"My philosophy, in essence, is the concept of man as a heroic
being, with his own happiness as the moral purpose of his life,
with productive achievement as his noblest activity, and reason
as his only absolute."
(Ayn Rand, Appendix to Atlas Shrugged)
"Heroism is the only alternative."
(Phyllis Chesler, Patriarchy: Notes of an Expert Witness)

Ayn Rand formulated
and presented a new vision of human being. She achieved a
wide-ranging integration of mind and body, a unified conception of
love, sex, self and relationships. She viewed love as a response
to values, and romantic love as a unity of reason and emotion,
virtue and desire, admiration and passion, human pride and animal
lust. Sex, for Rand, is an expression of self-esteem - a
celebration of oneself and of existence. A relationship provides
a trade of spiritual values, offering psychological visibility
(and thereby spiritual growth) through the perception of oneself
as an external reflection in another self.

And yet, despite this achievement, Rand made a mistake - a mistake
that limits the range of her achievement, and undercuts the scope
of her integration, a mistake that preserved elements of Platonism
and collectivism in her integration of love and sex. Rand
maintained a Platonic view of gender, which translates into
gender-role collectivism. The goal of this article is to identify
these elements and their effects, to establish how and at what
levels they contradict more fundamental ideas in Rand's
philosophy, and finally to suggest an extended Randian<1> position that incorporates gender
individualism and Feminist insights, thus providing the foundation
for a Randian-Feminist synthesis. I hope to unleash a hidden
potential in Rand's thought - a potential from which a conceptual
foundation for The Female Hero can be established.

AYN RAND'S VIEW OF GENDER

What exactly was Rand's view on gender? A careful analysis of the
Randian canon reveals that Rand had a view that remained unchanged
- one is tempted to say unchallenged - throughout her entire
life. This view permeated the fabric of her thinking, surfacing
at irregular intervals both in her fiction and non-fiction.

For example, there is this description of Dagny Taggart, the
powerful heroine in Atlas Shrugged (136):

[I]t was astonishing to discover that the lines of her shoulder
were fragile - and beautiful, and that the diamond band on the
wrist of her naked arm gave her the most feminine of all aspects:
the look of being chained.

For Rand, a person's physical appearance expresses his or her
gender, and Rand operates with distinct and separate bipolar
gender roles (masculinity and femininity) linked to the person's
biological sex (maleness and femaleness respectively). Hence, the
look of being chained is associated with femininity, and femininity
is seen by Rand as the psychological expression of biological
femaleness.

There is also this description of Dominique Francon, the heroine
of The Fountainhead ([1943] 1986, 262):

She stood leaning back, as if the air was a support - solid
enough for her thin, naked shoulder blades. ... She seemed
too fragile to exist; and that very fragility spoke of some
frightening strength which held her anchored to existence
with a body insufficient for reality.

One finds that all of Rand's heroines are of very slender - or
fragile - build. This also includes Kira in We The Living,
Karen Andre in Night of January 16th, and the various heroines
in The Early Ayn Rand.

The sex in Rand's novels is always described as a combat of wills,
and sometimes as a physical combat, such as the notorious "rape"
scene in The Fountainhead<2>, and
Bjorn Faulkner's "rape" of Karen Andre in Night of January
16th (Rand 1968, 82-83). To a lesser degree this also
applies to Dagny Taggart's sex scenes in Atlas Shrugged,
especially the one with John Galt (956-957). This combat is not a
combat of equals, and the woman is never the aggressor. The man
is always superior in both mental and physical strength.<3>

Here is another description of Dagny Taggart that illustrates this
ideal (154):

She stood as she always did, straight and taut, her head lifted
impatiently. It was the unfeminine pose of an executive. But
her naked shoulder betrayed the fragility of the body under the
black dress, and the pose made her most truly a woman. The proud
strength became a challenge to someone's superior strength, and
the fragility a reminder that the challenge could be broken.

Several other examples of male dominance may be found in the
pieces of fiction compiled in The Early Ayn Rand, e.g.,
"Kira's viking", and "Vesta Dunning".<4>
Interestingly, the editor of this collection,
Leonard Peikoff, identifies
a development in Rand's writing whereby the early fiction, with
dominating heroines, rather quickly turns into the male domination
typical of Rand's mature fiction (in Rand, 1984, 4). Peikoff, in
further describing the Randian heroine's feelings for her hero,
calls her "the opposite of a feminist" (34), and in yet another
instance he offers this description: "The hero, who now has
primacy over the heroine, is a completely recognizable Ayn Rand
type" (259).<5>

A discussion of the nature of sex in Atlas Shrugged, aimed at
explaining the integration of mind and body, love and sex,
evaluation and desire, and often repeated in Rand's non-fiction
(Rand [1961] 1968; Binswanger 1986), also carries with it strong
gender-role implications:

A man's sexual choice is the result and the sum of his
fundamental convictions. Tell me what a man finds sexually
attractive, and I will tell you his entire philosophy of life.
Show me the woman he sleeps with, and I will tell you his
valuation of himself. ... He will always be attracted to the
woman who reflects his deepest vision of himself, the woman
whose surrender permits him to experience - or to fake - a
sense of self-esteem. The man who is proudly certain of his own
value, will want the highest type of woman he can find, the
woman he admires, the strongest, the hardest to conquer -
because only the possession of a heroine will give him the sense
of an achievement, not the possession of a brainless slut.
(Rand 1957, 489-490)

Just as Rand's heroines are slender/fragile and feminine, her
female villains are often athletic or large, and unfeminine or
masculine, such as Eve Layton in The Fountainhead<6>, or Comrade Sonia in We the Living.<7> There seems to be a pattern in which heroes
are masculine, heroines are feminine, female villains are
unfeminine or masculine, and male villains are unmasculine or
feminine. Rand seems to engage in the "gendering" of evil, in
that characters whose gender identities and/or gender expressions
are considered inappropriate to their biological sex, are
portrayed as evil. This tendency is apparent in Rand's fiction
and non-fiction.

GENDER IN RAND'S NON-FICTION

According to Rand: "Men are metaphysically the dominant sex" (Rand
1975a). What exactly does it mean to be a "metaphysically
dominant sex"? The answer may be found in an article in The
Objectivist written by psychologist Nathaniel Branden
(1968), Rand's close associate for eighteen years, and the founder
and former leader of the first Objectivist movement:

The difference in the male and female sexual roles proceeds
from differences in man's and woman's respective anatomy and
physiology. Physically, man is the bigger and stronger of the
two sexes; his system produces and uses more energy; and he
tends (for physiological reasons) to be physically more active.
Sexually, his is the more active and dominant role; he has the
greater measure of control over his own pleasure and that of
his partner; it is he who penetrates and the woman who is
penetrated (with everything this entails, physically and
psychologically). ... [M]an experiences the essence of his
masculinity in the act of romantic dominance; woman experiences
the essence of her femininity in the act of romantic
surrender.<8>

Here Branden describes man as the romantic initiator and
aggressor, and woman as the challenger and responder to the man.<9> Throughout the Randian canon, this formulation
is not merely a preference, but a natural law. It is fair to say
that this is a part of Rand's philosophy, even though "sexual
psychology" is not strictly a part of any of the five major
philosophical disciplines.<10> But the errors
that Rand make concerning gender are philosophical in that they
contradict or entail philosophical principles and positions.
Moreover, Rand's gender credo is a part of Objectivist culture.
But the credo itself is unsupported by scientific knowledge and
logically incompatible with the larger context of Objectivism as a
philosophical system. Furthermore, it is both anti-individualist
and antifeminist.

