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18 February 2014

ByLt Gen JS BajwaIssueVol. 29.1 Jan-Mar 2014| Date : 17 Feb , 2014For India to emerge as a regional power and a global player, there is need for an attitudinal change. India has the wherewithal to protect its interests and assert its rights and claims. With political will, the country will forge ahead without encumbrances. The stakes are high and time is running out. India cannot remain static marking time expending energy wastefully while others zoom ahead consolidating and enhancing comprehensive national power. The location of uncommitted reserves up to Corps level and the Strategic Reserve/Mountain Strike Corps opens avenues that need courageous leadership and the will to be exploited to protect and enhance the country’s interests.“We should implement the military strategy of active defence for the new period, and enhance military strategic guidance as the times so require. We should attach great importance to maritime, space and cyber security. We should make active planning for use of military forces in peacetime, expand and intensify military preparedness, and enhance the capability to accomplish a wide range of military tasks, the most important of which is to win local war in an information age.”—Report of Hu Jintao to the 18th CPC National Congress, March 2013India has responded to threats to its security on the borders through diplomacy and refrained from the use of its military option…Building Up A CaseThe Indian Army had, for some time, been war-gaming the need for dedicated uncommitted force(s) for its Northern Borders. The Kargil War exposed the weakness of the existing set up in Ladakh in the tactical and operational realms. The Division headquarters located at Leh had been unable to generate adequate reserves and sufficient firepower to meet the threat by Pakistan or to dislodge the intruding elements from Indian territory. Nor was it structured to take under command additional forces and firepower resources that were inducted into Ladakh as also control two fronts. Its responsibilities in Eastern Ladakh dictated the requirement of maintaining adequate force presence and dominate that sector to counter any collusive venture by China.

February 17, 2014 China wants a code of conduct for troops on the India-China border areas. While the Indian side has reacted cautiously, it is not clear what effective additional protocols that the current proposed code will bring forth to usher stability in the border areas, says Srikanth Kondapalli.China surprised India once again with a formal suggestion for implementing a ‘code of conduct’ between the armed forces of both countries at the recently held 17th Special Representative meeting in New Delhi on February 10-11. While the Special Representative meetings were instituted to resolve the territorial dispute, initially to clarify the Line of Actual Control between the two countries, these interactions have expanded to include issues not just on the dispute per se but also on others aspects affecting the bilateral relations.China’s new proposal for modulating the behaviour of the troops on the borders comes as a surprise despite a series of arrangements between the two armies since the 1970s when confidence building measures were put in place across the undefined borders. These include the first CBMs at Chushul in Ladakh sector in the 1970s. Subsequently, the 1993 “Peace & Tranquility” agreement, 1996 CBMs in the military field, April 2005 proposals and the 2012 Border Defence Cooperation agreement.While China had suggested such a code of conduct for the maritime areas in the disputed South China Sea islands in November 2002, this is perhaps the first time that Beijing suggested such proposals on the land domain with India. With Russia and central Asia, China did conclude CBMs in the military field, including demilitarisation, prior to the resolution of the territorial disputes with these states since the 1990s, yet the current code of conduct proposal is different with India.

Gurmeet KanwalSINCE his re-election in May 2013, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has struggled to cope with the rising tide of internal instability in Pakistan. Pakistan's half-hearted fight against the remnants of al-Qaida and the home-grown Taliban like the TTP and the TNSM, fissiparous tendencies in Baluchistan, continuing radical extremism in the urban areas like Karachi, creeping Talibanisation in the heartland and the floundering economy are symptomatic of the nation's gradual slide towards becoming a 'failed state'.Despite facing the grave danger of a possible collapse of the state, the Pakistan government's counter-insurgency policy lacks cohesion. The latest manifestation of the lack of will is the commencement of a peace dialogue with the Taliban, even though the Taliban are willing to talk only on the assumption that the introduction of Sharia will replace democracy in Pakistan. The latest attempt at peace-making is contrary to the wishes of the Pakistan army.Hurt by a series of Taliban successes in “liberating” tribal areas and under pressure from the Americans to deliver in the “war on terror”, in the initial stages the Pakistan army had employed massive firepower to stem the rot. Fighter aircraft, helicopter gunships and heavy artillery were liberally employed to destroy suspected terrorist hideouts. This heavy-handed firepower-based approach without simultaneous infantry operations failed to dislodge the militants but caused large-scale collateral damage and served to alienate the tribal population. Major reverses had led to panic reactions, including the hurried negotiation of “peace accords” that were invariably broken by the militants.On September 5, 2006, the government of Pakistan had signed a "peace accord" with the tribal leaders in the North Waziristan town of Miranshah. The salient points of this rather surprising agreement included the following: the government agrees to stop air and ground attacks against militants in Waziristan; militants are to cease cross-border movement into and out of Afghanistan; foreigners (understood to mean foreign jihadists) in North Waziristan will have to leave Pakistan but "those who cannot leave will be allowed to live peacefully, respecting the law of the land and the agreement"; area check-points and border patrols will be manned by a tribal force and the Pakistan army will withdraw from control points; no parallel administration will be established in the area; the government agrees to follow local customs and traditions in resolving issues; the tribal leaders will ensure that no one attacks law-enforcement personnel or damages state property; tribesmen will not carry heavy weapons, but small arms will be allowed; militants will not enter agencies adjacent to North Waziristan; both sides will return any captured weapons, vehicles, and communication devices; the government will release captured militants and will not arrest them again; and, the government will pay compensation for property damaged and deaths of innocent civilians in the area.

