IR1006: Foreign Policy Making, Rational Actors, and Alternat

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IR1006: Foreign Policy Making, Rational Actors, and Alternative ModelsOverview: FPAllison & RationalityAllison's Alternative ModelsMore Alternative ModelsThreats to Security?Ryan K BeasleyAlternative Models & SecurityREADY?TURN FEWEST CARDS TO TEST HYPOTHESISHumans are not rational actors!You turned the K to see if there's a 3You turned the 3 to see if there's a KBut: Could be a J on back of the 3Turn the 4 (to disconfirm the hypothesis)MR. RUSSERT: If your analysis is not correct, and we’re not treated as liberators, but as conquerors, and the Iraqis begin to resist, particularly in Baghdad, do you think the American people are prepared for a long, costly, and bloody battle with significant American casualties?

VICE PRES. CHENEY: Well, I don’t think it’s likely to unfold that way, Tim, because I really do believe that we will be greeted as liberators. I’ve talked with a lot of Iraqis in the last several months myself, had them to the White House. The president and I have met with them, various groups and individuals, people who have devoted their lives from the outside to trying to change things inside Iraq. And like Kanan Makiya who’s a professor at Brandeis, but an Iraqi, he’s written great books about the subject, knows the country intimately, and is a part of the democratic opposition and resistance. The read we get on the people of Iraq is there is no question but what they want to the get rid of Saddam Hussein and they will welcome as liberators the United States when we come to do that. (NBC NEWS’ MEET THE PRESS, 2003)Daniel Kahneman (Nobel Prize Winner)Hypothesis: On the Back of Every 'K' there is a '3'Solution?One Thing is For Sure...Prone to MistakesThe Biggest Threat to International Security is Decision Making ErrorsIn case you forgot, he's an American!This is called the 'Confirmation Bias'Turning the 3 doesn't help at all!KJ34~Ryan K BeasleyThe Nature of Humans Leads to Numerous BiasesSystematicGroups“I argue that the decision to incorporate Iraq into the wider post 9/11 mission was pathologically driven by groupthink, which caused a shift in the administration’s view of Saddam from a troubling dictator to an existential threat to US security.” (Badie, 2010)Iraq War a Decision Making Mistake?Avoiding GroupthinkJanis: Bay of Pigs, North Korea, Pearl Harbor, Viet Nam, Marshall PlanGroupthink and Foreign PolicyMobs and Small GroupsQuit Smoking GroupProblem? Too Much Cohesion!Excessive Concurrence Seeking'Groupthink' Term Based on Book '1984'Others: Iran Hostage Rescue, Challenger Space Shuttle, Iran-Contra, Mayagues, Nazi Appeasement.Learning ObjectivesWhat is 'Foreign Policy'Graham Allison's ModelsRationality & the 'Rational Actor' modelMore Alternative ModelsBiggest Threat to International SecurityQuestionsDefining Foreign PolicyKey Dimensions:Who makes FP?Policies vs Decisions vs EventsIntentions vs OutcomesThe Big 4RealismLiberalismConstructivismForeign Policy AnalysisBridgeWe look at things a little differentlyEssence of DecisionGraham Allison (1971)3 Models:Rational Actor Organisational ProcessGovernmental PoliticsRationality/Rational ChoiceBasic AssumptionsExpected Utility: Summary and ExamplesAdditional Key AssumptionsReductionistStructures Emerge from Individuals InteractingUniversal DeductivePurposive BehaviourNeo-Classical Economics1950s and 1960sApplied Widely Across FieldsVoting BehaviourSecurity DilemmaRational Economic BehaviourIndividuals are Agents (not societies)Humans as Rational MaximisersCalculate Costs & Benefits Relative to GoalsChoose Actions that Maximise 'Expected Utility'Highest Cost/Benefit ValueSelf-Interested BehaviourMore Assumptions!Clear PreferencesPreference Ordering PossibleLogically ConsistentFull InformationReasoning CapacitiesPrefer A>BIf A>B and B>C, then A>CTransitivityTimeCognitive AbilitiesEmotional Detachment'Utility' = ValueBenefits (minus) Costs for each ChoiceExample:Car 1 (combined value of each feature - price)Car 2 (combined value of each feature - price)Rational Choice = Biggest UtilityCan Include ProbabilityNational Lottery -- Prize X (probability of winning)-ticket priceEuroMillions -- Prize X (probability of winning)-ticket priceRational Actors Choose the Option with the Greatest Utility(Oh No! Maths!!)'Rationality' & SecurityThe undersupply of cooperation is “the tragedy of the commons.” Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons (1968).While cooperation is collectively rational...The paradox of the PD gameSame for the Other PlayerPlayer 2Two possible strategies: Cooperate with each other, or undermine the other (Cooperate or Defect)PD 'Games'How the game works -- a simple narrativeThe Prisoners’ DilemmaHere's what it looks likePlayer 1Player 1 Prefers to DefectPlayer 1Plugging in 'payoffs'Player 1Player 2Each Corner is PossiblePlayer 1Player 2One of EachPlayer 1Player 2Or One of EachPlayer 1Player 2Both Could DefectPlayer 1Player 2Both Could CooperatePlayer 1Player 2Player 2 prefers to DefectPlayer 2A Simple Game that has Become a Dominant Paradigm for Social Scientists since it was Invented about 1960Outcomes for each player depend on actions of bothPlayer 1Player 2Defection is individually rational.First number is payoff for Player 1Second number is payoff for Player 2Etc.Here 4 is best, -1 worst (preference rankings)Game Theory Rooted in Rational ChoiceAccounts for 'Collective Action' ProblemsEnvironmental PollutionNuclear Arms RacesOffers SolutionsShift Payoffs Through Higher AuthorityInternal vs ExternalForeign & Domestic Policy not always easy to distinguishImmigration; subsidies & trade; etc.States are Primary FocusPolicies -- General Practices (Strategic Policies; Defense Policies; Doctrines)CMC -- Specific sets of DecisionsEvents -- Not all things are 'policies' or 'decisions'FPA Looks at All of theseStates?Decision Makers?But which ones?Publics?FPA Looks at All of theseForeign Policy MakingKey LeadersIntelligence AgenciesMilitary LeadersIndividuals Make FP DecisionsThe 'State' = Individuals Acting on Behalf of the State(Snyder, Bruck, & Sapin, 1954)ChoicesOutputsResultantsModels are not 'Reality' or 'True'But they can be more or less helpfulEvolution Built Our Brains for Survival Long AgoMaths and Logic Weren't Really a Big Part of the DealPsychologist Have Great Fun Demonstrating This!Example:Mary Buys a Horse for £100 & Sells it to Steve for £150Mary then Buys the Horse Back from Steve for £180, and then Sells it to Susan for £200How Much Money Did Mary Make or Lose?Is it easier if she buys a horse for £100 and sells it to Steve for £150, then buys a watch from Steve for £180 and sells it to Susan for £200?It's the EXACT SAME MATH PROBLEM!Prospect TheoryFraming Experiment (II)Framing Experiment (I)Changes in Asset Level more Important than Actual Asset LevelPeople Overvalue Losses compared to GainsProspects Can be 'Framed' as Gains or LossesRationally, Changing the Description Shouldn't Change PreferencesA 'Prospect' is a possible ('prospective') outcome based on a choiceCountry Preparing for Outbreak of 'Asian Disease'Expected to Kill 600 People; Must Take Some ActionProgram A: 200 people will be savedProgram B: 1/3 Chance All 600 Saved; 2/3 Chance Nobody SavedWhich Would You Choose?72% Chose Option A28% Chose Option BCountry Preparing for Outbreak of 'Asian Disease'Expected to Kill 600 People; Must Take Some ActionProgram A: 400 people will dieProgram B: 1/3 Chance Nobody will die; 2/3 Chance 600 will dieWhich Would You Choose?22% Chose Option A78% Chose Option BGoing from £10 to £30Going from £30 to £10Reference Point is £10Change is £20This is a GainReference Point is £30Change is £20This is a LossIf Given a Choice:Prefer a Sure Thing Here (Risk Averse)If Given a Choice:Prefer a Gamble Here (Risk Prone) Example: +£20, or 50% of +£40 & 50% of 0 Example: -£20, or 50% of -£40 & 50% of 0Notice?72% vs 22%78% vs 28%Leaders Take More Risks to Maintain Than GainLosses Hurt Worse Than Gains feel GoodAfter a Loss, Take Risks to RecoverTerritory, Prestige, Domestic SupportReference Point Doesn't Shift; Still in Domain of LossesEasier to Deter Gain-Seeing than Loss-RecoveryEasier to Cooperate Distributing Gains than LossesNot Polluting(foregone Gain)vs Stopping Polluting (Loss)Application to FPOrganisational ProcessFall back on 'Routines'Not 'Optimal' choices; 'Satisfactory' choicesThe StakesCuban Missile Crisis -- Case StudyNuclear DeterrenceGlobal Thermonuclear WarBased on Rational CalculationsMADAllison Wants to Question RationalityThe future of humanity is at stake!What is the Future of International Security?Security Quiz!Grand IR DebatesGlobalisation'Real' Security ThreatsNational SecurityNew