Registration of FIR under 156(3)CrPC for 498A accused

1. The facts leading to the filing of this petition and the issues that
arise for determination are set out in a detailed order passed by this
Court on 24th April 2008 the following order which reads as under:

1. The challenge in the instant case is to an order dated 3rd August
2007 passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate (‘MM’), New Delhi
directing registration of the FIR and investigation into the
allegations made in the complaint filed by the Respondent No.2 wife
complaining of harassment and demand for of dowry by the Petitioner
No.1 husband and his relatives.

2. The marriage of the Respondent No.2 with the Petitioner No.1 took
place on 19th September 2004. She filed a complaint on 24th April
2006 with the police which was taken up by the Crime Against Women
(‘CAW’) Cell on 24th April 2006. The CAW cell examined the matter,
looked into the evidence produced by the parties and on 5th December
2006 a report was prepared by the Sub Inspector (‘SI’) that the case
was not related to dowry harassment. The SI then forwarded the
matter to the Assistant Commissioner of Police (‘ACP’) who concurred
with the findings on 8th January 2008.

3. Conscious of the fact that the CAW cell had decided to close the
matter, the Respondent No.2 filed a complaint on 15th December 2006
in the court of the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate
(‘ACMM’) Delhi. The complaint is captioned as “Complaint under
Section 200 CrPC read with 156 (3) CrPC for summoning the above
named accused person and for registration of FIR against the above
named accused persons.” The prayer in the complaint is for the Court
to “direct the concerned police authorities to register an FIR
against all the aforesaid accused persons and to investigate and to
take legal action against all the accused as per law, in the
interest of justice.”

4. Initially, on 2nd January 2007 the learned MM passed an order
acknowledging the receipt of the complaint and directing it to be
checked and registered. Thereafter, it was assigned to the Mahila
Court. On 4th January 2007 while registering the complaint and
hearing the submissions of learned counsel for the complainant, the
learned MM noted that the “the complaint is pending with the CAW
Cell, Amar Colony for the past about eight months, yet no concrete
step is alleged to have been taken. Notice be issued to the in
charge CAW Cell, Amar Colony to appear and file status report on 5th
February, 2007.”

5. On 4th April 2007 a status report dated 6th March 2007 was filed
where, inter alia, the Enquiry Officer (‘EO’) of the CAW cell stated
that “there are substantial evidence in the file against the
allegations made by the complainant hence it is under
consideration.” On 6th June 2007 another status report was also
filed. On 4th April 2007 the learned MM was informed by the EO that
“there is evidence in support of the allegations made.”

6. On 3rd August, 2007 the learned MM was provided with the status
report which indicated that the complaint of Respondent No.2 had
been closed at the CAW Cell. The learned MM then passed the impugned
order which reads as under:

3.8.2007

Present: Complainant with counsel Sh. Amit Khanna.

SI Kusum Lata, EO, who has filed the status report. As per which the
complaint of the complainant has been closed at the CAW Cell. As per
directions, she has produced the original file. The same be taken on
record.

Heard. Ld. counsel for complainant prays that the directions for
registering the FIR be issued to the SHO, PS, Lajpat Nagar. SHO, PS
Lajpat Nagar is directed to register the FIR and get the same
investigated, in view of the allegations made.

Matter be listed for filing of status report on 18.9.2007.

7. Mr. Tarun Sharma, learned counsel for the Petitioner urges that
the impugned order could not have been passed in the teeth of the
report of the CAW Cell deciding to close the case and that the
learned MM erred in law directing registration of the FIR by
exercising the powers under Section 156 (3) CrPC. He submits that
the judgment in Rajinder Singh Katoch v. Chandigarh Administration
VIII (2007) SLT 584 support his submissions.

