THE AGREEMENTS The WTO is ‘rules-based’; its rules are negotiated agreements

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Chapter 2
THE AGREEMENTS
The WTO is ‘rules-based’;
its rules are negotiated agreements
1. Overview: a navigational guide
The WTO agreements cover goods, services and intellectual property. They spell out
the principles of liberalization, and the permitted exceptions. They include individual countries’ commitments to lower customs tariffs and other trade barriers, and
to open and keep open services markets. They set procedures for settling disputes.
They prescribe special treatment for developing countries. They require governments to make their trade policies transparent by notifying the WTO about laws in
force and measures adopted, and through regular reports by the secretariat on countries’ trade policies.
These agreements are often called the WTO’s trade rules, and the WTO is often
described as “rules-based”, a system based on rules. But it’s important to remember
that the rules are actually agreements that governments negotiated.
This chapter focuses on the Uruguay Round agreements, which are the basis of the
present WTO system. Additional work is also now underway in the WTO. This is
the result of decisions taken at Ministerial Conferences, in particular the meeting in
Doha, November 2001, when new negotiations and other work were launched.
(More on the Doha Agenda, later.)
Six-part broad outline
The table of contents of “The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations: The Legal Texts” is a daunting list of about 60 agreements, annexes, decisions and understandings. In fact, the agreements fall into a simple structure with six
main parts: an umbrella agreement (the Agreement Establishing the WTO); agreements
for each of the three broad areas of trade that the WTO covers (goods, services and intellectual property); dispute settlement; and reviews of governments’ trade policies.
The ‘additional details’
These agreements and annexes deal with
the following specific sectors or issues:
For goods (under GATT)
• Agriculture
• Health regulations for farm products (SPS)
• Textiles and clothing
• Product standards (TBT)
• Investment measures
• Anti-dumping measures
• Customs valuation methods
• Preshipment inspection
• Rules of origin
• Import licensing
• Subsidies and counter-measures
• Safeguards
For services (the GATS annexes)
•
•
•
•
•
Movement of natural persons
Air transport
Financial services
Shipping
Telecommunications
The agreements for the two largest areas — goods and services — share a common
three-part outline, even though the detail is sometimes quite different.
• They start with broad principles: the General Agreement on Tariffs and trade
(GATT) (for goods), and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATT)
(The third area, Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),
also falls into this category although at present it has no additional parts.)
• Then come extra agreements and annexes dealing with the special requirements of specific sectors or issues.
• Finally, there are the detailed and lengthy schedules (or lists) of commitments
made by individual countries allowing specific foreign products or serviceproviders access to their markets. For GATT, these take the form of binding
commitments on tariffs for goods in general, and combinations of tariffs and
quotas for some agricultural goods. For GATS, the commitments state how
much access foreign service providers are allowed for specific sectors, and
they include lists of types of services where individual countries say they are
not applying the “most-favoured-nation” principle of non-discrimination.
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Underpinning these are dispute settlement, which is based on the agreements and
commitments, and trade policy reviews, an exercise in transparency.
Much of the Uruguay Round dealt with the first two parts: general principles and
principles for specific sectors. At the same time, market access negotiations were
possible for industrial goods. Once the principles had been worked out, negotiations
could proceed on the commitments for sectors such as agriculture and services.
Additional agreements
Another group of agreements not included in the diagram is also important: the two
“plurilateral” agreements not signed by all members: civil aircraft and government
procurement.
Further changes on the horizon, the Doha Agenda
These agreements are not static; they are renegotiated from time to time and new
agreements can be added to the package. Many are now being negotiated under the
Doha Development Agenda, launched by WTO trade ministers in Doha, Qatar, in
November 2001.
In a nutshell
The basic structure of the WTO agreements: how the six main areas fit together —
the umbrella WTO Agreement, goods, services, intellectual property, disputes and trade
policy reviews.
Umbrella
Goods
Services
Intellectual property
Basic principles
GATT
GATS
TRIPS
Additional details
Other goods
agreements and
annexes
Services annexes
Market access
commitments
Countries’
schedules of
commitments
Countries’ schedules
of commitments
(and MFN exemptions)
Dispute settlement
Transparency
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AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING WTO
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
TRADE POLICY REVIEWS
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2. Tariffs: more bindings and closer to zero
Binding’ tariffs
The bulkiest results of Uruguay Round are the 22,500 pages listing individual countries’ commitments on specific categories of goods and services. These include commitments to cut and “bind” their customs duty rates on imports of goods. In some
cases, tariffs are being cut to zero. There is also a significant increase in the number of
“bound” tariffs — duty rates that are committed in the WTO and are difficult to raise.
ON THE WEBSITE:
www.wto.org > trade topics > goods > goods schedules
www.wto.org > trade topics > services > services schedules
Tariff cuts
Developed countries’ tariff cuts were for the most part phased in over five years
from 1 January 1995. The result is a 40% cut in their tariffs on industrial products,
from an average of 6.3% to 3.8%. The value of imported industrial products that
receive duty-free treatment in developed countries will jump from 20% to 44%.
The market access schedules are not simply
announcements of tariff rates.They
represent commitments not to increase
tariffs above the listed rates — the rates
are “bound”. For developed countries,
the bound rates are generally the rates
actually charged. Most developing countries
have bound the rates somewhat higher
than the actual rates charged, so the bound
rates serve as ceilings.
Countries can break a commitment
(i.e. raise a tariff above the bound rate),
but only with difficulty. To do so they have
to negotiate with the countries most concerned and that could result in compensation for trading partners’ loss of trade.
There will also be fewer products charged high duty rates. The proportion of
imports into developed countries from all sources facing tariffs rates of more than
15% will decline from 7% to 5%. The proportion of developing country exports facing tariffs above 15% in industrial countries will fall from 9% to 5%.
The Uruguay Round package has been improved. On 26 March 1997, 40 countries
accounting for more than 92% of world trade in information technology products,
agreed to eliminate import duties and other charges on these products by 2000 (by 2005
in a handful of cases). As with other tariff commitments, each participating country is
applying its commitments equally to exports from all WTO members (i.e. on a mostfavoured-nation basis), even from members that did not make commitments.
What is this agreement called? There is no legally binding agreement
that sets out the targets for tariff reductions (e.g. by what percentage they were
to be cut as a result of the Uruguay Round).
Instead, individual countries listed their commitments in schedules annexed to Marrakesh Protocol
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994. This is the legally binding agreement for the
reduced tariff rates. Since then, additional commitments were made under the 1997 Information
Technology Agreement.
More bindings
Developed countries increased the number of imports whose tariff rates are
“bound” (committed and difficult to increase) from 78% of product lines to 99%. For
developing countries, the increase was considerable: from 21% to 73%. Economies
in transition from central planning increased their bindings from 73% to 98%. This
all means a substantially higher degree of market security for traders and investors.
ON THE WEBSITE:
www.wto.org > trade topics > market access
> See also Doha Agenda negotiations
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And agriculture ...
Tariffs on all agricultural products are now bound. Almost all import restrictions
that did not take the form of tariffs, such as quotas, have been converted to tariffs
— a process known as “tariffication”. This has made markets substantially more
predictable for agriculture. Previously more than 30% of agricultural produce had
faced quotas or import restrictions. The first step in “tariffication” was to replace
these restrictions with tariffs that represented about the same level of protection.
Then, over six years from 1995–2000, these tariffs were gradually reduced (the
reduction period for developing countries ends in 2005). The market access commitments on agriculture also eliminate previous import bans on certain products.
In addition, the lists include countries’ commitments to reduce domestic support
and export subsidies for agricultural products. (See section on agriculture.)
> See also Doha Agenda chapter
3. Agriculture: fairer markets for farmers
What is ‘distortion’?
This a key issue. Trade is distorted if prices
are higher or lower than normal, and
if quantities produced, bought, and sold
are also higher or lower than norma
— i.e. than the levels that would usually
exist in a competitive market.
For example, import barriers and domestic
subsidies can make crops more expensive
on a country’s internal market. The higher
prices can encourage over-production.
If the surplus is to be sold on world markets, where prices are lower, then export
subsidies are needed. As a result, the
subsidizing countries can be producing
and exporting considerably more than
they normally would.
Governments usually give three reasons
for supporting and protecting their
farmers, even if this distorts agricultural
trade:
• to make sure that enough food is
produced to meet the country’s needs
• to shield farmers from the effects of
the weather and swings in world prices
• to preserve rural society.
But the policies have often been expensive,
and they have created gluts leading to
export subsidy wars. Countries with less
money for subsidies have suffered.
The debate in the negotiations is whether
these objectives can be met without
distorting trade.
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The original GATT did apply to agricultural trade, but it contained loopholes. For example, it allowed countries to use some non-tariff measures such as import quotas, and
to subsidize. Agricultural trade became highly distorted, especially with the use of
export subsidies which would not normally have been allowed for industrial products.
The Uruguay Round produced the first multilateral agreement dedicated to the sector.
It was a significant first step towards order, fair competition and a less distorted sector.
It was implemented over a six-year period (and is still being implemented by developing countries under their 10-year period), that began in 1995. The Uruguay Round
agreement included a commitment to continue the reform through new negotiations.
These were launched in 2000, as required by the Agriculture Agreement.
> See also Doha Agenda negotiations
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The Agriculture Agreement: new rules and commitments
is to reform trade in the sector and to
The objective of the
make policies more market-oriented. This would improve predictability and security for importing and exporting countries alike.
