Sanghamitta wrote:Ah but Tilt would your stance remain unchanged of you went ahead and ordered the books...and then didn't read them ?Or if you didn't order the books...but read them ?Or both ordered and then cancelled them ?Or didn't order or cancel or read them ?

We must leave no semantic stone unturned in the relentless search for Enlightenment.

This being is bound to samsara, kamma is his means for going beyond. -- SN I, 38.

“Of course it is happening inside your head, Harry, but why on earth should that mean that it is not real?” HPatDH p.723

>> Do you see a man wise[enlightened/ariya]in his own eyes? There is more hope for a fool than for him.<<-- Proverbs 26:12

Ñāṇa wrote:Moreover, the individuation of phenomena requires apperceptive memory recognition (saññā) and conceptual designation (paññatti) for differentiation. All such individuation is fabricated, relational, and conventional, and therefore phenomena cannot be established as ultimately existent.

this doesnt do anything to address that prior to being conceptually designated, the thing is still the thing. if the thing werent a thing, there would be a lack of the thing (nihilism) in which case it would be senseless to say it could be the focus of conceptual designation.

Noa Ronkin, Early Buddhist Metaphysics: The Making of a Philosophical Tradition (p. 247):

“Neither conceptualizing, nor conceptualizing wrongly, nor lacking conceptualization, nor conceptualizing nothing – in one who has achieved this state sensory recognizable experience (rupa) ceases, for what is called ‘verbal proliferation’ (papañca) has its origin in conceptualization.”

i am going to have check out these books youre mentioning

but i prefer to talk about what seems to be the more commonly accepted position, which is that things are marked by findable characteristic natures. this way, moments exist regardless of conceptualization.

A Japanese man has been arrested on suspicion of writing a computer virus that destroys and replaces files on a victim PC with manga images of squid, octopuses and sea urchins. Masato Nakatsuji, 27, of Izumisano, Osaka Prefecture, was quoted as telling police: "I wanted to see how much my computer programming skills had improved since the last time I was arrested."

5heaps wrote:but i prefer to talk about what seems to be the more commonly accepted position, .

Whose?

the ppl in this thread (there are more who accept real momentariness than those who do not)

where did they get their info from? dont really care at the moment, im more interested in working through the ideas than parroting text

A Japanese man has been arrested on suspicion of writing a computer virus that destroys and replaces files on a victim PC with manga images of squid, octopuses and sea urchins. Masato Nakatsuji, 27, of Izumisano, Osaka Prefecture, was quoted as telling police: "I wanted to see how much my computer programming skills had improved since the last time I was arrested."

my logic comes from kamma. if objects themselves cant maintain their characteristic natures as they are undergoing change then you cant say that objects change

you seem to want to wriggle your way out of this by suggesting that Buddha never spoke of objects themselves, but rather just about our designations of objects. or worse (ie. there are no external objects at all, there are only designations of objects)

A Japanese man has been arrested on suspicion of writing a computer virus that destroys and replaces files on a victim PC with manga images of squid, octopuses and sea urchins. Masato Nakatsuji, 27, of Izumisano, Osaka Prefecture, was quoted as telling police: "I wanted to see how much my computer programming skills had improved since the last time I was arrested."

my logic comes from kamma. if objects themselves cant maintain their characteristic natures as they are undergoing change then you cant say that objects change[/quote]Who knows what school of Buddhism you are referring to?

you seem to want to wriggle your way out of this by suggesting that Buddha never spoke of objects themselves, but rather just about our designations of objects. or worse (ie. there are no external objects at all, there are only designations of objects)

I would suggest you go back and carefully reread what was written above by me and Ñāṇa.

This being is bound to samsara, kamma is his means for going beyond. -- SN I, 38.

“Of course it is happening inside your head, Harry, but why on earth should that mean that it is not real?” HPatDH p.723

>> Do you see a man wise[enlightened/ariya]in his own eyes? There is more hope for a fool than for him.<<-- Proverbs 26:12

Ñāṇa wrote:Moreover, the individuation of phenomena requires apperceptive memory recognition (saññā) and conceptual designation (paññatti) for differentiation. All such individuation is fabricated, relational, and conventional, and therefore phenomena cannot be established as ultimately existent.

this doesnt do anything to address that prior to being conceptually designated, the thing is still the thing. if the thing werent a thing, there would be a lack of the thing (nihilism) in which case it would be senseless to say it could be the focus of conceptual designation.

