This unfair labor practice case is before the Authority in accordance
with section 2429.1(a) of the Authority's Regulations, based on a stipulation
of facts by the parties, who have agreed that no material issue of fact exists.
The General Counsel and the Respondent filed briefs.

The consolidated complaint alleges that the Respondent violated section
7116(a)(1), (5), and (8) of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations
Statute (the Statute) by refusing to furnish the Union with certain information
requested under section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute.(1) For the reasons stated below, we find that the Respondent
violated the Statute, as alleged, by failing to furnish unsanitized performance
plans. Accordingly, we order the Respondent to provide that information. We
also find that the Respondent did not violate the Statute by failing to furnish
unsanitized performance appraisals and a supervisor's work folder, because
disclosure of that information would violate the Privacy Act.(2) Therefore, we dismiss that portion
of the consolidated complaint.

II. Stipulation

On August 3, 1993, the Union requested unsanitized performance
appraisals, performance plans,(3) and the supervisor's work folder, referred to as "AF971," for
unit employee Linville for a 4-year period.(4) On September 28, 1993, the Union requested unsanitized
performance appraisals and performance plans for unit employees in "Zone 1" for
a 1-year period.(5) In both requests, the Union stated that it needed the
information in connection with a grievance the Union was investigating.

After the Respondent denied both these requests, the parties met to
discuss further the Union's information needs. The Union stated that "it was
investigating potential grievances alleging discriminatory treatment against
Union officials with respect to performance appraisals and cash awards, and
that [it] wanted to compare the Union members' appraisals to their
co-workers'." Stip. para. 22.

The parties stipulated that the information requested by the Union: is
normally maintained by the Respondent in the regular course of business in its
designated Privacy Act system of records; is reasonably available; is necessary
for full and proper discussion, understanding, and negotiation of subjects
within the scope of bargaining; and does not constitute guidance, advice,
counsel, or training provided for management officials or supervisors relating
to collective bargaining. Additionally, the parties stipulated that performance
plans "are subject to release pursuant to 5 U.S.C. Section 552a(b)(2)."
Stip. para. 10.

III. Positions of the Parties

A. General Counsel

First, with respect to disclosure of the performance plans relating to
Linville and Zone 1 employees, the General Counsel maintains that as the
Respondent stipulated that disclosure is required by law, namely, the Privacy
Act and section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute, the Respondent has admitted to a
violation of the Statute and has effectively consented to an order directing
release of the plans.

Second, the General Counsel maintains that, consistent with FOIA
Exemption 6, there is a public interest in disclosure of the performance
appraisals for Linville and Zone 1 employees. Specifically, the General
Counsel states that disclosure of such information would assist in promoting
the fair and equitable treatment of Federal employees, including Union
officials, and determining the manner in which the Respondent rewards superior
performance. The General Counsel contends that this public interest outweighs
the privacy interests of employees. The General Counsel also distinguishes this
case from the Supreme Court's decision in United States Department of
Defense v. FLRA, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 1006 (1994)
(Department of Defense), on the basis that the public interest in
appraisals is greater than the public interest in names and home addresses. As
to the routine use exception to the Privacy Act, the General Counsel argues,
consistent with the requirements of Federal Personnel Manual (FPM)
Letter 711-164, that "the performance appraisal and related information is
relevant and necessary." General Counsel's Brief at 14. Despite the
parties' stipulation that performance appraisals are maintained in an agency
system of records, the General Counsel makes no specific arguments with respect
to disclosure of the appraisals as a routine use under an Air Force system of
records.

Third, as to the AF971 regarding Linville, the General Counsel states
that these supervisory records are analogous to the "spread sheets" that were
at issue in United States Department of Veterans Affairs, Regional Office,
San Diego, California, 44 FLRA 312 (1992) (VARO). The
General Counsel explains that "the Union needed [the records] to determine
whether there was background information there used in preparing [Linville's]
appraisal." General Counsel's Brief at 11, n.13.

