Wednesday, May 31, 2017

This post examines a recent opinion from the Court of Appeal, Third District, California: The People
v. Fisher (2017). The court begins the opinion by explaining what the case
involves, what the charge was and what occurred at the trial level:

A jury found defendant Jacob Reed
Fisher guilty of first
degree murder. On appeal, he challenges the admission of several textmessages. He first contends the trial court erred in admitting text messages from the victim to
defendant's cell phone. He argues the texts were hearsay and lacked foundation
to be relevant to his motive or mental state. . . .

People v. Fishers,
supra.

The opinion goes on to explain how, and why, the prosecution
arose:

On January 18, 2014, the victim was
beaten and fatally shot in an apartment complex courtyard. During trial, the
prosecution introduced evidence of numerous text messages. One series of texts
from the victim to defendant indicated the victim had a quarrel with defendant
and codefendant before the murder. Another series of texts involved codefendant
asking a friend for a ride (for himself and defendant) after the murder.
Defense counsel moved to exclude the texts from the victim's phone but not the texts
sent by codefendant.

People v. Fishers,
supra.

The court then quotes from the text messages at issue in the
trial, dividing them into “”text messages from the victim to the defendant” and
“text messages between codefendant and a friend, after the murder.” People v. Fishers, supra.

The text messages from the victim to Fishers consist of the
following:

In the days leading up to the January
18 murder, the victim sent several text messages to defendant, regarding a
dispute over a gun:

`When you gonna see mee bro i'm tired
of chasin ur bitch ass and why u lie to people, u knew gun was there cuz i
called u before you left apartments, fukin pun.’ (Sent Jan. 16, 2014 at 4:37
p.m.)

`What ru hoping to accomplish by doin
this? U stole from a friend cuz u were butthurt bout a name? Grow the fuck up
little boy! Thought you were more gangst.’ (Sent Jan. 17, 2014 at 9:40 p.m.)

Defense counsel moved in limine to
exclude the texts. He argued they were hearsay, lacking in foundation
(asserting no evidence showed defendant received or responded to them), not
relevant, and more prejudicial than probative. The prosecution responded the
texts were offered for the nonhearsay purpose of showing the effect on
defendant. The prosecution added there was sufficient evidence the phone
belonged to defendant and that he had received the texts.

The trial court denied the motion to
exclude the texts. The court referenced other evidence of a dispute between the
victim and the two codefendants and explained the texts were not offered for
the truth of the matter asserted but as circumstantial evidence of motive and
intent.

People v. Fishers,
supra. In a footnote appended to the
end of the final sentence in the first paragraph, the Court of Appeals explains
that the

prosecution did not specify the
evidence. But at trial, the parties stipulated that, if called, defendant's
mother would testify the phone number the texts were sent to belonged to
defendant. And defendant's phone sent text messages before and after the
victim's series of texts, including texting `[c]all me’ to codefendant shortly
after the victim's last text.

People v. Fishers,
supra.

The opinion goes on to explain that the

trial court denied the motion to
exclude the texts. The court referenced other evidence of a dispute between the
victim and the two codefendants and explained the texts were not offered for
the truth of the matter asserted but as circumstantial evidence of motive and
intent.

The court, however, limited the
evidence to defendant. The jury was instructed: `[y]ou can only use this
evidence as to [defendant] only, as it has relevance, if any, to the effect it
had on defendant . . ., specifically his state of mind, attitude, intent and
motive. [¶] This evidence is limited to defendant . . . and not as to
[codefendant].’

People v. Fishers,
supra.

The Court of Appeals then takes up the text messages between
Fisher’s co-defendant “and a friend, after the murder”, explaining that

Shortly after the murder, codefendant
and a friend--apparently by directing her passenger to text while she
drove--exchanged texts:

FRIEND: `On my way what's going on’

CODEFENDANT: `Please hurry I need
your assistance asap’

FRIEND: `Do I need hand warmer’

FRIEND: `On my way’

CODEFENDANT: `No just need a ride
up out of here like yesterday’

FRIEND: `K b there soon’

CODEFENDANT: `It's me and my little
brother’

FRIEND: `K’

CODEFENDANT: `I need up out of
here’

FRIEND: `Its me and my girl.’