February 18, 2014 Ananth KrishnanBeijing is keen to play down terror concerns in the light of its ‘all-weather’ ties with IslamabadChina does not see the rising threats from terror groups as derailing its new “economic corridor” plan linking the troubled western Xinjiang region with Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), officials told The Hindu on Monday.Both countries are planning to accelerate development of the project when Pakistani President Mamnoon Hussain arrives here on a three-day visit, starting Tuesday.The economic corridor, which envisages expanding road links, building railway lines and installing energy pipelines linking Xinjiang with the Gwadar port in Pakistan, was flagged as a priority project by both countries last year.However, its feasibility has remained a matter of debate. Some Chinese companies have voiced concern about stability and security in Pakistan, while violent attacks in southern Xinjiang, located next to the PoK border, have been blamed by local officials on terror outfits with links to Pakistan-based groups.Recent attackOnly on Friday, 11 people were killed in Aksu, on an attack blamed by Xinjiang police officials on “extremists”. State media said, after the incident, “overseas separatism forces” had intended to “penetrate” into the southern Xinjiang regions of Kashgar, Hotan and Aksu.Many local Uighurs and rights groups have, however, accused the government of playing up the terror threat to clamp down on dissent.Following attacks in Hotan in 2011, Xinjiang’s Governor Nur Bekri said his government had discovered that members of the separatist East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and “terrorists in our neighbouring states have a thousand and one links”.

The Defence Minister alone cannot rectify the situation. Joint efforts of the Union Ministries of Human Resource Development, Industry and Finance are required to fix the problems in defence procurement. Also, the root of the problem lies beyond procurement procedure

Mr Pravin Sawhney makes an interesting case with regard to Union Minister for Defence AK Antony’s several undeniable lapses in his column, “He saw nothing, he did nothing”, on February 13, in The Pioneer. The issue, however, is deeper than Mr Antony’s personal incompetence and rather is the product of 67 years of disastrous socialism, and a historical Indian myopia on issues of security.Perhaps the single most obvious tell-tale sign in this is the whole narrative in India today on defence technology, be it the transfer or absorption or modification. The issue is such that it is not the Defence Minister who can rectify the situation, rather it is the joint efforts of the Union Ministries of Human Resource Development, Industry, Finance and Infrastructure that are required to fix. No matter how much India modifies it Defence Procurement Procedure, no matter how excellent a document we produce and no matter how good a Defence Minister we have, the root of the problem lies elsewhere.This mentality however of seeking silver bullet solutions, failing, and then muckraking the French, Americans and Russians claiming that they we’re duplicitous has a long historical tradition in India dating back to a few thousand years.In his 1945 book, India and the Indian Ocean: An essay on the influence of sea power on Indian history, KM Panikkar delves in depth into the story of the Arab horse and India’s obsession with it. We are informed that the Arab peninsula would only sell Indian traders stallions or colts — male horses, and the sale of a mare — the female to an Indian carried severe penalties. Similarly, specialised horse doctors were barred from travelling to India on pain of a particularly excruciating death, the same penalty applying to the captain of any ship willing to transport said doctor to Indian shores.

Strategy should be as fundamental to an officer’s education as mathematics and the sciences.

So how do you “make” a maritime strategist, an adept handler of nautical affairs? Sea-service chieftains are mulling how to do so, and more power to them. Why now in particular? Because the services are “refreshing,” or updating, the 2007 U.S. Maritime Strategy to keep abreast of today’s realities. It’s become plain that the niftiest strategy in the world is no better than its executors. If you want to oversee the global system of trade and commerce while fending off war — all on a shoestring — you need a deep-thinking cohort of mariners.

The setting is apt for pondering such questions. As I write this, I’m gazing across San Diego Bay and across, ahem, a frosty mug. The aircraft carriers Ronald Reagan and Carl Vinson — the latter my very first ship, thirty years ago (gulp) this summer — form part of the skyline. A plaque down the waterfront commemorates the “tuna fleet,” local fishing boats pressed into service as submarine chasers during World War II. And on and on. This place is Sea Power Central.

Trying to keep manifold commitments in straitened circumstances is the predicament confronting the U.S. foreign-policy apparatus, including its seafaring contingent. Yet how can a military service — how can anyorganization, really — mass-produce practitioners with the habits and skills to align ways and means with larger ends? Well, it must rejigger organizational arrangements to favor success. Substitute “leadership” for “strategy” in this debate. Next consider the lengths to which the naval services go to inculcate leadership. That should provide a rough guide to raising a generation of strategists. This is an intensive process that should span an officer’s career.

