Ecoregions as Geopolitical Subregions

According to WWF (World Wildlife Foundation), an ecoregion is a “large unit of land or water containing a geographically distinct assemblage of species, natural communities, and environmental conditions”. Ecoregions, in other words, are places that vary in terms of geographical conditions (e.g. The Congo River basin).

When we analyze the regional diversity within a country, what if instead of analyzing the political boundaries of a country, we, in turn, analyze a country’s ecoregions and contextualize them as diverse geopolitical subregions? In my interpretation, if an ecoregion, in terms of species, landforms and natural communities, is a space that varies from another physical space, why can’t we say the same about a country’s geopolitical regions?

What if we think of a geopolitical ecoregion as a distinct political space, with different ethnic groups, distinct political organization and governance, with their own social complexities, and their own economic specializations, however, within the context of a physical ecoregion, meaning: a group of people inhabiting the same landform and/or space (ecoregion), yet with distinct particularities that change when transitioning between one ecoregion onto another.

In this article I shall briefly introduce another analytical concept by analyzing Guatemala’s ecoregions as different geopolitical subregions. In Guatemala’s case there are three different physical regions: pacific coastal plains, highlands and the Petén rainforest lowlands; however, in order to be more specific, and to appreciate the diverse complexities from one ecoregion to another, I shall outline four specific ecoregions as geopolitical subregions: 1) Ermita Valley, 2) indigenous highlands, 3) Motagua river valley thornscrub, 4) tropical moist forests, and 5) pacific coastal lowlands. Lastly, this is a personal, general analysis and my own interpretation of how my country’s ecoregions ought to be defined and understood from a geopolitical viewpoint.

Guatemala’s Ecoregions

1. Ermita Valley

Guatemala’s capital was transferred more than three times, due to diverse environmental conditions and social strife during the colonization era (from Iximche to the Almolonga Valley, because of indigenous resistance between the Spanish conquistadores and the Kaqchikel tribe; from Almolonga to Antigua Guatemala, because of flooding; and from Antigua Guatemala to its actual location, the Ermita valley, because of an earthquake). Yet, eventually, it was the Ermita valley that was finally chosen to become Guatemala City’s permanent settlement. As if it were a constant lesson of trial and error. This choice was no coincidence. It was thought in geostrategic terms, by taking into account both climatic conditions and transportation/communication/commercial strategic corridors. However, the topographic barriers were never entirely considered.

Guatemala City (14º N) lies in the Ermita valley, which is, ultimately, a convergence zone of diverse climatic conditions. Guatemala city sits at an elevation of 4,900 feet, giving Guatemala City a very stable—yet fresh—temperature ranging between 15º C and 23º. Additionally, because of the tropical easterlies that blow (5º to 25º N/ 5º to 25º S) from the northeast, these winds tend regulate the wind circulation of Guatemala City. Also, mainly from its southeast, due to its close proximity to the Pacific Ocean (43 NM/79KM in a straight line from Guatemala City to Puerto de San Jose), high-pressure oceanic winds stemming from the Equatorial Counter Current warm ocean current, clashes with the highlands’ daily low-pressure gradient alongside the warm tropical easterlies, which influence the warm, rainy season (from May to mid-October).

As a consequence, these climatic convergence zone gives the Ermita valley throughout the day constant rain showers during the warm, rainy season, meanwhile, during the cold, dry season (end of October to March) the Equatorial Counter Current low-pressure system drifts away from Guatemala city, ultimately providing Guatemala city clear blue skies. All in all, Guatemala City, in the Ermita Valley, has a quasi-Mediterranean temperate climate, in spite of being located in the tropics. Politically and economically what does this mean? Guatemala City has the perfect conditions to increase its demography. Guatemala city metropolitan area has one of the largest demographics in Central America, with almost 5 million inhabitants. Guatemala city has 1 million inhabitants less than El Salvador and Nicaragua, 3 million less than Honduras, yet with more population than Costa Rica and Panama. It was no surprise that Guatemala City, was chosen to be Central America’s General Captaincy during the Spanish colonization. And it is the main demographic center that receives most of the internal migration, needless to add an increasing migration from El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua.

The ecoregion of the Ermita Valley, where Guatemala City is located, allows one to label Guatemala, in accordance to territorial morphological terms, as a ‘compact’ country. This means: From the Ermita Valley, Guatemala’s borders are relatively equidistant, by specially taking into account the distance from the Ermita Valley to Honduras via Chiquimula (# 4 on the map), to El Salvador via Jutiapa (# 13 on the map), and to Mexico via San Marcos (#17 on the map). In the geopolitical imagination of Guatemalans, Belize is considered a non-Central American country, but, rather, it is perceived as a Caribbean country. Also, from Guatemala’s point of view, Belize was taken from Guatemala because of bad political and commercial decisions. As a result, the Ermita Valley is the pivotal axis of all Guatemala. It is near its most important seaports (Puerto Quetzal and Champerico); it is the economic and financial capital powerhouse of the Central American Isthmus; and it is strategically located from the a) food-producing areas (Motagua River Valley Thornscrub); b) coffee belt (mainly from nearby regions such as Antigua Guatemala and Sololá); and c) commercial large-industrial agriculture and cotton-producing areas in the pacific coastal lowlands. Yet, in spite of its advantages, as I shall shorty introduce, politically, the Ermita Valley—or core geography—has a hard time in politically controlling and subduing its periphery.

