Mr. Weldon of Florida
(for himself and Mr. Feeney)
introduced the following bill; which was referred to the
Committee on Science and
Technology

A BILL

To authorize the Space Shuttle to be flown from 2010
through 2015, and to authorize appropriations for the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration for this purpose.

1.

Short title

This Act may be cited as the
Spacefaring Priorities for America’s
Continued Exploration Act or the SPACE Act.

2.

Findings

Congress finds the following:

(1)

Russia is not a
reliable partner

(A)

Unless Space Shuttle
operations are extended beyond 2010, the United States will be heavily reliant
on Russia to supply crew and possibly cargo transport services to the
International Space Station during the gap period of 2010 through 2015. There
will be no other way to fly our astronauts into space during this
period.

(B)

The United States should not increase
its reliance on Russia to transport American astronauts into space, given the
increasingly divergent views and posturing from Russia. Russia opposes the
United States plan to base an antimissile radar system in the Czech Republic
and interceptor missiles in Poland to deal with the threat posed by the Iranian
nuclear weapons and missile programs. Russia also suspended its participation
in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty, one of the most significant
arms control agreements of the Cold War years. Additionally, Russia continues
to arm some of America’s most hostile adversaries, Iran and Venezuela. Despite
United States objections, Russia sold billions of dollars worth of weapons to
the regime of Hugo Chavez in 2006. Such meddling is a possible violation of the
Monroe Doctrine and a throwback to the Cold War era. Even more troublesome is
the Russian history of weapons trading with Iran. Russia has supplied advanced
conventional arms technology, missile technology, and nuclear technologies to
this very anti-American regime.

(2)

Russia has
abused past nasa cooperation agreements

(A)

In the late 1990s,
Russia fell short in fulfilling its commitment to the International Space
Station.

(B)

The National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (in this Act referred to as NASA) was forced to
transfer hundreds of millions of dollars to enable the Russians to complete the
critical Space Station service module Zvezda, without which the International
Space Station could not operate.

(C)

Russia delayed completion of the
Zvezda service module for several years. Under the International Space Station
agreement, the Russian government had committed to fund as well as build the
Zvezda service module. Subsequent transfers from the United States, in order to
complete the module, reflect serious Russian mismanagement in the field of
space.

(D)

In 2000, while Russia was failing to
meet its commitment to the International Space Station, Russia was diverting
financial and human resources away from fulfilling its International Space
Station commitments in order to keep the Russian’s Mir Space Station
aloft.

(E)

Russia’s past shortcomings in
fulfilling commitments to its international space partners should serve as a
warning to the United States as we consider increased reliance on Russian space
services in the future. It is not prudent for the United States to depend on
Russia for access to space given our past experience with this
relationship.

(3)

American space
science should not be dependent on russian support

(A)

The United States has
already invested billions of dollars in the International Space Station program
since its inception.

(B)

There is much research of great value
being conducted in space, and on the International Space Station, that may
yield tremendous gains. Research being conducted on the International Space
Station may help scientists back on Earth develop medicines to treat diseases
and help us better understand the Earth’s climate. Many scientists believe that
the microgravity environment of space will enable the development of new drugs,
vaccines, and other therapies. Equipment on the International Space Station
will monitor stratospheric gases, and investigate ozone chemistry.

(4)

The United
States must have assured access to space

(A)

To ensure that the
United States realizes the dividends from the considerable investment we have
made in the International Space Station, we need to ensure continued access to
space for our astronauts. However, NASA’s plan for transport of crew to and
from the International Space Station fails to provide necessary redundancies to
provide assured access to space.

(B)

NASA anticipates that the Russian
Soyuz spacecraft will be the only vehicle for astronaut crew rotation to the
International Space Station after 2010. From 2011 until the planned operation
of Orion in 2015, NASA likely has no other option for transporting American
astronauts to space other than on Russian vehicles.

(C)

NASA has conceded that without the
Space Shuttle, it will be unable to transport the Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer
(AMS) to the International Space Station. Scientists involved in the
development of the AMS acknowledge that it will enhance scientific discoveries.
While the AMS has cost over $1,500,000,000 to develop and build, NASA has
stated that the remaining Space Shuttle manifest does not allow for transport
of the AMS and that it will not be an option to retrofit another launch vehicle
in order to fly it into space. Only by extending Space Shuttle operations
beyond 2010 will NASA be able to transport the AMS to the International Space
Station. As long as the AMS meets all required standards to verify its validity
and justify its transport on the Space Shuttle, NASA should fulfill its
obligation to the Department of Energy and our international partners.

(D)

In addition, the Japanese Centrifuge
Accommodation Module, which can only fly to the International Space Station on
the Space Shuttle, will also be unable to reach the Space Station absent
extending Space Shuttle operations.

(5)

A better
approach

(A)

Due to NASA’s lack of a
backup plan for reliance on the Russians for transport of American astronauts
to space, the United States needs a better approach. The best approach is the
Space Shuttle, a proven, domestic source of space transport for assured access
to space, including the International Space Station, for crew and cargo
transport.

(B)

With 2 Shuttle missions per year
during the human spaceflight program flight gap between Shuttle and Orion,
currently scheduled from 2010 through 2015, we can replace our need to rely on
the Russians for crew rotation for the International Space Station.

