Seventh revision, April 2013, with thanks to the many individuals who have provided more
information

The British SA80 series weapons have been
severely criticised for many years as being ill-conceived, seriously
unreliable and generally hopeless as military equipment. Is this fair,
or are the weapons better than their reputation suggests? And what is
going to happen when it is due for replacement?

I should start by saying that I have no military
experience and have never even fired an SA80. However, I have been
gathering information about them for years (much of it contradictory)
and this article is an attempt to provide a balanced judgment of this
weapon.

Background

First of all, what is the SA80 and how does it
relate to the L85 and L86? SA80 is the name of a family of rifles and
light machine guns produced for the British armed forces. The two
combat weapons of this family are the L85 IW (Individual Weapon) rifle
and the L86 LSW (Light Support Weapon) light machine gun, which is very
similar to the rifle but has a longer, heavier barrel and a built-in
folding bipod. It should be noted that the terms L85 and L86 should not
be used on their own, as they are always followed by an "Ax"
designation. The first models of both were the L85A1 and L86A1; they
have since been succeeded by the A2 versions of both. There is also a
manually-operated training weapon in the SA80 family (the L98A1), and a
short-barrelled carbine was initially offered but few were made. More
recently, a very short-barrelled L22A2 carbine has been adopted for
service for tank and helicopter crews.

The SA80 was designed in response to a NATO
competition, held in 1977-79, to establish a rifle and MG cartridge to
replace the 7.62x51 NATO, together with the associated weapons. The
British developed a 4.85x49 cartridge and the SA80 (then known as the
Enfield Individual Weapon) to fire it. However, the result of the
cartridge competition was really a foregone conclusion as the USA had
already adopted the .223 cartridge and M16 rifle. This was duly adopted
as the 5.56x45 NATO round, albeit in a different loading with a heavier
bullet at a lower velocity. The winning loading was the Belgian SS109
semi-armour-piercing; the US version of this is the M855, whereas the
original US round is designated the M193. The heavier and longer bullet
required a barrel change for the US weapons, as the rifling twist had
to be increased to stabilise the bullet (apparently a specific problem
with the tracer round).

The British had of course realised the almost
certain outcome, so their 4.85x49 round was based on the 5.56x45 case,
and converting the SA80 to fire the new NATO cartridge was simply a
matter of changing the barrel, although other modifications were made
as a result of the trials. The US Army adopted the M16A2 and the
British the L85A1, together with the L86A1, in 1985; other nations
produced a variety of weapons designed around the new standard
cartridge.

Design

The SA80 was unusual for the time in being a
bullpup design, i.e. the action and magazine are behind the pistol
grip. This had been favoured by the British since the late 1940s, and
featured in the 7mm EM-2 rifle (which is probably the most famous
military rifle never to see service). This preference initially
resulted from a desire to select a cartridge which combined a good
long-range performance (so it could replace the .303" in rifles and
MGs) with a light enough recoil for fully-automatic fire from the
shoulder (so it could replace the 9mm SMGs). To achieve the latter aim,
the rifle had also to be very compact, which led to the bullpup layout.

In the years since the EM-2 design, the
importance of compactness had become all the greater since infantry
were increasingly being carried in armoured vehicles and even
helicopters, in which space was short. So the bullpup layout was
retained in the SA80.

To give an idea of the benefits of the bullpup,
the L85A1 with a 20.4" (518mm) barrel is 30.9" (785mm) long, whereas
the M16A2 with its 20" (508mm) barrel is 39.6" (1,006mm) overall. The
short-barrelled M4 carbine version of the M16 is 33" (840mm) overall,
or 760mm (29.9") with the telescoping butt collapsed, but to achieve
this means shortening the barrel to 14.5" (368mm). In other words, the
M16 can only match the L85A1 in length by losing six inches (150mm)
from its barrel and having its stock collapsed. To give another
comparison, the L86A1 LSW has a 25.4" (646mm) barrel but is
considerably shorter than the M16A2 at only 35.4" (900mm) overall.

The SA80 is of course not the only bullpup 5.56mm
rifle around. The futuristic Steyr AUG and the French FAMAS both use
this layout, as do other recent military rifle designs in this calibre,
perhaps most notably the FN F2000 and the IWI Tavor which has been
adopted by both the Israeli Army and Indian special forces. Apart from
the American weapons (which all consist of variations on the M16 theme)
the only significant new Western non-bullpups in recent years are the
Heckler & Koch (HK) G36 and 416, and the FN SCAR.

The main criticisms of bullpups are that they
tend not to feel as well-balanced in the hands as conventional rifles
(although to some extent that is a matter of what you are used to), and
they are not suited to left-handed shooting as the spent cases are
normally ejected to the side, which in a bullpup means into the
left-handed firer's face. Some, like the AUG, can be easily converted
for left-handers, but that isn't much use if the user merely wishes to
switch to left-hand firing for a few seconds when firing to the right
around the corner of a building, for instance. The only bullpup to
solve this completely (apart from the caseless HK G11) is the new FN
F2000, which ejects the cases forwards and downwards so is suitable for
either hand without modification. The SA80 was reportedly offered with
a left-hand conversion kit, but in British Army service is strictly
right-handed only.

The mechanicals of the SA80 were derived from the
AR18, an American design which was intended as a lower-cost rival to
the M16 but never adopted by a major army. In theory, putting the AR18
mechanism into a bullpup layout was a simple and risk-free task.
However, that proved not to be the case.

