Security Council Imposes Additional Sanctions on Iran,

Voting 12 in Favour to 2 Against, with 1 Abstention

Expressing deep concern about Iran’s lack of compliance with its previous resolutions on ensuring the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme, the Security Council imposed additional sanctions on the country today, expanding an arms embargo and tightening restrictions on financial and shipping enterprises related to “proliferation-sensitive activities”.

Adopting resolution 1929 (2010) by a vote of 12 in favour to 2 against (Brazil, Turkey), with 1 abstention (Lebanon), the Council also requested the Secretary-General to create a panel of experts to monitor implementation of the sanctions. Annexed to the text containing the fourth round of sanctions imposed on Iran were measures directed against 41 new named entities and individuals, including one scientist and enterprises linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard and the defence industry, as well as banks and the national shipping line.

By other terms of the resolution, the Council decided that Iran should not acquire interests in any commercial activity relating to uranium enrichment and other nuclear materials or technology in other States, and that all States should prevent the transfer to Iran of any tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery systems, attack helicopters, or missiles and related systems or parts. It also called upon all States to report to the relevant Sanctions Committee, within 60 days, on the steps they had taken to implement the necessary measures.

Emphasizing the importance of diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution guaranteeing the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme, the Council noted in that regard the efforts by Turkey and Brazil for an agreement on the Tehran Research Reactor, which “could serve as a confidence-building measure”. It also stressed the willingness of the so-called E3+3 — China, France, Germany, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and the United States — to further enhance diplomatic efforts to promote dialogue and consultations towards a negotiated solution.

The Council affirmed that it would suspend the sanctions if, and so long as, Iran suspended all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, as verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to allow for good-faith negotiations. It also affirmed its determination to apply further measures if Iran continued to defy the just-adopted text as well as previous resolutions.

Speaking before the vote, the representatives of Brazil and Turkey said they had voted against the text because it ran against their efforts to bring about a negotiated solution through the agreement on the Tehran Research Reactor and the related Tehran Declaration of 17 May, which provided a new opportunity for diplomacy.

Following the vote, Lebanon’s representative said Iran had a right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy as well as an obligation to adhere to the safeguards regime, adding that the fuel swap deal it had negotiated with Brazil and Turkey provided a way towards a resolution of the problems that had arisen. The sanctions regime, on the other hand, represented a painful failure of diplomatic efforts, he added.

Speaking on behalf of the Foreign Ministers of the E3+3 countries, the representative of the United Kingdom said today’s action affirmed both the international community’s concern about Iran’s nuclear programme and the need for the country to comply with the requirements of the Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors, while also keeping the door open for continued engagement between the E3+3 and Iran. The Ministers welcomed and commended all diplomatic efforts in that regard, especially those recently made by Brazil and Turkey on the specific issue of the Tehran Research Reactor. “We expect Iran to demonstrate a pragmatic attitude and to respond positively to our openness towards dialogue and negotiations,” he said.

Iran’s representative, however, placed the resolution within the context of pressures exerted on his country over many decades by some of the same Powers supporting today’s resolution. Those pressures included suits to prevent Iran’s nationalization of its own oil, and the military coup that had reinstalled the Shah. The clear message was that no one should be allowed to endanger the vital interests of the capitalist world, he said.

Iran was more powerful today and would not bow to such pressures, he asserted, emphasizing his country’s right to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, and stressing that it had carried out “robust” cooperation with IAEA. The Council was showing its political biases by its reaction to the deal on the Tehran Research Reactor, and its lack of action on Israeli violations of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the threats made against Iran by that country and the United States, he said.

In their national statements, Council members and E3+3 countries all paid tribute to the efforts of Turkey and Brazil, which had resulted in the Tehran Declaration, but noted that the agreement did not deal with core issues such as compliance with IAEA, uranium enrichment in defiance of the Council and the revelation of the previously undeclared facility at Qom.

Also speaking today were the representatives of the United States, France, Uganda, Russian Federation, Japan, Austria, China, Nigeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Mexico.

The meeting began at 11:15 a.m. and ended at 12:59 p.m.

Background

Meeting this morning to consider the question of non-proliferation, the Security Council was expected to take action on a draft resolution (document S/2010/283) co-sponsored by France, Germany, United Kingdom and the United States.

Statements

MARIA LUIZA RIBEIRO VIOTTI (Brazil), speaking before action, said her delegation would vote against the draft resolution to honour the Tehran Declaration signed by her own country as well as Turkey and Iran on 17 May. Brazil also opposed the text because it did not see sanctions as effective in the present case. They would lead to the suffering of the Iranian people and play into the hands of those on all sides who did not want a peaceful resolution of the issue. Furthermore, adopting sanctions at the present juncture ran contrary to the efforts of Brazil and Turkey to engage with Iran on a negotiated solution, she added.

Describing the Tehran Declaration as a unique opportunity that should not be missed, she went on to point out that it had been approved by the highest Iranian officials as well as Parliament. The Declaration provided for the use of nuclear energy and set out ways to verify fully its peaceful purposes. The only possible way to further that collective goal was to achieve Iran’s cooperation through dialogue and negotiations. Indeed, the Declaration showed that dialogue could do more than sanctions, she said, expressing the Brazilian Government’s deep regret that the document had neither received the recognition it deserved, nor been given time to bear fruit.

She said she was also very concerned that the letter of the Vienna Group had only arrived hours ago and no time had been given for Iran to react to its opinion, including its call for a technical group meeting on details. Also of concern was the fact that the Council’s permanent members, together with a State that was not a member, had negotiated behind closed doors for a month. Brazil reaffirmed the imperative to carry out all nuclear activity under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and Iran’s activities were no exception, she emphasized, adding that the Tehran Declaration was “sound policy” that should be pursued. The resolution would delay rather than accelerate or ensure progress, and concerns about Iran’s nuclear programme would not be resolved until dialogue began. By adopting sanctions the Council was adopting one of two tracks to solving the question, and in Brazil’s opinion, it had chosen the wrong track.

ERTUĞRUL APAKAN (Turkey), also speaking before the vote, said his country was fully committed to all its non-proliferation obligations and, as such, was a party to all major relevant international instruments and regimes. Indeed the development of nuclear weapons by any country would make it even more difficult to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Turkey also wished to see a restoration of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.

