So much for the ephors of the universal association. We turn now to its
supreme magistrate. The supreme magistrate is he who, having been constituted
according to the laws (leges) of the universal association for its
welfare and utility, administers its rights (jura) and commands
compliance with them. Although the rights of the universal association belong
to the body of the universal association, or to the members of the realm, by
reason of ownership and proprietorship, they also relate to its supreme
magistrate to whom they have been entrusted by the body of the commonwealth by
reason of administration and exercise....

The magistrate is called supreme because he exercises not his own power,
but that of another, namely, the supreme power of the realm of which he is the
minister. Or he is so called in relation to inferior and intermediate
magistrates who are appointed by and depend upon this supreme power, and for
whom he prescribes general laws. Whence he is said to have supereminence over
all other superiors.[1] Moreover, he is called supreme in relation
to individuals. But he is not supreme in relation to his subjects collectively,
nor to law, to which he is himself subject....

Three matters are henceforth to be considered; the constituting, the
administration, and the types of the supreme magistrate.[2] The
constituting of the supreme magistrate is the process by which he assumes the
imperium and administration of the realm conferred by the body of the universal
association, and by which the members of the realm obligate themselves to obey
him. Or it is the process by which the people and the supreme magistrate enter
into a covenant concerning certain laws and conditions that set forth the form
and manner of imperium and subjection, and faithfully extend and accept oaths
from each other to this effect.

There is no doubt that this covenant, or contractual mandate
(contractum mandati) entered into with the supreme magistrate, obligates
both of the contracting parties, so much so that it is permitted to neither
magistrate not subjects to revoke or dishonour it. However, in this reciprocal
contract between the supreme magistrate as the mandatory, or promisor, and the
universal association as the mandator, the obligation of the magistrate comes
first, as is customary in a contractual mandate. By it he binds himself to the
body of the universal association to administer the realm or commonwealth
according to laws prescribed by God, right reason, and the body of the
commonwealth.[3] According to the nature of a mandate, the
obligation of the people, or members of the realm, follows. By it the people in
turn binds itself in obedience and compliance to the supreme magistrate who
administers the commonwealth according to the prescribed laws.

The supreme magistrate exercises as much authority (jus) as has
been explicitly conceded to him by the associated members or bodies of the
realm. And what has not been given to him must be considered to have been left
under the control of the people or universal association. Such is the nature of
the contractual mandate. The less the power of those who rule, the more secure
and stable the imperium remains. For power is secure that places a control upon
force, that rules willing subjects, and that is circumscribed by laws, so that
it does not become haughty and engage in excesses to the ruin of the subjects,
nor degenerate into tyranny.... Absolute power, or what is called the plenitude
of power, cannot be given to the supreme magistrate. For first, he who employs
a plenitude of power breaks through the restraints by which human society has
been contained. Secondly, by absolute power justice is destroyed, and when
justice is taken away realms become bands of robbers, as Augustine
says.[4] Thirdly, such absolute power regards not the utility and
welfare of subjects, but private pleasure. Power, however, is established for
the utility of those who are ruled, not of those who rule, and the utility of
the people or subjects does not in the least require unlimited power. Adequate
provision has been made for them by laws. Finally, absolute power is wicked and
prohibited. For we cannot do what can only be done injuriously. Thus even
almighty God is said not to be able to do what is evil and contrary to his
nature.[5] The precepts of natural law (jus naturale) are to
'live honourably, injure no one, and render to each his due.'[6] Law
is also an obligation by which both prince and subjects are
bound....[7]

The forms and limits of this mandate are the Decalogue, the fundamental
laws of the realm, and those conditions prescribed for the supreme magistrate
in his election and to which he swears allegiance when elected.