The new rules and commitments apply to:
• market access — various trade restrictions confronting imports
• domestic support — subsidies and other programmes, including those that
raise or guarantee farmgate prices and farmers’ incomes
• export subsidies and other methods used to make exports artificially competitive.
The agreement does allow governments to support their rural economies, but preferably through policies that cause less distortion to trade. It also allows some flexibility in
the way commitments are implemented. Developing countries do not have to cut their
subsidies or lower their tariffs as much as developed countries, and they are given extra
time to complete their obligations. Least-developed countries don’t have to do this at all.
Special provisions deal with the interests of countries that rely on imports for their food
supplies, and the concerns of least-developed economies.
“Peace” provisions within the agreement aim to reduce the likelihood of disputes or
challenges on agricultural subsidies over a period of nine years, until the end of 2003.
What is this agreement called? Most provisions: Agreement on Agriculture.
Commitments on tariffs, tariff quotas, domestic supports, export subsidies:
in schedules annexed to the Marrakesh Protocol to the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade 1994.
Also: [Ministerial] Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform
Programme on Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing Developing Countries.
(See also: “Modalities for the establishment of specific binding commitments under the reform
programme”, MTN.GNG/MA/W/24.)
Market access: ‘tariffs only’, please
The new rule for market access in agricultural products is “tariffs only”. Before the
Uruguay Round, some agricultural imports were restricted by quotas and other nontariff measures. These have been replaced by tariffs that provide more-or-less equivalent levels of protection — if the previous policy meant domestic prices were 75%
higher than world prices, then the new tariff could be around 75%. (Converting the
quotas and other types of measures to tariffs in this way was called “tariffication”.)
The tariffication package contained more. It ensured that quantities imported
before the agreement took effect could continue to be imported, and it guaranteed
that some new quantities were charged duty rates that were not prohibitive. This
was achieved by a system of “tariff-quotas” — lower tariff rates for specified quantities, higher (sometimes much higher) rates for quantities that exceed the quota.
The newly committed tariffs and tariff quotas, covering all agricultural products,
took effect in 1995. Uruguay Round participants agreed that developed countries
would cut the tariffs (the higher out-of-quota rates in the case of tariff-quotas) by an
average of 36%, in equal steps over six years. Developing countries would make 24%
cuts over 10 years. Several developing countries also used the option of offering ceiling tariff rates in cases where duties were not “bound” (i.e. committed under GATT
or WTO regulations) before the Uruguay Round. Least-developed countries do not
have to cut their tariffs. (These figures do not actually appear in the Agriculture
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Numerical targets for agriculture
The reductions in agricultural subsidies and protection agreed in the Uruguay Round.
Only the figures for cutting export subsidies appear in the agreement.
Tariffs
average cut for all
agricultural products
minimum cut per product
Domestic support
total AMS cuts for sector
(base period: 1986–88)
Exports
value of subsidies
subsidized quantities
(base period: 1986–90)
Developed countries
6 years:
1995–2000
Developing countries
10 years:
1995–2004
–36%
–24%
–15%
–10%
–20%
–13%
–36%
–24%
–21%
–14%
Least-developed countries do not have to make commitments to reduce tariffs or subsidies.
The base level for tariff cuts was the bound rate before 1 January 1995; or,
for unbound tariffs, the actual rate charged in September 1986 when the Uruguay Round began.
The other figures were targets used to calculate countries’ legally-binding
“schedules” of commitments.
Agreement. Participants used them to prepare their schedules — i.e. lists of commitments. It is the commitments listed in the schedules that are legally binding.)
For products whose non-tariff restrictions have been converted to tariffs, governments are allowed to take special emergency actions (“special safeguards”) in order
to prevent swiftly falling prices or surges in imports from hurting their farmers. But
the agreement specifies when and how those emergency actions can be introduced
(for example, they cannot be used on imports within a tariff-quota).
Four countries used “special treatment” provisions to restrict imports of particularly sensitive products (mainly rice) during the implementation period (to 2000 for
developed countries, to 2004 for developing nations), but subject to strictly defined
conditions, including minimum access for overseas suppliers. The four were:
Japan, Rep. of Korea, and the Philippines for rice; and Israel for sheepmeat,
wholemilk powder and certain cheeses. Japan and Israel have now given up this
right, but Rep. of Korea and the Philippines have extended their special treatment
for rice. A new member, Chinese Taipei, gave special treatment to rice in its first
year of membership, 2002.
Domestic support: some you can, some you can’t
The main complaint about policies which support domestic prices, or subsidize production in some other way, is that they encourage over-production. This squeezes out
imports or leads to export subsidies and low-priced dumping on world markets. The
Agriculture Agreement distinguishes between support programmes that stimulate
production directly, and those that are considered to have no direct effect.
Domestic policies that do have a direct effect on production and trade have to be cut
back. WTO members calculated how much support of this kind they were providing per year for the agricultural sector (using calculations known as “total aggregate
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measurement of support” or “Total AMS”) in the base years of 1986–88. Developed
countries agreed to reduce these figures by 20% over six years starting in 1995.
Developing countries agreed to make 13% cuts over 10 years. Least-developed countries do not need to make any cuts. (This category of domestic support is sometimes
called the “amber box”, a reference to the amber colour of traffic lights, which
means “slow down”.)
A tariff-quota
This is what a tariff-quota might look like
Measures with minimal impact on trade can be used freely — they are in a “green
box” (“green” as in traffic lights). They include government services such as
research, disease control, infrastructure and food security. They also include payments made directly to farmers that do not stimulate production, such as certain
forms of direct income support, assistance to help farmers restructure agriculture,
and direct payments under environmental and regional assistance programmes.
Also permitted, are certain direct payments to farmers where the farmers are
required to limit production (sometimes called “blue box” measures), certain government assistance programmes to encourage agricultural and rural development
in developing countries, and other support on a small scale (“de minimis”) when
compared with the total value of the product or products supported (5% or less in
the case of developed countries and 10% or less for developing countries).
Export subsidies: limits on spending and quantities
The Agriculture Agreement prohibits export subsidies on agricultural products
unless the subsidies are specified in a member’s lists of commitments. Where they
are listed, the agreement requires WTO members to cut both the amount of money
they spend on export subsidies and the quantities of exports that receive subsidies.
Taking averages for 1986–90 as the base level, developed countries agreed to cut the
value of export subsidies by 36% over the six years starting in 1995 (24% over 10 years
for developing countries). Developed countries also agreed to reduce the quantities
of subsidized exports by 21% over the six years (14% over 10 years for developing
countries). Least-developed countries do not need to make any cuts.
Imports entering under the tariff-quota
(up to 1,000 tons) are generally charged 10%.
Imports entering outside the tariff-quota are
charged 80%. Under the Uruguay Round
agreement, the 1,000 tons would be based
on actual imports in the base period or an
agreed “minimum access” formula.
Tariff quotas are also called “tariff-rate quotas”.
During the six-year implementation period, developing countries are allowed under
certain conditions to use subsidies to reduce the costs of marketing and transporting exports.
The least-developed and those depending on food imports
Under the Agriculture Agreement, WTO members have to reduce their subsidized
exports. But some importing countries depend on supplies of cheap, subsidized
food from the major industrialized nations. They include some of the poorest countries, and although their farming sectors might receive a boost from higher prices
caused by reduced export subsidies, they might need temporary assistance to make
the necessary adjustments to deal with higher priced imports, and eventually to
export. A special ministerial decision sets out objectives, and certain measures, for
the provision of food aid and aid for agricultural development. It also refers to the
possibility of assistance from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank
to finance commercial food imports.
ON THE WEBSITE:
www.wto.org >trade topics > goods > agriculture
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Whose international standards?
An annex to the Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures Agreement names:
• the FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius
Commission: for food
• the International Animal Health
Organization (Office International des
Epizooties): for animal health
• the FAO’s Secretariat of the International
Plant Protection Convention:
for plant health.
Governments can add any other international organizations or agreements whose
membership is open to all WTO members.
When members apply these standards,
they are likely to be safe from legal
challenge through a WTO dispute.
4. Standards and safety
Article 20 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) allows governments to act on trade in
order to protect human, animal or plant life or
health, provided they do not discriminate or use this as disguised protectionism. In
addition, there are two specific WTO agreements dealing with food safety and animal and plant health and safety, and with product standards in general. Both try to
identify how to meet the need to apply standards and at the same time avoid protectionism in disguise. These issues are becoming more important as tariff barriers
fall — some compare this to seabed rocks appearing when the tide goes down. In
both cases, if a country applies international standards, it is less likely to be challenged legally in the WTO than if it sets its own standards.
Food, animal and plant products: how safe is safe?
Problem: How do you ensure that your country’s consumers are being supplied
with food that is safe to eat — “safe” by the standards you consider appropriate? And
at the same time, how can you ensure that strict health and safety regulations are
not being used as an excuse for protecting domestic producers?
A separate agreement on food safety and animal and plant health standards (the
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement or SPS) sets out the basic rules.
It allows countries to set their own standards. But it also says regulations must be
based on science. They should be applied only to the extent necessary to protect
human, animal or plant life or health. And they should not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between countries where identical or similar conditions prevail.
Member countries are encouraged to use international standards, guidelines and
recommendations where they exist. When they do, they are unlikely to be challenged legally in a WTO dispute. However, members may use measures which
result in higher standards if there is scientific justification. They can also set higher standards based on appropriate assessment of risks so long as the approach is
consistent, not arbitrary. And they can to some extent apply the “precautionary principle”, a kind of “safety first” approach to deal with scientific uncertainty. Article 5.7
of the SPS Agreement allows temporary “precautionary” measures.
