[26.1]The new consuls, Cn, Fulvius Centimalus
and P. Sulpicius Galba, entered upon office on the 15th of March, and at
once convened a meeting of the senate in the Capitol to discuss questions
of State, the conduct of the war and the distribution of the provinces
and the armies. The retiring consuls - Q. Fulvius and Appius Claudius -
retained their commands and were instructed to prosecute the siege of Capua
unremittingly until they had effected its capture. The recovery of this
city was the main concern of the Romans now. What determined them was not
only the bitter resentment which its defection had evoked, a feeling which
was never more justified in the case of any city, but also the certainty
they felt that, as in its revolt it had drawn many communities with it,
owing to its greatness and strength, so its recapture would create amongst
these communities a feeling of respect for the power whose sovereignty
they had formerly acknowledged. The praetors of the past year, M. Junius
in Etruria and P. Sempronius in Gaul, had their commands extended and were
each to retain the two legions they had. M. Marcellus was to act as proconsul
and finish the war in Sicily with the army which he had. If he needed reinforcements
he was to take them from the troops which P. Cornelius was commanding in
Sicily, but none were to be selected from those who had been forbidden
by the senate to take a furlough or return home before the end of the war.
The province of Sicily was assigned to C. Sulpicius, and he was to take
over the two legions which were with P. Cornelius; any reinforcements he
needed were to be supplied from the army of Cn. Fulvius which had been
so disgracefully routed and cut up the previous year in Apulia. The soldiers
who had so disgraced themselves were placed under the same conditions with
regard to length of service as the survivors of Cannae. As an additional
brand of ignominy the men of both these armies were forbidden to winter
in towns or to construct winter quarters for themselves within ten miles
of any town. The two legions which Q. Mucius had commanded in Sardinia
were given to L. Cornelius, and any additional force he might require was
to be raised by the consuls. T. Otacilius and M. Valerius were ordered
to cruise off the coasts of Sicily and Greece respectively with the fleets
and soldiers they had previously commanded. The former had a hundred ships
with two legions on board; the latter, fifty ships and one legion. The
total strength of the Roman armies engaged on land and sea this year amounted
to twenty-five legions.

[26.2].At the beginning of the year a despatch
from L. Marcius was laid before the senate. The senators fully appreciated
the successful way in which he had conducted his operations, but a good
many of them were indignant at the honorific title he had assumed. The
superscription of the letter was "The propraetor to the senate,"
though the imperium had not been conferred upon him by an order of the
people nor with the sanction of the senate. An evil precedent had been
set, they said, when a commander was chosen by his army, and the solemn
procedure at elections, after the auspices were duly taken, was transferred
to camps and provinces far away from the magistrates and the laws, and
left to the caprice of the soldiers. Some thought the senate ought to take
the matter up, but it was thought better to adjourn the consideration of
it until the horsemen who had brought the despatch had left the City. With
regard to the food and clothing of the army, they ordered a reply to be
sent to the effect that both these matters would be attended to by the
senate. They refused, however, to allow the despatch to be addressed "To
the propraetor L. Marcius," lest it should appear that the question
which was to be discussed had been prejudged. After the messengers had
been dismissed the consuls gave this question priority over everything
else, and it was unanimously agreed that the tribunes should consult the
plebs as soon as possible as to whom they wished to have sent to Spain
with the imperium as commander-in-chief to take over the army which Cn.
Scipio had commanded. The tribunes undertook to do so, and due notice of
the question was given to the Assembly. But the citizens were preoccupied
with a controversy of a very different nature. C. Sempronius Blaesus had
fixed a day for bringing Cn. Fulvius to trial for losing his army in Apulia,
and made a very bitter attack upon him beforehand in the Assembly. "Many
commanders," he said, "have through rashness and inexperience
led their armies into most dangerous positions, but Cn. Fulvius is the
only one who has demoralised his army by every form of vice before betraying
them. They may with perfect truth be said to have been destroyed before
they saw the enemy; they owed their defeat to their own commander, not
to Hannibal.

"Now no man, when he is going to vote, takes sufficient trouble
to find out what sort of a man it is to whom he is entrusting the supreme
command of the army. Think of the difference between Tiberius Sempronius
and Cn. Fulvius. Tiberius Sempronius had an army of slaves given to him,
but in a short time, thanks to the discipline he maintained and the wise
use he made of his authority, there was not a man amongst them who when
he was in the field of battle gave a thought to his birth or his condition.
Those men were a protection to our allies and a terror to our enemies.
They snatched, as though from the very jaws of Hannibal, cities like Cumae
and Beneventum and restored them to Rome. Cn. Fulvius, on the other hand,
had an army of Roman citizens, born of respectable parents, brought up
as free men, and he infected them with the vices of slaves, and made them
such that they were insolent and riotous amongst our allies, weaklings
and cowards in face of the enemy; they could not stand even the war-cry
of the Carthaginians, let alone their charge. Good heavens! no wonder the
soldiers gave ground, when their commander was the first to run away; the
wonder is that any stood their ground and fell, and that all did not accompany
Cn. Fulvius in his panic and flight. C. Flaminius, L. Paulus, L. Postumius,
and the two Scipios, Cnaeus and Publius, all chose to fall in battle rather
than desert their armies, when they were hemmed in by the foe. Cn. Fulvius
came back to Rome as the all-but solitary herald of the annihilation of
his army. After the army had fled from the field of Cannae it was deported
to Sicily, not to return till the enemy had evacuated Italy, and a similar
decree was recently passed in the case of Fulvius' legions. But, shame
to relate, the commander himself remained unpunished after his flight from
a battle brought on by his own headstrong folly; he is free to pass the
rest of his life where he passed it in youth - in stews and brothels -
whilst his soldiers, whose only fault is that they copied their commander,
are practically sent into exile and have to undergo a service of disgrace.
So unequal are the liberties enjoyed in Rome by the rich and the poor,
the men of rank and the men of the people."

[26.3]In his defence Fulvius threw all
the blame upon his men. They clamoured, he said, for battle, and he led
them out, not at the moment, for it was late in the day, but on the following
morning. Though they were drawn up on favourable ground, at an early hour
they found either the terror of the enemy's name or the strength of his
attack too much for them. When they were all flying in disorder he was
swept away by the rush as Varro was at Cannae and as many other commanders
have been at different times. What help would he have given to the republic
by staying there alone? unless indeed his death would have warded off other
national disasters. His failure was not due to lack of supplies, or to
incautiously taking up a position on unfavourable ground; he had not been
ambushed through insufficient reconnoitring; he had been beaten in a fair
fight on an open field. Men's tempers, on whichever side they were, were
beyond his control, a man's natural disposition made him either brave or
cowardly. The speeches of the prosecutor and the defendant occupied two
days, on the third day the witnesses were produced. Besides all the other
serious charges brought against him, a great many men stated on oath that
the panic and flight began with the praetor, and that when the soldiers
found that they were left to themselves, and thought that their commander
had good ground for fear, they too turned their backs and fled. The prosecutor
had in the first instance asked for a fine, but the evidence which had
been given roused the anger of the people to such an extent that they insisted
upon a capital charge being laid. This led to a fresh contest. As the prosecutor
during the first two days had limited the penalty to a fine and only on
the third day made the charge a capital one, the defendant appealed to
the other tribunes, but they refused to interfere with their colleague.
It was open to him by ancient custom to proceed either by statute law or
by customary precedent, whichever he preferred, until he had obtained judgment,
whether the penalty were a capital or a pecuniary one. On this Sempronius
announced that he should prosecute C. Fulvius on the charge of treason
and requested the City praetor to convene the Assembly for the purpose
on the appointed day. Then the accused tried another way of escape. His
brother Quintus was in high favour with the people at the time, owing to
his former successes and the general conviction that he would soon take
Capua, and the defendant hoped that he might be present at his trial. Quintus
wrote to the senate for their permission, appealing to their compassion
and begging to be allowed to defend his brother's life, but they told him
in reply that it would militate against the interests of the State for
him to leave Capua. Just before the day of trial Cn. Fulvius went into
exile at Tarquinii. The plebs affirmed by resolution his legal status as
exile and all the consequences it involved.

[26.4]Meanwhile the whole stress of the
war bore on Capua. The blockade was proving more effective than direct
assault; the common people and the slaves could not endure the famine,
nor could they send messengers to Hannibal owing to the strict watch which
was kept. At last a Numidian was found who promised to get through with
the despatches, and he succeeded. He escaped through the Roman lines by
night, and this encouraged the Capuans to attempt sorties in all directions
while they still had some strength left. Numerous cavalry encounters took
place in which they generally had the advantage, but their infantry got
the worst of it. The gratification which the Romans derived from their
infantry successes was considerably damped by their finding themselves
beaten in any arm by an enemy whom they had invested and almost conquered.
At length they devised a clever plan by which they could make up for their
inferiority in the mounted arm. Young men of exceptional speed and agility
were selected from all the legions and supplied with bucklers somewhat
shorter than those used by the cavalry. Each was furnished with seven javelins,
four feet long and tipped with iron heads similar to those on the darts
of the velites. The troopers each took one of these upon his horse and
trained them to ride behind and leap down briskly at a given signal. As
soon as their daily training had given them sufficient confidence, the
cavalry advanced against the Capuans, who were drawn up on the level ground
between the Roman camp and the city walls. As soon as they came within
range the signal was given and the velites sprang down to the ground. The
line of infantry thus formed made a sudden attack on the Capuan horse;
shower after shower of javelins was flung at the men and horses all along
the line. A great many were wounded, and the novel and unexpected form
of attack created widespread consternation. Seeing the enemy shaken the
Roman cavalry charged home, and in the rout that followed they drove them
with much loss right up to their gates. From that time the Romans had the
superiority in their cavalry also. The velites were subsequently incorporated
in the legions. This plan of combining infantry and cavalry in one force
is said to have originated with one of the centurions - Q. Navius, and
he received special honour from his commander in consequence.

[26.5]Such was the position of affairs
at Capua. During this time Hannibal was drawn in two directions; he was
anxious to get possession of the citadel of Tarentum and he was equally
anxious to retain his hold on Capua. Regard for Capua however carried the
day, for he saw that it was the spot to which all eyes were turned, of
friends and foes alike, and its fate would show conclusively, one way or
the other, the consequences of defection from Rome. Leaving therefore his
baggage and heavy-armed troops in Bruttium, he hurried into Campania with
a force of horse and foot selected for their capacity for rapid marching.
Swift as his advance was, however, three and thirty elephants followed
him. He took up his position in a secluded valley at the back of Mount
Tifata which overlooked Capua. On his march he captured the fortified post
of Calatia. He then turned his attention to the besiegers of Capua, and
sent a message to the city telling them at what time he intended to attack
the Roman lines, so that they might be ready to make a sortie and pour
in full strength out of all their gates. The investing force was thrown
into a state of great alarm, for while Hannibal was delivering his assault
on one side, the whole of the forces of Capua, mounted and unmounted, supported
by the Punic garrison under Bostar and Hanno were making a vigorous sortie
on the other. Realising their critical position and the danger of leaving
a portion of their lines unprotected by concentrating their defence in
any one direction, the Romans divided their force; Appius Claudius confronted
the Capuans, Fulvius was opposed to Hannibal; the propraetor C. Nero with
the cavalry of the six legions held the road to Suessula, and C. Fulvius
Flaccus with the cavalry of the allies took up a position towards the Volturnus.
There was not only the usual shouting and uproar when the battle commenced;
the din of horses and men and arms was aggravated by the non-combatant
population of Capua. They crowded on to the walls, and by clashing brazen
vessels together, as people do in the dead of the night when there is an
eclipse of the moon, they made such a dreadful noise that it even distracted
the attention of the combatants.

Appius had no difficulty in driving the Capuans from his earthworks,
but Fulvius had to meet a much heavier attack from Hannibal and his Carthaginians
on the other side. Here the sixth legion gave way and a cohort of Spaniards
with three elephants succeeded in getting up to the breastwork. They had
penetrated the Roman line, and whilst they saw their chance of breaking
through into the camp they saw also the danger of being cut off from their
supports. When Fulvius saw the disorder of the legion and the danger which
threatened the camp, he called upon Q. Navius and other centurions of the
first rank to charge the enemy's cohort which was fighting just under the
breastwork. "It is a most critical moment," he told them; "either
you must allow the enemy to go on, in which case they will break into the
camp with less difficulty than they found in breaking through the closed
ranks of the legion, or you must dispose of them whilst they are still
below the breastwork. It will not be a hard fight; they are a small body,
cut off from their support; and the very fact of the Roman line being broken
will be an advantage if both sections close on the enemy's flanks, who
would then be hemmed and exposed to a double attack." On hearing this
Navius took the standard of the second maniple of hastati from the bearer
and advanced with it against the enemy, threatening at the same time to
throw it into their midst if his men did not promptly follow him and take
their share in the fighting. He was a huge man and his armour set him off,
and as he lifted the standard high in the air, he attracted all eyes. But
when he was close to the Spaniards they hurled their javelins at him from
all sides, and almost the whole of their line turned their attention to
this one man. Neither the number of the enemy, however, nor the force of
their missiles were able to check the gallant fellow's onset.

[26.6]M. Atilius now brought up the leading
maniple of the sixth legion against the Spanish cohort; L. Porcius Licinius
and T. Popilius, who were in command of the camp, were keeping up a fierce
struggle in front of the breastwork, and killed some of the elephants whilst
they were actually clambering over it. Their bodies rolled down into the
fosse and filled it up, making a bridge for the passage of the enemy, and
a terrible carnage began over the prostrate elephants. On the other side
of the camp the Capuans and their Punic garrison had by this time been
repulsed, and the fighting went on right up to the city gate which leads
to the Volturnus. The efforts of the Romans to break in were frustrated
not so much by the arms of the defenders as by the ballistae and scorpions
which were mounted over the gate and kept the assailants at a distance
by the missiles they discharged. A further check was given them by a wound
received by Appius Claudius; he was struck by a heavy javelin in the upper
part of the chest under the left shoulder, whilst he was riding along the
front encouraging his men. A great many of the enemy were however killed
outside the gate; the rest were driven in hasty flight into the city. When
Hannibal saw the destruction of his Spanish cohort and the energy with
which the Romans were defending their lines, he gave up the attack and
recalled the standards. The retiring column of infantry was followed by
the cavalry who were to protect the rear in case the enemy harassed their
retreat. The legions were burning to pursue them, but Fulvius ordered the
"retire" to be sounded, as he considered that he had gained quite
enough in making both the Capuans and Hannibal himself realise how little
he could do in their defence.

Some authors who describe this battle say that 8000 of Hannibal's men
were killed that day and 3000 Capuans, and that 15 standards were taken
from the Carthaginians and 18 from the Capuans. In other accounts I find
that the affair was nothing like so serious, there was more excitement
and confusion than actual fighting. According to these writers the Numidians
and Spaniards broke unexpectedly into the Roman lines with the elephants,
and these animals, trotting all over the camp, upset the tents and created
terrible uproar and panic during which the baggage animals broke their
tethers and bolted. To add to the confusion Hannibal sent some men got
up as Italians, who could speak Latin, to tell the defenders in the name
of the consul that as the camp was lost each man must do his best to escape
to the nearest mountains. The trick was, however, soon detected and frustrated
with heavy loss to the enemy, and the elephants were driven out of the
camp with firebrands. In any case, however it began or ended, this was
the last battle fought before Capua surrendered. The "medix tuticus,"
the supreme magistrate of Capua, happened for that year to be Seppius Loesius,
a man of humble birth and slender fortune. The story goes that owing to
a portent which had occurred in his mother's household she consulted a
soothsayer on behalf of her little boy, and he told her that the highest
official position in Capua would come to her son. As she was not aware
of anything which would justify such expectations she replied, "You
are indeed describing a desperate state of things in Capua when you say
that such an honour will come to my son." Her jesting reply to what
was a true prediction turned out itself to be true, for it was only when
famine and sword were pressing them sorely and all hope of further resistance
was disappearing that Loesius accepted the post. He was the last Capuan
to hold it, and he only did so under protest; Capua, he declared, was abandoned
and betrayed by all her foremost citizens.

