Canada's Standing Committee on Finance (a committee of our federal House of Commons) recently released its new report on reforming our anti-money laundering and terrorist financing laws. The report makes 32 recommendations for changes to the AML regime, on such topics as adjustments to reporting requirements, "politically exposed persons" (PEPs), crypto-currency, real estate ownership and casinos. A good write-up by Jacqueline Shinfield at the Blakes firm can be found here.

UK Weakens Human Rights Protections Under MLATtag:typepad.com,2003:post-6a0133f4784e68970b022ad3bd4c1e200b2018-11-03T10:28:34-04:002018-11-03T11:09:25-04:00Back in 2000 I published an article in the journal Criminal Law Forum, entitled "Human Rights and International Mutual Legal Assistance: Resolving the Tension." The cite is (2000) 11 Criminal Law Forum 143, but you can read a pre-publication version here. "Mutual legal assistance" (MLA) essentially refers to states gathering/seizing...Rob Currie

Back in 2000 I published an article in the journal Criminal Law Forum, entitled "Human Rights and International Mutual Legal Assistance: Resolving the Tension." The cite is (2000) 11 Criminal Law Forum 143, but you can read a pre-publication version here. "Mutual legal assistance" (MLA) essentially refers to states gathering/seizing evidence on their territories and sending it to treaty partner states, for use in criminal proceedings being conducted in the partner states. In the article I examined a number of issues about the human rights implications of states providing MLA to other states with which they are cooperating, and whether and in what circumstances doing so would violate the international human rights law obligations of the requested states. While it was fairly well-established that states parties to human rights treaties (particularly the ECHR) would breach their obligations by extraditing individuals to face human rights abuses in the requesting state, the question was much more diffuse when it came to MLA because the general view was that MLA did not engage the rights of the individual more closely. Thus, states tended to reserve the right to provide MLA in such circumstances, though as a matter of policy many human rights-promoting states tended to avoid it.

In putting together the article I was lucky enough to be able to interview (in 1998) an official from the Edinburgh office of the UK's Crown prosecutions office, who told me that the UK's policy matched the description above -- as a matter of policy, the UK would not provide MLA to states where there were grounds to believe the accused would suffer human rights abuses, even though this might breach the MLA treaty ("MLAT"). This policy was, and has been in the years since, most keenly applied in death penalty cases. In 2011 the UK Foreign Office issued a policy document entitled "Overseas Security and Justice Assistance: Human Rights Guidance," which made clear that officials involved in international cooperation should seek assurances from the requesting state that the death penalty will not be imposed, prior to providing MLA.

(The most recent update of the policy can be found here; see also an excellent article by Bharat Malkani in (2013) 62 ICLQ 523).

Currently this policy is being litigated in the UK, in the case of Alexanda Kotey and El Shafee Elsheikh, two former UK nationals who fought with ISIS in the Syrian war, were captured by Kurdish forces, and are now facing prosecution for various crimes in the US. The UK Home Secretary initially indicated that the provision of MLA to the US in the case would have to suspended while the death penalty was on the table, but has since rescinded that decision and decided to provide cooperation, given the "exceptional circumstances" of the case and in particular the seriousness of the crimes. Elsheikh's mother has brought a legal challenge to this decision; coverage here and here. The argument being made is that the UK is legally obliged to comply with the policy.

A good account of the case and the applicable UK law by Prof. Malkani can be found here. The claimants have a tough row to hoe, not made easier by the fact that the two individuals in question were stripped of their UK nationality in 2014. Prof. Malkani makes the point, which I think is correct, that the law as it stands actually supports the government's position; and if one is inclined to think that states (particularly non-death penalty states) should be restrained from helping other states carry out the death penalty, then what the case points to is the need to strengthen the law.

My own observation is that, as I have remarked in conference papers from time to time, the international legal situation has not changed since my article was published in 2000. One of the pernicious problems of inter-state criminal cooperation is that states tend to resist the application of human rights norms to the process, and have to be dragged kicking and screaming into agreement with some fairly simple ideas, such as that to enable foreign states to commit human rights abuses makes the requested states complicit in those abuses. Those states which even care about this nonetheless maintain their practice at the level of policy, and resist both compulsion to do so by courts and interpretations of international and domestic human rights instruments that might lead in that direction.

