By far the greatest weakness of the military
planning undertaken during 1941 as a result
of Admiral Stark's original recommendations
and the conversations with the British was
that the Army staff, notwithstanding the warning
given by Admiral Stark, was unwilling that
the plans should take account of the possibility
that the United States might become committed
to large-scale support of military operations
across the Pacific. The Army planners persisted
in this unwillingness despite the stiffening
of American policy in the Far East.

The first sign of the stiffening of American
policy in the Far East in 1941 was the President's
decision formally to include therein the support
of Chinese resistance to Japanese aggression.
Until the spring of 1941 American aid to China
had been limited to loans by the Export-Import
Bank for the purchase of arms and other supplies
in the United States. But during the months
following the President's re-election, while
lend-lease legislation was being drafted and
debated, the White House had been considering
a more comprehensive program of aid to China.
Early in the year Dr. Lauchlin Currie, one
of the President's administrative assistants,
had gone to China at Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's
request to examine the situation. He returned
on 11 March 1941, the very day on which the
President signed the Lend-Lease Act. At the
end of March Dr. T. V. Soong, who had
been representing the Chinese Government in
negotiations in Washington, presented a list
of the military requirements of China modern
air force of 1,000 aircraft, with American
instructors and technical advisers; weapons
and ammunition to equip thirty divisions of
the Chinese Army; and supplies for the development
of the remaining overland line of communications
between China and the West, by way of the Burma
Road.1During April the War Department reviewed
these requirements, and Mr. Hopkins and General
Burns of the Lend-Lease Administration joined
Dr. Currie in another study of them. On 6 May
the President declared the defense of China
to be vital to the defense of the United States,
thereby formally bringing aid to China within
the scope of the Lend-Lease Act.2
At the same time Dr. Soong organized China
Defense Supplies, Incorporated, to represent
his government

[63]

in lend-lease transactions. By mid-May the
first lend-lease ship for China had left New
York, carrying trucks, spare parts, and raw
materials.

During the summer of 1941 the President made
a second move in the development of Far Eastern
policy-the imposition of a de facto
oil embargo on Japan. This move, like the decision
to extend comprehensive military aid to China,
developed out of already established policy.
Since July 1940 the President had had authority
to control exports to foreign countries in
the interest of American security and had cut
off shipments to Japan of scrap metal, aviation
gasoline, and most types of machine tools.
To include oil among the exports to be licensed
and, in fact, to shut it off, was an even more
drastic step. The United States thereby would
virtually compel the Dutch and the British
to join in defying Japan, which was almost
entirely dependent on outside sources for oil,
unless they were willing to dissociate themselves
completely from American Far Eastern policy.
3By forcing this choice on the Dutch
and British, the United States would implicitly
acknowledge that, in case they should follow
the American lead in denying oil to Japan,
the United States would have an obligation
to defend their Far Eastern possessions. In
case they should follow the American lead,
moreover, Japan in turn would have to choose
either to meet the American conditions for
lifting the oil embargo-in effect, the evacuation
of their military forces from the Asiatic mainland-or
to secure, by the seizure of the Netherlands
Indies, a supply of petroleum on their own
terms, in the face of the strongly implied
American commitment to oppose such action with
military force. This choice the Japanese would
have to make-or review, if they had already
made it, as they apparently had- --while they
still had a few months oil reserves, and before
American military strength could become great
enough to endanger their chances of seizing
and holding the Netherlands Indies.

During July the President reflected upon
the course to be followed by the United States
now that Germany and the USSR were at war and
Japan was preparing for the conquest of the
European colonial empire situated about the
South China Sea. When the possibility of imposing
an oil embargo came up for discussion, Admiral
Stark and General Marshall recommended against
taking the step, on the ground that it would
force Japan either to surrender its long-range
strategic aims-which was unlikely or to strike
for oil in the Netherlands Indies-which would
mean war.4

On 24 July the President proposed to the
Japanese that in return for the neutralization
of French Indochina they accept the assurance
of a continued supply of raw materials and
food. 5
This attempt at a settlement came to nothing;
on the following day the

[64]

Japanese Government announced that the French
regime at Vichy had consented to admit Japan
to a joint protectorate over French Indochina.
Japanese forces (which had already been stationed
in large numbers in northern Indochina) at
once extended military occupation over the
entire colony.

The President, meanwhile, had announced that
he wanted trade with Japan put under a comprehensive
controlling order by which he could at will
reduce or increase oil shipments to Japan.
On 26 July he issued an executive order from
Hyde Park freezing Japanese assets in the United
States and halting all trade with Japan. The
American press welcomed the President's order
as an "oil embargo," and as time
went on without any export licenses for oil
being issued, it became evident that, whatever
Stark and Marshall may have believed the President
was going to do, he had in fact imposed an
embargo on shipments of oil to Japan. The Dutch
and British also joined in freezing Japanese
assets. On the assumption, then generally accepted,
that Japanese oil reserves would give out near
the end of 1942, it could be expected that
Japan would shortly be forced to resolve any
remaining internal disagreements on policy,
between giving in or carrying out the planned
offensive southward. 6

During the months immediately following the
ABC -1 conversations it was not the planners
in Washington but the Army and Navy staffs
in the far Pacific that first took part in
an effort to draw up an allied operational
plan against the contingency of a Japanese
attack. In April, as agreed between Stark and
Marshall, on the one hand, and the British
Chiefs, on the other, the British Commander
in Chief, Far East, convened a meeting in Singapore
of military representatives of the Netherlands,
American, Australian, and New Zealand Governments
for the purpose of devising such a plan under
the terms of ABC-l. 7

The American-Dutch-British ( ADB ) meetings
conducted in Singapore from 21 to 27 April
were based on the following assumption

Our object is to defeat Germany and
her allies, and hence in the Far Fast to maintain
the position of the Associated Powers against
Japanese attack, in order to sustain a long-term
economic pressure against Japan until we are
in a position to take the offensive.

Our most important interests in the Far East
area The security of sea communications and
(b) The security of Singapore.

An important subsidiary interest is the security
of Luzon in the Philippine Islands since, so
long as submarine and air forces can

[65]

be operated from Luzon, expeditions to threaten
Malaya or the Netherlands East Indies from
the East are out-flanked.8

The representatives worked out a general
statement of strategy for the whole area, comprehending
aid to China, for which the British already
had a project. The British project called for
the operation of air units and guerrillas in
China, a much less ambitious program than the
one then under discussion in Chungking and
Washington. The conference arrived at the following
conclusions

To ensure that we are not diverted from the
major object of the defeat of Germany and Italy,
our main strategy in the Far East at present
time must be defensive. There are, however,
certain measures open to us which will assist
greatly in the defense of our interests in
the Far East, but which are themselves offensive.

It is important to organize air operations
against Japanese occupied territory and against
Japan herself. It is probable that her collapse
will occur as a result of economic blockade,
naval pressure and air bombardment. This latter
form of pressure is the most direct and one
which Japan particularly fears.

