Center for World Conflict and Peace

Center for World Conflict and Peace

Friday, February 9, 2018

The topic of grand strategy has become a cottage industry in
US policy and academic circles the last 25 plus years. This shouldn’t be a
surprise, actually.

For almost five decades, the cold war provided considerable structure
for US foreign policy. It spawned a grand strategy—containment of Soviet power
and influence—that organized why, how, where and when the US exercised its soft
and hard power globally. But once the cold war was over, the main foreign
policy mission of the US had also ended. So while the US won the cold war on its
terms, and was now the undisputed sole superpower and global leader, it had work to do: it had to rediscover itself in a brand new world. This fact of life triggered a widespread
macro foreign policy debate about America’s future role in the world. Put
simply, what kind of grand strategy should the US pursue in the coming years?

In a sense, right from the beginning, the post-cold war grand
strategy debate met a goldilocks dilemma: Is it better for the US to do too
much or too little in the world? Or can the US strike just the right balance?
So for instance, should the US attempt to take advantage of its new position in
the world—perhaps by creating new institutions or exporting democracy? Or
should it be picky about where and when it exercises its power abroad? Or maybe
it should simply come back home and build a Fortress America, thereby insulating
itself from the dangers and threats beyond its borders? In the end, vigorous internationalism won the day. But how we got there, and the specific contours of it, varied from president to president. Only with the arrival of Donald Trump have we found a full-throated questioning of the virtues of internationalism.

The 1990s were a period in which the US was finding its way
in the world. The Clinton presidency placed international institutions and institution-building at the heart of US foreign policy, as NATO and EU expasion and the creation of the WTO were notable self-touted achievements. At the same time, however, Clinton muddled through much of the decade, reactively
responding to brushfires in the Balkans and the Middle East, while regrettably
doing little to nothing about a host of crises in Africa. In retrospect, given
the gathering storm of Islamic terrorism that we now know festered on Clinton’s
watch, his tenure reeks of fecklessness and incompetence on foreign policy
matters. But even at the time, by the end of his presidency, conservatives
viewed Clinton’s presidency as lost at sea morally and substantively. This perceived
aimlessness created a sense of purpose for Clinton’s successor, George W. Bush.

To correct the mistakes of Clinton, Bush entered office with
a mission to lead the US in a new, well-defined direction. This didn’t take
shape until 9/11. Prior to 9/11, Bush foreign embarked on a fuzzy-headed mission
to harmonize US relations with Russia and China. After 9/11, Bush completely
overhauled his foreign policy, turning toward a pro-democracy, nation building
craze that led the US into a two-front war and occupation of two countries. What
emerged from all this conflict and violence was what came be known as the Bush
Doctrine, a series of policies and strategies that shaped and unified America's orientation toward the rest of the world.

At bottom, the Bush Doctrine outlined the necessity for the
US to wage unilateral preventive foreign wars in the name of anti-terrorism and
pro-democracy reform, and served as a comprehensive organizing force for US foreign
policy. Either foreign nations were on board with the Bush Doctrine, willing to assist and work with the US, or they were against the US. Bush’s problem was that his grand strategy wasn’t the right one, for a
number of reasons. His foreign policy led to two costly, disastrous wars—wars
that hurt or killed thousands of Iraqis and Americans, divided America
politically, wrecked America’s global standing, and abetted the rise of global
rivals like Russia and China. Additionally, there were, and still are, scholars
and intellectuals who see global terrorism as more of a policing issue than a
strict foreign policy one. Moreover, while the dangers of terrorism to
Americans are real, the probability of experiencing such an attack is
extraordinary low. Americans are much more likely to die as a result of a
lightning strike or by falling down in their bathtubs.

Discussion about US grand strategy remained a hot topic during
the Obama years. After suffering through roughly seven years of a costly,
expansionist grand strategy, hopes were high that Obama would offer a new foreign
policy approach that scaled back US overseas commitments while also improving America’s
image globally. Supporters of Obama wrote pieces spelling out what a potential
Obama Doctrine might look like. But over time, those hopes were dashed, as
Obama offered less a grand strategy than a general dictum for the US “not to do
stupid stuff.” Obama’s risk averse foreign policy—aside from the catastrophic Libya
intervention—bled into his handling of crises in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria,
Ukraine, and Iran, among other cases. This relatively low-risk approach prevented the US
from accruing massive costs in blood and treasure, in contrast to the Bush
years, though it did feed the perception, in the US and beyond, that Obama was
content with “leading from behind.” Which, in turn, arguably galvanized the
avaricious ambitions of Moscow and Beijing to fill the power vacuums created by
America’s reticence to involve itself in various global disputes and
conflicts. Richard Haass used the term “reluctant sheriff” to describe the US
during the Clinton presidency, though it probably applies much better to Obama’s
America.

With the transition from Obama to Trump, the grand strategy
debate has once again reared its head. Does Trump have a grand strategy? If
not, what might a Trump grand strategy look like? Trump advocates claim that his
America First platform is his administration’s foreign policy organizing
principle. America First is fashioned as an anti-globalist program that is skeptical of trade deals, international institutions, and global elites. It defines the national interest very narrowly, as Trumpites prefer instead to erect barriers and walls to keep out bogeymen of various ethnic and national backgrounds. But on specific details, it's inchoate. The biggest problem is that
America First doesn’t offer any guidelines as to how we can determine what’s in
America’s best interests in each and every instance or event. America First is
a foreign policy nugget—really, a slogan—in search of something larger, bigger to flesh it out
and give it more meaning and substance.

One could argue that Trump’s National Security Strategy is
his administration’s grand strategy. It’s supposed to be, but it’s
not. It’s a document that has, in part, translated some of Trump’s tweets into
foreign policy jargon and, in part, incorporated some of the contemporary thinking
of Washington’s foreign policy establishment. This dual nature of the NSS makes
for a jarring read, particularly the sections on Russia and China.

A smart-aleck could argue that Trump’s personality quirks
prevent him from thinking strategically or in a long-term manner. But there really
is something to this. Frankly, my biggest concern is that Trump, whether on television or in the White House, is notorious for
not liking scripts—which is somewhat akin to how a grand strategy functions for
leaders and their governments—but
desperately needs one at all times. He sees them as too confining, believing
that he’s better—in terms style and substance—when he’s able to improvise and
rely on his instincts. Unfortunately, as we have seen, a freewheeling Trump is
one who is prone to exaggeration, lying, boasting, and making all sorts of wild
statements and accusations seemingly without much concern about the
consequences—to him, to the US, to the world. Yes, he’s a bit stiffer and looks
uncomfortable, but Trump does perform significantly better when he’s prepared,
when he’s giving remarks that have been ruminated over and vetted for accuracy,
clarity and coherence—which by themselves aren’t the same as grand strategy,
but they are by-products of what a well-oiled White House team and a grand
strategy can offer. An organized, detailed grand strategy would keep Trump more
focused and on point, polish off some of his personal rough spots, and deliver
a more consistently effective US foreign policy. Alas, this something we
probably won’t see—in part because of Trump’s personal preferences and in part
because there are no signs his team deems a foreign policy doctrine as
especially important.

