1. The case originated in an application
(no. 21753/02) against the Republic of Croatia lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Croatian national,
Mr Nenad Tomašić (“the applicant”), on 18 May 2002.

2. The Croatian Government (“the Government”)
were represented by their Agents, first Mrs L. Lukina-Karajković and
subsequently Mrs Š. Stažnik.

3. On 11 December 2003 the Court declared
the application partly inadmissible and decided to communicate the complaints
concerning access to a court and effective remedy to the Government.
Under the provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the Convention, it decided
to examine the merits of the application at the same time as its admissibility.

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

4. The applicant was born in 1950 and
lives in Bjelovar.

5. On 26 February 1992 the applicant's
summer house in Velika Pisanica was blown up by unknown perpetrators.

6. On 24 February 1995 the applicant
together with his wife brought a civil action against the State in the
Zagreb Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zagrebu) seeking damages. They relied on section
180 of the Civil Obligations Act.

7. On 3 February 1996 the Amendment
to the Civil Obligations Act (“the 1996 Amendment”) entered into
force. It provided that all proceedings concerning actions for damages
resulting from terrorist acts or acts of violence were to be stayed
pending the enactment of new legislation on the subject.

8. On 23 February 1996 the Municipal
Court stayed the proceedings pursuant to the 1996 Amendment.

9. On 31 July 2003 the Act on Liability
for Damage Resulting from Terrorist Acts and Public Demonstrations (“the
2003 Liability Act”) entered into force.

10. Pursuant to the 2003 Liability Act,
on 17 February 2004 the Municipal Court resumed the proceedings. On
26 April 2004 it declared the applicant's action inadmissible finding
that it no longer had jurisdiction in the matter.

11. The applicant appealed to the Zagreb
County Court (Županijski sud u Zagrebu). It appears that the proceedings
are currently pending before that court.

12. Meanwhile, on 24 April 2002 the applicant,
represented by an attorney, lodged a constitutional complaint about
the length of proceedings under section 63 of the Constitutional Court
Act. On 7 July 2004 the Constitutional Court accepted the applicant's
complaint. Relying on the Court's case law (Kutić v. Croatia, no. 48778/99, ECHR 2002-II), it found violations
of the applicant's constitutional rights to a hearing within a reasonable
time and of access to a court. It ordered the Zagreb Municipal Court
to give a decision in the applicant's case within a year and awarded
him compensation in the amount of 4,400 Croatian kunas (HRK).

“Liability for loss caused by death or bodily
injury or by damage or destruction of another's property, when it results
from acts of violence or terrorist acts or from public demonstrations
or manifestations, lies with the ... authority whose officers were under
a duty, according to the laws in force, to prevent such loss.”

16. The relevant part of the Reconstruction Act
(Zakon
o obnovi, Official Gazette nos. 24/96, 54/96, 87/96 and 57/00)
provides, inter alia, that the State shall grant, under certain conditions,
reconstruction assistance to owners of property (flats and family houses
only) which has been damaged during the war. The request is to be submitted
to the competent ministry.

17. The Act on Liability for Damage Resulting
from Terrorist Acts and Public Demonstrations (Zakon o odgovornosti za štetu nastalu uslijed terorističkih akata
i javnih demonstracija, Official Gazette no. 117/2003 – “the
2003 Liability Act”) provides, inter alia, that the State is to compensate only damage resulting
from bodily injuries, impairment of health or death. All compensation
for damage to property is to be sought under the Reconstruction Act.
Section 10 provides that all proceedings stayed pursuant to the 1996
Amendment are to be resumed.

“In the determination of his rights and obligations
or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair
hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial court
established by law.”

“(1) The Constitutional Court shall examine
a constitutional complaint whether or not all legal remedies have been
exhausted if the competent court fails to decide a claim concerning
the applicant's rights and obligations or a criminal charge against
him or her within a reasonable time ...

(2) If a constitutional complaint ... under paragraph
1 of this section is upheld, the Constitutional Court shall set a time-limit
within which the competent court must decide the case on the merits...

