An Essay Concerning Human
Understanding.

David Hume.

Sect.
XII. Of
the academical or sceptical Philosophy

PART I.

116. There is not
a greater
number of philosophical reasonings,displayed upon any subject,
than
those, which prove the existence of aDeity, and refute the
fallacies
of Atheists; and yet the mostreligious philosophers still
dispute
whether any man can be so blindedas to be a speculative
atheist.
How shall we reconcile thesecontradictions? The
knights-errant,
who wandered about to clear theworld of dragons and giants,
never
entertained the least doubt withregard to the existence of
these
monsters.

The Sceptic is
another enemy
of religion, who naturally provokes theindignation of all divines
and graver
philosophers; though it iscertain, that no man ever
met with
any such absurd creature, orconversed with a man, who
had no
opinion or principle concerning anysubject, either of action or
speculation.
This begets a very naturalquestion; What is meant by a
sceptic?
And how far it is possible topush these philosophical
principles
of doubt and uncertainty?

There is a species
of scepticism,
antecedent to all study andphilosophy, which is much
inculcated
by Des Cartes and others, as asovereign preservative
against error
and precipitate judgement. Itrecommends an universal
doubt, not
only of all our former opinions andprinciples, but also of our
very
faculties; of whose veracity, saythey, we must assure
ourselves,
by a chain of reasoning, deducedfrom some original
principle, which
cannot possibly be fallacious ordeceitful. But neither is
there
any such original principle whichhas a prerogative above
others,
that are self-evident andconvincing: or if there
were, could
we advance a step beyond it, butby the use of those very
faculties,
of which we are supposed to bealready diffident. The
Cartesian
doubt, therefore, were it everpossible to be attained by
any human
creature (as it plainly is not)would be entirely incurable;
and
no reasoning could ever bring us to astate of assurance and
conviction
upon any subject.

It must, however,
be confessed,
that this species of scepticism,when more moderate, may be
understood
in a very reasonable sense,and is a necessary
preparative to
the study of philosophy, bypreserving a proper
impartiality
in our judgements, and weaning ourmind from all those
prejudices,
which we may have imbibed fromeducation or rash opinion.
To begin
with clear and self-evidentprinciples, to advance by
timorous
and sure steps, to reviewfrequently our conclusions,
and
examine accurately all theirconsequences; though by
these means
we shall make both a slow and ashort progress in our
systems; are
the only methods, by which we canever hope to reach truth,
and attain
a proper stability andcertainty in our
determinations.

117. There is
another species
of scepticism, consequent to scienceand enquiry, when men are
supposed
to have discovered, either theabsolute fallaciousness of
their
mental faculties, or theirunfitness to reach any fixed
determination
in all those curioussubjects of speculation,
about which
they are commonly employed.Even our very senses are
brought
into dispute, by a certain species ofphilosophers; and the maxims
of
common life are subjected to thesame doubt as the most
profound
principles or conclusions ofmetaphysics and theology. As
these
paradoxical tenets (if they maybe called tenets) are to be
met
with in some philosophers, and therefutation of them in
several, they
naturally excite our curiosity,and make us enquire into the
arguments,
on which they may be founded.

I need not insist
upon the
more trite topics, employed by thesceptics in all ages,
against the
evidence of sense; such as thosewhich are derived from the
imperfection
and fallaciousness of ourorgans, on numberless
occasions;
the crooked appearance of an oar inwater; the various aspects
of objects,
according to their differentdistances; the double images
which
arise from the pressing one eye;with many other appearances
of a
like nature. These scepticaltopics, indeed, are only
sufficient
to prove, that the senses aloneare not implicitly to be
depended
on; but that we must correct theirevidence by reason, and by
considerations,
derived from the natureof the medium, the distance
of the
object, and the disposition ofthe organ, in order to
render them,
within their sphere, the propercriteria of truth and
falsehood.
There are other more profoundarguments against the
senses, which
admit not of so easy a solution.

