USS Hancock CV-19 WWII Operational History

The following is what we believe to be a report to the CNO from Capt. Gallery with the subject being "The
Forwarding of the War History of U.S.S. Hancock" The report was submitted to to the Association in an electronic
format from one of the Members of the U.S.S. Hancock Association and little has been done in the way of editing
the page or contents. The little editing that was done was for lay-out purposes only. We have confirmed some of
the incidents, times and dates, etc.

It is great reading and it took a long time to get the page posted because of the extensiveness of work. We tried
to retain as much of the original format as possible.

Enclosure: (A) War History of U.S.S. HANCOCK (CV19) from 15 April 1944.

1. In accordance with and in compliance of references (a) through (f), enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith.

2. Four copies of the Historical Narrative portion of the History were mailed to the Commandant of the ELEVENTH
Naval District on 6 October 1945 for public information in compliance with dispatch 300701 September of Commander
Task Group 38.1.

First Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. HANCOCK was Captain FRED C. DICKEY, of Manchester, New Hampshire. He
served as prospective Commanding Officer from February, 1944 until the ship was commissioned, when he took command.
Under his guidance, the ship went through her shakedown cruise, journeyed from Boston to Ulithi, and was in combat
for two months before he was relieved by Captain ROBERT F. HICKEY on November 30, 1944.

Since his enlistment in the Regular Navy.

In May, 1922, he was assigned to a shore station, receiving orders to report to the Naval Station, Pensacola,
Florida, as radio communication officer.

After three years duty at Pensacola, Captain DICKEY in October, 1925, joined the U.S.S. MARBLEHEAD and served
in the ship as senior aviator. During this period, he participated in the second Nicaraguan Campaign and the Yangtse
River Campaign, serving one year in the China station.

From 1928 until 1931 followed another tour of duty at Pensacola and afterward came three years in the U.S.S.
CHICAGO. The first two years of this duty, he served as Senior Aviator of the CHICAGO and Executive Officer of
Scouting Squadron TEN. The third year, he assumed command of Scouting Squadron TEN with additional duty as Commander,
Scouting Wing Cruiser Scouting Force.

In July, 1934, Captain DICKEY reported for duty under instruction at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island,
and spent nearly a year there in preparation for the next stop in his Navy career. This was command of Patrol Squadron
THREE, then based in the Canal Zone. From March 1937, until June 1939, he served as gunnery and tactical officer,
Patrol Plane Scouting Force, the first year of this duty being served as a member of Admiral Ernest J. King's Staff
and the second being spent in the same capacity with Rear Admiral C.S. Blakely.

Following this two year tour of staff duty, Captain DICKEY assumed command of the San Pedro Naval Air Station
and held that position until he was assigned to the aircraft carrier WASP in 1941. He assumed command of the Hutchinson
Naval Air Station in at December, 1942. In February of 1944, he was relieved of his duties Hutchinson and reported
at Quincy, Massachusetts, as prospective Commanding Officer of this ship and officially became Commanding Officer
when it was put into commission April 15.

Captain DICKEY holds seven service and campaign ribbons, the Victory Medal with star, the second Nicaraguan
Campaign Medal, the European-Africa-Middle East Campaign Medal and the Asiatic-Pacific Area Campaign Medal.

For his services on the HANCOCK, he was awarded the Silver Star Medal.

Traditional change-of-command ceremonies held on the hangar deck made November 30 a significant date in HANCOCK
history as Captain ROBERT F. HICKEY relieved Captain FRED C. DICKEY to become the second man to hold the responsible
position of command.

Officers and crew of the ship were gathered to witness the ceremonies and were given a quick inspection by way
of introducing them to the new Captain.

This was followed by a few words by departing Captain DICKEY, in which he remarked that the HANCOCK has come
a long way in ability, since she hoisted the Colors on April 15 and that she has donned a reputation that commands
respect in the fleet.

Reading of orders followed and the official change of command then was a matter of record.

Captain HICKEY comes to us from Washington, where he was in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, holding
the job of Director of Aviation Personnel. Up to the time he came aboard, he had 23 years of commissioned Naval
service, which started when he left the Naval Academy as an Ensign in the Class of 1921.

Born 28 December 1897 in Red Bluff, California, Captain HICKEY is still a Californian. He calls Yreka, California,
his home, and his wife (who was Miss Virginia Burnham before their marriage in June of 1928) lives with their two
children in San Diego, California. The children are Patricia Ann (15) and Robert Ashley (6).

He started his advance education at the University of California, where who was a student during 1915 and 1916,
at which time he received an appointment to the Naval Academy and left for 4 years of Annapolis life. On 3 June
1921, he became Ensign, and was sent to the U.S.S. WYOMING for his first commissioned year.

June of 1922 found him on his way, via the Suez Canal, to China duty aboard the U.S.S. POPE, a destroyer, on
which he was Engineering Officer. Submarine duty followed, and in August, 1924, he was sent to S-6.

His career in Naval Aviation began on January, 1925, when he was ordered to the Naval Air Station at Pensacola
for duty as student Naval Aviator. He received his wings in November of that year and was assigned to Fighting
Squadron TWO on board the U.S.S. LANGLEY.

Four years later, in 1928, he returned to Pensacola, this time as an instructor. Two years as an instructor
were followed by duty as Gunnery Officer, Executive Officer, and, for a short time Commanding Officer of Fighting
Squadron SIX.

In June, 1933, he was assigned duties as Commanding Officer of the Naval Reserve Aviation Base, Floyd Bennett
Field, and New York. It was during the stay of Captain HICKEY that the Italian Balbo made his flight to the United
States and based at Floyd Bennett Field before returning to Italy.

In June, 1935, he was made Senior Aviator aboard the U.S.S. CALIFORNIA, and a year later was Executive Officer
of VO 4B in the WEST VIRGINIA. He was given the job of Commanding Officer, VO 3B, and Aviation Officer in the staff
of ComBatDiv THREE in December, 1936. During this time, he saw duty aboard the IDAHO and the NEW MEXICO.

Shore duty followed in July, 1937, when he was assigned duty as Commanding Officer of Patrol Squadron SIX, based
at Pearl harbor. In July of 1939, he was shifted to duty aboard the RANGER as Assistant Air Officer.

A year of duty as Commander Air Group FOUR, based in the RANGER, started in June 1940 and ended in May 1941.
During this period, the RANGER did service in the Neutrality Patrol in the Atlantic and Caribbean.

Captain HICKEY then was assigned duty as Commanding Officer, Naval Air Station, Bermuda, where he remained until
he was sent to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations in November 1942. This was followed by assignment to
the HANCOCK.

Captain HICKEY was relieved on September 7, 1945, after serving as Commanding Officer for a week more than nine
months. He was awarded the Legion of Merit for his services as HANCOCK Commanding Officer.

Captain DANIEL V. GALLERY, famed for his achievement when, as Commanding Officer of the escort carrier GUADACANAL,
he was credited with the sinking of eleven German submarine and also captured another German sub in the first American
boarding party activity since 1815. He became the third Commanding Officer of the HANCOCK on 7 September 1945,
relieving Captain ROBERT F. HICKEY.

A native of Chicago, Ill., Captain GALLERY had seen 28 years of Naval Service before he came aboard the HANCOCK.
He had been a naval aviator for 18 years, and he had been commanding officer of a ship for one year.

His education prior to being commissioned a Naval Officer was at St. Ignacious High School (Parochial) in Chicago,
and at the Naval Academy, where he was a member of the class of 1921, which graduated in 1920 as a result of stepped-up
commissioning that followed World War I. From June of 1920 until December of 1926, he was assigned to battleships
and destroyers.

His
life in aviation started when he was assigned to Pensacola for flight training in January, 1927. Training completed,
he was assigned with:

Torpedo Squadron NINE for three years

Post Graduate School of Aviation Ordnance, three years

Aircraft squadron with the battle fleet, three years

Commanding Officer of Scouting Squadron FOUR

Commanding Officer of Observation Squadron THREE

Officer-in-Charge of the Aviation Section, Bureau of Ordnance

Special Navy Observer in England prior to World War II

From December 1941 until June 1943, he was Commanding Officer of the Fleet Air Base in Reykjavik, Iceland, and
from this duty went to sea as Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. GUADACANAL.

He was the first man to take-off and land on the deck of that escort carrier. Under his command, the GUADACANAL
scored eleven submarine kills. And he was the Commanding Officer of that ship, together with five destroyer escorts
which captured a Nazi submarine, U-Boat 505, off French West Africa on June 4, 1944. Not since 1815 had a United
States Navy boarding party taken a ship as a prize. After the Nazi sub had been captured, Captain GALLERY led the
boarding party that went aboard to look for booby traps.

One other duty filled his time before he came to the HANCOCK; from October, 1944, until June, 1945, he was assistant
director of the Aviation Planning Division of the Navy Department.

He distinguished himself extra-crucially in 1920, when he went to Antwerp with the American Olympic Team as
a wrestler. He was also a baseball player while at the Academy, playing with a class team.

At the time he came to the HANCOCK, he held the Distinguished Service Medal, the Bronze Star Medal, a Commendation
Ribbon, the Presidential Unit Citation, the Commander of the British Empire Medal, and the Expert Pistol Medal.

He is married (wife, Vera D. GALLERY) and has three children; James J. (13); Dan V. (11); and Beatrice Constance
(9). His home is Harmony Farm, Vienna, Virginia. He has three brothers, all of them in the Navy. One is Captain
W.O. GALLERY, USN., also an aviator, and a graduate of the Naval Academy Class of 1925, another is Captain P.D.
GALLERY, USN., a graduate of the Naval Academy Class of 1928, and the third is Lieutenant J. I. GALLERY, USNR.,
who is in the Chaplain Corps.

His favorite recreations are baseball and music. His love for the former is proved by his planning and executing
of the first playing of regulation softball on the flight deck of the HANCOCK. Something which had never been done
on an aircraft carrier, and which was inaugurated on this ship while anchored in Tokyo Bay in September, 1945.

1745 The ship was placed
in commission. Officers and crew were at quarters on the hangar deck. Captain R. C. GRADY, USN., Captain of the
Yard, Boston Navy Yard, and representative of the Commandant First Naval District read the order to commission
the ship. The National Anthem was played, the ensign was broken and the jack hoisted, and the personal flag of
Rear Admiral R. A. THEOBALD, USN., Commandant First Naval District was broken.

1748 Captain
FRED C. DICKEY read his orders from the Chief of NavPers dated 31 December 1943, assumed command of this vessel
and set the watch. Brief address made by Adm. THEOBALD, Hon. LEVERETT SALTONSTALL. Gov. of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, Mrs. DeWITT C. RAMSEY, sponsor of this vessel; and the captain.

1805 Piped down from commissioning
ceremony.

1810 The Commandant First
Naval District left the ship, his personal flag was hauled down and the commission pennant broken.

0600 Get underway at various
courses and speeds to conduct air operations. Exercised at fire and rescue quarters, fire quarters and gunnery
practice Offensive and defensive battle tactics - General Quarters. 1613 ceased flight operations. 1713 Anchored
in Old Plantation Flats.

3 June -

1229 Underway; standard speed
15 knots, 113 R.P.M., steaming on various courses at various speeds to carry out damage control problems.
1433 Secured from General Quarters (Damage Control Problem). 1542 Anchored in Chesapeake Bay, Old Plantation
Flats.

0858 Got underway in obedience
to ComAirPac orders of 24 September 1944. 0925 Passed through anti-submarine nets. 0940 Rendezvous with screen,
U.S.S. EDWARDS (DD619), ComDesDiv 14, USS CALDWELL (DD605) and USS COUGHLAN (DD606). 1218-1233 Maneuvering at various
courses and speeds to take position 1000 yards astern of WEST VIRGINIA. Steaming in company with Task Unit 12.5.2
on base course 260 T. Guide and OTC in WEST VIRGINIA (BB48).

30 September -

1129 Left Task Unit 12.5.2
with COUGHLAND and CALDWELL and proceeded to carry out orders of CincPac.

OCTOBER 1944

1 October -

Steaming on detached duty
in company with COUGHLAN (DD606) and CALDWELL (DD605) on base course 255 T. HANCOCK is OTC and guide.

Steaming in formation with
Task Group 38.2. SOPA Commander THIRD Fleet, Admiral W.F. HALSEY, in NEW JERSEY.

22 October -

1345 Pursuant to ComThirdFleet,
order number 220121 dated 22 October 1944, detached from TG 38.2 and proceeded to join TG 38.1 for temporary duty.
1457 Joined TG 38.1 and took station. Guide in U.S.S. OAKLAND, CTG in U.S.S. WASP.

26 October -

1804 Pursuant to ComThirdFleet
instructions, detached from Task Group 38.1 temporary duty completed and commenced maneuvering to join Task Group
38.2. 1836 on station, as a unit in Task Group 38.2, guide, and formation center in the INTREPID. SOPA is Rear
Admiral BOGAN in INTREPID.

1514 Underway. Commenced
maneuvering on various courses and speeds conforming to channel and to take place in Task Group 38.2. SOPA in U.S.S.
NEW JERSEY, OTC in U.S.S. INTREPID. 1626 Took departure from Ulithi Harbor, Ulithi Islands, West Caroline Group
with tower on Mangelang Island bearing 217 T and pgc, distance one mile, maneuvering at various courses and speeds
to gain place in formation.

15 November -

2306 Observed electrical
phenomena known as St. Elmo's fire on various antennae. 2339 St. Elmo's fire ceased.

0755 Changed course to 325
T and pgc, 334 psc, in company with U.S.S. THE SULLIVANS (DD537) and U.S.S. STEPHEN POTTER (DD538) on orders assigned.
0835 Commenced steaming on various courses and at various speeds to gain position for transfer of Vice Admiral
JOHN S. McCain, Commander Second Carrier Task Force, and Staff from U.S.S. WASP (CV18). 1047 Came alongside U.S.S.
PECOS (AO-65) to transfer personnel and baggage. 1119 Vice Admiral JOHN S. McCain and his staff came aboard. 1535
Received on board CTG 38.2, Vice Admiral G.F. BOGAN, and four members of his staff from destroyer.

1233 Enemy plane (Zeke) shot
out of air about 700 feet overhead. A wing and parts of the fuselage in flames landed on the flight deck, port
side frame 20 and on the forward 20 mm gun platform; another portion of the fuselage landed on the flight deck
amidships; sounded fire alarm and the 1235 fire was extinguished. Damage to material: one (1) 20 mm gun mount destroyed.
1254 Enemy planes crash dived into INTREPID and CABOT.

0546 Anchor aweigh; maneuvering
on various courses and speeds approaching new berth. 0657 Anchored in Berth 38 in 22 fathoms of water with 90 fathoms
of chain to the port anchor. 1944 Comdr. RALPH S. CLARKE, USN, was detached as Executive Officer of this ship for
duty as Commanding Officer of U.S.S. PETROF BAY (CVE80).

