Axis History Forum

This is an apolitical forum for discussions on the Axis nations and related topics hosted by the Axis History Factbook in cooperation with Christian Ankerstjerne’s Panzerworld and Christoph Awender's WW2 day by day.
Founded in 1999.

ljadw wrote:Don't be foolish : if the 30 divisions of the Westheer could not go to the East before 22 June, it would be too late .

Don't be "foolish"? Seriously? THE GERMANS DON'T KNOW THAT.

After 22 june, the window of opportunity was closed in the East and in the West :

Which has exactly ZERO to do with the argument.

if these divisions would leave in August, the Soviets would be already in Poland , and they could not leave in August as Dragoon would happen in August .

Don't be asinine. It has been explained to you numerous times, an absolute prerequisite for ANVIL/DRAGOON was a successful NEPTUNE. The assumption here is NEPTUNE fails. Q.E.D., no ANVIL/DRAGOON.

July also would be too late as in July the Allies could start a second landing in the North .

No, they could not. A "failed" NEPTUNE implies severe losses to the assault divisions and the amphibious assets allocated to the invasion. Those could not be realistically made up in a month. The planning and preparation for the NEPTUNE assault took three and a half months of intense activity. A new plan would not be cobbled together in a month. ANVIL/DRAGOON also required the transfer of amphibious assets and naval from England to Italy, which is a second strike against that possibility.

Meanwhile, assuming by some miracle the refitting and re-planning could be done in a month...then WHERE DO THEY LAND?

Post from Sheldrake from 28 december "The Germans could release all full Pz formations from the West and 20 full strength infantry divisions . "

Why do you find it so difficult to post what he actually said? "The Germans could release all full strength Panzer formations from the West and twenty full strength infantry formations, to be replaced by cadres for rebuilding."

What point are you trying to make by paraphrasing what Sheldrake said?

"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

ljadw wrote:
1) This is not correct : the Soviets were that strong that they could attack on several frionts . Before 22 June, AG NU was under heavy pressure and the few mobile reserves (9 + 10 SS ) were sent to this sectoe, because otherwise AGNU would collaps .

2) "replenish reserves" = nonsense :there were no reserves . And, if AGC was withdrawing, the other AGs also would have to withdraw .

3 ) Elastic defense is an euphemism for retreat . The only thing Manstein did after Citadel was to retreat . If you don't have sufficient mobile reserves, elastic defense is impossible .

4) Mellenthin is talking nonsense

5) There were no reinforcements available /

The situation in the East had arrived at the point that the Germans did not send their reserves where the Soviets could attack, but where they were attacking ; the Soviets were leading the dance, the Germans followed . Even if the Germans knew about Bagration, there was nothing they could do, unless taking away the mobile divisions who were preventing the collaps of AGNU .

I do not see the difference between mobile and static units. Yes, the Russians had tanks, but they moved 30-40 km ahead of the infantry divisions. On July 3 they entered Minsk. The offensive began on June 23. Distance Orsha - Minsk 197 km, an average of 20 km per day the Russians moved in the initial phase of Bagration.

More problems to Germans were caused by aviation. If the retreating columns were covered from the air, they would definitely leave the Bobruisk boiler. Further Model's decisions could be different than his refusal to fight for the salvation of the 4th Army.

Don't dismiss Freiser out of hand as as typical German - unless you mean thorough and rather good. He is a well regarded Bundeswehr historian, but a hero for his analysis of 1940 "The Blitzkrieg Legend." See how many times he is quoted on the Dunkirk and 1940 threads.

I think campaign in Poland in 1939 and in Russia 1941, all German strategy was just brutal force to attack, only favour factor is suprise attack , to defeat her enemies before they mobilize their armies.

On this way, Western campaign of 1940 was very innovative in many aspect, given German inferiority in manpower and AFV, but they used many innovative method to win this campaign, parachute assault in the Hague and Rotterdam in the Netheland to enable them to break the Dutch line easily, gilder infanty assault over Fort Eben Emael to clear the way for entry into Belgium was another innovative method.

