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The Intellectual Foundations of Political Economy

Early 19th Century Utilitarians

Principles of Political Economy

John Stuart Mill

Of the Grounds and Limits of the Laisser-faire or Non-interference Principle

1. We have now reached the last part of our undertaking; the discussion, so far as
suited to this treatise (that is, so far as it is a question of principle, not detail)
of the limits of the province of government: the question, to what objects governmental
intervention in the affairs of society may or should extend, over and above those
which necessarily appertain to it. No subject has been more keenly contested in the
present age: the contest, however, has chiefly taken place round certain select points,
with only flying excursions into the rest of the field. Those indeed who have discussed
any particular question of government interference, such as state education (spiritual
or secular), regulation of hours of labour, a public provision for the poor, &c.,
have often dealt largely in general arguments, far outstretching the special application
made of them, and have shown a sufficiently strong bias either in favour of letting
things alone, or in favour of meddling; but have seldom declared, or apparently decided
in their own minds, how far they would carry either principle. The supporters of interference
have been content with asserting a general right and duty on the part of government
to intervene, wherever its intervention would be useful: and when those who have been
called the laisser-faire school have attempted any definite limitation of the province
of government, they have usually restricted it to the protection of person and property
against force and fraud; a definition to which neither they nor any one else can deliberately
adhere, since it excludes, as has been shown in a preceding chapter,(1*) some of the
most indispensable and unanimously recognized of the duties of government.

Without professing entirely to supply this deficiency of a general theory, on a question
which does not, as I conceive, admit of any universal solution, I shall attempt to
afford some little aid towards the resolution of this class of questions as they arise,
by examining, in the most general point of view in which the subject can be considered,
what are the advantages, and what the evils or inconveniences, of government interference.

We must set out by distinguishing between two kinds of intervention by the government,
which, though they may relate to the same subject, differ widely in their nature and
effects, and require, for their justification, motives of a very different degree
of urgency. The intervention may extend to controlling the free agency of individuals.
Government may interdict all persons from doing certain things; or from doing them
without its authorization; or may prescribe to them certain things to be done, or
a certain manner of doing things which it is left optional with them to do or to abstain
from. This is the authoritative interference of government. There is another kind
of intervention which is not authoritative: when a government, instead of issuing
a command and enforcing it by penalties, adopts the course so seldom resorted to by
governments, and of which such important use might be made, that of giving advice
and promulgating information; or when, leaving individuals free to use their own means
of pursuing any object of general interest, the government, not meddling with them,
but not trusting the object solely to their care, establishes, side by side with their
arrangements, an agency of its own for a like purpose. Thus, it is one thing to maintain
a Church Establishment, and another to refuse toleration to other religions, or to
persons professing no religion. It is one thing to provide schools or colleges, and
another to require that no person shall act as an instructor of youth without a government
licence. There might be a national bank, or a government manufactory, without any
monopoly against private banks and manufactories. There might be a post-office, without
penalties against the conveyance of letters by any other means. There may be a corps
of government engineers for civil purposes, while the profession of a civil engineer
is free to be adopted by every one. There may be public hospitals, without any restriction
upon private medical or surgical practice.

2. It is evident, even at first sight, that the authoritative form of government intervention
has a much more limited sphere of legitimate action than the other. It requires a
much stronger necessity to justify it in any case; while there are large departments
of human life from which it must be unreservedly and imperiously excluded. Whatever
theory we adopt respecting the foundation of the social union, and under whatever
political institutions we live, there is a circle around every individual human being,
which no government, be it that of one, of a few, or of the many, ought to be permitted
to overstep: there is a part of the life of every person who has come to years of
discretion, within which the individuality of that person ought to reign uncontrolled
either by any other individual or by the public collectively. That there is, or ought
to be, some space in human existence thus entrenched around, and sacred from authoritative
intrusion, no one who professes the smallest regard to human freedom or dignity will
call in question: the point to be determined is, where the limit should be placed;
how large a province of human life this reserved territory should include. I apprehend
that it ought to include all that part which concerns only the life, whether inward
or outward, of the individual, and does not affect the interests of others, or affects
them only through the moral influence of example. With respect to the domain of the
inward consciousness, the thoughts and feelings, and as much of external conduct as
is personal only, involving no consequences, none at least of a painful or injurious
kind, to other people: I hold that it is allowable in all, and in the more thoughtful
and cultivated often a duty, to assert and promulgate, with all the force they are
capable of, their opinion of what is good or bad, admirable or contemptible, but not
to compel others to conform to that opinion; whether the force used is that of extra.legal
coercion, or exerts itself by means of the law.

Even in those portions of conduct which do affect the interest of others, the onus
of making out a case always lies on the defenders of legal prohibitions. It is not
a merely constructive or presumptive injury to others, which will justify the interference
of law with individual freedom. To be prevented from doing what one is inclined to,
from acting according to one's own judgment of what is desirable, is not only always
irksome, but always tends, pro tanto, to starve the development of some portion of
the bodily or mental faculties, either sensitive or active; and unless the conscience
of the individual goes freely with the legal restraint, it partakes, either in a great
or in a small degree, of the degradation of slavery. Scarcely any degree of utility,
short of absolute necessity, will justify a prohibitory regulation, unless it can
also be made to recommend itself to the general conscience; unless persons of ordinary
good intentions either believe already, or can be induced to believe, that the thing
prohibited is a thing which they ought not to wish to do.

It is otherwise with governmental interferences which do not restrain individual free
agency. When a government provides means of fulfilling a certain end, leaving individuals
free to avail themselves of different means if in their opinion preferable, there
is no infringement of liberty, no irksome or degrading restraint. One of the principal
objections to government interference is then absent. There is, however, in almost
all forms of government agency, one thing which is compulsory. the provision of the
pecuniary means. These are derived from taxation; or, if existing in the form of an
endowment derived from public property, they are still the cause of as much compulsory
taxation as the sale or the annual proceeds of the property would enable to be dispensed
with.(2*) And the objection necessarily attaching to compulsory contributions, is
almost always greatly aggravated by the expensive precautions and onerous restrictions,
which are indispensable to prevent evasion of a compulsory tax.

3. A second general objection to government agency, is that every increase of the
functions devolving on the government is an increase of its power, both in the form
of authority, and still more, in the indirect form of influence. The importance of
this consideration, in respect of political freedom, has in general been quite sufficiently
recognized, at least in England, but many, in latter times, have been prone to think
that limitation of the powers of the government is only essential when the government
itself is badly constituted; when it does not represent the people, but is the organ
of a class, or coalition of classes: and that a government of sufficiently popular
constitution might be trusted with any amount of power over the nation, since its
power would be only that of the nation over itself. This might be true, if the nation,
in such cases, did not practically mean a mere majority of the nation, and if minorities
were only capable of oppressing, but not of being oppressed. Experience, however,
proves that the depositaries of power who are mere delegates of the people, that is
of a majority, are quite as ready (when they think they can count on popular support)
as any organs of oligarchy, to assume arbitrary power, and encroach unduly on the
liberty of private life. The public collectively is abundantly ready to impose, not
only its generally narrow views of its interests, but its abstract opinions, and even
its tastes, as laws binding upon individuals. And the present civilization tends so
strongly to make the power of persons acting in masses the only substantial power
in society, that there never was more necessity for surrounding individual independence
of thought, speech, and conduct, with the most powerful defences, in order to maintain
that originality of mind and individuality of character, which are the only source
of any real progress, and of most of the qualities which make the human race much
superior to any herd of animals. Hence it is no less important in a democratic than
in any other government, that all tendency on the part of public authorities to stretch
their interference, and assume a power of any sort which can easily be dispensed with,
should be regarded with unremitting jealousy. Perhaps this is even more important
in a democracy than in any other form of political society; because where public opinion
is sovereign, an individual who is oppressed by the sovereign does not, as in most
other states of things, find a rival power to which he can appeal for relief, or,
at all events, for sympathy.

4. A third general objection to government agency, rests on the principle of the division
of labour. Every additional function undertaken by the government, is a fresh occupation
imposed upon a body already overcharged with duties. A natural consequence is that
most things are ill done; much not done at all, because the government is not able
to do it without delays which are fatal to its purpose; that the more troublesome
and less showy, of the functions undertaken, are postponed or neglected, and an excuse
is always ready for the neglect; while the heads of the administration have their
minds so fully taken up with official details, in however perfunctory a manner superintended,
that they have no time or thought to spare for the great interests of the state, and
the preparation of enlarged measures of social improvement.