Wherefore Fernando Vasquez and Lambert Daneau rightly say, and refute
those who disagree, that the people is prior in time and more worthy by nature
than its magistrate, and has constituted him.[8] And so no realm or
commonwealth has ever been founded or instituted except by contract entered
into one with the other, by covenants agreed upon between subjects and their
future prince, and by an established mutual obligation that both should
religiously observe. When this obligation is dishonoured, the power of the
prince loses its strength and is ended. Whence it follows that the people can
exist without a magistrate, but a magistrate cannot exist without a people, and
that the people creates the magistrate rather than the contrary. Therefore,
kings are constituted by the people for the sake of the people, and are its
ministers to whom the safety of the commonwealth has been entrusted. The
magistrate or prince is mortal and an individual person; the realm or community
(universitas) is immortal. Upon the death of the king, the right of the
realm returns to the estates and orders of the realm.

There are many precepts, examples, and rational evidences of this
constituting a supreme magistrate by such a covenant or contract between the
supreme magistrate and the ephors who represent the entire people of the
associated bodies....[9]

This covenant or constitution by which the supreme magistrate is
constituted by the ephors with the consent of the associated bodies has two
parts. The first is the committing of the realm and its administration to a
governor; the second is the promising of obedience and compliance by the
people.[10] The committing of the realm is the process by which the
ephors, in the name of the people or associated body, confer and entrust the
administration of the realm to the supreme magistrate.[11] This is
accomplished by two actions, namely the election of the supreme magistrate, and
his inauguration or initiation....

The election, which is called arcairesia by
the Greeks, is the process by which the ephors or magnates of the realm choose
and designate, according to the laws and customs of the commonwealth, the
supreme magistrate of the associated bodies or realm, and  invoking the
name of God  offer and entrust to him, under fixed conditions and laws,
the care and administration of the realm in accord with the established order
of piety and justice.... The estates or ephors of the realm united together
exercise this right of electing collectively, not individually, unless certain
ones among them hold this right by the common consent of all.... In this
election conducted in the name of the associated people as the mandator,
certain laws and conditions concerning subjection, and the form and manner of
the future imperium, are proposed to the prospective magistrate as the
mandatory. If he accepts these laws, and swears to the people to observe them,
the election is considered firm and settled. This agreement entered into
between magistrate and people is known as a mutually binding obligation....

The conditions and laws of subjection, or the form, manner, and limits
of the entrusted imperium, are customarily defined in certain articles that are
publicly read and proposed by one of the ephors to the magistrate to be
elected. Then this ephor asks whether the magistrate is willing to abide by
these articles in the administration of the realm, and solemnly binds his
assurances by a written oath....

But if no laws or conditions have been expressed in the election, and
the people has subjected itself to such a magistrate without them, then
whatever things are holy, fair, and just, and are contained in the Decalogue,
are considered to have been expressed, and the people is considered in the
election to have subjected itself to the imperium of the magistrate according
to them.[12] Indeed, there is no instance in which a people has
conferred upon a prince the unrestrained licence to bring about its own
ruin.[13] For a people when questioned could have doubtlessly
responded that it had granted no power to accomplish its own
ruin....[14]

If the people or commonwealth has conferred all its right and imperium
upon the supreme magistrate, as it is said in the Digest,[15] or
yields to him supreme power free from laws and without any reservation,
exception, or condition, then the general wording is to be closely interpreted
according to the subject matter  to the extent that the subject matter
manifestly permits  so that whatever is the nature of imperium or reign,
such is to be the interpretation of this general wording. The nature of
magistracy and imperium is that they regard the utility of subjects, not the
benefit of the one who exercises the imperium, and they administer the
commonwealth according to right reason and justice. For, as Augustine says,
when justice is taken away, what are realms other than large bands of
robbers?[16] And so absolute power and the jurisdiction of sinning
cannot be given to the supreme magistrate. Therefore, even a concession made
with the most general wording is to be interpreted in support of the welfare
and utility of the conceding people. For the mind of the conceding people was
surely that which restricts and limits the general wording. Indeed, the people
in constituting a prince by no means intended to elect a tyrant to the ruin of
itself, or to lose the capacity to protect itself. For a prince can easily
degenerate into a tyrant or do what is contrary to nature, so that the power of
the one may then be greater than the power of the whole. So even in a general
mandate or concession, things are not included that anyone would not have
conceded in a special mandate, especially those things that tend toward the
ruin of the conceder, the destruction of human society, and the violation of
divine law.

