According to a report published in Outlook, the Pakistani-American terror suspect has confessed about the involvement of some serving Pakistani Army officials in the 26/11 attacks.

Headley reportedly identified the Pakistani Army officers as Major Sayeed, Major Iqbal, Major Sameer and Colonel Shah.

According to Headley it was Colonel Shah was the one who was communicating with the terrorists and directing them during the terror attacks in which at least 166 people were killed and nearly 200 others injured.

Editor-in-Chief of Outlook magazine, Vinod Mehta said that Headley's revelations have nailed Pakistan.

"One of the four named, Colonel Shah was managing 26/11 on the phone line telling the perpetrators what to do and what not to do. He was giving tactical information. Three of those named are serving officers and one is a retired officer. Headley told this to FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) and FBI told this to India. There's a difference between state and non-state actors. For the first time now Headley has revealed that state actors from Pakistan were involved. We have got to see how Pakistan reacts," said Mehta.

Till now Pakistan has been claiming that the Mumbai terror attacks was masterminded and executed by 'non-state' actors.

Earlier, the four Pakistani handlers named by Headley were referred to as A, B, C and D by American investigating agencies.

Headley used to work as a double agent for the US Drug Enforcement Administration and also interacted with the Lashkar-e-Toiba in Pakistan.

He was arrested in the US in October 2009 by the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force at O'Hare International Airport before boarding a flight to Philadelphia, intending to travel on to Pakistan.

The 49-year-old is currently in custody in the US and has pleaded guilty to all the terror charges levelled against him by the FBI in a US District Court in Chicago.

He is being tried in the US for plotting terror attacks on behalf of the Lashkar-e-Toiba against India and on charges of plotting a terror attack against the facilities and employees of the Danish newspaper which had published cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed in 2005.

Pakistani-American terror suspect David Headley's confession about his involvement in the Mumbai terror attack reveals the close relationship between Al Qaeda and Pakistan's Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) group, according to a former CIA analyst.

Headley's revelations about an European cell of Al Qaeda were also disturbing, Bruce Riedel, who was a member of the National Security Council in the Clinton administration and is now at the Brookings Institution, was quoted as saying by the New York Times Friday.

They showed that 'Al Qaeda still has a significant operational infrastructure somewhere in Europe', he said.

Details of Headley's activities, contained in his plea agreement with US authorities, 'raise troubling questions about how an American citizen could travel for so long undetected from his home base in Chicago to well-established terrorist training camps in Pakistan', the Times said in a report from Islamabad.

Charged with helping plan the 2008 terror attack in Mumbai, Headley, 49, moved effortlessly between the US, Pakistan and India for nearly seven years, training at a militant camp in Pakistan on five occasions, according to the plea agreement.

Headley started his career as a militant scout with LeT, a terrorist group established decades ago with the help of the Pakistani military and intelligence agencies.

Lashkar was supposed to have been outlawed in Pakistan in 2002, but it remains active behind the veil of a public charity in Pakistan. According to Headley's plea, it continues to be assisted by former Pakistani military officials.

The plea names a retired Pakistani military officer, Col. Abdur Rehman Hashim Syed, known as Pasha, as Headley's main contact with Lashkar. Earlier prosecution documents said that Colonel Syed was arrested last year in Pakistan on unspecified charges but then released.

In early 2009, Colonel Syed introduced Headley to Muhammad Ilyas Kashmiri, an Al Qaeda operative in North Waziristan, according to the document.

The visit in February 2009 may finally have put Headley on the radar of the American authorities, who started tracking him in the late spring of last year, Riedel was quoted as saying.

Headley's plea agreement with the government was not his first. After being sentenced for drug trafficking in the 1990s, he served as an informant in Pakistan for the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) as part of a deal for a lighter sentence, the US daily said.

He was in Pakistan for DEA from the late 1990s until at least 2001. By 2002, he was training with Lashkar, raising the possibility that he had made contact with the militants while still working for DEA, the Times suggested.

Pakistani Army is shameless. They will hide behind technicalities and denials and will continue to perpetrate state sponsored terrorist activities until India pulls up it socks and show these terrorists their place.

