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112th Congress S. Prt.
1st Session COMMITTEE PRINT 112-32
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CENTRAL ASIA AND THE TRANSITION
IN AFGHANISTAN
__________
A MAJORITY STAFF REPORT
PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
One Hundred Twelfth Congress
First Session
December 19, 2011
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania MARCO RUBIO, Florida
JIM WEBB, Virginia JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TOM UDALL, New Mexico MIKE LEE, Utah
William C. Danvers, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Letter of Transmittal............................................ v
Executive Summary................................................ 1
Appreciating the Challenges of Central Asia...................... 3
Central Asia's Role in Supplying U.S. and Coalition Troops in
Afghanistan.................................................... 5
Striking a Balance between Security and Political Priorities..... 7
Translating the New Silk Road Vision into a Strategy............. 9
Assessing the Central Asia Counternarcotics Initiative........... 11
Securing Central Asia's Southern Borders......................... 12
Appendixes
Appendix I.--English Language Training........................... 17
Appendix II.--Remembering Osh.................................... 18
Appendix III.--Tajikistan: A Closer Look......................... 19
Appendix IV.--Total U.S. Budgeted Assistance to Central Asia,
Pakistan, and Afghanistan, FY 2001-2010 (millions)............. 20
Appendix V.--U.S. Budgeted Peace & Security Assistance vs. Total
Assistance to Central Asia, FY 2001-2010 (millions)............ 21
Appendix VI.--U.S. Assistance to Central Asia, FY 2001-2010...... 22
Appendix VII.--Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan................................... 23
(iii)
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
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United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC, December 19, 2011.
Dear Colleagues: This report by the committee's majority
staff is part of an ongoing examination of U.S. engagement in
Afghanistan and the broader region. It takes a close look at
the link between developing a comprehensive Central Asia
strategy and U.S. initiatives to promote peace and stability in
Afghanistan and the region. It is based on a field visit by the
committee's majority staff to Tajikistan, Kazakhstan,
Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan in October 2011, as well as
extensive staff meetings with experts and policymakers in
Washington, D.C.
Central Asia is critical to the outcome in Afghanistan. The
Northern Distribution Network and Manas Transit Center play
vital roles in supporting NATO and U.S.-led coalition
operations. Going forward, the challenge for the United States
is to strike a balance between its short-term, war-fighting
needs and long-term interests in promoting a stable,
prosperous, and democratic Central Asia.
Given the U.S. strategic interests at stake, this report
provides constructive and timely recommendations for the Obama
administration as it works to use our resources to achieve core
U.S. policy objectives.
Sincerely,
John F. Kerry,
Chairman.
(v)
CENTRAL ASIA AND THE TRANSITION
IN AFGHANISTAN
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Executive Summary
Central Asia, which includes the countries of Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, is on the
frontlines of the war in Afghanistan. Three of the five
countries share a long and porous border with Afghanistan, and
the region is bound to its southern neighbor by ties of
ethnicity, culture, history, politics, and language. They are
also connected by flows of militant groups and illicit
narcotics. Of all Afghanistan's neighbors, the greatest focus
has rightly been on Pakistan, whose internal dynamics have the
most profound effect on regional stability. But what happens in
Central Asia will also affect the outcome in Afghanistan.
As the United States plans for the 2014 transition, Central
Asia will continue to play a critical role in stabilization
efforts and our broader regional strategy. Central Asian
countries facilitate the movement of troops and non-lethal
supplies into Afghanistan. Kazakhstan provides robust economic
and humanitarian aid and recently hosted a meeting of the
International Contact Group in the lead-up to the Bonn
conference. Several countries, notably Tajikistan, Uzbekistan,
and Turkmenistan, are exporting cheap electricity, and
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have expressed interest in helping
advance a peace process in Afghanistan.
The legacy of the Soviet Union's precipitous withdrawal
from Afghanistan looms large in the minds and perspectives of
leaders in Central Asia. Leaders in the region want to see a
stable Afghanistan, one that does not fall prey again to the
abusive practices of the Taliban. However, they are looking for
reassurance that the United States and its partners have a
political strategy to end the war and bring lasting peace.
Officials with many governments told committee staff they fear
the transition will increase drug trafficking and leave behind
a security vacuum that extremist groups, such as the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), are
eager to fill. Tajikistan remains the weakest link in Central
Asia, and instability there would affect the entire region.\1\
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\1\ See Appendix III for a discussion on militancy in Tajikistan.
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The U.S. role in Afghanistan is changing, but Washington
should repeatedly stress that its engagement is not ending.
Afghanistan's neighbors fear the 2014 security transition and
withdrawal of coalition forces could mean abandonment. The
United States must keep working to change the narrative by
making it clear that we will protect our long-term interests in
the region. The top priority is regional stability, and that is
why 2014 will mark the beginning of a new phase of U.S.
engagement in the region. The U.S. military will continue to
work with the Afghan National Security Forces to prevent the
return of terrorist safe havens. Much as it is doing in Iraq,
the United States will remain vigorously engaged on security,
governance, and economic and social development.
American strategy is focused on Central Asia in part as a
response to the challenges of transiting supplies through
Pakistan for the Afghan war. Since 2009, the United States has
increasingly relied on a series of commercial air and ground
routes called the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) that
carry non-lethal supplies from Europe to U.S. and coalition
troops in Afghanistan through Russia, the Caucasus, and Central
Asia. The NDN is a critical component in supporting coalition
operations in Afghanistan and requires support from countries
like Uzbekistan. In Kyrgyzstan, the United States relies on the
Manas Transit Center as the premier air mobility hub for
operations in Afghanistan. The Transit Center is the entry and
exit point for virtually all coalition forces in Afghanistan
and is a major and vital mission. Maintaining the Center
requires active diplomatic and policy engagement with
Kyrgyzstan's leadership.
