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This chapter shows that the results reached in previous chapters about knowledge are true as well about justification for believing: if you are justified in believing p, then p is warranted enough to justify you in φ-ing, for all φ. The view is defended against challenges from two main camps: epistemological externalists and those who think that only what is known — and especially only what is true — can justify you in or be a reason you have for φ-ing. The chapter also defends the right-to-left direction of the conditional — if p is warranted enough to justify you in φ-ing, for all φ, then...

This chapter shows that the results reached in previous chapters about knowledge are true as well about justification for believing: if you are justified in believing p, then p is warranted enough to justify you in φ-ing, for all φ. The view is defended against challenges from two main camps: epistemological externalists and those who think that only what is known — and especially only what is true — can justify you in or be a reason you have for φ-ing. The chapter also defends the right-to-left direction of the conditional — if p is warranted enough to justify you in φ-ing, for all φ, then you are justified in believing p — paying special attention to the role that Wittgenstein's hinge propositions might play in an argument against it. The chapter closes with a discussion of recent principles suggested by John Hawthorne and Jason Stanley.