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Brookings Topics - Gulf StatesThu, 04 Aug 2016 12:21:25 +0000en-UShourly1https://wordpress.org/?v=4.5.3nohttps://www.brookings.edu/2016/07/14/why-the-iran-deals-second-anniversary-may-be-even-more-important-than-the-first/Why the Iran deal’s second anniversary may be even more important than the firsthttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/171792924/0/brookingsrss/topics/gulfstates~Why-the-Iran-deal%e2%80%99s-second-anniversary-may-be-even-more-important-than-the-first/
Thu, 14 Jul 2016 15:26:00 +0000http://www.brookings.edu?p=160459&preview_id=160459At the time that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran was being debated here in Washington, I felt that the terms of the deal were far less consequential than how the United States responded to Iranian regional behavior after a deal was signed. I see the events of the past 12 months as largely having borne out that analysis.

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At the time that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran was being debated here in Washington, I felt that the terms of the deal were far less consequential than how the United States responded to Iranian regional behavior after a deal was signed. I see the events of the past 12 months as largely having borne out that analysis. While both sides have accused the other of “cheating” on the deal in both letter and spirit, it has so far largely held and neither Tehran nor Washington (nor any of the other signatories) have shown a determination to abrogate the deal or flagrantly circumvent its terms. However, as many of my colleagues have noted, the real frictions have arisen from the U.S. geostrategic response to the deal.

Author

I continue to believe that the Obama administration was ultimately correct that signing the JCPOA was better than any of the realistic alternatives—even if I also continue to believe that a better deal was possible, had the administration handled the negotiations differently. However, its regional approach since then has left a fair amount to be desired:

The president gratuitously insulted the Saudis and other U.S. allies in his various interviews with Jeff Goldberg of The Atlantic.

After several alarming Iranian-Saudi dust-ups, administration officials have none-too-privately condemned Riyadh and excused Tehran in circumstances where both were culpable.

Washington has continued to just about ignore all manner of Iranian transgressions from human rights abuses to missile tests, and senior administration officials have turned themselves into metaphorical pretzels to insist that the United States is doing everything it can to assist the Iranian economy.

And the overt component of the administration’s Syria policy remains stubbornly focused on ISIS, not the Bashar Assad regime or its Iranian allies, while the covert side focused on the regime remains very limited—far smaller than America’s traditional Middle Eastern allies have sought.

To be fair, the administration has been quite supportive of the Gulf Cooperation Council war effort in Yemen—far more so than most Americans realize—but even there, still much less than the Saudis, Emiratis, and other Sunni states would like.

To be blunt, the perspective of America’s traditional Sunni Arab allies (and to some extent, Turkey and Israel) is that they are waging an all-out war against Iran and its (Shiite) allies across the region. They have wanted the United States, their traditional protector, to lead that fight. And they feared that the JCPOA would result in one of two different opposite approaches: either that the United States would use the JCPOA as an excuse to further disengage from the geopolitical competition in the region, or even worse, that Washington would use it to switch sides and join the Iranian coalition. Unfortunately, their reading of events has been that this is precisely what has happened, although they continue to debate whether the United States is merely withdrawing or actively changing sides. And as both Bruce Reidel and I have both stressed, this perception is causing the GCC states to act more aggressively, provoking more crises and worsening proxy warfare with Iran that will inevitably aggravate an already dangerously-unstable Middle East and raises the risk of escalation to something even worse.

U.S. President Barack Obama walks with Saudi King Salman at Erga Palace upon his arrival for a summit meeting in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia April 20, 2016. Photo credit: Reuters/Kevin Lamarque.

Looking to year two

All that said, I wanted to use the first anniversary of the JCPOA to think about where we may be on its second anniversary. By then, we will have a new president. Donald Trump has not laid out anything close to a coherent approach to the Middle East, nor does he have any prior experience with the region, so I do not believe we can say anything reasonable about how he might handle the region if he somehow became president. Hillary Clinton, on the other hand, has had considerable experience with the region—as first lady, senator, and secretary of state—and she and her senior aides have discussed the region to a much greater extent, making it possible to speculate on at least the broad contours of her initial Middle East policy.

In particular, Clinton has been at pains to emphasize a willingness to commit more resources to deal with the problems of the Middle East and a fervent desire to rebuild the strained ties with America’s traditional Middle Eastern allies. From my perspective, that is all to the good because an important (but hardly the only) factor in the chaos consuming the Middle East has been the Obama administration’s determination to disengage from the geopolitical events of the region and distance itself from America’s traditional allies. The problem here is not that the United States always does the right thing or that our allies are saints. Hardly. It is that the region desperately needs the United States to help it solve the massive problems of state failure and civil war that are simply beyond the capacity of regional actors to handle on their own. The only way to stop our allies from acting aggressively and provocatively is for the United States to lead them in a different, more constructive direction. In the Middle East in particular, you can’t beat something with nothing, and while the United States cannot be the only answer to the region’s problems, there is no answer to the region’s problems without the United States.

My best guess is that our traditional allies will enthusiastically welcome a Hillary Clinton presidency, and the new president will do all that she can to reassure them that she plans to be more engaged, more of a leader, more willing to commit American resources to Middle Eastern problems, more willing to help the region address its problems (and not just the problems that affect the United States directly, like ISIS). I think all of that rhetorical good will and a sense (on both sides) of putting the bad days of Obama behind them will produce a honeymoon period.

[T]he second anniversary of the JCPOA could prove even more fraught for America and the Middle East than the first.

But I suspect that that honeymoon will come to an end after 6 to 18 months, perhaps beginning with the second anniversary of the JCPOA and occasioned by it. I suspect that at that point, America’s traditional allies—the Sunni Arab States, Israel, and Turkey—will begin to look for President Clinton to turn her words into action, and from their perspective, that is probably going to mean doing much more than President Obama. I suspect that they will still want the United States to join and/or lead them in a region-wide war against Iran and its allies. And while I think that a President Clinton will want to do more than President Obama, I see no sign that she is interested in doing that much more.

Syria is one example. The GCC wants the United States to commit to a strategy that will destroy the Assad regime (and secondarily, eliminate ISIS and the Nusra Front). Clinton has said she was in favor of a beefed-up covert campaign against the Assad regime and that she is in favor of imposing a no-fly zone over the country. If, as president, she enacts both, this would be a much more aggressive policy than Obama’s, but as I have written elsewhere, neither is likely to eliminate the Assad regime, let alone stabilize Syria and end the civil war—the two real threats to both the United States and our regional allies (and our European allies).

Even more to the point, I cannot imagine a Hillary Clinton administration abrogating the JCPOA, imposing significant new economic sanctions on Iran, or otherwise acting in ways that it would fear could provoke Tehran to break the deal, overtly or covertly. That may look to our traditional allies like Washington is trying to remain on the fence, which will infuriate them. After Obama, and after Clinton’s rhetoric, they expect the United States to stand openly and resolutely with them. At the very least, such American restraint will place further limits on the willingness of a Clinton administration to adopt the kind of confrontational policy toward Tehran that our regional allies want, and that her rhetoric has led them to expect.

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton (C) speaks with Jordan’s Foreign Minister Nasser Judeh (L) and United Arab Emirates Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Anwar Gargash as they participate in the Libya Contact Group family photo at the Emirates Palace Hotel in Abu Dhabi June 9, 2011. Photo credit: Reuters/Susan Walsh.

Reconcile, or agree to disagree?

Let me be clear, I am not suggesting that the United States should adopt the GCC analysis of what is going on in the region wholeheartedly. I think that it overstates Iran’s role as the source of the region’s problems and so distracts from what I see as the region’s real problems—state failure and civil wars—even if the Iranians have played a role in exacerbating both.

Instead, my intent is simply to highlight that there are some important strategic differences between the United States and its regional allies, differences that are not all Barack Obama’s fault but reflect important differences that have emerged between the two sides. If this analysis is correct, then the second anniversary of the JCPOA could prove even more fraught for America and the Middle East than the first. The honeymoon will be over, and both sides may recognize that goodwill and rousing words alone cannot cover fundamental divergences in both our diagnosis of what ails the region and our proposed treatment of those maladies. If that is the case, then both may need to make much bigger adjustments than they currently contemplate. Otherwise, the United States may find that its traditional allies are no longer as willing to follow our lead, and our allies may discover that the United States is no longer interested in leading them on the path they want to follow.

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UncategorizedAt the time that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran was being debated here in Washington, I felt that the terms of the deal were far less consequential than how the United States responded to Iranian regional behavior after a deal was signed. I see the events of the past 12 months as largely having borne out that analysis. While both sides have accused the other of “cheating” on the deal in both letter and spirit, it has so far largely held and neither Tehran nor Washington (nor any of the other signatories) have shown a determination to abrogate the deal or flagrantly circumvent its terms. However, as many of my colleagues have noted, the real frictions have arisen from the U.S. geostrategic response to the deal.
Author
Kenneth M Pollack
Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for Middle East Policy
I continue to believe that the Obama administration was ultimately correct that signing the JCPOA was better than any of the realistic alternatives—even if I also continue to believe that a better deal was possible, had the administration handled the negotiations differently. However, its regional approach since then has left a fair amount to be desired:
- The president gratuitously insulted the Saudis and other U.S. allies in his various interviews with Jeff Goldberg of The Atlantic. - After several alarming Iranian-Saudi dust-ups, administration officials have none-too-privately condemned Riyadh and excused Tehran in circumstances where both were culpable. - Washington has continued to just about ignore all manner of Iranian transgressions from human rights abuses to missile tests, and senior administration officials have turned themselves into metaphorical pretzels to insist that the United States is doing everything it can to assist the Iranian economy. - And the overt component of the administration's Syria policy remains stubbornly focused on ISIS, not the Bashar Assad regime or its Iranian allies, while the covert side focused on the regime remains very limited—far smaller than America's traditional Middle Eastern allies have sought.
To be fair, the administration has been quite supportive of the Gulf Cooperation Council war effort in Yemen—far more so than most Americans realize—but even there, still much less than the Saudis, Emiratis, and other Sunni states would like.
To be blunt, the perspective of America's traditional Sunni Arab allies (and to some extent, Turkey and Israel) is that they are waging an all-out war against Iran and its (Shiite) allies across the region. They have wanted the United States, their traditional protector, to lead that fight. And they feared that the JCPOA would result in one of two different opposite approaches: either that the United States would use the JCPOA as an excuse to further disengage from the geopolitical competition in the region, or even worse, that Washington would use it to switch sides and join the Iranian coalition. Unfortunately, their reading of events has been that this is precisely what has happened, although they continue to debate whether the United States is merely withdrawing or actively changing sides. And as both Bruce Reidel and I have both stressed, this perception is causing the GCC states to act more aggressively, provoking more crises and worsening proxy warfare with Iran that will inevitably aggravate an already dangerously-unstable Middle East and raises the risk of escalation to something even worse. U.S. President Barack Obama walks with Saudi King Salman at Erga Palace upon his arrival for a summit meeting in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia April 20, 2016. Photo credit: Reuters/Kevin Lamarque.
Looking to year two
All that said, I wanted to use the first anniversary of the JCPOA to think about where we may be on its second anniversary. By then, we will have a new president. Donald Trump has not laid out anything close to a coherent approach to the Middle East, nor does he have any ... At the time that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran was being debated here in Washington, I felt that the terms of the deal were far less consequential than how the United States responded to Iranian regional behavior after a ... https://www.brookings.edu/2016/07/14/the-iran-deal-one-year-out-what-brookings-experts-are-saying/The Iran deal, one year out: What Brookings experts are sayinghttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/171790018/0/brookingsrss/topics/gulfstates~The-Iran-deal-one-year-out-What-Brookings-experts-are-saying/
Thu, 14 Jul 2016 13:54:00 +0000http://www.brookings.edu?p=160451&preview_id=160451How has the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—signed between the P5+1 and Iran one year ago—played out in practice? Several Brookings scholars, many of whom participated prominently in debates last year as the deal was reaching its final stages, offered their views.