Fortunately, Trump foreign policy hasn’t led to any major calamities
yet. However, he has committed a host of unforced errors—including the
decisions to move the US embassy to Jerusalem, station a permanent force in northern
Syria, engage in name calling with Kim Jong Un, and act deferentially to Russia
and China—which could well haunt the US down the line.

Sunday, December 10, 2017

The last few years in global affairs have been dominated by Vladimir
Putin. Since his reelection to the Russian presidency in 2012, Putin’s
ambitions and policies have strongly impacted the globe in sorts of ways. Just consider
the following: Russia’s hosting of the 2014 Winter Olympics, its invasion and
dismemberment of Ukraine, Russia’s intervention in the Syrian civil war, and
its meddling in various elections throughout the west, including in the US and
France—all important events. Over the past decade, Russia, on many fronts, has been
a force that other actors have to cope with and respond to, despite not being
one of the two most powerful states in the world. Russia has punched above its
weight, so to speak, in global influence and significance.

The idea of punching above one’s weight has remained a
dominant theme in international relations in 2017. But it’s not Russia that has
driven the lion’s share of world events this past year, it’s North Korea. And
because of that, my nomination for world politics “Person of the Year” is Kim
Jong Un, the portly young “Rocket Man” of Pyongyang.

To be clear, this isn’t an endorsement of North Korea’s
behavior or wild statements and threats. Moreover, it’s not a vote of approval
of how Kim governs and leads North Korea. Rather, it’s simply an observation
that North Korea, under Kim’s guidance, has managed to set the tone and course
of events in 2017. Let’s face it, North Korea has dominated news headlines in
2017. It has dominated the attention of world leaders. It has triggered a
flurry of diplomatic activity in the UN and East Asia. It’s even baited US President
Donald Trump into a twitter spat. It has repeatedly flouted UN resolutions and
broken international law. And just as importantly significantly, North Korea
has threatened and frightened an increasing number of people worldwide.

The source of all this sturm
und drang is Kim Jong Un’s unrelenting drive to advance his nation’s
missile and nuclear capabilities. This quest could be a function of offensive
motives, such as the desire to unify the Korean Peninsula on his terms. It could
well be an effort to test Trump, to see if he’s a paper tiger. It might also be
a product of defensive factors, such as worries of being abandoned and left
vulnerable by China and longstanding fears of an American-led invasion. Plus,
domestic politics is also probably playing a part here. Keeping the nation safe—something
the Kim dynasty has promised that only it can do—buttresses Kim’s legitimacy.

Regardless, what we do know is that Kim’s military program has
sped into overdrive this year. In September, North Korea is widely believed,
based on geological data, to have tested a two-stage hydrogen bomb, a more sophisticated
and destructive nuclear test than it had previously tested. As The
Washington Post points out, “original estimates had put its yield in the
100-kiloton range, but updated seismic data analyzed by experts…put it closer
to a whopping 250 kilotons, or nearly 17 times more powerful than the bomb that
flattened Hiroshima.” Just as alarmingly, the explosive device is believed to
be small enough to fit inside a rocket. In other words, North Korea has
ostensibly perfected the art of miniaturization and weaponization.

Meantime, North Korea has also conducted twenty-three
tests on six different types of missiles in 2017. North Korea’s latest
missile test, which displayed a new ICBM called the Hwasong-15, has triggered
further global concern, especially in Washington. The Hwasong-15, launched on
November 29th, flew for roughly 54 minutes at almost 2800 feet in altitude,
giving it a likely range of over 8000 miles, if launched at a normal
trajectory—all of those figures, but most significantly altitude and range,
exceed North Korea’s previous tests this calendar year. Pyongyang’s July
29 “game changer” test was tabbed by experts as evidence that North Korea could
hit America’s Midwest. The late November test puts all of the US in range,
including East Coast hubs like New York, Boston, Washington, DC, and Miami.
Even Cuba is now within range of a North Korea rocket—either a conventional one
or a nuclear-tipped one.

Put simply, the North Korea problem is a gathering storm,
one that’s becoming more dangerous and complicated by the day, and one that’s
come to a head in 2017. North Korea’s growing and advancing nuclear and
conventional weapons arsenal is problematic on its own terms, as it gives
Pyongyang greater abilities to harass, threaten, and strike US and allied
interests. But we’re also now seeing harrowing off-shoot problems, like the
prospect of first-strike preventive attacks, accidental launches, and war via
miscalculation/misinformation, picking up steam. Furthermore, 2017 is the year
that the North Korean puzzle has turned from a denuclearization problem to a deterrence game. And America’s refusal to treat the problem as such inevitably means
that Kim gains more time in the global spotlight going forward.

Sunday, November 26, 2017

Earlier this month, US President Donald Trump embarked on a five-nation trip across Asia, a journey that spanned nearly two weeks--his longest trip abroad since becoming president. As we've come to expect by now, his "excellent
adventure" was a mixed bag of good and bad elements.

First, the good stuff. Because of the
narrative of low expectations that continually surround Trump and his foreign
policy, this trip could be seen as at least a partial success, even though there wasn't a breakthrough in policies or ideas. To begin, Trump
seemed to be able to build rapport with the leaders of the countries he
visited. He hit it off with Japanese Prime Minister Abe, with the latter
flattering him with “Donald & Shinzo” baseball caps. In Seoul, Trump
reiterated America's commitment to South Korea. In China, Trump seemed to build a
good personal relationship with Xi Jinping, whom he called “a very special man.” Trump even showed Xi a video of his granddaughter speaking Chinese and singing for “Grandpa
Xi.” Trump also said the right words in Vietnam, assuring his host about
America's commitment in the South China Sea. And finally, in the Philippines, President Duterte serenaded Trump, while Trump exclaimed that
he had “a great relationship” with Duterte.

In short, Trump was on his
best behavior, courting no controversy while building rapport with the leaders he needs to work with. Unfortunately, Trump appears to think that
if he has good personal relations with foreign leaders, like Xi, Abe, Duterte,
and Moon, then the US automatically and by definition has good, harmonious ties
with these foreign nations and that any divergent national interests at stake
thereby wash away. But that's a very dubious belief.

For instance, no matter
how well Trump was feted by Xi, the US and China still are
loggerheads over a number of issues--most notably, over which great power, the
US or China, will dominate in Asia now and in the future. Another problem with this trip is that
Trump seemed to sacrifice the core ideals long embedded in the US national interest, most notably the issues of democracy, liberalism, and human rights. Trump touched very little on human rights
in his visits with Xi and Duterte, and in Vietnam, Trump ignored the political dissidents.