Firstly, India should start by declaring Pakistan as a terror sponsoring nation and should cut-off all ties and punish them on all fronts - economic, military, diplomatic and even water.

Pakistani Army is shameless. They will hide behind technicalities and denials and will continue to perpetrate state sponsored terrorist activities until India pulls up it socks and show these terrorists their place.

Firstly, India should start by declaring Pakistan as a terror sponsoring nation and should cut-off all ties and punish them on all fronts - economic, military, diplomatic and even water.

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Exactly, as long as India deals with them as if terrorism is just another mundane issue, PA will keep doing this. Why should India recognise Pakistan as a responsible state? Why are we submitting dossiers to Pakistan about its own army's involvement as if it is a responsible state? This sham must end and the guilty party is not Pakistan(it will continue to do what it was created for), it is Indian leadership.

I completely agree with you DD, lets say tommorow GOI declares that it has come to the conclusion that all terrorism in India emanation from Pakistan is directly sponsored by PA, not just their present leadership but over generations, and therefore India declares Pakistan as a rogue nation and terrorist nation and thus cuts off all ties with them. Their citizens would not be allowed to travel to India. Any company/country doing business with Pakistan will be given lesser priority then the country/company which is not doing business with them. What will happen if GOI takes this stand? Will heavens fall on our head? Why is GOI so docile?

India should adopt the following approach, Issue a fixed timeline or deadline to pakistan for bringing all those terrorists to book. Make it a big issue at every forum internationally. Make it clear in no uncertain terms that india will take actions it sees fit after the deadline passes.

That will highten tensions as most people will construe it as an ultimatum for war. But no we don't want an open war unless its imposed on us. What we can do is assassinate all those responsible. Saeed, Azhar, Salauddin, Dawood. I am sure our good friends in Mossad will help us with various techniques. Openly claim responsibility for such assassinations. That will make all take notice that india will no longer sit quite. Also attack terror camps esp Muridke which is a thriving center of excellence in terror education. If pakistan wants to escalate, they can be our guests.

NEW DELHI -- India is demanding unfettered access to David Coleman Headley, an American citizen who pleaded guilty in a U.S. court last week to scouting targets for the 2008 terrorism attack in Mumbai.

New Delhi's interest in interrogating Headley is causing a diplomatic rift between the United States and India. American diplomats have offered conflicting signals on whether Indian investigators will be able to question Headley, 49, a Pakistani American who has agreed to provide the United States with intelligence about possible future terrorist targets.

Authorities have described Headley as one of the most dangerous and informed terrorist operatives apprehended on American soil. He pleaded guilty to a dozen criminal charges related to the Mumbai attacks and acknowledged taking five trips to the city to videotape the attackers' targets. The attacks killed 166 people, including six Americans.

Although counterterrorism experts in Washington have lauded his arrest, Indian officials have bristled at the United States' decision to keep them at a distance.

"In India, there is still residual suspicion that Americans are not cooperating with us wholeheartedly on terrorism," said Lalit Mansingh, a retired Indian ambassador to the United States. "Washington should clarify this issue as quickly as possible so we don't slide further into a full political tizzy."

Relations between India and the United States have warmed in recent years, especially after the signing of a landmark 2008 civilian nuclear deal, a key policy achievement for the Bush administration. But tensions have risen recently with the Obama administration, especially over concerns that Washington is favoring India's arch rival, Pakistan, in its war on terrorism. Among New Delhi's fears is that Washington is providing Pakistan with sophisticated weaponry that could one day be turned on India.

Despite the mixed signals on Headley, U.S. officials said it was likely that India would eventually gain access to him. As part of his plea, Headley agreed to an interrogation by Indian officials.

Still, Indian newspapers this week are filled with breathless headlines and editorials emphasizing the perceived slight by the United States.

"US leaves India red-faced on Headley access," said a front-page headline in the New Delhi tabloid Mail Today.

Indian officials are also pushing the United States to extradite Headley and try him in an Indian court. They are unlikely to get him. As part of his plea bargain, the United States agreed not to send him. That aspect of the plea agreement has infuriated many Indians, who are quick to note that India allowed the FBI to interrogate Ajmal Amir Kasab, the lone surviving gunman in the attacks.

