Reply to Luis Oviedo - Part Three - The Malvinas: Marxism and War

We continue this reply by taking up the question of the 1982
Malvinas/Falklands war, explaining what the real position of the British
Marxists was at the time. In answer to Oviedo's blatant distortions Alan Woods
explains that they opposed the war as an imperialist war on both sides, and
adopted a genuine internationalist position. The third article carries yet another striking and colourful title “Alan
Woods and the Malvinas war – God save the Queen... and the kelpers”. It
is at this point that Luis Oviedo informs me that, in addition to all my other
counterrevolutionary sins, I am also an imperialist and a monarchist.
How does my friend arrive at such an interesting conclusion?

Luis Oviedo gets completely carried away: “Together with the Queen's
soldiers, Woods shouted at the top of his lungs, ‘Argies go home’. For
Socialist Appeal, the Malvinas are British and not a colonial occupied
territory. Which is why they raised "self-determination for the Kelpers"
–who did not wish to separate themselves from Great Britain– but not the
independence of the islands."

In the first place, Woods could hardly shout together with the soldiers of
the Queen, since Woods was not even living in Britain at the time, but in Spain.
In the second place, neither Woods nor anyone else on the Left in Britain has
ever shouted “Argies go home” either at the top of his voice or in a
whisper. This is yet another invention of friend Luis, whose imagination, apart
from its vividness, definitely has a morbid and slightly hysterical streak to
it. But hysteria is hardly an argument.

To begin with a small factual correction: Luis Oviedo refers to the position
of Socialist Appeal. As he must know, Socialist Appeal did not
even exist at the time, at least under that name. His remarks refer to the
position of the Militant Tendency, of which Ted Grant and myself were leading
members at the time. We always took a consistent internationalist position, and
our position on this question was no exception. But since comrade Oviedo is
determined to find fault with everything, he must do so on this also. How does
he do this?

First of all, I am subjected to a severe criticism for using the word Falklands,
instead of the Spanish term Las Malvinas. This is taken as indisputable
proof that we are open agents of imperialism. This argument is just childish.
The simple fact is that, in the English language, the name for these islands is
– the Falklands. If I were writing in Spanish, I would use Malvinas (and not Los
Falklands, as Luis sometimes does, for greater effect), as is done in our
Spanish language website. But, as I am sitting in London (not Londres),
and writing in the English language, I have used the English name. However in
order to please him, we will make a small concession and use the term Malvinas
throughout, even when writing in English.

Luis Oviedo makes a few quotes from the document written by Ted Grant, in May
1982. But, following his usual method, he quotes isolated passages taken out of
context in order to distort their meaning. He concludes: “So the current of
our opponent Alan Woods promoted imperialist war against Argentina”. At this
point even the patience of a saint would be exhausted. For what Oviedo writes
here is a blatant and scandalous lie. We will now deal with the Malvinas
war, our attitude to it and the Marxist attitude to war in general.

What caused the war?

The attitude of Marxists to war is determined by concrete circumstances. It
is not determined by superficial considerations such as “who attacked first”
and so on, but by what classes wage the war, for what specific aims, and in
whose interests. In order to work out a position in relation to a given conflict
it is necessary to cut across the patriotic demagogy and lies that are always
put forward by the ruling class of each side and expose the real motives that
are involved. Moreover, it is necessary to put forward a class position in a
skilful way such that it can get an echo in the masses.

What were the concrete circumstances of the Malvinas war? In order to clarify
our position it is first necessary to remind ourselves of the chain of events
that led to war. The reason why the Junta decided to start a war had nothing to
do with a genuine national liberation struggle. It was a manoeuvre designed
to head off revolution.

The Argentine Junta was the distilled essence of the counterrevolution.
30,000 people had been killed or had disappeared. Many more were imprisoned and
tortured. Yet Galtieri had excellent relations with Washington and London. But
by 1982 the Junta was completely discredited and hanging by a thread. The
economy was in difficulties, with a growth of unemployment and a rate of
inflation of 150 percent. There was massive discontent, with the beginning of
strikes and demonstrations. This culminated on March 30th with street
demonstration in Buenos Aires resulting in 2,000 detained and hundreds injured.

Cartoon published in Militant 597, April 16, 1982

The Junta itself was split. It needed a diversion to head off the
revolutionary movement. First they considered a war with Chile over the Beagle
Channel. Later they decided that an invasion of the Malvinas would be easier.
Why? Because their good friends in London had given them to understand that
Britain was ready to help them by handing over the islands. Therefore, they were
convinced that the invasion would not be opposed.

The head of the British delegation Richard Luce replied to the government in
Buenos Aires: “in diplomatic language, Luce’s reply meant that Britain was
wiling to explore the means whereby Argentina might eventually achieve their
goal of sovereignty over the islands, and that, if they were patient, they would
get it.” (The Falklands War – the Full Story, published by the
Sunday Times, p. 26.)

Galtieri was also convinced that the USA would back him. He had good reason
for this belief. He was a close ally of US imperialism. The Junta acted as the
jackal of the US imperialists. Argentina was President Reagan’s main ally in
South America. Galtieri had gone so far as to send Argentine troops to support
the right wing government of El Salvador. They also helped the USA in its fight
against the Sandinistas: “Argentina had 500 army men operating mainly out of
Honduras on sabotage raids in Nicaragua”, one US official admitted, “It was
something they believed in – it was an extension of the dirty war.”

This expresses very clearly the real relation between Argentina and
imperialism: not the relation of an oppressed colonial slave but that of a
junior partner, a willing accomplice, eager to please by participating in all
the crimes of the chief bandit. To present this relationship as the
traditional relationship between a colony (or semi-colony) and imperialism
simply does not fit in with the facts.

Jean Kirkpatrick, the US ambassador to the UN, was a great admirer of the
Junta. She made no secret of her view that the USA must support Argentina and
all other right wing dictatorships in Latin America as a way of combating
communism. She supported the invasion of the islands, and this view had strong
support within the State Department. This further encouraged Galtieri to believe
he could invade with impunity.

It is not easy to conceal preparations for an invasion. But all the warnings
were ignored. The reason is quite clear: British imperialism did not want a war
with the Junta, with which it had excellent relations. A section of the Tory
administration wanted to help the Junta by handing over the islands. But the
Junta, terrified of the growing revolutionary mood, was in a hurry.

