(Paper
presented at a conference on the Sachar Committee Report in Kochi, 16th-17th
June, 2007 organized by the Al-Ameen Educational Trust and the Forum for Faith
and Fraternity)

I
have been asked to speak on the subject of the social and cultural empowerment
of Muslims in India. This is, of course, a very broad topic and one cannot do
justice to it in the course of a short presentation. Rather than explore the
reasons of Muslim disempowerment, about which much has already been written, I
think it would be more useful to focus on certain practical measures that could
be undertaken in this regard. I will deliberately refer to the crucial question
of political empowerment only in passing as this is beyond the scope of this
presentation.

An
important point to consider in discussing the question of Muslim social and
cultural empowerment is that of the internal diversity among Muslims, which
makes it difficult to make any but the most broad generalizations. These
diversities are of various types-class caste, sect, language, region, ethnicity,
gender and so on. Often, discussions about Muslim social empowerment miss out,
whether deliberately or otherwise, these internal differences and variations,
based on a misleading and untenable assumption of a pan-Indian Muslim monolith.
It is striking to note how this notion of a Muslim monolith (like that of the
equally misleading notion of a Hindu monolith) informs the discourse of both
Hindu and Muslim right-wing forces and of the state. It was this same misplaced
notion of Hindus and Muslims being two separate, monolithic and undifferentiated
communities that paved the way for the Partition of India, which benefited the
ruling elites of India and Pakistan, but made matters much worse for the masses,
Hindu as well as Muslim. It must be noted that demands for resources or
empowerment based on this notion of a Hindu or Muslim monolith works essentially
to promote the interests of the elites, the so-called high caste, upper class
Hindus and Muslims. Thus, for instance, the demand by some Muslim elites for
reservations for all Muslims, based on this untenable assumption of a single
Muslim monolith, can be seen as reflecting the interests of these elites, for it
is obvious that such reservation would benefit essentially them, leaving out in
the cold the vast majority of the Muslim community. This is similar in its
implications to the case of Hindutva discourse, where the equally untenable myth
of a Hindu monolith is used as a means to protect and promote the interests of
so-called high caste and high class Hindus, and to deny other Hindus-the vast
majority-their rights. Hence, in discussing the issue of the empowerment of the
Muslim community, one must desist from speaking in terms of a Muslim monolith,
and focus particularly on the question of the empowerment of the marginalized
sections within the Muslim community, who, in many parts of India, happen to
form the vast majority of the community, most of them being of indigenous
so-called low caste background.

It is a
striking comment on the existing Muslim leadership that often their demands are
couched in terms of a Muslim monolith, rarely referring to the specific problems
of these marginalized sections, in whose marginalization, historically as well
as now, Muslim elites, in addition of course to Hindu elites and the state, have
had a crucial role to play. Muslim politics, particularly in north India, has
been largely the politics of symbolism, with political elites raising such
issues as the question of Urdu, the Muslim Personal Law, the Aligarh Muslim
University, the Babri Masjid and so on. One can perhaps speak of some sort of
complicity here with right-wing Hindu political elites, with both having a
vested interest in focusing on such communally divisive issues to boost their
own political fortunes. These issues are not unimportant in themselves. The
point, however, is that because these issues have overwhelmed north Indian
Muslim politics, the massive and growing social, educational and economic
problems of the Muslim masses have been ignored, deliberately or otherwise.

This calls
for the need for a new sort of grass-root based community leadership from among
the marginalized sections of the Muslims, which can go beyond the symbolic
politics that only further promote communal polarization. This new leadership
would focus on bread-and-butter issues that affect these sections as well as
other similarly marginalized sections among other communities, such as Dalits,
Backward Castes and Adivasis. Efforts at uniting these groups are underway,
although, Hindu and Muslim elites do not regard this with any enthusiasm, for
obviously it undermines their claims to be authoritative spokesmen and leaders
of their communities. This means that the empowerment of the marginalized
sections of the Muslims demands a dual process of democratization: gaining their
rightful share within the larger Indian society as well as within the Muslim
community itself.

