1. A de novo standard of review should be employed when reviewing motions to set aside
tax judgments and orders of sales on the grounds of insufficient service filed according to
K.S.A. 79-2804b.

2. Finding a party did not meet its burden of proof is a negative factual finding. Such a
finding will not be disturbed by an appellate court in the absence of proof of an arbitrary
disregard of undisputed evidence or some extrinsic consideration such as bias, passion, or
prejudice.

3. In a tax foreclosure case, the initial burden is on the movant to show the county did not
make a reasonable effort to determine the movant's correct address. If such a showing is
made, then the burden shifts back to the county to show that the movant's due process
rights were not violated.

4. In a tax foreclosure case, resorting to service by publication prior to conducting a
reasonable search for a party's correct address is improper and violates due process rights.

5. K.S.A. 60-304(e) allows service on corporations and other associations and states that
service can be obtained by serving an officer, manager, partner or a resident, managing or
general agent.

6. When determining whether a person is a general or special agent, one who is an integral
part of a business organization and does not require fresh authorization for each
transaction is a general agent. The extent of discretion an agent has regarding the
transactions he or she is employed to perform does not bear on whether the agent is
special or general. Thus, one is a general agent if he or she is in continuous employment,
although the employment consists of purchasing articles as the employer directs with no
discretion as to the kinds, amounts, or prices to be paid.

HILL, J.: In this tax foreclosure appeal, there are two separate counts where two couples,
Kenneth and Sharon Schrage and Terry and Yvonne Hummer, claim they did not receive legally
sufficient notice and ask us to set aside the sheriff's sales of their Jefferson County real estate
tracts. The Schrages are correct, and the Hummers are not.

In the Schrages' case, Jefferson County officials relied upon service by publication after
an attempt to personally serve the couple in Douglas County failed. Generally, in a tax
foreclosure action, service by publication is disapproved if the address of the parties can be
reasonably ascertained. Here, Kenneth and Sharon Schrage lived on the real estate tract in
question. Furthermore, they had both been served with process at least seven times by an officer
from the Jefferson County Sheriff's Department during the 3-year period preceding the tax sale.
Because their address could have been reasonably ascertained, we hold the publication notice
was insufficient and denied them due process of law. We reverse.

In the Hummers' case, Terry Hummer was the president, sole stockholder, and resident
agent of RVH, Inc., a corporation that was the title owner of a mobile home park in Jefferson
County. The Hummers live in Topeka, and after their home was visited twice by Shawnee
County process servers trying to serve the Jefferson County process, Terry Hummer called the
Shawnee County Sheriff's office advising it that either he or an employee would be down to pick
up the papers. An RVH, Inc. maintenance worker received the foreclosure petition and summons
at the sheriff's office after telling the deputy he had been sent to pick up the papers. Because that
worker was clothed with the apparent authority to receive process, we hold that personal service
was achieved in this instance and affirm the judgment.

Because each case is unique, we will first review common facts and then focus on events
important to each count. Finally, our analysis will concentrate on each count individually.

Facts Common to Both Counts

On January 8, 2003, the Board of Jefferson County Commissioners (the County), filed a
tax foreclosure action that involved delinquent real estate taxes on more than 500 parcels of land.
Each parcel was listed in a separate count. A title search performed on Count 286 revealed that
Kenneth D. Schrage and Sharon A. Schrage, of 802 Oak, Lawrence, Kansas 66044 (the Lawrence
address), were interested parties with respect to the real estate. Title searches performed on
Counts 257, 258, and 264 revealed that Terry Hummer, Yvonne Hummer, and RVH, Inc., all
with an address of 4431 N.W. Greenhills Road, Topeka, Kansas, 66618, were interested parties
with respect to those counts.

On November 22, 2004, the attorney for the County filed an affidavit seeking to serve all
of the defendants in the foreclosure action by publication notice. The affidavit stated that the
locations of approximately one-half of the defendants were unknown but did not list the specific
defendants whose whereabouts were unknown.

Notice of the tax foreclosure lawsuit was published in The Oskaloosa Independent on
September 30, October 7, and October 14, 2004. The publication included Count 286 (the
Schrages' tract) and Count 257 (RVH, Inc.'s tract) in the notice. An affidavit of publication was
later filed on August 2, 2005.