2. Indigenous Highlands

Though in ecological terms, this region would be denominated as a sub-temperate moist forest. In my mind, when it comes to the highlands of Guatemala, I believe that they should be addressed as the ‘indigenous highlands’. This is the most diverse, yet economically poorest geopolitical subregion of Guatemala, and the hardest to politically control and understand as a citizen of Guatemala City. In my view, the indigenous highlands encompass two subregions within the highlands: The western and central indigenous highlands. This ecoregion consists of approximately 45% of Guatemalan territory.

The highlands of Guatemala (though located in the tropics) have a mixture of tropical savannah and temperate climate. As a result, the seasonal variations are usually felt at lower elevations, nearby the pacific coastal lowlands. Because of the microclimates (low-pressure cells during the day and high-pressure cells throughout the night, in addition to the fertile volcanic ash and soil pH) in this region, the borderlands of the pacific coastal lowlands and the indigenous highlands have one of the best quality-produced coffees of Guatemala and the world. However, as the elevation increases, the less fertile and rockier the land is. Consequently, the indigenous populations in the highlands depend upon subsistence agriculture—i.e. corn, beans, grain, wheat, potatoes, and animal grazing—instead of high-yield cash crops as their counterparts in the pacific coastal lowlands.

The indigenous highland region of Guatemala is part of the Sierra Madre mountain range, which runs northwest-southwest from Mexico (originally a part of the Sierra Madre Oriental and Sierra Madre Occidental), making its way into the Honduran-Nicaraguan border up to the Cordillera Isabelia in Nicaragua. This region, which traverses Guatemala across the Honduran and Salvadoran border, into Nicaragua, circumscribes a total of 6 different mountain chains known as ‘sierras’. Out of these 6 sierras, 3 sierras (e.g. Cuchumatanes, Chamá, and De Las Minas) belong to the Indigenous highlands. Last but not least, Guatemala’s main river system is a Pacific Ocean drainage area; most of the rivers and streams that originate within the indigenous highlands drain in the Pacific Basin. Nevertheless, despite of highland-originated rivers, Guatemala does not have a proper navigational river system—except for the lower end of the Motagua River—given the topographic constraints amid its different watersheds in the form of valleys and sierras. For this reason, commercially speaking, population centers in the highlands, without a proper navigable system, have been historically disconnected with the rest of the country. Put it simply, one valley and its villages is an entire different world compared with other villages in another valley. In addition, because of the topographic barriers, Guatemala has had a hard time achieving a full political and economic integration with the highlands. And at the same time, due to a wide-array of social and geographical conditions, this region has one of the highest numbers of chronic child malnutrition in the whole country, which clearly given the poor levels of education, lack of strong government institutions, isolation, and soil fertility, this region overall can be considered Guatemala’ socially most diverse backcountry.

Politically, for the Guatemalan central government, the indigenous highlands, is the most diverse and challenging ecoregions in Guatemala. It has over 16 different Mayan languages, and 24 ethnic groups. The Mayan languages are spoken by the numerous indigenous tribes emanating from the valleys and sierras within the highlands (only in Huehuetenango, # 10 in the map, 9 Mayan languages are spoken!) As a result, it’s no wonder why most of the war theaters of the Guatemalan civil war (1960-1996), was fought in the indigenous highlands, mainly in the Ixil triangle of northern Quiche (# 7 in the map) alongside most of the western highlands.

Moreover, it was through the indigenous highlands that the Spaniards first penetrated Guatemala, while allying themselves with the Kaqchikel tribe, by defeating the then-most powerful K’iche’ tribe. Eventually, the Spaniards betrayed the Kaqchikel tribe and ravished the Indigenous highlands throughout the entire colonization period until Guatemala’s independence from Spain in 1821. As a result, in the modern-era, there is still a large degree of resentment towards the mestizo and white population, specifically towards the private sector and large Guatemalan corporations from Guatemala City. In spite of the fact that this area has a huge potential for hydroelectric and mining projects, many Amerindian communities have sabotaged these projects, with the support of foreign NGOs that have pushed indigenous auto-emancipation plans in the region, further destabilizing Guatemala. Nevertheless, regardless of their commonality, the indigenous groups in the highlands have never been able to politically unite themselves, (in some villages, deep in the mountains, some of them rarely speak Spanish), which, as a consequence, has led Guatemala—in spite of their indigenous population—to be a state governed by mestizo and white presidents.

