16 MR. AUGUSTINE: Thank you. My 10:07:29
17 colleagues -- one has got a question here. 10:07:29
18 MR. COOKE: We'll provide backup for 10:07:29
19 that. 10:07:29
20 DR. CRAWLEY: Yeah. And, In 10:07:38
21 particular, it would be interesting to look at 10:07:39
22 what are usually called the P-5 and P-95, you 10:07:40
63
1 know, the statistically significant lower and 10:07:43
2 upper bounds of those numbers to get some 10:07:48
3 insight as well. 10:07:48
4 MR. COOKE: Sure. 10:07:50
5 MR. AUGUSTINE: Wanda... 10:07:50
6 DR. AUSTIN: Yes. You indicated you 10:07:51
7 had a 65 percent confidence in the cost numbers. 10:07:53
8 What's your confidence in the schedule 10:07:56
9 of March 2015? 10:08:00
10 MR. COOKE: Right now the model that 10:08:01
11 we have the most history with is the cost. 10:08:02
12 We're actually developing a schedule model to 10:08:05
13 get that type of calculation, and we're working 10:08:09
14 through that with PA&E at headquarters to get to 10:08:11
15 a point where we have a good schedule 10:08:17
16 calculation in terms of probability. 10:08:20
17 Our schedule, we are -- actually at 10:08:22
18 this point we have moved from internal dates 10:08:27
19 that we were planning for to our commitment date 10:08:33
20 of March 2015. So we're realigning our internal 10:08:36
21 schedules right at this moment. We know we have 10:08:42
22 areas we need to work. And so it's a tight 10:08:45
64
1 schedule. That's certain. 10:08:48
2 MR. AUGUSTINE: Chris... 10:08:52
3 MR. CHYBA: Thank you. 10:08:54
4 Your chart that you showed us on 10:08:54
5 Influence of Key Drivers on Architecture 10:08:57
6 Selection compared loss of crew probabilities 10:09:01
7 for EELVs to Ares I and argued that it was 10:09:02
8 really that distinction, if I understood the 10:09:08
9 chart properly, that preferred Ares I to EELVs. 10:09:11
10 You've just said in your remark that there's a 10:09:17
11 range, of course, with respect to that estimate 10:09:19
12 for loss of crew for Ares I. 10:09:21
13 Does that -- you know, does the one 10:09:23
14 sigma in that extend over into the EELV range? 10:09:25
15 Can you give us some sense of whether there's 10:09:29
16 really a statistically significant difference 10:09:33
17 between the two? 10:09:34
18 MR. COOKE: I think, in terms of the 10:09:35
19 numbers that we showed you, the relative 10:09:37
20 differences are important. There are certainly 10:09:41
21 probabilities associated with each one, and once 10:09:43
22 again, I don't think we have those numbers here. 10:09:45
65
1 But I think in the -- they were calculated in an 10:09:47
2 apples-to-apples sense. 10:09:51
3 MR. CHYBA: But we will get those 10:09:54
4 numbers? 10:09:54
5 MR. COOKE: Yeah. 10:09:54
6 MR. CHYBA: Okay. Thank you. 10:09:56
7 MR. COOKE: We'll get you the 10:09:57
8 background on that. 10:09:58
9 MR. HANLEY: It's important to note, 10:09:59
10 though, that the methodology used to assess all 10:10:02
11 of the vehicle launch options was a common 10:10:04
12 methodology. That's what ESAS really was about. 10:10:07
13 It was to take the synthesis of prior analysis 10:10:10
14 and bring it apples to apples against a basic 10:10:13
15 set of mission requirements and compare on a 10:10:18
16 level playing field as best we could. 10:10:23
17 MR. AUGUSTINE: Leroy... 10:10:26
18 MR. CHIAO: Yeah. I have a question 10:10:29
19 about the Orion. I know the nominal plan right 10:10:31
20 now is to land in the water, but I noted in your 10:10:33
21 charts that in a contingency you can land on 10:10:36
22 terra firma. 10:10:36
66
1 And if that's the case, I'm wondering 10:10:37
2 why we don't o go back to that now. 10:10:39
3 MR. COOKE: The reason is in a 10:10:42
4 contingency sense we don't carry as much 10:10:44
5 redundancy in the systems. If we use at a 10:10:48
6 primary mode of landing, we would have a lot 10:10:50
7 more redundancy in it, and it would weigh a lot 10:10:53
8 more. And that's really the primary reason that 10:10:56
9 we went to the water landing. We wanted to make 10:10:59
