The Department of Energy (DOE) is today sending to the Federal Register for
publication, 10 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) Parts 709, 710, and 711, a new
regulation governing the administration of polygraph examinations. The regulation
culminates more than three months of public hearings and establishes the procedures for
how DOE intends to use polygraph examinations for certain DOE and contractor
employees, applicants for employment, and other individuals assigned or detailed to
Federal positions at DOE. The regulation describes the eight categories of employees
who will be eligible for counterintelligence polygraph testing and the controls on the use
of such testing to prevent unwarranted intrusion into the privacy of individuals.

The questions in DOE’s counterintelligence polygraph examination will be limited to the
narrowly focused topics of espionage, sabotage, terrorism, intentional unauthorized
disclosure of classified information, intentional unauthorized foreign contacts, and
deliberate damage or malicious misuse of a U.S. government or defense system. One of
the principal objectives of the counterintelligence polygraph is to identify activities
involving intent to harm the United States. DOE will not ask questions that probe a
person’s thoughts or beliefs, concern conduct that has no counterintelligence implication,
or concern conduct that has no direct relevance to an investigation.

This implementation plan applies to political appointees as well as all other DOE and
contractor employees with access to DOE’s highly sensitive information or materials.
DOE believes that all of its personnel should meet the same standards for access to this
information or materials, regardless of position.

This implementation plan identifies the specific positions within the eight
counterintelligence categories covered by the regulation that will be subject to polygraph
testing. Under this implementation plan, it is expected that approximately 800
individuals throughout the DOE complex will undergo polygraph testing.

BACKGROUND

The DOE national weapons labs are premier institutions among the world’s government-sponsored
scientific research and development organizations. Their discoveries not only
helped the United States to prevail in the Cold War, but will continue to provide for the
national security by maintaining the safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear
stockpile. As the repository of America’s most advanced know-how in nuclear and
related armaments and the home of some of America’s finest scientific minds, these labs
have been and will continue to be a major target of foreign intelligence services. As a
result, strong security and counterintelligence must be better integrated into DOE’s
national security mission. DOE’s counterintelligence polygraph program is one means of
carrying out that mission.

In February 1998, President Clinton issued PDD-61, “U.S. Department of Energy
Counterintelligence Program," a classified document containing the President’s
determination that DOE must do more to protect the highly sensitive and classified
information at its defense facilities. The President instructed DOE to develop and
implement specific measures to reduce the threat of compromise to such information.
Such measures may include financial disclosure, reporting of foreign travel, the
establishment of Special Access Programs (SAPs) where appropriate and use of
polygraph and psychological screening.

DOE has taken steps under PDD-61 to strengthen its protection of information and
technologies in connection with DOE’s atomic energy defense activities. Reform has
focused on the structure of the counterintelligence program; selection and training of field
counterintelligence personnel; counterintelligence analysis; counterintelligence and
security awareness; protections against potential insider threats; computer security;
improved coordination with the FBI, CIA and NSA; and the establishment of a
counterintelligence-scope polygraph program. DOE determined that instituting a
counterintelligence-scope polygraph program for individuals in positions with access to
the most highly sensitive and classified information and materials in connection with
DOE’s atomic energy defense activities is one of several necessary and prudent actions
required to fulfill its national security responsibilities.

DOE began developing and implementing a counterintelligence-scope polygraph
requirement for sensitive positions by issuing DOE Notice 472.2, “Use of Polygraph
Examinations," that establishes a polygraph requirement for Federal employees who
occupy or seek to occupy certain sensitive positions.

DOE published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) on August 18, 1999 (64 FR
45062) that proposed to expand the counterintelligence polygraph program to cover
employees at its facilities, contractor employees as well as Federal employees, in
positions with access to the most sensitive categories of classified information and
materials, as well as applicants for such positions. DOE received over 100 written
comments on the proposed rule as well as oral comments during four public hearings.
DOE carefully considered all these comments in preparing a final rule.

Today, DOE is sending to the Federal Register for publication, the final rule entitled,
“Polygraph Examination Regulation." This regulation for the use of polygraph
examinations for certain DOE and contractor employees will protect highly sensitive and
classified information and materials to which such employees have access.

IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

The eight counterintelligence categories identified in the regulation as being eligible for
potential polygraph examinations are:

(1) Positions that DOE has determined include counterintelligence activities or access to
counterintelligence sources and methods;

(2) Positions that DOE has determined include intelligence activities or access to
intelligence sources and methods;

(3) Positions requiring access to information that is protected within a non-intelligence
SAP designated by the Secretary of Energy;

(4) Positions that are subject to the Personnel Security Assurance Program (PSAP);

(5) Positions that are subject to the Personnel Assurance Program (PAP);

(6) Positions that DOE has determined have need-to-know or access to information
specifically designated by the Secretary regarding the design and operation of nuclear
weapons and associated use control features;

(7) Positions within the Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance, or
any successor thereto, involved in inspection and assessment of safeguards and security
functions, including cyber security, of the Department; and

(8) Positions within the Office of Security and Emergency Operations, or any successor
thereto.

Based on the decisions of the Program Managers, this implementation plan identifies the
specific positions within the eight counterintelligence categories that will be polygraphed.
In order of their listing above, they are:

1. The Director, Office of Counterintelligence (D/OCI) has determined that all
individuals in positions that involve counterintelligence activities or access to
counterintelligence sources and methods will be polygraphed. This includes all DOE and
contractor employees, applicants for employment, and other individuals assigned or
detailed to Federal positions in OCI.

2. The Director, Office of Intelligence (D/OI) has determined that DOE
employees and contractors who have access to DOE SAPs and have access to Sensitive
Compartmented Information (SCI) directly related to those SAPs will be polygraphed.

3. The Executive Secretary of the Special Access Program Oversight Committee
(SAPOC) has determined that everyone who has access to an Unacknowledged SAP or
multiple Acknowledged SAPs at the “Technical Level" will be polygraphed. (Individuals
who have access at the Technical Level have full knowledge of all program details, and
complete program access and involvement.) Within these SAPs are included those SAP
cleared weapons scientists and engineers with access to some of the most highly
classified nuclear weapons information. In addition, individuals who have access,
Technical or Non-technical, to more than one Acknowledged or Unacknowledged SAP
will be polygraphed.

4. The Director, Office of Safeguards and Security (D/OSS) has determined that
individuals in positions in the PSAP who are authorized to transfer unclassified files from
classified computers under the Tri-Lab Agreement will be polygraphed.

5. The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Military Application and Stockpile
Management has determined that weapons scientists and engineers within the PAP will
be polygraphed.

6. The Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs has determined that weapons
personnel who fall within the SAP, PSAP or PAP categories described above will be
polygraphed.

7. The Director, Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance
(D/OA) has determined that all individuals within OA, federal and contractors, who
conduct inspections/appraisals in Safeguards and Security or cyber-security will be
polygraphed.

8. The Director, Office of Security and Emergency Operations (D/OSEO) has
determined that individuals within OSEO who fall within the SAP, PSAP or PAP
categories described above will be polygraphed.

In addition, Congress, in section 3154 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2000, forbids DOE from providing anyone initial access to a SAP or the
PSAP without first signing a consent agreement and then taking a counterintelligence
polygraph examination. This statutory requirement will be implemented in accordance
with the terms of the polygraph regulation.

Annually, the eight DOE Program Managers identified above will be required to provide
the D/OCI with a list of the individuals within the eight counterintelligence categories
identified in the regulation, as well as a list with a written justification as to who within
the eight counterintelligence categories should be polygraphed. The D/OCI will review
the submissions from the Program Managers in order to confirm that all of the
incumbents in the identified categories of positions have been included. The D/OCI,
based upon the review, may amend the list of those recommended for polygraph by either
adding or deleting individuals. All such amendments will be noted on the documentation
forwarding the lists of individuals being recommended for polygraph to the Secretary for
final approval. Any disagreements between the Program Managers and the D/OCI
concerning who should be polygraphed will be resolved by the Secretary.

Every two years, the D/OCI in consultation with the Program Managers will conduct a
review to determine if the procedures being utilized by the Program Managers are
correctly identifying those individuals within the programs who should be polygraphed.
The D/OCI will submit any proposed revisions to this implementation plan, along with a
justification, to the Secretary for approval.

The first review of DOE’s counterintelligence polygraph program will commence within
twelve months of the issuance of the rule and will include an evaluation of the polygraph
program and may identify proposals for change. The report will be submitted by D/OCI
to the Secretary for potential action.