[26.7]Finding that his enemy could not
be drawn into an engagement and that it was impossible to break through
their lines and relieve Capua, Hannibal decided to abandon his attempt
and march away from the place, for he was afraid of being cut off from
his supplies by the new consuls. He was anxiously turning over in his mind
the question of his future movements when the idea occurred to him of marching
upon Rome, the head and guiding spirit of the whole war. He had always
set his heart upon this, and men blamed him for letting the opportunity
slip, immediately after the battle of Cannae; he himself admitted that
he had made a mistake in not doing so. He was not without hope of seizing
some part of the City in the confusion caused by his unexpected appearance,
and if Rome were in danger, he expected that both the consuls - or at all
events, one of them - would at once quit their hold on Capua. Then, as
they would be weakened by their forces being divided, they would give either
him or the Capuans the opportunity of fighting a successful action. One
thing made him anxious, the possibility of the Capuans surrendering as
soon as he had withdrawn. Amongst his men there was a Numidian who was
ready for any desperate enterprise, and he induced this man, by the offer
of a reward, to carry a despatch and enter the Roman lines in the guise
of a deserter, then steal away on the opposite side and enter Capua. He
wrote in a very encouraging strain, and pointed out that his departure
would be the means of saving them, as it would draw off the Roman generals
from their attack on Capua to defend Rome. They were not to be despondent,
a few days' patience would completely break up the siege. He then ordered
the boats which were on the Volturnus to be seized and brought up to a
fort which he had previously constructed to secure the passage of the river.
He was informed that there was a sufficient number of them to admit of
his entire army being taken across in one night. Ten days' rations were
supplied to the men; they marched down to the river, and all his legions
were across before day-break.

[26.8]Fulvius Flaccus was informed by deserters
of this project before it was put into execution, and at once sent intelligence
of it to the senate. The news was received with varying feelings as men's
temperaments differed. Naturally, at such a crisis, a meeting of the senate
was instantly convened. Publius Cornelius Asina was for recalling all the
generals and armies from every part of Italy for the defence of the City,
regardless of Capua or any other object they had in view. Fabius Maximus
considered that it would be a disgrace for them to quit their hold on Capua
and allow themselves to be scared by Hannibal and marched up and down at
his beck and menaces. "Do you suppose," he asked the senators,
"that the man who did not venture to approach the City after his victory
at Cannae, really hopes to capture it now that he has been driven away
from Capua? His object in coming here is not to attack Rome but to raise
the siege of Capua. The army which is now in the City will be sufficient
for our defence, for it will be aided by Jupiter and the other gods who
have witnessed Hannibal's violation of treaty engagements." P. Valerius
Flaccus advocated a middle course, which was ultimately adopted. He recommended
that a despatch should be sent to the generals commanding at Capua, telling
them what defensive force the City possessed. They themselves would know
what troops Hannibal was bringing and how large an army was required to
maintain the siege of Capua. If one of the generals commanding could be
sent with a part of the army to Rome without interfering with the effective
conduct of the siege by the other general, Claudius and Fulvius might arrange
which of them should continue the investment of Capua and which should
go to Rome to prevent their own city from being invested. When this decision
of the senate reached Capua, the proconsul Q. Fulvius, whose colleague
had been obliged to leave for Rome owing to his wound, selected a force
out of the three armies and crossed the Volturnus with 15,000 infantry
and 1000 cavalry. When he had definitely ascertained that Hannibal was
advancing by the Latin Road, he sent men on in advance through the burghs
situated on the Appian Way and also to some lying near it, to warn the
inhabitants to have supplies stored in readiness in their towns and to
bring them in from the outlying fields to the line of march. They were
further to call in their fighting men to defend their homes, and each municipality
was to provide for its own protection.

[26.9]After crossing the Volturnus Hannibal
fixed his camp a short distance from the river, and the next day he marched
past Cales into the Sidicine territory. One day was devoted to laying waste
the district, and then he proceeded along the Latin Road through the lands
of Suessa, Allifae, and Casinum up to the walls of the last-mentioned place.
Here he remained encamped for two days and ravaged the whole of the surrounding
country. From there he went on past Interamna and Aquinum into the territory
of Fregellae as far as the Liris. Here he found that the bridge had been
destroyed by the people of Fregellae in order to delay his advance. Fulvius
too had been delayed at the Volturnus, owing to Hannibal having burnt his
boats, and he had considerable difficulty in procuring rafts for the transport
of his troops, owing to the lack of timber. When, however, he had once
crossed, the remainder of his march was uninterrupted, as he found ample
supplies of provisions waiting for him in each city he came to, and also
put out by the side of the road in the country districts. His men, too,
in their eagerness urged one another to march more quickly, for they were
going to defend their homes. A messenger who had travelled from Fregellae
for a day and a night without stopping created great alarm in Rome, and
the excitement was increased by people running about the City with wildly
exaggerated accounts of the news he had brought. The wailing cry of the
matrons was heard everywhere, not only in private houses but even in the
temples. Here they knelt and swept the temple-floors with their dishevelled
hair and lifted up their hands to heaven in piteous entreaty to the gods
that they would deliver the City of Rome out of the hands of the enemy
and preserve its mothers and children from injury and outrage. The senators
remained in session in the Forum so as to be at hand should the magistrates
wish to consult them. Some received orders and went off to execute their
commissions, others offered their services in case they could be of use
anywhere. Troops were posted at the Capitol, on the walls, round about
the City and even as far as the Alban Mount and the fortress of Aesula.
In the midst of all this excitement word was brought that the proconsul
Q. Fulvius was on his way from Capua with an army. As proconsul he could
not hold command in the City, the senate therefore passed a decree conferring
upon him consular powers. After completely destroying the territory of
Fregellae in revenge for the destruction of the bridge over the Liris,
Hannibal continued his march through the districts of Frusinum, Ferentinum
and Anagnia into the neighbourhood of Labicum. He then crossed Algidus
and marched on Tusculum, but he was refused admittance, so he turned to
the right below Tusculum towards Gabii, and still descending, came into
the district of Pupinia where he encamped, eight miles from Rome. The nearer
his approach the greater was the slaughter of those who were fleeing to
the City at the hands of the Numidians who rode in front of the main body.
Many, too, of all ages and conditions were made prisoners.

[26.10]In the midst of this turmoil and
excitement Fulvius Flaccus entered Rome with his army. He passed through
the Porta Capena and marched right through the City past the Cavinae and
the Esquiliae, and out again through the Colline Gate, entrenching himself
on ground between the Colline and Esquiline Gates. Here the plebeian aediles
furnished him with provisions. The consuls, attended by the senate, visited
him in his camp, and a council was held to consider what measures the supreme
interests of the republic demanded. It was decided that the consuls should
form entrenched camps in the vicinity of the Colline and Esquiline Gates,
the City praetor taking command of the Citadel and the Capitol, and that
the senate should remain in permanent session in the Forum in case any
sudden emergency should need to be provided against. Hannibal had now moved
his camp to the Anio at a distance of three miles from the City. From this
position, he advanced with a body of 2000 cavalry towards the Colline Gate
as far as the temple of Hercules, and from that point he rode up and made
as close an inspection as he could of the walls and the situation of the
City. Flaccus was furious with indignation at this calm and leisurely proceeding
and sent some cavalry with orders to clear the enemy and drive them back
to their camp. There were some 1200 Numidian deserters stationed on the
Aventine at the time, and the consuls sent orders to them to ride through
the City to the Esquiliae, as they considered none more fitted to fight
amongst the hollows and garden walls and sepulchres and enclosed paths
all around that part of the City. When those on guard at the Citadel and
the Capitol saw them trotting down the Publician hill they shouted out
that the Aventine was taken. This caused so much confusion and panic that,
had not the Carthaginian camp been outside the City, the terrified population
would have poured out of the gates. As it was, they took refuge in the
houses and various buildings, and seeing some of their own people walking
in the streets, they took them for enemies and attacked them with stones
and missiles. It was impossible to calm the excitement or to rectify the
mistake, as the streets were packed with crowds of country people with
their cattle, whom the sudden danger had driven into the City. The cavalry
action was successful and the enemy were driven off. It became necessary,
however, to quell the disturbances which, without the slightest reason,
were breaking out in many quarters, and the senate decided that all who
had been Dictators, consuls or censors should be invested with the imperium
until the enemy had retired from the walls. During the remainder of the
day and throughout the night, many such disturbances arose and were promptly
repressed.

[26.11]The following day Hannibal crossed
the Anio and led out the whole of his force to battle; Flaccus and the
consuls did not decline the challenge. When both sides were drawn up to
decide an action in which Rome was the victor's prize, a tremendous hailstorm
threw the two armies into such disorder that they had difficulty in holding
their arms. They retired to their respective camps, fearing everything
rather than their enemy. The following day, when the armies were drawn
up in the same position, a similar storm separated them. On each occasion,
after they were once more in camp, the weather cleared up in an extraordinary
way. The Carthaginians looked upon the occasion as preternatural, and the
story runs that Hannibal was heard to say that at one time he lacked the
will, at another the opportunity, of becoming master of Rome. His hopes
were further damped by two incidents, one of some importance, the other
less so. The more important was his receiving information that while he
was actually in arms near the walls of Rome a force had marched out fully
equipped, under their standards, to reinforce the army in Spain. The other
incident, which he learnt from a prisoner, was the sale by auction of the
spot on which he had fixed his camp, and the fact that, in spite of his
occupation of it, there was no abatement in the price. That any one should
have been found in Rome to buy the ground which he was holding in possession
as spoil of war, seemed to Hannibal such an insulting piece of arrogance
that he instantly summoned a crier and made him give notice of the sale
of the silversmiths' shops round the Forum of Rome.

These incidents led to his withdrawal from Rome, and he retired as far
as the river Tutia, six miles distant from the City. From there he marched
to the grove of Feronia and the temple, which was celebrated in those days
for its wealth. The people of Capena and other cities round used to bring
their first-fruits and other offerings, according to their ability, and
they had also embellished it with a considerable quantity of gold and silver.
Now the temple was despoiled of all its treasures. Great heaps of metal,
where the soldiers, struck by remorse, had thrown pieces of uncoined brass,
were found there after Hannibal's departure. All writers are agreed as
to the plundering of this temple. Coelius tell us that Hannibal diverted
his march to it while he was going from Eretum to Rome, after marching
from Amiternum by Reate and Cutiliae. According to this writer, on leaving
Capua, Hannibal entered Samnium, and from there passed to the Peligni;
then, marching past the town of Sulmo, he crossed the frontiers of the
Marrucini and then advanced through the Alban territory to the country
of the Marsi, and from there to Amiternum and the hamlet of Foruli. There
can be no uncertainty as to the route he took, for the traces of that great
commander and his large army could not have been lost in so short a space
of time; the only point at issue is whether that was the route he took
when he marched to Rome or whether he followed it on his return to Campania.

[26.12]The energy with which the Romans
pressed the siege of Capua was far greater than that which Hannibal exhibited
in its defence, for he hurried away through Lucania to Bruttium in the
hope of surprising Regium. Though the siege was in no way relaxed during
Fulvius' absence, his return made a sensible difference in the conduct
of operations, and it was a matter of general surprise that Hannibal had
not returned at the same time. The Capuans gradually learnt through their
conversations with the besiegers that they were abandoned and left to themselves,
and that the Carthaginians had given up all hope of saving Capua. In accordance
with a resolution of the senate, the proconsul issued an edict which was
published in the city, that any Campanian burgher who went over to the
Romans before a certain day would be amnestied. Not a single man went over;
their fears prevented them from trusting the Romans, for they had in their
revolt committed crimes too great for any hope of pardon. But whilst no
one would provide for his own safety by going over to the enemy, there
was nothing done for the public safety in the way of wise or prudent counsel.
The nobility had deserted their public duties; it was impossible to get
together a meeting of the senate. The supreme magistracy was held by a
man who conferred no honour on his office; on the contrary, his unfitness
detracted from its authority and power. None of the nobility were to be
seen in the forum, or indeed anywhere in public; they shut themselves up
at home waiting for their country's downfall and their own destruction.
All responsibility was thrown upon the commandants of the Punic garrison,
Bostar and Hanno, and they were much more concerned for their own safety
than for that of their supporters in the city. A communication was drawn
up for the purpose of forwarding it to Hannibal, in which he was directly
charged with surrendering Capua into the enemy's hands and exposing his
garrison to every kind of torture. He had gone off, so the despatch hinted,
to be out of the way, lest Capua should be taken before his eyes, The Romans
could not be drawn off from besieging Capua even when an attack was threatened
on their city; so much more determination did the Romans show as enemies,
than the Carthaginians as friends. If Hannibal would return to Capua and
turn the whole tide of war in that direction, then the garrison were prepared
to make an attack on the besiegers. He had not crossed the Alps to make
war with Regium or Tarentum; where the legions of Rome were, there ought
the armies of Carthage to be. That was how he had conquered at Cannae,
and at Thrasymenus, by meeting the enemy face to face, army to army, and
trying his fortune in battle.

This was the main drift of the despatch. It was handed to some Numidians
who had undertaken to carry it on promise of a reward. They had come into
Fulvius' camp as deserters, intending to seize a favourable opportunity
of slipping away, and the famine from which Capua had long been suffering
was a very good reason why they should desert. A Campanian woman, however,
the mistress of one of these deserters, suddenly appeared in the camp and
informed the Roman commander that the Numidians had come in as part of
a pre-arranged plot, and were really carrying a despatch to Hannibal, and
that she was prepared to prove it, as one of them had disclosed the affair
to her. When this man was brought forward, he at first stoutly denied all
knowledge of the woman, but gradually he gave way before the truth, especially
when he saw that instruments of torture were being sent for and got ready,
and at last made a complete confession. The despatch was produced, and
further evidence came to light, as it was found that other Numidians were
at large in the Roman camp under the guise of deserters. Above seventy
of them were arrested and together with the recent arrivals were all scourged,
and their hands were cut off, after which they were sent back to Capua.
The sight of this terrible punishment broke the spirit of the Capuans.

[26.13]The people went in a body to the
senate house and insisted on Loesius summoning the senate. They openly
threatened the nobles who had so long absented themselves from the senate,
that they would go round to their houses and drag them all by main force
into the streets. These threats resulted in a full meeting of the senate.
The general opinion was in favour of sending a deputation to the Roman
commander, but Vibius Virrius, the prime author of the revolt from Rome,
when asked his opinion, told those who were talking about a deputation
and terms of peace and surrender that they were forgetting what they would
have done had they had the Romans in their power, or what, as circumstances
now were, they would have to suffer. "Why! ," he exclaimed, "do
you imagine that our surrender now will be like the one we made in old
days when, in order to get help against the Samnites, we surrendered ourselves
and all that belonged to us to Rome? Have you already forgotten at what
a critical moment for Rome we revolted from her? How we put to death with
every torture and indignity the garrison which we could easily have sent
away? What numerous and desperate sorties we have made against our besiegers,
how we have assaulted their lines and called Hannibal in to crush them?
Have you forgotten this last act of ours when we sent him to attack Rome
?

"Now look at the other side, consider their determined hostility
to us and see if you have anything to hope for. Though there was a foreign
enemy on Italian soil, and that enemy Hannibal, though the flames of war
were being kindled in every quarter, they neglected everything, even Hannibal
himself, and sent both the consuls, each with an army, to Capua. For two
years now have they hemmed us in with their lines of circumvallation, and
are wearing us down with famine. They have endured as much as we have in
the extremity of peril, the utmost severity of toil; often have they been
slaughtered about their entrenchments, and all but driven out of them.
But I pass over these things; the labours and dangers of a siege are an
old and common experience. But to show their rage and implacable hatred
against us I will remind you of these incidents: Hannibal assaulted their
lines with an enormous force of infantry and cavalry, and partly captured
them, but they did not raise the siege; he crossed the Volturnus and desolated
the district of Calenum with fire; the sufferings of their allies failed
to call off the Romans; he ordered a general advance on Rome itself, they
disregarded the threatening storm; he crossed the Anio and encamped within
three miles of the City, and at last rode up to its walls and gates and
made as though he would take their city from them if they did not loose
their hold on Capua; they did not loose their hold. When wild beasts are
mad with rage you can still divert their blind fury by approaching their
lairs and young ones which they will hasten to defend. The Romans were
not diverted from Capua by the prospect of their city being besieged, or
by the terrified cries of their wives and children which could almost be
heard here, or by the threatened desecration of their hearths and altars,
of the shrines of their gods and the tombs of their ancestors. So eager
are they to visit us with punishment, so greedily do they thirst for our
blood. And, perhaps, rightly; we should have done the same had fortune
favoured us.

