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The first and – if
one pays attention to the percentages Erdoğan obtained in the pre-election
polls – possibly the only round of the Turkish presidential elections is
only a few days away. As a result of the 2007 amendment to the Constitution, for
the first time in history, Turkish constituents will be responsible for
electing a presidential candidate instead of parliament voting on their behalf. The upcoming
elections carry symbolic value, because up until the 1980s the position was
mostly “reserved” for army generals.

The following is
an overview of the strengths and weaknesses of the three candidates. Our aim is
not only to familiarize the reader with the candidates but also to explain why public
opinion tends to see one candidate in particular—the current Prime Minister,
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan—as the victor of the upcoming presidential elections.

Candidate #1: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

The current
Prime Minister of Turkey has held his position for twelve years. Having won consecutive general and municipal
elections – three each – and two Justice and Development Party (AKP) proposed
referenda, the 60-year-old Erdoğan enters the presidential elections with an
insurmountable record of political success. Despite the many challenges
Erdoğan has faced in his political career, he has
shown cunning in playing the cards that can win the hearts of the majority of Turkish constituents.

His winning streak
is not one to overlook, as the electorate like winners. In a winner, they see
qualities of a leader who not only dreams, but also has the capacity to turn
dreams into realities. That this winner is also popular with the majority of Turkish
parliament adds to his capacity to pass legislation with the least amount of resistance.
The leader carries his electorate further on the path of creating a “stronger
Turkey”, a goal that Erdoğan himself has set for the centennial of the founding
of the Republic of Turkey, namely the “Turkey 2023” campaign.

In a winner, the
electorate see the possibility of realizing successful national projects:
including but not limited to, massive projects such as building nuclear power
plants, connecting the Black Sea with the Marmara Sea through a channel,
building Europe's largest airport, installing an elaborate subway system,
military infrastructure, national opera houses, etc…each contested
by different segments of society yet with little to no impact on the outcome.
While the projects he foresees may appear destructive dreams to his opponents, they
are reasonable ambitions. Well aware of this, Erdoğan utilizes discourse that
reassures his electorate that only by electing him, as the dreamer and miracle
maker, can Turkey continue to prosper. Or, in Erdoğan's words as uttered in his
most recent Istanbul rally: “We have shown the people that if we want [something]
and believe [in it], it ceases to exist as a dream.”

Moreover, the
capability to always end up on the winning side gives Erdoğan the well-earned
image of a stable figure. Furthermore, the resilience of the Turkish economy during
the global financial crisis of 2008 and the ensuing recession – as opposed to
the pre-Erdoğan crisis of 2000/01 – speaks both to Erdoğan voters' hearts
and to their pockets. Who would want an emotionally or economically uncertain
future if there already exists an example that satisfies the constituents? This
was clear from the outcome of the most recent municipal elections. The Erdoğan-led
AKP (the election was more about Erdoğan than the AKP, considering that he
attended the majority of the pre-election rallies as the main speaker) won the
elections, including metropolitan municipalities where the competitors competed
collaboratively for the votes (i.e. proposing joint candidates), which is
fairly unusual in Turkish politics.

Erdoğan's
success till now has added to his stability as a leader, but more importantly,
it imbues him with charisma – a gracious and divine quality that is
attributed to him by his electorate. It is no surprise that in the eyes of
many, Erdoğan is a "God-send", he is God's grace [Allah'ın lütfu]. Turkey may be a secular country, but Turkish
politics rarely functions secularly. It is no coincidence that in a recent
rally (in Tekirdag), Erdoğan put up an exorcism-like show on of bringing a fainted
woman back to consciousness by having her brought to him to shake her hand in
front of a large crowd. Whether the “show” was set-up is a debate we are less
interested in, but those in the audience seemed to enjoy it nevertheless.

While divination
is a resource that Erdoğan skillfully employs, one should also keep in mind
that the kind of Islamic discourse that interferes with politics in Turkey is
also not – and probably has never been – by the book. It is our belief that Erdoğan
(and his electorate) care little about his following of Islam, but rather how
he prioritises religion in politics. Unlike
other presidential candidates, Erdoğan need not convince anyone of his piety. This
is a point that analyses on Erdoğan often forgo. Yet it is necessary to remember
that what makes him successful is the proximity of his discourse to the kind of
Islam that the majority of constituents in Turkey find best suited to their needs.