If there would be an analogy that would best describe the Guatemalan highlands, it would most certainly be the Russian North Caucasus: These indigenous groups are part of the same state but different nations as a whole, living in fragmented spaces and finding shield and in the mountains. Though many of these groups speak Spanish, they still do so with a heavy indigenous accent, because they have still conserved their traditional and cultural Mayan identity and language in their communities. Because of this, each valley and sierra represents separate political entities, where they have their own enforcement of laws and linguistic barriers. Also, because of their own law enforcement customs, there is a high number of lynching, and rarely the Guatemalan state has enough coercive power to enforce their monopoly of security in the indigenous highlands. The indigenous highlands, rather than uniting Guatemala, have historically, culturally, politically, and commercially fragmented Guatemala.

3. Motagua River Valley Thornscrub

If you would journey from Guatemala City to Puerto Barrios, Izabal (Guatemala’s only outlet in the Caribbean Sea), you would notice how arid and dry the Motagua River valley ecoregion is—which is why the biggest common denominator is the thornscrub. This ecoregion, also known as ‘el oriente’ (the east), is actually more like Guatemala’s wild west; it is mainly the spiritual base of Guatemala’s most notorious drug cartels that operate in the form of family clans. Think of Calabria, Basilicata and Puglia and then think of the Motagua River valley thornscrub ecoregion as something similar, except for the sea, olives and pasta.

Geographically, one of the main climatic reasons on why this ecoregion tends to have a semi-arid, savannah-like climate, is because of the orographic effect that originates with the combination of both the tropical easterlies and the North Equatorial Current from the Caribbean Sea, converging into Izabal’s (#11 in the map) topographic obstacles (Sierra De Las Minas, Sierra Santa Cruz, Sierra Del Merendón, and to a lesser degree, Mico mountains). For this reason, the Foehn winds, coming from the northeast, which bring moist marine air from the Caribbean Sea, crash into Izabal’s numerous topographic barriers. When these moist marine winds surpass Izabal’s sierras, they descend with a warm, dry air, as a result, creating a rain shadow effect on the leeward slopes of the sierras (particularly the Sierra De Las Minas) that face the departments of Zacapa, Chiquimula, El Progreso and Jalapa. Yet, one of the primordial reasons on why these departments are not complete deserts alike is because of the Motagua river system and its tributaries, including the numerous valleys amid the diverse sierras that separate these regions (e.g. Sierra del Merendón), thereby providing this ecoregion with enough wind circulation, sunlight, and rain, equaling to arable land and soil fertility. Because of this climatic phenomena, The Motagua River Valley Thornscrub has sufficient soil fertility to produce perennial crops, mainly in Zacapa and Jalapa, and to a lesser extent Chiquimula; however, El Progreso has an agriculturally unworthy limestone bedrock floor, therefore, it is the least inhabited departments of all Guatemala, mainly serving as a transit point between Guatemala and Puerto Barrios, Izabal. And also, because of this climatic variation, the northern part of Chiquimula department—which is one of the most arid departments of this ecoregion—is considered a red zone concerning chronic infantile malnutrition. As a consequence, this ecoregion, geographically, is an ecoregion of extremes: It either has fertile valleys, good enough to produce tropical fruits and raise beef cattle, or it has a limestone bedrock type of soil, limiting the arable land and thus limiting population capacity support.

Geostrategically, this ecoregion is a region of valleys, sierras and rugged hills—however not as high as the indigenous highlands. Due to the Motagua River valley’s proximity to the Honduran Caribbean coast and proximity to the tropical moist forests ecoregion, indirectly, makes the Motagua River valley a natural gateway towards Mexico, Belize and further inland. In terms of drug mobility and illegal immigration arousing from Honduras, this ecoregion has become a leading entry point and node to Guatemala. Chiquimula (# 4 in the map) is the most geostrategic of all four departments that make part of the Motagua River Valley Thornscrub ecoregion. Chiquimula is close enough to the Sierra Madre of Honduras and El Salvador, yet far-flung from Guatemala’s government control, protected by the sierras of Zacapa and Jalapa.

Ethnically, the Motagua River Valley Thornscrub is an ethnically homogenous region, with chiefly both white and mestizo Spanish-speaking population. There are only two Mayan languages in the region—i.e. Poqomam and Ch’orti’—which are known indigenous minorities. Many European migrants, exclusively those arriving from the Iberian Peninsula and Mediterranean Europe that, after disembarking in Santo Tomas de Castilla, populated this valley conformed by multiple migrants alongside the already-settled mestizo population since colonial times. This ecoregion has a population and shared identity with those of Salvadoran and Honduran borderlands, oftentimes carrying firearms as part of their cultural identity. When their honor has been disrespected, violence or negotiated settlement is one of the leading cultural traits within the residents of this ecoregion. At first glance, as a Guatemalan, in my mind, the toughest and most loyal bodyguards usually originate from this ecoregion. But it is because of this culture of blood, honor and patriarchal hierarchical social structure that, according to Guatemalan stereotypes, it is this ecoregion’s population that resorts to violence and blood, if not settled by a respected town member or patriarchal figure.