Now, leaving aside the complex world of politics, a few practical suggestions
with regard to the issue of cultural empowerment. In this regard, it is crucial
to note that Muslims in India are not a cultural monolith, although they share a
common commitment to Islam, but even here one needs to take into account the
diverse interpretations and expressions of Islam, as reflected, for instance, in
the number of different maslaks, many of which define themselves in opposition
to each other. There has been a tendency among Muslim elites in north India to
seek to impose their so-called ashraf feudal culture and the Urdu language on
the rest of the Indian Muslim population. Even in north India itself, highly
Persianised Urdu, which is sought to be presented as the standard form of Urdu,
has always been an elitist language, historically the language of some north
Indian Muslim and Hindu elites. It was never the language of the Muslim or Hindu
masses, who spoke and continue to speak in various regional dialects,
incorrectly incorporated as Urdu or Hindi. The elitist strategy of projecting
north Indian ashraf culture as the culture of all Indian Muslims is, in fact, no
different from similar efforts on the part of north Indian Hindu elites to
impose Brahmincial culture and a highly Sanskritised Hindi on the rest of the
Hindu population, or what the Pakistani establishment sought to do in the
erstwhile East Pakistan with disastrous consequences. Even the state has sought
to present Urdu as a particularly Muslim language, which is not the case.
Efforts to preserve and promote Urdu are surely welcome, but it must be
remembered that it cannot and must not be treated as a Muslim language or as the
language of all the Muslims of India. This will only further reduce the chances
of survival of the language. It would also keep Muslims confined to their
ghettos, unable to compete in the job market because of lack of competence in
other languages. It would also further fortify barriers between Muslims and
others, which can only further strengthen the deep-rooted stereotypes that
others have about Muslims and Islam.

In this
regard, the emergence of a number of Muslim publications in languages other than
Urdu is a welcome development. This can help promote communication with other
communities, which, even from the point of view of explaining Islam to others,
is a crucial requirement. It can also help strengthen regional identities and
cultures, in which Muslims, Hindus and others can participate together, thus
making for greater and more positive inter-community interaction. North Indian
Muslims have much to learn from their counterparts in Kerala in this regard,
where Muslims, Hindus, Christian, Dalits and others all share a common
linguistic and cultural heritage, which has helped in fostering fairly cordial
inter-community relations.

The
democratic revolution demands that the cultures of marginalized communities be
celebrated and promoted. These often contain rich symbolic resources that
reflect the pains and anguish of the oppressed and their quest for emancipation,
as well as a symbolic critique of the culture of elites that is used to
legitimize their oppression. The retrieval of the cultures of the oppressed or
subalterns is happening today in the case of the Dalits and Adivasis. In the
Muslim case, this is less marked, for various reasons, but is reflected in some
recent efforts by so-called low caste Muslim groups, particularly in Uttar
Pradesh and Bihar, to celebrate their histories and heroes, commemorating the
liberative spirit of Islam, which, they argue, has been sought to be watered
down by Muslim elites. The tradition of numerous Sufi saints who bitterly
critiqued political and religious elites for their oppression of the poor, and
whose understanding of Islam was ecumenical and broad, reflecting a concern for
all of God's creatures, and not just Muslims alone, was also a part of this
broader subaltern tradition. This crucial social aspect of India's rich and
varied Sufi traditions, of the non-elite variety in particular, needs to be
highlighted, in order to evolve a popular culture that celebrates religious
pluralism and at the same time speaks out against oppression and hegemony, be it
of the state, or of Hindu and Muslim elites, and so on. This can play a vita
role in the socio-cultural empowerment of the marginalized, Muslims as well as
others. In this regard, it is pertinent to note how this tradition has been
considerably bruised by the ritualisation of popular Sufism, with the
transformation of Sufi shrines from centres of instruction and provision for the
needy to centres of mediation, being controlled by a class of elites who claim
to be religious intermediaries.

Indian
Muslim history, as is taught in schools and madrasas, and as is reflected in
books on the subject by both Muslim and other scholars, continues to be highly
elitist, and, incidentally, rather north Indian centric. This, too, is an issue
that needs to be addressed in the process of promoting the cultural empowerment
of the marginalized sections of the Muslims. Books on the subject of Indian
Muslim history inevitably focus almost entirely on Muslim rulers, Sufis and
ulema, almost all of whom were from the so-called higher castes-Sayyeds,
Shaikhs, Mughals and Pathans, who form only a relatively small minority of the
Indian Muslim population. There are hardly any books available on the literally
hundreds of indigenous Muslim communities, mainly those of so-called low caste
background. This, too, must change, if we are serious about a promoting
democratic culture that is biased in favour of the oppressed. This
democratization of Muslim historiography is as necessary as the democratization
of the official Hindu historical canon, which, like its Muslim counterpart, is
sternly elitist. Democratising Indian Muslim history writing would also serve a
very necessary political purpose-to highlight the fact that the so-called period
of 'Muslim rule' in India, which is routinely talked about both by Muslim and
Hindu elites, was hardly that. It was actually the rule of Muslim elites, almost
entirely of foreign extraction, in collaboration with sections of the Hindu
elites. The vast majority of the Muslims, of indigenous extraction, were as
marginalized and oppressed by these elites as their Hindu counterparts from the
so-called low castes were. Making this point in today's context of communal
rivalry is extremely significant in order to counter the political projects of
Hindu as well as Muslim right-wing forces.