Performance

The SA80 was the last weapon developed at the Royal Small
Arms Factory at Enfield. It experienced considerable development problems
despite a trials programme which lasted years; some tests were repeated over and
over. One problem was the constant change in project staff, at least three
changes occurred during the development period. This seemed to result in some of
the repetition of the testing. Ejection was always a problem; the angle of the
ejected case varied considerably as the gun heated up and the rate of fire
changed, which is why the ejection opening is so big (one reason why it had so
many problems with sand). The conversion from 4.85 to 5.56 also caused a
complication, the rate of fire dropped dramatically as the gas port was left in
the same position but the pressure/time curve of the rounds were different, so
the gas ports had to be enlarged considerably. This was less marked on the LSW
due to the longer barrel. The situation was made worse by the insistence of
Radway Green producing 5.56 using chopped tube rather than ball powder. The
chopped tube gave a lower port pressure and rate-of-fire. The 'girder' under the
LSW barrel came about as the Army wished to fire two round bursts from it. With
the original bipod which was attached to the gas block one round went high right
and the second low left. Firing a succession of double taps gave two distinct
groups and the additional ironware and the muzzle mounted bipod was the final
solution..

Although adopted for service, problems soon began to
surface: To quote Ian Hogg (Military Small Arms of the 20th Century) writing in
1990:

"…the first five years of this rifle's
service have been disastrous. A number of manufacturing defects showed
up in service conditions, and it was not until the closure of the RSAF
at Enfield and the setting up of an entirely new production line, with
new computer-controlled machine tools, at the new RSAF Nottingham, that
the quality of the production weapons began to improve. It will take
some time for the poor reputation gained by the initial issue weapons
to be overcome; the only consolation is that the same sort of thing has
happened to other military rifles in the past, and they have managed to
live down their early reputation and prove their innate reliability. It
is to be hoped that the L85A1 will do so as well."

It was not to be. Only a year later, the SA80
went to war in the Gulf, and the results were appalling. Of course,
dirt is the enemy of any automatic weapon, and there is plenty of it in
terms of sand and dust in the Gulf. The L85A1 proved seriously
unreliable in semi-auto mode (a bit better in full-auto) whereas the
L86 ironically performed the other way round. For the first time, the
SA80's problems went beyond the military and into the public arena.
Every man in the street learned that the British Army had a dangerously
inadequate weapon; the popular press were demanding change.

Apart from the reliability issue, other complaints raised about the SA80 were:

- the plastic furniture was of poor quality and often fell apart. The gun was generally not robust and was too easily damaged;

- the magazine release catch was easily knocked accidentally, dropping the magazine on the ground (a protective housing was
subsequently glued around it);

- the catch on the housing over the gas mechanism was far too weak, constantly popping open, and was routinely taped down;

- the magazine springs were very weak and could
only be loaded with 26-28 rounds. The magazines also had to be kept
very clean and the lips checked for any dents;

- the LSW couldn't provide effective suppressive
fire due to its small-capacity magazine and the tendency of the barrel
to overheat (after about 120-150 rounds, fired in short bursts);

- the weapon was difficult to strip and
reassemble, containing many fiddly parts (especially in the
bolt-carrier assembly). The gas plug, which needed to be removed for
cleaning, would easily jam in place and then required an armourer's
drill to remove;

- there were some ergonomic problems, e.g. the
safety catch has to be operated by the trigger finger rather than the
thumb, and to cock the weapon it is necessary to reach over to the
right side of the rifle with your left hand. The location and stiffness
of the fire selector switch has also been criticised. To be fair, these
issues don't seem to be considered major problems by most users.

After various attempts at denial, and years of
applying minor fixes that eased some problems but failed to solve the
big ones, the Ministry of Defence bowed to the inevitable in 1997. They
considered buying the M16 and M4 "off the shelf", but in the end
commissioned HK to undertake a thorough revamp of the SA80 (HK was by
this time owned by Royal Ordnance, so was in effect a British company -
it has since been returned to German control). The changes were
expensive (£92m - about 145 million dollars/euros) and
comprehensive, as follows:

- internal machining to clear feed and extraction paths

- new breech block and bolt

- new extractor and ejector with spring

- new recoil springs

- new firing pin

- new cocking handle

- entirely new magazine made from pressed steel

- new gas plug and cylinder

- new hammer

- new barrel extension

- new barrel (LSW only).

Some 200,000 weapons were converted to the A2
specification between 2000-2002. The MRBF (Mean Rounds Between Failure)
test scores achieved by the L85A2 in a variety of environments averaged
25,000, although dropping to just under 8,000 in the hot and dry
conditions of Kuwait. The L86A2 was subjected to a tougher test and
achieved a much lower overall average (just under 13,000) but performed
slightly better than the L85A2 in Kuwait. Much confidence was publicly
expressed that the problems had been resolved and the British Army now
had a rifle to be proud of. Details are provided on the British Army's
official website at: http://armydev.dera.gov.uk/presscentre/database/showPR.asp?id=2382
as follows:

THE ARMED FORCES
MINISTER ANNOUNCES THE SA80 A2’s RELIABILITY

The Armed
Forces Minister, The Right Honourable Adam Ingram, today announced the results
of the exhaustive SA80 A2 modification trials programme. As a result of the
modifications the A2 is one of, if not the most reliable 5.56mm rifle in the
world.

