Blueprint for after Gadhafi

A relatively successful transition from the Gadhafi regime to a united, stable, more open and democratic Libya would be seen in the region, and more widely, as a credit to the NATO-led intervention. It would enable Libya to resume its oil and gas exports, demonstrate the international community's capacity to manage such transitions and encourage positive outcomes to other Arab Spring protests.

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As the Gadhafi regime ends, the United States and Western allies should keep a few things in mind:

• The opposition led by the National Transitional Council, based in Benghazi, is a hodgepodge of former regime loyalists (civilian and military), liberal democrats, Islamists, expatriates, Berbers, various tribes and jihadists. They are united mainly in wanting Gadhafi gone. Fragmentation has not been a big issue, but the large concentration of regime supporters in Tripoli will present a bigger challenge to inclusivity. Little is known outside Libya about political, tribal, ethnic and regional fault lines, and Gadhafi-era institutions are so confused that it is difficult to see how they can provide a framework to limit the competition to nonviolent politics.

• Many Libyans have suffered under the Gadhafi regime, losing family members, property and freedom. Revenge killings have been reported in Benghazi. Gadhafi loyalists may be assumed to have information or articles of value that need to be extracted quickly. This could lead to detention, imprisonment and torture, with the police and intelligence services likely targets.

• Once stability is established, many of the half-million or so Libyan refugees and internally displaced people will return and seek to recover their property. Recovery of real estate can be particularly contentious and undermine public order, especially if the public lacks confidence in the courts.

• Failure to provide at least the current level of electricity and water promptly would undermine public order and make progress on governance, rule of law and the economy far more difficult.

In post-Gadhafi Libya, the more that can be done by the Libyans themselves, the better. Libyan capacity to organize themselves should not be underestimated, but Tripoli may require international peacekeepers to keep order, at least in the initial phase.

The most likely candidates for leadership roles in any international effort are the United Nations and the European Union, both of which have appropriate experience and good reasons to want a successful transition in Libya. The Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council should be expected to help mobilize needed international resources.

The United States could play a supportive role, ensuring that the effort is based on a solid strategic framework, filling in where donors fall short and bringing attention to top priorities. The existing "contact group" could be a vehicle for the United States to contribute without burdening it unduly.

International assistance should be conditional on inclusivity, which is vital. Many Gadhafi-held towns have formed councils that can be drawn upon to provide appropriate representation. These indigenous Libyan initiatives must not be inadvertently bypassed or destroyed once the Gadhafi regime is gone, as has happened in other post-conflict situations. The local councils could be particularly effective in mounting "neighborhood watch" operations to prevent public disorder, an approach taken during the protests in Egypt.

Preparation of a constitution (Libya currently has none) and elections at various levels will take several years. Mine clearing and retraining the police, army and judicial systems will take the better part of a decade. Accountability for past crimes and justice for those who abused power under the Gadhafi regime may take longer. Once restored to precrisis production, Libya's oil and gas can pay for reconstruction, but immediate financial requirements will be large.

The coherence of international efforts will depend on setting out from the start a clear set of agreed principles toward which the Libyans and international community will work. This can best be done in a new Security Council resolution.

If a U.N.-EU effort fails to ensure stability in Libya, the United States should be prepared to mobilize and support a NATO-led effort, including, if necessary, the deployment for a limited duration of U.S. ground forces. Only NATO has the military capacity required. Unilateral U.S. intervention would entail risks without commensurate gains to vital national security interests.