For encirclement of French 1st Army Group and BEF, it sound like replay of Napoleon 's masterpiece in battle of Austerlitz of 1805, when Austro-Russian combine troop went to deep in French right wing and enabled Napoleon used Vandamme and St Hilaire division to crush their center and then went deep, finally cutting off the whole Austro-Russian left wing. Also Anglo-French troop in 1940 marched too deep toward Belgium which enabled Rundstadt 's Heeresgruppe A (45 divisions) to attack to crush allied weak center at Sedan and then cut off the whole allied left wing and led to collapse of French 1st and 7th Armies and Dunkirk evacuation. And then encirclement of French 3rd, 5th and 8th Armies was also good one. Rommel 's swift action also caught British 51st Infantry division and French IX CA in suprise.
I would think this campaign was really German masterpiece in their war history. As you know, French Army was formidable enemy in this moment. She had 2.6 million field army while US only had 243,000 men in 1940. French had much more tanks than US too.

While in Poland or Russia, German did not have any innovative method or good planning for this.

Kelvin wrote:
I think campaign in Poland in 1939 and in Russia 1941, all German strategy was just brutal force to attack, only favour factor is suprise attack , to defeat her enemies before they mobilize their armies.

Only the plan. But the number of prisoners is evidence in favor of the superiority of the Germans in all respects. Then there were mudslide, frosts, but first many prisoners.

In the collection of articles prepared by prominent representatives of the American military historiography devoted to the problems of working out the most important operational and strategic decisions, concludes that at this stage of the war "behind the all-out military efforts of Germany there was no strategic idea, save for the idea of ​​Hitler's decision to keep every meter of the occupied territory ". Further in the book such episode is resulted. During a meeting between Hitler and Mussolini in Feltre on July 19, 1943, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Italian Armed Forces, Marshal Ambrosio, asked the Chief of Staff of the German High Command, Field Marshal Keitel, what is happening on the Russian front. Keitel could not say anything, except that the German army was exhausting the Russians.
"This," said Ambrosio, "is not an active program, but a rejection of initiative in operations. In fact, the countries of the axis are besieged, they are in a closed ring; it is necessary to get out of it. What perspectives do you have to do this? "There were no prospects, and Keitel evaded the answer. Hitler also did not have a solid plan to achieve victory. His confidence in the ultimate victory was increasingly based on insane hopes, which had no ground under him.

ljadw wrote:Don't be foolish : if the 30 divisions of the Westheer could not go to the East before 22 June, it would be too late .

Don't be "foolish"? Seriously? THE GERMANS DON'T KNOW THAT.

After 22 june, the window of opportunity was closed in the East and in the West :

Which has exactly ZERO to do with the argument.

if these divisions would leave in August, the Soviets would be already in Poland , and they could not leave in August as Dragoon would happen in August .

Don't be asinine. It has been explained to you numerous times, an absolute prerequisite for ANVIL/DRAGOON was a successful NEPTUNE. The assumption here is NEPTUNE fails. Q.E.D., no ANVIL/DRAGOON.

July also would be too late as in July the Allies could start a second landing in the North .

No, they could not. A "failed" NEPTUNE implies severe losses to the assault divisions and the amphibious assets allocated to the invasion. Those could not be realistically made up in a month. The planning and preparation for the NEPTUNE assault took three and a half months of intense activity. A new plan would not be cobbled together in a month. ANVIL/DRAGOON also required the transfer of amphibious assets and naval from England to Italy, which is a second strike against that possibility.

Meanwhile, assuming by some miracle the refitting and re-planning could be done in a month...then WHERE DO THEY LAND?