With regard to disclosure of the appraisals and AF971 pertaining to
employee Linville, the General Counsel argues that Linville's consent to be
represented by the Union constitutes consent to disclosure of the information.
Quoting Federal Employees Metal Trades Council and U.S. Department of the
Navy, Mare Island Naval Shipyard, Vallejo, California, 38 FLRA 1410,
1423 (1991) (Department of the Navy), the General Counsel claims that
"'[u]nder circumstances where the employee who is the subject of the records
has designated the Union as his or her representative, [the Authority] find[s]
that the Union's access to the relevant records would not be a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.'" General Counsel's Brief at 5
n.7.

Finally, the General Counsel claims, for the first time in its brief,
that the Respondent was obligated to provide all of the requested performance
appraisals in a sanitized form if the Respondent "conclusively demonstrate[d]
that the Union did not need unsanitized appraisals[.]" Id. at 19
(emphasis and footnote omitted). The General Counsel asserts that this case is
similar to U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization
Service, Border Patrol, El Paso, Texas, 37 FLRA 1310, 1324-25 (1990)
(INS), in which the Authority found that the agency violated the Statute
by failing to provide sanitized information, even though the union had
requested unsanitized information.

B. Respondent

The Respondent contends that performance appraisals are not releasable
without the written consent of the employees involved and that disclosure
without such consent would violate the Privacy Act. Citing FLRA v. United
States Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
National Weather Service, Silver Spring, Maryland, 962 F.2d 1055 (D.C.
Cir. 1992) and Ripskis v. Department of Housing and Urban Development,
746 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1984), the Respondent maintains that employees have
significant privacy interests in their appraisals and that there is no public
interest "in knowing an employee's rating which could conceivably outweigh an
employee's privacy interest." Respondent's Brief at 9. As such, the
Respondent claims that the employees' privacy interests outweigh whatever
public interest would be served by disclosure.

Further, despite the parties' stipulation that the information is
necessary, the Respondent claims that the Union failed to establish a
particularized need for the performance appraisals that would outweigh the
Respondent's countervailing anti-disclosure interests.

The Respondent makes no further arguments with respect to disclosure of
any of the requested information. In addition, the Respondent does not address
the General Counsel's claim that the Respondent was obligated to furnish the
requested information in a sanitized form.

IV. Analysis and Conclusions

A. Disclosure of Performance Plans Concerning Linville and
Zone 1 Employees Would Not Violate the Privacy Act and Is Required By
Section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute

We find, based on the parties' stipulations, that the performance plans
are disclosable consistent with the Privacy Act and section 7114(b)(4) of the
Statute.(6) We conclude that it is appropriate
in the circumstances of this case to rely on the stipulation that the plans are
required to be disclosed pursuant to the FOIA and the stipulation that the
information satisfies all the requirements of section 7114(b)(4). With regard
to the former stipulation, we note particularly that, as the parties
affirmatively referenced disclosure of the plans under the FOIA, they
apparently made an informed judgment that the information could be disclosed
under that statute. Consequently, we conclude that the failure to furnish the
performance plans violated section 7116(a)(1), (5) and (8) of the Statute. We
will order the Respondent to furnish the performance plans to the Union.

B. Disclosure of Performance Appraisals Concerning Linville
and Zone 1 Employees and the AF971 Concerning Linville Is Inconsistent
With the Privacy Act and Is Not Required Under the Statute(7)

1. Linville's Designation of the Union as Her Representative Does
Not Constitute Consent to Disclosure Under the Privacy Act

The Privacy Act does not bar disclosure of requested information where
an employee has provided such consent. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(b). In
this case, the parties agree that Linville's designation of the Union as her
representative "did not expressly state that Ms. Linville was authorizing
release of the requested information." Stip. para. 12.

Further, the General Counsel's reliance on the Union's information
request, which reproduced a portion of a Union complaint form on which Linville
had designated the Union to represent her "in the above-described complaint[,]"
stip. Exhibit 5, is misplaced because that form does not establish Linville's
implicit consent to disclosure. As the Respondent noted on receipt of this
request, the issue for which the Union was providing representation was not
specified on the form. As a result, the Respondent lawfully stated that "the
information requested cannot be released until the appropriate authorization
for release is received." Id., Exhibit 10. This reply thus made the
Union aware of the need to procure Linville's consent and that, with
appropriate authorization, the information requested could have been released.
Although the General Counsel now claims that consent was provided, nothing in
the record indicates why the Union did not, or could not, have procured
Linville's consent in a manner that would have satisfied the requirements of
the Privacy Act. We note that there is nothing to prevent the Union from
obtaining Linville's consent for disclosure of her performance appraisals and
the AF971 if there is presently a need for that information.

