Classified By: Ambassador Robert O. Blake, Jr., for reasons 1.4(b,d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador paid his initial call on new
Foreign Minister Bogollagama on February 8. Ambassador
reviewed U.S. support for Sri Lanka in its fight against LTTE
terrorism. He also underlined serious U.S. concerns about
Sri Lanka's deteriorating human rights and humanitarian
situation and urged the government to take urgent corrective
action. Bogollagama inquired about a letter 38 U.S.
representatives reportedly sent to President Bush requesting
appointment of a U.S. Special Envoy for Sri Lanka. He
mentioned that he planned to travel to the U.S. in the time
frame March 7 ) 19, and would seek an appointment with
Secretary Rice. Septel reports Ambassador's discussion with
SIPDIS
the Minister on Iran and Middle East issues. End summary.
2. (C) Ambassador and Pol Chief met with new Foreign
Minister Rohitha Bogollagama on February 8. Bogollagama
noted that his relationship with the U.S. Embassy, which had
started as a personal, professional one, had grown into a
bilateral one. (Bogollagama was the Embassy's attorney for
negotiations in the 1990s with the Sri Lankan Government,
GSL, over the VOA transmitter).
3. (C) Ambassador congratulated Bogollagama on his new
appointment as Foreign Minister, saying that it was a
confirmation of the trust and confidence that President
Rajapaksa reposed in him. The Ambassador emphasized that the
U.S was a steadfast friend of Sri Lanka and supporter in its
fight against LTTE terrorism.
4. (S) Ambassador reviewed the efforts that the U.S. was
making to help Sri Lanka, including designation of the LTTE
as a terrorist organization, freezing of LTTE accounts,
formation of the Contact Groups on financing and arms
trafficking, and the investigation and arrests of key figures
in the LTTE weapons procurement programs. The U.S. was also
helping with radars for maritime interdiction and in
intelligence-sharing on suspected LTTE vessels.
5. (C) The point to these activities, Ambassador said, was
to show the LTTE that it had nothing to gain by dragging out
the ethnic conflict. "They should not believe that they will
ever get a better deal." The U.S. would continue to tighten
the noose to help persuade the Tigers that the time to
negotiate was now.
6. (C) Referring to his remarks at the Jan 28 Development
Forum in Galle, Ambassador reiterated the U.S. belief that a
purely military solution was neither possible nor desirable.
He underlined the urgency of developing and putting forward a
viable devolution proposal that could form the basis for a
negotiation and eventual settlement of the conflict.
7. (C) Bogollagama noted that the All-Party Representative
Conference under the leadership of MP Tissa Vitharana was
laboring to produce the proposal. However, it was likely
this would take another six weeks. He assured us that the
GSL shared the view that the ultimate way forward was to
convince the LTTE to enter the political mainstream through a
devolution offer that the Tamil community would have to
consider.
8. (C) Ambassador informed Bogollagama that he had had
numerous frank and friendly conversations with previous
Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera on the deteriorating
human rights situation in the country. In our view,
Ambassador said, the climate of fear this engendered was
taking a serious toll on civil society in Sri Lanka. He
reviewed the various fora in which Sri Lanka's human rights
situation would be at issue in the next few weeks, including
UN Security Council working group consideration of the
COLOMBO 00000249 002 OF 002
Secretary General's report on Children and Armed Conflict and
SIPDIS
a likely draft resolution at the March session of the Human
Rights Council in Geneva.
9. (C) Ambassador also made it clear that the U.S. Human
Rights Report due in March would present a clear, unflinching
assessment of the deterioration we witnessed in 2006. He
noted that he had urged Sri Lanka's senior leadership,
including the President, to take urgent action on human
rights in order to pre-empt some of the criticism.
Otherwise, pressure for international monitoring would only
increase. He told Bogollagama one important step for the
government would be setting the country's constitutional
house in order by solving the impasse over the Constitutional
Council under the 17th Amendment. Then, appointments to
other government bodies essential for the system of checks
and balances could move forward.
10. (C) Bogollagama expressed concern about reports that 38
U.S. representatives had sent a letter to President Bush
requesting appointment of a U.S. Special Envoy for Sri Lanka.
Ambassador responded that we had not yet seen the letter and
had no position on it as yet. The Administration would make
a decision in due course on how to respond to it.
