Sicherheitspolitische Presseschau

Defense One

06.11.2018

Zac Brown hält das Argument, dass der INF-Vertrag eine angemessene amerikanische Reaktion auf das chinesische Raketenprogramm verhindere, nicht für überzeugend. Eine Stationierung von landgestützten Mittelstreckenraketen im Pazifik wäre seiner Ansicht nach "taktisch ineffektiv und strategisch destabilisierend". "First, virtually no allies would be willing to host new American ground-based missiles aimed at China. Japan has come out in defense of the INF Treaty, calling a U.S. withdrawal 'undesirable,' while Australian officials have indicated they have low thresholds for U.S. actions they perceive as needlessly provoking Beijing. Moreover, neither country is likely to view Taiwan as a core security interest in the same way as Washington. (...) This leaves the tiny island of Guam — nearly 2,000 miles from China — as the only realistic base for ground-launched missiles, an option which poses severe challenges for both survivability and military utility. (...) Guam is already a high-value target for Beijing, and any new missile deployment would only raise the incentives strike the island quickly in a fight. Moreover, it’s not completely obvious what this new force would do. (...) Simply put, there’s no need for ground-based, intermediate-range missiles when we have those aplenty in the air and at sea, all of which would be able to get in closer to China before launching."

29.10.2018

Die USA und Russland haben Alex Grigsby zufolge bei der UN unterschiedliche Modelle zur Schaffung internationaler Cyber-Normen vorgelegt. "I’m not a UN process expert, so it’s hard to say how this will play out. But if I were a betting man, I’d put my money on the U.S. approach coming out on top. As an institution, the United Nations prefers incrementalism over radical change. That makes it much harder for Russia, China and the rest of the SCO members to drum up support for a twenty-five paragraph code of conduct that contains vague language mostly unfamiliar to many states. By contrast, the U.S. resolution has more similarities to Russia’s previous resolutions, an advantage given that they will be familiar to diplomats at the UN who prefer sticking to previously agreed text. No matter what happens as diplomats haggle over the particulars of the resolution, expect a new GGE [UN Group of Governmental Experts] next year."

23.10.2018

Ankit Panda hält die Möglichkeit, dass ein Cyberangriff auf kritische Infrastrukturen in den USA mit einem Atomangriff beantwortet werden könnte, angesichts der Änderungen in der Nuklearstrategie der US-Regierung für durchaus realistisch. "One danger that merits special attention is the possibility of a North Korean cyberattack escalating out of control – one that sparks an American counterstrike using conventional weapons so intense that Pyongyang responds with an attempted nuclear missile attack on the United States. Or, a scenario where a North Korean cyberattack hits an American target so vital that it elicits an American nuclear missile strike in return. It’s not fantasy. These dynamics are particularly salient given certain policy changes introduced by the Trump administration’s Nuclear Posture Review, or NPR. (...) The Trump administration never should have specified the 'extreme circumstances' that might lead to the United States considering nuclear use. (...) Before a miscalculation or provocation has a chance to test the Trump NPR’s boundaries, U.S. officials in their ongoing talks with North Koreans should make their intentions on nuclear weapons and cyberattacks crystal clear."

21.10.2018

Michael Krepon hält die Drohung von US-Präsident Trump, den INF-Vertrag mit Russland aufzukündigen, sowohl aus diplomatischer als auch aus strategischer Sicht nicht für überzeugend. Die vorgetragenen Vertragsverletzungen Russlands könnten seiner Ansicht nach mit effektiven Gegenmaßnahmen innerhalb des Abkommens beantwortet werden. "There are effective treaty-compliant counters to the Russian violation by means of air-delivered and sea-based capabilities that the Pentagon is already pursuing. The White House could also push Vladimir Putin to return to treaty compliance by linking American restraint on deploying more missile defenses in Europe to the removal of Russia’s noncompliant missiles. But neither Trump nor Bolton has demonstrated a fondness for diplomacy or an interest in reaffirming the INF Treaty. This move is about freedom of U.S. action and a deep, abiding distrust of treaties. Trump’s withdrawal from the INF Treaty fits into an 'America First' strategy that undermines diplomatic ties. That’s the take-away by U.S. friends and allies — along with a foreboding sense of an intensified nuclear competition."