The agreement still allows countries to use different standards and different methods of inspecting products. So how can an exporting country be sure the practices
it applies to its products are acceptable in an importing country? If an exporting
country can demonstrate that the measures it applies to its exports achieve the same
level of health protection as in the importing country, then the importing country is
expected to accept the exporting country’s standards and methods.
ON THE WEBSITE:
www.wto.org > trade topics > goods > sanitary
and phytosanitary measures
The agreement includes provisions on control, inspection and approval procedures.
Governments must provide advance notice of new or changed sanitary and phytosanitary regulations, and establish a national enquiry point to provide information.
The agreement complements that on technical barriers to trade.
Technical regulations and standards
Technical regulations and standards are important, but they vary from country to country. Having too many different standards makes life difficult for producers and
exporters. Standards can become obstacles to trade. But they are also necessary for a
range of reasons, from environmental protection, safety, national security to consumer
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information. And they can help trade. Therefore the same basic question arises again:
how to ensure that standards are genuinely useful, and not arbitrary or an excuse for
protectionism.
The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement (TBT) tries to ensure that regulations,
standards, testing and certification procedures do not create unnecessary obstacles.
However, the agreement also recognizes countries’rights to adopt the standards they
consider appropriate — for example, for human, animal or plant life or health, for
the protection of the environment or to meet other consumer interests. Moreover,
members are not prevented from taking measures necessary to ensure their standards are met. But that is counterbalanced with disciplines. A myriad of regulations
can be a nightmare for manufacturers and exporters. Life can be simpler if governments apply international standards, and the agreement encourages them to do so.
In any case, whatever regulations they use should not discriminate.
The agreement also sets out a code of good practice for both governments and nongovernmental or industry bodies to prepare, adopt and apply voluntary standards.
Over 200 standards-setting bodies apply the code.
The agreement says the procedures used to decide whether a product conforms with
relevant standards have to be fair and equitable. It discourages any methods that
would give domestically produced goods an unfair advantage. The agreement also
encourages countries to recognize each other’s procedures for assessing whether a
product conforms. Without recognition, products might have to be tested twice, first
by the exporting country and then by the importing country.
Manufacturers and exporters need to know what the standards are in their prospective markets. To help ensure that this information is made available conveniently, all
WTO member governments are required to establish national enquiry points and to
keep each other informed through the WTO — around 900 new or changed regulations are notified each year. The Technical Barriers to Trade Committee is the major
clearing house for members to share the information and the major forum to discuss concerns about the regulations and their implementation.
ON THE WEBSITE:
www.wto.org > trade topics > goods
> technical barriers to trade
5. Textiles: back in the mainstream
Textiles, like agriculture, was one of the hardest-fought issues in the WTO, as it
was in the former GATT system. It has now completed fundamental change
under a 10-year schedule agreed in the Uruguay Round. The system of import
quotas that dominated the trade since the early 1960s has now been phased out.
From 1974 until the end of the Uruguay Round, the trade was governed by the
Multifibre Arrangement (MFA). This was a framework for bilateral agreements or unilateral actions that established quotas limiting imports into countries whose domestic industries were facing serious damage from rapidly
increasing imports.
The quotas were the most visible feature. They conflicted with GATT’s general
preference for customs tariffs instead of measures that restrict quantities. They
were also exceptions to the GATT principle of treating all trading partners equally because they specified how much the importing country was going to accept
from individual exporting countries.
Since 1995, the WTO’s Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) took over
from the Mulltifibre Arrangement. By 1 January 2005, the sector was fully integrated into normal GATT rules. In particular, the quotas came to an end, and
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importing countries are no longer able to discriminate between exporters. The
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing no longer exists: it’s the only WTO agreement
that had self-destruction built in.
Integration: returning products gradually to GATT rules
Textiles and clothing products were returned to GATT rules over the 10-year period.
This happened gradually, in four steps, to allow time for both importers and
exporters to adjust to the new situation. Some of these products were previously
under quotas. Any quotas that were in place on 31 December 1994 were carried over
into the new agreement. For products that had quotas, the result of integration into
GATT was the removal of these quotas.
Four steps over 10 years
The schedule for freeing textiles and garment products from import quotas (and returning
them to GATT rules), and how fast remaining quotas had to be expanded.
The example is based on the commonly-used 6% annual expansion rate of the old Multifibre
Arrangement. In practice, the rates used under the MFA varied from product to product.
Step
Percentage of products
to be brought under GATT
(including removal of any quotas)
How fast remaining
quotas should open up,
if 1994 rate was 6%
Step 1: 1 Jan 1995
(to 31 Dec 1997)
16%
(minimum, taking 1990
imports as base)
6.96%
per year
Step 2: 1 Jan 1998
(to 31 Dec 2001)
17%
8.7%
per year
Step 3: 1 Jan 2002
(to 31 Dec 2004)
18%
11.05%
per year
49%
(maximum)
No quotas left
Step 4: 1 Jan 2005
Full integration into GATT
(and final elimination of quotas).
Agreement on Textiles and
Clothing terminates.
The actual formula for import growth under quotas was: by 0.1 x pre-1995 growth
rate in the first step; 0.25 x Step 1 growth rate in the second step;
and 0.27 x Step 2 growth rate in the third step.
The agreement stated the percentage of products that had to be brought under
GATT rules at each step. If any of these products came under quotas, then the quotas had to be removed at the same time. The percentages were applied to the importing country’s textiles and clothing trade levels in 1990. The agreement also said the
quantities of imports permitted under the quotas had to grow annually, and that the
rate of expansion had to increase at each stage. How fast that expansion would be
was set out in a formula based on the growth rate that existed under the old
Multifibre Arrangement (see table).
Products brought under GATT rules at each of the first three stages had to cover the
four main types of textiles and clothing: tops and yarns; fabrics; made-up textile
products; and clothing. Any other restrictions that did not come under the
Multifibre Arrangement and did not conform with regular WTO agreements by
1996 had to be made to conform or be phased out by 2005.
If further cases of damage to the industry arose during the transition, the agreement
allowed additional restrictions to be imposed temporarily under strict conditions.
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These “transitional safeguards” were not the same as the safeguard measures normally allowed under GATT because they can be applied on imports from specific
exporting countries. But the importing country had to show that its domestic industry was suffering serious damage or was threatened with serious damage. And it
had to show that the damage was the result of two things: increased imports of the
product in question from all sources, and a sharp and substantial increase from the
specific exporting country. The safeguard restriction could be implemented either
by mutual agreement following consultations, or unilaterally. It was subject to
review by the Textiles Monitoring Body.
In any system where quotas are set for individual exporting countries, exporters
might try to get around the quotas by shipping products through third countries or
making false declarations about the products’ country of origin. The agreement
included provisions to cope with these cases.
The agreement envisaged special treatment for certain categories of countries — for
example, new market entrants, small suppliers, and least-developed countries.
A Textiles Monitoring Body (TMB) supervised the agreement’s implementation. It
consisted of a chairman and 10 members acting in their personal capacity. It monitored
actions taken under the agreement to ensure that they were consistent, and it
reported to the Goods Council which reviewed the operation of the agreement
before each new step of the integration process. The Textiles Monitoring Body
also dealt with disputes under the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing. If they
remained unresolved, the disputes could be brought to the WTO’s regular Dispute
Settlement Body. When the Textiles and Clothing Agreement expired on 1 January
2005, the Textiles Monitoring Body also ceased to exist.
6. Services: rules for growth and investment
ON THE WEBSITE:
www.wto.org
> trade topics > goods > textiles
Basic principles
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) is the first and only set of multilateral rules governing international trade in services. Negotiated in the Uruguay
Round, it was developed in response to the huge growth of the services economy
over the past 30 years and the greater potential for trading services brought about by
the communications revolution.
• All services are covered by GATS
Services represent the fastest growing sector of the global economy and account for
two thirds of global output, one third of global employment and nearly 20% of
global trade.
• Transparency in regulations, inquiry points
When the idea of bringing rules on services into the multilateral trading system was
floated in the early to mid 1980s, a number of countries were sceptical and even
opposed. They believed such an agreement could undermine governments’ ability
to pursue national policy objectives and constrain their regulatory powers. The
agreement that was developed, however, allows a high degree of flexibility, both
within the framework of rules and also in terms of the market access commitments.
• Most-favoured-nation treatment applies
to all services, except the one-off
temporary exemptions
• National treatment applies in the areas
where commitments are made
• Regulations have to be objective
and reasonable
• International payments:
normally unrestricted
• Individual countries’ commitments:
negotiated and bound
• Progressive liberalization:
through further negotiations
GATS explained
The General Agreement on Trade in Services has three elements: the main text containing general obligations and disciplines; annexes dealing with rules for specific
sectors; and individual countries’ specific commitments to provide access to their
markets, including indications of where countries are temporarily not applying the
“most-favoured-nation” principle of non-discrimination.
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General obligations and disciplines
Total coverage
The agreement covers all internationally-traded services — for
example, banking, telecommunications, tourism, professional services, etc. It also
defines four ways (or “modes”) of trading services:
• services supplied from one country to another (e.g. international telephone
calls), officially known as “cross-border supply” (in WTO jargon, “mode 1”)
• consumers or firms making use of a service in another country (e.g. tourism),
officially “consumption abroad” (“mode 2”)
• a foreign company setting up subsidiaries or branches to provide services in
another country (e.g. foreign banks setting up operations in a country), officially “commercial presence” (“mode 3”)
• individuals travelling from their own country to supply services in another
(e.g. fashion models or consultants), officially “presence of natural persons”
(“mode 4”).