8. Ms. Indrani Ghosh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Respondent No.2 seeks to rely upon the judgment of the Supreme Court
in H.S. Bains, Director, Small Savings-cum-Deputy Secretary Finance,
Punjab v. State (Union Territory of Chandigarh)
wherein it has been held that the Magistrate is not bound to accept
the closure report that may be submitted by the police under Section
173 CrPC. He may take cognizance of the offence on the basis of the
original complaint and proceed to examine upon oath the complainant
and the witnesses under Section 200 CrPC. While doing so the learned
MM may hold or direct an inquiry under Section 202 if he thinks fit.

9. Ms. Mukta Gupta, learned Senior standing counsel appearing on
behalf of the State seeks to rely upon the judgment in Suresh Chand
Jain v. State of Madhya Pradsh . She submits that
even before taking cognizance of the offence, the Magistrate can
direct registration of the FIR under Section 156 (3) CrPC and
investigation by the police into the allegations.

10. It is clear that none of the judgments cited by the counsel on
either side deals with the situation faced in the present case where
an exhaustive enquiry has been conducted by the CAW Cell of the
police into the allegations made by the Respondent No.2 and it has
come to the conclusion the complaint must be closed. No additional
facts have come on record and on the same set of allegations a
complaint has been filed in the court under Section 200 CrPC. A
prayer is also made for registration of the FIR under Section 156
(3) CrPC and investigation by the police.

11. The question that arises is as to what is the nature of the
report of the CAW cell in such a case. Can it be treated as a report
of the investigation by the police, and is the learned MM then bound
to deal with the said report before proceeding with the complaint
under Section 200 CrPC and making an order under Section 156(3)
CrPC?

12. Learned counsel for the parties wish to examine this question
further and address arguments.

13. List on 1st May, 2008.

14. Interim order to continue.

15. A copy of order be given dusty to learned counsel for the
parties.”

2. Counsel for the parties addressed arguments today on the question
highlighted in the above order dated 28th April 2008. Mr. Tarun Sharma,
learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner refers to a
judgment of the Division Bench of Punjab & Haryana High Court in Ganesh
Dass v. State of Kerala 1996 Crl LJ 612 to contend that the
investigation by the police after registering an FIR was entirely in
the realm of Section 154 CrPC and that the Magistrate has no power to
direct registering of an FIR. Mr. Sharma further submits that the
report of enquiry by the CAW Cell in the instant case should be
considered to be a report of investigation by the police in terms of
Section 173 CrPC and that the learned Magistrate ought not to have
ignored the said report and proceeded to direct investigation under
Section 156 (3) CrPC. He nevertheless does not contest the proposition
that in terms of the judgment of the Supreme Court in H.S. Bains v.
State (Union Territory of Chandigarh) it was open to
the learned Magistrate to reject the closure report and proceed with
the complaint in terms of Section 200 CrPC i.e. by recording the
statement of complainant and taking further steps thereafter in
accordance with law.

3. Ms. Gupta, learned Senior standing counsel appearing on behalf of
the State submits that the CAW Cell was set up only to provide, at the
pre-litigation stage, a facility for exploring the possibility of
settling their disputes through mediation with the help of the police.
She informs the Court that the CAW cell has now been notified as a
police station. She submits that although there are no specific
provisions in CrPC which contemplate a preliminary enquiry by the
police on a complaint by a person aggrieved by the commission of a
cognizable offence, certain observations of the Supreme Court in State
of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 implicitly recognize
this practice by the police. Ms. Gupta is categorical in her submission
that report of the CAW cell, prepared after the completion of an
enquiry, is not a report of investigation within the meaning of Section
173 CrPC. She nevertheless submits that in a case like the present one
where a detailed report of enquiry by the CAW Cell was available and
taken on record by the learned Magistrate, the latter ought not to
issue a direction to the police to investigate a case under Section 156
(3) CrPC. He should apply his mind to the report of the CAW cell and
set out even briefly the reasons why he still thinks it necessary to
issue a direction for investigation. If after considering he report of
the CAW cell the Magistrate is not inclined to order the investigation
under Section 156 (3) CrPC he may still decide to proceed under Section
200 CrPC by recording the statement of the complainant and thereafter
if necessary direct a limited investigation under Section 202 CrPC.