But these inconveniences, though real and serious, result much more from the bad organization
of governments, than from the extent and variety of the duties undertaken by them.
Government is not a name for some one functionary, or definite number of functionaries:
there may be almost any amount of division of labour within the administrative body
itself. The evil in question is felt in great magnitude under some of the governments
of the Continent, where six or eight men, living at the capital and known by the name
of ministers, demand that the whole public business of the country shall pass, or
be supposed to pass, under their individual eye. But the inconvenience would be reduced
to a very manageable compass, in a country in which there was a proper distribution
of functions between the central and local officers of government, and in which the
central body was divided into a sufficient number of departments. When Parliament
thought it expedient to confer on the government an inspecting and partially controlling
authority over railways, it did not add railways to the department of the Home Minister,
but created a Railway Board. When it determined to have a central superintending authority
for pauper administration, it established the Poor Law Commission. There are few countries
in which a greater number of functions are discharged by public officers, than in
some states of the American Union, particularly the New England States; but the division
of labour in public business is extreme; most of these officers being not even amenable
to any common superior, but performing their duties freely, under the double check
of election by their townsmen, and civil as well as criminal responsibility to the
tribunals.

It is, no doubt, indispensable to good government that the chiefs of the administration,
whether permanent or temporary, should extend a commanding, though general, view over
the ensemble of all the interests confided, in any degree, to the responsibility of
the central power. But with a skilful internal organization of the administrative
machine, leaving to subordinates, and as far as possible, to local subordinates, not
only the execution, but to a greater degree the control, of details; holding them
accountable for the results of their acts rather than for the acts themselves, except
where these come within the cognizance of the tribunals; taking the most effectual
securities for honest and capable appointments; opening a broad path to promotion
from the inferior degrees of the administrative scale to the superior; leaving, at
each step, to the functionary, a wider range in the origination of measures, so that,
in the highest grade of all, deliberation might be concentrated on the great collective
interests of the country in each department; if all this were done, the government
would not probably be overburthened by any business, in other respects fit to be undertaken
by it; though the overburthening would remain as a serious addition to the inconveniences
incurred by its undertaking any which was unfit.

5. But though a better organization of governments would greatly diminish the force
of the objection to the mere multiplication of their duties, it would still remain
true that in all the more advanced communities, the great majority of things are worse
done by the intervention of government, than the individuals most interested in the
matter would do them, or cause them to be done, if left to themselves. The grounds
of this truth are expressed with tolerable exactness in the poplar dictum, that people
understand their own business and their own interests better, and care for them more,
than the government does, or can be expected to do. This maxim holds true throughout
the greatest part of the business of life, and wherever it is true we ought to condemn
every kind of government intervention that conflicts with it. The inferiority of government
agency, for example, in any of the common operations of industry or commerce, is proved
by the fact, that it is hardly ever able to maintain.. itself in equal competition
with individual agency, where the individuals possess the requisite degree of industrial
enterprise, and can command the necessary assemblage of means. All the facilities
which a government enjoys of access to information; all the means which it possesses
of remunerating, and therefore of commanding, the best available talent in the market
-- are not an equivalent for the one great disadvantage of an inferior interest in
the result.

It must be remembered, besides, that even if a government were superior in intelligence
and knowledge to any single individual in the nation, it must be inferior to all the
individuals of the nation taken together. It can neither possess in itself, nor enlist
in its service, more than a portion of the acquirements and capacities which the country
contains, applicable to any given purpose. There must be many persons equally qualified
for the work with those whom the government employs, even if it selects its instruments
with no reference to any consideration but their fitness. Now these are the very persons
into whose hands, in the cases of most common occurrence, a system of individual agency
naturally tends to throw the work, because they are capable of doing it better or
on cheaper terms than any other persons. So far as this is the case, it is evident
that government, by excluding or even by superseding individual agency, either substitutes
a less qualified instrumentality for one better qualified, or at any rate substitutes
its own mode of accomplishing the work, for all the variety of modes which would be
tried by a number of equally qualified persons aiming at the same end; a competition
by many degrees more propitious to the progress of improvement, than any uniformity
of system.

6. I have reserved for the last place one of the strongest of the reasons against
the extension of government agency, Even if the government could comprehend within
itself, in each department, all the most eminent intellectual capacity and active
talent of the nation, it would not be the less desirable that the conduct of a large
portion of the affairs of the society should be left in the hands of the persons immediately
interested in them. The business of life is an essential part of the practical education
of a people; without which, book and school instruction, though most necessary and
salutary, does not suffice to qualify them for conduct, and for the adaptation of
means to ends. Instruction is only one of the desiderata of mental improvement; another,
almost as indispensable, is a vigorous exercise of the active energies; labour, contrivance,
judgment, self-control: and the natural stimulus to these is the difficulties of life.
This doctrine is not to be confounded with the complacent optimism, which represents
the evils of life as desirable things, because they call forth qualities adapted to
combat with evils. It is only because the difficulties exist, that the qualities which
combat with them are of any value. As practical beings it is our business to free
human life from as many as possible of its difficulties, and not to keep up a stock
of them as hunters preserve game, for the exercise of pursuing it. But since the need
of active talent and practical judgment in the affairs of life can only be diminished,
and not, even on the most favourable supposition, done away with, it is important
that those endowments should be cultivated not merely in a select few, but in all,
and that the cultivation should be more varied and complete than most persons are
able to find in the narrow sphere of their merely individual interests. A people among
whom there is no habit of spontaneous action for a collective interest -- who look
habitually to their government to command or prompt them in all matters of joint concern
-- who expect to have everything done for them, except what can be made an affair
of mere habit and routine -- have their faculties only half developed; their education
is defective in one of its most important branches.

Not only is the cultivation of the active faculties by exercise, diffused through
the whole community, in itself one of the most valuable of national possessions: it
is rendered, not less, but more, necessary, when a high degree of that indispensable
culture is systematically kept up in the chiefs and functionaries of the state. There
cannot be a combination of circumstances more dangerous to human welfare, than that
in which intelligence and talent are maintained at a high standard within a governing
corporation, but starved and discouraged outside the pale. Such a system, more completely
than any other, embodies the idea of despotism, by arming with intellectual superiority
as an additional weapon, those who have already the legal power. It approaches as
nearly as the organic difference between human beings and other animals admits, to
the government of sheep by their shepherd, without anything like so strong an interest
as the shepherd has in the thriving condition of the flock. The only security against
political slavery, is the check maintained over governors, by the diffusion of intelligence,
activity, and public spirit among the governed. Experience proves the extreme difficulty
of permanently keeping up a sufficiently high standard of those qualities; a difficulty
which increases, as the advance of civilization and security removes one after another
of the hardships, embarrassments, and dangers against which individuals had formerly
no resource but in their own strength, skill, and courage. It is therefore of supreme
importance that all classes of the community, down to the lowest, should have much
to do for themselves; that as great a demand should be made upon their intelligence
and virtue as it is in any respect equal to; that the government should not only leave
as far as possible to their own faculties the conduct of whatever concerns themselves
alone, but should suffer them, or rather encourage them, to manage as many as possible
of their joint concerns by voluntary co-operation; since this discussion and management
of collective interests is the great school of that public spirit, and the great source
of that intelligence of public affairs, which are always regarded as the distinct.
ive character of the public of free countries.

A democratic constitution, not supported by democratic institutions in detail, but
confined to the central government, not only is not political freedom, but often creates
a spirit precisely the reverse, carrying down to the lowest grade in society the desire
and ambition of political domination. In some countries the desire of the people is
for not being tyrannized over, but in others it is merely for an equal chance to everybody
of tyrannizing. Unhappily this last state of the desires is fully as natural to man.
kind as the former, and in many of the conditions even of civilized humanity, is far
more largely exemplified. In proportion as the people are accustomed to manage their
affairs by their own active intervention, instead of leaving them to the government,
their desires will turn to repelling tyranny, rather than to tyrannizing: while in
proportion as all real initiative and direction resides in the government, and individuals
habitually feel and act as under its perpetual tutelage, popular institutions develop
in them not the desire of freedom, but an unmeasured appetite for place and power:
diverting the intelligence and activity of the country from its principal business,
to a wretched competition for the selfish prizes and the petty vanities of office.

7. The preceding are the principal reasons, of a general character, in favour of restricting
to the narrowest compass the intervention of a public authority in the business of
the community: and few will dispute the more than sufficiency of these reasons, to
throw, in every instance, the burthen of making out a strong case, not on those who
resist, but on those who recommend, government interference. Laisser-faire, in short,
should be the general practice: every departure from it, unless required by some great
good, is a certain evil.

That these and similar regulations were not a dead letter, and that the officious
and vexatious meddling was prolonged down to the French Revolution, we have the testimony
of Roland, the Girondist minister.(4*) 'I have seen', says he, 'eighty, ninety, a
hundred pieces of cotton or woollen stuff cut up, and completely destroyed. I have
witnessed similar scenes every week for a number of years. I have seen manufactured
goods confiscated; heavy fines laid on the manufacturers; some pieces of fabric were
burnt in public places, and at the hours of market: others were fixed to the pillory,
with the name of the manufacturer inscribed upon them, and he himself was threatened
with the pillory, in case of a second offence. All this was done under my eyes, at
Rouen, in conformity with existing regulations, or ministerial orders. What crime
deserved so cruel a punishment? Some defects in the materials employed, or in the
texture of the fabric, or even in some of the threads of the warp.