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How has the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—signed between the P5+1 and Iran one year ago—played out in practice? Several Brookings scholars, many of whom participated prominently in debates last year surrounding official congressional review, offered their views.

Strobe Talbott, President, Brookings Institution:

At the one-year mark, it’s clear that the nuclear agreement between Iran and the major powers has substantially restricted Tehran’s ability to produce the fissile material necessary to build a bomb. That’s a net positive—for the United States and the broader region.

Robert Einhorn, Senior Fellow, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence and Senior Fellow, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative, Foreign Policy program:

One year after its conclusion, the JCPOA remains controversial in Tehran and Washington (as I describe in more detail here), with opponents unreconciled to the deal and determined to derail it. But opponents have had to scale back their criticism, in large part because the JCPOA, at least so far, has delivered on its principal goal—blocking Iran’s path to nuclear weapons for an extended period of time. Moreover, Iran’s positive compliance record has not given opponents much ammunition. The IAEA found Iran in compliance in its two quarterly reports issued in 2016.

But challenges to the smooth operation and even the longevity of the deal are already apparent.

A real threat to the JCPOA is that Iran will blame the slow recovery of its economy on U.S. failure to conscientiously fulfill its sanctions relief commitments and, using that as a pretext, will curtail or even end its own implementation of the deal. But international banks and businesses have been reluctant to engage Iran not because they have been discouraged by the United States but because they have their own business-related reasons to be cautious. Legislation proposed in Congress could also threaten the nuclear deal.

For now, the administration is in a position to block new legislation that it believes would scuttle the deal. But developments outside the JCPOA, especially Iran’s regional behavior and its crackdown on dissent at home, could weaken support for the JCPOA within the United States and give proponents of deal-killing legislation a boost.

A potential wildcard for the future of the JCPOA is coming governing transitions in both Washington and Tehran. Hillary Clinton would maintain the deal but perhaps a harder line than her predecessor. Donald Trump now says he will re-negotiate rather than scrap the deal, but a better deal will not prove negotiable. With President Hassan Rouhani up for re-election next year and the health of the Supreme Leader questionable, Iran’s future policy toward the JCPOA cannot be confidently predicted.

A final verdict on the JCPOA is many years away. But it is off to a promising start, as even some of its early critics now concede. Still, it is already clear that the path ahead will not always be smooth, the longevity of the deal cannot be taken for granted, and keeping it on track will require constant focus in Washington and other interested capitals.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action has fulfilled neither the worst fears of its detractors nor the most soaring ambitions of its proponents. All of the concerns that have shaped U.S. policy toward Tehran for more than a generation—terrorism, human rights abuses, weapons of mass destruction, regional destabilization—remain as relevant, and as alarming, as they have ever been. Notably, much the same is true on the Iranian side; the manifold grievances that Tehran has harbored toward Washington since the 1979 revolution continue to smolder.

An important truth about the JCPOA, which has been wielded by both its defenders and its detractors in varying contexts, is that it was transactional, not transformational. As President Barack Obama repeatedly insisted, the accord addressed one specific problem, and in those narrow terms, it can be judged a relative success. The value of that relative success should not be underestimated; a nuclear-armed Iran would magnify risks in a turbulent region in a terrible way.

But in the United States, in Iran, and across the Middle East, the agreement has always been viewed through a much broader lens—as a waystation toward Iranian-American rapprochement, as an instrument for addressing the vicious cycle of sectarian violence that threatens to consume the region, as a boost to the greater cause of moderation and democratization in Iran. And so the failure of the deal to catalyze greater cooperation from Iran on a range of other priorities—Syria, Yemen, Iraq, to name a few—or to jumpstart improvements in Iran’s domestic dynamics cannot be disregarded simply because it was not its original intent.

For the “new normal” of regularized diplomatic contact between Washington and Tehran to yield dividends, the United States will need a serious strategy toward Tehran that transcends the JCPOA, building on the efficacy of the hard-won multilateral collaboration on the nuclear issue. Iranians, too, must begin to pivot the focus of their efforts away from endless litigation of the nuclear deal and toward a more constructive approach to addressing the deep challenges facing their country today.

As I explain more fully here, one unintended but very important consequence of the Iran nuclear deal has been to aggravate and intensify Saudi Arabia’s concerns about Iran’s regional goals and intentions. This fueling of Saudi fears has in turn fanned sectarian tensions in the region to unprecedented levels, and the results are likely to haunt the region for years to come.

Riyadh’s concerns about Iran have never been primarily focused on the nuclear danger. Rather, the key Saudi concern is that Iran seeks regional hegemony and uses terrorism and subversion to achieve it. The deal deliberately does not deal with this issue. In Saudi eyes, it actually makes the situation worse because lifting sanctions removed Iran’s isolation as a rogue state and gives it more income.

Washington has tried hard to reassure the Saudis, and President Obama has wisely sought to build confidence with King Salman and his young son. The Iran deal is a good one, and I’ve supported it from its inception. But it has had consequences that are dangerous and alarming. In the end, Riyadh and Tehran are the only players who can deescalate the situation—the Saudis show no sign of interest in that road.

Norman Eisen, Visiting Fellow, Governance Studies:

The biggest disappointment of the post-deal year has been the failure of Congress to pass legislation complementing the JCPOA. There is a great deal that the legislative branch could do to support the pact. Above all, it could establish criteria putting teeth into U.S. enforcement of Preamble Section III, Iran’s pledge never to seek nuclear weapons. Congress could and should make clear what the ramp to seeking nuclear weapons would look like, what the triggers would be for U.S. action, and what kinds of U.S. action would be on the table. If Iran knows that, it will modulate its behavior accordingly. If it does not, it will start to act out, and we have just kicked the can down the road. That delay is of course immensely valuable—but why not extend the road indefinitely? Congress can do that, and much more (e.g. by increasing funding for JCPOA oversight by the administration and the IAEA), with appropriate legislation.

Over the past year, much effort has gone into ensuring that the Iran deal is fully implemented. To date, the P5+1 has—not surprisingly—gotten the better end of the bargain, with significant security benefits accruing to them and their partners in the Middle East once the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verified the required changes to Iran’s nuclear program. Iran, for its part, has experienced a natural lag in its economic resurgence, held back by the collapse in oil prices in 2014, residual American and European sanctions, and reluctance among banks and businesses to re-engage.

But, Iran’s economy has stabilized and—if the deal holds for its full measure—the security benefits that the P5+1 and their partners have won may fall away while Iran’s economy continues to grow. The most important challenge related to the deal for the next U.S. administration (and, presumably, the Rouhani administration in its second term) is therefore: how can it be taken forward, beyond the 10- to 15-year transition period? Iran will face internal pressure to expand its nuclear program, but it also will face pressure to refrain both externally and internally, should other countries in the region seek to create their own matching nuclear capabilities.

The best next step for all sides is to negotiate a region-wide arrangement to manage nuclear programs –one that constrains all sides, though perhaps not equally. It must ensure—at a minimum—that nuclear developments in the region are predictable, understandable, and credibly civilian (something Bob Einhorn and I addressed in a recent report). The next White House will need to do the hard work of convincing countries in the region—and beyond—not to rest on the victory of the JCPOA. Rather, they must take it for what it is: another step towards a more stable and manageable region.

This week, Washington is awash in events and policy papers taking stock of how the Iran nuclear deal has changed the Middle East in the past year. The narratives presented this week largely track the positions that the authors, speakers, or organizations articulated on the nuclear deal when it was first concluded last summer. Those who opposed the deal have marshaled evidence of how the deal has “emboldened” Iran’s destabilizing behavior, while those who supported the deal cite evidence of “moderated” politics in the Islamic Republic. That polarized views on the deal last year produce polarized assessments of the deal’s impact this year should surprise no one.

In fact, no matter which side of the nuclear agreement’s worth it presents, much of the analysis out this week ascribes to the nuclear deal Iranian behavior and attitudes in the region that existed before the deal’s conclusion and implementation. Iran has been a revisionist state, and a state sponsor of terrorism, since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The Saudi-Iranian rivalry predates the revolution; Iran’s backing of Houthi militias against Saudi and its allies in Yemen well predates the nuclear agreement. Most notably, the upheavals in the Arab world since 2011 have given Iran wider opportunities than perhaps ever before to exploit the cracks within Arab societies—and to use cash, militias, and other tools to advance its interests and expand its influence. Iran has exploited those opportunities skillfully in the last five years and, as I wrote last summer, was likely to continue to do so regardless of diplomatic success or failure in Vienna. To argue that the nuclear deal somehow created these problems, or could solve them, is ahistorical.

It is true that Iran’s access to global markets might free even more cash for these endeavors, and that is a real issue worth tracking. But since severe sanctions did not prevent Iran from spending hundreds of millions of dollars to support and supply Hezbollah, or marshaling Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and militia fighters to sustain the faltering regime of Bashar Assad in Syria, it’s not clear that additional cash will generate a meaningful difference in regional outcomes. Certainly, the nuclear deal’s conclusion and implementation did not alter the trajectory of Iranian policy in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, or Lebanon to any noticeable degree—and that means that, no matter what the merits or dangers of the JCPOA, the United States must still confront and work to resolve enduring challenges to regional instability—including Iran’s revisionist behavior.

When the JCPOA was being debated last year, I felt that the terms of the deal were far less consequential than how the United States responded to Iranian regional behavior after a deal was signed. I see the events of the past 12 months as largely having borne that out. While both sides have accused the other of “cheating,” the deal has so far largely held. However, as many of my colleagues have noted, the real frictions have arisen from the U.S. geostrategic response to the deal.

I continue to believe that signing the JCPOA was better than any of the realistic alternatives—though I also continue to believe that a better deal was possible, had the administration handled the negotiations differently. However, the administration’s regional approach since then has been problematic—with officials condemning Riyadh and excusing Tehran in circumstances where both were culpable and ignoring some major Iranian transgressions, for instance (and with President Obama gratuitously insulting the Saudis and other U.S. allies in interviews).

America’s traditional Sunni Arab allies (and to some extent Turkey and Israel) feared that either the United States would use the JCPOA as an excuse to further disengage from the region or to switch sides and join the Iranian coalition. Their reading of events has been that this is precisely what has happened, and it is causing the GCC states to act more aggressively.

I think our traditional allies would enthusiastically welcome a Hillary Clinton presidency. She would likely do all that she could to reassure them that she plans to be more engaged and more willing to commit American resources and energy to Middle Eastern problems. But those allies will eventually look for her to turn words into action. I cannot imagine a Hillary Clinton administration abrogating the JCPOA, imposing significant new economic sanctions on Iran, or otherwise acting in ways that it would fear could provoke Tehran to break the deal. Our allies may see that as Washington trying to remain on the fence, which will infuriate them.

So there are some important strategic differences between the United States and its regional allies. The second anniversary of the JCPOA could therefore prove even more fraught for America and the Middle East than the first.