2. The Documents Are Maintained in an Air Force System of
Records

Based on the parties' stipulation that the requested performance
appraisals and the AF971 are maintained in an Air Force system of records, we
assess the disclosability of the appraisals under that system of records. In
view of the Authority's previous findings that performance appraisals and
supporting documentation are maintained in OPM/GOVT-2, and the General
Counsel's assertion that the information satisfies the requirements for
disclosure consistent with that system of records, we find it appropriate to
also address disclosure of the requested performance appraisals and the AF971
under that system as well. E.g., FAA, Fort Worth,
51 FLRA at 328-29; U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal
Aviation Administration, New York TRACON, Westbury, New York,
50 FLRA 338, 346 (1995) (FAA). As we stated in FAA,
50 FLRA at 345, although parties bear various burdens in
substantiating their claims regarding disclosure of information under the
Privacy Act, including identification of the applicable system of records, we
will consider matters that are otherwise apparent.

3. Disclosure of the Documents Would Result in a Clearly Unwarranted
Invasion of Personal Privacy Under FOIA Exemption 6

In FAA, 50 FLRA at 345, we set forth the analytic
approach we will follow in assessing an agency's claims that disclosure of
information requested under section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute would
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy within the
meaning of FOIA Exemption 6 and, therefore, is prohibited by the Privacy Act.
In FAA, which involved the disclosure of performance appraisals of
bargaining unit employees, we stated that an agency asserting that the Privacy
Act bars disclosure is required to demonstrate: (1) that the information sought
is contained in a "system of records" within the meaning of the Privacy Act;
(2) that disclosure would implicate employee privacy interests; and
(3) the nature and significance of those privacy interests. If the agency
makes the requisite showings, the burden shifts to the General Counsel to:
(1) identify a public interest cognizable under the FOIA; and
(2) demonstrate how disclosure of the requested information will serve
that public interest. As we stated above, although the parties bear these
burdens, we will, where appropriate, consider matters that are otherwise
apparent.

We held in FAA, for reasons more fully explained there, that the
only relevant public interest to be considered in this context is the extent to
which the requested disclosure would shed light on the agency's performance of
its statutory duties, or otherwise inform citizens concerning the activities of
the Government. More particularly, we held that the public interest in
collective bargaining that is embodied in the Statute, or specific to a union
in fulfilling its obligations under the Statute and in expediting grievances,
will no longer be considered in our analysis under Exemption 6 of the FOIA.

Once the relevant interests are established, we will balance the
privacy interests of employees against the public interest in disclosure. Where
this balance leads us to conclude that the privacy interests are greater than
the public interest at stake, we will find that the requested disclosure would
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy under Exemption 6
and, therefore, that disclosure is prohibited by law under section 7114(b)(4)
of the Statute; accordingly, the agency is not required to furnish the
information, unless disclosure is permitted under another exception to the
Privacy Act. In contrast, where the balance tips the other way, because the
public interest is greater than the privacy interests, we will conclude that
disclosure would be required under the FOIA and, therefore, is not prohibited
by the Privacy Act.

Applying that framework here, we find, in agreement with the Respondent
and for the reasons more fully discussed in FAA, that employees have
substantial privacy interests in shielding their individual performance
appraisals from public view. Insofar as the AF971 constitutes background
material on which appraisals specific to Linville were based, the same privacy
interests that attach to performance appraisals attach as well to the AF971.
SeeFAA, Fort Worth, 51 FLRA at 329. The Union's
request encompasses unit employees' performance appraisals, and certain
supporting documentation, whether favorable to the employee or not. In this
regard, privacy interests may be heightened with respect to derogatory
information contained in an appraisal but such interests also exist even when
the information is favorable. SeeFLRA v. United States Department of
Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather
Service, Silver Spring, Maryland, 962 F.2d 1055, 1059 (D.C. Cir.
1992); Gilbey v. Department of Interior, No. 89-0801 (RCL)
1990 WL 174889 (D.D.C. Oct. 22, 1990). Disclosure of appraisal
and related information also could subject employees to embarrassment and
jealousy among their co-workers and could result in discord at the workplace.
E.g., U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs,
50 FLRA 472, 479-80 (1995); FAA, 50 FLRA at 347.

