Month: December 2012

The ‘Arab Spring’ of early 2011 brought about a dramatic change to the political landscape of the Middle East. In Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, longstanding dictators were forced out of office by popular uprisings fueled by civil discontent. The fall of these regimes were historic moments, marking the end of a long reign of oppression and political stagnation. However, the governmental transitions which followed, and which continue to this day, are vitally important in determining the political future of these countries and the ultimate result of the ‘Arab Spring’. For many in the Middle East and across the world, the overthrow of autocratic regimes offers the hope for democracy and new freedoms. Those who have guided and participated in these transitions have espoused democratic ideals and voiced commitments to the creation of new, democratic states. The circumstances and reality of the situation, however, means that these transitions have faced and will continue to face challenges and struggles in their attempt to bring about the creation of liberal democracy. Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya each have a set of issues which could hinder, slow, or even prevent the formation of functional, liberal democracy, and these issues need to be addressed and resolved in order to guarantee long-term political stability. While these issues are unique to their countries in their characteristics, they are not without parallels. Past democratic transitions in other regions of the world have suffered problems comparable to what the Middle East does today and have struggled through their own difficulties in forming democracy. Thus, by looking at the successful development of these other democracies possible solutions to the problems being faced now can be found and applied. Additionally, it is possible to derive from the democratic development of these other regions a prediction as to what the result of transitions in the Middle East may produce. The political situation in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya holds great promise for the development of democracy, but only if these difficult issues and challenges can be dealt with and solved.

Prior to discussing the challenges facing these transitions, it would be useful to analyze whether democracy has any requisites required for its formation and, if so, whether they have any bearing on the development of Middle Eastern democracy. Democracy grows best when begun and incubated in a country which possess institutional mechanisms such as the acceptance of rule of law, a functional civil society and culture, impartial administrative bodies, open news media, and a viable education system1. Prior to the ‘Arab Spring’, the conditions in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia appeared, compared to these requisites, antithetical to the formation and development of democracy: civil society was weak and thus an ineffective champion of democracy, labor unions were empty shells, literacy rates were low, economic control was in state hands, Islam is presumed to be inhospitable to democracy, and the region was remote from the epicenter of democratization2. According to this reality and the stated requisites for democracy, the ‘Arab Spring’ revolutions lacked the basis for democracy and, accordingly, any democratic experiment was doomed for failure. This is, however, an unsatisfying and, according to historical precedent, incorrect assumption. The Middle East isn’t unique in its poor endowment with the prerequisites of democracy. Other regions facing similar difficulties nonetheless managed to successfully begin and complete transitions to democracy. In Sub-Saharan Africa, civil society is notoriously weak but yet 23 of 42 countries carried out some measure of democratic transition between 1988 and 1994; poverty and inequality as well as geographic remoteness from a democratic epicenter plagued India, yet it managed to fully embrace democracy; Catholicism has at times been accused of incompatibility with democracy yet did not prevent countries in Latin America and southern Europe from democratizing3. This indicates that democratization is an outcome so complex that no variable will prove to be universally necessary for it. While failure to achieve the perquisites of democracy might undermine the consolidation of it, it cannot explain a failure to carry out democratic transition. As such, it should not and cannot be assumed that the democratic transitions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya are doomed to failure because their societies failed to meet perquisites for democracy. It is true they face significant hurdles and issues in their transitions, in part because of this failure, but the resolution of these issues can lead to full democratization as it has in countries with similar circumstances in the past.

What issues, then, do these transitions face? What challenges lay ahead which Tunisians, Egyptians, and Libyans will need to deal with in order to develop and solidify liberal democracy? In order to draw parallels to the transitions in the Middle East and those in other regions, the problems facing the new Arab democracies should be studied and understood. Some issues apparent in all of these countries include economic problems, the role of Islam in the political system, security concerns, and a lack of experience with democracy. Of course, there also exist further problems whose characteristics and presence are unique to each of these countries. Before any solution to these problems can be found, the problems must be studied and analyzed.

