The opinion of the court was delivered by: SAMUEL DER-YEGHIAYAN, District Judge

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The government brought this civil action against Defendant Osyp
Firishchak ("Firishchak") by filing a four count complaint
alleging that Firishchak's United States citizenship was
illegally procured, and therefore must be revoked pursuant
8 U.S.C. § 1451(a). A bench trial was held before this court on
August 1, 2, and 3 of 2005.

Firishchak has unsuccessfully attempted to deceive the
government and this Court. Firishchak's shameless attempt to
excuse himself from an inexcusable act is cowardly. We have taken
all of the evidence presented at trial into consideration and
have reviewed all of the documents submitted to the court by the
parties. We find that Firishchak lied on the stand before the court and we
find that he was a member of the Ukranian Auxiliary Police
("UAP") during World War II.

United States citizenship through naturalization is an honor
and a privilege. It would be a travesty of justice to grant
citizenship to an individual such as Firishchak or to allow him
to keep his citizenship which was procured illegally through
fraud and deceit. The evidence presented by the government and
Firishchak's own incredible testimony shows that he was a
participant in an organization that perpetrated some of the most
horrific acts against human decency ever known in history. Since
the government has shown by clear and convincing evidence that
Firishchak was a member of the UAP, the court cannot turn a blind
eye to his reprehensible conduct due to the passage of time or
his advanced age. Firishchak, after procuring his entry into the
United States illegally, has enjoyed over 50 years of the
benefits of a life in the United States, a life victims of the
atrocities were given no chance to enjoy. Sometimes the wheels of
justice grind slowly, but they grind exceedingly fine. Justice
has finally caught up with Firishchak.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Firishchak was born on April 18, 1919, in Trebuszany
(Trebusany, Trybushany, Tyshbushany), a town which became a part
of Czechoslovakia after World War I, and now is a part of Ukraine
(and renamed Delovoe (Delovoye)). 2. Firishchak's father was named Hrec (Hryts) Firishchak.
Firishchak's mother was named Mariya Firishchak (neé Yurkuch,
Yurkuts).

3. No other persons with Firishchak's name were born in the
town of Trebuszany on the same date that Firishchak was born
(i.e., on April 18, 1919).

4. On August 1, 1941, following Nazi Germany's June 1941
invasion of what was then Soviet territory, Nazi Germany
incorporated eastern Galicia into the so-called Government
General, a territory comprising the central and southern part of
Nazi-occupied prewar Poland. The new Galician territory,
designated "District Galicia," was ruled from the city of L'viv
(L'vov, Lwow), which the Germans called Lemberg.

5. In August 1941, the German Commander of the Order Police for
District Galicia directed the formation of Ukrainian auxiliary
police ("UAP") forces, also commonly referred to as the
"Ukrainian Police," to aid German occupation authorities in
policing the district.

6. Throughout its existence, the UAP in District Galicia was
financed, and operationally directed and controlled, by German
authorities. The members of the UAP in L'viv were uniformed,
armed, paid a salary, and were given various benefits by the
German authorities, including leave, and preferential access to scarce heating fuel, potato and other rations in
winter.

7. The Nazi occupation forces enacted a series of race-based
persecutory policies against the civilian population of District
Galicia. Jews were at the bottom of the Nazi racial hierarchy,
and the persecution and eventual elimination of Jews was a
central objective of the Nazi invasion of eastern Europe and the
territories of what was then the Soviet Union, and its subsequent
occupation policy.

8. Poles and Ukrainians also were considered by the Nazis to be
of low racial value, but not nearly as low as Jews. Unemployed
Poles and Ukrainians, particularly young men, were at risk of
being seized for local labor or transported to Germany to perform
labor for the German Reich.

9. Nazi persecutory policy toward the Jews in District Galicia
had three main components: 1) all Jews first were confined in
ghettos and issued new identification papers that identified them
as Jews; 2) nearly all of these Jews later were forcibly removed
from the ghetto for subsequent murder either by shooting or
gassing; and 3) a limited number of Jews whom the Germans
considered "work capable" temporarily were spared and were
transferred to forced labor camps where many died from
starvation, disease and other inhumane conditions. 10. The UAP was divided into "commissariats." Each commissariat
was responsible for a geographically defined section of the city
and was tasked to enforce German rule, including day-to-day
anti-Jewish policies.

11. The 1st Commissariat of the UAP in L'viv had responsibility
for the heart of the city, where most offices of the German
security authorities were situated. The 1st Commissariat
encompassed a portion of the Jewish residential district
("ghetto") until spring 1942. Thereafter, the northern boundary
of the 1st Commissariat abutted the southern edge of the L'viv
Jewish ghetto.

12. The headquarters building of the 1st Commissariat of the
UAP was located at 30 Kazymyrivska (Kasimir) Street in L'viv.

13. Firishchak began working for the 1st Commissariat of the
UAP in L'viv (Lwow, L'vov, Lemberg) on October 25, 1941. He held
the rank of Wachtmeister (Police Private). Firishchak served in
the 1st Commissariat of the UAP until at least October 1943.

14. At some time in October 1943, Firishchak transferred from
the 1st Commissariat to the Guard Company of the UAP in
L'viv, and served in that unit until shortly before the German
occupation forces fled L'viv in July 1944. 15. The Guard Company of the UAP was situated in the heart of
what had until June 1943 been the Jewish ghetto in L'viv.

16. During his service in the UAP in L'viv, Firishchak was
uniformed, armed, and paid a salary, and he received all of the
benefits accorded by the German authorities to members of the
UAP.

17. During his service in the UAP in L'viv, Firishchak
performed all of the duties of a Ukrainian Auxiliary policeman,
which included on a routine and daily basis enforcing Nazi
anti-Jewish policies.

18. UAP participation was central to the implementation of all
facets of Nazi anti-Jewish policy. On a routine and daily basis,
the men of the UAP all contributed to the Nazi persecution of the
Jews of L'viv.

19. The Ukrainian Auxiliary policemen in L'viv enforced Nazi
persecutory measures against those who the Nazis deemed dangerous
or undesirable because of their race, religion, national origin
or political belief, especially the Jews in the city. These
activities included checking personal identification documents
and arresting Jews who lacked special work passes, and arresting
Jews who failed to wear an armband bearing the Star of David
symbol that publicly identified them as Jews. All members of the
UAP performed these duties.

20. Even enforcement of rules applicable to the general
civilian population had a disproportionate effect on the Jews of
L'viv. For instance, because food rations for Jews were set at
half those of non-Jews, Jews were forced to try to make up for
the deficiency by purchasing more expensive goods on the black
market. Policing of black market activity by the UAP thus
impacted more heavily on the Jewish population.

21. In November 1941, all Jews living in L'viv were ordered to
move to a newly-created Jewish ghetto north of the city center.
The area was cleared at the same time of all non-Jews. The
operation was not completed until spring 1942.

22. During this ghettoization process, German police and
security personnel screened Jews moving into the quarter for
personal valuables, which they seized. Security forces also
selected ill, weak, or old Jews for immediate "resettlement"  a
Nazi euphemism for murder. Persons so selected were removed to a
nearby forest and shot. Thousands of Jews were killed during the
ghetto's creation.

23. German security forces began the reduction of L'viv's
ghetto in a series of actions in March 1942, even as the ghetto was itself still being
consolidated. Jews were first collected at a school, then were
transferred to a railhead on the edge of the city, from where
most were taken by train for "labor deployment in the East" 
another Nazi euphemism for murder, in this instance in the gas
chambers of Belzec extermination center, outside of L'viv. A few
Jews were transferred to Janowska Forced Labor Camp in L'viv,
where almost all died.

