The tax reform legislation likely to come out of the House and Senate reconciliation process will be far from ideal, but it will be much better than current tax law in several respects (see my last several posts listed in the left-hand margin). One complaint raised by Democrats and others, however, is that the GOP tax compromise will lead to higher budget deficits. Of course they are right, but Democrats fail as legitimate critics given their hypocrisy on the issue of deficit spending. And chronic deficits are ultimately a symptom of government excess. Deficits exist when the polity is unwilling to support the explicit taxes necessary to pay for the spending that politicians are willing and able to authorize.

Nevertheless, there is near-universal consensus that the tax plans passed by the House and Senate would add to the deficit if either were to become law, the biggest exception to that consensus being Republican leadership. The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) has estimated that the Senate plan would add $1.4 trillion to the deficit without the benefit of economic feedback. That shrinks to about $1 trillion with the dynamic feedback effect of resultant economic growth. Others believe the gap would be smaller, however. The Tax Foundation, for example, estimates the net cost in tax revenue at $500 billion. Veronique de Rugy quotes a dynamic score by Quantria/Inforum that would put the revenue loss at about $300 billion, based on the starting JCT static estimate. The Tax Foundation, as noted by de Rugy, believes the JCT errs in treating the U.S. economy as a closed economy in which business funding is limited to a fixed pool of domestic saving, and in assuming that the Federal Reserve would attempt to offset the economic growth spurred by the tax cuts. These JCT assumptions mute the economic and revenue responses to tax changes.

But whether you believe the JCT’s estimates or the others, the impact is relatively minor compared to the existing fiscal shortfalls brought on by government excess. Brian Riedl puts the proposed tax cuts in perspective. The 10-year deficit was already projected at $10 trillion, with little apparent concern from Democrats. Riedl notes that the opposition has repeatedly shown itself unwilling to address fiscal problems such as Obama’s deficit legislation, Bernie Sander’s $30 trillion health care plan, and a shortfall in Social Security and Medicare funding of $82 trillion over the next three decades:

“Critics who are unwilling to confront these mammoth spending deficits are in no position to lecture others on the deficit implications of a (comparatively modest) $2 trillion tax cut.“

Jeffrey Tucker, whose posts I usually enjoy, seems to assert that deficits are not worthy of great concern. He offers a negative and somewhat muddled assessment of Ricardian equivalence, the idea that deficit spending is neutral because the expectation of future taxes discourages private spending. Tucker’s position is rooted in impatience with the rhetoric of revenue neutrality, but I think his real point might not be too far from Reidl’s. To his credit, Tucker condemns “fiscal profligacy”. He says:

“To be sure, this is not a defense of fiscal irresponsibility. Debts and deficits are terrible. Fiscal conservatism is a good thing. The budget should always be balanced. But there is one proviso: none of this should happen at the expense of the wealth creators in society: you, me, and the business sector. Government should bear responsibility for its own profligacy.“

I will interpret that last remark generously to mean that Tucker would cut spending to shrink deficits, but he also advocates for the sale of federal assets, which I generally support.

Concern by some Republicans over the deficit effects of tax reform prompted a debate during the Senate negotiations over a so-called “trigger” that would have increased taxes automatically if revenue fell short of certain benchmarks. At the last link, Ryan Bourne explains what a bad idea that would have been. A future revenue shortfall could be attributed to any number of future developments, not all of which would be compatible with a tax hike as a fix. The trigger would also create uncertainty, dampening the positive revenue effects that would otherwise be operative. It’s a relief that the trigger idea was abandoned by the GOP.

Despite the corrosive effects of big government and excessive spending, there is a relatively painless solution to closing the fiscal gap, with or without GOP tax reform. (I use the word “painless” guardedly, because big government inflicts distortions and costs well beyond mere spending levels.) Dan Mitchell has updated his calculations showing that the annual deficit would be eliminated by a decline in the budgeted annual growth of spending from 5.49% to 2.67% over ten years, starting in 2019. That hardly seems draconian, but watch: progressives and even relatively reflective Democrats would call such growth reductions “heartless cuts”. Such is the intellectual integrity of the left.

The following is no mystery: if you want prosperity, steer clear of policies that inhibit production and physical investment. This too: if you want to lift people out of poverty and dependency, don’t promote policies that discourage hiring and work incentives. Yet those are exactly the implications of policies repeatedly advocated by so-called redistributionists. The ignorance flows, in large part, from a distraction, a mere byproduct of economic life that has no direct relation to economic welfare, but upon which followers of Bernie Sanders are absolutely transfixed: income and wealth inequality. Attempts to manipulate the degree of inequality via steeply progressive taxes, transfers and market intervention is a suckers game of short-termism. It ultimately reduces the value of the economy’s capital stock, chases away productive activity, destroys jobs, and leaves us all poorer.