Tunisia was the first country in the Arab world to witness the protests of the ‘Arab Spring’, and was also the first to witness the overthrow of a regime. Since then, the transition in Tunisia has brought about free and fair elections in October 2011 and the seating of a Constituent Assembly in January 2012. Many of the possible worst-case outcomes of the early transition, such as the reemergence of an autocratic regime, ideological polarization, or mass unrest have been avoided. Still, there are a number of issues ahead which Tunisia must deal with before it can ensure stability in its new democracy4. First, Tunisian society is highly depoliticized. This depoliticized nature of Tunisian society is a result to the political reality prior to the revolution where outcomes were largely preordained and many Tunisians disenfranchised5. This electoral manipulation led to a disaffection among Tunisians with politics which has and will continue to complicate the political transition, as it impedes the function of civil society and participation. A new Tunisian government will need to change the political culture of Tunisians and their perceptions of their role in the democracy, which will be a long and difficult task. An additional concern is of the role of political Islam in Tunisia. Al-Nahda, the dominant Islamist party within Tunisia, has frightened many Tunisian seculars and liberals who are uneasy with the prospects of a more Islamic government. In October 2011, it won 88 of the 217 seats in Tunisia’s Constituent Assembly that will draft Tunisia’s constitution6, demonstrating its popularity among many Tunisians and greatly increasing its clout. As such, it is in a position to influence the direction of the transition and determine the nature of the new state. At the root of the debate are questions of how Tunisia’s new democracy will interpret certain democratic principles in relation to Islamic tenets and the role of sharia in the judiciary .Whether the Tunisian political system will incorporate an Islamist party and whether all Tunisians will accept a more Islamic version of government remains to be see, but the issue is that it could lead to a polarization of Tunisian society between two competing visions for Tunisia and fragment the government. Fortunately, al-Nahda has thus far demonstrated moderation in its Islamic orientation, and has stated that it won’t seek too heavy of an incorporation of sharia into the Tunisian constitution7. Tunisians must also contend with a sprawling internal security apparatus built by the previous regime which has been associated with repressive practices and is perceived by the public as an instrument of regime control. Tunisian police have continued to utilize heavy-handed responses since the revolution, and this suggests that the changing of mentalities and culture within the security apparatus will be a slow process8. It is necessary, however, to bring the security forces under governmental oversight and force them to exercise reasonable practices in order to preserve the rule of law and to ensure the function of safe and free society. The status of the economy within Tunisia is also a major concern and issue. For many Tunisians, the 2011 uprising was motivated by socioeconomic grievances as much as a desire for political change9. Since the revolution, however, youth unemployment, regional disparities in wealth, and growing personal indebtedness has continued unabated10. Poor economic conditions could remain a source of political restiveness in Tunisia, and a failure by the new government to improve the economy could weaken its legitimacy and thus the transition as a whole. This mismatch between the hopes of Tunisians during the revolution and the difficult reality of the present economy will be perhaps the biggest challenge to stability in Tunisia going forward11. It should be noted that, despite these challenges, Tunisia’s success so far in its democratic transition has brought it across the threshold of becoming an electoral democracy. If these issues can be resolved and democracy deepen in Tunisia, it will serve as a model for the other transitional governments and the rest of the Arab world.

