pentagon acquisition reform

NATO and U.S.: Enemies of Choice for Russia’s Military By Pavel Felgenhauer, Eurasia Daily Monitor: “The Russian defense minister boasted about his country achieving military parity with the North Atlantic Alliance, “though we spend much less on defense.” Russia has been expanding and modernizing its nuclear triad of ground, sea and air strategic nuclear forces. Nine regiments of new land-mobile and silo-based Yars intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) have been deployed. A typical Strategic Rocket Force (RVSN) regiment fields ten ICBMs. According to Shoigu, by 2021 there will be 17 Yars regiments. The Russian Navy has today nine modern constantly deployed nuclear strategic subs, including three of the new Borei-class vessels with new Bulava ballistic missiles. Within the next four years, there will be 13 strategic subs, including 7 Borei-class submarines.” ​

The Nuclear Posture Review, New START, and the Russian Nuclear Buildup By Mark B. Schneider, RealClearDefense: “Russia’s accelerated modernization rate is significant because it is exactly the opposite of what Russia should be doing if it intends to comply with the New START Treaty. Russian New START data for March 1, 2017, eleven months before the deadline when the New START numerical limits come into legal effect, indicated that Russia had moved from below the New START deployed warhead limit of 1,550 at New START entry-into-force in 2011 to 215 warheads above it. (At New START entry into force Russia had 1,537 deployed warheads.) We are now only eight months away from the deadline. Putin’s programmatic announcement will probably increase the number of Russian warheads that have to be removed from accountability by February 5, 2018, to over 300 because Russian single-warhead SS-25 ICBMs are being replaced by Yars ICBMs carrying at least four warheads. The remaining eight months includes a long, cold Russian winter, hardly ideal weather for making the type of changes necessary for Russia to comply with New START."

Defense Acquisition Processes Are the EnemyBy William J. Totti, Proceedings Magazine: “It is routine for a defense procurement, including acquisition of information technology, to take five or more years from the establishment of requirements to down-select of the provider and contract start. During those years, the underlying technology will evolve significantly. Sensor technology will have evolved at least one cycle. The information technology that undergirds nearly every system we build will evolve at the speed of Moore’s Law, one generation every 18 months. Worse, it is common for the affected military service or agency to suspend security and technology updates on existing systems during the procurement cycle, believing it is better to wait until the new contract is available.” ​

A Burden Too Great to Bear By Andrew Forney, Strategy Bridge: “This picture of the president and his policies define, rightly or wrongly, their historical image. Never mind examples that run counter to this dominant narrative — the pragmatic and deliberate Bush contemplating the Surge or Obama the ultimate gambler authorizing the raid to kill Bin Laden. In foreign policy, this tendency moves further to the fore due to the mythology of “doctrines” — thanks James Monroe — and the idea that a president crafts a vision of the United States' relationship with the world and then enacts policies or takes actions to attain this vision.” ​

How the International System Shapes the Character of War: Order, Geography, and Networks By Benjamin Jensen, War on the Rocks: “Our world is awash in events that appear to be game changing. Russia stirs the pot in Ukraine and Syria. China expands economically through the One Belt One Road initiative and militarily in the South China Sea. North Korea rattles its nuclear saber. Iran arms proxies across the Gulf. Violent extremists seize territory in the Middle East and Africa, wielding machine guns mounted on pickup trucks, flying unmanned systems, and deploying hackers.” ​

Res ad Triariosvenit: Aging and Warfare in 2050 By Artur Varanda, Strategy Bridge: "“Things have come down to the Triarii." This is an old Roman saying, meaning that the situation has come to its bitter end. When the legions were essentially made of conscripted citizens, the Triarii were the oldest and wealthiest soldiers, and in battle they stood behind the lighter and younger Hastati and Principes. Usually, the Hastati were employed first, followed by the older and wealthier Principes, which usually were enough to win the battle. Having to commit the Triarii—the oldest, most influential citizens—into the mêlée meant that the situation was dire, and that victory was to be attained at all costs."

