SAE ARP4761, MIL-STD-882E and much, much more. Find out what the attraction is. Click here for insight. Compare FHA with PHA for example. You will see what continues to attract many people to this course.

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A FEW OF OUR PREVIOUS AVIATION CONTRACTS

SYSTEM SAFETY SUBCONTRACT

Harris Corporation selected HCRQ to be the system safety subcontractor on the FAA DCIS project.

The Data Comm Program is a critically important next step for improving air safety, reducing delays, increasing fuel savings, improving the environment, and leading U.S. aviation into the 21st century. The introduction of data communications between the FAA's air traffic control functions and carrier aircraft represents a key phase of the transition from the current decades old analog voice system to a predominantly digital mode of communication. The Data Comm System supports the NextGen vision by providing Air Traffic Service (ATS) data transmissions directly to pilots via aircraft avionics systems. This ATS data communications capability enables more efficient procedures and flight profiles through services such as revised departure clearances, automation of routine clearances, Traffic Flow Management reroutes, automated transfer of communications, optimized profile descents, and trajectory-based operations. These services contribute to evolving air traffic control from short-term tactical operations to the strategic managements of flights from gate-to-gate.

The Harris Team also includes companies such as ARINC, GE Aviation and Thales.

COMPANION CONTRACT: SYSTEM SAFETY

SUBCONTRACT ON DATA COMMUNICATIONS

​NETWORK SERVICE (DCNS)

HCRQ is the system safety subcontractor to Harris Corporation on the FAA DCNS project.

HCRQ was the system safety subcontractor to Harris Corporation on the Operational Supportability and Implementation System (OASIS) II in Alaska.​

SYSTEM SAFETY SME FOR DND'S MHP DEFENSE

​HELICOPTER ACQUISITION

HCRQ was responsible for specifying system safety requirements (e.g., SOW, CDRLs, DIDs), reviewing system safety portions of other SOW sections and DIDs (e.g., project management, system engineering, airworthiness) for the Canadian Martime Helicopter Project.

This position interfaced directly with human factors engineering, system engineering, software, project management, configuration management, and airworthiness aspects of this project. The MHP contract was awarded to Sikorsky Aircraft who openly praised the quality of our work.

This work thus established the baseline for system safety of the CH148 Cyclone.​

Clouds with supercooled liquid water constitute a significant aviation hazard because of the potential risk of air-craft icing. Icing reduces rate of lift, rate of climb, and fuel efficiency while increasing drag, stalling speed, weight, and power requirements.

At pre-determined intervals, the EEDS passes a pulse of current through embedded conductors. Electromagnetic forces repel the top layer away from the rigidly mounted bottom layer. The top layer imparts a shock/acceleration force to the outer surface. This rapid acceleration force breaks the surface tension of the ice on the outer surface of the cuff and shatters the ice into harmless particles.

DIRECT USER ACCESS TERMINAL (DUAT)

HCRQ provided system safety support to Data Transformation Corporation (DTC) on DUAT.

With the assistance of DTC, HCRQ prepared the Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA), Hazard Log (HL), System Safety Hazard Analysis (SHA), and System Safety Assessment Report (SAR). HCRQ also assisted with responses to comments from FAA and related document modifications.

DIRECT USER ACCESS TERMINAL SERVICE (DUATS)

HCRQ provided system safety support to Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC) on DUATS.

This effort was similar to that provided to DTC.

POTENTIAL FUTURE CONTRACT - FLIGHT SERVICE DIRECT (FSD)

FAA has a requirement for a performance-based acquisition to replace DUATS with increased capability, which will be called FSD.

Due to its previous effort on DUAT and DUATS, HCRQ hopes to provide the system safety support.

SYSTEM SAFETY SUPPORT FOR ECU

HCRQ provided SAE ARP4761 system safety support to RCCT (formerly Athena Technologies Inc.) on an Engine Control Unit (ECU) project.

TECHNICAL AIRWORTHINESS MANUAL (TAM) CRITIQUE

We critiqued DND's TAM identifying deficiencies with respect to system safety.

After spending this many years in system safety, we quickly focus on what is missing and what is wrong.

By the way, perhaps you are familiar with Australian Air Publication 7001.053(AM1) "Technical Airworthiness Management Manual". It specifies software safety requirements in sections 2.2.12 (e)(2), 2.2.12 (e)(4), and 3.5.3 (d)(2).

ED-135/SAE ARP4761 is based on qualitative safety targets, in the form of Development Assurance Levels, and quantitative safety targets which are flowed down and verified.

Similar to other approaches to system safety, its intent is to influence architectural design.

ED-135/SAE ARP4761 utilizes the concept of failure conditions which are classified according to severity.

Since ARP4761 focuses on aircraft hazards, it does not address the other types and their associated analyses. ARP4761 also falls short in a number of other areas and defines FMEA incorrectly ! HCRQ recently provided such insight to COMAC (China).

A Certification Maintenance Requirement (CMR) is a mandatory periodic task, required to maintain the safety of the aircraft, which is established during the design certification of the aircraft as an operating limitation of the type certificate.

The maintenance requirements, and the necessary interval between these focused maintenance activities in order to ensure adequate safety coverage, are derived by the System Safety Program.

The use of periodic maintenance or flight crew checks to detect significant latent failures when they occur is undesirable and should not be used in lieu of practical and reliable failure monitoring and indication.

A - Software whose anomalous behavior, as shown by the system safety assessment process, would cause or contribute to a failure of system function resulting in a catastrophic failure condition for the aircraft

B - Software whose anomalous behavior, as shown by the system safety assessment process, would cause or contribute to a failure of system function resulting in a hazardous/severe-major failure condition for the aircraft

C - Software whose anomalous behavior, as shown by the system safety assessment process, would cause or contribute to a failure of system function resulting in a major failure condition for the aircraft

D - Software whose anomalous behavior, as shown by the system safety assessment process, would cause or contribute to a failure of system function resulting in a minor failure condition for the aircraft

E - Software whose anomalous behavior, as shown by the system safety assessment process, would cause or contribute to a failure of system function with no effect on aircraft operational capability or pilot workload

A - Hardware functions whose failure or anomalous behavior, as shown by the hardware safety assessment, would cause a failure of system function resulting in a catastrophic failure condition for the aircraft

B - Hardware functions whose failure or anomalous behavior, as shown by the hardware safety assessment, would cause a failure of system function resulting in a hazardous/severe-major failure condition for the aircraft

C - Hardware functions whose failure or anomalous behavior, as shown by the hardware safety assessment, would cause a failure of system function resulting in a major failure condition for the aircraft

D - Hardware functions whose failure or anomalous behavior, as shown by the hardware safety assessment, would cause a failure of system function resulting in a minor failure condition for the aircraft

E - Hardware functions whose failure or anomalous behavior, as shown by the hardware safety assessment, would cause a failure of system function with no effect on aircraft operational capability or flight crew workload