A few commonsense ideas. One, there’s education. By sending officers to school, the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard can furnish them with the rudiments of strategic thought. The services can require them to study the classics of strategy and consider how well, or poorly, past statesmen and commanders applied the concepts formulated by the masters. That’s what we do with mid-career folks in Newport. And we do it rather well.

Naxalites of the Communist Party of India (Maoist), or Maoists in short, founded in September 2004, is the largest and most lethal Naxalite outfit in India having a presence –– intense to nominal –– in 20 states, spread across 203 districts. To run a war machinery of this size the outfit requires large amounts of funds. Responding to Question No. 2276, in the Rajya Sabha, on February 12, 2014, Minister of State for Home Affairs, RPN Singh said, “…the CPI(Maoist) party has been collecting not less than Rs. 140 crores annually from a variety of sources. Further, the possibility of certain front organizations of the CPI (Maoist) … clandestinely getting foreign funds cannot be ruled out.”

Through a consultative process involving various levels the Central Committee fixes the annual amount to be collected at the all-India level. The Zonal Committee appears to be the basic unit responsible for conveying the decision on the amount to be collected from each source. In effect, money is collected at all levels beginning from the Area Committee. In Jharkhand, there have been instances where the source has been informed of the amount he would have to pay, money left at the source(s) itself, and collected from the source at a later date, as and when the need arose. The Armed Squad need not necessarily go to collect the money. Usually, an over-ground member of the outfit is deputed to collect the money. These could a member of the Krantikari Kisan Committee, Krantikari Mahila Committee, a contractor, or an NGO, or any other designated person.

Some verities about federalism in the context of regionalism in South Asia are becoming clearer. The proposition that "the (changing) political map of South Asian countries must reflect its social and cultural diversities" is unarguable. How, then, should the inescapable contentions between the peripheral and central federating entities be managed, apart from differences between the federating units themselves that are "yielding contrary trends and mixed conclusions"? I argue that, while respecting regional aspirations, the Centre must function effectively as a coordinating and adjudicatory authority for the whole nation to remain viable.

One is fortified here by the lessons of history. The role of village republics in Buddhist times, their tradition of democratic functioning with all decisions being taken by consensus, and the local administration being under the village assemblies has been deified. The larger lesson of history is that these village republics were easily overrun by the Mauryan rulers and incorporated into their empire, since these purely local regional units could neither defend their integrity nor implement a common foreign policy.

Coming to British India, Sir Charles Metcalfe, acting governor-general of India had minuted in 1830: "This union of the village communities, each one forming a separate little state in itself, has, I conceive, contributed more than any other cause to the preservation of the peoples of India." Metcalfe was speaking to local government. He did not appreciate the interplay between centrifugal and centripetal forces in Indian history with empires being born, flourishing, reaching their zenith, declining and finally disintegrating over and over again. This process also revealed the underlying tension between the federal (integrative) and regional (disintegrative) forces within Indian polity. The balance of power must favour the central authority if the federal entity is to survive.

These issues have been dramatised by the regional Aam Admi Party's confronting the Union Government in Delhi. It would be recollected that Delhi became the capital of British India in 1912 after excising it from the Punjab Province. It was designated a Chief Commissioner's Province, and was directly administered by the Centre. Later, it was designated a Part C state, and, still later, pursuant to the recommendations of the State Reorganisation Committee, Delhi was designated a Union Territory. Under Article 239 of the Constitution, Union Territories are to be administered by the President through an Administrator (Lt Governor).

WAR-TORN Afghanistan took another step in its transition towards becoming a productive country with the inauguration of an agricultural university in Kandahar. Afghan National Agricultural Sciences and Technology University has been set up with Indian assistance. External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid was present at the inauguration of the university in a former Taliban stronghold. India is already training 614 Afghan agriculture students at various institutions and it has offered scholarships to them.

India has benefited tremendously from agriculture education, which provided the country with the much-need breakthroughs that took the form of the Green Revolution and brought about self-sufficiency in foodgrains. Like India, Afghanistan is predominantly an agrarian society and 80 per cent of Afghan people are dependent upon agriculture for livelihood. The sector, however, has not been adequately modernised. India can provide the know-how and is also a good example of how the use of modern methods, high-yielding varieties of seeds, drip irrigation and modern processing can change agrarian economies. In Afghanistan, there is much scope for improvement in agricultural practices and the use of technology that would help the farmers get better yields.

India has, for long, been a strategic partner of the present Afghan government. During the last decade, India contributed to infrastructure, especially in building roads and bridges. Recently the two countries have also signed agreements which allow for military aid. Soon Indian helicopters are expected to join Afghan forces. Even as Afghanistan faces impending Presidential elections, India is rightly continuing its engagement with the Karzai regime. Indeed, for India, it is imperative to press on with a variety of programmes that will help Afghan people in a meaningful manner. The agriculture university can perform a significant role in educating Afghan agriculture scientists and thus benefit farmers.