Carthage vs. Mosul: The Utility of Tactical Theory By B.A. Friedman, Strategy Bridge: “What can this battle tell us about modern warfare? Next to nothing if we seek a how-to tactical example. Ancient Rome’s methods were unnecessarily brutal, and there is little chance modern urban combat will feature arrows and makeshift spears. Yet, if we view the battle with a mind trained by theory to ask the right questions of the military history available to us, the fate of Carthage can be illuminating in both an operational and a strategic sense." ​

Mulvaney Seems to Have Pulled a Fast One on the Pentagon By Thomas Donnelly, The Weekly Standard: “Rolling out the Trump administration's formal 2018 budget, acting Pentagon comptroller John Roth confessed that Defense secretary James Mattis "hasn't spent one moment" looking beyond the coming budget year. But even a cursory glance at the plan makes one wonder whether he paid much attention to this year, either.”

Battles Can Be Won With Kinetics, but Wars Are Won With InfluenceBy Ajit Maan, RealClearDefense: “Our tactics in the battles against Daesh in Raqqa and Mosul appear to be on the verge of success. But tactical success in battle will not win the war without a strategy. And that strategy will not be successful if it depends solely upon kinetic force. \” The Age of Total WarByJohn Q. Bolton, Strategy Bridge: “Clausewitz tells us war is inherently unknowable, and once released it becomes an entity unto itself, transforming and growing without regard to the circumstances particular to its creation. But analysis requires categories, and most military professionals accept that war occurs on a continuum, a spectrum of conflict ranging from small-scale guerrilla warfare, to limited war, to conventional combat (force on force) by states leveraging all the elements of national power in a bid to defeat each other. And the period roughly ranging from the American Civil War to the end of World War II is clearly delineated in the scale, scope, duration, and government control of conflict.” ​

Unhappy Military Outcomes of the Post-Second World War EraByG. Stephen Lauer, Strategy Bridge: ““Why do U.S. military outcomes after 1945 so often fail to achieve the policy objectives for which they are begun?” The chronicle of discontent is both powerful and pervasive in the American psyche today. The story of failure and lives lost with little meaning demonstrates the capacity, especially in the ongoing, and seemingly never-ending, Iraq-Afghanistan wars, to paralyze policy in regards to the threat of quasi-state organizations such as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), and indeed other existing nation states, in response attempts to overturn seventy years of the post-1945 peace settlement—the so-called Pax Americana. There are two fundamentally antagonistic matters at work here, the risk perceptions of the policy maker, and those of the military leaders given the task to achieve a limited aim with limited means.” ​

Broken and Unreadable: Our Unbearable Aversion to Doctrine By Steve Leonard, Modern War Institute: ““War is not an affair of chance. A great deal of knowledge, study, and meditation is necessary to conduct it well.”—as a rallying cry to embrace the intellectual pursuit of doctrine.Yet, still, we don’t read doctrine. Why? Well, it’s complicated.” ​

Russian Amphibious Capabilities By Jörgen Elfving, Eurasia Daily Monitor: “The year 2017 will probably finally see the new landing ship Ivan Gren handed over to the Russian Navy. This vessel was long fraught with delays and mishaps on its way from the shipyard to the Ministry of Defense. In September, Russia will also hold the exercise Zapad 2017, which will almost certainly include a simulated amphibious landing. How this is accomplished, its size and the scenario will be of special interest due to the charged military situation in the Baltic Sea region. But it will also indicate something about Russia’s current amphibious capabilities, which are built on Moscow’s historical experiences from the Great Patriotic War and which were further developed during the Cold War.” ​

Developing an Effective Missile Defense By Thomas Karako, The Cipher Brief: “Of the four basic families of U.S. missile defense programs, the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) program is the only one devoted exclusively to long-range missile threats to the homeland. Others, like the Aegis Standard Missile, THAAD, and Patriot are tailored to defeat missiles of lesser range, and although some support homeland applications through the larger Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS), they are in the first instance for regional defense or force protection. GMD has a considerably larger defended area than that of any other BMD system.”