In addition to the defensive value of operation
[sic] submarine and air forces from Luzon,
referred to . . . above there is even greater
value from the offensive point of view in holding
this island. It is therefore recommended that
the defenses of Luzon should be strengthened
and that every effort should be made to maintain
a bombing force in the island in addition to
building up a similar force in China.

Other positive activities which may be undertaken
are as follows:-

(a) Support to the Chinese Regular Forces
by financial aid and provision of equipment.

(b) Operation of Guerillas in China.

(c) Organization of subversive activities
in Japan.

So far as economic pressure is concerned
the entry, of the United States of America,
the British Empire, and the East Indies into
a war against Japan would automatically restrict
Japanese trade to that with the coast of Asia.
Since China will be in the war against her,
and our submarine and air forces should be
able to interfere considerably with trade from
Thailand and Indo-China, a very large measure
of economic blockade would thus be forced upon
Japan from the outset.9

Maj. Gen. George Grunert, who was in command
in the Philippines, and his assistant chief
of staff, Col. Allan C. McBride, who had represented
him at Singapore, both perceived that the recommendations
of the Singapore conference were out of keeping
with existing American plans. In forwarding
the conference report to Washington, Grunert
called attention to the discrepancy

It will be noted that the conference emphasized
the importance of the Philippines, particularly
Luzon, as a strategic area for naval and air
bases from which offensive operations could
be conducted against Japanese territory and
sea communications, and as of advantage to
the Japanese in the event they were captured;
hence the recommendation to strengthen defenses
and augment the air force. Our present mission
and restrictions as to means are not in accord
therewith.10

[66]

The Army and Navy staffs in Washington came
to much the same conclusion and so informed
the British military mission, declaring, moreover,
that the United States intended "to adhere
to its decision not to reinforce the Philippines
except in minor particulars." 11More than a month later, early in July,
Admiral Stark and General Marshall formally
stated that they could not approve the ADB
report because it was at variance with ABC-1
and did not constitute a "practical operating
plan for the Far Fast Area." They, too,
announced that the United States was not planning
to reinforce the Philippines as recommended
in the report but, in significantly more cautious
terms.

Because of the greater needs of other strategic
areas, the United States is not now able to
provide any considerable additional re-enforcement
to the Philippines. Under present world conditions,
it is not considered possible to hope to launch
a strong offensive from the Philippines. 12

Admiral Stark and General Marshall did well
to speak cautiously of American military policy
in the Philippines. Three weeks later, when
the President imposed the "oil embargo,"
he created a new Arm-,, command in the Philippines-the
U. S. Army Forces in the Far last (USAFFE)-under
Lt. Gen. Douglas MacArthur. The new command,
formally established on 26 July 1941, comprehended
the forces of the Philippine Department, and
the Philippine Army, which by presidential
proclamation was called into the service of
the United States for the duration of the emergency.
General MacArthur, who had completed his tour
of duty as Chief of Staff in the fall of 1935,
had since 1936 been serving as Military Advisor
to the new Commonwealth Government of the Philippines.
To assume command of USAFFE, he was called
back to active duty with the rank of major
general and was at once promoted to the rank
of lieutenant general. 13

The War Department staff, which apparently
learned of the whole transaction only after
it had been arranged with General MacArthur,
began to modify its plans to suit the new situation.14The staff at once recommended, and General
Marshall approved, sending guns, light tanks,
and antitank ammunition to the Philippines.
The dispatch of 425 Reserve officers was approved
the next day, and a little later, in response
to a request from USAFFE, the Chief of Staff
assured General Mac Arthur that "specialists,
individuals, and organizations required by
you will be supplied promptly . ."
15On 31 July General

[67]

Marshall declared that it was the policy
of the United States to defend the Philippines,
with the qualification that the execution of
the policy would not "be permitted to
jeopardize the success of the major efforts
made in the theater of the Atlantic.16

The shift in plans continued in early August as the War Department scheduled
additional shipments of arms, troops, and equipment for the Philippines. Soon
after assuming command of USAFFE, General MacArthur had been notified that
plans were under way to send him twenty-five 75-mm. guns during September,
another twenty-five during October; a company of M3 light tanks as soon as
possible; a regiment of antiaircraft artillery (National Guard) as soon as
legislative authority for their retention in the service was secured; and
24,000 rounds of 37-mm. antitank ammunition.17Following a staff conference on 15 August, General Marshall approved
plans for the shipment to the Philippines of tank, antiaircraft, and ordnance
units-about 2,350 men-by 5 September. All necessary equipment for these units
was to be provided including fifty-four tanks.18The staff acknowledged that these actions amounted to nearly a complete
reversal of the longstanding policy "to maintain existing strength but
to undertake no further permanent improvements except as a measure of economy.
19

At the same time the terms and probable consequences
of American Far Eastern policy became more
sharply defined. On 6 August Ambassador Kichisaburo
Nomura presented his government's proposal
for a settlement in the Far East. The Japanese
Government proposed that the United States
should abandon its current policies aid to
China, refusal to recognize the status of Japan
in Indochina, control and virtual elimination
of trade with Japan, and the reinforcement
of the Philippines. In return, Japan offered
not to advance beyond Indochina, to evacuate
Indochina when the "China Incident"
was terminated, and, "at an opportune
time," to guarantee the neutrality of
the Philippines. 20

A few days later, at the Atlantic Conference
off Argentia, Newfoundland, the British presented
a draft, "Parallel Communications to the
Japanese Government," for adoption by
the British, Netherlands, and American Governments,
containing the warning that "any further
encroachment by Japan in the Southwestern Pacific
would produce a situation" in which the
signatory government "would be compelled
to take counter measures even though these
might lead to war" with Japan. The President

[68]

did not act on this proposal-which would,
in effect, have committed the United States
to joint action with the British and the Dutch,
but, shortly after his return from the conference,
the American Government independently notified
Japan to much the same effect, on a strictly
American basis. In a note given to Ambassador
Nomura on 17 August, the United States declared:

This Government now finds it necessary to
say to the Government of Japan that if necessary
,Japanese Government takes any further steps
in pursuance of a policy or program of military
domination by force or threat of fore of neighboring
countries, the Government of the United States
will be compelled to take immediately any and
all steps which it may deem necessary toward
safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests
of the 'United States and American nationals
and toward insuring the safety and security
of the United States. 21

This action gave added significance to the
establishment of USAFFE. By early fall the
War Department staff regarded it as American
policy to reinforce the Philippines as much
as possible in order to "deter or minimize"
Japanese aggression, even though other commitments
precluded an attempt to make Pacific defenses
entirely secure. 22

