(3)the physical, psychological, and economic impact of rape and sexual assault on the victim, the costs to society, and the implications for sentencing;

(4)the psychology of sex offenders, their high rate of recidivism, and the implications for sentencing;

(5)the historical evolution of laws and attitudes on rape and sexual assault;

(6)sex stereotyping of female and male victims of rape and sexual assault, racial stereotyping of rape victims and defendants, and the impact of such stereotypes on credibility of witnesses, sentencing, and other aspects of the administration of justice;

(7)application of rape shield laws and other limits on introduction of evidence that may subject victims to improper sex stereotyping and harassment in both rape and nonrape cases, including the need for sua sponte judicial intervention in inappropriate cross-examination;

(9)the legitimate reasons why victims of rape, sexual assault, and incest may refuse to testify against a defendant;

(10)the nature and incidence of domestic violence and dating violence (as defined in section
3796gg–2[1] of this title);

(11)the physical, psychological, and economic impact of domestic violence and dating violence on the victim, the costs to society, and the implications for court procedures and sentencing;

(12)the psychology and self-presentation of batterers and victims and the implications for court proceedings and credibility of witnesses;

(13)sex stereotyping of female and male victims of domestic violence and dating violence, myths about presence or absence of domestic violence and dating violence in certain racial, ethnic, religious, or socioeconomic groups, and their impact on the administration of justice;

(14)historical evolution of laws and attitudes on domestic violence;

(15)proper and improper interpretations of the defenses of self-defense and provocation, and the use of expert witness testimony on battered woman syndrome;

(16)the likelihood of retaliation, recidivism, and escalation of violence by batterers, and the potential impact of incarceration and other meaningful sanctions for acts of domestic violence including violations of orders of protection;

(17)economic, psychological, social and institutional reasons for victims’ inability to leave the batterer, to report domestic violence or dating violence or to follow through on complaints, including the influence of lack of support from police, judges, and court personnel, and the legitimate reasons why victims of domestic violence or dating violence may refuse to testify against a defendant;

(18)the need for orders of protection, and the implications of mutual orders of protection, dual arrest policies, and mediation in domestic violence and dating violence cases;

(19)recognition of and response to gender-motivated crimes of violence other than rape, sexual assault and domestic violence, such as mass or serial murder motivated by the gender of the victims;

(20)the issues raised by domestic violence in determining custody and visitation, including how to protect the safety of the child and of a parent who is not a predominant aggressor of domestic violence, the legitimate reasons parents may report domestic violence, the ways domestic violence may relate to an abuser’s desire to seek custody, and evaluating expert testimony in custody and visitation determinations involving domestic violence;

(21)the issues raised by child sexual assault in determining custody and visitation, including how to protect the safety of the child, the legitimate reasons parents may report child sexual assault, and evaluating expert testimony in custody and visitation determinations involving child sexual assault, including the current scientifically-accepted and empirically valid research on child sexual assault; [2]

(22)the extent to which addressing domestic violence and victim safety contributes to the efficient administration of justice; [3]

Section
3796gg–2 of this title, referred to in par. (10), was subsequently repealed and a new section
3796gg–2 enacted which does not define the terms “domestic violence” or “dating violence”. However, such terms are defined in section
13925 of this title.