To that end, seeing no viable alternative to a diplomatic and peaceful solution, Turkey had signed, with Brazil and Iran, the Tehran Declaration, which aimed to provide nuclear fuel to the Tehran Nuclear Research Reactor. It had created “a new reality” with respect to Iran’s nuclear programme, he said, adding that the agreement was designed as a confidence-building measure, which, if implemented, would contribute to the resolution of substantive issues relating to that nuclear programme in a positive and constructive atmosphere. “In other words, the Tehran Declaration provides a new and important window and opportunity for diplomacy,” he said, stressing that sufficient time and space should be allowed for its implementation.

Turkey was therefore deeply concerned that the adoption of sanctions would negatively affect the momentum created by the Tehran Declaration and the overall diplomatic process, he said. Furthermore, it was “rather unhelpful” that the responses of the Vienna Group had been received only a few hours ago. The negative nature of those responses and their having been sent only on the day when the Council planned to adopt sanctions “had a determining effect on our position”, he said, adding that Turkey’s position demonstrated its commitment to the Tehran Declaration and to diplomatic efforts.

He went on to say that his delegation’s vote against the resolution should not be construed as indifference to the problems emanating from Iran’s nuclear programme. “There are serious question marks within the international community regarding the purpose and nature of [that] programme, and those need to be cleared up.” Iran should be absolutely transparent about its nuclear programme and demonstrate full cooperation with IAEA in order to restore confidence. Turkey supported a diplomatic solution and the sanctions-based resolution would be adopted despite unrelenting efforts to that end.

However, the resolution’s adoption should not be seen as an end to diplomacy, he emphasized, expressing his firm belief that, after the adoption of the text, efforts towards finding a peaceful solution must be continued even more resolutely. “Our expectation from Iran is that to work towards implementation of the Tehran Declaration [it] must remain on the table and Iran should come to the negotiating table with the 5+1 [five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany] to take up its nuclear programme, including the suspension of enrichment,” he said.

Action on Draft Resolution

The Council then adopted the text by 12 votes in favour to 2 against (Brazil, Turkey), with 1 abstention (Lebanon).

Statements

SUSAN RICE (United States), speaking after the vote, said the resolution was a response to the threats to peace and security arising from Iran’s refusal to comply with the requirements of IAEA and the demands of the Council. “Words must mean something,” she said, stressing that the sanctions were not aimed at Iran’s right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, but squarely at concerns that it had ambitions to develop nuclear weapons. The measures were tough, smart and precise, she added.

Recalling the diplomatic openings that the United States had made to Iran, she said it had shunned successive opportunities to assure the international community of its peaceful purposes, in addition to announcing its intention to further enrich uranium and revealing undeclared sites. The resolution offered Iran a clear path to the suspension of sanctions and reaffirmed the willingness of the United States and other countries to continue diplomacy for that purpose. She praised the work of Turkey and Brazil, but said their proposal did not respond to the very real concerns about Iran’s nuclear programme. “This resolution does,” she said, emphasizing that respect for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons must remain at the centre of efforts to control nuclear weapons.

MARK LYALL GRANT (United Kingdom), speaking on behalf of the Foreign Ministers of China, France, Germany, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and the United States (“E3+3”), reaffirmed their determination and commitment to seek an early negotiated settlement to the Iranian nuclear issue. The adoption of the resolution, while reflecting the international community’s concern about that country’s nuclear programme and reconfirming the need for Iran to comply with Security Council and IAEA Board of Governors requirements, “keeps the door open for continued engagement between the E3+3 and Iran.”

He said the aim of ministerial efforts was to achieve a comprehensive and long-term settlement, which would restore international confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran’s programme, while respecting its legitimate right to the peaceful use of atomic energy. “We are resolute in continuing our work to this purpose. We also welcome and commend all diplomatic efforts in this regard, especially those recently made by Brazil and Turkey on the specific issue of the Tehran Research Reactor,” he added. The Ministers also reaffirmed their June 2008 proposals, as confirmed by the current text, which provided a sound basis for future negotiations.

He went on to say that the Ministers were prepared to continue dialogue and interaction with Iran in the context of implementing the understandings reached during their meeting in Geneva on 1 October 2009. They had asked Baroness Ashton, European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, to pursue that dialogue with Saeed Jalili, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, at the earliest opportunity. “We expect Iran to demonstrate a pragmatic attitude and to respond positively to our openness towards dialogue and negotiations,” he added.

Reverting to his national capacity, he recalled efforts to resolve the problem diplomatically, saying he regretted that they had not come to fruition and stressing that Iran had followed up with programmes that were even more provocative. He acknowledged the good-faith efforts of Turkey and Brazil, but recalled that Iran had pulled out of a previous agreement, noting that the United Kingdom could not allow it to use the new agreement to justify its defiance of IAEA and the Council. Today’s resolution had been made necessary by Iran’s own actions, he said, pledging his country’s readiness to resume talks while confirming its equal readiness to respond robustly if Iran continued to flout its responsibilities.

GÉRARD ARAUD (France) welcomed the adoption of the text, saying it had been carried out with a balanced representation and that such unity was a response to Iran’s clandestine nuclear programme. Since its discovery, Iran had continued to obfuscate the efforts of IAEA and ignore successive Security Council resolutions. There was no doubt about what was going on: Iran had built a clandestine military facility that was far too small for civilian purposes, and had also begun to enrich its uranium to 20 per cent, bringing it “dangerously close” to military grade. Given all that, it was no surprise that IAEA had recently reported that it was impossible to ensure that Iran’s nuclear programme was for peaceful purposes.

He said the Council had arrived at today’s decision after a long and earnest diplomatic push to negotiate with Iran on the nature and breadth of its nuclear programme. While France welcomed the initiative by Turkey and Brazil as an important confidence-building measure, it appeared that Iran was avoiding the substance of the agreement by continuing to enrich uranium. It was using the Tehran Declaration as an alibi to avoid discussing the programme with the E3+3, and to buy time for continued enrichment, he said, adding that Iran was using it to ignore the will of the wider international community. Indeed, the heart of the problem was the true nature of the Iranian nuclear programme, he emphasized.