Since the substance of Rand's claims are addressed throughout this
article, it is worth quoting at length from her important essay
"About a Woman President":

For a woman qua woman, the essence of femininity is
hero-worship - the desire to look up to man. "To look up"
does not mean dependence, obedience, or anything implying
inferiority. It means an intense kind of admiration; and
admiration is an emotion that can be experienced only by a
person of strong character and independent value
judgments. ... Hero worship is a demanding virtue: a woman
has to be worthy of it and of the hero she worships.
Intellectually and morally, i.e., as a human being, she has to
be his equal; then the object of her worship is specifically
his masculinity, not any human virtue she might lack. ...
Her worship is an abstract emotion for the metaphysical
concept of masculinity as such ... It means that a properly
feminine woman does not treat men as if she were their pal,
sister, mother - or leader. ... To act as the superior, the
leader, virtually the ruler of all the man she deals with,
would be an excruciating psychological torture. It would
require a total depersonalization, an utter selflessness, and
an incommunicable loneliness; she would have to suppress (or
repress) every personal aspect of her own character and
attitude; she could not be herself, i.e., a woman; ... she
would become the most unfeminine, sexless, metaphysically
inappropriate, and rationally revolting figure of all: a
matriarch. This would apply to the reigning queen of an
absolute monarchy, but it would not apply to a woman in any
field of endeavor other than politics.<11>
(Rand [1968] 1988 267-69)

Rand mentions Joan of Arc as the most heroic woman - and the most
tragic symbol - in history, not primarily because she was burned
at the stake, but because she had to assume the role of leader in
order to revive the fighting spirit of the soldiers.<12> It is interesting to compare Rand's view of
Joan of Arc with her penchant for gendering characters. Rand's
view seems to be that the heroism of Joan of Arc is not due to
military actions and achievements, or to opposition and resistance
to torture. Rather, it resides in Joan's alleged rejection of
femininity. This is a forceful illustration of the natural
law-like status that Rand ascribes to her own conceptions of the
masculine and the feminine in sexual psychology.

RANDIAN ALTERNATIVES TO RAND'S VIEWS OF GENDER

An obvious alternative interpretation of the sexual act, namely
that who conquers and who surrenders need not be predetermined
either in fact or by gender, that the sexual power transactions
may shift, change and reconfigure themselves over time (and that
this shifting and uncertainty of outcome itself may be a
part of the sexual tension and build-up), is not addressed neither
by Rand nor by other Objectivists. The Randian version of erotic
combat seems monotonous compared to the rich natural variation
of expression in human sexuality - even when limiting oneself to
consider rough and passionate sex only.

The lack of awareness of alternatives may be rightly interpreted
by feminists as an example of what Riane Eisler ([1987]
1995) calls "the dominator model" at work, whereby human
interaction is always interpreted as instances of corresponding
domination and submission. This is distinct from what Eisler
calls "the partnership model", whereby human interaction is
interpreted as a voluntary exchange between equals (xvii).
Replacing power hierarchies (especially gendered power
hierarchies) with equality and choice has always been a major
(perhaps, and ideally, the major) concern of feminism,
and a discussion of this aspect of feminism is essential for
understanding the tensions between Rand and feminism.

Interpreting Rand with Eisler's terminology, one may argue that
Rand's general philosophy as well as her heroic characters upholds
"the partnership model", which is the only moral basis for human
interaction and transactions, what Rand calls "the trader
principle". Yet, the literary images of human sexuality projected
by Rand, as well as several of her explicit non-fiction statements
are written in the language of "the dominator model". This is an
inherent contradiction in Rand's writing, and a feminist rereading
of Rand must address, and if possible, resolve it.

There are three interaction style alternatives to male conquest
and the domination of women: "women conquering men", "switching
between submission and conquest", and "equality without power
difference fetishism". Are these alternatives compatible with
Rand's philosophy? Or does her philosophy contradict her own
position on gender, which entails a restrictive and limited view
of human psychology and sexuality?

The alternatives above are underemphasized in Rand's work, because
of her gender restrictions. Indeed, if Rand's gender style
preferences are viewed as universal gender-role prescriptions, the
alternatives would be rejected in toto by any ardent Objectivist.
This would indeed be a strange and tragic outcome for a philosophy
that started out as a highly integrated vision of love, sex, self
and relationships.

GENDER LENSES OR ESSENCES?

Sandra
Bem (1993), a leading psychologist and researcher on gender
and gender roles, identifies three "lenses of gender" - three main
categories of deep, hidden cultural assumptions of gender that are
embedded in cultural discourses and social institutions as well as
in individual psyches:

The first lens ... is androcentrism, or male-centeredness. This
is not just the historically crude perception that men are
inherently superior to women but a more treacherous underpinning
of that perception: a definition of males and male experience as
a neutral standard or norm, and females and female experience as
a sex-specific deviation from that norm. It is thus not that man
is treated as superior and woman as inferior but that man is
treated as human and woman as "other".
The second lens is the lens of gender polarization. Once again,
this is not just the historically crude perception that women and
men are fundamentally different from one another but the more
subtle and insidious use of that perceived difference as an
organizing principle for the social life of the culture. It is
thus not simply that women and men are seen to be different, but
that this male-female difference is superimposed on so many
aspects of the social world that a cultural connection is thereby
forged between sex and virtually every other aspect of human
experience, including modes of dress and social roles and even
ways of expressing emotion and experiencing sexual desire.
Finally, the third lens is the lens of biological essentialism,
which rationalizes and legitimizes both other lenses by treating
them as the natural and inevitable consequences of the intrinsic
biological natures of women and men. (2)

While Rand was not a biological essentialist (even though several
of her positions on gender would seem to require a basis in
biological essentialism), she favored androcentrism and gender
polarization, both incompatible with her Objectivist philosophy.
In my view, Rand's Objectivism logically entails "metaphysical
equality" of women and men (not androcentrism) and gender
nonessentialism (not gender polarization).

Nonessentialism, in the context of gender and social science,
does not mean a denial of identity of consciousness, as Rand's
supporters might fear. It means a rejection of biological
determinism - specifically, it means a rejection of the idea
that biological sex alone determines or delimits human behavior.
It means that environmental and cultural factors, as well as
individual choice, will always be a part of the picture, and that
they may override, direct or redefine the expression of genetical
or biological tendencies at any time. So the term 'essentialism'
means one thing in philosophy (a universal and immutable Platonic
essence), and something else in the social sciences (where
'essence' is translated into an assumption of a transcultural,
transindividual biological determinism).

According to Rand and Objectivism, on the other hand,
consciousness has a particular identity.<13>
However, this identity is the same for men and women. In fact,
this is the only gender position compatible with
Objectivism.<13b> The idea of a gendered
identity of consciousness is not only unsupported; there are many
indications against it, including the empirical fact of human
variety with overlap between men and women, the fact that no
characteristic isolated to one sex only has been found, and the
fact that the variety of characteristics within each sex
is actually larger than it is betweenthe sexes.<14>

The idea that the identity of consciousness is gendered is
incompatible with a key idea of Objectivism, namely that people
are born tabula rasa, that is, without inborn ideas, i.e., their
mind is a "clean slate".<15> This means that
all of an individual's ideas and actions are open to rational
evaluation and may be changed volitionally. The idea of a
universal "gender essence", upon which the idea of a gendered
identity of consciousness rests, is a Platonic construct. Both
this construct itself and its implementation in the form of
biological determinism are totally at odds with Objectivism.

SEX VERSUS GENDER

Starting with the biological dichotomy of male and female,<16> does it exist, and do we need a
corresponding psychological dichotomy of masculine and feminine?
The terms "masculine" and "feminine" presuppose that there is a
similar psychological dichotomy, on the same level of reality as
the biological one, that is, as something given and determined by
nature. The implicit claim is that men normally are or should
conform to an approved list of psychological characteristics
perceived or defined as "masculine", and that women normally are
or should conform to a complementary list of psychological
characteristics perceived or defined as "feminine". And, as an
immediate and unavoidable implication of this, that the
not-masculine man and the not-feminine woman are abnormal or
immoral. The "gender-deviant" boy or girl may be subjected to
psychiatric treatment against his or her will, including
incarceration, drugs and electroshock.<17>
Such implications seem to be inherent in the terminology. But is
there really a sex-gender link?

Sandra Bem (1971) demonstrates the existence of two widespread,
fairly specific polarized stereotypes or notions of gender in our
culture, assigned to men and women respectively and exclusively.
This bipolar view on gender assumes that "masculinity" and
"femininity" are opposite ends of a scale. However, this view is
false. "Masculinity" and "femininity" are two independent
variables. An individual may have much of the one and little of
the other ("masculine") or little of the one and much of the other
("feminine"), or much of both (which is called "androgynous") or
little of both (which is called "undifferentiated"). Since about
50% of men and women describe themselves as androgynous, gender
stereotypes are wrong at least half the time and have poor
predictive power.

In our culture, the good part of "masculine" characteristics
centers on "instrumentality" or mastery, e.g., being strong,
enduring, independent, verbally accurate, competent in making and
using tools, persevering and excelling in one's activities, and in
the ability to organize and lead. In contrast, the bad part of
"masculinity" includes being cold, emotionally repressed, focused
on beating others rather than on self-improvement (aggressive
competitiveness), unable to admit and deal with doubt or failure,
and compulsive in one's inclinaton to dominate and control others.