Kevin Baron bezweifelt, dass das Pentagon seine engen Beziehungen zu Saudi-Arabien aufgrund der Affäre um den verschwundenen Journalisten Jamal Khashoggi in Frage stellen wird. Das US-Militär habe bisher in seinen Äußerungen immer wieder die strategische Bedeutung des Bündnispartners hervorgehoben. "Is the Saudi partnership still a matter of necessity? Should it be? That’s not likely the question Mattis and Dunford are asking for the near term. For them, the answer is yes. But for the long term, it’s also question for Pompeo and Trump. It’s a question of whether 'Saudi interests' under bin Salman still align with American interests, or just with American military and intelligence interests. (...) This week, national security press has been inundated with commentaries asking if the U.S.-Saudi relationship has been worth the cost. At the Pentagon, no matter the outcome of the Pompeo fact-finding trip or the Khashoggi investigation, the answer is most likely going to be a resounding yes."

16.10.2018

Das Pentagon fürchtet Patrick Tucker zufolge, dass sich das chinesische Mondprogramm künftig zu einer ernsten Bedrohung für amerikanische Satelliten entwickeln könnte. "The Chinese government has said the mission is part of a four-stage plan to build a moon base. 'We hope to start the construction of the [robot-manned] lunar base around 2025 and realize a manned landing on the moon around 2030,' Zhao Xiaojin of the China Aerospace Science and Technology Group told Xinhuanet in March. But [Jeff Gossel, the senior intelligence engineer in the Space and Missile Analysis Group at the Air Force’s National Air and Space Intelligence Center,] said putting a satellite at L2 could also enable Chinese attack spacecraft to zoom past the moon — about a quarter-million miles away — and then sneak up on critical U.S. intelligence and communications satellites in geosynchronous orbit, just 28,300 miles up — as occurred in the 2011 apocalypse-themed film 'Melancholia.'"

08.10.2018

Schulen in den USA werden aus Furcht vor neuen Amokläufen immer häufiger mit Sicherheits- und Überwachungssystemen ausgerüstet, die üblicherweise von der Polizei eingesetzt werden, berichtet Sydney Fussell. Ethische Fragen zum Einsatz dieser Sicherheitsmaßnahmen rücken dabei auch auf Seiten der Schüler weitgehend in den Hintergrund. "Rather than seeing surveillance technology, broadly, or face recognition, specifically, as invasive or disruptive to the learning environment, he has noticed the opposite: Students accept the presence of the tech without question. 'As our kids get older, they’ve been through all that before,' [Greg Bronson, a Lockport native and the president of the local teachers’ union,] says, referring to a number of emergency drills mandated by the state. Lockport students run school-shooting drills almost monthly. Bronson hypothesizes that, soon enough, face recognition and other technologies will just become part of the architecture of the modern school day, much the same as the drills. 'If anything,' he said, 'the bigger issue is getting them to take it seriously, because they have become so routine.'"

Patrick Tucker hat sich ausführlich mit Peter W. Singer über dessen neues Buch "Like War: The Weaponization of Social Media" unterhalten. "A new book looks at how 'likes' and lies are reshaping the nature of war and peace around the globe. We sat down with the author."

25.09.2018

Die Regierung in Warschau strebt die Errichtung einer ständigen US-Militärbasis in Polen an und möchte den US-Präsidenten durch den vorgeschlagenen Namen "Fort Trump" auf ihre Seite ziehen. Michael Fitzsimmons vom Strategic Studies Institute des U.S. Army War College nennt zwei Gründe, die seiner Ansicht nach gegen diesen Schritt sprechen. "In military terms, its merits are debatable. There are certainly some potential benefits, such as strengthening NATO’s ability to respond to Russian territorial aggression in Northeastern Europe, reassuring Poland and other countries on NATO’s eastern flank of the alliance’s commitment to collective defense, and offering greater efficiency than long-term rotational presence. As to deterrence of Russian aggression, however, the effects of a new U.S. base would be subject to the famous 'security dilemma': the time-worn truth that capabilities one rival builds for defense and deterrence appear provocative to the other rival supposedly being deterred, who then responds in kind. (...) even if Washington determines that the benefits of 'Fort Trump' would outweigh the costs in terms of deterrence and operational capability, there is another crucial but underappreciated security dilemma confronting this policy choice: the imperative to resist the Polish government’s recent turn toward illiberalism."