10 sure that we had the capability to land the crew 10:11:01
11 without injury, but there's not the level of 10:11:04
12 redundancy in systems to get to making that a 10:11:06
13 nominal case. 10:11:15
14 MR. CHIAO: So even in the reduction 10:11:18
15 of crew size from six to four, that's still the 10:11:18
16 case? I mean, you're still too heavy to land on 10:11:19
17 land? 10:11:20
18 MR. COOKE: Well, the thing is that we 10:11:20
19 don't want to lose the capability associated 10:11:22
20 with six crew. So if we fill up that with 10:11:25
21 weight, then you don't get to that point again. 10:11:31
22 And also it's important in the time 10:11:33
67
1 frame that we'll be traveling to the Space 10:11:35
2 Station that we are able to carry up mass and 10:11:39
3 down mass. So we don't want to give up the 10:11:42
4 mass -- any mass savings that you'd have there. 10:11:46
5 We don't want to give all of that up to do -- to 10:11:49
6 that capability or to get away from the original 10:11:52
7 requirements. 10:11:54
8 MR. McALISTER: Mr. Chair, our link is 10:11:59
9 back up with France. Unfortunately we're only 10:12:00
10 going to have audio, and we need to cut over 10:12:03
11 right now. 10:12:07
12 Sorry, Doug. 10:12:08
13 MR. AUGUSTINE: Jeff and Doug, thank 10:12:08
14 very much. We appreciate it. 10:12:10
15 Is the audio link live now? 10:12:11
16 MR. McALISTER: Yeah. Just go ahead 10:12:17
17 and make the introduction, Mr. Chair. 10:12:17
18 MR. AUGUSTINE: Okay. Fine. This is 10:12:19
19 Norm Augustine, and I'm here with my colleagues 10:12:22
20 on our committee looking at the future of the 10:12:24
21 U.S. Human Space Flight program. We understand 10:12:25
22 our video link is down but the audio link is 10:12:28
68
1 working. 10:12:33
2 We're very appreciative of your taking 10:12:34
3 the time to speak with us. I have already 10:12:37
4 introduced you to the audience here in the room 10:12:40
5 and on the television here in U.S. 10:12:44
6 But to both Mr. Dordain and General 10:12:47
7 Perminov, as I say, we're very anxious to hear 10:12:49
8 your thoughts on whatever it is you'd like to 10:12:51
9 share with us, but a few things that I think 10:12:53
10 we'd be particularly interested in would be what 10:12:56
11 you see as... 10:12:59
12 (Discussion off the record.) 10:12:59
13 GOVERNOR DORDAIN: Okay. Do you hear 10:13:42
14 me? Jean-Jacques speaking. So can I start my 10:13:43
15 remarks? 10:13:53
16 MR. AUGUSTINE: Well, thank you. And 10:13:53
17 let me just say a couple of things that we would 10:13:55
18 be particularly interested in hearing and we'd 10:13:58
19 welcome whatever you care to say to us. 10:14:01
20 We'd be very interested, I think, in 10:14:04
21 your view of the utility of the ISS beyond 2016. 10:14:06
22 We'd be, I think, also very interested 10:14:13
69
1 in your thoughts of what international programs 10:14:16
2 might go beyond the ISS into the future. 10:14:18
3 We'd certainly welcome any comments 10:14:24
4 you have on future international relationships 10:14:27
5 and on some of the lessons we've learned from 10:14:30
6 our partnerships to date. 10:14:35
7 So with that, let me turn to you and, 10:14:37
8 again, thank you for sharing your thoughts with 10:14:39
9 us. 10:14:39
10 GOVERNOR DORDAIN: Okay. Now, thank 10:14:41
11 you from my side. Thank you very much for 10:14:45
12 giving me an opportunity to make a contribution 10:14:48
13 to your committee. 10:14:53
14 (Whereupon, Governor Dordain presented
15 his comments via videoconference, and a
16 typewritten version provided by Governor Dordain
17 is included as follows:
18 GOVERNOR DORDAIN: This hearing is
19 very timely, since for the first time in the
20 history of the ISS, we have on board a crew of
21 six made of five different nationalities -- the
22 five partners are together in orbit, not only
70
1 with hardware but also with astronauts living
2 and working together in orbit, as we are working
3 together on the ground since 20 years.