The good part of "femininity" centers on expressivity: emotional
openness, the ability to listen and nurture, being cooperative,
easygoing, warm, loyal, playful, adept at non-verbal communication
skills, and able to identify and express emotions. The bad part
of "femininity" includes passivity, helplessness, submissiveness,
repression of "aggressive" feelings, and lack of self-assertion,
of independent action, of systematic pursuit of goals, and of
structure.

Western culture, however, often downplays feminine characteristics
altogether, equating moral virtue with maleness. By contrast, the
androgyny model challenges those who would privilege the masculine
alone as virtue. More importantly, it sees no automatic link
between maleness and "masculinity", nor between femaleness and
"femininity". It assumes "masculinity" and "femininity" are
defined with wide differences in different cultures; a
characteristic that is considered "masculine" in one culture is
considered "feminine" in another. The grouping of characteristics
into grab-bags labeled "masculinity" or "femininity" is arbitrary,
it is the result of cultural invention, not natural law. In other
words, androgyny seems to exempt or disconnect gender from sex.

It follows from this that the constituent characteristics of
gender stereotypes are arbitrarily joined and assigned; they are
not dictated by nature. One's psychological characteristics are
not determined by one's reproductive system. Biology is not
destiny. This suggests a need to encourage males to acquire those
characteristics (or rather the positive part of them) that our
culture calls "feminine", not instead of, but in addition to, the
masculine characteristics. And females need encouragement to
acquire the best of "masculine" characteristics in addition to
"feminine" characteristics (that is, the best of both worlds).

One effect of encouraging the best of the "masculine" and
"feminine" characteristics in everybody, that is, promoting
cultural, psychological and ethical androgyny,<18> is that androgyny counteracts the bad parts
of both "femininity" and "masculinity". That is, the good parts
of "femininity" drive out the bad parts of "masculinity", and the
good parts of "masculinity" drive out the bad parts of
"femininity". There are no "masculine virtues" and no "feminine
virtues", only human virtues that should be encouraged in
everyone. And there are many morally neutral psychological
characteristics that should be available to (i.e., socially
permissible for) anyone inclined toward them.<19>

Being androgynous means having more options to choose from,
because one is in touch with a bigger part of one's humanity.
Thus one's ability to deal with different situations is better.
Androgyny also implies that one will be able - and permitted -
to develop in directions chosen by oneself. Androgyny translates
into freedom and gender individualism. It encourages the
development of a complete and integrated human character and
personality, in contrast to the two incomplete half-humans of sex
stereotyping.

For many, "femininity" and "masculinity" appear to be two vague
and yet strangely limiting separate modes of being whose
reconciliation is impossible. Consequently, women and men are
viewed as so fundamentally different that they may as well have
come from different planets. Replacing these two terms with more
descriptive and objective ones like "expressivity" and
"instrumentality" may be a step toward resolving such conflicts
within and between individuals. Warren (1982, 184) notes:
"What's artificial is the notion that combining these diverse
characteristics is more difficult than separating them." This
combination is the goal of feminist androgynists.

BEYOND ANDROGYNY

The concept of androgyny has been criticized for reproducing the
same flaws inherent in "masculinity" and "femininity" - namely,
the idea of metaphysically given gender essences (even if
coexisting in the same body). If our goal is to liberate virtues,
and vices from arbitrary gender categories, why not abandon
androgyny, along with femininity and masculinity?

There are two reasons to reject this line of reasoning: First,
androgyny has served to undermine and expose several flaws in
traditional gender views, such as the notion that masculinity and
femininity are opposites and cannot coexist in the same person,
and the notion that sex determines gender, or that gender
expression (as well as sexual orientation) must follow and adhere
to sex stereotypes. Second, since it is unlikely that
"femininity" and "masculinity" will drop out of popular usage, a
strategy is needed to counteract their most damaging collectivist
implications. Androgyny is that strategy; it is a concept of a
process, the process of transcending the masculine-feminine
duality.<20>

One may question whether "masculine" and "feminine" are valid
concepts at all. Will anything at all remain when all cultural
artifacts and restrictions of gender have been overcome? If so,
what would be left? If what is left is essentially the same, only
habitually referred to as "feminine" when found in a woman and
"masculine" when found in a man, then there is no reason to have
two concepts for it. One concept will do.<20b> Moreover, since whatever it is that is
left is something that will vary in degree and composition between
individuals, using the two categories "femininity" and
"masculinity" to refer to it will be misleading because such a use
would suggest that the degree and composition varies with gender,
rather than varying with individuals, and that leads back towards
gender stereotypes and away from individual variation and
authenticity.

So we are faced with two alternatives: Either the terms
"masculine" and "feminine" may be used to describe any individual,
independent of one's sex, and without any moral component (so that
there is no implication of moral degradation in describing someone
as a "masculine woman" or a "feminine man"). This alternative
translates into the descriptive use of instrumental and expressive
characteristics, as described above. The benefit of this approach
is that it actually starts with what most people associate with
and mean by "masculine" and "feminine", and then there is some
hope of making it clear that these words do not refer to
unalterable natural or biological characteristics, nor mutually
exclusive ones, but to a diverse reality which is changeable,
voluntary, volatile and to a large degree cultural and social.

Alternatively, "masculine" and "feminine" may not refer to
phenomena that constitute two opposite or separate realms (if they
point to anything at all), but to some common aspect of the human
condition (for example characteristics related to an authentic
expression of sexual orientation, style preferences, and values on
a fundamental level common to all humans). But if so, the
existence of two opposite categories for the same, one,
fundamental reality is misleading - especially so because the
categories are construed as opposites. Hence, both terms ought to
be abandoned. Besides, a lot of other already existing terms
would seem to capture this reality better: authenticity, identity,
vitality, life force and soforth. However, I think it unlikely
for this to happen (that is, people will not abandon the use of
the words "masculine" and "feminine"), so we probably have to live
with the first approach for a long time.

A problem in the historical and etymological connection between
femininity and women and masculinity and men, is that, in a
Randian context, it may encourage the unwarranted and harmful
conclusion that only men are worthy of hero-worship, and only
women are to be granted the privilege of hero-worshiping.
Ideally, in the long run, we should abandon the terms
"masculinity" and "femininity" altogether, as remnants of a
collectivist past. Gender liberation or gender individualism
encourages individuals to take pride in and develop their own
unique gender identities. Perhaps most or all concepts of
androgyny will make themselves superfluous through the creation of
a "postandrogynous", or individualist, society.

OTHER SEX-GENDER MODELS

Androgyny as an empirical fact and a moral ideal is not dependent
on nonessentialism. That is, androgyny does not require that
there be no connection between (biological) sex and
(psychological/cultural) gender. One other possibility is that
there is such a connection, but that it is weak and may be
overridden or altered. In other words, cultural factors and
individual choice may override or modify a sex-gender or
biology-behavior link.

A third possibility is that there is a large biological component
in gender - for example, gender might be conceived as a kind of
sex-related sexual temperament or some equivalent thereof. Even
this model does not provide validation for or justification of the
rigid gender roles and gender polarization of our culture.
Cultural anthropology has documented the enormous variation in
"gender temperaments" between and within cultures.<20c> Within this model, we would operate with
many subcategories of maleness and femaleness, mapping a large
continuum of types depending on many variables or dimensions, a
situation that would in effect be functionally similar to ethical
androgyny. Hence, this model too is compatible with and in fact
leads to gender individualism. In other words, biology does not imply collectivism or
conformity.

Furthermore, biological determinants need not be, and often are
not, linked to or determined by sex. There is a lot of genetic
variation (from the standpoint of biological evolution, that's the
whole point or survival value of having two sexes in the first
place), so a prominence of biological factors does not translate
into or justify gender stereotypes. Indeed, in terms of genetic
variation and natural selection, one could argue that eradicating
individual differences and variety, which is the function and
purpose of gender-role collectivism, is opposed to our biological
nature, because natural selection needs biological variation in
order to work. This article is written on the assumption that
gender is an ethnicity (a cultural artifact), rather than
a temperament - that is, that gender is defined primarily
or ultimately by culture and by choice, rather than by biology),<21> since biological claims about human behavior
are notoriously uncertain and biased (see note 28). But the
choice is not between individual freedom on the one hand, against
an alliance of science and gender-role collectivism on the
other.

