Category Archives: EPO Enlarged Board of Appeal

Summary

The following questions are referred to the Enlarged Board of Appeal for decision:

In the assessment of inventive step, can the computer-implemented simulation of a technical system or process solve a technical problem by producing a technical effect which goes beyond the simulation’s implementation on a computer, if the computer-implemented simulation is claimed as such?

If the answer to the first question is yes, what are the relevant criteria for assessing whether a computer-implemented simulation claimed as such solves a technical problem? In particular, is it a sufficient condition that the simulation is based, at least in part, on technical principles underlying the simulated system or process?

What are the answers to the first and second questions if the computer-implemented simulation is claimed as part of a design process, in particular for verifying a design?

1. Introduction

The EPO case law on computer-implemented inventions has been quite stable for the last fifteen years. In particular, there has not been any decision of the Enlarged Board of Appeal (EBA) on this topic since G 3/08 of 12 May 2010.

Basically, a computer-implemented invention can be patented if it solves a technical problem by producing a technical effect. For the assessment of inventive step over the prior art only those features are taken into account, which contribute to the technical character of the invention.

There is, however, no general definition of what is “technical”.

The Technical Board of Appeal 3.5.07 (TBA) now has with decision of 22 February 2019 referred to the EBA the above three questions relating to the patentability of computer-implemented simulation methods. A decision by the EBA could have far-reaching consequences for applicants of computer-implemented inventions in Europe.

2. The invention

The invention disclosed in European patent application No. 03793825.5 and published as WO 2004/023347 A2 relates to a computer-implemented method of modelling the pedestrian crowd movement in an environment such as a train station.

The modelling can be used to help design or modify the venue (e.g. train station) and for that purpose achieve a more accurate and realistic simulation of pedestrian crowds in real-world situations. The application is based on the insight that human interaction can be expressed and modelled in the same way as interactions of physical objects as e.g. electrons in a semiconductor device.

Claim 1 of the patent application according to the main request of the applicant reads as follows:

simulating movement of a plurality of pedestrians through the environment, wherein simulating movement of each pedestrian comprises:

providing a provisional path (9) through a model of the environment from a current location (6) to an intended destination (7);

providing a profile for said pedestrian;

determining a preferred step (112′), to a preferred position (123′), towards said intended destination based upon said profile and said provisional path, wherein determining said preferred step comprises determining a dissatisfaction function expressing a cost of taking a step comprising a sum of an inconvenience function expressing a cost of deviating from a given direction and a frustration function expressing a cost of deviating from a given speed;

defining a neighbourhood (29) around said preferred position (123′);

identifying obstructions in said neighbourhood, said obstructions including other pedestrians (21) and fixed obstacles (25);

determining a personal space (24) around said pedestrian;

determining whether said preferred step (112′) is feasible by considering whether obstructions (21, 25) infringe said personal space over the course of the preferred step (112′).”

3. The Reasoning of the TBA

The TBA is of the view that the claimed invention lacks inventive step over a general purpose computer on the following grounds (section 11 of the decision):

“In the Board’s view, a technical effect requires, at a minimum, a direct link with physical reality, such as a change in or a measurement of a physical entity. Such a link is not present where, for example, the parabolic trajectory followed by a hypothetical object under the influence of gravity is calculated. Nor can the Board detect such a direct link in the process of calculating the trajectories of hypothetical pedestrians as they move through a modelled environment, which is what is claimed here. In fact, the environment being modelled may not exist and may never exist. And the simulation could be run to support purely theoretical scientific investigations, or it could be used to simulate the movement of pedestrians through the virtual world of a video game.”

In the proceedings before the TBA, the applicant has cited the earlier decision T 1227/05 relating to a computer-implemented method for the numerical simulation of an electronic circuit. T 1227/05 states: “An electronic circuit having input channels, noise input channels and output channels, the behavior of which is described by a system of differential equations is a sufficiently determined class of technical subjects, the simulation of which can be a functional technical feature.”

In other words, if the system or method to be simulated is sufficiently technical (expressed in engineering-heavy language ?), then the simulation method itself is also a technical method and for the assessment of inventive step has to be compared with prior art simulation methods, not with the functioning of a general purpose computer.

