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2. General GRUNERT. Sergeant, this Board is attempting to get at the facts, both as to what happened before and as to what led up to Pearl Harbor. Through a study of the congressional hearings on a resolution which indirectly brought this Board into being, we found, there, a reference to your name and your assignment in Hawaii at the time, and we understood from that reference that you, at the time, were connected with the Air Warning Service, and probably were with Sergeant [995] Lockard at the radar station known as Opana.

Sergeant ELLIOTT. That is right, sir.

3. General GRUNERT. So we asked you to come up here to tell us about that, and to answer our questions concerning it.

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

4. General GRUNERT. General Frank will ask you some questions and we hope to get at some facts through those questions.

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. Sir, I would like to make one correction. Sergeant Lockard was not a Sergeant at the time. He was a private.

5. General GRUNERT. He was a private, at the time?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. At the time of Pearl Harbor; yes, sir.

6. General GRUNERT. All right.

7. General FRANK. Sergeant, what was your rank, on the morning of December 7, 1941?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. That particular morning, we had a problem, and my duties were to plot the approach of targets that we picked up on

518 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

our detector-to plot them and send them in to our information center.

10. General FRANK. Let us be a little more specific as to what your duties were. Did you operate the machine called the oscilloscope?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. No, sir; I did not.

[996]

11. General FRANK. You were the plotter?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

12. General FRANK. From whom did you get your information, to make your plots?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. I received information from Private Lockard, as to the plots I would make.

13. General FRANK. How much training had you had?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. I had two weeks' training on plotting, at that particular time.

14. General FRANK. Did your assignment require you to have any technical knowledge of the operation of the radar equipment.

Sergeant ELLIOTT. No, sir; it did not. I might add, sir, that having technical knowledge would make one a better operator.

15. General FRANK. But it did not affect your plotting?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. No, sir.

16. General FRANK. How frequently had you been on this duty?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Well, sir, I had only been on it the two weeks previous to Pearl Harbor.

17. General FRANK. How many times had you been doing this work?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. I might clear that up, sir, by saying that I had only been in the outfit for about three months, and actually, on a detector, I had only had about two weeks, actually, in operation.

18. General FRANK. As a plotter?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. The other time was spent in setting up the unit and doing regular company duty, [997] previously to that.

19. General FRANK. Prior to the morning in question, how much activity had you had in the operation of the station? How much daily activity had you had early in the morning.

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Well, sir, I didn't operate every day, but at that time we were operating three hours a day.

20. General FRANK. On the days on which you operated, how much activity did you have early in the morning?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Sir, do you mean as to the targets that were received?

21. General FRANK. Yes, as to the number of planes that were out, that you picked up.

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Well, sir, I don't exactly remember.

22. General FRANK. What I am trying to ascertain is whether, on the morning of December 7, there was more activity than usual, or whether there was less activity than usual; or was it average?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Well, sir, during our problem, on Sunday, there was practically no activity, at all.

23. General FRANK. Prior to this time?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Prior to 7 o'clock; yes, sir. We had no plots to send in to our information center, and had no targets.

24. General FRANK. That is, on this morning of December 7?

PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 519

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. Previously, on days before that, there were, I would say, probably around 25 targets sent in. I don't remember for sure, but just a guess.

25. General FRANK. That is, on weekdays?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

[998]

26. General FRANK. There was general conversation around the operating room as to the manner and the satisfactoriness of the operation of the set, was there?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. No, sir; the set was operating satisfactorily during the problem. However, we had had trouble with the oil pump on the generator, previously; that is, the day before Pearl Harbor; and from the time we reported on the air, which was about 4:15 in the morning, till 7 o'clock, we had no discrepancies in operation.

[999]

27. General GRUNERT. Was that oil pump just a temporary disability?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

28. General GRUNERT. That could easily be fixed and was fixed?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir

29. General FRANK. That was an oil pump on the engine of your generating set?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir, on the engine, to generate power

30. General FRANK. Yes. How did your communications work between your radar set and the information center?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Very well, sir. We had direct communication. We had two lines of communication. We had a tactical line on which we sent the plots in directly to the information center, and we also had an administrative line.

31. General FRANK. Did you communicate the plotted positions?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes.

32. General FRANK. Or did somebody else do that?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Well, sir, at that time there were no plots to send in, as I remember.

33. General FRANK. But when there were plots to send in, you did that?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. The plotter has the head set that is connected with the information center.

34. General FRANK. There were no difficulties with your 270 radar set on that morning?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. None that I know of, sir.