1328 VT 124, Bu #23539, pilot,
Lieut. (jg) C.R. DEAN, 298954, and crewmen F.J. BLAKE, ARM3c, and D.E.ZIMA, AOM2c, made a normal landing and taxied
forward. As the plane reached a point abreast the island a violent explosion occurred, believed to have been caused
by the detonation of two (2) 500 lb. bombs adrift in the plane's bomb bay. The immediate results of the explosion
were: casualties: killed - 62; critically injured - 46; seriously injured - 25; slightly injured - 20. A 10x16
foot hole in the flight deck, gallery deck area in the vicinity demolished, inboard side signal bridge wrecked.
3 airplanes demolished. numerous shrapnel holes throughout the island structure. Fires broke out on the flight,
gallery, and hangar decks. Hauled clear of the formation and commenced maneuvering at various courses and speeds
in an attempt to control the winds over the deck, and with high speed turns, to wash flooding water out of the
hangar deck. 1342 Fire in hangar deck under control. 1405 Fire in gallery deck under control. 1406 HANCOCK planes
in the vicinity commenced landing on other carriers of the Task Group. 1500 Rejoined station in formation. 1510
Emergency repairs to the flight deck completed.

23 January -

1500 Commenced burial services.
1525 Held burial services for and committed to the deep 12 officers and 96 men at Long. 128-06.1'E, Lat. 19-37.5"N.

0712 Anchor aweigh; underway
to shift berth. 0812 Moored along port side JASON (ARH-1) in Berth 26, Ulithi Harbor, Anchored. 1506 As a result
of injuries suffered in explosion on flight deck on 21 January 1945, the following personnel were transferred to
U.S.S. SOLACE for treatment and disposition: 7 officers and 51 men. 2042 LCVP No. 1 sank alongside the starboard
quarter loaded with 150 bags of second class U.S. Mail.

28
January -

1530 Pursuant to orders from
ComAirPac to CTF 38, dated 26 January 1945, Air Group SEVEN was detached from the HANCOCK and left the ship. Pursuant
to orders from ComAirPac to CTF 38, dated 26 January 1945, Air Group EIGHTY reported aboard for duty. CTF 38 and
his staff left the ship.

31 January -

0910 A Board of Investigation,
Capt. HARVEY E. OVERESCH, Senior Member, convened by order of Commander Carrier Division FOUR, to inquire into
and report the circumstances of explosions of bomb on flight deck of HANCOCK on 21 January 1945. 1515 adjourned.

0736 Underway in obedience
to orders of ComFIFTHfleet, standing out of Ulithi Lagoon in column 1000 yards astern of FRANKLIN. 0759 Passed
through anti-submarine nets. 1910 BATAAN joined the formation.

15 March -

Steaming as a unit of Task
Group 58.2 with SOPA in FRANKLIN.

19
March -

0705 Observed enemy plane
in a shallow dive on the FRANKLIN and commenced firing at the enemy plane. 0706 Enemy plane dropped bomb or bombs
on FRANKLIN'S flight deck; heavy fires broke out immediately. 0710 HANCOCK assumed formation guide. 1025 ENTERPRISE
and FLINT joined this Task Group. 1029 MILLER came alongside port quarter and delivered Adm. DAVISON, Adm. BOGAN
and 24 officer and men of their staffs. 1150 CTG 58.5 in ENTERPRISE assumed temporary tactical control of this
task group. 1600 GUAM and ALASKA joined TG 58.2 and took station in formation. 1723 GUAM and ALASKA departed the
task group to join the FRANKLIN.

20
March -

Steaming. 1358 HALSEY POWELL
alongside to starboard for fueling. 1452 Sounded torpedo defense. 1456 Sounded general quarters. Enemy aircraft
dove on ship from port at high elevation from high altitude; taken under fire by one battery and exploded close
above island structure, the engine crashing on to fantail of HALSEY POWELL. 1458 Changed speed to back emergency
full. Lines and hoses to HALSEY POWELL out loose. Changed course to left with full rudder to avoid collision with
HALSEY POWELL, who had lost steering control. 1459 Resumed base course and speed. 1626 Enemy plane dove on ENTERPRISE
and was taken under heavy fire by most of the Task Group. 1642 Commenced firing on still another enemy plane diving
on ENTERPRISE. 1650 Enemy plane dove on this ship from starboard to port, hard right rudder, and the bomb missed
approximately 50 feet to port. The plane was shot down by the ASTORIA as it attempted to escape through the screen.
1710 Commenced firing at enemy plane on the starboard bow at 5000 feet and shot it down. Simultaneously another
enemy plane dove on the ship from the port quarter and was taken under fire by many ships. Its bomb missed but
the plane was not destroyed. An F6F, apparently in pursuit of the latter plane, was observed to be under fire also.
Off the port quarter at an altitude of approximately 1000 feet its belly tank burst into flames. The plane then
made what appeared to be a controlled water landing at the outer limits of the screen.

0939 BENHAM alongside port
quarter to receive ComCarDiv TWO, Rear Adm. DAVIDSON and ComCarDiv FOUR, Rear Adm. BOGAN, and all personnel of
both staffs aboard. 1740 HANCOCK detached from Task Group 58.2 and proceeding on various courses and speeds to
join TG 58.3. 1753 On station in TG 58.3.

23 March -

Steaming as a unit of Task
Group 58.3, group guide in the ESSEX, and SOPA in INDIANAPOLIS.

Steaming in standard cruising
formation. 1200 Unidentified plane on the screen bearing 000 T, distant 39 miles. 1203 Unidentified plane closed
to 018 T, distance 35 miles. 1207 Sounded Torpedo Defense. 1208 Unidentified plane on the screen bearing
010 T, distant 17 miles; went to general quarters. 1210 Opened fire on enemy plane on starboard bow, distance approximately
5000 yards at an altitude of 3000 feet. The plane headed across the bow from starboard to port until almost dead
ahead, executed a wing over, and headed directly for this ship in comparatively shallow glide. The plane was under
continual heavy fire during its approach; at approximately 500 to 800 yards ahead it was obscured to bridge personnel
by the smoke of the guns. When it emerged form the smoke, it was observed very low, just forward of the bow. The
Captain ordered hard right rudder but before the ship could answer the helm the Jap dropped a bomb that struck
the flight deck at frame 45, 10 feet inboard of the port side. The enemy plane disintegrated in the explosion and
set fire to 3 planes parked on and near the catapults, and 15 to 16 planes on the flight deck and set fire to many
planes on the hangar deck; many personnel jumped or were blown over the side. Casualties to personnel are listed
herewith: 27 killed; 35 missing in action, 20 jumped or blown over the side, rescued and admitted to sickbay; 17
wounded in action. 1212 Commenced maneuvering independently in an attempt to use the wind to some advantage in
fighting the fires and with violent high speed right turns to throw burning planes and gasoline over the side.
1218 Commenced firing at an unidentified plane high on the starboard quarter and ceased firing after 20 seconds.
1230 Steadied on course 270 T and pgc, distance approximately 5000 yards from assigned station. During the foregoing
maneuvers, the Task Group Commander had maneuvered the Task Group clear of HANCOCK'S evolutions, but kept it in
the close vicinity, so that its guns could be used to repel any further air attacks on HANCOCK. 1230 Damage Control
reported all fires under control. 1235 Commenced working back to assigned station. 1302 On station. 1417 Unidentified
aircraft on the screen closed to 12 miles. 1420 changed course to 205 T and pgc and took diving enemy plane under
fire to starboard. 1421 HANCOCK anti-aircraft fire shot down one Judy on the starboard bow at an altitude of approximately
3000 feet. 1615 Commenced landing aircraft, and completed at 1645, having landed 8 VFB, 12 VF, 4 VB and 14 VT of
Strike #1. BUNKER HILL landed HANCOCK CAP #2.

Steaming as a unit of Task
Group 58.3. 1215 NEW JERSEY joined formation and WASHINGTON and NORTH CAROLINA were detached from TG 58.3. 1629-1654
ENGLISH alongside starboard quarter to transfer HANCOCK survivors.

9 April
-

1312 In accordance with orders
from CTF 58, HANCOCK, CABOT, HAYNESWORTH and STEMBEL were detached from TG 58.3 and formed Task Unit 58.3.10, with
HANCOCK the guide. 1334 Commenced air operations. 1436 Completed air operations having launched 3 VT, 3 VB and
2 VFB replacement planes for BUNKER HILL; 2 VT, 1 VFB, 3 VB and 6 VFB replacement planes for ESSEX. 1515 Held burial
services for and committed to the deep the bodies of men who were killed in action when an enemy bomb hit the HANCOCK
on 7 April 1945 at Lat. 24-01'N. Long 134-27'E. 1727 Completed air operations, having landed 4 VFB, 6VF and 2 VT
"flyable duds" from the ESSEX.

1618 Got underway for Pearl
Harbor, T.H., in obedience to Port Director Ulithi Movement Order, dated 12 April 1945. 1707 Passed through anti-submarine
nets, in company with CABOT and FRANKS with SOPA in CABOT.

21
April -

Steaming in company with
CABOT and FRANKS as an independent unit. 0618 Completed flight operations, having launched 1 VFB, 6VF, 2 VB and
8 VT to land at Pearl Harbor. 0957 Passed through anti-submarine nets. 1049 Aided by tugs, first line over to Pier
F-13, Ford Island, Pearl Harbor, T.H. 1140 All lines secured.

1007 All lines cast off from
dock. Underway with pilot at the conn. 1032 Steaming on various courses and speeds to get in position to enter
drydock. 1153 Line #1 secured to drydock crane. 1216 Docked in No. 4 Drydock, Pearl Harbor, T.H. 1230 Commenced
pumping out drydock.

0730 All lines clear of dock.
Got underway. 0820 Passed by SATTERLEE (DD626) to form Task Group 19.1. 0908 Shifted engine revolutions and speed
control to Main Engine Control for the purpose of building up speed for full power run. 0935 Speed now registered
at 252 r.p.m., 32 knots. Structural test firing of new AA guns. Landed and launched 16 VF. Gunnery exercises. Second
high speed run. 1748 Passed through anti-submarine nets.

Steaming independently as
a unit of TG 19.13 on a full power run at 33 knots. 0405 Completed high speed run and commenced deceleration. 0610
HERNDON rejoined the formation. Flight operations. 1320 HUNTINGTON (DD781) joined the formation. Night air operation
exercises. 2152 HUNTINGTON temporarily detached from formation.

0559 Underway as a part of
Task Group 38.1. CTG 38.1, Rear Admiral T.L. SPRAGUE, embarked in BENNINGTON. Air operations and gunnery exercises
conducted in preparation for strikes against Japan.

8 July -

Rendezvoused with replenishment
group.

9 July -

0802-1802 Twelve mines sighted;
six destroyed by screen. 1756 Commenced high speed run to launch point, the beginning of a long series of strikes
against Shikoku, Honshu and Hokkaido, lasting until the Japanese capitulation on 15 August.

19 July -

1412 Sighted cream colored
balloon about 30 feet in diameter bearing 150 (T), 5 miles. Probably this was one of the explosive carrying balloons
with which the Japs are attempting to attack the U.S.

20 July -

Hurricane over Kyushu and
Western Shikoku.

AUGUST 1945

15
August -

0649 Orders were received
from CTG 38.1 to cancel the two strikes over the Tokyo area and to recall them to the ship. Commander H.L. MILLER,
CAG6, turned his flight around at 34 30'N, 140 20'E and jettisoned bombs. 0839 Word was received that the Secretary
of the Navy and Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet had confirmed the capitulation of Japan. 1302 Admiral HALSEY
spoke to the fleet, announcing Japan's surrender. His speech was broadcast to all hands over the public address
system.

19 August -

0745 Captain DANIEL V. GALLERY,
USN, 56881, reported aboard for duty under instruction as commanding officer. Since 17 August, hard work has been
going on in the selection, organization, equipment and training of the men from the HANCOCK who are apart of the
Third Fleet Naval Landing Force in Japan. The GERRARD (APA-84) was alongside to starboard from 1155 until 1242
while the HANCOCK Marine Detachment, under command of Captain S.R. BALLIF, USMC, was transferred for duty with
TF 31.

16 August - 31 August.

Searches for Allied POW Camps
were conducted. Supplies were dropped to the prisoners. In addition to reconnaissance photographic missions, a
show of air strength was made over Japan.

An Air Show was staged over
the BB MISSOURI from north of the Imperial Palace, Tokyo, by the maximum possible launch from all three task groups.
The parade was by tank groups in the following order: TG 38.1, TG 38.4 and TG 38.3. The lowest planes in the parade
flew at 1000 feet.

The formal surrender of the
Japanese Imperial Government, Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, and all Japanese armed forces wherever located
was signed on the Missouri at 0908 (I). Thus end of the glorious war cruises of the U.S.S. HANCOCK!

Strategic support of amphibious operations against the Central Philippines (Leyte) through the destruction of
enemy aircraft, air facilities, shipping and industrial establishments and fleet units in the Nansei Shoto, Formosa,
Luzon and the Visayas. It was assumed that such destruction would impair his power to reinforce the Philippines
in an effort to counter our invasion.

On 12, 13 and 14 October 1944 - Eastern and Northern Formosa were struck. Heavy enemy air attacks were repelled
the night of the 12th/13th as well as the afternoon of the 14th.

18 October 1944 - Aparri and Laoag in Northern Luzon were struck. All operations up to this time were in strategic
support of impending landings by ComSoWesPac forces on Leyte Island in the Central Philippines.

21 October 1944 - Strikes were made against Masbate. Cebu, Negros, and Panay in further support of the amphibious
operations which had taken place the day before.

25 and 26 October 1944 - While enroute to Ulithi in company with TG 38.1 on 24 October, heavy units of the Jap
Fleet were reported in the Visayas and TG 38.1 was orders to reverse course to westward. On the 25th and 26th of
October strikes were launched against the enemy fleet in Central Philippine waters.

29 October 1944 - Clark Airfield, Jap Warships, and other shipping in Manila Bay were struck.

Destruction of enemy air strength and air logistic installations on Southern Luzon, to cripple the enemy's recently
reinforced air power and allow our ground forces (at Leyte) additional time to complete their airfield installations
and bring in land based aircraft for future operations.

16 December 1944 - Attacks against Angeles, Angeles South and Porac Airfields; attacks against ground installations
at Port Masinloc, Baluarte, Pampanga River Bridge and elsewhere, and shipping strikes.

Mission - As part of TG 38.2 and TF 38 mission was the strategic support of amphibious landings in the Lingayen
Area of Luzon through the destruction by forces in Formosa, Pescafores, and Luzon. While an effort made to intercept
major units of the Japanese Fleet in the South China Sea was unsuccessful, substantial damage was done to enemy
shipping and coastal positions in French-Indo-China and China.