Absolute income growth is a better goal, and encouraging production is the best way to raise incomes in the long-run. Unless envy is your thing, income inequality is largely irrelevant as a policy goal. In “Why and How We Care About Inequality“, John Cochrane emphasizes that inequality may be a symptom of other problems, or perhaps no problem at all. His point is that treating a symptom won’t fix the underlying problem:

“A segment of America is stuck in widespread single motherhood … terrible early-child experiences, awful education, substance abuse, and criminality. 70% of male black high school dropouts will end up in prison, hence essentially unemployable and poor marriage prospects. Less than half are even looking for legal work.

This is a social and economic disaster. And it has nothing to do with whether hedge fund managers fly private or commercial. It is immune to floods of Government cash, and, as Casey Mulligan reminded us, Government programs are arguably as much of the problem as the solution. So are drug laws….“

The writers of the center-left Third Way blog give some details on income growth that might disappoint some progressives. They agree that the emphasis on redistribution is misplaced. Solving economic problems requires a different approach:

“From 1980 to 2010, income gains (after taxes and government transfers are included) favored the wealthy but were still spread across all income brackets: a 53% increase for the bottom quintile; a 41% increase for the next two; a 49% increase for the 4th; and a 90% increase for the richest fifth. Thus, while income inequality may offend our sense of justice, its actual impact on the middle class may be small.

With a singular focus on income inequality, the left’s main solutions are greater re-distribution and a re-writing of the rules to ‘un-rig’ the system. But, however well motivated, some of the biggest ideas into which they are directing their energy do not remotely address the underlying ‘Kodak’ conundrum—how do Americans find their place in a rapidly changing world? In fact, some would actually make the task of increasing shared prosperity significantly harder.“

The hubbub over inequality and redistribution is fueled by misconceptions. One is that the rich face low tax burdens, often lower than the middle class, a mistaken notion that Alan D. Viard debunks using 2013 data from a report from the Congressional Budget Office. The CBO report accounts for double taxation of dividends and capital gains at the corporate level and at the personal level (though capital gains are taxed to individuals now, while the anticipated corporate income is taxed later). The CBO study also accounts for employers’ share of payroll taxes (because it reduces labor income) so as to avoid exaggerating the tax system’s progressivity. Before accounting for federal benefits, which offset the tax burden, the middle 20% of income earners paid an average tax rate of less than 15%, while “the 1%” paid more than 29%. However, after correcting for federal benefits, the middle quintile paid a negative average tax rate, while the top 1% still paid almost 29%. That is a steeply graduated impact.

Rising income inequality in the U.S. is more a matter of changes in household structure than in the distribution of rewards. This conclusion is based on the fact that income inequality has risen steadily over the past 50 years for households, but there has been no change in inequality across individuals. An increasing number of single-person households, primarily women over the age of 65, accounts for rising inequality at the household level. The greedy corporate CEOs of the “occupier” imagination are really not to blame for this trend, though I won’t defend corporate rent-seeking activities intended to insulate themselves from competition.

Measures of income inequality hide another important fact: one’s position in the income distribution is not static. Chelsea German notes that Americans have a high degree of economic mobility. According to a Cornell study, only 6% of individuals in the top 1% in a given year remain there in the following year. German adds that over half of income earners in the U.S. find themselves in the top 10% for at least one year of their working lives.

There are several reasons why redistributionist policies fail to meet objectives and instead reduce opportunities for the presumed beneficiaries to prosper. Dan Mitchell covers several of these issues, citing work on: the rational response of upper-income taxpayers to punitive taxes; the insufficiency of funding an expanded welfare state by merely taxing “the rich”; the diversion of most anti-poverty funds to service providers (rather than directly to the poor); the meager valuation of benefits from recipients of Medicaid, and the fact that the program lacks any favorable impact on mortality and health measures. Mitchell features the “First Theorem of Government” in a sidebar:

“Above all else, the public sector is a racket for the enrichment of insiders, cronies, bureaucrats and interest groups.“

“You can only confiscate the wealth that exists at a given moment. You cannot confiscate future wealth — and that future wealth is less likely to be produced when people see that it is going to be confiscated.“

That future wealth can and should be enjoyed across the income spectrum, but punitive taxes destroy productive capital and jobs.

A great truth about poverty comes from Angela Ranchidi of the American Enterprise Institute: low wages are not at the root of poverty; it’s a lack of jobs. She quotes a Gallup report on this point, relative to the working-age poor in 2014:

“Census data show that, 61.7% did not work at all and another 26.6% worked less than full-time for the entire year. Only 11.7% of poor working-age adults worked full-time for the entire year in 2014. Low wages are not the primary cause of poverty; low work rates are. And if Gallup is correct, the full-time work rate may already be peaking.“

More than 88.3% of the working-age poor were either unemployed or underemployed! And here’s the kicker: redistributionists clamor for policies that would place an even higher floor on wage rates, yet the floor already in place has succeeded in compromising the ability of low-skilled workers to find full-time work.

Cochrane sums up the inequality debate by noting the obvious political motives of progressive redistributionists:

“Finally, why is “inequality” so strongly on the political agenda right now? Here I am not referring to academics. … All of economics has been studying various poverty traps for a generation….

