An Updated Knightsbridge Working Paper
Copyright 2004 By Roger Thompson
Professor of Military Studies, Knightsbridge University.
The opinions expressed herein are those of the author, and are not to be construed
as the opinions of Knightsbridge University. This is a work in progress and
supercedes all previous versions. It may be revised and updated as required.

Introduction: David versus Goliath at Sea
In 1981, The NATO exercise Ocean Venture ended with much embarrassment for the
U.S. Navy, and more specifically, its enormously expensive aircraft carrier
battle groups. During the exercise, a Canadian submarine slipped quietly through
the aircraft carrier U.S.S. America’s destroyer screen, and conducted
a devastating simulated torpedo attack on the ship. The submarine was never
detected, and the exercise umpire, a U.S. Navy officer, pronounced the carrier
“dead.” One analyst has stated that a second carrier, presumably
the U.S.S. Forrestal, was also reportedly destroyed by another enemy submarine
during this exercise. Later, the U.S.N. umpire tried to use material from his
official report in a magazine article, but when his superiors read it, his work
was promptly stamped “classified” to minimize the potential fallout.
Unfortunately, an anonymous Canadian submariner leaked the story to a local
newspaper, and indicated that this successful Canadian attack on an American
supercarrier was by no means an isolated incident. It was a simple ambush in
the North Atlantic, and it worked perfectly. Indeed, the article concluded that
the Americans never knew what hit them, that they were embarrassed by this failure,
and that they wanted to bury the matter then and there. The Canadian diesel
submarine ambushed a surface ship in the same way that Germany’s U-boats
had done it decades before. This news caused quite a stir in Congress, and the
U.S. Navy had a lot of explaining to do. Why had not one but two U.S.N. carriers
been sunk? Why indeed had a small, 1960s-vintage diesel submarine of the under-funded
Canadian Navy been able to defeat one of America’s most powerful and expensive
warships, and with such apparent ease?

As for the Canadian attack on the U.S.S. America, there are several possible
explanations. Firstly, Canadian submariners are extremely well trained and professional.
Secondly, at that time, the Oberon submarines used by the Canadian Navy were
probably the quietest in the world. A third possible reason, not so commonly
stated, and with all due respect, is that the mighty U.S. Navy is simply overrated.
It is my humble contention that the U.S. Navy is “not all it’s cracked
up to be,” and that is the focus of this paper.
Diesel Subs Feast on U.S. Carriers
“Remember, submarines are best at sinking surface ships; the lesson of
the Thomas Jefferson ought not to be ignored. The Kilo that nailed her did not
stalk the carrier. It was just lying in wait, hardly moving, virtually silent,
an explosive hole in the water.”
– Admiral Sir John Woodward, R.N. (ret.) on the sinking of an American
carrier by a diesel submarine in the novel Nimitz Class.

While Canadian submarines have routinely taken on U.S. Navy carriers, other
small navies have enjoyed similar victories. The Royal Netherlands Navy, with
its small force of extremely quiet diesel submarines, has made the U.S. Navy
eat the proverbial slice of humble pie on more than one occasion. In 1989, naval
analyst Norman Polmar wrote in Naval Forces that during NATO’s exercise
Northern Star, “…the Dutch submarine “Zwaardvis” was
the only orange (enemy) submarine to successfully stalk and sink a blue (allied)
aircraft carrier…” The carrier in question might have been the U.S.S.
America, as it was a participant in this exercise. Ten years later there were
reports that the Dutch submarine Walrus had been even more successful in the
exercise JTFEX/TMDI99. “During this exercise the Walrus penetrates the
U.S. screen and ‘sinks’ many ships, including the U.S. aircraft
carrier Theodore Roosevelt CVN-71. The submarine launches two attacks and manages
to sneak away. To celebrate the sinking the crew designed a special T-shirt.”
Fittingly, the T-shirt depicted the U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt impaled on the
tusks of a walrus. It was also reported that the Walrus sank many of the Roosevelt’s
escorts, including the nuclear submarine U.S.S. Boise, a cruiser, several destroyers
and frigates, plus the command ship U.S.S. Mount Whitney. The Walrus herself
survived the exercise with no damage. Some U.S.N. apologists might counter by
saying that the exercise was probably scripted, and the Dutch submarine probably
knew exactly where the carrier was, had an unfair advantage, and that in a real
war, the submarine would have been easily detected and destroyed. If so, then
why would the Dutch submariners, a very professional and well-trained group,
take such delight in simply completing a scripted “shoot the fish in a
barrel” scenario? Talented and wily enemies, of course, usually don’t
play by the rules.

Not to be outdone by the Canadians and Dutch, the Australian submarine force
has also scored many goals against U.S. Navy carriers and nuclear submarines.
On September 24 2003, the Australian newspaper The Age disclosed that Australia’s
Collins class diesel submarines had taught the U.S. Navy a few lessons during
multinational exercises. By the end of the exercises, Australian submarines
had destroyed two U.S. Navy nuclear attack submarines and an aircraft carrier.
According to the article: “‘The Americans were wide-eyed,’
Commodore Deeks (Commander of the R.A.N. Submarine Group) said. ‘They
realized that another navy knows how to operate submarines… They went
away very impressed.’”
However, officially, the U.S. Navy soon went into damage control mode and denied
that the Australians could beat a U.S. nuclear boat in a fair fight. Said The
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists: “The United States is justly proud
of its military prowess, but apparently a little defensive when anyone else
shows a bit of talent. Defense Week's ‘Daily Update’ on October
1, 2003, reported that the commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet was trying to
downplay the fact that an Australian diesel-electric submarine had ‘sunk’
an American submarine during recent training exercises, and said the Australians
were making too much of the simulated hit. Adm. Walter Doran said that the outcome
‘certainly does not mean that the Collins-class submarine in a one-on-one
situation is going to defeat our Los Angeles-class or our nuclear submarines.’"
But even if the entire exercise had been completely scripted and the American
submarine was “supposed” to be sunk, for training purposes (like
damage control), then why did an experienced Australian submariner like Commodore
Deeks, an officer in one of the finest, best trained, and most professional
navies in the world, make such unsubstantiated statements to the media? Because,
like the Japanese at Pearl Harbor, the Australians had actually caught the Americans
off guard and unawares. As we will see later, Captain Richard Marcinko, U.S.N.,
strayed from the rules during exercises in the 1980s, and he achieved incredible
results. War, as they say, is not fair, and pre-emptive or surprise attacks
have often proven devastatingly effective, as the Israelis demonstrated in 1967.
In October 2002, the Australians also reported that their diesel submarine H.M.A.S.
Sheehan had successfully “hunted down and killed” the nuclear submarine
U.S.S. Olympia during exercises near Hawaii. The C.O. of the Sheehan observed
that the larger U.S.N. nuclear boat’s greater speed was no advantage because
“It just means you make more noise when you go faster.” In the previous
year, during Operation Tandem Thrust, analyst Derek Woolner set forth that H.M.A.S.
Waller sank “two American amphibious assault ships in waters of between
70-80 metres depth, barely more than the length of the submarine itself. The
Collins class was described by Vice-Admiral James Metzger, Commander, U.S. Seventh
Fleet as 'a very capable and quiet submarine…” Although the Waller
was herself sunk during the exercise, the loss of a single diesel submarine,
in exchange for two massive amphibious assault ships, is quite a good bargain,
and very cost effective.
Finally, during RIMPAC 2000 it was reported that H.M.A.S. Waller had sunk two
American nuclear submarines and gotten dangerously close to the carrier U.S.S.
Abraham Lincoln. Even more ominous, asserted researcher Maryanne Kelton, is
that: “Even though the exercises were planned and the US group knew that
Waller was in the designated target area, they were still unable to locate it.
New Minister for Defence, Robert Hill, recorded later that the ‘Americans
are finding them exceptional boats…in exercises with the Americans they
astound the Americans in terms of their capability, their speed, their agility,
their loitering capacity, they can do all sorts of things that the American
submarines can’t do as well.’”

