The
Prosecution’s expert historian Robert Donia continued to testify in the Radovan
Karadzic trial on June 7, 2010.

Common Ground

Donia
agreed with Karadzic’s claim that “Up until the 30th of January, 1991, both the
SDA and the SDS were in favor of preserving Yugoslavia.” And he agreed with
Karadzic’s assertion that “On the 31st of March [1991] the Patriotic League was
formed as the military wing of the SDA.”

The
witness also testified that “what is normally referred to as [Bosnia’s]
declaration of sovereignty, along with a platform of the Presidency, were both
adopted without the participation and over the objections of the SDS on October
15 [1991], in the very early morning hours.”

The
Cause of Tensions in Bosnia

The
witness however, rejected Karadzic’s thesis that the “foremost reason for
tensions [was] the change in position by Mr. Izetbegovic and the SDA. Instead of
being in favor of preserving Yugoslavia, they opted for leaving Yugoslavia on
the 30th of January, 1991.”

According to the witness, tensions arose in Bosnia because of “the growing
concern among many Bosnians about the behavior of the Yugoslav People’s Army
both in prosecuting the campaign on behalf of Serb separatists in Croatia and in
its various undertakings in Bosnia starting in the late spring and summer of
1991.”

Although he blamed JNA activity in Croatia for increased tensions in Bosnia, the
witness did not believe that incidents like the Spegelj film, where Croatian
defense minister Martain Spegelj was videotaped in late 1990 (i.e. before the
war) telling the Croatian interior minister how he intended to murder JNA
soldiers and Serbs, contributed to increased tensions. He said, “I don't see
that at this time the concern of regarding Mr. Spegelj's -- the videotape and
his statements had much echo in Bosnia at that time.”

Separatism

Donia
would have people believe the problem wasn’t Croatian and Muslim separatists
wanting to secede from Yugoslavia,
rather it was Serbian separatists wanting to secede from Bosnia and Croatia. He
told the court, “Serbs wanted to separate themselves from Bosnia-Herzegovina.”
Gesturing towards Karadzic he said, “You established the SAOs only in September
and October [1991]. You established the communities of municipalities in this
period of late April, May, and June. You established the Bosnian Krajina one,
as I indicated, on the 25th of April, in Banja Luka.” (i.e. after the Patriotic
League was set-up, and after Izetbegovic began advocating Bosnian secession from
Yugoslavia)

According to Donia, the Bosnian-Serbs “were seeking to separate from
Bosnia-Herzegovina and undertook all kinds of initiatives and activities to so
separate.” So Karadzic asked him, “Do you mean to say that the Serbs would have
separated from Bosnia
even if Bosnia had remained in Yugoslavia?”

Donia
couldn’t answer. He confessed, “I don't have that much insight into what Serb
intentions would have been in that case.” Ironically, his “expert opinion” about
the intentions of the Serbs is the central focus of his testimony.

The
witness agreed with Karadzic’s suggestion that “the Serbs' first and utmost
priority was preserving Yugoslavia.”
He said, “I think that the vast majority of Serbs did, in fact, feel that
Yugoslavia was their home, yes.”

Karadzic asked him, “Do you agree that after that first and uppermost objective
the second objective in terms of this hierarchy was, among the Serbs, that is,
that if the Croats and Slovenes were leaving Yugoslavia the Serbs should remain
within Yugoslavia in those territories that were predominantly Serb and that
Bosnia should remain in Yugoslavia if at all possible.”

Donia
replied, “Greater Serbia essentially is what you are suggesting” He said, “The
programme that you embraced and that Mr. Milosevic embraced also included
holding on to those parts of Croatia which Serbs claimed as their land, and thus
it wasn't completely congruent with the remaining republics as they were then
bounded by the boundaries of Yugoslavia.”

Karadzic asked him, “Did those Serbs want to remain in Yugoslavia? Not
Milosevic, the Serbs living in Krajina or Bosnia. Did they wish to stay in
Yugoslavia?”

Donia
agreed, “I think most of them did, yes.” So Karadzic asked, “And was Yugoslavia
a sovereign and the sole recognized state amongst all those entities?”

Again
Donia agreed, “Up until January 15th, yes. January 15th, 1992, that was the
status, yes.”

So
Karadzic asked rhetorically, “How then could the Serbs have been separatists if
they were calling to remain in the country that they saw as their home, a home
which was internationally recognized?”

SDA
Sent Muslim Police for Training in Croatia

Karadzic showed the witness two documents (exhibits D260 and D261) issued by the
SDA calling on Muslim members of the Bosnian MUP to report to Croatia for
training before the Bosnian war, but after the war in Croatia had started.

The
witness said, “I find it unsurprising that that Bosnia was sending people to
Croatia for training, but I did not know that that was something that was being
done with either the endorsement or participation of the SDA.”

The
1991 Serb-Muslim Agreement

Karadzic also questioned Donia extensively about the 1991 Serb-Muslim agreement
he reached with Adil Zulfikarpasic & Mohammed Filipovic of the Muslim-Bosniak
Organization (MBO), and how it was sabotaged by Alija Izetbegovic.

Karadzic read several quotes from a book entitled "Articles and Interviews,”
written by Zulfikarpasic where he said:

“I have
to say that on behalf of the MBO, Mohamed Filipovic and I took part in the
negotiation on behalf of the SDS, Mr. Karadzic, Koljevic and Krajisnik. It's a
highly authoritative meeting and I wish to stress something else. From the very
beginning in talks, the SDA was informed as well as Alija Izetbegovic in
person. The initiative did stem from us, but on several occasions
we discussed it with Alija Izetbegovic, Muhamed Filipovic and I.”

“At
that meeting, we established once again that we agreed. Even Alija
Izetbegovic said that there was no alternative to this agreement and that he
accepts it fully.”

Zulfikarpasic was asked by the interviewer, “Mr. Zulfikarpasic, how do you
perceive the congratulatory notes, the one [Slobodan] Milosevic sent you and
Radovan Karadzic in response to the signing of this agreement?”

He
answered, “That note strengthened our agreement and showed us that the
Serb nation as a whole stands behind this idea, which, in any case,
contributed to easing tensions and creating a very good atmosphere.”

Zulfikarpasic explained in the interview however, “Mr. Izetbegovic, after
welcoming our initiative and after taking part in a three-hour meeting with us
and the SDS probably under pressure from the militant wing changed their
position within one hour.”

After
Karadzic readout excerpts from Zulfikarpasic’s interviews Donia confirmed that,
“the account that you've just read corresponds very closely to my own
understanding of how the talks proceeded, how they were initiated and
proceeding.” And Karadzic stated, “The agreement between the Serbs and the
Muslims that shows our true intentions.”