15. Resd. that the amendments which shall be offered
to the Confederation, by the Convention ought at a proper
time, or times, after the approbation of Congress to be
submitted to an assembly or assemblies of Representatives,
recommended by the several Legislatures to be expressly
chosen by the people, to consider & decide thereon.

[1:122; Madison, 5 June]

propos. 15. for "recommending conventions under appointment
of the people to ratify the new Constitution &c." being
taken up.

Mr. Sherman thought such a popular ratification unnecessary.
the articles of Confederation providing for changes
and alterations with the assent of Congs. and ratification
of State Legislatures.

Mr. Madison thought this provision essential. The articles
of Confedn. themselves were defective in this respect,
resting in many of the States on the Legislative sanction
only. Hence in conflicts between acts of the States, and of
Congs. especially where the former are of posterior date,
and the decision is to be made by State Tribunals, an uncertainty
must necessarily prevail, or rather perhaps a certain
decision in favor of the State authority. He suggested
also that as far as the articles of Union were to be considered
as a Treaty only of a particular sort, among the Governments
of Independent States, the doctrine might be set
up that a breach of any one article, by any of the parties,
absolved the other parties from the whole obligation. For
these reasons as well as others he thought it indispensable
that the new Constitution should be ratified in the most
unexceptionable form, and by the supreme authority of
the people themselves.

Mr. Gerry. Observed that in the Eastern States the Confedn.
had been sanctioned by the people themselves. He
seemed afraid of referring the new system to them. The
people in that quarter have at this time the wildest ideas
of Government in the world. They were for abolishing the
Senate in Massts. and giving all the other powers of Govt.
to the other branch of the Legislature.

Mr. King supposed the last article of ye Confedn. Rendered
the legislature competent to the ratification. The
people of the Southern States where the federal articles
had been ratified by the Legislatures only, had since impliedly
given their sanction to it. He thought notwithstanding
that there might be policy in varying the mode. A Convention
being a single house, the adoption may more easily
be carried thro' it. than thro' the Legislatures where there
are several branches. The Legislatures also being to lose
power, will be most likely to raise objections. The people
having already parted with the necessary powers it is immaterial
to them, by which Government they are possessed,
provided they be well employed.

Mr. Wilson took this occasion to lead the Committee by
a train of observations to the idea of not suffering a disposition
in the plurality of States to confederate anew on
better principles, to be defeated by the inconsiderate or
selfish opposition of a few States. He hoped the provision
for ratifying would be put on such a footing as to admit of
such a partial union, with a door open for the accession of
the rest.--

Mr. Pinkney hoped that in the case the experiment
should not unanimously take place nine States might be
authorized to unite under the same Governmt.

[1:126; Yates, 5 June]

The 15th or last resolve, That the amendment which shall
be offered to the confederation, ought at a proper time or times
after the approbation of congress to be submitted to an assembly
or assemblies of representatives, recommended by the several legislatures,
to be expressly chosen by the people, to consider and
decide thereon, was taken into consideration.

Mr. Madison endeavored to enforce the necessity of this
resolve--because the new national constitution ought to
have the highest source of authority, at least paramount to
the powers of the respective constitutions of the states--points
out the mischiefs that have arisen in the old confederation,
which depends upon no higher authority than the
confirmation of an ordinary act of a legislature--Instances
the law operation of treaties, when contravened by any antecedent
acts of a particular state.

Mr. King supposes, that as the p[e]ople have tacitly
agreed to a federal government, that therefore the legislature
in every state have a right to confirm any alterations
or amendments in it--a convention in each state to approve
of a new government he supposes however the most
eligible.

Mr. Wilson is of opinion, that the people by a convention
are the only power that can ratify the proposed system
of the new government.

[Volume 4, Page 649]

It is possible that not all the states, nay, that not even a
majority, will immediately come into the measure; but
such as do ratify it will be immediately bound by it, and
others as they may from time to time accede to it.

Question put for postponement of this resolve. 7 states
for postponment--3 against it.

[1:128; Pierce, 5 June]

Mr. Butler was of opinion that the alteration of the confederation
ought not to be confirmed by the different Legislatures
because they have sworne to support the Government
under which they act, and therefore that Deputies
should be chosen by the People for the purpose of ratifying
it.

Mr. King thought that the Convention would be under
the necessity of referring the amendments to the different
Legislatures, because one of the Articles of the confederation
expressly made it necessary.

As the word perpetual in the Articles of confederation
gave occasion for several Members to insist upon the main
principles of the confederacy, i e that the several States
should meet in the general Council on a footing of compleat
equality each claiming the right of sovereignty, Mr.
Butler observed that the word perpetual in the confederation
meant only the constant existence of our Union, and
not the particular words which compose the Articles of the
union.

