Faithless: The politics of new atheism

Abstract

The emergence of ‘new atheism’ during the course of the last
decade helped fuel an upsurge of interest in issues around religion. But
scholarly analysis of new atheism, particularly its political dimensions,
remains embryonic. This paper addresses this lacuna by examining the
politics of new atheism across a variety of themes related to politics.
These include the causal factors underpinning its emergence and development,
its organisational structure and composition, the political strategies
pursued by its proponents, and the various internal tensions and conflicts
that these dynamics have produced.

Introduction

The early years of the twenty-first century thrust issues around religion to the
forefront of public and political debate. One of the defining features of this was
the emergence of a more activist form of atheism, known as the ‘new
atheism’, which sought to openly challenge and criticise religious beliefs and
to promote the virtues of reason, rationality and science. Fueled by a series of
best-selling publications, and accompanied by high levels of media interest, new
atheism soon became something of a cultural phenomenon. By the summer of 2007, Tom
Flynn, Executive Director of the Council for Secular Humanism, could declare that,
“A movement was aborning, or at least being written about with feverish
energy” (Flynn, 2010).

Scholarly research into new atheism, though, remains embryonic. The vast majority of
works on the topic to date have been directed at a popular audience, and have been
largely crude and superficial in content, typically attempting to defend certain
theological positions rather than examine the dynamics of new atheism itself (e.g.
McGrath, 2004; Beattie, 2007; Haught,
2008; Eagleton, 2010). Serious
academic analyses have been more useful, but also problematic in various ways.
First, there are a relatively small number of such studies, a shortcoming that
reflects a more general lack of research into atheism and non-religion. As Lee and
Bullivant (2010: 26) observe, the study of
atheism remains “a long-term, collective blind spot in research”.
Analyses of new atheism have also centred on a comparatively limited number of
areas. Principally, these have focused on its historical context (e.g. Hyman, 2010, LeDrew, 2012), its sociological qualities (e.g. Bullivant, 2008; Cimino &
Smith, 2007, 2011), its
philosophical properties (e.g. Kitcher, 2012)
and the psychological characteristics of its adherents (e.g. Hunsberger & Altemeyer, 2006; Baker & Robbins, 2012).

One area that has been peculiarly absent from studies of new atheism, however, has
been its political dimension). The point is exemplified by a recently edited volume
on new atheism, purporting to offer a rounded examination of the topic, which
includes work from “the fields of religious studies, sociology of religion,
sociology of science, philosophy, and theology” (Amarasingham, 2010: 2), but contains nothing in the way of
political analysis. Studies addressing this lacuna have recently started to emerge,
with work examining various, specific aspects within new atheism. For instance, some
notable and useful recent articles examine the influence of radical atheism and
power in the British political context; Taira (2012) examines the use of identity politics within new atheism; and
Schulzke (2013) has analysed the ideological
dimension of new atheist thought, exploring its links to broader liberal values.

Research in this area, however, remains limited. The broader dynamics of new atheism,
including its political aims, organisation and strategies, particularly beyond the
small number of high-profile authors who are typically taken to represent new
atheism as a whole, remain largely unexplored. This omission is especially
disconcerting since political activism is one of the hallmarks of new atheism
itself. Comparing the huge discrepancies in the power and resources being commanded
by atheism and religion in the United States, for example, Richard Dawkins (2007), probably the most well-known of all new
atheists, makes the point abundantly clear, “[O]ur struggle”, he says,
“is not so much an intellectual struggle, as a political one: What are we
going to do about it?”.

The purpose of this paper is to establish a baseline for further research into the
political dimensions of new atheism by providing a broad overview of new
atheism’s most salient political features, focusing, in particular, on the
organisational, strategic and public policy dimensions of new atheism. It begins by
discussing some of the main ideational features of new atheism, and by considering
some of the causal factors that have underpinned its emergence and development. The
paper then examines the organisational structure and composition of new atheism,
centering, in particular, on its central groups and leadership figures, and on the
use of identity politics in its political aims and strategies. The key fault lines
and tensions around new atheism and other elements within the broader atheist,
secular and humanist population, are also explored, considering the extent to which
new atheism can be said to have been thus far successful in its goals.

Terms and conditions

Defining the parameters of new atheism is no easy task. Studies into the
demographics of the ‘nonreligious’ typically make no distinction
between different forms of atheism in a fashion that would allow a category of
‘new atheists’ to be easily identified. Some, such as Cragun et al.
(2012), have attempted to
disaggregate various sub-streams of thought within atheism, but ’new
atheism’ remains elusive. Fine-grained distinctions are also frequently
absent amongst atheists themselves. Not all of those who might subscribe to the
ethos of new atheism choose to identify themselves in this way, and the broader
atheist, secular and humanist populations (subsumed here under the collective
noun of the ‘nonreligious’) contain a number of overlapping identity
markers and labels, such as ‘agnostic’, ‘humanist’,
‘freethinker’, ‘skeptic’, ‘secularist’ and
so on. Although the links between them are by no means determinative or
reciprocal, it is not uncommon for ‘new atheists’ to ascribe to
multiple identities and to simultaneously associate with other descriptors. Two
of the most well-known new atheists, Richard Dawkins and AC Grayling, are also
Vice Presidents of the British Humanist Association. Another, Daniel Dennett
(2003), has publicly declared his
support for using the term ‘Brights’ to denote people with a
naturalistic worldview.