I add that no one can renounce the right of defence against violence and
injury. And the power of correcting an errant king, which the ephors have, has
not been transferred to the king and cannot be so transferred. Nor can the
supreme right in a commonwealth be transferred, because it is by nature
incommunicable, and remains with the body of the universal association.
Moreover, there is no power for evil or for inflicting injury. There is only
power for good and for giving support, and thus for the utility and welfare of
subjects. Therefore, the power that the people has, not a power that the people
does not have, is considered to be given by this general
wording....[17]

The laws and conditions by which Charles V swore allegiance when elected
emperor are recorded by Jean Sleiden.[18]

1. 'He (Caesar) shall defend the Christian commonwealth, the pope, and
the Roman church, of which he shall be the protector.

2. He shall administer law (jus) fairly, and seek peace.

3. He shall not only confirm all the laws (leges) of the
imperium, and especially what they call the Golden Bull, but with the counsel
of the electors he shall also amplify these laws when there is need to do
so.

4. He shall convene a senate chosen from Germans in the imperium,
which will oversee the commonwealth.

5. He shall not in the least rescind or diminish the rights,
privileges, and dignities of princes and orders of the imperium.

6. He shall permit the electors, when there is need, to convene among
themselves and to deliberate concerning the commonwealth; and he shall not
place any impediment whatever before them, nor shall he annoy them.

7. He shall abolish leagues of the nobility and of the masses, or
societies entered into against princes, and prohibit them by law so that they
may not arise later.

8. He shall make no league or covenant with foreign nations concerning
things pertaining to the imperium, except with the consent of the seven
electors.

9. He shall neither sell nor pledge the properties of the imperium nor
impair them in any other manner; and as soon as he can he shall recover those
lands that have been occupied by other nations, and those goods that have been
removed from the imperium, but without injury to those who by right or
privilege depend upon them.

10. If he or any member of his family possesses something not
legitimately acquired that belongs to the imperium, he shall restore it when
requested to do so by the seven electors.

11. He shall cultivate peace and friendship with neighbouring and
other kings; and he shall not undertake any war on behalf of the affairs of the
imperium, either within or beyond the boundaries of the imperium, without the
consent of all orders, and especially of the seven electors.

12. He shall bring no foreign soldier into Germany except with their
consent; however, when he or the imperium is assaulted in war, it is permitted
to him to do so, as it would be to any defenders.

13. He shall summon no assembly of the imperium, nor demand any tax or
tribute, except by the consent of the electors.

14. There shall be no assembly beyond the boundaries of the
imperium.

15. He shall not place foreigners in charge of public affairs, but
Germans selected from the nobility; and all documents shall be prepared either
in Latin or the language of the people.

16. He shall summon no estate to a court of law outside the boundaries
of the imperium.

17. Because many things happen at Rome against the agreements entered
into with popes in former times, he shall arrange with the pope that there be
no injury to the imperial privileges and liberty.

18. He shall form a plan with the electors by which the merchant
monopolies so greatly damaging to Germany may be restrained, and he shall carry
the plan through to its conclusion.

19. He shall impose no duty or tax upon imported goods unless the
electors consent, nor shall he lessen by letters of recommendation the tax of
electors who are near the Rhine.

20. If he has reason for action against any order, he shall proceed by
law, and he shall apply no force against those who place themselves under the
judgment of law; [...][19]

21. He shall confer upon no one the goods of the imperium that have
been accidentally vacated, but shall restore them to the public patrimony.

22. If he acquires a foreign province with the support of the orders,
he shall add it to the imperium; and if he recovers some public property by his
own strength and virtue, he shall restore it to the commonwealth.