'I have frequently seen manufacturers visited by a band of satellites who put all
in confusion in their establishments, spread terror in their families, cut the stuffs
from the frames, tore off the warp from the looms, and carried them away as proofs
of infringement; the manufacturers were summoned, tried, and condemned: their goods
confiscated; copies of their judgment of confiscation posted up in every public place;
fortune, reputation, credit, all was lost and destroyed. And for what offence? Because
they had made of worsted, a kind of cloth called shag, such as the English used to
manufacture, and even sell in France, while the French regulations stated that that
kind of cloth should be made with mohair. I have seen other manufacturers treated
in the same way, because they had made camlets of a particular width, used in England
and Germany, for which there was a great demand from Spain, Portugal, and other countries,
and from several parts of France, while the French regulations prescribed other widths
for camlets.'

The time is gone by, when such applications as these of the principle of 'paternal
government' would be attempted, in even the least enlightened country of the European
commonwealth of nations. In such cases as those cited, all the general objections
to government interference are valid, and several of them in nearly their highest
degree. But we must now turn to the second part of our task, and direct our attention
to cases, in which some of those general objections are altogether absent, while those
which can never be got rid of entirely, are overruled by counter-considerations of
still greater importance.

We have observed that, as a general rule, the business of life is better performed
when those who have an immediate interest in it are left to take their own course,
uncontrolled either by the mandate of the law or by the meddling of any public functionary.
The persons, or some of the persons, who do the work, are likely to be better judges
than the government, of the means of attaining the particular end at which they aim.
Were we to suppose, what is not very probable, that the government has possessed itself
of the best knowledge which had been acquired up to a given time by the persons most
skilled in the occupation; even then, the individual agents have so much stronger
and more direct an interest in the result, that the means are far more likely to be
improved and perfected if left to their uncontrolled choice. But if the workman is
generally the best selector of means, can it be affirmed with the same universality,
that the consumer, or person served, is the most competent judge of the end? Is the
buyer always qualified to judge of the commodity? If not, the presumption in favour
of the competition of the market does not apply to the case; and if the commodity
be one, in the quality of which society has much at stake, the balance of advantages
may be in favour of some mode and degree of intervention, by the authorized representatives
of the collective interest of the state.

8. Now, the proposition that the consumer is a competent judge of the commodity, can
be admitted only with numerous abatements and exceptions. He is generally the best
judge (though even this is not true universally) of the material objects produced
for his use. These are destined to supply some physical want, or gratify some taste
or inclination, respecting which wants or inclinations there is no appeal from the
person who feels them; or they are the means and appliances of some occupation, for
the use of the persons engaged in it, who may be presumed to be judges of the things
required in their own habitual employment. But there are other things, of the worth
of which the demand of the market is by no means a test; things of which the utility
does not consist in ministering to inclinations, nor in serving the daily uses of
life, and the want of which is least felt where the need is greatest. This is peculiarly
true of those things which are chiefly useful as tending to raise the character of
human beings. The uncultivated cannot be competent judges of cultivation. Those who
most need to be made wiser and better, usually desire it least, and if they desired
it, would be incapable of finding the way to it by their own lights. It will continually
happen, on the voluntary system, that the end not being desired, the means will not
be provided at all, or that, the persons requiring improvement having an imperfect
or altogether erroneous conception of what they want, the supply called forth by the
demand of the market will be anything but what is really required. Now any well-intentioned
and tolerably civilized government may think, without presumption, that it does or
ought to possess a degree of cultivation above the average of the community which
it rules, and that it should therefore be capable of offering better education and
better instruction to the people, than the greater number of them would spontaneously
demand. Education, therefore, is one of those things which it is admissible in principle
that a government should provide for the people. The case is one to which the reasons
of the non.interference principle do not necessarily or universally extend.(5*)

With regard to elementary education, the exception to ordinary rules may, I conceive,
justifiably be carried still further. There are certain primary elements and means
of knowledge, which it is in the highest degree desirable that all human beings born
into the community should acquire during childhood. If their parents, or those on
whom they depend, have the power of obtaining for them this instruction, and fail
to do it, they commit a double breach of duty, towards the children themselves, and
towards the members of the community generally, who are all liable to suffer seriously
from the Consequences of ignorance and want of education in their fellow-citizens.
It is therefore an allowable exercise of the powers of government, to impose on parents
the legal obligation of giving elementary instruction to children. This, however,
cannot fairly be done, without taking measures to insure that such instruction shall
be always accessible to them, either gratuitously or at a trifling expense.

It may indeed be objected that the education of children is one of those expenses
which parents, even of the labouring class, ought to defray; that it is desirable
that they should feel it incumbent on them to provide by their own means for the fulfilment
of their duties, and that by giving education at the cost of others, just as much
by giving subsistence, the standard of necessary wages is proportionally lowered,
and the springs of exertion and self-restraint is so much relaxed. This argument could,
at best, be only valid if the question were that of substituting a public provision
for what individuals would otherwise do for themselves; if all parents in the labouring
class recognized and practised the duty of giving instruction to their children at
their own expense. But inasmuch as parents do not practise this duty, and do not include
education among those necessary expenses which their wages must provide for, therefore
the general rate of wages is not high enough to bear those expenses, and they must
be borne from some other source. And this is not one of the cases in which the tender
of help perpetuates the state of things which renders help necessary. Instruction,
when it is really such, does not enervate, but strengthens as well as enlarges the
active faculties: in whatever manner acquired, its effect on the mind is favourable
to the spirit of independence: and when, unless had gratuitously, it would not be
had at all, help in this form has the opposite tendency to that which in so many other
cases makes it objectionable; it is help towards doing without help.

In England, and most European countries, elementary instruction cannot be paid for,
at its full cost, from the common wages of unskilled labour, and would not if it could.
The alternative, therefore, is not between government and private speculation, but
between a government provision and voluntary charity: between interference by government,
and interference by associations of individuals, subscribing their own money for the
purpose, like the two great School Societies. It is, of course, not desirable that
anything should be done by funds derived from compulsory taxation, which is already
sufficiently well done by individual liberality. How far this is the case with school
instruction, is, in each particular instance, a question of fact. The education provided
in this country on the voluntary principle has of late been so much discussed, that
it is needless in this place to criticize it minutely, and I shall merely express
my conviction, that even in quantity it is, and is likely to remain, altogether insufficient,
while in quality, though with some slight tendency to improvement, it is never good
except by some rare accident, and generally so bad as to be little more than nominal.
I hold it therefore the duty of the government to supply the defect, by giving pecuniary
support to elementary schools, such as to render them accessible to all the children
of the poor, either freely, or for a payment too inconsiderable to be sensibly felt.

One thing must be strenuously insisted on; that the government must claim no monopoly
for its education, either in the lower or in the higher branches; must exert neither
authority nor influence to induce the people to resort to its teachers in preference
to others, and must confer no peculiar advantages on those who have been instructed
by them. Though the government teachers will probably be superior to the average of
private instructors, they will not embody all the knowledge and sagacity to be found
in all instructors taken together, and it is desirable to leave open as many roads
as possible to the desired end. It is not endurable that a government should, either
de jure or de facto, have a complete control over the education of the people. To
possess such a control, and actually exert it, is to be despotic. A government which
can mould the opinions and sentiments of the people from their youth upwards, can
do with them whatever it pleases. Though a government, therefore, may, and in many
cases ought to, establish schools and colleges, it must neither compel nor bribe any
person to come to them; nor ought the power of individuals to set up rival establishments,
to depend in any degree upon its authorization. It would be justified in requiring
from all the people that they shall possess instruction in certain things, but not
in prescribing to them how or from whom they shall obtain it.

9. In the matter of education, the intervention of government is justifiable, because
the case is not one in which the interest and judgment of the consumer are a sufficient
security for the goodness of the commodity. Let us now consider another class of cases,
where there is no person in the situation of a consumer, and where the interest and
judgment to be relied on are those of the agent himself; as in the conduct of any
business in which he is exclusively interested, or in entering into any contract or
engagement by which he himself is to be bound.

The ground of the practical principle of non-interference must here be, that most
persons take a juster and more intelligent view of their own interest, and of the
means of promoting it, than can either be prescribed to them by a general enactment
of the legislature, or pointed out in the particular case by a public functionary.
The maxim is unquestionably sound as a general rule; but there is no difficulty in
perceiving some very large and conspicuous exceptions to it. These may be classed
under several heads.

