Perhaps it was already mentioned and I missed it, but would the most likely scenario involve that both AED's were never turned on ? The gear description given earlier made no mention if they were on. The odds of both of them not working is huge.

Was this the first jump in the US and could it have been a conversion jump from ripcord to BOC? Just a thought based on the TV picture.

It sounds from what TK has commented that all equipment worked as it should. I would take that to imply the Cypres units both cut their loops, and it is simply a reminder that an AAD is a last resort. 750ft doesn't leave much room for error and there are no guarantees you will live through an AAD fire.

It seems the focus is on why they both went low, rather than equipment.

Was this the first jump in the US and could it have been a conversion jump from ripcord to BOC? Just a thought based on the TV picture.

It sounds from what TK has commented that all equipment worked as it should. I would take that to imply the Cypres units both cut their loops, and it is simply a reminder that an AAD is a last resort. 750ft doesn't leave much room for error and there are no guarantees you will live through an AAD fire.

It seems the focus is on why they both went low, rather than equipment.

Call me a cynic, but an AAD is not designed to fire when turned off, hence it worked as designed. The apparent fact that not one reserve PC launched shows that they most likely were never turned on.

Was this the first jump in the US and could it have been a conversion jump from ripcord to BOC? Just a thought based on the TV picture.

It sounds from what TK has commented that all equipment worked as it should. I would take that to imply the Cypres units both cut their loops, and it is simply a reminder that an AAD is a last resort. 750ft doesn't leave much room for error and there are no guarantees you will live through an AAD fire.

It seems the focus is on why they both went low, rather than equipment.

Call me a cynic, but an AAD is not designed to fire when turned off, hence it worked as designed. The apparent fact that not one reserve PC launched shows that they most likely were never turned on.

Our problem is that we don't know if the reserve PCs were launched, we have each interpreted it differently. It would be nice to know, we do know the instructor pulled hos reserve.

Was this the first jump in the US and could it have been a conversion jump from ripcord to BOC? Just a thought based on the TV picture.

It sounds from what TK has commented that all equipment worked as it should. I would take that to imply the Cypres units both cut their loops, and it is simply a reminder that an AAD is a last resort. 750ft doesn't leave much room for error and there are no guarantees you will live through an AAD fire.

It seems the focus is on why they both went low, rather than equipment.

Call me a cynic, but an AAD is not designed to fire when turned off, hence it worked as designed. The apparent fact that not one reserve PC launched shows that they most likely were never turned on.

In the thread in Incidents it is mentioned that both reserves are beginning to open at impact.

Was going to ask this in the other thread, but as it is locked I'll ask here.

Info said

Quote:

Instructor jumping a newer Icon harness, with Smart 120 reserve, and 170ish Aerodyne main. Cypres Expert II. All compatible gear with no size or compatibility issues. His cutaway and reserve handles were pulled and cutaway handle was found close by.

Looking at all Aerodyne container sizes, I'm not aware of any that are set up for that sort of size difference. If it is one that comfortably houses a 120 reserve, then a 170 ish main would be very tight. Could this tightness of the main, with it not being deployed from the container, have caused reserve hesitation due to the added pressure on the bottom of the reserve tray?

On the flip side, if it was a container that was sized appropriately for a 170 ish main, then wouldn't a 120 reserve have been really quite loose, also potentially causing some sort of problem with deployment?

There are two general mysteries in this incident. The first is what caused them to not deploy at a normal safe altitude. I don't think we will learn any lesson we didn't already know when that cause is identified. (Likely it will be one or more of: be altitude aware, be healthy when you jump, avoid collisions in the air, fly stable, don't bump your head on the way out the door, don't chase a student below 2K, etc.)

But a second issue is why both impacted at a fatal speed, despite both having AAD's that apparently did fire. A solo instance can easily be understood as due to some known weakness (container with unusually high reserve extraction forces, misprogramed AAD, poor gear maintanence, PC hesitation due to non-optimum body position, etc) But the two together suggests a common cause that may be unique to this incident.

The video evidently shows the student loosing consciousness and the instructor catching up to him but too low.

Can you tell us where you read that?

Quote:

The conclusion is based, in part, on the instructor's helmet camera video. The student, 25-year-old student Andrimar Pordarson, apparently lost consciousness during his descent. The instructor, 41-year-old instructor Orvar Arnarson, managed to reach him. But, it was too late.

There are two general mysteries in this incident. The first is what caused them to not deploy at a normal safe altitude. I don't think we will learn any lesson we didn't already know when that cause is identified. (Likely it will be one or more of: be altitude aware, be healthy when you jump, avoid collisions in the air, fly stable, don't bump your head on the way out the door, don't chase a student below 2K, etc.)

