The Death of Socrates

Friday, 30 December 2011

Is human freewill necessary for humans to be morally responsible for their acts?

[SCL] Moral responsibility and culpability is
nothing to do with freewill whether this exists or not. A moral
agent is culpable for an action if that action is largely determined
by their character, nature or habits, as opposed to some external
constraint or threat (whether physical or psychological) or some
irreformable and incurable pathology or some transient aberration, as
might occur as a result of high fever or unintentional intoxication.

[SCL] If a moral agent’s action or behaviour is
potentially correctable by means of training or education (or
whatever other just means) then they are culpable and should attract
such training or education, which may involve punishment. Punishment,
however, should never be understood in terms of retribution or
vengeance. It never achieves any good to hurt someone just for the
sake of harming them.

[SCL] If a moral agent’s action or behaviour is
not susceptible to correction, then they are not culpable. If the
action or behaviour is liable to recur and is of a sufficient
nuisance, then they should have their freedom curtailed so as to
prevent them re-offending. This constraint should not have any
penitential character.

[MC]
Despite the fact that I agree with you on the importance of character
with regards to moral responsibility I think that once a certain
level of maturity has been reached, a person is ultimately
responsible for their own character. If they choose to indulge bad
habits and solidify a bad character, that is an act of free will, and
that is what makes them morally culpable.

[SCL] I agree unless you
mean that you are sure that there is such a thing as freewill in a
naïve sense of “could have done otherwise” and that “choice”
implies the exercise of such “freewill”. A person is clearly
responsible for their actions because they do them! One doesn't need
to be exercising a naïve freewill to be responsible.

[MC]
There is a difference between the type of responsibility you're
describing and the moral responsibility you were discussing. If a
baby picks up a gun and shoots a person, the baby is responsible in
the sense that the baby performed the action – thus fitting your
definition of responsibility – but the baby is clearly not morally
culpable.

[SCL] Why is the baby
“clearly” not morally responsible? How come that they picked up
the gun and shot someone? We don’t have the full story here.
Perhaps the baby was rather advanced in its mental development! Of
course if the baby had no idea of what a gun is or what death is and
that it could kill someone by shooting them, then my criterion for
culpability is not satisfied: the act was then no more than an
unfortunate misunderstanding or accident and nothing to do with the
agent’s character.

[MC]
My definition of the relationship of moral responsibility and free
will includes, but is not limited to, the naïve definition you
provide. Yes, a person is morally responsible if they could have done
otherwise – provided that they also could have known otherwise than
they did. A person who does wrong from ignorance is not morally
culpable, even though they were responsible for the action.

[SCL] Indeed: but I’d
say that this is because the act was not characteristic. Given that
they were not cognoscente of its implications they did not envisage
or intend them, hence these objective implications cannot be used to
evaluate the subjective ethical character of their actions.

[MC]
A person who does wrong despite the fact that they could reasonably
be supposed to have known better is morally responsible for their
actions, either because they deliberately did what they knew to be
wrong (an exercise of free will against their moral responsibility)
or because they failed to take positive action to remedy their lack
of knowledge or previously corrupted character (a failure to exercise
free will to discover and/or abide by your moral duties). Either way,
free will is of paramount importance.

[SCL] No. What is of
paramount importance is their character. I invoke Occam’s Rasor
here. All of what you say can be accounted for in terms of whether
the act flowed from their own personality and habitual virtues and
vices or not. There is absolutely no need to invoke another issue:
“freewill”. If some outcome was not envisaged in the act then
this outcome played no part in the deliberative process which gave
rise to the act. If I do not know that pressing the green button
causes someone to be electrocuted to death then my pressing the green
button for some other reason (even simply to amuse myself) is not an
act of murder. Of course, we agree, that recklessness is itself a
seriously immoral characteristic; but it is never clear what
precautions one should take or research undertake in order to avoid
the just charge of recklessness.

[SCL] Given that an agent
did in fact do what they did, and given that this fact is determined
by their experience and character and given that their character is
itself determined by their experience, nurture and genetic
inheritance, how could they have done other than what in fact they
did do?

[SCL] It would seem
that this is only possible if one invokes “randomness”. This
produces two problems. First, a random act cannot possibly be
culpable. Second, it is not clear what “random” means, and it may
be that nothing can in fact be random! Invoking a non-material soul
or spirit changes nothing. The argument repeats in the same way. If I
am wrong in my analysis, please show me how. I would be truly
indebted to you.

[MC]
So, you're a determinist. Makes sense, I suppose.

[SCL] I am not a
determinist in the sense that I wish to eliminate the notion of
“freewill” from the discussion. In fact I don’t think that
strict causality implies physical determinism in any naïve sense
(because of “The Butterfly Effect”) any more that freewill is
dependent on “could have done otherwise”.