(3) In a decision issued under paragraph 2 of
this section, the Constitutional Court shall assess appropriate compensation
for the applicant for the violation of his or her constitutional rights
... The compensation shall be paid out of the State budget within three
months from the date a request for payment is lodged.”

Section 23 provides that, in proceedings before
the Constitutional Court, each participant shall pay its own costs unless
the court decides otherwise. The term “costs of proceedings” does
not include the court fees since no such fees are payable in the proceedings
before the Constitutional Court. Under the case-law of the Constitutional
Court the issue of the recovery of the costs of proceedings is to be
decided by that court if a participant makes a request to that end.
For example, in case no. U-III-1384/2000 of 30 November 2000 the Constitutional
Court denied the complainant's request for recovery of costs since the
constitutional complaint had been dismissed.

20. The 1993 Tariff for Attorneys' Fees (Tarifa o nagradama
i naknadi troškova za rad odvjetnika, Official Gazette
nos. 69/93, 87/93, 16/94, 11/96), as in force at the material time (i.e.
when the applicant lodged his constitutional complaint), provided that
the fee for drafting a constitutional complaint amounted to HRK 400.

22. The applicant complained that Parliament's
enactment of the 1996 Amendment violated his right of access to a court
as provided in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing ... by [a] ...
tribunal...”

A. Admissibility

1. The parties' arguments

23. The Government submitted that the applicant
could no longer claim to be a victim within the meaning of Article 34
of the Convention since on 31 July 2003 the Liability Act entered into
force, which provided that the proceedings stayed under the 1996 Amendment
were to be resumed. Moreover, the Constitutional Court had accepted
the applicant's constitutional complaint, found a violation of his constitutional
right of access to a court, and awarded him compensation. The violation
complained of had, therefore, been remedied before the domestic authorities
and the applicant had lost his victim status.

24. The applicant submitted that, in spite of
the Constitutional Court's decision of 7 July 2004, he was still a “victim”
within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention. He argued that the
amount of compensation was insufficient and significantly lower than
amounts awarded by the Court in similar cases (see Kutić v. Croatia, no. 48778/99, § 39, ECHR 2002-II).

25. He further argued that, under the 2004 Tariff
for Attorneys' Fees, the fee for drafting a constitutional complaint
amounted to HRK 5,000. The Constitutional Court Act did not provide
for the recovery of such fee in case of a favourable outcome of the
proceedings before it. Accordingly, the compensation awarded to him
had not been sufficient to cover even the costs of the legal representation,
let alone the non-pecuniary damage incurred by the violation.

2. The Court's assessment

26. The Court recalls that in cases raising similar
issues on the merits as the present case it found that long periods
for which the applicants were prevented from having their civil claims
determined as a consequence of the 1996 Amendment constituted violations
of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see, for example, Kutić v. Croatia, cited above, § 33; and Freimann v.
Croatia, no. 5266/02, § 28, 24 June 2004). It has also held that
even after the entry into force of the 2003 Liability Act and the resultant
resumption of the proceedings, the applicants could still claim to be
victims of violations of their right of access to a court because their
proceedings had been stayed for a long time whereas the alleged violations
had not been recognised by any decision of the domestic authorities,
nor had they been awarded any compensation (see, for example, Urukalo and Nemet v. Croatia,no. 26886/02, §§ 23-27, 28 April 2005; and Lulić and Becker v. Croatia, no. 22857/02, §§ 30-34, 24 March
2005).

27. However, in the present case, the applicant's
complaint concerning access to a court was examined by the Constitutional
Court which adjudicated on it in its decision of 7 July 2004. Making
an assessment on an equitable basis, it provided for redress of compensatory
nature by awarding the applicant just satisfaction in respect of non-pecuniary
damage in the amount of HRK 4,400. It also ordered the Municipal Court
to decide the applicant's case within a year. However, at the time when
the Constitutional Court ruled on the applicant's complaint, the Municipal
Court had already done so.

