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enBan the bomb?: An Indian responsehttp://thebulletin.org/2014/november/ban-bomb-indian-response7789
Decades after several nuclear weapon states committed themselves to pursuing disarmament "in good faith" and "at an early date," frustration over the pace of disarmament is growing more conspicuous. For example, calls are emerging to establish a treaty banning nuclear weapons, essentially making outlaws of nuclear-armed nations. Authors from three countries—Richard Lennane of Australia (2014), Bharat Karnad of India, and Héctor Guerra of Mexico (2014)—address this question: How would prospects for disarmament be affected if non-nuclear nations established a treaty that banned nuclear weapons outright—and how might such a ban be enforced?
2014-11-01 00:00:00<a href="/bio/bharat-karnad">Bharat Karnad</a>http://thebulletin.org/2014/november/ban-bomb-indian-response7789Siegfried S. Hecker: The story of Plutonium Mountainhttp://thebulletin.org/2013/september/siegfried-s-hecker-story-plutonium-mountain
In this interview, former Los Alamos National Laboratory director Siegfried S. Hecker details one of the world’s great nonproliferation stories—the effort to secure the Semipalatinsk Test Site in Kazakhstan. He recounts his visit to the Russian nuclear weapons labs in early 1992, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when he found underfunded scientists who were indifferent to the cleanup of the testing site in the now-independent Kazakhstan and doubtful that the site would pose a security threat. Hecker talks about how he was able to organize engineers and nuclear scientists in the United States, Russia, and Kazakhstan to come together in a 15-year, $150-million effort to secure many of the tunnels and test areas at the sprawling Semipalatinsk Test Site.
2013-09-01 00:00:00http://thebulletin.org/2013/september/siegfried-s-hecker-story-plutonium-mountainHow to close the US nuclear industry: Do nothinghttp://thebulletin.org/2013/march/how-close-us-nuclear-industry-do-nothing
The United States is on course to all but exit the commercial nuclear power industry even if the country awakens to the dangers of climate change and adopts measures to favor low-carbon energy sources. Nuclear power had been in economic decline for more than three decades when the Bush administration launched a program that aimed to spark a nuclear power renaissance through subsidies and a reformed reactor licensing process. But Wall Street was already leery of the historically high costs of nuclear power. An abundance of natural gas, lower energy demand induced by the 2008 recession, increased energy-efficiency measures, nuclear’s rising cost estimates, and the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station further diminished prospects for private investment in new US nuclear plants. Without additional and significant governmental preferences for new nuclear construction, market forces will all but phase out the US nuclear fleet by midcentury.
2013-03-01 00:00:00<a href="/bio/peter-bradford">Peter A. Bradford</a>http://thebulletin.org/2013/march/how-close-us-nuclear-industry-do-nothingThe limited national security implications of civilian nuclear declinehttp://thebulletin.org/2013/march/limited-national-security-implications-civilian-nuclear-decline
A declared exit from commercial nuclear power in the United States is highly improbable. But a stealthy, gradual nuclear decline motivated by economics seems reasonably likely, as US utilities decide to close some plants early, rather than implement costly post-Fukushima safety regulations, and the number of new nuclear power plants fails to offset retirements. If nuclear power does make a slow exit, the national security implications are smaller than sometimes suggested. Nuclear energy is far down the list of options for enhancing the US military’s energy security. Weapons programs aren’t dependent on the civilian nuclear industry, and the nuclear Navy has a reliable supply chain. The United States has not needed to produce fissile material for weapons in decades, and although tritium for defense purposes is now produced in civilian reactors, there are other options for obtaining it. A nuclear phase-out could affect US nuclear export control and nonproliferation efforts, but export controls are only one tool among many that can be used to curb the desire for nuclear weapons. Even in a slow slide toward phase-out, the United States would remain at the global nuclear bargaining table for decades because of its status as a military nuclear superpower.
