This document is of particular significance to foreign creditors and Venny bondholders, because it is the first official document showing how many assets are still left in the State’s coffers after a year of sustained reserve depletion. Crucially, it should tell us something about the country’s asset composition between the liquid (i.e., something you can transform quickly into cash), the liquidable, and the liquified.

As with most things the Venezuelan government says and does, these spreadsheets hold way more than meets the eye. There’s a tiny little print for every single figure that matters! Given that we’re talking about a country with three different official FX rates and less transparency in external accounts than the Black Theater of Prague, this comes as no surprise.

Here are some of the main takeaways on the reported figures:

Reported income from operations fell sharply (-67%), with the greater damage dealt on the foreign currency ops (-72%). As a mirror image, expenses were down in the exact proportion (-67%), with the bigger fall as well on the FX-denominated front (-80%). All of this suggests that not even funny exchange-rate accounting (the biggest items on foreign currency incomes and expenses are “realized exchange-rate and price fluctuations”) could cover the sharp reduction in the bank’s financial activity that is most evident on its final result: a -99,90% plunge in net income versus the last semester, earning VEF 1,15 million in 1H15. Of course, there’s a number that’s always gonna keep rising: operating expenses rose 18% to VEF 4,13 Billion over the period. In other words, the BCV is not selling enough currency, as anyone who has been to a Venezuelan supermarket can attest to.

To start the Balance Sheet, the BCV seems to have an apparently solid +43% jump in FX liquidity. Funny, though, that it’s denominated in Bolos. Note 4 clarifies that the liquid resources of the bank are calculated with a mix of the 3 official FX rates (convenient!), and the end result was really a -32% draw in liquid funds to finish the period with USD 2,11 Bn. Interestingly, we can use the info in this Note to calculate an implicit average rate of 17,80 VEF/USD, which means a USD price 110% higher than the 8,48 average valuation reported in the second half of 2014. In other words, the BCV has assumed a devaluation that has gone unannounced to the public.

Venezuela’s position in IMF Special Drawing Rights fell 61% over the period (A total of 1,98 Bn was withdrawn, resulting in a position of USD 1,28 Bn to close 1H15), confirming local press reports showing several SDR redemptions throughout the year. Basically, the government is withdrawing as much as it can from the IMF … in order to pay Wall Street. #RobbingFromPeterToPayPaul

‘Various Foreign Currency Assets’ is a curious little item that doesn’t pass a smell test. The section shows a 2,47 Bn rise in the first half of 2015 (+17%) which is exclusively related to the inclusion of ‘Monetary Gold’, an item that stood at 0 in 2H14 and which was added “In conformity with the approved guidelines by the Superintendency for Banking Sector Institutions (SUDEBAN)”, quoting an undisclosed memo from the banking regulator dated March 9th 2015. Before you can say “what the heck is “monetary gold”?”, do note that this looks like the BCV is double counting our reserves in gold.

All in all, despite a presentation deliberately designed to mislead readers, the numbers speak for themselves: the Central Bank is running out of hard assets. And the rhythm of asset depletion seems to be accelerating over time.

Related

Russian-Venezuelan. A Santiaguino who left his heart in Caracas, Daniel is currently rehabbing from his addiction to High Beta and is pursuing a masters' degree in economics at Universidad Católica de Chile. Views are his own.

11 COMMENTS

Frankly, I believe that the fact that thess Financial Statements haven’t been reviewed by an independent external auditor is one more proof of the deep disregard we have as a nation for a system with proper institutions that ensure checks and balances. Se pagan, se dan el vuelto, y siguen (seguían?) ganando elecciones… Disgusting.
When was the last time the BCV published audited Statements? Did it ever happened at all?

Who ordered The Venezuelan Corrupt Bank (BCV) to publish this erroneous, twisted and incomplete data?
CapoCabello, Jorge Rodriguez or the lovely TSJ? Why now? Internationally, no serious business men will believe any of this anyway. But hey, all potential investors or lenders are long gone anyway, so what the hell. A little better than Syria right now, though. But even Haiti or Iraq or Nigeria are less risky for investors.

I really commend you for getting into the details of this arid and unsexy matter, and making it somehow digestible for mortals. The accounting department at BCV is probably most creative agency in Caracas these days.

Think about it: They have been printing money like there is no tomorrow AND money is a liability for the Central Bank. So, with US$ assets depleting the way they are, there is no way -NO WAY- that the capitalization of the Bank isn’t in deep red shit. Showing a positive “patrimonio” requires an extraordinary amount of lying, which BTW, is a felony that makes the bunch that sits in the directory and the higher management of the Bank, criminal felons.

But I would like to highlight two things, because the fiction with the “Empresa Nacional Auríifera” is only part of the problem, but it dwarf in front of two elements:

1.- The composition of the line “títulos valores públicos” for VEF 677 Bn., which is mostly the effect of the “PDVSA Pagaré”, that we know worth nothing.

2.- There is a line on something called “actívos diversos en moneda nacional” for VEF 229 Bn., which in my opinion is the most incredible one: All the transfers of US$ to FONDEN since 2005, has been “creating” an asset in local currency in order to no affect the balance of the BCV. This asset is simply inexistent.

So, even at implicit rate of 18Bs/$, we are talking about US$ 50+ Bn. in assets that simply does not exist. Insane.

Hey, @Econ_Vzla, thanks a lot for your feedback! And thank you as well for pointing out two big issues going on in the BCV’s balance sheet that I couldn’t find. You are correct, both the PDVSA pagaré and the FONDEN contributions accounting device are textbook cases of inorganic monetary expansion.

And it’s pretty interesting also that you mention one simple fact: and that is that the Bank’s equity is rapidly going to zero or negative. It would be interesting, if the lack of information allows it, to see whether a devaluation of the official FX rate would further deteriorate the results, or improve them; I’ve thought a lot of why the govt didn’t move the 6,30 rate this year, and besides the obvious (guiso-related) pointers, I think state institution’s bogus accounting, and the heavily negative effect on their equity in case of a devaluation, is one of the most important reasons why we have such an irreal “exchange rate” still.

[…] with revenues from high oil prices –which are now very low– and by the Central Bank –which is running on fumes. In September, before the elections and the large October debt payments, it had around USD 2 […]