Most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment Favour one, favour all. MFN means treating one’s trading partners equally on the principle of non-discrimination. Under
GATS, if a country allows foreign competition in a sector, equal opportunities
in that sector should be given to service providers from all other WTO members. (This applies even if the country has made no specific commitment to
provide foreign companies access to its markets under the WTO.)
MFN applies to all services, but some special temporary exemptions have been
allowed. When GATS came into force, a number of countries already had preferential agreements in services that they had signed with trading partners, either bilaterally or in small groups. WTO members felt it was necessary to maintain these
preferences temporarily. They gave themselves the right to continue giving more
favourable treatment to particular countries in particular services activities by listing “MFN exemptions” alongside their first sets of commitments. In order to protect the general MFN principle, the exemptions could only be made once; nothing
can be added to the lists. They are currently being reviewed as mandated, and will
normally last no more than ten years.
Commitments on market access and national treatment
Individual countries’
commitments to open markets in specific sectors — and how open those markets
will be — are the outcome of negotiations. The commitments appear in “schedules”
that list the sectors being opened, the extent of market access being given in those
sectors (e.g. whether there are any restrictions on foreign ownership), and any limitations on national treatment (whether some rights granted to local companies will
not be granted to foreign companies). So, for example, if a government commits
itself to allow foreign banks to operate in its domestic market, that is a marketaccess commitment. And if the government limits the number of licences it will
issue, then that is a market-access limitation. If it also says foreign banks are only
allowed one branch while domestic banks are allowed numerous branches, that is
an exception to the national treatment principle.
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These clearly defined commitments are “bound”: like bound tariffs for trade in
goods, they can only be modified after negotiations with affected countries. Because
“unbinding” is difficult, the commitments are virtually guaranteed conditions for foreign exporters and importers of services and investors in the sector to do business.
Governmental services are explicitly carved out of the agreement and there is nothing in GATS that forces a government to privatize service industries. In fact the
word “privatize” does not even appear in GATS. Nor does it outlaw government or
even private monopolies.
The carve-out is an explicit commitment by WTO governments to allow publicly funded services in core areas of their responsibility. Governmental services are defined in
the agreement as those that are not supplied commercially and do not compete with
other suppliers. These services are not subject to any GATS disciplines, they are not
covered by the negotiations, and commitments on market access and national treatment (treating foreign and domestic companies equally) do not apply to them.
GATS’ approach to making commitments means that members are not obliged to do
so on the whole universe of services sectors. A government may not want to make a
commitment on the level of foreign competition in a given sector, because it considers the sector to be a core governmental function or indeed for any other reason. In
this case, the government’s only obligations are minimal, for example to be transparent in regulating the sector, and not to discriminate between foreign suppliers.
Transparency
GATS says governments must publish all relevant laws and regulations, and set up enquiry points within their bureaucracies. Foreign companies
and governments can then use these inquiry points to obtain information about regulations in any service sector. And they have to notify the WTO of any changes in
regulations that apply to the services that come under specific commitments.
Regulations: objective and reasonable
Since domestic regulations are the most
significant means of exercising influence or control over services trade, the agreement says governments should regulate services reasonably, objectively and impartially. When a government makes an administrative decision that affects a service,
it should also provide an impartial means for reviewing the decision (for example a
tribunal).
GATS does not require any service to be deregulated. Commitments to liberalize do
not affect governments’ right to set levels of quality, safety, or price, or to introduce
regulations to pursue any other policy objective they see fit. A commitment to
national treatment, for example, would only mean that the same regulations would
apply to foreign suppliers as to nationals. Governments naturally retain their right
to set qualification requirements for doctors or lawyers, and to set standards to
ensure consumer health and safety.
Recognition
When two (or more) governments have agreements recognizing each
other’s qualifications (for example, the licensing or certification of service suppliers),
GATS says other members must also be given a chance to negotiate comparable
pacts. The recognition of other countries’ qualifications must not be discriminatory,
and it must not amount to protectionism in disguise. These recognition agreements
have to be notified to the WTO.
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International payments and transfers
Once a government has made a commitment to open a service sector to foreign competition, it must not normally restrict
money being transferred out of the country as payment for services supplied (“current transactions”) in that sector. The only exception is when there are balance-ofpayments difficulties, and even then the restrictions must be temporary and subject
to other limits and conditions.
Progressive liberalization
The Uruguay Round was only the beginning. GATS
requires more negotiations, which began in early 2000 and are now part of the Doha
Development Agenda. The goal is to take the liberalization process further by
increasing the level of commitments in schedules.
The annexes: services are not all the same
International trade in goods is a relatively simple idea to grasp: a product is transported from one country to another. Trade in services is much more diverse.
Telephone companies, banks, airlines and accountancy firms provide their services
in quite different ways. The GATS annexes reflect some of the diversity.
Movement of natural persons
This annex deals with negotiations on individuals’
rights to stay temporarily in a country for the purpose of providing a service. It specifies that the agreement does not apply to people seeking permanent employment
or to conditions for obtaining citizenship, permanent residence or permanent
employment.
Financial services
Instability in the banking system affects the whole economy.
The financial services annex gives governments very wide latitude to take prudential
measures, such as those for the protection of investors, depositors and insurance policy holders, and to ensure the integrity and stability of the financial system. The
annex also excludes from the agreement services provided when a government is
exercising its authority over the financial system, for example central banks’ services.
Telecommunications
The telecommunications sector has a dual role: it is a distinct sector of economic activity; and it is an underlying means of supplying other
economic activities (for example electronic money transfers). The annex says governments must ensure that foreign service suppliers are given access to the public
telecommunications networks without discrimination.
Air transport services
Under this annex, traffic rights and directly related activities are excluded from GATS’s coverage. They are handled by other bilateral agreements. However, the annex establishes that the GATS will apply to aircraft repair and
maintenance services, marketing of air transport services and computer-reservation
services. Members are currently reviewing the annex.
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Current work
GATS sets a heavy work programme covering a wide range of subjects. Work on
some of the subjects started in 1995, as required, soon after GATS came into force
in January 1995. Negotiations to further liberalize international trade in
services started in 2000, along with other work involving study and review.
Negotiations (Article 19)
Negotiations to further liberalize international
trade in services started in early 2000 as mandated by GATS (Article 19).
The first phase of the negotiations ended successfully in March 2001 when
members agreed on the guidelines and procedures for the negotiations, a key
element in the negotiating mandate. By agreeing these guidelines, members
set the objectives, scope and method for the negotiations in a clear and
balanced manner.
They also unequivocally endorsed some of GATS’ fundamental principles — i.e.
members’ right to regulate and to introduce new regulations on the supply of services in pursuit of national policy objectives; their right to specify which services they
wish to open to foreign suppliers and under which conditions; and the overarching
principle of flexibility for developing and least-developed countries. The guidelines
are therefore sensitive to public policy concerns in important sectors such as healthcare, public education and cultural industries, while stressing the importance of liberalization in general, and ensuring foreign service providers have effective access
to domestic markets.
The 2001 Doha Ministerial Declaration incorporated these negotiations into the
“single undertaking” of the Doha Development Agenda. Since July 2002, a process
of bilateral negotiations on market access has been underway.
Work on GATS rules (Articles 10, 13, and 15) Negotiations started in 1995 and are
continuing on the development of possible disciplines that are not yet included in
GATS: rules on emergency safeguard measures, government procurement and subsidies. Work so far has concentrated on safeguards. These are temporary limitations
on market access to deal with market disruption, and the negotiations aim to set up
procedures and disciplines for governments using these. Several deadlines have been
missed. The present aim is for the results to come into effect at the same time as those
of the current services negotiations.
Work on domestic regulations (Article 4.4)
Work started in 1995 to establish disciplines on domestic regulations — i.e. the requirements foreign service suppliers
have to meet in order to operate in a market. The focus is on qualification requirements and procedures, technical standards and licensing requirements. By
December 1998, members had agreed disciplines on domestic regulations for the
accountancy sector. Since then, members have been engaged in developing general
disciplines for all professional services and, where necessary, additional sectoral disciplines. All the agreed disciplines will be integrated into GATS and become legally
binding by the end of the current services negotiations.
MFN exemptions (Annex on Article 2)
Work on this subject started in 2000.
When GATS came into force in 1995, members were allowed a once-only opportunity
to take an exemption from the MFN principle of non-discrimination between a
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member’s trading partners. The measure for which the exemption was taken is
described in a member’s MFN exemption list, indicating to which member the
more favourable treatment applies, and specifying its duration. In principle, these
exemptions should not last for more than ten years. As mandated by GATS, all these
exemptions are currently being reviewed to examine whether the conditions which
created the need for these exemptions in the first place still exist. And in any case,
they are part of the current services negotiations.
Taking account of “autonomous” liberalization (Article 19)
Countries that have
liberalized on their own initiative since the last multilateral negotiations want that
to be taken into account when they negotiate market access in services. The negotiating guidelines and procedures that members agreed in March 2001 for the GATS
negotiations also call for criteria for taking this “autonomous” or unilateral liberalization into account. These were agreed on 6 March 2003.
