Is Modi aiming for an ally-Mukt BJP in 2019? Just look at these signals

The humiliation of Naidu indicates a BJP decision to go all out for a solitary victory in 2019, riding on Modi’s popularity.

The Telugu Desam Party might yet pull back from the brink and its ministers could yet be part of the BJP-led government at the Centre. But it seems unlikely. It has raised its protest to decibel levels of shrillness from which to climb down to baritone sobriety calls for greater musical training than Chandrababu Naidu has received.

There are specific, local reasons for the Prime Minister’s disdain for Andhra Pradesh’s demands for a special package, if not special category status. But the decision has non-local implications for the BJP’s ability to attract allies in 2019. These implications are obvious enough and, precisely for that reason, all the more intriguing.

If the TDP walks out of the NDA—it has only walked out of the government, not of the political alliance, yet—on the ground that the BJP has refused to honour its commitment to the alliance, it dissuades potential allies.

A big difference between the BJP’ style of functioning and the Congress style of functioning is in how political funding is mobilised. In the BJP, the money collection is far more centralised, and far more of the money given to the party actually ends up in the party’s coffers. In the Congress, far more sticks to the leaders who are supposed to act as conduits than reaches the party treasurer. The allies, too, benefited from this laissez faire approach during the UPA. In contrast, the allies have a tougher time in this regard within the NDA.

The Shiv Sena has already declared that it would not ally with the BJP in 2019. The Akalis got wiped out in alliance with vote-catcher Modi. The BJP is intent on raising its own strength in the Rajya Sabha and is not particularly accommodative of allies in this department, either. So, it really does not make sense to privilege something as arcane as fiscal discipline over retaining an ally-friendly image of the party. Yet, the BJP has chosen to do exactly that, by refusing to implement the reorganisation Act that created a separate state of Telangana and created payment imperatives benefitting Andhra Pradesh.

The vandalization of Periyar statues in Tamil Nadu, in the wake of a local BJP leader’s outburst of Hindu fervour against Periyar, defines the BJP as being beyond the Dravidian pale. Rajnikant’s party is most likely to be a non-starter, like that of Kamalaahaasan (that is how the name is written in Tamil and Malayalam and makes sense as a conjugation that means Laxmi’s husband or Vishnu).

Modi’s visit to Karunanidhi seemed to suggest the awareness that the BJP would need to make up in the South the seats it is bound to lose in the North, as compared to the 2014 results. The resounding victory of the rebel AIADMK faction in the RK Nagar by-election, with its candidate Dinakaran carrying out an anti-BJP campaign, has probably persuaded Modi that it is futile to try to undo the anti-North Indian passions unleashed by the Supreme Court’s move to ban Jallikattu.

The disdain for Naidu — Modi did not return a call — suggests not so much the confidence that Modi can replace Naidu with an eager Jagan Reddy, whose massive wealth makes him vulnerable to CBI and Enforcement Directorate investigations, as readiness to dispense with allies in 2019.

The BJP in 2019 is not the BJP of 2014. It runs governments in 22 states, on its own or with allies. It has a major presence in most states, except in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu. Further growth calls for displacing potential allies. The BJP has replaced the Congress in Tripura and Orissa as the principal challenger, and the Left in Bengal. It sees an opening in Andhra Pradesh. Modi probably calculates that his development charisma will appeal more to voters disappointed by Chandrababu Naidu than the YSR Congress scurrying forever from corruption charges. Which means that the BJP will try to make its own way in Andhra Pradesh, without an ally, come 2019.

There is another reason why allies might not be such a good thing for Modi. If the BJP fails to win a majority on its own in 2019, Modi would be seen to have suffered a setback, not climbed to greater heights of glory. That would be so un-Modiesque, besides having the potential to encourage challengers to Modi’s leadership to come out of the woodwork, claiming to be more acceptable to allies than the imperious Narendra Modi.

It is reasonable, therefore, to assume that the humiliation of Naidu indicates a BJP decision to go all out for a solitary victory in 2019, riding on Modi’s popularity.