Even when Costa Mendez on March 2nd sent Lord Carrington what amounted to an
ultimatum, threatening to break off negotiations unless the British made
immediate concessions, no serious measures were taken by London to prevent an
invasion. At this stage, the sending of a small task force would probably have
been enough to make the Junta think twice. But London’s inaction gave Galtieri
the green light to invade. Not once did the British government say to Buenos
Aires: “If you invade, we will take action.”

The sending of the task force to the South Atlantic was an imperialist action
on Britain’s part, and we denounced it accordingly. But the intention was not
to invade, conquer and enslave Argentina. The comparison with Iraq – which was
occupied by the imperialists – or Brazil in the 1930s – is therefore
completely incorrect. Argentina was not invaded or occupied. Its people were not
enslaved. That was never the intention. Incidentally, if the British
imperialists had invaded Argentina, as they did in Iraq, our position would have
been to support Argentina. But that was not the case.

The aim of the British imperialists was more limited. They were determined to
regain possession of the Islands because of the blow to their prestige dealt by
the Argentine invasion. Some “clever” people argued that the aim was the
exploitation of the oil that is supposed to be present in the sea around the
islands. But 20 years later there is no sign of this, although they have made
some money out of the rich fishing grounds.

The paradox is that, if the Junta had not been in such a hurry, they could
have got the islands handed over without the need for a war. London was not
interested in the Malvinas, which at that time were a considerable financial
burden and had no economic or strategic importance to Britain. For some time the
Argentine Junta – which, let us not forget – had excellent relations with
the government of Margaret Thatcher – was engaged in negotiations for the
handing over of the islands. For reasons that must be clear even to Luis Oviedo,
the inhabitants of the islands were not exactly overjoyed at this prospect. But
the feelings of the islanders was a matter of indifference to Carrington, who in
secret negotiations gave the Junta to understand that the islands would be
handed over to them.

Galtieri wrongly interpreted this to mean that the British would do nothing
if he invaded the islands. That was a serious mistake. Prestige is very
important to an imperialist power like Britain, which has defence agreements
with many countries, oil rich states in the Persian Gulf, for example. The press
photos of British soldiers lying on the ground, prisoners of the Argentine army,
broadcast around the world, was a blow to their prestige. It could not be
tolerated. Therefore, British imperialism counterattacked.

By invading the islands, therefore, Galtieri miscalculated. But he succeeded
in his immediate aim. Once the invasion of the Malvinas was announced the
revolutionary movement was overwhelmed by a surge of patriotism. The unions
immediately suspended the strikes, and instead of street demonstrations against
the Junta, there were mass patriotic demonstrations of people waving Argentine
flags and cheering the generals.

War is the continuation of politics by other means. It is a political
question as much as a military one. Napoleon explained long ago the vital
importance of morale in war. If the working class had taken power, there could
have been a real fight against imperialism. But a reactionary regime can never
fight imperialism, with which it is tied by a thousand threads. In fact, the
only reason Galtieri invaded is that he was convinced there would be no
resistance. “There will be much noise,” predicted Costa Mendez, “but that
is all.” This was a bad mistake.

The invasion of the islands put the British imperialists in a difficult
position. A section of the ruling class (Luce, Carrington) wanted to hand over
the islands to the Junta. They did not want to fight a war because it would
threaten the stability of the regime in Buenos Aires. That explains the total
inaction of the British before the invasion – something that is otherwise
inexplicable, since it is materially impossible that they had “not noticed”
the preparations for invasion.

London gave a strong hint to the Junta that the islands would be handed over
if only they would wait a little. But the Junta could not wait, since they
feared a revolution from one moment to the next. When they acted
precipitately, they were taken off balance. Thatcher was furious and demanded
action. She could not accept the humiliation of the British army by Argentina.
That faction of the Tories who favoured throwing the islands to Galtieri, like a
man throwing a bone to a dog, found itself in a minority. Carrington was forced
to resign. War was then inevitable.

The Junta was shocked to learn that the British were ready to fight. In the
course of the negotiations, the Junta almost immediately dropped its demand
for sovereignty. This showed that this was not a real war of national
liberation, but only a reactionary intrigue to save the Junta from overthrow.
They were terrified of the British army and even more terrified of their own
masses. The reactionary generals were afraid of a war and were prepared to
accept a compromise to save face, but Thatcher was implacable. She would accept
nothing less than total surrender and the handing back of the islands.

The war placed the US imperialists in a difficult position, since both
Galtieri and Thatcher were valued allies. But once Washington’s attempts to
get a compromise settlement had broken down, Reagan had to decide and he decided
in favour of Britain, a long-standing and ultimately more important ally.

The viciousness of Thatcher and the British imperialists was shown in the
sinking of the Belgrano, with the loss of over 368 lives. But the lives of
British personnel were of no more interest to them. The fact that they were
prepared to send the fleet into the South Atlantic with no air cover was proof
of that. Thatcher deliberately ordered the sinking of the Belgrano to sabotage a
negotiated settlement, brokered by the Americans, which Costa Mendez was on the
point of accepting.

Why did Argentina lose the war?

At no point does Luis Oviedo ask the most important question: why did the
invasion of the Islands fail? From a military point of view, Argentina could
and should have won the war. The sending of the British fleet across the
Atlantic without adequate air cover was a complete adventure, which only an
ignorant petty bourgeois parvenu like Thatcher could have contemplated (her
generals were against it because they knew the dangers it entailed).

Was it inevitable for the British to have won? By no means. In war very few
things are inevitable. It is, as Napoleon said, the most complex of all
equations. From a purely military point of view it was quite possible for
Argentina to have won. But the answer to this question is not military but
political. War always exposes the rottenness of a reactionary regime. The
Malvinas adventure cruelly exposed the weaknesses of Argentine capitalism and
the Junta. In the moment of truth it collapsed like a house of cards.

It is true that the British army was a well-trained and well-equipped
professional force. But that does not explain everything. There were many
disadvantages on the British side. First, defence is to offence as three to one.
That is to say, to take a defended position, one would normally require three
soldiers to every defender. In fact, the Argentine army outnumbered the British
by about three to one. This gave them a big advantage. They had sufficient time
to fortify the islands and dig in, in the time it took the British fleet to
cross the Atlantic.

The British forces were fighting far from home. Their supply lines were
over-extended. The loss of a single aircraft carrier would have been a disaster.
As it was, they lost a key supply ship – the Atlantic Conveyor – to
Argentine exocet missiles. From a military point of view, the British expedition
was an irresponsible adventure. I remember that a group of Spanish army officers
published a letter in El Pais, stating categorically that the Argentines could
not lose. Yet the British succeeded in recapturing the islands without too much
trouble. Why?