This diversity is reflected in the lack of any commonly agreed upon definition
for what new atheism actually is. Its main progenitors, and its central ideas,
are perhaps most closely associated with a series of best-selling books by four
main authors, known colloquially as the ‘Four Horsemen’, during the
middle of the previous decade: Sam Harris (The End of Faith, 2004), Daniel Dennett (Breaking the Spell, 2006),
Richard Dawkins (The God
Delusion, 2006), and Christopher Hitchens (God is Not Great, 2007).
Other proponents, such as Victor Stenger (2009) and AC Grayling (2013),
have also written in support of new atheist ideas, as have numerous activists
and commentators.

Several aspects of these texts are worthy of note. First, they endorse a strong
commitment to a naturalist worldview, and to the virtues of reason, rationality
and science as the best means of understanding reality. Tied to this is a view
of religion as propositional, as a set of truth claims about the nature of
reality that is to be treated as a scientific hypothesis and duly weighed
against the available evidence. As such, new atheists maintain that since no
evidence of this kind that can withstand scrutiny has ever been produced, the
claims made by religion must therefore be rejected as false. Moreover, since
religious beliefs and doctrines are necessarily founded on subjective
experiences or revealed authority rather than scientific evidence, they are also
considered to be not just wrong, but irrational, pathological and uniquely
dangerous in that they foster exclusionary and divisive in-group mentalities
that lead to prejudice, discrimination and violence. As Dawkins (2004:158) explains, while religion might
not be the only motivation for violence, it provides “the principal label,
and the most dangerous one, by which a ‘they’ as opposed to a
‘we’ can be identified….It is not an exaggeration to say that
religion is the most inflammatory enemy-labelling device in history”.

On this basis, new atheism adopts an avowedly critical posture towards religion.
Claiming that religious views have enjoyed a cosseted and excessively privileged
status for far too long, and that they should be accorded no more respect or
special treatment than any other viewpoint or opinion, proponents of new atheism
call for religious beliefs to be exposed to scrutiny wherever they are found in
precisely the same way that one might critique politics, literature or art.
Though recognising that not all religious views are equally noxious, this stance
is nonetheless applied to all forms of religious beliefs. As well as attacking
its more extreme varieties, ostensibly ‘moderate’ religious views
are also challenged on the grounds that, while they may not necessarily be
dangerous in and of themselves, they provide succour for more fundamentalist
positions and help to sustain the cultural legitimacy of belief in unobservable,
supernatural forces. As Greta Christina (2012:
loc.1045) writes, “moderate and progressive religion still
encourages the basic idea of faith; the idea that it’s acceptable, and
even virtuous, to believe in things you have no good reason to think are
true”.

New atheism also involves claims about religion and morality. Here, new atheists
assert that religion is not needed for moral behaviour, and is in many cases
itself deeply immoral, not least due to its negative social and personal
consequences. New atheists also tend to favour naturalistic explanations for
moral behaviour, grounded in the evolutionary merits of altruism and
co-operation, and emphasise the ethical value of human life without religion, as
a fleeting moment of existence made all the more valuable precisely by the
absence of an afterlife. Social scientific research showing that countries with
the highest levels of morality (measurable by levels of social disorder,
inequality, civil rights, happiness and so on) also tend to be the least
religious (and vice versa) are commonly emphasised too (e.g. Zuckerman, 2010).

In political terms, these core elements of new atheism prescribe no particular
viewpoint in and of themselves. As PZ Myers (2011) notes, when it comes to “the diversity of political
views within the New Atheists - we’re a madly disorganized mob, united
only by our dislike of the god-thing”. That said, research conducted in
the United States suggests that the general atheist population does share a
number of common demographic and psychological qualities that are likely to be
politically influential. Compared to religious believers, for example, atheists
are more likely to be younger, male and single, to have higher than average
levels of income and education, to be less authoritarian, less dogmatic, less
prejudiced, less conformist and more tolerant and open-minded on religious
issues. Atheists are also more likely to be politically independent (not
affiliated to any particular party) and to support progressive, liberal values
and political campaigns. Right-wing atheism, though not unknown, is
comparatively rare (see Hunsberger &
Altemeyer, 2006; Cragun et al.,
2012). Evidence also shows that atheism is linked to distinct
sociocultural, economic and political conditions. One of the defining features
is its geographical distribution. While estimates put the number of atheists
worldwide at just under a billion people (around 13% of the human population
according to WIN-Gallup International,
2012), levels of naturally developing or ‘organic’
atheism (as opposed to state-led atheism of the kind found in Communist
countries such as China) are especially predominant in advanced post-industrial
societies, most notably in Western Europe, Australia, Japan, Canada and South
Korea (see Zuckerman, 2007, Table
3.1).

As a sub-section of atheism in general, the preponderance of new atheism also
appears to be correlated to certain social conditions. In particular, although
evidence indicates that new atheist ideas are gaining popularity in a number of
countries (e.g. Zenk, 2012), it remains,
to a large extent, an Anglo-American phenomenon, and, primarily, a U.S. one. At
first blush, this might be considered somewhat anomalous. After all, levels of
atheism in the United States remain relatively low compared to other advanced
post-industrial nations. Most studies put the figure at less than 3%, and
publicly avowed atheism in national political life is practically non-existent
(Cragun et al., 2012; Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life,
2012).

Yet the explanation, perhaps paradoxically, may owe much to the preponderance of
religion in the United States, and to the fact that, as Zuckerman (2012) notes, politically active atheism is
more likely to emerge in situations where there is a perceived conflict with
religion. Research illustrating the extent of discrimination experienced by
atheists makes the point. A study conducted at the University of Minnesota, for
example, found that atheists were America’s “most distrusted
minority”, being thought less likely to share common American values (54%)
than other minorities, such as Muslims (64%), immigrants (70%) and homosexuals
(80%) (Edgell, Gerteis, & Hartmann,
2006). Other studies have revealed similar findings. Research by
Cragun et al. (2012) found that more than
two-fifths (41%) of self-identifying atheists had experienced discrimination
over the last five years, compared to just 19% of people identifying as having
’no religion’.

