Sudan’s popular protest movement: will the international community continue to ignore it?

The recent protests in Sudan were
characterized by unprecedented levels of street participation. Dalia Haj-Omar asks why the international
community continues to ignore the regime’s long-term governance failures,
choosing economic interests
over human rights, and failing to offer tangible support for the democracy that
Sudanese citizens are demanding

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When news ofrenewed protests in Sudan started to
spread in late September, many in the community of activists who were part of
the summer protests of June/July 2012 (dubbed the Sudan Revolts) took
the news with a dose of cautious optimism. The Sudan Revolts left us
feeling crushed - to say the least.

When news ofrenewed protests in Sudan started to
spread in late September, many in the community of activists who were part of
the summer protests of June/July 2012 (dubbed the Sudan Revolts) took
the news with a dose of cautious optimism. The Sudan Revolts left us
feeling crushed - to say the least. The earlier wave of country-wide protests
had been triggered by Khartoum University female students protesting
economic austerity measures. The Sudanese government’sswift campaign of arrests led to
most of the student leaders, youth movement leaders, and the younger leadership
of political parties being held behind bars for up to two months without
charges. Many endured physical and psychological torture, including extended
periods of solitary confinement. Some left the country because of repeated
threats to them and their families. Others still languish in self-imposed
exile.

When the Sudan Revolts reached Nyala in Darfur
on 31 July 2012, they were met with brutal force by state authorities, killing
12 and injuring at least 80 (mostly students). This was followed in December of
2012 with a government campaign targeting the most reputable civil society institutions, and closing five of them permanently. The one
clear lesson was that as protesters we were simply not ready for the scale of
protest needed to effectively call for regime change. We were a minority that
lacked popular street support. And we needed to work—perhaps for years, some of
us thought, to gain that critical following from the street.

The protest movement
in context

For months leading up to the latest protests
Sudanese citizens had experienced a steady decline in public services and a
sharp rise in the prices of basic commodities. The privatization and closures of public hospitals and the
neglect of the public educational sector had led normal citizens, doctors and public school teachers to protest
in a scattered and non-sustained manner. A natural disaster provided a tipping
point for public frustration in August 2013 when seasonal floods hit most of
the country, killed
36 people, destroyed 75,000 houses, and affected more than
half a million people. The Sudanese government’s performance was negligible,
and a Khartoum-basedcivil
society coalition of youth called Nafeer (inspired
by a Sudanese tradition where communities get together to aid those in need)
sprung to action, coordinating a huge relief effort that attracted about 8,000
volunteers, including partners in the private sector. Whenrelief
supplies did arrive from around the globe they were seen
for sale in local markets rather than being distributed for free as intended.
These experiences made it clear to Sudanese citizens that the state’s
priorities are elsewhere - namely in investing in manufacturing and militarism,
and not in supporting the citizenry even in the face of environmental crisis.

The experience of Nafeer
demonstrated that the disgruntled citizens of Sudan no longer had to consider
the question “what is the alternative leadership?”. There was clearly a new generation
of youth waiting to lead in the face of the crumbling yet repressive regime
clinging desperately to power.

Popular uprising and
state violence

The protests in late September 2013,
although short-lived, have shifted the power dynamics in Sudan. These protests started in Wad Madani in
Gazeira State on September 23, and quickly spread to other major towns
including Khartoum, Al Obied, Sinnar, Gadarif, Kassala, Port Sudan and Nyala.
What we saw in September was a popular revolt, with the most diverse and populous
participation ever witnessed in the last 24 years under the
ruling National Congress Party’s (NCP) rule.
Although the trigger was the lifting of economic
subsidies from fuel and essential foodstuffs, protesters
called for regime change from the outset, with school students and youth
leading the way. One of the first amateur videos to document the
protests was of female secondary school students in Khartoum chanting, “the
people want the downfall of the regime”.