"Heaven, however, has ordered otherwise, and so, though I am bound
to meet my death in any case, I can, whilst I am still free, escape the
insults and the tortures which the enemy is preparing for me, I can dispose
of myself by a death as peaceful as it is honourable. I refuse to look
upon Appius Claudius and Q. Fulvius exulting in all the insolence of victory;
I refuse to be dragged in chains through the streets of Rome to grace their
triumph, and then in the dungeon or bound to the stake, with my back torn
with the scourge, pass under the headsman's axe. I will not see my city
plundered and burnt, and the matrons and maidens and noble boys of Capua
ravished and outraged. Alba, the mother city of Rome, was rased by the
Romans to its foundations in order that no memorial of their origin and
of the stock whence they sprung might survive; much less can I believe
that they will spare Capua which they hate more bitterly than they hate
Carthage. So, for those of you who intend to meet your fate before you
witness all these horrors I have prepared a banquet today at my house.
When you have taken your fill of food and wine, the same goblet that is
handed to me will be passed round to you. That draught will free our bodies
from torture, our spirits from insult, our eyes and ears from seeing and
hearing all the suffering and outrage which await the vanquished. Men will
be in readiness to place our lifeless bodies on a vast pile which will
be kindled in the court-yard of the house. This is the only path to death
which is honourable and worthy of free men. Even the enemy will admire
our courage, and Hannibal will know that the allies whom he has abandoned
and betrayed were, after all, brave men."

[26.14]This speech of Virrius was received
with approbation by many who had not the courage to carry out what they
approved of. The majority of the senators were not without hope that the
clemency of the Roman people so often experienced in former wars would
be once more extended to them, and they determined to send envoys to make
a formal surrender of Capua. About seven-and-twenty accompanied Virrius
home and banqueted with him. When they had as far as possible deadened
their feelings with wine against the sense of impending evil, they all
partook of the poisoned cup. Then they rose from table and grasped each
other's hands and took a last embrace of one another, weeping for their
own and their country's doom. Some remained that they might be cremated
together on the same funeral pyre, others departed for their homes. The
congestion of the veins caused by the food and wine they had taken made
the action of the poison somewhat slow, and most of them lingered through
the whole night and part of the following day. All however, expired before
the gates were opened to the enemy. The following day, the gate called
"the Gate of Jupiter," opposite the Roman camp, was opened by
the proconsul's order. One legion was admitted through it and two squadrons
of allied cavalry, with C. Fulvius in command. First he took care that
all the weapons of war in Capua were brought to him; then, after stationing
guards at all the gates to prevent any exit or escape, he arrested the
Punic garrison and ordered the senate to go to the Roman commanders. On
their arrival in the camp they were manacled, and ordered to send word
for all the gold and silver they possessed to be brought to the quaestors.
This amounted to 2072 pounds of gold and 31,200 pounds of silver. Twenty-five
senators were sent to be kept in custody at Cales, and twenty-eight who
were proved to have been mainly instrumental in bringing about the revolt
were sent to Teanum

[26.15]As to the punishment to be meted
out to the senators of Capua, Claudius and Fulvius were anything but unanimous.
Claudius was prepared to grant them pardon, but Fulvius took a much sterner
line. Appius Claudius wished to refer the whole question to the senate
at Rome. He maintained that it was but right that the senators should have
an opportunity of investigating all the circumstances and finding out whether
the Capuans had made any of the allies or the Latins or the municipal burghs
privy to their designs, and if so, whether any of these had given them
assistance in the war. Fulvius, on the other hand, declared that the very
last thing they ought to do was to harass their faithful allies by vague
charges and put them at the mercy of informers who were perfectly indifferent
as to what they said or what they did. Any such investigation therefore
he should stifle. After this interchange of views they parted, Appius feeling
no doubt that in spite of his violent language his comrade would, in such
an important matter, await instructions from Rome. Fulvius, determined
to forestall any such obstacle to his designs, dismissed the council and
ordered the military tribunes and the officers of the allies to select
2000 horsemen and warn them to be in readiness by the time the third watch
was sounded. Starting with this force in the night, he reached Teanum at
day-break and rode straight into the forum. A crowd had collected at the
first entry of the cavalry, and Fulvius ordered the chief magistrate of
the district to be summoned, and on his appearance commanded him to produce
the Capuans who were in his custody. They were all brought forward and
then scourged and beheaded. Then putting spurs to his horse he rode to
Cales. When he had taken his seat on the tribunal and the Capuans who had
been brought out were being bound to the stake, a mounted messenger arrived
post-haste from Rome and handed Fulvius a despatch from the praetor C.
Calpurnius containing the decree of the senate. The spectators guessed
the nature of the contents, and those standing round the tribunal expressed
their belief - a belief which soon found expression throughout the Assembly
- that the whole question of the treatment of the Capuan prisoners was
to be left to the senate. Fulvius thought so too; he took the letter and
without opening it placed it in his breast and then ordered his marshal
to tell the lictor to carry out the law. Thus, those who were at Cales
were also executed. Now he read the despatch and the decree of the senate.
But it was too late to prevent a deed accomplished, which had been hurried
on as quickly as possible in order that it might not be prevented. Just
as Fulvius was leaving the tribunal a Capuan named Taurea Vibellius strode
through the middle of the crowd and addressed him by name. Fulvius resumed
his seat, wondering what the man wanted. "Order me too," he cried,
to be put to death so that you may boast of having caused the death of
a braver man than yourself." Fulvius declared that the man was certainly
out of his mind, and added that even if he wished to kill him he was prevented
from doing so by the decree of the senate. Then Vibellius exclaimed, "Now
that my native city has been taken, my friends and relations lost to me,
my wife and children slain by my own hand to save them from insult and
outrage, and since even the opportunity of dying as my fellow-countrymen
here have died is refused me, let me seek in courage a release from the
life which has become so hateful to me." With these words he drew
out a sword which he had concealed in his garment, and plunging it into
his heart fell dying at the general's feet.

[26.16]As the execution of the Capuans
and most of the other steps taken were carried out by the instructions
of Fulvius alone, some authors assert that Appius Claudius died immediately
after the surrender of Capua. According to this account, Taurea did not
come voluntarily to Cales, nor did he perish by his own hand; when he had
been tied to the stake along with the others he shouted repeatedly, and
as owing to the noise they could not hear what he was saying, Fulvius ordered
silence. Then Taurea said, as I have already related, that he was being
done to death by a man who was far from being his equal in courage. At
these words, the marshal, on the proconsul's order gave this direction
to the lictor: "Lictor, let this brave man have more of the rod, and
execute the law upon him first of all." Some authors assert that the
decree of the senate was read before the men were beheaded, but there was
a proviso in it to the effect that if he thought fit, he might refer the
question to the senate, and Fulvius took this to mean that he was at liberty
to decide as to what would be the best course in the interests of the republic.
After Fulvius returned to Capua, he received the submission of Atella and
Calatia. Here too the ringleaders in the revolt were punished; seventy
of the leading senators were put to death, and three hundred Campanian
nobles thrown into prison. Others who were distributed amongst the various
Latin cities to be kept in custody perished from various causes; the rest
of the population of Capua were sold as slaves. The question now was what
was to be done with the city and its territory. Some were of opinion that
a city so strong, so near to Rome and so hostile to it, ought to be utterly
destroyed. Utilitarian considerations however prevailed. The territory
was generally allowed to be the first in Italy in point of productiveness,
and the only reason why the city was spared was that there might be a place
for the tillers of the soil to live in. A motley throng of peasants, freedmen,
small tradesmen and artisans were told off to occupy the place; the whole
of the territory with the buildings on it became the property of the Roman
State. It was settled that Capua itself should be simply a lodgment and
a shelter, a city merely in name; there was to be no corporate life, no
senate, no council of the plebs, no magistrates; the population were without
any right of public assembly or self-government; they had no common interest
and were incapable of taking any common action. The administration of justice
was in the hands of a praetor who was to be sent annually from Rome. In
this way matters were arranged at Capua in pursuance of a policy which
commends itself from every point of view. Sternly and swiftly was punishment
meted out to those who had been most guilty, the civic population was scattered
far and wide with no hope of return, the unoffending walls and houses were
spared from the ravages of fire and demolition. The preservation of the
city, whilst it was a material advantage to Rome, afforded to the friendly
communities a striking proof of her lenity; the whole of Campania and all
the surrounding nationalities would have been horror-struck at the destruction
of such a famous and wealthy city. The enemy, on the other hand, was made
to realise the power of Rome to punish those who were faithless to her,
and the powerlessness of Hannibal to protect those who had gone over to
him.

[26.17]Now that the senate was relieved
from its anxiety about Capua, it was able to turn its attention to Spain.
A force of 6000 infantry and 300 cavalry was placed at Nero's disposal,
and he selected it from the two legions he had had with him at Capua; an
equal number of infantry and 600 cavalry were to be furnished by the allies.
He embarked his army at Puteoli and landed at Tarraco. Here he hauled his
ships ashore and furnished the crews with arms, thus augmenting his strength.
With this composite force he marched to the Ebro and took over the army
there from Ti. Fonteius and L. Marcius. He then advanced against the enemy.
Hasdrubal - Hamilcar's son - was encamped at the Lapides Atri (the "Black
Boulders"). This is a place in the Auretanian country between the
towns of Iliturgis and Mentissa. Nero occupied the two exits of the pass.
Hasdrubal, finding himself shut in, sent a herald to promise in his name
that he would deport the whole of his army from Spain if he were allowed
to leave his position. The Roman general was glad to accept the offer,
and Hasdrubal asked for an interview the following day. At this conference
they were to draw up in writing the terms upon which the various citadels
were to be handed over, and the date at which the garrisons were to be
withdrawn, on the understanding that they should take with them all their
goods and chattels.

His request was granted, and Hasdrubal ordered the most heavily armed
portion of his army to get out of the pass as best they could as soon as
darkness set in. He was careful to see that not very many went out that
night, as a small body would make but little noise and be more likely to
escape observation. They would also find their way more easily through
the narrow and difficult foot-paths. The next day he kept the appointment,
but so much time was taken up in discussing and writing down a number of
things which had nothing to do with the matters they had agreed to discuss,
that the whole day was lost and the business adjourned till the morrow.
So another opportunity was afforded him of sending off a fresh body of
troops by night. The discussion was not brought to a close the next day,
and so it went on; several days were occupied in discussing terms, and
the nights in despatching the Carthaginians secretly from their camp. When
the greater part of the army had escaped, Hasdrubal no longer kept to the
conditions which he had himself proposed, and there was less and less desire
to come to terms as his sincerity diminished with his fears. Almost the
entire force of infantry had now got out of the defile when, at daybreak,
a dense fog covered the valley and the whole of the surrounding country.
No sooner did Hasdrubal become aware of this than he sent a message to
Nero begging that the interview might be put off for that day as it was
a day on which the Carthaginians were forbidden by their religion to transact
any important business. Even this did not arouse any suspicion of trickery.
On learning that he would be excused for that day, Hasdrubal promptly left
his camp with the cavalry and elephants, and by keeping his movements secret,
emerged into safety. About ten o'clock the sun dispersed the mist, and
the Romans saw that the hostile camp was deserted. Then, recognising at
last the trick which the Carthaginian had played upon him and how he had
been befooled, Nero hurriedly prepared to follow him and force him to an
engagement. The enemy, however, declined battle; only a few skirmishes
took place between the Carthaginian rear and the Roman advanced guard.

[26.18]The Spanish tribes who had revolted
after the defeat of the two Scipios showed no signs of returning to their
allegiance; there were not, however, any fresh instances. After the recovery
of Capua the public interest both in senate and people centered in Spain
quite as much as in Italy; and it was decided that the army serving there
should be increased and a commander-in-chief appointed. There was, however,
much uncertainty felt as to whom they ought to appoint. Two consummate
generals had fallen within thirty days of each other, and the selection
of a man to take their place demanded exceptional care. Various names were
proposed, and at last it was arranged that the matter should be left to
the people, and a proconsul for Spain formally elected. The consuls fixed
a day for the election. They were in hopes that those who felt themselves
qualified for such an important command would become candidates. They were,
however, disappointed, and the disappointment renewed the grief of the
people, as they thought of the defeats they had sustained and the generals
they had lost. The citizens were depressed, almost in despair, nevertheless
they went out to the Campus Martius on the day fixed for the election.
All turned their eyes to the magistrates and watched the expression of
the leaders of the republic as they looked enquiringly at one another.
Everywhere men were saying that the State was in such a hopeless condition
that no one dared to accept the command in Spain. Suddenly, Publius Cornelius
Scipio, the son of the Scipio who had fallen in Spain, a young man barely
twenty-four years old, took his stand upon a slight eminence where he could
be seen and heard, and announced himself as a candidate. All eyes were
turned towards him, and the delighted cheers with which his announcement
was received were at once interpreted as an omen of his future good fortune
and success. On proceeding to vote, not only the centuries but even the
individual voters were unanimous to a man in favour of entrusting P. Scipio
with the supreme command in Spain. When, however, the election was decided
and their enthusiasm had had time to cool down, there was a sudden silence
as the people began to reflect on what they had done, and ask themselves
whether their personal affection for him might not have got the better
of their judgment. What gave them the greatest concern was his youth. Some,
too, recalled with dread the fortune that had attended his house, and regarded
as ominous of evil even the name of the man who was quitting two bereaved
families in order to carry on a campaign round the tombs of his uncle and
his father.

[26.19]Seeing how the step which they
had taken so impetuously now filled them with anxiety, Scipio called the
voters together and spoke to them about his age and the command which they
had entrusted to him, and the war which he had to conduct. He spoke in
such lofty and glowing words that he evoked their enthusiasm once more,
and inspired them with more hopeful confidence than is usually called out
by faith in men's promises or by reasonable anticipations of success. Scipio
won people's admiration not only by the sterling qualities which he possessed,
but also by his cleverness in displaying them, a cleverness which he had
developed from early youth. In his public life he generally spoke and acted
as though he were guided either by visions of the night or by some divine
inspiration, whether it was that he was really open to superstitious influences
or that he claimed oracular sanction for his commands and counsels in order
to secure prompt adoption. He sought to create this impression on men's
minds from the beginning, from the day when he assumed the toga virilis,
for he never undertook any important business, either public or private,
without first going to the Capitol, where he sat for some time in the temple
in privacy and alone. This custom, which he kept up all through his life,
gave rise to a widespread belief, whether designedly upon his part or not,
that he was of divine origin, and the story was told of him which was commonly
related of Alexander - a story as silly as it was fabulous - that he was
begotten by an enormous serpent which had been often seen in his mother's
bedroom, but on any one's approach, suddenly uncoiled itself and disappeared.
The belief in these marvels was never scoffed at by him; on the contrary,
it was strengthened by deliberate policy on his part in refusing to deny
or to admit that anything of the kind ever occurred. There were many other
traits in this young man's character, some of which were genuine, others
the result of studied acting, which created a greater admiration for him
than usually falls to the lot of man.

It was the confidence with which he had in this way inspired his fellow-citizens
that led them to entrust to him, young as he was, a task of enormous difficulty,
and a command which involved the gravest responsibilities. The force which
he had formed out of the old army in Spain, and that which sailed from
Puteoli with C. Nero, were further reinforced by 10,000 infantry and 1000
cavalry. M. Junius Silanus was appointed as his second in command. Setting
sail from the mouth of the Tiber with a fleet of thirty vessels, all quinqueremes,
he coasted along the Etruscan shore, crossed the Gulf of Gaul, and after
rounding the Pyrenaean Promontory brought up at Emporiae, a Greek city,
founded by settlers from Phocaea. Here he disembarked his troops and proceeded
overland to Tarraco, leaving orders for his fleet to follow his movements.
At Tarraco he was met by deputations which had been sent from all the friendly
tribes as soon as they knew of his coming. The vessels were hauled ashore,
and the four Massilian triremes which had acted as convoy were sent home.
The deputations informed Scipio of the unsettlement amongst their tribes
due to the varying fortunes of the war. He replied in a bold and assured
tone, full of self-confidence, but no expression savouring of presumption
or arrogance escaped him, everything he said was marked by perfect dignity
and sincerity.