The Chileans too, have used their diesel submarines to successfully attack
U.S. Navy ships during exercises. In 2001, the unusually candid skipper of the
nuclear submarine U.S.S. Montpelier (Commander Ron LaSilva, U.S.N.) recounted
that a Chilean diesel submarine "Shot him twice during successive exercise
runs.” As a result, LaSilva learned that “bigger and nuclear is
not always better.” Commander LaSilva should be commended for his courage,
for as we shall later in this paper, this kind of honesty is usually not the
best policy for U.S.N. officers.

And lastly, in 1998, U.S. News and World Report noted “In two recent
exercises with Latin American navies, a Chilean sub managed to evade its U.S.
counterparts and ‘sink’ a U.S. ship.” To be more specific,
during RIMPAC 1996, the Chilean submarine Simpson was responsible for sinking
the carrier U.S.S. Independence (this event was mentioned in the 1997 Discovery
Channel TV documentary “Fleet Command.”) U.S. News and World Report
also quoted retired U.S. Navy Rear Admiral W. J. Holland, who maintained if
the U.S. Navy had to deal with a hostile diesel submarine today, “It would
take a month to handle that problem, including two weeks of learning.”
In any event, the moral of this naval story is that the U.S. Navy really needs
“a healthy dose of humility and caution in future operations.”

Today, the U.S. Navy has no diesel submarine combatants, and this means that
although the diesel submarine is a very dangerous threat, the Americans must
rely on smaller allies like Canada, Chile, Peru, Columbia, Australia, and others
to provide this vital training. This, it can be argued, is a very serious handicap
for any blue water navy, much less the world’s largest. Likewise, the
U.S. Navy is also very weak in mine countermeasures, and must rely on allies
for those capabilities as well.

Not surprisingly, NATO and allied diesel submariners are extremely confident
in their ability to sink American carriers. In his 1984 book The Threat: Inside
the Soviet Military Machine, Andrew Cockburn wryly noted that European submariners
on NATO exercises were far more concerned about colliding with noisy American
nuclear submarines (running fast and therefore, blind) than about being attacked
by American ships. Despite the vast amount of propaganda put out by the U.S.
Navy, well-run diesel submarines are still intrinsically quieter than any nuclear
submarine because they have fewer moving parts. As former Royal Navy submarine
officer Ashley Bennington said in his 1999 response to an article on the Virginia
class submarines: “…You mention that the new Virginia class of nuclear
submarines will easily detect diesel submarines, implying that diesels are noisy.
As a general rule, however, diesel submarines, which use an electric motor that
runs on batteries, are quieter than nuclear-powered subs, which constantly run
coolant pumps.”
Bennington’s sentiments were echoed in late 2004 by Captain Viktor Tokya
of the German Navy. Toyka said that conventional submarines, especially those
with Air Independent Propulsion, are more difficult to detect than nuclear boats.
It seems that Bennington and Tokya rather doubt the farfetched claim from the
Office of Naval Intelligence (O.N.I.) that modern U.S.N. nuclear boats have
become “just as quiet” as conventional boats in the past ten years.
Any startling revelations coming from O.N.I. should be treated with the greatest
skepticism because, after all, one of their main jobs during World War II was
to broadcast disinformation and propaganda to frighten and demoralize the enemy.
In doing so, they greatly exaggerated U.S.N. capabilities, and they do the same
today. Former Navy Secretary John Lehman also mentioned that senior U.S. Navy
admirals have a tradition of omitting information about the U.S. Navy’s
weaknesses and deficiencies during public testimony and, during the 1970s at
least, of promoting an “illusion of overall superiority” to Congress.
“Admiral Elmo Zumwalt was the first naval leader to break ranks after
he left office, and he wrote in his memoirs that ‘none of us thought we
had such a capability and all of us were under heavy pressure not to let on’;
his public testimony was purged by the Pentagon of references to ‘adequate,
marginal or inadequate capability…”
Captain Li Chao-peng of the Taiwanese Navy also concurred that diesel submarines
are more cost-effective and are still quieter than any nuclear submarines. His
navy has Dutch Zwaardvis diesel submarines and in 2002 he told the Taipei Times:
“The only advantage that a nuclear submarine has over a conventionally-powered
one is its endurance under the sea…But a diesel-powered sub like ours
is much quieter than a nuclear one." He added that the Taiwanese diesel
subs can definitely “compete” with nuclear boats. New advances in
Air Independent Propulsion, such as fuel cells, will give conventional submarines
more endurance, and even greater stealth. The future for nuclear submarines
does not look promising.