4 This is just a fact which should
5 inspire our reflections - there is not anymore,
6 for any of the five partners, a separate Human
7 Space Flight program. We have all together
8 one Human Space Flight program shared among five
9 partners. Obviously ESA cannot have a separate
10 Human Space Flight program since we are
11 dependent on the USA and on Russia for
12 transporting our astronauts, but even though
13 NASA and Roskosmos could have a separate
14 program, they have not.
15 And this is the reason why I am
16 attaching a great importance to the hearing of
17 today because your conclusions may have an
18 impact on our own plans, but also, I hope, our
19 inputs might have an impact on your conclusions.
20 I thank Mike O'Brien to have sent me
21 four questions of interest for you and I shall
22 start by answering your questions, it being
71
1 understood that I am ready to answer any
2 further question you may raise, either today or
3 at a later stage.
4 I have not prepared a presentation of
5 the European Space Agency, its programs and
6 activities.
7 However, I would like to underline
8 three characteristics of ESA which could explain
9 the common aspects of my answers and remarks of
10 today:
11 The European Space Agency has today 18
12 Member States which, according to the
13 ESA Convention, pool their resources for
14 developing space systems for both science
15 and applications to the citizens. This means
16 that the overall ESA activities range from
17 Science of the Solar System and of the Universe,
18 Science of the Earth and its environment, Life
19 Sciences, Physical Sciences to operational
20 meteorology, operational services for
21 Environment and Security, operational navigation
22 systems with Galileo, without forgetting the
72
1 activities related to the guaranty of access to
2 space and the development of competitive
3 technologies, in particular for
4 telecommunications. As a result, human space
5 flight activities in ESA represent a maximum of
6 15% of the total ESA activities. And Member
7 States have never decided to increase their
8 contribution to human space flight activities to
9 the detriment of science and services to the
10 citizens.
11 This balance between different type of
12 activities -- science, applications, innovation,
13 launchers, human space flights is organized and
14 even protected by the fact that there is
15 not one ESA program and one ESA budget, but as
16 many programs as type of activities. And each
17 development program is subject to one legal
18 decision through which the Member States
19 participating to that program are committed up
20 to completion of that program (within the limit
21 of 120% of the planned budget). This
22 process makes the decision difficult, but
73
1 provides a robust basis to all individual
2 programs of ESA once the decision is taken.
3 This is the reason why ESA is the most reliable
4 partner in the world.
5 If there is one topic on which ESA can
6 teach the worlds, it is about international
7 cooperation. International cooperation is our
8 daily life: 18 countries of Europe
9 cooperating within ESA and cooperating with all
10 space powers in the world, starting
11 with NASA which has been a partner since the
12 start of the mother organization of
13 ESA (ESRO born in 1964), with Canada which is
14 not only an international partner but
15 also associated to ESA, i.e., contributing to
16 some ESA programs, with Russia, with
17 Japan, with India, China... We know how much
18 cooperation is difficult, but we know
19 how much cooperation is successful. It is
20 always easier not to cooperate, but always
21 more difficult to succeed alone.
22 With this background, let's move on to
74
1 your questions.
2 1. What has ESA learned from the ISS
3 partnership?
4 The partnership is the most important
5 asset of the ISS, which will live much longer
6 than the hardware in orbit.
7 The ISS partnership is an operational
8 "G5" working everyday to reach common
9 objectives.
10 This is a very solid partnership
11 because it has been built-up through a long list
12 of problems (technical and financial) that we
13 had to overcome together and even drama
14 (the worst being the loss of Columbia) that we
15 had to face together to reach a common
16 objective -- completing the assembly of the ISS
17 and maintaining a permanent human presence in
18 orbit.
19 ISS today is already a success, a
20 technical, operational and management success, a
21 fantastic success based on partnership.