The rise of ‘new atheism’

The origins of new atheism are complex and involve multiple, interacting forces.
Some of these, such as processes of secularisation, are long-term effects. Other
causes, such as the terrorist attacks of 9/11, are more immediate, even
visceral. Insofar as they help to account for the main developments in the
emergence new atheism, these causal influences can be distilled into several key
variables that are common to both the U.S and Britain: 1) concerns about the
growing political influence of religion as well as the dangers of religious
beliefs; 2) transformations in mass communication; 3) cultural forces around the
preeminent social authority of science; and 4) the salience of identity
politics.

The first of these factors concerns the growing political influence of religion,
and involves a tension between declining levels of support for organised
religion and the increasing political influence of religious groups. Although
secularisation has been noticeably stronger in Britain, with a progressive fall
in measurable religiosity throughout the post-war period, decline is evident in
the United States as well. A steady rise in the proportion of the religiously
unaffiliated, known colloquially as the ‘nones’, since the 1990s is
indicative of the general trend (Pew Research
Center, 2010). At the same time, both countries have also experienced
a rising influence of religion in the public sphere since the turn of the
century. In the U.S this has centered on the role of the Christian Right,
especially under the administration of George W. Bush. In Britain, issues of
multiculturalism and faith schools have been particularly prominent. In this
context, new atheism can be said to represent something of a defensive
rear-guard action, an attempt to push back against the encroaching forces of
faith, and a response to a world that, as Aronson (2008) observes, “no longer seems to be going our
way”.

A third factor centres on the apparent dangers of religious belief. This includes
a variety of circumstances, from the influence of religion in individual cases
of harm and abuse, to its role in violent conflict. An obvious influence here
has been the impact of Islamic terrorism, highlighted in its most graphic form
by the attacks of 9/11 and their aftershocks in Madrid and London. Writing in
the immediate aftermath of the attacks, Dawkins (2004:161) declared that it was now time to break the “absurd
taboo” surrounding religious criticism and that, “Those of us who
have for years politely concealed our contempt for the dangerous collective
delusion of religion need to stand up and speak out”. “Things are
different after September 11th”, he said, “Let’s stop being so
damned respectful!”

If concerns about the growing influence and danger of religion helped to create
the space for new atheist ideas to emerge, a critical factor behind their
popular dissemination has been the transformation in global media and
communications since the 1980s. The dramatic rise in the ubiquity of the
Internet has been particularly influential. By facilitating the free exchange of
information, and by providing a means by which hitherto isolated individuals can
draw together, the Internet has been especially instrumental in the U.S,
“creating a new space for atheists to come out, speak out and “meet
up” in a still largely religious society” (Cimino & Smith, 2011: 28). Indeed, while best-selling
publications have been critical for raising awareness of new atheism, one of the
central features of its development has been its online character. Many of the
most important activities, groups, spokespeople and opinion formers involved in
new atheism operate predominantly, if not entirely, on the Internet. Noteworthy
examples include organisations such as Project Reason and the Richard Dawkins
Foundation, prominent (if not exclusively new atheist) forums and community
spaces, such as Atheist Nexus and Think Atheist, and popular new atheist blogs,
such as Pharangyula (penned by PZ Myers), Butterflies and Wheels (by Ophelia
Benson) and Why Evolution is True (by Jerry Coyne).

The character and development of new atheism has also been shaped by the
authority of science and the academy (especially pertinent in advanced
technological societies such as the U.S and Britain), which has elevated the
status of new atheist advocates and their arguments, many of which attack
religion from an avowedly scientific perspective. Another has been the cultural
salience of issues relating to identity. Emerging with the new social movements
from the 1970s and 1980s, and from the decline of traditional, universalising
political projects aimed at bringing about large-scale social transformation via
institutional means, the promotion of identity politics instead emphasizes
individual groups, as well as their lifestyles, culture and values. This
involves a shift to the micro-politics of the personal realm and to a greater
focus on the terrain of culture as a key site of social and political struggle
(Bernstein, 2005).

Contestation around issues of identity politics can even be seen in the genesis
of the term ‘new atheism’ itself. This was initially devised and
propagated by opponents of atheism as a means of attempting to delegitimise
atheist ideas, deriving initially from a 2006 article for Wired magazine by Gary Wolf,
entitled ‘The Church of the Non-Believers’, and followed shortly
afterwards by an article by Simon Hooper (2006) for CNN.com entitled, ‘The Rise of the New Atheists’.
From thence the term began to proliferate more widely. The critical line against
new atheism is based on a number of common tropes. These include complaints that
its proponents are overly polemical, aggressive, rude and intolerant, have a
superficial conception of religious belief and, ironically (given that the
assertion of a ‘new’ atheism came from its opponents), offer little
originality in terms of philosophical and intellectual argument. It is also
regularly claimed that new atheism is an exclusivist preserve of a Western,
white, male, intellectual elite, comprising a fundamentalist, ideologically
right-wing worldview with imperialist, if not racist, undertones. Comparisons to
totalitarian regimes, notably Fascism and Communism, are frequent too, with this
being seen as indicative of the moral vacuum at the heart of atheism and its
inability to offer any positive values of its own beyond excoriating religion
(for examples see Eagleton, 2006; Beattie, 2007; Berkowitz, 2007; Berlinerblau, 2010, Hart,
2010).2

Such claims, unsurprisingly, are strongly rejected by supporters of new atheism
as little more than a collection of straw men and caricatures. Indeed, though
many have come to accept the term ‘new atheism’ as a shorthand
practical descriptor for a more radically critical approach, the whole notion of
a qualitatively unique and distinct form of atheism is nonetheless considered to
be erroneous. AC Grayling highlights the absurdity of the claim, remarking,
“how can we be new if the arguments are old?” (Aitkenhead, 2011). In any event, for many, the novelty of
‘new’ atheism is not to be found in the details of its intellectual
arguments, but in the extent to which atheists are now willing to openly
criticise religion, and the degree to which such an approach has found wider
public resonance. As Tom Flynn (2010)
observes, “There’s nothing new about the new atheism”, beyond
the fact that atheist arguments have now found mainstream publishing success and
exposure “to millions who would never otherwise pick up an atheist
book”.

