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Evolutionary Psychology (EP) is a discipline which purports to explain mental and psychological traits as adaptations—functional products of “natural selection”—which are genetically inherited/transmitted. Its main premises is that the human mind can be explained by evolution through natural selection; that the mind is “modular”—called the “massive modularity hypothesis” (see Pinker, 1997). EP purports that the mind is “a cluster of evolved information-processing mechanisms” with its main goal being “to characterize these Darwinian algorithms” (Sterelny and Griffiths, 1999: 336). The problem with EP, though, is that many of the “theories/hypotheses” are just speculation—what is termed “just-so stories” (Gould and Lewontin, 1979; Richardson, 2007; Nielsen, 2009; Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini, 2010). In this article, I will discuss the massive modularity hypothesis, adaptationism, and the promises that EP makes as a whole.

Massive Modularity

The massive modularity hypothesis (MMH) proposes that the modules “for” mental processing evolved in response to “natural selection” (Samuels, 1998). To evolutionary psychologists, the mind is made up of different modules that were “selected for” different mental abilities. So, to evolutionary psychologists like Tooby and Cosmides, Pinker et al, much of human psychology is rooted in the Pleistocene (i.e., Tooby and Cosmides’ 5th Principle that “our modern skulls house a stone age mind“) . Evolutionary psychologists propose that the mind is made up of different, genetically influenced, modules that which were specifically selected as to help our ancestors solve domain-specific problems.

Two principle arguments exist for the MMH. Argument (1)—called the optimality argument—is:

There are adaptive problems in every environment; different adaptive problems in different environments require different solutions, and different solutions can be implemented by functionally distinct modules.

Adaptive problems are selective pressures; for each unique pressure faced in the original evolutionary environment (OEE), there is a unique module which was selected to solve those—and only those—specific adaptive problems.

Therefore, since different adaptive problems require different solutions and different solutions can be implemented by functionally distinct modules, then there must exist differing modules in the human mind which were selected for in virtue of their contribution to fitness.

Or the argument could be:

Domain-specific processes exist

These processes arose due to evolution

Therefore these domain-specific processes that arose due to evolution have a genetic basis

Tooby and Cosmides claim that, distinct modules for certain adaptive problems in distinct environments are superior at solving different problems, rather than a general-purpose cognitive module. They argue that selection can produce different modules in the mind “for” different adaptive problems. Tooby and Cosmides put their argument in their own words as:

(1) As a rule, when two adaptive problems have solutions that are incompatible or simply different, a single solution will be inferior to two specialized solutions

(3) Simply to survive and reproduce, our Pleistocene ancestors had to be good at solving an enormously broad array of adaptive problems—problems that would defeat any modern artificial intelligence system. A small sampling include foraging for food, navigating, selecting a mate, parenting, engaging in social exchange, dealing with aggressive threat, avoiding predators, avoiding pathogenic contamination, avoiding naturally occurring plant toxins, avoiding incest and so on

(4) [Therefore] The human mind can be expected to include a large number of distinct, domain-specific mechanisms (quoted from Samuels, 1998: 585-586)

Clearly, the assumption from Tooby and Cosmides is that specific modules for certain adaptive problems in the OEE are superior to general-purpose modules. Samuels (1998: 586) writes:

In the case of psychological traits, in order to use optimality considerations with any confidence one needs to know (a) what features were being optimized by the evolutionary process and (b) what range of phenotypes were available to natural selection. As a matter of fact, however, we have little knowledge about either of these matters.

Samuels (1998) thusly concludes that “the endorsement of the Massive Modularity Hypothesis by evolutionary psychologists is both unwarranted and unmotivated.” (Also see Prinz, 2006.)

The key point of the MMH is that, according to Tooby and Cosmides, we would expect that the mind consists of different modules which are “designed” to solve domain-specific problems. If we know what type of adaptive situations happened to our ancestors then we should be able to construct the evolution of a trait by knowing its current functional use and “working backwards”—what is termed “reverse engineering”—inferring “function” from “cause” (see Richardson, 2007: chapter 2); inferring effect from relevant causes (see Richardson, 2007: chapter 3) and disentangling historical ancestry from history and structure (see Richardson, 2007: chapter 4).

As for their second argument:

It is impossible for human psychology—that contains nothing but general-purpose mechanisms—to have evolved since such a system cannot be adaptive.

Such a system cannot possibly have solved the adaptive problems faced by our ancestors in the evolutionary past.

Therefore, the mind cannot possibly have evolved general-purpose mechanisms and had to have evolved different mental modules in order to carry out different tasks.

They defend the argument by stating that the domain-dependence of different errors is a cause of the evolution of different modules of the mind; that information for crucial adaptive behavior cannot be learned by using only domain-specific systems; and that many adaptive problems are highly complex and unlikely to have been solved by general-purpose modules. Therefore, the mind must be modular since this can account for domain-specific problems—while, according to Tooby and Cosmides, general-purposed modules cannot. The argument, though, fails to provide us with any reason to accept the claim that the mind is made up of mostly—or is all made up of—Darwinian modules which were kept around since they were targets of selection.

Clearly, evidence for the modularity of mind is lacking—as is the evidence that reverse engineering “works” for the purpose intended.

Given these difficulties – well-known especially since Konrad Lorenz and Nico Tinbergen’s pioneering experiments on animal behavior – it is not scientifically acceptable within evolutionary biology to conclude that, because a given pattern of responses contributes to evolutionary success, then there is some ‘organ’ (or part of the brain) producing such a pattern, that is therefore an adaptation (see Williams 1966). This is because the ‘organ’ or ‘module’ may not actually exist as a biologically real trait, and even if it does, its current function may or may not be the same as the past function(s).

Sterelny and Griffiths (1999: 342) write that “… evolutionary psychology has bought into an oversimplified view of the relationship between an evolving population and its environment, and has prematurely accepted a modular conception of the mind.”

False dichotomies

Tooby and Cosmides (1992) coined the phrase “Standard Social Science Model” (SSSM) in order to differentiate their EP model (the “integrated causal model”; ICM) from the SSSM. According to Tooby and Cosmides (1992), the basis of the SSSM is to employ complete general-purpose cognitive modules and to deny any type of nativist modules whatsoever. Therefore, according to Tooby and Cosmides’ characterization of their so-called “opposition”, interesting differences between groups—and, of course, individuals—are due completely to cultural conditioning with absolutely no nativist elements since there are only general-purpose modules. Differences between individuals, according to the SSSM, are cultural products—differences in socialization cause individual differences.