36. General FRANK. All right. It was operated by motor [1000] generator rather than by commercial current?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir

36. General FRANK. Had your motor generator been working all right except for that oil pump trouble the day before?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Previously, yes, sir

37. General FRANK. DO YOU know whether or not that were plenty of spare parts and spare tubes for the set?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. That, I am sure there were, sir.

38. General FRANK. Did you consider the set dependable?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Very much, sir.

39. General FRANK; Where was the location of the set at Opana Point with respect to the Kahuku Point radios station?

520 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Sergeant ELLIOTT. I believe, sir, it was between two and three miles.

40. General FRANK. Back toward the hills?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

41. General FRANK. Was it on an elevation so that the line of sight was above the Kahuku Point radio towers?

42. General FRANK. All right. There was no interference with the Kahuku Point radio station, with the operation of the set?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. That, sir, I can't answer that, although there may possibly have been, at that particular azimuth.

43. General FRANK. Who was operating the set?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. At what time, sir?

44. General FRANK. Who was operating the set when you first [1001] picked up any planes? You stated that it was very quiet and you didn't pick up any airplanes prior to about 7 o'clock?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

45. General FRANK. And who was operating the set when you did pick up some airplanes?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Well, that, sir, is: after our problem was over at 7 o'clock, I was to get further instruction in the operation of the oscilloscope, and at that time I was at the controls. However, Lockard was instructing me as to the different echoes that I would see, and it was at that time that the flight was noticed by Private Lockard.

46. General FRANK. Well, when he first noticed the flight did he take over the operation of the oscilloscope, or did he leave you with it?

Sergeant ELLIOTT . Yes, sir; he took over the operation of the oscilloscope because it was just something completely out of the ordinary.

47. General FRANK. And unusual?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

48. General FRANK. All right. And you remember about what time that was?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; by our clock at the unit it was two minutes after seven.

49. General FRANK. Was a plotting made of the planes that they picked up?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. After insisting for quite some time on my part, there was a plot made.

50. General FRANK. Well, who made the plots?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. I made the plots, sir, and sent them [1002] in. I spoke to the switchboard operator at the information center. I spoke over the administrative telephone line.

51. General FRANK. Will you look at that (indicating)? Is that a copy of your plot sheet?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. This one particular flight, yes, sir. The others were entered after this particular flight was marked.

53. General FRANK. And after you went off duty?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 521

54. General FRANK. We shall mark that as the next exhibit and put it in the record.

Please have the record show that this is the same plotting sheet to which General Colton referred in his testimony, and the witness has testified that he made the plot starting from north of Oahu at 7:02 a. m. and extending down to 7:30 a. m.

(Radar plotting sheet of December 7, 1941, was marked Exhibit No. 15 and received in evidence.)

55. General FRANK. Will you please give a description of the sequence of events as they developed from the time you picked up that flight coming in?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. After picking up the flight Private Lockard took over the controls of the oscilloscope. I went to the plotting table and asked Private Lockard to give me a target on it, which he did. After getting the plot I suggested that we send it in to our information centers; and [1003] since our problem had been over at 7 o'clock, Private Lockard looked at me and laughed and told me I was crazy for wanting to send in that reading.

56. General FRANK. Why?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. That I do not know, sir. I presume, sir, that it was because our problem had been over at 7 o'clock. But I kept talking about the plot and sending it in; and, as an example, I stated that even if it was the Navy planes coming in, that if the Army was to send up interceptors to intercept those planes it would make a fine problem. And finally, after talking about it for awhile, why, he told me to go ahead and send it in if I wanted to, which I did.

I called the information center on the administrative line and spoke to the switchboard operation at the information center, who was Corporal McDonald. He was Private McDonald at that time. I explained to him what we had picked up, and he stated that he didn't know what to do about it, as there wasn't anybody at the information center. I asked him to get somebody that would know what to do. So with that we hung up.

Later, Private McDonald called back to the unit. At this time Private Lockard answered the phone, and he spoke to the officer referred to in the Roberts report; and the information given Lockard-it was told to me through Lockard-was to forget it; and after he was given that information to forget it, he wanted to shut the unit down.

57. General FRANK. Who wanted to shut it down?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Private Lockard wanted to shut the unit down, and since I was to get the instruction on it I wanted to continue operation. Finally, after insisting on that, we did [1004] continue the flight and completing the flight on this chart which you have just shown me before, sir, and we followed the flight all the way in until it was approximately 15 or 25 miles from the Island of Oahu, and the flight was lost. It was lost due to technical reasons, that it was an impossibility to detect it any further.

