Sunday, 1 April 2012

As the 30th anniversary nears it is time to
reassess not just the current tensions between Argentina and the UK over the
islands but also what is being done, given the governments steadfast commitment
to keeping the islands, to ensure their defence and long term future. Of all
the sources for the heightened emphasis on the islands, by parties on both
sides of the Atlantic, the anniversary itself is just one reason; drilling for
oil off the islands is a big bone of contention as is the presence of the heir
to the British throne in the same year. Irrespective of the rights to or
contested claims over the Islands in this anniversary, it is worth taking the
time to consider how much the military-strategic situation has changed.

30 years ago, taken by surprise and woefully unprepared, the
Falklands War defined a prime minister and scarred the memory of the armed
forces and the nation. In the 1982 conflict the British government had been far
from clear with regards to British attitude to the Falklands – far from making
it clear that the Falklands would not be lost at any price, the political and
diplomatic indicators all suggested a lack of commitment to the island. In
addition, the intelligence capacity of Britain in South America, and
particularly with regards to the Military Junta ruling Argentina was woefully
inadequate. Additionally the military technology and capacity for defending the
islands was limited, indeed British forces landed to re-take the island 7 weeks
after the first landing of Argentine forces. What followed was short but bloody
land conflict which eventually led to the recapture of Stanley by the British
on the 14th June.

The military situation of the Falklands today is
incomparable-taking the island by force would be an almost impossible and at
least highly improbable turn of events. Today it is defended through
sophisticated intelligence networks, fighters, an extended airstrip and a range
of military technology that are not just comparable with their Argentian
counterparts but generations ahead. The Director-General of RUSI Michael
Clarke illustrates the transformed military equation stating that ‘asking
whether Britain can still beat Argentina in a Falklands conflict is a bit like
worrying whether defence cuts have made it impossible to beat Germany at El
Alemein.’ Ultimately it is all the rhetoric
and not-so-diplomatic exchanges, including the heated exchanges last summer
when after restating British commitments to the islands so long as they ‘want
to remain sovereign British territory’ his argentine counterpart called him
‘arrogant’ and characterised the British position as ‘stupidity’. The defence
of the islands has gone from being an essentially naval commitment in 1982 to a
predominately RAF operation; the first line of defence of the island is the
fighters, transport aircraft, logistics and air-to-air refuelling of the RAF.
The construction since 1982 of Mount Pleasant, a major military facility and
airbase 30 miles from Stanley, has transformed any attack-defence equation.
Undoubtedly whosoever holds Mount Pleasant controls the island, and if lost to
an invading force, Britain could not with twice the forces currently available
retake the islands (clarify?). The 4 top of the range Typhoon fighters,
infantry company, rapier air defence battery and supporting units which are
typically based in the Falklands have been reinforced by an increased naval
presence in the south Atlantic. With a mere 18 hours for reinforcements the
islands are better protected from a military conflict than ever.

The weakness of this plan is that it depends on the 24 hour
warning and above all on maintaining control of the airport-the islands could
not realistically be ‘recaptured’ if lost. However, such a weakness is not
theoretically a problem, given the 400 miles of open water and air-space
between Argentina and the islands a surprise attack is almost inconceivable.
The defence of the islands militarily is only as strong as the will to defend
them politically and that is something the British Government and all political
parties are committed to.

However, this is a defence strategy predicated on repelling
military assault and yet the defence of the islands by military means is
unlikely to do anything to defend the future of the islands from the much more
successful blend of political and diplomatic pressure that the Argentinians and
their south American allies can bring to bear on the UK and its allies. For
this generation of politicians it is inconceivable and politically suicidal to
consider the eventual ceding of the Falklands, and yet while the wounds are
still too raw in Britain, the greatest threat to our ability to defend the
islands is a test of strength of will. Whether the Falklands will remain British
in 50 or 100 years is anyone’s guess but the likelihood is, that if they are
not it will not have been because of an incapacity to defend the islands
militarily.