Tooby and Cosmides’ portrayal [of the SSSM] is very effective. It is also a piece of sophistry, offering a false dichotomy between a manifestly untenable view and their own. The alternative is one that sees no differences between individuals and no biological contribution to individual or social development. I think no serious figure embraces that view, since, perhaps, John Watson in the early twentieth century.

Tooby and Cosmides also say that “There is no small irony in the fact that [the[ Standard Social Science MOdel’s hostility to adaptationist approaches is often justified through the accusation that adaptationist approaches purportedly attribute important differences between individuals, races and classes to genetic differences. In actuality, adaptationist approaches offer the explanation for why the psychic unity of humankind is genuine and not just an ideological fiction” (1992, 79).

Adaptationism is a research programme in which, according to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ““adaptationists” view natural selection among individuals within a population as the only important cause of the evolution of a trait; they also typically believe that the construction of explanations based solely on natural selection to be the most fruitful way of making progress in evolutionary biology and that this endeavor addresses the most important goal of evolutionary biology, which is to understand the evolution of adaptations.”

Though numerous problems exist with this programme, not least the claim that most—or all—important phenotypic traits are the product of evolution by natural selection. In their book Sex and Death: An Introduction to Philosophy of Biology, Sterelny and Griffiths (1999: 351) write:

Adaptive explanation is an inference from the current phenotype of an organism to the problems that organism faced in its evolutionary past. Obviously, that inference will be problematic if we do not have an accurate description of the current phenotype and its adaptive significance—of the solution that evolution actually produced. The inference from current adaptive importance to adaptation is problematic enough even when the adaptive and phenotypic claims on which it is based are uncontroversial (13.1). The inference is still more problematic when the nature of the phenotype and its adaptive importance are yet to be established.

This is not the main problem with the paradigm, though. The main problem is that all of these theories/hypotheses are “just-so stories”—“… an adaptive scenario, a hypothesis about what a trait’s selective history might have been and hence what its function may be” (Sterelny and Griffiths, 1999: 61). I’d also add that just-so stories are stories that cannot be independently verified of the data that they purport to explain—that is, there is no observation that can disconfirm the adaptationist “hypothesis”, and the only data that “proves” the hypothesis is the data it purports to explain. EP hypotheses are not testable. Therefore EP hypotheses are just-so stories.

Sterelny and Griffiths (1999: 338) “… agree with the central idea of evolutionary psychology, namely, that we should look for the effects of natural selection on the psychological mechanisms that explain our behaviors, rather than on those behaviors themselves.” I disagree, since it is not possible that “psychological mechanisms” can be selected.

What is the relationship between environment and adaptation? First, we need to think of some “problems” that exist in the environment. One example is mate choice: Should one be faithful to their partner? When should one abandon their old partner? When should they help their kin find partners? When and how should one punish infidelity? This problem, pretty obviously, is evidence against the idea that adaptations are explained by the problem to which the adapted trait is the solution (see David Buller’s 2005 book Adapting Mindsfor strong critiques against “reverse engineering”). If—and only if—a single cognitive device exists that guides a creature’s behavior with respect to the issues of mate choice, the issue is then a single-domain, not multi-domain, problem, while there are different aspects of the same problem (see the questions above). The existence of said module explains why we think of mate choice as a single problem.

Sterelny and Griffiths (1999: 342) are hopeful in EP’s quest to discover our shared “human nature”, “But both the objective and subjective obstacles to carrying out this program remain serious.” The adaptationist programme, however, is unfalsifiable. “Particular adaptive stories can be tested, as we discuss below, but Gould and Lewontin argue that this does not test the idea of adaptationism itself. Whenever a particular adaptive story is discredited, the adaptationist makes up a new story, or just promises to look for one. The possibility that the trait is not an adaptation is never considered” (Sterelny and Griffiths, 1999: 237).

Adaptationist explanations (EP is—mostly—nothing but adaptationist explanation) are not scientific since they cannot be falsified—EP hypotheses are not falsifiable, nor do they generate testable predictions. They only explain the data it purports to explain—meaning that all EP adaptationist explanations are just-so stories. (Also see Kaplan, 2002 for arguments against the adaptationist paradigm.)

Conclusion

Even those who are sympathetic to the EP research programme, rightly, point out the glaring flaws in the programme. These flaws—in my opinion—cannot be overcome. EP will always be “plausible and speculatuve ” just-so stories that purport to explain the evolution of what, supposedly, are traits that were “selected for” in virtue of their contribution to fitness in the OEE. However, we do not (and cannot) know what the OEE was like—we would need a time machine. It is not possible for us to know the selective pressures that occurred on our ancestors in the OEE. We do know that increased reproductive efficiency in the current-day is not evidence that said trait was adaptive and selected in the OEE.

The mind is not modular; Tooby and Cosmides proposed a false dichotomy (their ICM vs SSSM) which is not valid (no one is a “blank slatist”, whatever that is); and the adaptationist paradigm is nothing but speculative just-so stories.

For EP to be a valid research programme, EP hypotheses must generate testable, falsifiable predictions.

There is no reason at all to accept any just-so story since these adaptive explanations cannot produce evidence that the trait was not a byproduct, due to genetic drift etc. Therefore EP is not a scientific enterprise; it only tells “plausible”, speculative stories just-so stories “… I view evolutionary psychology as more speculation than science. The conclusion I urge is, accordingly, skeptical. Speculation is just that: speculation. We should regard it as such. Evolutionary psychology as currently practiced is often speculation disguised as results. We should regard it as such” (Richardson, 2007: 25). This is the view that should be accepted in the mainstream, since there can be no evidence for the speculative stories of EP.

71 Comments

““adaptationists” view natural selection among individuals within a population as the only important cause of the evolution of a trait; they also typically believe that the construction of explanations based solely on natural selection to be the most fruitful way of making progress in evolutionary biology and that this endeavor addresses the most important goal of evolutionary biology, which is to understand the evolution of adaptations.””

Oh good, so this doesn’t apply to any Evolutionary Biologist.