2013-03-01 00:00:00<a href="/bio/sharon-squassoni">Sharon Squassoni</a>http://thebulletin.org/2013/march/limited-national-security-implications-civilian-nuclear-declineThe economics of a US civilian nuclear phase-outhttp://thebulletin.org/2013/march/economics-us-civilian-nuclear-phase-out
In the United States, which trades three-fifths of its electricity in competitive markets, the prohibitive capital cost of new nuclear power plants ensures that only a handful will be built. Nonetheless, with 40-year licenses being extended to 60 years, the 104 existing reactors’ relatively low generating costs are widely expected to justify decades of continued operation. But the generating costs of aging reactors have been rising, while competitors, including modern renewables, show rapidly falling total costs—and those opposed cost curves have begun to intersect. An expanding fraction of well-running nuclear plants is now challenged to compete with moderating wholesale power prices, while plants needing major repairs or located in regions rich in wind power increasingly face difficult choices of whether to run or close. Thus, even without events that might accelerate nuclear phase-out, as the Fukushima disaster did in Germany, shifting competitive conditions have begun to drive a gradual US nuclear phase-out. Its economics are illuminated by a detailed energy scenario that needs no nuclear energy, coal, or oil and one-third less natural gas to run a 158 percent bigger US economy in 2050—but cuts carbon emissions by 82 to 86 percent and costs $5 trillion less. That scenario’s 80-percent-renewable, 50-percent-distributed, equally reliable, and more resilient electricity system would cost essentially the same as a business-as-usual version that sustains nuclear and coal power, but it would better manage all the system’s risks. Similarly comprehensive modeling could also analyze faster nuclear phase-out if desired.
2013-03-01 00:00:00<a href="/bio/amory-b-lovins">Amory B. Lovins</a>http://thebulletin.org/2013/march/economics-us-civilian-nuclear-phase-outNuclear exit, the US energy mix, and carbon dioxide emissionshttp://thebulletin.org/2013/march/nuclear-exit-us-energy-mix-and-carbon-dioxide-emissions
If the United States were to adopt a policy to phase out nuclear generation, as has happened recently in other developed countries, what would the environmental and energy-mix implications be? Based on alternative scenarios of nuclear exit that consider the influence of potential policies to limit greenhouse gas emissions, a model of the US and global economy indicates that, under current policy, a US nuclear exit would increase carbon dioxide emissions, and likely raise electricity prices and reduce gross domestic product by relatively small amounts. Those economic impacts would be increased by additional measures to limit carbon dioxide emissions.
2013-03-01 00:00:00<a href="/bio/henry-d-jacoby">Henry D. Jacoby</a>, <a href="/bio/sergey-paltsev">Sergey Paltsev</a>http://thebulletin.org/2013/march/nuclear-exit-us-energy-mix-and-carbon-dioxide-emissionsThe Cuban Missile Crisis: A nuclear order of battle, October and November 1962http://thebulletin.org/2012/november/cuban-missile-crisis-nuclear-order-battle-october-and-november-1962
This year marks the 50th anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis, when the United States and the Soviet Union walked back from the brink of a nuclear war. In this issue of Nuclear Notebook, the authors analyze the order of battle of nuclear forces that were available to military and civilian officials in both the United States and the Soviet Union in October and November of 1962. This detail, they point out, has remained widely overlooked by authors, experts, and researchers over the past five decades. Once these nuclear forces are defined, the authors write, the true nature of the crisis was even more serious and dangerous than previously thought. 2012-11-01 00:00:00<a href="/bio/hans-m-kristensen">Hans M. Kristensen</a>, <a href="/bio/robert-s-norris">Robert S. Norris</a>http://thebulletin.org/2012/november/cuban-missile-crisis-nuclear-order-battle-october-and-november-1962Modernization of nuclear weapons: Aspiring to “indefinite retention”?http://thebulletin.org/2012/september/modernization-nuclear-weapons-aspiring-%E2%80%9Cindefinite-retention%E2%80%9D
Currently, all nations with nuclear weapons are modernizing their arsenals, delivery systems, and related infrastructure. These programs have serious implications for nuclear disarmament. By investing in the extension, upgrading, and reinforcement of their arsenals and capacities, the author writes, these governments are investing in the future of nuclear weapons, not in the future of disarmament. Other non-nuclear states have expressed concern with these programs and are using international venues, including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty review conferences, to call on the nuclear-armed states to cease these programs, which undermine the objectives of the treaty in terms of both non-proliferation and disarmament. Ending upgrades and investment in nuclear weapons would help establish the necessary conditions for disarmament. The author writes that non-nuclear weapon states should further advance the conditions for disarmament by negotiating a treaty banning nuclear weapons, highlighting that the world’s governments, themselves, do not need to possess nuclear weapons in order to prohibit them.
