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S E C R E T STATE 131801
NOFORN
SIPDIS
FOR TFCO
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/28/2019
TAGS: EFINKTFNPTERPINRPRELPKKUAEQASA
SUBJECT: TERRORIST FINANCE: ACTION REQUEST FOR SENIOR
LEVEL ENGAGEMENT ON TERRORISM FINANCE
REF: A. (A) STATE 112368
¶B. (B) RIYADH 1499
¶C. (C) KUWAIT 1061
¶D. (D) KUWAIT 1021
¶E. (E) ABU DHABI 1057
¶F. (F) DOHA 650
¶G. (G) ISLAMABAD 2799
Classified By: EEB/ESC Deputy Assistant Secretary
Douglas C. Hengel for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
-------
Summary
-------
¶1. (U) This is an action request cable. Please see para 3.
¶2. (S/NF) Summary: In August 2009, Special Representative to
the President for Afghanistan and Pakistan (S/SRAP)
Ambassador Richard Holbrooke in coordination with the
Department of Treasury established the interagency Illicit
Finance Task Force (IFTF). The IFTF is chaired by Treasury
A/S David Cohen. It focuses on disrupting illicit finance
activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the external
financial/logistical support networks of terrorist groups
that operate there, such as al-Qa'ida, the Taliban, and
Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LeT). The IFTF's activities are a vital
component of the USG's Afghanistan and Pakistan (Af/Pak)
strategy dedicated to disrupting illicit finance flows
between the Gulf countries and Afghanistan and Pakistan. The
IFTF has created a diplomatic engagement strategy to assist
in the accomplishment of this objective. The strategy
focuses on senior-level USG engagement with Gulf countries
and Pakistan to communicate USG counterterrorism priorities
and to generate the political will necessary to address the
problem. The IFTF has drafted talking points for use by all
USG officials in their interactions with Gulf and Pakistani
interlocutors. These points focus on funding for terrorist
groups threatening stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan and
targeting coalition soldiers. These points have been cleared
through the relevant Washington agencies.
¶3. (SBU) Action request: Drawing on the background materials
for respective countries, and in preparation for the upcoming
visits by Ambassador Holbrooke and Treasury U/S Levey in
January, the Department requests all action posts deliver the
general talking points in paras 5-6 and country specific
talking points contained in the following paras: (1) Saudi
Arabia ) para 8, (2) Kuwait ) para 10, (3) UAE ) para 12,
and (4) Pakistan ) para 13. The talking points should be
delivered by Ambassadors/Charge D'Affaires.
¶4. (C) In response to State 112368, the Department has
received responses from Embassies Riyadh, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi,
Doha, and Islamabad regarding the resource capabilities
devoted towards these efforts. The Department also received
each Mission's evaluation of the effectiveness of host
country institutions working on combating terrorism financing
along with post's recommendations on ways forward.
----------------------------------------
General talking points for all Embassies
----------------------------------------
¶5. (SBU) Threat financing:
Cutting off the flow of funds to terrorist organizations and
achieving stability in Af/Pak are top U.S. priorities.
These objectives require effective actions against terrorist
fundraising in the Gulf by
al-Qa'ida, the Taliban, LeT, and other Af/Pak-based violent
extremist groups, all of which undermine the security of the
entire international community. We will not succeed without
your cooperation.
Long term success in combating terrorist financing requires a
comprehensive, strategic approach that includes the following
elements:
(1) aggressive action to identify, disrupt and deter
terrorist donors, fundraisers and facilitators;
(2) appropriate legal measures, including effective
prosecution, to hold terrorist financiers and facilitators
publicly accountable and to send a strong message of
deterrence to current and would-be donors that their actions
face significant legal and social repercussions.
(3) strong oversight of charities, including their
overseas branches, to ensure that these organizations are not
supporting terrorist and extremist elements;
(4) strict enforcement of UN 1267 sanctions; and
(5) full compliance with international anti-money
laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT)
standards, including vigorous enforcement.
¶6. (SBU) Charities:
The United States strongly supports legitimate charitable
activities and is a strong proponent of private charitable
giving.