18.09.2018

Brian VanDeMark von der U.S. Naval Academy hat in seinem neuen Buch "Road to Disaster" aus der Perspektive der Kognitionswissenschaft untersucht, wie die USA nach 1945 immer tiefer in die Krise des damaligen Indochinas hineingezogen wurden und schließlich den Krieg in Vietnam begannen. "In 1945, Vietnam’s Ho Chi Minh wrote to President Truman, thanking him for U.S. assistance in their mutual fight against the Japanese and asking for help against France’s effort to reassert colonial control in Indochina. Truman never got the letter — but there’s little reason to think it would have diverted America from its path to war in Southeast Asia. In his new book, Road to Disaster, U.S. Naval Academy professor Brian VanDeMark explores why. By using the insights of cognitive science to dissect the flawed perceptions and decisions of the Vietnam era, he teaches today’s leaders to spot their own."

04.09.2018

Alex Grigsby erwartet, dass die USA mit Russland trotz der Vorkommnisse während der Präsidentschaftswahlen und anderer Vorbehalte bei der Bekämpfung von Cyberangriffen auf kritische Infrastrukturen zusammenarbeiten werden. Moskau habe ein entsprechendes Angebot zuletzt auf dem Gipfeltreffen in Helsinki unterbreitet und werde dies im Herbst bei der UN wiederholen. "The United States and Russia recognize that despite their significant differences, they have to talk to each other to avoid uncontrolled escalation in cyberspace. That’s why even after the 2014 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the United States kept meeting with Russian cyber experts despite having cut cooperation elsewhere. (...) The most promising opportunity for U.S.-Russia cyber cooperation will come this fall at the United Nations. (...) The United States is unlikely to be enthused at the prospect of another GGE [Group of Governmental Experts on Information Security] process when it would rather spend its time enforcing existing cyber norms instead of talking about creating new ones. Despite these misgivings, it is one of the few options that keeps Moscow and Washington at the bargaining table."

21.08.2018

Einer neuen Studie zufolge sind dem Terror der radikalislamischen Gruppe Boko Haram deutlich mehr Menschen zum Opfer gefallen als bisher angenommen. "The study shows that though Boko Haram’s territorial control is now limited to some small villages and pockets of countryside, a shift in tactics has helped the group stay a threat to millions. It has turned to suicide bombings, which accounted for almost a third of all casualties in the first half of 2018, and has increasingly attacked Muslim places of worship. (...) This new compilation of data is based on an analysis of publicly available data from CFR’s Nigeria Security Tracker (NST) and the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), an independent nongovernmental organization based at the University of Sussex. (...) From June 2011 through June 2018, the NST documented 2,021 incidents involving Boko Haram, in which 37,530 people were killed, nearly double the conventionally cited estimate of twenty thousand. Over the same period, ACLED identified 3,346 incidents, in which 34,261 people were killed. Both totals reflect deaths of alleged Boko Haram fighters, government forces, and civilians combined."

10.08.2018

Präsident Trump habe den Drohnenkrieg der USA gegen mutmaßliche Terroristen "dramatisch" ausgeweitet, berichtet Daniel Rosenthal. Details und Regeln der Operationen würden der Öffentlichkeit und dem Kongress dabei weitgehend vorenthalten. Neben der Tötung möglichst vieler feindlicher Kämpfer sei zudem keine weitergehende Strategie erkennbar. "According to leaks to The New York Times and other outlets, last fall he introduced a new policy that moved responsibility for counterterrorism operations outside traditional war zones to lower-level commanders, and lowered the threshold for such strikes. (Targets are no longer required to pose a 'continuing, imminent threat' to the United States, but rather may be lower-level foot soldiers, and there is purportedly no longer a requirement for 'near certainty' that the target be on-site for strikes.) (...) The narrow objective for drone strikes, of course, is to kill the terrorists who are targeted and, thus, remove them from the battlefield. By that standard, the program may be deemed a success insofar as, according to government-released statistics, the program has resulted in the deaths of over 3,000 combatants. (...) But there has been insufficient attention, both within government and from NGOs, in assessing the broader-view net result of the drone program; said differently, and channeling former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, are we killing more terrorists than we are creating?"

