Mountains of Concrete:
A summary of the report by International Rivers (NGO)
accessed at http://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/mountains-of-concrete-dam-building-in-the-himalayas-3582

The Himalayas are the source of some of the largest rivers in Asia – the Indus, Ganga, Brahmaputra, and
Irrawaddy, the mountain range stretches across an arc of 2,400km and covers six countries - Bhutan,
Nepal, India, Pakistan, China and Afghanistan. The rivers that originate in the Himalayas provide
livelihoods and prosperity to 2 billion people living between the Indus Basin plains of Pakistan in the
west to Bangladesh in the east.
The Himalayas are called the ‘Third Pole’, as they are a highly glaciated area has huge stocks 35,110 km2
of glacier and ice cover, and a total ice reserve of 3,735 km 3. With their high slopes and huge quantities
of fast-moving waters; the Himalayan rivers have large potential to generate hydroelectric power.
Almost each and every one of the major rivers is a trans-boundary one. Some of the earliest and largest
hydropower stations include the Bhakra Nangal project in India and the Tarbela project in Pakistan.
Massive plans are underway in Pakistan, India, Nepal and Bhutan to build several hundred dams in the
region, with over 150,000 Megawatts (MW) of additional capacity proposed in the next 20 years in the
four countries. If they all go ahead this will be the most dammed region in the world.
While these hydropower projects are being justified on the grounds of economic development and
electricity needs – and there are real and growing needs of electricity in these countries, even energy
crises in several – the real drivers for building these projects are quite different. For Bhutan and Nepal,
the total hydropower potential is far in excess of their power requirements. Both countries see
possibilities of earning huge revenues from the sale of surplus electricity to India – hydro-dollars on the
lines of petro-dollars.
Most of the dams are being constructed to deliver electricity to load centres far away, and in the case of
Nepal and Bhutan for electricity exports to India. There are also questions about whether the power
generated from these projects would help increase access to electricity for the poor and the vulnerable
sections of society, as the location of these projects in remote and difficult terrains, privatization, and
the incentives offered will result in a high cost for the electricity generated.
NEPAL
Nepal is suffering from a power deficit situation, and the Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) had to resort
to load shedding in 2006-07. At the same time, about 60% of the rural population did not have access
to electricity. Nepal also has a severe energy crisis with a shortage of petroleum fuels, yet most of the
big projects in Nepal are planned with the intent to export electricity to India. The NEA estimates the
energy and power demand in 2018-19 to be 8,333 Gigawatt Hours (GWh) and 1,788 MW, while for
2024-25 the estimates are 13,099 GWh and 2,779 MW. Most of the planned capacity addition of 22,000
MW is clearly slated for exporting power to India. Nepal plans to add 1,750 MW by the year 2020. It
has only installed 1.27% of its HEP potential. Among the big projects planned for the immediate future
West Seti, Upper Karnali and Arun III will export electricity to India, with only a small percentage of that
power being set aside for Nepal.

BHUTAN
With Bhutan’s own power needs expected to be around 1,000 MW by 2020, it already has more
installed capacity than this to date. Most of the electricity generated in Bhutan is exported to India.
Between April 2007 and March 2008, Bhutan exported 5,300 GWh, or about 70- 75% of its generation,
to India. It is significant that even after deducting this export, the per capita annual electricity
generation in Bhutan is about 1,800 Kilowatt hours (KWh), by far the highest among all four countries,
and almost three times higher than India. But electricity coverage in Bhutan was 60% in 2007, and only
40% in rural areas.
Hydropower is the single biggest revenue earner for Bhutan. Revenue from the sale of electricity
provided 45% of national revenue before the 1,020 MW Tala project was commissioned and is expected
to account for about 60% with the full commissioning of Tala. Most of this is from the sale of power to
India. Bhutan wants to increase this income many fold; this is the biggest driver of its hydropower
program.
In July 2006, India and Bhutan signed an agreement for long-term cooperation in the field of
hydropower development. Under this umbrella agreement, valid for 60 years, India will import a
minimum of 5,000 MW of power from Bhutan by 2020. Bhutan is now urging India to push this up to
10,000 MW. Its recently announced ‘Bhutan Sustainable Hydropower Development Policy,’ endorsed by
the Cabinet in the last week of June 2008, approves this target and mentions the projects that will be
pursued to meet this target.