Another glaring problem was Trump was played by his hosts, especially China. So as to woo The Donald, China reportedly told Trump that he was given a "state-plus" visit, replete with a lavish dinner, state ceremonies, and screaming kids lined up along the streets to cheer on Trump's movements around China. In response, Trump was butter in Beijing's hands. All of the economic criticisms he's lobbed at China over the years--as a
civilian, as a political candidate, and as president--on issues like currency
valuation, US-China trade deals, and the like fell by the wayside. Instead, Trump bizarrely blamed past US
administrations for China getting the upper hand in the relationship and
congratulated Beijing for being wily and clever. It's one thing to pursue good
relations with Beijing, it's quite another to act obsequiously toward China. At this point, it's certainly plausible that China now believes it can roll over and sweet talk
Trump, even on issues of American national interest.

At the same time, however, it is possible that
Trump's personal approach to foreign policy might yield some benefits. For instance, de-emphasizing tensions with China, rather adopting a
confrontational approach to Beijing, in both public and private settings, can be good thing. It's establishes some stability in Sino-US ties, which can
reverberates throughout the broader Asia. And just as importantly, having good
ties with China is lays the foundation for US and China to jointly work on some
of the world's toughest issues, like North Korea, global economic growth,
China's expansionism in the South China Sea, and so on.

Another interesting part of Trump's trip is
that he revived the so-called quad, a four-country dialogue involving the US,
Japan, India, and Australia. The quad, along with the use of the term
"Indo-Pacific," rather than Asia, signals an effort by Team
Trump to include India in its thinking and policymaking on Asia. Which is a
good and important development. India is the world's largest democracy, a
latent economic powerhouse under Prime Minister Modi, and potential aspirant
for regional hegemony down the line. In terms of US national interests, it's
far better to have India fully integrated into the existing regional order,
working and playing well with Washington's allies, and firmly on America's
side.

Lastly, it seems like quite a bit of Asia is
starting to move on from the US, already preparing for a post-America Asia, and
Team Trump either doesn't see it or isn't particularly bothered by it. The 11
remaining members of the TPP have already reached consensus on several major
core issues that could well pave the way for a revised pact (now called
the Comprehensive and
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership) minus the US now that Trump withdrew America
from the TPP back in January. Furthermore, it's important to note that
observers of the recent major gatherings in Asia have commented on
the difference in how Xi and Trump have been received by audiences: Xi has been
cheered, Trump not so much. Trump's America First platform, with its emphasis
on bilateral trade deals and protectionism, doesn't resonate in Asia. These things
are viewed as relics of the past, elements of a retrograde economic policy.
Asia is becoming increasingly open and integrated economically, and this is the
direction Asian nations, on balance, want to go. Trump is treading down a
different path, one with not so many followers, and it risks transforming
America First into America Alone. Overall, while Trump might find it
worthwhile to build good rapport with leaders of the countries in East and
Southeast Asia, this might not help him or the US very much absent a coherent US foreign
policy strategy that takes into account the long-term interests of the US,
rather than the en vogue knee-jerk populist policies that could well make China into a de-facto
leader across Asia.

Tuesday, October 24, 2017

Below is an interview I’ve conducted over the last few weeks
with the writer/poet Amalie Flynn. Our readers/followers might remember Ms.
Flynn, as we’ve previously highlighted Amalie and her
work on this blog. For those who might not remember, Amalie is the author of several blogs
and the poetic-memoir
Wife and War, which was released in 2013. We at CWCP have been fans of her
work for years. And now, Amalie is back with a new project called The Sustainability of Us. Ms. Flynn describes this project as “eco-memoir – made of poems. It is about
one family – mine. And wider still. Across our bodies and bodies of land.
Because it is about all of us – and the question – the question of what is
sustainable.” In the following interview, I ask Amalie about the motives and
themes that underpin her new project, as well as the role that the current
political landscape in the US is playing in her work.

Brad Nelson: First, I'd like to start with a basic question.
What motivated you to start your new project The Sustainability of Us?

Amalie Flynn: A convergence of desires led me to The
Sustainability of Us.

My desire to write about my child, who has a disability, who
has apraxia, and who does not have language, the full power to speak. I want to
write about him and express his experience, empower it in a way he cannot, by
speaking it into being.

My desire to write about the environment, the physical land,
which surrounds all of us, and holds us in this space. I want to write about
the connection between each of us and the land, how it writes the story of our
lives, and we write its story, weaving in and out of each other’s narratives,
and how there is always consequence. I want to write about the specific
connection between my son and the land, in terms of language and rights, the
rights of the environment and the rights of my son, rights that can be cultivated
and cared for by the rest of us, but are often desecrated and dismantled, torn
down and ripped away.

And my desire to write about my child and the land - right
now - in this new political reality we are living in, that is marked by
division and fracture and seemingly insurmountable separation. I want to write
in search of the ways we are interdependent, the ways we can be connected, all
of us, to the government, to one another, to the land. I want to write about
how we interact, together, in this, our giant ecosystem of being. I want to
write about the rights and responsibilities we have, our own rights and the
responsibilities we have, to protect the rights of others and of the land, what
rights we choose to protect and what rights we choose to risk, what we choose
to conserve and what we choose to endanger, and the sustainability of it, the
sustainability of us.

BN: Was it easy to decide to write publicly about your son's
experiences? Or did you have any trepidation about that?

BN: Another thought occurred to me. Your comment about the
interdependence and interconnectivity among people, the government, and the
land is quite fascinating. I'm curious about what has inspired and influenced
your thinking about the world in these terms. To my ears, it sounds very
Buddhist--whether intentional or not.

AF: I’ve written about both of my children before. In my Wife and War poems, I wrote about my
son’s disability in poems like Horn, Fill, Matter, Locate,and Words. But in my Wife and War poems, I wrote about my son’s experience alongside
war. This project – The Sustainability of
Us – is different. Because my son’s experience is the focus. And because –
in these poems, his experience is paired with the environment. The environment
is dynamic in a different way than war. War is destructive while the
environment is constructive, organic, and cyclic. Writing about my son’s
disability paired with the environment is my effort to convey his experience of
being, almost ecologically, in terms of his autonomy and his interrelationship
with others – in a world where he may seem not to fit in but a world that is
undoubtedly his. You asked me if it is hard to write about my son. And, yes, it
is hard. Because it is raw and vulnerable and, all at once, mine and not mine.
But it is harder not to write about him. Not to give voice to his story, to my
story with him, to our family’s story. It is a story of struggle and strength
and a constancy of tenuous beauty, like a lotus through mud.