It cannot be said that the average British soldier is any braver than the
average Argentine soldier. The Argentines are capable of great bravery and they
have shown this many times in history. But here the question of morale is
decisive. And this is inseparable from the regime in the army and society. A
rotten reactionary regime can only produce a rotten and reactionary army.
Officers like Lami Dozo were trained in a fascist ideology from a young age.
Several of his tutors were German Nazis like Hans-Ulrich Rudel, who was arrested
by the Americans in 1945 – and obligingly released. In his book In Spite of
Everything, he supported almost everything the Nazis did.

Another of his tutors, Jordan Bruno Genta, who was assassinated by the
Montoneros in 1974, wrote a stream of books spouting obscenities against
freemasons and Jews. He also wrote a doctrine for the air force that justified
military intervention in politics and argued for devotion, not to the
constitution but to “God and the motherland”. Any action the military might
have to take in defence of the “motherland” (read oligarchy) was excused by
“God’s will”. This kind of fascist thinking was summed up in his book Guerra
Contrarrevolucionaria. It was the inspiration for the fascist Triple A death
squads.

Such an environment is fertile ground for producing murderers and scum but
not good generals and fighters. The army is only a reflection of society, and
the army that invaded the Malvinas was a mirror of Argentine society at that
time. This was no real army of liberation. It was still the army of the Junta,
led by the same reactionary gangsters that had murdered 30,000 people. Captain
Alfredo Astiz was a typical specimen. Known variously as “the Blond Angel”,
“the Hawk” and “the Butcher of Cordoba”, he distinguished himself as a
murderer and torturer of women in the dirty war. But he did not show the same
spirit when confronted by the British army. He surrendered like a coward, and
was later flown back to Buenos Aires on a first class ticket.

War is also a class question. The poor working class conscripts who were sent
to the islands were not equipped for war. Many of them did not have proper
equipment, clothes or even food. They were demoralised and that explains why the
British succeeded with relative ease in retaking the islands. This is the crux
of the matter. It was absurd to imagine that such a regime and such an army
would wage a serious struggle against British imperialism.

The Junta’s reactionary gamble failed. A letter published in La Prensa in
July 1982 said: “Never again must we let a government we did not elect lead us
into a war we did not want.” As always the main victims were ordinary working
class people. To the long list of the crimes of the Junta must be added all
those young Argentine soldiers who died on the islands in appalling conditions
because of the rotten and incompetent regime. They lacked the most basic things:
proper clothes, boots, food. How were they supposed to fight the British army?
Above all the young Argentine troops who were sent to the Malvinas lacked
motivation and morale. That is why they lost.

After the war, British commanders expressed their surprise that the Argentine
army did not put up greater resistance. Major Chris Keeble said of the Battle of
Goose Green:

“We had been given all this garbage about their equipment and their food,
and dysentery being rife. All that was really irrelevant. We knew that when we
got to the Falklands that we would have the same problems: trench foot,
shortages of this and that. The question that decides it all is whether they
want to fight. There was not a man in 2 Para who did not want to do that
operation. Their [the Argentines’] weakness even before we had attacked is
that they did not really want to fight. They were not 100 percent behind their
government’s action in the Falklands. All that crap about being educated from
birth about the Malvinas. If they were that committed, why didn’t they fight
for it?”

In these lines there is more than a little imperialist arrogance. But there
is also an element of truth. In war, soldiers are expected to fight and die for
a cause. The Argentine conscript did not want to die for a corrupt and
reactionary government that had sent him, ill-prepared, to a frozen rock in the
South Atlantic for reasons that were not totally clear to him. A Para sergeant
said: “I felt sorry for them, especially the young ones; they didn’t really
know why they were there.” (The Falklands War – the Full Story, publishedby the Sunday Times.)

What happened in the 1982 war is a proof that the rotten and corrupt
Argentine bourgeoisie is incapable of playing any sort of progressive role, at
home or abroad: that is the point that the Argentine Marxists must explain to
the people. The forcible seizing of the Islands by a bloody military
dictatorship had not a single atom of progressive content. And that is why it
failed.

The only way in which the Malvinas issue can be resolved is for the Argentine
working class to take power. The existence of a regime of workers’ democracy
in Buenos Aires would be a powerful force of attraction for all the peoples –
including the inhabitants of the Malvinas.

A socialist Argentina would immediately take the initiative of offering to
establish a Socialist Federation of Latin America. With full employment, high
living standards and full democratic rights, this would be an irresistible
prospect, not just for the peoples of Spanish-speaking South America, but also
for the inhabitants of the islands.

We must pose the question concretely. What power of attraction can the
present capitalist regime in Argentina have for anyone? Mass unemployment,
poverty and hunger are not a good advertisement! Many Argentine citizens have
voted with their feet and left to seek their fortune in foreign parts. Under
such conditions, why should the people of the Malvinas want to join Argentina?
To pose the question is to answer it. But it must be posed in class terms,
not as empty nationalist demagogy.

Let us speak clearly. The problem of the Malvinas will never be solved by
the rotten and reactionary Argentine bourgeoisie. The Argentine oligarchy
has dragged a once prosperous country into the abysm of poverty and hunger. It
cannot solve any of the problems of the Argentine people. To imagine that such a
bourgeoisie could settle the issue of the Malvinas is simply madness. The
prior condition to solve this question – and all the other questions facing
the masses – is that the working class must take power.

A ‘war of national liberation’?

Twenty years later we have nothing to hide and nothing to be ashamed of. But
among honest elements in the Left in Argentina, there are doubts. The demand for
an honest debate is growing. The chauvinist elements are losing ground. Even
Luis Oviedo shows signs of wishing to qualify his enthusiasm for the Malvinas
adventure when he hastens to assure us that the PO opposed the invasion of
the Islands:

“Let's make this clear: Pol�tica Obrera (antecessor to the Partido Obrero)
was opposed to the invasion (it was the only one to do so), but was not opposed
to defending Argentina headed by Galtieri against Thatcher's imperialist fleet
supplied by the US at its base in Ascension Island and guided by Reagan's
satellites.”

The PO has made a big song and dance about our alleged “betrayal” and “pro-imperialist”
position. There is not a word of truth in all these irresponsible accusations.
We have never hidden our position on the Malvinas because we have nothing to
hide. We invite the comrades in Argentina to republish what they wrote at the
time. Let people judge for themselves who had a false position at the time and
since.