The result? A still-diffuse set of international practices and norms around whether and how inter-state criminal cooperation should be shaped by human rights standards, starved for legal vitality by deliberate stickhandling on the part of states.

Canada Joins Five-State Coalition to Combat Tax Crimetag:typepad.com,2003:post-6a0133f4784e68970b022ad3a74c66200b2018-08-09T14:39:25-04:002018-08-09T14:39:25-04:00It was recently announced that Canada has joined a five-state coalition of tax authorities, called the "Joint Chiefs of Global Tax Enforcement (J5)", the overall goal of which is to "increase collaboration in the fight against international and transnational tax crime and money laundering." The Canadian government actor involved is,...Rob Currie

It was recently announced that Canada has joined a five-state coalition of tax authorities, called the "Joint Chiefs of Global Tax Enforcement (J5)", the overall goal of which is to "increase collaboration in the fight against international and transnational tax crime and money laundering." The Canadian government actor involved is, of course, the Canada Revenue Agency. The other partner agencies are the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (not so "internal" any more, I guess), the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission, the Australian Taxation Office, the Netherlands Fiscale Inlichtingen - en Opsporingsdienst, and the UK's Revenue & Customs.

The IRS webpage on the J5 indicates that it was formed in response to a call from the OECD for states to do more to "tackle enablers of tax crime," and describes the desired results:

The outcome of this active collaboration will see the J5:

Enhance existing investigation and intelligence programs

Identify significant targets for new investigations

Improve the tactical intelligence threat picture now and into the future

Lead the wider community in developing its strategic understanding of the methods, weaknesses and risks from offshore tax crime and cybercrime

Raise international awareness that the J5 is working together to reduce transnational tax crime, cybercrime and money laundering, and create uncertainty for those who seek to commit such offenses.

No word yet on whether there is a specific treaty in place to facilitate this collaboration or whether the states will rely on their existing criminal cooperation networks and instruments (extradition, mutual legal assistance, etc.). This is an interesting development in the historical sense, as states have traditionally been loath to engage in much enforcement activity regarding the tax/fiscal laws of other states.

Government of Canada Publishes Draft Amendments to Money Laundering/Terrorist Financing Regstag:typepad.com,2003:post-6a0133f4784e68970b022ad3545adb200c2018-06-19T09:35:34-04:002018-06-19T09:35:34-04:00Back in February I blogged about the Canadian Dept. of Finance's discussion paper which called for suggestions for changes to our anti-money laundering and terrorist financing. The review period is over and the department has released proposed amendments to the relevant regulations, which can be found here. There is a...Rob Currie

Back in February I blogged about the Canadian Dept. of Finance's discussion paper which called for suggestions for changes to our anti-money laundering and terrorist financing. The review period is over and the department has released proposed amendments to the relevant regulations, which can be found here. There is a 90-day period open for comments, and it's expected that the bill will be brought forward in the fall session of Parliament. A good write-up by two lawyers at Osler's can be found here.

As usual, I'm most interested in jurisdiction, and note that the new regs extend their applicability to money service businesses (MSBs) which have no physical presence in Canada but carry on business here, primarily via the internet. This is one of those changes that will likely be called "extraterritorial" but in fact is an application of the "extended territorial jurisdiction" principle under customary international law, under which states can prescribe laws over conduct that occurs partly outside and partly inside Canada. This kind of jurisdiction is increasingly used in the anti-money laundering regulatory sphere, and as Professor Scassa and I wrote (in the Georgetown Journal of International Law) some years ago, is seeing increased use over "cyber" activities of many sorts.

Cross-Border Abduction & Harassment by State Agents: Still Unlawful (Despite Appearances)tag:typepad.com,2003:post-6a0133f4784e68970b01b7c95f65a8970b2018-04-10T07:46:44-04:002018-04-10T08:05:06-04:00A rather fundamental rule of customary international law is that state officials are prohibited from exercising their powers on the territories of foreign states. This rule is often referred to as "the prohibition on extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction," and it has good policy reasons behind it. Particularly with matters relating to...Rob Currie

A rather fundamental rule of customary international law is that state officials are prohibited from exercising their powers on the territories of foreign states. This rule is often referred to as "the prohibition on extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction," and it has good policy reasons behind it. Particularly with matters relating to criminal law and national security, states guard their sovereignty very closely and wish to maintain control over everything that could be viewed as an "enforcement" activity on their territories. Actions by foreign state agents are likely to be viewed as illegitimate by citizens and residents of the target state, not to mention that local procedural/human rights protections are undermined. Extraditions are sometimes scotched because of breaches of this rule. World War I started, in part, because one state insisted on an entitlement to investigate a crime on the territory of another state.

