“Artificial intelligence is the future, not only for Russia, but for all humankind. It comes with colossal opportunities, but also threats that are difficult to predict. Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world.”1 – Russian President Vladimir Putin, 2017.

“A people that no longer can believe anything cannot make up its mind. It is deprived not only of its capacity to act but also of its capacity to think and to judge. And with such a people you can then do what you please.”2 – Hannah Arendt, 1978

Speaking to Russian students on the first day of the school year in September 2017, Putin squarely positioned Russia in the technological arms race for artificial intelligence (AI). Putin’s comment (see above) signaled that, like China and the United States, Russia sees itself engaged in direct geopolitical competition with the world’s great powers, and AI is the currency that Russia is betting on. But, unlike the United States and China, Russia lags behind in research and development on AI and other emerging technologies. Russia’s economy makes up less than 2 percent of global GDP compared to 24 percent for the United States and 15 percent for China, which puts Russia on par with a country like Spain.3 Despite Putin’s focus on AI, the Russian government has not released a strategy, like China has, on how the country plans to lead in this area. The Russian government’s future investment in AI research is unknown, but reports estimate that it spends approximately $12.5 million a year4 on AI research, putting it far behind China’s plan to invest $150 billion through 2030. The U.S. Department of Defense alone spends $7.4 billion annually on unclassified research and development on AI and related fields.5

Russia’s public corruption, decline in rule-of-law, and increasingly oppressive government regulations have produced a poor business environment. As a consequence, the country trails the United States and China in terms of private investment, scientific research, and the number of AI start-ups.6 In 2018, no Russian city entered the top 20 global regional hubs for the AI sector,7 despite the much-hyped opening of the “Skolkovo Innovation Center” in 2010, which was designed to be Russia’s answer to Silicon Valley. Unlike Silicon Valley, Skolkovo did not spur the kind of private investments and innovation that the Kremlin had hoped for and has since fizzled out. Russia’s new venture, a “technopolis” named Era, which is set to open in the fall of 2018, now promises to be the new hub for emerging technologies, but it too is unlikely to spur Silicon Valley like innovation.8 It is telling that despite high-level presidential and administrative support, there is scant Russian language academic research on AI.

It is not likely that the country’s stagnant and hydrocarbon-dependent economy will do much to improve the government’s ability to ramp up investment in emerging technologies. In the longer term, Russia’s demographic crisis (Russia is projected to lose 8 percent of its population by 2050, according the UN)9 will likely lead to shortages in highly skilled workers, many of whom have already left Russia for better pay and opportunities elsewhere.10 Western sanctions on key sectors of the Russian financial sector and defense industry, which Europe and the United States imposed after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the United States has continued to ramp up since then, put extra pressure on the Russian economy. Taken together, the economic and demographic trends signal that in the AI race, Russia will be unable to match China on government investment or compete with the United States on private sector innovation.

The Kremlin is undoubtedly aware of the country’s unfavorable position in the global AI competition, even if such an admission is unlikely to ever be made publicly. Strategically, such a wide gap between ambition and capacity means that Russia will need to invest its limited resources carefully. Currently, Moscow is pursuing investments in at least two directions: select conventional military and defense technologies where the Kremlin believes it can still hold comparative advantage over the West and high-impact, low-cost asymmetric warfare to correct the imbalance between Russia and the West in the conventional domain. The former—Russia’s development and use of AI-driven military technologies and weapons—has received significant attention.11

AI has the potential to hyperpower Russia’s use of disinformation … And unlike in the conventional military space, the United States and Europe are ill-equipped to respond to AI-driven asymmetric warfare in the information space.

The latter—the implications of AI for asymmetric political warfare—remains unexplored.12 Yet, such nonconventional tools—cyber-attacks, disinformation campaigns, political influence, and illicit finance—have become a central tenet of Russia’s strategy toward the West and one with which Russia has been able to project power and influence beyond its immediate neighborhood. In particular, AI has the potential to hyperpower Russia’s use of disinformation—the intentional spread of false and misleading information for the purpose of influencing politics and societies. And unlike in the conventional military space, the United States and Europe are ill-equipped to respond to AI-driven asymmetric warfare (ADAW) in the information space.

Russian information warfare at home and abroad

Putin came to power in 2000, and since then, information control and manipulation has become a key element of the Kremlin’s domestic and foreign policy. At home, this has meant repression of independent media and civil society, state control of traditional and digital media, and deepening government surveillance. For example, Russia’s surveillance system, SORM (System of Operative-Search Measures) allows the FSB (Federal Security Service) and other government agencies to monitor and remotely access ISP servers and communications without the ISPs’ knowledge.13 In 2016, a new package of laws, the so-called Yarovaya amendments, required telecom providers, social media platforms, and messaging services to store user data for three years and allow the FSB access to users’ metadata and encrypted communications.14 While there is little known information on how Russian intelligence agencies are using these data, their very collection suggests that the Kremlin is experimenting with AI-driven analysis to identify potential political dissenters. The government is also experimenting with facial recognition technologies in conjunction with CCTV. Moscow alone has approximately 170,000 cameras, at least 5,000 of which have been outfitted with facial recognition technology from NTechLabs.15

Still, Moscow’s capacity to control and surveil the digital domain at home remains limited, as exemplified by the battle between the messaging app Telegram and the Russian government in early 2018. Telegram, one of the few homegrown Russian tech companies, refused to hand over its encryption keys to the FSB in early 2018.16 What followed was a haphazard government attempt to ban Telegram by blocking tens of millions of IP addresses, which led to massive disruptions in unrelated services, such as cloud providers, online games, and mobile banking apps. Unlike Beijing, which has effectively sought to censor and control the internet as new technologies have developed, Moscow has not been able to implement similar controls preemptively. The result is that even a relatively small company like Telegram is able to outmaneuver and embarrass the Russian state. Despite such setbacks, however, Moscow seems set to continue on a path toward “digital authoritarianism”—using its increasingly unfettered access to citizens’ personal data to build better microtargeting capabilities that enhance social control, censor behavior and speech, and curtail counter-regime activities.17

Under Putin, Cold War-era “active measures”—overt or covert influence operations aimed at influencing public opinion and politics abroad—have been revived and adapted to the digital age.

Externally, Russian information warfare (informatsionaya voyna) has become part and parcel of Russian strategic thinking in foreign policy. Moscow has long seen the West as involved in an information war against it—a notion enshrined in Russia’s 2015 national security strategy, which sees the United States and its allies as seeking to contain Russia by exerting “informational pressure…” in an “intensifying confrontation in the global information arena.”18 Under Putin, Cold War-era “active measures”—overt or covert influence operations aimed at influencing public opinion and politics abroad—have been revived and adapted to the digital age. Information warfare (or information manipulation)19 has emerged as a core component of a broader influence strategy. At the same time, the line between conventional (or traditional) and nonconventional (or asymmetric) warfare has blurred in Russian military thinking. “The erosion of the distinction between war and peace, and the emergence of a grey zone” has been one of the most striking developments in the Russian approach to warfare, according to Chatham House’s Keir Giles.20 Warfare, from this perspective, exists on a spectrum in which “political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and other nonmilitary measures” are used to lay the groundwork for last resort military operations.21 The importance of information warfare on the spectrum of war has increased considerably in 21st century warfare, according to contemporary Russian military thought.22