But a second issue is why both impacted at a fatal speed, despite both having AAD's that apparently did fire. A solo instance can easily be understood as due to some known weakness (container with unusually high reserve extraction forces, misprogramed AAD, poor gear maintanence, PC hesitation due to non-optimum body position, etc) But the two together suggests a common cause that may be unique to this incident.

From the gear the student was wearing he appeared to be a big guy. A big guy going unstable has the free-fall speed of someone going head-down. Two jumpers together may skew the cypress data due to the burble they are both creating.

I would really like to see the cypress data, they must have been extremely close when the parameters for cutter activation where achieved. It's extremely unwise to for an Instructor to chase a student that low but they do get drawn into it.

Over the past couple years there has been an acceptable general train of thought given to increasing the activation height of an AAD. Some of the old farts on here know what I mean about dirty low pullers.

With pattern traffic & canopy collisions I think a general trend of increasing deployment altitude overall is a wise move forward that has been taking place. I prefer to have my cypress2 set at 1200 in expert mode, however I never ever want to see it.

I don't use an aad but it seems like it would be safer for those things to fire at 1000 ft. I guess it could cause more two outs but I would rather have two out than one at line stretch.

Your post gives me an excuse to follow up on a post in the original thread. On that thread I Posted on post #130:

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Quote -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- How about raising activation heights to 1500 feet for students and 1000 feet for expert .. add extra margin of safety. why 750 feet ? hang on I think mr Booth has already raised this !! -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- I replied:

"When you understand the problem you will understand that raising the altitude will not help. Those reserves wouldn't open in 2000 feet. If you can't get the bag out of the container you can't get the canopy out of the bag." ------------------------------------

From that post I recieved several PM's asking why I thought that way. I answered with references to the balance of evidence. However I failed to refer to the best proof, "the eye in the sky". for that I make amens here by reposting the fololowing link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vaYQ6iP8zlg

I don't use an aad but it seems like it would be safer for those things to fire at 1000 ft. I guess it could cause more two outs but I would rather have two out than one at line stretch.

Your post gives me an excuse to follow up on a post in the original thread. On that thread I Posted on post #130:

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Quote -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- How about raising activation heights to 1500 feet for students and 1000 feet for expert .. add extra margin of safety. why 750 feet ? hang on I think mr Booth has already raised this !! -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- I replied:

"When you understand the problem you will understand that raising the altitude will not help. Those reserves wouldn't open in 2000 feet. If you can't get the bag out of the container you can't get the canopy out of the bag." ------------------------------------

From that post I recieved several PM's asking why I thought that way. I answered with references to the balance of evidence. However I failed to refer to the best proof, "the eye in the sky". for that I make amens here by reposting the fololowing link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vaYQ6iP8zlg

I've wondered about your cryptic commentary for a couple days now. I'm tired of the guessing game. Is it the container? The reserve pilot chute? The construction of the reserve pack tray, the size of the reserve in the container or none of the above. I'll not send you a PM but what exactly are you saying?

Does anything you've commented on have anything to do whatsoever with this incident? ....and if so, how and why?

The video I'd classify as an isolated incident, with two jumpers, jumping different gear it's even more of an anomaly.

Factually the distance of the two jumpers in relation to where they landed leads me to believe they were both very close, almost hands on. For student and instructor to travel from iceland I'd think the instructor thought he wasn't going to lose a student at zhills.

I've wondered about your cryptic commentary for a couple days now. I'm tired of the guessing game. Is it the container? The reserve pilot chute? The construction of the reserve pack tray, the size of the reserve in the container or none of the above.

It's all of the above. I can't tell you exactly what is wrong with each rig on each failure because I haven't had the opporitunity to examine and test it. In sone cases it is mostly one just one weak component like the pilot chute and in some cases it is on rigs with the maine closed, maybe extraction force and in some a little of both. I do know it is happening and I believe it is pervasive. See my post #3 here: http://www.dropzone.com/...;;page=unread#unreadIt offers additional insite to my position. BTW: The BPS is studing the adoption of a procedure to screen for the problem.

Knock it off, everyone. tired of the same rhetoric as in the incident thread. Have asked the moderator to lock this one too, due to unknowledgeable and ridiculous assumptions.

The press release and the gear post already explained it. this is far simpler that everyone thinks and any speculation beyond that is simply ignorance on the part of the poster. You were not here, you are not part of the investigation and stomping all over it does not actually change any facts.