Building political support in Central Asia for coalition
efforts in Afghanistan has been challenging. In many cases, the
United States is forced to rely on highly corrupt,
authoritarian governments in countries whose populations are
suspicious of U.S. intentions. Russia has deep ties in this
region and fears American military encirclement. For their
part, Chinese strategists are leery of permanent U.S. bases on
China's border, but they are even more nervous about the risk
of instability in Afghanistan should the United States and its
partners fail to help stabilize the country.
To strengthen U.S. engagement with Central Asian countries,
the Obama administration has launched Annual Bilateral
Consultations (ABCs) that meet regularly and provide an
important platform for discussions on a range of issues from
security to human rights. The administration is complementing
this high-level political engagement with the ``New Silk Road''
(NSR) initiative, a vision of regional economic integration
that it hopes will connect Afghanistan with its neighbors in
South and Central Asia. The administration is also focused on
combating drug trafficking, which poses a serious threat to
regional stability, through new regional programs such as the
Central Asia Counternarcotics Initiative. Known as CACI, this
initiative seeks to build task forces throughout the region to
share sensitive information and coordinate joint operations.
As the United States prepares for the 2014 transition in
Afghanistan and continues to engage with countries in Central
Asia, this report offers three overarching recommendations for
U.S. policy:
(1) Strike a balance between security and political priorities
in Central Asia. As the United States increases
security cooperation with the countries of Central Asia
to support efforts in Afghanistan, it must also lay the
foundation for a long-term strategy that sustains these
gains and protects U.S. interests in the region.
Security assistance has an important role to play, but
the United States should continue promoting political
and economic reform by making greater investments where
possible in democracy and governance, public health,
economic assistance, and English language training.\2\
Given the tight fiscal climate, the administration
should consider using existing Afghanistan resources on
cross-border projects that promote regional stability
for Afghanistan and its neighbors. It should also
prioritize and increase assistance to Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan, given their fragility and importance for
broader regional stability.\3\
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\2\ See Appendix I for a discussion on expanding English language
training in Central Asia.
\3\ See Appendixes II and III for a discussion on the 2010 violence
in Osh, Kyrgyzstan and militancy in Tajikistan.
(2) Translate the New Silk Road (NSR) vision into a working
strategy for the broader region beyond Afghanistan.
This will require identifying needs, available
resources, U.S. comparative advantages, and the
economic reforms regional governments must take to
support increased trade and investment. Connecting
Central to South Asia via Afghanistan will be
challenging in light of the barriers to continental
transport and trade, including the lack of regional
cooperation. NSR will not be a panacea for
Afghanistan's economic woes, but it offers a vision for
the region that has the potential to foster private
sector investment if projects are prioritized and steps
are taken to create an enabling environment. The United
States can play a vital role by supporting political
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and economic reform and leveraging its resources.
(3) Link the regional Central Asia Counternarcotics Initiative
(CACI) with bilateral initiatives that offer traction,
given the constraints on regional cooperation. CACI
provides an important vision for reform and information
sharing to tackle narcotics trafficking in the region.
While there is demand for such an initiative among
local agencies with a mandate to combat the drug trade,
significant challenges remain. Regional cooperation has
a checkered history in this part of the world.
Corruption is widespread and prospects for the task
forces remain unclear, given the lack of political
will. The administration should consider piloting the
task forces in countries where they stand the greatest
chance of success, which will require a comparative
regional assessment of efforts to combat the drug
trade. It should also scale up cross-border operations
between Central Asian and Afghan law enforcement and
military officials, including joint training
activities.
Appreciating the Challenges of Central Asia
Central Asia occupies a unique position on the map, sitting
at the crossroads of Europe and Asia. Given its history,
politics, and culture, a regional strategy should take into
account the following realities:
Central Asian states have similarities, but they are not
homogeneous. While countries such as Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan can trade on massive energy reserves,
others like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are fragile
states that rely on external resources for their
survival. Border security varies greatly. Tajikistan's
borders are largely ``green'' zones, allowing militants
and narcotics to flow virtually unimpeded across them.
Uzbekistan is contiguous to all other Central Asian
states and Afghanistan. It maintains highly controlled
borders, including land mines along its border with
Tajikistan. Kyrgyzstan is the lone parliamentary
democracy in an otherwise autocratic region, but its
institutions are brittle and ethnic tensions simmer
just beneath the surface.
Key Central Asian militant groups are based in Pakistan and
fight in Afghanistan. Groups such as the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Islamic Jihad Union
(IJU), which trace their roots to Central Asia, are
based in North Waziristan, Pakistan. They have
conducted attacks in Afghanistan and have ties to the
Taliban and Haqqani network. Both groups continue to
pose a threat to stability in Afghanistan. Central
Asian governments fear that these groups, which
entertain ambitions of establishing a caliphate in
Central Asia, will thrive as the United States draws
down its military presence in Afghanistan.
Weak political will and limited capacity facilitate
narcotics flows. According to U.S. officials, an
estimated 30 percent of narcotics flow from Afghanistan
to Russia via Central Asia, mostly through Tajikistan.
Despite multiple initiatives, counternarcotics efforts
have been hampered by rampant corruption, weak
political will, limited human capacity, and porous
borders. Russia, China, Iran, and the European Union
all share American concerns about the narcotics flows,
creating potential for greater cooperation and
coordination.
