Plaintiff/Appellanthereby appears in Opposition to the “Order” of 10-25-11

a copy of
which is attached for reference.

Good cause exists for allowing
this appeal as of right to move forward pursuant to Title 28
U.S.C. Sec. 1291, for the following reasons based on the
abundance of evidence already established in this case.

In preparing this Opposition,
Appellant’s research reveals that the definition of the term
as used in this instant Order “insubstantial” is deemed
subjective by this circuit. “Although it is difficult to
formulate a precise standard, not every case in which
appellant files an unimpressive opening brief is appropriate
for summary affirmance. Motions to affirm should be confined
to appeals obviously controlled by precedent and cases in
which the insubstantiality is manifest from the face of
appellant’s brief.2” United
States of America v. James Lynn Hooton,
Defendant-Appellant No. 82-1441, U.S. Court of Appeals,
(Decided October 13, 1982.)

As to form, Plaintiff/Appellant,
has found no authority as to the form this Opposition should
take, nor has there been any requested format. Therefore,
Appellant shall respond in opposition to this Order after a
practical manner.

FACTS AND ARGUMENT

On August 9, 2011, Plaintiff
Ronald Branson in the underlying court action,moved the below court for
the entry of Summary Judgment against all Defendants as to all
issues, based upon two grounds; namely 1) Non-response to
Plaintiff’s Request for Admissions, and 2) upon EXHIBITS A, B,
C, and D. Such Exhibits documented a major fraud which took
place within the Los Angeles Superior Court, which fraud led
all the way up through, and included the Appellate Department
of the Superior Court. Such fraud appears on its face to have
begun when someone unknown, created and filed a fraudulent
Minute Order of 11-24-09, which Minute Order alleges
“DEFENDANT IS PRESENT IN COURT, AND REPRESENTED BY MARVIN
GROSS DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER – DEFENDANT PLEADS NOT GUILTY TO
COUNT 01, 125(A) VC. DEFENDANT PLEADS NOT GUILTY TO COUNT 02,
27153 VC. – DEFENDANT WAS ARRAIGNED AND PLEAD NOT GUILTY ON
CITATION 0750701 – THAT CITATION IS NOW FILED AS A MISDEMEANOR
ON THIS CASE. – LAST DAY IS 12/18/09.”

It was not until after the matter
was on appeal that Plaintiff/Appellant, (hereinafter “P/A”),
discovered this fraud upon which all Defendants/Appellees
(hereinafter “D/A”) rely in asserting that P/A was convicted
of a crime. This fraudulent Minute Order is an exhibit to the
Motion for Summary Judgment.

As a result of P/A discovering
the information regarding this false and fraudulent
arraignment of criminal charges, he consulted with Court
Reporter Veronika Cohen about this incident at which he
supposedly was present and entered pleas to such charges. She
advised P/A that no such incident took place. P/A relayed this
same information on to the Appellate Department of the Los
Angeles Superior Court at oral argument attempting to impeach
the record and uncover the fraud behind this fraudulent Minute
Order. P/A asked this panel of judges to consult with the
Official Court Reporter for themselves and ascertain the truth
regarding this matter, after all, it was this document upon
which their entire affirmance of a conviction was based.

California Code of Civil
Procedure 1916 provides, “Any judicial record may be impeached
by evidence of a want of jurisdiction in the court or judicial
officer, of collusion between the parties, or of fraud in the
party offering the record, in respect to the proceedings.”

Notwithstanding this law, this
County appellate panel forged forward, based upon this exposed
fraud, to order, without jurisdiction to do so, a false and
fraudulent affirmance of the charges as stated within this
fraudulent Minute Order.

It thereby became obvious that it
was this very appellate panel itself who were offering this
fraudulent record, in respect to the proceedings, and who
thereby were in collusion by fraud with the other side. Such
conduct, bordering on criminal conduct, cannot be respected by
any other tribunal.