4. Ms. Indrani Ghosh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Respondent No.2 submits that if this Court were to hold that the
learned Magistrate has to discuss the reasons why he is not accepting
the report of the enquiry by the CAW Cell then the matter should be
remanded back to the learned Magistrate at the stage of considering the
application under Section 156 (3) CrPC and a direction given for a time
bound disposal of the application in accordance with law.

5. The questions that arise for determination, as formulated in the
previous order of this Court are:

(a) What is the nature of the report of enquiry of the CAW cell? Is
it a report of the investigation by the police in terms of Section
173 CrPC?

(b) Is a Magistrate, when approached thereafter by a complainant
with a complaint under Section 190 read with Section 200 CrPC along
with an application under Section 156 (3) CrPC seeking a direction
for investigation by the police, bound to deal with the said report
before disposing of the application under Section 156 (3) CrPC and
proceeding with the complaint under Section 200 CrPC?

6. This Court has to first consider the nature of the proceedings
before the CAW Cell, which has now been notified as a police station.
There is no dispute that the complaint, at the stage at which it is
referred to the CAW Cell by the police, has not been registered as an
FIR in terms of Section 154 (1) CrPC. The CAW cell, manned entirely by
the police, is indeed a kind of pre-litigative alternate dispute
resolution mechanism that might help in resolving a dispute before the
criminal justice process is set in motion by registering an FIR. This
may not be a statutorily recognised device. Nevertheless given the
nature of matrimonial disputes, straightway registering an FIR, which
triggers the criminal justice process, can place the parties in an
inflexible position and thereafter less inclined to reconcile their
differences. The offences under Section 498 A and 406 IPC being
cognizable and non-bailable, the process of anticipatory bail, arrest,
regular bail, filing of charge sheet, if any, have to follow the
registration of an FIR. The reference of the complaint to the CAW cell
has the effect of postponing the activation of the criminal justice
process by facilitating dialogue between the parties with the help of
the police. Of course, while not all attempts at settlement may be
successful, going by the official statistics, there is a reasonable
measure of success at such efforts by the CAW Cell in Delhi. The
enquiry by the CAW Cell is at the pre-FIR stage and is therefore only a
preliminary enquiry. Even if, as in the instant case, it takes eighteen
months to conclude, the report of the CAW Cell would only be that of a
preliminary enquiry and nothing more. The question whether any legal
sanctity is to be attached to such a report of preliminary enquiry
requires to be addressed next.

7. The Supreme Court has in some of its decisions recognised the
practice of the police conducting a preliminary enquiry before
registering an FIR. In P. Sirajudin v. State of Madras (1970) 1 SCC 597
in the context of a criminal complaint against a public servant, it was
observed in the judgment of Mitter, J. (SCC, p.601): “Before a public
servant, whatever his status, is publicly charged with acts of
dishonesty which amount to serious misconduct of the type alleged in
this case and a first information is lodged against him, there must be
some suitable preliminary enquiry into the allegations by a responsible
officer. Earlier in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Bhagwant Kishore Joshi
in the concurring opinion of Mudholkar J., it was
expressly stated: (SCR pp. 86-87)

In the absence of any prohibition in the Code, express or implied, I
am of the opinion that it is open to a police officer to make
preliminary enquiries before registering an offence and making a
full scale investigation into it.

8. In Bhajan Lal, in para 79 of the judgment, the Supreme Court
expressed its agreement with the above “views” in P. Sirajuddin and
Bhagwant Kishore Joshi. Therefore the practice adopted by the police of
conducting a preliminary enquiry by the police even before registering
an FIR has received the judicial imprimatur and therefore its legality
cannot be questioned.

