I recently posted here on the extraordinary 500-page “Critical Study” of the Awards in the South China Sea Arbitration published by the Chinese Society of International Law (CSIL) in Oxford University Press’ Chinese Journal of International Law.

The piece drew a number of interesting comments, the most interesting from Professor Bing Ling of the University of Sydney:

This Critical Study is not some spontaneous work by individual academics, but clearly a government-orchestrated project produced in the name of a learned society. The Working Report of the Board of CSIL (2013-18) reports that the work of CSIL, including the Critical Study, was carried out “under the supervision and leadership of the Foreign Ministry” (https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/Xv8Kij_bDuqMETULvUfMqg).

That CSIL Working Report makes for interesting reading in Google Translate. It opens with:

In the past five years, under the guidance of the socialist ideology with Chinese characteristics in the new era of Xi Jinping, the current council has united and led the members to work together under the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to earnestly implement the spirit of the 18th and 19th National Party Congress and the Party Central Committee … [including through] adherence to the correct political direction …

In terms of the five years of work the first heading is “Serving the State’s Foreign Affairs and Foreign Affairs Bureau to Promote the International Influence of the Society” and achievement (A)(II) is listed as:

Actively respond to the “Southern Gulf [sic] arbitration case proposed by the Philippines”. From 2016 to 2018 , the Society made a multi-level, multi-channel and multi-perspective speech by organizing domestic and international seminars, writing reports, publishing series of articles, publishing special issues, receiving television interviews, and writing criticism reports. They refuted and exposed the Philippine arbitral tribunal for the South China Sea arbitration case to expand powers, ultra vires, and abuse of power. … Including: 1. Organization of domestic experts and scholars, organized the “Philippine South China Sea Arbitration” academic seminar. 2. Organize domestic experts and scholars to write a report on the “Arbitral Tribunal of the South China Sea Arbitration Court has no legal effect” report and publish it in both Chinese and English; 3. Organize domestic experts and scholars to write a “Critique of the South China Sea Arbitration Award” report in both Chinese and English publishing. … (Emphasis added.)

A further important piece of context is the following passage:

… [W]e always adhere to the overall situation of serving the country’s diplomacy and foreign affairs. Diplomatic foreign affairs work is an important part of the overall work guilof the party and the country. The work of international law teaching research and associations is also an important component of foreign affairs. In the past five years, the Institute has guided the Chinese international law community to focus on the research direction of the focus of diplomatic work. It closely identifies the actual needs of diplomatic work when organizing various academic conferences to determine the theme of the conference, and effectively plays a role as a bridge between the theoretical and practical world of international law. Under the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Society has always adhered to the mission of the National Foreign Affairs and Foreign Affairs Center, paid close attention to the evolution of the international situation, strengthened theoretical and empirical studies of international law in related fields, and scored a series of important achievements. In particular, in 2016, the Society mobilized the academic community to cooperate with the overall deployment of diplomacy to carry out the juridical struggle and actively responded to the “Philippine South China Sea Arbitration Case” in various ways, effectively refuting and exposing the unlawful practices of the temporary arbitration tribunal. (Emphasis added.)

Allowing for the vagaries of Google Translate, this five year Working Report raises a number of interesting questions including:

Given the close association of the CSIL and the Chinese Foreign Ministry – and the apparent integration of the CSIL into the diplomatic effort on this issue – should Foreign Ministry “leadership” of the Critical Study have been acknowledged in a first footnote?

Did the CSIL’s self-professed “mobiliz[ation of] the academic community” have any impact (directly or indirectly) on the peer review process for the Critical Study?

OUP lists the Chinese Journal of International Law as “An independent, peer-reviewed research journal edited primarily by scholars from mainland China, and published in association with the Chinese Society of International Law, Beijing, and Wuhan University Institute of International Law, Wuhan …” Should that description make some acknowledgement of the seemingly close links between the CSIL and the Foreign Ministry?

In addition, the editorial board includes a substantial number of distinguished scholars who are resident outside China. It would be interesting to know how many of them were involved in the editorial decision-making and peer review process which has resulted in what could potentially be seen as a 500 page government-commissioned or -vetted report being published in a scholarly journal.