[26.20]Tarraco was now his headquarters.
From there he paid visits to the friendly tribes, and also inspected the
winter quarters of the army. He praised them warmly for having maintained
their hold on the province after sustaining two such terrible blows, and
also for keeping the enemy to the south of the Ebro, thereby depriving
them of any advantages from their victories, and also affording protection
to their own friends. Marcius, whom he kept with him, he treated with so
much honour that it was perfectly obvious that Scipio had not the slightest
fear of his reputation being dimmed by anybody. Soon afterwards Silanus
succeeded Nero and the new troops were sent into winter quarters. After
making all the necessary visits and inspections and completing the preparations
for the next campaign Scipio returned to Tarraco. His reputation was quite
as great among the enemy as among his own countrymen; there was amongst
the former a foreboding, a vague sense of fear which was all the stronger
because no reason for it could be given. The Carthaginian armies withdrew
into their respective winter-quarters: Hasdrubal, the son of Gisgo, to
Gades on the coast, Mago into the interior above the forest of Castulo,
Hasdrubal, the son of Hamilcar, near the Ebro in the neighbourhood of Saguntum.
This summer, marked by two important events, the recovery of Capua and
the despatch of Scipio to Spain, was drawing to a close when a Carthaginian
fleet was sent from Sicily to Tarentum to intercept supplies from the Roman
garrison in the citadel. It certainly succeeded in blocking all access
to the citadel from the sea, but the longer it remained the greater was
the scarcity amongst the townspeople as compared with that amongst the
Romans in the citadel. For though the coast was clear and open access was
secured to the harbour by the Carthaginian fleet, it was impossible to
convey to the population of the city as much corn as was consumed by the
crowd of sailors, drawn from every class, on board the fleet. The garrison
in the citadel, on the other hand, being only a small body, were able to
exist on what they had previously laid in, without any external supply.
At length the ships were sent away, and their departure was hailed with
more delight than their arrival had been. But the scarcity was not in the
slightest degree lessened, for when their protection was withdrawn, corn
could not be brought in at all.

[26.21]Towards the end of this summer
M. Marcellus left Sicily for Rome. On his arrival in the City he was granted
an audience of the senate in the Temple of Bellona. After giving a report
of his campaign and gently protesting on his own behalf and on that of
his soldiers against not being allowed to bring them home, though he had
completely pacified the province, he requested to be allowed to enter the
City in triumph. After a lengthy debate his request was refused. On the
one hand, it was argued, it was most inconsistent to refuse him a triumph
now that he was on the spot after the way in which the news of his successes
in Sicily had been received, and public thanksgivings and special rites
ordered while he was still in his province. Against this it was alleged
that as the senate had ordered him to hand over his army to his successor,
it was a proof that a state of war still existed in the province, and he
could not enjoy a triumph since he had not brought the war to a close,
nor was his army present to testify as to whether he deserved a triumph
or not. They decided upon a middle course, he was to be allowed an ovation.
The tribunes of the plebs were authorised by the senate to propose as an
ordinance to the people "that for the day on which he entered the
City in ovation M. Marcellus should retain his command."

The day previous to this he celebrated his triumph on the Alban Mount.
From there he marched into the City in ovation. An enormous quantity of
spoil was carried before him together with a model of Syracuse at the time
of its capture. Catapults and ballistae and all the engines of war taken
from the city were exhibited in the procession, as were also the works
of art which had been accumulated in royal profusion during the long years
of peace. These included a number of articles in silver and bronze, pieces
of furniture, costly garments and many famous statues with which Syracuse,
like all the principal cities of Greece, had been adorned. To signalise
his victories over the Carthaginians eight elephants were led in the procession.
Not the least conspicuous feature of the spectacle was the sight of Sosis
the Syracusan and Moericus the Spaniard who marched in front wearing golden
crowns. The former had guided the nocturnal entry into Syracuse, the latter
had been the agent in the surrender of Nasos and its garrison. Each of
these men received the full Roman citizenship and 500 jugera of land. Sosis
was to take his allotment in that part of the Syracusan territory which
had belonged to the king or to those who had taken up arms against Rome,
and he was allowed to choose any house in Syracuse which had been the property
of those who had been put to death under the laws of war. A further order
was made that Moericus and the Spaniards should have assigned to them a
city and lands in Sicily out of the possessions of those who had revolted
from Rome. M. Cornelius was commissioned to select the city and territory
for them, where he thought best, and 400 jugera in the same district were
also decreed as a gift to Belligenes through whose instrumentality Moericus
had been induced to change sides. After Marcellus' departure from Sicily
a Carthaginian fleet landed a force of 8000 infantry and 3000 Numidian
horse. The cities of Murgentia and Ergetium revolted to them, and their
example was followed by Hybla and Macella and some other less important
places. Muttines and his Numidians were also roaming all through the island
and laying waste the fields of Rome's allies with fire. To add to these
troubles the Roman army bitterly resented not being withdrawn from the
province with their commander and also not being allowed to winter in the
towns. Consequently they were very remiss in their military duties; in
fact it was only the absence of a leader that prevented them from breaking
out into open mutiny. In spite of these difficulties the praetor M. Cornelius
succeeded by remonstrances and reassurances in calming the temper of his
men, and then reduced all the revolted cities to submission. In pursuance
of the senate's orders he selected Murgentia, one of those cities, for
the settlement of Moericus and his Spaniards.

[26.22]As both the consuls had Apulia
for their province, and as there was less danger from Hannibal and his
Carthaginians, they received instructions to ballot for Apulia and Macedonia.
Macedonia fell to Sulpicius, and he superseded Laevinus. Fulvius was recalled
to conduct the consular elections in Rome. The Veturian century of juniors
was the first to vote, and they declared for T. Manlius Torquatus and T.
Otacilius, the latter being at the time absent from Rome. The voters began
to press round Manlius to congratulate him, regarding his election as a
certainty, but he at once proceeded, surrounded by a large crowd, to the
consul's tribunal and begged to be allowed to make a brief speech and also
asked that the century which had voted might be recalled. When all were
on the tiptoe of expectation to learn what he wanted, he began by excusing
himself on the score of his eyesight. "A man must have little sense
of shame," he continued "whether he be pilot of a ship or commander
of an army, who asks that the lives and fortunes of others should be committed
to him when, in all he does, he has to depend upon other people's eyes.
If, therefore, you approve, order the Veturian century of juniors to cast
their vote again, and to remember, whilst they are choosing their consuls,
the war in Italy and the critical position of the republic. Your ears can
hardly yet have recovered from the uproar and confusion caused by the enemy
a few months ago, when he brought the flames of war almost up to the very
walls of Rome." The century replied with a general shout that they
had not changed their minds, they should vote as before. Then Torquatus
said, "I shall not be able to tolerate your manners and conduct, nor
will you submit to my authority. Go back and vote again, and bear in mind
that the Carthaginians are carrying war in Italy, and that their leader
is Hannibal." Then the century, swayed by the speaker's personal authority
and by the murmurs of admiration which they heard all around them, begged
the consul to call up the Veturian century of seniors, as they wished to
consult their elders and be guided by their advice in the choice of consuls.
They were accordingly called up and an interval was allowed for the two
bodies to consult privately in the ovile. The seniors maintained that the
choice really lay between three men, two of them already full of honours
- Q. Fabius and M. Marcellus - and, if they particularly wished a new man
to be appointed consul to act against the Carthaginians, M. Valerius Laevinus,
who had conducted operations against Philip both by sea and land with conspicuous
success. So they discussed the claims of these three, and after the seniors
had withdrawn the juniors proceeded to vote. They gave their vote in favour
of M. Marcellus Claudius, resplendent with the glory of his conquest of
Sicily, and, as the second consul, M. Valerius. Neither of them had put
in a personal appearance. The other centuries all followed the leading
century. People nowadays may laugh at the admirers of antiquity. I for
my part do not believe it possible, even if there ever existed a commonwealth
of wise men such as philosophers dream of but have never really known,
that there could be an aristocracy more grave or more temperate in their
desire for power or a people with purer manners and a higher moral tone.
That a century of juniors should have been anxious to consult their seniors
as to whom they were to place in supreme authority is a thing hardly credible
in these days, when we see in what contempt children hold the authority
of their parents.

[26.23]Then followed the election of praetors.
The successful candidates were P. Manlius Vulso, L. Manlius Acidinus, C.
Laetorius and L. Cincius Alimentus. When the elections were over news came
of the death of T. Otacilius in Sicily. He was the man whom the people
would have given to T. Manlius as his colleague in the consulship, if the
order of the proceedings had not been interrupted. The Games of Apollo
had been exhibited the previous year, and when the question of their repetition
the next year was moved by the praetor Calpurnius, the senate passed a
decree that they should be observed for all time. Some portents were observed
this year and duly reported. The statue of victory which stood on the roof
of the temple of Concord was struck by lightning and thrown down on to
the statues of Victory which stood above the facade in front of the pediment,
and here it was caught and prevented from falling lower. At Anagnia and
Fregellae the walls and gates were reported to have been struck. In the
forum of Subertum streams of blood had flowed for a whole day. At Eretium
there was a shower of stones and at Reate a mule had produced offspring.
These portents were expiated by sacrifices of full-grown victims; a day
was appointed for special intercessions and the people were ordered to
join in solemn rites for nine days. Some members of the national priesthood
died this year, and others were appointed in their stead. Manlius Aemilius
Numida, one of the Keepers of the Sacred Books, was succeeded by M. Aemilius
Lepidus. C. Livius was appointed pontiff in the room of M. Pomponius Matho,
and M. Servilius, augur, in the place of Spurius Carvilius Maximus. The
death of the pontiff T. Otacilius Crassus did not occur before the close
of the year, so no one was appointed in his place. C. Claudius, one of
the Flamens of Jupiter, was guilty of irregularity in laying the selected
parts of the victim on the altar and consequently resigned his office.

[26.24]M. Valerius Laevinus had been holding
private interviews with some of the leading Aetolians with the view of
ascertaining their political leanings. It was arranged that a meeting of
their national council should be convened to meet him, and thither he proceeded
with some fast-sailing vessels. He commenced his address to the assembly
by alluding to the captures of Syracuse and Capua as instances of the success
which had attended the arms of Rome in Sicily and Italy, and then proceeded:
"It is the practice of the Romans, a practice handed down from their
ancestors, to cultivate the friendship of other nations; some of them they
have received into citizenship on the same footing as themselves; others
they have allowed to remain under such favourable conditions that they
preferred alliance to full citizenship. You, Aetolians, will be held in
all the greater honour because you will have been the first of all the
oversea nations to establish friendly relations with us. Philip and the
Macedonians you find to be troublesome neighbours; I have already dealt
a fatal blow to their ambitions and aggressiveness, and I shall reduce
them to such a pass that they will not only evacuate those cities which
they have wrested from you, but will have enough to do to defend Macedonia
itself. The Acarnanians, too, whose secession from your league you feel
so keenly, I shall bring back to the old terms by which your rights and
suzerainty over them were guaranteed." These assertions and promises
of the Roman commander were supported by Scopas, the chief magistrate of
Aetolia at the time, and by Dorimachus, a leading man amongst them, both
of whom from their official position spoke with authority. They were less
reserved, and adopted a more confident tone as they extolled the power
and greatness of Rome. What weighed most, however, with the Assembly was
the hope of becoming masters of Acarnania.

The terms on which they were to become the friends and allies of Rome
were reduced to writing and an additional clause was inserted that if it
was their will and pleasure the Eleans and Lacedaemonians as well as Attalus,
Pleuratus and Scerdilaedus might be included in the treaty. Attalus was
king of Pergamum in Asia Minor; Pleuratus, king of the Thracians; Scerdilaedus,
king of the Illyrians. The Aetolians were at once to commence war with
Philip on land, and the Roman general would assist them with not less than
twenty-five quinqueremes. The territories, buildings and walls of all the
cities as far as Corcyra were to become the property of the Aetolians,
all the other booty was to go to the Romans, who were also to be responsible
for Acarnania passing under the dominion of the Aetolians. Should the Aetolians
make peace with Philip, one of the conditions was to be that he would abstain
from hostilities against Rome and her allies and dependencies. Similarly,
if the Romans made a treaty with him it was to be a provision that he should
not be allowed to make war upon the Aetolians and their allies. These were
the agreed conditions, and after a lapse of two years, copies of the treaty
were deposited by the Aetolians at Olympia, and by the Romans in the Capitol,
in order that the sacred memorials round them might be a perpetual witness
to their obligation. The reason for this delay was that the Aetolian envoys
had been detained for a considerable time in Rome. No time, however, was
lost in commencing hostilities, and Laevinus attacked Zacynthus. This is
a small island adjacent to Aetolia, and it contains one city of the same
name as the island; this city, with the exception of its citadel, Laevinus
captured. He also took two cities belonging to the Acarnanians -Oeniadae
and Nasos - and handed them over to the Aetolians. After this he withdrew
to Corcyra, feeling satisfied that Philip had enough on his hands with
the war on his frontiers to prevent him from thinking about Italy and the
Carthaginians and his compact with Hannibal.

[26.25]Philip was wintering in Pella when
the news of the defection of the Aetolians reached him. He had intended
to march into Greece at the beginning of the spring, and with the view
of keeping the Illyrians and the cities adjacent to his western frontier
quiet he made a sudden invasion into the territories of Oricum and Apollonia.
The men of Apollonia came out to give battle, but he drove them back in
great panic to their walls. After devastating the neighbouring district
of Illyria, he turned swiftly into Pelagonia and captured Sintia, a city
of the Dardani, which gave them easy access into Macedonia. After these
rapid incursions he turned his attention to the war which the Aetolians,
in conjunction with the Romans, were commencing against him. Marching through
Pelagonia, Lyncus and Bottiaea he descended into Thessaly, whose population
he hoped to rouse to joint action with him against the Aetolians. Leaving
Perseus with a force of 4000 men to hold the pass into Thessaly against
them he returned to Macedonia, before engaging in the more serious contest,
and from there marched into Thrace to attack the Maedi. This tribe were
in the habit of making incursions into Macedonia whenever they found the
king occupied with some distant war and his kingdom unprotected. To break
their aggressiveness he devastated their country, and attacked Iamphoryna,
their chief city and stronghold.

When Scopas heard that the king had gone into Thessaly, and was engaged
in hostilities there, he called up all the fighting men of Aetolia and
prepared to invade Acarnania. The Acarnanians were inferior to their enemy
in strength; they were also aware that Oeniadae and Nasos were lost, and
above all, that the arms of Rome were turned against them. Under these
circumstances they entered upon the struggle more in a spirit of rage and
despair than with prudence and method. Their wives and children and all
men over sixty years of age were sent into the adjoining country of Epirus.
All who were between fifteen and sixty bound themselves by oath not to
return home unless they were victorious, and if any one left the field,
defeated, no man should receive him into any city or house or admit him
to his table or his hearth. They drew up a form of words, invoking a terrible
curse upon any of their countrymen who should prove recreants, and a most
solemn appeal to their hosts, the Epirotes, to respect their oath. They
also begged them to bury those of their countrymen who fell in battle in
one common grave and place over it this inscription: "Here lie the
Acarnanians who met their death whilst fighting for their country against
the violence and injustice of the Aetolians." In this determined and
desperate mood, they fixed their camp on the extreme limit of their borders
and awaited the enemy. Messengers were despatched to Philip to announce
their critical situation, and in spite of his recapture of Iamphoryna and
other successes in Thrace he was compelled to abandon his northern campaign
and go to their assistance. Rumours of the oath which the Acarnanians had
taken arrested the advance of the Aetolians; the news of Philip's approach
compelled them to withdraw into the interior of their country. Philip had
made a forced march to prevent the Acarnanians from being crushed, but
he did not advance beyond Dium, and on learning that the Aetolians had
retired he returned to Pella.