Strike Days

3 January 1945 - Strikes against Koshun and Heito airfields, Formosa; against shipping in Southwest Formosa
and at other Formosa targets.

4 January 1945 - Strikes against Heito, against shipping in Southwest Formosa and other Formosa targets.

6 January 1945 - Strikes against Cabanatuan, Mabalacat, Bamban and other Luzon airfields and other targets.

7 January 1945 - Strikes against Clark, Luna and Rosales airfields and other Luzon targets.

9 January 1945 - Strikes against Heito, Kato, Koshun, Giran Bi Point, Toko Seaplane Station and other targets
in Formosa.

12 January 1945 - Strikes at Camranh Bay, Cape Varella, San Thon Nut and along coast of French-Indo-China against
shipping and other targets.

15 January 1945 - Strikes against shipping and other targets at Hong Kong, Formosa, and Pescadores.

Strategic support of amphibious operations against Iwo Jima through destruction of enemy aircraft and air facilities
in the Empire, direct support of ground forces on Iwo Jima, and photographic reconnaissance of, combined with an
attack on, Okinawa and Amami O Shima in the Nansei Shoto.

Strike Days

16 February 1945 - Strikes against aircraft and air facilities Chiba Peninsula, Honshu, aircraft and airfields
east of Tokyo and at Konoike, Honshu, and against shipping near O-Shima Island.

17 February 1945 - Strikes against airfields on Chiba Peninsula and Kisarazu, Honshu and small shipping.

19 February 1945 - Close direct support of ground troops against enemy positions on Iwo Jima and strikes against
airfields, naval base and shipping at Chichi Jima and Haha Jima.

21 February 1945 - Close direct support of ground troops against enemy positions on Iwo Jima.

22 February 1945 - Close direct support of ground troops against enemy positions of Iwo Jima.

25 February 1945 - Strikes against small shipping and airfields and aircraft at Konoike and on Chiba Peninsula,
Honshu.

1 March 1945 - Strikes against aircraft and air installations at Koniya Seaplane Base and Tokuno Shima, against
shipping and against ground installations at Amami-O-Shima, Okinoyerabu, Tokuna, and Takara Shima.

The strategic support of impending amphibious operations against Okinawa Jima through the destruction of enemy
aircraft, air installations, and naval and surface vessels in the Japanese home islands. In addition pre-invasion
attacks were to be made on all the islands of the Nansei Group, and close air-ground support provided to friendly
amphibious forces on Okinawa.

Strike Days

18 March 1945 - Strikes against enemy airfields in Central and Southern Kyushu, particularly Kagoshima and Izumi
fields. The force was subjected to enemy air attack throughout the entire day and during the night.

19 March 1945 - Strikes against enemy vessels in Kobe Harbor, airfields, including Itami, Osaka and Tokushima
- and installations in the Kobe-Osaka area and military targets along the shores of Kii-Suido. Heavy enemy air
counter-attack continued throughout the day, the U.S.S. FRANKLIN being hit and badly damaged.

20 March 1945 - HANCOCK assigned to salvage group escorting the crippled FRANKLIN to rear area. Enemy air attacks
continued almost without interruption during this period, the ENTERPRISE being hit and seriously damaged while
the HANCOCK shot down two suicide divers attacking her. Parts of one of these planes hit and badly damaged U.S.S.
HALSEY POWELL which had just cast off from alongside HANCOCK.

28 March 1945 - Strikes against wharves, docks, the Sea plane Base and shipping in the Kagoshima Bay Area, Kyushu.

30 and 31 March 1945 - 1, 3 and 4 April 1945 - Strikes against ground defenses and other installations and airfields
on Okinawa, including one strike against Ie Shima, in close support of amphibious operations on Okinawa.

6 April 1945 - Strikes against Amami Kikai Wan, Tokuna, and Kikai Airfield. Enemy air attacks against the force
were frequent during the period 30 March through 6 April 1945.

7 April 1945 - While engaged in striking important enemy fleet units off Southern Kyushu, HANCOCK was hit by
an enemy suicide plane which dropped a bomb on, and crashed into, the flight deck. HANCOCK remained with TG 58.3
while the force continued to support Okinawa ground forces the following day, although no flight operations were
possible from the ship. On 9 April HANCOCK in company with CABOT (CTU-58.3.10), HAYNESWORTH and STEMBEL were detached
from TG 58.3 and ordered to proceed to Ulithi.

20 June 1945 - Air attacks on installations and fortifications at Wake Island.

Ninth Combat Operation (1 July - 15 August 1945)

Mission - Air strikes against enemy aircraft, air installations, communication facilities, industrial targets,
naval combatant vessels, and Merchant shipping off the Japanese Empire from Lat. 32-45N to 44-OON and from Long
132-00E to 146-OOE.

Strike Days

10 July 1945 - Strikes against airfields, aircraft, and air installations in Tokyo Plains Area.

14 July 1945 - Strikes against airfields, aircraft and air installations in Eastern Hokkaido, against shipping
in Nemuro Wan and Kushire Harbor, and against ground targets.

15 July 1945 - Strikes against airfields, shipping, factories, communications and other ground targets in Hokkaido.

17 July 1945 - Attacks on ground targets in the vicinity of Mito, Tokyo Area.

18 July 1945 - Strikes against airfields, aircraft, and air installations in Tokyo Plain Area; strike against
BB NAGATO in Yokosuka Naval Base.

28 July 1945 - Strikes against aircraft and airfields at Akenogahara and Suzuka; strikes against shipping in
Owashi Wan; strikes against BB - XCV ISE, CA AOBA and shipping in Kure Harbor.

30 July 1945 - Strikes against aircraft and air installations in the area west of Osaka.

9 August 1945 - Strikes against aircraft and air installations and airfields in North Honshu.

10 August 1945 - Strikes against airfields and aircraft, transportation equipment and factories in North Honshu.

13 August 1945 - Strikes against Tokyo Shibaura Electronics Plant and Japan International Aircraft Company (Hiratsuka);
strikes against aircraft and air installations at Ueda and Nagano Airfields.

15 August 1945 - One strike, launched against Tokyo Shibaura Electronics Plant and another against Nagano Airfield,
recalled at 0640 (I), before attack made. While returning, our Photo Division of 4 VF from the 2 Jacks and one
Zeke and smoked a Frank. The other Japs fled. Later HANCOCK'S DCAP #3 shot down a torpedo carrying Kate that was
diving on TG 38.5 at 1123. This was the ship's last combat of the war.

Mission - Search for, dropping supplies to and photography of Prisoner of War Camps located in Japan.

HISTORICAL NARRATIVE - U.S.S. HANCOCK (CV19)

Pre-commissioning

Operating for ten months as a unit of the THIRD and FIFTH Fleets during the final war operations against the
Japanese, and operating previously in shakedown cruising, pre-commissioning activities, and in the long trip from
Boston to Ulithi, the U.S.S. HANCOCK was sixteen months old the day hostilities ceased.

Historically, she claims several distinctions. On the final day of the war, one of her pilots (R.S. FARNSWORTH,
of VBF6) shot down in the air the last Japanese plane to attack Allied sea power operating as the Fast Carrier
Task Force off Japan. Air Group EIGHTY, flying off the HANCOCK deck, set the record for planes destroyed in the
air in one day when fliers from the group knocked down 71 Japanese planes during the first carrier raid against
Tokyo on 16 February 1945. She has flown the personal flag of Admiral CHESTER A. NIMITZ and of Vice Admiral JOHN
S. McCAIN. She has also played host to Admiral WILLIAM HALSEY and to Admiral of the British Fleet, Lord KEYES.
Twice she blazed under fires on her flight and hangar decks, one of these times the result of an accidental explosion
of the bomb in a returning TBM on 21 January 1945, the other time the result of a hit by an enemy plane and bomb
on 7 April 1945. In each instance, her damage control parties controlled and extinguished the fires quickly enough
to limit damage and to make it unnecessary for the ship to return to the United States. Her combat history measures
from the first strikes against Formosa and the Nansei Shoto islands on 10 October 1944 to the end of the war, when
she was with the fleet off the Japanese homeland on 15 August 1945.

It was at the Quincy, Mass., Shipbuilding Yard of the Bethlehem Steel Company that hull 1511 (later to become
CV-19 the HANCOCK) felt the blow of a Champagne bottle on its bow on 24 January 1944. Mrs. DeWITT Clinton Ramsey,
wife of Rear Admiral Ramsey, who was at that time Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, had just broken the bottle
of champagne and hull 1511 slid down the ways to become water borne.

Less than three months later, on April 15, 1944, hull 1511 was towed to South Boston Navy Yard, where the Steel
Company turned the ship over to the Navy, the Navy designated Captain FRED C. DICKEY to be Commanding Officer,
and the first watch was set. At that time HANCOCK history began. We climbed aboard, more than 2000 of us, baggage,
and records, to put our lives into the ship.

Pre-commissioning was over, and we began to evaluate more accurately the value of those several months that
we had been preparing for sea duty on a new ship. Officers who were with the crew during these pre-commissioning
days varied in their assignment of values to the program. Almost all of them were agreed on one point - that pre-commissioning
enabled them to size up the men who were to work them. Officers who were assigned after having already served a
term of overseas duty were one hundred present in accordance that these months of stateside duty worked as effective
rehabilitation. It came, for them, as a welcome interlude in a long war.

Lt. (jg) Edward R. Starkey said of pre-commissioning: "I was able to contemplate what problems would arise,
what equipment would be needed, and what preparations were necessary. There was much gear needed which wasn't in
the ship's allowance which was secured with the help of shore based activities." His duties were those as
a maintenance officer for bombers."

Excerpts from comments of other representative officers were as follows:

S.M. ADAMS, Commander, USN, assigned to Air Operations and C.I.C.: "The length of time was O.K. The location
should have been near other ships of the same class. Any formation, schools, and material made available to the
Air Department would have been an improvement. We were left out in the cold with little information on the ship,
no practice with equipment, and no qualified personnel to advise us."

Norman A. Prichard, Lieut., USNR, Air Plot Officer: "A naval air station would have been the best location
for pre-commissioning, for an Air Department, anyhow."

Robert M. Nelson, Lt.. Comdr., USNR., Carrier Aircraft Service Division Officer: "It would have been impossible
to operate from a maintenance standpoint on the shakedown cruise if the organizational work had not been carried
out with the Air Group at Quonset Point. Perhaps the most important contribution of the pre-commissioning work
was the fact that we operated as a unit. Maintaining Air Group SEVEN aircraft with our men, which not only gave
us the experience but also gave the Air Group an opportunity to develop a degree of confidence in our organization
and work."

Glen H. Franks, Lieut., USNR, Assistant Flight Officer: "Attention is invited to the lack of any means
at most pre-commissioning activities to train men in flight deck procedure."

Robert L. Stegall. Lt(jg), USN, Material Officer, Aircraft Maintenance Division: Advantages - "A more thorough
knowledge concerning C.A.S.D. Commissioning and section "D" allowance lists, contents, and quantity.
Allocating of same to proper tool rooms and engineering groups, and in instances of shortages or surplus items,
being in a position to work with the Supply Department more quickly to correct same."

Lee M. Porter, Lieut., USNR, Combat Information Center Officer: "Without pre-commissioning, men and officers
would not have been trained as a team, an attribute vitally necessary for the proper functioning of C.I.C."

A.W. Hodge, Commander, USNR, Communication Officer: "The organization of the Pre-commissioning detail at
Newport during the time the officers and men from this ship were assigned was in such a chaotic condition that
practically no benefit was obtained. There were certain benefits such as association with the office and crew which
mere acquaintance made possible. As matter of fact, it can be truthfully said that because of the confusion and
lack of proper and efficient organization and any worthwhile program of training, the work of organizing the ship
was made more difficult.. In fairness to the planned use of pre-commissioning training as contemplated by the Navy,
it should be stated that we were the second carrier to go through this processing and the lack of organization
may have been due to limitations of time. The lack of planning cannot, however, be explained. The conditions existing
are indescribable. Programs set up by the prospective Executive Officer and Heads of Departments in lieu of any
established program were constantly interfered with by watches, special details, athletic programs, infantry drill,
lectures on subjects usually taught in indoctrination training, and similar diversifying subjects."

L.A. Cioffi, Ens., USNR, assigned to training communication personnel: "I was given an idea of shipboard
organization and departmental functions. Prior to this period, I had never served on a ship, and what I managed
to absorb, either accidentally or purposely, served me in good stead when I stopped aboard."

Jack C. Davis, Lt(jg), USNR, who acted as aide to the Commanding Officer, listed the following advantages:

The advantage of getting acquainted with the people I'd have to work with.

The realization of just how immense the problem confronting us was, but little positive action could be taken
by me towards its solution because of my abysmal ignorance of things nautical.

Since I was at Quincy, I got a chance to familiarize myself with the ship somewhat. I say somewhat, because
knowing nothing of shipboard routine, I could only guess at what my particular job would consist of and what would
be needed to accomplish it.

Pre-commissioning duty did give us a chance to organize a fairly smooth commissioning ceremony.

Advantages listed by Joseph B. Hoyt, Lieut., USNR, who was a Damage Control Officer, include: Considerable knowledge
of the ship's hull systems was gained prior to commissioning; also an opportunity to "know the ship"
was presented. This information was of value in developing the damage control organization and its training program.
Large quantities of damage control and hull department material was brought aboard prior to commissioning; being
at the ship assisted in material distribution an stowage and the acquisition of areas needed Hull Department. Necessary
plans, drawings, forms, etc., were obtained for the development of damage control. Berthing and messing arrangements
were developed during pre-commissioning period.

Ens. R.E. Brooks, USNR, who was a Junior officer in a Gunnery Division: "The HANCOCK was my first ship.
The pre-commissioning detail gave me invaluable help in understanding my shipboard organization, divisional responsibilities,
and shipboard routine. I was fortunate in serving under an experienced Division Officer."

E.B. Quillin, Lieut. (SC) USNR, in charge of loading all stores and allowance material: "In being assigned
to the pre-commissioning detail of the HANCOCK, there were certain distinct advantages such as: becoming familiar
with the storerooms, and location of department spaces; getting to know department heads and assistants. This was
valuable in turning over allowance material; getting to know the storekeepers, thus enabling one to make more intelligent
assignments of the men after commissioning, and many others."

R.L. Mallett, Chief Torpedoman, USNR, Torpedo Officer assigned to Quincy: "Before being assigned to the
HANCOCK, I had never been aboard a carrier. It enabled me to familiarize myself with not only my part of the ship,
but with the ship as a whole.

I had ample time to check allowance lists and to receive and check my equipment against the allowance lists.
I was also able to make some changes in the torpedo workshop that was more advantageous. I was satisfied with the
situation as it was."