FRIEND: `5 mins.. coming up on fair
oaks’

CODEFENDANT: `Just hurry please and
just know the hood is hot’

FRIEND: `K’

FRIEND: `So ... what's new’

CODEFENDANT: `No it's hella hot’

FRIEND: `Cuz u’

FRIEND: `Cominh up now’

CODEFENDANT: `We ya’

FRIEND: `Just passed el camino’

FRIEND: `I'm looking for u’

CODEFENDANT: `I'm in apts right b4
marconi’

The opinion then noted that

the friend picked defendant and
codefendant up less than a mile from the murder. Defendant did not move to
exclude that text exchange.

People v. Fishers,
supra. In a footnote following the
codefendant’s reference to “a hand warner,” the court notes that a “hand
warmer” is a gun. People v. Fishers, supra. In another footnote, the court
explains that the codefendant “referred to defendant as his 1brother.” People v. Fishers, supra.

The Court of Appeals ended this section of the opinion by
explaining that the

friend picked defendant and codefendant
up less than a mile from the murder. Defendant did not move to exclude that
text exchange.

The jury found defendant guilty of
first degree murder and found he had used a firearm in committing the offense.

People v. Fishers,
supra.

The Court of Appeals then began its analysis of the
arguments Fishers made as to the two categories of text messages, beginning
with the “text messages from the victim to defendant.” People v. Fishers, supra.
It begins with the messages from the victim to Fishers, explaining that

defendant contends the trial court
erred in admitting the text messages from the victim's phone. He points out the
prosecutor's brief argument to the jury that the texts showed defendant took a
gun from the victim, thereby arguing the messages proved the truth of their
contents. He further argues the prosecution failed to provide the necessary
foundation that defendant was aware of the messages' content, asserting there
was no evidence he had received (and read) the texts.

People v. Fishers,
supra.

The Court of Appeal then begins the articulation of its
analysis of this issue, noting that

`”[A]n out-of-court statement can
be admitted for the nonhearsay purpose of showing that it imparted certain
information to the hearer, and that the hearer, believing such information to
be true, acted in conformity with such belief.’” (People v. Clark (2016)
63 Cal.4th 522, 562.)

Here, the trial court acted within
its discretion in admitting the text messages from the victim to defendant for
the nonhearsay purpose of showing their effect on defendant.

The prosecutor's statement in
closing that defendant had taken the victim's gun, although inappropriate and
unwise, does not render admission of the evidence error. The court properly
instructed the jury that it may consider the messages only for defendant's
state of mind, attitude, intent and motive. We presume juries heed admonitions
and limiting instructions. (Francis v. Franklin (1985) 471 U.S.307, 324, fn. 9] [that a jury follows instructions is a ‘crucial
assumption’ of trial by jury].) And a prosecutor's statements to the jury are,
of course, not evidence.

Moreover, there is other evidence
that defendant received the text messages. The record reflects the messages
were sent to defendant's phone. The parties stipulated defendant's mother would
testify the number belonged to him. The record further reflects that
defendant's phone was in working order before and after the victim sent the
series of texts. Defendant texted codefendant several days before the victim's
first text. And two hours after the victim's last text, defendant texted `Call
me’ to codefendant. Any remaining doubt as to whether defendant had seen the
messages would go to their weight, for the jury to consider.

Accordingly, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in admitting the text messages for the limited purpose
of showing their effect on defendant's state of mind.

[d]efendant also challenges the
introduction of text messages sent by his codefendant to a friend, after the
murder. He argues the texts did not qualify under the hearsay exception for
statements of a coconspirator because the object of the conspiracy-murder--was
complete before the texts were exchanged. He further argues his trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance in failing to object to their admission and for
failing to seek a limiting instruction.

Evidence Code section 1223 permits
evidence of a statement made while participating in a conspiracy, in
furtherance of the conspiracy's objective, so long as the statement was made
before or during the conspiracy.

Preliminarily, defendant has forfeited
his challenge by failing to raise it before the trial court. (See People
v. Rogers (1978) 21 Cal.3d 542, 548 [issues relating to the
admissibility of evidence will not be considered on appeal absent a timely
objection in the trial court].) Nevertheless, we will address the merits in
considering defendant's claim of ineffective assistance.

`[T]o establish a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, defendant bears the burden of demonstrating, first, that
counsel's performance was deficient because it “fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness ... under prevailing professional norms.”’ (People
v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 745-746.)