22 The first lesson of this partnership
75
1 is the interest of keeping a partnership open to
2 new partners -- the partnership has moved from
3 the original four of Space Station Freedom
4 to five in 1993, when the four partners: USA,
5 Canada, Japan and ESA sent a collective
6 invitation to Russia for joining the
7 partnership. Fifteen years later, we know that,
8 without Russia after the Columbia tragedy, the
9 ISS would have collapsed.
10 Now, and just because the partnership
11 is so solid, we can and we have to draw
12 together the lessons learned coming from our
13 common experience onboard ISS, in particular, on
14 what we could do better in future endeavors. I
15 was the one among the ISS Heads of Agencies to
16 propose to share the lessons learned and the
17 exercise is on-going.
18 I would have preferred, therefore, to
19 present today an already collective set of
20 lessons learned, but I can tell you which points
21 must, in my view, be investigated for
22 improvements:
76
1 a) Need for redundancy in key
2 functions, in particular transportation
3 functions. The U.S. Space Shuttle has been a
4 single point failure, in particular for
5 transporting modules of ISS during the assembly
6 phase and for downloading significant
7 masses from the ISS to the ground. When the
8 Shuttle was grounded, all elements of ISS were
9 grounded. Interdependency should not mean,
10 therefore, lack of redundancy.
11 b) Need for full standardization --
12 interdependency requires standardization of
13 interfaces, which could not be fully achieved
14 for ISS operation.
15 c) Need for balancing utilization,
16 assembly and maintenance activities from the
17 start of the program. The choice which has been
18 made (which was maybe the only possible scenario
19 after the Columbia tragedy), to concentrate all
20 operations towards assembly, postponing
21 therefore utilization after completion of
22 assembly, has pushed the benefits very late in
77
1 the program and created a gap with the user
2 communities.
3 d) The evolution of partnership from
4 Freedom to ISS, as well as the sequence:
5 assembly first, then utilization, has extended
6 the program into a very long period, with no
7 intermediate, concrete and visible, milestones
8 which could have focused the teams on shorter
9 term objectives and could have attracted the
10 attention and interest of governments and
11 public. The only significant milestone is
12 assembly complete which has moved continuously
13 for a long time.
14 e) The last improvement that we could
15 bring for future endeavors is to associate the
16 public from all partners to such programs.
17 2. What is the European Space Agency's
18 interest in continuing the ISS program and why?
19 First of all, as I said above, the ISS
20 program has been sequenced in two successive
21 periods: The assembly and then the utilization.
22 The assembly is going to be completed next year,
78
1 but the utilization is just starting. The ISS
2 is, therefore, already a technical success but
3 is still far to be an overall success since the
4 success of utilization is still to be
5 demonstrated. If the utilization is not a
6 success, the overall ISS program will be
7 assessed as a failure.
8 There are, therefore, two basic
9 reasons to continue the ISS program:
10 1. To reap the benefits of the
11 investments made, by utilizing the resources on
12 board. The ISS is a unique laboratory offering
13 resources which cannot be found on Earth. As
14 for any laboratory, significant results will
15 come from a repetition of experiments which
16 require years rather than months.
17 The costs of utilizing such laboratory
18 are well defined and known by all partners. The
19 only answer to the question: "How long should
20 we use the ISS as a laboratory?" Is: "As long
21 as the benefits are worth the costs."
22 As far as the utilization of ISS is
79
1 concerned, my proposal is therefore the
2 following: To organize every three years a
3 joint (all partners) assessment of the
4 benefits drawn from the utilization of ISS and
5 to jointly decide on that basis to
6 continue for another period of 4 to 5 years, up
7 to the end of the technical duration
8 of life of ISS. This means that, if the
9 benefits are worthwhile, new laboratories in
10 LEO should be developed in order to keep the
11 continuity of utilization beyond ISS.
12 2. To be part of the human exploration
13 program. The ISS is the place for testing
14 hardware and operations before they are used for
15 lunar exploration and even more for Mars
16 exploration which is the end objective of human
17 exploration. There should not be any gap
18 between ISS operations and lunar operations,
19 since any discontinuity would lead to a loss of
20 expertise, because expertise is with the
21 people who operate.
22 As far as the role of ISS within the
80
1 human exploration program is concerned, my
2 proposal is therefore to continue the ISS
3 operations up to the start of a human lunar base
4 operation.
