Calls for Senate reform are multiplying once again, thanks to lingering doubts about where Conservative Senators Mike Duffy and Pamela Wallin actually live. Patrick Brazeau’s recent run-in with the law didn’t improve matters.

Let’s get a few things settled. First, the Senate is not about to be abolished (sorry, New Democrats). That would require a constitutional amendment backed by the unanimous support of the provinces — something that will never happen, since Quebec and the Maritimes benefit from the current arrangement.

Second, those eager to talk about opening up the Constitution to deal with Senate reform ought to hold their horses. The Supreme Court has yet to rule on Stephen Harper’s reform package, which would see senators elected and limited to single terms — something that might obviate the need for constitutional talks.

Third, the Senate is the least of our problems. The real crisis is in the House of Commons, the only effective body in our bicameral legislature. MPs are only too happy to talk ad nauseum about Senate reform — it spares them the painful process of discussing the shortcomings of the Lower Chamber.

We do need to talk about electoral reform — but since that also would likely require constitutional talks, we can set it aside for now. Let’s look at what else is wrong with Parliament’s green room — things that we could fix now, without taking on all the grief that opening the Constitution would entail. This is not an exhaustive list, but a few problems come to mind almost instantly.

Concentration of power: This isn’t just a problem in the governing party. Every party leader controls caucus members’ political futures, from their right to carry the party banner in their riding to their ability to speak in the House. That absolute power severely restricts the MP’s ability to vote according to conscience and constituents’ interests.

There are several ways to deal with this. One would be to allow any party caucus to trigger a leadership review — liberating a relatively powerless group of elected officials but ultimately allowing the broader party membership to decide the leader’s fate, thus enhancing democracy across the board.

A second option would be to limit the ability of the leader to appoint candidates. Leaders need to keep the party brand in shape, so they should retain the power to appoint a candidate in cases where, for example, a one-issue candidate wins a nomination, or in a riding where the party truly has no local organization. But the goal should be for candidates to be viewed as the legitimate choices of their local riding association, not as tools of the party.

Cabinet bloat: Capping the size of cabinet (say, at twenty-five members) sends a message to caucus — your chances of promotion are slim at best. This would have a liberating effect on the average government backbencher; if you know you’re not getting a seat at the big table any time soon, you’ll feel more entitled to vote the way you want, regardless of the PM’s wishes.

MPs are only too happy to talk ad nauseum about Senate reform — it spares them the painful process of discussing the shortcomings of the Lower Chamber.

Prorogation: The temptation to abuse the prorogation power is too strong — we have to take it out of the prime minister’s hands for good. Never again should one person (whose position exists merely by parliamentary convention) be able to shut down the body tasked with representing the democratic will of the Canadian people purely for tactical reasons.

We should either fix prorogation dates — which could be canceled or postponed in the event that the government had failed to exhaust its legislative agenda on time — or leave prorogation to a vote of the whole Commons.

Inter-party cooperation: They talk about it, but nothing ever seems to happen. The unwillingness of parties to work together has led to attempts by governments to ram as much legislation through Parliament in as little time as possible. The favourite method is to load unrelated legislative measures into a single ‘omnibus’ bill which, due to its shaggy nature, can never receive proper scrutiny from MPs.

Our system is designed to increase the chance of power being placed in the hands of the few — it doesn’t take a popular majority to win a majority government. Hence, majority governments are more frequent — they’re what we’re used to, just as we’re used to the idea of those parties outside of government playing no part in the creation of legislation.

But that’s not how it’s supposed to work. We don’t elect governments in Canada — we elect parliaments. Even backbench members of the governing party are supposed to hold the government to account.

I see no reason why every government couldn’t be a coalition government. We elect a parliament, so let’s draw from its best in order to former the country’s executive council. Hopefully, that would put an end to 400-page legislation. It might even improve decorum.

So let’s just forget about Senate reform for the time being. The Commons is where the real problems lie — and where we need to start looking for solutions.

Zach Paikin is a frequent media commentator on public policy issues and Canadian political affairs. He also contributes research on international affairs to several Washington-based think tanks and institutes. He was a candidate for National Policy Chair of the Liberal Party of Canada at the party’s 2012 biennial convention. He holds a BA in Middle East Studies from McGill University and is currently pursuing graduate studies in Global Affairs at the University of Toronto.

Follow Zach on Twitter at @zpaikin. Click here to view a list of all columns by Zach Paikin.

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