We recognize and admire the emphasis placed on charity within
Islam and we seek to work cooperatively with governments and
organizations in the Islamic world to ensure that legitimate
charitable activities thrive.
At the same time, we want to increase our cooperative efforts
to ensure that extremists and terrorists do not exploit
charitable giving.
--------------------------------------------- ----------
Country-specific background material and talking points
--------------------------------------------- ----------
¶7. (U) Saudi Arabia background
(S/NF) While the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) takes
seriously the threat of terrorism within Saudi Arabia, it has
been an ongoing challenge to persuade Saudi officials to
treat terrorist financing emanating from Saudi Arabia as a
strategic priority. Due in part to intense focus by the USG
over the last several years, Saudi Arabia has begun to make
important progress on this front and has responded to
terrorist financing concerns raised by the United States
through proactively investigating and detaining financial
facilitators of concern. Still, donors in Saudi Arabia
constitute the most significant source of funding to Sunni
terrorist groups worldwide. Continued senior-level USG
engagement is needed to build on initial efforts and
encourage the Saudi government to take more steps to stem the
flow of funds from Saudi Arabia-based sources to terrorists
and extremists worldwide.
(S/NF) The USG engages regularly with the Saudi
Government on terrorist financing. The establishment in 2008
of a Treasury attache office presence in Riyadh contributes
to robust interaction and information sharing on the issue.
Despite this presence, however, more needs to be done since
Saudi Arabia remains a critical financial support base for
al-Qa'ida, the Taliban, LeT, and other terrorist groups,
including Hamas, which probably raise millions of dollars
annually from Saudi sources, often during Hajj and Ramadan.
In contrast to its increasingly aggressive efforts to disrupt
al-Qa'ida's access to funding from Saudi sources, Riyadh has
taken only limited action to disrupt fundraising for the UN
1267-listed Taliban and LeT-groups that are also aligned with
al-Qa'ida and focused on undermining stability in Afghanistan
and Pakistan.
(S/NF) Saudi Arabia has enacted important reforms to
criminalize terrorist financing and restrict the overseas
flow of funds from Saudi-based charities. However, these
restrictions fail to include &multilateral organizations8
such as the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO),
Muslim World League (MWL) and the World Assembly of Muslim
Youth (WAMY.) Intelligence suggests that these groups
continue to send money overseas and, at times, fund extremism
overseas. In 2002, the Saudi government promised to set up a
&Charities Committee8 that would address this issue, but
has yet to do so. The establishment of such a mechanism,
however, is secondary to the primary U.S. goal of obtaining
Saudi acknowledgement of the scope of this problem and a
commitment to take decisive action.
(S/NF) Department note: The Department received post's
comments regarding embassy staffing at Riyadh and
recommendations for enhancing bilateral cooperation (ref B).
The Department agrees with post's recommendation that the
U.S. must reinforce, on a political level, the Saudi Arabia
Government's recent acknowledgement that terrorist groups
other than al-Qa'ida are a threat both to it and to regional
stability. The Department also supports post's assessment
that consistent engagement, including the exchange of
actionable intelligence, by senior USG officials is
paramount. We plan to discuss these issues with the SAG
during upcoming senior-level USG visits.
¶8. (U) Saudi Arabia talking points
(S/REL USA, SAU) We recognize your government's efforts to
disrupt al-Qa'ida networks in the Kingdom and we reaffirm our
commitment to support the Saudi government in its actions on
terror finance. We encourage your government to continue
efforts against al-Qa'ida and stress the importance of
sharing and acting on information related to terrorist
financing.
(S/REL USA, SAU) We note your concerns with fundraising in
the Kingdom by al-Qa'ida and other terrorist groups and urge
decisive action to enforce the UN 1267-mandated asset freeze
against Taliban and LeT fundraising similar to Saudi efforts
to enforce UN 1267 sanctions and take other appropriate
action to target al-Qa'ida.
(S/REL USA, SAU) We underscore that the Taliban and LeT are
aligned with al-Qa'ida and that your government's support for
disrupting the financing of these groups is critical to the
stability of Afghanistan, Pakistan and the broader Central
and South Asian region. We emphasize the need to prevent the
Taliban from using the cover of reconciliation talks to raise
funds.
