In a matter of first impression, the Georgia Supreme Court recently held that personal injury claims arising from lead poisoning due to lead-based paint ingestion were excluded from coverage under an absolute pollution exclusion in a commercial general liability insurance policy covering residential rental property. The decision in Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Smith, S15G1177, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 245 (Ga. Mar. 21, 2016) is significant for insurers since it expressly rejects the notion that a pollution exclusion clause is limited to traditional environmental pollution.

The facts are straightforward. Amy Smith (“Smith”), individually and as next friend of her daughter Tyasia Brown (“Brown”), sued her landlord, Bobby Chupp (“Chupp”), for injuries Brown allegedly sustained as a result of ingesting lead from deteriorating lead-based paint at the house Smith rented from Chupp. Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company (“GFB”) insured the house under a CGL policy issued to Chupp. Chupp tendered Smith’s claims to GFB, and the insurer filed a declaratory judgment action against Smith and Chupp seeking a determination that Brown’s injuries were not covered under the policy and that it had no duty do defend Chupp against Smith’s claims.

GFB contended, among other things, that Brown’s injuries from lead poisoning were excepted from coverage by the policy’s pollution exclusion, which defined “Pollution” as “‘[b]odily injury’ or ‘property damage’ arising out of the actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of ‘pollutants’ . . . .” The policy defined “pollutant” as “any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste.”

In granting summary judgment to GFB, the trial court relied on the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision in Reed v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 284 Ga. 286 (2008), which addressed the proper construction of an identical pollution exclusion in a CGL policy insuring residential rental property wherein a tenant sued her landlord for carbon monoxide poisoning. Although not explicitly listed in the policy as a pollutant, the Reed Court held that carbon monoxide gas fell within the policy’s definition of a pollutant and concluded that all of the plaintiff’s injuries arising therefrom were excluded from coverage under the pollution exclusion.

On appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to GFB. The Court of Appeals observed that the specific issue of whether lead-based paint should be considered a “pollutant” under the pollution exclusion clause was one of first impression in Georgia, and noted that a conflict existed among other jurisdictions on this issue. The Court of Appeals sided with those foreign courts holding that a pollution exclusion similar to the instant one did not bar coverage for injuries arising out of the ingestion or inhalation of lead-based paint. The Court of Appeals rejected the trial court’s interpretation of Reed, finding that while a straightforward reading of the pollution exclusion in Reed compelled the conclusion that carbon monoxide gas was a pollutant, it was unclear whether identical language in the instant policy was expansive enough to unambiguously include lead, lead-based paint or paint as a pollutant.

In its analysis, the Georgia Supreme Court found that GFB’s CGL policy contained an absolute pollution exclusion that precludes recovery for bodily injury or property damage resulting from exposure to any pollutants. Overviewing the genesis and development of the absolute pollution exclusion, the Court highlighted the litany of Georgia decisions, including Reed, that have repeatedly applied such clauses outside the context of traditional environmental pollution. Further, the Court rejected the notion that the pollutant at issue must be explicitly named in the policy to be enforceable.

In reversing the Court of Appeals, the Georgia Supreme Court followed Reed and found that GFB’s CGL policy unambiguously governed the factual scenario. Simply put, the Court of Appeals failed to apply the plain language of the contract. Accordingly, the Georgia Supreme Court held that lead present in paint unambiguously qualifies as a pollutant and that the plain language of the policy’s pollution exclusion excluded Smith’s claims against Chupp from coverage.

*** On March 3, 2016, this author published a related blog article on a recent Vermont Supreme Court decision holding that the plain language interpretation of a pollution exclusion in a homeowner policy barred coverage for property damage to a home rendered uninhabitable by an over-application of a bed bug pesticide.

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