24. Ukrainian Auxiliary policemen in L'viv performed so-called
"extraordinary" duties with regard to the ghetto, which included,
inter alia: taking part in sweeps of the ghetto during periodic
reduction actions; manning cordon posts around the city to
prevent Jews from escaping before and during such actions; and
hunting for Jews who attempted to hide or flee.

25. Throughout its existence, the UAP in L'viv did not have
sufficient manpower to carry out the responsibilities assigned to
it by German security authorities, particularly with regard to
its "extraordinary" duties, i.e., those relating to periodic
reductions of the Jewish ghetto. All members of the UAP 
including Firishchak  thus performed these "extraordinary"
duties.

26. Ukrainian Auxiliary policemen, including members of the 1st
Commissariat, took part in the March 1942 ghetto reduction
actions, and delivered to their German superiors thousands of
Jews for "resettlement." 27. Another round-up of Jews took place in L'viv on June 24-25,
1942. The Jews were sent to Janowska Forced Labor Camp, or were
"locally resettled," i.e., shot in a forest outside of the
city.

28. Ukrainian Auxiliary policemen, including members of the 1st
Commissariat, participated in the round-up of Jews that took
place in L'viv on June 24-25, 1942.

29. In August 1942, German authorities began the largest ghetto
reduction action against the residents of the L'viv Jewish
ghetto, an action commonly known as the "Great Operation." During
this action, which began August 10 and continued until August 23,
Ukrainian Auxiliary policemen checked the identity papers of Jews
in the ghetto. Jews whose documents attested to employment in a
German-sanctioned industrial enterprise were left at liberty in
the ghetto; Jews who lacked the necessary authentication stamps
or documentation were seized and delivered to an assembly point
in the city center to await "resettlement." Ukrainian Auxiliary
policemen also: escorted Jews from the assembly point to the
railhead or Janowska Forced Labor Camp; provided search teams
that cleared Jews from apartments; escorted the Jews between
processing points; and manned the cordon duty posts to prevent
Jews from escaping from the city. During the two-week operation
members of the UAP seized and delivered for "resettlement" at
least 18,400 Jews. 30. Prior to the Great Operation, the UAP established a cordon
around L'viv to prevent Jews from fleeing the city to escape
"resettlement," as had occurred during earlier ghetto clearance
actions.

31. Members of the 1st Commissariat and its Department of
Street Traffic actively participated in all aspects of the Great
Operation.

32. During the Great Operation of August 1942, Ukrainian
Auxiliary policemen, including members of the 1st Commissariat,
shot to death dozens of Jews who resisted, fled, or attempted to
hide.

33. On August 9, 1942, on the eve of the Great Operation,
Firishchak took part in a search to locate seven men who did not
report for duty with the 1st Commissariat's Department of Street
Traffic. Several of the men Firishchak had been assigned to
locate thereafter participated directly in the Great Operation.

34. Between March 1942 and June 1943, virtually all of the more
than 100,000 Jews in L'viv were seized and transported to killing
sites, including Belzec, or to forced labor camps. The Jewish
ghetto in L'viv (which became known as the "Jewish camp"
(Julag)) was liquidated in June 1943, and its Jews were shot or transferred to forced labor camps. Members of the 1st
Commissariat participated in these June 1943 ghetto reduction
operations. A small number of Jews survived by hiding in the
ruins of the ghetto.

35. Between November 19 and 23, 1943, all Ukrainian Auxiliary
policemen in L'viv, including those assigned to the Guard
Company, were ordered onto the city streets for a search and
cordon (blockade) operation to locate Jews in hiding or who
otherwise managed to evade capture during earlier actions. During
this operation, which immediately followed the final mass
shooting of Jewish prisoners at the Janowska Forced Labor Camp,
Ukrainian Auxiliary policemen manned roadblocks and patrolled the
streets to screen any person attempting to leave the city,
particularly people considered to be "Jewish looking." Jews
identified during this operation were escorted by UAP personnel
to the commissariat building and later turned over to German
authorities.

36. Firishchak entered the Guard Company of the UAP some time
in October 1943 (see Finding of Fact # 14, supra), and thus
participated in the search and cordon operation between November
19 and 23, 1943.

37. In April 1949, Firishchak sought a determination from the
United States Displaced Persons Commission (DPC) that he was a
Displaced Person as defined in the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub.L. No. 80-774,
ch. 647, 62 Stat. 1009 (DPA), and therefore was eligible to
immigrate to the United States under the DPA.

38. In connection with his application to the DPC, Firishchak
described his employment and residences from 1941 to 1944,
claiming he had worked as a laborer for: 1) a factory in Nitra,
Slovakia, from 1939 to December 1941; 2) a Ukrainian cooperative
in "Lwow" (i.e., L'viv), Poland, from December 1941 to April
1944; and 3) a building firm in Nitra, Slovakia, from April to
October 1944.

39. Firishchak's description of his wartime activities to the
DPC was false, inasmuch as he actually served from October 1941
through July 1944 as a Ukrainian Auxiliary policeman in L'viv.

40. On or about May 10, 1949, Firishchak filed an Application
for Immigration Visa and Alien Registration with the American
Consulate in Munich, Germany, to obtain a non-quota immigration
visa to the United States under the DPA.

41. On his visa application, Firishchak described his
residences from 1941 to 1944, declaring that he had resided in
Nitra, Slovakia (1939 to December 1941); Lemberg (i.e. L'viv), Poland (December 1941 to April
1944); and Nitra, Slovakia (April 1944 to October 1944).

42. In the course of applying for a non-quota immigration visa
under the DPA, Firishchak orally swore to the truth of the
information on his visa application.

43. Firishchak did not truthfully disclose his service in the
UAP to the vice consul who processed his application, and who
conducted a mandatory interview of Firishchak, during which
Firishchak was specifically questioned about his activities
during the war.

44. Firishchak was issued Immigration Visa No. 1959/50 under
the DPA, which he used to enter the United States at the Port of
Boston, Massachusetts, on or about June 2, 1949.

45. On or about September 14, 1954, Firishchak signed and filed
a Petition for Naturalization with the United States Immigration
and Naturalization Service. He orally swore to the truth of the
information he provided therein.

46. On November 11, 1954, the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois granted Firishchak's Petition
for Naturalization and issued to him Certificate of Naturalization No. 7365065.

47. On June 23, 2003, Firishchak voluntarily appeared at the
offices of the United States Attorney in Chicago, Illinois, for a
sworn interview regarding his whereabouts and activities in
Europe during World War II, his immigration to the United States,
and his subsequent naturalization as a United States citizen.

48. During that voluntary sworn interview, Firishchak was shown
an exhibit containing eight signatures collected from other
documents. The signatures were written in Ukrainian, utilizing
the Cyrillic alphabet. Firishchak identified seven of the
signatures on that document as his signature.