Branden (1996) predicts a revival of "animal
self-assertiveness" as a factor in a revival of masculinity and
femininity. To me, the idea of an "animal gender pride" suggests
an image of a unique and personal gender identity that one
experiences as if one is born with it. This may not be what
Branden has in mind, but this emphasis on a pristine and
unapologetic pride suggests an appealing image of an innocent and
undamaged personal pride untarred and untouched by a gender
collectivist culture.

HEROISM AND WORSHIP AS EXPRESSIONS OF PRIDE

This approach means that we must reject Rand's description of a
femininity that sees the object of a woman's worship to be
specifically a man's masculinity, "not any human virtue
she might lack" (Rand [1968] 1988, 268). Rand's claim is too
narrow in three ways: First, it posits masculinity as the only
object worthy of hero-worship, and second, it only permits women
the privilege of hero worship, not men. But Rand's claim is wrong
in a third way as well: in its tacit assumption that if one
admires or worships some other aspect than
masculinity/gender in the other, this can only happen if one does
not possess (at least not to the same degree) the trait
or virtue in question. And if it is a basic character virtue that
one lacks and therefore seeks to find in another person, the
relationship must degenerate into Platonic (incomplete in itself)
love (examined below).<22>

But one can possess a virtue in the same degree as one's lover,
and still worship an expression of that virtue in a realm or
through skills that one does not possess. For example, I may be
as courageous as my lover, but lacking her physical skills and
training, I can worship her courage as expressed through her
abilities as a skydiver or kickboxer. Possessing a virtue is one
thing, skills and arenas for its expression is something else, and
it is the latter, the unique embodiment of virtues, skills,
characteristics, preferences, experiences, gestures, ideas and
beliefs and so forth, that constitute the flavor and style of a
unique personality. It is this flavor and style that are the
building blocks of a person's sense of life, which, according to
Rand, is the main component of a person with whom one falls in
love. Being in love implies that two persons' senses of life
resonate.

So Rand posited an asymmetry between femininity and masculinity,
and hence between men and women, and that was a mistake. However,
there is an asymmetry here, one not properly addressed or
explored by Rand. Hero-worship and heroism/being a hero are
asymmetrical a way other than Rand assumed. Being a hero (which,
for Rand means having a productive purpose, developing and using
one's abilities and creativity to the fullest, and earning pride
in the process)<23> is something that one can
achieve for oneself, and recognize and acknowledge in oneself
through one's self-esteem and pride. But hero-worship requires
another, one who is the object and recipient of
worship.

This constitutes a fundamental asymmetry. On the one hand,
developing a fully self-sufficient ego with an independent
first-hand 'creator' approach to life is a demanding task.
Indeed, it is this task which is the very theme of The
Fountainhead. Still, it involves primarily oneself and thus
one self. It rests on factors that are in principle available to
the individual in the first place, factors within the
individual. Finding another self, however - that special
other self with whom one has a great deal in common - and
developing and maintaining a relationship with this other
resonating self, depends on many external factors that may be
outside an individual's control. In other words, "finding
oneself" is a self-contained task, so to speak, while
finding another is not. And this is the asymmetry.

The need for hero worship is also outwardly directed. It is the
need for connection, the crucial foundation for a love
relationship. And since this connection emerges through a process
of mutual psychological visibility, the need for a hero to worship
in a romantic-sexual context, speaks to the very essence of the
relationship. One might say, in this context, that it is even
more crucial than the need to be a hero.<24>
What each hero needs from a relationship, then, is not primarily
the recognition of his or her own heroism, but an outlet for the
act of worshiping the other's heroism. Both need to be heroes in
the first place, and both need an external source for hero
worship.

A romantic relationship with only one hero and one hero-worshiper
is dysfunctional; it would reduce the hero-worshiper to a kind of
metaphysical parasitism. Rand can easily be read to support and
uphold such a position. This is why Rand has never been popular
with feminists; and it is certainly a strange position for her to
hold, as an individualist.<25>

There must be an equality of worth and an equality of "soul
trading" in a relationship, and the asymmetry between being a hero
and worshiping a hero (between pride and admiration) destroys that
equality, unless both lovers do both. However, since Rand equates
masculinity with being a hero, and femininity with hero-worship,
she obscures our perception of the heroic in women.

I have argued for the mutuality, equality and symmetry of these
needs in all humans, regardless of gender. The paradox is that my
case is based on inferences drawn from a rereading of Rand's own
philosophy. This suggests that Rand's personal views of gender
are at variance with that philosophy.

LOVE: ARISTOTELIAN VERSUS PLATONIC

Given this mutuality, this "Randian androgyny" of heroism and
hero-worship if you like, how different can two people be and
still retain a relationship that is equal and mutual? What about
Rand's heroes and heroines? Do they fall short of this standard?

Rand's heroic characters, in my view, when examined in isolation,
"as individuals", are acceptable, because the author makes it
clear that each person is and must be morally complete. The
relationship must be its own goal and reward, not a means to some
other "higher" end. The key concept here is "moral completeness"
(an Aristotelian concept), or in Randian terminology, "the
self-sufficient ego". As Rand states through the character of
Howard Roark, in order to say "I love you", one must first be able
to say the "I" (Rand [1943] 1986, 377). Exploring this topic,
Allan
Gotthelf (1989), an Aristotelian scholar and an Objectivist,
introduces the opposing concepts of "Aristotelian love", and
"Platonic love":

Aristotelian love is that conception of love according to
which love of another human being (I) stems from a fundamental
completeness of person - an achieved moral character and
its consequence, an authentic self-love; and (II) is aimed at a
heightened, and joyous, self-experience, as an end in itself,
not a means to some greater end - because there is no greater
end for a human being than his own happiness on earth, and such
love is a source of profound happiness.
Platonic love is that conception of love according to which
love of another human being (I) stems from a fundamental
incompleteness of person, and (II) is aimed at some higher
goal and value beyond the love relationship itself, through
which the desired completeness is approached.

Gotthelf identifies six key aspects of the Aristotelian
alternative to Platonic love. First, that there is nothing higher
or more real than the individual. Second, that completeness of
character (moral perfection) is possible. Third, that humans can
achieve full virtues. Fourth, that humans take pride in this, and
that this is profoundly good. Fifth, that love of others is an
expression of love for self. And sixth, that love is an end in
itself.

Gotthelf also identifies romantic love as a species of
Aristotelian love. Rand was an Aristotelian in her conceptions of
love and sex, building upon and enhancing foundations laid by
Aristotle. Since all of Rand's heroes and heroines are (or come
to be) morally complete, they practice Aristotelian love.
However, if one considers their larger context, a gender role
pattern emerges. A rereading of the Randian canon reveals a
pattern that reflects Rand's personal preferences, rather than a
universal prescription to be inferred or derived from her
philosophy.

GENDER: ARISTOTELIAN VERSUS PLATONIC

For Rand, gender is metaphysical, not human-made. Rand is an
advocate of what I call "Platonic gender". Platonic gender is the
idea that there exist universal ideal forms of masculinity and
femininity, forms that all men and all women respectively and
separately either share by birth or ought to adhere to by choice.
Rand suggests that gender must be chosen by the individual, in
accordance with the individual's biological sex.<26> Hence, Rand appears at first glance to be a
nonessentialist, insofar as she posits that individuals do not
have an inborn gender identity.

However, Rand claimed that the woman who is or aspires to be the
political leader or ruler of men, will do damage to herself. This
is an essentialist claim, since apparently the woman cannot choose
away the alleged damage (resulting from her loss of femininity and
her alleged psychological masculinization), a damage that cannot
happen to a man. So on the one hand, gender is chosen, but on the
other hand, it is not. Rand's ideas of gender are in conflict
with her general philosophical ideas of free will, universal moral
virtues, and women's equality.<27>

The idea of Platonic gender runs contrary to Rand's
Aristotelianism. In particular, it is incompatible with
Aristotelian love, which is the basis for Rand's theory of love.
In contrast to Platonic gender, we can formulate an alternative
concept: Aristotelian gender. Aristotle's concept of the personal
daimon
may serve as a basis for this concept: each person is
conceived to be constituted of a 'daimon,' a unique personal
identity that is the great sum of all an individual's
characteristics (inborn, learned, or chosen - and comprising
personality as well as character traits). The gender daimon is
that part of this sum which is related to gender. The daimon
concept emphasizes the individual and underscores the empirical
fact of human variety and uniqueness. This places primacy on the
individual context, rather than on the uniform enforcement of
universal rules as suggested by Platonic constructs. Aristotelian
gender is entirely unique to the individual. Implicit in this
view is that one should not try to impose one's own gender daimon
on someone else.