Some general discussions came on.--

[1:179; Madison, 9 June]

[Mr. Paterson] It has been said that if a Natl. Govt. is to
be formed so as to operate on the people and not on the
States, the representatives ought to be drawn from the
people. But why so? May not a Legislature filled by the
State Legislatures operate on the people who chuse the
State Legislatures? or may not a practicable coercion be
found. He admitted that there was none such in the existing
System. He was attached strongly to the plan of the
existing confederacy, in which the people chuse their Legislative
representatives; and the Legislatures their federal
representatives. No other amendments were wanting than
to mark the orbits of the States with due precision, and
provide for the use of coercion, which was the great point.
He alluded to the hint thrown out heretofore by Mr. Wilson
of the necessity to which the large States might be reduced
of confederating among themselves, by a refusal of
the others to concur. Let them unite if they please, but let
them remember that they have no authority to compel the
others to unite. N. Jersey will never confederate on the
plan before the Committee. She would be swallowed up.
He had rather submit to a monarch, to a despot, than to
such a fate. He would not only oppose the plan here but
on his return home do everything in his power to defeat
it there

[1:214; Madison, 12 June]

The Question taken on Resolution 15, to wit, referring
the new system to the people of the States for ratification
it passed in the affirmative: Massts. ay. Cont. no. N.Y. no.
N. J. no. Pa. ay Del. divd. Md. divd. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C.
ay. Geo. ay. [Ayes--6; noes--3; divided--2.]

[1:237; Madison, 13 June]

19. Resd. that the amendments which shall be offered
to the confederation by the convention ought at a proper
time or times after the approbation of Congs. to be submitted
to an Assembly or Assemblies recommended by the
several Legislatures to be expressly chosen by the people
to consider and decide thereon.

[1:250; Madison, 16 June]

Mr. Patterson. said as he had on a former occasion given
his sentiments on the plan proposed by Mr. R. he would
now avoiding repetition as much as possible give his reasons
in favor of that proposed by himself. He preferred it
because it accorded 1. with the powers of the Convention.
2 with the sentiments of the people. If the confederacy was
radically wrong, let us return to our States, and obtain
larger powers, not assume them of ourselves. I came here
not to speak my own sentiments, but the sentiments of
those who sent me. Our object is not such a Governmt. as
may be best in itself, but such a one as our Constituents
have authorized us to prepare, and as they will approve.
If we argue the matter on the supposition that no Confederacy
at present exists, it can not be denied that all the
States stand on the footing of equal sovereignty. All therefore
must concur before any can be bound. If a proportional
representation be right, why do we not vote so here?
If we argue on the fact that a federal compact actually
exists, and consult the articles of it we still find an equal
Sovereignty to be the basis of it. He reads the 5th. art: of
Confederation giving each State a vote--& the 13th. declaring
that no alteration shall be made without unanimous
consent. This is the nature of all treaties. What is
unanimously done, must be unanimously undone. It was
observed (by Mr. Wilson) that the larger State[s] gave up
the point, not because it was right, but because the circumstances
of the moment urged the concession. Be it so. Are
they for that reason at liberty to take it back. Can the donor
resume his gift Without the consent of the donee. This
doctrine may be convenient, but it is a doctrine that will
sacrifice the lesser States. The large States acceded readily
to the confederacy. It was the small ones that came in reluctantly
and slowly. N. Jersey & Maryland were the two
last, the former objecting to the want of power in Congress
over trade: both of them to the want of power to appropriate
the vacant territory to the benefit of the whole. If
the sovereignty of the States is to be maintained, the Representatives
must be drawn immediately from the States,
not from the people: and we have no power to vary the
idea of equal sovereignty. The only expedient that will
cure the difficulty, is that of throwing the States into
Hotchpot. To say that this is impracticable, will not make
it so. Let it be tried, and we shall see whether the Citizens
of Massts. Pena. & Va. accede to it. It will be objected that
Coercion will be impracticable. But will it be more so in
one plan than the other? Its efficacy will depend on the
quantum of power collected, not on its being drawn from [Volume 4, Page 650]
the States, or from the individuals; and according to his
plan it may be exerted on individuals as well as according
that of Mr. R. a distinct executive & Judiciary also were
equally provided by this plan.

. . . . .

[Mr. Wilson] . . . 13. finally ye ratification is in this to
be by the people themselves--in that by the legislative authorities
according to the 13 art: of Confederation.

With regard to the power of the Convention, he conceived
himself authorized to conclude nothing, but to be at liberty
to propose any thing. In this particular he felt himself perfectly
indifferent to the two plans.

With regard to the sentiments of the people, he conceived it
difficult to know precisely what they are. Those of the particular
circle in which one moved, were commonly mistaken
for the general voice. He could not persuade himself
that the State Govts. & sovereignties were so much the
idols of the people, nor a Natl. Govt. so obnoxious to
them, as some supposed. Why sd. a Natl. Govt. be unpopular?
Has it less dignity? will each Citizen enjoy under it
less liberty or protection? Will a Citizen of Delaware be degraded
by becoming a Citizen of the United States? Where
do the people look at present for relief from the evils of
which they complain? Is it from an internal reform of
their Govt.? No. Sir, It is from the Natl. Councils that relief
is expected. For these reasons he did not fear, that the
people would not follow us into a national Govt. and it will
be a further recommendation of Mr. R.'s plan that it is to
be submitted to them and not to the Legislatures, for ratification.

[1:314; Madison, 19 June]

Mr. Madison. Much stress had been laid by some gentlemen
on the want of power in the Convention to propose
any other than a federal plan. To what had been answered
by others, he would only add, that neither of the characteristics
attached to a federal plan would support this objection.
One characteristic, was that in a federal Government,
the power was exercised not on the people individually;
but on the people collectively, on the States. Yet in some
instances as in piracies, captures &c. the existing Confederacy,
and in many instances, the amendments to it proposed
by Mr. Patterson must operate immediately on
individuals. The other characteristic was, that a federal
Govt. derived its appointments not immediately from the
people, but from the States which they respectively composed.
Here too were facts on the other side. In two of the
States, Connect. and Rh. Island, the delegates to Congs.
were chosen, not by the Legislatures, but by the people at
large; and the plan of Mr. P. intended no change in this
particular.

