This action brought by plaintiff under the Federal Civil Rights
Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983) seeks an award of money damages and an
order restraining the prosecution of certain criminal
proceedings presently pending against plaintiff in the state
court.

In her amended complaint*fn1 plaintiff alleges that on July
18, 1968 defendants Nyden and Jakubowski in their capacities as
deputy sheriffs of Cook County, Illinois, attempted to serve a
civil writ on plaintiff and pursuant to the writ attempted to
take possession of a television set. Plaintiff further alleges
that she refused to allow Nyden and Jakubowski to enter her
dwelling whereupon the deputies enlisted the aid of defendant
Rollin, a police officer of the City of Chicago. Officer
Rollin, according to the complaint, gained entry to plaintiff's
dwelling without plaintiff's consent and without legal
authority by physically forcing open the door leading to
plaintiff's apartment. Upon plaintiff protesting, Officer
Rollin then placed her under arrest. Upon her further
protestations, plaintiff alleges that Nyden and Jakubowski
squirted a liquid chemical substance in her face while Officer
Rollin subjected her to a physical search of her person. Nyden
and Jakubowski then removed the television set from plaintiff's
dwelling. Plaintiff was charged with interfering with service
of process in violation of a state statute*fn2
(Ill.Rev.Stat. C. 38 § 31-3) and with disorderly conduct in
violation of an ordinance of the City of Chicago (Municipal
Code § 193-1a).

Plaintiff further alleges that her conduct in resisting the
entry of the defendants into her residence was lawful and that
her protestations constituted a legitimate exercise of her
right of free speech as guaranteed by the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution.

Plaintiff further complains that despite the "clear legality"
of her conduct, defendants Stamos*fn3 and Simon in their
capacities as prosecutors for the County of Cook and the City
of Chicago respectively, have continued to prosecute plaintiff
with the charges of interfering with service of process and
disorderly conduct. Considering what she views as a "total
absence of evidence" of criminal conduct plaintiff alleges that
the continued prosecution is in bad faith and constitutes
further deprivation of her rights. Plaintiff has also filed a
motion for temporary restraining order, prohibiting her
prosecution. Plaintiff also challenges the adequacy of the
Illinois State criminal system and argues that the intervention
of this court is necessary to protect her rights under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution. Summarized, plaintiff's theory is that the
prosecution in the state court is in bad faith, and has a
"chilling effect" on her exercise of First Amendment rights as
she wants to continue "speaking out" against these defendants.
Furthermore, she alleges that her rights cannot be protected in
the state court because, "the state criminal system is grossly
inadequate in protecting plaintiff, an innocent citizen, from
groundless charges."

In answer to the complaint and the motion for a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction, certain
defendants have filed motions to dismiss. Essentially the basis
of the motions to dismiss are: (1) That the complaint fails to
state a claim under the Civil Rights Act; (2) That the doctrine
of Abstention requires this court to refrain from interfering
with the prosecution until the state court has had an
opportunity to determine the issues; and (3) That this court is
barred by the "Anti-Injunction Act" (28 U.S.C. § 2283) from
enjoining a pending proceeding in the state court.

The Cook County State's Attorney, on his own behalf and as
attorney for defendants Nyden and Jakubowski, deputy sheriffs
of Cook County, subsequently withdrew their motions to dismiss
the complaint and filed an answer, in effect, admitting that
the facts as pleaded in plaintiff's complaint, if proven, state
a claim for relief in the form of money damages against the
defendant deputy sheriffs. I agree, accepting the facts as
pleaded, that the complaint does state a claim under the Civil
Rights Act. Accordingly, all other pending motions to dismiss
the complaint are denied.

The State's Attorney, like the Corporation Counsel of the City
of Chicago, continues to oppose plaintiff's motion for
temporary restraining order stressing that such action in this
case is barred by the Anti-Injunction Act (28 U.S.C. § 2283). A
resolution of this question requires an analysis of section
2283, measured against the allegations in plaintiff's complaint
and motion.

In her motion plaintiff alleges that the charges brought by the
County and City are set for immediate trial in the Circuit
Court of Cook County. In her view, the crux of the criminal
charges is that she resisted the entry of the deputy sheriffs
and Chicago police officer when they sought to take possession
of the property named in the writ of replevin. Plaintiff
alleges that the service of the writ was not made in a manner
authorized by law because the deputy sheriffs did not inform
plaintiff of her right under the state Replevin Statute to file
a bond in double the amount of the value of the property if she
desired to retain possession. Therefore, plaintiff argues,
since the writ was illegally served, her resistance was not
unlawful under state law. Thus, she is innocent of the charges
brought by the County and City and in light of her alleged
innocence, any prosecution of her must be in bad faith and in
violation of the due process requirements of the United States
Constitution.

As above stated, plaintiff also alleges that the prosecution is
being continued to intimidate her from pursuing her right to
speak out against the alleged civil rights deprivations
inflicted upon her by certain of the defendants. For this
reason and because the state criminal system is, "grossly
inadequate in protecting plaintiff, an innocent citizen from
groundless charges", plaintiff argues that it is appropriate
for this court to intervene to protect her rights under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution.

Before discussing the arguments and authorities presented by
plaintiff in support of her motion for temporary restraining
order and the arguments and authorities presented by the County
and City in opposition, I offer some preliminary observations.
First, as I read plaintiff's motion and arguments, I am to
conclude that the prosecution of plaintiff is in bad faith and
in violation of the United States Constitution because
plaintiff is in fact innocent of the charges brought by the
County and City authorities. I must therefore determine that
innocence, or at least some probability of it, before I find
the requisite "bad faith." This, of course, involves an
interpretation and construction of the state statutes under
which the plaintiff is being prosecuted as well as the Replevin
Statute upon which her defense is partially based. Upon a
finding of innocence, I am then asked to determine that the
"groundless" state court prosecution inhibits plaintiff's right
to speak out against the defendants and that the state criminal
system is inadequate to protect her from groundless charges
such as these. For the reasons I shall discuss in detail, I
decline the invitation extended by plaintiff's motion to embark
on this pointless adventure.

The Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 provides:

"A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to
stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly
authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its
jurisdiction,
or to protect or effectuate its judgments."

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