Here, failing to object did not fall
below an objective standard of reasonableness because the texts were properly
admitted as coconspirator statements. (See Evid. Code, § 1223.) Although
the text messages were exchanged immediately after the murder,
they were sent while defendant and his co-defendant were still participating in
the conspiracy. They were attempting to escape the scene, waiting less than a
mile from the shooting. Indeed, their content indicates immediate flight: `Please
hurry I need your assistance asap’; `[I] need a ride up out of here like
yesterday’; `I need up out of here’; `Just hurry please and just know the hood is
hot.’

Defendant's argument that the
conspiracy had ended is unavailing. The uncharged conspiracy to murder the
victim implicitly included an objective of escaping the immediate area of the
shooting. (See Levenson & Ricciardulli, Cal. Criminal Law (The Rutter Group
2016) § 12:23, p. 12:23 [`a conspiracy is generally thought not to end until
all acts of escape or concealment are completed . . . [though not] merely
because the conspirators act in concert to avoid detection and punishment’]; People
v. Saling (1972) 7 Cal.3d 844, 852 [`Particular circumstances may
well disclose a situation where the conspiracy will be deemed to have extended
beyond the substantive crime to activities contemplated and undertaken by the
conspirators in pursuance of the objectives of the conspiracy’].) Because this
evidence was properly admitted as an admission of a coconspirator, defendant's
claim of ineffective assistance must fail.

[t]he instant motions to suppress and
dismiss the indictment challenge the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (`FBI's’)
seizure of a computer server that hosted a child pornography website called
`Playpen,’ and the FBI's ensuing operation of the website on a government
server.

U.S. v. Perdue, supra.

The Judge goes on to explain why, and how, the prosecution
arose:

The facts of this case that are
material to the court's decision are undisputed. In early 2015, acting on a tip
from a foreign law enforcement agency, the FBI located and seized a computer
server that contained a child pornography website called Playpen. Playpen
existed as a hidden website on the Tor Network, also known as the dark
web. Through sophisticated encryption, the Tor Network anonymizes and actively
conceals identifying information about website users, including a user's true
Internet Protocol (`IP’) address. To access Playpen, it was necessary for users
to know the website's address on the Tor Network. Users could not, for example,
stumble upon Playpen while browsing the Internet. Once on the Playpen website,
users logged in with dedicated usernames and passwords. Playpen offered users
various forums for different child pornography topics, including `Incest’ and
`Toddlers.’ Inside each forum were discussion posts, images, and videos related
to the particular topic.

Because the Tor Network anonymizes its
users, the FBI could not uncover who was operating or accessing the Playpen
website through normal investigative techniques. The FBI devised a plan to
investigate Playpen's users, who would normally be untraceable. The plan called
for the FBI to copy the Playpen server and continue to operate the Playpen
website on the FBI server. While operating the website, the FBI would use a network
investigative technique (`NIT’) that allowed it to retrieve information from
the computers of the persons who logged in to the Playpen website. The
NIT—computer code developed by the FBI—would be attached to various files
uploaded to Playpen. When the website user downloaded a file, the NIT would
force the user's computer to send to the FBI the user's actual IP address and
other identifying information. With the actual IP address, the FBI could
identify and locate the user.

Acting according to the plan, the FBI
copied the Playpen server and brought it to a government facility located in
the Eastern District of Virginia. On February 20, 2015 the FBI applied for and
obtained from a United States Magistrate Judge of the Eastern District of Virginia
a search warrant (the `NIT Warrant’) authorizing the FBI to deploy the NIT
program for a period of up to 30 days.

On or about February 23, 2015, Perdue
accessed the Internet from his residence using a personal computer. Using the
Tor Network, he logged in to the Playpen website and clicked on a post
entitled, `8 Year Old Blonde,’ which contained child pornography. As the content
from this post downloaded onto the computer, the NIT computer code was sent
automatically. The NIT relayed Perdue's IP address and other information back
to the FBI in the Eastern District of Virginia.

Based on this information, the FBI
issued a subpoena to AT & T, the Internet service provider connected with
Perdue's IP address, and learned that Perdue was the account holder associated
with the address. The FBI obtained a warrant to search Perdue's residence, and
it found (1) a computer containing child pornography, and (2) a flash drive
containing an 80–page Microsoft Word document containing links to child
pornography websites. Perdue subsequently confessed to accessing Playpen and
using the Tor Network to obtain child pornography.

