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Narrative:Jetstar Airways flight JQ8 was being operated on a scheduled passenger service from Singapore Changi Airport, Singapore to Melbourne, Australia. The captain was designated as the pilot monitoring and the first officer (FO) was the pilot flying. The flight was cleared for a departure from runway 20C. The flight crew had set flaps 5 for departure with a calculated rotation speed (VR) of 169 kt at the take-off weight of 191 t. Their planned acceleration altitude was 3,000 ft (the altitude at which the flaps would be retracted from flaps 5 to flaps 1). The flight crew received air traffic control instructions for a standard instrument departure and the aircraft departed. At about 3,000 ft the FO called for flaps 1 and the captain set the flap lever to the flaps 1 setting. The flight crew then received an engine-indicating and crew-alerting system (EICAS) caution for FLAPS DRIVE, which indicated a fault with the wing flaps. The captain notified air traffic control of the fault, received a clearance to level the aircraft at 6,000 ft and completed the FLAPS DRIVE fault checklist actions. The aircraft entered a holding pattern at 6,000 ft and the captain elected to assume the role of pilot flying after the decision was made to return to Singapore. While in the holding pattern, the flight crew completed their failure management briefing and briefed the cabin crew manager about the occurrence and their plan. The captain then made a public address to the passengers to inform them of the need to return to Singapore due to a technical issue with the flaps. The FO contacted the company to report their intentions, calculated the reference landing speed (VREF) as 195 kt at about 188 t with flaps 1 selected and briefed the arrival procedure. The captain elected not to jettison excess fuel due to their proximity to other aircraft in the holding pattern, the landing distance required provided a sufficient safety margin, and the fact that the checklist did not require it. The aircraft landed without incident and was taxied to the gate with emergency service vehicles in attendance. The captain noted on the engine-indicating and crew alerting system that there was a high brake temperature on one of the right landing gear brakes after landing and reported this to the engineering staff after shutdown. Before the flight crew exited the aircraft an engineering staff member entered the flight deck to report that they found damage to the left wing. This was followed by a report from a ground handling staff member that rubber debris was found on runway. Inspection of the aircraft found the number 6 wheel tyre tread had delaminated. Damage to the airframe included the left inboard wing panel (above the number 6 wheel) was punctured, an area of the trailing edge of the left inboard flap was cracked, and the left inboard flap torque tube was broken. A broken torque tube will interrupt the flap drive system for flaps outboard of the break. Consequently, a change in the flap setting will trigger a misalignment between the flap skew sensors.

Findings: - The number 6 wheel tyre experienced shoulder step-wear, which led to cracking and undercutting of the tyre tread and a subsequent delamination of the number 6 tyre, which occurred in less than the normal average life cycles. - Debris from the delaminated tyre penetrated the left under wing panel and damaged the flap torque tube, resulting in an asymmetric flap condition when the flaps were commanded to retract. - When retracting the wing flaps, the crew received a flap drive fault indication, which resulted in a return to the departure airport and a high-speed overweight landing. - Following the damage to the flap torque tube, the aircraft protective systems operated as designed and the flight crew completed the checklist as published.