Command mistakes, lack of training led to Niger ambush that killed 4 U.S. soldiers

These images provided by the U.S. Army show Staff Sgt. Jeremiah W. Johnson, 39, of Springboro, Ohio, and Sgt. La David Johnson of Miami Gardens, Fla. Both were killed in Niger along with two other U.S. soldiers when a joint patrol of American and Niger forces was ambushed by militants believed linked to the Islamic State group.(Photo: AP Images)

The four U.S. soldiers killed in a militant ambush in Niger last year were victims of command mistakes, insufficient training and ultimately a surprise attack by a well-trained and better-armed force, the Pentagon said Thursday.

An eight-page report summarizes an investigation, and a full report will follow, said Marine Corps Gen. Thomas Waldhauser, commander of U.S. Africa Command. Waldhauser said at a Pentagon news conference that changes have been made to better prepare and protect U.S. troops across Africa.

“I take ownership of all the events connected to the ambush of 4 October,” he said. “The responsibility is mine.”

Defense Secretary Jim Mattis ordered a broad review of training, operating procedures and planning to be completed within four months. Waldhauser said troops are being better armed and trained for their mission — training and equipping local troops, as opposed to directly confronting enemy targets.

"We cannot overstate the courage with which our forces fought," said Army Maj. Gen. Roger Cloutier, chief of staff for U.S. Africa Command and lead investigating officer.

U.S. Senator Tim Kaine, D-Va. and a member of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services committees, said in a statement Thursday that the tragedy is "deeply troubling."

"Our troops were in Niger to ‘train and equip’ the Nigerian military. They embarked on a mission described as consistent with that limited purpose, but it was actually a ‘kill or capture’ combat mission designed to target a high value person believed to be present in the region," Kaine said.

The battle near the village of Tongo Tongo prompted the investigation into whether the soldiers had sufficient weaponry, ammunition and training for the mission in the West African nation. The investigative team interviewed 143 people, including survivors of the attack.

The troops were hunting for a high-ranking Islamic State militant, but their leaders submitted a less dangerous mission for command approval, the report says. The capture-or-kill mission required approvals higher up the chain of command than it received, Cloutier said.

The report describes a "contradictory and ambiguous" command approval system. It cites "a general lack of situational awareness and command oversight at every echelon."

The militant was not found, and the troops were sent on an intelligence-gathering mission. They stopped at Tongo Tongo, and the ambush came shortly after they left the village. Evidence that the villagers tipped off the militants or otherwise aided in the attack was inconclusive, the report says.

The report says the troops had little time to train together or with Nigerian forces and did not complete standard pre-mission drills.

"Although the report details the compounding impact of tactical and operational decisions, no single failure or deficiency was the sole reason for the events," the report says.

Cloutier said he and a group of officers had spoken with the families of those who died. Wright's father, Arnold Wright, told the Associated Press he worried that the Army would pin the blame on lower-ranking soldiers and not accept command responsibility.

“The whole thing was a screwed-up mess,” Wright said.

Pentagon chief spokeswoman Dana White called the report a "sober reminder' of the need to develop and maintain elite combat skills.

"As painful as the loss of our soldiers is, it is our duty to honor their sacrifice and learn from this operation in our constant effort to improve our training, tactics, techniques, procedures and operations," she said.