Archive for the 'A380' Category

Today the first Airbus A380 for Korean Air (MSN035) has been rolled out of the Airbus paint shop in Hamburg.
The aircraft is the first of 10 A380s ordered by the Asian airline. Korean Air will become the sixth operator of the A380 when it takes delivery in the second quarter of this year.
Korean Air will initially operate the A380 on flights from Seoul to Tokyo, Hong Kong and Bangkok, followed later in the year by transpacific services to New York and Los Angeles.

Today a preliminary report on Qantas flight QF32 (Airbus A380 VH-OQA) was released by Australian Aviation Safety Bureau (ATSB). On 4 November the flight sustained an uncontained failure of the Intermediate Pressure (IP) turbine disc on engine No 2.

The report reveals many interesting details about sustained damage, flight crew response, a brief history of the flight, cause of the incident and data obtained from flight data recorder (FDR). (link at the bottom)

The crew reported a slight yaw and that the aircraft immediately levelled off in accordance with the selection of altitude hold

PIC noticed that the autothrust system was no longer active

Electronic Centralised Aircraft Monitor (ECAM) system displayed a message indicating an “overheat” warning in the No 2 engine turbine. Soon after, multiple ECAM messages started to be displayed. The PIC confirmed with the flight crew that he was maintaining control of the aircraft and called for the commencement of the requisite ECAM actions by the FO in response to those messages.

Affected engine’s thrust lever was moved to IDLE and a PAN radio call was transmitted to Changi air traffic control (ATC)

Warning indicating a fire in the No 2 engine that displayed for about 1 to 2 seconds; the ECAM then reverted back to the overheat warning

The crew decided to shut down No 2 engine; after they had selected the ENG 2 master switch OFF, the ECAM displayed a message indicating that the No 2 engine had failed

The crew reported assessing that there was serious damage and discharged one of the engine’s two fire extinguisher bottles into the engine

Flight crew did not receive confirmation that the fire extinguisher bottle had discharged. They repeated the procedure for discharging the fire extinguisher and again did not receive confirmation that it had discharged.

Crew followed the procedure for discharging the second fire extinguisher bottle into the No 2 engine. After completing that procedure twice, they did not receive confirmation that the second bottle had discharged.

Continuation with engine failure procedure, which included initiating an automated process of fuel transfer from the aircraft’s outer wing tanks to the inner tanks.

Engine display for the No 2 engine had changed to a failed mode

Engine display for Nos 1 and 4 engines had reverted to a degraded mode (indicates that some air data or engine parameters are not available)

Display for No 3 engine indicated that the engine was operating in an alternate mode as a result of actioning an ECAM procedure

Crew recalls following systems warnings on ECAM after failure of engine No 2:

Engines No 1 and 4 operating in a degraded mode

GREEN hydraulic system – low system pressure and low fluid level (one of two primary hydraulic systems - power is supplied by engine-driven pumps on Nos 1 and 2 engines)

YELLOW hydraulic system – engine No 4 pump errors (second of two primary hydraulic systems - power is supplied by engine-driven pumps on Nos 3 and 4 engines)

Failure of the alternating current (AC) electrical No 1 and 2 bus systems

Flight controls operating in alternate law (reduces some of the flight control protections that are available under normal law)

Wing slats inoperative

Flight controls – ailerons partial control only

Flight controls – reduced spoiler control

Landing gear control and indicator warnings

Multiple brake system messages

Engine anti-ice and air data sensor messages

Multiple fuel system messages, including a fuel jettison fault

Centre of gravity messages

Autothrust and autoland inoperative

No 1 engine generator drive disconnected

Left wing pneumatic bleed leaks

Avionics system overheat

Photo: Damage to electrical wiring located in the leading edge of the left wing (punctured by debris)

Customer service manager (CSM) attempted to contact the flight crew, including through use of the EMERGENCY contact selection on the cabin interphone system. This activated the flight deck warning horn. No associated ECAM message was displayed, the flight crew associated the emergency contact warning horn with the continuously-sounding warnings from the ECAM system and cancelled the horn.

holding at the present altitude while processing ECAM messages and associated procedures - no immediate return to Singapore - needed holding pattern for about 30 minutes

20 NM (37 km) racetrack holding pattern at 7,400 ft east of Singapore

ATC acknowledged crew that a number of aircraft components found on Indonesian island of Batam

Second Officer (SO) was dispatched into the cabin to visually assess the damage to the No 2 engine; a passenger, who was also a pilot for the operator, brought the SO’s attention to a view of the aircraft from the vertical fin-mounted camera that was displayed on the aircraft’s in-flight entertainment system. That display appeared to show some form of fluid leak from the left wing.

