This chapter moves the story from the New Deal to the U.S. Army. As the state's main wartime hub for psychological research, the Army Research Branch, headed by University of Chicago sociologist ...
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This chapter moves the story from the New Deal to the U.S. Army. As the state's main wartime hub for psychological research, the Army Research Branch, headed by University of Chicago sociologist Samuel A. Stouffer, presented evidence to military commanders that better-educated soldiers were more efficient, exhibited higher morale, and were less likely to desert or suffer a psychoneurotic breakdown than their educationally deprived peers. Military and educational policymakers were galvanized by this finding and joined forces to create the Army Information and Education Division—the education clearinghouse for the common soldier. With the steady support of General George C. Marshall, the chief of staff of the army, who believed wholeheartedly in the transformative power of education, millions of G.I.s made use of the educational services provided to them.Less

Educating Citizen-Soldiers in World War II

Christopher P. Loss

Published in print: 2011-11-27

This chapter moves the story from the New Deal to the U.S. Army. As the state's main wartime hub for psychological research, the Army Research Branch, headed by University of Chicago sociologist Samuel A. Stouffer, presented evidence to military commanders that better-educated soldiers were more efficient, exhibited higher morale, and were less likely to desert or suffer a psychoneurotic breakdown than their educationally deprived peers. Military and educational policymakers were galvanized by this finding and joined forces to create the Army Information and Education Division—the education clearinghouse for the common soldier. With the steady support of General George C. Marshall, the chief of staff of the army, who believed wholeheartedly in the transformative power of education, millions of G.I.s made use of the educational services provided to them.

The campaign to sell voluntary repatriation was not the administration's only PR success in 1952. As the war persisted, officers and officials at all levels made big improvements in their publicity ...
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The campaign to sell voluntary repatriation was not the administration's only PR success in 1952. As the war persisted, officers and officials at all levels made big improvements in their publicity efforts. Many learned from earlier mistakes. In the Far East, senior officers also established more effective bureaucratic structures and brought in more personnel to help deal with reporters. On the ground in Korea, the changing nature of the war also eased the military's task. As the fighting bogged down in stalemate, it became less newsworthy. For the first time, the military also had enormous control over what reporters saw. And at the same time, they were now in a position to alleviate the two practical problems that had soured military‐media relations in 1950: appalling billets and antiquated communications. In Washington, meanwhile, officials undertook numerous information campaigns that helped sustain a measure of support for the war.Less

Steady Improvements

Steven Casey

Published in print: 2008-04-01

The campaign to sell voluntary repatriation was not the administration's only PR success in 1952. As the war persisted, officers and officials at all levels made big improvements in their publicity efforts. Many learned from earlier mistakes. In the Far East, senior officers also established more effective bureaucratic structures and brought in more personnel to help deal with reporters. On the ground in Korea, the changing nature of the war also eased the military's task. As the fighting bogged down in stalemate, it became less newsworthy. For the first time, the military also had enormous control over what reporters saw. And at the same time, they were now in a position to alleviate the two practical problems that had soured military‐media relations in 1950: appalling billets and antiquated communications. In Washington, meanwhile, officials undertook numerous information campaigns that helped sustain a measure of support for the war.

This chapter examines how the support of influential Americans, including President Roosevelt and Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, combined with the pioneering work of ...
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This chapter examines how the support of influential Americans, including President Roosevelt and Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, combined with the pioneering work of combat historian S. L. A. Marshall to produce richly detailed histories that contributed to the U.S. Army's unprecedented drive to document the services wartime history—a practice that the Army had not followed either during or after other major conflicts. The chapter demonstrates that in addition to its use in official histories, others put oral history to use to serve the war effort. Samuel Stouffer and the U.S. Army's Research Branch often used oral histories to improve survey questions that went out to hundreds of thousands of soldiers. The Research Branch's work proved invaluable in many instances, and perhaps nowhere was it more worthwhile than in reshaping treatments for battle fatigue. The extensive use of oral histories during the war led to its widespread acceptance by the U.S. Army after 1945, and because of the active campaigning of wartime practitioners such as historian Forest Pogue, the wider community of academic historians, who often disparaged the value of oral history after the war, came increasingly to embrace the practice during the 1960s and the 1970s.Less

Veterans Tell Their Stories and Why Historians and Others Listened

G. Kurt Piehler

Published in print: 2010-09-04

This chapter examines how the support of influential Americans, including President Roosevelt and Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, combined with the pioneering work of combat historian S. L. A. Marshall to produce richly detailed histories that contributed to the U.S. Army's unprecedented drive to document the services wartime history—a practice that the Army had not followed either during or after other major conflicts. The chapter demonstrates that in addition to its use in official histories, others put oral history to use to serve the war effort. Samuel Stouffer and the U.S. Army's Research Branch often used oral histories to improve survey questions that went out to hundreds of thousands of soldiers. The Research Branch's work proved invaluable in many instances, and perhaps nowhere was it more worthwhile than in reshaping treatments for battle fatigue. The extensive use of oral histories during the war led to its widespread acceptance by the U.S. Army after 1945, and because of the active campaigning of wartime practitioners such as historian Forest Pogue, the wider community of academic historians, who often disparaged the value of oral history after the war, came increasingly to embrace the practice during the 1960s and the 1970s.

