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Cressida J. Heyes

Feminist Solidarity after Queer Theory: The Case of Transgender

that feminist politics needs to speak to (and be spoken by) many more subjects than women and men, heterosexual women and lesbians. How—in theory and in practice—should feminism engage bisexuality, intersexuality, transsexuality,1 transgender, and other emergent identities that reconﬁgure both conventional and conventionally feminist understandings of sex, gender, and sexuality?2 For me this question takes its most pressing forms when I think about how effective alliances can be forged in feminist spaces. How should feminists imagine and create communities that take the institutions and practices of sex, gender, and sexuality to be politically relevant to liberation? How might such communities incorporate our manifest and intransigent diversity and build solidarity? In this article I work through these questions with reference to the leitmotiv of transgender. Following Susan Stryker, in this article I use trans as a broad umbrella adjective intended to capture the multiple forms of sex and gender crossing and mixing that are taken by their practitioners to be signiﬁcant life projects. I use transgendered to describe anyone who lives a gender they were not perinatally assigned or that is not publicly recognizable within Western cultures’ binary gender systems, and I use transsexed to describe anyone who undergoes (or hopes to undergo) any
t is by now clear I would like to thank audiences at the University of Alberta, University of Calgary, Eastern Society for Women in Philosophy, and the Canadian Philosophical Association for their helpful comments and questions on papers that preceded this one. I thank April Herndon, David Kahane, and two anonymous Signs reviewers for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts. 1 There is some political debate about whether “transexual” is a spelling preferable to “transsexual.” Some critics have suggested that an integrated rather than a compound noun avoids the problematic implication that transsexuals “cross sexes.” See Wilchins 1997, 15. I will use the more familiar “ss” spelling throughout. 2 The very separability and meaningfulness of the terms sex, gender, and sexuality are called into question by many of these identities. In particular, this article implicitly challenges the distinction between sex (the body as male or female) and gender (the social role of the individual as a man or a woman). Thus I will use the phrase sex-gender identity to avoid the impression that this distinction is being upheld.
[Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 2003, vol. 28, no. 4] ᭧ 2003 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0097-9740/2003/2804-0007$10.00

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Part of feminism is changing those institutions and creating new history. I will start from the claim that gender is not best understood simply as an attribute of individuals but rather as a set of often hierarchical relations among differently gendered subjects. with their concomitant devaluing of the lesser terms female and feminine. these terms are contested within trans communities: see Prosser 1998. At a more speciﬁc level.16. Leslie Feinberg has introduced the pronouns hir (in place of her/his) and ze (in place of he/she) to describe hirself. for yet another. I will use them throughout this article. I will seek to explain and argue against this division. gender. and Cromwell 1999. However political resistance through transforming gender has been articulated. is my larger interest in the ethics of self-transformation. In this space. With theorists such as Jessica Benjamin (1995).26. and conﬂicting ideological and strategic approaches to politics. Of course. esp. the struggle has been on the disputed terrain where the life of the individual meets its institutional and historical conditions of possibility. Thus any project that takes
This usage follows Stryker 1994. however. 2. then. 19–30.1094
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of a number of physical interventions to bring hir sexed body more closely into line with hir gender identity. have conspired to fracture feminist and queer communities along identity fault lines. but it is also. Although gender is often experienced as a deeply authentic aspect of the individual self. over time. generating a whole new ﬁeld of meaning within which some identities may eventually cease to exist while others are being created. and sexuality. This move has opened up new possibilities for individuals. 251–52. “trans liberation” and “feminism” have often been cast as opposing movements. 17 Jan 2014 00:37:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
. At this very general level. many theorists have persuasively argued that gender identities must be understood as relationally formed. Despite the fact that many transgendered people are daily the victims of the most intense and public attempts to discipline gender in ways feminists have long criticized. without entirely conceding the normative concerns that motivate it. a wide range of gendered subjects stand to gain from challenges to enforced binaries within the nexus of sex. but in the interim feminists must make sense of the scope and limits of our agency within structures of oppression and privilege. Another backdrop to this essay.5 on Fri.3 Feminists of all stripes share the political goal of weakening the grip of oppressive sex and gender dimorphisms in Western cultures. the complexities of oppression and privilege. esp. 200–205. for an alternative reading. ethics meets politics: feminism entails not only organizing for change but also changing oneself.
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I offer a critical analysis of two very different feminist texts: the 1994 reissue of Janice Raymond’s notorious The Transsexual Empire: The Making of the She-Male (originally published in 1979) and Bernice Hausman’s 1995 book Changing Sex: Transsexualism. Speciﬁcally. Initially.16. epitomized by authors such as Kate Bornstein. I hope. By showing in some detail how these strategies of foreclosure work. however. and Riki Anne Wilchins. 17 Jan 2014 00:37:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
. Leslie Feinberg. A second set of difﬁculties is raised by the genre of popular trans feminist polemic. then. ze does not examine the fact that the expression of one gender may limit the possible meanings or opportunities available to others.26. ﬁrst.5 on Fri. by persistently foreclosing all possibilities for political resistance to a disease model. Adopting the language of individual freedom of expression with regard to gender. they construct trans people as lacking both agency and critical perspective. and the Idea of Gender. Taking Feinberg’s remarks in hir recent book Trans Liberation: Beyond Pink or Blue (1998) as exemplar. will sidestep important ethicopolitical questions that arise from gender relations and the demands of community. to develop the negative case presented by Sandy Stone (1991) that inﬂuential non-trans feminists have orientalized the trans subject and concomitantly failed to investigate their authorial locations as stably gendered subjects. This literature voices the views of trans people with radical gender politics. I will contest hir implication that a feminist politics should tolerate any “gender expression. Technology.” A failure to understand gender as relational (and hierarchical) leads Feinberg to elide certain normative implications of hir account. I will argue that too often this literature falls back onto an implausibly atomistic self that is given normative free rein to assert its gender. Raymond and Hausman’s otherwise theoretically contrasting texts represent the transsexual (qua monolithic representative of all transgender subjectivities) as uniquely mired in pathology. moving beyond the traditional forums of sensationalized autobiography or objectifying psychological studies. Both commentators draw on the classiﬁcation of transsexuality as a mental “disorder” to make their case. These authors properly advocate the right to express and develop a gender identity not determinately linked to birth sex. This reductive characterization of the transsexual as the dupe of gender then permits the conclusion that transgender politics writ large have no feminist potential.S I G N S
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up the ethics of self-transformation will be necessarily linked to the questions about community I want to raise. Rather than understanding transgendered people as working within an ethics of self-transformation with which all feminists must grapple.
This content downloaded from 138. Charges of political quietism against transsexuals present one set of challenges to meaningful political alliances between trans and non-trans feminists.