"Since the Mumbai attacks claimed the lives of six Americans, the FBI felt it had an automatic entitlement to that meeting. But the murder of more than a hundred Indians in the same attack; one that left India naked and vulnerable forever, does not apparently give us the same right," Barkha Dutt, a national talk show host, said in a recent column in the Hindustan Times. "But we are being asked to forget all of that and be grateful for the fact that Headley may now testify in the trial via videoconference. What a joke."

The Indian media have also noted that Headley once worked as an informant in Pakistan for the Drug Enforcement Administration. He agreed to do so in exchange for a lighter sentence on drug-trafficking charges in the 1990s. Many Indians have speculated that, before the Mumbai siege, Headley was a CIA operative who went rogue, an assertion Washington has denied.

"If the shoe was on the other foot and the Indian authorities had in their custody an Indian citizen involved in major terrorist attacks in the U.S., Washington would no doubt expect to be given direct access to this person. So India is justified in expecting to question David Headley directly," said Lisa Curtis, a senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation in Washington.

"Until India gets direct access to Headley," she said, "there will be an underlying suspicion that the U.S. is trying to cover something up."

India should adopt the following approach, Issue a fixed timeline or deadline to pakistan for bringing all those terrorists to book. Make it a big issue at every forum internationally. Make it clear in no uncertain terms that india will take actions it sees fit after the deadline passes.

That will highten tensions as most people will construe it as an ultimatum for war. But no we don't want an open war unless its imposed on us. What we can do is assassinate all those responsible. Saeed, Azhar, Salauddin, Dawood. I am sure our good friends in Mossad will help us with various techniques. Openly claim responsibility for such assassinations. That will make all take notice that india will no longer sit quite. Also attack terror camps esp Muridke which is a thriving center of excellence in terror education. If pakistan wants to escalate, they can be our guests.

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Yusuf, immediately after 26/11, India raised the pitch and demanded action from Pakistan and threatened that 'all options are open', the issue was raised on all important fora around the world. So, the first step that you said was done at that time. Once, Pakistan did not do anything, the next step of retribution, covert or overt as India saw fit should have followed. It didnt. Why? [email protected] leadership...

The same will happen with your proposal as well, the first step of giving ultimatum, raising issue on all forum will happen, but the second step is were India falters.

Washington, March 26: Securely hidden from public view, belying the head-butting, handshakes and the toasts between Americans and Pakistanis taking part in their first ministerial-level “strategic dialogue” this week, US president Barack Obama asked for the arrest of Hafiz Saeed, one of the masterminds of the Mumbai terror attacks in 2008.

Although the top-level Pakistani delegation to the talks, including chief of army staff General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani and foreign minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi, has been in Washington since Monday, Obama has not met any member of the delegation till the time of writing.

According to sources at the heart of the bilateral dialogue, however, during pre-talks, inter-agency discussions among US officials and key members of his cabinet at the White House, Obama made it clear that the US-Pakistan strategic partnership cannot be a partnership of hearts and minds unless the Pakistani government firmly targets Saeed’s Lashkar-e-Toiba, which has acquired the image here of the next al Qaeda.

In taking a tough line on Saeed’s arrest, which has been demanded by India, Obama disagreed with the views of the Pentagon, US intelligence agencies and sections of the state department led by special envoy for Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke, all of whom are for treating Pakistan with kid gloves on anything to do with India, including the Mumbai terror attacks.

The President appears to have been somewhat cornered into his hardline stand after a key hearing last fortnight of the South Asia sub-committee of the US House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee, at which every member of the panel — except one — called for heavy-handed action against the Lashkar by the Pakistanis.

“This group of savages needs to be crushed,” the highly respected chairman of the committee, Gary Ackerman, said at the hearing without mincing words.

Such was the strength of opinion against Islamabad’s double-dealing over Lashkar that even Shuja Nawaz, a Pakistani-American scholar whom Pakistani lobbyists had planted at the hearing as a witness, was forced to put the gloss that “the former trainers and associates from the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) perhaps now have an opportunity of independently working with the LeT”.

