> - If 1000 copies of you are made in London lacking 50% of your
> memories and 10 copies are made in Paris lacking 5% of your memories,
> are you more likely to find yourself waking up in London or Paris?

It gets more interesting if you start tweaking this example a bit:
assume the copies in London lose enough memories that they can't
realise they are flawed, but the ones in Paris will all know they are
imperfect copies. Where do you wake up then?

You don't even need to make it so precise - just set it up so that
your quasi-duplicates in London are not you, by most objective
standards, but are utterly subjectively convinced that they are; the
reverse prevails in Paris.

On another note, has anyone delt with divergence of copies? Basically
the consensus seems to be: quasi-identical copies the same, copies ten
years later very different people. But how fast do the differences add
up? Is the experience of existential terror - oh my god, they're going
to kill me! why did I go into this dumb transport machine in the first
place - enough to claim that we have two different people? And hence
that the "original copy" should not be killed?