[Justice – Equity doing justice to
soften the common law]D leased a block of
flats in London from C in 1937. When war broke out, many flats were left
empty as people were evacuated to escape bombings. C agreed to reduce the
rent by half if D stayed. D paid the reduced rent until the end of the
war, and C then claimed for the "arrears".

Held: Denning J "discovered" the equitable doctrine of promissory
estoppel, and said that although C were once again entitled to the rent
originally agreed after the war ended, they could not go back on their
promise to accept a reduced rent for the earlier years.

When a party to a contract makes a promise to the other, which he knows
will be acted on, that he will not enforce his strict legal rights; the
equitable principle of promissory estoppel makes that promise binding on
him until such time as he gives reasonable notice of his intention to
resume those rights.

Denning J (obiter
dicta) said that had Central London sued for the arrears for the
years 1940-45, it would have failed. It would have been estopped
from going back on its promise [as set out in the 1940 agreement] to
accept a reduction in rental, even though that promise had not been
supported by any consideration from High Trees because to hold otherwise
would have been unjust

[Justice - rules of natural justice - must
be allowed to present his case]

D
the Chief Constable dismissed C a probationer constable because he had
heard largely unfounded rumours about his private life, but D believed
them. The rumours included a former "hippy" lifestyle, the keeping of 4
dogs and financial difficulties.

Held: The Chief Constable’s decision to force the resignation of
the respondent was vitiated by his erroneous assumption that he had an
absolute discretion and by his total failure to observe the rules of
natural justice in not giving the respondent the opportunity to refute the
allegations on which the chief constable relied.

C wonPer curiam:
Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the
manner in which the decision was made, and therefore the court is not
entitled on an application for judicial review to consider whether the
decision itself was fair and reasonable.

^[Justice
- prosecutor's fallacy]
D was convicted of a series of rapes of young women DNA evidence linked
him to three rapes.

Held: The first stage in DNA profiling is to achieve a match.
The second stage is the statistical evaluation of the match.
A forensic scientist said there was a match and wrongly said that the
possibility of it being somebody else was one in 3 million.
As to the statistical evaluation the chance of anyone other than the
defendant matching the profile was 1 in 3 million.
There are two distinct questions.
1. What is the probability that an individual will match the DNA profile?
2. What is the probability that an individual is innocent, given that he
matches the DNA profile?
The 'prosecutor's fallacy' consists of giving the answer to the first
question as the answer to the second.

[Justice - rules of natural justice - must
be allowed to present his case]

D
the University where C was a student. At the end of term C and
others were seen naked. There was not time before the end of term to
do other than send C a letter, fining him £10 and suspending him.

Held: D had not complied with the rules of natural
justice in that he did not give C a chance of being heard before he
reached his decision to inflict a penalty. But as C had suffered no
injustice and the punishment was correct, there would be no order.

C lost

[Comment] This can be viewed
as a rogue decision as it sought to deal with the decision and not what it
should, and that was to correct the procedure.

During an adjournment of the
inquest concerning the sinking of "The Marchioness", the coroner was
reported as describing some of the relatives of the deceased as "unhinged"
and "mentally unwell."

Held: The use of the
expressions "unhinged" and "mentally unwell" indicated a real possibility
of unconscious bias. The coroner's decision would be quashed and the
matter remitted to a different coroner for a fresh decision on whether to
resume the inquests. R v Gough [1993] followed.

[Justice - rules of natural justice - must be allowed to present his
case - with assistance from "McKenzie
Friend"]

DD had not paid the Poll Tax, a solicitor asked that DD be allowed the
assistances of a McKenzie Friend, which the magistrates refused. The
case was heard and a liability order made against DD.

The Divisional Court dismissed an appeal, DD appealed to the Court of
Appeal.

Held: In civil proceedings to which the public had a right of
access the court, as part of its duty to administer justice fairly and
openly, was under a duty to permit a litigant in person to have all
reasonable facilities for exercising his right to be heard in his own
defence, including quiet and unobtrusive advice from another member of the
public accompanying him as an assistant or adviser.

D won

Per curiam:
The term ‘McKenzie friend’ with its connotations of a certain status and
mystique should not be used to describe the assistance provided by another
member of the public to a litigant in person in the presentation of his
case.

[Justice - supremacy of the Rule of Law]
D was found to be in possession of terrorist bomb equipment, such as used
by the IRA. He fled to Zimbabwe but was illegally kidnapped and deported
to Britain where he stood trial and was sentenced to 30 years'
imprisonment. The judge said he was a highly dangerous man.

Seven years after his trial he appealed on grounds concerning his
deportation from Zimbabwe to England.

Held: Allowing the appeal, that "unsafe" in the Criminal Appeal Act
1995 s. 2 was wide enough to encompass an abuse of process prior to trial.

The methods employed by the authorities to procure M's deportation
represented a blatant failure to adhere to the rule of law and the need to
discourage such behaviour as a matter of public policy was also an
important factor.

[Justice - rules of natural justice - must
be allowed to present his case]

D
the watch committee for the police dismissed C who had been acquitted at
Crown Court on charges relating to conspiracy and corruption. The trial
judge intimated C had not given professional and moral leadership to other
officers.

Held: The decision to dismiss C was void because the watch
committee had not observed the principles of natural justice.

C
had not been charged nor informed of the grounds on which they proposed to
proceed and had not been given a proper opportunity to present his
defence.

CC were given leave to land in the United Kingdom for the purpose of
attending education in scientology. The British Government, having been
convinced that scientology was socially harmful, rejected their
applications for extension of their stay in this country.

Held: The Home Secretary had power under the Aliens Order
1953 to refuse aliens permission to land or to extend their time of
stay and he had acted in the interest of society.

There being no right of entry or extension of stay, questions of
interference with rights and of the applicability of rules of natural
justice did not arise, because his act was administrative.

Obiter, per Lord Denning MR: The Home Secretary should, in exceptional
circumstances, listen to reason as to why he should not apply a certain
policy.

A
and his wife, both Pakistani nationals wanted to adopt a child, aged 5
1/2, born in Pakistan of a close relative.

A
sought advice and was handed a letter issued by the Home Office which
declared the legal position.

A
commenced the necessary procedures along the lines indicated by the letter
for such cases. Owing to an administrative muddle the entry application
for the child was refused.

Held: By sending the circular letter the Secretary of State had
effectively made his own rules. The categories of unreasonableness were
not closed and an unfair action would seldom be a reasonable one. The
Secretary of State had misdirected himself according to his own criteria
and had acted unreasonably.

[Justice - rules of natural justice - D must
be allowed to present his case, this includes time to prepare his case]

D, a Greek see captain was alleged to have allow oil to spill into London
Docks. He was served with a summons at 10.30 am he was due to sail
at 9.00 pm the same day. At 4pm his case was heard, he was convicted and
fined £5,000. D applied to the High Court for a quashing order (certiorari)
to quash the conviction.

Held: Certiorari granted because it was a requirement of the rules
of natural justice that a party to proceedings, and particularly defendant
in a criminal case, should be given a reasonable opportunity to present
his case, and that included a reasonable opportunity to prepare his case
before being called on to present it.

Per curiam:
When the court cannot conduct a trial in accordance with the rules of
natural justice in the time available before defendant’s ship sails, the
court should ensure that some sensible provision is made for security for
the appropriate penalty in the event of a conviction, bearing in mind
that, in the absence of security being offered, the court has power, as a
last resort, to remand defendant in custody.