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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 002809
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/19/2018
TAGS: PGOVPRELMOPSPHUMIZ
SUBJECT: ERBIL: S/A KRAJESKI MEETS WITH ANGRY KRG LEADERS
PREPARING FOR CONFRONTATION WITH PM MALIKI
Classified By: Classified By: RRT Erbil Regional Coordinator Lucy Taml
yn for Reasons 1.4 (b,d)
This is an Erbil Regional Reconstruction Team (RRT) reporting
cable.
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: KRG officials are frustrated with the
stagnation in the implementation of Article 140, dismayed
about recent Iraqi Army attempted deployments into Khaneqin
and other disputed territories, and fearful for their future
within a federal Iraq if the perceived anti-Kurd sentiment
growing in Baghdad continues to strengthen. During an August
24-28 trip to Erbil, Dohuk, and Sulimaniyah, Senior Advisor
Tom Krajeski met with KRG President Masu'd Barzani and other
senior KRG officials, all three governors, NGO
representatives, journalists, and representatives of minority
groups. President Barzani complained bitterly about PM
Maliki's growing power and ambition, and reiterated the KRG's
close ties to and dependence on the USG for support and
protection of their interests. NGO and journalists chafe
under KRG rule, but Kurdish popular support for uniting
Kirkuk and other disputed territories with the KRG remains
very strong. Religious minority representatives acknowledged
the improvements in their overall quality of life since the
fall of Saddam,s regime, but expressed a desire for
unification of and increased decision-making authority for
their (still disparate) communities. END SUMMARY.
¶2. Senior Advisor for Northern Iraq Thomas Krajeski,
accompanied by POLOff Joseph Cassidy and POLMILOff David
Howell, visited all three provinces of the KRG August 24-28.
He met with senior-level officials of the regional and
provincial government, political party leaders and religious
minority groups. He also met with representatives of the
independent media in Kurdistan Region. S/A Krajeski
reiterated USG support for the implementation of Article 140,
the USG,s desire for the successful passage of the national
Provincial Elections Law, the necessity of separating the
Kirkuk issue from the passage of the law, and the desire of
the USG for an equitable, peaceful and locally-generated
resolution on the status of Kirkuk. S/A Krajeski also
conveyed the USG desire for a reduction of military tensions
in Khaneqin district and increased diplomatic cooperation
between the GOI and KRG on the political administration of
the disputed areas.
GOI and KRG standoff in Khaneqin at Risk of Escalation
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶3. (C) In August 27 meetings with KRG President Masu,d
Barzani and KRG Chief of Intelligence Masrur Barzani, S/A
Krajeski voiced USG concern about recent confrontations
between the Iraqi Army and KRG Peshmerga forces in the
Khaneqin district of northern Diyala province. He said that
the status of the disputed territories should be determined
via political and diplomatic means, not through military
escalation. Both the KRG President and the KRG Intel Chief
responded by expressing grave concern over what they believed
to be the overreaching of the GOI into Kurdish areas, with
little regard for Kurdish authority or interests in the
disputed areas. KRG President Barzani has concluded that
Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki's recent actions in Khaneqin
underscored his growing "arrogance," and that Maliki's
intention is that Khaneqin be the first step in using force
to undermine the rights of the KRG as provided under the
Iraqi constitution. He believes that the GOI has no interest
in cooperating with the KRG as an equal partner within a
federal Iraq. KRG President Barzani stated that the only
acceptable way to determine the status of the disputed areas
is through the implementation of Article 140, and that until
there is a constitutional resolution to this issue, no Iraqi
army presence in the disputed areas would go unchallenged by
a KRG Peshmerga presence. The idea that Khaneqin was only
the first step by the GOI to encroach upon KRG autonomy was
shared by the KRG Deputy Prime Minister Omar Fatah, who
likened the current situation to a similar incident during
the Iraq-Iran War, in which Saddam negotiated with the KRG to
allow them to temporarily occupy Khaneqin due to its close
proximity to the Iranian border, but then took it back and
expelled Kurdish forces.
