China's New Challenge to the U.S.-Japan Alliance

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As Chinese warships and naval survey vessels
ply Japanese waters hoping to stake their claim to potentially
gas-rich seabeds, the United States is sending mixed signals to
Japan on the U.S.-Japan alliance. Ambiguity in Washington may
undermine Japanese confidence in the alliance-in itself, a major
strategic goal for Beijing. Washington must now publicly support
Japan, our most important ally in Asia, if it hopes to deter China
from further adventurism in Japan's Exclusive Economic
Zone.

Provocative
Behavior

On Tuesday, July 6, Japanese antisubmarine
aircraft spotted a Chinese naval survey vessel, the Nandiao
411, well within Japan's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The
Chinese foreign ministry declined to comment on the incursion,
saying it had not received any report of naval survey
activities.

On July 13, Japanese coast guard cutters
discovered a Chinese civilian research vessel, the Xiangyanghong
9, within the EEZ and engaged in survey operations for which it
had not sought, much less obtained, Japanese government
permission-a possible violation of the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).[1]
Japanese aircraft ordered the vessel to leave the area, but the
Chinese ship refused to respond.

Even more ominously, on July 14, a Chinese
naval vessel overtook a Japanese resource exploration ship inside
the EEZ, forcing it to alter its route to avoid a collision.[2]

The Chinese navy has made a habit of
traversing Japanese waters for the past two years, and Chinese
ships and submarines have been particularly assertive in the past
year. In January, the Japanese government declassified a report
that Chinese naval vessels had entered the EEZ six times during
2003 "to survey subsea routes for Chinese submarines to enter the
Pacific." These incursions include two violations of Japan's
territorial waters by Ming class submarines in the vicinity of
Kagoshima at the southern tip of Kyushu. So far this year, Japan's
Self Defense Forces have documented at least twelve violations of
the EEZ, including three separate incursions northwest of the
Senkaku Islands in May alone.

Alarmed by China's presence in Japanese
waters, Tokyo will soon dispatch a civilian survey vessel-looking
for natural gas-to the area near the Senkaku Islands (which China
calls "Diaoyutai") to assert its own EEZ rights. Beijing's foreign
ministry protested this news, claiming that the EEZ is "disputed."
It warned Tokyo not to take "any action that may imperil China's
interest and complicate the current situation."

The Chinese navy's sudden assertiveness-indeed
aggressiveness-in Japanese waters is a test of the U.S.-Japan
alliance. Washington must be careful not to confront this challenge
with its traditional studied ambiguity. Ambiguous support for an
ally against China's increasingly provocative territorial
encroachments will encourage China to become more aggressive not
just in Japanese waters, but also in the South China Sea and, of
course, the Taiwan Strait.

China
Has No Claim

The status of the Senkakus is clear. Japan
first claimed the uninhabited and unclaimed islets in question in
1895 to use their rocky outcroppings for maritime navigation aids.
From that time through the end of World War II, they were
administered as part of Japan's Okinawa prefecture. Upon the
Japanese surrender, the United States administered the islets under
a military occupation authority. In 1972, when the United States
returned Okinawa to Japanese administration, the Senkakus were
included in the reversion. There is, accordingly, no doubt that the
United States has always regarded the islands as
Japanese.

China and Taiwan have expressed interest in
the islands since only 1968, when a United Nations Economic
Commission for Asia report suggested there may be petroleum
deposits in the seabed near the islets. (No petroleum or gas
deposits have since been detected in the area.) On June 11, 1971,
the Republic of China on Taiwan formally claimed the islands. After
the United States returned the islands to Japan in the 1972 Okinawa
Reversion Agreement, China lodged a formal protest with the U.S.
government. Eager not to alienate Beijing just as President Nixon
was beginning his opening to China, the U.S. State Department
announced that the Reversion Agreement "did not affect the
sovereignty" over disputed islands.

As recently as March 2004, the State
Department accepted China's claims over the Senkakus as being
equally valid as Japan's title. Still, in a stance known
affectionately in Japan as the "Armitage Doctrine," U.S. officials
have said that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty covers "all
territories under the administration of Japan" and there is no
question that, as a matter of law-under the Reversion Agreement,
the alliance treaty, and the terms of the U.S. military occupation
of the Ryukyu island chain-that the Senkakus are indeed "under the
administration of Japan." As such, any hostile activities against
the islands would trigger the treaty.

In this context, China's forays into the
Senkakus seem designed to probe where the bedrock of the U.S.-Japan
alliance begins-or if it is there at all. Of course, Chinese survey
vessels are also mapping the ocean bottom for the benefit of the
country's rapidly expanding submarine fleet.

Steps for the Administration

State clearly that the Senkakus are covered by the U.S.-Japan
Security Treaty.
The United States cannot expect to avoid a showdown with China and
Japan over the islands by continuing to tell China that it "takes
no position on the matter of sovereignty over the Senkakus." This
only encourages China to force a confrontation with Japan over the
islets, which will either draw the United States into the fray on
Japan's side or risk the collapse of the U.S.-Japan alliance-an
event China devoutly hopes to see.

The Administration must state firmly and publicly not only that the
Senkakus are covered under the alliance and that the United States
will support Japan's claim as a matter of law, but also that the
United States sees a prima facie case supporting Japan's
claims to sovereignty over the islands. While this would irritate
Beijing, it would also be a clear message that the United States
plans to remain a Pacific power and that Beijing's aggressive
territorial claims are counterproductive. Any continued
confrontations in the area would be ample evidence of Beijing's
broader ambitions in Asia. Better to know now, than later. Either
way, the United States must stand firmly and unequivocally with
Japan.

Assist the Japanese Self Defense Forces in monitoring Chinese
incursions.
While China's naval forays into Japan's EEZ are perfectly legal
under international law, Chinese oil and natural gas surveys are
not. U.S. Naval forces should join Japanese forces in actively
monitoring Chinese maritime operations in Japanese waters, as a
demonstration of alliance strength and to dissuade China from
believing testing the EEZ boundaries is cost-free.

The United States should view with alarm
China's increasing aggressiveness in the Western Pacific and its
continuing challenges to long-established maritime boundaries. The
seabeds that China now claims have been under Japanese sovereignty
for over a century. The United States has, over past years,
reportedly reassured Japan that the territorial waters China now
claims-and the islands they encompass-fall within the ambit of
Japanese administration and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. The
United States should make this point firmly and thereby confront
China's provocations with clarity instead of
ambiguity.

John Tkacik, Jr., is
Research Fellow in China Policy in the Asian Studies Center at The
Heritage Foundation.

[1]Article 56 of the UNCLOS
limits such coastal state jurisdiction to "exploring…the
natural resources" of the EEZ. Articles 95 and 96 assert complete
immunity on the high seas-and, under Article 58, in EEZs-for
warships and ships "used only on government, non-commercial
service." For the full text and overview, see United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, of
December 10, 1982.