The B-17 and Defense of the Philippines

The notion that the Philippines could be
defended, in spite of all the considerations
that has led the planners so often to reject
the idea, grew out of a new approach to the
problem of operations in the western Pacific,
involving the use of long-range Army bombers
to neutralize Japanese offensive capabilities.
The Army Air Corps long-range bomber, the B-17,
had gone into production in 1938. Lack of funds
and competition with other types of planes
and production had delayed deliveries of B-17's,
and by the summer of 1941 not a single Army
Air Forces group was completely equipped with
the "modernized" B-17. But enough
planes were coming off the assembly lines to
justify planning for operations.23By deferring the fulfillment of other
urgent requirements for the B-17-to patrol
the approaches to Hawaii, the Panama Canal,
Alaska, and the continental United States-and
by deferring plans for strategic bombing across
the Atlantic, a fairly strong bomber force
might be built up in the Philippines by early
1942 to take the place of the strong naval
forces that neither the U . S. Wavy, on the
one hand, nor the British, Dutch, and Australian
Navies, on the other, were willing to commit
to the sup-

[69]

port of the Philippines.24A bomber force would threaten the movement
of Japanese naval units and Japanese troop
and cargo shipping south of Formosa, thus covering
the Philippines and its communications south
to the Netherlands Indies. By developing this
threat, the United States might be able to
force the Japanese either to accept a state
of armed neutrality in the far Pacific, freeing
American and British forces for operations
against Germany, or to open hostilities before
American forces should become heavily engaged
across the Atlantic. In either case the U.
S. Army was partly insured against the risk
of being called upon to send large forces across
both oceans in the early stages of hostilities.

In early August the Secretary of War approved
a program for sending modern planes to the
Philippines as soon as they became available.
The Air Force, USAFFE, formerly the Philippine
Department Air Force, then consisted of one
squadron of P-40B's, two squadrons of P-35A's,
one squadron of P-26A's, and two squadrons
of B-18's. To the Far East, the AAF allocated
four heavy bomber groups, to consist of 272
aircraft including 68 in reserve, and an additional
two pursuit groups totaling 130 planes.

There were not enough planes available in
the United States to carry out these plans
at once. After the Secretary of War approved
the program, arrangements were made for fifty
P-40E's to be sent directly from the factories
and for twenty-eight P-40B's to be taken from
operating units, to be shipped to the Philippines
in September. The 19th Bombardment Group, which
had ferried the first B-17's to Hawaii in May,
was selected for permanent transfer to the
Philippines and given priority in assignment
of B 17's. 25Yet so urgent was the need for heavy
bombers in the Far East that the AAF did not
wait for the 19th Group to pioneer an air route
to the Philippines. A provisional squadron
from the Hawaiian Air Force flew from Hawaii
via Make and Australia to Manila in September.
As B-17's became available in October and November
they were flown to the Philippines. By the
second week of November it was planned to send
"all modernized" B-17's from the
United States to the Far East. 26

The South Pacific Terry Route

A corollary to the program of reinforcing
the Philippines was the development of an alternate
route for ferrying bombers to the Philippines,
less exposed to Japanese attack than the route
via Midway and Wake. It was necessary both
to develop and to defend such a route, not
only in order to assure the continued arrival
of the bombers themselves in' cast of hostilities
but also in order to utilize bombers for the
protection of surface communications on which
the defense of the Philippines would remain
heavily dependent. In August 1941, when it
became evident that the defense of the Philippines
had become an object-and indeed the chief immediate
object of

[70]

American military policy, the joint Board at once approved the project,
long urged by the Army Air Corps, of developing such a route. Air Forces plans
for a South Pacific air route were approved and received top priority among
those agencies charged with its development. Funds were promptly made available
from defense aid appropriations, on the basis of a presidential letter of
:3 October that authorized the Secretary of War to "deliver aircraft
to any territory Subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, to any
territory within the Western Hemisphere, to the Netherlands East Indies and
Australia," and to construct the facilities needed for effecting such
delivery. Although rapid progress was soon reported on the South Pacific route,
the heavy bombers were to continue flying the northern route via Midway and
Wake at least until mid-January 1942. 27

The Race Against Time

The great difficulty in reinforcing the Philippines
was that such a development would at best take
several months. The Japanese Government, forewarned,
would meanwhile be free to initiate its planned
offensive in the southwest Pacific while the
American position was still too weak to be
held. The period of uncertainty would last
perhaps eight months-from August 1941 to March
1942. The very small number of B-17's becoming
available each month was only one of the limiting
factors. A second, of scarcely less importance,
was the slowness with which pursuit units could
be made ready and shipped to the Philippines
to protect the airfields from which the B-17'a
would operate. A third was the shortage of
antiaircraft artillery; a fourth, the shortage
of bombs and ammunition; a fifth, the small
number of radar sets and trained operators
available. The last were of the greatest importance
not only to warn of the approach of enemy planes
but also to control friendly planes enemy planes
the air and to enable them to make contact
with the enemy. As the British had found, the
proper use of radar could multiply by many
times the security and efficiency of the the
defenses against air attack.

Besides calculating the length of time it
would take for these various critical types
of equipment and personnel to become available
for shipment to the Philippines, the planners
had to take into account the delay involved
in getting them to the Philippines and in organizing
them for effective operations after they had
arrived. Finally they had to calculate the
time needed to develop and secure a line of
communication to the Philippines: The planners,
considering all these factors together, could
not reasonably expect the Philippines to be
defensible much before the end of the winter
1941-42. 28

[71]

Shipping Schedules

It quickly became the main immediate concern
of the War Department to get troops and
equipment to the Philippines. Nearly all the
shipping available to the Army in the Pacific
was assigned to this task, and the Arm was
also relying on the use of two large transports
which had earlier been transferred to the Navy
to help move the large forces involved in the
initial plan to occupy Iceland. When, in August,
the Navy proposed the immediate conversion
of the transports Mount Vernon, Wakefield,
and West Point to aircraft carriers,
though for the purpose of supplying Army planes
and personnel to the overseas bases as well
as for use, the Army took strong exception,
pointing out that no large troop movement approaching
12,000 troops or more could be carried out
without the use of at least two of these ships.29The Joint Board, taking up the problem
recommended, on 15 October 1941, that the Army
withdraw its objections to the conversion of
the West Point, Mount Vernon, and Wakefield
to aircraft carriers, and immediately seek
to acquire and convert suitable merchant tonnage
of comparable troop capacity. 30The Army therefore had to send its troop
reinforcements to General MacArthur in smaller
increments which could be carried on chips
available in November and December. 31

The schedule of shipments finally established
in November provided for sending to the Philippines
some 20,000 troops, about one third of them
Air horses units, on eleven troopships to sail
from fan Francisco between 21 November and
9 December 1941. 32The Holbrook, carrying 2,000
troops and equipment (the 147th Field Artillery
Regiment and the 148th Field Artillery Regiment
minus one battalion), and the Republic
carrying 2,630 troops and equipment (the 2d
Battalion of the 131st field Artillery Regiment,
the 7th Bombardment Group, and 48 Air Corps
officers), sailed from San Francisco 21-22
November. Convoyed by the USS Pensacola,
they were due to arrive in the Philippines
on 14 January 1942. Sailings for 15,000 troops
were scheduled for 5-9 December. The President
Johnson with 2,500 troops the 2d Battalion
of the 138th Field Artillery Regiment and three
squadrons of the 35th Pursuit Group), the
Etolin with 1,400 troops " including
the 218th Field Artillery Regiment minus the
2d Battalion) and the Bliss sailed
from San Francisco on 5 December 1941. The
following day the President Garfield
sailed from the same port