U.S. v. Perdue, supra.

The federal judge goes on to point out that

[t]he grand jury later indicted Perdue for the offenses
of receipt of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S. Code §2252A(a)(2)(A), and possession of child pornography involving a prepubescent
minor, in violation of 18 U.S. Code § 2252A(a)(5)(B). Perdue moves to
suppress all evidence obtained from the NIT, alleging that the authorizing
warrant was made without jurisdiction under 28 U.S. Code §636(a) and Fed. R. Crim. P. 41. He also moves to dismiss the
indictment. The government opposes both motions.

U.S. v. Perdue, supra. This opinion only examines the
court’s analysis of Perdue’s motion to suppress.

The District Court Judge began his analysis of the issues in
the case with Perdue’s motion to suppress evidence, in which he argued that the
evidence at issue was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.U.S. v.
Perdue, supra. He began the
analysis by explaining that

[t]he general rule under the Fourth
Amendment is that searches of private property are reasonable if conducted
pursuant to a valid warrant issued upon probable cause. See, e.g.,Katzv. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). `A defendant normally bears the
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged search
or seizure was unconstitutional.’ United States v. Waldrop, 404
F.3d 365, 368 (5th Cir. 2005 (citing United States v.
Guerrero–Barajas, 240 F.3d 428, 432 (5th Cir. 2001)). `The exclusionaryrule prohibits introduction at trial of evidence obtained as the result of an
illegal search or seizure.’ United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449,
466 (5th Cir. 2001). The exclusionary rule also `encompass[es] evidence that is
the indirect product or ‘fruit” of unlawful police conduct.’ Id. (citing WongSun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963)).

The judge goes on to explain that Perdue argued that the

magistrate judge in the Eastern
District of Virginia who issued the NIT Warrant lacked authority under
both Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(b) (2015) and § 636(a) of the Federal
Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(a), to authorize the search of
a computer in Texas. The government responds that the NIT is functionally a
tracking device that `was used to track the movement of [information] both within
and outside of Virginia.’ Gov't Br. 10. According to the government, `[t]he NIT
program, by way of operation, used [a communication stream between the
government's server in Virginia and Perdue's computer in Texas] to track from
where Perdue's computer signal emanated.’ Id.

U.S. v. Perdue, supra.

The District Court Judge went on to explain that

Rule 41(b)(4) provides that `a
magistrate judge with authority in the district has authority to issue a
warrant to install within the district a tracking device; the warrant may
authorize use of the device to track the movement of a person or property
located within the district, outside the district, or both.’ A `tracking
device’ is `an electronic . . . device which permits the tracking of the movement
of a person or object.’ 18 U.S. Code § 3117; see also Rule
41(a)(2)(E) (incorporating definition in § 3117). And the rules indicate
that `property’ includes `information.’ Rule 41(a)(2)(A).

The courts that have considered the NIT
Warrant have split on the issue. See United States v. Torres,
2016 WL 4821223, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2016) (collecting cases).
Courts that have held that Rule 41(b) was not violated have concluded
that the defendants `voluntarily and deliberately came to the Eastern District
of Virginia when [they] took affirmative steps to log into the Playpen website
by entering a username and password.’ United States v. Sullivan,
––– F.Supp.3d ––––, ––––, 2017 WL 201332, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 18, 2017); see
alsoUnited States v. Anzalone, 208 F.Supp.3d 358, 370 (D.
Mass. 2016) (collecting cases). It was therefore permissible for the
magistrate judge to authorize affixing a tracking device—i.e., the NIT code—to
the defendants' computers once they were present in the district. Courts that
have held that the magistrate judge violated Rule 41(b) have reasoned
that the government's defense of the magistrate judge's authority stretches the
Rule. See, e.g., United States v. Hammond, ––– F.Supp.3d ––––,
––––, 2016 WL 7157762, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2016) (`[Defendant's]
computer is a physical object that at all times remained in his home in the
Northern District of California, and the download, too, occurred here and not
‘virtually’ in the Eastern District of Virginia.’).

U.S. v. Perdue, supra.

