Monday, September 2, 2013

Syria - My response to five non-interventionist arguments

In a democracy,
very few issues demand more scrutiny than debates over the prospective use of military
force.

Yet, just as the
opponents of intervention in Syria should spare no quarter in their critiques,
so too must their analysis meet reciprocal consideration. To facilitate serious
discussion, a debate must necessarily involve more than one argument and one
rebuttal.

So, in that regard, here are my criticisms of some of the non-intervention
arguments that have been made over the last week.

Matt Lewis, ‘A
clear red line, the paper tiger… and how we get dragged into war’ The Daily Caller

Matt Lewis, a
columnist I greatly respect, suggests that we’re allowing
ourselves to be ‘’sucked’’ into an
unwarranted conflict. Lewis posits that the focus on upholding the ‘red line’
is dangerously misguided. Instead, he argues, we should consider the merits of
military intervention without the polluting influence of perception centric considerations. Lewis further suggests that it
could be a positive future circumstance, if Iran and co. falsely perceive American
weakness, but later find that assessment painfully mistaken.

I disagree.

From my
perspective, Lewis is disconnecting two fundamentally interdependent elements
of US foreign policy. Credibility is interwoven with our direct, immediate
interests. America’s enemies; though variable in ideology, nonetheless tend to
have one thing in common. They’re totalitarians. When America is perceived as
weak, the cause of peace is hampered (see Iran). In that
scenario, American interests eventually and inevitably become directly
involved.

When you’re dealing
with people who believe that political discourse involves blowing
up playgrounds, you better be sure that they understand your resolve. For
America’s word to have any meaning, for our power to be real, we must back up
our words with action.

Landis centers his
argument in two themes. First, that ‘’U.S. intervention in Syria will
likely lead to something similar [to the 2003 invasion of Iraq]: civil war and radicalization.’’ Second, ‘’with America's economy in the dumps, its military badly bruised, its
reputation among Muslims in tatters, and its people fatigued by foreign wars
[intervention would be a mistake].’’ I have problems with both these statements. On the first point, does Landis
genuinely believe that Syria’s present situation is amenable to even a
semblance of long term stability? As I argued earlier this week, while a US intervention in Syria is
indeed fraught with risk, our failure to intervene likely portends one of two
terrible outcomes – Syria’s descent into a Salafi terrorist dominated political
wasteland, or, an Assad victory that would be perceived (and acted upon) by
Iran as a theologically ordained victory over the United States.

On the
second point, I believe that Landis is making the archetypal mistake in terms
of identifying anti-US sentiment in the Islamic world. Ultimately, America
isn’t hated because of what we do, we’re hated because we lack policy
consistency and because we’re
unwilling to confidently
articulate the rationale
for our actions. Oh… and though it certainly wouldn’t be a cakewalk (and
shouldn’t be considered flippantly), there’s also no question that the US Military possesses the capability to intervene
against Assad in a meaningful way.

Ponnoru’s main
contention: ‘’This
is not a military action that we are undertaking to defend ourselves from
attack or to protect a core interest. The congressional power to declare war,
if it is not to be a dead letter, has to apply here.’’ I fundamentally disagree. Even by the standards of the War
Powers Act (see sixty day deadline), a law which I have vigorously
defended, the decision
to apply limited action against Assad rests with the Executive… aka the
President. In this vein, Obama has made an awfulmiscalculation in requesting approval from Congress. In addition, I don't see how it's possible to honestly argue that the US lacks a ‘’core
interest’’ in Syria. Constraining Iranian influence, opposing the massacre
of civilians, preventing the emergence of a de-facto terrorist caliphate,
reinforcing the deterrent posture of American ‘red lines’… the list of
compelling US imperatives is both long and substantial.

Yglesias suggests
that instead of using military force (it’s too risky…), we should ‘’work at the United Nations to get wrongdoing punished.’’ He doesn’t seem
to be joking.

