GEORGE KENNAN, 1904-2005: Emerson said that to be great is to be misunderstood. By that standard, George Kennan was surely the greatest American diplomat of the 20th century.

Kennan's name is inseparable from the doctrine of containment that influenced American foreign policy throughout the Cold War. Kennan gave the doctrine its name in his legendary essay in Foreign Affairs entitled The Sources of Soviet Conduct.

Yet within just a few short years, Kennan began to denounce what was being done in the name of his doctrine. The NYT obituary of Kennan captures an important dimension of this dissent by observing that

Mr. Kennan was deeply dismayed when the policy was associated with the immense build-up in conventional arms and nuclear weapons that characterized the cold war from the 1950's onward.

Yet long before the military build-up initiated during the Korean War, Kennan became infuriated by President Truman's division of the world into totalitarian and democratic realms as well Truman's commitment to spread democracy across the globe.

The NYT misses this point entirely. It never provides its readers with even the faintest suggestion that Kennan was fundamentally opposed to democracy promotion as a matter of principle. In contrast, the WaPo obituary of Kennan quotes him as saying that

"I would like to see our government gradually withdraw from its public advocacy of democracy and human rights. I submit that governments should deal with other governments as such, and should avoid unnecessary involvement, particularly personal involvement, with their leaders."

Mind you, Kennan's statement has absolutely nothing to do with the fact that he was a lifelong Democrat and that, these days, democracy promotion is a Republican agenda item. I can make this assertion with such confidence because Kennan's statement above is from 1999.

Yet while the Post deserves credit for recognizing the anti-democratic elements of Kennan's thinking (including his reactionary sexism and racism -- also ignored by the NYT), its provision of a quote from 1999 fails to inform readers that Kennan's opposition to promoting democracy was a six decade-long affair.

When asked to propose a US strategy for Latin America in the late 1940s, Kennan insisted that the United States must abandon its aversion to establishing firm alliances with right-wing dictators both because they were anti-communists and because the people of Latin America weren't ready for democracy.

The purpose of pointing all this out is not to expose the flaws of an otherwise great man. Rather, the purpose is to point out that these often-ignored aspects of Kennan's thinking were integral to everything that stood for. Because Kennan was a "realist".

Amazingly, neither the Times nor the Post describes Kennan as such. Yet it is this label that best identifies the intellectual movement to which Kennan belonged and to which he contributed so much. Although labels tend to oversimplify, it is very meaningful to say that George Kennan, Hans Morgenthau and Henry Kissinger were realists, whereas Harry Truman, Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan were not. They were idealists.

Realists believe that violent conflict is an inevitable aspect of international relations. That is a sensible thing to believe. Realists also believe that the best way to avoid violence is to recognize and respect the sovereign authority of foreign governments, provided that they acknowledge the sovereignty of others as inviolable.

Thus, no matter how cruel or authoritarian a government is, serious realists such as Kennan insist that the United States should not attempt to reform it. Certain idealists might respond to such an argument that it is immoral. And it is.

But the far greater flaw of this sort of realist analysis is its failure to recognize how often the United States can best enhance its national security by also promoting its values. Even though the occupations of Germany and Japan demonstrated that point quite conclusively in the 1940s, Kennan was unable to grasp this simple fact.

Today, we are learning once again in Iraq, in Afghanistan and in Lebanon that our values are not an albatross around our necks but rather the greatest weapon in our arsenal.

For all his flaws, I recognize George Kennan as a great thinker and a great American. Yet at this critical moment, we cannot afford to let the celebration of his life prevent us from remembering the price of being "realistic".

(In addition see http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/chance.htm and http://www.hpol.org/churchill/ for more cold war insights into how to counter the Bush Admin. rhetoric with more credible, historically based rhetoric.

