Tag: pacific legal foundation

The federal government is currently engaged in a misguided attempt to use a noneconomic statute – the Endangered Species Act – to regulate under its Commerce Clause authority a noneconomic activity, the potential “take” of the noncommercial, wholly intrastate delta smelt. Acting under this purported authority, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service issued an opinion in 2008 that requires a reduction of critical water deliveries in California for the alleged benefit of the threatened delta smelt species. The delta smelt-based water cutbacks have resulted in substantial hardship to farmers and other water users in Southern California and the San Joaquin Valley.

In 2009, the Pacific Legal Foundation filed a lawsuit contending that regulation of the delta smelt is not a valid exercise of the Commerce Clause. The district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed. Cato joined Chapman University’s Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence and former attorney general Edwin Meese in filing a brief that supports PLF’s request for Supreme Court review.

We argue that the Court should take this case in order to delineate the constitutional distinction between federal and state power and protect the states’ exclusive police power to regulate and advance the health, safety, and welfare of the people. Specifically, our brief argues: (1) that the federal government’s regulation of a wholly intrastate, noncommercial species exceeds Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause; (2) the expansive application of the ESA to the delta smelt, because it is noncommercial species that doesn’t travel across state lines, intrudes on the core police powers reserved to the states; and (3) that the Supreme Court should repudiate the aggregation principle of Wickard v. Filburn(the 1942 wheat-farming case central to the Obamacare litigation). Striking down the expanded interpretation of the ESA at issue here is not enough.

If left untouched, the Ninth Circuit decision opens the door to unlimited and abusive assertions of power by an assortment of federal agencies. The Court needs to reinforce and rebuild the limits of the Commerce Clause and to reign in a federal government that continues to believe that the Constitution sets no bounds on its power.

The name of the case is Stewart & Jasper Orchards v. Salazar. The Supreme Court will decide this fall whether to hear it.

As followers of this blog recognize, Obamacare has more constitutional defects than just the individual mandate or even the coercive use of Medicaid funds. One issue that is getting increasing attention (see the Weekly Standard, National Review, and George Will) is this weird new entity called the Independent Payment Advisory Board.

That is, IPAB creates “recommendations” for cutting Medicare spending, which then acquire the force of law. Congress is specifically barred from reversing or modifying these “recommendations”; the only thing it can do is add further cuts. It can also abolish IPAB, but only by passing a curious “resolution” that must be introduced between Jan. 3 and Feb. 1. 2017, and must be passed by 3/5 of all members of both houses by Aug. 15 of that same year. Otherwise, Congress loses even its power to add further Medicare cuts and IPAB becomes a permanent fixture of of our health care world.

Suffice it to say, Congress cannot delegate its legislative authority to any such independent, everlasting institution. One Congress can’t even bind its successors!

A board of “Platonic Guardians” to govern the health care system or some aspects of it. The cost of health care is spinning dangerously out of control…. [O]ur traditional political institutions—Congress and the executive administrative agencies—are too driven by special interest politics and too limited in their expertise and vision to control costs. Enter the Platonic guardians…an impartial, independent board of experts who could make evidence-based policy determinations based purely on the basis of effectiveness and perhaps efficiency.

Think about that for a second. Plato’s “Guardians” (also known as philosopher kings) were a group of “godlike” officials (that’s Plato’s word) who would wield undemocratic power to form the perfect utopian state without oversight. According to The Republic, the Guardians would, among their other things, enforce:

by law…such an art of medicine…[which] will care for the bodies and souls of such of your citizens as are truly wellborn, but those who are not, such as are defective in body, they will suffer to die, and those who are evil-natured and incurable in soul they will themselves put to death. This certainly…has been shown to be the best thing for the sufferers themselves and for the state.

America’s constitutional democracy was created in direct contradiction to such authoritarian ideas.

Luckily, our friends at the Goldwater Institute have a lawsuit pending against IPAB, Coons v. Geithner (here’s the case page). You’ll be hearing a lot more about this case regardless of the final result of the individual mandate lawsuits. Here’s PLF’s amicus brief on the important “non-delegation doctrine” issue at its heart.

