1898 Wilmington race riot report - Page 282

257
his willingness to recreate the violence that
had overturned Fusion rule in Wilmington. 94
The bravado of the Atlanta campaign
suggests that the lack of governmental
response to the violence in Wilmington gave
Southerners implicit license to suppress the
black community under the right
circumstances, as, for example, in response
to a perceived black crime wave. Just as
Wilmington whites used newspapers to
assist in their attempts to regain power,
Atlanta’s leaders used Georgia papers to fuel
the flames of the impending riot and
subsequently to provide a modicum of calm
and justification for the violence. 95
Following the Wilmington and
Atlanta riots, southern states experienced
relative calm since whites had gained a
strong footing in their control over blacks
through Jim Crow legislation and
intimidation. White lynch mobs still held
both whites and blacks in check. However,
by the 1921 Tulsa riot and the 1923
Rosewood riot, the threat of black- on- white
sexual assault still proved to be a strong
force in instigating violence that spread to
include large numbers of black victims and
black property loss. Further, the lack of
state and federal response to vigilante
violence demonstrated a tolerance of such
behavior by white leaders, nearly
sanctioning the activity through
nonintervention. 96
Tulsa’s riot represented likely the
most violent racial clash in American
history. After an initial encounter between
whites and blacks outside the city’s jail on
94 Mixon, The Atlanta Riot, 69- 70; Crowe, “ Racial
Violence and Social Reform,” 243; Hunter, ’ Joy, 124.
95 Ray Stannard Baker, Following the Colour Line:
An Account of Negro Citizenship in the American
Democracy ( New York: Doubleday, Page, and
Company, 1908), 5.
96 “ A Documented History of the Incident Which
Occurred at Rosewood, Florida, in January 1923”
presented to the Florida House of Representatives,
December 22, 1993.
the night of May 31, 1921, whites prepared
their invasion. The Tulsa police department
deputized dozens of whites who murdered
African Americans. White mobs looted
black homes before setting them on fire.
Blacks attempted to defend themselves by
taking up arms against the white invasion,
but the state militia entered the African
American enclave known as Greenwood and
disarmed blacks and confined them to city
parks, leaving their homes and families
unprotected. Thirty- five blocks, the heart of
the city’s black community, were destroyed.
Estimates of the death toll vary from 75 to
300. Legal scholar Alfred L. Brophy
emphasized the role of the state guard in
facilitating the destruction of the black
community, in a manner not entirely
different from the activities witnessed in
Wilmington and Atlanta. 97
Whereas some Wilmington whites
believed that the riot marked a positive
turning point in the city’s history, those in
the white communities in Atlanta and Tulsa
recognized the need to present their riots as
aberrations and placate the black
community. Their efforts appear to have
been directed more toward potential
investors rather than black victims,
particularly given the hollow effort toward
compensation. Historian Wayne Mixon
contended that Atlanta’s commercial- civic
elite orchestrated the riot to impose their
vision of the city’s future. Atlanta and Tulsa
presented an image of a repentant white
leadership that had restored the pre- riot
order disrupted by the violence of the lower
class of whites. In Atlanta, the Committee
of Ten was formed to illustrate to outsiders
that order had been restored and that white
elites cared for their black neighbors. The
Civic League and the Colored Cooperative
were established to facilitate communication
between the races. The Committee of Ten
distributed relief, but their efforts reflected a
97 Ellsworth, Death in a Promised Land, chapter 3.

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257
his willingness to recreate the violence that
had overturned Fusion rule in Wilmington. 94
The bravado of the Atlanta campaign
suggests that the lack of governmental
response to the violence in Wilmington gave
Southerners implicit license to suppress the
black community under the right
circumstances, as, for example, in response
to a perceived black crime wave. Just as
Wilmington whites used newspapers to
assist in their attempts to regain power,
Atlanta’s leaders used Georgia papers to fuel
the flames of the impending riot and
subsequently to provide a modicum of calm
and justification for the violence. 95
Following the Wilmington and
Atlanta riots, southern states experienced
relative calm since whites had gained a
strong footing in their control over blacks
through Jim Crow legislation and
intimidation. White lynch mobs still held
both whites and blacks in check. However,
by the 1921 Tulsa riot and the 1923
Rosewood riot, the threat of black- on- white
sexual assault still proved to be a strong
force in instigating violence that spread to
include large numbers of black victims and
black property loss. Further, the lack of
state and federal response to vigilante
violence demonstrated a tolerance of such
behavior by white leaders, nearly
sanctioning the activity through
nonintervention. 96
Tulsa’s riot represented likely the
most violent racial clash in American
history. After an initial encounter between
whites and blacks outside the city’s jail on
94 Mixon, The Atlanta Riot, 69- 70; Crowe, “ Racial
Violence and Social Reform,” 243; Hunter, ’ Joy, 124.
95 Ray Stannard Baker, Following the Colour Line:
An Account of Negro Citizenship in the American
Democracy ( New York: Doubleday, Page, and
Company, 1908), 5.
96 “ A Documented History of the Incident Which
Occurred at Rosewood, Florida, in January 1923”
presented to the Florida House of Representatives,
December 22, 1993.
the night of May 31, 1921, whites prepared
their invasion. The Tulsa police department
deputized dozens of whites who murdered
African Americans. White mobs looted
black homes before setting them on fire.
Blacks attempted to defend themselves by
taking up arms against the white invasion,
but the state militia entered the African
American enclave known as Greenwood and
disarmed blacks and confined them to city
parks, leaving their homes and families
unprotected. Thirty- five blocks, the heart of
the city’s black community, were destroyed.
Estimates of the death toll vary from 75 to
300. Legal scholar Alfred L. Brophy
emphasized the role of the state guard in
facilitating the destruction of the black
community, in a manner not entirely
different from the activities witnessed in
Wilmington and Atlanta. 97
Whereas some Wilmington whites
believed that the riot marked a positive
turning point in the city’s history, those in
the white communities in Atlanta and Tulsa
recognized the need to present their riots as
aberrations and placate the black
community. Their efforts appear to have
been directed more toward potential
investors rather than black victims,
particularly given the hollow effort toward
compensation. Historian Wayne Mixon
contended that Atlanta’s commercial- civic
elite orchestrated the riot to impose their
vision of the city’s future. Atlanta and Tulsa
presented an image of a repentant white
leadership that had restored the pre- riot
order disrupted by the violence of the lower
class of whites. In Atlanta, the Committee
of Ten was formed to illustrate to outsiders
that order had been restored and that white
elites cared for their black neighbors. The
Civic League and the Colored Cooperative
were established to facilitate communication
between the races. The Committee of Ten
distributed relief, but their efforts reflected a
97 Ellsworth, Death in a Promised Land, chapter 3.