Maskirovka, the Soviet/Russian term for the art of deception and concealment in both military and nonmilitary operations, is a key concept that figures prominently into Russian strategic thinking. The theory is broader than the narrow definition of military deception. In the conventional military domain, it includes the deployment of decoys, camouflage, and misleading information to deceive the enemy on the battlefield. The use of “little green men,” or unmarked soldiers and mercenaries, in Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 is one example of maskirovka in military practice. So is the use of fake weapons and heavy machinery: one Russian company is producing an army of inflatable missiles, tanks, and jets that appear real in satellite imagery.23

Maskirovka, as a theory and operational practice, also applies to nonmilitary asymmetric operations. Modern Russian disinformation and cyber attacks against the West rely on obfuscation and deception in line with the guiding principles of maskirovka. During the 2016 U.S. Presidential elections, for example, Russian citizens working in a troll factory in St. Petersburg, known as the Internet Research Agency (IRA), set up fake social media accounts pretending to be real Americans. These personas then spread conspiracy theories, disinformation, and divisive content meant to amplify societal polarization by pitting opposing groups against each other.24 The IRA troll factory itself, while operating with the knowledge and support of the Kremlin and the Russian intelligence services, was founded and managed by proxy: a Russian oligarch known as “Putin’s chef,” Yevgeny Prigozhin. Concord, a catering company controlled by Prigozhin, was the main funder and manager of the IRA, and it went to great lengths to conceal the company’s involvement, including the setting up a web of fourteen bank accounts to transfer funding to the IRA.25 Such obfuscation tactics were designed to conceal the true source and goals of the influence operations in the United Stated while allowing the Kremlin to retain plausible deniability if the operations were uncovered—nonconventional maskirovka in practice.

On the whole, Russia’s limited financial resources, the shift in strategic thinking toward information warfare, and the continued prevalence of maskirovka as a guiding principle of engagement, strongly suggest that in the near term, Moscow will ramp up the development of AI-enabled information warfare. Russia will not be the driver or innovator of these new technologies due its financial and human capital constraints. But, as it has already done in its attacks against the West, it will continue to co-opt existing commercially available technologies to serve as weapons of asymmetric warfare.

AI-driven asymmetric warfare

The Kremlin’s greatest innovation in its information operations against the West has not been technical. Rather, Moscow’s savviness has been to recognize that: (1) ready-made commercial tools and digital platforms can be easily weaponized; and (2) digital information warfare is cost-effective and high-impact, making it the perfect weapon of a technologically and economically weak power. AI-driven asymmetric warfare (ADAW) capabilities could provide Russia with additional comparative advantage.

Digital information warfare is cost-effective and high-impact, making it the perfect weapon of a technologically and economically weak power.

U.S. government and independent investigations into Russia’s influence campaign against the United States during the 2016 elections reveal the low cost of that effort. Based on publicly available information,26 we know that the Russian effort included: the purchase of ads on Facebook (estimated cost $100,000)27 and Google (approximate cost $4,700), set up of approximately 36,000 automated bot accounts on Twitter, operation of the IRA troll farm (estimated cost $240,000 over the course of two years)28, an intelligence gathering trip carried out by two Russian agents posing as tourists in 2014 (estimated cost $50,000)29, production of misleading or divisive content (pictures, memes, etc.), plus additional costs related to the cyber attacks on the Democratic National Committee and the Clinton campaign. In sum, the total known cost of the most high-profile influence operation against the United States is likely around one million dollars.

The relatively low level of investment produced high returns. On Facebook alone, Russian linked content from the IRA reached 125 million Americans.30 This is because the Russian strategy relied on ready-made tools designed for commercial online marketing and advertising: the Kremlin simply used the same online advertising tools that companies would use to sell and promote its products and adapted them to spread disinformation. Since the U.S. operation, these tools and others have evolved and present new opportunities for far more damaging but increasingly low-cost and difficult-to-attribute ADAW operations.

Three threat vectors in particular require immediate attention. First, advances in deep learning are making synthetic media content quick, cheap, and easy to produce. AI-enabled audio and video manipulation, so-called “deep fakes,” is already available through easy-to-use apps such as Face2Face,31 which allows for one person’s expressions to be mapped onto another face in a target video. Video to Video Synthesis32 can synthesize realistic video based a baseline of inputs. Other tools can synthesize realistic photographs of AI-rendered faces, reproduce videos and audio of any world leader,33 and synthesize street scenes to appear in a different season.34 Using these tools, China recently unveiled an AI made news anchor.35 As the barriers of entry for accessing such tools continue to decrease, their appeal to low-resource actors will increase. Whereas most Russian disinformation content has been static (e.g., false news stories, memes, graphically designed ads), advances in learning AI will turn disinformation dynamic (e.g. video, audio).

Because audio and video can easily be shared on smart phones and do not require literacy, dynamic disinformation content will be able to reach a broader audience in more countries. For example, in India, false videos shared through Whatsapp incited riots and murders.36 Unlike Facebook or Twitter, Whatsapp (owned by Facebook) is an end-to-end encrypted messaging platform, which means that content shared via the platform is basically unmonitored and untraceable. The “democratization of disinformation” will make it difficult for governments to counter AI-driven disinformation. Advances in machine learning are producing algorithms that “continuously learn how to more effectively replicate the appearance of reality,” which means that “deep fakes cannot easily be detected by other algorithms.”37

Russia, China, and others could harness these new publicly available technologies to undermine Western soft power or public diplomacy efforts around the world. Debunking or attributing such content will require far more resources than the cost of production, and it will be difficult if not impossible to do so in real time.

Second, advances in affective computing and natural language processing will make it easier to manipulate human emotions and extract sensitive information without ever hacking an email account. In 2017, Chinese researchers created an “emotional chatting machine” based on data users shared on Weibo, the Chinese social media site.38 As AI gains access to more personal data, it will become increasingly customized and personalized to appeal to and manipulate specific users. Coupled with advances in natural learning processing, such as voice recognition, this means that affective systems will be able to mimic, respond to, and predict human emotions expressed through text, voice, or facial expressions. Some evidence suggests that humans are quite willing to form personal relationships, share deeply personal information, and interact for long periods of time with AI designed to form relationships.39 These systems could be used to gather information from high value targets—such as intelligence officers or political figures—by exploiting their vices and patterns of behavior.

Advances in affective computing and natural language processing will make it easier to manipulate human emotions and extract sensitive information without ever hacking an email account.

Third, deep fakes and emotionally manipulative content will be able to reach the intended audience with a high degree of precision due to advances in content distribution networks. “Precision propaganda” is the set of interconnected tools that comprise an “ecosystem of services that enable highly targeted political communications that reach millions of people with customized messages.”40 The full scope of this ecosystem, which includes data collection, advertising platforms, and search engine optimization, aims to parse out audiences in granular detail and identify new receptive audiences will be “supercharged” by advances in AI. The content that users see online is the end product of an underlying multi-billion dollar industry that involves thousands of companies that work together to assess individuals’ preferences, attitudes, and tastes to ensure maximum efficiency, profitability, and real-time responsiveness of content delivery. Russian operations (as far as we know), relied on the most basic of these tools. But, as Ghosh and Scott suggest, a more advanced operation could use the full suite of services utilized by companies to track political attitudes on social media across all congressional districts, analyze who is most likely to vote and where, and then launch, almost instantly, a customized campaign at a highly localized level to discourage voting in the most vulnerable districts. Such a campaign, due to its highly personalized structure, would likely have significant impact on voting behavior.41

Once the precision of this distribution ecosystem is paired with emotionally manipulative deep fake content delivered by online entities that appear to be human, the line between fact and fiction will cease to exist. And Hannah Arendt’s prediction of a world in which there is no truth and no trust may still come to pass.