2012-09-01 00:00:00<a href="/bio/ray-acheson">Ray Acheson</a>http://thebulletin.org/2012/september/modernization-nuclear-weapons-aspiring-%E2%80%9Cindefinite-retention%E2%80%9DArctic 2030: What are the consequences of climate change?http://thebulletin.org/2012/july/arctic-2030-what-are-consequences-climate-change
Although scientists disagree about the rate at which Arctic ice is melting, climate change will greatly alter the northern latitudes in coming decades if greenhouse gas emissions are not greatly curtailed. Many of the expected changes will be negative; already, permafrost is melting in Siberia, and apartments and factories are sinking into quagmires. The melting of Arctic ice, however, will also open sea-lanes to shipping and allow access to enormous oil and gas reserves beneath the Arctic Ocean. The prospect of increased Arctic commerce brings with it competition among countries and companies for control of the area’s riches, and international competition always carries the possibility of conflict. Three authors, all experts in national security and the Arctic, explore the military, diplomatic, environmental, and economic outlook for the Arctic in 2030: from Russia, Yury Morozov (2012); from Canada, Rob Huebert; and from the United States, George Backus (2012).
2012-07-01 00:00:00<a href="/bio/rob-huebert">Rob Huebert</a>http://thebulletin.org/2012/july/arctic-2030-what-are-consequences-climate-changePrinciples in practice: Radiation regulation and the NRChttp://thebulletin.org/2012/may/principles-practice-radiation-regulation-and-nrc
The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission uses quantitative radiogenic cancer risk information in a number of official areas. In this article, the authors describe two specific areas where quantitative cancer risk information is used: (1) the system of radiation protection for workers and the public, and (2) the performance of value-impact analysis (i.e., cost–benefit analysis) in the review of imposing new regulations on the industry. The authors write that two main factors have led to a change in the recommended occupational dose limit. First, the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) moved away from comparisons with safe industries, instead basing its assessment on cancer risk resulting from a lifetime of radiation exposure. The second factor is that additional epidemiological data have accumulated since 1977 and, combined with changes in the methods used to analyze this data, have resulted in a reassessment of the risk-per-unit radiation dose. The ICRP now recommends an annual occupational dose limit of .020 sievert. There was no corresponding change in the recommended dose limit for members of the public. Currently, the NRC is evaluating these changes and considering revising its regulations accordingly. Nonetheless, the authors write, dose limits play a very small role in modern radiation protection practices, the emphasis being on optimizing situations involving radiation exposure, with the result that most licensed facilities operate at annual doses to workers and members of the public that are well below any applicable limit.
