Civil War Historic Markers Across Georgia

The Civil War in Georgia as told by its historic markers.

Battle of Ringgold Gap

Beginning on 1863/11/27 and ending 1863/11/27

After the battle of Missionary Ridge, Gen. Bragg´s Confederate Army retreated through the Ringgold Gap in disorder towards Dalton, GA. Brig. Gen. Patrick R. Cleburne was ordered to take position in the gap east of Ringgold and to hold back the Federals and save the Confederate trains and artillery from capture. Even though outnumbered 3 to 1, Gen. Cleburne successes in delaying Gen. Hooker long enough for the Confederate forces to reach safety.

Exercising his only independent command, Cleburne utilized the terrain and his well-trained troops, to hold up Federals pursuit for five precious hours. The trains and artillery were saved. By Joint Resolution, the Confederate Congress thanked Cleburne for his achievement.

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Pursuit Through Chickamauga Valley
November 26, 1863

Soon after daylight on November 26 Gen. Joseph Hooker (USA) tried to ascertain the whereabouts of the Confederate forces, his reconnaissance determined that Gen. Braxton Bragg´s (CSA) forces had retired from the field. The scouts reported that "the field was as silent as a grave." Satisfied that the Confederates were in full retreat he requested permission that he be allowed to pursue the Confederates in the direction of Graysville, Georgia, to try and intercept them. His request was approved and he was reinforced by Palmer´s (USA) Corps. [8]

By ten o´clock on the morning of the 26th, Gen. Hooker (USA) had issued orders and his command was pursuing the retreating Confederates on the road to Graysville, GA.[8]

My column was in rear of Osterhaus´ (USA) division, and was followed by Cruff´s division, of the Fourth Corps. We crossed West Chickamauga Creek, the infantry on a foot bridge and the horses swimming. The artillery was compelled to await the arriving of pontoons.

Along the whole route were evidences of the precipitate flight of the enemy; the smoke of his burning trains and supplies, hastily fired by him for want of time for removal, was visible upon all the routes. Our path was strewn with abandoned caissons and limbers filled with ammunition, broken wagons, tents, arms, accouterments, and camp equipage in profusion. He had destroyed all the bridges, the rebuilding of which somewhat delayed the pursuing column. We pressed his rear closely throughout the whole day. We passed bivouac fires, still burning, and at many of them captured numerous stragglers from his rear guard. I deployed detachments on the flanks, which fell upon a number of parties secreted, who were captured, in some instances, with slight resistance.

About dusk we reached near Graysville, and, while awaiting the construction of a foot-bridge over Pea Vine Creek, the advance made a dash upon the rear guard of Breckinridges command, with sharp firing, when my division was immediately formed in line of battle on both sides of the main road, and advanced. The skirmish ahead resulted in the capture from the enemy of three guns of Fergusons battery, artillerists, and a portion of the infantry support. One gun of this battery had been captured the day before in Rossville Gap.

The main body retreated rapidly without offering opposition. Having passed Pea Vine Creek and Chickamauga Swamp at 10 p. m., it was ascertained the enemy had forces on Pigeon Hills, just beyond, skirmishing having commenced with Osterhaus´ (USA) advance up the road. Creighton´s (USA) brigade was hastily moved to the front, doubled on Osterhaus´ (USA) column, and formed in line upon a road on the level below the hills, at right angles with the Ringgold road, their right resting latter.

Cobham´s (USA) brigade was drawn up in line in an open field, 300 yards to the rear. My skirmishers were immediately thrown to the front, scaled the hills, and the rebel rear guard was driven from the ridges.

The night was dark, the country difficult of travel, the deep stream of the East Chickamauga in advance of us, and we were within 4 miles of Ringgold, where the whole of Braggs army (CSA) would converge to pass through the gap on the route of the Western and Atlantic Railroad leading to Dalton. We bivouacked for the might at the foot of Pigeon Hills.
[9]

During the 26th, General Palmer's (USA) Second Division was pursuing the Confederates towards Chickamauga Station. They attacked the rear guard at Chickamauga Station, and captured stores, caissons, two siege guns, and other military equipment.[10]t

After covering the retreat of the Army of Tennessee from Missionary Ridge, Gen. Cleburne´s (CSA) division arrived on the west bank of the East Chickamauga River at 10 p.m. on November 26. General Cleburne reports that “at this point the river had to be forded. It was nearly waist deep in the nights freezing cold. I therefore determined to postpone crossing until the morning, and bivouacked on the hills nearby.”[11]

At 3 a.m. on the morning of the 27th Gen. Cleburne (CSA) received orders to take a strong position in the gorge of the mountains to attempt to check the pursuit of the enemy. Gen. Cleburne (CSA) rode ahead to examine the ground in the gap and to form a plan for its defense. He found the ideal place in Ringgold Gap. In his official report Gen. Cleburne (CSA) states that:[11]

The town of Ringgold, a place of 2,000 or 3,000 inhabitants, stands on a plain between the East Chickamauga River and the range of hills known as Taylors Ridge. It is on the Western and Atlantic Railroad, about 20 miles southeast of Chattanooga. Taylors Ridge, which rises up immediately back of the town, runs in a northerly and southerly direction. Opposite the town the ridge is intersected by a narrow gap, which admits the railroad, a wagon road, and a good sized creek, a tributary of the Chickamauga. The creek hugs the southernmost or left-hand hill as you face Ringgold. The wagon and railroad run close to the creek. At its western mouth, next to Ringgold, the gap widens out to a breadth of over 100 yards, leaving room for a patch of level wooded land on each side of the roads. The gap is about half a mile through, but the plain immediately in front of its east or rear mouth is so cut up by the windings of the creek that three bridges, or three fords, have to be crossed in the first half mile of road leading from the gap to Dalton. It will be perceived at once that this was a most dangerous position to be caught in if the enemy should succeed in turning either flank.

