THE EXCELLENCIE OF A FREE STATE
LONDON PRINTED FOR
A. MILLAR AND T. CADELL IN THE STRAND,
G. KEARSLY IN LUDGATE STREET, AND
H. PARKER IN CORNHILL
MDCCLXVII
PREFACE TO THIS EDIT.
On the subject of government, no country hath produced writings so
numerous and valuable as our own. It hath been cultivated and adorned by
men of greatest genius, and most comprehensive understanding, MILTON,
HARRINGTON, SYDNEY, LOCKE, names famous to all ages.
But, beside their incomparable writings, many lesser treatises on the
same argument, which are little known, and extremely scarce, deserve to
be read and preserved: in which number may be reckoned the small volume
I now give the public, written by MARCHAMONT NEDHAM, a man, in the
judgment of some, inferior only to MILTON.
It was first inserted in the Mercurius Politicus, that celebrated state-
paper, published "in defence of the Commonwealth, and for the
information of the people;" and soon after re-printed in 12 mo, under
the following title, "The Excellencie of a Free State. Or, The right
constitution of a Commonwealth. Wherein all objections are answered, and
the best way to secure the people's liberties discovered. With some
errors of government, and rules of policie. Published by a well-wisher
to posteritie. London, printed for Thomas Brewster, at the west end of
Paul's, 1656."
An account of the author may be seen in A. Wood's Athenae Oxonienses,
tho' drawn in bitterness of wrath and anger. If this volume shall be
favorably received, the editor will go on to give other rare treatises
on government in his possession, to the entertainment and benefit, as he
hopes, of the public. Reader, farewel,
Richard Baron
Below Blackheath, Jan. 1, 1767
TO THE READER.
TAKING notice of late with what impudence, and (the more is the pity)
confidence, the enemies of this commonwealth in their public writings
and discourses labour to undermine the dear-bought liberties and
freedoms of the people, in their declared interest of a free-state; I
thought it high time, by counter-working them, to crush the cockatrice
in the egg, that so it might never grow to be a bird of prey: in order
thereto, I have published this following discourse to the world; that so
the eyes of the people being opened, they may see whether those high and
ranting discourses of personal prerogative and unbounded monarchy,
(especially one lately published by Mr. Howel, that struts abroad with a
brazen face) or a due and orderly succession of the supreme authority in
the hands of the people's representatives, will best secure the
liberties and freedoms of the people from the incroachments and
usurpations of tyranny, and answer the true ends of the late wars.
This treatise is not intended for a particular answer to Mr. Howel's
said book, but yet may obviate that part thereof which he calls, "Some
reflexes upon government:" for his main design is not so much, (though
that be part) to asperse the Long Parliament, (and so through their
sides to wound all their friends and adherents) as to lay a foundation
for absolute tyranny, upon an unbounded monarchy: and in order
thereunto, he advises his Highness to lay aside parliaments, (or at
best, to make them cyphers) and to govern the nation vi & armis: not out
of any honour or respect he bears to his person, "but to bring the old
interest and family into more credit and esteem with the people."
His principles and precedents, they are purely his own: for I am
confident, that the most considerate part of those that did engage for
the late king, are so far from owning his tenets, that they would rather
lay aside the family and interest of the Stuarts, and declare for a
free-state, than endure to be yoked and enslaved by such an absolute
tyranny as he pleads for. My reason is this: because most of the
nobility and gentry of this nation have fair estates of their own, free,
without any dependence upon the crown; and they would be as unwilling to
fender up their estates and posterities in the paw of the lion, as the
commoners themselves.
His precedents are as false as his principles are bad: for proof hereof,
take one (and that a main one) for all: he saith, "That until the reign
of Henry the First, the commons of England were not called to the
parliament at all, or had so much as a consent in the making of laws."
To prove that this is false, there is extant an old Latin copy speaking
of a parliament in the reign of king Ethelred; which telleth us, that in
it were universi Anglorum optimates Ethelredi regis edicto: & convocata
plebis multitudine collectę regis edicto: A writ of summons for all the
lords, and for choice of the commons: a full and clear parliament. My
author saith, "The proofs of parliaments, in Canute's time, are so many,
and so full, that they tire us altogether." His remarkable letter from
Rome, recorded by the Monk of Malmsbury, runs thus: To the archbishops,
bishops, &c. Primatibus & toti genti Anglorum, tam nobilibus, quam
plebeis. Hoveden is full in this also; Cujus (Edmundi) post mortem, rex
Canutus omnes episcopos, duces, nec non & principes, cunctosque
optimates gentis Anglię, Lundonię congregari jussit. A clear summons of
parliament. And the very name of parliament is found (saith my
author)[1] in his time, in the old book of Edmund's-Bury. Rex Canutus,
anno regni 5. cunctos regni sui pręlatos, proceresque, ac magnates, ad
suum convocans parliamentum. And that it was a full parliament, we may
believe from the persons we find there, at the charter to that
monastery; confirmed by Hardicanute, but granted by Canute, in suo
publico parliamento, pręsistentibus personaliter in eodem archi-
episcopis, episcopis, suffraganeis, ducibus, comitibus, abbatibus, cum
quam plurimis gregariis militibus (knights of shires it seems) & cum
populi multitudine copiosa (other commons also) omnibus tum eodem
parliamento personaliter existentibus. Edward the Confessor refers the
repairing of Westminster to the parliament: at length, cum totius regni
electione, (they are his own words)[2] he sets upon the decayed minster.
But they that would know more of the customs and constitutions of this
nation, let them repair to those large volumes, that are so frequent in
print upon that subject; especially that excellent piece, "The Rights of
the Kingdom." This may suffice to prove that the commons were called to
parliament long before Henry the First.
I believe none will be offended with this following discourse, but those
that are enemies to public welfare: let such be offended still: it is
not for their sake that I publish this ensuing treatise; but for your
sakes, that have been noble patriots, fellow-soldiers; and sufferers for
the liberties and freedoms of your country, that posterity in after-ages
may have something to say and shew to (if God shall permit any)
succeeding tyrants, wherefore their fathers sacrificed their lives, and
all that was dear to them: It was not to destroy magistracy, but to
regulate it; nor to confound propriety, but to enlarge it: that the
prince as well as the people might be governed by law; that justice
might be impartially distributed without respect of persons; that
England might become a quiet habitation for the lion and the lamb to lie
down and feed together; and that none might make the people afraid: it
was for these things they fought and died; and that not as private
persons neither, but by the public command and conduct of the supreme
power of the nation, viz. the people's representatives in parliament:
and nothing will satisfy for all the blood and treasure that hath been
spilt and spent, make England a glorious commonwealth, and stop the
mouths of all gain-sayers, but a due and orderly succession of the
supreme authority in the hands of the people's representatives.
[1 MN] Howel saith William the Conqueror first brought the word
parliament.
[2 MN] Mr. Howel would have his Highness lay a sessment for the
repairing of Paul's without consent of parliament.
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE FOLLOWING DISCOURSE.
WHEN the senators of Rome, in their public decrees and orations, began
to comply with and court the people, calling them "lords of the world,"
how easy a matter was it then for Gracchus to persuade them to un-lord
the senate? In like manner, when Athens was quitted of kings, the power
was no sooner declared to be in the people, but immediately they took
it, and made sure of it in their own hands, by the advice of Solon, that
excellent lawgiver: for, as Cicero saith, There is a natural desire of
power and sovereignty in every man, so that if any have once an
opportunity to seize, they seldom neglect it; and if they are told it is
their due, they venture life and all to attain it.
If a people once conceive they ought to be free, this conception is
immediately put in practice; and they free themselves. Their first care
is to see, that their laws, their rights, their deputies, their
officers, and all their dependents, be settled in a state of freedom.
This becomes like the apple of the eye; the least grain, atom, or touch,
will grieve it: it is an espoused virgin; they are extreme jealous over
it.
Thus strangely affected were the Roman people, that if any one among
them (though ne'er so deserving) were found to aspire, they presently
fetched him down, as they did the gallant Męlius and Manlius; yea, their
jealousy was so great, that they observed every man's looks, his very
nods, his garb, and his gait, whether he walked, conversed, and lived as
a friend of freedom among his neighbours. The supercilious eye, the
lofty brow, and the grand paw, were accounted monsters, and no character
of freedom; so that it was the special care of the wiser patriots, to
keep themselves in a demure and humble posture, for the avoiding of
suspicion. Hence it was that Collatinus, one of their freedom's
founders, and of their first consuls, living in some more state than
ordinary, and keeping at too great a distance from the people, soon
taught them to forget his former merits: insomuch, that they not only
turned him out of his consulship, but quite out of the city into
banishment. But his colleague Brutus, and that wise man Valerius
Publicola, by taking a contrary course, preserved themselves and their
reputation. For, the one sacrificed his children, those living monuments
of his house, to make the vulgar amends for an injury: the other courted
them with the title of majesty, laid the fasces, the ensigns of
authority, at their feet, fixt all appeals at their tribunals, and
levelled the lofty walls of his own stately house, for fear they should
mistake it for a castle. Thus also did Menenius Agrippa, Camillus, and
other eminent men in that popular state: so that by these means they
made themselves the darlings of the people, whilst many others of a more
grandee-humour, soon lost their interest and reputation.
Thus you see, that when a people's right is once declared to them, it is
almost impossible to keep it, or take it from them.
It is pity, that the people of England, being born as free as any people
in the world, should be of such a supple humour and inclination, to bow
under the ignoble pressures of an arbitrary tyranny, and so unapt to
learn what true freedom is. It is an inestimable jewel, of more worth
than your estates, or your lives; it consists not in a licence to do
what you list, but in these few particulars: First, in having wholesome
laws suited to every man's state and condition. Secondly, in a due and
easy course of administration, as to law and justice, that the remedies
of evil may be cheap and speedy. Thirdly, in a power of altering
government and governors upon occasion. Fourthly, in an uninterrupted
course of successive parliaments, or assemblies of the people. Fifthly,
in a free election of members to sit in every parliament, when rules of
election are once established. By enjoying these only, a people are said
to enjoy their rights, and to be truly stated in a condition of safety
and freedom.
Now if liberty is the most precious jewel under the sun, then when it is
once in possession, it requires more than an ordinary art and industry
to preserve it. But the great question is, Which is the safest way?
whether by committing of it into the hands of a standing power, or by
placing the guardianship in the hands of the people, in a constant
succession of their supreme assemblies. The best way to determine this,
is by observation out of Roman stories; whereby it plainly appears, that
people never had any real liberty, till they were possessed of the power
of calling and dissolving the supreme assemblies, changing governments,
enacting and repealing laws, together with a power of chusing and
deputing whom they pleased to this work, as often as they should judge
expedient, for their own well-being, and the good of the public. This
power is said to be the first-born of that people's freedom: and many a
shrewd fit, many a pang and throw the commonwealth had, before it could
be brought forth in the world: which (Gracchus told them) was a sore
affliction from the gods, that they should suffer so much for the
ignorance or negligence of their ancestors, who when they drove out
kings, forgot to drive out the mysteries and inconveniences of kingly
power, which were all reserved within the hands of the senate. By this
means the poor people missing the first opportunity of settling their
freedom, soon lost it again: they were told they were a free-state; and
why? Because (forsooth) they had no king, they had at length never a
Tarquin to trouble them: but what was that to the purpose, as long as
they had a Gaius, and an Appius Claudius, and the rest of that gang, who
infected the senators with an humour of kinging it from generation to
generation? Alas, when the Romans were at this pass, they were just such
another free-state as was that of Sparta, in the days of yore, where
they had a senate too, to pull down the pride of kings; but the people
were left destitute of power and means to pull down the pride of the
senate; by which means indeed they became free to do what they list,
whilst the people were confined within straiter bounds than ever. Such
another free-state in these days is that of Venice, where the people are
free from the dominion of their prince or duke; but little better than
slaves under the power of their senate. But now in the commonwealth of
Athens, the case was far otherwise; where it was the care of Solon, that
famous law-giver, to place both the exercise and interest of supremacy
in the hands of the people, so that nothing of a public interest could
be imposed, but what passed current by virtue of their consent and
authority: he instituted that famous council called the Areopagus, for
the managing of state-transactions; but left the power of legislation,
or law-making, in a successive course of the people's assemblies; so
that avoiding kingly tyranny on the one side, and senatical
incroachments on the other, he is celebrated by all posterity, as the
man that hath left the only pattern of a free-state fit for all the
world to follow.
It is also to be observed, when kings were driven out of Rome, though
they were declared and called a free-state, yet it was a long time ere
they could be free indeed, in regard Brutus cheated them with a mere
shadow and pretence of liberty: he had indeed an ambition high enough,
and opportunity fair enough to have seized the crown into his own hands;
but there were many considerations that deterred him from it; for he
well perceived how odious the name of king was grown: Besides, had he
sought to inthrone himself, men would have judged it was not love to his
country made him take up arms, but desire of dominion; nor could he
forget, that serene privacy is to be preferr'd before hazardous royalty:
for what hope could he have to keep the seat long, who by his own
example had taught the people both the theory and practice of opposing
tyranny? It was necessary therefore that he should think of some other
course more plausible, whereby to work his own ends, and yet preserve
the love of the people; who not having been used to liberty, did very
little understand it, and therefore were the more easily gulled out of
the substance, and made content with the shadow.
For the carrying on this design, all the projecting grandees joined
pates together; wherein, as one observes, Regnum quidem nomen, sed non
regia potestas Romā fuit expulsa: Though the name of king were exploded
with alacrity, yet the kingly power was retained with all art and
subtilty, and shared under another notion among themselves, who were the
great ones of the city. For all authority was confined within the walls
of a standing senate, out of which, two consuls were chosen yearly; and
so by turns they dubb'd one another with a new kind of regality; the
people being no gainers at all by this alteration of government, save
only, that (like asses) they were saddled with new paniers of slavery.
But what followed? The senate having got all power into their own hands,
in short time degenerated from their first virtue and institution, to
the practice of avarice, riot, and luxury: whereby the love of their
country was changed into a study of ambition and faction: so that they
fell into divisions among themselves, as well as oppressions over the
people; by which divisions, some leading grandees, more potent than
their fellows, took occasion to wipe their noses, and to assume the
power into their own hands, to the number of ten persons. This form of
government was known by the name of the Decemvirate; wherein these new
usurpers, joining forces together, made themselves rich with the spoils
of the people, not caring by what unlawful means they purchased either
profit or pleasure, till that growing every day more insupportable, they
were in the end by force cashiered of their tyranny.
But what then?[3] The people being flush'd with this victory, and
calling to mind how gallantly their ancestors had in like manner
banished kings, began at last to know their own strength; and stomach'd
it exceedingly, that themselves, on whose shoulders the frame of state
was supported, (and for whose sakes all states are founded) should be so
much vassalized at the will of others, that they who were lords abroad,
should be slaves at home: so that they resolvcd to be ridden no longer
under fair shews of liberty. They raised a tumult under the conduct of
their tribune Canuteius; nor could they by any persuasion be induced to
lay down arms, till they were put in possession of their rights and
privileges. They were made capable of offices of the government, even to
the dictatorship; had officers of their own, called tribunes, who were
held sacred and inviolable, as protectors of the commons, and retained a
power of meeting and acting with all freedom in their great assemblies.
Now, and never till now, could they be called a free-state, and
commonwealth, though long before declared so: for the way being open to
all without exception, virtue, learning, and good parts, made as speedy
a ladder to climb unto honours, as nobility of birth; and a good man as
much respected as a great;[4] which was a rare felicity of the times,
not to be expected again, but upon the dawning of another golden age.
The main observation then arising out of this discourse, is this, That
not only the name of king, but the thing king (whether in the hands of
one or of many) was plucked up root and branch, before ever the Romans
could attain to a full establishment in their rights and freedoms.
Now when Rome was thus declared a free-state, the next work was to
establish their freedom in some sure and certain way: and in order to
this,[5] the first business they pitch'd upon, was, not only to engage
the people by an oath against the return of Tarquin's family to the
kingdom, but also against the admission of any such officer as a king,
for ever; because those brave men, who glorified themselves in laying
the foundation of a commonwealth, well knew that in a short revolution
others of a less public spirit would arise in their places, and gape
again after a kingdom. And therefore it was the special care of those
worthy patriots, to imprint such principles in men's minds, as might
actuate them with an irreconcilable enmity to the former power:
insomuch, that the very name of king became odious to the Roman people;
yea, and they were so zealous herein, that in process of time, when
Cęsar took occasion by civil discords to assume the sovereignty into his
single hands, he durst not entertain it under the fatal name of king,
but clothed himself with the more plausible stile of emperor; which
nevertheless could not secure him from the fatal stab that was given him
by Brutus in revenge, on the behalf of the people. Our neighbours of
Holland traced this example at the heels, when upon recovery of their
freedom from Spain, they bind themselves by an oath to abjure the
government,[6] not only of king Philip, but of all kings for ever.
Kings being cashiered out of Rome, then the right of liberty, together
with the government, was retained within the hands and bounds of the
Patrician or Senatorian order of nobility; the people not being admitted
into any share, till partly by mutinies and partly by importunities,
they compell'd the senate to grant them an interest in offices of state,
and in the legislative power, which were circumscribed before within the
bounds of the senate. Hence arose those officers called tribunes, and
those conventions called assemblies of the people, which were as bridles
to restrain the power and ambition of the senate, or nobility. Before
the erect[i]on of those, whilst all was in the hands of the senate, the
nation was accounted free, because not subjected to the will of any
single person: But afterwards[7] they were free indeed, when no laws
could be imposed upon them without a consent first had in the people's
assemblies: so that the government in the end came to be settled in an
equal mixture of both interests, patrician and popular; under which
form, they attained to the height of all their glory and greatness. In
this form of free-state, we now see the Venetian, where the patrician is
predominant, and the people a little too much kept under. The same form
is embraced also by our neighbours the United Provinces; but the best
part of their interest lies deposited in the hands of the people. Rome
kept up their senate as their standing council, for the managing of
state-affairs, which require wisdom and experience: but as for making of
laws, and the main acts of supremacy, they were reserved to the grand
assemblies; so that the people gave rules whereby to govern, and the
secrets of government were intrusted in the hands of the senate. And
this commonwealth ever thriv'd best, when the people had most power, and
used most moderation: and though they made use of it now and then to fly
out into extravagant courses, yet they were no lasting fits, like those
distempers that brake out through the ambition of the senators. Besides,
we cannot but take notice, as long as the popular interest continued
regular, and more predominant than the other, so long the people were
secure of their liberties: which enjoyment, was a good allay and
recompence, for many harsh inconveniences that brake out when they were
unruly and irregular: whereas, when the senate afterwards worm'd the
people out of power, as that design went on by degrees, so Rome lost her
liberty;[8] the senate domineering over the people, and particular
factions over the senate, till those factions tearing one another to
pieces, at length he that was head of the paramount surviving faction,
by name Cęsar, took occasion to usurp over all, swallowing up the rights
and liberties of the Romans, in the gulph of a single tyranny.
It was a noble saying, (though Machiavel's) "Not he that placeth a
virtuous government in his own hands, or family; but he that
establisheth a free and lasting form, for the people's constant
security, is most to be commended." Whosoever hath this opportunity, may
improve his actions to a greater height of glory, than ever followed the
fame of any ambitious idol that hath grasp'd a monarchy: for, as Cato
saith in Plutarch, "even the greatest kings or tyrants, are far inferior
to those that are eminent in free-states and commonwealths:" Nor were
those mighty monarchs of old, to be compared with "Epimanondas,
Pericles, Themistocles, Marcus Curius, Amilcar, Fabius, and Scipio," and
other excellent captains in free-states, which purchased themselves a
fame, in defence of their liberties. And though the very name of liberty
was for a time grown odious, or ridiculous among us, having been long a
stranger in these and other parts; yet, in ancient time, nations were
wont to reckon themselves so much the more noble, as they were free from
the regal yoke: which was the cause why then there were so many free-
states in all parts of the world.
Nor is it only a mere gallantry of spirit that excites men to the love
of freedom; but experience assures it to be the most commodious and
profitable way of government, conducing every way to the enlarging a
people in wealth and dominion.[9] "It is incredible to be spoken (saith
Salust) how exceedingly the Roman commonwealth increased in a short
time, after they had obtained liberty." And Guicciardine affirms, "That
free-states must needs be more pleasing to God than any other form,
because in them more regard is to be had to the common good, more care
for the impartial distribution of justice, and the minds of men are more
enflamed thereby to the love of glory and virtue, and become much more
zealous in the love of religion, than in any other government whatever."
It is wonderful to consider, how mightily the Athenians were augmented
in a few years, both in wealth and power, after they had freed
themselves from the tyranny of Pistratus: but the Romans arrived to such
a height, as was beyond all imagination, after the expulsion of their
kings, and kingly government. Nor do these things happen without special
reason; it being usual in free-states to be more tender of the public in
all their decrees, than of particular interests: whereas the case is
otherwise in a monarchy, because in this form the prince's pleasure
weighs down all considerations of the common good. And hence it is, that
a nation hath no sooner lost its liberty, and stoop'd under the yoke of
a single tyrant, but it immediately loseth its former lustre, the body
fills with ill humours, and may swell in titles; but cannot thrive
either in power or riches, according to that proportion which it
formerly enjoyed, because all new acquisitions are appropriated as the
prince's peculiar, and in no wise conduce to the ease and benefit of the
public.
It was the pride of Richard Nevil, the great Earl of Warwick, and he
reckoned it the greatest of earthly glories, to be called, (as indeed he
was) a king-maker, in that he made and unmade kings at his pleasure: for
we read in our Chronicles, how that he first pull'd down the house of
Lancaster, and brought king Henry the sixth from a crown to a prison;
setting up the title of the house of York, in the person of king Edward
the fourth: afterwards, he deposed this Edward, drave him out of
England, and restored the same Henry to the crown, whom he had before
depress'd. But the great query is, Wherefore, and how this was done? One
would have thought, there had been no hope of reconciliation betwixt him
and the house of Lancaster, having so highly disobliged them, in casting
down and imprisoning the person of Henry: But yet it is very observable
of this man, Warwick, being on a sudden discontented with the change
that he had made, because he missed of thole ends which he aimed at, in
bringing it about; and perceived other persons (whom he conceived his
inferiors,) to partake of the interest and favour of Edward; therefore
out of an emulous impatience of spirit, he presently cast about to undo
all that before he had done; he supprest the new government, to advance
the old.
From which piece of story, we may very well conclude, how unsafe it is
in a new alteration, to trust any man with too great a share of
government, or place of trust; for such persons stand ever ready (like
that Warwick) upon any occasion of discontent, or of serving their own
interests, to betray and alter the government; especially if they have
Warwick's main guard, that is, if they can (as he did) bring the prince
whom they formerly disobliged, to come in upon their own terms, and upon
such conditions as may bridle him, and secure the power so in their own
hands, that whilst he king it only in title, themselves may be kings de
facto, and leave their old friends in the lurch, or yield them up at
mercy (as Warwick did) to gratify the tyrant, and their own tyrannical
ambition.
How much therefore doth it concern every commonwealth, in such a case,
to see and beware that Warwick's Ghost be not conjur'd up again to act a
part in some new tragedy.
[3 MN] How the Romans obtained their rights and privileges.
[4 MN] Goodness preferred before greatness.
[5 MN] What they did to preserve their freedom.
[6 MN] Oaths in those days were not like an old almanack.
[7 MN] No laws imposed, but with the people's consent in their
assemblies.
[8 MN] The Romans lose their rights and liberties.
[9 MN] The Romans flourished most when they were a free-state.
THE RIGHT CONSTITUTION OF A COMMONWEALTH.
THE Romans having justly and nobly freed themselves from the tyranny of
kings, and being in time brought to understand that the interest of
freedom consists in a due and orderly succession of the supreme
assemblies; they then made it their care, by all good ways and means, to
fortify the Commonwealth, and establish it in a free enjoyment of that
interest, as the only bar to the return of kings, and their main
security against the subtil mining of kingly humours and usurpations.
The publick Rostra, or pulpits, sounded out the commendations of
freedom; their augurs, or prophets, found freedom written in the
entrails of beasts, and collected it from the flight of the auspicious
bird, the sun-daring eagle, spreading her wings aloft over the Capitol:
the common people also, in their common discourses, breathed nothing but
freedom, and used the frequent mention of it as a charm against the
return of tyranny.
Nor was it without reason, that this brave and active people were so
studiously devoted to the preservation of their freedom, when they had
once attained it, considering how easy and excellent it is above all
other forms of government, if it be kept within due bounds and order. It
is an undeniable rule,[10] that the people (that is, such as shall be
successively chosen to represent the people) are the best keepers of
their own liberties; and that for these following reasons.