In north
India, as some surveys have shown, Muslims from so-called low caste background
do not have adequate representation in various Muslim organizations. This is an
issue that needs to be seriously addressed. Demands for their adequate
representation are sometimes dismissed as
'conspiracies' to divide the Muslims on the basis of caste, which is said to be
an un-Islamic institution, but I believe this argument is untenable, reflecting
a desire to preserve the status quo. In actual fact, genuine and lasting unity
can only be promoted if such organizations, particularly at their leadership
level, are more socially inclusive in terms of class and caste. Keeping certain
social groups out or not providing them adequate representation, whether
consciously or unconsciously, can only further reinforce Muslim disunity.

In this
regard, the Muslim media has a very crucial role to play and it would be
interesting to do a survey on what space they devote to the bread-and-butter
issues of the Muslim poor. I do not suppose think the conclusions of such a
survey would be very heartening. Related to this is the lack of serious
empirical research on the marginalized sections of the Muslim community. This,
too, reflects a certain lack of concern or indifference on the part of large
sections of the Muslim elite towards the crucial social and economic problems of
the Muslim masses. There is, to my mind, just one institution in the whole of
India, the Institute of Objective Studies in New Delhi, that sponsors such
research, although the quality of its research output leaves much to be desired.
Why, one must ask, did we have to wait for the government-appointed Sachar
Committee to produce a detailed report on the social and economic
marginalization of Muslims? Why have Muslim organizations not been doing this
sort of research, although this is crucial for planning for practical
intervention as well as for lobbying with the state and working with NGOs? It is
striking that while there are literally thousands of institutions in India for
Islamic Studies, there is hardly any institution focusing on Indian Muslim
Studies, on the social, educational and economic conditions of Muslims. This
reflects the way in which Muslim elites view the priorities of the community and
their relative neglect of the manifold problems of the Muslim masses.

Promoting
empirical research on marginalized sections of the Muslim community, and
awareness-building, mobilisation and lobbying based on this, is essential in
empowering them socially as well as culturally. I think the notion that an ideal
career is that of a doctor, a lawyer or an engineer, or, now, a computer
scientist or a business manager, needs to be challenged, and more Muslim youth
need to go in for higher studies and careers in journalism, the liberal arts,
humanities and the social sciences, to focus in their work particularly on
marginalized sections of the community. There is a pressing need for the setting
up of voluntary agencies to work among the Muslim poor. While there are
literally thousands of madrasas in India, and crores of rupees are spent on
fancy mosques, the number of Muslim NGOs which are really doing sincere and
constructive work for the educational and social empowerment of the marginalized
sections of the Muslims is relatively meagre. Muslim organizations must make
demands on the state for adequate state investment in Muslim areas. In addition,
however, efforts must be made to mobilize the internal resources of the
community for the empowerment of the marginalized. In this regard, there needs
to be rethinking of the best possible use of zakat funds, most of which now go
to madrasas. The standard charity-based approach has to give way to seeking to
seeking to empower the poor. There is also a serious need for working on the
issue of waqfs and dargahs and exploring possibilities for increasing their
revenues and using these for the poor. This also calls for democratic management
of the waqf boards and dargah committees.

Another
important issue in the context of the empowerment of the marginalised sections
among the Muslims is that of madrasa reforms. The vast majority of madrasa
students come from these sections of Muslim society. The on-going debate on
madrasa curricular reforms needs to be taken further and efforts to include
'modern' subjects need to be expanded. In addition, students must be
familiarized with the world around them and with contemporary affairs. This will
enable them to play a more constructive and socially engaged role in their
capacity of would-be religious specialists. This will also help widen their
career options and facilitate their joining colleges and universities after they
graduate.

The rigid
dualism that characterizes Muslim education, between the ulema and 'modern'
educated Muslims, must be narrowed down and efforts need to be made to promote
greater dialogue and interaction between the two to help in the process of the
empowerment of the marginalized sections of the Muslim community. In this
regard, I would like to cite the instance of a group of Muslim activists, mainly
retired government officers, in Bangalore which I recently came across. This
group goes every Friday to various mosques in the city and, after the imam reads
the Arabic khutba, they deliver sermons on the importance of education and also
on the salience of the findings of the Sachar Committee report. After the prayer
gets over, there is a question and answer session, where people ask questions
and advice is given on how to form local groups, solve local problems and access
various government schemes. Another such interesting example is that of a group
of ulema in Bangalore, who are now doing a course in English, Computer
Applications and Social Sciences. They have got together to prepare and publish
Friday khutbas in Urdu that relate religious prescriptions to the need for
education, health provision and other forms of social service.