I've never denied the appearance of phenomena.

5heaps wrote:but i prefer to talk about what seems to be the more commonly accepted position, which is that things are marked by findable characteristic natures. this way, moments exist regardless of conceptualization.

Which position would that be? More specifically, which theory of radical momentariness do you accept? The Vaibhāṣika-Sarvāstivāda version? The Sautrāntika-Sarvāstivāda version? The Theravāda version? And which author within your chosen vāda? Because even within any particular vāda there are significant disagreements. For example, if your choice is the Theravāda version, then which Theravāda version do you accept? Ācariya Ānanda’s version? Ācariya Anuruddha’s version? Ācariya Sumaṅgala’s version?

5heaps wrote:this way, moments exist regardless of conceptualization.

Sorry, but no Theravāda commentator would agree that "moments exist."

5heaps wrote:the thing which is impermanent is the thing which is momentary (maintains its characteristic nature as it is undergoing subtlest change). for us its simple -- impermanent thing, momentary thing, conditioned thing and functioning thing are all equivalent.

And how are you going to establish the objective validity your momentary thing "that maintains its characteristic nature as it is undergoing subtlest change"? If you rely on any criterion or measurement (pamāṇa) based on deluded worldly cognitions, then all you will ever "prove" is that deluded worldly cognitions are deluded. Not a valid source for establishing the unerring validity of any supposed objective truth-claims. Sn 3.12 Dvayatānupassanā Sutta:

Entrenched in name and form, They conceive that “This is true.”

In whatever way (worldlings) conceive it,It turns out other than that.For that is what is false about it.Whatever is transitory certainly has a false nature.

If, on the other hand, you attempt to employ any criterion or measurement (pamāṇa) in order to try to establish liberated cognitons, then you will also be at a loss because there are no means of measurement which can be used as reference points to validate a measureless cognition (appamāṇacetasa). SN 6.7 (S i 148) Kokālika Sutta:

What wise man here would seek to defineA measureless one by taking his measure?He who would measure a measureless oneMust be, I think, an obstructed worldling.

Better to practice satipaṭṭhāna and begin to relinquish notions of objective truth-claims about theories of radical momentariness.

Besides morality there are other dhammas1which are profound, hard to see, hard to comprehend, tranquil, noble, surpassing logic...

The problem one might have with Nanavira Thera's statements (based on that one quote -- don't know the whole argument) is that he presents insight wisdom as a refutation of logic. But if insight wisdom is a refutation of logic, on what basis does he or anyone have in using it?

The dhammas taught by the Buddha are not something that refute logic, but surpass it and elucidate it.

Of course this might just be misunderstanding Nanavira Thera by taking his words out of context. What he's saying is probably not meant to be good or bad philosophy; it is meant to surpass philosophy. It cannot be understood by a mind grasping wrongly at concepts. He points out that logic is without foundation; it is built upon impermanent dhammas, while insight is not built upon a shaky foundation.

With this context, let me repeat Bhikkhu Bodhi's quote again:

"the objective domain of the uttermost knowledge cannot be encompassed by reasoning."

(Actually that's not even Bhikkhu Bodhi, is it? That's just his translation from the early Theravada commentaries?)

But if insight wisdom is a refutation of logic, on what basis does he or anyone have in using it?

Im just curious. Is the phrase "refutation of logic" kind of a paradox or maybe an oxymoron? Would a process of refuting necessarily involve the application of logic? At least when one is speaking abstractly I would think refutation requires logic.

Not a big deal.

Gabe

"Beautifully taught is the Lord's Dhamma, immediately apparent, timeless, of the nature of a personal invitation, progressive, to be attained by the wise, each for himself." Anguttara Nikaya V.332

But if insight wisdom is a refutation of logic, on what basis does he or anyone have in using it?

Im just curious. Is the phrase "refutation of logic" kind of a paradox or maybe an oxymoron? Would a process of refuting necessarily involve the application of logic? At least when one is speaking abstractly I would think refutation requires logic.