Post from Sheldrake from 28 december "The Germans could release all full Pz formations from the West and 20 full strength infantry divisions . "

Why do you find it so difficult to post what he actually said? "The Germans could release all full strength Panzer formations from the West and twenty full strength infantry formations, to be replaced by cadres for rebuilding."

What point are you trying to make by paraphrasing what Sheldrake said?

You are constantly mixing two things : the HTL (what happened) and the ATL (= this IF thread) :that in the HTL a successful Neptune was a prerequisite for Dragoon, is irrelevant for the IF we discuss . The IF is that after a failure of Neptune half of the Westheer (including its "best" units) would leave for the East,with as result that whole regions of the West would be undefended, which would make Anvil,or a second landing in the North, or a landing on the French Western coasts much more easier than in the HTL .In the HTL Blaskowitz had one PzD as mobile reserve against Anvil,and he failed, in the ATL this PzD would go to the East, and Anvil would be more successfull than it was in the HTL .

There would be no need for a preparation of 3 months for Neptune bis , as fewer troops and supplies would be needed .

The same for Anvil .

The Allies could very easily land with 2 divisions on the undefended Belgian coast, as 2 Pz would no longer be there to stop them .

The Allies could very easily land with 2 divisions on the French West Coast, where they would be received by the Resistance,as 2 SS would no longer be there to stop them .

If half of the Westheer would leave the West for the East, the West would collaps and it would not prevent the collaps of the East .

If the Westheer remained where it was, the East would collaps and it would not prevent the collaps of the West (what happened in the HTL).

Don't dismiss Freiser out of hand as as typical German - unless you mean thorough and rather good. He is a well regarded Bundeswehr historian, but a hero for his analysis of 1940 "The Blitzkrieg Legend." See how many times he is quoted on the Dunkirk and 1940 threads.

I think campaign in Poland in 1939 and in Russia 1941, all German strategy was just brutal force to attack, only favour factor is suprise attack , to defeat her enemies before they mobilize their armies.

On this way, Western campaign of 1940 was very innovative in many aspect, given German inferiority in manpower and AFV, but they used many innovative method to win this campaign, parachute assault in the Hague and Rotterdam in the Netheland to enable them to break the Dutch line easily, gilder infanty assault over Fort Eben Emael to clear the way for entry into Belgium was another innovative method.

For encirclement of French 1st Army Group and BEF, it sound like replay of Napoleon 's masterpiece in battle of Austerlitz of 1805, when Austro-Russian combine troop went to deep in French right wing and enabled Napoleon used Vandamme and St Hilaire division to crush their center and then went deep, finally cutting off the whole Austro-Russian left wing. Also Anglo-French troop in 1940 marched too deep toward Belgium which enabled Rundstadt 's Heeresgruppe A (45 divisions) to attack to crush allied weak center at Sedan and then cut off the whole allied left wing and led to collapse of French 1st and 7th Armies and Dunkirk evacuation. And then encirclement of French 3rd, 5th and 8th Armies was also good one. Rommel 's swift action also caught British 51st Infantry division and French IX CA in suprise.
I would think this campaign was really German masterpiece in their war history. As you know, French Army was formidable enemy in this moment. She had 2.6 million field army while US only had 243,000 men in 1940. French had much more tanks than US too.

While in Poland or Russia, German did not have any innovative method or good planning for this.

Hmm Can I suggest you read Freiser? His analysis of what happened at Sedan and afterwards is very good.

The first time in April, the last June 14. Hitler insisted the main blow would be in Ukraine against the facts.

When Hitler insisted it would be against Ukraine? It was, as we can see, shared by FHO and the OKH.

The command of Army Group Center on the intelligence received it became clear that there is a large concentration of Russian forces for strikes in the directions of Bobruisk, Mogilev, Orsha, Vitebsk. His command intended to withdraw his troops to the border of Polotsk, Bobruisk, greatly reducing the front line and strengthening the density of defense. This point of view was also reported at a meeting at the General Staff of the Army, held on June 14, 1944, but she never found support at the top.