(C)

Savings from replacing Russian
transport services to the International Space Station with the Space Shuttle
would pay for a portion of the costs for flying 2 Space Shuttle missions per
year.

(D)

Only by closing the gap between 2010
and 2015, or until the Orion is operational, will our Nation be able to keep
our Nation’s highly skilled and critically important spaceworkers and engineers
gainfully employed, and mitigate the loss of critical skills.

(E)

By extending Space Shuttle operations,
NASA may realize considerable savings by no longer having to pay retention
bonuses to critical space workers. But retention bonuses would not be the only
added costs associated with the end of Space Shuttle operations when critical
skilled workers leave NASA or its contractors. Recruitment incentives for new
workers and contract cost increases could also be incurred by NASA since the
majority of the Kennedy Space Center’s workforce are contractors.

(F)

The success of the Constellation
program will depend on having the most skilled and experienced workforce
possible. The workforce gap, as currently envisioned by NASA, will jeopardize
this. NASA has acknowledged that thousands of critical space workers will lose
their jobs in the transition from the Space Shuttle to the Constellation
program. Continued operation of the Space Shuttle, but on a reduced flight
requirement, while also integrating these workers into the Orion program, is
the best way to retain many of these critical workers and skill sets.

(G)

An August 2007 study by the Government
Accountability Office, NASA Progress Made on Strategic Human Capital
Management, but Future Program Challenges Remain, stated that
the agency as a whole faces challenges in recruiting and retaining
highly experienced senior-level engineers in certain specialties. NASA’s
principal workforce challenge will be faced in the transition to the next
generation of human space flight systems..

(H)

This Act authorizes for NASA
additional funding under section 4 to fully restore the appropriation
shortfalls in fiscal years 2007 and 2008 compared to the funds that were
authorized for NASA. An additional $1,000,000,000 is authorized in section 4(b)
to reimburse NASA for the costs incurred by NASA from the Space Shuttle
return-to-flight efforts following the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster.

3.

Prohibition on
use of Russian space services

NASA shall not rely solely on the Russian
government for astronaut transport or cargo resupply services. This prohibition
does not apply to the current Soyuz emergency escape services for astronauts on
the International Space Station.

4.

Additional
funding for NASA

(a)

Additional
authorization for fiscal year 2007 shortfall

There are authorized to be appropriated to
NASA $1,648,000,000, 41.6 percent of which shall be for Exploration Systems,
and 28.7 percent of which shall be available for Space Operations.

(b)

Columbia
return-to-flight

There are authorized to be appropriated to NASA
$1,000,000,000 for emergency funding to reimburse for Columbia return-to-flight
costs, of which the Exploration Systems and Space Operations Accounts shall
receive funding at the rate proportional to the amounts used to pay the costs
associated with the Space Shuttle return-to-flight efforts.

(c)

Additional
authorization for fiscal year 2008 shortfall

There are authorized to be appropriated to
NASA $1,064,000,000, 41.7 percent of which shall be for Exploration
Systems.

(d)

Preservation of funding for
programs

NASA shall not take any funding from its Exploration
Systems account or the Constellation program in order to fund the continued
operation of the Space Shuttle program as required in this Act.

5.

Extending Space
Shuttle operations

(a)

Use of space
shuttle for access to space

NASA shall fly at least 2 Space Shuttle
missions per year for crew transport, instead of Russian crew and cargo
services, for the period of 2010 through 2015, or until Orion is operational.
There are authorized to be appropriated to NASA such sums as may be necessary,
in addition to amounts otherwise authorized, to carry out this subsection,
including for the production of more external tanks as may be needed.

(b)

Insufficient
funding

Except as provided under subsection (c), the requirements
of this Act shall have effect only to the extent that sufficient funding is
appropriated, as authorized under subsection (a). Sufficient funding is defined
as funds required to fully or partially comply with the requirements of this
Act.

(c)

Report to
Congress

NASA shall report to Congress not later than 90 days
after the date of enactment of this Act on the specific costs and actions
needed to extend the operation of the Space Shuttle in accordance with this
Act.

(d)

Operational
efficiencies

As soon as possible, but no later than March 31,
2011, NASA shall investigate areas of reduced operations and enhanced cost
savings and implement those that do not impinge the safe operation of the Space
Shuttle program, including the following:

(1)

The possible
retirement of one Space Shuttle orbiter, leaving 2 to remain operational, in a
manner that ensures the safe operation of the Space Shuttle program.

(2)

Significantly reducing changes to the
design of the Space Shuttle orbiters, in a manner that ensures the safe
operation of the Space Shuttle program. This shall include changes to the Space
Shuttle software systems.

Maximizing the use
of shared personnel between the continued operation of the Space Shuttle and
Constellation and other NASA programs.

(e)

Facilities

If
conflicts arise in NASA’s efforts to allocate facilities, personnel, and other
resources in order to fly the Space Shuttle as well as continue the development
of Constellation, then NASA shall identify in a report to Congress in advance
such conflicts, along with recommendations as to how they can be
mitigated.

6.

Shuttle
recertification

Not later than
6 months after the date of enactment of this Act, NASA shall define achievable
and attainable requirements for operation of the Space Shuttle program beyond
2010, as recommended by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. NASA shall
transmit these requirements to Congress in the form of a report. NASA shall
then immediately begin the process of satisfying these requirements and shall
satisfy all requirements no later than March 31, 2010.