Considered
and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Willis, Judge; and Hudson, Judge.

U N P U B L I S
H E D O P I N I O N

HUDSON, Judge

On appeal in this termination-of-parental-rights
dispute, appellant-mother argues that the district court should have granted
her petition to vacate her voluntary termination of her parental rights because
(a) the record shows that her voluntary petition to terminate her parental
rights was a result of undue influence; and (b) the record does not show “good
cause” for termination. Because the
record does not support appellant’s argument that she was subject to undue
influence, and because the issue of good cause is not within the scope of this
appeal, we affirm.

FACTS

Appellant-mother
W.M.W.’s child was born on November 1, 2002.
In April 2004, the child was placed in foster care because appellant was
hospitalized due to deteriorating mental health. The child was returned to appellant’s care on
July 6, 2004. Between February 2004 and
August 2004, the child’s weight dropped from the 25th percentile to the 10th
percentile. Between August 2004 and
September 2004, the child lost more weight and dropped from the 10th to the 3rd
percentile. No medical reasons could be
found for the child’s weight loss. On
November 5, 2004, the child was returned to foster care. On March 4, 2005, the child was again returned
to appellant’s care but remained under the protective supervision of the
county.

Appellant’s mental condition
deteriorated further, and on August 4, 2005, appellant reported to a service
provider that she had washed the child’s mouth out with soap and had kicked the
child after the child had kicked her. On
August 29, 2005, appellant reported to another service provider that she was
“fed up” with the child’s behavior and that she “could have thrown her down the
stairs.”

Police visited appellant on
September 2, 2005, to pick up the child and return her to foster care, but they
found that the child was not at appellant’s house. Appellant told the police that the child was
in Wisconsin
with a friend and did not seem to know when the child would return. The child was eventually returned to foster
care on September 5, 2005.

In November 2005, AnokaCounty
filed a petition to involuntarily terminate appellant’s parental rights. In late February 2006, appellant was hospitalized
after overdosing on Ativan. The termination-of-parental-rights
(TPR) trial originally scheduled for early March was continued to April 4,
2006. In late March 2006, appellant was
hospitalized for depression and suicidal thoughts. Civil commitment of appellant was considered,
but her caregivers ultimately decided that she should enter a supervised
treatment program.

On April 4, 2005, the morning of the
TPR trial, appellant filed a petition to voluntarily terminate her parental rights. After taking testimony, the district court
accepted appellant’s petition and determined that she was “making a knowing,
intelligent, voluntary although difficult decision to terminate her parental rights.” The district court issued the order
terminating appellant’s parental rights on June 7, 2006. Claiming that she had been subject to undue
influence when she filed the petition to voluntarily terminate her parental
rights, on September 5, 2006, appellant moved the district court for vacation of
the June 7, 2006 order. The district court
denied appellant’s motion on December 22, 2006, concluding that she had failed
to allege any facts that would support her argument that her petition to
terminate her parental rights was not voluntary and that good cause existed to
terminate appellant’s parental rights.
This appeal, which was filed on January 18, 2007, follows.

The
child’s guardian ad litem moved this court for dismissal of the appeal as
untimely. On February 13, 2007, this
court issued an order limiting the scope of appellant’s appeal to the part of
the December 22, 2006 district court order denying her motion to vacate the
June 7, 2006 order on the ground that her consent to the termination of her
parental rights was not voluntary.

D E C I S I O N

Appellant argues that the district
court abused its discretion by refusing to vacate its June 7, 2006 order
terminating her parental rights and grant her an evidentiary hearing. Appellant maintains that her petition to terminate
her parental rights was not voluntary because she was subject to undue influence. Specifically, appellant argues that she was
subject to undue influence because (1) medical professionals advised her that a
trial would not be good for her mental health; (2) her attorney advised her
that she may not be successful at a trial; and (3) she was not offered a
continuance to consider her decision.

A
district court has discretion to decide a motion to vacate a judgment, and this
court will not disturb a district court’s decision absent an abuse of that
discretion. Nelson v. Siebert, 428 N.W.2d 394, 395 (Minn. 1988).
Under the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Protection Procedure, “[u]pon
motion and upon such terms as are just,” a court may relieve a party from a
final order and may grant a new trial or other relief because of:

(a) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;

(b) newly
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in
time to move for a new trial;

(c) fraud (whether
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of
an adverse party;

(d) the judgment is
void; or

(e) any other
reason justifying relief from the operation of the order.

Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P.
46.02.

