The Friedman plan is a public-relations effort to try and divert us from
looking at Saudi complicity in Islamic terrorism

http://www.jewishworldreview.com --
ONCE upon a time there was a renowned New York Times columnist named Thomas
Friedman, who had two Pulitzer Prizes in his pocket, and all the wealth and
honor that such a person accrues. But the book contracts, speaker's fees,
television appearances and the freedom to work on his golf game wasn't
enough.

Something was wrong.

As a Middle East "expert," Tom had been telling everyone for years from his
bully pulpit on the Times' opinion page that if only Israel would make enough
concessions to the Palestinian Arabs, everything would be all right.

Sometime in the 1990s, Tom also apparently figured out how to work the on/off
switch on his computer, and this revelation gave him a big idea. He then
spent time touring exotic spots around the globe, playing golf and
interviewing Third World leaders who generally told him what he wanted to
hear: namely, that all they really wanted out of life was a new Lexus, a
reliable cell phone and a satellite dish with access to the Playboy channel.
Tom sought to prove that this meant that the causes of conflict - pride,
honor and religious fanaticism - would be erased by a drive for consumer
goods. The desire of the Arabs for technology would make them forget about
wanting to destroy Israel.

Then, in the summer of 2000, President Bill Clinton's passion for a Nobel
peace prize and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak's domestic political
problems led them to a summit at Camp David, where Barak offered the
Palestinians just about everything in his pocket.

Tom didn't trust Clinton to pressure Israel as much as he did his old pal,
former Secretary of State James "bleep the Jews" Baker (who once acted on one
of Tom's suggestions to publicly taunt Israel), but he liked the general
idea. The concessions were not supported by the majority of the Israeli
people, and would have divided Jerusalem and threatened Israel's security. B
ut Tom thought Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat couldn't pass on such a sweet
deal.

He was wrong. Arafat turned it down flat. Two months later, the old terrorist
launched a war of attrition against Israel that was waged by both Islamic
fundamentalists and Arafat's own "police" forces.

It was now apparent - even to dim lights like Tom - that the Palestinians
weren't interested in peace, even on their own terms. Then came Sept. 11 and
the support for Osama bin Laden around the Arab world that was further proof
of the importance of the fundamentalism that Tom thought was outdated.

Tom viewed this not as a sign of his own intellectual bankruptcy, but rather
a failure of the Arabs to listen to him. Tom also resented those critics who
pointed out just how wrong he had been all along. But rather than crediting
them with a better understanding of the Palestinians, he just dismissed them.
Tom spent the next year-and-a-half sulking and tried to divert himself with
other issues. But without the Middle East, he was just another smart-aleck
with a cliché-filled prose style.

FRIEDMAN PLAYS PEACEMAKER

A few months later, Tom visited Saudi Arabia. But in spite of his championing
of the Palestinians and derision for Israelis who aren't leftists, he found
most Saudis think of him as just another Jew.

Then he had a brilliant idea that, if properly promoted, might ensure that
the Times' ax-wielding new editor Howell Raines wouldn't separate Tom from
his expense account.

That idea was revealed in a column published on Feb. 17, in which he floated
a peace proposal. The terms were simple. Israel would unilaterally give up
everything it gained in the Six-Day War, including all of eastern Jerusalem
and its Old City, as well as 100 percent of Judea and Samaria and hand it
over to Yasser Arafat as a reward for his rejection of peace and the 18
months of war that had cost the lives of hundreds of Israelis and
Palestinians. In exchange, Saudi Arabia would recognize Israel's right to
exist.

According to his own breathless account, when Tom suggested this to Saudi
Crown Prince Abdullah, the prince said that Tom was reading his mind, and
that he had just such a proposal on his desk. Tom was thrilled and announced
that peace was at hand, if only those pesky Israelis would carefully read his
column.

Four days later, Tom's self-promotion was embraced by the editorial page of
the Times. On the same day, an article plugging the plan by Henry Siegman,
the leftist former leader of the American Jewish Congress, was run on the
opinion page. A day later, The Philadelphia Inquirer's Friedman-wannabe, the
ever-mediocre Trudy Rubin, chimed in with a "me-too" column endorsing the
"Saudi" plan.

Other good friends of Israel in Europe picked up the notion as did some in
Israel who were looking for something to use against Prime Minister Ariel
Sharon. News editors seized on this non-story and proceeded to puff it up
into a full-scale peace initiative.

The aim of all of this buzz was, in part, to pressure President Bush to
abandon his strong support of Israel and his opposition to Arafat. Enemies of
Sharon see the proposal as a way to shift blame for the war from Arafat to
the Israeli government. Both the U.S. and Israel said they liked the idea of
the Saudis showing support for any notion of peace but it is a long way from
there to something real.

A FLAWED PLAN

So what's wrong with the idea?

Like so many other so-called peace initiatives, the Friedman plan is a
public-relations effort aimed at Western audiences and not the Arab public.
In fact, the Saudis never offered the proposal to anyone but Friedman. The
real purpose for them is to try and get the American press to stop reporting
about Saudi complicity in Islamic terrorism and anti-American extremism.
Second, the idea that an Israeli retreat to the 1949 armistice lines could
bring peace is a fallacy. Arafat's insistence at Camp David on the "right of
return" for Palestinian refugees makes it clear that they still see the
conflict as one that must end in Israel's destruction.

A unilateral Israeli withdrawal would also weaken Israel both morally and
militarily. Nobody even pretends anymore that a Palestinian state will be
demilitarized. Such a retreat would also be analogous to Barak's skedaddle
from Southern Lebanon in the months before Camp David. Few would dispute that
Hezbollah's victory over Israel emboldened the Palestinians to attempt the
current intifada. But this time, with the loss of all of Israel's strategic
depth, the consequences would prove even more dangerous.

Israel's people are currently demoralized, with many wondering why Sharon has
relied on half-hearted military measures against the terrorists at a time
when Jews are being murdered by Arafat's minions virtually every day.

Yet far from aiding Israel or the ever-suffering Palestinian people, the
Friedman/Saudi plan helps only its authors and diverted attention - at least
for a few days - from Arafat's war at time when Jewish blood continued to
flow.

The bottom line is that Friedman's stunt won't be be anything more than a
footnote in the history of the conflict, if that. No Israeli government in
the foreseeable future will repeat Barak's mistakes, let alone exceed them as
Friedman prescribes.

This story does illustrate just how a powerful writer can use his position to
promote a personal agenda. That is common enough.
But the way this self-infatuated journalist shamefully smeared his byline
across a painful chapter in Jewish history should not be
forgotten.