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UncategorizedHow has the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—signed between the P5+1 and Iran one year ago—played out in practice? Several Brookings scholars, many of whom participated prominently in debates last year surrounding official congressional review, offered their views.
Strobe Talbott, President, Brookings Institution:
At the one-year mark, it’s clear that the nuclear agreement between Iran and the major powers has substantially restricted Tehran’s ability to produce the fissile material necessary to build a bomb. That’s a net positive—for the United States and the broader region.
Robert Einhorn, Senior Fellow, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence and Senior Fellow, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative, Foreign Policy program:
One year after its conclusion, the JCPOA remains controversial in Tehran and Washington (as I describe in more detail here), with opponents unreconciled to the deal and determined to derail it. But opponents have had to scale back their criticism, in large part because the JCPOA, at least so far, has delivered on its principal goal—blocking Iran’s path to nuclear weapons for an extended period of time. Moreover, Iran’s positive compliance record has not given opponents much ammunition. The IAEA found Iran in compliance in its two quarterly reports issued in 2016.
But challenges to the smooth operation and even the longevity of the deal are already apparent.
A real threat to the JCPOA is that Iran will blame the slow recovery of its economy on U.S. failure to conscientiously fulfill its sanctions relief commitments and, using that as a pretext, will curtail or even end its own implementation of the deal. But international banks and businesses have been reluctant to engage Iran not because they have been discouraged by the United States but because they have their own business-related reasons to be cautious. Legislation proposed in Congress could also threaten the nuclear deal.
For now, the administration is in a position to block new legislation that it believes would scuttle the deal. But developments outside the JCPOA, especially Iran’s regional behavior and its crackdown on dissent at home, could weaken support for the JCPOA within the United States and give proponents of deal-killing legislation a boost.
A potential wildcard for the future of the JCPOA is coming governing transitions in both Washington and Tehran. Hillary Clinton would maintain the deal but perhaps a harder line than her predecessor. Donald Trump now says he will re-negotiate rather than scrap the deal, but a better deal will not prove negotiable. With President Hassan Rouhani up for re-election next year and the health of the Supreme Leader questionable, Iran’s future policy toward the JCPOA cannot be confidently predicted.
A final verdict on the JCPOA is many years away. But it is off to a promising start, as even some of its early critics now concede. Still, it is already clear that the path ahead will not always be smooth, the longevity of the deal cannot be taken for granted, and keeping it on track will require constant focus in Washington and other interested capitals.
Suzanne Maloney, Deputy Director, Foreign Policy program and Senior Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy, Foreign Policy program:
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action has fulfilled neither the worst fears of its detractors nor the most soaring ambitions of its proponents. All of the concerns that have shaped U.S. policy toward Tehran for more than a generation—terrorism, human rights abuses, weapons of mass destruction, regional destabilization—remain as relevant, and as alarming, as they have ever been. Notably, much the same is true on the Iranian side; the manifold grievances that Tehran has harbored toward Washington since the 1979 revolution continue to ... How has the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—signed between the P5+1 and Iran one year ago—played out in practice? Several Brookings scholars, many of whom participated prominently in debates last year https://www.brookings.edu/2016/06/27/want-to-ease-tensions-in-the-middle-east-science-diplomacy-can-help/Want to ease tensions in the Middle East? Science diplomacy can helphttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/171792382/0/brookingsrss/topics/gulfstates~Want-to-ease-tensions-in-the-Middle-East-Science-diplomacy-can-help/
Mon, 27 Jun 2016 16:00:00 +0000http://www.brookings.edu?p=96368&preview_id=96368Science diplomacy can help countries in the Middle East and elsewhere solve on-the-ground challenges and improve standards of living for their citizens. But it can also lay groundwork for improving relations in a region often defined by tension (if not outright conflict) through functional, scientific cooperation that is less politicized.

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In the Middle East, governments and non-state actors alike have tried all forms of diplomacy to solve the challenges they face, with mixed results: shuttle diplomacy by the United States between the Israelis and Palestinians worked for a time, great-power diplomacy over the Syrian civil war largely hasn’t, and direct negotiations with unsavory groups like the Taliban have moved in fits and starts.

But progress can come from unlikely sources, and science diplomacy—whereby experts collaborate scientifically to address common problems and build constructive international partnerships—has more potential than is often recognized. Science diplomacy can of course help countries solve on-the-ground challenges and improve standards of living for their citizens. But it can also lay groundwork for improving relations in a region often defined by tension (if not outright conflict) through functional, scientific cooperation that is less politicized.

Efforts in science and technology, on the one hand, and diplomacy on the other, can achieve more if they are thoughtfully merged—rather than siloed. Science diplomacy, therefore, can contribute to peace- and security-building in the Middle East (and with the United States) in unique ways.

Science and global governance

Across the world, science diplomacy has helped set the stage for advancing foreign policy and global governance goals.

The 2015 nuclear deal between Iran and the P5+1 illuminated how negotiating over and collaborating on science and technology issues can be an important gateway to achieving significant foreign policy goals. Direct (and often very technical) diplomacy between U.S. Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz and the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Ali Akbar Salehi, was key to achieving the framework agreement, as was collaboration between Iranian and Western nuclear scientists more broadly. Provided that the agreement is thoroughly enforced, it’s a major victory for global nuclear nonproliferation efforts—and much credit goes to effective science diplomacy.

Global efforts to combat climate change are another area in which science diplomacy has had a real impact on policy. The United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has become a model for critical science policy research and recommendations. The 2015 conference in Paris brought together hundreds of political leaders and experts to examine the scientific evidence that the globe is warming, discuss remedies, and chart a path forward that can help slow environmental damage. So, science diplomacy was again central—this time in shaping and implementing the global climate governance framework.

Another area where we have observed substantive gains from science diplomacy is the global management of infectious diseases. The Zika outbreak in Latin America, Ebola epidemic in West Africa, dengue in the Caribbean and Asia, MERS in the Gulf region and in South Korea, and the global threat of pandemic influenza all underscore that international cooperation is key to fighting modern plagues, which spread more rapidly in an era of constant global travel. In some cases more than in others, political leaders have devoted considerable resources to promoting international scientific cooperation—whether in clinical monitoring, medical interventions, research into pathogen biology and diagnostics, and treatments (including vaccine development). In fact, the global response to severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is an example where international collaboration helped identify affected populations and coordinate treatment through the WHO Global Alert and Response System (which has identified new cases in Europe, the Middle East, Australia, Canada, Vietnam, Taiwan, and Hong Kong). The system’s main goal is to send supplies and medical specialists (including epidemiologists), design clinical trials, provide diagnostic tests, identify modes of transmission, and provide treatment. This coordinated response effort has controlled the pandemic.

Science in a fraught region

In the Middle East, opportunities abound for science diplomacy. Not only can this type of approach help solve practical, quality-of-life challenges—from energy to health and beyond—it can bring together expert communities and bureaucracies. In the process, it can contribute to more normalized people-to-people and government-to-government relations. Even at the height of the Cold War, for example, U.S. and Russian nuclear scientists and other experts worked together to monitor each other’s nuclear facilities; even though Moscow and Washington had nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles aimed directly at each other, bureaucratic cooperation on technical issues became a normal part of the relationship and helped enhance transparency and trust.

In the energy sector, for example, innovation in science and technology will play a crucial role in helping to transition Middle Eastern states in the region away from a dependence on fossil fuels—a broad goal of the Paris accords and a specific strategic goal of states like Saudi Arabia and Iran. Notwithstanding the sectarian disagreements between Iran and Saudi Arabia, both need to address their fast-growing demand for electricity; they need not be in competition with each other. Saudi Arabia currently fuels its own 10 percent annual rise in electricity needs with crude oil, owing to domestic natural dry gas reserves. Iran’s vast gas reserves could be used to meet the kingdom’s growing energy needs, but Iran’s decaying gas fields need $250 billion in major repairs. Many think that if Saudi Arabia used its investment power to revitalize Iran’s gas industry, it would secure the energy it needs to meet demands. The economic benefits of cooperation on energy could promote better relations. Another area of cooperation that can drive the local economies is the Arab Gulf’s first major cross-border enterprise, the Dolphin Gas Project, which was started in 2007. The project involves the transportation of natural gas from Qatar to Oman and to the UAE. Finally, international cooperation between Oman and Iran is developing, where Oman intends to import natural gas from Iran for industrial development. This would require investing in an underwater pipeline from the Iranian coast to Oman. The UAE could do the same to build its economy: import natural gas from Iran, since the pipelines exist. The technical know-how for all these initiatives already exists—to date the main stumbling block has been overcoming regional politics.

In health, there is also room for mutually-beneficial cooperation. Back in 1996, the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs helped establish the Middle East Cancer Consortium—that effort continues to help train the next generation of scientists and medical professionals in cancer biology in the region. Other programs have focused on vaccine development for childhood diseases; preventing HIV, malaria, and tuberculosis infections; ending childhood malnutrition; and managing unwanted pregnancies. Programs like these have yielded important advances in public health and have enhanced cooperation between countries like the Palestinian Authority, Egypt, Cyprus, Turkey, and Israel with the United States.

And in a unique cross-sectoral approach, Jordan is host to a promising initiative called the Synchrotron Light for Experimental Science and Application in the Middle East (SESAME). Modeled after the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN), SESAME is a partnership between Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Iran, Jordan, Pakistan, the Palestinian Authority, and Turkey that aims to create research career opportunities that will limit “brain drain” from the region and serve as a model for scientific collaboration.

STEM education: The root of science diplomacy

Science diplomacy has the potential to deliver real dividends that extend beyond the science and technology spaces themselves. When states cooperate on functional, non-politicized (or at least less politicized) issues—whether at the level of non-state scientific communities or at the level of state bureaucracies focused on energy, health, or other issues—they become more accustomed to working together and trusting each other. This can gradually have spillover effects into politics and security arenas.

Science diplomacy doesn’t just happen, though—it requires real efforts on behalf of policymakers and experts. One crucial step is advancing STEM education (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) to build more robust and diverse expert communities. This is something that President Obama emphasized in his speech at Cairo’s Al-Azhar University in 2009. He identified possible areas of cooperation, both within the region and with the United States, including researching and piloting new sources of energy, creating “green” jobs, enhancing communication and informatics, sharing medical information, generating clean water, and growing new crops.

In some countries in the region, particularly in the Gulf, there are signs of new investment in STEM education and related efforts. For example, Qatar has pledged to spend 3 percent of its GDP on scientific research, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has decided to create the world’s first sustainable city. Saudi Arabia created the King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST) with a $20 billion endowment, $200 million of which has been used to attract scientists and educators from the West. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE continue to build and sustain partnerships with European and American universities.

Interest in science among students and the general citizenry in many Middle Eastern countries remains low, which is problematic at a time when the region’s young people need to compete in a world increasingly centered around STEM. More governments in the region—perhaps with U.S. help—need to increase efforts to attract their young people to STEM education and careers.

International cooperation on STEM issues—led by science diplomats—can strengthen relationships between Middle Eastern states and with the United States. Science and technology disciplines transcend politics, borders, and cultures, and are thus an important bridge between nations. During a time of strained geopolitical relationships, we can focus on making progress in health and disease, food and water security, and other areas—and thereby enhance domestic stability and international security in the process.

