Posted
by
samzenpuson Sunday November 11, 2012 @04:25PM
from the patient-zero dept.

chicksdaddy writes "We hear a lot about vulnerabilities in industrial control system (ICS) software. But what about real evidence of compromised SCADA and industrial control systems? According to security researcher Michael Toecker, a consultant at the firm Digital Bond, the evidence for infected systems with links to industrial automation and control systems is right under our eyes: buried in public support forums. Toecker audited support sites like bleepingcomputer.com, picking through data dumps from free malware scanning tools like HijackThis and DDS. He found scans of infected systems that were running specialized ICS software like Schweitzer Engineering Labs (SEL) AcSELerator Software and GE Power's EnerVista Software (used to configure GE electric power protection products). The infected end user systems could be the pathway to compromising critical infrastructure, including electrical infrastructure. 'With access to a protection relay through a laptop, a malicious program could alter settings in the configuration file, inject bad data designed to halt the relay, or even send commands directly to the relay when a connection was made,' Toecker wrote."

... where they take you through the seven stages of grief? Twelve steps to living a sober life?

Will we have to go up in front of a group and say, "Hi. My name is PPH and I plugged a thumb drive into my SCADA controller. I've been doing Windows for years and I guess it just caught up with me one day."

Why would anyone responsible for these computers (running devices whose operation is dangerous to human life) ever connect them to the internet?? Are they complete morons? Why would they be able to keep their jobs? Are they all idiot sons of rich people and therefore can't be fired or something? I don't get it? What am I missing?

How many millions of dollars a year do you want to spend to maintain that isolation? You can do it, it's just really expensive.

1. Lock down/destroy all wireless comm on all hardware2. Make entire network visible - all cable runs visible in clear conduits.3. No software installs without full audit (sorry, no commercial installs allowed, no audit software allowed on the gold network)4. Destroy all hardware leaving the building (and yes, that includes guests' cellphones.)5. No windows, line of sight, radio leakage, etc.6. Fab your own chips. Even a 555 timer can hold a rogue 8086.7. No interns. Assume every Chinese grad is a malware vector (and everyone else, too.)8. Assume you still have a 1 bit per second channel to the outside world (power draw, sound, etc.)

I was not completely clear, but even if you opt for even a simple DIP-8 555, current tech lets us embed a side-saddle microprocessor (4004, 6502, 8086) easily. Unless you pry the top off and scan it, you can't be sure you don't have a trojan horse. It's only a few thousand lines of code for the chip to decide it's in the right place for its payload (running a centrifuge, controlling a missile fin, etc) and then to fail nastily.

If it weren't for the fact that Vdd and Vss are reversed, a properly programmed PIC 12f675 could be a pin-for-pin replacement for a 555. As a matter of fact, I've stopped using 555s entirely, since a 12f675 provides the same functionality, and more, with NO external parts.

Installing a trojan would be as easy as inverting the 1 and 8 pins inside the package.

You appear to have a problem with the concept of direction. The problem being addressed was that of stuff with the evil bit set coming *in* from the internet. Moving a PC relative to the windows does not change that at all, for example. Most of your defences seem to *presume* there's a man on the inside, but if you've got a man on the inside, there's no defence if there are *any* input devices at all. And a computer with no input devices can not receive or process any information. And therefore isn't a comp

You appear to have a problem with the concept of direction. The problem being addressed was that of stuff with the evil bit set coming *in* from the internet. Moving a PC relative to the windows does not change that at all, for example. Most of your defences seem to *presume* there's a man on the inside, but if you've got a man on the inside, there's no defence if there are *any* input devices at all. And a computer with no input devices can not receive or process any information. And therefore isn't a computer any more. You're just trying to show off that you can think of lots of ways of getting data off a supposedly secure system, which is pointless willy waving, anyone can do that. Why did you mention destroying guests' phones, but not the pad of paper they had in their pocket? Or their memories?

Its a lot easier to physically secure hardware -- and, more importantly, to know when a physical compromise has happened. These organizations, by and large, already have those provisions in place. I can't speak for the GP, but I would assume that's why he didn't get into those issues. People understand (to some extent) physical security. They don't understand "technical" security.

While I agree that you only get as much security as your willing to pay for, you can get a high degree of security with less complication then this. How about air gap and properly paid, highly trained and ful security vetted engineers.

Also, from my own experience working with scada systems most organizations mirror the data over to a decision support service that lacks the control modules. So some of these infections may simply be on the historian not the control system.

1. The SCADA-related stuff is, in fact, properly air-gapped. Then the contractor who has to update the firmware on widget Z shows up and plugs in or a stupid and/or malicious insider manages to find a working USB port.

2. You install a fancy Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition system. Your Boss says "WTF, why can't I supervise and manage from the comfort of my iPad like in the vendor demo?" You proceed to punch one or more holes in your precious security.

Used to be possible through about 2000. Essentially impossible today, since most industrial systems vendors - just like everyone else - provide the vast majority of their support via Internet services. You want assistance debugging that control function giving you problems? Open up a support connection to the vendor. Can't do that? The vendor would be happy to send an on-site support tech at $2000/day, but of course he wil

Almost all situations fall into the first category. The SEL relays have rear ports for permanent connections and a front port for service. Usually they are set up so programming can't be changed over the serial or Ethernet network, but the front port has no ability for lock-down. SEL even has a cute little "data transporter" that has a serial port on it, so you don't have to bring your laptop to the relay.