Responding to AI-driven asymmetric warfare

Caught by surprise by Russia’s influence operations against the West, governments in the United States and Europe are now establishing processes, agencies, and laws to respond to disinformation and other forms of state-sponsored influence operations.42 However, these initiatives, while long overdue, will not address the next generation of ADAW threats emanating from Russia or other actors. So far, Western attempts to deter Russian malign influence, such as economic sanctions, have not changed Russian behavior: cyber-attacks, intelligence operations, and disinformation attacks have continued in Europe and the United States.

To get ahead of AI-driven hyper war,43 policymakers should focus on designing a deterrence strategy for nonconventional warfare.44

The first step toward such a strategy should be to identify and then seek to remedy the information asymmetries between policymakers and the tech industry. In 2015, the U.S. Department of Defense launched the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) to fund the development of new technologies with defense implications.45 DIU’s mission could be expanded to also focus on pilot AI research and development into tools to identify and counter dynamic disinformation and other asymmetric threats.

The U.S. Congress established an AI Caucus co-chaired by Congressman John Delaney and Congressman Pete Olsen. The Caucus should make it a priority to pass legislation to set the U.S. government’s strategy on AI, much like China, France, and the EU have done. The Future of Intelligence Act, introduced in 2017, begins this process, but it should be expanded to include asymmetric threats and incorporated into the broader national security strategy and the National Defense Authorization Act. Such legislation should also mandate an immediate review of the current tools the U.S. government has to respond to an advanced disinformation attack. Part of the review should include a report, in both classified and unclassified versions, on investments in AI research and development across the U.S. government and the preparedness of various agencies in responding to future attacks. As attribution becomes more difficult, such a report should also recommend a set of baselines and metrics that warrant a governmental response and what the nature of such a response would be.

To get ahead of AI-driven hyper war, policymakers should focus on designing a deterrence strategy for nonconventional warfare.

Step two toward a deterrence strategy would involve informing the Russian government and other adversarial regimes of the consequences for deploying AI-enabled disinformation attacks. Such messaging should be carried out publicly by high-level cabinet officials and in communications between intelligence agencies. Deterrence can only be effective if each side is aware of the implications of its actions. It also requires a nuanced understanding of the adversary’s strategic intentions and tactical capabilities – Russian strategic thinking will be different than Chinese strategic thinking. Deterrence is not a one size fits all model. Policymakers will need to develop a more in-depth understanding of Russian (or Chinese) culture, perceptions, and thinking. To that end, the U.S. government should reinvest, at a significant level, into cultivating expertise and training the next generation of regional experts.

Inevitably, policy will not be able to keep pace with technological advances. Tech companies, research foundations, governments, private foundations, and major non-profit policy organizations should invest in research that will assess the short- and long-term consequences of emerging AI technologies for foreign policy, national security, and geopolitical competition. Research and strategic thinking at the intersection of technology and geopolitics is sorely lacking even as Russia—a country identified as a direct competitor to the United States in the 2017 National Security Strategy —prioritizes expanding its capacities in this area. The United States is still far ahead of its competitors, especially Russia. But even with limited capabilities, the Kremlin can quickly gain comparative advantage in AI-driven information warfare, leaving the West to once again be caught off guard.

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By Alina Polyakova
“Artificial intelligence is the future, not only for Russia, but for all humankind. It comes with colossal opportunities, but also threats that are difficult to predict. Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world.”1 – Russian President Vladimir Putin, 2017.
“A people that no longer can believe anything cannot make up its mind. It is deprived not only of its capacity to act but also of its capacity to think and to judge. And with such a people you can then do what you please.”2 – Hannah Arendt, 1978
Speaking to Russian students on the first day of the school year in September 2017, Putin squarely positioned Russia in the technological arms race for artificial intelligence (AI). Putin’s comment (see above) signaled that, like China and the United States, Russia sees itself engaged in direct geopolitical competition with the world’s great powers, and AI is the currency that Russia is betting on. But, unlike the United States and China, Russia lags behind in research and development on AI and other emerging technologies. Russia’s economy makes up less than 2 percent of global GDP compared to 24 percent for the United States and 15 percent for China, which puts Russia on par with a country like Spain.3 Despite Putin’s focus on AI, the Russian government has not released a strategy, like China has, on how the country plans to lead in this area. The Russian government’s future investment in AI research is unknown, but reports estimate that it spends approximately $12.5 million a year4 on AI research, putting it far behind China’s plan to invest $150 billion through 2030. The U.S. Department of Defense alone spends $7.4 billion annually on unclassified research and development on AI and related fields.5
Russia’s public corruption, decline in rule-of-law, and increasingly oppressive government regulations have produced a poor business environment. As a consequence, the country trails the United States and China in terms of private investment, scientific research, and the number of AI start-ups.6 In 2018, no Russian city entered the top 20 global regional hubs for the AI sector,7 despite the much-hyped opening of the “Skolkovo Innovation Center” in 2010, which was designed to be Russia’s answer to Silicon Valley. Unlike Silicon Valley, Skolkovo did not spur the kind of private investments and innovation that the Kremlin had hoped for and has since fizzled out. Russia’s new venture, a “technopolis” named Era, which is set to open in the fall of 2018, now promises to be the new hub for emerging technologies, but it too is unlikely to spur Silicon Valley like innovation.8 It is telling that despite high-level presidential and administrative support, there is scant Russian language academic research on AI.
It is not likely that the country’s stagnant and hydrocarbon-dependent economy will do much to improve the government’s ability to ramp up investment in emerging technologies. In the longer term, Russia’s demographic crisis (Russia is projected to lose 8 percent of its population by 2050, according the UN)9 will likely lead to shortages in highly skilled workers, many of whom have already left Russia for better pay and opportunities elsewhere.10 Western sanctions on key sectors of the Russian financial sector and defense industry, which Europe and the United States imposed after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the United States has continued to ramp up since then, put extra pressure on the Russian economy. Taken together, the economic and demographic trends signal that in the AI race, Russia will be unable to match China on government investment or compete with the United States on private sector innovation.
The Kremlin is undoubtedly aware of the country’s unfavorable position in the global AI ... By Alina Polyakova
“Artificial intelligence is the future, not only for Russia, but for all humankind. It comes with colossal opportunities, but also threats that are difficult to predict. Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become ... https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2018/10/23/brookings-survey-finds-57-percent-say-they-have-seen-fake-news-during-2018-elections-and-19-percent-believe-it-has-influenced-their-vote/Brookings survey finds 57 percent say they have seen fake news during 2018 elections and 19 percent believe it has influenced their votehttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/576260430/0/brookingsrss/topics/mediaandjournalism~Brookings-survey-finds-percent-say-they-have-seen-fake-news-during-elections-and-percent-believe-it-has-influenced-their-vote/
Tue, 23 Oct 2018 11:00:13 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?p=543692

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By Darrell M. West

The subject of fake news has sparked considerable discussion over the last two years. Following revelations of foreign government meddling and online disinformation campaigns, there is concern regarding the sources of false information and the possible impact on voters. Political observers worry that U.S. elections are being disrupted and democracy is being undermined.

To examine this topic just a few weeks before the 2018 midterm elections, researchers at the Brookings Institution undertook a national poll and asked a series of questions about the prevalence of fake news, shifts since 2016, sources of fake news, and how to combat disinformation campaigns.

The survey was an online U.S. national poll undertaken with 2,024 adult internet users between October 14 to 16, 2018. It was overseen by Darrell M. West, vice president of Governance Studies and director of the Center for Technology Innovation at the Brookings Institution and the author of The Future of Work: Robots, AI, and Automation. Responses were weighted using gender, age, and region to match the demographics of the national internet population as estimated by the U.S. Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey.