By the second week of protests the
government started rethinking its “shoot to kill” policy amidst mounting
criticism from within its ranks, and clear frictions between its police and
security forces. On September 28, 31
reformist members of the ruling party referred to as Sa’ihoon, signeda public
letter asking Omer El Bashir to reinstate the subsidies and to: “stop the
censorship of the national press; allow freedoms granted by the constitution
including freedom of peaceful protest; conduct objective investigations on the
shooting of protesters and hold those responsible accountable; and compensate
those impacted by death, injury and vandalism.” The letter ended by telling El
Bashir that, “the legitimacy of your rule has never been at the brink as it is
today”.

The NCP has ignored
the request to investigate the shooting of protesters, and it has initiated acommission of inquiry to question NCP members who signed the public
letter, making it clear that criticism from within is not acceptable. Last
month, top level NCP members who signed the letter, such as Ghazi Salahulddin
had received notices of suspension from the NCP.
Soon after this, a new political party - the National Movement for Change - composed of
ex-NCP members was announced.

The international
community and the popular tide

Condemnations of Khartoum’s brutal
reaction to peaceful protest were issued within the first few days by the United
States, United
Arab Emirates, European
Union, Britain, and the United
Nations. However, the international community seems to
not be learning from its long engagement with Sudan and continues to engage
only at the level of cosmetic crisis management.

The international community, and
especially the United States, invested billions of dollars in humanitarian aid,
peacekeeping and the brokering and implementation of the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA) that ended Africa’s longest civil war and resulted in the separation
of the South and the creation of South Sudan. Nonetheless the international
community continues to reward the NCP for a half-hearted implementation of the
CPA.

Neither the CPA nor the separation of
South Sudan have ensured the stability of the two neighbouring countries,
because the regime in Khartoum is focused on remaining in power at all costs.
For almost a quarter of century Khartoum’s governance approach has been
characterized by the political and economic marginalization of the peripheries,
resulting in a country that is mostly at war with itself.

The current economic crisis is a result
of Khartoum’s policy of excessive dependency on oil exports since 1999, to the
neglect of other industries such as agriculture. Amongst all the African and Middle
Eastern countries, Sudan spends the lowest percentage of its national budget on
education and health, and the highest (almost 80% ) on an elaborate military
and security apparatus.

Nonetheless the international community
continues to broker economic deals with the regime in Khartoum and to give it
loans. In April 2013 the World
Bank gave Sudan a grant
for basic education of $76.5 million. In early October 2013 the
government of Qatar injecteda loan
of $1 billion into the Central Bank of Sudan to stabilize the
exchange rate and address the severe shortage in foreign reserves (the second
such loan in the last year). Additionally the government of Sudan recently
announced a business deal with theBritish
South East African Mining company (SEAM) to extract gold. On
October 3, the Italian government hosted a business
conference in Rome for Sudan to discuss trade, inviting a
top-level delegation from the Sudanese government that included the Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Ali Karti.

Sudan’s Minister of Finance, Ali Mahmoud
and his Undersecretary attended the annual World Bank/ International Monetary Fund
meeting in October this year with no official critique. The
statement by the IMF summarizing a “Technical Working Group Meeting
on External Debt” focusing on Sudan totally disregarded the ongoing protests,
the Sudanese government's use of violence and its suppression of fundamental
freedoms. It even went as far as welcoming, “progress made by Sudan, including the recent
implementation of difficult reform measures”. Moreover, the IMF’s Mission Chief
for Sudan commended Sudan for its “long track record of implementing
sustainable economic policies”.

The pattern in international diplomacy
and development is clear now. Whatever loans the government of Sudan gets will
not go towards sustainable economic solutions to relieve its impoverished
population, although they will likely result in massive debt burden on
generations to come if the root causes of bad governance continue to be
ignored. On the ground we know that the regime in Khartoum is less popular and
more divided than it has ever been. The peaceful protest movement - in which
young women are a driving force - continues to grow in spite of an
international community that has continued to choose economic interests over
human rights, and in doing so has so far failed to offer tangible support for
the democracy that Sudanese citizens are demanding.

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