I was delighted to be awarded an early career grant from the Regional
Studies Association (RSA) which enabled me to explore the potential disjuncture
between the centralised social-institutional arrangement and the decentralised
techno-economic system in China. I was inspired by the studies (such as Peck
& Zhang, 2013) on the emerging Sino-capitalism regime but disappointed by
the reductionist ‘neoliberalism’ label that broad-brush China’s distinctive
social and economic evolution. As a scholar who witnessed China’s reforms over
the past three decades, I am more than aware that the Central government retains
a firm hand over a wide range of social-institutional management and activities.
Ironically, the faster economic ‘neoliberalism’
has advanced, the more the state has asserted bureaucratic-authoritarian
control over itssocial affairs, because
of the fear for social disturbance.

Within this context I focused my attention on three science parks,
specifically the imbalance between housing provision and labour market within
and surrounding these science parks, to explore the disjuncture between China’s
social and economic subsystems. The three science parks chosen were: Beijing Zhongguancun
Science Park (Z-Park); Shanghai Zhangjiang Science Park (Z-SHIPs), and Wuhan
Optics Valley of China (OVC). They were selected because the housing-labour
imbalance is at its most acute around these industry agglomerations. Three
research aims were set for this project:

(2) To identify disjunctures
in the different mixes of state-market relations in different regions;

(3) To discuss civil
society and government responses to emerging problems.

This paper on ‘Housing the Knowledge Economy’ mainly addressed the
latter two questions, in particular the awareness of social housing providers
to the housing needs of knowledge workers. These issues were analysed mainly through
secondary data, complemented by interviews with local and national authority
and science parks’ managers. This method was chosen because the supply (rather
than demand) effect of social housing was the main concern of this paper. Based
on extensive documentary coding and analysis, it was found that for China as a
whole, its labour market has been liberalised to a similar extent as that in
the West, but Beijing is still the ‘central command centre’ in setting targets for
social housing construction, which has resulted in a substantial disjuncture
between where people work and where they live. Nonetheless, regional variations
were prominent.

In Z-Park, where the most acute work-home imbalance was identified,
the local authorities were least explicit in their social housing (or even
commercial housing) commitment. Along with spatial expansion of Z-Park outside
the central districts of Beijing, more social housing (financed by the
municipal government) for Z-Park employees was provided around it. In Z-SHIPs,
attention to the housing needs of science park employees was much more noticeable
than Z-Park. But what made Z-SHIPs stood out was its reliance on the private
rental sector, whereas the municipal government offers small subsidy to on-park
workers. In OVC, where the land constraint was not as severe as in the other
two cases, the real estate sector has long been identified as the pillar of
local development. Social housing was public financed and distributed, and
often located far from city centre, in a pattern similar to Z-Park. But the
much more aggressive real estate development in OVC might distract the public
resources, such as land and capital, from industrial development.

By distinguishing China’s social-institutional and techno-economic
domains, this research could uncover the multiple faces of the widely debated
Sino-capitalism. Another novel aspect of this research lies in identifying the
possible inconsistent pace towards neoliberalism both temporarily and regionally,
which in turn could hamper China’s overall system function. This draws
policy attention to a systematic approach in promoting knowledge economy. A
following paper from this project, which is based on questionnaire survey of
knowledge workers, will explore further such inconsistencies around the three
Science Parks from the demand side.

Economic growth policies based on the creative economy have
arrived in Indonesia. Widely adopted in Anglo-Saxon and European countries, the
Indonesian government has recently embraced the idea. A ministry was established
to coordinate the creative economy sector especially. The goal is to inspire
the growth of creative industries as a driver for local economic development. However,
the national policy formulation and the local implementations and
interpretations are importantly divorced. This can jeopardize the anticipated
outcomes. Local forces and path dependence appear strong. Cities rich in
traditional culture interpret the creative economy discourse in terms of traditional
handicraft businesses and tourism. Meanwhile, in more advanced cities, the
‘real’ creative industries are already growing and the local government started
to be aware of the difference between creative industries and long-established
traditional businesses which focus on heritage, conservative values. Yet, it is
visible that in both situations, local governments use the creative economy policy
to reinforce what is already there.

