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Tuesday, 19 November 2013

Former Army Chief
VK Singh today tendered an “unconditional apology” to the Supreme Court for
making certain remarks on its order over age row, saying he had no intention to
bring disrepute to the institution and judges, who are like “demigods”.

Singh, who was
rapped by the court for “scandalising” the court and attributing motives to its
verdict, said he had “highest respect” for the judiciary, particularly the apex
court.

“I have the highest respect
for the judiciary particularly this Hon'ble Court. Inspite of occasional
criticism reported in isolated cases, I firmly believe the judges are Demigods
compared to other departments of our public life.

“To attribute unworthy or
illegitimate motives to the judges who dealt with my withdrawn petition on
February 10, 2012 was far from my mind. I hold them in high respect and I
hereby tender an unqualified apology,” said General Singh in his reply to the
court. — PTI

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2013/20131119/nation.htm#14

BrahMos variant clears Army test

New Delhi,
November 18

The Army today
successfully test-fired an advanced version of the 290-km range BrahMos
supersonic cruise missile which penetrated and destroyed a "hardened
target" in the Pokhran firing range in Rajasthan.

"The Block
III variant of BrahMos with deep penetration capability is fitted with a new
guidance system and the launch by the Army has successfully validated the deep
penetration capability of the supersonic cruise missile system against hardened
targets," BrahMos officials said here.

"The missile
system was successfully test fired by the Indian Army at the Pokhran test range
in Rajasthan at 1055 hours," they said.

The missile after
launch "followed the predetermined trajectory and successfully pierced the
designated concrete structure at bull’s eye owing to sheer velocity of the
missile." The test-firing was witnessed by local Corps Commander Lt Gen
Amit Sharma, who along with other senior officers congratulated the operational
Army team for the successful launch. — PTI

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2013/20131119/edit.htm#3

Naval challenges amid giant strides

India has miles to
go before it can catch up with China

Harsh V. Pant

AFTER a long
nine-year wait, India has finally taken possession of the 45,000-tonne, $2.3
billion Admiral Gorshkov, now renamed INS Vikramaditya, built in the final
years of the Soviet Union and now India's largest ship. It is now being
escorted by warships to India on a two-month voyage from Russia's northern
coast and will reach the port of Karwar in January following which the Navy
will operationalise it with the first landing of its MiG-29K aircraft.

Earlier this year
in August, India became the fifth nation in the world with the capability to
indigenously design and build its own aircraft carrier, INS Vikrant. This
launch was preceded with the announcement that the reactor in India's first
indigenously built nuclear-powered submarine (SSBN), INS Arihant, has gone
critical, marking a turning point in New Delhi's attempt to establish a nuclear
triad. But the celebrations came to an abrupt end when two days after the
launch of INS Vikrant, a tragedy followed as INS Sindhurakshak, one of the 10
kilo-class submarines that form the backbone of India's ageing conventional
submarine force, sank with 18 crew members after explosions at the naval
dockyard in Mumbai. Together these developments underscored the giant strides
that India has made as well as the challenges that India faces in its attempts
to emerge as a credible global naval power.

Indian naval
expansion is being undertaken with an eye on China, and recent strides
notwithstanding, India has nautical miles to go before it can catch up with its
powerful neighbour, which has made some significant advances in the waters
surrounding India. The launch of an aircraft carrier is seen as critical for
the Indian Navy as it remains anxious to maintain its presence in the shipping
lanes of the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea, especially in the light of
China's massive naval build-up. China commissioned its aircraft carrier,
Liaoning, last year which is a refurbished vessel purchased from Ukraine in
1998. It is also working on an indigenous carrier of its own even as it is
eyeing a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier.

India remains
heavily dependent on imports to meet its defence requirements, so its recent
successes are particularly important. But for all the euphoria, it will be five
years until INS Vikrant can be commissioned by the Indian Navy and INS Arihant
has yet to pass a series of sea trials. The Indian Navy wants to be a serious
blue-water force and is working hard to achieve that goal. Indian naval
planners have long argued that if it is to main continuous operational
readiness in the Indian Ocean, protect sea lanes of communication in the
Persian Gulf and monitor Chinese activities in the Bay of Bengal, it needs a
minimum of three aircraft carriers and a fleet of five nuclear submarines. With
Admiral Gorshkov likely to be operational by early next year and a second
aircraft indigenous carrier in the wings, the Navy could be close to realising
the dream of operating three carriers by the end of the decade.