The County sought default judgment, which was granted on December 13, 2004. A
sheriff's sale was ordered to be held on January 21, 2005. Notice of the sale was published in The
Oskaloosa Independent on December 16, 23, and 30, 2004. The affidavit of publication of that
notice was filed on August 2, 2005. At the sheriff's sale, the Schrages' property was sold for
$55,500 and RVH, Inc.'s parcel was sold for $36,500.

Matters Unique to the Schrages' Case

Not quite a month after the sheriff's sale on February 11, 2005, the Schrages filed a
motion to set aside the default judgment obtained by the County as a result of the publication
notice. The Schrages claimed that they did not receive notice of either the default judgment or the
sale of the property and that they were not properly served.

At the April 15, 2005, hearing on their motion, the Schrages were delinquent on multiple
personal and real estate taxes from various years due to the County. The County claimed the total
of the overdue taxes equaled $24,989.83. Ultimately, in June 2005, the district court denied
Schrages' motion to set aside the default judgment.

Jefferson County records available at the time of the filing of the foreclosure action are
revealing but not conclusive concerning the Schrages' correct address. The Schrage tract is a
42-acre site with an address of 11585 U.S. 59 Highway, Oskaloosa, Kansas (the U.S. 59 address).
In
December 1997, the County issued a building permit to Ken Schrage for construction of a
dwelling. The application for the building permit, as well as the permit itself, lists the Lawrence
address for Ken Schrage but also listed the U.S. 59 address as his new address. Furthermore, an
application for a permit to build a septic tank, dated December 16, 1997, indicated Kenneth's
address was the Lawrence address, but also listed the U.S. 59 address as a "New Address."

The Jefferson County Treasurer testified that her office had several addresses listed for
the Schrages but that the Lawrence address was the one that most commonly appeared on her
records. She further stated that her office searched for addresses for the Schrages by using motor
vehicle records, but no vehicles were registered in their name. The Schrages' 2002 personal
property tax statement was mailed to the U.S. 59 address but was returned as undeliverable. It
was also sent to the Lawrence address but was returned by the post office.

The Schrages' own conduct contributed to the confusion about their correct address.
Sharon Schrage testified that she and her husband moved from the Lawrence address to the U.S.
59 address in March or April of 1997. Sharon further testified that in February of 2002 or 2003, a
fire destroyed their residence at that address. After the fire she, began living in a "fifth wheel
trailer" on the Oskaloosa property. The fifth wheel trailer was physically placed inside a Morton
building on the real estate. As of April 15, 2005, the Schrages had not obtained a sewer permit
for the trailer and had not placed the title for the trailer in their name.

Furthermore, Sharon also admitted to having two addresses in Nortonville as well as a
P.O. Box address in Oskaloosa. She explained that she needed two addresses in Nortonville
because she had a business. Schrage further admitted that no vehicles had been registered under
the name "Schrage" in 2003, 2004, or 2005, because Sharon would not have been able to register
her vehicles in Jefferson County under the name "Schrage" due to a policy preventing registration
when outstanding property taxes are due. Sharon testified that her maiden name was "Tootle" and
that she used that name for legal purposes. Sharon stated that she had a handicapped son, and she
was made his conservator. Sharon testified that her attorney told her that it was legal if she used
"Tootle-Schrage" as her last name until her son died.

Despite all of this behavior, there was evidently no problem in serving the Schrages with
legal process in Jefferson County. Robert Chartier, an officer with the Jefferson County Sheriff's
office, testified that he had served Kenneth Schrage at least seven times within the previous 3
years. Chartier claimed that all but one or two times he obtained service on Kenneth at the
Schrages' restaurant in Nortonville, which is also within Jefferson County. Chartier went on to
state that the times he did not serve Kenneth at the restaurant, he obtained service on him at his
address on U.S. 59.

Besides process servers, other county officials have been to the U.S. 59 property. Sharon
Schrage claimed that during the time she owned the property at U.S. 59, the county attorney,
representatives from the sheriff's department, representatives from the appraiser's office, a
representative from the health department, and other county officials had been on the property.

Matters Unique to the Hummers' Case

Terry Hummer was the president, sole stockholder, and resident agent of RVH, Inc.
Count 257 in the tax foreclosure petition concerns a mobile home park owned by RVH, Inc.
Neither Terry nor Yvonne Hummer had a personal ownership interest in Count 257. Sole
ownership of the parcel in Count 257 was in RVH, Inc.

