Elmer Plischke1, Professor of Government and
Politics, University of Maryland (American Political Science
Association)

The Bureau of Public Affairs:

John Richardson, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Public
Affairs

The Historical Office:

William M. Franklin, Director

Richardson Dougall

S. Everett Gleason

Arthur G. Kogan

Fredrick Aandahl

Ralph R. Goodwin [Absent]

William Slany

Rogers P. Churchill

Joan E. Brosius

Herbert A. Fine

Evans Gerakas

John P. Glennon

David W. Mabon

Margaret G. Martin

Neal H. Petersen

Charles S. Sampson

David H. Stauffer

Morning Session - 9:15 am. to 12:25 p.m.

OPENING REMARKS

Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs
Richardson welcomed the Committee, commended the work of the Historical
Office, and indicated that the Department of State, recognizing the importance
of the Foreign Relations series, had asked for funds to
bring the series five years closer to currency.

Dr. Gleason presented a report covering both of these
agenda items [see Attachment 1]. The Committee had before it a chart setting
forth the status of the series as of October 1971 [see Attachment 2]. Dr. Aandahl distributed an additional chart indicating
the status of the series as of November 1971 [see Attachment 3].

In reply to questions by Dr. Plischke, it was indicated
by Dr. Gleason and Dr.
Franklin that the historian soon to join the staff and the three
additional positions requested by the Department but not yet approved at other
levels of the Executive Branch or the Congress would bring the Foreign Relations staff to a total strength of 18 historians. Dr. Franklin said that there was great pressure within
the Department to hold down the personnel level and to recruit from within the
Department. The Historical Office, which obviously required professional
historians, had been fortunate in that the Deputy Under Secretary of State for
Management, William B. Macomber, Jr., had approved every recent HO request for
outside recruiting authority.

In response to an inquiry by Dr. LaFeber, Dr. Franklin discussed the implications of the
announced White House interest in special documentary projects on the Korean,
Lebanese, and Cuban crises. He explained to the Committee that in August, John
D. Ehrlichman, Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs, had informed the
press that the President had requested that an interdepartmental committee,
chaired by Assistant Attorney General William Rehnquist, and already charged
with a review of Executive Order 10501 and government declassification
procedures, also investigate the feasibility of such special documentary
projects. A Department of State paper submitted to the Rehnquist committee
warned that a question of credibility would arise if such projects became “white
papers” not up to the scholarly standards of the Foreign
Relations series. The Department paper pointed out that any such white
papers should at least have a preface explaining that the published volume did
not pretend to be complete but only included such documentation as was currently
available. The Historical Office did not want to take responsibility for any
published documentary which omitted important papers, such as those at the
levels of President and Secretary of State.

Dr. Plischke commended the publication Documents on Germany, 1944-1975 prepared by the
Historical Studies Division of the Historical Office and released as a Committee
print by the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate in May 1971. He
noted that the volume was very useful even though not complete in the Foreign Relations sense of the word, and he suggested
that the publications contemplated by the White House might be done in the same
manner. Dr. Franklin replied that Documents on Germany, which was a revision of an earlier version,
contained only previously published and released documents. He felt that special
documentary projects which contained some but not all of the important
unpublished records would be inadequate and unreliable. Only projects as
comprehensive and definitive as Foreign Relations would
be acceptable. The Historical Office realized that it had no credibility with
the public to trade on, and a serious question of credibility would arise if
special documentary publications, less comprehensive and reliable than Foreign Relations, were to be issued.

Dr. Franklin reminded the Committee that the 1942-1949
China volumes and the wartime conference volumes of the Foreign Relations series had resulted from the request by Republican
Senators in the early 1950s for single-volume publications on China and the
wartime conferences. Congress had approved work on the comprehensive series on
China and the wartime conferences only after the Historical Office had
demonstrated that these topics could not be adequately documented in
single-volume works. The China volumes, whose publication had been speeded up
and then held back at different periods, were eventually incorporated into the
annual Foreign Relations sequence. He felt that any new
documentary project undertaken now should also be incorporated in the Foreign Relations series, as a first choice.