Janice Raymond’s text is similarly at pains to show that transsexuals’ attitudes are fundamentally inimical to a particular kind of identity politics. This is perhaps especially important to acknowledge when much of what has been written about trans people by non-trans feminists has not only been hostile but has also taken an explicit dis identiﬁcation with transsexuals’ experiences as its critical standpoint. 7 See Gamson 1998 for analysis of the intense manipulation of representations of trans people in U.26. 17 Jan 2014 00:37:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
. describing it. 3). while being devoid of any critical examination of the author’s location and investments in the identity being defended.
Where is the author?
I am acutely aware of the pitfalls of writing about trans people from a vantage point as a non-trans woman and someone who is not actively involved with extra-academic trans communities. talk shows.7 However.S. but the most striking analogy with feminist treatments of transgender is perhaps with his claim that “Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient—dealing with it by making statements about it. Orientalism as a Western style for dominating.6 It also inhibits alliances between trans and non-trans feminists. my personal motivations are. Transsexuality. as always. 6 I am thinking here of “orientalism” in all of the senses invoked by Edward Said.5 This move runs counter to familiar feminist political commitments to respecting what the marginalized say about themselves and seems to ignore the risks of orientalism. There is a remarkable continuity between some of the stereotypes Gamson discusses and those upheld within feminist contexts. deeply intertwined with the structure of my arguments. In fact. the ﬁrst two transsexual people I came to know
I have tried to write this article in the spirit of Jacob Hale’s “Suggested Rules for Nontranssexuals Writing about Transsexuals. 5 In his critique of Bernice Hausman.5 on Fri. by teaching it. It must also engage the politics of self-transformation in a broader ﬁeld. Such an ethics should recognize the discursive limits on individual selftransformation without denying agency to gendered subjects. Transsexualism.
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This content downloaded from 138. based largely on popular (feminist) portrayals. where one’s choices affect others’ identities and possibilities.4 Questions about the location of a non-trans author in an article primarily concerned with trans issues are important. theorists’ inclination to stress deep differences between these groups attenuates the political motivation to investigate shared experiences. settling it. restructuring.1096
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Thus feminist writing about transgender needs to deﬁne and articulate a middle ground in which an ethics of self-fashioning can be developed. and having authority over the Orient” (1978. authorizing views of it. Jay Prosser argues that Hausman “blocks out” her own gender identity and embodiment in order tacitly to justify her authorial location “outside of ” transsexuality as “the authoritative site from which to speak” (1998. for a long time I sustained a marked feminist suspicion of transsexuality. or Trans—” (1997). ruling over it: in short.16. 132–33).

Both heterosexual and lesbian spaces have their own comforts for women. femmes. to consider trans issues in light of these social realities. making oneself over into a more politically appealing subject—even (perhaps especially) if one is well-motivated by political theory to do so—cannot be accomplished by ﬁat. Despite my qualms about the term bisexual. as traitors to a cause certain others share. and aspirations will resist even the most determined attempts at refashioning (1990. recognition. while others use mtf or ftm. one female-to-male [FTM]) disrupted this suspicion: both were feminists. I am not claiming any epistemic authority here. motivation comes from a deep sense of unease
Again. and troubling because those very practices too often congeal into political ideologies and group formations that are exclusive or hegemonic. women working in male-dominated occupations. when everywhere else feels worse. my visibility as a bisexual feminist woman. have been. and I have often been excluded from both. For example. and.26. Over several years. and this is certainly not a representative sample—any more than my genetic women colleagues in feminist studies are. this descriptor provides a kind of home for me. bisexual feminists. As I want to argue in this article.5 on Fri. rejecting the capitalization as an acronym that misleadingly signals discrete identities.S I G N S
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socially (one male-to-female [MTF]. however. male feminists. ﬁrst. the terms MTF and FTM are disputed in trans communities. second. 17 Jan 2014 00:37:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
. and stability are essential to human ﬂourishing and political resistance. and both were involved (in very different ways) in queer communities.
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This content downloaded from 138.8 I have since read. which hit particularly hard for those who live along their fault lines. The two most salient personal aspects of this inquiry.or homosexuality—and I have felt the moments of truth as well as the sometime hypocrisy and complacency of those demands. I have also been told that I needed to change to ﬁt into those spaces—by acceding either to my true hetero. and corresponded with many more trans people in the context of my feminist theoretical work. I have come to see connections among these different people that make me less inclined to separate out transsexuals. and so on. gay men. the alliances and conﬂicts this identiﬁcation has produced. I have also known a lot of other people who have struggled with gender—as butches. or trans people in general. related. Sometimes. some prefer the terms female-to-female or male-to-male to capture the subjective experience of transition rather than its perception by others. pleasures. Non-trans feminists have a responsibility. 45–62). female and male survivors of sexual violence. as Sandra Bartky points out. I think. It is both necessary and troubling to seek out a home as a gendered or sexual being: necessary because community. However. one’s desires. listened to. My second.16.

139–54) argues convincingly that what she labels the axes of dualism and control conspire to create social conditions in Western cultures where mental acuity. gender. One implication that Bordo does not explore is that it is very difﬁcult for fat women to be taken seriously as intellectuals. transgender has been colonized as a feminist theoretical testing ground. This is one of the reasons—for better or worse—that I am gripped by the phenomenology of transgender. it would seem that the experience of one’s body failing to conform to one’s identity. ought to be recognizable to non-trans women. emphasis mine).
This content downloaded from 138.5 on Fri. Experiences like mine are at least partially explicable within the insightful feminist frameworks offered by commentators such as Susan Bordo (1993). or the lack of it.26. I am quite clear that I am not a transsexual. represented as the acid test of constructionism. In some ways. I am greatly indebted to April Herndon for her insightful analysis of this topic. I feel quite ridiculously fearless in the face of the physical risks that attaining that body might necessitate. 174. Yet it is the demand for bodily modiﬁcations on the part of transsexed people that has most provoked feminist commentators and been characterized as the most politically regressive and foreign of desires.
Feminists construct transsexuality
Whether appropriated to bolster queer theoretical claims. Janice Raymond’s oeuvre is part of a tradition of radical feminism that
9 Bordo (1993. Surely an incisive intellectual mind requires an equally lean and skillful body?9 When it comes to the kind of body I most want.16. too female in some respects. For example. in a startlingly dissociative moment Bernice Hausman speculates that “those of us who are not transsexuals may wonder what it is like to feel oneself ‘in the wrong body’” (1995. and the conﬂicted desire to change that body. As subjects who explore what Michel Foucault (1988) called “technologies of the self” in particularly literal forms. is believed to be reﬂected in the body’s form. or attacked for suspect political commitments. 17 Jan 2014 00:37:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
. but I have often wished (including for periods of years at a time) to be in a different body.1098
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with my own body. transgendered people seem paradigmatic of many of the most pressing feminist anxieties about identity. and personal transformation. I feel as though the body I have is the wrong body: too large. I try to answer the question of why this phenomenological connection has seemed so unavailable to non-trans feminists. especially for women. even though I am well aware of their practical and political perils. In the ﬁrst part of the article. too clumsy. If this is so.