DOCUMENTATION

[Source: Russian Foreign Ministry, March 6]

Article by Russia's Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov

60 Years of Fulton: Lessons of the Cold War and Our Time,published by Rossiiskaya Gazeta on March 6, 2005

""On March 5, 1946, Winston Churchill delivered the Fulton speech,which was one of the most symbolic events of the Cold War. Twoweeks earlier George Kennan's famous "long wire" was received inWashington, the Iranian and Turkish crises were developing inparallel, the Truman doctrine, the Marshall plan and much elsewere shortly to be announced. But it was the speech by the formerBritish Prime Minister that is generally thought to haveintroduced clarity into the development of events that had beenbrewing and eventually came to be named "the Cold War". Itprovided the most succinct definition of the new paradigm ofinternational relations. The date is so close to another date,May 9, 1945, that they cannot be analyzed without closeinterconnection, although it is obvious that they symbolize twototally different eras -- different in content, the view of theworld and the very nature of international relations, differentin terms of their consequences for European and world politics. It would seem that now, 60 years on, when even the"post-Cold War period" has acquired a history of its own, it ispossible to assess that turning point in world development with ameasure of objectivity, if not with total disinterest. But thesources of the Cold War still remain obscure in many ways. Thatis why it is necessary to sort out what had happened then, howthe pragmatic policy that united the anti-Hitler allies came tobe replaced with a different policy, a policy of confrontationbased on ideas and principles that could not but be divisive. I am convinced that too much in present-day internationallife calls for a critical review of the history of the Cold War,and a renunciation of the apologia of that complicated phenomenonof international life. The world is again at a turning point. Andthe conclusions we draw will go a long way to determine thefuture of the planet, and each individual country, includingRussia. One cannot replay history, but one can figure it out inorder to try not to repeat mistakes. If a sharp transition fromallied policy to ideological confrontation was inevitable andjustified, then such an interpretation of history will shore upsimilar approaches to problems in our times. If the Cold War wasan aberration in the development of international relations, thatlogic can and must be reversed in the politics of today. The Cold War was essentially about rivalry of the twosystems led by the USSR and the US, which had not only apolitical-ideological, but also a social-economic and otherdimensions. The origin of the Cold War is not confined to thescheme prevalent in Western countries: the USSR renouncedcooperation with the Western allies and reverted to "communistexpansion", and the West responded to the challenge of the Sovietthreat. The slide toward the Cold War, as confirmed by archivedocuments and studies by objective historians, was at least atwo-way process for which the US and Britain bore much of theblame. The choice they made, based on premises that for the mostpart have not been justified, in reality initiated the creationof a new bipolar world order. The policy of the USSR throughout the second half of the1940s, for all its toughness, was in many ways defensive and inits own way had a consistent and predictable character. Mindfulof the lessons of the Great Patriotic War, it was aimed atcreating a protective belt of friendly states along the westernborders, gaining access to the World Ocean and ensuring maximumdefense depth all along the perimeter. Likewise, one should notforget that the Soviet Union, which had made the decisivecontribution to victory over Nazi Germany, was stretched to thelimit at the end of the war. Moscow was physically unable to comeup with any initiative of confrontation with yesterday'santi-Hitler allies. During the war, the US and Britain showed a tolerantattitude to the geopolitical claims of the USSR, recognized thelegitimacy of its security interests and adhered to the course ofintegrating the USSR into the Western community. The Victorydramatically changed the attitude of the Allies to the Sovietsecurity interests. Joint occupation of German territory shouldhave remained a unifying element for the anti-Hitler coalition.But it did not happen. Ideology came into play. Otherwise, it ishard to explain the Anglo-American slogan of "containing"; theSoviet Union, a strategy that envisaged not only blocking"Moscow's expansion", but breaking up the Soviet system as theultimate goal of the Cold War. The factor of ideology, of course,could not be content with foreign policy alone. The course forisolating and wearing down the USSR through arms race, on whichthe West embarked, visited