Senior officials of the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom and the
Russian Federation met in Moscow on 10 and 11 September to address concerns with regard to
compliance with the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. The U.S. Delegation was
led by Under Secretary of State Frank G. Wisner, the United Kingdom Delegation by Assistant
Under Secretary of State Paul Lever, and the Russian Delegation was headed by the Deputy
Foreign Minister Grigory Berdennikov. Senior Defense, Foreign Affairs, and other relevant officials also participated. The leaders of the United
States and the U.K. Delegations were received by the Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev.

The three Governments confirmed their commitment to full compliance with the Biological
Weapons Convention and stated their agreement that biological weapons have no place in
their Armed Forces.

During these meetings, the Russian Government stated that it had taken the following
steps to resolve compliance concerns:

A. Noted that President Yeltsin had issued on 11 April, 1992, a decree on securing the
fulfillment of international obligations in the area of biological weapons. This affirms
the legal succession of the Russian Federation to the obligations of the Convention and
states that the development and carrying out of biological programs in violation of the
Convention is illegal. Pursuant to that decree, the Presidential Committee on Convention-related problems of chemical weapons and biological weapons was entrusted with the oversight of the implementation of the 1972 Convention in the Russian Federation.

B. Confirmed the termination of offensive research, the dismantlement of experimental
technological lines for the production of biological agents, and the closure of the
biological weapons testing facility.

C. Cut the number of personnel involved in military biological programs by fifty percent.

D. Reduced military biological research funding by thirty percent.

E. Dissolved the department in the Ministry of Defense responsible for the offensive
biological program and created a new department for radiological, biological and chemical
defense.

F. Submitted the Declaration to the United Nations under the terms of the confidence-building
measures agreed at the Third Review Conference of the Convention in 1991.

G. President Yeltsin has ordered the conduct of an investigation into activities at the
Institute of Ultrapure Biological Preparations at St. Petersburg, in response to concerns
raised by the U.S. and the United Kingdom. United States, U.K. and other experts are invited to take
part in the investigation, including a prompt visit to this facility, and the report will
be made public.

H. The Russian Parliament has recommended to the President of the Russian Federation that
he propose legislation to enforce Russia's obligations under the 1972 Convention.

As a result of these exchanges Russia has agreed to the following steps:

A. Visits to any non-military biological site at any time in order to remove ambiguities,
subject to the need to respect proprietary information on the basis of agreed principles.
Such visits would include unrestricted access, sampling, interviews with personnel, and
audio and video taping. After initial visits to Russian facilities there will be
comparable visits to such U.S. and U.K. facilities on the same basis.

B. The provision, on request, of information about dismantlement accomplished to date.

C. The provision of further clarification of information provided for in Form F of its
U.N. declaration.

D. Prominent independent scientists will be invited to participate in the investigation
of cases concerning compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention.

In addition, the three governments agreed to create working groups, including experts,
to address the following:

A. Visits to any military biological facility, on a reciprocal basis, in order to
remove ambiguities, subject to the need to respect confidential information on the
basis of agreed principles. Such visits would include unrestricted access, sampling,
interviews with personnel, and audio and video taping.

B. A review of potential measures to monitor compliance with the Biological Weapons
Convention and to enhance confidence in that compliance.

C. A review of potential modalities for testing such measures.

D. An examination of the physical infrastructure of biological facilities in the three
countries to determine jointly whether there is specific equipment or excess capacity
inconsistent with their stated purpose.