Special treatment for least-developed countries (Article 19)
GATS mandates
members to establish how to give special treatment to least-developed countries
during the negotiations. (These “modalities” cover both the scope of the special
treatment, and the methods to be used.) The least-developed countries began the
discussions in March 2002. As a result of subsequent discussions, members agreed
the modalities on 3 September 2003.
Assessment of trade in services (Article 19) Preparatory work on this subject started in early 1999. GATS mandates that members assess trade in services, including the
GATS objective of increasing the developing countries’ participation in services trade.
The negotiating guidelines reiterate this, requiring the negotiations to be adjusted in
response to the assessment. Members generally acknowledge that the shortage of statistical information and other methodological problems make it impossible to conduct an assessment based on full data. However, they are continuing their discussions
with the assistance of several papers produced by the Secretariat.
ON THE WEBSITE:
www.wto.org > trade topics > services
Air transport services
At present, most of the air transport sector — traffic rights
and services directly related to traffic rights — is excluded from GATS’ coverage.
However, GATS mandates a review by members of this situation. The purpose of the
review, which started in early 2000, is to decide whether additional air transport services should be covered by GATS. The review could develop into a negotiation in its own
right, resulting in an amendment of GATS itself by adding new services to its coverage
and by adding specific commitments on these new services to national schedules.
> See also Doha Agenda negotiations
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7. Intellectual property: protection and enforcement
The WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS), negotiated in the 1986–94 Uruguay Round, introduced intellectual property rules into the multilateral trading system for the first time.
Types of intellectual property
The areas covered by the TRIPS Agreement
• Copyright and related rights
Origins: into the rule-based trade system
Ideas and knowledge are an increasingly important part of trade. Most of the value
of new medicines and other high technology products lies in the amount of invention, innovation, research, design and testing involved. Films, music recordings,
books, computer software and on-line services are bought and sold because of the
information and creativity they contain, not usually because of the plastic, metal or
paper used to make them. Many products that used to be traded as low-technology
goods or commodities now contain a higher proportion of invention and design in
their value — for example brandnamed clothing or new varieties of plants.
• Trademarks, including service marks
• Geographical indications
• Industrial designs
• Patents
• Layout-designs (topographies)
of integrated circuits
• Undisclosed information,
including trade secrets
Creators can be given the right to prevent others from using their inventions,
designs or other creations — and to use that right to negotiate payment in return
for others using them. These are “intellectual property rights”. They take a number
of forms. For example books, paintings and films come under copyright; inventions
can be patented; brandnames and product logos can be registered as trademarks;
and so on. Governments and parliaments have given creators these rights as an
incentive to produce ideas that will benefit society as a whole.
The extent of protection and enforcement of these rights varied widely around the
world; and as intellectual property became more important in trade, these differences
became a source of tension in international economic relations. New internationally-agreed trade rules for intellectual property rights were seen as a way to introduce
more order and predictability, and for disputes to be settled more systematically.
The Uruguay Round achieved that. The WTO’s TRIPS Agreement is an attempt to
narrow the gaps in the way these rights are protected around the world, and to bring
them under common international rules. It establishes minimum levels of protection
that each government has to give to the intellectual property of fellow WTO members.
In doing so, it strikes a balance between the long term benefits and possible short
term costs to society. Society benefits in the long term when intellectual property protection encourages creation and invention, especially when the period of protection
expires and the creations and inventions enter the public domain. Governments are
allowed to reduce any short term costs through various exceptions, for example to
tackle public health problems. And, when there are trade disputes over intellectual
property rights, the WTO’s dispute settlement system is now available.
The agreement covers five broad issues:
• how basic principles of the trading system and other international intellectual property agreements should be applied
• how to give adequate protection to intellectual property rights
• how countries should enforce those rights adequately in their own territories
• how to settle disputes on intellectual property between members of the WTO
• special transitional arrangements during the period when the new system is
being introduced.
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What’s the difference?
Copyrights, patents, trademarks, etc apply
to different types of creations or inventions. They are also treated differently.
Patents, industrial designs, integrated circuit designs, geographical indications and
trademarks have to be registered in order
to receive protection. The registration
includes a description of what is being
protected — the invention, design, brandname, logo, etc — and this description is
public information.
Copyright and trade secrets are protected
automatically according to specified conditions. They do not have to be registered,
and therefore there is no need to disclose,
for example, how copyrighted computer
software is constructed.
Other conditions may also differ, for
example the length of time that each type
of protection remains in force.
Basic principles: national treatment, MFN, balanced protection
As in GATT and GATS, the starting point of the intellectual property agreement is
basic principles. And as in the two other agreements, non-discrimination features
prominently: national treatment (treating one’s own nationals and foreigners equally),
and most-favoured-nation treatment (equal treatment for nationals of all trading
partners in the WTO). National treatment is also a key principle in other intellectual
property agreements outside the WTO.
The TRIPS Agreement has an additional important principle: intellectual property
protection should contribute to technical innovation and the transfer of technology.
Both producers and users should benefit, and economic and social welfare should
be enhanced, the agreement says.
How to protect intellectual property: common ground-rules
The second part of the TRIPS agreement looks at different kinds of intellectual
property rights and how to protect them. The purpose is to ensure that adequate
standards of protection exist in all member countries. Here the starting point is the
obligations of the main international agreements of the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) that already existed before the WTO was created:
• the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (patents,
industrial designs, etc)
• the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (copyright).
Some areas are not covered by these conventions. In some cases, the standards of
protection prescribed were thought inadequate. So the TRIPS agreement adds a significant number of new or higher standards.
Copyright
The TRIPS agreement ensures that computer programs will be protected as literary
works under the Berne Convention and outlines how databases should be protected.
It also expands international copyright rules to cover rental rights. Authors of computer
programs and producers of sound recordings must have the right to prohibit the
commercial rental of their works to the public. A similar exclusive right applies to
films where commercial rental has led to widespread copying, affecting copyrightowners’ potential earnings from their films.
The agreement says performers must also have the right to prevent unauthorized
recording, reproduction and broadcast of live performances (bootlegging) for no
less than 50 years. Producers of sound recordings must have the right to prevent the
unauthorized reproduction of recordings for a period of 50 years.
Trademarks
The agreement defines what types of signs must be eligible for protection as trademarks, and what the minimum rights conferred on their owners must be. It says that
service marks must be protected in the same way as trademarks used for goods. Marks
that have become well-known in a particular country enjoy additional protection.
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Geographical indications
A place name is sometimes used to identify a product. This “geographical indication”
does not only say where the product was made. More importantly it identifies the
products special characteristics, which are the result of the product’s origins.
Well-known examples include “Champagne”, “Scotch”, “Tequila”, and “Roquefort”
cheese. Wine and spirits makers are particularly concerned about the use of placenames to identify products, and the TRIPS Agreement contains special provisions for
these products. But the issue is also important for other types of goods.
Using the place name when the product was made elsewhere or when it does not
have the usual characteristics can mislead consumers, and it can lead to unfair competition. The TRIPS Agreement says countries have to prevent this misuse of place
names.
For wines and spirits, the agreement provides higher levels of protection, i.e. even
where there is no danger of the public being misled.
Some exceptions are allowed, for example if the name is already protected as a trademark or if it has become a generic term. For example, “cheddar” now refers to a particular type of cheese not necessarily made in Cheddar, in the UK. But any country
wanting to make an exception for these reasons must be willing to negotiate with
the country which wants to protect the geographical indication in question.
The agreement provides for further negotiations in the WTO to establish a multilateral
system of notification and registration of geographical indications for wines. These are
now part of the Doha Development Agenda and they include spirits. Also debated in
WTO, is whether to negotiate extending this higher level of protection beyond wines
and spirits.
Industrial designs
Under the TRIPS Agreement, industrial designs must be protected for at least 10 years.
Owners of protected designs must be able to prevent the manufacture, sale or importation of articles bearing or embodying a design which is a copy of the protected design.
Patents
The agreement says patent protection must be available for inventions for at least
20 years. Patent protection must be available for both products and processes, in
almost all fields of technology. Governments can refuse to issue a patent for an
invention if its commercial exploitation is prohibited for reasons of public order or
morality. They can also exclude diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods, plants
and animals (other than microorganisms), and biological processes for the production of plants or animals (other than microbiological processes).
Plant varieties, however, must be protectable by patents or by a special system (such
as the breeder’s rights provided in the conventions of UPOV — the International
Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants).
The agreement describes the minimum rights that a patent owner must enjoy. But it
also allows certain exceptions. A patent owner could abuse his rights, for example by
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failing to supply the product on the market. To deal with that possibility, the
agreement says governments can issue “compulsory licences”, allowing a competitor to produce the product or use the process under licence. But this can only
be done under certain conditions aimed at safeguarding the legitimate interests of the patent-holder.
If a patent is issued for a production process, then the rights must extend
to the product directly obtained from the process. Under certain conditions
alleged infringers may be ordered by a court to prove that they have not used
the patented process.
An issue that has arisen recently is how to ensure patent protection for pharmaceutical
products does not prevent people in poor countries from having access to medicines —
while at the same time maintaining the patent system’s role in providing incentives for
research and development into new medicines. Flexibilities such as compulsory licensing are written into the TRIPS Agreement, but some governments were unsure of how
these would be interpreted, and how far their right to use them would be respected.