The gap and the hills on either hand are thinly wooded, except the base of the right-hand hill, along which, next to the town, a heavy fringe of young timber extends from the gap northward for 300 or 400 yards. Behind this fringe of trees I placed two regiments of Smiths (Texas) brigade, Col. H. B. Granbury, Seventh Texas, commanding; the Sixth, Tenth, and Fifteenth Texas (consolidated), Capt. John R. Kennard commanding, on the left; the Seventeenth, Eighteenth, Twenty-fourth, and Twenty-fifth Texas Dismounted Cavalry (consolidated), Maj. W. A. Taylor commanding, on the right; the remaining regiment of the brigade, the Seventh Texas, Capt. C. E. Talley (CSA) commanding, I sent to the top of the right-hand hill, with instructions to keep out of view but watch well the right flank of its brigade at the foot. On the precipitous hill to the left of the gap and creek I placed the Sixteenth Alabama, Maj. F. A. Ashford commanding, of Lowreys (Alabama and Mississippi) brigade, with instructions to conceal itself and guard well the left flank. I also sent on the face of this hill fronting Ringgold three companies of the Sixth and Seventh Arkansas (consolidated), of Liddell´s (Arkansas) brigade, under charge of Lieutenant Dulin, of General Liddell´s staff. For the defense of the gap itself, I disposed the rest of the Arkansas brigade, under command of Col. D. C. Govan: The Fifth and Thirteenth Arkansas (consolidated), Col. John E. Murray commanding, I placed in a small ravine running across the mouth of the gap from the right-hand hill to the railroad embankment; the Eight and Nineteenth Arkansas (consolidated), under command of Lieut. Col. A. S. Hutchison, 50 paces in rear and parallel to the former regiment; the Sixth and Seventh Arkansas (consolidated), under command of Lieut. Col. Peter Snyder, and the Second, Fifteenth, and Twenty-fourth Arkansas Regiments (consolidated), under Lieut. Col. E. Warfield, at suitable distances in rear and covered as well as the nature of the ground would permit, thus giving me four short lines across the gap. From these regiments I sent a body of skirmishers to occupy the patch of woods at the month of the gap and left of the railroad and that portion of the bank of the creek close to the month of the gap. In front of the mouth of the gap, supported by Govan´s foremost regiment in the ravine, I placed a section of Semple´s battery, two Napoleon guns, commanded by Lieutenant Goldthwaite. I had screens of withered branches built up in front of these, so as to effectually conceal them from view, and made the artillerymen shelter themselves in the ravine close by. The remaining three regiments of Lowrey´s brigade consisting of the Thirty-second and Forty-fifth Mississippi Regiments (consolidated), under command of Col. A. B. Hardcastle the Thirty-third Alabama, under command of Col. Samuel Adams, and the Forty-fifth Alabama, Lieut. Col. H. D. Lampley commanding. I placed in reserve in the center of the gap. The portion of Polk´s (Tennessee and Arkansas) brigade with me - consisting of the First Arkansas, Col. J. W. Colquitt commanding; the Second Tennessee, Col. W. D. Robison commanding, and the Third and Fifth Confederate Regiments (consolidated), under Lieut. Col. J. C. Cole. I ordered to fake position temporarily near the rear mouth of the gap with directions to observe my right flank and prevent the enemy from turning me in that quarter. [11]

See General Cleburne´s (CSA) full report on the action at Ringgold Gap.

At approximately 8 a.m., just as General Cleburne´s (CSA) men come into position, Union skirmishers began advancing on his position at Ringgold Gap.

Ringgold
8 am November 27, 1863

On the morning of November 27, Gen. Hooker´s (USA) command broke camp by 5:30 AM. Again Gen. Osterhaus´ (USA) division led the column, Gen. Geary´s (USA) division was in the center and Gen. Cruff´s (USA) division brought up the rear. The mounted infantry, under Capt. House (USA), supported by a line of éclaireurs and flankers, of the Seventeenth Missouri, John F. Cramer (USA) commanding, advanced rapidly over the very bad roads, and explored the adjacent hills and fields. [12]

At Ringgold, a screen of Confederate Calvary guarded both the ford and a Covered Trestle Bridge over the creek. When Capt. House (USA) and his twelve men arrived at the ford they charged the Confederate Calvary screen. The Confederates fired one round and retreated towards the town of Ringgold with Capt. House (USA) and his men in pursuit. Once the Confederate Calvary reached town they realized that only a small number of Union horsemen were pursuing them and they turned and drove Capt. House (USA) and his men back near the creek.[12]

During these maneuvers Col. J.F. Cramer (USA) urged his regiments, the Seventeenth and the Twenty-ninth Missouri, forward and secured the Covered Trestle Bridge over the creek before the rebels could set fire to it.[12]

With the crossing secured, Col. Cramer (USA)deployed his two regiments and drove the Confederate skirmishers, both horse and foot, from the town and into their mainline of resistance at the gap. While Col. Cramer's (USA) line of skirmishers was clearing the Confederates from the town, Gen. Woods (USA) received orders to deploy the Thirteenth Illinois and the Third, Twelfth and Thirty-first Missouri regiments on the line just vacated by Col. Cramer's (USA) advancing battalion.[12]

After his command crossed the Chickamauga, Gen. Woods (USA), commanding the 1st brigade, sent the Seventeenth and Thirty-first Missouri forward as skirmishers. They moved forward across an open field to the timbers at the foot of the slope and were they engaged Cleburne´s (CSA) skirmishers. Gen. Woods (USA) then sent the Twenty-ninth Missouri to support the Seventeenth and Thirty-first Missouri, but the whole line of skirmishers was driven back upon the Union mainline in confusion. They were not again entirely rallied until after the Confederates retreated.[4][14]Gen. Woods (USA) then sent the Thirteenth Illinois to the extreme right to some houses within 100 yards of the enemy artillery. He also sent the Seventy-sixth Ohio well to the left to the slopes of White Oak Ridge to flank the Confederates. In the center he sent the Twelfth and Third Missouri. [15]