Russia and China maintain a strong presence in Central
Asia. China, in particular, is extending its economic
reach, while Iran, South Korea, India, Japan, and
Turkey are also playing greater roles. Russia is
attempting to expand its influence through a network of
military bases, commercial agreements, and new
political alliances, and may redeploy Russian troops to
the Tajik-Afghan border as the United States draws down
in Afghanistan. China is consolidating its economic and
political power in Central Asia through no-strings-
attached lend-
ing policies, financial investments, and infrastructure
projects. Its export-import bank extended a $5 billion
line of credit to Kazakhstan's state-owned Development
Bank and an additional $5 billion to Kazmunaigaz, a
state-run gas company. China provided Turkmenistan with
a $4.1 billion loan to develop the vast South Yolotan
gas field and is responsible for several major energy
and transport projects in Tajikistan.
Regional rivalries within Central Asia lead to zero-sum
thinking. Regional rivalries such as those between
Tajikistan's President Emomali Rahmon and Uzbekistan's
President Islam Kar-
imov are endemic in Central Asia. There is a growing
trust deficit among its political leaders, many of whom
see international relations as a zero-sum game.
Governments seem to care less about growing the pie and
more about how big their slice will be, making regional
initiatives difficult to pursue.
Key countries lack enabling economic environments.
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan are some of
the toughest places to do business in the world.
Corruption is rife throughout the region and
institutional and bureaucratic obstacles create
systemic delays. For example, the World Bank's 2012
Doing Business report finds that it takes 71 days to
export an item from Uzbekistan and 92 days to import
one, compared to an average of 10 and 11 days,
respectively, for Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) countries. Without a
serious reform commitment, governments in the region
will have a difficult time implementing economic
initiatives that link Central and South Asia.
Human rights are a pressing concern. The State Department's
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices consistently
document serious human rights problems throughout the
region. Progress will depend on public pressure and
quiet, persistent engagement that emphasizes the
economic and social benefits of respecting fundamental
human rights. Uzbekistan, in particular, will require a
careful balancing of priorities, given its central role
in supporting the Northern Distribution Network (NDN).
It has made some modest progress in recent years such
as allowing the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) to visit prisons. Unfortunately, such
steps continue to be overshadowed by the country's
significant human rights concerns, including torture in
pre-trial detention facilities, imprisonment of human
rights defenders, forced child labor in the cotton
fields, and government restrictions on religious
freedom. Nevertheless, it is in the United States'
interest to engage with such admittedly authoritarian
countries on the full range of bilateral priorities,
including security, good governance, human rights,
trade, and investment.
Governments are cracking down on religious freedom. Islam
is flourishing in Central Asia, but countries such as
Tajikistan are limiting its free expression by
monitoring Friday sermons, recalling students studying
at religious institutions abroad, and prohibiting most
children under the age of 18 from attending religious
services at mosques. These restrictions, along with a
stifling political climate and limited economic
opportunities, could drive many organizations
underground. This threatens to radicalize a younger
population whose active participation in society is
vital to promoting economic growth, political reform,
and moderation.
Central Asia's Role in Supplying U.S. and Coalition
Troops in Afghanistan
Since 2009, the United States has steadily increased
traffic on the NDN, a major logistical accomplishment that has
resulted in a series of commercial air and ground routes that
supply NATO and U.S. operations in Afghanistan. Close to 75
percent of ground sustainment cargo is now shipped via the NDN.
According to U.S. Transportation Command, an estimated 40
percent of all cargo transits the NDN, 31 percent is shipped by
air, and the remaining 29 percent goes through Pakistan.
The NDN comprises three principal land routes: one
stretching from the Georgian Black Sea port of Poti, through
Baku, Azerbaijan, across the Caspian Sea, and into Central
Asia; one from the Latvian port of Riga through Russia,
Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan; and a final route that originates
in Latvia and travels through Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
and passes into Afghanistan via Tajikistan. An estimated 70
percent of cargo transiting the NDN enters at Uzbekistan's
Hairaton Gate.
The NDN has allowed the United States to diversify its
supply routes into Afghanistan, instead of relying solely on
Pakistan for transit. Whereas in 2009, about 90 percent of U.S.
non-military supplies for Afghanistan transited through the
Pakistani port city of Karachi, today, more non-lethal cargo is
shipped to Afghanistan via the NDN than through Pakistan.
The NDN is not a perfect substitute for the current supply
routes in Pakistan. The NDN only allows for one-way transit of
goods to Afghanistan, though discussions are reportedly
underway to expand the NDN to support two-way transit of cargo
leaving Afghanistan via the northern routes. The NDN also only
allows for the transit of non-lethal supplies, such as cement,
lumber, blast barriers, septic tanks, and matting. Sensitive
and high-technology equipment is transported by airlift.
Moreover, the NDN is not cheap. It costs roughly an additional
$10,000 per twenty-foot container to ship via the NDN instead
of Pakistan. But airlifting supplies directly into Afghanistan
remains the most expensive option, which costs an estimated
$40,000 more per twenty-foot container, according to U.S.
Transportation Command.
In addition to the NDN, the United States relies on the
Manas Transit Center in Kyrgyzstan as the premier air mobility
hub for operations in Afghanistan. The Transit Center is the
entry and exit point for virtually all coalition forces. The
Center enables critical missions, including aerial refueling
and medical evacuations. About 13 million pounds of cargo
transit the Center each month, and it consumes one million
gallons of fuel every two days. In short, this is a major and
vital mission.
