The second part of the series that relates what really happened
during the
1962 Cuban missile crisis.

By Servando González
TNA News with Commentary
The New Australian
Australia
La Nueva Cuba

8. The Soviet had deployed the missiles with cunning and stealth. In shipping
the
missiles to Cuba, the USSR was accused of stealth and deception. This
accusation of deceit runs throughout all official US statements. The evidence
indicates, however, that Soviet stealth and deception were faked. The available
record suggests that, in fact, the Russians went to great pains to let
the
Americans discover the missiles. There is evidence that the Soviets sped
up their
pace of work and camouflaged the missiles only after they were sure the
Americans had discovered them.

The plan to set up the missiles was carried out in such a way that they
would
inevitably be discovered by the Americans. If one assumes that the anti-aircraft
SAM's were intended to protect the installations of the strategic missiles,
then they
should have been installed and ready to shoot the US planes before the
strategic
missiles arrived. Actually the SAM's and other associated anti-aircraft
nets only
became operational when the construction of the strategic missile sites
was well
along, and the Soviets employed almost no camouflage at all to hide either
set of
weapons. In any case, since the SAM's could not shoot down planes flying
below
10,000 feet, these anti-aircraft missiles would not have been useful in
the event of
an American invasion.

Both the MRBM's and the IRBM's were above ground and located in soft terrain,
very vulnerable to any type of enemy attack. Although a single installation
of
MRBM could be built in a matter of days, the Russians were progressing
very
slowly in their installation. They seemed to be in no great hurry, and
worked only
during daylight hours.

The Cubans were concerned about the role of the American intelligence
surveillance, but the Russians dismissed their concern and gave the matter
no
importance. The Cuban intelligence services were also aware that the CIA
was
interrogating Cuban refugees at the Opa Locka military base in Florida.
The large
number of refugees arriving in Miami was providing the CIA with a great
deal of
information. Castro proposed to stop the emigration flood by eliminating
all
available means of escape from the island, but the Soviets proposed to
leave things
unchanged.

In that way, reasoned the Russians, the CIA would obtain a lot ofcontradictory
information and soon stop relying on the credibility of the refugees. Many
of the
departing refugees had seen missiles, but, in most cases, these were just
antiaircraft SAMs. To the Cubans' dismay, the Soviets even suggested that,
instead of trying to hide evidence of the missiles, it was better to let
it be obvious.
For the first time the Cuban personnel working at the antiaircraft missile
sites were
granted leaves.

The Cubans knew the quality of the American air surveillance technology.
On
several occasions Castro asked the Soviets to give him SAMs, and let his
people
operate them, but the Russians were reluctant. Although most of the Cubans
assigned to the missile bases were engineering students from Havana University,
the Soviets only allowed them to operate the radars.

By the beginning of August the Russians complained to the Cuban government
about the lack of discipline and seditious demonstrations of the university
students
at the missile bases. Apparently the Cubans were frustrated by the Russians'
inaction in the face of overflying American U-2 planes. Fidel himself had
to make an
inspection visit to the bases in order to calm down the Cubans there. Apparently
Fidel convinced everybody, with one important exception: Ché Guevara.
Major
Guevara said that he would only change his opinion if somebody convinced
him
that the American spy planes flying over Cuba were not jeopardizing the
operation.
But he finally opted to accept Fidel's orders.

Contrary to the opinion of most American analysts, almost all SAM antiaircraft
sites in western Cuba had reached operational status by the beginning of
August,
1962. From that early date the Soviets could have fired on the American
spy planes
if they had wanted to.

On the morning of October 14, 1962, a U-2 entered Cuban air space and flew
over
the province of Pinar del Río. The Cubans watched the plane on the
radar screens,
appalled as the Russians did nothing. Later Castro complained bitterly
about the
Russian inaction. Why were the Soviets permitting the American planes to
discover
the missiles? It was at the Excomm meeting the morning of the 23rd of October
that CIA Director John McCone reported that the Russians were beginning
to
camouflage the missile sites. Nobody could explain why they had waited
so long to
do so.

9. Finally, the CIA smelled a rat, Kennedy approved the U-2 flights, and
Major
Anderson photographed the missiles. According to most American analysts,
what
initiated the crisis were the U-2 photographs of Soviet missile sites in
Cuba on
October 14, 1962. US leaders might have received information three weeks
earlier if
a U-2 had flown over the western part of Cuba in the last week of September.
But,
quite unexplainably, the U-2s were prevented from flying over that part
of Cuba,
precisely where intelligence reports indicated that the missiles were most
likely to
be.

On August, 1962, a U-2 returned with photographs of Russian SA-2 antiaircraft
missiles being unloaded at Cuban docks. More U-2s came back with fresh
pictures
of more SA-2s. But President Kennedy insisted there was no evidence that
the
Russians were moving in offensive missiles that could threaten the United
States.

Though all evidence pointed to the province of Pinar del Río in
the western part of
Cuba as the most likely location for missile sites, a very strange thing
happened:
after September 5 no U-2 flights were directed over that part of the island.
It was
not until October 14, that a U-2 plane, reportedly by chance, took the
now famous
photographs of the sites under construction. Yet, the word that there were
Russian
missile sites in Cuba was so widespread that even Time magazine ran an
article on
September 21 showing a map of Cuba clustered with Soviet ground-to-air
missiles,
mainly in the western part of the island, west and south of Havana.

In retrospect it is clear that both the Americans and the Russians were
playing a
subtle cat-and-mouse game, the Russians trying, by every means, to get
the
Americans to discover the missiles, and the Americans trying not to discover
them.