5 on Fri. emphasis in original). Alluding to Raymond’s work. 142–63) also endorses Raymond’s position. 95–109. 67–68.com/.26.g. In a recent Village Voice editorial.. 52. xv). inverting the analysis to portray FTMs as lesbian deserters who mimic the misogynist aspects of gay male culture. early lesbian feminists created a new category of woman-identiﬁed women. that good old-fashioned indubitable ‘I’ so beloved of Descartes. More recent endorsements: Claudia Card describes The Transsexual Empire as “the most powerful treatise on the ethics and politics of maleto-constructed female [sic] transsexualism” (Card 1994. This paradigm is conceptually and politically dependent on the radical separation of women from men. Sheila Jeffreys (1993.g.michfest. in a way reminiscent of Raymond’s sarcastic treatment of Stone (Raymond [1979] 1994. and there I am’” (2001). See Morris 1999. Norah Vincent attributes the legitimacy of transsexuality to the ascendancy of postmodern philosophy. see Daly (1978) 1990. Stressing the realities of violence against women. whose great adage ‘I think.16. n. Kathy Miriam writes that “recent ‘transgender’ militancy is a clear indication that feminist lesbian fears in the 1970’s were not paranoia.. Raymond’s work on transsexuality thus emerges from a paradigm in which dissociation from men and masculinity.. unequal division of domestic labor. economic dependence. Card 1990). the soul. The Transsexual Empire ([1979] 1994) has become the archetypal articulation of radical feminist hostility to transsexuality and has had a persistent inﬂuence on feminist perceptions of transgender. recommending instead that women become “woman-identiﬁed. Other recent recapitulations of aspects of Raymond’s position (and critical responses) can be found in discussions surrounding organizers’ refusal to admit (openly) trans women to the Michigan Womyn’s Music Festival (MWMF). and Yudkin 1978. feminists denaturalized heterosexual relationships. and indeed lesbian feminists have continued to emphasize the importance of self-deﬁnition and willful separation in creating feminist communities (e. and an ideology of self-sacriﬁce. Frye 1983.10 Raymond’s early investigation of the
10 For contemporaneous analyses that recapitulate some of Raymond’s theses. 71–72 (and 238 and 287 for notes explicitly endorsing aspects of Raymond’s position). 17 Jan 2014 00:37:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
. Radicalesbians 1988). are prime political values. Rich 1980). Vincent writes: “[Transsexuality] signiﬁes the death of the self. using understandings of heterosexuality as a compulsory institution to bring relationships between women and men into the political sphere (e. 171–74. but a realistic apprehension of the signiﬁcance of ‘lesbian’ transsexuals as a penetration of woman-only space by men” (Miriam 1993. and messages posted to the festival Web board at http:// www.g. xxii). the letters pages in the alternative magazine Lesbian Connection. 116. therefore I am’ has become an ontological joke on the order of ‘I tinker.S I G N S
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stressed the autonomy of women from men. esp. I am indebted to Mary Gebhart for sharing her invaluable primary research and critical analysis of the rift between trans and lesbian feminists at MWMF (dis-
This content downloaded from 138.” In this context. combined with self-deﬁnition and control of women’s identity. resistant to the pull of compulsory heterosexuality and likely to generate liberatory spaces within which women could transform themselves (e.

Michigan State University. and I will not
sertation in progress. for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably” (1958. no commentator pays sufﬁciently close attention to the details of her views. See Colapino 1997. as Ludwig Wittgenstein would say. And we could not get outside it. although it has also provided some succor for opponents of damaging cosmetic genital surgeries on intersexed children.5 on Fri. in media expose ´ s of this case. Finally. Raymond’s ad hoc attempts to exclude MTFs while including all genetic women are rather unconvincing. the possibility of alliance between trans and non-trans feminists.12 In her 1994 introduction.16. Money was portrayed as overly casual about the link between sex and gender.26.
This content downloaded from 138. dogmatically insisting that early childhood socialization could imprint gender identity.11 However. The child was raised as a girl. Raymondian understandings of MTF identity have been reiterated in debates in Canada around human rights claims brought by transsexuals against their exclusion from positions in feminist organizations reserved for women. demanding medical treatment to restore—insofar as this was possible—a male body. Interestingly enough. 12 Ludwig Wittgenstein says “A picture held us captive.1100
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medical discourses and institutions that police transsexuality is a signiﬁcant contribution to feminist scholarship. and. 43–68). Raymond again restricts membership in the category “women” to those with a shared female history. while his identical twin brother was raised as a boy. 115). Predictably. 86–108). see Owen 2003. For a detailed account of this Wittgensteinian approach to genealogy as political therapy. American Studies Program). despite a number of critical analyses of Raymond’s overall approach (such as Riddell 1996. which are often defended by theorists who would eschew any overt connection with her approach. where a male infant was surgically altered to have feminized genitals following a botched circumcision. See Michele Landsberg’s commentary in the Toronto Star (2000). and her critical commentary on John Money’s theories of gender identity remains valuable (and topical in light of recent media fascination with the cases he managed) (Raymond [1979] 1994. sec. hence. the case has been taken to make the explicitly antifeminist point that boys and girls are born rather than made. and eventually marrying and adopting children. Feminists writing about transgender are. regardless of biological sex. It is against this background that I take up the “new introduction on transgender” to the 1994 reissue of The Transsexual Empire. 17 Jan 2014 00:37:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
. I suggest that Raymond’s resistance to changing her position is not simply a principled refusal. and Chase 1998. Caliﬁa 1997. explicitly excluding MTF transsexuals. held captive by a picture within which the history of fetishizing trans people combines with a lack of critical attention to the privilege of being stably gendered to erase the possibility of a trans feminist politics. 11 The cause ce ´ le ` bre that recently brought Money and his theories into the public eye is the John/Jean case. In adolescence and young adulthood John rejected his female gender identity and began to live as a man. This picture needs to be made visible as a picture before it can be dispelled.

It uses the classiﬁcation “gender identity disorder.26. 14 With its spiraling taxonomies of “mental disorders. age. 15 References to Raymond’s (1979) 1994 “new introduction on transgender” can be identiﬁed by page numbers in roman numerals.13 At the root of her exclusion of transsexuals from the category women (and. This approach precludes the kind of ad hoc boundary defense that ensnares Raymond. from women-only spaces) is a critique of institutions that. however. within this model.15 These conclusions depend on the validity of a number of controversial premises: ﬁrst. 537). 17 Jan 2014 00:37:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
. including myself.5 on Fri. transsexuals themselves practice misogynist forms of femininity and deny their male privilege. xvi. who have recommended alternative forms of generalization.
13 The essentialist claim that we can think of “women” as a category with necessary and sufﬁcient conditions of membership has been widely challenged by feminists. 34). particularly of the classiﬁcation of “gender identity disorder” as a pathology by the infamous Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders of the American Psychiatric Association (“the DSM”). On her reading. that the identities of all trans people can be captured using a theoretical model avowedly based on a small sample of primarily MTF transsexuals. Raymond argues. among others.14 Raymond renders transsexuality co-causal with its disease classiﬁcation and also suggests that transsexuals are complicitous with some medical experts’ sexist norms ([1979] 1994. Key to this construction is Raymond’s critique of the medicalization of transsexuality. athletes. it still leaves many political questions unresolved. and third.
This content downloaded from 138. For example. oppression. I have argued that “women” should be understood as a Wittgensteinian family resemblance concept (Heyes 2000a). and class in particular. the DSM-IV itself is not a document I want to defend. Rather than exploring these analogies. make transsexuality possible.” for which the primary symptoms are “a strong and persistent cross-gender identiﬁcation (not merely a desire for any perceived cultural advantages of being the other sex [sic])” and “persistent discomfort with his or her sex or sense of inappropriateness in the gender role of that sex” (American Psychiatric Association 1994. and cosmetic surgery candidates. This ﬁnal premise is particularly interesting to me because so many non-trans women also undertake to dramatically change their bodies for reasons arguably connected to gender identity: bodybuilders.16. that the desire to change one’s body in order to accommodate one’s identity in this way is conclusive evidence of antifeminist political commitments. Raymond emphasizes disanalogies with other social hierarchies—race. anorectics. dieters. hence. second. MTF transsexuals are artifacts of patriarchal medical practices that appropriate women’s bodies and perpetuate gender essentialism and.S I G N S
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elaborate or rebut them here. that all trans people are dependent on thoroughgoing sex reassignment surgery (SRS) for the successful expression of their identities. hence. of course.” almost invariably described as if they were psychic states entirely separable from cultural and historical context.

