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Friday, September 21, 2012

The Rogatchover on Eishes Ish

I've heard about this, but never saw it inside. This is where he says that an Eishes Ish is b'etzem assurah to her husband, too, but there's a hetter where he's legitimately fulfilling the purpose of the marriage. The teshuva also has another tremendous chiddush that would render useless all the gramma switches and Shabbos stoves, which, by the way, is what the Feinsteins hold.

It's not OCR'ed, so I can't copy it, and you'll have to read it inside. You wouldn't believe me anyway unless you saw it in situ. It's in the Warsaw edition of his Teshuvos, Teshuva 18.

8 comments:

The comment on gramma is a chidush only in that the Gaon felt he had to prove it. After all, gramma is chayav in dinei shamayim, and is only a distinction in dinei adam, such as mazik and rotzay'ach. In issurim, which is purely dinei shamayim [except for possible malkos], there is obviously an issur.

Maybe the Rogotchover felt that it was possible to have an onesh without an issur, so that he had to prove that there was an issur also.

However, by Shabbos, gramma is a ptur because of meleches machsheves, so gramma switches remain viable. Of course, that gets into the machlokes R' Akiva Eiger and the Nesivos if even misasek generates an issur.

Precisely. And in halacha, gramma is considered a ptur for melachos. Otherwise, it would be forbidden to open a door on Shabbos to a room with a flame in it or wash one's hands outdoors on a concrete area on Sukkot if the water would eventually flow onto grass...

The big difference is that if you're doing it davka with the intention that the melacha occur (albeit through a grama) that MM makes it into chilul shabbos. See Aruch Hashulchan 242:24, and an open Rashi in Bava Kamma 60a, although the Rosh there and the Rach in Shabbos 120b argue and say that by Zoreh this is the classic definition of the melacha, so the concept is limited to Zoreh. Similarly, the Gemara says that nursing a child is technically a melacha, but of course it is muttar. But why is it a melacha? The woman is just putting the child to her breast, and the child nurses! The child is doing the melacha, not the woman. The answer is that because children naturally nurse, if you put a child to a breast with the intention that the child nurse, then the result is called your מלאכת מחשבת. The same ought to be true by putting a leech on someone's skin, and just like Zoreh is a machlokes Rashi and the Rosh/Rach, this too is a machlokes between the Magen Avraham, who holds it's a grama even when you put grain into an active mill and certainly when you put a leech on skin, against the Even Ha'Ozer who holds it's a perfect melacha gmura, at the end of 328. Another example of this is in Tosfos Shabbos 73b. For further discussion, see Totzos Chaim 8:3

1. Is there anyone who attributes P'tor Grama to M"M ? It seems from Shabbos 120b that Grama is the same in all Issurim.

2. True, MM could be a reason for Chiyuv, as we find in Zoreh. As B mentioned, the question as to how broad is this Chiyuv depends on the different Rishonim there, and the MA vs Even ha'ozer etc.

3. However, Rashi should still deal with Shabbos 120b (strangely, the Rogatchover proves from there that intended grama is assur, but the the case of Kibuy there is intended). Three approaches I know of: (i) Zera Emes (brought by the Beis Yitzcak) : Grama is permitted when there is a time delay (ii) Dovev Misharim: Grama is permitted if the result is not certain (but probably this cannot stand alone without the first Chiluk). (iii) Achiezer - grama is permitted unless it's the standard way of doing the Melacha (not clear if he says it in Rashi though, I think not). Probably there are many more.

4. Also, see BB 26a (devei Bar marion), where it is clear that such grama's that are not Girey Diley for Nizkey Schenim, e.g. Koach Sheni, are not included in MM. So the discussion is not just what's grama, but also what are Koach Kocho, Koach Sheni etc.

All this is extensively discussed in Halperin's מעשה וגרמא בהלכה and Lev's בירור מושגים.

5. Anyway, my point is that this fascinating Teshuva of the Rogatchover does not render useless gramma switches any more than Rashi BK 60, which should still be confronted with Shabbos 120b. The grama switches I saw are consistent with most, if not all, approaches to the BK 60 vs Shabbos 120 issue.

The objection to the grama technology I know of is based on the 'black-box' claim that as long as one pushed the button on one side and the machine, designed for this purpose, does the melacha on the other side, we consider the whole thing one process. This might make sense, or not, but it is not the נעשית-מחשבתו argument.

I wonder if the Rogatchover is primarily talking about Gilui Arayos and Shfichas Damim, but not other issurim, as he implies in והרבה יש להאריך בזה גבי גרם ש"ד וג"ע. The logic to distinguish those from other issurim is pretty clear, albeit baalebatish.

In any case, the fact remains that the Rogatchover does directly address grama as it applies to kol hatorah kullah and says that it does not apply where you are creating the situation knowing that you will use a grama to reverse it. I don't understand it- it seems that finding a situation and doing a grama issur is no different than creating a situation where you're going to undo it by means of a grama.

He still has to deal with Shabbos 120b, and with נהמא אבי פוקרא which he mentions, and therefore to qualify his statement a bit, allowing "גרמא שלא בעצם הדבר", whatever that means. Intention and pre-planning alone cannot be enough to exclude the grama heter.