During the advance, the right flank of the Thirteenth Illinois, became exposed to the Confederate artillery positioned in the mouth of the gap. Once the Union line was within canister range, the confederates opened fire. A rapid discharge broke the right of the Union line to pieces and caused them to run for shelter under the embankment.[13][14]

One portion of their forces moved straight forward down the railroad in column, while three regiments moved forward by a right-oblique as if to flank our left. These three regiments moved in line with the beautiful order and precision characteristic of well-drilled troops until they were distant not more than 300 yards. Meanwhile, the column on the railroad came slowly on until their advance was arrested by a solid shot from the left piece. Simultaneously a round of canister from the right piece was fired into the line which had marched opposite to our left. Then the left piece was quickly trained to the left and another round of canister from each was thrown into the same line. Owing to the high weeds and the smoke of the discharge, it was not possible to ascertain what, if any, execution had been done in the enemy´s ranks, but when the smoke of the second round had lifted, the ground upon which they had stood was abandoned. Five or ten minutes afterward their skirmishers were seen running up from a distance greatly in rear of the place to which they had first advanced. At no time after that did they move so large a force so close to us; but, sending their skirmishers forward, they were able to cause great annoyance, for one by one, stealthily and rapidly approaching, their sharpshooters gained the cover of the houses before spoken of.[14]

The left of the Union line continued to advance in the face of a deadly fire form Major Taylor's Texas regiments. Maj. Taylor (CSA) deployed his skirmishers up the hill at right angles to its line of battle, and held the Union forces in check. Maj. Taylor (CSA) sent word to Col. Granbury (CSA) of his situation. Col. Granbury (CSA) sent two companies of his left regiment to reinforce Maj. Taylor's (CSA) right. With three companies of his own regiment Maj. Taylor (CSA) charged down the hill upon the forces attempting to turn him, and routed it, capturing between 60 and 100 prisoners and the colors of the Twenty-ninth Missouri Regiment. Maj. William A. Taylor (CSA) describes the action:
[13]

About 9 a. m. the enemy advanced a heavy line of skirmishers. When within about 20 yards of my line of skirmishers, and on the right of the regiment, they were fired upon and the engagement commenced, our fire slightly checking their advance. The enemy, heavily re-enforced, advanced steadily and with the intention of flanking my right. Informing Colonel Granbury, commanding brigade, of this fact, I immediately withdrew Company K, Captain Manion, from the front, and ordered First Lieutenant Basye, Company E, to take his position; ordered Captain Manion to deploy his company a little in advance and at right angles with the regiment, and ordered Captain Speir, Company B, to support him. The enemy being close upon my flank, rapid firing soon commenced, which told with terrible effect upon the enemy, owing to the coolness and the accuracy of the aim and the bravery of the men. Seeing the enemy again heavily re-enforcing, I ordered Captain Marsh, Company I, to deploy his company, take command of the skirmishers, to advance, and drive the enemy back, which he did, charging them with a shout in gallant style, routing the enemy and driving them back in confusion, killing quite a number, capturing a stand of colors (Twenty-ninth Missouri), and between 60 and 100 prisoners, among them a number of officers. [16]

General Osterhaus (USA), seeing that the confederates where moving to re-enforce their position on the top of Taylor Ridge, ordered the Ninth and Twenty-first Iowa to support the Fourth Iowa and the Seventy-sixth Ohio. He retained the Thirty-first Iowa in reserve, but did deploy two companies as sharpshooters on the left of Colonel Cramer´s (USA) skirmishers and to cover the ascending battalions. [12 e] As the 29th, 109th and the 119th Pennsylvania of the second Brigade of Brigadier General John W. Geary (USA) Division, commanded by George A. Cobham, Jr. (USA), moved to the stone depot, they were ordered by General Hooker (USA) to take position in a small piece of scrubby woodland and bushes on the right of the depot and beyond the railroad, directing them to lie down and to not fire a shot until the enemy came within a short range.[17]

General Osterhaus reports that:

During all these movements the enemy kept up a most galling fire of artillery and musketry along the whole line, to which our infantry replied most vigorously and without yielding any of the ground they gained inch by inch. The enemy´s artillery was placed at very short range in the gap, and partly masked by undergrowth and young pine trees. He fired mostly shell and canister.

Strengthening Colonel Cramer (USA) by skirmishers from the Twelfth Missouri Infantry, I sent orders to that officer to push the left of his line well forward, and at the same time ordered the Thirteenth Illinois Infantry (which held the extreme right) to advance rapidly over an open field to a few houses in front. By these movements I concentrated a converging fire on the enemy´s artillery, which I hoped to secure, by driving off the cannoneers and supports.

The Thirteenth Illinois Infantry executed the order in magnificent style; they charged through a hail-storm of balls, and gained the position assigned to them and held it, although the rebels poured a most murderous fire into these brave men from the gorge in front and the hill on the right.

Seeing their artillery, and with it the key of their position, threatened, the enemy rallied a strong force and dashed from the gorge and down the hill with great energy** [Maj. Taylor´s charge]. He succeeded in driving in my skirmishers, who fell back on my second line (deployed behind the railroad embankment). This assault of the enemy was promptly checked by the Third, Twelfth, and Thirty-first Missouri Infantry regiments, whose well-directed volleys drove the enemy immediately back again, leaving their dead and wounded on the ground, which was at once re-occupied by a line of skirmishers. The Thirteenth Illinois remained undaunted, keeping up a vehement fire.[12 f]

At about the same time as the 1st brigade fell back from the top of White Oak Ridge, the 2nd Brigade, commanded by Col George A. Cobham, Jr. (USA) arrived at the stone depot. As the union forces fell back under the pressure of Maj. Taylor´s (CSA) charge, the 2nd brigade of was ordered to move to the right of the stone depot.[34] Brig. Gen. Geary (USA) reports that:

Cobham was sent to his [General Osterhaus] support, and, moving upon the double-quick, crossed the railroad under severe fire, and took position in front on a mound to the left of time railroad and gap, facing the ridge. The impetuous advance of the rebel line was checked and hurled back toward the ridge, and sharpshooters were sent out to operate against those of the enemy who, in large numbers, were active in our front, and the men were ordered to lie down.[34]

The 2rd Brigade of Brigadier General Geary´s (USA) division, commanded by Col. David Ireland (USA), arrived in Ringgold at about 10 am. They marched through town and took shelter in the lee of the stone depot. At about 10:40 AM Ireland's (USA) brigade received orders to move up Taylor's gap to relieve some regiments of Gen. Osterhaus´ (USA) division which were being hard pressed by the Confederates. Col. Ireland (USA) immediately ordered the brigade forward at the double quick, to arrive at the front the brigade had to cross an open field and was subjected to a murderous fire of musketry and artillery from the Confederate line. The brigade moved in perfect order and rank even though they met a large numbers of Union troops running to the rear in disorder.[18]

After crossing the field the brigade marched along the banks of Chickamauga Creek until their right reached an old barn at the gap. The brigade formed with the Hundred and forty-ninth New York on the right, then the Sixtieth New York, Hundred and second New York, and the Hundred and thirty-seventh New York on the left. Once the brigade had arrived in position on the banks of the creek, Lieut. Col. Randall (USA) threw five companies of 140th New York behind the barn, and the balance of the regiment along the creek. These men were subjected to a galling fire from sharpshooters secreted up Taylor's Ridge and from Semple´s Battery (CSA) in the gap. Col. Randall (USA) selected a few good sharpshooters and instructed them to shelter themselves and watch the artillery men and the sharpshooters of the enemy, and on no account to waste their ammunition or exposed themselves. He then strengthened the position by constructing a breastwork from an old wagon that had been filled with rails. While moving into these positions the enemy fired canisters of grape shot at the barn and although splinters flew in every direction no one was injured. The other regiments of the brigade were not heavily engaged. Although they were under heavy fire, Gen. Ireland (USA) repeatedly ordered them not to waste ammunition or expose themselves. The brigade held this position from about 10:40 AM until twelve noon, about which time Union artillery opened fire on the Confederates.[18]

From his position in the gap Lieutenant Goldthwaite (CSA), commanding the Confederate battery watched as the third brigade moved into position on their left, he reported that the fire from the Union Forces was at many times accurate, but few of his men were hurt because of a the protection afforded by slight ravine which they ran to when they were not firing. Having only two chests of ammunition, Lieut. Goldthwaite (CSA) did not deem it advisable to fight men singularly or in groups of two or three, but preserve his ammunition and his last canister for a larger force. Lieut. Goldthwaite (CSA) describes what happened next:[19]

In this I was fortunate, for after their sharpshooters had been for some time firing without being able to provoke a reply, except from the infantry upon our left, taking courage from the silence of the pieces, about 300 probably a portion of the three regiments which had been driven back by the first fire and had sought the houses for protection suddenly springing from behind the houses, made a rapid, daring, and determined dash as if to gain the clump of woods which was immediately upon our left, and from which our infantry had been harassing them with a steady, galling fire. These 300 had gotten within 75 or 60 yards, when both guns were fired into them, one loaded with solid shot, the other with canister. They were driven back, leaving their flag and some of their men upon the ground; nor did they, while our troops held that part of the field, make any effort to regain the flag or carry off the bodies of their comrades. They could not be driven from the houses, for ammunition was too scarce to be fired away without some effect. Three times, however, farther back, they endeavored to cross the railroad, and each time retreated as we fired. Indeed, so discouraged and dispirited were they by their defeat in every quarter that at one time, when attempting to cross, the mere sight of the piece and the cannoneers training it upon them (for the mask of brush had been blown away) made them break in confusion. At last they did succeed in moving over a force which, threatening our left, made it advisable that the pieces should be retired. Although exposed to a very sharp fire, they were taken to the rear without loss. Only 2 men were wounded in the battery in this fight, which slight loss I attribute to the bush in front, which greatly concealed the cannoneers when firing; to the ravine in rear where they sought protection when not firing, and to the annoying fire of our infantry.[19]

At about 12 noon Gen. Cleburne (CSA) received a dispatch from Lieut. Gen. Hardy (CSA) that the Confederate train was now well advanced and that he may safely withdraw. General Cleburne (CSA) consulted with Generals Breckenridge (CSA) and Wheeler (CSA), of who were present lending their personal assistants, and plans were made to withdrawal from Taylor's Ridge and take up a new position on some wooded hills one mile in the rear. At 1 PM the Confederate forces rebuilt the screen in front of the artillery that had been partially blown away and began withdrawing both pieces by hand without loss.[20]

Soon after 2 PM Gen. Cleburne (CSA) began withdrawing his skirmishers, fired the bridges to his rear and proceeded to form a new line of battle in the position to their rear. He reports that the enemy was visible on the Ridge about half an hour after he had withdrawn the skirmishers. [20]

White Oak Ridge
Confederate right

Gen. Osterhaus (USA) ordered the Seventy-sixth Ohio, commanded by Maj. Willard Warner (USA), to proceed to the left of the Ringgold Gap and to scale the ridge to try and flank the Confederates deployed along the Ringgold Gap. Maj. Warner (USA) moved steadily up the mountain, which was high and steep, with a strong line of skirmishers well to the front and met little opposition until it neared the summit. [42] The Fourth Iowa, commanded by Lieut. Col. George Burton (USA), was ordered by Col. J.A. Williamson (USA) commanding the second brigade, to support the Seventy-sixth Ohio in its attack on the ridge. Col. Burton (USA) had been ordered to move by his right flank in the center of the regiment for the purpose of supporting the Seventy-sixth Ohio. On arriving halfway up the ridge, Major Warner (USA) of the Seventy-sixth Ohio requested that the Fourth Iowa follow in his immediate rear. Maj. Burton (USA) reports that: [22]