28. The Court reiterates that a decision or measure
favourable to the applicant is not in principle sufficient to deprive
him of his status of a “victim” unless the national authorities
have acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, and then afforded
redress for, the breach of the Convention (see, as the most recent authority, Cocchiarella v. Italy
[GC], no. 64886/01, § 71, to be published in ECHR 2006).

29. The Court observes that the Constitutional
Court, expressly relying on the case-law of the Court, acknowledged
that there had been a violation of the applicant's constitutional right
of access to a court. The Court considers that such acknowledgment satisfies
in substance the first condition laid down in the Court's case law.

30. The applicant's status of a victim then depends
on whether the redress afforded was adequate and sufficient having regard
to just satisfaction as provided for under Article 41 of the Convention
(see, mutatismutandis, Dubjaková v.
Slovakia (dec.), no. 67299/01, 19 October 2004).

31. The Court notes that in the instant case the
compensation awarded to the applicant was substantially lower than what
the Court has awarded in similar cases (see, for example, Kastelic v. Croatia,no. 60533/00, § 41, 10 July 2003; Crnojević v. Croatia, no. 71614/01, § 29, 21 October 2004).
However, adequacy of the redress falls to be assessed in the light of
all the circumstances of the case (see, mutatismutandis, Dubjaková v. Slovakia (dec.), cited above).

32. In this connection, the Court recalls that
in the length-of-proceedings cases one of the characteristics of sufficient
redress which may remove a litigant's victim status relates to the amount
awarded. The amount depends, in particular, on the characteristics and
effectiveness of the remedy. Thus, the States which, like Croatia, opted
for a remedy designed both to expedite proceedings and afford compensation
is free to award amounts which – while being lower than those awarded
by the Court – are not unreasonable (see Cocchiarella v. Italy [GC], cited above, §§ 93 and 96-97). This
is so not only because such a remedy is closer and more accessible to
an applicant than an application to the Court, but also because it is
faster and is processed in the applicant's own language. It thus offers
advantages that need to be taken into consideration (see Cocchiarella v. Italy [GC], cited above, § 139).

In the Court's view, these principles apply mutatis mutandis
to the alleged violations of the right of access to a court in the circumstances
similar to those of the present case.

33. The Court notes that in the present case Parliament
enacted the legislation envisaged in the 1996 Amendment – the 2003
Liability Act – which now regulates all issues concerning damages
from terrorist acts. The new legislation also put an end to the impugned
legal situation providing that all proceedings stayed pursuant to the
1996 Amendment were to be resumed. Moreover, pursuant to the new legislation,
the Municipal Court delivered a decision in the applicant's case. The
Court also observes that, apart from awarding compensation to the applicant,
in its decision the Constitutional Court was also willing to order the
Municipal Court to expedite the proceedings. The part of its decision
ordering the Municipal Court to decide the applicant's case within a
year proved to be inoperative only because that court had already delivered
a decision in the applicant's case.

34. As to the issue of attorney's fees, the Court
reiterates that excessive procedural costs (including the attorney's
fees) may significantly hamper an applicant's efforts to obtain compensation
(see Cocchiarella v. Italy
[GC], cited above, § 102). Given that in the proceedings before the
Constitutional Court each participant, in principle, pays its own costs
(see paragraph 19 above), the substantial raise of attorneys' fees (see
paragraph 21 above) is a factor that should be taken into consideration
in determining the amount of compensation. Otherwise, the domestic authorities
risk reaching a paradoxical result that they take away with one hand
what they awarded with the other (see, mutatis mutandis, Cocchiarella v. Italy [GC], § 92). However, the Court notes that
in the instant case the attorney's fees did not exceed HRK 400 at the
time the applicant lodged his constitutional complaint. Furthermore,
the applicant did not submit any evidence proving that he had ever requested
the Constitutional Court to compensate him for the costs of the proceedings,
an option existing under section 23 of the Constitutional Court Act.

35. Nevertheless, taking into account all circumstances
of the case, the Court considers that the amount of compensation which
is approximately 15 % of what it generally awards in similar Croatian
cases is manifestly unreasonable having regard to its case-law.