118. It seems
evident, that
men are carried, by a natural instinctor prepossession, to repose
faith
in their senses; and that, withoutany reasoning, or even
almost before
the use of reason, we alwayssuppose an external
universe, which
depends not on our perception, butwould exist, though we and
every
sensible creature were absent orannihilated. Even the animal
creation
are governed by a likeopinion, and preserve this
belief
of external objects, in all theirthoughts, designs, and
actions.

It seems also
evident, that,
when men follow this blind and powerfulinstinct of nature, they
always
suppose the very images, presentedby the senses, to be the
external
objects, and never entertain anysuspicion, that the one are
nothing
but representations of theother. This very table which
we
see white, and which we feel hard,is believed to exist,
independent
of our perception, and to besomething external to our
mind,
which perceives it. Our presencebestows not being on it: our
absence
does not annihilate it. Itpreserves its existence
uniform
and entire, independent of thesituation of intelligent
beings,
who perceive or contemplate it.

But this universal
and primary
opinion of all men is soondestroyed by the slightest
philosophy,
which teaches us, thatnothing can ever be present
to the
mind but an image or perception,and that the senses are only
the
inlets, through which these imagesare conveyed, without being
able
to produce any immediateintercourse between the mind
and
the object. The table, which wesee, seems to diminish, as
we remove
farther from it: but the realtable, which exists
independent
of us, suffers no alteration: itwas, therefore, nothing but
its
image, which was present to themind. These are the obvious
dictates
of reason; and no man, whoreflects, ever doubted, that
the
existences, which we consider, whenwe say, this house and that
tree,
are nothing but perceptions in themind, and fleeting copies or
representations
of other existences,which remain uniform and
independent.

119. So far, then,
are we
necessitated by reasoning to contradict ordepart from the primary
instincts
of nature, and to embrace a newsystem with regard to the
evidence
of our senses. But herephilosophy finds herself
extremely
embarrassed, when she would justifythis new system, and obviate
the
cavils and objections of thesceptics. She can no longer
plead
the infallible and irresistibleinstinct of nature: for that
led
us to a quite different system, whichis acknowledged fallible and
even
erroneous. And to justify thispretended philosophical
system,
by a chain of clear and convincingargument, or even any
appearance
of argument, exceeds the power of allhuman capacity.

By what argument
can it be
proved, that the perceptions of themind must be caused by
external
objects, entirely different from them,though resembling them (if
that
be possible) and could not ariseeither from the energy of
the mind
itself, or from the suggestion ofsome invisible and unknown
spirit,
or from some other cause still moreunknown to us? It is
acknowledged,
that, in fact, many of theseperceptions arise not from
anything
external, as in dreams, madness,and other diseases. And
nothing
can be more inexplicable than themanner, in which body should
so
operate upon mind as ever to convey animage of itself to a
substance,
supposed of so different, and evencontrary a nature.

It is a question
of fact,
whether the perceptions of the senses beproduced by external
objects, resembling
them: how shall this questionbe determined? By experience
surely;
as all other questions of alike nature. But here
experience
is, and must be entirely silent.The mind has never anything
present
to it but the perceptions, andcannot possibly reach any
experience
of their connexion withobjects. The supposition of
such
a connexion is, therefore, withoutany foundation in reasoning.

120. To have
recourse to the
veracity of the Supreme Being, in orderto prove the veracity of our
senses,
is surely making a veryunexpected circuit. If his
veracity
were at all concerned in thismatter, our senses would be
entirely
infallible; because it is notpossible that he can ever
deceive.
Not to mention, that, if theexternal world be once
called in
question, we shall be at a loss tofind arguments, by which we
may
prove the existence of that Being orany of his attributes.

121. This is a
topic, therefore,
in which the profounder and morephilosophical sceptics will
always
triumph, when they endeavour tointroduce an universal doubt
into
all subjects of human knowledgeand enquiry. Do you follow
the instincts
and propensities of nature,may they say, in assenting
to the
veracity of sense? But these leadyou to believe that the very
perception
or sensible image is theexternal object. Do you
disclaim
this principle, in order to embrace amore rational opinion, that
the
perceptions are only representationsof something external? You
here
depart from your naturalpropensities and more
obvious sentiments;
and yet are not able tosatisfy your reason, which
can never
find any convincing argument fromexperience to prove, that
the perceptions
are connected with anyexternal objects.

