This is a
first truth of reason. A first truth, be it remembered,
has this invariable characteristic, namely, all moral agents know
it, by a necessity of nature, and assume its truth, in all their
practical judgments, whatever their philosophical theories may be.
Take, for example, the affirmation, or assumption, that every
event must have had an adequate cause. This is a first
truth; all men know it, and, in all their practical judgments,
assume it, whatever their theorizings may be.

Now who does
not know, with the same certainty, that men possess the attributes
of moral agents; to wit, intellect, (including reason,
conscience, and consciousness,) sensibility, and free
will. Every moral agent does know, and cannot but know this.
That man has intellect and sensibility, or the powers of knowing
and feeling, has not, to my knowledge, been doubted. In
theory, the freedom of the will in man has been denied. Yet
the very deniers have, in their practical judgment, assumed the
freedom of the human will, as well, and as fully, as the most
staunch defenders of human liberty of will. Indeed, nobody ever
did or can, in practice, call in question the freedom of the human
will, without justly incurring the charge of insanity. By a
necessity of his nature, every moral agent knows himself to be
free. He can no more hide this fact from himself, or reason
himself out of the conviction of its truth, than he can speculate
himself into a disbelief of his own existence. He may, in
speculation, deny either, but in fact he knows both. That he
is, that he is free, are truths equally well known,
and known precisely in the same way, namely, he intuits them--sees
them in their own light, by virtue of the constitution of his
being. I have said that man is conscious of possessing the powers
of a moral agent. He has also the idea of the valuable, of right
and of wrong: of this he is conscious. But nothing else is
necessary to constitute man or any other being a subject of moral
obligation, than the possession of these powers, together with
sufficient light on moral subjects to develope the ideas just
mentioned.

Again. Man,
by a law of necessity, affirms himself to be under moral
obligation. He cannot doubt it. He affirms absolutely, and
necessarily, that he is praise or blame-worthy as he is benevolent
or selfish. Every man assumes this of himself, and of all other
men, of sound mind. This assumption is irresistible, as well as
universal.

The truth
assumed then, is a first truth, and not to be called in question.
But if it be called in question, in theory, it still remains and
must remain, while reason remains, a truth of certain knowledge
from the presence of which there is, and can be, no escape. The
spontaneous, universal, and irresistible affirmation that men, of
sound mind, are praise or blame-worthy, as they are selfish or
benevolent, shows beyond contradiction, that all men regard
themselves, and others, as the subjects of moral
obligation.

II. Extent
of moral obligation.

By this is
intended, to what acts and states of mind does moral obligation
extend? This certainly is a solemn and a fundamentally important
question.

In the
examination of this question I shall,

1. Show by an
appeal to reason, or to natural theology, to what acts and states
of mind moral obligation cannot directly extend.

2. To what
acts or states of mind moral obligation must directly
extend.

3. To what
acts and mental states moral obligation must indirectly extend.

I. I am to
show by an appeal to reason, or to natural theology, to what acts
and states of mind moral obligation cannot directly
extend.

1. Not to
external or muscular action. These actions are connected with the
actions of the will, by a law of necessity. If I will to move my
muscles, they must move, unless the nerves of voluntary
motion are paralyzed, or some resistance is offered to muscular
motion, that overpowers the strength of my will, or, if you
please, of my muscles. It is generally understood and agreed that
moral obligation does not directly extend to bodily or outward
action.

2. Not to the
states of the sensibility. I have already remarked, that we are
conscious, that our feelings are not voluntary, but involuntary
states of mind. Moral obligation cannot, therefore, directly
extend to them.

3. Not to
states of the intellect. The phenomena of this faculty, we also
know, by consciousness, to be under the law of necessity. It is
impossible that moral obligation should extend directly to any
involuntary act or state of mind.

4. Not to
unintelligent acts of will. There are many unintelligent
volitions, or acts of will, to which moral obligation cannot
extend, for example, the volitions of maniacs, or of infants,
before the reason is at all developed. They must, at birth, be the
subjects of volition, as they have motion or muscular action. The
volitions of somnambulists are also of this character. Purely
instinctive volitions must also come under the category of
unintelligent actions of will. For example: a bee lights on my
hand, I instantly and instinctively shake him off. I tread on a
hot iron, and instinctively move my foot. Indeed, there are many
actions of will, which are put forth under the influence of pure
instinct, and before the intellect can affirm obligation to will
or not to will. These surely cannot have moral character, and of
course moral obligation cannot extend to them.