¶4. (C) On August 26, Senior PUK Politburo members Dr. Kamal
Fuad and Omer Ali Said highlighted the continued
counterterrorist cooperation between the KRG and GOI in
Diyala and elsewhere, indicating that the KRG considered it a
&sacred mission8 to work with GOI and MNF-I on
counterterrorism issues. The agreement between GOI and KRG
to coordinate before Iraqi Army forces entered any
problematic areas controlled by Peshmerga had been working
well before Khaneqin. The recent Iraqi Army actions there
were uncoordinated and provocative, with Iraqi forces
attacking the governor,s office in Diyala, killing his
BAGHDAD 00002809 002 OF 004
secretary and arresting other employees. While admitting
that a small (but not significant) Al-Qaeda presence existed
in Khaneqin, Kamal Fuad characterized the district as a
normally safe area, and suggested that Prime Minister
Maliki,s move into the district had less to do with
counterterrorism than to expel Kurds from the area. The GOI
was seeking unilateral authority to expel Peshmerga forces
from disputed areas, and this is "unacceptable." When the
Peshmerga went to these areas, Fuad said, the GOI was
informed and the purpose was to protect the areas. The
Peshmerga presence had been positive and there had been no
tension with any ethnic groups. The KRG was ready to
cooperate to fight terror, but if the purpose was simply to
expel Kurds, it would reject this; counterterrorism could not
be the justification for the expulsion of Kurds from disputed
areas. Fuad noted that the PUK and KDP leadership would
continue to coordinate closely on Khaneqin, suggesting an
unusual degree of party unity on this issue. Fuad said he
hoped that relations between the KRG and the GOI would
continue to develop positively and that the KRG hoped for no
escalation in Khaneqin, but stressed the message that the KRG
was prepared to defend its position militarily in Diyala if
provoked.
¶5. (C) Governor of Sulaimaniyah Dana Majeed told us of Prime
Minister Maliki,s decision to remove Iraqi Army troops from
around Khaneqin city and expressed hope that the move would
go far toward avoiding further escalation. Majeed judged
Maliki,s original decision to deploy IA to Khaneqin as
ill-conceived and criticized the Prime Minister for not
having weighed the consequences of his actions. Majeed noted
wryly the political precedent being created in Khaneqin,
suggesting that if demonstrations had proved to be a
successful means of driving the Iraqi Army out of disputed
areas, others would eventually follow suit. General Mahmud
Singawi, Deputy Commander of the PUK Peshmerga and President
Talabani,s Peshmerga representative, claimed that the Iraqi
Army was trying to destabilize Khaneqin, forcing a Peshmerga
withdrawal that would then create a free hand in the area.
General Mushen Bayuz, PUK Deputy Minister of Peshmerga
Affairs, agreed that the action in Khaneqin was a concerning
one that could lead to similar unilateral moves by Iraqi
forces in other disputed areas. Singawi had just returned
from Khaneqin before meeting with S/A Krajeski, having
visited to try and help calm the situation. The KRG,s goal,
he said, was to avoid escalation and to avoid war. Public
pressure, however, as a result of the unilateral Iraqi Army
move into the district and the August 26 explosion in Jalalwa
was mounting. All ethnic groups had participated in
demonstrations rejecting the Iraqi Army &occupation,8
Singawi said. &People are afraid. If we do not support
them, they may turn elsewhere.8
KRG Offcials Deeply Suspicious, Resentful of Maliki, Growing
Power of Baghdad
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶6. (C) Both KRG President Masu'd Barzani and KRG Intel Chief
Masrur Barzani expressed fears about the KRG's increasing
marginalization from key decisions concerning the future of
Iraq. Masrur noted that the most important positions within
the GOI have gone to friends of PM Maliki, while Kurds have
been relegated to ineffectual positions outside of the
&circle of influence.8 On this point, he pointed out that
all positions currently held by Kurds in the GOI are the
result of alliances formed between the Kurds and other
parties, and that &we are only Iraqis when the GOI wants
something from us, but we are Kurds and therefore separate
from Iraq when we want to be treated as equal partners with
the GOI and share in the administration of its government.8
In both meetings, they alleged double-standards in the
treatment of the Kurds as compared with other minority
populations in Iraq. Masrur highlighted Prime Minister
Maliki,s refusal to fulfill the promise that he made two
years ago to create two entirely Kurdish divisions of the
Iraqi Army as an example of discrimination against the Kurds,
noting that PM Maliki has already created two completely
Shi,a military divisions.