On Monday 14 May 2018 the Chinese Journal of International Law, an Oxford University Press journal, published an extraordinary 500 page “Critical Study” of the Awards on jurisdiction and the merits in the South China Sea Arbitration between the Philippines and China. Readers will recall the case was brought under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) by the Philippines against China and that there was an awards on jurisdiction in 2015 and a final award on the merits in 2016 (discussed in many places including here, here, here, here and here). The Critical Study was produced by the joint efforts of some 70 scholars and is listed as having been authored by the Chinese Society of International Law (CSIL). It examines almost every issue raised in the case – and several that weren’t – and concludes the Tribunal was catastrophically wrong on every single point, right down to how many times the Philippines was allowed to amend its pleadings.

The extent to which the Critical Study manages to strike a temperate and balanced tone towards the Awards made by the arbitral tribunal is summed up in the introduction:

“These awards are not conducive to solving the dispute between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea; instead, they have complicated the related issues. They have impaired the integrity and authority of [UNCLOS], threaten to undermine the international maritime legal order, run counter to the basic requirements of the international rule of law, and also imperilled the interests of the whole international community” [para 5].

Like pirates, the Tribunal members it seems are close to hostes humani generis and their award a threat to international legal order. The other blow to any semblance of academic neutrality in the book-length Critical Study is the one issue it studiously chooses not to address: China’s refusal to participate in proceedings. The Critical Study, while challenging almost every other paragraph of the award is entirely silent as to the Tribunal’s plainly correct finding that China – even if it disputed jurisdiction – was bound by its voluntary membership of UNCLOS to participate in proceedings. Further, UNCLOS makes clear China was bound by the result of such proceedings, even in the event of non-appearance. Indeed, this is why in UNCLOS cases where the UK and France disputed jurisdiction, for example, they have nonetheless shown up to make the argument.

In any event, the Critical Study raises a number of very interesting questions both in terms of the legal arguments it makes and in the simple fact of its existence. In the remainder of this (unfortunately long) post I would like to offer some brief and necessarily initial observations on following issues:

First, what is the significance of the critical study as an intervention in the debates about the South China Sea award, and what does it tell us about Chinese approaches to international law?

Second, is there any merit to the substantive legal arguments advanced by the Critical Study? (And what do these arguments tell us about Chinese approaches to international law?) I will put aside here the issues of both jurisdiction and the legal definition of islands capable of generating significant maritime zones (on which reasonable minds have differed) and focus on arguments regarding Chinese historic rights in the South China Sea and whether the Spratley Islands can be considered an archipelago.

An overview of the Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire judgment is provided in the first part of this post. The purpose of this second part is to highlight issues of practical significance which flow from the judgment.

In two important ways, the Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire judgment has demonstrated the functionality of dispute resolution processes under Part XV of UNCLOS, both in the context of maritime delimitation disputes and more generally.

Consistency with international delimitation jurisprudence

First, the ITLOS Special Chamber evidenced a desire to contribute to the development of consistent delimitation jurisprudence, and confirmed that the ‘equidistance/relevant circumstances method’ is now standard in a delimitation process – regardless of whether the coasts of claiming States parties are opposite or adjacent to one another. Importantly, it adhered to the three-step methodology identified and employed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Black Sea. It did so by drawing a provisional equidistance line between the relevant coasts, considering the factors which might warrant adjustment of that line, and then applying an ex-post facto (dis)proportionality test to verify that the delimitation line was equitable. Notably, the Special Chamber maintained consistency with recent maritime delimitation jurisprudence by underscoring the primacy of criteria associated with coastal geography (concavity, coastal length, etc.) and ignoring factors related to offshore oil activities or the presence of seabed resources in the relevant area. Read the rest of this entry…

On 23 September 2017, the Special Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) rendered an award in Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire. It is only the second case, following the Guyana/Suriname Arbitration of 2007, in which an international adjudicating body has ascertained the meaning and scope of Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) within the context of unilateral oil and gas operations in disputed areas.

