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Opinion: F-35B Vertical Landings In Doubt For U.K.

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The British public may be disappointed if, after enduring traffic mayhem and paying for their Fairford and Farnborough show tickets, they expect to see the F-35B Joint Strike Fighter emulate the vertical landings (VL) that the AV-8 Harrier family has made routine since the Beatles were playing dodgy nightclubs in Hamburg.

U.S. Marine Corps aviation boss Brig. Gen. Matthew Glavy has said there are no plans for the F-35B to perform VLs in the U.K., because the program staff has not finished testing the matting that is needed to protect the runway from exhaust heat. (The program office, Marines and Lockheed Martin did not return emails about any part of this story.) It may sound like a simple issue, but it pops the lids off two cans of worms: the program’s relationship with the truth, and the operational utility of VL.

In December 2009, the Naval Facilities Engineering Command (Navfac) issued specifications for contractors bidding on JSF construction work. The main engine exhaust, the engineers said, was hot and energetic enough to have a 50% chance of spalling concrete on the first VL. “Spalling” occurs when water in the concrete boils faster than it can escape, and steam blows flakes away from the surface.

Lockheed Martin was dismissive. The specifications were out of date and based on worst-case assessments, the company said, and tests in January 2010 showed that “the difference between F‑35B exhaust temperature and that of the AV-8B is very small, and is not anticipated to require any significant Conops [concept of operations] changes.”

Navfac ignored Lockheed Martin and commissioned high-temperature-concrete VL pads at four sites. At the Navy’s Patuxent River, Md., flight-test center, F-35Bs perform VLs on a pad of AM-2 aluminum matting, protecting the concrete from heat and blast. Why didn’t the January 2010 tests result in a change to the specifications? How were those tests performed? The Navy has referred those questions to Lockheed Martin, which has repeatedly failed to answer them.

This isn’t the only instance where Lockheed Martin has tried to shoot the messenger on the basis of weak facts. When a Rand Corp. report last year concluded that the JSF will cost more than three single-service programs, Lockheed Martin accused Rand of using “outdated data” but founded that criticism on numbers that were not in the report.

After the fiscal 2011 Selected Acquisition Report showed the F-35A cost per flight hour to be 40% higher than the F-16’s, program leaders asserted that the Pentagon’s accountants had misinterpreted their own numbers. Two reports later, the numbers have barely budged.

The bigger issue is that the Pentagon bought the F-35B for two reasons: it can land on an LHA/LHD-class amphibious warfare ship, and it can operate from an improvised forward operating location (FOL), created around a 3,000-ft. runway. The capabilities are complementary. Without an FOL, the amphibious force is limited to six fighters per LHA (unless essential helicopters are off-loaded). But a short runway is of little value unless you can use it twice.

And what Navfac calls “standard airfield concrete” is military-grade, made with aggregate and Portland cement. Many runways are built with asphaltic concrete—aggregate in a bitumen binder—which softens and melts under heat.

The Marines could use AM-2 landing pads. But AM-2 is not a friend to the agility that justifies the F-35B over other forms of expeditionary airpower. An Air Force study calls it “slow to install, difficult to repair, [with] very poor air-transport-ability characteristics.” A single 100 X 100-ft. VL pad weighs around 30 tons and comprises 400 pieces, each individually installed by two people.

Rolling or creeping vertical landings can spread the heat load over a greater area. But there is no sign that they have been tested on concrete, asphalt or AM-2 over asphalt. What about multiple, close-together landings? Will hot asphalt debris stay off the fighter’s low-observable skin?

Nobody seems willing to say when such tests will be conducted—which is odd, because we conduct flight tests to prove an aircraft can meet requirements. How was the requirement for the F-35B to VL on a non-standard runway framed? Indeed, was that requirement formally defined at all?

At least $21 billion of the JSF’s research and development bill—including the F135 engine and the crash weight-reduction program of 2004 as well as the powered-lift system—is directly attributable to the F-35B, which also has the highest unit cost of any military aircraft in production. The design compromises in the F-35B have added weight, drag and cost to the F-35A and F-35C. It would be nice to know that—air shows aside—it will deliver some of its promised operational utility.

Apparently the F-35B didn't VL during its airshow performance a few weeks ago in NC, nor did it bow for the audience like the Harrier does in its familiar airshow routine - although various doors, inlets and outlets performed their own routines...

Eh, personally I'm waiting for the first F-35 red flag against - I presume - F-16 and F-15 aggressors simulating AESA radars (I'll be waiting until the early 2020's I know).

I'm really wondering how hard the USAF and other branches are going to have to work to suppress the pilots' horror.