AF: The idea that we are all connected is a repeating theme
in my writing, a core belief, and an interest, really, in what happens when we
forget, forget we are connected, disconnect, and, then, remember again. Often
we forget that we are part of the natural environment, this ecosystem of living
and nonliving species, or that we are dependent on other species and they are
dependent on us. We forget that we are living in a community with these
species, with blades of Blue Fescue grass, a Rufa Red Knot, algae in bloom. And
this forgetting happens in our human relationships too. We forget that we are
connected to other humans, interrelated, and, in many ways, interdependent. So,
in these poems, I am laying, like gauze, the idea of an ecosystem over our
interactions, our interactions with the environment, with each other, and with
our government, so that I can see and describe what bleeds through, what
happens when we forget we are connected and what happens when we remember our
connections again. I am drawn to the land in my writing because I think it
provides a perspective and a tension to the human experience – and because I
think the land possesses intrinsic value and is important. This philosophy comes from my scholarship –
my doctoral work was an eco-anthropological analysis of the American suburban
front lawn. It comes from Aldo Leopold’s land ethic, the warnings of Rachel
Carson, and my own sense of environmental ethics. It comes from my obsession
with space and place, what we build and what we do not, what fills and what
leaves holes or a void. It comes from my belief in the narrative and story and
shape of land. And it comes from my own sense of self, my deep connection to
land. Being in nature is almost ritualistic for me. I do it every day. And it
is one of the ways I feel most myself, most human, when I find myself amongst
the land, because I remember myself again in a contrast to and in a connection
with that land.

BN: I'd like to swing back to a comment you made earlier in
our conversation. You said, "And my desire to write about my child and the
land - right now - in this new political reality we are living in, that is
marked by division and fracture and seemingly insurmountable separation."
I'd like to tease out this sentence a bit. In particular, I'm curious about the
impact of the current political environment on your work. How do you see it?
And is the impact different from, say, the Obama years?

AF: Currently, America is fiercely divided. The current
administration operates by way of division, seems to empower itself by dividing
us, and is deeply mired in a scandal that divides us further still. And, yet, at the heart of this division is the reality that
politics are personal. Politics are personal because politics affect people,
real human beings with lives that are delicate and deserving of certain
protections from their government. For me, what marks this administration as so
different from the last administration, beyond all the fanfare and cacophony of
scandal, is the very real reversal of rights, the moving backwards.

The policies and pursuits of this administration threaten
the rights of many Americans – the rights of minorities, women, refugees,
immigrants, the LGBTQ community, those who practice Islam, Judaism, or no
religion at all, the rights of the environment, and, yes, the rights of those
who live with disabilities – like my child.

Through aggressive deregulation of environmental
protections, this administration has relegated the environment to the role of raw
resource – a material to be used by humans, exploited, disregarded, and thrown
away. There is a connection here – with the alarming way this administration
has threatened the rights of people with disabilities. This administration has
not proven to be an advocate for disability rights. Instead, there is an effort
to strip health care coverage away from people with disabilities. There is a
rolling back of ADA and regulations requiring businesses to be accessible.
There is the proposal that IDEA be no longer federally mandated but left to
states to decide whether to enforce it or not. There is the prospect that
restructuring the public school system through school choice and voucher
programs will re-segregate schools and deny children with disabilities the
right to free and equal education. There is the actual physical erasure of the
page on the White House website that was formerly dedicated to disability
rights.

So, I see the environment and people with disabilities as
connected. They are connected because the rights of each are threatened by this
administration. Viewed from this perspective, my son and the environment are
even more closely connected. Because they are both voiceless. They are both
without a voice, at least in a traditional sense.

For me, the difference between this administration and the
last administration is a backwards movement, the reversal of rights, the danger
and darkness of a retrograde. And I am focused on this difference poetically –
what this difference means for the environment, my child, all of us, not just
politically, but personally. Because the America I love is forward moving. It
is constantly trying to move forward. In ways that include everyone.

That we now live in an America that is moving backwards is
devastating and will have very real and harmful repercussions, for the
environment, in the personal lives of people, and for us all as a public
society. So, it is this difference and this devastation that I am writing
about. It is the disregard for a child. It is a river forced dry.

BN: I detect a sense of urgency in your assessment of the
Trump era: the seemingly dire state of US politics, the growing intractable divisions
within America, the declining state of our environment, and so on. It seems clear that your new project is a personal visceral reaction to all of
that. At the same time, I suspect that you see—and maybe even hope—your poetic-blog
goes beyond that, beyond the personal to something larger and bigger. Am I right?

AF: The degradation of the environment, the diminishment of
certain groups of people, such as people with disabilities, the divisions
between us – these realities precede our current administration and have always
existed in America – as has my disquiet about them. Policies of the current
administration that target the environment and people with disabilities only
bring into focus a subjugation that is always there, that has always been
there, in America. So, while this project speaks to the danger of the current
administration’s mistreatment of the environment and of people with
disabilities, it is speaking to something larger, an America where domination
and degradation is woven into so many of our interactions, with each other,
with our government, and with the land. In these poems, I seek to say something
illimitable – about the environment and about us – about the dichotomy at the
heart of this existence – resilience and self-sustainment, fragility and
vulnerability. Ultimately, these poems are about humanity, how we are all
connected, and the deep schisms and voids that form when we deny these
connections or sever them. In each poem, there is the optimism of connection,
reconnection. And the reality that sometimes – sometimes it is too late.

Amalie Flynn is an American writer and the author of WIFE
AND WAR: THE MEMOIR and three blogs: WIFE AND WAR, SEPTEMBER ELEVENTH, and THE
SUSTAINABILITY OF US. Flynn’s WIFE AND WAR poetry has appeared in THE NEW YORK
TIMES AT WAR and in TIME’S BATTLELAND, has appeared in THE HUFFINGTON POST, and
has received mention from THE NEW YORK TIMES MEDIA DECODER. Her SEPTEMBER
ELEVENTH blog has received mention from CNN. In addition, her WIFE AND WAR blog
has a global readership, with readers from over 90 countries. WIFE AND WAR: THE
MEMOIR is her first book.

Monday, October 9, 2017

US President
Donald Trump continues to issue incendiary statements and tweets on North
Korea. As you may recall, there is the “fire and fury” statement, the “Rocket
Man” mocking tweet, the “destroy North Korea” UN speech, and his “calm before
the storm” boast, which has been interpreted as a threat to Pyongyang. In two October
7th tweets (see here
and here),
Trump wrote, “Presidents and their administrations have been talking to North
Korea for 25 years, agreements made and massive amounts of money paid….hasn't
worked, agreements violated before the ink was dry, makings fools of U.S.
negotiators. Sorry, but only one thing will work!”

Combined, these statements and tweets suggest that Trump believes or at least wants Kim Jong Un to believe that military force, if not
outright regime change, is on America’s agenda. Trump thinks that past American
presidents have been far too lenient on North Korea and that tough talk, coercive
actions, and maybe even military force are better courses of action. There is a
place for coercion, actually. And I’ve advocated
a combination of containment and deterrence as appropriate coercive
maneuvers. As examples, strengthening America’s partnerships with South Korea and Japan, relying
on the principles of Mutually Assured Destruction, boosting missile defenses in
Asia and on the homeland, putting pressure on China to manage better North
Korea, attempting to squeeze Pyongyang’s diplomatic space and contacts, pursuing economic sanctions, and tracking and punishing smuggling of all kinds—things Team
Trump are, mostly, doing—are good, reasonable approaches.

