Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume II,
Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969–1972

355. Telegram From the Under Secretary of State (Richardson) to Secretary of
State Rogers1

Washington, March 22,
1969, 2104Z.

WH 9440/44766. From the Under Secretary. I am sending you our redraft,
cleared by Samuels, of the
Presidential memorandum on STR2 which we have just returned to Bob
Ellsworth. If you can find
the opportunity, I think it would be useful to discuss this with the
President, together with Henry
Kissinger if you wish, during your current trip.3

March 22, 1969.

Issue for Presidential Decision: Should the Office of the Special Trade
Representative be retained within the Executive Office of the President
or placed under the jurisdiction of the Department of Commerce?

Whether foreign trade policy should be separated from the rest of foreign
relations is a principal issue of disagreement. State favors retention
of the office in the White House, while Commerce wants it to be moved to
its jurisdiction. Treasury4 and the Budget Bureau
have directly submitted views supporting retention.

The arguments are summarized below.

Arguments for placing STR under commerce:

(1)

Foreign trade policy should be separated from other aspects of
international relations and should be placed within the
jurisdiction of a department where it will receive primary
attention.

(2)

The Commerce Department is the most logical Department for the
STR because of the
Department’s involvement with export expansion, foreign
investment and domestic industry.

(3)

There is a general advantage in reducing the number of
independent offices which in theory report directly to the
President, but to which in fact he can give little, if any,
attention.

Arguments for retaining STR within the
Executive Office of the President:

(1)

Removal of the STR function
from the White House, where it has gained recognition and
stature for adherence to a policy of reciprocal [Page 779]liberal trade, would be
interpreted both in the US and abroad as indicating a retreat
from this policy. This would be particularly true at a time when
we shall be endeavoring to persuade foreign countries to agree
to a voluntary restraint on textile exports to the United
States. It also would tend to raise questions about the meaning
of the President’s position on trade policy stated in his recent
press conferences and his trip to Europe.

(2)

International trade policy is integrally related to our total
monetary and financial, diplomatic, political and military
effort, and is not separable for purposes of policy
determination or negotiation. It would be difficult for a
government department whose main responsibility necessarily lies
in the domestic sphere to bring into consideration and focus the
overall foreign policy considerations relating to trade.

(3)

STR has no constituency of its
own that limits its objectivity; it provides a mechanism for
taking into account the diverse domestic and foreign policy
interests that need to be weighed in determining the national
interest; it gives trade policy and negotiations its full time;
it has wide public and Congressional support; and it has a
record of tough and effective negotiation.

(4)

Congress recognized the need to have a representative
independent of the regular departments to deal with trade
matters. In 1962, the Senate Finance Committee noted: “The
committee felt that the chairman, if he was chosen from one of
the departments, would represent more the views of that
department than the overall broader perspective represented by
the Special Representative.” This view was reaffirmed by
Congressman Mills and
Senator Long last fall in a conference committee executive
session on trade legislation.

(5)

The transfer from STR to
Commerce would not reduce the burden on the White House. On the
basis of past experience and the nature of the trade problem,
frequent appeals from various agencies are likely. Ultimately a
new STR would emerge within the
President’s official family.

Elliot Richardson.

Source: National Archives,
Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC
Files, Subject Files, Box 403, Office of the Special Trade
Representative. Confidential; Eyes Only. Rogers was with the President at San Clemente,
California.↩