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UncategorizedIn the Middle East, governments and non-state actors alike have tried all forms of diplomacy to solve the challenges they face, with mixed results: shuttle diplomacy by the United States between the Israelis and Palestinians worked for a time, great-power diplomacy over the Syrian civil war largely hasn’t, and direct negotiations with unsavory groups like the Taliban have moved in fits and starts.
But progress can come from unlikely sources, and science diplomacy—whereby experts collaborate scientifically to address common problems and build constructive international partnerships—has more potential than is often recognized. Science diplomacy can of course help countries solve on-the-ground challenges and improve standards of living for their citizens. But it can also lay groundwork for improving relations in a region often defined by tension (if not outright conflict) through functional, scientific cooperation that is less politicized.
Efforts in science and technology, on the one hand, and diplomacy on the other, can achieve more if they are thoughtfully merged—rather than siloed. Science diplomacy, therefore, can contribute to peace- and security-building in the Middle East (and with the United States) in unique ways.
Science and global governance
Across the world, science diplomacy has helped set the stage for advancing foreign policy and global governance goals.
The 2015 nuclear deal between Iran and the P5+1 illuminated how negotiating over and collaborating on science and technology issues can be an important gateway to achieving significant foreign policy goals. Direct (and often very technical) diplomacy between U.S. Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz and the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Ali Akbar Salehi, was key to achieving the framework agreement, as was collaboration between Iranian and Western nuclear scientists more broadly. Provided that the agreement is thoroughly enforced, it’s a major victory for global nuclear nonproliferation efforts—and much credit goes to effective science diplomacy.
Global efforts to combat climate change are another area in which science diplomacy has had a real impact on policy. The United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has become a model for critical science policy research and recommendations. The 2015 conference in Paris brought together hundreds of political leaders and experts to examine the scientific evidence that the globe is warming, discuss remedies, and chart a path forward that can help slow environmental damage. So, science diplomacy was again central—this time in shaping and implementing the global climate governance framework.
Another area where we have observed substantive gains from science diplomacy is the global management of infectious diseases. The Zika outbreak in Latin America, Ebola epidemic in West Africa, dengue in the Caribbean and Asia, MERS in the Gulf region and in South Korea, and the global threat of pandemic influenza all underscore that international cooperation is key to fighting modern plagues, which spread more rapidly in an era of constant global travel. In some cases more than in others, political leaders have devoted considerable resources to promoting international scientific cooperation—whether in clinical monitoring, medical interventions, research into pathogen biology and diagnostics, and treatments (including vaccine development). In fact, the global response to severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is an example where international collaboration helped identify affected populations and coordinate treatment through the WHO Global Alert and Response System (which has identified new cases in Europe, the Middle East, Australia, Canada, Vietnam, Taiwan, and Hong Kong). The system’s main goal is to send supplies and medical specialists (including epidemiologists), design clinical trials, provide diagnostic tests, ... In the Middle East, governments and non-state actors alike have tried all forms of diplomacy to solve the challenges they face, with mixed results: shuttle diplomacy by the United States between the Israelis and Palestinians worked for a time, ... https://www.brookings.edu/2016/06/22/is-the-iranian-saudi-cold-war-heating-up-how-to-reduce-the-temperature/Is the Iranian-Saudi “cold war” heating up? How to reduce the temperaturehttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/171792930/0/brookingsrss/topics/gulfstates~Is-the-IranianSaudi-%e2%80%9ccold-war%e2%80%9d-heating-up-How-to-reduce-the-temperature/
Wed, 22 Jun 2016 17:43:00 +0000http://www.brookings.edu?p=96365&preview_id=96365In Saudi Arabia and Iran, emotions are running high, and even an accidental spark could turn the cold war between the two regional powers hot. Their antagonism is a grave threat to the wider region, which isn’t exactly a bastion of stability these days—and it’s contrary to those states' long-term interests.

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While Saudi-Iranian tensions have been on the rise for years, Saudi Arabia’s execution of Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr in January—met with angry reactions in Iran—heightened the stakes so dramatically that there is now serious potential for direct confrontation. Emotions are running high, and even an accidental spark could turn the cold war between the two regional powers hot. Their antagonism is a grave threat to the wider region, which isn’t exactly a bastion of stability these days—and it’s contrary to the long-term interests of Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Muhammad bin Salman, Saudi Arabia’s Deputy Crown Prince and Minister of Defense, stressed in a January interview with The Economist that “a war between Saudi Arabia and Iran [would be] the beginning of a major catastrophe in the region,” adding: “For sure we will not allow any such thing.”

The prince is right—an outright Saudi-Iranian conflict would quickly spiral into a region-wide conflagration with gravely destabilizing effects on the Middle East and beyond. Yet the provocative rhetoric and actions of leaders on both sides continue to fan the flames.

Both sides must work to reduce the temperature and address the root causes of the tension. There are three main considerations that should inform the approach:

First, each misunderstands the other. While Iranian-Emirati and Iranian-Omani relations are based on dialogue and exchange, Iranian-Saudi relations are based on misunderstanding, ignorance, and isolation. Combined with heightened sectarian prejudice, which has emerged largely in the fertile landscape for hatred and division sown by the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, the long-running enmity between the two nations has only worsened.

Second, due to Iran being isolated and sanctioned ever since its 1979 revolution, a network of militia leaders, mujahedeen, intelligence agencies, and high-ranking clerics have been able to hijack the state. Rather than pursue national interests such as improving regional cooperation or increasing inward investment, Iranian foreign policy has largely served the private interests of that network. These actors have the most to lose as Iran becomes more open, as their space to maneuver in the shadows would be reduced. In Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the Arab world, observers tend to perceive Iran’s actions in the region as targeting Saudi Arabia. But often, Iran’s intent is to enrich that shadowy network. The Saudis and Arabs more broadly should support the lifting of sanctions, since it will squeeze those actors in Iran—yet what we see is the opposite. Saudi Arabia could help empower those who genuinely want reform in Iran by encouraging more openness.

Third, Iran-Saudi tensions are kept alive by the ever-narrowing space between religious institutions and policymakers in Saudi Arabia. The problem for the House of Saud is that its legitimacy is derived from its custodianship of Mecca and Medina—it needs to appease the clerics, who have unfortunately slid into divisive sectarian rhetoric. The late King Abdullah made steps to distance the state from the clergy, but King Salman’s monarchical arrangement is different, resulting in a shift back toward the clerics.

From vicious to virtuous cycle

To head off outright confrontation, Saudi Arabia and Iran need to identify potential areas of shared interest. Both states’ economies are dependent on oil, and both are working to reduce that reliance. To some extent, each country’s economy depends on the other’s success. Both are targeted by the same terror groups, including al-Qaida and the Islamic State. And the countries face similar environmental threats, including oil spills, challenges related to accelerated industrialization, and water shortages. In all of these areas, Iran and Saudi Arabia can work together.

It won’t be easy, but there are helpful historical examples. Seventy years ago, no one could have imagined France, Germany, and Britain overcoming their regional rivalries to become close political and economic partners. And there are constructive roles for outside powers: Europe, for example, could facilitate more dialogue on religious tolerance in the Middle East, focusing on the 2004 Amman Message that all Muslims have common interests and can unite. Europe can also be more vigilant in ensuring that divisive sectarian clerics do not abuse their political asylum by using it as a platform to broadcast incendiary misinformation and propaganda that often crosses the line into hate speech. Meanwhile, multi-track diplomacy and various types of cultural, educational, and social exchanges between Saudis, Iranians, and others can help break down the barriers of misunderstanding and prejudice.

War between Iran and Saudi Arabia is not inevitable, but both sides must take steps now to turn down the heat. At the end of the day, it is in neither state’s interest to let their already poor relations spiral further downward.

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UncategorizedWhile Saudi-Iranian tensions have been on the rise for years, Saudi Arabia’s execution of Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr in January—met with angry reactions in Iran—heightened the stakes so dramatically that there is now serious potential for direct confrontation. Emotions are running high, and even an accidental spark could turn the cold war between the two regional powers hot. Their antagonism is a grave threat to the wider region, which isn’t exactly a bastion of stability these days—and it’s contrary to the long-term interests of Saudi Arabia and Iran.
Muhammad bin Salman, Saudi Arabia’s Deputy Crown Prince and Minister of Defense, stressed in a January interview with The Economist that “a war between Saudi Arabia and Iran [would be] the beginning of a major catastrophe in the region,” adding: “For sure we will not allow any such thing.”
The prince is right—an outright Saudi-Iranian conflict would quickly spiral into a region-wide conflagration with gravely destabilizing effects on the Middle East and beyond. Yet the provocative rhetoric and actions of leaders on both sides continue to fan the flames.
Both sides must work to reduce the temperature and address the root causes of the tension. There are three main considerations that should inform the approach:
- First, each misunderstands the other. While Iranian-Emirati and Iranian-Omani relations are based on dialogue and exchange, Iranian-Saudi relations are based on misunderstanding, ignorance, and isolation. Combined with heightened sectarian prejudice, which has emerged largely in the fertile landscape for hatred and division sown by the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, the long-running enmity between the two nations has only worsened. - Second, due to Iran being isolated and sanctioned ever since its 1979 revolution, a network of militia leaders, mujahedeen, intelligence agencies, and high-ranking clerics have been able to hijack the state. Rather than pursue national interests such as improving regional cooperation or increasing inward investment, Iranian foreign policy has largely served the private interests of that network. These actors have the most to lose as Iran becomes more open, as their space to maneuver in the shadows would be reduced. In Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the Arab world, observers tend to perceive Iran’s actions in the region as targeting Saudi Arabia. But often, Iran’s intent is to enrich that shadowy network. The Saudis and Arabs more broadly should support the lifting of sanctions, since it will squeeze those actors in Iran—yet what we see is the opposite. Saudi Arabia could help empower those who genuinely want reform in Iran by encouraging more openness. - Third, Iran-Saudi tensions are kept alive by the ever-narrowing space between religious institutions and policymakers in Saudi Arabia. The problem for the House of Saud is that its legitimacy is derived from its custodianship of Mecca and Medina—it needs to appease the clerics, who have unfortunately slid into divisive sectarian rhetoric. The late King Abdullah made steps to distance the state from the clergy, but King Salman’s monarchical arrangement is different, resulting in a shift back toward the clerics.
Related
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What the 2016 U.S. presidential election means for the Middle East John Hudak Monday, February 22, 2016 - Markaz
Fight or flight: America’s choice in the Middle East Kenneth M Pollack Tuesday, February 16, 2016 - Islamist Movements
Profiling Jabhat al-Nusra Charles Lister Wednesday, July 27, 2016
From vicious to virtuous cycle
To head off outright confrontation, Saudi Arabia and Iran need to identify potential areas of shared interest. Both states’ economies are dependent on oil, and both are working to reduce that reliance. To some extent, each country’s economy depends on the ... While Saudi-Iranian tensions have been on the rise for years, Saudi Arabia’s execution of Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr in January—met with angry reactions in Iran—heightened the stakes so dramatically that there is now serious potential ... https://www.brookings.edu/2016/06/16/the-political-implications-of-transforming-saudi-and-iranian-oil-economies/The political implications of transforming Saudi and Iranian oil economieshttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/171792932/0/brookingsrss/topics/gulfstates~The-political-implications-of-transforming-Saudi-and-Iranian-oil-economies/
Mon, 30 Nov -0001 00:00:00 +0000http://www.brookings.edu?p=96319&preview_id=96319Both Saudi Arabia and Iran are conspicuously planning for a post-oil future. The centrality of oil to the legitimacy and autonomy of both regimes means that these plans are little more than publicity stunts. Still, just imagine for a moment what it would mean for Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Middle East if these grandiose agendas were adopted.

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Saudi deputy crown prince and defense minister Mohammad bin Salman is just wrapping up a heavily hyped visit to Washington, aimed at reinforcing the kingdom’s partnership with the United States. Recent years have frayed what is traditionally the central strategic relationship for Riyadh, principally over the Obama administration’s nuclear diplomacy with Iran.

Since the conclusion of the Iranian nuclear deal last July, the perennial antagonism between Riyadh and Tehran has reached a dangerous pitch, fueling the violence that rages in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen and the undercurrent of instability that saturates the region. And the fallout of their rivalry has left its mark well beyond the boundaries of the Gulf, exacerbating volatile energy markets and, by extension, the global economy.

Within OPEC, Riyadh and Tehran are eyeing each other warily, and their continuing differences torpedoed a proposed ceiling on oil production at OPEC’s latest meeting. The outcome was not surprising; a similar effort to agree on a production freeze between the group and a handful of non-OPEC producers fizzled in April. In the meantime, any incentives for drastic measures to address soft oil prices have abated as oil prices creep back up to approximately $50 a barrel.