These causal underpinnings have shaped some of the core political aspects of new
atheism in a variety of ways. Concerns about the growing and negative social
influence of religion, for instance, have been central to the high levels of
hostility with which religion is usually regarded, the rise of the Internet has
had a significant impact in enabling a decentralised organisational structure
and in facilitating the spread of new atheist ideas, while an emphasis on
identity politics has underpinned many of the promotional campaigns undertaken
by new atheists, as well as key strategic debates, splits and divisions within
new atheism itself. These issues, and their implications, are explored in the
following sections.

Groups and campaigns

New atheism is politically engaged in a variety of ways. One of the most notable
involves on-going efforts to reduce the influence of religion in the public
sphere. In this, new atheists are active from a number of vantage points.
Expanding far beyond the typical vision of new atheism as limited to the
confines of the Four Horsemen, its proponents are organisationally arranged in a
loosely connected, non-hierarchical and decentralised fashion, with no formal
representative body (and, indeed, with many eschewing formal involvement
altogether), and frequently operate within the existing nexus of groups set up
to promote broader nonreligious causes and ideals.3 In the United States a wide range of national-level bodies have
been established for this purpose. They include American Atheists, the Center
for Inquiry, the Freedom From Religion Foundation, the Secular Coalition for
America, the American Humanist Association, the Military Association of Atheists
and Freethinkers and the Council for Secular Humanism. A National Atheist Party,
aiming to influence electoral politics directly, was established in March 2011.
By way of contrast, in Britain there are just two main national organisations:
the British Humanist Association and the National Secular Society. Other groups,
such as Atheist UK, Center For Inquiry UK and the National Federation of
Atheist, Humanist and Secular Student Societies, remain peripheral.

These organisations are actively involved in a number of common campaign issues.
One of the principal themes is their opposition to religious influence over
public policy. Key areas include social service provision, such as the
faith-based initiatives of George W. Bush, or the Big Society agenda of the
British Coalition government; healthcare, including support for assisted dying
and opposition to restrictions on reproductive rights and scientific research,
such as that involving the use of embryonic stem cells; education, largely
centring on the issue of creationism in the U.S, and on faith schools and
compulsory worship in Britain; and civil rights, involving religious exemptions
from equalities legislation, and discrimination on issues such as housing,
employment and same-sex marriage.

Prominent, too, have been vigorous efforts to ensure or maintain a secular public
sphere. In the United States this has centred on campaigns, pursued through the
courts, to keep state buildings, land and offices free from religious symbols
and ceremonies. Notable campaigns have included opposition to nativity scenes in
public parks, prayer banners in public schools, displays of the Ten Commandments
around courthouses and calls for a ‘Day of Prayer’ by federally
elected officials. On-going attempts to remove the phrase ‘under
God’ from the Pledge of Allegiance and ‘In God we Trust’ from
the American currency have also been contentious, as has a legal bid from
American Atheists opposing the display of a cross-shaped section of rubble found
in the wreckage of 9/11 in the partially state-funded National September 11
Memorial and Museum. In Britain the primary (and long-standing) campaigns have
centred on disestablishment of the Church of England and the removal of its
Bishops’ automatic right to seats in the upper legislature (the House of
Lords). The use of the courts to affect change has been largely absent as a
political strategy, but there are signs that this might be changing. A recent
and high profile case by the National Secular Society opposed to the inclusion
of prayers as a formal part of local council meetings provoked controversy
following a court decision in its favour. Although the British government
quickly took measures to circumvent the ruling, many councils have since altered
their procedures amidst legal uncertainty over the issue.

The ability of nonreligious organisations to pursue and promote such campaigns is
restricted by their comparatively small size and by the limited resources at
their disposal, especially compared to those available to religious groups. In
Britain, although exact figures are not available, the National Secular Society
is estimated to have a membership of 7–10,000, while the British Humanist
Association claims to have over 28,000 members and supporters (figures for paid
members are not stated).4 In contrast (and
again, exact figures are difficult to establish), Britain’s largest
religious institution, the Church of England, claims that around a million
people attend its services every week.

More detailed figures can be extrapolated for U.S organisations by analysing
financial returns, which provide a breakdown of income and expenditure
activities. Figures for the 2010 calendar year, the last available year for
which comparative figures were available at the time of writing, show that the
central organisation for the promotion of explicitly atheist causes in the U.S,
American Atheists, received a gross income of $577,895, and had an estimated
paid membership of around 2,000. The largest of all the nonreligious
organisations in the United States, the Freedom From Religion Foundation, had an
income of $2,234,307 with an estimated membership of around 18,000. The largest
annual income was accrued by the Council for Secular Humanism, which received
total gross revenues of $2,313,634. In contrast, the Christian-based Alpha
course (‘Alpha USA’) received an annual income of $6,965,725, the
Family Christian Association of America obtained $8,966,672, and the American
Bible Society received the enormous sum of $67,293,170.5 Research from the U.S has also revealed there to be more
than 200 religious organisations involved in national-level lobbying, with a
grand total of $350 million a year being dedicated to this purpose (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life,
2011).

