Description
This paper explains why the Iraqi performance in Desert Storm was predictable: Nonindustrialized, third world nations are incapable of fielding a decisive, conventional air force. To illustrate the point, this essay studies Iraq’s performance in the war against Iran. During the conflict, the Iraqi air force obtained all the equipment and training money could buy, but after eight years of combat experience it still made only minor contributions in a war effort against an equal foe. The in- ability of third world nations to independently organize, train, and equip air forces to decisive levels is inevitable. Avoiding large, wasted sums of money fielding a force of questionable value should lead these countries to alternative forms of aerial warfare.

Table of Contents
1 ORGANIZATION 1
Origins of the Ba’athist Movement 1
Iraqi Military Political Involvement 2
Organization of the Air Force 3
Organizational Summary 5
Notes 6
2 TRAINING 7
Importance of Training 7
Public Education in Iraq 8
Iraqi Military Training 9
Foreign Training 10
The Training Factor 11
Notes 13
3 EQUIPPING 14
Expanding the Military in Iraq 14
Growth of the Iraqi Air Force 15
Iraq’s Money Supply 17
Problems of Acquisition 18
Notes 20
4 EMPLOYMENT. 21
Prewar Air Power Balance 22
Start of the War 22
Air Power in the First Two Years 25
Export War 27
Targeting Iran’s Will 33
Air Support of the Army 37
Summary of Iraqi Air Combat 41
Notes 42
5 CONCLUSION 45
Failure of the Iraqi Air Force 45
Limits of Third World Air Power 46
Alternatives to a Large Air Force 46
The Future 48
BIBLIOGRAPHY 49