severe hardship on the Soviet peopleand extended the existence of the Stalinist system. Theconditions of a "hostile encirclement" and a constant threat tothe country's security provided a justification for total controlof the authorities over society and economic inefficiency of thesystem. The Cold War with its militarization and conformismexacted a stiff price from the American people, distortingnational priorities and the standards of democracy for a longperiod for the sake of countering an "external threat". Localconflicts during the Cold War carried away millions of humanlives. Soviet-American rivalry for influencing the world wasapparently inevitable, but it could have assumed other, lessconfrontational and less dangerous forms. Especially since theWest had a clear edge over the USSR in the whole spectrum ofmilitary, economic, scientific-technical and other components ofpower, and hence, greater freedom of choice, and it could afforda far more moderate policy with regard to the USSR. Perhaps,Churchill's speech had a bit of a self-fulfilling prophecy aboutit: the Soviet Union could not threaten the West at the time, butas the Cold War unfolded, it acquired such a potential. Insteadof political settlement of differences, as the main architect ofthe "containment" strategy, George Kennan lateradmitted, what was expected from the Soviet Union wasunconditional capitulation, but it was too strong to accept it. After the Second World War, we perceived Stalin's Russia asan expansionist and aggressive force and we replied in kind,wrote Henry Kissinger. We recognize that thereby we probably gavethe Soviet side the impression that we were trying to force theUSSR into a permanently losing position. We were not sufficientlywell aware that the security needs of a continental power differsubstantially from the needs of a power surrounded by oceans onall sides, as ours. Our history of absence of foreign invasionsfrom 1812 made us impervious to the problems of the country thathad repeatedly been invaded. Completing the picture wasdemonization of the rival and a black-and-white vision of theworld. One cannot but note the obvious haste of the Anglo-Americandecisions to unleash the Cold War. These decisions, sofundamental for the destinies of the world, were taken within avery narrow circle of two powers and on a very shaky basis thatproved to be a short-lived factor, namely, the monopoly onnuclear weapons. I believe that it is not only in hindsight thatsuch an approach can be described as irresponsible. All thesubsequent developments, the vicissitudes of geopolitical rivalryand the nuclear arms race, when the USSR and the US alternatelygained the lead, provide ample grounds for such an assessment.But eventually the world passed on to detente, which marked, ineffect, the West's recognition that there was no alternative to apolicy of engaging the Soviet Union. A policy, let me note, whichmay have been chosen back in 1945-1946. It appears that a crucial test for the policy of engagementwas the issue of continued mutually beneficial trade, economicand financial ties between the US and the USSR in the post-warperiod. Moscow counted on it very much. The economy could haveexerted a stabilizing impact on political relations. By puttingforward a range of political conditions, the US effectivelyrenounced negotiations on Soviet proposals of credits that couldhave helped find a positive joint agenda. Although Moscow did not entertain particular illusions, itstill hoped that confrontation would not acquire such a totalcharacter. In the face of the policy pursued by the allies,Moscow had no option but to bow to the inevitable, albeit for itsown ideological reasons. History does not tolerate the subjunctive mood. But it ishard not to assume that the USSR, which had paid such a horribleprice for the common victory whose fruits, though to varyingdegrees, were used by everyone, was ready to play by the rulesand make compromises. Moscow provided considerable evidence forthat. This is also borne out by the sequence of events, and theirdevelopment in Asia in fact depended on the US choice that wasprompted by ideological motives. The price of cooperation maywell have been a more moderate policy of Moscow with regard toCentral and East European countries. But a sense of confrontationand pressure from all directions, lack of reciprocity andincentives for coming to an agreement ruled out such an option. I see the reluctance to draw conclusions from the experienceof the Cold War and honestly and critically analyze itsconsequences as a manifestation of dangerous intellectual andpsychological inertia that poses a real threat to internationalrelations in our times. It is not about answering the seeminglytrivial question as to who won and who lost the Cold War. Themain thing is that everyone gained from its end because everyonehas been freed from its shackles. The policy