Identity politics

The political activities of new atheism extend beyond the formal, public sphere.
In this, two aspects are of particular importance. The first of these involves
challenging religion in the private sphere; the second focuses on issues of
civil rights and group belonging. Together, they denote the utilisation of
identity politics in an attempt to drive cultural change, invoking a much
broader conception of the ‘political’ beyond that associated with
public policy issues, and opening up the goals and ambitions of atheism to a
politicisation of personal space (e.g., Berkowitz, 2007; Cimino & Smith,
2011). Both of these aspects are found more strongly in the U.S than
elsewhere.

A central feature of identity politics is its emphasis on groups. Groups help
connect perceptions about the self to the wider social context, facilitating a
sense of belonging and meaning as well as establishing norms for appropriate
beliefs and behaviours. In this way groups provide a focal point for the
promotion of shared interests based around common themes, issues and concerns
(Brewer, 2001). Sustaining group
identity and cohesion requires constant attention by group members, both to
monitor the boundary between the group and wider society, as well as to police
instances of deviance within the group itself (Vignoles & Moncaster, 2007). These processes often lead to in-
and out-group mentalities, especially in situations involving uncertainty and/or
where a threat to the group and its interests is thought to exist (Ysseldyk, Matheson and Anisman, 2010). The
successful projection of identity politics requires a strong sense of group
commitment, clear identity markers and a collective sense of relative
deprivation, all of which are needed to sustain a necessary degree of group
motivation (Reicher, Spears and Haslam,
2010).

A central goal in the use of identity politics by new atheists has been to
promote new atheist ideas and undermine religious belief; if not to eradicate it
altogether (although for many this remains desirable), then to certainly push it
as far to the margins as possible. As AC Grayling (2007) explains: “No doubt the conflict will be long
and bloody…But eventually, one hopes, those who persist in wanting to have
an invisible friend, who continue believing in fairies at the bottom of the
garden, will do so in private, where such proclivities belong along with wearing
the opposite sex’s underwear”. Alongside this, a related goal in the
U.S context has been to raise the visibility of atheism with a view to
countering adverse public perceptions and gaining mainstream acceptance. Key to
this is the belief that the true size of the atheist (and nonreligious)
constituency is far greater than is typically imagined, and that, drawing on the
experiences of the gay rights movement, revealing the actual numbers will
increase familiarity and undermine negative stereotypes. Among the principal
methods being directed to the achievement of these aims include the ‘We
Are Atheism’ and ‘Out’ campaigns, which encourage atheists to
publicly identify themselves as such. A recent ‘Reason Rally’, which
attracted up to 20,000 people to Washington, had a similar goal (and a campaign
in Britain calling on irreligious people to select ‘no religion’ in
the last census had much the same objective). Other efforts include promotional,
educational and outreach work by nonreligious organisations, the publication of
books, articles and magazines about atheism and the problems of religious
belief, participation in public talks, debates and documentaries (many of which
are available for public view online through channels such as YouTube) and the
production of media programmes such as ‘The Atheist Experience’ and
Freethought radio. New atheists have also sought to attract attention and
challenge religious ideas through promoting resources and events designed to
highlight relevant issues around non-religion, such as International Blasphemy
Rights Day and the use of advertisements on billboards and public transport. In
2009 a high-profile bus campaign launched in London with the slogan,
“There’s Probably No God, Now Stop Worrying and Enjoy Your
Life”, inspired similar campaigns in cities around the world. The tactic
has since become widely used but remains controversial. Many atheist adverts
have been defaced, and several companies have refused to carry them, leading to
legal challenges.

Moreover, new atheism has self-consciously adopted a discourse rooted in a
language of group rights and demands for equal treatment. This has been fuelled,
to a large degree, by a desire to establish a sense of explicitly
‘atheist’ identity, and, although the goal is not universally
accepted (e.g. Grothe & Dacey, 2004;
Namazie, 2011), to develop a greater
notion of group membership, community and belonging (see e.g. Aronson, 2008; Cimino & Smith, 2007; 2011). As PZ Myers (2008)
notes, “If this New Atheist movement…is to increase its ability to
influence the culture, being able to recognize our essential unity as a
community is essential”. “A fractured group of hermits and
misfits”, he warns, “can not change the world”.

A key facet of this has been to try and construct a support network of resources
and assistance to fellow and potential atheists. As Greta Christina (2012: loc.39) writes: “atheists need
to do more than just pry people out of religion…We need to develop secular
and atheist communities, to replace the ones people often lose when they let go
of their religion”. Noteworthy examples here include the work of social
action groups such as Non-Believers Giving Aid, the Foundation Beyond Belief and
Atheists Helping the Homeless, community events such as the Atheist Film
Festival and Rock Beyond Belief and organisations such as Camp Quest, which
provides residential summer camps for children of nonreligious parents. A range
of local, national and international conferences, conventions and meetings (such
as Skepticon, The Amazing Meeting and the annual conventions of nonreligious
organisations), also help to bring like-minded people together.

Divisions and schisms

While the use of identity politics has been beneficial in establishing a broader
atheist community, it has also created a number of tensions and conflicts, both
between new atheists and other nonreligious sub-groups as well as within new
atheism itelf. These range from personal spats between individual activists,
including criticisms of Sam Harris for his support of security profiling in
airports, disputes over the line-up of speakers for the Reason Rally and the
expulsion of bloggers (notably Paul Mason, aka ‘Thunderf00t’) from
the prominent Freethought blogs network, to more serious rifts over key
principles, aims and strategies.