P/A then got back with Court
Reporter Veronika Cohen listed in the Minute Order, and
informed her that the appellate court refused to accept the
fact that no arraignment took place. Ms. Cohen then prepared a
declaration dated 3-9-11 verifying that there was no such
arraignment that took place. In her declaration she identifies
her position as the “OFFICIAL REPORTER FOR THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES”
which P/A attached as Exhibit B to all three Motions for
Summary Judgment served upon counsels for all of the D/As.

The declaration of the Official
Reporter for the Los Angeles County Courts stands unopposed
and deemed true throughout both the State action, and this
current federal action. There is nothing more to be resolved
in this federal action except damages to be determined by a
jury.

P/A has testified numerous times
by declaration that he was neither present at any arraignment,
had never received notice of any arraignment, never plead to
any charges at an arraignment, was never presented with a
verified complaint alleging charges, that he never waived his
right to defend himself should he be presented with criminal
charges. Everything involving the People of the State of
California
v. Ronald Branson, Case # 9VY04970, is based upon a total
fraud, and that the affirmation of conviction based upon a
fraudulent non-existent arraignment on fraudulent non-existing
charges performed without notice and without the presence or
knowledge of P/A, all now manifest as a magnificent cover-up
in this federal action.

Coming to the other ground for
P/A’s Motion for Summary Judgment, i.e., non-response to
Request for Admissions, it was therefore deemed admitted by
the D/As: “That there was no case called Re Ronald Branson;
that there was no foundation for the affirmance of a criminal
conviction against Ronald Branson inasmuch as there was no
arraignment on criminal charges against him. (Admission 6
& 8). That the case of People v. Ronald Branson, 9VY04970
was absent jurisdiction and the most basic fundamental right
to due process, and was based on fraud; that the intended
targeted victim was Ronald Branson to cause him to suffer
imprisonment. (Admission 13 & 15).”– Conclusion of P/A’s
Reply to Opposition of Defendant Marvin Gross to Plaintiff’s
Motion for Summary Judgment by Plaintiff Ronald Branson
against Defendant Marvin Gross & Los Angeles County, page
14, lines 12 – 21.

Since it is manifest by both the
declaration of the Official Court Reporter for the County of
Los Angeles, and by their own deemed admissions that there was
no criminal charges brought forth against P/A, nor an
arraignment on anything, that the criminal court debacle upon
which these D/As rely for their Motions to Dismiss was devoid
of absolutely all jurisdiction both in personam, and in rem,
and are situated in the same legal status as if no criminal
proceeding existed. Further noteworthy is the fact that the
City of Los Angeles
did not even opposeP/A’sMotion for Summary Judgment. They submitted nothing in their
defense against the granting of the Motion for Summary
Judgment.

The question now in consideration
is whether such lack of jurisdiction through manifest fraud,
and deception, should carry over into this Federal litigation.

P/A’s Motion for Summary Judgment
was set for hearing on October 17, 2011. On this date, P/A
appeared in court for a decision regarding this fraud.
However, rather than a decision regarding this fraud, the
court rendered the following; “ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION TO DISMISS by Judge Otis D Wright, II. This Court
GRANTS Moving Defendants’ Motion and dismisses Plaintiff’s FAC
in its entirety. In the event Plaintiff’s conviction is
overturned on appeal, he may file a new action. All remaining
motions are hereby found moot, and the Clerk of Court shall
close this case.”

It therefore becomes obvious that
Judge Otis D. Wright’s Order completely ignores all the
evidence regarding the fraud. By saying, “In the event
Plaintiff’s conviction is overturned on appeal, he may file a
new action,” he thereby refutes that P/A never received a
notice, was never arraigned, was never presented with a
verified complaint, that he never entered a plea to anything,
that there was no magistrate, no Probable Cause, he was never
allowed to put on his own defense should he have been
presented with charges, and that he was never convicted of any
charges. It was impossible to affirm a conviction of anything
against P/A.