“The main problem is that all of these theories/hypotheses are “just-so stories”

So you didn’t read Cleland’s paper? What about Alcock’s book?

“EP will always be “plausible and speculatuve ”

Um no. All science is only plausible, including Theories in Physics. Have you read any of Jerry coyne’s responses to Jerry fodor? Fodor’s Thesis on NS is not relevant to your criticisms, but In one of Coyne’s responses he explicitly details how Scientists are able confirm adaptionist explanations. We use Archaeological and Genetic evidence to deduce the evolutionary history of particular species. In no way is it “speculative”, and this argument is akin to saying “it’s just a theory”.

Also it seems highly dishonest of you to point out the “flaws” of EP and EB without actually going over the methods they use to create their conclusions. It’s almost like you’re intentionally ignoring information…hmmm. I think i might start calling you Pumpkin.

“the mind cannot possibly have been naturally selected since evolutionary biology is a physical theory and Fodor and Pitatelli-Palmarini’s 2010 book”

Naturalism is axiomatic at this point. Hence, why all criticism of it still accepts it as truth. Even assuming the mind is not physical, property dualism states that it is still catalyzed by physical means, therefore selection on the variation of it’s physical propagator(the brain) will influence the mind as well. Again, irreducibility is not incompatible with interactionism.

Fodor’s thesis was simply stating that NS is not a sufficient mechanism, not that it isn’t one completely. Secondly, Fodor never suggested that NS doesn’t actually happen. That would be absurd.

“The mind is not modular; Tooby and Cosmides proposed a false dichotomy”

I agree here. In reality the generalization of the mind is what allows it to specialize in the first place.

It applies to EP/adaptationist thinking. You can just read the article to see who is named.

So you didn’t read Cleland’s paper? What about Alcock’s book?

Alcock’s book uses the false dichotomy between the SSSM and ICM. I’ve read some of it; I put it aside to read other things. Just paste/explain the argument.

Have you read Adapting Minds by David Buller? Evolutionary Psychology as Maladapted Psychology by Richardson, and Getting Darwin Wrong: Why Evolutionary Psychology Won’t Work by Wallace?

Um no

Um yes. There is no reason to accept any EP just-so story since there cannot be an observation that independently verifies any EP story since they are inherently ad hoc.

Fodor’s Thesis on NS is not relevant to your criticisms

Sure it is. EP rests on NS being true. Have you read the original EP papers by Tooby, Cosmides, and Barkow? In fact, Fodor has written a bit on EP and NS.

Again, irreducibility is not incompatible with interactionism.

If the mind is not the brain, nor irreducible to anything physical, then evolutionary biology—and NS—cannot explain the emergence of mind and cognition since it is purely a physical theory and mind and cognition are not physical (nor are they processes of physical functions).

Fodor’s thesis was simply stating that NS is not a sufficient mechanism, not that it isn’t one completely.

But, as it turns out, when phenotypic traits are (locally or otherwise) coextensive, selection theory cannot distinguish the trait upon which fitness is contingent from that trait that has no effect on fitness (and is merely a free-rider). Advertising to the contrary notwithstanding, natural selection can’t be a general mechanism that connects phenotypic variation with variation in fitness. So natural selection can’t be the mechanism of evolution. (Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini, 2010: 115)

Aren’t you “Reading through his [Fodor’s] book”? Why don’t you get me quotes from chapters 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8?

Hahaha, you don’t know what a blank slatism is?

What is it? Who is a blank slatist? If you can name some blank slatists, can you quote them ‘blank slating’?

Your strawman is too narrow and inaccurate to actually apply to the fields you are criticizing.

“Alcock’s book uses the false dichotomy between the SSSM and ICM. I’ve read some of it; I put it aside to read other things. Just paste/explain the argument.”

Can you point out where in the book he does this? He actually makes it explicitly clear that Sociobiologists do not assume such a dichotomy.

If you have the book pages 64-75 are probably the most relevant for this discussion. Critics such as yourself assume that Sociobiologists cannot test or predict their “just-so stories” which is just obviously false. Ad hoc explanations are identical to new hypotheses. Alcock goes on to lay out many examples of him and other researchers adhering to the same epistemic norms of the natural sciences.

Alcock does admit that these theories are not as sound as those of the “harder” sciences, but his book was written in 2001. Decades later our methodology has become increasingly more sophisticated to the point that now we’re making miniture Neanderthal brains in the lab: https://www.livescience.com/62916-mini-neanderthal-brains.html

The arguments you are making are essentially creationist ones. God of the gaps.

“Um yes. There is no reason to accept any EP just-so story since there cannot be an observation that independently verifies any EP story since they are inherently ad hoc.”

P1: All inherently Ad hoc Hypotheses cannot be independently verified by any observation(according to RR)
P2: All new hypotheses are inherently Ad hoc
C1: New hypotheses cannot be independently verified.

Of course that wasn’t my point though. What you consider “plausible and speculative” isn’t any more so than the the theories of Experimental science, since most if not all theories have some tie into speculative assumptions.

“Sure it is. EP rests on NS being true. ”

What do you mean by “being true”? The only way NS could not be “true” would be if:

A. Mutations did not occur
B. Organisms are completely homogenous
C. Differences in reproduction and survival are not due to variation among organisms.

“If the mind is not the brain, nor irreducible to anything physical, then evolutionary biology—and NS—cannot explain the emergence of mind and cognition since it is purely a physical theory and mind and cognition are not physical (nor are they processes of physical functions).”

We’ll go ahead and ignore the fact that you don’t know what irreducible means, because either way you have still missed the point. I’ll be generous and attribute your statements some kind of truth it still does not mean NS cannot act upon the mind by extension of it’s physical catalyst, the brain. Dualism of any kind still requires an explanation for interactionism. Property dualism was one solution, but the way you use it implies you simply cannot grasp that concept. In all reality Property dualism has faulty premises and Dual-aspect monism is a far more tenable position.

To Simplify, the brain is attributable to at least some of the variation in mental thought, there is no denying that. Since the brain is physical in can be selected and subsequently the mind with it.