However, the US can’t embrace an “all sticks, no carrots”
approach, which is what Trump is doing. It makes the Kim regime feel as
if it has no way out of its crisis with the US, no suitable policy off-ramp to
avoid a head-on collision: either Pyongyang prepares for war or it capitulates
to American demands. There has to be a blend of containment/deterrence with the
hope of talks that offer some concessions—some policies and tools that allow
Kim Jong Un to save face, feel less insecure, and trust the US in any potential
negotiations.

With all this in mind, then, it’s fairly evident to me that
Trump is bungling the North Korea crisis. And not only that, he’s getting quite
a few fine-grained aspects of the crisis wrong. Please consider the below
arguments and empirical realities.

1. Empirical
research by the Center for Strategic and International Studies clearly
indicates that engagement with North Korea—diplomatic outreach, promises of
concessions, etc.—have consistently gotten Pyongyang to the negotiating table.
Yes, once at the negotiating table, North Korea has posed problems: it has sabotaged
talks and undermined nuclear deals that have been agreed upon over the last 25
years. That said, drawing Pyongyang to talks is a desirable thing. It lowers the
tensions and hostilities, regionally and internationally, allowing all sides to
take a breather. It also enables existing US-North Korean diplomatic channels to talk and coordinate without the unnecessary burden of a nuclear war looming in the background. And those two things, in turn, just might offer the proper conditions
for a comprehensive nuclear deal to get done, finally. After all, that’s the
goal, right?

2. Directly and obliquely threatening a very insecure and
isolated Kim Jong Un only bolsters his inclination to stay away from diplomatic
talks and expand his nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities. The Kims have
long believed that the US has designs on overthrowing their government, despite
pleas to the contrary by various American administrations since the end of the
Korean War. North Koreans think their predicament with the US is an existential
dilemma. Upping the threats only plays into the long-held narrative about US
intentions and motives vis-à-vis North Korea.

3. North Korea is especially insecure and
vulnerable these days. It’s a cornered and isolated nation. Of course, Kim is shunned and
threatened by America and its Asia allies, Japan and South Korea. But China,
Pyongyang’s lifeline, is also alarmed and tired of Pyongyang’s antics, which
only fuels North Korea’s sense of insecurity, particularly its feeling that it
could well be abandoned and left unprotected by Beijing. Astonishingly, President
Xi Jinping has yet to meet Kim, and there’s no sign of that happening anytime
soon. And when Kim has his uncle killed in 2013, he eliminated China’s main
contact to North Korea. Additionally, in recent years, and particularly this
year, China has voted with the US on UN resolutions condemning North Korea and
applying further sanctions on the Kim regime. Sure, there are reports of Russia
filling in the economic gap vacated by China, but such activity merely helps to
keep the regime afloat another day but doesn’t lessen much Pyongyang’s
insecurity. North Korea knows that Russia isn’t attached to the Kim dynasty and
doesn’t have strong historical ties and connections to North Korea, and so it’s
unlikely that Pyongyang views Moscow as a potential savior. It’s this sense of
isolation and danger that informs how North Korea views the world and how it
interacts with it.

4. The North Korea problem is no longer a denuclearization
problem, as has been suggested by various elements of Team Trump, but rather a
deterrence puzzle. As soon as Team Trump realizes this, the better US foreign
policy will be. Put simply, Kim has nukes and he’s not giving them up. Handing
them over/dismantling them only exacerbates his political and personal
insecurities and vulnerabilities, for it means he’ll no longer have the
requisite capabilities to deter an American invasion. Plus, years of North
Korean propaganda have made both the nation’s nukes and its nuclear scientists
quite popular, offering a source of pride in what citizens believe to be an
indigenously created and sustained program of scientific achievement.
Furthermore, the nuclear program gives the Kim regime a veneer of legitimacy it
sorely needs, as it fulfills the promise the Kims have made that they and only
they can protect the nation from imperialists and other invaders seeking
conquest of North Korea. Mothballing the nuclear program raises the possibility
that North Koreans might begin to question the things that have been drummed
into heads for decades, potentially leading to the whole house of cards falling
down. Don’t underestimate Kim, he knows this. Hence, North Korean
denuclearization is a longshot, best-case scenario, one that’s highly unlikely at the moment and thus should not be the focus of US foreign policy.

5. Team Trump has no clue how to communicate threats to
North Korea. Scholarly research shows that whether threats are deemed credible
depends crucially on the interests and capabilities of the actor who issues them. If an actor issuing a threat is viewed as powerful, and if that threat
covers issues seen as vital to that actor, it's likely those threats will be
perceived as credible or believable. On those counts, US threats to North Korea
are indeed credible. Keep in mind, though, there are other factors that can enhance or weaken
the credibility of threats: most notably, consistently and clarity. Deterrence/compellence
scholars have argued that threats are credible if the same message of those
threats is explicitly and overtly communicated on a repeated basis. More specifically, (1) the issue at stake, (2) the policy or behavior that is
sought by the actor issuing the threat, and (3) type or form of punishment if compliance
isn’t forthcoming absolutely must be clearly and repeatedly communicated to the threated side/actor. If not, there is room for the threatened to misinterpret or misunderstand the threat,
which can throw both sides into a conflict that might have been otherwise
avoided.

On this matter, on consistently and clarity, the Trump
administration is performing extraordinarily poorly. In his public statements
and tweets, Trump brandishes bellicose rhetoric. In fact, his statements are
tweets have been so outside of the norm of past US administrations that North
Korean diplomats have been left puzzled by their meaning. As Evan Osnos reports, they’ve been desperately searching for clues in their efforts
to decipher the meaning and intent of Trump’s wild and brazen threats. So that,
by itself, is a major problem. But additionally, Trump’s statements and tweets
are often at odds with public comments made by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson. Tillerson has repeatedly offered very cautious remarks meant to lower hostilities and
make clear that the US seeks diplomacy rather than war. But Trump has, on
several occasions, undercut him, arguing that diplomatic overtures are
a waste of time. As a result, the North Koreans don’t know what to think. Is
Trump simply playing good cop/bad cop with them? Or is Tillerson irrelevant? Is US foreign policy made by Trump via Twitter? Given this sense of
uncertainty, and given Pyonyang's insecurities, it makes loads of sense for North Korea to assume and prepare for the worst: that the US, led by an unpredictable and rash leader, isn’t
just looking to bully Kim but seeks war against him and his state.

6. The North Korea problem can’t and won’t be solved,
whenever it’s eventually ameliorated, by force. On this issue, the much-lampooned Steve Bannon is correct. The US is unable to take out all of North
Korea’s nuclear facilities and its missile systems. What this means, then, is
that if the US did attempt degrade North Korea’s military capabilities, Kim
will have a residual force that could be used to strike against US interests in
Asia, enough to cause significant death and destruction—including the deaths
of hundreds of thousands American troops and civilians who are stationed/live
in the region. Regime Change is also a no-go because Kim would very likely use
his nuclear arsenal in response. North Korea’s nuclear doctrine is probably one
of “asymmetric
escalation,” a term coined by Vipin Narang. This
refers to the prospect of North Korea quickly escalating an ongoing conflict,
one in which conventional weapons are used against it, to the nuclear realm.
Regime change is precisely the kind of conflict that would trigger asymmetric
escalation.