Since the end of the Cold War, and the demise of the Soviet submarine fleet,
the U.S. Navy has admitted that it has not made Anti-Submarine Warfare (A.S.W.)
a high priority, especially in shallow water, and it shows. The U.S.N. has announced
a new initiative to improve and coordinate A.S.W. tactics, units, training,
and equipment, but one should take note that even during the Cold War, the U.S.N.
was not the most proficient navy in this specialty, even in deep water. Other
forces, such as the Canadian Navy and Air Force, were and are more skilled in
most aspects of A.S.W. (in deep or shallow water), despite having old equipment
like the Sea King helicopter. In the early 1980s, Canada’s Navy was on
the verge of rusting out, yet due to its intensive training and emphasis on
A.S.W. excellence, it was still better at hunting submarines than the U.S.N.
At the time, a retired British naval officer and Dalhousie University defense
analyst told a Halifax newspaper that, “ship-for-ship,” the Canadian
Navy’s elderly frigates and destroyers were still “better equipped,
better maintained, and better trained” for A.S.W. than U.S.N. surface
ships. Today, Canada’s incoming Victoria class diesel submarines, Halifax
class frigates (equipped with the Canadian-designed AN/SQR-501 CANTASS towed
sonar array system, which is said to be “superior to other similar systems
in western navies,” ) the Iroquois class destroyers, and updated CP-140
Aurora patrol aircraft are in many ways better equipped, better designed, more
suitable, and better trained for A.S.W. than their American equivalents.

Fortunately, these failures and shortcomings are finally and slowly becoming
public knowledge in the United States, for as the Congressional Budget Office
revealed in 2001: “Some analysts argue that the Navy is not very good
at locating diesel-electric submarines, especially in noisy, shallower waters
near coastal areas. Exercises with allied navies that use diesel-electric submarines
confirm that problem. U.S. antisubmarine units reportedly have had trouble detecting
and countering diesel-electric submarines of South American countries. Israeli
diesel-electric submarines, which until recently were relatively old, are said
to always ‘sink’ some of the large and powerful warships of the
U.S. Sixth Fleet in exercises. And most recently, an Australian Collins class
submarine penetrated a U.S. carrier battle group and was in a position to sink
an aircraft carrier during exercises off Hawaii in May 2000. Thus, if a real
opponent had even one such submarine with a competent commanding officer and
crew, it could dramatically limit the freedom of action of U.S. naval forces
in future conflicts.”
The U.S. Navy’s aircraft carriers have plenty of supporters as well as
detractors, and one of their most common defenses is to argue, as former Navy
Secretary John Lehman did, “We never lost an aircraft carrier of over
thirty thousand tons in World War II.” Quite right, but this argument
loses considerable strength when we consider how easily the U.S. Navy might
have lost the Battle of Midway in 1942. In his brilliant work “Our Midway
Disaster: Japan Springs a Trap, June 4, 1942 ” Professor Theodore F. Cook
postulated that had the Japanese been just a little bit more diligent and skeptical
about the phony radio reports about Midway’s water problems, there would
have been a very high probability that they would have won the ensuing battle.
“Given the deadly suddenness of carrier warfare,” he noted, “How
easily might it have been the U.S. Navy mourning the loss of three carriers…
in exchange for, perhaps, one or two Japanese flattops on June 4, 1942?”
Furthermore, he recommended that his readers ponder a rather unpleasant theoretical
possibility: “What would have happened if the Japanese had won at Midway?
With only one carrier left in the Pacific, how could we have resisted their
advance?” One should never forget that the American victory at Midway
was far from certain, and has been often been called a “miracle.”
Heavily outnumbered, the Americans prevailed, but this was largely due to the
gullibility of a few Japanese naval personnel. Had the Americans lost at Midway,
the modern day “big carrier” U.S. Navy might have evolved quite
differently, to say the least.
One final comment on the diesel submarine versus carrier scenario. In the preceding
paragraphs, it was apparent that foreign navies openly and unashamedly boast
when one of their submarines “sinks” an American carrier on exercises.
They have no problem letting the news media know about their triumphs. With
a few courageous and candid exceptions, such as the people quoted in this paper,
American nuclear submariners generally do not publicly reveal their own accomplishments
against U.S.N. aircraft carriers. If they do, they do it anonymously, usually
after they leave the service, or they provide only the sketchiest of details.
Why is this so? Former U.S.N. F-14 Radar Intercept Officer Jerry Burns gave
a pretty straightforward answer in 2000: because “Anyone who says something
is wrong gets thrown out of the Navy.” Also, as Professor Thomas Etzhold
pointed out, there is an “unwritten rule” in U.S. Navy exercises:
No carrier is ever to be sunk (or even seriously damaged). Obviously, these
gag orders only apply to U.S.N. personnel, not to foreign crews. The author
of the 1987 book War Games, Thomas B. Allen, described this naval censorship
during an interview with the American NPR network in 2003. “The Navy had
a kind of unwritten rule: You can't sink an aircraft carrier in a war game.
And if you talked to any submariner who had been in either an exercise or a
war game, you get a whole story about how many times they really sank aircraft
carriers.” In other words, the truth is suppressed for “the good
of the service.” We can therefore deduce that the good of the service
is the paramount concern in the U.S.N; not the good of the country, and not
the good of the taxpayers who bankroll these extravagant, anachronistic leviathans
of the sea.

The Russians Mug the Kitty Hawk and the Constellation
These examples provide ample evidence of the vulnerability of U.S. Navy carrier
battle groups to attacks from diesel submarines, but of course there are other
ways to sink a carrier, as the Russian Air Force knows well. In October 2000,
the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Kitty Hawk was “mugged” by Russian SU-24
and Su-27 aircraft, which were not detected until they were virtually on top
of the carrier. The Russian aircraft buzzed the carrier’s flight deck
and caught the ship completely unprepared. To add insult to injury, the Russians
took very detailed photos of the Kitty Hawk’s flight deck, and very courteously,
provided the pictures to the American C.O. via e-mail. In a story in the December
7, 2000 edition of WorldNetDaily, one U.S. sailor exclaimed, “The entire
crew watched overhead as the Russians made a mockery of our feeble attempt of
intercepting them.” Russia’s air force is now only a faint shadow
of what it once was, but even now, they can demonstrate that they can, if necessary,
do significant damage to the U.S. Navy. It’s little wonder then that a
Russian newspaper gloated that “If these had been planes on a war mission,
the aircraft carrier would definitely have been sunk.”

Perhaps they are right. As Howard Bloom and Dianne Star Petryk-Bloom advised
in 2003, both the Russians and Chinese now have the deadly SS-N-22 Sunburn missile
at their disposal. This massive long-range missile, equipped with nuclear or
conventional warheads, is extremely difficult to detect or destroy. According
to Jane’s Information Group, it is more than capable of destroying any
U.S. Navy aircraft carrier. Some would say that this example is not valid because
in a real war, the carrier and her escorts would have been more careful, and
at a higher level of readiness. Indeed yes, but what if this mock attack had
been the opening shot in an unexpected war? In that case, the U.S. Navy probably
would have lost one multi-billion dollar carrier and probably some of its escorts
on the very first day. Multiple coordinated surprise attacks by aircraft, cruise
missiles and diesel submarines could quickly emasculate many of the U.S. Navy’s
carrier battle groups.