of the Cold War shackled the UN by becoming avirtual alternative to genuinely multilateral diplomacy. Thediscipline of blocs, political expediency, and the interests ofsaving ideological "face" prevailed. I am convinced that it isprecisely now, after the end of the Cold War, that theOrganization can fully reveal its potential. To be sure, it needsto be comprehensively adapted to the modern conditions, which isthe aim of the unanimously adopted decisions of the 2005 summit.A solid basis for this exists, including the bedrock principlesof the UN Charter. And if the UN managed to serve the interestsof the world community in the worst of times, it is even morecapable of doing it effectively today, given the good will of allthe states. Today, nobody needs to be persuaded that the world is facedwith a real threat of a chasm between civilizations. It isprovoked by terrorists, but not only by them. Playing into theirhands are extremists on the other side, as is more thanconvincingly demonstrated by the "cartoon", and the ideologicalapproaches to international problems as a whole. Direct parallelswith the experience of the "fight against communism", slogansthat smack of Islamophobia, and relapses into the policy ofdouble standards in the field of democratic development anddefense of human rights leave little room for any otherinterpretations. The logic of the ideological approach to internationalaffairs is diametrically opposed to the imperatives ofglobalization. Not only the opportunities, but the threats arebecoming global. This suggests only one conclusion: the newchallenges and threats to security and sustainable developmentcan only be effectively opposed together, through collectiveefforts of the whole international community. The fact thatsecurity and prosperity are indivisible gives us no sensiblealternative. In turn, it requires a common denominator to enableus to distinguish practical policies based on legitimateinterests of states and a commitment to values whoseinterpretations inevitably differ. The question of the sources and meaning of the Cold War istoo important for us to be content with a "vague" understanding.There must be a maximum of clarity here. And one should not shutdown the archives: the remaining issues cannot be cleared upwithout authentic documents. Russia is ready for joint researchon a balanced basis, without a selective approach to history (andsuch attempts were made at the dawn of the Cold War also), itsevents, facts and phenomena. We call on our internationalpartners, above all former allies in the anti-Hitler coalition,to exercise this approach. New conditions dictate a new formula of leadership in themodern world. Russia is convinced that the choice should be madein favor of responsible leadership in order to form commonapproaches with all the leading powers. Today it is possible: theinternational community has the political will for this. Ourcommon overarching task should be to strengthen multilateral,collective principles of world policy. The Cold War offers lessons that are common for all of us.They are the disastrous nature of the complex of infallibilityand the wish to bestow happiness on other peoples against theirwill, the danger of militarization of international relations andthe temptation to rely on military methods of solving problemsinstead of settling them by political and diplomatic means. Russia, having resolutely stepped out of the Cold War,ceased to be an ideological, imperial state. The liberation ofRussian forces and resources can be only fruitful for theinterests of Europe and the whole world. Russia has acquired afreedom to behave in accordance with its historical mission, thatis, to be itself and hence, to make its full contribution to thecommon cause of maintaining international stability and harmonybetween civilizations at the critical stage of the formation of anew architecture of international relations. The current situation in the world, for all its challenges,differs radically from the Cold War period. In spite of therelapses into old approaches, there is still a growing awarenessof the common tasks facing all the countries. Russia, the US andother leading states are interacting closely on a broad range ofproblems, including the fight against terrorism and the spread ofWMD, in bilateral and multilateral formats, including at the UNSecurity Council, the G8 and the Russia-NATO Council. Diversetrade and economic and investment links are developing betweenus, thus laying an objective foundation of inter-dependence andmutual interest that were so lacking before. Together we aretackling the problems of global energy security, protectingpeople's health from epidemics and providing access to moderneducation. Joint understanding of our common past will onlystrengthen mutual understanding and trust and enable us tofinally overcome the legacy of the Cold War in world politics.""(rap)