Both variants of the SA80 A2, the Individual Weapon (IW) and the Light Support
Weapon (LSW) were subjected to a series of gruelling tests during which over 3
million rounds were fired. The trials were conducted in four phases and were
designed to test the A2’s reliability in a range of challenging climatic
conditions.

The tests set by the MOD are the toughest reliability criteria imposed by any
nation. On average, across all of the trials, the IW fired an average of
25,200 rounds before it failed a test, known as a battlefield mission*. The
LSW, which has a much tougher mission requirement, fired an average of 12,897
rounds before it too failed. This compares very favourably to all of the small
arms in its class** and exceeds the expected service life of the A2 (10,000
rounds, after which it is refurbished). It is, therefore, possible for an A2
to suffer no failures during its service life.

The A2 will be issued on a phased basis from December 2001. Although the
unmodified SA80 is a capable weapon the modification programme can be brought
forward, if there is an operational requirement to do so. There are currently
around 10,000 modified weapons in stock.

The modification programme will cost around £92 million, including the cost of
spares, trials etc. Around 200,000 weapons will be modified.

The Armed Forces Minister, The Right Honourable Adam Ingram said “The trials
were designed to push the weapons to the very limit of their endurance. I’m
delighted to say that the SA80 A2 passed with flying colours. It is more than
capable of the task that we have given it and it will equip our armed forces
until a new small arm is introduced in around 2015.”

Major Andrew MacDonald (Princess of Wales Royal Regiment (PWRR)), the head of
the trials team said “I’m convinced that the SA80 A2 is the best 5.56mm rifle
in the world, if there is a better one I haven’t seen it yet.” He added, “If I
was going to go to war tomorrow I couldn’t think of a more reliable and
accurate weapon to take with me than the A2. It would certainly be my weapon
of choice.”

Flight Lieutenant Ian Caesar (RAF Regiment) added “I was in Brunei for the
tests where I was impressed to the point of boredom. Whenever there was a
stoppage, which was very rare, people woke up and came running to have a look.
The reliability of this weapon has been hugely improved”.

A It is
the name given to the SA80 Individual Weapon (IW) and Light Support Weapon (LSW)
that were introduced into service in 1986 as the new general purpose small arm
for the Armed Forces. The A2 variant is the modified version of both the IW
and LSW.

Q How
does the MOD measure reliability?

A It is
measured by how often the weapon fails during a battlefield mission. It is
presented in terms of Mean Rounds Between Failure (MRBF).

Q What is MRBF?

A This is
a measure of the average number of rounds that are fired between failures of a
battlefield mission test. The battlefield mission requires the IW to fire 150
rounds in 8 minutes 40 seconds and for the LSW to fire 960 round in 36 minutes
(see the Q&A on the SA80’s initial in-service reliability on page 5 for
further information).

Q What
is the A2’s MRBF?

A The MRBF
varied in each of the test environments and between weapon variants:

Individual Weapon

Light Support Weapon

Trials Type/Location

MRBF

MRBF

Cold/Dry - Alaska

31,500

43,200

Temperate - UK

>31,500

16,000

Hot/wet - Brunei

>31,500

9,600

Hot/Dry - Kuwait

7,875

8,728

Average

25,200

12,897

The minimum expected life of the new components is 10,000
rounds. It is, therefore, possible for an A2 to suffer no stoppages during its
life.

Q Why does the MRBF vary between environments?

A Each test environment – arctic, jungle, desert
and temperate – places different demands on the weapon system. Deserts, for
example, are the most challenging environments for all mechanical devices, not
just weapons. Sand makes its way into the weapons mechanism and this causes
advanced wear and can foul the working parts. All weapon systems, such as the
M16 and AK47 display different levels of reliability in each climatic
environment.

Q Where were the tests
run?

A The
arctic tests were run in Alaska (US Army’s Cold Regions Test Centre in Fort
Greely), the jungle tests in Brunei (Seria), the desert tests in Kuwait (Kazma)
and the temperate tests in the UK (Warminster).

Q What has been modified?

A The list includes:

1.Breech block,

2.Breech bolt,

3.Cartridge extractor,

4.Cartridge ejector,

5.Recoil springs,

6.Extractor spring,

7.Firing pin,

8.Cocking handle,

9.Magazine (the whole magazine has been replaced),

10.Gas plug and cylinder,

11.Hammer,

12.Barrel extension

13.Barrel (LSW only).

Q Do these minor changes really make that much of a difference?

A Yes. For
example, the firing pin, a known problem area, has not suffered a single
problem during the trial programme – around 3 million rounds have been fired
without one breakage.

Q How
much will the modification programme cost?

A The
modification programme is expected to be around £92 million. This includes the
cost of spares, trials etc. The cost is within the overall cost envelope
approved in June 2000 (£92.25 million).

Q How
long will it take for all of our Armed Services to receive A2s?

A Based
on the current estimate it will take four years and three months – from
December 2001 to February 2006.

Q Why
is it taking so long?

A This
isn’t a particularly long time. The MOD is modifying around 200,000 weapons.
These have to be withdrawn from service, modified and reissued. This all takes
time. Ideally we would like to issue all of the armed forces with the modified
weapons at the same time but this isn’t practical. Nor is it unusual for
weapons to be gradually introduced into service. When the SA80 A1, for
example, was originally introduced it was phased into service between 1986-93.

Q How many A2’s
are there?