PAKISTAN
Pakistan has plans to add 10,000 MW through five projects by the year 2016. Another 14 projects
(21,000 MW) are under study for construction by 2025. The government is pushing for the immediate
implementation of the massive 4,500 MW Diamer-Bhasha project, which is expected to cost $8.5
billion, around 72% of the Pakistani government’s annual revenue. The 14 projects planned for the next
phase are expected to cost $32.15 billion. While Pakistani media reports suggest that the World Bank
will not finance the Dam, they might make a part-payment.
The first and primary driver for large storage dams in Pakistan appears to be for irrigation and
agriculture, while power generation is secondary. This is not surprising since agriculture, while
contributing about 25% to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), accounts for an overwhelming 66% of the
county’s employment and over 80% of its exports.
Agriculture and irrigation in Pakistan are in a severe crisis. The country has one of the world’s oldest
and most extensive irrigation systems based on the Indus Basin rivers, but it is now facing massive
problems. Waterlogging and soil salinity have affected vast areas, and ameliorative measures have
aggravated the problems. River flows have fallen drastically as enormous quantities of water have been
diverted. The lowest riparian state, Sindh, has been the worst affected, including agriculture and
fisheries in the mangrove areas. Many of the problems are inherent to big dams and canal-based
systems. Yet the same solutions are being suggested for addressing the problem – more water, and for
that, more big dams and storage capacities. These solutions are politically appealing, even though they
are likely to aggravate rather than address the problems, because the proposed storage projects are in
remote areas of the Himalayas.

Pakistan’s Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) estimates that it will need about $20.3
billion for the five projects that it wants to build by 2016. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has
funded virtually all the large hydropower projects in Pakistan to date – Tarbela, Mangla and Gazhi
Barotha and will continue to invest in power and energy, and water and irrigation sectors. The Indus
River originates in Tibet, travels through India and then into Pakistan, where it descends from the
mountains onto the plains to eventually meet the sea. The Satluj River, too, rises near Mansorovar in
Tibet, and then, after traversing through India and Pakistan, eventually meets the Chenab and the Indus
rivers. The World Bank’s ‘Pakistan Country Water Strategy’ argues strongly that there is ‘the urgent
need for construction of major new storage on the Indus.’ It is ironic that a major argument for the
necessity of new big dams is that heavy sedimentation has led to the loss of storage capacity of the
biggest existing dams like Tarbela and Mangla, and so new dams are needed as replacements, even
though these rivers carry heavy silt loads.
Agriculture is the backbone of Pakistan’s economy. Pakistan today is among one of the World’s fastest
growing populations, now estimated at over 150 million. Due to the lack of large river regulation
capability through sizeable storages, the country is already facing serious shortages in food grains. The
power deficit in Pakistan is predicted to grow to 5,500 MW by 2010 unless new power projects are
brought online. Furthermore, about 40% of firms in Pakistan identified electricity as a major constraint
for the operation and growth of their businesses; a quarter of the Pakistani population has no access to
electricity at all.
INDIA
India launched in 2003 the ‘50,000 MW Initiative’ to fast track hydropower development, by taking up
time-bound preparation of the Preliminary Feasibility Reports (PFRs) of 162 new hydroelectric schemes
(50,000 MW). India has plans to build this capacity by 2017 and then in the 10 years following, to add
another 67,000 MW of hydropower. The hydropower capacity addition planned in just the next 10
years in this region is close to 80,000 MW. This can be compared to the planned additions in the whole
of Latin America (60-64,000 MW) or Africa (27-99,000 MW).
The push for hydropower in India mainly comes from the need to meet the power demands of the 9%
plus annual growth rate. India continues to be plagued by power and energy shortages. Overall for the
country, peak power demand in the year 2007-08 was 108,886 MW, while the peak power demand met
was 90,793 MW, there was a shortfall of 18,093 MW or 16.6% of peak demand. The energy demand in
the same year was 737,052 GWh, towards which energy availability was 664,660 GWh. This was a
deficit of 72,392 GWh, or 9.8%.
A large portion of Indian society does not have access to electricity. According to the Working Group on
Power for the 11th Five Year Plan, 154,567 villages, or a full 26% of the inhabited villages in the country,
were without access to electricity in 2006. The household-level picture is worse; according to the 2001
Census, 44.2% of households in India did not have access to electricity. Shortages affecting urban
centres are also leading to demonstrations, violence and riots. Vulnerable people, like the poor,
marginal farmers, are finding access to electricity more and more difficult due to a lack of physical
access or increasing tariffs. An increase in power generation capacity, as seen in the National Electricity
Policy of 2005, includes: Access to Electricity (available for all households in the next five years);
Availability of ‘Power on Demand’; Per capita availability of electricity to be increased to over 1,000

units (1,000 KWh) by 2012; Minimum lifeline consumption of 1 unit (1 KWh)/ household/day by the year
2012.