9. This Court would like to observe that since an enquiry by the CAW
Cell might take some time. If at the end of such enquiry, the police
decides not to register an FIR, the complainant cannot be without a
remedy. There would be little purpose for the complainant to approach
the Superintendent of Police (SP) under Section 154 (3) CrPC since the
report of the CAW Cell, at least in Delhi as is evident from the
records of the instant case, is reviewed up to the level of the Deputy
Commissioner of Police (DCP), an officer of an equivalent rank. The
complainant can file a complaint before the learned MM under Section
190 read with Section 200 CrPC along with an application under Section
156 (3) CrPC asking for a direction to the police to investigate the
case. For this limited aspect the observations of the Supreme Court in
para 16 of Minu Kumari v. State of Bihar are
relevant, which reads as under: (SCC page 365)

16.When the information is laid with the police, but no action in
that behalf is taken, the complainant is given power under Section
190 read with Section 200 of the Code to lay the complaint before
the Magistrate having jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence
and the Magistrate is required to enquire into the complaint as
provided in Chapter XV of the Code. In case the Magistrate after
recording evidence finds a prima facie case, instead of issuing
process to the accused, he is empowered to direct the police
concerned to investigate into offence under Chapter XII of the Code
and to submit a report. If he finds that the complaint does not
disclose any offence to take further action, he is empowered to
dismiss the complaint under Section 203 of the Code. In case he
finds that the complaint/evidence recorded prima facie discloses an
offence, he is empowered to take cognizance of the offence and would
issue process to the accused.

Any delay by the learned MM in taking cognizance of the offence in such
event can be condoned by exercising power under Section 473 CrPC.

10. The decision of the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High
Court in Ganesh Dass, which was relied upon by the learned counsel for
the petitioner is no longer good law as is evident from two decisions
of the Supreme Court. The first is Madhu Bala v. Suresh Kumar 1997 JCC
532 (SC) where the Supreme Court held (JCC, p.534):

10. From the foregoing discussion it is evident that whenever a
Magistrate directs an investigation on a `complaint’ the police has
to register a cognizable case on that complaint treating the same as
the FIR and comply with the requirements of the above Rules. It,
therefore, passes our comprehension as to how the direction of a
Magistrate asking, the police to ‘register a case’ makes an order of
investigation under Section 156(3) legally unsustainable. Indeed,
even if a Magistrate does not pass a direction to register a case,
still in view of the provisions of Section 156(1) of the Code which
empowers the Police to investigate into a cognizable ‘case’ and the
Rules framed under the Indian Police Act, 1861 it (the police) is
duty bound to formally register a case and then investigate into the
same. The provisions of the Code, therefore, does not in any way
stand in the way of a Magistrate to direct the police to register a
case at the police station and then investigate into the same. In
our opinion when an order for investigation under Section 156(3) of
the Code is to be made the proper direction to the Police would be
‘to register a case’ at the police station treating the complaint as
the First Information Report and investigate into the same.

11. In Suresh Chand v. State of Madhya Pradesh the
Supreme Court reiterated the above position and observed: “For the
purpose of enabling the police to start investigation it is open to the
Magistrate to direct the police to register an FIR. There is nothing
illegal in doing so.”

12. The procedure that is to adopted by the learned Magistrate is
determined by the collective reading of Section 200 and 190 CrPC.
Before taking cognizance the learned Magistrate wishes to have a
investigation done by the police then he can pass necessary direction
to that effect under Section 156 (3) CrPC. The following passage in
Madhu Bala explains the position (JCC, p.534):

8. From a combined reading of the above provisions it is abundantly
clear that when a written complaint disclosing a cognizable offence
is made before a Magistrate, he may take cognizance upon the same
under Section 190(1)(a) of the Code and proceed with the same in
accordance with the provisions of Chapter XV. The other option
available to the Magistrate in such a case is to send the complaint
to the appropriate Police Station under Section 156(3) for
investigation. Once such a direction is given under Sub-section (3)
of Section 156 the police is required to investigate into that
complaint under Sub-section (1) thereof and on completion of
investigation to submit a ‘police report’ in accordance with Section
173(2) on which a Magistrate may take cognizance under Section
190(1)(b) – but not under 190(1)(a). Since a complaint filed before
a Magistrate cannot be a `police report’ in view of the definition
of `complaint’ referred to earlier and since the investigation of a
‘cognizable case’ by the police under Section 156(1) has to
culminate in a `police report’ the `complaint’ – as soon as an order
under Section 156(3) is passed thereon – transforms itself to a
report given in writing within the meaning of Section 154 of the
Code, which is known as the First Information Report (FIR). As under
Section 156(1), the police can only investigate a cognizable ‘case’,
it has to formally register a case on that report.