First: -- The individual who is presumed to be the best judge of his own interests
may be incapable of judging or acting for himself; may be a lunatic, an idiot, an
infant: or though not wholly incapable, may be of immature years and judgment. In
this case the foundation of the laisser.faire principle breaks down entirely. The
person most interested is not the best judge of the matter, nor a competent judge
at all. Insane persons are everywhere regarded as proper objects of the care of the
state.(6*) In the case of children and young persons, it is common to say, that though
they cannot judge for themselves, they have their parents or other relatives to judge
for them. But this removes the question into a different category; making it no longer
a question whether the government should interfere with individuals in the direction
of their own conduct and interests, but whether it should leave absolutely in their
power the conduct and interests of somebody else. Parental power is as susceptible
of abuse as any other power, and is, as a matter of fact, constantly abused. If laws
do not succeed in preventing parents from brutally ill-treating, and even from murdering
their children, far less ought it to be presumed that the interests of children will
never be sacrificed, in more commonplace and less revolting ways, to the selfishness
or the ignorance of their parents. Whatever it can be clearly seen that parents ought
to do or forbear for the interest of children, the law is warranted, if it is able,
in compelling to be done or forborne, and is generally bound to do so. To take an
example from the peculiar province of political economy; it is right that children,
and young persons not yet arrived at maturity, should be protected so far as the eye
and hand of the state can reach, from being over-worked. Labouring for too many hours
in the day, or on work beyond their strength, should not be permitted to them, for
if permitted it may always be compelled. Freedom, of contract, in the case of children,
is but another word for freedom of coercion. Education also, the best which circumstances
admit of their receiving, is not a thing which parents or relatives, from indifference,
jealousy, or avarice, should have it in their power to withhold.

The reasons for legal intervention in favour of children, apply not less strongly
to the case of those unfortunate slaves and victims of the most brutal part of mankind,
the lower animals. It is by the grossest misunderstanding of the principles of liberty,
that the infliction of exemplary punishment on ruffianism practised towards these
defenceless creatures, has been treated as a meddling by government with things beyond
its province; an interference with domestic life. The domestic life of domestic tyrants
is one of the things which it is the most imperative on the law to interfere with;
and it is to be regretted that metaphysical scruples respecting the nature and source
of the authority of government, should induce many warm supporters of laws against
cruelty to animals, to seek for a justification of such laws in the incidental consequences
of the indulgence of ferocious habits to the interests of human beings, rather than
in the intrinsic merits of the case itself. What it would be the duty of a human being,
possessed of the requisite physical strength, to prevent by force if attempted in
his presence, it cannot be less incumbent on society generally to repress. The existing
laws of England on the subject are chiefly defective in the trifling, often almost
nominal, maximum, to which the penalty even in the worst cases is limited.

Among those members of the community whose freedom of contract ought to be controlled
by the legislature for their own protection, on account (it is said) of their dependent
position, it is frequently proposed to include women: and in the existing Factory
Acts, their labour, in common with that of young persons, has been placed under peculiar
restrictions. But the classing together, for this and other purposes, of women and
children, appears to me both indefensible in principle and mischievous in practice.
Children below a certain age cannot judge or act for themselves; up to a considerably
greater age they are inevitably more or less disqualified for doing so; but women
are as capable as men of appreciating and managing their own concerns, and the only
hindrance to their doing so arises from the injustice of their present social position.
When the law makes everything which the wife acquires, the property of the husband,
while by compelling her to live with him it forces her to submit to almost any amount
of moral and even physical tyranny which he may chose to inflict, there is some ground
for regarding every act done by her as done under coercion: but it is the great error
of reformers and philanthropists in our time, to nibble at the consequences of unjust
power, instead of redressing the injustice itself. If women had as absolute a control
as men have, over their own persons and their own patrimony or acquisitions, there
would be no plea for limiting their hours of labouring for themselves, in order that
they might have time to labour for the husband, in what is called, by the advocates
of restriction, his home. Women employed in factories are the only women in the labour.
ing rank of life whose position is not that of slaves and drudges; precisely because
they cannot easily be compelled to work and earn wages in factories against their
will. For improving the condition of women, it should, in the contrary, be an object
to give them the readiest access to independent industrial employment, instead of
closing, either entirely or partially, that which is already open to them.

10. A second exception to the doctrine that individuals are the best judges of their
own interest, is when an individual attempts to decide irrevocably now, what will
be best for his interest at some future and distant time. The presumption in favour
of individual judgment is only legitimate, where the judgment is grounded on actual,
and especially on present, personal experience; not where it is formed antecedently
to experience, and not suffered to be reversed even after experience has condemned
it. When persons have bound themselves by a contract, not simply to do some one thing,
but to continue doing something for ever or for a prolonged period, without any power
of revoking the engagement, the presumption which their perseverance in that course
of conduct would otherwise raise in favour of its being advantageous to them, does
not exist; and any such presumption which can be grounded on their having voluntarily
entered into the contract, perhaps at an early age, and without any real knowledge
of what they undertook, is commonly next to null. The practical maxim of leaving contracts
free, is not applicable without great limitations in case of engagement in perpetuity;
and the law should be extremely jealous of such engagements; should refuse its sanction
to them, when the obligations they impose are such as the contracting party cannot
be a competent judge of; if it ever does sanction them, it should take every possible
security for their being contracted with foresight and deliberation; and in compensation
for not permitting the parties themselves to revoke their engagement, should grant
them a release from it, on a sufficient case being made out before an impartial authority.
These considerations are eminently applicable to marriage, the most important of all
cases of engagement for life.

11. The third exception which I shall notice, to the doctrine that government cannot
manage the affairs of individuals as well as the individuals themselves, has reference
to the great class of cases in which the individuals can only manage the concern by
delegated agency, and in which the so-called private management is, in point of fact,
hardly better entitled to be called management by the persons interested, than administration
by a public officer. Whatever, if left to spontaneous agency, can only be done by
joint-stock associations, will often be as well, and sometimes better done, as far
as the actual work is concerned, by the state. Government management is, indeed, proverbially
jobbing, careless, and ineffective, but so likewise has generally been joint-stock
management. The directors of a joint.stock company, it is true, are always shareholders;
but also the members of a government are invariably taxpayers; and in the case of
directors, no more than in that of governments, is their proportional share of the
benefits of good management, equal to the interest they may possibly have in mismanagement,
even without reckoning the interest of their case. It may be objected, that the shareholders,
in their collective character, exercise a certain control over the directors, and
have almost always full power to remove them from office. Practically, however, the
difficulty of exercising this power is found to be so great, that it is hardly ever
exercised except in cases of such flagrantly unskilful, or, at least, unsuccessful
management, as would generally produce the ejection from office of managers appointed
by the government. Against the very ineffectual security afforded by meetings of shareholders,
and by their individual inspection and inquiries, may be placed the greater publicity
and more active discussion and comment, to be expected in free countries with regard
to affairs in which the general government takes part. The defects, therefore, of
government management, do not seem to be necessarily much greater, if necessarily
greater at all, than those of management by joint-stock.

The true reasons in favour of leaving to voluntary associations all such things as
they are competent to perform, would exist in equal strength if it were certain that
the work itself would be as well or better done by public officers. These reasons
have been already pointed out: the mischief of overloading the chief functionaries
of government with demands on their attention, and diverting them from duties which
they alone can discharge, to objects which can be sufficiently well attained without
them; the danger of unnecessarily swelling the direct power and in. direct influence
of government, and multiplying occasions of collision between its agents and private
citizens; and the inexpediency of concentrating in a dominant bureaucracy, all the
skill and experience in the management of large interests, and all the power of organized
action, existing in the community; a practice which keeps the citizens in a relation
to the government like that of children to their guardians, and is a main cause of
the inferior capacity for political life which has hitherto characterized the over-governed
countries of the Continent, whether with or without the forms of representative government.(7*)
But although, for these reasons, most things which are likely to be even tolerably
done by voluntary associations, should, generally speaking, be left to them; it does
not follow that the manner in which those associations perform their work should be
entirely uncontrolled by the government. There are many cases in which the agency,
of whatever nature, by which a service is performed, is certain, from the nature of
the case, to be virtually single; in which a practical monopoly, with all the power
it confers of taxing the community, cannot be prevented from existing. I have already
more than once adverted to the case of the gas and water companies, among which, though
perfect freedom is allowed to competition, none really takes place, and practically
they are found to be even more irresponsible, and unapproachable by individual complaints,
than the government. There are the expenses without the advantages of plurality of
agency; and the charge made for services which cannot be dispensed with, is, in substance,
quite as much compulsory taxation as if imposed by law; there are few householders
who make any distinction between their 'water rate' and other local taxes. In the
case of these particular services, the reasons preponderate in favour of their being
performed, like the paving and cleansing of the streets, not certainly by the general
government of the state, but by the municipal authorities of the town, and the expense
defrayed, as even now it in fact is, by a local rate. But in the many analogous cases
which it is best to resign to voluntary agency, the community needs some other security
for the fit performance of the service than the interest of the managers; and it is
the part of the government, either to subject the business to reasonable conditions
for the general advantage, or to retain such power over it, that the profits of the
monopoly may at least be obtained for the public. This applies in the case of a road,
a canal, or a railway. These are always, in a great degree, practical monopolies;
and a government which concedes such monopoly unreservedly to a private company, does
much the same thing as if it allowed an individual or an association to levy any tax
they chose, for their own benefit, on all the malt produced in the country, or on
all the cotton imported into it. To make the concession for a limited time is generally
justifiable, on the principle which justifies patents for invention: but the state
should either reserve to itself a reversionary property in such public works, or should
retain, and freely exercise, the right of fixing a maximum of fares and charges, and,
from time to time, varying that maximum. It is perhaps necessary to remark, that the
state may be the proprietor of canals or railways without itself working them; and
that they will almost always be better worked by means of a company, renting the railway
or canal for a limited period from the state.