Further, the fact that Linville designated the Union as her
representative does not serve to "lessen" her privacy interests in the
information sought. In United States Department of Justice v. Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 771 (1989) (Reporters
Committee), the Court held that "the identity of the requesting party has
no bearing on the merits of his or her FOIA request." Subsequently, in
Department of Defense, 114 S. Ct. at 1014, the Court
stated that because "all FOIA requestors have an equal, and equally qualified,
right to information," information that is sought "to vindicate the policies
behind the Labor Statute is irrelevant to the FOIA analysis." The import of
these decisions is that, for purposes of information requests involving the
FOIA, the Statute gives unions no special status vis-a-vis other requesters. To
the extent that prior Authority decisions rest on unions having a special
status because of their relationship to the individuals about whom information
is sought, those decisions will no longer be followed. E.g., U.S.
Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs, 45 FLRA 1022, 1026
(1992); U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration,
National Aviation Support Facility, Atlantic City Airport, New Jersey,
43 FLRA 191, 198-203 (1991); Department of the Navy, 38 FLRA
1410.

We also find that the General Counsel has established the existence of
a public interest, cognizable under FOIA Exemption 6, that would be served by
disclosure of the performance appraisals and the AF971. In particular,
disclosure of that information would permit review of the ways in which the
Respondent administers its appraisal program and permit monitoring of the
public fisc to ensure that the Respondent's expenditure of monies for awards is
appropriate.(8)

Nonetheless, our review of the record leads us to conclude that the
public interest articulated by the General Counsel and cognizable under FOIA
Exemption 6 would not be enhanced by disclosure of the performance appraisals
and supporting documentation in a manner that includes employee names.
See, e.g., U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
51 FLRA 248, 255 (1995); VAMC, Newington, 51 FLRA at 153.
In this connection, disclosure of unsanitized information may well
enhance the Union's ability to use the information to determine whether Union
officials had been treated in a discriminatory manner with respect to
performance appraisals and cash awards. However, this interest is specific to
the Union as the requesting party and, as discussed above, may not be
considered in balancing interests under FOIA Exemption 6.(9)SeeSocial Security
Administration, San Francisco Bay Area, 51 FLRA 58, 65 (1995).
Moreover, although the public has an interest in determining whether the
Respondent has violated the Statute by, for example, treating Union officials
in a disparate manner, the General Counsel has not shown how disclosure of
unsanitized performance appraisals and supporting documentation would enhance a
member of the public's (as opposed to the Union's) ability to determine whether
such disparate treatment had occurred.

Finally, we find that the findings in VARO no longer provide
support for the General Counsel's claim that disclosure of the AF971 does not
violate the Privacy Act. In that case, the Authority found that disclosure of
spread sheets containing production figures for individual unit employees was
authorized under FOIA Exemption 6. In finding a public interest in disclosure
of the information, the Authority relied on various factors, including the
public interest embodied in the Statute, that have since been rejected.
FAA, 50 FLRA at 344 n.6, 348. Other components of the
Authority's alternative analysis under Reporters Committee, such as
administering the respondent's appraisal system in a fair and even-handed
manner and gaining insight into the efficiency of the processing of veterans
benefits claims, either have not been shown to exist here or are outweighed by
the intrusion on employee privacy interests.

We conclude, on balance, that the intrusion on employees' privacy
interests outweighs the public interest that would be served by disclosure.
Therefore, disclosure of the unsanitized appraisals and the AF971 would
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of employees' personal privacy under
FOIA Exemption 6.

4. Disclosure Is Not Authorized By the Routine Use Exception to the
Privacy Act

Based on the parties' stipulation that the appraisals and the AF971 are
maintained in an Air Force system of records, the routine use statement
attendant to that system governs disclosure of the appraisals as a routine use.
However, the Authority is unable to assess whether the Union's request for that
information satisfies those requirements for disclosure because the routine use
statement is not contained in the record. Specifically, there is no evidence as
to whether the Union is a routine user of the information or whether the use to
which the requested appraisals and AF971 would be put is consistent with the
purposes for which the information was collected. Under these circumstances,
the General Counsel, who maintains the burden of establishing that requested
information satisfies the requirements of section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute,
has failed to establish that the information is disclosable under the routine
use exception to the Privacy Act.