(In addition see http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/chance.htm and http://www.hpol.org/churchill/ for more cold war insights into how to counter the Bush Admin. rhetoric with more credible, historically based rhetoric.

DOCUMENTATION

[Source: Russian Foreign Ministry, March 6]

Article by Russia's Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov

60 Years of Fulton: Lessons of the Cold War and Our Time,published by Rossiiskaya Gazeta on March 6, 2005

""On March 5, 1946, Winston Churchill delivered the Fulton speech,which was one of the most symbolic events of the Cold War. Twoweeks earlier George Kennan's famous "long wire" was received inWashington, the Iranian and Turkish crises were developing inparallel, the Truman doctrine, the Marshall plan and much elsewere shortly to be announced. But it was the speech by the formerBritish Prime Minister that is generally thought to haveintroduced clarity into the development of events that had beenbrewing and eventually came to be named "the Cold War". Itprovided the most succinct definition of the new paradigm ofinternational relations. The date is so close to another date,May 9, 1945, that they cannot be analyzed without closeinterconnection, although it is obvious that they symbolize twototally different eras -- different in content, the view of theworld and the very nature of international relations, differentin terms of their consequences for European and world politics. It would seem that now, 60 years on, when even the"post-Cold War period" has acquired a history of its own, it ispossible to assess that turning point in world development with ameasure of objectivity, if not with total disinterest. But thesources of the Cold War still remain obscure in many ways. Thatis why it is necessary to sort out what had happened then, howthe pragmatic policy that united the anti-Hitler allies came tobe replaced with a different policy, a policy of confrontationbased on ideas and principles that could not but be divisive. I am convinced that too much in present-day internationallife calls for a critical review of the history of the Cold War,and a renunciation of the apologia of that complicated phenomenonof international life. The world is again at a turning point. Andthe conclusions we draw will go a long way to determine thefuture of the planet, and each individual country, includingRussia. One cannot replay history, but one can figure it out inorder to try not to repeat mistakes. If a sharp transition fromallied policy to ideological confrontation was inevitable andjustified, then such an interpretation of history will shore upsimilar approaches to problems in our times. If the Cold War wasan aberration in the development of international relations, thatlogic can and must be reversed in the politics of today. The Cold War was essentially about rivalry of the twosystems led by the USSR and the US, which had not only apolitical-ideological, but also a social-economic and otherdimensions. The origin of the Cold War is not confined to thescheme prevalent in Western countries: the USSR renouncedcooperation with the Western allies and reverted to "communistexpansion", and the West responded to the challenge of the Sovietthreat. The slide toward the Cold War, as confirmed by archivedocuments and studies by objective historians, was at least atwo-way process for which the US and Britain bore much of theblame. The choice they made, based on premises that for the mostpart have not been justified, in reality initiated the creationof a new bipolar world order. The policy of the USSR throughout the second half of the1940s, for all its toughness, was in many ways defensive and inits own way had a consistent and predictable character. Mindfulof the lessons of the Great Patriotic War, it was aimed atcreating a protective belt of friendly states along the westernborders, gaining access to the World Ocean and ensuring maximumdefense depth all along the perimeter. Likewise, one should notforget that the Soviet Union, which had made the decisivecontribution to victory over Nazi Germany, was stretched to thelimit at the end of the war. Moscow was physically unable to comeup with any initiative of confrontation with yesterday'santi-Hitler allies. During the war, the US and Britain showed a tolerantattitude to the geopolitical claims of the USSR, recognized thelegitimacy of its security interests and adhered to the course ofintegrating the USSR into the Western community. The Victorydramatically changed the attitude of the Allies to the Sovietsecurity interests. Joint occupation of German territory shouldhave remained a unifying element for the anti-Hitler coalition.But it did not happen. Ideology came into play. Otherwise, it ishard to explain the Anglo-American slogan of "containing"; theSoviet Union, a strategy that envisaged not only blocking"Moscow's expansion", but breaking up the Soviet system as theultimate goal of the Cold War. The factor of ideology, of