23. He shall ratify what the electors of the Palatinate and Saxony
have performed in their public capacity during the time of interregnum.

24. He shall not scheme to make the dignity of the imperium hereditary
and proper to his family, but shall permit the free and unimpaired power of
election to the seven electors, according to the law (lex) of Charles IV
and the prescript of pontifical law (jus); and if anything shall have
been done to the contrary, it shall have no effect.

25. As soon as he shall be able, he shall come to Germany for the
inauguration.' ...

In the election of the supreme magistrate, the highest concern must be
had for the fundamental law of the realm (lex fundamentalis regni). For
under this law the universal association has been constituted in the realm.
This law serves as the foundation, so to speak, of the realm and is sustained
by the common consent and approval of the members of the realm. By this law all
the members of the realm have been brought together under one head and united
in one body. It is indeed called the pillar of the realm.

This fundamental law is nothing other than certain covenants
(pacta) by which many cities and provinces come together and agree to
establish and defend one and the same commonwealth by common work, counsel, and
aid. When common consent is withdrawn from these covenants and stipulations,
the commonwealth ceases to exist, unless these laws are rejected and terminated
by common consent, and new ones established, without harm to the commonwealth
or impairment to its rights of sovereignty. Lambert Daneau sets forth an
important difference between these fundamental laws and the rights of
sovereignty.[20] A commonwealth or realm can be constituted and
continue to endure, he says, without these fundamental laws. But without rights
of sovereignty no commonwealth can be established or, if already established,
conserved and passed on to posterity....

The election of the supreme magistrate is in accord with either of two
types. One is entirely free, and the other is restricted to persons of a
certain origin from whom the choice is to be made. For rulers are to be elected
either from all persons or from men of a certain kind, namely, from the
nobility or from a certain family.

The entirely free election is one that rests upon the free choice of the
ephors who do the electing.[21] In this unrestricted election, it is
allowed to change the earlier polity, or to annul it and to establish another
and new one. For the people, or body of the associated communities, retains for
itself the free power to establish and change the commonwealth. The people is
not obligated to anyone concerning the succession and continuation of imperium
and administration, but upon the death of the last supreme magistrate as
administrator of the commonwealth, it regains its authority (jus)
undiminished, which it can transfer to any other person whatever according to
its own preference.[22] However, an atheist, an impious or wicked
man, or one who is a stranger to true and orthodox religion should not be
elected. Nor should a man from an ignoble or servile station in life. Nor
should a bastard, for reasons provided by Peter Gregory.[23] Nor
should one who is given to drunkenness, or inclined to vices and crimes. Nor
should one who is unappreciative toward a good predecessor. But concerning the
election of a woman, see my earlier comments[24] as well as those
later in this chapter.

There should be a regard for piety and virtue in the election to this
indispensable office, however much at other times some men have been elected
because of wealth, as historical examples testify,[25] others
because of force and might, others by plots and strategems, others by promises
made and broken, and still others by lot. Such elections, however, are not
without the consent of the people, and they are rightly permitted when neither
regard for piety and virtue, nor counsel concerning them, can be exercised.

The restricted election is one that has been limited by the agreement of
the people and realm, or universal association, to persons of a certain origin.
By established law, the right to be elected has been obtained for these
persons, and it cannot later be withdrawn or transferred to another against
their will, without injury and violation of trust. And so in this election a
change in the polity once established and accepted by the people is not
permitted to the ephors or to the people. The reason is that the people has
obligated itself to certain persons, to whom it promised to continue the
administration of this polity, and gave its word to them, which it is not later
permitted to break. And this obligation passes over into the fundamental law of
the commonwealth. The right of succession even attaches itself to the
descendants of the first supreme magistrate while still in the loins of their
parents, so far as they are not incapable of ruling because of defect or other
disabilities. Therefore, they ought not to be rejected and excluded from
imperium.... This restricted election, which leads political theorists to refer
to a successive realm, is preferred by many to the free
election.[26] For by this procedure every occasion is cut off for
factions and conspiracies, which the ambition to exercise domination often
excites, and many perils are averted that would ordinarily happen in a time of
interregnum. The occurrence of much confusion and disturbance that accompanies
an interregnum is also avoided, and imperium is continued without interruption.
When, however, the persons become extinct to whom this election is limited,
then this restricted election becomes a free one.