First,[11] Because they never think of usurping over other mens rights,
but mind which way to preserve their own: whereas, the case is far
otherwise among kings and grandees, as all nations in the world have
felt to some purpose; for they naturally move within the circle of
domination, as in their proper center; and count it no less security
than wisdom and policy, to brave it over the people. Thus Suetonius
tells us, how Cęsar, Crassus, and another, Societatem iniere, nequid
ageretur in repub. quod displicuisset ulli e tribus: "Made a bargain
between themselves, that nothing should be done in the Commonwealth that
displeased either of them three." Such another triumvirate of grandees
was that of Augustus, Lepidus, and Antony, who agreed to share the world
between themselves; and traced the same paths as the other did, to the
top of worldly tyranny, over the ruins of their country's liberties:
they saved and destroyed, depressed and advanced whom they pleased, with
a wet finger. But whilst the government remained untouched in the
people's hands, every particular man lived safe, (except the ambitious)
and no man could be undone, unless a true and satisfactory reason were
rendered to the world for his destruction.
Secondly,[12] The people are best keepers of their own liberty, because
it is ever the people's care to see, that authority be so constituted,
that it shall be father a burthen than benefit to thole that under take
it; and be qualified with such slender advantages of profit or pleasure,
that men shall reap little by the enjoyment. The happy consequence
whereof is this, that none but honest, generous, and public spirits,
will then desire to be in authority, and that only for the common good.
Hence it was, that in the infancy of the Roman liberty, there was no
canvassing of voices; but single and plain hearted men were called,
intreated, and in a manner forced with importunity to the helm of
government, in regard of that great trouble and pains that followed the
employment. Thus Cincinnatus was fetch'd out of the field from his plow,
and placed (much against his will) in the sublime dignity of dictator:
so the noble Camillus, and Fabius, and Curius, were, with much ado,
drawn from the recreation of gardening, to the trouble of governing: and
the consul-year being over, they returned with much gladness again to
their private employment.
A third reason[13] why the people in their supreme assemblies
successively chosen, are the best keepers of their liberty, is, because
as motion in bodies natural, so succession in civil, is the grand
preventive of corruption. The truth of this will appear very clearly, if
we weigh the effects of every standing authority from first to last in
the Roman state: for whilst they were governed by a continued power in
one and the same hands, the people were ever in danger of losing their
liberty; sometimes in danger of being swallowed up by kingly aspirers,
witness the design of Męlius, Manlius, and others; sometimes in danger
of a surprize by a grandee cabinet or junta, who by contracting a
particular interest, distinct from that which they had in common with
the people, so ordered the matter in time, that partly by their own
strength, and partly by advantage of power, to gratify and curb whom
they pleased, and to wind in other counsels and parties to their own,
they still brought the lesser into such subjection, that in the end they
were forced all, either to yield to the pleasure of the grandees, or be
broken by them. By these practices, they produced that upstart tyranny
of the Decemviri, when ten men made a shift to enslave the senate, as
well as the people. Lastly, by continuing power too long in the hands of
particular persons, they were swallowed up by two triumvirates of
emperors by turns, who never left pecking at one another, till Julius
and Augustus, having beaten all competitors out of the field, subjected
all to the will of a single emperor. If this were so among the Romans,
how happy then is any nation, and how much ought they to joy in the
wisdom and justice of their trustees, where certain limits and bounds
are fixed to the powers in being, by a declared succession of the
supreme authority in the hands of the people?
A fourth reason is,[14] Because a succession of supreme powers doth not
only keep them from corruption, but it kills that grand cankerworm of a
Commonwealth, to wit, faction: for, as faction is an adhering to, and a
promoting of an interest, that is distinct from the true and declared
interest of state; so it is a matter of necessity, that those that drive
it on must have time to improve their slights and projects, in
disguising their designs, drawing in instruments and parties, and in
worming out of their opposites. The effecting of all this, requires some
length of time: therefore the only prevention is a due succession and
revolution of authority in the hands of the people.
That this is most true, appears not only by reason, but by example: if
we observe the several turns of faction in the Roman government. What
made their kings so bold, as to incroach and tyrannize over the people,
but the very same course that heightened our kings heretofore in
England, to wit, a continuation of power in their own persons and
families? Then, after the Romans became a Commonwealth, was it not for
the same reason, that the senate fell into such heats and fits among
themselves? Did not Appius Claudius, and his junta, by the same means,
lord it over the senate? Whence was it, that Sylla and Marius caused so
many proscriptions, cruelties, and combustions in Rome, but by an
extraordinary continuation of power in themselves? How came it to pass
likewise, that Julius Cęsar aspired, and in the end attained the empire?
and, that the people of Rome quite lost their liberty; was it not by the
same means? For, had not the senate and people so long protracted the
power of Pompey and Cęsar; had Pompey had less command in Asia, and
Cęsar less in Gallia, Rome might have stood much longer in the
possession of her liberty.
After the death of Cęsar, it was probable enough, they might then have
recovered their liberty, but that they ran again into the same error, as
before: for by a continuation of power in the hands of Octavius,
Lepidus, and Antony, the Commonwealth came to be rent and divided into
three several factions; two of which being worn out by each other, only
Octavius remained; who considering, that the title of Perpetual Dictator
was the ruin of his father Julius, continued the government only for a
set time, and procured it to be settled upon himself but for ten years.
But what was the effect of this continuation of power? Even this, that
as the former protractings had been the occasions of faction, so this
produced a tyranny: for, at the end of every ten years, he wanted no
pretence to renew a lease of the government; and by this means so played
his cards, that at length he easily and utterly extinguished the small
remains of the Roman freedom.
The observation then arising from hence, is this, that the only way for
a people to preserve themselves in the enjoyment of their freedom, and
to avoid those fatal inconveniences of faction and tyranny, is, to
maintain a due and orderly succession of power and persons. This was,
and is, good Commonwealths language; and without this rule, it is
impossible any nation should long subsist in a state of freedom. So that
the wisdom, the piety, the justice, and the self-denial of those
governors in free-states, is worthy of all honour and admiration, who
have, or shall at any time as willingly resign their trusts, as ever
they took them up; and have so far denied themselves, as to prefix
limits and bounds to their own authority. This was it that made Brutus
so famous in the beginning of the Roman Commonwealth. For this also it
was, that history hath left so reverend a remembrance of Scipio,
Camillus, and Virginus; as did Cato likewise of Pompey: whilst the ten
grandee usurpers, with Sylla and Cęsar, and the names of others that
practised the.contrary, are left as odious upon the Roman record, as the
name of Richard the third will be in our modern chronicle, to all
posterity.
A fifth reason[15] to prove the life of liberty lies in succession of
powers and persons, is, because it is the only remedy against self-
seeking, with all the powerful temptations and charms of self-interest:
for the attaining of particular ends requires length of time, as well as
the creating and promoting of a faction: both these designs must lie
long in fermentation, or else they can never gain the beloved
opportunity to bring matters to perfection. The truth of this appears
likewise in the story of the Roman state: for, as long as all authority
was confined within the walls of a standing senate, they being more
studious of their own, than the common good, in a short time the
Commonwealth was turned altogether into a private; insomuch, that the
people became not only incapable of any honour and authority, but well-
nigh reduced to flat beggary. Hence it was, that so many quarrels and
combustions arose one after another: for, the great ones having made use
of their time, in drawing all to themselves, the people were forced to
live upon borrowing; and when they could borrow no longer, they fell
into a general mutiny, and forsook the city: nor could they be pacified
till all accounts were quitted; and then, with much ado, they were
wrought upon with the eloquence of Menenius Agrippa, with his excellent
fable of a mutiny in a natural body, among the members against the
belly.
Thus, as the first insurrection was occasioned by the usury and
exactions of the great ones; who by their long continuance in power had
drawn all unto themselves: so the second was occasioned by the
lordliness of those ten persons, who being elected to do justice,
according to the laws, made use of their time, only to confirm their
power, and greaten themselves, by replenishing their own coffers,
ingrossing of offices, and preferring their own kindred and alliances:
and at length, improved self-interest so high, that they domineered,
like absolute tyrants, advancing and depressing whom they pleased,
without respect of merit or insufficiency, vice or virtue; so that
having secured all in their own hands, they over-ruled their fellow-
senators at pleasure, as well as the people.
Many more instances of after-times might be given; but these are
sufficient whereupon to ground this observation, that as the first
founders of the Roman liberty did well in driving out their kings; so on
the other side, they did very ill in settling a standing authority
within themselves: for, by this means, lying open to the temptations of
honour and profit, (which are sails too big for any human bulk) they
were immediately swallowed up of self; and taking their rise from the
opportunity of a continued power, made use of the public only to advance
their private, whereby they put the Commonwealth into frequent flames of
discontent and sedition; which might all have been prevented, could they
have denied themselves at first, and settled the state free indeed, (as
they ought to have done) by placing an orderly succession of supreme
authority in the hands of the people.
A sixth reason,[16] why a free state is much more excellent than a
government by grandees or kings; and, that the people are the best
keepers of their own liberties, is, because, as the end of all
government is (or ought to be) the good and ease of the people, in a
secure enjoyment of their rights, without pressure and oppression: so
questionless the people, who are most sensible of their own burthens,
being once put into a capacity and freedom of acting, are the most
likely to provide remedies for their own relief; they only know where
the shoe wrings, what grievances are most heavy, and what future fences
they stand in need of, to shelter them from the injurious assaults of
those powers that are above them: and therefore it is but reason, they
should see that none be interested in the supreme authority, but persons
of their own election, and such as must in a short time return again
into the same condition with themselves, to reap the same benefit or
burthen, by the laws enacted, that befals the rest of the people. Then
the issue of such a constitution must needs be this, that no load shall
be laid upon any, but what is common to all, and that always by common
consent; not to serve the lusts of any, but only to supply the
necessities of their country.
But when it happens, that a supreme power long continues in the hands of
any person or persons; they, by greatness of place, being seated above
the middle region of the people, sit secure from all winds and weathers,
and from those storms of violence that nip and terrify the inferior part
of the world: whereas, if by a successive revolution of authority, they
come to be degraded of their earthly godheads, and return into the same
condition with other mortals, they must needs be the more sensible and
tender of what shall be laid upon them. The strongest obligation that
can be laid upon any man in publick matters, is, to see that he engage
in nothing but what must either offensively or beneficially reflect upon
himself: for as, if any be never so good a patriot, yet if his, power be
prolonged, he will find it hard to keep self from creeping in upon him,
and prompting him to some extravagancies for his own private benefit;
so, on the other side, if he be shortly to return to a condition common
with the rest of his brethren, self-interest binds him to do nothing but
what is just and equal; he himself being to reap the good or evil of
what is done, as well as the meanest of the people.
This without controversy must needs be the most noble, the most just,
and the most excellent way of government in free-states; without which,
it is obvious to common sense, no nation can long continue in a state of
freedom: as appears likewise by example out of the Roman story. For what
more noble patriots were there ever in the world, than the Roman
senators were, whilst they were kept under by their kings, and fell the
same burthens of their fury, as did the rest of the people? but
afterwards being freed from the kingly yoke, and having secured all
power within the hands of themselves and, their posterity, they at
length fell into the same absurdities that had been before committed by
their kings; so that this new yoke became more intolerable than the
former. Nor could the people find any remedy, until they procured that
necessary office of the tribunes; who being invested with a temporary
authority by the people's election, remained the more sensible of their
condition, and were as moderators between the power of the great ones,
and the rights of the people.
What more excellent patriot could there be than Manlius, till he became
corrupted by time and power? Who more noble, and courteous, and well-
affected to the common good, than was Appius Claudius at first? but
afterwards, having obtained a continuation of the government in his own
hands, he soon lost his primitive innocency and integrity, and devoted
himself to all the practices of an absolute tyrant. Many others might be
reckoned up. And therefore hence it was, that when the senate (for some
reasons) thought to continue Lucius Quintius in the consulship longer
than the usual time; that gallant man utterly refused it, and chose
rather to deny himself, than that a precedent so prejudicial to the
Roman freedom should be made for his sake, by a prerogative of authority
in his hands, beyond the ordinary custom.
A seventh reason[17] why a people qualified with a due and orderly
succession of their supreme assemblies, are the best keepers of their
own liberties, is, because, as in other forms, those persons only have
access to government, who are apt to serve the lust and will of the
prince, or else are parties or compilers with some powerful faction: so
in this form of government by the people, the door of dignity stands
open to all (without exception) that ascend thither by the steps of
worth and virtue: the consideration whereof hath this noble effect in
free states, that it edges mens spirits with an active emulation, and
raiseth them to a lofty pitch of design and action.
The truth of this is very observable in the Roman state; for, during the
vassalage of that people under kings, we read not of any notable
exploits, but find them confined within a narrow compass, oppressed at
home, and ever and anon ready to be swallowed up by their enemies. After
this government of kings was abolished, you know that of grandees in a
standing senate was next erected; under which form they made shift to
enlarge their bounds a little: but the most they could then do, was only
to secure themselves from the attempts of the banished Tarquins, and
those petty neighbours that envied the small increase of their dominion.
But at length, when the state was made free indeed, and the people
admitted into a share and interest in the government, as well as the
great ones; then it was, and never till then, that their thoughts and
power began to exceed the bounds of Italy, and aspire towards that
prodigious empire. For, while the road of preferment lay plain to every
man, no public work was done, nor any conquest made; but every man
thought he did and conquered all for himself, as long as he remained
valiant and virtuous: it was not alliance, nor friendship, nor faction,
nor riches, that could advance men; but knowledge, valour, and virtuous
poverty, was preferred above them all.
For the confirmation whereof, we find in the same story, how that many
of their brave patriots and conquerors were men of the meanest fortune,
and of so rare a temper of spirit, that they little cared to improve
them, or enrich themselves by their public employment: so that when they
died, they were fain to be buried at the public charge. We find
Cincinnatus, a man of mean fortune, fetch'd from the plough, to the
dignity of a dictator: for he had no more than four acres of land, which
he tilled with his own hands. Yet so it happened, that when the Roman
consul with his whole army was in great peril, being circumvented and
straitned by the Equuns, and the city of Rome itself in a trembling
condition; then, with one consent, they pitch'd upon Cincinatus, as the
fittest man for their deliverance: and he behaved himself so well, with
so much magnanimity, integrity, and wisdom, that he relieved the consul,
routed and utterly subdued the enemy, and gave as it were a new life to
his country's liberties: which work being over, he with all willingness
quitted his authority, and returned to the condition of a painful
private life.
This example might seem strange, but that we know it was ordinary in
that state, till it grew corrupt again; for we read also, how Lucius
Tarquin, (not of the tyrant's family) a man of mean fortune, yet of
great worth, was chosen general of the horse, and drawn to it out of the
country, in which place he surpassed all the Roman youth for gallant
behaviour. Such another plain country-fellow was Attilius Regulus, the
scourge of Carthage in his time; of whom many eminent points of bravery
were recorded: as were also most of those heroic spirits that succeeded,
down to the times of Lucius Paulus Emilius, by whose conquests, the
first charms and inchantments of luxury were brought out of Asia to
Rome, and there they soon swallowed up the remainders of primitive
integrity and simplicity. And yet it is very observable also, that so
much of the ancient severity was remaining still even in the time of
this Paulus, the famous general, that a silver dish, that was part of
the spoil, being given to a son in law of his, who had fought stoutly in
that war, it was thought a great reward; and observed by the historian,
to be the first piece of plate that was ever seen in the family.
This observation then arises from this discourse, that as Rome never
thrived till it was settled in a freedom of the people; so that freedom
was preserved, and that interest best advanced, when all places of
honour and trust were exposed to men of merit, without distinction;
which happiness could never be obtained, until the people were instated
in a capacity of preferring whom they thought worthy, by a freedom of
electing men successively into their supreme offices and assemblies. So
long as this custom continued, and merit took place, the people made
shift to keep and encrease their liberties: but when it lay neglected,
and the stream of preferment began to run along with the favour and
pleasure of particular powerful men, then vice and compliance making way
for advancement, the people could- keep their liberties no longer; but
both their liberties and themselves were made the price of every man's
ambition and luxury.
The eighth reason,[18] why the people in their assemblies are the best
keepers of their liberty, is, because it is they only that are concerned
in the point of liberty: for whereas in other forms the main interest
and concernment both of kings and grandees, lies either in keeping the
people in utter ignorance what liberty is, or else in allowing and
pleasing them only with the name and shadow of liberty instead of the
substance: so in free-states the people being sensible of their part
condition in former times, under the power of great ones, and comparing
it with the possibilities and enjoyments of the present, become
immediately instructed, that their main interest and concernment
consists in liberty; and are taught by common sense, that the only way
to secure it from the reach of great ones, is, to place it in the
people's hands, adorned with all the prerogatives and rights of
supremacy. The truth of it is, the interest of freedom is a virgin that
every one seeks to deflour; and like a virgin, it must be kept, from any
other form, or else (so great is the lust of mankind after dominion)
there follows a rape upon the first opportunity. This being considered,
it will easily be granted, that liberty must needs lie more secure in
the people's than in any other's hands, because they are most concerned
in it: and the careful eyeing of this concernment, is that which makes
them both jealous and zealous; so that nothing will satisfy, but the
keeping of a constant guard against the attempts and incroachments of
any powerful or crafty underminers.
Hence it is, that the people having once tasted the sweets of freedom,
are so extreamly affected with it, that if they discover, or do but
suspect the least design to incroach upon it, they count it a crime
never to be forgiven for any consideration whatsoever. Thus it was in
the Roman state, where one gave up his children, another his brother to
death, to revenge an attempt against common liberty: divers also
sacrificed their lives, to preserve it; and some their best friends, to
vindicate it upon bare suspicion; as in the cases of Maelius, and
Manlius, and others, after manifest violation, as in the case of Cęsar.
Nor was it thus only in Rome; but we find also as notable instances of
revenge in the free-people of Greece, upon the same occasion. But the
most notable of all, is that which happened in the island of Corcyra,
during the war of Peloponnesus: where the people having been rook'd of
liberty by the slights and power of the grandees, and afterwards by the
assistance of the free-states of Athens recovering it again, took
occasion thereupon to clap up all the grandees, and chopped off ten of
their heads at one time, in part of satisfaction for the injury: but yet
this would not serve the turn; for, some delay being made in executing
of the rest, the people grew so inraged, that they ran, and pulled down
the very walls, and buried them in the ruins and rubbish of the prison.
We see it also in the free state of Florence, where Cosmus the first
founder of the Tuscan-tyranny, having made shipwreck of their liberty,
and seized all into his own hands; though he enslaved their bodies, yet
he could not subdue their hearts, nor wear their past liberty out of
memory; for upon the first opportunity, they sought revenge, and a
recovery; forcing him to fly for the safety of his life: and though
afterwards he made way for his return and re-establishment by treachery,
yet now after so long a time, the old freedom is fresh in memory, and
would shew itself again upon a favourable occasion.
But of all modern instances, the most strange is that of the land of
Holstein; which being deprived of liberty, and about seventy years since
made a dutchy, and an appendix to the crown of Denmark; though the
inhabitants be but a boorish, poor, silly generation, yet still they
retain a sense of indignation at the loss of their liberty; and being
given to drink, the usual compliment in the midst of their cups, is
this, "Here is a health to the remembrance of our liberty."
Thus you see what an impression the love of freedom makes in the minds
of the people: so that it will be easily concluded, they must be the
best keepers of their own liberties; being more tender and more
concerned in their security, than any powerful pretenders whatsoever.
The ninth reason[19] to justify a free-state, is, because in free-states
the people are less luxurious, than kings or grandees use to be. Now,
this is most certain, that where luxury takes place, there is as natural
a tendency to tyranny, as there is from the cause to the effect: for,
you know the nature of luxury lies altogether in excess. It is a
universal depravation of manners, without reason, without moderation; it
is the canine appetite of a corrupt will and phantasy, which nothing can
satisfy; but in every action, in every imagination, it flies beyond the
bounds of honesty, just, and good, into all extremity: so that it will
easily be granted, that form of government must needs be the most
excellent, and the people's liberty most secured, where governors are
least exposed to the baits and snares of luxury.
The evidence of this may be made out, not only by reason, but by
examples old and new. And first, by reason, it is evident, that the
people must needs be less luxurious than kings or the great ones,
because they are bounded within a more lowly pitch of desire and
imagination: give them but panem & circenses; bread, sport and ease, and
they are abundantly satisfied. Besides, the people have less means and
opportunities for luxury, than those pompous standing powers, whether in
the hands of one or many: so that were they never so much inclined to
vice or vanity, yet they are not able to run on to the same measure of
excess and riot. Secondly, as it appears they are less luxurious; so,
for this cause also, it is clear, they (that is, their successive
representatives) must be the best governors; not only, because the
current of succession keeps them the less corrupt and presumptuous; but
also, because, being the more free from luxurious courses, they are
likewise free from those oppressive and injurious practices, which kings
and grandees are most commonly led and forced unto, to hold up the port
and splendor of their tyranny, and to satisfy those natural appetites of
covetousness, pride, ambition and ostentation, which are the perpetual
attendants of great ones, and luxury. Thus much for reason.
Now, for example, we might produce a cloud of instances, to shew, that
free-states, or the people duly qualified with the supreme authority,
are less devoted to luxury, than the grandee or kingly powers: but we
shall give you only a few.
The first that comes in our way is the state of Athens, which, whilst it
remained free in the people's hands, was adorned with such governors as
gave themselves up to a serious, abstemious, severe course of life; so
that whilst Temperance and Liberty walked hand in hand, they improved
the points of valour and prudence so high, that in a short time they
became the only arbitrators of all affairs in Greece. But being at the
height, then (after the common fate of all worldly powers,) they began
to decline; for (contrary to the rules of a free-state) permitting some
men to greaten themselves, by continuing long in power and authority,
they soon lost their pure principles of severity and liberty: for, up
started those thirty grandees, (commonly called the tyrants) who having
usurped a standing authority unto themselves, presently quitted the old
discipline and freedom, gave up themselves first to charms of luxury,
and afterwards to all the practices of an absolute tyranny. Such also
was the condition of that state, when at another time (as in the days of
Pistratus) it was usurp'd in the hands of a single tyrant.
From Athens let us pass to Rome, where we find it in the days of
Tarquin, dissolved into debauchery. Upon the change of government, their
manners were somewhat mended, as were the governors in the senate: but
that being a standing power, soon grew corrupt; and first let in luxury,
then tyranny, till the people being interested in the government,
established a good discipline and freedom both together; which was
upheld with all severity, till the ten grandees came in play; after
whose deposition, liberty and sobriety began to breathe again, till the
days of Sylla, Marius, and other grandees that followed down to Cęsar,
in whose time luxury and tyranny grew to such a height, that unless it
were in the life and conversation of Cato, there was not so much as one
spark, that could be raked out of the ashes, of the old Roman discipline
and freedom; so that of all the world, only Cato remained as a monument
of that temperance, virtue and freedom, which flourished under the
government of the people.
Omitting many other examples, our conclusion upon these particulars
shall be this, That since the grandee or kingly powers are ever more
luxurious than the popular are, or can be; and since luxury ever brings
on tyranny, as the only bane of liberty; certainly the rights and
privileges of the people, placed and provided for, in a due and orderly
succession of their supreme assemblies, must needs remain more secure in
their own hands, than in any others whatsoever.
A tenth reason,[20] to prove the excellency of a free-state or
government by the people, above any other form of government, is,
because under this government, the people are ever indued with a more
magnanimous, active, and noble temper of spirit, than under the grandeur
of any standing power whatsoever. And this arises from that apprehension
which every particular man hath of his own immediate share in the public
interest, as well as of that security which he possesses in the
enjoyment of his private fortune, free from the reach of any arbitrary
power, Hence it is, that whensoever any good success or happiness
betides the public, everyone counts it his own: if the common wealth
conquer, thrive in dominion, wealth or honour, he reckons all done for
himself; if he sees distributions of honour, high offices, or great
rewards, to valiant, virtuous, or learned persons, he esteems them as
his own, as long as he hath a door left open to succeed in the same
dignities and enjoyments, if he can attain unto the same measure of
desert. This it is which makes men aspire unto great actions, when the
reward depends not upon the will and pleasure of particular persons, as
it doth under all standing powers; but is conferred upon men (without
any consideration of birth or fortune) according to merit, as it ever
is, and ought to be in free-states, that are rightly constituted.