With all that in mind, the Security Council had adopted a text that would slow down the progress of Iran’s nuclear programme and allow diplomacy more time, he continued. The text was aimed at addressing Iran’s continuing attempts to “ride a train for which it does not have a ticket”; not directed at the Iranian people. Adopting it was “the very least the Council could do” in its efforts to reassure the wider international community about the nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. The Council also sought to prevent a regional nuclear arms race and to prevent a conflict that could have disastrous consequences in an already unstable region.

The door to dialogue and diplomacy, as always, remained open, he said. France, United Kingdom, United States and the Russian Federation had written to IAEA seeking a discussion of all issues of concern regarding the tripartite agreement. Those countries were also willing to discuss other measures as set out in the resolution. However, such measures could not be taken by others alone, and the Iranian leadership “must take the hand that is being offered” rather than continue its dangerous pursuit of regional supremacy. Rather than a path to isolation, Iran must choose to be brought into the fold of the international community, he added.

RUHAKANA RUGNDA (Uganda) said his delegation had voted in favour of the text because it fully supported the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’s aims. Indeed, the Treaty set out the provisions for safeguarding and verifying all nuclear activity, and it was important that all the nuclear activities of parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty were in compliance with relevant safeguards. The recent IAEA report raised a number of questions about the purposes of Iran’s nuclear programme, he said. Uganda commended the recent initiative by Turkey and Brazil, which was vital to confidence-building efforts. All future efforts must respect Iran’s right to peaceful use of nuclear energy, which ensuring also that Iran adhered to Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards and cooperated with IAEA in a full and transparent manner.

VITALY CHURKIN ( Russian Federation) said his vote in favour had been guided by his country’s consistent position on the need for to resolve through dialogue all questions involving Iran’s nuclear programme. Hopefully Iran would see the resolution as an appeal to launch substantial negotiations to clarify all issues and to fulfil its responsibilities towards IAEA and the Security Council. The Russian Federation would continue to make significant efforts to promote dialogue and the resolution of all such problems.

Thus far, Iran had not opened the road sufficiently to allow it fully to master the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, thanks to its lack of cooperation with IAEA, he said. Sanctions, forceful measures that must be used in a balanced and proportional way, were aimed exclusively at bolstering the non-proliferation regime and not at the well-being of the Iranian people, he stressed, welcoming the efforts of Brazil and Turkey.

YUKIO TAKASU (Japan) affirmed the importance of efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the responsibilities implied by the right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful uses, stressing that Iran had not fulfilled its responsibilities in that regard. Japan paid tribute to the efforts of Brazil and Turkey, but regretted that the resulting Declaration did not address core issues, including Iran’s continuing enrichment of uranium to high levels. Japan also supported the dual-track approach to resolving the Iran nuclear issue through dialogue as well as pressure, he said, noting that the resolution contained a targeted and balanced approach along those lines, while in no way closing the doors to diplomacy.

THOMAS MAYR-HARTING (Austria), noting that his delegation had voted in favour of the text, said a decision of that kind was never to be taken lightly. From the time when IAEA had revealed Iran’s programme in 2003, Austria had hoped that the issue could be resolved through negotiations, but even after five Council resolutions, the nature of the programme remained unclear. Indeed, a clandestine nuclear facility had been discovered just a few months ago, he said, emphasizing his country’s continuing commitment to a dual-track approach.

While Austria believed the current resolution was necessary, it still stood behind the two packages proffered by the international community in 2006 and 2008, he said, highlighting also the fact that today’s text stressed the willingness of the E3+3 to continue and enhance diplomatic dialogue and consultations. The resolution also expressed the Council’s willingness to consider suspending the measures outlined therein if Iran suspended its enrichment activities and carried out the aims of the Council’s previous resolutions.

LI BAODONG (China) said that, like previous texts, the current one reflected international concerns as well as the desire of all parties to resolve the matter through dialogue and negotiations. China therefore called on all States to implement the resolution fully and effectively. However, any actions undertaken must be conducive to stability in the Middle East, must not affect the daily lives of the Iranian people, must be commensurate with Iran’s actual practice in the nuclear field, and must respect all international norms on nuclear matters.

He said the adoption of the current text did not mean the door was closed to diplomatic efforts. Indeed, it was an attempt to bring Iran back to the table, since the sanctions it outlined could be suspended, or even lifted, if Iran complied with its IAEA obligations. Over the years, China had worked hard to ensure a negotiated settlement of the issue, and welcomed the tripartite agreement between Brazil, Turkey and Iran. It was to be hoped that Iran would use the momentum generated by the Tehran Declaration to build the international community’s confidence.

NAWAF SALAM (Lebanon), stressing the importance of ridding the Middle East and the world of nuclear weapons, said his country had been one of the first parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, adding that the recent Review Conference had reaffirmed the importance of a nuclear-weapon-free Middle East. Israel was the only country in the region that held nuclear weapons, he said, emphasizing that it should allow IAEA inspection of its nuclear facilities, and that enforcement of the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime should not be selective.

Iran had a right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, as well as an obligation to adhere to the safeguards regime, he said. The fuel swap deal negotiated by Turkey and Brazil provided a road towards resolving the problems that had arisen, he said, adding that the agreement was still a gateway to confidence-building measures. The solution to the overall issue would come about through dialogue and not pressure. The sanctions regime represented a painful failure of diplomatic efforts, he said, while stressing his refusal to give up on such efforts and calling for a reinvigorated, flexible and constructive dialogue.

RAFF BUKUN-OLU WOLE ONEMOLA (Nigeria) said the Non-Proliferation Treaty remained the best framework for guaranteeing the right to peaceful nuclear programmes while preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, and for that reason his country was cooperating with IAEA in its efforts to meet its people’s energy needs. In that context, Nigeria could not understand why Iran was not cooperating with the Agency if its goals were peaceful. It was incumbent on that country to dispel doubts about its nuclear programme, he stressed, calling on Iran to respond positively to diplomatic efforts, and welcoming the dual-track approach. Nigeria applauded the efforts of Brazil and Turkey in that context, he said.