There are lots of good reasons for this rule. Which is why it's odd to see Turkey announcing boldly to the world that its intelligence agency has abducted 80 Turkish nationals from foreign states (all of whom are wanted on what can only be described as politically-motivated charges) and intends to keep on doing so. Cross-border abduction is probably the most well-known example of an egregious breach of the rule; the most famous instance is still the illegal abduction of Adolf Eichmann from Argentina by Israel, which caused such heavy international tension that the UN Security Council had to become involved.

It is also increasingly well-documented that the government of China sends agents all over the world to engage in various kinds of "enforcement" activities against its citizens living abroad. There are many Chinese expats living in Canada and they are the frequent targets of this kind of activity. And do I even need to mention the poisoning of former Russian spies in the UK?

This kind of low-level corrosion of respect for territorial sovereignty is, shall we say, not a good thing. For more, you can read about this in Chapters 2 and 9 of our book.

Committee Against Torture Releases New Comment on Non-Refoulementtag:typepad.com,2003:post-6a0133f4784e68970b01bb09fce64c970d2018-03-20T08:29:11-04:002018-03-20T08:32:38-04:00The UN's Committee Against Torture, set up under the UN Convention Against Torture to monitor implementation of the Convention, has released a revised General Comment on the implementation of Article 3 of the Convention. Article 3 is the obligation of non-refoulement, i.e. that states must not extradite, deport or otherwise...Rob Currie

The UN's Committee Against Torture, set up under the UN Convention Against Torture to monitor implementation of the Convention, has released a revised General Comment on the implementation of Article 3 of the Convention. Article 3 is the obligation of non-refoulement, i.e. that states must not extradite, deport or otherwise return individuals to a state where they will face torture.General Comment No. 4, as it is now called, contains some revised and updated views of the Committee regarding the contours of the non-refoulement obligation.

States parties to the Convention were invited to submit views on a draft of the new General Comment, and 23 states (including Canada) did so. The views, the Committee's reactions, and how all of this is reflected in the Comment are helpfully canvassed in the first of what is promised to be a two-part blog post on the always-lively and informative EJIL Talk! blog. This will be of interest to those who follow the development of non-refoulement as a human rights norm, those interested in the evolution of standards in transnational criminal cooperation, as well as methodology geeks like me who monitor the development of state practice around interpretation and enforcement of treaty obligations.

Book reference: Chapter 10, International Criminal Cooperation, Human Rights, and the Application of the Charter

Reviewing Canada's Anti-Money Laundering/Terrorist Financing Lawstag:typepad.com,2003:post-6a0133f4784e68970b01bb09f3289b970d2018-02-14T08:35:53-05:002018-02-14T08:37:47-05:00The Canadian federal Department of Finance recently released a discussion paper which reviews, and proposes possible changes to, Canada's anti-money laundering (AML) and anti-terrorist financing (ATF). The paper is part of the consultation process designed to feed the mandatory five-year review of Canada's Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist...Rob Currie

The consultation paper is wide-ranging and contains numerous proposals for expanding the reach of the legislation, to entities such as companies operating private ATM machines, certain forms of gambling, dealers of valuable items, company service providers, etc. It examines problems related to identifying beneficial ownership of companies and looks at interesting problems like politically exposed persons, the regulation of "structuring" (usually called "smurfing") and the sharing of information between the government and private parties.

Feedback to the paper must be provided by April 30, 2018. An excellent overview of the paper, by Jacqueline Shinfield of the Blakes law firm, can be found here. On a side note, the role of lawyers in the AML/ATF matrix, and particularly the balance of obligations to uphold the law and maintain client confidentiality, continues to be controversial.