A large part of the undeveloped hydropower potential is located in the Himalayan states of Arunachal
Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh and Sikkim, The Government of Arunachal Pradesh Cabinet
note of April 2005 talks about how, if the hydropower potential of the state could be harnessed and the
power sold to the rest of India, ‘the state would float in hydro dollars like the Arab countries are floating
in petro dollars. The initial cost may be US$60 billion. Dams do cost around $1.2 million per MW, with
an additional cost of laying the transmission lines. There is a funding gap in the power sector of almost
44% of the funds remain unsecured.
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) like the World Bank and the ADB are likely to play an
important role in Nepal and Bhutan, as are the government of India, Indian companies and some
bilateral donors. In Pakistan, IFIs, China and domestic resources are the likely sources of funds. In India,
the government, public and private developers, Indian banks and Indian financial institutions are likely
to be the biggest players, although given the size of the program there will also be a host of national and
international players. Some of the key financial agencies have already been discussed above. Among
the public sector developers of the projects are the WAPDA in Pakistan, the Nepal Electricity Authority
in Nepal and several publicly owned corporations in India like NHPC Limited, North Eastern Electric
Power Corporation Limited (NEEPCO), and NTPC.
India’s Hydropower Policy 2008 states: ‘Lately, financial institutions have become more flexible...in
financing power projects, particularly hydro projects. High energy prices in a fast expanding power
market have diluted their insistence on water-tight PPAs backed by Government guarantees...there
would be no dearth of funds for projects with viable tariffs...’ While these high energy prices may ease
the availability of funds for power projects, they will push electricity out of the reach of the poor. The
fast expanding markets of those who can pay high energy prices beg the question – what about those
who cannot?
The important question then becomes the impact of these measures (reforms) on the tariffs of the
electricity generated, and the implications for access to electricity for the poor. The reforms, and many
of the incentives being offered to the hydropower sector, are likely to lead to higher tariffs. In the case
of the Himalayan projects, distance from load centres; difficult terrain and other factors will add to the
high capital costs of hydropower projects. India’s new hydropower Policy allows developers to sell 40%
of their saleable electricity on a merchant basis. There is a real danger that these projects will then end
up generating high-cost power supplied only to consumers with a high paying capacity. This is an
important concern. The National Tariff Policy 2006 says: ‘Consumers, particularly those who are ready
to pay a tariff which reflects efficient costs, have the right to get uninterrupted 24 hours supply of
quality power.’ Is this a recognition and a pre-emptive defense of the fact that these policies are likely to
lead to higher tariffs, which only a certain segment of consumers will likely be able to afford?

Every year around 17, 000 children die from drowning (1/3rd or deaths of 5 to 9 year olds DFID)
Chinese involvement
Some 10 different Chinese companies have built or are building at least 13 dam projects in Nepal and
nine in Pakistan. Since the year 2000 China’s central government has advanced a ‘going out’ campaign
in an effort to boost China’s economy, which includes incentives for companies to expand their overseas business. China’s domestic dam industry is now arguably the most prolific in the world, with
technical skills on par with those of industrialized nations.
India seeks to bolster its own overseas dam industry rather than helping China gain footing in the
region. China’s ability to not only construct but also finance projects may give it a slight advantage over
India, as suggested by recent media reports regarding competition for dam contracts in Nepal. It may
be noted however that many Indian thermal power projects are sourcing equipment from China and
Chinese companies.
Many of the dams Chinese companies have built in Nepal and Pakistan are relatively small, trends
suggest that Chinese dam builders and financiers are setting their sights on larger projects. For
example, the 750 MW West Seti project, which will be the largest dam in Nepal, is being built by China
machinery import-export Company and is financed in part by three Chinese banks: China export import
(exim) Bank, the industrial and Commercial Bank of China, and the Bank of China. The project has been
the subject of intense debate within Nepal not only because it will displace thousands of subsistence
farmers and destroy Seti river fish habitat, but also because 90% of the power the project produces will
go to India.