10. An American invasion of Cuba would have brought nuclear war with the
Soviet
Union. The day after the Bay of Pigs invasion began, Khrushchev sent President
Kennedy a message appealing to him to stop the aggression. The tone of
the
message, however, was not in accordance to the man who some months earlier
had boasted with apocalyptic visions. "As for the USSR, there must be no
mistake
about our position. We will extend to the Cuban people and its government
all the
necessary aid for the repulse of the armed attack on Cuba. . . We are sincerely
interested in the relaxation of international tensions, but if others go
in for its
aggravation, then we will answer then in full measure." The fact is that
when the
invasion began Castro wired Russia for help or at least for open solidarity,
but
Khrushchev ignored him until the Cuban militia had definitely beaten the
invaders.

Khrushchev's "missile rattling" about Cuba was not the first case of such
bluffings.
He had before threatened with rockets over Suez, over the landings in Lebanon
and
Jordan, and over Berlin. Khrushchev also threatened Britain and France
with
long-range missiles at the time of the Suez crisis, but not before he was
certain
that the crisis was effectively over. When the Matsu-Quemoy crisis of the
fall of
1958 erupted, Soviet support came in the form of two threatening letters
from
Khrushchev to Eisenhower. But Khrushchev's guarantees and promises of help
to
Communist China were extended only after it had become clear that the United
States was not going to intervene in the affair and the threat of war was
gone.
Therefore, it is safe to assume that, at most, an American invasion of
Cuba would
have brought a strong condemnation from the USSR delegate at the UN, and
a
barrage of threats in the Soviet press for internal consumption only, and
nothing
more.

11. After the crisis was over, Khrushchev and Kennedy signed a secret pact
guaranteeing the non-invasion of Cuba. In 1970 Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger,
disturbed over the submarine base the Soviets were building in Cienfuegos,
a port
on the Southern coast of Cuba, hunted through the State Department's files
looking
for the written agreement he was sure President Kennedy had signed with
Khrushchev. He found, to his utter amazement, that there was none.

Moreover, if the agreement ever existed, it has the dubious honor of having
being
applied retroactively, because the American harassment of the anti-Castro
Cubans
in the US began just after the Bay of Pigs invasion, a year and a half
before the
Cuban missile crisis. If American presidents from Kennedy on have proved
unwilling
to get rid of Fidel Castro, it is not because a non-existent pact forbids
them to do
so, but because of some other secret reasons unknown to us.

12. General LeMay was a mad warmonger out of control. General Curtiss LeMay,
Air Force Chief, argued forcefully with the President that a military attack
was
essential. When the President questioned him about what the Soviet response
might be, General LeMay assured him that there would be no reaction at
all. Later
the Kennedys and their buddies, as usual, made derogatory comments of General
LeMay's statements behind his back.

But LeMay was not a mad warmonger as he is depicted in the film, nor was
he
alone. Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson made his arguments that an
air
attack and invasion represented the only American alternative to the US
He added
that the President of the United States had the responsibility for the
security of the
American people and of the whole world, that it was his duty to take the
only action
which could protect that security, and that this meant destroying the missiles
in
Cuba.

Shortly before his tv address to inform the nation of his decision to impose
a
blockade on the Soviet ships bound for Cuba, President Kennedy met with
the
members of the Cabinet and informed them of the crisis for the first time.
Then, he
met with leaders of Congress. According to Robert Kennedy, this was the
President's most difficult meeting. Many congressional leaders were sharp
in their
criticism. They complained that the President should take a more forceful
action —
a military attack or an invasion of Cuba —, and that the blockade was far
too weak
a response.

When Senators Richard Russell and William Fulbright were informed of the
situation in Cuba and the presidential decision to blockade the island,
they argued
that a blockade could not be effective in the short time remaining before
the missile
sites became operational. In fact, if one assumed that the nuclear warheads
were
already in Cuba, as it was logical to suppose at the time, a blockade of
the island
seemed to be a foolhardy decision.

Dean Acheson, one of the most notable critics of President Kennedy's decisions
during the crisis, wrote later that, though the American strategy during
the crisis
was wrong, it succeeded in obtaining the withdrawal of the missiles simply
by
"dumb luck". Acheson's recommendation for decisive military action, namely
an air
strike over Cuba, was flatly rejected by Kennedy. And Acheson was not the
only
one with little praise for Kennedy's decision-making abilities. General
Douglas
McArthur, though crediting Kennedy with political cunning, called the President
"just dumb when it comes to decision making."

13. On October 28, 1962, a missile battery under Soviet command shot down
Maj.
Rudolf Anderson's U-2.Not so fast Louie! According to Seymour Hersh, there
is
strong evidence that, on October 26, 1962, a Cuban army unit attacked and
overran
a Soviet-manned SAM base at Los Angeles, near Banes, in the Oriente province,
killing many Soviets and seizing control of the site. This was the very
base that
later fired the SAMs which destroyed Anderson's U-2.

Hersh based his article on information partly drawn from an interview with
former
Department of Defense analyst Daniel Ellsberg, who was himself citing classified
material from a post-crisis study of the event. The speculation is based
on an
intercepted transmission from the Soviet base at Los Angeles indicating
heavy
fighting and casualties. Adrián Montoro, former director of Radio
Havana Cuba, and
Juan Antonio Rodríguez Menier, a senior Cuban intelligence officer
who defected in
1987 and is now living in the US, seem to confirm Ellsberg's thesis.

*Servando Gonzalez is a Cuban-born American writer. He was an officer in
the
Cuban army during the missile crisis. His upcoming book The Secret Fidel
Castro:
Deconstructing the Symbol will appear this Spring.