5 In conclusion, there are two
6 rationales for continuing the ISS program
7 exploitation, one related to utilization, one
8 related to human exploration, which may lead to
9 two different dates for the end of exploitation.
10 The best is, therefore, to define a rationale
11 and not a date.
12 3. How would you characterize the ESA
13 obligation and that of the U.S. to the ISS in
14 terms of its operational life?
15 As I said above, it is more a question
16 of rationale than a question of obligation: If
17 there is a common rationale to continue, it
18 constitutes, in my view, an obligation to
19 continue together. On the other hand, no
20 obligation can replace a lack of rationale.
21 For what concerns each partner's
22 obligations, they are defined in the
81
1 multilateral IGA at Government level and in the
2 bilateral MOU's at Agency level.
3 First, the obligation of each partner
4 is to maintain its own flight elements in order
5 and to pay its share of common operations costs,
6 i.e., for ESA to maintain the Columbus
7 laboratory in order and to compensate for 8.3%
8 of the common operation costs. Against such
9 obligation, each partner gets a right of
10 utilization of a percentage of available
11 resources proportional to its obligations.
12 Second, there is no termination date in the
13 different agreements, meaning that operational
14 life continues if no decision is taken. Third,
15 each partner has the right to withdraw
16 unilaterally at any time. But there is a
17 difference among partners: If ESA withdrew, the
18 other partners could continue on their own; if
19 NASA withdrew, the ISS operations would stop,
20 which makes a significant difference.
21 However, I do not think that a
22 unilateral decision could happen, first thanks
82
1 to the solidity demonstrated in the partnership,
2 second because the rationale is the same for
3 all partners. As I said above, the duration of
4 operational life of ISS should rely on
5 solid rationale and should be a joint decision
6 by all partners.
7 At the end, the only obligation of
8 each Partner, is to match their budget with the
9 objectives. But this is true for any program,
10 including non space programs.
11 4. How does ISS and its extension past
12 2015 connect to the European Space
13 Agency's future plans for human and robotic
14 exploration beyond low Earth
15 orbit?
16 The future plans of ESA for human and
17 robotic exploration will be defined in several
18 steps, the next step being planned in 2011.
19 A first step has been defined in
20 November 2008, with the decisions by Member
21 States:
22 To embark into an ambitious program of
83
1 robotic exploration of Mars: A first
2 mission, Exomars, is under detailed definition,
3 planning a launch in early 2016 with an
4 objective for ESA to demonstrate landing, moving
5 at the surface and drilling capabilities.
6 Follow-on missions are being prepared. These
7 missions are subject to a lot of discussions
8 with NASA for a long term cooperation, starting
9 by a significant contribution of NASA to
10 Exomars, based on the model of our common
11 success Cassini Huygens. Discussions with
12 Russia are also on-going, including an ESA
13 contribution to the Russian Phobos Grunt
14 mission.
15 To start the preparation of a
16 potential contribution of ESA to a human lunar
17 exploration programs. It is clear that for
18 human exploration:
19 Europe is dependent upon other
20 partners, in particular, USA, and cannot take
21 decisions on its own.
22 Europe needs a high level political
84
1 decision, because any significant contribution
2 of Europe to human exploration requires
3 significant additional budget, since human
4 exploration should not be developed to the
5 detriment of science and applications for the
6 citizens. A first high level political
7 conference on the subject is planned in October
8 this year.
9 At the end, the most important
10 connection between ISS duration of life and
11 future human exploration is the budget
12 competition: Can we afford to finance ISS
13 continuation and the development of future human
14 exploration?
15 This is the reason why, one important
16 rationale to continue ISS is to make it an
17 integral part of the exploration program.
18 This the reason why also, additional
19 resources are necessary because you can always
20 transfer budgets between operations and
21 development activities, but you cannot transfer
22 the expertise because operations require very
85
1 different industrial capabilities than
2 development.
3 Before closing my statement, Mister
4 Chairman, I would like to come back to a
5 very important characteristic for a partnership
6 to be sustainable -- it must be open to new
7 partners. And we, the five partner of the ISS,
8 we must address an important question -- shall
9 we invite other partners, China, India, South
10 Korea (which are today contributing to the
11 elaboration of a Global Exploration Strategy) to
12 join our current partnership, under "terms and
13 conditions" that we could jointly agree (as we
14 have done in 1993 when inviting Russia to join
15 the four Freedom partners)?