But serious
challenges remain as exemplified by the disaster of INS Sindhurakshak which has
brought the focus back to the enduring problems of safety and reliability the
Navy has been grappling with for decades. The Navy has a poor accident record
with several mishaps in recent years. INS Sindhurakshak had been reintroduced
to service only in April this year after a refit in Russia. The Navy has
ordered a review of its submarines weapons safety systems after initial
investigations showed arms on board the submarine may have played a role in its
sinking. The latest accident comes at a time when even as the Navy's surface
fleet expansion has been progressing well, the Indian submarime fleet is not
only ageing but also depleting fast with the induction of new submarines not on
track.

Despite the
success of Vikrant and Arihant, India's indigenous defence production has been
marred by serious technical and organisational problems, leading to significant
delays in the development of key defence technologies and platforms. The Navy,
much like the other two services, has found it difficult to translate its
conceptual commitment to self-reliance and indigenisation into actionable
policy, resulting in a perpetuation of reliance on external sources for naval
modernisation. Yet India's reliance on its Navy to project power is only likely
to increase in the coming years as naval build-up continues apace in the
Indo-Pacific. Apart from China, other powers are also developing their naval
might. Japan's commissioning of third helicopter carrier, the Izumo, has raised
hackles in Beijing which has referred to it as an "aircraft carrier in
disguise."

And in this
regional context, India's naval engagement with East and Southeast Asian states
is integral to its two-decade old 'Look East' policy. Countries ranging from
the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia to Vietnam and Myanmar have been
pushing India toward assuming a higher profile in the region. India is training
Myanmar naval personnel and is building at least four offshore patrol vehicles
in Indian shipyards to be used by Myanmar's Navy. The Indian Navy has not only
been supplying spares to Hanoi for its Russian-origin ships and missile boats
but has also extended a $100 million credit line to Vietnam for the purchase of
patrol boats. Defence Minister A.K. Antony was in Australia, Thailand and
Singapore recently forging closer naval ties even as New Delhi's naval
relationship with major Western powers and the Gulf states is blossoming.

As a result, the
Navy will remain an indispensable tool for furthering national foreign policy
goals. But as resources dry up with a significant decline in the economic
growth rate, Indian naval planners will have to think more carefully about
balancing their ways, ends and means if India wants to emerge as serious naval
power in the coming years.

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2013/20131119/edit.htm#5

Using technology to strengthen guard

Modern technology
will play an increasing role in the security calculus of a country. Internal
security in these situations, when aspirations and expectations have been
aroused, will be achieved only if India is successful in finding
technology-based solutions.

Shivshankar Menon

Science and
warfare have always been intimately connected. That technology is critical to
war is now so widely recognised that military historians today define the ages
of warfare by technological change rather than by the great generals or leaders
associated with them. We now speak of the age of gunpowder, of industrial war,
of the atomic age, and of modern war in the age of electronics or the age of
systems.

This is not a new
or post-industrial revolution phenomenon, though the pace of change has
certainly accelerated in the last three centuries. The invention of the stirrup
and the high saddle in Asia enabled cavalry to dominate the battlefield that
belonged to infantry. The limitations of cavalry (it could not hold ground or
reduce fortifications) meant that infantry continued in new roles. From the
12th century until the end of the 17th century, the proportion of cavalry to
infantry in most successful armies was steady at around 1:2, until the musket,
bayonet and flintlock increased infantry firepower, decimating cavalry.

That was only one
of the changes that gunpowder brought to warfare. Once gunpowder could be used
as a propellant for cannon balls breaking down castle walls, tactics and
strategy changed. Combined with the logistics revolution that long-distance
navigation, and soon the telegraph, mass production and railways made possible,
we saw an age of industrial war by European nations against the non-industrial
world from the 19th century onwards.

Examples of such
change, of revolutions in military affairs as a result of the adoption of new
technologies — gunpowder, navigation, radio, atomic energy, and electronics —
are myriad and well known to military men, though not part of our science
history curricula in schools and universities.