The Special Chamber delimited the parties’ territorial sea, exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf boundaries within and beyond 200 nautical miles (nm) with the boundary being an unadjusted equidistance line favouring Ghana. Other key questions for adjudication were a) Ghana’s claim regarding a long-standing, tacit agreement as to the existence of a maritime boundary and b) Côte d’Ivoire’s allegation that, by continuing with oil activities in the disputed area, Ghana had violated its Article 83(1) and (3) UNCLOS obligations to negotiate in good faith and to make every effort through provisional arrangements not to jeopardise or hamper arrival at an agreement.

In its judgment, the Special Chamber reached a number of conclusions which, taken with its Order for the prescription of provisional measures of 25 April 2015, will have significant, practical implications for the future conduct of unilateral oil and gas activities in disputed maritime areas, as well as for the associated rights and obligations incumbent upon States concerned. Read the rest of this entry…

The dispute between the Parties was submitted to arbitration in accordance with an Arbitration Agreement signed by the parties on 4 November 2009 in Stockholm (Annex HRLA-75, Final Award), and witnessed by the then Swedish Prime Minister, Fredrik Reinfeldt, since Sweden then held the Presidency of the Council of the European Union (“EU”). The Arbitration Agreement is unique because it is the first intra-state arbitration agreement of its kind to be drafted under the auspices of the EU, despite the fact that this is not the first occasion where an international organisation was involved in such a task. [See for example the signature for specific purposes of the World Bank of the Indus Waters Treaty 1960, between India and Pakistan, although that treaty is much more complex and not just a simple arbitration agreement (see Article IX and Annexure G). See also for example the involvement of the African Union, the UN and a few EU member states in the drafting of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2005, which was witnessed by the Minister of Development Co-operation of the Netherlands on behalf of the EU, paving the way for the drafting of the Abyei Arbitration Agreement 2008, which was eventually signed by the government of Sudan and the Sudan’s People’s Liberation Movement Army only. Brooks Daly has written more on the procedural aspects of the Abyei arbitration.]

The brokering of the Arbitration Agreement by the EU is reflected in Article 9, which requires Slovenia to “lift its reservations as regards the opening and closing of negotiation chapters where the obstacle is related to the dispute”. This was an important provision for Croatia’s accession to the EU. It is to be noted that Slovenia had already been a member of the EU for approximately 5 years at the date of signature of the arbitration agreement, as it had acceded to the EU on 1 May 2004. On the other hand, on the date of signature of the Arbitration Agreement, Croatia was on the path to accession, which was to last for another 4 years, as it eventually became an EU member state on 1 July 2013.

There are two other points worth mentioning regarding the 2009 Arbitration Agreement. First, the applicable law as set out in Article 4 is unusual. The “rules and principles of international law” were applicable to determining the course of the maritime and land boundary (Article 3(1)(a)). International law, equity and “the principle of good neighbourly relations in order to achieve a fair and equitable result” were applicable to determining Slovenia’s junction to the High Sea and the regime for the use of the relevant maritime areas (Article 3(1)(b) and (c)). This is probably a rare instance of the principle of good neighbourly relations for the achievement of a “fair and just result” being encountered in a modern Arbitration Agreement. While it is doubtful whether such a principle could count as a “general principle of law recognised by civilized nations” within the meaning of Article 38(1)(C) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, it might be regarded as similar to a requirement to determine a case ex aequo et bono under Art. 38(2) of the ICJ Statute. The inclusion of this source of “applicable law” is a curious addition, which can probably be explained by the fact that it was a product of negotiations under the auspices of the EU.

The second point worth mentioning regarding the Arbitration Agreement is that one of the tasks of the arbitral tribunal, as per Article 3 (b)-(c), was to determine “Slovenia’s junction to the High Sea” and “the regime for the use of the relevant maritime areas”. This is a peculiar insertion, and apparently led the arbitral tribunal to determine that starting point of the present arbitration was not whether Slovenia should have a junction to the high sea, but rather where the junction would be and what would be the package of rights given to Slovenia over that area. Read the rest of this entry…

Tromelin is a flat and small feature, about 1,700 metres long and 700 metres wide, with an area of about 80 hectares (200 acres). Its flora is limited, while the site is known to host significant numbers of seabirds. There is no harbour nor anchorages on the island, but a 1,200-metre airstrip, and there appears to be no continuous human presence.