The oscilloscope, from the beam that is sent out, has a back echo, and at that particular spot the oscilloscope is blank, and it is impossible to pick up any flight whatsoever at that particular point, and that was as far as we could follow the flight, and at approximately

522 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

7:39 is when we started to shut down the unit, and at 7:45 our truck came from our camp (incidentally, which was nine miles away from the unit) to pick us up to take us to breakfast, and upon arriving at the camp, why, we had found out what had happened at Pearl Harbor.

58. General FRANK. What had happened?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Well, the Japanese had struck, sir.

59. General FRANK. Did you make any attempt to look for the planes in the direction in which they had come in on your plot from the Opana position?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. No, sir.

60. General FRANK. You didn't have any suspicion?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

61. General FRANK. That they were Japanese planes?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Well, at the time, no, sir, we didn't have any suspicion they were Japanese planes, although it was just something out of the ordinary and did create a curiosity in us; and, however, we did, as I remember it now, go outside of the unit, and tried to see planes from our location at the [1005] unit, although we couldn't see any.

62. General FRANK. Well, if there was no suspicion of their being Japanese planes, and you wanted to get instruction in the operation of the oscilloscope, why did Lockard take it away from you?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Well, that, sir, I do not know, because I never went back to the oscilloscope until after.

63. General FRANK. If it was instruction that you were after, that was a right good opportunity to get it, wasn't it?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. Incidentally, sir, the reason why I could not get the instruction during the problem was the fact that it would take an experienced man to operate that unit and pick up those flights efficiently. But I was just as pleased, sir, to be able to plot it, because it actually was the first flight that was out at that distance that I was able to plot.

64. General FRANK. How far out did you pick it up; do you remember?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Well, at the very beginning, sir, it was 137 miles.

65. General GRUNERT. Are there any questions?

66. General RUSSELL. Sergeant, was there any interruption in the operation of the oscilloscope that morning?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. None that I know of, sir.

67. General RUSSELL. Then, it would be a legitimate conclusion that just as soon as these planes came within range you would pick them up?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

68. General RUSSELL. The point I was attempting to make [1006] definite is that there wasn't any period of time there between the end of the problem and your continued practice when the oscilloscope was not functioning.

Sergeant ELLIOTT. No, sir, there was no time. I am sure there wasn't. Another point, sir, that I might bring out, our clock at the unit I said showed 7:02 at the time that we sent in the first plot. However, when I was ordered, over the plotting set while we were operating the problem, to shut down, the time by the clock there

PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 523

was 6:54, and I can't remember as to whether we had made any time check whatsoever that morning.

69. General RUSSELL. Now, Sergeant, had you been on any Sunday problem prior to this morning of December 7th?

82. General RUSSELL. Do you know why you were sent out on this particular Sunday morning, Sergeant?

[1008] Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. We were sent out there on Saturday afternoon. We were sent out there for the purpose of-well, at that time during peacetime it wasn't guarding the unit, although we had a firearm out there; we had a .45 pistol and I believe it was seven rounds of ammunition, but the purpose in our being out there was just to be on the unit in case any prowlers or anyone should come around. It wasn't a regular guard post or a walking post or

524 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

anything of that nature, but it did call for two men to be present at all times at the unit.

83. General RUSSELL. The equipment was left out there continuously, then?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

84. General RUSSELL. Your presence was antisabotage, was it?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

85. General RUSSELL. Now, how long had that set been in at this point, if you know?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. We had started putting it in, sir, about two weeks before Pearl Harbor. No, sir. We moved out to that location in November, the early part of November, and setting up the unit took about two weeks, and the other two weeks was previous to Pearl Harbor.

86. General RUSSELL. NOW, how long had you been with this signal outfit?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Well, just a period of three months before Pearl Harbor, sir.

87. General RUSSELL. Do you recall when the first mobile sets were received and installed?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. That, sir, I couldn't answer, as I was [1009] in the Air Corps at that time. and when I was transferred to the signal company, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii, they had already had some of their location picked out and other units in operation.

88. General RUSSELL. When was that?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Well, upon my transfer it was the 15th of September in '40, sir; '41.

89. General RUSSELL. When you were transferred over to the signal outfit from the Air Corps-I want to get this definite and know that you are accurate in the statement-some locations had been selected and some of the units were in operation?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; they were.

90. General RUSSELL. And that was in September?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

91. General RUSSELL. Sergeant, in reporting these flights or targets that you had discovered out there on ordinary days, did you know or were you told what any of these flights were?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. I don't quite get your point, sir. You mean?

92. General RUSSELL. You discovered the flights after 7 o'clock?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

93. General RUSSELL. Every target that you had discovered or worked out here before had been after 7 o'clock in the morning?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. I am sure it was, yes, sir.

