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A most unnatural alliance

Is
naturalism on the wane in philosophy? Even more so than with other -isms in our
field, the precise meaning of “naturalism” is widely disputed. By and large, it
stands for two substantially different positions, each of which, naturally, lends
itself to further conceptual hair-splitting [1, 2]. Perhaps the best way to understand the broad difference
is to compare their respective counterparts. What does it mean to oppose naturalism?

To be an
anti-naturalist in the first sense is to posit the existence of supernatural
beings or entities beyond the natural realm: gods, demons, ghosts, spiritual
realms, the afterlife. Naturalism, then, is simply the thesis that none of
these things exist. The natural universe, consisting of matter and energy or
whatever the latest entities postulated by modern physics (snares, waves,
fields…), is all there is. Let’s call this worldview
naturalism.

The second
brand of anti-naturalism, by contrast, is a normative thesis about the proper
role of philosophy, about what philosophy ought
to be. It claims that philosophy has certain proprietary methods and ways of
knowing, which should be distinguished from those of science. To be a
naturalist, in this sense, is to reject this alleged special role for
philosophy. Naturalists do not believe that there is any such thing as a philosophical
“way of knowing”, or that philosophers are charged with a special task in regard
to science, for instance to provide its epistemological foundations [3, 4]. Instead, naturalists see philosophy and the sciences
(in the plural) as cut from the same cloth, and as mutually dependent. Both are
enmeshed in the same web of knowledge. Disciplinary boundaries reflect
accidents of history, and may have some pragmatic justification (division of cognitive
labor), but they carry little epistemic import. Let’s call this holistic naturalism

On the face
of it, these respective forms of anti-naturalism seem to have little to do with
each other. Many proponents of aprioristic “pure” philosophy are staunch
atheists, and of course most believers in the paranormal and supernatural have
no truck with highfalutin academic philosophy. Still, both forms of naturalism
have come under fire in philosophy, and the attacks are not completely
unrelated. In some cases, we even see a most “unnatural” alliance emerging. Opponents
of holistic naturalism, by carving
out a special niche for Pure Philosophy insulated from the empirical sciences,
have provided a perfect refuge for speculation about the supernatural, largely unconstrained
by empirical facts. Such a safe haven from science has been welcomed by opponents
of worldview naturalism (mostly,
theists) who are worried about encroachments of science upon their territory. It
is not a coincidence, therefore, that God has reared his head again in the most
abstruse and rarefied quarters of academic philosophy – i.e. analytic metaphysics
– even though the majority of philosophers in that field remain as godless as
ever.

One of the
worst offenders on both anti-naturalist fronts is Notre Dame philosopher Alvin
Plantinga [5, 6], renowned for his contributions to modal logic – a family of logical
systems which contain operators for what is ‘possible’ and ‘necessary’ – and in
particular to the so-called possible
world semantics of such logical systems. In terms of metaphysical
extravagance, this branch of anti-naturalist philosophy has fulfilled the worst
nightmares of philosopher W.V.O. Quine, the godfather of holistic naturalism who
was suspicious of modal logic right from its inception. Although arguably modal
logic by itself is a legitimate topic and has some useful applications, its possible
world semantics has quickly spawned a proliferation of unactualized
possibilities, necessary and accidental properties, (un)exemplified essences,
and all other sorts of abstract entities, if not wholesale invisible universes [7]. In principle, Plantinga’s own approach to possible
worlds, called actualism, has no
bearing on the existence of supernatural entities, though it is metaphysically
extravagant in its own right (with an infinite number of invisible
unexemplified essences squeezed into the actual world). But Plantinga, a
Reformed Protestant, has wielded the tools of modal logic and necessary/contingent
properties to resurrect and refurbish that old darling of metaphysics, the
Ontological Argument for the existence of God, and has also applied possible
world semantics to “study” the problem of evil and theological determinism. In
any sensible universe, such antics would’ve been regarded as a reductio ad absurdum of the whole
enterprise, but Plantinga is hailed by some as one of the greatest philosophers
of his generation. There is also a stream of publications on his argument
against evolutionary naturalism (i.e. evolution without supernatural guidance),
including a collection of essays by distinguished philosophers [8]. In his attack on evolutionary naturalism and
elsewhere, Plantinga combines a pseudo-rigorous brand of analytic formalism, largely
detached from empirical reality, with an unflinching defense of Christian
dogmas, including Biblical infallibility, the doctrine of Original Sin, the
Resurrection of Jesus, and of course Intelligent Design creationism [9, 10].

Is naturalism really on the wane?

It is hard
to dispel the impression that we are witnessing a re-emergence of both
supernaturalism and aprioristic metaphysics in philosophy. But I still think that
the overall trend among philosophers is toward naturalism in both senses (and
certainly worldview naturalism). I may be overly optimistic, but I think anti-naturalism
is actually a rearguard fight in philosophy, and will eventually run out of
steam. So what reasons are there to suspect that the rumors of the demise of
naturalism have been somewhat exaggerated?