Prevalence of fake news and impact on vote

Fifty-seven percent say they have seen fake news during the 2018 elections and 19 percent believe it has influenced how they plan to vote. In addition, 42 percent think there now is more fake news than in 2016.

There are some differences by gender and age. Men (59 percent) are slightly more likely than women (56 percent) to see fake news. Of the age groups, senior citizens (60 percent) are more likely than young people (50 percent) to see fake news.

Regarding vote impact, men (23 percent) were more likely than women (16 percent) to say fake news has influenced their vote. Senior citizens (22 percent) are more likely than those aged 35 to 54 (15 percent) to claim fake news has influenced them.

Who generates fake news?

We asked who they thought generates the most fake news in terms of political party, ideology, and country. Thirty-two percent believe Republicans generate the most fake news, 32 percent cite Democrats, 2 percent name independents, and 34 percent are unsure.

Forty-six percent see Russia as the country generating the most fake news, compared to 21 percent who name some other country, 16 percent who cite North Korea, 13 percent say China, and 4 percent claim it is Iran.

How much of a threat to democracy?

Forty-five percent believe fake news is very much a threat to democracy, 28 percent say it is somewhat of a threat, 10 believe it is not very much of a threat, and 17 percent are unsure.

Believe technology firms and government should do more to protect people

Sixty percent believe major technology companies should be doing more to protect people from fake news and 56 percent think the U.S. government should be doing more to safeguard people.

Change in information acquisition to protect themselves from fake news

Forty-six percent say they have changed the way they get information in order to protect themselves from fake news, 29 percent have not, and 25 percent are unsure.

Survey Questions and Answers

1. Have you seen fake news during the 2018 elections?

16% definitely no

8% possibly no

10% possibly yes

47% definitely yes

19% don’t know or no answer

2. Do you think there now is:

8% less fake news

34% about the same amount

42% more fake news than in 2016

16% don’t know or no answer

3. Has fake news influenced how you plan to vote in the 2018 elections?

57% definitely no

10% possibly no

4% possibly yes

15% definitely yes

14% don’t know or no answer

4. Who do you think generates the most fake news? (rotate answers)

32% Republicans

2% Independents

32% Democrats

34% don’t know or no answer

5. Who do you think generates the most fake news? (rotate answers)

30% conservatives

2% moderates

33% liberals

35% don’t know or no answer

6. Of organizations outside the United States, which countries do you think generate the most fake news? (rotate answers)

46% Russia

13% China

4% Iran

16% North Korea

21% some other country

7. How much of a threat to democracy do you think fake news is:

10% not very much

28% somewhat

45% very much

17% don’t know or no answer

8. Do you think major technology companies should be doing more to protect people from fake news?

12% definitely no

7% possibly no

17% possibly yes

43% definitely yes

21% don’t know or no answer

9. Do you think the U.S. government should be doing more to protect people from fake news?

14% definitely no

8% possibly no

15% possibly yes

41% definitely yes

22% don’t know or no answer

10. Have you changed the way you get information in order to protect yourself from fake news?

Region:

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https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/voting_booths_nyc.jpg?w=270By Darrell M. West
The subject of fake news has sparked considerable discussion over the last two years. Following revelations of foreign government meddling and online disinformation campaigns, there is concern regarding the sources of false information and the possible impact on voters. Political observers worry that U.S. elections are being disrupted and democracy is being undermined.
To examine this topic just a few weeks before the 2018 midterm elections, researchers at the Brookings Institution undertook a national poll and asked a series of questions about the prevalence of fake news, shifts since 2016, sources of fake news, and how to combat disinformation campaigns.
The survey was an online U.S. national poll undertaken with 2,024 adult internet users between October 14 to 16, 2018. It was overseen by Darrell M. West, vice president of Governance Studies and director of the Center for Technology Innovation at the Brookings Institution and the author of The Future of Work: Robots, AI, and Automation. Responses were weighted using gender, age, and region to match the demographics of the national internet population as estimated by the U.S. Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey.
Prevalence of fake news and impact on vote
Fifty-seven percent say they have seen fake news during the 2018 elections and 19 percent believe it has influenced how they plan to vote. In addition, 42 percent think there now is more fake news than in 2016.
There are some differences by gender and age. Men (59 percent) are slightly more likely than women (56 percent) to see fake news. Of the age groups, senior citizens (60 percent) are more likely than young people (50 percent) to see fake news.
Regarding vote impact, men (23 percent) were more likely than women (16 percent) to say fake news has influenced their vote. Senior citizens (22 percent) are more likely than those aged 35 to 54 (15 percent) to claim fake news has influenced them.
Who generates fake news?
We asked who they thought generates the most fake news in terms of political party, ideology, and country. Thirty-two percent believe Republicans generate the most fake news, 32 percent cite Democrats, 2 percent name independents, and 34 percent are unsure.
In terms of ideology, 33 percent believe liberals generate the most fake news, 30 percent say conservatives, 2 percent name moderates, and 35 percent aren’t sure.
Forty-six percent see Russia as the country generating the most fake news, compared to 21 percent who name some other country, 16 percent who cite North Korea, 13 percent say China, and 4 percent claim it is Iran.
How much of a threat to democracy?
Forty-five percent believe fake news is very much a threat to democracy, 28 percent say it is somewhat of a threat, 10 believe it is not very much of a threat, and 17 percent are unsure.
Believe technology firms and government should do more to protect people
Sixty percent believe major technology companies should be doing more to protect people from fake news and 56 percent think the U.S. government should be doing more to safeguard people.
Change in information acquisition to protect themselves from fake news
Forty-six percent say they have changed the way they get information in order to protect themselves from fake news, 29 percent have not, and 25 percent are unsure.
Survey Questions and Answers
1. Have you seen fake news during the 2018 elections?
- 16% definitely no - 8% possibly no - 10% possibly yes - 47% definitely yes - 19% don’t know or no answer
2. Do you think there now is:
- 8% less fake news - 34% about the same amount - 42% more fake news than in 2016 - 16% don’t know or no answer
3. Has fake news influenced how you plan to vote in the 2018 elections?
- 57% definitely no - 10% possibly no - 4% possibly yes - 15% definitely yes - 14% don’t know or no answer
4. Who do you think generates the most fake news? (rotate ... By Darrell M. West
The subject of fake news has sparked considerable discussion over the last two years. Following revelations of foreign government meddling and online disinformation campaigns, there is concern regarding the sources of false ... https://www.brookings.edu/media-mentions/20181017-wapo-amanda-sloat/20181017 WaPo Amanda Sloathttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/575647094/0/brookingsrss/topics/mediaandjournalism~WaPo-Amanda-Sloat/
Wed, 17 Oct 2018 20:05:32 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?post_type=media-mention&p=543497

Eighteen months ago, Donald Trump visited Saudi Arabia and said he had concluded $110 billion dollars in arms sales with the kingdom. It was fake news then and it’s still fake news today. The Saudis have not concluded a single major arms deal with Washington on Trump’s watch. Nonetheless, the U.S. arms relationship with the kingdom is the most important leverage Washington has as it contemplates reacting to the alleged murder of Jamal Khashoggi.

Follow the money

In June 2017, after the president’s visit to Riyadh—his first official foreign travel—we published a Brookings blog post detailing that his claims to have sold $110 billion in weapons were spurious. Other media outlets subsequently came to the same conclusion. When Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman visited the White House this year, the president indirectly confirmed that non-deal by chiding the prince for spending only “peanuts” on arms from America.

