Lt. General John C.
Pemberton described his preparation for the battle at Champion Hill
in the following excerpts from his Official Reports,
The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the
Union and Confederate Armies,
by Robert N. Scott, Major, Third Art., and Bvt. Lieut. Col.. War
Department, August 23, 1880.

"I think it due to myself, in bringing this
portion of my report to a conclusion, to state emphatically that the
advance movement of the army from Edwards Depot on the afternoon of May
15 was made against my judgment, in opposition to my previously
expressed intentions, and to the subversion of my matured plans. In one
contingency alone I had determined to move toward Jackson; the safety of
Vicksburg was of paramount importance; under no circumstances could I
abandon my communications with it."General
John C. Pemberton

The repulse of General Bowen at Port Gibson,
and our consequent withdrawal to the north bank of the Big Black,
rendered it necessary that I should as rapidly as possible concentrate
my whole force for the defense of Vicksburg from an attack in the rear
by Grant's army, which was hourly swelling its numbers. Orders,
therefore, were immediately transmitted to the officers in command at
Grenada, Columbus, and Jackson to move all available forces to Vicksburg
as rapidly as possible.

On the 10th, information was received from a scouting
party that visited Cayuga and Utica, where the enemy had recently been,
that his cavalry force was about 2,000, and that he was supposed to be
moving on Vicksburg. My dispositions were made accordingly, and every
effort was used to collect all the cavalry possible. Such as could be
obtained were placed under the command of Col. Wirt Adams, who was
directed to harass the enemy on his line of march, cut his
communications wherever practicable, patrol the country thoroughly, and
to keep Brigadier-General Gregg (who had just arrived with his brigade
from Port Hudson and was then at Raymond) fully advised of the enemy's
movements.

On the 11th, Brig. Gen. John Adams, commanding at
Jackson, was directed to hurry forward, as fast as they could arrive,
the troops from South Carolina, to re-enforce Brigadier-General Gregg at
Raymond. At this time information was received from Brigadier-General
Tilghman that the enemy was in force opposite Baldwin's Ferry, and Gregg
was notified accordingly, and informed that the enemy's movements were
apparently toward the Big Black Bridge, and not, as had been supposed,
against Jackson.

On the 12th, the following was addressed to
Major-General Stevenson:

From information received, it is evident the enemy
is advancing in force on Edwards Depot and Big Black Bridge; hot
skirmishing has been going on all the morning, and the enemy are at
Fourteen-Mile Creek. You must move up with your whole division to the
support of Loring and Bowen at the bridge, leaving Baldwin's and
Moore's brigades to protect your right.

In consequence of this information, Brigadier-General
Gregg was ordered not to attack the enemy until he was engaged at
Edwards or the bridge, but to be ready to fall on his rear or flank at
any moment, and to be particularly cautious not to allow himself to be
flanked or taken in the rear. Thus it will be seen that every measure
had been taken to protect Edwards Depot and Big Black Bridge, and, by
offering or accepting battle, to endeavor to preserve my communications
with the east.

At this juncture, however, the battle of Raymond was
fought by a large body of the enemy's forces and one brigade of our
troops under the command of Brigadier-General Gregg.

I have received no official report of that affair, and
hence cannot say how it was fought or by whom the engagement was brought
on. Unofficial information represents Brigadier-General Gregg and his
small command to have behaved with great gallantry and steadiness, but
after an obstinate conflict of several hours they were finally
overwhelmed by superior numbers and compelled to retire. The command was
withdrawn in good order, and retired to Jackson.

On the 14th, a large body of the enemy made their
appearance in front of Jackson, the capital of the State. After some
fighting, our troops were withdrawn, and the enemy took possession of
the place; but as General Johnston was commanding there in person, his
official report, which has doubtless gone forward, will furnish all the
information required.

On the 12th, the following telegram was sent to General
J. E. Johnston:

The enemy is apparently
moving his heavy force toward Edwards Depot, on Southern Railroad;
with my limited force I will do all I can to meet him. That will be
the battle-field if I can carry forward sufficient force, leaving
troops enough to secure the safety of this place (Vicksburg).
Re-enforcements are arriving very slowly, only 1,5,00 having arrived
as yet. I urgently ask that more be sent also that 3,000 cavalry be at
once sent to operate on this line. I urge this as a positive
necessity. The enemy largely outnumber me, and I am obliged to hold
back a large force at the ferries on Big Black lest he cross and take
this place. I am also compelled to keep considerable force on either
flank of Vicksburg out of supporting distance.

The same dispatch was also sent to His Excellency
President Davis on the same date.