[MC]
You can't possibly believe that free will would have anything to do
with moral responsibility, because for you free will as such cannot
exist. It is at best a questionably-grounded construction other
people use to assign responsibility for acts, and at worst a total
illusion.

[SCL] Not really. As far
as I can see “freewill” as you understand it is an superfluous
hypothesis: that is all. I used to think that it was necessary and
used this as an argument to justify believing in “naïve freewill”.
Then I thought about the whole issue more carefully and concluded
that I had been wrong. It seems to me that one only need believe in
“naïve freewill” if one wishes to justify retribution and
vengeance. As a Platonist, I have no desire to justify such things:
my conclusion that “naïve freewill” is spurious follows.

[MC]
I agree that “ a random act cannot possibly be culpable.” I am
unclear about “it is not clear what ‘random’ means, and it may
be that nothing can in fact be random!”. However, even stipulating
that I agreed with your objection to an unclear definition, your
prefatory sentence still seems staggeringly wrong.

[MC]
An agent does, in fact, do what they do – that's tautologous –
and it is true that the action proceeds from their experience and
character; however, you're slipping in a different use of the word
“determined” here. I grant that the motivation for any non-random
act I perform may be found somewhere in my experience or in my
character (or both). Therefore, those things together determine the
range of options which I possess; but I still have a choice of
options within that range. And though my experience and character may
predispose me toward one of the options, my choice is not thereby
determined.

[SCL] How do you know this? What, then,
does determine or cause or elicit your action?

[MC]
Do you see? We are taught, and fed, and observe, and practice – and
so learn – a wide variety of moral stances and positions, correct?

[SCL] I’m not sure of your meaning
here, but I suppose that I agree with you.

[MC]
Then I fail to see how you can hold that any response of a competent
moral agent can possibly be determined in the sense that the agent
could not have done otherwise.

[SCL] Similarly, I fail
to see how I could hold anything otherwise. The issue here is not
about human freewill so much as the occurrence of any event. It would
seem that either an account can be made of the event such that one
comes to understand how and why this event occurred rather than any
other that might seem to be possible before one understood the
situation and lawful processes involved; or else no such account can
be made. In the first case one has to conclude that the event was
caused – if not, strictly speaking “determined” – by the
relevant circumstances and lawful processes and “could not have
been otherwise”, that is: it was not arbitrary, but coherent. In
the second case one has to conclude that the event was random,
arbitrary, uncaused and “could definitely have been otherwise”!
However, you have agreed that – in the case of human acts – this
second possibility is incompatible with culpability; hence it follows
that culpability is only a coherent concept in connection with events
(and human acts are certainly “events”) which are causal and so
“could not have been otherwise”.

[MC]
An example. The man who sees a rough-sleeper on the street and gives
him five pounds' worth of charity entertains doubts about how they
will spend the money, and feels guilty wondering whether they will
just spend it on drink and worsen their situation. The man who sees a
rough-sleeper on the street and does nothing entertains doubts about
whether this might not have been an “honest” down-and-out who
would have used the money for food, and feels guilty wondering
whether he has just passed up the opportunity to do good by someone
else. Both men experienced the same range of options. Perhaps they
were predisposed to the choice they made; but the mere fact that they
experienced the discomfort of a moral dilemma is evidence that the
options they discarded were still live to them. They could have done
other than they did.

[SCL] This is a mere
assertion. There is no reason to think that it is true. I grant that
when one makes a choice in such a situation it “feels” as if “one
could have done otherwise”, but all that this means in practice is
that there was a choice to be made; and that there was a conflict of
uncertainty: not that one could have chosen differently.

‎[MC]
I expect that you will attempt to invoke some sort of “complete
picture” argument, whereby you argue that the choice of any agent
is really determined, and the phenomenon I have discussed above is
merely evidence of the complexity of human experiences and
characters.

[SCL]
Indeed: you haven't taken into account the complete picture. Any
specific act is itself caused by their character, their past
experiences and by the immediate situation in which they found
themselves. It was these things which led them to do what they did,
and they could not have done otherwise.”

[MC]
But consider human nature. We very often do things differently in
similar situations. I have been both men in the above situations, for
example – I have both given and failed to give charity. So how can
you say which is my dominant response, since I have done both and so
clearly could do otherwise?[SCL] But are the
situations exactly the same in all the important factors? Did you
have the same emotional mood, and were you in the same financial
situation? Did the bum’s appearance inspire equal sympathy in you,
or more or less? Were there people near you whom you would care to
impress through an act of charity? Was the bum standing close to a
liquor store? Had someone been kind or cruel to you recently? Had you
heard a sermon on “the Good Samaritan” recently? Had you read an
article about the foolishness of giving money to rough sleepers,
recently?