The controversial project, the 4,500 MW Diamer-Bhasha Dam in northern Pakistan, may have gotten the
green light in august 2008 when it was reported that the Chinese government (presumably, China exim
Bank) agreed to finance the $8.5 billion dollar project. While China’s involvement in the Diamer-Bhasha
Dam is yet to be confirmed; another large dam in Pakistan’s north is already under construction by
Chinese companies. In February 2008, the cornerstone for the 969 MW, $1.5 billion Neelum-Jhelum
Dam was laid by China Gezhouba Company and China national machinery import and export
Corporation. Several smaller projects built by Chinese companies and financed by Chinese banks are in
the works throughout Pakistan.

In Pakistan, the reservoir of the Diamer-Bhasha Dam will spread over 130 km2 (32,000 acres) and 24,500
people will be affected. Given the size of the reservoir, the resettlement figures seem to be an
underestimate. The impact of Himalayan dams is likely to be much greater if the totality of the impacts
of the destruction of the resource base, including rivers, fisheries and forests, is taken into
consideration.

Impacts of Dams on the environment
This dam building activity will fundamentally transform the landscape, ecology and economy of the
region. The social and environmental costs are often externalized, and thus not paid for by the projects
themselves). Damming and diversion of rivers will severely disrupt the downstream flows, impacting
agriculture and fisheries and threatening livelihoods of entire populations. Degradation of the natural
surroundings and a massive influx of migrant workers will have grave implications for the culture and
identity of local people, who are often distinct ethnic groups small in numbers. As the entire region is
seismically active, these dams face high risks of catastrophic failures due to earthquakes. UNESCO has
declared the Sagarmatha National Park near Mt. Everest in Nepal as a World Heritage Site, but it could
be under threat.

The World Bank said ‘the Himalayan hydropower sites are, from a social and environmental perspective,
among the most benign in the world.’ This is a patently false assertion. Dams in the Himalayas will have
social and environmental impacts similar to dams in other parts of South Asia, which have proven very
harmful. The low population density in these areas is sometimes put forward to argue that the projects
are benign from a social impact point of view. Indeed, this very fact can mean that the populations are
actually more vulnerable to displacement and that the impacts of displacement would thus be more
severe. In fact, due to the peculiar geographical and cultural circumstances, dams in the Himalayas will
have some serious impacts not seen elsewhere.
The impact of global warming is already being felt much more in the Himalayas than in other parts of
the world. This is resulting in the accelerated melting of glaciers and the depletion of the massive water
store of the region. There are real fears that the ‘abode of snow’ would no longer be left with any,
turning ‘the snow- covered mountains into bare, rocky mountains’ and ‘dynamic glaciers...into lifeless
rubble.’ This would have tremendous impacts all the way to the Indo-Gangetic Plains.
The impact of climate change will be aggravated by the construction of hundreds of dams. As glaciers
melt, water in the rivers will rise, and dams will be subjected to much higher flows, raising concerns of
dam safety, increased flooding and submergence. With the subsequent depletion of glaciers there will
be much lower annual flows, affecting the performance of such huge investments. Climate change will
also increase the threats of Glacial Lake Outburst Floods (GLOFs) and possible cascading failures of
downstream dams.
LOSS OF THE RESOURCE BASE
Most of the people living on the banks of rivers in the Himalayan region derive their sustenance from
their natural resource base. Agriculture provides food and other needs. The river gives fish, and also
provides water for daily use and irrigation. It can also provide transportation routes. Forests provide a
variety of things including fruits, vegetables, timber, fodder and in many areas they are also an integral
part of the jhum, or shifting cultivation, cycle. This richness and multi- dimensionality of the resource
base is often not understood nor taken into account by planners when considering the impacts of
projects.
DOWNSTREAM IMPACTS
Since the Ranganadi Hydro Electric Project (RHEP) was built in Arunachal Pradesh. Horticulture has
almost finished along the river banks (banana, oranges, pineapple and spices); tourists who fished have
disappeared as the waters disappeared. As serious as the problem of diminished water flows are
sudden high flows in the River. On several occasions the project has released large quantities of water
into the river without any warning, leading to flash floods.
The Farakka Barrage in India only 18km from Bangladesh reduces flow by four fifths. The Tehri Dam
(2006) diverts 270 million gallons of drinking water per day. The Brahmaputra river system has intricate
links with beels, the wetlands in the plains downstream that are an important source of livelihoods and
fisheries. The changes in the flow regime are likely to seriously impact these wetlands. Dams would
trap silt behind them, depriving downstream areas of nutrients.