IVAN BARBALIĆ (Bosnia and Herzegovina) said his delegation had once again been among those that had nourished hopes that the issue could be solved through negotiations and in a satisfactory manner for all concerned. “However, we find ourselves confronted by further aggravation regarding a comprehensive solution to the nuclear capacity development in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” he said, adding that his own country, as a State party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, was fully committed to implementing the Treaty, which represented an irreplaceable framework for promoting security and preventing nuclear proliferation. The IAEA safeguards agreements could ensure that nuclear energy was used in a safe and responsible manner.

The right of all States to the peaceful use of nuclear energy was also important and must be fully respected and protected, he stressed. “ Iran is no exception to that rule. It should be made clear, nevertheless, that the scope and objectives of any nuclear programme, including Iran’s, have to remain in accordance with international rules and must be subjected to a verifiable and transparent inspection regime by the International Atomic Energy Agency.” The Council had adopted resolutions calling on Iran to comply with the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to extend full cooperation to IAEA inspectors, yet, according to the most recent reports, the international community had not received a clear and unequivocal response from Iran, which had brought the Council to the present stage.

Bearing in mind the importance of restoring confidence in the strictly peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme, he urged Iran to comply with all resolutions of the Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors, and to implement the Additional Protocol. A negotiated settlement, based on mutual trust and respect, was the best option, and in that regard, Bosnia and Herzegovina welcomed the recent efforts by Turkey and Brazil “as a significant confidence-building measure”. The resolution adopted today was tough, but it did not close out the option of further diplomatic efforts towards an ultimate negotiated solution, he said, calling upon the various parties directly involved to explore all possible means to pave the way for a peaceful solution.

Council President CLADUE HELLER ( Mexico), speaking in his national capacity, emphasized that his country was firmly committed to nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful use of nuclear energy. However, Mexico was concerned that the actions being taken weakened those three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and were of particular concern when carried out in a region already rife with instability and mistrust. Iran’s “controversial” nuclear programme was not a new issue for the Council, he said, stressing that the country must comply with all requests by IAEA to ensure the peaceful nature of its programme. It must also comply with Security Council resolutions and ensure transparency regarding its nuclear activities.

“It is Iran that must gain the confidence of the international community, not the Security Council,” he declared, expressing Mexico’s support for dialogue and negotiations as the way forward. The sanctions and other measures adopted by the Council did not punish the people of Iran, but focused only on its nuclear activities. Recent diplomatic initiatives were insufficient because they addressed neither international concerns about the nature of Iran’s programme nor the issue of enrichment. Today’s text did not close the door to diplomatic negotiations, but left room for heightened diplomatic efforts, he said, adding that the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East should be pursued to ensure the security and stability of all States in that region, including a future Palestinian State. Mexico would continue to purse the path of dialogue and reject the use of force, he emphasized.

MOHAMMAD KHAZAEE (Iran) said that his nation had endured unfair pressures for many years due to the aggression of some of the same countries that supported today’s resolution. He pointed specifically to a suit by the United Kingdom which had claimed that the nationalization of Iran’s oil endangered international peace, and the subsequent United States-supported coup, mounted under a similar pretext of maintaining international peace, which had reinstated the dictatorship of the Shah. The clear message was that no one should be allowed to endanger the vital interests of the capitalist world, he asserted.

The similarity of those efforts was that the United States and United Kingdom were, then as now, trying to deprive Iran of its absolute right to achieve energy self-sufficiency, he said. However, the difference was that today Iran was more powerful and enjoyed greater support among its people, who had enjoyed three decades of political experience, a scientific, cultural and industrial renaissance, and the support of the overwhelming majority of nations.

Recalling also the support that the United States had offered Iraq in its war with his country, he said that the Security Council Powers that had refused to take action against Iraq’s use of chemical weapons in that conflict were the same ones that had imposed today’s resolution. Weapons of mass destruction were religiously proscribed in Iran, which was committed to strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty, while remaining determined to exercise its right to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

He said there was robust cooperation with IAEA, with more than 4,500 person-day inspections permitted since 2003. But even so, a few Western countries continued their provocative behaviour, exemplified by the politically motivated reactions to the deal for the supply of fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor. However, Iran still responded positively to the efforts of Turkey and Brazil, which had pursued that deal in good faith, leading to a declaration on the exchange of fuel. But instead of welcoming that agreement, the hostile Powers had immediately introduced the current resolution.

The Council had been turned into the tool of a few countries which did not hesitate to abuse it, he said. Those countries should provide answers about their behaviour, including their threats of force against Iran. Their prevention of Council action against the criminal Israeli regime, which daily issued such threats, indicated double standards, he said, maintaining that his own country was merely trying to exercise its legal and inalienable rights, while Israel violated the most basic principles of international law, as demonstrated by the Goldstone Report and the recent “flotilla massacre”. Iran would never bow to hostile actions and pressures on the part of a few Powers, and would continue to defend its rights, he vowed.

Mr. LYALL GRANT (United Kingdom) said in response that Iran’s “distorted account of history and personal attacks against my country” only demeaned that representative. In fact, his statement seemed to be an attempt not to respond to the concerns of the international community and the specific concerns set out in Council resolutions about Iran’s nuclear ambitions. The Iranian delegate’s attacks were an insult to the Council and all those who had sought a negotiated settlement over the past four years. “I hope that on more sober reflection, Iran will respond honestly to the questions asked by the Council over the past four years about its nuclear programme [and] will engage more positively with the Council.”

“Reaffirming its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the need for all States Party to that Treaty to comply fully with all their obligations, and recalling the right of States Party, in conformity with Articles I and II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination,

“Recalling the resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors (GOV/2006/14), which states that a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue would contribute to global non-proliferation efforts and to realizing the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery,

“Noting with serious concern that, as confirmed by the reports of 27 February 2006 (GOV/2006/15), 8 June 2006 (GOV/2006/38), 31 August 2006 (GOV/2006/53), 14 November 2006 (GOV/2006/64), 22 February 2007 (GOV/2007/8), 23 May 2007 (GOV/2007/122), 30 August 2007 (GOV/2007/48), 15 November 2007 (GOV/2007/58), 22 February 2008 (GOV/2008/4), 26 May 2008 (GOV/2008/115), 15 September 2008 (GOV/2008/38), 19 November 2008 (GOV/2008/59), 19 February 2009 (GOV/2009/8), 5 June 2009 (GOV/2009/35), 28 August 2009 (GOV/2009/55), 16 November 2009 (GOV/2009/74), 18 February 2010 (GOV/2010/10) and 31 May 2010 (GOV/2010/28) of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran has not established full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and heavy-water-related projects as set out in resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) nor resumed its cooperation with the IAEA under the Additional Protocol, nor cooperated with the IAEA in connection with the remaining issues of concern, which need to be clarified to exclude the possibility of military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear programme, nor taken the other steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors, nor complied with the provisions of Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) and which are essential to build confidence, and deploring Iran’s refusal to take these steps,