¶7. (C) Both the KRG President and the KRG Intel Chief voiced
their strong opinion that Prime Minister Maliki was making
unilateral decisions about the future of Iraq without
consulting the KRG and other key players in the GOI. KRG
President Barzani stated that, &It must be understood that
Maliki cannot exceed the rights given to him by the
constitution,8 and that Maliki was &behaving as a
dictator,8 forgetting that the KRG had entered into a
voluntary union with the GOI. The KRG President added that,
should Maliki continue to take KRG support for granted, he
would be forced to consider withdrawing the security support
assets that the KRG already provides elsewhere in Iraq. S/A
Krajeski responded by saying that this would cause relations
BAGHDAD 00002809 003 OF 004
between the GOI and the KRG to deteriorate further and would
not serve the KRG,s larger interests of, for the first time
in history, creating a secure and internationally-recognized
autonomous region for the Kurds. When Ambassador Krajeski
suggested that KRG President Barzani voice his concerns
directly to Prime Minister Maliki, the KRG President
demurred, saying he is not boycotting Maliki. (Note: We
learned later that Maliki had been refusing to take Masu'd's
calls, but that they finally spoke the night of August 29.
End note)
Status of Kirkuk remains a charged issue and Article 140
remains a sticking point
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶8. (C) Beginning with a meeting with Deputy Speaker of the
Kurdistan National Assembly Kemal Kirkuki, S/A Krajeski
stated the USG position that the most equitable and realistic
solution to Kirkuk is likely to come from the resident
population of Kirkuk, not from Baghdad, the UN, or any other
external entity. He also conveyed USG disappointment with
the linkage of the Provincial Elections Law to the Kirkuk
issue and expressed the USG hope that all parties involved in
Kirkuk be amenable to compromise in order to the facilitate
an equitable resolution in a timely fashion. He added that
decentralization was good for democracy and ultimately, for
formalizing the authority of the KRG, and that it was only
through the passage of the Provincial Elections Law that
decentralization could be codified. He noted the unique
opportunity for the KRG to, for the first time in history,
create an internationally-recognized autonomous region, and
expressed the USG hope that the KRG would not allow the
inability to compromise with the GOI on Kirkuk and other
issues to prevent the KRG from benefiting from that
opportunity.
¶9. (C) KNA and KRG interlocutors reiterated Kurdish support
for the passage of the Provincial Elections Law, but also
stated their position that the passage of the law should not
come at the expense of Kurdish claims to Kirkuk. KNA Deputy
Speaker Kerkuki, as well as KRG Deputy Prime Minister Omar
Fatah and the governors of Dohuk, Erbil and Sulaimaniyah,
spoke of the historical significance of Kirkuk to the KRG and
repeated their staunch belief that implementation of Article
140 was the only acceptable, equitable and constitutional way
to determine its political status and that of the other
disputed areas that the KRG has effectively administered for
the majority of its existence (including Khaneqin, Akre,
Faiyda and Halabja.) KNA Deputy Speaker Kirkuki spoke
negatively of the first round of UNAMI recommendations on
disputed areas. He also said that he and others were
increasingly concerned that the GOI was becoming more hostile
towards the KRG, that the GOI,s actions regarding Kirkuk and
Khaneqin were indicative of their desire to isolate the Kurds
and begin encroaching on their hard-won territory and power.