Hence, the concept of Aristotelian gender aims (1) to clarify the
individuality and variety of gender, and (2) to thwart the uniform
collectivism inherent in the traditional, "Platonic" conceptions
of gender, masculinity and femininity. Aristotelian gender forms
a basis for gender individualism. In a sense, both Aristotelian
gender and psychological androgyny are aspects of the same
reality. When we examine this reality from the vantage point of
Rand and Aristotle, we may call it "Aristotelian gender". When we
assume the vantage point of feminism, equality, psychology and
cultural anthropology, we may call it "androgyny".

GENDER AS HUMAN-MADE

My point then, is that the ideas of contemporary feminism
concerning the relationship between gender and sex are compatible
with Objectivism and individualism, unlike Rand's own personal
views of gender. Moreover, these ideas are best supported by
empirical findings, unlike research purporting to support
biological essentialism, "research" that is usually biased,
methodologically flawed, and conceptually ambiguous.<28>

So, gender is man-made, not metaphysical;<29>
there are no universal gender forms of masculinity or femininity.
Gender is Aristotelian; it is personal and unique to the
individual. Gender and sex are two different things.<30> Hence, those who uphold Platonic gender,
including Rand,<31> commit the epistemological
fallacy that Rand called "package-dealing", treating two different
things as if they were one and the same thing.

Platonic gender is in conflict with the idea of tabula rasa, that
humans have no inborn ideas. Platonic gender is sex as destiny
and sex as duty: a rationale for cultural and social enforcement
of collectivist gender roles, and for other arbitrary rules
regulating the expression of gender and sexuality.

The idea of gender roles (and rules) is a form of collectivism,
and is incompatible with individualism. The feminist claim that
there is no connection, or a weak and breakable connection,
between sex and gender<32> is thus not merely
an empirical claim, but also a moral imperative. By removing the
collectivist restrictions on gender, it becomes possible to treat
people as individual humans first, thus liberating them to choose
their own path. Ironically, many feminists hold a view on gender
roles that is much closer to individualism than are the views of
many Randians. When it comes to issues of gender, contemporary
feminism is more "Randian" than Rand.

According to Rand, "Man is a being of self-made soul" - and so,
of course, is Woman. So why should Man (or Woman) let tradition
or other group thinking decide their gender expression or sexual
preferences? People of course have a right to be anything they
want to be, including a right to limit themselves with
collectivist stereotypes. Rand developed and advocated a
philosophy of enlightened self-interest, with an imperative to "be
all you can be". But this striving for one's best self, this
"moral ambitiousness", is irreconcilable with the idea of reducing
oneself to a stereotype, to an interchangeable unit in a
collectivist binary gender machine.

THE RICHNESS OF HUMAN SEXUALITY

Rand ([1968] 1988) tells us "that a properly feminine woman does
not treat men as if she were their pal, sister, mother - or
leader." But she is inconsistent with her own philosophy.
Relationships go through dynamic shifts. They are not always
about sex or love-making. Sometimes a relationship is about
emotional support. For example, through a difficult moment,
during stress or a crisis, one or the other may temporarily assume
a role like that of a sister, brother, mother or father, a
situation where a sexual emphasis might be inappropriate.

And pal? Certainly friendship is a vital and necessary ingredient
in any long-lasting romantic relationship. Often a long-lasting
relationship begins as a solid friendship. A lover can be a good
pal.<33> There are also such things as sexual
friendships - friendships that take on a sexual component, without
the assumption of a lasting romantic relationship, and without
love in the strict sense.

Furthermore, sex and love-making are much richer and more complex
realms than Rand seems to allow. Let us identify four different
main categories of interaction in human sexuality:

male domination with active penile penetration

female domination with active vaginal engulfment

switching roles, sometimes one dominates, sometimes the other

equality with neither partner more active or dominating

Since this is a conceptual categorization, the four roles may be
combined in different ways, or used alternatively in the same
sexual experience.<34>

Sciabarra (1995, 200) describes an interpretation of the sexual
act as portrayed by Dmitri Sergeyevich Merezhkovsky, a Russian
Symbolist poet in the Silver Age era of Rand's youth:

Merezhkovsky had viewed the sexual act as the highest form of
unity, since each body is interpenetrated by the other. For
Merezhkovsky, true human being involves a synthesis of the
womanly aspect in man, and the manly aspect in woman.

Sciabarra further points out that this ideal of an indivisible
androgyne goes beyond what Objectivists - so far - have
accepted, even though some Objectivists reject many
culturally-induced gender stereotypes (at least in the
intellectual and emotional realms).

There are two points that require comment here: First, the ideal
of "interpenetration" is an unfortunate term because it is
androcentric, evoking the image of penile penetration to the
exclusion of vaginal engulfment. A better term might be, for
example, permeation. Second, while the idea of a mutual
interpenetration (or permeation) certainly is an improvement over
androcentric, one-sided active male penetration and passive female
reception, it is still problematic. The concept seems to hide a
great variety in the reality it attempts to describe, ranging from
complete female domination and active engulfment to complete male
domination and active penetration. Just as the male
penetration-concept excludes the three other main interaction
categories, the mutual interpenetration concept seems to
over-emphasize the "equal roles"-category (and perhaps male
penetration as well, due to choice of words).

All four sexual-interaction categories are compatible with the
feminist "partnership model", as defined by Riane Eisler, only
when identified as equally valid personal preferences. None of
them would be acceptable or compatible if enforced as a universal
prescription.

THE FEMALE HERO: A NEW SYNTHESIS OF RAND AND FEMINISM

In this article, I have argued that Ayn Rand laid the foundations
for a revolution in our philosophical understanding of human
sexuality, love and relationships, but that her project has been
prohibited from reaching its full potential because of flaws and
inconsistencies in her notions of gender. The fundamental
contradiction is that, in metaphysics, Rand is a gender
nonessentialist (gender must be chosen), while in
metaethics, ethics, and esthetics, Rand is a gender essentialist
(gender must be chosen correctly). The
gender-role restrictions that Rand prescribes as normative
universals, and their Platonic underpinnings, undercut the very
individualism and revolutionary sexuality inherent in Rand's
philosophy.

Because we live in a culture that is both androcentric (derived
from its ancient Greek roots)<35> and
misogynistic (derived from its Christian heritage), we are
culturally deprived of symbols and myths of female power, female
heroism. While it is equally important that men reclaim their
emotional and nurturing sides ("feminine" virtues), cultural
deprivation demands that we concentrate on women reclaiming power
and mastery ("masculine" virtues). This is where the heroic
potential in Rand's philosophy meets feminism.

It is my belief that a feminist rereading of the Randian canon can
energize and contribute to feminism, by nourishing its
individualist aspects. What we need are symbols and myths that
integrate female power and sexuality, strength and beauty, courage
and grace. What we need is not "heroines" (who are usually
reduced to passive prize objects/rewards for male heroes), but
female heroes (active heroes who happen to be female).
The term "heroine" serves to masculinize what can otherwise be an
excellent term for a virtuous person - namely hero - because it
prevents women from being subsumed under the category of "hero".
This is a prime example of how the male is defined as the norm,
the human, and the female as a deviation from that norm or as
"other" (see also Hofstadter 1987). So starved are we, that we
grope at any sign, any crumb, we can find of the female hero in
popular culture.

As part of the feminist enterprise, archaelogists, historians and
cultural anhtropologists (like Riane Eisler) are rediscovering,
reclaiming and reinterpreting ancient images and myths of female
power and female heroism. These images and myths of a "new
ancient feminism" (Stone [1979] 1990) can be used as vehicles for
assessing and interpreting the feminist potential in Rand's
philosophy.

There is an archetype of female power and heroism that is known in
all cultures and all times, even among the most androcentric and
misogynistic ones: The
Amazon.<36> Heroic Amazon traditions,
ancient Greek mythology and philosophy (including androcentrism),
and Rand's ancient Greece-influenced philosophy have a number of
intriguing conceptual and historical interconnections.

Rand compared one of her heroines to a Valkyrie,
a powerful Amazon feminist symbol (see note <5>). Is there a
basis for an amazon
feminist interpretation of Rand,<37>
and how would such an interpretation relate to the author's
explicit androcentrism?