[26.26]At the beginning of spring Laevinus
set sail from Corcyra and after rounding the promontory of Leucata reached
Naupactus. He announced that he was going on to attack Anticyra, so that
Scopas and the Aetolians might be ready for him there. Anticyra is situated
in Locris, on the left hand as you enter the Corinthian Gulf, and is only
a short distance either by sea or land from Naupactus. In three days the
attack began in both directions; the naval attack was the heavier one because
the ships were furnished with artillery and engines of every kind, and
it was the Romans who were delivering the attack on this side. In a few
days the place surrendered and was made over to the Aetolians; the booty
in accordance with the treaty became the property of the Romans. During
the siege a despatch was handed to Laevinus informing him that he had been
made consul, and that P. Sulpicius was coming to succeed him. Whilst he
was there he was overtaken by a tedious illness, and consequently arrived
in Rome much later than was expected. M. Marcellus entered upon his consulship
on March 15, and in order to comply with traditional usage summoned a meeting
of the senate on the same day. The meeting was a purely formal one; he
announced that in his colleague's absence he should not submit any proposals
either in respect of the policy of the State or the assignment of provinces.
"I am quite aware," he told the senators, "that there are
a large body of Sicilians quartered in the country houses of my detractors
round the City. I have no intention of preventing them from publishing
here in Rome the charges which have been got up by my enemies; on the contrary,
I was prepared to give them an immediate opportunity of appearing before
the senate had they not pretended to be afraid of speaking about a consul
in his colleague's absence. When, however, my colleague has come I shall
not allow any business to be discussed before the Sicilians have been brought
into the senate house. M. Cornelius has issued what is practically a formal
summons throughout the island in order that as many as possible might come
to Rome to lay their complaints against me. He has filled the City with
letters containing false information about a state of war existing in Sicily,
solely that he may tarnish my reputation." The consul's speech won
for him the reputation of being a man of moderation and self-control. The
senate adjourned, and it seemed as though there would be a total suspension
of business pending the other consul's arrival. As usual, idleness led
to discontent and grumbling. The plebs were loud in their complaints about
the way the war dragged on, the devastation of the land round the City
wherever Hannibal and his army moved, the exhaustion of Italy by the constant
levies, the almost annual destruction of their armies. And now the new
consuls were both of them fond of war, far too enterprising and ambitious,
quite capable, even in a time of peace and quiet, of getting up a war,
and now that war was actually going on all the less likely to allow the
citizens any respite or breathing space.

[26.27]All this talk was suddenly interrupted
by a fire which broke out in the night in several places round the Forum
on the eve of the Quinquatrus. Seven shops which were afterwards replaced
by five were burning at the same time, as well as the offices where the
New Banks now stand. Soon after, private buildings - the Basilicae did
not yet exist - the Lautumiae, the Fish Market and the Hall of Vesta were
alight. It was with the utmost difficulty that the Temple of Vesta was
saved, mainly through the exertions of thirteen slaves, who were afterwards
manumitted at the public cost. The fire raged all through the next day
and there was not the smallest doubt that it was the work of incendiaries,
for fires started simultaneously in several different places. The senate
accordingly authorised the consul to give public notice that whoever disclosed
the names of those through whose agency the conflagration had been started
should, if he were a freeman, receive a reward, if a slave, his liberty.
Tempted by the offer of a reward, a slave belonging to the Capuan family
of the Calavii, called Manus, gave information to the effect that his masters,
together with five young Capuan nobles, whose fathers had been beheaded
by Q. Fulvius, had caused the fire and were prepared to commit every description
of crime if they were not arrested. They and their slaves were at once
apprehended. At first they endeavoured to throw suspicion upon the informer
and his statement. It was asserted that after being beaten by his master,
the day before he gave information, he had run away and had made out of
an occurrence which was really accidental the foundation of a false charge.
When, however, the accused and accuser were brought face to face and the
slaves were examined under torture, they all confessed. The masters as
well as the slaves who had been their accessories were all executed. The
informer was rewarded with his liberty and 20,000 ases.

When Laevinus was passing Capua on his way to Rome he was surrounded
by a crowd of the inhabitants who implored him with tears to allow them
to go to Rome and try if they could not awaken the compassion of the senate
and persuade them not to allow Q. Flaccus to ruin them utterly and efface
their name. Flaccus declared that he had no personal feeling against the
Capuans, it was as public enemies that he regarded them, and should continue
to do so as long as he knew that they maintained their present attitude
towards Rome. He had shut them up, he said, within their walls, because
if they got out anywhere they would prowl about the country like wild beasts,
and mangle and murder whatever came in their way. Some had deserted to
Hannibal, others had gone off to burn down Rome. The consul would see in
the half-burnt Forum the result of their crime. They had tried to destroy
the temple of Vesta, with its perpetual fire, and the image which was concealed
in the sacred shrine - that image which Fate had decreed to be the pledge
and guarantee of Roman dominion. He considered that it would be anything
but safe to give the Capuans a chance of entering the City. After hearing
this Laevinus made the Capuans take an oath to Flaccus that they would
return within five days after receiving the reply of the senate. Then he
ordered them to follow him to Rome. Surrounded by this crowd and by a number
of Sicilians who had also met him, he entered the City. It seemed just
as though he were bringing in a body of accusers against the two commanders
who had distinguished themselves by the destruction of two famous cities
and who would now have to defend themselves against those they had vanquished.

[26.28]The first questions, however, which
the two consuls brought before the senate were those relating to foreign
policy and the allocation of the various commands. Laevinus made his report
on the situation in Macedonia and Greece, and the unrest amongst the Aetolians,
the Acarnanians and the Locrians. He also gave details as to his own military
and naval movements, and stated that he had driven Philip, who was meditating
an attack on the Aetolians, back into the interior of his kingdom. The
legion could now be safely withdrawn, as the fleet was sufficient to protect
Italy from any attempt on the part of the king. After this statement about
himself and the province of which he had had charge, he and his colleague
raised the question of the various commands. The senate made the following
dispositions. One consul was to operate in Italy against Hannibal; the
other was to succeed T. Otacilius in command of the fleet and also to administer
Sicily with L. Cincius as praetor. They were to take over the armies in
Etruria and Gaul, each of which comprised two legions. The two City legions
which the consul Sulpicius had commanded the previous year were sent to
Gaul, and the consul who was to act in Italy was to appoint to the command
in Gaul. C. Calpurnius had his office of propraetor extended for a year,
and was sent into Etruria, Q. Fulvius also received a year's extension
of his command at Capua. The composite force of citizens and allies was
reduced, one strong legion being formed out of the two; this consisted
of 5000 infantry and 300 cavalry, those who had served longest being sent
home. The army of the allies was reduced to 7000 infantry and 300 cavalry,
the same rule being observed as to the release of the veterans who had
seen the longest service. In the case of the retiring consul, Cn. Fulvius,
no change was made; he retained his army and his province, Apulia, for
another year. His late colleague, P. Sulpicius, received orders to disband
his entire army with the exception of the naval force. Similarly the army
which M. Cornelius had commanded was to be sent home from Sicily. The men
of Cannae, who practically represented two legions, were still to remain
in the island, under the command of the praetor L. Cincius. L. Cornelius
had commanded the same number of legions the previous year in Sardinia,
and these were now transferred to the praetor P. Manlius Vulso. The consuls
received instructions to see that in raising the City legions, none were
enrolled who had been in the army of M. Valerius, or in that of Q. Fulvius.
So the total number of Roman legions in active service that year was not
to exceed one-and-twenty.

[26.29]When the senate had finished making
the appointments, the consuls were ordered to ballot for their commands.
Sicily and the fleet fell to Marcellus, Italy and the campaign against
Hannibal to Laevinus. This result utterly appalled the Sicilians, to whom
it seemed as though all the horrors of the capture of Syracuse were to
be repeated. They were standing in full view of the consuls, waiting anxiously
for the result of the balloting, and when they saw how it was decided,
they broke out into loud laments and cries of distress, which drew the
eyes of all upon them for the moment, and became the subject of much comment
afterwards. Clothing themselves in mourning garb they visited the houses
of the senators and assured each of them in turn that if Marcellus went
back to Sicily with the power and authority of a consul they would every
one of them abandon his city and quit the island for ever. He had, they
said, before shown himself vindictive and implacable towards them; what
would he do now, furious as he was at the Sicilians who had come to Rome
to complain of him? It would be better for the island to be buried beneath
the fires of Aetna or plunged in the depths of the sea than to be given
up to such an enemy to wreak his rage and vengeance on it. These remonstrances
of the Sicilians were made to individual nobles in their own homes, and
gave rise to lively discussions, in which sympathy with the sufferers and
hostile sentiments towards Marcellus were freely expressed. At last they
reached the senate. The consuls were requested to consult that body as
to the advisability of a rearrangement of the provinces. In addressing
the House Marcellus said that had the Sicilians been already admitted to
an audience he would have taken a different line, but as matters stood,
he did not wish it to be open to any one to say that they were afraid to
lay their complaints against the man in whose power they would shortly
be placed. If, therefore, it made no difference to his colleague he was
prepared to exchange provinces with him. He begged the senate not to make
any order, for since it would have been unfair to him for his colleague
to have chosen his province without recourse to the ballot, how much more
unfair and even humiliating to him would it be now to have the province
which had fallen to him formally transferred to his colleague! After indicating
their wish, without embodying it in a decree, the senate adjourned, and
the consuls themselves arranged to exchange provinces. Marcellus was being
hurried on by his destiny to meet Hannibal, in order that, as he was the
first Roman general to win the distinction of a successful action with
him after so many disastrous ones, so he would be the last to contribute
to the Carthaginian's reputation by his own fall, and that just at the
time when the war was going most favourably for the Romans.

[26.30]When the exchange of provinces
had been decided, the Sicilians were introduced into the senate. After
expatiating at some length upon the unbroken loyalty of Hiero to Rome,
and claiming the credit of it for the people rather than for the king,
they proceeded: "There were many reasons for the hatred we felt towards
Hieronymus and afterwards towards Hippocrates and Epicydes, but the principal
one was their abandoning Rome for Hannibal. It was this that led some of
the foremost of our younger men to assassinate Hieronymus close to the
senate-house, and also induced some seventy who belonged to our noblest
houses to form a plot for the destruction of Epicydes and Hippocrates.
As Marcellus failed to support them by bringing up his army to Syracuse
at the time he promised, the plot was disclosed by an informer, and they
were all put to death by the tyrants. Marcellus was really responsible
for the tyranny, owing to his ruthless sacking of Leontium. From that time
the Syracusan leaders never ceased to go over to Marcellus and undertake
to deliver up the city to him whenever he wished. He would rather have
taken it by storm, but when all his attempts by sea and land failed, and
he saw that the thing was impossible, he chose as agents of the surrender
an artisan called Sosis and the Spaniard Moericus, rather than let the
leaders of the city, who had so often offered in vain to do so, undertake
the task. No doubt he considered that he would thus have more justification
for plundering and massacring the friends of Rome. Even if the revolt to
Hannibal had been the act of senate and people and not simply of Hieronymus;
if it had been the government of Syracuse who closed the gates against
Marcellus, and not the tyrants Hippocrates and Epicydes who had ousted
the government; if we had warred against Rome in the spirit and temper
of the Carthaginians, what greater severity could Marcellus have shown
towards us than that which he actually practiced, unless he had blotted
Syracuse out from the face of the earth? At all events, nothing has been
left to us beyond our walls and our houses stripped of everything, and
the defaced and despoiled temples of our gods, from which even the gods
themselves and their votive offerings have been carried off. Many have
been deprived of their land, so that they have not even the bare soil on
which to support themselves, and all who belong to them, with the remains
of their wrecked fortunes. We beg and entreat you, senators, if you cannot
order all that we have lost to be restored to us, at least to insist upon
the restitution of what can be found and identified." After they had
stated their grievances, Laevinus ordered them to withdraw, that their
position might be discussed. "Let them stop," exclaimed Marcellus,
"that I may make my reply in their presence, since we who conduct
war on your behalf, senators, must do so on condition of those whom we
have vanquished coming forward as our accusers. Two cities have been taken
this year: let Capua call Fabius to account, and Syracuse, Marcellus."

[26.31]When they had been brought back
into the senate-house, Marcellus made the following speech: "I have
not so far forgotten, senators, the majesty of Rome or the dignity of my
office as to stoop to defend myself, as consul, against the charges of
these Greeks, if they concerned me alone. The question is not so much what
I have done as what they ought to have suffered. Had they not been enemies
it is a matter of indifference whether I maltreated Syracuse now or in
Hiero's lifetime. But if they have proved false to us, opened their gates
to the enemy, threatened our envoys with drawn swords, shut their city
and walls against us and called in a Carthaginian army to protect them
against us, who is there who can feel any indignation at their having suffered
hostile violence after having practiced it? I declined the offers of their
leaders to deliver up the city, and looked upon Sosis and the Spaniard
Moericus as much more suitable persons to be trusted in a matter of such
importance. As you make their humble station in life a reproach to others,
you do not yourselves belong to the lowest class in Syracuse, and yet who
amongst you promised to open your gates and admit my armed force into your
city? Those who did this are the objects of your hatred and execration;
not even in this place do you shrink from insulting them, showing thereby
how far you yourselves were from contemplating anything of the kind. That
low social position, senators, which these men make a ground of reproach,
proves most clearly that I discouraged no man who was willing to render
effectual help to the commonwealth. Before commencing the siege of Syracuse,
I made various attempts at a peaceful settlement, first by sending envoys
and then by personal interviews with the leaders. It was only when I found
that no reverence for the persons of my envoys protected them from violence
and that I was unable to get any reply from the leaders with whom I conferred
at their gates, that I took action and finally took the city by storm,
after a vast expenditure of toil and exertion by sea and land. As to the
incidents attending its capture, these men would be more justified in laying
their complaints before Hannibal and his vanquished Carthaginians than
before the senate of the people who vanquished them. If, senators, I had
intended to conceal my spoliation of Syracuse I should never have adorned
the City of Rome with its spoils. With regard to what I, as conqueror,
took away or bestowed in individual cases, I am quite satisfied that I
acted in accordance with the laws of war, according to the deserts of each
individual. Whether you approve of my action or not is a question that
concerns the State more than it concerns me. I only did my duty, but it
will be a serious matter for the republic, if by rescinding my acts you
make other generals in the future more remiss in doing their duty. And
since you have heard what both the Sicilians and I have had to say in each
other's presence, we will leave the House together in order that the senate
may be able to discuss the matter more freely in my absence." The
Sicilians were accordingly dismissed; Marcellus proceeded to the Capitol
to enrol troops.

[26.32]The other consul, Laevinus, then
consulted the senate as to what reply was to be given to the petition of
the Sicilians. There was a long debate and great divergence of opinion.
Many of those present supported the view expressed by T. Manlius Torquatus.
They were of opinion that hostilities ought to have been directed against
the tyrants, who were the common enemies of Syracuse and of Rome. The city
ought to have been allowed to surrender, not taken by storm, and when surrendered
it ought to have had its own laws and liberties guaranteed to it, instead
of being ruined by war after it had been worn out by a deplorable servitude
under its tyrants. The struggle between the tyrants and the Roman general
in which Syracuse was the prize of victory had resulted in the utter destruction
of a most famous and beautiful city, the granary and treasury of the Roman
people. The commonwealth had frequently experienced its generosity, especially
in the present Punic war, and the City had been embellished by its munificent
gifts. If Hiero, that loyal supporter of the power of Rome, could rise
from the dead, with what face would any one dare to show him either Rome
or Syracuse? In the one - his own city - he would see universal spoliation
and a large part of it burnt, and as he approached the other he would see
just outside its walls, almost within its gates, the spoils of his country.
This was the line of argument urged by those who sought to create a feeling
against the consul and evoke sympathy for the Sicilians. The majority,
however, did not take such an unfavourable view of his conduct, and a decree
was passed confirming the acts of Marcellus both during the war and after
his victory, and declaring that the senate would for the future make the
interests of the Syracusans their charge and would instruct Laevinus to
safeguard the property of the citizens so far as he could without inflicting
any loss on the State. Two senators were sent to the Capitol to request
the consul to come back, and after the Sicilians had again been brought
in, the decree was read to them. Some kind words were addressed to the
envoys and they were dismissed. Before they left the House they flung themselves
on their knees before Marcellus and implored him to forgive them for what
they had said in their anxiety to gain sympathy and relief in their distress.
They also begged him to take them and their city under his protection,
and look upon them as his clients. The consul promised that he would do
so, and after a few gracious words dismissed them.