49. The seven Ukrainian language/Cyrillic alphabet signatures
identified by Firishchak during his June 23, 2003 sworn interview
as his signature were taken from the following documents:

a. Application for permanent insurance identification
document, L'viv, December 19, 1941, signed (in
Cyrillic) Yosyf Firishchak. That document states that
"Yosyf Firishchak," born April 18, 1919 in
Trybushany, as of that date had been employed by the
"1st Commissariat of the Ukrainian Police" since
October 25, 1941. That document also states that the
first name of the father of "Yosyf Firishchak" was "Hryts," and lists the residence of
"Yosyf Firishchak" as 30 Kazymyrivs'ka Street in
L'viv.

b. Registration form, L'viv, March 26, 1942, signed
(in Cyrillic) Y. Firishchak. That document states
"Osyp Firishchak," born April 18, 1919 in
Tryshbushany, began working on October 25, 1941, as a
wachtmeister (police private) in the 1st
Commissariat of the Ukrainian Auxiliary Police in
L'viv.

c. List of names of 1st Commissariat men
acknowledging being briefed about a regulation issued
on March 4, 1942, by the Higher SS and Police Leader
(no date), signed (in Cyrillic) "O. Firishchak." That
document contains a list of signatures of members of
the 1st Commissariat of the Ukrainian Police in
Lemberg (L'viv), acknowledging that they were briefed
about regulations concerning behavior toward Germans.
Listed at number 15, with signature, is
Wachtmeister "Osyp Firistschak."

d. Roster of men briefed on the report and wanted
list of the Government General published on April 8,
1942 (no date), signed (in Cyrillic) "O. Firishchak."
That document contains a list of signatures of Ukrainian policemen in Lemberg
(L'viv), acknowledging that they were briefed about a
report and wanted list for the Government General.
Listed at number 67, with signature, is
Wachtmeister "Osyp Firistschak."

e. Roster of men briefed on the report and wanted
list of the Government General published on April 8,
1942 (no date), signed (in Cyrillic) "O. Firishchak."
That document, which is nearly identical to the
previous document, contains a list of signatures of
Ukrainian policemen in Lemberg (L'viv), acknowledging
that they were briefed about a report and wanted list
for the Government General. Listed at number 67, with
signature, is Wachtmeister "Osyp Firistschak."

f. Roster of 1st Commissariat policemen receiving
heating allowances for the winter of 1943-44 (no
date), signed (in Cyrillic) "Firishchak." That
document contains a list of signatures of 1st
Commissariat policemen acknowledging receipt of
payment for heating. The ninth signature on the list
is Vistun (Ukrainian for Wachtmeister (police
private)) "Osyp Firistschak." g. Roster of 1st Commissariat policemen receiving
heating allowances for the winter of 1943-44 (no
date), signed (in Cyrillic) "Firishchak." That
document is nearly identical to the previous one, and
contains a list of signatures of 1st Commissariat
policemen acknowledging receipt of payment for
heating. The ninth signature on the list is Vistun
"Osyp Firistschak."

50. The Ukrainian language/Cyrillic alphabet signatures on
these documents are spelled the same. All of these documents
refer to Firishchak.

51. Eight additional wartime documents of the UAP identify
"Osyp Firishchak" or "Firischtschak O." as a Ukrainian Auxiliary
policeman, utilizing the phonetic Latin alphabet spelling of his
Ukrainian name. Several of those specifically identify him as a
member of the 1st Commissariat, and one notes his date of birth
as April 18, 1919. All of these documents refer to Firishchak.

52. Six additional wartime documents of the UAP identify "Osyp
Firiszczak" as a member of the Guard Company of the UAP. All of
these documents refer to Firishchak, utilizing a standard
(Polish) transliteration of his Ukrainian name.

53. Firishchak's Ukrainian surname on GX 33-39, 40-47, 51, 139,
140, 141a, 141j, 142a, and 142 translates phonetically from the
Cyrillic alphabet into the Latin alphabet as "Firishchak,"
"Firishchtschak," "Firistschak," or "Firiszczak." Any variation
in the transliterated (i.e., Latin alphabet) spelling of
Firishchak's Ukrainian surname on these documents is
insignificant. During his voluntary sworn interview Firishchak
clearly identified the Ukrainian language/Cyrillic alphabet
signatures on GX 33-39 as his own. During his trial testimony he
incredibly claimed that at the sworn interview he did not
understand what was clearly asked of him in the following
exchange:

Q. [C]an you tell me if these look like your
signatures on this sheet [GX 146 (Ex. 50; GX 148].

A. Yeah, that's mine.

Q. These are yours?

A. Yeah, this one, this one, but this one, could be I
was in better shape.

Q. When you say `this one' and this one,' lets start
with [signature] No. 1. I mean, do these look like
your signatures, [numbers] 1, 2, 3?

A. Yeah.

Q. 4?

A. Yeah.

Q. 5?

A. Yeah.

Q. 6? 7?

A. Except this one, yes. Q. 8 is the only one you have a question about?

A. Yeah.

Q. But the rest of them look fine?

A. Yeah.

(GX 146 at 13-14). At no time during trial did he
deny that the seven signatures he identified during
that interview in fact were his. In light of the
certainty with which he identified the signatures as
his own, any recantation at trial would not have been
credible. Additionally, GX 33 and 34 also bear
Firishchak's admitted date and place of birth; GX 33
also correctly lists the first name of Firishchak's
father ("Hyrts"). GX 43 also correctly notes
Firishchak's admitted date of birth. Further,
Firishchak admitted at trial that he lived in L'viv
during all or most of the period that a person
bearing his name, date and place of birth, with a
father named "Hyrts," served as a Ukrainian Auxiliary
policeman. The absence of any evidence that another
person bearing Firishchak's name, with the same date
of birth, from the same village, whose father was
named "Hyrts," served in the UAP between October 1941
and July 1944, also confirms that all of the
documents refer to the same individual  Firishchak.

WITNESS TESTIMONY

The Government presented testimony from two qualified expert
witnesses (one during trial and one via de benne esse
deposition), and from three fact witnesses (two during trial and one via de benne esse deposition). All of
the Government's witnesses testified credibly.

Dr. Dieter Pohl, a scholar at the Institute for Contemporary
History in Munich, Germany, testified credibly at trial as an
expert witness for the Government on the Nazi occupation of
District Galicia, including the Ukrainian Auxiliary Police in
L'viv, and about documents relating to those subjects. Firishchak
did not dispute Dr. Pohl's credentials as an expert; in any event
he is amply qualified to provide expert testimony. Dr. Pohl has
devoted his entire professional career to the historical
examination and analysis of German and East European history
since 1918, especially the Nazi era from 1933 to 1945. Relying on
properly authenticated wartime documentation, Dr. Pohl detailed
the origin, formation, function and operation of the UAP during
the Nazi occupation of L'viv, the nature of the persecution
inflicted by the Nazis  with the routine and daily assistance of
the UAP  upon certain civilians deemed to be enemies of Germany
because of their race, religion, national origin, or political
opinion, particularly the Jewish population of the city. He also
explained the role played by Firishchak, as a Ukrainian Auxiliary
policeman, in carrying out that persecution.

Robert Groner, a former trial attorney with the United States
Department of Justice Office of Special Investigations, testified
credibly at trial as a witness for the Government. He explained
that in advance of Firishchak's voluntary sworn interview in June
2003, he prepared a document (GX 146, Ex. 5; GX 148) containing
eight samples of Firishchak's Ukrainian language/Cyrillic
alphabet signature. Mr. Groner testified that he selected seven of these
signature from wartime documents which showed that Firishchak
served in the UAP, cut those signatures from photocopies of the
wartime documents, and pasted them onto GX 148. (See Agreed
Fact #27). Mr. Groner was present at the voluntary sworn
interview of Firishchak on June 23, 2003, and testified that
during that interview the document containing the signature
samples was shown to Firishchak, who identified as his own the
seven signatures taken from wartime documents showing that
Firishchak served in the UAP. (GX 146 at 13-14). Mr. Groner noted
that Firishchak declined the services of an interpreter (who was
present), and was composed, lucid and responsive during the
interview  except when he was shown documents regarding his
service in the UAP, when he became nervous and agitated.

William Weiss, a survivor of the L'viv Jewish ghetto, testified
credibly at trial as a witness for the Government. He discussed
his experiences during his forced confinement to the ghetto, and
related the horrible mistreatment he and his family suffered at
the hands of the Nazi occupation forces, with the routine and
daily participation of the Ukrainian Auxiliary Police.

