STANFORD FIN'L: Judge to Rule If Ponzi Scheme Covered by SIPC-------------------------------------------------------------Bill Rochelle, the bankruptcy columnist for Bloomberg News,reports that a U.S. District Judge in Washington held a hearingJan. 24 on the request of the U.S. Securities and ExchangeCommission to force the Securities Investor Protection Corp. toinitiate a liquidation of the R. Allen Stanford Ponzi scheme. Ifgranted, SIPC would pay both costs of the liquidation and atleast a portion of customers' claims. SIPC answered by arguingthat the Stanford fraud involves certificates of deposit issuedby a bank in Antigua, not a broker in the U.S. that's a member ofSIPC. SIPC says that its mandate from Congress is to providepayment only for claims of customers of brokers that are coveredby SIPC. The case is Securities and Exchange Commission v.Securities Investor Protection Corp., 11-mc-00678, U.S. DistrictCourt, District of Columbia (Washington).

About Stanford International Bank

Domiciled in Antigua, Stanford International Bank Limited --http://www.stanfordinternationalbank.com/-- is a member of Stanford Private Wealth Management, a global financial servicesnetwork with US$51 billion in deposits and assets undermanagement or advisement. Stanford Private Wealth Managementserves more than 70,000 clients in 140 countries.

On Feb. 16, 2009, the United States District Court for theNorthern District of Texas, Dallas Division, signed an orderappointing Ralph Janvey as receiver for all the assets andrecords of Stanford International Bank, Ltd., Stanford GroupCompany, Stanford Capital Management, LLC, Robert Allen Stanford,James M. Davis and Laura Pendergest-Holt and of all entities theyown or control. The February 16 order, as amended March 12,2009, directs the Receiver to, among other things, take controland possession of and to operate the Receivership Estate, and toperform all acts necessary to conserve, hold, manage and preservethe value of the Receivership Estate.

The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, on Feb. 17, chargedbefore the U.S. District Court in Dallas, Texas, Mr. Stanford andthree of his companies for orchestrating a fraudulent, multi-billion dollar investment scheme centering on an US$8 billionCertificate of Deposit program.

A criminal case was pursued against him in June before the U.S.District Court in Houston, Texas. Mr. Stanford pleaded notguilty to 21 charges of multi-billion dollar fraud, money-laundering and obstruction of justice. Assistant AttorneyGeneral Lanny Breuer, as cited by Agence France-Presse News, saidin a 57-page indictment that Mr. Stanford could face up to 250years in prison if convicted on all charges. Mr. Stanfordsurrendered to U.S. authorities after a warrant was issued forhis arrest on the criminal charges.

The criminal case is U.S. v. Stanford, H-09-342, U.S. DistrictCourt, Southern District of Texas (Houston). The civil case isSEC v. Stanford International Bank, 3:09-cv-00298-N, U.S.District Court, Northern District of Texas (Dallas).

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VIRGOLINO FINANCE: Fitch Puts 'B' Rating on Sr. Unsecured Notes----------------------------------------------------------------Fitch Ratings has assigned foreign and local currency IssuerDefault Ratings (IDRs) of 'B' to Virgolino de Oliveira S/A Acucare Alcool (GVO) and to Virgolino de Oliveira Finance S/A(Virgolino Finance). The Rating Outlook is Stable. VirgolinoFinance is a fully owned subsidiary of GVO. Fitch has alsoassigned a rating of 'B/RR4' to Virgolino Finance's proposedsenior unsecured notes of approximately USD200 million for atenor up to 10 years. The recovery rating follows Fitch's softcap for recovery ratings in Brazil of 'RR4'. The notes areunconditionally guaranteed by GVO, Agropecuaria Nossa Senhora doCarmo S/A, Acucareira Virgolino de Oliveira S/A and AgropecuariaTerras Novas S/A. Net proceeds from this proposed issuance willbe used for general corporate purposes, including the repaymentof existing debt, the financing of capital expenditures and thestrengthening of cash reserves.