” and the cosmetics and cosmetic surgery industries are engaged in constructing discourses that pathologize age. This schema. discourses of transsexuality have an obvious foothold.16. essentially. to the ubiquitous skin-bleaching creams marketed to people of color. Yet her point about “transracial” medical intervention is simply false: cosmetic modiﬁcations that aim to make features of bodies less ethnically or racially marked abound.26. Likewise. while in some moments resistant to any crossing of categories. depending on the relation of sexual object choice to biological sex. And while transsexuality often operates using a much more medicalized and depoliticized discourse than the other examples. “there is no demand for transracial medical intervention precisely because most Blacks recognize that it is their society. dieting has a socioeconomic subtext. To the extent that “sex. Yet even here there are ways of expressing dissatisfaction with one’s class status that. One simply is. and related beauty treatments are expressing a relatively depoliticized “age dissatisfaction. to nose jobs for Jews. not their skin. Most purchasers of antiwrinkle creams. simultaneously creates conditions of possibility for transsexuality understood as a biological or pathological phenomenon. 17 Jan 2014 00:37:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
. Where the disanology with other social groups seems most marked is in the case of socioeconomic class. face-lifts.
This content downloaded from 138. for example. and concomitantly heterosexual or homosexual. “Does a Black person who wants to be white suffer from the ‘disease’ of being a ‘transracial’?” and claims. we need both a broader understanding of the history of sexuality and a more careful evaluation of how that history confronts individuals. organized through a binary schema. from hair-straightening treatments for African Americans. that needs changing” ([1979] 1994. to understand why. is that they seem to complicate rather than clarify the point she wants to make. for better or worse.” “gender.1102
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What is interesting about these appeals. While Raymond’s attempts at disanalogy may fail. An increasingly common psychology in selling these products is to encourage potential consumers to think of themselves as young people trapped in an older person’s body—an uncanny echo of transsexual discourse (Morgan 1998. Raymond asks. xvi). 327).5 on Fri. seek their remedy in changes to the body: to the extent that obesity connotes “trashiness” in North America. either male or female.” and “sexuality” have come to be thought of as core ontological facts about individuals. however. to eyelid surgery for East Asians. dieting is marketed to women in particular using the language of a thin person “just dying to get out” of her fat body. she would be right to point out that these forms of self-fashioning are hardly random expressions of presocial desires and that all take place in larger political contexts.

The picture of transsexuality I have been criticizing might seem like a throwback to the headier days of second-wave feminism. This latter humanist position has more of a grip on our thinking about race. dominant racial taxonomies all admit of several racial groups. is a natural category that adheres to bodies rather than history. than it does in the case of gender. then “transracialism” makes no sense. However. In
This content downloaded from 138. a (differently racist) discourse understands race as a superﬁcial aspect of identity: “we’re all the same underneath.S. depending how you think). Thus Raymond’s critique of medicalization. This analysis leaves no space for recognition of the discontinuity between the expectations of non-trans medical practitioners and transsexuals themselves. there is more than one permutation. race has an ambivalent relationship to dichotomy: while the politics of race often does operate to reduce racial conﬂict to “black versus white. But part of my argument is that this picture persists into recent interpretations of transgender identities.26. Thus it is less clear what a transracial would cross between. when women were women and generalizations were unqualiﬁed. contexts. and indeed for the very possibility of a feminist transsexual. An even less plausible contention is that transsexuals’ participation in the institution of transsexuality is evidence of their political naı ¨vete ´ and gender bad faith. What do transsexuals of color do on this model. while accurately reﬂecting many of the conservative requirements imposed on transsexual “patients. The category of “race” carries with it a (racist) biological baggage that gives related meaning to medical interventions: race. “all the same” (where “same” is coded “white”). then she would have to concur that the history of race and its negotiation by individuals are signiﬁcantly different. thus changing one’s body can change one’s race (or the perception of one’s race—the same thing.” especially in U.” If we are. while people of color (would) consciously and univocally resist “transracialism” because they are politically savvy to its actual (or potential) role in maintaining racism.” singles out transsexuals as uniquely implicated in politically regressive ideologies. I wonder? Raymond’s transsexual is decisively coded as white. or not. 17 Jan 2014 00:37:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
. precluding the possibility of a “double consciousness” within which these paradoxically divergent understandings of race and gender are potentially available to the transsexual (not just to the nontranssexual critic). Working out the analogies and disanalogies between “transsexualism” and “transracialism” is therefore going to require more than an assertion that the former exists while the latter does not. I would argue.5 on Fri. Furthermore. even when the explicit theoretical paradigm is not lesbian feminist. in one (misguided) part of the popular imagination. in some sense.S I G N S
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If Raymond would agree with this synopsis.16. when this is itself arguable.

Ostensibly.5 on Fri. 117). Bernice Hausman offers a Foucauldian genealogy of transsexuality. While we might debate the causal mechanisms she identiﬁes.” a well-known call to arms by and on behalf of radical transsexuals. 14. 110) Although much of her scholarship is based on the history of sexology.16. 17 Jan 2014 00:37:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
. (Hausman 1995. Hausman’s primary thesis is “that the development of certain medical technologies made the advent of transsexualism possible” (1995. while we might hope that a constructionist historical analysis would be less likely to project negative moral qualities onto contemporary subjects without appreciating the complexity of their locations.1104
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Changing Sex. Hausman explicitly disavows the possibility of trans subjects who challenge the epistemic priority of technological intervention mediated by medical professionals. she ﬁrst takes up Sandy Stone’s “The Empire Strikes Back: A Posttranssexual Manifesto. including
This content downloaded from 138. In a chapter devoted to transsexual autobiography. I do not have space here to argue with Hausman’s historical scholarship on the emergence of medicaltechnological discourses. Hausman is also interested in what contemporary transsexuals have to say about this process. I think she does show that the emergence of sexological discourse and. the demand for sex change is an enunciation that designates a desired action and identiﬁes the speaker as the appropriate subject of that action. 7). crucially. who but a suffering individual would voluntarily request such severe physical transformation? Yet it is through this demand that the subject presents him/ herself to the doctor as a transsexual subject. Hausman reaches conclusions quite similar to Raymond’s. She ﬁnds the conditions of possibility for the transsexual subject in a genealogy that grants “to the technology a relative autonomy from what are known as gender ideologies” (1995. like Raymond. However. a supportive technological base for effecting SRS were key conditions of possibility for contemporary transsexual identity as a medicalized phenomenon. The acting subject is subservient to emergent technology in her analysis: By demanding technological intervention to “change sex. the demand for sex change represents the desperation of the transsexual condition: after all. Demanding sex change is therefore part of what constructs the subject as a transsexual: it is the mechanism through which transsexuals come to identify themselves under the sign of transsexualism and construct themselves as its subjects. for example. Hausman endorses most of Stone’s political aspirations.” transsexuals demonstrate that their relationship to technology is a dependent one.26.