In addition to the 30,000 U. S. Army troops
present, and those due to arrive in the Philippines,
there were 80,000 troops in the Philippine
Army, including the ten divisions to be activated
by 15 December. The total strength of General
MacArthur's command-present, en route, and
under orders-amounted to about 137,000, considerably
less than the 200,000 he had estimated as sufficient
for defensive operations.34

The Far Eastern Air Force had 35 four engine
bombers and 107 P-40E's on hand, and 38 more
P-40E's and 52 A-24's (dive bombers) were en
route in the Pensacola convoy. In addition,
37 pursuits and 48 four-engine bombers were
due to leave the United States by 6 and 10
December, respectively. As for ground force
materiel, equipment for one antiaircraft regiment
had recently arrived, as well as 105 tanks
and 50 self-propelled 75-mm. guns (tank destroyers
). Forty-eight 75-mm. guns were en route (with
the Pensacola convoy), and more guns and a
considerable amount of ammunition were scheduled
to be shipped.35

The program for helping China went forward
very slowly. At the end of the summer of 1941
the War Department released its first shipment
of ammunition for the Chinese, and in October
the first weapons were shipped to the Chinese
Army. The scarcity of weapons on hand made
the American staff extremely reluctant to release
any, least of all to China. It was only after
considerable prompting by Dr. Currie that the
first shipment was released, at the expense
of the Philippines. The activities of China
Defense Supplies, Incorporated, had raised
doubts of China's ability to use and maintain
materiel. The British, for their part, were
disinclined to transfer---as the joint Board
suggested in September--to China au "appropriate
amount" of the munitions allocated to
them and continued to propose that the Chinese
confine themselves to guerrilla operations.
Finally, to deliver materiel to China was extremely
slow, uncertain, and expensive, the more so
because of the inefficiency and corruption
with which the Burma Road was being administered.
Although the United States was evidently willing
to support China, the aid actually sent in
1941 was necessarily a mere token of American
intentions and not

At the end of October, Chiang Kai-shek advised General Magruder that he
feared the Japanese were about to attack Yunnan and seize Kunming, thereby
cutting the Burma Road. In the Generalissimo's opinion, Kunming was the key
city of the Far East-if it were lost, China would fall, the Japanese would
attack Malaysia, and nothing could stop war in the Pacific. Air support would
be the only help that could reach China in time. The Generalissimo asked General
Magruder to inform Washington that he desired President Roosevelt to intercede
with the British Government to have air support furnished China by British
air forces at Singapore. In addition, he wished the United States to bring
diplomatic pressure to bear on the Japanese. General Magruder concurred in
Chiang's estimate that only British or American air intervention could save
Kunming.37

The State, War, and Navy Departments and
the Joint Board at once took up the Generalissimo's
views and General Magruder's estimate. The
War Department estimated from information available
in Washington that the Japanese would probably
not attack Kunming so soon as feared by the
Generalissimo and General Magruder. At the
same time the War Department restudied the
whole program to send aid to China and reached
the following conclusions:

It is desirable that large Japanese forces
be kept involved in China. However, from the
larger viewpoint, prospective Chinese defeat
would not warrant involvement of the United
States, at this time in war with Japan.

Political and economic measures should be
used wherever effective to deter Japanese action.

Most effective aid to China, as well as to
the defense of Singapore and the Netherlands
East Indies, is now being built up by reinforcement
of the Philippines. The safety of Luzon as
an air and submarine base should soon be reasonably
assured by the arrival of air and ground reinforcements.
Strong diplomatic: and economic pressure may
be exerted from the military viewpoint at the
earliest about the middle of December 1941,
when the Philippine Air Force will have become
a positive threat to Japanese operations. It
would be advantageous, if practicable, to delay
severe diplomatic and economic pressure until
February or March, 1942, when the Philippine
Air Force will have reached its projected strength,
and a safe air route, through Samoa, will be
in operation.

Material aid to China should be accelerated
consonant with the studied needs of Russia
and Great Britain.

Aid to the Volunteer Air Force in China should
be continued and accelerated as far as practicable.38

On 1 November, State Department and military
representatives conferred at the State Department
on the Chinese crisis and the general Far Eastern
situation, and debated the merits of an immediate
declaration of war by the United States. The
State Department asked whether the Army and
Navy were ready to support an immediate declaration
of war against Japan. Two days later the joint
Board considered the

[74]

question, and Admiral Stark and General Marshall
recommended to the President

That the dispatch of United States armed
forces for direct aid to China be unfavorably
considered.

That material aid to China be accelerated
consonant with the needs of Russia, Great Britain,
and our own forces.

That aid to the American Volunteer Group
be continued and accelerated to the maximum
extent.

Finally, on 8 November, Dr. Soong asked the
President for one third of the Nay's dive bombers,
and submitted a restatement of Chinese ordnance
demands, without which, he stated, the Chinese
could not hope to resist a Japanese attack
on Kunming. The War Department replied to Soong,
as it was advising General Magruder, that all
the United States could do was speed the flow
of lend-lease supplies and facilitate the build-up
of the American Volunteer Group. 40

This statement of policy was in accordance
with the War Department's determination that
the reinforcement of the Philippines must take
precedence over all other American commitments
in the Far East. On that ground General Marshall
disapproved a proposal to take twenty-four
3-inch antiaircraft guns from American troops
and send them to China, later allocating to
the U. S. troops 90-mm. guns then on lend-lease
order.41In a telephone conversation with Col.
Victor V. Taylor of Defense Aid, on 4 November,
General Marshall explained, "it would
be an outrage for me to deny to MacArthur something
that we send on a round about voyage up into
China and I can't give any to MacArthur because
I've got these regiments with only one battery,
that . . . have been in now for a year . .
. .' 42This remark summed up the whole problem
of the War Department-a disparity between policy
and capabilities that answered their worst
fears. The last hope was that the Japanese,
upon learning-as they soon must learn-that
the United States was fully committed, might
reconsider. General Marshall fixed on 10 December
as the date of the arrival of the first "really
effective reinforcements" in the Philippines,
observing that "after that date, but not
before," it would be advantageous for
the Japanese to learn of them.43

During the summer and fall, as the United
States proceeded with the development of military
plans in the Far Fast, the

[75]

British stall continued to seek an understanding
on the terms of American military collaboration
in the event of war with Japan. In August,
at the Atlantic Conference, it was agreed that
the British Chiefs of Staff would prepare a
fresh draft of the ADB report to bring it into
accord with ABC-1. Two months later the U.
S. Chiefs of Stall rejected also this draft
(ADB-2) as not meeting the "present situation
in the Far East" 44