They continued to believe that the Russian offensive should be expected between the Carpathians and Kovel, which was reflected in the "Bulletin of the enemy's assessments on the Eastern Front", published on June 13, 1944. It stated that the offensive preparations of the Russian troops against the Army Group Center were intended to mislead the German command concerning the direction of the main attack and to draw back reserves from the region between the Carpathians and Kovel.

Therefore, Hitler categorically forbade the withdrawal of troops of Army Group Center, demanding from them "in any circumstances to defend and hold occupied lines," and refusing to replenish reserves. [18]

The army group commander, Field Marshal E. Bush, was asked to settle for the defense of his strip with still quite considerable forces at his disposal. However, on June 20 the command of the army group, having received news of the large-scale sabotage of Belarusian guerrillas on the railway communications, had realized that they could no longer see a quiet summer.

You've heard this surname, but what Zeitzler insisted on, you do not know. It is appropriate to use the word General Staff. Hitler was informed of unwillingness to repel the Soviet offensive, but he ignored the arguments. 14 armies, 87 divisions, 11 tank units are many. Hitler ordered the General Staff to draw small red arrows on the map, in Ukraine large.

The first time in April, the last June 14. Hitler insisted the main blow would be in Ukraine against the facts.

When Hitler insisted it would be against Ukraine? It was, as we can see, shared by FHO and the OKH.

From April to June, Hitler insisted. I quoted many sources, where it is written. The opinion of Hitler about the ability of Army Group Center to reflect the Soviet offensive was not shared by anyone. You do not have enough sources of information for such conclusions. Only big and small red arrows, but this is not enough.

The command of Army Group Center on the intelligence received it became clear that there is a large concentration of Russian forces for strikes in the directions of Bobruisk, Mogilev, Orsha, Vitebsk. His command intended to withdraw his troops to the border of Polotsk, Bobruisk, greatly reducing the front line and strengthening the density of defense. This point of view was also reported at a meeting at the General Staff of the Army, held on June 14, 1944, but she never found support at the top.

They continued to believe that the Russian offensive should be expected between the Carpathians and Kovel, which was reflected in the "Bulletin of the enemy's assessments on the Eastern Front", published on June 13, 1944. It stated that the offensive preparations of the Russian troops against the Army Group Center were intended to mislead the German command concerning the direction of the main attack and to draw back reserves from the region between the Carpathians and Kovel.

Therefore, Hitler categorically forbade the withdrawal of troops of Army Group Center, demanding from them "in any circumstances to defend and hold occupied lines," and refusing to replenish reserves. [18]

The army group commander, Field Marshal E. Bush, was asked to settle for the defense of his strip with still quite considerable forces at his disposal. However, on June 20 the command of the army group, having received news of the large-scale sabotage of Belarusian guerrillas on the railway communications, had realized that they could no longer see a quiet summer.

Now you are admitting at least that OKH/FHO (and OKW) were wrong.

They were not mistaken. OKH FHO OKW knew about the forthcoming offensive of 14 armies in Belarus and inability to repel it.

Hitler ordered the General Staff to draw small red arrows on the map, in Ukraine large.

Now Hitler ordered the FHO to draw big arrows in the map!!!! This is the most ridiculous thing I read in years.

From April to June, Hitler insisted. I quoted many sources, where it is written. The opinion of Hitler about the ability of Army Group Center to reflect the Soviet offensive was not shared by anyone. You do not have enough sources of information for such conclusions. Only big and small red arrows, but this is not enough.

No, it is you that don't have (don't know) enough sources.

They were not mistaken. OKH FHO OKW knew about the forthcoming offensive of 14 armies in Belarus and inability to repel it.

No. The guys "at the top" knew there would be an offensive in Belarus, but they thought it was NOT the BIG offensive.

Hitler ordered the General Staff to draw small red arrows on the map, in Ukraine large.