The attack alluded to should be able to bypass the sneakernet use of the data transporter. Conceivably, if the service tech's laptop is compromised all relays would allow for remote settings change despite the visible settings on the laptop.

But, unless you could crack the relay firmware downloading the settings to another device or viewing from the built-in screen (which is extremely tedious), you would easily identify the problem.

I'm torn on how serious to take this. It isn't like settings are changed often, so practical implications are limited.

1. Many of these systems are remote and need to be managed remotely. The ability to do this via leased lines through telecoms is greatly diminishing and the result is often even if you do get some kind of leased line it still gets routed through the internet.2. These systems need to be constantly visible and accessed by a wide variety of non control software to help optimise a process.3. Legal requirements often force you to physically connect this to some kind of remote

I'm a sysadmin for a small municipal office with a SCADA system. I manage every computer except the one used for SCADA, which is the responsibility of the vendor. Their only concern is that the computer stays unmodified from their "standard" set up, but it still requires unrestricted Internet access. This means:

How retarded promotional videos like this [youtube.com] geared towards PHBs. The marketing and sales people do not want certificates and security as it would make their products look bad and hard to setup.

Easy access and PHB approved so the IT is ordered to do it or find another job. When shit hits the fan you just fire the IT guy.

I think if government (ie: DHS in the US) really wants to secure SCADA without overhauling it, they should require and provide site-to-site VPN routers with Internet traffic blocked minus a few things. Just plug them into a modem or switch and 99% of the problem is taken care of. I think it would cost pennies compared to things like the backscatter scanners.

As the sysadmin I can stick it on a VLAN to keep it away from the computers I'm responsible for, but other than that, my hands are tied.

Until your boss calls and asks why can't he view setup on his phone from the internet like was shown in the promotion video? Please unblock internet access.... then an employee who is trying to get around the facebook firewalling software uses it to browse the internet. Oh, yeah fun times.

These systems were *never* designed with security in mind. They were designed to talk to each other and quickly and then get out of the way. The protocols used do not even have a concept of it. In many cases you are lucky they talk to each other at all.

Then you had a handful of manufactures trying to corner the 'security' (which was a pathetic joke). Which means at a time when it should have been getting traction on 'how to talk to each other securely'. You ha

We had a company with those requirements and we refused point blank to allow it Internet access. We allowed them a one day trial to prove it was secure and of course it was riddled with viruses within hours. We then forced them to wipe and reinstall it, and plugged it in to our isolated production network.

The guys designing and working with these systems haven't the first clue about IT, let alone security.

I, along with many others at my company, have Quickset loaded on our laptops. It's just configuration software that you use to prepare protective relays (and could use to communicate with them). I suppose the database on it could be hacked (it's a secured pgsql database, but that security can easily be overridden if you know what you're doing). It is *not* a SCADA package. It's on every relay tech's laptop, along with many engineers. I'd not be surprised to see virii on computers with Quickset on it at all,

I can tell you that none of the protective relays I've installed, the engineers involved didn't care one bit for security and all the SEL relays, Square D SEPAM relays, GE Relays, they are all installed with the default password with full access to anyone that has a RS-232 or Modbus cable. None of these relays are set correctly and barely anyone knows what setups to use on them. If someone really wanted to create a disaster, these relays are wide open, and someone with a laptop can easily just make a quick script to upload malicious settings and code to these relays very easily and quickly. The ones that are networked via status updates are even worse. As for SCADA systems, the majority of them are running Windows XP with no updates on, no antivirus, no anything and have full unrestricted access to the internet with full access to the PLC's on machines. These vulnerabilities have been known for YEARS by many installers, so I really don't find this article that surprising.

If someone has access to the RS232 port on the relay, you have MUCH bigger problems. Heck, they can remove the six screws and set the 'no password' jumper on an SEL relay and not worry about passwords at all.

Once physical security is compromised, electronic security is worthless. Hit the bus diff lockout switch and the station will clear anyway...

Modbus cable? What kind of security are you dealing with here? From what I can gather the only time someone will be able to start messing with this stuff is if they are there, standing right in front of the relay. At this point all bets are off. There are many thousands of things someone could do at a plant to wreak havoc even once you have passworded your modbus interface, and many of them are far less technical than modifying a protective scheme so why bother.

'First I got infected by "malware protection designed to protect" and "windows xp recovery" I used rkill to fix this. But now any google search gets redirected and I hear commercials even with no browser open. The TDSSKiller won't run even when is renamed. And SAS or malware bytes won't detect anything.' link [bleepingcomputer.com]

Organizations that use SCADA and/or distributed controls, typically the manufacturing and raw materials sectors but also public utilities, very seldom maintain complete on-site in-house support for said systems or their industrial sub-components (proprietary machine programs, frequently written in Step 7 or ControlLogix but locked down by the machine vendor). Neither are most maintenance budgets able to afford frequent on-site vendor visits.