There but for the grace of the USOC went San Francisco

In this photo taken on Thursday, July 16, 2015, an abandoned stadium used for baseball events during Athens' 2004 Olympic games is seen through weeds at the old airport of Athens. Now, in a bid to get a third European bailout, the ruling party has done an about face and is pledging to fast-track the waterfront project plus a host of other privatization efforts aimed at generating cash to help to reduce Greece’s 320 billion euros national debt.(AP Photo/Petros Giannakouris)

In this photo taken on Thursday, July 16, 2015, an abandoned...

The old joke about a boat owner is that the two happiest days of his life are when he gets it and when he unloads it. More than a few folks in Boston are feeling that way about the city’s aborted bid for the 2024 Olympics.

“Mercifully, our short regional nightmare is over,” the Boston Globe’s Dan Shaughnessy wrote, summing up a sentiment that was reflected in opinion polls leading to last week’s unceremonious dissolution of the bid.

So the question arises: Could this have been the fate of San Francisco, which until January had been in hot competition with Boston, Los Angeles and Washington to become the U.S. finalist for the Summer Games?

In a word: Possibly.

The ultimate deal killer in Boston was Mayor Marty Walsh’s refusal to guarantee that city taxpayers would serve as a backstop in the event of cost overruns or fundraising shortfalls. The U.S. Olympic Committee already had been growing nervous about groundswell of opposition, including a potential 2016 ballot measure to prohibit any state aid for the bid.

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San Francisco did not include a taxpayer-bailout pledge in its bid package, which was quite wise in view of past Olympic fiscal debacles, but it no doubt was a negative point with the USOC. If Mayor Ed Lee had been similarly jammed to put taxpayers on the hook, he almost certainly would have made the same decision as Walsh — or face a revolt that would interrupt his smooth path to re-election.

Leaders of the San Francisco 2024 were determined to do it the right way: privately raise the estimated $4.5 billion and make use of existing venues — with the notable exception of a temporary stadium for opening ceremonies — and demand no direct public subsidies.

They put together an impressive team with big-project experience and political savvy. One of the bid’s chief promoters was Larry Baer, the Giants president and CEO, who helped shepherd the approval and completion of AT&T Park, which showed the sports world that top-flight venues could be built without public money.

It’s hard to imagine that the all-star San Francisco team, with Baer and Olympic gold medalist Anne Warner Cribbs and venture capitalist Steve Strandberg in key roles, would have encountered the distrust and vitriol that engulfed Boston’s tone deaf and transparency-contemptuous bid organizers. As Shaughnessy wrote, “They shot themselves in the foot at every turn. They hired the wrong people. They failed to hire the right people. ... They kept telling us that the sun was shining when we were standing in the pouring rain.”

Boston also was put off by the arrogance and demands of the USOC, exemplified by a televised debate in which its representative suggested its townsfolk would need to “adjust” to the logistical and financial challenges that come with the privilege of hosting the Summer Games.

San Francisco would have been stuck with the USOC as partner in the dance to persuade the even notoriously pricklier International Olympic Committee to choose us over Paris; Rome; Budapest, Hungary, and other contenders two years from now.

The demise of the Boston bid instantly put Los Angeles back in play, with its array of Olympic-ready venues and history as a successful host. Surely the Olympic movement owes Los Angeles a debt of gratitude for taking on the 1984 Summer Games when they were regarded as such a headache — terrorism target (Munich 1972), fiscal debacle (Montreal 1976), boycott diminished (Moscow 1980) — that the only other bidder, Tehran, withdrew.

Under the guidance of Peter Ueberroth, the 1984 Games leveraged corporate sponsorships and broadcast rights to produce an impressive $232 million profit and invigorate global interest in hosting the Olympics.

They did not, however, put an end to the financial burden. Some hosts took it only willingly as a way to put their nation on the world stage (Seoul 1988, Beijing 2008, Sochi 2014) while others were victims of excessive expectations (Sydney 2000) or woeful management (Athens 2004).

This is no place to risk the public treasury.

Boston is feeling a sense of relief right now. So should San Francisco.

The investment: On being awarded the Summer Games, Mayor Jean Drapeau boasted, “The Montreal Olympics can no more have a deficit, than a man can have a baby.”

The hangover: This was one expensive baby. The 30 years it took to pay off the $1.5 billion debt became such a cruel joke that the Olympic Stadium was nicknamed “The Big Owe.”

Athens 2004

The investment: Spending for the Summer Games soared to almost 9 billion euros, or double the original budget.

The hangover:Greek taxpayers were left with a debt of 7 billion euros, not counting related projects such as a new airport and metro system. The deficit contributed to the nation’s fiscal downward spiral that continues today. Many of the costly venues built for the Games have been all but abandoned.

Sochi 2014

The investment: The original plan was to spend $12 billion for the Winter Games.

The hangover: The Russian government ended up shelling out more than $50 billion for the Olympics.

Lake Placid 1980

The investment: About $100 million was spent on facilities for the Winter Games, a decidedly modest sum by today’s standards.

The hangover: There were no miracles on the ledger sheet. A bailout from the New York Legislature was needed to pay creditors after organizers were left with an $8.5 million deficit.