The revolution in Libya took much longer and was a much bloodier struggle than in Egypt and Tunisia. Mummar Gaddafi was overthrown and killed following months of civil war and an international intervention on the side of the rebels. Still, following his fall the country has begun its own transition into democracy. Nevertheless, as a result of Gaddafi’s rule and the manner of his ouster, the challenges facing Libya in its development of democracy are markedly different than those of its neighbors. First, Libya faces a severely weakened internal cohesion as a result of its population’s tribal nature and because of regional splits between East and West. Leaders from the East and South of Libya seek a more decentralized state, while those from the West favor centralization12. This, coupled with strong regional identities, could potentially cause a split in the country or turn regions against each other in a fight to determine the nature of the future government. Of course, the issue about what level of centralization the new Libya will possess demonstrates that there are mutually exclusive competing visions for its future, and this could lead to instability or struggles down the road. Even more worrisome is that there exists an array of militias that are tied to different tribes and locales, each of which claims ownership of the revolution and demands a share of the political spoils. Ethnic divisions between Berbers and Arabs are surfacing as well13. Such divisions could reinforce ethnic and regional loyalties at the expense of national identification, and thus harm the social and civil cohesiveness of the national state. Going forward, Libya’s leaders will need to negotiate some sort of balance between the role of the central government, its power, and the role of regional administrations. They will also need to foster the development of national identity and dispel regional and ethnic identification; otherwise, the function of a national democracy seeking to represent all Libyans will be severely hampered. Another major challenge facing Libya is building a democratic state in a country systematically depoliticized by the former regime. Gaddafi’s rule saw the absence of competitive elections, political parties, and creation of tight regulations on civic life14. This had depraved Libyans of any avenue for genuine political participation, and its effects have and will continue to be felt. Having lacked any experience with civil society or any institutions for it, the new Libyan state and Libyan people will need to create fresh mechanisms for democratic participation and learn civil culture. This, of course, will be a difficult endeavor, and will necessarily take some time15. Until then, Libyan democracy will be shaky at best and undoubtedly fail to encompass the entire Libyan population. Another massive difficulty facing the Libyan transition is the tenuous state of security in the country. Tens of thousands of armed revolutionaries form a patchwork pattern of control over various parts of the country. The Libyan transitional government has tried to reign in these militia groups and incorporate them into security forces or integrate them into local governments16. Still, armed groups not under oversight by the Libyan government pose a direct challenge to the transition and its ability to keep security and stability during a tenuous time. The proliferation of arms from the civil war means that organizations seeking to subvert the government or who disagree with the direction of the transition could inflict damage or forcefully impede its progress. This is especially dangerous as a national, government controlled army and security apparatus is still in formation and is dwarfed by the number of armed rebels and the territorial size of Libya17. Despite the difficulties that lay in the way of a successful transition, there is optimism to be had about the prospects of a democratic Libya: tribal and regional differences are less virulent than the sectarian and ethnic divisions that have fueled prolonged conflict in some other regions of the Middle East, Libya’s geopolitical environment is fairly positive, there is a widespread pride in Gaddafi’s overthrow, and there is the fact that Libya has a copious oil revenue which, if properly managed, can help to rapidly rebuild and form state and national institutions18.

On February 11th, 2011, President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt was forced to cede power, making him the second Arab leader to be ousted in less than a month because of sweeping protests. His swift ouster marked the beginning of what promised to be a much longer and more difficult political transition. On June 24th, 2012, Mohamed Morsi won the Egyptian presidential elections, marking a significant step forward in Egypt’s transition. However, the challenges it faces going further are significant. One of the largest issues facing Egypt now is the overreach of Egypt’s dominant political party, the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood19. Egypt now has only two nationally elected bodies, the presidency and the upper house, both of which the Brotherhood controls. Furthermore, the Brotherhood has control in the Constituent Assembly, the body tasked with drafting a new constitution. There is serious concern that the Muslim Brotherhood could build itself a monopoly on the system and guarantee its supremacy. If it does, democracy in Egypt could very well take on an illiberal tint and one form of dictatorship be replaced with another. A similar concern is of the growing powers of the Egyptian presidency. On the 22nd of November, Morsi made a decree that placed him above oversight of any kind, including the courts20. This move sparked massive protests, demonstrating that it faces significant opposition, but the potential for Morsi morphing the Egyptian presidency into a dominant office, one that enjoys powers even more substantial than under Mubarak, is worrisome for those who fear the return of authoritarianism. Related to these issues is the role of political Islam within Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamic parties have a control of Egyptian politics during the formative period of the new Egyptian state. This is especially worrisome for liberals and seculars in Egypt, groups which participated in the revolution and ouster of Mubarak but who now are being pushed out of the process of drafting a constitution and thus out of the formation of the new state. This represents the struggle between competing visions for Egypt’s future, and there are concerns among some Egyptians that an Islamic government would be hostile to liberal democracy or roll back freedoms21. Indeed, it is unclear whether the results of this Islamist hegemony over the Egyptian transition may produce or if it will satisfy the aspirations and hopes of the protesters who filled Tahrir square last February. A disconnect between results and the initial vision could lead to a return to street politics and an erosion of domestic stability22, and the recent protests against Morsi indeed does demonstrate this. An additional major concern for Egypt is status of the economy, which has regressed significantly since the revolution. While many of the economic issues the ‘new’ Egypt faces are challenges it inherited such as high unemployment, an education system ill-suited to the job market, and wealth inequality, the additional challenges of the revolution have exacerbated these issues and the prospect for future growth is austere23. If economic decline continues, the new government could face serious issues of legitimacy and could face public anger over the differences between hopes at the beginning of the revolution and the economic reality of the present. Indeed, there are fears that continued economic decline could lead to a reversion to authoritarianism or force the government to rush to fulfill populist economic demands with little consideration of their long term economic consequence24. Egypt’s democratic transition thus faces a number of significant and dangerous challenges, and some of these have come to a head in the very recent past. As one of the leading Arab states, the ultimate results of the Egyptian transition will undoubtedly play a significant role in shaping and influencing the future of the broader Arab political environment. It should be remembered that, despite their current conflict, the disparate groups which seek to influence the direction of the transition and the future of the Egyptian government have come together in past in order to oust Mubarak. With that in mind, there is hope that national reconciliation between these groups can happen in the future and a liberal Egyptian democracy can form.