It had been alledged (by Mr. Patterson) that the Confederation
having been formed by unanimous consent, could
be dissolved by unanimous Consent only Does this doctrine
result from the nature of compacts? does it arise
from any particular stipulation in the articles of Confederation?
If we consider the federal union as analogous
to the fundamental compact by which individuals
compose one Society, and which must in its theoretic origin
at least, have been the unanimous act of the component
members, it cannot be said that no dissolution of the
compact can be effected without unanimous consent. a
breach of the fundamental principles of the compact by a
part of the Society would certainly absolve the other part
from their obligations to it. If the breach of any article by
any of the parties, does not set the others at liberty, it is
because, the contrary is implied in the compact itself, and
particularly by that law of it, which gives an indefinite authority
to the majority to bind the whole in all cases. This
latter circumstance shews that we are not to consider the
federal Union as analogous to the social compact of individuals:
for if it were so, a Majority would have a right to
bind the rest, and even to form a new Constitution for the
whole, which the Gentn: from N. Jersey would be among
the last to admit. If we consider the federal union as analogous
not to the social compacts among individual men:
but to the conventions among individual States. What is
the doctrine resulting from these conventions? Clearly, according
to the Expositors of the law of Nations, that a
breach of any one article, by any one party, leaves all the
other parties at liberty, to consider the whole convention
as dissolved, unless they choose rather to compel the delinquent
party to repair the breach. In some treaties indeed
it is expressly stipulated that a violation of particular articles
shall not have this consequence, and even that particular
articles shall remain in force during war, which in
general is understood to dissolve all subsisting Treaties.
But are there any exceptions of this sort to the Articles of
confederation? So far from it that there is not even an
express stipulation that force shall be used to compell an
offending member of the Union to discharge its duty. He
observed that the violations of the federal articles had
been numerous & notorious. Among the most notorious
was an Act of N. Jersey herself; by which she expressly refused
to comply with a constitutional requisition of
Congs.--and yielded no farther to the expostulations of
their deputies, than barely to rescind her vote of refusal
without passing any positive act of compliance. He did not
wish to draw any rigid inferences from these observations.
He thought it proper however that the true nature of the
existing confederacy should be investigated, and he was
not anxious to strengthen the foundations on which it now
stands

[1:335; Madison, 20 June]

Mr. Elseworth 2ded. by Mr. Gorham moves to alter it so
as to run "that the Government of the United States ought
to consist of a supreme legislative, Executive and Judiciary".
This alteration he said would drop the word national,
and retain the proper title "the United States." He
could not admit the doctrine that a breach of any of the
federal articles could dissolve the whole. It would be
highly dangerous not to consider the Confederation as still
subsisting. He wished also the plan of the Convention to
go forth as an amendment to the articles of Confederation,
since under this idea the authority of the Legislatures
could ratify it. If they are unwilling, the people will be so
too. If the plan goes forth to the people for ratification [Volume 4, Page 651]
several succeeding Conventions within the States would be
unavoidable. He did not like these conventions. They were
better fitted to pull down than to build up Constitutions.

[2:88; Madison, 23 July]

Resol: 19. referring the new Constitution to Assemblies
to be chosen by the people for the express purpose of ratifying
it" was next taken into consideration.

Mr. Elseworth moved that it be referred to the Legislatures
of the States for ratification. Mr. Patterson 2ded. the
motion.

Col. Mason considered a reference of the plan to the
authority of the people as one of the most important and
essential of the Resolutions. The Legislatures have no
power to ratify it. They are the mere creatures of the State
Constitutions, and cannot be greater than their creators.
And he knew of no power in any of the Constitutions, he
knew there was no power in some of them, that could be
competent to this object. Whither then must we resort? To
the people with whom all power remains that has not been
given up in the Constitutions derived from them. It was of
great moment he observed that this doctrine should be
cherished as the basis of free Government. Another strong
reason was that admitting the Legislatures to have a competent
authority, it would be wrong to refer the plan to
them, because succeeding Legislatures having equal authority
could undo the acts of their predecessors; and the
National Govt. would stand in each State on the weak and
tottering foundation of an Act of Assembly. There was a
remaining consideration of some weight. In some of the
States the Govts. were not derived from the clear & undisputed
authority of the people. This was the case in Virginia.
Some of the best & wisest citizens considered the
Constitution as established by an assumed authority. A National
Constitution derived from such a source would be
exposed to the severest criticisms.

Mr. Randolph. One idea has pervaded all our proceedings,
to wit, that opposition as well from the States as from
individuals, will be made to the System to be proposed.
Will it not then be highly imprudent, to furnish any unnecessary
pretext by the mode of ratifying it. Added to
other objections agst. a ratification by Legislative authority
only, it may be remarked that there have been instances in
which the authority of the Common law has been set up
in particular States agst. that of the Confederation which
has had no higher sanction than Legislative ratification.--Whose
opposition will be most likely to be excited agst. the
System? That of the local demogagues who will be degraded
by it from the importance they now hold. These
will spare no efforts to impede that progress in the popular
mind which will be necessary to the adoption of the
plan, and which every member will find to have taken
place in his own, if he will compare his present opinions
with those brought with him into the Convention. It is of
great importance therefore that the consideration of this
subject should be transferred from the Legislatures where
this class of men, have their full influence to a field in
which their efforts can be less mischievous. It is moreover
worthy of consideration that some of the States are averse
to any change in their Constitution, and will not take the
requisite steps, unless expressly called upon to refer the
question to the people.

