Political Ferment Under the PNDC

As the country prepared to move toward constitutional rule, the major
concern of Ghanaians was how to ensure a relatively smooth and peaceful
democratic transition. This concern was shared by the opposition, the
activities of which were under constant surveillance by the national
security agencies, and by the ruling PNDC, under pressure to present a
clear, firm timetable and program for a return to constitutional
government.

The transition process had unsavory features that many Ghanaians
believed could lead to an outbreak of violence. Intense mutual suspicion
and antipathy existed between the PNDC leadership and the opposition
going back to the June 4, 1979, uprising and the draconian measures
taken by the AFRC. On one side, Rawlings and the PNDC saw the opposition
leaders not as individuals genuinely interested in real democracy but as
elitist, corrupt, and selfseeking "big men" who had vowed to
fight to the bitter end to reverse the gains of the revolution and to
restore the old system of corruption and exploitation.

On the other, the opposition viewed Rawlings and his Ewe ethnic
henchmen, notably Kojo Tsikata, his chief of security, as a bloodthirsty
group--with the worst human rights record in postcolonial Ghanaian
history--which was determined to retain power by any means. Many
opposition leaders could not forgive Rawlings for the loss of lives,
power, and property, and for the incarcerations inflicted on friends and
relatives, if not on themselves, by the PNDC regime. The once
respectable professional elite of comfortable lawyers, doctors,
university professors, businessmen, and politicians in exile abroad
could not hide their outrage at Ghana's being ruled by, to them, a
young, inexperienced, half-educated military upstart.

It is against this background of intense mutual hostility and
distrust and vicious political rivalry that the evolution of the
democratic transition between 1988 and the inauguration of the Fourth
Republic in January 1993 should be assessed and understood. This long
transition process was characterized by two related struggles: the
struggle for economic recovery from decades of economic decline and for
better living standards for the average Ghanaian; and the struggle for
"true democracy," the meaning of which was hotly debated and
gradually shifted over time, especially after 1988. These national
struggles led to the reconstitution of old political alliances and to
the emergence of new political groupings.

That it took the PNDC more than ten years to lift the ban imposed on
political parties at the inception of PNDC rule not only demonstrated
the PNDC's control over the pace and direction of political change but
also confirmed the shallowness of the political soil in which the party
system was rooted. Party activity had been banned under all the military
governments that had dominated nearly twenty out of the thirty-five
years of Ghana's postcolonial existence. Even during periods of civilian
administration, party organization had been largely urban centered and
rudimentary. It had depended far more on personal alliances and on
ethnic and local ties, not to mention patron-client relationships, than
on nationally institutionalized structures. Party politics had tended to
generate corruption and factionalism. The party system, therefore, never
had any real hold on the consciousness of the average Ghanaian,
especially the rural Ghanaian.

All the same, three major electoral political traditions have emerged
in Ghana since the 1950s, namely, the Nkrumahist tradition, the
Danquah-Busiaist tradition, and the more recent Rawlingsist tradition.
These traditions are identified with their founders-- each a commanding
political figure--and are not necessarily mutually exclusive. In
political terms, the Nkrumahists are generally considered
"leftist" and "progressive," the DanquahBusiaists
more "rightist" and more "conservative," and the
Rawlingsists "populist" and "progressive." In
practice, however, the traditions are less distinguishable by
ideological orientation than by dominant personalities and ethnic
origins.

Against this background, the opposition call for multiparty democracy
had to overcome great odds, not least of which was the intense prejudice
of the chairman of the PNDC against political parties. Rawlings strongly
believed that party politics had hitherto produced two forms of abuse of
power--the "corrupt dictatorship" of the Kofi Abrefa Busia
regime (1969-72) and the "arrogant dictatorship" of the
Nkrumah (1957-66) and Limann (1979- 81) governments. Nonpartisan,
honest, and accountable government would provide an effective antidote
to these abuses, he argued. Indeed, Rawlings appeared to have an almost
fanatical belief that corruption was at the root of nearly all of
Ghana's problems and that, if only it could be stamped out, the country
would return to its former prosperity.

In reaction to Rawlings's position, opposition groups, such as the
London-based Ghana Democratic Movement and the Campaign for Democracy in
Ghana, and individuals within and outside Ghana committed to multiparty
democracy grew increasingly desperate as they focused on the single aim
of overthrowing the PNDC regime. Between 1983 and 1986, at least a dozen
coup plots were uncovered by an efficient and much-feared state security
system. At the same
time, vigorous debates occurred within the PNDC, radical organizations,
and trade unions over the direction of economic policy, the content and
form of true democracy, and the desirability of accepting International
Monetary Fund ( IMF) support for Ghana's Economic Recovery Program
(ERP).

Urban workers and students especially exhibited growing frustration
at their inability to influence policy or to express dissent through
readily available channels. Many urban workers felt the CDRs did not
effectively represent the opinions of workers in the way that the PDCs
and the WDCs had done before their reorganization. In general, public
criticism of government policy was discouraged. In the face of repeated
coup plots and destabilization attempts, which lasted throughout the
PNDC period, the regime was eager to retain tight control of the
political situation, and an independent press had difficulty surviving.
All the same, the PNDC was clearly aware of the urgent need for the
government to provide genuine democratic channels and institutions to
enable workers, students, professional bodies, and other interest groups
to express dissent and to provide constructive criticism of government
policy. There was, therefore, a concerted effort to transform the CDRs
and other revolutionary organs into real instruments of grass-roots
democracy. The implementation of the government decentralization program
and the establishment of district assemblies were likewise aimed at
furthering the process of genuine popular democratization.