According to a study by the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), the flow in the lower
Indus River decreased from 105,000 million cubic meters (MCM) in 1932 to 43,000 MCM in 1970 as a

result of the number of projects on the Indus and its tributaries. In the1990s, the flow went down to
12,000 MCM. This led to a sharp reduction in the area of mangrove forests, declining fish production,
degraded water quality and severe encroachment of the sea into the delta area with a resultant loss of
4,856 km2 of farmland.
The impact will be particularly severe when there is a cascade or series of such projects on a single river
or in a single river basin. The run-of-river projects in the Himalayas (projects without any storage or
pondage) can have serious impacts by disturbing downstream river flows. Some run-of-river projects
divert the water into tunnels, leaving downstream sections dry, and thus cause even more severe
impacts downstream.
CULTURAL IMPACTS
One of the most severe impacts of dam construction in the region, which will be particularly severe in
the Himalayas, will be on the culture and identity of the local people. The total population of these
tribes is small in number and hence they are excessively vulnerable to the influx of new settlers that is
likely to take place during the construction of such huge infrastructure projects, as staff and
construction workers will be largely constituted of migrant populations.
For example, in the lower Dibang Valley, the Idu Mishmi population is 11,021. According to the EIA of
the Dibang project about 5,800 workforce will come from outside. You can imagine how we will
become outsiders in our own lands. Our tribe has been declared as an endangered tribe by the United
Nations. Any attempts to resettle people of one tribe or clan into areas that belong to other tribes can
lead to ethnic tensions. The customs, traditions and the very character of local tribal communities are
closely tied to the lands, rivers, forests and other elements of the natural ecosystem. The construction
of the Talon/ Dibang dam will herald the end of the Idu culture and tradition as the river is as sacred to
us, as is the river Ganga to the Hindus.
Dam building in the Himalayas will also lead to the submergence of places of religious or historical
significance. The Shaligram Shila, a very important religious site for Hindus, now remains submerged
quite often due to the Kaligandaki project in Nepal. The Bhagirathi River is sacred in India and is
threatened by the number of projects planned on it. A huge treasure trove of rock carvings, dating back
from ancient times, has been found along the Indus where the Diamer-Bhasha reservoir is planned. All
of these will be submerged by the reservoir.
ECOLOGICAL IMPACTS
The Himalayas are recognized not only as a hotspot of biodiversity but also for their fragility.
Conservation International also says that of the estimated 10,000 species of plants in the Himalayas,
about 3,160 are endemic, as are 71 genera. Furthermore, five plant families are endemic to the region.
About 300 mammal species have been recorded in the Himalayas, including a dozen that are endemic.
SEISMICITY AND SEDIMENTATION
Much of the area in which the Himalayan dams are proposed is a high-risk seismic zone. This can have
severe implications for both the safety of the projects and the surrounding areas. WAPDA in Pakistan
rates the seismicity at the Diamer-Bhasha Dam site higher than at other project sites. In several places
in Arunachal Pradesh, fear of the colossal destruction and loss of life and property in the case of a dam

break haunts the people. Another possible threat from an earthquake is that the resultant landslides
and land-shifting could block rivers and create ‘quake dams’ – temporary dams created from earthquake
loosened debris – which could pose risks of catastrophic failure. The floods resulting from such dams
could have a cascading impact on the man-made dams with disastrous results. As a consequence of the
2008 Sichuan earthquake in China, ‘as of May 27, 2008, 34 lakes had formed in nine earthquakeaffected counties due to earthquake debris blocking and damming rivers.’
The problem of sedimentation in reservoirs is also going to be particularly severe in the Himalayas. The
Himalayas are young mountains and are highly prone to erosion. By 2004, the Tarbela Reservoir had
lost 28% of its gross storage due to silt accumulation, and the Mangla and Chashma reservoirs had lost
22% and 45%, respectively. The accumulation of sediment behind these dams also deprives
downstream plains of nutrients and silt deposits that have been the source of their fertility.
IMPACTS OF TRANSMISSION LINES
A unique feature of the Himalayan dams is that they are planned in areas that are far from major load
centres. Hence, these projects will require construction of long transmission lines, which will push up
the cost of energy from the projects. The transmission lines will require land and thus more people
could be displaced. Furthermore, as these lines will traverse through difficult terrain and fragile
ecosystems, they are likely to have significant impacts on the environment. Yet there seems to have
been little assessment of these impacts.
