Archive for the ‘Metaphysics’ Category

Abstract: The physical constants and laws of nature in our universe appear to be finely-tuned to secure the emergence of life. The best explanation of this appearance of fine-tuning for life is that the physical constants and laws of nature are in fact finely-tuned, that is, they are designed. Therefore, the finely-tuned appearance of our universe constitutes good (if not conclusive) evidence for the existence of God. This is the Fine-Tuning Argument and it is arguably the most influential argument for the existence of God in contemporary philosophy of religion. But, it is a bad argument, or so I argue. In this talk, I propose a counter-argument, which follows the same inferential approach that underlies the Fine-Tuning Argument, to a conclusion that is incompatible with its soundness. I argue, more specifically, that one can use the same kind of consideration that the Fine-Tuning Argument rests on to argue not for the existence of God but against the reliability of our current fundamental physics. This poses a serious problem for the Fine-Tuning Argument since it is essential for the argument that our current fundamental physics is reliable.

DATE: Thursday 24 March 2016

TIME: 15:40 – 18:00

PLACE: H-355, Bilkent University, Ankara

*Abstract*:

Revisionary ontologies appear to disagree with common sense about which material objects there are. There are powerful arguments for these views, but even after having provided them, their proponents face the Problem of Reasonableness: they need to explain why most reasonable people hold beliefs apparently incompatible with the true ontology. According to mainstream approaches to this problem, the mismatch between ordinary belief and the true ontology is either merely apparent or superficial. In their place, I propose my unapologetic view, which consists of a causal and an evaluative component. In the causal component, I argue that our tendencies to form beliefs about material objects were influenced by selective pressures that were independent from the ontological truth. In the evaluative component, I draw a parallel with the New Evil Demon Problem and argue that whatever is the best treatment of this problem, the revisionary ontologist can apply it to ordinary people’s beliefs about material objects. I conclude that the unapologetic view emerges as an attractive, stable, and hitherto overlooked solution to the Problem of Reasonableness.

Abstract: In this talk, I will present evidence of a systematic ambiguity in our explanatory terminology, as well as my preferred account of that ambiguity: the causal metaphor account of metaphysical explanation. I will then discuss how that account explains the attraction of grounding skepticism. I will close by considering whether, in addition, it can be the basis of a convincing argument for grounding skepticism.

Al-Farabi (870 AD– 950 AD) and al-Ghazzali (1058 AD – 1111 AD) are among the intellectual giants in the history of Islam. They were separated in time by nearly two centuries but judging from their writings they appeared to have been contemporaries. They belonged to two different intellectual schools of thought, al-Farabi to the Peripatetic school and al-Ghazzali to the school of kalam (“dialectical theology”). Their thoughts have both similarities and differences. Professor Bakar will discuss their similar ideas such as in their acceptance of the ideas of hierarchy of knowledge and tawhidic epistemology as well as their differences with regard to their understanding of the relationship between intellect-reason and revelation, their notions of philosophy, and the relationship between religion and philosophy. Professor Bakar presents arguments that despite their differences on many intellectual issues they are united in their thinking at a deeper level and as such are to be regarded as coming from the same intellectual universe of Islam.