The truth of this will appear much more evident, if you list a little to
take a view of the condition of people, under various forms of
government: for, the Romans of old, while under. kings, (as you heard
before) remained a very inconsiderable people, either in dominion or
reputation; and could never inlarge their command very far beyond the
walls of their city. Afterwards, being reduced unto that standing power
of the senate, they began to thrive a little better, and, for a little
time: yet all they could do, was only to struggle for a subsistence
among bad neighbours. But at length, when the people began to know,
claim, and possess their liberties in being governed by a succession of
their supreme officers and assemblies; then it was, and never till then,
that they laid the foundation, and built the structure of that wondrous
empire that over-shadowed the whole world. And truly the founding of it
must needs be more wonderful, and a great argument of an extraordinary
courage and magnanimity, wherewith the people was indued in recovery of
liberty; because their first conquests were laid in the ruin of mighty
nations, and such as were every jot as free as themselves: which made
the difficulties so much the more, by how much the more free (and
consequently, the more courageous) they were, against whom they made
opposition: for as in those days the world abounded with free-states,
more than any other form, as all over Italy, Gallia, Spain, and Africa,
&c. so specially in Italy, where the Tuscans, the Samnites, and other
emulators and competitors of the Roman freedom, approved themselves such
magnanimous defenders of their liberty against Rome, that they endured
wars so many years with utmost extremity, before ever they could be
brought to bow under the Roman yoke. This magnanimous state of freedom
was the cause also why Carthage was enabled so long, not only to oppose,
but often to hazard the Roman fortune, and usurp the laurel. It brought
Hannibal within view, and the Gauls within the walls of the city, to a
besieging of the Capitol; to shew, that their freedom had given them the
courage to rob her of her maiden-head, who afterwards became mistress of
the whole world. But what serves all this for, but only to shew, that as
nothing but a state of freedom could have enabled those nations with a
courage sufficient so long to withstand the Roman power: so Rome herself
also was beholden to this state of freedom, for those sons of courage
which brought the necks of her sister-states and nations under her
girdle? And it is observable also in after times, when tyranny took
place against liberty, the Romans soon lost their ancient courage and
magnanimity; first under usurping dictators, then under emperors, and in
the end the empire itself.
Now, as on the one side, we feel a loss of courage and magnanimity,
follow the loss of freedom: so, on the other side, the people ever grow
magnanimous and courageous upon a recovery; witness at present, the
valiant Swisses, the Hollanders, and not long since, our own nation,
when declared a free-state, and a re-establishment of our freedom in the
hands of the people procured, (though not secured) what noble designs
were undertaken and prosecuted with success? The consideration whereof,
must needs make highly for the honour of all governors in free-states,
who have been, or shall be instrumental in redeeming and setting any
people in a fulness of freedom, that is, in a due and orderly succession
of their supreme assemblies.
The eleventh reason is,[21] because in this form no determinations being
carried, but by consent of the people; therefore they must needs remain
secure out of the reach of tyranny, and free from the arbitrary
disposition of any commanding power. In this case, as the people know
what laws they are to obey, and what penalties they are to undergo, in
case of transgression; so having their share and interest in he making
of laws, with the penalties annexed, they become the more inexcusable if
they offend, and the more willingly submit unto punishment when they
suffer for any offence. Now the case is usually far otherwise, under all
standing powers: for, when government is managed in the hands of a
particular person, or continued in the hands of a certain number of
great men, the people then have no laws but what kings and great men
please to give: nor do they know how to walk by those laws, or how to
understand them, because the sense is oftentimes left at uncertainty;
and it is reckoned a great mystery of state in those forms of
government, that no laws shall be of any sense or force, but as the
great ones please to expound them: so as by this means, the people many
times are left as it were without law, because they bear no other
construction, and meaning, but what suits with particular mens interests
and phantasies; not with right reason, or the public liberty.
For the proof of this under kingly government, we might run all the
world over; but our own nation affords instances enough in the practices
of all our kings: yet this evil never came to such a height, as it did
in the reign of Henry the seventh; who by usurping a prerogative of
expounding the laws after his own pleasure, made them rather snares,
than instruments of relief, (like a grand catch-pole) to pill, poll, and
geld the purses of the people; as his son Harry did after him, to
deprive many gallant men both of their lives and fortunes. For, the
judges being reputed the oracles of the law, and the power of creating
judges being usurp'd by kings, they had a care ever to create such, as
would make the laws speak in favour of them, upon any occasion. The
truth whereof hath abundantly appeared in the days of the late king, and
his father James, whose usual language was this: "As long as I have
power of making what judges and bishops I please, I am sure to have no
law nor gospel but what shall please me."
This very providing for this inconvenience, was the great commendation
of Lycurgus his institution in Sparta; who, though he cut out the
Lacedemonian Commonwealth after the grandee fashion, confirming the
supremacy within the walls of the senate, (for their king was but a
cypher) yet he so ordered the matter, that he took away the grandeur;
that as their king was of little more value than any one of the
senators; so the senate was restrained by laws, walking in the same even
pace of subjection with the people; having very few offices of dignity
or profit allowed, which might make them swell with state and ambition;
but were prescribed also the same rules of frugality, plainness, and
moderation, as were the common people: by which means immoderate lusts
and desires being prevented in the great ones, they were the less
inclined to pride and oppression; and no great profit or pleasure being
to be gotten by authority, very lew desired it; and such as were in it,
sat free from envy, by which means they avoided that odium and emulation
which uses to rage betwixt the great ones and the people in that form of
government.
But now the case is far otherwise in the Commonwealth of Venice, where
the people being excluded from all interest in government, the power of
making and executing of laws, and bearing of offices, with all other
immunities, lies only in the hands of a standing senate, and their
kindred, which they call the Patrocian, or noble order. Their duke, or
prince, is indeed retrained, and made just such another officer as were
the Lacedemonian kings; differing from the rest of the senate, only in a
corner of his cap, besides a little outward ceremony and splendor: but
the senators, themselves have liberty at random, arbitrarily to ramble,
and do what they please with the people: who excepting the city itself,
are so extreamly oppressed in all their territories, living by no law
but the arbitrary dictates of the senate, that it seems rather a junta,
than a Commonwealth; and the subjects take so little content in it, that
seeing more to be enjoyed under the Turk, they that are his borderers
take all opportunities to revolt, and submit rather to the mercy of a
pagan-tyranny. Which disposition if you consider, together with the
little courage in their subjects, by reason they press them so hard; and
how that they are forced, for this cause, to rely upon foreign
mercenaries in all warlike expeditions, you might wonder how this state
hath held up so long; but that we know the interest of Christendom,
being concerned in her security, she hath been chiefly supported by the
supplies and arms of others.
Therefore our conclusion shall be this, That since kings, and all
standing powers, are so inclinable to act according to their own will
and interests, in making, expounding, and executing of laws to the
prejudice of the people's liberty and security: and seeing the only way
to prevent arbitrariness, is, that no law or dominations whatsoever
should be made, but by the people's consent and election: therefore it
must of necessity be granted that the people are the best keepers of
their own liberties, being settled in a due and orderly succession of
their supreme assemblies.
A twelfth reason is,[22] because this form is most suitable to the
nature and reason of mankind: for, as Cicero saith, "Man is a noble
creature, born with affections to rule, rather than obey; there being in
every man a natural appetite or desire of principality." And therefore
the reason why one man is content to submit to the government of
another, is, not because he conceives himself to have less right than
another to govern; but either because he finds himself less able, or
else because he judgeth it will be more convenient for himself, and that
community whereof he is a member, if he submits unto another's
government. Nemini parere vult animus a natura bene informatus, nisi,
&c. saith the same Cicero: that is to say, in honest English, "A mind
well instructed by the light of nature, will pay obedience unto none but
such as command, direct, or govern, for its good and benefit." From both
which passages and expressions of that oracle of human wisdom, these
three inferences do naturally arise: first, that by the light of nature
people are taught to be their own carvers and contrivers, in the framing
of that government under which they mean to live. Secondly, that none
ate to preside in government, or sit at the helm, but such as shall be
judged fit, and chosen by the people. Thirdly, that the people are the
only proper judges of the convenience or inconvenience of a government
when it is erected, and of the behaviour of governors after they are
chosen: which three deductions appear to be no more, but an explanation
of this most excellent maxim, That the original and fountain of all just
power and government is in the people.
This being so, that a free-state-government by the people, that is, by
their successive representatives, or supreme assemblies, duly chosen, is
most natural, and only suitable to the reason of mankind; then it
follows, that the other forms, whether it be of a standing power in the
hands of a particular person, as a king; or of a set number of great
ones, as in a senate, are besides the dictates of nature, being meer
artificial devices of great men, squared out only to serve the ends and
interests of avarice, pride and ambition of a few, to a vassalizing of
the community. The truth whereof appears so much the more, if we
consider, that a consent and free election of the people, which is the
most natural way and form of governing, hath no real effect in the other
forms; but is either supplanted by craft and custom, or swallowed up by
a pernicious pretence of right (in one or many) to govern, only by
virtue of an hereditary succession. Now certainly, were there no other
argument to prove the excellency of government by the people, &c. beyond
the other forms; yet this one might suffice, that in the people's form,
men have liberty to make use of that reason and understanding God hath
given them, in chusing of governors, and providing for their own safety
in government; but in the other forms of a standing power, all authority
being entailed to certain persons and families, in a course of
inheritance, men are always deprived of the use of their reason about
choice of governors, and forced to receive them blindly, and at all
adventure: which course being so destructive to the reason, common
interest, and majesty of that noble creature, called man, that he should
not in a matter of so high consequence as government, (wherein the good
and safety of all is concerned) have a freedom of choice and judgment,
must needs be the most irrational and brutish principle in the world,
and fit only to be hissed out of the world, together with all forms of
standing power (whether in kings, or others) which have served for no
other end, but to transform men into beasts, and mortified mankind with
misery through all generations.
The truth of this is evident all the world over; first, by sad examples
of monarchy: for the kingly form having been retained in a course of
inheritance, men being forced to take what comes next for a governor,
whether it be male or female, a wise man or a fool, good or bad; so that
the major part of hereditary princes have been tyrannous and wicked by
nature, or made so by education and opportunity: the people have been
for the most part bandied to and fro, with their lives and fortunes, at
the will and pleasure of some one single unworthy fellow, who usually
assumes the greater confidence in his unrighteous dealing, because he
knows the people are tied in that form to him and his, though he
practise all the injustice in the world. This was it that brought on
tyranny in Rome, first under their kings, afterwards under emperors: for
it is to be observed out of the story, that all those emperors which
ruled by right of inheritance, proved most of them no better than savage
beasts, and all of them wicked, except Titus. 'Tis true indeed, that a
nation may have some respite, and recruit now and then, by the virtue
and valour of a single prince; yet this is very rare; and when it doth
happen, it usually lasts no longer than for his life, because his son or
successor (for the most part) proves more weak or vicious than himself
was virtuous, as you may see in the several lists of kings throughout
Great Britain, France, Spain, and all the world. But this is not all the
inconvenience, that hereditary princes have been, and are for the most
part wicked in their own persons: for, as great inconveniences happen by
their being litigious in their titles; witness the bloody disputes
between the princes of the blood in France, as also in England, between
the two houses of York and Lancaster; to which many more might be
reckoned out of all other kingdoms; which miseries the people might have
avoided, had they not been tied to one particular line of succession.
Therefore, if any kingly form be tolerable, it must be that which is by
election, chosen by the people's representatives, and made an officer of
trust by them, to whom they are to be accountable. And herein, as kings
are only tolerable upon this account, as elective; so these elective
kings are as intolerable upon another account, because their present
greatness gives them opportunity ever to practise such slights, that in
a short time, the government that they received only for their own
lives, will become entailed upon their families; whereby the people's
election will be made of no effect further, than for fashion, to mock
the poor people, and adorn the triumphs of an aspiring tyranny; as it
hath been seen in the elective kingdoms of Bohemia, Poland, Hungary, and
Sweden, where the forms of election were, and are still retained; but
the power swallowed up, and the kingdoms made hereditary; not only in
Sweden, by the artifice of Gustavus Ericus; but also in Poland, and the
Empire; where the people's right of election was soon eaten out by the
cunning of the two families of Casimir and Austria.
Let this serve to manifest, that a government by a free election and
consent of the people, settled in a due and orderly succession of their
supreme assemblies, is more consonant to the light of nature and reason;
and consequently much more excellent than any hereditary standing power
whatsoever. To take off all mis-constructions; when we mention the
people, observe all along, that we do not mean the confused promiscuous
body of the people, nor any part of the people who have forfeited their
rights by delinquency, neutrality, or apostacy, &c. in relation to the
divided state of any nation; for they are not to be reckoned within the
lists of the people.
The thirteenth reason,[23] to prove the excellency of a free-state above
any other form, is, because in free-states there are fewer opportunities
of oppression and tyranny, than in the other forms. And this appears, in
that it is ever the care of free-commonwealths, for the most part, to
preserve, not an equality, (which were irrational and odious) but an
equability of condition among all the members; so that no particular man
or men shall be permitted to grow over-great in power; nor any rank of
men be allowed above the ordinary standard, to assume unto themselves
the state and title of nobility.
The observation of the former secures the people's liberty from the
reach of their own officers, such as being entrusted with the affairs of
high trust and employment, either in camp and council, might perhaps
take occasion thereby to aspire beyond reason, if not restrained and
prevented.
The observation of the latter secures the people from the pressures and
ambition of such petty tyrants, as would usurp and claim a prerogative,
power, and greatness above others, by birth and inheritance. These are a
sort of men not to be endured in any well-ordered commonwealth; for they
always bear a natural and implacable hate towards the people, making it
their interest to deprive them of their liberty; so that if at any time
it happen, that any great man or men whatsoever, arrive to so much power
and confidence, as to think of usurping, or to be in a condition to be
tempted thereunto; these are the first that will set them on, mingle
interests with them, and become the prime instruments in heaving them up
into the seat of tyranny.
For the clearing of these truths; and first, to manifest the
inconvenience of permitting any persons to be over-great in any state;
and that free-states that have not avoided it, have soon lost their
liberty, we shall produce a file of examples, In Greece we find, that
the free-state of Athens lost its liberty upon that account once, when
they suffered certain of the senators to overstep the rest in power;
which occasioned that multiplied tyranny, made famous by the name of the
thirty tyrants: at another time, when by the same error they were
contained, through the power of Pistratus, to stoop unto his single
tyranny.
Upon this score also, the people of Syracuse had the same misfortune
under the tyrant Hiero, as had they of Sicily, under Dionysius and
Agathocles.
In Rome also the case is the same too: for during the time that liberty
was included within the senate, they gave both Męlius and Manlius an
opportunity to aspire, by permitting them a growth of too much
greatness: but by good fortune escaping their clutches, they afterwards
fell as foolishly into the hands of ten of their fellow-senators, called
the Decemviri, in giving them so much power as tempted them unto
tyranny. Afterwards, when the people scuffled, and made a shift to
recover their liberty out of the hands of the senate, they committed the
same error too, by permitting of their servants to grow over-great; such
as Sylla, who by power tyrannized and made himself dictator for five
years, as Cęsar afterwards settled the dictatorship upon himself for
ever; and after Cęsar's death, they might have recovered their liberty
again, if they had taken care (as they might easily have done) to
prevent the growing greatness of Augustus, who gaining power first, by
the courtesy and good will of the senate and people, made use of it to
establish himself in a tyranny, which could never after be extinguished,
but in the ruin of the Roman empire, itself.
Thus also the free-state of Florence foolishly ruined itself by the
greatning of Cosmus; first, permitting him to ingross the power, which
gave him opportunity to be a tyrant; and then as foolishly forcing him
to declare himself a tyrant, by an unseasonable demand of the power back
out of his hands. Many more instances might be fetched out of Milan,
Switzerland, and other places: but we have one nearer home, and of a
later date, in Holland; whereby, permitting the family of Orange to
greaten a little more than beseemed a member of a free state, they were
insensibly reduced to the last cast, to run the hazard of the loss of
their liberty.
Therefore one prime principle of state, is, to keep any man, though he
have deferved never so well by good success or service, from being too
great or popular: it is a notable means (and so esteemed by all free-
states) to keep and preserve a commonwealth from the rapes of
usurpation.
A fourteenth reason,[24] (and though the last, yet not the least) to
prove a free-state or government by the people, settled in a due and
.orderly succession of their supreme assemblies, is much more excellent
than any other form, is, because in this form, all powers are
accountable for misdemeanors in government, in regard of the nimble
returns and periods of the people's election: by which means, he that
ere-while was a governor, being reduced to the condition of a subject,
lies open to the force of the laws, and may with ease be brought to
punishment for his offence; so that, after the observation of such a
course, others which suceeed will become the less daring to offend, or
to abuse their trust in authority, to an oppression of the people. Such
a course as this, cuts the very throat of all tyranny; and doth not only
root it up when at full growth, but crusheth the cockatrice in the egg,
destroys it in the seed, in the principle, and in the very possibilities
of its being for ever after. And as the safety of the people is the
sovereign and supreme law; so an establishment of this nature is an
impregnable bulwark of the people's safety, because without it, no
certain benefit can be obtained by the ordinary laws; which if they
should be dispensed by uncontroulable, unaccountable persons in power,
shall never be interpreted but in their own sense; nor executed but
after their own wills and pleasure.
Now this is most certain, that as in the government of the people, the
successive revolution of authority by their consent hath ever been the
only bank against inundations of arbitrary power and tyranny; so on the
other side, it is as sure, that all standing powers have and ever do
assume unto themselves an arbitrary exercise of their own dictates at
pleasure, and make it their only interest to settle themselves in an
unaccountable state of dominion: so that, though they commit all the
injustice in the world, their custom hath been still to persuade men,
partly by strong pretence of argument, and partly by force, that they
may do what they list; and that they are not bound to give an account of
their actions to any but to God himself. This doctrine of tyranny hath
taken the deeper root in men's minds, because the greatest part was ever
inclined to adore the golden idol of tyranny in every form: by which
means the rabble of mankind being prejudicated in this particular, and
having placed their corrupt humour or interest in base fawning, and the
favour of present great ones, therefore if any resolute spirit happen to
broach and maintain true principles of freedom, or do at any time arise
to so much courage, as to perform a noble act of justice, in calling
tyrants to an account, presently he draws all the enmity and fury of the
world about him. But in commonwealth? it is and ought to be otherwise;
for, in the monuments of the Grecian and Roman freedom, we find those
nations were wont to heap all the honours they could invent, by public
rewards, consecration of statues, and crowns of laurel, upon such worthy
patriots: and as if on earth all were too little, they inrolled them in
heaven among the deities. And all they they did out of a noble sense of
commonweal-interest; knowing that the life of liberty consists in a
strict hand, and zeal against tyrants and tyranny, and by keeping
persons in power from all the occasions of it: which cannot be better
done, than (according to the custom of all states that are really free)
by leaving them liable to account: which happiness was never seen yet
under the sun, by any law or custom established, save only in those
states, where all men are brought to taste of subjection as well as
rule, and the government settled by a due succession of authority, by
consent of the people.
In Switzerland the people are free indeed, because all officers and
governors in the cantons, are questionable by the people in their
successive assemblies.
The inference from the foregoing particulars, is easy, That since
freedom is to be preserved no other way in a commonwealth, but by
keeping officers and governors in an accountable state; and since it
appears no standing powers can ever be called to an account without much
difficulty, or involving a nation in blood or misery. And since a
revolution of government in the people's hands hath ever been the only
means to make governors accountable, and prevent the inconveniences of
tyranny, distraction, and misery; therefore for this, and those other
reasons foregoing, we may conclude, that a free state, or government by
the people, settled in a due and orderly succession of their supreme
assemblies, is far more excellent every way than any other form
whatsoever.
[10 MN] The people the best keepers of their own liberties.
[11 MN] 1st reason. Because the people never think of usurping over
other mens rights.
[12 MN] 2d reason. The people's care is, that public authority be
constituted for public ends.
[13 MN] 3d reason. Succession in power is the grand preventive of
corruption.
[14 MN] 4th reason A succession of supreme power kills that canker-worm
of a Commonwealth, to wit, faction.
[15 MN] 5th reason A succession of powers and persons is the only remedy
against self-seeking.
[16 MN] 6th reason. The end of all government being the good and ease of
the people, they best know where the shoe pinches.
[17 MN] 7th reason. In this government the door of dignity stands open
to all that descend thither by the steps of worth and virtue
[18 MN] 8th reason. The people are the best keepers of their liberty,
because they only are concerned in the point of liberty.
[19 MN] 9th reason. The government of a free-state is less luxurious,
than that of kings or grandees.
[20 MN] 10th reason. In a free-state, the people are evermore
magnanimous and valiant.
[21 MN] 11th reason. No determinations are carried but by consent of the
people.
[22 MN] 12th reason. A free-state is most suitable to the nature and
reason of mankind.
[23 MN] 13th reason. In this government there are fewer opportunities of
oppression and tyranny, than under any other form.
[24 MN] 14th reason. In this form all powers are accountable for
misdemeanors in government.
ALL OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT of the
PEOPLE ANSWERED.
Considering, that in times past, the people of this nation were bred up
and instructed in the brutish principles of monarchy, by which means
they have been the more averse from entertaining notions of a more noble
form: and remembring, that not long since we were put into a better
course, upon the declared interest of a free-state, or commonwealth; I
conceived nothing could more highly tend to the propagation of that good
interest, and the honour of its founders, than to manifest the
inconveniences and ill consequences of the other forms; and so to root
up their principles, that the good people, who but the other day were
inverted in the possession of a more excellent way, may (in order to
their re-establishment) understand what commonwealth-principles are; and
thereby become the more resolute to defend them against the common
enemy; learn to be true commonwealth's-men, and zealous against
monarchic-interest, in all its appearances and incroachments whatsoever.
To this end we have set down our position, that a free-state, or
government by the people, settled in a due and orderly succession of
their supreme assemblies, is the most excellent form of government;
which (I humbly conceive) hath been sufficiently proved, both by reason
and example: but because many pretences of objection are in being, and
such as by many are taken for granted; therefore it falls in of course,
that we may refute them: which being done with the same evidence of
reason and example, I doubt not but it will stop all the mouths, not
only of ignorance, but even of malice and flattery, which have presumed
to prophane that pure way of a free-state, or government by the people.
That objection of royalists, and others, which we shall first[25] take
notice of, is this, that the erecting of such a government would be to
set on levelling and confusion. For answer, if we take levelling in the
common usage and application of the term in these days, it is of an
odious signification, as if it levelled all men in point of estates,
made all things common to all, destroyed propriety, introduced a
community of enjoyments among men; which is a scandal fastened by the
cunning of the common enemy upon this kind of government, which they
hate above all others; because, were the people once put in possession
of their liberty, and made sensible of the great benefits they may reap
by its enjoyment, the hopes of all the royal sticklers would be utterly
extinct, in regard it would be the likeliest means to prevent a return
of the interest of monarchy; for no person or parties seeking or setting
up a private interest of their own, distinct from the public, it will
stop the mouths of all gainsayers. But the truth is, this way of free-
state, or government by the people in their successive assemblies, is so
far from introducing a community, that it is the only preservative of
propriety in every particular: the reasons whereof are plain; for, as on
the one side, it is not in reason to be imagined, that so choice a body,
as the representative of a nation, should agree to destroy one another
in their several rights and interests: on the other side, all
determinations being carried in this form by common consent, every man's
particular interest must needs be fairly provided for, against the
arbitrary disposition of others; therefore, whatever is contrary to
this, is levelling indeed; because it placeth every man's right under
the will of another, and is no less than tyranny; which seating itself
in an unlimited uncontroulable prerogative over others without their
consent, becomes the very bane of propriety; and however disquieted, or
in what form soever it appears, is indeed the very interest of monarchy.
Now that a free-state, or successive government of the people, &c. is
the only preservative of propriety, appears by instances all the world
over; yet we shall cite but a few.
Under monarchs, we shall find ever, that the subjects had nothing that
they could call their own; neither lives, nor fortunes, nor wives, nor
any thing else that the monarch pleased to command, because the poor
people knew no remedy against the levelling will of an unbounded
sovereignty; as may be seen in the records of all nations that have
stooped under that wretched form: whereof we have also very sad examples
in France, and other kingdoms, at this very day, where the people have
nothing of propriety; but all depends upon the royal pleasure, as it did
of late here in England. Moreover, it is very observable, that in
kingdoms where the people have enjoyed any thing of liberty and
propriety, they have been such kingdoms only, where the frame of
government hath been so well tempered, as that the best share of it hath
been retained in the people's hands; and by how much the greater
influence the people have had therein, so much the more sure and certain
they have been, in the enjoyment of their propriety.
To pass by many other instances, consider how firm the Arragonians were
in their liberties and properties, so long as they held their hold over
their kings in their supreme assemblies; and no sooner had Philip the
Second deprived them of their share in the government, but themselves
and their properties became a prey (and have been ever since) to the
will and pleasure of their kings.
