A new report by the Pakistani government cites "gross negligence" for allowing the al-Qaida leader to hide out so long. Was there more to it?

It has been a source of contention between the United States and Pakistan since the 2011 raid in which Navy SEALs killed Osama bin Laden: How could the world's most wanted fugitive hide in a country that was supposed to be committed to catching him? The relationship between the two nations was sour before the raid—U.S. authorities didn't notify Pakistan about the bin Laden raid for fear of alerting the target—and the humiliation of the armed action damaged the relationship even further.

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"We think that there had to be some sort of support network for bin Laden inside of Pakistan," President Obama said in an interview on 60 Minutes shortly after the raid. The week after the raid, Pakistani president Asif Ali Zardari said that Americans "have suggested that Pakistan lacked vitality in its pursuit of terrorism or, worse yet, that we were disingenuous and actually protected the terrorists we claimed to be pursuing. Such baseless speculation may make exciting cable news, but it doesn't reflect fact."

Two years later, more details about exactly how Pakistan could have missed bin Laden are coming to light. The Pakistani government formed a commission to study how bin Laden could have lived unnoticed in Pakistan. Within that report, newly leaked to Al Jazeera, are details about Abbottabad, the city where bin Laden was found, and the public officials who police it. The report concludes that gross incompetence led to the failure to detect bin Laden. But there is also plenty of fodder indicating that local law enforcement were content to leave the strange building and its unseen occupants alone despite some prominent red flags, while it seems Pakistan's national intelligence agencies ignored the signs the al-Qaida leader was present.

There are no smoking guns here. But there are some revelations that the commission investigators say stretch credibility—even in as dysfunctional a state as Pakistan.

The Terrorist's Neighborhood

The picture of Abbottabad that emerged in the media just after the raid showed a city that was home to a significant military base, and the idea of bin Laden hiding near Pakistan's "West Point" was galling. But the report describes another side of the city, one that was a haven for militants.

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Abbottabad is located near the border of the contentious Federally Administered Tribal Areas, home to many violent militant groups and the scene of sporadic Pakistani military efforts to roust them. Local media told the Commission "that while Abbottabad was a peaceful area, in recent years a large number of outsiders had settled there for various reasons. Militants were rumored to have brought their families after being displaced by military operations." In fact, the report mentions the fact that many militants' families lived there as a reason the area was considered safe from terrorism.

Pakistani law enforcement knew about this militant population. The regional police inspector general told the Pakistani commission that "more than 200 persons were under surveillance but the OBL compound and its residents were not among them. (There seems to have been the assumption that militants would only rent but not buy property.)"

The Pakistanis seemed content to refrain from connecting any dots. "The civilian provincial administration were out of the loop despite their clear responsibilities," the report states. "Their role in counter-terrorism was at best marginal, and in tracking OBL it was precisely zero."

Building a Fort in Plain Sight

The Pakistani government does not allow foreigners to own land in Abbottabad. Still, bin Laden associates and brothers Ibrahim and Abrar al-Kuwaiti were able to purchase the land where the built-to-spec compound sat. They used outdated National Identity Cards to buy the land, despite the fact that those cards were replaced by more advanced, computerized identification. Authorities made no inquiry into the buyers' backgrounds, even when the home violated local construction rules. These violations were suspicious—tall walls (topped with barbed wire) that violated ordinances, a failure to pay any taxes, the illegal construction of a third floor, and the routing of four gas/electric lines into a house supposedly housing two families.

"There were multiple oversights and violations of laid-down procedures on such a scale that, even allowing for the general deterioration in administration and oversight standards, it still appeared to be more than just a case of negligence," the report's authors state. "Either OBL was extremely fortunate to not run into anyone committed to doing his job honestly or there was a complete collapse of local governance."

It might be unfair to expect building inspectors and local police to identify the terrorist compound. But the report notes that the national spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence, never told local officials what suspicious activity to look for—an odd oversight considering the influx of militants to the city. Even worse, "the OBL compound was located a short distance from the local ISI office, suggesting that the ISI's curiosity should have been aroused."

The report sums up: "How the entire neighborhood, local officials, police, security and intelligence officials missed the size, shape, the barbed wire, the lack of visitors over a period of nearly six years beggars belief."

The Case of Umar Patek

In 2002, Umar Patek, as a member of an al-Qaida-linked terrorist group in Indonesia, helped to build and plant a bomb in Bali that killed 202 people. He was caught in January 2011—in Abbottabad. What was he doing there? He claimed to be on his way to Afghanistan to fight Americans, but the committee calls this claim far-fetched because the city is not well-positioned to be part of any jihadi transportation pipeline into Afghanistan (there are plenty of easier ways to get there).

"It was very likely that his al-Qaida support network had contact with the al-Qaida network of support for OBL," the report states. "The local ISI did not probe this possibility, although it had been tracking al-Qaida in the area for at least two years. During this time it did not solicit the cooperation of civil administration including police. The interrogation of Umar Patek's network members should have turned up actionable information."

If Patek had wanted to meet bin Laden himself, then the Bali bomber might have been out of luck. Members of the household said bin Laden did not meet with al-Qaida operatives out of security concerns. Nevertheless, Patek's presence in Abbottabad raised the eyebrows of the commission authors. "It would seem very likely that Patek, despite his denial, had come to seek instructions or inspiration from OBL," they say. "If so, it shows Patek knew where to look for him."

The ISI investigators had first crack at Patek, but the commission said it accepted his scenic-trip-to-Afghanistan story. Indonesia extradited Patek and he's now serving 20 years in prison.

Patek's presence in Abbottabad was not the only sign of an al-Qaida network in the city. The report bluntly states: "The disconnect between the civilian and intelligence administrations seems to have been complete: The civilians [were] by and large unaware of the extent to which the Abbottabad area was penetrated by militants including al-Qaida, and the local ISI [was] well aware of their presence but unwilling to share information that might have made the whole counter-terrorism effort, including the search for OBL, more effective."

The report never says the ISI turned a blind eye to al-Qaida in Abbottabad. But it certainly provides some tantalizing clues, leaving the reader to assume one of two things. One, the ISI (despite its reputation) is grossly incompetent. Or, two, that elements within the agency allowed the world's most wanted man to shelter in Pakistan. Either way it's bad news, considering the ongoing effort to eliminate terrorists (by drone attacks) in Pakistan. Without reliable partners, counterterrorism efforts fail.