Dr. Dougall pointed out that the Foreign Relations volumes on the Korean conflict, which were already
in an advanced state of preparation, could be accelerated, thus making
unnecessary any less complete and less reliable publication on Korea. Dr. Glennon reported that the record of U.S. policy in
Korea for 1950 would be completed in manuscript in December 1971. Dr. Franklin said that he hoped that the Korean story
could be released in the Foreign Relations series but
the more serious problem was how to handle publications on such incidents as the
Lebanon landing of 1958 and the Cuban crisis of 1962, which were topics far
ahead of the Foreign Relations series.

Dr. Claude wondered whether any partisan pressure had
been brought to bear to publish special documentary volumes, and whether this
would slow down Foreign Relations. Dr. Freeman also was puzzled by the White House selection of the three
particular crises. Dr. Franklin assured the Committee
that there had been no partisan pressure in the matter, and that the three
projects mentioned by the White House, namely, the Korea conflict, the Lebanon
landing, and the Cuban missile crisis, had been chosen apparently so as to have
one project from each of three Presidential administrations,

In response to an inquiry from Dr. Plischke, Dr. Franklin briefly described the nature and extent
of the classified studies prepared by the Historical Studies Division of the
Historical Office. It was pointed out that the Foreign
Relations volumes on the Korean conflict were being greatly facilitated
by a large special study on Korea and that many other Foreign
Relations compilations in the period since World War II would be
similarly aided by such special studies. Unfortunately, such studies were only
done at the request of other offices and bureaus of the Department and did not
systematically cover all foreign affairs problems; but studies had been made of
most of the major crises of the last 20 years.

Dr. Claude raised the possibility of releasing the 1950
Foreign Relations volume on Korea before the 1948 and
1949 volumes were published. Dr. Franklin observed
that in the past individual Foreign Relations volumes for
several different years had been released as they were completed irrespective of
the chronology. Headline-seeking journalists tended to speculate on the release
of volumes apparently out of order and to attribute dramatic but false political
or foreign policy motives to such releases. In order to avoid such harmful
publicity and to demonstrate that the publication of Foreign
Relations was a strictly historical project with no connection to
current policy, the volumes were now being released strictly chronologically for
each year although not numerically within each year. The series could use
publicity, but not the sort which disturbed foreign governments or Departmental
officers. Dr. Dougall reminded the Committee that the
foreign press, particularly some foreign news services, closely followed the
publication of Foreign Relations and tended to take items
in the volumes out of context to make up stories with an anti-U.S. twist.

There was a general discussion of various aspects of the problem of special
documentary studies for the 1950s and ’60s. Dr.
Plischke indicated he would be happy to see the publication of special
documentaries, even though they were less comprehensive than the Foreign
Relations series, particularly in the absence of the now suspended
series American Foreign Policy: Current Documents. He was
prepared to wait for the publication of the definitive Foreign
Relations series. Dr. Claude shared the view
that having partial documentation available early was desirable. Dr. LaFeber also felt the publication of special
documentary volumes would be helpful if their preparation did not interfere with
the preparation of the Foreign Relations series. He
pointed out that the Current Documents though not
definitive was quite helpful to scholars. He felt there was a significant
documentary gap for the Korean war period and a real need both for an early,
secondary-level, partial documentary collection and for the complete Foreign Relations coverage. He held that an early if
partial documentary would permit more scholarship on Korea than was currently
possible, and any such special volume of papers could carry a preface which
clearly explained the limitations in scope and coverage. Dr. Varg observed that there were two audiences for documentaries
which argued for the publication of two different types of documentaries. For
those scholars and teachers who were not often able to have access to the
archives, it was essential to maintain a complete and definitive Foreign Relations series of the highest standard. There
was another audience, however, not interested in research, which urgently needed
the early publication of important although incomplete documentation on such
topics as the Korean War. The preface to such limited documentary publications
would have to apprise the readers of the restricted scope and coverage.
Throughout this discussion, Dr. Franklin reiterated
that the central problem of producing special documentary volumes for crises of
the 1950s or ’60s was the inevitable incompleteness of such volumes. With the
addition of some of the previously classified records they would be more
substantial than the Current Documents but far less
complete and authoritative than the Foreign Relations
series. Their shortcomings would be played up by every hostile critic, including
many scholars. He was prepared, however, to make the effort, if that was the
ultimate decision of the White House. He thought that the resort to a non-book
format and the use of photo-offset without annotation might afford a practical
method for presenting such special documentation with a minimum of criticism.
The Committee indicated general assent to this suggestion.