The restricted election, by which they call a realm hereditary or
successive, is either of two kinds. It may be limited to a certain nation and
the nobles thereof, or to the heirs of the deceased supreme magistrate. In an
election restricted to a certain nation, it is permitted to elect a supreme
magistrate only from those having their origin within the realm. So among the
Jews it was not permitted by the fundamental law of the realm to establish a
king unless he came from an Israelite family. For this reason the female
Athaliah, a foreign-born queen, was cast down from the imperium.[27]
So it is established in the fundamental law of the German imperium that no one
who is not from the German nation may be elected emperor and caesar.

An election restricted to the heirs of the deceased magistrate is in
turn limited either to any heirs whatever, even foreign ones, or else to his
family and blood relatives.... An election of the first kind, namely, one that
is limited to testamentary heirs, even foreigners, is servile and
pernicious.... An election of the other kind, namely, one that is restricted to
the family and offspring, is also twofold. It is either limited to persons of
both masculine and feminine sex, or to masculine heirs only. In the former,
living masculine agnates of the deceased exclude females who are even closer in
degree of relationship. But if no such males are living, females related by
blood to the deceased are admitted. Vincent Cabot disagrees.[28] He
considers it to be general in all realms in which females are able to succeed
to the supreme magistracy that women who are descendant from the deceased in a
straight line are to be preferred to men related in a lateral line, which he
confirms by the opinion of Spaniards. But the previous judgment is approved by
Jean Bodin,[29] and more nearly agrees with the Mosaic
law.[30] It also has greater regard for the commonwealth because it
keeps the government thereof in the family of the deceased, and does not
transfer this government to another family.[31] Such is the example
of the Jewish polity, which is the best of all....[32]

In the election restricted to make heirs of the same family and clan,
which excludes females as ineligible, the closest living males of the same
family as that of the deceased are elected to the administration of the realm.
So according to the fundamental law of the Jewish polity, kings from the family
of David were elected continuously until the fall of Jerusalem under
Nebuchadnezzar.... In this election according to hereditary succession carried
out in keeping with the fundamental laws of the realm, the first-born
(primogenitus) from a legimate matrimony is preferred, and the others
are excluded. However, the first-born should make provision for his brothers
that they may be able to maintain themselves decently....

This first-born is to be elected even if he is deaf, mute, of a
different religion, or in any other manner awkward for ruling.... For once such
a law of primogeniture has been established, the people has obligated itself to
the supreme magistrate and to his descendants, and has even elected his
descendants who are still in the loins of the parent. This promise once made
cannot be withdrawn without a violation of trust and justice.... Wherefore, if
a prince of a different religion is called to administer the realm, then the
orders will undertake to instruct him in the true and orthodox religion. If
this cannot be done, they will require him to grant the exercise of pure
religion to the remaining members of the realm, as we see done in the German,
Polish, French, English, and Swiss polities....

Election by the people is not excluded, however, in these hereditary
realms.... The reason is that the person elected receives the realm not from
his dead father, but from the universal association. This practice is
customarily even more useful and favourable to the magistrate than it is
pleasing to the people and worthy of respect to outsiders. For because of it
obedience can much less be denied to him. Whence I consider it best that even
in this case the people and members of the realm shall have reserved to
themselves the election, so that they shall be permitted to choose the one from
the many children of the deceased magistrate, or from his entire family, that
they have judged best fitted for the administration of the realm....

