I should have a heterogeneous mix of subjects up today, plus a continuation of the " reforming State" discussion going on below (Dave, Collounsbury and Jeff have made a few remarks already this morning but I will address them fully later ). The children need to be hustled out the door to their activities as I have a workman coming this afternoon.

Hi Mark, Way off the topic here but I'd love to hear your thoughts regarding this piece from Time that discusses Iran's growing involvement in Iraq. I am having a hard time understanding why Iran is taking such an active role here - but an even more difficult time understanding why Iraq would accept Iran's support given their history. Some have suggested this 'leak' is simply the US preparing a casus belli to take a poke at Iran - which I seriously doubt, but it does make for some entertaining reading. thanks!Iwasawa.

If I am not mistaken, for some time there have been hints of Iranian influence on some of the Shia (sp?) leaders in Iraq, and now that Shiites have majority control of the Iraqi government, the hardliners in Iran are likely trying to influence the development of the constitution, etc., in Iraq. I, too, am interested in your understanding of all this, Mark.

At one time I had an excellent contact in Iraq who could tell me fairly authoritatively the extent to which this TIME report reflected reality. Alas, he is now incommunicado so I'm going to have to wing this one on my own.

There is a mosaic of interests at work:

Iran has normal state interests in seeing a friendly, stable, Iraq. That means a Shiite dominated state but not so dominated as to provoke civil war or cause the Americans to stay. Iran's permanent government in the foreign and defense ministries look to this end in mind.

The religious hardliners in Iran's government who support " Supreme Guide" Khameini have an interest in trying to secure Iranian dominance over the Shiite religious schools in Najaf and Karbala.

This is not simply an issue of prestige but of longitudinal political survival. None of the living Marjas - the " objects of emulation" - support the concept of Khomeini's vilayat al-faqih " rule of the jurisprudent". Very few of the Grand Ayatollahs do, in Iran or Iraq so the only way to secure their legitimacy is to educate the young, future, ayatollahs from the ground up and co-opt the middle level clergy. Khameini in particular feels the need for bolstering because he came to his exalted position basically through sycophancy and intrigue and everyone knows it.

The Pasdaran element are not clericals but are militarized guardians of the ethos of the Iranian revolution. Sort of an elite ideological guard, a foreign intelligence service and a political police rolled into one.

The Pasdaran are the most anti-American aspect of Iran's regime and they are growing politically powerful in their own right - the new president represents " the pasdaran party". They are not completely under Khameini's control and they - or at least factions within the Pasdaran - are spoiling for a fight with American and western interests. Other factions have been more pragmatic and provided America's IC with a good deal of useful intel on the Taliban and pre-war Iraq.

Juan Cole dismisses the possibility of cooperation between al Qaida and the Pasdaran in Iraq or elsewhere. Generally Shiite-Sunni radicals would regard each other with great antipathy so as a rule of thumb that's fine but state and factional interests are also at work.

I think that Cole, at best, has an unproven assumption since neither Iran's government nor al Qaida appear to be very homogenous. Their internal decision-making process is opaque and relationships are murky and often-times transient. Saddam talked to al Qaida, so does Iran, so did/does Pakistan, the Saudis and probably many, many others who are our allies.

Iran has helped both secular and religious Sunni Arab terrorist groups in Palestine and the Iranian border is porous both in Azerbaijan-Kurdistan and in Baluchistan in the east. Who really knows what local Pasdaran authorities might be up to ? Or criminal gangs that might be cut-outs and smugglers for all comers with cash to pay ? Hard to know the players and their motivations without deep expertise which I do not have.

Iran is run by bad people. Some of them are reckless idiots and some are cautious and pragmatic. Others are corrupt. That's what we have to work with and our best ace in the hole is that an Iraq engulfed in total civil war is on Iran's doorstep and not ours. So uncomfortably, there is some degree of common interest with Iran but not a lot.