A Navy spokesman said that the Kitty Hawk had not been surprised, that they
knew the Russian planes were not going to attack, and that the Russian aircraft
were tracked almost from the moment they took off. In other words, “We
were on top of things, no need to intercept, and certainly no reason for alarm.”
When the Russians over flew the Kitty Hawk, the carrier was “in the process
of refueling and therefore was not going fast enough at the moment of the refueling
to launch planes.” It took 40 minutes for the first American aircraft
to be launched, and the Russian Air Force was delighted with the results: “’For
the Americans, our planes were a complete surprise,' said Gen. Anatoly M. Kornukov,
the Russian air force's commander in chief. ‘In the pictures, you can
clearly see the panic on deck.’'' This episode sounds somewhat like what
happened to the Japanese Navy at the Battle of Midway, where its aircraft carriers
were caught off guard and attacked while their planes were being rearmed.
Those who say this happened only because the carrier was not in a high state
of readiness at the time, and because the Russians were expected and tracked
anyway, are clearly missing the entire point. Firstly, enemies often attack
during periods of low readiness. Secondly, if the crew of the Kitty Hawk really
knew of the impending Russian visit, why did the Russian photos apparently depict
a mass panic on the flight deck, and why did the U.S. Navy decline to release
the photos? If the crew had truly not been surprised, the photos of the flight
deck should surely reveal this, and clear the U.S. Navy. If there had been some
classified equipment or activity depicted in the Russian photos, surely the
Pentagon could have censored the photos as required, then released them to show
the world a crew at sea going about routine business.

Why also did the Kitty Hawk, 40 minutes later, finally launch aircraft to intercept
the Russian planes that had already flown over, but did no physical harm to
the ship? Why was it necessary to belatedly intercept the Russians if the U.S.
Navy was so confident that the Russians were no threat? And why did the Washington
Times impart that the “Kitty Hawk commanders were so unnerved by the aerial
penetration they rotated squadrons on 24-hour alert and had planes routinely
meet or intercept various aircraft?” Because in asymmetrical warfare,
the very concept is to strike when the larger, more powerful enemy is least
prepared. This is what the Japanese did when they attacked Pearl Harbor in the
early morning hours on a Sunday. This is why the 1968 Tet holiday offensive
was launched when the Army of the Republic of Vietnam was in a low state of
readiness. But then, perhaps it would have been more sporting of the Russians
to have called in first before launching their mock attack.

It goes without saying that Soviet/Russian submarines have a long tradition
of tracking and stalking U.S. Navy carriers, especially during the Cold War.
The Soviets maintained a huge force of both nuclear and diesel submarines, and
it seems that both types were able to close with U.S. Navy carrier battle groups.
In 1997, to name just one example, a Russian nuclear submarine got uncomfortably
close to the carrier U.S.S. Constellation during a Pacific cruise. So close,
in fact, that an anonymous U.S. Navy source “concluded later than the
submarine would have sunk the Constellation near Seattle if there had been a
conflict.” No doubt the official wanted to remain anonymous to protect
his career, as it is well known that the U.S. Navy goes to great lengths to
officially deny that anyone or anything can even damage one of their aircraft
carriers (as mentioned earlier). Nonetheless, one might expect that the Russians
too have many high quality periscope photos of American ships taken by surprise
from very close range.

The Chinese Know Thy Potential Enemy
The Chinese too have a strong interest in neutralizing American aircraft carriers,
and in his 2000 book China Debates the Future Security Environment, Michael
Pillsbury demonstrated that the Chinese have completed detailed studies of the
vulnerabilities of U.S. Navy carriers. He documented that the Chinese have noted
the following possible weaknesses: lack of stealth due to the large number of
radar reflections plus infrared and electromagnetic signatures, all of which
make the carrier “very difficult to effectively conceal,” flight
restrictions during bad weather, the inability to safely operate in shallow
waters, decreased readiness during regular at-sea replenishments, poor A.S.W.
and mine countermeasures capabilities, and the structural vulnerabilities of
catapults, elevators, and arresting gear. Sun Tzu put it best when he said “Know
thy enemy and know thy self and you will win a hundred battles.” It seems
the Chinese have taken Sun Tzu’s advice to heart when it comes to their
potential rivals.

Lax Security
One would think that the U.S. Navy would spare no expense to protect its bases,
especially those in which their nuclear submarines, both attack and missile
boats, are stationed. One would think that effective, vigilant, round-the-clock,
air-tight, multi-tiered security would shroud an installation in which Trident
missile submarines are based. One would think that the security around these
nuclear missile-launching platforms would be almost impregnable. But if one
also thinks that strong security measures were the norm in the U.S. Navy during
(and after) the Cold War, one should think again.

In June, 2001, Lieutenant Commander Jack Daly, U.S.N., told the audience of
a radio broadcast called Judicial Watch that U.S.N. nuclear submarine and aircraft
carrier bases were becoming increasingly vulnerable to attack due to lax security
measures. He cited an incident in April, 1997, in which a Russian spy ship reportedly
used a laser to attack a helicopter in the Strait of Juan de Fuca, near two
U.S.N. bases. Daly and his Canadian Air Force pilot suffered permanent eye damage
because of the attack, and Daly said it was now routine for Russian spy ships
to go snooping around the U.S.N. bases at Bremerton and Everett, Washington.
He also propounded that the spy ship that attacked his helicopter had “come
to within 1,000 yards of the nuclear-missile-armed U.S.S. Ohio.” The reason
why the Russians had gotten so bold, he argued, was that the U.S. Navy had grown
complacent and unconcerned about espionage and security. With the end of the
Cold War, he said, the U.S.N. had basically let its guard down.

However, it must be pointed out that even during the Cold War, security at
U.S.N. bases was often very poor. Probably the most qualified man to speak on
this issue is a former U.S.N. senior officer, Captain Richard Marcinko. In the
1980s, during the watch of C.N.O. Admiral James Watkins, U.S.N., Marcinko and
his SEAL Team Six were assigned to test security at major U.S.N. bases, and
the results of his simulated terrorist raids were very disturbing. His team
infiltrated the New London Naval Base, where nuclear submarines, including missile
boats, are based. Marcinko’s team had little difficulty infiltrating the
base, and it made a mockery of the base security forces. In his own words: “I
rented a small plane, and Horseface flew us under the I-95 bridge, wetting our
wheels in the Thames as we swooped low. We buzzed the sub pens. No one waved
us off. We rented a boat and flew the Soviet flag on its stern, then chugged
past the base while we openly taped video of the subs in their dry docks, capturing
classified details of their construction elements. The dry docks were exposed
and unprotected – if we’d decided to ram one of the subs, nothing
stood in our way.”