M.F. Foster, Lieut., "M" Division Officer: "I was able to completely organize the "M"
Division before the ship was placed in commission. All logs and forms used in the division were complete and ready
for use when needed on the first day in commission. Pre-commissioning activities helped to prevent much night work
after the ship was placed in commission. It, therefore, gave us much more time to train the men in the actual operation
of the new engineering plant."

The following weeks were spent in fitting out, (Navy talk - which means that we were trying the valves and bunks,
testing the engines and cook stoves, loading stores and supplies, and filling our magazines with ammunition).

On May 22, we shoved off, ready to make final underway preparations prior to leaving for the fleet. We went
to Norfolk, Virginia, and operated for several weeks in Chesapeake Bay, where our air group landed aboard. Here
we had just enough steaming to begin to feel ourselves working as one big unit. On June 12, we left for the first
HANCOCK foreign duty, six weeks shakedown cruising to the Gulf of Paria in Trinidad, where it was too much work
and not enough play to allow us to try Port of Spain and the famed "rum and Coca-Cola." We did get ashore
once or twice, to small but beautiful little Scotland Bay, where we swam in crystal waters, had a share of athletics,
and became (the first time for many of us) foreigners.

Shakedown completed, we returned to South Boston Navy Yard for those last leaves in July, and on July 31, 1944,
the HANCOCK left for her long trip down the East Coast, through the West Indies, the Caribbean Sea, the Golfo de
Los Mosquitos, to Panama. We had liberty for one watch in Colon and Cristobal on August 9. Traversed the Canal
on the 10th with liberty for the other half of the crew in Balboa and Panama City that night, and departed the
next morning through the Gulf of Panama into the Pacific and up to San Diego.

One week in North Island and we said goodbye to the United States on August 23.

Getting ready for joining the fleet, we had steamed 17,524 miles. As a ship's crew, we had been formed for eight
months, and the ship had been in commission for more than four months.

Incidental to our journey from San Diego to Pearl Harbor was our duty as a ferry for personnel and cargo. We
called ourselves "APCV19" during the trip, and looked more like an overloaded liner than a fast carrier.
Berthing, mustering, and feeding of passengers was the problem of the Hull Department, without conflicting too
much with ship's work and ship personnel. Passengers were everywhere, it seemed; they were given cots and put in
larger staterooms, assigned corners in passageways, bunked in mess halls, and let loose on the hangar deck to find
space in convenient corners among the cargo for spreading their mattresses and bedding. They were fed after ship's
company had eaten.

Mustering was done by passengers in charge of groups assigned to them by their orders. Passenger air group officers
were put in charge of groups of men. They were assigned in sections according to the alphabet, each section consisting
of about 70 men. From time to time, enlisted passengers were assigned working parties.

Pearl Harbor was next, and after such a long period of training, you'd think we'd be considered ready. But no,
we had more training periods in Hawaiian waters before we were tagged for the seal of approval, ready for combat
duty.

The air group was assigned to temporary duty at the Naval Air Station, Kaneohe. Meantime, ten days of minor
alterations were made at the repair dock, Pearl Harbor Navy Yard. Ready stowage spaces on the gallery deck for
rockets and ammunition were installed, a change that later proved valuable during busy strike days.

From September 10 to 14, night carrier landing qualifications were completed west of the islands. Twenty-one
pilots were qualified. During the daytime, the Gunnery Department exercised at sleeve firing.

On 14th of September while moored at Ford Island, Pearl Harbor, Admiral of the British Fleet, Lord KEYES, Royal
Navy; Admiral CHESTER W. NIMITZ, USN; Lieut. General HARMON, USA; Lieut. General BUCKNER, USA; Rear Admiral SHERMAN,
USN, accompanied by staff and civilian passengers, came aboard to review exercises. At 1230 that day, 25 VF, 16
VB, 10 VT flew out from the beach and landed aboard. This group was launched again at 1345, and the ship proceeded
and moored at starboard side of Pier F-2, N.A.S., Ford Island, Pearl Harbor, T.H. The highest commendation that
the ship and air group received on this day's exercise was from Admiral NIMITZ. He said, quote "The HANCOCK
and Air Group SEVEN are ready to fight the Japs" unquote.

On September 24, we shoved off for points west. Our destination was Manus Island, in the Admiralties. That was
a trip that would delouse the ship of all Pollywogs. Loyal Shellbacks started talk of dire initiation activities
that would make the many "Hannah" men who had never before crossed the line realize that there was more
to entering the Domain of King Neptune that a mere plotting of positions on the navigation chart. Shellbacks spread
the word, "Heads will roll." The day neared, and lists of slimy folk were prepared. Unfortunate was the
individual who could not produce credentials. Eager beavers among the initiators jumped the gun by several days,
and many a pollywog felt the sea breezes on his shorn topside while ceremonies consistent with the ever-present
realization that the ship must never allow horseplay to interfere with readiness were prepared. But on September
30 orders to proceed to Ulithi, in the Carolines, were received from CincPac. That was well and good - until we
looked at the charts. "Why," said the Sons of Neptune, "That's North of the equator!."

So the HANCOCK did not cross the line that trip. To this day, she still has not crossed the line. But there
are many men aboard her who scratch their once-saved heads and call themselves "Shellwogs".

It was on this route that our first real fire occurred on deck. A scoutbomber plane had a bad barrier crash
and ignited, sliding over the port side at the same time. The pilot was rescued by DD U.S.S. CALDWELL, but the
gunner was lost. Two flight deck crewmen were also killed on this accident. The fire on the flight deck was immediately
brought under control and extinguished without appreciable damage in a few minutes. The work of the crash crew
and fire-fighting parties on this occasion is worthy of mention and proved the old adage that "practice makes
perfect".

We steamed into our new "home port" on October 5, and that was a day we will long remember. The name
of the place was Ulithi, although most of us wondered why such a water-logged little atoll should have a name.
This was not land as we were accustomed to speak of land. The multitude of ships (Admiral HALSEY's famed THIRD
Fleet) looked more like they were anchored in mid-ocean and there appeared to be much more deck space in Ulithi
Harbor than there was beach area anywhere in sight.

That was a big day - the day our war history started. All of us who could possibly be topside were topside,
drinking in the wonderful sight of naval power. Down carrier row we steamed, passing first the light carrier PRINCETON
to port, then gliding by other INDEPENDENCE carriers, CLEVELAND cruisers, IOWA battleships, and down into the ESSEX-Class
carrier berthing area. The hook went down, the anchor ball went up, and we became, proudly, "a unit of the
THIRD Fleet".

Our first group assignment was to Task Group 38.2, under Rear Admiral G.F. BOGAN in the INTREPID. For the first
time, our plane complement was increased, as 7 VF were added to bring the fighter total to 44 and 6 VB were deducted
to reduce bomber complement to 30.

Nine operations measure our career since that time. We were at sea practically all of the time and we were in
combat waters most of the time.

"Operation One," in our history, started on October 6 and was a 25-day jaunt up to the Nansei Shoto
Islands (Okinawa and Amami O Shima), Formosa, Luzon, and back to Ulithi.

There were eight strike days during this operations. A strike day is a day when our planes take off to bomb,
rocket and strafe any enemy force or installations.

The first day of HANCOCK air action against enemy forces and installations was October 10, when our planes swarmed
over Okinawa, Amami O Jima and Mimami Dai to Jima, which are islands in the Nansei Shoto group south of Japan.
On this initial day of battle 10 October 1944, the ship launched four deckload strikes against enemy airfields,
surface vessels and air installations at Okinawa Jima, North of 26 30' north. A deckload at that time consisted
of twelve scout bombers, VB; nine torpedo bombers, VT; and eight fighters, VF. In addition, Ie Jima was reconnoitered
and Amami O Jima, Minami Daito Jima and Kita Diato Jima were photographed. During the day, 156 sorties over the
targets were flown and 53 tons of bombs dropped by HANCOCK aircraft. The following damage to the enemy: one Jingei-class
submarine tender, one large tanker, one medium freighter, one small oiler, one oil barge, one LST and six luggers
were sunk. Four medium freighters, two medium oilers, four small oilers and seven luggers or barges were probably
sunk; one large freighter and one small freighter were damaged; and seven enemy aircraft were destroyed on the
ground. Our own losses consisted of one VB with pilot and crewman, shot down by enemy AA. The element of surprise
in this engagement was overwhelming to the enemy. He was literally caught with his "pants down".

October 12, 13 and 14 found us again in action, and we were duly initiated into combat this time. Strikes were
launched against Eastern and Northern Formosa, and it is to be noted that it was particularly daring for our task
force to enter these waters at this early date, when the Philippines were still Japanese controlled. Those of us
who were aboard for the first big air raid against our fleet on the night of October 12 and 13 will never forget
it. Our best estimates any that about 90 to 100 Japanese planes were in the raids. We stayed at our battle stations
repelling the attacks from the beginning of sunset at about twenty minutes after five (1720 navy time) until four
thirty-five the next morning. That makes seven hours and fifteen minutes of attack; but the excitement was so great
that most of us thought it was not more than a couple of hours. There was little time to look at our watches to
check up on that.

One thing we did learn, and it was an important lesson: we learned that our hours of gunnery exercises and our
repeated warnings to keep vigilant were not wasted. We shot down two of the planes that made direct runs on us
and saved the HANNAH from what might have been serious damage.

On October 14, one plane scored a fortunate hit on us; and yet, not so fortunate for the Japanese, because although
it did make a hole in catwalk, the bomb did not explore until it hit the water alongside the ship and no damage
was suffered by us other then the hole.

These operations had been in support of the impending campaign against Leyte. On October 21, we continued them,
sending our planes out to hit Masbate, Cebu, Nigros and Panay - all islands in the Philippines. The Leyte landings
had been made the day before.

Three days later, our American Patrol planes contacted heavy units of the Jap's Fleet underway in the Visayas.
The news was electrifying to us and we turned our course of attack.

That which followed has since been designated "The Second Battle of the Philippine Sea". Our planes
did a good job of pickling several enemy ships, scoring damaging hits on a NACHI Class heavy cruiser, and a YAMATO
Class battleship. Strikes continued, and we scored additional hits on a KONGO Class battleship, a NACHI Class heavy
cruiser, and an AGANO Class light cruiser, The enemy fleet was well covered with smoke from its own fires by this
time as October 25 drew to a close.

During the night, the enemy retreated to the Sulu Sea, and our planes pursued the next day. West of Panay hits
with 1000-pound bombs were scored on a MOGAMI Class heavy cruiser, and these were followed up by torpedo hits.
Later flights reported this ship sunk.

Shortly after this time, but still before morning had passed, an AGANO Class light cruiser was sighted, also
west of Panay. Torpedo attacks polished this one off with terrific explosions and we now had two large warships
to our credit. But the day was not completed. Our planes returned in the afternoon and sank a 5000-ton landing
ship. HANNAH, in the Second Philippine Sea Battle, has done her part.

October 29, was the last strike day of this period, and saw damage inflicted on Japanese - held fields in Luzon.
Our record for Operation One showed a total of 97 planes destroyed, 4 warships sunk, 12 merchant ships sunk, and
eight days of strikes against the Japanese.

The second operation in HANCOCK History was brief, consisting of two days of strikes on enemy airfields and
ground installations in Southern Luzon in support of the army landings in Leyte. On November 5 and 6, our planes
did their work, and at the end of the second day tallied their score: 63 planes destroyed, 57 planes probably destroyed,
and much damage done to ground installations. In addition, one subchaser was sunk. We started back to Ulithi on
November 5, passing through the typhoon that capsized three of our destroyers and damaged other ships. It was quite
a wind, and waves were so high they occasionally broke over the flight deck. At times, our wind indicators indicated
up to 90 knots of wind velocity.

"OPERATION THREE"

Five days were spent in port, and on November 14, we started out once more for points North. We were out after
more enemy planes. We were also destined to become flagship of the SECOND Carrier Task Force, and on November 17,
Vice Admiral JOHN S. McCAIN and his staff came aboard.

Strikes started on November 19, with air fields in the vicinity of Manila receiving special attention. They
were resumed on November 25, with shipping in Manila Harbor this time on the receiving end.

November 25, will be remembered as another day of abundant enemy air activity against us, however, and one dive
in particular stands out in HANCOCK History. At about 1230, an enemy plane was sighted on our starboard quarter,
high and to the right of the sun. He had been headed aft, but did a wing-over and started his dive -- the first
KAMIKAZE to come at us. But we were not caught napping and started firing at the moment he started diving. Down
he came, through all the AA, we were able to throw up -- 5-inch, 40 mm and 20 mm.

It seemed unbelievable that he could keep coming, and finally, when he was only 1000 feet from the ship, a direct
hit caused him to explode. Pieces fell on all sides of us. The bomb exploded on the port side with no damage; the
tail assembly fell astern. A portion of the fuselage with its meatball (rising sun) fell on the flight deck amidships;
a wing fell on the deck forward on the port side and started a fair sized fire which our damage control party quickly
extinguished. We were seriously impressed, but no personnel casualties were suffered -- except for one Jap pilot
who succeeded in his attempt to join his ancestors.

During this period, we held two strike days, resulting in the following damage to the enemy: eight aircraft
and one merchant ship destroyed.

Operation Four followed after another short stay in Ulithi. It was a 12-day cruise and the targets were the
same -- airfields and shipping in the Manila and Luzon areas. Although, there were only two days of strikes, December
15 and 16, our planes destroyed 39 enemy aircraft, probably destroyed or damaged 85 more, seriously damaging eight
ships one of which, an LST, is known to have sunk, and damaged 11 other ships. The object of these attacks was
to support landings on Mindoro, and our air group did its share of the task. The enemy used every trick of concealment
it could devise, but that did not keep our planes from hitting them so hard that they went into the foray against
the landings badly shaken and reeling from our attacks. On December 22, we were back in Ulithi -- for Christmas!

"OPERATION FIVE"

Eight days later, after we had gone all - out for a Yuletide program that gave us the life we needed, we started
out again -- HANCOCK operation number Five.

This was the cruise that drew attention from all the world because of its daring probe into enemy-controlled
water of the South China Sea between the Philippines and China. On December 30, we left our base. After several
days of approach, we struck Formosa on January 3, repeating on January 4, Saturday, January 6, was another strike
day and this day set a record for us - for the first time on any strike day, all planes that took off returned.
On the 7th, our planes hit an old familiar target again Luzon.