“But, as it turns out, when phenotypic traits are (locally or otherwise) coextensive, selection theory cannot distinguish the trait upon which fitness is contingent from that trait that has no effect on fitness (and is merely a free-rider). Advertising to the contrary notwithstanding, natural selection can’t be a general mechanism that connects phenotypic variation with variation in fitness. So natural selection can’t be the mechanism of evolution. (Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini, 2010: 115)”

You don’t understand Fodor’s argument. He was simply saying NS lacks context sensitive explanatory power, the only way it can compensate is by adding footnote laws for individual cases, this means NS can never suffice by itself. This is true but Fodor cannot extrapolate an absolute conclusion from this for multiple reasons:

No Evolutionary Biologist attempts to summarize an adaptionist theory in 1 intensional statement. They all make an effort to deconfound variables.
Removing NS makes Evolution a weaker theory.

Its far from saying NS is not an explanatory mechnism. I thought words mattered?

“can you quote them ‘blank slating’?”

That is a very poor attempt at demonstrating any kind of supposed “absurdity” from the statement in question.

A blank slatist is someone who believes the mind has no physical variation. Such as yourself.

no. idealism is axiomatic at this point. the solution to the mind body problem is there is no problem because naturalism is FALSE. it’s like the missing heritability. it never existed because twin studies are crap.

‘no one is a “blank slatist”, whatever that is”

Hahaha, you don’t know what a blank slatism is?

the whole HBD-sphere thinks the ONLY alternative to blank slatism is heriditism because they’re DUMB. like you meLo.

they go one and on and on about heritability this heritability that and they have no idea what they’re talking about.

Can you point out where in the book he does this? He actually makes it explicitly clear that Sociobiologists do not assume such a dichotomy.

Cultural determinism.

Alcock goes on to lay out many examples of him and other researchers adhering to the same epistemic norms of the natural sciences.

He says that all that is required is “the willingness to test hypotheses about the possible adaptive value of complex social attributes” (p 212).

But what Alcock doesn’t seem to get is that (1) the evidence is not there; (2) grounds for the so-called evidence are not adequate; and (3) the “interpretation” of the “data” is biased. It’s obviously not the “willingness to test hypotheses”. The EP/SB debate is about evidence, not willingness to test hypotheses (although the hypotheses need to be testable in order to be scientific).

Nevermind the fact that Alcock is a methodological adaptationist (see the SEP article on Adaptationism).

It’s also worth noting that, going back to Gould and Lewontin’s original paper, one can always construct a new just-so story when one adaptive story is disproved, meaning that adaptationism is true by default since one can always craft a new adaptive story when if refuted by evidence. Gould and Lewontin’s main qualms are not that specific hypotheses can’t be tested, but the assumption that traits are adaptations are not. Adaptationism is, itself, an empirical claim and so testing specific adaptationist hypotheses is not the same as testing adaptationism as a general assumption.

The “argument” provided is bad; science generates testable predictions; just-so stories do not since they are inherently ad-hoc.

What do you mean by “being true”?

I mean on distinguishing between coextensive traits.

To Simplify, the brain is attributable tot at least some of the variation in mental thought, there is no denying that. Since the brain is physical in can be selected and subsequently the mind with it.

The brain can be selected because it is physical; the mind cannot be selected because it is not physical. If you’re assuming for sake of argument that mind is irreducible to brain, then you have to see them as two distinct properties.

Its far from saying NS is not an explanatory mechnism.

So the claim that selection is the mechanism of evolution cannot be true.

… for much of the same reasons … Darwin can’t have been right about the mechanisms of evolution.

Well if we’re right, that’s exactly what Darwin did not do [propose a theory of causation]; or, if you prefer, Darwin did propose a causal mechanism for the process of speciation, but he got it wrong.

That is a very poor attempt at demonstrating any kind of supposed “absurdity” from the statement in question.

Well?

A blank slatist is someone who believes the mind has no physical variation. Such as yourself.

Are you saying that I am a proponent of Tooby and Cosimide’s SSSM and Alcock’s cultural determinism (coeval phrases)?

Can you paste the relevant passages of those books

Counter-explanations are easily explained away. Sociobiology in other words, explains too much, and provides too ‘deep’ an explanation for things that surely have more simpler (more proximal) causes (Malik, 2001).

Sociobiology is false, or at least a gross oversimplification (as a theory of human behavior: it has been productive when applied to animals). It failed because, in explaining everything, it explained nothing: evolutionary explanations it seems, are the wrong kind of explanation for our everyday behaviors. (From Wallace, 2010)

To evolutionary psychologists, our “cognitively natural” environment is the OEE (original evolutionary environment) in Africa tens of thosuands of years ago—the Pleistocene. (Though I’ve already established that it’s not possible to know the conditions of the OEE and therefore it’s not possible to know what was currently adaptive was necessarily adaptive tens of thousands of years ago, when EPists claim that our minds were ‘set’ back in the stone age.)

He says that EP is different from SB in that SB looks for ultimate causes, whereas EP looks for ultimate causes regarding evolution, but also explains human behavior in proximal terms.

But there are other problems here: SB was created by biologists to explain animal behavior; EP was created by anthropologists and cognitive scientists as a theory of human cognition. So EP is a theory of psychology along with anthropology and lingustics with some bio thrown in. Let’s get to the main claim of EP though, from Pinker himself:

The mind is not the brain but what the brain does … the brain’s special status comes from a special thing the brain does … that special thing is information processing, or computation. Information and computation reside in patterns of data and in relations of logic that are independent of the physical medium that carries them. This insight, first expressed by mathematician Alvin Turing, the coputer scientists Alvin Newell, Herbert Simon, amd Marvin Minsky, and the philosophers Hillary Putnam and Jerry Fodor is now called the computational theory of mind. It is one of the great ideas of intellectual history, for it solves one of the puzzles that make up the ‘mind-body problem’: how to connect the ethereal world of meaning and intention, the stuff with our mental lives, with a physical hunk of matter like the brain … the computational theory of mind resolves this paradox. It says that beliefs and desires are information, incarnated as configurations of symbols … the computational theory of mind is indispensable in addressing the questions we long to answer … without the computational theory of mind it is impossible to make sense of the evolution of the mind. (Pinker, 2003: 24-27) (Quote from Wallace, 2010)

Pinker then goes on to discuss mental modules—the modularity of the mind—which is a core position of EP, which, if false, falsifies EP. Pinker et al are cognitivists, and so the rise of EP was a response to behaviorism: behaviorists claim that the mind is holistic and general; cognitivists claim that the mind is made up of discrete mental modules.

