The issue of routing resilience has been an object of constant attention by the industry for more than a decade. BGP vulnerabilities were identified as early as 1988 and many of them still exist today. There are other threats, beyond BGP, that can potentially negatively affect network routing. But despite seeming fragility, global inter-domain routing of the Internet demonstrates exceptional stability and
robustness. Indeed, apart from a few high-profile cases when intentional actions or unintentional configuration mistakes affected global routing for a limited time, threats from the routing system rarely endanger service providers' commitments.

But is this a true reflection of the state of affairs or simply an indication that we may not be aware of the impacts? In order to answer this question we need to understand the history and current state of challenge. What level of attack has there been in the past -- to what extent do security incidents happen, but go unnoticed, or get dealt with inside a single network, possibly introducing collateral damage? Are the number and impact of service disruptions and malicious activities stable, increasing or decreasing? Can we understand why?

The panel comprised of researchers and network operators will explore the challenge of routing resiliency. The panelists will discuss the measurement data and operational statistics, and will share their perspectives supported by research analysis and operational experience.