The divisions of Major-Generals Loring and Stevenson
moved from the line they had occupied between Warrenton and Big Black
Bridge to Edwards Depot, General Stevenson being directed to keep well
closed upon the rear of General Loring's column.

On the evening of the 12th, I moved my headquarters to
Bovina, to be nearer the scene of active Operations.

The command arrived at Edwards Depot on the 13th, and
was placed in position, covering all approaches from the south and east,
in the following order, viz: Bowen on the right, Loring in the center,
and Stevenson on the left. This position was occupied from the night of
the 13th until the morning of the 15th.

On the 13th, the following dispatch was sent to General
Johnston:

General Forney reports
from Vicksburg this morning four transports loaded with troops arrived
at Young's Point this morning. Five regiments and a battery passed
down by Brown & Johnston's. Wagon trains continue to pass back and
forth. My re-enforcements will be very small and arrive very slowly.
If possible, Port Hudson should also be re-enforced. I have been
forced to draw largely from there. I have no major-general to command
brigades arriving in Jackson. I am in position with eight brigades
near Edwards Depot.

On the morning of the 14th, while on my way to Edwards
Depot from Bovina, I received the following dispatch, dated May 13, from
General Johnston, then at Jackson:

I have lately arrived, and learn that Major-General
Sherman is between us, with four divisions, at Clinton. It is important
to re-establish communications, that you maybe re-enforced. If
practicable, come up in his rear at once. To beat such a detachment
would be of immense value. The troops here could co-operate. All the
strength you can quickly assemble should be brought. Time is
all-important.

I immediately replied as follows:

BOVlNA, May 14, 1863.
I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your communication. I move
at once with whole available force (about 16,000) from Edwards Depot,
leaving Vaughn's brigade (about 1,500) at Big Black Bridge. Tilghman's
brigade (1,500), now at Baldwin's Ferry, I have ordered to bring up
the rear of my column; he will be, however, from 15 to 20 miles behind
it. Baldwin's Ferry will be left necessarily unprotected. To hold
Vicksburg are Smith's and Forney's divisions, extending from Snyder's
Mill to Warrenton, numbering 7,500 effective men. The men have been
marching several days, are much fatigued, and I fear will straggle
very much. In directing this move, I do not think you fully comprehend
the position that Vicksburg will be left in, but I comply at once with
your order.

The "detachment" General Johnston speaks of in
his communication consisted of four divisions of the enemy, constituting
an entire army corps, numerically greater than my whole available force
in the field; besides, the enemy had at least an equal force to the
south, on my right flank, which would be nearer to Vicksburg than myself
in case I should make the movement proposed. I had, moreover, positive
information that he was daily increasing his strength. I also learned on
reaching Edwards Depot that ore division of the enemy (A. J. Smith's)
was at or near Dillon's. This confirmed me in the opinion, previously
expressed, that the movement indicated by General Johnston was extremely
hazardous. I accordingly called a council of war of all the general
officers present, and placing the subject before them (including General
Johnston's dispatch) in every view in which it appeared to me, asked
their opinions respectively. A majority of the officers present
expressed themselves favorable to the movement indicated by General
Johnston. The others, including Major-Generals Loring and Stevenson,
preferred a movement by which the army might attempt to cut off the
enemy's supplies from the Mississippi River. My own views were strongly
expressed as unfavorable to any advance which would separate me farther
from Vicksburg, which was my base. I did not, however, see fit to put my
own judgment and opinions so far in opposition as to prevent a movement
altogether, but believing the only possibility of success to be in the
plan of cutting the enemy's communications, it was adopted, and the
following dispatch was addressed to General Johnston:

EDWARDS DEPOT, May 14,
1863.
I shall move as early to-morrow morning as practicable with a column
of 17,000 men to Dillon's, situated on the main road leading from
Raymond to Port Gibson, 7 ½ miles below Raymond and 9 ½ miles from
Edwards Depot. The object is to cut the enemy's communications and to
force him to attack me, as I do not consider my force sufficient to
justify an attack on the enemy in position or to attempt to cut my way
to Jackson. At this point your nearest communication would be through
Raymond. I wish very much I could join my re-enforcements. Whether it
will be most practicable for the re-enforcements to come by Raymond
(leaving it to the right if the march cannot be made through Raymond)
or to move them west along the line of railroad (leaving it to the
left and south of the line of march) to Bolton Depot, or some other
point west of it, you must determine. In either movement I should be
advised as to the time and road, so that co-operation may be had to
enable the re-enforcements to come through. I send you a map of the
country, which will furnish you with a correct view of the roads and
localities.