Missile Defense Intercept Success Highlights Slow ProgressByDaniel Gouré, RealClearDefense: “The very success of the latest test highlights two long-standing problems with the U.S. approach to missile defense. The first is the slow pace of progress in the overall program. This is a function of a number of factors. One is clearly resources. The MDA is being asked to pursue too many technologies and support too many programs for the funding levels available over the past eight years. If the Trump Administration is serious about defending the nation, a 50 percent addition to the missile defense budget is in order.” ​

Super-Computers & 3RD OffsetSupercomputers and the Third Offset By Patrick Kennedy, The Strategist (ASPI): “Paraphrased, the US Third Offset strategy runs something like ‘bolstering US conventional deterrence through technological and operational innovation’. The strategy hinges on innovation,and sees the integration of autonomy into weapon systems and organisational constructs as a decisive advantage. But innovation is prized around the world, and it’s risky to pin hopes to a possible monopoly on innovation, or the ability to leverage innovation into military effects.

The Challenge of China’s Blue-Water Navy By Dr. Patrick M. Cronin, Dr. Mira Rapp-Hooper, Harry Krejsa, Alexander Sullivan and Rush Doshi, CNAS: “The United States has enjoyed largely uncontested naval supremacy across the blue waters, or open oceans, for decades. The rapid emergence of an increasingly global People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) suggests that this era will soon come to a close. China’s ability to conduct power projection and amphibious operations around the world will become a fundamental fact of politics in the near future, with significant consequences for the United States and its allies, all of which need to begin preparing for a “risen China” rather than a “rising China,” especially in the realm of maritime security.”

Information Operations Countermeasures to Anti-Access/Area DenialBy Brian D. Wieck, Strategy Bridge: “China’s objective with its anti-access, area denial strategy to push the US out to what it terms the “first island chain” (Japan down through the Philippines) immediately, and to push the U.S. out to what it terms the “second island chain” (extends out to Guam) between 2020 and 2050 according to Chinese flag office Liu Huaqing's 1980s plan.[1] The U.S. response to this strategy—a whole of government response with synchronized information operations—requires U.S. Pacific allies to deem U.S. security objectives legitimate and support these objectives. China’s Three Warfares strategy attempts to undercut both of these.” ​

Good to Great: Innovation in the Industrial Base​By Stephen Rodriguez, War on the Rocks: ““Thoughtless reliance on technology is a liability.” This quote did not come from a disgruntled acquisition professional in the Pentagon, but from noted author Jim Collins in his eponymous business book, Good to Great. He did not have had the third offset strategy in mind when he wrote this line, yet he crystallized the innovation debate between policymakers and defense planners.” ​

Slow, Inflexible, and Micromanaged:The Problems of a Military That Overstates RiskBy Ben Summers, Modern War Institute: “In ambiguous, dynamic operating environments, mission command flattens organizational structures so teams can respond with nuance and speed. Mission command is about fostering a culture of trust and empowerment so subordinate leaders can exercise initiative and creativity to meet their commander’s intent. But there are pitfalls.”

Eisenhower's "Military-Industrial Complex" Shrinks to 1% of EconomyBy Loren Thompson, Forbes: “The United States did not have a large defense industry for most of its history. Because threats were episodic rather than continuous, the traditional practice was to mobilize the commercial economy for war production when danger arose, and then demobilize when it had passed.” ​

Sandra Erwin writes: The first and second offset strategies were less strategies than the ability to advance existing technologies into what became the Atomic Bomb in the first, and the advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance along with advanced battle management in the second offset. To achieve the third, exploiting COTS to our advantage may be the best chance of hedging against emerging near-peer competitors such as Russia and China. – Real Clear Defense

Aegis Ashore could become a model for missile defense against an aggressive North Korea in Japan, Guam and Hawaii, as well as in Europe to counter an Iranian threat, because it is adaptable and capable of carrying mixed load, a defense security expert said Wednesday. – USNI News

The Rise of the Warrior Caste and the All-Volunteer ForceBy Amy Schafer, CNAS: “Though the American experiment of an all-volunteer military force is largely considered to be a success, maintaining long-term awareness of challenges facing recruitment and retention will prove instrumental to sustaining the force for years to come. One such element is the “warrior caste” – the propensity of youth from military families to serve in the armed forces – a concept gaining renewed attention as the wars of the past 15 years wind down and the composition and readiness of the military take priority.” ​

Good Riddance to Rotational Crews By John Cordle, Proceedings Magazine: “I have heard it said that the “turning radius” of an idea is around 30 years. At that point, it becomes “new” again, and the reasons why it was dropped in the first place are forgotten. Here’s hoping the rotational crews concept is one idea that, when its time comes around again, will just keep moving into the graveyard of dead ideas.” ​