SINCE his re-election in May 2013, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has struggled to cope with the rising tide of internal instability in Pakistan. Pakistan's half-hearted fight against the remnants of al-Qaida and the home-grown Taliban like the TTP and the TNSM, fissiparous tendencies in Baluchistan, continuing radical extremism in the urban areas like Karachi, creeping Talibanisation in the heartland and the floundering economy are symptomatic of the nation's gradual slide towards becoming a 'failed state'.

Despite facing the grave danger of a possible collapse of the state, the Pakistan government's counter-insurgency policy lacks cohesion. The latest manifestation of the lack of will is the commencement of a peace dialogue with the Taliban, even though the Taliban are willing to talk only on the assumption that the introduction of Sharia will replace democracy in Pakistan. The latest attempt at peace-making is contrary to the wishes of the Pakistan army.

Hurt by a series of Taliban successes in “liberating” tribal areas and under pressure from the Americans to deliver in the “war on terror”, in the initial stages the Pakistan army had employed massive firepower to stem the rot. Fighter aircraft, helicopter gunships and heavy artillery were liberally employed to destroy suspected terrorist hideouts. This heavy-handed firepower-based approach without simultaneous infantry operations failed to dislodge the militants but caused large-scale collateral damage and served to alienate the tribal population. Major reverses had led to panic reactions, including the hurried negotiation of “peace accords” that were invariably broken by the militants.

On September 5, 2006, the government of Pakistan had signed a "peace accord" with the tribal leaders in the North Waziristan town of Miranshah. The salient points of this rather surprising agreement included the following: the government agrees to stop air and ground attacks against militants in Waziristan; militants are to cease cross-border movement into and out of Afghanistan; foreigners (understood to mean foreign jihadists) in North Waziristan will have to leave Pakistan but "those who cannot leave will be allowed to live peacefully, respecting the law of the land and the agreement"; area check-points and border patrols will be manned by a tribal force and the Pakistan army will withdraw from control points; no parallel administration will be established in the area; the government agrees to follow local customs and traditions in resolving issues; the tribal leaders will ensure that no one attacks law-enforcement personnel or damages state property; tribesmen will not carry heavy weapons, but small arms will be allowed; militants will not enter agencies adjacent to North Waziristan; both sides will return any captured weapons, vehicles, and communication devices; the government will release captured militants and will not arrest them again; and, the government will pay compensation for property damaged and deaths of innocent civilians in the area.

Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest writers to have their say. Please click here if you are interested in contributing.

Pakistan has increasingly become a target for terrorist violence, particularly sectarian attacks, over the last two decades. As security forces prove no match for the insurgents, the wealthy and intellectual elites are fleeing the country.

The spread of extremism has hurt the country's international image. This was worsened by a Human Rights Watch report released last month which reported that terrorist groups are operating with complete immunity in certain regions.

It is as if the government and military have either closed their eyes to terrorist activities or they are simply incapable of dealing with them. Concerns are being expressed that the insurgents will soon take over Karachi, as armed groups have done in cities in Iraq and Syria.

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and army chief General Raheel Sharif face the seemingly insurmountable tasks of improving morale among security forces while also combating the spread of terrorism.

Murders and assassinations have become daily occurrences across the country. The heightened intensity of attacks by Sunni militant groups such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan or Pakistani Taliban in recent weeks suggest their main motive is to create complete anarchy. However, these forces could also be planning to replicate the 1992 ouster of Mohammad Najibulla in Afghanistan by the Afghan Taliban.

Evidence of this can be seen in their targeting of army bases, security checkpoints and defense establishments, as well as their sectarian attacks on Shi'ites.

To commit these violent acts, they are recruiting fidayeens(suicide bombers) in large numbers. For instance, 12 security personnel were killed on January 22 in different attacks, while just two days earlier 22 army personnel were killed in the bombing of on army cantonment in the Bannu area of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. The TTP took responsibility for these attacks.

Shahidullah Shahid, a spokesman for the TTP, claimed that the latter attack was carried out to avenge the killing of senior commander Wali-ur-Rehman last May. He said that Pakistan army was their enemy and that these strikes would continue.

Although Pakistan claims to have killed at least 40 terrorists in assaults on Taliban hideouts in the aftermath of these attacks, the government is still undecided over launching a full-scale operation in the tribal areas that give the TTP shelter.

Expressing the growing desperation of some Pakistanis over this delay, Bilawal Bhutto, son of the late Benazir Bhutto, has said that there is an urgent need to take military action against the terrorists.

CHAK, Afghanistan — In a deserted village off Highway 1, southwest of Kabul, an Afghan Army bomb disposal team was unearthing its 15th bomb of the day when sniper shots began to rain down.

Some soldiers bolted for cover under the flimsy canopy of the village bazaar. Others fired at the mud buildings where they believed the sharpshooter was holed up.

A rocket specialist, Sgt. Sayed Wazir, set a 107-millimeter rocket on a flat stone in an open field, taped a wire to the rocket, screamed a prayer and touched the tips of the wire to a car battery. The missile streaked toward the village.

So began another skirmish in the battle for Highway 1, a crucial artery of communication and commerce that links the capital, Kabul, with the major cities. A 1,300-mile ring road that stitches the country together, the route is a prime target for insurgents and highwaymen, its control coveted by all sides, its defense an acid test for efforts to secure the country’s future.