Our traversing of the channel between Formosa and Luzon was on the night of January 9 - 10. We were all aware
of the possibilities of what might be ahead. We hoped there would be enemy retaliation in the form of a Japanese
fleet sent out to stop us. That would make it possible for strikes to be launched to inflict more damage on the
much-diminished enemy sea forces. These hopes filled our hearts as we went through Bashi Channel, passing one Island
as close as 11 miles. The night passed with little activity, but at ten minutes after six in the morning one of
our light carrier planes destroyed an enemy plane, and other bogies were in the vicinity. One got in to 20 miles,
was intercepted, and set afire by a fighter from one of our light carriers. As we looked in the direction of the
"splash", we saw a light high in the sky, small like a star. But this was no ordinary star -- it grew
constantly larger until finally we identified it as a twin-engine plane with its left engine ablaze. It was diving
right at us, looking bigger every second. Just when it was so close that we were sure he would score a hit on our
flight deck. After some of our light machine guns had opened fire, his entire left wing came off and the plane
dived crazily and more steeply, dropping into the water 200 yards off our port beam and immediately bursting into
a huge flame. We go into the South China Sea all right, but with much Thanksgiving.

On January 12, a new field of American carrier operation was entered - we hit French-Indo-China. Our strikes
were against Camranh Bay and Saigon. In the Bay, a fair-sized enemy convoy was sighted, was attacked, was sunk.

Hong Kong, in China, felt the brunt of our strikes on January 16. Pilots reported that AA fire here was as dense
as they had ever seen but they pressed home their attack and did much damage to shipping and installations. The
cost was higher than we paid other days, and we lost six pilots and five aircrewmen in combat.

Evidently the Japanese did not desire to offer resistance, and they did not send out any large surface force.
We had to be content with normal strikes with no naval targets, and on January 20 the Fleet retired through Bashi
Channel into the Pacific again. The next day we launched strikes against Formosa.

This day - January 21 - is one of tragedy in our history. Early in the afternoon a returning strike plane made
a normal landing, taxied to the island structure, and here its 500 - pound bomb exploded. Many of our shipmates
were killed instantly, some were seriously injured, and some of the injured later succumbed. Fires raged on our
flight deck and hangar deck. Danger surrounded many of us, and we learned then that our crew knew how to face death
and yet work efficiently. All fires were extinguished in 36 minutes. Rapid temporary repairs were made, and our
planes were landed before they might have been forced to make water landings due to lack of fuel.

At 1500 on January 23, we sadly buried at sea 12 officers and 96 enlisted men who lost their lives in the explosion.
On January 25, we entered Ulithi, and quick repairs were started immediately.

The success of our operation is measured by 7 enemy warships sunk, 4 enemy merchant ships sunk, 36 enemy planes
destroyed, and ten strike days against territory far inside what was suppose to be enemy-controlled area.

"Operation Six" in our history started on 10 February and again a milestone of daring was ahead -
we were scheduled to strike Tokyo, the Heart of the Empire. After three years and two months of hard fighting across
the Pacific, the Navy was about to say hello to its destination - the enemy Capital. And the HANCOCK was "in
on it". We were apprehensive, but proud.

Before leaving Ulithi, we received a new air group aboard, Group EIGHTY, and on February 10, we set out for
three weeks of operations in support of landings on Iwo Jima.

During those weeks, we had seven days, three of them against Tokyo, three of them against Iwo Jima, and one
against Amami O Shima in the Nansei Shoto Islands. We were now part of the FIFTH Fleet under Vice Admiral RAYMOND
A. SPRUANCE. Vice Admiral MARC MITSCHER was in command of our Carrier Task Force.

Our mission was to destroy enemy aircraft in preparation for the impending Iwo Jima amphibious operations, and
we started out with explosive success on February 16, when our air group set a new record by destroying 71 enemy
planes in the air. This surpassed even the record set in 1943 by LEXINGTON planes at the famous "Marianas
Turkey Shoot", and the HANCOCK took her place as one of the queen carriers of the flat-top fleet. Our record
that day was not equaled for the duration of the war and still stands. Six strikes left our decks, and all of them
wreaked aerial havoc on Japanese air power.

Seventeen Zekes, four Vals, sixteen Oscars, six Tojos, two Bettys, two Dinahs, five Tonys, and nineteen unidentified
enemy planes were destroyed in the air. In addition, 18 others were racked up as "probably destroyed".
Twenty-seven others were damaged.

But that wasn't all. On the next day, we were back. The Japs were short on planes by this time, but we managed
to destroy 12 more in the air.

February 19, 21, and 22 were spent in sending up aerial support of friendly ground forces on Iwo Jima, and on
February 25, we returned to Tokyo. The Japanese had not thrown in the towel yet, but they did climb out of the
ring for awhile, leaving us with no opponent. Their fields were deserted, their planes were not in the air. Our
fliers were able to find only 12 to 15 planes all day, all of them on the ground. Four were destroyed, the rest
were damaged.

Light attacks were sent out against Amami O Shima on March 1, with three more enemy airborne planes being tallied,
plus four more on the grounds; and an March 3, we returned to Ulithi. Even more than before we could see the inevitable
outcome; we had knocked at the enemy's front door, walked into his living room, given him a beating, and walked
out. During this operation, Air Group EIGHTY destroyed one enemy warship and three merchant ships. His resistance
had caused some damage to other ships of our Fleet, but the cost was much less than the prize.

"Operation Seven" was to be not only the most rugged one in HANCOCK experience, but was also the most
active one for the United States Navy during the War. Okinawa was close to Japan, the enemy was desperate, and
his final weapon was sprung in full force - suicide attacks.

We left Ulithi this time on March 14 for operations against enemy aircraft, air installations, naval vessels,
and merchant shipping at Kyushu, the Kobe-Osaka area of Honshu, Shikoku, and the Nansei Islands. In addition, we
gave close air support to ground forces on Okinawa Jima.

The Okinawa Campaign was far from completion when, on April 7, we were hit by a suicide plane, who dropped his
bomb on our flight deck forward on the port side, then crashed in flames on the deck, causing damage that made
further flight operations impossible.

In Ulithi Air Group SIX, under command of Comdr. H.L. MILLER, came aboard, the same air group that was destined
to remain with us until the end of the War. Air Group SIX began the war on U.S.S. ENTERPRISE and was the first
Air Group to see action.

The Okinawa Campaign would make a history in itself. We saw a lot and did a lot. The first big day was March
18, when we were off Kyushu and bogies were numerous all day. (Bogies are aircraft that are unidentified, are treated
as enemy until proved otherwise). At about breakfast time one of our carriers was hit by a bomb. Another was hit
by an enemy plane half an hour later. That was all for the day, although enemy planes made intermittent approaches.
During the night, flares were dropped ahead of us, and shortly before dawn enemy planes again were close by. Two
of them were splashed before sunrise by our air patrol and at about seven in the morning, we opened fire on an
enemy plane that was diving on the FRANKLIN, sister carrier that was cruising next to us. Our fire did not stop
his dive, however, and he dropped his bomb squarely on the FRANKLIN flight deck, causing the entire flight and
hangar decks to explode in a huge mass of flame and smoke. The story of the FRANKLIN is well known now, and it
was with great sadness that we watched "Big Ben" twisting and turning in her battle to remain afloat.

On the next day, March 20, while the destroyer HALSEY POWELL was fueling from us, enemy planes were again overhead.
One dived on us from port, was set afire by our AA fire at about 700 feet and exploded in the air. However, the
engine and burning fragments passed close by our island structure and crashed into the fantail of the destroyer.

An hour and a half later another carrier operating with us was hit by a bomb, and was almost tagged by a second
bomb fifteen minutes later,. It looked like the Japs were not after the HANCOCK until about twenty minutes later,
when one was splashed about 2000 yards off our port beam. This was followed by another which dived and bombed us
from starboard, his bomb exploding in the water 100 feet off our port beam with no damage to "Fightin' Hannah".

Enemy planes kept coming - all day, all night, and on into the next day. At noon on March 21 a twin-engine plane
started a dive on us, turned away, and dropped his bomb near one of our light carriers. During this dive, we were
hit in the stack by fire from our own ships - a hazard which we sometimes had to face.

Things were then comparatively quiet, with only a few enemy planes appearing each day, until April 6, when a
diving plane again barely missed one of our "Baby Flat Tops". The Japs were again active, and a short
time after mid-day on April 7, we spotted an enemy plane off our starboard bow. He headed to port, turned, and
made a run directly at us. Unstopped by our AA fire, he came in on the water from almost dead ahead, dropped his
bomb from low altitude, and scored a hit on our flight deck near the port catapult. His plane crashed on deck forward,
cartwheeled all the way aft into our planes spotted there. We immediately had fires forward and aft on both flight
and hangar decks. Many of our shipmates, trapped by flames or knocked over the side by the blast, were recovered
from the water by destroyers. Others were not recovered. Some were killed on board ship; others were wounded.

Despite the great fires, our damage control parties did excellent work and saved the Ship from greater damage.
We were out of danger in less than half an hour (unless another Jap should come). Less than four hours later, we
were able to land planes that had been on a strike mission when the bomb hit occurred.

"Operation Seven" was over for us on April 9, when we started for Ulithi. That afternoon, at 1530,
we committed the bodies of 28 shipmates to the sea. There had been 35 others missing as a result of the bomb. Another
day of sadness in HANCOCK History was past.

During this operation, our planes destroyed 30 enemy planes in the air, 43 on the ground, and sank one enemy
ship. Three other enemy ships were probably sunk, and 26 were damaged. In addition to this, heavy damage was inflicted
on land installations in all target areas. We paid particular attention, when necessary, to land areas forward
of friendly forces on Okinawa. Among the ships badly damaged were an enemy carrier and light carrier in Kobe Harbor
on March 19.

In many ways "Operation Seven" might appear to be not as successful as previous ones. We did not destroy
as many planes, did not sink any enemy warships. The reason is simple: there were not as many planes to be destroyed
and the warships had been cached away, far from the scene of our landings. Okinawa was, in the light of this, very
successful. It was the last amphibious operation before the end of the war and spelled defeat to the Japanese -
a word which they had stubbornly refused to use up until that time.

There remained only two more operations for us. Both of these came after we had been repaired at Pearl Harbor.
In the surge of a fast-ending War, we had been designated to hasten recovery in Hawaii to enable us to be present
for the big push on Japan itself. We grumbled at missing our on being assigned a yard in the States; but most of
us realized the war expediency that made more rapid results necessary.

June 13 started "Operation Eight", which was our shortest - a one-day stand at Wake Island, long bypassed
and no longer of much use to the Japs. We looked on this raid, which occurred on June 20, almost as a warm-up engagement
for the bigger things to come. Our pilots had a field day that day, showing the Japs on Wake, a sample of precision
bombing and accurate rocketing that they will never forget - those of them who are still around to remember. There
were no enemy planes around, but ground installations and AA positions were worked over thoroughly and if it had
been desired for friendly forces to land at any future date, they could thank us for making their job easier.

Of significance in this Wake Island raid was the first use of White Phosphorus bombs for covering the vision
of enemy AA fire. In each wave, a series of these bombs were dropped near a position, making the task easier for
bombers and strafing planes, but more difficult in one way in that targets were partially obscured for our own
gunners and bombers.

Our new destination was Leyte Gulf, where we rejoined the THIRD Fleet on June 26. Leyte and Samar surrounded
our anchorage, and we viewed this scene of the great landing operations that took place in the autumn of 1944 with
much curiosity. Here, where the furious Battle of Leyte Gulf had been staged, we were now able to swim and walk
around the beach like week-end guests.

We got underway for "Operation Nine" on Sunday, July 1 - re-armed, re-provisioned, and ready. Okinawa
had been secured during our absence from the Fleet and we were fairly sure that there could be only one real target
now - Japan itself.

Ten days later, the "push" began. We struck Tokyo Plain on July 10. Hokkaido in the North on the 14th
and 15th, Tokyo Plain on the 17th and 18th, Shikoku and Kure in the south on the 24th, Honshu and Kure on the 25th
and 28th, Honshu on the 30th and again on August ninth and tenth, and Tokyo Plain on the 13th. Strikes were scheduled
on the 15th of August, but only a few minutes before our first big strike of the day reached its prospective target,
the order to return to base was received from Admiral HALSEY.

We were steaming about 100 miles from the coast of Japan, when Captain ROGER F. HICKEY read over the loudspeaker
system, the message from Secretary of the Navy JAMES FORRESTALL, which informed us that Japan had surrendered.
This information had been delayed for almost half an hour while planes wore being recovered, and when the last
engine had been cut the long-awaited news was heard. Our immediate response was something worth seeing and feeling.
Gun crews waved their arms, flight deck personnel did jigs among the planes, and people below decks put on their
own demonstrations of happiness.

The war was over - almost. Not long after we heard the news, a lone Jap who "didn't get the word"
dived on a neighboring task group and was destroyed before he could wreak any damage. We watched him go down in
flames - the last time, save one, that we were to witness that familiar sight.

Our air group then gleaned another distinction in its long list of accomplishments when, three hours after hostilities
had been ordered ceased, one of our fighter pilots spotted a Japanese plane diving on the nearby British Task Force
and destroyed him before he was able to reach his target. They say he shot this fellow down "in a friendly
sort of way", the war then being over. This was the last plane to be shot down attacking our naval forces
in the War. And this same air group had been the first one to see action in this War, back on December 7, 1941,
in Pearl Harbor.

In this final war operation, nine enemy aircraft were destroyed in the air and 304 were destroyed on the ground.
In addition to this, ten merchant ships were sunk and heavy damage was meted two battleships, one large aircraft
carrier, two heavy cruisers, and one destroyer. Many locomotives were destroyed, airfield installations were damaged
and destroyed, factories were bombed, and Yokosuka Naval Base, which is near Yokohama, was damaged. The locomotive
score showed 37 destroyed and 20 damaged. Yes, our last war cruise showed great versatility on the part of our
fliers.

How far did we travel in our 16 months between commissioning and war's end? Far enough to go 39 times across
the United States, a total of 119,822 miles. That means we averaged 10.7 nautical miles every hour. In October,
1944 (our month of most miles) we steamed 13,748 nautical miles.

"The Fightin' Hannah" is also proud of her scoreboard. She destroyed 733 planes, 34 merchant ships
and 14 warships in the final ten months of the War. Ten of the planes were knocked down my Ship anti-aircraft fire,
which is important because when they get that close it's "Get or be Got". We are glad that it is not
necessary to enlarge these numbers; but we are also proud of them as they stand and of the part we know they played
in victory.

Like any other combat unit that has seen war as it really is, we look at our record and remember always that
it cost us "Blood, Sweat, and Tears".

POST WAR CRUISING

Our final cruise found us with a new skipper. On the 7th of September, Captain DANIEL V. GALLERY relieved Captain
ROBERT F. HICKEY as Commanding Officer. HICKEY commanded U.S.S. GUADACANAL from September 1943 to September 1944
and has eleven German U-boats to his credit, one of which was boarded and taken as a prize - the first time since
1815 that a navy boarding party had taken an enemy warship as a prize.