Each time a new
technology arrives the human reaction has been very similar. There is a deep
root for the many technology control and denial regimes that we see in the
modern world. The interesting question, however, is why even identical
implements and technologies have been understood and used in entirely different
ways in the hands of different societies. Gunpowder was known and used in China
from the 7th century onwards but was only harnessed to warfare effectively
towards the end of the 14th century, first in West Europe and then by the
Mughals and others, long before China did so. Steel was manufactured in blast
furnaces in China around 800 AD, thereafter in India, and in Western Europe
after 1300 but was effectively applied to the manufacture of weapons in the
Levant and Europe, not East Asia. Clearly science and technology is a necessary
condition but not a sufficient condition for enhanced military effectiveness.

The determining
element was the human factor, the choices made by the elite responsible for
military decisions. And those choices were guided by their social and cultural
milieu, or from what we would now call their strategic culture. Strategic
culture is the influence of our ideological and mental training and upbringing
and the ways of thinking that we normally take for granted. It is not an easy
idea for scientists who are trained to think of a universal scientific method,
which produces reproducible results irrespective of the country, culture or
gender of those who carry out an experiment.

Certain countries,
say India and Russia for instance, consistently produce mathematicians of the
highest quality. Why a generation of path-breaking nuclear physicists came from
not just one country but one high school? While science itself is value neutral
and culture free, technology, the choice of what to study, and how to apply
science is not. It is the result of individual choices that reflect their
milieu and upbringing.

It is that
relationship between strategic culture and available technologies produced by
science that determines not just the manner in which technologies are applied
to war, but the changes in tactics, strategy and what the Russians call the operational
art. Often this goes beyond the military to the nature of society itself.

Industrial war

The industrial
revolution brought total war, an era of mass industrialised warfare where
quantity was quality. The highly skilled German war machine was overwhelmed in
WWII by the material superiority of its opponents. The industrial revolution
also established the idea of military invention as a permanent and systematic
feature of modern war, not just the invention of new weapons which has happened
through the ages. The difference was the sustained conduct of military research
with state support to take advantage of rapid technological change. As a
result, the relationship between the state and industry, and between the state
and research, became increasingly close. From the 1940s until the seventies
military, R&D led rather than followed the ideas of industry in critical
sectors like electronics and aerospace. If not for this, computers would have
come some 12-15 years later, as also the first integrated circuits which led to
the information revolution. The Internet was first conceived in the sixties as
a "post apocalyptic command grid" — as a means of maintaining
strategic military communication in the event of a surprise nuclear attack.

Information and
communications

Many recent
technologies that have carried forward the information and communications
technology revolution (ICT) and its military applications are the result of
private research and entrepreneurship, of small science, unlike the Cold War
pattern of military led and state organised or conducted research. Today the
role of the state in new areas has shrunk to being a facilitator and provider
of funds. The products of many of the new technologies are made in what would
have been called handicraft industry in the past, not the large military
industrial complex.

The ICT revolution
has brought power into the hands of small groups and individuals, and made the
state's control over its physical borders irrelevant while creating a whole new
domain for contention in cyber space. The state's legal monopoly of violence
has been exposed and the new information and communication technologies promote
alternative forms of war. By enabling and empowering individual communications
and small group operations, these technologies make guerrilla warfare and
sub-conventional conflict more likely, as also the use of asymmetry and
deception, and conflict at the lower end of the spectrum of violence.

When attacks in
cyber space are close to the speed of light, conventional deterrence can barely
operate. Cyber space is a borderless, anonymous and anarchic domain, where it
is hard to ascribe an origin or source to attacks and other malicious
activities.

The other new
domain of contention that science has created is outer space which is
increasingly being used for military purposes.

Technology and
security

Technology has
changed the way we define security. We cannot consider national security
without considering cyber security, and we look increasingly to technology for
solutions to internal security issues. If we have had some success in
intelligence-based counter-terrorism operations recently, it is due in part to
a combination of technological methods, including data fusion, with traditional
intelligence trade craft.

As we urbanise our
societies, technology becomes ever more important to policing and law and
order. Half the world's population now lives in cities. India too is rapidly
moving in that direction. Internal security in these situations, when
aspirations and expectations have been aroused, will be achieved only if we are
successful in finding technology-based solutions.

Besides, in the
borderless world that ICT has created, we have no choice but to benchmark our
domestic security efforts and institutions to international standards. It is
time to think about India's technology security. This would involve not just
our possession of and access to technology, but also our ability to innovate,
generate technology, and more important, to use it and apply it in creative
ways to the solution of our problems.