II. To
what acts and states of mind moral obligation must directly
extend.

1. To
ultimate acts of will. These are, and must be, free.

Intelligent
acts of will, as has been before observed, are of three classes.
1. The choice of some object for its own sake, i.e. because
of its own nature, or for reasons found exclusively in itself, as,
for example, the happiness of being. These are called ultimate
choices, or intentions. 2. The choice of the conditions and means
of securing the object of ultimate choice, as, for example,
holiness, as the conditions or means of happiness. 3. Volitions,
or executive efforts to secure the object of ultimate choice.
Obligation must extend to these three classes of the actions of
the will. In the most strict and proper sense it may be said, that
obligation extends directly, only to the ultimate intention. We
learn, from consciousness, that the choice of an end necessitates
(while the choice of the end exists) the choice of the known
conditions and means of securing this end. I am free to
relinquish, at any moment, my choice of an end, but while I
persevere in the choice, or ultimate intention, I am not free to
refuse the known necessary conditions and means. If I reject the
known conditions and means, I, in this act, relinquish the choice
of the end. The desire of the end may remain, but the actual
choice of it cannot, when the will knowingly rejects the known
necessary conditions and means. In this case, the will prefers to
let go the end, rather than to choose and use the necessary
conditions and means. In the strictest sense the choice of known
conditions and means, together with executive volitions, is
implied in the ultimate intention or in the choice of an end.

When the good
or valuable, per se, is perceived, by a moral agent, he
instantly and necessarily, and without condition, affirms his
obligation to choose it. This affirmation is direct and universal,
absolute, or without condition. Whether he will affirm himself to
be under obligation to put forth efforts to secure the good must
depend upon his regarding such acts as necessary, possible, and
useful.

The
obligation, therefore, to put forth ultimate choice, is in the
strictest sense direct, absolute, and universal.

Obligation to
choose holiness, (as the holiness of God) as the means of
happiness, is indirect in the sense that it is conditioned. 1.
Upon the obligation to choose happiness as a good per se;
and, 2. Upon the knowledge that holiness is the necessary means of
happiness.

Obligation to
put forth executive volitions is also indirect in the sense that
it is conditioned; 1. Upon obligation to choose an object as an
end; and, 2. Upon the necessity, possibility, and utility of such
acts.

It should
here be observed, that obligation to choose an object for its own
sake, implies, of course, obligation to reject its opposite; and
obligation to choose the conditions of an intrinsically valuable
object for its own sake, implies obligation to reject the
conditions or means of the opposite of this object. Also,
obligation to use means to secure an intrinsically valuable
object, implies obligation to use means, if necessary and
possible, to prevent the opposite of this end.

For example.
Obligation to will happiness, for its intrinsic value, implies
obligation to reject misery, as an intrinsic evil. Obligation to
will the conditions of the happiness of being, implies obligation
to reject the conditions of misery. Obligation to use means to
promote the happiness of being, implies obligation to use means,
if necessary and practicable, to prevent the misery of being.

Again, the
choice of any object, either as an end, or a means, implies the
refusal of its opposite. In other words, choice implies
preference, refusing is properly only choice in an opposite
direction. For this reason, in speaking of the actions of the
will, it has been common to omit the mention of nilling, or
refusing, since such acts are properly included in the categories
of choices and volitions. It should also be observed that choice,
or willing, necessarily implies an object chosen, and that this
object should be such that the mind can regard it as being either
intrinsically, or relatively valuable, or important. As choice
must consist in an act, an intelligent act, the mind must have
some reason for choice. It cannot choose without a reason, for
this is the same as to choose without an object of choice. A mere
abstraction without any perceived or assumed, intrinsic, or
relative importance, to any being in existence, cannot be an
object of choice, either ultimate or executive. The ultimate
reason which the mind has for choosing is in fact the object of
choice; and where there is no reason there is no object of choice.

2. I have
said, that moral obligation respects in the strictest sense, and
directly the intention only. I am now prepared to say still
further, that this is a first truth of reason. It is a truth
universally and necessarily assumed, by all moral agents, their
speculations to the contrary, in any wise, notwithstanding. This
is evident from the following considerations.