AMAZON HEROISM VERSUS ANDROCENTRISM

The
Amazon archetype may be the most radical and subversive
alternative to gender-role collectivism. The heroic image of a
strong and proud woman undaunted in pursuit of her goals is an
archetypical image of individualism. Such women, real or
imaginary, are excellent role models - heroes - for girls and
young women. This is where one of the main front lines of the
battle for the future of feminism will be: over the ethical,
social, political and esthetical meanings and evaluations of
Amazon symbols and role models. The popular culture icon of the
contemporary female action hero is a relatively new phenomenon in
films, but an old trend in myths and literature.

Popular culture provides many examples of how Amazon myths are
rewritten in order to sunder female power and female sexuality.
Red
Sonja, a 1985 Dino de Laurentiis movie, based on the
character from Robert E. Howard's Conan stories, is one such
example. Red
Sonja is a strong and capable Amazon warrior, and she has
sworn not to make love to any man that has not beaten her in a
sword fight. As a result of her prowess and ability, she is a
virgin. This is an old idea; we also find it in Goethe's story
about
Siegfried and Brunhilde, where Brunhilde is far
too strong to be conquered, and so Siegfried cheats her into
believing that he has actually conquered her. But Brunhilde is
chaste; she does not use her power to get a lover, as a man would
do.

There are several ancient Greek myths with similar motifs, such as
the myth of Atalanta, an
Amazonian huntress and the best athlete in Calydon, who could
outrun any man, and would only marry a man who could outrun her.
She was beaten when she was tricked into stopping to pick up three
golden apples dropped by one of her suitors. The message remains
that a woman must renounce her power, if she is to have a lover,
or to exist as a sexual being.

The idea that Amazons are chaste or asexual beings stems from the
conception of sexuality as an act of conquest by which the male
subdues a passive female and makes her surrender. In this frame
of mind, the act of sex is always interpreted as penetration -
and, hence, domination - even if it is initiated and lead by a
female giant interacting with a male dwarf. Sex is penetration,
and penetration is domination. Thus, the male has, by his
(biological) nature, the role of domination as an active agent or
subject; and the female has, by her (biological) nature, the role
of submission as a passive object. But a strong, autonomous,
female hero is not submissive, and has not surrendered.
Conventional wisdom wants us to believe that such a female denies
her own femininity and sexuality; that she is and must be
virginal.

However, the original meaning of the term "virgin" is a woman who
is whole unto herself, not controlled by a male (Naisbitt and
Aburdene 1994). She has a self-contained identity, or in Rand's
terminology: a self-sufficient ego. Artemis
and Athena
were called virgins, even though they took lovers, because their
myths are not defined by family members; theirs were
self-contained identities.

The literal meaning of virginity is not sexual celibacy or
abstinence, but the state of being unmarried. Larson (1995, 100)
writes:

The virgin, because purity was a kind of freedom from the sexual
claims of any man, was theoretically more free than the wife.
This conceptual freedom was translated into the power of virgins
in myth. Virgins were associated with the wild and untamed;
hunters were often required to maintain chastity. The verb
damazo, "tame", referred to the taking of a wife.<38>

This is a powerful illustration of the cultural sundering of female
sexuality and female power. In order to be a sexual being, a woman
must be accessible to a man, available for conquest and penetration.
If she is not, she cannot have a sex life, and a sexuality, because
these are given to her by the man. She cannot take them on her own;
she cannot herself win or conquer a man, and take him into her,
engulfing him - or so this mythology will have us believe.

Hence, as a result of this monotonous over-emphasis on the first
sexual-interaction category, male domination and conquest, the
powerful woman is widely imagined as virginal, and perhaps even
sexless. Rereading Rand's "Woman President" essay in this context
is illuminating. Rand describes the woman in power as "totally
depersonalized", "utterly selfless", "incommunicably lonely",
"unfeminine", "metaphysically inappropriate", and "rationally
revolting". Rand's supporters often cite her defense of women as
the intellectual, emotional, moral, and political equals of men.
While this claim about equality is largely true if one emphasizes
Rand's meta-ethics and ethics rather than her views on gender and
sexuality,<38b> Rand's view of gender is part
of an old, ignoble canonical tradition stretching back to the
androcentric society of ancient Greece. Walker (1983, 1051)
notes, about virtue:

Latin virtus was derived from vir, 'man', and originally
meant masculinity, impregnating power, semen, or male magic,
like Germanic heill. Patriarchal thinkers defined manliness
as good and womanliness as bad, therefore virtus became
synonymous with morality or godliness along with other
synonyms hinting at male sexuality: erectness, uprightness,
rectitude, upstandingness, etc."

Rand speaks of the "excruciating psychological torture" of women
who are allegedly defeminized, masculinized and made sexless by
being powerful and rise to a leadership position over men. What
about the girls who stumble and languish in their search for a
worthy role model, a vision of female heroism? How can young
girls know what they should be looking for? What about the boys
who are longing for the vision of a female hero, perhaps without
even knowing what they are longing for? Some girls find both
inspiration and role models through identification with male
heroic characters, and that's fine, but we should not have to rely
on literary or artistic crossdressing. Then again, how could it
be different in a culture whose very concept of moral virtue is
equated with maleness?

MEN ARE FROM EARTH, WOMEN ARE FROM EARTH

The pernicious combination of androcentrism and gender
polarization has sundered female power and female sexuality, thus
depriving us all of female heroes. This whole approach corrupts
and degrades the female, in fact and on principle. A new fusion
of female power and female sexuality is needed, a new vision of
the Female Hero. The archaic and stale androcentric monopoly on
interpreting the meaning and scope of human sexuality must be
broken by those who have long since outgrown it. The Western
Canon has for too long been starved for integrated symbols of
female power and female sexuality. Dagny Taggart at her best is a
glaring exception - a railroad-running Randian protagonist of
Amazonian proportions. But Amazon myths, images and stories have
often been repressed, obscured, rewritten in an androcentric
image. Still they persist, return and resurface.

There is an increasing interest in real life female heroes such as
lifeguards, fire-fighters, astronauts, and athletes. Women are
gaining access to professions and positions traditionally
associated with masculinity, including traditionally "masculine"
sports. Female martial artists excel in power, skill and
self-confidence. Female
bodybuilders, sculptors of living flesh, are using the body as
a vehicle to express determination, power, beauty and sexuality,
an integration of mind, body and spirit (Frueh, Fierstein and
Stein 2000; and Ian 1991). Any woman getting serious about such
an athletic pursuit is engaging in an inherently feminist and
heroic act, insofar as she is taking control of her own body,
building physical as well as mental strength, rejecting femininity
as subservience, passivity and weakness (Burton Nelson 1994).
Such strong women threaten not men, but male privilege and
masculinity. They challenge and change the very assumptions of
androcentrism and gender polarization. They constitute a new
"Power Feminism for the 21st century" as advocated by the new
feminists (Wolf 1993).

The cultural revival is expressed further in the explosive
popularity of the larger-than-life TV-action-fantasy-series hero
Xena,
who has sky-rocketed into the American consciousness. Xena is a role model
for many young girls. Other cinematic examples can be found in
the Alien movies, Terminator 2, and in the
fantasy & science fiction work of feminist
writers in the heroic fiction tradition.<39>

Perhaps the long winter is drawing to a close, as it is realized
that female-hero deprivation in the culture is a problem for both
girls and boys, women and men. Indeed, to the extent that men are
responsible for androcentricity and gender polarization, they have
also punished themselves. They deprive and drain their own
existence of the inspiration, zest and color that only a female
hero can bring. A master-slave relationship among men and women
entails mutual dependency. As Rand ([1943] 1986, 691) observed,
"[A] leash is only a rope with a noose at both ends". A master
may be as rigidly confined to his role as a slave. Both the
master and the slave could benefit greatly from breaking out of a
gender role prison. They would lose their separate role perks,
but they would collaborate in the process of dismantling the
polarization that has crippled them.

This is the potential in Rand's vision - and in its synthesis with
feminism. Rand limited herself to the task of projecting Man the
Hero, the ideal man. The time is ripe for Woman
the Hero, the ideal woman - woman as equal and woman
as conqueror. Those who wish to carry forth Rand's legacy
should take it upon themselves to uphold "Randian androgynes" - a
fully realized heroism that extends to female and male heroes
equally.

It is a synthesis that clears Rand's philosophy of androcentric
and Platonic gender ideals, while clearing feminism of any vestige
of collectivism and victimology. This is what a synthesis of Rand
and feminism can achieve: heroism for everyone, human virtues for
everyone (no "feminine" or "masculine" virtues, only human
virtues), and the possibility of morally neutral personality
options for everyone. The future belongs to the androgynes and
postandrogynes.