[The Committee recessed briefly for coffee.]

AGENDA ITEM III: STATUS OF THE SERIES AND PUBLICATION PROSPECTS
(Continued)

Dr. Dougall presented a brief report on the status of
the wartime conference volumes. The volume The Conferences at
Washington and Quebec, 1943 was released during 1971. The last
conference volume, The Conference at Quebec, 1944, would
be published early in 1972. Tardy British clearance of certain documentation had
delayed publication, but happily had afforded the opportunity to add certain
important papers to the collection. In reply to questions from Dr. Plischke, Dr. Dougall
explained that the wartime conferences comprised 7 volumes in the Foreign Relations series. The documentation on the
Argentia Conference of August 1941 was not the subject of a separate wartime
conference volume but was included in Foreign Relations,
194l, Volume I.

AGENDA ITEM IV: CLEARANCE AND TECHNICAL EDITING PROBLEMS

Dr. Gleason reported to the Committee on current
clearance problems [see Attachment 1]. He circulated to the Committee the
galleys for the compilation on Italy for 1948 which indicated the extent and
nature of the deletions and revisions requested by the Italian Desk.

In reply to a question from Dr. Varg, Dr. Gleason explained that appeals of the clearance
decisions of Department officers were carried to the Assistant Secretary of
State level, sometimes even to the Under Secretary level. Dr. Franklin observed that the Historical Office could always win
these appeals, given sufficient time. But since this might take years, the
problem was when to compromise.

Dr. Franklin informed the Committee of the
establishment during the year of the Department’s Council on Classification
Policy under the chairmanship of Deputy Under Secretary Macomber. He explained
that the Council had been created to deal with declassification and security
problems, which had become acute after the revelation of the Pentagon Papers. The Council was not intended to deal specifically
with the Historical Office’s clearance problems, but it was hoped that it could
be so utilized. Dr. Claude and Dr. Varg observed that the new Council might be regarded as a response
to the Advisory Committee’s recommendation of the previous year that top-level
Foreign Service officers be utilized to facilitate rapid clearance of Foreign Relations volumes.

Dr. Franklin described to the Committee the problem
which has arisen in connection with the clearance of National Security Council
[NSC] documents intended for publication in the Foreign
Relations series. In the past the Department of State had assumed
responsibility for the declassification of Presidential papers on foreign
affairs, subject to the clearance of other interested government agencies. When
the first NSC papers were included in Foreign Relations
compilations (those for 1947), the same procedure was attempted, but the NSC--a
statutory agency--has insisted on its authority to declassify its documents.
Procedures for NSC declassification were currently being developed and were
being given the very highest-level consideration. Dr.
Dougall explained that resolution of the problem had been made
difficult in the absence of direct contact between NSC officials and the
Historical Office. The only authorized official channel, through the Executive
Secretariat of the Department of State, was cumbersome and prone to delay. Dr. Franklin advised the Committee that he had been
unsuccessful in several efforts to get mutual friends to explain the situation
to Dr. Kissinger.

Dr. Gleason indicated to the Committee that the NSC
clearance question, which was causing the most serious delay in the publication
of Foreign Relations volumes, had been compounded when
the NSC Staff also claimed responsibility for the clearance of all “Presidential
papers”. A number of Foreign Relations volumes, otherwise
ready for publication, had to be referred to the NSC Staff for a review of such
papers, liberally defined. Recently, however, the NSC Staff had decided to
forego clearance of Presidential papers subject to their clearance by the
appropriate executive departments. In reply to a question by Dr. Claude, Dr. Franklin
indicated that the Council on Classification Policy might be used in helping
secure clearance of NSC papers. He also mentioned that memoirs and oral history
projects had already disclosed the substance of many NSC papers, and NSC 68 had
been written about in detail in books and articles.

The discussion of the NSC clearance question led Dr.
Franklin to raise with the Committee the problem of whether the current
in-depth coverage of the Foreign Relations series could
be maintained. He pointed out that Dr. Gleason had been more interested than
previous editors in documenting the formulation of foreign policy; but these
were the documents that were often the most sensitive and which held the series
back. He asked if the Committee wanted the series to be speeded up at the cost
of leaving out such documentation whenever it posed a clearance problem. Dr. Varg commented that it would be useful to state a
goal for the series in the Committee’s report.