I brought my regiment into line immediately in his rear, still moving steadily forward. When near the crest of the hill, the men of both regiments, from the steepness and ruggedness of the ground and the heaviness of the enemy´s fire, being somewhat deployed, the regiment was ordered to fix bayonets, and charge in line with the Seventy-sixth. The order was gallantly obeyed; the crest of the hill was taken and held for about ten minutes, when the enemy, being in heavy force, rallied in our front and charged upon our right and left flanks simultaneously, at the same time pouring upon us a heavy direct and enfilading fire. Under these circumstances, having no support, we were compelled to fall back about 30 yards down the hill, where we succeeded in holding our position until re-enforcements arrived. [22]

The Seventh Texas, Capt. C. E. Talley (CSA) commanding, was sent to the top of the right-hand hill, with instructions to keep watch on the Confederate right flank. [11][23] As soon as Capt. Talley (CSA) reached the top of the hill he threw out skirmishers to the right, and then he scouted the terrain, to his left and right, for the purpose of gaining an accurate knowledge of the position. When he returned to the regiment, and while preparing to place vedettes along the front of the hill, Lieutenant Adams (CSA), who was in front, discovered that a party of three of the enemy had succeeded in very nearly reaching the top of the hill by sheltering themselves behind the timber and rough ground. They were ordered to surrender, when two of the men attempted to escape, the Confederates opened fire, killing one and wounding and capturing another. The third (a first lieutenant, Seventeenth Missouri) was also captured and sent to the rear. Capt. Talley (CSA) then threw out Companies A and D, as skirmishers, along the hill in front. At this time a body of troops (First Arkansas Regiment – CSA) moved up and took position some distance to the right of the Seventh Texas. [24]

Gen. Cleburne (CSA) had ordered Gen. Lucius E. Polk (CSA) to form his brigade in the gap along the road running to the rear and to maintain communication with the Seventh Texas on the ridge. Deployment of the brigade was completed by 9:00 a. m. and Gen. Polk (CSA) proceeded to the top of Taylors Ridge to see the commanding officer of Seventh Texas Regiment. Before arriving there he met a straggler, who told him the enemy were crossing Taylors Ridge to the right of General Cleburne´s (CSA) position. Gen. Polk (CSA) immediately ordered the First Arkansas Regiment to the top of the ridge. Arriving in column at the top of the ridge, the First Arkansas found the skirmishers of the Federal´s within 20 steps of the top of the ridge on the side facing Ringgold. Firing commenced before the First Arkansas had formed line of battle and continued during the entire time of bringing the regiment into position. After a stubborn contest for some half hour, The confederates succeeded in driving the Federal forces back to the foot of the ridge, where they immediately formed, and being heavily re-enforced, commenced to move up the hill again. [25]

Seeing the Union forces moving to his right, Gen. Cleburne (CSA) sent word to Gen. M. P. Lowrey Lowrey to shift his forces to the top of the ridge to hold the confederate right. Gen. Lowery reports that:

I moved my brigade at once by the right flank, and after ascending the hill I heard firing several hundred yards to the right, and, leaving a staff officer to bring up the command, I went in haste to see what it meant. I found the First Arkansas Regiment engaging the enemy´s skirmishers, who had already gained the top of the hill. After assuring this regiment that support was at hand, and directing them to hold their position, I hastened to the head of my brigade, which was coming up the ridge at a double-quick with the right flank to the enemy, and the bullets from the enemy´s guns already flying down the line, I know that nothing but the most prompt and rapid movement could save the position, and that I could not take time to put the whole brigade in position before moving upon the enemy. Hence, on reaching the head of the column, composed of Hawkins´ sharpshooters and the Thirty-second and Forty-fifth Mississippi Regiments, I commanded, by company into line, and deployed the column on the tenth company, continuing the movement to the front with all possible rapidity at the same time. I sent Lieutenant Hall, my aide-de-camp, to bring up the next regiment in the same manner, and I went with the first to their important work, and nobly did they perform it. Our spirited fire, the sight of re-enforcements, and a terrific rebel yell combined to strike terror to the foe, and he fled in confusion. [26]

Brigadier-General Lowrey gave the command, by company into line, and then, on the tenth company deploy column, and move rapidly forward, obliqueing to the right, and take position on the crest of the ridge to the front, which movements were executed rapidly, and under a hot fire of the enemy at short range, and, from the fatigue occasioned by the toilsome ascent of the steep ridge, some little confusion occurred, and the four right companies formed on the right and the remainder of the regiment on the left of the First Arkansas Regiment.[27]

Finding that the two regiments that he sent up the ridge had met stubborn resistance, Col. Williamson (USA) ordered the Ninth and Twenty-six Iowa regiments to support the Fourth Iowa and the Seventy-sixth Ohio on the ridge. The Ninth Iowa, commanded by Col. David Carskaddon, and the Twenty-sixth Iowa, commanded by Col. George A. Stone (USA), moved up on the right flank of the positions held by the Seventy-sixth Ohio and a Fourth Iowa before regiments maintain the disposition through the remainder of the morning even though they were subjected to a severe and galling fire. [28]

The remaining two regiments of Col. Williamson´s (USA) brigade, the Twenty-fifth and the Thirteenth Iowa, moved to the left of the four regiments on the side of the ridge. The Twenty-fifth and the Thirteenth Iowa were able to get within about 75 paces of the summit when three regiments of the Twelve Army Corps passed by the left flank of the Twenty-fifth and another passing between the Twenty-fifth and the Thirteenth. Even though these regiments were ordered and begged by Col. Stone (USA) to go up on his left the officer in command said they had orders to do as they did and persisted in their course.[29]

To meet this threat, Generals Polk (CSA) and Lowery had to shift their forces to the right. As the First Arkansas Regiment moved to their right, the Thirty-second and Forty-fifth Mississippi Regiments which had formed on each side of the First Arkansas, were now able to consolidate. Col. Hardcastle reports:

In about three-quarters of an hour the First Arkansas Regiment moved to the right, and I then formed my left on the right wing, and reformed my regiment in good order while subject to a heavy fire from the enemy.[27]

Gen. Geary´s (USA) division entered the town of Ringgold at approximately 8 o'clock,. They marched through the town quickly while under fire from the ridge beyond and several of the men were wounded. Gen. Geary (USA) then received orders from Gen. Hooker (USA) to send a brigade to the left of Gen. Ousterhaus, and for them to “scale the mountain, gain the summit, and if possible to attack the enemy in the flank, and to charge with vigor along the ridge”. Gen. Geary (USA) immediately dispatched to Creighton´s brigade. They quickly formed about three quarters of a mile from the gap, parallel to the railroad, two lines en echelon, the Sixty-sixth Ohio and Twenty-eighth Pennsylvania in front, and the Seventh Ohio and the One-hundred and forty-seventh Pennsylvania 100 yards in the rear. [30]

Col. Charles Candy describes the actions of the 1st brigade:

The brigade moved at daylight next morning (27th) and marched to Ringgold, Ga. Upon arriving at that place, the enemy was found to have taken up a strong position on Taylors Ridge, and General Osterhaus´ (USA) division was skirmishing with them. Orders were received soon after from General Geary (USA), commanding division, in person, to move to the left of the town, and from that point to charge up the ridge and drive the enemy from it, supposing that they were holding it with a small force. The brigade was moved accordingly to the point designated and formed in two lines, in the following order: Sixty-sixth Ohio and Twenty-eighth Pennsylvania Volunteers in advance, and the Seventh Ohio and One hundred and forty-seventh Pennsylvania Volunteers in the second. They were then moved forward toward the ridge, under a heavy fire of musketry. When the brigade had arrived at the foot of the ridge the second line was moved by the left flank, in order that the line might be extended, and to prevent the enemy from concentrating too heavy a fire on the brigade at any one point, and cause them to extend their lines also, and thereby weaken theirs in our immediate front, and to prevent us from flanking them and to enable us to carry the hill, but the enemy re-enforced his lines with fresh troops and had double our numbers to oppose us.

The brigade moved steadily forward under a most galling fire. They did not return the fire until they had ascended half the distance, when our men opened on them, but were very weak from climbing, the mountain side being very steep. Some of the men almost gained the top, but were soon driven back by overpowering numbers.[31]

Seeing the Union forces continuing to move to the Confederates´ right, Gen. Polk (CSA) to move his defending regiments to the right, sent orders for the Fifth Confederate Regiment to move up to the top of the ridge. By moving to the right, the confederate left was now only guarded by a line of skirmishers. In his official report, Gen. Polk (CSA) states:

After a considerable delay, about 12 m., the enemy commenced moving a column rapidly by the left flank on a road running some 200 yards from the foot of the ridge. I again moved by the right flank and watched their movements. Having moved by the left flank some half mile, the enemy by a rapid movement threw their line in a column of regiments and advanced up the hill. They were again met by the same stubborn resistance that before repulsed them. General Lowrey coming to my assistance with one of his regiments, I had it moved in rear of my line until the enemy had advanced within 40 yards of my line, when I ordered it up in line with First Arkansas Regiment, and at the same time throwing Second Tennessee down the hill upon the left flank of the enemy, they were again driven back to the foot of the hill in great confusion. [25]

General Lowrey also describes the action:

The Thirty-third Alabama Regiment was soon brought up and formed on the left of the Thirty-second and Forty-fifth Mississippi, and the Forty-fifth Alabama on their left, while Brigadier-General Polk (CSA) came up with two regiments and formed them on the right. The enemy, in the meantime, was pressing up the hill with great, determination, but the heavy fire from our advantageous position rendered their ascent impossible. But as they continued to move to the right, it was necessary for our line also to move to the right and to leave a bare line of skirmishers to hold the crest of the hill on the left. When Brigadier-General Polk (CSA) was severely pressed, he sent to me in great haste for assistance, when I moved the Forty-fifth Alabama Regiment in double-quick to his support, and the general said as his ammunition was nearly exhausted they were just in time to save the position. When my ammunition was nearly exhausted and I had sent for more, my men and officers gave me assurance with great enthusiasm that they would hold the position at the point of the bayonet and with clubbed muskets if the enemy dared to charge them. The position was held until I was ordered to retire from it, which was done in good order. [27]

Col. Charles Candy decrips the event:

The men sheltered themselves behind trees and rocks as much as possible, they being unable to move forward. It was as much as a man could do to climb the mountain without any opposition, let alone in the face of double his own numbers pouring down heavy volleys of musketry on him. The men held their ground with coolness and determination. The Seventh Ohio Volunteers ascended the mountain on the side of a ravine, and were moving rapidly up, when the enemy threw a force on both sides of it, and poured a heavy enfilading fire on them. The regiment received this fire unflinchingly, pressed on until their brave leader (Lieut. Col. O. J. Crane) was struck mortally, while gallantly leading his men, and had lost all their commissioned officers in killed and wounded, and a greater part of the regiment, when they were compelled to fall back by overpowering numbers of the enemy.