This week’s strategic dialogue made absolutely no progress on the issue of a nuclear deal for Pakistan, similar to the one the US signed with India. The subject does not find even a passing mention in a joint statement released at the end of the talks.

In fact, an American source privy to the entire proceedings blamed the sudden brouhaha over a nuclear deal for Pakistan on a section of the Indian media that thought up the issue as a headline-grabbing curtain raiser for the talks.

“The issue has been injected periodically by the Pakistanis into our talks directly and through third parties since 2006,” conceded the source. “This time the media asked about it at press conferences. If we are asked in public, we are not going to sour the mood by saying that Pakistan cannot have a nuclear deal. We have been diplomatic in public but very clear in private on this issue.”

The Americans are understood to have told Qureshi and Kayani that Pakistan must first put in place proper export control laws which will give the US Congress some confidence that there is at least a fig leaf of rationale behind Islamabad’s request for a nuclear deal.In 1999, as talks between then Planning Commission deputy chairman Jaswant Singh and the US deputy secretary of state Strobe Talbott got under way on India's nuclear programme, the Americans similarly asked for new, water tight export control laws on Indian statutes as a guarantee against nuclear proliferation.

An expert on such laws was then posted to the US embassy in New Delhi for six months and she worked with Rakesh Sood, then joint secretary in South Block for disarmament, on new laws. That was six years before the US announced a nuclear deal with India.

This experience offers a road map for any such deal with Pakistan, if at all. Besides, an American source involved in the talks with Pakistan pointed out that "if this president had been in power in 2005, there would have been no nuclear deal even with India. So where is the question of him initiating any such deal for Pakistan?"

Doesn't come as a surprise. Reminds me of Kargil, how during and after the blunderous operation all the officers responsible for the planning and execution went silent. It was even denied that any state actors were involved for the initial stages. They will always cook up terror plans, launch them, watch them blow up in their faces and then accept guilt only after having been caught. PA has been engaging in this dark side of unconventional warfare for a long time now with zero accountability. They have mowed down any criticism or opposition from within and gone on a killing spree outside from India to United Kingdom Pakistani military establishment has left fingerprints all over with acts of terrorism.

The Asset Managers EXCLUSIVE
DAVID HEADLEY 26/11 INTELLIGENCEHeadley’s confessions prove a Pak role. But did the US know of 26/11 beforehand?

What Headley Has Told the Americans

*Out of the four Pakistani handlers involved in 26/11, identified as A, B, C and D in the court documents relating to Headley’s arrest, three are serving Pakistani army officials—Colonel Shah, Major Sameer and Major Iqbal.
*Headley has told US investigators that he received training in combat and tactical operations, counter-surveillance methods and weapons-handling from the Lashkar-e-Toiba in Pakistan between 2002-06.
*Headley has said he carried out a survey of the landing points on the Mumbai coast and collected the GPS coordinates that would be used by Kasab & co to land from the sea for the assault on targets in Mumbai.
*Headley conducted reconnaissance of all the key targets so that the terrorists could be given location-specific training. His inputs provided intelligence to the LeT, enabling them to prepare a concise attack plan.
*Intelligence sources say Headley has also revealed that he developed links with Al Qaeda through HuJI operative Ilyas Kashmiri, a former Pakistani army commando, in meetings in Waziristan in 2009.

***

For 10 years, Daood Sayed Gilani existed only in the shadows, quietly travelling between India, Pakistan and the United States, building his links with the terror outfit Lashkar-e-Toiba. Ideally, Gilani should have shown up on the radar of the Indian or US intelligence communities during his extensive tours in India. That didn’t happen because on February 16, 2006, Gilani virtually ceased to exist. He was now officially David Coleman Headley.

Arrested on October 3 last year, Headley’s journey and his central role in the planning of the 26/11 attacks on Mumbai had initially confounded Indian intelligence. But his plea bargain now in the North district court of Illinois and subsequent confessions have helped Indian investigators piece together a key element of the 26/11 puzzle, adding further credence to the suspicion that it was conducted with the help of the Pakistani intelligence establishment.