The like also may be said of France, where, as long as the people's
interest bore sway in their supreme assemblies, they could call their
lives and fortunes their own, and no longer: for, all that have
succeeded since Lewis the Eleventh, followed his levelling pattern so
far, that in short time they destroyed the people's property, and became
the greatest levellers in Christendom. We were almost at the same pass
here in England: for, as long as the people's interest was preserved by
frequent and successive parliaments; so long we were in some measure
secure of our properties: but as kings began to worm the people out of
their share in government, by discontinuing of parliaments: so they
carried on their levelling design, to the destroying of our properties;
and had by this means brought it so high, that the oracles of the law
and gospel spake it out with a good levelling grace, "That all was the
king's, and that we had nothing we might call our own."
Thus you see how much levelling, and little of propriety, the people
have had certain under monarchs; and if any at all, by what means, and
upon what terms they have had it. Nor hath it been thus only under
kings; but we find, the people have ever had as little of property
secure, under all other forms of standing powers; which have produced as
errant levellers in this particular, as any of the monarchies. In the
free-state of Athens, as long as the people kept free indeed, in an
enjoyment of their successive assemblies, so long they were secure in
their properties, and no longer. For, to say nothing of their kings,
whose history is very obscure, we find, after they were laid aside, they
erected another form of standing power, in a single person, called a
governor, for life; who was also accountable for misdemeanors: but yet a
trial being made of nine of them, the people saw so little security by
them, that they pitched upon another landing form of decimal government;
and being oppressed by them too, they were cashier'd. The like miseries
they tailed under the standing power of thirty, which were a sort of
levellers more rank than all the rest; who put to death, banished,
pill'd, and poll'd whom they pleased, without cause or exception; so
that the poor people having been tormented under all the forms of
standing power, were in the end forced (as their last remedy) to take
sanctuary under the form of a free-state, in their successive
assemblies.
And though it may be objected, that afterwards they fell into many
divisions and miseries, even in that form: yet whoever observes the
story, shall find, it was not the fault of the government, but of
themselves, in swerving from the rules of a free-state, by permitting
the continuance of power in particular hands; who having an opportunity
thereby to create parties of their own among the people, did for their
own ends, inveigle, engage, and entangle them in popular tumults and
divisions. This was the true reason of their mis-carriages. And if ever
any government of the people did miscarry, it was upon that account.
Thus also the Lacedemonians, after they had for some years tried the
government of one king, then of two kings at once of two distinct
families; afterwards came in the Ephori, as supervisors of their kings;
after (I say) they had tried themselves through all the forms of a
standing power, and found them all to be levellers of the people's
interest and property, then necessity taught them to seek shelter in a
free-state, under which they lived happily, till by a forementioned
error of the Athenians, they were drawn into parties by powerful
persons, and so made the instruments of division among themselves, for
the bringing of new levellers into play; such as were Manchanidas and
Nabis, who succeeded each other in a tyranny.
In old Rome, after the standing form of kings was extinct, and a new one
established, the people found as little of safety and property as ever:
for, the standing senate, and the Decemviri, proved as great levellers
as kings: so that they were forced to settle the government of the
people by a due and orderly succession of their supreme assemblies. Then
they began again to recover their property, in having somewhat they
might call their own; and they happily enjoyed it, till, as by the same
error of the Lacedemonians and Athenians, swerving from the rules of a
free-state, lengthning of power in particular hands, they were drawn and
divided into parties, to serve the lusts of such powerful men as by
craft became their leaders: so that by this means (through their own
default) they were deprived of their liberty long before the days of
imperial tyranny. Thus Cinna, Sylla, Marius, and the rest of that
succeeding gang, down to Cęsar, used the people's favour, to obtain a
continuation of power in their own hands; and then having saddled the
people with a new standing form of their own, they immediately rooted up
the people's liberty and property, by arbitrary sentences of death,
proscriptions, fines, and confiscations: which strain of levelling,
(more intolerable than the former) was maintained by the same arts of
devilish policy down to Cęsar; who striking in a favourite of the
people, and making use of their affections to lengthen power in his own
hands; at length, by this error of the people, gained opportunity to
introduce a new levelling form of standing power in himself, to an utter
and irrecoverable ruin of the Roman liberty and property.
In Florence they have been in the same case there, under every form of
standing power. It was so, when the great ones ruled: it was so under
Goderino, it was so under Savanarola the monk. When they once began to
lengthen power by the people's favour, they presently fell to levelling
and domineering, as did Cosmus afterwards, that crafty founder of the
present dukedom.
Upon the same terms, the republic of Pisa lost themselves, and became
the prey of several usurpations.
Mantua was once a free city of the empire; but neglecting their
successive assemblies, and permitting the great ones, and most wealthy,
to form a standing power in themselves: the people were so vexed with
them, that one Pafferimo getting power in his own hands, and then
lengthening it by artifice, turned leveller too, subjecting all to his
own will; so that the poor people, to rid their hands of him, were
forced to pitch upon another, as bad, and translate their power into a
petty dukedom, in the hands of the family of Gonzaga.
We may from hence safely conclude against all objecting monarchs and
royalists, of what name and title soever, that a free-state or
commonwealth by the people in their successive assemblies is so far from
levelling or destroying property, that in all ages it hath been the only
preservative of liberty and property, and the only remedy against the
levellings and usurpations of standing powers: for, it is clear, that
kings and all standing powers are the levellers.
A second objection[26] in the mouths of many, is this, "that the
erecting of such a form in the people's hands, were the ready way to
cause confusion in government; when all persons (without distinction)
are allowed aright to chuse and be chosen members of the supreme
assemblies.
For answer to this, know, we must consider a commonwealth in a twofold
condition: either in its settled state, when fully stablished and
founded, and when all men were supposed friends to its establishment; or
else when it is newly founding or founded, and that in the close of a
civil war, upon the ruin of a former government, and those that stood
for it; in which case it ever hath a great party within itself, that are
enemies to its establishment.
As to the first, to wit, a commonwealth in its settled and composed
state, when all men within it are presumed to be its friends,
questionless, a right to chuse and to be chosen, is then to be allowed
the people, (without distinction) in as great a latitude, as may stand
with right reason and convenience, for managing a matter of so high
consequence as their supreme assemblies; wherein somewhat must be left
to human prudence; and therefore that latitude being to be admitted more
or less, according to the nature, circumstances, and necessities of any
nation, is not here to be determined.
But as to a commonwealth under the second consideration, when it is
founding, or newly founded, in the close of a civil war, upon the ruin
of a former government; in this case, (I say) to make no distinction
betwixt men; but to allow the conquered part of the people an equal
right to chuse and to be chosen, &c. were not only to take away all
proportion in policy, but the ready way to destroy the commonwealth, and
by a promiscuous mixture of opposite interests, to turn all into
confusion.
Now, that the enemies of liberty, being subdued upon the close of a
civil war, are not to be allowed sharers in the rights of the people, is
evident, for divers reasons; not only because such an allowance would be
a means to give them opportunity to sow the seeds of new broils and
divisions, and bring a new hazard upon the liberties of the people,
(which are reasons derived from convenience:) but there is a more
special argument from the equity of the thing, according to the law and
custom of nations, that such as have commenced war, to serve the lusts
of tyrants against the people's interest, should not be received any
longer a part of the people, but may be handled as slaves when subdued,
if their subduers please so to use them; because by their treasons
against the majesty of the people, (which they ought to have maintained)
they have made forfeiture of all their rights and privileges, as members
of the people; and therefore if it happens in this case at any time,
that any immunities, properties, or enjoyments be indulged unto them,
they must not take them as their own by right, but as boons bestowed
upon them by the people's courtesy.
The old commonwealth of Greece was very severe in this particular: for,
as they were wont to heap up all honours they could vent, upon such as
did or suffered any thing for the maintenance of their liberty; so, on
the other side they punished the underminers of it, or those that any
ways appeared against it, with utmost extremity; persecuting them with
forfeitures, both of life and fortune; and if they escaped with life,
they usually became slaves; and many times they persecuted them, being
dead, branding their memories with an eternal mark of infamy.
In old Rome they dealt more mildly with the greatest part of those that
had sided with the Tarquins after their expulsion: but yet they were not
restored to all their former privileges. In process of time, as oft as
any conspired against the people's interest, in their successive
assemblies; after they had once gotten them, themselves were banished,
and their estates, confiscated, not excepting many of the senators, as
well as others; and made for ever incapable of any trust in the
commonwealth.
Afterwards, they took the same course with is many of Catiline's fellow-
traitors and conspirators, as were worthy any thing; and had no doubt
sufficiently paid Cęsar's abettors in the same coin, but that he wore
out all opposites with his prosperous treason. Thus Milan, and the rest
of those states, when they were free, as also the Swisses and
Hollanders, in the infancy of the Helvetian and Belgic freedoms, who
took the same course with all those unnatural parricides and apostates,
that offered first to strangle their liberty in the birth, or afterwards
in the cradle, by secret conspiracy, or open violence. Nor ought this to
seem strange, since if a right of conquest may be used over a foreign,
who only is to be accounted a fair, enemy: much more against such as,
against the light of nature, shall engage themselves in so foul
practices, as tend to ruin the liberty of their native country.
Seeing therefore that the people in their government, upon all occasions
of civil war against their liberties, have been most zealous in
vindicating those attempts upon the heads of the conspirators: seeing
also, that upon the close of a civil war, they have a right; and not
only a right, but usually a very great resolution to keep out those
enemies of liberty, whom they conquer, from a participation of any right
in government: therefore in this case also, as well as the former, we
may conclude, that they in their successive assemblies, are so far from
levelling the interest of government into all hands, without
distinction, that their principal care is ever to preserve it in their
own, to prevent the return of new wars, old interests, and confusion.
But there is a third objection[27] against it, drawn from a pretended
inconvenience of such a succession; alledging, "That the management of
state-affairs requires judgment and experience; which is not to be
expected from new members coming into those assemblies upon every
election.
Now, because the very life of liberty lies in a succession of powers and
persons; therefore it is meet I should be somewhat precise and punctual
by way of answer to this particular, Observe then, that in government
two things are to be considered: acta imperii, and arcana imperii: that
is, acts of state, and secrets of state. By acts of state, we mean the
laws and ordinances of the legislative power: these are the things that
have most influence upon a commonwealth, to its ill or well-being; and
are the only remedies for such bad customs, inconveniences, and
incroachments as afflict and grieve it. Wherefore, matters of grievance
being matters of common sense, and such are obvious to the people, who
best know where the shoe pinches them; certainly, there is no need of
any great skill or judgment in passing or applying a law for remedy,
which is the proper work of the people in their supreme assemblies; and
such, as every ordinary understanding is instructed in by the light of
nature: so that, as to this, there can be no danger by instituting an
orderly succession of the people.
But as for those things called arcana imperii, secrets of state, or the
executive part of government, during the intervals of their supreme
assemblies: these things being of a nature remote from ordinary
apprehensions, and such as necessarily require prudence, time, and
experience, to fit men for management: much in reason maybe said, and
must be granted, for the continuation of such trusts in the same hands,
as relate to matter of counsel, or administration of justice, more or
less, according to their good or ill-behaviour. A prudential
continuation of these, may (without question) and ought to be allowed
upon discretion; because, if they do amiss, they are easily accountable
to the people's assemblies. But now the case is otherwise, as to these
supreme assemblies, where a few easy, necessary things, such as common
sense and reason instruct men in, are the fittest things for them to
apply themselves unto; and there the people's trustees are to continue,
of right, no longer than meer necessity requires, for their own redress
and safety; which being provided for, they are to return into a
condition of subjection and obedience, with the rest of the people, to
such laws and government as themselves have erected: by which means
alone, they will be able to know whether they have done well or ill,
when they feel the effects of what they have done. Otherwise, if any
thing happen to be done amiss, what way can there be for remedy? since
no appeal is to be had from the supreme body of the people, except a due
course of succession be preserved from hand to hand, by the people's
choice; and other persons thereupon admitted (upon the same terms) into
the same authority.
This is the truth, as we have made manifest both by reason and example:
therefore we shall add a little to our former discourse, by way of
illustration. In Athens, when governed by the people, we find, it was
their course to uphold constant returns, and periods of succession in
their supreme assemblies, for remedy of grievances; and they had a
standing council, called the Areopagus, to whom all the secrets of state
were committed, together with the administration of government during
the intervals of those assemblies, at whose return they were
accountable; and warily continued, or excluded, as the people found
cause.
In Sparta they had the like; as also in Rome, after the people had once
got their successive assemblies, wherein they passed laws for
government: and not knowing how to be rid of their hereditary senate,
they permitted them and their families to continue a standing council;
but yet controulable by, and accountable to their assemblies, who
secluded and banished many of them for their misdemeanors: so that by
this means the people had an opportunity to make use of their wisdom,
and curb their ambition.
In Florence (when free) the government was after the same mode.
In Holland also, and Switzerland, they have their supreme assemblies
frequent by election, with exceeding benefit, but no prejudice to
affairs: for the frequency of those successive meetings, preserves their
liberty, and provides laws; the execution whereof is committed to
others, and affairs of state to a council of their own choice,
accountable to themselves: where their state-concernments very seldom
miscarry, because they place and displace their counsellors with
extraordinary care and caution.
By these particulars, you may perceive the vanity of the aforesaid
objection, and how slender a pretence it is against that excellent
course of successive assemblies; since affairs of state are as well
disposed (or rather better) under this form than any other.
A fourth objection[28] commonly used against the constitution of a free-
state, or government by the people in their successive assemblies, is
this: "That such a government brings great damage to the public, by
their frequent discontents, divisions, and tumults, that arise within
it."
For answer to this, it is requisite that we take notice of those
occasions which are the common causes of such humours in this form:
which being once known, it will easily appear whence those
inconveniences do arise, and not from any default in the nature of the
government: they are commonly these three, First, when any of their
fellow-citizens, or members of the commonweal shall arrogate any thing
of power and privilege unto themselves, or their families, whereby to
grandize or greaten themselves, beyond the ordinary size and standard of
the people. We find this to be most true, by the course of affairs in
the Roman state, as they are recorded by Livy; who plainly shews, that
upon the expulsion of the Tarquins, though the senate introduced a new
government, yet their retaining the power of the old within the hands of
themselves and their families, was the occasion of all those after
discontents and tumults that arose among the people. For, had Brutus
made them free, when he declared them so; or had the senate a little
after, followed the advice and example of Publicola, and some others as
honest as he; all occasion of discontent had been taken away: but when
the people saw the senators seated in a lofty posture over them; when
they felt the weight of that state and dignity pressing upon shoulders
that were promised to be at ease, and free; when they found themselves
exempted from the enjoyment of the same common privileges, excluded from
all offices, or alliance with the senators; their purses emptied of
money, their bellies of meat, and their hearts of hope: then it was,
that they began to grumble and mutiny; and never until they got a power
to bridle the great ones, by an happy succession of their supreme
assemblies.
A second occasion of the people's being inclined to discontent and
tumult, under their free form of government, appears in story to be
this: When they felt themselves not fairly dealt withal, by such as
became their leader's and generals. Thus in Syracusa, Dionysius
cloathing himself with a pretence of the people's liberties, and being
by that means made their general, and then making use of that power to
other ends than was pretended, became the fire-brand of that state, and
put the people all into flames, for the expulsion of him, who had made a
forfeiture of all his glorious pretences.
Thus in Sparta; the people were peaceable enough under their own
government, till they found themselves over-reached, and their credulity
abused by such as they trusted, whose designs were laid in the dark, for
the converting of liberty into tyranny, under Manchanidas and Nabis. In
old Rome, under the people's government, it is true, it was a sad sight
oftentimes to see the people swarming in tumults, their shops shut up,
and all trading given over throughout the city, and sometimes the city
forsaken and left empty.
But here, as also in Athens, the occasion was the same: for, as the
people naturally love peace and ease; so finding themselves often out-
witted and abused by the slights and feats of the senate, they presently
(as it is their nature upon such occasions) grew out of all patience.
The case was the same also when any one of their senators, or of
themselves, arrived to any height of power by insinuating into the
people's favour, upon specious and popular pretences, and then made a
forfeiture of those pretences, by taking a contrary course. Thus Sylla
of the senatorian order, and Marius of the plebeian, both got power into
their hands, upon pretence of the people's good, (as many others did
before and after, not only in Rome, but in other free-states also) but
forfeiting their pretences by taking arbitrary courses, they were the
sole causes of all those tumults and slaughters among the Romans, the
infamy whereof hath most injuriously been cast upon the people's
government, by the profane pens of such as have been bold in pension or
relation in the courts of princes.
Thus Cęsar also himself, striking as a favourite of the people upon fair
pretences, and forfeiting them, when in power, was the only cause of all
those succeeding civil broils and tragedies among the people.
A third occasion of the people's being inclined to discontent and tumult
in a free-state, is this, when they are sensible of oppression. For, I
say again, the people are naturally of a peaceable temper, minding
nothing but a free enjoyment: but if once they find themselves
circumvented, misled, or squeezed by such as they have intruded, then
they swell like the sea, and over-run the bounds of just and honest,
ruining all before them.
In a word, there is not one precedent of tumults or sedition can be
cited out of all stories, by the enemies of freedom, against the
people's government; but it will appear likewise thereby, that the
people were not in fault, but either drawn in, or provoked thereto, by
the craft or injustice of such fair pretenders as have had by-ends of
their own, and by-designs upon the public liberty.
Nevertheless, admit that the people were tumultuous in their own nature;
yet those tumults (when they happen) are more easily to be borne, than
these inconveniences that arise from the tyranny of monarchs and great
ones: for popular tumults have these three qualities.
First, the injury of them never extends further than some few persons;
and those (for the most part) guilty enough; as were the thirty grandees
in Athens, the ten in Rome, and those other state-mountebanks, that
suffered for their practices by the people's fury.
Secondly, those tumults are not lasting, but (like fits) quickly over:
for, an eloquent oration, or persuasion, (as we see in the example of
Menenius Agrippa) or the reputation of some grave or honest man, (as in
the example of Virginius, and afterwards of Cato) doth very easily
reduce and pacify them.
Thirdly, the ending of those tumults, tho' they have ruined some
particulars, yet it appears they have usually turned to the good of the
public: for we see, that both in Athens and Rome, the great ones were by
this means kept in awe from injustice; the spirits of the people were
kept warm with high thoughts of themselves and their liberty, which
turned much to the inlargement of their empire.
And lastly, by this means they came off always with good laws for their
profit, (as in the case of the law of twelve tables, brought from Athens
to Rome) or else with an augmentation of their immunities, and
privileges (as in the case of procuring the tribunes, and their supreme
assemblies) and afterwards in the frequent confirmation of them against
the incroachments of the nobles.
Now the case is far other wise under the standing power of the great
ones; they, in their counsels, projects, and designs, are fast and
tenacious; so that the evils under those forms are more remediless.
Besides, they reach to the whole body of a commonweal: and so the evils
are more universal. And lastly, those tumults, quarrels, and
inconveniencies that arise from among them, never tend nor end, but to
the farther oppression and suppression of the people in their interest
and propriety.
For conclusion then: by these particulars you may plainly see the vanity
of this objection about tumults, how far they are from being natural
effects of the people's government; insomuch, as by the records of
history, it appears rather that they have been the necessary
consequences of such tricks and cheats of great men, as in the days of
yore have been put upon the people.
A fifth objection[29] against the form of a free-state, or government by
the people in their successive assemblies, and which we find most in the
mouths of royalists and parasites, is this, "That little security is to
be had therein for the more wealthy and powerful sort of men, in regard
of that liberty which the people assume unto themselves, to accuse or
calumniate whom they please upon any occasion."
For answer to this, know, that calumniation (which signifies ambitious
slandering of men, by whisperings, reports, or false accusations) was
never allowed or approved in this form of government. 'Tis true indeed,
that such extravagances there have been (more or less) in all forms
whatsoever; but in this, less than any: it being most in use under
standing powers of great ones, who make it their grand engine to remove
or ruin all persons that stand in the way of them and their designs: And
for this purpose, it hath ever been their common custom to have
instruments ready at hand; as we see in all the stories of kings and
grandees from time to time; yea, and by Aristotle himself, together with
the whole train of commentators, it is particularly marked out inter
flagitia dominationis, to be one of the peculiar enormities that attend
the lordly interest of dominion.
The Roman state, after it grew corrupt, is a sufficient instance; where
we find, that not only the ten grandees, but all that succeeded them in
that domineering humour over the people, ever kept a retinue well
stock'd with calumniators and informers, (such as we call "Knights of
the post") to snap those that in any wise appeared for the people's
liberties. This was their constant trade, as it was afterwards also of
their emperors. But all the while that the people kept their power
entire in the supreme assemblies, we read not of its being brought into
any constant practice. Sometimes indeed, those great commanders that had
done them many eminent services, were, by reason of some after-actions,
called to an account; and having, by an ingrossment of power, rendered
themselves suspected, and burthensome to the commonwealth, were
commanded to retire, as were both the Scipio's.
And in the stories of the Athenian commonwealth, we find that by their
lofty and unwary carriage, they stirred up the people's fear and
jealousy so far, as to question and send divers of them into banishment,
notwithstanding all their former merits; as we read of Alcibiades,
Themistocles, and others: whereas, if the rules of a free-state had been
punctually observed, by preserving a discreet revolution of powers, and
an equability, or moderate state of particular persons, there had been
no occasion of incroachment on the one part, or of fear on the other;
nor could the prying royalist have had the least pretence or shadow of
invective against the people's government in this particular.
Thus much of calumniation, which is less frequent under the people's
form, than any other.
Now as to the point of accusing, or liberty of accusation by the people,
before their supreme assemblies; it is a thing so essentially necessary
for the preservation of a commonwealth, that there is no possibility of
having persons kept accountable without it; and, by consequence, no
security of life and estate, liberty and property. And of what excellent
use this is, for the public benefit of any state, appears in these two
particulars.
First, it is apparent, that the reason wherefore kings, and all other
standing powers, have presumed to abuse the people, is, because their
continuation of authority having been a means to state them in a
condition of impunity, the people either durst not, or could not assume
a liberty of accusation; and so have lingered without remedy, whilst
great men have proceeded without controul to an augmentation of their
misery: whereas if a just liberty of accusation be kept in ure, and
great persons by this means lie liable to questioning, the commonwealth
must needs be the more secure; because none then will dare to intrench,
or attempt aught against their liberty; and in case any do, they may
with much ease be suppressed. All which amounts, in effect, to a full
confirmation of this most excellent maxim, recorded in policy: Maxime
interest repub. libertatis, ut libere possis civem aliquem accusare: "It
most highly concerns the freedom of a commonwealth, that the people have
liberty of accusing any persons whatsoever."
Secondly, it appears, this liberty is most necessary, because as it hath
been the only remedy against the injustice of great and powerful
persons; so it hath been the only means to extinguish those emulations,
jealousies, and suspicions, which usually abound with fury in men's
minds, when they see such persons seated so far above, that they are not
able to reach them, or bring them (as it becomes all earthly powers) to
an account of their actions: of which liberty when the people have seen
themselves deprived in time past, it is sad to consider how they have
flown out into such absurd and extraordinary courses, in hope of remedy,
as have caused not only distraction, but many times utter ruin to the
public. Most of those tumults in old Rome, were occasioned for want of
this liberty in ordinary; as those that happened under the Decemviri: so
that the people, not having freedom to accuse and question their
justice, were enflamed to commit sudden outrages, to be revenged upon
them. But when they had once obtained power to accuse or question any
man, by assistance of their tribunes, then we meet with none of those
heats and fits among them; but they referred themselves over, with much
content, to the ordinary course of proceeding. A pregnant instance
whereof, we have in the case of Coriolanus; who having done some injury
to the people, they finding him befriended and upheld by the great ones,
resolved to be revenged upon him with their own hands; and had torn him
in pieces as he came out of the senate, but that the tribunes
immediately stepped in, and not only promised, but appointed them a day
of hearing against him; and so all was calm again, and quiet; whereas,
if this ordinary course of remedy, in calling him to account, had not
been allowed, and he been destroyed in a mutiny, a world of sad
consequences must have befallen the commonwealth, by reason of those
enormities and revenges that would have risen, upon the ruin of so
considerable a person.
In the stories of Florence also, we read of one Valesius, who greatning
himself into little less than the posture of a prince in that republic,
he so confirmed himself, that the people not being able to regulate his
extravagances by any ordinary proceedings, they betook themselves to
that unhappy remedy of arms; and it cost the best blood and lives in
that state, before they could bring him down; involving them in a world
of miseries, which might have been avoided, had they taken care to
preserve their old liberty of accusation and question, and being able to
take a course with him in an ordinary way of progress.
Thus also in the same state, Soderino, a man of the same size, interest,
and humour; when the people saw that they had lost their liberty, in
being unable to question him, ran like madmen upon a remedy as bad as
the disease, and called in the Spaniard to suppress him: so that turned
almost to the ruin of the state, which might have been prevented could
they have repressed him by the ordinary way of accusation and question.