Mario DeCapua testified credibly via de benne esse deposition
as an expert witness for the Government regarding the operation
of the United States Displaced Persons Commission ("DPC"), an
agency charged with implementing the DPA. Firishchak did not
dispute Mr. DeCapua's credentials as an expert; in any event he
is uniquely qualified to provide expert testimony. Mr. DeCapua
served from 1948 until 1952 as the head of the Security
Investigations Division of the DPC. Mr. DeCapua testified that he helped prepare the "Inimical List," a
listing of organizations whose members automatically were
ineligible for admission under the DPA. He explained that the
list was not exclusive, and that membership in organizations not
named on the list also could be disqualifying under the DPA. (GX
153 at 18, 24-25). Mr. DeCapua also described the screening
procedures (which he developed) that a DPC case analyst was
required to follow when processing visa applications under the
DPA. He testified that investigations were conducted for the DPC
by the U.S. Army Counterintelligence Corps ("CIC"), which paid
particular attention to the activities of young men of military
service age who lived in areas occupied by German forces during
the war. Any information regarding an applicant's wartime
activities would be noted in a report to the DPC. (GX 153 at
29-32). Mr. DeCapua stated that under DPC procedures an analyst
would have rejected  and in fact did reject  visa applications
of persons known to have served in a police force created and
directed by Nazi German authorities, such as the UAP. (GX 153 at
17-22; 26-33, 36-39, 43-45, 47, 52, 69; GX 153, Ex. 2).

Everett Coe, a former U.S. Department of State Vice Consul who
processed Firishchak's application for an immigrant visa in
Munich, Germany, in 1949 (GX 154 at 37), testified credibly via
de benne esse deposition as a witness for the Government. Mr.
Coe testified that he worked exclusively on visa applications
under the DPA. (GX 154 at 17-18). He explained the procedures
that he followed as a vice consul when processing those
applications. He stated that in determining an applicant's
eligibility, he relied on reports prepared by the DPC regarding
that applicant's background. (GX 154 at 21, 41-42, 44-45). He
testified that it was mandatory for a visa applicant to submit to
an interview by a vice consul, and that such interviews were
conducted under oath, with the assistance of a translator if
needed. (GX 154 at 22-23). He also testified that it was standard
procedure  and his personal practice  to separately ask an
applicant about his or her wartime activities and whereabouts.
(GX 154 at 24, 32, 38-39). That was particularly important when
the applicant was a man who lived during World War II in areas
under Nazi occupation and was of age for Nazi service. (GX 154 at
39). Mr. Coe stated that he would not have approved Firishchak's
visa application had Firishchak truthfully disclosed his wartime
service in the UAP. (GX 154 at 31-35, 42-45). Mr. Coe testified
credibly that Firishchak was granted a visa because he
misrepresented his service in the UAP to the DPC and to Coe
during his mandatary interview. (GX 154 at 44-45).

Firishchak testified in his own defense at trial, and denied
ever having served in the UAP in L'viv. Firishchak's testimony
was not credible. Firishchak's demeanor and mannerisms clearly
showed that he was lying under oath on the stand. His testimony
was also replete with inconsistencies and he provided the court
with a completely unbelievable story regarding his life during
World War II. It is hardly a surprise that Firishchak would
attempt to distance himself in a coy and self-serving manner from
the atrocities of the Nazi regime and from his lies that allowed
him to obtain entry into the United States and eventual United
States citizenship, but the evidence points undeniably at his
deception. Firishchak acknowledged during his interview by the government
that seven of the eight signatures that he was shown were his
signatures and he was only unsure as to the eighth signature.
During his testimony at trial, Firishchak's main contention as to
his identification of the signatures during the interview was
that he was not first told that the signatures were taken from
papers that would incriminate him. Firishchak thus has admitted
that he gave the government a truthful answer about the
signatures, but only regrets not being forewarned about the
incriminating papers so that he would have had a chance to be
untruthful. We are concerned with Firishchak's truthful
statements rather than the lies that he would have told if
forewarned that the government had the goods on him.

Firishchak acknowledged on the stand that the individual
identified on the incriminating documents presented by the
government had the same name as him, the same birth date, the
same name of a father, was from the same village as him, and was
located in the same town as he was at the time in question during
World War II. Firishchak pointed out that some of the names on
the documents were not spelled the same as his name, but the
government's expert witness, Dr. Pohl, adequately explained how
there could be different spellings depending on the language that
was used on the documents. Firishchak provided the court with a
fairy tale depicting himself as a homeless soul, drifting though
Nazi occupied territories, from place to place, and hiding out in
coffee shops along the way. Just as it pushes the realm of
credibility that Firishchak sat out the war in coffee shops,
Firishchak's attempts to hide behind semantics as to the spelling
of his name is preposterous. Firishchak testified that he left his factory job in Nazi
Germany and went with little money and without proper travel
documents, in company of men he did not know. Firishchak claimed
that he was on the way to a town to go to school with two
individuals. However, strangely Firishchak admits that he did not
even know the name of the town that he was going to go to school.
Firishchak claims that he was able to move at will without travel
documents and without being challenged by anyone. Firishchak
acknowledges that he ended up in L'viv. Interestingly, the
individual also named Firishchak who is identified on the
documents presented by the government as a Ukrainian Auxiliary
policeman also resided in L'viv.

Firishchak's story of his time in L'viv, sitting in coffee
shops, and picking up occasional odd jobs without detection by
the Nazis or the UAP is totally unbelievable. Such a tale is
directly contrary to all of the reliable and credible testimony
provided by the government that showed that the UAP regularly
checked the identification of persons on the street and regularly
sought out individuals to do work for the Nazi regime. It is a
ridiculous notion that Firishchak, an able bodied young man would
be able to spend the duration of World War II hanging out,
unnoticed in coffee shops. During the trial, Firishchak painted
an abstract and general story of his activities in L'viv in order
to avoid showing his hand of deception. However, the government
repeatedly was able to get Firishchak to trip over his own lies
on the stand. For instance, Firishchak claimed that he never
slept in the same place and was always on the move, but then he
acknowledged that he had an address in L'viv for an extended
period of time. In Firishchak's answer to interrogatories in this action he admitted that he spent most of
the duration of the war living at two fixed addresses in L'viv,
and provided the street names and the names of his landladies.
Firishchak also attempted to change the facts during his
testimony saying that he was wandering in the country from time
to time and sleeping in barns rather than residing in L'viv.
Firishchak's testimony, in short, was entirety unbelievable and
he only sunk himself further by his mannerisms on the stand which
betrayed the fact that he was lying under oath to save himself
from denaturalization.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Key questions before us are whether Firishchak is a member of
the UAP, whether as a member of UAP he is accountable for the
atrocities of the UAP, whether he procured his entry into the
United States illegally, and whether the government has proved
its case by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence. Kungys
v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 772 (1988); Fedorenko v. United
States, 449 U.S. 490, 505 (1981). The following are the court's
conclusions of law:

1. The following historical documents offered by the Government
regarding the Nazi occupation of District Galicia and the city of
L'viv, the establishment, operation, and wartime activities of
the UAP, and Firishchak's service in the UAP, were properly
admitted into evidence pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 803(16) and 901(b)(8) (admission of ancient documents):
GX 1, 3-8, 10, 12-16, 18-19, 21-23, 25-26, 33-41, 43-47, 51, 54,
57-58, 60-61, 68-76, 80-82, 87-91, 93-107, 109-110, 112, 114-119,
120-123, 125-126, 128-131, 133140, 141a, 141j, 142a, 142b, 160.
These documents all were shown to be: 1) in such condition as to
create no suspicion concerning their authenticity; 2) found in
places where, if authentic, they would likely be; and 3) in
existence 20 years or more at the time they were offered.
Fed.R.Evid. 901(b)(8). See United States v. Kairys, 782 F.2d 1374,
1379 (7th Cir. 1986). It is not necessary to show a chain of
custody for an ancient document. Id. at 1379; see also United
States v. Koziy, 728 F.2d 1314, 1322 (11th Cir. 1984).