The Taj Mahal Hotel ablaze during 26/11

While the broad contours of Headley’s confessions have been made public, US intelligence has also shared some sensitive material with their Indian counterparts through official channels, which has proved to be a breakthrough in the 26/11 probe. Some of the key information the US has shared with India is:

Headley has accepted he had four Pakistani handlers. While one has been identified as retired army officer Major Abdul Rahman Hashim Sayeed, the identity of the others had not been disclosed. Indian investigators told Outlook that Headley has confessed that the other three were serving Pakistani army officers. Headley has identified them as Major Iqbal, Major Sameer and Colonel Shah. While the names could be pseudonyms, it has confirmed that the handlers were serving army officials. This is the first evidence of official Pakistani involvement in the 26/11 attacks. In fact, American prosecutors refer to the handlers as “A, B, C and D”. The person identified as ‘A’ is believed to be Colonel Shah of the Pakistan army.
Headley has also accepted his role in the 26/11 terror strike and has confirmed that he conducted extensive surveillance of the targets. Having attended three LeT training capsules between 2002-06, Headley used his extensive tactical military knowledge to brief the 10 terrorists who attacked Mumbai. He had also visited the Taj Mahal and Trident hotels and mapped both of them from a tactical point of view. His maps and videos helped the LeT in training the terrorists who knew precise locations of hotel rooms, possible entry and exit points that could be used by Indian security forces to launch a counter-offensive and also helped identify the best areas in the hotels where explosives could be detonated to cause maximum casualties and damage.
The landing points and the Mumbai coastline was also surveyed by Headley. Armed with a GPS, Headley hired a boat in the summer of 2008 and, after sailing along the Mumbai coast, fed in the coordinates that would help the terrorists to come ashore. Headley ruled out three landing points and finally settled on the area next to Badhwar Park for the terrorists to come into Mumbai and then spread out. The coordinates supplied by Headley helped the terrorists landing from the sea pinpoint the two hotels, Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus and Nariman House where the Jewish organisation, Chabad, had its headquarters. Armed with the coordinates, the terrorists knew exactly where to head for after they landed at Badhwar Park.
Headley also worked with two key HuJI and LeT operatives—Ilyas Kashmiri and Zaki-ur-Rahman ‘Lakhvi’, both former Pakistani army commandos. Lakhvi became the chief of operations for the LeT and put the final plan together. He also used the extensive footage and tactical details Headley had provided to train the assault team. After the 26/11 attack, Headley met up with Kashmiri again in the summer of 2009 in Waziristan to plan further attacks.
Headley and his handlers were planning another terrorist strike in India, possibly in the latter part of 2009. While popular belief is that the Pune blasts had a Headley hand, Indian investigators have ruled this out. However, the new attack could have been deferred by the LeT in the aftermath of Headley’s arrest.
For Indian intelligence, Headley’s revelations are in many ways a game-changer. This is the first evidence of the spreading global reach of the LeT, which now includes terrorists from western backgrounds using US travel documents. Indian visa rules are very specific that any person of Pakistani origin has to be checked out thoroughly before a visa is granted to visit

Lakhvi put 26/11 together using the extensive videos/tactical details provided by Headley.

In Headley’s case, he managed to hide the fact that his father was a Pakistani in the documents submitted to the Indian consulate in Chicago. No surprise then that Headley was granted a multiple-entry business visa enabling him to travel to India several times between 2006-08. What now worries security officials is the possibility of more Americans or Britishers (with or without Pakistani links) visiting India who could be part of the LeT’s global terror network.
However, even with all this shared information, there has been a rift between Indian intelligence and their US counterparts. While India had granted FBI officials full access to Ajmal Amir Kasab, the lone terrorist caught alive in the 26/11 attack, no such access was given to an Indian security team that travelled to the US earlier this year.

This has raised doubts on whether Headley had also been working for the Americans in some covert capacity before he turned rogue. Indian officials feel that Headley’s name-change was facilitated by US intelligence to help him work with the LeT. “The Americans were probably running Headley as their asset to gather more information about the LeT and its leadership without realising that he had ‘turned’,” a senior Indian security official told Outlook.