From these premises, then, let us conclude, That seeing the crooked way
of calumniation is less used under the people's form of government, than
any other: and since the retaining of a regular course, for admitting
and deciding of all complaints and controversies by way of accusation,
is of absolute necessity to the safety and well being of a commonwealth:
therefore this objection is of as little weight as the rest, so as in
any wise to diminish the dignity and reputation of a freer state, or
government by the people in their successive assemblies.
A sixth objection[30] against the form of a free-state, or government by
the people, is alledged by many, to this effect: "That people by nature
are factious, inconstant, and ungrateful."
For answer, first, as to the point of being factious, we have already
shewn, that this government, stated in a succession of its supreme
assemblies, is the only preventive of faction; because, in creating a
faction, there is a necessity, that those which endeavour it, must have
opportunity to improve their slights and projects, in disguising their
designs; drawing in instruments and parties, and in worming out
opposites: the effecting of all which, requires some length of time;
which cannot be had, and consequently, no faction formed, when
government is not fixed in particular persons, but managed by due
succession and revolution of authority in the hands of the people.
Besides, it is to be considered, that the people are never the first or
principal in faction: they are never the authors and contrivers of it,
but ever the parties that are drawn, into sidings by the influence of
standing powers, to serve their interests and designs.
Thus Sylla and Marius, Pompey and Cęsar, continuing power in their own
hands, cleft the Roman empire at several times into several parties: as
afterwards it was cleft into three by the triumvirate; wherein the
people had no hand, being (as they are always) purely passive, and
passionately divided, according as they were wrought upon by the subtle
insinuations of the prime engineers of each faction.
Thus Italy was divided into Guelph and Gibelline: and France torn in two
by the two families of Orleans and Burgundy; also, by the Guisians and
their confederates; where in the people had no further hand, than as
they were acted by the persuasions and pretences of two powerful
parties.
The case also was the same in England, in times past, when the grandee-
game was in action between the two families of York and Lancaster. So
that it is clear enough, The people in their own nature are not inclined
to be factious, nor are they ever engaged that way, farther than as
their nature is abused, and drawn in by powerful persons.
The second particular of this objection is inconstancy; which holds true
indeed in them that are debauched, and in the corrupted state of a
commonwealth, when degenerated from its pure principles, as we find in
that of Athens, Rome, Florence, and others: but yet in Rome you may see
as pregnant in stances of that people's constancy, as of any other sort
of men whatsoever: for they continued constant irreconcileable enemies
to all tyranny in general, and kingly power in particular.
In like manner, when they had once gotten their successive assemblies,
they remained so firm and stiff to uphold them, that the succeeding
tyrants could not in a long time, nor without extraordinary conning and
caution deprive them of that only evidence of their liberty.
Moreover, it is observable of this people, That in making their
elections they could never be persuaded to chuse a known infamous,
vitious, or unworthy fellow; so that they seldom or never erred in the
choice of their tribunes and other officers. And as in the framing of
laws, their aim was ever at the general good, it being their own
interest, quatenus the people; so their constancy in the conservation of
those laws was most remarkable: for, notwithstanding all the crafty
devices and fetches of the nobles, the people could never be woo'd to a
consent of abrogating any one law, till by the alteration of time,
affairs, and other circumstances, it did plainly appear inconvenient.
But the case hath ever been otherwise under kings and all standing
powers, who usually ran into all the extremes of inconstancy, upon every
new project, petty humour, and occasion, that seemed favourable for
effecting of their by-designs. And in order hereunto, stories will
inform you, That it hath been their custom, to shift principles every
moon, and cashier all oaths, protestations, promises and engagements,
and blot out the memory of them with a wet finger.
This was very remarkable in the late king,[31] whose inconstancy in this
kind, was beyond compare; who no sooner had passed any promises, made
vows and protestations, fixed appeals an the high court of heaven, in
the behalf of himself and his family; but presently he forfeited all,
and cancelled them by his actions. As to the third point, of
ingratitude, it is much charged upon this form of government; because we
read both in Athens and Rome, of divers unhandsome returns made to some
worthy persons that had done high services for those commonwealths; as
Alcibiades, Themistocles, Phocion, Miltiades, Furius Camillus,
Coriolanus, and both the Scipio's; the cause of whose misfortunes is
described by Plutarch and Livy, to be their own lofty and unwary
carriage; having (say they) by an ingrossment of power, rendered
themselves suspected, and burthensome to the commonwealth, and thereby
stirred up the people's fear and jealousy: whereas if they had kept
themselves within the rules of a free-state, by permitting a discreet
revolution of power in particular hands; there had been no occasion of
incroachment on the one part, nor of fear on the other. Of all, the
Scipio's indeed were most to be pitied, because their only fault seems
to be too much power and greatness, (which indeed is the greatest fault
that members of a commonwealth can be guilty of, if seriously
considered;) insomuch, that being grown formidable to their fellow-
senators, they were by them removed: and so it appears to have been the
act of the nobles, (upon their own score and interest) and not of the
people. But as for Camillus and Coriolanus, they sufficiently deserved
whatsoever befel them, because they made use of the power and reputation
they had gotten by their former merits, only to malign and exercise an
implacable hate towards the people's interest. Nevertheless, the people
restored Camillus again to his estate and honour, after some little time
of banishment.
And though this accident in a free-state hath been objected by many, as
a great defect; yet others again do highly commend the humour: For (say
they) it is not only a good sign of a commonwealth's being in pure and
perfect health, when the people are thus active, zealous, and jealous in
the behalf of their liberties, that will permit no such growth of power
as may endanger it; but it is also a convenient means to curb the
ambition of its citizens, and make them contain within due bounds, when
they see there is no presuming after inlargements, and accessions of
powers and greatness, without incurring the danger and indignation of
the people.
Thus much of the reason why the people many times cast off persons that
have done them eminent services: yet on the other side, they were so far
from ingratitude, that they have always been excessive in their rewards
and honours, to such men as deserved any way of the public, whilst they
conformed themselves to rules, and kept in a posture suiting to liberty.
Witness their consecration of statues, incense, sacrifices, and crowns
of laurel, inrolling such men in the number of their deities.
Therefore the crime of ingratitude cannot in any peculiar manner be
fastened upon the people: but if we consult the stories of all standing
powers, we may produce innumerable testimonies of their ingratitude
toward such as have done them the greatest service; ill recompence being
a mystery of state pracfised by all kings and grandees, who (as Tacitus
tells us) ever count themselves disobliged, by the braved actions of
their subjects.
Upon this account, Alexander hated Antipater and Parmenio, and put the
latter to death. Thus the emperor Vespasian cashiered and ruined the
meritorious Antonies. Thus also was Alphonsus Albuquerque served by his
master the king of Portugal; and Consalvus the great, by Ferdinand of
Aragon: as was also that Stanley of the house of Derby, who set the
crown upon king Henry the seventh's head. Thus Sylla the Roman grandee
destroyed his choicest instruments that helped him into the saddle; as
Augustus served his friend Cicero, and exposed him to the malice and
murder of Antony.
Innumerable are the examples of this kind, which evidence, that such
unworthy dealings are the effect of all standing powers; and therefore
more properly to be objected against them, than against the government
of the people.
Thus having answered all, or the main objections, brought by the
adversaries of a free-state; before we proceed to the errors of
government, and rules of policy, it will not be amiss, but very
convenient, to say something of that which indeed is the very foundation
of all the rest; to wit, "that the original of all just power and
government is in the people."
[25 MN] A free-state the only preservative against levelling, and
confusion of propriety.
[26 MN] A free-state gives no cause of confusion.
[27 MN] Affairs of state as well managed under a free-state as under any
form.
[28 MN] Discontents and tumults, no natural effects of a free-state.
[29 MN] Calumniation less used under the people's government, than under
any other form.
[30 MN] Faction, inconstancy, and ingratiude, no natural effects of the
people's government.
[31] * Charles I.
THE ORIGINAL OF ALL JUST POWER is in the
PEOPLE.
THOSE men that deny this position, are fain to run up as high as Noah
and Adam, to gain a pretence for their opinion: alledging, That the
primitive or first governments of the world were not instituted by the
consent and election of those that were governed, but by an absolute
authority invested in the persons governing. Thus they say our first
parent ruled, by a plenary power and authority in himself only, as did
also the patriarchs before and after the flood too, for some time,
becoming princes by virtue of a paternal right over all the families of
their own generation and extraction: so that the fathers, by reason of
their extraordinary long lives, and the multiplicity of wives, happened
to be lords of kingdoms or principalities of their own begetting.
And so some deriving the pedigree or government of this paternal right
of sovereignty, would by all means conclude, "That the original of
government neither was nor ought to be in the people."
For answer to this, consider, That magistracy, or government is to be
considered, as natural, or as political: naturally he was a true public
magistrate or father of his country, who in those patriarchal times
ruled over his own children and their descendants. This form of
government was only temporary, and took an end not long after the flood,
when Nimrod changed it, and by force combining numbers of distinct
families into one body, and subjecting them to his own regiment, did, by
an arbitrary power, seated in his own will and sword, constrain them to
submit unto what laws and conditions himself pleased to impose on them.
Thus the paternal form became changed into a tyrannical. Neither of
these had (I confess) their original in or from the people, nor hath
either of them any relation to that government which we intend in our
position.
But secondly, There is a government political, not grounded in nature,
nor upon paternal right by natural generation; but founded upon the free
election, consent or mutual compact of men entering into a form of civil
society. This is the government we now speak of, it having been in
request in most ages, and still is: whereas the other was long since out
of date, being used only in the first age of the world, as proper only
for that time.
So that to prevent all objections of this nature, when we speak here of
government, we mean only the political, which is by consent or compact;
whose original we shall prove to be in the people. As for the government
of the Israelites, first under Moses, then Joshua and the judges: the
scripture plainly shews, that they were extraordinary governors, being
of God's immediate institution, who raised them up by his spirit, and
imposed them upon that people; whose peculiar happiness it was in cases
of this nature, to have so infallible and sure a direction; so that
their government was a theocracy (as some have called it) having God
himself for its only original: and therefore no wonder we have in that
time and nation, so few visible foot-steps of the people's election, or
of an institution by compact. But yet we find after the judges, when
this people rejected this more immediate way of government by God, (as
the Lord told Samuel, "They have not rejected thee but me.") and desired
a government after the manner of other nations; then God seems to
forbear the use of his prerogative, and leave them to an exercise of
their own natural rights and liberties, to make choice of a new
government and governor by suffrage and compact. The government they
aimed at, was kingly: God himself was displeased at it, and so was
Samuel too; who in hope to continue the old form, and to fright them
from the new, tells them, what monsters in government kings would prove,
by assuming unto themselves an arbitrary power, (not that a king might
lawfully and by right do what Samuel describes, but only to shew how far
kings would presume to abuse their power; which no doubt Samuel foresaw,
not only by reason, but by the spirit of prophecy.) Nevertheless the
people would have a king; say they, "Nay, but there shall be a king over
us:" whereupon saith God to Samuel, "Hearken to their voice." Where we
plainly see; first, God gives them leave to use their own natural
rights, in making choice of their own form of government; but then
indeed, for the choice of their governor, there was one thing
extraordinary, in that God appointed them one, he vouchsafing still in
an extraordinary and immediate manner to be their director and
protector: but yet, though God was pleased to nominate the person, he
left the confirmation and ratification of the kingship unto the people;
to shew, that naturally the right of all was in them, however the
exercise of it were superseded at that time, by his divine pleasure, as
to the point of nomination: for, that the people might understand it was
their right, Samuel calls them all to Mizpeh, as if the matter were all
to be done anew on their part; and there by lot, they at length made
choice of Saul, and so immediately by proclaiming him with shouts and
acclamations: and then having had proof of his valour against the
Amorites, they meet at Gilgal, and proclaim him king once again, to shew
that (naturally) the validity of the kingship depended wholly upon the
people's consent and confirmation. And so you see the first and most
eminent evidence of the institution of political government in scripture
doth notoriously demonstrate, that its original is in or from the
people; and therefore I shall wave any further instances in cases of the
like nature out of scripture, which are not a few. Only let it be
remembered, that Peter in his First Epistle, calls all government the
ordinance of man, (in the original, "the creation of man," a creature of
a man's making) to shew, that in all its forms it depends only upon the
will and pleasure of the people.
We might insist farther to evince the truth of this by strength of
reason; but let this serve to assert the right of the thing; and as for
the rest, every man will easily believe it very consonant to reason, if
he reflect upon the matter of fact, and consider, that it hath been the
unanimous practice of all the nations of the world, to assert their own
rights of election and consent (as often as they had opportunity) in the
various turns of institution and alteration of government. In Italy of
old they had most free states, and few princes; now all princes, and no
free states. Naples, after many revolutions, is under Spain, Rome under
a pope, and under him one senator, instead of those many that were wont
to be; Venice and Genoa have senators and dukes, but the dukes are of
small power; Florence, Ferrara, Mantua, Parma, and Savoy, have no
senators, but dukes only, and they absolute; Burgundy, Lorrain, Gascony,
and Brittany, had once kings, then dukes, but now are incorporated into
France: so all the principalities of Germany that now are, were once
imbodied in one entire regiment: Castile, Aragon, Portugal, and
Barcelona, were once distinct kingdoms, but now united all to Spain,
save Portugal, which fell off the other day; France was first one
kingdom under Pharamond, afterwards parted into four kingdoms, and at
last become one again:
England consisted of free-states, till the Romans yoked it; afterwards
it was divided into seven kingdoms, and in the end it became one again.
Thus you see how the world is subject to shiftings of government: and
though it be most true, that the power of the sword hath been most
prevalent in many of these changes, yet some of them have been chiefly
managed, (as they ought) by the people's consent; and even in those
where the sword hath made way, the people's consent hath ever been drawn
and taken in afterwards, for corroboration of title; it having been the
custom of all usurpers, to make their investitures appear as just as
they could, by getting the community's consent ex post facto, and
entering into some compact with them, for the better establishing
themselves with a shew of legality; which act of all tyrants and
usurpers, is a manifest (though tacit) confession of theirs, "That de
jure the original of all power and government, is and ought to be in the
PEOPLE."
ERRORS of GOVERNMENT; AND RULES of POLICY.
HAVING proved that the original of all just power and government is in
the people; and that the government of the people, in a due and orderly
succession. of their supreme assemblies, is much more excellent than any
other form, I suppose it falls in of course, in the next place, to note,
and observe those common errors in policy, wherein most countries of the
world, (especially that part of it called Christendom) have been long
intangled; that when the mystery of tyranny is undressed, and stript of
all its gaudy robes, and gay appearances, it may be hissed out of the
civil part of mankind into the company of the more barbarous and brutish
nations.
The first error[32] that we shall observe in antient christian policy,
and which hath indeed been a main foundation of tyranny, is that corrupt
division of a state into ecclesiastical and civil; a fault whereof our
latest refiners of political discourse are as guilty in their writings,
as any others: but that there is the least footstep, in the scripture,
for christians to follow such a division of state, or to allow of a
national way of churching, which is the root of that division, could
never yet be proved by any; and the contrary is very clear from the
drift and scope of the gospel. We read, indeed, of the commonwealth of
Israel being thus divided, and that it was done according to rules and
constitutions of God's own appointment; it being God's way then, when he
was pleased to make choice of that people only, out of all the world, to
be his own peculiar, and so fixed his church there in a national form:
Then it was confined and restrained to that particular nation, excluding
all others. But if any man will argue from hence, that it is lawful for
any nation now under the gospel to follow this pattern; then it behoves
him, 1. To prove, that God intended the Jewish government as a pattern
for us to follow under the gospel. And if any man will pretend to this,
then in the second place, it will concern him to prove, that we are to
follow it in every particular, or only in some particulars. That we are
to follow it in every one, no sober man
did ever yet affirm: and if they will have us to follow it in some
particulars, relinquishing the rest, then it concerns him to produce
some rule or command out of scripture, plainly pointing out what parts
of it we are to embrace, and what not; or else he will never be able to
make it appear, that the form of the commonwealth of Israel was ever
intended, either in the whole, or in part, as a pattern for christians
to follow under the gospel. But never was any such rule alledged yet out
of scripture by those that pretend to a national church.
And therefore, if we seriously reflect upon the design of God, in
sending Christ into the world, we shall find it was to put an end to
that pompous administration of the Jewish form; that as his church and
people were formerly confined within the narrow pale of a particular
nation, so now the pale should be broken down, and all nations taken
into the church: not all nations in a lump; nor any whole nations, or
national bodies to be formed into churches; for his church or people,
now under the gospel, are not to be a body political, but spiritual, and
mystical: Not a promiscuous confusion of persons, taken in at adventure;
but an orderly collection, a picking and chusing of such as are called
and sanctified; and not a company of men forced in, by commands and
constitutions of worldly powers and prudence; but of such as are brought
in by the power and efficacy of Christ's word and spirit: for he himself
hath said, "My kingdom is not of this world; it is not from hence, &c."
and therefore, that hand which hitherto hath presumed, in most nations,
to erect a power, called ecclesiastic, in equipage with the civil, to
bear sway, and bind men's consciences to retain notions, ordained for
orthodox, upon civil penalties, under colour of prudence, good order,
discipline, preventing of heresy, advancing of Christ's kingdom; and to
this end, hath twisted the spiritual power (as they call it) with the
worldly and secular interest of state; this (I say) hath been the very
right hand of Antichrist, opposing Christ in his way: whose kingdom,
government, governors, officers, and rulers; laws, ordinances, and
statutes, being not of this world, (I mean, jure humana,) depend not
upon the helps and devices of worldly wisdom.
Upon this score and pretence, the infant mystery of iniquity began to
work in the very cradle of christianity.
Afterwards it grew up by the indulgence of Constantine, and other
christian emperors, whom though God used in many good things for the
suppression of gross heathen idolatry, yet (by God's permission) they
were carried away, and their eyes so far dazzled, through the glorious
pretences of the prelates and bishops, that they could not see the old
serpent in a new form wrapt up in a mystery; for Satan had a new game
now to play, which he managed thus: First, he led a great part of the
world away with dangerous errors, thereby to find an occasion for the
prelates, to carry on the mystery of their profession; and so, under
pretence of suppressing those dangerous errors, they easily screwed
themselves into the civil power: and for continuing of it the surer in
their own hands, they made bold to baptize whole nations with the name
of christian, that they might (under the same pretence) gain a share of
power and authority with the magistrate in every nation; which they soon
effected.
The infant being thus nursed, grew up in a short time to a perfect man,
the man of sin (if the pope be the man, which is yet controverted by
some:) for, the prelates having gotten the power in their hands, began
then to quarrel, who should be the greatest among them. At length he of
Rome bore away the bell; and so the next step was, that, from national
churches, they proceed to have a mother-church of all nations. A fair
progress and pitch, indeed, from a small beginning: And now being up,
they defied all with bell, book, and candle, excommunicating and
deposing kings and emperors, and binding men's consciences still, under
the first specious pretence of suppressing heresy, to believe only in
their arbitrary dictates, traditions, and errors, which are the greatest
blasphemies, errors, and heresies, that ever were in the world. Now they
were up, see what ado there was to get any part of them down again? What
a quarter and commotion there was in Germany, when Luther first brake
the ice? and the like here in England, when our first reformers began
their work? These men, in part, did well, but having banished the pope's
actual tyranny, they left the seed, and principle of it, still behind,
which was, a state ecclesiastical united with the civil; for the bishops
twisted their own interest again with that of the crown, upon a
protestant account; and by virtue of that, persecuted those they called
Puritans, for not being as orthodox (they said) as themselves.
To conclude, if it be considered, that most of the civil wars, and
broils, throughout Europe, have been occasioned, by permitting the
settlement of clergy interest, with the secular, in national forms, and
churches, it will doubtless be understood, that the division of a state
into ecclesiastical and civil, must needs be one of the main errors in
christian policy.
A second error[33] which we shall note, and which is very frequent under
all forms of government, is this; That care hath not been taken at all
times, and upon all occasions of alteration, to prevent the passage of
tyranny out of one form into another, in all the nations of the world:
for, it is most clear, by observing the affairs and actions of past-
ages, and nations, that the interest of absolute monarchy, and its
inconveniences have been visible and fatal under the other forms (where
they have not been prevented) and given us an undeniable proof of this
maxim, by experience in all times; That the interest of monarchy may
reside in the hands of many, as well as of a single person.
The interest of absolute monarchy, we conceive to be an unlimited,
uncontrolable, unaccountable station of power and authority in the hands
of a particular person, who governs only according to the dictates of
his own will and pleasure. And though it hath often been disguised by
sophisters in policy, so as it hath lost its own name, by shifting
forms; yet really, and effectually, the thing in itself hath been
discovered under the artificial covers of every form, in the various
revolutions of government: so that nothing more concerns a people
established in a state of freedom, than to be instructed in things of
this nature, that the means of its preservation being understood, and
the subtle sleight of old projectors brought into open view, they may
become the more zealous to promote the one, and prevent the other, if
any old game should happen to be played over anew, by any succeeding
generation.
It is very observable in Athens, that when they had laid aside their
king, the kingly power was retained still in all the after-turns of
government: for their decimal governors, and their thirty (commonly
called the tyrants) were but a multiplied monarchy, the monarchal
interest being held up as high as ever, in keeping the exercise of the
supremacy out of the people's hands, and seating themselves in an
unaccountable state of power and authority, which was somewhat a worse
condition, than the people were in before; for their kings had
supervisors, and there were also senatic assemblies, that did restrain
and correct them: but the new governors having none, ran into all the
heats and fits, and wild extravagancies, of an unbounded prerogative: by
which means, necessity and extremity opening the people's eyes, they, at
length, saw all the inconveniences of kingship wrapt up in new forms,
and rather increased, than diminished; so that (as the only remedy),
they dislodged the power out of those hands, putting it into their own,
and placing it in a constant orderly revolution of persons elective by
the community. And now being at this fair pass, one would have thought
there was no shelter for a monarchal interest, under a popular form too.
But alas, they found the contrary; for, the people not keeping a strict
watch over themselves, according to the rules of a free-state; but being
won by specious pretences, and deluded by created necessities, to
intrust the management of affairs into some particular hands, such an
occasion was given thereby to those men to frame parties of their own,
that by this means, they in a short time became able to stand upon their
own legs, and do what they list without the people's consent: and in the
end, not only discontinued, but utterly extirpated their successive
assemblies.
In Rome also, the case was the same under every alteration; and all
occasioned, by the crafty contrivances of grandising parties, and the
people's own facility and negligence, in suffering themselves to be
deluded: for, with the Tarquins, (as it is observed by Livy, and others)
only the name king was expelled, but not the thing; the power and
interest of kingship was still retained in the senate, and ingrossed by
the consuls: For, besides the rape of Lucrece, among the other faults
objected against Tarquin, this was most considerable, That he had acted
all things after his own head, and discontinued consultations with the
senate, which was the very height of arbitrary power. But yet as soon as
the senate was in the saddle, they forgat what was charged by themselves
upon Tarquin, and ran into the same error, by establishing an arbitrary,
hereditary, unaccountable power in themselves, and their posterity, not
admitting the people (whose interest and liberty they had pleaded, into
any share in consultation, or government, as they ought to have done, by
a present erecting of their successive assemblies: so that you see the
same kingly interest, which was in one before, resided then in the hands
of many. Nor is it my observation only, but pointed out by Livy, in his
second book, as in many other places; Cum ą patribus, non consules sed
carnifices, &c. "When (saith he) the senators strove to create, not
consuls, but executioners, and tormentors, to vex and tear the people,
&c." And in another place of the same book, Consules, immoderatā,
infinitāq; potestate, omnes metus legum, &c. "The consuls, having an
immoderate and unlimited power, turned the terror of laws and
punishments only upon the people, themselves (in the mean while) being
accountable to none but to themselves, and their confederates in the
senate."
Then the consular government being cashiered, came on the Decemviri. Cum
consulari imperio ac regio, sine provocatione (saith my author) "Being
invested with a consular and kingly power, without appeal to any other."