“Reaffirming that outstanding issues can be best resolved and confidence built in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme by Iran responding positively to all the calls which the Council and the IAEA Board of Governors have made on Iran,

“Noting with serious concern the role of elements of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC, also known as “Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution”), including those specified in Annex D and E of resolution 1737 (2006), Annex I of resolution 1747 (2007) and Annex II of this resolution, in Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems,

“Noting with serious concern that Iran has constructed an enrichment facility at Qom in breach of its obligations to suspend all enrichment-related activities, and that Iran failed to notify it to the IAEA until September 2009, which is inconsistent with its obligations under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement,

“Also noting the resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors (GOV/2009/82), which urges Iran to suspend immediately construction at Qom, and to clarify the facility’s purpose, chronology of design and construction, and calls upon Iran to confirm, as requested by the IAEA, that it has not taken a decision to construct, or authorize construction of, any other nuclear facility which has as yet not been declared to the IAEA,

“Noting with serious concern that Iran has enriched uranium to 20 per cent, and did so without notifying the IAEA with sufficient time for it to adjust the existing safeguards procedures,

“Noting with concern that Iran has taken issue with the IAEA’s right to verify design information which had been provided by Iran pursuant to the modified Code 3.1, and emphasizing that in accordance with Article 39 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement Code 3.1 cannot be modified nor suspended unilaterally and that the IAEA’s right to verify design information provided to it is a continuing right, which is not dependent on the stage of construction of, or the presence of nuclear material at, a facility,

“Reiterating its determination to reinforce the authority of the IAEA, strongly supporting the role of the IAEA Board of Governors, and commending the IAEA for its efforts to resolve outstanding issues relating to Iran’s nuclear programme,

“Expressing the conviction that the suspension set out in paragraph 2 of resolution 1737 (2006) as well as full, verified Iranian compliance with the requirements set out by the IAEA Board of Governors would contribute to a diplomatic, negotiated solution that guarantees Iran’s nuclear programme is for exclusively peaceful purposes,

“Emphasizing the importance of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution guaranteeing that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes and noting in this regard the efforts of Turkey and Brazil towards an agreement with Iran on the Tehran Research Reactor that could serve as a confidence-building measure,

“Emphasizing also, however, in the context of these efforts, the importance of Iran addressing the core issues related to its nuclear programme,

“Stressing that China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States are willing to take further concrete measures on exploring an overall strategy of resolving the Iranian nuclear issue through negotiation on the basis of their June 2006 proposals (S/2006/521) and their June 2008 proposals (INFCIRC/730), and noting the confirmation by these countries that once the confidence of the international community in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme is restored it will be treated in the same manner as that of any Non-Nuclear Weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non‑Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

“Welcoming the guidance issued by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to assist States in implementing their financial obligations under resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1803 (2008), and recalling in particular the need to exercise vigilance over transactions involving Iranian banks, including the Central Bank of Iran, so as to prevent such transactions contributing to proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems,

“Recognizing that access to diverse, reliable energy is critical for sustainable growth and development, while noting the potential connection between Iran’s revenues derived from its energy sector and the funding of Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, and further noting that chemical process equipment and materials required for the petrochemical industry have much in common with those required for certain sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities,

“Havingregard to States’ rights and obligations relating to international trade,

“Recalling that the law of the sea, as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), sets out the legal framework applicable to ocean activities,

“Calling for the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by Iran at an early date,

“Determined to give effect to its decisions by adopting appropriate measures to persuade Iran to comply with resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) and with the requirements of the IAEA, and also to constrain Iran’s development of sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missile programmes, until such time as the Security Council determines that the objectives of these resolutions have been met,

“Concerned by the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear programme and mindful of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,

“Stressing that nothing in this resolution compels States to take measures or actions exceeding the scope of this resolution, including the use of force or the threat of force,

“Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

“1. Affirms that Iran has so far failed to meet the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors and to comply with resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008);

“2. Affirms that Iran shall without further delay take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors in its resolutions GOV/2006/14 and GOV/2009/82, which are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme, to resolve outstanding questions and to address the serious concerns raised by the construction of an enrichment facility at Qom in breach of its obligations to suspend all enrichment-related activities, and, in this context, further affirms its decision that Iran shall without delay take the steps required in paragraph 2 of resolution 1737 (2006);

“3. Reaffirms that Iran shall cooperate fully with the IAEA on all outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to concerns about the possible military dimensions of the Iranian nuclear programme, including by providing access without delay to all sites, equipment, persons and documents requested by the IAEA, and stresses the importance of ensuring that the IAEA have all necessary resources and authority for the fulfilment of its work in Iran;

“4. Requests the Director General of the IAEA to communicate to the Security Council all his reports on the application of safeguards in Iran;

“5. Decides that Iran shall without delay comply fully and without qualification with its IAEA Safeguards Agreement, including through the application of modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangement to its Safeguards Agreement, calls upon Iran to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol to its IAEA Safeguards Agreement that it signed on 18 December 2003, calls upon Iran to ratify promptly the Additional Protocol, and reaffirms that, in accordance with Articles 24 and 39 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, Iran’s Safeguards Agreement and its Subsidiary Arrangement, including modified Code 3.1, cannot be amended or changed unilaterally by Iran, and notes that there is no mechanism in the Agreement for the suspension of any of the provisions in the Subsidiary Arrangement

“6. Reaffirms that, in accordance with Iran’s obligations under previous resolutions to suspend all reprocessing, heavy water-related and enrichment-related activities, Iran shall not begin construction on any new uranium-enrichment, reprocessing, or heavy water-related facility and shall discontinue any ongoing construction of any uranium-enrichment, reprocessing, or heavy water-related facility;

