Garibaldi's turn.
Watching from the Corsini
The Roman Republic of 1849
PART TWO: We are Again Romans
by Lawrence DiStasi
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DiStasi and originally published in L'Italo-Americano. The series covers the history behind
Italy's •unification, which marks its 150  anniversary this year.
ROME, la@
Drawing of the
Villa, he never hesitated, but
ordered an offensive to turn
the initial stall of the French
into a defeat in the open field.
To do so, his soldiers had to
charge down from the Pamfili
Gardens and cross a wailed
lane connecting the Porta
San Pancrazio with the main
road to Civitavecchia. Up this
lane marched about 1,000
French infantry. Garibaldi's
students and artists suddenly
found themselves combating
an army of veterans, and
soon had to retreat. The situ-
ation quickly grew perilous:
both Corsini and Pamfili were
being overrun, and their loss
would be devastating.
Garibaldi sent for reinforce-
ments -- about 800 volun-
teers under Colonel Galletti,
who, alongside Garibaldi, led
the Italian Legion's charge to
recapture the two villas. Here
is how Trevelyan describes it:
Swarming over the Corsini
hill, and across the little
stream and valley that divide
it from the Pamfili grounds,
the Legionaries came crash-
ing through the groves. The
Garibaldian officers, 'the ti-
gers of Montevideo,' with long
beards and hair that curled
over their shoulders, were
singled out to the enemy's
marksmen by red blouses,
falling almost to the knees.
This was the day that they
had waited for so long in ex-
ile, this the place towards
which they had sailed so far
across the ocean. Behind
them Italy came following on.
And above the tide of shout-
Corsini battle.
ing youths, drunk with their
first hot draught of war,
raised Garibaldi on his horse,
majestic and calm as he al-
ways looked, but most of all
in the fury of battle, the folds
of his white American pon-
cho floating off his shoulders
for a flag of onset. (132)
The Italians dislodged the
French from Corsini and pur-
sued them down into nearby
vineyards, where "after fierce
struggling, body to body, with
guns, and hands, and bayo-
nets" they put the French to
flight• Nor was that all. The
main body of the French was
so slow in retreating that
nearly 400 were taken pris-
oner. Coupled with the 500
French soldiers killed that
day, this capture of prisoners
made the rout -- Oudinot and
his 'invincible' army were
fleeing towards Civitavecchia
-- both complete and sweet.
And the people of Rome knew
it.
That night the city was il-
luminated, the streets were
filled with shouting.and tri-
umphant crowds, and there
was scarcely a window in the
poorest and narrowest alley of
the mediaeval slums that did
not show its candle. It was no
vulgar conquest which they
celebrated. After long centu-
ries of disgrace, this people
had recovered its self-respect,
and from the highest to the
lowest ranks men felt; "We
are again Romans."
(Trevelyan, 134)
Sadly, Garibaldi's superiors
did not understand, or did not
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Rome in 1849
wish to understand the situ-
ation he had presented them.
Retreating on unfamiliar
ground, the French should be
pursued, .he argued, and
driven into the sea; the whole
of Italy. could be aroused. But
Mazzini gave greater weight
to two considerations. First,
imposing total defeat on "the
French might be satisfying,
but it would further alienate
Louis Napoleon, and Mazzini
still hoped the French would
come to their senses and aid
a fellow republic fighting for
liberty. Second, Rvme's lead-
ers worried about the other
armies closing in on them --
King Ferdinand's Neapolitan
army advancing from the
south, and Austrian forces
driving down from the north.
If Garibaldi were to march
forty miles to Civitavecchia,
Rome would be left without
her most capable defender. It
was the first, but not the last
quarrel that would divide the
two titans of Italian unifica-
tion. In the end, the soldier
had to yield to the statesman.
