COLONEL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the battle of
the 21st of July, near Manassas, Va. It has been delayed till this time from the inability
of the subordinate commanders to get earlier a true account of the state of their
commands.
In my communication to you of the 20th ultimo, I stated it as my
intention to move that afternoon and drive the enemy from the east side of Bull Run, so as
to enable the engineers to make a sufficiently accurate reconnaissance to justify our
future movements. Later in the day they had obtained enough information of the passages
across the stream to dispense with this reconnaissance, and it was decided to move without
further delay.
It had been my intention to move the several columns out on the road a
few miles on the evening of the 20th, so that they would have a shorter march in the
morning; but I deferred to those who had the greatest distance to go, and who preferred
starting early in the morning and making but one move.
On the evening of the 20th ultimo my command was mostly at or near
Centreville. The enemy was at or near Manassas, distant from Centreville about seven miles
to the southwest. Centreville is a village of a few houses, mostly on the west side of a
ridge running nearly north and south. The road from Centreville to Manassas Junction runs
along this ridge, and crosses Bull Run about three miles from the former place. The
Warrenton turnpike, which runs nearly east and west, goes over this ridge through the
village, and crosses Bull Run about four miles from it, Bull Run having a course between
the crossings from northwest to southeast.
The First Division (Tyler's) was stationed as follows: One brigade on
the north side of the Warrenton turnpike and on the eastern slope of the Centreville
ridge; two brigades on the same road and a mile and a half in advance to the west of the
ridge; and one brigade on the road from Centreville to Manassas where it crosses Bull Run
at Blackburn's Ford, where General Tyler had the engagement of the 18th ultimo.
The Second Division (Hunter's) was on the Warrenton turnpike, one mile
east of Centreville.
The Third Division (Heintzelman's) was on a road known as the old
Braddock road, which comes into Centreville from the southeast about a mile and a half
from the village.
The Fifth Division (Miles') was on the same road with the Third
Division, and between it and Centreville.
A map, which is herewith, marked A, will show these positions better
than I describe them.
Friday night a train of subsistence arrived, and on Saturday its
contents were ordered to be issued to the command, and the men required to have three
days' rations in their haversacks. (See appendix herewith, marked B.)
Saturday orders (copy herewith, marked c) were issued for the available
force to march.
As reported to you in my letter of the 19th ultimo, my personal
reconnaissance of the roads to the south had shown that it was not practicable to carry
out the original plan of turning the enemy's position on their right. The affair of the
18th at Blackburn's Ford showed he was too strong at that point for us to force a passage
there without great loss, and if we did, that it would bring us in front of his strong
position at Manassas, which was not desired.
Our information was that the stone bridge over which the Warrenton road
crossed Bull Run to the west of Centreville was mined, defended by a battery in position,
and the road on his side of the stream impeded by a heavy abatis. The alternative was,
therefore, to turn the extreme left of his position.
Reliable information was obtained of an undefended ford about three
miles above the bridge, there being another ford between it and the bridge, which was
defended. It was therefore determined to take the road to the upper ford, and, after
crossing, to get behind the forces guarding the lower ford and the bridge, and after
occupying the Warrenton road east of the bridge to send out a force to destroy the
railroad at or near Gainesville, and thus break up the communication between the enemy's
forces at Manassas and those in the Valley of Virginia before Winchester, which had been
held in check by Major-General Patterson.
Brigadier-General Tyler was directed to move with three of his brigades
on the Warrenton road, and commence cannonading the enemy's batteries, while Hunter's
division, moving after him, should, after passing a little stream called Cub Run, turn to
the right and north, and move by a wood road around to the upper ford, and then turn south
and get behind the enemy; Colonel Heintzelman's division to follow Hunter's as far as the
turning-off place to the lower ford, where he was to cross after the enemy should have
been driven out by Hunter's division; the Fifth Division (Miles') to be in reserve on the
Centreville ridge.
I had felt anxious about the road from Manassas by Blackburn's Ford to
Centreville along this ridge, fearing that, whilst we should be in force to the front and
endeavoring to turn the enemy's position, we ourselves should be turned by him by this
road. For if he should once obtain possession of this ridge, which overlooks all the
country to the west to the foot of the spurs of the Blue Ridge, we should have been
irretrievably cut off and destroyed. I had, therefore, directed this point to be held in
force, and sent an engineer to extemporize some field works to strengthen the position.
The Fourth Division (Runyon's) had not been brought to the front
farther than to guard our communications by way of Vienna and the Orange and Alexandria
Railroad. His advanced regiment was about seven miles in rear of Centreville.