12. To a fourth case of exception I must request particular attention, it being one
to which as it appears to me, the attention of political economists has not yet been
sufficiently drawn. There are matters in which the interference of law is required,
not to overrule the judgment of individuals respecting their own interest, but to
give effect to that judgment: they being unable to give effect to it except by concert,
which concert again cannot be effectual unless it receives validity and sanction from
the law. For illustration, and without prejudging the particular point, I may advert
to the question of diminishing the hours of labour. Let us suppose, what is at least
supposable, whether it be the fact or not -- that a general reduction of the hours
of factory labour, say from ten to nine, would be for the advantage of the workpeople:
that they would receive as high wages, or nearly as high, for nine hours. labour as
they receive for ten. If this would be the result, and if the operatives generally
are convinced that it would, the limitation, some may say, will be adopted spontaneously.
I answer, that it will not be adopted unless the body of operatives bind themselves
to one another to abide by it. A workman who refused to work more than nine hours
while there were others who worked ten, would either not be employed at all, or if
employed, must submit to lose one-tenth of his wages. However convinced, therefore,
he may be that it is the interest of the class to work short time, it is contrary
to his own interest to set the example, unless he is well assured that all or most
others will follow it. But suppose a general agreement of the whole class: might not
this be effectual without the sanction of law? Not unless enforced by opinion with
a rigour practically equal to that of law. For however beneficial the observance of
the regulation might be to the class collectively, the immediate interest of every
individual would lie in violating it: and the more numerous those were who adhered
to the rule, the more would individuals gain by departing from it. If nearly all restricted
themselves to nine hours, those who chose to work for ten would gain all the advantages
of the restriction, together with the profit from infringing it; they would get ten
hours' wages for nine hours' work, and an hour's wages besides. I grant that if a
large majority adhered to the nine hours, there would be no harm done; the benefit
would be, in the main, secured to the class, while those individuals who preferred
to work harder and earn more, would have an opportunity of doing so. This certainly
would be the state of things to be wished, for; and assuming that a reduction of hours
without any diminution of wages could take place without expelling the commodity from
some of its markets -- which is in every particular instance a question of fact, not
of principle -- the manner in which it would be most desirable that this effect should
be brought about, would be by a quiet change in the general custom of the trade; short
hours becoming, by spontaneous choice, the general practice, but those who chose to
deviate from it having the fullest liberty to do so. Probably, however, so many would
prefer the ten hours' work on the improved terms, that the limitation could not be
maintained as a general practice: what some did from choice, others would soon be
obliged to do from necessity, and those who had chosen long hours for the sake of
increased wages, would be forced in the end to work long hours for no greater wages
than before. Assuming then that it really would be the interest of each to work only
nine hours if he could be assured that all others would do the same, there might be
no means of attaining this object but by converting their supposed mutual agreement
into an engagement under penalty, by consenting to have it enforced by law. I am not
expressing any opinion in favour of such an enactment, which has never in this country
been demanded, and which I certainly should not, in present circumstances, recommend:
but it serves to exemplify the manner in which classes of persons may need the assistance
of law, to give effect to their deliberate collective opinion of their own interest,
by affording to every individual a guarantee that his competitors will pursue the
same course, without which he cannot safely adopt it himself.

Another exemplification of the same principle is afforded by what is known as the
Wakefield system of colonization. This system is grounded on the important principle,
that the degree of productiveness of land and labour depends on their being in a due
proportion to one another; that if a few persons in a newly-settled country attempt
to occupy and appropriate a large district, or if each labourer becomes too soon an
occupier and cultivator of land, there is a loss of productive power, and a great
retardation of the progress of the colony in wealth and civilization: that nevertheless
the instinct (as it may almost be called) of appropriation, and the feelings associated
in old countries with landed proprietorship, induce almost every emigrant to take
possession of as much land as he has the means of acquiring, and every labourer to
become at once a proprietor, cultivating his own land with no other aid than that
of his family. If this propensity to the immediate possession of land could be in
some degree restrained, and each labourer induced to work a certain number of years
on hire before he became a landed proprietor, a perpetual stock of hired labourers
could be maintained, available for roads, canals, works of irrigation, &c., and for
the establishment and carrying on of the different branches of town industry; whereby
the labourer, when he did at last become a landed proprietor, would find his land
much more valuable, through access to markets, and facility of obtaining hired labour.
Mr Wakefield therefore proposed to check the premature occupation of land, and dispersion
of the people, by putting upon all unappropriated lands a rather high price, the proceeds
of which were to be expended in conveying emigrant labourers from the mother country.

This salutary provision, however, has been objected to, in the name and on the authority
of what was represented as the great principle of political economy, that individuals
are the best judges of their own interest. It was said, that when things are left
to themselves, land is appropriated and occupied by the spontaneous choice of individuals,
in the quantities and at the times most advantageous to each person, and therefore
to the community generally; and that to interpose artificial obstacles to their obtaining
land, is to prevent them from adopting the course which in their own judgment is most
beneficial to them, from a self.conceited notion of the legislator, that he knows
what is most for their interest, better than they do themselves. Now this is a complete
misunderstanding, either of the system itself, or of the principle with which it is
alleged to conflict. The oversight is similar to that which we have just seen exemplified
on the subject of hours of labour. However beneficial it might be to the colony in
the aggregate, and to each individual composing it, that no one should occupy more
land than he can properly cultivate, nor become a proprietor until there are other
labourers ready to take his place in working for hire; it can never be the interest
of an individual to exercise this forbearance, unless he is assured that others will
do so too. Surrounded by settlers who have each their thousand acres, how is he benefited
by restricting himself to fifty? or what does a labourer gain by deferring the acquisition
altogether for a few years, if all other labourers rush to convert their first earnings
into estates in the wilderness, several miles apart from one another? If they, by
seizing on land, prevent the formation of a class of labourers for wages, he will
not, by postponing the time of his becoming a proprietor, be enabled to employ the
land with any greater advantage when he does obtain it; to what end therefore should
he place himself in what will appear to him and others a position of inferiority,
by remaining a hired labourer, when all around him are proprietors? It is the interest
of each to do what is good for all, but only if others will do likewise.

The principle that each is the best judge of his own interest, understood as these
objectors understand it, would prove that governments ought not to fulfil any of their
acknowledged duties -- ought not, in fact, to exist at all. It is greatly the interest
of the community, collectively and individually, not to rob or defraud one another.
but there is not the less necessity for laws to punish robbery and fraud; because,
though it is the interest of each that nobody should rob or cheat, it is not any one's
interest to refrain from robbing and cheating others when all others are permitted
to rob and cheat him. Penal laws exist at all, chiefly for this reason -- because
even an unanimous opinion that a certain line of conduct is for the general interest,
does not always make it people's individual interest to adhere to that line of conduct.

13. Fifthly; the argument against government interference grounded on the maxim that
individuals are the best judges of their own interest, cannot apply to the very large
class of cases, in which those acts of individuals with which the government claims
to interfere, are not done by those individuals for their own interest, but for the
interest of other people. This includes, among other things, the important and much
agitated subject of public charity. Though individuals should, in general, be left
to do for themselves whatever it can reasonably be expected that they should be capable
of doing, yet when they are at any rate not to be left to themselves, but to be helped
by other people, the question arises whether it is better that they should receive
this help exclusively from individuals, and therefore uncertainly and casually, or
by systematic arrangements, in which society acts through its organ, the state.

This brings us to the subject of Poor Laws; a subject which would be of very minor
importance if the habits of all classes of the people were temperate and prudent,
and the diffusion of property satisfactory; but of the greatest moment in a state
of things so much the reverse of this, in both points, as that which the British islands
present.

Apart from any metaphysical considerations respecting the foundation of morals or
of the social union, it will be admitted to be right that human beings should help
one another; and the more so, in proportion to the urgency of the need: and none needs
help so urgently as one who is starving. The claim to help, therefore, created by
destitution, is one of the strongest which can exist; and there is prima facie the
amplest reason for making the relief of so extreme an exigency as certain to those
who require it, as by any arrangements of society it can be made.