NOTES

<1>I use the terms "Randian" and "Randianism" as
broad terms describing the philosophy and philosophers influenced
by and building upon Rand (on a par with Aristotelian, Kantian
etc.). Hence "Randian" is a broader term than "Objectivist"
(but narrower than "Aristotelian", if one agrees that Randianism
is a tradition within Aristotelianism).

<2> See Rand ([1943] 1986), 219-221. I do not
mean to suggest that these scenes imply or advocate rape. There
is a distinction between rape and physical force, and the two must
not be confused. The essential characteristic of rape is
non-consensuality (Amsden 1983b). The use of physical
force need not be part of rape, because it can be consensual. Erotic
combat is a valid and moral preference. If one of the lovers
has a distinct physical prowess and "superiority", this can be a
resource for sexual playfulness and a basis for hero worship in
action. Just as there can be physical force without rape,
there can be rape without physical force. Having sex with an
unconscious person is rape. Sex coerced with threats is rape,
even if no actual physical force is exerted.

<3> One might argue that Dagny Taggart was
mentally superior to Hank Rearden and that, in spite of this, they
had a love affair. But this love relationship was a temporary one
- it was over the very moment that Dagny set eyes on John Galt.
At that point, Galt became the center of Dagny Taggart's
romantic-sexual life. Both Rearden and later Francisco D'Anconia
immediately accept Galt as the winner of Dagny's love. Hence, the
Rearden-Dagny Taggart relationship is not an exception to Rand's
general ideal of male superiority, but a particular way to
illustrate how this ideal is supposed to work.

<4> Consider also Rand's reply to Peikoff
concerning Think Twice: "Do you think that I would ever
give the central action in a story of mine to anyone but the
hero?" (1984, 333).

<5> While Dagny Taggart is usually perceived to
be the mature and most fully realized Rand heroine, a case may be
made that in the context of feminism, gender and sexuality, Kira
Argounova of We the Living may in fact be a better
candidate. See
Valérie Loiret-Prunet's essay in this volume. Since
We the Living is an early work of Rand, the male hero has
not yet gained primacy over the heroine. Kira is in fact stronger
than both Andrej and Leo, and profoundly determines the course of
their lives, even though she chooses the pose of submitting to
them. The descriptions of Kira underscore her strength and power,
her heroism (3, 4 and 26-37). She is contrasted both to her
stereotypically feminine sister Lydia and to the masculine
Communist Comrade Sonia, and she may in many ways be perceived as
androgynous. She is also compared to a
Valkyrie (27) - a symbol of female power and the conqueror of
heroes.
Dagny Taggart, on the other hand, is subject to the mature Rand's
increased literary efficacy with male primacy.

<6> Rand [1943] 1986, 581: "She had the special
faculty of making satin and perfume appear as modern as an
aluminum table top. She was Venus rising out of a submarine
hatch. Eve Layton believed that her mission in life was to be the
vanguard - it did not matter of what. Her method had always been
to take a careless leap and land triumphantly far ahead of all
others. Her philosophy consisted of one sentence - "I can get
away with anything". In conversation she paraphrased it to her
favorite line: "I? I'm the day after tomorrow." She was an expert
horsewoman, a racing driver, a stunt pilot, a swimming champion."

<7> Rand [1936] 1959, 51: "The young woman had
broad shoulders and a masculine leather jacket; short husky legs
and flat masculine oxfords; a red kerchief tied carelessly over
short straight hair; eyes wide apart in a round freckled face;
thin lips drawn together with so obvious and fierce a
determination that they seemed weak; dandruff on the black leather
of her shoulders."

<8> Rand generously condemns the irrationality
of Freudianism; yet one of the most bizarre consequences of Rand's
views on gender is that she actually provides some rationalization
for Freud's concept of "penis
envy". After all, if a penis is required in order to be a
powerful subject, a seducer, a sexual initiator and aggressor, and
a hero, then surely it must be rational to want one?

<9> One wonders whether a romantic liaison
between a man and a physically stronger, bigger or more energetic
woman (or even a woman equal in these respects) would be
considered abnormal or immoral; the formulations would seem to
favor such a conclusion.

<11> Actually, one need only consider Rand's
Playboy interview to see a contradiction with her general
philosophy:

Playboy: Do you believe that women as well as men should
organize their lives around work - and if so, what kind of
work?
Rand: Of course. I believe that women are human beings.
What is proper for a man is proper for a woman. The basic
principles are the same. I would not attempt to prescribe what
kind of work a man should do, and I would not attempt it in
regard to women. There is no particular work which is
specifically feminine. Women can choose their work according
to their own purpose and premises in the same manner as men do.

This is Rand's general philosophy, and it directly contradicts what
Rand says in her "Woman President" essay.

<12> For a much more plausible and
better-investigated interpretation of Joan of Arc, see Leslie
Feinberg (1996), chapter 4 and Walker (1983), s.v. "Joan of
Arc".

<13b> The idea of two universal and separate
gendered identities (a "male" and a "female" consciousness) leads
inevitably to polylogism - an idea that Rand was strongly opposed
to, and that Objectivist epistemology rejects.

<16> Even the assumption of a male-female
duality is being challenged, by intersexuals and transgenders as
well as by increasing historical and cultural anthropological data
suggesting that several, perhaps most cultures operate with more
than two sexes/genders. See, for example, Rothblatt 1995 and
Feinberg 1996.

<18> By "ethical androgyny", I mean a moral
imperative that identifies all virtues (and all vices) as
human virtues (and vices). This rejects the idea of
gendered (masculine or feminine) virtues (and vices). Ethical
androgyny must not be confused with androgyny as a gender
expression (androgynous looks, "unisex" clothing etc.), since it
assumes all gender expressions to be equally valid, as morally
neutral options available to the individual.

<21> Note however, that the sex-gender
distinction follows from and depends upon the canon of Western
ideas and culture. Other cultures (notably many Native American
and African cultures) without a history of gender rigidity and
oppression, without androcentrism, biological essentialism and
gender/sex dualism, depart from the duality. See Mead [1949] 1975
and Feinberg 1996, especially chapter 3.

<22> In a Randian or Aristotelian context,
Platonic love is unhealthy and undesirable for several reasons.
First, Platonic love assumes that sex, as opposed to "pure love"
(an example of the mind-body dichotomy), is impure and base.
Second, it assumes that love has a "higher purpose" than itself,
i.e., that love is a means to some other goal, such as moral or
religious improvement. Thus, love is not a goal in itself, but is
demoted to a lower status. Third, the idea of Platonic love,
based upon Plato's metaphysics, rejects the importance of the
individual, and the possibility for completeness of character for
which an Aristotelian ethics provides.

<23> Interestingly, and unfortunately, neither
"hero", "heroism", or "masculinity" is explicitly defined in the
Randian corpus, and none of these terms are to be found in the
index of any of Rand's books, nor in The Ayn Rand
Lexicon. Masculinity is, however, implicitly equated with
being a hero, since femininity is defined as hero-worship. But
notice how this concept of masculinity contradicts Rand's general
philosophy - where heroism is understood as a human
character trait, as a sum and effect of human
life-affirming and necessary virtues. Recently
Andrew Bernstein
(1998) has addressed the issue of heroism in an online
article, discussed by Gramstad
(1998).

<24> It must be stressed, however, that these
two needs are not to be conceived as dualistic opposites, but as
relational and as mutually reinforcing, thus constituting an
organic unity. Consider Gail Wynand's worship of Dominique in
The Fountainhead: "It was a strange glance; she had
noticed it before; a glance of simple worship. And it made her
realize that there is a stage of worship which makes the worshiper
himself an object of reverence." (Rand [1943] 1986, 509). In
other words, the ability to worship is both an expression of a
person's heroism and a causal factor in creating and establishing
that heroism. In order to become heroic, one must first desire
heroic being, and in order to desire this, one must value (or
worship) the perceived heroism in another. So hero-worship is
more fundamental, but the fundamental and the derivative
constitute a reciprocal bicausal organic whole. For a discussion
of the role and importance of organic unity in Rand's thought, see
Sciabarra 1995, especially 17, 117, 128, 138, 145, 256, 269 and
403 n. 5.
A relationship with one hero and one hero-worshiper would sunder
the organic unity of the relationship, and create dualistic
opposition (conflict). This is why we talk about "opposite" sexes
and a "war between the sexes". This feminist rereading of Rand
stresses organic unity in its rejection of "opposite" sexes and
the gender-role collectivist ideology associated with them.