He also, by his Order,
necessarily, by implication, calls the Official Court Reporter
for the County of Los Angeles, a liar when she states under
oath by declaration that there was no such criminal proceeding
before her upon which Minute Order all Defendants rely in
asserting that there was a conviction.

Obviously,it is impossible to “overturn” a non-existent fraudulent
“conviction,” based upon a non-existent fraudulent
arraignment, based upon non-existent fraudulent charges, all
performed without notice to P/A, and without his knowledge or
his appearance, thereby making it impossible to “file a new
action.”

All of this fraud was brought to
the judge’s attention within P/A’s opposition to all of these
D/A’s Motions to Dismiss, which facts, for purposes of the
Motion to Dismiss, must assume the
truthfulness of the factual allegations. As to the application
of substantive law as to the facts of Notice and Opportunity,
and fraud, P/A will establish this within his below points and
authorities.

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

As stated in U.S. v. Hooton,(Supra), cited in the
commencement of this Opposition to “Order,” the standard for
insubstantiality of an Opening Brief is case precedent,
“Although it is difficult to formulate a precise standard, not
every case in which appellant files an unimpressive opening
brief is appropriate for summary affirmance. Motions to affirm
should be confined to appeals obviously controlled by
precedent and cases in which the insubstantiality is manifest
from the face of appellant’s brief.2”

While acknowledged that this is
not an Opening Brief, which Opening Brief would otherwise be
due April 2, 2012, the same minimum standard of case precedent
for an Opening Brief should be applied as to when no Opening
Brief on appeal is allowed.

Below are case precedents in
matters of lack of notice, lack of opportunity to put on a
defense, and of extrinsic fraud, as alleged, and even proved,
within discovery below. P/A had a right to notice, a right to
appear, to be apprised ofcharges,if any, that might be laid against him, to a magistrate, and
to Probable Cause, and to put on his own defense, all of which
were denied him.

“No state shall … deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.” Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Constitution.

“While warrants were not required in
all circumstances, the requirement of probable cause, as
elaborated in numerous precedents, was treated as absolute.
The "long-prevailing standards" of probable cause embodied
"the best compromise that has been found for accommodating
[the] often opposing interests" in "safeguard[ing] citizens
from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy" and in
"seek[ing] to give fair leeway for enforcing the law in the
community's protection." Brinegar v. United States,338 U. S. 160, 338 U. S. 176 (1949). The standard of probable
cause thus represented the accumulated wisdom of precedent and
experience as to the minimum justification necessary to make
the kind of intrusion involved in an arrest "reasonable" under
the Fourth Amendment. The standard applied to all arrests….”Dunaway v. New York,
4422 U.S. 200 (1979)

“The petition here involved does not
disclose whether petitioner upon his arrest was immediately
taken before a magistrate …. It does aver that no waiver was
made. Under such circumstances the filing of a complaint was
mandatory, and essential to the jurisdiction of the court.
‘Jurisdiction is fundamental. It is the primary question for
determination by a court to any case for jurisdiction is the
power to hear and determine. [Citing cases.] If a judgment is
rendered by a court which did not have jurisdiction to hear a
cause, such judgment is void ab initio. [Citing
cases.] Even though a void judgment is affirmed on appeal, it
is not thereby rendered valid.’ (In re Wyatt, 114
Cal.App. 557, 559. [300 P. 132])” Ralph v. Police Court,
84 C.A.2d 257, 260.

“Fraudvitiates the most solemn contracts, documents and even
judgments.” United
States v. Throckmorton (1878) 98 U.S. 61, 70.

“Nocourt in this land will allow a person to keep an advantage
which he has obtained by fraud. No judgment or a court, no
order of a minister, can be allowed to stand if it has been
obtained by fraud. Fraud unravels everything. …fraud vitiates
all transactions, and if taken for a fraudulent purpose to
carry out a fraudulent scheme, such action is void and of no
force or effect whatever, equality will compel fair dealing,
disregarding all forms and subterfuges, and looking only to
the substance of things.” Jackson Law Office, P.C.
v. Chappell, 327 SW2d 15 at 27 citing Libhart v. Copeland
949 SW2d 783, 794.