“A
parent who has consented to a termination order cannot have that order set
aside simply because she has changed her mind or her circumstances have
otherwise changed. . . . [O]nly where
fraud, duress or undue influence are proven will a termination order based on
parental consent be rescinded.” In re Welfare of K.T., 327 N.W.2d 13, 18
(Minn. 1982)
(citation omitted). “Undue influence”
means “coercion, amounting to a destruction of one’s free will, by means of
importunities, flatteries, insinuations, suggestions, arguments, or any
artifice not amounting to duress.” In re Welfare of N.M.C., 447 N.W.2d 14,
16 (Minn. App. 1989) (quotation omitted).

Appellant
argues that “[t]he waiving of parental rights in order to avoid exposure to a
medically harmful trial, that might trigger suicidal ideation, presents
sufficient factual basis to require a full evidentiary hearing.” She also maintains that her “volition had
been influenced and overpowered by immediate medical concerns and advice.” Appellant’s arguments are not supported by
the record.

First,
while being questioned by the district court regarding her decision to tender
the petition to voluntarily terminate her parental rights, appellant stated
that (1) she was of sound mind; (2) her mental illness did not interfere with her
ability to decide to terminate her parental rights; (3) she was not under the
influence of any medication that would influence her decision to terminate her
parental rights; (4) she did not need any additional time to consider her
decision; (5) she understood the termination of her parental rights would be
permanent; (6) she had discussed how her CHIPS/TPR case should proceed with her
attorney since its inception in 2004; and (7) she understood that she had a
right to trial and to present and question witnesses. All of these statements, made on the record
before the district court, contradict appellant’s present assertion that she
was subject to undue influence.

Second,
appellant has not shown that any of the circumstances surrounding the TPR trial
amounted to undue influence. Appellant suggests
that she was subject to undue influence because her attorney was concerned
about her chance for success at trial. But
she does not show that her attorney’s legal advice destroyed her own free will
by means of “importunities, flatteries, insinuations, suggestions, arguments,
or . . . artifice.” In re Welfare of N.M.C., 447 N.W.2d at 16. Appellant also argues that she was subject to
undue influence because her caregivers and attorney were concerned for her
mental health, but she does not show that this in any way affected her own free
will or ability to make decisions. Given
appellant’s history, it is not surprising that there were concerns regarding
her mental health in the context of the TPR proceeding. More to the point, appellant was plainly aware
of her own mental state; her attorney and caregivers were not telling appellant
anything that she did not already know. That
concerns regarding appellant’s mental health were expressed by caregivers and
her attorney does not mean that appellant’s will was overcome such that her
decision to voluntarily terminate her parental rights was not voluntary. Appellant has not shown that the decision to
proceed with the voluntary termination was the product of anyone’s will but her
own.

Appellant
also argues that she is entitled to relief because she was not asked
specifically whether her decision to terminate her parental rights was made
freely and without undue influence. But all
of appellant’s statements made during the TPR hearing clearly indicate that her
decision was made freely and without undue influence. Nothing in the record suggests otherwise. The “great anxiety, stress and grief” felt by
a parent in a TPR proceeding should not “be confused with undue influence and
duress as a means of regaining that child when the natural parent changes her
mind.” Welfare of N.M.C., 447 N.W.2d at 17 (quotation omitted). If a parent were always permitted to argue
that he or she “was unduly influenced or placed under duress during an
otherwise emotional decision to give up a child . . . the door of certainty and
finality would never be closed and the best interests of the child could never
be served.” Id.
(quotation omitted). We conclude that
appellant has failed to make a prima facie case of undue influence.

Appellant also argues that the
district court should have offered to continue the proceedings to give her
sufficient time to consider her decision and “stabiliz[e] in the community.” “The decision to grant or deny a continuance
is within the district court’s sound discretion and will not be reversed absent
an abuse of discretion.” Cargill, Inc. v. Jorgenson Farms, 719
N.W.2d 226, 231 (Minn.
App. 2006).

Appellant
did not request a continuance of the June 7 proceedings. Additionally, there was nothing to suggest to
the district court that a continuance was necessary. Appellant relies on Welfare of N.M.C. and Welfare
of K.T. for her argument that the court should have heeded “procedural
caution” and, sua sponte, granted a continuance. Appellant provides no authority to support
her argument that because a continuance was offered in Welfare of N.M.C. and a continuance was granted in Welfare of K.T., it was error for the
district court not to grant a continuance in this case even though none was
requested. Also, in Welfare ofK.T., the
appellant specifically stated on the record that she did not understand certain
aspects of the proceedings. 327 N.W.2d
at 15. In contrast, here, appellant made
no such declaration. All of her
statements to the court indicated that she fully understood the decision she
was making. The district court did not
abuse its discretion by not granting a continuance when none was
requested.

For
all these reasons, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by denying appellant’s motion to vacate its June 7, 2006 order
terminating her parental rights or by refusing to grant an evidentiary hearing.