(Comment: Rhetorically, Kurdish officials move quickly from
complaints about Baghdad's growing power to expressions of
fear that Kurds will be targeted for extinction. In these
conversations, S/A acknowledged Kurdish fears but disputed
the characterization of Maliki as just another Saddam. End
Comment) To varying degrees, the Deputy Speaker,s views
were shared by other KRG officials, including KRG Deputy
Prime Minister Fatah. Fatah made it very clear that it was
not in the interest of any KRG official to recommend any
alternative to Kirkuk being a part of the KRG, saying that
anyone who did so would &be accused of treason.8 Both KNA
Deputy Speaker and KRG Deputy Prime Minister alluded to the
possibility that the people of the Kurdistan Region would
&rise up8 if Kirkuk were separated from the KRG, and that
they (the KRG leadership) would be unable to control them.
¶10. (C) Former PUK Deputy Secretary General and now reformist
outsider and media mogul Nashirwan Mustafa went further in an
August 26 meeting, saying that Kirkuk had long ago become an
emotional issue. He said, &We fought for eight years in the
name of Kirkuk,8 but also said that the Kurdish parties are
cynically taking advantage of Kirkuk as a diversion to draw
attention away from their own inability to provide basic
services and improved infrastructure. The recent low voter
registration turnout was a protest, he said, against an
ineffectual KRG leadership.
Relations with bordering countries
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶11. (C) On the issue of Iran,s activities in the region,
Nashirwan Mustafa indicated his belief that Iran was playing
a long and calculated game, using its wealth and links to the
Shi,a, in the south of Iraq to expand its influence in the
country. The nuclear issue was a matter of dignity for the
Iranians, he said, and urged the USG to continue its dialogue
and pressure in place of any military action against Iran.
BAGHDAD 00002809 004 OF 004
Governor Majeed, who was PUK representative in Iran from
2000-2003, offered his view that Iran was moving slowly and
quietly, having cultivated public Shi'a support in Iraq
through provision of services and through support of Shi,a
holy sites in Najaf and Karbala. Majeed believed that Iran
was attempting the same type of influence in Kurdistan.
Iran, he said, could become "like the USSR" if it was allowed
to complete its nuclear program, and Iraq would be "among the
first to surrender." Majeed urged the USG to continue
investment in Iraq,s security and economic viability as
effective checks on Iran,s rising influence and power in the
region.
Religious minorities find safety, sympathy in the KRG, but
are concerned about the future
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶12. (U) In various meetings with representatives of the
Assyrian and Yezidi communities, S/A Krajeski affirmed the
USG commitment to the security, economic development, and
political inclusion of the Christian and other religious
minority communities of Iraq. Representatives confirmed the
accommodations made for them within the KRG and called
themselves fortunate, relative to their co-religionists in
the rest of Iraq. That view was reinforced by the Governor
of Dohuk Province, Tamer Ramadan, who provided information
about the resources that the province has committed to
facilitate the return of religious minorities to their
ancestral homelands within Dohuk Province. However, both the
Yezidi and Assyrian groups expressed grave concern for the
safety of those members of their communities who do not live
within the KRG. In addition, the Assyrian community
expressed concern about their ability to protect their
interests, even within the KRG, without some form of
formalized political autonomy. The self-selected spokesman
of the Assyrian community, KRG Minister of Finance Sarkis
Mamendu, openly stated the community,s intention to pursue
formalized political autonomy. He expressed his belief that,
were he not in the position of leadership that he currently
occupies, no one in the KRG would be able or willing to
protect the advances towards self-determination that the
community has already made. When pressed for details on the
exact nature of the autonomous-yet-integrated relationship
the Assyrians sought with the KRG or with the GOI, KRG
Minister of Finance was unable to provide specifics. S/A
Krajeski responded by saying that the decision on whether to
create an autonomous Assyrian entity would be for Iraqis to
make, not the USG, but that it would be politically
controversial. He said the USG interest is in protecting
minority groups, whatever political jurisdiction they fall
under.
BUTENIS