Keeping Manas operational has been a challenge. In 2006,
Kyrgyzstan requested a significant increase in lease payments
from the United States for use of Manas. A settlement was
reached later that year, including an announcement that the
United States would provide $150 million in total assistance
and compensation. In 2009, Kyrgyzstan's then President
Kurmanbek Bakiyev announced that he intended to close Manas,
reportedly bowing in large part to pressure from the Russians
who offered Bakiyev a mixture of loans and grants for budget
stabilization. The United States concluded a five-year
agreement with Kyrgyzstan in 2009 to keep operations running,
increasing its rent payment from $17.4 million to $60 million
per year. However, suspicions in Kyrgyzstan regarding the U.S.
presence at Manas run deep, and the Transit Center is
frequently part of domestic public debate.
Besides supporting the NDN and Manas Transit Center, most
governments in Central Asia have granted U.S. and coalition
forces over-flight rights. Russia has permitted over-flights
since 2009, and Kazakhstan signed an air transit agreement with
the United States in 2010.
Striking a Balance Between Security
and Political Priorities
As the United States increases security cooperation with
the countries of Central Asia to support efforts in
Afghanistan, it must also lay the foundation for a long-term
strategy that sustains these gains and protects U.S. interests
in the region.
Achieving our security goals and promoting good governance
and human rights are not mutually exclusive. In fact, security
and political engagement are complementary strategies that are
more likely to be effective when pursued together. For example,
promoting economic reforms that focus on removing barriers to
continental transport and trade will not only benefit local
economies; it will also help support the NDN. The NDN, in turn,
can drive economic reform as local economies work to improve
purchasing standards and local governments cooperate to keep
the NDN up and running.
Similarly, in Kyrgyzstan, the Manas Transit Center provides
vital support to U.S. and coalition operations in Afghanistan.
It also promotes stability through its theatre security
cooperation division, which helps build ties with the local
community through humanitarian assistance, military-to-military
operations, and social cultural operations. Kyrgyzstan recently
participated in the first peaceful and democratic transition of
power in Central Asia, and the United States is actively
supporting its democratic transition. Through investments in
parliamentary strengthening and public health, good governance
and economic growth, we have managed to promote political
reform as we continue operations at the Manas Transit Center.
Striking the right balance between U.S. security and
political priorities will require greater investments in U.S.
civilian assistance. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are the most
fragile states in the region and U.S. assistance there can make
a real difference.\4\ The United States should consider
increasing its investments in democracy and governance, public
health programs, economic assistance, and English language
training\5\ to augment its security assistance.
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\4\ See Appendixes II and III for a discussion on the 2010 violence
in Osh, Kyrgyzstan and militancy in Tajikistan.
\5\ See Appendix I for a discussion on expanding English language
training in Central Asia.
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Civilian assistance for all countries in Central Asia was
$186.2 million in FY 2010 and is on a downward trajectory.\6\
Peace and security assistance to the region, which includes
funds from the national defense 050 account and smaller amounts
from the foreign assistance 150 account, increased from $70
million in FY 2001 to $257 million in FY 2010, though it too
may actually be declining. Overall, U.S. assistance to the
countries of Central Asia is relatively small compared to
Afghanistan and Pakistan. In FY 2010, for example, total U.S.
assistance to Central Asia, including both the function 150 and
050 accounts, amounted to just under three percent ($436.24
million) of what we spent in Afghanistan ($14.78 billion). \7\
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\6\ The $186.2 million figure includes funds from the AEECA account
and other Function 150 programs. For more information, see: Jim Nichol,
``Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S.
Interests,'' Congressional Research Service, RL33458, October 12, 2011,
p. 53.
\7\ See Appendixes IV, V, and VI for budget numbers and charts.
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Given the tight fiscal climate in the United States, the
administration should consider using existing Afghanistan
resources on cross-border projects that promote regional
stability to the benefit of both Afghanistan and its northern
neighbors. For a relatively small amount of money, such
projects can reinforce cooperation between Afghanistan and
Central Asian states and deliver immediate results. These
projects could include:
Scaling up cross-border electricity projects, such as Pamir
Energy. This public-private partnership supplies
electricity to an estimated 85 percent of the Gorno-
Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast in Tajikistan as well as
to several districts in northern Afghanistan;
Expanding joint training sessions between Afghan and Tajik
military and law enforcement officials at the U.S.-
funded facility in Khorog and the National Border Guard
Academy in Dushanbe, as well as considering similar
programs between Uzbek officials and their Afghan
counterparts;
Implementing cross-border community border guarding
programs, including more targeted training for
populations living on the border, organizing joint
training study tours, focusing on community policing
and cross-border training of border guards and Ministry
of Interior police in the region on vehicle inspection
best practices, crime scene evidence gathering,
emergency response, human rights, and interrogation and
interview techniques;
Promoting cross-border working groups with provincial
governments in Afghanistan and Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, strengthening sub-national
governance on both sides of the border;
Funding cross-border initiatives to tackle multi-drug
resistant and extensively resistant tuberculosis (TB).
The Central Asian states have some of the highest rates
of TB in the world. Cross-border initiatives could help
control TB infection rates and spur innovative and
sustainable programming;
Encouraging cross-border health programs by facilitating
the exchange of medical professionals;
Facilitating exchanges between women-led Tajik and Afghan
non-governmental organizations. Tajikistan has
experienced civil war in the recent past and its people
are familiar with the challenges and opportunities of
reconciliation. Women, in particular, can play a
critical role in laying the groundwork for a
comprehensive peace process;
Integrating Afghanistan's youth into existing programs in
Central Asia that promote economic development, such as
Junior Achievement programs, and expanding vocational
training opportunities to teach vocational and
agricultural skills to populations on the border to
provide economic opportunities and help stabilize the
region; and
Supporting American-style summer camps for Afghan and
Central Asian youth similar to the successful Camp
America model in the Isfara and Rasht regions of
Tajikistan. The curriculum can include sports, English
language, leadership, critical thinking, and team
building, with a focus on addressing the roots of
terrorism before they take hold in regions vulnerable
to extremism.