Pursuant to the plan laid down in this dispatch, the
army was put in motion on the 15th, about 1 p.m., in accordance with the
following order, viz:

This army will move
to-morrow morning (15th instant) in the direction of Raymond, on the
military road, in the following order:

1. Col. Wirt Adams'
cavalry will form the advance guard, keeping at least 1 mile in
advance of the head of the column, throwing out one company in front
of his column and a small detachment in its advance, besides the
flankers upon his column, when practicable.
2. Loring's division will constitute the right and the advance in the
line of march. He will throw a regiment of infantry, with a section of
artillery, at least 200 yards in his front, with a company of infantry
at least 75 yards in its advance, all with the necessary detachments
and flankers.
3. Bowen's division will constitute the center, and will follow the
leading division.
4. Stevenson's division will constitute the left,
bringing up the rear of the column.
5. The artillery of each brigade
will march in the rear of their brigade.
6. The ambulances of each brigade will follow in the rear of their
brigade.
7. The ordnance wagons of each division will follow in the rear of
their division.
8. The wagon train will follow in rear of the entire
column.
9. Should Tilghman's brigade arrive after the departure of the column,
it will constitute, with a field battery, the rear guard, following
immediately in rear of the wagon train.
10. A company of Wirt Adams' cavalry will close the order of march.
11. The wagon train will follow in the order of division; that is to
say, the wagon train of Loring's division on the right of the train;
that of Bowen's division in the center, &c. Quartermasters,
commissaries, and ordnance officers will remain with their trains
unless otherwise ordered. Straggling, always disgraceful in an army,
is particularly forbidden. 8tringent orders will be issued by the
division commanders to prevent this evil. The rear guard is especially
instructed to permit no one to fall to the rear under any
circumstances.

A continuous and heavy rain had made Baker's Creek
impassable by the ordinary ford on the main Raymond road, where the
country bridge had been washed away by previous freshets. In consequence
of this, the march was delayed for several hours, but the water not
falling sufficiently to make the creek fordable, the column was directed
by the Clinton road, on which was a good bridge, and, after passing the
creek upward of 1 ½ miles, was filed to the right along a neighborhood
road, so as to strike the Raymond road about 3 ½ miles from Edwards
Depot. The march was continued until the head of the column had passed
Mrs. Elliston's house, where it was halted, and the troops bivouacked in
order of march. I made my headquarters at Mrs. Elliston's, where I
found Major-General Loring had also established his.

The divisions of Generals Stevenson and Bowen having
been on the march until past midnight, and the men considerably
fatigue--desiring also to receive reports of reconnaissances made in my
front before proceeding farther--I did not issue orders to continue the
movement at an early hour the following morning.

Immediately on my arrival at Mrs. Elliston's on the
night of the 15th, I sent for Col. Wirt Adams, commanding the cavalry,
and gave him the necessary instructions for picketing all approaches in
my front, and directed him to send out scouting parties to discover the
enemy's whereabouts. I also made strenuous efforts to effect the same
object through citizens, but without success. Nothing unusual occurred
during the night.

On the morning of the 16th, at about 6.30 o'clock, Col.
Wirt Adams reported to me that his pickets were skirmishing with the
enemy on the Raymond road some distance in our front. While in
conversation with him, a courier arrived and handed me the following
dispatch from General Johnston:

CANTON ROAD, TEN MILES
FROM JACKSON,
May 15, 1863-8.30 a.m.

Our being compelled to
leave Jackson makes your plan impracticable. The only mode by which we
can unite is by your moving directly to Clinton, informing me, that we
may move to that point with about 6,000 troops. I have no means of
estimating enemy's force at Jackson. The principal officers here
differ very widely, and I fear he will fortify if time is left him.
Let me hear from you immediately. General Maxey was ordered back to
Brookhaven. You probably have time to make him join you. Do so before
he has time to move away.

I immediately directed a countermarch, or rather a
retrograde movement, by reversing the column as it then stood, for the
purpose of returning toward Edwards Depot to take the Brownsville road,
and thence to proceed toward Clinton by a route north of the railroad. A
written reply to General Johnston's instructions, in which I notified
him that the countermarch had been ordered and of the route I should
take, was dispatched in haste, and without allowing myself sufficient
time to take a copy.

