An alternative to the standard endurance/perdurance accounts of persistence has recently been developed: the stage theory (Sider, 2001; Hawley, 2001). According to this theory, a persisting object is identical with an instantaneous stage (temporal part). On the basis of Leibniz’s Law, I argue that stage theorists either have to deny the alleged identity (i.e. give up their central thesis) or hold that stages are both instantaneous and continuants. I subsequently show that, although stage theory is flexible enough to accommodate the latter claim, the cost for accommodating it is an excessive proliferation of persistence concepts.

@inproceedings{09a7b101-48c9-445f-9b5b-4b6f2704f04f,
abstract = {<b>Abstract in Undetermined</b><br/><br>
An alternative to the standard endurance/perdurance accounts of persistence has recently been developed: the stage theory (Sider, 2001; Hawley, 2001). According to this theory, a persisting object is identical with an instantaneous stage (temporal part). On the basis of Leibniz’s Law, I argue that stage theorists either have to deny the alleged identity (i.e. give up their central thesis) or hold that stages are both instantaneous and continuants. I subsequently show that, although stage theory is flexible enough to accommodate the latter claim, the cost for accommodating it is an excessive proliferation of persistence concepts.},
author = {Hansson Wahlberg, Tobias},
booktitle = {Procedings of the 2008 Lund-Rutgers Conference, Lund Philosophy Reports 2008:1},
editor = {Jönsson, Martin},
keyword = {persistence,stage theory,temporal counterparts,predication,Leibniz’s Law},
language = {eng},
pages = {78--82},
publisher = {Lund University (Media-Tryck)},
title = {Can I be an Instantaneous Stage and yet Persist Through Time?},
year = {2008},
}