That is a central claim of EP, and if it is false (and it is), then EP cannot be true. Also note that it doesn’t matter if Melo argued these things; what matters is what the molders and crafters of EP say about their discipline: it is clearly false.

The central claims of EP (formulated by anthropologists and cognitive scientists) rests on the modular mind. The mind is not modular. Therefore the main tenet of EP is false.

We’ve known what thoughts are made of since hebbian theory was first proposed

Literally refuted by Ross’ argument. Formal thinking is not physical nor a function of physical processes (I will further demonstrate this with below).

Quantum mechanics has more or less shown

Nothing about physical states would tell one what form is being realized, even if one knew—atom for atom—which state they would be in in any given moment, since many incompossible forms are realized.

Most of it of course is simply an argument from ignorance and therefore no definitive conclusion can be drawn from it.

Ross’ argument is sound (which has also been further developed and defender by Ed Feser).

Naturalism is false. See Nagle (Mind and Cosmos; What is it like to be a bat?, Noe (Out of Our Heads), Davidson (argument against the existence of psychological and psychophysical laws), Ross (Immaterial Aspects of Thought), Kripke-Wittgenstein (rule-following argument), Bilgrami (Moore-Frege-Moore pincer argument), Mcdowell (Defeasibility and Knowledge), Timmons and Horgan (moral twin earth), Street (Normativity and Water) and Moore (open question argument).

Thinking is a mental activity which results in a thought; a thought is a mental state of considering a particular belief or answer. So these mental states are, or closely related to, beliefs. So when one considers a particular stance, they are paving the way to holding a particular belief, whereas when they commit themselves to an answer they have acquired a new belief. Beliefs are propositional attitudes, so believing p commits one to adopting the belief to that proposition p. Therefore, necessarily—on the basis that thoughts are closely related to, or are beliefs and the fact that beliefs are propositional attitudes and the fact that beliefs are intentional mental states if they have aboutedness or directedness—thoughts are not physical.

Mugabe,

the whole HBD-sphere thinks the ONLY alternative to blank slatism is heriditism

Do you have actual quotes? The last time I looked through it was quite clear he was demonstrating the absurdity of the dichotomy. As you do in this post, but what’s interesting is that you’ve made the false dichotomy before to attack a strawman: Genetic determinism. So this dichotomy is only welcome when it goes against those you disagree with? Weird.

“But what Alcock doesn’t seem to get is that (1) the evidence is not there”

Yes it is. The past is over-determined by present traces.

“(2) grounds for the so-called evidence are not adequate;”

I’m curious to know what you consider “adequate” evidence? Where exactly do you draw that line? Because as far as I’m aware every scientist knows Science isn’t a “truth seeking” methodology. It’s a model of reality from our own interpretations. I’m also concerned that you have yet to address my link on the mini Neanderthal brains. Can we not make extrapolations about our ancient human relatives from them? Why did you not go over the dating(among others) techniques Historical scientists use to make inferences about our past environments and behavior? Your criticism is definitely aimed at the entirety of Historical science, is it not? It’d have to be if your main point is “we don’t have time machines”

“and (3) the “interpretation” of the “data” is biased. It’s obviously not the “willingness to test hypotheses” It’s also worth noting that, going back to Gould and Lewontin’s original paper, one can always construct a new just-so story when one adaptive story is disproved, meaning that adaptationism is true by default since one can always craft a new adaptive story when if refuted by evidence.”

How is it bias? Replace the phrases “adaptive story” and “just so story” with “hypotheses” and you might realize how ridiculous your arguments actually are. New hypotheses are by definition ad hoc. So how do you tell if a hypothesis is sufficient as an explanation? You test it.

“The “argument” provided is bad; science generates testable predictions; just-so stories do not since they are inherently ad-hoc.”

Yes it’s a very poor argument, but that’s because it is yours. Science explains, and not even physics throws out Hypotheses with failed predictions, they modify them. For the last time, read Cleland’s paper.

“The brain can be selected because it is physical; the mind cannot be selected because it is not physical.”

Are you an epiphenominalist?

“If you’re assuming for sake of argument that mind is irreducible to brain, then you have to see them as two distinct properties.”

The mind is Emergent. A(brain)+B(Environment)=C(The Mind). Therefore any change in A or B will result in a change of C and vice versa.

As I said I’m more interested in your claims of M being non-hereditary, but the main reason I’m not a Property dualist despite believing Consciousness is an emergent phenomena is simply because I do not view the physical and mental as fundamentally different in the nature of their properties(so it’s more accurate to say aspect than property) just as i don’t view the properties(aspects) of water as being alien to the ones prescribed to hydrogen and oxygen.

“Well?”

Well what? Blank slatism is an ideology, are you fucking stupid?

“Are you saying that I am a proponent of Tooby and Cosimide’s SSSM and Alcock’s cultural determinism (coeval phrases)?”

If their description matches mine, then yes.

“I’ve already established that it’s not possible to know the conditions of the OEE”

You’ve done nothing of the sort. We do know the conditions, literally pick up any Geology, Archaeology, or Anthropology book.

“That is a central claim of EP, and if it is false (and it is), then EP cannot be true.”

The falsification of massive modualrity would not overturn EP anymore than the falsification of Gravity would overturn physics.

Besides that you do realize that connectionism has absorbed Computationalism, right? I’m surprised you don’t advocate the latter theory, as Ross’, Kripke’s, Wittgenstein’s, and Fodor’s arguments all hinge upon it’s validity. Assuming how they define thought of course.

“Also note that it doesn’t matter if Melo argued these things; what matters is what the molders and crafters of EP say about their discipline: it is clearly false”

Disciplines change constantly. Deal with it. EP as a discipline is not reliant on it’s creators original ideals. Just like modern Biology has nothing to do with Darwin.

“No it is not; numerous a priori arguments refute naturalism.”

Yes it is. I could never say the natural world is all there is, because I don’t know(neither do you) but, any and all arguments against it must accept some part of the natural world. Go ahead, go play in the middle of the road. Make sure you videotape yourself “refuting naturalism”.

“Literally refuted by Ross’ argument. Formal thinking is not physical nor a function of physical processes. Nothing about physical states would tell one what form is being realized, even if one knew—atom for atom—which state they would be in in any given moment, since many incompossible forms are realized.”