In one sense,
military and security technology is evolving towards India's strengths. The
question is how we can best organise ourselves to exploit these opportunities.
If we are to produce technologies and outcomes that national security requires,
the traditional ways in which we have organised our scientific effort will need
to change, or at least be considerably supplemented. We need much stronger
links between scientists and the services, and we need to break down the
vertical silos in which we work today.

The possible
changes in war from the use of new materials, genetics, or nanotechnology are
mind boggling. India is fortunate in having a cohort of world-class scientists
and governments supportive of scientific research.

Indian science and
technology will make its contribution to the defence and security of the
country.

Excerpt from a
lecture on "Science and technology" by the National Security Adviser
at the Indian Academy of Science on November 9.

Nuclear revolution

Equation changes:
The creation of nuclear weapons brought into being weapons of such unimaginable
power that they changed the way in which we thought of war. The atomic military
revolution required the development of a doctrine and a force capable of using
technology in a new and unexpected way. The power of these weapons made war
between the superpowers irrational under all but the most extreme
circumstances.

Paradoxical: The
main purpose of the military establishment was to win wars, but after nuclear
weapons, it was to prevent them. This was to be done through deterrence, by
threatening unacceptable damage upon an enemy who might attempt to win a
nuclear exchange. In order to prevent the use of N-weapons, the adversary had
to be convinced of the certainty of their use against him.

Deterrence theory:
The development of deterrence theory, different from earlier versions of
dissuasion or coercion, and its ramifications, including game theory and other
refinements, was a result of the development of these weapons. Since deterrence
is sensitive to technological change, it sustained military R&D efforts
right through the Cold War.

The challenges:
There were problems with reliance on deterrence. What if a possessor of
N-weapons did not understand that these weapons were not meant for use? Fortunately,
these weapons were the product of big science, requiring heavy capital
investments and large and complex facilities. They were therefore in the hands
of states and it has been possible to deal with the proliferation of these
weapons through inter-state mechanisms like the IAEA and NPT.

How gunpowder
changed it

The invention of
the stirrup and high saddle in Asia enabled cavalry to dominate the
battlefield. Limitations of cavalry meant that infantry continued in new roles.

From the 12th
century until the end of the 17th century the proportion of cavalry to infantry
in most successful armies was steady, until the musket, bayonet and flintlock
increased infantry firepower, decimating cavalry.

Once gunpowder
could be used as a propellant for cannon balls breaking down castle walls,
tactics changed. Combined with the logistics revolution that long-distance
navigation, and soon the telegraph, mass production and railways made possible,
we saw an age of industrial war by European nations against the non-industrial
world from the 19th century.

NEW DELHI — Israel
will collaborate in producing high-tech systems for Indian soldiers, tapping a
potential US $3 billion market.

Israel will team
with India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) to produce a
variety of systems related to command and control, battlefield management,
sensors and weapons, according to a proposal that was finalized last month.

An Indian Army
official said the Indian Futuristic Infantry Soldier As a System (F-INSAS)
program “aims to utilize advanced technologies to enhance capabilities of an
individual soldier.” F-INSAS “is based on lessons from conflicts worldwide and
intends to make the Indian soldier a self-contained fighting machine,” the
official said.

DRDO and Israel
have agreed to jointly develop portable command-and-control (C2) systems for
Indian soldiers. The system will have an encrypted computer and a monitor able
to operate in harsh Indian weather. The system will be connected with the
Indian Army’s battlefield management system, a network-centric warfare project
under development, said another Indian Army source.

The economic model
of the arrangement between DRDO and Israel is unclear, but an Indian Army
source said the C2 system must be able to grow over the years to accommodate
1.1 million Indian troops.

In addition, DRDO
is teaming up with Israel for joint development of an advanced mobile
observation system for infantry soldiers that will operate through a radio
frequency sensor, allowing a soldier to remain at a distance while observing
and recording a target.

DRDO has also
submitted a proposal to the Indian Defence Ministry to develop an advanced
personal network radio able to integrate voice; command, control,
communications and intelligence applications; and GPS signals. The system will
be connected to long-range radio networks to provide unprecedented operational
range. This system will be developed with Israeli help.

To meet Army
requirements, DRDO is also developing a multi-caliber individual weapon system
and an air bursting grenade for individual weapons.

NEW DELHI — India
will replace its tactical ballistic missile Prithvi-1 with a shorter-range
missile, the Pragati, which was displayed for the first time at the KINTEX
Seoul defense show, Indian Army sources said.