Guest Blog: Assurances in Extradition Casestag:typepad.com,2003:post-6a0133f4784e68970b01b7c92aea3b970b2017-10-17T10:35:44-04:002017-10-17T10:37:53-04:00I am delighted to once again present a guest blog post from my friend and co-author, Dr. Joseph Rikhof, the recently-retired Manager of the Law at the War Crimes Program, Justice Canada. Below he discusses the Supreme Court of Canada's recent decision in India v. Badesha, a closely-watched case on...Rob Currie

I am delighted to once again present a guest blog post from my friend and co-author, Dr. Joseph Rikhof, the recently-retired Manager of the Law at the War Crimes Program, Justice Canada. Below he discusses the Supreme Court of Canada's recent decision in India v. Badesha, a closely-watched case on the controversial topic of diplomatic assurances in extradition cases. Prof. Joanna Harrington and I blogged on the BC Court of Appeal's decision in the case, which you can read here.

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Assurances in extradition law; the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the India v. Badesha case

On September 8, 2017 the Supreme Court rendered a decision in the Badesha case.[1] This case involved the request from India to have Surjit Singh Badesha and Malkit Kaur Sidhu extradited to stand trial for conspiracy to commit the murder of Jaswinder Kaur Sidhu, whose body was discovered on June 9, 2000 in a village in the Indian state of Punjab. It was the theory of the Indian government that she had been the victim of an honour killing arranged by the accused, who are the victim's uncle and mother and both Canadian citizens living in Canada, and carried out by eleven co-accused, some of whom had already been tried in India.

After an extradition hearing, Mr. Badesha and Ms. Sidhu were committed for surrender. The Minister of Justice then ordered their surrender to India after determining, in accordance with section 44(1)(a) of the Extradition Act, that it would not be unjust or oppressive to do so. Mr. Badesha and Ms. Sidhu applied for judicial review of the Minister’s decision to the British Columbia Court of Appeal. A majority of the court concluded that it was unreasonable for the Minister to find that surrendering Mr. Badesha and Ms. Sidhu would not be unjust or oppressive in the circumstances. Accordingly, the majority ordered that the Minister’s decision be set aside and that the matter be remitted to the Minister for further consideration. The Attorney General of Canada appealed from that order.[2]

The importance of the Supreme Court decision lies in the reliance on diplomatic assurances provided by a country to where a person will be extradited and where concerns have been raised about the human rights situation in that country. In this case the appellants had argued to the Minister that the surrender was unjust or oppressive as there was no guarantee India would honour a death penalty assurance; that they would not have a fair trial in India; that prison conditions in India would be inhumane given their advanced age and health problems. The Minister had received assurances from the government of India to counter such allegations, specifically that no death penalty would be imposed; that even though a fair trial should be assumed, Canadian officials would be allowed to attend the court proceedings on request; that India would provide required medical care and medications and make every reasonable effort to ensure their safety and consular access while in custody in India.[3]

The Supreme Court indicated that the general principles with respect to assurances in extradition law are that, in assessing whether there is a substantial risk of torture or mistreatment, diplomatic assurances regarding the treatment of the person sought may be taken into account by the Minister and that where the Minister has determined that such a risk of torture or mistreatment exists and that assurances are therefore needed, the reviewing court must consider whether the Minister has reasonably concluded that, based on the assurances provided, there is no substantial risk of torture or mistreatment.[4]

The court then, relying on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, provided the following legal framework for the acceptance of assurances from third states:

whether the assurances are specific or are general and vague;

who has given the assurances and whether that person can bind the receiving state;

if the assurances have been issued by the central government of the receiving state, whether local authorities can be expected to abide by them;

whether the assurances concern treatment which is legal or illegal in the receiving state;

the length and strength of bilateral relations between the sending and receiving states, including the receiving state’s record in abiding by similar assurances;

whether compliance with the assurances can be objectively verified through diplomatic or other monitoring mechanisms, including providing unfettered access to the individual’s lawyers;

whether there is an effective system of protection against torture in the receiving state, including whether it is willing to cooperate with international monitoring mechanisms (including international human rights NGOs) and whether it is willing to investigate allegations of torture and to punish those responsible; and

whether the individual has previously been ill-treated in the receiving state.[5]

