Event Detail

In my paper, I will first explore Hegel’s own distinctions between various types of idealism, most
of which he explicitly rejects. I will discuss his notions of subjective, transcendental and absolute
idealism and present the outlines of his criticisms of the first two as well as the motivation behind
his commitment to a version of absolute idealism. In particular, I will argue that the latter does
not share the defining features of what is now commonly called “idealism”, as Hegel neither
denies the existence of an external world nor even holds that we can only somehow indirectly
infer the truth of propositions about the external world from the structure of some given mental
material. I will give an account of Hegel’s concept of “the absolute idea”, which lies behind his
absolute idealism. In this context, I will argue that it is crucial for our understanding of Hegel and
his potential relevance for various branches of contemporary philosophy that the absolute idea is
precisely not a mental or “spiritual (geistig)” entity. Rather it amounts to a set of methodological
assumptions designed to guarantee the overall intelligibility of what there is, regardless of its
actual natural, social or more broadly normative structure.