Tromelin was discovered by a French navigator in 1722, and France today claims sovereignty over it by virtue of historical title (discovery of terra nullius) dating back to that date. The islet was the scene of a sad – and little known – episode of history as the place where approximately 60 Malagasy men and women were abandoned for 15 years in the 18th century after a French ship transporting slaves eschewed on the island. Most of the slaves died within a few months. The survivors were finally rescued in 1776, when Bernard Boudin de Tromelin, captain of the French warship La Dauphine, visited the island and discovered seven women and an eight-month-old child. Captain Tromelin also raised a French flag on the island – and his name was given to it.

French possession of Tromelin was interrupted by Britain which took control of the island in 1810. Then in 1954, the British gave their consent to France’s effective control over Tromelin. But sovereignty over Tromelin is still disputed, and the island has been claimed by the newly independent Mauritius since 1976, and reportedly also by Madagascar and the Seychelles (see V. Prescott, ‘Indian Ocean Boundaries’ at 3462-63). The controversy in France over Tromelin has led to the postponing of the ratification by the Parliament of a framework agreement entered into by France and Mauritius in June 2010, providing for joint economic, scientific and environmental management (cogestion) of the island and of surrounding maritime areas. Read the rest of this entry…

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) recently set the arena for a timely discussion of the question of the admissibility of a claim of continental shelf rights beyond 200 nm, absent a recommendation by the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). The litigation concerned the Question of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Nicaragua and Colombia beyond 200 nautical miles from the Nicaraguan Coast (NICOL II). In its 17 March 2016 Judgment on Preliminary Objections, the ICJ dismissed Colombia’s preliminary objections against the jurisdiction of the Court and the inadmissibility of Nicaragua’s first claim. While the ICJ upheld Colombia’s contentions against the admissibility of Nicaragua’s second submission – a rather unusual request for the establishment of a provisional regime of conduct in the area of overlapping entitlements pending delimitation – the case will now move to the merits with respect to Nicaragua’s request for the Court to adjudge and declare:

“The precise course of the maritime boundary between Nicaragua and Colombia in the areas of the continental shelf which appertain to each of them beyond the boundaries determined by the Court in its Judgment of 19 November 2012.”

This post will focus on the decision of the ICJ to reject, by 11 votes to 5, Colombia’s overarching claim on inadmissibility. ICJ’s 2016 ruling seems to definitely settle the doctrinal debate concerning admissibility of maritime rights beyond 200 nm without exhaustion of the procedure in UNCLOS Article 76(8). Read the rest of this entry…

Comments Off on The Admissibility of a Claim of Continental Shelf Rights Beyond 200nm Before an International Tribunal Absent a Recommendation by the CLCS: A Few Words About the ICJ’s 2016 Judgment in Nicaragua v. Colombia

The International Court of Justice simultaneously issued two intriguing judgments on 17 March 2016, both involving applications filed by Nicaragua against Colombia, and both of which have some nexus to the Court’s 19 November 2012 Judgment in Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia). To recall, the Court in its 2012 Judgment had affirmed Colombia’s sovereignty over seven islands, drawn a single maritime boundary delimiting the continental shelf and exclusive economic zones of Nicaragua and Colombia, and rejected Nicaragua’s request to have Colombia declared in breach of international law for allegedly denying Nicaragua’s access to natural resources to the east of the 82nd meridian. (2012 Judgment, dispositif, para. 251)