The Saudis have continued to buy spare parts, munitions, and technical support for the enormous amount of American equipment they have bought from previous administrations. The Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) is entirely dependent on American and British support for its air fleet of F15 fighter jets, Apache helicopters, and Tornado aircraft. If either Washington or London halts the flow of logistics, the RSAF will be grounded. The Saudi army and the Saudi Arabian National Guard are similarly dependent on foreigners (the Saudi Arabian National Guard is heavily dependent on Canada). The same is also true for the Saudis allies like Bahrain.

Under President Obama, Saudi Arabia spent well over $110 billion in U.S. weapons, including for aircraft, helicopters, and air defense missiles. These deals were the largest in American history. Saudi commentators routinely decried Obama for failing to protect Saudi interests, but the kingdom loved his arms deals.

But the kingdom has not bought any new arms platform during the Trump administration. Only one has even been seriously discussed: A $15 billion deal for THAAD, terminal high altitude area defense missiles, has gotten the most attention and preliminary approval from Congress, but the Saudis let pass a September deadline for the deal with Lockheed Martin. The Saudis certainly need more air defenses with the pro-Iran Zaydi Shiite Houthi rebels in Yemen firing ballistic missiles at Saudi cities.

Shaking the arms relationship is by far the most important way to clip his wings.

The three and a half year-old Saudi war in Yemen is hugely expensive. There are no public figures from the Saudi government about the war’s costs, but a conservative estimate would be at least $50 billion per year. Maintenance costs for aircraft and warships go up dramatically when they are constantly in combat operations. The Royal Saudi Navy has been blockading Yemen for over 40 months. The RSAF has conducted thousands of air strikes. The war is draining the kingdom’s coffers. And responsibility for the war is on Mohammed bin Salman, who as defense minister has driven Riyadh into this quagmire. Shaking the arms relationship is by far the most important way to clip his wings.

Avenging Khashoggi

Congress now has the power to make a serious decision, halting arms sales and the logistics train for the kingdom in the wake of the reported murder of Saudi critic Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul Turkey last week. The outrageous attack on Jamal deserves serious reaction, and given Trump’s dereliction of duty on the matter, it is up to Congress to act. The president may try to override a Senate arms stand-down but it would be a painful setback for the prince.

Jamal’s last opinion piece before his death was about the war in Yemen. He called for an immediate Saudi ceasefire and blamed the war on Mohammed bin Salman. At stake, Jamal argued, is Saudi “dignity” and its role as a leader in the Islamic world. It has rightly been seen as an ineffectual bully. Saudi Arabia’s war is alienating people around the world. Across the Muslim world, the Saudi brand has been damaged. Khashoggi compared Mohammed bin Salman to Syrian President Bashar Assad as a war criminal. His death only further darkens Mohammed bin Salman’s standing. Much of the world is likely to treat him and his henchmen as pariahs.

The prince’s goal in Istanbul was to intimidate any opposition or criticism no matter how peaceful. The more blatant and gruesome the intimidation, the more likely it will chill dissent. But it will also polarize the country and encourage the deep conspiracies that could violently and suddenly change the kingdom in very unexpected ways. These are very dangerous waters for the House of Saud.

]]>
By Bruce Riedel
Eighteen months ago, Donald Trump visited Saudi Arabia and said he had concluded $110 billion dollars in arms sales with the kingdom. It was fake news then and it’s still fake news today. The Saudis have not concluded a single major arms deal with Washington on Trump’s watch. Nonetheless, the U.S. arms relationship with the kingdom is the most important leverage Washington has as it contemplates reacting to the alleged murder of Jamal Khashoggi.
Follow the money
In June 2017, after the president’s visit to Riyadh—his first official foreign travel—we published a Brookings blog post detailing that his claims to have sold $110 billion in weapons were spurious. Other media outlets subsequently came to the same conclusion. When Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman visited the White House this year, the president indirectly confirmed that non-deal by chiding the prince for spending only “peanuts” on arms from America.
The Saudis have continued to buy spare parts, munitions, and technical support for the enormous amount of American equipment they have bought from previous administrations. The Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) is entirely dependent on American and British support for its air fleet of F15 fighter jets, Apache helicopters, and Tornado aircraft. If either Washington or London halts the flow of logistics, the RSAF will be grounded. The Saudi army and the Saudi Arabian National Guard are similarly dependent on foreigners (the Saudi Arabian National Guard is heavily dependent on Canada). The same is also true for the Saudis allies like Bahrain.
Under President Obama, Saudi Arabia spent well over $110 billion in U.S. weapons, including for aircraft, helicopters, and air defense missiles. These deals were the largest in American history. Saudi commentators routinely decried Obama for failing to protect Saudi interests, but the kingdom loved his arms deals.
But the kingdom has not bought any new arms platform during the Trump administration. Only one has even been seriously discussed: A $15 billion deal for THAAD, terminal high altitude area defense missiles, has gotten the most attention and preliminary approval from Congress, but the Saudis let pass a September deadline for the deal with Lockheed Martin. The Saudis certainly need more air defenses with the pro-Iran Zaydi Shiite Houthi rebels in Yemen firing ballistic missiles at Saudi cities.
Shaking the arms relationship is by far the most important way to clip his wings.
The three and a half year-old Saudi war in Yemen is hugely expensive. There are no public figures from the Saudi government about the war’s costs, but a conservative estimate would be at least $50 billion per year. Maintenance costs for aircraft and warships go up dramatically when they are constantly in combat operations. The Royal Saudi Navy has been blockading Yemen for over 40 months. The RSAF has conducted thousands of air strikes. The war is draining the kingdom’s coffers. And responsibility for the war is on Mohammed bin Salman, who as defense minister has driven Riyadh into this quagmire. Shaking the arms relationship is by far the most important way to clip his wings.
Avenging Khashoggi
Congress now has the power to make a serious decision, halting arms sales and the logistics train for the kingdom in the wake of the reported murder of Saudi critic Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul Turkey last week. The outrageous attack on Jamal deserves serious reaction, and given Trump’s dereliction of duty on the matter, it is up to Congress to act. The president may try to override a Senate arms stand-down but it would be a painful setback for the prince.
Jamal’s last opinion piece before his death was about the war in Yemen. He called for an immediate Saudi ceasefire and blamed the war on Mohammed bin Salman. At stake, Jamal argued, is Saudi “dignity” and its role as ... By Bruce Riedel
Eighteen months ago, Donald Trump visited Saudi Arabia and said he had concluded $110 billion dollars in arms sales with the kingdom. It was fake news then and it’s still fake news today. The Saudis have not concluded a ... https://www.brookings.edu/events/enemy-of-the-people/Enemy of the peoplehttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/573052750/0/brookingsrss/topics/mediaandjournalism~Enemy-of-the-people/
Fri, 05 Oct 2018 21:00:12 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?post_type=event&p=540835

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The American press has long been an institution seeking to uphold the integrity of our democracy. Past presidential administrations may have criticized the media at times, but the Trump administration has elevated such attacks to unprecedented levels, declaring the press as being an “enemy of the American people.” As President Trump fuels the “fake news” fire and a general distrust of journalists, the power of the press is weakening in some segments of society. In his new book, “Enemy of the People,” award-winning journalist and warns that this trend poses serious threats to the health of our democracy.

On Wednesday, Oct. 17, Kalb debuted his book at Brookings and was joined by veteran journalist Dan Rather for a discussion about its main themes. The two journalists explored how Trump has delegitimized the American press and why we should fear for the future of American democracy.