Crime is low in this region, with no gang cliques, as in the case of Guatemala City. Yet, this is not because there is a strong authority that enforces the law accordingly. Rather it is the drug cartels that enforce their own codes of honor and security amongst their areas of controls, by building community clinics, restaurants and other commercial assets that emphasizes a sense of loyalty amongst the various townships via employment for the communities. One reason why mainly this population shares the same ethnicity and political identity, is because this ecoregion has been an important—and only—transit route between Guatemala City and Puerto Barrios, therefore, many Spanish immigrants settled in this region, which can resemble at times, to those dry-arid regions of southern Spain, such as Extremadura, Andalucía, for instance. Furthermore, according to Guatemalan historians, it was such population that brought their own cultural legacies to this area of Guatemala, and thus shared with southwestern Honduras and northwestern El Salvador.

4. Tropical Moist Forests

Izabal and Peten (# 5 and # 11 in the map) represent another hinterland in the Guatemalan regional mentality. Though this ecoregion is scientifically and more accurately described as a tropical moist forest, in simpler terms, is pretty much known as a jungle rainforest. In essence, these two departments represent Guatemala’s jungle forests. This ecoregion is moderately populated since most of the population, in the case of Izabal, revolves around Lake Izabal and confined to the main transportation corridor from Guatemala City to Puerto Barrios. In the case of Peten, this region, given its size (35, 854 km2), is theoretically underpopulated; most of its population gravitates around Flores (Petén’s principal city) and its widely distributed cities in the lowlands, nearing Izabal and Alta Verapaz. Notwithstanding, it is also an imperative region that has been pivotal in the geopolitics of Guatemala, from both a historic and modern day viewpoint.

Geographically, the Tropical Moist Forest ecoregion is a combination of low-level sierras (Sierra de Santa Cruz, Sierra de Chama), low-elevated highlands (Maya Highlands), coupled with limestone plains that bound together this particular ecoregion. This particular ecoregion has the right ‘ingredients’ of climate and weather: 1) the right amount of insolation (solar energy), 2) temperature, 3) pressure, 4) wind, and 5) precipitation to evolve into tropical rainforests, and one of the last virgin rainforests of Guatemala (e.g. North Peten). Yet, the climatic reason why this ecoregion is composed of different subtropical, warm, moist forests is because of the perpendicular angle in which the North Equatorial Current passes right through this region. Without elevated topographical obstacles, the North Equatorial Current alongside the Trade Winds, provide the Yucatan Peninsula, Cozumel Island, Belize and, essentially, Peten and Izabal, with plenty of rainfall (around 120 inches) from the humid waters of the Caribbean sea. Agriculturally, this means that Peten, with its limestone type of lowlands and dense forests, is not the most suitable region to plant and harvest cash crops, as opposed to the pacific coastal lowlands. Consequently, it is an agriculturally inadequately developed region, with minimal cash crops. Yet, when it comes to livestock, palm oil, underexploited oil basins (e.g. La Libertad refinery), and vast space to develop, it is one of the most promising regions of Guatemala. Meanwhile, Izabal, though it has the same moist rainforests as Peten, generally speaking, the Izabal-Zacapa ecological frontier, provides Izabal with some commercial agriculture potential—i.e. bananas, cotton, cocoa, some coffee and livestock. However, to the western side of Lake Izabal, as like the case of Peten, Izabal has basic subsistence agriculture and some mining projects, as with the case of the Fenix Nickel Project.

Peten, compared with the relative isolation of Izabal, is another hinterland in the Guatemalan political map. Historically, the Spaniards colonized Peten 160 years after their settlement in the Guatemalan indigenous highlands—it was left alone for more than a century. Peten was one of the hardest landscapes to secure and to stabilize. Long story short, Peten was one of the first spaces on which the Mayan civilization took place. Nevertheless, after the Spaniards subdued, with an army of Aztec warriors, most of the Guatemalan highland kingdoms, it was the Itza tribe and other tribes of hunters and gatherers, that resisted the most against the Spanish thrust for colonization space, materialized in the form of Christian missionaries. All in all, Spain penetrated Guatemalan lands during the 1520s, however, the Itza and Mopan tribes would prove to be the most battle-hardened tribes of all Guatemala, delaying the full Spanish takeover of Peten and Guatemala until 1697. Peten’s fierce tribes and inhospitable terrain, prove to be one of the most difficult landscape in Guatemala to secure; the remnants of the Itza and Mopan tribes would be absorbed by the Alta Verapaz highland Q’eqchi tribes. Eventually, Peten, would be contested by the British throughout the British colonization of the Caribbean, but secured by the Spaniards and eventually inherited by the Guatemalan government after border disputes between the Yucatan General Captaincy and the Guatemala General Captaincy. Finally, Izabal’s history is not as dramatic as Peten’s was. In order to fight the pirates that plagued the Honduran Caribbean coast, the Spaniards decided to build a port that would be eventually known as Santo Tomas de Castilla, currently the most important seaport of Izabal, and Guatemala’s only outlet to the Caribbean. Izabal, unlike Peten, was used by the Spaniards as their main transportation and communication corridor between Guatemala City and Izabal, thus making Izabal another strategic point in Guatemala’s history.