As the Situation in the Far East moved toward a climax, the British informed
the Americans that they were forming a capital chip force to send to Far Eastern
waters. At the same time the British First Sea Lord, Admiral Pound, wrote
to Admiral Stark:

I do not consider that either ADB-1 or ADB-2
meet the new conditions [change of government
in Japan and I would suggest that the need
for a conference to draw up strategic operating
plans for Mar Eastern Area based afresh on
ABC-1 has now become urgent . . . . If you
agree in principle to the abandoning of further
discussions on ABD-1 and ADB-2 and to the holding
of a fresh conference on basis of ABC-1, we
can then proceed to discuss the agenda . .
. .45

In reply, Admiral Stark acknowledged the
need for prompt action and stated that the
Army was "re-enforcing both land and air
forces as rapidly as practicable and training
Philippine Army intensively." In regard
to the proposed conference, he wrote, "ONTO
believes that ADB should not be revived as
ABC- 1 is an adequate major directive which
should be implemented by a sound strategical
operating plan" drawn up between British,
Dutch, and United States naval and air forces.46Less than a week later another communication
from the United States Chiefs of Staff to the
British, acknowledging the 5 November message,
"cordially" concurred in the British
decision to send more vessels to Singapore.
They indicated that the American reinforcements
were on the way to the Far East and urged the
British to send air reinforcements to Singapore
without delay "as a powerful deterrent
against a possible Japanese move to the South."
They reiterated that "ADB-I1 and ADB-2
do not meet the new conditions about to be
established in the Far East Area," and
stated that "ABC-1 with certain revisions
of assigned tasks is an appropriate major directive
upon which satisfactory operating plans can
be directly based." Finally, the United
States Chiefs of Staff suggested new conferences
to be held in Manila by Vice Adm. Sir Tom Phillips,
Commander in Chief, Eastern Fleet ( British),
with Admiral Thomas C. Hart, Commander in Chief,
U. S. Asiatic Fleet, and General MacArthur,
Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in the
Far East. 47

Toward the end of November the War Department
instructed General MacArthur to "proceed
with preliminary [U. S. Army and Navy conferences
and thereafter hold conferences with the British
and Dutch." The objective was the development
of ABC-1, still "regarded as a sound major
directive," by the "commanders on
the

spot" in terms of their own problems.
48Before the outbreak of war in the Pacific,
General MacArthur was able to report on his
discussions with Admiral Hart and Admiral Phillips,
and on 7 December listed the arrangements he
proposed to effect with the Navy and-unless
otherwise directed-with Army and Air commanders
of "potential allies." 49

The noncommittal attitude that the American planners continued to exhibit
during the late summer and fall of 1941 toward American collaboration in the
defense of the Malay Barrier had actually survived the view of national strategic
policy with which it had originally been associated-- the assumption that
American forces would not be committed to that area. It owed its survival
largely to the circumstance that the United States, although it had assumed
great military obligations in the Far East, had assumed them independently
and on terms that virtually precluded close collaboration between the British
and American military staffs. American plans for aiding China were far more
comprehensive than the British plans, and promised not only to conflict with
British lend-lease requirements but also to make the defense of the Burma
line of communication to China far more important to the United States than
it was to the British themselves, who were planning to make their main stand
against the Japanese before Singapore. The British preoccupation with Singapore
was also irreconcilable with American policy in the Southwest Pacific. The
United States was undertaking to make the Philippines defensible. The very
likelihood that the Japanese would forestall the completion of this undertaking
raised questions of American policy so obvious and so fundamental that no
one except the President of the United States could open formal discussion
of them. He did not do so, and the military staffs were therefore obliged
to avoid the momentous question whether the United States in that contingency
would withdraw from operations in the Southwest Pacific or contribute to the
defense of the Malay Barrier.

Even as the American troops and equipment
destined for the Far East began to gather at
San Francisco and the first shipments were
loaded and embarked, the last hope of achieving
a general settlement in the Pacific through
diplomatic means faded and vanished. 50
General :Marshall and

[78]

Admiral Stark continued to the last to seek more time. They informed the
President, on 27 November, that "if the current negotiation ended without
agreement, Japan might attack: The Burma Road; Thailand; Malaya; the Netherlands
East Indies; the Philippines; the Russian Maritime Provinces." They observed
that "the most essential thing now, from the United States viewpoint,
is to gain time." Although considerable Navy and Army reinforcements
had been rushed to the Philippines, "the desirable strength" had
not yet been reached. Ground forces totaling 21,000, they declared, were to
sail from the United States by 8 December and it was "important that
this troop reinforcement reach the Philippines before hostilities commence."
Finally Marshall and Stark recommended: "Precipitance of military action
on our part should be avoided so long as consistent with national policy."
51

In the first week of December ominous intelligence
reports began to arrive with news of Japanese
naval and troop movements in the Far East.52That the Japanese were up to some "deviltry"
was clear, but precisely when and where they
would strike was not clear. On the morning
of December, while official Washington anxiously
reflected on the hard decision that the President
might have to make-- in case Japan should strike
in the area of the South China Sea, bypassing
for the moment the Philippines--the War Department
learned, through an intercepted Japanese message,
that Japan would present to the United States
later in the day a note which would put an
end to further negotiations. At noon last-minute
warning messages were sent by the War Department
to the Philippines, ,Hawaii, Panama, and the
west coast. Through a series of fateful mishaps
the message to Army headquarters at Fort Shafter,
Hawaii, was delayed in transmittal.53While it was still on its way, the first
wave of Japanese carrier-based planes-- whose
approach had gone, not undetected, but unheeded--
--came in from the north and leveled off for
their bombing run over the Pacific: Fleet riding
at anchor unalerted in Pearl Harbor. This attack
opened a campaign long since conceived and
planned to drive the Western powers from the
Far East. 54

[79]

About one o'clock in Washington on the afternoon
of 7 December the first news of the attack
on Pearl Harbor reached the War Department.
The news came as a shock, even as the attack
itself had come. It caught by surprise not
only the American people at large, who learned
of the attack a short while later, but also
their leaders, including the very officers
who had earlier been so much concerned over
the possibility of just such an attack. One
explanation is that these officers and their
political superiors were momentarily expecting
the Japanese to use all their forces against
the weakly held British and Dutch positions
in the Far East ( and probably, but not certainly,
against the Philippines). They were undoubtedly
pondering the hard decisions they would have
to recommend and make if this should happen.55For this and perhaps for other reasons
they had made no special effort to review the
intelligence available and had paid no special
attention to what the Army and Navy commanders
in Hawaii were doing. As they soon found out,
the Japanese task force had also caught those
commanders unprepared and had accomplished
its destructive mission almost unopposed, leaving
a great part of the U. S. Pacific Fleet sunk
or disabled in Pearl Harbor. At the same time
the southward advance of Japanese forces began
as expected. During the afternoon and evening,
news came in of Japanese forces moving into
Thailand, bombing Singapore, and landing in
Malaya. This news, coming in conjunction with
the news from Hawaii-the successive reports
of casualties and damage suffered by the fleet
at Pearl Harbor and by Army and :Marine air
units-presented the American high command,
not with the anticipated crisis in domestic
and foreign politics but, instead, with an
unexpectedly acute crisis in military operations.
56

