Dinkins v. Schinzel

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND GRANTING IN PART MOTION TO AMEND
COUNTERCLAIM [ECF NOS. 23, 27, 49]

JENNIFER A. DORSEY, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE.

Geraldine
Schinzel claims that Kenneth Dinkins defrauded her in a
land-sale deal, and she has colorfully published her theories
about Dinkins on the internet.[1]When Dinkins sued Schinzel,
claiming that she has damaged his business reputation and
caused him emotional distress, Schinzel counterclaimed on
fraud and contract theories. Schinzel claims that, after
defrauding her in the real-estate transaction, Dinkins
defamed her on YouTube and elsewhere.[2]

Dinkins
moves to dismiss all of Schinzel's claims, arguing that
they are meritless and offering various evidence for his
position.[3] To evaluate his arguments, I would have to
convert this FRCP 12(b)(6) motion into one for summary
judgment, and I decline to do so at this early litigation
stage, so I deny the motion. Dinkins also moves for summary
judgment on his own claims. But because discovery has not
been completed, I grant Schinzel's FRCP 56(d)
request[4]and deny the motion without prejudice to
its refiling when the record in this case has been better
developed. I then turn to Schinzel's motion to amend her
counterclaim to add a claim for injunctive relief. I grant
the request in part: because injunctive relief is a remedy,
not a “claim, ” I deny the request to add a new
cause of action; but Schinzel may amend her counterclaim to
include injunctive relief as a component of her prayer for
relief.[5]

Discussion

A.
Dinkins's Motion to Dismiss Schinzel's Counterclaims
[ECF No. 23]

The
very first page of Dinkins's motion highlights the theory
behind his motion for FRCP 12(b)(6) relief: “The
Defendant[']s Counterclaims contain Blatant false
information.”[6] He spends the next 17 pages of his motion
explaining why the transaction that Schinzel claims happened
between herself and Dinkins was actually between an unrelated
party and Dinkins, recharacterizing her allegations, offering
counterfacts and affirmative defenses, and proclaiming that
it was really Schinzel who was engaging in the type of
conduct she accuses Dinkins of.[7]

Rule 8
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a claimant
to plead enough facts to put the subject of her claim on
notice of the nature of the claim. A claim must be dismissed
as insufficient under FRCP 12(b)(6) if the claimaint has
failed to plead “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.”[8]The claimant need
not provide detailed factual allegations, but she has to show
“more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.”[9] A true FRCP 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
tests the sufficiency of the complaint on its face, and the
court must assume all allegations in the complaint are true.
So, “in ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, a court may
generally consider only allegations contained in the
pleadings, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters
properly subject to judicial notice.”[10] Otherwise,
the motion must be converted into one for summary judgment.

Dinkins's
motion, though captioned as one under FRCP 12(b)(6), does not
challenge the sufficiency of the allegations in Shinzel's
counterclaim; it challenges their merits. By asking the court
to reject Schinzel's theories and allegations as false
based on outside evidence that he attaches to his motion,
Dinkins is not asking for true FRCP 12(b)(6) relief, he's
asking for summary judgment. Because this case remains in its
early stages with more than two months left in the discovery
period and three months before summary-judgment motions are
due, and because the record is not yet well developed, I do
not find that it would be fair at this stage of the
proceedings to convert this motion into one for summary
judgment, so I decline to do so. Schinzel has pled sufficient
facts to support plausible claims, and Dinkins has not
demonstrated otherwise. I thus deny Dinkins's motion to
dismiss Schinzel's counterclaims. If Dinkins wants to
dispute the merits of Schinzel's claims, he should bring
a motion for summary judgment at the appropriate time.

B.
Dinkins's Motion for Summary Judgment on His Own Claims
[ECF No. 27]

Dinkins
also moves for summary judgment in his favor on his claims
against Schinzel, arguing that the evidence supports
them.[11] In a responsive affidavit,
Schinzel's counsel asks the court to delay or deny
summary judgment under FRCP 56(d) because he was still
waiting for Dinkins's responses to key discovery requests
that are the subject of a pending motion to compel, and
because additional, specific discovery is still
needed.[12] Issues from that motion to compel are
yet to be resolved, and supplemental briefing was only
recently filed.[13] I find that Schinzel has shown by
affidavit “that, for specified reasons, ” she
“cannot present facts essential to justify” her
opposition to the motion for summary judgment, and that
judicial economy dictates that Dinkins's motion for
summary judgment-filed less than four months into this
contentious litigation-be denied without prejudice under FRCP
56(d). Dinkins may file a new motion for summary judgment
between the close of discovery and the deadline for
dispositive motions.[14]

Schinzel
has also moved to file an amended counterclaim to add a
“Sixth Claim for Relief” entitled
“Permanent Injunction.”[15] FRCP 15(a)(2) directs
that “[t]he court should freely give leave when justice
so requires.”[16] In determining whether to grant leave to
amend, district courts consider five factors: (1) bad faith,
(2) undue delay, (3) prejudice to the opposing party, (4)
futility of amendment, and (5) whether the movant has
previously amended the complaint.[17]

This is
Schinzel's first request to amend her counterclaim, and
it is timely because it was filed before the October 8, 2017,
deadline to amend pleadings.[18] I find no evidence of bad
faith, undue delay, or futility of amendment here. And
considering that discovery is still ongoing and various
discovery disputes remain unresolved, amendment will not
cause any prejudice to Dinkins.

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;But
there is a glaring defect in the request: injunctive relief
is not a claim-it&#39;s a remedy. A permanent injunction is a
form of relief that the court may grant when a plaintiff
succeeds on a substantive cause of action that lends itself
to this remedy.[19] So I grant the motion only in part:
Schinzel may amend her counterclaim to add injunctive relief
...

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