31.07.2018

Das Pentagon hat Marcus Weisgerber zufolge erste Schritte unternommen, um die von US-Präsident Trump geforderte Weltraum-Armee ("Space Force") aufzubauen. Ob es dabei tatsächlich zur Schaffung eines eigenständigen Teils der US-Streitkräfte kommen wird, hängt allerdings vom Kongress ab. "In coming months, Defense Department leaders plan to stand up three of the four components of the new Space Force: a new combatant command for space, a new joint agency to buy satellites for the military, and a new warfighting community that draws space operators from all service branches. These sweeping changes — on par with the past decade’s establishment of cyber forces — are the part the Pentagon can do without lawmakers’ approval. Creating the fourth component — an entirely new branch of the military with services and support functions such as financial management and facilities construction — will require congressional action."

24.07.2018

Debra Decker vom Stimson Center nennt einige konkrete Sachgebiete, auf denen die USA und Russland künftig stärker kooperieren könnten. Bei der Organisation der Zusammenarbeit sollte die US-Regierung ihrer Ansicht nach einen Vorschlag Wladimir Putins aufgreifen. "Trump promised that 'representatives from our national security councils will meet to follow up on all of the issues we addressed.' But who? Neither Trump’s heavy-handed National Security Advisor John Bolton nor some of the staff new to the National Security Council and diplomacy are the best choices for leading this work. President Putin — surprised? — has a better suggestion: seek positive 'points of contact' for U.S.-Russian engagement, as he called them (at least in the English translation), assisted by 'an expert council that would include political scientists, prominent diplomats and former military experts from both countries.' Such experts would know the history of Russian-U.S. engagement — the duplicity but also how the two countries can work positively together."

10.07.2018

Matthew Costlow würde eine Verlängerung des START-Vertrags ohne russische Gegenleistung dagegen als "Geschenk" an Russland betrachten, das nicht leichtfertig vergeben werden sollte. "Prudence (...) dictates waiting until February 2021 to see whether the extension of the New START Treaty remains in the U.S. national interest. (...) This is not to say that President Trump should not pursue risk reduction measures when he meets with President Putin, he should. But extending the New START Treaty now is unnecessary, would reduce future bargaining leverage, and sends a signal of accommodation to President Putin – the opposite of what he needs."

10.07.2018

US-Präsident Trump sollte das Gipfeltreffen mit Russlands Präsident Putin nach Ansicht von Joe Cirincione nutzen, um eine Verlängerung des START-Vertrags zu vereinbaren und damit die nukleare Rüstungskontrolle neu zu stärken. "The New START Treaty will expire in 2021. If it does, both nations could bust through the ceiling the accord places on each side’s long-range nuclear forces — the missiles and bombers that can span oceans to deliver nuclear bombs in as little as 30 minutes after launch. For the first time since President Richard Nixon negotiated the SALT Treaty in 1972, there would be no limit to the number or types of strategic weapons Russia and the United States deploy. Worse, Russia and the United States would lose all inspections, tracking and verification of these arsenals, which account for over 92 percent of all the nuclear weapons in the world. (...) With little effort and no cost, Trump can secure five more years of verified limits on Russian forces. It would be the best deal of his presidency so far."

02.07.2018

Eine Weiterführung des amerikanischen Militäreinsatzes in Syrien würde nach Ansicht von Bonnie Kristian nicht im amerikanischen Interesse liegen. Die Risiken und die Kosten könnten angesichts der kaum erreichbaren Ziele nicht mehr gerechtfertigt werden. "Whether there was ever anything worthwhile to be gained by U.S. military intervention in Syria’s near-decade of conflict may be subject to debate, but it is increasingly evident there is no good reason to stay there now. In Syria, the United States finds no reward, only risks. It is time to make our exit. The gravest plausible risk, of course, is greatpower conflict with Russia. (...) But this sort of catastrophic escalation is not the only way that continued U.S. intervention in Syria may have unwanted and unintended results. Trump campaigned against the nation-building of past administrations, but the longer the United States stays in Syria and the more changes we effect, the more we will own its eventual reconstruction. (...) The recklessness of keeping U.S. soldiers in harm’s way in Syria is compounded by the fact, often sidestepped by Washington, that there are no vital American interests at stake."