16 I do not want to anticipate the
17 answer, but not raising the question among the
18 five partners would be, in my view, the worst
19 option.
20 You will receive soon a typed version
21 of my remarks and I thank you for your
22 attention. 10:50:36
86
1 (Whereupon, the typewritten version of 10:50:36
2 Governor Dordain's comments concluded.) 10:50:36
3 GOVERNOR DORDAIN: And, again, I am 10:50:36
4 more than ready to answer any other question 10:50:36
5 today or at any time you would like listen to 10:50:36
6 me. But thank you for your attention. 10:50:40
7 MR. AUGUSTINE: Well, thank you so 10:50:48
8 much for your candor and for sharing your 10:50:49
9 thoughts with us and for sharing the benefits of 10:50:52
10 your experience. We're very appreciative. 10:50:55
11 And let me check at this point to 10:50:59
12 see -- is General Perminov is on the line 10:51:04
13 anywhere? 10:51:07
14 General, are you there? 10:51:07
15 (Discussion off the record.) 10:52:26
16 MR. AUGUSTINE: General Perminov, have 10:52:26
17 you joined us? 10:52:31
18 GENERAL PERMINOV: Yes. 10:52:32
19 THE INTERPRETER: Yes. Mr. Perminov 10:52:32
20 is with you. 10:52:36
21 MR. AUGUSTINE: Good. Well, thank you 10:52:36
22 very much for being with us. We have a large 10:52:38
87
1 group here in Washington and a group on 10:52:42
2 television -- public television -- or available 10:52:45
3 to the public, and we would be very interested 10:52:48
4 in your thoughts on the subject of international 10:52:52
5 programs, the long-term future of ISS, programs 10:52:56
6 beyond that and anything you would care to share 10:53:01
7 with us. We have allotted about 20 more minutes 10:53:04
8 for this session, and so if you could make any 10:53:07
9 comments, we'd be very appreciative. 10:53:12
10 I'm afraid our communications have 10:53:50
11 broken down. We may have to reschedule this for 10:53:52
12 another time. 10:53:56
13 General, are you able to hear me? 10:53:57
14 (Discussion off the record.)
15 GENERAL PERMINOV: Now, the view of
16 Roscosmos NASA Current Plan For Human Space
17 Flight.
18 (Whereupon, General Perminov presented
19 his comments via videoconference with the
20 assistance of an interpreter, and a typewritten
21 version provided by General Perminov is included
22 as follows:
88
1 GENERAL PERMINOV: Critical to the ISS
2 program implementation are the issues of
3 technical and transportation support (crew
4 rotation, crew rescue, cargo delivery, etc.).
5 Roscosmos welcomes NASA endeavor to
6 speed up the development of the new piloted
7 transportation system "Orion" and the new launch
8 vehicle "Ares I".
9 Successful implementation of
10 Commercial Orbital Transportation Services for
11 the ISS would allow to streamline technical and
12 transportation support of the station and to
13 make it more systematic and stable.
14 NASA Human Space Flight program looks
15 quite balanced and promising to us.
16 2. Cooperation with NASA in ISS
17 Program:
18 Roscosmos-NASA cooperation over recent
19 years has provided the following results:
20 After Columbia accident in 2003 the
21 permanent crew presence on the ISS was ensured
22 and maintained;
89
1 The ISS international crews rotation
2 has been conducted including rescue capability
3 in case of contingency situations; the ISS cargo
4 delivery and utilization has been ensured taking
5 into account the planned Space Shuttle
6 retirement in 2010;
7 ISS U.S. Segment deployment has been
8 completed;
9 The launch of Soyuz TMA in May 2009
10 increased the ISS crew up to six persons.
11 Cooperation experience accumulated by
12 Roscosmos and NASA allows us to proceed to the
13 next stage of ISS utilization: A full-scale
14 implementation of the national programs of
15 scientific experiments in space and ISS
16 utilization as an international space
17 laboratory.