A large part of this was settled when WTO ministers issued a special declaration at
the Doha Ministerial Conference in November 2001. They agreed that the TRIPS
Agreement does not and should not prevent members from taking measures to protect public health. They underscored countries’ ability to use the flexibilities that are
built into the TRIPS Agreement. And they agreed to extend exemptions on pharmaceutical patent protection for least-developed countries until 2016. On one
remaining question, they assigned further work to the TRIPS Council — to sort out
how to provide extra flexibility, so that countries unable to produce pharmaceuticals
domestically can import patented drugs made under compulsory licensing. A waiver
providing this flexibility was agreed on 30 August 2003.
Integrated circuits layout designs
The basis for protecting integrated circuit designs (“topographies”) in the TRIPS agreement is the Washington Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated
Circuits, which comes under the World Intellectual Property Organization. This was
adopted in 1989 but has not yet entered into force. The TRIPS agreement adds a number of provisions: for example, protection must be available for at least 10 years.
Undisclosed information and trade secrets
Trade secrets and other types of “undisclosed information” which have commercial
value must be protected against breach of confidence and other acts contrary to honest commercial practices. But reasonable steps must have been taken to keep the
information secret. Test data submitted to governments in order to obtain marketing approval for new pharmaceutical or agricultural chemicals must also be protected against unfair commercial use.
Curbing anti-competitive licensing contracts
The owner of a copyright, patent or other form of intellectual property right can
issue a licence for someone else to produce or copy the protected trademark, work,
invention, design, etc. The agreement recognizes that the terms of a licensing contract could restrict competition or impede technology transfer. It says that under certain conditions, governments have the right to take action to prevent anti-competitive licensing that abuses intellectual property rights. It also says governments must
be prepared to consult each other on controlling anti-competitive licensing.
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Enforcement: tough but fair
Having intellectual property laws is not enough. They have to be enforced. This is covered in Part 3 of TRIPS. The agreement says governments have to ensure that intellectual property rights can be enforced under their laws, and that the penalties for
infringement are tough enough to deter further violations. The procedures must be
fair and equitable, and not unnecessarily complicated or costly. They should not entail
unreasonable time-limits or unwarranted delays. People involved should be able to
ask a court to review an administrative decision or to appeal a lower court’s ruling.
The agreement describes in some detail how enforcement should be handled, including rules for obtaining evidence, provisional measures, injunctions, damages and
other penalties. It says courts should have the right, under certain conditions, to order
the disposal or destruction of pirated or counterfeit goods. Wilful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale should be criminal offences.
Governments should make sure that intellectual property rights owners can receive the
assistance of customs authorities to prevent imports of counterfeit and pirated goods.
Technology transfer
Developing countries in particular, see technology transfer as part of the bargain in
which they have agreed to protect intellectual property rights. The TRIPS Agreement
includes a number of provisions on this. For example, it requires developed-country
governments to provide incentives for their companies to transfer technology to
least-developed countries.
Transition arrangements: 1, 5 or 11 years or more
When the WTO agreements took effect on 1 January 1995, developed countries were
given one year to ensure that their laws and practices conform with the TRIPS
agreement. Developing countries and (under certain conditions) transition
economies were given five years, until 2000. Least-developed countries have 11 years,
until 2006 — now extended to 2016 for pharmaceutical patents.
ON THE WEBSITE:
www.wto.org
> trade topics > intellectual property
If a developing country did not provide product patent protection in a particular area
of technology when the TRIPS Agreement came into force (1 January 1995), it had
up to 10 years to introduce the protection. But for pharmaceutical and agricultural
chemical products, the country had to accept the filing of patent applications from
the beginning of the transitional period, though the patent did not need to be granted until the end of this period. If the government allowed the relevant pharmaceutical or agricultural chemical to be marketed during the transition period, it had to
— subject to certain conditions — provide an exclusive marketing right for the product for five years, or until a product patent was granted, whichever was shorter.
Subject to certain exceptions, the general rule is that obligations in the agreement
apply to intellectual property rights that existed at the end of a country’s transition
period as well as to new ones.
> See also Doha Development Agenda
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8. Anti-dumping, subsidies, safeguards: contingencies, etc
Binding tariffs, and applying them equally to all trading partners (most-favourednation treatment, or MFN) are key to the smooth flow of trade in goods. The WTO
agreements uphold the principles, but they also allow exceptions — in some circumstances. Three of these issues are:
• actions taken against dumping (selling at an unfairly low price)
• subsidies and special “countervailing” duties to offset the subsidies
• emergency measures to limit imports temporarily, designed to “safeguard”
domestic industries.
Anti-dumping actions
What is this agreement called?
Agreement on the implementation
of Article VI [i.e 6] of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
If a company exports a product at a price lower than the price it normally charges
on its own home market, it is said to be “dumping” the product. Is this unfair
competition? Opinions differ, but many governments take action against dumping in order to defend their domestic industries. The WTO agreement does not
pass judgement. Its focus is on how governments can or cannot react
to dumping — it disciplines anti-dumping actions, and it is often called the “AntiDumping Agreement”. (This focus only on the reaction to dumping contrasts with
the approach of the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement.)
The legal definitions are more precise, but broadly speaking the WTO agreement
allows governments to act against dumping where there is genuine (“material”)
injury to the competing domestic industry. In order to do that the government has
to be able to show that dumping is taking place, calculate the extent of dumping
(how much lower the export price is compared to the exporter’s home market price),
and show that the dumping is causing injury or threatening to do so.
GATT (Article 6) allows countries to take action against dumping. The AntiDumping Agreement clarifies and expands Article 6, and the two operate together.
They allow countries to act in a way that would normally break the GATT principles
of binding a tariff and not discriminating between trading partners — typically antidumping action means charging extra import duty on the particular product from
the particular exporting country in order to bring its price closer to the “normal
value” or to remove the injury to domestic industry in the importing country.
There are many different ways of calculating whether a particular product is being
dumped heavily or only lightly. The agreement narrows down the range of possible
options. It provides three methods to calculate a product’s “normal value”. The main
one is based on the price in the exporter’s domestic market. When this cannot be used,
two alternatives are available — the price charged by the exporter in another country,
or a calculation based on the combination of the exporter’s production costs, other
expenses and normal profit margins. And the agreement also specifies how a fair comparison can be made between the export price and what would be a normal price.
Calculating the extent of dumping on a product is not enough. Anti-dumping measures can only be applied if the dumping is hurting the industry in the importing country. Therefore, a detailed investigation has to be conducted according to specified rules
first. The investigation must evaluate all relevant economic factors that have a bearing
on the state of the industry in question. If the investigation shows dumping is taking
place and domestic industry is being hurt, the exporting company can undertake to
raise its price to an agreed level in order to avoid anti-dumping import duty.
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Detailed procedures are set out on how anti-dumping cases are to be initiated, how
the investigations are to be conducted, and the conditions for ensuring that all interested parties are given an opportunity to present evidence. Anti-dumping measures
must expire five years after the date of imposition, unless an investigation shows
that ending the measure would lead to injury.
Anti-dumping investigations are to end immediately in cases where the authorities
determine that the margin of dumping is insignificantly small (defined as less than
2% of the export price of the product). Other conditions are also set. For example,
the investigations also have to end if the volume of dumped imports is negligible
(i.e. if the volume from one country is less than 3% of total imports of that product
— although investigations can proceed if several countries, each supplying less than
3% of the imports, together account for 7% or more of total imports).
The agreement says member countries must inform the Committee on AntiDumping Practices about all preliminary and final anti-dumping actions, promptly
and in detail. They must also report on all investigations twice a year. When differences arise, members are encouraged to consult each other. They can also use the
WTO’s dispute settlement procedure.
ON THE WEBSITE:
www.wto.org > trade topics > goods > antidumping
> See also Doha Agenda negotiations
Subsidies and countervailing measures
This agreement does two things: it disciplines the use of subsidies, and it regulates
the actions countries can take to counter the effects of subsidies. It says a country
can use the WTO’s dispute settlement procedure to seek the withdrawal of the subsidy or the removal of its adverse effects. Or the country can launch its own investigation and ultimately charge extra duty (known as “countervailing duty”) on subsidized imports that are found to be hurting domestic producers.
The agreement contains a definition of subsidy. It also introduces the concept of a
“specific” subsidy — i.e. a subsidy available only to an enterprise, industry, group of
enterprises, or group of industries in the country (or state, etc) that gives the subsidy. The disciplines set out in the agreement only apply to specific subsidies. They
can be domestic or export subsidies.
The agreement defines two categories of subsidies: prohibited and actionable. It originally contained a third category: non-actionable subsidies. This category existed for
five years, ending on 31 December 1999, and was not extended. The agreement
applies to agricultural goods as well as industrial products, except when the subsidies are exempt under the Agriculture Agreement’s “peace clause”, due to expire at the
end of 2003.
‘AD-CVD’?
People sometimes refer to the two together
— “AD-CVD” — but there are fundamental
differences. Dumping and subsidies —
together with anti-dumping (AD) measures
and countervailing duties (CVD) — share a
number of similarities. Many countries
handle the two under a single law, apply a
similar process to deal with them and give
a single authority responsibility for investigations. Occasionally, the two WTO committees responsible for these issues meet
jointly.
The reaction to dumping and subsidies is
often a special offsetting import tax
(countervailing duty in the case of a subsidy).
This is charged on products from specific
countries and therefore it breaks the GATT
principles of binding a tariff and treating
trading partners equally (MFN). The agreements provide an escape clause, but they
both also say that before imposing a duty,
the importing country must conduct a
detailed investigation that shows properly
that domestic industry is hurt.