122. There is
another sceptical
topic of a like nature, derived fromthe most profound
philosophy; which
might merit our attention, were itrequisite to dive so deep,
in order
to discover arguments andreasonings, which can so
little
serve to any serious purpose. It isuniversally allowed by
modern enquirers,
that all the sensiblequalities of objects, such
as hard,
soft, hot, cold, white, black, &c.are merely secondary, and
exist
not in the objects themselves, but areperceptions of the mind,
without
any external archetype or model,which they represent. If
this be
allowed, with regard to secondaryqualities, it must also
follow,
with regard to the supposed primaryqualities of extension and
solidity;
nor can the latter be any moreentitled to that
denomination than
the former. The idea of extensionis entirely acquired from
the senses
of sight and feeling; and ifall the qualities, perceived
by
the senses, be in the mind, not in theobject, the same conclusion
must
reach the idea of extension whichis wholly dependent on the
sensible
ideas or the ideas of secondaryqualities. Nothing can save
us from
this conclusion, but theasserting, that the ideas of
those
primary qualities are attained byAbstraction, an opinion,
which,
if we examine it accurately, weshall find to be
unintelligible,
and even absurd. An extension, thatis neither tangible nor
visible,
cannot possibly be conceived: and atangible or visible
extension, which
is neither hard nor soft, blacknor white, is equally beyond
the
reach of human conception. Let anyman try to conceive a
triangle in
general, which is neitherIsosceles nor Scalenum, nor
has
any particular length or proportion ofsides; and he will soon
perceive
the absurdity of all the scholasticnotions with regard to
abstraction
and general ideas.*

* This argument is
drawn from
Dr. Berkeley; and indeed most of thewritings of that very
ingenious
author form the best lessons ofscepticism which are to be
found
either among the ancient or modernphilosophers, Bayle not
excepted.
He professes, however, in histitle page (and undoubtedly
with
great truth) to have composed hisbook against the sceptics as
well
as against the atheists andfree-thinkers. But that all
his
arguments, though otherwiseintended, are, in reality,
merely
sceptical, appears from this, thatthey admit of no answer and
produce
no conviction. Their only effectis to cause that momentary
amazement
and irresolution and confusion,which is the result of
scepticism.

123. Thus the
first philosophical
objection to the evidence of senseor to the opinion of
external existence
consists in this, that such anopinion, if rested on
natural instinct,
is contrary to reason, andif referred to reason, is
contrary
to natural instinct, and at thesame time carries no
rational evidence
with it, to convince animpartial enquirer. The
second objection
goes farther, andrepresents this opinion as
contrary
to reason: at least, if it be aprinciple of reason, that
all sensible
qualities are in the mind,not in the object. Bereave
matter
of all its intelligible qualities,both primary and secondary,
you
in a manner annihilate it, and leaveonly a certain unknown,
inexplicable
something, as the cause of ourperceptions; a notion so
imperfect,
that no sceptic will think itworth while to contend
against it.

PART II.

124. It may seem a
very extravagant
attempt of the sceptics todestroy reason by argument
and ratiocination;
yet is this the grandscope of all their enquiries
and
disputes. They endeavour to findobjections, both to our
abstract
reasonings, and to those which regardmatter of fact and existence.

