Management Update July 2009 DHS Will Implement Federal Contractor E-Verify Requirements And Rescind Stalled No-Match Regulation On July 8, 2009, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Janet Napolitano announced that the Department intends to implement a Bush-era rule mandating the use of E-Verify by federal contractors and subcontractors. Additionally, Secretary Napolitano announced that DHS is rescinding its controversial "No-Match" regulation. Implementation of E-Verify Requirements for Federal Contractors In June 2008, President Bush issued an Executive Order requiring federal government contractors use an electronic employment eligibility verification system designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security to verify the employment eligibility of employees performing federal contract work. Former DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff designated the federal E-Verify program as the system to be used in accordance with the Executive Order. E-Verify is the federal government's web-based employment verification program that compares information from an individual's Form I-9 against federal government databases to verify workers' employment eligibility. For a discussion of the Executive Order, see our June 13, 2008, Legal Alert, available at http://www.fordharrison.com/shownews.aspx?show=3953. Subsequently, the federal agencies charged with implementing the Executive Order issued a rule amending the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) to require federal contractors and subcontractors use the E-Verify program and setting forth federal contractors' responsibilities under the Executive Order. For a more detailed discussion of this rule, see our November 14, 2008, Legal Alert, available at http://www.fordharrison.com/shownews.aspx?show=4295. However, the federal contractor E-Verify rule has been subject to legal challenge in federal court by a coalition of business groups led by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, who claim the Executive Order and rule violate the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act's express statutory prohibition against requiring participation in the E-Verify program. As a result of the lawsuit, implementation of the rule has been postponed four times since it was published. The most recent postponement pushed the effective date back to September 8, 2009. Although the lawsuit is still pending, DHS stated in a recent press release, "the Administration will push ahead with full implementation of the [federal contractor E-Verify] rule, which will apply to federal solicitations and contract awards Government-wide starting on September 8, 2009." No-Match Regulation to be Rescinded DHS also announced that it will rescind its controversial No-Match regulation, which set forth a "safe harbor" for employers who receive letters from the Social Security Administration stating that an employee's Social Security Number does not match the agency's records. The safe harbor Management Update July 2009 DHS Will Implement Federal Contractor E-Verify Requirements And Rescind Stalled No-Match Regulation On July 8, 2009, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Janet Napolitano announced that the Department intends to implement a Bush-era rule mandating the use of EVerify by federal contractors and subcontractors. Additionally, Secretary Napolitano announced that DHS is rescinding its controversial "No-Match" regulation. Implementation of E-Verify Requirements for Federal Contractors In June 2008, President Bush issued an Executive Order requiring federal government contractors use an electronic employment eligibility verification system designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security to verify the employment eligibility of employees performing federal contract work. Former DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff designated the federal E-Verify program as the system to be used in accordance with the Executive Order. E-Verify is the federal government's web-based employment verification program that compares information from an individual's Form I-9 against federal government databases to verify workers' employment eligibility. For a discussion of the Executive Order, see our June 13, 2008, Legal Alert, available at http://www.fordharrison.com/shownews.aspx?show=3953. Subsequently, the federal agencies charged with implementing the Executive Order issued a rule amending the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) to require federal contractors and subcontractors use the E-Verify program and setting forth federal contractors' responsibilities under the Executive Order. For a more detailed discussion of this rule, see our November 14, 2008, Legal Alert, available at http://www.fordharrison.com/shownews.aspx?show=4295. However, the federal contractor E-Verify rule has been subject to legal challenge in federal court by a coalition of business groups led by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, who claim the Executive Order and rule violate the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act's express statutory prohibition against requiring participation in the E-Verify program. As a result of the lawsuit, implementation of the rule has been postponed four times since it was published. The most recent postponement pushed the effective date back to September 8, 2009. Although the lawsuit is still pending, DHS stated in a recent press release, "the Administration will push ahead with full implementation of the [federal contractor E-Verify] rule, which will apply to federal solicitations and contract awards Government-wide starting on September 8, 2009." No-Match Regulation to be Rescinded DHS also announced that it will rescind its controversial No-Match regulation, which set forth a "safe harbor" for employers who receive letters from the Social Security Administration stating that an employee's Social Security Number does not match the agency's