(1.) Very
young children know and assume this truth universally. They always
deem it a sufficient vindication of themselves, when accused of
any delinquency, to say, "I did not mean to," or if accused of
short coming, to say, "I meant or intended to have done it--I
designed it." This, if true, they assume to be an all-sufficient
vindication of themselves. They know that this, if believed, must
be regarded as a sufficient excuse to justify them in every case.

(2.) Every
moral agent necessarily regards such an excuse as a perfect
justification, in case it can be sincerely and truly made.

(3.) It is a
saying as common as men are, and as true as common, that men are
to be judged by their motives, that is, by their designs,
intentions. It is impossible for us not to assent to this truth.
If a man intend evil, though, perchance, he may do us good, we do
not excuse him, but hold him guilty of the crime which he
intended. So if he intend to do us good, and, perchance, do us
evil, we do not, and cannot condemn him. For this intention and
endeavour to do us good, we cannot blame him, although it has
resulted in evil to us. He may be to blame for other things
connected with the affair. He may have come to our help too late,
and have been to blame for not coming when a different result
would have followed; or he may have been blameable for not being
better qualified for doing us good. He may have been to blame for
many things connected with the transaction, but for a sincere, and
of course hearty endeavour to do us good, he is not culpable, nor
can he be, however it may result. If he honestly intended to do us
good, it is impossible that he should not have used the best means
in his power, at the time: this is implied in honesty of
intention. And if he did this, reason cannot pronounce him guilty,
for it must judge him by his intentions.

(4.) Courts
of criminal law have always in every enlightened country assumed
this as a first truth. They always inquire into the quo
animo, that is, the intention, and judge accordingly.

(5.) The
universally acknowledged truth that lunatics are not moral agents
and responsible for their conduct, is but an illustration of the
fact that the truth we are considering, is regarded, and assumed,
as a first truth of reason.

3. We have
seen that the choice of an end implies, and, while the choice
continues, necessitates the choice of the known conditions and
means of the end, and also the putting forth of volition to secure
the end. If this is true, it follows that the choice of the
conditions and means of securing an end, and also the volitions
put forth as executive efforts to secure it, must derive their
character from the ultimate choice or intention, which gives them
existence. This shows that moral obligation extends, primarily and
directly, only to the ultimate intention or choice of an end,
though really, but less directly, to the choice of the conditions
and means, and also to executive volitions.

But I must
distinguish more clearly between ultimate and proximate
intentions, which discrimination will show, that in the most
strict and proper sense, obligation belongs to the former, and
only in a less strict and proper sense to the latter.

An ultimate
end, be it remembered, is an object chosen for its own sake.

A proximate
end is an object chosen as a condition or means of securing an
ultimate end.

An ultimate
end is an object chosen because of its intrinsic nature and value.

A proximate
end is an object chosen for the sake of the end, and upon
condition of its relation as a condition or means of the end.

Example:--A
student labours to get wages, to purchase books, to obtain an
education, to preach the gospel, to save souls, and to please God.
Another labours to get wages, to purchase books, to get an
education, to preach the gospel, to secure a salary, and his own
ease and popularity. In the first supposition he loves God and
souls, and seeks, as his ultimate end, the happiness of souls, and
the glory and gratification of God. In the last case supposed, he
loves himself supremely, and his ultimate end is his own
gratification. Now the proximate ends, or immediate objects of
pursuit, in these two cases, are precisely alike, while their
ultimate ends are entirely opposite. Their first, or nearest end
is to get wages. Their next end is, to obtain books, and so we
follow them, until we ascertain their ultimate end, before we
learn the moral character of what they are doing. The means they
are using, i.e. their immediate objects or proximate ends of
pursuit, are the same, but the ultimate ends, at which they aim,
are entirely different, and every moral agent, from a necessary
law of his own intellect, must, as soon as he understands the
ultimate end of each, pronounce the one virtuous, and the other
sinful, in his pursuits. One is selfish and the other benevolent.
From this illustration it is plain, that strictly speaking, moral
character, and, of course, moral obligation, respect directly, the
ultimate intention only. We shall see, in the proper place, that
obligation also extends, but less directly, to the use of means to
obtain the end.

4. The Bible
every where, either expressly or impliedly recognizes this truth.
"If there be a willing mind," that is, a right willing or
intention, "it is accepted," &c.

5. Again. All
the law is fulfilled in one word, "love." Now this cannot be true,
if the spirit of the whole law does not directly respect
intentions only. If it extends directly to thoughts, emotions, and
outward actions, it cannot be truly said that love is the
fulfilling of the law. This love must be good will, for how could
involuntary love be obligatory?

