Reporting
on Human Rights Violations Nonexistent between 1982 and
1984

President
George W. Bush nominated John Negroponte as the first
Director of National Intelligence on February 17, 2005.
(Source: White House)

Washington D.C., April 12, 2005 - As the
Senate Intelligence Committee convenes to consider the nomination
of John Negroponte to be Director of National Intelligence, the
National Security Archive today posted hundreds of his cables
written from the U.S. Embassy in Tegucigalpa between late 1981
and 1984. The majority of his "chron file"- cables and
memos written during his tenure as Ambassador- was obtained by
the Washington Post under the Freedom of Information
Act. The documents were actually declassified at Negroponte's
request in June 1998, after he had temporarily retired from the
Foreign Service.

The 392 cables and memos record Negroponte's daily,
and even hourly, activities as the powerful Ambassador to Honduras
during the contra war in the early 1980s. They include dozens
of cables in which the Ambassador sought to undermine regional
peace efforts such as the Contadora initiative that ultimately
won Costa Rican president Oscar Arias a Nobel Prize, as well as
multiple reports of meetings and conversations with Honduran military
officers who were instrumental in providing logistical support
and infrastructure for CIA covert operations in support of the
contras against Nicaragua -"our special project" as
Negroponte refers to the contra war in the cable traffic. Among
the records are special back channel communications with then
CIA director William Casey, including a recommendation to increase
the number of arms being supplied to the leading contra force,
the FDN in mid 1983, and advice on how to rewrite a Presidential
finding on covert operations to overthrow the Sandinistas to make
it more politically palatable to an increasingly uneasy U.S. Congress.

Conspicuously absent from the cable traffic, however, is reporting
on human rights atrocities that were committed by the Honduran
military and its secret police unit known as Battalion 316, between
1982 and 1984, under the military leadership of General Gustavo
Alvarez, Negroponte's main liaison with the Honduran government.
The Honduran human rights ombudsman later found that more than
50 people disappeared at the hands of the military during those
years. But Negroponte's cables reflect no protest, or even discussion
of these issues during his many meetings with General Alvarez,
his deputies and Honduran President Robert Suazo. Nor do the released
cables contain any reporting to Washington on the human rights
abuses that were taking place.

Today's posting by the National Security Archive includes the
complete series of cables released under the Freedom of Information
Act. The State Department released another several dozen cables
from the series yesterday, and these are available in Part
2 of this posting.

DocumentsNote: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe
Acrobat Reader to view.

In a "roger channel" cable to Assistant Secretary
of State Enders, Negroponte berates the State Department for
open channel references in cable to U.S. backing for contras
based in Honduras. He claims that the contras are all based
now inside Nicaraguan territory and suggests that the Bureau
of Intelligence and Research "circulate a piece pointing
out that is precisely where they are and not rpt not in Honduras."
In public statements, including letters to the New York
Times and the Economist, Negroponte argues that
there are no contra camps on Honduran territory.

In this cable Negroponte appears to concede that the contras
are openly operating on Honduran territory and suggests that
this is making Honduran government officials nervous. The leading
contra group, the FDN, he reports, "has obviously overdone
things and, if it does not want to wear out its welcome in Honduras,
it will have to lower its profile to the absolute minimum. This
will likely mean sacrificing public affairs activities from
Honduras in order to preserve the ability to operate from here
for more essential purposes." Negroponte urges the State
Department to help by keeping Congressional delegations from
stating that they are coming to Honduras to "meet with
FDN, or visit contra camps."

In a back channel communication to CIA director William Casey,
National Security Advisor William Clark and Assistant Secretary
Thomas Enders, Negroponte begins to press for additional weapons
for the contras in Honduras. He advises that this issue will
be high on the agenda of the Honduran commander-in-chief, Gustavo
Alvarez, when he comes to Washington. "This thing is starting
to work and is building up a momentum, " he writes, sounding
more like a CIA station chief than a diplomat. "It wouldn't
surprise me," he predicts, "if the size of force could
be doubled in next five months if we provided necessary weapons."
Several months later, Negroponte recommends to the White House
that the number of rifles, AK-47s, provided by the CIA to FDN
personnel be increased by 3000 units. In November 1983, President
Reagan authorizes Negroponte's recommendation.