But there are also fundamental differences,
and these are reflected in the agreements.
Dumping is an action by a company. With
subsidies, it is the government or a government agency that acts, either by paying out
subsidies directly or by requiring companies
to subsidize certain customers.
But the WTO is an organization of countries
and their governments. The WTO does
not deal with companies and cannot regulate companies’ actions such as dumping.
Therefore the Anti-Dumping Agreement
only concerns the actions governments
may take against dumping. With
subsidies, governments act on both sides:
they subsidize and they act against each
others’ subsidies. Therefore the subsidies
agreement disciplines both the subsidies
and the reactions.
What is this agreement called?
Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures
• Prohibited subsidies: subsidies that require recipients to meet certain export
targets, or to use domestic goods instead of imported goods. They are prohibited because they are specifically designed to distort international trade,
and are therefore likely to hurt other countries’ trade. They can be challenged
in the WTO dispute settlement procedure where they are handled under an
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accelerated timetable. If the dispute settlement procedure confirms that the
subsidy is prohibited, it must be withdrawn immediately. Otherwise, the
complaining country can take counter measures. If domestic producers are
hurt by imports of subsidized products, countervailing duty can be imposed.
• Actionable subsidies: in this category the complaining country has to show
that the subsidy has an adverse effect on its interests. Otherwise the subsidy
is permitted. The agreement defines three types of damage they can cause.
One country’s subsidies can hurt a domestic industry in an importing country.
They can hurt rival exporters from another country when the two compete
in third markets. And domestic subsidies in one country can hurt exporters
trying to compete in the subsidizing country’s domestic market. If the Dispute
Settlement Body rules that the subsidy does have an adverse effect, the subsidy must be withdrawn or its adverse effect must be removed. Again, if
domestic producers are hurt by imports of subsidized products, countervailing
duty can be imposed.
What is this agreement called?
Agreement on Safeguards
Some of the disciplines are similar to those of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
Countervailing duty (the parallel of anti-dumping duty) can only be charged after the
importing country has conducted a detailed investigation similar to that required for
anti-dumping action. There are detailed rules for deciding whether a product is being
subsidized (not always an easy calculation), criteria for determining whether imports
of subsidized products are hurting (“causing injury to”) domestic industry, procedures for initiating and conducting investigations, and rules on the implementation and duration (normally five years) of countervailing measures. The subsidized
exporter can also agree to raise its export prices as an alternative to its exports being
charged countervailing duty.
Subsidies may play an important role in developing countries and in the transformation of centrally-planned economies to market economies. Least-developed countries and developing countries with less than $1,000 per capita GNP are exempted
from disciplines on prohibited export subsidies. Other developing countries are
given until 2003 to get rid of their export subsidies. Least-developed countries must
eliminate import-substitution subsidies (i.e. subsidies designed to help domestic
production and avoid importing) by 2003 — for other developing countries the
deadline was 2000. Developing countries also receive preferential treatment if their
exports are subject to countervailing duty investigations. For transition economies,
prohibited subsidies had to be phased out by 2002.
ON THE WEBSITE:
www.wto.org > trade topics > goods > subsidies
and countervailing measures
> See also Doha Agenda negotiations
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Safeguards: emergency protection from imports
A WTO member may restrict imports of a product temporarily (take “safeguard”
actions) if its domestic industry is injured or threatened with injury caused by a
surge in imports. Here, the injury has to be serious. Safeguard measures were
always available under GATT (Article 19). However, they were infrequently used,
some governments preferring to protect their domestic industries through “grey
area” measures — using bilateral negotiations outside GATT’s auspices, they persuaded exporting countries to restrain exports “voluntarily” or to agree to other
means of sharing markets. Agreements of this kind were reached for a wide range
of products: automobiles, steel, and semiconductors, for example.
The WTO agreement broke new ground. It prohibits “grey-area” measures, and it
sets time limits (a “sunset clause”) on all safeguard actions. The agreement says
members must not seek, take or maintain any voluntary export restraints, orderly
marketing arrangements or any other similar measures on the export or the import
side. The bilateral measures that were not modified to conform with the agreement
were phased out at the end of 1998. Countries were allowed to keep one of these
measures an extra year (until the end of 1999), but only the European Union — for
restrictions on imports of cars from Japan — made use of this provision.
An import “surge” justifying safeguard action can be a real increase in imports
(an absolute increase); or it can be an increase in the imports’ share of a shrinking
market, even if the import quantity has not increased (relative increase).
Industries or companies may request safeguard action by their government. The
WTO agreement sets out requirements for safeguard investigations by national
authorities. The emphasis is on transparency and on following established rules and
practices — avoiding arbitrary methods. The authorities conducting investigations
have to announce publicly when hearings are to take place and provide other appropriate means for interested parties to present evidence. The evidence must include
arguments on whether a measure is in the public interest.
The agreement sets out criteria for assessing whether “serious injury” is being
caused or threatened, and the factors which must be considered in determining the
impact of imports on the domestic industry. When imposed, a safeguard measure
should be applied only to the extent necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury
and to help the industry concerned to adjust. Where quantitative restrictions (quotas) are imposed, they normally should not reduce the quantities of imports below
the annual average for the last three representative years for which statistics are
available, unless clear justification is given that a different level is necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury.
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In principle, safeguard measures cannot be targeted at imports from a particular
country. However, the agreement does describe how quotas can be allocated among
supplying countries, including in the exceptional circumstance where imports from
certain countries have increased disproportionately quickly. A safeguard measure
should not last more than four years, although this can be extended up to eight
years, subject to a determination by competent national authorities that the measure is needed and that there is evidence the industry is adjusting. Measures
imposed for more than a year must be progressively liberalized.
When a country restricts imports in order to safeguard its domestic producers, in
principle it must give something in return. The agreement says the exporting country
(or exporting countries) can seek compensation through consultations. If no agreement is reached the exporting country can retaliate by taking equivalent action — for
instance, it can raise tariffs on exports from the country that is enforcing the safeguard
measure. In some circumstances, the exporting country has to wait for three years
after the safeguard measure was introduced before it can retaliate in this way — i.e. if
the measure conforms with the provisions of the agreement and if it is taken as a
result of an increase in the quantity of imports from the exporting country.
To some extent developing countries’ exports are shielded from safeguard actions.
An importing country can only apply a safeguard measure to a product from a developing country if the developing country is supplying more than 3% of the imports
of that product, or if developing country members with less than 3% import share
collectively account for more than 9% of total imports of the product concerned.
The WTO’s Safeguards Committee oversees the operation of the agreement and is
responsible for the surveillance of members’ commitments. Governments have to
report each phase of a safeguard investigation and related decision-making, and the
committee reviews these reports.
ON THE WEBSITE:
www.wto.org > trade topics > goods > safeguards
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9. Non-tariff barriers: red tape, etc
A number of agreements deal with various bureaucratic or legal issues that could
involve hindrances to trade.
•
•
•
•
•
import licensing
rules for the valuation of goods at customs
preshipment inspection: further checks on imports
rules of origin: made in ... where?
investment measures
Import licensing: keeping procedures clear
Although less widely used now than in the past, import licensing systems are subject to disciplines in the WTO. The Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures
says import licensing should be simple, transparent and predictable. For example,
the agreement requires governments to publish sufficient information for traders to
know how and why the licences are granted. It also describes how countries should
notify the WTO when they introduce new import licensing procedures or change
existing procedures. The agreement offers guidance on how governments should
assess applications for licences.
Some licences are issued automatically if certain conditions are met. The agreement
sets criteria for automatic licensing so that the procedures used do not restrict trade.
Other licences are not issued automatically. Here, the agreement tries to minimize
the importers’ burden in applying for licences, so that the administrative work does
not in itself restrict or distort imports. The agreement says the agencies handling
licensing should not normally take more than 30 days to deal with an application —
60 days when all applications are considered at the same time.
Rules for the valuation of goods at customs
For importers, the process of estimating the value of a product at customs presents
problems that can be just as serious as the actual duty rate charged. The WTO agreement on customs valuation aims for a fair, uniform and neutral system for
the valuation of goods for customs purposes — a system that conforms to
commercial realities, and which outlaws the use of arbitrary or fictitious customs values. The agreement provides a set of valuation rules, expanding and giving
greater precision to the provisions on customs valuation in the original GATT.
A related Uruguay Round ministerial decision gives customs administrations the right
to request further information in cases where they have reason to doubt the accuracy
of the declared value of imported goods. If the administration maintains a reasonable
doubt, despite any additional information, it may be deemed that the customs value of
the imported goods cannot be determined on the basis of the declared value.
What is this agreement called?
Agreement on Implementation of Article VII
(i.e. 7) of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994; and related
ministerial decisions: “Decision Regarding
Cases Where Customs Administrations Have
Reasons to Doubt the Truth or Accuracy of
the Declared Value” and “Decisions on Texts
Relating to Minimum Values and Imports by
Sole Agents, Sole Distributors and Sole
Concessionaires”.
ON THE WEBSITE:
www.wto.org > trade topics > goods > customs valuation
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Preshipment inspection: a further check on imports
Preshipment inspection is the practice of employing specialized private companies
(or “independent entities”) to check shipment details — essentially price, quantity
and quality — of goods ordered overseas. Used by governments of developing countries,
the purpose is to safeguard national financial interests (preventing capital flight,
commercial fraud, and customs duty evasion, for instance) and to compensate for
inadequacies in administrative infrastructures.