In the alternative, we reach the same result by assessing disclosure of
the appraisals and the AF971 under OPM/GOVT-2. OPM/GOVT-2 contains "Employee
Performance File System Records." 57 Fed. Reg. 35709 (August 10,
1992). That system includes performance appraisals and supporting
documentation. Id. OPM's routine use statement governing that system of
records, identified as routine use "e," provides that records may be disclosed
"to officials of labor organizations recognized under 5 U.S.C. chapter 71 when
relevant and necessary to their duties of exclusive representation." Id.
at 35710. Accordingly, to determine whether the routine use exception
applies here we must decide whether the requested information is "relevant and
necessary," within the meaning of routine use "e."

OPM issued "guidance to agencies" for interpreting these terms in FPM
Letter 711-164, which was published on September 17, 1992. When the FPM
was abolished on December 31, 1993, the Letter, along with certain other
parts of the FPM, was provisionally retained through December 31, 1994.
For the reasons set forth in U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal
Aviation Administration, Little Rock, Arkansas, 51 FLRA 216 (1995), we
apply the FPM Letter's guidance in deciding this case.

The FPM Letter contains two requirements that a union must satisfy in
order to establish that requested information is consistent with routine use
"e": (1) the information must be "relevant" to the express purpose for which it
is sought, meaning that the nature of the information must bear a traceable,
logical, and significant connection to the purpose to be served; and
(2) the information must be "necessary," meaning that there are no
adequate alternative means or sources for satisfying the union's informational
needs. In clarifying this second requirement, the FPM Letter explains that it
is to be determined on a case-by-case basis; the union "must show that it has a
particularized need for the information in a form that identifies specific
individuals, and that its information needs cannot be satisfied through less
intrusive means, such as by releasing records with personally-identifying
information deleted."

In this case, we find that the Union has failed to demonstrate that the
requested information is "relevant" within the meaning of FPM Letter 711-164.
As such, it is unnecessary to determine whether the information satisfies the
standard of "necessary."

Applying the standard of "relevance" and the ordinary meaning of the
terms "traceable," "logical," and "significant,"(10) we have examined the record to assess whether the Union has
established that the nature of the information requested can reasonably be
attributed to and is likely to influence or affect the purpose for which the
information was sought. The Union requested the performance appraisals and the
AF971 in order to compare the appraisals of Union members with those of their
co-workers for the purpose of investigating potential grievances alleging
discriminatory treatment of Union officials. The Union has not explained, and
it is not clear from the record, in what manner the appraisals of Union
members would assist in uncovering discriminatory treatment of Union
officials. For example, there is nothing in the record to indicate that
any of the employees whose appraisals were requested are Union officials or
work in the same unit as Union officials, such that the appraisals could be
used to assess the existence or non-existence of discriminatory treatment.
Further, based on the General Counsel's uncontradicted assertion that the AF971
constitutes background information in connection with Linville's performance
appraisal, we fail to see how that particular kind of information is likely to
serve the purpose for which the information was sought. SeeU.S.
Department of Justice, Federal Correctional Facility, El Reno.
Oklahoma, 51 FLRA 584, 591-92 (1995); VA, St. Petersburg,
51 FLRA at 538-40.

Accordingly, we conclude that disclosure of the performance appraisals
and the AF971 is not consistent with the routine use exception to the Privacy
Act.

C. The Claimed Failure to Provide Sanitized Performance Appraisals
Is Not Properly Before Us

A complaint serves to put a respondent on notice of the basis of the
charges against it. E.g., U.S. Department of Justice, U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Border Patrol, Washington,
D.C., 41 FLRA 154, 173 (1991). Where a complaint fails to do so, the
Authority may nonetheless address a claimed violation of the Statute where that
claim is fully and fairly litigated. U.S. Department of Labor, Washington,
D.C., 51 FLRA 462, 467-68 (1995) (DOL). In this case, neither
the unfair labor practice charges nor the consolidated complaint alleged that
the Respondent violated the Statute by failing to furnish unsanitized
performance appraisals concerning Linville and the employees in
Zone 1.(11) Further, there is no evidence in
the record that the Union had ever requested or offered to accept the
appraisals in a sanitized form. Specifically, there is nothing in the
correspondence between the Union and the Respondent that addressed the
furnishing of the requested material in a sanitized form. Consequently, nothing
in this record would support a finding that the issue was fully and fairly
litigated.