A We currently have
10,000 modified SA80's in stock. This will increase to 15,000 in
December 2001.

Q Can the
modification programme be put into a higher gear?

A Currently H&K are
modifying 3,000 weapons a month. This is already planned to increase to 4,000
a month in May 2002. It is theoretically possible to increase these numbers
still further . This would, however, increase the cost of the programme.

Q Are there plans
to increase the number of SA80's modified each month?

A Currently no. The details of the UK’s
participation in the current conflict are undecided. A decision will be made
in light of any possible military involvement.

Q Are
there plans to issue A2’s to any troops who may be involved in combating
international terrorism?

A The SA80 A1 is a good weapon. The A2, however,
is more reliable in extreme environments. It is the MOD’s intention to ensure
that our troops have the best weapons available to them. If and when any
troops are deployed they will be equipped with equipment appropriate to the
task. The A2 is already available in considerable numbers, and if we need to
bring forward the issue of the weapons we will do so.

Q Why does the MOD have a stock of A2s?

A It was always the MOD’s intention to shave an
operational stockpile for just this sort of contingency. This is designed to
give the MOD the option of issuing A2’s, if appropriate, to units ahead of the
planned rollout programme.

Q Why were A2’s not issued to troops involved
in exercise Saif Sareea?

A The troops involved in exercise Saif Sareea
deployed at a time when the MOD was building up the operational stockpile.
Issuing A2’s would have eaten into the stockpile. There are, moreover, no
current plans to deploy any troops involved in exercise Saif Sareea at the end
of the exercise.

Q
Will the phased introduction reduce the combat effectiveness of our Armed
Forces?

A The
unmodified SA80 is a capable weapon system. So units who have not received the
modified weapon will still remain effective. It is, however, fair to say that
the modified SA80 system will increase the combat effectiveness of the units
that are issued with them in extreme environments. Priority will be given to
units in the JRRF and in operational theatres. In this way the troops who have
the most urgent operational requirements will receive the weapons first.

Q
When will X unit receive the modified SA80?

A The
issue programme is still being drawn-up. The current plan, however, is for the
Infantry Training Centre (ITC) Wales to be the first to receive supplies of
the modified weapon (December 2001). The ITC conducts the key battle courses
for junior and senior NCOs. The full rollout will commence in the New Year
with 3 Commando Brigade (May 2002). We will, of course release further
information in due course.

Q
Which units are the lowest priority?

A The
units with the lowest operational requirement.

Q How
will the modified weapons be issued?

A The
modified weapon will be issued to whole formations, such as 3 Commando
Brigade, in one go. All of the units that make up the formation such as
infantry, armour, artillery and signals will receive modified weapons. This
will avoid any problems associated with having a mixed fleet of weapons e.g.
fitting unmodified spares to the modified weapon.

Q
What would happen if modified and unmodified components were mixed?

A
Depending on the part the most serious effect would be to reduce the weapons
reliability. At worst the weapon would fail to function. There are no known
safety risks.

Q How
difficult is the A2 to maintain?

A It isn’t difficult to maintain. As with any
mechanical system good cleaning and preventative maintenance are essential to
ensure the best performance.

Q How
lethal is the A2?

A Because of its accuracy the A2 is very lethal.
The average user of an A2 has a higher probability of incapacitating their
target than they would using a comparable service rifle, particularly at
longer ranges.

A The
5.56mm round travels at a very high velocity. When it comes into contact with
a target a great deal of force is directed in a small area and this gives it
very good penetration characteristics.

Q
Will the A2 be able to be fired from the left shoulder?

A No.
They will continue to be fired from the right shoulder. Left-handed troops
are, however, able to accurately fire the weapon from their right shoulder.

Q The
design goes back to 1945 so it isn’t surprising that the SA80 is unreliable?

A No.
The Royal Small Arms Factory Enfield produced the first bullpup prototype in
1945. The current SA80 bears only a superficial resemblance to the 1945 model.
The technology, materials, optics, manufacturing processes etc have all moved
on since 1945. Indeed, the gas operating system used in the modern automatic
and semi-automatic rifles first appeared in 1905. So just because it is an
old principle it doesn’t mean that it is flawed!

Q
Will the A2 be readmitted to the NATO nominated weapon list?

A The
SA80 is fully compatible with all of the 5.56mm rounds produced by other NATO
countries. We fully expect the SA80 to be readmitted and the trials are
currently ongoing. The results of the trials are expected by February 2002.

Q
Isn’t the modification programme an admission that the SA80 is seriously
flawed?

A No.
Weapons are routinely modified during the course of their service life. The
SLR, for example, was modified 54 times

Q How
many weapons will be modified?

A The
MOD expects to modify around 200,000 weapons. Any unmodified weapons will, as
far as possible, be cannibalised for spares.

Q How many lives have been lost as a result of the SA80’s reliability
problems?

A None.

Q How will the Armed Forces be able to tell the difference between a
modified and unmodified weapon?

A For five reasons:

1.The
soldiers will be issued with their own modified SA80,

2.The
modified weapons will have H&KA2 stamped on it,

3.The
cocking handle is visibly different,

4.Some
internal components will be differently coloured,

5.It will
be more reliable.

Q Why
wasn’t the SA80 reliable when it was introduced?