Mr. Gerry. The arguments of Col. Mason & Mr. Randolph
prove too much, they prove an unconstitutionality
in the present federal system & even in some of the State
Govts. Inferences drawn from such a source must be inadmissable.
Both the State Govts. & the federal Govt. have
been too long acquiesced in, to be now shaken. He considered
the Confederation to be paramount to any State Constitution.
The last article of it authorizing alterations must
consequently be so as well as the others, and everything
done in pursuance of the article must have the same high
authority with the article.--Great confusion he was confident
would result from a recurrence to the people. They
would never agree on any thing. He could not see any
ground to suppose that the people will do what their rulers
will not. The rulers will either conform to, or influence
the sense of the people.

Mr. Ghorum was agst. referring the plan to the Legislatures.
1. Men chosen by the people for the particular
purpose, will discuss the subject more candidly than members
of the Legislature who are to lose the power which is
to be given up to the Genl. Govt. 2. Some of the Legislatures
are composed of several branches. It will consequently
be more difficult in these cases to get the plan
through the Legislatures, than thro' a Convention. 3. in
the States many of the ablest men are excluded from the
Legislatures, but may be elected into a Convention.
Among these may be ranked many of the Clergy who are
generally friends to good Government. Their services
were found to be valuable in the formation & establishment
of the Constitution of Massachts. 4. the Legislatures
will be interrupted with a variety of little business. by artfully
pressing which, designing men will find means to delay
from year to year, if not to frustrate altogether the
national system. 5--If the last art: of the Confederation is
to be pursued the unanimous concurrence of the States
will be necessary. But will any one say. that all the States
are to suffer themselves to be ruined, if Rho. Island
should persist in her opposition to general measures.
Some other States might also tread in her steps. The present
advantage which N. York seems to be so much attached
to, of taxing her neighbours by the regulation of
her trade, makes it very probable, that she will be of the
number. It would therefore deserve serious consideration
whether provision ought not to be made for giving effect
to the System without waiting for the unanimous concurrence
of the States.

Mr. Elseworth. If there be any Legislatures who should
find themselves incompetent to the ratification, he should
be content to let them advise with their constituents and
pursue such a mode as wd be competent. He thought
more was to be expected from the Legislatures than from
the people. The prevailing wish of the people in the Eastern
States is to get rid of the public debt; and the idea of
strengthening the Natl. Govt. carries with it that of
strengthening the public debt. It was said by Col. Mason
1. that the Legislatures have no authority in this case. 2. [Volume 4, Page 652]
that their successors having equal authority could rescind
their acts. As to the 2d. point he could not admit it to be
well founded. An Act to which the States by their Legislatures,
make themselves parties, becomes a compact from
which no one of the parties can recede of itself. As to the
1st. point, he observed that a new sett of ideas seemed to
have crept in since the articles of Confederation were established.
Conventions of the people, or with power derived
expressly from the people, were not then thought of.
The Legislatures were considered as competent. Their ratification
has been acquiesced in without complaint. To
whom have Congs. applied on subsequent occasions for
further powers? To the Legislatures; not to the people.
The fact is that we exist at present, and we need not enquire
how, as a federal Society, united by a charter one
article of which is that alterations therein may be made by
the Legislative authority of the States. It has been said that
if the confederation is to be observed, the States must
unanimously concur in the proposed innovations. He would
answer that if such were the urgency & necessity of our
situation as to warrant a new compact among a part of the
States, founded on the consent of the people; the same
pleas would be equally valid in favor of a partial compact,
founded on the consent of the Legislatures.

Mr. Williamson thought the Resoln. (19) so expressed as
that it might be submitted either to the Legislatures or to
Conventions recommended by the Legislatures. He observed
that some Legislatures were evidently unauthorized
to ratify the system. He thought too that Conventions were
to be preferred as more likely to be composed of the ablest
men in the States.

Mr. Govr. Morris considered the inference of Mr. Elseworth
from the plea of necessity as applied to the establishment
of a new System on ye. consent of the people of
a part of the States, in favor of a like establishnt. on the
consent of a part of the Legislatures as a non sequitur. If
the Confederation is to be pursued no alteration can be
made without the unanimous consent of the Legislatures:
Legislative alterations not conformable to the federal compact,
would clearly not be valid. The Judges would consider
them as null & void. Whereas in case of an appeal to
the people of the U. S., the supreme authority, the federal
compact may be altered by a majority of them; in like manner
as the Constitution of a particular State may be altered
by a majority of the people of the State. The amendmt.
moved by Mr. Elseworth erroneously supposes that we are
proceeding on the basis of the Confederation. This Convention
is unknown to the Confederation.

Mr. King thought with Mr. Elseworth that the Legislatures
had a competent authority, the acquiescence of the
people of America in the Confederation, being equivalent
to a formal ratification by the people. He thought with Mr.
E--also that the plea of necessity was as valid in the one
case as in the other. At the same time he preferred a reference
to the authority of the people expressly delegated
to Conventions, as the most certain means of obviating all
disputes & doubts concerning the legitimacy of the new
Constitution; as well as the most likely means of drawing
forth the best men in the States to decide on it. He remarked
that among other objections made in the State of
N. York to granting powers to Congs. one had been that
such powers as would operate within the State, could not
be reconciled to the Constitution; and therefore were not
grantible by the Legislative authority. He considered it as
of some consequence also to get rid of the scruples which
some members of the States Legislatures might derive
from their oaths to support & maintain the existing Constitutions.