The divisions were ordered to march at 2.30 o'clock a.m., so as to
arrive on the ground early in the day, and thus avoid the heat which is to be expected at
this season. There was delay in the First Division getting out of its camp on the road,
and the other divisions were, in consequence, between two and three hours behind the time
appointed--a great misfortune, as events turned out. The wood road leading from the
Warrenton turnpike to the upper ford was much longer than we counted upon, the general
direction of the stream being oblique to the road and we having the obtuse angle on our
side.
General Tyler commenced with his artillery at 6.30 a.m., but the enemy
did not reply, and after some time it became a question whether he was in any force in our
front, and if he did not intend himself to make an attack, and make it by Blackburn's
Ford. After firing several times, and obtaining no response, I held one of Heintzelman's
brigades in reserve, in case we should have to send any troops back to re-enforce Miles'
division. The other brigades moved forward as directed in the general order.
On reaching the ford at Sudley Springs, I found part of the leading
brigade of Hunter's division (Burnside's) had crossed, but the men were slow in getting
over, stopping to drink. As at this time the clouds of dust from the direction of Manassas
indicated the immediate approach of a large force, and fearing it might come down on the
head of the column before the division could all get over and sustain it, orders were sent
back to the heads of regiments to break from the column, and come for-ward separately as
fast as possible.
Orders were sent by an officer to the reserve brigade of Heintzelman's
division to come by a nearer road across the fields, and an aide-de-camp sent to
Brigadier-General Tyler to direct him to press forward his attack, as large bodies of the
enemy were passing in front of him to attack the division which had crossed over.
The ground between the stream and the road leading from Sudley Springs
south, and over which Burnside's brigade marched, was, for about a mile from the ford,
thickly wooded, whilst on the right of the road for about the same distance the country
was divided between fields and woods. About a mile from the ford the country on both sides
of the road is open, and for nearly a mile farther large rolling fields extend down to the
Warrenton turnpike, which crosses what became the field of battle, through the valley of a
small water-course, a tributary of Bull Run.
Shortly after the leading regiment of the First Brigade reached this
open space, and whilst the others and the Second Brigade were crossing to the front and
right, the enemy opened his fire, beginning with artillery and following it up with
infantry.
The leading brigade (Burnside's) had to sustain this shock for a short
time without support, and did it well. The battalion of regular infantry was sent to
sustain it, and shortly afterwards the other corps of Porter's brigade and a regiment
detached from Heintzelman's division to the left forced the enemy back far enough to allow
Sherman's and Keyes' brigades of Tyler's division to cross from their position on the
Warrenton road.
These drove the right of the enemy (understood to have been commanded
by Beauregard) from the front of the field, and out of the detached woods, and down to the
road, and across it, up the slopes on the other side. Whilst this was going on,
Heintzelman's division was moving down the field to the stream and up the road beyond.
Beyond the Warrenton road, and to the left of the road down which our troops had marched
from Sudley Springs, is a hill with a farm house on it. Behind this hill the enemy had
early in the day some of his most annoying batteries planted. Across the road from this
hill was another hill, or rather elevated ridge or table land. The hottest part of the
contest was for the possession of this hill with a house on it.
The force engaged here was Heintzelman's division, Willcox's and
Howard's brigades on the right, supported by part of Porter's brigade and the cavalry
under Palmer, and Franklin's brigade of Heintzelman's division, Sherman's brigade of
Tyler's division in the center and up the road, whilst Keyes' brigade of Tyler's division
was on the left, attacking the batteries near the stone bridge. The Rhode Island Battery
of Burnside's brigade also participated in this attack by its fire from the north of the
turnpike. The enemy was understood to have been commanded by J. E. Johnston.
Ricketts' battery, which did such effective service and played so
brilliant a part in this contest, was, together with Griffin's battery, on the side of the
hill, and became the object of the special attention of the enemy, who succeeded (our
officers mistaking one of his regiments for one of our own, and allowing it to approach
without firing upon it) in disabling the battery, and then attempted to take it. Three
times was he repulsed by different corps in succession and driven back, and the guns taken
by hand (the horses being killed) and pulled away. The third time it was supposed by us
all that the repulse was final, for he was driven entirely from the hill, so far beyond it
as not to be in sight, and all were certain the day was ours. He had before this been
driven nearly a mile and a half, and was beyond the Warrenton road, which was entirely in
our possession from the stone bridge westward, and our engineers were just completing the
removal of the abatis across the road to allow our re-enforcements (Schenck's brigade and
Ayres' battery) to join us.
The enemy was evidently disheartened and broken. But we had then been
fighting since 10.30 o'clock in the morning, and it was after 3 o'clock in the afternoon.