As can be seen, the issues facing the transitions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya are numerous and significant in the challenges they pose. Solutions to these problems can be found and implemented, but that does not mean that they necessarily will, or whether the ‘proper’ solution can be found. Furthermore, unexpected events, circumstances, or issues may arise which could also jeopardize the formation of liberal democracy in these countries. Thus, As a result of these challenges and the unpredictable nature of democratic transitions, the changes currently underway in the Arab world may indeed lead to various possible destinations that differ from liberal democracy. Nevertheless, an analysis of past experiences with democratic transitions from throughout the world can provide examples of how the Arab experience might proceed and what some possible results of the current transitions could be. Additionally, these past experiences can provide lessons for the current Arab transitions and solutions to the problems which they currently posses. A brief history of the recent ‘third wave’ of democratic transition should be thus be provided.

The ‘third wave’ of democratic transitions began in Southern Europe in the mid 1970s, continued in Latin America in the 1980s and into the 1990s, and spread throughout Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet ‘sphere’ following the breakup of the Soviet Union in 198925. In Southern Europe, Spain experienced a regime-initiated transition whose speed and success hinged on a high degree of consent and consensus. Greece was eased into its transition with considerable and recent experience with democratic rule. In Portugal, a transition was slowed because of political and ideological divisions26. The Southern European countries had an important advantage in that they were eligible for membership in European Institutions, which provided a framework and incentive for the transitions as well as a yardstick for measuring progress towards the establishment of democratic rule. In Latin America, the Argentine government was delegitimized and brought down because of the Falklands War and guided by the military through a democratic transition. In Chile, the democratic transition was carried out within a constitutional framework set up by an authoritarian regime with past experiences with democracy27. These transitions reflected strong continent-wide trends towards democratic governance, the free market, and trade liberalization. These trends strengthened the role of civil society and elected officials while transforming the political role of the military28. In Eastern Europe, the regime changes in Hungary and Poland represented examples of regime-initiated transitions which were characterized by considerable consensus and compromise. Civil society and independent institutions had developed well before the onset of these transitions, which facilitated the ease of transition. Romania and Kyrgyzstan were examples of society-initiated transition. They both lacked well-developed civil society and the transition process was characterized by considerable social unrest and turmoil29. The transitions in Romania and Kyrgyzstan are perhaps most similar to the transitions in the Arab world, as they came from pressures from society rather than from the regime to launch reforms. Additional parallels exist, such as the repressive nature of the regimes, the failure for civil society or independent institutions to develop, and the presence of a limited circle of aristocrats who enjoyed the benefits and spoils of rule30. Additional comparisons between the Arab transitions into democracy and other democratic transitions exist. Popular expectations and continued pressure among revolutionaries and the public will be more important to the outcomes of the Arab Spring than in some previous transitions. In Egypt, for example, protesters have continuously put pressure against those managing the transition to maintain momentum towards democracy, and this is especially evident in the recent protests against Morsi’s decree. In contrast, Transitions in Southern Europe, Latin America, and Eastern Europe were generally sustained by elite consensus, developed before the transitions opening or in its early stages, and the populations were less abrasive with their demands. A result of popular protests and ‘transition from below’ may force the transitions to move more quickly than those initiated from above, such as in Latin America31. On the other hand, in the absence of the elite and intergroup consensus which helped push forward transitions in some Latin American and European countries, the Egyptian, Libyan, and Tunisian transitions may remain contested for protracted periods of time.