Photo: Left wing fuel tank damage (punctured by debris)

SO proceeded to lower deck on the left side of the aircraft to observe damage to the left wing and fuel leaking. The fluid leak appeared to be coming from underneath the left wing, in the vicinity of the No 2 engine and that the fluid trail was about 0.5 m wide. The SO could not see the turbine area of the No 2 engine from any location within the cabin.

Elected not to initiate further fuel transfer - were unsure of the integrity of the fuel system. Could not jettison fuel due to ECAM fuel jettison fault

Noticed that the aircraft’s satellite communications system had failed and received ACARS message from aircraft operator that indicated that multiple failure messages had been received from the aircraft

SCC and PIC made a number of public address (PA) announcements to the passengers indicating that the aircraft had sustained a technical failure, and that the crew were addressing the issues associated with that failure. Subsequently, the SCC and SO returned to the cabin on numerous occasions to visually assess the damage on the left side of the aircraft, and to inspect the right side of the aircraft, and to provide feedback to the cabin crew and passengers.

It took about 50 minutes to complete all initial procedures associated with ECAM messages. During that time, the autopilot was engaged.

They assessed the aircraft systems to determine those that had been damaged, or that were operating in a degraded mode. They considered that the status of each system had the potential to affect the calculation of the required parameters for the approach and landing. The crew also believed that the failure may have damaged the No 1 engine, and they discussed a number of concerns in relation to the lateral and longitudinal fuel imbalances that had been indicated by the ECAM.

Input of affected aircraft systems into landing distance performance application (LDPA) to determine the landing distance required for an overweight landing to runway 20C at Changi Airport of about 440 t, which was 50 t above the aircraft’s maximum landing weight.
Based on the initial inputs to the LDPA by the flight crew, the LDPA did not calculate a landing distance. After discussion, and in the knowledge that the runway at Changi was dry, the crew elected to remove the inputs applicable to a landing on a wet runway and re-ran the calculation. This second calculation indicated that a landing on runway 20C was feasible, with 100 m of runway remaining. The crew elected to proceed on the basis of that calculation and advised ATC to that effect.

Crew advised ATC that they would require emergency services to meet the aircraft at the upwind end of the runway, and that the aircraft was leaking fluid from the left wing that was likely to include hydraulic fluid and fuel.

Crew discussed the controllability of the aircraft and conducted a number of manual handling checks at the holding speed. The crew decided that the aircraft remained controllable

Lowering of flaps - remained controllable

As result of the landing gear-related ECAM messages, the landing gear was lowered using the emergency extension procedure and a further controllability check was conducted

Crew was aware of: reverse thrust was only available from the No 3 engine, no leading edge slats were available, there was limited aileron and spoiler control, anti-skid braking was restricted to the body landing gear only, there was limited nosewheel steering and that the nose was likely to pitch up on touchdown. An ECAM message indicated that they could not apply maximum braking until the nosewheel was on the runway.

The wing flaps were extended to the No 3 position

The PIC was aware that accurate speed control on final would be important to avoid either an stall condition, or a runway overrun. Consequently, the PIC set the thrust levers for Nos 1 and 4 engines to provide symmetric thrust, and controlled the aircraft’s speed with the thrust from No 3 engine.

Autopilot disconnected a couple of times during early part of approach as the speed reduced to 1 kt below approach speed. The PIC initially acted to reconnect the autopilot but, when it disconnected again at about 1,000 ft, he elected to leave it disconnected and to fly the aircraft manually for the remainder of the approach. Due to the limited landing margin available, the CC reminded the PIC that the landing would have to be conducted with no flare and that there would be a slightly higher nose attitude on touchdown.

Cabin crew was briefed to prepare for a possible runway overrun and evacuation

Aircraft touched down, the nosewheel touched down within about 6 seconds, the PIC commenced maximum braking and selected reverse thrust on No 3 engine. The flight crew observed that the deceleration appeared to be ‘slow’ in the initial landing roll, but that with maximum braking and reverse thrust, the aircraft began to slow. The PIC recalled feeling confident that, as the speed approached 60 kts, the aircraft would be able to stop in the remaining runway distance. In consequence, the No 3 engine was gradually moved out of maximum reverse thrust. Manual braking was continued and the aircraft came to a stop about 150 m from the end of the runway. The aircraft was met by emergency services.