The other scenario is that this will be like the tactics revolution after the Vietnam war. Ultimately, the pilot generation which suffered for their superiors' obstinacy and wilful disregard for reality will reach general officer rank and force change.

Up to a point,we have to accept that LM, and the powers that be in Washington, value this program/their careers/profit margin over operational effectiveness and the lives of allied combatants. This is the choice which they have made.

The real elephant in the room is the nebulous term "stealth". A F-35 will be more stealthy than a Rafale flying over North Korea. But both of them will be detected by current Russian or Chinese detection mechanisms, while the "4th Gen fighter" will be able to carry more assets.
Countries around the world that have ordered the F-35, are paying for an over-hyped, over-expensive, over-complicated and over-promised plane. A foolish waste of taxpayers money.

I have two theories about the 35b;
In the first, the leaders of the AF and Lockheed are brilliant illusionists who have composed this dreadful narrative of mindless beurocrats and braindead military halfwits to decieve our enemies; the 35 actually has a Super-Secret laser that can knock down a hundred enemy aircraft in minutes - pew-pew-pew-pew, just like Star Wars.

In the other theory, the generals, our leaders, the people holding the shield we firmly believe will protect us against all comers, are the sons of the general in 'Dr Strangelove';
"Can it get through! ! You ought to see that big mother roarin' down the runway, eight big jets howling" - spreads his arms like a fourth grade kid and goes whizzing around the war room making jet engine sounds.
I try to keep the first theory foremost in my mind.
A man has to sleep.

In a F35B lifetime 99% of all operational landings will probably be sort of conventional, as happened with the Harrier. Any STOVL jet aircraft is very inefficient due to the large amount of power needed and weight restrictions. Summary: it is a waste of money and the UK and all other adopters should have gone to the C variant.

The problem we Brits have is the lack of engineering expertise to come up with an alternative or variation of EMALS. Because of the cost of EMALS to the UK, the government ran a mile and defaulted to the compromise B variant position. The UK has now ended up with a 'large', nearly 70,000t, carrier with a damn ski jump that immediately stops any sort of cross deck operations with the US or French. We recall the days of angle decks, steel deck, steam catapults and mirror landing systems all from the UK but non steam catapults defeated us and will haunt the Fleet Air Arm for a long time to come.

Most of us believe that the "Bee" will perform conventionally (CTOL) the majority of the time, thus the "A" landing gear. The shipboard tests todate have proven the STOVL concept and will continue to prove it after IOC with the Gator Navy. Forward Operating Base tests are to be proven with the matting, etc. during the test. Now....for the sake of argument, would you let your $100?? mm a/c setdown on an unproven landing surface for the benefit of an "Air Show"?, I think not. Can it do that, probably (hundreds of VLs, todate). Shoud it do that, only in time of war. I think pushing the "Landing Button" is adequate practice for any field scenario that would raise caution to the owner in regards to FOD. Lastly, anyone that lands a "Bee" on a unproven site, not in the time of war should reap any possible reward that FOD "might" provde.

Shipboards testing was successful after extensively modifying and hardening the test vessel at a still unknown additional cost due to the intense heat and supersonic engine exhaust.

Additionally the size of the F-35 engine has put the USN in the difficult position to either break replacement F135 engines into separate modules for transport individually or hauling the 9,400-pound engine module in a sling under a V-22 Osprey in "good weather" to carriers and amphibious ships deploying the F-35.

1. CAS does not require nor really benefit from RFLO, particularly in daytime, the principle threats are all IR/EO and this will only become worse as thermal imagers continue to proliferate and early dazzle lasers spread to hybrid threats while conventional forces gain lethal equivalents (See: Northrop Grumman, Gamma Firestrike: 108KW, weaponization threshold, in 2010). Even against hypervelocity shoulder fire weapons like the SA-18 and 24, the F-35B is short the TADIRCM to be survivable in direct attack.

2. AV-8Bs which operate from forward strips come back badly dinged up. This effect on the surface coatings of an F-35 would be likely ruin it for serious power projection operations into a contested environment short of a trip back to a major depot for reconditioning.

3. In ODS, 86 Harriers supplied 3,380 sorties, with for an average of 78 sorties per jet and up to a surge limit of 50 sorties per day from fields like Tanajib which was _less than_ 30nm from the Kuwaiti border. Comparitively, 165 A-10s flew 8,624 sorties, often to 4 times the operational depth _in a slower airframe_.

4. Modern jets with very expensive but also very precise, multi-mode (IIR/MMW/SALH) seekers as well as INS/GPS, thru-weather, guidance do not have to mass in numbers because they are carrying, on average, 4X as many munitions as ODS jets were, particularly when coming from longer ranges.