Iran and Saudi Arabia have plenty of reasons to continue pumping for the foreseeable future. Since the lifting of nuclear-related sanctions in January, Iranian leaders have been determined to make up for lost time and lost revenues, already defying expectations by quickly raising production to levels that hadn’t been reached since November 2011 and aggressively cutting prices in hopes of winning back its pre-sanctions export market.

The centrality of oil to the legitimacy and autonomy of both regimes means that these plans are little more than publicity stunts.

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia appears prepared to continue pumping at record-high levels, part of a larger strategy aimed at maintaining market share and driving down non-OPEC production. The two states’ economic incentives are compounded by their fierce geostrategic and sectarian rivalry, which has intensified, as evidenced by the standoff over Iranian participation in the annual pilgrimage to Mecca.

But even as the two states duel over oil production and prices, both Saudi Arabia and Iran are conspicuously planning for a post-oil future. Leaders in both countries have decreed an end to the era of oil dependency, endorsing ambitious blueprints for restructuring their economies that—if implemented—would ultimately transform state, society, and the wider region. The centrality of oil to the legitimacy and autonomy of both regimes means that these plans are little more than publicity stunts. Still, just imagine for a moment what it would mean for Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Middle East if these grandiose agendas were adopted.

Competing and complementary visions

Tehran’s plan actually dates back more than a decade, with the 2005 release of its “20 Year Perspective” (sometimes called “Vision 2025”). The plan laid out extravagant expectations: rapid growth and job creation, diversification away from oil, a knowledge-based economy. Intervening developments—sanctions that targeted Iran’s oil exports and helped expand non-oil trade—have only bolstered the rhetorical commitment of Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, to a “resistance economy” in which oil exports constitute a minor part.

“One of our most serious losses is dependence on oil,” Khamenei bemoaned in a 2014 speech. “I am not saying that oil should not be used. Rather, I am saying that we should reduce our dependence on selling crude oil as much as we can.”

Not to be outdone, Saudi Deputy Crown Prince Salman announced Saudi “Vision 2030,” to address what he described as “an addiction to oil.” The plan, which has met with equal doses of fanfare and skepticism since its announcement last month, aims to create a “thriving economy” and end Saudi dependence on oil revenues by 2020. Vision 2030 includes provisions to sell off a small stake in the kingdom’s state oil company, Saudi Aramco, and create the world’s largest sovereign wealth fund to manage the country’s income, as well as goals of creating 450,000 new private sector jobs, cutting public sector wages, and tripling the country’s non-oil exports all within the same abbreviated time frame.

Jeopardizing domestic stability

There is one hitch, however: these aspirations, though laudable, are preposterously unmoored from current political and economic exigencies. The institutions of governance and the structure of power in resource-rich states such as Saudi Arabia and Iran are organized around the state’s role as purveyors of vital social and economic goods. Riyadh and Tehran distribute cash handouts, provide jobs in already-bloated state bureaucracies, and levy few taxes. Diversifying away from reliance on oil would essentially require Riyadh and Tehran to radically curtail this distributive role, inviting historic social and political changes that could ultimately compromise regime ideology and weaken state legitimacy.

[T]hese aspirations, though laudable, are preposterously unmoored from current political and economic exigencies.

In Saudi Arabia, the supply of these benefits is central to the monarchy’s legitimacy. To diversify away from oil, which currently accounts for over 70 percent of government revenues, Riyadh would have to drastically cut spending, far more than it already has. Not only would this further slash subsidies and hike fees, it would also effectively force Saudi workers—two-thirds of whom are employed by the state—to take up private sector jobs, 80 percent of which are currently staffed by expatriates. To accomplish this transition would require fundamental changes to the incentive structure for the Saudi labor force: a much broader willingness to accept low-skill, low-wage jobs, as well as the requisite improvements in education and productivity to support larger numbers of Saudi nationals moving into private sector positions.

For the Saudi economy to be truly competitive, Riyadh would have to initiate dramatic changes to a central component of the Saudi social compact—women’s rights and freedoms. The Vision 2030 document boasts that over 50 percent of Saudi university graduates are women and pledges to “continue to develop their talents, invest in their productive capabilities and enable them to strengthen their future and contribute to the development of our society and economy.”

But the domestic Saudi labor force is overwhelmingly male, and even the plan’s modest aspirations to raise female participation in the workforce from 22 to 30 percent are likely to run into logistical and social obstacles. Shortly after announcing Vision 2030, Deputy Crown Prince Salman said Saudi Arabia is not yet ready to let women drive. A diversified economy will not emerge in the kind of constricted social environment mandated by the Saudi interpretation of sharia (Islamic law).

Iran’s Islamic Republic doesn’t have the same degree of gender segregation, but Iran’s official interpretation of Islam has still constrained female participation in the workforce. Iran employs an equally low percentage of women—according to a 2014 U.N. report around 16 percent—and women’s unemployment is more than double that of men (nearly 20 percent).

The bigger challenge for Iran will be truly opening up its economy to foreign direct investment. This remains hotly contested among the leadership, even in the aftermath of the nuclear agreement and the lifting of related sanctions. While there is some consensus around the need for foreign capital and technology, hardliners including Khamenei are determined to insulate Iran from any accompanying cultural influence and dependency. As the supreme leader recently inveighed, the global economy is “a plan and system that has been devised mainly by Zionist capitalists and some non-Zionists with the purpose of usurping the economic resources of the whole world…If a country merges its economy with the global economy, this is not a source of pride, rather it is a loss and a defeat!”

This deeply-rooted paranoia has provided a convenient platform for the Islamic Republic to galvanize citizens’ loyalty to the state and hostility to outside interference. And it also inhibits the liberalization that makes foreign investment possible: measures to enhance transparency and security, develop more attractive legal and fiscal frameworks, shrink the role of the state, and undertake an array of other structural reforms. Without these measures, Tehran will struggle to capitalize on its extraordinary reengagement with the world.

While Saudi Arabia has maintained a more consistent and mutually beneficial pattern of foreign investment, its leadership too will have to revamp its approach if it is to broaden its economic base. For Riyadh, the challenge is less one of attracting foreign capital than of developing a sustainable influx of technology and expertise to develop sectors other than energy. The kingdom will also have to overcome serious regulatory hurdles and a proclivity for mammoth (and often white elephant) projects.

Compromising regional clout

Riyadh and Tehran will need to balance their economic aspirations and their approach to the region, too. Historically, their role in global energy markets has largely shielded both states from the fallout of regional instability. The world’s need for reliable oil at reasonable prices has inculcated the commitment of outside powers to secure transportation of resources and considerable autonomy for Riyadh and Tehran from the implications of their own policies.

As a result, Saudi Arabia and Iran can fund nefarious activity across the region, violate the civil and human rights of their citizens and other residents, and carry out belligerent foreign policies without severe repercussions for their oil revenues. Only in the past five years has Tehran seen the limits of the world’s reluctance to jeopardize its investment with a major oil exporter; and the recent reversal of the U.N. condemnation regarding the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen demonstrates that Riyadh remains insulated.

Saudi Arabia and Iran can fund nefarious activity across the region, violate the civil and human rights of their citizens and other residents, and carry out belligerent foreign policies without severe repercussions for their oil revenues.

Regional developments make the prospect of economic diversification even less likely, as sensitivity to such developments will only increase if either country successfully develops its non-oil sectors. At the same time, regional stability is a basic prerequisite for economic diversification. Robust growth and good governance throughout the Middle East would provide the optimal context for the economic transformation of Iran and Saudi Arabia, since the marketplace for their non-oil exports is concentrated in the immediate neighborhood. But such transformation would require both countries to put economic priorities that serve their general populations above the ideological and religious agendas—supported by oil rents—that propel their regional and international influence and that provide a large portion of their autonomy in foreign policymaking.

Technocrats in both countries understand this intuitively. At a 2015 conference on Iran’s economy, President Hassan Rouhani wondered “How long can the economy pay subsidies to politics?” He added that the country’s economy “pays subsidies both to foreign policy and domestic policy. Let us try the other way round for a decade and pay subsidies from the domestic and foreign policy to the economy to see [what] the lives and incomes of people and the employment of the youth will be like.” The problem, of course, is political will: neither country is prepared to elevate the interests of its people over the demands of ideology.

Imagining an unlikely future

Can either Iran or Saudi Arabia really kick the oil habit? It seems exceptionally unlikely. Even as Khamenei extols the need for inward-focused development, Tehran is racing to expand crude output level to four million barrels per day by March 2017.

Oil enabled the creation of the modern Middle Eastern state and fueled the rise of both countries to regional predominance. Oil is a vector for their regional rivalry, and it provides prestige and funds to be used in other arenas of competition. A genuine diversification of the two largest economies in the Middle East and North Africa would jeopardize their revenue streams and domestic legitimacy, as well as their efforts to assert their primacy across the Islamic world.

[N]either country is prepared to elevate the interests of its people over the demands of ideology.

“All success stories start with a vision,” Deputy Crown Prince Salman is quoted as saying on the Vision 2030 website. But vision is insufficient to bridge the gap between aspiration and reality; a serious agenda to implement either the Saudi or the Iranian vision would require painful compromises to regime ideology and a fundamental overhaul of the institutions and the structure of power in both countries.

Imagine, though, for a moment, that these far-fetched ambitions were quite serious, and that both the Saudi and Iranian leadership were determined to do what was necessary to truly wean their economies off oil dependence. Consider what it might mean for the region if these grandiose ambitions were not simply the illusions of overpriced consultants and embattled technocrats—if a leadership emerged in one or both of the Middle East’s most powerful actors prepared to invest political capital in a genuine transformation of priorities and policies. What might be possible if Tehran and Riyadh sought to compete for economic opportunities instead of fueling violence and sectarianism around the region? If instead of a vicious sectarian and geopolitical rivalry, these two old adversaries engaged in a race to the top?

What will it take to move these visions from wishful thinking to reality? More than rhetoric, to be sure. But even the articulation of improbable objectives will have its impact. As documented in a recent book, Iran’s post-revolutionary experience demonstrates that the regime’s reliance on promises of economic gains has generated public expectations for effective and accountable governance. Now Iranians and Saudis have been told by their leaders—who happen to be officially infallible—that the time has come to transcend oil. What might happen if they believe it?