24.06.2018

William Langewiesche erzählt in dieser Reportage die detaillierte Geschichte eines amerikanischen Bombenangriffs auf 70 Extremisten in Libyen. "The tale of a 2017 bombing raid in the Libyan desert that pitted stealth bombers and 500-pound bombs against 70 ragtag fighters. (...) The Air Force has three types of heavy bombers, any of which could have done the job. The choice of the B-2 was surprising because it is by far the most expensive airplane to fly and maintain, and Libya post-Qaddafi had no air defenses that might require a stealth capability to penetrate. Bombing ignorant gunmen camped out in a desert of a non-country is a far cry from launching an attack against a modern military adversary. But the high cost of the mission was perhaps an attraction by bureaucratic if not military logic — you may lose money if you don’t spend it — or the B-2s might have just needed some work to do. The Air Force says simply that after a formal process of consideration, the B-2 was deemed the appropriate platform."

17.06.2018

Gerade in Europa hoffen immer noch viele, dass die USA nach der Amtszeit Donald Trumps auf die gewohnten außenpolitischen Pfade zurückkehren werden. Ronald Brownstein erklärt, warum diese Hoffnung enttäuscht werden könnte. Präsident Trump habe einen Konflikt unter den Republikanern wiederaufleben lassen, der bereits in den 1950er Jahren ausgefochten worden sei. Diesmal werde der isolationistische Flügel der Partei den Kampf wohl gewinnen. "(...) the principal Republican divide over international involvement is now demographic. Trump’s insular nationalism resonates powerfully with his core constituency of Republicans without a college degree, a group that is almost entirely white. College-educated Republicans, who are also almost entirely white, are generally more skeptical — though even many of them have grown more suspicious of global engagement. (...) On U.S. alliances, the data paint a similar picture. While more college-educated than non-college-educated Republicans believe NATO is essential, both groups were far more likely than Democrats at either education level to question its value. (...) for now, Trump has demolished Eisenhower’s consensus, and routed the forces of global engagement inside the GOP as Taft never could. The only question is whether Trump’s victory lasts as long as Ike’s did."

11.06.2018

Uri Friedman hat sich in Seoul mit dem Korea-Experten John Delury unterhalten, der Donald Trumps Nordkorea-Strategie im neuen internationalen Kontext als angemessen und "mutig" einschätzt. "Delury disagreed with Trump’s decision to withdraw the U.S. from the nuclear agreement with Iran, and acknowledged that America’s relations with Iran are even more toxic than its relations with North Korea because Washington and Tehran are on opposing sides of conflicts across the Middle East. Still, he maintained that Obama’s 'complicated, technical' deal may have been 'too focused' on constraining Iran’s nuclear capabilities. 'It wasn’t a deep political settlement,' he explained, whereas 'what I see Trump working on with Kim Jong Un is … a fundamental transformation of the relationship.' And what Trump is facing is nothing less than a new nuclear age, when the strategies that kept the world safe during the Cold War may no longer apply. (...) 'I think Trump gets it,' Delury told me. Fundamental transformation is 'the way to get progress with North Korea.'"

20.05.2018

Der Korea-Experte Joel S. Wit hat vor wenigen Jahren an Treffen früherer Mitarbeiter der US-Regierung mit nordkoreanischen Offiziellen teilgenommen. Er schlussfolgert, dass Verhandlungen über einen schrittweisen und langfristig angelegten Prozess zur Denuklearisierung Nordkoreas durchaus Aussichten auf Erfolg hätten. "(...) what they outlined was a step-by-step process of denuclearization accompanied in each phase by U.S. measures of their own. It is entirely different from the 'Libya model' espoused by John Bolton, which involves giving up its program first and only then getting benefits in return. Indeed, the Trump administration doesn’t necessarily endorse Bolton’s view. Susan Thornton, the acting assistant secretary of state in charge of Asia, said last week that it was obvious there would be multiple steps in a long process of denuclearization, and the key issue was what happened first. How those differences over denuclearization are resolved inside the Trump administration, and whether common ground can be found with the North Koreans, will determine the future of the Korean peninsula. The stakes are nothing less than the success or failure of the world’s best current chance to disarm North Korea. The Thornton approach could mean, over the long term, that it really happens. The Bolton approach would assure that it won’t."