The chief
objection against
all abstract reasonings is derivedfrom the ideas of space and
time;
ideas, which, in common life andto a careless view, are very
clear
and intelligible, but when theypass through the scrutiny of
the
profound sciences (and they are thechief object of these
sciences)
afford principles, which seem fullof absurdity and
contradiction.
No priestly dogmas, invented onpurpose to tame and subdue
the rebellious
reason of mankind, evershocked common sense more
than the
doctrine of the infinitivedivisibility of extension,
with
its consequences; as they arepompously displayed by all
geometricians
and metaphysicians, with akind of triumph and
exultation.
A real quantity, infinitely lessthan any finite quantity,
containing
quantities infinitely less thanitself, and so on in
infinitum;
this is an edifice so bold andprodigious, that it is too
weighty
for any pretended demonstrationto support, because it
shocks the
clearest and most natural principlesof human reason.* But what
renders
the matter more extraordinary,is, that these seemingly
absurd
opinions are supported by a chain ofreasoning, the clearest and
most
natural; nor is it possible for us toallow the premises without
admitting
the consequences. Nothing canbe more convincing and
satisfactory
than all the conclusionsconcerning the properties of
circles
and triangles; and yet, whenthese are once received, how
can
we deny, that the angle of contactbetween a circle and its
tangent
is infinitely less than anyrectilineal angle, that as
you may
increase the diameter of the circlein infinitum, this angle of
contact
becomes still less, even ininfinitum, and that the
angle of
contact between other curves andtheir tangents may be
infinitely
less than those between any circleand its tangent, and so on,
in infinitum?
The demonstration of theseprinciples seems as
unexceptionable
as that which proves the threeangles of a triangle to be
equal
to two right ones, though thelatter opinion be natural
and easy,
and the former big withcontradiction and absurdity.
Reason
here seems to be thrown into akind of amazement and
suspence,
which, without the suggestions ofany sceptic, gives her a
diffidence
of herself, and of the ground onwhich she treads. She sees a
full
light, which illuminates certainplaces; but that light
borders upon
the most profound darkness. Andbetween these she is so
dazzled
and confounded, that she scarcelycan pronounce with certainty
and
assurance concerning any one object.

* Whatever
disputes there
may be about mathematical points, wemust allow that there are
physical
points; that is, parts ofextension, which cannot be
divided
or lessened, either by the eye orimagination. These images,
then,
which are present to the fancy orsenses, are absolutely
indivisible,
and consequently must be allowedby mathematicians to be
infinitely
less than any real part ofextension; and yet nothing
appears
more certain to reason, than thatan infinite number of them
composes
an infinite extension. How muchmore an infinite number of
those
infinitely small parts ofextension, which are still
supposed
infinitely divisible.

125. The absurdity
of these
bold determinations of the abstractsciences seems to become, if
possible,
still more palpable with regardto time than extension. An
infinite
number of real parts of time,passing in succession, and
exhausted
one after another, appears soevident a contradiction,
that no
man, one should think, whosejudgement is not corrupted,
instead
of being improved, by thesciences, would ever be able
to
admit of it.

Yet still reason
must remain
restless, and unquiet, even with regardto that scepticism, to which
she
is driven by these seemingabsurdities and
contradictions.
How any clear, distinct idea cancontain circumstances,
contradictory
to itself, or to any other clear,distinct idea, is absolutely
incomprehensible;
and is, perhaps, asabsurd as any proposition,
which
can be formed. So that nothing can bemore sceptical, or more full
of
doubt and hesitation, than thisscepticism itself, which
arises
from some of the paradoxicalconclusions of geometry or
the science
of quantity.*

* It seems to me
not impossible
to avoid these absurdities andcontradictions, if it be
admitted,
that there is no such thing asabstract or general ideas,
properly
speaking; but that all generalideas are, in reality,
particular
ones, attached to a general term,which recalls, upon
occasion, other
particular ones, that resemble, incertain circumstances, the
idea,
present to the mind. Thus when theterm Horse is pronounced, we
immediately
figure to ourselves theidea of a black or a white
animal,
of a particular size or figure: Butas that term is also usually
applied
to animals of other colours,figures and sizes, these
ideas,
though not actually present to theimagination, are easily
recalled;
and our reasoning and conclusionproceed in the same way, as
if they
were actually present. If thisbe admitted (as seems
reasonable)
it follows that all the ideas ofquantity, upon which
mathematicians
reason, are nothing butparticular, and such as are
suggested
by the senses and imagination,and consequently, cannot be
infinitely
divisible. It is sufficientto have dropped this hint at
present,
without prosecuting it anyfarther. It certainly
concerns all
lovers of science not to exposethemselves to the ridicule
and contempt
of the ignorant by theirconclusions; and this seems
the
readiest solution of thesedifficulties.