As to the General Counsel's reliance on INS, the Authority
stated in DOL that it will no longer follow previous decisions to the
extent that they hold that a respondent may be found to have violated the
Statute by failing to disclose sanitized information without regard to whether
such violation was charged in the complaint or fully and fairly litigated.
51 FLRA at 468, n.6.

D. Summary

In sum, we find that the Respondent violated section 7116(a)(1), (5)
and (8) of the Statute by failing to furnish the Union with unsanitized
performance plans. The Respondent did not violate the Statute based on its
refusal to furnish unsanitized performance appraisals and the AF971, as
disclosure of such information would be inconsistent with the Privacy Act.

V. Order

Pursuant to section 2423.29 of the Authority's Regulations and section
7118 of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, the U.S.
Department of the Air Force, 56th Support Group, MacDill Air Force Base,
Florida shall:

1. Cease and desist from:

(a) Failing and refusing to furnish performance plans requested by the
National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 153, the exclusive
representative of certain of its employees, pursuant to the Federal Service
Labor-Management Relations Statute.

(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights assured by the
Statute.

2. Take the following affirmative action in order to effectuate the
purposes and policies of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations
Statute:

(a) Furnish the performance plans requested by the National Federation
of Federal Employees, Local 153, the exclusive representative of certain
of its employees.

(b) Post at its facilities at MacDill Air Force Base copies of the
attached Notice on forms to be furnished by the Federal Labor Relations
Authority. Upon receipt of such forms, they shall be signed by the Commanding
Officer and shall be posted and maintained for 60 consecutive days thereafter,
in conspicuous places, including all bulletin boards and other places where
notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to
ensure that such Notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.

(c) Pursuant to section 2423.30 of the Authority's Regulations, notify
the Regional Director of the Atlanta Region, Federal Labor Relations Authority,
in writing, within 30 days from the date of this Order, as to what steps have
been taken to comply.

The allegations in the consolidated complaint that the Respondent
violated section 7116(a)(1), (5), and (8) of the Statute by refusing to furnish
the Union with unsanitized performance appraisals and the AF971 are
dismissed.

NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES

POSTED BY ORDER OF THE

FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY

The Federal Labor Relations Authority has found that the U.S. Department
of the Air Force, 56th Support Group, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, violated
the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute and has ordered us to
post and abide by this notice.

We hereby notify our employees that:

WE WILL NOT refuse to furnish the performance plans requested by the
National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 153, the exclusive
representative of certain of our employees, pursuant to the Federal Service
Labor-Management Relations Statute.

WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner, interfere with, restrain, or
coerce our employees in the exercise of their rights assured by the
Statute.

WE WILL furnish the performance plans requested by the National
Federation of Federal Employees, Local 153.

___________________________(Agency)

Dated:______________ By:____________________________

(Signature) (Title)

This Notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of
posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.

If employees have any questions concerning this Notice or compliance
with any of its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Regional
Director, Atlanta Regional Office, Federal Labor Relations Authority, whose
address is: Marquis Two Tower, Suite 701, 285 Peachtree Center Ave.,
Atlanta, GA 30303-1270, and whose telephone number is: (404) 331-5212.

FOOTNOTES: (If blank, the decision does not
have footnotes.)

1. During the pendency of this
proceeding, the Authority granted the General Counsel's motion to sever Case
No. AT-CA-31326 from the consolidated complaint, and to grant the Union's
request to withdraw the charge. Accordingly, we do not discuss the information
request contained in that charge, except to the extent it provides elucidation for the issues that remain
before the Authority.