I read Stone’s allusions to “authentic experience” or “a true. gender. but immediately foreclosed by the author”: “For the reader interested in verifying his or her own gender confusions. What Hausman does with this “Foucauldian model. 296. Stone represents “the power at work—the force that produces transsexual autobiography as singular and monolithic—as entirely repressive and negative.16. without any enabling function” (Hausman 1995. Hausman also introduces a circularity that makes these goals impossible to meet. For a critical reader. Her organizing thesis is that the trans subject must necessarily reiterate central tropes of autobiographical and
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the desire to destabilize the ofﬁcial history of transsexuality and to offer dissident transsexual autobiographies that resist the allure of essentialism and passing (Hausman 1995. Stone is not suggesting that transsexual narratives have a univocal authenticity that has yet to be articulated but rather that whatever transgressive possibilities transsexuality might afford will not be generated by lying about basic aspects of one’s lived experience (e. this “interpretive foreclosure” is reiterated in the encounter between the would-be transsexual and the clinician (157). on the other hand. 147). This approach would enable us to gauge the ways in which transsexual autobiographies function as enabling—and not merely repressive—narratives” (1995. the ‘truth’ of the transsexual experience. these narratives provide ample opportunity for identiﬁcation and mirroring. is to read a number of popular testimonials as “closed texts” within which “alternate interpretations are at times suggested. especially as the author makes blanket statements concerning sex. emphases in original). 295) as more literal calls to stop participating in the denials that conformity to clinical protocols requires.g. so good. the reading process can be conﬁning. the fact that one was raised as a boy even though one currently lives as a woman). 143–45). For Hausman. Driving a wedge between Stone’s account and her own enables Hausman to make what she presents as a counterargument: “Another way to examine these autobiographies is to use a Foucauldian model to analyze the statements made in transsexual autobiographies and thereby to examine the forms of subjectivity and experience made possible by these statements. She suggests that Stone’s overall goal is to liberate “suppressed stories.” however. However. 146). The purpose of the narratives is to force the reader to comply with the author’s experience” (156).26. in the service of this goal. 17 Jan 2014 00:37:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
. This is a very odd interpretation of a text that professes a commitment to “constituting transsexuals as a genre—a set of embodied texts whose potential for productive disruption of structured sexualities and spectra of desire has yet to be explored” (Stone 1991.5 on Fri. and sexuality.. effective and representational counterdiscourse” (1991. So far.

then. in both cases. see also 130). 129. This rhetorical work is accomplished. Both authors anticipate the objection that their emphasis on the surgically (re)constructed transsexual obscures the multiplicity of transgendered lives. transsexuals encouraged a therapeutic response on the part of clinicians. 132). is what Hausman can make of the agency of transsexuals in authoring their own narratives. the transsexual author is an agent only to the extent that she or he works to foreclose interpretations of her/his story as evidence of anything other than authentic “mistaken identity” requiring SRS. indeed. I want now to turn to their strikingly similar feminist analyses of the limitations of the contemporary trans liberation movement. For Hausman. as if one couldn’t be a transsexual and a critic at the same time” (1998. .5 on Fri. Whereas the gender-confused use transsexual autobiography to verify their gender confusion. In this way. Her historical work not only describes the conditions of possibility for a certain articulation of transsexual identity but goes on to tautologically present the class of transsexuals as coterminous with those who uncritically accede to the terms of contemporary technological intervention. then any conceptual space for resistance to the medical-technological complex has also been foreclosed. As Jay Prosser points out (referring to Hausman’s quote from 156 above): “The ‘critical reader’ is set up in opposition to ‘the reader interested in verifying his or her gender confusion’ . and both respond to trans critics articulating new narratives and political strategies. in relatively brief ripostes appended to larger analyses—in Raymond’s case. tautologically. in the “new introduction on transgender” discussed above.1106
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medical narratives of transsexuality in order to exist. . as the individual who accedes to the terms of the discourse that generated a particular subject position.26. and the demand for medical-technological intervention overdetermines these “conﬁning” personal narratives. in a six-page epilogue
This content downloaded from 138. Thus in Hausman’s reduction the transsexual is deﬁned. critical readers (presumably having no gender confusion to verify) apparently get to see through to the internal problematics of these texts: as if transsexuals were not critical thinkers and readers. The question. and in Hausman’s. 17 Jan 2014 00:37:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
. Thus Hausman suggests that transsexuals have agency only in their complicity: “By making their desired treatment absolutely clear.
(The same) feminists construct transgender (the same way)
Having thus shown how both Raymond’s and Hausman’s analyses conspire to preclude agential resistance on the part of transsexuals. If technology overdetermines the transsexual. transsexuals were actively engaged in deﬁning their position within medical discourses” (1995.16.

and straights who exhibit any kind of dress and/or behavior interpreted as ‘transgressing’ gender roles” (Raymond [1979] 1994. and in fact there is only very sketchy and largely anecdotal evidence about the proportions of genetic males and females who might be described as “transgendered. She provides no support for the empirical aspect of this claim.5 on Fri. However..16. rather than transcending. 17 Jan 2014 00:37:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
. it never moves off this continuum to an existence in which gender is truly transcended. This deﬁnition enables Raymond to attack the more ephemeral and often less politicized performances of celebrities such as RuPaul and k.” however deﬁned (partly because these statistics are in rapid ﬂux). Raymond still sees a necessarily misogynist politics: “It is interesting that. drag queens.S I G N S
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to Changing Sex. a more charitable interpretation would have her arguing that popular representations of single acts are a poor substitute for collective action against gender norms. She suggests that “the ideal of transgender is provocative. many trans activists agree and see themselves as part of a political movement working toward new legal. it allows for a continuum of gendered expression. binary gender roles (e. xxv). When it comes to “transgender. One might legitimately retort here that the personal is the political and that Raymond’s point trades on a false dichotomy. d. dismantling and going beyond gender roles. bisexuals.26. institutional. even when the form of transgender in question seems more overtly controversial and transgressive. and cultural norms that do not embody compulsory. xxv). In fact. Raymond is theoretically motivated to emphasize the role of genetic men by her
This content downloaded from 138. seek to combine aspects of traditional femininity with traditional masculinity” ([1979] 1994. we see how both authors’ skepticism about the feminist implications of transsexuality is extended to transgender more broadly. On a political level. lang (being “shaved” by Cindy Crawford on the 1993 cover of Vanity Fair). On a personal level. xxxv). like transsexuals.e. covers preoperative and postoperative transsexuals.. Wilchins 1997). Both authors argue that their analyses need not change in the face of trans people who do not appear to ﬁt. i. gays and lesbians. Bornstein 1997.” however. cross dressers.g. Raymond offers a capacious deﬁnition: “The term. the majority of transgenderists are men who. Throughout the main text of The Transsexual Empire. transvestites. Its supposedly iconoclastic rebellion against traditional gender conﬁnement is more style than substance” ([1979] 1994. In these passages. thus dismissing transgender activism as irrelevant to feminist politics.” which she takes to imply speciﬁc ideological commitments to essentialist and antifeminist understandings of gender. however. transgender. Raymond reduces “transsexual” to “seeking total sex reassignment surgery.