After spending billions of dollars upgrading and repaving Highway 1, the international military coalition is now leaving its protection almost entirely to Afghan forces like these, the soldiers of the Afghan Army’s Sixth Battalion, Fourth Brigade, 203rd Corps. They patrol one of the world’s most dangerous roads like beat cops, responding to domestic disputes and traffic accidents, as well as hidden explosives and sniper fire. Their struggles, which are many, offer glimpses into the road war’s new contours.

The verdict is out: instead of supporting decisive military action to break the back of insurgents, the government chose to dialogue, with umpteenth committees to name, shame, blame and footdrag. Interestingly, where the dialogue option has halted government military action as a confidence-building and reconciliatory measure, not only are the Taliban carrying out their signature strikes (such as the latest at a cinema house in Peshawar and a direct attack against security forces) but are already picking on soft targets such as the peaceful Ismailia (Shia) population in Gilgit Baltistan area to convert or scare them into vacating their homeland. This is also being attempted against the harmless Kailash tribes, as are targeted strikes against government empathisers and Aman (peace) Jirga members, to further their reign of terror and convey the message that they are still in control.

What will be the implication of these talks? Will the talks be successful? Will they usher peace? Or will negotiating with the insurgents lead to the popularly dreaded Taliban interpreted Shariah? Some feel that it is the Taliban and not the government who are at a weaker wicket, and with time the former stands to lose more than gain. This is because such violent movements are inherently self-annihilating in nature, and usually, factionalism, power struggle, and their getting too big for their size will cause their eventual downfall. However, there is little comfort in this theory, as not only will such a scenario entail heavy collateral damages, but would end up substantially destroying critical infrastructure and distort the socio-political fabric before it ceases.

So what do the talks hold, and what is their measure of success? Would they result in bringing forth a pro-government or pro-Taliban stance or a win-win situation for both? Either of the options does not promise lasting peace. Allowing insurgents and anti-state elements a platform to voice their demands and form even the governmental committee with a few members that enjoy Taliban approval not only legitimises the insurgents but has already placed them on a superior footing. To date, except for supporting the option of dialogue and a chocked demand to remain within the constitutional framework, there is apparently no other governmental stance. Any demands and preconditions placed have been entirely by the TTP, whether it be an apparent unilateral ceasefire from the government’s side, seeking the release of TTP prisoners, stay on executions as well as retaining their weapons.

Any recent perusal of the news from Afghanistan would lead an intelligent observer to conclude that the impending U.S. withdrawal will be a complete catastrophe. All of the gains from the last 13 years in the form of improved governance, infrastructure improvements, advances in the status of Afghan women etc are in immediate peril if the U.S. withdraws all of its forces. The U.S. departure is dangerous in that there is not a follow-on plan for what to do with Afghanistan. This is another circumstance where the “long imperial afternoon” experience of the British in Afghanistan during the 19th century provides a useful solution. Like the U.S., the British Empire had more pressing concerns than Afghanistan and could ill-afford to station large numbers of troops there for extended periods. For the British, Afghanistan was not a country, but more of a geographic location populated by a host of small tribal nations. Rather than try to fundamentally alter these tribal relationships, which proved unsuccessful, or make it one of the formal “pink bits” on the imperial map, the British embraced them at the extreme “local” level and were largely successful in maintaining peace in the Central Asian hub for many decades. The Afghan wars fought by the British were more about mistakes the British made in carrying out their own policy rather than provocations by the Afghans. The U.S. can still withdraw the vast bulk of its troops from Afghanistan as planned, but it must also realize that this central “hub” of the Eurasian continent cannot again be totally left to its own devices.

Cap emblem of 19th century Khyber Rifles

Afghanistan has been a geographic “hub” within the Hindu Kush mountain range from earliest antiquity. Rather than a “graveyard of empire” as popularly believed, the region has been more of a highway for imperial conquest. Afghanistan possesses a a virtual ring of mountain passes and flatlands within an otherwise mountainous terrain. This system facilitated easy movement within Central Asia. It was exploited by Persian satraps, Alexander the Great, Turkish and Mongol warlords on horseback, and a host of other conquerors seeking to move quickly within the vast Eurasian interior. The nearly 130 year British involvement in Afghanistan was undertaken to prevent the 19th century Russian Empire, and after World War 1 its Soviet successor, from using these same routes to threaten India. For most of their period of influence in Afghanistan, the British relied on a combination of influence-building in Kabul, good relations with all of the Afghan tribes, and small security units of native troops advised and officered by Britons. The two 19th century wars fought by the British in Afghanistan, (1839-1842) and (1878-1880), were both initially successful, punitive expeditions to disabuse Afghan rulers of any intent to admit Russian troops into their region. Both conflicts experienced bloody defeats however, when British troops became complacent, failed to manage competing tribal interests, or tried to “modernize” the Afghan state to European standards. The British were most effective in maintaining order in Afghanistan when their actual military footprint was miniscule. Small units like the famed Khyber Rifles, led by Britons who lived with Afghan villagers and adopted their custom,s successfully policed Afghanistan for decades without significant unrest. The British supported the often weak central government in Kabul, but also maintained relations with competing tribes in order to ensure some level of impartiality. Peace was maintained so long as all Afghan parties thought they had an an element of independence and influence.