What position did the Left in Argentina take on the issue of the war? Was it
permissible, for the sake of a few islands in the Atlantic, to forget about the
30,000 dead and join hands with the Junta, even temporarily? We do not think so.
To imagine that the reactionary Argentine Junta could play a progressive role in
this conflict was the height of naiveté. War is the continuation of politics by
other means. The invasion of the Malvinas was only the continuation of the Junta’s
domestic policy, dictated by the need to survive, by creating a diversion.

The reactionary nature of the invasion of the islands is very well expressed
in the following:

“The first thing that must be made clear is that the recovery of a
territory that belongs to us historically and geographically and that is in the
imperialists' hands is not, in itself, sufficient to characterize that action as
a true defence of national independence. It is evident that that
characterization depends on the ends pursued by that act of recovery, as all as
on the overall policy of the government carrying it out.

“If the recovery of the Malvinas is just a means of switching masters in
the South Atlantic, or a way of solving a conflict that is hindering the
surrender of the resources of the region to foreign capital, it is clear that
this action has an anti-imperialist appearance, but its real meaning is a
greater subjugation to imperialism. Something like that must not surprise us in
a continent where bourgeois nationalism has a long history of demagogy and a
long experience in the employment of the tactics of deceit towards the popular
masses.”

This is very well put, and expresses the essence of the matter. We have no
fundamental difference with what is said in these lines. Who is the author?
Comrade Jorge Altamira, the leader of the PO. He continues:

“Today, the Argentinean state that is engaged in the recovery of the
Malvinas is in the hands of the direct or indirect agents of the powers that
oppress our nation. What can be the real extent of an act of sovereignty when
the country that undertakes it (and the government that executes it) is
politically dominated by the agents of national oppression? The obvious
conclusion is that the priority is a different one: to smash first the internal
reaction, break the links of submission (economic and diplomatic) and build a
powerful internal anti-imperialist and revolutionary front, based on the
workers. The priority of a real national struggle is to break the internal front
of reaction and build the revolutionary front of the masses. That is what
happened in all the great national emancipatory revolts: the French, Russian,
Chinese and Cuban Revolutions.

“Vis-a-vis the fundamental priorities of the struggle for national
liberation, the occupation of the Malvinas is a distractionist move, which the
dictatorship intends to capitalize internally and internationally in the
interests of the Argentinean exploiters and the imperialist bourgeoisies that
‘protect’ them.”

See Malvinas: In Order to Fight Against Imperialism, No Support Whatsoever
for the Dictatorship (5 April 1982, Pol�tica Obrera N° 328 Magazine
Internacionalismo, Year II, No 5, August-October 1982) http://www.po.org.ar/english/malvinas.htm

Imperialist intrigues

Comrade Altamira makes some very interesting points about the real aims of
the Junta. One month before the occupation of the Malvinas, the newspaper "La
Prensa" (3/3/82) gave extensive information about the character and the
aims of the operation. "According to the Argentinean sources we had
access to, the US government would have expressed its "understanding"
vis-à-vis the new position of Buenos Aires, as well as its conviction that the
recovery of the Malvinas for Argentina constitutes, at this point in time,
almost a condition sine qua non for the establishment of an adequate Western
defence structure in the South Atlantic, able to withstand Soviet
penetration in the area, dissipate the long-standing tensions on the Beagle
straits between Argentina and Chile, which is nowadays being mediated by the
Vatican; a mediation whose resolution could depend on the stronger or weaker
strategic or geopolitical position of Argentina in the whole southern region,
not only in the Beagle. Both issues appear to be intimately linked, not only
from the point of view of general military and economic security, but as in
regard to the diplomatic interests of the Catholic Church. As to Washington,
everybody agrees that the recovery of the Malvinas by Argentina would perhaps
open the doors for the creation of joint military bases in the islands, or
the leasing of bases to the US, with a much greater capability of control over
the whole area than any defence position in the Beagle, whether it belongs to
Argentina, Chile or any other Western country (by the way these are not mutually
exclusive categories)."

"According to our sources," continues La Prensa, "the
Argentine plans also extend to eventual British interests going beyond those
specifically concerning the inhabitants of the islands, which in any case
would receive the most generous terms regarding their property, cultural and
political status, free access to all Argentinean facilities, and even special
economic compensations. On this point, it was even pointed out to us that Buenos
Aires would be willing to offer British Petroleum and other British enterprises
a share in the exploitation of hydrocarbon and other resources in wide areas of
the region, as well as facilities for its navy, in such a way that the return of
sovereignty over the islands would not in any way diminish, but on the contrary
increase, Great Britain's perspectives in the Southern Atlantic.
Undoubtedly, this attitude aims not only at reaching a pacific solution to the
conflict, but also to consolidate the tacit support of the US if a military
clash should take place, with the aim of easing as far as possible Washington's
frictions with its ’cousins’ and allies in NATO."

This analysis was corroborated by La Naci�n the following day
(4/3/82): "American diplomacy is trying to determine whether that
renewed effort of Argentina to recover possession of the Malvinas Islands is
related to the growing internationalisation of the American continental
situation.

"The rearmament of Venezuela, the announcement of the first naval
manoeuvres of NATO in the Gulf of Mexico and the search for new US bases on the
West coast of the Caribbean are expressions of the new dimension attributed to
the defence of the continent.

"This coincides with the unexpected and vigorous effort in favour of
a prompt solution of the conflict over the possession of the archipelago which
controls the austral naval routes. Englishmen have been there for more than a
century, but their navy has been shrinking due to the heavy budgetary problems
of the United Kingdom.

"The US Navy, besides, thinks that the Cuban fleet, though small,
constitutes a threat to the continental routes. The Cuban ships cannot operate
in the Southern Atlantic but their activity in the Caribbean can interfere with
the efforts of the US navy in the austral passages.

"That would be even more ominous in the case of a potential crisis in
the India Ocean, which is one of the scenarios of the US naval strategists.

"America diplomatic sources point out that to these elements should be
added what they perceive as the excellent military relations between Argentina
and the US.

"Although clearly Washington always attempts to stay clear of the
Malvinas question, the new circumstances could lead to a revision of its
position, or at least encourage Argentina to force that change.

"...The news media doubts that the sale of planes to Venezuela, the
search for bases in the Caribbean and the first military manoeuvres of NATO in
the region are isolated facts.