13. This Court agrees with the submission of Ms. Gupta, learned Senior
Standing counsel for the State that the report prepared by the police,
in the CAW Cell, partakes the character of a report of preliminary
enquiry and not that of a report of investigation as contemplated under
Section 173 CrPC. It is clear from reading of the various provisions of
Chapter XII CrPC that the report of investigation by the police is
consequent upon the registration of the FIR as contemplated by Section
154 (1) CrPC. The proceedings before the CAW Cell are anterior to the
stage of registration of FIR. If after registration of the FIR the
report of investigation by the police indicates that no cognizable
offence is made out, then such a report is termed a closure/
cancellation report. After a closure report is filed by the police,
there are three courses of action open to the Magistrate as explained
by the Supreme Court in H.S. Bains. Paras 6 and 7 of the said decision
are instructive and read as under:

6. It is seen from the provisions to which we have referred in the
preceding paragraphs that on receipt of a complaint a Magistrate has
several courses open to him. He may take cognizance of the offence
and proceed to record the statements of the complainant and the
witnesses present under Section 200. Thereafter, if in his opinion
there is no sufficient ground for proceeding he may dismiss the
complaint under Section 203. If in his opinion there is sufficient
ground for proceeding he may issue process under Section 204.
However, if he thinks fit, he may postpone the issue of process and
either enquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to
be made by a Police Officer or such other person as he thinks fit
for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient
ground for proceeding. He may then issue process if in his opinion
there is sufficient ground for proceeding or dismiss the complaint
if there is no sufficient ground for proceeding. On the other hand,
in the first instance, on receipt of a complaint, the Magistrate
may, instead of taking cognizance of the offence, order an
investigation under Section 156(3). The police will then investigate
and submit a report under Section 173(1). Oft receiving the police
report the Magistrate may take cognizance of the offence under
Section 190(1)(b) and straightaway issue process. This he may do
irrespective of the view expressed by the police in their report
whether an offence has been made out or not. The Police report under
Section 173 will contain the facts discovered or unearthed by the
police and the conclusion drawn by the police there from. The
Magistrate is not bound by the conclusions drawn by the Police and
he may decide to issue process even if the Police recommend that
there is no sufficient ground for proceeding further. The Magistrate
after receiving the Police report, may, without issuing process or
dropping the proceeding decide to take cognizance of the offence on
the basis of the complaint originally submitted to him and proceed
to record the statements upon oath of the complainant and the
witnesses present under Section 200 Criminal Procedure Code and
thereafter decide whether to dismiss the complaint or issue process.
The mere fact that he had earlier ordered an investigation under
Section 156(3) and received a report under Section 173 will not have
the effect of total effacement of the complaint and therefore the
Magistrate will not be barred from proceeding under Sections 200,
203 and 204. Thus, a Magistrate who on receipt of a complaint,
orders an investigation under Section 156(3) and receives a police
report under Section 173(1), may, thereafter, do one of three things
: (1) he may decide that there is no sufficient ground for
proceeding further and drop action; (2) he may take cognizance of
the offence under Section 190(1)(b) on the basis of the police
report and issue process; this he may do without being bound in any
manner by the conclusion arrived at by the police in their report :
(3) he may take cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(a) on
the basis of the original complaint and proceed to examine upon oath
the complainant and his witnesses under Section 200. If he adopts
the third alternative, he may hold or direct an inquiry under
Section 202 if he thinks fit. Thereafter he may dismiss the
complaint or issue process, as the case may be.