records. The safe harbor Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=01d96e21-bc0b-4274-aa59-bd5bfb14ec64required employers to take certain steps to resolve the discrepancy within a certain period of time or face liability. Shortly after being issued in 2007, the No-Match regulation was challenged in court, subject to an injunction and has never been implemented. Employers' Bottom Line: Although it is not clear how the lawsuit challenging the federal contractor E-Verify rule will ultimately affect its implementation, federal contractors and subcontractors covered by the rule should be prepared to comply with the E-Verify requirements for new federal contracts awarded after September 8, 2009. Ford & Harrison attorneys will be providing more detailed information regarding compliance with the rule. In the meantime, if you have questions regarding the E-Verify requirements or other business immigration issues, please contact Charles Roach, croach@fordharrison.com, 612-486-1631, or any member of Ford & Harrison's Business Immigration Practice Group. • Recent Court Decisions Provide Guidance On Fair Pay Act After being signed into law by President Obama in January 2009, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act as written left employers and others in the dark as to how broadly it would be interpreted by courts and what would be considered a "discriminatory compensation decision or other practice." The Fair Pay Act overruled the Supreme Court's decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), which held that the time period for bringing a compensation-related charge with the EEOC begins to run on the date the discriminatory decision was made and not with each paycheck received by an employee. In response to this decision, Congress enacted the Fair Pay Act, which now permits employees to bring claims that would have been untimely under the Court's ruling. Under the Fair Pay Act, an unlawful employment practice occurs when: (1) the discriminatory pay decision is made; (2) "an individual" becomes subject to the discriminatory pay decision; or (3) "an individual is affected by the discriminatory compensation decision or other practice." The Act is ambiguous in that it does not define "other practice." Courts around the country, however, have recently begun interpreting the Act and the meaning of what constitutes a "discriminatory compensation decision or other practice." In a recent opinion from the Southern District of Mississippi, an employee filed suit against her employer alleging she was denied tenure and a related salary increase because of her gender in violation of Title VII. See Gentry v. Jackson State University (S.D. Miss. April 17, 2009). Her employer sought summary judgment because the denial occurred in 2004 and the employee did not file her charge of discrimination with the EEOC until 2006, well after the 180 days provided by Title VII for the timely filing of a charge of discrimination. The court acknowledged that the tenure denial itself was a discrete act of which the employee obviously was aware because the denial of tenure also meant that she was denied a salary increase. However, the court denied the employer's motion for summary judgment, finding that required employers to take certain steps to resolve the discrepancy within a certain period of time or face liability. Shortly after being issued in 2007, the No-Match regulation was challenged in court, subject to an injunction and has never been implemented. Employers' Bottom Line: Although it is not clear how the lawsuit challenging the federal contractor E-Verify rule will ultimately affect its implementation, federal contractors and subcontractors covered by the rule should be prepared to comply with the E-Verify requirements for new federal contracts awarded after September 8, 2009. Ford & Harrison attorneys will be providing more detailed information regarding compliance with the rule. In the meantime, if you have questions regarding the EVerify requirements or other business immigration issues, please contact Charles Roach, croach@fordharrison.com, 612-486-1631, or any member of Ford & Harrison's Business Immigration Practice Group. • Recent Court Decisions Provide Guidance On Fair Pay Act After being signed into law by President Obama in January 2009, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act as written left employers and others in the dark as to how broadly it would be interpreted by courts and what would be considered a "discriminatory compensation decision or other practice." The Fair Pay Act overruled the Supreme Court's decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), which held that the time period for bringing a compensationrelated charge with the EEOC begins to run on the date the discriminatory decision was made and not with each paycheck received by an employee. In response to this decision, Congress enacted the Fair Pay Act, which now permits employees to bring claims that would have been untimely under the Court's ruling. Under the Fair Pay Act, an unlawful employment practice occurs when: (1) the discriminatory pay decision is made; (2) "an individual" becomes subject to the discriminatory pay decision; or (3) "an individual is affected by the discriminatory compensation decision or other practice." The Act is ambiguous in that it does not define "other practice." Courts around the country, however, have recently begun interpreting the Act and the meaning of what constitutes a "discriminatory compensation decision or other practice." In a recent opinion from the Southern District of Mississippi, an employee filed suit against her employer alleging she was denied tenure and a related salary increase because of her gender in violation of Title VII. See Gentry v. Jackson State University (S.D. Miss. April 17, 2009). Her employer sought summary judgment because the denial occurred in 2004 and the employee did not file her charge of discrimination with the EEOC until 2006, well after the 