Mr. Madison thought it clear that the Legislatures were
incompetent to the proposed changes. These changes
would make essential inroads on the State Constitutions,
and it would be a novel & dangerous doctrine that a Legislature
could change the constitution under which it held
its existence. There might indeed be some Constitutions
within the Union, which had given, a power to the Legislature
to concur in alterations of the federal Compact. But
there were certainly some which had not; and in the case
of these, a ratification must of necessity be obtained from
the people. He considered the difference between a system
founded on the Legislatures only, and one founded on the
people, to be the true difference between a league or treaty,
and a Constitution. The former in point of moral obligation
might be as inviolable as the latter. In point of political operation,
there were two important distinctions in favor of
the latter. 1. A law violating a treaty ratified by a preexisting
law, might be respected by the Judges as a law, though
an unwise or perfidious one. A law violating a constitution
established by the people themselves, would be considered
by the Judges as null & void. 2. The doctrine laid down by
the law of Nations in the case of treaties is that a breach
of any one article by any of the parties, frees the other
parties from their engagements. In the case of a union of
people under one Constitution, the nature of the pact has
always been understood to exclude such an interpretation.
Comparing the two modes in point of expediency he
thought all the considerations which recommended this
Convention in preference to Congress for proposing the
reform were in favor of State Conventions in preference
to the Legislatures for examining and adopting it.

On question on Mr. Elseworth's motion to refer the plan
to the Legislatures of the States

Mr. Govr. Morris moved that the reference of the plan
be made to one general Convention, chosen & authorized
by the people to consider, amend, & establish the same.--Not
seconded.

On question for agreeing to Resolution 19, touching the
mode of Ratification as reported from the Committee of
the Whole; viz, to refer the Constn. after the approbation
of Congs. to assemblies chosen by the people:

Resolved That the Amendments which shall be offered to
the Confederation by the Convention ought at a
proper Time or Times, after the Approbation of
Congress, to be submitted to an Assembly or Assemblies
of Representatives, recommended by [Volume 4, Page 653]
the several Legislatures, to be expressly chosen
by the People to consider and decide thereon.

. . . . .

23. The assent of the Legislature of States shall be
sufficient to invest future additional Powers in U.S. in C.
ass. and shall bind the whole Confederacy.

. . . . .

4. The ratification of the reform is--After the approbation
of Congress--to be made

by a special convention in each State
recommended by the assembly
to be chosen for the express purpose
of considering and approving or rejecting
it in toto:
and this recommendation may be used from
time to time

. . . . .

Addenda

1. The assent of the Conventions of states shall
give operation to this constitution

2. Each assenting state shall notify its assent to congress:
who shall publish a day for its commencement, not
exceeding After such publication, or with the assent
of the major part of the assenting states after
the expiration of days from the giving of the
assent of the ninth state,

1. each legislature shall direct the choice of representatives,
according to the seventh article and provide
for their support:

2. each legislature shall also choose senators; and
provide for their support

3. they shall meet at the Place & on the day assigned
by congress,

4. They shall as soon as may be after meeting elect
the executive: and proceed to execute this constitution.

. . . . .

Resolved, That the Constitution proposed by this Convention,
to the People of the United States for their approbation
be laid before the United States in Congress assembled
for their Agreement and Recommendation and be
afterwards submitted to a Convention chosen in each State
under the Recommendation of its Legislature, in order to
receive the Ratification of such Convention.

[2:189; Madison, 6 Aug.]

The ratifications of the Conventions of States
shall be sufficient for organizing this Constitution.

XXII

This Constitution shall be laid before the United States
in Congress assembled, for their approbation; and it is the
opinion of this Convention, that it should be afterwards
submitted to a Convention chosen, under the recommendation
of its legislature, in order to receive the ratification
of such Convention.

XXIII

To introduce this government, it is the opinion of this
Convention, that each assenting Convention should notify
its assent and ratification to the United States in Congress
assembled; that Congress, after receiving the assent and
ratification of the Conventions of States, should appoint
and publish a day, as early as may be, and appoint a
place for commencing proceedings under this Constitution;
that after such publication, the Legislatures of the
several States should elect members of the Senate, and direct
the election of members of the House of Representatives;
and that the members of the Legislature should meet
at the time and place assigned by Congress, and should, as
soon as may be, after their meeting, choose the President
of the United States, and proceed to execute this Constitution."

[2:211; McHenry, 7 Aug.]

I now begged his particular attention to my last proposition.
By the XXII article we were called upon to agree
that the system should be submitted to a convention chosen
in each State under the recommendation of its legislature.
And that a less number of conventions than the
whole agreeing to the system should be sufficient to organise
the constitution.

We had taken an oath to support our constitution and
frame of government. We had been empowered by a legislature
legally constituted to revise the confederation and
fit it for the exigencies of government, and preservation of the
union. Could we do this business in a manner contrary to
our constitution? I feared (This was said first I thought--
then I feared) we could not. If we relinquished any of the
rights or powers of our government to the U.S. of America,
we could no otherwise agree to that relinquishment
than in the mode our constitution prescribed for making
changes or alterations in it.

Mr. Carrol said he had felt his doubts respecting the
propriety of this article as it respected Maryland; but he
hoped we should be able to get over this difficulty.