A When
the SA80 was accepted into service the stated battlefield mission, which
determined the characteristics of the weapon, was for the rifle to fire 120
rounds over a 24 hour period. The LSW had to fire 800 rounds in 24 hours.
Against these criteria the unmodified weapons are very reliable. Today the
battlefield mission is for the IW to fire 150 rounds in 8 minutes 40 seconds.
The LSW needs to fire 960 round in 36 minutes. It is, therefore, not
surprising that the SA80 weapon system needs to be modified. Comparing the
battlefield requirements set for the SA80 system in the late 1980s to the
current one is similar to comparing the Vauxhall Astra of 1986 to the current
model. The latest version is much more reliable. It is the same with the
SA80. NB In the original trials any number of stoppages that could be
cleared by the firer were not counted as failures. In the trials of the
modified weapon more than one stoppage, including those that can be cleared by
the firer, counts as a failure.

A battlefield mission was counted as a failure when there
was more than one stoppage that the soldier could clear immediately on their
own or there was a stoppage that required an armourer or a tool to clear.

Q Why
didn’t the MOD replace the SA80 weapon system with a new weapon system?

A There
are two reasons:

1.The A2 would achieve the required levels of reliability.

2.It is more cost effective to modify the SA80 than it is to buy a new
weapon system. To procure and support a new system would cost around £500
million . This includes spares, additional infrastructure (rifle racks, blank
firing adapters etc), training etc. The modification programme is expected to
cost around £92 million – a fifth of the cost of procuring a new weapon
system.

Q Why doesn’t the A2 use a plastic magazine?

A The A2’s magazine housing, where the magazine fits into the body of the
weapon, cannot be increased in size to accommodate the larger plastic magazine
that would be required. The walls of a plastic magazine must be thicker than
its metal equivalent to provide the same strength, making a plastic magazine
bulkier. Plastic magazines also require horizontal reinforcing ridges around
the walls to provide rigidity. These ridges and the additional bulk cause the
magazines to jam in ammo pouches or pockets. A thin plastic magazine also
flexes and this can cause further failures – the round is not correctly
inserted into the feed mechanism. These problems make them inappropriate for
use by the British Army. It has also been suggested that transparent
plastic magazines would help soldiers know how many rounds they had in their
weapon. This is true to a degree but where the magazine attaches to the rest
of the weapon the magazine is obscured.

Q Why wasn’t the weight of the A2 reduced?

A The weight of the weapon contributes to its low recoil. This is a major
factor in its accuracy. Moreover, the A2 isn’t that much heavier than most
other rifles when the optical sight is removed from the weapon. The optical
sight is only issued to troops involved in dismounted close combat e.g.
infantry.

· IW unloaded (without SUSAT) 3.8 Kg

· M16A3
unloaded
3.4 Kg

· G36
unloaded
3.3 Kg

Q Why use optical sights if they are so heavy?

A To enhance the capability of the soldier in the field by making target
easier to locate and engage. These are contributory factors to its accuracy.
The SUSAT also greatly enhances the soldier’s ability to engage targets in low
light (dawn, dusk and moonlight) and provides every user with a magnifying
observation device. The SUSAT adds 0.8 Kg to the weapons overall weight.

Q What grenade launching ability does the A2 have?

A It fires a rifle grenade. This is slipped over the barrel of the IW and
fired using an ordinary round of ammunition. The round strikes a bullet trap
on the grenade and this provides the energy to launch the grenade. The MOD is
content with the capability of the current rifle grenade.

Q Is it true that the optical sights zero is destroyed when a rifle grenade
is fired from the A2?

A. No. The standard rifle grenade that is currently used will not affect the
optical sight's accuracy.

Q Will the Cadet Forces receive A2s?

A No. There is no operational requirement.

Q Why has it taken so long to modify the SA80?

A It hasn’t taken that long. The SA80, in common with all weapon systems, has
been subject to constant revisions throughout its life. The current programme
is a major refurbishment programme that will extend the weapons in service
life until 2020. The trials programme can’t be rushed through. It is important
to properly test the weapon. The trials have, indeed, identified a number of
minor issues that have been addressed.

Q Will the A2 be upgraded again?

A There are no large-scale modifications planned. A small number are expected
to be modified in 2009 to include a rapid area effects weapon that is part of
the FIST roll out plan.

Q Will the Future Integrated Soldier Technology (FIST) make the A2?

A Not initially. The A2 is expected to remain in service until 2020 and will
form part of the initial operating capability of the FIST programme

Q Will the blank firing adapter (BFA) be modified?

A The BFA is being
modified slightly to ensure its reliability of function.

Q Do the UK’s Special Forces use the SA80 weapon
system?

A I am
sure you will understand that the MOD cannot divulge details of the weapons
used by the SF as this would assist potential adversaries in countering or
neutralising UKSF capabilities.

Q Why did the Police recently buy the G36 and not the SA80 IW or LSW?

A
The SA80 IW and LSW are no longer in production. The last one to roll-off the
production line did so over eight years ago. It was not, therefore, possible
for the police to acquire either the unmodified or modified SA80.

NB The MOD Police make extensive use of the SA80 IW to guard
certain establishments.

Q Is a belt fed machine gun better than the LSW?

A A belt fed machine gun and a LSW have
different capabilities. The current belt fed machine gun used by the Armed
forces is the GPMG. Although this has a greater rate of fire than the LSW it
is much heavier, less accurate and the ammunition is not compatible with the
IW. The capabilities are, however, complimentary.

