Page 359

The Papers of William A. Graham 329
Considerations like these brought me to the conclusion that,
whatever reason there might be for suspecting that this clause
might have been intended by a part at least of the Convention
to impose political disabilities on Roman Catholics, it could not
be judicially expounded as excluding them from office. A penal
provision against a portion of the free-men of the State—a dis-abling
provision against the whole community in its selection of
civil officers—penal and disabling provisions because of religious
principles which it was an unalienable and declared right to
profess and to follow^ out in worship—could not be upheld and
enforced unless clearly and definitely declared.
The question was purely one of legal and judicial exposition.
It involved the construction of a written provision in the Consti-tutional
Law of the Country. The construction which had been
settled by Judicial Tribunals, or, where none such had obtained
the construction which would be attached to it by Judicial Tri-bunals,
according to the fixed principles of legal interpretation,
must be taken by all to be the true one. Private Conscience was
concerned so far only as not to violate the Law. But what the
Law was, conscience could not determine, nor even private reason
decide against either an official interpretation either actually
made, or such as must result from the rules universally adopted
by legal tribunals for their own government.
In this opinion of what must be the judicial exposition of this
clause, I was confirmed by the highest legal authority within the
State, and without the State. Moreover I had the written opinion
given me more than thirty years ago when I first became a mem-ber
of the State Legislature, of Samuel Johnston ^^ who of all men
then living best knew and was best qualified to expound the Con-stitution.
Under such circumstances to decline an office, which my con-science
told me I was bound to take unless disabled by the Con-stitution,
appeared to me an abandonment of duty. I had no
well-founded scruple myself. To be deterred by the apprehension
of what others might think seemed to me cowardice. Besides if
from any mistaken notions of delicacy I could have consented
*- Samuel Johnston (1733-1816), a native of Scotland, educated in New England,
who came to Edenton in 1736, a lawyer, member assembly, 1760, provincial treasurer,
delegate to the first four provincial Congresses, and president of the third and
fourth. He was state senator, 1779, member of the Continental Congress, 1780-1782,
and declined election as president. He was president of the conventions of 1788
and 1789, and the first United States senator elected under tlie Constitution,
serving from 1789 to 1793. He was a judge of the superior court, 1800-1803.
Gaston's tribute to his knowledge and wisdom is restrained, rather than otherwise.

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The Papers of William A. Graham 329
Considerations like these brought me to the conclusion that,
whatever reason there might be for suspecting that this clause
might have been intended by a part at least of the Convention
to impose political disabilities on Roman Catholics, it could not
be judicially expounded as excluding them from office. A penal
provision against a portion of the free-men of the State—a dis-abling
provision against the whole community in its selection of
civil officers—penal and disabling provisions because of religious
principles which it was an unalienable and declared right to
profess and to follow^ out in worship—could not be upheld and
enforced unless clearly and definitely declared.
The question was purely one of legal and judicial exposition.
It involved the construction of a written provision in the Consti-tutional
Law of the Country. The construction which had been
settled by Judicial Tribunals, or, where none such had obtained
the construction which would be attached to it by Judicial Tri-bunals,
according to the fixed principles of legal interpretation,
must be taken by all to be the true one. Private Conscience was
concerned so far only as not to violate the Law. But what the
Law was, conscience could not determine, nor even private reason
decide against either an official interpretation either actually
made, or such as must result from the rules universally adopted
by legal tribunals for their own government.
In this opinion of what must be the judicial exposition of this
clause, I was confirmed by the highest legal authority within the
State, and without the State. Moreover I had the written opinion
given me more than thirty years ago when I first became a mem-ber
of the State Legislature, of Samuel Johnston ^^ who of all men
then living best knew and was best qualified to expound the Con-stitution.
Under such circumstances to decline an office, which my con-science
told me I was bound to take unless disabled by the Con-stitution,
appeared to me an abandonment of duty. I had no
well-founded scruple myself. To be deterred by the apprehension
of what others might think seemed to me cowardice. Besides if
from any mistaken notions of delicacy I could have consented
*- Samuel Johnston (1733-1816), a native of Scotland, educated in New England,
who came to Edenton in 1736, a lawyer, member assembly, 1760, provincial treasurer,
delegate to the first four provincial Congresses, and president of the third and
fourth. He was state senator, 1779, member of the Continental Congress, 1780-1782,
and declined election as president. He was president of the conventions of 1788
and 1789, and the first United States senator elected under tlie Constitution,
serving from 1789 to 1793. He was a judge of the superior court, 1800-1803.
Gaston's tribute to his knowledge and wisdom is restrained, rather than otherwise.