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Don’t Take Covert Action against Iran

As the United States conducts major naval exercises off the
Iranian coast, ABC News reports that President Bush has authorized
the CIA to conduct a covert action campaign to destabilize the
Iranian government. It is an unwise and potentially disastrous
scheme. A far better strategy would be to engage the Iranian regime
in an effort to create domestic pressures for it to reform.

One can understand the temptation to undermine the Iranian
government, since it is one of the more odious political and social
systems on the planet. But a U.S. covert action program is almost
certain to be counterproductive. While a growing number of Iranians
(especially young Iranians) are fed up with the repressive rule of
the mullahs and want a more open society, U.S. sponsorship of a
resistance campaign could be the kiss of death for those
factions.

Moreover, millions of Iranians have not yet made up their minds
about whether to support the current ruling elite or back
reformers.

Many of those moderates seem increasingly disillusioned with the
mullahs, but they are not necessarily fond of the United
States.

Moreover, populations the world over almost universally resent
pressure and interference from foreign powers. The typical reaction
is to rally around the incumbent regime and reject opposition
figures tainted by foreign influence.

Popular resentment against a covert U.S. campaign of
destabilization is even more likely in Iran than in other
nations.

Most Iranians remember that the United States interfered once
before in their country’s internal affairs, and the outcome was not
a happy one. It was a coup orchestrated by the CIA in 1953 that
ousted a democratic government and restored the autocratic Shah to
power. His corrupt and repressive rule for the next quarter century
paved the way for the Islamic fundamentalist revolution. Any hint
of U.S. meddling today would probably cause Iranian moderates to
make common cause with the ruling religious elite.

Even a covert campaign to force the existing regime to change
its behavior — which some anonymous administration officials
insist is the real purpose of the new effort — is likely to
backfire. Proponents contend that such covert action is an
alternative to war with Iran.

But instead of being a substitute for war, it could easily
become a prelude to war.

The Iranian regime is not likely to tamely accept U.S. actions
directed against it. That is especially true if such actions
include Washington’s apparent support for Sunni Muslims based in
Pakistan who have already launched terrorist attacks against urban
targets in Iran.

If Tehran retaliates by sponsoring new terrorist missions
against American interests in the Middle East (as seems all too
probable), there will be potent cries in the United States for
military action against Iran.

Rather than go down the counterproductive and dangerous path of
covert action, the United States should try exactly the opposite
approach: engagement, leading to the normalization of diplomatic
and economic relations with Iran. The Iranian leadership would
likely be enticed by the carrot of normalized relations with
Washington — and the considerable economic benefits that it would
ensue. In the long run, though, normalization would undermine the
power of the clerical regime. For authoritarian systems, engagement
is a poisoned carrot.

Engagement would unleash insidious medium-and long-term economic
and political trends. Ever since the Islamic revolution in 1979,
Iran’s economy has been a chronic underachiever. A restored
economic relationship with the United States would create a host of
new trading and investment opportunities. That, in turn, would
produce a rapidly growing middle class.

As we have seen in countries as diverse as South Korea, Chile,
Mexico and Taiwan, the emergence of a large, prosperous middle
class creates powerful domestic pressures for more open —
ultimately, fully democratic — political systems. That process
would likely occur in Iran as well. For millions of Iranians
pursuing their economic dreams, the dour and restrictive mullahs
would be an increasingly unacceptable obstacle. And there would be
real centers of economic power to challenge the incumbent political
elites.

Covert warfare would drive millions of moderate Iranians into
the arms of the mullahs and increase the danger of an armed
conflict between the United States and Iran. Engagement is almost
certain to produce a better outcome, and it’s a better way to
achieve our objectives.