Marcinko’s team did far worse during his visit to New London. His men
infiltrated the sub pens, and thereby proceeded to wreak havoc on the submarines
therein. “First, they found the sentries – who were secure in their
shacks drinking coffee – and silenced them. Then, they concealed explosives
behind the diving planes of one nuclear sub. They boarded another Boomer sub
and placed demolition charges in the control room, in the nuclear-reactor compartment,
and in the torpedo room.” They were challenged by base personnel, but
explained that they were just doing maintenance, and amazingly, they were never
asked to identify themselves. Marcinko later briefed a very unhappy admiral
and boasted “I blew up two of your nuclear subs, and if I’d wanted
to, I could have blown ‘em all up.” To be fair, the U.S. Navy is
now taking security much more seriously, but only as a result of the attack
on the U.S.S. Cole and the September 11th attacks. Despite the lessons taught
by Captain Marcinko and his SEALS in the 1980s, little was done to improve security
in the interim. Apparently the U.S. Navy prefers to learn its lessons, when
it does actually learn, the hard way.

A Few Realistic Men
“My own experience (in war games) is that I never have any problem getting
a carrier…those fleets are going to get ground into peanut butter in a
war.”
– Anonymous U.S.N submarine commander on how easy it is to find and sink
a U.S.N. aircraft carrier.

“One enemy diesel submarine lucky enough to get one torpedo hit on a
CVN (nuclear powered aircraft carrier) or an AEGIS cruiser could easily turn
US resolve and have a huge impact on a conflict… the challenge of finding
and destroying a diesel submarine in littoral waters can be nearly impossible…
In general…a diesel submarine operating on battery power is quieter, slower,
and operating more shallow than a nuclear submarine.”
- Lieutenant Commander Christopher J. Kelly, U.S.N.

Earlier, I discussed how easy it is for foreign diesel submarines and air forces
to attack U.S.N. carriers. But it’s not just the Russians, Chinese, Canadians,
Chileans, Dutch and Australians who think the U.S. Navy’s carrier battle
groups are overrated, expensive and extremely vulnerable. Admiral Hyman Rickover
himself didn’t think much of his own carrier-centered Navy, either. When
asked in 1982 about how long the American carriers would survive in an actual
war, he curtly replied that they would be finished in approximately 48 hours.
The well-known and atypically out-spoken American retired submarine commander,
Captain John L. Byron, also intimated in the early 1980s that even noisy American
nuclear submarines had little difficulty operating against U.S. Navy carriers.
“Operating against a carrier is too easy,” he quipped. “The
carrier’s ASW protection often resembles Swiss cheese.” Another
former U.S. Navy officer and columnist, the late Scott Shuger, said pretty much
the same thing in 1989: “I’ve seen enough photos of American carriers
through periscope crosshairs – most sub crew offices feature one –
to become a believer. Despite all the antisubmarine warfare (A.S.W.) equipment
that carrier groups take with them to sea, in my own experience most exercises
against subs ended up with my carrier getting a green flare at close quarters,
the standard simulation for a successful torpedo or cruise missile attack.”
Former C.I.A. director Admiral Stansfield Turner, U.S.N. (ret.) has also complained
that the U.S. Navy’s continuing policy of building and deploying “big,
over-powered aircraft carriers” is “ill-advised.”

Another senior American officer who might agree with Rickover, Turner, Byron
and Shuger is retired U.S. Marine Corps Lieutenant General Paul Van Riper. In
Exercise Millennium Challenge (2002), Van Riper, playing the role of Saddam
Hussein, used small boats to destroy 16 U.S. Navy ships, including an aircraft
carrier and two helicopter carriers, in the Persian Gulf. As usual, the U.S.
Navy was not pleased with this successful attack against its most powerful ships,
and so it stopped the exercise, “reactivated” the dead ships and
continued as though nothing had happened. “‘A phrase I heard over
and over was, ‘That would never have happened,’ Van Riper recalls.
And I said ‘Nobody would have thought that anyone would fly an airliner
into the World Trade Centre’… but nobody seemed interested.’”
Sadly, this kind of official denial is standard operating procedure in the U.S.
Navy. Consider also the American submarine commander who once said that, during
war games, he “put six torpedoes into a carrier, and I was commended –
for reducing the carrier’s efficiency by 2 percent.” The battleship
admirals did the same thing when they ran the U.S.N., and we all know what happened
to the battleship.

Many of the criticisms of the carrier-centered navy come from U.S. Army officers
who see the U.S.N. as a rival more than as a partner in national defense. One
might dismiss army criticisms of the U.S.N. as merely parochial slander, but
some army critics make good sense. Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Macgregor, U.S.
Army, made a number of convincing arguments in his ground-breaking book, Breaking
the Phalanx. Macgregor is a vocal critic of U.S. military strategy, and his
criticisms are not restricted to the U.S. Army. He argued that with the U.S.
Navy’s new focus on littoral warfare, the big carrier navy is in even
more danger now than during its days as a high seas fleet designed to face the
Soviet Union. The fact that U.S.N. aircraft carriers are so big, and so much
firepower is concentrated on them, makes them attractive and worthy targets
for weapons of mass destruction in littoral waters: “The concentration
of several thousand sailors, airmen, and Marines in an amphibious or Nimitz-class
aircraft carrier risks single point failure in future warfighting.” Also,
as the quality and availability of cruise missiles increase, so do the chances
of a successful attack on carrier battle groups: “The survivability of
large carriers and amphibious ships depends on antiship missile defenses, which
must perform perfectly within a few seconds of a missile alert. In both cases,
very expensive platforms can be destroyed by relatively inexpensive weapons…”
(emphasis added).

Former U.S.N. officer (and submariner) Dr. Robert Williscroft said in September
2004 that there are several possible nightmare scenarios that face the modern
U.S. Navy, and they most certainly will involve quiet diesel submarines: “The
bad guys can station one of the new ultra-quiet AIP subs at a choke point, and
seriously damage or even sink a carrier. An AIP sub can sneak up on a Virginia
class (nuclear submarine) deploying a Seal team with devastating results. A
hunter-killer pack of several AIP subs can take out any nuke we have, once they
find it.” Macgregor also noted that at a cost of approximately $4 billion
for construction alone, the loss of even one Nimitz-class carrier would be morally
and financially devastating. The loss of one or more of the $2 billion Virginia-class
nuclear submarines would also be a tremendous burden on the United States Treasury.