The judge goes on to explain that the

court agrees with the courts that have
concluded that Rule 41(b)(4) does not extend to the NIT Warrant.
Although caselaw suggests that the court is to construe Rule 41broadly, seeUnited States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 169 (1977) (holding that Rule
41(b) `is sufficiently flexible to include within its scope electronic
intrusions authorized upon a finding of probable cause’), it cannot render it
meaningless. As one court has explained:

`[i]f the “installation” occurred on
the government-controlled computer, located in the Eastern District of
Virginia, applying the tracking device exception breaks down, because [defendant]
never controlled the government-controlled computer, unlike a car with a
tracking device leaving a particular district. If the installation occurred on
[defendant's] computer, applying the tracking device exception again fails,
because [defendant's] computer was never physically located within the Eastern
District of Virginia.’

United States v. Michaud, 2016
WL 337263, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 28, 2016). Accordingly, the court holds that
the NIT Warrant exceeded the magistrate judge's authority under Rule 41(b) by
authorizing the search of a computer in Texas.

U.S. v. Perdue, supra.

The judge then took up the issue of whether, since the
magistrate exceeded his/her authority by authorizing the search, the evidence
should be suppressed. U.S. v. Perdue,
supra. He began his analysis of this
issue by explaining that the

exclusionary rule precludes the
government from relying on illegally-seized evidence. United States v.
Houltin, 566 F.2d 1027, 1030 (5th Cir. 1978). `The purpose of the
exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct.’ United States
v. Pope, 467 F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir. 2006). This purpose will not be
served, and thus the rule is inapplicable, where evidence is obtained in `objectively
reasonable good-faith reliance upon a search warrant.’ Id. (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted). `Under the good-faith exception,
evidence obtained during the execution of a warrant later determined to be
deficient is admissible nonetheless, so long as the executing officers'
reliance on the warrant was objectively reasonable and in good faith.’ United
States v. Payne, 341 F.3d 393, 399 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 921–25 (1984)). The good-faith exception
cannot apply if `the issuing magistrate/judge was misled by information in an
affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known except for reckless
disregard of the truth[.]’ Id. at 399 (quoting United
States v. Webster, 960 F.2d 1301, 1307 n.4 (5th Cir. 1992) (per curiam)). `The “good faith inquiry is confined to the objectively ascertainable
question whether a reasonably well-trained officer would have known that the
search was illegal despite the magistrate's authorization.”’ Pope,
467 F.3d at 917 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23, 104 S.Ct.
3405).

In the context of a Rule 41 violation,

`where there is no constitutional
violation nor prejudice in the sense that the search would likely not have
occurred or been as abrasive or intrusive had Rule 41 been followed,
suppression ... is not appropriate if the officers concerned acted in the
affirmative good faith belief that the warrant was valid and authorized their
conduct.’

United States v. Comstock, 805
F.2d 1194, 1207 (5th Cir. 1986). This is because the balance of interests
inherent in an exclusionary rule analysis `weighs much less heavily [when] the
[Rule 41] violation is neither of constitutional dimensions nor intentional.’ Id. at
1210.

U.S. v. Perdue, supra.

For these and other reasons, the judge denied Perdue’s
motion to suppress evidence and his motion to dismiss the indictment against
him. U.S. v. Perdue, supra.

Wednesday, May 24, 2017

This post examines a recent opinion from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit: United States v. Broca-Martinez, 2017 WL 1521492 (2017). As Wikipedia explains, this court is one of
several U.S. Courts of Appeals which have jurisdiction over federal cases in
the territory their Circuit encompasses.

The court, like most
courts, begins the opinion by explaining how and why the prosecution arose:

Defendant–Appellant
Cecilio Broca-Martinez appeals the district court's denial of his motion to
suppress. While on patrol in December 2015, Officer Juan Leal began following
Broca-Martinez's vehicle because it matched a description Homeland Security
agents had provided the Laredo Police Department (`LPD’). Officer Leal stopped
Broca-Martinez after a computer search indicated the vehicle's insurance status
was `unconfirmed.’ The stop led to the discovery that Broca-Martinez was in the
country illegally and that he was harboring undocumented immigrants at his
residence. Broca-Martinez entered a conditional guilty plea to one
count of conspiracy to transport undocumented aliens in violation of 8U.S. Code § 1324. On appeal, he contends that there was no reasonable suspicion
justifying the initial stop.

United States v. Broca-Martinez, supra.

For an overview of
the vehicle insurance requirements of the U.S. states, check out this Wikipedia entry.