126. The sceptical
objections
to moral evidence, or to thereasonings concerning matter
of
fact, are either popular orphilosophical. The popular
objections
are derived from the naturalweakness of human
understanding;
the contradictory opinions, whichhave been entertained in
different
ages and nations; the variations ofour judgement in sickness
and health,
youth and old age, prosperityand adversity; the perpetual
contradiction
of each particular man'sopinions and sentiments;
with many
other topics of that kind. It isneedless to insist farther
on this
head. These objections are butweak. For as, in common
life, we
reason every moment concerning factand existence, and cannot
possibly
subsist, without continuallyemploying this species of
argument,
any popular objections, derivedfrom thence, must be
insufficient
to destroy that evidence. Thegreat subverter of
Pyrrhonism or
the excessive principles ofscepticism is action, and
employment,
and the occupations of commonlife. These principles may
flourish
and triumph in the schools;where it is, indeed,
difficult,
if not impossible, to refute them. Butas soon as they leave the
shade,
and by the presence of the realobjects, which actuate our
passions
and sentiments, are put inopposition to the more
powerful
principles of our nature, theyvanish like smoke, and leave
the
most determined sceptic in the samecondition as other mortals.

127. The sceptic,
therefore,
had better keep within his propersphere, and display those
philosophical
objections, which arise frommore profound researches.
Here he
seems to have ample matter oftriumph; while he justly
insists,
that all our evidence for any matterof fact, which lies beyond
the testimony
of sense or memory, isderived entirely from the
relation
of cause and effect; that we haveno other idea of this
relation than
that of two objects, which havebeen frequently conjoined
together;
that we have no argument toconvince us, that objects,
which
have, in our experience, beenfrequently conjoined, will
likewise,
in other instances, beconjoined in the same
manner; and
that nothing leads us to thisinference but custom or a
certain
instinct of our nature; which itis indeed difficult to
resist, but
which, like other instincts, may befallacious and deceitful.
While
the sceptic insists upon these topics,he shows his force, or
rather, indeed,
his own and our weakness; andseems, for the time at
least, to
destroy all assurance and conviction.These arguments might be
displayed
at greater length, if any durablegood or benefit to society
could
ever be expected to result from them.

128. For here is
the chief
and most confounding objection toexcessive scepticism, that
no durable
good can ever result from it;while it remains in its full
force
and vigour. We need only ask such asceptic, What his meaning
is? And
what he proposes by all thesecurious researches? He is
immediately
at a loss, and knows not what toanswer. A Copernican or
Ptolemaic,
who supports each his differentsystem of astronomy, may
hope to
produce a conviction, which willremain constant and durable,
with
his audience. A Stoic or Epicureandisplays principles, which
may not
be durable, but which have aneffect on conduct and
behaviour.
But a Pyrrhonian cannot expect,that his philosophy will
have any
constant influence on the mind: orif it had, that its
influence would
be beneficial to society. On thecontrary, he must
acknowledge, if
he will acknowledge anything, thatall human life must perish,
were
his principles universally andsteadily to prevail. All
discourse,
all action would immediatelycease; and men remain in a
total
lethargy, till the necessities ofnature, unsatisfied, put an
end
to their miserable existence. It istrue; so fatal an event is
very
little to be dreaded. Nature is alwaystoo strong for principle.
And though
a Pyrrhonian may throw himself orothers into a momentary
amazement
and confusion by his profoundreasonings; the first and
most trivial
event in life will put toflight all his doubts and
scruples,
and leave him the same, in everypoint of action and
speculation,
with the philosophers of everyother sect, or with those
who never
concerned themselves in anyphilosophical researches.
When he
awakes from his dream, he will bethe first to join in the
laugh against
himself, and to confess, thatall his objections are mere
amusement,
and can have no othertendency than to show the
whimsical
condition of mankind, who must actand reason and believe;
though they
are not able, by their mostdiligent enquiry, to satisfy
themselves
concerning the foundation ofthese operations, or to
remove the
objections, which may be raisedagainst them.