The immediate fear of the War Department
was that the Japanese might launch another
carrier force against some important strategic
target- the naval installations at Pearl Harbor
(which were still intact), the aircraft factories
on the west coast of the United States, or
the locks of the Panama Canal. The War Department
could do little to make these targets less
vulnerable to air attack in the near future,
but Marshall was determined that he and his
stall should not do less than they could, merely
because they could do so little. The Army's
war plan RAINBOW 5 went into effect, insofar
as it related to Japan, with the notification,
on 7 December, to MacArthur and other commanders
by the War Department that hostilities had
commenced and operations would be governed
by RAINBOW 5 as far as

[80]

possible. 57During the first week of war, though
there were many other affairs that demanded
and shared his attention, General -Marshall
spent several hours daily at Army staff conferences
and joint Board meetings that were mainly taken
up with measures to reinforce Hawaii, Panama,
and the west coast. 58The movements to which he was most attentive
were quite small-the movement of antiaircraft
guns and six regiments of antiaircraft artillery
to the west coast, the movement to Hawaii of
thirty-six heavy bombers (by air) and (by train
and ship) of ammunition, 110 pursuit planes,
and some 7,000 men with their unit equipment.
In addition the War Department ordered ammunition,
air warning equipment, eighty pursuit planes,
nine heavy bombers, and 16,000 men sent to
Panama as fast as possible, and two pursuit
groups and large ground forces (including two
infantry divisions) to the west coast. It was
an enormous job for the War Department as then
constituted to keep track of these hurried
movements, especially movements of munitions.
:Marshall insisted that his immediate subordinates
"follow up" on them, especially the
yen' officers upon whom he also relied for
plans and recommendations on strategy-Arnold,
Gerow, and the members of their staffs. 59

Behind their immediate fear of air raids
on vital installations was the knowledge that
the ,Japanese had forestalled American plans
to bring American military strength in the
far Pacific up to that required to carry out
American foreign policy in the ear East. The
Far Eastern Air Force in being, though forewarned,
was still by no means equipped, trained, or
organized to defend an outpost so far from
the United Mates and so near to Japan.60
The results of the first Japanese raids of
8 December on the Philippine Islands were a
convincing demonstration. They left MacArthur
with only seventeen heavy bombers and fewer
than seventy pursuit planes. 61

[81]

His air force, already half destroyed, was
scarcely more of a threat to Japanese operations
than the submarines and inshore patrol left
behind in the Philippines by Admiral Hart's
Asiatic Fleet. 62The Japanese were free not only to land
in the Philippines but also to move forces
southward into the Netherlands Indies with
every chance to isolate the Philippines before
reinforcements should arrive in the area. It
was hard to avoid the conclusion that the United
States must accept the loss of the Philippines
as inevitable and concentrate on strengthening
the local defenses of Hawaii, Panama, Alaska,
and the west coast.

Up to this point the War and Navy Departments
were in substantial agreement.63
But Secretary Stimson went further. He had
been in entire accord with the growing firmness
of American policy toward Japan during 1941,
and was convinced that to show any sign of
an intention to withdraw from the conflict,
even temporarily, would discredit the whole
policy. He understood, moreover, that the people
of the United States, whatever their views
of foreign policy, would not accept a strategic
withdrawal in the face of the enemy- that had
attacked Pearl Harbor. Finally, he shared with
the professional soldiers and the American
people a strong sense of obligation to do everything
humanly possible to support Mac Arthur's forces.
As he had good reason to expect, Marshall supported
and the President shared and approved his views.
All agreed that it did not matter what the
likelihood was of getting reinforcements to
the Philippines nor what risks the attempt
might entail. The United States could not withdraw
from the Southwest Pacific.

The Pensacola Convoy

The development of this policy opened with
a decision on a specific problem-the disposition
of five ships bound for Manila, under the escort
of the USS Pensacola, that had been
in the South Pacific on 7 December. This convoy,
the vanguard of several that had been scheduled
to arrive in the Philippines during the early
winter, put in at Suva in the Fiji Islands
to await orders. There were some 4,00 men aboard,
including one regiment and two battalions of
field artillery and the ground echelon of a
heavy bomber group, and large quantities of
munitions-guns, ammunition, bombs, motor vehicles,
aviation gasoline, fifty-two dive bombers,
and eighteen pursuit planes. 64

On 9 December the Joint Board decided to
order the Pensacola convoy to return
to Hawaii. This decision was in accord with
the views of the War Department staff. Marshall
concurred without comment. 65But he was dissatisfied with the decision,
for

[82]

he had to consider the position of MacArthur,
and the assurance he had included in the instructions
he had sent him on the afternoon of 7 December:
"You have the complete confidence of the
War Department and we assure you of every possible
assistance and support within our power."
66He could not reconcile this pledge with
the joint Board's decision of 9 December.

The next morning Marshall stated the problem at the close of a conference
with Stimson, Gerow, and two of the latter's assistants.67He "pointed to the catastrophe that would develop if Hawaii should
become a Japanese base, and he said that this thought was guiding the Navy
in its actions." On the matter of the convoy, Marshall said that

. . . he was concerned ,with just what to say to General MacArthur. He did
not like to tell him in the midst of a very trying situation that his convoy
had had to be turned back. and he would like to send some news which would
buck General MacArthur up. 68

Secretary Stimson at once went to the President,
who ended the impasse by asking the joint Board
to reconsider its decision. The Joint Board
took up the President's request at its meeting
that afternoon

In view of the President's desire that the
Manila-bound convoy continue to the Far East,
concurred in by the Secretary of War, the Board
weighed the following factors:

a. The risk involved in proceeding to Australia
as compared to the risk in returning to Hawaii.

b. The possibility of ultimately getting
some of the supplies, in particular airplanes
and ammunition, into the Philippines.

c. The utility of the supplies to the Dutch
Fast Indies or Australia should it not be possible
to deliver them to 'Manila. In particular,
some might be available to defend the Navy
base at Port Darwin.

d. The immediate requirements of the Oahu
garrison for defensive material.

e. The capability of supplying Oahu with
defense material from the United States.