2012-05-01 00:00:00<a href="/bio/terry-brock">Terry A. Brock</a>, <a href="/bio/sami-s-sherbini">Sami S. Sherbini</a>http://thebulletin.org/2012/may/principles-practice-radiation-regulation-and-nrcRussian nuclear forces, 2012http://thebulletin.org/2012/march/russian-nuclear-forces-2012
Despite the promise of a more transparent future after Russia's ratification of New START in January 2011, the international community’s ability to monitor developments in Russia’s nuclear forces has become more difficult because the Kremlin does not release full aggregate treaty numbers of the country’s strategic nuclear forces and the United States has agreed not to make the information available as it did during START I. Despite these obstacles, the two authors estimate that Russia has more than 4,400 nuclear warheads assigned to its military forces that are undergoing widespread modernization. 2012-03-01 00:00:00<a href="/bio/hans-m-kristensen">Hans M. Kristensen</a>, <a href="/bio/robert-s-norris">Robert S. Norris</a>http://thebulletin.org/2012/march/russian-nuclear-forces-2012Nuclear pursuits, 2012http://thebulletin.org/2012/january/nuclear-pursuits-2012
In this Nuclear Notebook the authors highlight the key milestones and facts regarding the nuclear pursuits of the first five states to develop nuclear weapons—the United States, the Soviet Union and Russia, Britain, France, and China. 2012-01-01 00:00:00<a href="/bio/hans-m-kristensen">Hans M. Kristensen</a>, <a href="/bio/robert-s-norris">Robert S. Norris</a>http://thebulletin.org/2012/january/nuclear-pursuits-2012Rose Gottemoeller: Getting to yeshttp://thebulletin.org/2011/november/rose-gottemoeller-getting-yes
The assistant secretary of state for the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance discusses where the United States is headed with various treaties like New START, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). In this interview, she describes how the United States and Russia are implementing New START and explains how this experience might be helpful in paving the way for CTBT ratification down the road. She discusses how the United States would prefer to have the FMCT negotiated within the Conference on Disarmament, and notes that the P5 is prepared to “wrestle this problem to the ground.” Today’s concerns do not revolve around a massive strike from the Russian Federation, she says—it is no longer the Cold War. She describes the biggest threat to be the same one President Barack Obama mentioned in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review—terrorism.
2011-11-01 00:00:00http://thebulletin.org/2011/november/rose-gottemoeller-getting-yesThe implications of Fukushimahttp://thebulletin.org/2011/julyaugust/implications-fukushima
The effects of the tragedy at Japan’s Fukushima power plant will continue to reverberate over the upcoming weeks, months, and years. And, as the writers in this symposium explain, the consequences of the disaster go beyond Japan—like Chernobyl and Three Mile Island, Fukushima will reshape nuclear agendas and policies in countries around the world. In this Global Forum, leading experts reflect on the current and future implications of Fukushima for their own countries—the United States, the European Union, and South Korea. Mark Cooper (2011) writes from the United States; Caroline Jorant from the European Union; and Soon Heung Chang (2011) from South Korea. In August, this forum will continue as a Roundtable at www.thebulletin.org.
2011-07-01 00:00:00<a href="/bio/caroline-jorant">Caroline Jorant</a>http://thebulletin.org/2011/julyaugust/implications-fukushimaFrom danger to dollars: What the US should do with its highly
enriched uraniumhttp://thebulletin.org/2010/novemberdecember/danger-dollars-what-us-should-do-its-highly-enriched-uranium
Although the Obama administration has highlighted the need to secure fissile
material worldwide, domestic efforts to secure highly enriched uranium (HEU)
have been sluggish and uninspired. In the post-9/11 era, the United States has
tremendous opportunities not only to better secure its dangerous HEU, but to
make money by doing so. The authors write that the United States could create a
new HEU surplus by designating that which is unnecessary for military needs;
reduce the backlog of retired warheads awaiting dismantlement; increase the rate
at which surplus HEU is downblended into low enriched uranium (LEU), a form of
uranium unusable for weapons but usable as nuclear fuel; and sell that LEU to
nuclear power plants for billions of dollars. The slow pace of downblending HEU
in the United States poses a security risk to the population, deprives taxpayers
of a needed source of revenue, and sends the wrong message to the global
community about the US commitment to combating nuclear terrorism, the authors
point out, and developing and implementing a new downblending strategy should be
a priority.
2010-11-01 00:00:00<a href="/bio/peter-stockton">Peter Stockton</a>, <a href="/bio/ingrid-drake">Ingrid Drake</a>http://thebulletin.org/2010/novemberdecember/danger-dollars-what-us-should-do-its-highly-enriched-uranium