Democracy in Developmenthttp://blogs.cfr.org/coleman
Coleman maps the intersections between political reform, economic growth, and U.S. policy in the developing world.Thu, 20 Nov 2014 22:18:18 +0000en-UShourly1https://wordpress.org/?v=4.6.1Women Leaders Under Attackhttp://blogs.cfr.org/coleman/2014/11/20/women-leaders-under-attack/
http://blogs.cfr.org/coleman/2014/11/20/women-leaders-under-attack/#commentsThu, 20 Nov 2014 22:18:18 +0000http://blogs.cfr.org/coleman/?p=5190In Afghanistan earlier this week, another female leader came under attack. Shukria Barakzai, an outspoken and high-profile member of Afghanistan’s...]]>

In Afghanistan earlier this week, another female leader came under attack. Shukria Barakzai, an outspoken and high-profile member of Afghanistan’s parliament, narrowly escaped death when a suicide bomber rammed her armored car as she headed to work. At least three people were killed and many injured, but Barakzai escaped with only minor injuries. No stranger to death threats and assassination attempts, Barakzai has experienced several near misses during her many years as an activist and politician, and she readily accepts the personal risks she faces on a daily basis.

When I interviewed Barakzai several years ago in her parliamentary office in Kabul, she matter-of-factly acknowledged that she is on the Taliban’s assassination list. “I don’t care,” she insisted. “I would be proud to die for my country.” Knowing that she has three young daughters, I pushed her on this sentiment, but she replied without hesitation, “I love my country and my people even more than my girls. Maybe in the future my children will be proud of their mother and understand that I am working for my beliefs on behalf of all the children of Afghanistan.”

Barakzai’s steely determination is not unique. I’ve interviewed scores of women leaders from across the region, from Libya and Yemen to Afghanistan and Pakistan, who echo a similar message. They are willing to lay down their lives in the fight against extremism.

Too many of them do. Earlier this year, extremists in Libya assassinated Salwa Bugaighis, a leading civil society activist and human rights lawyer who was particularly outspoken on women’s rights. In Somalia in July, al-Shabab assassinated Saado Ali Warsame, a popular singer-turned-parliamentarian, for her politics. In Iraq, ISIS has also targeted women leaders. In mid-September, the group publicly executed Samira Salih al-Nuaimi, a lawyer and human rights activist, and then, in October, it killed Iman Mohammed Younis al-Salman, a Turkmen former lawmaker from Ninevah. In Pakistan, Malala Yousafzai was only fifteen years old when the Taliban tried to kill her for speaking out on behalf of girls’ education.

Afghan women have paid a particularly high price for simply trying to change the narrative on women’s role in society. Dozens of women leaders, like Lieutenant Islam Bibi, Afghanistan’s most senior female police officer at the time, have been gunned down, often on their way to work. The assassination of women leaders reverberates far beyond the personal tragedy. Picking off women who have risen to prominence aims to silence not only this generation, but the next as well. While in terms of sheer numbers, men make up the majority of victims of extremist terror campaigns, the impact of assassinating women leaders is compounded by the fact that there are fewer of them. Female politicians—and the women doctors, civil society activists, entrepreneurs, journalists, and others who dare to lead—are targeted precisely because they refuse to conform to extremists’ medieval demands for submission.

As the United States draws down its troops in Afghanistan, expect Taliban attacks on women to increase. These attacks, like much else the Taliban does, will sow terror but generate little public sympathy for their extremist ideologies. As the recent 2014 Asia Foundation Survey of the Afghan People (its tenth nationwide public opinion survey in Afghanistan) notes, about two-thirds (67.8 percent) of Afghans support the right of women to work outside the home. Not surprisingly, survey results indicate that in recent years, substantially more women are seeking employment outside the home and a growing number of Afghans acknowledge that female members of their family contribute to household income (22.4 percent in 2014, up from 13.9 percent in 2009).

The political arena, however, remains a tough place for Afghan women. More Afghans (46.1 percent) believe that political positions in government should be mostly for men than believe such positions should be shared equally between men and women (42.1 percent). The right of women to serve in parliament has been a contested issue from the earliest days of the country’s 2004 constitution, which reserved a quarter of parliamentary seats for women. Last year, opponents of this quota spearheaded a movement to eliminate it. Due to the efforts of activists and committed female politicians such as Shukria Barakzai, the quota was retained, although it was reduced from 25 percent to 20 percent.