Translating the New Silk Road Vision Into A Strategy
The United States has a vested interest in promoting
regional economic integration, which could catalyze political
reform and reinforce efforts to stop illicit traffic and
militant activity at Afghanistan's borders. As cited in a World
Bank report, landlocked countries can face average growth rates
that are about 1.5 percentage points lower because of
transaction costs and other inefficiencies such as
unpredictability in transportation time.
In July 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced
the New Silk Road (NSR) initiative, a long-term economic vision
to transform Afghanistan into a hub of transport and trade,
connecting markets in India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central
Asia. Some of the proposed NSR projects include completing the
Afghan Ring Road; establishing rail links between Afghanistan
and Pakistan; completing the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-
India (TAPI) pipeline; and creating a regional electricity
market by establishing a transmission line between Central Asia
and South Asia (CASA-1000).
NSR requires U.S. leadership, not necessarily an infusion
of new U.S. funds. It will instead involve cooperation from
multilateral development banks, foreign donors, regional
governments, and the private sector. NSR has been
enthusiastically welcomed by governments in Afghanistan and
Central Asia who want to connect to markets in Europe and Asia
and appreciate American attention to their economic challenges.
However, connecting Central to South Asia via Afghanistan
will be challenging in light of the barriers to continental
transport and trade, including the lack of regional
cooperation. NSR will not be a panacea for Afghanistan's
economic woes, but it does offer a vision for the broader
region that could foster private sector investment if projects
are prioritized and steps are taken to create an enabling
environment. The United States can play a vital role by
supporting political and economic reform and leveraging its
resources.
Going forward, the administration should consider the
following questions in implementing NSR:
What are the right priorities and timelines? How is the
United States prioritizing projects and coordinating
with multilateral donors and foreign companies who are
already vested in this effort? Should the United States
cast a broad net, or focus on a few specific projects
that stand the greatest chance of success? How do we
implement quick-impact projects that show results,
while focusing on the longer-term conditions that
create an enabling economic environment?
What is the right balance between ``hardware'' and
``software''? One study cited by the Central Asia-
Caucasus Institute estimates that about 60 percent of
the time required to ship goods from Bishkek,
Kyrgyzstan through Kazakhstan to Novosibirsk, Russia is
spent at two border crossings, comprising 64 percent of
the total cost. What is the right balance between
``hardware'' projects like big-ticket infrastructure
and ``software'' improvements such as customs and legal
reforms that focus on removing barriers to continental
transport and trade?
Should NSR be regional or continental in scope? South and
Central Asia are part of a broader continental economy.
How can the United States augment its relationships in
Central Asia to include allies such as Japan, South
Korea, and India? The United States has engaged in
policy discussions with these countries on Central
Asia. How can we build on relationships with partners
and allies to secure international support for trade
and investment in Central Asia?
For NSR to succeed, the administration should incorporate
lessons learned from previous U.S. attempts to promote regional
economic integration in Central Asia. In 2006, the State
Department advanced a vision to link Central Asia with
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India, while also expanding
continental trade. The United States also signed a Trade and
Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) with the countries of
Central Asia in 2004. These initiatives were promising, but the
same obstacles that stymied progress then still exist in
Central Asia today, including lack of regional cooperation,
corruption, inhospitable business climates, regional rivalries,
and the unfavorable cost differential between continental and
maritime trade.
This report recommends the following six-pronged approach
for NSR:
(1) Appreciate the region's challenges: Internal divisions,
corruption, and poor business climates limit prospects
for regional integration. A NSR strategy must take into
account the differences among the Central Asian states,
as well as their shared past. The region has yet to
develop a culture of private enterprise and evolving
one will take time. Bringing Afghanistan, Pakistan, and
the rest of South Asia into the fold will make
attracting private sector investment all the more
necessary, and all the more challenging.
(2) Get local buy-in: Local governments need to do their part,
enacting the kind of macroeconomic reforms that will be
required for regional integration to take shape. The
United States and other partners can aid this effort
through capacity-building programs and technical
assistance.
(3) Engage the private sector: NSR is intended to be locally
owned and privately financed, spurring completion of
several major energy and infrastructure projects across
the region. What is needed now is a strategy for
engaging the private sector, given the hesitation of
investors to commit to a region where incomes are low,
political risks are high, and the logistical challenges
are great.
(4) Focus on software: NSR is a generational vision for the
entire region. It should not simply be a means to cope
with the economic impact of transition in Afghanistan.
Creating an enabling environment for private sector-
led, export-oriented growth by removing the impediments
to continental transport and trade, including customs
and legal reforms, trade facilitation, and border
management, should be an urgent priority.
(5) Get real results quickly: Most of the projects envisioned
under the new strategy will take three to ten years to
yield results. However, there are some projects that
can deliver in the near term, demonstrate the potential
of this strategy, and help broaden political support to
sustain longer-term U.S. engagement. At the tactical
level, for example, the United States could speed
implementation of a few ``demonstration projects,''
such as using its convening power to open a transport
corridor between Central Asia and the port of Gwadar in
Pakistan.
(6) Communicate intentions clearly: The United States should
be mindful of creating expectations that cannot be
fulfilled. A strategic communications strategy should
clearly articulate how NSR will be implemented, what
role the United States and other donors will play, what
steps regional governments must take, how projects are
being prioritized, the timeframe for implementation,
and how the private sector is engaged. This strategy
should also take into account the most effective means
of communicating in these countries.