Brand awareness

One of the central issues here is the question of branding, namely, whether new
atheists should actively describe themselves as such, or whether the adoption of
an alternative label would be more politically expedient. Sam Harris (2007), for example, has argued that the
continued use of the term ‘atheism’, as defined purely by its
relationship to religion, has been “a mistake of some consequence”
that has contributed to the marginalisation of atheism as little more than a
“cranky sub-culture”. Instead, Harris argues for the rejection of
all labels, maintaining that “there is no reason for us to fight in
well-ordered ranks, like the red coats of Atheism”, and that victory will
only be achieved when the very notion of god is no longer taken seriously and
atheism becomes “scarcely intelligible as a concept”. Not all,
however, agree with this position. Indeed, for some, the very idea of
surrendering the term ‘atheism’ at a time when religious ideas
remain so pervasive is anathema. According to PZ Myers (2007a), any adoption of a new label would merely lead to
the supplicant being treated “with the same contemptuous sneer”, and
that, in any case, labels remain politically useful tools, providing
“rallying cries for the tiny, scattered bubbles of rationality drifting in
the sea of superstition and ignorance”. Still others have supported the
use of alternative descriptors as a way of avoiding the negative connotations
associated with atheism. ‘Brights’, for example, was coined by Paul
Geisert and Mynga Futrell (2004), and was
initially promoted by both Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennett as part of an
online drive to achieve greater acceptance of a naturalist (though not an
exclusively atheist) worldview. Other alternatives, such as the recently devised
‘Atheism+’, and ‘Gnu atheism’ (a play on the GNU free
software movement), have also been taken up. The deliberate adoption of atheist
symbols and imagery, such as the atheist fish, the flying spaghetti monster and
variants on the letter ‘A’, has proven to be popular as well.

Accommodate or confront?

Another fault line between nonreligious sub-groups concerns the zero tolerance
approach taken by new atheists towards religious beliefs. This is considered by
many within the broader nonreligious community to be divisive, polarising and
ultimately counterproductive, driving religious believers further into their
trenches and alienating potential supporters. Accordingly, many favour a more
accommodating approach, maintaining that forging alliances with moderate
religious groups on issues of common concern, such as tackling fundamentalism,
promoting secular government and supporting science education, is likely to be
more politically fruitful. Paul Kurtz, founder of the Council for Secular
Humanism and the Center for Inquiry, for example, claims that confrontational
tactics may have raised the visibility of new atheism, but its fervent attacks
on religion have been “a strategic blunder” given the need to appeal
“to a wider base of support” (Kurtz,
2011; Nisbet, 2007). In the
same vein, the interfaith activist, Chris Stedman (2010, 2011), claims
that denigrating religious beliefs “condemns us to permanent minority
status”. Alain de Botton (2012),
too, has called for a new wave of atheism, incorporating what he considers to be
the more positive and useful elements of religion (such as its use of ritual and
architecture) to supplant the overly negative approach taken by new
atheists.

Such claims, however, are brusquely dismissed by new atheists themselves, who
argue that a confrontational approach remains necessary to attract attention and
promote social change, and that accommodation amounts to little more than
passive acquiescence in religious privilege. As PZ Myers (2007b) claims, “The path we’ve taken in the
past, the cautious avoidance of the scarlet letter of atheism, has not
worked”. Similarly, Adam Lee (2012)
notes that, “No broad social movement has ever achieved its objectives by
sitting back and waiting for everyone else to come around”. Many new
atheists add that, in any case, tackling religious belief with a plurality of
approaches is itself beneficial, since this expands the intellectual weaponry in
the nonreligious arsenal, and that confrontational tactics can even assist those
advocating a more moderate approach by enabling them to appear more reasonable,
and therefore more acceptable to mainstream public opinion (an effect known as
the Overton window).6 Describing the
benefits of a ‘good cop, bad cop’ routine, Greta Christina (2007) writes that, “since the
multi-pronged approach to activism is so much more effective than any one prong
alone, it seems patently absurd to insist that everyone else in the movement
should be working the exact same prong that we’re working”.

Diversity issues

While questions of tactics have brought new atheism into conflict with the
broader nonreligious community, there are tensions within new atheism as well.
Central to this are questions, becoming increasingly prominent during the past
18 months, about issues around diversity. General agreement on the need to
combat the notable under-representation of ethnic minorities within the secular
movement (African Americans, for instance, are the least likely racial group in
the U.S to self-identify as being atheist; see Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2008) has been accompanied by
more fractious discussions around gender equality. A series of controversial
incidents involving sexist and misogynistic comments on atheist websites and
forums, claims of sexual harassment at atheist gatherings and concerns about a
lack of female representation at conferences have put matters firmly at the
forefront of internal debate.7 The omission
of female authors from lists of prominent atheists, most notable in the typical
framing of new atheism around the Four Horsemen and the concomitant neglect of
works by Jennifer Michael Hecht (Doubt:
A History, 2004) and Susan Jacoby (Freethinkers, 2004) – the former of
which appeared before the book that is usually attributed with kick-starting the
new atheist movement (Sam Harris, The End of Faith) – has
added to the sense that the style of new atheism remains gendered towards the
promotion of masculine values of confrontation and aggressive posturing.8 These issues have led many feminist
activists to claim that the atheist movement in general, and new atheism in
particular, remains dominated by a white, middle class male elite (e.g. McCreight, 2011; Myers, 2011; Watson,
2012). According to Victoria Bekiempis (2011), the popular impression is that it amounts to little
more than “a contentious, showboating boys’ club”.