Here, the valid
criticism – particularly within the context of the presidential elections,
which, in its Turkish translation (Cumhurbaşkanlığı Seçimleri) connotes being
representative of "the people" (cumhur) – is that his policies do not
resonate with a larger majority – leaving him as a candidate who tends to
exclude as much as he includes. Whether we like it or not, Erdoğan's politics
of not reaching out to a larger audience – which includes peoples such as
Armenians, Jews, Kurds or Alevis – fits flawlessly into a system that
prioritizes the hearts that are won over those that are lost and left in
frustration. Erdoğan's utilization of hate speech, as in shouting out to the
leader of the opposition, "Come out and tell us all that you are an
Alevi", which in any democratic regime is – and needs to be – considered a
shortcoming, works to his advantage. This itself is an indication of his
destructive potential for the democratic system in Turkey, which we have also
seen in action on various occasions, including the Gezi Protests of summer 2013.
However, Erdoğan's populist attitude resonates well with his constituents who
represent the necessary majority of the populace to win him the title of
President.

Candidate #2: Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu

Next on the list
is Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, whose candidacy caught many in Turkey by surprise. An
independent candidate backed by the opposition parties, such as the secularist
Republican People's Party (CHP) and the nationalist National Action Party
(MHP), the 70-year-old academic Professor Doctor İhsanoğlu previously served as
the Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), an
institution representative of the Islamic world. That the AKP as a whole, and
particularly the current President Abdullah Gül, lobbied for him which makes his candidacy
even more interesting. In some ways, Erdoğan is competing against an old friend,
who he portrays as a bitter enemy.

While İhsanoğlu's
previous role in an Islamic institution and his proximity to members of the AKP
has caused friction among secular-minded Turks, particularly among members of
the CHP who were initially divided over his candidacy, İhsanoğlu's image as a
scholar of Islam is a clever strategy utilized by the leader of the opposition
to compete for the religious electorate in Turkey. Aware of this danger, Erdoğan
attempts to delegitimize İhsanoğlu's candidacy by arguing that scholarly Islam
is not representative of people's Islam: "Born in Cairo. Came to Turkey at
the age of 30. What makes him a man of these lands? Who do you think you are
fooling? We are the men of these lands. We are born here, raised here, and we
have worked here," argued Erdoğan at a recent rally in the eastern
Anatolian city of Van. Whether Islam à la İhsanoğlu will ring a bell for the
constituents is uncertain, but his candidacy nevertheless pushes Erdoğan to justify
his legitimacy over the use of religious capital in his populist rhetoric.

What adds
further strength to İhsanoğlu is his intellectual capital. As a prestigious
professor who has represented Turkey in the upper echelons of the academic
world (i.e. faculty member at the University of Ankara, chair of department of
History at the University of Istanbul, visiting Professor at various European
and American universities) as well as international politics (i.e. OIC), İhsanoğlu's
professional credentials make him a strong presidential candidate. His
intellectual capital is far superior to that of Erdoğan. However, it is equally
questionable whether İhsanoğlu's intellectual expertise would work against Erdoğan's
practical experience as a politician. Previous elections have shown that the
Turkish constituents tend to vote not only for populist but also pragmatic
leaders. They tend not to give a new candidate a try if the previous one
provides them with sufficient means to economic comfort. Rather than voting for
credentials, the electorate tends to cast its vote based on "on the
ground" achievements. Erdoğan's 12-year rule as the prime minister is a
point that proves this tendency. While one could argue that a presidential title
is more symbolic than administrative one, Erdoğan has made it clear that he
intends to assume greater powers once he is the president. Why then would the
electorate be expected to vote for a president who will not work alongside the
(AKP) government, while an already existing candidate will?

Furthermore, İhsanoğlu's
lack of expertise in Turkish politics has weakened his candidacy. The
proponents of Erdoğan's rule as the Prime Minister like his attitude as an
unruly leader. They appreciate his vulgar language particularly in the
international arena – his accusations of Israel of tyranny, support for the
Muslim Brotherhood, criticism of Europe and the US for their involvement in the
escalation of violence in the Middle East and their alleged attempts to cause
unrest in Turkey (i.e. the Gezi protests). As a former Secretary General of the
OIC, İhsanoğlu remains reluctant in raising his voice over developments in the
Middle East, which could be a precious reservoir to take votes from Erdoğan during
the elections. However, İhsanoğlu remaining silent on issues that matter to the
Turkish electorate, is received as a weakness in the eyes of Turkish voters.

Candidate #3: Selahattin Demirtaş

Selahattin Demirtaş,
the 41-year-old candidate of the People's Democratic Party (BDP), is without a
doubt the most colorful candidate of this election term. The youngest of the
three, Demirtaş represents what could have previously been considered a dream:
the Kurdish Presidential candidate of a Kurdish political party. A lawyer by
profession who led the Human Rights Association in Diyarbakır, Turkey, Demirtaş went on to serve as a
member of predecessors of HDP, such as the Democratic Society Party (DTP) and
Peace and Democracy Party (BTP). The former was closed down by the constitutional
court and the latter was disbanded by the party members and reformed under its
current formation (BDP).