Mr. Jenifer now came in to whom Mr. Carroll repeated
what we had said upon my propositions and our determinations.
Mr. Jenifer agreed to act in unison with us but
seemed to have vague ideas of the mischiefs of the system
as it stood in the report.

I wished to impress him with the necessity to support us,
and touched upon some popular points.

[2:468; Madison, 30 Aug.]

Art: XXI. taken up. viz: "The ratifications of the Conventions
of States shall be sufficient for organizing
this Constitution."

Mr. Wilson proposed to fill the blank with "seven" that
being a majority of the whole number & sufficient for the
commencement of the plan.

Mr. Carrol moved to postpone the article in order to
take up the Report of the Committee of Eleven . . . --and
on the question

Mr. Govr. Morris thought the blank ought to be filled in
a twofold way, so as to provide for the event of the ratifying
States being contiguous which would render a smaller
number sufficient, and the event of their being dispersed, [Volume 4, Page 654]
which wd require a greater number for the introduction
of the Government.

Mr. Sherman. observed that the States being now confederated
by articles which require unanimity in changes,
he thought the ratification in this case of ten States at least
ought to be made necessary.

Mr. Randolph was for filling the blank with "Nine" that
being a respectable majority of the whole, and being a
number made familiar by the constitution of the existing
Congress.

Mr Wilson mentioned "eight" as preferable.

Mr. Dickinson asked whether the concurrence of Congress
is to be essential to the establishment of the system,
whether the refusing States in the Confederacy could be
deserted--and whether Congress could concur in contravening
the system under which they acted?

Mr. Madison. remarked that if the blank should be filled
with "seven" eight, or "nine"--the Constitution as it stands
might be put in force over the whole body of the people.
tho' less than a majority of them should ratify it.

Mr. Wilson. As the Constitution stands, the States only
which ratify can be bound. We must he said in this case go
to the original powers of Society, The House on fire must
be extinguished, without a scrupulous regard to ordinary
rights.

Mr. Butler was in favor of "nine". He revolted at the
idea, that one or two States should restrain the rest from
consulting their safety.

Mr. Carrol moved to fill the blank with "the thirteen".
unanimity being necessary to dissolve the existing confederacy
which had been unanimously established.

Mr King thought this amendt. necessary, otherwise as
the Constitution now stands it will operate on the whole
though ratified by a part only.

[2:475; Madison, 31 Aug.]

Mr. King moved to add to the end of art: XXI the words
"between the said States" so as to confine the operation of
the Govt. to the States ratifying it.

Mr. Madison proposed to fill the blank in the article with
"Any seven or more States entitled to thirty three members
at least in the House of Representatives according to
the allotment made in the 3 Sect: of art: 4." This he said
would require the concurrence of a majority of both the
States and people.

Mr. Sherman doubted the propriety of authorizing less
than all the States to execute the Constitution, considering
the nature of the existing Confederation. Perhaps all the
States may concur, and on that supposition it is needless
to hold out a breach of faith.

Mr Govr. Morris moved to strike out "Conventions of
the" after "ratifications". leaving the States to pursue their
own modes of ratification.

Mr. Carrol mentioned the mode of altering the Constitution
of Maryland pointed out therein, and that no other
mode could be pursued in that State.

Mr. King thought that striking out "Conventions". as the
requisite mode was equivalent to giving up the business
altogether. Conventions alone, which will avoid all the obstacles
from the complicated formation of the Legislatures,
will succeed, and if not positively required by the plan, its
enemies will oppose that mode.

Mr. Govr. Morris said he meant to facilitate the adoption
of the plan, by leaving the modes approved by the
several State Constitutions to be followed.

Mr. Madison considered it best to require Conventions;
Among other reasons, for this, that the powers given to
the Genl. Govt. being taken from the State Govts the Legislatures
would be more disinclined than conventions composed
in part at least of other men; and if disinclined, they
could devise modes apparently promoting, but really.
thwarting the ratification. The difficulty in Maryland was
no greater than in other States, where no mode of change
was pointed out by the Constitution, and all officers were
under oath to support it. The people were in fact, the
fountain of all power, and by resorting to them, all difficulties
were got over. They could alter constitutions as
they pleased. It was a principle in the Bills of rights, that
first principles might be resorted to.

Mr. McHenry said that the officers of Govt. in Maryland
were under oath to support the mode of alteration prescribed
by the Constitution.

Mr Ghorum urged the expediency of "Conventions"
also Mr. Pinkney, for reasons, formerly urged on a discussion
of this question.

Mr. L. Martin insisted on a reference to the State Legislatures.
He urged the danger of commotions from a resort
to the people & to first principles in which the Governments
might be on one side & the people on the other.
He was apprehensive of no such consequences however in
Maryland, whether the Legislature or the people should
be appealed to. Both of them would be generally against
the Constitution. He repeated also the peculiarity in the
Maryland Constitution.

Mr. King observed that the Constitution of Massachusetts
was made unalterable till the year 1790, yet this was
no difficulty with him. The State must have contemplated
a recurrence to first principles before they sent deputies to
this Convention.