Firishchak argued that the government's case is not strong
because the case is built mainly upon documents rather than
eyewitnesses' testimony, but it is an undeniable fact that many
eyewitness did not survive the atrocities perpetrated by the UAP
and those that did survive may not remember the names and faces
of the perpetrators clearly after over fifty years have passed.
The question therefore becomes: should the mere passage of time
shield perpetrators from being held accountable for such
atrocities? The answer is a resounding NO.

5. Firishchak is a resident of Chicago, Illinois, and thus
venue is proper in this District under INA Section 340(a),
8 U.S.C. § 1451(a). (Dkt. #5, Firishchak's Answer #3, 5). 6. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) provides for the revocation of
Firishchak's citizenship and the cancellation of his Certificate
of Naturalization if his citizenship was illegally procured.
(Agreed Legal Finding #1). See e.g. Fedorenko,
449 U.S. at 514-15.

7. 8 U.S.C. § 1427 sets forth the requirements for the legal
procurement of citizenship through naturalization. Section
1427(a)(1), provides that no person shall be naturalized unless
such person has been lawfully admitted to the United States for
permanent residence. (Agreed Legal Finding #2). See e.g.
Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 506, 508, 515; United States v.
Tittjung, 235 F.3d 330, 336-37 (7th Cir. 2000).

8. To be lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent
residence, an individual must be in possession of a valid visa
and be legally eligible for that visa. INA Section 211(a),
8 U.S.C. § 1181(a). (Agreed Legal Finding #3). Fedorenko,
449 U.S. at 506, 508, 515; Tittjung, 235 F.3d at 336-37.

9. The lawfulness of Firishchak's admission is determined
according to the law in effect at the time of his or her initial
entry into the United States. (See Agreed Legal Finding #4).
See Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 507, 514; Tittjung,
235 F.3d at 336-37. Because Firishchak entered the United States by means of a visa issued under the DPA, the lawfulness of his entry must
be examined under that Act. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 507, 514;
Tittjung, 235 F.3d at 336-37.

10. Firishchak's visa eligibility also was subject to State
Department regulations in effect at the time he applied for his
visa. (See Agreed Legal Finding #15). See 22 C.F.R. §§ 53.32,
53.33 (1949) (GX 154 (Ex. 5)). See also Ex. 154, Coe Testimony.

11. Under DPA Section 10, the burden was at all times on an
applicant to establish his or her eligibility as a displaced
person. (DPA Section 10, 63 Stat. 1013). See United States v.
Mandycz, 359 F.Supp.2d 601, 618 (E.D. Mich. 2005). See also
Ex. 153, DeCapua Testimony.

12. The Government's burden in this denaturalization action is
to prove its case by "clear, unequivocal and convincing
evidence," which must not leave "the issue in doubt."
Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 505-06. United States v. Hajda,
135 F.3d 439, 444 (7th Cir. 1998).

13. To meet its burden of proving that Firishchak was not
lawfully admitted to the United States as a result of his
activities during World War II, the Government need not present
admissions by Firishchak or testimony from live witnesses who confirm Firishchak's Nazi service. See, e.g.,
Hammer v. INS, 195 F.3d 836, 843 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding
assistance in persecution under the Holtzman Amendment,
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(E), in the absence of admissions or fact witness
testimony); United States v. Szehinskyj, 104 F. Supp. 2d 480,
494-95 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (finding that the defendant assisted in
persecution despite lack of "live evidence"); United States v.
Tittjung, 753 F. Supp. 251, 256 (E.D. Wis. 1990) (finding
assistance in persecution based on Nazi wartime documents).

14. The DPA, in designating who was a "displaced person"
eligible for immigration, incorporated by reference the
definition contained in Annex I to the Constitution of the
International Refugee Organization (IRO). DPA Section 2(b),
62 Stat. 1009, 1013 (1948). (Agreed Legal Finding #5). That
definition excluded from displaced persons status  and thereby
barred from entry into the United States  any person who had
"assisted the enemy in persecuting civil populations. . . ."
Annex I, Part II, Section 2(a), reprinted in 62 Stat. 3037 at
3051-52 (1948). (Agreed Legal Finding #5). Fedorenko,
449 U.S. at 495-96 n. 3 n. 4, 510-11; United States v. Schmidt,
923 F.2d 1253, 1256 (7th Cir. 1991).

15. An individual need not be shown to have committed a
particular atrocity, or a specific persecutory act, to be
excludable for assisting in persecution under DPA Section 2(b). (See Agreed Legal Finding #6). Fedorenko,
449 U.S. at 510 n. 32; United States v. Ciurinskas,
148 F.3d 729, 734 (7th Cir. 1998). Nor is it necessary for the Government
to show that an individual served voluntarily. Fedorenko,
49 U.S. at 512; Schmidt, 923 F.2d at 1257-58.

16. Under the DPA, visa disqualification based on assistance in
persecution does not require a finding that Firishchak made a
material misrepresentation in order to procure his visa.
Tittjung, 235 F.3d at 340-41. The assistance in persecution bar
"does not contain a fraud element, but rather provides wholly
independent grounds for denaturalization." Id.; See also
United States v. Dailide, 316 F.3d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 2003)
(stating that "a finding of misrepresentation is not a necessary
prerequisite to a finding of `illegal procurement'" of
citizenship).

17. Someone who, as a member of the Ukrainian Auxiliary Police
in L'viv during World War II, performed the routine and daily
duties of a Ukrainian Auxiliary policeman, which included
enforcing Nazi persecutory measures against Jews and others who
the Nazis deemed dangerous or undesirable because of their race,
religion, national origin or political belief, has assisted in
the persecution of civil populations. (See Agreed Legal Finding
#7). United States v. Osidach, 513 F.Supp. 51, 60-61, 63,
84-85, 97-99 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (Ukrainian policeman in
Nazi-occupied Rawa Ruska, Ukraine, who patrolled the streets of the town "to keep `order,'" assisted in persecution; "The mere
presence of the watchful eye of the conqueror or his deputies,
coupled with the often demonstrated presence of both the means
and the inclination to persistently inflict various indignities,
physical abuse, injuries or even death, without notice or reason,
is the personification of mental persecution, to anyone, let
alone innocent civilian men, women, and children reduced to
various degrees of substandard mental and physical well-being").
See United States v. Koziy, 728 F.2d 1314, 1316 (11th Cir.)
(Ukrainian policeman who guarded a Jewish ghetto and participated
in killings assisted in persecution), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 835 (1984); United States v. Dercacz, 530 F.Supp. 1348
(E.D.N.Y. 1982) (member of Ukrainian police force who brought
Jews to the police station and reported them to the commandant
and the Gestapo for not wearing their identifying armbands, and
who reported civilians who sold food to the Jews in the ghetto,
assisted in persecution under DPA Section 2(b)); United States
v. Theodorovich, 102 F.R.D. 587, 591 (D.D.C. 1984) (default
judgment takes as established that Ukrainian policeman in L'viv
participated in persecution of Jews). See also United States v.
Stelmokas, 100 F.3d 302, 307, 312 (3d Cir. 1996) (guard
commander at Kaunas ghetto "participated in confining the Jews to
an area in which they were regularly subjected to extreme
deprivation, brutality, and arbitrary shootings"), cert.
denied, 520 U.S. 1242 (1997);; United States v. Dailide,
953 F.Supp. 192, 194-95, 197 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (Lithuanian policeman
who arrested Jews for attempting to escape the ghetto and turned them over to the Germans assisted in
persecution under DPA Section 2(b)).