Despite the challenges, Barakzai and her determined female colleagues in parliament will continue to champion rights for women in the face of real security threats. As Fawzia Koofi, another indomitable female parliamentarian who has survived assassination attempts, said in an interview earlier this year: “You cannot talk about women’s education, women’s economic empowerment, and social empowerment without their political participation. So for any young woman, I would encourage them to have the courage to put herself forward.”

I highly recommend these backgrounders for their concise overviews and recommendations, highlighting CFR’s work on contemporary global challenges.

]]>http://blogs.cfr.org/coleman/2014/06/25/cfr-backgrounders/feed/0Democracy Can Still Deliverhttp://blogs.cfr.org/coleman/2014/06/06/democracy-can-still-deliver/
http://blogs.cfr.org/coleman/2014/06/06/democracy-can-still-deliver/#respondFri, 06 Jun 2014 21:20:46 +0000http://blogs.cfr.org/coleman/?p=5157Democracy is going through a rough patch. Freedom House reports that the number of democracies around the world has retreated...]]>

Democracy is going through a rough patch. Freedom House reports that the number of democracies around the world has retreated in recent years. The frightening turbulence in countries struggling to transition to democracy such as Egypt and Thailand makes clear how difficult that process is. And with economic malaise persisting in many democracies while growth still surges in autocratic China, more than a few people wonder whether it’s even worth bothering with democracy and all its political dysfunctions. Can democracies effectively meet the aspirations of citizens in today’s complex world?

I, for one, come down firmly on the side of Churchill, who famously quipped that democracy is the worst form of government, except for all those others that have been tried. While some autocracies have managed to deliver impressive growth rates, we mustn’t forget that many more have failed miserably and deprived their citizens of the most basic human rights along the way. As we underscored in our book Pathways to Freedom last year, the experiences of democratic countries as diverse as Indonesia, Poland, and Mexico show that democracies can indeed deliver both economic growth and freedom.

A new report, “The Democratic Alternative from the South: India, Brazil, and South Africa,” echoes this view. Authored by Ann Bernstein, executive director of the Centre for Development and Enterprise (CDE) in South Africa, the report concludes that inclusive growth is not only possible in a democracy but that democracy can offer a competitive advantage to states pursuing high-growth strategies–namely, built-in self-correction mechanisms to address bad policies and hold politicians accountable. As consolidated democracies, Brazil, India, and South Africa have established strong institutions to battle corruption and abuse of power, ensure effective democratic governance, and create more transparency. Among these institutions are Brazil’s Supreme Court, which tried several of former president Lula’s senior staff in the country’s largest corruption case, and South Africa’s office of the public prosecutor, which investigates and addresses abuse of powers and misconduct in government.

In a meeting at CFR last week to discuss the report, Bernstein noted that democracies often look messy and even politically chaotic from the outside, but they are surprisingly resilient. Autocracies, on the other hand, appear to be stable and efficient, until quite suddenly they aren’t. And their meltdown can be spectacularly painful.

The case studies of Brazil, South Africa, and India are great reminders that democracy can take root in all types of societies at different levels of development. It is not restricted to just rich countries; indeed, for these countries (and many others) democracy is the path to inclusive growth.

Earlier today, Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau offered to release more than 200 kidnapped school girls in exchange for prisoners. In the video, approximately one hundred girls are seen wearing hijabs and reciting verses from the Quran. Most of the girls are believed to be Christian, but Shekau explains they have been converted to Islam. Meanwhile, the international effort to rescue the girls is ramping up. The United States, the United Kingdom, China, France, and Israel are helping the Nigerian government strategize about how to find the girls and fight the radical Islamic group.

Widespread corruption, unemployment, and illiteracy make northern Nigeria, Boko Haram’s stronghold, fertile ground for extremism. As I recently wrote in a Foreign Affairs article, reforming Nigeria’s crumbling education system is crucial for the country’s future stability and economic growth. Nigeria’s current counterterrorism approach relies on brutal use of force, which has resulted in hundreds of civilian casualties and public outrage. If Nigeria really wants to beat Boko Haram, the government must address the underlying issues that led to its rise and continue fuel the movement. Read more on ForeignAffairs.com.

