Friday, August 8, 2014

Staunton, August 8 – Putinism, Igor
Eidman says, is “a combination of the practice and ideology of the authoritarian
regime of Putin, which operates on a corrupt bureaucratic oligarchy and is in
many respects close to a fascist dictatorship,” with its “aggressive
annexationist foreign policy, state-monopoly capitalism, force structures, and
chauvinism and traditionalism” promoted by state propaganda.

As such, Putinism is larger than
Putin and may extend beyond the period of his personal rule, the Moscow
commentator says.In any case, the
outlines of this new system are now clear and it is possible to describe its
ideology and practice in some detail.That is what Eidman has now done (kasparov.ru/material.php?id=53E0B2745B538).

Putinist ideology has “a right-conservative character and
is close to a fascist one. Its basic elements are chauvinism, clericalism and
xenophobia.” It also includes “imperial revanchism and the cult of a strong
aggressive state,” “aggressive anti-Westernism, anti-Americanism, and
anti-liberalism.”

It postulates “a theory of a conspiracy of the West (the
United States, the Anglo-Saxons, and Atlantic civilization) against Russia.” It
promotes “a cult of an authoritarian ruler and national leader.” And an
important element of this ideology is the union of church and state, which
presupposes state support of religious propaganda.”

At the same time, Eidman says, “Putinism promotes class
peace and the unification of all social groups around the state and the
national leader in the struggle with external and internal enemies (national
traitors). In contrast to the majority of other forms of fascism, Putinism is
free from ethno-nationalism.”

In terms of political practice, Putinism is based on “imitation
democracy,” an imitation “’opposition’” and “the authoritarian power of the
president.” Economically, it involves the fusion of the bureaucracy and the
major bourgeoisie, systematic corruption, and state control of key sectors of
the economy.

Putinism is distinguished as well by “the absence of a
social state, a very high division in the level of incomes between the richest
and poorest, a weak and small middle class, low levels of pensions, and
extremely low social supports.”Education and health care are corrupt and ineffective, and labor unions
are “completely controlled by the state.”

And in terms of foreign policy, “the most important and
most dangerous part of the practice of Putinism has become an aggressive
annexationist foreign policy course,” the Moscow commentator continues.

Putinism has its origins in the events and ideas of the
1990s, Eidman says.Economically, it
emerged “under the influence of two main forces: the neo-liberal economists and
the conservative bureaucracy connected with state corporations.”From the first, it adopted the model of the
anti-social state, and from the second, a continuing role for the bureaucracy
in the economy and an authoritarian political system.

The ideology of Putinism, Eidman insists, “arose much
later,” only after “the Putin system of power was formed.” It has been “aggressively
propagandized by the state” ever since.

Putinism resembles “the fascist and anti-democratic
regimes in Europe of the 1920s through 1960s.” It is different from German Nazism
and Italian fascism in that it is authoritarian rather than totalitarian, it
has “a negative attitude toward ethno-nationalism and anti-Semitism,” and is
not a social state.

According to Eidman, it is “closer to the right-conservative
regimes of the type of Franco in Spain, the clerical fascism of
Dolphus-Shuschnigg in Austria and Salazar in Portugal, the Hungarian regime of
Horthy and so on.But its closest
analogues are “the authoritarian, etatist, state-capitalist regimes in the
developing countries” over the last 60 years.

Among these are those of Saddat and Mubarak in Egypt,
Saddam Husein in Iraq, the Assadsin Syria, Marcos in the Philippines, and Suharto
in Indonesia. Ideologically, it is close to the right-wing military
dictatorships in Latin America and southeast Asia, although its economic
approach is very different than theirs.

In conclusion, Eidman says, “Putinism could exist even
after the departure of Putin. In this case, in place of the founding father of
this system, the role of the key figure of the regime will be played by the
latest successor. Such modernization of the façade could be useful to the
financial-bureaucratic oligarchy because it would allow their business to avoid
international sanctions and isolation.”

Given that, he concludes, “the task of the democratic
movement is the destruction of the Putinist system and not the [mere]
replacement of the individual in power.”