What lessons and past experiences, then, can be derived from these other transitions and applied to the Arab transitions? Are there solutions to the problems which inhibit the development of liberal democracy in the Middle East? First, the role of Islam in Arab politics can be examined. With the rise of democracy, parties and espousing Islamic views either came into existence or began to operate within the political system, and the powerful performance of various Islamist parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and al-Nahda in Tunisia demonstrates that Islamism will play a significant role in the future of these states. The question is whether these parties will be able to develop political and social agendas within a democratic system alongside parties with secular orientations, and whether transitional leaders can integrate Islamist parties and values into largely secular conceptions of the state. It is possible that the transitions will follow paths similar to Turkey and Indonesia, where socially conservative Muslim parties play active roles in electoral politics within the democratic system32. Past experience with religion in transitions have demonstrated that it need not necessarily be an issue or be incompatible with liberal democracy. The evolution of the Catholic Church in Latin America demonstrates how religious actors can evolve to operate within new political paradigms. Throughout much of history, it was considered antithetical to democracy, but following Vatican II the Catholic Church came to be widely regarded as a champion of democracy and human rights, especially in Brazil and Chile’s democratic transitions33. The question whose answer remains to be seen is whether the Arab states in transition will be able to reinterpret their Islamic traditions and whether the more conservative or radical elements will moderate their positions once integrated into the system. If they do not, a significant concern is that the deep schisms between secular groups and Islamic groups will fracture the new democratic systems or spark conflict over the future of the state.

Despite this concern, previous democratic transitions demonstrate that the threat to democratization that social cohesion problems pose comes less from the problems themselves, in this case the role of Islam, and more from how the government responds to them34. They test a government’s capacity and commitment to responding in way that are consistent with norms associated with democracy, and poor responses to cohesion problems could manifest or reinforce weakness in democracy. Polarization is brought to the surface in the democratization process by enabling parties that reflect differing views to wield new influence. Lack of consensus on the nature of the state can be an obstacle in constitutional negotiations, law reform, establishment of new governance structures, and setting of policy priorities35. These, however, are all issues with the conduct of government, and the government does not need to let these societal cohesion problems create these issues. Previous transitions have demonstrated that this is possible: in Indonesia, the government successfully brokered agreements between Muslim and Christian communities and responded to violence between these groups with police deployment and negotiations, and in Spain an escalation of violence linked to Basque and Catalan nationalism threatened to derail the transition process, but the government negotiated autonomy arrangements so that the problem was defused. On the other hand, Turkey’s transitional example demonstrates a government’s response that can weaken or reflect weaknesses in its democracy. The Turkish government responded to Kurdish nationalism with repressive measures directed at segments of its own population and resistance to cultural and political autonomy for the Kurdish area36. Thus, societal cohesion problems such as the split between seculars, liberals, and Islamists need not necessarily thwart the development and consolidation of democracy, but the way the government responds to these problems could.