180 days provided by Title VII for the timely filing of a charge of discrimination. The court acknowledged that the tenure denial itself was a discrete act of which the employee obviously was aware because the denial of tenure also meant that she was denied a salary increase. However, the court denied the employer's motion for summary judgment, finding that Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=01d96e21-bc0b-4274-aa59-bd5bfb14ec64the denial of tenure, which the plaintiff claimed negatively affected her compensation, qualified as a "compensation decision" or "other practice" affecting compensation within the Fair Pay Act. In reaching its decision, the court relied in part on an opinion from the Eastern District of New York, which similarly found that an employee's EEOC charge against his employer for a refusal to propose the plaintiff for appointment to associate or full-time professor with tenure two years earlier was timely. See Rehman v. State University of New York at Stony Brook, (E.D. N.Y. 2009). The court also cited a decision from the District of Delaware, which held that under the Fair Pay Act a plaintiff's failure to promote claim was timely. See Shockley v. Minner (D. Del. March 31, 2009). Additionally, the court cited a decision from the Middle District of Florida, which held that plaintiffs' complaints about demotions and pay reductions that occurred sixteen years before an EEOC charge was filed were timely under the Fair Pay Act. See Bush v. Orange County Corrections Dept. (M.D. Fla. 2009). If these decisions are any indication of how other courts are likely to rule, many cases that would have once been deemed to be untimely will be considered timely, and as a result, claims will be made years after the alleged discriminatory pay decision was made. Further, it is becoming clearer now how courts may interpret "other practice" under the Act. If you have any questions regarding this article, please contact the author, Diane Perez, an attorney in our Miami office, dperez@fordharrison.com or 305-808-2132, or the Ford & Harrison attorney with whom you usually work. • Nevada Supreme Court Clarifies Rule Regarding Assignability Of Restrictive Covenants In a case handled by Ford & Harrison attorneys, the Nevada Supreme Court recently held that its rule prohibiting the assignment of noncompetition agreements in an asset purchase does not apply in the context of a corporate merger. See HD Supply Facilities Maintenance Ltd. v. Bymoen (Nev. June 11, 2009). In this case, Bymoen signed noncompetition, nonsolicitation and confidentiality agreements with his original employer, which ultimately became part of HD Supply through a series of mergers. Bymoen subsequently resigned from HD Supply and was hired by a competitor of the company. HD Supply sued to enforce the noncompetition agreement. In response, Bymoen argued that the agreement was unenforceable because the noncompetition agreement did not contain an assignment clause as required by the Nevada Supreme Court's 2004 decision in Traffic Control Services v. United Rentals (2004). In Traffic Control the Court held, "absent an agreement negotiated at arm's length, which explicitly permits assignment and which is supported by separate consideration, employee noncompetition covenants are not assignable." The Court in HD Supply rejected this argument, finding that the requirements of Traffic Control do not apply in the context of a corporate merger, but instead are limited to situations involving an asset purchase. The Court held that the decision in Traffic Control was based on the common law of contractual assignments, which holds that personal services contracts (such as noncompetition agreements) are not assignable absent consent of the parties. The Court found the denial of tenure, which the plaintiff claimed negatively affected her compensation, qualified as a "compensation decision" or "other practice" affecting compensation within the Fair Pay Act. In reaching its decision, the court relied in part on an opinion from the Eastern District of New York, which similarly found that an employee's EEOC charge against his employer for a refusal to propose the plaintiff for appointment to associate or full-time professor with tenure two years earlier was timely. See Rehman v. State University of New York at Stony Brook, (E.D. N.Y. 2009). The court also cited a decision from the District of Delaware, which held that under the Fair Pay Act a plaintiff's failure to promote claim was timely. See Shockley v. Minner (D. Del. March 31, 2009). Additionally, the court cited a decision from the Middle District of Florida, which held that plaintiffs' complaints about demotions and pay reductions that occurred sixteen years before an EEOC charge was filed were timely under the Fair Pay Act. See Bush v. Orange County Corrections Dept. (M.D. Fla. 2009). If these decisions are any indication of how other courts are likely to rule, many cases that would have once been deemed to be untimely will be considered timely, and as a result, claims will be made years after the alleged discriminatory pay decision was made. Further, it is becoming clearer now how courts may interpret "other practice" under the Act. If you have any questions regarding this article, please contact the author, Diane Perez, an attorney in our Miami office, dperez@fordharrison.com or 305-808-2132, or the Ford & Harrison attorney with whom you usually work. • Nevada Supreme Court Clarifies Rule Regarding Assignability Of Restrictive Covenants In a case handled by Ford & Harrison attorneys, the Nevada Supreme Court recently held that its rule prohibiting the assignment of noncompetition agreements in an asset purchase does not apply in the context of a corporate merger. See HD Supply Facilities Maintenance Ltd. v. Bymoen (Nev. June 11, 2009). In this case, Bymoen signed noncompetition, nonsolicitation and confidentiality agreements with his original employer, which ultimately became part of HD Supply through