Mr. Sherman moved to postpone art. XXI. & to take up
art: XXII on which question,

Art: XXI. as amended was then agreed to by all the
States, Maryland excepted, & Mr. Jenifer being, ay--

Art. XXII taken up, to wit, "This Constitution shall be
laid before the U--S. in Congs. assembled for their approbation;
and it is the opinion of this Convention that it
should be afterwards submitted to a Convention chosen,
in each State under the recommendation of its Legislature,
in order to receive the ratification of such Convention"

Mr. Govr. Morris & Mr. Pinkney moved to strike out the
words "for their approbation" On this question

Mr Govr. Morris & Mr. Pinkney then moved to amend
the art: so as to read

"This Constitution shall be laid before the U. S. in Congress
assembled; and it is the opinion of this Convention
that it should afterwards be submitted to a Convention
chosen in each State, in order to receive the ratification of
such Convention: to which end the several Legislatures
ought to provide for the calling Conventions within their
respective States as speedily as circumstances will permit".--Mr.
Govr. Morris said his object was to impress in
stronger terms the necessity of calling Conventions in order
to prevent enemies to the plan, from giving it the go
by. When it first appears, with the sanction of this Convention,
the people will be favorable to it. By degrees the State
officers, & those interested in the State Govts will intrigue
& turn the popular current against it.

Mr. L--Martin believed Mr. Morris to be right, that after
a while the people would be agst. it. but for a different
reason from that alledged. He believed they would not ratify
it unless hurried into it by surprize.

Mr. Gerry enlarged on the idea of Mr. L. Martin in
which he concurred, represented the system as full of
vices, and dwelt on the impropriety of destroying the existing
Confederation, without the unanimous Consent of
the parties to it:

Col: Mason 2ded. the motion, declaring that he would
sooner chop off his right hand than put it to the Constitution
as it now stands. He wished to see some points not
yet decided brought to a decision, before being compelled
to give a final opinion on this article. Should these points
be improperly settled, his wish would then be to bring the
whole subject before another general Convention.

Mr. Govr Morris was ready for a postponement. He had
long wished for another Convention, that will have the
firmness to provide a vigorous Government, which we are
afraid to do.

Mr. Randolph stated his idea to be, in case the final
form of the Constitution should not permit him to accede
to it, that the State Conventions should be at liberty to propose
amendments to be submitted to another General
Convention which may reject or incorporate them, as shall
be judged proper.

Mr. Gerry moved to reconsider art: XXI & XXII from
the latter of which "for the approbation of Congs." had
been struck out. He objected to proceeding to change the
Government without the approbation of Congress as being
improper and giving just umbrage to that body. He repeated
his objections also to an annulment of the confederation
with so little scruple or formality.

Mr. Hamilton concurred with Mr. Gerry as to the indecorum
of not requiring the approbation of Congress. He
considered this as a necessary ingredient in the transaction.
He thought it wrong also to allow nine States as
provided by art XXI. to institute a new Government on
the ruins of the existing one. He wd propose as a better
modification of the two articles (XXI & XXII) that the
plan should be sent to Congress in order that the same if
approved by them, may be communicated to the State
Legislatures, to the end that they may refer it to State
Conventions; each Legislature declaring that if the convention
of the State should think the plan ought to take
effect among nine ratifying States, the same shd take effect
accordingly.

Mr. Gorham--Some States will say that nine States shall [Volume 4, Page 656]
be sufficient to establish the plan--others will require unanimity
for the purpose--And the different and conditional
ratifications will defeat the plan altogether.

Mr. Hamilton--No Convention convinced of the necessity
of the plan will refuse to give it effect on the adoption
by nine States. He thought this mode less exceptionable
than the one proposed in the article, and would attain the
same end,

Mr Fitzimmons remarked that the words "for their approbation"
had been struck out in order to save Congress
from the necessity of an Act inconsistent with the Articles
of Confederation under which they held their authority.

Mr. Randolph declared if no change should be made in
this part of the plan, he should be obliged to dissent from
the whole of it. He had from the beginning he said been
convinced that radical changes in the system of the Union
were necessary. Under this conviction he had brought forward
a set of republican propositions as the basis and outline
of a reform. These Republican propositions had however,
much to his regret been widely, and in his opinion,
irreconcileably departed from--In this state of things it
was his idea and he accordingly meant to propose, that the
State Conventions shd. be at liberty to offer amendments
to the plan,--and that these should be submitted to a second
General Convention, with full power to settle the
Constitution finally--He did not expect to succeed in this
proposition, but the discharge of his duty in making the
attempt, would give quiet to his own mind.

Mr. Wilson was against a reconsideration for any of the
purposes which had been mentioned.

Mr King thought it would be more respectful to Congress
to submit the plan generally to them; than in such
a form as expressly and necessarily to require their
approbation or disapprobation. The assent of nine
States he considered as sufficient; and that it was more
proper to make this a part of the Constitution itself, than
to provide for it by a supplemental or distinct recommendation.

Mr. Gerry urged the indecency and pernicious tendency
of dissolving in so slight a manner, the solemn obligations
of the articles of confederation. If nine out of thirteen can
dissolve the compact, Six out of nine will be just as able to
dissolve the new one hereafter.

Mr. Sherman was in favor of Mr. King's idea of submitting
the plan generally to Congress. He thought nine
States ought to be made sufficient: but that it would be
best to make it a separate act and in some such form as
that intimated by Col: Hamilton, than to make it a particular
article of the Constitution.