Dr. Plischke characterized the clearance problem as a
dilemma of delay vs. exclusion. Dr. Franklin observed
that in a few cases delay did not solve the problem of exclusion. As an example
he mentioned certain military contingency plans that would be sensitive for 50
or 75 years. Dr. Freeman appeared to feel that
contingency plans were not really necessary for the Foreign
Relations series. The Committee indicated general agreement with this
view. Dr. Gleason mentioned that CIA intelligence
estimates could not be cleared for 75 years, but he did not believe such
estimates were essential for the Foreign Relations series
inasmuch as their principal points appeared in NSC papers. Dr. Franklin pointed out that the difficulties in clearing papers for
the 1947 volumes of the series demonstrated the unlikelihood of being able to
clear substantially complete special documentary studies on such matters as the
Cuban missile crisis in the near future.

The discussion turned to the problems of clearance within the Bureaus of the
Department of State. Dr. Claude suggested a
recommendation for reducing clearance delay by strictly limiting clearance to 6
months, and Dr. Varg thought that the bureaus wasted
much time over papers of no serious import. Dr.
Plischke asked why the maximum time for clearance was not enforced with
an ultimatum. Dr. Franklin felt that the speed of
clearance had improved, thanks in part to the efforts of the Committee in
previous years. The problem was now shifting to the substance rather than the
mechanics of clearance. Dr. Gleason agreed that the
speed of clearance had improved somewhat, though there were exceptions.
Currently the bureaus were taking, on the average, 8 months to clear volumes.
The Historical Office requested that clearance be completed within three months
but would be satisfied if it were completed in six. Dr.
Plischke suggested that there might be advantage in the designation of
a third-party arbiter in deciding clearance issues between the Historical Office
and officers of the Department. Dr. Franklin replied
that there was no place in the Department’s chain of command for arbiters. In
case of deadlock, the Historical Office had to appeal to the next higher
authority--in this case, the Assistant Secretaries and the Under Secretary of
State. Dr. Plischke thought an Under Secretary might
be too busy to take on such questions, and he wondered if some officer in the
Under Secretary’s office could be assigned responsibility for making clearance
and declassification decisions. Dr. Franklin believed
that such a downward delegation of authority would not be effective Dr. Deener felt that Dr.
Plischke’s proposal was for a sidewards delegation of authority and he
thought it ought to be tried, particularly in view of the importance of this
problem in the Department’s public relations.

Dr. Franklin told the Committee that action on
clearance delays would be sought through the Council on Classification Policy.
The Department, and particularly Deputy Under Secretary Macomber, recognized
that only the Historical Office systematically declassified documents, acting as
a declassification team. The Council on Classification Policy had considered the
possibility of giving the Historical Office the authority to declassify papers
of all but the greatest sensitivity, but no decision had been reached.
Responding to a question from Dr. Varg, Dr. Franklin indicated that it would not be useful to
take the difficult clearance problems to desk officers, because such actions
would probably elicit negative decisions. The question was whether the
Historical Office could assume greater clearance responsibility and go ahead
with the publication of the Foreign Relations volumes
without reference to desk officers. He was aware that such a procedure would
have risks. The publication in Foreign Relations of
documents dealing with matters of current significance could result in hostile
press coverage and create problems that might be momentarily serious. Were the
Historical Office to assume the responsibility of publication without prior desk
clearance, it would have to become much more familiar with current foreign
policy issues around the world.

Dr. Plischke asked if the Historical Office wanted the
support of the Advisory Committee in asking to be allowed to assume
responsibility for clearance. Dr. Franklin pointed out
to the Committee that efforts were being made to bring the Foreign Relations series up to 20 years behind currency. In keeping
with the spirit of the Bicentennial celebration, the Foreign
Relations slogan was “’56 in ’76”. Were the series to draw so close to
currency, however, the Department would be unlikely to grant HO the
responsibility for clearance. The Historical Office hoped to achieve both the
20-year line and the responsibility for clearance, but the latter could probably
only be acquired gradually. In the meantime, the Historical Office would
probably have to continue to deal with Office and Country Directors in the more
sensitive clearance issues.