The final war cruise lengthened into the longest cruise the HANCOCK experiences, and before we dropped our hook
in Tokyo Bay on 10 September, we completed 72 days of continuous steaming. Toward the end of the cruise, HANCOCK
Marines (71 of them) took part in occupational activities of Japan, and were sent to Yokosuka Naval Air Base on
August 30, where they set up defenses while that base was being used for American Air Patrol of the Tokyo Plain
Area. They brought back to the ship on their return on September 6 many stories of Japan and their treatment there.
Here was our first opportunity to learn first-hand what damage we had meted the enemy during the previous month.
Not until our liberty parties went ashore the second week in September, were we able to appreciate the stories
the Marines told. We saw Yokosuka, Yokohama, and Tokyo. We saw blocks of city areas laid flat and burned black.
We saw people in bread lines. We saw a population so militarized that even with the war over and most people out
of uniform, everyone among the male population wore parts of uniform - shirts, leggings, pants, hats, or shoes.
We saw Japanese women cringe into their houses at our approach, evidently thinking of the rape we should have had
in mind if their wartime propaganda had been, as they thought truth. We also saw the Japanese man, small, short-legged,
quiet, and slow-moving. We saw him in the attitude we can never understand, the bowing attitude and scurrying politeness.
We saw some who stuck to their arrogance, who shunned our looks and, occasionally, hissed as we passed. We looked
on them in their poverty, wreckage, and physical minuteness and wondered - this was the land that conceive Pearl
Harbor Day and even conceived the idea that they would conquer the United States and her Allies. We looked, we
wonder, but we did not understand. Probably, we never will.

During pre-commissioning and shakedown, training the basic organization of the Air Department was laid out and
with minor modifications it has remained in effect for the entire war. In general, the ship was well prepared for
the contemplated wartime operations as envisioned at the completion of the shakedown.

B. Changes In Ship's Structure

Battle experience dictated several changes in the ship's structure, some of which have already been accomplished.
This vessel suffered two bomb explosions with consequent flight and hangar deck fires, which forcefully brought
out the point that the gallery deck is a trap, exposed to damage from above and below. By evacuating the spaces
on this deck during general quarters, it is felt that many lives were saved. To do this, three ready rooms were
moved to B-201-1EL and gunnery department berthing established in the vacated gallery deck spaces. Ready Room #2
was left on the gallery deck for use by night fighters and condition 11 pilots. The ACI Office was moved to B-201-1EL
adjacent to the ready rooms with the old gallery deck space being converted to a storeroom. This arrangement proved
extremely handy for the pilots and gave them the protection of the armored hangar deck above. The case of access
between the wardroom, ACI, and ready rooms made all Air Groups enthusiastic about the change. No trouble was encountered
in manning planes, though an enclosed and armored ladder from the second deck through the hangar to the island
would be desirable. The present route from ready rooms to flight deck is forward on the second deck to the ladder
at frame 39, thence to the forecastle and up to the flight deck. Condition 11 pilots were kept in the crew shelter
at Flight Deck Control or in Ready Room #2 on the gallery deck, depending on the proximity to enemy territory.

C. General

&#9;1. Arming

(a). In using "Deckload Strike" operations, all arming was carried out on the flight deck, thus decreasing
the hazard to the ship in case of attack with planes on deck. It cannot be stressed too strongly that aircraft
munitions must be taken from the magazines at the latest possible time and placed on the planes just prior to takeoff.
Similarly the gasoline system was drained back and inerted when not actually in use. Only by keeping all inflammables
protected as much as possible, can effective damage control be maintained.

(b). In connection with this problem, the facilities for handling aircraft munitions on board carrier are definitely
unsatisfactory. This is probably the result of the tremendous increase in the desired number of sorties each day,
and to the development of rockets. For munitions supply to the flight deck, we are still using antiquated "dumb
waiters" which operate so slowly that it is necessary to break out bombs and rockets far in advance of the
time it is desired to start loading the planes. Provisions for proper stowage and handling of rockets are lacking.
In all aircraft arming, the aim should be to provide faster means of securing the munitions to the plane, and to
have a supply train direct from the magazines to the flight deck which can keep peace with the arming crews available.
This will require extensive redesign of handling equipment and of the munitions themselves, and should be given
top priority for future modification.

This ship has consistently moved planes forward on the flight deck by taxiing rather than towing, even though
the latter is preferable, because suitable tow bars were not available. Standard towbars and fittings on the aircraft
should be provided instead of requiring each carrier to develop its own jury rig. Suitable metal stock is seldom
available for making or repairing lightweight, easily handled towbars, and the wear on them is severe. Both forward
and after towbars should be provided, and all carrier aircraft required to have the same fittings for their attachment.
This could be provided for in the aircraft specifications.

3. Combat Information Center

Though CIC was able to give satisfactory performance in its present location in the island structure, the development
of more radar and communication equipment makes the provision of additional space a necessity. Only be removing
numerous functions of CIC to other spaces was the HANCOCK able to achieve the required results, though the flow
of information was slower than with an ideal layout. Form experience of other ships in combat, it is believed that
the most satisfactory location for CIC where adequate space and protection can be obtained is on the second deck.

4. Airborne Electronics

The advent of more airborne electric equipment has created a serious problem in its stowage and maintenance.
The spaces originally provided are inadequate to handle the volume of maintenance work and are rather inaccessible
to the aircraft. Stowage facilities for spare sets are lacking and should be increased to meet the future demands.

5. Air Group

On this ship, the Air Group Commander has the responsibility for the conduct of attacks and the handling of
aircraft in the air. His desires as to gasoline load and the armament of the planes are followed whenever latitude
is given in the operation orders. This is necessary in order to take advantage of the training of the Group in
special forms of attack, Special effort has been made to eliminate as many of the hazards of flying as possible
and to keep the pilots in good physical condition. To allow the maximum sleep, pilots are not required to answer
routine calls for general quarters and flight quarters except when scheduled for a flight. Air Group personnel
have been treated as part of the ship's company, and a most important part. This policy has paid off big dividends
in the welding of the fighting team, which is essential.

During the period 9 March 1945 to date, while Air Group SIX was aboard the U.S.S. HANCOCK, it is the opinion
of the Squadron Commanders and the Air Group Commander that nowhere could one find a closer feeling than existed
between the ship's officers and enlisted men and the Air Group. The Air Group felt that the HANCOCK was their ship
just like in peace time days.

It is strongly felt by Air Group SIX that the organization and liaison between the ship and the Air Group should
be used as a model by all carriers. Excellent cooperation was given the Group as soon as they reported aboard.
All hands made one feel as though he was welcome. The Engineering Department and First Lieutenant moved the Ready
Rooms and the gunners close to the guns. Changes for efficient operations aboard ship were cheerfully made, hence
a close feeling existed between Ship and the Air Group which in the long run made a more efficient combat team.

The Air Department moved the ACI Office next to the Ready Rooms. This office was always handy to the ACIO's,
the Squadron Commanders and the Air Group Commander. After this change was made, Air Combat Intelligence information
was the best that this command has ever seen. Everyone worked hard for the Air Group. The Air Officer was always
open to suggestions, and the Air Group always tried hard to correct any deficiencies on the part of the pilots,
which the Air Officer would point out in regard to deck operations. Safety in operations was stressed by the Air
Department. It is believed that the U.S.S. HANCOCK is an outstanding example of organization and leadership, which
operated an Air Group during 11 months of combat and 1 month of P.O.W. missions with minimum losses and maximum
results.

Lastly, the Air Group felt as though they were running their own show because the Captain and the Executive
Officer always let the Squadron Commanders run their own squadrons and the Air Group Commander run the Air Group.

A. General comments on the changes in the structure or equipment of the ship introduced as a result of experience.

1. Coamings were placed around the hatches on the hangar deck in an effort to eliminate the danger of water
and gasoline running down below decks as a result of a fire on the hangar deck. Damage sustained on the U.S.S.
INTREPID and U.S.S. FRANKLIN in the fall of 1944 made the necessity of these coamings obvious. It was found from
actual combat fire experience to be well worth while.

2. Hangar Deck Control and wiring leading to it were armored with 25# STS as a result of observations of blast
and shrapnel damage and fire to the hangar deck area due to bomb explosions below the flight deck. Protection thus
afforded to the control station for the hangar deck sprinklers is considered very necessary and during battle the
Fire Marshal is assigned to Hangar Deck Control as a battle station.

3. Hatches were installed over open hatchways on the second deck in compartments B-201-1EL and B-202-L. Previously,
the absence of hatches in these spaces presented a fire and flood hazard. Such was found true in damage to both
the U.S.S. FRANKLIN, U.S.S. INTREPID, and U.S.S. BUNKER HILL.

4. Secondary Damage Control with all the necessary charts, communications and personnel was set up in the forward
portion of the Carpenter Shop, compartment C-207-1EL. The Assistant Damage Control Officer was stationed in Secondary
Damage Control for general quarters. It was considered essential that some station other than a repair party be
given the control in the event Damage Control Central was wiped out. Such a casualty would of itself mean that
repair parties would be too busy with their own area to take over the control of the damage control organization.

5. The Dragging Gear Locker in compartment C-220-A was changed into a Damage Control Workshop to provide a location
for a separate group made up of shipfitters and carpenters mated concerned with the upkeep and repair of the hull
systems, damage control equipment, and watertight integrity. Separating the men according to their functions was
found a mere installed under a Plexiglas cover in the passage outside the Damage Control Workshop, thus facilitating
knowledge of and work on the ship's firemain.

6. The Paint Locker in compartment C-218-L was enlarged by including the Acid Stowage just aft of the Paint
Locker. This was found highly desirable as the old Paint Locker was much too small for a ship this size. A new
Acid Locker was constructed on the 01 deck, frames 205-206 starboard of C-0201-M.

7. Damage Control Central chart facilities were changed by building chart boards on all available bulkhead space
and installing a "Yoke" shaped board in the center running athwartships. Large layout charts of each
deck, the firemain, drainage, ventilation, gasoline, fuel oil, and flooding diagrams were placed on these boards
and Plexiglas covers installed to produce a very efficient means of recording status of the systems and the ship.

8. The Aviation Tool Room, compartment B-129-E, was changed into a Hull Tool Issue Room and a window with watertight
cover placed between that space and the Shipfitter Shop, compartment B-118-E, making hull tools very handy for
the shop using them. The former Hull Tool Issue Room, compartment B-314-2L, was turned over to the E Division for
an Electrical Tool Room.

9. Unit repair lockers, 26 in all, were installed as subdivisions of repair parties enabling wide distribution
of tools and personnel. Each locker has a complete set of tools, several rescue breathing apparatus and communications
with the main repair locker. Men were assigned about four to five per unit and main repair areas were subdivided
into sections for each unit. The ship was able to set Condition Zebra within five minutes after the general alarm
was sounded, although the time was usually around seven minutes to enable all personnel to get to their battle
stations.

10. Three rescue parties were set up in the gallery deck to assist in helping personnel caught in the "mystic
maze" during fire or other casualty. The parties were provided with RBA's lines, floodlamps, cable cutters,
etc., and were well trained in rescue work, being taught to know their area like a book.

11. Vent openings in the forward elevator pit had to be raised about four feet to prevent water in flooded pit
from going down the vent ducts to the forward pump spaces. They only closures on these ducts were in the spaces
concerned and it was deemed more desirable to raise the duct than install another closure in the duct opening.

12. Four six-inch drains were installed in the elevator pits to speed drainage since water from the hangar deck
sprinklers filled these pits much faster than they were formerly able to drain. Both pits were filled level with
the hangar deck due to the use of the hangar deck sprinkling system to combat fires due to both bomb explosions.

13. A mess hall master at arms shack was built in compartment B-304-L to facilitate control of messing. It is
considered to have helped greatly the feeding problem on a ship this size.

14. The fire hose stowage on the 02 deck between frames 70 and 74 starboard was changed to a Hull Department
Storeroom, and used for such items as spare canisters, life jackets, and mattresses. Stowage space was badly needed
by the Hull Department.

15. Several topside foam hoppers were removed and standard 11/2" fire hose connections installed thus increasing
the number of hoses with water that could be played on a fire. Foam is of little value in other than a fire in
a confined area.

16. Repair IV was enlarged inboard about nine feet making room for more tools and a better location for the
repair officer to operate. A second doormat was installed, thus making the locker accessible from two places obviating
the possibility of being trapped within the locker or being unable to get into the locker.

18. The door to the forward elevator pit from passage A-207-L at frame 29 was changed to a scuttle after it
was found necessary to shore that door, when the pit was flooded. The door opened into the passage whereas the
scuttle opens into the elevator pit, so the force of an explosion would jam the scuttle shut instead of open.

19. The Warrant Officer's Mess was charged into a Junior Officer's Bunkroom by installing 27 CPO bunks. The
old Warrant Officer's Pantry was made into a washroom and writing room for the occupants of the bunkroom. This
was necessary because of the large number of ship's officers and the size of the squadrons carried.

20. Staterooms 222, 224, and 226 were converted into one Junior Officer's Bunkroom for 22 men. Damage from the
Jap bomb explosion necessitated work on the strengtheners in this area and the change was made during the yard
period. Only after this second Junior Officer's Bunkroom was constructed were all officers on board able to sleep
in bunks, previous to this time cots had been set up in larger staterooms to provide berthing.

21. A stowage space for boatswain gear and ready lines was built on the 02 level between frames 4 and 8 port
side. This stowage is very handy and provides a place to keep surplus gear.

22. A stowage Post Office was moved to compartment B-303-L and a Fire Marshal's Office put in its place. The
old Post Office was too small for the mail handled, and the space made a very desirable stowage for surplus fire-fighting
gear as well as an office from which the Fire Marshal's Gang could operate.

23. Three topside feeding stations were built to facilitate feeding men stationed topside during general quarters.
They were located as follows: Forward Station was in the forward decontamination spaces; Midship Station was in
the old service pantry for Ready Room No.2; and the After Station was in the old service pantry for Ready Room
No. 3. By feeding all topside people at those stations and all below decks personnel in the mess hall, feeding
was accomplished during general quarters as expeditiously and efficiently as possible.

24. Stowages were made throughout the ship for structural steel to be used for emergency repairs. They were
places as near as possible to repair stations thereby making quick repairs possible.

25. Messing compartment B-323-L was converted into a living space for 18 men and a stowage for printing supplies
and bomb vanes. Expanded metal bulkheads separate the stowage from the berthing space. It was only by using all
available space that a sufficient number of bunks could be had for the increased complement.