Further in
this regard, it would be useful if arrangements can be made for madrasa managers
and ulema, particularly from the younger generation, to visit Christian
seminaries and learn from their example. There, would-be Christian priests learn
not only about their own religion, but also about other religions, as well as
about social work and social activism. Perhaps these subjects and skills could
be included in the madrasa curriculum as well. I also think that there is much
that madrasas and other Muslim organisations in the rest of India can learn from
the Kerala example, where Muslim organizations are much better organized and
socially engaged. It would serve a valuable purpose if arrangements could be
made for Muslim social activists and younger ulema from other parts of India,
who wish to work for the empowering the Muslim poor, to visit various Muslim
institutions in Kerala to see the very interesting and creative work that they
are doing and to learn from their example. The somehow deeply-rooted notion that
north India must lead and south India must follow is completely mistaken and
there is much that the south Indian example holds for north Indian Muslims to
learn from.

Linked to
this is the need for developing alternate understandings of Islamic theology and
jurisprudence that are rooted in and creatively responsive to the Indian
situation of religious pluralism, caste, class and gender oppression and the
fact of Muslims being a minority in India. This needs to be reflected in the
madrasa curriculum as well. Such progressive understandings of religion can play
a crucial role in addressing the lived realities and concerns of the
marginalized, irrespective of community. Clearly, understandings of religion, no
matter what religion, that are exclusivist and insensitive to the local context,
particularly that of oppression, betray the genuine core of true spirituality.

My last
point relates to intra-community and inter-community relations. It is obvious
that the empowerment of the marginalized sections among the Muslims requires an
atmosphere of harmonious intra- and inter-community relations. It is striking to
note in this regard the sharp inter-maslak divisions and strife that are
promoted by certain Muslim institutions, publishing houses, ulema groups and
madrasas. It is equally striking to note the absence of any organized dialogue
work to bring together ulema of different maslaks to enable them to work
together in a spirit of ecumenism. I think this is a serious issues that
urgently needs to be addressed.

On the
inter-community relations front, obviously Hindu-Muslim strife hurts the
marginalized sections of the Muslims the most and so for their progress and
empowerment communal harmony is indispensable. In this regard, the state and
Hindu organizations and activists have a crucial role to play. But so do
Muslims. The ulema need to be sensitized to the issue and need of inter-faith
dialogue and undertake suitable efforts in this regard. There is an urgent need
to promote inter-religious dialogue, and in this regard to go beyond the present
limited form of dialogue at the level of religious doctrines between religious
specialists-ulema and pundits-which, although important, is clearly inadequate.
Often, such dialogue is promoted simply by missionary motives or in order to
defend one's beliefs against those of others. Generally, such dialogue at the
level of theology stumbles after a point because each religion, as interpreted
by its religious orthodoxy, has certain non-negotiable fundamentals. Hence,
dialogue efforts must go beyond simply theological exchange, which remains
limited to a small religious elite . Dialogue needs to be extended beyond the
narrow sphere of religious specialists to become more democratic and socially
inclusive, include people from different walks of life, particularly social
activists and media persons from different religious backgrounds.

Inter-community dialogue should go beyond talking about one's religion to focus
on the possibilities of joint efforts to work for social issues of common
concern. This is the dialogue of social action, which moves beyond mere
theological exchange and polemics. There is an urgent need for many more Muslims
to be involved in social movements on issues that are not limited just to the
Muslim community, but, rather, are of much wider concern, such as the
environmental movement or the struggle against so-called globalization and
against caste, class and gender oppression. The obsession with issues only
concerning the Muslims is, I feel, very stifling and also counter-productive
from the point of view of the Muslim masses. So, too, is the tendency to be
self-righteous, to ignore the serious need for introspection, to blame others
for all one's ills and to remain silent when, in some situations, non-Muslims
suffer at the hands of Muslims.

Of course
there are several other things that must be done for the empowerment of the
marginalized sections of the Muslim community, including, particularly, women. I
will not go into this because much has already been said and written about this,
including in the recommendations of the Sachar Committee Report. What I have
presented here are some stray and rather disjointed thoughts for your
consideration and I only hope that this would enthuse at least some people here
to seriously think of working on these issues.

Yoginder Sikand works with the Centre for Jawaharlal Nehru Studies, Jamia
Millia Islamia, New Delhi. He can nbe contacted on ysikand@gmail.com