PART III.

129. There is,
indeed, a more
mitigated scepticism or academicalphilosophy, which may be
both durable
and useful, and which may, inpart, be the result of this
Pyrrhonism,
or excessive scepticism,when its undistinguished
doubts
are, in some measure, corrected bycommon sense and reflection.
The
greater part of mankind are naturallyapt to be affirmative and
dogmatical
in their opinions; and while theysee objects only on one
side, and
have no idea of any counterpoisingargument, they throw
themselves
precipitately into the principles,to which they are inclined;
nor
have they any indulgence for those whoentertain opposite
sentiments. To
hesitate or balance perplexestheir understanding, checks
their
passion, and suspends theiraction. They are, therefore,
impatient
till they escape from astate, which to them is so
uneasy:
and they think, that they couldnever remove themselves far
enough
from it, by the violence of theiraffirmations and obstinacy
of their
belief. But could suchdogmatical reasoners become
sensible
of the strange infirmities ofhuman understanding, even in
its
most perfect state, and when mostaccurate and cautious in its
determinations;
such a reflection wouldnaturally inspire them with
more
modesty and reserve, and diminishtheir fond opinion of
themselves,
and their prejudice againstantagonists. The illiterate
may
reflect on the disposition of thelearned, who, amidst all the
advantages
of study and reflection, arecommonly still diffident in
their
determinations: and if any of thelearned be inclined, from
their
natural temper, to haughtiness andobstinacy, a small tincture
of Pyrrhonism
might abate their pride,by showing them, that the
few advantages,
which they may have attainedover their fellows, are but
inconsiderable,
if compared with theuniversal perplexity and
confusion,
which is inherent in human nature.In general, there is a
degree of
doubt, and caution, and modesty,which, in all kinds of
scrutiny
and decision, ought for ever toaccompany a just reasoner.

130. Another
species of mitigated
scepticism which may be ofadvantage to mankind, and
which
may be the natural result of thePyrrhonian doubts and
scruples,
is the limitation of our enquiriesto such subjects as are best
adapted
to the narrow capacity of humanunderstanding. The
imagination of
man is naturally sublime,delighted with whatever is
remote
and extraordinary, and running,without control, into the
most distant
parts of space and time inorder to avoid the objects,
which
custom has rendered too familiarto it. A correct Judgement
observes
a contrary method, and avoidingall distant and high
enquiries,
confines itself to common life, and tosuch subjects as fall under
daily
practice and experience; leaving themore sublime topics to the
embellishment
of poets and orators, or tothe arts of priests and
politicians.
To bring us to so salutary adetermination, nothing can
be more
serviceable, than to be oncethoroughly convinced of the
force
of the Pyrrhonian doubt, and ofthe impossibility, that
anything,
but the strong power of naturalinstinct, could free us from
it.
Those who have a propensity tophilosophy, will still
continue
their researches; because theyreflect, that, besides the
immediate
pleasure, attending such anoccupation, philosophical
decisions
are nothing but the reflections ofcommon life, methodized and
corrected.
But they will never betempted to go beyond common
life,
so long as they consider theimperfection of those
faculties
which they employ, their narrow reach,and their inaccurate
operations.
While we cannot give a satisfactoryreason, why we believe,
after a
thousand experiments, that a stonewill fall, or fire burn; can
we
ever satisfy ourselves concerningany determination, which we
may
form, with regard to the origin ofworlds, and the situation of
nature,
from, and to eternity?

This narrow
limitation, indeed,
of our enquiries, is, in everyrespect, so reasonable, that
it
suffices to make the slightestexamination into the natural
powers
of the human mind and to comparethem with their objects, in
order
to recommend it to us. We shall thenfind what are the proper
subjects
of science and enquiry.

