THE WORLD

THE WORLD; A CHASTENED AYATOLLAH CALLS OFF HIS HOLY WAR

By YOUSSEF M. IBRAHIM

Published: July 24, 1988

BAGHDAD—
By almost any standard, it was a remarkable statement. In the equivalent of a fireside chat except that it was read for him by a radio announcer, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in effect told the Iranian nation last week that it had lost the war with Iraq and must now turn its attention to salvaging what is left of the decade-old revolution he brought about.

Iran's decision to seek a cease-fire in the eight-year war, under the same United Nations resolution that it had rejected for a year, was not only an admission of defeat. The fact that it was announced by Ayatollah Khomeini, the supreme leader, was even more telling. He is, after all, the man who overthrew the Shah of Iran, established an Islamic republic for all to see and, with it firmly in place, challenged the world.

''It means the model has failed,'' said Nezar Hamdoon, Iraq's Deputy Foreign Minister. ''It will be devastating for the whole Islamic fundamentalist phenomenon in the region. They have to explain why it failed.''

The Ayatollah's statement was filled with the rhetoric for which he is known - he spoke of ''world devourers,'' ''Reagan's insane actions'' and the ''satanic attacks of Iraq.'' But such phrases appeared to serve as a mask for the critical point, his seeming acknowledgment that his quest to spread fundamentalist ideology throughout the region was over. And he admitted that it hurt. ''I know it is hard for you, but then is it not hard for your old father?'' he said.

The strain presented a rare side of Ayatollah Khomeini: that of a vulnerable and defeated leader, a man of dignity who asked his compatriots to accept that defeat is the will of God. He went on to ask his people not to question the decision to seek peace even though Iran had vowed for years to score a decisive military victory and to replace the secular Government of President Saddam Hussein of Iraq with Islamic fundamentalist rule.

From the start of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980, it has been obvious that the conflict juxtaposed not just two warring armies but two different ideas of government. Iraq, a socialist Moslem state that nurtures an active hostility to radical religious and sectarian movements of any kind, found itself threatened with a neighboring power whose mission was twofold: to dismantle every vestige of secularism and Westernization, and to construct a religious state and export that ideal elsewhere.

The Iranian Islamic revolution could not live in isolation, the Ayatollah and his lieutenants often said; unless others adopted its model, Iran was doomed. Saudi Arabia and other monarchies in the Persian Gulf that have adopted a Western economic system beneath a veneer of Islamic rule found Iran's mullahs challenging the religious legitimacy of their governments.

''Our dear nation, the true struggler for Islamic values, fully realizes that struggle is not compatible with seeking a comfortable life,'' the Ayatollah said. His vision stemmed from interpreting Islam as an ideology requiring followers to shed all ties to both East and West and plunge their societies into the strictest adherence to Koranic law. Most Arabs interpreted this as a ride back into the 19th century.

But the Iranians were certain the message would spread because of two factors. One was the existence in the region of a large pool of Shiite Moslems who share a spiritual affinity with Iranian Shiites. Second was the revolutionary message of Iran that appealed to the ''disinherited'' - those who under the banner of repressed aspirations wanted to overthrow corrupt monarchies and to redress an unfair distribution of oil wealth.

Although these constituencies exist, Iran overestimated their anger, commitment and ability to meet the challenge. In fact, most Arab Shiites viewed the chaos of the revolution in Iran as a catastrophe.

''It is the beginning of the end for militant Islam,'' said Ahmad Abdelgalil, an Egyptian diplomat here. ''Fundamentalists in the region had two sources of support. Morally they looked upon Iran's defiance of the world and its success in the war as an inspiration for their own movements, and they took money from the Iranians to fund their activities.'' Both, he said, ''have now evaporated.'' Iran also underestimated the tenacity of Iraq and the degree of support Baghdad would receive from Arab countries, more than $50 billion since 1982, according to various Arab and Western officials. ''It shows that most Arabs regarded the Iranian threat as much more menacing than the Israeli threat,'' said a Palestinian official. ''All the Arab aid to Egypt, Syria, Jordan and the Palestinians in 40 years of war against Israel is a fraction of the aid they have given Iraq in only six years.''

Finally, Iranian leaders took the devotion of their people for granted. In eight years of war, Iran has fought largely with an army of volunteers, supporters of the Ayatollah. ''The Iraqis never depended on fervor,'' said a Western envoy. ''People here go to the front because they get shot if they don't.''

Several months ago, the lack of money and weapons, an economic collapse at home and the resulting decrease in zeal among Iranian volunteers began to take its toll. Devastating reverses on the battlefield cost Iran all of its territorial gains of six years. Then the July 3 downing of the Iranian airliner by the United States Navy, in which 290 people were killed, seemed to crystallize for many Iranians how isolated their country had become. With a huge Western fleet patrolling its shores, a superior Iraqi Army inflicting unbearable punishment and Arab rejection of its Islamic appeal, Iran's choice narrowed to one option: abandoning the war.

The question now is whether Iraq, which started the war to blunt what it said were Iranian political provocations and terrorist acts, will let Iran do so. One thing is certain: The Iraqis would like the war to end.

Equally certain is their distrust of Iran. The Iraqis say the only proof of real peace is for the process of normalization to begin, including direct talks; until then, they will pursue the war as aggressively as they can. The other concession the Iraqis have sought is the concurrence of the Ayatollah. ''The Iraqis have always maintained that if acceptance to end the war came from Khomeini himself, it would set into motion a whole process of changing the attitude of the Iranian people and his many supporters in Lebanon and elsewhere,'' said a Western envoy.

It was a decision as painful ''as drinking poison,'' the Ayatollah said, but one which he was willing to make ''in the interests of the Iranian nation.'' For the man who spent so many years in exile and fought so many battles to bring forth his vision of an Islamic republic, making that statement must have been like drinking poison. started the war to blunt what it said were Iranian political provocations and terrorist acts, will let Iran do so. ''The Iraqis will want to extract every possible guarantee to make sure Iran will never again think of forcing itself militarily or ideologically on their way of life,'' said an Arab diplomat. ''They know Iran has its back to the wall.''

One thing is certain: The Iraqis would like the war to end. Equally certain is their distrust of Iran. The Iraqis say the only proof of real peace is for the process of normalization to begin, including direct talks; until then, they will pursue the war as aggressively as they can. The other concession the Iraqis have sought is the concurrence of the Ayatollah. ''The Iraqis have always maintained that if acceptance to end the war came from Khomeini himself, it would set into motion a whole process of changing the attitude of the Iranian people and his many supporters in Lebanon and elsewhere,'' said a Western envoy.

It was a decision as painful ''as drinking poison,'' the Ayatollah said, but one which he was willing to make ''in the interests of the Iranian nation.'' For the man who spent so many years in exile and fought so many battles to bring forth his vision of an Islamic republic, making that statement must have been like drinking poison.

Photos of Iraqi troops at the front (Picture Group/May Tell) (pg. 1); Iraqi soldier near a wr-scarred portrait of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini after the capture of the Fao Peninsula in April, 1988 (Sygma/Pavlosky) (pg. 2)