Now Hitler ordered the FHO to draw big arrows in the map!!!! This is the most ridiculous thing I read in years.

But you do not know. Criticized Frieser for Hitler bla bla bla, but why he wrote it, do not know.

https://www.welt.de/geschichte/zweiter- ... nfig=print
Frieser: When evaluating German booty files in Russian archives, I discovered that the front-line units had explained the Soviet offensive intentions surprisingly well. But the results were not adequately relayed by Army Group Center. Blame was their commander-in-chief, Field Marshal Ernst Busch. When he wanted to point out the threat, Hitler reacted with a tantrum. Busch broke in and banned "defeatist" messages. So the evil took its course.

From April to June, Hitler insisted. I quoted many sources, where it is written. The opinion of Hitler about the ability of Army Group Center to reflect the Soviet offensive was not shared by anyone. You do not have enough sources of information for such conclusions. Only big and small red arrows, but this is not enough.

The command of Army Group Center on the intelligence received it became clear that there is a large concentration of Russian forces for strikes in the directions of Bobruisk, Mogilev, Orsha, Vitebsk. His command intended to withdraw his troops to the border of Polotsk, Bobruisk, greatly reducing the front line and strengthening the density of defense. This point of view was also reported at a meeting at the General Staff of the Army, held on June 14, 1944, but she never found support at the top.

They continued to believe that the Russian offensive should be expected between the Carpathians and Kovel, which was reflected in the "Bulletin of the enemy's assessments on the Eastern Front", published on June 13, 1944. It stated that the offensive preparations of the Russian troops against the Army Group Center were intended to mislead the German command concerning the direction of the main attack and to draw back reserves from the region between the Carpathians and Kovel.

Therefore, Hitler categorically forbade the withdrawal of troops of Army Group Center, demanding from them "in any circumstances to defend and hold occupied lines," and refusing to replenish reserves. [18]

They were not mistaken. OKH FHO OKW knew about the forthcoming offensive of 14 armies in Belarus and inability to repel it.

No. The guys "at the top" knew there would be an offensive in Belarus, but they thought it was NOT the BIG offensive.

There are not enough sources, I agree. Frieser years 6 already back, in a documentary about Bagration, said the following, a quote:

For a long time it was believed that the offensive in Byelorussia was not expected for Germans. From recently discovered documents it became clear: Hitler was reported in detail about the impending catastrophe.

ljadw wrote:You are constantly mixing two things : the HTL (what happened) and the ATL (= this IF thread) :that in the HTL a successful Neptune was a prerequisite for Dragoon, is irrelevant for the IF we discuss . The IF is that after a failure of Neptune half of the Westheer (including its "best" units) would leave for the East,with as result that whole regions of the West would be undefended, which would make Anvil,or a second landing in the North, or a landing on the French Western coasts much more easier than in the HTL .In the HTL Blaskowitz had one PzD as mobile reserve against Anvil,and he failed, in the ATL this PzD would go to the East, and Anvil would be more successfull than it was in the HTL .

Nonsense. As originally conceived, ANVIL was to be a simultaneous operation with NEPTUNE. NEPTUNE was to be three divisions and ANVIL two or three. That was rejected by Eisenhower and Montgomery as impractical, which had little to do with the number of German divisions...at the time there were calculated some 47 to 48 in France and the Low Countries, rather than 61...and just something like four were expected to be Panzer formations.

THAT is the ACTUAL situation running up to both the HTL AND the ATL. THAT is what ACTUALLY will influence the decision making.

There would be no need for a preparation of 3 months for Neptune bis , as fewer troops and supplies would be needed .

A total of 683 LCT and LCT (A) were required for the NEPTUNE assault alone and 96 more for the follow-up forces. Of those, 149 were lost of damaged in the SUCCESSFUL "HTL". To get those 683 in the "HTL" required extensive effort and negotiation, in the well-known strategic negotiations in London and Washington, but also in the lesser-known negotiations in British shipyards where enormous effort was made to get at least a 95% operational rate by D-Day.