Intelligence officials also point out that Headley had lied to the authorities that his father’s name was “William Headley”. The son of a Pakistani diplomat, Sayyid Salim Gilani, Headley had wiped clean his Pakistani links which, say Indian intelligence officials, could have only been done with the help of the Americans. The fact that Headley also managed to return to Pakistan after each visit to India to brief his handlers has also caused consternation in Indian security circles. This is another indication of the Americans probably helping Headley in a bid to infiltrate the LeT’s ranks.

Five Questions India Wants To Ask Headley

Are there more terror accomplices of western origin with American or British passports/travel documents working with the Lashkar-e-Toiba or any other homegrown terror outfit in India?
Is the LeT planning another attack against India based on the intelligence gathered by Headley during his trips in India? If so, what are the targets?
Who are the serving or retired Pakistani officers that Headley dealt with during his visits to Pakistan? What role do they play within the LeT and are they still active?
Did Headley work with terror cells in India during his stay here and if so, where are they located and what was the nature of their interface?
What are the names of the LeT members who planned the 26/11 assault on Mumbai, and also details of other actionable intelligence?
But the one question which has the Indian security establishment most worried is whether US intelligence knew beforehand about the 26/11 attack. “The Americans did share a few intercepts and intelligence that an attack was coming. But did they know what Headley knew?” an official with the ministry of home affairs asks. Could it be that they had not informed the Indian intelligence agencies in detail so as to save their own man?

The National Investigation Agency (NIA), set up after 26/11, conducted a meticulous investigation based on the inputs given by the Americans. They have unearthed details of Headley’s travels in India and also gathered evidence that corroborates the US investigation. However, with the American authorities refusing to share the tapes of Headley’s communications with his Pakistani handlers prior to his arrest—which had been intercepted by the US National Security Agency—the Indian security establishment has been left in a disadvantaged position. “We could have matched them with the voice samples intercepts we have from the 26/11 attack. That would have clinched the case for us,” a security official noted.

In fact, Colonel Shah (or handler “A”) is believed to be one of the four Pakistanis who was calling in tactical instructions to the terrorists during the Mumbai assault. Incidentally, Headley has confessed that the terrorists had been instructed to “fight to the death” and had “remained in telephonic contact with LeT Member A during the attacks”.

While India will continue to use all diplomatic and legal channels available to get access to Headley, security officials note with growing concern the growing evidence of Headley’s links with Al Qaeda through the LeT. This has confirmed a long-standing suspicion within the Indian intelligence community that the LeT and Al Qaeda share a strategic and seamless relationship, waiting to strike again when the time is right.

The focus of Laskhar-e-Tayyeba (LeT) terrorist David Coleman Headley's case has been his role in conducting the reconnaissance for the Mumbai attack on November 26, 2008.

But now, Indian investigators have been struck by the tasks he was assigned for the planned follow-up attack that could have taken place had he not been arrested in Chicago in October.

Primary among his targets was the National Defence College (NDC), located on 6 Tees January Marg in Lutyens New Delhi, opposite Gandhi Smriti - the house were Mahatma Gandhi was assassinated.

According to his interrogators and as mentioned in his plea agreement, Headley said he was pushed by the LeT handlers to target the so-called ideological spots - the Jewish Chabad Houses, hotels where foreigners and Indians mingled and the Chhatrapati Shivaji train terminal. But the Pakistan Army's Inter- Services Intelligence personnel were reportedly keen that he scout targets related to the military.

Headley told the Federal Bureau of Investigation ( FBI) that he had surveyed the NDC and its sister facility, Raksha Bhavan where the students flats are, several times during his visit to New Delhi in 2009. He had once walked 2.5 km from Raksha Bhavan, which is located on Man Singh Road near the Andhra Bhavan roundabout, to the NDC. Whether he also videographed this roundabout is not known. But he did tell the FBI that he had observed the timings of the buses as they ferried the student officers from Raksha Bhavan to the NDC and back.

The college, which is the highest- level training institution for senior officers of the armed forces, houses a hundred students, staff and support personnel at any given time. Many of them are foreigners from countries such as the US, Australia, the UK, Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.