Just as this reverse movement commenced, the enemy drove
in Colonel Adams' cavalry pickets, and opened with artillery at long
range on the head of my column on the Raymond road. Not knowing whether
this was an attack in force or simply an armed reconnaissance, and being
anxious to obey the instructions of General Johnston, I directed the
continuance of the movement, giving the necessary instructions for
securing the safety of the wagon train. The demonstrations of the enemy
soon becoming more serious, orders were sent to division commanders to
form in line of battle on the cross-road from the Clinton to the Raymond
road, Loring on the right, Bowen in the center, and Stevenson on the
left. Major-General Stevenson was instructed to make the necessary
dispositions for the protection of the trains then on the Clinton road
and crossing Baker's Creek. The line of battle was quickly formed,
without any interference on the part of the enemy. The position selected
was naturally a strong one, and all approaches from the front well
covered. A short time after the formation of the line, Loring's division
was thrown back so as to cover the military road, it being reported that
the enemy had appeared in that direction. The enemy made his first
demonstration on our right, but after a lively artillery duel for an
hour or more, this attack was relinquished, and a large force was thrown
against our left, where skirmishing became heavy about 10 o'clock, and
the battle began in earnest along Stevenson's entire front about noon.

Just at this time a column of the enemy were seen moving
in front of our center toward the right. [John C.] Landis' battery, of
Bowen's division, opened upon and soon broke this column, and compelled
it to retire. I then directed Major-General Loring to move forward and
crush the enemy in his front, and directed General Bowen to co-operate
with him in the movement. Immediately on the receipt of my message,
General Bowen rode up and announced his readiness to execute his part of
the movement as soon as Major-General Loring should advance. No movement
was made by Major-General Loring, he informing me that the enemy was too
strongly posted to be attacked, but that he would seize the first
opportunity to assault, if one should offer. The enemy still making
strenuous efforts to turn Major-General Stevenson's left flank,
compelled him to make a similar movement toward the left, thus extending
his own line and making a gap between his and Bowen's divisions. General
Bowen was ordered to keep this interval closed, and the same
instructions were sent to General Loring in reference to the interval
between his and General Bowen's division.

General Stevenson having informed me that unless
re-enforced he would be unable to resist the heavy and repeated attacks
along his whole line, Bowen was ordered to send one brigade to his
assistance, which was promptly brought forward under Col. F. M.
Cockrell, and in a very short time his remaining brigade, under the
command of Brig. Gen. Martin E. Green, was put in, and the two together,
under their gallant leaders, charged the enemy, and for the time turned
the tide of battle in our favor, again displaying the heroic courage
which this veteran division has made conspicuous on so many stricken
fields.

The enemy still continued to move troops from his left
to his right, thus increasing his vastly superior forces against
Stevenson's and Bowen's divisions. Feeling assured that there was no
important force in his front, I dispatched several staff officers in
rapid succession to Major-General Loring, ordering him to move all but
one brigade (Tilghman's, which was directed to hold the Raymond road and
cover the bridge and ford at Baker's Creek) to the left as rapidly as
possible. To the first of these messages, sent about 2 p.m., answer was
returned by Major-General Loring that the enemy was in strong force in
his front, and endeavoring to flank him. Hearing no firing on the right,
I repeated my orders to Major-General Loring, explained to him the
condition of affairs on the left, and directed him to put his two left
brigades into the fight as soon as possible. In the transmission of
these various messages to and fro, over a distance of more than a mile,
much valuable time was necessarily consumed, which the enemy did not
fail to take advantage of.

About 4 p.m. a part of Stevenson's division broke badly
and fell back in great disorder, but were partially rallied by the
strenuous exertions of myself and staff, and put back under their own
officers into the fight, but observing that large numbers of men were
abandoning the field on Stevenson's left, deserting their comrades, who
in this moment of greatest trial stood manfully at their posts, I rode
up to General Stevenson, and informing him that I had repeatedly ordered
two brigades of General Loring's division to his assistance, and that I
was momentarily expecting them, asked him whether he could hold his
position; he replied that he could not; that he was fighting from 60,000
to 80,000 men. I then told him I would endeavor myself to find General
Loring and hasten him up, and started immediately with that object. I
presently met Brigadier-General Buford's brigade, of Loring's division,
on the march and in rear of the right of Bowen's division.

Colonel Cockrell, commanding the First Missouri Brigade,
having in person some time previously urgently asked for
re-enforcements, which (none of Loring's troops having came up) I was
then unable to give him, one regiment of Buford's brigade was detached
at once and directed to his support; the remainder of Buford's brigade
was moved as rapidly as possible to the assistance of General Stevenson.