The court was of the view that the assurances received from the government of India were sufficient within this framework, taking especially into account the fact that there was no history of India not complying with assurances given to its treaty partners; that there had been no evidence of any corruption, intimidation or torture involved in India’s investigation of Mr. Badesha, Ms. Sidhu or any of the eleven co-accused; that there was no evidence that the seven co-accused found guilty at trial were mistreated while in prison in India; and that there was also no evidence that Ms. Sidhu and Mr. Badesha had personal characteristics that would make them part of a category of individuals who would be particular targets of ill-treatment in India because of their political or religious affiliations.[6] The court also took into account the nature and gravity of the crime, which was criminal conduct of the most horrific nature, namely participation in a conspiracy to commit the honour killing of a family member.[7] As a result the surrender decision by the Minister was found to be reasonable.[8]

This decision by the Supreme Court can be compared and in some respect contrasted with a recent extradition decision in the UK of July 28, 2017[9] by the High Court of Justice. This appeal case involved the second request for extradition by Rwanda for four persons involved in the 1994 genocide in that country. The first request had been denied in 2009 by the same court as a result of fair trial concerns in Rwanda related to the independence of the judiciary and the safety of defence witnesses.[10] This time, the court again refused extradition for a number of reasons, which were again related to the fairness of the trial,[11] but primarily because of the lack of sufficient legal representation for the defendants in such trials in Rwanda[12] while providing a stark comment about the general legal system in Rwanda:

… the evidence suggests that Rwanda has, if anything, become more of an illiberal and authoritarian state than was the case in 2008/2009. … we are struck by the fact that these renewed requests from the GoR, relying on improvements in the legal system, come from a state which, in very recent times, has instigated political killings, and has led British police to warn Rwandan nationals living in Britain of credible plans to kill them on the part of that state.[13]

However, in spite of these shortcomings in the legal process in Rwanda, the court was of the view that they could be remedied by the government of Rwanda providing assurances while echoing some of the sentiments by the Supreme Court of Canada, but in reverse, in saying:

Given the seriousness of the offences alleged here, we are prepared to permit the Appellant a final opportunity to seek to assure the Court that credible and verifiable conditions will be in place, to overcome the legal bar to extradition upheld above. It should by no means be assumed that such assurances will successfully overcome the bar to extradition given the historical failure of the Appellant to cooperate in prosecutions in England, the serious concerns articulated earlier in this judgment, the length of time that has passed and the inherent difficulty of being able to rely on assurances. However, it seems to us right that the opportunity should be afforded to the Appellant to persuade us that satisfactory assurances can be given. Given the very long history here, there can be no question of any long delay before the matter is finally resolved.

On the facts of this case, any successful future assurances or guarantees would have to be detailed, formal and underpinned with significant diplomatic weight. They would have to include at least (1) adequate funding for investigation and development of defence cases and for representation in Court by experienced and properly resourced advocates, (2) assurance of admission to the Rwandan Bar for suitably qualified and experienced foreign lawyers as defence counsel, where desired, and (3) inclusion of at least one non-Rwandan judge in any trial, such judge to be suitably experienced and independent of any connection with the Government of Rwanda (for example an existing judge of another relevant international Court or tribunal).[14]

By way of post-script to the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, firstly, the case in question has not resulted in the extradition of Badesha and Sidhu; while in transit in Toronto on their flight from Vancouver to India, the Court of Appeal of British Columbia agreed on September 21, 2017, to hear further arguments re their surrender, as a result of which they were returned to Vancouver and remanded into custody.[15]

Secondly, with respect to assurances, this notion also became a factor to consider in three Ministerial Directions on September 25, 2017 by the Minister of Public Safety to the RCMP, CSIS and CBSA with the title “Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities”; two of the three appendices to these directions state the following:

When there is a substantial risk that disclosing information to a foreign entity would result in the mistreatment of an individual, and officials are unable to determine if that risk can be mitigated through, for example, the use of caveats or assurances, the matter will be referred to the President of CBSA/Director of CSIS/Commissioner of the RCMP for decision.[16]

[5] Paragraph 51. For a recent analysis of diplomatic assurances, see Mariagiulia Giuffré, “Deportation with Assurances and Human Rights, The Case of Persons Suspected or Convicted of Serious Crimes, 15 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2017), 75-95.