[MC]
Well, of course the factors won’t all be the same. The likelihood
of even the major factors being the same is astronomical; and when
you taken into account the minor factors, the chances become so long
as to be practically impossible.

[SCL]
Well, there you are, then! Different situations lead to different
responses; but if you ever ran into a situation that was the same in
all the relevant particulars, you couldn't do otherwise than you had
done before – barring some change in your character or experience,
of course; which would be inevitable, given that the second time was
subsequent to the first and so your previous experience relevant to
the second event is definitely different to that which was relevant
to the first event.

[MC] Very
convenient. Since those people would likely never run into exactly
the same situation again, you are free to claim that if they respond
differently in a similar situation in future, there is some
controlling difference, either in an overlooked situational factor or
in the modified characters or experiences of those people. So, if I
gave money to a bum, and then had a bad experience with bums, the
next one I meet and don't give money to, you would explain by
saying… [SCL] …that your new experience was
involved in and contributed to your revised judgement.

[MC]
There’s a difference between determined and informed. I can still
choose to go against my instinctive desire to not give money to this
rough-sleeper based on my bad past experience, can’t I? How is that
not an exercise of free will? [SCL] Such a desire
would have to be motivated by some event from your past, or some
moral code embedded in your character, wouldn't it? Otherwise, it's
causeless!

[MC] Sure. [SCL]
You see, then: your moral acts can be accounted for in terms of your
experience and character and there is no need to postulate that “you
could have done otherwise.”

[MC]
But this doesn’t mean thay are determined! Both choices are a part
of my moral fabric. That I am inclined toward one or the other at any
given point does not mean that both choices are not still available
to me. The choice does not have to random to be free, nor do the
alternatives have to be perfectly equal in probability. All that
matters is that I make a selection from the range available to me,
recognizing that of course there is a range available to me.

[SCL] You are now
invoking a thing called “freedom” which seems to have all the
characteristics of “random” but which you wish, nevertheless, to
distinguish from “random”. Moreover you are referring to
“probability” which only signifies something in the context of a
random variable. In any case, it is not clear what “random means”
or that anything is truly random.

[MC]
Well, if you admit that you do not know what “random” means,
perhaps this allows one to believe that some things which seem
“random” are actually significant somhow – and that this
justifies calling them “free” rather than simply “random”.

[SCL] Perhaps – but
I’d require you to give an account of this; not just assert it as a
matter of “blind irrational faith”; and then, it would seem
plausible that any such account would render “free”
part-and-parcel of the general account of how an an event came to
happen. Once more, “free” acts would be accountable in terms of
character and experience.

[SCL] Moreover, any
choice which you actualize is determined by a host of factors, many
of which you might not even be aware of. [MC]
Can you give me an account of which factors would incline me certain
ways and why? I mean, it's your thesis that this must be the case.
With one neat sentence, you’ve said that you can in principle
explain every single thing anyone does. Let’s see you actually do
that in practice!

[SCL]
I don't have all the necessary information to predict your actions.
Of course not! This is part of the difference of an event being
“accountable”, “inevitable” and “caused” on the one hand
and “determined” and “predictable” on the other.

[MC]
Then you can’t prove I don’t have free will! [SCL]
It isn’t my business to do so! I am only intent on showing you that
you have no need to account for “freewill”, “moral
responsibility” or “culpability” in terms of “could have done
otherwise.”

[MC] I have the experience
of choosing. [SCL] Indeed, and so do I; but it is a
mistake to interpret this experience in terms of thinking that “you
could have done otherwise.” In fact, your decisions are accountable
in terms of genetics, mood, character and experience – past and
present.

[MC] Let's set aside genes for
the moment. I have, in the past, put myself into situations that
changed my experiential data, or have deliberately put myself into
situations knowing that a change in my character was likely to
result. That's an exercise of free will, which neatly incorporates
and supersedes your whole outlook. [SCL] Such a choice
would have to be motivated by...

[MC]
…previous genetics, experiences, or character. I know! I know! If I
pull your string, will you say something else?

[SCL] What would motivate
me to do so? It seems to me that I have a surprisingly complete and
coherent account of all the experience which you want me to explain.
If you could show me an inconsistency or an incompleteness in my
account, I would be very grateful; but until you do, I cannot
conceive of any reason to deviate from my script – especially in
terms of the deviation which you seem to favour as it appears to be
incoherent and to explain nothing!