Divisions around this issue are prominent and emotive. While feminists contend
that much more needs to be done to address these problems, others claim that any
gender bias within atheism is no more disproportionate than in any other area of
life, and that assertions of widespread misogyny are overblown. Illustrating the
point, writer, Paula Kirby (2012) wrote
an open letter to the movement, berating those making accusations of sexism for
being ‘Feminazis’, and accusing them of promoting a victim mentality
that was ultimately bad for attracting women to the atheist movement.

Internal divisions have recently intensified following the development of a new
identity marker known as ‘Atheism+’. Catalysing from an initial
series of blog posts by Jen McCreight, but rapidly gaining wider popularity,
Atheism+ presents itself as a new ‘new atheism’, and contends that
many of the problems faced by the atheist movement are due to its domination by
old, middle class, privileged white males. Accordingly, Atheism+ calls for
greater practical action to align atheism to progressive political causes and
aims to provide an inclusive umbrella term for bringing the positive aspects of
atheism, secularism and humanism together in support of social justice,
diversity and a more affirming ethical vision. As McCreight (2012) puts it,

The ‘first wave’ of atheism were the traditional
philosophers, freethinkers, and academics. Then came the second wave of
‘New Atheists’ like Dawkins and Hitchens, whose trademark
was their unabashed public criticism of religion. Now it’s time
for a third wave….that cares about how religion affects everyone
and that applies skepticism to everything, including social issues like
sexism, racism, politics, poverty, and crime.

The reaction to Atheism+ has been mixed. Though many have greeted the idea warmly
including high-profile new atheists such as Greta Christina, Richard Carrier,
Ophelia Benson and PZ Myers, others have been harshly critical. Prominent
objections include claims that the goals of Atheism+ are unnecessarily divisive
and elitist, and that the whole notion itself is undifferentiated from secular
humanism. Ron Lindsay (2012), President
of the Center for Inquiry, for instance, points out that secular groups already
campaign for progressive issues, and warns that the attempt to establish a new
form of atheist identity could have a “potentially divisive impact”.
More provocatively, Al Stefanelli (2012)
accuses those behind Atheism+ of promoting “a climate of exceptionalism
and an air of superiority….bordering on hubris and arrogance”. The
full implications of Atheism+ remain to be seen.

A tipping point?

For some (mostly critics), the impact of the ‘new’ atheism has
clearly been limited. Wendy Kaminer (2011), for instance, contends that while new atheism “has
increased the visibility of secularists and humanists, it has not increased
their clout”. Chris Stedman (2010)
similarly asserts that while new atheism might have dominated public discourse
on non-religiosity it has failed to achieve mainstream acceptability for atheist
beliefs. Equally dismissive, David Hart (2010) regards new atheism as a mere piece of cultural ephemera,
little more than a ‘passing fad’ and no more weighty than
‘light entertainment’. It is, he says, “one of those
occasional and inexplicable marketing vogues that inevitably go the way of pet
rocks, disco, prime-time soaps, and The Bridges of Madison
County”.

Others, though, point to more positive signs. According to the atheist blogger,
Hemant Mehta (2011), new atheism has now
made it increasingly acceptable to come out publicly as an atheist in the U.S, a
point echoed by Tom Flynn (2010), who
claims that “atheists and other nonbelievers are poised for huge growth in
public acceptance” and that “the dark age of public revulsion
towards atheists is soon to end”. Richard Dawkins (2012) agrees, asserting that the growth of atheism is
rapidly approaching ‘a tipping point’, “We are approaching
that critical mass”, he states, “where the number of people who have
come out has become so great that suddenly everybody will realize, ‘I can
come out, too’”.

Measuring the impact and the effectiveness of new atheism, though, is fraught
with difficulty. Isolating key factors and influences in social change is a
complicated exercise, and one made all the more burdensome in this instance by
the various problems involved in identifying the parameters and composition of
new atheism itself. Even where social, cultural and political developments might
be observed, such as those associated with policy issues or trends and attitudes
around (non)-religious beliefs, establishing definitive causal influence to
anything that could reasonably be described as ‘new atheist’ remains
a torturously complex process. Nonetheless, signs of success do appear to be
evident. One area that is most notable here concerns the on-going decline of
religiosity, and the progressive trend in the proportion of people identifying
as nonreligious, in both Britain and the United States. In the former, where
atheism is already far less socially contentious, the numbers of people
describing themselves as having ‘no religion’ (of which atheists
form a sub-set) increased from 39.8% in 2005, the point at which new atheism
began to take off, to a peak of 50.9% in 2009 (see Table 1). Although this subsequently fell back to 46.1% in 2011,
the broader long-term trend appears to be in an upward direction.

In the U.S, the rate of expansion (if not the overall percentages) is more
impressive still. According to research by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public
Life (2012), the number of religiously
unaffiliated in the United States has now reached record levels, having grown
from 15.3% in 2007 to just under a fifth (19.6%) of the adult population in
2012. The number of people willing to explicitly describe themselves as atheist
has risen. According to a study by WIN-Gallup international (2012), the proportion of self-identifying
atheists in the U.S has increased from 1% to 5%, since 2005, while the number
describing themselves as religious has fallen from 73% to 60%. At the same time,
the low social status of atheism in the United States also shows signs of
improving. According to a recent poll by Gallup, the proportion of people
willing to vote for an atheist as President, though still lower than for other
minority groups, has now surpassed half (54%) of the voting population for the
first time since the question was asked in the 1950s (Winston, 2012).