GVO's strategic shareholding position in Copersucar fundamentallysupports the ratings at their current level. GVO and VirgolinoFinance's ratings also reflect the consolidated financial profileof the group, in particular its leveraged capital structure andtight liquidity position. The ratings further incorporate thegroup's exposure to the cyclicality of the sugar and ethanolcommodities' price cycle, as well as the volatility of cash flowgeneration, exposing the group to refinancing risk. They alsoreflect the exposure of GVO's sugar cane production business tovolatile weather conditions, foreign currency risk relative to aportion of its debt; and the risk of governmental interference inthe ethanol commercialization policies within the local market.The ratings benefit from GVO's adequate business model and thegeographical location of its production units.Competitive Advantages Linked to GVO's participation inCopersucar:

GVO benefits from EBITDAR margins above the industry average andgood access to financing, mitigating the risks derived from itsmiddle-tier business position within the industry. The companyalso benefits from the favorable prospects related to ethanolconsumption in the country and Brazil's significant presence inthe global sugar trade. GVO's main challenges are related to theexpansion of its agricultural activities. The execution ofnecessary crop investments in order to allow for better capacityutilization and higher processing volumes are key to sustain anincrease in its consolidated operational cash flow over the nextfew years and, consequently, to lower its leverage ratios.

Strengthened Business Profile:

GVO's position as the largest Copersucar shareholder strengthensits financial and business profiles. The group benefits fromCopersucar's robust scale, which results in mitigated demandrisks, lower logistics costs and better stability in thecompany's collection flow. GVO also benefits from lessrestrictive access to liquidity during challenging operatingscenarios when compared to other peers in the agribusiness, dueto the credit lines provided by Copersucar. GVO holds 10.36% ofCopersucar's total capital. Copersucar's large scale businessaccounts for approximately 18% of sugar and ethanol sales in theCentral South region of Brazil and 10% of the sugar internationalmarket, making it an important price making agent. Copersucarhas 48 partner mills with a combined sugar cane crushing capacityof around 115 million tons per year and also counts on salescontracts with non-partner mills, in a lesser extent.

GVO sells 100% of its production to Copersucar, through a longterm exclusivity contract, mitigating demand risk. Prices forits products are linked to the average sugar and ethanol marketprices plus a premium (Esalq+2%). The premium is possible due tologistics savings and scale gains obtained through thepartnership with Copersucar. GVO is responsible for theagricultural activities and for the sugar and ethanol production,while Copersucar is responsible for all commercial activities andassociated logistics, as well as for the implementation ofhedging policies. Copersucar remunerates GVO based on therealized production on a monthly basis during the year,independently of the moment the sale to the final customeroccurs. This translates to a higher flexibility in GVO's workingcapital management compared to other companies that faceseasonality in their activities. GVO's businesses are exposed tothe volatility of the sugar and ethanol prices. However, therisks of future sales operations through derivatives transactionsand eventual margin calls remain under Copersucar'sresponsibility.

Standalone Liquidity Remains Weak:

GVO's liquidity position remains weak, despite a number of longterm financing transactions that closed during the last year. Asof Oct. 31, 2011, the group reported a cash position of BRL127.8million that covered only 23% of its short-term debt. Partiallymitigating refinancing risk, GVO's financial profile benefitsfrom a significant working capital financing line, in the amountof up to 40% of its annual revenues, equivalent to approximatelyBRL400 million, granted by Copersucar. This credit line issubject to certain limits in terms of revenues and it is linkedto guarantees on inventories and/or bank guarantees. Thisfacility is an important liquidity source for GVO, especially inperiods of more restrictive access to credit.

Leverage Still High:

GVO improved its leverage ratios over recent periods, butcompared to 2009 and 2008, they still remain relatively high.The group's high debt level derives mainly from large investmentsmade to double production capacity, which were badly timed withthe global economic crisis and the downward cycle of the sugarand ethanol industry. These events severely impacted GVO'scredit metrics during 2008 and 2009. The group's net debt toEBITDA ratio reached the peak of 13.0 times (x) as of April 30,2008, being reduced along the last two years, due mainly to theincrease in production capacity with the start-up of newindustrial facilities and the robust sugar and ethanol averageprices in the period. GVO's consolidated net adjusteddebt/EBITDAR adjusted by dividends received from Copersucar ratiofor the last 12 months (LTM) ended on April 30, 2011 was 4.4x.This ratio should be maintained at around 4.3x for the LTM endingApril 30, 2012, with a trend of moderate reduction in followingyears. This prediction assumes average prices of sugar, hydrousethanol and anhydrous ethanol of up to BRL850/ton, BRL950/m3 andBRL1050/m3, respectively. These prices compared to averageprices of BRL1040/ton, BRL962/m3 and BRL1100/m3 in 2010,respectively.