94. General RUSSELL. And this is the first target that you had ever discovered before 7 o'clock, because it was the first time you had been on duty before 7 o'clock?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. You are referring, sir, to the enemy [1010] planes that we picked up on the morning of the 7th?

95. General RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; I think it was shortly after 7 o'clock, Sir.

96. General RUSSELL. Yes, but prior to this morning you had never been on duty before 7 o'clock?

PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 525

Sergeant ELLIOTT. I am sure that I wasn't sir.

97. General FRANK. Do you mean that this is the first time that you ever went on duty around 4 o'clock?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. I am sure it was; yes, sir.

98. General FRANK. Well, what time were you on duty this morning?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. You see, sir, we were on duty from 4 until 7 operating the unit, but we had been out at the station since Saturday afternoon at 12 o'clock, the day before Sunday.

99. General FRANK. Do you know whether or not this unit was operated daily?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir, it was.

100. General FRANK. Starting at what time?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Well, at that time I don't remember, sir, just how long we had been operating from 4 to 7. I don't believe it was long. But that was the operating time that we had been operating.

101. General FRANK. From 4 to 7?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

102. General FRANK. But you had not been out there before at 4 o'clock?

[1011] Sergeant ELLIOTT. NO, sir.

103. General FRANK. Were you a regular plotter?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. No, sir; still in the process of learning. This covers a period of two weeks that I learned the plotter's duty. This two weeks' time, sir, was during the daytime when there was no problem scheduled where it called for experienced men to be operating.

104. General FRANK. Oh. Well, then, you were not the regularly assigned plotter? You just happened to be there getting instruction; is that correct?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Well, I had had my instruction; I was a qualified plotter at that time.

106. General FRANK. But you were not the regular, assigned plotter for that station; is that correct?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Well, no, sir. We never actually had a regular, assigned plotter, sir. The men that had the duty were just men that were assigned. They may not be assigned at the same time each time they were assigned. It was just those that were called to make up a crew for the particular time that we operated. We didn't have enough men to make complete groups.

106. General FRANK. I have nothing further.

[1012]

107. Colonel GRUNERT. The problems you referred to were the exercises between 4 and 7 each morning; is that correct?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

108. General GRUNERT. The rest of the day was spent in instruction and training, quite often spent on the set; not particularly engaged in trying to get any particular thing out of the air or any problem out of the air?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. No, sir, other than just for purposes of training.

109. General GRUNERT. As a plotter at the radar station it was none of your business to be informed as to what was in the air, whether Navy, Marine, or Army craft?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. No, sir.

110. General GRUNERT. You plotted everything you found there?

526 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Sergeant ELLIOTT. That is right, sir.

111. General GRUNERT. And sent that to the information center, and it was their business to know what was in the air, whether it was friendly or enemy craft?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. At the information center, sir, they had officers from the Navy, the Army, the Coast Artillery, and so forth, and Air Corps officers, and so forth, and they all had information as to the flights that their particular branch was sending out. But after that is plotted on the plotting table, any flight that they cannot account for, any one of the different branches, it is considered an enemy plane. That was the procedure. We were never notified out there as to what the target was that we had picked up.

112. General GRUNERT. Can you tell from the radar how many [1018] planes there are in a certain flight?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. No, sir.

113. General GRUNERT. Can you tell whether there are a lot of planes or just one?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. In the case of the morning of the 7th, when there was such a large flight, we knew it was a large flight.

114. General GRUNERT. How did you know it was a large flight if the machine did not tell you?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Just by the appearance on the oscilloscope, sir.

115. General GRUNERT. Then you can tell whether it is a volume of planes or a single plane?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. At particular distances, sir, if there was only one or a few planes we could tell they were only a few. However. if there is a large number of planes we could tell that there was a large number of planes and know that it was not just a few.

116. General GRUNERT. Do you suppose that that is what excited Lockard when the machine showed there was a large number of planes and he took it over for himself?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Sir, as to exactly what happened there: The oscilloscope has a main pulse. That main pulse to the extreme left is the zero point in the mileage scale; and what Lockard thought that morning was that the mileage scale was off, and he went to check it from the main pulse and found that what he thought was the main pulse was this flight, and he checked it and rechecked it and found that it was not the main pulse; that it was actually a flight. It was from then on that [1014] Private Lockard operated.

117. General GRUNERT. One more question: Did you know anything about some bombers or planes expected from the mainland on that morning?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. No, sir; we did not know that. I did not know it at that time.

118. General GRUNERT. Thank you very much for coming up, Sergeant, and giving us that information.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

Media Credits

Testimony of Sergant George E. Elliott at the Army Pearl Harbor Hearing Board 517.