Moreover, using military force against North Korea raises the
thorny issue of Chinese behavior. In short, what would China do? Would a fed up
and disgusted let Kim fall? In that case, it might stay on the sidelines or perhaps
even coordinate with the US—so as to ensure that it has a say in what a future
North Korea looks like. But the US should by no means assume this behavior by
China. For example, what if China fears that regime change equates to
North-South unification, Seoul as the capital, and a unified Peninsula, on its
border, inside the Western camp, an outcome akin to Germany in the early 1990s?
This is exactly the kind of outcome China fears and wants to avoid. So what
does China do? Does it rescue Kim?

7. Making Kim believe that the US is hell-bent on using
military force against North Korea could cause him to launch a pre-emptive war
against the America and South Korea. In other words, coercive pressure by the
US could backfire and produce the outcome that everyone globally is looking to
avoid. This is a problem that Trump has single-handedly caused: his “madman”
approach to North Korea, allegedly inspired by Richard Nixon’s policy posture
and decision-making during the Vietnam War, has led Pyongyang to conclude that the
Trump administration is looking for a fight. Unfortunately, though, if Kim
thinks that no matter what he does—no matter what kinds of policy changes he
enacts on the nuclear issue—the US will deploy force against North Korea, then
he has incentives to order a first-strike with the hope of gaining early
advantages on the battlefield. And as outlined above, given North Korea’s
probable asymmetric escalation nuclear doctrine, a first move with conventional
forces greatly enhances the likelihood that nuclear weapons will quickly enter
the picture. This is the most likely route in which a rational Kim Jong Un,
responding to perceived threats and pressures, uses nuclear weapons against the
US territory and US interests.

8. Trump’s preference to decertify Iran only makes the North
Korean problem more difficult. Surely, Kim is looking Trump’s effort to
abrogate the Iran deal and sees this as evidence of the US as being an
untrustworthy partner, one whose word is effectively meaningless. Specifically,
I’m sure Kim is struck by two things: (1) a deal negotiated by one US
government can be stymied by its successor; and (2) Trump wants out of the deal
based on details that are unrelated to the actual specifics of it. The IAEA,
Mattis, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joseph Dunford, the Europeans, various
nuclear watchdogs, and so on, all say Iran is upholding its end of the nuclear
bargain and that the US ought not take measures to scupper it. Hence, Trump
can’t really say that Iran’s violating the deal; instead, his claim is that Iran is repudiating the “spirit” of the deal by conducting
missile tests and arming extemist/militant groups like Hamas and Hezbollah—bad things, yes, but
outside the purview of the deal as negotiated by Iran and the P5+1. With this
in mind, why should Kim go ahead with nuclear talks if the US will break its
promises down the road? Pushing to renegotiate the Iran deal—a tactic known
among Congressional Republicans as “fix it or nix it”—only deincentivizes North
Korea to come back to the negotiating table.

Monday, August 14, 2017

It’s beyond crazy and wild, terrible and horrific, to see
the protests, violence, and torch-bearing Nazis in Charlottesville. I
spent two years as a grad student at the University of Virginia, or UVA, and loved my time there and in and
around Charlottesville. For those who are unaware, it’s a beautiful part of America: UVA is a national treasure, for architectural and historical and scholastic
reasons, and the natural scenery of the bucolic surrounding area, which includes Shenandoah National
Park and the Blue Ridge Mountains, is breathtaking. It’s so strange to have
such a majestic, tranquil area roiled by unrest and murder. Not so long ago I
never would have dreamed that Charlottesville would be the center of a major
news event, but it is. In fact, the city is a major front in the
battle between 21st century America and white nationalists and Nazis.
Yes, Nazis.

Trump's Statements

If you scan mainstream news sources and social media, there’s
been a justifiable outcry across the political spectrum, against President Trump’s initial statement, one that reeked of bizarre moral equivalency, that blamed “all sides” for Saturday’s violence. By not naming and
shaming the Charlottesville Nazis, Trump, in effect, let them off the hook. And
they know it. Chatter from Nazis, most notably from The Daily Stormer, showed their
pleasure that Trump failed to condemn them, their rhetoric, or their actions. They
firmly believe the president of the US has their back, which is by itself astounding and disturbing. But it also means that this Nazi problem isn’t going away anytime
soon. Given the political climate (the polarization, Trump in charge,
Breitbarters in the White House, etc.), it’s hard not to see them as
emboldened, even ascendant, right now.

On Monday, Trump gave a more forceful statement, albeit a scripted, Teleprompter-read one. Keep in mind, though, that it took two days and a second try for Trump to name and denounce "KKK, neo-Nazis, white supremacists, and other hate groups." For a guy who's ultra-quick to call out "losers," "haters," and "bad hombres" and "fake news," his fumfering spoke volumes. Many wondered if Trump was sincere.

Apparently not. On Tuesday, Trump held a disastrous press conference, one that was supposed to focus on his infrastructure plans, but instead was consumed by last weekend's events in Virginia. There, in an off-the-cuff exchange with reporters, he reverted back to his "all sides" sentiment. He did call out the murderer, the Nazi who crashed his car into a crowd, but he also placed blame on the "alt-left," calling them violent, and said that there were some good people who attended the white nationalist rally, and that they "peacefully" marched on Friday night. Evidence shows otherwise, as the marchers shouted "Jews won't replace us," and "Blood and Soil," among other white supremacist slogans. In the aftermath of the Tuesday's press conference, Richard Spencer and David Duke tweeted their plaudits for Trump's performance, which they viewed as a full-throated defense of their movement.

What's going on here? What explains Trump's behavior? Why defend a violent hate movement, one, mind you, that despises members of his own family?

Four Explanations

1. Trump is a racist or has racist inclinations.

I don't throw around the R word lightly, so it's difficult to write that anyone, let alone the American president, could well be a racist. But this is where we're at. The possibility that Trump's a racist or racist inclinations can't be ruled out anymore; it's not just leftist hyper-babble. And we can't simply pin the blame for Trump's various repugnant statements and policies on Stephen Bannon, his Darth Vader-like Chief Strategist. Not when Trump, of his own unprompted volition, publicly and vigorously defended white nationalists. And please note Trump's history. Well before he was a political figure and had to make political
calculations about his words and actions, Trump had a checkered past with various identity groups. He (along
with his dad and Trump Management) was sued in the 1970s for housing
discrimination, played a part in spreading false statements and riling up New
Yorkers in the Central Park Five case, and aroused suspicions of bigotry during
his Apprentice days. And of course, what helped Trump rise to political prominence, even before his formal participation in US politics, was his "Birther" antics, a xenophobic and racially-tinged campaign against former President Barack Obama.