And in his third book he saith, Decem regum species erat: "It was a form
often kings," the miseries of the people being encreased ten times more
than they were under kings, and con-
suls. For remedy therefore, the ten were cashiered also; and consuls
being restored, it was thought fit for the bridling of their power, to
revive also the dictatorship (which was a temporary kingship, used only
now and then upon occasion of necessity) and also those deputies of the
people called tribunes, which one would have thought had been sufficient
bars against monarchic interest, especially being assisted by the
people's successive assemblies. But yet for all this, the people were
cheated through their own neglect, and bestowing too much confidence and
trust upon such as they thought their friends: for when they swerved
from the rules of a free-state, by lengthening the dictatorship in any
hand, then monarchic interest stept in there, as it did under Sylla,
Cęsar, and others, long before it returned to a declared monarchal form;
and when they lengthened commands in their armies, then it crept in
there, as it did under the afore-named persons, as well as Marius,
Cinna, and others also; and even Pompey himself, not forgetting also the
pranks of the two triumvirales, who all made a shift under every form,
being sometimes called consuls, sometimes dictators, and sometimes
tribunes of the people, to out-act all the . flagitious enormities of an
absolute monarchy. It is also evident in the story of Florence, that
that commonwealth, even when it seemed most free, could never quite
shake off the interest of monarchy: for, it was ever the business of one
upstart, or other, either in the senate, or among the people, to make
way to their own ambitious ends, and hoist themselves into a kingly
posture through the people's favour, as we may see in the actions of
Savanarola the monk, Soderino, and the Medices, whose family did (as we
see at this day) fix itself at length in the state of an absolute
monarchy, under the title of a dukedom. Nor can it be forgotten, how
much of monarchy (of late) crept into the United Provinces. Now the use
that is to be made of this discourse, is this, that since it is clear,
the interest of monarchy may reside in a consul, as well as in a king;
in a dictator, as well as in a consul; in the hands of many, as well as
of a single person; and that its custom hath been to lurk under every
form, in the various turns of government; therefore as it concerns every
people in a state of freedom, to keep close to the rules of a free-
state, for the turning out of monarchy (whether simple, or compound,
both name and thing, in one or many) by which means only they will be
enabled to avoid this second error in policy; so they ought ever to have
a reverent and noble respect of such founders of free-states, and
common-wealths, as shall block up the way against monarchic tyranny, by
declaring for the liberty of the people, as it consists in a due and
orderly succession of authority, in their supreme assemblies.
A third error[34] in policy, which ought especially to be taken notice
of, and prevented in a free-state, hath been a keeping of the people
ignorant of those ways and means that are essentially necessary for the
preservation of their liberty; for, implicit faith, and blind obedience,
hath hitherto passed current, and been equally pressed and practised by
grandees, both spiritual and temporal, upon the people; so that they
have in all nations shared the authority between them. And though many
quarrels have risen in times past between kings, and their clergy,
touching their several jurisdictions, yet the mysteries of domination
have been still kept under lock and key: so that their prerogative
remained entire ever above the reach and knowledge of the people: by
which means monarchs, and other standing powers, have seen their own
interest provided for, as well as the popes, in this mysterious maxim,
"Ignorance is the mother of devotion."
But these things ought not to be so, among a people that have declared
themselves a free-state: for, they should not only know what freedom is,
and have it represented in all its lively and lovely features, that they
may grow zealous and jealous over it, but, that it may be a zeal
according to knowledge and good purpose, it is without all question,
most necessary, that they be made acquainted, and thoroughly instructed
in the means and rules of its preservation, against the adulterous wiles
and rapes of any projecting sophisters that may arise hereafter.
And doubtless, this endeavour of mine, in laying down the rules of
preserving a free-state, will appear so much the more necessary, if we
consider, that all the inconveniences that in times have happened under
this form, to embroil, or ruin it, have proceeded (as we have formerly
proved) either from the people's neglect, or rather ignorance of those
means and rules that should be committed unto them, both for practice,
and observation: having therefore made brief collections out of the
monuments of this kind of learning, I shall here insert them, that the
people of every commonwealth, which mean to preserve their freedom, may
be informed how to steer their course, according to such rules as have
been put in practice heretofore by divers nations.
First,[35] It hath been a custom, not only to breed up all the young fry
in principles of dislike and enmity against kingly government; but also
to cause all that were capable of swearing, to enter into an oath of
abjuration, to abjure a toleration of kings, and kingly power, in time
to come.
Thus Brutus bound the Romans by an oath against kings, "That they should
never suffer any man again to reign at Rome."
Thus the Hollanders preserved themselves also, entering into an oath of
abjuration, not only against king Philip and his family, but all kings
for ever.
And Brutus, to make sure work, did no only do this, but divided the
royal revenue among the people; which was a good way to make them
resolute to extremity, knowing, That if ever any king came in play
again, he would take all away again by virtue of his prerogative and
crown. He brake also all the images and statues of the Tarquins, and he
levelled their houses with the ground, that they might not remain as
temptations to any ambitious spirits. Suitable to this policy, was that
of Henry VIII, who when he disposed of the revenues of abbies,
demolished also the building; saying, "Destroy the nests, and the rooks
will ne'er return again." Which, questionless, was a most sure way, both
in him, and Brutus, to be imitated, or neglected, as there may be
occasion: but they thought, in a case of this nature, that the
convenience in keeping them, could not countervail the danger.
Secondly,[36] It hath been usual not to suffer particular persons to
grandise, or greaten themselves more than ordinary; for, that by the
Romans was called, affectatio regni, "an aspiring to kingship:" Which
being observed in Męlius and Manlius, two noble Romans, that had
deserved highly of the state, yet their past merits and services could
not exempt them from the just anger of the people, who made them
examples to posterity: yea, the name of the latter, (though Livy calls
him an incomparable man, had he not lived in a free state,) was ever
after disowned by his whole family, that famous family of the Manlii,
and both the name and memory of him, and of his consulship, was razed
out of all public records, by decree of the senate. The not keeping
close to this rule, had of late like to have cost the Low Countries, the
loss of their liberty; for the wealth of the House of Orange, grown up
to excess, and permitting the last man to match unto a kingly family,
put other thoughts and designs into his head, than beseemed a member of
a free-state; which, had he not been prevented, by the providence of
God, and a dark night, might, in all probability, have reduced them
under the yoke of kingly power.
Thirdly,[37] Especial care hath been taken, non diurnare imperia, "not
to permit a continuation of command and authority, in the hands of
particular persons, or families." This point we have been very large in.
The Romans had a notable care herein, till they grew corrupt. Livy in
his fourth book, saith, Libertatis magna custodia est, si magna imperia
esse non sinas, & temporis modus imponatur: "It is a grand preservative
of liberty, if you do not permit great powers and commands to continue
long; and if so be you limit, in point of time." To this purpose they
had a law, called the Emilian Law, to restrain them; as we find in the
ninth book, where he brings in a noble Roman, saying thus: Hoc quidem
regno simile est; "And this, indeed, is like a kingship, that I alone
should bear this great office of the censorship, triennium & sex menses,
three years and six months, contrary to the Emilian Law." In his third
book also, he speaks of it, as of a monstrous business, That the ides of
May were come (which was the time of their year's choice) and yet no new
election appointed: Id-veró regnum haud dubie videre, deploratur in
perpetuum libertas: "It without doubt seems no other than a kingdom, and
liberty is utterly lost for ever." It was treason for any man to hold
that high office of the dictatorship in his own hand, beyond six months.
He that would see notable stuff to this purpose, let him read Cicero's
Epistles to Atticus, concerning Cęsar. The care of that people, in this
particular, appeared also, that they would not permit any man to bear
the same office twice together.
This was observed likewise (as Aristotle tells us) in all the free-
states of Greece.
And in Rome we find Cincinnatus, one of the brave Roman generals, making
a speech unto the people, to persuade them, to let him lay down his
command. Now the time was come, though the enemy was almost at their
gates, and never more need, than at that time, of his valour and
prudence, as the people told him; but no persuasion would serve the
turn; resign he would, telling them, "There would be more danger to the
state, in prolonging his power, than from the enemy, since it might
prove a precedent most pernicious to the Roman freedom." Such another
speech was made by M. Rutilius Censorinus to the people, when they
forced him to undergo the office of censor twice together, contrary to
the intent and practice of their ancestors; yet he accepted it: but (as
Plutarch tells us) upon this condition; "That a law might pass against
the title in that, and other officers, left it should be drawn into
precedent in time to come." Thus the people dealt also with their own
tribunes, the law being, "That none of them should be continued two
years together." So tender were the Romans, in this particular, as one
principal rule and means, for the preservation of their liberty.
A fourth rule,[38] Not to let two of one family to bear offices of high
trust at one time, nor to permit a continuation of great powers in any
one family. The former usually brings on the latter: and if the latter
be prevented, there is the less danger in the former: but however, both
are to be avoided. The reason is evident, because a permission of them
gives a particular family an opportunity, to bring their own private
interest into competition with that of the public: from whence presently
ensues this grand inconvenience in state, the affairs of the
Commonwealth will be made subservient to the ends of a few persons; no
corn shall be measured, but in their bushel; nor any materials be
allowed for the public work, unless they square well with the building
of a private interest, or family. This therefore was a principal point
of state among the Romans, Ne duo vel plures ex unā familiā magnos
magistratus gerant eodem tempore; "Let not two or more, of one family,
bear great offices at the same time." And a little after it follows, Ne
magna imperia ab unā familiā prescribantur; "Let not great commands be
prescribed, or continued by one family."
That little liberty which was left to the Romans, after that fatal stab
given to Cęsar in the senate-house, might have been preserved, had they
prevented his kinsman Octavius from succeeding him in the possession of
an extraordinary power. The effecting whereof was Cicero's work, and,
indeed, his principal error: as he often afterwards acknowledged; which
may serve to shew, "That the wisest man may be sometimes mistaken:" for
he brought the other into play; whereas had he quitted his spleen, and
consulted his brain, he must questionless have seen, that a siding with
Antony had been more convenient, than with the other; who being once
admitted into power, soon drew the parties and interests of his uncle
Julius to become his own; and with a wet finger, not only cast off his
friend Cicero, but contrived the ruin of the republic, and him, both
together.
The Florentine family of the Medices, who hold an absolute command at
this day, made themselves, by continuing power in their hands, in a
short time so considerable, that they durst openly bid defiance to
public liberty, which might have continued much longer, had not Casinus
been so easily admitted to succeed his cousin Alexander.
It is observable also, of the same family, that one of them being pope,
they then hatched designs upon several parts of Italy, not doubting but
to carry them by favour of the pope their kinsman: but he dying before
their ends were effected, they then made a party in the conclave, for
the creating of Julian de Medicis, who was brother to the former pope;
and had like to have carried it, till Pompeius Columba stood up, and
shewed them how dangerous and prejudicial it must of necessity prove to
the liberties of Italy, that the popedom should be continued in one
house, in the hands of two brothers, one after another.
What effects the continuation of power in the family of Orange, hath had
in the United Provinces, is every man's observation; and that nation
sufficiently felt, long before the project came to maturity, in this
last man's days; and had he left a son of sufficient years behind him,
to have stept immediately into his place, perhaps the design might have
gone on: but certainly that people have wisely improved their
opportunity, (the cockatrice being not fledged) in reducing that family
into a temper more suitable to a state and interest of liberty.
What made the ancient Roman senate, in a short time, so intolerable to
that people, but because they carried all by families? as the senate of
Venice doth now at this day: where, if the constitution were otherwise,
the people would then (perhaps) be much more sensible what it is to be
in a "state of freedom."
Fifthly,[39] It hath been usual in free-states, to hold up the majesty
and authority of their suffrages, or votes, intire in their senators, or
supreme assemblies: for if this were not looked to, and secured from
control, or influence of any other power, then actum erat de libertate;
"Liberty and authority became lost for ever," So long as the Roman
people kept up their credit and authority, as sacred, in their tribunes,
and supreme assemblies, so long they continued really free: but when by
their own neglect, they gave Sylla, and his party, in the senate, an
opportunity of power to curb them, then their suffrages (once esteemed
as sacred) were trodden under foot; for immediately after, they came to
debate and act but by courtesy, the authority left being by Sylla, after
the expiration of his dictatorship, in the hands of the standing senate,
so that it could never after be regained by the people. Nor did the
senate themselves keep it long in their own hands: for when Cęsar
marched to Rome, he deprived them also of the authority of their
suffrages; only in a formal way made use of them, and so under a shadow
of legality, he assumed that power unto himself, which they durst not
deny him.
Just in the same manner dealt Cosmus with the Florentine senate: he made
use of their suffrages, but he had so played his cards before-hand, that
they durst not but yield to his ambition. So also Tiberius, when he
endeavoured to settle himself, first brought the suffrages of the senate
at his own devotion, that they durst not but consent to his
establishment; and then so ordered the matter, that he might seem to do
nothing, not only without their consent; but to be forced to accept the
empire, by their intreaty: so that you see there was an empire in
effect, long before it was declared in formality.
From hence, therefore, we may clearly deduce the necessity of this rule
in a free-state, from the practice of times past, that no state can
prefer its freedom, but by maintaining the free suffrage of the people
in full vigour, untainted with the influence, or mixture, of any
commanding power.
A sixth rule[40] in practice hath been this; To see, that the people be
continually trained up in the exercise of arms, and the militia lodged
only in the people's hands; or that part of them, which are most firm to
the interest of liberty, that so the power may rest fully in the
disposition of their supreme assemblies. The happy consequence whereof,
was ever to this purpose: That nothing could at any time be imposed upon
the people, but by their consent; that is, by the consent of themselves;
or of such as were by them intrusted: this was a rule most strictly
practised in all the free-states of Greece: for, as Aristotle tells us,
in his fourth book of Politics, they ever had special care to place the
use and exercise of arms in the people: because (say they) the
Commonwealth is theirs who held the arms.
The sword, and sovereignty, ever walk hand in hand together. The Romans
were very curious in this particular: after they had gained a plenary
possession of liberty in their tribunes, and successive assemblies, Rome
itself, and the territories about it, was trained up perpetually in
arms, and the whole commonweal, by this means became one formal militia.
A general exercise of the best part of the people in the use of arms,
was the only bulwark of their liberty: this was reckoned the surest way
to preserve it both at home, and abroad; the majesty of the people being
secured thereby, as well against domestic affronts from any of their own
citizens, as against the foreign invasions of bad neighbours.
Their arms were never lodged in the hands of any, but such as had an
interest in the public; such as were acted by that interest, not drawn
only by pay; such as thought themselves well paid, in repelling
invaders, that they might with freedom return to their affairs: for, the
truth is, so long as Rome acted by the pure principles of a free-state,
it used no arms to defend itself, but, such as we call, sufficient men;
such, as for the most part were men of estate, masters of families, that
took arms (only upon occasion) pro aris et focis, for their wives, their
children, and their country. In those days there was no difference, in
order, between the citizen, the husbandman, and the soldier: for, he
that was a citizen, or villager yesterday, became a soldier the next, if
the "public liberty" required it; and that being secured, by repelling
of invaders, both foreign and domestic, immediately the soldier became
citizen again: so that the first and best brave Roman generals, and
soldiers, came from the plough, and returned thither when the work was
over.
This was the usual course even before they had gained their tribunes and
assemblies; that is, in the infancy of the senate, immediately after the
expulsion of their kings: for, then even in the senatic assembly, there
were some sparks of liberty in being, and they took this course to
maintain it.
The Tarquins being driven out, but having a party left still within,
that attempted to make several invasions, with confidence to carry all
before them: and yet in the intervals, we find not any form of soldiery;
only the militia was lodged and exercised in the hands of that party,
which was firm to the "interest of freedom," who upon all occasions,
drew forth at a nod of the senate, with little charge to the public, and
so rescued themselves out of the claws of kingly tyranny.
Nor do we find in after-times, that they permitted a deposition of the
arms of the Commonwealth in any other way, till that their empire
increasing, necessity constrained them to erect a continued stipendiary
soldiery (abroad in foreign parts) either for the holding, or winning of
provinces. Then luxury increasing with dominion, the strict rule and
discipline of freedom was soon quitted; forces were kept up at home,
(but what the consequences were, stories will tell you) as well as in
the provinces abroad.
The ambition of Cinna, the horrid tyranny of Sylla, the insolence of
Marius, and the self-ends of divers other leaders, both before, and
after them, filled all Italy with tragedies, and the world with wonder:
so that in the end, the people seeing what misery they had brought on
themselves, by keeping their armies within the bowels of Italy, passed a
law to prevent it, and to employ them abroad, or at a convenient
distance: the law was, "That if any general marched over the river of
Rubicon, he should be declared a public enemy."
And in the passage of that river, this following inscription was
erected, to put the men of arms in mind of their duty: Imperator, sive
miles, sive tyrannus armatus quisquis, sistito vexillum, armaq;
deponito, nec citra hunc amnem trajicito: "General, or soldier, op
tyrant in arms, whosoever thou be, stand, quit thy standard, and lay
aside thy arms, or else cross not this river."
For this cause it was, that when Cęsar had presumed once to march over
this river, he conceived himself so far engaged, that there was no
retreat; no game next, but have at all, advanceth to Rome itself, into a
possession of the empire.
By this means it was, the Commonwealth having lost its arms, lost itself
too, the power being reduced both effectually and formally into the
hands of a single person, and his dependants, who, ever "after, kept the
arms out of the hands of the people.
Then followed the erecting of a Prętorian Band, instead of a public
militia, he being followed herein by Augustus, and the rest of his
successors, imitated of latter times by the grand seignor; by Cosmus the
first great duke of Tuscany; by the Muscovite, the Russian, the Tartar,
and the French, who by that means are all absolute; and it was strongly
endeavoured here too in England by the late king,[41] who first
attempted it by a design of introducing foreigners, viz. the German
horse, and afterwards by corrupting of the natives; as when he laboured
the army in the North, in their return to rifle the parliament,
neglected train-bands; and at length, flew out himself into open arms
against the nation.
So that you see, the way of freedom hath been to lodge the arms of a
common-weal, in the hands of that part of the people, which are firm to
its establishment.
Seventhly,[42] that children should be educated and instructed in the
principles of freedom. Aristotle speaks plainly to this purpose, saying;
"That the institution of youth, should be accommodated to that form of
government, under which they live; forasmuch, as it makes exceedingly
for preservation of the present government, whatsoever it be." The
reason of it appears in this; Because all the tinctures and impression
that men receive in their youth, they retain in the full age, though
never so bad, unless they happen (which is very rare) to quell the
corrupt principles of education, by an excellency of reason, and sound
judgment.
And for confirmation of this, we might cite the various testimonies of
Plutarch, Isocrates, with many more, both philosophers, orators, and
others, that have treated of this particular, touching the education of
children, as it relates either to domestic, or civil government: But we
shall take it for granted, without more ado, supposing none will deny,
of what effect it is, in all the concernments of mankind, either in
conversation, or in action.
The necessity of this point, appears from hence, as well as the reason,
That if care he not taken to temper the youth of a Commonwealth with
principles and humours suitable to that form, no sure settlement, or
peace, can ever be expected: for schools, academies, with all other
seed-plots, and seminaries of youth, will otherwise be but so many
nurseries of rebellion, public enemies, and unnatural monsters that will
tear the bowels of their mother country: and this neglect, if it follow
an alteration of government, after a civil war, is so much the more
dangerous; because, as long as youngsters are nursled up in the old ways
and rudiments, by the old ill-affected pedagogues, there will ever be a
hankering after the old government, which must ever be in a fair
probability of return, when new generations shall be catechised into old
tenets and affections, contrary to the establishment of a free-state;
that being taken for the declared interest of this nation. Therefore,
the consequence of such neglect is clearly this, That the enmity will be
immortal, a settlement impossible: there must be a perpetual disposition
to civil war, instead of civil society.
Upon this account it was, that in Plutarch and Isocrates, we find so
many good testimonies of the great care that was had amongst all the
free-states of Greece in this particular, which tyed up their pędagogues
and teachers to certain rules; and selected certain authors to be read
only, as classical, for the institution of their youth: and, that it was
so in the days of Julius Cęsar, even in that barbarous country of
Gallia, appears by Cęsar's own Commentaries, who tells, how that it was
the main office of those famous men amongst them called Druides, to
breed up their youth not only in religion, but also to instruct them in
the nature of a Commonwealth, and should them with principles answerable
to the government.
If we reflect upon the two grand turns of state in Rome, the first, from
a monarchy, to a free-state; and then from a free-state, to a monarchy
again; they minister matter of notable observation in this particular.
In the first, we find how difficult it was for the Romans to preserve
their freedom when they had gotten it, because most of the youth had
been educated in monarchical principles, and such tutors were ever
inclining that way upon the least opportunity: so that the sons even of
Brutus himself, (who was the founder of their liberty) quitted that
natural affection which they owed unto their father and country; and
being swayed by the monarchic principles of corrupt education, drew in a
great part of the Roman youth, (like themselves,) to join with them in a
design for the bringing back of the Tarquins to the kingdom.
It is very observable also, what ado that Commonwealth had to settle, so
long as any of the old stock of education were living, because those
corrupt points of discipline and government, wherewith they were
seasoned when young, could not be worn out with age; but hurried many of
them along with the storm of every insurrection and invasion of the
public enemy.
On the other side, in the turn of a free-state, to a monarchy again, we
see with what difficulty Cęsar met, in settling his own domination over
a people that had been educated in a free-state, and in principles of
freedom; insomuch, that in the end it cost him his life, being stabbed
for his usurpation by a combination of some of the senators, and the
fact: applauded not only by the people, but by Cicero, and all the Roman
writers, and others that had been bred up under the form of freedom.
And afterwards, when Augustus took upon him the inheritance and title of
his uncle Cęsar, he did it, lento pede, very slowly and warily, for fear
of conjuring up the same spirit in the people, that had flown into
revenge against his uncle, for his rape upon their liberty.
And it is noted by Tacitus, that among the other advantages that
Augustus had for this establishment, there was this: That he never
declared himself, till, after many delays and shifts, for the
continuation of power in his own hands, he got insensibly into the
throne, when the old men were most of them dead, and the young
generation grown up, having been pretty well educated and inured to his
lordly domination. The words of Tacitus are these: "All (saith he) was
quiet in the city, the old names of the magistrates remained unchanged;
the young men were all born after Augustus his victory at Actium: and
the greatest part of the old men, during the civil wars: when the free-
state was imbroiled and usurpt (in effect, though retained still in name
by powerful and ambitious persons) so that when he assumed and owned the
empire, there was not one man living, that had so much as seen the
ancient form of government of a free-state; which indeed facilitated his
design very much, the generation then living, being by his artifice and
power, bred up to his own monarchy-interest and devotion."
We might be larger, but this is enough to shew of what consequence the
careful education of youth, is, in the constitution of government: and
therefore, without doubt, it is one essential point to be observed in
the establishment of a free-state, that all ways and means be used for
their seasoning and instruction in the principles of freedom.
The eighth rule,[43] is, that which more especially relates unto the
people themselves in point of behaviour, viz. That being once possessed
of liberty, they ought to use it with moderation, lest it turn to
licentiousness; which, as it is a tyranny itself, so in the end it
usually occasions the corruption and conversion of a free-state into
monarchical tyranny: and therefore (by way of prevention) it is
necessary to set down a few cautions.
First,[44] That in a free-state, it is above all things necessary to
avoid civil dissension; and to remember this, That the uttermost remedy
is not to be used upon every distemper or default of those that shall be
intrusted with the people's power and authority: for, if one
inconvenience happen in government, the correction, or curing of it by
violence, introduceth a thousand: and for a man to think civil war, or
the sword, is a way to be ordinarily used for the recovery of a sick-
state, it were as great a madness, as to give strong waters in a high
fever: or as if he should let himself blood in the heart, to cure the
aking of his head.
And therefore, seeing that enormity of tumult, dissension, and sedition,
is the main that hath been objected by tyrants, and their creatures,
against the people's government, the only expedient to confute it is,
That those people, that are or shall be settled, in a state of freedom,
do (upon all occasions) give them the lie, by a discreet and moderate
behaviour in all their proceedings, and a due reverence of such as they
have once elected, and made their superiors.
And as this is most requisite on the one side; so on the other side, if
there be just (but they must be sure it be just) cause to use sharp and
quick remedies, for the cure of a Commonwealth, then (seeing all majesty
and authority is really and fundamentally in the people, and but
ministerially in their trustees, or representatives) it concerns the
people by all means to see to the cure.
And that is, in a word, in such cases only, as appear to be manifest
intrenchments (either in design, or in being) by men of power, upon the
fundamentals, or essentials, of their liberty, without which, liberty
cannot consist.
What those essentials are, may be collected out of the past-discourse;
the sense of all shall be illustrated by one instance.
It is that famous contention which lasted for three hundred years in
Rome betwixt the senate and the people, about the dividing of such lands
as were conquered and taken from the enemy.
The senators, they sharing the lands amongst themselves, allowed little,
or none, unto the people; which gave such discontents, that the people
made a law to curb them; enacting, That no senator should possess above
500 acres of land.
The senators cried, it was against their liberty, thus to be abridged by
the people: and the people cried, it was inconsistent with liberty, that
the senators should thus greaten themselves by an ingrossment of wealth
and power into their own hands. Livy saith, "The people in this, said
right, and the senators did wrong: but that they both did ill, in making
it a ground of civil dissension;" for, in process of time, when the
Gracchi, who were supposed great patrons of liberty, took upon them to
side with the people, they did, instead of finding out some moderate
ways and expedients to reduce the senators to reason, proceed with such
heat and violence, that the senate being jealous of their own safety,
were forced to chuse Sylla for their general: which being observed by
the people, they also raised an army, and made Marius their general: so
that here you see it came to a down-right civil war.