On the other hand, in all cases of helping, there are two sets of consequences to
be considered; the consequences of the assistance, and the consequences of relying
on the assistance. The former are generally beneficial, but the latter, for the most
part, injurious; so much so, in many cases, as greatly to outweigh the value of the
benefit. And this is never more likely to happen than in the very cases where the
need of help is the most intense. There are few things for which it is more mischievous
that people should rely on the habitual aid of others, than for the means of subsistence,
and unhappily there is no lesson which they more easily learn. The problem to be solved
is therefore one of peculiar nicety as well as importance; how to give the greatest
amount of needful help, with the smallest encouragement to undue reliance on it.

Energy and self-dependence are, however, liable to be impaired by the absence of help,
as well as by its excess. It is even more fatal to exertion to have no hope of succeeding
by it, than to be assured of succeeding without it. When the condition of any one
is so disastrous that his energies are paralysed by discouragement, assistance is
a tonic, not a sedative: it braces instead of deadening the active faculties: always
provided that the assistance is not such as to dispense with self-help, by substituting
itself for the person's own labour, skill, and prudence, but is limited to affording
him a better hope of attaining success by those legitimate means. This accordingly
is a test to which all plans of philanthropy and benevolence should be brought, whether
intended for the benefit of individuals or of classes, and whether conducted on the
voluntary or on the government principle.

In so far as the subject admits of any general doctrine or maxim, it would appear
to be this -- that if assistance is given in such a manner that the condition of the
person helped is as desirable as that of the person who succeeds in doing the same
thing without help, the assistance, if capable of being previously calculated on,
is mischievous: but if, while available to every. body, it leaves to every one a strong
motive to do without it if he can, it is then for the most part beneficial. This principle,
applied to a system of public charity, is that of the Poor Law of 1834. If the condition
of a person receiving relief is made as eligible as that of the labourer who supports
himself by his own exertions, the system strikes at the root of all individual industry
and self-government; and, if fully acted up to, would require as its supplement an
organized system of compulsion, for governing and setting to work like cattle, those
who had been removed from the influence of the motives that act on human beings. But
if, consistently with guaranteeing all persons against absolute want, the condition
of those who are supported by legal charity can be kept considerably less desirable
than the condition of those who find support for themselves, none but beneficial consequences
can arise from a law which renders it impossible for any person, except by his own
choice, to die from insufficiency of food. That in England at least this supposition
can be realized, is proved by the experience of a long period preceding the close
of the last century, as well as by that of many highly pauperized districts in more
recent times, which have been dispauperized by adopting strict rules of poor-law administration,
to the great and permanent benefit of the whole labouring class. There is probably
no country in which, by varying the means suitably to the character of the people,
a legal provision for the destitute might not be made compatible with the observance
of the conditions necessary to its being innocuous.

Subject to these conditions, I conceive it to be highly desirable, that the certainty
of subsistence should be held out by law to the destitute able-bodied, rather than
that their relief should depend on voluntary charity. In the first place, charity
almost always does too much or too little: it lavishes its bounty in one place, and
leaves people to starve in another. Secondly, since the state must necessarily provide
subsistence for the criminal poor while undergoing punishment, not to do the same
for the poor who have not offended is to give a premium on crime. And lastly, if the
poor are left to individual charity, a vast amount of mendacity is inevitable. What
the state may and should abandon to private charity, is the task of distinguishing
between one case of real necessity and another. Private charity can give more to the
more deserving. The state must act by general rules. It cannot undertake to discriminate
between the deserving and the undeserving indigent. It owes no more than subsistence
to the first, and can give no less to the last. What is said about the injustice of
a law which has no better treatment for the merely unfortunate poor than for the ill-conducted,
is founded on a misconception of the province of law and public authority. The dispensers
of public relief have no business to be inquisitors. Guardians and overseers are not
fit to be trusted to give or withhold other people's money according to their verdict
on the morality of the person soliciting it; and it would show much ignorance of the
ways of mankind to suppose that such persons, even in the almost impossible case of
their being qualified, will take the trouble of ascertaining and sifting the past
conduct of a person in distress, so as to form a rational judgment on it. Private
charity can make these distinctions; and in bestowing its own money, is entitled to
do so according to its own judgment. It should understand that this is its peculiar
and appropriate province, and that it is commendable or the contrary, as it exercises
the function with more or less discernment. But the administrators of a public fund
ought not to be required to do more for anybody, than that minimum which is due even
to the worst. If they are, the indulgence very speedily becomes the rule, and refusal
the more or less capricious or tyrannical exception.

14. Another class of cases which fall within the same general principle as the case
of public charity, are those in which the acts done by individuals, though intended
solely for their own benefit, involve consequences extending indefinitely beyond them,
to interests of the nation or of posterity, for which society in its collective capacity
is alone able, and alone bound, to provide. One of these cases is that of Colonization.
If it is desirable, as no one will deny it to be, that the planting of colonies should
be conducted, not with an exclusive view to the private interests of the first founders,
but with a deliberate regard to the permanent welfare of the nations afterwards to
arise from these small beginnings; such regard can only be secured by placing the
enterprise, from its commencement, under regulations constructed with the foresight
and enlarged views of philosophical legislators; and the government alone has power
either to frame such regulations, or to enforce their observance.

The question of government intervention in the work of Colonization involves the future
and permanent interests of civilization itself, and far outstretches the comparatively
narrow limits of purely economical considerations. But even with a view to those considerations
alone, the removal of population from the overcrowded to the unoccupied parts of the
earth's surface is one of those works of eminent social usefulness, which most require,
and which at the same time best repay, the intervention of government.

To appreciate the benefits of colonization, it should be considered in its relation,
not to a single country, but to the collective economical interests of the human race.
The question is in general treated too exclusively as one of distribution; of relieving
one labour market and supplying another. It is this, but it is also a question of
production, and of the most efficient employment of the productive resources of the
world. Much has been said of the good economy of importing commodities from the place
where they can be bought cheapest; while the good economy of producing them where
they can be produced cheapest, is comparatively little thought of. If to carry consumable
goods from the places where they are superabundant to those where they are scarce,
is a good pecuniary speculation, is it not an equally good speculation to do the same
thing with regard to labour and instruments? The exportation of labourers and capital
from old to new countries, from a place where their productive power is less, to a
place where it is greater, increases by so much the aggregate produce of the labour
and capital of the world. It adds to the joint wealth of the old and the new country,
what amounts in a short period to many times the mere cost of effecting the transport.
There needs be no hesitation in affirming that Colonization, in the present state
of the world, is the best affair of business, in which the capital of an old and wealthy
country can engage.

It is equally obvious, however, that Colonization on a great scale can be undertaken,
as an affair of business, only by the government, or by some combination of individuals
in complete understanding with the government; except under such very peculiar circumstances
as those which succeeded the Irish famine. Emigration on the voluntary principle rarely
has any material influence in lightening the pressure of population in the old country,
though as far as it goes it is doubtless a benefit to the colony. Those labouring
persons who voluntarily emigrate are seldom the very poor; they are small farmers
with some little capital, or labourers who have saved something, and who, in removing
only their own labour from the crowded labour market, withdraw from the capital of
the country a fund which maintained and employed more labourers than themselves. Besides,
this portion of the community is so limited in number, that it might be removed entirely,
without making any sensible impression upon the numbers of the population, or even
upon the annual increase. Any considerable emigration of labour is only practicable,
when its cost is defrayed, or at least advanced, by others than the emigrants themselves.
Who then is to advance it? Naturally, it may be said, the capitalists of the colony,
who require the labour, and who intend to employ it. But to this there is the obstacle,
that a capitalist, after going to the expense of carrying out labourers, has no security
that he shall be the person to derive any benefit from them. If all the capitalists
of the colony were to combine, and bear the expense by subscription, they would still
have no security that the labourers, when there, would continue to work for them.
After working for a short time and earning a few pounds, they always, unless prevented
by the government, squat on unoccupied land, and work only for themselves. The experiment
has been repeatedly tried whether it was possible to enforce contracts for labour,
or the repayment of the passage money of emigrants to those who advanced it, and the
trouble and expense have always exceeded the advantage. The only other resource is
the voluntary contributions of parishes or individuals, to rid themselves of surplus
labourers who are already, or who are likely to become, locally chargeable on the
poor.rate. Were this speculation to become general, it might produce a sufficient
amount of emigration to clear off the existing unemployed population, but not to raise
the wages of the employed: and the same thing would require to be done over again
in less than another generation.