2. He far underestimates the goals and intentions of the American white supremacist movement.

It's certainly plausible that he's been fooled by the 21st century uniform of the white nationalists that no longer embraces the white hood. That's been replaced by khakis and white polo shirt. And Richard Spencer, an infamous white nationalist, typically dresses in fancy suits. Perhaps Trump sees the more open, transparent racists as less threatening. Maybe. Relatedly, and more importantly, behind closed doors Trump has reportedly voiced that argument that these folks are simply trying to protect their "heritage." That's revealing. It shows that Trump likely sees at least a chunk of the white supremacists as just another civic action group seeking to assert their interests and voice their grievances. If so, then, in Trump's worldview the white supremacists are no different than union workers, the NRA, the pharmaceutical lobby, and so on.

3. He sees himself in the Nazis

No, I'm not necessarily referring to whether Trump is a racist. Rather, it would not surprise me if viewed the white nationalists as similar political actors existing in a somewhat similar situation: that they are both insurgents or outsiders, attacked, demonized, and misunderstood by the "mainstream media" and the left, willing to say the politically incorrect "hard truths" that nobody dares to say, and desirous of shaking up the political establishment. I think he has a personal affinity for the white nationalists, and feels a sense of kinship with them.

4. Self-preservation politics

Politics are playing a role here, I have no doubt. They are very likely pushing and pulling him in dark directions. I suspect that he believes the rubes (“I love the poorly educated!”) and racists are the support base he simply cannot lose. And at an approval rating about 35%, Trump knows his margin for success, now and in the future, is tenuous at best. Trump seeks to keep the kooks on his side and inspired, in part because of his desire to reciprocate their loyalty, according to those who know him, but also because they're vital cogs in his machine—pledging support, donating money, buying hats, attending rallies, intimidating the press and political opponents, and causing mischief and proselytizing online, where they're members of his army of Internet trolls.

Should Trump fail to keep these groups firmly in his camp and highly motivated, he runs the risk of not just losing the presidency in 2020, but he very well could lose the
GOP nomination in 2020—and that’s says nothing about the fate of the impending
Congressional elections in 2018. It’s clear that Trump has made a strategic
decision to solidify his far right flank by playing up various cultural wedge issues, gambling that satisfied, galvanized racist numbskulls can help to keep him in office. Embedded in this is another gamble: that he won't alienate his overall base of white voters and that they will accept his hug of Nazis, either approving of it or looking away. Certainly, this strategy is ruinous for the country, but,
then again, Trump is not a country-first patriot; he’s a me-first plutocrat whose
prime directive is to enrich himself and his family.

Reports on the state of the White House reveal a cornered,
threatened, and paranoid Trump. For starters, the Russiagate investigations, the constant turnover and infighting within Team Trump, Trump's reckless and incendiary tweets, and the lack of much substantive policy progress are taking a significant toll. It's creating the impression of a White House that's chaotic, incompetent, and mendacious. For instance, most Americans don't think Trump is trustworthy or approve of the job he's doing as president. Most troubling for Trump, even approval from white working class voters without a college degree, his much-hyped base, is trending downward.

Moreover,
the GOP vultures are circling Washington, believing that Trump is politically vulnerable. There are already rumblings that his Veep, Mike Pence, is planning
contingency operations to run for the presidency in 2020. Conservative power
broker Bill Kristol is floating the idea of putting together a “Committee to
Not Reelect the President,” sort of an anti-CREEP coalition, for those who
recall the Nixon days. There are also, already, a number of prominent Republicans who seem
primed to run for the GOP nomination in 2020, such as Ben Sasse, Jeff Flake, and
John Kasich: Sasse and Flake have recently released books—a typical first-step
for US politicians seriously considering a run at the White House—and Kasich has made sure to keep his name in the news. The avid
cable news watcher that he is, Trump is abundantly aware of all these
developments.

And then there are the Democrats. Undoubtedly, the Democrats have their issues: they lack clear leaders, they leaders they do have are largely aged and uninspiring, and they lack a clear message and policy alternative to Trump. Yet they are able to get under Trump's skin. His Twitter rants against various Democrats, like Richard Blumenthal and Chuck Schumer, and the Democratic Party make that point clear. And Congressional Democrats are united in their fierce resistance to all things Trump, which makes his life difficult. Without Democratic support, he can't get any legislation passed, has to make excuses and scapegoat others, including members of his own party, for his lightweight governing record, and is forced to rely on executive orders, which, all combined, make him appear weak and feckless.

Making Sense of It All

What does all this mean? The four explanations, individually and/or collectively, leads us to an uncomfortable but inescapable conclusion: Trump has an incentive to turn a blind eye, if not cozy up, to these groups. And Tuesday's defense of the Nazis is just the latest in a string of overtures to them. Indeed, he’s thrown many winks and
nods to them since he began his political career more than two years ago. During the campaign, Trump refused to immediately and sharply disavow
support from infamous former KKK leader and white nationalist David Duke, repeatedly posted retweets from
known white nationalists, and he and his children tweeted the notorious Pepe
the Frog memes. His policy proposals and initiatives include “The Wall,”
banning transgender folks from the military, the infamous “Muslim Ban”
executive order, and a government direction to focus solely on Islamic
terrorism, thereby mostly ignoring the more numerous terror acts of white nationalists,
among other things. Trump has elevated bogus and extremist “news outlets” like
InfoWars and Breitbart. And to top it off, several of his key staff—like
Sebastian Gorka, Stephen Miller, and Stephen Bannon—have a history of espousing
bigoted, xenophobic views. In all, this has been a bonanza for Nazi types in
the US.

If you add it all up, it seems rather dire. Frankly, it
feels as if the US is rotting from the inside. A day ago my nine-year-old daughter, after seeing pictures of the Nazi flag on television, said to me: "Dad, I thought the Nazis were defeated in World War II? And why are they here in the United States?" Clearly, we have a massive problem, one that's (1) complex, in that there are multiple causes and contributors to white nationalism and supremacy, (2) growing, considering that the ranks of "alt-right" are swelling and the movement is already planning more "marches" and rallies," and (3) lacks a quick or easy solution. Most troublesome, a part of the problem stems from the highest office in the US. Trump has publicly and tacitly endorsed white supremacy, elevated this ideology and its adherents to mainstream status, and demonized and marginalized those individuals and groups who want to challenge the narrative and actions of white racists. At bottom, we have a sitting US president who's abdicated his moral authority, and that's only one of a host of major foreign and domestic problems that he's either created or worsened since taking office seven months ago.

On a positive note, many good Americans, on
the right and left, are activated and mobilized, in various ways, against far,
far right extremism, Nazis and others of their ilk, and their abettors in the
White House. Much, much more needs to be done, obviously. But don’t despair.
Instead, remain vigilant, speak out, put pressure on your Congresspersons to
repudiate and investigate extremism and hate groups. Please, let’s make America
kind and decent again.

Wednesday, August 9, 2017

Brad Nelson and Yohanes Sulaiman offer their thoughts on the latest news on North Korea's nuclear program.

Yohanes Sulaiman: The North Korean nuclear issue has been
sliced and diced beyond recognition -- even by us, in the past couple of years.
And the core issue remains: how much is the US and its allies willing to pay
for getting an outcome they want.