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UncategorizedSaudi deputy crown prince and defense minister Mohammad bin Salman is just wrapping up a heavily hyped visit to Washington, aimed at reinforcing the kingdom’s partnership with the United States. Recent years have frayed what is traditionally the central strategic relationship for Riyadh, principally over the Obama administration’s nuclear diplomacy with Iran.
Since the conclusion of the Iranian nuclear deal last July, the perennial antagonism between Riyadh and Tehran has reached a dangerous pitch, fueling the violence that rages in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen and the undercurrent of instability that saturates the region. And the fallout of their rivalry has left its mark well beyond the boundaries of the Gulf, exacerbating volatile energy markets and, by extension, the global economy.
Within OPEC, Riyadh and Tehran are eyeing each other warily, and their continuing differences torpedoed a proposed ceiling on oil production at OPEC’s latest meeting. The outcome was not surprising; a similar effort to agree on a production freeze between the group and a handful of non-OPEC producers fizzled in April. In the meantime, any incentives for drastic measures to address soft oil prices have abated as oil prices creep back up to approximately $50 a barrel.
Iran and Saudi Arabia have plenty of reasons to continue pumping for the foreseeable future. Since the lifting of nuclear-related sanctions in January, Iranian leaders have been determined to make up for lost time and lost revenues, already defying expectations by quickly raising production to levels that hadn’t been reached since November 2011 and aggressively cutting prices in hopes of winning back its pre-sanctions export market.
The centrality of oil to the legitimacy and autonomy of both regimes means that these plans are little more than publicity stunts.
Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia appears prepared to continue pumping at record-high levels, part of a larger strategy aimed at maintaining market share and driving down non-OPEC production. The two states’ economic incentives are compounded by their fierce geostrategic and sectarian rivalry, which has intensified, as evidenced by the standoff over Iranian participation in the annual pilgrimage to Mecca.
But even as the two states duel over oil production and prices, both Saudi Arabia and Iran are conspicuously planning for a post-oil future. Leaders in both countries have decreed an end to the era of oil dependency, endorsing ambitious blueprints for restructuring their economies that—if implemented—would ultimately transform state, society, and the wider region. The centrality of oil to the legitimacy and autonomy of both regimes means that these plans are little more than publicity stunts. Still, just imagine for a moment what it would mean for Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Middle East if these grandiose agendas were adopted.
Competing and complementary visions
Tehran’s plan actually dates back more than a decade, with the 2005 release of its “20 Year Perspective” (sometimes called “Vision 2025”). The plan laid out extravagant expectations: rapid growth and job creation, diversification away from oil, a knowledge-based economy. Intervening developments—sanctions that targeted Iran’s oil exports and helped expand non-oil trade—have only bolstered the rhetorical commitment of Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, to a “resistance economy” in which oil exports constitute a minor part.
“One of our most serious losses is dependence on oil,” Khamenei bemoaned in a 2014 speech. “I am not saying that oil should not be used. Rather, I am saying that we should reduce our dependence on selling crude oil as much as we can.”
Not to be outdone, Saudi Deputy Crown Prince Salman announced Saudi “Vision 2030,” to address what he described as ... Saudi deputy crown prince and defense minister Mohammad bin Salman is just wrapping up a heavily hyped visit to Washington, aimed at reinforcing the kingdom’s partnership with the United States. Recent years have frayed what is traditionally ... https://www.brookings.edu/2016/06/02/irans-regional-rivals-arent-likely-to-get-nuclear-weapons-heres-why/Iran’s regional rivals aren’t likely to get nuclear weapons—here’s whyhttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/171793714/0/brookingsrss/topics/gulfstates~Iran%e2%80%99s-regional-rivals-aren%e2%80%99t-likely-to-get-nuclear-weapons%e2%80%94here%e2%80%99s-why/
Mon, 30 Nov -0001 00:00:00 +0000http://www.brookings.edu?p=96302&preview_id=96302In last summer’s congressional debate over the Iran nuclear deal, one of the more hotly debated issues was whether the deal would decrease or increase the likelihood that countries in the Middle East would pursue nuclear weapons. Bob Einhorn strongly believes the JCPOA will significantly reduce prospects for proliferation in the Middle East

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In last summer’s congressional debate over the Iran nuclear deal—the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—one of the more hotly debated issues was whether the deal would decrease or increase the likelihood that countries in the Middle East would pursue nuclear weapons.

Supporters of the JCPOA argued that, by removing the risk of a nuclear-armed Iran, it will reduce incentives for countries of the region to acquire nuclear arms. Opponents of the deal—not just in the United States but also abroad, especially Israel—claimed that the JCPOA would increase those incentives because it would legitimize enrichment in Iran, allow Iran to ramp up its nuclear capacity when key restrictions expire after 10 and 15 years, and boost the Iranian economy and the resources Iran could devote to a weapons program.

I strongly believe the JCPOA will significantly reduce prospects for proliferation in the Middle East (and as my colleague Richard Nephew explains in another post out today, there are things the United States and other powers can do to help reduce that prospect further). But uncertainties about the future of the JCPOA and the region will persist for quite some time—and these uncertainties could motivate regional countries to keep their nuclear options open. They may ask themselves a variety of questions in the years ahead: Will the JCPOA be sustainable over time? Will it unravel over concerns about compliance? Will it withstand challenges by opponents in Tehran and Washington? Will it survive leadership transitions in the United States and Iran? Will Iran ramp up its fissile material production capacities when key restrictions expire? Will it then break out of the JCPOA and seek to build nuclear weapons? Will Iran continue to threaten the security of its neighbors in the years ahead? And will the United States maintain a strong regional military presence and be seen by its partners as a reliable guarantor of their security?

I strongly believe the JCPOA will significantly reduce prospects for proliferation in the Middle East.

Richard and I studied how these and other questions might affect nuclear decision-making in the Middle East. In particular, we evaluated the likelihood that key states will pursue nuclear weapons, or at least enrichment or reprocessing programs that could give them a latent nuclear weapons capability. We focused on four states often regarded as potential candidates to join the nuclear club: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Turkey.

Saudi Arabia

Of the four, Saudi Arabia is the most highly motivated to pursue nuclear weapons. It sees Iran as an implacable foe that is intent on destabilizing its neighbors, achieving regional hegemony, and upending the Kingdom’s internal order. At the same time, the Saudis have lost much confidence in the U.S. commitment to the security of its regional partners. In part as a result, the new Saudi leadership has taken a more assertive, independent role in regional conflicts, especially in Yemen. But despite their reservations about the United States, the Saudis know they have no choice but to rely heavily on Washington for their security—and they know they would place that vital relationship in jeopardy if they pursued nuclear weapons.

The Saudis clearly have sufficient financial resources to make a run at nuclear weapons. But acquiring the necessary human and physical infrastructure to pursue an indigenous nuclear program would take many years.

Given the Kingdom’s difficulty in developing an indigenous nuclear weapons capability, speculation has turned to the possibility that it would receive support from a foreign power, usually Pakistan, which received generous financial support from Saudi Arabia in acquiring its own nuclear arsenal. But while rumors abound about a Pakistani commitment to help Saudi Arabia acquire nuclear weapons, the truth is hard to pin down. If such a Saudi-Pakistani agreement was ever reached, it was probably a vague, unwritten assurance long ago between a Pakistani leader and Saudi king, without operational details or the circumstances in which it would be activated. In any event, the Saudis would find it hard to rely on such an assurance today, when Pakistanis are trying to put the legacy of A.Q. Khan behind them and join the international nonproliferation mainstream.

United Arab Emirates (UAE)

Like Saudi Arabia, the UAE believes Iran poses a severe threat to regional security and has become more aggressive since the completion of the JCPOA. And like the Saudis, the Emiratis have lost considerable confidence in the reliability of the United States as a security guarantor. But also like the Saudis, the Emiratis are reluctant to put their vital security ties to the United States in jeopardy.

[L]ike the Saudis, the Emiratis have lost considerable confidence in the reliability of the United States as a security guarantor.

Moreover, the Emiratis are heavily invested in their ambitious nuclear energy program—with efforts currently underway, with the help of a South Korean-led consortium, to construct four nuclear power reactors—and they know this project would be dead in the water if they opted for nuclear weapons.

The Emiratis have also been a leading regional supporter of nonproliferation. In their bilateral agreement for civil nuclear cooperation with the United States, they formally renounced the acquisition of enrichment or reprocessing capabilities (the so-called “gold standard”), effectively precluding the pursuit of nuclear weapons. After the JCPOA permitted Iran to retain its enrichment program, the UAE, faced with criticism domestically and from some Arab governments for having given up its nuclear “rights,” said it may reconsider its formal renunciation of enrichment. But subsequently, Emirati officials have made clear that their nuclear energy plans have not changed and that they have no intention to pursue enrichment or reprocessing.

Egypt

Egypt is on everyone’s short list of potential nuclear aspirants—in part because of its former role as leader of the Arab world and its flirtation with nuclear weapons in the Gamal Abdel Nasser years. But while Egypt and Iran have often been regional rivals, Egypt does not view Iran as a direct military threat. Instead, Egypt’s main concerns include extremist activities in the Sinai, the fragmentation of Iraq and Syria, disarray in Libya—and the adverse impact of these developments on Egypt’s internal security. The Egyptians recognize that none of these threats can be addressed by the possession of nuclear weapons.

Although Russia is committed to work with Egypt on its first nuclear power reactor, Cairo’s nuclear energy plans have experienced many false starts before, and there is little reason to believe the outcome will be different this time around, especially given the severe economic challenges the Egyptian government currently faces. Moreover, although Egypt trained a substantial number of nuclear scientists in the 1950s and 1960s, its human nuclear infrastructure atrophied when ambitious nuclear energy plans never materialized.

Turkey

Because of its emergence in the last decade as a rising power, its large and growing scientific and industrial basis, and its ambition to be an influential regional player, Turkey is also on everyone’s short list of potential nuclear-armed states. But Turkey has maintained reasonably good relations with Tehran, even during the height of the sanctions campaign against Iran. Although the two countries have taken opposing sides in the Syria civil war, Turkey, like Egypt, does not regard Iran as a direct military threat. Indeed, Ankara sees instability and terrorism emanating from the Syrian conflict as its main security concerns—and nuclear weapons are not viewed as relevant to dealing with those concerns.

Current tensions with Russia over Turkey’s November 2015 shoot-down of a Russian fighter jet are another source of concern in Ankara. But the best means of addressing that concern is to rely on the security guarantee Turkey enjoys as a member of NATO. While Turkish confidence in NATO has waxed and waned in recent decades, most Turks, especially in the military, believe they can count on NATO in a crisis, and they would be reluctant to put their relationship with NATO at risk by pursuing nuclear weapons.

Former nuclear aspirants

For the sake of completeness, our study also looked at regional countries that once actively pursued nuclear weapons but were forced to abandon their programs: Iraq, Libya, and Syria. But we concluded that, given the civil strife tearing those countries apart, none of them was in a position to pursue a sustained, disciplined nuclear weapons effort.

Bottom line

Our study found that the Iran nuclear deal has significantly reduced incentives for countries of the Middle East to reconsider their nuclear options. At least for the foreseeable future, none of them is likely to pursue nuclear weapons or even latent nuclear weapons capabilities—or to succeed if they do.