Unlike the
Prithvi-I, which is propelled by liquid fuel, the Pragati is a solid-fuel
missile with a shorter range of between 70 and 170 kilometers. It helps fill
the gap created by the delay in the purchase of 155mm/52 caliber guns, said the
Army source.

The Army had been
demanding a solid-fueled missile in place of the Prithvi-I missile since its
induction in 1994. The Prithvi-I was cumbersome to move, maintain and deploy,
the source added.

Capable of firing
in a salvo, Pragati can be launched within two to three minutes of preparation
time, a much quicker reaction than the Prithvi-I, which requires at least half
an hour. The Prithvi-I missile still can be used for longer-range engagement, the
source said.

The
vehicle-mounted Pragati will fill the firing gap between the homegrown Pinaka
multibarrel rocket launcher, with a range of 40 kilometers, and the Prithvi-I
missile with a range of 150 kilometers, the source said.

Comparing the
missile to the Lockheed Martin Army Tactical Missile System, a scientist at the
Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) said they developed the
Pragati in response to the Nasr short-range missile produced by Pakistan.

Admitting that the
Army needs short-range missiles, the DRDO scientist said the Prithvi has
advanced guidance systems and has been tested several times. Its variants are
inducted in the Indian Army, Navy and Air Force, claimed the DRDO scientist.

The scientist,
however, would not comment on Pragati’s ability to carry a nuclear warhead.
Pakistan has claimed that its Nasr short-range missile can carry a nuclear
weapon.

Mahindra Singh, a
retired Army brigadier general, said the military would be able to strike more
targets with greater accuracy with the Pragati rather than depending on the
less accurate Prithvi, which would require a greater amount of explosives.

The Indian
government has clarified its stand that it will not treat Indian Army Capt.
Saurabh Kalia's torture by the Pakistan Army in 1999 during the Kargil conflict
as a war crime, counsel said Monday.

India has filed
its response in the case in the Supreme Court, saying it has no intention of
taking up the issue under the Geneva Convention.

"The
government in its reply says it's bound by some agreement (Simla Agreement of
1972), so it can't treat Saurabh Kalia's case as a war crime," martyr's
family counsel Arvind Sharma, who is based in Delhi, told IANS over telephone.

He said the case
has been listed for hearing Tuesday before an apex court bench headed by
Justice R.M. Lodha.

The apex court
bench of Justice R.M. Lodha and Justice Anil R. Dave issued notice to the
central government on a plea for direction that his torture by the Pakistan
Army be referred to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

Counsel Sharma
told the court that the victim's family approached the defence ministry seeking
that the matter be referred to the ICJ as Kalia's treatment, after being
captured, violated the international convention on the treatment of prisoners
of war.

Defence Minister
A.K. Antony in a reply to Rajya Sabha member Rajeev Chandrasekhar's letter said
in October 2013 "India is committed to settle differences with Pakistan by
peaceful means through bilateral negotiations," N.K. Kalia told IANS.

Kalia, 63, retired
as a senior scientist from the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research.

The letter,
forwarded by Chandrasekhar to Kalia, says: "The matter (killing of Capt.
Saurabh) has been examined in consultation with the Ministry of External
Affairs (MEA)."

"It's
informed by the MEA that they have raised the issue appropriately in the
international fora under the Simla Agreement with Pakistan. India is committed
to settle differences with Pakistan by peaceful means through bilateral
negotiations. Therefore, the matter has not been dealt with under the Geneva
Convention," said Antony's letter dated Oct 3, 2013.

Chandrasekhar, who
wrote a letter to the minister of external affairs, with a copy to the prime
minister and the defence minister, Dec 6, 2011, asked the MEA to "take up
the matter with the United Nations Human Rights Council to declare this as a
war crime and move the International Court of Justice".

Capt. Saurabh, of
the 4 Jat Regiment, was the first army officer to report the incursion by the
Pakistan Army on the Indian soil in Kargil region.

He and five
soldiers - Arjun Ram, Bhanwar Lal Bagaria, Bhika Ram, Moola Ram and Naresh
Singh - were on patrol of the Bajrang Post in the Kaksar sector of Jammu and
Kashmir when they were taken captive by the Pakistani Army troops May 15, 1999.

They were tortured
for weeks before being killed. Their mutilated bodies were handed over to the
Indian authorities June 9.

Achievements don't
usually get overlooked, but more often than not, we don't get to know about
them.