Losses in the equally critical LCA/LCVP and LCI (L), were comparable. Then, the great storm of 19-21 June stranded 800 craft...if NEPTUNE gets "defeated" around that time, then that must be accounted for in the "ATL" as well.

Now, add in the embarkation planning, convoy planning, landing planning, follow-on planning, and so forth required for a new beach.

Yes, there is a "need" for preparation greater than the month you seem to think would work.

The same for Anvil .

Nonsense.

The Allies could very easily land with 2 divisions on the undefended Belgian coast, as 2 Pz would no longer be there to stop them .

Nonsense. The presence or absence of 2. Panzer was never an element in the planning that rejected the Belgian coast.

The Allies could very easily land with 2 divisions on the French West Coast, where they would be received by the Resistance,as 2 SS would no longer be there to stop them .

Nonsense. The presence or absence of 2. SS-Panzer was never an element in the planning that rejected the Biscay coast.

If half of the Westheer would leave the West for the East, the West would collaps and it would not prevent the collaps of the East .

Nonsense. The idea that all 30 divisions will pick up as one and move is ludicrous and is simply yet another example of how little thought and understanding you have of the problem.

If the Westheer remained where it was, the East would collaps and it would not prevent the collaps of the West (what happened in the HTL).

Whatever the Germans would do, they were doomed .

Of course, but then I said that long ago and it has very little to do with this argument.

"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

But you do not know. Criticized Frieser for Hitler bla bla bla, but why he wrote it, do not know.

https://www.welt.de/geschichte/zweiter- ... nfig=print
Frieser: When evaluating German booty files in Russian archives, I discovered that the front-line units had explained the Soviet offensive intentions surprisingly well. But the results were not adequately relayed by Army Group Center. Blame was their commander-in-chief, Field Marshal Ernst Busch. When he wanted to point out the threat, Hitler reacted with a tantrum. Busch broke in and banned "defeatist" messages. So the evil took its course.

When Busch pointed out the threat to Hitler? When Busch or any from his Staff said: there are 14 armies preparing a BIG offensive position, we can't oppose it, please let me reatreat. WHEN? Primary sources, please.

Jordan, commander 9th Army, wrote (22 June)

Ziemke

The army believes that, even under the present conditions, it would be possible to stop the enemy offensive, but not under the present directives which require an absolutely rigid defense

Ziemke

On 12 May the Eastern Intelligence Branch revised its estimate: the main effort would still be in the south, between the Carpathians and the Black Sea, toward the Balkans, but a large offensive force was also being assembled between the Carpathians and the Pripyat Marshes to attack toward L'vov, Lublin, and Brest.

Ziemke

Thereafter the signs multiplied rapidly as the deployment went into high gear, but they were not enough to divert the OKH's attention from Army Group North Ukraine, where Model was readying his "offensive solution" under the appropriate cover name SCHILD UND SCHWERT. The Eastern Intelligence Branch dismissed the activity opposite Army Group Center as "apparently a deception."

Ziemke

On 14 June, Zeitzler called the army group and army chiefs of staff to a conference. In advance he stated that what was to be said "would not particularly concern Army Group Center." The expected offensive against Army Group North Ukraine continued to preoccupy the OKH; even the predicted Balkan operation had receded into the background. At the meeting the chief of the Eastern Intelligence Branch warned that simultaneous attacks on Army Groups Center and South Ukraine could be expected as preliminaries to the big offensive against Army Group North Ukraine.

The FHO have his own intelligence system. There was no interference by Hitler.

Little, but they are against Hitler and his fault

OKH/FHO/OKW as well.

The guys at the top are Hitler. 14 armies are a BIG offensive.

[/quote][/quote]

Nonsense. Hitler was not alone directing the war. That there were 14 armies is irrelevant. Look at the map: the FHO also counted