Thereafter, Nicaragua instituted two Applications on matters appearing to flow from, but alleged to be extraneous to, the Court’s 2012 maritime delimitation Judgment. In its 2013 Application in Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia) [hereafter, “Application on Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces Violations”], Nicaragua alleged, among others, that Colombia violated Nicaragua’s rights pertaining to maritime zones defined under the Court’s 2012 maritime delimitation Judgment and that Colombia had also breached the obligation not to use or threaten to use force. On the other hand, in its 2013 Application in Question of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Nicaragua and Colombia beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Nicaraguan Coast (Nicaragua v. Colombia) [hereafter, “Continental Shelf beyond 200 NM Application”], Nicaragua requested the Court to declare “the precise course of the maritime boundary between Nicaragua and Colombia in the areas of the continental shelf which appertain to them beyond the boundaries determined by the Court in its Judgment of 19 November 2012” [hereafter, “first Request”], as well as “the principles and rules of international law that determine the rights and duties of the two States in relation to the area of overlapping continental shelf claims and the use of its resources, pending the delimitation of the boundary between them beyond 200 nautical miles from Nicaragua’s coast.” [hereafter, “second Request”] (Continental Shelf beyond 200 NM Application, para. 12).

At the core of Colombia’s preliminary objections in both cases was the argument that the Court had already resolved the alleged matters in the 2012 Judgment, and accordingly, incidents related to these matters thereafter ought to be enforced under the canonical rule in Article 94(2) of the UN Charter (“[i]f any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.”). Nicaragua’s theory was essentially based on the characterization of fresh disputes with Colombia that may have some factual/legal nexus with the 2012 Judgment, but were, ultimately, left undetermined or outside the purview of the 2012 Judgment. It is highly interesting to see how this theory mainly prevailed in the Court’s 17 March 2016 Judgment on Preliminary Objections in Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia) [hereafter, “Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces Violations Judgment on Preliminary Objections”] and its 17 March 2016 Judgment on Preliminary Objections in the Question of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Between Nicaragua and Colombia Beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Nicaraguan Coast (Nicaragua v. Colombia) [hereafter, “Continental Shelf beyond 200 NM Judgment on Preliminary Objections”]. The Court’s unprecedented acceptance of jurisdiction for certain claims in both of these Nicaraguan applications certainly provoke new lines of inquiry on lines of demarcation between issues of enforcement of the Court’s judgments, and related but separate claims that could be instituted fresh with the Court, without triggering the rule on enforcing ICJ judgments through the more political forum of the Security Council. How was the Court able to assume jurisdiction in these cases, and what do these decisions bode for the settled rule on the finality of the Court’s judgments?

Last month, Turkey submitted a note verbaleto the Secretary-General of the United Nations setting out the geographical coordinates of its continental shelf in the Eastern Mediterranean, as established by a delimitation agreement with the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (“TRNC”). The agreement was signed on 21 September 2011 and ratified by the Turkish government on 29 June 2012. A map published by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs depicting the agreement is pictured below. (The reasons why the “TRNC” is in quotation marks will be elaborated below.) By transmitting this document to the UN Secretary-General, Turkey sought to achieve the publication of the agreed coordinates in the Law of the Sea Bulletin (LSB), where official submissions by states regarding the law of the sea are published. Although Turkey has not acceded the UN Law of the Sea Convention (‘LOSC’), it acted in accordance with article 84(2) LOSC (due publicity of charts or lists of geographical coordinates regarding continental shelf delimitation). Nonetheless, the submission of Turkey was not listed as an official deposit on the website of the Department of Oceans and the Law of the Sea (DOALOS).

The Turkish approach on the regime of islands

The delimitation agreement outlines some of Turkey’s longstanding positions on the law of the sea. It deals only with the continental shelf and does not provide for the delineation of an exclusive economic zone (EEZ). While there is nothing precluding coastal states from choosing which maritime zones to claim and/or to delimitate, Turkey’s choice not to delimit an EEZ with the “TRNC” alludes to the Turkish position that islands in certain regions (implying the Aegean Sea) should not be entitled to claim maritime zones of their own other than territorial sea or should have reduced capacity to generate such zones. This stance was formulated in the context of the dispute between Turkey and Greece concerning sovereignty over the maritime space of the Aegean Sea; since the 1970s, Turkey has sustained that the Aegean islands are situated on the continental shelf of Anatolia (Turkey) and, consequently, do not have a continental shelf of their own. This matter was an apple of discord between the Turkish and the Greek delegations over the course of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (‘UNCLOS III’). In the end, by virtue of article 121(2) LOSC, the Conference recognised the rights of islands to generate maritime zones. Article 121 LOSC reflects customary law (ICJ, Nicaragua v Colombia (2012), para 139) and, accordingly, applies to non-states parties as well.