The inauguration of the magistrate, which is also called a coronation,
is the process by which he who has been elected by the magnates, after he has
executed an oath that he will administer the realm according to the prescribed
laws, is publicly confirmed and proclaimed magistrate in the presence of the
people and with the invocation of the name of God. Thus he is inducted and put
into possession of the realm, with the granting and handing over to him of the
insignia and customary Symbols by which the administration of the realm is
represented. And, with the favourable and joyful acclamation of the people, he
is greeted as supreme magistrate. The inauguration, therefore, is a renewal of
the preceding election, and a solemn confirmation for stabilizing the authority
of the magistrate and for making his person known to each and all. The
inauguration, to be sure, does not add anything to the newly elected supreme
magistrate....

These supreme magistrates bear and represent the person of the entire
realm, of all subjects thereof, and of God from whom all power derives. They
bear, as it were, the form of divine might, majesty, glory, imperium, clemency,
providence, care, protection, and government. For this reason they use in their
titles, 'We by the grace of God', and other similar formulas.... Such an
elected and inaugurated supreme magistrate does not need the approval and
confirmation of the pope....[33]

The promise of obedience and compliance that follows the election and
inauguration is the event in which the members of the realm  or the
people through its ephors, and the ephors in its name  promise their
trust, obedience, compliance, and whatever else may be necessary for the
administration of the realm. This promise, which pertains to things that do not
conflict with the law of God and the right of the realm, is made to the
magistrate who receives the entrusted administration of the commonwealth, and
is about to undertake his office and to rule the commonwealth piously and
justly....

The oath that the magistrate first swears to the subjects, and the
subjects then offer to the magistrate, is properly called a homage
(homagium) from omou , which means 'at the
same time' (simul), and agion , which means
'sacred' (sacrum), so that, as it were, what is common, or a common
oath, should be sacred. Those subjects who have upheld this oath are called
faithful.

Because of this trust, compliance, service, aid, and counsel that the
people promises and furnishes to its supreme magistrate, he is said to have
innumerable eyes and ears, large arms, and swift feet, as if the whole people
lent him its eyes, ears, strength, and faculties for the use of the
commonwealth, Whence the magistrate is called mighty, strong, rich, wise, and
aware of many things, and to represent the entire people....

Such services and aid consist above all in works of occupational skill
and in works of allegiance. Works of occupational skill consist in material
services extended and performed for the welfare and utility of the realm and
magistrate according to the function, trade, and office that each is able to
perform.... Works of allegiance consist in obedience and reverence. Obedience
is the compliance that is shown to the just commands of the magistrate, and is
required even if he should be an impious or wicked man. For the life of the
magistrate does not take away his office, and whoever disparages the magistrate
scorns God.... However, obedience is not to be extended to impious commands of
the magistrate. For obedience to God is more important than obedience to
men....[34] Reverence is that honour, veneration, and adoration that
the subject with fear and trembling, owes to the magistrate because of the
lofty position to which the magistrate is elevated by God, and because of the
many and great benefits that God dispenses to us through the hand of the
magistrate. Whence the deeds of the whole realm are attributed wisely and
happily to the virtue and administration of the prince, and we honour no one in
preference to him.... If the people does not manifest obedience, and fails to
fulfill the service and obligations promised in the election and inauguration
 in the constituting  of the supreme magistrate, then he is the
punisher, even by arms and war, of this perfidy and violation of trust, indeed,
of this contumacy, rebellion, and sedition.[35] But if the supreme
magistrate does not keep his pledged word, and fails to administer the realm
according to his promise, then the realm, or the ephors and the leading men in
its name, is the punisher of this violation and broken trust. It is then
conceded to the people to change and annul the earlier form of its polity and
commonwealth, and to constitute a new one.[36] In both cases,
because a proper condition of the agreement and compact is not fulfilled, the
contract is dissolved by right itself. In the first case, the prince will no
longer treat such rebels and perfidious persons as his subjects, and is no
longer required to perform toward them what he has promised. In the other case,
likewise, the people, or members of the realm, will not recognize such a
perfidious, perjurous, and compact-breaking person as their magistrate, but
treat him as a private person and a tyrant to whom it is no longer required to
extend obedience and other duties it promised. The magistrate loses the right
to exact them justly. And it can and ought to remove him from office. Thus
Bartolus says that a legitimate magistrate is a living law, and if he is
condemned by law he is condemned by his own voice.[37] But a tyrant
is anything but a living law....

