This appeal arises under two rarely invoked statutes. The Alien Tort
Statute (ATS), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, grants federal district courts jurisdiction to hear
civil suits by aliens alleging torts committed in violation of the law of nations.
Section 2255(a) of Title 18 creates a civil cause of action for victims of certain
sexual offenses under federal law. Plaintiff Carmen T. Cisneros, a native and
citizen of Mexico, relied on both statutes in suing Defendant Michael J. Aragon
for alleged sexual offenses committed in this country while she was under 16.
The district court granted Mr. Aragon summary judgment on the ground that it
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over either claim. It held that (1) it did not
have subject-matter jurisdiction over the ATS claims because "the particular sex
offenses asserted by . . . [Ms. Cisneros] . . . do not qualify as torts in violation of
the law of nations," Aplt. App. at 133; and (2) it did not have subject-matter
jurisdiction over the § 2255(a) claims because Ms. Cisneros had "failed to
offer
sufficient evidence to [prove that] the alleged sex acts . . . occur[red] within the
special maritime or territorial jurisdiction of the United States," id. at 134
(internal quotation marks omitted). We affirm the dismissal of the § 1350 claims
for lack of jurisdiction. We also affirm the dismissal of the § 2255(a) claims but
for failure to establish an element of the cause of action rather than for lack of
jurisdiction.

I. BACKGROUND

Ms. Cisneros alleges that she was born in Mexico on October 22, 1971,
was brought to Wyoming by her parents in 1979, and married Mr. Aragon in
Wyoming on April 29, 1987, while she was 15. Their marriage was dissolved 13
years later. According to her amended complaint, Mr. Aragon's sexual
offenses--statutory rape and sexual assault by having sexual relations with one
incapable of appraising the nature of the conduct or physically incapable of
refusing to participate in the conduct--occurred in Wyoming during the year
before she turned 16. Two of the offenses allegedly occurred in the Medicine
Bow National Forest on federal land.

II. ANALYSIS

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the district
court's summary judgment de novo, "apply[ing] the same legal standard to be
used by the district court" under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Carpenter v. Boeing Co.,
456 F.3d 1183, 1192 (10th Cir. 2006). Under Rule 56(c) summary judgment
shall be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

A. Claims Under the Alien Tort Statute

The ATS provides that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1350. Ms. Cisneros is not
alleging that Mr. Aragon's conduct violated a treaty of the United States. Our
inquiry thus focuses exclusively on whether Ms. Cisneros has sufficiently alleged
a violation of the law of nations, as that term is used in § 1350. For guidance
we
turn to the Supreme Court's recent decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542
U.S. 692 (2004).

The plaintiff in Sosa was a Mexican national who had been unlawfully
abducted in Mexico, held overnight, and then transported to the United States
where he was arrested by federal officers on charges of the murder and torture of
an agent of the federal Drug Enforcement Administration. See id.
at 697­98.
Defendant Sosa was a Mexican national who had participated in the abduction.
After being acquitted on the charges against him, the plaintiff brought an action
against Sosa in a United States district court under the ATS. See id. at
698­99.
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the law of nations included "a
general prohibition of 'arbitrary' detention defined as officially sanctioned action
exceeding positive authorization to detain under the domestic law of some
government, regardless of the circumstances." Id. at 736. The Court concluded
that it did not, holding that the plaintiff had no claim under the ATS. See id. at
738. Although the Court did not articulate "the ultimate criteria for accepting a
cause of action subject to jurisdiction under § 1350," id. at 732,
it did delineate
the principal considerations.

The Court first concluded that the ATS, which was originally enacted as
part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, is "only jurisdictional," id. at 712, and does not
create a statutory cause of action, see id. at 713. But it rejected the notion that
"the ATS was stillborn because there could be no claim for relief without a
further statute expressly authorizing adoption of causes of action." Id. at 714.
Instead, according to the Court, the statute expressed Congress's intent "that
federal courts could entertain claims once the jurisdictional grant was on the
books, because torts in violation of the law of nations would have been
recognized within the common law of the time." Id. One component of this law
was "a body of judge-made law regulating the conduct of individuals situated
outside domestic boundaries and consequently carrying an international savor."
Id. at 715. Within this law was

a sphere in which these rules binding individuals for the benefit of
other individuals overlapped with the norms of state relationships.
Blackstone referred to it when he mentioned three specific offenses
against the law of nations addressed by the criminal law of England:
violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of
ambassadors, and piracy. An assault against an ambassador, for
example, impinged upon the sovereignty of the foreign nation and if
not adequately redressed could rise to an issue of war. It was this
narrow set of violations of the law of nations, admitting of a judicial
remedy and at the same time threatening serious consequences in
international affairs, that was probably on minds of the men who
drafted the ATS with its reference to tort.

Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The Court concluded:

[A]lthough the ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no new
causes of action, the reasonable inference from the historical
materials is that the statute was intended to have practical effect the
moment it became law. The jurisdictional grant is best read as
having been enacted on the understanding that the common law
would provide a cause of action for the modest number of
international law violations with a potential for personal liability at
the time.