Finding that the enemy's vastly superior numbers were
pressing all my forces engaged steadily back into old fields, where all
advantages of position would be in his favor, I felt it to be too late
to save the day, even should Brigadier-General Featherston's brigade, of
General Loring's division, come up immediately. I could, however, learn
nothing of General Loring's whereabouts; several of my staff were in
search of him, but it was not until after General Bowen had personally
informed me that he could not hold his position longer, and not until
after I had ordered the retreat, that General Loring, with Featherston's
brigade, moving, as I subsequently learned, by a country road which was
considerably longer than the direct route, reached the position on the
left known as Champion's Hill, where he was forming line of battle when
he received my order to cover the retreat.

Had the movement in support of the left been promptly
made when first ordered, it is not improbable that I might have
maintained my position, and it is possible the enemy might have been
driven back, though his vastly superior and constantly increasing
numbers would have rendered it necessary to withdraw during the night to
save my communications with Vicksburg.

Early in the day Major [Samuel H.] Lockett, chief
engineer, had been instructed to throw a bridge across Baker's Creek, on
the Raymond road. The stream had also fallen sufficiently to render the
ford practicable. The retreat was ordered to be conducted by that route,
and a staff officer immediately dispatched to Brigadier-General
Tilghman, who was directed to hold the Raymond road at all hazards; it
was in the execution of this important trust, which could not have been
confided to a fitter man, that the lamented general bravely lost his
life. He was struck by a fragment of shell and died almost instantly.

Although, as before stated, a large number of men had
shamefully abandoned their commands, and were making their way to the
rear, the main body of the troops retired in good order.

On reaching the ford and bridge at Baker's Creek, I
directed Brigadier-General Bowen to take position with his division on
the west bank, and to hold the crossing until Loring's division, which
was directed to bring up the rear, had effected the passage. I then
proceeded at once to the intrenched line covering the wagon and railroad
bridges over the Big Black, to make the necessary arrangements for
holding that point during the passage of the river.

In his official report, Major-General Stevenson says:

On my arrival, about
sunset, at the ford on Baker's Creek, I found that the enemy had
crossed the bridge above, and were advancing artillery in the
direction of the road on which we were moving. One battery had already
taken position and was playing on the road, but at right angles, and
with too long a range to prevent the passage of troops. Here I found
on the west side the brigades of General Green and Colonel Cockrell,
of Bowen's division, who had there halted and taken up position to
hold the point until Loring's division could cross. I found Colonel
[Thomas M.] Scott, of the Twelfth Louisiana Regiment, of Loring's
division, halted about half a mile from the ford, on the east side,
and directed him to cross. I there addressed a note to General Loring,
informing him of what I had done, telling him of the change I had
caused Colonel Scott to make in his position, stating that with the
troops then there, and others that I could collect, I would hold the
ford and road until his division could cross, and urging him to hasten
the movement. To this note I received no answer, but in a short time
Colonel Scott moved off his regiment quickly in the direction of his
original position, in obedience, I was informed, to orders from
General Loring. Inferring from this that General Loring did not intend
to cross at that ford, he having had ample time to commence the
movement, I suggested to General Green and Colonel Cockrell to move
forward to the railroad bridge. My command reached that point at about
1 o'clock that night and bivouacked near Bovina.

The entire train of the army, under the judicious
management of Col. A. W. Reynolds, commanding Tennessee Brigade, of
Stevenson's division, was crossed without loss, though the movements of
the enemy compelled Colonel Reynolds' brigade to cross the Big Black
above the railroad bridge.

On reaching the line of intrenchments occupied by
Brigadier-General Vaughn's brigade of East Tennesseeans (Smith's
division), he was instructed by myself in person to man the trenches
from the railroad to the left, his artillery to remain as then posted,
and all wagons to cross the river at once Special instructions were left
with Lieut. J. H. Morrison, aide-de-camp, to be delivered to Generals
Loring, Stevenson, and Bowen, as they should arrive, and were delivered
to all except General Loring, as follows:

General Stevenson's
division to cross the river and proceed to Mount Alban.

General Loring's to cross and occupy the west bank.
Brigadier-General Bowen's division, as it should arrive, was directed to
occupy the trenches to the right and left of Vaughn's, and his artillery
to be parked, that it might be available for any point of the lines most
threatened.

General Stevenson's division, arriving very late in the
night, did not move beyond Bovina, and I awaited in vain intelligence of
the approach of General Loring. It was necessary to hold the position to
enable him to cross the river, should the enemy, which was probable,
follow him closely up.

For this purpose alone I continued the troops in
position until it was too late to withdraw them under cover of night. I
then determined not to abandon so strong a front while there was yet a
hope of his arrival.

I have not up to this time received General Loring's
report of the share taken by his division in the battle of Baker's
Creek, nor have I yet been informed of the reason why he failed to
rejoin the army under my command.