" What is not doubted by anyone is that Washington places the question
of the defence of its continental allies in a global perspective that could
lead it to persuade Great Britain to solve the irritating southern conflict with
its key allies."

"The impression among diplomatic circles is that while there are no
formal elements with which to determine what is happening, something may be
happening. Neither Argentina nor the United States are at ease, and, moreover,
they are not acting in tandem.”

So there we have it! The Junta in Buenos Aires, far from planning a war
against imperialism, was involved in manoeuvres with US imperialism to secure
the handing over of the islands to Argentina in order to strengthen the
stranglehold of imperialism in the strategically important South Atlantic. They
hoped to arrive at a compromise with British imperialism, whose interests would
be safeguarded, as the article points out: “Buenos Aires would be willing
to offer British Petroleum and other British enterprises a share in the
exploitation of hydrocarbon and other resources in wide areas of the region, as
well as facilities for its navy, in such a way that the return of sovereignty
over the islands would not in any way diminish, but on the contrary increase,
Great Britain's perspectives in the Southern Atlantic.”

In what way these reactionary intrigues could be mistaken for a “war of
national liberation” it is very hard to see. The Junta was not planning to
fight imperialism but, as faithful office boys of imperialism, to arrive at a
secret agreement with London to secure the handing over of the islands.
Unfortunately for them, they miscalculated and the whole plot unravelled. They
found themselves in a war which they did not want and which they lost. The US
imperialists, who backed the dictatorship and its intrigues, was forced to
abandon the Junta in order to avoid a conflict with London.

Comrade Altamira concludes: “All this information must be linked to a more
general problem: foreign policy is the continuation of internal policy; and the
internal and foreign policy of Galtieri-Alemann is one of submission to
imperialism. That is why, whatever the derivations of the international crisis,
as a result of the contradictions an alliance between Yankees and Englishmen,
and between the dictatorship and both of them, the occupation of the Malvinas is
not part of a policy of national liberation or independence, but a simulacrum of
nation sovereignty, because it limits itself to territorial issues, while its
social content continues to be pro-imperialist. The national state is formally
sovereign in the whole continental territory of Argentina, yet this by no means
precludes the fact that, due to its economic and international policy, it is
subjugated to imperialism.

“To consider the recovery of Malvinas as an isolated act of sovereignty,
and, even worse, to hide the active negotiations with imperialism by the
dictatorship in order to integrate the occupation of the islands into a
pro-imperialist strategy, is to let oneself be misled, consciously or
unconsciously, by bourgeois demagogy.”

Further: “Whatever the course of events,” wrote comrade Altamira, “it
is clear that the occupation of the Malvinas is not the axis of national
liberation. The dictatorship has had recourse to it in order to find a way out
of its deep internal crisis and impasse.”

This could not be clearer or more correct. Jorge Altamira is to be
congratulated on the stand he took over the invasion of the Malvinas. What was
necessary was to resist all attempts to mislead the workers, consciously or
unconsciously, by bourgeois demagogy. That was the case then, and it is the case
now. And if it was bourgeois demagogy twenty-two years ago to present the
reactionary adventure of the Junta as a “war of national liberation”, then
it remains equally wrong today.

Finally, comrade Altamira says: “If war breaks out, not out of demagogic
patriotism but out of authentic anti-imperialism we say: war to the death,
revolutionary war against imperialism. That means not only a naval war in the
South, but an attack on the imperialist properties in the entire national
territory, confiscation of foreign capital and, above all, the arming of the
people.”

It was correct to pose the question in terms of an anti-imperialist struggle,
to base oneself on what was progressive in the instincts of the masses and to
try to impart to the war a genuinely anti-imperialist content, above all by
demanding the expropriation of the property of the imperialists, which

Galtieri naturally refused to do. Altamira writes:

“On Friday 2 from the Bank of London alone deposits for more than 10
million dollars were withdrawn. Only after Thatcher froze the Argentinean funds
in London did the dictatorship implement a ridiculous control of foreign
exchange, which does not prevent the flight of capital through the black market,
or the support of the economic boycott by the capitalists of other imperialist
nations. The dictatorship is already capitulating.”

And he concludes:

“Given the overall present situation and the attempts to drag the workers
to tail-end and support the dictatorship, we declare that it is necessary to
maintain the workers' and anti-imperialist independence, with a precise program:

1) To denounce the attempt to capitulate before imperialism, whether by sell-out
negotiations on the economy and foreign policy, or by the withdrawal of
troops in exchange for the gradual and conditioned return of the archipelago to
Argentina.

2) To demand the intervention against all the foreign capital that is already
sabotaging or speculating against the national economy.

3) In case of war, to extend it all over the country, attacking and
confiscating big imperialist capital and, above all, calling for the arming of
the workers.

4) Immediate satisfaction of all the demands of the unions and the other
workers' organizations; satisfaction of the demands of movement of the mothers
and relatives of the desaparecidos [the missing, the 30,000 people killed
by the dictatorship].

5) The fight for the formation of an anti-imperialist united front that will
struggle for the implementation of this programme in actual practice.”

All these demands are excellent, as is the final conclusion: “The working
class must be conscious of this, because if it is blinded in the face of the
situation, the change of regime will take place at its own cost. That is why the
demand for unlimited political democracy and a sovereign Constituent Assembly
retains its full validity.”

This goes to the essence of the question: above all in a war situation the
working class must not allow itself to be blinded by the pressures of patriotism
and “national unity”, but maintain its class independence. Incidentally, in
that situation, where Argentina was under a dictatorship and no democratic
rights existed, the democratic demands would necessarily occupy a central
position – including the demand for a Constituent Assembly. That was correct
then, because it flowed from the whole situation. It is not correct today
because it does not.

The position of the British Marxists

We have pointed out the position taken by comrade Altamira in 1982. What
position was taken by the British Marxists? Luis Oviedo says we supported
British imperialism and took a chauvinist position against Argentines in general
(“Argies out!”). This is what Ted Grant wrote at the time, concerning the
tasks of the Argentine Marxists:

“In Argentina, the role of Marxists must be skilfully to oppose the war.
They will expose the inconsistencies of the Junta, showing the mess which the
capitalist officer caste have made of the economy. The Junta has, temporarily,
been able to divert the Argentine masses on nationalist lines. But the Marxists
will demonstrate the incapacity of the officer caste to fight a revolutionary
war, without which it is virtually ruled out that Argentina could defeat
Britain, which is still a relatively powerful imperialist power. Why does the
Junta fight with kid gloves? The Argentine capitalists, on whose interests the
Junta rests, are linked to American and British finance capital. Marxists in the
Argentine will demand the expropriation, first of British investments, and then
of all foreign capital in the country.

