The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.

The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.

The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).
Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09KUALALUMPUR150.

UNCLAS KUALA LUMPUR 000150
DEPT FOR CA/FPP
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KFRDCVISCPASCMGTASECEAPMY
SUBJECT: MALAYSIA FRAUD SUMMARY (SEPT 2008 - FEB 2009)
REF: 08 STATE 74840
¶1. SUMMARY: Malaysia is not a country associated with a high level
of fraud in immigration and travel matters involving the United
States. However Malaysia is a destination and transit point for
many forms of illegal travel and human trafficking. The country, as
a whole, enjoys a relatively high level of educational and economic
opportunity for its citizens, and imports a large number of foreign
workers to fill local jobs. The recent economic crisis has led to
many layoffs, however, and calls for curtailing the entry of foreign
labor. While these factors could cause some to seek better
opportunities abroad, we believe the effect on the United States
will be minimal. END SUMMARY
¶A. Country Conditions:
¶2. Malaysia is a relatively prosperous country with an economy that
runs the gamut from high tech industries to subsistence agriculture
and everything in between. Formal unemployment is low and job
opportunities relatively abundant. Most guest workers come from
Indonesia, the Philippines and the Indian subcontinent, and are
employed in low skill areas, particularly the agricultural and
construction fields and as domestic servants. The availability of
jobs and possibilities on the local economy has contributed to a low
level of visa fraud. While the worldwide economic crisis is
beginning to hit Malaysia, the country's long-term economic
prospects remain good, and the current downturn is not likely to
result in significantly greater levels of fraud.
¶3. Malaysia is a multiethnic and multiracial society, with ethnic
Malays making up something over half the population, and citizens of
Chinese and Indian descent and non-Malay indigenous groups making up
the rest. Tensions between the groups have rarely erupted in
violence, though non-Malays frequently complain about preferential
treatment of Malays in many spheres. Ethnic minorities and the
political opposition have increasingly challenged the race-based
status quo over the past several years. Reportedly, there has been
an increase in the out-migration of ethnic Chinese in recent years.
However, we do not believe that perceptions of unequal treatment
have been or will become a serious inducement to visa fraud.
¶B. Non-Immigrant Visa (NIV) Fraud:
¶4. Post does not see a great deal of fraud in the visa process.
Typically, fraud involves misrepresentation of an applicant's
income, job or family circumstances, claims that may be supported by
easily identifiable fraudulent financial documents or job letters.
Less commonly, applicants will obtain fraudulent stamps in their
passports to hide overstays in the U.S. The B1B2 category is
probably the most prone to misrepresentation, but even so we have a
90% plus approval rate and a very low 1% to 2% overstay rate in this
category. The largest group of overstayers is Malaysian-Chinese, a
conclusion confirmed by validation studies. Our officers and FSNs
are trained in recognition of documents or patterns indicative of
fraud. We have two Mandarin speaking officers full time at
interview windows; in fact our staff -- FSN and FSO -- speaks a
total of 15 different languages, which enables us to meet the needs
of our applicant population. We encourage student visa applicants,
making college and high school outreach visits to provide visa
application information and to humanize the face of the visa
process. The number of student visa applicants has increased over
the last several years and is now approaching levels not seen since
the pre-September 11 time period. We see little fraud in this
category. Our approval rate for students is above 95%, and most of
our refusals are third country nationals who cannot demonstrate ties
to Malaysia.
¶C. Immigrant Visa (IV) Fraud:
¶5. Our IV fraud revolves around applicants who have violated
immigration laws in the past -- overstays, working while on a B1B2
visa or things of this nature. We see few cases of relationship
fraud. Our IV workload is relatively low, only around 600 per year,
enabling us to devote maximum time to verifying cases. Most of our
cases are family-based and are reasonably easy to investigate in
Malaysia.
¶D. Diversity Visa (DV) Fraud:
¶6. Malaysia has very few DV applicants and has not experienced DV
fraud in the last year.
¶E. ACS and U.S. Passport Fraud:
¶7. In the last year we have investigated several suspicious
passport and citizenship cases, but did not find any instances of
fraud. We have not detected fraud in any other type of in ACS
case.
¶F. Adoption Fraud:
¶8. Malaysia has a very low rate of adoption, particularly by
foreigners. There are two factors that keep the rate so low: (a)
Islamic societies do not encourage adoption and specifically
prohibit adoption of Muslim children. With a majority Muslim
population, Malaysia has little history of adoptions by foreigners.
(b) The availability of adoptable children is very limited, as
families tend to take in the children of relatives who die or cannot
support them. Our low level of adoptions makes it possible for us
to fully explore and verify the cases we handle.
¶G. Use of DNA Testing:
¶9. We have requested DNA testing in five passport cases over the
past six months; in all cases the claimed relationship was
confirmed. We have not requested testing in any IV or visas 92/93
case in the past six months, but have received a few requests from
DHS to arrange and witness tests for them. Suggestion of the
possibility of DNA testing has caused several applicants to
reconsider their applications. There have not been any cultural
problems with DNA testing nor are there any operational concerns
with testing at Post.
¶H. Asylum and Other DHS Benefit Fraud:
¶10. We process a handful of visas 92/93 cases. We have generally
detected little fraud, though we recently returned a case for
revocation because we believed the relationship was fraudulent.