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UncategorizedIn last summer’s congressional debate over the Iran nuclear deal—the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—one of the more hotly debated issues was whether the deal would decrease or increase the likelihood that countries in the Middle East would pursue nuclear weapons.
Supporters of the JCPOA argued that, by removing the risk of a nuclear-armed Iran, it will reduce incentives for countries of the region to acquire nuclear arms. Opponents of the deal—not just in the United States but also abroad, especially Israel—claimed that the JCPOA would increase those incentives because it would legitimize enrichment in Iran, allow Iran to ramp up its nuclear capacity when key restrictions expire after 10 and 15 years, and boost the Iranian economy and the resources Iran could devote to a weapons program.
I strongly believe the JCPOA will significantly reduce prospects for proliferation in the Middle East (and as my colleague Richard Nephew explains in another post out today, there are things the United States and other powers can do to help reduce that prospect further). But uncertainties about the future of the JCPOA and the region will persist for quite some time—and these uncertainties could motivate regional countries to keep their nuclear options open. They may ask themselves a variety of questions in the years ahead: Will the JCPOA be sustainable over time? Will it unravel over concerns about compliance? Will it withstand challenges by opponents in Tehran and Washington? Will it survive leadership transitions in the United States and Iran? Will Iran ramp up its fissile material production capacities when key restrictions expire? Will it then break out of the JCPOA and seek to build nuclear weapons? Will Iran continue to threaten the security of its neighbors in the years ahead? And will the United States maintain a strong regional military presence and be seen by its partners as a reliable guarantor of their security?
I strongly believe the JCPOA will significantly reduce prospects for proliferation in the Middle East.
Richard and I studied how these and other questions might affect nuclear decision-making in the Middle East. In particular, we evaluated the likelihood that key states will pursue nuclear weapons, or at least enrichment or reprocessing programs that could give them a latent nuclear weapons capability. We focused on four states often regarded as potential candidates to join the nuclear club: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Turkey.
Saudi Arabia
Of the four, Saudi Arabia is the most highly motivated to pursue nuclear weapons. It sees Iran as an implacable foe that is intent on destabilizing its neighbors, achieving regional hegemony, and upending the Kingdom’s internal order. At the same time, the Saudis have lost much confidence in the U.S. commitment to the security of its regional partners. In part as a result, the new Saudi leadership has taken a more assertive, independent role in regional conflicts, especially in Yemen. But despite their reservations about the United States, the Saudis know they have no choice but to rely heavily on Washington for their security—and they know they would place that vital relationship in jeopardy if they pursued nuclear weapons.
The Saudis clearly have sufficient financial resources to make a run at nuclear weapons. But acquiring the necessary human and physical infrastructure to pursue an indigenous nuclear program would take many years.
Given the Kingdom’s difficulty in developing an indigenous nuclear weapons capability, speculation has turned to the possibility that it would receive support from a foreign power, usually Pakistan, which received generous financial support from Saudi Arabia in acquiring its own nuclear arsenal. But while rumors abound about a Pakistani commitment to help Saudi Arabia acquire nuclear weapons, the truth is hard to pin down. If such a ... In last summer’s congressional debate over the Iran nuclear deal—the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—one of the more hotly debated issues was whether the deal would decrease or increase the likelihood that countries ... https://www.brookings.edu/2016/04/26/is-there-a-path-to-peace-in-yemen/Is there a path to peace in Yemen?http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/171800750/0/brookingsrss/topics/gulfstates~Is-there-a-path-to-peace-in-Yemen/
Mon, 30 Nov -0001 00:00:00 +0000http://www.brookings.edu?p=96232&preview_id=96232The conflict in Yemen has become a mutually hurting stalemate, and constructing a truly all-inclusive decision-making process to pick up where the National Dialogue Conference left off will be key to reaching any power-sharing agreement.

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Editors’ Note: The conflict in Yemen has become a mutually hurting stalemate, writes Sultan Barakat. Constructing a truly all-inclusive decision-making process to pick up where the National Dialogue Conference left off will be key to reaching any power-sharing agreement. This post originally appeared on Al Jazeera.

After a year of the Saudi-led coalition’s war in Yemen, parties to the conflict have been meeting in Kuwait this week, in the latest effort to resolve the conflict. Despite sporadic violations, a fragile truce brokered by United Nations envoy Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed that went into effect on April 10 seems to be holding.

This is good news for Yemenis and the region, as it seems there is a growing appreciation that maintaining violence as the means to achieve political goals in Yemen is simply not feasible.

Despite the lack of progress, the fact that talks are taking place outside Riyadh is in itself a positive compromise and an important step by the Saudis. For the talks to be effective, Saudi Arabia needs to revisit its overall strategy now that its year-long military campaign has not solved Yemen’s protracted crisis.

Furthermore, to improve upon the failed ceasefires of July and December 2015, the delegations should consider the following factors, which may provide a degree of common ground on which to build a lasting peace in Yemen.

Mutually hurting stalemate

First, the conflict has become a mutually hurting stalemate. Yemen is facing a humanitarian catastrophe that will haunt the region for years to come.

In addition to the 6,000 people killed and 30,000 wounded, more than 2.5 million people remain internally displaced and 14.4 million are affected by food insecurity, with many of the country’s governorates on the verge of famine.

Most Yemenis lack access to clean water and proper sanitation. Meanwhile, with the military campaign costing an estimated $200 million a day, the coalition supporting President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi against the Houthis will find it increasingly difficult to afford as a result of the falling price of oil.

Furthermore, having announced its developmental Vision 2030, it is in Saudi Arabia’s interest to put an end to its war in Yemen as soon as possible.

Second, it will be almost impossible to advance a peace agreement in Yemen without an innovative form of inclusive local power sharing that addresses the concerns of all parties.

Mistakenly viewed by many observers as a two-sided conflict between the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthi rebels, Yemen’s war is actually a multifaceted predicament.

Mistakenly viewed by many observers as a two-sided conflict between the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthi rebels, Yemen’s war is actually a multifaceted predicament involving a volatile combination of local, regional, and international actors, all of them armed and having major and competing interests in the country’s future.

The political transition process set out by the Gulf Cooperation Council back in 2011 failed to incorporate key sections of Yemeni society into the decision-making process, such as the southern separatist Hirak movement, the Houthis, and Yemeni youth and women.

As a result, Hadi’s transitional government was increasingly viewed as illegitimate and unrepresentative of the demands and concerns of the Yemeni people.

Power-sharing agreement

Constructing a truly all-inclusive decision-making process to pick up where the National Dialogue Conference left off will be key to reaching any power-sharing agreement.

Relatedly, the Houthis continue to harbor grievances against the Hadi government. They associate Hadi with the corrupt Saleh regime that exacerbated political problems in Yemen for decades. They protested the exclusive way in which he oversaw Yemen’s transition process, leading to unilateral decisions on major national issues and the drafting and implementation of a new constitution.

It seems that the Saudis too, do not have full confidence in Hadi and his cabinet. According to a private conversation with a senior member of Hadi’s government, the Saudis have yet to approve his proposed operational budget for governing in Aden and elsewhere.

As a compromise, the Saudis should consider working with the Houthis in order to reach an understanding on how to cease hostilities and resolve political disagreements with an open mind as to who should be in the leading seat. This may be another point of convergence that is rising fast.

Fourth, the six-region federalism plan endorsed by Hadi must be re-examined and evaluated more thoroughly if an effective power-sharing agreement is to be reached. Without proper consensus from factions such as Hirak and the Houthis, these divisions will put at risk any prospect of lasting peace in Yemen.

One of the major concerns is that federalism may exacerbate calls for secession in the future.

Among Hirak supporters, certain factions say they will accept nothing less than complete secession of the South, while others have hailed the six-federation outline as a step towards possible secession in the near future.

Access to sea

Apprehension over access to the sea and possession of natural resources has dominated debates over the regional boundaries. Ironically, this is an issue that may unite Houthis and Southern Yemenis as they both reject the federal system as currently structured.

Finally, Yemen’s war has already strengthened the presence of al-Qaida and other extremist groups, including the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as ISIS). Today, al-Qaida controls large swaths of territory and has penetrated the very structure of the Yemeni state, becoming a recognized partner in raising taxes locally, allocating central expenditures, and paying local salaries.

Since the enemies of al-Qaida and ISIL—the Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition—are busy fighting each other, extremist organizations can now operate with impunity. It is in the interest of all parties heading to Kuwait to ensure that this situation does not continue.

The peace talks in Kuwait will provide the Saudis with an opportunity to present a strategy for ceasing hostilities in Yemen without necessarily sacrificing their political goals.

Yemen and its people deserve to have their humanitarian issues improved and find a peace settlement that encourages the formation of an inclusive political system.

Failure to do so would perpetuate moral insolvency on the part of the Saudis and their coalition partners, threaten to further destabilize Yemen and the Arabian Peninsula, and enable al-Qaida and ISIL to continue to flourish.

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Uncategorized Editors’ Note: The conflict in Yemen has become a mutually hurting stalemate, writes Sultan Barakat. Constructing a truly all-inclusive decision-making process to pick up where the National Dialogue Conference left off will be key to reaching any power-sharing agreement. This post originally appeared on Al Jazeera.
After a year of the Saudi-led coalition's war in Yemen, parties to the conflict have been meeting in Kuwait this week, in the latest effort to resolve the conflict. Despite sporadic violations, a fragile truce brokered by United Nations envoy Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed that went into effect on April 10 seems to be holding.
This is good news for Yemenis and the region, as it seems there is a growing appreciation that maintaining violence as the means to achieve political goals in Yemen is simply not feasible.
Despite the lack of progress, the fact that talks are taking place outside Riyadh is in itself a positive compromise and an important step by the Saudis. For the talks to be effective, Saudi Arabia needs to revisit its overall strategy now that its year-long military campaign has not solved Yemen's protracted crisis.
Furthermore, to improve upon the failed ceasefires of July and December 2015, the delegations should consider the following factors, which may provide a degree of common ground on which to build a lasting peace in Yemen.
Mutually hurting stalemate
First, the conflict has become a mutually hurting stalemate. Yemen is facing a humanitarian catastrophe that will haunt the region for years to come.
In addition to the 6,000 people killed and 30,000 wounded, more than 2.5 million people remain internally displaced and 14.4 million are affected by food insecurity, with many of the country's governorates on the verge of famine.
Most Yemenis lack access to clean water and proper sanitation. Meanwhile, with the military campaign costing an estimated $200 million a day, the coalition supporting President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi against the Houthis will find it increasingly difficult to afford as a result of the falling price of oil.
Furthermore, having announced its developmental Vision 2030, it is in Saudi Arabia's interest to put an end to its war in Yemen as soon as possible.
Second, it will be almost impossible to advance a peace agreement in Yemen without an innovative form of inclusive local power sharing that addresses the concerns of all parties.
Mistakenly viewed by many observers as a two-sided conflict between the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthi rebels, Yemen's war is actually a multifaceted predicament.
Mistakenly viewed by many observers as a two-sided conflict between the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthi rebels, Yemen's war is actually a multifaceted predicament involving a volatile combination of local, regional, and international actors, all of them armed and having major and competing interests in the country's future.
The political transition process set out by the Gulf Cooperation Council back in 2011 failed to incorporate key sections of Yemeni society into the decision-making process, such as the southern separatist Hirak movement, the Houthis, and Yemeni youth and women.
As a result, Hadi’s transitional government was increasingly viewed as illegitimate and unrepresentative of the demands and concerns of the Yemeni people.
Power-sharing agreement
Constructing a truly all-inclusive decision-making process to pick up where the National Dialogue Conference left off will be key to reaching any power-sharing agreement.
Relatedly, the Houthis continue to harbor grievances against the Hadi government. They associate Hadi with the corrupt Saleh regime that exacerbated political problems in Yemen for decades. They protested the exclusive way in which he oversaw Yemen's transition process, leading to unilateral decisions on major national issues and the drafting and implementation of a new constitution.
It seems that the Saudis ... Editors’ Note: The conflict in Yemen has become a mutually hurting stalemate, writes Sultan Barakat. Constructing a truly all-inclusive decision-making process to pick up where the National Dialogue Conference left off will be key to ... https://www.brookings.edu/research/risky-routes-energy-transit-in-the-middle-east/Risky routes: Energy transit in the Middle Easthttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/171800756/0/brookingsrss/topics/gulfstates~Risky-routes-Energy-transit-in-the-Middle-East/
Mon, 30 Nov -0001 00:00:00 +0000http://www.brookings.edu?p=84742&post_type=research&preview_id=84742In a new Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper, Robin Mills identifies the key points of vulnerability in MENA energy supply and transit, including the pivotal Strait of Hormuz and a number of important pipelines. Mills also assesses the impact of possible disruptions on both the global economy and MENA states themselves.

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In 2011, Libya’s revolution knocked most of its oil production offline for months, resulting in a loss of nearly 2 percent of global production and a corresponding increase in oil prices. The security of energy exports and energy transit from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, given its paramount importance to the global economy, has long been a concern. The current, very unsettled political situation in the region has made that concern even more salient.

In a new Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper, Robin Mills identifies the key points of vulnerability in MENA energy supply and transit, including the pivotal Strait of Hormuz and a number of important pipelines. Mills also assesses the impact of possible disruptions on both the global economy and MENA states themselves.

Mills argues that to mitigate such disruptions, infrastructural, institutional, and market approaches must be used together. Mills highlights the need for improved assessments of the viability of various infrastructure projects and calls for the development of regional institutional arrangements that can better manage transit crises as they arise.