“They will demand that Argentina be handed back to the Argentines: that is
the expropriation of both landed and industrial capital. They will show the
privileges and incompetence of the rotten upper strata of the officer caste, and
their military incompetence. Without the genuine planning of industry, and fair
rationing and distribution of goods for all, it would be impossible to wage an
effective war. The Marxists would criticise the entirely selfish aims of the
Junta and the Argentine capitalists, whose aim, if they hold the Falklands,
would be to reap profits, as junior partners of American imperialism, at the
expense of the working class. The Marxists would explain that victory over the
powerful imperialist Britain could not be gained by military means, especially
under the direction of the totalitarian Junta, but only through political and
social means. An overthrow of the Junta by the workers and the establishment of
a socialist Argentina would be the most powerful weapon against all imperialism,
especially British and American. The Argentine working class could then appeal
to the labour movement and the workers and soldiers of Britain. The workers of
Argentina would then suggest a socialist federation of Argentina, the Falklands,
and of a socialist Britain. “A socialist government in the Argentine would
then point out that the Falklands issue has been magnified out of all proportion
by generations of Argentine capitalists for their own ends. They would appeal to
the workers of all Latin America to overthrow the economic yoke of capitalism
and imperialism, and to overthrow their own Juntas, and to prepare for a
socialist federation of Latin America. The Junta's aims cannot be the aims of
the working class, either in home or foreign policy. For the capitalists, war
will be profitable. For the workers and soldiers, the war will mean bloodshed
and suffering. In the course of a long war, if the present conflict were to be
prolonged, Marxist ideas of this sort would receive enormous support in
Argentina and throughout Latin America. The overthrow of the Junta would mark
the beginning of a socialist revolution in Argentina, though because of the
absence of a Marxist leadership it would in the beginning take a distorted
Peronist form”. (The Falklands Crisis - A Socialist Answer, by Ted
Grant, May 1982.)

Now where does this position differ from that of Jorge Altamira?
Fundamentally, there is no difference. Yet Luis Oviedo persists in the myth that
we had an “imperialist” position. Really, there are none so blind as those
who will not see.

The question of the ‘kelpers’

Having read with pleasure the writings of Jorge Altamira of 1982, we return
with some trepidation to the writings of Luis Oviedo in 2004. He continues to
bore away like a dentist’s drill:

"Woods prostitutes the right to self-determination of the peoples
by placing it at the service of the reinforcement of colonial oppression. But
since for the Marxists every national demand is subordinate to the proletarian
revolution, his defense of 'self-determination of the Kelpers' should have led
him to raise a 'workers government of the Falklands', something which evidently
he did not do because it would have placed in evidence the complete ridiculousness
of his positions.

"These supporters of 'colonial socialism' are the ones who attack
the Partido Obrero.” (My emphasis)

We will reply to this rubbish as politely as we can. In the first place,
Comrade Oviedo does not pose the question of self-determination in a Marxist
way. He is indignant at our alleged defence of the “kelpers”, as he calls
the inhabitants of the Islands. Because we raise the question of the rights of
the islanders as one of the elements in the equation (not necessarily the
most important one) he accuses us of being “advocates of colonial socialism”.

Let us speak clearly, so that even Luis Oviedo can understand what we are
saying: to us it is a matter of indifference to who these islands belong.
The British working class has no interests in maintaining Britain’s control
over them. Our first duty was to fight against our own bourgeoisie – to
oppose the reactionary policies of the Thatcher government. At no time, either
directly or indirectly did we support the war. Let me go further: for any
British Marxist to have supported this war would have been a betrayal.

Comrade Oviedo assumes that the position of the British Marxists in relation
to the war was determined by the position of the “kelpers”. This is very far
from the case. We are well aware that the imperialists always make use of small
peoples for their own reactionary purposes. The British imperialists were not
interested in the opinions of the people who live on the islands, and in fact
were preparing to hand them over to Argentina before the Junta invaded, as Ted
Grant pointed out:

“Thatcher and the Tories pretend that the Falkland Islanders and their
wishes are their first consideration. In reality, it is the last thing they are
concerned about. If it were in the interests of British imperialism, they would
sacrifice the interests of the Islanders without blinking an eyelid. It is the
prestige of British imperialism and the prospect of exotic riches in the
Antarctic, not the interests of the Islanders, which determine the policy of the
Tory Government”. (The Falklands Crisis - A Socialist Answer, by Ted
Grant, May 1982.)

The question of the “kelpers” did not in any way affect our analysis of
the war as an imperialist war on the part of Britain, as we explained at great
length. On the other hand, the fact that there was a military dictatorship
in Buenos Aires also did not alter our view of the war, any more than the
existence of the Nazi regime in Germany changed the imperialist nature of the
Second World War. In both cases, the British Marxists took the position that the
war was an imperialist war. I hope that is now sufficiently clear.

The point is, however, that the British imperialists cynically used the
crimes of the Junta and the oppression of the inhabitants of the islands as a
pretext for sending the fleet. We were obliged to answer these arguments, which
had a certain effect on the masses in Britain. There was actually no enthusiasm
for the war in Britain. But the argument that a fascist dictatorship was
oppressing the islanders had an effect, and had to be answered.

How should we answer this? We said: it is true that the Junta is a monstrous
regime. But the British ruling class were in favour of this regime. They were
the best of friends until the invasion, when Thatcher and co. suddenly “discovered”
that it was a fascist dictatorship that tortured and murdered people. We can
have no confidence in the Tories and the ruling class. We said to the Labour
leaders: break the united front with the Tories. We demanded a general election,
and put forward the slogan: Labour to power on a socialist programme.

We said to the British workers: yes, the Junta is also our enemy. But the
British imperialists cannot defend the interests of the working class anywhere.
Let the working class take power into its hands and then we will be in a
position to fight a revolutionary war against the Junta. We will appeal to our
brothers and sisters in Argentina to rise against the dictatorship and we will
help them. Moreover, we will propose a socialist federation of Britain and
Argentina to unite the two peoples. The question of the Malvinas can then be
amicably settled on a free and voluntary basis.