Technologies A) Rising, Disatisfied ChinaB) Nuclear ProliferationC) Global TerrorismWhat is the Biggest Threat to International Security, in the next 20 years?D) Climate ChangeE) Financial MeltdownG) War Technology (Nano; Robots; AI)(if you *had to* pick one)H) Other ______________________________F) War (interstate &/or Civil)There's a lot to be afraid of!Decline of War/ViolenceReturn of Great Power PoliticsHuman Security'Securitization'Nuclear Weapons'Expert Political Judgments'Tetlock, 200520 Year study of Expert PredictionsThousands of Prediction, across several fieldsSome Key Findings:Experts no better than DilettantesExperts worse than basic statistical modelsNature of Expertise Doesn't Really MatterWorst Predictors most likely to get on T.V.How Did YOU decide the future of international security?QuizA) Rising, Disatisfied ChinaB) Nuclear ProliferationC) Global TerrorismWhat is the Biggest Threat to International Security, in the next 20 years?D) Climate ChangeE) Financial MeltdownG) War Technology (Nano; Robots; AI)H) Other ______________________________F) War (interstate &/or Civil)These are all Wrong!(probably)What Mistakes do Experts Make?The Same Ones We All Make!Fail to Recognize the Complexity of Big and Distant PredictionsOverconfidence in Own AccuracyOver-predict Change; Under-predict Status QuoFail to Use the Baserate: ExampleMy Prediction about International Security in 20 Years...?The Status Quo Baserate!Only Slightly Better than Random GuessingUsually Should Predict 'More of the Same'So, What is the Greatest Threat to International Security, right now?We should predict 'more of the same'What do they all have in common?WarStatesNon-State ActorsNew Security ThreatsOld Security ThreatsREADY?TURN THE FEWEST CARDS TO BEST TEST THE HYPOTHESISKJ34Hypothesis: On the Back of Every 'K' there is a '3'Quiz!(don't say anything out loud)(Write it Down)vs.Governmental PoliticsJFK speech: "The essence of ultimate decision remains impenetrable to the observer - often, indeed, to the decider himself."

Why did Soviets put them there?Why did U.S. choose to 'blockade' Cuba?Why did Soviets pull them out?Rational ActorOrganizational ProcessGovernmental PoliticsRational Actor: ExplanationKhrushchev Counters 'Missile Gap'JFK Responds with BlockadeUSSR has fewer missiles than claimedShorter Range from Cuba CompensatesScores Cold War PointsConsidered full range of optionsBlockade BestDoesn't Over-escalatePuts ball in Khrushchev's CourtSoviets Back DownCalculated risk of nuclear war as too highTime ConstraintsInformation ConstraintsCrisisStandard Operating ProceduresBreak Problem Down into ComponentsDifferent agencies deal with different bitsShort-term solutionsHigh Threat, Short Time, SurpriseOrganizational Process: ExplanationLots of 'irrationalities'Why didn't Soviets Camouflage missiles?Soviets New to Placing Nukes ElsewhereAgency followed standard proceduresSoviet troops decorating barracks with Red StarsJFK's Group Considered Few OptionsAir Strikes vs BlockadeConfusion over precision of strikesNavy was prepared; could easily communicate withSoviets had no follow-up planFew standing options against US actionInternal Political BattlesVarious Organisational Interests CompeteOrganisational Position Shapes View'Where you stand depends on where you sit'Policies often 'Compromise' or 'Resultant'Who is most powerful bureaucrat?Policies change over timeInternal power struggles shift outcomesGovernmental Politics: ExplanationKhrushchev Facing Political DemandsCutting Military Spending'Missile Gap'Placates governmental constituenciesJFK Need to Look ToughBay of Pigs & Congressional ElectionsAdvisors favoured air strike; but not BobbyJFK Distrusted advice of CIA after Bay of PigsKhrushchev Tries to 'Save Face'Turkey missiles = Cuban missileStrikes private deal on thisAir Force vs CIA wranglingBy Individuals, Groups, and OrganizationsRemember Tetlock's Study?Tetlock, 200520 Year study of Expert PredictionsThousands of Prediction, across several fieldsSome Key Findings:Experts no better than DilettantesExperts worse than basic statistical modelsNature of Expertise Doesn't Really MatterWorst Predictors most likely to get on T.V.Only Slightly Better than Random GuessingAgent-Centred Approach (Hudson)DiplomatsWe'll Come Back to This Later(but I have the answer...)