Peten and Izabal illustrate two important examples in the tropical moist forests ecoregion of Guatemala, however, with different historical legacies. The former was hard to subdue and conquer while the latter was simply used as a node that would lead to the exploration and conquer of modern-day Honduras and further onto the isthmus. For this reason, Peten and Izabal (# 5 and # 11 in the map) played a leading role in the Spanish conquest of the Central American Isthmus. Geostrategically, however, Peten presents itself as if it were a separate country within Guatemala, and with a tremendous amount of Mexican influence. As aforementioned, the Yucatan General Captaincy (modern-day Mexico) would be the departing point of the Spanish expeditions, notably from Campeche, Merida and Salamanca de Bacalar onto Nojpeten, the Itza tribal kingdom, indirectly knitting the would-be Mexican influence, after the Mexican emancipation from Spain. Therefore, unsurprisingly, during the late 1950s, the Guatemalan government fostered internal migration from the Motagua River valley, pacific coastal lowlands, and central indigenous Highlands (specifically Alta Verapaz) to acculturate Peten. (In 1866 Peten was formally absorbed into Guatemala political geography, thereby reflecting the isolation and indirect dispute Peten was between Mexico and Guatemala.) Also, during the 1960s and 1970s, Peten was used as a base by the Guatemalan military regimes to creep and intimidate Belize of potential invasion. However, given ongoing civil war (1960-1996), and a threat by the British Government, Guatemala desisted in retaking Belize.

Commercially and geographically, Peten and Izabal remain isolated places. The indigenous highlands block political control of Peten and Izabal; as a consequence, both territories have become an extension of the drug cartels that originated in the Motagua River valley thornscrub ecoregion. Last but not least, Izabal is only connected by one important interdepartmental highway from Guatemala City, thus easily being cut whenever violent protests erupt in Guatemala City. Furthermore, because of the topographic obstacles from the Motagua River ecoregion, and the tropical moist forests and sierras of Izabal, Peten is a region where it is preferable to fly instead of a lengthy 8 to 10 hour drive. Consequently, Izabal and Peten, remain another hinterland in the Guatemalan geopolitical map.

5. Pacific Coastal Lowlands

As initially mentioned, Guatemala is a country of many hinterlands and borderlands. But if there is a region that represents the core geography of Guatemala, and a region that is fully controlled by the central government, that would be the pacific coastal lowlands; not only an area where the government exerts full control, but also an area that represents the bread and basket of Guatemala as a whole.

The Coastal lowlands is comprised by 5 separate departments, sharing similar mestizo ethnicity and stable climatic conditions, without much variety as the indigenous highlands, neither an unbalanced orographic rain shadow effect as in the Motagua River valley thornscrub ecoregion, nor the limestone, unfertile soil variety of the Tropical Moist Forest ecoregion. To a large degree, because of the Pacific Equatorial Counter Current, in this ecoregion, during the day, cool air descends, traveling in an onshore flow, until eventually is lifted when reaching some of the volcanic areas close to the Ermita Valley. Eventually, when the air ascends, these sea-hugging lowlands enjoy a continuous onshore sea breeze flow, steadily providing the right amount of humidity, insolation, temperature and air, influencing the soil pH (between 6.8 to 7.2) of the plains. During the night, when the land cools down, the ocean becomes warmer. And as the cool air descends from the indigenous highlands and Ermita valley’s hillsides, a refreshing land breeze aids this particular region. Lastly, in the same vein, since most of the indigenous highlands rivers, tributaries and small streams drain in the Pacific Ocean; these watersheds yield Guatemala’s most important developed agricultural spaces and industrialized areas.