During the discussion that followed, Army members abandoned the position
they had taken the day before and instead advanced the opinion that Hawaii
could be supplied from the United States and expressed a desire to continue
the Manila-bound convoy to Australia and to make every effort to supply airplanes,
ammunition, and other critical material to the Philippine garrison. The Board
therefore agreed: "The Manila-bound convoy would be routed and escorted
to Brisbane, Australia. Movement thereafter would be determined following
arrival and depending upon the situation. 69

On 12 December the convoy was ordered on
to Brisbane, and the War Department made the
senior Army officer aboard, Brig. Geri. Julian
F. Barnes, directly responsible to General
Mac Arthur, with a primary mis-

[83]

sion of getting reinforcements to the Philippines.
First of all General Barnes was to have his
planes unloaded and assembled and try to get
them to the Philippines. Before unloading troops
and other equipment he was to find out whether
the Navy would undertake to send any ships
through to the Philippines. 70

Aircraft and Ammunition

In Manila General MacArthur at once asked Admiral Hart, commander of the
Asiatic Fleet, whether he could bring the convoy on to the Philippines. Admiral
Hart told him that he expected the Japanese to establish a complete blockade
before the ships could reach the Philippines, and gave him the "impression"
that he thought "the islands were ultimately doomed." General MacArthur,
in reporting their conversation, emphasized that as soon as people in the
Philippines came to the conclusion that there was no hope of keeping open
a line of communication, "the entire structure here" would "collapse"
over his head. He declared and repeated that the battle for the Philippines
was the decisive action of the war in the far Pacific: "If the western
Pacific is to be saved it will have to be saved here and now"; and again
he said, "The Philippines theater of operations is the locus of victory
or defeat." He urged that authorities in Washington review their strategy
with this idea in mind, and furnish the air power needed to delay the Japanese
advance: first of all, fighter planes to protect airfields and allow new ones
to be built and, second, bombers to operate against Japanese air bases, communications,
and installations. He concluded by declaring that the retention of the islands
would justify "the diversion here of the entire output of air and other
resources." 71He followed with a second message specifying that one immediate need
was for 200 pursuit planes and 50 dive bombers, to be brought in by carrier
to within flying distance of the Philippines. His other immediate need was
for .50-caliber ammunition. 72

MacArthur's estimate gave the War Department
something definite to go on in getting support
for "every effort to supply airplanes,
ammunition and other critical material to the
Philippine garrison." A measure of the
urgency of his need was his report that as
of 12 December he had in commission twelve
heavy bombers, and he had so few P-40's left
(twenty-seven) that he had ordered the pilots
to avoid direct combat in order to save the
planes for reconnaissance and "to make
[a] show of strength.73

[84]

On Sunday, 14 December, Stimson went over
the problem with Marshall, and found that he,
too, felt that the United States could not
abandon the effort, however desperate, since
to do so would be to "paralyze the activities
of everybody in the Far East." The Secretary
again went to the President, who at once agreed
and instructed the Navy to co-operate.74The War Department thereupon assured
MacArthur:

Your messages of December thirteenth and
fourteenth have bean studied by the President.
The strategic importance of the Philippines
is fully recognized and there has been and
will be no repeat no wavering in the determination
to support you. The problem of supply 1S complicated
by Naval losses in the Pacific but as recommended
in yours of December fourteenth bomber and
pursuit re-enforcements and to be rushed to
you. Keep us advised of the situation as you
see it.75

On 15 December Marshall ordered two transports
to be loaded to take pursuit planes and ammunition
to Australia.76On the following day and the morning
of 17 December two, additional shipments were
scheduled, which would bring to 230 the pursuit
planes shipped from the United States to Australia
by early January, in addition to the eighteen
in the Pensacola convoy. 77How to get these planes from Australia
to the Philippines was something else again.
General Marshall had asked Admiral Stark to
see whether the Navy would make an aircraft
carrier available.78Meanwhile, General Arnold was hurrying
preparations to send eighty heavy bomber (B-24's)
1 via Cairo, three a day, for use in ferrying
critical supplies between Australia and the
Philippines.79

Conferences on Coalition Strategy against
Japan

The determination to do what was possible did not signify that the War Department
thought there was much chance of saving the Philippines. But it did represent
a step in defining American strategy in the Pacific. The President, in adopting
the policy of reinforcing the Philippines, had clearly indicated the direction
of American strategy in the Par Eastern area. The next step was to correlate
American strategy with the plans of the other powers arrayed against Japan.
Several days before Roosevelt declared himself, Chiang Kai-shek had urged
the President to offer a plan for joint action by the powers at war with Japan.80The President, who had already been considering such a step, now proposed
that two military conferences be held concurrently in the ear East by representatives
of the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and China-- one at Chungking
to which the Soviet Union should be invited to send a

[85]

representative) to consult on strategy on
the Asiatic mainland, and one at Singapore
to consult on operations in the Southwest Pacific.
The purpose of these meetings was to consider
plans to occupy Japanese forces on all fronts
in an effort to prevent them from concentrating
forces on one objective after another.81Maj. Gen. George H. Brett, then in India,
was designated the War Department representative
for the proposed Chungking conference, to be
assisted by General Magruder, already in Chungking.
Lt. Col. Francis G. Brink, the U. S. military
observer in Singapore, was named War Department
representative for the conversations at Singapore.

The President may have been under the impression
that Japanese forces were overextended, presenting,
in the words of MacArthur, a "golden opportunity"
for a "master stroke." General MacArthur
himself hoped that the soviet Union would take
advantage of the opportunity, and the War Department
at first shared his hope. 82But Stalin had meanwhile made it plain
that the Soviet Union was not going to do so.83MacArthur for some time persisted in
the belief that the U. S. Pacific Fleet should
make a diversionary counterattack west of Hawaii,
but the fleet was actually much too

weak to do so.84The Chinese actually was incapable of
offensive action. There was, therefore, no
real threat to prevent the Japanese from concentrating
air and naval strength against one after another
of the widely separated positions then held
by the Allies in the Southwest Pacific and
south eastern Asia.

The conferences held at Chungking (17 and
23 December) and at Singapore (18 and 20 December)
nevertheless served to demonstrate that the
United States Government was not preparing
to withdraw from the Far Eastern war but was,
instead, determined to take a more active parts.
85

[86]

The President saw them as part of a worldwide
effort to establish international military
collaboration on a more permanent basis, which
also encompassed the British-American meetings
scheduled to begin shortly in Washington, and
conversations in Moscow, which he proposed,
between representatives of the Soviet Union,
the United States, Great Britain, and China.86

The Singapore conference produced the first
concrete proposal for such collaboration. According
to the War Department representative, Colonel
Brink, the conference clearly showed "an
immediate need for one supreme head over a
combined allied stall' for detailed coordination
of USA British Australia and Dutch measures
for movements to their designated locations,
institution arid maintenance of air and sea
lines of communication and the strategic direction
of all operations in Pacific area." The
logical location of the Allied headquarters
would be at Bandung in Java, and "unofficial
opinions" among the representatives at
Singapore indicated that a "USA Commander
acquainted with the Pacific area would not
only be acceptable but desirable." 87