On March 30, 2004, a summons was issued for RVH, Inc. On August 12, 2004, separate
summons were issued for Terry and Yvonne Hummer. The address listed on the summons for all
three parties was 4431 N.W. Greenhills Road, Topeka, Kansas, 66618. The return portion of the
summons relating to Terry and Yvonne indicated that service was attempted but not obtained and
that Terry and Yvonne were avoiding service. The return portion of the summons relating to
RVH, Inc. indicated that agent service was obtained on "Sean Sweeney at SNSO."

The County obtained publication service on the Hummers through the same manner used
to obtain publication service on the Schrages. The County also obtained a default judgment on
Count 257 under the same motion used to obtain default judgment against Count 286 (the
Schrages' tract). The notice of sheriff's sale on Count 257 was also published in The Oskaloosa
Independent on the same dates as the notice provided in Count 286, and the property was sold at
the same sheriff's sale.

On January 28, 2005, RVH, Inc. and the Hummers filed a motion to set aside the sale of
Count 257 and the other counts in which they had an interest, claiming a lack of notice of the
judgment or the sale.

At the hearing on his motion, Terry Hummer testified that he did not receive a summons
with respect to this matter or any notice concerning the tax foreclosure sale; he did not recall any
telephone calls from the Shawnee County Sheriff's office indicating that papers were available to
be picked up at its office. Furthermore, Hummer testified that he never had an intent to avoid
service of process on any court matter and that he did not attempt to conceal himself or avoid
public places during the period in which service was attempted. He stated that Sean Sweeney was
an employee of RVH, Inc. who performed general maintenance, and Hummer went on to say that
he never authorized Sweeney to pick up a summons on any matter.

Rosemary Hanna, a process server with the Shawnee County Sheriff's office, testified at
the hearing on the Hummers' motion. Hanna testified that she previously worked as a clerk with
the sheriff's office, and during this time, she received a call from a person who identified himself
as Terry Hummer. Hanna testified that process servers had previously gone to the Hummers'
home at 4431 N.W. Greenhills Road in Topeka and had left notes on the door on two different
occasions. Hanna claimed that when she received the call from Terry, she checked the computer
system to determine if they had any outstanding papers for Terry Hummer but did not find any
matches. When Hanna told Terry that they did not have any papers in his name, Hanna claimed
he told her that it would probably be under the name of his company, RVH, Inc. Hanna then
found two summons for RVH, Inc. and asked if Terry was going to pick them up. Hanna claimed
Terry stated that either he or someone from his company would retrieve them.

Eventually, Sweeney came to the Shawnee County Sheriff's office and picked up the
papers on April 15, 2004. Hanna claimed that she asked Sweeney whether he was a
representative of RVH, Inc. and Sweeney answered affirmatively and claimed that Terry had sent
him to pick up the papers. Hanna did not request any identification from Sweeney before serving
him with the papers. Hanna claimed that Sweeney did not know what type of papers he was
receiving.

At the hearing, Carrie Chambers, the city clerk and court clerk for the City of Meriden,
testified that Sweeney had delivered sewer payments for RVH, Inc. into her office on different
occasions. She also testified that Sweeney had accepted official documents from the City of
Meriden on RVH, Inc.'s behalf.

Ultimately, the district court denied RVH, Inc. and the Hummers' motion to set aside the
sale of Count 257.

Standard of Review and Legal Principles

The Schrages' motion to set aside the sheriff's sale indicated that it was made according to
K.S.A. 79-2804b. No Kansas case has defined the standard of review from a denial of a motion
to set aside a sale under K.S.A. 79-2804b. But, we believe that an examination of K.S.A.
79-2804b persuades us that this action should be treated as we would treat a denial of a motion
filed
according to K.S.A. 60-260(b)(4) dealing with void judgments.

K.S.A. 79-2804b permits the filing of various motions to examine and modify tax
judgments:

"Legal or equitable actions or proceedings may be brought to open, vacate, modify
or set
aside any judgment rendered for taxes, interest and costs or any order of sale made under the
provisions of K.S.A. 79-2803, or amendments thereto, or any sale made under the provisions of
K.S.A. 79-2804, or any amendments thereof, but every such action or proceeding, including
those
brought to set aside judgments on the grounds and in the manner prescribed by the code of civil
procedure, must be commenced within twelve months after the date the sale of the real estate,
which was affected by such judgment, order of sale or sale, was confirmed by the court."