36. It follows that the redress afforded to the
applicant cannot be regarded as adequate and sufficient. Accordingly,
the applicant can still claim to be a “victim” of a breach of his
right of access to a court, and the Government's objection must therefore
be dismissed.

37. The Court further notes that this complaint
is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3
of the Convention. It also notes that it is not inadmissible on any
other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B. Merits

38. The Court has frequently found violations
of the applicants' right of access to a court under Article 6 § 1 of
the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present
case (see Kutić v. Croatia, cited above, and Multiplex v. Croatia,no. 58112/00, 10 July 2003).

39. Having examined all the material submitted
to it, the Court considers that the Government have not put forward
any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion
in the present case.

There has accordingly been a breach of Article
6 § 1.

II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE
13 OF THE CONVENTION

40. The applicant also complained that
they had no effective remedy at their disposal as guaranteed by Article
13 of the Convention which reads as follows:

“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set
forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy
before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been
committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”

41. The Government contested that argument.

42. The Court notes that this complaint is linked
to the one examined above and must therefore likewise be declared admissible.

43. Having regard to the finding relating to Article
6 § 1 (see paragraph 39 above), the Court considers that it is not necessary
to examine whether, in this case, there has also been a violation of
Article 13 since its requirements are less strict than, and are here
absorbed by, those of Article 6 § 1 (see, for example, Dražić v. Croatia, no. 11044/03, § 43, 6 October 2005).

III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF
THE CONVENTION

44. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation
of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law
of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation
to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction
to the injured party.”

A. Damage

45. The applicant claimed EUR 22,880
in respect of pecuniary damage and EUR 74,000 in respect of non-pecuniary
damage.

46. The Government deemed the amounts claimed
by the applicant excessive.

47. The Court does not discern any causal
link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it
therefore rejects this claim.

48. As to the non-pecuniary damage sought,
the Court reiterates that where an applicant had resorted to an available
domestic remedy and thereby obtained a finding of a violation and was
awarded compensation, but can nevertheless still claim to be a “victim”,
the amount to be awarded under Article 41 may be less than the amounts
the Court was awarding in similar cases. In that case an applicant must
be awarded the difference between the amount obtained from the Constitutional
Court and an amount that would not have been regarded as manifestly
unreasonable compared with the amounts awarded by the Court (see, mutatis
mutandis, Cocchiarella v. Italy [GC], cited above, §§ 139-140).

49. The Court considers that, in the absence of
domestic remedies, in the present case it would have awarded the sum
of EUR 4,000. It has already found (see paragraph 35 above) that the
applicant was awarded EUR 600 by the Constitutional Court, which is approximately
15 % of what the Court would have awarded him.

50. Having regard to the circumstances of the
present case, the characteristics of the constitutional complaint as
well as the fact that, notwithstanding this domestic remedy, the Court
has found a violation, it considers, ruling on an equitable basis, that
the applicant should be awarded EUR 1,200 in respect of non-pecuniary
damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount.

B. Costs and expenses

51. The applicant also claimed EUR 2,620
for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts.

52. The Government contested the claim.

53. According to the Court's case-law,
an applicant is entitled to reimbursement of his costs and expenses
only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and
necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to quantum. In the present
case, regard being had to the information in its possession and the
above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of
EUR 60 for costs and expenses in the domestic proceedings, plus any
tax that may be chargeable on that amount.

C. Default interest

54. The Court considers it appropriate
that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate
of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage
points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

1. Declares the remainder of the application admissible;

2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of
the Convention;

3. Holds that there is no need to examine the complaint under
Article 13 of the Convention;

4. Holds

(a) that the
respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the
date on which the judgment becomes final according to Article 44 § 2 of
the Convention, the following amounts which are to be converted into
the national currency of the respondent State at a rate applicable at
the date of settlement:

(b) that from
the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple
interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the
marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default
period plus three percentage points;

5. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing
on19 October 2006, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of
Court.