Projects in Nepal seem to be the only ones to explicitly mention the amount of land required for
transmission lines. As an example, the West Seti project plans to acquire 7 km2 (678 ha) of land for
transmission lines. The impacts from transmission line construction will be an important issue in
Pakistan, Nepal and Bhutan. A major impact will be felt in India in the Siliguri Corridor or ‘Chicken’s
neck’ – the area between Siliguri and Bidhan Nagar in West Bengal – which is the only connection from
the Indian mainland to the states in the northeast. This area is the only way to transmit power from
Bhutan to India, and from India’s northeast to the rest of the country; the transmission lines will have to
be bunched together here.
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS
Hydropower is often portrayed as an important weapon in the fight against climate change, claiming
that it produces very small amounts of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. However, it is now recognised
that big dams can be significant sources of GHGs, including methane. A study by Ivan Lima and
colleagues from Brazil’s National Institute for Space Research (INPE) show that the methane emissions
from Indian big dams contribute 18.7% of the total GHG emissions in India. This means that the claim
that hydropower is climate friendly is a myth.
DISASTROUS TRACK RECORD
While the social and environmental impacts of the proposed dams are likely to be severe, the record of
these countries of assessing, avoiding, mitigating or compensating for past big dam projects does not
inspire confidence. In Pakistan, the refugees of Tarbela Dam were not resettled or compensated
properly, even several decades after the dam was completed. The oustees from Bhakra Dam in India,
displaced in the late 1940s and early 1950s, are still fighting for proper rehabilitation. Indeed, the World
Commission on Dams (WCD) notes that in India over 75% of people displaced by big dams, have not
been rehabilitated and are impoverished.

One of the main justifications for big hydropower dams is that the export of electricity to India will bring
massive earnings and could wipe out the trade deficit with India of about 66 billion Nepali rupees ($957
million). Claims are made that the West Seti project alone will slash this deficit by 25% by exporting
electricity from this project. 66 billion trade deficit with India will be reduced by all of 0.45 percent.
Thus the claim that this project alone will take care of 25 percent of the deficit is a myth. The projects
are going to be built by foreign corporations with most of the capital coming from outside the country.
In India, prior to the reforms, electricity generated had to be sold to the government-owned State
Electricity Boards (SEBs), who were the sole distributors. The SEBs had a social obligation to supply
electricity to all sections of society, including those with low paying capacities like the poor and small
and marginal farmers. They did this using direct subsidies from the government and cross-subsidisation
among the various users. Distribution is now being opened up to the private sector, and the Open
Access policy means that the generator can sell power generated to anyone, including directly to the
consumer. After 7-10 years when capital is repaid, operating expenses are 11%, thus public companies
can sell the power at lower tariffs, private companies pay the shareholders the dividends and keep
electricity at market value.
‘on 4 august 1985...the terminus of langmoche glacier in the Dudh Kosi river Basin of Nepal collapsed
into Dig tsho glacial lake. The resulting displacement wave traveled along the lake, overtopped the
lake’s moraine dam and initiated a period of accelerated erosion that ultimately led to dam failure.
Initial discharge rates of the ensuing flood may have been as high as 2,000 m3/ second, with an average
discharge of 500 m3/second over 4 hours, draining a total volume of 610 million m3 of water... Five
people were killed and a small run-of-river hydropower scheme was completely destroyed shortly
before its commissioning. Environmental degradation was severe, with the loss of cultivated land and
destabilisation of valley sides and river channels for 90 km downstream.’
CLIMATE CHANGE
Climate change is likely to be the one phenomenon that will have the most serious implications for
dams in the Himalayas. It is likely to fundamentally alter the basic assumptions on which the dams are
planned – especially water flows – and has consequences for dam performance and safety. The entire
climate of the region, including rainfall, temperatures, and geographical phenomena such as erosion
and landslides, will change dramatically, and the region’s ecology, agriculture, economy and livelihoods
will also be affected. Yet, none of the dams being built or planned in the Himalayas has taken this
aspect into consideration. Climate change has introduced huge uncertainties in the basic parameters
affecting dam projects, and has made these projects unpredictable and financially risky.