Forms of the physical processes we witness and prescribe them to are incompossible because of incomplete information. . You can say the glass is half empty or that it’s half full, both are correct forms of one physical event but that form cannot be sufficiently explained in physical terms without neuronal events. In other words, many incompossible forms can be attributed to the glass of water but each form has indeterminate physical processes behind it’s propagation.

if we use my earlier example: A(neuronal event)+B(Stimulant)=C(semantic forms). The equation wouldn’t make much sense if you took away A. C would become causally indeterminate from B making it appear to be incompossible. A(depression)+B(perception of glass)= C(the glass is half empty.) The form was not satisfied until all physical processes are accounted for. More simply stated: Forms are not just properties of the stimulant.

“Therefore, necessarily—on the basis that thoughts are closely related to, or are beliefs and the fact that beliefs are propositional attitudes and the fact that beliefs are intentional mental states if they have aboutedness or directedness—thoughts are not physical.”

All you did was explain thoughts through purely mental terms, your argument does not establish that thoughts are immaterial.

Mugabe,

“in reality rr has matured intellectually far beyond all others in the HBD-sphere and in a very short period. and he’s serious. the others are clowns.”

Hahaha, you consider taking culture and complex gene-environment interactions into account as large “intellectual maturation”? If you start off with the assumption of HBD or more specifically the white nationalist/alt right side of it, then you were never a scientific person to begin with, and it totally explains his swing to the opposite extreme with a little remnants of cognitive dissonance inbetween. You on the other hand, you’re just schizophrenic.

It’s even more laughable that your superiority complex derives from a strawman.

For future reference QM says little of Idealism. Simply by the fact that a blind person could be hit by a car. Your perception of reality is not equal to reality.

It’s even more laughable that your superiority complex derives from a strawman.

your strawman is a strawman because IQ too low to understand what i’ve said. sad!

the HBD-sphere is no more and no less sophisticated than any psychology professor who investigates human behavioral genetics and no less sophisticated than geneticists looking for the genetic architecture of obesity, high blood pressure, schizophrenia, type 2 diabetes, or blasian-ness.

ALL of them are morons. EPs are sub-morons. analytic-linguisting/anglo-american/oxford “philosophers” are full on idiots. almost as dumb as blasians.

“he quotes me saying P. then he says not-P. then he affirms P in the next sentence.”

“east asians and blacks can’t reason”

I’m asian and white. I should also warn you, I don’t have EGI biases, any attempt to trigger me in this way is honestly just pathetic from my perspective.

“almost ALL physicists must be schooled by blasian meLo on the interpretation of QM.”

Idealism and QM have multiple interpretations and versions to them. None of which confirm the validity of the other. No respectable physicist will disagree with this statement.

“ALL of them are morons. EPs are sub-morons. analytic-linguisting/anglo-american/oxford “philosophers” are full on idiots.”

All philosophers who attempt to override science with Priori arguments are moronic.

“indeed! not a single psychology professor doing twin studies and not a single geneticists looking for the “genetic architecture” of whatever human disease understands this.”

Equalizing cultural effect is not the same as trying to dichotomize it. In your attempt at propagating this conceptual criticism you’ve obfuscated the whole issue. Yes there is a nature/nurture feedback loop. No, that doesn’t make twin studies, or GWAS redundant.

“he quotes me saying P. then he says not-P. then he affirms P in the next sentence.”

Example?

“you used to think there were no blank slatists and you ranted about it?”

I used to believe that Thoughts were immaterial, which is the cause of his blank slatism. It seems you cant identify context clues. Sad.

“i assume you’re referring to his niche in the HBD-sphere. if so, you’re wrong, and you’re contradicting your blasian self. this is sad.”

Definitely not wrong. Both of you are the laughingstocks of HBD. Not because anyone is scared of your ideas, not because anyone is stupid, but because your knowledge of the issues at hand are so amateurish it’s just pure entertainment when you stooges rant about it, creating strawmen and displaying obvious intellectual insecurities, anytime someone questions your dogma.

” if you understood GxE you’d think, “this paper is crap. who am i kidding?” or you simply wouldn’t have done the research in the first place.”

You clearly do not understand what GxE is. The interaction is not stochastic, the only difference between + and x as a concept is that the latter is just the former with more steps, therefore upping the complexity. Reaction norms are due to endogenous factors. Evolution is purely additive(whatever the fuck that statement means) in every way shape and form

“neither of them has any sense of humor.”

RR is trolled consistently for not having a sense of humor. Anytime I see him type the word “cringe” I’m just shocked at how oblivious he is. Do you believe the shit you say here is humorous? People laugh at you, not with you.

“i saw the beginning of a yale biology lecture wherein it was explained that nature vs nurture is a false dichotomy. so if you have a degree in biology you may have learned this, otherwise it’s very unlikely.”

I didn’t have to take a logic class, a biology, or QM to understand any of those concepts. They’re easy. The majority of arguments posted by RR, I had already grasped by 17, in fact I “rediscovered” the causal exclusion principle when I was 15, as I was more interested in Philosophy before I ever learned what Anthropology and Biology were.

See the difference between us Mugabe is that I’m not Bias nor am i insecure.

I find superiority within my mixed heritage. I don’t up peoples “intellectual maturation” just because they agree with me. I’m calling you stupid because there is no hope for you, because you’re next repsonse going be the same old two-step. Not because of your opinions. So go ahead, keep assuring yourself that your life’s failures are everyone elses fault.

Why is perception required for existence? You seemed to be confused as to who has the burden of proof.

It’s shown that organisms conform and adapt to their environment. This could not happen without realism. This utilities of perception could not be apparent without an attachment to some form of reality.

In this context, Indeterminably means that there is no definite meaning or form that a process can satisfy. This is also true for Formal thinking and especially perception. For example let’s say there are 7 apples on a tree, and 2 on the ground. One falls to the ground. You could describe this physical event in many incompossible forms. 7-1=6, 2+1=3, etc. But the same could be said for when you witness someone else is prescribing what they witness with a perspective or a form, therefore all thought is indeterminate. Simply put, you don’t know someone else perspective on an issue, neither do you know whether someone is adding or “quadding” when they perform a function.

Consciousness cannot be accounted for in physical terms. For consciousness is absolutely fundamental. It cannot be accounted for in terms of anything else.