a series of mergers. Bymoen subsequently resigned from HD Supply and was hired by a competitor of the company. HD Supply sued to enforce the noncompetition agreement. In response, Bymoen argued that the agreement was unenforceable because the noncompetition agreement did not contain an assignment clause as required by the Nevada Supreme Court's 2004 decision in Traffic Control Services v. United Rentals (2004). In Traffic Control the Court held, "absent an agreement negotiated at arm's length, which explicitly permits assignment and which is supported by separate consideration, employee noncompetition covenants are not assignable." The Court in HD Supply rejected this argument, finding that the requirements of Traffic Control do not apply in the context of a corporate merger, but instead are limited to situations involving an asset purchase. The Court held that the decision in Traffic Control was based on the common law of contractual assignments, which holds that personal services contracts (such as noncompetition agreements) are not assignable absent consent of the parties. The Court found Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=01d96e21-bc0b-4274-aa59-bd5bfb14ec64that this rule makes sense in the contractual setting of an asset purchase because that transaction introduces into the equation an entirely different entity, the acquiring company. However, the Court found that this rule does not apply in the context of a corporate merger because in a merger two corporations unite to form a single corporate entity that shares a continuity of existence with the merging companies. The Court also held that where, as here, a relevant merger statute exists, the issue of a covenant's assignability is not controversial. The Court noted that the majority of courts to have considered the issue have found that in a merger, the right to enforce the restrictive covenants of a merged corporation normally vests in the surviving entity. Accordingly, based upon the distinction between mergers and asset purchases, the Court held that Traffic Court's rule of nonassignability does not apply when a successor corporation acquires restrictive employment covenants as the result of a merger. If you have any questions regarding this decision please contact the Ford & Harrison attorneys who represent HD Supply, Dawn Siler-Nixon, dsiler-nixon@fordharrison.com, 813-261-7834 or Dinita James, djames@fordharrison.com, 602-627-3520 or the Ford & Harrison attorney with whom you usually work. • U.S. Supreme Court Update Supreme Court Sets New Standard for Evaluating Disparate Treatment Versus Disparate Impact In Ricci v. DeStefano (June 29, 2009), a 5-4 decision, the Court held that the mere desire to avoid liability under Title VII's disparate impact provision does not automatically justify a conscious decision to violate the statute's disparate treatment provision. Title VII's disparate treatment provision prohibits intentional discrimination on the basis of a protected category, while the disparate impact provision prohibits certain practices that are not intended to discriminate but, in fact, have a disproportionately adverse effect on minorities. Recognizing the difficulty employers may face in balancing these competing interests, the Court adopted a "strong basis in evidence" test to be used in such situations. Under this standard, employers must demonstrate that a strong basis in evidence exists that their actions might violate Title VII's disparate impact provisions before employers can make race-based decisions. Applying the standard in this case, the Court held that several white and Hispanic firefighters were entitled to judgment in their favor on their claims that the City of New Haven intentionally discriminated against them when it refused to certify the results of tests administered to determine which firefighters qualified for promotions. The City refused to certify the test results based on a concern that the tests had a disparate impact on minorities. However, the Court held that the City failed to show that it had "an objective, strong basis in evidence to find the tests inadequate." that this rule makes sense in the contractual setting of an asset purchase because that transaction introduces into the equation an entirely different entity, the acquiring company. However, the Court found that this rule does not apply in the context of a corporate merger because in a merger two corporations unite to form a single corporate entity that shares a continuity of existence with the merging companies. The Court also held that where, as here, a relevant merger statute exists, the issue of a covenant's assignability is not controversial. The Court noted that the majority of courts to have considered the issue have found that in a merger, the right to enforce the restrictive covenants of a merged corporation normally vests in the surviving entity. Accordingly, based upon the distinction between mergers and asset purchases, the Court held that Traffic Court's rule of nonassignability does not apply when a successor corporation acquires restrictive employment covenants as the result of a merger. If you have any questions regarding this decision please contact the Ford & Harrison attorneys who represent HD Supply, Dawn Siler-Nixon, dsiler-nixon@fordharrison.com, 813-261-7834 or Dinita James, djames@fordharrison.com, 602-627-3520 or the Ford & Harrison attorney with whom you usually work. • U.S. Supreme Court Update Supreme Court Sets New Standard for Evaluating Disparate Treatment Versus Disparate Impact In Ricci v. DeStefano (June 29, 2009), a 5-4 decision, the Court held that the mere desire to avoid liability under Title VII's disparate impact provision does not automatically justify a conscious decision to violate the statute's disparate treatment provision. Title VII's disparate treatment provision prohibits intentional discrimination on the basis of a protected category, while the disparate impact provision prohibits certain practices