..... be preferred not only qua his junior teachers but qua outsiders, provided everything is equal on merits. if this is the intent and rationale underlying the proviso, i think, with respect to the tribunal, that it clearly misconstrued the proviso and proceeded to reject the application in limine as if the only criteria for ..... teachers employed in the same school and the outsiders, preference is to be given to the senior teacher serving in the school, provided he is otherwise eligible and suitable. the rationale underlying this proviso appears to be that a senior teacher who has put in services in a school for which the appointment of principal is to be made, is to .....

..... with any amount of justification that the learned judges of this high court has lost sight of the distinction?36. the next question that arises is was there any, valid rationale in deducting insurance payments and accident insurance payments under lord campbell's act as it stood prior to the amendment in 1908 when such payments were not deducted under common ..... law in personal injury cases? there was hardly any convincing rationale and it is precisely for that reason that it became necessary for the legislature to intervene in 1908 and thereafter from time to time to extend the principle of justice .....

..... only if the essential conditions set out above are fulfilled. the class which enjoys reservation must be educationally handicapped. the reservation must be geared to getting ever the handicap. the rationale of reservation must be in the case of medical students, removal of regional or class inadequacy or like disadvantage.31. the view expressed by the patna high court in the .....

..... framers of the code were well aware of the line of distinction between a mere 'further enquiry' and that of a 'trial', 'retrial' or 'commitment for trial'.17. the other rationale for the patna view appears in the following observations of chief justice das in brijnath sahai's case. 1957 cri lj 290 (pat):otherwise the result may be an absurd .....

..... the harsher sentence. having characterized the jury's decision for life imprisonment as an "acquittal" of the death sentence, the court recites the classic double jeopardy rationale applicable to retrying the issue of guilt or innocence, green v. united states, supra, at 355 u. s. 187 -188, and applies it to ..... of the double jeopardy clause. the court has cited each opinion time and time again, and more than once the court has declined to reexamine pearce. indeed, its rationale has been reaffirmed in recent cases. united states v. difrancesco, 449 u. s. 117 , 449 u. s. 135 -136, n. 14 (1980); chaffin ..... relied upon page 451 u. s. 445 in north carolina v. pearce. that exception is applicable here, and we therefore refrain from extending the rationale of pearce to the very different facts of the present case. chief justice bardgett, in his dissent from the ruling of the missouri supreme court ..... convict him." id. at 355 u. s. 190 . see also price v. georgia, 398 u. s. 323 (1970). thus, the "clean slate" rationale recognized in pearce is inapplicable whenever a jury agrees or an appellate court decides that the prosecution has not proved its case. in the usual sentencing proceeding, however ..... upon itself." addington v. texas, 441 u. s. 418 , 441 u. s. 423 -424 (1979). iv these procedural differences become important when the underlying rationale of the cases is considered. the state here relies principally upon north carolina v. pearce. [ footnote 15 ] the page 451 u. s. 442 court's .....

..... regulated and have a long history of regulation. today, the court conveniently discards the latter portion of the exception. [ footnote 3/3 ] yet the very page 452 u. s. 612 rationale for the exception -- that the "businessman . . . in effect consents to the restrictions placed upon him" -- disappears without it. it can hardly be said that a businessman consents to restrictions on ..... , of which any person who chooses to enter such a business must be aware." 436 u.s. at 436 u. s. 313 (emphasis page 452 u. s. 611 added). the rationale for the exception was unmistakably that of implied consent. the court reasoned that " [t]he businessman [in an industry with a long tradition of close government supervision] in effect consents ..... , however, that the warrantless entry authorized by congress in this case, 103(a) of the federal mine safety and health act of 1977, can be justified by the court's rationale. the court holds that warrantless searches of stone quarries are permitted because the mining industry has been pervasively regulated. but i have no doubt that, had congress enacted a criminal ..... safety justifies a program of warrantless inspections of commercial premises. see 436 u.s. at 436 u. s. 336 -339 (stevens, j., dissenting). justice stewart has cogently demonstrated that the rationale of today's decision is much closer to the reasoning in my dissent than to the reasoning in the majority opinion in barlow's, inc. nevertheless, i am not persuaded .....