(S/REL USA, SAU) We urge your government to assume
responsibility for the overseas operations of charities and
NGOs headquartered in the Kingdom. We encourage you to
prevent terrorists and their supporters from exploiting
religious events (Hajj, Umrah, Ramadan) to raise funds. We
acknowledge the recent adoption of stricter financial
controls on charities, but urge greater regulation and
oversight of the Saudi charitable sector.
(S/REL USA, SAU) We would like to stress our interest in
broadening and deepening this dialogue and information
exchange as we still lack detailed information on the
ultimate sources of terrorist financing emanating from the
Kingdom. We commend your government for recent efforts to
put terrorists and terrorist financiers on trial, and we
encourage you to publicize details of prosecutions to
maximize the deterrent effects.
(S/REL USA, SAU) You have had success in detaining and
deterring financial facilitators. However, we encourage your
government also to focus on the long-term and more
fundamental goal of dissuading donors from funding violent
extremism.
(S/REL USA, SAU) We commend your government's effort over the
past several years to use the media, internet, and other
forms of public outreach to discourage extremism. We
emphasize that a critical component in this campaign is
cutting off the flow of funds from Saudi Arabia to foreign
religious, charitable, and educational organizations that
propagate violent extremist ideologies to vulnerable
populations.
¶9. (U) Kuwait background
(S/NF) The USG has consistently engaged the Government of
Kuwait (GOK) about the specific activities of terrorist
financiers in country, Kuwaiti charities financing terrorism
abroad, and Kuwait's lack of a comprehensive anti-money
laundering and counter-terrorist financing regime. While the
GOK has demonstrated a willingness to take action when
attacks target Kuwait, it has been less inclined to take
action against Kuwait-based financiers and facilitators
plotting attacks outside of Kuwait. Al-Qa'ida and other
groups continue to exploit Kuwait both as a source of funds
and as a key transit point.
(S/NF) The GOK has undertaken a number of initiatives to curb
terrorist financing in the charitable sector (ending direct
cash donations, increasing monitoring and supervising mosques
and charitable organizations, and enhancing enforcement of
regulations by a Ministry of Social Affairs task force). It
also recently arrested some Kuwait-based al-Qa'ida
facilitators, but it is too early to assess whether this
marks a change in Kuwaiti policy of co-opting terrorists as a
means of deflecting potential attacks against Kuwaiti
interests.
(S/NF) Kuwait's law prohibits efforts to undermine or attack
Arab neighbors, a basis for the prosecution of al-Qa'ida
facilitators, Kuwait remains the sole Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) country that has not criminalized terrorist
financing. The GOK faces an uphill battle to implement
comprehensive terror finance legislation due to a lack of
parliamentary support. However the government is also not
currently prepared to push hard on this issue. The GOK at
times has obstructed or been slow to enforce UN-mandated
asset freezes of Kuwait-based entities.
(S/NF) A particular point of difference between the U.S. and
Kuwait concerns Revival of Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS).
In June 2008 the USG domestically designated all RIHS offices
RIHS under Executive Order 13224 for providing financial and
material support to al-Qa'ida and UN 1267-listed al-Qa'ida
affiliates, including Lashkar e-Tayyiba, Jemaah Islamiyah,
and Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya. The United States nominated RIHS
for listing under UNSCR 1267 but Indonesia placed a technical
hold on the RIHS listing due concerns regarding RIHS's
presence in Indonesia. Libya also placed a hold - probably
at Kuwait's behest - citing insufficient information on
RIHS's activities. Indonesia has rotated off the United
Nation's Security Council so only Libya's hold on RIHS
remains. (Department note: Libya's hold will drop in 2010
unless one of the newly elected UNSC Members places a hold on
our request to list RIHS.) In Kuwait, RIHS enjoys broad
public support as a charitable entity. The GOK to date has
not taken significant action to address or shut down RIHS's
headquarters or its branches, which is consistent with GOK
tolerance of similar behavior by Kuwaiti citizens and
organizations as long as the behavior occurs or is directed
outside of Kuwait.