that are not intended to discriminate but, in fact, have a disproportionately adverse effect on minorities. Recognizing the difficulty employers may face in balancing these competing interests, the Court adopted a "strong basis in evidence" test to be used in such situations. Under this standard, employers must demonstrate that a strong basis in evidence exists that their actions might violate Title VII's disparate impact provisions before employers can make race-based decisions. Applying the standard in this case, the Court held that several white and Hispanic firefighters were entitled to judgment in their favor on their claims that the City of New Haven intentionally discriminated against them when it refused to certify the results of tests administered to determine which firefighters qualified for promotions. The City refused to certify the test results based on a concern that the tests had a disparate impact on minorities. However, the Court held that the City failed to show that it had "an objective, strong basis in evidence to find the tests inadequate." Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=01d96e21-bc0b-4274-aa59-bd5bfb14ec64Court Rejects "Mixed Motive" Age Discrimination Claims In Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. (June 18, 2009), a 5-4 decision, the Court held that to prevail on an ADEA claim, the individual claiming discrimination must prove that age was the "but-for" cause of the alleged adverse employment action – i.e., that the employer would not have taken the adverse employment action but for the individual's age. This decision means that individuals suing for disparate treatment under the ADEA can no longer prevail by showing that the employer acted with "mixed motives," one of which was the individual's age. Before this decision, many courts permitted individuals bringing age discrimination claims to show that age was one of the reasons for the adverse employment action and required employers to prove that they would have taken the adverse action regardless of age. Under the Court's decision, "a plaintiff bringing a disparate-treatment claim pursuant to the ADEA must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that age was the 'but-for' cause of the challenged adverse employment action. The burden of persuasion does not shift to the employer to show that it would have taken the action regardless of age, even when a plaintiff has produced some evidence that age was one motivating factor in that decision." Supreme Court Finds No Current Violation of Title VII Based on Pre-PDA Leave Credit Policy In AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, (May 18, 2009), the Court held that an employer does not necessarily violate the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) by paying pension benefits calculated, in part, based on a system that did not give full credit for time spent on maternity leave but did give full credit for other types of medical leave, where the maternity leave accrual policy was applied only prior to the enactment of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. In reaching this conclusion, the Court held that there was no necessary violation and that the benefit calculation rule in this case was part of a bona fide seniority system under § 703(h) of Title VII, which insulates it from challenge. Additionally, the Court held that the PDA does not apply retroactively, noting that there was "no indication at all that Congress had retroactive application in mind" when it enacted the PDA. • Court Rejects "Mixed Motive" Age Discrimination Claims In Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. (June 18, 2009), a 5-4 decision, the Court held that to prevail on an ADEA claim, the individual claiming discrimination must prove that age was the "but-for" cause of the alleged adverse employment action -i.e., that the employer would not have taken the adverse employment action but for the individual's age. This decision means that individuals suing for disparate treatment under the ADEA can no longer prevail by showing that the employer acted with "mixed motives," one of which was the individual's age. Before this decision, many courts permitted individuals bringing age discrimination claims to show that age was one of the reasons for the adverse employment action and required employers to prove that they would have taken the adverse action regardless of age. Under the Court's decision, "a plaintiff bringing a disparate-treatment claim pursuant to the ADEA must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that age was the 'but-for' cause of the challenged adverse employment action. The burden of persuasion does not shift to the employer to show that it would have taken the action regardless of age, even when a plaintiff has produced some evidence that age was one motivating factor in that decision." Supreme Court Finds No Current Violation of Title VII Based on Pre-PDA Leave Credit Policy In AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, (May 18, 2009), the Court held that an employer does not necessarily violate the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) by paying pension benefits calculated, in part, based on a system that did not give full credit for time spent on maternity leave but did give full credit for other types of medical leave, where the maternity leave accrual policy was applied only prior to the enactment of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. In reaching this conclusion, the Court held that there was no necessary violation and that the benefit calculation rule in this case was part of a bona fide seniority system under § 703(h) of Title VII, which insulates it from challenge. Additionally, the Court held that the PDA does not apply retroactively, noting that there was "no indication at all that Congress had retroactive application in mind" when it enacted the PDA. • Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=01d96e21-bc0b-4274-aa59-bd5bfb14ec64