After landing, crew commenced to shut down the remaining engines. When the final engine master switch was selected OFF, the aircraft’s electrical system went into a configuration similar to the emergency electrical power mode. That rendered many of the aircraft’s cockpit displays inoperative, and meant that there was only one very high frequency (VHF) radio available to the crew.

Just before the cockpit displays went blank, a number of the flight crew noticed that the left body landing gear brake temperature was indicating 900 °C, and rising. After some initial confusion about which radio was functioning, the FO contacted the emergency services fire commander, who asked for the No 1 engine to be shut down. The FO responded that they had done so already, but was advised again by the fire commander that the engine continued to run.

recycled the engine master switch to OFF but the engine did not shut down

use of emergency shutoff and fire extinguisher bottles but the engine did not shut down

tried to activate a series of circuit breakers in the aircraft’s equipment bay, the engine did still not shut down

attempts were made to reconfigure the transfer valves in the aircraft’s external refuelling panel, in an effort to transfer fuel out of the No 1 feed tank, and starve the No 1 engine of fuel. However, due to the lack of electrical power, that was not possible.

Ground engineers attended the aircraft and attempted a number of methods to shut down the engine, each without success

Finally, the decision was taken to drown the engine with fire-fighting foam from the emergency services fire vehicles. The No 1 engine was reported to have finally been shut down about 2 hours and 7 minutes after the aircraft landed.

Fire commander indicated that there appeared to be fuel leaking from the aircraft’s left wing. The FO advised the commander of the hot brakes, and requested that fire retardant foam be applied over that fuel. The fire commander complied with that request

four of the wheels on the left body landing gear had deflated

55 minutes after landing - after the fire risk had decreased - passengers disembarked via stairs on the right side of the aircraft, using only a single door (No 2 main deck forward door), to keep remaining doors clear in case of the need to deploy the escape slides.

Qantas today announced that their Airbus A380 fleet remains grounded for at least another 72 hours and will not return to service until the engine issues have been identified and resolved.

Qantas is continuing an intensive inspection program on all Rolls-Royce engines in its A380 fleet. As part of their investigation, Qantas engineers have removed a number of engines to undertake further examination. The focus of the investigation has been narrowed to the possibility of an oil leakage in the relevant turbine area.

These inspections are taking place in Sydney and Los Angeles with Qantas engineers working closely with Rolls-Royce, as well as Airbus and Australian regulators.

Qantas has scheduled extra services from Los Angeles to ensure passengers affected by the suspension of A380 operations are returned to Australia as soon as possible.

The backlog of passengers in Los Angeles is expected to be cleared by last departure from Los Angeles on 8 November with all passengers accommodated on specially chartered relief flights and across scheduled services. A Special Assistance Team has been deployed to Los Angeles to assist.

Hotel accommodation, meals and international phone calls have been provided for passengers impacted by the A380 disruptions. Qantas will provide compensation for customers who have experienced delays.

Today Qantas flight QF32, an Airbus A380-842, experienced an uncontained engine failure after take-off from Singapore. It performed a turn back and landed safely back in Singapore Changi. Parts of debris of affected engine number 2 punctured the left wing. The plane landed with opened landing gear doors as well as undeployed leading edge flaps - suggesting an emergency deployment of the landing gear or some kind of hydraulic or electrical issue caused by debris. According to sources engine No1 was producing significant thrust after the plane stopped and was not controllable from the cockpit.

The plane involved is VH-OQA, MSN 14. It was delivered to Qantas on 19th September 2008 and had logged around 8165 flight hours and 831 flight cycles as of today. It is powered by Rolls-Royce Trent 900 engines.

Qantas grounded its A380 fleet until sufficient information has been obtained about what occurred on QF32. Rolls-Royce has recommended immediate checks of its Trent 900 engines. Singapore Airlines, another operator of the Trent 900 engine, have announced that their A380 flights will be delayed as result of these inspections. Lufthansa sees no impact on its A380 flight schedule.

Airbus A380 production moves ahead with the next new operator of the A380 - Korean Air.
Four A380s for Korean Air are now in production. The first aircraft is currently being prepared for its maiden flight, with the second and third aircraft now positioned next to each other in the main assembly hall. Meanwhile the joining of the wings and main fuselage sections of the fourth aircraft has just been completed.
First delivery is scheduled for May 2011 with the next three following in June, July and August. From 2012-2014, additional aircraft will be introduced, bringing the total to ten.