We note that K.S.A. 79-2804b does not provide any standards by which a district court
should grant a motion to set aside a sale. Simply put, under K.S.A. 79-2804b a party may seek to
"open, vacate, modify or set aside" a judgment or a sale. Thus, determining a standard of review
based solely on K.S.A. 79-2804b is not possible. We therefore examine the nature of the action.

In this case, the Schrages are essentially seeking to set aside the sale due to a lack of
personal jurisdiction. See In re Marriage of Brotherton, 30 Kan. App. 2d 1298, 1301,
59 P.3d
1025 (2002) ("Jurisdiction over a party can be acquired only by issuance and service of process
in the method prescribed by statute or by voluntary appearance.") If the district court lacked
jurisdiction over the Schrages, then the district court's orders relating to them would be void. See
Abbey v. Cleveland Inspection Services, Inc., 30 Kan. App. 2d 114, 119, 41 P.3d
297 (2002).
Accordingly, the Schrages' motion to set aside the sale is similar to a motion for relief from a
judgment or order filed under K.S.A. 60-260(b)(4), which applies to void judgments.

Review of a K.S.A. 60-260(b)(4) order is de novo. See State ex rel. Secretary of
SRS v.
Clubb, 30 Kan. App. 2d 1, 3, 39 P.3d 80 (2001), where the court specifically ruled a de
novo
standard is to be employed:

"The standard of review on appeal from a ruling for relief from judgment under
K.S.A.
60-260(b) is generally abuse of discretion. The movant must prove sufficient grounds for relief
by
clear and convincing evidence. [Citation omitted.] However, when a judgment is attacked under
K.S.A. 60-260(b)(4) as being void, there is no question of discretion on the part of the trial court.
'Either a judgment is valid or it is void, and the court must act accordingly once the issue is
resolved.' [Citation omitted.] 'A judgment is void if the court acted in a manner inconsistent with
due process. A void judgment is a nullity and may be vacated at any time.' [Citation omitted.]"

A de novo standard of review should be employed when reviewing motions to set aside
tax judgments and orders of sales on the grounds of insufficient service filed according to K.S.A.
79-2804b.

In denying the Schrages' motion, the district court found that a presumption of validity
existed concerning service of process and that the burden was on the Schrages to overcome the
presumption. The district court found that the Schrages failed to sustain their burden. Finding a
party did not meet its burden of proof is a negative factual finding. Such a finding will not be
disturbed by an appellate court in the absence of proof of an arbitrary disregard of undisputed
evidence or some extrinsic consideration such as bias, passion, or prejudice. See General
Building Contr., LLC v. Board of Shawnee County Comm'rs, 275 Kan. 525, 541, 66 P.3d
873
(2003).

Our Supreme Court in deciding whether the district court erred in refusing to confirm a
tax foreclosure sale due to a county's failure to perform a reasonable search prior to resorting to
service by publication stated: "The initial burden was on the [party attacking service] to show
that the County did not make a reasonable effort to determine a correct address." Board of
Reno
County Comm'rs v. Akins, 271 Kan. 192, 198-99, 21 P.3d 535 (2001). The statement on
the
burden of proof in Akins was previously stated in Board of County
Commissioners v. Knight, 2
Kan. App. 2d 74, 78-79, 574 P.2d 575 (1978), in which this court found that a party attacking
service by publication had the burden of proof to present a prima facie case. If such a showing
was made, then the burden shifted back to the county to show that the party's due process rights
were not violated. Accordingly, the district court's finding that the Schrages initially had the
burden of proof was not erroneous. Thus, we conclude the use of the standard of review that
applies to negative findings is proper.

Analysis of the Schrages' Case

The Schrages argue that the district court erred in finding that they did not meet their
burden of showing that they were not properly served. It is undisputed that K.S.A. 60-307 allows
for service by publication in tax foreclosure actions. However, the Schrages claim that the
County failed to take appropriate actions prior to resorting to service by publication in an effort
to ensure that their due process rights were protected.