DISCLAIMER: Because of the generality of this update, the information provided herein may not be applicable in all situations and should not be acted upon without specific legal advice based on particular situations.

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You can make a request to exercise any of these rights by emailing us at privacy@jdsupra.com or by writing to us at:

You can also manage your profile and subscriptions through our Privacy Center under the "My Account" dashboard.

We will make all practical efforts to respect your wishes. There may be times, however, where we are not able to fulfill your request, for example, if applicable law prohibits our compliance. Please note that JD Supra does not use "automatic decision making" or "profiling" as those terms are defined in the GDPR.

Timeframe for retaining your personal information: We will retain your personal information in a form that identifies you only for as long as it serves the purpose(s) for which it was initially collected as stated in this Privacy Policy, or subsequently authorized. We may continue processing your personal information for longer periods, but only for the time and to the extent such processing reasonably serves the purposes of archiving in the public interest, journalism, literature and art, scientific or historical research and statistical analysis, and subject to the protection of this Privacy Policy. For example, if you are an author, your personal information may continue to be published in connection with your article indefinitely. When we have no ongoing legitimate business need to process your personal information, we will either delete or anonymize it, or, if this is not possible (for example, because your personal information has been stored in backup archives), then we will securely store your personal information and isolate it from any further processing until deletion is possible.

Onward Transfer to Third Parties: As noted in the "How We Share Your Data" Section above, JD Supra may share your information with third parties. When JD Supra discloses your personal information to third parties, we have ensured that such third parties have either certified under the EU-U.S. or Swiss Privacy Shield Framework and will process all personal data received from EU member states/Switzerland in reliance on the applicable Privacy Shield Framework or that they have been subjected to strict contractual provisions in their contract with us to guarantee an adequate level of data protection for your data.

California Privacy Rights

Pursuant to Section 1798.83 of the California Civil Code, our customers who are California residents have the right to request certain information regarding our disclosure of personal information to third parties for their direct marketing purposes.

You can make a request for this information by emailing us at privacy@jdsupra.com or by writing to us at:

Some browsers have incorporated a Do Not Track (DNT) feature. These features, when turned on, send a signal that you prefer that the website you are visiting not collect and use data regarding your online searching and browsing activities. As there is not yet a common understanding on how to interpret the DNT signal, we currently do not respond to DNT signals on our site.

Access/Correct/Update/Delete Personal Information

For non-EU/Swiss residents, if you would like to know what personal information we have about you, you can send an e-mail to privacy@jdsupra.com. We will be in contact with you (by mail or otherwise) to verify your identity and provide you the information you request. We will respond within 30 days to your request for access to your personal information. In some cases, we may not be able to remove your personal information, in which case we will let you know if we are unable to do so and why. If you would like to correct or update your personal information, you can manage your profile and subscriptions through our Privacy Center under the "My Account" dashboard. If you would like to delete your account or remove your information from our Website and Services, send an e-mail to privacy@jdsupra.com.