Now the Roman forces had
to face the threat from the
south. King Ferdinand, with
an army of 10,000 men, was
camped a mere 20 miles from
Rome near two cities in the
Alban Hills, Frascati and
Albano. Still worried about
another French attack,
Rome's military leadership
under General Avezzana de-
cided it could spare only 2300
soldiers, mostly Garibaldi's
Legion, some students, and
one experienced troop,
• Luciano Manara's Lombard
Bersaglieri. The latter had
fought the previous year in
the famous "five days" of
Milan, suffered the loss to the
Austrians, and then headed
to Rome. Blocked at
Civitavecchia by the French,
they were only able to gain
passage by promising not to
fight. Though they honored
their pledge by staying out of
the April 30 battle, they were
now eager to show what they
were made of.
Garibaldi saw that it was
foolhardy to make a frontal
attack on such a large force,
so he chose to employ his
guerrilla tactics -- to harass
Ferdinand's army so it could
not move on Rome. Marching
at night, Garibaldi feinted
north from Tivoli before he
turned south to his real tar-
get, Palestrina, where he set
up headquarters on May 7.
When" they saw what 'they
faced, the Neapolitans sent
General Lanza and Colonel
Novi to dislodge this "bandit"
hampering their advance.
But Garibaldi did not wait to
be attacked, sending
Manara's Bersaglieri to at-
tack first. So shocked were
the Neapolitans by Garibaldi's
offensive that the battle was
over in three hours, with the
enemy in full flight -- Lanza's
right wing abandoning towns
right and left and not stopping
till they reached Ferdinand's
headquarters on the Alban
lake; Novi's left wing retreat-
ing first to Colonna and then
to Frascati.
Once again, however,
Rome's leaders stopped
Garibaldi's advance and
recalled him, fearing a new
move by General Oudinot.
They were mistaken.
Oudinot was awaiting rin-
forcements. To disguise this,
Louis Napoleon sent
Ferdinand de Lesseps (of later
Suez Canal fame) as an en-
voy, allegedly to try to arrange
a peace between Roman lead-
ers and Pius IX. On May 17,
the Assembly and the Trium-
virate agreed to halt hostili-
• ties to give de Lesseps time;
but what they really did was
give the French time -- first
for Oudinot to be reinforced;
then for elections that would
increase the power of
French Catholics in Paris fa-
voring the invasion. Both
would prove fatal to Rome's
survival.
For the moment, though, a
truce reigned and Garibaldi
took advantage of it by hav-
ing .red shirts -- to become a
sacred symbol of Italian uni-
fication -- made for all of his
legionnaires (previously, only
his officers had th.em). The
triumvirate also took advan-
tage of the truce to again try
to drive Ferdinand's army out
of Roman territory. They pro-
moted Garibaldi to Division
General, but still kept him
under General Roselli, the
Commander-in-Chief. This,
too, would have disastrous
consequences because
Roselli, though decent, was a
conventional, timid com-
mander. Thus the Roman
army moving south now com-
bined mismatched elements.
As Trevelyan notes:
The army moved with the
uncomfortable and jerky mo-
tion of a man with an excit-
able dog on a leash; Garibaldi
dashed about in front locating
and engaging the enemy, and
then was forced to wait till
Roselli came sulkily lumber-
ing up with the bulk of the
troops. (153)
So though he had a force
five times the one Garibaldi
had led earlier, Roselli still
chose to avoid a direct attack,
harassing the enemy's flank
instead. Impatient with the
lumbering army's pace,
Garibaldi raced ahead to see
what the enemy were up to.
It turned out that, intimi-
dated, "King Bomba" was in
full retreat. To Garibaldi, the
only danger was that the en=
emy would escape, so he
moved to cut them off by at-
tacking with an advance
guard, simultaneously calling
for Roselli to rush up to fin-
ish the job. It was a breach of
discipline, but absolutely jus-
tified in his mind: by disrupt-
ing the Neapolitan retreat, he
could, once joined by Roselli,
strike a decisive blow for
Rome, and, possibly, all of
Italy.
Garibaldi placed his ad-
vanced force outside Velletri
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