Something similar
happened when an Indian Army soldier climbed Mt. Everest twice in one year,
breaking through the cocoon of limitations.

Surmounting
difficulties has become second nature to Major Ranveer Singh Jamwal (VSM). He
climbed Mt. Everest on May 25, 2012 and on May 19, 2013, giving him the
distinction of summiting Everest twice within twelve months.

An innocent boy
from the non-descript village of Badhori in Jammu and Kashmir's Samba District,
Jamwal joined the army as a sepoy, and acquired the motivation to break all
shackles of human spirit to test his every limit.

The army helped
him to become a commissioned officer and his achievement of summiting Mt.
Everest twice within a year, has won him the Tenzing Norgay National Adventure
Award in August this year.

But, how many of
us have even heard of his name?

Jamwal's ever
smiling face and the pleasant demeanor infects everyone interacting with him.
He prides himself and his service, and this can be seen as soon as he starts
speaking.

Fondly called
Jammy, Jamwal said: "I am a typical soldier of the Indian Army, who is
ready to give his best in everything I am asked to do. Whatever achievements I
have in my name today, are the result of our army and my seniors."

"They were
there to not only to guide me, but also in the true esprit de corps, everyone
was there to help me to excel," he adds.

Life has been a
constant test of grit and resolve for Jamwal. He always dreamt of joining the
army. His father-Onkar Singh - is a retired soldier and Jamwal said he learnt
the dignity of hard work from the former. He sees his father as his role model.

His motto is
"stop thinking in terms of limitations and start thinking in terms of
possibilities".

Today, Jamwal is a
proud officer of the Jat regiment. He began his journey as an ordinary jawan in
the Dogra regiment, which he calls his nursery.

The officers of
the Dogra regiment guided him to clear his officer examination (Army Cadets
College) in four years. He joined the Indian Military Academy in 1998 and was
commissioned into the Jat regiment as an officer in June 2002.

Always inclined
towards sports, his joining a voluntary course in mountaineering at High
Altitude Warfare School (HAWS), Gulmarg, proved to be the catalyst for future
glory.

He was adjudged
the best student and was posted back to the HAWS as an instructor. From there,
he was sent to Switzerland to do a course in search and rescue in mountains. He
ended up being rated the best student.

While talking
about the kind of support he got, Major Jamwal said: "Can you imagine
every person in my regiment used to be aware of my every step forward, and, it
was because they all wanted me to do well."

His family, which
includes his father, mother, younger brother, wife and two kids, has been a
constant source of motivation.

"Every award
and recognition is actually shared by my family," he says.

His wife, Kiran,
says: "Since my first day of marriage, I had sensed his dedication and
devotion towards his work, and thus, I decided to help him to give his
best."

This officer has
also climbed peaks in Europe, Africa and South America.

Because of his
selfless devotion and fearless leadership, Jamwal was given the Vishisht Sewa
Medal in 2013.

He has been
actively involved in various rescue expeditions in Kashmir and the Garhwal
Himalayas.

The Government of
Nepal has also acknowledged this feat by awarding him the Sagarmatha Pollution
Control Committee appreciation certificate.

Jammu and Kashmir
MLA Surjit Singh Slathia, who represents the constituency from to which Major
Jamwal hails says, "We are proud of his achievements. He has brought
laurels to our country and to Jammu and Kashmir." (ANI)

India arms, with
little rationale. Growing affluence has led to advanced weapons purchases, with
defence spending tripling over the decade and a slew of contracts in the wake —
the MRCA fighter aircraft, C-17 transport planes, attack helicopters, aircraft
carriers and leased nuclear submarines.

However, there is
little doctrinal and strategic sense behind this purported modernisation.
Purchases are conducted, while pursuing a Sisyphean dream of indigenisation.
Delays, with ensuing corruption charges, blow a hole in our national security.

A default policy
of strategic restraint is pursued, keeping quiet and lying low. Despite border
transgressions, this policy keeps us out of regional alliances, branding us as
a soft state, enabling ad hoc defence procurement. Insurgencies, whether in
Kashmir or the Northeast, remain our primary official threat, with the
Naxalites as a close second.

Dysfunctional
institutional relationships and inter-service rivalries are stymieing
integration. Lacking an integrated national security doctrine, the Army plans
for a two-front war and operationalising the Cold Start doctrine. The Air Force
plans for an offensive strategic air campaign, with the MRCA contract. The Navy
builds carrier task forces and expeditionary warfare capabilities. Ninety per
cent of the ministry of defence’s joint secretaries focus mostly on
procurement, leaving little for planning.

