ACCORDING to the formal division of the subject of these papers, announced in my first number, there
would appear still to remain for discussion two points: "the analogy of the proposed government to your
own State constitution," and "the additional security which its adoption will afford to republican
government, to liberty, and to property." But these heads have been so fully anticipated and exhausted in
the progress of the work, that it would now scarcely be possible to do any thing more than repeat, in a
more dilated form, what has been heretofore said, which the advanced stage of the question, and the time
already spent upon it, conspire to forbid.
It is remarkable, that the resemblance of the plan of the convention to the act which organizes the
government of this State holds, not less with regard to many of the supposed defects, than to the real
excellences of the former. Among the pretended defects are the re-eligibility of the Executive, the want of
a council, the omission of a formal bill of rights, the omission of a provision respecting the liberty of the
press. These and several others which have been noted in the course of our inquiries are as much
chargeable on the existing constitution of this State, as on the one proposed for the Union; and a man
must have slender pretensions to consistency, who can rail at the latter for imperfections which he finds
no difficulty in excusing in the former. Nor indeed can there be a better proof of the insincerity and
affectation of some of the zealous adversaries of the plan of the convention among us, who profess to be
the devoted admirers of the government under which they live, than the fury with which they have
attacked that plan, for matters in regard to which our own constitution is equally or perhaps more
vulnerable.

The additional securities to republican government, to liberty and to property, to be derived from the
adoption of the plan under consideration, consist chiefly in the restraints which the preservation of the
Union will impose on local factions and insurrections, and on the ambition of powerful individuals in
single States, who may acquire credit and influence enough, from leaders and favorites, to become the
despots of the people; in the diminution of the opportunities to foreign intrigue, which the dissolution of
the Confederacy would invite and facilitate; in the prevention of extensive military establishments, which
could not fail to grow out of wars between the States in a disunited situation; in the express guaranty of a
republican form of government to each; in the absolute and universal exclusion of titles of nobility; and in
the precautions against the repetition of those practices on the part of the State governments which have
undermined the foundations of property and credit, have planted mutual distrust in the breasts of all
classes of citizens, and have occasioned an almost universal prostration of morals.
Thus have I, fellow-citizens, executed the task I had assigned to myself; with what success, your conduct
must determine. I trust at least you will admit that I have not failed in the assurance I gave you respecting
the spirit with which my endeavors should be conducted. I have addressed myself purely to your
judgments, and have studiously avoided those asperities which are too apt to disgrace political disputants
of all parties, and which have been not a little provoked by the language and conduct of the opponents of
the Constitution. The charge of a conspiracy against the liberties of the people, which has been
indiscriminately brought against the advocates of the plan, has something in it too wanton and too
malignant, not to excite the indignation of every man who feels in his own bosom a refutation of the
calumny. The perpetual changes which have been rung upon the wealthy, the well-born, and the great,
have been such as to inspire the disgust of all sensible men. And the unwarrantable concealments and
misrepresentations which have been in various ways practiced to keep the truth from the public eye, have
been of a nature to demand the reprobation of all honest men. It is not impossible that these circumstances
may have occasionally betrayed me into intemperances of expression which I did not intend; it is certain
that I have frequently felt a struggle between sensibility and moderation; and if the former has in some
instances prevailed, it must be my excuse that it has been neither often nor much.

Let us now pause and ask ourselves whether, in the course of these papers, the proposed Constitution has
not been satisfactorily vindicated from the aspersions thrown upon it; and whether it has not been shown
to be worthy of the public approbation, and necessary to the public safety and prosperity. Every man is
bound to answer these questions to himself, according to the best of his conscience and understanding,
and to act agreeably to the genuine and sober dictates of his judgment....