The aggressive actions of the RVNAF and the 9th Division in the Delta
and U.S. forces and our Allies elsewhere in South Vietnam forced the
Communist leaders to abort their Winter-Spring Offensive. Yet, the
dispersed and elusive Viet Cong and NVA units that remained in the
Upper Delta still had a limited capability to attack population centers
and military installations if they were permitted to concentrate forces.
We saw how, after the beating they took in the February 1968 Tet Offensive, the Viet Cong were able to mass and attack Saigon again in
May. Even after the Mini-Tet losses, they attempted another highpoint in
Long An in August and September. Consequently, to prevent yet another
Communist attempt at a highpoint and to permit the GVN pacification
program to progress, it was necessary for the division to continue to aggressively locate and destroy enemy local and main force units.

Unrelenting Pressure

Maj. Gen. Harris W. Hollis followed Maj. Gen. Julian J. Ewell as the
fourth commanding general of the 9th Infantry Division in Vietnam.
Under his outstanding leadership, the 9th Division continued to apply unrelenting pressure, night and day, on the enemy. The large Viet
Cong losses diluted the Communist leadership, replacements were not
as well trained or experienced, the enemy’s resupply of weapons and
ammunition was being interdicted and the people rallying to the GVN
reduced his food supply. As the Viet Cong capabilities weakened, ours
strengthened. In April and May, the 9th Division continued to operate
full-bore and eliminated more than six thousand enemy (see table 14).
The net result was that the Viet Cong Infrastructure eroded and pacification greatly improved. During April and May, seven different main

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