7. In Abhinandan Jha and Ors. v. Dinesh Mishra, (supra) the question
arose whether a Magistrate to whom a report under Section 173(1) had
been submitted to the effect that no case had been made out against
the accused, could direct the police to file a charge-sheet, on his
disagreeing with the report submitted by the Police. this Court held
that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to direct the police to
submit a charge-sheet. It was open to the Magistrate to agree or
disagree with the police report. If he agreed with the report that
there was no case made out for issuing process to the accused, he
might accept the report and close the proceedings. If he came to the
conclusion that further investigation was necessary he might make an
order to that effect under Section 156(3). If ultimately the
Magistrate was of the opinion that the facts set out in the police
report constituted an offence he could take cognizance of the
offence, notwithstanding the contrary opinion of the police
expressed in the report. While expressing the opinion that the
Magistrate could take cognizance of the offence notwithstanding the
contrary opinion of the police the Court observed that the
Magistrate could take cognizance under Section 190(1)(c)’. We do not
have any doubt that the reference to ‘Section 190(1)(c)’ was a
mistake for ‘Section 190(1)(b)’. That appears to be obvious to us.
But Shri Kapil Sibal urged that the reference was indeed to Section
190(1)(c) since at that time Section 190(1)(c) included the words
‘or suspicion’ and the Court had apparently taken the view that the
Magistrate could take cognizance of the offence not under Section
190(1)(b) as if on a police report but under Section 190(1)(c) as if
‘on suspicion’. We do not agree with this submission. Section
190(1)(c) was never intended to apply to cases where there was a
police report under Section 173(1). We find it impossible to say
that a Magistrate who takes cognizance of an offence on the basis of
the facts disclosed in a police report must be said to have taken
cognizance of the offence on suspicion and not upon a police report
merely because the Magistrate and the Police arrived at different
conclusions from the facts. The Magistrate is not bound by the
conclusions arrived at by the police even as he is not bound by the
conclusions arrived at by the complainant in a complaint. If a
complainant states the relevant facts in his complaint and alleges
that the accused is guilty of an offence under Section 307 Indian
Penal Code the Magistrate is not bound by the conclusion of the
complainant. He may think that the facts disclose an offence under
Section 324 Indian Penal Code only and he may take cognizance of an
offence under Section 324 instead of Section 307. Similarly if a
police report mentions that half a dozen persons examined by them
claim to be eye witnesses to a murder but that for various reasons
the witnesses could not be believed, the Magistrate is not bound to
accept the opinion of the police regarding the credibility of the
witnesses. He may prefer to ignore the conclusions of the police
regarding the credibility of the witnesses and take cognizance of
the offence. If he does so, it would be on the basis of the
statements of the witnesses as revealed by the police report. He
would be taking cognizance upon the facts disclosed by the police
report though not on the conclusions arrived at by the police. It
could not be said in such a case that he was taking cognizance on
suspicion.

14. Therefore, there is no manner of doubt that whether a complaint is
referred to the CAW Cell no FIR is registered at that stage. The report
of preliminary enquiry by the police in the CAW Cell is not a report of
investigation under Section 173 CrPC. Question (a) is answered
accordingly.

15.In the instant case the records shows that a detailed report of
preliminary enquiry was prepared by the CAW Cell over a period of
almost 18 months and was reviewed by the officers at various levels up
to the DCP before concluding that no cognizance offence was made out.
When the complaint was filed by the complainant before the learned MM
and was taken up on 4th January 2007 the Court was informed “the
complaint is pending with the CAW Cell, Amar Colony for the past eight
months…”. Later when on 3rd August 2007 the learned MM was shown the
report of the enquiry of the CAW Cell the learned MMM observed “the
same be taken on record.” Thereafter, a direction was issued to the
police “to register an FIR and get the same investigated in view of the
allegations made.”

