162. Memorandum of Discussion at the 344th Meeting of the National
Security Council, Wednesday, November 12, 19571

General Cutler opened the meeting
by informing the Council that it was to hear a briefing of the annual
report submitted by the Net Evaluation Subcommittee of the NSC, pursuant to the directive recommended
by the Council and approved by the President on May 24, 1956 (NSC 5605). Under the terms of the
aforementioned directive, the Subcommittee was established as part of a
permanent procedure “to provide integrated evaluations of the net
capabilities of the USSR, in the event
of general war, to inflict direct injury upon the continental United
States and to provide continual watch for changes which would
significantly alter its net capabilities.” General Cutler identified [Page 673]the members of the NSC Subcommittee as follows: General
Twining, Chairman; the
Director, Office of Defense Mobilization; the Chairman, Atomic Energy
Commission; the Federal Civil Defense Administrator; the Director of
Central Intelligence; and the Chairmen of the Council’s Internal
Security Committees. He also referred to the Subcommittee’s Staff
Director, appointed by the President, General Gerald C. Thomas, USMC (Ret.).

General Cutler then introduced the
Chairman of the Subcommittee, General Twining, who in turn introduced General Thomas.

General Thomas summarized the Subcommittee’s terms of reference as
outlined in NSC 5605 noting that the
report covered the period through mid-1960. He added that, although the
USSR was not credited with an
ICBM capability in this year’s
report, the Russians will indeed have a substantial ICBM capability in 1960, according to
reliable reports recently received by the Subcommittee. General Thomas
indicated that in its war-gaming for purposes of this year’s report, the
Subcommittee omitted overseas bases, confining itself, insofar as U.S.
forces were concerned, to continental U.S. elements. He indicated that
at the outset the Subcommittee Staff prepared auxiliary terms of
reference and basic assumptions consistent with NSC 5605. These terms and assumptions facilitated the
making of a realistic evaluation of U.S. and USSR capabilities and vulnerabilities. After outlining the
Subcommittee’s general approach to the problem, General Thomas mentioned
briefly the several agencies which contributed to and otherwise
participated in the preparation of this year’s Net Evaluation
Report.

General Thomas next introduced Brig. General W. W. Smith, USAF, the Deputy Director of the
Subcommittee Staff. General Smith outlined in detail the basic
assumptions on which this year’s net evaluation exercise was based.
These included the assumption that the USSR would initiate war against the U.S. in mid-1960.
Proceeding on that assumption, the Subcommittee had war-gamed the attack
on the basis of its being perpetrated: (a) with no warning (strategic
surprise), and (b) with full warning (full alert) and with U.S. forces
on maximum sustainable alert.

General Smith thereafter outlined the auxiliary assumptions on which this
year’s evaluation was based. These included, but were not limited to,
the following: USSR would have adequate
bases from which to launch an attack; they would have adequate refueling
capability; they would be willing to expend some of their aircraft by
assigning them to one-way missions; their nuclear warheads would be set
to detonate on impact if the carrying aircraft were shot down; some of
their submarines would have guided missile capabilities; they would risk
strategic surprise in order to outflank the DEW Line; they would not engage in large-scale clandestine
attack, etc. Insofar as the [Page 674]U.S. is concerned, General Smith indicated that some of the auxiliary
assumptions included the following: the status of U.S. forces as of the
time of the attack would be the same as those actually in being on March
1, 1957; a substantial portion of SAC
would be in constant alert status; etc. General Smith then indicated
that four hypothetical Soviet attacks were planned by the Subcommittee:
(a) attack based on Strategic Surprise and aimed only at military
targets, (b) an attack based on Strategic Surprise and aimed at
composite targets, (c) an attack based on Full Alert and aimed only at
military targets, and (d) an attack based on Full Alert and aimed at
composite targets.

General Smith then called upon Colonel S. D. Kelsey, USAF, a member of the Subcommittee Staff,
who presented in detail the highlights of the USSR’s attack on the continental U.S. He was followed by
Captain W. R. Stevens, USN, a member of
the Subcommittee Staff, who outlined in some detail the retaliatory
attack made on the USSR by SAC. Colonel Kelsey then gave the results
of the country’s damage assessment insofar as the U.S. was concerned. He
was followed by Captain Stevens who summarized the results of the damage
inflicted on the USSR.

Dr. L. L. Montague, CIA, a member of the Subcommittee Staff, presented the
effects of Soviet clandestine operations on the continental U.S. [29 words not declassified]. Dr.
Montague was followed by Colonel J.D.
Raney,USA, a member of the
Subcommittee Staff, who outlined the military action resulting from
three alternative conditions of attack considered by the Subcommittee.
Colonel Raney also described the damage done to the U.S. under each of
these attacks. In essence, the conclusion was drawn that under any of
the attack conditions described by Colonel Raney, the survival of the
U.S. would hang in the balance.