Economically speaking, this is the bread and basket of Guatemala. But, apart from an economic viewpoint, this is the only ecoregion that remains the most reachable, unobstructed ecoregion of all. For this obvious reason, this eco region represents Guatemala’s core geography. And since the colonization epoch, this ecoregion has been the most developed, connected and transited with both the indigenous highlands and Ermita valley. Yet from a security point of view, it represents an open space for illegal immigration contraband groups and an easy gateway for criminal gangs (e.g. MS 13 and Barrio 18) that arouse from El Salvador, which easily reach the Ermita Valley, via Jutiapa (#13 on the map). Also, contraband and narcotics that stem from Ecuadorian (e.g. Guayaquil, Manta and Esmeraldas) and Colombian pacific ports (e.g. Bucaramanga) flawlessly make their way into the pacific coastal lowlands, eventually crossing into Mexico, without having to pass through Guatemala City. As a result, in spite of the rapid urbanization and industrialization this region upholds, it is a clear path for Colombian and Mexican cartels to commercialize in a hassle-free, point-to-point operational environment. Nevertheless, all of these departments are within an ease reach by the Guatemalan central government, if compared with the highlands and the tropical moist forest ecoregions.

Conclusion

• Even if this has been a generally, non-academic personal analysis, we have seen that by describing each geopolitical subfield, in the form of ecoregions, we are brought to ponder and grasp the intersection of how physical geography and political geography come to terms with each other—something unfortunately mainstream academia does not support.

• Guatemala is one of the most difficult territories within Central America to exert and control political dominance and economic integration. It is a highly fragmented country, but this fragmentation is experienced best in the indigenous highlands, where still, up to this day, after 500 years of Spanish domination, indigenous groups have conserved their identity, customs, laws and sense of governance. From an anthropological and academic viewpoint, it is one of the most fascinating countries of all Latin America. But from a statist point of view, the indigenous highlands are a buffer zone between Peten and the Ermita Valley, by shielding and isolating from government control the majority of the indigenous groups as well as control over the cartel regions and Mexican influence in the Peten basin.

Halford Mackinder, who unfortunately has been deemed as a determinist and bigot, had argued that geography is there to either be taken advantage from or simply to limit oneself. I wonder what the position of the Guatemalan government is. Moreover, if they are actually conscious of our barriers as a nation…

At COP24, countries agree concrete way forward to bring the Paris climate deal to life

After two weeks of crunch negotiations – with overtime – the almost 200 parties gathered in Katowice, Poland, for the United Nations COP24 two-week climate change conference, adopted on Saturday a “robust” set of implementing guidelines for the landmark 2015 Paris Agreement, aimed at keeping global warming well below 2°C compared to pre-industrial levels.

Following several sleepless nights, cheers and applause welcomed the COP24 President, Michal Kurtyka, as he opened the conference’s closing plenary meeting, which had been postponed close to a dozen times.

He thanked the hundreds of delegates in the room for their “patience”, noting that the last night “was a long night”. General laughter followed when the room’s big screens showed a delegate yawning whole-heartedly; the meeting had been set to wrap up on Friday.

Mr. Guterres, who has made addressing the impacts of climate change one of the top priorities of his term as UN Secretary-General, came three times to Katowice in the past two weeks to support the negotiations but, given the repeated delays, was forced to leave before the closing plenary, due to prior engagements.

The adopted guidelines package, called the “rulebook” by some, is designed to encourage greater climate action ambition and benefit people from all walks of life, especially the most vulnerable.

Trust and climate action financing

One of the key components of the ‘Katowice package’ is a detailed transparency framework, meant to promote trust among nations regarding the fact that they are all doing their part in addressing climate change. It sets out how countries will provide information about their national action plans, including the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, as well as mitigation and adaptation measures.

An agreement was reached on how to uniformly count greenhouse gas emissions and if poorer countries feel they cannot meet the standards set, they can explain why and present a plan to build up their capacity in that regard.

On the thorny question of financing from developed countries in support of climate action in developing countries, the document sets a way to decide on new, more ambitious targets from 2025 onwards, from the current commitment to mobilize US$100 billion per year as of 2020.

Another notable achievement of these negotiations is that nations agreed on how to collectively assess the effectiveness of climate action in 2023, and how to monitor and report progress on the development and transfer of technology.

“The guidelines that delegations have been working on day and night are balanced and clearly reflect how responsibilities are distributed amongst the world’s nations,” said Ms. Espinosa in a press statement. “They incorporate the fact that countries have different capabilities and economic and social realities at home, while providing the foundation for ever increasing ambition.”

“While some details will need to be finalised and improved over time, the system is to the largest part place,” she added.

Article 6: the one major matter nations couldn’t find consensus on

Ultimately, the negotiations tripped on one key issue which will be back on the table at the next UN climate change conference, COP25, set to take place in Chile. This is the matter known in specialized circles as “Article 6,” regarding the so-called “market mechanisms” which allow countries to meet a part of their domestic mitigation goals.

This is done for example through “carbon markets” – or “carbon trading”, which enables countries to trade their emissions allowances. The Paris Agreement recognizes the need for global rules on this matter to safeguard the integrity of all countries’ efforts and ensure that each tonne of emissions released into the atmosphere is accounted for.

“From the beginning of the COP, it very quickly became clear that this was one area that still required much work and that the details to operationalize this part of the Paris Agreement had not yet been sufficiently explored”, explained Ms. Espinosa, noting that the majority of countries were willing to agree and include the guidelines on market mechanisms but that “unfortunately, in the end, the differences could not be overcome”.