Mr. Hamilton then moved to postpone art XXI in order
to take up the following, containing the ideas he had above
expressed. viz

Resolved that the foregoing plan of a Constitution be
transmitted to the U. S. in Congress assembled, in order
that if the same shall be agreed to by them, it may be communicated
to the Legislatures of the several States, to the
end that they may provide for its final ratification by referring
the same to the Consideration of a Convention of
Deputies in each State to be chosen by the people thereof,
and that it be recommended to the said Legislatures in
their respective acts for organizing such convention to declare,
that if the said Convention shall approve of the said
Constitution, such approbation shall be binding and conclusive
upon the State, and further that if the said Convention
should be of opinion that the same upon the assent
of any nine States thereto, ought to take effect
between the States so assenting, such opinion shall thereupon
be also binding upon such State, and the said Constitution
shall take effect between the States assenting
thereto"

Mr. Gerry 2ded. the motion.

Mr. Wilson. This motion being seconded, it is necessary
now to speak freely He expressed in strong terms his disapprobation
of the expedient proposed, particularly the
suspending the plan of the Convention on the approbation
of Congress. He declared it to be worse than folly to rely
on the concurrence of the Rhode Island members of
Congs. in the plan. Maryland had voted on this floor; for
requiring the unanimous assent of the 13 States to the
proposed change in the federal System. N--York has not
been represented for a long time past in the Convention.
Many individual deputies from other States have spoken
much against the plan. Under these circumstances Can it
be safe to make the assent of Congress necessary. After
spending four or five months in the laborious & arduous
task of forming a Government for our Country, we are
ourselves at the close throwing insuperable obstacles in the
way of its success.

Mr. Clymer thought that the mode proposed by Mr.
Hamilton would fetter & embarrass Congs. as much as the
original one, since it equally involved a breach of the articles
of Confederation.

Mr. King concurred with Mr. Clymer. If Congress can
accede to one mode, they can to the other. If the approbation
of Congress be made necessary, and they should
not approve, the State Legislatures will not propose the
plan to Conventions; or if the States themselves are to provide
that nine States shall suffice to establish the System,
that provision will be omitted, every thing will go into confusion,
and all our labor be lost.

A Question being then taken on the article XXI. It was
agreed to, unanimously.

Col: Hamilton withdrew the remainder of the motion to
postpone art XXII, observing that his purpose was defeated
by the vote just given;

Mr. Williamson & Mr. Gerry moved to re-instate the
words "for the approbation of Congress" in art: XXII.
which was disagreed to nem: con:

[Volume 4, Page 657]

[2:579, 603; Committee of Style]

XXI.

The ratification of the Conventions of nine States shall
be sufficient for organising this Constitution between the
said States.

XXII.

This Constitution shall be laid before the United States
in Congress assembled, and it is the opinion of this Convention
that it should be afterwards submitted to a Convention
chosen in each State, under the recommendation
of its Legislature, in order to receive the ratification of
such Convention.

XXIII.

To introduce this government, it is the opinion of this
Convention, that each assenting Convention should notify
its assent and ratification to the United States in Congress
assembled; that Congress, after receiving the assent and
ratification of the Conventions of nine States, should appoint
and publish a day, as early as may be, and appoint a
place for commencing proceedings under this Constitution;
that after such publication, the Legislatures of the
several States should elect Members of the Senate, and direct
the election of Members of the House of Representatives;
and that the Members of the Legislature should
meet at the time and place assigned by Congress and
should, as soon as may be, after their meeting, proceed to
execute this Constitution.

That it be an instruction to the Committee to prepare
an address to the People to accompany the present constitution,
and to be laid with the same before the United
States in Congress.

. . . . .

VII.

The ratification of the conventions of nine States, shall
be sufficient for the establishment of this constitution between
the States so ratifying the same.

[2:631; Madison, 15 Sept.]

Mr. Randolph animadverting on the indefinite and dangerous
power given by the Constitution to Congress, expressing
the pain he felt at differing from the body of the
Convention, on the close of the great & awful subject of
their labours, and anxiously wishing for some accommodating
expedient which would relieve him from his embarrassments,
made a motion importing "that amendments to
the plan might be offered by the State Conventions, which
should be submitted to and finally decided on by another
general Convention" Should this proposition be disregarded,
it would he said be impossible for him to put his
name to the instrument. Whether he should oppose it afterwards
he would not then decide but he would not deprive
himself of the freedom to do so in his own State, if
that course should be prescribed by his final judgment--

Col: Mason 2ded. & followed Mr. Randolph in animadversions
on the dangerous power and structure of the
Government, concluding that it would end either in monarchy,
or a tyrannical aristocracy; which, he was in doubt.
but one or other, he was sure. This Constitution had been
formed without the knowledge or idea of the people. A
second Convention will know more of the sense of the
people, and be able to provide a system more consonant
to it. It was improper to say to the people, take this or
nothing. As the Constitution now stands, he could neither
give it his support or vote in Virginia; and he could not
sign here what he could not support there. With the expedient
of another Convention as proposed, he could sign.

Mr. Pinkney. These declarations from members so respectable
at the close of this important scene, give a peculiar
solemnity to the present moment. He descanted on the
consequences of calling forth the deliberations & amendments
of the different States on the subject of Government
at large. Nothing but confusion & contrariety could spring
from the experiment. The States will never agree in their
plans--And the Deputies to a second Convention coming
together under the discordant impressions of their Constituents,
will never agree. Conventions are serious things,
and ought not to be repeated--He was not without objections
as well as others to the plan. He objected to the contemptible
weakness & dependence of the Executive. He
objected to the power of a majority only of Congs over
Commerce. But apprehending the danger of a general
confusion, and an ultimate decision by the Sword, he
should give the plan his support.