Assessing the Central Asia Counternarcotics Initiative
Militant activity and a lack of economic opportunity are
not the only threats to regional stability. Drug trafficking
and the corruption that it creates pose an equally serious
challenge. Afghanistan is the epicenter of the drug problem.
Production of opium decreased in Afghanistan by almost 50
percent in 2010, according to the United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime (UNODC), but prices have proved less elastic.
This has allowed the Taliban and other criminal actors to
exploit stockpiles from earlier harvests to maintain high
profit margins. Drugs have become a source of income for
insurgent groups, with the Taliban reaping tens to possibly
hundreds of millions of dollars each year from the drug trade.
In June 2011, the State Department launched a new $4.1
million initiative known as ``CACI,'' or the Central Asia
Counternarcotics Initiative, to build local capacity and
stimulate regional cooperation on counternarcotics. CACI seeks
to establish vetted units and build counternarcotics task
forces in the five Central Asian countries, linking them with
existing task forces in Russia and Afghanistan. The U.S. Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the State Department's
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
(INL) will implement the initiative.
CACI provides an important vision for encouraging greater
reform and information sharing across the region. As one U.S.
official put it, ``we are planting a seed with CACI,'' which
could eventually grow into an effective investigative network
for sharing information and conducting joint operations across
the entire supply chain.
While there is demand for such an initiative among local
agencies with a mandate to combat the drug trade, significant
challenges remain. Regional cooperation has a checkered history
in this part of the world. Central Asia is home to a wealth of
regional organizations and initiatives, many of which have
failed to achieve their stated goals. Corruption is widespread
and prospects for the vetted units remain unclear, given the
lack of political will in several Central Asian countries.
To succeed, CACI will need to be coordinated across a range
of interagency and intergovernmental counternarcotics
initiatives. In FY 2010, the United States spent an estimated
$69 million on counternarcotics in Central Asia through various
Defense Department and State Department security assistance
programs. The international community and regional
organizations have also devoted considerable resources to the
counternarcotics effort and launched a variety of initiatives,
including the UNODC's Paris Pact-mandated ``Rainbow Strategy,''
the NATO-Russia Council Project on Counternarcotics, and
various initiatives within the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) and the Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO).
Going forward, the administration should consider:
Applying regional labels to new initiatives with caution,
given the structural constraints on regional
cooperation in Central Asia;
Piloting vetted units in countries where they stand the
greatest chance of success, which will require a
comparative regional assessment of efforts to combat
the drug trade;
Scaling up cross-border operations between Central Asian
and Afghan law enforcement and military officials,
including joint training activities; and
Investing in informal working groups, like the Northern
Route Working Group (NRWG), to improve information
sharing and coordinate joint operations and regional
and international counternarcotics efforts. The NRWG
was established in 2010 to coordinate joint
counternarcotics investigations in northern
Afghanistan. It is composed of the Russian Federal Drug
Control Service, Tajikistan Drug Control Service,
Kyrgyzstan Drug Control Service, and DEA Country
Offices in Dushanbe, Kabul, and Moscow.
Securing Central Asia's Southern Borders
To support counternarcotics efforts, the United States
should continue to shore up the borders between Central Asia
and Afghanistan. Tajikistan's border with Afghanistan is
particularly long, porous, and thinly guarded. Unmanned
sections are known as ``green borders,'' where virtually anyone
can cross by river raft, donkey, or truck. Some areas of the
border are protected by fences and border patrols, but many
sections are left wide open.
According to officials in the region, most smuggling occurs
at official points of entry and there is credible evidence that
Tajik authorities look the other way, with some actively
facilitating the drug trade. Tajik authorities told committee
staff they make seizures about three to four times a year, with
the last significant seizure in Dushanbe at the end of 2009,
when the Tajik Ministry of Interior reportedly seized a large
shipment of drugs coming from the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous
Oblast.
Cross-border cooperation between Tajikistan and Afghanistan
leaves room for improvement. Weak local government and
corruption on both sides of the border are obstacles to
effective border management. The Government of Tajikistan has
relations with the Afghan border police, including regular
meetings. They have agreements in place on exchanging
information, but effective joint cooperation must be
strengthened.
The United States is actively working with the Tajik
government to improve border security. It is constructing or
refurbishing border guard facilities, providing training for
Tajik and Afghan border guards at a U.S.-funded facility in
Khorog, and implementing programs on police reform, rule of
law, judicial training, prosecutorial training, trafficking in
persons, domestic violence, and drug demand reduction. The
United States also provides basic equipment to Tajik border
guards.
There are three steps the United States could take to build
on its efforts to improve border security in Tajikistan and the
wider region:
Improve and share data collection: It is hard to have a
genuine discussion and debate about the narcotics
problem when our local partners lack publicly
accessible and consistent information on the drug
trade. According to Tajik Ministry of Interior
estimates, they seize about 70 to 80 percent of all
drugs that pass through Tajikistan each year, with only
10 percent of drugs produced in Afghanistan transiting
Central Asia. The UNODC estimates that as much as 25 to
30 percent of the drugs produced in Afghanistan transit
Central Asia. Experts estimate that roughly five to ten
percent of these flows are seized.
Get back to brass tacks: Establishing elite investigatory
units, as envisioned under CACI, is a long-term goal.
In the near term, the United States should also focus
on the basics, working with the Government of
Tajikistan to improve standards and facilities for
interrogations, as well as to provide modern
communications equipment, rations, and vehicles for
border guards, customs service, and law enforcement
agencies.