6. Again. The
spirit of the Bible every where respects the intention. If the
intention is right, or if there be a willing mind, it is accepted
as obedience. But if there be not a willing mind, that is, right
intention, no outward act is regarded as obedience. The willing,
is always regarded by the scripture, as the doing. "If a man look
on a woman, to lust after her," that is, with licentious
intentions, or willing, "he hath committed adultery with her
already," &c. So on the other hand, if one intends to perform
a service for God, which, after all, he is unable to perform, he
is regarded as having virtually done it, and is rewarded
accordingly.

This is too
obviously the doctrine of the Bible to need further elucidation.

III. To
what acts and mental states moral obligation indirectly
extends.

Under this
head I remark--

That it has
been already said, the choice of means and executive volitions,
together with outward action, and also the states of the intellect
and sensibility, are connected with ultimate intention by a law of
necessity.

(1.) The
muscles of the body are, directly, under the control of the will.
I will to move, and my muscles must move, unless there be
interposed some physical obstruction of sufficient magnitude to
overcome the strength of my will.

(2.) The
intellect is also directly under the control of the will. I am
conscious that I can control and direct my attention as I please,
and think, upon one subject or another.

(3.) The
sensibility, I am conscious, is only indirectly controlled by the
will. Feeling can be produced only by directing the attention and
thoughts to those subjects that excite feeling, by a law of
necessity.

The way is
now prepared to say--

1. That
obligation extends indirectly to all intelligent acts of will in
the sense already explained, all men are too conscious to need
proof.

2. That moral
obligation extends indirectly, to outward, or bodily actions.
These are often required, in the word of God. The reason is, that
being connected with the actions of the will, by a law of
necessity, if the will is right, the outward action must follow,
except upon the contingencies just named, and therefore such
action may reasonably be required. But if the contingencies, just
named, intervene, so that outward action does not follow the
choice or intention, the Bible accepts the will for the deed,
invariably. "If there be a willing mind, it is accepted
according," &c.

3. Moral
obligation extends, but more directly, to the states of the
sensibility, so that certain emotions or feelings are required as
outward actions are, and for the same reason, namely, the states
of the sensibility are connected with the actions of the will, by
a law of necessity. But when the sensibility is exhausted, or
when, for any reason, the right action of the will does not
produce the required feelings, it is accepted upon the principle
just named.

4. Moral
obligation, indirectly, extends also to the states of the
intellect; consequently the Bible, to a certain extent, and in a
certain sense, holds men responsible for their thoughts and
opinions. It everywhere assumes that if the heart be constantly
right, the thoughts and opinions will correspond with the
state of the heart, or will; "If any man will do his will he shall
know the doctrine whether it be of God." "If thine eye be single
thy body shall be full of light." It is, however, manifest that
the word of God every where assumes that, strictly speaking, all
virtue and vice belong to the heart or intention. Where this is
right, all is regarded as right; and where this is wrong, all is
regarded as wrong. It is upon this assumption that the doctrine of
total depravity rests. It is undeniable that the veriest sinners
do many things outwardly, which the law of God requires. Now
unless the intention decides the character of these acts, they
must be regarded as really virtuous. But when the intention is
found to be selfish, then it is ascertained that they are sinful
notwithstanding their conformity to the letter of the law of God.

The fact is,
that moral agents are so constituted that it is impossible for
them not to judge themselves, and others, by their subjective
motives or intentions. They cannot but assume it, as a first
truth, that a man's character is as his intention is, and
consequently that moral obligation respects, directly, intention
only.

5. Moral
obligation then indirectly extends to every thing about us, over
which the will has direct, or indirect control. The moral law,
while, strictly, it legislates over intentions only, yet in fact,
in a sense less direct, legislates over the whole being, inasmuch
as all our powers are directly or indirectly connected with
intention, by a law of necessity. Strictly speaking, however,
moral character belongs alone to the intention. In strict
propriety of speech, it cannot be said that either outward action,
or any state of the intellect, or sensibility, has a moral element
or quality belonging to it. Yet in common language, which is
sufficiently accurate for most practical purposes, we speak of
thought, feeling, and outward action as holy or unholy. By this,
however, all men really mean, that the agent is holy or unholy, is
praise or blame-worthy, in his exercises and actions, because they
regard them as proceeding from the state or attitude of the
will.

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