The men had been up since 2 o'clock in the morning, and had made what to those unused to
such things seemed a long march before coming into action, though the longest distance
gone over was not more than 9½ miles; and though they had three days' provisions served
out to them the day before, many, no doubt, either did not get them, or threw them away on
the march or during the battle, and were therefore without food. They had done much severe
fighting. Some of the regiments which had been driven from the hill in the first two
attempts of the enemy to keep possession of it had become shaken, were unsteady, and had
many men out of the ranks.
It was at this time that the enemy's re-enforcements came to his aid
from the railroad train (understood to have just arrived from the valley with the residue
of Johnston's army). They threw themselves in the woods on our right, and opened a fire of
musketry on our men, which caused them to break and retire down the hill-side. This soon
degenerated into disorder, for which there was no remedy. Every effort was made to rally
them, even beyond the reach of the enemy's fire, but in vain. The battalion of regular
infantry alone moved up the hill opposite to the one with the house, and there maintained
itself until our men could get down to and across the Warrenton turnpike on the way back
to the position we occupied in the morning. The plain was covered with the retreating
groups, and they seemed to infect those with whom they came in contact. The retreat soon
became a rout, and this soon degenerated still further into a panic.
Finding this state of affairs was beyond the efforts of all those who
had assisted so faithfully during the long and hard day's work in gaining almost the
object of our wishes, and that nothing remained on that field but to recognize what we
could no longer prevent, I gave the necessary orders to protect their withdrawal, begging
the men to form a line, and offer the appearance, at least, of organization and force.
They returned by the fords to the Warrenton road, protected, by my
order, by Colonel Porter's force of regulars. Once on the road, and the different corps
coming together in small parties, many without officers, they became intermingled, and all
organization was lost.
Orders had been sent back to Miles' division for a brigade to move
forward and protect this retreat, and Colonel Blenker's brigade was detached for this
purpose, and was ordered to go as far forward as the point where the road to the right
left the main road.
By referring to the general order it will be seen that while the
operations were to go on in front, an attack was to be made at Blackburn's Ford by the
brigade (Richardson's) stationed there. A reference to his report, and to that of Major
Hunt, commanding the artillery, will show that this part of the plan was well and
effectively carried out. It succeeded in deceiving the enemy for considerable time and in
keeping in check a part of his force. The fire of the artillery at this point is
represented as particularly destructive.
At the time of our retreat, seeing great activity in this direction,
much firing, and columns of dust, I became anxious for this place, fearing if it were
turned or forced the whole stream of our retreating mass would be captured or destroyed.
After providing for the protection of the retreat by Porter's and
Blenker's brigades, I repaired to Richardson's, and found the whole force ordered to be
stationed for the holding of the road from Manassas, by Blackburn's Ford, to Centreville,
on the march, under orders from the division commander, for Centreville. I immediately
halted it, and ordered it to take up the best line of defense across the ridge that their
then position admitted of; and subsequently, taking in person the command of this part of
the Army, I caused such disposition of the forces, which had been added to by the First
and Second New Jersey and the De Kalb Regiments, ordered up from Runyon's reserve before
going forward, as would best serve to check the enemy.
The ridge being held in this way, the retreating current passed slowly
through Centreville to the rear. The enemy followed us from the ford as far as Cub Run,
and, owing to the road becoming blocked up at the crossing, caused us much damage there,
for the artillery could not pass, and several pieces and caissons had to be abandoned. In
the panic the horses hauling the caissons and ammunition were cut from their places by
persons to escape with, and in this way much confusion was caused, the panic aggravated,
and the road encumbered. Not only were pieces of artillery lost, but also many of the
ambulances carrying the wounded.
By sundown most of our men had gotten behind Centreville ridge, and it
became a question whether we should or not endeavor to make a stand there. The condition
of our artillery and its ammunition, and the want of food for the men, who had generally
abandoned or thrown away all that had been issued the day before, and the utter
disorganization and consequent demoralization of the mass of the Army, seemed to all who
were near enough to be consulted--division and brigade commanders and staff--to admit of
no alternative but to fall back; the more so as the position at Blackburn's Ford was then
in the possession of the enemy, and he was already turning our left.
On sending the officers of the staff to the different camps, they
found, as they reported to me, that our decision had been anticipated by the troops, most
of those who had come in from the front being already on the road to the rear, the panic
with which they came in still continuing and hurrying them along.
At -- o'clock the rear guard (Blenker's brigade) moved, covering the
retreat, which was effected during the night and next morning. The troops at Fairfax
Station, leaving by the cars, took with them the bulk of the supplies which had been sent
there. My aide-de-camp, Major Wadsworth, staid at Fairfax Court-House till late in the
morning, to see that the stragglers and weary and worn-out soldiers were not left behind.