18 2. Cooperation with NASA in ISS
19 Program:
20 Roscosmos-NASA cooperation over recent
21 years has provided the following results:
22 After Columbia accident in 2003 the
90
1 permanent crew presence on the ISS was ensured
2 and maintained;
3 The ISS international crews rotation
4 has been conducted including rescue capability
5 in case of contingency situations; the ISS cargo
6 delivery and utilization has been ensured taking
7 into account the planned Space Shuttle
8 retirement in 2010;
9 ISS U.S. Segment deployment has been
10 completed;
11 The launch of Soyuz TMA in May 2009
12 increased the ISS crew up to six persons.
13 Cooperation experience accumulated by
14 Roscosmos and NASA allows us to proceed to the
15 next stage of ISS utilization: A full-scale
16 implementation of the national programs of
17 scientific experiments in space and ISS
18 utilization as an international space
19 laboratory.
20 3. Desirability of ISS Operation
21 Beyond 2016:
22 Completion of the ISS U.S. segment
91
1 deployment as well as Roscosmos plans to
2 additionally equip the ISS Russian segment in
3 the nearest future will significantly increase
4 the ISS scientific potential.
5 By 2015 the ISS will have the unique
6 capabilities for scientific research in space,
7 engineering development and implementation of
8 humanitarian, educational and commercial
9 projects.
10 Taking into account these
11 circumstances, as well as recommendations
12 approved at June 2008 meeting of Heads of
13 Agencies Roscosmos considers it expedient to
14 prolong the ISS utilization term up to 2020 at
15 the minimum.
16 4. Russia Future Plans For Human Space
17 Flight Program:
18 The prospective plans for the Russian
19 human space flight are determined by the Federal
20 Space Program of Russia for the period from 2006
21 to 2015, the Concept of Russian Human Space
22 Flight Development till 2020 and a number of
92
1 other documents.
2 The main objectives of the future
3 human space flights are:
4 Exploration and efficient utilization
5 of the near Earth space;
6 Study and exploration of the Moon,
7 Mars and deep space in order to resolve global
8 problems on the Earth and in space and to
9 generate new knowledge for the benefit of the
10 humankind.
11 In order to achieve the above
12 mentioned goals we expect to make the following
13 steps in the timeframe until 2020:
14 Complete the assembly of the ISS
15 Russian Segment and to continue its utilization
16 in full configuration;
17 Provide the creation of the
18 prospective crew transportation system based on
19 a new generation piloted spacecraft;
20 Build and prepare for operation the
21 first elements of the orbital assembly
22 experimental piloted space complex by the end
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1 the ISS life cycle;
2 Develop elements, technologies and key
3 systems of prospective interplanetary complexes
4 for missions to the Moon and Mars, and develop
5 new means and methods of biomedical support to
6 ensure long-term human space flights, including
7 the interplanetary flights, and so on.
8 5. Future Interaction With NASA In
9 Space Exploration:
10 The experience gained by Russia, U.S.
11 and Europe in the area of piloted space
12 complexes and their long-term utilization,
13 including the ISS activities, allows us to
14 proceed to the implementation of the
15 larger-scale projects, in particular, the
16 development of piloted spacecraft for missions
17 to the Moon and Mars.
18 Roscosmos supports the necessity of
19 involving technical and scientific potential of
20 other countries for such large-scale projects
21 implementation.
22 Russia finds acceptable those projects
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1 which ensure equal rights of partners who will
2 share the obtained results and also Russia's
3 participation in the development of critical
4 elements (launch vehicles, power propulsion
5 systems, technologies and experience of
6 long-term crew life support in space).
7 In this connection Roscosmos considers
8 it expedient to establish the international
9 joint expert group to conduct comprehensive
10 analysis of integration feasibility in the
11 sphere of space exploration.
12 6. What has Roscosmos learned from the
13 ISS partnership?
14 Apparently, the ISS lessons show that
15 any critical element in the project should have
16 a backup (should be redundant). As a rule, such
17 elements include launch vehicles, crew and cargo
18 transportation spacecraft and Mission Control
19 Centers.
20 During the utilization phase the
21 redundancy should be provided by various modules
22 and project elements for the specific functions
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1 such as habitation, power supply and, partly,
2 the payload complexes and systems.
3 The ISS could serve as a unique test
4 stand for developing advanced technologies.
5 This process has already started and will expand
6 as we accumulate more experience and
7 capabilities for autonomous stay on the ISS.
8 The ISS lessons show that educational
9 and public outreach activities
s