Misalignment of
resources and tactics leads to negligible inter-service cooperation while
maintaining civilian control, minimising costs, slowly indigenising and
utilising inappropriate forces for domestic security threats. This
institutional dysfunction must change, with an empowered chief of defence staff
appointed, and lateral recruitment from the IAS, foreign service and ministry
of finance encouraged, bolstering in-house expertise. Our defence culture
should change, from stressing disengagement, avoiding confrontation and a
defensive mindset to one that promotes integration and proactively manages
threats and opportunities.

With little
planning, our procurement is expensive, distracted by payment/offset issues and
corruption scandals. Any defence acquisition goes through three ministries. The
DRDO’s privileged role as a bidder and evaluator ensures veto power over
imports, delaying procurement until marked research failures. There are few
exports, with no credible advanced weapons manufacturing base. Military wages
should attain parity with civilians, recognising their hardships.

Our outdated
ordnance factories need professionalisation, with joint ventures with private
firms encouraged. Defence exports should be promoted, in order to increase
scale and foster innovation. Our defence acquisition planning must be cognisant
of long term military trends and threat perceptions. The offset process needs
definition, with relevant trade-offs offered — ‘a more offset the better’ will
not be suffice.

The DRDO has been
a muted failure, with few deployed weapon system successes, with significant
gains made primarily in the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme
(Prithvi, Agni et al) and white elephants (the LCA, Arjun) scattered around.
Poor planning, over-optimistic timelines and lack of coordination, along with
unionisation ensures cost and time overruns. The DRDO should be trimmed to a
manageable size, spinning off its numerous laboratories, allowing it to focus
on areas of competence, with public audit of major projects, and encouraging
private participation in defence R&D.

The Army lies in a
bind. With multiple mandates, it focuses on counterinsurgency, while preparing
for a two-front war, maintaining peace-keeping and disaster recovery
capabilities. Cold Start, with integrated battle groups, rebuilds it as a
networked agile force. This increasing armoured mobility needs to be matched by
purchases of helicopters, tanks and howitzers, battlespace management systems
and networked units (F-INSAS systems). Its emphasis on manoeuvre and initiative
will require significant cultural change, cantonment system reforms and a
flatter hierarchy.

A meritorious
culture has to be promoted, with greater recruitment from the rural masses,
along with more officer training academies, to address officer shortage, with
promotions linked to both seniority and merit. Lateral recruitment from the
National Cadet Corps and ancillaries and opportunities for junior commissioned
officers (JCOs) ought to be encouraged. It must break out of this statist
posture.

Attrition dwindles
India’s Air Force. Confined fundamentally to air defence, the MiG’s growing
obsolescence reduces its combative power, increasing dependence on foreign
imports and higher variability in its aircraft mix — a logistical nightmare.
Offensive air operations should be given equal priority with air defence, with
force multipliers like aerial refuelling, electronic warfare and space asset
integration.

Close air support
integration with the army requires implementation, particularly on a doctrinal
and tactical level. Underrated capabilities in airlift and aerial
reconnaissance should be bolstered, providing greater expeditionary and
humanitarian support and real-time intelligence, particularly through the
timely purchase and development of UAVs and military satellites.

India’s navy
stagnates, with a rusty underwater fleet. The delayed operationalisation of INS
Arihant and with Sagarika, the ballistic missile, still not deployed, the
nuclear triad dream is pushed into the medium term. While expeditionary
capabilities have been built, particularly with two carrier task forces,
underwater deterrence has been neglected, with the Scorpene delays leaving
India with few submarines to matter.

The Navy should
have a larger budget to meet the growing maritime trade and coastal security
requirements. Long-range reconnaissance systems could be purchased, to keep
trading lanes open and terrorist threats at bay. In-house submarine building
capabilities can be revived with a new line established. It should be built as
India’s true strategic force, with nuclear submarines armed with ballistic
missiles.

India’s rise
requires a build-up of strength. Its professional armed forces have little
influence on policy — this must change. Strong institutional reform, promoting
joint doctrines, integrated services and better policy-making in line with
clearly enunciated strategic national goals, must be enacted. Neglect and
dysfunction left us bereft once; the same must not be repeated.