CTBT Scope Note

I’ve been meaning to write something about the scope of the CTBT — this ongoing debate about whether the Russians believe so-called hydronuclear tests are permitted under the treaty

I don’t find compelling the evidence that Russia has a different definition, let alone that they are conducting tests that over time will alter the military balance but I accept that my judgment is not a very good proxy for the sixty-seventh vote in the United States Senate.

“Under the global ban on nuclear tests, we can only use computer-assisted simulations to ensure the reliability of Russia’s nuclear deterrent,” Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said. “Therefore, the most powerful supercomputers will be placed in federal nuclear centers.”

The interesting question, I suppose, is precisely what he said in Russian.

Little help? Spasiba.

Update | 11:36 Is that a yellow car on the right side of image? Does this mean that Russian nuclear complex officials, like their American counterparts, insist on using lame automobile analogies? That is something that Obama and Medvedev could sign — a Treaty Banning Automotive Metaphors (T-BAM) in nuclear weapons policy making.

Americantski nuclear weapons manufacture before test moratorium are like Mustang, while our nuclear weapons are like East German Trabant … — you remember, car in third U2 video for hit song, “One.”

tbaum | July 27, 2009

That should be the “Treaty Banning Automobile-Using Metaphors” or T-BAUM.

tbaum | July 27, 2009

And for your caption:

We have made significant progress in automobile design— a car that has no roof. However, we have no analogue for nuclear weapons. But it sure is fun to drive!

Or…

I am sweating profusely because I am 0.5 meters away from the president of my country and I am using a red laser pointer. I hope it is not considered a weapon.

anon | July 27, 2009

Great — so now our military-industrial complex gave the Russian military-industrial complex another idea…start talking of “the reliability of Russia’s nuclear deterrent” to get supercomputers and other goodies. Nice work guys.

I sure am a-hoping our reliabilities are much bigger than those Russians’ tiny reliabilities.

This sounds naive, but why doesn’t anyone just nicely ask the Russians what their take on the issue is? Now, that would be fun…

In any case, here is what he said: “because with the global ban on nuclear testing, checking the reliability of the nuclear complex, nuclear shield, is only possible with the use of computer modeling.”

On a somewhat related note, I just submitted a pocket reference of the CTBT to Apple as an iPhone application, so anyone interested in having a quick reference to it on their iPhone… go nuts. It should (hopefully) be approved and go live in a week or two.

Zak Johnson | July 28, 2009

In January 2000, Duma member Y. Kapralov said the following about the Russian Federation’s interpretation of the commitments of the CTBT:

“Qualitative modernization of nuclear weapons is only possible with the conduction of actual and hydronuclear tests with any fission energy yield that contradicts the CTBT directly. There is a danger of concealment of hydronuclear experiments from the verification mechanism of the CTBT. However, we think that they can be detected by special equipment located in the immediate proximity from experiment site. In principle this problem can be solved within the framework of the CTBT verification mechanism.”

Zak Johnson | July 28, 2009

The recent 2009 Strategic Posture Review offered the following criticism about the CTBT:

“The (CTBT) remarkably does not define a nuclear test. In practice this allows different interpretations of its prohibitions and asymmetrical restrictions. The strict U.S. interpretation precludes tests that produce nuclear yield. However, other countries with different interpretations could conduct tests with hundreds of tons of nuclear yield—allowing them to develop or advance nuclear capabilities with low-yield, enhanced radiation, and electro-magnetic-pulse. Apparently Russia and possibly China are conducting low yield tests. This is quite serious because Russian and Chinese doctrine highlights tactical nuclear warfighting. With no agreed definition, U.S. relative understanding of these capabilities would fall further behind over time.”