There is little demand for other DHS services, and we have not
experienced any cases of fraud.
¶I. Alien Smuggling, Trafficking, Organized Crime, Terrorist
Travel:
¶11. Malaysia, like its neighbors, is a nexus for the illegal
movement of people. The main transit point in Malaysia for illegal
travelers is the Kuala Lumpur International Airport (KLIA). A
variety of nationalities have used or attempted to use KLIA for
document swaps. Imposters and travelers with fake or altered
documents, including Africans, Europeans, Asians, Australians, and
North Americans, have been detected. The Embassy regularly
participates in airport interdiction exercises, working alongside
airline personnel boarding flights destined to the United States to
detect fraudulent activity. Immigration authorities recently told
us they have begun regular patrols through these areas in an attempt
to better detect and deter this activity. But a number of security
holes remain at KLIA -- most specifically arriving and departing
passengers use the same common areas and are able to mingle at
will.
¶12. We benefit from good cooperation with other missions on
trafficking and related issues. There are monthly meetings of fraud
and airport liaison officers of like-minded missions in which issues
of common concern are discussed and information on recent cases
shared. Other countries stage regular KLIA interdictions where
airport liaison officers observe and help check boarding documents.
Post also participates with these missions in a variety of training
activities for airline staffers and immigration officers.
¶13. On December 7, 2008 a Japanese Airlines ground agent detected a
questionable passenger about to board a flight to Narita/Tokyo. The
passenger presented an American passport to the ground agent along
with a recently purchased ticket. As recently purchased tickets are
a fraud indicator in Malaysia, the ground agent questioned the
passenger about her travel plans. The passenger could not speak
English, and when questioning began she left the check-in area and
disappeared. Subsequent examination of her American passport
revealed that the passport was stolen in July of 2006 in Toronto,
Canada. The passport was photo subbed, but was of particularly good
quality. The passport and relevant documents, including copies from
PIERS of the original application and the passenger's routing
information were turned over to our RSO for further investigation.
¶14. The city of Ipoh is the major source of illegal and falsified
documents in Malaysia. Although passports are not commonly forged,
many other documents and the national identity card can be obtained
in Ipoh. We believe that most of the fraudulent financial and
employment documents presented by our NIV applicants originate in
Ipoh. RSO has an open investigation regarding over 100 B-1/B-2
recipients who used fraudulent documents associated with Ipoh from
¶2007.
¶J. DS Criminal Fraud Investigations:
¶15. The Consular Section and RSO work cooperatively on
investigations, sharing information on a regular basis and
participating jointly in activities such as the monthly diplomatic
community fraud council meetings. RSO has been helpful in a number
of instances providing crime trend data and information regarding
stolen American passports. RSO has also worked with the Consular
Section to develop a protocol with the Royal Malaysia Police for the
investigation of counterfeit Malaysian government issued documents
that come to our attention.
¶K. Host Country Passport, Identity Documents, and Civil Registry:
¶16. Malaysia produces civil documents with effective and
appropriate security features. The Malaysian passport is machine
readable and has several levels of anti-fraud protection.
Malaysians are also required to have personal identification cards
from an early age. It is possible that passports and identity cards
have been issued to unqualified individuals through official
corruption, but we have no clear evidence. However, blanks of both
have been stolen in the past and sold for fraudulent use. The
Malaysian government has embarked on an effort to issue passports
more quickly and cheaply, which some fear will compromise the
document itself (through abandonment of some anti-fraud features)
and the issuance process.
¶17. We have detected forged entry and exit stamps in the passports
of visa applicants, usually for the purpose of hiding previous
overstays. Our FSNs have become entry/exit stamp experts, an
excellent resource in detecting questionable stamps.
¶L. Cooperation with Host Government Authorities:
¶18. Cooperation with Malaysian Government Authorities often depends
on which office or person one is dealing with. We have generally
positive and mutually helpful relations with the Immigration staff
at KLIA and with officers in the Home Ministry (Malaysian
Immigration's parent agency). We conduct regular training and
exercises at the airport, which has resulted in identifying
fraudulent travelers and the discovery of altered or fake travel
documents.
¶19. Overall, Malaysian efforts to counter immigration-related fraud
are sporadic and of mixed effectiveness. Punishments under
Malaysian law for immigration-related fraud, when committed by
Malaysians, tend to be comparatively light, including confiscation
of passports and difficulty in obtaining replacements.
¶M. Areas of Particular Concern:
¶20. We have no areas of concern beyond those discussed above.
¶N. Staffing and Training:
¶21. Post does not have any full-time FPU employees; our deputy
section chief is our designated Fraud Prevention Manager and is
assisted by one FSN. Both have received FSI fraud training. Our
part-time consular officer has airport liaison, immigration training
and flight interdiction efforts as part of his regular duties. We
have been successful in obtaining appropriate training for
interested officers and FSNs, all of whom assist in anti-fraud
activities. In addition, all consular staff receive an airport
orientation and participate in flight interdiction on a regular
basis, insuring that everyone is familiar with the fraud environment
in Malaysia. Officers under the Singapore DHS OIC regularly visit
Kuala Lumpur to conduct training at KLIA and advise Post on a
variety of issues.
RAPSON