Positive Free Cash Flow, Despite Higher Capital Expenditures:

GVO presented a significant decline of 24.6% in sugar caneprocessing volumes for the LTM ending April 30, 2011. Productionreached 8.8 million tones. This performance reflected thenegative impact of the Brazilian harvest due to unfavorableweather conditions and low investments in sugar cane croprenovation over the last few years. However, the group's netrevenues on a consolidated basis remained relatively stablecompared to the previous year, reaching BRL1 billion. Thisresult was obtained due to a sales mix more focused on sugar andto the maintenance of robust average prices for both sugar andethanol. During the same period, the group reported EBITDARadjusted for dividends received from Copersucar of BRL349million, compared to BRL359 million in April 2010. Dividendsfrom Copersucar totaled BRL40 million in the 2010/2011 harvestperiod.

GVO's consolidated funds from operations (FFO) and cash flow fromoperations (CFO) were BRL310 million and BRL264 million,respectively, for the LTM ended on April 30, 2011. Thisperformance compares to BRL180 million and BRL235 million,respectively, for the same period 2010. Capex totaled BRL 220million for the recent LTM period, higher than the amounts spentin the previous years. This increase is mainly due to higherexpenses related to the expansion and renovation of sugar caneplantations. This is important to sustain higher sugar canecrushing volumes in the next crop periods in order to increasethe group's operational cash flow generation. Free cash flow(FCF) was BRL44 million for the period. During the next fewyears, investments are expected to return to lower levels,between BRL110 million-130 million per year, concentrating on theagricultural area. Fitch expects GVO to generate positive FCFfrom 2012.

Moderate Exposure to FX Fluctuations:

GVO's debt profile is moderately exposed to foreign exchangemovements. As of Oct. 31, 2011, consolidated adjusted debtincluding obligations related to leased land was BRL1.8 billion.The debt comprised an international notes issuance (27%); loansgranted by Copersucar (21%); financings from the BrazilianEconomic Social and Development Bank (BNDES, 15%); exportprepayment transactions (11%) and others (26%). For the sameperiod, only the notes issuance was exposed to exchange risks asthere was no protection through derivatives for this operation.During the LTM ended April 30, 2011, 55% of GVO's revenues werefrom exports.

Adequate Business Profile:

GVO has an adequate business profile, based on its favorablelocation, diversified production base and operationalflexibility. The group consists of four industrial units locatedin the State of Sao Paulo, conveniently located near the mainconsumption markets and export channels. GVO has an installedcrushing capacity for 12 million tons of sugar cane, withflexibility to reach up to 60% of total capacity for sugar orethanol. The group's production is totally integrated andbenefits from sugar cane supply from its own and leased land forapproximately 40% of its needs. The remaining 60% is supplied bythird parties, through long term contracts and there is no supplyconcentration above 5%.

Key Rating Drivers:

Negative rating actions could be driven by lower than expectedoperational cash flow generation or deterioration of GVO'soperating margins. Improvement in the group's liquidity positioncoupled with a longer and more manageable debt maturity profilewith lower leverage levels, could lead to a positive ratingaction.

"The rating on VOF's senior notes is the same as the global-scalecorporate credit rating on Virgolino, because we believe nosignificant subordination to senior secured creditors will exist.Virgolino's secured debt is also overcollateralized byshareholders' assets, and the company will partly use theproceeds of the notes to pay down existing secured debt. Thecompany will also use the notes to finance the renewal andexpansion of its sugarcane fields," S&P said.

"The rating reflects Virgolino's high debt and its challenges toincrease production in the next several years, given its agingsugarcane fields and resulting low capacity utilization (70% ofits annual 12 million ton sugarcane crushing capacity). Theproduction and cash flow dropped due to poor weather conditionsand low investments in field renewal. Although we believe sugarand ethanol prices should remain strong for the next crop seasondue to tight supply-demand balances, Virgolino is exposed tomargin swings due to price volatility. Risk factors also includeits limited product and geographic diversity and climate risk.The partly mitigating factors are its membership in Copersucar --a large cooperative of 43 Brazilian sugar and ethanol producers-- lower-than-peers' operating and logistic costs, and affordableworking credit facilities to finance its production," S&P said.

===========================C A Y M A N I S L A N D S===========================

Renowned journalist Cliff Hughes, on his Nationwide radioprogram, disclosed that a 'reliable source' told him that LIMEJamaica would be closing its doors, according to JamaicaObserver.