The One hundred and forty-seventh Pennsylvania Volunteers, being on the left, had gained a position near the top of the ridge, and were well protected by a ledge of rocks about the height of a man´s head, but the enemy at the same time that they had forced the Seventh Ohio back, threw a force on both flanks of this regiment, and were throwing a force down the side of the mountain, when the commanding officer (Lieut. Col. Ario Pardee, jr.) of the One hundred and forty-seventh Pennsylvania Volunteers, seeing the Seventh Ohio falling back, and the enemy coming in on him, thereby making his position untenable, fell back slowly and in good order to the foot of the mountain, and prepared to resist any attack that might be made on the flanks. At this time that brave and accomplished officer, Col. William R. Creighton, fell mortally wounded in the attempt to rally the men of his regiment at the foot of the ridge, when the command devolved on myself[† 2]. The regiments on the right had maintained their position on the side of the mountain, skirmishing with the enemy, but could gain no ground, and many of the men out of ammunition. Seeing the condition of affairs, I proceeded to have the scattered portions of the brigade collected on the railroad. I reported the condition of things to the general commanding, when I received orders to form the brigade on the main street of the town, and ordered those regiments that were on the side of the mountain to rejoin the brigade, they having reported themselves entirely out of ammunition and unable to maintain their position without serious loss. [32]

In his official report, General Cleburne (CSA) sums up the last skirmish on top of the ridge:

A peculiarity of Taylors Ridge is the wavy conformation of its north side. The enemy, moving up in a long line of battle, suddenly concentrated opposite one of the depressions in this wavy surface and rushed up it in heavy column. General Polk (CSA), with the assistance of General Lowrey, as quickly concentrated a double line opposite this point, at the same time placing the Second Tennessee in such a position as to command the flank of any force emerging from it. The attack was again defeated and the enemy hurled down the hill, with the loss of many killed on the spot, several prisoners, and the colors of the Seventy-sixth Ohio Regiment. The colors and most of the prisoners were captured by the First Arkansas.[33]

Taylor´s Ridge
Confederate left

Gen. Cleburne´s (CSA) left flank was held by the Sixteenth Alabama, of Govan´s brigade, commanded by Maj. Frederick A. Ashford. The Sixteenth Alabama was placed at an elevated point on the top of Taylor´s Ridge on the road leading from Tunnel Hill to Ringgold. Three companies of the Sixth and Seventh Arkansas infantry regiment, commanded by Lieut. Col. Peter Synder (CSA), were deployed as skirmishers between the Confederate mainline of defense in the gap in the Sixteenth Alabama on top of Taylor´s Ridge. Lieut. Dulin (CSA) was placed in command of the three companies gaurding the slope of Taylor´s Ridge.[34][35]

At about 10:40, Col. Ireland´s (USA) brigade moved from their position behind the stone depot and advanced along the left of Chickamauga Creek. Major Ashford (CSA), from his position on top of Taylor´s Ridge, watched the movements of Col. Ireland´s (USA) brigade. Major Ashford (CSA) advanced a company of skirmishers and assisted in driving Col. Ireland´s (USA) Federal forces back. As soon as the engagement became general on the right of the Sixteenth Alabama, Major Ashford (CSA) then advanced two more lines of skirmishers and moved the remainder of his company over the crest of the hill, as if intending to attack and if possible to create a diversion in his direction. [18][35]

Brig. Gen. Walter C. Whitaker´s (USA) second brigade, of Brig. Gen. Cruft´s (USA) division, which was held in reserve until late in the morning received orders from Gen. Hooker (USA) to reconnoiter the peak of Taylor's Ridge. Gen. Whitaker (USA) ordered the Ninety-ninth Ohio, commanded by Lieut. Col. Cummins (USA), to perform the reconnaissance. The regiment charged up the hill, but when its skirmishers were about one third of the way up, the regiment was ordered back. By the time the Ninety-ninth Ohio made this charge up Taylor´s Ridge, the Confederates had already begun their withdrawal.[36][37]

Palmer´s (USA) XIV Corps.

Of the three divisions commanded by Maj. Gen. John M. Palmer (USA), XIV Corps, Army of the Cumberland, only the first division saw action at Ringgold. The second division commanded by Brig. Gen. Jefferson C. Davis (USA) was on the road between Parker´s Gap and Ringgold. The division was ordered be prepared to support either General Howard (USA) at Parker´s Gap, or Gen. Hooker (USA) at Ringgold Gap. The division remained between Parker´s Gap and Ringgold until November 28th when it moved to Parker´s Gap [38]. While the third division commanded by Brig. Gen. Absalom Baird (USA) was sent to conduct a reconnaissance of Chickamauga and then march to Ringgold where they were held in reserve.[39]

The first division of Major General Palmer´s (USA) XIV Corps was commanded by Brig. Gen. Richard W. Johnson (USA), and at the beginning of the Chattanooga and Ringgold campaign had 5,772 men and 310 officers for aggregate strength of 7,573. [21]. Gen. Johnson's (USA) first division followed Gen. Hooker´s (USA) force to Ringgold. Upon arriving at Ringgold, Gen. Johnson (USA) directed Gen. Carlin 1st Brigade, to deploy to the left of Gen. Hooker´s (USA) men and to advance on the Confederate positions on White Oak Ridge. Gen. Carlin (USA) deployed his skirmishers and they opened fire upon the Confederates on top of the Ridge. The brigade had not advanced far before orders were received from Gen. Hooker (USA) for the division to halt and await further orders. [40]

The Confederate withdrawal from the Gap.

From his location on top of White Oak Ridge, Gen. Polk (CSA) watched the Federal forces massing for another attack:

The enemy still continued moving over the railroad bridge in heavy column, and about 1 o´clock commenced moving rapidly to our right in two columns, one coming direct from the railroad bridge and the other moving some 300 yards beyond the foot of the ridge. This being reported to General Cleburne (CSA), he ordered my command to withdraw and take a position some 2 miles to the rear of Taylors Ridge. This move was made in perfect order. The enemy did not advance upon Taylors Ridge until we had taken our position 2 miles to the rear. [25]

Col. John E. Murray, commanding the Fifth and Thirteenth Arkansas, held a position in the gap near Semple´s Battery. He describes the withdrawal of the battery and his two Arkansas regiments:

After holding the enemy in check here for several hours, without receiving much injury myself, though the injury inflicted on him must have been severe, I caused the artillery, by order of Major-General Cleburne (CSA), to be carried by hand to the rear until it reached, a place where the limbers could be brought to it with safety. I then withdrew my command, by direction of General Cleburne (CSA), by the right flank, and left the Eighth and Nineteenth Arkansas, with some skirmishers from the Sixth and Seventh Arkansas, to hold the position.

