CRS Annotated Constitution

Fugitive From
Justice: Defined.—To be a fugitive from justice within the meaning of
this clause, it is not necessary that the party charged
should have left the State after an indictment found or
for the purpose of avoiding a prosecution anticipated or
begun. It is sufficient that the accused, having committed
a crime within one State and having left the jurisdiction
before being subjected to criminal process, is found
within another State.227 The motive which induced the
departure is immaterial.228 Even if he were brought
involuntarily into the State where found by requisition
from another State, he may be surrendered to a third State
upon an extradition warrant.229 A person indicted a
second time for the same offense is nonetheless a fugitive
from justice by reason of the fact that after dismissal of
the first indictment, on which he was originally indicted,
he left the State with the knowledge of, or without
objection by, state authorities.230 But a
defendant cannot be extradited if he was only
constructively present in the demanding State at the time
of the commission of the crime charged.231
For the purpose of determining who is a fugitive from
justice, the words “treason, felony or other crime”
embrace every act forbidden and made punishable by a law
of a State,232 including
misdemeanors.233

Procedure for
Removal.—Only after a person has been charged with a crime in
the regular course of judicial proceedings is the governor
of a State entitled to make demand for his return from
another State.234 The person demanded has no
constitutional right to be heard before the governor of
the State in which he is found on the question whether he
has been substantially charged with crime and is a
fugitive from justice.235 The constitutionally
required surrender is not to be interfered with by habeas
corpus[p.880]upon speculations as to what
ought to be the result of a trial.236 Nor is it
proper thereby to inquire into the motives controlling the
actions of the governors of the demanding and surrendering
States.237 Matters of defense, such as the running
of the statute of limitations,238 or the
contention that continued confinement in the prison of the
demanding State would amount to cruel and unjust
punishment,239 cannot be heard on habeas
corpus but should be tested in the courts of the demanding
State, where all parties may be heard, where all pertinent
testimony will be readily available, and where suitable
relief, if any, may be fashioned. A defendant will,
however, be discharged on habeas corpus if he shows by
clear and satisfactory evidence that he was outside the
demanding State at the time of the crime.240
If, however, the evidence is conflicting, habeas corpus is
not a proper proceeding to try the question of
alibi.241 The habeas court’s role is, therefore,
very limited.242

Trial of
Fugitives After Removal.—There is nothing in the Constitution or laws of the
United States which exempts an offender, brought before
the courts of a State for an offense against its laws,
from trial and punishment, even though he was brought from
another State by unlawful violence,243 or by abuse
of legal process,244 and a fugitive lawfully
extradited from another State may be tried for an offense
other than that for which he was surrendered.245
The rule is different, however, with respect to fugitives
surrendered by a foreign government, pursuant to treaty.
In that case the offender may be tried only “for the
offense with which he is charged in the proceedings for
his extradition, until a reasonable time and opportunity
have been given him, after his release or trial upon such
charge, to return to the country from whose asylum he had
been forcibly taken under those proceedings.”246

Clause 3.
No person held to Service or Labour in one State,
under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in
Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be
discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be
delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or
Labour may be due.

This clause contemplated the existence of a positive
unqualified right on the part of the owner of a slave
which no state law could in any way regulate, control, or
restrain. Consequently the owner of a slave had the same
right to seize and repossess him in another State, as the
local laws of his own State conferred upon him, and a
state law which penalized such seizure was held
unconstitutional.247 Congress had the power and the
duty, which it exercised by the Act of February 12,
1793,248 to carry into effect the rights given by
this section,249 and the States had no
concurrent power to legislate on the subject.250
However, a state statute providing a penalty for harboring
a fugitive slave was held not to conflict with this clause
since it did not affect the right or remedy either of the
master or the slave; by it the State simply prescribed a
rule of conduct for its own citizens in the exercise of
its police power.251