..... supreme page 452 u. s. 116 court's interpretation of the fourteenth amendment was erroneous, they also demonstrated that the trial judge's faithful application of that court's bakke rationale in this case was an insufficient basis for supporting the injunction. with the guidance of this court's decision in bakke, the california court of appeal reversed the judgment and ..... a remedy for past discrimination. the evidence was, however, quite plainly irrelevant to the theory of the trial judge's intended decision, which was, of course, wholly consistent with the rationale of the california supreme court's opinion in bakke, supra. the trial judge summarily denied the motion to reopen. on october 11, 1977, the trial court entered findings of fact ..... trial court agreed, and entered judgment in petitioners' favor. the california court of appeal reversed, 95 cal.app.3d 506, 157 cal.rptr. 260, holding that the trial court's rationale was no longer tenable in light of this court's intervening decision in university of california regents v. bakke, 438 u. s. 265 . the court of appeal's page 452 ..... , but allowed the use of race or sex as a factor in making job assignments. on respondents' appeal, the california court of appeal reversed, holding that the trial court's rationale was no longer tenable in view of this court's intervening decision in university of california regents v. bakke, 438 u. s. 265 . however, the court of appeal did not .....

..... 404 u. s. 83 (1971) (reductions of social security based on workers' compensation comports with due process). in this light, the agency may well have employed the very rationale proffered by retirees -- that two benefits systems must have identical purposes before they may be integrated -- and departed from retirees' reasoning only in concluding that these two benefit systems share ..... benefit offsets based on workers' compensation. our judicial function is not to second-guess the policy decisions of the legislature, no matter how appealing we may find contrary rationales. as a final argument, retirees claim that we should defer to the policy decisions of the state legislature. to this claim we now turn. iii the new jersey ..... railroad retirement supply payments solely for wages lost due to retirement. because of this distinction, retirees conclude that integration of pension funds with workers' compensation awards lacks the rationale page 451 u. s. 519 behind integration of pension funds with social security and railroad retirement. retirees' claim presumes that erisa permits integration with social security or railroad ..... the same effect. there is no merit in the argument that integration of pension funds with workers' compensation awards, which are based on work-related injuries, lacks the rationale behind erisa's permission of integration of pension funds with social security and railroad retirement payments, which supply payments for wages lost due to retirement. both the social .....

..... contexts." post at 450 u. s. 702 . apparently, he has overlooked such cases as allied stores of ohio, inc. v. bowers, 358 u. s. 522 (1959), where we described the rationale for our earlier decision in wheeling steel corp. v. glander, 337 u. s. 562 (1949): "the statutes, on their face admittedly discriminatory against nonresidents, themselves declared their purpose. . . . having themselves ..... this litigation have defended the truck length regulation on the basis of the safety advantages of 55-foot singles and 60-foot doubles over 65-foot doubles, iowa's actual rationale for maintaining the regulation had nothing to do with these purported differences. rather, iowa sought to discourage interstate truck traffic on iowa's highways. [ footnote 2/2 ] page 450 u ..... interest in efficient and safe interstate transportation, the state law cannot be harmonized with the commerce clause. [ footnote 12 ] a iowa made a more serious effort to support the safety rationale of its law than did wisconsin in raymond, but its page 450 u. s. 672 effort was no more persuasive. as noted above, the district court found that the "evidence .....

..... the search in belton on the basis of the officer's safety, but justice brennan, dissenting, post at 453 u. s. 466 -469, has forcefully demonstrated the inadequacy of that rationale. [ footnote 3/15 ] it is true that the state, in belton, did not argue that the automobile exception justified the search of respondent's jacket pocket. nevertheless, just as the ..... on the automobile exception to uphold the search of respondent's jacket pocket, the court takes an extraordinarily dangerous detour to reach the same result by adopting an admittedly new rationale applicable page 453 u. s. 450 to every "lawful custodial arrest" of the occupant of an automobile. the court's careful and repeated use of the term "lawful custodial arrest ..... plurality, i feel that such a rule cannot be found as long as the court continues in the direction in which it is headed. instead, i would return to the rationale of carroll and chambers and hold that a warrant should not be required to seize and search any personal property found in an automobile that may, in turn, be constitutionally ..... require officers to obtain warrants in order to examine the contents of insubstantial containers in which no one had a reasonable expectation of privacy. the plurality's approach strains the rationales of our prior cases and imposes substantial burdens on law enforcement without vindicating any significant values of privacy. i nevertheless concur in the judgment because the manner in which the .....