Korean Air will be the first Asian airline to use the aircraft on transpacific routes between the US and Asia. The double-decker airplane will be outfitted with between 400 and 450 seats, making it the most spacious A380 anywhere.

“The reduced seating layout will expand cabin space and provide customers with a truly luxurious air travel experience,” says Korean Air’s Americas Marketing Director, John Jackson. “We are designing the cabin to promote relaxing air travel, and will incorporate some unique features to be revealed later.”

Korean Air will be the 6th carrier to introduce the A380 into its fleet.

On Sunday 6 June, Lufthansa operated its first commercial Airbus A380 flight. Lufthansa flew the German national soccer team to the Soccer World Cup in Johannesburg aboard its new flagship Airbus A380. The A380 (D-AIMA / MSN038) operating the Frankfurt-Johannesburg route under flight number LH2010 left Frankfurt Airport at 20:30 and arrived at Johannesburg at 8:15 local time.

Video

All the passengers on the special flight were presented with an exclusive Lufthansa World Cup fan kit full of items the supporters will need to cheer their team on.

Captain Jürgen Raps, Member of the Lufthansa German Airlines Board and Chief Pilot, was pilot in command of the special flight. The cabin crew comprised two pursers and 19 flight attendants.

After returning to Germany, Lufthansa’s Airbus A380 will be on display at ILA Berlin Air Show - one of the world’s largest and most important aerospace exhibitions.

The A380 will be used on regular service between Frankfurt and Johannesburg, Beijing and Tokyo.

Some news for our German visitors. Lufthansa’s new flagship, the Airbus A380, will undergo a number of test flights in early June.

Before the first Lufthansa Airbus A380 flies the German soccer team to Johannesburg (South Africa) for the Football World Cup on Sunday, 6 June, Lufthansa will carry out numerous flights. The flights - with no passengers on board - are required as part of the qualifications for pilots to acquire a licence to fly this aircraft type. In addition to take-offs and landings, the flight tuition includes line training on scheduled routes to prepare the pilots to operate scheduled services for the airline with the A380.

The Lufthansa A380, named “Frankfurt am Main“, will be seen at the following airports in Germany, Austria and Switzerland:

Airbus today celebrated the delivery of the 6,000th aircraft in the airframe manufacturer’s 40 year history. The aircraft, an A380 (MSN025), was handed over to Emirates Airline in a ceremony in Hamburg. The aircraft is Emirates’ eighth A380.

Accepting delivery of the new aircraft, Adel Al Redha, Executive Vice President, Emirates’ Engineering and Operations, said: “The A380 represents the future of air travel and our strength and determination to drive forward, alongside Airbus, to meet our ambitious expansion plans and traffic demand. If a powerful demonstration of the resilience of the aviation industry was required, today has provided that. All who have flown the A380 will realise that this is a very special aircraft, embracing the latest in passenger comfort, technology and environmental credentials.”

“Today’s delivery is our 25th A380 so far, and more importantly, the 6,000th Airbus produced in our 40 year history. It is particularly significant that it is both an A380 and for Emirates, as they were involved in its development from early on. We are proud to have the words’ Airbus 6,000th Aircraft’ inscribed alongside the Emirates livery,” said Tom Enders, Airbus CEO.

With a total order for 58 aircraft, Emirates is the single largest customer for the A380. Established in 1985, Emirates became an Airbus operator from the outset. Today, Emirates’ Airbus fleet has grown to 55 aircraft with a further 121 on order.

Airbus delivered its first customer aircraft in May 1974 - an A300B2
The 1,000th aircraft was delivered in March 1993 - an A340-300
The 2,000th was delivered in May 1999 - an A340-300
The 3,000th was delivered in July 2002 - an A320
The 4,000th was delivered in September 2005 - an A330-300
The 5,000th was delivered in December 2007 - an A330-200

Airbus was formed in 1969, and by 2005 had reached more than 50 per cent of worldwide deliveries in a single year, of all aircraft of more than 100 seats. It also took Airbus some 30 years after its initial creation to bypassBoeing in terms of sales and remain at around half the market share.

Yesterday the first Airbus A380 was handed over to Air France. The French carrier is the first European airline to fly the “whale jet” on scheduled services. The aircraft - MSN0033 / F-HPJA - is the twentieth A380 delivered by Airbus. 10 A380s are already flying with Singapore, five with Emirates and four with Qantas.