26. Ready Room No. 1, 3, and 4 and the ACI Office were moved to compartment B-201-1EL, frames 100 to 111. Ready
Rooms No. 1, 3, and 4 were converted into berthing spaces. Changes in berthing were made placing all personnel
with gunnery battle stations topside, keeping catapult and landing gear crews topside, and moving all men with
lower-deck battle stations to below-deck living spaces. This move is considered of prime importance because it
allows gunnery personnel to be near to their gun stations and because it clears the 02 deck of many personnel who
would otherwise be stationed there during battle. Several carriers have had many casualties in aviation personnel,
because of their being caught on the gallery deck, while sustaining enemy-inflicted damage. It is to be noted that
this arrangement allows the hangar deck to be kept closed even though the ship is not in Condition I.

27. Spare hose stowage was installed on the second, third, main, and gallery levels for both 11/2" and
21/2" hoses. This dispersal of hoses keeps them handy throughout the ship and prevents the possible destruction
of all spare hoses with one casualty.

28. One and one-half inch connections were installed at foam hoppers on the hangar deck to provide additional
hose streams for emergency use. A suitable globe valve was provided on the system side of the hopper in order that
either foam stream or water stream could be furnished. These hose connections are considered desirable because
11/2" all-purpose nozzle and 100 to 150 feet of 11/2" hose were provided at each location.

1. Consumption of water over capacity production made it necessary to have water hours. The problem was first
created while on shakedown cruise -- the water having gotten as low as 50,000 gallons in ship's tanks. Water was
then secured in all heads and washrooms, the only water on the ship being available to the gallery, laundry, and
scuttlebutt's. After the water supply was raised, water hours were used, the heads and washrooms having water available
for an hourly period around each meal. The most satisfactory system is now being used wherein all the water for
ships use is recorded on meters installed in the two risers. The safety margin is 140,000 gallons and the danger
margin is 100,000 gallons in ship's tanks. No matter how high the daily consumption is, water will be left on if
supply is 140,000 gallons or better. If water is below 140,000, water will be secured in showers and washrooms
at 50,000 gallons consumption. If the supply gets below 100,000 gallons water is kept secured until the supply
again reaches 140,000 gallons. Daily consumption is figured on a 0000 to 0000 basis.

2. Smoke coming from fires topside was sucked into the main vent trunk through the openings on the port and
starboard sides aft and then was forced down into the engine spaces making them almost uninhabitable. A canvas
drop was rigged for each opening. set in a roll above the opening and personnel instructed as to how and when it
should be dropped. The canvas had been installed previous to bomb explosion on the 7th of April, 1945, and was
used at that time. A part of the port canvas caught fire, but all things considered, it was a worthwhile measure.

3. Vent ducts in the forward elevator pit filled with water whenever the level in the pit went up to about two
feet. The duct closures are in the compartments concerned; rather then install another closure which might be inaccessible
because of water or fire, the duct opening was raised four feet.

4. The necessity of having as many hoses and as much water as possible at the scene of fires prompted increasing
the hoses per each 21/2" fire plug from 100 feet to 150 feet. Two-hundred feet of 11/2" hoses were carried
at each fire plug, 100 feet were attached and 100 feet kept in a standby status and unattached. On strike days,
both lengths were attached to the fire plug.

5. Foam equipment and the various length applicators were found difficult to handle, and we used and found more
desirable the all-purpose nozzle. The quicker water is played on the fire, the better; the aforementioned equipment
took precious time and the latter was ready for instant use.

6. It was found desirable to have many portable 002 in the hangar deck area because of small fires in and around
the airplanes and even more are desirable on the 02 deck because of flashbacks and electrical fires in this area.
It is worth noting in this connection that fire hoses can be run only with difficulty in this area.

7. The importance of the gasoline and hangar deck repair parties necessitated installing 3JG and 7JG sound powered
circuits in Damage Control Central. This was accomplished shortly after commissioning and was very helpful in controlling
and coordinating repair parties during casualties.

D. Training Program

1. There can be no doubt that an extensive training program was needed when the ship was commissioned and throughout
the period after that date. Approximated one-third of the R-1 Division personnel had never been to sea before in
any kind of craft and less than ten percent of the division had been on carriers. These figures are merely estimates,
actually the condition was probably worse. Of those that had been to sea, very few had a working knowledge of damage
control.

2. During the latter part of the pre-commissioning detail's existence, the R-1 Division enlisted men worked
on board ship -- the seamen worked on leading parties and the rated men assisted the Shipyard. Officers assisted
in the organization and all hands attended what schools were available to them.

3. After commissioning, daily lectures, demonstrations, movies or drills were held. These were of considerable
value; experienced officers and men leading the training and all officers and men actually operated the equipment
and took part in the drills.

4. In the battle area frequent drills were held on possible casualties and on those experienced by other ships.
Errors were pointed out and Department officers with the mid-watch in Damage Control Central wrote out the drills
for the following day.

5. All lectures given were compiled and made available to the men and officers. A large number were filed and
issued to other officers and divisions on the ship.

6. It is recommended that:

(A) a qualification record for men showing their abilities, be compiled; this record to be consulted and used
as a factor in determining a man's practical factor on an examination for advancement in rating;

(B) that R Division personnel be sent to the ship as soon as possible when the pre-commissioning detail is formed
to enable them to become thoroughly familiar with the ship and its equipment;

C) that refresher courses and special courses for old and newly assigned men be undertaken at regular intervals
in the period of a ship's life.

C. Suitability of the ship for the functions in which it has been engaged, with recommendations for improvement.

1. In all essential particulars, it is considered that ships of the ESSEX class provided satisfactory performance
of tasks to which they were assigned. However, numerous minor structural alterations and installations have been
suggested for improvement of efficiency of operations and for the betterment of living and working conditions of
personnel.

2. It is considered that the ventilation aboard this ship is inadequate and approved alterations should be accomplished
to remedy existing conditions.

3. The experience of this ship indicates that increased capacity of evaporating equipment is desirable. It is
also suggested that a loop system for fresh water distribution be provided to establish more favorable pressure
conditions, and that consideration be given to isolation of fresh water lines to permit securing washrooms and
showers without disturbing other outlets.

4. Personnel complement required in battle zone was considered excessive for facilities provided in connection
with berthing and personal cleanliness resulting in crowded conditions and inadequate washroom facilities. The
laundry load developed by over-complement resulted in considerable inconvenience and delay.

5. Trash burning facilities proved in adequate and the improvised spark arrestor, for incinerators required
excessive attention. It is recommended that complete study of the trash disposal problem be made with the view
towards elimination of excessive smoke and sparks. The present location of the incinerators is undesirable and
interfered with operating functions.

6. Considerable difficulty was experienced with drainage system due primarily to clogging. It is felt that an
enlargement of piping would greatly improve the disposal of waste liquids.

7. From the standpoint of watertight integrity, the location of sewage disposal outlets through the skin of
the ship presented several conditions which could be readily improved by a redesign of piping which would carry
outlets to a higher level.

8. Experience in the war zone indicated the need for ships of this class carrying certain spare parts for equipment
such as roller curtains, garbage grinders, plumbing and flushing valves, and fittings, firemain valves, laundry
machinery, etc. These items of equipment are subject to failure or excessive wear.

9. The principle problem involving the safety of ships of this class centers on the fire hazard. This hazard
is considered severe due to the presence of large quantities of gasoline and other inflammable liquids and to the
operation of aircraft both on the hangar and flight decks. The experience of this ship indicates that hangar deck
fires can be effectively controlled by the hangar deck sprinkling system now provided; however, it is essential
that all valves and controls are maintained in reliable working order at all times. This will involve frequent
inspections and tests of equipment by competent and conscientious personnel. In addition, it is essential that
the control equipment for operation of the sprinkler system be manned by experienced officer personnel at all times,
and that third deck repair parties be thoroughly indoctrinated to insure a secondary means of operation in event
of failure of electrical control devices.

10. The firemain requires a segregation, which will permit maximum volume and pressure conditions for sprinkler
systems and fire plugs at time of emergency. This can only be accomplished by an arrangement, which will necessitate
the manual operation of the minimum number of gate valves on the firemain required to place all fire pumps immediately
in service with a pressure of 150 pounds at the pumps. The demands of a severe gasoline and airplane fire on the
hangar deck will normally call for the initial use of at least six fire pumps and if not promptly checked will
require the entire pumping capacity of the ship. It has been determined that a longitudinal segregation of the
firemain is desirable inasmuch as the minimum number of sectional control valves are required to be kept closed
and only two valves require opening to make all fourteen fire pumps available for the hangar deck sprinkling system.

&#9;11. Some consideration and study has been given to the installation of a sprinkling system for the flight
deck. Results of such study have been itemized for reference. Further study of this feature of protection may be
desirable.

&#9;12. It is considered that the present ventilation trunk on the second deck, port side, is undesirable
and creates a smoke and flood hazard to below-deck areas which should be eliminated by accomplishment of the alterations
which have been submitted for ships of this class.

1. The system of replenishment at sea allowed for an ample supply of bombs, projectiles, rockets and fuses at
all times. Priority was given at each loading to the items in the order in which they were needed and thus there
has been an ample supply of ammunition for all operations.

2. Maintenance, in so far as operations permitted, was carried out daily on the battery. Periods at anchor were
utilized to complete minor overhaul and repairs.

B. Training

1. Training was hampered by long periods at sea, condition watches, refueling and rearming, etc., but was carried
out in so far as practicable. Actual and practical work on the battery plus training courses kept the Gunnery Department
supplied with ratings during the war.

C. General

1. The experience of the Gunnery Department, operating under combat conditions, has been coordinated and systematized
into a book published under title of "Gunnery Department Instructions" effective 15 August 1945. These
instructions set forth the administrative and battle organization, policy, procedures, and doctrine of the Gunnery
Department and have been given a wide distribution. Procedures have been standardized using prescribed forms, which
now number about twenty-five, simplifying the administrative routine and problems encountered and expediting changes
and adjustments required in shifting from war to peace standards.

1. The Executive Officer's Office was originally planned for office 2-95-4 frames 90-100 (2nd deck), but instead
they moved into the space allotted for Flag Operations Office, 2-86-1, at the time of Commissioning.

2. The Captain's Office was moved from 02-91-2 to 2-95-4, due to need for a larger office. This change was made
in January 1945 by the Ship's Force.

3. The Main Communication Office was moved from B-0203-L to B-0101-L, frames 79-86 on 01 deck, the space which
was assigned as the Air Office, but was being occupied by the V-2 Division as an office. This change was made in
December 19 by the Ship's Force.

4. Radio ONE, B-0403-C was enlarged by inclusion of the 40mm clipping room forward from frame 82 to frame 79.
This was accomplished during post-shakedown period, with completion made in Pearl Harbor Navy Yard in September
1944.

B. Communication Department Training Program.

1. The training program inaugurated during the pre-commissioning period at NTS, Newport, Rhode Island, has been
steadily promoted, and developed. Based, fundamentally, on standards and requirements as issued by the Bureau,
the program has also incorporated several phases that were deemed expedient to wartime cruising and combat operations.
At present, training is being carried on in conjunction with a new overall ship's training set-up, which calls
for specific training hours during the day, as well as the maintenance of percentage progress reports for each
man. These latter are then summarized to show the rate of progress in each rate.

Originally, the department had cognizance of the K-1 Division, Radio men, and Radio Technicians; K-2, Signalmen;
and K-3, Yeomen, Printers and Mailmen. In June 1945, the K-4 Division was added. This brought all the Technicians,
both Radio and Electronics, into one division.

At Newport, daily classes were held, by trained instructors, for all divisions. After moving aboard the ship,
courses were drawn and issued to the men as needed or requested. Examining boards were designated and examinations,
covering up-to-the moment requirements and operations, were made up by the Division Officers.

The Radiomen, Technicians and Signalmen have been sent to schools in each of the ports that the ship has visited,
except those in the forward area, where none were available.

A coding practice machine, with oscillator, was procured at Pearl Harbor, and proved of great value in the operating
area when men had to be trained almost over-night for new circuit guards. It is suggested that these machines be
made available to all carriers.

Several recommended texts were made available to both Radiomen and Technicians. It would be progressive to have
a small Communication library decided upon and issued to all major ships.

Training Films, held by the Ship's Visual Aids Officer, were shown to K-1, K-2 and K-4 at opportune times.

The Signalmen took advantage of visual drills as ordered and controlled by group or force commanders. With the
advent of peace, a radio circuit was designated for drill and training in the group with which the ship operated.

Experience has proven that a definite, comfortable, equipped space should be provided for the efficient training
of communication personnel.

C. Radio and Electronics Comments.

During the pre-commissioning period for this ship, the Radio Material Officers and the Radio Technicians were
assigned to duty at the Quincy Ship Yard, to assist in the fitting out of the ship with Radio and Radar equipment.

This procedure was very beneficial to the ship, in that the maintenance personnel became very familiar with
every phase of their work. Some of the pre-commissioning time was utilized to send maintenance personnel to various
schools to study the specific equipment used aboard this ship.

It is strongly advocated that Radio and Radar material personnel be assigned to a ship under construction early
enough to allow them to become thoroughly familiar with the equipment and its installation. A great deal can be
learned from the yard workmen and the Company Field Engineers during this period.

After commissioning, this ship had a long availability at the South Boston Navy Yard. During this period, the
Radio and Radar installations were completed and put into operation. Company Field Engineers and maintenance personnel
worked in close harmony checking out each piece of equipment and making test runs to determine operational characteristics.
Again much was learned from the Field Engineers and the ship's maintenance personnel were ready to assume the complete
responsibility for the equipment.

Because of the previous work and study, very little attention was given to the correction of the installations
troubles during the shakedown, since most of the "bugs" had already been removed. This permitted the
maintenance personnel to concentrate on improvements, alterations, and modifications which would increase the fighting
ability of the ship.

These changes were recommended and made during the post-shakedown availability.

After this post-shakedown availability, the ship started for the combat area, via Norfolk, Panama Canal, San
Diego and Pearl Harbor. During this trip, a number of additional improvements were suggested and were completed
at Pearl Harbor.

From the period of 10 October 1944 to the end of the war, 15 August 1945, this vessel has been in the combat
zones. During that period of time, many maintenance problems came up and were solved. It was discovered that for
best operations under a combat conditions, many relocations were necessary. The equipment were modified many times
to meet situations as they developed. New equipment were obtained and installed by ship's force to supplement or
supersede existing equipment. Details of these changes are given in separate reports, and are not mentioned here
because of the classification assigned them.

The parts replacement supply problem was very critical for all electronic equipment. The difficult thing to
understand regarding this fact is that very little change was noticed; even now, many of the same items are as
critical as they have ever been. While on the subject of supply, the splendid job that SerRon 10 did in the forward
area with the limited quantity of supplies is worthy of comment. The SerRon 10 forces supplied a sorely needed
service to the task forces of the Pacific. They were ever ready to help with supplies, and Field Engineers, to
restore vital Radio and Radar equipment to efficient operating condition.