We do not belong to this material world that science constructs for us. We are not in it; we are outside. We are only spectators. The reason why we believe that we are in it, that we belong to the picture, is that our bodies are in the picture. Our bodies belong to it. Not only my own body, but those of my friends, also of my dog and cat and horse, and of all the other people and animals. And this is my only means of communicating with them.

I am an atheist, because I can’t figure out why God made Asians.

—Schrodinger.

schrodinger claimed to be an atheist but only in the sense of being an unbeliever in all religion…except vedanta…typical. but every sincere believer is an atheist in this sense. he doesn’t believe his religion is an accident. he believes that under the surface his religion is about how things are and must be.

“I don’t think any form of thought is determinate.”
Then what is? Is theres nothing determinate? If so, cant you use an slippery slope to argue reductio ad absurdum on every claim? Isnt “cognito ergo sum” relevant for any type of knowledge?

I think this comment touches into ” This is also true for Formal thinking ”

I seem to belive that reason is as much of an illusion as our senses are. There might very well be things far beyond our understanding. Its like wanting ants to see the third dimension. Therefore i subscribe to empiricism never being able to create an indivisible unit. I suspect every noumenon is going to have yet another set of factors causing it.

This is not to ridicule empiricisms perdictive value, but its relationship to determinate truths. Isnt the insertion of empirical values to an premise monitored by the cognition based on cognito ergo sum?

“In this context, Indeterminably means that there is no definite meaning or form that a process can satisfy”

What makes them incompossible? 7-1=6 means one apple leaving the tree and 2+1=3 means one faling down, i dont see how any of those two examples showed that an apple falled down from an tree. a-b-c=d would be more accurate, where a is the total amount of apples, b the amount of apples already on the ground, c the amount of apples falling and d the amount of apples on the tree. Can you find an incompossible form of my statement? or is my revision flawed somehow?

“But the same could be said for when you witness someone else is prescribing what they witness with a perspective or a form, therefore all thought is indeterminate.”
I dont follow how that would mean that math isnt determinate

“Simply put, you don’t know someone else perspective on an issue, neither do you know whether someone is adding or “quadding” when they perform a function.”

It seems like you confuse models of cognition to the deductive ability of an individual from cognito ergo sum. Sure, subjective emotion of others is indeterminate, but your own reasoning (not cognition) has to be determinate, no?
Its almost like an paradox, you need an determinate process to determine that the world is indeterminate, no? How would you determine indeterminateness? It goes to the first question in this comment.

In my view, every argument said by others is not true if you dont get it. If you make an consensus argument, its only true in that limit but not by the full “richness” people tend to state truth.

If so, cant you use an slippery slope to argue reductio ad absurdum on every claim? Isnt “cognito ergo sum” relevant for any type of knowledge?It seems like you confuse models of cognition to the deductive ability of an individual from cognito ergo sum. Sure, subjective emotion of others is indeterminate, but your own reasoning (not cognition) has to be determinate, no?
Its almost like an paradox, you need an determinate process to determine that the world is indeterminate, no? How would you determine indeterminateness? It goes to the first question in this comment.”

This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because any course of action can be made out to accord with the rule”. Kripke gives a mathematical example to illustrate the reasoning that leads to this conclusion. Suppose that you have never added numbers greater than 50 before. Further, suppose that you are asked to perform the computation ’68 + 57′. Our natural inclination is that you will apply the addition function as you have before, and calculate that the correct answer is ‘125’. But now imagine that a bizarre skeptic comes along and argues that there is no fact about you that determines that you ought to answer ‘125’ rather than ‘5’. Your past usage of the addition function is susceptible to an infinite number of different quus-like interpretations. It appears that every new application of ‘plus’, rather than being governed by a strict, unambiguous rule, is actually a leap in the dark. The obvious objection to this procedure is that the addition function is not defined by a number of examples, but by a general rule or algorithm. But then the algorithm itself will contain terms that are susceptible to different and incompatible interpretations, and the skeptical problem simply resurfaces at a higher level. In short, rules for interpreting rules provide no help, because they themselves can be interpreted in different ways. Or, as Wittgenstein himself puts it, “any interpretation still hangs in the air along with what it interprets, and cannot give it any support. Interpretations by themselves do not determine meaning

Cogito ergo sum is subject to the same paradox, it’s only deemed valid, because of presupposed rules.

What this implies is that our deductive abilities are actually inductive. Meaning all statements of certainty are reduced to a probability function.

It doesn’t mean it’s wrong it just means it’s uncertain.

The reason my argument vs the opposite is more powerful, is because it has more reference points(empirical and conceptual). It has a higher probability of being true.

“those two examples showed that an apple falled down from an tree.”

They’re not supposed to show that. The only point is that nothing of the physical facts of an event can entail how you interpret said event.

Of course I argue the opposite with RR, I claimed above that physical processes could be considered determinate, if you were a non-reductive physicalist. If both are indeterminate, it rules out idealism and Dualism. If both are determinate it rules out dualism but supports idealism.

A blank slatist is someone who believes the mind has no physical variation. Such as yourself.

the mind is not physical dummkopf. no one denies that variation in the brain may be invariably associated with variation in the mind. what some deny is that non-pathological variation in the brain has an environment independent effect on mind. or if it does, the effect is very small. this is consistent with the findings of james lee and professor shoe.

we both speak english yet you are a 4′ tall asian and i am a human. see?

Its the per capita number of people in an group fufilling an stereotype compared to the same meassurement of other groups in an controlled environment that is HBD.

So youre saying HBD is correct to an certain extent especially when in unequal/very different environments. But thats just confusing as it doesnt have an quantitative value, making it unfalsifiable.

For me your quantitative aspect seems to be disproving the HBD conclusions and by falsifiyng their conclusion of low iq groups not being capable of reaching certain feits with environment controled with arguing against their premises. But whenever someone reaches the conclusion of you saying that all groups are equal psychologically you say “not so fast”. Thus an middle ground in the capacity of low iq groups to achieve an society (or other real things that correlate with IQ), while not having any ground in the false paradigm of psyhometrics, giving one the illusion that you are in the middle ground of HBDers and environmentalists.

Thats acutally pretty reasonable and how i see it. Maybe im just projecting.