The occasion, indeed, was given by the senators; (for, there was no
reason they should grandise themselves in so gross a manner as they did)
but yet the occasion ought not to have been so taken, and prosecuted
with such violence as it was by the people: for seeing more temperate
ways had been practised by their ancestors, and might have been found
out again, to curb the ambition of their nobility in the senate:
therefore, the people ought, first, to have tried those ways again, and
have used all other means to have brought things about, rather than by a
misguided heat and violence to rush into arms; which as it is the most
desperate remedy, so it ought never to be used, but when all other
courses have been tried in vain, and when the public liberty is really
concerned by an imminent danger, or invincible necessity: for, this
quarrel, which questionless might have been composed, was, through
indiscretion, made the ground of so bloody a civil war, that what
through fines, banishment, inhuman cruelties, acted on both sides,
defeats in the open field, and massacres within the city, it cost the
best blood and estates of the nobility and commons; and in the end, it
cost them also their liberty.
For it is worthy observation, that out of the root of this civil war,
sprang that noble one, which was managed between Pompey and Cęsar, and
which will serve to illustrate the other part of our discourse, in
shewing, when it is that the people may make use of the utmost
remedy;[45] that is, in case of an intrenchment, manifestly designed and
acted upon the public liberty. For Cęsar having given manifest cause of
suspicion to the senate and people, by his acting amongst his soldiers;
and then by a down-right march with them over Rubicon towards Rome,
(which was treason by the. law) this was a plain usurpation, and drew an
invincible necessity, upon the people, and senate, to arm for their
liberty, and commence a civil war under the conduct of Pompey; so that
this last war was necessary as the other was needless, if they could
have kept within the bounds of prudence and moderation.
We have a very notable instance also in our own nation, which may serve
for a just example to all the world in point of behaviour. If we run
over the catalogue of the late king's[46] defaults in government, we
find extraordinary patience in the people, notwithstanding his
extraordinary incroachments from time to time. It were needless to
reckon up the several monopolies, impositions, and other oppressions of
the people, both in soul and body, which are made public and known to
all the world; together with that highest of all practices, not only in
dissolving parliaments abruptly, but professedly designing the ruin of
parliaments, in depriving the people of their due succession. Yet
notwithstanding all this, that desperate remedy of the sword was
forborne, until invincible necessity did put it into their hands, For
the preservation of themselves, with their rights and liberties.
And so by these examples, any people in a state of freedom, may be
sufficiently instructed how to demean themselves, for the avoiding of
licentiousness, tumult, and civil dissension, which are the principal
inconveniences charged by royalists, upon free-states and commonwealths:
from hence, also, may be observed all the necessary points of prudence,
and forbearance, which ought to take place in respect of superiors, till
it shall evidently appear unto a people, "that there is a design on foot
to surprize and seize their liberties."
A second caution, is, in relation to their elective power, that in all
elections of magistrates, they have an especial eye upon the public, in
making choice of such persons only, as have appeared most eminent, and
active, in the establishment and love of freedom.
In such hands the guardianship of Liberty may be safely placed, because
such men have made the public interest, and their own, all one; and
therefore will neither betray, nor desert it, in prosperity or
adversity; whereas men of another qualification and temper, if they get
into authority, care not to serve the public any further, than the
public serves them, and will draw off and on as they find their
opportunity: yea, and take this for a certain rule, that if any person
be admitted into power, that loves not the commonwealth, above all other
considerations, such a man is (as we say) every man's money; any state-
merchant may have him for a factor: and for good consideration, he will
often make returns upon the public interest, have a stock going in every
party, and with men of every opinion, and (if occasion serve) truck with
the common enemy, and commonwealth, both together.
But that you may see, I do not speak without book, it is Aristotle's
opinion, as well as mine; who saith, in the first of his Politics, being
thus translated, Per negligentiam mutatur status reipublicę, cum ad
potestates assumuntur illi qui pręsentem statum non amant: The form of a
commonwealth is then altered by negligence, when those men are taken
into power, which do not love the present establishment. It is not only
a way to preserve a commonwealth, to avoid those that hate it, but those
also are as much to be avoided, that do not love it; that is, who are
not earnestly wedded to it by an inward active principle of affection:
and the reason is very evident, because their affections being of an
indifferent nature, remain ready to run out into any form, interest, or
party, that offers itself upon the least alteration or temptation
whatsoever. For this, we might give you instances enough, and too much;
but Waving them it may suffice, that most of the broils, tumults, and
civil dissensions, that ever happened in free-states, have been
occasioned by the ambitious, treacherous, and indirect practices of such
persons admitted into power, as have not been firm in their hearts to
the interest of Liberty.
The truth of this is (omitting many others) to be seen in the Roman
state, after its liberty was fully settled in a succession of the
people's supreme assemblies.
For the nobility in the senate, being men of another interest (however
they pretended) and, sometimes by cunning, sometimes by corrupting,
getting trust from the people, did by combination and compliance with
their fellow senators, so garble, perplex, and turmoil the people's
affairs, concernments, and understandings, that at length, what they
could never have done by force, as opposites, they effected by fraud, as
friends, to deprive the people of a quiet and comfortable enjoyment of
their freedom.
A third caution[47] is, That in all their elections of any into the
supreme court, or councils, they be not led by any bent of faction,
alliance, or affection, and that none be taken in, but purely upon the
account of merit.
The former course hath ever been the occasion of discontents, sidings,
and parties.
The latter stops the mouths of men, that perhaps are contrary-minded,
and draws the consent and approbation of all the world, when they see
men put in authority, that have a clear reputation of transcendent
honesty and wisdom.
A fourth caution,[48] is, That as it is the secret of Liberty, that all
magistrates, and public officers, be kept in an accountable state,
liable to render an account of their behavior and actions; and also,
that the people have freedom to accuse whom they please: so on the other
side, it concerns them, above all things, to avoid false charges,
accusations calumniations against persons in authority, which are the
greatest abuses and blemishes of Liberty, and have been the most
frequent causes of tumult and dissension.
The banishment, called Ostracism, among the Athenians, was instituted
(at first) upon a just and noble ground: so was that called Petatisrn,
among the Lacedemonians, to turn such out of the commonwealth, who had
rendered themselves suspected against the common liberty: but yet the
abuse of it afterwards proved most pernicious, to the imbroiling of
those states with civil dissention, when it was perverted by some
petulant spirits, to an opposition of some few (and but few) of their
best deserving citizens.
The Romans also, in their state of liberty, retained this freedom also,
of keeping all persons accountably and accusing whom they pleased; but
then they were very cautious also, to retain that decree of the senate,
called, Turpilianum, in full force and virtue, whereby a severe fine was
set on the beads of all calumniators, and false accusors.
The due observation of this rule preserved that state a long time from
usurpation by men in power on the one side, and from popular clamour and
tumults on the other side.
A fifth caution is,[49] That, as by all means they should beware of
ingratitude, and unhandsome returns, to such as have done eminent
services for the commonwealth; so it concerns them, for the public peace
and security, not to impose a trust in the hands of any person or
persons, further than as they may take it back again at pleasure. The
reason is, because (as the Proverb saith) honores mutant mores; "Honours
change men's manners;" accessions, and continuations of power and
greatness, expose the mind to temptations: they are sails too big for
any bulk of mortality to steer an even course by.
The kingdoms of the world, and the glories of them, are baits that
seldom fail when the Tempter goes a-fishing: and none but He that was
more than man, could have refused them. How many free-states and
commonwealths have paid dear for their experience in this particular?
who by trusting their own servants too far, have been forced, in the
end, to receive them for their masters. Nor is it to be wondered at by
any, considering that immoderate power soon lets in high and ambitious
thoughts; and where they are once admitted, no design so absurd, or
contrary to a man's principles, but he rusheth into it, without the
least remorse or consideration: for the spirit of ambition is a spirit
of giddiness; it foxes men that receive it, and makes them more drunk
than the spirit of wine.
So that were they never so wise, just and honest before, they afterwards
become the contrary, mere sots, non compos mentis, being hurried on
without fear or wit, in all their undertakings: and therefore, without
question, it highly concerns a people that have redeemed and rescued
their liberties out of the hands of tyranny, and are declared a free-
state, so to regulate their affairs, that all temptations, and
opportunities of ambition, may be removed out of the way: or else there
follows a necessity of tumult and civil dissension, the common
consequence whereof hath ever been a ruin of the public freedom.
Thus Cęsar, who first took arms upon the public score, and became the
people's leader, letting in ambitious thoughts to his unbounded power,
soon shook hands with his first friends and principles, and became
another man: so that upon the first fair opportunity, he turned his arms
on the public liberty.
Thus did Sylla serve the senate, and Marius also the people, being the
same tyrant, in effect, though not in name, nor in an open manner.
Thus did Pisistratus at Athens, Agathocles in Sicily, Cosmos, Soderino,
and Savanarola in Florence, Castrucio in Lucca; and others, in many
other places: nor must it be forgotten what the family of Orange would
have done in Holland; for upon the very same account have usurpations
been commenced in all free-states throughout the world.
The ninth,[50] and last rule, for preservation of the public freedom, is
this, That it be made an unpardonable crime, to incur the guilt of
treason against the interest and majesty of the people.
And for the clearing of this, it will be requisite to muster up those
various particulars that come within the compass of treason, according
to the practice and opinion of other nations. The first remarkable
treason in old Rome, after its "establishment in a state of freedom,"
was that of Brutus his sons, who entered into a formal conspiracy for
the bringing back of the Tarquins to the kingdom by force of arms.
This Brutus was the founder of the Roman liberty; and therefore one
would have thought the young men might have obtained an easy pardon: but
such was the zeal of the Romans, for the preservation of their freedom,
that they were all put to death without mercy; and, that all others in
time to come, might be deprived of the least hope of being spared upon
the like occasion, their own father was the man most forward to bring
them to execution.
This was treason in gross: but in aftertime, there started up more
refined pieces of treason: as may be collected out of the actions of
Męlius and Manlius, two persons that had deserved highly of the
commonwealth; but especially the latter, who saved it from ruin, when
the Gauls had besieged the Capitol.
Nevertheless, presuming afterwards upon the people, because of his
extraordinary merits, he, by greating himself beyond the size of a good
citizen, and entertaining thoughts and counsels of surprizing the
people's liberties, was condemned to death; but yet not without the
people's pity (as indeed it was an unhappy necessity, that they should
be forced to destroy him that had saved them from destruction.) To the
same end came Męlius also, upon the like occasion.
Another sort of treason there was contrived likewise against that
people.
And that was by those magistrates, called the Decemviri, touching whose
actions, and the ground of their condemnation, I only let you know,
That you may be sufficiently informed by other pens than mine; such as
the historians Livy, Pomponius, Dionysius, and others, that have written
of the Roman affairs and antiquities.
A fourth sort of treason against that people, was manifest usurpation,
acted over and over, long before the time of Cęsar.
Some other particulars also, there were, of less consideration, that
came within the compass of treason; and in all, they were very strict:
to vindicate the interest of the commonwealth, without respect of
persons.
To those passages out of the old commonwealth of Rome, let us add the
rest we have to say about this point, out of the practices of the
present state of Venice, the most exact for punctilios of that nature
that ever was in the world; and therefore, questionless, it is the most
principal cause of her so long continuance: It is, there, death without
mercy, for any man to have the least attempt, or thought, of conspiring
against the commonweal, and in several other cases, as followeth.
Secondly, it is treason in case any senator betray counsels: there it is
an unpardonable crime, and such a mortal sin, that draws on death
without mercy.
This severity also, was retained in the Roman state, where such as
became guilty of this crime, were either burnt alive, or hanged upon a
gibbet: "Hereupon," (saith Valerius Max. lib, 2.) "when any matter was
delivered, or debated, it was, as if no man had heard a syllable of what
had been said among so many:" from whence it came to pass, that the
decrees of their senate were called Tacita, that is to say, things
concealed; because never discovered, until they came to execution.
Thirdly, it is treason, without mercy, for any senators, or other
officers of Venice, to receive gifts or pensions, from any foreign
prince, or state, upon any pretence whatsoever. It was an old Proverb
among the Heathens, "That the gods themselves might be taken with
gifts:" and therefore the consequences must needs be dangerous, in the
inferior courts of states and princes; since nothing can be carried in
this case, according to "native interest," and "found reason;" but only
by pluralities of foreign dictates, and compliances: but in Venice they
are so free from this treacherous impiety, that all states which
transact with them, must do it above-board, consult before-hand with
their brains, and not their purses: so that (as Thuanus saith) the king
of France needs not use much labour to purchase an interest with any
prince, or state in Italy, unless it be the "Venetian republic," where
all foreign compliances, and pensioners, are punished with utmost
severity; but escape well enough, in other places.
Fourthly, it is treason for any of her senators to have any private
conference with foreign ambassadors and agents. It is very observable
also, among our neighbours of the Low-Countries, that one article of the
charge, whereby they took off Barnevelt's head, was, for that he held
familiarity and converse with the Spanish ambassador, at the same time
when Spain was an enemy.
Thus you have a brief description of treason, in the most notable kinds
of it, according to the customs and opinions of two of the most eminent
free-states, (which may serve instead of all the rest) that have been in
the world; who, as a principal rule and means for the preservation of
freedom, made it a crime unpardonable, to incur the guilt of treason, in
any of these kinds against the interest and majesty of the people in a
free-state.
We now return to the former main point of this discourse, in tracing out
the remainders of those errors that have been received in the practice
of policy.
A fourth error[51] in policy, and which is indeed epidemical, hath been
the regulation of affairs by reason of state, not by the strict rule of
honest. But for fear being mistaken, you are to understand, that by
reason of state here, we do not condemn the equitable results of
prudence and right reason; for upon determinations of this nature
depends the safety of all states, and princes; but that reason of state
that flows from a corrupt principle to an indirect end; that reason of
state which is the statesman's reason, or rather his will and lust, when
he admits ambition to be a reason, preferment, power, profit, revenge,
and opportunity, to be reason, sufficient to put him upon any design of
action that may tend to the present advantage; though contrary to the
law of God, or the law of common honesty and of nations.
A more lively description of this strange Pocus called "reason of
state," take as followeth. It is the most sovereign commander, and the
most important counsellor. Reason of state is the care and compass of
the ship, the life of a state, That which answers all objections, and
quarrels, about mal-government. That's it, which makes war, imposes
taxes, cuts off offenders, pardons offenders, sends and treats
ambassadors.
It can say and unsay, do and undo, balk the common road, make high-ways
to become by-ways, and the furthest about, to become the nearest cut. If
a difficult knot come to be untied, which neither the divine by
scripture, nor lawyer by case or precedent can untie, then reason of
state, or a hundred ways more, which idiots know not, dissolves it. This
is that great empress which the Italians call raggione di stato. It can
rant as a soldier, compliment as a Monsieur, trick it as a juggler,
strut it as a statesman, and is as changeable as the moon, in the
variety of her appearances.
But we may take notice of a more excellent way in opposition to this
sandy foundation of policy, called "reason of state," viz. a simple
reliance upon God in the vigorous and present actings of all
righteousness, expert by honest men, in plain language, to this effect;
fiat justitia, & fractus illabatur orbis; "Deal uprightly, walk close
and real to your promises and principles; though the fabrick of heaven
and earth should fall, yet God is able to support; he expects but so
much saith as will counterpoise a grain of mustard seed." Besides, in
following singly, just and righteous principle, a man gains this
advantage, that he may go on boldly, with a mind free from that
torturing sollicitude of success; (he is subject to none of those heats
and colds, those fits and frights, wherewith men are perpetually vexed,
for fear of discovery or miscarriage, when they have once intangled
themselves in any by-acting of engagements) he either prospers, to the
great good of his nation, or else dies with honour and triumph.
But those that follow the other principle of "human invention," and
serve that Italian goddess, raggione di stato, they may live awhile as
gods, but shall die like men, and perish like one of the princes.
But because words will not serve the turn, take a few examples of those
many that might be fetched from all ages, and nations. It was "reason of
state" made Pharaoh hold the Israelites in bondage, and afterwards, when
they were freed, to endeavour to bring them back again to their old
slavery: but you know what he came to. It was "reason of state" that
made Saul to spare Agag, and plot the ruin of David.
It was "reason of state" that made Jeroboam to set up calves in Dan and
Bethel.
It was "reason of state," (and a shrewd one too) when Achitophel caused
Absalom to defile his father's concubines in the sight of all Israel.
You know what end they both came to. It was the same, that caused Abner,
first, to take part with the house of Saul, and that caused Joab to kill
him after he came to be his rival in same, and the favour of David:
their ends were both bloody.
Hence it was, that Solomon having pardoned Adonijah, thought fit
afterwards to put him to death, upon a very slender occasion.
And Jehu, though he had warrant from God to destroy all the house of
Ahab his master; yet because in the execution of it, he mingled "reason
of state," in relation to his own interest, and minded the establishment
of himself thereby, more than the command and honour of God, in the
execution of justice: therefore God cursed him for his pains,
threatening by the mouth of the prophet Hosea, to avenge the blood of
Ahab's family upon the house of Jehu.
It was "reason of state" that moved Herod to endeavour the destruction
of Christ, as soon as he was born.
It was "reason of state" in the Jews, (left the Romans should come and
take away their place and nation) and in Pilate, (left he should be
thought no friend to Cęsar) that made them both join in crucifying the
Lord of glory, and incur that heavy curse, which at length fell upon the
Jewish place and nation.
It is "reason of state" that makes the Pope and the Cardinals stick so
close one to another, and binds them and the monarchs of Christendom in
one common interest, for the greatening of themselves, and the enslaving
of the people; for which, a sad definition doth attend them.
It was "reason of state" that destroyed so many millions of men
(forsooth) in the "holy war;" that so princes might not have time to
take notice of the Pope's usurpation, nor the people leisure and
opportunity to all their princes to an account for their unpounded
tyranny.
It was "reason of state" that was pleaded in behalf of Borgia, to
justify all his villanies, in wading through so much blood and mischief
to a principality in Italy; but he escaped not, to enjoy the fruit of
all his labour.
It was the same devil that made Henry the IVth of France, to renounce
his religion, and turn Papist, to secure himself from popish revenge;
but God punished him, and sent a popish dagger through his heart.
It made Richard the third in England, to butcher his own nephew; for
which, vengeance pursued him, being at last tied athwart a horse-back,
naked and bloody, like a calf of the shambles.
It made Henry the VIIth to extinguish the line of Plantagenet, and his
son after him, not only to dabble his hands in the blood of many, but to
persecute the protestants, notwithstanding that he fell heavy also upon
the Papists.
It made his daughter Mary to fill up the measure of her father's
iniquities, as they could not be expiated by the virtues of her sister,
and successor, whose only fault was, in following reason of state so
far, as to serve the interest of monarchy, above that of religion, by
upholding an order of prelacy; so that in her the direct line of that
family ended.
After this, it was wicked reason of state that continued monarchy, and
brought in a Scotchman upon us. This was James, who was so great an
admirer of reason of state, that he adopted it for its own darling, by
the name of "King-craft:" and his motto, "No Bishop, no King," shewed,
that he preferred reason of state before the interest of religion; as in
other things, before honesty: witness, among many other, his quitting
the cause of God, and the Palatinate, to keep fair with the house of
Austria: for which, and for the same reason of state, put in practice by
his son Charles, for the ruin of religion and liberty, by a bloody war,
the whole family hath been brought to a sad destruction.
These examples are sufficient to shew that reason of state, preferred
before the rule of honesty, is an error in policy with a vengeance; as
they that will not believe, shall be sure to feel it, since it brings
unavoidable ruin, not only to particular persons, but upon whole
families and nations.
A fifth error[52] in policy hath been this, viz. A permitting of the
legislative and executive powers of a state, to rest in one and the same
hands and persons. By the legislative power, we understand the power of
making, altering, or repealing laws, which in all well-ordered
governments, hath ever been lodged in a succession of the supreme
councils of assemblies of a nation.
By the executive power, we mean that power which is derived from the
other, and by their authority transferred into the hand or hands of one
person (called a prince) or into the hands of many (called states) for
the administration of government, in the execution of those laws. In the
keeping of these two powers distinct, flowing in distinct channels, so
that they may never meet in one, save upon some short extraordinary
occasion, consists the safety of a state.
The reason is evident; because if the lawmakers (who ever have the
supreme power) should be also the constant administrators and dispensers
of law and justice, then (by consequence) the people would be left
without remedy, in case of injustice, since no appeal can lie under
heaven against such as have the supremacy; which, if once admitted, were
inconsistent with the very intent and natural import of true policy:
which ever supposeth, that men in power may be unrighteous; and
therefore (presuming the worst) points always, in all determinations, at
the enormities and remedies of government, on the behalf of the people.
For the clearing of this, it is worthy your observation; that in all
kingdoms and states whatsoever, where they have had any thing of freedom
among them, the legislative and executive powers have been managed in
distinct hands: that is to say, the lawmakers have set down laws, as
rules of government; and then put power into the hands of others (not
their own) to govern by those rules; by which means the people were
"happy, having no governors, but such as were liable to give an account
of government to the supreme council of law-makers. And on the other
side, it is no less worthy of a very serious observation, that kings and
standing states never became absolute over the people, till they brought
both the making and execution of laws into their own hands: and as this
usurpation of theirs took place by degrees, so unlimited arbitrary power
crept up into the throne, there to domineer over the world, and defy the
liberties of the people.
Cicero, in his second book De Offic. and his third, De Legibus, speaking
of the first institution of kings, tells us, how they were at first left
to govern at their own discretion without laws. Then their wills, and
their words, were law; the making and execution of laws was in one and
the same hands.
But what was the consequence? Nothing but injustice, and injustice
without remedy, till the people were taught by necessity to ordain laws,
as rules whereby they ought to govern. Then began the meeting of the
people successively in their supreme assemblies, to make laws; whereby
kings (in such places as continued under the kingly form) were limited
and restrained, so that they could do nothing in government, but what
was agreeable to law; for which they were accountable, as well as other
officers were in other forms of government, to those supreme councils
and assemblies. Witness all the old stories of Athens, Sparta, and other
countries of Greece, where you shall find, that the law-making, and the
law-executing powers, were placed in distinct hands under every form of
government: for, so much of freedom they retained still under every
form, till they were both swallowed up (as they were several times) by
an absolute domination.
In old Rome, we find Romulus their first king cut in pieces by the
"senate, for taking upon him to make and execute laws at his own
pleasure. And Livy tells us, that the reason why they expelled Tarquin
their last king, was, because he took the executive and legislative
powers both into his own hands, making himself both legislator and
officer, inconsulto senatu, "without advice, and in defiance of the
senate."
Kings being cashiered, then their standing-senates came in play, who
making and executing laws, by decrees of their own, soon grew
intolerable, and put the people upon divers desperate adventures, to get
the legislative power out of their hands, and place it in their own;
that is, in a succession of their supreme assemblies: But the executive
power they left, part in the hands of officers of their own, and part in
the senate; in which state it continued some hundreds of years, to the
great happiness and content of all, till the senate by sleights and
subtilties got both powers into their own possession again, and turned
all into confusion.
Afterwards, their emperors (though usurpers) durst not at first turn
both these powers into the channel of their own unbounded will; but did
it by degrees, that they might the more insensibly deprive the people of
their liberty, till at length they openly made and executed laws at
their own pleasure, being both legislators and officers, without giving
an account to any: and so there was an end of the Roman liberty.
To come nearer home, let us look into the old constitution of the
commonwealths and kingdoms of Europe. We find in the Italian states,
Venice, which having the legislative and executive power, confined
within the narrow pale of its nobility in the senate, is not so free as
once Florence was, with Siena, Milan, and the rest; before their dukes,
by arrogating both those powers to themselves, wormed them out of their
liberty.
Of all those states there, only Genoa remains in a free posture, by
keeping the power of legislation only in their supreme assemblies, and
leaving the execution of law in a titular duke and a council. The
keeping of these powers asunder within their proper sphere, is one
principal reason why they have been able to exclude tyranny out of their
own state, while it hath run the round in Italy.
What made the Grand Seignior absolute of old, but his ingrossing both
these powers? and of late the kings of Spain and France? In ancient
tirnes the case stood far otherwise; for in Ambrosio Morales his
Chronicle you will find, that in Spain the legislative power was lodged
only in their supreme council, and their king was no more but an
elective officer, to execute such laws as they made, and in case of
failing; to give them an account, and submit to their judgments, which
was the common practice; as you may see also in Mariana. It was so also
in Aragon, till it was united to Castile, by the marriage of Ferdinand
and Isabel; and then both states soon lost their liberty, by the
projects of Ferdinand and his successors, who drew the powers of
legislation and execution of law, within the verge and influence of the
prerogative royal: whilst these two powers were kept distinct, then
these states were free; but the ingrossing of them in one and the same
hands, was the loss of their freedom.
