Zohra Kibboua

Anton Vallelian

Transcrição

Introduction to Human Rights Week 4: typology V. Generational classification: critical approach - part 1 Vasak's classification of Human Rights into three generations did not fail to cause criticisms. I would like to put three types of criticisms forward. The first type of criticism concerns terminology. The second type of criticism attacks the simplistic nature of the generational classification. The third type of criticism puts forward ideological and political consequences which follow from this classification. Let us return to these three criticisms. Let us begin with the terminological criticism. Authors noticed that the word "generation" is misleading. Indeed, the word "generation" evokes the idea that a generation succeeds and replaces the previous one. We could therefore think that a more recent generation of Human Rights replaces an older generation. This is clearly not the idea of these three generations of Human Rights. Indeed, these three categories of rights coexist and complement each other. The second criticism attacks the simplistic nature of the classification. That is the other side of the coin of an attempt to simplify. As soon as we try to simplify, we expose ourselves to the criticism of being too simplistic, of being too reductionist. It is, for example, obvious that the temporal criteria is an approximation. Social and political movements do not respect the limits of a century. It was however also reproached to this classification to be simplistic in other respects. On the one hand, some rights are difficult to classify. On the other hand, we will see that some generations overlap. The prohibition of discriminations is difficult to classify. This right is enshrined in almost all Human Rights conventions. It is a transversal right. The right to equal treatment applies in the field of civil and political rights, in the field of economic, social and cultural rights and in the field of solidarity rights. This right is not easy to classify because of its transversality. We can also observe that the content of the two Covenants overlaps. Indeed, several rights are protected in the two Covenants. It is for example the case of freedom of association, freedom of marriage, prohibition of slavery and forced labor, and the right for parents to ensure the religious and moral education of their children. There are not only overlaps between rights belonging to different categories. Overlaps also exist among subcategories of rights. We have already given two examples of that. On the one hand, liberties of communication, which are civil rights, overlap with political rights. On the other hand, the right to education can be considered as a social right because the State is bound to provide basic services to the people, but the right to education also belongs to cultural rights. Finally, we have also seen that, according to generational classification, Human Rights impose different obligations on the State. The first generation entails negative obligations and the second generation entails positive obligations. The State must therefore act. This leads to the conclusion that the realisation of the rights of the first generation is free and the one of the second generation is costly. This polarized vision was understandably also judged simplistic. This criticism shows that we are close to ideology. Here is an example to illustrate this: Article 10 of the ICESCR protects the right to conditions of detention in conformity with human dignity. More precisely, the Covenant says: "All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person." The same provision also states more precise rules such as separating adults from teenagers. We easily understand that the realisation of this right is inevitably costly. Prisons need to be built and they must accommodate the prisoners in a way that respects human dignity. Moreover, the rights of the second generation - rights whose realisation is considered costly - can also be hampered by the State actions. I am going to give you an example: arbitrary evictions. In this case, the State has acted. By acting, the State interfered in a right of the second generation. This polarized vision opposing supposedly cost-free rights to costly rights already illustrates the third type of criticism, which is ideological. In our view, this criticism is the most fundamental one. This is why we will devote the most time to it. This criticism expresses a competitive and antagonistic vision between the different categories of Human Rights. This criticism allowed States to help themselves à la carte and to refuse the complete menu of Human Rights. When I say "à la carte service", I mean that States went along with Human Rights which were in accordance with their ideological preferences but they relinquished other Human Rights judged less important or even against their ideology. This à la carte service can be explained thanks to two ideological divisions. The first division is a West-East division. During the Cold War, this division opposed the Occidental bloc to the Soviet bloc. We can see on the map the two blocs that confronted one another. We can see here the Iron Curtain that divided Europe after World War II which opposed the great powers. The Soviet Union and its Allies against the United States and its Allies. The second division is a North-South division. This division mainly opposes the developed countries to the developing countries from the seventies on. We can see it on the map: the countries in the North are opposed to the countries in the South. These countries have partly different concerns and demands. In the two following videos, we are going to discover together the ideological and political stake linked to each of these divisions, this is to say the East-West and South-North divisions.