For support, the Schrages rely on the decision in Akins. In discussing the
issue of
publication service and foreclosure orders, the Kansas Supreme Court first analyzed
Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 94 L. Ed. 865, 70 S. Ct. 652 (1950), the
fundamental case dealing with the subject. The court in Akins stated:

"Mullane does not stand for the proposition that service by
publication deprives a party
of their due process rights. Service by publication, without more, however, is unconstitutionally
invalid. The Court in Mullane admitted that service by publication is nothing more
than an
exercise in futility a majority of the time. Service by publication will, more often than not, fail to
provide notice to affected parties. Failure to provide actual notice, however, will not prevent a
judicial foreclosure sale of real estate. A party's due process rights are protected by what occurs
prior to and in addition to the attempted publication service. . . . The Court in
Mullane approved
of service by publication where addresses were not known, but disapproved of service by
publication where addresses of parties could be reasonably ascertained. [Citations omitted.]" 271
Kan. at 197.

Clearly, under Akins, resorting to service by publication prior to conducting a
reasonable
search for a party's correct address is improper and violates due process rights. 271 Kan. at 197.
Additionally, while the real estate at issue in the present case is not as economically valuable as
the property in Akins, the property was valuable to the Schrages since they lived on
it.
Accordingly, the standard of reasonableness is heightened in the present case. Thus, this court
must decide whether Jefferson County conducted a reasonable search for the Schrages' correct
address prior to resorting to service by publication.

Even though it is clear from the record that the County had reason to be confused
regarding the Schrages' current address, we do not think the County conducted a proper search
prior to resorting to service by publication. There is evidence indicating that the County could
have discovered the correct address by performing a reasonable investigation. First and foremost
was Officer Chartier's testimony that as an officer with the Jefferson County Sheriff's office, he
had served Kenneth approximately seven times, including once or twice at the U.S. 59 address.
Therefore, if the County had contacted the sheriff's office prior to mailing the summons, it could
have discovered the Schrages' correct address. We do not think it too onerous to require the
County to first attempt personal service in the county by an officer employed just for that purpose
before resorting to publication notice. If it would have been to no avail, the failed effort provides
evidence of a reasonable investigation as to the whereabouts of the parties.

Additionally, Sharon testified that various county officials had been at the U.S. 59
property. Other than Sharon's claim of a visit by an official with the county health department
where the official inspected the septic tank on the property and when county appraisers came to
the property and saw furniture in the barn, it is unclear whether the remaining visits by county
officials put the County on notice that the Schrages were living on the property.

While Akins does not require the County to exhaust every possible resource
in attempting
to determine a person's address or whereabouts prior to resorting to service by publication, it
does require a reasonable search. The County's failure to attempt service at any address other
than the Lawrence address goes against a finding of reasonableness, especially given the fact that
personal service was never attempted at the property at issue. It is clear that the County had
access to the U.S. 59 address but simply decided to only attempt service at the address which the
treasurer's office had connected to the Schrages most often. We cannot find this to be reasonable.

Furthermore, we recognize that the behavior of the Schrages was suspect. This point is
mentioned in Akins:

"We readily agree that a taxpayer has some duty to keep a county informed of the
taxpayer's address and to pay property taxes. However, when we are dealing with substantial
and/or valuable parcels of real estate (here it appears the land was worth in excess of $150,000),
the efforts taken by the County to locate the landowner should be proportional to the use and
value of the property." 271 Kan. at 200.

It appears the district court arbitrarily disregarded undisputed evidence. The court did not
refer to the evidence supporting the Schrages' claim, such as Chartier's testimony or even the fact
that the County was aware of other addresses for the Schrages, in making its decision.
Additionally, the only evidence the court referred to regarding the reasonableness of the County's
search was the fact that the County attempted service at the Lawrence address. The court cited
plenty of evidence showing why the County was confused as to the Schrages' correct address but
did not indicate that it even considered the reasonableness of the search.

If the evidence disregarded by the district court is taken into account, it is reasonable to
conclude that the County did not perform a reasonable search. The County admits to having
multiple addresses for the Schrages but did not take any action other than searching motor
vehicle records and attempting service at the Lawrence address to find the correct address.
Unquestionably, other methods were available. The County's failure to use these methods
resulted in a denial of the Schrages' due process rights. Accordingly, the district court's decision
is reversed.

Since we are reversing this count, we need not examine the Schrages' claim that the
County never actually attained service on them due to the County's failure to comply with K.S.A.
60-307(e).