Not a big deal.

Gabe

Why you asking me? What could I possibly say?

You use logic. Why not just think about it -- in a much deeper way than you might presently? It's not a big deal is right. Just be mindful and investigate what logic is when you use it.

Ñāṇa wrote:Moreover, the individuation of phenomena requires apperceptive memory recognition (saññā) and conceptual designation (paññatti) for differentiation. All such individuation is fabricated, relational, and conventional, and therefore phenomena cannot be established as ultimately existent.

this doesnt do anything to address that prior to being conceptually designated, the thing is still the thing. if the thing werent a thing, there would be a lack of the thing (nihilism) in which case it would be senseless to say it could be the focus of conceptual designation.

I've never denied the appearance of phenomena.

right, you love appearances. i am saying the nihilism comes from not accepting the objects which the appearances are based on.

even in mindonly which doesnt accept external objects, they do not say that physical form for example is equivalent to appearance of the mental consciousness.

Which position would that be? More specifically, which theory of radical momentariness do you accept? The Vaibhāṣika-Sarvāstivāda version? The Sautrāntika-Sarvāstivāda version?

they should all be studied. or, in a more generalized and progressive format. in the indian tenet system (which Tilt calls "tibetan tenet system") the shift from vaibhashika momentariness to sautrantika to momentariness is very profound. likewise into midonly it is very profound. these 4 systems are used as an outline, like a map, for finding subtler and subtler objects of negation, for the purpose of meditation.

Sorry, but no Theravāda commentator would agree that "moments exist."

they dont say that a thing is produced in dependence on causes and conditions? and that once this thing is produced, it abides? and then disintegrates? i guess they all happen at once then? still no? i guess theyre unchanging then. no? what other option is there? even Arya Nagarjuna accepts a qualified momentariness, as do all the schools who assert no nature.

5heaps wrote:the thing which is impermanent is the thing which is momentary (maintains its characteristic nature as it is undergoing subtlest change). for us its simple -- impermanent thing, momentary thing, conditioned thing and functioning thing are all equivalent.

And how are you going to establish the objective validity your momentary thing "that maintains its characteristic nature as it is undergoing subtlest change"? If you rely on any criterion or measurement (pamāṇa) based on deluded worldly cognitions, then all you will ever "prove" is that deluded worldly cognitions are deluded.

all that delusion misconceives to be true is svabhava. there is nothing wrong with the object itself, its just that it has never been clearly seen since its generally mixed with an appearance of svabhava.

A Japanese man has been arrested on suspicion of writing a computer virus that destroys and replaces files on a victim PC with manga images of squid, octopuses and sea urchins. Masato Nakatsuji, 27, of Izumisano, Osaka Prefecture, was quoted as telling police: "I wanted to see how much my computer programming skills had improved since the last time I was arrested."

Not at all. The Theravada is a complete path of practice which does not need the tenet system.

yes, and its essential to the world. hopefully it will survive the next 50 years. ours will, since we go step by step by step [through graded tenets].

A Japanese man has been arrested on suspicion of writing a computer virus that destroys and replaces files on a victim PC with manga images of squid, octopuses and sea urchins. Masato Nakatsuji, 27, of Izumisano, Osaka Prefecture, was quoted as telling police: "I wanted to see how much my computer programming skills had improved since the last time I was arrested."

Not at all. The Theravada is a complete path of practice which does not need the tenet system.

yes, and its essential to the world. hopefully it will survive the next 50 years. ours will, since we go step by step by step [through graded tenets].

Ah, so you plainly expose your bias. Why are you here? You are not a Theravadin; you seem not to have any real knowledge of the Theravada, but you want to tell the Theravadins here what is supposedly true about the Theravada, even though you do not know. It is the usual stuff that comes out of someone who has swallowed the tenet system whole and regurgitates it undigested to no one else's liking. So why are you here?

This being is bound to samsara, kamma is his means for going beyond. -- SN I, 38.

“Of course it is happening inside your head, Harry, but why on earth should that mean that it is not real?” HPatDH p.723

>> Do you see a man wise[enlightened/ariya]in his own eyes? There is more hope for a fool than for him.<<-- Proverbs 26:12