The TBA consequently held that if the board were “to follow decision T 1227/05, it would have to acknowledge that some or all of the steps of the simulation method of claim 1 contribute to a technical effect of the invention and could thus not be ignored when assessing inventive step” and that it “would hence be necessary to compare the invention with prior art other than a general-purpose computer.”

The TBA, however, still found that it “would tend to consider the subject matter of claim 1 of the main request to lack inventive step over a general-purpose computer” since the claimed method would “assist the engineer only in the cognitive process of verifying the design of the circuit or environment, i.e. of studying the behavior of the virtual circuit or environment designed.” And, “the cognitive process of theoretically verifying its design appears to be fundamentally non- technical.”

4. The referral questions

The TBA therefore referred the case to the EBA for reconciling its own view (citing a number of other earlier decisions as support) with the inconsistent view of T 1227/05. The questions are:

In the assessment of inventive step, can the computer-implemented simulation of a technical system or process solve a technical problem by producing a technical effect which goes beyond the simulation’s implementation on a computer, if the computer-implemented simulation is claimed as such?

If the answer to the first question is yes, what are the relevant criteria for assessing whether a computer-implemented simulation claimed as such solves a technical problem? In particular, is it a sufficient condition that the simulation is based, at least in part, on technical principles underlying the simulated system or process?

What are the answers to the first and second questions if the computer-implemented simulation is claimed as part of a design process, in particular for verifying a design?

In effect, the question to decide here is if the required technical effect of a simulation method can be provided not only in the way the simulation program is running on the computer – then the relevant prior art is a general purpose computer – or if this technical effect can be provided also by technical properties of the simulated system (here: the design of the train station; in T 1227/05: the electronic circuit). If the design of a train station with staircases, exits, shops etc. is regarded in the same way as a technical subject matter as the design of an electronic circuit (which in my personal view should not be in doubt), then questions 1 and 2 have to be answered in the affirmative.

The outcome of the referral has in my view implications far beyond simulation programs, for example also to inventions based on machine learning (ML). If you replace in the referral questions “simulation” by “machine learning process”, the same issues arise.

There can be no doubt: If the first two questions of the referral are not answered in the affirmative by the EBA, applicants of various types of computer-implemented inventions in Europe will be in trouble.

Including a not originally disclosed negative feature (disclaimer) in a patent claim in order to delimit the claimed subject-matter from the prior art does not constitute an inadmissible extension of the subject-matter of the original patent application if the disclaimer does not have a technical effect.

To the relief of many patentees in particular in the chemical and biotech industries the Enlarged Board of Appeal has in its most recent decision G1-16 confirmed that undisclosed disclaimers are allowable under certain circumstances defined in the decision G1-03, namely in order to

restore novelty by delimiting a claim against state of the art under Article 54(3) and (4) EPC (later published prior art);

restore novelty by delimiting a claim against an accidental anticipation under Article 54(2) EPC; an anticipation being accidental if it is so unrelated to and remote from the claimed invention that the person skilled in the art would never have taken it into consideration when making the invention; and

disclaim subject-matter which, under Articles 52 to 57 EPC, is excluded from patentability for nontechnical reasons.

An undisclosed disclaimer is defined by including into a patent claim a negative technical feature, whereby neither the disclaimer itself nor the subject-matter excluded by it have been disclosed in the application as filed (G1-16, point 14).

The Enlarged Board of Appeal (EBA) reasoned that such undisclosed disclaimers in most cases constitute added matter, i.e. “the requirements of Article 123(2) EPC leave virtually no chance of an undisclosed disclaimer being allowable” since “introducing any disclaimer per definitionem excludes subject-matter from a claim and, hence, changes the technical content of the claim” (G1-16, point 42). The EBO allowed undisclosed disclaimers under the above-mentioned clearly defined conditions despite the fact that they violate Art. 123(2) EPC, because under these circumstances a violation of Art. 123(2) EPC would not give the patentee or applicant an unwarranted advantage damaging to the legal security of third parties; this being the rationale behind Art. 123(2) EPC (G1-16, point 36).