This is what we found in Bandung, Surakarta and Yogyakarta,
the first three cities to implement the creative economy policy in Indonesia.
Bandung is the only city in which the interpretation aligns with the general
understanding of a creative economy that emphasises innovation and new
knowledge creation. Meanwhile, in Surakarta and Yogyakarta the term creative
economy is used, while it refers to existing ‘traditional’ cultural economic
activities – batik and traditional crafts - which have been in operation for
years. These different interpretations are governed by several factors.
Firstly, in Bandung there were ‘intermediaries’, especially The British
Council, university actors and epistemic communities, who introduced the
creative economy discourse and directed the local government’s interpretation
towards the creative economy concept. Secondly, related to this, these
intermediaries helped structure local assemblages and influenced local policies
so that the creative economy not only became a development discourse, but also
an important strategy embodied in local policies. In comparison, the creative
economy was applied by the national government in Surakarta and Yogyakarta as
‘pilot projects’, but at the end of the day, the local governments in these
cities decided to focus on traditional cultural industries as these industries are
big and have been cultural attractions in these cities. Thirdly, there is a
strong attachment to traditional culture in Surakarta and Yogyakarta, making it
politically challenging to prioritize a ‘modern’, innovative creative economy
like in Bandung.

The creative economy idea has become a temptation for many
governments in Asian developing countries. However, often this means
copy-pasting the word ‘creative economy’
without considering whether the concept is suitable for local contexts. The
Indonesian case thus provides insights for other developing countries. So, can
stimulating a creative economy be the way forward for developing countries? It can,
in some cities. There would be some cities that will be ready for this
‘creative turn’, while for others continuing the development of tradition-based
economic activities might be more relevant. This, of course, depends on what
the local government wants to do: developing the ‘innovative-style’ of creative
economy, or rather protecting traditional values in cultural industries.
Governments clearly can do both, but they need to acknowledge that the
accompanying policy strategies as well as the expected economic gains
importantly differ. For example, to support a ‘real’ creative economy, it is
crucial to develop a climatethat allows
creative industries or entrepreneurs to collaborate and build networks. Meanwhile,
to support the traditional cultural economy, supply-side support seems
important, as the small businesses involved in the sector are vulnerable and have a limited capacity to
highlight and economise cultural values. Given the weak articulation of the
national policy and the different local interpretations, the creative economy
policy in its current form is unlikely to become the silver bullet the
Indonesian government wants it to be.

My article
“City of go(l)d: Spatial and cultural effects of high-status Jewish immigration
from Western countries on the Baka neighbourhood of Jerusalem” discusses high-status
privileged migration to Israel by Jews from Western countries, and its
influences on one of the places where they settle – a Jerusalem neighbourhood
called Baka.

My interest in
the topic started from a resident’s perspective, as an Israeli-Jew who suddenly
found herself in an English/French speaking environment, where housing prices
were going up rapidly, new housing solely built and marketed for wealthy
newcomers and where the cultural atmosphere was very accommodating for
migrants, and less so for Israelis. I wanted to understand the processes at
play and the immigrants’ perspectives.

The article
discusses privileged migration to Israel, an ethnic immigration country, where
the sole criteria for immigration is Jewish origin. I am dealing particularly
with immigration of Jews from Western countries – the United States, France and
the UK. The way Diaspora Jews imagine Israel and Jerusalem plays a crucial role
in their decision to move there. Many immigrants choose to live near other
expatriates in order to enjoy the comforts of the ethnic enclave. The paper
deals with the outcomes of such choice, in terms of the spatial and cultural
implications that privileged lifestyle migration has on the space in which it
settles.

While Jewish
immigration to Israel is termed “aliya” and their immigration is perceived as a
homecoming, I choose to term it as a type of lifestyle migration, in order to
place it among larger trends in contemporary immigration and the literature
concerning it. By so doing, I aim to contribute to the understanding of the
effects lifestyle migration has on cities, neighbourhoods and housing markets
and to elaborate the understanding of who lifestyle migrants are, what
motivates them and how they live in their destinations.

The paper focuses
on the case-study of English- and French-speaking Jewish immigrants who live in
the Baka neighbourhood in Jerusalem and on their effects on the neighbourhood’s
gentrification process, its real estate market and issues of consumerism and
belonging. This case-study demonstrates how lifestyle migration links with
urban transformation. While gentrification has more often been studied in the
global north, this paper shows that neoliberal processes, like gentrification
or the global flow of capital and investments, are indeed much more
encompassing.

While much has
been written on the topic of gentrification, there is not so much on the
combination between gentrification and immigration, and particularly
high-status lifestyle migration, defined as the mobility of relatively
privileged individuals in search for a better quality of life. Similar
processes currently occur in many places and therefore, the spatial politics of
privileged migration and its impact on cities, neighbourhoods and housing
markets is a story that needs to be told. Moreover, as lifestyle migration has
mainly been researched in the context of rural or coastal tourist destinations,
this urban case-study illuminates a somewhat blind spot of this literature.

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