[26.33]The Capuans were then admitted
to an audience. Their case was a harder one, and their appeal for mercy
was all the stronger. They could not deny that they deserved punishment,
and there were no tyrants on whom they could throw the blame, but they
considered that they had paid an adequate penalty after so many of their
senators had been carried off by poison, and so many had died under the
axe. Some of their nobles, they said, were still living, who had not been
driven by the consciousness of guilt into doing away with themselves, nor
had the victor in his wrath condemned them to death. These men begged that
they and their families might be set at liberty, and some portion of their
goods restored to them. They were for the most part Roman citizens, connected
with Roman families by intermarriage. After the envoys had withdrawn, there
was some doubt as to whether they ought to summon Q. Fulvius from Capua
- the consul Claudius had died soon after its capture - in order that the
matter might be debated in the presence of the general whose proceedings
were being called in question. This had just been done in the case of Marcellus
and the Sicilians. When, however, some senators were seen sitting in the
House who had been through the whole of the siege - M. Atilius Regulus
and Caius the brother of Flaccus, both on his staff, and Q. Minucius and
L. Veturius Philo, who had been members of Claudius' staff - they would
not have Q. Fulvius recalled, nor the hearing of the Capuans adjourned.
Amongst those who had been at Capua, the man whose opinion carried most
weight was M. Atilius, and he was asked what course he would advise. He
replied: "I believe I was present at the military council which met
after the fall of Capua, when the consuls made enquiry as to which of the
Capuans had assisted our republic. They discovered only two, and those
were women. One was Vestia Oppia of Atella, who was living in Capua and
who offered sacrifices daily for the welfare and triumph of Rome; the other
was Cluvia Pacula, at one time a woman of loose character, who secretly
supplied the starving prisoners with food. The rest of the Capuans were
just as hostile to us as the Carthaginians themselves, and those whom Q.
Fulvius executed were selected rather on account of their higher rank than
of their greater guilt. I do not quite see how the senate is competent
to deal with the Capuans, who are Roman citizens, without an order of the
people. After the revolt of the Satricans, the course adopted by our ancestors
was for a tribune of the plebs, M. Antistius, to bring the matter first
before the Assembly, and a resolution was passed empowering the senate
to decide what should be done to them. I therefore advise that we arrange
with the tribunes of the plebs for one or more of them to propose a resolution
to that body empowering us to settle the fate o f the Capuans." L.
Atilius, tribune of the plebs, was authorised by the senate to put the
question in the following terms: "Whereas the inhabitants of Capua,
Atella and Calatia, and also the dwellers in the valley of the Sabatus
have yielded themselves to the proconsul Fulvius to be at the arbitrament
and disposal of the people of Rome, and whereas they have surrendered divers
persons together with themselves, as also their land and city with all
things therein, sacred and profane, together with their goods and chattels
and whatsoever else they had in possession, I demand of you Quirites to
know what it is your will and pleasure shall be done in regard of all these
persons and things?" The resolution of the Assembly ran thus: "What
the senate, or the greater part of those who are present, shall, on oath,
decree and determine, that we will and order shall be done."

[26.34]The plebs having thus resolved,
the senate made the following orders: First they restored their liberty
and property to Oppia and Cluvia; if they wished to ask the senate for
a further reward, they were to come to Rome. Separate decrees were made
in the case of each of the Capuan families; it is not worth while giving
a complete enumeration. Some were to have their property confiscated, they
themselves with their wives and children were to be sold, with the exception
of those of their daughters who had married outside the territory before
they passed under the power of Rome. Others were to be thrown into chains,
and their fate settled afterwards. In the case of the rest, the question
whether their property should be confiscated or not depended upon the amount
at which they were assessed. Where property was restored it was to include
all the captured live stock except the horses, all the slaves except the
adult males, and everything which was not attached to the soil. It was
further decreed that the populations of Capua, Atella, Calatia and the
valley of the Sabatus should all retain their liberty, except those who
themselves, or whose parents had been with the enemy, but none of them
could become a Roman citizen or a member of the Latin League. None of those
who had been in Capua during the siege could remain in the city or its
neighbourhood beyond a certain date; a place of residence was assigned
to them beyond the Tiber at some distance from it. Those who had not been
in Capua during the war, nor in any revolted Campanian city, were to be
settled to the north of the Liris in the direction of Rome; those who had
gone over to the side of Rome before Hannibal came to Capua were to be
removed to this side of the Volturnus, and no one was to possess any land
or building within fifteen miles of the sea. Those who had been deported
beyond the Tiber were forbidden to acquire or to hold either for themselves
or their posterity landed property anywhere except in the territories of
Veii, Sutrium and Nepete, and in no case was such holding to exceed fifty
jugera. The property of all the senators and of all who had held any magistracy
in Capua, Atella and Calatia was ordered to be sold in Capua, and those
persons whom it had been decided to sell into slavery were sent to Rome
and sold there. The disposal of the images and bronze statues which were
alleged to have been taken from the enemy, and the question which of them
were sacred and which profane, were referred to the Pontifical College.
After hearing these decrees. the Capuans were dismissed in a much more
sorrowful state of mind than that in which they had come. It was no longer
Q. Fulvius' cruelty to them, but the injustice of the gods and their accursed
fate that they denounced.

[26.35] After the departure of the Sicilian
and Capuan envoys, the enrolment of the new legions was completed. Then
came the question of providing the fleet with its proper complement of
rowers. There was not a sufficient number of men available, nor was there
any money at the time in the treasury with which to procure them or to
pay them. In view of this state of things the consuls issued an order requiring
private individuals to furnish seamen in proportion to their income and
their rank, as they had done on a previous occasion, and also to supply
them with thirty days' provision and pay. This order excited such a widespread
feeling of indignation and resentment that if the people had had a leader
they would have risen in insurrection. The consuls, they said, after ruining
the Sicilians and Capuans, had seized upon the Roman plebs as their next
victim to mangle and destroy. "After being drained by the war-tax,"
they complained, "for so many years, we have nothing left but the
bare and wasted soil. Our houses have been burnt by the enemy, our slaves
who tilled our fields have been appropriated by the State, first buying
them for a few coppers to make soldiers of them, and now requisitioning
them for seamen. Whatever silver or gold we had has been taken to pay the
rowers and furnish the annual war-tax. No resort to force, no exercise
of authority can compel us to give what we do not possess. Let the consuls
sell our goods, then let them glut their rage on our bodies which are all
we have left; nothing remains with which we can even ransom ourselves."
Language of this kind was used not only in private conversation, but openly
in the Forum, before the very eyes of the consuls. A vast crowd had gathered
round the tribunal, uttering angry cries, and the consuls were powerless
to allay the agitation either by fair speeches or by threats. Ultimately
they announced that they would give them three days to think the matter
over, and they themselves devoted that time to seeing whether they could
not find some way out of the difficulty. The next day they called the senate
together to consider the matter, and many arguments were advanced to prove
that the plebs were acting fairly and reasonably in their protest. At last
the discussion came round to this point, that whether fair or unfair the
burden must fall on the individual citizens. From what source, it was asked,
could they procure seamen and sailors, when there was no money in the treasury,
and how could they keep their hold on Sicily, or render the shores of Italy
safe against any attempt by Philip, if they had no fleet?

[26.36]As there seemed to be no solution
of the difficulty and a kind of mental torpor appeared to beset the senate,
the consul Laevinus came to the rescue. "As the magistrates,"
he said, "take precedence of the senate and the senate of the people
in honour and dignity; so they ought to lead the way in discharging unpleasant
and difficult tasks. If, in laying any obligation on an inferior, you have
first decided that it is binding on you and those connected with you, you
will find that all are more ready to obey you. They do not feel an expense
to be burdensome when they see each of their leaders bearing more than
his due share of it. We want the Roman people to have fleets and to equip
them, we want each citizen to furnish rowers and not to shirk his duty;
then let us impose the burden on ourselves first of all. Let us, every
one of us, bring our gold and silver and bronze money, tomorrow, to the
treasury, only reserving the rings for ourselves, our wives and our children,
and the bullae for our boys. Those who have wives and daughters may keep
an ounce of gold for each of them. With regard to silver, those who have
occupied curule chairs should keep the plating on their horse-trappings
and two pounds of silver that they may have a dish and saltcellar for the
gods. All the other senators should keep only one pound of silver. In the
case of bronze coin let us retain 5000 ases for each household. All the
rest of our gold and silver and money let us place in the hands of the
commissioners of the treasury. No formal resolution should be passed; our
contributions must be strictly voluntary; and our mutual rivalry to assist
the commonwealth may stir up the equestrian order to emulate us, and after
them, the plebs. This is the only course which we consuls have been able
to devise after our lengthy discussion, and we beg you to adopt it with
the help of the gods. As long as the commonwealth is safe, each man's property
is safe under its protection, but if you desert it, it will be in vain
that you try to keep what you have." These suggestions were so favourably
received that the consuls were even thanked for them. No sooner did the
senate adjourn, than they each brought their gold and silver and bronze
to the treasury, and they were so eager to be among the first to have their
names inscribed in the public register that the commissioners were not
able to take over the amounts or the clerks to enter them fast enough.
The equestrian order showed quite as much zeal as the senate, and the plebs
were not behind the equestrian order. In this way, without any formal order
or compulsion by the magistrates, the full complement of rowers was made
up, and the State put in a position to pay them. As the preparations for
war were now complete the consuls started for their respective provinces.

[26.37]At no period of the war were the
Carthaginians and the Romans alike subjected to greater vicissitudes of
fortune, or to more rapid alternations of hope and fear. In the provinces,
the disasters in Spain on the one hand and the successes in Sicily on the
other filled the Romans with mingled feelings of sorrow and joy. In Italy
the loss of Tarentum was felt to be a grievous blow, but the unexpected
stand by the garrison in the citadel made all hearts glad, and the sudden
panic at the prospect of Rome being besieged and stormed gave way to universal
rejoicings when Capua was taken a few days later. In the campaign overseas
a kind of balance was struck. Philip began hostilities at an inopportune
moment for Rome, but in the new alliance with the Aetolians and Attalus,
king of Pergamum, it seemed as though Fortune were giving a pledge of Rome's
dominion in the East. The Carthaginians, again, felt that the capture of
Tarentum was a set-off against the loss of Capua, and though they prided
themselves on having marched unopposed up to the walls of Rome they were
mortified at the futility of their enterprise, and humiliated by the contempt
shown for them when a Roman army marched out on its way to Spain whilst
they were actually lying under the very walls. Even in Spain itself, where
the destruction of two great generals with their armies had raised their
hopes of finally expelling the Romans and finishing the war, the higher
their hopes had been, the greater the disgust they felt at their victory
being robbed of all its importance by L. Marcius, who was not even a regular
general. So whilst Fortune was holding the scales evenly and everything
was in suspense, both sides felt the same hopes and fears as though the
war were only just beginning.

[26.38]Hannibal's principal cause of anxiety
was the effect produced by the fall of Capua. It was generally felt that
the Romans had shown greater determination in attacking than he had in
defending the place, and this alienated many of the Italian communities
from him. He could not occupy them all with garrisons unless he was prepared
to weaken his army by detaching numerous small units from it; a course
at that time highly inexpedient. On the other hand he did not dare to withdraw
any of his garrisons and so leave the loyalty of his allies to depend upon
their hopes and fears. His temperament, prone as it was to rapacity and
cruelty, led him to plunder the places which he was unable to defend, in
order that they might be left to the enemy waste and barren. This evil
policy had evil results for him, for it aroused horror and loathing not
only amongst the actual sufferers but amongst all who heard of them. The
Roman consul was not slow in sounding the feelings of those cities where
any hope of recovering them had shown itself. Amongst these was the city
of Salapia. Two of its most prominent citizens were Dasius and Blattius.
Dasius was friendly to Hannibal; Blattius favoured the interests of Rome
as far as he safely could, and had sent secret messages to Marcellus holding
out hopes that the city might be surrendered. But the thing could not be
carried through without the help of Dasius. For a long time he hesitated,
but at last he addressed himself to Dasius, not so much in the hope of
success as because no better plan presented itself. Dasius was opposed
to the project, and by way of injuring his political rival disclosed the
affair to Hannibal. Hannibal summoned them both before his tribunal. When
they appeared, he was occupied with business, intending to go into their
case as soon as he was at liberty, and the two men, accuser and accused,
stood waiting, apart from the crowd. Whilst thus waiting Blattius approached
Dasius on the subject of the surrender. At this open and barefaced conduct,
Dasius called out that the surrender of the city was being mooted under
the very eyes of Hannibal. Hannibal and those round him felt that the very
audacity of the thing made the charge improbable, and regarded it as due
to spite and jealousy, since it was easy to invent such an accusation in
the absence of witnesses. They were accordingly dismissed. Blattius, however,
did not desist from his venturesome project. He was perpetually urging
the matter and showing what a beneficial thing it would be for them both
and for their city. At last he succeeded in effecting the surrender of
the city with its garrison of 5000 Numidians. But the surrender could only
be effected with a heavy loss of life. The garrison were by far the finest
cavalry in the Carthaginian army, and although they were taken by surprise
and could make no use of their horses in the city, they seized their arms
in the confusion and attempted to cut their way out. When they found escape
impossible they fought to the last man. Not more than fifty fell into the
hands of the enemy alive. The loss of this troop of horse was a heavier
blow to Hannibal than the loss of Salapia; never from that time was the
Carthaginian superior in cavalry, hitherto by far his most efficient arm.

[26.39]During this period the privations
of the Roman garrison in the citadel of Tarentum had become almost insupportable;
the men and their commandant M. Livius placed all their hopes in the arrival
of supplies sent from Sicily. To secure a safe passage for these along
the coast of Italy, a squadron of about twenty vessels was stationed at
Regium. The fleet and the transports were under the command of D. Quinctius.
He was a man of humble birth, but his many deeds of gallantry had gained
him a high military reputation. He had only five ships to begin with, the
largest of these - two triremes - had been assigned to him by Marcellus;
subsequently, owing to the effective use he made of these, three quinqueremes
were added to his command, and at last, by compelling the allied cities,
Regium, Velliea and Paestum to furnish the ships which they were bound
by treaty to supply, he made up the above-mentioned squadron of twenty
vessels. As this fleet was setting out from Regium, and was opposite Sapriportis,
a place about fifteen miles from Tarentum, it fell in with a Tarentine
fleet, also of twenty ships, under the command of Democrates. The Roman
commander, not anticipating a fight, had all sail set; he had, however,
got together his full complement of rowers while he was in the neighbourhood
of Croton and Sybaris, and his fleet was excellently equipped and manned,
considering the size of the vessels. It so happened that the wind completely
died down just as the enemy came into sight, and there was ample time to
lower the sails and get the rowers and soldiers into readiness for the
approaching conflict. Seldom have two regular fleets gone into action with
such determination as these small flotillas, for they were fighting for
larger issues than their own success. The Tarentines hoped that as they
had already recovered their city from the Romans after the lapse of nearly
a century, so they might now rescue their citadel, by cutting off the enemy's
supplies after they had deprived them of the mastery of the sea. The Romans
were eager to show, by retaining their hold on the citadel, that Tarentum
had not been lost in fair fight. but by a foul and treacherous stroke.
So, when the signal was given on each side, they rowed with their prows
straight at each other; there was no backing or maneuvering, nor did they
let go of any ship when once they had grappled and boarded. They fought
at such close quarters that they not only discharged missiles, but even
used their swords in hand-to-hand fighting. The prows were locked together
and remained so while the hinder part of the vessel was pushed about by
the oars of hostile ships. The vessels were so crowded together that hardly
any missile failed to reach its aim or fell into the water. They pressed
forward front to front like a line of infantry, and the combatants made
their way from ship to ship. Conspicuous amongst all was the fight between
the two ships which had led their respective lines and were the first to
engage.