France likewise was once as free as any nation under heaven: though the
king of late hath done all, and been all in all, till the time of Lewis
the XIth, he was no more but an officer of state, regulated by law, to
see the laws put in execution; and the legislative power (that) rested
in the assembly of the three estates; but Lewis by snatching both these
powers into the single hands of himself, and his successors, rookt them
out of their liberty; which they may now recover again, if they have but
so much manhood, as to reduce the two powers into their ancient, or into
better channels.
This pattern of Lewis was followed close by the late[53] king of
England, who by our ancient laws, was the same here, that Lewis ought to
have been in France, an officer in trust, to see to the execution of the
laws: but by aiming at the same ends which Lewis attained, and
straining, by the ruin of parliaments, to reduce the legislative power,
as well as the executive into his own hands, he, instead of an absolute
tyranny, which might have followed his project, brought a swift
destruction upon himself and family.
Thus you see it appears, that the keeping of these two powers distinct,
hath been a ground preservative of the people's interest, whereas their
uniting hath been its ruin all along in so many ages and nations.
A sixth error[54] in policy, observable in the practices of other times
and nations, hath been a reducing transactions, and the interests of the
public, into the disposition and power of a few particular persons. The
ill consequences whereof have ever been these; that matters were not
wont to be carried by fair, friendly, and legal debates, but by design
and surprizal; not by freedom, and consent of the people, in their open
assemblies; but according to the premeditated resolutions, and
forestalments of crafty projectors in private cabinets, and junto's; not
according to the true interest of state, but in order to the serving of
men's ends; not for the benefit and improvement of the people, but to
keep them under as ignorant of true liberty, as the horse and mule; that
they might be bridled and saddled, and ridden, under the wise pretences
of being governed and kept in order. But the grand and worse
consequences of all, hath been this; that such collegues, partners, and
ingrossers of power having once brought about their ends by lying
practices upon the people; have ever fallen into fits of emulation
against themselves, and the next design hath ever been to rook their
fellows, and rid themselves of competitors; so that at length they have
been their own executioners, and ruined one another. And had it been
only the destruction of themselves, the matter were not considerable;
but the people having by this means been torn with civil dissensions,
and the miseries of war, by being drawn into parties, according to their
several humours and affections; the usual event ever was, that in the
end they have been seized as the prey of some single tyrant.
An example of this there was in the state of Athens, under the
government of those thirty men, who usurped the power into their own
hands, and were afterwards called the thirty tyrants, for their odious
behaviour; for Xenophon tells us, that they drew the determinations of
all things into their own closets, but seemed to manage them, calculis &
suffragiis plebis, "by the votes of the people," which they had brought
to their own devotion in the assembly, to countenance their proceedings.
And their custom was, if any sort of men complained, and murmured at
their doings, or appeared for the public, immediately to snap them off
by the loss of life or fortune, under a pretence of being seditious and
turbulent fellows against the peace of their tyranny. These junto-men
had not been many months in possession, but they began to quarrel with
one another; and the reason why the game went not on, against one
another, was; because the people took it out of their hands, and
diverted the course of their spleen against each other, into a care of
mutual defence, they being assaulted on every side, by popular arms and
clamours, for the recovery of liberty. So you see the event of these
thirty men's combination, was no less than a civil war; and it ended in
their banishment. But as great a mischief followed, for a new junto of
ten men got into their places, whose government proving little less
odious than the former, gave an occasion to new changes, which never
left shifting, till at last they fell into a single tyranny. And the
wilder sort of people, having by a sad experience, felt the fruits of
their own error, in following the lusts and parties of particular
powerful persons, grew wise; and combining with the honester sort, they
all as one man, set their shoulders to the work, and restored the
primitive majesty and authority of their supreme assemblies.
Herodotus in his second book, tells us, that monarchy being abolished in
Egypt, after the death of king Setho, and a declaration published for
the freedom of the people, immediately the administration of all affairs
was engrossed in the hands of twelve grandees, who having made
themselves secure against the people, in a few years fell to quarrelling
with one another (as the manner is) about their share in the government.
This drew the people into several parties, and so a civil war ensued;
wherein Psammeticus (one of the twelve) having slain all his partners,
left the people in the lurch, and instead of a free-state, seated
himself in the possession of a single tyranny.
But of all old instances, the most famous are the two triumvirates that
were in Rome. The first was that of Pompey, Cęsar, and Crassus, who
having drawn the affairs of the empire, and the whole world into their
own particular hands, acting and determining all in a private junto of
their own, without the advice or consent of the senate and people,
unless it were now and then to make stalking horses of them, for the
more clearly conveyance of some unpleasing design: these men, having
made an agreement among themselves, that nothing should be done in the
commonwealth, but what pleased their own humour, it was not long ere the
spirit of ambition set them flying at the faces of one another, and drew
the whole world upon the stage, to act that bloody tragedy, whose
catastrophe was the death of Pompey, and the dominion of Cęsar. The
second triumvirate was erected after the fatal stab given to Cęsar in
the senate, between Octavius (afterwards emperor by the name of
Augustus,) Lepidus, and Anthony: these having drawn all affairs into
their own hands, and shared the world between them, presently fell a
bandying against one another. Augustus picking a quarrel with Lepidus,
gave him a lift out of his authority, and confined him to a close
imprisonment in the city. This being done first, he had the more hope
and opportunity next for the outing of Anthony: he picks a quarrel with
him too, begins a new civil war, wherein Rome and a great part of the
world was engaged to serve his ambition; and things being brought to the
decision of a battle, and the ruin of Anthony, he afterwards seated, and
secured himself in the enjoyment of a single tyranny.
Omitting many other instances, here in England, it is worthy
observation, that in the great contest between Henry the third, and the
barons, about the liberties of themselves and the people, the king being
forced at length to yield, the lords, instead of freeing the nation
indeed, ingrossed all power into their own hands, under the name of the
twenty-four conservators of the kingdom, and behaved themselves like
totidem tyranni, "so many tyrants," acting all in their own names, and
in junto's of their own, wholly neglecting, or else over-ruling
parliaments. But then not agreeing among themselves, there were three or
four of them defeated the other twenty, and drew the entire management
of affairs into their own hands, viz. the earls of Leicester,
Gloucester, Hereford, and Spencer; yet it continued so not long; for,
Leicester getting all into his own power, fell at enmity with
Gloucester, and was defeated by him.
At length, Leicester putting his fortune to a battle, was slain; and the
king thereupon, getting all power back again, took advantage of that
opportunity for the greatening of himself, and prerogative.
And so you see, all that the people got by the effusion of their blood,
and loss of their peace, was, that instead of one tyrant, they had
twenty-four, and then four; and after them a single usurper, (which was
Montfort, earl of Leicester) and he being gone, they were forced to
serve their old tyrant Henry the third again, who, by this means, became
the more secure and firm in his tyranny: whereas if they had dealt like
men of honour, and made the nation as free as they pretended, not
ingrossing all into their own private hands, but instating the liberty
of England paramount above the regal prerogative, in a due and constant
course of successive parliaments (without which liberty is but a mere
name and shadow), then all the succeeding inconveniences had been surely
prevented: the bloody bickering afterwards might have been avoided,
their own persons and honours preserved, kings either cashiered or
regulated, as they ought to have been, and the whole nation freed from
those after-gripes and pangs, inflicted by that Henry and his corrupt
line of successors.
The world affords many instances of this kind, but these are sufficient
to manifest the fatal consequences that have happened, in permitting
public transactions and interests to be ingrossed, and rest in the power
of a few particular persons, and that it deserves to be marked (as one
saith) with a black coal, as a most pernicious error in policy.
A seventh error in policy,[55] is the driving of factions and parties.
Now that you may know what faction is, and which is the factious party
in any state or kingdom, afflicted with that infirmity; the only way is
first to find out the true and declared interest of state; and then if
you observe any designs, counsels, actings, or persons, moving in
opposition to that which is the true public interest, it may be
infallibly concluded, that there lies the faction, and the factious
party, which is so much the more dangerous, in regard it not only
afflicts and tears commonwealths with divisions and discords at home,
but in the end exposes them to the mercy (or rather) the malice of some
public enemy, either at home, or from abroad, and brings a sad
desolation and ruin upon the estates, lives, and liberties of the
people.
There is a notable faction we read of in this Roman story, which was
that of the Decemviri, who being intrusted with the government, and the
time of their trust expired, they, instead of making a resignation,
combined together for the perpetuation of the power in their own hands,
contrary to the intent of their first election, and in defiance of that
which twelve months before had been declared the interest of the
commonwealth. The grand engineer among them was Appius Claudius, who
managed his design by promising the nobility, that if they would stick
to the Decemviri, then the Decemviri would stick to them, and join with
them, in keeping under the people and their tribunes, and to defeat them
of their successive assemblies. By this means he sowed the seeds of an
immortal enmity between the senate and the people; though himself and
his collegues were notwithstanding deceived of their own establishment,
and soon cashiered from their imperious domination.
If we consider also what befel Cartharge, and how it came to ruin: the
story tells us, it was occasioned by their factions, the whole senate
being divided betwixt two potent families of Hannibal and Hanno; by
which means they were disenabled from carrying on their war with
unanimity and alacrity, as was requisite against such wary gamesters as
the Romans, who made such use of their civil dissensions, that they soon
laid the glory of that famous republic in the dust.
It was faction and civil dissension that destroyed Rome itself; that is
to say, her liberty, and made her stoop under the yoke of Cęsar.
And it must not be omitted, that when her liberty was first established,
and Tarquin expelled, he had like to have made his way back again, by
reason of their divisions. And though he missed his aim there, yet
Pisistratus, another tyrant, being driven out of Athens, made a shift to
get an again, by reason of their mutual divisions.
It was the same devil of faction, and civil dissension, (as Philip de
Comines tells us) that made way for the Turk into Hungaria, as it let
him in before into Constantinople; that admitted the Goths and Vandals
into Spain and Italy; the Romans into Jerusalem, first under Pompey; and
afterwards under Vespasian and Titus.
It was the cause why Genoa, for a time, was content to submit to the
family of Sforza, dukes of Milan. It brought the Spaniard into Sicily
and Naples; and the French once into Milan, where they outed the
aforenamed family of Sforza.
From hence, therefore, let us conclude, that no error is more dangerous,
no treason more pernicious to a commonwealth, than the driving of
faction.
An eighth and last error,[56] observable in practice of times and
nations, hath been a violation of faith, principles, promises, and
engagements, upon every turn of time, and advantage. An impiety that
ought to be exploded out of all nations, that bear the name of
Christians: and yet we find it often pass, among the less discerning
sort of men, for admirable policy: and those impostors that used it,
have had the luck to be esteemed the only politicians. But yet, lest so
many wise men of the world, as have been given up to this monstrous
vanity, should be thought to have no reason for it, I remember, I find
it usually exprest in Machiavel, to be this, because the greatest part
of the world being wicked, unjust, deceitful, full of treachery and
circumvention, there is a necessity that those which are downright, and
confine themselves to the strict rule of honesty, must ever look to be
over-reached by the knavery of others. And take this for certain, (saith
he) Qui se virum bonum omnibus partibus profiteri studet, eum certč
inter tot non bonos periclitari necesse est. "He which endeavours to
approve himself an honest man to all parties, must of necessity miscarry
among so many that are not honest." Because some men are wicked and
perfidious, I must be so too. This is a sad inference, and fit only for
the practice of Italy, where he wrote it.
The ancient Heathen would have loathed this; and the Romans (who were
the noblest of them all) did in all their actions detest it, reckoning
plain honesty to have been the only policy, and the foundation of their
greatness. Favendo pietati fideique, populus Romanus ad tantum fastigii
pervenerit. "The people of Rome attained to so great a height, by
observing faith and piety:" whereof you shall see an instance or two.
In the war between them and Porsena king of the Tuscans, it so happened,
that their city was besieged by Porsena: but peace being made, upon some
advantageous conditions for the Tuscans, the Romans, for the performance
of their conditions, were forced to yield up divers noble virgins.
Those virgins, after some time, made an escape from the Tuscans, and
came back to Rome, but were demanded again.
Hereupon the senate, though they were then recovered, and in a posture
able to have defied the Tuscans, and denied the performance of those
harsh conditions, chose rather to preserve their faith inviolate, than
to take the present advantage; and so delivered up the virgins.
The behaviour also of Attilius Regulus, is very memorable, who being
prisoner at Carthage, and condemned to a cruel death, was,
notwithstanding, permitted to go to Rome, upon his bare parole, to
propound certain terms to the senate; which if they yielded, then he was
to have his liberty: if not, he was to return again to Carthage, and to
suffer.
The senate not yielding, he, rather than violate his faith, did return,
and suffer, being put into a barrel spiked with nails, and tumbled down
a hill by the Carthaginians. Nor was it the temper only of a few
persons; but general throughout the whole nation, as might be shown by
innumerable examples; especially in their leagues and treaties with
other nations.
But that you may the better know, and avoid the impious importers, I
shall represent them in Machiavel's own language; who in that unworthy
book of his, entitled, "The Prince," hath made a most unhappy
description of the wiles that have been used by those jugglers; and
thereby left a lesson upon record, which hath been practised ever since
by all the state-rooks in Christendom. And therefore, since they have
made so ill use of it, I suppose the best way to prevent the further
operation of the poison, is, to set it down here before you, (as I shall
do verbatim, without adding, or diminishing a syllable) and then make
two or three inferences thereupon, for the practice of the people.
"In what manner princes ought to keep their words. How commendable in a
prince it is to keep his word, and live with integrity, not making use
of cunning and subtlety, every one knows well: yet we see by experience,
in these our days, that those princes have effected great matters, who
have made small reckoning of keeping their words, and have known by
their craft, how to turn and wind men about, and in the end overcome
those who have grounded upon the truth.
"You must then know, there are two kinds of combating or fighting: the
one, by right of the laws: the other, merely by force. That first way is
proper to men: the other is also common to beasts. But because the first
many times suffices not, there is a necessity to make recourse to the
second: wherefore, it behoves a prince to know how to make good use of
that part which belongs to a beast, as well as that which is proper to a
man.
"This part hath been covertly shewed to princes by ancient writers; who
say, that Achilles, and many others of those ancient princes, were
intrusted to Chiron the Centaur, to be brought up under his discipline.
The moral of this, having for their teacher, one that was half a beast,
and half a man, was nothing else, but that it was needful for a prince
to understand how to make his advantage of the one, and other nature,
because neither could subsist without the other.
"A prince then being necessitated to know how to make use of that part
belonging to a beast, ought to serve himself of the conditions of the
fox and the lyon; for the lyon cannot keep himself from snares, nor the
fox defend himself against the wolves. He had need then be a fox, that
he may beware of the snares; and a lyon that he may scare the wolves.
Those that stand wholly upon the lyon, understand not themselves.
"And therefore a wise prince cannot, nor ought not to keep his faith
given, when the observance thereof turns to disadvantage, and the
occasions that made him promise, are past: for if men were all good,
this rule would not be allowable; but being they are full of mischief,
and will not make it good to thee, neither art thou tied to keep it.
with them: nor shall a prince ever want lawful occasions to give colour
to this breach. Very many modern examples hereof might be alledged,
wherein might be shewed, how many peaces concluded, and how. many
promises made, have been violated and broken by infidelity of princes;
and ordinarily things have best succeeded with him that hath been
nearest the fox in condition.
"But it is necessary to understand, how to set a good colour upon this
disposition, and be able to feign and dissemble throughly; and men are
so simple, and yield so much to the present necessities, that he who
hath a mind to deceive, shall always find another that will be deceived.
I will not conceal any of the examples that have been of late; Alexander
the Sixth never did any thing else, than deceive men, and never meant
otherwise, and always found whom to work upon; yet never was there man
that would protest more effectually, nor aver any thing with more solemn
oaths, and observe them less than he: nevertheless, his cozenage thrived
well with him, for he knew how to play his part cunningly.
"Therefore is there no necessity for a prince to be endued with all
those above written qualities, but it behoves well that he seem to be
so: or rather I will boldly say this, that having those qualities, and
always regulating himself by them, they are hurtful; but seeming to have
them, they are advantageous, as to seem pitiful, faithful, mild,
religious, and indeed to be so (provided withal thou beest of such a
composition, that if need require thee to use the contrary, thou canst,
and knowest how to apply thyself thereto.) And it suffices to conceive
this, that a prince, and especially a new prince, cannot observe all
these things, for which men are held good, he being often forced, for
the maintenance of his state, to do contrary to his faith, charity,
humanity, and religion. And therefore it behoves him to have a mind so
disposed as to turn and take the advantage of all winds and fortunes;
and as formerly I said, not forsake the good while he can; but to know
to make use of the evil upon necessity. A prince then ought to have a
special care, that he never let fall any words, but what are all
seasoned with the five above written qualities: and let him seem to him
that sees and knows him, all pity, all faith, all integrity, all
humanity, all religion; nor is there any thing more necessary for him to
seem to have, than the last quality: for all men in general judge
thereof, rather by the sight than by the touch; for every man may come
to the sight of him, few come to the touch and feeling of him; every man
may come to see what thou seemest; few come to understand and perceive
what thou art: and those few dare not oppose the opinion of many, who
have the majesty of state to protect them. And in all men's actions,
especially those of princes, wherein there is no judgment to appeal
unto, men forbear to give their censures till the events, and ends of
things. Let a prince therefore take the surest courses he can to
maintain his life and state, the means shall always be thought
honourable, and commended by every one: for the vulgar is ever taken
with the appearance and event of a thing, and for the most part of the
people, they are but the vulgar, the others that are but few, take place
where the vulgar have no subsistence. A prince there is in these days,
whom I shall not do well to name, that preaches nothing but peace and
faith, but had he kept the one and the other, several times had they
taken from him his state and reputation."
This is the old court Gospel, which hath gained many thousand of
proselytes, among the great ones, from time to time, and the inferences
arising thence in behalf of the people, in brief are these: That since
the great ones of the world have been very few that have avoided this
doctrine, therefore it concerns the people to keep a strict hand and eye
upon them all, and impose not overmuch or long confidence in any.
If the right of laws be the way of men, and force of beasts and great
ones, not only advised, but inclined to the latter, then it concerns any
nation or people to secure themselves, and keep great men from
degenerating into beasts, by holding up of law, liberty, privilege,
birth-right, elective power, against the ignoble beastly way of powerful
domination.
If of all beasts, a prince should sometimes resemble the lion, and
sometimes the fox, then people ought to observe great ones in both the
disguises, and be sure to cage the lion, and unkennel the fox, and never
leave till they have stript the one, and unraised the other.
If a prince cannot, and ought not to keep his faith given, when the
observance thereof turns to disadvantage, and the occasions that made
him promise, are past; then it is the interest of the people, never to
trust any princes, nor engagements and promises of men in power, but
ever to preserve a power within themselves, either to reject them, or to
hold them to the performance whether they will or no. And if princes
shall never want occasions to give colour to this breach, then also it
concerns the people, ever to make sure of the instance, and not suffer
themselves to be deluded with colours, shadows, and mere pretences.
Lastly, if it be necessary for great ones to feign and dissemble
thoroughly; because men are so simple, and yield so much to the present
necessity (as Machiavel saith;) and in regard he that hath a mind to
deceive, shall always find another that will be deceived: then, it
concerns any people or nation, to make a narrow search ever into the
men, and their pretences and necessities, whether they be feigned or
not; and if they discover any deceit hath been used, then they deserve
to be slaves, that will be deceived any longer. Thus I have noted the
prime errors of government, and rules of policy. I shall now conclude
with a word of advice, in order to the chusing of the supreme
assemblies.
Since it appears, that the right, liberty, welfare, and safety of a
people, consists in a due succession of their supreme assemblies: surely
then, the right constitution and orderly motion of them, is of the
greatest consequence that can be, there being so much embarked in this
vessel, that if it should miscarry, all is irreparably lost, unless it
can be recovered again out of the sea of confusion. Therefore, as at all
times there ought to be an especial care had to the composure and
complexion of those great assemblies, so much more after the confusion
of a civil war, where it is ever to be supposed, there will be many
discontented humours a-working, and labouring to insinuate themselves
into the body of the people, to undermine the settlement and security of
the commonwealth, that by gaining an interest and share with the better
sort, in the supreme authority, they may attain those corrupt ends of
policy, which were lost by power.
In this case without question, there are several men that ought to be
taken into a strict consideration. There is the old malignant and the
new; against whom, not only the doors are to be shut, but every hole and
cranny ought to be stopt, for fear they creep into authority. There is
likewise a tame beast, more dangerous than the other two, which is that
amphibious animal, the neutral of Laodicea, that can live in either
element, sail with any wind on every point of the compass, and strike in
with malignants of every sort, upon any occasion.
This is he that will undo all, if he be not avoided; for in the form of
an angel of light, he most slightly carries on the works of darkness.
Let not him then, as to our present case, be so much as named upon an
election. Thus much for the constitution of the supreme assembly, or the
manner of settling authority upon the close of a civil war, for the
recovery of liberty. What remains then, but that upon due caution for
excluding the wild geese and the tame, the malignant and the neutral,
such a people may reasonably be put into possession of their right and
interest in the legislative power, and of all enjoyment of it, in a
succession of their supreme assemblies.
The only way to preserve liberty in the hands of a people, that have
gained it by the sword, is to put it in the people's hands, that is,
into the hands of such as by a contribution of their purses, strength,
and counsels, have all along asserted it, without the least stain of
corruption, daggering, or apostacy; for in this case, these only are to
be reckoned the people: the rest having either by a traitorous
engagement, compliance, neutrality, or apostacy, as much as in them
lies, destroyed the people, and by consequence made a forfeiture of all
their rights and immunities, as members of a people. In this case
therefore men ought to have a courage; and to have a care of the course
of election, and trust God with the success of a righteous action; for
nothing can be more righteous and necessary, than that a people should
be put into possession of their native right and freedom. However they
may abuse it, it is their right to have it, and the want of it is a
greater inconvenience, and draws greater inconveniences after it, than
any can be pretended to arise from the enjoyment, though they were
presented in a multiplying glass, to the eyes of discerning men. But
now, as this holds true at all times, in all nations, upon the like
occasions of liberty, newly purchased, so much more in any nation, where
freedom, in a successive course of the people's assemblies, hath once
been solemnly acknowledged and declared to be the interest of the
commonwealth; for, then a depriving the people of their due, is a
foundation for broils and divisions; and as Cicero defines faction to be
a deviation from the declared interest of state, so in this case, if it
happen that any shall desert a commonwealth in its declared interest,
they immediately lose the name and honour of patriots, and become
parties in a faction.
FINIS.
[32 MN] One error in government, is a corrupt division of a state into
ecclesiastical and civil.
[33 MN] The not preventing the passage of tyranny out of one form into
another, is a main error of policy.
[34 MN] A keeping the people in ignorance of the essential ways and
means that are necessary for the people's liberty, is an error in a
free-state.
[35 MN] It hath been one rule in all free-states, to abjure a toleration
of kings, and kingly government.
[36 MN] It hath been a rule in all free-states, not to suffer particular
persons to grandise more than ordinary.
[37 MN] A third rule in policy, not to permit a continuation of command
and power in the hands of particular persons and families.
[38 MN] Not to let two of one family bear offices of trust at one time.
[39 MN] The majesty and authority of the suffrages, or votes of the
supreme assembly to be kept intire.
[40 MN] The people are to be continually trained up in the exercise of
arms, and the militia lodged in the hands of those that are firm to the
interest of the nation.
[41] * Charles I.
[42 MN] Children educated and instructed in the principles of freedom.
[43 MN] Cautions for the people to observe.
[44 MN] The people are not to use the utmost remedy in all cases of
male-administration.
[45 MN] In what case the Romans used the utmost remedy.
[46] * Charles I.
[47 MN] Faction, alliance, and affection is to be avoided in all
elections.
[48 MN] The people are to avoid all false charges against persons in
authority.
[49 MN] As the people are to avoid ingratitude, so likewise to have a
care not to intrust any particular persons with an unlimited power.
[50 MN] Treason against the people's liberties, not to be pardoned.
[51 MN] A new reason of state preferred before rules of honesty, is an
error in policy.
[52 MN] A uniting of the legislative and executive powers in one and the
same hands, an error in policy.
[53] * Charles I
[54 MN] Affairs of state transacted by a few, is an error in policy.
[55 MN] Driving of faction and parties, a main error in policy.
[56 MN] Breach of vows and promises, a main error in policy.