course,could not be content with foreign policy alone. The course forisolating and wearing down the USSR through arms race, on whichthe West embarked, visited severe hardship on the Soviet peopleand extended the existence of the Stalinist system. Theconditions of a "hostile encirclement" and a constant threat tothe country's security provided a justification for total controlof the authorities over society and economic inefficiency of thesystem. The Cold War with its militarization and conformismexacted a stiff price from the American people, distortingnational priorities and the standards of democracy for a longperiod for the sake of countering an "external threat". Localconflicts during the Cold War carried away millions of humanlives. Soviet-American rivalry for influencing the world wasapparently inevitable, but it could have assumed other, lessconfrontational and less dangerous forms. Especially since theWest had a clear edge over the USSR in the whole spectrum ofmilitary, economic, scientific-technical and other components ofpower, and hence, greater freedom of choice, and it could afforda far more moderate policy with regard to the USSR. Perhaps,Churchill's speech had a bit of a self-fulfilling prophecy aboutit: the Soviet Union could not threaten the West at the time, butas the Cold War unfolded, it acquired such a potential. Insteadof political settlement of differences, as the main architect ofthe "containment" strategy, George Kennan lateradmitted, what was expected from the Soviet Union wasunconditional capitulation, but it was too strong to accept it. After the Second World War, we perceived Stalin's Russia asan expansionist and aggressive force and we replied in kind,wrote Henry Kissinger. We recognize that thereby we probably gavethe Soviet side the impression that we were trying to force theUSSR into a permanently losing position. We were not sufficientlywell aware that the security needs of a continental power differsubstantially from the needs of a power surrounded by oceans onall sides, as ours. Our history of absence of foreign invasionsfrom 1812 made us impervious to the problems of the country thathad repeatedly been invaded. Completing the picture wasdemonization of the rival and a black-and-white vision of theworld. One cannot but note the obvious haste of the Anglo-Americandecisions to unleash the Cold War. These decisions, sofundamental for the destinies of the world, were taken within avery narrow circle of two powers and on a very shaky basis thatproved to be a short-lived factor, namely, the monopoly onnuclear weapons. I believe that it is not only in hindsight thatsuch an approach can be described as irresponsible. All thesubsequent developments, the vicissitudes of geopolitical rivalryand the nuclear arms race, when the USSR and the US alternatelygained the lead, provide ample grounds for such an assessment.But eventually the world passed on to detente, which marked, ineffect, the West's recognition that there was no alternative to apolicy of engaging the Soviet Union. A policy, let me note, whichmay have been chosen back in 1945-1946. It appears that a crucial test for the policy of engagementwas the issue of continued mutually beneficial trade, economicand financial ties between the US and the USSR in the post-warperiod. Moscow counted on it very much. The economy could haveexerted a stabilizing impact on political relations. By puttingforward a range of political conditions, the US effectivelyrenounced negotiations on Soviet proposals of credits that couldhave helped find a positive joint agenda. Although Moscow did not entertain particular illusions, itstill hoped that confrontation would not acquire such a totalcharacter. In the face of the policy pursued by the allies,Moscow had no option but to bow to the inevitable, albeit for itsown ideological reasons. History does not tolerate the subjunctive mood. But it ishard not to assume that the USSR, which had paid such a horribleprice for the common victory whose fruits, though to varyingdegrees, were used by everyone, was ready to play by the rulesand make compromises. Moscow provided considerable evidence forthat. This is also borne out by the sequence of events, and theirdevelopment in Asia in fact depended on the US choice that wasprompted by ideological motives. The price of cooperation maywell have been a more moderate policy of Moscow with regard toCentral and East European countries. But a sense of confrontationand pressure from all directions, lack of reciprocity andincentives for coming to an agreement ruled out such an option. I see the reluctance to draw conclusions from the experienceof the Cold War and honestly and critically analyze itsconsequences as a manifestation of dangerous intellectual andpsychological inertia that poses a real threat to internationalrelations in our times. It is not about answering the seeminglytrivial question as to who won and who lost the Cold War. Themain thing is that everyone