Estonian municipal council elections finished at 8pm on October 15, 2017.

I’m writing now at 10:37pm Estonian time, as the results have been posted online. I will update this post if there are changes.

UPDATE 2017-10-17: Some information for context

Eligible voters for Parliamentary elections and eligible voters for Local elections are not the same, so the two types of elections are difficult to compare. Local elections draw from a larger electorate.

2013 Local elections – Eligible voters – 1,086,935

2015 Parliamentary elections – Eligible – 899,793

2017 Local elections – Eligible voters – 1,100,648
Also I believe the 2017 local election is the first one in which 16 and 17 year olds could vote.

It’s important to be careful whether one is talking about voting as a percentage of total eligible voters, or voting as a percentage of actual voters.

END UPDATE

Summary: ONLINE VOTING IS NOT A SOLUTION FOR INCREASING TURNOUT.

There is no Internet voting on election day in Estonia, the online voting system is only available for advance voting.

The total number of Internet votes cast was 186,034 (one hundred eighty-six thousand thirty-four). I don’t like comparing different types of elections as they have different characteristics, but just for the sake of a complete picture, the total number of Internet votes cast in the Parliamentary elections in 2015 was 176,329. So the total increase is 9,705 (nine thousand seven hundred and five). UPDATE 2017-10-17: However note that the local elections draw from a much larger pool of eligible voters. END UPDATE

So while 186k online votes is indeed a record for Estonia, it is a relatively small absolute increase. And I would caution strongly against projecting this result of under 200k online votes to jurisdictions with tens or hundreds of millions of voters.

The total number of votes cast was 367,199 (three hundred sixty-seven thousand, one hundred and ninety-nine), for a total turnout of 53.2%.

UPDATE 2017-10-17: The total number of votes cast was 586,523 (five hundred eight-six thousands five hundreds and twenty-three), for a total turnout of 53.3%.

Turnout DROPPED from the 2013 local elections, which had a turnout of 58%, for a turnout DROP of 4.7%.

So just to make my point super clear: Estonia has had online voting since 2005. After 12 years of offering online voting, they have managed a turnout of just over 50%, and that turnout dropped from the previous local election.ONLINE VOTING IS NOT A SOLUTION FOR INCREASING TURNOUT.

On https://kov2017.valimised.ee/osavotu-statistika.html the turnout for online voting seems to be is a separate item called E-HÄÄLI but I have to say I don’t really understand the numbers other than total turnout shown in the bottom right and the Internet voting turnout (as a percentage of TOTAL eligible voters) is 16.9%. That is to say, only 16.9% of eligible Estonian voters chose to cast their ballot online.

This is a serious issue in general, as the card is at the heart of citizen digital interactions with the government, but has particular implications for Internet voting, as the ID card is key to the functioning of the voting system, enabling amongst other features the unique Estonian ability to vote multiple times with only the last vote counting (including choosing to vote in person on election day, cancelling all previous Internet votes).

There are local government council elections coming up soon, with online voting starting in a month, running from 5 October 2017 to 11 October 2017 (online voting is only available for advance polls, not on election day).

The analysis of the ID-card vulnerability, by “[a]n international group of cryptography scientists from recognized universities” will be “published in the coming autumn at an international scientific conference” according to the ID-card safety FAQ.

For a perspective on security concerns with the Estonian system that predate the ID card issue, it is also important to read the materials on the website Independent Report on E-voting in Estonia as well as

Vancouver Independent Election Task Force recommended to city council that Vancouver conduct an online voting pilot, including asking the province to establish an independent technical committee – see slide 17 “Conduct an online voting pilot” of the Task Force presentation to council and pages 27-28 of the Task Force final report

Many Ontario municipalities have approved Internet voting for the 2018 municipal elections (far more than this blog can track; it will probably end up being about 200 municipalities)

Swiss Post has launched a demo of its third-party-vendor-based Internet voting solution, along with some accompanying technical documentation. In the text they open the possibility of external evaluation, stating “Swiss Post is also working with universities to review the system from a neutral scientific perspective.” See primary sources in English, French, German and Italian. I encourage you to examine the documentation, available by clicking on Transparency and Publications on the page Swiss Post’s e-voting solution.

In addition to Canada, a number of other countries have expressed concerns about cybersecurity of the entire electoral process, including cybersecurity for political parties. This includes: the US, the Netherlands, France, and Australia.