[10] Vincent Brown aka Vincent Bajinja and others v. The Government of Rwanda and The Secretary of State for the Home Department (2009) EWHC 770 (Admin). Between October 2008 and May 2009 courts in Germany, France, Switzerland and Finland had also refused extradition for similar reasons until in May 2009 Sweden reversed this trend, which was upheld by the ECtHR in the case of Ahorugeze v. Sweden, Application No. 37075/09. That time, a number of countries have extradited or deported persons to Rwanda, namely Norway, Denmark, Canada and the Netherlands (see Government of Rwanda v Nteziryayo & Ors [2017] EWHC 1912 (Admin), paragraph 156 with a detailed overview of the trials of those persons in Rwanda in paragraphs 157-207).

Cherif Bassiouni Passestag:typepad.com,2003:post-6a0133f4784e68970b01bb09c719df970d2017-09-25T19:17:48-04:002017-09-25T19:17:48-04:00It has just been announced that one of the greats in the field of International Criminal Law, Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni, has passed away at the age of 79. If you do any amount of research in this area you will quickly encounter Bassiouni's work, and it is impossible to...Rob Currie

It has just been announced that one of the greats in the field of International Criminal Law, Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni, has passed away at the age of 79. If you do any amount of research in this area you will quickly encounter Bassiouni's work, and it is impossible to overstate his significance. Reporting can be found here.

"Long-Arm Subpoenas," the Microsoft Ireland Case, and International Lawtag:typepad.com,2003:post-6a0133f4784e68970b01b7c8e2abce970b2017-03-21T09:27:38-04:002017-09-25T19:21:58-04:00I have just posted a new draft paper entitled "Cross-Border Evidence Gathering in Transnational Criminal Investigation: Is the Microsoft Ireland Case the 'Next Frontier'?" The paper examines the currently roiled state of international law regarding the gathering of electronic evidence across borders by law enforcement officials. It specifically bears down...Rob Currie

I have just posted a new draft paper entitled "Cross-Border Evidence Gathering in Transnational Criminal Investigation: Is the Microsoft Ireland Case the 'Next Frontier'?" The paper examines the currently roiled state of international law regarding the gathering of electronic evidence across borders by law enforcement officials. It specifically bears down on the issue of what are sometimes called "long-arm subpoenas," essentially demands by police in one state that individuals located in that state gather and produce evidence that is stored or otherwise located in another state. This has traditionally been an irritant between states but has become all the more relevant with regard to electronic data.

The issue has come to a head in the U.S. in the case of US. v. Microsoft, where police issued a warrant demanding that Microsoft produce data that was stored at its facility in Ireland. Microsoft refused on the basis that the warrant had inappropriate extraterritorial reach; both Irish sovereignty and Irish/EU law could be breached if Microsoft complied with the request. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Microsoft, in a decision which will likely be appealed to the US Supreme Court but which dealt almost entirely with US procedural law and did not satisfactorily address the international law aspects (despite the fact that these were argued very ably by Microsoft and some of the interveners).

My paper focuses on the international law angle, in particular the customary international law prohibition on the extraterritorial exercise of enforcement jurisdiction. It concludes that, despite the fact that state practice is uneven, the best conclusion is that long-arm subpoenas breach the prohibition, and that effective solutions to this problem have to involve multilateral agreement of some kind.

The paper is under submission to a journal but the current working version can be found on SSRN here; the abstract is below. I welcome comments!

ABSTRACT: A recent and prominent American appeals court case has revived a controversial international law question: can a state compel an individual on its territory to obtain and produce material which the individual owns or controls, but which is stored on the territory of a foreign state? The case involved, United States v. Microsoft, features electronic data stored offshore which was sought in the context of a criminal prosecution. It highlights the current legal complexity surrounding the cross-border gathering of electronic evidence, which has produced friction and divergent state practice. The author here contends that the problems involved are best understood—and potentially resolved—via examination through the lens of the public international law of jurisdiction, and specifically the prohibition of extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction. Analysis of state practice reveals that unsanctioned cross-border evidence gathering is viewed by states as an intrusion on territorial sovereignty, engaging the prohibition, and that this view properly extends to the kind of state activity dealt with in the Microsoft case.