While there have been discussions that a "limited
strike" is on the table, frankly, I don't see any "limited
strike" as possible. For the North Korean regime, any
"provocation" must get a reply, especially a strike by the United
States, for one simple reason: This is a very insecure regime that has to ratchet
its provocations all way up to eleven. And any attack that goes without response,
would make the North Korean people and, more importantly, its political elite question
whether the Dear Leader has gone soft or has joined the rank of mortals, and
thus presenting an opportunity for an uprising.

In essence, there is only two major options: wait and do
nothing or go for war.

1. Wait

Some specialists argue that the regime is vulnerable due to
its weak economy, growing discontent, etc. But as we can see from many examples
all over the world, such as in Venezuela, where you have a two-bit very
unpopular autocrat ruling a country that is wrecked daily with protests from the
opposition, any determined autocrat, as long as he or she can maintain the
loyalty of political elite, can survive indefinitely.

And North Korea is a special basket case, where you have a
population that is totally subservient (they don't even riot during the great
famine period!) and a cowed political elite. Moreover, you have China next
door, who, while it loathes the regime, hates the possibility of the US
presence in the Yalu River even more. Thus, regardless of North Korean
provocations, Beijing will keep the supply lines open. And Kim Jong Un also knows
that.

2. War

This will be messy for sure. Can't sugarcoat this. Thousands
or even millions may die, with sky-high damage, and, depending on the outcome,
that would also destroy the reputation of both China and the United States in
the region, because the Korean and Japanese population would blame both China
and the US. Kim Jong Un's regime is gambling that this will be the brake that
forces both China and the US to stay in option one. Why is he confident? See
all the appeasement from the US to North Korea since Bill Clinton era and how
China keeps supporting the regime even today even after North Korea essentially
gave China the finger.

The third option is the Trump option. Trump is so bombastic and
unpredictable that he may actually convince China that war is inevitable and that
China really needs to do something about Kim Jong Un. At this point, though,
China's ineffective policy to North Korea would come home to roost simply
because China does not have any Korean policy per se, except keeping the North
Korean regime afloat. I doubt Beijing actually considers the possibility of
North Korea going rogue, considering the close relationship between Kim Jong Il
and Beijing. And even if China wants to do any regime change in North Korea,
the possibility has probably already closed when North Korean agents managed to
murder Kim Jong Un's brother in Malaysia, preempting this kind of scenario. So,
there is very little possibility that China can impose regime change without
bringing the entire country down, and Kim Jong Un knows it. And Beijing also
knows it.

Brad Nelson: As I see it, the developments over the last day have revealed three new things. (1) US intelligence has recently
estimated North
Korea could have as many as 60 nukes, which is about three times the
typical estimates that I've heard about North Korea nuclear capabilities. Most
estimates have placed the country’s nuclear arsenal at around 15-20 nukes. (2)
North Korea has the ability to miniaturize a nuclear weapon and therefore
weaponize a ballistic missile. Nuclear weapons experts have believed that North
Korea would probably perfect this technology, but that it was several years
away from doing so. (3) Arguably, the
rhetoric from the sitting US president ("fire and fury"), which
has escalated tension (North Korea possibly targeting Guam), is another new
wrinkle in this intractable situation.

First, it's certainly possible that Trump's
off-the-cuff remarks yesterday, while intended to signal strength and resolve,
could be interpreted By Kim as deeply ominous and threatening—that Trump is
seriously thinking about a 1st strike against the regime. And if that's the
case, Kim, thinking he has nothing to lose, might lash out militarily against
American interests in the region (South Korea, Guam, etc.). And second, if Trump really intend to deliver a nuclear 1st strike threat, that goes against decades of US foreign policy, which has embraced the notion of second-strike deterrent or extended deterrent threats as sufficient to protect and preserve US national security interests. Is Trump moving US nuclear policy in a more aggressive direction?

So what to do? Well, as you know, there've been many
different proposals bandied about by policymakers, scholars, and analysts over
the years. Recent pieces by Mark
Bowden and Jeffrey
A. Bader do a good job of highlighting these options, which include regime
change, targeted strikes against North Korea's arsenal, delegating the issue to China,
putting significant pressure on China to strangle Pyongyang, resuming the
six-party talks, doing nothing/acceptance (that North Korea is indeed a nuclear
power), containment/deterrence, and direct high-level bilateral negotiations
with North Korea’s leadership.

Of these, I'm in favor of a combination of
containment/deterrence and negotiations. The other options either likely won't
work and/or entail significant costs in blood and treasure (for the US, South
Korea, and North Korea). Roughly speaking, my two-track plan involves very
senior-level talks up to and possibly including Kim and Trump on freezing then
rolling back North Korea's nuclear program over time in exchange for various economic
concessions and security guarantees; at the same time, the US would also up its
missile defense in the region and on American homeland, strengthen its ties to
states throughout Asia via more military exercises and arms transfers, and
actively clamp down on North Korea's economy and military. Based on how North
Korea responds to all of this, the US could then decide whether to ease up on
containment in favor of talks, or prioritize containment over talks.

Historically for the US, this has been the most successful
path to moderating disputes and tensions. The US used this dual-track approach
vis-a-vis the Soviets during the cold war, and the Bush and Obama
administrations did likewise against Iran. Eventually, both Iran and the
Soviets came out of the cold, after they realized they couldn't compete against
the US and its allies and needed to play nice with the rest of the world. The
downside is that this two-track approach doesn't lend itself to a quick,
overnight resolution and it requires patience by American leaders--something
that's on short supply at the moment, it seems. Of course, nobody likes the
idea of Kim possessing nuclear-tipped ICBMs that can hit dozens of nations, including, it now seems, the heartland of the US. But
patience can work in the end. Kim is rational, North Korea is isolated and
poor, and China despises Kim and his antics. Plus, I see an added benefit here:
if the US sincerely reaches out to Pyongyang, which is what Beijing wants, I
suspect that China, seeing its interests taken into account by Washington, will
be willing to do more than it has on the North Korea problem.

YS: Again, I don't think that negotiation will work simply
because it cannot give both sides what they want: North Korea, at least under
Kim Jong Un, simply wants nukes for self-preservation. Kim and his cronies might negotiate, but at the end of the day, they will present the fait accompli: They
have nukes, deal with it. And that is unacceptable for everyone else. For Pyongyang,
giving up nukes at this stage would risk a massive backlash domestically, because
it would (1) signal that the Kim Jong Un's regime is as vulnerable to outside pressure, and (2) defeat the entire raison d'etre of its existence. Other states, such as
Iran, can backtrack on their military nuclear programs because they've never tied their legitimacy to them, but not North Korea, which has placed itself in a corner.

What I think we have to deal with in the future is: how to
deal with a nuclear North Korea, the possibility of further proliferation, and a
massive rearmament in South Korea and Japan. Maybe I am too pessimistic here,
but I just don't see Kim being willing or able to negotiate a freeze or roll
back of his country’s nukes.