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In 2011, Libya’s revolution knocked most of its oil production offline for months, resulting in a loss of nearly 2 percent of global production and a corresponding increase in oil prices. The security of energy exports and energy transit from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, given its paramount importance to the global economy, has long been a concern. The current, very unsettled political situation in the region has made that concern even more salient.
Read “Risky Routes: Energy Transit in the Middle East“
In a new Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper, Robin Mills identifies the key points of vulnerability in MENA energy supply and transit, including the pivotal Strait of Hormuz and a number of important pipelines. Mills also assesses the impact of possible disruptions on both the global economy and MENA states themselves.
Mills argues that to mitigate such disruptions, infrastructural, institutional, and market approaches must be used together. Mills highlights the need for improved assessments of the viability of various infrastructure projects and calls for the development of regional institutional arrangements that can better manage transit crises as they arise.
In 2011, Libya’s revolution knocked most of its oil production offline for months, resulting in a loss of nearly 2 percent of global production and a corresponding increase in oil prices. The security of energy exports and energy transit ... https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/after-doha-what-next-for-opec/After Doha, what next for Opec?http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/171800758/0/brookingsrss/topics/gulfstates~After-Doha-what-next-for-Opec/
Mon, 30 Nov -0001 00:00:00 +0000http://www.brookings.edu?p=131521&post_type=opinion&preview_id=131521Most Opec countries attended along with non-Opec leaders such as Russia and Oman. It seemed that the previously announced deal to freeze production at January levels was a formality, especially as most countries involved could not or would not increase output anyway. But at the last moment the Saudi position changed, and it became clear they would not agree to freeze production unless Iran were included.

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Most Opec countries attended along with non-Opec leaders such as Russia and Oman. It seemed that the previously announced deal to freeze production at January levels was a formality, especially as most countries involved could not or would not increase output anyway. But at the last moment the Saudi position changed, and it became clear they would not agree to freeze production unless Iran were included.

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Most Opec countries attended along with non-Opec leaders such as Russia and Oman. It seemed that the previously announced deal to freeze production at January levels was a formality, especially as most countries involved could not or would not increase output anyway. But at the last moment the Saudi position changed, and it became clear they would not agree to freeze production unless Iran were included.
Most Opec countries attended along with non-Opec leaders such as Russia and Oman. It seemed that the previously announced deal to freeze production at January levels was a formality, especially as most countries involved could not or would not ... https://www.brookings.edu/events/the-role-of-lng-in-a-changing-energy-world/The role of LNG in a changing energy worldhttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/171800762/0/brookingsrss/topics/gulfstates~The-role-of-LNG-in-a-changing-energy-world/
Mon, 30 Nov -0001 00:00:00 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/events/the-role-of-lng-in-a-changing-energy-world/This discussion focused on the quickly evolving LNG market, Qatar’s role in creating and shaping it, and how the United States sees LNG as an important tool to help the world achieve its carbon reduction goals.

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The Brookings Doha Center (BDC) hosted a panel discussion on April 21, 2016, about the ongoing transformations in the LNG market. The panelists were Amos J. Hochstein, special envoy and coordinator for international energy affairs at the U.S. Department of State; and H.E. Abdullah bin Hamad al-Attiyah, chairman of Abdullah bin Hamad al-Attiyah International Foundation for Energy & Sustainable Development. Sultan Barakat, senior foreign policy fellow and director of research at the BDC, moderated the event, which was attended by members of Qatar’s diplomatic, academic, and media community.

Barakat commenced the session by noting that the energy markets are witnessing exciting, almost transformational times. The increasing availability and decreasing price of LNG is key to that transformation: allowing countries to diversify energy sources, meet demand spikes, and transition from outdated fuel sources to modern renewables. Within this framework, LNG emerges as an important transition fuel that will facilitate a shift towards cleaner energy. However, some hesitancy still exists when it comes to the consumption of natural gas, as we see places like China considering a return to coal.

Hochstein agreed with Barakat adding that these times are in fact revolutionary for all aspects of the energy market mainly due to the emergence of unconventional and offshore explorations, the rise in renewable energies, technological advancements and new efficiency levels, in addition to a renewed political commitment to climate change.

He then described the evolution of the natural gas industry. Only a few decades ago, gas could only be transported via restricting pipelines set up between a consumer and producer, which Hochstein likened to a “catholic marriage”. This old transport system was later supplemented, in an effort pioneered by Qatar, with liquefied natural gas (LNG) adding flexibility to the gas market and allowing the commodity to be traded more independently. Still, unlike oil, LNG could not be simply transported by tanker and be immediately ready for consumption, it required the consumer to re-gasify it. In other words, multibillion dollar investments into infrastructure were necessary simply to use natural gas after it was purchased. To address this hurdle, another innovation emerged, the floating storage and regasification unit (FSRU), a transportable LNG conversion unit which allowed a consumer to forgo the hefty investment in regasification, rendering LNG more accessible, faster, and cheaper.

Given these transformations, new producers have been eager to enter the LNG market; Australia and the United States will rival Qatar’s production levels by the end of the decade, and other producers such as Mozambique, Tanzania, Egypt, Israel, and Cyprus will soon follow. When President Obama was sworn into office, the United States was the largest importer of LNG in the world. Remarkably, the United States exported its first LNG cargo a few weeks ago. In fact, U.S. import regasification terminals are now being converted to export-oriented liquefaction ones.

Hochstein argued that, as a result to these developments, gas prices are becoming less tied to oil. Given the surge in production, it is likely that gas prices will remain low even if oil prices rebound. This would be equalized by an upsurge in demand, which is likely to occur given continued low prices and renewed commitment to environmental protection. Hochstein encouraged governments and companies to use gas as a transition fuel, assisting a shift from fossil fuels to clean energy. In fact, Hochstein sees that government policy should proactively encourage and regulate such a transition in order to meet climate change goals.

Sultan then directed a question to al-Attiyah, asking how those developments are likely to affect Qatar. Al-Attiyah, who has been working in Qatar’s energy sector since the 70s, began by describing the emergence of LNG in Qatar. When he was appointed minister of energy in 1992, LNG production was nonexistent; at that time, gas discoveries were bad news to companies looking for oil. Given transportation difficulties and the distance between Qatar and major gas consumers, conventional wisdom at the time considered gas a failed enterprise. Yet, when Qatar finally decided to go ahead and invest in LNG, it saw incredible success. Qatar now exports to Asia, Europe, and the Middle East.

Interestingly, Qatar started investing in gas when oil was sold at around $10 per barrel, a time when gas was also at its lowest price. The investment was lucrative despite the low prices because oil and gas markets work in cycles of boom and bust, and the price soon recovered. Today, Qatar plans on adopting a similar policy, investing in the maintenance and development of its LNG capacities despite the low prices. More importantly, the current prices are an opportunity to increase efficiency and make production more cost effective, a commitment that will expand profit margins once prices rebound.

In fact, al-Attiyah added, the low rates will encourage consumers to develop the infrastructure necessary to consume more gas. This will increase demand for the commodity in the long run. It is also important to note that Qatar is at a particular advantage at the moment; the country has already developed all its infrastructure and facilities, making its production costs lower than those of any new coming competitors. If anything, the low prices will deter some competitors from entering the market and force others to abandon new projects, thus maintaining Qatar’s position as the lead gas exporter.

Another advantage that al-Attiyah highlighted is Qatar’s flexibility, given the fact that it operates the largest LNG fleet in the world. It also has long, well-established relationships with its consumers. For instance, Japan has been Qatar’s consumer for almost 20 years. When the tsunami overtook Japan’s pacific coast in 2011 forcing it to shut down its nuclear power plants, Qatar immediately converted hundreds of cargos to aid its customer in its emergency. Al-Attiyah assured that all Qatar’s customers can expect similar customer service and accommodation. Qatar is one of the few countries that manage the full production chain: upstream, downstream, and transportation, which allows it to be highly flexible and reliable. To sum up, if anything, the current low prices present an important opportunity for Qatar to attract new consumers, get rid of upcoming producers, and increase its efficiency.

After a Q&A session that asked about the potential development of a gas cartel, technological advancements in renewable energy, diversification plans in Qatar, and gas supply to the Ukraine, Barakat concluded by thanking the guests and saying that the event has been rather constructive and encouraging, emphasizing mutual benefits and highlighting the potential advantages of the current situation.

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The Brookings Doha Center (BDC) hosted a panel discussion on April 21, 2016, about the ongoing transformations in the LNG market. The panelists were Amos J. Hochstein, special envoy and coordinator for international energy affairs at the U.S. Department of State; and H.E. Abdullah bin Hamad al-Attiyah, chairman of Abdullah bin Hamad al-Attiyah International Foundation for Energy & Sustainable Development. Sultan Barakat, senior foreign policy fellow and director of research at the BDC, moderated the event, which was attended by members of Qatar's diplomatic, academic, and media community.
Barakat commenced the session by noting that the energy markets are witnessing exciting, almost transformational times. The increasing availability and decreasing price of LNG is key to that transformation: allowing countries to diversify energy sources, meet demand spikes, and transition from outdated fuel sources to modern renewables. Within this framework, LNG emerges as an important transition fuel that will facilitate a shift towards cleaner energy. However, some hesitancy still exists when it comes to the consumption of natural gas, as we see places like China considering a return to coal.
Hochstein agreed with Barakat adding that these times are in fact revolutionary for all aspects of the energy market mainly due to the emergence of unconventional and offshore explorations, the rise in renewable energies, technological advancements and new efficiency levels, in addition to a renewed political commitment to climate change.
He then described the evolution of the natural gas industry. Only a few decades ago, gas could only be transported via restricting pipelines set up between a consumer and producer, which Hochstein likened to a “catholic marriage”. This old transport system was later supplemented, in an effort pioneered by Qatar, with liquefied natural gas (LNG) adding flexibility to the gas market and allowing the commodity to be traded more independently. Still, unlike oil, LNG could not be simply transported by tanker and be immediately ready for consumption, it required the consumer to re-gasify it. In other words, multibillion dollar investments into infrastructure were necessary simply to use natural gas after it was purchased. To address this hurdle, another innovation emerged, the floating storage and regasification unit (FSRU), a transportable LNG conversion unit which allowed a consumer to forgo the hefty investment in regasification, rendering LNG more accessible, faster, and cheaper.
Given these transformations, new producers have been eager to enter the LNG market; Australia and the United States will rival Qatar's production levels by the end of the decade, and other producers such as Mozambique, Tanzania, Egypt, Israel, and Cyprus will soon follow. When President Obama was sworn into office, the United States was the largest importer of LNG in the world. Remarkably, the United States exported its first LNG cargo a few weeks ago. In fact, U.S. import regasification terminals are now being converted to export-oriented liquefaction ones.
Hochstein argued that, as a result to these developments, gas prices are becoming less tied to oil. Given the surge in production, it is likely that gas prices will remain low even if oil prices rebound. This would be equalized by an upsurge in demand, which is likely to occur given continued low prices and renewed commitment to environmental protection. Hochstein encouraged governments and companies to use gas as a transition fuel, assisting a shift from fossil fuels to clean energy. In fact, Hochstein sees that government policy should proactively encourage and regulate such a transition in order to meet climate change goals.
Sultan then directed a question to al-Attiyah, asking how those developments are likely to affect Qatar. Al-Attiyah, who has been working in Qatar's energy sector since the 70s, began by describing the emergence of LNG in Qatar. ... The Brookings Doha Center (BDC) hosted a panel discussion on April 21, 2016, about the ongoing transformations in the LNG market. The panelists were Amos J. Hochstein, special envoy and coordinator for international energy affairs at the U.