Another important phase of supply and maintenance was in connection with an "Electronics Pool" which
was set up on the larger ships. The close cooperation between various vessels is responsible for the rapid repairs
effected to electronic equipment. Smaller vessels were not as well equipped as the larger vessels were for maintenance.
Therefore, entire units were interchanged between the larger and smaller ships.

The supply of properly trained Radio Technicians was very limited, with the result that very few ships had their
full allowance of rated technicians. To lick this problem, our extensive program was set up for training selected
personnel for RT rates. After a period of several months, if the man showed promise, he would be sent to the Radar
Maintenance School at Pearl Harbor for more formal education lasting from two to four months. One of our best RT-men
was trained by this method. The training aboard consisted of periods of theory followed by sessions of practical
application. All of this was coordinated with good hard work. It is pointed out here, that until the war ended
the demand for Radio Technicians was far in excess of the supply.

Some of the major alterations and modifications, which were made by the Ship's Force for the most part, are
as follows:

The SC-3 Radar was replaced with a SR Radar. Directional IFF was installed for the SM Radar. The SCR-720 Radar
(used for zenith search) was installed with the help of the Pearl Harbor NYD. Directional IFF was installed on
both of the Mk12 fire control Radar. The R.P.P.I. units, in CIC and in Air Defense Forward were rearranged. The
R.P.P.I. units in Air Defense Aft, Air Plot, Chart House, and one VP from CIC were removed. The aft radio towers
(damaged) were replaced by metal whip antennas by the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard in June 1945. The Mk8, Mod "O"
stable element was replaced by Mk8, Mod 2 stable element. The SG-1 Radar was modified

to a SG-16 Radar. Mk22 Radar was installed by the Boston navy Yard during the post-shake down availability.
A YM, a YJ-2b and RCM equipment was installed aboard by the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard. Details of these and many other
minor changes have been covered in reports submitted by this ship to BuShips.

When this vessel was placed in commission, about eighty (80) percent of the personnel had never been to sea
and about sixty (60) percent had never seen a piece of machinery in operation. Under these conditions, the Engineering
Department trained men sufficiently well enough to operate and handle all major casualties to the machinery, and
joined the Pacific Fleet in the War Zone five months after commissioning.

In general, the Engineering Department equipment was well built. However, due to inexperienced (Building Yard)
personnel, there were a number of small items that caused trouble, such as inferior welding and wiring; also, machinery
was not properly tested before it left the manufacturers, and in some cases the material did not meet specifications.

Operating conditions in the War Zone required all the boilers and machinery to be in an operating of "standby"
condition, always being ready to make full power at any time. This condition permitted little or no chance for
upkeep inspections or overhaul when underway. Whenever the ship went to rear areas, very little work could be done
due to maintaining a condition of readiness, which prevented work on machinery. The tender assistance was very
inadequate, mostly due to their not having the material. This vessel has been underway on eight (8) boiler operations
for a maximum of sixty-two (62) days in one period.

B. Summary of Casualties and Comments.

1. BOILERS - Superheated tubes completely plugged with soot; causing reduced capacity of output and low superheat
temperature with a considerable reduction in efficiency, which caused a lot of trouble in controlling smoke. This
was due to operating conditions, not blowing tubes (in some cases, not for five (5) days), and not being able to
clean the boilers, (fire and watersides) many times exceeding two thousand (2,000) hours of operation. There were
several design features which should be improved and these will be corrected at the next Navy Yard overhaul. Considerable
trouble was experienced with the actuator safety valve on the superheater outlet leaking steam. These valves were
"worked over" whenever possible, but at no time were we over completely able to stop them from leaking.
Investigation should be made for a better control of forces draft blowers as proper blower operation is essential
for smoke control; the present equipment and control valves are not adequate for fast maneuvering in War Zones.

A Study should be made for a better means of removing the soot deposits from tubes. Present equipment does not
efficiently remove the soot deposits, especially if they are permitted to build up.

2. MAIN ENGINES - No trouble had been experienced with the main engines; reduction gears, or shafting. They
met all demands for whatever service or maneuvering was requested. The propellers were slightly eroded, especially
at the base of the blades, and most of them had to have the pitch corrected and were rebalanced after a year in
operation.

3. TURBO-GENERATORS - No trouble has been experienced with the turbo-generators either electrical or mechanical.
Investigation should be made for a faster operating governor and voltage regulator because if a large load is suddenly
put on, the frequency and voltage drops off as much as twenty (20) percent.

4. AUXILIARIES - In general, the auxiliaries held up well under wartime operating conditions. However, there
was considerable erosion on the casings of the Main Feed Pumps and Fire Pumps. Most all of the Air Compressors
had severely worn pistons and cylinders after one year of service.

5. STEAM LINES- These gave no trouble except for faulty welding and leaky gaskets. This was the largest single
casualty that happened continually and many times boilers and main engines had to be secured underway from three(3)
to six (6) hours, to repair leaky gaskets. This was due to rapid acceleration and deceleration of main engines,
causing the steam temperature to vary considerably. These rapid steam changes and the general dirty condition of
the boilers made it impossible for the superheater to maintain design temperature. In some cases, the lines were
not properly drained out and gaskets would get watersoaked and leak.

6. SALT WATER LINES - These were a constant source of trouble due to corrosion. This can only be remedied by
installing a non-corrosive metal.

7. STEERING ENGINE & ELEVATORS - In general, these gave no operating trouble after bearing trouble was corrected
shortly after commissioning.

8. EVAPORATORS - There was very little trouble experienced with the evaporators except in and around atolls.
The coral seemed to form a harder scale with considerable more resistance to heat transfer. If routine cleaning
was maintained and with the introduction of boiler compound and starch, the evaporators would make design capacity
of water. It is recommended for wartime operation that larger capacity evaporators be installed.

9. ELECTRICAL - In general, the electrical equipment held up very well except for wiring that was exposed in
the heavy weather. Care should be taken in the future not to install wiring and motors in Gyrocompasses would cause
some error, but this was corrected when cleaned. The Bendix Log sword vibrates considerably at low speeds under
fifteen (15) knots.

C. Training.

During wartime and in the War Zone, very little time is available for training. Due to severe operating conditions
and remaining at general quarter stations many times for two or three days and most of the time during strikes,
16 hours per day; also, when time is available, most of it is spent on upkeep of material. This calls for a complete
and thorough training course to be given to all personnel before they are assigned to ships and should include
an extensive training center, divided up into departments to which they are to be assigned. Then Officers and Petty
Officers which are to be assigned to the ship should be sent to give a thorough indoctrination on ship's life exactly
in the routine that will be used, on the particular type of ship to which they are assigned. A complete set-up
of an Engineering plant should be established and training given on all phases of it machinery and accompanying
lectures on particular types of machinery, to include actual diagrams, training films, and plans. This course should
be of sufficient length, so when the new personnel arrive on the ship, nothing will be strange and they will fall
in immediately to the ship's routine.

D. Conclusion.

The general design of the Engineering plant of its machinery met the necessary requirements for extended combat
operations with the minimum amount of upkeep. There is one big objection: "Ventilation". The present
arrangement of intakes to the machinery spaces made it very vulnerable whenever large fires were started on flight
and hangar decks gave forth large volumes of smoke. Each machinery space should have its own intake and these should
be located at various places throughout the ship with cross connections between them. This would allow for closing
off of one section and taking the air from a section where there is little or no smoke. The ventilation in the
firerooms should be double its present supply and exhaust, with more ventilation supplied around turbo-generators
and distribution boards in the firerooms. When operating in hot climatic condition, you hardly touch any part of
the equipment without getting a slight burn. Such conditions make it almost impossible to work around when fireroom
is lighted off. Some thought should be given for comfort of personnel during long periods of general quarters where
it is necessary to remain on their stations for two or three days.

With the end of the war and the advent of demobilization, emphasis shifted immediately aboard the U.S.S. HANCOCK
from battle efficiency to training. Three principal forms of training were started. The first, a vocational training
program, provided voluntary training in about thirty subjects ranging from Latin to Welding to Shoe Repairing.
This program was designed to help men from Latin to Welding to Shoe Repairing. This program was designed to help
men soon to be discharged by giving them additional skill, credits or groundwork in a trade or subject they might
find useful in civilian life. The second program was primarily an accounting system to permit a close watch to
be kept on the normal training for advancement in rating based on the standard requirements as listed in the BuPers
Manual. The third program was a return to the old pre-war system of notebooks for weekly assignments of questions
to be answered by all junior officers.

The vocational training program started with considerable success, over 350 men enrolling in over 35 subjects.
Other duties, recreation, and loss of interest soon cut the original number down to 225. As long as nothing more
interesting presented itself, the men would attend classes, but athletic programs, liberty and recreation caused
the men to skip classes and lose interest.

B. General.

There were no changes in the structure or equipment and no maintenance difficulties.

1. Informal classroom work in which an officer instructor conducts a session on a particular problem of supply.

2. More important than the above is the constant training a man gets in performing his own particular job under
the supervision of storekeeper, cook, or baker petty officers.

Results of this system, as opposed to any formalized school curriculum, have been favorable.

B. Recommendations.

Several recommendations in the form of alterations have been submitted. The more important are:

1. Refrigerated spaces. All refrigerated spaces on board are poorly insulated. While operating in the tropics,
the amount of condensation in neighboring compartments is excessive and not conducive to good preservation.

2. Compartments B-406-A and B-412-A. These two storerooms are located directly above engine spaces. Lack of
proper insulation makes the temperature of these rooms too high for work of any duration.

3. Condensation is noticeable in practically all storerooms on the 4th deck. Application of an anti-sweat paint
would reduce this.

4. Construction of a "receiver's cage" on the hangar deck for assembling and sorting incoming stores
is considered desirable.

5. The appearance of the gallery, as important factor in proper serving of food, could be greatly improved by
the installation of stainless steel equipment.

C. Comments.

1. One of the biggest problems in the Pacific and also one of the most important because it involves spare parts,
is freight. The HANCOCK has not received a shipment of any consequence since leaving Pearl in June. On investigation,
the chief source of trouble seems to be a ruling that forbids SevRon 10 from removing freight ashore for sorting
- it must remain afloat. Possible solution might be to use Guam rather than the more isolated and ill-equipped
bases for sorting and final shipment. At present, all routing of freight is governed by dispatches from high echelons
of command. The feasibility of allowing each ship's Supply Officer to route his own freight is suggested.

2. The supplying of "standard" materials in the forward area, although not perfect, is pretty good.
AK loads could be kept up to date better than at present. The rigid ruling of forbidding a ship to order any BBB
(AK) item except from an AK could be relaxed under certain conditions where the quantity of an item requested is
far in excess of the AK load.

3. It is felt that SerRon 6 (Logistic Group Operating at Sea) vessels are not put to maximum use. These vessels
(oilers, AK's, destroyers) return to port frequently for replenishment and could be used for picking up freight
and placing special orders for the combatant ships. Another weakness is the "first come, first served"
rule. The employment of any method of distribution - such as use of a ship's Supply Officer as allocating agent
- would be more satisfactory.

4. The above is not to be considered a complete discussion of the experiences of the Supply Department of this
vessel. A thoroughly detailed report on the same subject is being prepared for submission to the Bureau of Supplies
and Accounts.

The training program given to the Medical Department personnel and ship's crew consisted of the following.

During pre-commissioning, a number of hospital corpsmen were assigned to the Chelsea Naval Hospital for training
in operating room technique, sterilization procedures and care of Medical Department material. Also, several were
assigned to the Naval Training Station, Newport, Rhode Island, for instruction in clerical procedures.

During the shakedown cruise, all hospital corpsmen were given an intensive course in first aid procedures and
routine medical care aboard this type vessel. The bandsmen, who ere assigned as stretcher bearers, were also given
this instruction.

The ship's crew was given instruction in essential first aid measures, during the shakedown cruise. The was
done by divisions.

Since that time, the hospital corpsmen have been under more or less continual instruction considered necessary
for their duties aboard the ship. Emphasis was placed upon training individuals in different divisions of the Medical
Department in order to give each individual as wide and diversified a knowledge of Medical Department procedures
as possible, and also to enable one individual to take another's place should anyone be lost. Frequent changes
in assignments within the Medical Department have also been made from time to time to carry out these measures.

The ship's officers and crew have been given several refresher periods of instruction in the essentials of first
aid treatment while out in the forward area.

It is felt that too much emphasis cannot be placed on the thorough training of hospital corpsmen in first aid
treatment. Following the two instances aboard this ship resulting in a large number of casualties, the hospital
corpsmen did outstanding work and undoubtedly helped the Medical Officer in serving a number of lives. The thorough
training they had received no doubt was essential in making this possible.

The consensus of opinion of the Medical Officers toward the first aid training of the ship's crew (officer and
men) has always been to only teach them certain essential things. They would be able to do and to stress these
points rather than try to give too comprehensive a course in first aid. During the two instances resulting in a
large number of casualties, several instances of ship's crew personnel applying these measures adequately tend
to bear out the viewpoint held.

The practice of rotating individuals to different departments within the Medical Department is proving valuable
now with the transfer of several of the key personnel from the ship.

It is noteworthy that not a single casualty on 7 April 1945 succumbed after reaching a first aid station or
the sick bay.

There has been no major change made in the main sick bay area since commissioning, as the present layout is
considered as good as can be made with the sick bay located where it is. In any future ships of this type, however,
it is strongly recommended the whole sick bay area be moved to a new location, namely the warrant officer's country,
as in such a location the vibration and noise from the propellers of the ship would not be present. This vibration
and noise is especially bad when the ship is underway at a fast speed. Such conditions make surgical operations,
dental procedures, laboratory work and certain other work quite difficult at times.

Several of the battle dressing stations has been changed as a result of experience. It has been found that battle
dressing stations exposed on the hangar deck are practically useless in case of major damage to a ship of this
type because of fire, smoke, and water on the hangar deck. As a result of this knowledge, the battle dressing station
forward on the hangar deck was moved into the Photo Laboratory, and the after battle dressing station on the hangar
deck moved to the Junior Officer's Bunk Room up in the forecastle area. On the last occasion resulting in a large
number of casualties, a large number were given emergency treatment in the forecastle area.

Another change which was made primarily from experience from other ships of this type was to remove all medical
personnel from the Gallery Deck Battle Dressing Station during general quarters due to its vulnerability to smoke
from fire in the area and on the hangar deck. The small battle dressing station was set up for the Air Group Medical
Officer in the Flight Deck Crew's Shelter.

A major source of dissatisfaction regarding sick bay equipment since commissioning has been the air conditioning
units. The two installed at the time the ship was constructed have continually broken down and are out of order
a good bit of the time.

A small unit has been installed in the dental spaces which have proven invaluable to these working in there.

The new unit authorized for this type ship should remedy the above fault.

With the ship being transferred into peacetime operations, a comparable reduction in Medical Department personnel
to that of the ship has been recommended.