Luis Oviedo has a good laugh at the idea of a revolutionary war. He is
clearly not aware that this was Lenin’s position in World War One. The
Bolsheviks had the position of revolutionary defeatism for Russia. They refused
to support the imperialist war and instead advocated revolution. Lenin
ceaselessly explained to the Russian workers and peasants that the main enemy
was at home. But as early as 1915 Lenin pointed out that if the Russian workers
came to power, then the nature of the war would change. A Russian workers’
republic would be entiteld to wage a revolutionary war against the Kaiser’s
Germany. In such a case it would be permissible for the Red Army to come to the
aid of the German revolution by military means. Let us also recall that Trotsky
was in favour of the Red Army intervening against Germany after the victory of
Hitler.

The idea of a revolutionary war was inscribed on the banner of the Bolshevik
Party before 1917. Of course, the prior condition for this was that the Russian
workers should take power. We raised the perspective of a workers’ government
in Britain that would wage a revolutionary war against the Junta, while making
an appeal to the Argentine working class to rise. Under such conditions,
we said, we could agree to fight the Junta, but under the bourgeoisie, never.
This was exactly the same as the idea that Lenin advanced in 1915-16.

Comrade Oviedo talks a lot about the right of self-determination but at no
time does he say what that right consists of. The right of self-determination
is for people, not for rocks. We cannot support every military adventure
launched by the bourgeois of former colonial countries to seize land and sources
of raw materials. Luis Oviedo complains that we described the invasion of the
Malvinas as an annexation. Well, what else was it, when the entire population of
the Islands was opposed to it? A liberation? What kind of a liberation is it
that abolishes every democratic right that was enjoyed by these people, reducing
them to the same servitude that was “enjoyed” by the rest of the Argentine
nation? What a mockery!

Now may we be permitted a question? What does Luis Oviedo suggest should be
done with the population of the Malvinas? To this question he gives no answer.
It is not true that our attitude to the war was determined by this question.
That would be completely incorrect. But is it correct on the part of Argentina
to ignore the rights of these people and trample them underfoot? Such a
suggestion would be contrary to the letter and the spirit of proletarian
internationalism. The answer is very simple. On a capitalist basis, an equitable
solution to the national question is not possible. It necessarily involves the
violation of the rights of one or another national group. Only the working class
can bring about a fair and democratic solution to the national problem by taking
power. That is the only solution.

We denounced Thatcher’s military adventure in the South Atlantic and
systematically exposed the hypocrisy of the British ruling class, which had
excellent relations with the Junta until the latter invaded the Islands, and
only then discovered that the Junta was “fascist” and killed and tortured
people. Thatcher and her cronies were not interested in the fate of the
inhabitants of the islands, but used this demagogically to influence the British
people to accept the need for war. Therefore, we were obliged to take this
question into account in our public propaganda.

Ah! says Luis. But why did Woods not demand the withdrawal of the British
army from the Malvinas, in order to give independence to the inhabitants
of the Islands? This is a very peculiar mode of argument. In the first place,
nobody has ever said that the inhabitants of the Malvinas are a nation,
or argued that they can form an independent state. In the second place, let us
recall that Marxists are not obliged to defend independence, but only the
right to self-determination – that is to say, the right of a given people
to decide whether they live within the frontiers of a given state.

As far as the inhabitants of the Islands are concerned, all that we can say
is that they should have the right to decide freely in which state they wish to
live. “But they will decide to stay British” Luis will complain. Maybe so.
But then there is not much Luis Oviedo can do about it. But such an outcome is
not at all certain. A capitalist Argentina, of course, will have no appeal to
the people of the islands. But a socialist Argentina would be quite a different
matter.

The working class, as Lenin explained, demands a democracy that rules out
the forcible retention of any group of people within the boundaries of one state.
That is precisely the basis of the Leninist principle of the right of
self-determination. The idea that it is acceptable to forcibly annex a group of
people against their will is an abomination that has nothing in common with
Marxism-Leninism. That applies to the English-speaking inhabitants of the
Malvinas as much as to anyone else.

Comrade Oviedo thinks himself very smart, but in reality he only stumbles
into new errors and contradictions at every step. The demand for the withdrawal
of troops would arise in a normal colonial situation, where the population felt
themselves oppressed by a foreign army of occupation. But this is not a normal
colonial situation. The people of the Islands, confronted with the reality of a
brutal military occupation by a dictatorial regime predictably reacted against
Argentine rule. They preferred the presence of British soldiers to that
prospect. Is this surprising? With 30,000 victims of the Junta, one must admit
that it is not.

Opposition to colonial rule is opposition to national oppression. But
at the time of the invasion, the population of the islands was wholly British.
If there had been an Argentine minority on the islands that was being oppressed,
we would have to have taken this into account. But at the time of the invasion there
was not a single Argentine living on the islands. To draw an analogy with
the French colons in Algeria is false, because the colons were a
minority of the population, the majority of which was made up of oppressed
Arabs. This was entirely different to the situation that existed in the Malvinas
on the eve of the invasion.

The Islanders were not a colonially oppressed population. On the contrary, they
were afraid that they would be oppressed by the Junta, and these fears were
well founded, since the Junta was oppressing its own people. In whose interests
was it to deprive these people of their most elementary rights? What was
progressive in enslaving the people who lived on these islands? And who would
have benefited if the Junta had succeeded in its military adventure? These
concrete questions are not even considered by Luis Oviedo. His wisdom begins and
ends with the bare assertion: “The Malvinas belong to Argentina.”

Let us accept for the sake of argument that this is the case. How can we get
the Malvinas to unite with Argentina? By force? Apart from the fact that the
forcible incorporation of people in a state to which they do not wish to belong
has never been the position of Marxists, the military solution has been tried
and has failed. Twenty two years later the Malvinas remain firmly under British
control and no change in the situation is in sight. All the fulminating and
patriotic flag waving in the world will not change this. What does the PO
suggest to solve the problem? Nothing.And this is hardly surprising,
since on a capitalist basis no solution is possible.

The truth is always concrete. Socialists (and even consistent democrats)
stand for the solution of national disputes by a voluntary union of the peoples.
But on the present basis, there is nothing attractive for the people of the
islands in the idea of joining Argentina. Politically, after the experience of
1982, no government in London could agree to the handover of the islands to
Argentina while the islanders were against it. The only way to convince the
people of the Islands to join with Argentina is for the Argentine workers to
take power into their own hands and establish a workers’ democracy. That would
open the way to a voluntary federation. There are many advantages for the
Islanders in such an arrangement. Once they were convinced that their rights and
language were not being threatened, they would willingly accept union. And from
a Marxist point of view, a voluntary union is the only kind of union we
are interested in.

