PYONGYANG AND THE U.S. NUCLEAR GAMBIT

August 11, 1994

On August 12, the US and the DPRK agreed on the outline of a wide-ranging
accord to resolve their differences on the North Korean nuclear program.
The essence of the deal is that the US will provide North Korea with a
light-water reactor, "make arrangements for interim energy alternatives"
for the DPRK and work to "reduce barriers to trade and investment" so as
to generally improve the North Korean economy. In return, "upon receipt
of USA assurances" that the above conditions are being implemented the
DPRK "will freeze construction" of its bigger graphite-cooled reactors,
"seal the Radiochemical Laboratory" (its main reprocessing facilities),
"forego" reprocessing of the 4,000 rods (even though the IAEA still will
not have access to them), and accept a yet to be determined regime of
IAEA inspections.

It therefore appears that the Geneva accords are an effort to induce
North Korea to merely freeze some of its nuclear activities in return for
a huge incentive package. None of the DPRK's nuclear installations will
be dismantled, while the US and its allies will be providing another
reactor as well as resolving many of the DPRK's endemic energy supply and
economic problems. Washington seems to believe that once these measures
are adopted, Pyongyang will no longer desire, nor be able to procure,
nuclear weapons, save for the one or two devices it already has. The
reality is that nothing could be further from the truth.

The fact of the matter is that North Korea already has close to ten
operational nuclear warheads for its ballistic missiles, and two nuclear
devices that can be carried by truck or transport plane. All the warheads
are 50kt nuclear warheads, each weighing around 500 kg (1,100 lb).

To support this, North Korea has an array of ballistic missiles which can
carry nuclear warheads. This arsenal includes over 120 NoDong-1s, and a
few hundreds of NK-SCUD- Bs and NK-SCUD-Cs, all in operational service.
Moreover, the NoDong-2s can be pressed into operational service under
extreme conditions.

Consequently, the notion that closing down the DPRK's 5mw reactor would
end North Korea's nuclear potential would seen to be dubious to say the
least.

(This discrepancy between the administration's assessment and the actual
on the ground situation stems in some measure from two fundamentally
different approaches to intelligence gathering and analysis. The first
relies primarily on gathering and verifying intelligence by technical
means -- from space-based collection systems to a variety of sensors and
measuring systems of such international bodies as the IAEA. The second
relies primarily on human sources -- defectors, spies, and other such "on
the ground" assets.)

In this context, then, analysis has centered on determining just how much
Plutonium North Korea has extracted from its 5mw reactors in Yongbyon.
Washington insists that there is no verifiable evidence that Plutonium
was extracted on any other than one occasion in 1989. Therefore,
according to the United States, the DPRK cannot possibly have the
Plutonium needed for nuclear weapons.

This, however, ignores the fact that, since June 1992, activities have
intensified in the DPRK's primary nuclear weapons site at Yongbyon -- an
elaborate underground complex called Building 500. Pyongyang has argued
that the building is merely a nuclear waste storage site. However, in
early 1993, IAEA inspectors requested access to Building 500 to confirm
that it was being used only for those purposes for which it was claimed.
The DPRK not only refused, but announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty.

Shortly thereafter the North Korean Arm y (KPA) quickly established 40
military encampments, three airbases, a major ammunition depot, and
deployed some 300 heavy anti-aircraft guns around the entire Yongbyon
complex. When the IAEA continued to insist on inspecting Building 500,
the DPRK declared its now infamous Semi-War State, ordering the
mobilization of its armed forces. All this is quite surprising over a
mere "dump site."

Subsequently, in early May 1994, the DPRK flagrantly violated the
remnants of its agreement with the IAEA. Ignoring warnings from the US
and the UN, including explicit threats of sanctions, the DPRK cancelled
all IAEA inspections and began quickly removing 4,000 fuel rods from the
5mw reactor in Yongbyon, making it impossible to ascertain whether or not
any Plutonium had ever been removed. (Measuring the extent of a possible
removal of Plutonium from these fuel rods is the key to verifying through
technical means the size of the north Korean nuclear arsenal.)