18. The Court has found as a fact that during World War II
Firishchak was a member of the Ukrainian Auxiliary Police in
L'viv, and performed the routine duties of a Ukrainian Auxiliary
policeman, which included enforcing Nazi persecutory measures
against Jews and others who the Nazis deemed dangerous or
undesirable because of their race, religion, national origin or
political belief. (See Finding of Fact # 13-19, 24-36, 47-52,
supra). Firishchak therefore assisted in persecution, and was
not legally eligible to receive a visa under DPA Section 2(b).
(See Agreed Legal Finding #7). Accordingly, the Government has
proven the allegation in Count I of the Complaint, and is
entitled to judgment on that Count.

19. The Court also has found as a fact that during World War II
all members of the UAP in L'viv performed so-called
"extraordinary" duties with regard to the Jewish ghetto, which
included, inter alia: taking part in sweeps of the ghetto
during periodic reduction actions; manning cordon posts around
the city to prevent Jews from escaping before and during such
actions; and hunting for Jews who attempted to hide or flee.
(See Finding of Fact #24-25, supra). Firishchak's performance
of these "extraordinary" duties provides additional grounds for
concluding that he assisted in persecution, and thus was not legally eligible to receive a visa under DPA Section 2(b), as
alleged in Count I of the Complaint.

20. The Court also has found as a fact that on August 9, 1942,
the eve of the ghetto clearance action known as the "Great
Operation," Firishchak took part in a search to locate seven men
who did not report for duty with the 1st Commissariat's
Department of Street Traffic, and that several of the men
Firishchak had been assigned to locate thereafter participated in
the Great Operation. (See Finding of Fact # 33, supra).
Firishchak's conduct in this regard provides additional grounds
for concluding that he assisted in persecution, and thus was not
legally eligible to receive a visa under DPA Section 2(b), as
alleged in Count I of the Complaint.

21. Further, someone who served in the Ukrainian Auxiliary
Police in L'viv during World War II, which enforced Nazi
persecutory measures against Jews and others who the Nazis deemed
dangerous or undesirable because of their race, religion,
national origin or political belief, assisted in the persecution
of civil populations. (See Agreed Legal Finding #8). See
United States v. Ciurinskas, 148 F.3d 729, 733 (7th Cir. 1998)
("Even if Ciurinskas had not personally participated, his service
in the 2nd Battalion [of the Lithuanian Schutzmannschaft
(indigenous police force)] is sufficient to constitute assistance
in persecution"); Schmidt, 923 F.2d at 1259 ("[E]ven if Schmidt personally did not participate in the brutal acts committed at
Sachsenhausen, the fact of his armed, uniformed service is
sufficient to establish that he assisted in persecution"). Cf.
Naujalis v. INS, 240 F.3d 642, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) (a member of
the same Lithuanian Schutzmannschaft battalion assisted in
persecution by guarding "a vital railway facility" at a time when
other members of the battalion were murdering thousands of Jewish
men, women and children; regardless of whether Naujalis
participated in those killing actions, his "service contributed
to the overall strength and dynamic" of the unit).

22. The Court has found as a fact that Firishchak served during
World War II in the Ukrainian Auxiliary Police in L'viv, which
enforced Nazi persecutory measures against Jews and others who
the Nazis deemed dangerous or undesirable because of their race,
religion, national origin or political belief. (See Finding of
Fact # 13-19, 24-36, supra). This finding provides additional
grounds for concluding that Firishchak assisted in persecution,
and therefore was not legally eligible to receive a visa under
the DPA. (See Agreed Legal Finding #8). Accordingly, the
Government has proven the allegations in Count I of the
Complaint, and is entitled to judgment on that Count.

23. DPA Section 13 prohibited issuance of a visa to "any person
who is or has been a member of, or participated in, any movement
which is or has been hostile to the United States or the form of government of the
United States." (Agreed Legal Finding #9). See United States v.
Wittje, 333 F.Supp.2d 737, 747-48 (N.D. Ill. 2004), app.
pending, No. 04-3517 (7th Cir.); Ciurinskas,
976 F.Supp. at 1187; Hajda, 963 F.Supp. at 1466, 1471. See also United States
v. Koziy, 540 F.Supp. 25, 34 (S.D. Fla. 1982), aff'd,
728 F.2d 1314 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 835 (1984); United
States v. Osidach, 513 F.Supp. 51, 72-75, 78-79 (E.D. Pa.),
app. dism. on Firishchak's death, No. 81-1956 (3d Cir. July 22,
1981).

24. The degree of participation or involvement in the hostile
movement is irrelevant; DPA Section 13 does not consider the role
an individual played in the hostile movement. United States v.
Koreh, 59 F.3d 431, 444-45 (3d Cir. 1995), citing Osidach,
513 F.Supp. at 72. Rather, membership or participation in a hostile
movement per se precludes visa eligibility. The "plain language
of [DPA] section 13 contains no requirement that a Firishchak
personally participate in any hostile acts committed by the
movement, and the legislative history suggests that Congress
sought to exclude all members of such groups, regardless of the
degree of their participation." Koreh, 59 F.3d at 444-45. See
Ciurinskas, 148 F.3d at 734 (membership in Lithuanian
Schutzmannschaft was sufficient for disqualification under the
hostile movement bar, even if there was no showing of active
participation); Wittje, 333 F.Supp.2d at 748 (not necessary
under DPA Section 13 to show that member of Waffen SS guarded concentration camp). See also
Demjanjuk, No. 99CV1193, 2002 WL 544622, *28 (membership in
units that guarded Nazi concentration and forced labor camps
rendered Demjanjuk inadmissible under DPA Section 13).

25. Under the DPA, visa disqualification based on membership or
participation in a hostile movement does not require a finding
that Firishchak made a material misrepresentation in order to
procure his visa. See United States v. Negele, 222 F.3d 443,
448 (8th Cir. 2000) (because the Court affirmed the
denaturalization order based on a violation of DPA Section 13, it
did not need to consider the misrepresentation charge), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 1153 (2001); Wittje, 333 F.Supp.2d at 748
(denaturalization granted on summary judgment based on membership
in a hostile movement without a finding of a material
misrepresentation during visa application process).

26. While at the time the DPA was in effect there existed for
use by immigration officials a list of organizations considered
hostile movements under DPA Section 13, commonly known as the
"Inimical List," see Ciurinskas, 976 F.Supp. at 1182; Koziy,
540 F.Supp. at, 33-34, that list was not exhaustive, and
membership or participation in organizations not appearing on the
list also was disqualifying. See United States v. Kowalchuk,
773 F.2d 488, 496 (3rd Cir. 1985); Mandycz,
359 F.Supp.2d at 619; United States v. Kwoczak, No. 97-5632, 2002 WL 32137688 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 1, 2002) (Attachment 3),
at *3; Koreh, 856 F.Supp. at 902.

27. Someone who served during World War II in the Ukrainian
Auxiliary Police was a member of, or participated in, a hostile
movement. (See Agreed Legal Finding #10). See, e.g., Koziy,
540 F.Supp. at 34; Osidach, 513 F.Supp. at 62-63, 97, 112.

28. The Court has found as a fact that Firishchak served during
World War II in the Ukrainian Auxiliary Police in L'viv, which
enforced Nazi persecutory measures against Jews and others who
the Nazis deemed dangerous or undesirable because of their race,
religion, national origin or political belief. (See Finding of
Fact # 13-19, 24-36, 47-52, supra). Firishchak therefore was a
member of, or participated in, a prohibited hostile movement, and
was not eligible under DPA Section 13 to receive a visa. (See
Agreed Legal Finding #10). Accordingly, the Government has proven
the allegations in Count II of the Complaint, and is entitled to
judgment on that Count.