<25> The famous Russian film creator Andrej
Tarkovskij has said that when the masculine world and the feminine
world meet in a relationship, the feminine must give way and
reorient itself according to the masculine. This attitude seems
to be very common in Russia, taken for granted even by the
Communists. Rand may have inherited this attitude from her
environment (see Sciabarra 1995). It was a part of the Russian
air she breathed, an aspect of the Russian culture of her youth,
and may have been reinforced by Rand's childhood admiration of
Hollywood.

<29> Normally I would say "human-made", not
"man-made". However, I use the term man-made at this juncture,
because "the metaphysical versus the man-made" is a central motif
and a well-known phrase in Rand's philosophy (see her essay by
that title in Rand 1982b). Furthermore, the androcentrism,
misogyny, gender polarization and biological essentialism in our
culture, are to a large degree man-made.

<30> For a discussion of the different meanings
of sex and gender, see the introduction to Vetterling-Braggin
1982. See also Burke 1996 and Bem 1993. See also this popular
online source: What is Gender? An Anthropologist From
Mars,
http://www.chaparraltree.com/raq/whatis.shtml.

<31> It is a curious parallel between Rand and
Aristotle that neither was able to overcome so many of the poor
gender stereotypes of their respective ages, in spite of
rethinking and innovating so many other areas of their
contemporary thought. Even more curious is the fact that Plato
was a gender egalitarian; he did not accept the low and restricted
view of women of his day. Aristotle was the one who, in
advocating male and female essences, applied Platonic forms to
gender.

<32> See Vetterling-Braggin 1982, part 4. See
also Tavris 1992; Caplan and Caplan 1994; Lenskyj 1987.

<33> Rand's novels have many instances of this.
For example, Dagny was a pal to Frisco before their love affair
ended; after they became "enemies", their relations retained
elements of friendship. Hank and Dagny were friendly business
associates.

<34> There are other dimensions as well,
concerning, for example, degrees of tenderness, and of playfulness
(Branden 1983). Yet another dimension is the type of activity,
such as polymorphous (nongenital) sex. The idea of genital sex as
the only worthy form of sex, while anything else is just
"foreplay", is another result of the androcentric and
gender-polarized view of human sexuality. In order to fully
realize its sexual potential, each sexual activity needs to be
recognized and perceived as an end in itself, not as a means to
some other or "higher" end.

Moreover, since the gender of the lovers does not make any
difference (there is no such thing as a gender role or a gender
duty), the lovers need not be of different sexes. They may both
be of the one sex, or the other sex, or one of each sex. Being
heterosexual, I frame this whole essay in heterosexual terms, but
I do not see any reason to assume that the arguments I make are
not equally valid for a gay or lesbian couple. Quite the
contrary, unlike many Objectivists, who exhibit antigay sentiment,
I say that we don't need to know the developmental origins of
homosexuality in order to evaluate its morality. The validity of
homosexuality as a neutral moral option (neither a virtue nor a
vice) - like heterosexuality - follows directly from these two
premises: (1) the "metaphysical egalitarianism" of women and men,
and (2) the mutuality of pride and admiration in relationships as
I have described.

This is in stark contrast to Rand, who perceived homosexuality as
"immoral" and "disgusting", a result of "psychological flaws and
corruptions" (Rand 1971). One might assume that she would be most
opposed to lesbianism, since that, by her own definition,
supposedly cannot involve a hero. This assumption seems to be
confirmed in Rand's expressed disgust with the Women's Lib
movement: "[T]o proclaim spiritual sisterhood with lesbians, and
to swear eternal hostility to men - is so repulsive a set of
premises from so loathsome a sense of life that an accurate
commentary would require the kind of language I do not like to see
in print." See Rand (1975a, 175).
Rand's antigay sentiment has been softened somewhat by Peikoff
(1994). Peikoff's statement is worth quoting at length:

Romantic love is the status of one individual to another when
that individual is irreplaceable in the person's life, a
profound passion that was not necessarily sexual, but of a
completely different order than friendship. ... And [Rand]
felt that this was a very profound need of man, to have
relationships that have this deeper commitment. ... Now, she
did not see any reason why one man could not feel this for
another, or for that matter, one woman for another. ... Ayn
Rand, as you know, was not a great admirer of women - and I
asked her ... if you had a choice, would you have wanted to be
born a man? ... And ... she said ... "Oh no, then I would have
to love a woman." ... And the idea for her as a woman and as a
man-worshiper, having her love object as a woman was just to
awful to be contemplated. Now, therefore, she had great
sympathy for the idea of Man as the hero and another man seeing
that, particularly in a case like Wynand and Roark where
they're equals, and yet at the same time Roark has an edge of
strength, and Wynand sees that this is what he could have
become. It was a setup for two such passionate valuers, one to
reply to the other. She told me she even had Roark nude,
naked, in front of Wynand, when he, ... came out of the water,
on the yacht, and Wynand says to him, "it should have been a
statue of you". That's the closest she got to hinting, not
that there was a sexual relation, but that Wynand was in love
with this man, so profoundly that he even had a special
esthetic pleasure from looking at his body.

Peikoff admits that "philosophy as such has [nothing] to say about
sexual orientation", but he suggests that Roark and Wynand do not
have a sexual relationship, because "essential" to sexuality is
"conquest and surrender, or dominance and submission". Rand, he
says, saw these roles not as arbitrary, but as having an
"anatomical basis. There has to be a reason in the nature of the
two bodies why one conquers and one surrenders. Otherwise, she
thought it was arbitrary, demeaning and irrational. ... for that
reason she believed that homosexuality was improper. Not
immoral. ... You could be completely moral and just trapped in an
upbringing and conclusions that you didn't understand, but
objectively wrong, in that, knowingly or not, it is a defiance of
one of the conditions of a mature and healthy sexual relationship.
But that is not the same thing ... as this irreplaceable male love
relationship", symbolized in the Roark-Wynand connection.

Given Rand's expressed disgust with homosexuality, and her view of
romantic love as an "integrated response of mind and body, of love
and sexual desire", as a "profound, exalted, lifelong
passion that unites ... mind and body in the sexual act"
(1988, 54-56), it is clear that Peikoff has deviated from Rand's
position - even while maintaining her Platonic view of gender.

<35> It may be noted that Ancient Greece had
its share of strong women, exemplified in pantheons, myths,
literature, theater plays and so forth. But the range of choice,
expression and societal participation for women was severely
limited. According to Larson (1995, 8): "As a general rule, only
heroines who lack significant familial ties (i.e.,
husband or son) can stand alone" - and thus be independent female
heroes.

<36> The Amazons comprised different peoples
living in Asia Minor and North Africa, among whom women were
political and military leaders, and soldiers (Bell 1991; Stone
1976, [1979] 1990; Walker 1983). They are known from Greek
legends; the Greeks feared them and they were long believed to be
invincible. The term has survived in the vernacular, usually
referring to any tall and strong woman - or, more generally,
referring to any woman who is vigorous, unafraid, outspoken.
Women like this are known in all cultures. But androcentric
societies disparage and debase them, and institutionalize social
and cultural patterns that suppress and oppress such qualities in
girls and women.

Amazon feminism is dedicated to the image of the female hero in
fiction and in fact, as it is expressed in art and literature,
in the physiques and feats of female athletes, and in sexual
values and practices. ... Amazon feminism rejects the idea that
certain characteristics or interests are inherently masculine
(or feminine), and upholds and explores a vision of heroic
womanhood.

<38> Modern texts about reclaiming "Wild Woman"
archetypes address the same situation. See for example Estes
1995.

<38b> But one may ask, if a woman,
qua woman, is incapable of being a sexual conqueror and
thus of experiencing sexual conquest, can she then be said to be
the emotional equal of man? And if the rapture and power of a
sexual conquest, caused by the conqueror, is a measure of
character strength or virtue, as Rand often seems to suggest, can
one then truly say that woman are morally equal to man when it is
assumed that she is incapable of (or must be discouraged from)
being a conqueror?

<38c> Borrowing a phrase from Rand: today we
are witnessing "[T]he first of their return".

Rand, Ayn. [1964] 1970. The Virtue of Selfishness: A New Concept
of Egoism. New York: New American Library.

Rand, Ayn. 1968. Night of January 16th. New York: New
American Library.

Rand, Ayn. [1968] 1988. About a Woman President. In The Voice
of Reason: Essays in Objectivist Thought, edited by Leonard
Peikoff. New York: New American Library. Originally published in
The Objectivist, December 1968.