Here, you are urged and encouraged to run your mouths about something important.

Tuesday, March 19, 2013

Obama to Republicans on National Debt: Heads I win, Tails you lose

Every time we reach another national debt crisis fork in the road (debt ceiling, continuing resolution, fiscal cliff, etc.), Barack Obama flips a coin. Right before doing so, he sets the rules: heads I win, tails you lose. The problem is that his opponents accept the terms.

It's common knowledge that Obama is quite familiar with the Cloward-Piven strategy. In fact, he's been implementing it since he was first inaugurated in 2009. That strategy is to so overwhelmingly burden entitlement programs that the system eventually collapses. The strategy was originally created in the 1960's and the Obama administration has applied it in a 21st Century world (Obama phones just one example).

As the debt climbs higher and higher, Obama banks on two theorems he might see as a win/win situation (heads and tails):

The collapse of the society Cloward-Piven strategists want, gets closer.

Arrest / reversal of the process becomes increasingly more difficult as collapse approaches.

Theorem number one is precisely why Obama doesn't just appear to be disinterested in solving the debt crisis; his actions and demeanor clearly demonstrate that he's interested in furthering it (heads I win). The lavish vacations and runaway spending that seems ridiculously outrageous to clear-thinking individuals will never embarrass him because it's all part of his plan. The longer his opponents attempt to embarrass him, the more he spends because he knows he either has those opponents snookered or neutered (Boehner saying he 'absolutely' trusts Obama is a case in point). The reason he's behaving like a man who wants to collapse the economy is because he does.

The more debt the country goes into, the closer we get to the endgame of the Cloward-Piven strategy - collapse.

Yet, for some reason, Obama's political opponents who have the power to confront this problem (House leadership), refuse to admit the truth and, subsequently allow Obama to further test and reinforce his first theorem. This can be seen perfectly in Speaker John Boehner's refusal to attach an Obamacare de-funding mechanism to the Continuing Resolution, which means a monstrous steroid injection to both theorems. That Rep. Paul Ryan put forth a budget that de-funds Obamacare while also knowing it hadn't a chance of passing, demonstrates that Obama's opponents know what's right but refuse to do it.

The longer theorem number one can be tested before Republican leadership decides to arrest and reverse the process, the better it is for Obama because it will only strengthen theorem number two.

Sequestration gave us a look into what Obama would do if Speaker John Boehner, et. al. chose to test theorem number two on a more grandiose scale, like say, the upcoming CR (tails you lose).

Up until sequestration actually happened, the Republicans never really knew how Obama would handle things if the former never caved because... Republicans always seemed to cave. Whether it was the debt ceiling, CR's, or the fiscal cliff, in the end, Obama always got another blank check and the national debt has just continued rising. As such, the president has been able to further test both theorems.

When sequestration happened, we got our first glimpse at Obama's playbook if Boehner, et. al. ever made a serious attempt to reverse the country's self-destructive fiscal course. The cancellation of White House tours and the release of hardened criminals were indicators. In the first instance, American citizens were told to stay off their own property. It wasn't just unnecessary, political, petty, and punitive - it was also symbolic. More seriously, the decision to release thousands of hardened criminals was meant to threaten a much larger White House-sanctioned prison release if House leadership decided to finally deal with the debt crisis.

In essence, Obama was saying that if the opposition attempted to confront the real debt problem, he would hold America hostage. This communicates something else as well, namely, that Obama isn't as eager to test theorem number two as he is theorem number one. He's acting like a man who wants to reach the Cloward-Piven endgame by never having to win a game of chicken over theorem number two. The administration's handling of sequestration did more harm to Obama than it did to House Republican leadership, which is why the latter should ultimately force Obama's hand.

If this administration was so willing to use sequestration to so transparently harm Americans, what would it do if the government was shut down because House leadership decided not to pass that CR?

Perhaps Obama doesn't want us to find out because he knows his actions will finally be transparently his alone and that he will lose.