11. (C) Ambassador said that while the U.S.-nominated member
of the Independent International Group of Eminent Persons
(IIGEP) was not a special envoy per se, the U.S. was glad to
have the opportunity to help Sri Lanka investigate its most
serious cases of human rights violations. He praised Dewey
as a sensible, pragmatic man who would contribute
significantly to the IIGEP's work of supporting the Sri
Lankan Commission of Inquiry. It was essential that these
bodies make serious progress, the Ambassador added. For that
reason, the U.S. was also providing a technical-level expert
to assist Dewey and the International Panel.
12. (C) Bogollagama concurred that the GSL needed to address
past human rights abuses as a matter of the greatest urgency.
Most important, he said, Sri Lanka needed to do this for
itself ) and not merely as the result of external pressure.
13. (C) Ambassador informed Bogollagama that he was working
along with Minister for Human Rights and Disaster Assistance
Mahinda Samarasinghe and Defense Secretary Gothabaya
Rajapaksa in the Coordinating Committee on Humanitarian
Access. There were still a number of problems to work out on
access to Sri Lanka's more than 200,000 internally displaced
persons. Ambassador added that he greatly appreciated
Samarasinghe's participation in a joint press conference with
several Ambassadors to highlight the excellent work that NGOs
have been performing in this area. This helped to counter
the mistaken impression that the NGOs were in Sri Lanka with
the goal of helping the LTTE.
14. (C) COMMENT: We know Bogollagama well from his previous
position as Minister of Enterprise Development and Investment
Promotion. He was also Minister of Industries in the
previous UNP administration. This initial meeting was useful
to brief an important new Cabinet figure on matters of
concern to us in the bilateral relationship and the political
realm. While he generally responded well to our concerns and
said the right things, we will have to see whether he will be
able to convey tough messages to the President, and whether
he will have real clout within the Cabinet. Bogollagama has
an ambitious program of travel (ref B) and has recently
returned from India (ref A) and Germany. He told us he would
like to travel to the U.S. sometime between March 7 ) 19 and
will request a meeting with Secretary Rice.
15. (C) ACTION REQUEST FOR SCA: Please advise which dates in
this time frame might work and if, in principle, the
Secretary would be prepared to meet with him.
SIPDIS
BLAKE

Raw content

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000249
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2017
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PTER, PHUM, MOPS, CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: NEW FOREIGN MINISTER AFFIRMS COMMITMENT
TO DEVOLUTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS
REF: A) COLOMBO 175 B) COLOMBO 232
Classified By: Ambassador Robert O. Blake, Jr., for reasons 1.4(b,d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador paid his initial call on new
Foreign Minister Bogollagama on February 8. Ambassador
reviewed U.S. support for Sri Lanka in its fight against LTTE
terrorism. He also underlined serious U.S. concerns about
Sri Lanka's deteriorating human rights and humanitarian
situation and urged the government to take urgent corrective
action. Bogollagama inquired about a letter 38 U.S.
representatives reportedly sent to President Bush requesting
appointment of a U.S. Special Envoy for Sri Lanka. He
mentioned that he planned to travel to the U.S. in the time
frame March 7 ) 19, and would seek an appointment with
Secretary Rice. Septel reports Ambassador's discussion with
SIPDIS
the Minister on Iran and Middle East issues. End summary.
2. (C) Ambassador and Pol Chief met with new Foreign
Minister Rohitha Bogollagama on February 8. Bogollagama
noted that his relationship with the U.S. Embassy, which had
started as a personal, professional one, had grown into a
bilateral one. (Bogollagama was the Embassy's attorney for
negotiations in the 1990s with the Sri Lankan Government,
GSL, over the VOA transmitter).
3. (C) Ambassador congratulated Bogollagama on his new
appointment as Foreign Minister, saying that it was a
confirmation of the trust and confidence that President
Rajapaksa reposed in him. The Ambassador emphasized that the
U.S was a steadfast friend of Sri Lanka and supporter in its
fight against LTTE terrorism.
4. (S) Ambassador reviewed the efforts that the U.S. was
making to help Sri Lanka, including designation of the LTTE
as a terrorist organization, freezing of LTTE accounts,
formation of the Contact Groups on financing and arms
trafficking, and the investigation and arrests of key figures
in the LTTE weapons procurement programs. The U.S. was also
helping with radars for maritime interdiction and in
intelligence-sharing on suspected LTTE vessels.
5. (C) The point to these activities, Ambassador said, was
to show the LTTE that it had nothing to gain by dragging out
the ethnic conflict. "They should not believe that they will
ever get a better deal." The U.S. would continue to tighten
the noose to help persuade the Tigers that the time to
negotiate was now.