Marxism and self-determination

The bourgeois nationalists in the former colonial countries are always trying
to beat the drum for “national unity”. They try to argue that the working
class must set aside its interests and join them in the alleged “struggle
against imperialism” – which they are incapable of waging. One of the main
arguments is that we must have an immediate, “practical” solution – which
usually means war.

On this Lenin wrote: “The bourgeoisie, which naturally comes out as the
hegemon (leader) at the start of every national movement, says that the support
of all national aspirations is practical. But the policy of the proletariat in
the national question (as in other questions) supports the bourgeoisie only in
order to secure national peace (which the bourgeoisie cannot bring about
completely and which can be achieved only with complete democracy), in
order to secure equal rights and to create the best conditions for the class
struggle. Therefore, it is against the practicality of the bourgeoisie
that the proletarians advance their principles in the national question; they
always give the bourgeoisie only conditional support. In national affairs
the bourgeoisie always strives either for privileges for its own nation
or exceptional advantages for it; and this is called being ‘practical’. The
proletariat is opposed to all privileges, to all exceptionalism. To demand that
it should be “practical” is to trail in the wake of the bourgeoisie, to fall
into opportunism.” (Lenin, The right of Nations to Self-Determination,
pp. 77-78. February-May, 1914.)

Note that Lenin says that there are certain conditions in which it is
permissible for the working class of colonial or semi-colonial countries to give
conditional support to the bourgeoisie. What conditions is Lenin talking
about here? It is very clear that he is talking about the national liberation
struggle against imperialism, the struggle of oppressed peoples for
self-determination and national independence.

The British Marxists always consistently stood for the freedom of the
colonies held by British imperialism in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. That
was our internationalist duty, and we performed it rigorously in every case. The
accusation that we were in some way “colonial socialists” is simply
laughable.

The defence of the right of self-determination was, and remains, our
position. The defence of the right to self-determination is not conditioned by
the nature of the regime. We defended Abyssinia against Mussolini’s Italy,
despite the reactionary feudal regime of Haili Selassi. The Abyssinian people
were fighting a war of national liberation against foreign enslavement. Even if
the occupying power were democratic, instead of fascist, Marxists would have had
to support Abyssinia.

The same was the case of Brazil in the 1930s, which some people have
erroneously cited as a parallel with the case of the Malvinas war. Trotsky
explained that Marxists would have to support Brazil against British
imperialism, although it was ruled by the fascist regime of Vargas.

Is it correct to draw an analogy with what Trotsky wrote in the 1930s about
Brazil and the Malvinas war? At that time Trotsky was considering the
possibility of an act of aggression by British imperialism against Brazil,
involving the invasion and colonial enslavement of Brazil by Britain. In
such circumstances, Trotsky explained, the Marxists would have to defend Brazil,
even though it was under a fascist dictatorship. All this is correct and ABC for
Marxists.

But was this the case in the war of 1982 between Britain and Argentina? Was
this really a war to conquer, occupy and colonially enslave Argentina? It was
not. The nature of the occupation of the Malvinas by the Junta has been very
well explained by Jorge Altamira, and there is very little to be added to what
he has said. This was a reactionary war on both sides. It did not benefit the
workers of either Britain or Argentina. Therefore, to demand that we should have
supported one group of bandits against another is entirely incorrect.

The war was a reactionary, imperialist war on the part of Britain, and the
duty of the British Marxists was therefore to oppose their own bourgeoisie.
For their part, the Argentine Marxists had the duty to oppose the Argentine
bourgeoisie and its agents in the Junta. To demand, in this concrete case,
that the British Marxists ought to have gone further and supported Argentina is
incorrect and an impermissible concession to social chauvinism. In this
particular case, there was nothing to choose between the two sides.

The case of the invasion of Iraq was entirely different. Iraq has been
invaded and occupied by US and British imperialism on behalf of the giant
American corporations that wish to plunder its oil wealth. We therefore
immediately took the position of opposing the imperialist war, for the
unconditional withdrawal of all foreign troops: let the Iraqi people decide
their own future! That is the only possible policy. But what has this got to
do with the war of 1982?

While insisting on the right of nations to self-determination, Lenin and
Trotsky also fought against nationalist philistinism – especially
among the workers of oppressed nations. But all too often national
philistinism is just what we find among certain so-called Trotskyists who
have never assimilated the essence of the teachings of Lenin and Trotsky. Lenin
explained that on all the serious matters, it is class, not national,
affiliation that decides.

Just as the bourgeoisie always subordinates the “national interest” to
its own class interests, so the proletariat always places the class struggle
before the national question. This idea was already expressed by Marx when he
wrote that the national question is always subordinate to the labour
question. The Argentine bourgeois is far closer to the British imperialists
than their own working class. The “anti-imperialism” of the bourgeoisie is a
lie and a deception. This is what must be explained. But how can it be explained
if the question is always posed in simplistic terms as “Argentina versus
Britain”?

What attitude did the British Marxists take to this war? Firstly, implacable
opposition to the war, secondly, an exposure of the hypocrisy of British
imperialism. Far from the caricature presented by Luis Oviedo, we consistently
combated all the vile anti-Argentine propaganda in the media (“Argies out”
and so on), and pointed out that the interests of the British and Argentine
workers were the same. Luis Oviedo and others in Argentina try to imply that we
were somehow “neutral”. That is utter nonsense. The British Marxists did
their duty. We denounced the war as an imperialist war from start to finish.We opposed our own bourgeoisie. We consistently denounced the reactionary
actions of Thatcher and the British imperialists. We also denounced the Labour
leaders for their collaboration with the Tories. That was all that could be
demanded of us in the circumstances.

Comrade Altamira at first took the same position as we did. But can it be
said that the Argentine Trotskyists have consistently maintained an
internationalist position? The arguments of Luis Oviedo give us serious doubts
on this question. Running through them is a very clear element that is not at
all in the spirit of Marxism but very much in line with that of Argentine
nationalism.

Unfortunately, at the time of the Malvinas war, many Argentine Marxists
allowed themselves to be carried away by the prevailing mood in society – a
mood of patriotic intoxication that was deliberately whipped up by the Junta for
its own ends. The intoxication of the masses can be understood, and in any case
was only a temporary condition. But it is a bad business when Marxists allow
themselves to be influenced by such moods and allow these passing moods of the
masses to dictate their policy. Above all in time of war it is necessary to
stand against the prevailing tide of chauvinism and “patriotic” demagogy.