because Raymond’s brand of feminism requires only one subject: the woman-identiﬁed woman. I suspect the answer to this is no. including some transsexuals.” As she herself asks rhetorically. Raymond famously states that “the problem of transsexualism would best be served by morally mandating it out of existence” ([1979] 1994. as I have shown.’ In fact. “What good is a gender outlaw who is still abiding by the law of gender?” ([1979] 1994. Jess’s transgendered life seems as close as it is possible to get to surviving on a discursive fault line—psychologically and quite literally. The hypothesis that transgender is antifeminist seems unfalsiﬁable. emphases in original). xxxv). Raymond is also disappointed with the inability of transgendered people to “transcend” gender roles and with transgendered practices that only “combine aspects of traditional femininity with traditional masculinity. Indeed.26. 178). Hausman discusses Kate Bornstein’s Gender Outlaw (1995).” but whatever answers are offered to these methodological (and historical) questions need to make both problem and solution explicit (see Halberstam 1998). Jess. Raymond is critical of what she sees as the “politically disappointing” retreat of the protagonist. arguing for the conclusion that “the contradictions that emerge from her arguments . some are criticized for failing to occupy a gender home (even when neither “woman” nor “man” seems welcoming). who have started to publicly repudiate the conservative politics of transsexuality espoused by clinicians and popular media (1995. Hausman’s critique of the trans movement is remarkably similar. xxxii. Her epilogue brieﬂy considers how to make sense of those transgendered people.” Genetic women who might plausibly be described as “trans” are explained within a binary gender system—albeit a critical feminist model.16. demonstrate the extent to which the transgender movement bases its claims within the conventional
This content downloaded from 138. 195). Some transgendered people are criticized for mixing still identiﬁably gendered aesthetics or behaviors and thus failing to “transcend” gender. Yet. In answer.1108
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desire to safeguard the integrity of the category “woman-identiﬁed women. . into “a long-suffering self-surrender to being other—not a woman who is a butch and not a woman who tries to pass as a man with the help of hormones and surgery. Jess’s ﬁnal transformation is from being womanidentiﬁed to being other-identiﬁed” (Raymond [1979] 1994. 17 Jan 2014 00:37:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
. .5 on Fri. but a transgendered individual who identiﬁes as simply ‘other. Even in her critique of Stone Butch Blues (Feinberg 1993). It is clearly a parallel oversimpliﬁcation to insist on including any masculine woman in the category “trans. and one is left wondering if there could be any kind of trans life that would satisfy Raymond with its feminist credentials and contribution to social transformation.

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. or to articulate ways of being that exceed the binary logic. which is precisely one goal of the transsexual—to forget or dismiss the technological intervention necessary to maintain his or her chosen sex” (200).
Trans liberation?
The rhetorical strategies of Raymond and Hausman thus inhibit community building by deﬁning feminist transgender politics as an oxymoron.16. as well as the possibility of unsettling the stability of those who see themselves as ‘normally sexed’” (1995. the object of discussion again slips from the transgendered individual seeking “limited technological intervention” to the transsexual who is ideologically dependent on denying that such intervention has occurred. Feinberg’s Trans Liberation. To support this claim. 197). Certainly every attempt by a self-identiﬁed trans person to unsettle the stability of the normally sexed and gendered. usually involves hormone treatment. In this text I identify an understanding of gender as a property
This content downloaded from 138. Non-trans feminists who are convinced by these arguments will not be motivated to explore alliances—indeed. even with limited technological intervention. will risk rejection by Hausman as well as by Raymond. and taking hormones. In this context it is unclear what the “more critical project” Hausman alludes to could be.S I G N S
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parameters of the gender identity paradigm rather than transgressing that paradigm. Hausman attributes to all trans people not just a pragmatic dependence on medical services but also a wholesale adoption of a particular diagnosis and its concomitant politics. they provide justiﬁcations for actively resisting transgender expression and inclusion. 198). ‘Transcending’ gender (Raymond’s words) involves a more critical project. In the passage just quoted.5 on Fri. I now want to take up the second horn of the dilemma I identiﬁed at the beginning of the article and turn to trans feminist writing—speciﬁcally. as it claims to do” (Hausman 1995. To ignore these facts is to discount the signiﬁcance of technological intervention on the body’s tissue and function. because that logic deﬁnes the possibility of the switching in the ﬁrst place. Hausman reiterates her argument that medicotechnological treatment is inseparable from all trans identities: “Transgenderism. even in small doses. This conclusion is supported with the premise that any attempt to proliferate genders (as Bornstein wants to do) will always relate back to the binary: “In Raymond’s argument—and my own—one cannot ‘escape’ gender by switching roles or performances and thereby confuse the binary logic. is risky. Taking hormones in the dosages necessary to maintain the opposite sex’s morphology is not something that should be done without proper medical treatment and supervision. Like Raymond.26.

the public trans person was most often manipulated as a talk-show gimmick. cross-dressers. sexual fetish. 5).1110
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of individuals rather than relations that hampers the development of feminist community in which agents are held morally accountable for the consequences of their gender expression for others. 17 An earlier version of this critique of Feinberg was ﬁrst published in Heyes 2000b. In the emerging genre of popular trans feminist polemic (as in much of popular feminist writing) the rhetorical emphasis is squarely on the right of individuals to express their gender as they choose or to engage in free gender play. and hir extensive connections to
16 Two books that complicate this genre were published too late to be discussed in this essay. and Feinberg (1998). Until very recently. transsexual men and women. to an intersexed activist discussing the emergence of the intersex movement. Feinberg’s work on trans liberation as a political movement “capable of ﬁghting for justice” must be read against this background. and interpreting Gender Outlaw or Read My Lips as the ﬁnal word in trans politics is rather like seeing The Female Eunuch or The Beauty Myth as the epitome of feminism—each text captures particular moments of a political movement. to a gay transman on the signiﬁcance of his native heritage. 17 Jan 2014 00:37:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
. which was written in 2000.
This content downloaded from 138. I see gender voluntarism as playing an important rhetorical role for transgendered intellectuals. 1997). to a drag queen recalling New York street life and Stonewall. and our signiﬁcant others” (1998. intersexuals born on the anatomical sweep between female and male.16. but need not deﬁne the scope of critique or remedy. an impressively wide range of queer identities and stories inﬂected by class. These images are still there. Feinberg never hesitates to draw parallels with the oppression of women. Bornstein (1995. philosophically speaking. and. defends particular theses perhaps. and age are represented: from a male transvestite who became a full-time transgendered woman talking with her wife about their relationship. I concur that Bornstein risks eliding a number of concerns about the embeddedness of gendered subjects. See Namaste 2000 and Haynes and McKenna 2001.17 This movement. in the short “portraits” by other contributors. on Feinberg’s account. who use both ﬁrst-person narratives and polemical commentary on gender to motivate more critical understandings of what trans liberation might mean. or tell-all sensationalist. Hausman’s brief critique of Bornstein ﬁnds fault with the “liberal humanist” model of the self such claims imply. However.5 on Fri. race. Wilchins (1997). but there is also now a genre of writing by feminist activists such as Stone (1991). gender-blenders. Stryker (1994). includes “masculine females and feminine males. many other sex and gender-variant people. Indeed.16 This is an emerging genre.26.

I avoid judgments about others. and the language of choice appears throughout the book in slogans such as. there are interesting dissonances between Feinberg’s analysis of trans oppression and hir emphasis on freedom of individual self-expression: “Each person’s expression of their gender or genders is their own and equally beautiful. economic marginalization and exploitation. and cultural intolerance and disgust directed against any gender “deviance. In certain contexts Feinberg’s appeal for blanket tolerance of all and any gender expressions is appropriate. The notion of gender freedom ze espouses speaks against both the crushing weight of the dominant culture’s gender discipline and some of feminism’s more doctrinaire moments: “There are no rights or wrongs in the ways people express their own gender style. Hir stated primary goal is to “refocus on defending the [gender] diversity in the world that already exists. as well as all the other hues of the palette”. To refer to anyone’s gender expression as exaggerated is insulting and restricts gender freedom” (1998. with a particular emphasis on rupturing the connection between sexed bodies and gender identities. For example. “gender expression” must surely (on Feinberg’s own account) occupy a normative terrain.26. avoids important normative questions. . and political consciousness. “since I don’t accept negative judgments about my own gender articulation. And. 24). however. In particular. the privilege of white bourgeois male masculinity is implicated in the cultural visibility of minority male masculinities. skirts or suits. People of all sexes have the right to explore femininity.16. This approach. “These ideas of what a ‘real’ woman or man should be straightjacket the freedom of individual self-expression” (4). 17 Jan 2014 00:37:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
. “every person should have the right to choose between pink or blue tinted gender categories. This freedom is characterized very much as a property of individuals. cultural disdain for femininity.S I G N S
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feminist activism are made explicit throughout hir writing. It is also implicated in politically fraught behaviors. Gender expression is thus not only an aesthetic choice about cosmetics or hairstyle. many feminists have argued that misogynist violence is constitutive of certain kinds of masculinity. No one’s lipstick or ﬂattop is hurting us.5 on Fri. . Despite the book’s many virtues. So even if the aesthetic choices of individuals are not up for moral grabs (as I agree they should not be). and creating room for even more possibilities” (28). . but it is hardly a form of gender
This content downloaded from 138. masculinity—and the inﬁnite variations between—without criticism or ridicule” (25). Each person has the right to express their gender in any way that feels most comfortable” (53).” These social structures inform and support normative heterosexuality and white bourgeois patriarchy.