“7. Decides that Iran shall not acquire an interest in any commercial activity in another State involving uranium mining, production or use of nuclear materials and technology as listed in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 1, in particular uranium-enrichment and reprocessing activities, all heavy-water activities or technology-related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, and furtherdecides that all States shall prohibit such investment in territories under their jurisdiction by Iran, its nationals, and entities incorporated in Iran or subject to its jurisdiction, or by persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them;

“8. Decides that all States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to Iran, from or through their territories or by their nationals or individuals subject to their jurisdiction, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, or related materiel, including spare parts, or items as determined by the Security Council or the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) (“the Committee”), decides further that all States shall prevent the provision to Iran by their nationals or from or through their territories of technical training, financial resources or services, advice, other services or assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer, provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of such arms and related materiel, and, in this context, calls upon all States to exercise vigilance and restraint over the supply, sale, transfer, provision, manufacture and use of all other arms and related materiel;

“9. Decides that Iran shall not undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using ballistic missile technology, and that States shall take all necessary measures to prevent the transfer of technology or technical assistance to Iran related to such activities;

“10. Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals designated in Annex C, D and E of resolution 1737 (2006), Annex I of resolution 1747 (2007), Annex I of resolution 1803 (2008) and Annexes I and II of this resolution, or by the Security Council or the Committee pursuant to paragraph 10 of resolution 1737 (2006), except where such entry or transit is for activities directly related to the provision to Iran of items in subparagraphs 3(b)(i) and (ii) of resolution 1737 (2006) in accordance with paragraph 3 of resolution 1737 (2006), underlines that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory, and decides that the measures imposed in this paragraph shall not apply when the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that such travel is justified on the grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligations, or where the Committee concludes that an exemption would otherwise further the objectives of this resolution, including where Article XV of the IAEA Statute is engaged;

“11. Decides that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of resolution 1737 (2006) shall apply also to the individuals and entities listed in Annex I of this resolution and to any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, and to any individuals and entities determined by the Council or the Committee to have assisted designated individuals or entities in evading sanctions of, or in violating the provisions of, resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) or this resolution;

“12. Decides that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of resolution 1737 (2006) shall apply also to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC, also known as “Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution”) individuals and entities specified in Annex II, and to any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, and calls upon all States to exercise vigilance over those transactions involving the IRGC that could contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;

“13. Decides that for the purposes of the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of resolution 1737 (2006), the list of items in S/2006/814 shall be superseded by the list of items in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 1 and INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2, and any further items if the State determines that they could contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and further decides that for the purposes of the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of resolution 1737 (2006), the list of items contained in S/2006/815 shall be superseded by the list of items contained in S/2010/263;

“14. Calls upon all States to inspect, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, in particular the law of the sea and relevant international civil aviation agreements, all cargo to and from Iran, in their territory, including seaports and airports, if the State concerned has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 3, 4 or 7 of resolution 1737 (2006), paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007), paragraph 8 of resolution 1803 (2008) or paragraphs 8 or 9 of this resolution, for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those provisions;

“15. Notes that States, consistent with international law, in particular the law of the sea, may request inspections of vessels on the high seas with the consent of the flag State, and calls upon all States to cooperate in such inspections if there is information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the vessel is carrying items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 3, 4 or 7 of resolution 1737 (2006), paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007), paragraph 8 of resolution 1803 (2008) or paragraphs 8 or 9 of this resolution, for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those provisions;

“16. Decides to authorize all States to, and that all States shall, seize and dispose of (such as through destruction, rendering inoperable, storage or transferring to a State other than the originating or destination States for disposal) items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 3, 4 or 7 of resolution 1737 (2006), paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007), paragraph 8 of resolution 1803 (2008) or paragraphs 8 or 9 of this resolution that are identified in inspections pursuant to paragraphs 14 or 15 of this resolution, in a manner that is not inconsistent with their obligations under applicable Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1540 (2004), as well as any obligations of parties to the NPT, and decides further that all States shall cooperate in such efforts;

“17. Requires any State, when it undertakes an inspection pursuant to paragraphs 14 or 15 above to submit to the Committee within five working days an initial written report containing, in particular, explanation of the grounds for the inspections, the results of such inspections and whether or not cooperation was provided, and, if items prohibited for transfer are found, further requires such States to submit to the Committee, at a later stage, a subsequent written report containing relevant details on the inspection, seizure and disposal, and relevant details of the transfer, including a description of the items, their origin and intended destination, if this information is not in the initial report;

“18. Decides that all States shall prohibit the provision by their nationals or from their territory of bunkering services, such as provision of fuel or supplies, or other servicing of vessels, to Iranian-owned or -contracted vessels, including chartered vessels, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe they are carrying items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 3, 4 or 7 of resolution 1737 (2006), paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007), paragraph 8 of resolution 1803 (2008) or paragraphs 8 or 9 of this resolution, unless provision of such services is necessary for humanitarian purposes or until such time as the cargo has been inspected, and seized and disposed of if necessary, and underlines that this paragraph is not intended to affect legal economic activities;

“19. Decides that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of resolution 1737 (2006) shall also apply to the entities of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) as specified in Annex III and to any person or entity acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, or determined by the Council or the Committee to have assisted them in evading the sanctions of, or in violating the provisions of, resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) or this resolution;

“20. Requests all Member States to communicate to the Committee any information available on transfers or activity by Iran Air’s cargo division or vessels owned or operated by the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) to other companies that may have been undertaken in order to evade the sanctions of, or in violation of the provisions of, resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) or this resolution, including renaming or re-registering of aircraft, vessels or ships, and requests the Committee to make that information widely available;

“21. Calls upon all States, in addition to implementing their obligations pursuant to resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this resolution, to prevent the provision of financial services, including insurance or re-insurance, or the transfer to, through, or from their territory, or to or by their nationals or entities organized under their laws (including branches abroad), or persons or financial institutions in their territory, of any financial or other assets or resources if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such services, assets or resources could contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including by freezing any financial or other assets or resources on their territories or that hereafter come within their territories, or that are subject to their jurisdiction or that hereafter become subject to their jurisdiction, that are related to such programmes or activities and applying enhanced monitoring to prevent all such transactions in accordance with their national authorities and legislation;