Negroponte exchanges "roger channel" cables with
the U.S. ambassador to Managua, Anthony Quainton, who has written
to complain that the Ambassador to Honduras has invited the
leader of the contra force known as the FDN to dinner at his
house. In his telegram of May 23, Negroponte explains that he
"met his first real live Nicaraguan exile activist; has
his own home no less; and with customary and traditional sense
of hospitality offered him dinner." Ambassador Quainton
responds to what he calls Negroponte's "gastronomic diplomacy
in Tegucigalpa." He notes that "I have my doubts about
a dinner at the [embassy] residence for a man who is in the
business of overthrowing a neighboring government." Perhaps,
Quainton adds, "I should wine and dine Ruben Zamora et
al [political leaders of the Salvadoran guerrillas] in order
to maintain parity."

After visiting Washington in mid September, Negroponte reports
to Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Langhorne
Motley, on visits with Congressmen and with CIA officials. He
states that the CIA head of the Western Hemisphere division,
Duane "Dewey" Clarridge, has shown him a draft of
the new Presidential finding authorizing covert operations to
support the contra war. "It focused almost exclusively
on interdiction," Negroponte complains. "I sincerely
believe that case can be made that the more complete the finding
the broader the likely Congressional support." Eight days
later, when President Reagan signs the final draft of the finding,
it has been expanded beyond to the scope of interdicting arms
allegedly going from Nicaragua to El Salvador to include promoting
"meaningful negotiations and constructive, verifiable agreement
with [Nicaragua's] neighbors on peace in the region."

Negroponte argues that there is no negotiated settlement that
will meet U.S. goals, even if the Sandinista government agrees
to an accord that would curtail its support for other insurgencies.
"We can visualize no such negotiated arrangement capable
of ensuring that Nicaragua would not come back to cause trouble
to its neighbors some other day," he writes, opposing any
agreement that leaves the revolutionary government in place.
"Indeed, such a negotiated outcome would be a Trojan horse
not unlike the 1962 Cuban missile arrangement which facilitated
consolidation of the Cuban revolution." This cable acknowledged
the "political importance" of being "forthcoming"
in negotiations over Nicaragua, but established the bottom line
Negroponte reiterated throughout his tenure as ambassador: that
the U.S. should prevent any peace accord that enabled the Sandinistas
to remain in power.

In a memorandum sent through a special back channel to CIA
director William Casey and the State Department and NSC, Negroponte
argues that the outcome of regional peace talks could lead to
"effectively shutting down our special project," also
known as the contra war. He asks if Washington is "falling
prey to the Mexican/Nicaraguan salami slicer?"

As the Contadora peace process led by Venezuela and Mexico
picked up steam in 1983, Negroponte presents the argument that
Contadora was only advancing Nicaraguan interests. "Our
side is in disarray," he cables Washington. "The sooner
we recognize it and come up with a comprehensive strategy for
dealing with the situation the better."

In yet another cable pressing the State Department to intervene
to stop the momentum of the peace process in Central America,
Negroponte admits that "No one will accuse this embassy
of inconsistency in its skepticism towards the course on which
the Contadora four are embarked." Contadora, he warns,
could paint USG, Honduras and possibly El Salvador into a corner
whereby we are accused of obstructing regional peace."
Negroponte recommends that U.S. officials move to influence
Contadora "towards a fundamental different approach."
Eventually, U.S. officials manage to undercut an peace initiative
put forth by Mexico and the peace process collapses.

Negroponte reports on what he sees as the Honduran top military
commander's "commitment to constitutional government"
and appears to laud his dedication to democracy. General Gustavo
Alvarez, to whom the Honduran human rights ombudsman and other
investigators have assigned responsibility for the death squad
activity of the Honduran secret police Battalion 316 in the
early 1980s, was Negroponte's key contact in the Honduran military
on the contra war and for covert and overt U.S. use of Honduran
military facilities. Five months after Negroponte wrote this
cable, Alvarez was ousted as commander-in-chief because of his
"authoritarian tendencies" and exiled to a diplomatic
posting in South America.

THE
COMPLETE NEGROPONTE FILEAs
received from the State Department under the Freedom of Information
Act