Changes in Our Privacy Policy

We reserve the right to change this Privacy Policy at any time. Please refer to the date at the top of this page to determine when this Policy was last revised. Any changes to our Privacy Policy will become effective upon posting of the revised policy on the Website. By continuing to use our Website and Services following such changes, you will be deemed to have agreed to such changes.

Contacting JD Supra

If you have any questions about this Privacy Policy, the practices of this site, your dealings with our Website or Services, or if you would like to change any of the information you have provided to us, please contact us at: privacy@jdsupra.com.

JD Supra Cookie Guide

As with many websites, JD Supra's website (located at www.jdsupra.com) (our "Website") and our services (such as our email article digests)(our "Services") use a standard technology called a "cookie" and other similar technologies (such as, pixels and web beacons), which are small data files that are transferred to your computer when you use our Website and Services. These technologies automatically identify your browser whenever you interact with our Website and Services.

How We Use Cookies and Other Tracking Technologies

We use cookies and other tracking technologies to:

Improve the user experience on our Website and Services;

Store the authorization token that users receive when they login to the private areas of our Website. This token is specific to a user's login session and requires a valid username and password to obtain. It is required to access the user's profile information, subscriptions, and analytics;

Track anonymous site usage; and

Permit connectivity with social media networks to permit content sharing.

There are different types of cookies and other technologies used our Website, notably:

"Session cookies" - These cookies only last as long as your online session, and disappear from your computer or device when you close your browser (like Internet Explorer, Google Chrome or Safari).

"Persistent cookies" - These cookies stay on your computer or device after your browser has been closed and last for a time specified in the cookie. We use persistent cookies when we need to know who you are for more than one browsing session. For example, we use them to remember your preferences for the next time you visit.

"Web Beacons/Pixels" - Some of our web pages and emails may also contain small electronic images known as web beacons, clear GIFs or single-pixel GIFs. These images are placed on a web page or email and typically work in conjunction with cookies to collect data. We use these images to identify our users and user behavior, such as counting the number of users who have visited a web page or acted upon one of our email digests.

JD Supra Cookies. We place our own cookies on your computer to track certain information about you while you are using our Website and Services. For example, we place a session cookie on your computer each time you visit our Website. We use these cookies to allow you to log-in to your subscriber account. In addition, through these cookies we are able to collect information about how you use the Website, including what browser you may be using, your IP address, and the URL address you came from upon visiting our Website and the URL you next visit (even if those URLs are not on our Website). We also utilize email web beacons to monitor whether our emails are being delivered and read. We also use these tools to help deliver reader analytics to our authors to give them insight into their readership and help them to improve their content, so that it is most useful for our users.

Analytics/Performance Cookies. JD Supra also uses the following analytic tools to help us analyze the performance of our Website and Services as well as how visitors use our Website and Services:

Google Analytics - For more information on Google Analytics cookies, visit www.google.com/policies. To opt-out of being tracked by Google Analytics across all websites visit http://tools.google.com/dlpage/gaoptout. This will allow you to download and install a Google Analytics cookie-free web browser.

Facebook, Twitter and other Social Network Cookies. Our content pages allow you to share content appearing on our Website and Services to your social media accounts through the "Like," "Tweet," or similar buttons displayed on such pages. To accomplish this Service, we embed code that such third party social networks provide and that we do not control. These buttons know that you are logged in to your social network account and therefore such social networks could also know that you are viewing the JD Supra Website.

Controlling and Deleting Cookies

If you would like to change how a browser uses cookies, including blocking or deleting cookies from the JD Supra Website and Services you can do so by changing the settings in your web browser. To control cookies, most browsers allow you to either accept or reject all cookies, only accept certain types of cookies, or prompt you every time a site wishes to save a cookie. It's also easy to delete cookies that are already saved on your device by a browser.

The processes for controlling and deleting cookies vary depending on which browser you use. To find out how to do so with a particular browser, you can use your browser's "Help" function or alternatively, you can visit http://www.aboutcookies.org which explains, step-by-step, how to control and delete cookies in most browsers.

Updates to This Policy

We may update this cookie policy and our Privacy Policy from time-to-time, particularly as technology changes. You can always check this page for the latest version. We may also notify you of changes to our privacy policy by email.

Contacting JD Supra

If you have any questions about how we use cookies and other tracking technologies, please contact us at: privacy@jdsupra.com.

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