"LIME is reiterating that it is 100 per cent committed to Jamaicaand denies reports circulating in the media which raisesquestions about our future operations. We would like to assureour employees, our loyal customers, our shareholders, oursuppliers, and the wider public that we remain committed toserving them. It is therefore imperative that we are notdistracted from the real issues plaguing the country's telecom'ssector," LIME said in a statement obtained by the news agency.

The report notes that Lachlan Johnston, LIME's parent Cable &Wireless Communications Plc's Director of Brand andCommunications in London, said that: We have not spoken with aMr. Cliff Hughes from Jamaica about pulling out of that marketand we were equally surprised by that news item. We have no ideawhere Mr. Hughes got his information and it was no waysubstantiated by us. The government of Jamaica is fully aware ofour commitment to the country and our desire for betterregulations that ensure a level playing field. It, too, must beincredulous as to this announcement. The team in Jamaica headedby Chris Dehring, Gary Sinclair and Grace Silvera operate thatbusiness and has said that LIME is not pulling out and thatremains the case.

Jamaica Observer discloses that LIME did lose JM$2.6 billion in asix-month period and its operating costs continue to escalate,but that does not necessarily mean that it will be pulling out ofJamaica.

* JAMAICA: Unemployment on the Rise, Statin Data Shows------------------------------------------------------RJR News reports that the Statistical Institute of Jamaica,(Statin), said the unemployment rate in Jamaica has increased.

Statin said its measures show unemployment in October, which isthe last month for which data is available, rose to 12.8%,according to RJR News.

By comparison, the report notes that the unemployment rate inJuly was 12.3%.

RJR News discloses that the higher unemployment rate was realizeddespite 5,500 net new jobs being created between August andSeptember. The report says that is because more people joinedthe labor force than jobs were created.

In all, 9,400 people joined the labor force between August andOctober, RJR News adds.

* * *

As of Nov. 16, 2011, the country continues to carry Standard andPoor's "C" short-term debt ratings and "B-" long-term debtratings.

===========M E X I C O===========

VITRO SAB: Bondholders' Appeal Goes to US Circuit Court in March----------------------------------------------------------------Bill Rochelle, the bankruptcy columnist for Bloomberg News,reports that Mexican glassmaker Vitro SAB won another skirmish onJan. 24 in the U.S. Court of Appeals in New Orleans. Holders ofsome of the US$1.2 billion in defaulted bonds may end up winningthe war when the circuit court hears arguments in an expeditedappeal in early March.

According to the report, Vitro succeeded in persuading the U.S.Bankruptcy Judge in Dallas to halt a lawsuit the bondholdersfiled in New York state court against Vitro subsidiaries not inbankruptcy in any country. The bankruptcy judge ruled that thestate-court suit was automatically halted by the parent's Chapter15 case because the bondholders wanted the judge to rule that thesubsidiaries should oppose approval of the parent'sreorganization plan. In a two-page ruling Jan. 24, the appealscourt said it was important to hold an expedited appeal toconsider "an issue of first impression regarding whether theautomatic stay extends to protect Vitro's non-debtorsubsidiaries." The appellate court told Vitro and thebondholders to file all their briefs by Feb. 15.

The report relates that in the Jan. 24 ruling, the appeals courtgave Vitro at least a temporary victory by allowing thebankruptcy court's opinion to stand until the appeal is argued inMarch. As a result, the New York state suit remains frozen. TheJan. 24 ruling was the second time this month that the circuitcourt refused to allow the state suit to go ahead on a temporarybasis.

In the New York suit, the bondholders want the judge to rule thatnon-bankrupt Vitro subsidiaries must vote against the parent'sreorganization pending in a court in Mexico. Bondholders areopposing the Mexican parent's reorganization because it's basedon votes from subsidiaries to overwhelm opposition frombondholders.

About Vitro SAB

Headquartered in Monterrey, Mexico, Vitro, S.A.B. de C.V. (BMV:VITROA; NYSE: VTO), through its two subsidiaries, Vitro EnvasesNorteamerica, SA de C.V. and Vimexico, S.A. de C.V., is a globalglass producer, serving the construction and automotive glassmarkets and glass containers needs of the food, beverage, wine,liquor, cosmetics and pharmaceutical industries.