(S/NF) Department note: The Department appreciates postVs
thorough description of the staffing situation at Mission
Kuwait (ref B). The Department commends U.S. Embassy Kuwait
for taking an active approach in proposing a strategy to
build GOK capacity in combating financial crimes through
training and seminars focused on legislation and law
enforcement (ref C). The opportunity to engage the GOK on
improving its capabilities to deal with financial crimes is
enthusiastically welcomed by agencies in Washington.
Washington agencies appreciate post's assessment and
identification of several focal areas that deal with
financial crimes. These goals closely track the work of the
IFTF Capacity Building Working Group. The Department
commends Embassy Kuwait's recent support of Kuwait's National
Anti Money Laundering Committee's AML conference in early
December 2009. In response to post's request, the Department
will work with relevant members of the Washington
inter-agency to provide comments and feedback to the draft of
Kuwait's amended AML law.
¶10. (U) Kuwait talking points
(S/REL USA, KWT) We appreciate the breadth and depth of our
strong bilateral relationship. We would like to see our
cooperation on counter-terrorist financing improve to a level
that matches our excellent cooperation in many other areas.
In this respect, the recent Kuwait anti-money laundering
conference held in Kuwait is a positive step forward.
(S/REL USA, KWT) Our information indicates that Kuwaiti
donors serve as an important source of funds and other
support for al-Qa'ida and other terrorist groups. The arrest
in August of six Kuwaiti men who were plotting terrorist
attacks on U.S. and Kuwait interests marks an important step
in enhanced counterterrorism cooperation. We encourage you
to keep up the positive momentum.
(S//REL USA, KWT) We underscore that the Taliban and LeT are
aligned with al-Qaida and that your government's support for
disrupting the financing of these groups is critical to the
stability of Afghanistan, Pakistan and the broader Central
and South Asian region. We emphasize the need to prevent the
Taliban from using the cover of reconciliation talks to raise
funds.
(S/REL USA, KWT) We appreciate your government's generosity
for a wide range of important causes and for the positive
contributions made by Kuwaiti charities. We commend Kuwait
for some of the initiatives taken to enhance oversight of
charitable donations, but we need you to do more to prevent
the financing of terrorism abroad from Kuwaiti soil.
(S/REL USA, KWT) Our goal is to work more closely with your
government to separate and protect legitimate charitable
activity from those that fund terror. We have particular
concerns about their foreign activities.
(S/REL USA, KWT) We remain concerned that the continued
absence of counterterrorism legislation criminalizing
terrorist financing will continue to prevent effective
counterterrorist efforts.
(S/REL USA, KWT) We urge your government to prioritize the
passage of counterterror finance legislation. Robust and
comprehensive anti-money laundering and counterterror
financing laws will enhance your government's ability to
prosecute those seeking to undermine Kuwait's security, but
will also enhance the reputation of Kuwait's financial sector
as a whole.
(S/REL USA, KWT) If raised, Kuwait RIHS: We have shared our
concerns with your government regarding RIHS on numerous
occasions. We designated the organization in the United
States as a specially designated terrorist entity based on
information that RIHS funds have supported terrorist groups
in various regions of the world. The USG is not alone in its
concern; six other governments (Albania, Azerbaijan,
Bangladesh, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, and Russia) have
taken enforcement action against RIHS branches in their
countries.
(S//REL USA, KWT) We would welcome the opportunity to work
more closely with you to ensure that RIHS and other charities
cannot be used to support terrorists.
¶11. (U) United Arab Emirates background
(S/NF) UAE-based donors have provided financial support to a
variety of terrorist groups, including al-Qa'ida, the
Taliban, LeT and other terrorist groups, including Hamas.
Washington agencies note, however, that they have limited
information on the identity of Taliban and LeT donors and
facilitators in the UAE. Hence there is limited information
to be shared with local interlocutors. Nonetheless, the point
can be emphasized that the UAE's role as a growing global
financial center, coupled with weak regulatory oversight,
makes it vulnerable to abuse by terrorist financiers and
facilitation networks.