Since his introduction into politics, the Kurdish
movement in general and Demirtaş in particular has shifted away from politics
based solely on ethnic (Kurdish) identity to one that is more interested in
solving larger social issues and therefore more connected to the problems of
the population at large. Contrary to Erdoğan, who skillfully utilizes a rhetoric of exclusion to appeal to his electorate,
the co-chair of HDP (which promotes gender equality in party politics) employs
a rhetoric of reconciliation and prioritizes pluralism. This coming from a
candidate primarily supported by the Kurdish electorate shows how Kurdish
politics have transformed over the years to become more inclusive.

Moreover, Demirtaş
represents a political approach that is also more outspoken on issues that lie
outside the scope of the two other candidates, such as gender equality in
politics, environmental issues, LGBT rights and Syriacs' and Alevis' religious
freedoms. In that, Demirtaş comes out as a candidate who is more on par with
the changing demands of a new generation, particularly those that are not
attracted to the allure of Islamic capitalism. Demirtaş also stands as the only
courageous candidate in speaking openly about class politics. During his Eid
al-Fitr visit to the tombs of those killed in the Soma mining disaster, Demirtaş
pointed out how the population at large suffers from economic inequalities due
to the capitalistic nature of AKP rule. While the class-based nuances in Demirtaş'
speech are reminiscent of the early days of the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK),
which was established as a Marxist faction in 1975, Demirtaş' emphasis on class
is less focused on the Kurdish working class and more on Turkey's working class
as a whole.

Nevertheless, Demirtaş's
call for a new, peaceful and democratic life, as explicated by his slogan, has
two obstacles that need to be overcome in order to compete with Erdoğan. First,
Demirtaş does not have a monopoly over Kurdish votes. While his BDP may be
enjoying the majority of Kurdish votes, Erdoğan's AKP is next in line,
competing for the same votes. As the leader of the majority party, Erdoğan has
taken audacious steps forward (as well as backwards) in negotiating with the
Kurdish leader Abdullah Öcalan. Segments of Kurdish voters have been attentive
of this process and trusted Erdoğan as the only political leader who has the
power (parliamentary majority) in finding a solution to Öcalan's imprisonment.
While one needs to be very critical in examining how the AKP uses the
"Kurdish question", as a tactic to control Kurdish votes, one should
also keep in mind that not all Kurds are distanced to the AKP’s capacity make their dreams come true.

The second
crucial question is whether the electorate at large would accept a new face for
the Kurdish movement, as embodied by Demirtaş. Unsurprisingly, Erdoğan is not
willing to accept that Demirtaş is sincere in his more inclusive approach. In a
rally earlier this month, Erdoğan asserted that the HDP does not use the
Turkish flag in its assemblies and works under the shadow of a gun. While Erdoğan's
characterization of Demirtaş is skewed, the fear he emphasizes may nevertheless
resonate with the majority of Turkish constituents who continue to equate Kurds
as separatists.

Conclusion

Turkey needs a fresh
approach to politics. Out of the three candidates, only Demirtaş is
representative of unconventional ways of thinking and talking about politics.
His dynamism, which İhsanoğlu greatly lacks, brings hope that there are
alternatives. Yet, how hopeful should one be? The winner of this election will
be the candidate who displays the greatest expertise in reading the dynamics of
the majority of the Turkish constituents and Erdoğan appears to come first in
this category. Unlike Demirtaş or İhsanoğlu, Erdoğan also has the most to lose.
During his 12 years as Prime Minister, he may have won the hearts of the
majority of the Turkish constituents, yet he also made many enemies out of his
previous allies, like the members of the Gülen community. Aware of the dangers
of not winning and having to face previous accusations of corruption and explaining
his involvement in shady deals with corrupt Middle Eastern leaders, this time
without immunity and institutional support, Erdoğan is willing to spend extra time rallying and polarizing
Turkish constituents to obtain the results he needs.

Overall,
however, one should keep in mind that the upcoming presidential election is a
referendum. It reflects people's choice. And Erdoğan as the winner of the
previous Turkish referenda also comes out as representative of his electorate's
will. He certainly is not representative of the national will as he claims in
his slogan; and this is a crucial problem that Turkish democracy will continue
to face in the upcoming years under Erdoğan's helm. However, it is unlikely
that Erdoğan's electorate—representative of a growing 50 percent in previous election—is
as worried as other constituents may be about the shortcomings of Turkish
democracy.

Time will only
tell. The first round of elections will take place on 10 August 2014. If none
of the candidates gain a simple majority, the second round will take place on
24 August 2014 between the two leading candidates.

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