For all the problems involved in analysing social change, it would seem
implausible, not least given the timing of events, to suggest that these shifts
were entirely unrelated to the emergence of new atheism. Yet if new atheism has
helped drive the growth and social standing of non-religion, its impact on
public policy has been more adulterated. Despite numerous legal achievements in
enforcing the constitutional separation between church and state in the U.S,
efforts to remove religious phraseology from the national currency and pledge of
allegiance have not succeeded, and signs of a clear political breakthrough at
the national level remain hard to discern. nonreligious organisations also
remain dwarfed by their religious counterparts in terms of membership size and
resources, and the persistence of internal schisms and in-fighting within and
around new atheism may undermine attempts to establish a genuine sense of
community and deter potential supporters. In Britain, too, the picture is an
ambivalent one. On the one hand, organised religion remains in decline, court
cases alleging religious discrimination in public life have repeatedly failed,
new atheist issues and debates continue to command media attention, and
governments of all political persuasions have passed legislation deemed by many
religious groups to be contrary to religious freedoms (most recently, and
notably, in the case of same-sex marriage). On the other hand, Britain retains
an established church (replete with seats in the upper House of its
legislature), nonreligious groups remain relatively small in size, and recent
governments have also implemented policies designed to promote a greater role
for faith in the public realm, most obviously in the continued funding of faith
schools, and in plans, currently being pursued under the Coalition
government’s Big Society agenda, to facilitate the greater involvement of
religious organisations in the provision of public services.

The qualified success of new atheism at this point, then, needs to be set in this
broader context. The social and cultural influence of religion remains deeply
entrenched, even if its position has been unsettled, and many obstacles and
challenges lie ahead. Success at the level of public policy, in particular,
remains patchy, and legal victories, though noteworthy, remain few. That said,
with the numbers of the nonreligious increasing, and with support for organised
religion continuing to decline, the future prospects for the broader atheist,
secular and humanist community appear healthy.

Conclusion

Debates about religion in the twenty-first century have been fundamentally shaped by
the emergence of new atheism. Attracting global attention, though centred primarily
on the United States and (albeit less so) Britain, new atheism is harshly critical
of all forms of religious belief and has sought to openly challenge and undermine
religious influence in both public and private spheres. Academic research into this
subject, however, remains embryonic, and all the more so where its political
dimension is concerned. This study has sought to address this lacuna by exploring a
number of key political issues that underpin the emergence and development of new
atheism, and has explored from a political perspective its organisational structure,
main objectives and strategies, internal dynamics and tensions, and the extent to
which it has thus far managed to achieve its goals.

Though new atheism is difficult to pin down with precision, a number of themes are
apparent. New atheism is politically diverse, organisationally decentred and
contains no consensus or uniformity of opinion on core strategic issues. Debates
around branding, the promotion of an atheist identity, relations with other atheist,
secular and humanist groups, as well as problems around a lack of internal
diversity, persist. The dynamics of these issues, and the way in which they unfold,
will shape the way in which new atheism develops. In directing attention to these
themes, this paper has also sought to highlight the need for more research in this
area. New atheism remains intrinsically political. To understand it, scholars must
pay more attention to its political dimension.

Notes

1Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to: Steven Kettell,
University of Warwick, Department of Politics and International Studies, Social
Sciences Building, The University of Warwick, Coventry, UK, CV4 7AL,
email:s.kettell@warwick.ac.uk. Acknowledgments: I would like
to thank the anonymous reviewers of this journal, as well as Lois Lee, for their
insightful and valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper.

2It may, of course, be thought somewhat ironic in this respect that those for whom
new atheism is most anathema appear to want to spend the most time attacking
it.

3Studies into the membership of atheist, secular and humanist groups have revealed
a varied composition, from doughty, long-serving campaigners to ‘activists
who may be more open to an avowedly ‘new atheist’ posture. The kind
of viewpoint taken varies from issue to issue (Hunsberger & Altemeyer, 2006; Catto & Eccles, 2013). A recent study conducted in the United
States developed a classification scheme for atheists with six types:
Intellectual Atheist/Agnostic (37.6%); Activist (23%); Anti-Theist (14.8%);
Ritual Atheist/Agnostic (12.5%); Seeker-Agnostic (7.6%); and Non-Theist (4.4%).
Of these types, the first three, comprising a total of 75.4% of atheists
interviewed, were actively involved in promoting atheism in some way. For more
details see http://www.atheismresearch.com/.

4Details of British membership figures are derived from personal information given
anonymously to the author.

5Details of U.S membership figures are estimated using figures for membership dues
based on the cost of a standard paid membership package. Copies of these
financial returns can be obtained through www.guidestar.org.

6The theory was conceived by Joseph Overton, and sets out the way in which the
range of policies that are considered to be politically acceptable by the
general public changes over time. For a discussion of its use in the Freethought
movement, see Croft (2012).

7One incident above all else, the so-called ‘Elevatorgate’ affair,
involving complaints about inappropriate propositioning at a conference by the
high-profile atheist blogger and activist, Rebecca Watson, has come to symbolise
this particular issue; not least for the response it elicited from Richard
Dawkins, who declared that Watson should ‘grow up, or at least grow a
thicker skin’ (Watson, 2011)

8Although the titles by Hecht and Jacoby are not expressly ‘new
atheist’ in their orientation (their contents focus on skepticism and
freethought rather than atheism in particular), they were nevertheless
influential in helping to raise public awareness about atheist issues.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers of this journal, as well as Lois Lee,
for their insightful and valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper.

References

Aitkenhead, D. 2011 ‘AC Grayling: ‘How can you be a militant atheist?
It’s like sleeping furiously’’. Guardian, April 3 2011

Amarasingham, A. 2010 ‘Introduction: What is the new
atheism?’ In: Amarasingham, A. ed. 2010 Religion and the New Atheism: A Critical Appraisal. Leiden: Brill.

Aronson, R. 2008 Living Without God: New Directions for Atheists, Agnostics,
Secularists and the Undecided. Counterpoint, Berkeley.

This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0),
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Copyright is retained by the author(s).