The Court of Appeals
goes on to explain, in some detail, how the prosecution arose:

On
December 2, 2015, Broca-Martinez was stopped by Officer Leal in Laredo, Texas.
That day, Homeland Security Investigations (`HIS’) received a tip that
undocumented immigrants were being housed at a residence on Zacatecas Avenue in
Laredo. While surveilling the residence, HSI agents saw two men leave and enter
a gray Nissan Altima. HSI subsequently notified the LPD to have its officers
`be on the lookout’ for the vehicle. After receiving a radio transmission to
`be on the lookout’ for this vehicle, Officer Leal saw an Altima that matched
the description. He followed the vehicle and entered its license plate number into
an `in-vehicle computer’ database designed to return vehicle information such
as insurance status.

The
computer indicated the insurance status was `unconfirmed.’ Based on his
experience using this system, Officer Leal concluded that the vehicle was
likely uninsured—a violation of Texas's driver financial responsibility law.
Official Leal then stopped the vehicle. After being stopped, Broca-Martinez
gave his name to Officer Leal and admitted he was in the United States
illegally. While they waited for HSI agents to arrive, Officer Leal issued
Broca-Martinez a citation for violating the insurance requirement and driving
without a license.

When
HSI agents arrived, they interviewed Broca-Martinez. The agents obtained verbal
consent from Broca-Martinez to search the Zacatecas Avenue residence, where
fourteen undocumented immigrants were being sheltered. On December 22, 2015,
Broca-Martinez was indicted by a grand jury on three counts of conspiring to
harbor illegal aliens in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324. Broca-Martinez
filed a motion to suppress evidence on January 25, 2016. He argued there was no
reasonable suspicion justifying the initial stop and that the exclusionary rule
barred all evidence obtained as a result of the stop.

Officer
Leal testified to the following at a hearing on the motion to suppress: At the
time of the stop, Leal knew the radio-transmission instruction involved a
Homeland Security investigation but was unaware of any details. Upon seeing a
vehicle that matched the given description, he ran the `license plates through
what is called the NCIC/TCIC system, which gives a return on the vehicle, make,
model, [and] year’ as well as “a VIN number” and “a confirmation to see if the
vehicle is insured.’ Officer Leal has in the past `performed multiple traffic
stops for vehicles not having insurance’ and was familiar with the Texas law
requiring drivers to have liability insurance. Leal did not stop the vehicle
because of Broca-Martinez's undocumented status—a fact he did not know—but
because he believed Broca-Martinez was uninsured. He explained that when he
types a license plate number into the NCIC/TCIC system, it will either report
`insurance confirmed’ or `unconfirmed,’ and after getting a response he knows,
`with the knowledge and experience of working,’ whether the vehicle is
uninsured.

United States v. Broca-Martinez, supra.

The Court of Appeals
goes on to explain that

During
the stop, Officer Leal did not ask for proof of insurance. He stated that he `already
knew that the vehicle wasn't insured’ based on the `unconfirmed’ status generated
by the computer. However, the district court questioned why Officer Leal did
not seek to confirm the computer's report, asking specifically whether `reports
are sometimes inaccurate.’ Leal responded: `For the most part, no.’ Later,
Broca-Martinez's attorney pressed Officer Leal on the `unconfirmed’ status:

`Q:
Officer Leal, you said that the information you got on the insurance is that it
was unconfirmed?

A:
Yes.

Q:
So, in other words, he could have or not have insurance, correct?

A:
No.

Q:
It's unconfirmed?

A:
Yes.’

The
district court denied Broca-Martinez's motion to suppress. Broca-Martinez
entered a conditional plea to one count of conspiracy to transport undocumented
aliens in violation of 8 U.S. Code § 1324. Broca-Martinez preserved his
right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress. On June
8, 2016, Broca-Martinez was sentenced to twelve months and one day
imprisonment. He timely appealed.

United States v. Broca-Martinez, supra.

The Court of Appeals then takes up its analysis of the
issues in the case, explaining that

`[i]n reviewing a district court's
denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district court's findings of fact
for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo.’ United States v. Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d 420, 429 (5th Cir. 2005). `Whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to support a stop is
treated as a question of law.’ United States v. Castillo, 804 F.3d
361, 364 (5th Cir. 2015). Nonetheless, this Court views the evidence `in the
light most favorable to the prevailing party in the district court—in this
case, the Government.’ Id. The district court had jurisdiction
under 18 U.S. Code § 3231, and this Court has appellate jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S. Code § 1291.