Quinctius himself was in the Roman ship, and in the Tarentine vessel
was a man named Nico Perco, who hated the Romans for private as well as
public grounds, and who was equally hated by them, for he was one of the
party who betrayed Tarentum to Hannibal. Whilst Quinctius was fighting
and encouraging his men, Nico took him unawares and ran him through with
his spear. He fell headlong over the prow, and the victorious Tarentine
springing on to the ship dislodged the enemy, who were thrown into confusion
by the loss of their leader. The foreship was now in the hands of the Tarentines,
and the Romans in a compact body were with difficulty defending the hinder
part of the vessel, when another of the hostile triremes suddenly appeared
astern. Between the two the Roman ship was captured. The sight of the admiral's
ship in the enemy's hands created a panic, and the remainder of the fleet
fled in all directions; some were sunk, others were hurriedly rowed to
land and were seized by the people of Thurium and Metapontum. Very few
of the transports which were following with supplies fell into the enemy's
hands; the rest, shifting their sails to meet the changing winds, were
carried out to sea. An affair took place at Tarentum during this time which
led to a very different result. A foraging force of 4000 Tarentines were
dispersed through the fields, and Livius, the Roman commandant, who was
always looking out for a chance of striking a blow, sent C. Persius, an
able and energetic officer, with 2500 men from the citadel to attack them.
He fell upon them while they were dispersed in scattered groups all through
the fields, and after inflicting great and widespread slaughter, drove
the few who escaped in headlong flight through their half-opened gates
into the town. So matters were equalised as far as Tarentum was concerned;
the Romans were victorious by land, and the Tarentines by sea. Both were
alike disappointed in their hopes of obtaining the corn which had been
within their view.

[26.40]Laevinus' arrival in Sicily had
been looked forward to by all the friendly cities, both those who had been
old allies of Rome, and those who had recently joined her. His first and
most important task was the settlement of the affairs of Syracuse, which,
as peace had only quite recently been established, were still in confusion.
When he had accomplished this task he marched to Agrigentum, where the
embers of war were still smouldering, and a Carthaginian garrison still
in occupation. Fortune favoured his enterprise. Hanno was in command, but
the Carthaginians placed their chief reliance on Muttines and his Numidians.
He was scouring the island from end to end and carrying off plunder from
the friends of Rome; neither force nor stratagem could keep him from entering
Agrigentum and leaving it on his raids whenever he chose. His reputation
as a dashing officer was beginning to eclipse that of the commandant himself,
and at last created so much jealousy that even the successes he gained
were unwelcome to Hanno, because of the man who gained them. It ended in
his giving the command of the cavalry to his own son in the hope that by
depriving Muttines of his post he would also destroy his influence with
the Numidians. It had just the opposite effect, for the ill-feeling created
only made Muttines more popular, and he showed his resentment at the injustice
done to him by at once entering into secret negotiations with Laevinus
for the surrender of the city. When his emissaries had come to an understanding
with the consul and arranged the plan of operations, the Numidians seized
the gate leading to the sea after driving off or massacring the men on
guard, and admitted a Roman force which was in readiness into the city.
As they were marching in serried ranks into the forum and the heart of
the city, amidst great confusion, Hanno, thinking it was only a riotous
disturbance caused by the Numidians, such as had often happened before,
went to allay the tumult. When, however, he saw in the distance a larger
body of troops than the Numidians amounted to, and when the well-known
battle shout of the Romans reached his ears, he at once took to flight
before a missile could reach him. Escaping with Epicydes through a gate
on the other side of the city, and attended by a small escort, he reached
the shore. Here they were fortunate enough to find a small ship, in which
they sailed across to Africa, abandoning Sicily, for which they had fought
through so many years, to their victorious enemy. The mixed population
of Sicilians and Carthaginians whom they had left behind, made no attempt
at resistance, but rushed away in wild flight, and, as the exits were all
closed, they were slaughtered round the gates. When he had gained possession
of the place, Laevinus ordered the men who had been at the head of affairs
in Agrigentum to be scourged and beheaded; the rest of the population he
sold with the plunder, and sent all the money to Rome.

When the fate of the Agrigentines became generally known throughout
Sicily, all the cities at once declared for Rome. In a short time twenty
towns were clandestinely surrendered and six taken by storm, and as many
as forty voluntarily surrendered on terms. The consul meted out rewards
and punishments to the chief men in these cities, according to each man's
deserts, and now that the Sicilians had at last laid arms aside he obliged
them to turn their attention to agriculture. That fertile island was not
only capable of supporting its own population, but had on many occasions
relieved the scarcity in Rome, and the consul intended that it should do
so again if necessary. Agathyrna had become the seat of a motley population,
numbering some 4000 men, made up of all sorts of characters - refugees,
insolvent debtors - most of them had committed capital offences at the
time when they were living in their own cities and under their own laws
and afterwards when similarity of fortunes arising from various causes
had drawn them together at Agathyrna. Laevinus did not think it safe to
leave these men behind in the island, as a material for fresh disturbances,
whilst things were settling down under the newly established peace. The
Regians too would find a body so experienced in brigandage as they were,
very useful; accordingly Laevinus transported them all to Italy. As far
as Sicily was concerned, the state of war was put an end to this year.

[26.41]At the commencement of spring P.
Scipio issued orders for the allied contingents to muster at Tarraco. He
then launched his ships and led the fleet and transports to the mouth of
the Ebro, where he had also ordered the legions to concentrate from their
winter quarters. He then left Tarraco, with an allied contingent of 5000
men for the army. On his arrival he felt that he ought to address some
words of encouragement to his men, especially to the veterans who had gone
through such terrible disasters. He accordingly ordered a parade and addressed
the troops in the following words: "No commander before my time, who
was new to his troops, has been in a position to express well-deserved
thanks to his men before he made use of their services. Fortune laid me
under obligations to you before I saw my province or my camp, first because
of the devoted affection you showed towards my father and my uncle during
their lifetime and after their death, and then again, because of the courage
with which you kept your hold on the province when it was apparently lost
after their terrible defeat, and so retained it unimpaired for Rome and
for me their successor. It must be our aim and object now with the help
of heaven not so much to maintain our own footing in Spain as to prevent
the Carthaginians from maintaining theirs. We must not remain stationary
here, defending the bank of the Ebro against the enemy's passage of the
river; we must cross over ourselves and shift the seat of war. To some
of you at least, I fear that this plan may seem too large and bold when
you remember the defeats we have lately sustained, and when you think of
my youth. No man is less likely to forget those fatal battles in Spain
than I am, for my father and my uncle were killed within thirty days of
each other, so that my family was visited by one death upon another.

"But though I am almost heart-broken at the orphanhood and desolation
of our house, the good fortune and courage of our race forbid me to despair
of the State. It has been our lot and destiny to conquer in all great wars
only after we have been defeated. Not to mention the earlier wars - Porsena
and the Gauls and the Samnites - I will take these two Punic wars. How
many fleets and generals and armies were lost in the first war! And what
about this war? In all our defeats I was either present in person, or where
I was not, I felt them more keenly than any one. The Trebia, Lake Thrasymenus,
Cannae - what are they but records of Roman consuls and their armies cut
to pieces? Add to these the defection of Italy, of the greatest part of
Sicily, of Sardinia, and then the crowning terror and panic - the Carthaginian
camp pitched between the Anio and the walls of Rome, and the sight of the
victorious Hannibal almost within our gates. In the midst of this utter
collapse one thing stood unshaken and unimpaired, the courage of the Roman
people; it and it alone raised up and sustained all that lay prostrate
in the dust. You, my soldiers, under the conduct and auspices of my father
were the first to retrieve the defeat of Cannae by barring the way to Hasdrubal
when he was marching to the Alps and Italy. Had he joined forces with his
brother the name of Rome would have perished; this success of yours held
us up under those defeats. Now, by the goodness of heaven, everything is
going in our favour; the situation in Italy and Sicily is becoming better
and more hopeful day by day. In Sicily, Syracuse and Agrigentum have been
captured, the enemy has been everywhere expelled and the whole of the island
acknowledges the sovereignty of Rome. In Italy, Arpi has been recovered
and Capua taken, Hannibal in his hurried flight has traversed the whole
breadth of Italy from Rome to the furthest corners of Bruttium, and his
one prayer is that he may be allowed to make a safe retreat and get away
from the land of his enemies. At a time when one defeat followed close
on the heels of another, and heaven itself seemed to be fighting on Hannibal's
side, you, my soldiers, together with my two parents - let me honour them
both with the same appellation - upheld in this country the tottering fortunes
of Rome. What then can be more foolish than for you to fail in courage
now when all is going on prosperously and happily there? As to recent events,
I could wish that they had caused as little pain to me as to you.

"The immortal gods who watch over the fortunes of the dominions
of Rome, and who moved the electors in their centuries to insist with one
voice upon the supreme command being given to me - the gods, I say, are
assuring us through auguries and auspices and even through visions of the
night that all will go successfully and happily with us. My own heart too,
hitherto my truest prophet, presages that Spain will be ours and that ere
long all who bear the name of Carthage will be driven away from this soil
and will cover sea and land in their shameful flight. What my breast thus
divines is confirmed by solid reasoning from facts. Owing to the maltreatment
they have received their allies are sending envoys to us to appeal for
protection. Their three generals are at variance, almost in active opposition
to each other, and after breaking up their army into three separate divisions
have marched away into different parts of the country. The same misfortune
has overtaken them which was so disastrous to us, they are being deserted
by their allies as we were by the Celtiberians, and the army which proved
so fatal to my father and my uncle they have split up into separate bodies.
Their domestic quarrel will not let them act in unison, and now that they
are divided they will not be able to withstand us. Welcome, soldiers, the
omen of the name I bear, be loyal to a Scipio who is the offspring of your
late commander, the scion of a stock which has been cut down. Come on then,
my veterans, and lead a new army and a new commander across the Ebro into
the lands which you have so often traversed and where you have given so
many proofs of your prowess and your courage. You recognise a likeness
to my father and my uncle in figure, face, and expression, I will soon
show you that I am like them also in character and fidelity and courage,
so that each of you may say that the Scipio who was his old commander has
either come to life again or reappeared in his son."

[26.42]After kindling the spirits of his
men by this speech, he crossed the Ebro with 25,000 infantry and 2500 cavalry,
leaving M. Silanus in charge of the country north of the Ebro with 3000
infantry and 300 cavalry. As the Carthaginian armies had all taken different
routes, some of his staff urged him to attack the one which was nearest,
but he thought that if he did that there would be a danger of their all
concentrating against him, and he would be no match for the three together.
He decided to begin with an attack on New Carthage, a city not only rich
in its own resources, but also with the enemy's war-stores, their arms,
their war-chest and hostages drawn from every part of Spain. It possessed
an additional advantage in its situation, as it afforded a convenient base
for the invasion of Africa, and commanded a harbour capable of holding
any fleet however large, and, as far as I know, the only one of the kind
on that part of the coast which abuts on our sea. No one knew of his intended
march except C. Laelius, who was sent round with his fleet and instructed
to regulate the pace of his vessels so that he might enter the harbour
at the same time that the army showed itself. Seven days after leaving
the Ebro, the land and sea forces reached New Carthage simultaneously.
The Roman camp was fixed opposite the north side of the city, and to guard
against attacks from the rear was strengthened by a double rampart; the
front was protected by the nature of the ground. The following is the situation
of New Carthage. There is a bay about half-way down the coast of Spain,
opening to the south-west and stretching inland about two-and-a-half miles.
A small island at the mouth of the harbour forms a breakwater and shelters
it from all winds, except those from the south-west. From the innermost
part of the bay stretches a promontory on the slopes of which the city
stands, surrounded on the east; and south by the sea. On the west it is
enclosed by a shallow sheet of water which extends northward and varies
in depth with the rise and fall of the tide. A neck of land about a quarter
of a mile in length connects the city with the mainland. The Roman commander
did not throw an earthwork across this isthmus, though it would have cost
him very little trouble to do so; whether it was that he wished to impress
the enemy with his confidence in his strength, or because he wished to
have an unimpeded retirement in his frequent advances against the city.

[26.43]When the necessary intrenchments
were completed he drew up the vessels in the harbour as though he were
going to blockade the place by sea. Then he was rowed round the fleet and
warned the captains to be careful in keeping a look-out by night, as an
enemy when first besieged makes counter-attacks in all directions. On his
return to camp he explained to his soldiers his plan of operations and
his reasons for beginning the campaign with an attack upon a solitary city
in preference to anything else. After they were mustered on parade he made
the following speech to them: "Soldiers, if any one supposes that
you have been brought here for the sole purpose of attacking this city,
he is making more account of the work before you than of the advantage
you will reap from it. You are going, it is true, to attack the walls of
a single city, but in the capture of this one city you will have secured
the whole of Spain. Here are the hostages taken from all the nobles and
kings and tribes, and when once these are in your power, everything which
the Carthaginians now hold will be given up to you. Here is the enemy's
war-chest, without which they cannot keep up the war, seeing that they
have to pay their mercenaries, and the money will be of the utmost service
to us in gaining over the barbarians. Here are their artillery, their armoury,
the whole of their engines of war, which will at once provide you with
all you want, and leave the enemy destitute of all he needs. And what is
more, we shall become masters, not only of a most wealthy and beautiful
city, but also of a most commodious harbour, from which all that is requisite
for the purposes of war, both by sea and land, will be supplied. Great
as our gains will be, the deprivations which the enemy suffers will be
still greater. Here is their stronghold, their granary, their treasure,
their arsenal - everything is stored here. Here is their direct route from
Africa. This is their only naval base between the Pyrenees and Gades; from
this Africa threatens the whole of Spain. But I see that you are all perfectly
ready; let us pass over to the assault on New Carthage, with our full strength
and a courage that knows no fear." The men all shouted with one voice,
that they would carry out his orders, and he marched them up to the city.
Then he ordered a general attack to be made by the army and the fleet.

[26.44]When Mago, the Carthaginian commander,
saw that an attack was being prepared both by land and sea, he made the
following disposition of his forces. Two thousand townsmen were posted
in the direction of the Roman camp; the citadel was occupied by 500 soldiers;
500 more were stationed in the higher part of the city, towards the east.
The rest of the townsmen were ordered to be in readiness to meet any sudden
emergency and to hasten in whatever direction the shouting of the enemy
might summon them. Then the gate was thrown open and those who had been
drawn up in the street leading to their enemy's camp were sent forward.
The Romans, at the direction of their general, retired a short distance
in order to be nearer to the supports which were to be sent up. At first
the lines stood confronting each other in equal strength; but as the successive
reinforcements came up they not only turned the enemy to flight, but pressed
upon them so closely as they fled in disorder that if the "retire"
had not sounded they would in all probability have burst into the city
pell-mell with the fugitives. The confusion and terror of the battlefield
spread right through the city; many of the pickets fled from their stations
panic-struck; the defenders of the walls leaped down the shortest way they
could and deserted the fortifications. Scipio had taken his stand on an
eminence which they called Mercury's Hill, and from here he became aware
that the walls were in many places without defenders. He at once called
out the whole force in the camp to the attack, and ordered the scaling
ladders to be brought up. Covered by the shields of three powerful young
men - for missiles of every description were flying from the battlements
- he went up close to the walls, encouraging his men, giving the necessary
orders, and, what did most to stimulate their efforts, observing with his
own eyes each man's courage or cowardice. So they rushed on, regardless
of missiles and wounds, and neither the walls nor the men upon them could
prevent them from striving who should be the first to mount. At the same
time the ships commenced an attack upon that part of the city which faced
the sea. Here, however, there was too much noise and confusion to admit
of a regular assault, for what with bringing up the vessels and hauling
out the scaling ladders, and clambering ashore as quickly as they could,
the men only got in one another's way through their hurry and eagerness.

