The objectives of our inspection were to determine whether the Violent Crime Task
Forces (VCTF) met their goals and program objectives as identified in the task force
proposals, whether the VCTFs expended funds for approved purposes, and whether program
managers provided adequate oversight. We conducted the inspection at the United States
Attorney's Office (USAO), the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Headquarters and
Washington Field Office (WFO), and the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD), all located
in the District of Columbia.

We reviewed the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports, the USAO's quarterly financial and
progress reports, firearm case logs, weekly activity reports, the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) Project Lead monthly and annual program reports, a judgmental
sample of USAO and FBI case files, FBI accomplishment reports, District of Columbia laws
and regulations. In addition, we interviewed the former USAO Operation Ceasefire Program
Coordinator, the MPD Operation Ceasefire Program Coordinator, the USAO's Criminal History
Intake Unit analysts, the MPD's Firearm Identification Unit examiners, the USAO's former
and current gun coordinators, the USAO Administrative and Financial Officers, the MPD's
Office of Finance and Budget personnel, the USAO's Executive Assistant United States
Attorney for Community Relations, the FBI's Safe Streets Coordinator in the WFO, an FBI
Supervisory Special Agent in its Headquarters Safe Streets and Gang Unit, and ATF Special
Agents assigned to Operation Ceasefire and Project Lead.

We reviewed the Financial Management Information System (FMIS) accounts for Operation
Ceasefire and Safe Streets. We compared the FMIS reports to supporting documentation to
ensure that accounting records were accurate and that appropriate authorizations were
obtained. We determined whether the MPD overtime invoices and police officer overtime
hourly rates were correct and accurate by reviewing personnel rosters, time and attendance
records, court appearance records, and case files. We compared the MPD's rosters of police
officers assigned to the VCTFs to ensure that only those authorized received overtime
reimbursements. We selected a judgmental sample of 15 police officers and reviewed the
supporting documentation for their overtime claims to identify any duplicate records or
unusual claims.

To determine that a GRU officer was entitled to receive overtime pay for a court
appearance and that the court appearance was related to an Operation Ceasefire case, we
selected 17 cases from the MPD court appearance worksheets submitted with the six
invoices. The USAO located and we reviewed 9 of 17 case files. The USAO could not locate
the other eight case files. We found that eight of the nine cases were not related to
Operation Ceasefire. We identified all overtime hours claimed by GRU police officers for
these nine cases. We also reviewed every court appearance sheet submitted to the USAO for
reimbursement for Operation Ceasefire and determined the number of hours and total
overtime incorrectly reimbursed for court appearances for 1994 cases.

We also requested a total of 20 cases from October 1996 for the WFO's Safe Streets
homicide and gang squads to compare MPD overtime claims to Safe Streets case activities.
The FBI located and we reviewed 16 of 20 cases. The other four cases were in use by
Special Agents at the time of our request and were unavailable for review. We were
successful in comparing the activities listed in six case files to the overtime claimed.
However, the other ten cases did not contain information for the requested time period.
Based on the limited information available for review, we could not link the activities
listed on the MPD overtime invoices to the other ten case files.