By theoretical calculations alone, since 1990 the Yongbyon 5mw reactor
would have produced enough Plutonium for 4 to 6 nuclear weapons. In this
context, various defectors have insisted that Plutonium has been
extracted clandestinely over the years and used for the production of
nuclear warheads. However, only samples and measurements of the fuel rods
undertaken by IAEA inspectors on site in Yongbyon would have been able to
either confirm or deny the defectors' accounts about the North Korean
military nuclear program - a program that Pyongyang denies even exists.

Therefore, it seems to stand to reason that the DPRK's refusal to allow
any inspection and measurement of the rods cannot but indicate that North
Korea has something to hide. That "something" can be found in the
persistent flow of information from North Korean defectors, as well as
sources from Russia, the PRC, and other countries, about all aspects of
the development of nuclear weapons in Yongbyon. These sources claim that
the DPRK has secretly and incrementally removed Plutonium from the
Yongbyon reactor for some time.

For example, Kim Dai-Ho, a former official at a North Korean reprocessing
plant in Yongbyon who defected in May 1994, reported that in 1988 the
DPRK had secretly removed 12 kg [26.4 lb] of Plutonium from the Yongbyon
reactor. This fuel was used to produce two nuclear devices which were
completed in 1990-1. In addition, it was recently learned that the DPRK
has suspended reactor operations annually since 1989. These stoppages
lasted 71 days in 1989, 30-odd days in 1990, and 50-odd days in 1991. In
each of these periods alone it is feasible that the DPRK could have
extracted an additional 22-27 kg (48.4-59.4 lb) of Plutonium, enough for
3-5 weapons.

Comparable quantities of Plutonium have since been removed from the
Yongbyon reactor in incremental quantities and used in the production of
the DPRK's growing arsenal of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the DPRK has
succeeded in acquiring 56 kgs (123.2 lbs.) of Plutonium from the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) since early 1992 -- sufficient
for the production of ten warheads, the first of which was completed in
the Spring of 1993.

This data fits closely with a growing volume of information on the DPRK'
5 nuclear arsenal that has been obtained through various other sources.
In fact, there is close agreement between the reports on the number of
weapons and the reported extraction of Plutonium .

An example of this is a KGB document of 22 February 1990 which stated
that the DPRK already had nuclear weapons for the "development of the
first atomic explosive device had been completed" in Yongbyon. The KGB
added that Kim Jong-Il "personally controls" the DPRK's military nuclear
program which is aimed at "achieving military superiority over South
Korea" as well as realizing "the prestigious aim of becoming one of the
states possessing such weapons."

Similarly, Yi Chung-Kuk, a sergeant in a KPA chemical-warfare unit who
defected in mid March 1994, disclosed that he had "heard on several
occasions beginning in 1991 from high-ranking military cadres and his
senior officers that North Korea has already completed nuclear weapons
development." Also, Ko Yong-Hwan, a high level official who defected in
the Fall of 1991, reported that Pyongyang expected to have a nuclear
arsenal by 1993, at which point the DPRK would be able to produce 3-5
"small nuclear bombs" a year. Subsequent improvements raised the annual
production rates to about five warheads per year from Plutonium extracted
at Yongbyon and another 2-3 warheads from the Plutonium acquired in the
CIS.

On the basis of this and a great volume of data derived from multiple
other sources, it was possible to conclude by mid 1993 that the DPRK had
about six nuclear weapons in operational status. Four of these were 50kt
warheads designed for deployment on North Korea's ballistic missiles. At
the very least, the DPRK has already "virtually completed" these six
nuclear weapons and has classified them as "laboratory nuclear devices."