The first three months under President Yameen offer a glimpse into the island nation’s future.

As Maldivian President Abdulla Yameen completed three months in office on February 17, one could not help but notice the Indian Ocean archipelago’s return to religious conservatism and its growing engagement with China.

The Maldives, a string of 1,192 islands, has made several moves to cement the supremacy of Sunni Islam since Yameen was sworn in as president in November 2013.

The Ministry of Islamic Affairs has set its top priorities for 2014, which include blocking all religions except Islam in the nation, ensuring that all laws and regulations adhere to Islamic principles and developing and strengthening the Islamic Fiqh Academy to issue fatwas. The ministry has also signed an agreement with the Saudi Arabian Muslim Scholars Association to receive a grant of MVR1.6 million, or $104,166, for the “mutual goal” of developing and improving the study of the Quran and religion.

The Ministry of Education has meanwhile introduced Arabic as a subject in schools. The ministry now plans to have schools teach the Quran as a subject up to grade VII.

Yameen has set key targets for foreign policy. Chief among them are protecting the Islamic unity of the country and promoting Islamic characteristics internationally.

The parliament in December passed a bill to amend the constitution to restrict the legislature from removing the clause that gives Islam the status of state religion. The bill was introduced by the Maldivian Development Alliance, an ally of Yameen’s Progressive Party of the Maldives (PPM).

These moves have been made against the backdrop of a projected threat to religion from both domestic forces, read progressive and pro-democracy parties, and foreign powers, read the “Christian” West.

Speaking on the “Maldives Conversion to Islam Day” on February 2, Yameen told the citizens, “We should also be very vigilant of foreign influences attempting to weaken our religious faith.”

On the Maldives’ National Day on January 2, Home Minister Umar Naseer issued a similar warning. He said there is an “ongoing psychological war aiming to lead astray our faith in Islam, and break up our ties of nationalism, a war that is escalating at a very fast speed.” He described the “war” as a “huge danger.”

The first three months under President Yameen offer a glimpse into the island nation’s future.

As Maldivian President Abdulla Yameen completed three months in office on February 17, one could not help but notice the Indian Ocean archipelago’s return to religious conservatism and its growing engagement with China.

The Maldives, a string of 1,192 islands, has made several moves to cement the supremacy of Sunni Islam since Yameen was sworn in as president in November 2013.

The Ministry of Islamic Affairs has set its top priorities for 2014, which include blocking all religions except Islam in the nation, ensuring that all laws and regulations adhere to Islamic principles and developing and strengthening the Islamic Fiqh Academy to issue fatwas. The ministry has also signed an agreement with the Saudi Arabian Muslim Scholars Association to receive a grant of MVR1.6 million, or $104,166, for the “mutual goal” of developing and improving the study of the Quran and religion.

The Ministry of Education has meanwhile introduced Arabic as a subject in schools. The ministry now plans to have schools teach the Quran as a subject up to grade VII.

Yameen has set key targets for foreign policy. Chief among them are protecting the Islamic unity of the country and promoting Islamic characteristics internationally.

The parliament in December passed a bill to amend the constitution to restrict the legislature from removing the clause that gives Islam the status of state religion. The bill was introduced by the Maldivian Development Alliance, an ally of Yameen’s Progressive Party of the Maldives (PPM).

These moves have been made against the backdrop of a projected threat to religion from both domestic forces, read progressive and pro-democracy parties, and foreign powers, read the “Christian” West.

Speaking on the “Maldives Conversion to Islam Day” on February 2, Yameen told the citizens, “We should also be very vigilant of foreign influences attempting to weaken our religious faith.”

In the early hours of 13 February 2014, a bus carrying personnel of the Special Security Unit (SSU), an elite group of the Sindh Police that provides security to important personalities and installations was targeted by a car bomb outside the Police Training Centre in Karachi. Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed the responsibility for the attack attributing it as a revenge for the killing of their companions by the police. The blast that killed 13 police commandoes and injured over 57 others made a mockery of the security forces’ claims of success in the ongoing operations in Karachi, the economic and financial hub of Pakistan.

The city has been undergoing a major security operation for over five months to clean up the city of armed militants and other criminal groups. The operation led by the Pakistan Rangers was launched on 05 Sep 2013 to rid the city of endemic violence. Many alleged criminals and militants were killed in the operations and 13800 suspects had been arrested by the end of January. However, as is evident by the recent attack, it has failed to bring peace to Karachi, although the killings have reduced marginally. It does not appear as if Karachi is going to witness prolonged peace. In 2013, there were 2,507 cases of killings in Karachi, of these 1403 were killed in the first six months alone. Of these nearly 70 per cent were killed in target killings, where as others were victims of security operation, sectarian attacks, militants’ attack, gang wars and other acts of terrorism. In July and August the violence peaked resulting in the killings of 500 people. This resulted in a unique meeting of Pakistani Federal cabinet in Karachi, which gave the go ahead for the security operations to be led by the Pakistan Rangers. It was projected as a short swift and targeted operation, but it has turned out to be anything but that and has continued unabated for over five months without any signs of culmination.