This isn’t “Top Gun”
As we’ve seen, U.S. carriers are remarkably vulnerable to attacks by submarines
and aircraft, but what about the much-vaunted American naval aviators? How would
the U.S.N. pilots fare in a dogfight with a well-trained enemy? The evidence
is not encouraging. Canadian pilots routinely outperform U.S.N. aircrews in
exercises, and have done so for many years. During the days of Royal Canadian
Navy carrier aviation it was well known that the pocket carrier H.M.C.S. Bonaventure,
which had just one catapult, could put more planes in the air than much larger
U.S.N. A.S.W. carriers of the Essex class. Furthermore, although the little
Bonaventure (which displaced only about 16,000 tons) operated R.C.N. Banshee
jet fighters for years, U.S.N. Banshee pilots did not wish to risk a landing
on a smaller carrier. One author put it this way: “In joint RCN-USN exercises,
aircraft from both fleets regularly landed on the other's carriers. However,
the American Banshee pilots straight-out refused to attempt a landing on Bonaventure.
The task was becoming so routine for the Canadian pilots that they were doing
it before sunrise.”

U.S. Naval aviators pride themselves as being supposedly far better than any
air force pilots, but one merely has to look at the Canadian, Israeli and Chilean
air forces to cast doubt on that assumption. In the early 1980s it was revealed
that the average pilot in the Canadian Air Force flew about 300 hours a year,
whereas his U.S. Navy counterpart flew only about 160 hours annually. Although
the Canadian pilots fly fewer hours these days, they can still hold more than
their own with U.S.N. pilots. Since the late 1990s, Canada’s new military
pilot training center has established a new standard of excellence, and is recognized
internationally as having the most advanced pilot training regimen in the world.
The official Canadian Air Force Web site makes it clear that Canada’s
pilot training system is far ahead of the U.S. Navy: “To date, Canada
has sold more than $1-billion in training to pilots from Britain, Italy, Denmark,
Singapore and Hungary since the inception of NFTC training in 1999. Using the
most advanced and effective integrated pilot training system at the most modern
training facilities currently available in the world, Canada has become the
benchmark in military pilot training. ‘We have the leading edge, most
advanced technology for pilot training in the world. It is well ahead of everyone,
Britain, the United States, everyone. It is the model for other countries so
we are very proud of that,’” said Lieutenant-Colonel Brian Houlgate,
Director of the Canadian Aerospace Training Project.
Canadian fighter pilots, in particular, receive certain training benefits that
are simply not readily available to many U.S. Navy aviators most of the year,
simply because Canada has huge, under populated areas that are ideal for flight
training. U.S. Naval aviators at bases such as Oceana Naval Air Station (the
largest U.S.N. fighter base on the east coast) must deal with massive military
and civilian air traffic congestion, plus the close proximity of civilian living
areas, and thus, very limited air space. As a result, according to journalist
Jack Dorsey, their training, particularly at low levels, suffers because of
safety and noise concerns. Canadian pilots training at Cold Lake, Alberta, Canada’s
largest fighter base, have far fewer restrictions due to the base’s relative
isolation and huge 4,000 square mile air weapons range. That is one reason why
many U.S.N. pilots covet the opportunity to fly at the Canadian base during
the annual Maple Flag air combat exercises. But it is not just the vast air
space that attracts the interest of U.S.N. pilots. The new Canadian air combat
training system now in place at Cold Lake “is the first system of its
kind” to integrate a “rangeless” Air Combat Maneuvering Instrumentation
system (ACMI) “with an electronic warfare system - the Surface Threat
Electronic Warfare (STEW) system, which simulates surface-to-air and other ground-to-air
threats.” “Together, these systems make up the most modern training
system in the world today,” said Keith Shein of Cubic Corporation in June,
2004. “The combination of these two training systems enables pilots to
realistically view their performance and tactics on each mission.” Better
training makes better pilots.
Like the Canadians, The Israeli Air Force, also one of the most professional
in the world, has outshined the U.S. Navy, and they have done so even with less
capable aircraft. A joint U.S.N.-I.A.F. air combat exercise in 1999 underlines
and highlights the thesis that the U.S. Navy is overrated. On September 14,
1999, The Jerusalem Post announced that the Israelis soundly dispatched the
air wing from the U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt (which, incidentally, was the same
carrier the Dutch destroyed in 1999). Israeli F-16s squared off against American
F-14s and F-18s, both of which are said to be more capable than the F-16. The
final results were astonishing. The Israelis shot down a whopping 220 U.S. aircraft
while losing only 20 themselves. The 10:1 kill ratio was so embarrassing that
the results were not “officially published ‘to save the reputations
of the U.S. Navy pilots.’” The magazine article on which the article
was based, however, reported the kill ratio to be about 20:1.
Some dispute these figures, and claim that the Israelis had an “unfair
advantage,” and did not include American victories from “stand-off
missile hits.” But, as The Washington Times reported on September 15,
2000, an official investigation by Vice Admiral Lee F. Gunn, U.S.N., confirmed
“Navy pilots were thoroughly beaten in an exercise against Israeli fliers.
‘An air wing commander was proud the Israelis only achieved a 6-to-1 kill
ratio during simulated air-to-air combat maneuvers against a carrier air wing
during a recent exercise, instead of the 20-to-1 kill ratio initially claimed.’”
Other former navy officers agree that U.S. Naval aviation has been sub-par for
a number of years. In the February 2000 edition of WorldNetDaily, former F-14
radar intercept officer Jerry Burns said “We are a much less effective
force than we were seven or eight years ago.” “At the start of the
Kosovo conflict, says Burns, who at the time was stationed at the Strike Weapons
Tactics School in Virginia Beach, U.S. Navy pilots hadn't been trained in using
laser-guided weapons. ‘That's why we had such high miss rates in the opening
phases of the war. We had to dispatch someone [to tutor pilots] in laser-guided
bomb delivery techniques.’ Burns, who retired in 1999, says that when
he last served on the Eisenhower in the Mediterranean, the carrier was ‘undermanned’
by 450 to 500 sailors. ‘They didn't have enough people to keep the [approach]
radar fully manned at all times.’ If the weather closed in, he adds, someone
would have to be sent down to the bunkroom to wake up a radar operator. ‘The
Navy says operations are safe. But they aren't safe. Planes were running out
of gas and they couldn't come on board.’ Flight training hours have been
cut back so much, says Burns, that the last time his carrier fighter squadron
went on deployment, its aviators were only getting 10 to 15 hours a month.”
Chile is not a great military power, but its air force is well trained, and
they too have given the U.S. Navy reason for pause. In the August 1989 issue
of Air Combat magazine, author Jeffrey Ethell reported that Chilean Air Force
pilots, flying the relatively unsophisticated but nimble F-5, had trounced an
American carrier air group from the U.S.S. Independence in air combat exercises.
The kill ratio was 56:16 in favor of the Chileans, and as one might expect,
this incident did not receive much press coverage in the United States.
An Australian colleague recently informed me of an amusing incident between
a Royal Australian Air Force (R.A.A.F.) P-3C Orion and a U.S.N. aircraft carrier,
and it is definitely worth mentioning. In the words of retired Squadron Leader
J.R. Sampson, R.A.A.F.: “When I was an R.A.A.F. liaison/briefing officer
enroute from Diego to Perth for R&R sometime in 1981/82, I dined in the
(American) admiral's suite and the admiral gave me a copy of a message that
censured an air wing commander for allowing an R.A.A.F. P-3C to get in undetected
amongst the C.V.B.G. (Carrier Battle Group) screen a few days earlier. According
to the message the commander himself was in an F-14 cockpit checking out the
T.C.S. (Television Camera Set) that had just been installed as a new piece of
F-14 kit. T.C.S enables long-range visual identification of targets. He was
adjusting the FOV (Field of View) when he saw a P-3 swim across his screen,
right on the carrier's bow at about 300 feet above sea level. He'd just come
from C.I.C. (Combat Information Center) and knew that no cooperating P-3's were
due so he queried the FLYCO who queried the C.I.C. who asked the on station
E-2C. They didn't even have the capability to launch an F-14 intercept. Very
embarrassing but the admiral gave me a copy of the message to take back to headquarters…”
Embarrassing yes, and it proves that an enemy doesn’t even need speedy
jet fighters to get through a U.S.N. battle group’s defenses. A large
and relatively slow turbo prop aircraft like the P-3 can do it just as well.