United States v. Broca-Martinez, supra.

The Court of Appeals then began its analysis of the issues,
and the arguments, in the case:

Under Texas law, `[a] person may not
operate a motor vehicle in [Texas] unless financial responsibility is established
for that vehicle through’ either a `motor vehicle liability insurance policy’
or other means such a surety bond, a deposit, or self-insurance. Tex.
Transp. Code Ann. § 601.051. Violating this statute is a misdemeanor. Id. §
601.191. At issue in this case is whether Officer Leal had reasonable suspicion
that Broca-Martinez was in violation of this statute.

United States v. Broca-Martinez, supra. In a footnote appended to the last sentence
above, the court explains that

Broca-Martinez
acknowledges that the only reason for the stop was a traffic violation and that
Officer Leal `had no information regarding any suspicion of any criminal
activity by the passengers’ in the vehicle.

protects individuals against
warrantless searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. It `applies to
seizures of the person, including brief investigatory stops such as the stop of
the vehicle here.’ United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417(1981). When a vehicle is stopped, the officer `must have a particularized and
objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal
activity.’ Id. at 417–18, 101 S.Ct. 690. This `reasonable
suspicion’ exists `when the officer can point to specific and articulable facts
which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant
the search and seizure. Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d at 430. And while
the officer must have more than a `mere hunch’ that the person stopped is
engaged in illegal activity, `reasonable suspicion need not rise to the level
of probable cause.’ Id. Indeed, it requires only `”some
minimal level of objective justification” for making the stop.” Castillo,
804 F.3d at 367 (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1,7 (1989)).

United States v. Broca-Martinez, supra.

The Court of Appeals
then took up the issue in controversy in this case, explaining that

[w]e
have not yet addressed whether a state computer database indication of
insurance status may establish reasonable suspicion. However, several other
circuits have found that such information may give rise to reasonable suspicion
as long as there is either some evidence suggesting the database is reliable or
at least an absence of evidence that it is unreliable.

United States v. Broca-Martinez, supra.

The opinion then goes
on to explain that

[i]n United
States v. Cortez-Galaviz, 495 F.3d 1203 (10th Cir. 2007), the Tenth Circuit
encountered similar facts and affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress. Id. at
1204. In that case, a Drug Enforcement Agency agent stopped a vehicle after
inputting its license plate information into a computer database and receiving
the following notification: `INSURED/Not Found: AS OF/9/30/2005 Recommend
request proof of insurance.’ Id. The court found this
information was `particularized and objective’ and `suggestive of a traffic
violation.’ Id. at 1206. While acknowledging that the message
`did not as definitively indicate criminal activity as a `no’ response,’ it
also did not `equate to an `exculpatory “yes,”’ and the suggestive ambiguity of
the particularized and objective information [the officer] had at hand
justified his decision to warrant a brief traffic stop. Id. Like
Broca-Martinez, the defendant in Cortez-Galaviz argued that
the stop was not justified because there were alternative means of complying
with the state insurance law. Id. at 1207. But the Tenth
Circuit found that argument `overstate[d] the requirements for reasonable
suspicion under the Fourth Amendment.’ Id; see also United
States v. Miranda-Sotolongo, 827 F.3d 663, 669 (7th Cir. 2016) (`Reasonable
suspicion ... does not require the officer to rule out all innocent
explanations of what he sees.’). Additionally, although the defendant in Cortez-Galaviz
challenged the reliability of the computer database, the court found
limited evidence of unreliability, especially when viewed in the light most
favorable to the government. 495 F.3d at 1208.

United States v. Broca-Martinez, supra.

And it went on to explain
that

[b]y
contrast, the Tenth Circuit reached a different conclusion in United
States v. Esquivel-Rios, 725 F.3d 1231 (10th Cir. 2013), where there was evidence
the database was unreliable. In that case, a Colorado state trooper stopped a
vehicle after inquiring into the validity of its temporary registration tag. Id. at
1234. Even though the tag `looked genuine,’ the trooper `called in the tag
number to a dispatcher who soon replied “that's a negatory on record, not
returning.”’ Id. The trooper stopped the vehicle solely based
on that information and found illegal drugs after obtaining consent for a
search. Id. at 1234–35. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit found
this case distinguishable from Cortez-Galaviz and other cases
in which `the record suggested no reason to worry about the database's
reliability.’ Id. at 1235. Here, the dispatcher provided
critical testimony that `Colorado temp tags usually don't return,’ which
the court regarded as `a piece of evidence our cases haven't confronted before:
evidence admitted by a district court suggesting that the database on which the
officer relied to justify his stop might bear a real problem.’ Id. (emphasis
in original).