Along with the first orders for moving planes
and ammunition to the Far Fast and the President's
proposal of regional military conferences among
the powers fighting Japan, went another development
of great strategic significance-the decision
to establish an advanced American military
base at Port Darwin in northern Australia.
This decision was a logical consequence of
the determination to continue the fight in
the southwest Pacific: whatever might happen.
To carve this decision into effect in the War
Department, which was certain to be a full-time
job, General Marshall selected a staff officer,
Brig. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, who saw the
problem as he himself did, who knew the situation
in the far Pacific, and who had the very important
added qualification that he knew MacArthur
very well. On 14 December General Eisenhower
presented himself to General Marshall. Marshall
gave him the problem of Far Eastern strategy
to work on. Eisenhower came back with the answer
that the United States must keep open the Pacific
line of communication to Australia and go ahead
as fast as possible to establish a military
base there. This answer corresponded with the
conclusion reached that day by Stimson and
Marshall and approved by the President.
Marshall told Eisenhower to go ahead. 88On 17 December General Marshall approved
Eisenhower's plan for establishing a base in
Australia.89It was first of all to be an air base,
and, as had been recommended by his staff,
he designated a senior Air officer to take
command-General Brett, who was then attending
the Allied military conference at Chungking.90Brig. Gen. Henry

[87]

B. Clagett was ordered from the Philippines
to take over command from Barnes until Brett
arrived.

The forces in Australia thus became the nucleus
of a new overseas command even though they
were still part of MacArthur's U. S. Army Forces
in the Far East and had the primary mission
of getting vitally needed supplies to the Philippines.91It was evident that the establishment
of this new command implied a more comprehensive
strategy in the Southwest Pacific than the
desperate effort to prolong the defense of
the Philippines. Stimson at once saw this and
stated the thesis very clearly to three of
his civilian assistants

I laid before them the issue which was now
pending before us, namely as to whether we
should make every effort possible in the Far
Fast or whether, like the Navy, we should treat
that as doomed and let it go. We all agreed
that the first course was the one to follow;
that we have a very good chance of making a
successful defense, taking the southwestern
Pacific as a whole. If we are driven out of
the Philippines and Singapore, we can still
fall back on the Netherlands East Indies and
Australia; and with the cooperation of China-if
we can keep that going-we can strike good counterblows
at Japan. While if we yielded to the defeatist
theory, it would have not only the disastrous
effect on our material policy of letting Japan
get strongly ensconced in the southwestern
Pacific which would be a terribly hard job
to get her out of, but it would psychologically
do even more in the discouragement of China
and in fact all of the four powers who are
now fighting very well together. Also it would
have a very bad effect on Russia. So this theory
goes. It has been accepted by the President,
and the Army is taking steps to make a solid
base at Port Darwin in Australia.92

During the following week events made it clear to all concerned that the
United States was committing itself to the defense of the Southwest Pacific,
in collaboration with its allies, and not simply to the reinforcement of the
Philippines. The Manila-bound convoy arrived at Brisbane on 22 December. On
the same day General Clagett flew in from the Philippines to take temporary
command of Army forces in Australia, pending the arrival of Brett. Clagett
reported that, after the unloading of the aircraft, the convoy was to go on
to Port Darwin, picking up its escort from the Asiatic Fleet at the Torres
Strait (between New Guinea and -Australia), as ordered by MacArthur, in the
hope that Marshall would get the Navy to try to run the convoy through to
the Philippines. 93But the Japanese had already made their first landing in Sarawak (
in Borneo). and another force was on its way to Jolo (between Mindanao and
Borneo). The isolation of the Philippines was nearly complete.

MacArthur had not yet given up the other
hope that planes might be brought by carrier
to within flying distance of the Philippines,
as he had earlier recommended.94The War Department at once answered
that it was out of the question.95
The Japanese

[88]

DRAFT MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT with revisions in General
Marshall's handwriting, and message for
Brig. Gen. John A. Magruder which was
inclosed. (Blurred stamps dated "Jan
2 1951," indicate declassification
of document.

meanwhile had been getting ready for the
invasion of Luzon, and MacArthur foresaw that
his forces would have to fall back through
central Luzon to the final defensive positions
on Bataan peninsula, covering Corregidor, according
to long-established plans.96In view of this estimate of the situation,
the War Department discounted heavily the possibility
of any pursuit planes at all getting to the
Philippines, even if a route could be found
to fly them northward from island to island.
MacArthur was left to extract such reassurance
as he might from the declaration that the War
Department would nevertheless "press in
every way for the development of a strong United
Mates air power in the Far East based on Australia."
97The same estimate of the situation caused
the War Department to send word to General
Brett at Chungking to get to Australia as quickly
as possible "to assume command of U. S.
Army interests in that region." 98On 24 December MacArthur announced that
he had ordered south to the Netherlands Indies
and Australia what was left of his own heavy
bomber force--- fourteen B-17's --which could
no longer operate for lack of fighter protection.99The President in turn then recognized
that "there was little likelihood that
the land and air re-enforcements now on their
way from the U. S. via Australia could arrive
at their destination." He wanted them
to be used "in whatever manner might best
serve the joint cause in the Far East."
100

The plan for establishing a "solid"
base in Australia had by that time become a
major commitment of Army air forces. The immediate
goal was to establish nine combat groups in
the Southwest Pacific-two heavy and two medium
bombardment groups, one light bombardment group,
and four pursuit groups. A part of this force
one group of medium bombers and two pursuit
groups-was allocated to the defense of the
Netherlands Indies.101

This force represented the largest projected concentration of American air
power outside the Western Hemisphere, considerably larger than the forces
that had been scheduled for shipment to the Philippines before 7 December,
and a very substantial part of the fifty-four groups that the army expected
to have by the end of the winter. Furthermore, it would require a heavy investment
in crews and planes to build up these forces- much larger than the investment
to build up comparable forces elsewhere-since the rate of attrition would
at first be high, as a result not only of action by numerically superior enemy
forces but also of the constant use of hastily organized half-trained
units operating from improvised bases in unfamiliar areas at the end of a
long, uncertain supply line. The commitment to bring these air forces up to
pro-

[95]

jetted strength would evidently affect all
other strategic plans, by further widening
the existing gap between planes and air units
available and planes and air units needed to
carve them out.

It was less evident at first, except to staff officers working on detailed
plans, that another immediately critical effect on strategy would be to intensify
the shortage of ships and naval escort vessels. These officers began estimating
what it would take to build airfields in Australia (at Townsville and Port
Darwin), to finish building airfields on the way from Hawaii to Australia,
to construct the port facilities required, to defend these installations against
raids, and to quarter and ration the troops employed. Most of the men and
most of the supplies and equipment would have to be shipped from the continental
United States. The first demand on ships and naval escort vessels was to move
goods to the United Kingdom. If the defense of the South and Southwest Pacific
came next, what would remain to meet other Allied demands, to reinforce overseas
garrisons, to deploy American troops in the North Atlantic, and to send expeditionary
forces into the South Atlantic? These hard questions were much in Army planners
minds when the first wartime British-American staff conference opened in Washington,
24 December 1941, after two and a half weeks of American participation in
open hostilities.