]]>http://blogs.cfr.org/coleman/2014/05/12/beating-boko-haram/feed/0Algeria’s Presidential Election and the Challenges Aheadhttp://blogs.cfr.org/coleman/2014/04/17/algerias-presidential-election-and-the-challenges-ahead/
http://blogs.cfr.org/coleman/2014/04/17/algerias-presidential-election-and-the-challenges-ahead/#respondThu, 17 Apr 2014 14:23:24 +0000http://blogs.cfr.org/coleman/?p=5135Algerians head to the polls today to vote in presidential elections. Although six candidates are running, the country’s long-serving president,...]]>

Algerians head to the polls today to vote in presidential elections. Although six candidates are running, the country’s long-serving president, seventy-seven year old Abdelaziz Bouteflika, is expected to coast to a fourth term. In a region rife with revolution, Algeria is caught in a political time warp. The ruling elite swim against the tide of political change that the Arab uprisings unleashed. They rally around the ailing Bouteflika–who suffered a stroke in 2013 and has rarely been seen in public during the campaign–as the candidate of stability and security.

Many Algerians fear the political chaos that surrounds them (“we don’t want to turn out like Libya” is a common refrain); memories of the country’s harsh civil war, which claimed as many as 200,000 lives before Bouteflika helped bring it to an end in the late 1990s, are still raw. Yet Bouteflika’s reach for another term has nevertheless sparked public discontent. With no hope of unseating him, Islamic and secular opposition groups are instead calling for a national boycott of the elections in an effort to discredit the process. Voter turnout is expected to be low.

A middle-class youth group, Barakat (“enough” in Algerian-Arabic dialect), has tapped into a rising desire for political change. Barakat rails against the closed political system, state corruption, rampant unemployment, and Bouteflika’s manipulation of the constitution to allow for longer presidential terms. During the campaign, it has organized protests in the capital of Algiers and peripheral cities. Although the protests have been small, they point to growing dissatisfaction among youth.

Bouteflika will undoubtedly be re-elected, but his next term is unlikely to be a smooth one. There are several significant challenges that he and his government will have to confront to maintain stability and head off increasing public discontent:

First, there is growing public dissatisfaction over the country’s economic stagnation. Citizens are increasingly fed up with unemployment and underemployment. Overall unemployment is reported at 10 percent and youth unemployment upward of 20 percent, but the real number is no doubt much higher. Though the official unemployment level has declined over the past decade, the number of Algerians in informal employment and temporary jobs has increased, leading to job insecurity and low-wage work. Energy receipts, which constitute about 70 percent of public revenues, have been largely devoted to the state’s patronage system instead of invested in productive capacity. The majority of energy rents are spent on current consumption, notably civil servant wages, fuel and food subsidies, farmer assistance, and social housing, not productive investments. Education and healthcare have been woefully underfunded. Problems are compounded by high-level government corruption and cronyism that have impeded private sector growth, and discouraged foreign investment. The state’s central focus on oil and gas production has also created an undiversified economy, with oil and gas accounting for 98 percent of exports. There is also concern that the government’s energy revenues might not last much longer. Declining reserves and increasing domestic consumption could significantly reduce Algeria’s energy exports within the decade.

Second, there is a looming succession challenge. Bouteflika appears increasingly incapacitated (he could not stand on his own during his recent meeting with Secretary of State John Kerry, and his speech was slurred), and may not survive another term. Meanwhile, the pool of strong potential successors among the ruling elite–those with the stature of having played an important role in the Algerian war of independence–is narrowing. The ruling regime may be hard pressed to field a leader who can hold the center together.

Third, terrorism continues to pose a threat to the state. The Algerian government has long been a target of Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) and offshoot groups, which aim to overthrow the “un-Islamic” government. Recently, the activity and influence of terrorist groups in the Sahel and Maghreb have increased, benefiting from the weakness of transitional governments in Libya and Tunisia and increasingly porous regional borders. Mitigating the danger of terrorism will continue to be a priority and may require expanding cooperative relations with neighboring countries.

As Bouteflika and his government anticipate a decisive victory, they would do well to bear in mind the political and economic challenges ahead, and muster the political will to make the difficult but necessary reforms to boost economic performance, alleviate socioeconomic pressures fueling unrest, drive back terrorist groups, and set the stage for political succession.