But it also sometimes evades hard political questions about who is damaged and privileged by conﬁgurations of gender that themselves need to be transformed. ze says: “All your life you’ve heard such dogma about what it means to be a ‘real’ woman or a ‘real’ man. ze concludes: “I believe that we need to sharpen our view of how repression by the police. It is not so clear that. courts.16. sometimes from within the subject’s own political consciousness. if one is either a woman or a trans person.1112
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expression that Feinberg can condone. The chances of this are far greater. ending gender oppression will beneﬁt everyone. I once asked Feinberg. 17 Jan 2014 00:37:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
. “What’s good about masculinity?” Ze referred in hir answer to the diversity of masculinities across and within time and place and to the freedom of individuals to express their gender without fear of reprisal. Implicitly addressing hir nontrans readers. Their self-expression may be deeply felt or essential to maintaining a gendered identity. as well as all forms of racism and bigotry. This is an important goal. however.5 on Fri. 11). Such analysis should also include critique of the gender work accomplished by male police ofﬁcers who assault gender-queers.26. Feinberg does not acknowledge that far from “choking. This refusal to pass judgment on others’ choices contributes to the appeal of Feinberg’s rhetoric throughout hir work. When ze discusses hir experience of police brutality against gay drag kings and drag queens. No doubt ze would resist such a demand on the reasonable grounds that trans people have too often been forced to conform to damaging gender norms or been oppressively criticized—as I have
This content downloaded from 138. Feinberg thus seems to sidestep the ethical ﬁeld into which one invariably stumbles when talking about the merits of various “gender expressions. but in posing the question I was thinking more of the ethical dilemmas faced by men who want to avoid participating in sexism (Kahane 1998). operates as gears in the machinery of the economic and social system that governs our lives” (1998. And chances are you’ve choked on some of it” (1998. as Feinberg likes to think. To express masculinity (no matter what one’s birth sex) is often to despise femininity.” This elision comes from hir willingness to treat gender as an individual matter rather than as a web of relations in ongoing tension and negotiation. just as to express femininity is often to implicate oneself in one’s own oppression. In other words. 3). Feinberg’s approach here elides a crucial aspect of progressive gender politics: the demand that we change ourselves. With this problem in mind. It is perhaps even more difﬁcult to combine the demands of maintaining a public identity as a transman with a commitment to feminism (Hale 1998).” there are many people who lap up gender ideology precisely because it supports their privilege. and prisons. but it clearly needs to be fought against. in the same way that Raymond’s dogmatism detracts from hers.

which would be informed by consideration of how speciﬁc gendered ways of being ﬁt into a web of possibilities and repressions. thoughts. How might non-trans feminists temper critique of trans identities without adopting a laissez-faire account of gender and while recognizing our own parallel struggles with identity? In the context of her critique of transgender politics. so as to transform themselves” (Foucault 1988. we might see SRS as one technology of the self among many others implicated in gender identity and oppression. and the stakes are particularly high for subjects often denied any gender home unless they undertake them. however. In the case of trans identities. Missing from this rhetoric is any rich account of the ethics of self-transformation. 18).26. and way of being.16. It is not clear why the theoretical parameters of this question speciﬁcally limit the critical faculties of transsexuals. 17 Jan 2014 00:37:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
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already shown—for having the “wrong” sort of consciousness. One important characteristic of the middle ground excluded by these positions is a relational. we condemn any trans move as merely another iteration of oppressive norms. We might equally ask: “Are subjects who identify unquestioningly as ‘heterosexual’ in order to accommodate the demands of heteropatriarchy really able to question the
This content downloaded from 138. 199). conduct. with Feinberg.
“Us and them”: Feminist solidarity and transgender
Thus either feminists elide. a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls. or. Rather than treating transgender as a special case.5 on Fri. I have pointed out that these technologies are unusually literal. Filling in this gap might mitigate some of the legitimate anxieties of non-trans feminists (including Raymond and Hausman) that transgender politics will be inattentive to the relations that hold stigmatized concepts of “woman” in place. with Hausman and Raymond. Hausman asks—supposedly rhetorically—“are subjects who change their sex in order to make their bodies ‘match’ some kind of internal experience of the self deﬁned as gender really able to question the ‘system’ that so clearly demarcates their choices?” (1995. But this response does not allow for important political distinctions between progressive transformations of consciousness initiated from within marginalized communities and disciplining moves that attempt only to reinforce established divisions. the ethical questions that are raised by self-fashioning in the context of gender relations. or with the help of others. historicized model of the self that broadens the scope of Foucauldian analysis to encompass “technologies of the self”—“matrices of practical reason” that “permit individuals to effect by their own means.

142).5 on Fri.” “men.” “gay. urbanization. while it shaped her way of being in the world.” “lesbian.26. Q’s story bears a striking resemblance to the autobiographies of many trans people.18 To make this point more forcefully. As a devotee of Foucauldian feminism. he replied “On this question I have absolutely nothing to say. 17 Jan 2014 00:37:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
. But just as non-trans feminists take seriously the experience of “growing up as a lesbian. as I would like to. This intellectual attitude. and in fact she could continue simply to pass as heterosexual. she ﬁnally decided that she would “come out” and create a life as a lesbian. yet who in autobiographical moments resorts to the language of “I’ve always known I was a lesbian.16. by contrast. she was convinced. 19 Martin 1988. that “lesbian” is in fact a relatively recent category of being. just as there is a standard “coming out” story for gays and lesbians. structuring consciousness and determining possibilities. After years in the closet. imagine Q. Mason-Schrock 1996. as I have discussed.19 These tropes may well inspire post hoc interpretations. The categories “women.1114
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‘system’ that so clearly demarcates their choices?” Adopting a radical framework in which choice must be understood through the deep construction of subjects cannot apply only to the construction of transsexuals.” so there is no less of
When Foucault was asked whether he had any conviction one way or another on the distinction between innate predisposition to homosexual behavior and social conditioning.
18
This content downloaded from 138. away from the allure of causal pictures. nonetheless coexisted uneasily with her sense that things could not have been otherwise except at the cost of great anguish and selfdeception. Prosser 1998. and many people tried to persuade her that sexuality was quite malleable. there is a set of tropes that deﬁne the genre of (transsexual) autobiography. a lesbian feminist who subscribes enthusiastically to the notion that her life constitutes a resistance to institutionalized heterosexuality. I read Foucault not simply as demurring due to lack of expertise (as if the question had a correct answer that he did not know) but also as shifting the focus of political conversation. created by economic change.” Q recalls a childhood fraught with ambivalence and trauma: she had unrequited crushes on other girls. ‘No comment.’” He goes on to say that this is “not my problem” and “not really the object of my work” (1997. Q was well aware that she lived in a culture where “sexuality” is treated ahistorically and quasi-scientiﬁcally as a core ontological fact about individuals. Phelan 1993. and she agonized over imagining herself the married mother that her culture expected her to become. so.” and “heterosexual” have their own histories that congeal in contemporary individuals. and feminist social movement. This caused her family a great deal of anguish. trying to pass as heterosexual. Of course. she experimented brieﬂy and unsuccessfully with dating boys. shifting kinship relations.