Headley provided the details of the LeTISI link- up in what is being called the 'Karachi Project' of conducting terrorist strikes in India using local recruits, and Lashkar cadre where possible.

However, intelligence officials said Abdul Khwaja, aka Amjad, who was handed over to India from Bangladesh did not use the word "Karachi Project". But he claimed to have met several Indians, including the Bhatkal brothers and Abdul Aziz aka Gidda at a safe house in the high- security cantonment in Karachi.

NEW DELHI: Who paid Pakistani-American terrorist David Coleman Headley's international credit card bills is at the heart of a widening probe which has revealed that at least Rs 20-25 crore was spent by terror suspects in the recent past across the country through such credit cards. Bills for such cards were paid in US, Canada and Nepal, and establishing a link could unearth the identity of their masters.

Intelligence agencies, tracking economic footprints and wide network of jihadis and their sleeper cells in different cities, have found that of late, terror suspects have been using international credit cards issued in US, Canada, UK, Dubai, Nepal and Bangladesh and bills are picked up by their handlers based in these countries. Agencies are identifying all such payment gateways and their beneficiaries.

It's no more hawala channel or traders operating across the LoC that are sources of funding for the scores of terror outfits active within the country. Terrorists are now individually given international credit cards which they use to withdraw money for their operations in India and pay for their bills during their stay here.

Top sources said at least Rs 20-25 crore expenditure made by terror suspects in the recent past through such credit cards was traced by security and intelligence agencies. Investigation revealed that money was withdrawn in all parts of the country, including Delhi, Mumbai, Bangalore, Hyderabad and Kashmir — indicating the wide spread of terror networks and the ease with which they manage to hoodwink the surveillance system.

In what could lead to the exposing of a wider base of terror masterminds operating from as far away as US, Canada and some other destinations in Europe, the government is in touch with these countries to verify who picked up the credit card bills on behalf of these terror suspects.

The attempt of terror outfits to use destinations like the US and Europe to fund their operatives here through credit cards is also a new modus operandi, according to a senior intelligence official. This is to hoodwink the financial system that was keeping a close watch on all possible channels of funding for terror outfits coming from countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh and UAE, he added.

The government had imposed strict know-your-customer guidelines for banks and financial institutions in the country to choke terror funding using the legal system. This was in addition to a major crackdown on hawala channels after a series of terror attacks in the past were linked to such financing methods.

David Headley has pleaded guilty on 12 counts, including the 26/11 Mumbai attacks and the Danish plot. However, not much is known of his role in the wave of attacks in India between September 2006 and July 2008. This should be an area of focus for India if and when it gets to interrogate him

The Chicago conspiracy case has taken a curious turn with the plea agreement between the US Attorney’s Office and David Coleman Headley. The 35-page plea bargain document filed with the US Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, makes for interesting reading. While the earlier chargesheets had covered several details on the transcripts of conversations and e-mails exchanged between David Headley and his Pakistan-based controllers from both the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba and Brigade 313, the plea bargain reveals some new facts.

While it was known previously that Headley had attended training in Lashkar camps in Pakistan in 2002-2003, the plea bargain details specifically what training was received and when. In February 2002 Headley is said to have attended a three-week course on indoctrination on the merits of jihad. Following this he further attended another three-week course in August 2002 on handling weapons and grenades. In April 2003 we are told he attended a three-month course on close combat tactics and survival skills. In August 2003 we are told of another three-week course on surveillance.

It is interesting to note that Headley’s focus on India begins around the same time as the wave of terror starting late-2005 with the Delhi blasts. It is also interesting to note that planning for Headley to be based in India started as early as February 2006 with several trips to Pakistan and Chicago in the months leading up to the 7/11 Mumbai blasts. While it is not until September 2006 that Headley arrived in India, it is interesting to note that surveillance of potential targets in Mumbai and other cities had started in 2006 itself.

