Executive Summary: Observing “Operation
Protective Edge” against Hamas in Gaza lead to the conclusion that a revision
of Israel’s conceptual strategic compass is needed, particularly regarding the
concepts of ‘deterrence’ and ‘decisive victory’.

Limited-scale, asymmetrical conflicts have
become the norm. All-out wars between stateS where both parties invest all of
their national resources in an attempt to achieve a decisive victory have
become less relevant.

Theories of warfare or conduct-of-operations
doctrines that have been studied over the course of decades are no longer
relevant to the new military situation. David Ben-Gurion’s conceptual trinity
of ‘deterrence’, ‘early warning’ and ‘decisive victory’ is no longer fully
valid. These concepts should no longer be used as the only or main criterion
when evaluating military and political moves made in the context of the new situation.

While ‘deterrence’ remains relevant to
preventing total war, we may lose the ability to deter violence in specific
situations, such as launching rockets at Israel by terrorist organizations.

As far as ‘early warning’ is concerned, an
intelligence setup may be prepared for a total war with a list of warning
indicators compiled to indicate an intention by the other side to initiate a
confrontation. However, these precautions and indicators may not be relevant in
the event of suicide bomber terrorists.

The ‘decisive victory’ concept, in accordance
with Clausewitzian thinking, posits that the losing side can be compelled to
negotiate terms of its surrender. For this reason a modicum of governance is to
be allowed to the losing side to assure the implementation of the terms of
surrender. But in the context of limited-scale conflicts, partial military
victories are attainable even if no decisive victory is achieved.

Negotiations may be arranged under
international or superpower sponsorship for the purpose of reaching ceasefire
agreements. Or a situation may emerge where it will be in the best interests of
both parties to hold their fire with each party claiming certain political accomplishments,
without the fundamental conflict coming to an end and without decisive victory.

In the 2006 Lebanon War, military victory was
unclear and no decisive victory was achieved. Yet the severe blow inflicted on
the Dahiyeh suburb of Beirut and the destruction of Hezbollah’s long-range
missiles were significant achievements. However, during the last day before the
ceasefire came into effect, Hezbollah launched some 250 rockets into Israeli
territory. Hezbollah declared this as a victory and subsequently acquired a
dominant role in the politics of Lebanon.
This political role contributed to the subsequent calm along the
Israel-Lebanon border.

The deterrence of the last eight years
seemingly achieved in Lebanon was not achieved because of the accomplishments
of the Israeli military. It was not the result of the Israeli military blow,
but the result of Hezbollah’s fears of losing their political accomplishments
in Lebanon in the event of another conflict with Israel. Indeed, Hezbollah has
not stopped preparing forces, materiel and arms for a future war. Instead,
deterrence resulted from other developing interests over which Israel had no
control or influence, such as the Syrian civil war.

Since the large rocket attacks occurred after
Israel invaded Lebanon in the 2006 war, it may be right to stress that the 2006
Lebanon War led to the loss of deterrence with regard to rockets – which
encouraged the massive acquisition of rockets by the terrorist organizations in
the Gaza Strip. However, the Iron Dome
system has partly restored Israeli deterrence in this area – as seen during
Operation Pillar of Defense and most certainly during Operation Protective Edge

Since we use concepts and theories that are no
longer suitable to the existing conflicts, there are endless arguments on the
subject of achieving either deterrence or decisive victory. The conclusion here
is that Israel should update its combat doctrines to match the current
situation and conflict.

Currently, even a brilliant military victory
can lead to a political fiasco or to diplomatic damage. In some cases,
deterrence can be achieved without using military force. Such deterrence can be
achieved by creating a situation where the parties are not interested in a
military confrontation, as each party stands to lose something.

Today, in limited-scale and asymmetrical
conflicts, the presence of the media and the video photography options
available on the battlefield along with the ability to broadcast the footage
almost in real time can restrict the use of force.

Additionally, there is the need for domestic
national consensus – widespread conviction that the employment of the military
is really necessary. There is also a need for international backing, at least
on the part of certain superpowers. The intensity of this backing will determine
the duration of the fighting and the scale of the use of force. Finally, there
is the sensitivity to losses among civilians, and the sensitivity to casualties
sustained by Israel’s military forces.

Under these conditions, achieving a decisive
victory is close to impossible. A proportionate victory may be achieved
according to the aforementioned parameters, but hard-to-watch images,
operational errors or diminished international backing may lead to a situation
where the combat operations have to be stopped.

The lessons to be learned regarding the force
structure are highly significant. Investments should be made in active and
passive defense so as to enable discretion regarding the offensive operations.
The better protected the rear area is, the less we will be dragged into unreasonable
or insufficiently prepared scenarios.

It is desirable to plan for short-term
confrontations lasting no more than a few days. In this way, the IDF can bring
its superior firepower to bear in concentrated fashion, making a powerful
psychological impact on the enemy, and doing so before international political
backing wanes (as it inevitably does when the images of destruction broadcast
by the media begin to gnaw away at support for Israel). Israel must strike swiftly and determinedly
while the casualty parameter is still within the range regarded as
proportionate.

The purpose of a military operation is to gain
political achievements. Fighting should stop the moment we realize that we are
beginning to lose politically. At times, declaring a unilateral ceasefire will
maintain the initiative, while regaining the chance of political backing.

The conduct of wartime operations does not
have to be continuous. We must constantly monitor the trends of the parameters
outlined above. In every confrontation, different parameters become dominant.
In some cases it is our own losses, while in other cases the dominant parameter
is the domestic public opinion. Other times it may be an operational error or
the perception of the conflict within the international context.

If Israel decides that continuous military
activity is not mandatory, it will be able to define the objectives of military
operations in a more precise and attainable manner. Such an approach allows
Israel to progress in the stages of military intensity in a controlled manner,
so as to prevent situations where Israel loses the initiative and is forced to
execute unwise moves.

One additional point: Achieving deterrence is
not the most important objective. The national defense interest transcends
deterrence. By way of example, consider the 1991 Gulf War. Under the leadership
of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, Israel refrained from responding to the
missiles launched by Iraq into Israel, thereby leading many observers to claim
that Israel suffered a deterrence failure. However, the other national
strategic interests Israel upheld were more important. The decision that
deterrence is not the dominant strategic goal is definitely a determination to
be made in the political realm rather than in the military sphere.

Moreover, deterrence is not always achieved
through a decisive military blow, but rather by creating common political
interests that both parties would like to maintain or would be afraid of
losing.About The Author:

Maj. Gen. (res) David Ivry served as the Chief
of Israel’s Air Force, as Deputy IDF Chief of Staff, as Director General of the
Ministry of Defense, as Head of the National Security Council, and as Israel’s
ambassador to the US.