but resistance is also motivated by the feminist recognition that the penis does not make the man (Devor 1998. and the apparently conservative gender-boundary-preserving choices (surgical. a girl or a boy or a man or a woman. .5 on Fri.S I G N S
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an onus to respect the testimony of those who describe early lives marked out by gender confusion and distress: As our (modern Western) world is now. 112–17. and behavioral) of many transsexuals have to be read in full appreciation of what the real options are.20 I have certainly seen transsexuals act in ways that I thought showed poor political judgment on matters of oppression and privilege. . but that does not make their experience any less real or deeply felt on an individual level. too. but I have seen lesbians misstep. many MTFs who do not want to engage in penile-vaginal intercourse after SRS resist the
20 Certainly in the literature on passing and on transgender there are numerous allusions to the shock of losing or gaining male privilege that was previously taken for granted or unknown. Many MTF transsexuals are developing their own forms of feminist consciousness and expressing their politics by both refusing certain medical interventions and asserting their rights to transform medical requirements. perhaps even more wounding. as well as the depoliticized queer aestheticism that some feminists ﬁnd objectionable (Bolin 1994. but. 132–33) It may well be the case that a larger institutional history creates those subjects. For example. are taken to be impossible to relate to humanly. failure to conform to the norms of gender is socially stigmatizing to an unbearable extent: To be human just is to be male or female. Caliﬁa 1997. In such a world. Cromwell 1999. 138–40). . and increasingly I have been impressed by the political commitment and sophistication of many trans activists. Raymond recognizes that denial is very deeply built into the structure of privilege and. The cosmetic and functional inadequacy of phalloplastic techniques is undoubtedly a major element of this resistance (and a valid one: who wants a lousy outcome to their surgery?). 221–44.
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.16. hormonal. especially lower-body surgeries. Those who cannot readily be classiﬁed by everyone they encounter are not only subject to physically violent assaults. boundary blurring carries psychic costs no one can be asked to pay. (Scheman 1997.26. that people read as men are likely to underestimate the signiﬁcance of their male privilege. hence. The politically resistant choices that trans people are making often do challenge the terms of medical practice. 405–13. Feinberg 1998). Many FTMs in particular refuse surgeries.

empirically speaking. Yet it is precisely those people who must grapple with the pros and cons—physically as well as politically—of hormone treatments and surgeries who are most aware of the trauma and risks of changing one’s body.16. bloodless.26. . 18). medically managed changes to the body they want to make. These dilemmas. At the very end of her book Hausman claims that “the transgenderist[’s] .1116
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heterosexist demand to excessively dilate or surgically extend their newly constructed vaginas. 15–19. 17 Jan 2014 00:37:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
. an enforced normative ideal body type. These pros and cons include consideration of how desperately uncomfortable. and be-ing” ([1979] 1994.5 on Fri. transgendered people face a complex set of choices about which. Much more can be said here. In making decisions about hormones. again. 200). In this I am joined by all of the authors
This content downloaded from 138. Rather. Raymond states that “medicalized intervention produces harmful effects in the transsexual’s body that negate bodily integrity. . passing. false. crash diets. and acquiescent. tautological and. or participation in other procedures such as plastic surgery. I have shown that Hausman’s and Raymond’s claims that transsexual identity is overdetermined by its medicalization are. Both critics are right that such interventions carry medical risks not yet fully understood.
Feminist solidarity after queer theory
My feminist utopia deﬁnitely does not include rigid disciplining of dimorphic sex and gender categories. which they may approach with more or less information. trans people—especially if they are feminists—face ethical and political dilemmas. unsafe. a growing political consciousness. and expanded community has caused those trans people who do seek medical services to be increasingly concerned with the limits of SRS as a route to an authentic identity. might be best understood as related to others faced by non-trans feminists. if any. ingestion of hormones. surgery. or bodybuilding are hardly different. or even to have one constructed in the ﬁrst place (Bornstein 1995. it seems as though increased access to critical information about medical procedures. and gender conformity. and one of the frustrations of much philosophy of the body is precisely that it treats ﬂesh as inﬁnitely malleable. but I hope to show only that trans people face complex choices about if and how to modify their bodies. genetic women who ponder the wisdom of breast implants. or psychic need. In general. merit medical attention because of the inherent dangers of reconﬁguring the body’s tissues” (1995. 118–21). In a similar vein. or abjection. conceptually speaking. objectiﬁcation. or unhappy one would be without altering one’s body. political acumen. In this regard. wholeness.

If we are all individuals making normatively equal gender choices. if we detach ourselves from each other and our mutual implication in favor of a demand for individual freedom. ———. San Francisco: Cleis. New York: Routledge. Acknowledging this. and Diversity. Washington. As Naomi Scheman puts it. My Gender Workbook: How to Become a Real Man. 447–85. Anne. Benjamin. Gender Outlaw: On Men. Like Subjects. and sharing these goals for me deﬁnes a potential for feminist solidarity. New York: Zone. ed.26. 1997.: Yale University Press. and the political zeitgeist is such that solidarity must. 1997. hopefully. of necessity. and our comfort with our own gender. “Pluralist Lesbian Separatism.16. . 1990. Jeffner Allen. Bartky.: SUNY Press.S I G N S
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I have discussed in this article. then where is oppression? The answer to this question looks more complicated now. “Transcending and Transgendering: Male-to-Female Transsexuals. Bornstein. Sex Changes: The Politics of Transgenderism.” In Third Sex. ed. Albany. more honest. I have argued.5 on Fri. 152–53). New York: Vintage. Pat. is not who is or is not really whatever.” In Lesbian Philosophies and Cultures. Very different experiences and identities can motivate similar feminist goals. Bolin. Conn.: American Psychiatric Association. and the Body. 1993. Solidarity will founder. Card. Third Gender: Beyond Sexual Dimorphism in Culture and History. Dichotomy. Department of Philosophy University of Alberta
References
American Psychiatric Association. New York: Routledge. but. 1995. Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression. Bordo. Unbearable Weight: Feminism. than they do about the realities of trans communities or political movements. 4th ed. N. Kate. but who can be counted on when they come for any one of us: the solid ground is not identity but loyalty and solidarity” (1997. or Something Else Entirely. leads us toward the recognition of political common ground and thus to the question of how feminist alliances can be formed.
This content downloaded from 138. Women. and the Rest of Us. D. Sandra. 1990. the Real You. 1994. start from the deep diversity of agents. Susan. 17 Jan 2014 00:37:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
. “The issue . 1995. New Haven. Western Culture. 1994. . Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.Y. however. a Real Woman. Love Objects: Essays on Recognition and Sexual Difference. 125–41. The approaches I have criticized may say more about non-trans feminists’ failure to interrogate our own identities. Jessica. Gilbert Herdt. Berkeley: University of California Press.C. Caliﬁa. Claudia.