* * *

In order to confirm the status of the North Korean military's nuclear
capabilities, a high level delegation of West European diplomats and
experts based in Beijing visited the DPRK in the early Winter of 1993.
Returning from Pyongyang in mid December, the delegation reported that
the DPRK had "several atomic bombs and the vehicles to launch them." The
delegation also confirmed much of the data provided by defectors,
including claims that North Korea "has built several kilo-size bombs." On
the basis of the DPRK's verified Plutonium production at Yongbyon alone,
the delegation concluded that the DPRK already had "at least half a dozen
bombs" to be delivered by a growing arsenal of ballistic missiles.

As if to support this, the latest assessment of the magnitude of the
North Korean nuclear arsenal was provided by Kang Myong-To, the
son-in-law of Kang Song-San, the DPRK's prime minister, who defected in
May 1994. He reported that the DPRK "already possess [ed] five nuclear
warheads" in October 1993, and would have about ten warheads by the end
of 1994. The delivery platform in "long-range missiles."

Thus, there is ample evidence to suggest that the DPRK currently has at
least seven or eight nuclear warheads (as well as two devices) and that
by the end of the year it will have over ten warheads. In this
connection, it is noteworthy that the available multiple-source data
about the extraction of Plutonium and weapons' production rates in North
Korea corresponds to that which would be expected if Pyongyang had a
nuclear arsenal of the size that has been reported.

With this in mind, the value of IAEA inspections should be questioned.
Indeed, as early as February 1990, the KGB was stressing that Pyongyang's
interest was in "concealing from world opinion and from the controlling
international organizations the actual fact of the production of nuclear
weapons in the DPRK."

Furthermore, in late January 1994, a highly informed Chinese official
reported that he had "recently heard from a senior North Korean official
that North Korea is hiding nuclear weapons in an underground warehouse in
the mountains near Pyongyang and that any thorough inspection of North
Korean nuclear facilities by the United States will fail to locate them."
Yi Chung-Kuk also learned "from his senior officer that it will be of no
use to inspect Yongbyon because nuclear weapons are being produced at
another place."

Also, it is known from other sources that the work on the warheads made
from the Plutonium acquired in the CIS is conducted away from Pyongyang.
Indeed, in the Fall of 1993, a defector reported the existence of "a
dreadful underground nuclear plant in the Chagang-Do province in the
northern area" where the most sensitive weapons related activities take
place.

Not surprisingly, therefore, high-level North Korean defectors have
always questioned the validity of the negotiations with the US. In fact,
as early as mid-191, Ko Yong-Hwan had warned that as far as Pyongyang was
concerned, "negotiations for nuclear safeguards are only a delaying
tactic." He went on to explain that the highest levels in Pyongyang had
concluded around 1985-986 that they "cannot cope with the situation with
conventional (classic) weapons; therefore nuclear weapons must be
developed ... [as] the last means for preserving their political system."

Kang Myong-To tells a similar story:

"North Korea's nuclear development is not intended as a bargaining chip
as seen by the Western world, but for the maintenance of its system
under the circumstances in which it is faced with economic difficulties
and a situation following the collapse of Eastern Europe....Therefore,
I think that until at least ten nuclear warheads are produced, Kim
Jong-Il will continue to adopt delaying tactics."

Kang Myong-To stressed that the DPRK had acquired its nuclear weapons "to
secure an advantageous position its talks with the United States and
Japan. North Korea believes the United States would not be able to attack
it then because of nuclear [weapons]." Therefore, Kang Myong- To
concluded, in no way would the DPRK give up its military nuclear
capabilities because Pyongyang "sees nuclear development as the only
means to maintain Kim Jong-Il's regime."

As an outgrowth of this, defecting North Korean officers have described a
chilling scenario for the possible use of the DPRK's nuclear warheads in
the event of a major crisis. These officers believe that Pyongyang will
order a preemptive launch of nuclear weapons against a few select
objectives in Japan. "As a preemptive strike, North Korea would attack US
military bases in Japan and then launch air raids on Japan's major
military bases," explained an officer who defected in 1993. According to
another former KPA officer who defected in the Fall of 1992, it is
virtually common knowledge among the elite units of the KPA that their
country has nuclear weapons and that "our missiles could destroy even
Japan, the United States, or South Korea."