The first of the A2s were rushed into action in
Afghanistan late in 2001. However, reports started to emerge that the
L85A2 was still jamming, despite all of the modifications. The British
popular press made much of these stories, and many were the voices
baying for the scrapping of this fundamentally flawed weapon. By now
the British Army's rifle had become the subject of derision around the
world, and attempts by the Army, following an urgent enquiry, to
explain that the soldiers had not been taught the proper cleaning
procedure were dismissed as cover-ups. Public speculation assumed that
the SA80's remaining life was short and focused on which weapon might
replace it. In the Gulf, British regular troops are now being equipped
with the FN Minimi LMG (it has been in service with special forces for
some years as the L110A1), a move taken to mean the end of the LSW. But
is this fair?

An Evaluation

There seems little doubt that the L85A1 and
companion L86A1 were flawed to an unacceptable degree. They might just
about pass in the northern European environment, but the adverse
conditions of desert warfare showed their weaknesses all too clearly.
About the only good thing which could be said about them, apart from
their compactness, was that they were always very accurate even with
iron sights. This characteristic is fully expoited by the SUSAT (Sight
Unit Small Arms Trilux)
four-power telescopic sight, standard issue for front-line combat
units. The LSW is even more accurate, and was reportedly marketed as a
sniper rifle, being effective out to 600m; in fact, some criticise it
for being too accurate to deliver effective suppressive fire.

But what of the L85A2? It should be remembered
that only a handful of cases of jams were reported from Afghanistan,
and the problems were much less serious than the news media made out.
Here is what happened, from the man in the centre of it: http://www.navynews.co.uk/articles/2002/0211/1002111301.asp
as follows:

Testing times for new weapon: 13.11.02 11:40

Sgt Jamie Miles is a Platoon Weapons Instructor – a specialist
in weapons and tactics – with the Royal Marines, and was part of 45
Commando during operations in Afghanistan last year. He sent back one of
the three defect reports about problems with the SA80 A2 weapon. In Sgt
Miles’ own words:

“The SA80 A2 was introduced to us at 45 Commando last November, we
conducted the usual static firing weapons test and initial reaction to
that was ‘OK, this weapon looks the same but it is actually performing
extremely well.

“Normally we’d fire some men through a couple of basic shoots and every
man would probably incorporate a couple of stoppages. With the entire
company, at that stage we had none.

“We then went off to our training area. We conducted everything from
single-man close-quarter battle all the way up through to section attacks,
troop attacks, company and everything, and 110 men had fired approximately
between 3,500 rounds and 4,200 rounds each. We had five stoppages, four of
them were down to the firer.

“So now we are looking at: ‘This weapon is fantastic. Yeah, OK, it
looks like a Lada but actually we are driving a Porsche 911.’ And we are
now confident, and the feeling within the company was very good.

“We were then launched into HMS Ocean as part of the Amphibious Ready
Group and deployed subsequently to Operation Jacana. And then went on to a
sub-op called Operation Ptarmigan.

“For the first time in 20 years, a Royal Marines Commando unit had
formed up, supported by artillery, mortars, heavy machine guns, and more
importantly, the rifleman had confidence with his A2.

“And we successfully went on Op Ptarmigan, dominated the ground, lined
out for the first time in 20 years and it was a pure success. At that
point there were no real issues with the weapon.

“But we had noted that the heat made it a little bit more difficult to
keep clean. We had noted that the dust started sticking to the insides, a
little bit of sludge – the downdraft from the Chinooks - weapons are
starting to look shabby, and we’ve got this mindset in 3 Commando Brigade
that if you look at a weapon that’s dirty, they think it’s ineffective.

“When you’re a recruit, when you’re a trained Marine, when you’re a
sergeant, if your weapon looks dirty, you clean it. We need to come away
from that – does it work?

“We then later started getting a few more difficulties on the range. The
ammunition was starting to feel a little bit different but this is only
coming after a matter of time. And I thought ‘Have we ruined these weapons
because of the amount of ammunition we’ve fired through?’

So we thought ‘Hang on a minute, this dust mixing with all the oil – is
that what’s slowing it up?’ So Royal Marines being Royal Marines, a clean
weapon is a good weapon and we then stuck liberally with the oil.
As a rule people were still oiling but it was liberally. And some people
tried dry and all sorts of regimes were coming out.

“We’ve got men deploying on to the ground with a little bit of confidence
knocked now – considering the highs that we were on before we got on ship.

“So it wasn’t a massive, major issue, although it would have been if
things had turned for the worse. So I then wrote a report saying ‘The A2 –
there are problems.’

“And then all of a sudden – boom! Heckler and Koch are arriving, Col
Haddow’s arriving, the trials team’s arriving: ‘Let’s sort this out.’

“So the trials team came out, Col Haddow conducted his second day of trials,
the day I left theatre, and two weeks later the brigade were out of the
theatre.

“So I’m now going to Oman to conduct the confidence demonstration. There
were nine Royal Marines out there, four RAF Regiments, one Parachute
Regiment guy and so on, it was a good mix, tri-Service.

“There were three people there on the confidence course, there was myself,
C/Sgt Ryan, and Sgt Evans, who had reported problems.

“I went out, I was still pro-A2, but you know I had it clear in my head that
there were issues that needed addressing. So I went out there for the two
weeks and sat on the fence, if you like, and wanted the clinical trials
results to show me – I wanted to see fact.