The German Federal Court of Justice (FCJ), however, applies in the recently published ex-parte decision “Phosphatidylcholin” a different reasoning. In the case the FCJ had to decide upon an appeal on points of law (“Rechtsbeschwerde”) of the applicant of a patent application, which has been rejected both by the GPTO and the Federal Patent Court based on the ground that of an undisclosed disclaimer consisted of an inadmissible extension beyond the content of the original application. The patent claim before the FCJ reads as follows:

The undisclosed disclaimer (feature c)) requires that the claimed preparations are free from phosphatidylcholine (a particular form of lecithin). Such preparations free from phosphatidylcholine are not disclosed in the original application documents. The GPTO and the Federal Patent Court therefore rejected the claim as inadmissibly amended, which finding was not contested by the applicant itself.

The FCJ, however, takes a different position and concludes that in the original application documents there is also no indication that phosphatidylcholine is a necessary component of the preparation or that its addition is considered advantageous. Therefore, the disclaimer “merely expresses the fact that from the large number of possible compositions of the preparation, which are possible according to the original application documents, only those containing phosphatidylcholine are excluded”. In addition, the undisclosed disclaimer merely serves to distinguish the invention over a (non-accidental, prepublished) prior art reference R disclosing skin protection preparations containing sodium chloride and glycerin in addition to the main ingredient phosphatidylcholine. The FCJ concludes that undisclosed disclaimers do not consist of an inadmissible amendment if (i) they serve the purpose to distinguish the claimed subject-matter over the prior art and (ii) the disclaimer has no technical effect. The use of undisclosed disclaimers is allowable during the examination as well as in post grant procedures.

The reasoning of the FCJ thus differs from that of the EBA. The EBO concludes: Undisclosed disclaimers constitute an inadmissible amendment but are exceptionally allowable under the above-mentioned circumstances 1., 2., or 3. The FCJ finds: Undisclosed disclaimers do not constitute an inadmissible amendment in the first place and are therefore allowable (i) if they serve to distinguish the claim over the prior art and (ii) if they do not have a technical effect.

In practice, the main difference is that under the FCJ approach the allowability of undisclosed disclaimers is also applicable to non-accidental prepublished prior art (as reference R in the subject decision “phosphatidylcholine”). Condition (ii) requires that the undisclosed disclaimer must not have a technical effect, i.e. the skilled person must not derive any new technical information therefrom. This condition seems to imply that undisclosed disclaimers are not be accepted to support inventive step. The FCJ has decided in the “phosphatidylcholine” case that the disclaimer does not have any technical effect based on the application documents without reference to the prior art, such that the question of inadmissible extension is independent from the considered prior art.

The assessment of a potential technical effect of the undisclosed disclaimer, however, may lead to the following problem:

In the present appeal on points of law case the FCJ had to refer the matter back to the Federal Patent Court to decide on the merits whether the claim containing the disclaimer is novel and involves an inventive step over the prior art. It is to be expected that novelty will be confirmed, because otherwise the disclaimer would not have made any sense. More interesting, however, is the assessment of inventive step: The closest prior art document R discloses a skin protection preparation comprising phosphatidylcholin (as main, essential ingredient) + glycerol + sodium chloride (features [C+A+B]). The application under review claims glycerol + sodium chloride + (not phosphatidylcholin), i.e. features [A+B+notC]. Would it be obvious for the skilled person starting from closest reference R to provide a skin protection preparation removing the main, essential component? Probably not. In this case, however, the disclaimer notC would indeed have a technical effect establishing inventive step, contrary to the finding of the FCJ allowing the disclaimer in the first place. It will be interesting to see how the Federal Patent Court will resolve this matter.

The EBA approach, in contrast, appears to avoid such problems: A negatively claimed technical feature is regarded as (almost) always having a technical effect such that its addition contravenes Art. 123(2) EPC, but is exceptionally allowed under certain precisely defined conditions avoiding unnecessary hardship for the patent proprietor while preserving legal certainty for third parties.