]]>http://blogs.cfr.org/coleman/2014/04/17/algerias-presidential-election-and-the-challenges-ahead/feed/0Afghans Vote for a New Presidenthttp://blogs.cfr.org/coleman/2014/04/07/afghans-vote-for-a-new-president/
http://blogs.cfr.org/coleman/2014/04/07/afghans-vote-for-a-new-president/#commentsMon, 07 Apr 2014 17:41:26 +0000http://blogs.cfr.org/coleman/?p=5129Despite significant security concerns, Afghans went to the polls in droves on Saturday to elect a new president. An estimated...]]>

Despite significant security concerns, Afghans went to the polls in droves on Saturday to elect a new president. An estimated 7 million voters, one-third of them women, cast ballots – a marked improvement over the 2009 elections in which only 4 million voted. Fraud and violence also occurred less than expected: while at least twenty people were killed across the country and numerous fraud complaints have been filed, there were no major attacks or allegations of foul play on the level of the 2009 election.

The results of the election won’t be known for several weeks, but a run off is likely given that no candidate is expected to get over 50 percent of the vote. President Hamid Karzai will likely play powerbroker in whatever political deals are made behind the scenes. But once in office, the new president will have to chart his own course, grappling with ongoing challenges of corruption, weak governance, insurgency, and economic turmoil. Read more of my thoughts on the election and presidential front runners in my latest U.S. News article.

Following his meeting today with Tunisia’s Prime Minister Mehdi Jomaa, President Obama announced $500 million in new loan guarantees that will allow Tunisia to access additional financing in international markets at favorable rates. This is good news for Tunisia, which has made more progress than any other “Arab Spring” country in its transition to democracy. Indeed, it has become an oasis of optimism in an otherwise tumultuous region.

In his speech earlier this week at Columbia University, Prime Minister Jomaa described his country as a “start-up democracy” and urged the U.S. government to provide more support. The new loan guarantees will help, but there is still more that the U.S. can do to encourage democracy in Tunisia for a relatively small investment. For more on what the U.S. and other countries can do to support Tunisia’s transition, read my latest Foreign Policy article.

]]>http://blogs.cfr.org/coleman/2014/04/04/supporting-tunisia/feed/0Women’s Rights under Attack in Iraqhttp://blogs.cfr.org/coleman/2014/03/25/womens-rights-under-attack-in-iraq/
http://blogs.cfr.org/coleman/2014/03/25/womens-rights-under-attack-in-iraq/#respondTue, 25 Mar 2014 18:36:09 +0000http://blogs.cfr.org/coleman/?p=5114As the grim headlines from Iraq attest, the sectarian tensions that threatened to rip the country apart in the darkest...]]>

As the grim headlines from Iraq attest, the sectarian tensions that threatened to rip the country apart in the darkest days of 2006-2007 were never resolved. In the lead-up to the country’s parliamentary election on April 30th, suicide attacks and car bombings are again on the rise. Now, a proposed law threatens to worsen sectarian strife, and also make life harder for Iraqi women.

The Jaafari Personal Status Law, recently approved by the Council of Ministers (but still to be approved by parliament), could fulfill a long-time goal of the country’s conservative Shia leaders: to exert religious control over critical family matters such as marriage, divorce, custody, and inheritance. It would make martial rape legal; ban inter-religious marriage; prevent women from leaving their home without their husband’s permission; restrict women’s divorce, inheritance, and custody rights; and effectively legalize child marriage by not including a minimum age for marriage.

Although Article 19 of Iraq’s constitution asserts gender equality, the constitution has other contradictory clauses which leave women’s rights vulnerable. For example, the constitution specifies that no law can contradict the “established rulings” of Islam – a clause that opens the door to gender discrimination on religious grounds. The Jaafari Bill would drive a truck through that opening and be disastrous for women’s rights. For more on how this bill could exacerbate sectarian tensions and erode women’s rights in Iraq, read my latest Foreign Affairs article.

]]>http://blogs.cfr.org/coleman/2014/03/25/womens-rights-under-attack-in-iraq/feed/0International Women’s Day 2014: MENA Womenhttp://blogs.cfr.org/coleman/2014/03/07/international-womens-day-2014-mena-women/
http://blogs.cfr.org/coleman/2014/03/07/international-womens-day-2014-mena-women/#commentsFri, 07 Mar 2014 20:14:26 +0000http://blogs.cfr.org/coleman/?p=5107In honor of International Women’s Day, the Middle East Program at the Wilson Center asked a diverse group of experts...]]>

In honor of International Women’s Day, the Middle East Program at the Wilson Center asked a diverse group of experts from business, politics, media, and civil society to contribute to its third annual report on women’s status in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The publication, “MENA Women: Opportunities and Obstacles in 2014,” includes entries from forty-three women across twenty countries in the region and beyond, offering a broad and timely set of perspectives on the future of women in the Arab world. Although there are several areas of deep concern for women – particularly in Iraq and Syria – the views are generally cautiously optimistic and point to a positive trend line across the region.