24.04.2018

Patrick Tucker stellt die Ergebnisse eines Experten-Workshops der RAND-Stiftung vor, denen zufolge Waffensysteme mit künstlicher Intelligenz bisher geltende strategische Konzepte entwerten und das empfindliche nukleare Gleichgewicht zwischen den Großmächten gefährden könnten. "New smarter, faster intelligence analysis from AI agents, combined with more sensor and open-source data, could convince countries that their nuclear capability is increasingly vulnerable. That may cause them to take more drastic steps to keep up with the U.S. Another worrying scenario: commanders could make decisions to launch strikes based on advice from AI assistants that have been fed wrong information. (...) Absent some means to better verify the validity of data inputs (...) and a better understanding of enemy intent, adversaries could turn the vast U.S. intelligence collection and digestion tools against them, especially as those tools work faster and more efficiently. In other words, fake news, combined with AI, just might bring about World War III."

16.04.2018

Italien besitzt Elisabeth Braw zufolge eine "hybride" Polizeieinheit, die aufgrund ihrer militärischen Fähigkeiten auch im Ausland eingesetzt werden könne. Das Konzept sei als Alternative zu konventionellen Streitkräften attraktiv, da es sich heute bei vielen internationalen Konflikten nicht um ausgewachsene Kriege handle. "Indeed, the Carabinieri play a crucial role in international stability-projection. 'Their dual identity has allowed the Carabinieri to take part in Italian military missions abroad both as a combat unit, as a Military Police unit, as a specialized anti-riot crowd control unit, and as trainers of the indigenous police forces and security units in a crisis area,' General Claudio Graziano, Italy’s Chief of Defense, told me. That unusual combination has made the Carabinieri popular among countries emerging from armed conflict. Unlike UN peacekeepers, they can both train local police forces and help maintain public order. Currently some 500 Carabinieri are on foreign deployment, serving as part of 33 missions."

14.04.2018

Patrick Tucker erläutert die vom Pentagon veröffentlichten taktischen Details des Militärschlags der USA, Großbritanniens und Frankreichs in Syrien. "Saturday’s U.S.-French-British strike 'overwhelmed' the Syrian air defenses and degraded the Assad regime’s chemical weapons capabilities, Pentagon leaders told reporters this morning. Three facilities were targeted in the 4 a.m. strike, in which allied warships and -planes fired 105 weapons, including the first combat use of the Joint Air to Surface Standoff, or JASSM, missile, Lt. Gen. Kenneth McKenzie, Jr. said. McKenzie said the Syrians responded by firing 40 surface-to-air missiles, most of them after the allied munitions had already struck their targets. The head of the joint staff called the defensive fire 'materially ineffective' against the coalition forces, but said it likely did pose a threat to civilians on the ground."

30.03.2018

Defense One hat sich in einem Dossier mit den sicherheitspolitischen und militärischen Konsequenzen der fortschreitenden Entwicklung von Künstlicher Intelligenz beschäftigt. Ben Watson schreibt in seiner Einleitung: "From the moment the word “robot” was first uttered in a Czechoslovakian play nearly 100 years ago, man has feared his creation will someday kill the creator. It’s a narrative that has stuck with us, said Patrick Tucker, Defense One’s Technology Editor, at a recent event in Washington called Genius Machines: The Next Decade of Artificial Intelligence: 'The idea of artificial intelligence eventually killing us is actually borne into our first fever dreams about what it would be.' The 1920 play was R.U.R., subtitled in English as Rossum’s Universal Robots. Now 98 years later, robotics researchers across the globe are seeking inroads into AI, machine-learning, and human-machine teaming. And it’s all happening under the changing shadows of great-power dynamics."

13.02.2018

Joseph Bosco macht darauf aufmerksam, dass US-Präsident Trump in seiner Nordkorea-Rhetorik die Lage der Menschenrechte in der Diktatur in den Mittelpunkt gerückt habe. Frühere Administrationen hätten das Thema nur beiläufig erwähnt, um Nordkorea und China zu signalisieren, dass eine militärische Intervention mit dem Ziel des Regimewechsels in Washington nicht in Erwägung gezogen werde. "Based on his increasing focus on the human rights catastrophe that is North Korea, President Trump may have decided that the best route to denuclearization, short of preventive military action, is through the rehumanization of the North Korean people. The confluence of strategic and human rights concerns should help convince Beijing and Moscow that this administration is serious about changing the situation in North Korea one way or another, and help persuade the American public that the course is both necessary and just. It will not be the first time in recent history that moral concerns and realpolitik coincide rather than conflict. But it will be ironic that this president should be the one to remind us of that truth."