Dr. Claude wondered if, after assuming greater
clearance responsibility and encountering several troublesome episodes, the
Historical Office might become more timid and turn more often to desk officers
in clearance questions. Dr. Franklin recognized the
dangers involved but welcomed the risk for sake of speeding publication. He felt
that turning to desk officers and country directors with clearance problems
meant giving up clearance responsibility and inviting Departmental officers to
stop publication of sensitive papers. He acknowledged that if Foreign Relations volumes, cleared without reference to country desk
officers, resulted in adverse reaction and complaints from ambassadors, the
clearance-declassification authority would be taken away from the Historical
Office. Miss Brosius commented that Country Directors
would be reluctant to yield their authority for clearance. The wrath of an
ambassador was regarded by a Country Director as a very serious matter.

AGENDA ITEM V: LUNCH

The Committee recessed for lunch with Deputy Under Secretary of State William B.
Macomber, Jr.

Afternoon Session - 2:45 p.m. to 3:45 p.m.

AGENDA ITEM VI: PROBLEMS OF ACCESS AND DECLASSIFICATION

Dr. Kogan (Special Assistant to the Director of the
Historical Office) briefly reviewed current policy on access to Department
files. During the first ten months of 1971, the Department had issued 135 grants
of access to the Restricted Period. 11,000 pages of notes and documents had been
reviewed, some of which were referred to the Department of State from other
government agencies. The Historical Office had actively supported the National
Archives in persuading the White House to propose the declassification of World
War II records. This would in fact eliminate our Restricted Period and would
allow foreign scholars to have the access which they had unfortunately been
denied under the Department’s regulations.

Dr. Franklin reminded the Committee that the Department
of State had in the past been in the vanguard of nations opening their archives.
Last year the United Kingdom had announced that they would open their archives
through World War II In January 1972. The declassification of most wartime
Combined Chiefs of Staff documents was a first step in that program. The
Canadians had decided to follow suit, and this combined action made everything
better for the scholars and easier for the bureaucrats.

Dr. Varg asked whether the declassification of World
War II records would result in the permanent elimination of the Restricted
Period. Dr. Franklin said he could not yet answer this
question. In principle he did not like the Restricted Period, and he thought
that everyone would agree that it would be better to have the files either open
or closed. But serious problems would have to be solved before the Open Period
could be advanced beyond 1945; more screening would undoubtedly be necessary.
The Historical Office was obliged to “feel its way forward” in the entire
problem.

Dr. Franklin took the opportunity to apprise the
Committee of the attention being given within the government to the problems of
bulk declassification of documents. The Council on Classification Policy,
chaired by Deputy Under Secretary Macomber, had recognized that many government
documents older than 10 years no longer required classification but could not be
made available to the public because of the absence of an adequate
declassification procedure. Various procedures were being considered by the
Council. The procedure which appeared to have the most support was the bulk
declassification of segments of the files carried out by a special team of
officers. He had pointed out that such a procedure would be wholly
unsatisfactory. The cost in time and money of such an operation would yield
little of real value to the public; scholars and other perceptive observers
would recognize the uselessness of what was declassified, and the government
would suffer a further loss of credibility. He had maintained before the Council
on Classification Policy that it was important to declassify by subject and
“from the top down”. Unless the Department was willing to declassify the top
documents on any given subject, it would do no good to declassify the great bulk
of lower-level material. Furthermore, documents should not be declassified one
by one; they had to be compiled into meaningful stories, as was done for Foreign Relations.

AGENDA ITEM IV: CLEARANCE AND TECHNICAL EDITING PROBLEMS
(resumed)

At the request of Dr. Claude, Dr.
Gleason concluded that portion of his Report dealing with the problems
of technical editing [see Attachment l].

Dr. Franklin noted that much time and effort went into
the analytical indexes to the Foreign Relations volumes,
and he asked the Committee whether they found the indexes useful enough to be
continued at this level. The Committee strongly endorsed the continuation of the
current indexes.