The operation did give some respite to the troubled city, as the killings came down slightly. In September 2013, when the operation was launched the killings dropped to 137 from 280 in the previous month. However, thereafter there has not been any significant drop in the killings. In October, 133 people were killed, followed by 165 in November and 169 in December, where as the number of those killed in the first month of 2014 was 144. It is therefore quite clear that there has been no relief for the troubled city despite such a massive operation having been underway for over five months. According to security agencies, two phases of the operation have already been completed and the final phase is underway. Unfortunately, the security environment in Karachi has not improved one bit and in fact some of the factors that have contributed to the violence have become more acute.

The violence in Karachi is on account of various faultlines, which have aggravated with the passage of time. The first has been the intra-ethnic faultline, where in Bihari Mohajirs, who have supported Mohajir Qaumi Movement Haqiqi (MQM-H) group – a breakaway faction of MQM, allegedly propped up by the ubiquitous intelligence agencies, clash with other Mohajirs mainly from UP, Delhi and Gujrat. This conflict fortunately appears to be subsiding, as Haqiqis have been decimated and have not been able to make an impact even after their leader Afaq Ahmed was released after eight years of incarceration.

In news certain to delight the government, Sinopec announced the discovery of a massive natural gas deposit in the country’s Sichuan Basin.

How massive?

According to Sinopec, the Sichuan Basin’s Anyue field in the Moxi bloc holds 440.4 billion cubic meters of proven geological reserves, of which 308.2 billion cubic meters are “technically recoverable,” equivalent to two years of national consumption.

Sinopec is building a facility capable of pumping 4 billion cubic meters of gas annually in the discovery bloc, with a second phase online to produce an additional 6 billion cubic meters per year under a proposed second phase of expansion at the field, which up to now has already produced 600 million cubic meters of natural gas. Test production resulted in average daily production of 1.1 million cubic meters per well, and the producing wells have an average daily output of 600,000 cubic meters.

This can only produce satisfaction in Beijing, as China is the world’s second-largest consumer of oil and projected to move from second-largest net importer of oil to the largest in 2014.

China’s natural gas consumption has been rising rapidly as it turns to the cleaner-burning fuel to cut pollution. Its gas consumption in 2013 rose 13.9 percent from a year earlier to 167.6 billion cubic meters, making China the world’s third-largest gas consumer, according to a PetroChina Co. report, of which over 30 percent of the country’s natural gas was imported.

Most Western writings/conferences on India-Pakistan nuclear deterrence tend to try and understand this dyad in a narrow regional box of South Asia. This is not only stifling and restricting but also not a useful formulation. Rather, the India-Pakistan nuclear entanglement has roots beyond this geographical construct since no consideration of this relationship is meaningful without bringing China into the picture. China, however, brings along its own set of strategic equations with Russia and the US, thereby making the nuclear issue global.

The reason that the Indo-Pak nuclear entanglement cannot be divorced from China is because Beijing impinges on the region in two ways. The first one pertains to the close relationship that China has had with its all-weather friend, Pakistan. It was with generous Chinese help that Pakistan built its nuclear weapons. The transfer of 50 kg highly enriched uranium, weapon designs, providing delivery vectors, including the setting up of a missile factory, are well known facts today. To quote Gary Milhollin, an American non-proliferation expert, “If you subtract China’s help from Pakistan’s nuclear programme, there is no nuclear programme.” Having created a nuclear weapons state, China uses it effectively as a proxy to complicate India’s security.

The second shadow is cast by China’s ongoing nuclear modernization. While China is doing so with its eyes on US capabilities and their impact on its own nuclear deterrence, India suffers the downstream effect of these developments. Indian responses, in turn, have an impact across its western border. Therefore, strategic deterrence and stability in the 21st century has to be considered in a more global construct. No current dyadic nuclear relationship has the luxury of bipolar equation of the Cold War. Rather, regional deterrence is complicated by the inevitability of each nation’s response to its threat perceptions in a sort of a chain reaction, oblivious to, or perhaps unable to address the fact that its own responses have further implications.

One good illustration of this is the ongoing march of ballistic missile defence (BMD). The US set the tone for this by abandoning the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty in 1972 and expressing a resolve to pursue defence along with deterrence to deal with a range of new threats that could not be deterred and hence had to be defended against. As the US has steadily gone about developing and deploying requisite capabilities over the last decade or so, it has repeatedly tried to reassure Russia and China that its BMD is not meant to upset strategic stability with them. But, that is not how Moscow and Beijing read American intentions. Fearing the worst, both are engaged in developing their own hedging strategies, which include building their own BMD, as well as counter-measures, to address their threat perceptions as emerging from the US BMD.

The United States government, be it the White House, security strategists, the civilian leadership or the military brass, apparently has no qualms about Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's decision to affirm Japan's right to practice "collective self defense", or CSD.