2. The Privacy Act regulates the
disclosure of any information contained in an agency "record" within a "system
of records," as those terms are defined in the Privacy Act, that is retrieved
by reference to an individual's name or some other personal identifier.
5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(4), (5). With certain enumerated exceptions,
the Privacy Act prohibits the disclosure of personal information about Federal
employees without their consent. Two exceptions to this prohibition are
relevant here. First, exception (b)(2) of the Privacy Act (the Freedom of
Information Act or FOIA exception) provides that the prohibition against
disclosure is not applicable if disclosure of the requested information would
be required under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552. Exemption (b)(6) of the FOIA (Exemption 6) provides, in
turn, that information contained in "personnel and medical files and similar
files" may be withheld if disclosure of the information would result in a
"clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(6). If such an invasion would result, then disclosure is not
required by the FOIA. Second, exception (b)(3) of the Privacy Act,
5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3) (the routine use exception), provides for
release of information "for a routine use as defined in section (a)(7)
. . . ." A "routine use" is defined in section (a)(7) as the use
of covered information "for a purpose which is compatible with the purpose for
which it was collected."

3. Performance plans contain
information on individual employees, including each employee's name, social
security number, position title, description of duties, and identification of
each performance element, with a notation as to whether the element is critical
or noncritical. We recognize that disclosure of social security numbers may
implicate Privacy Act considerations. However, we do not address the privacy
aspects of that particular identifying information in view of the parties'
stipulation that the plans are disclosable consistent with the Privacy Act and
the absence of any arguments regarding the privacy interests in social security
numbers.

6. As the performance plans do not
contain employee ratings, this case is distinguishable from U.S. Department
of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, Pittsburgh Research Center, 51 FLRA
276 (1995), where the Authority determined that disclosure of "Individual
Performance Plans," which contained employees' final performance ratings, would
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy under FOIA
Exemption 6.

7. In view of this disposition, it is
unnecessary to address whether the parties' stipulation that the performance
appraisals are "necessary" would be binding on the parties.

8. Although the Union did not request
award information, the Union stated that it needed the requested appraisals in
order to determine whether Union officials were treated in a discriminatory
manner with respect to cash awards, as well as appraisals.

9. We note that the Union could have
requested disclosure of the performance appraisals of employees in Zone 1
with the names of employees deleted, but coded in a manner that would have
fulfilled the Union's stated needs. As we find in Part IV.C. below, the Union
did not make such a request. Disclosure of sanitized and coded performance
appraisal information presumably would not have identified particular employees
and their performance appraisals and, thereby, would have protected against a
clearly unwarranted invasion of employees' privacy, within the meaning of FOIA
Exemption 6. However, we recognize that sanitization of Linville's
performance appraisals and the AF971 would not have protected Linville's
privacy interests because her identity is known. SeeU.S. Department
of Veterans Affairs, Regional Office, St. Petersburg, Florida,
51 FLRA 530, 537 (1995) (VA, St. Petersburg); Federal
Aviation Administration, New York TRACON, Westbury, New York,
51 FLRA 115, 122 n.9 (1995).

10. According to Webster's Third New
International Dictionary (Unabridged) (1986), "traceable" is defined as
"suitable or of a kind to be attributed: Due, Ascribable"; "logical" means
"that is in accordance with inferences reasonably drawn from or proceeding or
surrounding or predictable facts or events or circumstances"; and "significant"
refers to "having or likely to have influence or effect." The Authority refers
to dictionary definitions of terms to supply meaning where none has otherwise
been provided. For example, International Association of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers, Franklin Lodge No. 2135 and International Plate
Printers, Die Stampers and Engravers Union of North America, Local Nos. 2, 24,
and 32 and Graphic Communications International Union, Local No. 285 and
International Association of Siderographers, Washington Association and U.S.
Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Engraving and Printing, 50 FLRA
677, 683 (1995). SeealsoU.S. Department of the Army, Red
River Depot, Texarkana, Texas v. FLRA, 977 F.2d 1490, 1492 (D.C. Cir.
1992) (court found that the Authority's adoption of the dictionary definition
of a statutory term was permissible).

11. In contrast, in the portion of the
case that was severed and remanded to the regional director per the General
Counsel's motion, the complaint specifically alleged that the failure to
provide the information first in an unsanitized form and then in a sanitized
form violated the Statute.