NEW BUSINESS

Dr. Plischke raised the possibility of including in the
Foreign Relations series compilations of documents
dealing specifically with the methodology of American diplomacy. After being
assured that some such methodological papers were already included in the
current substantive-compilation format of the series, Dr.
Plischke asked if it would be possible to enlarge the indexes of
volumes to include some of the more current conceptual intangibles of importance
to political scientists. Dr. Franklin and Dr. Gleason held out little hope that the current
indexing capabilities of the series would permit the inclusion of specialized
entries of the sort suggested.

In response to a question by Dr. LaFeber, Dr. Franklin explained that the publication of the Current Documents series had been suspended in order to
add two historians to the Foreign Relations staff. The
Current Documents series was a “service of
convenience” which the government could no longer sustain when Foreign Relations needed help so badly. Efforts to find academic
sponsors interested in continuing the series had so far been unsuccessful. Dr. Franklin suggested that the three learned
societies represented on the Advisory Committee ought to be able to provide the
sponsorship necessary to continue the series. The Historical Office was prepared
to give its cooperation to any group that undertook this task.

Dr. Plischke recalled that during a discussion with
former Assistant Secretary of State Michael Collins, a suggestion had been
advanced that additional documentation of the sort previously included in the
Current Documents series be published in the
Department of State Bulletin. Dr.
Franklin said that the Bulletin staff itself
could not undertake such documentary publication as a regular program. Such
materials would have to be prepared and processed by the Historical Office at
the expense of the work of Foreign Relations.

AGENDA ITEM VII: COMMITTEE’S PRIVATE MEETING

The open meeting was adjourned at 3:45 p.m., the Historical Office staff
withdrew, and the Advisory Committee began its closed session.

I thought it useful, particularly for the new members of the Committee, to
provide a brief description of the organization of the Foreign
Relations Division, and recent changes in its staff.

The Division has three branches, General, Western, and Eastern. The General
Branch, headed by Mr. Goodwin, covers our United Nations policy, and
multilateral U.S. diplomacy in general--foreign economic policy, atomic energy
policy, national security policy and the like. Besides Mr. Goodwin, there are
three historians assigned to the Branch. One of these, Miss Joan Brosius, is a
Foreign Service Officer, recently assigned to us. We hope for at least three
years. I will ask her to stand. Another valuable newcomer is David Mabon who has
been with us a little over a year.

The Western Branch is headed by Fredrick Aandahl, well-known to most of you. His
branch is responsible for compiling the documentation on Western Europe, NATO,
the Marshall Plan, and European integration, etc. The only new member of this
group of five is Mrs. Margaret Martin, recently assigned to us from elsewhere in
the Historical Office. We have lost Howard Smyth through retirement.

The Eastern Branch, until a few months ago, was headed by a real old-timer,
Rogers Churchill, who graciously accepted a special assistantship, enabling us
to promote William Slany, another Slavic specialist, to be Chief of this
branch.

Regrettably, we shall lose Mr. Churchill, who for years has covered the Soviet
Union, by mandatory retirement next September. We have also lost through
retirement the services of another veteran, John Reid, who was our specialist on
China and the Far East. John Glennon has very capably taken over these
assignments, and before his departure Mr. Reid had finished all the volumes on
China through 1949.

Another relative newcomer in this Branch, Evans Gerakas, has been assigned to us
from the Current Documents project as was Mr. Glennon.
These shifts have unhappily caused Current Documents to
fall into limbo, we hope only temporarily, but without much assurance of revival
in the near future.

The Eastern Branch is responsible for the documentation of U.S. policies in
Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, the Near East and Africa, and the Far
East.

I do not want to leave with the Committee the impression that these branches are
water-tight compartments. Lack of sufficient staff numbers in recent years has
made it necessary to shift members of one branch to work on compilations
theoretically the responsibility of another. It is a tribute to the staff’s
competence and flexibility that they produce just about as reliable a product in
fields where they profess no specialized knowledge as in ones where they do.

As you all are aware our two major problems over the last few years, problems
which have caused the series to fall some 25 years behind the event, have been
insufficient staff and clearance. Until very recently, for instance, we have not
been permitted, with one exception, to recruit trained diplomatic historians
from outside the Department and the Foreign Service, i.e. from the universities.
Happily, there appears to be a thaw in the ice-cap. We are anticipating the
arrival of a trained historian from Ohio State by next January and the
Department’s budget office has agreed to permit us three more new historians for
the next fiscal year. If approval for these three additions actually survives
the gauntlet it must still run, there is little question that within a very few
years, lack of staff will no longer stand in the way of getting the series back
to a lag of twenty years or less, in the next five or six years.