(S/NF) Department Note: The Department has received post's
comments regarding personnel staffing at Mission UAE and the
challenges post faces. The Department is supportive of the
action plan laid out on engaging with the UAE on Taliban
finance issues (ref E). The Department assesses that a
bilateral commitment by the United States and the UAE to
focus on weaknesses within its financial regulatory measures
is an important step in making progress on strengthening UAE
efforts to disrupt potential terrorist financing.
¶12. (U) United Arab Emirates talking points
(S/REL USA, ARE) We appreciate the depth and breadth of our
bilateral relationship. Since 2001, we have developed a
strong partnership with your government in countering
financial support for al-Qa'ida, and more recently, in
constricting Iran's ability to use UAE financial institutions
to support its nuclear program.
(S/REL USA, ARE) We would like to extend our cooperation and
partnership to efforts to deal with the threat represented by
Taliban and LeT fundraising in the UAE. We believe that the
United States and UAE, which both have troops in the field in
Afghanistan, share a common interest in curtailing any
Taliban or LeT fundraising activities and fully implementing
UN 1267 sanctions on such activities on behalf of these
groups in the UAE.
(S/REL USA, ARE) However, we are pleased that concerns have
been raised in the UAE regarding the Taliban and LeT
fundraising. We also commend the calls for increased
vigilance, information sharing, and enforcement actions to
disrupt and deter this activity.
(S/REL USA, ARE) In our view, the alignment of the Taliban
and LeT with al-Qa'ida means that our mutual efforts to
disrupt the financing of these groups also is critical to the
stability of Afghanistan and Pakistan.
(S/REL USA, ARE) We emphasize the need to prevent the
Taliban from using the cover of reconciliation talks to
travel and raise funds.
(S/REL USA, ARE) We appreciate your government's willingness
to work with the USG on cash courier interdiction and note
that such efforts are crucial to undermine al-Qa'ida, the
Taliban, and other groups' ability to exploit the UAE as a
fundraising and facilitation hub. We urge your government to
strengthen its regulatory and enforcement regime to interdict
cash couriers transiting major airports.
¶13. (U) Pakistan background
(S/NF) Pakistan's intermittent support to terrorist groups
and militant organizations threatens to undermine regional
security and endanger U.S. national security objectives in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Although Pakistani senior
officials have publicly disavowed support for these groups,
some officials from the Pakistan's Inter-Services
Intelligence Directorate (ISI) continue to maintain ties with
a wide array of extremist organizations, in particular the
Taliban, LeT and other extremist organizations. These
extremist organizations continue to find refuge in Pakistan
and exploit Pakistan's extensive network of charities, NGOs,
and madrassas. This network of social service institutions
readily provides extremist organizations with recruits,
funding and infrastructure for planning new attacks. On the
international stage, Pakistan has sought to block the UNSCR
1267 listings of Pakistan-based or affiliated terrorists by
requesting that China place holds on the nominations. China
recently placed a technical hold on the designation of three
Pakistan-based or affiliated terrorists nominated by India,
although China did not prevent the most recent
Pakistan-related U.S. designation nomination in June.
(S/NF) The Department has received post's comments regarding
personnel staffing and the detailed description of the
challenges faced by Embassy Islamabad in the area of
terrorism finance (ref D). Department leaves it to post
discretion to determine which departments within the host
government should receive the points provided in para 16 so
that Pakistan fully understands the priority the USG places
on this issue.
¶14. (U) Pakistan talking points
(S/REL USA, PAK) Emphasize that Pakistan's support for
disrupting financing to the Taliban and LeT obligatory
pursuant to their obligations under UNSCR 1267 and successor
resolutions, and is critical to achieving stability in
Afghanistan and Pakistan.
(S/REL USA, PAK) We are deeply concerned that Pakistan has
failed to enact an AML/CTF law that meets APG/FATF standards.
As you may realize the FATF is currently engaged in a
&International Co-Operation Review Group8 exercise, that
is likely to have very negative multilateral repercussions if
the Parliament does not pass an adequate AML/CTF law.