29. DPA Section 10 rendered inadmissible to the United States
any alien "who shall willfully make a misrepresentation for the
purpose of gaining admission to the United States as an eligible
displaced person" under the DPA. 62 Stat. 1013. (Agreed Legal
Finding #11). 30. A misrepresentation must be "material" for it to be
disqualifying under DPA Section 10. (Agreed Legal Finding #12).
Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 507; Ciurinskas, 976 F.Supp. at 1188.
A misrepresentation is "material" if it would have a natural
tendency to influence the relevant decision-maker's decision.
(Agreed Legal Finding #12). Kungys v. United States,
485 U.S. 759, 770-71 (1988). The Government is not required under this
standard to prove that Firishchak would not have received a visa
had he not made the misrepresentation. (Agreed Legal Finding
#12). Id. at 771-72. See United States v. Demjanjuk,
367 F.3d 623, 636-37 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 125 S.Ct. 429 (2004). The
materiality of a misrepresentation in a denaturalization
proceeding is a question of law. (Agreed Legal Finding # 12).

31. Firischak's wartime activities, in particular his
membership in the UAP, and his activities as a Ukrainian
Auxiliary policeman, were material facts capable of affecting the
decision of the Displaced Persons Commission ("DPC") as to
whether Firishchak was an eligible "displaced person" within the
meaning of the DPA. Firishchak's membership in the UAP, and his
activities while serving in that unit, also were material facts
capable of affecting the decision of the vice consul who reviewed
Firishchak's Application for Immigration Visa in order to
determine whether he was eligible under the DPA for an immigrant
visa. (See Agreed Legal Finding #13). See Kowalchuk,
773 F.2d at 497 (immigration officials paid "[c]lose attention . . . to
the applicant's occupation and residence during the war years and the applicant
had the burden under the law of proving eligibility for a visa.
Persons who had served in the Ukrainian police or militia would
have been ineligible."); Koziy, 728 F.2d at 1319-20 ("if
[Koziy] had disclosed his connection with the police force in his
visa application, his application would have been rejected
outright, or at the least, an investigation would have
commenced"); Dercacz, 530 F.Supp. at 1353 (claim by Ukrainian
policeman on his visa application that he had been a "dairy
farmer" was a material misrepresentation under DPA Section 10);
Osidach, 513 F.Supp. at 101-02 (claim by Ukrainian policeman
that he had been a "dairy technic" was a material
misrepresentation under DPA Section 10).

32. The Court has found as a fact that Firishchak served during
World War II in the Ukrainian Auxiliary Police in L'viv. (See
Finding of Fact #13-19, 47-52, supra). The Court also has found
as a fact that Firishchak misrepresented his service in the
Ukrainian Auxiliary Police to the DPC and to the vice consul who
processed his visa application. (See Finding of Fact # 37-43,
54, supra). He therefore made a willful and material
misrepresentation of his wartime activities for the purpose of
gaining admission to the United States as an eligible displaced
person" under the DPA, and was ineligible under DPA Section 10 to
receive a visa. (See Agreed Legal Finding #14). Accordingly,
the Government has proven the allegations in Count III of the
Complaint, and is entitled to judgment on that Count.

33. At the time Firishchak entered the United States,
regulations promulgated by the Department of State (pursuant to
authority delegated by Presidential proclamation) forbade the
issuance of a visa to any alien whose entry would be prejudicial
to the United States. 22 C.F.R. §§ 53.32, 53.33 (1949). (Agreed
Legal Finding #15). Among those aliens whose entry was deemed
prejudicial to the United States were any person who "advocated
or acquiesced in activities or conduct contrary to civilization
and human decency on behalf of the Axis countries during . . .
[World War II]." 22 C.F.R. § 53.33(j) (1949). (Agreed Legal
Finding #15). See Ciurinskas, 976 F.Supp. at 1187-88;
Baumann, 764 F.Supp. at 1337; United States v. Stelmokas, No.
92-3440, 1995 WL 464264 (E.D. Pa. 1995), at *24-25, aff'd on
other grounds, 100 F.3d 302 (3d Cir. 1996).

34. "Acquiesce," as used in these regulations, includes
"passive assent or agreement without protest." United States v.
Negele, No. 4:97CV01810 (E.D. Mo. July 20, 1999), slip op. at 88
(quoting American Heritage College Dictionary 12 (1993)), aff'd
on other grounds, 222 F.3d 443 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied,
531 U.S. 1153 (2001). See Ciurinskas, 976 F.Supp. at 1187-88
(Ciurinskas acquiesced in activities or conduct contrary to
civilization and human decency within the meaning of the State
Department regulations because he was "aware of, and assisted in . . . activities
directed against Jews"; participation in that conduct, "whether
active or passive," rendered him inadmissible under
22 C.F.R. § 53.33(j)).

35. Someone who served in the Ukrainian Auxiliary Police, which
was subordinate to the Nazi security authorities and routinely
assisted in implementing a range of Nazi anti-Jewish policies,
advocated or acquiesced in activities or conduct contrary to
civilization and human decency. (See Agreed Legal Finding #16).

36. The Court has found as a fact that Firishchak served during
World War II in the Ukrainian Auxiliary Police in L'viv, which
enforced Nazi persecutory measures against Jews and others who
the Nazis deemed dangerous or undesirable because of their race,
religion, national origin or political belief. (See Finding of
Fact # 13-19, 24-36, 47-52, supra). Firishchak therefore
advocated or acquiesced in activities or conduct contrary to
civilization and human decency, and thus was ineligible to
receive a visa under State Department regulations. (See Agreed
Legal Finding #16). Accordingly, the Government has proven the
allegations in Count IV of the Complaint, and is entitled to
judgment on that Count.

37. During closing arguments, defense argued that the
government had omitted from its pretrial pleadings three decisions which allegedly
support Firishchak's claim that he is not subject to
denaturalization. All three decisions are wholly inapposite to
the issues before this court, and do not save Firishchak from
denaturalization as a result of his service as a Ukrainian
Auxiliary policeman. The court will address the three decisions
below:

a. The district court decision in United States v. Lindert,
907 F. Supp. 1114 (N.D. Ohio 1995), was not based on the DPA  in
fact, Lindert originally was refused admission to the United
States under the DPA  and in any event the court's ruling no
longer is good law.

Lindert served as a guard at several concentration
camps, and after the war was held by British forces
as a prisoner-of-war ("POW"). His POW record
mistakenly reported that he served in an SS combat
unit. Lindert, 907 F. Supp at 1120. After he was
released, Lindert applied for immigration to the
United States under the DPA. His application stated
only that he had served in the Waffen SS; Lindert did
not reveal that he had guarded concentration camps.
He was denied a visa under the hostile movement
clause of DPA Section 13 based on his membership in
the Waffen SS. There was no determination as to
whether Lindert assisted in persecution, because he
concealed his concentration camp guard service. Id.
at 1121. In 1954, Lindert reapplied for a visa under
a different statute, which did not bar entry based on mere membership in the Waffen SS. On his
visa application, Lindert again falsely stated that
he was assigned to an SS combat unit, and did not
disclose that he had served as a concentration camp
guard. Id. at 1121-22. Because membership in the
Waffen SS by itself no longer was considered
disqualifying (as opposed to performing the duties of
a concentration camp guard) Lindert was issued a visa
and was later admitted to citizenship. Id.

The denaturalization complaint in that case was not
brought based on Lindert's unlawful admission to the
United States. Rather, the complaint mainly alleged
that at the time Lindert applied for citizenship, he
lacked the "good moral character" required for
naturalization; the court found that the Government
did not meet its burden in that regard. Id. at
1123-24. That ruling has been subject to criticism,
see K. Lesli Ligorner, Nazi Concentration Camp
Guard Service Equals "Good Moral Character"?: United
States v. Lindert, 12 Am. U.J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 145
(1999), and is directly contrary to the decision in
United States v. Schiffer, 831 F. Supp. 1166, 1172
(E.D. Pa. 1993), in which the district court
denaturalized a former concentration camp guard
because he lacked the "good moral character" required
for citizenship under the INA, concluding:

That the armed concentration camp guards played a
major role in the persecution of . . . [prisoners]
and in attaining the Nazi goal of annihilation is
beyond dispute.