One of the principal reasons why Colonization should be a national undertaking, is
that in this manner alone, save in highly exceptional cases, can emigration be self-supporting.
The exportation of capital and labour to a new country being, as before observed,
one of the best of all affairs of business, it is absurd that it should not, like
other affairs of business, repay its own expenses. Of the great addition which it
makes to the produce of the world, there can be no reason why a sufficient portion
should not be intercepted, and employed in reimbursing the outlay incurred in effecting
it. For reasons already given, no individual, or body of individuals, can reimburse
themselves for the expense; the government, however, can. It can take from the annual
increase of wealth, caused by the emigration, the fraction which suffices to repay
with interest what the emigration has cost. The expenses of emigration to a colony
ought to be borne by the colony; and this, in general, is only possible when they
are borne by the colonial government.

Of the modes in which a fund for the support of colonization can be raised in the
colony, none is comparable in advantage to that which was first suggested, and so
ably and perseveringly advocated, by Mr Wakefield: the plan of putting a price on
all unoccupied land, and devoting the proceeds to emigration. The unfounded and pedantic
objections to this plan have been answered in a former part of this chapter: we have
now to speak of its advantages. First, it avoids the difficulties and discontents
incident to raising a large annual amount by taxation; a thing which is almost useless
to attempt with a scattered population of settlers in the wilderness, who, as experience
proves, can seldom be compelled to pay direct taxes, except at a cost exceeding their
amount; while in an infant community indirect taxation soon reaches its limit. The
sale of lands is thus by far the easiest mode of raising the requisite funds. But
it has other and still greater recommendations. It is a beneficial check upon the
tendency of a population of colonists to adopt the tastes and inclinations of savage
life, and to disperse so widely as to lose all the advantages of commerce, of markets,
of separation of employments, and combination of labour. By making it necessary for
those who emigrate at the expense of the fund, to earn a considerable sum before they
can become landed proprietors, it keeps up a perpetual succession of labourers for
hire, who in every country are a most important auxiliary even to peasant proprietors:
and by diminishing the eagerness of agricultural speculators to add to their domain,
it keeps the settlers within reach of each other for purposes of co-operation, arranges
a numerous body of them within easy distance of each centre of foreign commerce and
non-agricultural industry, and insures the formation and rapid growth of towns and
town products. This concentration, compared with the dispersion which uniformly occurs
when unoccupied land can be had for nothing, greatly accelerates the attainment of
prosperity, and enlarges the fund which may be drawn upon for further emigration.
Before the adoption of the Wakefield system, the early years of all new colonies were
full of hardship and difficulty: the last colony founded on the old principle, the
Swan River settlement, being one of the most characteristic instances. In all subsequent
colonization, the Wakefield principle has been acted upon, though imperfectly, a part
only of the proceeds of the sale of land being devoted to emigration: yet wherever
it has been introduced at all, as in South Australia, Victoria, and New Zealand, the
restraint put upon the dispersion of the settlers, and the influx of capital caused
by the assurance of being able to obtain hired labour, has, in spite of many difficulties
and much mismanagement, produced a suddenness and rapidity of prosperity more like
fable than reality.(8*)

The self-supporting system of Colonization, once established, would increase in efficiency
every year; its effect would tend to increase in geometrical progression: for since
every able-bodied emigrant, until the country is fully peopled, adds in a very short
time to its wealth, over and above his own consumption, as much as would defray the
expense of bringing out another emigrant, it follows that the greater the number already
sent, the greater number might continue to be sent, each emigrant laying the foundation
of a succession of other emigrants at short intervals without fresh expense, until
the colony is filled up. It would therefore be worth while, to the mother country,
to accelerate the early stages of this progression, by loans to the colonies for the
purpose of emigration, repayable from the fund formed by the sales of land. In thus
advancing the means of accomplishing a large immediate emigration, it would be investing
that amount of capital in the mode, of all others, most beneficial to the colony;
and the labour and savings of these emigrants would hasten the period at which a large
sum would be available from sales of land. It would be necessary, in order not to
overstock the labour market, to act in concert with the persons disposed to remove
their own capital to the colony. The knowledge that a large amount of hired labour
would be available, in so productive a field of employment, would insure a large emigration
of capital from a country, like England, of low profits and rapid accumulation: and
it would only be necessary not to send out a greater number of labourers at one time,
than this capital could absorb and employ at high wages.

Inasmuch as, on this system, any given amount of expenditure, once incurred, would
provide not merely a single emigration, but a perpetually flowing stream of emigrants,
which would increase in breadth and depth as it flowed on; this mode of relieving
overpopulation has a recommendation, not possessed by any other plan ever proposed
for making head against the consequences of increase without restraining the increase
itself: there is an element of indefiniteness in it; no one can perfectly foresee
how far its influence, as a vent for surplus population, might possibly reach. There
is hence the strongest obligation on the government of a country like our own, with
a crowded population, and unoccupied continents under its command, to build, as it
were, and keep open, in concert with the colonial governments, a bridge from the mother
country to those continents, by establishing the self-supporting system of colonization
on such a scale, that as great an amount of emigration as the colonies can at the
time accommodate, may at all times be able to take place without cost to the emigrants
themselves.

The importance of these considerations, as regards the British islands, has been of
late considerably diminished by the unparalleled amount of spontaneous emigration
from Ireland; an emigration not solely of small farmers, but of the poorest class
of agricultural labourers, and which is at once voluntary and self-supporting, the
succession of emigrants being kept up by funds contributed from the earnings of their
relatives and connexions who had gone before. To this has been added a large amount
of voluntary emigration to the seats of the gold discoveries, which has partly supplied
the wants of our most distant colonies, where, both for local and national interests,
it was most of all required. But the stream of both these emigrations has already
considerably slackened, and though that from Ireland has since partially revived,
it is not certain that the aid of government in a systematic form, and on the self-supporting
principle, will not again become necessary to keep the communication open between
the hands needing work in England, and the work which needs hands elsewhere.

15. The same principle which points out colonization, and the relief of the indigent,
as cases to which the principal objection to government interference does not apply,
extends also to a variety of cases, in which important public services are to be performed,
while yet there is no individual specially interested in performing them, nor would
any adequate remuneration naturally or spontaneously attend their performance. Take
for instance a voyage of geographical or scientific exploration. The information sought
may be of great public value, yet no individual would derive any benefit from it which
would repay the expense of fitting out the expedition; and there is no mode of intercepting
the benefit on its way to those who profit by it, in order to levy a toll for the
remuneration of its authors. Such voyages are, or might be, undertaken by private
subscription; but this is a rare and precarious resource. Instances are more frequent
in which the expense has been borne by public companies or philanthropic associations;
but in general such enterprises have been conducted at the expense of government,
which is thus enabled to entrust them to the persons in its judgment best qualified
for the task. Again, it is a proper office of government to build and maintain lighthouses,
establish buoys, &c. for the security of navigation: for since it is impossible that
the ships at sea which are benefited by a lighthouse, should be made to pay a toll
on the occasion of its use, no one would build lighthouses from motives of personal
interest, unless indemnified and rewarded from a compulsory levy made by the state.
There are many scientific researches, of great value to a nation and to mankind, requiring
assiduous devotion of time and labour, and not unfrequently great expense, by persons
who can obtain a high price for their services in other ways. If the government had
no power to grant indemnity for expense, and remuneration for time and labour thus
employed, such researches could only be undertaken by the very few persons who, with
an independent fortune, unite technical knowledge, laborious habits, and either great
public spirit, or an ardent desire of scientific celebrity.

Connected with this subject is the question of providing, by means of endowments or
salaries, for the maintenance of what has been called a learned class. The cultivation
of speculative knowledge, though one of the most useful of all employments, is a service
rendered to a community collectively, not individually, and one consequently for which
it is, prima facie, reasonable that the community collectively should pay; since it
gives no claim on any individual for a pecuniary remuneration; and unless a provision
is made for such services from some public fund, there is not only no encouragement
to them, but there is as much discouragement as is implied in the impossibility of
gaining a living by such pursuits, and the necessity consequently imposed on most
of those who would be capable of them, to employ the greatest part of their time in
gaining a subsistence. The evil, however, is greater in appearance than in reality.
The greatest things, it has been said, have generally been done by those who had the
least time at their disposal; and the occupation of some hours every day in a routine
employment, has often been found compatible with the most brilliant achievements in
literature and philosophy. Yet there are investigations and experiments which require
not only a long but a continuous devotion of time and attention: there are also occupations
which so engross and fatigue the mental faculties, as to be inconsistent with any
vigorous employment of them upon other subjects, even in any intervals of leisure.
It is highly desirable, therefore, that there should be a mode of insuring to the
public the services of scientific discoverers, and perhaps of some other classes of
savants, by affording them the means of support consistently with devoting a sufficient
portion of time to their peculiar pursuits. The fellowships of the Universities are
an institution excellently adapted for such a purpose; but are hardly ever applied
to it, being bestowed, at the best, as a reward for past proficiency, in committing
to memory what has been done by others, and not as the salary of future labours in
the advancement of knowledge. In some countries, Academies of science, antiquities,
history, &c., have been formed, with emoluments annexed. The most effectual plan,
and at the same time least liable to abuse, seems to be that of conferring Professorships,
with duties of instruction attached to them. The occupation of teaching a branch of
knowledge, at least in its higher departments, is a help rather than an impediment
to the systematic cultivation of the subject itself. The duties of a professorship
almost always leave much time for original researches; and the greatest advances which
have been made in the various sciences, both moral and physical, have originated with
those who were public teachers of them; from Plato and Aristotle to the great names
of the Scotch, French, and German Universities. I do not mention the English, because
until very lately their professorships have been, as is well known, little more than
nominal. In the case, too, of a lecturer in a great institution of education, the
public at large has the means of judging, if not the quality of the teaching, at least
the talents and industry of the teacher; and it is more difficult to misemploy the
power of appointment to such an office, than to job in pensions and salaries to persons
not so directly before the public eye.