131. It seems to
me, that
the only objects of the abstract scienceor of demonstration are
quantity
and number, and that all attemptsto extend this more perfect
species
of knowledge beyond these boundsare mere sophistry and
illusion.
As the component parts of quantityand number are entirely
similar,
their relations become intricateand involved; and nothing
can be
more curious, as well as useful, thanto trace, by a variety of
mediums,
their equality or inequality,through their different
appearances.
But as all other ideas areclearly distinct and
different from
each other, we can never advancefarther, by our utmost
scrutiny,
than to observe this diversity,and, by an obvious
reflection, pronounce
one thing not to beanother. Or if there be any
difficulty
in these decisions, it proceedsentirely from the
undeterminate
meaning of words, which is correctedby juster definitions. That
the
square of the hypothenuse is equalto the squares of the other
two
sides, cannot be known, let theterms be ever so exactly
defined,
without a train of reasoning andenquiry. But to convince us
of this
proposition, that where there isno property, there can be no
injustice,
it is only necessary to definethe terms, and explain
injustice
to be a violation of property. Thisproposition is, indeed,
nothing
but a more imperfect definition. It isthe same case with all those
pretended
syllogistical reasonings, whichmay be found in every other
branch
of learning, except the sciences ofquantity and number; and
these may
safely, I think, be pronouncedthe only proper objects of
knowledge
and demonstration.

132. All other
enquiries of
men regard only matter of fact andexistence; and these are
evidently
incapable of demonstration.Whatever is may not be. No
negation
of a fact can involve acontradiction. The
non-existence
of any being, without exception, isas clear and distinct an
idea as
its existence. The proposition, whichaffirms it not to be,
however false,
is no less conceivable andintelligible, than that
which affirms
it to be. The case isdifferent with the sciences,
properly
so called. Every proposition,which is not true, is there
confused
and unintelligible. That the cuberoot of 64 is equal to the
half
of 10, is a false proposition, and cannever be distinctly
conceived. But
that Caesar, or the angelGabriel, or any being never
existed,
may be a false proposition, butstill is perfectly
conceivable,
and implies no contradiction.

The existence,
therefore,
of any being can only be proved byarguments from its cause or
its
effect; and these arguments arefounded entirely on
experience.
If we reason a priori, anything mayappear able to produce
anything.
The falling of a pebble may, foraught we know, extinguish
the sun;
or the wish of a man control theplanets in their orbits. It
is only
experience, which teaches us thenature and bounds of cause
and effect,
and enables us to infer theexistence of one object from
that
of another.* Such is thefoundation of moral
reasoning, which
forms the greater part of humanknowledge, and is the source
of
all human action and behaviour.

* That impious
maxim of the
ancient philosophy, Ex nihilo, nihilfit, by which the creation
of matter
was excluded, ceases to be amaxim, according to this
philosophy.
Not only the will of thesupreme Being may create
matter;
but, for aught we know a priori,the will of any other being
might
create it, or any other cause,that the most whimsical
imagination
can assign.

Moral reasonings
are either
concerning particular or generalfacts. All deliberations in
life
regard the former; as also alldisquisitions in history,
chronology,
geography, and astronomy.

The sciences,
which treat
of general facts, are politics, naturalphilosophy, physic,
chemistry, &c.
where the qualities, causes andeffects of a whole species
of objects
are enquired into.

Divinity or
Theology, as it
proves the existence of a Deity, and theimmortality of souls, is
composed
partly of reasonings concerningparticular, partly
concerning general
facts. It has a foundation inreason, so far as it is
supported
by experience. But its best and mostsolid foundation is faith
and divine
revelation.

Morals and
criticism are not
so properly objects of theunderstanding as of taste
and sentiment.
Beauty, whether moral ornatural, is felt, more
properly
than perceived. Or if we reasonconcerning it, and endeavor
to fix
its standard, we regard a new fact,to wit, the general tastes
of mankind,
or some such fact, which may bethe object of reasoning and
enquiry.

When we run over
libraries,
persuaded of these principles, whathavoc must we make? If we
take in
our hand any volume; of divinityor school metaphysics, for
instance;
let us ask, Does it contain anyabstract reasoning
concerning quantity
or number? No. Does itcontain any experimental
reasoning
concerning matter of fact andexistence? No. Commit it
then to
the flames: for it can containnothing but sophistry and
illusion.