831 F.Supp. at 1198. Schiffer "was an active
participant in the persecution occurring at these
camps in that he helped prevent inmates from escaping
the grotesquely inhumane conditions there." Id.

That Schiffer is the better decision was made clear
in December 2004, when Congress effectively
overturned Lindert by amending 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)
to bar a finding of good moral character in cases
where an alien assisted in Nazi persecution.
(Attachment 4). Thus, Lindert, even taken on its
own flawed terms, no longer is good law.

b. The ruling in Petkiewytsch v. INS, 945 F.2d 871 (6th Cir.
1991), a deportation (removal) case brought under the Holtzman
Amendment, also does not assist Firishchak. In that case, a panel
of the Sixth Circuit found that Petkiewytsch served involuntarily
as "a reluctant civilian guard" at a labor education camp  "the
least punitive of all types of Nazi camps"  and was "once
himself imprisoned for failing to perform his guard duties
diligently," and therefore was not deportable under the Holtzman
Amendment's "assistance in persecution" clause. Id. at 880-81.
The Seventh Circuit has thoroughly rejected the Petkiewytsch
panel's interpretation of the Holtzman Amendment (as has every
Circuit Court to consider the issue). See Naujalis v. INS,
240 F.3d 642, 646 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing Kalejs v. INS,
10 F.3d 441, 444 (7th Cir. 1993).

The government . . . need not present evidence of
personal involvement in specific atrocities under
the Holtzman Amendment. As the Seventh Circuit has
observed:

Because the statute authorizes deportation of anyone
who `assisted' in persecution, personal involvement
in atrocities need not be proven. [A]n individual who
served as a guard has assisted in persecution for
purposes of the Holtzman Amendment. . . . Nazi
concentration camps were places of persecution;
individuals who, armed with guns, held the prisoners
captive . . . cannot deny that they aided the Nazis
in their program of racial, political and religious
oppression.

195 F.3d at 843 (emphasis added), quoting Kulle,
825 F.2d at 1192. See also Schellong v. INS,
805 F.2d at 661 (individuals who held "prisoners captive
[in concentration camps] . . . cannot deny that they
aided the Nazis in their program of racial, political
and religious oppression"). The Sixth Circuit in
Hammer found it irrelevant that

the government produced no evidence that Hammer actually shot anyone or forced any prisoner into a
gas chamber, no court has required such a
showing. . . . Hammer's interpretation of the
Holtzman Amendment would read the words `assisted, or
otherwise participated' out of the statute. We
conclude that the requirements of the Holtzman
Amendment may be satisfied even in the absence of
eyewitness testimony that the alien personally
engaged in acts of brutality.

Id. at 843 (emphasis added). The Court explained:

We do not believe that Petkiewytsch compels the
conclusion that `assistance' to the Nazi regime can
never be sufficient for deportation under the
Holtzman Amendment, because such an interpretation
would be squarely at odds with the text of the
statute.

Even if Petkiewytsch had not been repudiated by the
Sixth and Seventh Circuits, and every other court
which has considered it, its holding would not be
available to Firishchak. Firishchak never has claimed
that he involuntarily or reluctantly performed the
duties of a Ukrainian Auxiliary policeman, or that
conditions for Jews in the L'viv ghetto, and the city
as a whole, were not punitive. Petkiewytsch is
virtually inapplicable here.

c. The relevance of United States v. Sokolov, 814 F.2d 864
(2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1005 (1988), to the present case is
illusive. Sokolov was a writer for a Russian-language newspaper
published by the German miliary, and wrote virulently
anti-Semitic articles urging the Soviet population to support
anti-Jewish actions taken by the Nazis. 814 F.2d at 866. The
Second Circuit found that Sokolov was ineligible for a visa under
the DPA because he "advocated or assisted in the persecution of
Jews." Id. at 874. The Court considered it irrelevant that
"there was no showing of actual persecution . . . resulting from
these articles." Id. The Court also found that Sokolov belonged
to a hostile movement, and therefore independently was ineligible
for a visa under DPA Section 13. Id. The Court declined to find
that the Government had proven that Sokolov made material
misrepresentations to obtain his visa, because while there was
testimony from the officer-in-charge of the consulate where
Sokolov obtained his visa that vice consuls "very often" asked an
applicant about his or her wartime activities, there was no
evidence that the vice consul who issued Sokolov's visa followed
that practice. Id. at 872. Here, Everett Coe, the vice consul
who processed Firishchak's visa application, testified credibly
and unequivocally that in every case he always asked a visa
applicant about his or her wartime activities and whereabouts 
particularly when the applicant was a man who during World War II
lived in areas under Nazi occupation and was of age for Nazi
service. (See Finding of Fact #54(e)). Firishchak admits that his
membership in the Ukrainian Auxiliary Police, and his activities
while serving in that unit, were material facts capable of
affecting the decision of the vice consul as to whether he was
eligible under the DPA for an immigrant visa. (See Agreed Legal
Finding #13).

38. Because Firishchak was legally ineligible for a visa under
DPA Section 2(b), and/or DPA Section 10, and/or DPA Section 13,
and/or under State Department regulations, his admission into the
United States was unlawful. (See Agreed Legal Finding #2-3,
17). A finding of visa ineligibility on any one of these four
grounds (i.e., Counts I through IV of the Complaint) is
sufficient to establish that Firishchak was not lawfully admitted
to the United States. See Negele, 222 F.3d at 448 (affirming
denaturalization judgment on one of the district court's three
bases for finding that Negele was ineligible for a visa);
Stelmokas, 100 F.3d at 316 (denaturalization judgment must be
upheld "even if we sustain only one of the [six] bases for [the
district court's] conclusion that [Stelmokas] had been ineligible
to enter the United States").

40. INA Section 340(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a), requires that an
individual's citizenship be revoked if it was illegally procured.
Courts are without discretion to refrain from entering a judgment
of denaturalization against a naturalized citizen whose
citizenship was procured illegally. (Agreed Legal Findings #1-3,
17-19). See Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 516.

41. Based upon the foregoing analysis, we find in favor of the
government and find that because Firishchak's citizenship was
illegally procured, Certificate of Naturalization No. 7365065,
issued to him on November 11, 1954, by the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois, must be revoked.
Further, a judgment must be entered forever restraining and
enjoining Firishchak from claiming any rights, privileges,
benefits, or advantages under any document evidencing United
States citizenship. Firishchak also must be directed to surrender
immediately and deliver to the Attorney General (or to his
designee in the Office of Special Investigations) Certificate of
Naturalization No. 7365065, his United States passport, should he
have one, and any other indicia of United States citizenship.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing analysis, the court concludes that the
government has proved its case by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence
with respect to all four counts. Therefore, we grant the relief
requested by the government.

ORDER

IT IS ORDERED that judgment is entered in favor of the
government and against Defendant on Counts I through IV of the
complaint.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Order of November 11, 1954, of
the United States District Court, for the Northern District of
Illinois granting the Defendant United States citizenship is
REVOKED and SET ASIDE.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Certificate of Naturalization No.
7365065 is CANCELLED and that Defendant shall immediately
surrender Certificate of Naturalization No. 7365065 to the
Attorney General of the United States (or to his designee in the
Office of Special Investigations).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant shall immediately
surrender his United States passport, if any, to the Attorney
General of the United States (or to his designee in the Office of
Special Investigations).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant is forever restrained and
enjoined from claiming any rights, privileges, benefits, or
advantages under any document evidencing United States
citizenship. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall
transmit a copy of this Order and Judgment to the Attorney
General of the United States (or to his designee in the Office of
Special Investigations).

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