Other key COP24 achievements

In addition to the political negotiations among Member States on the Paris guidelines, over the past two weeks, the hallways of COP24 buzzed with close to 28,000 participants having lively exchanges, sharing innovative ideas, attending cultural events, and building partnerships for cross-sectoral and collaborative efforts.

Many encouraging announcements, especially on financial commitments for climate action, were made: Germany and Norway pledged that they would double their contributions to the Green Climate Fund, established to enable developing countries to act; the World Bank also announced it would increase its commitment to climate action after 2021 to $200 billion; the climate Adaptation Fund received a total of $129 million.

The private sector overall, showed strong engagement. Among the highlights of this COP, two major industries – the sports and the fashion worlds – joined the movement to align their business practices with the goals of the Paris Agreement, through the launch of the Sports for Climate Action Framework, and the Fashion Industry Charter for Climate Action.

Many more commitments were made, and concrete, inspiring actions were taken.

“From now on, my five priorities will be: ambition, ambition, ambition, ambition and ambition,” said Patricia Espinosa on behalf of UN chief António Guterres at the closing planery. “Ambition in mitigation. Ambition in adaptation. Ambition in finance. Ambition in technical cooperation and capacity building. Ambition in technological innovation.”

To achieve this, the UN Secretary-General is convening a Climate Summit on 23 September, at UN Headquarters in New York, to engage Governments at the highest levels.

Related

EU plays instrumental role in making the Paris Agreement operational

The UN climate conference (COP24) in Katowice, Poland, concluded today with the adoption of a clear rulebook to make the Paris Agreement on climate change work in practice across the world. The completion of the rulebook was the EU’s top objective in these negotiations.

The Paris rulebook will enable the Parties to the Paris Agreement to implement, track and progressively enhance their contributions to tackling climate change, in order to meet the Agreement’s long-term goals.

Commissioner for Climate Action and Energy Miguel Arias Cañete said: “In Europe, and working united as Europeans, we have reached a balanced deal on the rules to turn the Paris Agreement into action.The EU played an instrumental role in reaching this outcome, working with allies from both developed and developing countries and with major economies, in particular China, to raise ambition and strengthen global efforts to fight climate change. We have responded to the urgency of science by acknowledging positively the IPCC special report on global warming of 1.5°C. This was a key ask for the EU and its allies. The Paris rulebook is fundamental for enabling and encouraging climate action at all levels worldwide – and success here also means success for multilateralism and the rules-based global order. The EU will continue to lead by turning our commitments into concrete action, leaving no one behind in the transition to a climate-neutral future; and inspiring other countries to make this necessary transition. I would like to thank Minister Kurtyka and the Polish COP Presidency for a job well done, and to Minister Köstinger and her team from the Austrian Presidency for helping the EU stay united and leading.”

EU action

The EU’s nationally determined contribution (NDC) under the Paris Agreement is to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by at least 40% by 2030 compared to 1990, under its wider 2030 climate and energy framework. All key legislation for implementing the 2030 emissions target has already been adopted, including the increased EU’s 2030 targets on renewable energy and energy efficiency – which if fully implemented could lead to an EU GHG emissions cut of some 45% by 2030, the Commission has estimated – as well as the modernisation of the EU Emissions Trading System and 2030 targets for all Member States to cut emissions in sectors such as transport, buildings, agriculture and waste.

Back in November 2016 – just before the Paris Agreement entered into force – the Commission presented the Clean Energy for All Europeans Package, aimed at setting the most advanced regulatory framework that will make the European energy sector more secure, more market-oriented and more sustainable.
We acknowledge that this transition is going to be more difficult for some regions than others – notably those regions, where the economy is based on coal production.
The Commission, together with these legislative proposals, outlined a special initiative to work with coal and carbon-intensive regions in transition so that they can also benefit from the clean energy transition. The clean energy transition is a transition for all Europeans and its socio-economic impacts must be carefully managed.

EU ambition also goes beyond 2030. Following the invitation by the EU leaders, the Commission on 28 November presented a strategic long-term vision for a prosperous, modern, competitive and climate-neutral European economy by 2050.

The strategic vision, which follows wide stakeholder consultation and takes into account the recent IPCC special report on 1.5°C, is an ambitious vision for ensuring a prosperous, modern, competitive and secure economy, providing sustainable growth and jobs and improving the quality of life of EU citizens.

The strategic vision, which the Commission presented to global partners at COP24, will kick-start an EU-wide debate which should allow the EU to adopt a long-term strategy and submit it to the UNFCCC by 2020. To this end, the European Council invites the Council to work on the elements outlined in the Communication.