Id. at 724.

The Court next addressed whether § 1350 empowered the federal courts to
recognize under the law of nations new claims, in addition to the well-established
traditional causes of action for "violation of safe conducts, infringement of the
rights of ambassadors, and piracy." Id. Although the Court accepted the
possibility of new causes of action, it cautioned that "there are good reasons for a
restrained conception of the discretion a federal court should exercise in
considering a new cause of action of this kind." Id. at 725. It continued: "[W]e
think courts should require any claim based on the present-day law of nations to
rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and
defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century
paradigms we have recognized." Id. Applying this standard, the Court held that
"a single illegal detention of less than a day, followed by the transfer of custody
to lawful authorities and a prompt arraignment, violates no norm of customary
international law so well defined as to support the creation of a federal remedy
[under § 1350]." Id. at 738.

Ms. Cisneros asserts two types of sexual abuse. First, she alleges that
Mr. Aragon violated the federal statutory-rape statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a),
because he had sexual relations with her when she was only 15 years old and he
was 19. Second, she alleges that he violated 18 U.S.C. § 2242(2)(A) and (B)
because he had sexual relations with her at a time when she was (1) incapable of
appraising the nature of the conduct and (2) physically incapable of refusing to
participate in the conduct. According to Ms. Cisneros, these statutory provisions
are "a 'law of nation' [sic] providing this Court with enough to find jurisdiction
under the ATS." Aplt. Br. at 9. In the alternative, she contends that "there is
plenty of common everyday evidence subject to judicial notice to show the 'law
of nations' requirement is met." Id. at 8.

We reject both contentions. To begin with, criminalization of conduct by
the United States does not mean that the conduct violates the law of nations.
Such criminalization may be relevant evidence, but the controlling consideration
is whether the claimed wrongdoing "rest[s] on a norm of international character
accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the
features of the 18th-century paradigms [that the Supreme Court has] recognized."
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725. A United States statute may or may not express "a norm
of international character." Consequently, jurisdiction under § 1350 cannot be
based solely on a violation of our criminal code.

For her second contention Ms. Cisneros relies on an Interpol website titled
"Legislation of Interpol member states on sexual offences against children," see
http://www.interpol.int/Public/Children/SexualAbuse/NationalLaws, and on
Articles 16 and 34 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child,
see http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/crc/treaties/crc.htm. But neither source
states norms of international law that satisfy the "requirement of clear definition"
set forth in Sosa. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.21. The Interpol website
simply
summarizes pertinent statutes provided by member states. It does not purport to
express any consensus among nations. And Ms. Cisneros makes no effort to
extract or identify from the site any data that would support her view. We have
not attempted to do that work for her but there is reason to doubt her conclusion.
For example, as Mr. Aragon points out, it is hardly clear that his alleged acts
would even be criminal in her native Mexico.(1)

Articles 16 and 34 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child likewise provide Ms. Cisneros with no support. Article 16 states:

1. No child shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference
with his or her privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to
unlawful attacks on his or her honour and reputation.

2. The child has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks.

And Article 34 provides:

States Parties undertake to protect the child from all forms of sexual
exploitation and sexual abuse. For these purposes, States Parties
shall in particular take all appropriate national, bilateral and
multilateral measures to prevent:

(a) The inducement or coercion of a child to engage in any unlawful
sexual activity;

(b) The exploitive use of children in prostitution or other unlawful
sexual practices;

(c) The exploitive use of children in pornographic performances and
materials.

This language hardly describes sexual misconduct "with a specificity comparable
to the features of the 18th-century paradigms [that the Supreme Court has]
recognized." Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725. The two articles are simply aspirational
goals stated in imprecise language.(2)

Moreover, the law of nations, particularly the subset of that law
enforceable under the ATS, does not include a norm simply because the norm is
enshrined in the domestic law of all civilized societies. Auto theft is not a
violation of international law. As the Supreme Court said in Sosa, the drafters of
the ATS probably had in mind only rules of international law regulating the
conduct of individuals that "overlapped with the norms of state relationships,"
542 U.S. at 715, that is, a "narrow set of violations of the law of nations []
admitting of a judicial remedy and at the same time threatening serious
consequences in international affairs, " id. The Court's requirement that the
law-of-nations norm be defined with precision is not a substitute for the requirement
that the violation be of a type that can substantially impact international affairs,
but is an additional requirement. A pre-Sosa circuit-court opinion reflected this
limitation when it recognized ATS causes of action for war crimes and genocide
but not "torture and summary execution--when not perpetrated in the course of
genocide or war crimes." Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 243 (2d Cir. 1995).
There can be no doubt that the alleged misconduct of Mr. Aragon was not of the
sort that comes close to "threatening serious consequences in international
affairs." Sosa at 715. We therefore affirm the district court's rejection of
Ms. Cisneros's ATS claims.