Many contributors sighted Tunisia as a ray of hope and potential model for other countries. Tunisia’s new constitution, adopted in January, enshrines equality and commits the state to ensuring gender parity in elected councils and greater female political participation. Morocco is another bright spot. Building on progressive reforms to its constitution in 2011 and outrage over the suicide of a sixteen-year-old girl who was forced to marry her rapist, the country recently revised its penal code to better prosecute sexual violence and end child marriage.

Egypt’s amended constitution, though flawed in several critical respects, does at least remove the most worrying clauses regarding women that appeared in the Morsi constitution. It also sets a 25 percent quota for women in local councils and obligates the government to achieve gender parity in society and politics and uphold ratified international conventions. This stands to empower Egyptian women to leverage the international Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women in securing their rights. As several contributors noted, Hala Shukrallah’s ascension as the first female leader of an Egyptian political party, Al-Dostour, is also cause for celebration. Still, onlookers remain rightly skeptical of the military government’s commitment to human rights. Dalia Fahmy, a member of the Egyptian Rule of Law Association, warns that “Egyptians will have to remain vigilant to ensure that laws aimed at protecting women are not sacrificed in the name of stability and that women are treated as dignified citizens rather than subjects of the state—as they historically have been.”

Saudi Arabia remains a notable laggard on women’s rights, but continues to make incremental steps in the right direction. Women participated in municipal elections for the first time this year, and female lawyers are now allowed to obtain permits to practice law in Saudi courts. These reforms are in part the result of grassroots campaigns aimed at exposing government repression. Hala Al Dosari, a Saudi activist, explains, “The October 26 driving campaign, for instance, not only gained significant international exposure, but created a global and national discourse on the position of women in Saudi society as symbolized by the iconic driving ban.” The country also recently saw its first female editor-in-chief take the reins of the Saudi Gazette newspaper.

In neighboring Yemen, women made up 30 percent of the National Dialogue Conference (NDC), charged with charting the country’s political transition. The NDC’s final report recommended codifying gender equality, prohibiting gender-based discrimination, outlawing child marriage, and implementing a political quota for women. The constitutional drafting committee is not bound by these recommendations, but they lay the groundwork for important changes.

Elsewhere, the picture is bleaker. In Iraq, a country still gripped by violence, Rend Al Rahim, executive director of the Iraq Foundation and former ambassador to the United States, laments that “political rhetoric about women’s rights and gender equality, sonorously upheld in the constitution, is not matched by actions on the part of the state or political parties, nor is it reflected in the social culture, dominated as it is by a stifling compound of patriarchal conventions and skewed interpretations of Islam.” The Iraqi Ministry of Justice recently drafted a new Personal Status Law that could strip women of what little protection they have from conservative clerical doctrine. Another more progressive law on Protection from Family Violence has made little progress in Iraq’s parliament and is unlikely to pass anytime soon.

In the Levant, the Syrian civil war continues to pose dangers to women, both in the country and in external refugee camps where women and girls are often subject to sexual assault and violence. Overall, several contributors to the report continued to cite conflict and sectarianism as among the top issues threatening women. As Hanin Ghaddar, managing editor of NOW News in Lebanon, points out, “It is not easy to lobby for better opportunities for women when the economy is crumbling and the country is on the verge of a massive civil war.” Militarization and ongoing armed conflict, coupled with Islamic extremism, continue to threaten women’s rights.

Although political quotas might offer a leg up for women in the region, critics argue that the women who end up filling those seats are often elites who might simply toe the party line and fail to champion women’s rights. Increased political and economic opportunities might translate into more women making it to elected office or business boardrooms in the MENA, but it is essential that they keep the plight of all women in mind when they assume positions of power. Farahnaz Ispahani, a former member of parliament in Pakistan, offers a promising example from her country where women in parliament came together to pass more pro-women’s legislation in a five-year period than at any other time in the country’s history. The key: the female parliamentarians worked across class lines, religions, and party affiliations to advance the rights of all women.