[MC]
OK, here is a puzzle for you to chew on:

[MC] Let's say, just
for the sake of argument, that my decisions are completely determined
by my genetics and my experiences and my character combined.
Therefore, none of my decisions is truly free, and so on my
definition I am not morally responsible for them.

[SCL] On my account of
things, you may very well be responsible for your acts: if your
character is reformable – which fact you have not reported.

[MC]
My genes are entirely a result of a random combination of genes from
my parents. My character and experience partly comes from them –
they are certainly the dominant figures – but also from a host of
others, and even from the arrangement of things in the world. So
these people and things exhaustively explain my behaviour, and
therefore, they host the moral responsibility for my actions.

[SCL] That is a logical
non-sequetor. I have said that culpabiliy arises when (1) an act
flowslargely from the nature of the actor and (2) if that nature is
susceptible to reformation.

[MC]
But these people also got their genetics, characters, and experiences
from elsewhere. So none of their decisions on how to raise me was a
free one, either...and the genetics passed down to them were totally
random, from a limited set of options.

[SCL] On your account of
things, yes; but not on mine!

[MC] So
the ultimate responsibility for my behaviour must be passed back to
the explanations of the genetics, characters, and experiences of
those who affected those who affected me. But none of those people
can ultimately be held responsible either, for the same reason. In
fact, it seems as though no human being can be ultimately responsible
for his or her moral behaviour, or for the behaviour of any other
person.

[SCL] On your account of
things, yes; but not on mine!

[MC] The
question, then: WHO OR WHAT IS?

[MC] You have five options,
as far as I can see:

[MC] 1) Claim that nothing is ultimately
responsible.

[SCL] No!

[MC]
2) Claim that Nature is ultimately responsible.

[SCL] No!

[MC]
3) Claim that God is ultimately responsible.

[SCL] Yes – but not as
you mean it!

[MC] 4) Claim that there is an
error in my definition of moral responsibility.

[SCL] Yes, as I have been
doing consistently all along!

[MC] 5) Admit
defeat.

[SCL] Never!

[MC]
I assume you will choose the fourth. Selecting the first would render
your whole post moot. Selecting the second would be tantamount to
admitting that assignment of moral responsibility is based on sheer
chance. Selecting the third would be tantamount to holding God
responsible for the sins of all of humanity. And since you clearly
don't agree with my view that moral responsibility is tied to free
will, in a choice between the only remaining options of #4 and #5,
you must pick the former.

[SCL] This is an example of excellent
logical reasoning!

[MC]
Now, then. WHY?

[SCL] I hope that this is clear from
what I have said above. To reiterate:

[SCL] Moral responsibility and culpability is
nothing to do with freewill whether this exists or not. A moral
agent is culpable for an action if that action is largely determined
by their character, nature or habits, as opposed to some external
constraint or threat (whether physical or psychological) or some
irreformable and incurable pathology or some transient aberration, as
might occur as a result of high fever or unintentional intoxication.

[SCL] If a moral agent’s action or behaviour is
potentially correctable by means of training or education (or
whatever other just means) then they are culpable and should attract
such training or education, which may involve punishment. Punishment,
however, should never be understood in terms of retribution or
vengeance. It never achieves any good to hurt someone just for the
sake of harming them.

[SCL] If a moral agent’s action or behaviour is
not susceptible to correction, then they are not culpable. If the
action or behaviour is liable to recur and is of a sufficient
nuisance, then they should have their freedom curtailed so as to
prevent them re-offending. This constraint should not have any
penitential character.

[SCL] As far as I can see
“freewill” as you understand it is an superfluous hypothesis:
that is all. I used to think that it was necessary and used this as
an argument to justify believing in “naïve freewill”. Then I
thought about the whole issue more carefully and concluded that I had
been wrong. It seems to me that one only need believe in “naïve
freewill” if one wishes to justify retribution and vengeance. As a
Platonist, I have no desire to justify such things: my conclusion
that “naïve freewill” is spurious follows.

[SCL] The issue here is
not about human freewill so much as the occurrence of any event. It
would seem that either an account can be made of the event such that
one comes to understand how and why this event occurred rather than
any other that might seem to be possible before one understood the
situation and lawful processes involved; or else no such account can
be made. In the first case one has to conclude that the event was
caused – if not, strictly speaking “determined” – by the
relevant circumstances and lawful processes and “could not have
been otherwise”, that is: it was not arbitrary, but coherent. In
the second case one has to conclude that the event was random,
arbitrary, uncaused and “could definitely have been otherwise”!
However, you have agreed that – in the case of human acts – this
second possibility is incompatible with culpability; hence it follows
that culpability is only a coherent concept in connection with events
(and human acts are certainly “events”) which are causal and so
“could not have been otherwise”.