For those familiar with OUP's "Very Short Introduction" series, the character of this little book can scarcely surprise; it is impressively even-handed and enlightening--managing to be so whilst tackling the tremendous task of compressing by no means light-hearted material into 125 pages. The author manages to cover the full gamut of modern German philosophy from Kant to Critical Theory, the scope extending beyond the central doctrines of stalwart figures to the objections of lesser lights such as Solomon Maimon and the figures of both schools of Neo-Kantianism, and satellite French thought in Michel Foucault. Further, the author's appraisal of the relation between the so-called "continental" and "analytical" approaches to philosophy is virtuous (see especially p. 84); he provides a fair estimation of some of the issues without weighing too heavily with the German tradition. The only glaring omission in the historical trajectory of the book is Leibniz; however, histories of this kind often begin with Kant and the thematic of the book, being on the close integration of German philosophy into cultural history, makes it understandable that work (such as Leibniz's) with fewer socio-political implications is left to one side.

As a brief aside, what is perhaps also worth mentioning is the failure to link the phrases "space of reasons" (53) and "the view from nowhere" (80) to Wilfrid Sellars and Thomas Nagel, respectively. Given the introductory nature of the book, it seems useful to actually provide the full scholarly apparatus necessary for following up references for oneself. Doing so enables connection with current philosophical work and is simply sound practice (yet cf. p. 125 and the mention of Richard Rorty, John McDowell and Robert Brandom).

The result of the judicious selection of material, and reasonably sound treatment of important and difficult issues (especially the interpretation of Kant and Hegel), is a volume perfect for those keen to plunge into the German tradition for the first time, or, for the familiar who seek a brief overview able to piece together the many parts of the puzzle.

There is little that can be said in criticism of this book, although some minor points are to be given their due. It is worth pointing out that some idiosyncratic (or lightly misleading) translations of key terms have been offered and this seems to have occurred as a result of the author providing original translations of the texts. Whilst such is excellent scholarly practice, there are two difficulties here: (1) Given that the book itself is in English, it is most likely to be read by English speakers, therefore it is useful to provide references to the canonical English translations, and this has not been done (there are, however, some helpful suggestions for further reading); (2) Provision of original translations of the German results in not only alternate furnishings of important terms but of extended excerpts of prose as well, and while this may be a relatively minor matter it seems that reliance on canonical translations is good practice where such versions in English have stood the test of time. Walter Kaufmann's Nietzsche is a paradigm case of this, an example particularly pertinent given the extended citation of a portion of Twilight of the Idols on pp. 78-79.

Another instance is the reference to Nietzsche's "transvaluation of all values" (77 & ff.) and "superman" (80); Kaufmann's canonical renderings are "revaluation" and "overman", respectively. The second case is more relevant, because translating Übermensch as "superman" not only obscures Nietzsche's meaning--where there is a play on words in his Thus Spoke Zarathustra regarding "Über"--yet it also encourages a misleading pop-culture parody of an important philosophical idea. Having said that, such an inappropriate translation is commonplace, so the objection is not about refusal to employ canonical form, but rather the opposite; unfortunately, being introductory, this text ought to resist purchasing simplicity at the cost of philosophical rigor. Further along, and less importantly, we have Heidegger's vorhanden as "objectively present" (104), rather than "present-at-hand". To his credit, the author's translation of Marx's "religion is the opium of the people" (62), commonly rendered as "masses", is probably more faithful to the German des Volkes.

In another case, only half of Hegel's famous remark from the Philosophy of Right is cited: "the real is rational" (45); this, together with the fact that there is an relevant rift between "real", uttered in the common English speaker's mouth, and what an adequate translation of Hegel's German would be (the full remark is often translated: "what is rational is actual and what is actual is rational"), amounts to an admittedly subtle error. Yet whilst a, prima facie, pedantic criticism, the purpose of these Very Short Introductions should be to provide the fairest, clearest interpretation of the material as possible; and unfortunately, lack of sensitivity to the confusions that such subtleties may engender can swim against the tide of the volume's purpose: stimulating interest in the subject, rather than implanting suspicion about the usefulness of studying it further -- a reaction probably more likely to be elicited by the bizarre statement 'the real is rational' than the alternate and full transliteration of the remark (even if only partly because of common prejudices attached to the word 'real'). Again, this is a minor criticism, since for the uninitiated reader the issues pertaining to the points just made might go unnoticed.

One final remark worth making here is that it is incorrect to say that Kant's Transcendental Idealism was a kind of "realism" (10); rather, Kant thought that a consistent and plausible Empirical Realism was committed to Transcendental Idealism. Attention to this point is actually fairly important, given the systematic misinterpretation of "Idealism" as a philosophical term. So while the author does well to separate Kant from Berkeley, there is a problem with the above terminological confusion since it suggests extraction of virtue from Kant depends on his disavowal of an "implausible idealism". Rather, it has been an insistence of contemporary philosophical thought to misconstrue the term "idealism" by linking it with a philosopher entirely unrepresentative of it (Berkeley endorsed a kind of "Immaterialism"; our earlier mentioned Leibniz seems to be the relevant modern origin of the term "Idealism"). Unsurprisingly, this point is central to understanding the shape of the German tradition as a whole--the topic of the book.

Typographical errors: "A Hegelian"--instead of "An"--(50); "does"--rather than "did"--(84); errors of tense on bottom of 105 ("is" employed instead of "was"); errors of tense again on 116 ("dies" in place of "died"; "is" in place of "was"; "falls" in place of "fell"; "write" instead of "wrote"; etc.); "an" rather than "a" (121).

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