According to the report ‘The Melting Himalayas’ by the International Centre for Integrated Mountain
Development (ICIMOD) in Kathmandu, much of the annual precipitation in this region falls as snow, and
the ‘snowfall builds up from year to year to form glaciers that provide long-term reservoirs of water
stored as ice.’
Significant portions of the river flows of Himalayan rivers come from these reservoirs through snow and
glacial melt. ‘The Melting Himalayas’ notes that the contribution of snow and glacial melt to the major
rivers in the Himalayan region ranges from less than 5% to more than 45% of the average flows. The

contribution in lean season can be much higher. For example, snow and ice melt contribute about 70%
of the summer flows of the main Ganga, Indus and Kabul rivers before and after precipitation from
summer monsoons. Also, the contribution of glacial melt to the tributaries, especially in the higher
reaches, could be much greater. On the Tibetan plateau the glacial area has decreased by 4.5% over the
last 20 years and by 7% over the last 40 years. One concludes that with a two degree Celsius increase by
2050, 35% of the present glaciers will disappear and runoff will increase, peaking between 2030 and
2050.
The IPCC believe the Himalayan system which is fed by the South Asian monsoon, will see increased
precipitation. As ‘The Melting Himalayas’ notes, ‘Intensification of the Asian monsoon is predicted by
most climate models. On a regional scale this could result in increase in precipitation. On the Indian
subcontinent, temperatures are predicted to rise between 3.5 and 5.5 degrees Celcius by 2100. An even
higher increase is predicted for the Tibetan Plateau (Lal 2002), although this is unlikely to impact
significantly on high altitude glacier ice loss.
If there is a conflict in allocation of water between different end-uses (as is possible in a multi-purpose
scheme), it is likely that the water needs of domestic use and irrigation will be given priority. Climate
change is likely to exacerbate water shortages and could shift the allocation of water away from
hydropower (where a conflict exists).
The frequency of glacial lake outburst floods (GLOFs) in the Himalayas of Nepal, Bhutan and Tibet has
increased from 0.38 events per year in the 1950s to 0.54 events per year in the 1990s. In Bhutan
twenty-four lakes were identified as potentially dangerous for glacial lake outburst floods.
Conclusion
Dramatic changes are likely to occur in the Himalayas that will affect the fundamental basis of the
proposed dams including the water flows, and yet there are many uncertainties in these predictions.
Building big dams – hugely expensive structures with massive impacts that concentrate valuable
resources in few locations – in the face of such uncertainties is possibly the worst course to follow. This
could also lead to massive financial losses as investments underperform and cannot deliver the planned
benefits.
Apart from importing electricity, several Indian dam proponents are calling for big storage dams to be
built in Nepal to control floods in the downstream Indian states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. Indeed,
some commentators in Nepal say that India is not interested in the electricity from these projects as
much as it is in the regulated releases of water to meet irrigation needs within its borders. It should be
kept in mind that some dams in Nepal and Bhutan – for example the 4,000 MW Sankosh Multipurpose
project in Bhutan - are likely to be an integral part of India’s ambitious Inter-Linking of Rivers project
that aims to build as many as 30 inter-basin transfer projects.
In 2007, the Affected Citizens of Teesta in Sikkim, India staged a relay hunger strike against the Teesta
Dams projects for more than 500 days.
The International Energy Agency’s ‘Statistics for Pakistan for 2005’ show that distribution losses were
25%. The World Bank says that in Pakistan ‘the transmission and distribution networks are over-loaded,
underinvested, and under-maintained, with technical and commercial losses significantly above the

norm. Reducing losses from such levels are generally more cost-effective measures for reducing the
demand-supply imbalances than adding generation capacity.’ In India T&D losses for the country as a
whole are estimated to be in the range of 35%–45%.’ One of the most fascinating examples of
alternatives emerging from people’s struggles around dams is that of Sulgaon Village in the
submergence area of the 400 MW.
The people living near the Maheshwar hydropower project on the Narmada River in India are strongly
opposing the project as a part of the Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA – Save the Narmada) movement.
Guided by experts from the Prayas Energy Group, Sulgoan citizens carried out a comprehensive survey
of energy consumption and energy sources in their own village. Based on this, they demonstrated that
using demand-side measures to conserve energy, along with local energy sources, mostly renewable
biomass, to generate electricity, they could not only meet their own energy and electricity needs, but
could also export significant amounts of it. Scaling this up could lead to a large source of sustainable
and renewable energy without many of the serious social and environmental disruptions that come
from other projects.