“22. Decides that all States shall require their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and firms incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction to exercise vigilance when doing business with entities incorporated in Iran or subject to Iran’s jurisdiction, including those of the IRGC and IRISL, and any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such business could contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems or to violations of resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) or this resolution;

“23. Calls upon States to take appropriate measures that prohibit in their territories the opening of new branches, subsidiaries, or representative offices of Iranian banks, and also that prohibit Iranian banks from establishing new joint ventures, taking an ownership interest in or establishing or maintaining correspondent relationships with banks in their jurisdiction to prevent the provision of financial services if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that these activities could contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;

“24. Calls upon States to take appropriate measures that prohibit financial institutions within their territories or under their jurisdiction from opening representative offices or subsidiaries or banking accounts in Iran if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such financial services could contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;

“25. Deplores the violations of the prohibitions of paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007) that have been reported to the Committee since the adoption of resolution 1747 (2007), and commends States that have taken action to respond to these violations and report them to the Committee;

“26. Directs the Committee to respond effectively to violations of the measures decided in resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this resolution, and recalls that the Committee may designate individuals and entities who have assisted designated persons or entities in evading sanctions of, or in violating the provisions of, these resolutions;

“27. Decides that the Committee shall intensify its efforts to promote the full implementation of resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this resolution, including through a work programme covering compliance, investigations, outreach, dialogue, assistance and cooperation, to be submitted to the Council within forty-five days of the adoption of this resolution;

“28. Decides that the mandate of the Committee as set out in paragraph 18 of resolution 1737 (2006), as amended by paragraph 14 of resolution 1803 (2008), shall also apply to the measures decided in this resolution, including to receive reports from States submitted pursuant to paragraph 17 above;

“29. Requests the Secretary-General to create for an initial period of one year, in consultation with the Committee, a group of up to eight experts (“Panel of Experts”), under the direction of the Committee, to carry out the following tasks: (a) assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate as specified in paragraph 18 of resolution 1737 (2006) and paragraph 28 of this resolution; (b) gather, examine and analyse information from States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties regarding the implementation of the measures decided in resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this resolution, in particular incidents of non‑compliance; (c) make recommendations on actions the Council, or the Committee or State, may consider to improve implementation of the relevant measures; and (d) provide to the Council an interim report on its work no later than 90 days after the Panel’s appointment, and a final report to the Council no later than 30 days prior to the termination of its mandate with its findings and recommendations;

“30. Urges all States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties, to cooperate fully with the Committee and the Panel of Experts, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal on the implementation of the measures decided in resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance;

“31. Calls upon all States to report to the Committee within 60 days of the adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing effectively paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23 and 24;

“32. Stresses the willingness of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States to further enhance diplomatic efforts to promote dialogue and consultations, including to resume dialogue with Iran on the nuclear issue without preconditions, most recently in their meeting with Iran in Geneva on 1 October 2009, with a view to seeking a comprehensive, long-term and proper solution of this issue on the basis of the proposal made by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States on 14 June 2008, which would allow for the development of relations and wider cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme and, inter alia, starting formal negotiations with Iran on the basis of the June 2008 proposal, and acknowledges with appreciation that the June 2008 proposal, as attached in Annex IV to this resolution, remains on the table;

“33. Encourages the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to continue communication with Iran in support of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution, including relevant proposals by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States with a view to create necessary conditions for resuming talks, and encourages Iran to respond positively to such proposals;

“34. Commends the Director General of the IAEA for his 21 October 2009 proposal of a draft Agreement between the IAEA and the Governments of the Republic of France, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation for Assistance in Securing Nuclear Fuel for a Research Reactor in Iran for the Supply of Nuclear Fuel to the Tehran Research Reactor, regrets that Iran has not responded constructively to the 21 October 2009 proposal, and encourages the IAEA to continue exploring such measures to build confidence consistent with and in furtherance of the Council’s resolutions;

“35. Emphasizes the importance of all States, including Iran, taking the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the Government of Iran, or of any person or entity in Iran, or of persons or entities designated pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and related resolutions, or any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was prevented by reason of the measures imposed by resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this resolution;

“36. Requests within 90 days a report from the Director General of the IAEA on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in resolution 1737 (2006), as well as on the process of Iranian compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors and with other provisions of resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and of this resolution, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration;

“37. Affirms that it shall review Iran’s actions in light of the report referred to in paragraph 36 above, to be submitted within 90 days, and: (a) that it shall suspend the implementation of measures if and for so long as Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, as verified by the IAEA, to allow for negotiations in good faith in order to reach an early and mutually acceptable outcome; (b) that it shall terminate the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 12 of resolution 1737 (2006), as well as in paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of resolution 1747 (2007), paragraphs 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of resolution 1803 (2008), and in paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23 and 24 above, as soon as it determines, following receipt of the report referred to in the paragraph above, that Iran has fully complied with its obligations under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and met the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors, as confirmed by the IAEA Board of Governors; (c) that it shall, in the event that the report shows that Iran has not complied with resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this resolution, adopt further appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to persuade Iran to comply with these resolutions and the requirements of the IAEA, and underlines that further decisions will be required should such additional measures be necessary;

“38. Decides to remain seized of the matter.”

Resolution Annex I

Individuals and entities involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities

Entities

1. Amin Industrial Complex: Amin Industrial Complex sought temperature controllers which may be used in nuclear research and operational/production facilities. Amin Industrial Complex is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, the Defense Industries Organization (DIO), which was designated in resolution 1737 (2006).

2. Armament Industries Group: Armament Industries Group (AIG) manufacturers and services a variety of small arms and light weapons, including large- and medium-calibre guns and related technology. AIG conducts the majority of its procurement activity through Hadid Industries Complex.

6. First East Export Bank, P.L.C.: First East Export Bank, PLC is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, Bank Mellat. Over the last seven years, Bank Mellat has facilitated hundreds of millions of dollars in transactions for Iranian nuclear, missile, and defense entities.

9. Malek Ashtar University: A subordinate of the DTRSC within MODAFL. This includes research groups previously falling under the Physics Research Center (PHRC). IAEA inspectors have not been allowed to interview staff or see documents under the control of this organization to resolve the outstanding issue of the possible military dimension to Iran’s nuclear program.