After the session, speakers took questions from the audience.

]]>
Washington, DCpast15398028001539807300America/New_YorkThe American press has long been an institution seeking to uphold the integrity of our democracy. Past presidential administrations may have criticized the media at times, but the Trump administration has elevated such attacks to unprecedented levels, declaring the press as being an “enemy of the American people.” As President Trump fuels the “fake news” fire and a general distrust of journalists, the power of the press is weakening in some segments of society. In his new book, “Enemy of the People,” award-winning journalist and warns that this trend poses serious threats to the health of our democracy.
On Wednesday, Oct. 17, Kalb debuted his book at Brookings and was joined by veteran journalist Dan Rather for a discussion about its main themes. The two journalists explored how Trump has delegitimized the American press and why we should fear for the future of American democracy.
After the session, speakers took questions from the audience. The American press has long been an institution seeking to uphold the integrity of our democracy. Past presidential administrations may have criticized the media at times, but the Trump administration has elevated such attacks to unprecedented ... https://www.brookings.edu/experts/ananth-krishnan/Ananth Krishnanhttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/571139356/0/brookingsrss/topics/mediaandjournalism~Ananth-Krishnan/
Mon, 24 Sep 2018 05:41:48 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?post_type=expert&p=538513

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By Rohan Laik

Ananth Krishnan is a Visiting Fellow at Brookings India. Previously, he was China Bureau Chief and Associate Editor for the India Today Group, based out of Beijing until August 2018. Krishnan reported out of China for nine years, for India Today and earlier for The Hindu newspaper, starting in June 2009. His reporting has focused on China’s relations with India, China’s neighbourhood diplomacy, Chinese domestic politics, Tibet and Xinjiang.

Krishnan has closely tracked Sino-Indian relations for a decade, from the boundary question and the rapidly expanding trading relationship to the long history of cultural engagement between the neighbours. His reporting has taken him to all but three of China’s 33 provinces and regions, from the China-India border in Tibet and Xinjiang, and the trading markets and factories of Guangdong, to the forgotten ruins of ancient Indian temples in Fujian. He has interviewed China’s Premier, Foreign Minister and Defence Minister on Sino-Indian relations. He has reported widely on China’s neighbourhood diplomacy with a focus on Beijing’s engagement in South Asia, and has closely tracked China’s Belt and Road Initiative since its unveiling in 2013.

He has appeared frequently on Indian television to comment on China’s diplomacy. Krishnan’s interests include Tibet and Xinjiang, and he has travelled extensively in both regions. He has authored a chapter on Xinjiang and the politics of assimilation in China in the reporting anthology “Chinese Characters”

Before moving to China, Krishnan was based at The Hindu newspaper’s headquarters in Chennai, where he covered the aviation industry, and at the newspaper’s bureau in Mumbai. He holds a master’s degree in social science from the University of Chicago, focusing on the politics of the film industry in Tamil Nadu, and bachelor’s degrees in history and economics from the University of California, Los Angeles.

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By Rohan Laik
Ananth Krishnan is a Visiting Fellow at Brookings India. Previously, he was China Bureau Chief and Associate Editor for the India Today Group, based out of Beijing until August 2018. Krishnan reported out of China for nine years, for India Today and earlier for The Hindu newspaper, starting in June 2009. His reporting has focused on China's relations with India, China's neighbourhood diplomacy, Chinese domestic politics, Tibet and Xinjiang.
Krishnan has closely tracked Sino-Indian relations for a decade, from the boundary question and the rapidly expanding trading relationship to the long history of cultural engagement between the neighbours. His reporting has taken him to all but three of China's 33 provinces and regions, from the China-India border in Tibet and Xinjiang, and the trading markets and factories of Guangdong, to the forgotten ruins of ancient Indian temples in Fujian. He has interviewed China's Premier, Foreign Minister and Defence Minister on Sino-Indian relations. He has reported widely on China's neighbourhood diplomacy with a focus on Beijing's engagement in South Asia, and has closely tracked China's Belt and Road Initiative since its unveiling in 2013.
He has appeared frequently on Indian television to comment on China's diplomacy. Krishnan's interests include Tibet and Xinjiang, and he has travelled extensively in both regions. He has authored a chapter on Xinjiang and the politics of assimilation in China in the reporting anthology “Chinese Characters”
(https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520270275/chinese-characters). He has also authored a chapter on China's changing media landscape and the media's role in foreign policy and specifically regarding relations with India (https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/media-at-work-in-china-and-india/book247412).
Before moving to China, Krishnan was based at The Hindu newspaper's headquarters in Chennai, where he covered the aviation industry, and at the newspaper's bureau in Mumbai. He holds a master's degree in social science from the University of Chicago, focusing on the politics of the film industry in Tamil Nadu, and bachelor's degrees in history and economics from the University of California, Los Angeles. By Rohan Laik
Ananth Krishnan is a Visiting Fellow at Brookings India. Previously, he was China Bureau Chief and Associate Editor for the India Today Group, based out of Beijing until August 2018. Krishnan reported out of China for nine years, for ... https://www.brookings.edu/podcast-episode/trumps-war-on-the-press/Trump’s war on the presshttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/568465282/0/brookingsrss/topics/mediaandjournalism~Trumps-war-on-the-press/
Fri, 07 Sep 2018 14:25:22 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?post_type=podcast-episode&p=535903

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By Marvin Kalb, Bill Finan, Fred Dews
Marvin Kalb, a nonresident senior fellow and veteran journalist, discusses his new book “Enemy of the People: Trump's War on the Press, the New McCarthyism, and the Threat to American Democracy,” and why President Trump's attacks on the media are a cause for concern.
Also in this episode, David Wessel reflects on the government's response to the financial crises 10 years ago and introduces work the Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy is doing around the anniversary.
Related content:
Enemy of the People
Trump is winning!
Enemy of the People: Marvin Kalb addresses President Trump’s attacks on the press and judiciary
Day 1: Responding to the Global Financial Crisis
Day 2: Responding to the Global Financial Crisis
—
Thanks to audio producer Gaston Reboredo with assistance from Mark Hoelscher, and to producers Brennan Hoban and Chris McKenna. Additional support comes from Jessica Pavone, Eric Abalahin, Camilo Ramirez, and Emily Horne.
Subscribe to Brookings podcasts here or on Apple Podcasts, send feedback email to BCP@Brookings.edu, and follow us and tweet us at @policypodcasts on Twitter.
The Brookings Cafeteria is a part of the Brookings Podcast Network.
By Marvin Kalb, Bill Finan, Fred Dews
Marvin Kalb, a nonresident senior fellow and veteran journalist, discusses his new book “Enemy of the People: Trump's War on the Press, the New McCarthyism, and the Threat to American Democracy,”https://www.brookings.edu/media-mentions/20180905-buzzfeed-chris-meserole/20180905 Buzzfeed Chris Meserolehttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/571199434/0/brookingsrss/topics/mediaandjournalism~Buzzfeed-Chris-Meserole/
Wed, 05 Sep 2018 13:01:19 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?post_type=media-mention&p=538471

Shortly after assuming the awesome powers of the presidency, Donald J. Trump declared war on the American press. With a torrent of insulting tweets, he has accused reporters of being the “enemy of the American people,” using a phrase familiar to 20th century dictators but unprecedented in a democracy. Reporters are also, in his judgment, “very unpatriotic,” “disgusting and dishonest people,” who indulge in “fake news.” How many so indulge, you ask? Ninety-one percent, he responds. Only 9 percent can be trusted, and they all work for FOX News.

