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How Washington Encourages Nuclear Proliferation

The current top priority for U.S. foreign policy is to prevent
Iran from building nuclear weapons—or even acquiring the
capability to build such weapons. That goal reflects the general
U.S. policy, in place for more than six decades, of combating
nuclear proliferation. U.S. leaders achieved a major diplomatic
triumph with the signing of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT) in the late 1960s, and subsequent administrations have fought
hard to prevent signatories from violating its provisions and to
lobby other states to join the nonproliferation regime.

But U.S. actions frequently undermine Washington’s own
nonproliferation goals. U.S. policy makers are adamant that such
countries as Iran and North Korea have no legitimate reasons to
want their own nuclear arsenals. That argument is either naive or
disingenuous. Leaders in Pyongyang and Tehran have undoubtedly
watched how Washington treats non-nuclear adversaries, and
surveying the global scene has not offered any comfort.

Following the Persian Gulf War in 1991, a high-level Indian
military official was asked what lessons could be drawn from that
conflict. His response reportedly was: “Don’t fight the
United States unless you have nuclear weapons.” That lesson
was strengthened later in the decade when U.S.-led NATO forces
bombed Serbia into relinquishing control of its restive Kosovo
province.

Leaders in Pyongyang and
Tehran have undoubtedly watched how Washington treats non-nuclear
adversaries, and surveying the global scene has not offered any
comfort.

Two more recent incidents made it clear that non-nuclear
adversaries of the United States risk being targets of forcible
regime change. In 2003, Washington invaded Iraq and ousted Saddam
Hussein. This happened right on Iran’s doorstep, and
outspoken American hawks even asserted that a broader purpose of
the Iraq mission was to intimidate Tehran—or, hopefully, even
spark an uprising against the clerical regime.

An even more damaging precedent was set in Libya. Longtime
Libyan strongman Muammar el-Qaddafi had pursued a nuclear program
for years—albeit with only minimal progress. But he finally
abandoned that effort and sought to normalize relations with the
United States and its Western allies. For a short time, it appeared
that his course change would pay dividends, as the Western powers
greatly eased their economic sanctions, and even such a strident
hawk like Senator John McCain praised Qaddafi during a visit to
Libya.

The honeymoon did not last long, though. When insurgent forces
began an uprising against Qaddafi’s rule, the U.S. and its
NATO allies assisted the rebellion, even launching air strikes on
government targets. Qaddafi’s ouster and execution conveyed
the message that a ruler who gave up his nuclear ambitions could
not expect any lasting benefits from the West. Indeed, remaining
non-nuclear merely made a regime-change agenda easier and more
certain.

Given such a track record, it is a bit much for U.S. officials
to demand that North Korea and Iran walk into the same trap. And
both governments show no intention of doing so.

It’s possible that Pyongyang and especially Tehran might
have pursued their nuclear quests even if the United States had not
treated non-nuclear adversaries the way that it did. Regional
considerations also play important roles. India and Pakistan
eventually barged into the global nuclear-weapons club primarily
because of their bilateral rivalry, and in India’s case,
worries about China. Concerns about U.S. intentions played only a
secondary role. Given the bitter Sunni-Shiite rivalry throughout
the Middle East and its own ambitions as a regional power, Tehran
has relevant incentives to become a nuclear-weapons state
irrespective of U.S. policy.

But Washington certainly has not helped its nonproliferation
agenda toward Iran, North Korea, or other countries that are on
unfriendly terms with the United States. Instead, U.S. actions have
made the case that those governments would be wise to acquire a
nuclear deterrent if they want to avoid being the next case of
forcible regime change. That was assuredly not Washington’s
intention, but it is the inevitable result.