The Preshipment Inspection Agreement recognizes that GATT principles and obligations
apply to the activities of preshipment inspection agencies mandated by governments.
The obligations placed on governments which use preshipment inspections include
non-discrimination, transparency, protection of confidential business information,
avoiding unreasonable delay, the use of specific guidelines for conducting price verification and avoiding conflicts of interest by the inspection agencies. The obligations
of exporting members towards countries using preshipment inspection include nondiscrimination in the application of domestic laws and regulations, prompt publication of those laws and regulations and the provision of technical assistance where
requested.
The agreement establishes an independent review procedure. This is administered
jointly by the International Federation of Inspection Agencies (IFIA), representing
inspection agencies, and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), representing exporters. Its purpose is to resolve disputes between an exporter and an
inspection agency.
Rules of origin: made in ... where?
“Rules of origin” are the criteria used to define where a product was made. They
are an essential part of trade rules because a number of policies discriminate
between exporting countries: quotas, preferential tariffs, anti-dumping actions,
countervailing duty (charged to counter export subsidies), and more. Rules of
origin are also used to compile trade statistics, and for “made in ...” labels that
are attached to products. This is complicated by globalization and the way a
product can be processed in several countries before it is ready for the market.
The Rules of Origin Agreement requires WTO members to ensure that their rules
of origin are transparent; that they do not have restricting, distorting or disruptive
effects on international trade; that they are administered in a consistent, uniform,
impartial and reasonable manner; and that they are based on a positive standard (in
other words, they should state what does confer origin rather than what does not).
For the longer term, the agreement aims for common (“harmonized”) rules of origin among all WTO members, except in some kinds of preferential trade — for
example, countries setting up a free trade area are allowed to use different rules of
origin for products traded under their free trade agreement. The agreement establishes a harmonization work programme, based upon a set of principles, including
making rules of origin objective, understandable and predictable. The work was due
to end in July 1998, but several deadlines have been missed. It is being conducted
by a Committee on Rules of Origin in the WTO and a Technical Committee under
the auspices of the World Customs Organization in Brussels. The outcome will be
a single set of rules of origin to be applied under non-preferential trading conditions
by all WTO members in all circumstances.
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An annex to the agreement sets out a “common declaration” dealing with the operation
rules of origin on goods which qualify for preferential treatment.
ON THE WEBSITE:
www.wto.org > trade topics > goods
> rules of origin
Investment measures: reducing trade distortions
The Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) Agreement applies only to measures
that affect trade in goods. It recognizes that certain measures can restrict and distort
trade, and states that no member shall apply any measure that discriminates against
foreigners or foreign products (i.e. violates “national treatment” principles in GATT).
It also outlaws investment measures that lead to restrictions in quantities (violating
another principle in GATT). An illustrative list of TRIMs agreed to be inconsistent
with these GATT articles is appended to the agreement. The list includes measures
which require particular levels of local procurement by an enterprise (“local content
requirements”). It also discourages measures which limit a company’s imports or set
targets for the company to export (“trade balancing requirements”).
Under the agreement, countries must inform fellow-members through the WTO of all
investment measures that do not conform with the agreement. Developed countries
had to eliminate these in two years (by the end of 1996); developing countries had five
years (to the end of 1999); and least-developed countries seven. In July 2001, the Goods
Council agreed to extend this transition period for a number of requesting developing
countries.
The agreement establishes a Committee on TRIMs to monitor the implementation of these commitments. The agreement also says that WTO members should
consider, by 1 January 2000, whether there should also be provisions on investment
policy and competition policy. This discussion is now part of the Doha Development
Agenda.
ON THE WEBSITE:
www.wto.org > trade topics > investment
10. Plurilaterals: of minority interest
For the most part, all WTO members subscribe to all WTO agreements. After the
Uruguay Round, however, there remained four agreements, originally negotiated in
the Tokyo Round, which had a narrower group of signatories and are known as
“plurilateral agreements”. All other Tokyo Round agreements became multilateral
obligations (i.e. obligations for all WTO members) when the World Trade
Organization was established in 1995. The four were:
• trade in civil aircraft
• government procurement
• dairy products
• bovine meat.
The bovine meat and dairy agreements were terminated in 1997.
Fair trade in civil aircraft
The Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft entered into force on 1 January 1980. It
now has 30 signatories. The agreement eliminates import duties on all aircraft,
other than military aircraft, as well as on all other products covered by the agreement
— civil aircraft engines and their parts and components, all components and subassemblies of civil aircraft, and flight simulators and their parts and components. It
contains disciplines on government-directed procurement of civil aircraft and
inducements to purchase, as well as on government financial support for the civil
aircraft sector.
ON THE WEBSITE:
www.wto.org
> trade topics > goods > civil aircraft
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Government procurement: opening up for competition
In most countries the government, and the agencies it controls, are together the
biggest purchasers of goods of all kinds, ranging from basic commodities to hightechnology equipment. At the same time, the political pressure to favour domestic
suppliers over their foreign competitors can be very strong.
An Agreement on Government Procurement was first negotiated during the Tokyo
Round and entered into force on 1 January 1981. Its purpose is to open up as much
of this business as possible to international competition. It is designed to make
laws, regulations, procedures and practices regarding government procurement
more transparent and to ensure they do not protect domestic products or suppliers,
or discriminate against foreign products or suppliers.
The agreement has 28 members. It has two elements — general rules and obligations, and schedules of national entities in each member country whose procurement is subject to the agreement. A large part of the general rules and obligations
concern tendering procedures.
The present agreement and commitments were negotiated in the Uruguay Round.
These negotiations achieved a 10-fold expansion of coverage, extending international
competition to include national and local government entities whose collective purchases are worth several hundred billion dollars each year. The new agreement also
extends coverage to services (including construction services), procurement at the
sub-central level (for example, states, provinces, departments and prefectures), and
procurement by public utilities. The new agreement took effect on 1 January 1996.
It also reinforces rules guaranteeing fair and non-discriminatory conditions of international competition. For example, governments will be required to put in place
domestic procedures by which aggrieved private bidders can challenge procurement
decisions and obtain redress in the event such decisions were made inconsistently
with the rules of the agreement.
ON THE WEBSITE:
www.wto.org > trade topics > goods >
government procurement
The agreement applies to contracts worth more than specified threshold values.
For central government purchases of goods and services, the threshold is SDR
130,000 (some $185,000 in June 2003). For purchases of goods and services
by sub-central government entities the threshold varies but is generally in the
region of SDR 200,000. For utilities, thresholds for goods and services is generally
in the area of SDR 400,000 and for construction contracts, in general the threshold
value is SDR 5,000,000.
Dairy and bovine meat agreements: ended in 1997
The International Dairy Agreement and International Bovine Meat Agreement were
scrapped at the end of 1997. Countries that had signed the agreements decided that
the sectors were better handled under the Agriculture and Sanitary and
Phytosanitary agreements. Some aspects of their work had been handicapped by the
small number of signatories. For example, some major exporters of dairy products
did not sign the Dairy Agreement, and the attempt to cooperate on minimum prices
therefore failed — minimum pricing was suspended in 1995.
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11. Trade policy reviews: ensuring transparency
Individuals and companies involved in trade have to know as much as possible
about the conditions of trade. It is therefore fundamentally important
that regulations and policies are transparent. In the WTO, this is achieved
in two ways: governments have to inform the WTO and fellow-members of
specific measures, policies or laws through regular “notifications”; and the WTO
conducts regular reviews of individual countries’ trade policies — the trade policy
reviews. These reviews are part of the Uruguay Round agreement, but they began
several years before the round ended — they were an early result of the negotiations.
Participants agreed to set up the reviews at the December 1988 ministerial meeting
that was intended to be the midway assessment of the Uruguay Round. The first
review took place the following year. Initially they operated under GATT and, like
GATT, they focused on goods trade. With the creation of the WTO in 1995, their
scope was extended, like the WTO, to include services and intellectual property.
What is this agreement called?
Trade Policy Review Mechanism
The importance countries attach to the process is reflected in the seniority of the
Trade Policy Review Body — it is the WTO General Council in another guise.
The objectives are:
• to increase the transparency and understanding of countries’ trade policies and
practices, through regular monitoring
• improve the quality of public and intergovernmental debate on the issues
• to enable a multilateral assessment of the effects of policies on the world trading
system.
The reviews focus on members’ own trade policies and practices. But they also take
into account the countries’ wider economic and developmental needs, their policies
and objectives, and the external economic environment that they face. These “peer
reviews” by other WTO members encourage governments to follow more closely the
WTO rules and disciplines and to fulfil their commitments. In practice the reviews
have two broad results: they enable outsiders to understand a country’s policies and
circumstances, and they provide feedback to the reviewed country on its performance in the system.
Over a period of time, all WTO members are to come under scrutiny. The frequency
of the reviews depends on the country’s size:
• The four biggest traders — the European Union, the United States, Japan and
China — are examined approximately once every two years.
• The next 16 countries (in terms of their share of world trade) are reviewed every
four years.
• The remaining countries are reviewed every six years, with the possibility of a
longer interim period for the least-developed countries.
For each review, two documents are prepared: a policy statement by the
government under review, and a detailed report written independently by
the WTO Secretariat. These two reports, together with the proceedings
of the Trade Policy Review Body’s meetings are published shortly afterwards.
ON THE WEBSITE:
www.wto.org > trade topics > trade policy reviews
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This page: Hearing of a dispute panel on steel.
Facing page: The Appellate Body