I transmit herewith the reports of the several division and brigade
commanders, to which I refer for the conduct of particular regiments and corps, and a
consolidated return of the killed, wounded, and missing, marked D. From the latter it will
be seen that our killed amounted to 19 officers and 462 non-commissioned officers and
privates, and our wounded to 64 officers and 947 non-commissioned officers and privates.
Many of the wounded will soon be able to join the ranks, and will leave our total of
killed and disabled from further service under 1,000.
The return of the missing is very inaccurate, the men supposed to be
missing having fallen into other regiments and gone to Washington; many of the zouaves to
New York. In one brigade the number originally reported at 616 was yesterday reduced to
174. These reductions are being made daily. In a few days a more correct return can be
made.
Of course nothing accurate is known of the loss of the enemy. An
officer of their forces, coming from them with a flag, admitted 1,800 killed and wounded,
and other information shows this to be much under the true number.
The officer commanding the Eleventh New York (Zouaves) and Colonel
Heintzelman say that the returns of that regiment cannot be relied on, as many there
reported among the casualties have absented themselves since their return, and have gone
to New York.
Among the missing are reported many of our surgeons, who remained in
attendance on our wounded, and were, against the rules of modern warfare, made prisoners.
The issue of this hard-fought battle, in which certainly our troops
lost no credit in their conflict on the field with an enemy ably commanded, superior in
numbers, who had but a short distance to march, and who acted on his own ground on the
defensive, and always under cover, whilst our men were of necessity out on the open
fields, should not prevent full credit being given to those officers and corps whose
services merited success if they did not attain it.
To avoid repetition I will only mention here the names of those not
embraced in the reports of division and brigade commanders. I beg to refer to their
reports for the names of those serving under their immediate orders, desiring that on this
subject of persons, &c., they be considered as part of my own.
I claim credit for the officers of my staff and for those acting as
such during the day. They did everything in their power, exposing themselves freely when
required, and doing all that men could do, communicating orders, guiding the columns,
exhorting the troops, rallying them when broken, and providing for them the best the
circumstances admitted.
They are as follows:

First Lieut. H. W. Kingsbury, Fifth
Artillery, A, D.C.
Maj. Clarence S. Brown, New York Militia, volunteer A.D.C. Maj. James S. Wadsworth, New
York Militia, volunteer A.D.C.
The latter (who does me the honor to be on my personal staff) had a horse shot under him
in the hottest of the fight. <323>
Capt. James B. Fry, assistant adjutant-general.
Capt. O. H. Tillinghast, assistant quartermaster, who discharged alone the important and
burdensome duties of his department with the Army, and who was mortally wounded whilst
acting with the artillery, to which he formerly belonged, and in which he was deeply
interested.
Capt. H. F. Clarke, Subsistence Department, chief of subsistence department.
Major Myer, Signal Officer, and Maj. Malcolm McDowell, who acted as aides.
Surg. W. S. King and Assistant Surgeon Magruder, Medical Department.
Maj. J. G. Barnard, Engineer, and senior of his department with the Army, who gave me most
important aid.
First Lieut. Fred. E. Prime, Engineer.
Capt. A. W. Whipple, First Lieut. H. L. Abbot, and Second Lieut. H. S. Putnam,
Topographical Engineers.
Maj. W. F. Barry, Fifth Artillery, chief of artillery.
Lieut. Geo. C. Strong, ordnance officer.
Maj. W. H. Wood, Seventeenth Infantry, acting inspector-general.
Second Lieut. Guy V. Henry, who joined me on the field, and was of service as an
aide-de-camp.

The following
officers commanded divisions and brigades, and in the several places their duty called
them did most effective service and behaved in the most gallant manner:

As my position
may warrant, even if it does not call for, some explanation of the causes, as far as they
can be seen, which led to the results herein stated, I trust it may not be considered out
of place if I refer, in a few words, to the immediate antecedents of the battle.
When I submitted to the General-in-Chief, in compliance with his verbal
instructions, the plan of operations and estimate of force required, the time I was to
proceed to carry it into effect was fixed for the 8th of July (Monday).
Every facility possible was given me by the General-in-Chief and heads
of the administrative departments in making the necessary preparations. But the regiments,
owing, I was told, to want of transportation, came over slowly. Many of them did not come
across until eight or nine days after the time fixed upon, and went forward without my
ever seeing them and without having been together before in a brigade.
The sending re-enforcements to General Patterson by drawing off the
wagons was a further and unavoidable cause of delay. Notwithstanding the herculean efforts
of the Quartermaster-General, and his favoring me in every possible way, the wagons for
ammunition, subsistence, &c., and the horses for the trains and for the artillery, did
not all arrive for more than a week after the time appointed to move.