“I sat on the fence as far as a decision, but as far as input into it went,
it was a massive think-tank. We sat there and went: ‘Well, actually, we’ve
got someone from the DPA here and the DLO, you’re the people who are meant
to be giving us kit. So this is what we want.’

“And for two weeks we hounded them with ideas upon ideas – everything from
the way we train people to the kit that we require to the re-education of
the Brigade and to everything else that is going to be an issue with the
SA80.

“They gave us a pamphlet, the existing cleaning regime, and we looked at it
and went ‘Well, sorry, that’s rubbish’ – and it was now 30 pages long, which
is too much.

“We have got the average recruit who has got a lot of information to take in
– we’re not saying he’s solid, we’re saying he has already got a lot to
learn.

“So C/Sgt Ryan came up with a cleaning regime in line with what they wanted,
but ten times simpler. But I don’t know if anything is going to come of
that.

“And we have now walked away from there, very, very happy; we’ve also got
some extremely good results.
There are other weapons in service, but in comparison the A2 has come out
superior.

“A weapon system is called a system for a reason. It is not just a weapon,
it is a cleaning kit, it is a person, it is the bayonet, it is everything.

“The weapon system is a package, and the package needs work, and if we do
that, we are going to turn the 95 per cent pass rate to 99 per cent.

“And there is no other weapon system in the world that can do that. For a
basic infantry weapon, that the Royal Marines need, the A2 is the weaponhead.

“You can use it in the desert, you can use it in the jungle, you can use
it in the Arctic, you can use it for offensive operations or to blow up
areas. It’s a good compromise for everything that we need. We don’t need a
new weapons system. This system does it all.

“I have sat on the fence on this one, I have seen the results, I have
fired the weapon operationally and on the ranges. I am convinced there is no
problem.

“If you want a weapon that looks Gucci and good, well great, look
somewhere else. But I am telling you now, I don’t care what it looks like,
the A2 is the better weapon.

“Those people who keep writing into the Daily Telegraph are bored ex-Royal
Marines who are fed up of doing the gardening and don’t know what to do
today. I’m currently serving in the Royal Marines and I’ve got a message for
you: this A2 is a hoofin’ weapon – write to me!

“There are issues, but we’ve got the information – we just need to get out
there and tell people. We’ve got the regime to get this squared away.”

First trial method: Interviewed Royal Marines from the
patrol whose weapons had suffered stoppages in contact; inspected weapons
and asked them to prepare using existing routines;
12 firers to range: 150 rounds in just over eight minutes, simulating
contact engagement and an assault
Results: Only 2 weapons performed satisfactorily

Second trial method: Trials team set out to replicate
the heat and dust conditions on operations with 36 Royal Marines (24 from
the first test, but 12 new as a control group). Two Chinook helicopters
flying, on each landing Royal Marines deploy and took up firing positions,
then helicopters take off, land again, and Royal Marines re-embark – seven
times (five with extreme brown-out conditions). Returned to range, lay
weapons directly on the sand, left there for an hour in the hottest part of
the day – up to 52 degrees Centigrade. Then straight to firing point,
dustbowl with constant 20-knot wind
Battlefield mission test repeated with all 36: 5,400 rounds firedResults: 24 Royal Marines who had been previously
instructed, 87.5% reliability; control group, 17%

Results: The Individual Weapon fired 165 battlefield
missions, each comprising 150 rounds over a period of 8 mins 40 secs. A
total of 24,750 rounds fired and only 51 stoppages
• Out of 165 battlefield missions, A2 passed 156: of the 9 failures
stoppages were easily cleared and not mission critical
• A2 achieved a 95% success rate, above operational requirement of 90%, and
its nearest rival of popular choice achieved only 47%

One interesting comment from a soldier involved in the
trials, is that not all NATO 5.56 mm ammunition performs in the same way. The
trials were conducted using British ammo, but some German and American types
were tried. It was found that the German ammo fouled the gas ports very quickly,
whereas the US ammo sometimes didn't seem to produce enough pressure to cock the
gun reliably, with a stoppage occurring once every one or two magazines.

At the same time, the US troops using the Army's
M4 carbine were reporting a catalogue of problems: among them, 20%
reported double feeding, 15% reported feeding jams and 13% reported
that the feeding jams were due to magazines. Only 89% reported
confidence in the weapon (see: http://www.geocities.com/usarmyafghangearproblems/tsld017.htm )
as follows:

M4 Carbine Lessons Learned

34% of Soldiers reported that their M4’s
handguards rattle and become excessively hot when firing.

Soldiers reported the following
malfunctions:

89% reported confidence in the weapon.

20% were dissatisfied with its ease of
maintenance.

Problems reported locking magazines in and
some soldiers had to chamber a round in order to lock the magazine.

Soldiers asked for a weapon with a larger
round, “So it will drop a man with one shot.”

One US Special Forces soldier is quoted on the
'Stars and Stripes' website as saying that: "the M4 with optics and the newer hand guards tends to be a pretty good weapon....misfeeds
don't happen too often with good weapon maintenance." This
indicates that perfect reliability is not something expected of a
military weapon. Even the FN Minimi LMG, in US service as the M249, has
recently been seen on television jamming in action, which illustrates
that such problems affect even the best weapons.