gained from its end because everyonehas been freed from its shackles. The policy of the Cold War shackled the UN by becoming avirtual alternative to genuinely multilateral diplomacy. Thediscipline of blocs, political expediency, and the interests ofsaving ideological "face" prevailed. I am convinced that it isprecisely now, after the end of the Cold War, that theOrganization can fully reveal its potential. To be sure, it needsto be comprehensively adapted to the modern conditions, which isthe aim of the unanimously adopted decisions of the 2005 summit.A solid basis for this exists, including the bedrock principlesof the UN Charter. And if the UN managed to serve the interestsof the world community in the worst of times, it is even morecapable of doing it effectively today, given the good will of allthe states. Today, nobody needs to be persuaded that the world is facedwith a real threat of a chasm between civilizations. It isprovoked by terrorists, but not only by them. Playing into theirhands are extremists on the other side, as is more thanconvincingly demonstrated by the "cartoon", and the ideologicalapproaches to international problems as a whole. Direct parallelswith the experience of the "fight against communism", slogansthat smack of Islamophobia, and relapses into the policy ofdouble standards in the field of democratic development anddefense of human rights leave little room for any otherinterpretations. The logic of the ideological approach to internationalaffairs is diametrically opposed to the imperatives ofglobalization. Not only the opportunities, but the threats arebecoming global. This suggests only one conclusion: the newchallenges and threats to security and sustainable developmentcan only be effectively opposed together, through collectiveefforts of the whole international community. The fact thatsecurity and prosperity are indivisible gives us no sensiblealternative. In turn, it requires a common denominator to enableus to distinguish practical policies based on legitimateinterests of states and a commitment to values whoseinterpretations inevitably differ. The question of the sources and meaning of the Cold War istoo important for us to be content with a "vague" understanding.There must be a maximum of clarity here. And one should not shutdown the archives: the remaining issues cannot be cleared upwithout authentic documents. Russia is ready for joint researchon a balanced basis, without a selective approach to history (andsuch attempts were made at the dawn of the Cold War also), itsevents, facts and phenomena. We call on our internationalpartners, above all former allies in the anti-Hitler coalition,to exercise this approach. New conditions dictate a new formula of leadership in themodern world. Russia is convinced that the choice should be madein favor of responsible leadership in order to form commonapproaches with all the leading powers. Today it is possible: theinternational community has the political will for this. Ourcommon overarching task should be to strengthen multilateral,collective principles of world policy. The Cold War offers lessons that are common for all of us.They are the disastrous nature of the complex of infallibilityand the wish to bestow happiness on other peoples against theirwill, the danger of militarization of international relations andthe temptation to rely on military methods of solving problemsinstead of settling them by political and diplomatic means. Russia, having resolutely stepped out of the Cold War,ceased to be an ideological, imperial state. The liberation ofRussian forces and resources can be only fruitful for theinterests of Europe and the whole world. Russia has acquired afreedom to behave in accordance with its historical mission, thatis, to be itself and hence, to make its full contribution to thecommon cause of maintaining international stability and harmonybetween civilizations at the critical stage of the formation of anew architecture of international relations. The current situation in the world, for all its challenges,differs radically from the Cold War period. In spite of therelapses into old approaches, there is still a growing awarenessof the common tasks facing all the countries. Russia, the US andother leading states are interacting closely on a broad range ofproblems, including the fight against terrorism and the spread ofWMD, in bilateral and multilateral formats, including at the UNSecurity Council, the G8 and the Russia-NATO Council. Diversetrade and economic and investment links are developing betweenus, thus laying an objective foundation of inter-dependence andmutual interest that were so lacking before. Together we aretackling the problems of global energy security, protectingpeople's health from epidemics and providing access to moderneducation. Joint understanding of our common past will onlystrengthen mutual understanding and trust and enable us tofinally overcome the legacy of the Cold War in world politics.""(rap)