More likely and no less complex is the potential introduction of a North
Korean nuclear ultimatum in the context of a surprise non-nuclear
invasion of South Korea. A threat from Pyongyang to hit Japan, including
Tokyo, and perhaps Russia, with nuclear weapons to prevent the United
States from intervening in a war would, in the North's view, be bound to
attract attention in Washington.

At the very least, deliberations in Washington or. the appropriate
reaction to a North Korean invasion and its potential nuclear
implications would take long enough for the KPA, by Pyongyang's own worst
case calculations, to complete the occupation of the Korean Peninsula.
Under such conditions, Pyongyang is convinced, the US would give up on a
war to drive the North back. A senior official of the South Korean
Ministry of Defense concurs that Pyongyang's strategy is "to initiate a
surprise attack on the South and occupy some territory and negotiate for
the termination of war, or to deny US reinforcement by threatening to use
nuclear weapons."

Meanwhile, the US-DPRK negotiations on nuclear issues have resumed in
Geneva. They are still based on the premise that no North Korean
extraction of Plutonium from the Yongbyon 5mw reactor has been confirmed
except for one case in 1989. The negotiations continue even though the
DPRK stresses that it would not permit access to Building 500 or an IAEA
examination of the fuel rods (even though all evidence of extraction had
already been destroyed). Moreover, the DPRK has informed the US that it
will continue to expand its nuclear program and complete a 50mw and a
200mw reactor unless it gets a Russian-made modern light-water reactor
and other economic incentives. The accord reached in Geneva on August 12
changes none of these provisions.

Indeed, the Geneva accords constitute a profound change in US policy
concerning the North Korean nuclear arsenal. Washington gave up on
preventing the DPRK from becoming a nuclear power and no longer even
insists on verifying the extent of the North Korean arsenal through IAEA
inspection. Instead, the US has opted to appease and bribe North Korea
with the hope that Pyongyang will freeze its nuclear build-up.

In short, Washington is buying time while maintaining the charade that
the DPRK does not have nuclear weapons. Consequently, the US and its
allies have settled into the "do-nothing-for-now" mode, merely postponing
the hour of reckoning in the hopes that time will deliver a mutually
acceptable status quo that Washington, Beijing, Tokyo, and even Seoul and
Pyongyang, can learn to live with.

Meanwhile, the economic crisis in North Korea continues to grow and it
would appear that only drastic measures will be able to prevent
Pyongyang's economic collapse. With such being the case, North Korea
would appear to have only two viable options: To attempt a regional
nuclear extortion, demanding that the US, Japan and South Korea rebuild
its economy, or to launch an all out effort at attaining reunification by
force. The Geneva accords, in this connection, would seem to be an
implicit surrender by Washington to Pyongyang's first option.

Thus, ignoring the DPRK's real nuclear arsenal in the Geneva negotiations
is perilous. Pyongyang's position, Kang Myong-To warns, is that "by 1994,
if we are capable of possessing about ten [nuclear weapons], we will be
able to make it known to the international community, and to hold the
North-US talks or South-North summit talks from a position of advantage."
Left unclear is in what form will such an announcement would take place.
Given the overall context of Pyongyang's acquisition of nuclear weapons,
it is quite likely that the announcement will come as a nuclear
ultimatum, perhaps during an invasion.

Moreover, even if the Geneva accords are implemented, and even if there
is no new Korean War in 1994, the North Korean threat to the US will only
continue to rise simply because by the mid to late 1990s the DPRK will be
able to field the nuclear-tipped NoDonq-X ICBM which is capable of
reaching the continental US. This fact alone will introduce a whole new
dimension to the crisis in Korea. Hence, the looming spectre of the new
Korean War, with its nuclear component, will remain with the United
States for as long as Kim Jong-Il and his regime remain in power in
Pyongyang.