The enemy did not get a battery into position until about the time that I withdrew my command. One was then brought up by him and posted on an eminence in the suburbs of Ringgold, which shelled us rapidly for awhile, without, however, inflicting major damage.

My loss in this action was 2 killed, 16 wounded, and 3 missing. That of the enemy in my immediate front must have been several times as large. [34]

Lieut. Col. Peter Snyder, commanding Sixth and Seventh Arkansas Infantry, describes the actions of the last Confederate´s to withdraw:

At about 2 p. m. I was ordered by Colonel Govan to deploy the remainder of my regiment and move forward on the line to relieve all the skirmishers of the brigade. I moved forward with my three companies, while Captain Griggs, acting major of my regiment, went forward and withdrew the old skirmishers and conducted them to the rear. I held my position with my line of skirmishers under a very heavy fire of artillery and small-arms until all of General Cleburne´s (CSA) division had crossed the first bridge on the Western and Atlantic Railroad below Ringgold, when I commenced retiring, the enemy not following. When I reached the bridge I found it on fire. I waded the creek with my command and moved down the railroad a short distance below the Catoosa house and joined the other regiments of the brigade.

My entire loss during the days engagement was 13 privates and 3 officers wounded.

Both officers and men behaved in a manner to meet my warmest commendation. [43]

@@@ -- Under constrution

Notes:

†^
Of Gen. Hooker's three division involved in the battle, only General Geary (USA) provides a detailed number of troops under his command at the Battle of Ringgold Gap. General Geary (USA) places his strength at 1,989 men at the Battle of Ringgold Gap.[5] At the beginning of the Battle of Missionary Ridge, General Osterhaus division had 3,375 [6] Infantry while General Cruft had 3,134 Infantry[7]. The three division would have had a combined maximum strength of 8,498. Both, Gen. Geary´s (USA) and Gen. Osterhaus´ (USA) divisions would have lost men killed, wounded or missing at the Battle of Missionary Ridge and would not have been available at Ringgold Gap. Many sources place the strength of General Hooker forces at 12,000, assuming that each division was at full strength with 4,000 men each. Of Gen. Palmer´s (USA) XIV A.C., only the 11st Division took part for a short time in the battle at Ringgold. At the beginning of the Lookout Mountain-Ringgold Campaign, the strength of Gen. Palmer´s (USA) 11st division that were present for duty was listed as 6,082.[21]

†^
Col. Candy injured his hip earlier at Lookout Mountain and had passed command to Col. Creighton. Col. Candy describes the event — “Between 2 and 3 o´clock I had the misfortune to injure my hip. Shortly after receiving the injury, was ordered forward to relieve Third Brigade. After relieving third brigade, becoming very, lame, I sent my adjutant-general to General Geary (USA) stating that I would be compelled to relinquish command of the brigade to the next senior officer. I turned over the command to Col William B. Creighton, Seventh Ohio Volunteers.” [41]

References

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^ THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: OFFICAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES; Published under the direction of the Secretary of War. Washington: Government Printing Office; 1890-91. Series I, Volume 31, Part 2, O.R. No. 248, p 757

^ THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: OFFICAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES; Published under the direction of the Secretary of War. Washington: Government Printing Office; 1890-91. Series I, Volume 31, Part 2, O.R. No. 192, p 608

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^ THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: OFFICAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES; Published under the direction of the Secretary of War. Washington: Government Printing Office; 1890-91. Series I, Volume 31, Part 2, OR 197, p 621 & OR 199 pp 624-625

^ THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: OFFICAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES; Published under the direction of the Secretary of War. Washington: Government Printing Office; 1890-91. Series I, Volume 31, Part 2, OR 258 pp 768-769

^ THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: OFFICAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES; Published under the direction of the Secretary of War. Washington: Government Printing Office; 1890-91. Series I, Volume 31, Part 2, OR 112 p 403

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^ THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: OFFICAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES; Published under the direction of the Secretary of War. Washington: Government Printing Office; 1890-91. Series I, Volume 31, Part 2, OR 113 pp 414-415

^ THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: OFFICAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES; Published under the direction of the Secretary of War. Washington: Government Printing Office; 1890-91. Series I, Volume 31, Part 2, OR 248 p 756

^ a b c THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: OFFICAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES; Published under the direction of the Secretary of War. Washington: Government Printing Office; 1890-91. Series I, Volume 31, Part 2, O.R. 256 pp 765-767

^ a b THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: OFFICAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES; Published under the direction of the Secretary of War. Washington: Government Printing Office; 1890-91. Series I, Volume 31, Part 2, O.R. 269, pp 769-770

^ THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: OFFICAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES; Published under the direction of the Secretary of War. Washington: Government Printing Office; 1890-91. Series I, Volume 31, Part 2, O.R. 13, p 157

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^ THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: OFFICAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES; Published under the direction of the Secretary of War. Washington: Government Printing Office; 1890-91. Series I, Volume 31, Part 2, O.R. 148, p 493

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^ THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: OFFICAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES; Published under the direction of the Secretary of War. Washington: Government Printing Office; 1890-91. Series I, Volume 31, Part 2, O.R. 132, p 460 & O.R. 133 p, 465

^ THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: OFFICAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES; Published under the direction of the Secretary of War. Washington: Government Printing Office; 1890-91. Series I, Volume 31, Part 2, O.R. 113, p 412

^ THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: OFFICAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES; Published under the direction of the Secretary of War. Washington: Government Printing Office; 1890-91. Series I, Volume 31, Part 2, O.R. 194, pp 611-612

^ THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: OFFICAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES; Published under the direction of the Secretary of War. Washington: Government Printing Office; 1890-91. Series I, Volume 31, Part 2, O.R. 256, p 767