General Thomas concluded the Staff presentation by noting that any
evaluation of net capabilities at a time three years hence was
necessarily speculative. As a consequence, the estimates made could be
either high or low, but in any event were considered by the Subcommittee
to be as realistic as any that could be made at this time. General
Thomas noted that the Subcommittee report highlighted a number of
deficiencies including: (a) lack of concrete information as to the size
of the forces of both the USSR and the
U.S. in mid-1960; (b) limitations on the kind and amount of operational
data available concerning new weapons; (c) uncertainties as to the
extent to which our air defense measures could be degraded by Soviet
electronic counter-measures equipment; (d) the paucity of intelligence
concerning Soviet guided missiles systems, etc.

General Thomas indicated that it was the conclusion of the Subcommittee
that in the event of a Soviet attack on the U.S. in 1960, both the U.S.
and the USSR would be devastated; that
by such an attack the [Page 675]USSR in 1960 could kill from ¼ to ½ of the
U.S. population and injure many more in the process; and that military
and civilian leadership of the U.S. at the Seat of Government would be
virtually wiped out.

Upon the completion of the Subcommittee’s presentation, General Cutler mentioned that access to the
Subcommittee’s report was being strictly limited in accordance with the
President’s direction; that only two copies thereof would be made; the
President’s copy would be retained in the files of the NSC, and that a second copy would be
designated for the NSC’s Disaster
File.3 He also mentioned that access to the report in any
future instance would be decided in each case by the President. General
Cutler then called for
questions.

Admiral Strauss asked that one of
the charts utilized by the Staff be re-exhibited, namely the chart
dealing with Attack Conditions numbered VI and VIII (Full Alert vs.
Strategic Surprise).4 Admiral Strauss observed that the chart seemed to indicate that
the same number of weapons were placed on target and yet there was a
large difference in the weight thereof under the respective attack
conditions simulated. It was pointed out to Admiral Strauss that the 12% increase in the
weight of the weapons detonated is attributable to the fact in that, in
that particular instance (Full Alert), larger aircraft were mounted
where the larger attack occurred, thus enabling the Russians to carry
larger weapons.

The President referred to that portion of the presentation dealing with
Full Alert and queried as to the nature of the USSR’s calculations relative to our taking the offensive if
we were to see tremendous mobilization occurring in the USSR. He wondered if the Russians would
dare give the Free World such warning lest it be concerned that we would
strike first upon seeing such tremendous mobilization. The President
said that while the democracies don’t start wars, the Russians might
calculate that they would in such an eventuality.

General Thomas commented that it was his own belief that it was not
realistic or reasonable to think in terms of starting war under
conditions of full alert for the opponent.

The President observed that from the presentation it seemed that we
suffered more casualties when we were in a state of alert than when we
were attacked with no warning. To this General Thomas responded that the
distinguishing feature of an attack under conditions of full alert is
that each of the adversaries can make a heavier attack under full alert
than under conditions of surprise.

Noted and discussed the annual report for 1957 of the Net Evaluation
Subcommittee, pursuant to paragraph 4 of NSC 5605, as presented orally by the Director and other
members of the Subcommittee Staff.

Note: Immediately following this NSC
meeting, the President met with the statutory Council Members and
the Members and Director of the Staff of the Net Evaluation
Subcommittee to discuss the types of attack which should be used as
the assumption for future reports by the Net Evaluation
Subcommittee. As a result of the discussion, the President requested
the Net Evaluation Subcommittee, with the assistance of the Director
of its Staff, to prepare for Council consideration modifications in
NSC 5605 to provide that future
net evaluations will assume one alternate type of attack each year
in a three-year cycle.6

The paragraph and Note that follow constitute
NSC Action No. 1815,
approved by the President on November 12. (Department of
State,S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D
95, Records of Action by the National Security
Council)↩

Attached to a
memorandum from General Twining to Cutler, dated November 20, is a draft prepared
by the Net Evaluation Subcommittee staff of recommended changes
to paragraph 3 of NSC 5605 to
incorporate the President’s suggestions. A memorandum from
Lay to the Vice
President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense, dated
November 25, indicates that the Director of the Office of
Defense Mobilization had approved the proposed changes in
paragraph 3 and asked the three statutory members to indicate
their action. Secretary Dulles’ concurrence is indicated in his
memorandum to Lay, dated
December 2. All these memoranda are ibid.,S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5605 Series. NSC Action No. 1838 indicates that
the statutory members of the NSC
as of December 24 concurred in the changes to NSC 5605 recommended by the Net
Evaluation Subcommittee, and the recommended revision of NSC 5605 was approved by the
President on December 24 and subsequently circulated as NSC 5728. (Ibid.,S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D
95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) NSC 5728 is in the Eisenhower
Library, NSC Staff Records,
Disaster File.↩