Vitro is the largest manufacturer of glass containers and flatglass in Mexico, with consolidated net sales in 2009 of MXN23,991million (US$1.837 billion).

Vitro defaulted on its debt in 2009, and sought to restructurearound US$1.5 billion in debt, including US$1.2 billion in notes.Vitro launched an offer to buy back or swap US$1.2 billion indebt from bondholders. The tender offer would be consummatedwith a bankruptcy filing in Mexico and Chapter 15 filing in theUnited States. Vitro said noteholders would recover as much as73% by exchanging existing debt for cash, new debt or convertiblebonds.

Concurso Mercantil & Chapter 15 Proceedings

Vitro SAB on Dec. 13, 2010, filed its voluntary petition for apre-packaged Concurso Plan in the Federal District Court forCivil and Labor Matters for the State of Nuevo Leon, commencingits voluntary concurso mercantil proceedings -- the Mexicanequivalent of a prepackaged Chapter 11 reorganization. Vitro SABalso commenced parallel proceedings under Chapter 15 of the U.S.Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 10-16619) in Manhattanon Dec. 13, 2010, to seek U.S. recognition and deference to itsbankruptcy proceedings in Mexico.

Early in January 2011, the Mexican Court dismissed the ConcursoMercantil proceedings. The judge said Vitro couldn't pushthrough a plan to buy back or swap US$1.2 billion in debt frombondholders based on the vote of US$1.9 billion of intercompanydebt when third-party creditors were opposed. Vitro as a resultdismissed the first Chapter 15 petition following the ruling bythe Mexican court.

On April 12, 2011, an appellate court in Mexico reinstated thereorganization. Accordingly, Vitro SAB on April 14 re-filed apetition for recognition of its Mexican reorganization in U.S.Bankruptcy Court in Manhattan (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 11-11754).

The Vitro parent told the Mexico stock exchange that it receivedsufficient acceptances of its reorganization pending in a courtin Monterrey. The approval vote was evidently obtained usingclaims of affiliates. The bondholders are opposing the Mexicanreorganization plan because shareholders could retain ownershipwhile bondholders aren't being paid in full. Bondholderspreviously cited an "independent analyst" who estimated theMexican plan was worth 49% to 54% of creditors' claims.

In the present Chapter 15 case, the Debtor seeks to block anycreditor suits in the U.S. pending the reorganization in Mexico.

Vitro engaged Susman Godfrey, L.L.P. as U.S. special litigationcounsel to analyze the potential rights that Vitro may exercisein the United States against the ad hoc group of dissidentbondholders and its advisors.

A larger group of noteholders, known as the Ad Hoc Group of VitroNoteholders -- comprised of holders, or investment advisors toholders, which represent approximately US$650 million of theSenior Notes due 2012, 2013 and 2017 issued by Vitro -- was notamong the Chapter 11 petitioners, although the group hasexpressed concerns over the exchange offer. The group says theexchange offer exposes Noteholders who consent to potentialadverse consequences that have not been disclosed by Vitro. Thegroup is represented by John Cunningham, Esq., and RichardKebrdle, Esq. at White & Case LLP.

The Debtor did not file a list of its largest unsecured creditorstogether with its petition.

The petition was signed by Jorge J. Unanue, president andsecretary.

SWISS CHALET: Can Employ Alvarez Sepulveda as Special Counsel-------------------------------------------------------------The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico hasgranted Swiss Chalet Inc. permission to employ Pablo R. AlvarezSepulveda, Law Office as special counsel for the Debtor, withcompensation to be paid in such amounts as may be allowed by theCourt upon proper application or applications.

Prior to the filing of its Chapter 11 petition, Debtor engagedthe services of Alvarez Sepulveda as its counsel in generalcorporate and labor matters including litigation before localcourts.

Pablo R. Alvarez Sepulveda, Esq., the principal of Pablo R.Alvarez Sepulveda Law Office, had assured the Court that his firmdoes not represent or hold any interest adverse to Debtor or tothe estate in respect to the matters on which Alvarez Sepulvedais to be employed, and that the firm, its associates and membersare disinterested persons as that term is defined under Section101(14) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Pablo R. Alvarez Sepulveda, Esq., will charge US$150 per hour,plus expenses, for work performed or to be performed.

About The Swiss Chalet Inc.