While 12 counts on which Headley has pleaded guilty cover the 26/11 Mumbai attacks and the planned attack in Denmark, not much is known of his role in the wave of attacks in India between September 2006 and July 2008. This should be an area of focus for India if and when it gets to interrogate him. The identities of the four Lashkar operatives that Headley interacted with also remain unknown at this time. It is important to note that while Lashkar members A, B and D and more specifically A &D find mention meeting with Headley on several occasions, not much is revealed on the specific role played by Lashkar member C and the circumstances of Headley’s interactions with Lashkar member C.

It is interesting to note that according to the plea bargain the Danish attacks were initially proposed by Lashkar member A. Headley’s overt collaboration with Ilyas Kashmiri’s Brigade 313 on the Danish attack did not start until November 2008. It is also claimed that Headley was initially unaware of the fact that Abdur Rehman’s controller or sponsor for the planned Danish attacks was Ilyas Kashmiri, even though he previously knew that Abdur Rehman was working for Ilyas Kashmiri.

An insight into the dynamics between the Lashkar and the Brigade 313 become apparent from a reported conversation from February 2009 when Ilyas Kashmiri is said to have advised Headley that Lashkar’s support was not required to conduct the Danish attack. It is also interesting to note that Lashkar too advises Headley of putting the Danish plans on hold on account of increased heat on Lashkar following 26/11.

Kashmiri’s suggestion that Lashkar’s services were not required at around the same time that Lashkar itself had decided to put its plans on hold, could perhaps be suggestive of something more than a mere coincidence. While this narrative leads to believe that Brigade 313 and Lashkar had distinct priorities, it must also be asked if the Brigade 313 was working in tandem with Lashkar to take the heat off Lashkar.

The plea bargain filings don’t throw much light on the circumstances that first brought Headley in contact with the Brigade 313’s Abdur Rehman. A significant omission considering that specific dates on Headley’s indoctrination into Lashkar spread over two years had been revealed. This ought to be an area for the Indian team to probe further to uncover the true nature of the Lashkar’s relationship with the so called Brigade 313 lead by Ilyas Kashmiri.

It must be recalled that there was practically no reportage on Ilyas Kashmiri for nearly three years after he was arrested and let off by Pakistan in 2004. It was not until 2007 that Ilyas Kashmiri’s Brigade 313 made news for its operations in Waziristan with retired Pakistan military officers and former Lashkar members in its fold. It must also be recalled that the blame for assassination of Pakistani Major-General Amir Faisal Alvi a week before of 26/11 was initially ascribed to the Lashkar before it was claimed that the accused Major Haroon was an ex-Lashkar working for 313 Brigade at Ilyas Kashmiri’s behest.

Interestingly all through 2009, Ilyas Kashmiri’s graph has been on the rise with his alleged escape from the jaws of death and the claims of his becoming the chief of Al Qaeda’s Shadow Army of Lashkar al-Zil. The apparent Takfiri faultline between the Lashkar and the Brigade 313 notwithstanding, there has been cross pollination between the two outfits in the form of ex-members of Lashkar and retired Pakistan Army officers. This cross-pollination should be reason for Indian investigators to be far more circumspect on the true nature of the Lashkar-operated syndicate within and outside the Pakistan military jihadi establishment than we have been lead to believe.

-- The writer, an expert on security affairs, tracks terrorism in South Asia.

The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) has refused to clear a week-long visit to a US-based institute by Law Minister Veerappa Moily, Chief Justice of India K.G. Balakrishnan and Attorney General G. E. Vahanvati. All three have accordingly called off the trip.
They were invited by the Dean Rusk Center for International Legal Studies at the University of Georgia. But the MEA hinted that it was beneath their dignity to go.
“The programme set out at the Dean Rusk Center does not seem to merit the participation of the honourable CJI, honourable minister and Attorney General,” Vivek Katju, secretary (west) in the ministry, said in a letter Bhupinder Prasad, secretary, justice.
Though the letter said that if “the high-ranking personalities” felt it would be undesirable to turn down an invitation already accepted, they could go ahead. It added: “The MEA would like to reiterate that political clearance is not a mere formality and this should be kept in mind before accepting any engagements.”
Though the law ministry refused to comment officially on the matter, a senior official said: “It would have been better if a clear reason had been given for rejecting the visit.”