The EU also remains committed to the collective global goal to mobilise USD 100 billion a year by 2020 and through to 2025 to finance climate action in developing countries, from a variety of public and private sources. In 2017, the EU, its Member States and the European Investment Bank together provided a total EUR 20.4 billion in climate finance, around a 50% increase from 2012.

The first ever universal system for the Parties to track and report progress in climate action, which provides flexibilities to those countries that genuinely need it. This will inspire all Parties to improve their practices over time and communicate the progress made in clear and comparable terms.

A good, consensual outcome on adaptation issues. The Parties now have guidance and a registry to communicate their actions as regards to adapting to the impacts of climate change.

As to the global stocktake process, the next moment to review collective action, which the EU considered vital for the Paris Agreement, the result provides a solid basis for further elaboration on the details of the process. The global stocktake will invite Parties to regularly review progress and the level of ambition based on the latest available science.

Finally, with the decisions on finance and technology, there is now a solid package that the EU trusts will provide reassurances to our partners on our commitment to continued global solidarity and support.

Background

The 24th Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) – ‘COP24′ – took place from 2-14 December in Katowice, Poland, presided over by the Polish government. It brought together ministers and government officials, as well as a wide range of stakeholder representatives.

The Paris Agreement, adopted in December 2015, sets out a global action plan to put the world on track to avoid dangerous climate change by limiting global warming to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature rise to 1.5°C. It entered into force on 4 November 2016. 195 UNFCCC Parties have signed the Agreement and 184 have now ratified it.

Related

Cleaning up couture: What’s in your jeans?

Today you made a decision that could change the face of the planet. You decided what to wear.

When was the last time you looked in your wardrobe and couldn’t find anything suitable?

Screen stars on Netflix wear stunning but different couture in every episode. Celebrities boast cutting edge design, always pictured in a new outfit. Are you keeping up? Don’t worry. The latest news is that you don’t have to.

If you listen to Deputy Mayor of Paris—and Parisians would know—Antoinette Guhl, as stated in the report A New Textiles Economy: “Circular is the new black! We need a fashion industry based on three principles: clean, fair and good.”

Our clothing is an expression of individuality. We use it to make ourselves unique as well as provide comfort and protection. But the environmental cost of our clothes is adding up.

The industry’s environmental footprint is immense. It extends beyond the use of raw materials. Combined, the global apparel and footwear industries account for an estimated 8 percent of the world´s greenhouse gas emissions.

Lifecycle assessments show—taking cotton production, manufacture, transport and washing into account— it takes 3,781 litres of water to make one pair of jeans. The process equates to around 33.4 kilogrammes of carbon equivalent emitted, like driving 111 kilometres or watching 246 hours of TV on a big screen.

Even just washing our clothes releases plastic microfibres and other pollutants into the environment, contaminating our oceans and drinking water. Around 20 per cent of global industrial water pollution is from dyeing and textile treatment.

Yet globally, the industry wields considerable power. It is worth US$1.3 trillion, employing around 300 million people along the value chain.

UN Environment’s Llorenç Milà i Canals, Head of the Life Cycle Initiative, said fashion presents a massive opportunity to create a cleaner future.

But steps must be taken to involve everyone involved in the value chain to address environmental hotspots; define and take bold action on them.

“All actors must play their part in redefining the way value is generated and kept within the apparel sector, moving away from disposable apparel to a sector that generates and sustains value for society without polluting the environment,” he said.

As consumers, this means buying less. Some studies estimate that the average garment is worn ten times before being discarded. Demand for clothing is projected to rise two per cent a year—but the number of times we wear them has dropped one third compared to the early 2000s.

This waste costs money and the value of natural resources. Of the total fibre input used for clothing, 87 per cent is incinerated or sent to landfill. Overall, one garbage truck of textiles is landfilled or incinerated every second.

There are steps we can all take today. Like checking materials are durable and keeping them for longer. Reducing the amount of clothes we buy, reusing and buying second hand items and recycling. Wash them less and smarter: use concentrated liquid soap rather than powdered detergent, which is abrasive and washes more fibers into water.

But while our attitude towards our clothing needs a rethink, so too does the way in which our clothes are produced. Collectively, on a large scale, reducing our environmental footprint requires cutting resource consumption and designing pollution out of clothing altogether.

The fashion industry is starting to take note.

A Pulse survey of decision makers from all industry segments confirms that sustainability is climbing up corporate agendas. Of executives polled, more than half said sustainability informed their strategy—up from last year.

Innovative new technology can play a part in cutting resource use. Cotton and recycled polyester still put a strain on the environment, so finding and developing new sustainable materials is key to reducing natural resource consumption.

In the meantime, developing countries—with a nascent textile industry —have an opportunity to build circular models into production from the start. They can set the bar high for the rest of the world to follow suit.

Ultimately, the key to a sustainable future lies in radically rethinking the way we consume and use clothing, and disrupting current business models. That means buying less. And it means putting pressure on our fashion industry to design a more responsible product.