Considered one of most influential U.S. military officers of the twentieth century, William E. DePuy (1919–1992) developed the education and training program that regenerated the U.S. Army after the ...
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Considered one of most influential U.S. military officers of the twentieth century, William E. DePuy (1919–1992) developed the education and training program that regenerated the U.S. Army after the Vietnam War. This book draws from sources such as transcripts and letters in DePuy's personal papers, interviews with those who knew him best, and secondary literature to trace DePuy's life—from child to decorated officer to commander of Training and Doctrine Command.Less

General William E. DePuy : Preparing the Army for Modern War

Henry G. Gole

Published in print: 2008-09-26

Considered one of most influential U.S. military officers of the twentieth century, William E. DePuy (1919–1992) developed the education and training program that regenerated the U.S. Army after the Vietnam War. This book draws from sources such as transcripts and letters in DePuy's personal papers, interviews with those who knew him best, and secondary literature to trace DePuy's life—from child to decorated officer to commander of Training and Doctrine Command.

When America went to war again, Berlin responded by turning his revue-writing impulse again to patriotic ends. Invited to revise Yip Yip Yaphank for a new era, Berlin created This Is the Army (1942) ...
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When America went to war again, Berlin responded by turning his revue-writing impulse again to patriotic ends. Invited to revise Yip Yip Yaphank for a new era, Berlin created This Is the Army (1942) and succeeded by avoiding direct expressions of patriotism and focusing instead on the ordinary complaints and wishes of the common soldier. More than that, Berlin’s songs had a way of reflecting the common preoccupations that soldiers and citizens shared, and thus it could be argued, his work helped to normalize the war experience in an unstable period of American history. This Is the Army takes center stage in Berlin’s work for several reasons: its tour of the U.S. and war zones, its performances for more than a million civilian and soldier spectators, and its status as “the best thing I’ve ever been connected with,” as Berlin called it.Less

Musical Theater of War : This Is the Army, 1942–45

Jeffrey Magee

Published in print: 2012-04-06

When America went to war again, Berlin responded by turning his revue-writing impulse again to patriotic ends. Invited to revise Yip Yip Yaphank for a new era, Berlin created This Is the Army (1942) and succeeded by avoiding direct expressions of patriotism and focusing instead on the ordinary complaints and wishes of the common soldier. More than that, Berlin’s songs had a way of reflecting the common preoccupations that soldiers and citizens shared, and thus it could be argued, his work helped to normalize the war experience in an unstable period of American history. This Is the Army takes center stage in Berlin’s work for several reasons: its tour of the U.S. and war zones, its performances for more than a million civilian and soldier spectators, and its status as “the best thing I’ve ever been connected with,” as Berlin called it.

This chapter concerns the mechanization of cavalry in the U.S. Army after World War I. It discusses the early mechanization experiments, the mechanization of horse cavalry units for service, and the ...
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This chapter concerns the mechanization of cavalry in the U.S. Army after World War I. It discusses the early mechanization experiments, the mechanization of horse cavalry units for service, and the merger of the cavalry and armor divisions in 1950. The chapter also explores the history of the development of mechanized forces in the whole of the U.S. Army, from the advent of tanks in battle in the 1914–1918 war to the end of Desert Storm in 1991.Less

Introductory Essay

General Donn A. Starry

Published in print: 2006-07-03

This chapter concerns the mechanization of cavalry in the U.S. Army after World War I. It discusses the early mechanization experiments, the mechanization of horse cavalry units for service, and the merger of the cavalry and armor divisions in 1950. The chapter also explores the history of the development of mechanized forces in the whole of the U.S. Army, from the advent of tanks in battle in the 1914–1918 war to the end of Desert Storm in 1991.

This chapter focuses on Frank Parker, a U.S. Army cavalry officer who first conceptualized combined arms mechanized force. Parker began to understand the idea of the operational depth of mechanized ...
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This chapter focuses on Frank Parker, a U.S. Army cavalry officer who first conceptualized combined arms mechanized force. Parker began to understand the idea of the operational depth of mechanized warfare supported by tactical aviation as a solution to trench warfare during World War I. He became a visionary after witnessing the introduction of the airplane and tank in warfare. The chapter provides background on Parker's education and career.Less

Frank Parker Early Mechanized Cavalry Theorist

George F. Hofmann

Published in print: 2006-07-03

This chapter focuses on Frank Parker, a U.S. Army cavalry officer who first conceptualized combined arms mechanized force. Parker began to understand the idea of the operational depth of mechanized warfare supported by tactical aviation as a solution to trench warfare during World War I. He became a visionary after witnessing the introduction of the airplane and tank in warfare. The chapter provides background on Parker's education and career.