Lack of Training
Despite its vastly superior numbers, resources and weapons, the U.S. Navy, the
world’s only true heavyweight navy, continually fails to vanquish welterweight
and lightweight naval powers. This would indicate that training and good officers,
not big, expensive ships, are the key to naval power. It is training, or lack
thereof, that truly undermines the performance of the U.S. Navy. For example,
even though the U.S. Navy maintains the largest submarine fleet in the world
(because the Russian fleet is mostly tied up at dockside), their submariners
do not currently receive escape training. The Canadian submarine force has only
4 boats, and yet it has the most advanced submarine escape training facility
in the world.

The U.S. Navy opines that its officers and crews are the most professional
in the world, yet media reports have indicated a startling number of U.S. Navy
ship commanders have been fired or suspended in recent years, including the
captain of the carrier John F. Kennedy, whose ship collided with a small dhow
in the Persian Gulf in 2004. One should also recall the attack on the U.S.S.
Stark and the shoddy damage control procedures used by her crew, the accidental
and inexcusable attack on an Iranian airliner by the U.S.S. Vincennes, and the
more recent collision between the nuclear submarine U.S.S. Greeneville and a
Japanese vessel. When the Japanese government found out that untrained civilian
guests were actually at the controls of the Greenville before the collision,
they were most undiplomatic. “It is outrageous. The US Navy is slack,”
said the Japanese Defence Agency Chief Toshitsugu Saito in response. Paul Beaver,
Military Editor at Jane’s Defence Weekly, told National Public Radio’s
Lisa Simeone in 2001 that the U.S. Navy is quite probably the only navy in the
world that has a “civilian ride-along program”. Although civilians
can visit British and Canadian warships, for example, they may only do so when
the ships are at dockside, and they must leave the ships before they get underway.
He added that Britain’s Royal Navy would never even consider such a ride-along
program because of the inherent risks involved.

Regarding the Vincennes incident, former Chicago Tribune military correspondent
Lt. Col. David Evans, U.S.M.C. retired, said it was "An operationally inept
tragedy that caused the loss of 290 civilians, when the skipper had electronic
(transponder) evidence that the 'target' was not an Iranian F-14 but a commercial
airliner, not to mention that the captain was in Iranian territorial waters,
where he had no business being since he was not under attack. Many U.S. Navy
officers feared this sort of thing could happen, calling their apprehension
a case of 'Aegis arrogance.'" If U.S. Navy officers and crews are really
the best, at the very least, many of them appear to suffer from a lot of bad
luck, or bad policies, or just poor judgment.

In addition to training deficiencies, in recent years there has also been compelling
evidence of serious morale problems among U.S.N. junior officers. “In
the fall of 1999,” reported Jack Spencer of the Heritage Foundation, “the
Navy surveyed its junior officers to gauge morale. They expected a 15 percent
response rate, but, to their surprise, over 55 percent of those surveyed responded.
Of these responses, 82 percent responded negatively. Citing poor leadership,
inadequate pay and compensation, and insufficient spare parts and equipment,
only one-third said they planned to reenlist.” Notice that the primary
reason listed for low morale is “poor leadership,” which, one might
suspect, is a nice way of saying “bad senior officers and bad politicians,
in that order.”

The U.S. Navy also boasts that its Blue Angels flight and maintenance teams
are the world’s best, but when one examines their bloated, overly specialized
maintenance team, one really has to wonder. The Blue Angels perform with only
six F-18 jets, whereas the Canadian Snowbirds fly nine Tutors, which are much
older. The Canadian team flies more airplanes, but has a much smaller maintenance
team. The Blue Angels have approximately 100 technicians, but the Snowbirds
have only about ten. American technicians are very specialized, and as a result
they need lots of them to do the same job that just one Canadian technician
can do. This does not sound like an efficient or cost-effective arrangement,
to say the least.

A 2002 study by the RAND Corporation confirmed that U.S. Navy training in fighters,
A.S.W. aircraft and surface ship A.S.W. also does not compare favorably with
the training received by members of the French Navy and the British Royal Navy
and Royal Air Force. The study compared the training of U.S.N. F-18 pilots with
R.A.F. Tornado pilots and French Navy Super Etendard aviators, and found that
“The British and French pilots have greater experience levels and more
continuity in their units than the U.S. pilots.” The study also compared
U.S.N. P-3 Orion crews and DDG-51 destroyer crews with their French and British
A.S.W. counterparts and concluded once again that the American A.S.W. crews
were, on average, the least experienced and the least cohesive. The French and
British units were more cohesive and provided greater continuity because “While
the typical career pattern for U.S. Navy officers takes them away from the operational
ship world to various headquarters and staff assignments, French and British
naval officers may stay in the operational community throughout their careers.”
In addition, “Enlisted sailors in the French and British navies have longer
initial service commitments than those of U.S. Navy sailors.”