(S/REL USA, PAK) We stress your government's obligation,
under UNSCR 1267, and successor resolutions to strictly
enforce existing sanctions against the 142 Taliban, LeT
leader Hafiz Saeed, LeT/JUD, al Rashid Trust, al Akhtar Trust
and other individuals and entities on the UN 1267
Consolidated List.
(S/REL USA, PAK) We urge your government to support the
international community's efforts to combat terrorist
financing. Your government's views of UNSCR 1267 listing
requests for LeT and other Pakistan-based terrorist groups
should be made on the merits of the requests and not linked
to politics, including what country made the nomination or
which countries are referenced in the public statements of
the cases.
(S/REL USA, PAK) We urge your government to comply with UN
and domestic legal obligations to enforce sanctions on the
Pakistan-based, UN-proscribed NGOs al Rashid Trust and al
Akhtar Trust, and all successor organizations that continue
to funnel money and provide other forms of support to the
Taliban and LeT.
(S/REL USA, PAK) We emphasize that social services provided
by NGO extremist organizations, such as Jamaat-ud Dawa (JUD)
challenge the legitimacy of your government to provide for
its people. This includes relief efforts in the Internally
Displaced Person (IDP) camps of the Northwest Frontier
Provinces by the new LeT/JUD charity Falah-e Insaniyat
Foundation.
(S/REL USA, PAK) We stress that our governments must work
together to ensure that there are moderate alternatives to
terrorist-controlled social welfare networks upon which IDPs
and other vulnerable populations currently rely. We must
work together to develop and support NGOs not affiliated with
terrorist groups, and establish a comprehensive oversight and
enforcement mechanism for NGOs that is consistent with the
Financial Action Task Force's international standard.
(S//REL USA, PAK) We urge your Government in the strongest
possible terms to take action against the Haqqani network,
which is funneling weapons and fighters across the border to
fight U.S. and Coalition Forces in Afghanistan. This
network, led by Sirajuddin Haqqani who was listed by the UN
under UNSCR 1267, funds its activities through illicit
activities, including kidnapping, extortion, bank robbery,
narcotics, smuggling, and fraud.
(S//REL USA, PAK) We urge your Government to replace the
anti-money laundering decree recently promulgated by your
Executive Branch with legislation fully consistent with the
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations and to
ensure that the current decree can stand in court. The FATF
Forty Plus Nine Recommendations are international standards,
which Pakistan, by virtue of its membership in the
Asia-Pacific Group, committed to.
¶15. (U) Qatar background
(S//NF) Department Note: Qatar is one of the four Gulf
countries included in the IFTF, and accordingly, the IFTF
developed the background information included in para 16 for
inclusion in the diplomatic engagement strategy. However,
given the current focus of U.S. engagement with the GOQ on
terror finance related to Hamas, it would be
counter-productive for Embassy Doha to engage the GOQ at this
time on disrupting financial support of terrorist groups
operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
(S/NF) Qatar has adopted a largely passive approach to
cooperating with the U.S. against terrorist financing.
Qatar's overall level of CT cooperation with the U.S. is
considered the worst in the region. Al-Qaida, the Taliban,
UN-1267 listed LeT, and other terrorist groups exploit Qatar
as a fundraising locale. Although Qatar's security services
have the capability to deal with direct threats and
occasionally have put that capability to use, they have been
hesitant to act against known terrorists out of concern for
appearing to be aligned with the U.S. and provoking
reprisals.
(S//NF) Department Note: The Department has received post's
comments regarding personnel staffing and the thorough
description of the coordination process on terrorist finance
issues at Embassy Doha (ref F). Department appreciates post's
assessment that GOQ definitions of what constitutes terrorism
differs occasionally from those of the USG. Department agrees
with post's suggested approach on this issue of engaging with
direct discussions with host government officials.
----------------------------------------
Points of contact and reporting deadline
----------------------------------------
¶16. (U) Please direct any questions or comments on this
request to EEB/ESC/TFS (Jay J. Jallorina or Linda Recht).
Posts are requested to report back on responses from other
governments by January 19, 2010.
CLINTON