[26.45]Whilst this was going on the Carthaginian
general had manned the walls with his regular soldiers, and they were amply
supplied with missiles, great heaps of which had been stored in readiness.
But neither the men, nor their missiles, nor anything else proved such
a sure defence as the walls themselves. Very few of the ladders were long
enough to reach to the top of the wall, and the longer the ladders the
weaker they were. The consequence was that whilst each man who reached
the top was unable to get on to the wall, the others who came up behind
him were unable to advance and the ladder was broken by the mere weight
of men. Some who were on ladders which stood the strain grew dizzy from
the height and fell to the ground. As men and ladders were crashing down
in all directions and the spirits and courage of the enemy were rising
with their success, the signal was sounded for retiring. This led the besieged
to hope that they would not only gain a respite from their hard and wearisome
struggle for the time being, but would also be safe for the future, as
they believed that the city could not be taken by escalade and storm, whilst
the construction of siege works would be a difficult matter and would allow
time for succours to be sent. The noise and tumult of this first attempt
had hardly subsided when Scipio ordered fresh troops to take the ladders
from those who were exhausted and wounded and make a more determined attack
upon the city. He had ascertained from the fishermen of Tarraco, who were
in the habit of crossing these waters in light skiffs and when these ran
aground of wading ashore through the shallows, that it was easy at low
water to approach the walls on foot. It was now reported to him that the
tide was on the ebb; and he at once took about 500 men with him and marched
down to the water. It was about midday, and not only was the falling tide
drawing the water seaward, but a strong northerly wind which had sprung
up was driving it in the same direction, and the lagoon had become so shallow
that in some places it was waist-deep and in others only reached to the
knee. This state of things, which Scipio had ascertained by careful investigation
and reasoning, he ascribed to the direct intervention of the gods, who
he said were turning the sea into a highway for the Romans, and by withdrawing
its waters were opening up a path which had never before been trodden by
mortal feet. He bade his men follow the guidance of Neptune and make their
way through the middle of the lagoon up to the walls.

[26.46]Those who were making the attack
on the land side were in very great difficulties. Not only were they baffled
by the height of the walls, but as they approached them they were open
to showers of missiles on both hands, so that their sides were more exposed
than their front. In the other direction, however, the 500 found their
passage through the lake and their ascent from there to the foot of the
walls an easy matter. No fortifications had been constructed on this side,
as it was considered to be sufficiently protected by the lake and by the
nature of the ground, nor were there any outposts or pickets on guard against
any attack, as all were intent on rendering assistance where danger was
actually visible. They entered the city without meeting any opposition,
and at once marched full speed to the gate round which all the fighting
had gathered. All had their attention absorbed in the struggle; even the
eyes and ears of the combatants, as of those who were watching and cheering
them on, were so riveted on the fighting that not a single man was aware
that the city behind him was captured until the missiles began to fall
upon them from the rear. Now that they had the enemy in front and rear
they gave up the defence, the walls were seized, the gate was battered
from both sides, smashed to pieces, and carried out of the way to allow
a free passage to the troops. A large number surmounted the walls and inflicted
heavy slaughter on the townsmen, but those who entered through the gate
marched in unbroken ranks through the heart of the city into the forum.
From this point Scipio saw the enemy retreating in two directions; one
body was making for a hill to the east of the city, which was being held
by a detachment of 500 men; the others were going to the citadel where
Mago, together with the men who had been driven from the walls, had taken
refuge. Sending a force to storm the hill, he led the rest of his troops
against the citadel. The hill was taken at the first charge, and Mago,
seeing that the whole of the city was in occupation of the enemy, and that
his own position was hopeless, surrendered the citadel and its defenders.
Until the citadel was surrendered the carnage went on everywhere throughout
the city, no adult male who was met with was spared, but on its surrender
the signal was given and an end put to the slaughter. The victors then
turned their attention to the plunder, of which there was a vast amount
of every kind.

[26.47]As many as 10,000 freemen were
made prisoners. Those who were citizens were set free and Scipio gave them
back their city and all the property which the war had left them. There
were some 2000 artisans; these Scipio allotted to the public service, and
held out to them hopes of recovering their liberty if they did their best
in the tasks which the war demanded. The rest of the able-bodied population
and the sturdiest of the slaves he assigned to the fleet to make up the
complement of rowers. He also augmented his fleet by five vessels which
he had seized. Besides all this population there were the Spanish hostages;
these he treated with as much consideration as though they had been children
of the allies of Rome. An enormous amount of munitions of war was also
secured; 120 catapults of the largest size and 281 smaller ones, 23 of
the heavier ballistae and 52 lighter ones, together with an immense number
of scorpions of various calibre, as well as missiles and other arms. 73
military standards were also captured. A vast quantity of gold and silver
was brought to the general, including 287 golden bowls, almost all of which
were at least a pound in weight, 18,300 pounds of silver plate and coinage,
the former comprising a large number of vessels. This was all weighed and
counted and then made over to the quaestor C. Flaminius, as were also 10,000
bushels of wheat and 270 pecks of barley. In the harbour 63 transports
were captured, some of them with their cargoes of corn and arms, as well
as bronze, iron, sails, esparto grass, and other articles required for
the fleet. Amidst such an enormous supply of military and naval stores,
the actual city itself was regarded as the least important capture of all.

[26.48]Leaving C. Laelius with the marines
in charge of the city, Scipio led his legions the same day back into camp.
They were well-nigh worn out; they had fought in the open field, had undergone
much toil and danger in the capture of the city, and after capturing it
had sustained a conflict on unfavourable ground with those who had taken
refuge in the citadel. So he gave them one day's respite from all military
duties and ordered them to seek refreshment and rest. The next day he issued
orders for all the soldiers and marines to appear on parade that he might
address them. First he offered up a thanksgiving to the immortal gods because
they had not only made him master in a single day of the wealthiest city
in all Spain, but had also brought together beforehand into the place all
the resources of Africa and Spain, so that whilst nothing was left to the
enemy he and his men had a superabundance of everything. Then he praised
the courage of his troops, whom, he said, nothing had daunted, neither
the sortie of the enemy, nor the height of the walls, nor the untried depth
of the lagoon, nor the fort on the hill, nor the unusual strength of the
citadel. Nothing had prevented them from surmounting every obstacle and
forcing their way everywhere. Though every man amongst them deserved all
the rewards he could give, the glory of the mural crown belonged especially
to him who was the first to scale the wall, and the man who considered
that he deserved it should claim it.

Two men came forward, Q. Tiberilius, a centurion of the fourth legion,
and Sextus Digitius, one of the marines. The contention between them was
not so heated as the excitement with which each body advocated the claim
of its own representative. C. Laelius, the commander of the fleet, supported
the marine, M. Sempronius Tuditanus took the part of his legionaries. As
the dispute was almost becoming a mutiny, Scipio announced that he would
allow three arbitrators to be named who should investigate the case and
take evidence and give their decision as to which had been the first to
scale the wall and enter the town. C. Laelius and M. Sempronius were named
by their respective parties, and Scipio added the name of P. Cornelius
Caudinus, who belonged to neither party, and bade the three sit at once
and try the case judicially. As they proceeded, the dispute became hotter
than ever, for the two men whose dignity and authority had helped to restrain
the excitement were now withdrawn to the tribunal. At last Laelius left
his colleagues and stepped down in front of the tribunal to Scipio and
pointed out to him that the proceedings were being carried on in defiance
of all order and self-restraint, and the men were almost coming to blows.
And even if there were no resort to violence the precedent that was being
set was none the less detestable, since men were trying to win the reward
of valour by falsehood and perjury. On the one side were the soldiers of
the legion, on the other those of the fleet, all alike ready to swear by
all the gods to what they wanted rather than to what they knew to be true,
and prepared to involve in the guilt of perjury not themselves only, but
the military standards, the eagles and their solemn oath of allegiance.
Laelius added that he was making these representations to him at the wish
of P. Cornelius and M. Sempronius. Scipio approved of the step Laelius
had taken and summoned the troops to assembly. He then announced that he
had definitely ascertained that Q. Tiberilius and Sextius Digitius had
both surmounted the wall at the same moment, and he should honour their
bravery by presenting them each with a mural crown. Then he bestowed rewards
upon the rest according to each man's merit. C. Laelius, the commander
of the fleet, was singled out for special distinction, and in the praises
which he lavished upon him he placed him on an equality with himself, finally
presenting him with a golden crown and thirty oxen.

[26.49]After this he ordered the hostages
from the various Spanish states to be summoned into his presence. It is
difficult to give their number, for I find in one place 300 mentioned and
in another 3724. There is a similar discrepancy amongst the authorities
on other points. One author asserts that the Carthaginian garrison amounted
to 10,000 men, another puts it at 7000, whilst a third estimates it as
not more than 2000. In one place you will find that there were 10,000 prisoners,
in another the number is said to have exceeded 25,000. If I followed the
Greek author Silenus I should give the number of scorpions large and small
as 60; according to Valerius Antias there were 6000 large ones and 13,000
small ones; so wildly do men invent. It is even a matter of dispute who
were in command. Most authorities agree that Laelius was in command of
the fleet, but there are some who say that it was M. Junius Silanus. Antias
tells us that Arines was the Carthaginian commandant when the garrison
surrendered, other writers say it was Mago. Nor are authors agreed as to
the number of ships that were captured, or the weight of gold and silver,
or the amount of money that was brought into the treasury. If we are to
make a choice, the numbers midway between these extremes are probably nearest
the truth. When the hostages appeared Scipio began by reassuring them and
dispelling their fears. They had, he told them, passed under the power
of Rome, and the Romans preferred to hold men by the bonds of kindness
rather than by those of fear. They would rather have foreign nations united
to them on terms of alliance and mutual good faith than kept down in hard
and hopeless servitude. He then ascertained the names of the States from
which they came and made an inventory of the number belonging to each State.
Messengers were then despatched to their homes, bidding their friends to
come and take charge of those who belonged to them - where envoys from
any of these States happened to be present he restored their own relations
to them on the spot; the care of the rest he entrusted to C. Flaminius
the quaestor, with injunctions to show them all kindness and protection.
Whilst he was thus engaged a high-born lady, wife of Mandonius the brother
of Indibilis, chief of the Ilergetes, came forward from the crowd of hostages
and flinging herself in tears at the general's feet implored him to impress
more strongly on their guards the duty of treating the women with tenderness
and consideration. Scipio assured her that nothing would be wanting in
this respect. Then she continued: "We do not set great store on those
things, for what is there that is not good enough for the condition that
we are in? I am too old to fear the injury to which our sex is exposed,
but it is for others that I am anxious as I look at these young girls."
Round her stood the daughters of Indibilis and other maidens of equal rank
in the flower of their youthful beauty, and they all looked up to her as
a mother. Scipio replied: "For the sake of the discipline which I
in common with all Romans uphold, I should take care that nothing which
is anywhere held sacred be violated amongst us; your virtue and nobility
of soul, which even in misfortune is not forgetful of matronly decorum,
make me now still more careful in this matter." He then delivered
them into the charge of a man of tried integrity, with strict injunctions
to protect their innocence and modesty as carefully as though they were
the wives and mothers of his own guests.

[26.50]Soon afterwards an adult maiden
who had been captured was brought to him by the soldiers, a girl of such
exceptional beauty that she attracted the eyes of all wherever she moved.
On enquiring as to her country and parentage, Scipio learnt, amongst other
things, that she had been betrothed to a young Celtiberian noble named
Aluccius. He at once sent for her parents and also for her betrothed, who,
he learnt, was pining to death through love of her. On the arrival of the
latter Scipio addressed him in more studied terms than a father would use.
"A young man myself," he said, "I am addressing myself to
a young man, so we may lay aside all reserve. When your betrothed had been
taken by my soldiers and brought to me, I was informed that she was very
dear to you, and her beauty made me believe it. Were I allowed the pleasures
suitable to my age, especially those of chaste and lawful love, instead
of being preoccupied with affairs of state, I should wish that I might
be forgiven for loving too ardently. Now I have the power to indulge another's
love, namely yours. Your betrothed has received the same respectful treatment
since she has been in my power that she would have met with from her own
parents. She has been reserved for you, in order that she might be given
to you as a gift inviolate and worthy of us both. In return for that boon
I stipulate for this one reward - that you will be a friend to Rome. If
you believe me to be an upright and honourable man such as the nations
here found my father and uncle to be, you may rest assured that there are
many in Rome like us, and you may be perfectly certain that nowhere in
the world can any people be named whom you would less wish to have as a
foe to you and yours, or whom you would more desire as a friend."

The young man was overcome with bashfulness and joy. He grasped Scipio's
hand, and besought all the gods to recompense him, for it was quite impossible
for him to make any return adequate to his own feelings, or the kindness
Scipio had shown him. Then the girl's parents and relatives were called.
They had brought a large amount of gold for her ransom, and when she was
freely given back to them, they begged Scipio to accept it as a gift from
them; his doing so, they declared, would evoke as much gratitude as the
restoration of the maiden unhurt. As they urged their request with great
importunity, Scipio said that he would accept it, and ordered it to be
laid at his feet. Calling Aluccius, he said to him: "In addition to
the dowry which you are to receive from your future father-in-law you will
now receive this from me as a wedding present." He then told him to
take up the gold and keep it. Delighted with the present and the honourable
treatment he had received, the young man resumed home, and filled the ears
of his countrymen with justly-earned praises of Scipio. A young man had
come among them, he declared, in all ways like the gods, winning his way
everywhere by his generosity and goodness of heart as much as by the might
of his arms. He began to enlist a body of his retainers, and in a few days
returned to Scipio with a picked force of 1400 mounted men.

[26.51]Scipio kept Laelius with him to
advise as to the disposal of the prisoners, the hostages and the booty,
and when all had been arranged, he assigned him one of the captured quinqueremes,
and placing on board Mago and some fifteen senators who had been made prisoners
with him, he sent Laelius to Rome to report his victory. He had himself
decided to spend a few days in New Carthage, and he employed this time
in exercising his military and naval forces. On the first day the legions,
fully equipped, went through various evolutions over a space of four miles;
the second day was employed in rubbing up and sharpening their weapons
in front of their tents; the third day they engaged in regular battle.
practice with single-sticks and darts, the points of which were muffled
with balls of cork or lead; the fourth day they rested, and on the fifth
they were again exercised under arms. This alternation of exercise and
rest was kept up as long as they remained in Carthage. The rowers and marines
put out to sea when the weather was calm and tested the speed and handiness
of their ships in a sham fight. These maneuvers going on outside the city
on land and sea sharpened the men both physically and mentally for war;
the city itself resounded with the din of warlike constructions carried
on by the artisans of every kind who were kept together in the Government
workshops. The general devoted his attention equally to everything. At
one time he was present with the fleet watching a naval encounter; at another
he was exercising his legions; then he would be giving some hours to an
inspection of the work which was going on in the shops and in the arsenal
and dockyards, where the vast number of artisans were vying with each other
as to who could work the hardest. After starting these various undertakings
and seeing that the damaged portions of the walls were repaired, he started
for Tarraco, leaving a detachment in the city for its protection. On his
way he was met by numerous delegations; some of them he dismissed, after
giving his reply while still on the march; others he put off till he reached
Tarraco, where he had given notice to all the allies, old and new, to meet
him. Almost all the tribes south of the Ebro obeyed the summons, as did
many also from the northern province. The Carthaginian generals did their
best to suppress any rumours of the fall of New Carthage, then when the
facts came out too clearly to be either suppressed or perverted, they tried
to minimise its importance. It was by a sudden ruse, almost by stealth,
they said, that one city out of the whole of Spain had been filched from
them in a single day; a young swaggerer elated with this trifling success
had in the intoxication of his delight made believe that it was a great
victory. But when he learnt that three generals and three victorious armies
were bearing down upon him he would be painfully reminded of the deaths
which had already visited his family. This was what they told people generally,
but they themselves were perfectly aware how much their strength was in
every way weakened by the loss of New Carthage.

End of Book 26

Copyright (c) 1996 by Bruce J. Butterfield.
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