Clearance, however, is quite a different matter, and we will come to that
presently.

Status of the Series and Publication Prospects

The most disheartening notes in the charts Mr. Aandahl has prepared are, of
course, that as of now four volumes for the year 1946 have yet to be published,
and that only two volumes were published during the last fiscal year. One of
these was, in fact, a Conference volume. Had it not been for clearance problems,
new and old, at least four would have appeared in FY 1971.

We have reason to hope that the remaining volumes for 1946, one General, one on
the Far East, and two on China will be out by the end of this fiscal year, June
30, 1972.

Of the eight volumes for 1947, five are in pages and ready to go when we finally
get Write House-NSC clearance. The remaining three are in galleys, and two
cleared except for the White House, and ready for paging when that clearance
comes. In short, we ought to make a very decent showing in the next fiscal year
to make up for our dismal showing in the last.

Of the nine volumes for 1948, one is in pages, seven in galleys, one partially in
galleys. Only two have received clearance short of the White House.

The eight volumes we plan for 1949 are in various stages from incomplete
manuscript to galleys. I will not go into detail on each of them, but we are
confident that the manuscript for all of them will have been completed by early
next summer. In short, most of the staff are now working on the 1950
compilations. We are in reach of our goal of compiling a year in a year. If we
succeed in getting the additional personnel mentioned earlier, we will easily
achieve or surpass this goal. The chief remaining obstacle to getting our
volumes out more rapidly will then be clearance.

Clearance and Technical Editing Problems

Our, so to speak, normal clearance problems--clearance with the policy desks in
the State Department, and with Defense, AEC, and other Government agencies, have
continued at about their usual level or, with certain glaring exceptions, have
actually improved. Defense has been laggard, reflecting an unusual timidity or
desire to project a low profile in view of Congressional and public criticism of
so many aspects of the military establishment and its costs. This has reached a
rather silly stage in Defense when we are requested to omit the names of service
attachés, certain of their reports to the ambassadors, and the numbers of the
JCS papers we wish to print. CIA is also likely to give us difficulty even
though we do not propose to print their intelligence estimates as such.

I will cite only one instance of what I have just described as glaring
exceptions. I refer to the rather long compilation on United States policy
towards Italy in 1948. Most of us recall that the main preoccupation of the U.S.
government in that year was to prevent a Communist take-over of Italy either by
constitutional means or by subversion. The main thrust of our documentation,
sent for clearance to the Italian desk in the Department, was naturally directed
to this aspect of our Italian policy. The galleys came back to us, after an
inordinate length of time, so completely gutted that the reader would scarcely
be aware of the existence of the Italian Communist party. The desk even
requested us to delete press conferences and quotations from Italian newspapers
of the time. If we cannot secure reconsideration of this wholesale slaughter, I
would certainly be obliged to recommend the excision of the entire compilation.
To print what would be permitted by the desk would simply amount to a fraud. We
have never been guilty of that! The galleys in question I have had brought over
and if you have time I suggest you glance at them. A quick glance will be quite
enough.

Our major clearance problem, however, is a new one to most of you. It lies in the
White House and more particularly in the National Security Council Staff. I will
ask Mr. Franklin to go into the grim details of that situation since he knows it
at first hand and the rest of us only at second.

****************

Technical editing problems have decidedly eased in the past year. Although the
Publication and Reproduction Services Division, who are responsible for the
technical editing of our volumes, are worse understaffed than we are, the
contracting out of much of this work to the Crowell-Collier Company has been
satisfactory and I believe will further improve in time. Also the problem of
indexes which has vexed us in the past seems on the way to a satisfactory
conclusion. Small as it is the staff of PBR is still able to guide the
contractors and to save us from egregious errors on the technical side. The
technical excellence of the volumes and their indexes is still a matter of
considerable pride to us, quite apart from the substance of the volumes.

If the Committee have questions of detail that Mr. Franklin and I have not
covered, the Branch chiefs, I am sure, can provide many of the answers.