Packard Dep. at 25. He was still experiencing “anxiety symptoms,” but reported no trouble

sleeping or eating. Id. Plaintiff told Dr. Packard he felt strange about not working, and that

there were “some jobs here he [could] have,” but that he was not “sure what he want[ed] to do.”

Id. Plaintiff also announced that he was “going to [the] Florida Keys with friends to go fishing

for a week in two weeks.” Id.

On February 8, 2002, McKenna sent plaintiff a three-paragraph letter which, in part,

scolded plaintiff for not returning the District’s telephone calls. That letter – a copy of which is

attached to the Savoiardo Declaration as Exhibit M – began:

Your building principal, Sam McAleese, advised me that you have
not been returning his phone calls. It is critical that we know the
periods of time for which you will be unable to perform the duties
of your job as a Social Studies teacher in the school district. It is
imperative that your doctor inform us of his prognosis as to when
you will be able to return to work. As you must understand,
continuity of instruction with the same teacher is of great
importance regarding the academic success of our students.

The remaining two paragraphs of McKenna’s letter proposed two possible accommodations,

If you are unable to return to work within a short period of time, I
would like to offer you the opportunity for a fixed term leave of
absence without pay through the end of the school year. That way,
we should be able to provide your students with continuity of
instruction for that fixed term of time. You are hereby directed to
call me regarding your interest in an agreed upon fixed term leave
of absence.

At the current time, it is our intention to ask the Board of
Education at their Regular meeting on Tuesday, February 12, 2002
to designate your absence from work as Family and Medical Leave
Act leave on an unpaid basis for the period of time commencing
February 13, 2002 for a period of up to 12 weeks. During the time
of such leave, you will be entitled to all medical benefits as if you
were on payroll.

Savoiardo Declaration, Ex. M.

Although plaintiff claims that he called McKenna on February 10, 2002, Petrone Aff. at

¶41 – the day after he receiving McKenna’s letter, id. at ¶39 – plaintiff does not represent that he

ever spoke to McKenna. Rather, plaintiff maintains that McKenna was unavailable when he

called, and that he did not call plaintiff back. Id. at ¶41. In addition, it is undisputed that

plaintiff never provided the prognosis which McKenna had demanded. Def. 56.1 Statement at

¶47; Pl. 56.1 Statement at ¶47.

According to plaintiff, he called the District shortly after the February 12, 2002, School

Board meeting to determine what had transpired. Petrone Aff. at ¶43. Plaintiff spoke to a

secretary, who informed him that he had been “placed . . . on extended medical leave.” Id.

Notwithstanding the fact that McKenna’s letter explicitly stated that McKenna would request

that the School Board grant plaintiff a leave of absence of up to 12 weeks, plaintiff apparently

believed that he had been placed on leave until the Fall. Def. 56.1 Statement at ¶52; Pl. 56.1

Statement at ¶52. Therefore, plaintiff thought it was no longer necessary to contact McKenna.

What he was most adamant about was the fact that he was not
informed as to whether or not [plaintiff] was coming back on a
certain targeted date . . . and that [plaintiff] couldn’t even tell him
when that would be. I think [McAleese] felt it was kind of fishy.

Id. at 125.

According to plaintiff, Lerner called him the day of his meeting with McKenna and

McAleese and said that McKenna and McAleese had demanded his resignation. Petrone Aff. at

¶¶45-46. Lerner stated that if plaintiff resigned, he would receive an additional ten paid sick

days and “full disability benefits.” Id. at ¶46. If he refused to resign and was terminated, he

would not receive any benefits. Id. at ¶47. However, Lerner himself did not think that plaintiff

would be terminated before he returned to school. As Lerner explained during his deposition,

“What would have happened was that if . . . and when John came back he would be observed and

would be found wanting in certain areas and, therefore, his days in Hampton Bays would have

been numbered.” Lerner Dep. at 167.

By Lerner’s account, plaintiff did not make an immediate decision on whether to resign.

Lerner and plaintiff had several conversations, during which they discussed the possibility of

filing a grievance and the hypothetical question of “What would happen if [he] came back.”

Statement at ¶¶55, 59. That three-paragraph letter – a copy of which is attached to the Savoiardo

Declaration as Exhibit O – begins:

After discussions with my union representative I understand that
you have agreed to issue me fifteen additional paid days (up to and
including winter break, February 5-February 25, 2002). I have
also been informed that I will be receiving disability benefits in
accordance with the district’s disability insurance policy effective
the second week of March (completion of 60 day wait period). In
addition I understand I will receive my full medical benefits until
September 01, 2002, after that date I will be entitled to an
additional 18 months of medical coverage under the COBRA law.
I also understand under the COBRA law that I must begin my own
medical contributions as of September 02, 2002.

Statement at ¶58; Pl. 56.1 Statement at ¶58. Plaintiff attributes the error to a miscommunication

between him and Lerner. Id.

The remaining two paragraphs of plaintiff’s letter made no allusions to coercion. Rather,

that letter states, in pertinent part:

As a result of my illness, and the unknown prognosis of a specific
recovery date, I must resign . . . effective September 01, 2002. It is
with great regret that I offer my resignation. It is my sincere hope
that with my current course of medical treatment, I will be able to
return to the educational field in the near future.

I thank you and the Board of Education for your understanding
during this very difficult time in my life. I sincerely regret the
inconvenience my unexpected illness has caused the district. I also
would like to express my sincere apologies . . . .

Savoiardo Declaration, Ex. O. Plaintiff now claims that these statements “did not accurately

reflect” his medical condition and his ability to teach at the time; that he “felt healthy enough to

return to work right around the time that [he] was forced to resign;” and that he drafted these

[D]uring our last phone conversation you had asked me to inform
you as soon as I knew when I could return to work. Since my
physician to this day cannot provide me with that information, I
was not able to even guess as to when I could return.

Id. After describing his ailments – his GAD and PD, as well as an intestinal fissure – plaintiff

concludes the letter by writing:

I decided along with consulting with Steve Lerner that getting
healthy should be my top priority. Despite my misgivings about
resigning from teaching in my first year, I felt that I would not be
able to give the kids my best effort in educating while
simultaneously battling these ailments. I sincerely hope you
understand my position.

Id.

In March 2002, McKenna appeared before the School Board in connection with

[P]laintiff bears the initial burden of proving by a preponderance
of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. The burden
of production then shifts to defendants, who must offer through the
introduction of admissible evidence a non-discriminatory reason
for their actions that, if believed by the trier of fact, would support
a finding that unlawful discrimination was not a cause of the
disputed employment action. Plaintiff then must show that the
proffered reason was merely a pretext for discrimination, which
may be demonstrated either by the presentation of additional
evidence showing that the employer’s proffer