Cases
from the Seventh, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits confronting similar fact patterns
are generally consistent with the reasoning in Cortez-Galaviz and Esquivel-Rios. See Miranda-Sotolongo,
827 F.3d at 671 (finding reasonable suspicion established when the
database showed no vehicle registration record, `at least in the absence of
evidence that [the officer] could not reasonably rely on the absence of a
registration record to support an investigative stop’); United States
v. Sandridge, 385 F.3d 1032, 1036 (6th Cir. 2004) (concluding there
was reasonable suspicion for a stop when license plate check three weeks prior
had indicated the driver was driving without a valid license); United
States v. Stephens, 350 F.3d 778, 779 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that
when database check showed license plates were `not on file,’ there was
reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle).

United States v. Broca-Martinez, supra.

The court went on to address another issue, explaining that

Broca-Martinez relies only on state
court cases to support his argument. See Gonzalez-Gilando v. State, 306
S.W.3d 893, 896–97 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2010, pet. ref'd) (finding database
information insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion because there was no
`evidence developing the source of the information comprising the database,
explaining what was meant when insurance information was unavailable, . . .
[or] illustrating the accuracy of the database’); State v. Daniel,
446 S.W.3d 809, 815 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.); Contraras v.
State, 309 S.W.3d 168, 173 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2010, pet. ref'd). But
although states may `impos[e] more stringent constraints on police conduct than
does the Federal Constitution,’ this does not dictate our Fourth Amendment
analysis. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43 (1988). Even so,
Broca-Martinez's case is distinguishable from Gonzalez-Gilando;
here, there was testimony regarding Officer Leal's experience with the database
and suggesting the system was reliable.

United States v. Broca-Martinez, supra. As this Wikipedia entry on precedent in U.S.
and other common law countries explains, the decisions of a particular court
are usually binding on that court, and may serve as persuasive precedent with
regard to other courts. So, it is usual for litigators before a particular
court to rely on that court’s precedent, as much as possible.

The Court of Appeals then began the process of enunciating
its “holding” – its decision in the case:

[w]e agree with the other circuits that
have confronted this question. A state computer database indication of
insurance status may establish reasonable suspicion when the officer is
familiar with the database and the system itself is reliable. If that is
the case, a seemingly inconclusive report such as “unconfirmed” will be a
specific and articulable fact that supports a traffic stop. Lopez-Moreno,
420 F.3d at 430. Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, Officer
Leal's testimony provides sufficient support for the reliability of the
database. Officer Leal explained the process for inputting license plate
information, described how records in the database are kept, and noted that he
was familiar with these records. He explained that `with the knowledge and
experience of working,’ he knows the vehicle is uninsured when an `unconfirmed’
status appears because the computer system will either return an `insurance
confirmed’ or `unconfirmed’ response. When Broca-Martinez's attorney questioned
the system's reliability, Officer Leal confirmed that it was usually accurate.
(`Q: So, in other words, he could have or not have insurance, correct? A: No.’)
(`Q: You asked him for his insurance? A: Not that I recall. I already knew that
the vehicle wasn't insured.’) (`Q: I mean reports are sometimes inaccurate, right?
A: For the most part, no.’).

United States v. Broca-Martinez, supra.

It went on to point out that

[e]ven if Officer Leal was not positive
Broca-Martinez was uninsured, he cleared the bar for reasonable suspicion. An
officer does not have to be certain a violation has recurred. See Castillo,
804 F.3d at 366. `This would raise the standard for reasonable suspicion far
above probable cause or even a preponderance of the evidence, in contravention
of the Supreme Court's instructions.’ Id.

United States v. Broca-Martinez, supra.

The court therefore held that “[f]or the foregoing reasons,
we AFFIRM the denial of Broca-Martinez's motion to suppress and AFFIRM
Broca-Martinez's conviction and sentence.”