Army Crafting Strategy to Reduce Logistics Tail By Jen Judson, Defense News: “In the future operational environment, up against near-peer adversaries, the U.S. Army will be expected to be able to operate in smaller, more dispersed units far away from well-established military posts that offer creature comforts as well as essentials like fuel, water, ammunition and energy.” ​

SOF’s Evolving Role: Warfare “By, With, and Through” Local ForcesBy Linda Robinson, The Cipher Brief: “The role of U.S. special operations forces (SOF) in the Middle East has expanded steadily since the inception of the counter-ISIS campaign in 2014. In part, this expansion is due to the metastasis of ISIS into Libya, Yemen, and other countries beyond its major land-holding presence in Iraq and Syria. But the most notable feature of the expanded U.S. SOF role in the Middle East has been its work alongside indigenous forces in Iraq and Syria.” ​

Comparing the Navies of Russia and China By James Mugg and Christopher Cowan, The Strategist (ASPI): “Most discussions of ‘near-peer’ conflicts in the modern context include some reference to both a ‘resurgent Russia’ and a ‘rising China’. We thought it’d be interesting to compare the navies of the two nations as a case study of broader trends in their defence modernisation efforts. Similar analyses could be conducted for other military branches, but an abundance of open-source data on naval assets and the maritime nature of the Asia–Pacific theatre make navies a sensible place to start.”

Every Marine a Rifleman No More?By Jeff Schogol, Marine Corps Times: “The Corps is more skeptical than the other services about many aspects of Carter's "Force of the Future" reforms. The Marines truly believe their motto of “Every Marine is a rifleman,” and believe that has been the service’s unique strength throughout its storied history. ”

n a future Multi-Domain Battle, the Army wants to fight in small units that can disperse, hide, and keep on the move. That’s not possible while tethered to traditional supply lines. So what the Army calls “demand reduction” isn’t a nice-to-have administrative efficiency, it’s a battlefield necessity. – Breaking DefenseFuture soldiers may enter a battlefield alongside autonomous fighting vehicles on the ground and a "ghost fleet" of unmanned ships at sea, as swarms of miniature drones buzz overhead…But for that to happen, several speakers at the National Defense Industrial Association's annual Armament Systems Forum in Fredericksburg, Virginia, said Tuesday that much has to change about how the military acquires and implements new gear. – Military Times

RUSSIA: The End of U.S. Primacy in AsiaBy Sergey Sukhankin, Eurasia Daily Monitor: “Recent events in Syria seem to have spurned Russia into more decisive action when it comes to upgrading its military capabilities. In part, these Russian efforts appear to be focusing on developing advanced hypersonic weaponry and missile complexes.”

How I Went to War Against Stealth F-22 Raptors and F-35sBy Dave Majumdar, The National Interest: “While the Raptor would be the most formidable fighter in the world due to its raw performance even without stealth, it’s now clear to me that even the F-35 with its mediocre kinematic performance will be an extremely dangerous foe in the air due to its low radar cross-section and sensors. “If the pilots of both could carry a 9mm and open the canopy inflight, they would have 15 more kills per sortie,” the senior Air Force official told me. “It's like fighting Mr. Invisible.”" ​

Why the Navy Needs a New DestroyerBy Rich Smith, Motley Fool: “Out of 275 ships on the Navy's "Battle Forces" list, fully 23% of the Navy's ships are Arleigh Burke-class "destroyers," and 25% are nuclear submarines. Throw in a few Ticonderoga-class cruisers (8% of the fleet) and 10 operational aircraft carriers (4%), and well over half the fleet is made up of just four types of warship. Why doesn't the Navy have a more flexible toolkit, with more types of vessels designed to tackle more specific sorts of missions?” A Tale of Two Navies By Jack Curtis, Strategy Bridge: “As the United States struggles to cultivate new strategic partnerships, the task of carefully tending to existing partnerships remains critical to positively shaping an ever-changing geopolitical landscape. When considering existing partnerships, there is none closer than that between the United States and Great Britain, specifically between the respective navies.” ​