In the face of public disapproval, resistance by an impotent political opposition, and gentle push-back from the minority partner of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Abe looks to implement CSD by asserting the government's right to repurpose the provisions of the pacifist constitution without formal revision or reinterpretation, but through a simple statement by the cabinet.

US supporters have been cheering him on in this awkward process, like anxious soccer parents on the sidelines trying to will a clumsy toddler into nudging the ball into an empty net.

Whether this is a good idea, especially as it will permit Japan to restructure its security relationship with its future Asian allies without US mediation, history will, as they say, judge. But it looks like the United States is all in, on the basis that collective self-defense will enable Japanese military forces to assist the US.

I assume Ambassador to Japan Caroline Kennedy (term as ambassador and, indeed, total public career to date: three months) lacks the political or foreign policy throw-weight to freelance on key US-Japan issues, so this statement of support for collective self defense is probably an authoritative indicator of Obama administration preferences:

"Japan will be a more effective alliance partner if its Self-Defense Forces are able to help defend American soldiers or sailors if they are attacked," US Ambassador Caroline Kennedy told the Asahi newspaper in an interview published Jan 23. [1]

Prime Minister Abe dutifully sang from the same hymnal before the Diet (parliament) on February 6:

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe stressed Thursday that the country's continued self-imposed ban on exercising its right to collective self-defense will adversely affect the Japan-US alliance.

Referring to a case in which Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force vessels fail to counterattack when US warships conducting joint activities come under attack, Abe said at a meeting of the House of Councillors Budget Committee, "The damage from the failure to the Japan-US alliance is immeasurable." [2]

I am presuming that in the original Japanese the case Abe described was a hypothetical: susbstitute "if" for "when" and "would be" for "is".

Questions of grammar and tense aside, this scenario doesn't fit the current pacifist constitution. The 1997 US-Japan Defense Guidelines explicitly and repeatedly mandate bilateral wartime operations, as can be seen from this useful table of responsibilities (Table 1). [3]

Glenn Greenwald, Ewen MacAskill and Laura Poitras of “The Guardian” and Barton Gellman of “The Washington Post” will receive the award for national security reporting.

Four journalists who reported on the extent of the U.S. National Security Agency’s secret surveillance based on documents leaked by whistle-blower Edward Snowden are among the winners of the 65th annual George Polk Awards in Journalism.

Glenn Greenwald, Ewen MacAskill and Laura Poitras of The Guardian and Barton Gellman of The Washington Post will receive the award for national security reporting for stories based on secret documents leaked by Mr. Snowden, a former intelligence analyst. The awards were announced on Sunday by Long Island University. They were created in 1949 in honour of CBS reporter George W. Polk, who was killed while covering the Greek civil war.

Journalists who wrote about massive traffic jams caused by bridge lane closures in New Jersey, a catastrophic garment factory collapse in Bangladesh and the struggles of a homeless family in Brooklyn also will be among those honoured.

The United States, like other nations, has gathered intelligence throughout its history to ensure that national security and foreign policy decisionmakers have access to timely, accurate, and insightful information.

The collection of signals intelligence is necessary for the United States to advance its national security and foreign policy interests and to protect its citizens and the citizens of its allies and partners from harm. At the same time, signals intelligence activities and the possibility that such activities may be improperly disclosed to the public pose multiple risks. These include risks to: our relationships with other nations, including the cooperation we receive from other nations on law enforcement, counterterrorism, and other issues; our commercial, economic, and financial interests, including a potential loss of international trust in U.S. firms and the decreased willingness of other nations to participate in international data sharing, privacy, and regulatory regimes; the credibility of our commitment to an open, interoperable, and secure global Internet; and the protection of intelligence sources and methods.

In addition, our signals intelligence activities must take into account that all persons should be treated with dignity and respect, regardless of their nationality or wherever they might reside, and that all persons have legitimate privacy interests in the handling of their personal information.

In determining why, whether, when, and how the United States conducts signals intelligence activities, we must weigh all of these considerations in a context in which information and communications technologies are constantly changing. The evolution of technology has created a world where communications important to our national security and the communications all of us make as part of our daily lives are transmitted through the same channels. This presents new and diverse opportunities for, and challenges with respect to, the collection of intelligence – and especially signals intelligence. The United States Intelligence Community (IC) has achieved remarkable success in developing enhanced capabilities to perform its signals intelligence mission in this rapidly changing world, and these enhanced capabilities are a major reason we have been able to adapt to a dynamic and challenging security environment.1

The 1 For the purposes of this directive, the terms "Intelligence Community" and "elements of the Intelligence Community" shall have the same meaning as they do in Executive Order 12333 of December 4, 1981, as amended (Executive Order 12333).

United States must preserve and continue to develop a robust and technologically advanced signals intelligence capability to protect our security and that of our partners and allies. Our signals intelligence capabilities must also be agile enough to enable us to focus on fleeting opportunities or emerging crises and to address not only the issues of today, but also the issues of tomorrow, which we may not be able to foresee.