[The] answer seems pretty clear. Because [the politicians and pundits] don’t want to talk about Obamacare, Dodd-Frank, bailouts, debt, the stimulus, the rotten cronyism of energy policy, denial of education to poor and minorities, the abject failure of their policies to help poor and middle class people, and especially sclerotic growth. Restarting a centuries-old fight about “inequality” and “tax the rich,” class envy resurrected from a Huey Long speech in the 1930s, is like throwing a puppy into a third grade math class that isn’t going well. You know you will make it to the bell.

That observation, together with the obvious incoherence of ideas the political inequality writers bring us leads me to a happy thought that this too will pass, and once a new set of talking points emerges we can go on to something else.“

People respond to incentives. That does not, in and of itself, make some people “energetic” and others “lazy”. To the contrary, it really means they are responsive and capable of calculating rewards. Critics of the welfare state are sometimes accused of labeling welfare recipients as “lazy”, which is absurd and a cop-out response to serious questions about the size, effectiveness, and even the fairness of means-tested benefits. The structure of welfare benefits in the U.S. often penalizes work effort and market earnings. That being the case, who can blame a recipient for minimizing work effort? From their perspective, that is what society wants them to do. Note that this has nothing to do with the provision of a social safety net for those who are unable to help themselves.

“At issue is the so-called “welfare cliff” beyond which families will literally become poorer the higher their wages, as the drop off in entitlements more than offsets the increase in earnings.“

The cliff looks different in different states and even differs by county. The chart at the top of this post is for Pennsylvania, from the state’s Secretary of Public Welfare, though I saw it on this post from LiberalForum. (Go to the link if the image is not clear). The Zero Hedge post linked above includes a dramatic illustration for Cook County in Illinois. Not many welfare recipients participate in all of the programs shown in the charts, but the point is that many of the programs create nasty incentives that tend to “trap” families at low income levels. Often, these workers and their families would be better off in the long-run if they were to suffer the consequences of the cliff in order to gain more work experience. Unfortunately, few have the resources to ride out a period of lower total income precipitated by the cliff. Another obvious implication is that increases in the minimum wage would actually harm some families by pushing them over the cliff.

Welfare cliffs differ by the recipients’ family structure (one- versus two-parent households, number of children) and do not apply to every welfare program. For example, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is very well-behaved in the sense that additional work and/or wage income flows through as a net gain the household. While most welfare programs involve a benefits cliff, incentives are undermined even before that point. A flattening in the level of total income as earned income rises indicates that the recipient faces an increasing marginal tax rate. The chart above shows that total income is relatively flat over a range of earned income below the income at which they’d encounter the cliff. This flat range starts at an earned income of $15,000 to $20,000 and extends up to the severe cliff at almost $30,000.

Zero Hedge quotes a report from the Illinois Policy Institute:

“We realize that this is a painful topic in a country in which the issue of welfare benefits and cutting (or not) the spending side of the fiscal cliff have become the two most sensitive social topics. Alas, none of that changes the matrix of incentives for Americans who find themselves facing a comparable dilemma: either remain on the left side of minimum US wage and rely on benefits, or move to the right side at far greater personal investment of work, and energy, and… have the same (or much lower) disposable income at the end of the day.“

Another interesting take on this issue is offered by Dan Mitchell, who cites a recent National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) paper, which finds:

“…the decline in desire to work since the mid-90s lowered the unemployment rate by about 0.5 ppt and the participation rate by 1.75 ppt. This is a large effect…“

The findings suggest that the welfare reforms of the 1990s actually had positive effects on work effort, though even the EITC creates some incentive problems for second earners. Worst of all is the incentive impact of expanded disability benefits, which have undone some of the gains from reform. Newer programs like Mortgage Assistance and now, Obamacare, have added to the work disincentives. Mitchell cites other research that reinforce these conclusions.

The welfare cliff harms economic efficiency by distorting the offer price of labor, by increasing costs to taxpayers, and by reducing the availability of productive resources. It is grossly unfair because it consigns its intended beneficiaries to a life of dependency. What a waste! Here is Mitchell’s prescription:

“Regarding the broader issue of redistribution and dependency, I argue that federalism is the best approach, both because states will face competitive pressure to avoid excessively generous benefits and because states will learn from each other about the best ways to help the truly needy while minimizing the negative impact of handouts on incentives for productive behavior.“

A side effect of negative welfare incentives is that they increase the relative benefits of participating in illegal income-earning activity. The “War on Drugs” exacerbates this effect by driving up drug prices. Of course, this activity is untaxed, and because it is unreported, it does not push the recipient toward the benefits cliff. This is another example of different government policies working at cross purposes, which is all too common.

In advanced civilizations the period loosely called Alexandrian is usually associated with flexible morals, perfunctory religion, populist standards and cosmopolitan tastes, feminism, exotic cults, and the rapid turnover of high and low fads---in short, a falling away (which is all that decadence means) from the strictness of traditional rules, embodied in character and inforced from within. -- Jacques Barzun