6. (C) Referring to his remarks at the Jan 28 Development
Forum in Galle, Ambassador reiterated the U.S. belief that a
purely military solution was neither possible nor desirable.
He underlined the urgency of developing and putting forward a
viable devolution proposal that could form the basis for a
negotiation and eventual settlement of the conflict.
7. (C) Bogollagama noted that the All-Party Representative
Conference under the leadership of MP Tissa Vitharana was
laboring to produce the proposal. However, it was likely
this would take another six weeks. He assured us that the
GSL shared the view that the ultimate way forward was to
convince the LTTE to enter the political mainstream through a
devolution offer that the Tamil community would have to
consider.
8. (C) Ambassador informed Bogollagama that he had had
numerous frank and friendly conversations with previous
Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera on the deteriorating
human rights situation in the country. In our view,
Ambassador said, the climate of fear this engendered was
taking a serious toll on civil society in Sri Lanka. He
reviewed the various fora in which Sri Lanka's human rights
situation would be at issue in the next few weeks, including
UN Security Council working group consideration of the
COLOMBO 00000249 002 OF 002
Secretary General's report on Children and Armed Conflict and
SIPDIS
a likely draft resolution at the March session of the Human
Rights Council in Geneva.
9. (C) Ambassador also made it clear that the U.S. Human
Rights Report due in March would present a clear, unflinching
assessment of the deterioration we witnessed in 2006. He
noted that he had urged Sri Lanka's senior leadership,
including the President, to take urgent action on human
rights in order to pre-empt some of the criticism.
Otherwise, pressure for international monitoring would only
increase. He told Bogollagama one important step for the
government would be setting the country's constitutional
house in order by solving the impasse over the Constitutional
Council under the 17th Amendment. Then, appointments to
other government bodies essential for the system of checks
and balances could move forward.
10. (C) Bogollagama expressed concern about reports that 38
U.S. representatives had sent a letter to President Bush
requesting appointment of a U.S. Special Envoy for Sri Lanka.
Ambassador responded that we had not yet seen the letter and
had no position on it as yet. The Administration would make
a decision in due course on how to respond to it.
11. (C) Ambassador said that while the U.S.-nominated member
of the Independent International Group of Eminent Persons
(IIGEP) was not a special envoy per se, the U.S. was glad to
have the opportunity to help Sri Lanka investigate its most
serious cases of human rights violations. He praised Dewey
as a sensible, pragmatic man who would contribute
significantly to the IIGEP's work of supporting the Sri
Lankan Commission of Inquiry. It was essential that these
bodies make serious progress, the Ambassador added. For that
reason, the U.S. was also providing a technical-level expert
to assist Dewey and the International Panel.
12. (C) Bogollagama concurred that the GSL needed to address
past human rights abuses as a matter of the greatest urgency.
Most important, he said, Sri Lanka needed to do this for
itself ) and not merely as the result of external pressure.
13. (C) Ambassador informed Bogollagama that he was working
along with Minister for Human Rights and Disaster Assistance
Mahinda Samarasinghe and Defense Secretary Gothabaya
Rajapaksa in the Coordinating Committee on Humanitarian
Access. There were still a number of problems to work out on
access to Sri Lanka's more than 200,000 internally displaced
persons. Ambassador added that he greatly appreciated
Samarasinghe's participation in a joint press conference with
several Ambassadors to highlight the excellent work that NGOs
have been performing in this area. This helped to counter
the mistaken impression that the NGOs were in Sri Lanka with
the goal of helping the LTTE.
14. (C) COMMENT: We know Bogollagama well from his previous
position as Minister of Enterprise Development and Investment
Promotion. He was also Minister of Industries in the
previous UNP administration. This initial meeting was useful
to brief an important new Cabinet figure on matters of
concern to us in the bilateral relationship and the political
realm. While he generally responded well to our concerns and
said the right things, we will have to see whether he will be
able to convey tough messages to the President, and whether
he will have real clout within the Cabinet. Bogollagama has
an ambitious program of travel (ref B) and has recently
returned from India (ref A) and Germany. He told us he would
like to travel to the U.S. sometime between March 7 ) 19 and
will request a meeting with Secretary Rice.
15. (C) ACTION REQUEST FOR SCA: Please advise which dates in
this time frame might work and if, in principle, the
Secretary would be prepared to meet with him.
SIPDIS
BLAKE