The list of significant positive by-products of Canada’s lengthy and costly involvement in Afghanistan does not justify the sacrifices made.

Former Cpl. John Lowe, a Canadian, rests during an operation on March 23, 2010 in Panjwaii, Afghanistan.

By:Eugene Lang Published on Tue Mar 25 2014

Last week marked the end of Canada’s 12-year odyssey in Afghanistan. Assessments of our involvement in that country are now emerging. Some claim we failed in our objectives. Others argue it is premature to pronounce mission success or failure.

Irrespective of what happens in Afghanistan, any assessment of Canada’s missions there should acknowledge some positive by-products that have accrued to this country as a result of Canadian sacrifices.

Those sacrifices were significant. One hundred and fifty-eight Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) fatalities and five civilian deaths. More than 2,000 wounded Canadians. Sixty-eight hundred veterans on disability for their Afghanistan service. Estimates that 13 per cent of the 40,000 CAF personnel who served in Afghanistan will suffer post-traumatic stress disorder. Between $14 billion and $18 billion spent on military operations, development assistance, and the costs of death, disability and medical support for CAF personnel.

Canada has made a major sacrifice in Afghanistan over the past dozen years. But the mission was not without positive outcomes.

The CAF conducted pretty close to the full spectrum of military operations in Afghanistan: stabilization, reconnaissance, counter-insurgency, reconstruction, special forces operations, and training and mentoring of Afghan security forces. Today, Canada’s military is the most operationally experienced we have had in this country in over half a century. That experience extends all through the ranks.

Canada also has a more integrated force than we did a decade ago. CAF operations in Afghanistan required a level of integration among the services — Air Force, Army, Navy and Special Forces — that hadn’t been required in previous post-Cold War foreign deployments.

The Canadian Army is now one of the world’s most expert in counter-insurgency. Given the number of insurgencies in play around the globe that is a skill set worth having, if only for consultative purposes.

Canada’ special forces — JTF2 — were deployed successfully for years in Afghanistan and increased significantly in size over the course of the missions. Having robust, experienced Special Forces is an invaluable tool to respond to both domestic and international crises.

In short, today the government of Canada has a significantly expanded capability set to work with. You cannot put a price on this when working through the calculus of providing a useful contribution to a multinational armed force that mitigates risks to Canada and is consistent with Canadian values.

Another byproduct of the missions was an improvement of our institutions of government over the last dozen years. Afghanistan required more joined-up foreign policy institutions (CIDA, the Department of Foreign Affairs and National Defence), not just in Ottawa, but also in theatre. Afghanistan forced government to do the hard work of connecting the silos, ending turf wars and bridging different world views among these departments. In responding to future international crises, interdepartmental co-ordination will be far easier to achieve.

Parliament has matured, too. Afghanistan set an important Parliamentary precedent when two votes were taken in 2006 and 2008 to extend Canada’s military involvement. In future, it is hard to imagine any government putting the CAF into a hostile situation abroad without Parliament’s approval. Having Parliament onside, which is not required constitutionally, is important in maintaining broader public support for foreign military operations and in educating citizens about what their military is being asked to do on their behalf.

Among Members of Parliament there is somewhat more literacy on foreign policy and the armed forces than there was a decade ago. Canadians, too, have a better understanding of what their military is and can do.

The connection between the military and the Canadian population — which had broken down in the 1990s due to the incidents in Somalia and their aftermath — has been fully restored as a result of the missions in Afghanistan. The CAF is considered again to be one of the premier institutions in Canada.

Perhaps most importantly, our politicians, public servants and military leaders have a more sophisticated grasp of the limitations of military force in effecting foreign policy outcomes. That knowledge and humility only comes from being involved in conflicts in complex societies like Afghanistan.

These are significant positive by-products of Canada’s lengthy and costly involvement in Afghanistan. Are they reasons to go to war? Absolutely not. Do they justify the sacrifices? No. But when assessing mission “success” or “failure” we should at least consider the benefits that have accrued to this country.

Eugene Lang is BMO Visiting Fellow at Glendon College. He served as Chief of Staff to two Ministers of National Defence and is co-author (with Janice Stein) of The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar. This article is an adaptation of a presentation he gave to The Colloquium at Glendon College.

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