5. Internal, high density, carriage means fewer jets in the target area, longer, which means each aircraft can suck more gas from the tanker and there is not an Tanker->E-3->IP->SCAR bottleneck on finding targets before fuel becomes and issue. This, by itself, removes 80-90% of the 'value' of a STOVL airframe ashore in that jets which stay on deck as -helos- transfer forwards (to directly support Marine maneuver and particularly artillery) have the carrier entirely to themselves where they are not interfering with helo-spots for the purposes of staging STOL launches and SRVL recoveries while having the nominal added advantage of a 'clean deck' (coated with thermal protection) and ready access to a large spares and expert maintenance pool. Roughly 35% of the Harrier II force remained at sea or returned to deck at night for this very reason in 1991. Those which remained ashore often dealt with the threat of SCUD launches by basically finding a ditch and a gas mask as they could do little else to protect their open-air dispersals (even though Tanajib was a semi-prepared site).

6. A depending upon variant, (towed or onboard) a tanker truck carries somewhere between 5,000 and 11,600 gallons of fuel which is roughly (6.8lbs/gallon of JP-8) 34,000 to 78,880lbs of fuel. An F-35 which takes off with even a half load of 7,000lbs of fuel and tanks up with a KC-46 in-air, is going to suck down an entire tanker truck in around 11 missions and since modern doctrine is centered on the section/element, that is actually only 5 section launches.

7. Contrary to popular opinion, the F-35 in all flavors is unlikely to be a useful ISR gatherer because it's .889lb/lb/hr F135 engine (roughly equivalent to the J79 of 60 years ago!) and 31,000 dollar per flight hour operating costs all translate to limited sortie generation per daily ATO and non-persistent presence in the combat theater. Comparitively, an MQ-1 predator carries 1,000lbs of fuel for up to 40hrs and runs about 970 dollars per flight hour. If you want a fast ambulance, call in tacair when the first mortar round strikes or the IED blows. If you want preemptive engagement as suppression, have a platform that can run up and down the chosen road network for a resupply or force deployment anything up to 24hrs before the actual movement. The tireburners will be out then.

8. In OEF, Team Harrier was explicitly told their presence was not needed. As a result, they came to Bagram almost a fortnight after the A-10s were already there and only moved to a true FOL for _two days_, where the flew a couple missions, none with weapons (hot'n'hi) and then came back. Finally, Camp Bastion tells us that if you create a high value target that is successful at interrupting enemy combat activities, someone will find a way to nail it _if they can reach it_. Just like they did 'The Slug' (B-57s, which the Viets hated for their work on the HCMT) at Bien Hoa.

CONCLUSION:
Rolling VLs are nothing new, AV-8Bs have been doing them since the 80s. Operating from ships is nothing special, it's just easier to keep your maintenance tail in one place and bring the jets to them rather than trying to keep logistics in the field. Fuel and Weapons will be a major issue, especially compared to helos which burn around 1/10th as much, per mission and fire munitions that a single man can carry. Sustaining high intensity warfare capable VLO coatings in rough field conditions may be a major problem, though operating 6 aircraft detachments on LHAs makes this a non-event based on sorties per day anyway.

My biggest questions come from the likely proliferation of SSL technology (based on civilian telecomms) and alternative platforms which provide superior enduring presence both over embattled forces and in sanitizing routes of march. The MQ-1, not the Harrier, not the AC-130, not even the A-10, was the _Number One_ requested CAS asset in SWA. Because it as cheap enough to generate and persistent enough to stay overhead for troops forced to spend a night in the field.

C'on guys why are you so bitter about the F-35 getting all fouled up when trying to VL or VTO from dusty areas. See, the Army's Corps of Engineers will fly into those areas on Vertol helos, spray the weeds for mosquitos, vaccum them with Sears cleaners, then spread out rubber mats (with the Welcome sign of course) or if necessary metal planking, then bring the helos over again for a final rotor blowing of any remaining dust and other particles and after all tell the F-35s pilots to land elsewhere for their $ 110 million toys might get ruined.

There are two 'traditional' reasons for the Marine obsession with STOVL forward operations.

1. Abandonment.
In WWII, at Guadalcanal. The big, bold, brave, bada$$ Marines were left at their amphib anchorage because the carrier was more valuable than they were. It was the correct decision because it was the sole carrier we had in the Pacific at the time. That decision, repeated today with a 1.5 billion dollar LHD/LHA, would be exactly the same, whether the Marines had their PSP pad up and working or not. You cannot trade hulls jammed up against predictable landward targeting localization, for over the beach support.