B. Claims Under 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a)

Section 2255(a) states:

Any minor who is a victim of a violation of section 2241(c), 2242,
2243, 2251, 2251A, 2252, 2252A, 2260, 2421, 2422, or 2423 of this
title and who suffers personal injury as a result of such violation,
may sue in any appropriate United States District Court and shall
recover the actual damages such minor sustains and the cost of the
suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. Any minor as described
in the preceding sentence shall be deemed to have sustained damages
of no less than $50,000 in value.(3)

We will assume that a criminal conviction is not necessary for a defendant to face
civil liability under the statute. See Smith v. Husband, 376 F. Supp. 2d 603, 613
(E.D. Va. 2005).

The predicate offenses alleged by Ms. Cisneros are violations of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2242(2)(4) and
2243(a).(5) The dispositive feature of both
statutes is that they
require prohibited acts to be committed within the "special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction of the United States." That jurisdiction is defined by
18 U.S.C. § 7(3) to include "[a]ny lands reserved or acquired for the use of
the
United States, and under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction thereof . . . ."

Ms. Cisneros has claimed that two of Mr. Aragon's acts came within the
statutes because they occurred on federally owned land within the Medicine Bow
National Forest. We agree with the district court, however, that she failed to
offer sufficient evidence to support this claim. Most importantly, as pointed out
by the district court, although Ms. Cisneros "include[d] latitude and longitude
information in her [summary judgment response]," Aplt. App. at 127, she failed
to provide any "documentary evidence showing that these locations were in fact
on federally owned land and not on privately owned land within the Medicine
Bow National Forest," id. at 138. On appeal her sole contention is that her
evidence was adequate to show that the alleged acts occurred on federal land. In
her summary-judgment response, she asserted that "[m]aps made/created by
Plaintiff when retracing her 'steps'" were attached to her response, id. at 89; but
there are no maps attached to the copy of the response in the record on appeal.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court's ruling that Ms. Cisneros failed to
establish an essential element of her § 2255 claims. Although failure to prove
this element is not a jurisdictional flaw because the complaint alleges the
elements of the federal claims, see Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 681-82 (1946),
this failure nevertheless justified dismissal of the claims.

C. State-Law Claims and Supplemental Jurisdiction

Ms. Cisneros's amended complaint also pleaded claims under state law for
intentional infliction of emotional distress and assault and battery. She alleged
that the district court could exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these claims
under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. But because the district court correctly dismissed the
federal claims, it could properly dismiss the state-law claims as well. See id.
§ 1367(c)(3).

D. Motion for New Trial and for Reconsideration

Ms. Cisneros's notice of appeal stated that she is also appealing the
district-court order denying her joint motion for a new trial and for
reconsideration. In her opening brief, however, she failed to offer any
substantive arguments explaining why the district court erred in denying the
motion. Consequently, we consider the issue waived. See Wilburn v. Mid-South
Health Dev., Inc., 343 F.3d 1274, 1281 (10th Cir. 2003)
("We . . . will not
consider issues that are raised on appeal but not adequately addressed."); Adler v.

We AFFIRM the district court's order dismissing Ms. Cisneros's ATS
claims for lack of jurisdiction. We also AFFIRM the district court's grant of
summary judgment on the § 2255 claims for failure to produce evidence of an
essential element of the claims. Finally, we AFFIRM the dismissal of
Ms. Cisneros's state-law claims and the denial of her joint motion for new trial
and for reconsideration.

FOOTNOTESClick footnote number to return to corresponding location in the text.

*. After examining the briefs and appellate
record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

1.See Aplee. Supp. App.
at 88­89 (setting forth English-language translation
of Article 262 of the Mexican Penal Code, which provides that "[w]hoever has
copulation with a person older than twelve years and younger than eighteen,
obtaining his consent through means of deceit, shall be subject to a sentence of
three months to four years in prison"). Ms. Cisneros has not alleged the deceit
required by Mexican law.

2. We note that this is typical of many
of the articles in the United Nations
Convention. For example, section one of Article 12 provides that "States Parties
shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right
to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the
child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the
child."

3. We quote the version of the statute in
effect from 1998 through 2005. An
amendment enacted in 2006 would not affect our analysis. We note, however,
that the version in effect from enactment in October 1986 until the 1998
amendment referred only to violations of §§ 2251 and 2252, so
Ms. Cisneros
could have a claim based on a violation of § 2255 only if the 1998 amendment
applied retroactively to conduct preceding the amendment. We also note that on
appeal Mr. Aragon has not raised a statute-of-limitations argument under
§ 2255(b).

Whoever, in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United
States or in a Federal prison, or in any prison, institution, or facility in which
persons are held in custody by direction of or pursuant to a contract or agreement
with the Attorney General, knowingly--

. . .

(2) engages in a sexual act with another person if that other person is--

(a) Of a minor.--Whoever, in the special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction of the United States or in a Federal prison, or
in any prison, institution, or facility in which persons are held in
custody by direction of or pursuant to a contract or agreement with
the Attorney General, knowingly engages in a sexual act with
another person who--

(1) has attained the age of 12 years but has not attained
the age of 16 years; and

(2) is a least four years younger than the person so
engaging;

or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more
than 15 years, or both.