Turkey’s resentment at the provisions on the regime of islands was one of the reasons it voted against and has not yet acceded to the LOSC (see Plenary Meetings 160 and 189). For the sake of clarity, it should be pointed out that when it comes to maritime delimitation, the maritime space an island can claim may be diminished depending on the circumstances (see, e.g., Anglo-French Arbitration 1977, small floral 50s party extra 1950s chiffon dress vintage dress floral xs dress blue PPARwFx, Black Sea Case 2009, Bangladesh/Myanmar 2012). Therefore, although in principle islands are not deprived of the rights bestowed on them by article 121 LOSC, they may not always be granted full effect in maritime boundary delimitations. However, islands cannot be denied their capacity to generate maritime zones and/or to be given decreased effect a priori;each case should be scrutinised according to its own unique terms. In any event, the Turkish argument that the Greek islands in the Aegean are located on the continental shelf of Turkey has been severely emaciated by the introduction of the EEZ concept and the prevalence of the “distance criterion” of maritime delimitation over the “geological” one. The distance criterion provides that the breadth of the maritime space afforded to a state should be calculated according to a fixed distance measured from the coast. The geological criterion, by contrast, would permit a state to claim the sea waters lying over the “natural prolongation” of its territory irrespective of the distance from its coastline. In the Nicaragua v Colombia case (2012), the ICJ put an end to the argument that one state’s islands cannot have their own continental shelf because they are located on another state’s continental shelf:

“The Court does not believe that any weight should be given to Nicaragua’s contention that the Colombian islands are located on “Nicaragua’s continental shelf”. It has repeatedly made clear that geological and geomorphological considerations are not relevant to the delimitation of overlapping entitlements within 200 nautical miles of the coasts of States.” (para 214).

The delimitation agreement

According to its well-established position that islands should not have the capacity to claim extended maritime zones when facing a bigger coastline, Turkey holds the view that Cyprus, being an island, has lesser effect in terms of maritime delimitation than the longer Turkish coastline, which is opposite the northern coast of Cyprus. Hence, as the agreement provides, the continental shelf delineation was carried out in accordance with equitable principles, resulting in a delimitation line closer to Cyprus at some points, which gives Turkey a more extensive maritime space than that allocated to the “TRNC”. Turkey was a fervent advocate of the equitable principles/relevant circumstances method during UNCLOS III, vehemently rejecting the median line/special circumstances method (UNCLOS III, Negotiating Group 7). The “equitable principles” method, which was elaborated in the 1969 Continental Shelf cases, stipulates that all relevant factors should be considered in order to reach an equitable result; however, the Court gave no further guidance as to how such an equitable result would be reached, rendering this method equivocal. Read the rest of this entry…

Readers interested in the territorial and maritime boundary disputes between China and her neighbours in the South and East China Seas will welcome the creation by Oxford University Press of a “Debate Map” on the topic. The “Debate Map” is a valuable way of keeping track of scholarly commentary, in journals and blogs, on the range of issues related to those territorial and maritime disputes. It is essentially an index which categorises and:

maps scholarly commentary on the international law aspects of the conflicts in and around the South China and East China Seas, including maritime boundary disputes, the question of sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, China’s recent announcement of an Air Defence Identification Zone, and the Philippines/China UNCLOS arbitration. It brings together primary documents with discussions in English-language legal blogs and a selection of journal articles.

Readers can “[u]se this map to review scholarly arguments and to keep track of which issues have been covered and who has said what.” OUP has also made available a range of online OUP materials on these issues (see the Oxford Public International Law Page).