The Swiss Chalet Inc., developed the Gallery Plaza Condominiumand Atlantis Condominium in San Juan, Puerto Rico. SCI also ownsthe DoubleTree Hotel in Condado, San Juan, Puerto Rico, adjacentto the Gallery Plaza. SCI filed a Chapter 11 petition (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 11-04414) on May 27, 2011. Charles A. Cuprill,P.S.C. Law Offices, in San Juan, P.R., serves as its bankruptcycounsel. CPA Luis R. Carrasquillo & Co., P.S.C., serves as itsfinancial consultants. In its schedules, the Debtor disclosedtotal assets of US$115,580,977 and total debts of US$138,603,384.The petition was signed by Arnold Benus, director.

CL FIN'L: CLICO 'Challengers' Holding Out Until Court Ruling------------------------------------------------------------Julien Neaves at Trinidad Express reports that Peter Permell,chairman of Colonial Life Insurance Company Limited (CLICO)policyholders group, said that some policyholders are awaitingthe outcome of litigation challenging Trinidad and Tobago'sgovernment's repayment plan before accepting the state's offer.CLICO is a subsidiary of CL Financial Limited.

"Some policyholders have not availed themselves yet because theywaiting to see how the litigation plays itself out. So they sortof hedging their bets," Trinidad Express quoted Mr. Permell assaying.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America onJan. 16, 2012, Caribbean360.com said that a group of CLICOpolicyholders went again before the court to challenge Trinidadand Tobago government's refusal to pay them the full amount dueon their Executive Flexible Premium Annuities (EFPA).Caribbean360.com related that they were seeking an interim courtorder that Government give details of the assets of CLICO whichhas been sold and how the proceeds of the sales were applied.Mr. Maharaj said the lawsuit also sought to compel Government togive details of the EFPA policyholders who have been paid in fullsince January 2009, the report noted.

"We don't know where that is going but I suspect by June we willget a better idea as to what is going on with that litigation andthe number of policyholders who took up the offer," Mr. Permellsaid, Trinidad Express notes.

Mr. Permell said the revised offer by Government has been"rolling out quite smoothly" and noted that, according to FinanceMinister Winston Dookeran, about 2,000 of 15,000 policyholdershave taken up the offer, a payout so far of about TT1.1 billion,Trinidad Express adds.

About CL Financial

CL Financial Group Limited is a privately held conglomerate inTrinidad and Tobago. Founded as an insurance company by CyrilDuprey, Colonial Life Insurance Company was expanded into adiversified company by his nephew, Lawrence Duprey. CL Financialis now one of the largest local conglomerates in the region,encompassing over 65 companies in 32 countries worldwide withtotal assets standing at roughly US$100 billion.

* * *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America onAugust 10, 2009, A.M. Best Co. downgraded the financial strengthrating to C (Weak) from B (Fair) and issuer credit rating to"ccc" from "bb" of Colonial Life Insurance Company (Trinidad)Limited (CLICO) (Trinidad & Tobago). The ratings remain underreview with negative implications. CLICO is an insurance membercompany of CL Financial Limited (CL Financial), a diversifiedholding company based in Trinidad & Tobago.

According to a TCR-LA report on Feb. 20, 2009, citing Trinidadand Tobago Express, Tobago President George Maxwell Richardssigned bailout bills for CL Financial, giving the government theauthority to control the company's unit, Colonial Life InsuranceCompany, and giving the central bank extensive powers to treatwith CL Financial's collapse and the consequent systemic crisis.

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Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicativeprices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outsidesources during the prior week we think are reliable. Thosesources may not, however, be complete or accurate. The MondayBond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior topublication. Prices reported are not intended to reflect actualtrades. Prices for actual trades are probably different. Ourobjective is to share information, not make markets in publiclytraded securities. Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer orsolicitation to buy or sell any security of any kind. It islikely that some entity affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holdssome position in the issuers' public debt and equity securitiesabout which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies withinsolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on thelatest balance sheets publicly available a day prior topublication. At first glance, this list may look like thedefinitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at historicalcost net of depreciation may understate the true value of afirm's assets. A company may establish reserves on its balancesheet for liabilities that may never materialize. The prices atwhich equity securities trade in public market are determined bymore than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in eachThursday's edition of the TCR-LA. Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged. Send announcements toconferences@bankrupt.com

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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed tobe reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions formembers of the same firm for the term of the initial subscriptionor balance thereof are US$25 each. For subscription information,contact Peter Chapman at 240/629-3300.