Taken together, the contributions in this publication offer not only interesting insights on women’s rights and status, but also grounds for hope that, indeed, women are truly transforming the MENA region.

]]>http://blogs.cfr.org/coleman/2014/03/07/international-womens-day-2014-mena-women/feed/1Women’s Challenges, and Opportunities, in Yemenhttp://blogs.cfr.org/coleman/2014/02/19/womens-challenges-and-opportunities-in-yemen/
http://blogs.cfr.org/coleman/2014/02/19/womens-challenges-and-opportunities-in-yemen/#commentsWed, 19 Feb 2014 21:04:09 +0000http://blogs.cfr.org/coleman/?p=5098Earlier this month, I hosted Abdul Karim Ali Al-Eryani, former prime minister of Yemen, at a Council on Foreign Relations...]]>

Earlier this month, I hosted Abdul Karim Ali Al-Eryani, former prime minister of Yemen, at a Council on Foreign Relations discussion. Al-Eryani recently concluded his role as a leader of Yemen’s ten-month-long National Dialogue Conference (NDC), a process that brought together rival political, tribal, religious, and social groups to craft a roadmap for the country’s political transition. Although Yemen is still struggling with escalating violence, secessionist threats, and a humanitarian crisis of poverty and malnourishment, the inclusive NDC was widely hailed for at least pulling the country back from the brink of civil war.

The conference culminated in a report that included some 1,400 recommendations that will now form the basis for drafting the country’s new constitution. Interestingly, when asked what he saw as the major achievements of the NDC, Al-Eryani was quick to note gains for women.

The NDC explicitly sought to include women. Women made up 30 percent of NDC members, were represented in all nine working groups, and chaired three of those groups – a big step forward from previous national dialogues in which women’s voices were largely excluded. The NDC also recommended adopting a 30 percent quota for women in all branches of government and a legal end to child marriage. Although both of these recommendations will be undoubtedly hard to implement, they provide a basis on which to build for advancing women’s rights in Yemen.

The 30 percent quota for women was particularly controversial in the NDC, with some factions preferring a lower quota of 15 percent and others opposing it all together. (Opponents wielded the usual brick-bat of there not being enough “qualified” Yemeni women to support a quota.) Moreover, the NDC recommendations are just that – recommendations – so there is no guarantee that all the provisions will make it into the new constitution. Even if the quota is codified into law, there is no guarantee it will be implemented or that women in office will advance women’s rights or simply toe their party’s (more-often-than-not conservative) line.

Some have raised legitimate concerns that the quota could evolve as simply window dressing for women in Yemen and make little difference on the ground. If it does adopt the quota, Yemen will follow the path of post-revolution Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt, which have all adopted quotas to ensure women’s political participation (in Egypt’s case – its latest constitution states that 25 percent of municipal seats will be reserved for women.) As the mixed experience of other countries has shown, quotas are hardly a silver bullet, but can still be an important step toward increasing women’s political participation.

The NDC’s recommendation to set the age of marriage for boys and girls at eighteen will also be challenging to make a reality. Yemen has one of the highest rates of child marriage in the world – an estimated 52 percent of girls in Yemen are married before the age of eighteen, and 14 percent before age fifteen. Islah, the influential Islamist party, has opposed setting a legal age for marriage in the past (in 1999, Islah was instrumental in abolishing the existing age of marriage – which was then fifteen – on the grounds that it contravened Sharia). But after the conclusion of the NDC, Islah members acknowledged the recommendation on setting the age of marriage at eighteen and stated that the party would not oppose such legislation.

Still, even with a law on the books, changing the deeply ingrained traditional practice of marrying girls off at very young ages will take decades to change – with lots of grassroots education about the ills of child marriage and local enforcement required. Since the NDC final report also includes a recommendation to make Sharia the primary source of legislation, expect ongoing conflict between the strong equality language proposed by the NDC and existing family laws that discriminate against women.

The reality is that women in Yemen are still denied many legal rights and treated as second-class citizens. Yemen now faces the grueling process of drafting and ratifying a new constitution in a greatly divided country. Consensus will be hard to reach and laws difficult to enforce, especially given Yemen’s ongoing security crisis. The NDC was an important first step, bringing together an unprecedented diversity of stakeholders, but the real battle for Yemen’s future still lies ahead.