“Extrinsic fraud usually arises
when a party is denied a fair adversary hearing because he has
been ‘deliberately kept in ignorance of the action or
proceeding, or in some other way fraudulently prevented from
presenting his claim or defense.’ ’’Cross v. Tustin
(1951) 37 Cal.2d 1067.

“The principle stated in this terse
language lies at the foundation of all well ordered systems of
jurisprudence. Wherever one is assailed in his person or his
property, there he may defend, for the liability and the right
are inseparable. This is a principle of natural justice,
recognized as such by the common intelligence and conscience
of all nations. A sentence of a court pronounced against a
party without hearing him or giving him an opportunity to be
heard is not a judicial determination of his rights, and is
not entitled to respect in any other tribunal.
“That there must be notice to a party of some kind,
actual or constructive, to a valid judgment affecting his
rights is admitted. Until notice is given, the court has no
jurisdiction in any case to proceed to judgment, whatever its
authority may be, by the law of its organization, over the
subject matter. But notice is only for the purpose of
affording the party an opportunity of being heard upon the
claim or the charges made; it is a summons to him to appear
and speak, if he has any thing to say, why the judgment sought
should not be rendered. A denial to a party of the benefit of
a notice would be in effect to deny that he is entitled to
notice at all, and the sham and deceptive proceeding had
better be omitted altogether. …. It is difficult to speak of a
decree thus rendered with moderation; it was in fact a mere
arbitrary edict, clothed in the form of a judicial sentence.”
Windsor v. McVeigh,
93 U. S. 274 (1876).

“If the court of a state had
jurisdiction of a matter, its decision would be conclusive,
but this Court cannot yield assent to the proposition that the
jurisdiction of a state court cannot be questioned where its
proceeding were brought collaterally before the circuit court
of the United States.

“Where a court has jurisdiction,
it has a right to decide any question which occurs in the
cause, and whether its decision be correct or otherwise, its
judgment, until reversed, are regarded as binding in every
other court. But if it acts without authority, its judgments
and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable,
but simply void, and form no bar to a remedy sought in
opposition to them, even prior to a reversal. They constitute
no justification, and all persons concerned in executing such
judgments or sentences are considered in law as trespassers.

“The jurisdiction of any court
exercising authority over a subject may be inquired into in
every other court when the proceedings of the former are
relied on and brought before the latter by a party claiming
the benefit of such proceedings.” Elliott v. Lessee of
Piersol, 26 U.S. 1 Pet. 328 (1828).

“The affirmance of a void
judgment upon appeal imparts no validity to the judgment, but
is in itself void by reason of the nullity of the judgment
appealed from.” Pioneer
Land Co. v. Maddux, 109 Cal. 633, 642.

“The doctrine of res judicata is
inapplicable to void judgments. ‘Obviously a judgment, though
final and on the merits, has no binding force and is subject
to collateral attack if it is wholly void for lack of
jurisdiction of the subject matter or person, and perhaps for
excess of jurisdiction or where it is obtained by extrinsic
fraud.” Rochin v. Pat
Johnson Manufacturing Co., (1998) 67 Cal. App. 4th
1228, 1239.

“… [W]e are of opinion that we should
recognize the condition created by the judgment of the state
court unless, from an intrinsic consideration of the state
record, one or all of the following conditions should appear:
1, that the state procedure, from want of notice or
opportunity to be heard, was wanting in due process, 2, that
there was such an infirmity of proof as to facts found to have
established the want of fair private and professional
character as to give rise to a clear conviction on our part
that we could not, consistently with our duty, accept as final
the conclusion on that subject, or 3, that some other grave
reason existed which should convince us that to allow the
natural consequences of the judgment to have their effect
would conflict with the duty which rests upon us not to disbar
except upon the conviction that, under the principles of right
and justice, we were constrained so to do.”Selling v. Radford,
243 U.S. 46, 51 (1917)