Trump’s goal, transparent as it is dangerous, is to demean, humiliate, and undermine the credibility of the mainstream press, one of the pillars of American democracy. To an alarming extent, he appears to have succeeded, especially among members of the Republican Party, which currently controls the levers of power in the U.S. government.

The impact could be catastrophic, producing a constitutional crisis more profound than the Watergate scandal.

For example, if the special counsel, Robert Mueller III, produces a formal charge of “obstruction of justice,” or, possibly, proof of “collusion,” “conspiracy,” or “cooperation” with the Russians during the 2016 presidential campaign; or if a newspaper points unmistakably to Trump being engaged in illegal money laundering; or if a judge concludes Trump has indeed violated the emoluments clause of the U.S. Constitution (unlikely though that may be), Trump has now positioned himself, with a wave of the hand, to dismiss any and all of this as nothing more than “fake news” disseminated by “failing” and “corrupt” news organizations—none of it, in any case, to be taken seriously, all of it, the work of the “Trump Derangement Syndrome.”

Because Trump has bewitched the Republican Party, magically converting it into his own plaything, there is a strong likelihood that a substantial majority of Republicans, in and out of Congress, will accept his argument, and do nothing, leaving Trump able to escape the consequences of his many failings, even though the evidence would likely point to his complicity and guilt. And, in this context, where then is the rule of law, the idea that no man stands above the law, another pillar of American democracy?

Of course, the Democrats would object powerfully, but, short of votes on Capitol Hill, they would be unable to launch impeachment hearings, or effect policy. The 91 percent of the media that Trump described as “fake news” would continue to produce superb reporting on one Trump malfeasance or another, but these reports would have little effect. Cable news commentators would, on FOX, rally to the president’s defense, while those on MSNBC would continue to eviscerate him, just as they have been doing since his inauguration. But, magically, Trump would likely bob and weave and somehow duck the noose of political punishment.

The press has always been central to the president’s strategy: he’s mesmerized by it but at the same time repelled by it.

Once upon a time, 30 or 40 years ago, CBS’s Walter Cronkite was able to close his evening newscast with the tag line “…And that’s the way it is,” and most of his viewers would believe him. He was “the most trusted man” in America. Today there is no Walter Cronkite. Over the years, for many reasons, the general public has begun to distrust much of what they see, hear, and read on the news. According to a recent Gallup poll, only 32 percent of Americans now have a “great or fair” amount of trust in the press. Twenty years ago, it was 55 percent. Seventy-three percent believe that, thanks to the wild world of social media, there is now more inaccurate information floating around than ever before. So, what can be trusted? Trump skillfully plays into this netherworld of bewilderment and confusion.

Though 85 percent of Americans still believe “freedom of the press is essential to American democracy,” significant percentages now also believe the government should have the right to crack down on the press in ways decidedly antithetical to the 1st Amendment. For example, 48 percent of Republicans agree with Trump that the press is, in fact, “the enemy of the American people,” according to a recent Ipsos poll. (Remarkably, 12 percent of Democrats and 23 percent of Independents also agree.) Forty-three percent of Republicans now think the president should have the power even to shut down news organizations that, in his judgment, have “engaged in bad behavior.” In Trumpese, that means covering him with a critical, skeptical eye, the proper role for a journalist.

The short-term consequences of Trump’s apparently successful management of the media are dangerous; the long-term consequences are simply frightening.

One example of the short-term danger: covering a Trump rally these days opens reporters, now more than ever, to jeers, middle finger insults, and threats of violence. Many have to be protected by their own ”security guards.” CNN’s Jim Acosta, who covers the White House, said he was “very worried” by the “hostility whipped up by Trump.” MSNBC’s Katy Tur told her viewers that she has been threatened with “rape”—and worse. A reader warned Times columnist Bret Stephens, “once we start shooting you fu—ers, you aren’t going to pop off like you do now.”

Long term: not just in the United States, but in many other countries, too, the Trump message of suspicion and hostility toward the press has spread—and with it, a global turning away from democracy and toward authoritarianism. Trump did not create this rightwing movement, but he is riding its crest; and because of the power of his office, he is driving it to new heights of acceptability.

Democrats may object to this behavior, but their minority status in Congress (and best hope in 2018 to capture only one chamber) limits their ability to respond effectively. Republicans, dependent on the voters who Trump has hypnotized with his anti-media rhetoric will not dare challenge the head of their party on this point, for fear of hurting their own political fortunes.

By his fiery anti-press rhetoric, President Trump has undermined American democracy, opening the door to a constitutional crisis.

]]>
By Marvin Kalb
Shortly after assuming the awesome powers of the presidency, Donald J. Trump declared war on the American press. With a torrent of insulting tweets, he has accused reporters of being the “enemy of the American people,” using a phrase familiar to 20th century dictators but unprecedented in a democracy. Reporters are also, in his judgment, “very unpatriotic,” “disgusting and dishonest people,” who indulge in “fake news.” How many so indulge, you ask? Ninety-one percent, he responds. Only 9 percent can be trusted, and they all work for FOX News.
Trump’s goal, transparent as it is dangerous, is to demean, humiliate, and undermine the credibility of the mainstream press, one of the pillars of American democracy. To an alarming extent, he appears to have succeeded, especially among members of the Republican Party, which currently controls the levers of power in the U.S. government.
The impact could be catastrophic, producing a constitutional crisis more profound than the Watergate scandal.
For example, if the special counsel, Robert Mueller III, produces a formal charge of “obstruction of justice,” or, possibly, proof of “collusion,” “conspiracy,” or “cooperation” with the Russians during the 2016 presidential campaign; or if a newspaper points unmistakably to Trump being engaged in illegal money laundering; or if a judge concludes Trump has indeed violated the emoluments clause of the U.S. Constitution (unlikely though that may be), Trump has now positioned himself, with a wave of the hand, to dismiss any and all of this as nothing more than “fake news” disseminated by “failing” and “corrupt” news organizations—none of it, in any case, to be taken seriously, all of it, the work of the “Trump Derangement Syndrome.”
Because Trump has bewitched the Republican Party, magically converting it into his own plaything, there is a strong likelihood that a substantial majority of Republicans, in and out of Congress, will accept his argument, and do nothing, leaving Trump able to escape the consequences of his many failings, even though the evidence would likely point to his complicity and guilt. And, in this context, where then is the rule of law, the idea that no man stands above the law, another pillar of American democracy?
Of course, the Democrats would object powerfully, but, short of votes on Capitol Hill, they would be unable to launch impeachment hearings, or effect policy. The 91 percent of the media that Trump described as “fake news” would continue to produce superb reporting on one Trump malfeasance or another, but these reports would have little effect. Cable news commentators would, on FOX, rally to the president’s defense, while those on MSNBC would continue to eviscerate him, just as they have been doing since his inauguration. But, magically, Trump would likely bob and weave and somehow duck the noose of political punishment.
The press has always been central to the president’s strategy: he’s mesmerized by it but at the same time repelled by it.
Once upon a time, 30 or 40 years ago, CBS’s Walter Cronkite was able to close his evening newscast with the tag line “…And that’s the way it is,” and most of his viewers would believe him. He was “the most trusted man” in America. Today there is no Walter Cronkite. Over the years, for many reasons, the general public has begun to distrust much of what they see, hear, and read on the news. According to a recent Gallup poll, only 32 percent of Americans now have a “great or fair” amount of trust in the press. Twenty years ago, it was 55 percent. Seventy-three percent believe that, thanks to the wild world of social media, there is now more inaccurate information floating around than ever before. So, what can ... By Marvin Kalb
Shortly after assuming the awesome powers of the presidency, Donald J. Trump declared war on the American press. With a torrent of insulting tweets, he has accused reporters of being the “enemy of the American people,”https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2018/08/17/trumps-war-on-fake-news-could-actually-make-the-mainstream-media-stronger/Trump’s war on ‘fake news’ could actually make the mainstream media strongerhttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/564851784/0/brookingsrss/topics/mediaandjournalism~Trump%e2%80%99s-war-on-%e2%80%98fake-news%e2%80%99-could-actually-make-the-mainstream-media-stronger/
Fri, 17 Aug 2018 15:52:49 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?p=533119

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By Jonathan Rauch

Nothing immediately changed as a result of the decision by hundreds of newspapers across the country to run simultaneous, but independent, editorials defending freedom of the press and deploring President Trump’s identification of the media as an enemy of the American people. The president certainly did not change his behavior. As one would expect, he seized upon the action to redouble his attacks. Trump is a wartime president, but his war is against the media.