The RAND study also observed that unlike the British and the French forces,
U.S. Navy aviation units do not maintain consistent readiness to go into battle
throughout the fiscal year. As Scott Shuger said, “Amazingly, it’s
not uncommon for navy squadrons to cut back their flight hours drastically or
even to be grounded due to the scarcity of aviation fuel near the end of the
fiscal quarter. This even happens to squadrons already at sea. Several times
during my carrier service we had to drop anchor and wait for more fuel money.”
This inconsistent readiness is due to the U.S. Navy’s rigid deployment
cycle system and its “training philosophy”. The authors concluded
that this “readiness bathtub” has “caused concern at the Chief
of Naval Operations (CNO) level.” The French and British do not have this
problem because they do not use “fixed deployment and training cycles”
and also because they strive to have their air units consistently ready for
combat at all times of the year.

What Tom Clancy Doesn’t Know…
Through his many best-selling books and movies, author Tom Clancy has created
a crisp, sharp, spit-polished, efficient, and patriotic image for the U.S. Navy.
Some think he should be a paid Public Relations consultant or recruiter for
the U.S. submarine force. It may come as a shock to some of his readers, however,
that the American sailors in his books are too good to be true, and that even
some American submariners admit their training is not very good. Several recent
books have effectively stripped off much of the shiny Hollywood polish on the
American submarine force, most notably former Petty Officer Andrew Karam’s
account of life on the U.S.S. Plunger, Rig Ship for Ultra Quiet (2002), and
Douglas C. Waller’s Big Red (2001). Both authors (Karam served on the
submarine U.S.S. Plunger) made it known that there is a lot of hype regarding
U.S. submarine training, but the reality is much less impressive. As for the
legendary assertion that all U.S. submariners are experts on “every system”
in their boats, one sailor told Waller that was “All bunk.” Waller
explained that “The (submariner’s) qualification only made you familiar
with the rest of the boat. It didn’t mean you could actually run other
parts. If (the sailor) and the other missile techs suddenly died, those nukes
in the back wouldn’t have a clue how to fire these rockets.” Former
Petty Officer Karam, an Engineering Laboratory Technician, concurred, and acknowledged
that he could only work on other systems “in a pinch”. He continued
“The Plunger, and, for that matter, any nuke boat, was sufficiently complex
that one person simply could not learn everything to that level of detail in
the 14 months we were given to qualify. Not if they were doing their own jobs,
too.”

British allies, of course, have long ridiculed American submariners for spending
too much time and effort learning about nuclear reactors. Surprisingly, Waller
wrote that some U.S. Navy officers quietly agree. The Drill Coordinator on the
U.S.S. Nebraska, Lieutenant Brent Kinman, U.S.N., told Waller that American
submariners talk too much about the reactor, like mechanics, and not enough
about how to fight the ship effectively: “That was the problem with today’s
submariners, Kinman thought. They were technicians rather than warriors. The
average lieutenant riding these boats considered himself a nuclear engineer
first and a submarine officer second. ‘It almost feels like we’re
out there just driving the reactor around…’” This overemphasis
on engineering might explain why diesel submarines are so often triumphant against
U.S.N. nuclear submarines during exercises.

Conclusion
The U.S. Navy is the largest navy in the world, and on paper, certainly the
most powerful. It is also unmistakably the most expensive navy the world has
ever seen. Of that there is no doubt. With the Russian Navy all but gone, and
the Chinese Navy still ascending, the American navy remains the dominant sea
power in the world. Yet, as we have seen here, this heavyweight navy often has
great difficulty handling the little guys. Indeed, if the U.S. Navy were a boxer,
one might say that his dominance is due mostly to his sheer size because he
punches well below his massive weight. In this era of asymmetrical warfare,
of David versus Goliath conflicts, perhaps it is time for America to rethink
its naval strategy, lose some weight, and as sports announcers say, “focus
more on the fundamentals.” For all the money America spends on its huge
navy, it really needs to be much better.

The Author
Roger Thompson is Professor of Military Studies at Knightsbridge University
and a Fellow of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. His
book Brown Shoes, Black Shoes, and Felt Slippers: Parochialism and the Evolution
of the Post-War U.S. Navy was published by the U.S. Naval War College in 1995,
and endorsed by the former CNO, the Late Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., U.S.N.

Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Lieutenant Colonel David Evans, U.S.M.C., Retired
(former Military Correspondent for the Chicago Tribune), Henrik Fyrst Kristensen,
and Dr. Emilio Meneses (who provided me with much information on exercises between
the Chilean Air Force/Navy and the U.S.N.), for their comments and constructive
criticisms of earlier versions of this paper.

Appendix A
U.S.N. Ships Theoretically Destroyed or Incapacitated in Exercises as reported
by the Media since 1981

Note: This table is based on publicly available English media sources such
as newspapers, magazines, books, journals and broadcast media. Only ships that
have been named have been included. There have been many others, but unfortunately
these ships were not specifically named in the reports.

Ethell, Jeffrey. “Pelea a Cuchillo en Chile,” (Traduccion Revista
Fuerza Aerea .A Spanish translation of an article by Ethell that originally
appeared in the August 1989 issue of Air Combat magazine). This translation
can be viewed at:
www.fach-extraoficial.com/espanol/f5knife.htm

Kelton, Maryanne. “New Depths in Australia-U.S. Relations: The Collins
Class Submarine Project.” School of Political and International Studies
Working Paper, The Flinders University of South Australia. March 2004, pp. 22-23.

Online Resources
www.geocities.com/Pentagon/Quarters/2230/bonnie.html
A great site that describes the achievements of Canada’s last aircraft
carrier. Well researched and thoroughly documented. Very professional in all
respects.

www.dutchsubmarines.com
An excellent site maintained by Dutch submariners. It has extensive entries
on Dutch successes against U.S.N. carriers and some startling periscope photos
as well.

Radio Interviews
Interview: “Paul Beaver Discusses the U.S. Navy’s Public Relations
Program compared with Others around the World,” on NPR Weekend Edition
– Sunday with Lisa Simeone. 2/17/2001. HighBeam Research (accessed September,
2004).

Interview with Thomas B. Allen on “Talk of the Nation” with Neal
Conan on NPR, 1/8/2003. HighBeam Research (accessed September, 2004).