=/Phew!International RelationsRealismBehaviours Predicted from Key AssumptionsApplies to All IndividualsCMCWhy Did Soviets Place Missiles?Why Did U.S. Choose to Blockade?Why Did Soviets Back Down?Nuclear War Rationally Averted!We Look at Things... ...a Little DifferentlyNo Choice but to Back Down200 Saved = 400 Die1/3 Chance Nobody will die & 2/3 Chance 600 will diePeople are Risk Prone with Losses but Risk Averse with GainsHurts More to Lose £20 than it Feels Good to Gain £20Changes are Relative to a 'Reference Point'Probability X Value = Expected Value80% Chance of Winning £100 = £8080% Chance of Losing £100 = -£80People are Quicker to Adjust Their Reference Points Up than DownReference Points'Pouring Good Money After Bad'Leads to 'Sunk Cost' EffectDon't Adjust to the LossDown £10Playing Poker: Down £20, then Win £10 Back. How Do You Feel?Down £10Playing Poker: Up £20, then lose £10. How do You Feel?Assign Devil's AdvocateInclude Outside ExpertsAssign 'Critical Evaluators'Unbiased (non-advocating) leaderCMC & Groupthink?Impartial Leader; Methodical Decision ProceduresSome Refinements to JanisShafer and Crichlow: 39 Cases (U.S., British, Israeli)JanisProblem? What Problem?Key: Reduce Interpersonal ConflictProblem: Excessive ConflictGroups Can Be Made More EffectiveGroups: The Old SchoolThus: Individual Mistakes and Irrationalities will be Checked (will 'wash out') by Groups and InstitutionsCounty Fair and Bull Weight GuessingArgument: Collectively We Will be Pretty AccurateProblem: Not Same Irrationalities Across Several ActorsYes, Individual Irrationality is RealThe Aggregation IssueBut Choices are Almost Opposite!Expected Values are IdenticalIllustrationCentral PropositionsFramingStrange Human Minds!CMC?Khrushchev sees as a 'Gain'JFK sees as a 'Loss'Gets Missiles CloserScores points in Cold WarChanged the Status QuoLose Face as LeaderRisk Averse in Domain of GainsBacked DownRisk Prone in Domain of LossesEscalated to BlockadeOne of the Cases Examined by JanisFound Groupthink was AvoidedJFK Absented Self from some MeetingsEncouraged Multiple Points of ViewIncluded 'Outside' ExpertsBuilt from two rational actors interactingTwo 'players' -- each with two optionsMany Applications in IRPollution; arms races; etc.e.g. Don't Build Weapons; Don't Pollutee.g. Build Weapons; Pollutee.g. Don't Build Weapons; Don't Pollutee.g. Build Weapons; PolluteThat is, Punish DefectorsConsequencesWhat's the biggest threat to International Security?What's the Biggest Threat to Security?Rising China?Global Terrorism?War?Etc.?(that 'Prospect Theory' stuff)Allison's Alternative ModelsIndividuals and GroupsRationality & AlternativesBoth Don't build/polluteBoth build/polluteOne does, one doesn'tOne does, one doesn'tEasier Domestically than InternationallyReviewAllison's ModelsRational Actor ProblematicDifferent Lenses Reveal Different FeaturesProspect TheorySystematic 'Biases' Challenge RationalityGroupthinkGroups won't necessarily eliminate 'errors' or 'biases'Groups can make Systematic Mistakes tooRationality a Powerful AssumptionHelps Explain Structures & ProblemsDecision Making 'Mistakes' MatterHelps Explain some Bad ChoicesIt's just a model (not 'right' or 'true')Different Models (Allison's; Prospect Theory; Groupthink; etc.)That Violates Rationality!Groups Have Problems?Allison Shows Organisational ProblemsSystematic Problems in Small Groups?Organisational ProcessBureaucratic PoliticsGroup 'Irrationality'?Etc.'Split' or 'Steal'e.g. Both say they won't build nukes, but then one doesThe outcome depends on BOTH choices(What the hell is wrong with Mary!?)(player 1 payoffs shown)(player 2 payoffs shown)So Anarchy & Rationality Result in Security ThreatsEvery card has a letter on one side and a number on the other'A rose by any other name would smell as sweet'It's the underlying 'utility' or 'value', not the label'Asset Level' means 'how much you have'=1/3 Chance All 600 Saved & 2/3 Chance Nobody SavedPhew! Nuclear War Irrationally Averted!If so, the individual irrationality may not 'wash out'Player 1Player 2Etc.Both Don't build/polluteBoth build/polluteOne does, one doesn'tOne does, one doesn'tEvery card has a letter on one side and a number on the otherLots of ApplicationsCO2 EmissionsBuilding Nuclear WeaponsAthletes Using Performance Enhancing DrugsOverfishingAdvertising BudgetsBut we over-rate change: Worst Predictors get on TV!Which Seems to be a better explanation to You?