As for the
apparent rise of supernaturalism, we should keep in mind that God-loving
philosophers make for a good story. In an era of secularization, and especially
in a traditional bulwark of atheism such as Anglo-Saxon philosophy, displays of
religion devotion strike many people as unusual and noteworthy. There is more
attention for religious philosophers precisely because, by and large, both
academia and society at large are becoming less religious. The media love
stories of philosophers cum Christian apologists like William Lane Craig,
Richard Swinburne and Alvin Plantinga. Philosophers themselves have always put
a premium on bold and radical ideas that challenge what is seemingly obvious, and
for a long time, atheism was indeed the default position in Anglo-Saxon philosophy.
Moreover, like many other academic researchers, philosophers feel the temptations
of the Templeton Foundation, with its explicitly religious and spiritual goals.
If you are willing to say something nice about religion and faith, or at least challenge
naturalism and “scientism”, you are more likely to get Templeton money. Plausibly,
the Templeton Factor alone has artificially inflated the apparent appeal of
religiosity and anti-naturalism in the academic world. It remains an open
question whether those philosophers (and other academics) working on Templeton grants
really harbor any sympathy for the “big questions of human purpose and ultimate
reality”, as Templeton’s mission statements puts it. Perhaps they are just
bending over backwards to please their creditors, and their enthusiasm for religion
and spirituality will not outlive their grant terms.

As for the
pushback against holistic naturalism, we should keep in mind that naturalist
philosophers are by definition less visible, precisely because they ally
themselves more closely to the sciences, and tend to downplay their credentials
as philosophers. Many card-carrying philosophers out there are just constructively
working on various issues such as self-deception, animal cognition, transhumanism,
cultural evolution, using all the intellectual tools and resources at their
disposal, while caring little about whether or not they are doing ‘proper’
philosophy. Many of them are collaborating closely with scientists and publish
in interdisciplinary journal, where the borderline between science and
philosophy are increasingly blurring, and where few people care about labels.

Finally, I
think the resurgence of both forms of anti-naturalism should be regarded as a
backlash against, and further demonstration of, existing naturalist trends.
Just as, on a larger and more dramatic scale, religious fundamentalism is a reaction
against the threats posed to religion by Enlightenment and modernity,
anti-naturalists are (rightly) worried about the encroachments of science on
every domain of reality. It is really true that science is unraveling many
traditional doctrines that used to hold sway over people’s minds, and that its overwhelming
success is endangering other ways of knowing. With every advance made by
science, people have expressed worries about science overstepping its proper limits
and encroaching on foreign territory [11].

Most of
these worries are actually well-founded. Science beats all other approaches
hollow, and the worldview emerging in its wake is devoid of anything
supernatural. As physicist Sean Carroll explains in his latest book The Big Picture, many people
underestimate the extent to which the framework of modern physics – quantum
field theory – has tightened around a small number of forces and particles, leaving
no wiggling room at all for anything spooky or supernatural [12]. Science also presents a worldview that
renders much of a priori analytic
metaphysics completely obsolete [13]. Everything in nature is composed of inanimate
matter and energy, nature is all there is, and there are no “other ways of knowing”.
Both forms of anti-naturalism can be seen as rearguard fights against the rising
tide of scientific naturalism.

And if I am
wrong on that last count, and philosophy is increasingly dominated by the
forces of anti-naturalism, then it will indeed render itself obsolete, becoming
little more than an “idle tea-table amusement”, as Bertrand Russell put it. But
until that day arrives, I still call myself a proud philosopher, joining the
ranks of the naturalists (in both senses) in their midst.

(Free Inquiry, December 2017/January 2018)

1. Stroud, B., The charm of naturalism. Proceedings and
Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 1996. 70(2): p. 43-55.

Comments

Lets always try to remember to divide naturalism, in a minimum of three ways--outer natural, inner natural and one's own observation---that physical phenomena is seen is the phenomenon of observation....

"Science also presents a worldview that renders much of a priori analytic metaphysics completely obsolete [13]. Everything in nature is composed of inanimate matter and energy, nature is all there is, and there are no “other ways of knowing”."

This is pretty controversial, and is not altogether an obvious, nor seemingly true, result of contemporary naturalism. One need only look at the extensive literature on fundamentality/grounding, or on (Humean) supervenience, for examples of self-identifying naturalistic metaphysical worldviews that claim otherwise. Perhaps, everything in nature is at its most basic, composed of matter and energy (however these are to be understood), but it doesn't follow that everything simpliciter is composed merely of matter and energy, in a mereological sense.

I definitely align myself with the "naturalist" camp, and I agree to a large extent with your overall assessment of the status quo.

(In fact, I might be an 'anti-naturalist' in the first sense because I still identify myself as a christian in some sense, though I strongly believe that biblical stories have no place at all in rational discourses and have zero credibility. I am scared of giving up the faith, since it will be pretty detrimental to my mental health, which is largely constituted by indoctrination in Sunday schools ;-).)

Still, I have some qualms about your assessment of modal logic and PW semantics. Even though much part of clueless metaphysics has spawned due to PW semantics, which is discouraging for me as well (kudos to Ladyman and Ross again!), I think taking reductio takes a heavy toll. For, as you should know, PW semantics was not developed for its own sake but to facilitate natural language semantics. As far as I know, PW semantics is now the established foundation in theoretical linguistics, so denouncing it will therefore accompany discrediting a large part of academic achievements in linguistics as well. You should definitely be careful about undermining a certain academic field (in fact, an empirical science, despite a 'soft' one) solely on the basis of a philosophical motivation.

Of course, practicing linguists will care little about modal metaphysics and just take 'instrumentalist' attitude over such issues. The point is, however, a similar point holds for philosophical problems which are deemed more 'fruitful' too, e.g., QM interpretations or the measurement problem. Hence, insofar as you deem the controversy over QM interpretations to be substantive, I think metaphysical issues incurred by PW semantics should not be overlooked either. The onus is on naturalists to show that we can dispense with modal metaphysics without thereby undermining linguistics, and I think it is a worthy project.