Another important lesson from past democratic transitions is that few cases of successful democratic transitions have not suffered from turbulence such as this, indicating that political instability and turbulence alone does not derail democratization, and that the difficulty of managing high popular expectations or perceptions about future direction after regime change was not a prominent factor in the reversal of transitions. Indeed, Romania’s transition process was prolonged and disorderly, with ideological differences rife between segments of society. Nevertheless, Romania managed to successfully democratize, demonstrating that tumult early in a transition does not doom the democratic process, provided that there are sufficient countervailing forces to keep democratization on track.38 Rather, a failure to reform institutions, insufficient commitment to democratization on the part of leaders, and other internal power struggles were more powerful factors39. Outcomes can hinge on whether the regime change involved the rejection of the former political system, not just the rejection of the former regime. Thus, the role of political Islam itself might not be of concern, but instead the way that the transitioning states form their governments to cope with or incorporate it could be. Tunisia and Libya could, therefore, overcome their issues and still develop liberal democracies: Tunisia’s has rejected the mechanisms of Ben ‘Ali’s state and has developed new democratic institutions, and Libya has begun the process of developing a new democratic framework from scratch. In Egypt, however, the consolidation of power under the Muslim Brotherhood and Morsi’s grabbing of power for the office of the presidency is similar to tactics used by past dictatorial regimes and could pave the way for the reappearance and entrenchment of authoritarianism, thus potentially spelling disaster for the prospect of a democratic Egypt. Of course, the protests in response to Morsi’s decree and the growing clout of the Muslim Brotherhood represents a significant countervailing pressure, and thus perhaps the tumult that Egypt is experiencing will, like in the case of Romania, not derail the long term democratic transition.

The economic conditions in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt are of major concern because of the difficulties they present to the transitions. Poor economic conditions were a trigger for the ‘Arab Spring’, and they were as well in many countries which have experienced political transitions in the past. Eastern European regimes had based their legitimacy on ensuring satisfactory standards of living, for example, and saw it fracture when undermined by poor economic performance. Chile’s 1982 financial crises reinforced a trend towards gradual democratization. A major lesson from these transitions, however, is that failure to improve living standards has not caused democratization to fail40. Spain suffered sharp economic deterioration after regime change, but democratization proceeded and enjoyed strong public support. In Argentina, a dire economic situation during the regime change prompted the new civilian government to adopt an austerity program, and while strong public backlash led to the new president’s early resignation it did not dissolve the political transition. Thus, economic problems, however troublesome for government leaders, are not necessarily determinative of the course of democratization. Of course, the transitions in the Arab world are especially fragile and could be more vulnerable to economic strains than in many past cases. Considering that the main motivator for revolution was poor economic conditions, it is entirely possible that failure to improve the economy could delegitimize these new regimes and damage the democratic framework which the transitions are trying to produce.

If anything, these lessons learned from previous transitions demonstrate that the Arab transitions, though facing many issues and challenges, are not facing an impossible task in developing liberal democracy. The emergence of a democracy in Tunisia, whose transition has gone by largely successfully, could increase the probability of reform and successful transitions in the other Arab countries. After all, the transitions in Latin America demonstrate that regional factors and diffusion about the role of democracy influenced democratization more than any other factor41. Furthermore, though the current situation in these transitioning states may appear fragile, that does not mean that they are doomed. The climate for democratization in Latin America during the 1970s was also similarly ‘negative’, and few would have predicted that these states would have developed liberal democracies over the long term42. History has proven that, if the transitions in the Arab states are able to overcome their issues and struggles, then it is entirely possible that democracy will be built and consolidated over the long term. Whether they will, however, remains to be seen. Still, Arab democracy should not be disavowed just yet.

33. David Cortright, “Is Islam the Issue?”, The Tipping Point: transitions to Democracy in Latin America and the Middle East”, Kellogg Institute for International Studies, accessed December 2, 2012. http://kellogg.nd.edu/about/Tipping%20Point-Arab%20Spring.pdf

41. David Cortright, “Conclusion?”, The Tipping Point: transitions to Democracy in Latin America and the Middle East”, Kellogg Institute for International Studies, accessed December 2, 2012. http://kellogg.nd.edu/about/Tipping%20Point-Arab%20Spring.pdf