Look, I get that
intervention isn’t a simple proposition. I’m also fully cognizant of the great
risks that are involved. But to suggest that UN action poses a viable
alternative? Ludicrous. Yglesias is using the false aura of au-naturel UN legitimacy to defend his
argument against its inherent weakness – the continued slaughter of civilians,
the destruction of WMD deterrence and the evaporation of America’s word. His
defense of a ‘’rules based’’ international
system that precludes responsive action is at once morally pathetic and
intellectually defective. In short, what use are rules if they permit the
unrestrained gassing of children?

Incidentally, I’m always
shocked by the striking and unrepentant hypocrisy of the American left in their
understandings of morality.

Friedersdorf’s argument is pretty simple – ‘'Intervening in Syria could have catastrophic consequences for
America and for the region. Non-intervention would pose no threat to us….’'

Wrong.
I outlined the awful risks of non-intervention in my response to Matt Lewis,
however, Friedersdorf’s suggestion that intervention ‘’could have catastrophic consequences’’ is below him. Of course
intervention is risky. That’s conflict. Nevertheless, Friedersdorf is using Moltke’s general
law (the application of military force is inherently unpredictable)
in order to make a strategic argument against one particular intervention. The
only way that Friedersdorf can honestly subscribe to this supposition is by
adopting a position of absolute pacifism. Regardless, Friedersdorf speaks to a
general (and as I see it far too casual) theme amongst those opposing
intervention. In the aftermath of Iraq, scrutiny of US military deployments has
increased. That’s a good thing.
Nevertheless, using the social hesitancy born of Iraq as a foundational strategic
argument against Syria isn’t tenable. It allows the non-interventionist
movement to make non-interventionist arguments that offer little beyond ‘it’s
risky so we shouldn’t do it’, whilst simultaneously locking interventionist
arguments into an inherent catch 22 – ‘if it doesn’t go perfect, you were wrong.’
Sure, we need a plan for intervention. But the non-interventionists also need
to address what is likely to occur if
we don’t intervene.

In
the end, the intervention versus non-intervention discussion should be
characterized by a reciprocal debate. One vested in the balancing of facts and the
consideration of risks in the context of America’s long term humanitarian/strategic
interests.

But
those of us who support intervention also need to play a responsive role. We
shouldn’t be afraid to critique those arguments that challenge ours.

3 comments:

I don't see how your arguments apply to the strategy as proposed. The President's plan, to lob a few missiles and not aim for anything more, would do nothing to prevent a Salafist and terrorist dominated government.

I think that regardless, even if we do intervene, there are two likely outcomes: Syria’s descent into a Salafi terrorist dominated political wasteland, or, an Assad victory that would be perceived (and acted upon) by Iran as a theologically ordained victory over the United States.

Nothing in what has been proposed so far makes either of those two outcomes less likely, and I think that on average intervening would increase the chance of civilian casualties.

John, thanks for your comment. When I talk about intervention - I personally include these steps (http://www.tomroganthinks.com/2013/08/5-proposals-for-american-intervention.html), which I suspect (to some degree or another) we're already taking. As you say, by the confines of their tactical capability and pursuant to the President's ''limited'' strategy, a missile attack can only hope to achieve WMD deterrence. However, I also believe that collaboratively, these variable steps would be able to exert pressure on Assad to reduce his civilian bloodletting.

I'd like to think so. But I also worry that limited escalation against Assad-- without committing to getting him out of power-- could cause him to increase the ferocity of his (conventional) attacks by increasing the severity of the war.

Suppose that the only two outcomes are the Salafi terrorist allied groups winning, or Assad. From a geopolitical standpoint of the US, stalemate might be preferable. From a civilian standpoint, a continuing civil war might have higher civilian casualties than either side winning, however. So I'm afraid that it's possible that the USA's strategic interests are not the same as those of Syrian civilians.

In any case, intervening calls for a high level of engagement, higher than the Administration is willing to announce in public (though I hope that they're doing so in private.) There's certainly no guarantee that Salafists wouldn't take over after the civil war ended, as in the experience of Afghanistan after the Soviet invasion ended. So I'm reluctant, like Ramesh, to endorse a plan when some of the most important aspects the Administration is unwilling to endorse publicly, and we're left to "suspect" that it's doing them.