2. Responsiveness.
Supposedly, a jet which is 15 minutes away at a forward operating location (which means it's also within range for a 150 dollar mortar shell) is more capable than a jet which if RIGHT OVERHEAD on an in-air stack of holding CAS. This would be funny if it were not so stupid because the truth is that a Navy Big Deck, fully war-kitted with 80 jets _like the Nimitz class was designed for_ (i.e. two Marine and two Navy Hornet squadrons) can sustain a CAS orbit overhead whereas the 6 F-35s which a Marine Gator Freighter can put out: 'whenever helos are not on the spots' cannot even generate and escort force for STOM ops and a FORCAP defense for the ARG, simultaneously. Derp.

If the traditional Marine SPOD capture mission set _requires_ a CSG to provide effective air support for troops in contact and a CSG is itself increasingly non-survivable in the face of Klub and DF-21 and similar ICD defensive systems, then it's time to look at the overall _cost_ of airpower and do some serious biddable trading.

If I can buy a Jumper Missile battery (Israeli make-it-work followon to Netfires) for 1 million dollars per missile from a 16 missile pack and the F-35B costs 135 missile dollars then I can buy 8.4 batteries or roughly 134 shots for 'guided artillery purposes' at 1/5th the weight of an M109 but with twice the potential range (65km).

IS THAT ENOUGH to make the F-35 a loseable asset?

If not, how about a mix of Jumpers and the XM395 PGMM, 120mm mortar munitions at 50,000 dollars a round? If I only buy 70 jumpers, I can buy 1,300 INS/GPS and SALH precision mortar shots with the remainder. Range is only 10-12km but boy can I slapshot a lot of nets with those rounds. And that is just for ONE F-35B.

From the other side, if the F-35B is also an interdictor (and it isn't because of it's incredibly short radius), how many 3 million dollar Hoplite minicruise weapons can I buy to hit targets 400km downrange at Mach 3? Why I can buy 45 missiles. And because those missiles reach the target approximately 3.52 times as fast (and don't have to come home to reload) their ops tempo is a correspondingly SEVEN TIMES greater in terms of hitting targets quickly and efficiently rather than 'as fast as 25 jets on a harrier carrier will allow'. Hoplite could be carried by any ship, down to the size of an LCS (or a sub) and thus could be positioned to provide support to specops STOM raiding when Carriers could not be risked.

We are not looking at the spectrum of responses available. We are stuck in WWII mode of massed attack. And trying to justify the F-35B based on it's _takeoff and landing modes_ (.5 percent of it's total mission evolution, utterly non-combatant) is thus incredibly stupid because a weapons system is only as good as the EFFECTS it delivers to the pointy end of the fight.

And a missile does better vertical takeoff than the F-35B does a vertical landing.

CONCLUSION:
Solid State Lasers will come to rule the roost of modern airwar by 2025. They are already at weaponization threshold of 100KW today. When that happens, losing strikes to air defenses will basically come down to routing and random chance. No countermeasures, no 'deflector shields', if someone sees you fly overhead, you're dead.

Missile biased effects delivery at that point will be essential because we will be losing 20-50 percent of our 'raid packages', no matter what.

The two things we need to provide for to make a missile centric strike warfare capacity work will be survivable targeting and capable comms networking. Targetting will basically come down to an emphasis upon electro optical low observables to match current, RF, biased stealth. And Comms will have to be point to point laser and MMW linked through relays, air and ground, so that Marines can get the call for fires out, a FAC can task a drone like the VARIOUS to perform a sanity check. And the shot be allocated to splash within, say, a 2 minute window.

Trying to get an 'all doing' system which makes that happen within a fighter sized package is going to cost a bazillion dollars. Separating out the missions (fires vs. targeting vs. commo) will allow you to package the avionics and effects into different platforms whose sum cost will be much lower, even in aggregate, than the totality of the one-airframe superweapon that the F-35B is falsely represented as being.

Until we see and act upon that, U.S. Military Power, biased as it is towards Airpower Support Dependence, is headed for a KT Boundary moment in the -very near- future. Whereby we will not have air superiority because the enemy will not be trying to outcompete us with fighters. At. All.

They will take out our heavy basing modes with missiles, they will shoot down our fighters with lasers and hunting weapons and then we will be down to thrown rocks and harsh language because we have become utterly dependent on that one fires delivery modality.

This is silly. Note to author...You don't NEED to land a VTOL on a soft, asphalt runway. That's the whole idea! If you can afford F-35Bs then you certainly can afford to lay down a few small, hardened, landing/launching pads for them per base.

And if you do want to land or launch F-35bs on an existing runway, then DO it! You don't need to land vertically if you already have a runway to land normally upon. The vertical component is just for use when needed/where needed.