The fact is that desert conditions will test any
automatic weapon, and malfunctions are always likely if they are not
kept clean. This can be particularly difficult when troops are
disembarking from helicopters, as the rotors whip dust into everything
(it is reported that British troops have been wrapping plastic bags
around their rifles until they are clear of the helos). The British
have continued testing the L85A2 in adverse conditions, and have
reported that it consistently beats all competition (most notably the
M16 family) for reliability - and by a considerable margin too. There
have been no reports so far of problems in the current Gulf
conflict. Furthermore, the FN Minimi has not been issued to
replace the LSW. The version of the Minimi chosen by the British is the
short-barrelled 'Para' type (L110A1) and it is being used to supplement
the firepower of infantry units by delivering suppressive fire out to
300m; the L86A2 is being retained for its long-range accuracy, and
infantry four-man fire teams are therefore armed with two L85A2 (one
with a 40mm UGL), an L86A2 and an L110A1.

In conclusion, it seems clear that the L85A2 is
now at least as reliable as any other 5.56mm weapon, and a lot more so
than most. In military rifles probably only the Kalashnikovs are
superior, but they were designed to achieve reliability in the face of
complete neglect by untrained troops, and suffer the consequences in
terms of poor accuracy. So how does the L85A2 now compare in other
respects?

One of the downsides has already been mentioned;
it can only be shot right-handed. It is also on the heavy side,
weighing 8.37 lb (3.8 kg) compared with 7.5 lb (3.4 kg) for the M16A2.
The weight with a loaded magazine and the SUSAT is no less than 11.5 lb
(5.2 kg) while the L86A2 has an all-up weight of 15.4 lb (7.0 kg).
However, it retains the benefit of a short overall length and its
commendable accuracy.

Given the importance of striking velocity to the
effectiveness of the 5.56mm bullets, the higher muzzle velocity
conferred by the longer barrel, compared with the American M4, is
significant. Once source ( http://www.ammo-oracle.com/
) states that when fired from the short M4 barrel, the bullets will
only reliably fragment (and thereby achieve maximum effectiveness) out
to 50-100m compared with 150-200m in the L85 and M16 barrels, and
further still in the L86, which has a muzzle velocity of 970 rather
than 940 m/s (3,180 rather than 3,080 fps). Given recent American
complaints about the lack of effectiveness of the 5.56mm cartridge,
apparently associated with its use in the short-barrelled M4, that is
important.

The Future

Experience in the 2003 Gulf War and its aftermath has
revealed that the SA80's problems had been (almost) solved by the A2 rebuild. The only reported issue concerned the safety catch: soldiers on several occasions
released the safety catch only to find they still could not fire.
Armed forces minister Adam Ingram said afterwards:
"Work has been undertaken on the safety catch/plunger, and following successful
trials of a revised safety plunger, a contract will be let shortly".
Despite this glitch, reports from troopshave
been almost universally favourable, so the future of the SA80 is assured until
its planned out-of-service date. In autumn
2007 an urgent operational requirement was expressed for an enhancement for the
rifles consisting of a new fore-end with Picatinny rails to take (among other
things) a forward vertical handgrip with a built-in bipod (ironically, HK had
suggested this at the time of their makeover, but this had been rejected as
unnecessary). New optical sights to replace
the SUSAT have also been adopted, initially the US Trijicon for
some troops but since 2011 the ELCAN SpecterOS 4x Lightweight Day
Sights (LDS) has come into general use.

Also in 2011, Cranfield University announced the results of a study
carried out in conjunction with Frazer Nash Consultancy into the
potential for a significant SA80 weight reduction as a part of the
"Reducing the Burden on the Dismounted Soldier" project. They achieved
weight reductions to some specific components as follows:

The combined result of these
savings was a total reduction of around 20% in the weight of the
gun+grenade launcher. It seems that the modifications were succesfully
tested but there is no sign that they will be adopted.

In any case, the SA80 is now an old design which has not been
manufactured for a long time, so the army has been thinking about its
replacement for some years. In July 2006 a Minister of Defence confirmed in a Parliamentary answer an in-service date of 2020 for its replacement,
and this remained the target for the next few years. However, more
recently some informal views were circulating to the effect that there
was no urgency over this project - lots of spare parts being on hand -
and the army saw no point in replacing the SA80 unless a step-change
improvement came along.

This is very interesting
since it is hard to see any of the current 5.56mm assault rifles
offering such a major improvement, nor is it clear how they could ever
do so. Should the LSAT project result in a US adoption of such a system
then the substantial weight reduction of the plastic-cased telescoped
ammunition would deliver such a step-change, but the probability of
that happening in the near future seems to be fading as the US Army has just adopted the M4A1, a modified
version of the current carbine. Furthermore, hybrid polymer/metal versions
of the current cartridge cases seem close to offering weight savings
which are not far short of the LSAT's.

The only other change which
might be substantial enough to attract the British Army's interest
could be the introduction of a new cartridge, able to match the
long-range performance of the 7.62mm with a lot less weight and recoil,
as discussed in other articles on this website. However, the UK would
never "go it alone" with such a change, so there would have to be
substantial support within NATO.

Whatever the future
brings, the one virtual certainty is that the British Army's next rifle
will be bought from abroad. The country no longer has the design skills
or manufacturing experience to produce its own automatic weapons. This
will of course be no more than a return to previous practice, the old
7.62mm SLR and the current 5.56mm and 7.62mm belt-fed infantry machine
guns being of Belgian origin, while the tank machine gun and new 7.62mm
"Sharpshooter" rifle are American. So the SA80 seems likely to go down
in history as the final attempt to design, make and field an indigenous
standard infantry rifle for the British Army.