11/10/2017

On Putnam's Regulative Ideal of Decency

Marx said that religion put Utopia (or the higher stage of communism, which he - revealingly called The Kingdom of Freedom') "in the sky", and what we have to is put it on earth. (An idea he took from Feuerbach and the Young Hegelians.) So the Marxist project is nothing less than to establish the Kingdom of Freedom - the Kingdom of Heaven, in fact - on earth, and without divine help. In this sense Marxism is a religious heresy (not just 'heresy' from a Christian point of view, but from any traditional religious point of view)…I want to argue that Marx got it exactly backwards. The idea of a Kingdom of Freedom (or Heaven) belongs 'in the sky' - as a guiding ideal, not something we can humanly achieve; and putting it 'on earth' necessarily leads to a politics which combines hatred with exaggerated optimism. It is no accident that traditional religion has realistic moral psychology, and Marxism has a totally unrealistic moral psychology…

Next point: the traditional notion of progress was deeply scientistic (or technology-istic, at any rate). Basically, both 19th century liberals Marxists (and even some conservatives) believed that technology would make possible a Utopian, or anyway a better - and - better, future. Disagreement was over means; revolution or evolution, public ownership or private ownership, but the underlying conception of a peaceful, democratic, abundant society brought about by science and technology was shared….

I want to argue that science and technology do not at all guarantee moral progress. They only enlarge our capacity to do good or evil….This enlarged capacity cannot be denied. But there is no 'logic of history' - none we can verify 'scientifically' - that guarantees that increased capacity ('competence') for good-or-evil will become increased performance of good.

A passing reference in Daniel Stoljaer's new book, Philosophical Progress: in Defense of a Reasonable Optimism, sent me back to Putnam's note (which clearly was never intended for publication).* The main claim of the derasha (a Jewish sermon) us is to articulate the outlines of a regulative ideal that can substitute for bad utopian thinking: that society "can become...more decent." Putnam defends this by thinking "of societies, like people, as having Free Will." The idea then is that with the regulative ideal of decency, we could will ourselves to become more decent. This requires, and Putnam is clear about this, a prior 'consensus' that a "society" is indeed a 'we' as well as firm agreement over the goal (more decency) that will both guide future agency, but also prevent backsliding "since [progress toward decency] can always be reversed." This is Putnam's ''conception" of progress something he distinguishes from the "model" that will guide political behavior.

At first glance an attractive feature of Putnam's approach (one he emphasizes) is that it does not require individual moral improvement--none of us have to try to be especially decent in order to make society (in the way Putnam understand it) decent. For, the way Putnam thinks about social decency, he is really thinking in terms collective goods and the aims of our public institutions. (Putnam is a socialist about the supply of public goods, and eager to abolish private property, but not private reward.) So, this approach to progress does not require us to turn each other into angels (recall).

Now, it is unclear in Putnam's sketch how a 'we' can be formed such that genuine willing (in the sense of presupposing a consensus and aiming for one) is possible. That may be not be heretical, but on this point the Marxist may well be thought more realistic than Putnam. That Putnam recognizes the significance of the objection can be found inside Putnam's model that will guide his political stance:

The model I advocate has three elements: socialism as the guiding principle in the economy; liberalism as the guiding principle in politics; conservatism as the guiding principle in culture....From liberalism I want to keep the emphasis on individual differences and on individual liberty....Conservatism: Bell remarks that religious rituals are one way of preserving shared affections and sentiments across generations, and that these are what hold any society together. More specifically, in traditional societies the traditions and rituals both express that one consciously shares attitudes and feelings with one's fathers, grandfathers... and teach each new generation to share them. Today we are living in the most anti-historical of all ages. People don't share 'affections and sentiments' with past generations they scarcely share 'affections and sentiments' with each other, except hedonistic ones, which hardly produce much cohesion or much worth while. I think that one can revise traditions to eliminate racist, or male chauvinist, etc. elements; I think one can respect other traditions while standing in one oneself; but that whatever kind of future we may have some respect for the value of traditions will necessarily be part of it.

So tradition is needed to provide the glue, that is, 'affections and sentiments,' of a the social person. And, for Putnam, these social feelings are inherited from the past, not engineered. Traditions are changeable, however, and can, be improved from within.

There are (at least) two problems, however, here. First, and Putnam is frank about this, tradition is not allowed to play the role, 'today' (I don't think circumstances have changed for the better since on this score.) So, the question is if the conception of progress that Putnam puts forward can be salvaged if the tradition can't play the role in his model of politics. For, without tradition, Putnam has no access to a glue, as it were a civic religion, behind the will that will choose a decent future. If tradition can't play such a role, then maybe something else can (and conservativism can be dropped from his socialist-liberal model). What this may be is left open, but is an urgent question.

To be sure, Putnam's approach does not require a prior political unity. Like a certain form of Kantian, he could hold that the positing of a social will, is a precondition to becoming an autonomous, social will. But he needs something that can do the job absent a living (or invented) tradition.

Second, Putnam requires, from his political model that tradition is reshaped. But there is no 'logic of history' that will deliver this; rather, and this is the second glance, a reshaped tradition requires the existence of some angels who reshape tradition from within. And the development of such angels or to facilitate their reshaping-of-tradition-activities requires sermons among the "few friends" (for whom the Note was written) as well as a wider public.

*Putnam's footnote remark, that "indeed, I would not know how to construct a polished political essay," deserves more reflection for those of us who care about political essays, polished or not.