Increase Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) staff: DEA
maintains only a handful of narcotics officers in
Central Asia. By contrast, there are 81 DEA officers in
Afghanistan. The administration should consider a
modest increase in DEA's staff in Central Asia, given
the volume of narcotics that transits the Northern
Route and the challenges of coordinating an effective
response.
=======================================================================
APPENDIXES
=======================================================================
Appendix I.--English Language Training
Across Central Asia, the English language is barely heard.
This should concern the United States for three reasons: (1)
fewer English-speakers means fewer opportunities for bilateral
engagement, (2) fewer opportunities for engagement means less
influence, and (3) less influence means reduced opportunities
for trade and investment, as well as meaningful dialogue on
human rights and legal reform.
English language training is important for other countries,
too. Conversational fluency in the English language is critical
to participating in peacekeeping missions and joint military
exercises, to say nothing of reaping the benefits of
globalization. It is why countries like Kazakhstan have
invested in English language training, with the ambitious goal
of becoming trilingual in Kazakh, Russian, and English in 10
years. The United States should seize the opportunity and
expand English language training throughout the region.
Increasing support for English language training in Central
Asia would complement existing U.S. outreach efforts. Public
diplomacy programs like the Future Leaders Exchange (FLEX)
program have played an important role in fostering people-to-
people exchanges for high school students from Russia, Ukraine,
Moldova, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. The United States also
teaches English through the International Military Education
and Training (IMET) program, annual Fulbright scholarships,
English Language Fellowship and Specialist programs, and the
Peace Corps.
Unfortunately, the Peace Corps' footprint in Central Asia
is getting smaller. The Uzbekistan program ended in 2005, and
the Peace Corps recently suspended its program in Kazakhstan,
leaving just 89 volunteers in Kyrgyzstan and 25 in
Turkmenistan. Tajikistan does not have a Peace Corps program,
despite high-level interest from the United States.
Expanding English language training requires unity of
effort to succeed, particularly in a constrained fiscal
environment. There is room for creativity in partnering with
the private sector. For instance, in cooperation with the State
Department, American companies could leverage their resources
to bolster English language opportunities in Central Asia. This
could be achieved with a minimal start-up investment from the
U.S. Government. Public-private partnerships like the U.S.-
Kazakhstan Public-Private Economic Partnership Initiative
(PPEPI) have delivered results. We should apply this model to
our English language programs in Central Asia.
Appendix II.--Remembering Osh
The ghosts of the 2010 violence in Kyrgyzstan, during which
clashes between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks left nearly 500 dead
and hundreds of thousands displaced, still haunt the streets of
Osh in the heart of the Ferghana Valley. Charred buildings and
half-empty markets are stark reminders of the tensions that
simmer just beneath the surface. Kyrgyzstan has taken some
positive steps since the ouster of former President Kurmanbek
Bakiyev last April, with credible parliamentary elections in
October 2010, and a presidential election this fall. But much
work remains to be done to consolidate Kyrgyzstan's democratic
transition.
Reconciliation initiatives have been slow to get off the
ground. Officials have pledged reforms to encourage better
inter-ethnic relations. But throughout the country, an uneasy
fear pervades discussion of the future.
Kyrgyzstan's halting strides toward democracy underscore
the fragility of Afghanistan's northern flank. Many of the
Central Asian countries labor under the constraints of
artificially imposed borders and mismanagement of natural
resources. The Ferghana Valley, which spans the countries of
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, is one of the most
densely populated and ethnically diverse areas in the world. It
has been a hotbed of violence and instability, as well as a
fertile recruiting ground for militant groups. Ferghana's
diversity, economic potential, and local governance structures
are sources of strength. But these rays of light have been
overshadowed by social and cultural conflict.
Remembering Osh is less a call to action than a caution
against the tendency to assume we can ``fix'' what ails Central
Asia. The United States can help, and in many respects, U.S.
assistance can make a real difference. In Osh, for example, the
United States could put more dollars behind youth sports
centers and joint economic initiatives for ethnic Kyrgyz and
Uzbeks, as well as mobile health clinics that provide
psychosocial support for families of the victims of last year's
violence. But ultimately, it is the people of Central Asia that
must lead the way to reconciliation, economic growth, and
political reform.
There is reason for hope. In Tokmok, a small town to the
east of Bishkek, an elderly gentleman proudly cast his vote in
this year's presidential election. ``Do you want to know whom
I'm voting for?'' he asked his compatriots, to which they
responded with cries of ``No, No.'' The gentleman raised his
voice: ``I'm voting for peace and stability in Kyrgyzstan.''
Appendix III.--Tajikistan: A Closer Look
Tajikistan is a weak state in a dangerous neighborhood. It
lacks resources and shares a widely porous and vulnerable
border with Afghanistan. Corruption is rife, and the country's
institutions are brittle, raising concerns about its ability to
manage political, economic, and humanitarian shocks.
Militant ambushes against a convoy of government troops and
a suicide bombing in the northern city of Khujand last year
exposed Tajikistan's vulnerability to growing extremism at home
and armed incursions from across the border in Afghanistan.
Much of what passes for terrorist activity in the country may
be local in nature, driven by those who have grown dissatisfied
with electricity shortages, unemployment, corruption, abusive
interrogation methods, and religious persecution. The IMU and
other militant groups occasionally infiltrate the country, and
there is some evidence to suggest that Tajikistan's northern
Isfara district is at risk of becoming a haven for extremists.
In the final analysis, however, the specter of Islamic
radicalism may be a self-inflicted wound.