Still, the newspapers’ action is a significant event. Depending on what happens in the next few years, it might even prove historic—for two reasons. First, the action is collective; second, it is institutional.

In the United States, mainstream media (MSM, as it is sometimes called) have always been allergic to cooperation. The morning paper where I started my career had a fiercely competitive, almost hostile relationship with the local afternoon paper, even though both papers were owned by the same company and shared a building. Outlets’ obsession with independence often works against conducting in-depth investigations and holding public officials to account. An example is how easy it is for a public official to evade hard questions at a press conference by calling on the next journalist, who will almost always change the subject instead of continuing a line of inquiry.

Of course, journalists are aware that fragmentation and competitiveness can work against our mission, but that always seemed a price worth paying for our feisty independence and our competitive energy. In any case, even if we wanted to coordinate, we have no ready mechanism to do so. Several organizations might sign a joint letter objecting to a government ruling or demanding a document, or they might commission an opinion poll together, but that is about as far as coordination ordinarily goes. A Japanese-style news cartel would never fly here.

Those organizational and psychological barriers have now fallen. A single paper, the Boston Globe, called for a day of editorializing, and hundreds responded. Mainstream news media has identified itself as a collective interest and shown itself to be capable of organizing nationwide in its own defense.

That newfound solidarity will have minuses. Conspiracy theorists and populists will see it as evidence that media are a left-wing or establishmentarian cabal. But it will also have pluses, probably bigger ones.

In the recent movie “The Post,” a key plot point occurs when an editor dumps a pile of newspapers on a table. To the astonishment and delight of Washington Post editor Ben Bradlee and publisher Katherine Graham, newspapers around the country have chosen to follow the Post’s decision to publish a secret government document, thereby risking criminal prosecution by the Nixon Administration. By doing so, they send the same kind of message that NATO sent the Soviet Union: that none will allow the others to be picked off one by one. If the government wants to tangle with any, it must tangle with all.

The show of solidarity is presented as a game-changer in the movie, and rightly so. The emergence of Thursday’s coalition of the willing may or may not prove equally important, but it demonstrates a degree of collectivism and organization which I would have thought unlikely, if not inconceivable, prior to the Trump era.

The response is also, importantly, institutional in nature. Papers joined in the effort not because they are ideologically homoegenous but despite the fact that they are not. They are liberal, conservative, and in between. Instead, they are responding to Trump as institutions, conveying that his “enemy of the people” rhetoric is a threat to our democratic system that transcends ordinary political disputes.

Journalism’s trade schools and professional societies take an institutional point of view, of course. And when the publisher of The New York Times goes to the Oval Office to plead with the president to tone down the anti-journalist rhetoric (without necessarily easing up on the New York Times), he seeks to represent journalism as a whole, not just his publication. Thursday’s gesture, however, was of a different order, because the voices used were the newspapers’ own—hundreds of them, undelegated and unfiltered. After enduring decades of abusive rhetoric that started long before Trump, Thursday’s coalition of the willing suggests that journalism is finding its institutional voice and its will to push back.

One day’s editorials do not a revolution make. They are another welcome sign, however, that America’s civil society and civic culture retain resilience, despite being severely tested. Or because they are severely tested. Nixon and Watergate wounded up strengthening the institutions that Nixon hated the most, mainstream media chief among them. Trump may end up having the same effect.

]]>
By Jonathan Rauch
Nothing immediately changed as a result of the decision by hundreds of newspapers across the country to run simultaneous, but independent, editorials defending freedom of the press and deploring President Trump's identification of the media as an enemy of the American people. The president certainly did not change his behavior. As one would expect, he seized upon the action to redouble his attacks. Trump is a wartime president, but his war is against the media.
Still, the newspapers' action is a significant event. Depending on what happens in the next few years, it might even prove historic—for two reasons. First, the action is collective; second, it is institutional.
In the United States, mainstream media (MSM, as it is sometimes called) have always been allergic to cooperation. The morning paper where I started my career had a fiercely competitive, almost hostile relationship with the local afternoon paper, even though both papers were owned by the same company and shared a building. Outlets' obsession with independence often works against conducting in-depth investigations and holding public officials to account. An example is how easy it is for a public official to evade hard questions at a press conference by calling on the next journalist, who will almost always change the subject instead of continuing a line of inquiry.
Of course, journalists are aware that fragmentation and competitiveness can work against our mission, but that always seemed a price worth paying for our feisty independence and our competitive energy. In any case, even if we wanted to coordinate, we have no ready mechanism to do so. Several organizations might sign a joint letter objecting to a government ruling or demanding a document, or they might commission an opinion poll together, but that is about as far as coordination ordinarily goes. A Japanese-style news cartel would never fly here.
Those organizational and psychological barriers have now fallen. A single paper, the Boston Globe, called for a day of editorializing, and hundreds responded. Mainstream news media has identified itself as a collective interest and shown itself to be capable of organizing nationwide in its own defense.
That newfound solidarity will have minuses. Conspiracy theorists and populists will see it as evidence that media are a left-wing or establishmentarian cabal. But it will also have pluses, probably bigger ones.
In the recent movie “The Post,” a key plot point occurs when an editor dumps a pile of newspapers on a table. To the astonishment and delight of Washington Post editor Ben Bradlee and publisher Katherine Graham, newspapers around the country have chosen to follow the Post's decision to publish a secret government document, thereby risking criminal prosecution by the Nixon Administration. By doing so, they send the same kind of message that NATO sent the Soviet Union: that none will allow the others to be picked off one by one. If the government wants to tangle with any, it must tangle with all.
The show of solidarity is presented as a game-changer in the movie, and rightly so. The emergence of Thursday's coalition of the willing may or may not prove equally important, but it demonstrates a degree of collectivism and organization which I would have thought unlikely, if not inconceivable, prior to the Trump era.
The response is also, importantly, institutional in nature. Papers joined in the effort not because they are ideologically homoegenous but despite the fact that they are not. They are liberal, conservative, and in between. Instead, they are responding to Trump as institutions, conveying that his “enemy of the people” rhetoric is a threat to our democratic system that transcends ordinary political disputes.
Journalism's trade schools and professional societies take an institutional point of view, of course. And when the publisher of The New York Times goes to the Oval Office to plead ... By Jonathan Rauch
Nothing immediately changed as a result of the decision by hundreds of newspapers across the country to run simultaneous, but independent, editorials defending freedom of the press and deploring President Trump's identification of ...