Immigration policy should not rest on the truth or falsity of “HBD”; even if “HBD” is false (it is), migration should not be a “free-for-all” (one main altright argument is that if “HBD” is true, then immigration should end).

but it’s not even clear what “left” and “right” mean anymore as used by the mass media.

the bourgeois media defines the “far right” as simply people who are opposed to their fake social agenda.

dimaio is to the left of bernie in some ways. and salvini is to the right of trump in some ways.

the terms “right” and “left” originate from the french revolution where the left was the bourgeoisie and the right was the feudal aristocracy and the monarchy. since then the bourgeoisie has just kept on winning. so that 30+ years ago “right” meant bourgeoisie and “left” meant proletariat.

it’s like religion. if one were a christian and conservative he’d have to be a roman or an eastern. but if one were super conservative he’d have to be a pagan.

if one were an ultra-conservative on economic matters he’d have to be a socialist as until the neolithic revolution there was no such thing as income generating property. their were no herds or farm land to own.

if you believe in popular sovereignty then you must also believe in immigration restrictions, trade restrictions, and capital controls…otherwise your country is run by global capitalists. you must also accept that the poor may take from the rich via the ballot box.

“they go one and on and on about heritability this heritability that and they have no idea what they’re talking about.”

This discussion has nothing to do with heritability

” non-pathological variation in the brain has an environment independent effect on mind. or if it does, the effect is very small. ”

And nobody who understands how genetics or evolution works would agree with that sentence. I sure as hell don’t, and if you’re going to insult my intelligence, at least properly identify my position, you fucking retard.

“the mind is not physical dummkopf.”

The mind is completely and 100% physical. You cannot comprehend or even model thoughts without physicality. What you wannabe neuroscientists consistently fail to grasp is that non-physical, does not equal unobservable. You can have coextensive concepts modeling the same observation. But those conceptions are still entirely physical.

“but NO ONE is a blank slatist. rr is right.”

You’re both fucking idiots.

I used to think the same thing, I used to rant about it on here to RR(who used to completely disagree with Ross’ arguments!!!!) but my only justification was ignorance, and semantics. It’s no different for RR. Until he aquires the balls and intellectual honesty to actually explain his reasoning. He’ll just continue occupying the “village idiot” niche he’s done such an impressive job of filling.

“we both speak english yet you are a 4′ tall asian and i am a human.”

My dick is bigger than yours, your mom would say the same thing if her mouth wasn’t full right now. Snow nigger.

Lenin was developing the work of Engels, who said that “with each epoch-making discovery, even in the sphere of natural science, materialism has to change its form.”[35] One of Lenin’s challenges was distancing materialism, as a viable philosophical outlook, from the “vulgar materialism” expressed in the statement “the brain secretes thought in the same way as the liver secretes bile” (attributed to 18th-century physician Pierre Jean Georges Cabanis); “metaphysical materialism” (matter composed of immutable particles); and 19th-century “mechanical materialism” (matter as random molecules interacting per the laws of mechanics).

but this is only for potential ability. for any one environment or narrow range of environments there will be significant variation due to the dominant GxE effect. humans have uniquely plastic behavior and intelligence is acquired. it’s not something one simply has. anyone can make himself smarter but it’s much harder the older one is. non-asian kids can be raised to be geniuses. it’s been done.

the homogeneous society is best for many reasons. one of these is that such a society is most likely to realize the potential of its members ceteris paribus.

I can attribute my view changes to the books DNA Is Not Destiny: The Remarkable, Completely Misunderstood Relationship Between You and Your Genes by Stephen Heine; Genes, Brains, and Human Potential: The Science and Ideology of Intelligence by Ken Richardson; and The Essential Davidson, a volume of Davidson’s works on action and psychology, truth, meaning and interpretation. (And of course, Nagel’s What is it like to be a bat? and Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost Certainly False along with Fodor and Pitatelli-Palmarini’s What Darwin Got Wrong.)

but davidson was an anglo-american/analytic/oxford “philosopher”. i think less than very little of such people. it’s “philosophy” for dumb people basically. and davidson was also a hollywood screen writer at one time. gross.

even though nagel is a jew and an atheist, at least he groks that vulgar materialism is vulgar.

but the final solution to the HBD question is still out there for some delusional people like professor shoe.

that is…an argument can be resolved, a proposition can be tested, or it’s probably meaningless…and the HBD question CAN BE RESOLVED TO THE SATISFACTION OF ALL NON CRAZY PEOPLE.

quote : “even if “HBD” is false (it is), migration should not be a “free-for-all” (one main altright argument is that if “HBD” is true, then immigration should end).”

Hi. How far “HDB” is wrong ?
I am interested in these questions, and your point of view interests me. If they are wrong, then it implies that the races would have egalitarian psychological traits, and we should in no way observe any racial bias, no average differences in social-economic achievements, criminality, even cultural diversity which is the reflection of a certain personality more or less shared in a group.

the resolution to the antinomy between hereditism and blank-slate-ism is GxE-ism.

that is, excluding retards, each human has almost perfectly equal intellectual potential…

but this potential can NOT be realized for everyone (or even a large minority) in ONE environment/culture/society…

to put it another way:

HBDers are to nazis as transvestites are to women.

they get that “blood” matters, but they don’t get that “soil” matters too, and that both ONLY matter as constituents of what the genuine moron guido von list termed the “biune-bifidic-dyad”.

as kant said: Thoughts without intuitions are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.

as far as human varieties and individual differences go it may be said: Blood without soil is who knows what. Soil without blood is who cares.

instead of hearing negroes complaining about “the man”, hear “i am a cactus in a forest” or “i am a redwood in the desert.”

if afro is not in fact a mossad agent he’s proof enough. he makes a fool of cockring.

the political implications are that the US and the rest of new world are permanently fucked. an end to affirmative action and an end to the constant bitching about disparate outcomes won’t solve the problem of a heterogeneous society. and “white” is a dumb category. white people hate white people too! the EU is a disaster.

if you publish a paper claiming, “eureka! i have found genes that explain a tiny bit of the variance in IQ or prostate cancer” then you’re a blasian. if you understood GxE you’d think, “this paper is crap. who am i kidding?” or you simply wouldn’t have done the research in the first place.

i saw the beginning of a yale biology lecture wherein it was explained that nature vs nurture is a false dichotomy. so if you have a degree in biology you may have learned this, otherwise it’s very unlikely.