It may be said generally, that anything which it is desirable should be done for the
general interests of mankind or of future generations, or for the present interests
of those members of the community who require external aid but which is not of a nature
to remunerate individuals or associations for undertaking it, is in itself a suitable
thing to be undertaken by government: though, before making the work their own, governments
ought always to consider if there be any rational probability of its being done on
what is called the voluntary principle, and if so, whether it is likely to be done
in a better or more effectual manner by government agency, than by the zeal and liberality
of individuals.

16. The preceding heads comprise, to the best of my judgment, the whole of the exceptions
to the practical maxim, that the business of society can be best performed by private
and voluntary agency. It is, however, necessary to add, that the intervention of government
cannot always practically stop short at the limit which defines the cases intrinsically
suitable for it. In the particular circumstances of a given age or nation, there is
scarcely anything really important to the general interest, which it may not be desirable,
or even necessary, that the government should take upon itself, not because private
individuals cannot effectually perform it, but because they will not. At some times
and places, there will be no roads, docks, harbours, canals, works of irrigation,
hospitals, schools, colleges, printing-presses, unless the government establishes
them; the public being either too poor to command the necessary resources, or too
little advanced in intelligence to appreciate the ends, or not sufficiently practised
in joint action to be capable of the means. This is true, more or less, of all countries
inured to despotism, and particularly of those in which there is a very wide distance
in civilization between the people and the government: as in those which have been
conquered and are retained in subjection by a more energetic and more cultivated people.
In many parts of the world, the people can do nothing for themselves which requires
large means and combined action: all such things are left undone, unless done by the
state. In these cases, the mode in which the government can most surely demonstrate
the sincerity with which it intends the greatest good of its subjects, is by doing
the things which are made incumbent on it by the helplessness of the public, in such
a manner as shall tend not to increase and perpetuate, but to correct, that helplessness.
A good government will give all its aid in such a shape, as to encourage and nurture
any rudiments it may find of a spirit of individual exertion. It will be assiduous
in removing obstacles and discouragements to voluntary enterprise, and in giving whatever
facilities and whatever direction and guidance may be necessary: its pecuniary means
will be applied, when practicable, in aid of private efforts rather than in supersession
of them, and it will call into play its machinery of rewards and honours to elicit
such efforts. Government aid, when given merely in default of private enterprise,
should be so given as to be as far as possible a course of education for the people
in the art of accomplishing great objects by individual energy and voluntary co-operation.

I have not thought it necessary here to insist on that part of the functions of government
which all admit to be indispensable, the function of prohibiting and punishing such
conduct on the part of individuals in the exercise of their freedom, as is clearly
injurious to other persons, whether the case be one of force, fraud, or negligence.
Even in the best state which society has yet reached, it is lamentable to think how
great a proportion of all the efforts and talents in the world are employed in merely
neutralizing one another. It is the proper end of government to reduce this wretched
waste to the smallest possible amount, by taking such measures as shall cause the
energies now spent by mankind in injuring one another, or in protecting themselves
against injury, to be turned to the legitimate employment of the human faculties,
that of compelling the powers of nature to be more and more subservient to physical
and moral good. NOTES: 1. Supra, Bk, v, Ch. I. 2. The only cases in which government
agency involves nothing of a compulsory nature, are the rare cases in which, without
any artificial monopoly, it pays its own expenses. A bridge built with public money,
on which tolls are collected sufficient to pay not only all current expenses, but
the interest of the original outlay, is one case in point. The government railways
in Belgium and Germany are another example. The Post Office, if its monopoly were
abolished, and it still paid its expenses, would be another.

3. De la Liberte du Travail, Vol. II, pp. 353-4. 4. I quote at second hand, from
Mr Carey's Essay on the Rate of Wages, pp. 195-6. 5. In opposition to these opinions,
a writer, with whom on many points I agree, but whose hostility to government intervention
seems to me too indiscriminate and unqualified, M. Dunoyer, observes, that instruction,
however good in itself, can only be useful to the public in so far as they are willing
to receive it, and that the best proof that the instruction is suitable to their wants
is its success as a pecuniary enterprise. This argument seems no more conclusive respecting
instruction for the mind, than it would be respecting medicine for the body. No medicine
will do the patient any good if he cannot be induced to take it; but we are not bound
to admit as a corollary from this, that the patient will select the right medicine
without assistance. Is it not probable that a recommendation, from any quarter which
he respects, may induce him to accept a better medicine than he would spontaneously
have chosen? This is, in respect to education, the very point in debate. Without doubt,
instruction which is so far in advance of the people that they cannot be induced to
avail themselves of it, is to them of no more worth than if it did not exist. But
between what they spontaneously choose, and what they will refuse to accept when offered,
there is a breadth of interval proportioned to their deference for the recommender.
Besides, a thing of which the public are bad judges, may require to be shown to them
and pressed on their attention for a long time, and to prove its advantages by long
experience, before they learn to appreciate it, yet they may learn at last; which
they might never have done, if the thing had not been thus obtruded upon them in act,
but only recommended in theory. Now, a pecuniary speculation cannot wait years, or
perhaps generations for success; it must succeed rapidly, or not at all. Another consideration
which M. Dunoyer seems to have overlooked, is, that institutions and modes of tuition
which never could be made sufficiently popular to repay, with a profit, the expenses
incurred on them, may be invaluable to the many by giving the highest quality of education
to the few and keeping up the perpetual succession of superior minds, by whom knowledge
is advanced, and the community urged forward in civilization. 6. The practice of
the English law with respect to insane persons, especially on the all-important point
of the ascertainment of insanity, most urgently demands reform. At present no persons,
whose property is worth coveting, and whose nearest relations are unscrupulous, or
on bad terms with them, are secure against a commission of lunacy. At the instance
of the persons who would profit by their being declared insane, a jury may be impanelled
and an investigation held at the expense of the property, in which all their personal
peculiarities, with all the additions made by the lying gossip of low servants, are
poured into the credulous ears of twelve petty shopkeepers, ignorant of all ways of
life except those of their own class, and regarding every trait of individuality in
character or taste as eccentricity, and all eccentricity as either insanity or wickedness.
lf this sapient tribunal gives the desired verdict, the property is handed over to
perhaps the last persons whom the rightful owner would have desired or suffered to
possess it. Some recent instances of this kind of investigation have been a scandal
to the administration of justice. Whatever other changes in this branch of law may
be made, two at least are imperative: firSt, that, as in other legal proceedings,
the expenses should not be borne by the person on trial, but by the promoters of the
inquiry, subject to recovery of costs in case of success: and secondly, that the property
of a person declared insane, should in no case be made over to heirs while the proprietor
is alive, but should be managed by a public officer until his death or recovery. 7.
A parallel case may be found in the distaste for politics, and absence of public spirit,
by which women, as a class, are characterized in the present state of society, and
which is often felt and complained of by political reformers, without, in general,
making them willing to recognise, or desirous to remove, its cause. It obviously arises
from their being taught, both by institutions and by the whole of their education,
to regard themselves as entirely apart from politics. Wherever they have been politicians,
they have shown as great interest in the subject, and as great aptitude for it, according
to the spirit of their time, as the men with whom they were contemporaries: in that
period of history (for example) in which Isabella of Castile and Elizabeth of England
were, not rare exceptions, but merely brilliant examples of a spirit and capacity
very largely diffused among women of high station and cultivation in Europe. 8. The
objections which have been made, with so much virulence, in some of these colonies,
to the Wakefield system, apply, in so far as they have any validity, not to the principle,
but to some provisions which are no part of the system, and have been most unnecessarily
and improperly engrafted on it; such as the offering only a limited quantity of land
for sale, and that by auction, and in lots of not less than 640 acres, instead of
selling all land which is asked for, and allowing to the buyer unlimited freedom of
choice, both as to quantity and situation, at a fixed price.