16. Considering the fact that the learned MM called for the report of
the CAW Cell, which is fairly detailed, the proper course of action
before ordering an investigation under Section 156 (3) would have been
to examine that report before deciding to issue a direction for
investigation. When the police in the CAW Cell has come to conclusion
that no cognizable offence is made out, the Magistrate cannot brush
aside that conclusion lightly. Although that the said conclusion of the
CAW Cell is not binding on the Magistrate at that stage, since his
order is a judicial one he must give reasons, however brief, why he is
inclined to order investigation notwithstanding the said report.
Question (b) is answered accordingly.

17. Therefore, the course of action is available to the Magistrate in a
case like the instant one is to either to accept the conclusion arrived
at by the CAW Cell and decline the prayer for ordering investigation
under Section 156 (3) CrPC or give reasons and order an investigation
under Section 156 (3) CrPC. If after registering the FIR and carrying
out investigations the police again file a cancellation or closure
report, then the Magistrate can adopt one of the three courses as
indicated in H.S.Bains.

18. Even where a Magistrate, on a perusal of the report of the CAW Cell
decides not to order investigation by the police under Section 156 (3)
CrPC he may proceed under Section 200 CrPC by recording the statement
of the complainant and if according to him, the commission of
cognizable offence is made out, he may take cognizance and proceed
further in accordance with law including ordering a limited
investigation under Section 202 CrPC if he thinks it to be necessary
before issuance of process to the accused.

19. The net result of the above discussion is that the learned MM in
the instant case must now be asked to recommence the proceedings from
the stage where the complaint was filed by the complainant with a
prayer for a direction under Section 156 (3) CrPC. Although the
complaint appears to have been filed by the complainant by titling it
as a complaint under Section 200 CrPC read with Section 156 (3) CrPC,
the prayer was confined to seeking a direction for investigation. This,
however, is a technical hitch and need not prejudice the complainant.
The learned MM is directed to proceed in the matter by treating the
complaint as one under Section 200 CrPC with a separate prayer for a
direction under Section 156 (3) CrPC for investigation by the police.
In other words even if the learned MM declines, for any reason, the
prayer under Section 156 (3) he will nevertheless have to deal with the
complaint under Section 200 CrPC in accordance with law, in the manner
explained hereinabove.

20. In that view of the matter, the order dated 3rd August 2007 passed
by the learned MM is hereby set aside. The case is remanded to the
learned MM for recommencing the proceedings from the stage at which
they were as on that date. The learned MM will now consider the report
of the CAW Cell before disposing of the prayer under Section 156 (3)
CrPC within two months from the date of receipt of this order and in
any event not later than 11th July 2008. He will proceed in the matter
in terms of this judgment. It is made clear that at the stage of
deciding the prayer under Section 156 (3) CrPC the Magistrate is not
required to hear the Petitioner here but only the complainant.

21.The petition is disposed of. All the pending applications stand disposed of accordingly.

22. A copy of order be given dusty to learned counsel for the parties.
A certified copy of the order be sent to the learned MM concerned immediately along with the trial court record.

4 thoughts on “Registration of FIR under 156(3)CrPC for 498A accused”

dear sir
i am a senior citizen ledy G B Devi, we have lodge a complaint under sec 156(3)in a murder of the our elder brother,cjm court order the lodge an fir in investigation for this matters on dated 28-05-08, police lodge a omplaint u/s 304 ipc on dated 28-11-08 submitted a final report on 29-11-08 (next day) wrongly and we have file the protest but our protest are lying pending for arguments, we have require the some similar case, for the know of ruling in supreme court/ high court

Dear Sir,
My question is the local police station can refuse the complaint of theft under crpc 154 & 156 without any reason. what is the basic needs of lodging complaint under crpc 154 & 156 pertaining to theft cases.

i am a budding and fresher in the the field of law. can u pls send me the FORMAT OF (GETTING A FIR REGISTERD UNDER SEC 156(3) CRPC.) AND PLEASE PROVIDE ME ATLEADT 2 CASE STUDIES.I shall be extremely thank ful to you.