Islam is flourishing in Tajikistan. Yet the government is
limiting its free expression by monitoring Friday sermons,
prohibiting most children under the age of 18 from attending
religious services at mosques, and recalling students pursuing
religious studies at institutions abroad. Government
restrictions on religious expression, coupled with a lack of
economic opportunity, could drive many organizations
underground. This threatens to radicalize a younger population
whose active participation in society is vital to promoting
economic growth, political reform, and moderation.
For Central Asia to remain part of the solution for
Afghanistan and not the problem, its governments must address
the shortcomings in their domestic security regimes. In
addition to the human and social costs, the presence of
radicalized and alienated populations in Central Asia could
present the Taliban and other militant groups with ample
opportunity to regenerate and spread their message from across
the border.
Appendix IV.--Total U.S. Budgeted Assistance to Central Asia, Pakistan,
and Afghanistan, FY 2001-2010 (millions)
Sources: For Afghanistan, FY 2002-2010, see: Curt Tarnoff,
``Afghanistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance,'' Congressional
Research Service, R40699, August 19, 2011, p.16. For
Afghanistan, FY 2001, see: Kenneth Katzman, ``Afghanistan:
Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,''
Congressional Research Service, November 22, 2011, RL30588, p.
75. For Pakistan, see: Susan B. Epstein and K. Alan Kronstadt,
``Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance,'' Congressional Research
Service, R41856, November 4, 2011, pp. 20-21. Data on total
U.S. budgeted assistance to Central Asia compiled for Senate
Foreign Relations Committee majority staff by Jim Nichol,
Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs at the Congressional
Research Service.
Notes: Estimates for Afghanistan include total budget
function 050 and function 150 assistance, FY 2001-2010.
Estimates for Pakistan include total security and economic
assistance, excluding Coalition Support Funds, FY 2001-2010.
Estimates for Central Asia include assistance reported by all
agencies and programs, FY 2001-2010.
Appendix V.--U.S. Budgeted Peace & Security Assistance vs. Total
Assistance to Central Asia, FY 2001-2010 (millions)
Source: Data on total U.S. budgeted assistance and Peace
and Security (P&S) assistance to Central Asia compiled for
Senate Foreign Relations Committee majority staff by Jim
Nichol, Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs at the
Congressional Research Service.
Notes: Peace and Security assistance includes Department of
Defense funding for combating weapons of mass destruction,
counternarcotics, and stabilization operations and security
sector reform (Section 1206); Department of Energy funding for
combating weapons of mass destruction; and Department of State
funding for International Military Education and Training
(IMET), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Non-Proliferation,
Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR), and
Assistance to Eastern Europe and Central Asia (AEECA) funding
for counterterrorism, transnational crime, counternarcotics,
stabilization operations and security sector reform, combating
weapons of mass destruction, and conflict mitigation and
reconciliation.
Appendix VI.--U.S. Assistance to Central Asia, FY 2001-2010
Table 1: Total U.S. Assistance Budgeted for Central Asia, FY 2001-2010
(millions of dollars, by fiscal year)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kazakhstan................................ 80.01 97.4 97.88 111.00 84.91 80.06 165.55 179.52 219.02 157.9 1273.25
Kyrgyzstan................................ 43.07 94.47 53.85 55.25 55.23 43.34 71.25 71.23 111.74 117.53 716.96
Tajikistan................................ 76.48 136.34 48.71 53.01 65.69 42.81 48.44 67.33 65.60 82.99 687.4
Turkmenistan.............................. 12.57 18.93 10.98 10.42 18.94 10.44 19.84 16.83 20.78 28.25 167.98
Uzbekistan................................ 48.33 224.14 90.77 84.25 78.28 49.30 35.90 38.33 48.55 37.36 735.21
Regn...................................... 7.57 13.88 9.99 3.41 4.67 5.23 7.59 6.66 25.61 12.21 96.82
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total................................... 268.03 585.16 312.18 317.34 307.72 231.18 348.57 379.9 491.3 436.24 3677.62
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Data on total U.S. budgeted assistance to Central Asia compiled for Senate Foreign Relations Committee majority staff by Jim Nichol, Specialist
in Russian and Eurasian Affairs at the Congressional Research Service.
Notes: Estimates for Central Asia include assistance reported by all agencies and programs, FY 2001-2010.
Table 2: U.S. Budgeted Peace & Security Assistance for Central Asia, FY 2001-2010
(millions of dollars, by fiscal year)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kazakhstan................................ 36.66 47.63 51.67 73.75 56.00 50.35 139.8 155.5 187.6 137.72 936.68
Kyrgyzstan................................ 6.55 38.62 11.28 12.33 17.44 13.27 18.78 37.57 42.23 48.62 246.69
Tajikistan................................ 0.75 21.6 1.62 7.88 28.99 10.00 17.49 30.48 25.50 31.48 175.79
Turkmenistan.............................. 1.87 7.73 1.16 0.97 8.98 2.17 5.72 5.90 8.71 13.0 56.21
Uzbekistan................................ 24.27 82.53 39.18 41.62 43.43 28.67 17.82 26.82 33.98 25.95 364.27
Regn...................................... 0.30 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.91 0.68 3.60 2.13 19.21 0.75 27.7
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total................................... 70.4 198.1 105.0 136.5 155.7 105.1 203.2 258.4 317.2 257.52 1807.34
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Data on U.S. budgeted peace and security assistance to Central Asia compiled for Senate Foreign Relations Committee majority staff by Jim
Nichol, Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs at the Congressional Research Service.
Appendix VII.--Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan
Source: Jim Nichol, ``Central Asia: Regional Developments
and Implications for U.S. Interests,'' Congressional Research
Service, RL33458, October 12, 2011, p. 54, http://www.fas.org/
sgp/crs/row/RL33458.pdf.