I was not even prepared as late as the 15th ultimo, and the desire I
should move became great, and it was wished I should not, if possible, delay longer than
Tuesday, the 16th ultimo. When I did set out on the 16th I was still deficient in wagons
for subsistence, but I went forward, trusting to their being procured in time to follow
me.
The trains thus hurriedly gotten together, with horses, wagons,
drivers, and wagon-masters all new and unused to each other, moved with difficulty and
disorder, and was the cause of a day's delay in getting the provisions forward, making it
necessary to make on Sunday the attack we should have made on Saturday.
I could not, with every exertion, get forward with the troops earlier
than we did. I wished them to go to Centreville the second day, which would have taken us
there on the 17th, and enabled us, so far as they were concerned, to go into action on the
19th instead of the 21st; but when I went forward from Fairfax Court-House beyond
Germantown to urge them forward, I was told it was impossible for the men to march
farther. They had only come from Vienna, about six miles, and it was not more than six and
one-half miles farther to Centreville, in all a march of twelve and one-half miles; but
the men were foot-weary, not so much, I was told, by the distance marched, as by the time
they had been on foot, caused by the obstructions in the road and the slow pace we had to
move to avoid ambuscades. The men were, moreover, unaccustomed to marching, their bodies
not in condition for that kind of work, and not used to carrying even the lead of
"light marching order."
We crossed Bull Run with about 18,000 men of all arms, the Fifth
Division (Miles') and Richardson's brigade on the left at Blackburn's Ford and
Centreville, and Schenck's brigade of Tyler's division on the left of the road near the
stone bridge, not participating in the main action. The numbers opposed to us have been
variously estimated. I may safely say, and avoid even the appearance of exaggeration, that
the enemy brought up all he could which were not kept engaged elsewhere. He had notice of
our coming on the 17th, and had from that time until the 21st to bring up whatever he had.
It is known that in estimating the force to go against Manassas I
engaged not to have to do with the enemy's forces under Johnston, then kept in check in
the valley by Major General Patterson, or those kept engaged by Major-General Butler, and
I knew every effort was made by the General-in-Chief that this should be done, and that
even if Johnston joined Beauregard, it should be because he would be driven in and
<325>followed by General Patterson. But, from causes not necessary for me to refer
to, even if I knew them all, this was not done, and the enemy was free to assemble from
every direction in numbers only limited by the amount of his railroad rolling-stock and
his supply of provisions. To the forces, therefore, we drove in from Fairfax Court-House,
Fairfax Station, Germantown, and Centreville, and those under Beauregard at Manassas, must
be added those under Johnston from Winchester, and those brought up by Davis from Richmond
and other places at the South, to which is to be added the levy en masse ordered by the
Richmond authorities, which was ordered to assemble at Manassas. What all this amounted to
I cannot say; certainly much more than we attacked them with.
I could not, as I have said, move earlier or push on faster, nor could
I delay. A large and the best part, so considered, of my forces were three-months
volunteers, whose terms of service were about expiring, but who were sent forward as
having long enough to serve for the purpose of the expedition.
On the eve of the battle the Fourth Pennsylvania Regiment of Volunteers
and the battery of Volunteer Artillery of the Eighth New York Militia, whose term of
service expired, insisted on their discharge. I wrote to the regiment as pressing a
request as I could pen, and the honorable Secretary of War, who was at the time on the
ground, tried to induce the battery to remain at least five days, but in vain. They
insisted on their discharge that night. It was granted; and the next morning, when the
Army moved forward into battle, these troops moved to the rear to the sound of the enemy's
cannon.
In the next few days, day by day I should have lost ten thousand of the
best armed, drilled, officered, and disciplined troops in the Army. In other words, every
day which added to the strength of the enemy made us weaker.In conclusion, I desire to say
in reference to the events of the 21st ultimo, that the general order for the battle to
which I have referred was, with slight modifications, literally conformed to; that the
corps were brought over Bull Run in the manner proposed, and put into action as before
arranged, and that, up to late in the afternoon, every movement ordered was carrying us
successfully to the object we had proposed before starting--that of getting to the
railroad leading from Manassas to the valley of Virginia, and going on it far enough to
break up and destroy the communication, and interpose between the forces under Beauregard
and those under Johnston; and could we have fought a day--yes, a few hours--sooner, there
is everything to show that we should have continued successful, even against the odds with
which we contended.

I have the honor to be, very
respectfully, your most obedient servant,
IRVIN McDOWELL,
Brigadier-General, Commanding