Military

Further Reading

Prepared
Statement Of

THE HONORABLE PAUL WOLFOWITZ

DEPUTY
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

27
June 2001

Mr.
Chairman [Bob Stump], Congressman Skelton, and members
of the Committee:

I
appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you the
Navy's recent decision concerning long-term training
on Vieques. Following
my introductory statement, Secretary England, Admiral
Clark and General Williams will address the issue in
more detail.

Following
careful consideration and consultation with military
leaders, Secretary of the Navy Gordon England made a
decision concerning the way ahead on Vieques.
On June 15, he announced publicly his decision
that the Navy plans to discontinue training on the
Vieques range in May 2003.
It is a decision that Secretary Rumsfeld and I
fully support.

While
Secretary England will explain the detailed reasoning
that led to his decision, let me briefly outline six
broad considerations that put this issue into context.

First
and foremost is the need to ensure that our sailors
and Marines-indeed all of our forces-are properly
trained to meet any situation their duty may call for,
including actual combat.
As a matter of fact, the carrier battle groups
that train at Vieques frequently find themselves
shortly afterwards flying combat missions over Iraq.

Mr.
Chairman, you have emphasized "the importance of
realistic training to protect the lives of American
service members."[1]

Let
me assure you that protecting the lives of the men and
women who wear our nation's uniforms is one of our
most fundamental concerns, one that we well understand
and fully appreciate.

However,
a second inescapable fact guiding our decision-making
is the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2001[2].

That
Act, passed by the Congress and signed into law by
President Clinton on October 30, 2000, requires that
training on Vieques beyond May 2003 will be determined
by a vote of the residents of Vieques.
I am surprised that so much of the commentary
that I have read on this issue in recent weeks fails
even to mention this law and the fact that the Navy
would not be able to train on Vieques beyond May 2003
unless it receives a positive vote from the residents
of that island who have, so far, expressed strong
sentiments to the contrary.

In
signing this Act into law, President Clinton said:
"residents will determine through a referendum
whether there will be any training at Vieques beyond
that which is critical to the readiness of the Navy
and the Marine Corps to conduct at Vieques.
However, he then went on to define, as the law
effectively defines, critical training to be only
"training with non-explosive ordnance for no more
than 90 days per year through May 1, 2003."
In other words, President Clinton declared,
consistent with the law he was signing, that training
beyond 2003 was not critical for the Navy and Marine
Corps.

One
can dispute that conclusion, but there's no
disputing the fact that the law leaves the decision on
Navy and Marine Corps training on Vieques to the
citizens of that island.

Third,
the best available evidence strongly suggests that the
citizens of Vieques would probably vote for the
Navy's departure from Vieques in 2003.
Indeed, 66 percent of the voters on Vieques in
the last election for governor voted for candidates
who wanted the Navy out of Vieques, not by 2003, but
within 60 days or sooner.

The
remaining 34 percent of the voters supported the
candidate who ran on a platform of getting the Navy
out of Vieques by May 2003 (a candidate, by the way,
who subsequently demanded that the Navy leave before
President Clinton left office).

Fourth,
dictating national security decisions by local
referendum is fundamentally flawed public policy. Win
or lose on the Vieques referendum, it is a mistake to
allow local elections to dictate essential matters of
national security.

Fifth,
given the near certainty that we will be voted out of
Vieques, which would ensure our departure by May 2003,
we need to direct maximum thought and energy into
developing alternate places and methods of training,
so we can avoid training degradation.
Failure to confront the reality of Vieques and
prolonging uncertainty only reduces our chances of
being prepared for the nearly-inevitable future.

Sixth,
continued training at Vieques until 2003 is
critical for our sailors and Marines.

For
that reason, we need to find a way to lower the
political temperature so that effective training can
take place during this critical transitional period up
until May 2003.

Secretary
England, who answered the President's call to serve
our country and our Armed Forces, brings to his
position extensive experience as a defense industry
leader. His
abilities are surpassed only by his concern for the
sailors and Marines who serve us so well.

Secretary
England made his decision with one overriding
consideration: to do the best possible job of meeting
the requirements of the men and women who serve, given
the constraints of the situation presented by the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2001.

Secretary
England was confronted with a difficult decision
immediately upon taking office, and he has done an
impressive job dealing with a far from ideal
situation.

His
leadership is greatly appreciated by Secretary
Rumsfeld, myself and I hope by the members of this
Committee.

Mr.
Chairman, and members of this Committee, I share your
concerns, and I look forward to our continued efforts
to guarantee the combat readiness of our forces
through effective training and to provide for the
needs of all those who voluntarily defend the
liberties we hold dear.
Thank you.
I will now turn the microphone over to
Secretary England