Analysis of the Hummers and RVH, Inc.'s Case

RVH, Inc. claims the district court erred by finding that it did not meet its burden of
showing improper service. While publication notice was served on the corporation as well as the
Hummers, publication notice is not the primary issue here. The County claims it obtained agent
service on RVH, Inc. when it served Sean Sweeney. Since the corporation had sole ownership of
the tract in Count 257, the service by publication as it relates to the Hummers individually is
irrelevant.

The primary issue on appeal is whether Sweeney was an agent of RVH, Inc. at the time
service was obtained on him. Resolution of this issue involves a review of factual findings made
by the district court. We review these findings by determining whether substantial competent
evidence exists to support them. See U.S.D. No. 233 v. Kansas Ass'n of American
Educators, 275
Kan. 313, 318, 64 P.3d 372 (2003). "'The court does not weigh conflicting evidence, pass on
credibility of witnesses, or redetermine questions of fact.' [Citation omitted.]" State ex rel.
Morrison v. Oshman Sporting Goods Co. Kansas, 275 Kan. 763, 775, 69 P.3d 1087
(2003).

In this case, substantial competent evidence exists to support the district court's factual
finding that Sweeney was a general agent of RVH, Inc. First, it was uncontested that Sweeney
worked for RVH. Additionally, Rosemary Hanna, a process server with the Shawnee County
Sheriff's office who was working as a clerk at the relevant time herein, testified that a person
identifying himself as Terry Hummer called her after notes had been left at the Hummers'
residence by process servers indicating that he needed to pick up papers. Hanna testified that
Terry told her during the conversation that the papers would likely be under RVH, Inc. Hanna
further testified that Terry told her that either he or someone from his company would get the
papers. Hanna also claimed that a person identifying himself as Sweeney arrived on April 15,
2004, to pick up the papers. Hanna also testified that Sweeney stated that he was a representative
of RVH, Inc. Additionally, Carrie Chambers, the city clerk and court clerk for the City of
Meriden, testified that Sweeney had accepted official documents on RVH, Inc.'s behalf on prior
occasions.

Terry Hummer disputed Hanna's account of their conversations and the claim that he
authorized Sweeney to pick up papers on his behalf. However, as stated earlier, this court does
not pass on the credibility of witnesses or reweigh conflicting evidence. The only question is
whether the evidence presented by the County was sufficient to support the factual findings by
the district court. Accordingly, after analyzing the evidence set forth above, substantial
competent evidence exists to support the district court's findings of fact.

This evidence discussed above is sufficient to prove that Sweeney was not only directed
to pick up the papers at Shawnee County but had also performed similar duties on other
occasions. This is sufficient to show that Sweeney was a general agent of RVH, Inc. and,
therefore, service was proper.

It is important to review the service statute. K.S.A. 60-304(e) allows service on
corporations and other associations and states that service can be obtained "by serving an officer,
manager, partner or a resident, managing or general agent . . . ." The County claims that Sweeney
was a general agent of RVH, Inc. Kansas courts have not set forth a precise definition of a
general agent. However, in Masek Distributing, Inc. v. First State Bank & Trust
Co., 908 F.
Supp. 856, 862 (D. Kan. 1995), the federal court enunciated principles it believed the Kansas
Supreme Court would use when determining whether a person is general or special agent.
Specifically, the court stated:

"'One who is an integral part of a business organization and does not require fresh
authorization
for each transaction is a general agent.' [Citation omitted.] The extent of discretion an agent has
regarding the transactions he or she is employed to perform does not bear on whether the agent is
special or general. [Citation omitted.] 'Thus, one is a general agent if he is in continuous
employment, although the employment consists of purchasing articles as the employer directs
with
no discretion as to the kinds, amounts, or prices to be paid.' [Citation omitted.]" 908 F. Supp. at
862.

We believe the definition of a general agent set out above is reasonable and find it
persuasive.

If the apparent authority doctrine is applied to the present case, then Sweeney had
apparent authority to accept service. The facts indicated that Terry contacted Hanna and told her
that either him or one of his representatives would be by to pick up the papers. Sweeney later
arrived and identified himself as a representative of RVH, Inc. No facts exist which indicate that
Hanna had any reason to doubt Sweeney's capacity to accept the papers. Accordingly, service was
proper.

We reverse the Schrages' judgment and remand. We affirm the RVH, Inc. judgment.