1. So Joshua was constituted supreme prefect by Pharaoh (Genesis 41: 43
f.), Daniel was called supreme among his colleagues (Daniel 2: 48; 5: 29), and
some priests were said to be supreme (Matthew 27: 1, 6, 12, 20; Acts 7: 1).

2. [Chapters XIX-XX, XXI-XXXVIII, and XXXIX respectively.]

3. 'Let him not turn aside from this precept.' Deuteronomy 17: 20. 'To
be instituted for the utility of the realm.' II Samuel 23: 3.

9. [Here follows an extended discussion of these precepts, examples, and
rational evidences. Although this discussion adds nothing new to what has
already been said, it nevertheless illustrates Althusius' use of theology,
history, and philosophy respectively in support of his political theories.
Precepts are passages from the Bible setting forth God's ordination of
rulership as arising from the people or as being for the good of the people.
(Deuteronomy 16: 18; 17: 14-20; Romans 13: 1, 5.) Examples are alluded to from
the histories of Israel, Sparta, Persia, Rome, Germany, France, England,
Denmark, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, and Belgium. Rational evidences are, for the
most part, the same arguments for rulership that Althusius employed in Chapter
I, which arguments draw heavily upon Cicero and Peter Gregory.]

10. [Chapters XIX and XX respectively.]

11. A community (universitas) can elect and constitute its own
curators and administrators. Digest III, 4, 6, 1; I, 2, 13 and 22; Nicolaus
Losaeus, De jure universitatum, I, 3.

18. De statu religionis et reipublicae, I, ann. 1519. [This
reproduction of material from Sleiden is retained in this translation to
provide an historical illustration of what Althusius has in mind when he writes
about fundamental laws of a realm. This German illustration should be
sufficient for the purpose, however, and it therefore seems unnecessary to
retain the comparable material that follows on the fundamental laws of France,
England, Spain, Sweden, Poland, and Brabant.]

19. [The unacknowledged  and perhaps inadvertent  omission
from this law and condition as found in Sleiden reads as follows: 'and he shall
punish no one without a hearing, but proceed therein by due process of law
(jus)'.]

20. Politices christianae, III, 6.

21. You will find examples of this in Peter Gregory, De
republica, VII, 15; Vincent Cabot, Variarum juris, I, 8 and 10; I
Samuel 8; 16; II Samuel 5: 3 f.; Judges 11: 10 ff.; I Chronicles 29: 22-24. The
kings of Poland and Denmark are so elected, so far as I have been able to
gather from historical writing.

22. Vincent Cabot musters examples of this. Variarum juris, I,
10. But he is in error when he says that if no arrangement has been prescribed,
then the king has free disposition concerning the realm, a statement that he
himself contradicts at another place. I, 14.

31. [Althusius apparently fears that the marriage of a female supreme
magistrate, or of a female in the line of succession to the supreme magistracy,
may introduce a foreign influence and royal house into the realm.]

32. Deuteronomy 17. [See especially verse 15.]

33. Lupold of Bebenburg, De jure regni et imperii, I, 8.

34. Acts 5.

35. Andreas Gail says that it is permitted to a lord to take and hold
the goods of subjects until the subjects are brought back into the obedience
that they owe. Practicarum observationum, I, obs. 17.

36. How this is to be done is discussed in Chapter XXXVIII below, where
I have explained how, when, and by what persons a supreme magistrate who has
become a tyrant against the original covenant and compact may be resisted.