Location: Corner of Imam Ali Highway and Babaei Highway, Tehran, Iran

10. Ministry of Defense Logistics Export: Ministry of Defense Logistics Export (MODLEX) sells Iranian-produced arms to customers around the world in contravention of resolution 1747 (2007), which prohibits Iran from selling arms or related materiel.

Location: PO Box 16315-189, Tehran, Iran; located on the west side of Dabestan Street, Abbas Abad District, Tehran, Iran

12. Modern Industries Technique Company: Modern Industries Technique Company (MITEC) is responsible for design and construction of the IR-40 heavy water reactor in Arak. MITEC has spearheaded procurement for the construction of the IR-40 heavy water reactor.

13. Nuclear Research Center for Agriculture and Medicine: The Nuclear Research Center for Agriculture and Medicine (NFRPC) is a large research component of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), which was designated in resolution 1737 (2006). The NFRPC is AEOI’s center for the development of nuclear fuel and is involved in enrichment-related activities.

Location: P.O. Box 31585-4395, Karaj, Iran

A.K.A.: Center for Agricultural Research and Nuclear Medicine; Karaji Agricultural and Medical Research Center

20. Special Industries Group: Special Industries Group (SIG) is a subordinate of DIO.

Location: Pasdaran Avenue, PO Box 19585/777, Tehran, Iran

21. Tiz Pars: Tiz Pars is a cover name for SHIG. Between April and July 2007, Tiz Pars attempted to procure a five axis laser welding and cutting machine, which could make a material contribution to Iran’s missile program, on behalf of SHIG.

7. Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters: Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA) is an IRGC-owned company involved in large scale civil and military construction projects and other engineering activities. It undertakes a significant amount of work on Passive Defense Organization projects. In particular, KAA subsidiaries were heavily involved in the construction of the uranium enrichment site at Qom/Fordow.

8. Makin: Makin is owned or controlled by or acting on behalf of KAA, and is a subsidiary of KAA.

9. Omran Sahel: Owned or controlled by Ghorb Nooh.

10. Oriental Oil Kish: Oriental Oil Kish is owned or controlled by or acting on behalf of KAA.

11. Rah Sahel: Rah Sahel is owned or controlled by or acting on behalf of KAA.

12. Rahab Engineering Institute: Rahab is owned or controlled by or acting on behalf of KAA, and is a subsidiary of KAA.

13. Sahel Consultant Engineers: Owned or controlled by Ghorb Nooh.

14. Sepanir: Sepanir is owned or controlled by or acting on behalf of KAA.

15. Sepasad Engineering Company: Sepasad Engineering Company is owned or controlled by or acting on behalf of KAA.

Resolution Annex III

Entities owned, controlled, or acting on behalf of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL)

Proposal to the Islamic Republic of Iran by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the European Union

Presented to the Iranian authorities on 14 June 2008 Teheran

Possible Areas of Cooperation with Iran

In order to seek a comprehensive, long-term and proper solution of the Iranian nuclear issue consistent with relevant UN Security Council resolutions and building further upon the proposal presented to Iran in June 2006, which remains on the table, the elements below are proposed as topics for negotiations between China, France, Germany, Iran, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, joined by the High Representative of the European Union, as long as Iran verifiably suspends its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, pursuant to OP 15 and OP 19(a) of UNSCR 1803. In the perspective of such negotiations, we also expect Iran to heed the requirements of the UNSC and the IAEA. For their part, China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union High Representative state their readiness:

to recognize Iran’s right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with its NPT obligations;

to treat Iran’s nuclear programme in the same manner as that of any Non-nuclear Weapon State Party to the NPT once international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme is restored.

Nuclear Energy

- Reaffirmation of Iran’s right to nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful purposes in conformity with its obligations under the NPT.

- Provision of technological and financial assistance necessary for Iran’s peaceful use of nuclear energy, support for the resumption of technical cooperation projects in Iran by the IAEA.

- Support for construction of LWR based on state-of-the-art technology.

- Support for R&D in nuclear energy as international confidence is gradually restored.

- Provision of legally binding nuclear fuel supply guarantees.

- Cooperation with regard to management of spent fuel and radioactive waste.

Political

- Improving the six countries’ and the EU’s relations with Iran and building up mutual trust.

- Encouragement of direct contact and dialogue with Iran.

- Support Iran in playing an important and constructive role in international affairs.

- Promotion of dialogue and cooperation on non-proliferation, regional security and stabilization issues.

- Work with Iran and others in the region to encourage confidence-building measures and regional security.

- Reaffirmation that a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue would contribute to non-proliferation efforts and to realizing the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery.

- Reaffirmation of the obligation under the UN Charter to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.

- Cooperation on Afghanistan, including on intensified cooperation in the fight against drug trafficking, support for programmes on the return of Afghan refugees to Afghanistan; cooperation on reconstruction of Afghanistan; cooperation on guarding the Iran-Afghan border.

Economic

Steps towards the normalization of trade and economic relations, such as improving Iran’s access to the international economy, markets and capital through practical support for full integration into international structures, including the World Trade Organization, and to create the framework for increased direct investment in Iran and trade with Iran.

Energy Partnership

Steps towards the normalization of cooperation with Iran in the area of energy: establishment of a long-term and wide-ranging strategic energy partnership between Iran and the European Union and other willing partners, with concrete and practical applications/measures.

Agriculture

- Support for agricultural development in Iran.

Facilitation of Iran’s complete self-sufficiency in food through cooperation in modern technology.

Environment, Infrastructure

- Civilian Projects in the field of environmental protection, infrastructure, science and technology, and high-tech:

- Development of transport infrastructure, including international transport corridors.

- Support for modernization of Iran’s telecommunication infrastructure, including by possible removal of relevant export restrictions.

Civil Aviation

- Civil aviation cooperation, including the possible removal of restrictions on manufacturers exporting aircraft to Iran:

Search

Daily Noon Briefing

The Secretary-General condemned today’s murder of a Palestinian child in the West Bank and called for the perpetrators of that terrorist act to be promptly brought to justice. He expressed his deepest condolences to the family of Ali Dawabsha, who were themselves severely injured in the arson attack. He urged both sides to take bold steps to return to the path of peace.