07TBILISI725, EUR DAS MATT BRYZA’S MARCH 29 MEETING WITH

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 000725
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/CARC AND EEB/EPC/IEC
COMMERCE FOR 4231/ITA/MAC DANICA STARKS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2017
TAGS: PRELENRGGGARRUTXUN
SUBJECT: EUR DAS MATT BRYZA'S MARCH 29 MEETING WITH
GEORGIAN PM NOGHAIDELI
TBILISI 00000725 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft, reason 1.4(b) and (d).
///////////////////////////////////////////// //////////////////
PLEASE CANCEL (ZFR) TBILISI 725 (ALL 3 SECTIONS) IN ITS ENTIRETY.
SUBJECT CABLE WAS PREVIOUSLY SENT AS TBILISI 711.
OUR APOLOGIES FOR ANY INCONVIENCE CAUSED.
///////////////////////////////////////////// ///////////////////
TBILISI 00000725 002 OF 003
measure. He described him as a "fascist" and "war criminal".
His release, Noghaideli said, would send a message of
impunity, and his exchange for prisoners held by the Abkhaz
would only encourage future hostage taking by the Abkhaz. He
fears the release of Chakabaria will only increase tensions
in the long run and damage the security of the people in
Gali. The GOG will look for ways to decrease tensions, but
it cannot enter into a prisoner exchange, he said.
¶6. (C) Noghaideli said that although his meeting with Abkhaz
de facto prime minister Ankvab was canceled, the Abkhaz are
now seeking to reschedule it. However, they are seeking
Noghaideli's presence at what is essentially a technical
meeting, and after Ankvab's first refusal to meet, he is not
inclined to attend. The meeting will go forward without his
participation, however. (Note: at the meeting an agreement
on dividing the output of the Enguri power plant will be
signed. The agreement included a GOG commitment to finance
individual electric meters to consumers on the whole
territory of Abkhazia.) Bryza suggested that the agreement
on the Enguri power plant output would be helpful before the
UNOMIG mandate renewal vote, because it would emphasize
Georgia's willingness to cooperate with the Abkhaz. Bryza
urged Noghaideli to meet with Ankvab. Noghaideli resisted,
but he later called Bryza to say he had reconsidered and is
now willing to meet with Ankvab.
FOCUSING ON TRANS-CASPIAN OIL AND GAS
-------------------------------------
¶7. (C) Bryza praised Georgia and Azerbaijan for cooperating
on meeting their energy needs this year, and especially
Azerbaijan's willingness to do without Russian gas and to
stop shipping oil through Novorossisk in response to Russian
demands that Azerbaijan not supply Georgia. Noghaideli said
that Aliyev's decision was mostly a reaction to Russia
offering better terms for its gas to Armenia than to
Azerbaijan. He complained that Azerbaijan is creating
significant problems for transport of oil through the South
Caucasus. He will meet with Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan
leaders in Baku on April 4 to discuss the issue.
¶8. (C) Drawing on his recent trip to Ashgabat, Noghaideli
told DAS Bryza that President Berdimuhammedov wants western
legitimacy. Trips to Europe and America would give him that
and would expose him to the West. Such trips should happen
soon, Noghaideli said. He said that Berdimuhammedov can
become a leader either in the style of Kazakhstan's
Nazarbayev or, less appealingly, Uzbekistan's Karimov --
though he will never be a Saakashvili. Although human rights
advocates may object, Noghaideli said, now is the time to
deal with Berdimuhammedov if the West is to have any
influence as he grows into his new position.
¶9. (C) Noghaideli said that Turkmenistan has always sought a
balance between Russia and Iran, and now will want to do so
between Russia and the West. He said that Turkmenistan
currently sells its oil on an exchange within the country at
a low price, but forces it to be taken out via Iran and to
Afghanistan. Noghaideli thinks that if Berdimuhammedov
allows the free sale of oil outside the country, 90 percent
of it would go west through the Caucasus -- but for the
problems the Azeris are creating in transportation.
Noghaideli said that Berdimuhammedov will likely be willing
to license western companies to develop Turkmenistan's
off-shore reserves of natural gas. He confirmed that the
Georgian Oil and Gas Corporation will seek such a license.
Oil and gas from fields developed by Western companies will
only flow west, he believes. Bryza said that Noghaideli's
view confirms what the USG is hearing from Turkmenistan. He
mentioned the U.S. hope to export Turkmen gas from Block One,
operated by Petronas, to Baku's ACG field.
¶10. (C) Bryza mentioned that Kazakhstani Prime Minister
Massimov has expressed interest in shipping compressed
natural gas across the Caspian. Noghaideli again complained
that Azerbaijan has "destroyed a good transport relationship"
over the past year. The Georgian-proposed
Georgia-Azerbaijan-Kazakhstan trilateral in Baku on April 4
is important in that regard, he said. (Note: Massimov is
scheduled to visit Tbilisi as well as Bak
u.)
¶11. (C) Noghaideli said that he has given up on getting
Turkey to share its Shah Deniz gas with Georgia. Turkey will
not be ready to receive gas until September, he said.
Georgia is now discussing getting more gas from the Azeris,
who he says have enough to cover Georgia's needs. President
TBILISI 00000725 003 OF 003
Saakashvili is calling Azeri President Aliyev to discuss.
Because of the delays in production of Shah Deniz gas earlier
this year, Georgia did not get as much gas as it had hoped
from Azerbaijan, only 20% of its imports, according to
Noghaideli. Russian gas will be about 50% of supply this
year, he said. The warm winter and good management have
allowed Georgia to reduce its gas consumption this year,
however.
ARMENIAS ONLY FRIEND(S)
-----------------------
¶12. (C) Bryza and Noghaideli briefly discussed the situation
in Armenia. When he was in Armenia for the late Prime
Minister Andranik Markarian's funeral, Noghaideli was
surprised to learn that Armenia's government budget is only
USD 1.1 billion, compared to Georgia's USD 2.7 million.
Armenia's decision to rely on Russian support has hurt it
economically and cost it nearly all its friends, other than
Georgia, he said. The Government of Armenia is maintaining
its NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan as a lifeline to
the West, he said.
¶13. DAS Bryza has cleared this telegram.
TEFFT

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