Himalayas store vast amounts of water, and with their high slopes, the fast-moving rivers present huge
potential for generating hydropower. India, Pakistan, Nepal and Bhutan have initiated massive plans to
build several hundred dams to realize this potential. These countries have growing needs of energy and
electricity, and some of them suffer from severe shortages and even crises. All of them face very real
and very difficult questions of how to meet these needs. Hydropower dams in the Himalayas are being
advanced as a solution to meet a substantial part of these requirements.
Yet there is little evidence to establish that big dams are the only, the best or the optimal solution to the
electricity question. In particular, while these projects will undoubtedly generate many thousands of
units of electricity, it does not follow automatically that they will help improve access to power for the
poor and the vulnerable sections of society. Indeed, the way the hydropower programs are structured,
the high cost of these projects, their long distances from load centres, privatization of many of them,
and incentives and tax breaks being offered to attract private companies, are all likely to result in high
costs of electricity and hence most of the benefits will accrue to sections of society with a high paying
capacity.
At the same time, the projects are likely to have huge social, environmental and cultural impacts,
impacts that will be especially harsh on locals, tribal people, farmers and others living in the remote
valleys of the Himalayas. These projects threaten not only livelihoods but often the very identity and
culture of these people. The downstream impacts of the proposed projects will also be serious, and
could be felt in areas from just downstream of the projects all the way to the plains and the deltas.
Projects are being pushed forward, unmindful of these social, environmental and cultural impacts,
impacts that have not been fully and properly assessed and are often downplayed. Of particular
concern are the cumulative impacts of what is likely to be the highest concentration of dams in the
world, in a region that is ecologically fragile.
Unfortunately, the people who will be most severely affected have had little say in the planning, design
and implementation of these projects, and even now have no place in the decision-making structures.
Similarly, social, environmental and cultural issues are not even important considerations in the

decision-making process let alone being on the same footing as financial and economic ones.
Against this background, climate change looms as a huge threat that is set to overturn the fundamental
assumptions, especially river flows, on which these projects are planned. The impacts of climate change
are likely to lead initially to high flows and extreme events – raising concerns of dam safety – and are
later likely to result in sharp drops in flows – raising questions about dam performance. The frequency
of catastrophic events like GLOFs is also likely to increase; further increasing risks to dam safety.
Sedimentation, already a bane for dams in the Himalayas, is also set to intensify. The big dam planners
seem to have adopted an ostrich-like attitude to the impacts of climate change on the Himalayan
region.
Pushing ahead such a massive dam-building program in the fragile Himalayan region without proper
social and environmental assessments and safeguards, and ignoring the likely impacts of climate change,
can have severe consequences. The recent devastation caused by the breach in the embankments of
the Kosi River in Nepal and the subsequent change of course that wreaked havoc with the lives of
millions of people is an indication of what lies in store if we undertake far-reaching interventions in
sensitive regions of the Himalayas without fully evaluating the possible consequences.
All of these things point to the need for a comprehensive review of the dam building program in each of
the river basins in the Himalayas. They call for evolving an alternative approach to meeting the pressing
energy and water needs in a manner that is just and sustainable. The recommendations of the World
Commission on Dams offer the best possible framework for this. The choices are not easy, and the
process will be difficult. The decisions lie with the people in the respective countries. Yet, just as these
countries claim the right to make their own decisions, they will have to grant the same right to local
people, those who will be most affected, to have a meaningful say in these decision-making processes.
And even as the interests of the local people need to be given a priority along with national interests,
the people of this region should remember that they are the custodians of a treasure that is the
common heritage of the entire world – the Himalayas.
International Treaties
Few EIAs have been carried out prior to large dam construction. Even if individual projects do have an
EIA the whole drainage basin has not been dealt with as a whole, as seen in coastal Shoreline
Management Plans. India and Pakistan negotiated and signed the Indus Water Treaty in 1960 and have
successfully implemented the sharing of the Indus Basin river waters since then. There is deep
resentment amongst many Nepali people with the rulers in New Delhi that stems from the feeling that
many of the bilateral water-sharing agreements have favored India.
The Berlin Rules on Water Resources (August 21, 2004) is a document adopted by the International Law
Association to summarize international law customarily to freshwater resources, whether within a
nation or crossing international boundaries. The document supersedes the earlier Helsinki Rules on the
Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, which was limited to international drainage basins and
aquifers.