Three weeks before DePuy assumed command of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and four months before the Yom Kippur War started, DePuy asserted to several infantry trainers that the previous ...
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Three weeks before DePuy assumed command of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and four months before the Yom Kippur War started, DePuy asserted to several infantry trainers that the previous army had been ill-trained compared to the present army. He asserted that they needed to produce units that were five times as good as those of the enemy forces. Since the Red Army and the U.S. Army could be perceived as relatively equal, training served as the fundamental determinant of their performance. Preparing for the war thus entailed producing “infantry squads and platoons to do the mission of the Army.” Since the Yom Kippur War's resulting lethality proved to be an indicator of how the first battle had to be won, the Yom Kippur War served as leverage to obtain revitalizing resources for the Army.Less

TRADOC Commander : The Army’s Road Back

Henry G. Gole

Published in print: 2008-09-26

Three weeks before DePuy assumed command of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and four months before the Yom Kippur War started, DePuy asserted to several infantry trainers that the previous army had been ill-trained compared to the present army. He asserted that they needed to produce units that were five times as good as those of the enemy forces. Since the Red Army and the U.S. Army could be perceived as relatively equal, training served as the fundamental determinant of their performance. Preparing for the war thus entailed producing “infantry squads and platoons to do the mission of the Army.” Since the Yom Kippur War's resulting lethality proved to be an indicator of how the first battle had to be won, the Yom Kippur War served as leverage to obtain revitalizing resources for the Army.

Most Civil War generals were graduates of West Point, and many of them helped transform the U.S. Army from what was little better than an armed mob that performed poorly during the War of 1812 into ...
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Most Civil War generals were graduates of West Point, and many of them helped transform the U.S. Army from what was little better than an armed mob that performed poorly during the War of 1812 into the competent fighting force that won the Mexican War. This book demonstrates how the “old army” transformed itself into a professional military force after 1814, and, more important, how “old army” methods profoundly shaped the conduct of the Civil War.Less

West Pointers and the Civil War : The Old Army in War and Peace

Wayne Wei-siang Hsieh

Published in print: 2009-11-15

Most Civil War generals were graduates of West Point, and many of them helped transform the U.S. Army from what was little better than an armed mob that performed poorly during the War of 1812 into the competent fighting force that won the Mexican War. This book demonstrates how the “old army” transformed itself into a professional military force after 1814, and, more important, how “old army” methods profoundly shaped the conduct of the Civil War.

During World War II, U.S. Army generals often maintained diaries of their activities and the day-to-day operations of their command. These diaries have proven to be invaluable historical resources ...
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During World War II, U.S. Army generals often maintained diaries of their activities and the day-to-day operations of their command. These diaries have proven to be invaluable historical resources for World War II scholars and enthusiasts alike. Until now, one of the most historically significant of these diaries, the one kept by General Courtney H. Hodges of the First U.S. Army, has not been widely available to the public. Maintained by two of Hodges' aides, Major William C. Sylvan and Captain Francis G. Smith Jr., this military journal offers a firsthand account detailing the actions, decisions, and daily activities of General Hodges and the First Army throughout the war. It opens on June 2, 1944, as Hodges and the First Army prepare for the Allied invasion of France. In the weeks and months that follow, the diary highlights the crucial role that Hodges' often undervalued command—the first to cross the German border, the first to cross the Rhine, the first to close to the Elbe—played in the Allied operations in northwest Europe. It recounts the First Army's involvement in the fight for France, the Siegfried Line campaign, the Battle of the Bulge, the drive to the Roer River, and the crossing of the Rhine, following Hodges and his men through savage European combat until the German surrender in May 1945. Popularly referred to as the “Sylvan Diary” after its primary writer, the diary has previously been available only to military historians and researchers, who were permitted to use it at only the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, the U.S. Army Center for Military History, or the U.S. Army Military History Institute. The text has now been edited in its entirety a biography of General Hodges, as well as extensive notes that clarify the diary's historical details, have been added.Less

Normandy to Victory : The War Diary of General Courtney H. Hodges and the First U.S. Army

Published in print: 2008-09-26

During World War II, U.S. Army generals often maintained diaries of their activities and the day-to-day operations of their command. These diaries have proven to be invaluable historical resources for World War II scholars and enthusiasts alike. Until now, one of the most historically significant of these diaries, the one kept by General Courtney H. Hodges of the First U.S. Army, has not been widely available to the public. Maintained by two of Hodges' aides, Major William C. Sylvan and Captain Francis G. Smith Jr., this military journal offers a firsthand account detailing the actions, decisions, and daily activities of General Hodges and the First Army throughout the war. It opens on June 2, 1944, as Hodges and the First Army prepare for the Allied invasion of France. In the weeks and months that follow, the diary highlights the crucial role that Hodges' often undervalued command—the first to cross the German border, the first to cross the Rhine, the first to close to the Elbe—played in the Allied operations in northwest Europe. It recounts the First Army's involvement in the fight for France, the Siegfried Line campaign, the Battle of the Bulge, the drive to the Roer River, and the crossing of the Rhine, following Hodges and his men through savage European combat until the German surrender in May 1945. Popularly referred to as the “Sylvan Diary” after its primary writer, the diary has previously been available only to military historians and researchers, who were permitted to use it at only the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, the U.S. Army Center for Military History, or the U.S. Army Military History Institute. The text has now been edited in its entirety a biography of General Hodges, as well as extensive notes that clarify the diary's historical details, have been added.