As I wrote last week, a decade ago in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, the Supreme Court rejected the idea that those who buy property subject to burdensome regulations lose the right the seller otherwise has to challenge those regulations. The Court ruled that the Takings Clause does not have an “expiration date.” Sadly, not all government authorities or courts took Palazzolo to heart, and now we have a second such case meriting Cato’s involvement in the span of a week.

In 2000, after the EPA issued a Record of Decision concerning limiting access to a “slough” (a narrow strip of navigable water) on its Superfund National Priorities List, CRV Enterprises began negotiations to buy a parcel of land next to the slough across from a site once occupied by a wood-preserving plant. CRV hoped to develop that parcel and others it already controlled into a mixed-use development, including a marina, boat slips, restaurants, lodging, storage, sales, and service facilities. The company eventually bought the land with notice of the EPA’s ROD but the EPA later installed a “sand cap” and “log boom” that obstructed CRV’s access to the slough.

CRV sued the United States in the Court of Federal Claims, which dismissed the case for lack of standing. The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that CRV’s claim “is barred because [the company] did not own a valid property interest at the time of the alleged regulatory taking.” The Federal Circuit thus turned two Supreme Court precedents on their head and put that “expiration date” on the Takings Clause. It did so despite the fact that multiple federal courts have upheld Palazzolo’s rule and that longstanding California common law recognizes that a littoral (next to water) owner’s access to the shore adjacent to his property is a property right.

Cato, joined by Reason Foundation, the Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence, and the National Federation of Independent Business, filed an amicus brief supporting CRV’s request that the Supreme Court review the Federal Circuit’s decision and reaffirm Palazzolo. We argue the following: (1) when post-enactment purchasers are per se denied standing to challenge regulation, government power expands at the expense of private property rights; (2) a rule under which pre-enactment owners have superior rights to subsequent title-holders threatens to disrupt real estate markets; (3) the Federal Circuit abrogated the rule of Palazzolo; and (4) this case — viewed in the context of other courts’ rulings — indicates the need for the Supreme Court to settle the spreading confusion about Palazzolo. Otherwise, the existence of a “post-enactment” rule will create a “massive uncompensated taking” from small developers and investors that would preserve and enhance the rights of large corporations.

Palazzolo put to rest “once and for all the notion that title to property is altered when it changes hands.” The ability of property owners to challenge government interference with their property is essential to a proper understanding of the Fifth Amendment; the Court must reestablish the principle that transfer of title does not diminish property rights. Significantly, the Federal Circuit isn’t alone in its misapplication of Palazzolo; the Ninth Circuit in Guggenheim v. City of Goleta (in which Cato also filed a brief) recently issued an opinion severely narrowing Palazzolo’s scope and deepening a circuit split.

Thanks to legal associate Nick Mosvick and former legal associate Brandon Simmons (acting as our outside counsel in this case) for their work on this case, CRV Enterprises v. United States.

As the legal battle against Obamacare continues, we got good constitutional news today in another aspect of health care law. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, based in New York City, ruled that statutes restricting commercial speech about prescription drug-related data gathering are unconstitutional. The court emphasized that the First Amendment protects “[e]ven dry information, devoid of advocacy, political relevance, or artistic expression.”

The case, IMS Health v. Sorrell, concerned a Vermont law that sought to constrain various aspects of prescriber-identifiable data gathering, dissemination, and use. The state argued that such information collection and exchange could induce doctors to alter their prescribing practices in ways that impose additional costs on the state’s budget. Most notably, the law outlawed the transfer of doctors’ prescription history to facilitate drug companies’ one-on-one marketing—a practice known as “detailing” —because the state believed detailing drives up brand-name drug sales and, in turn, health care costs. Thus, the Vermont law would have eliminated a key part of the market by hindering economic incentives to comprehensively gather the data. The state argued that the data sharing isn’t “traditional journalistic activity,” it’s not protected by the First Amendment.

Cato joined the Pacific Legal Foundation, the Progress & Freedom Foundation, and two trade associations to file an amicus brief in the case in support of the plaintiffs challenging the law. The Vermont Prescription Restraint Law (and the similar laws enacted in New Hampshire and Maine) imposed unprecedented censorship on a broad swath of socially important information. We are gratified that the Second Circuit upheld First Amendment protections here and congratulate the plaintiffs on their victory.

You can read Cato’s brief here and the Second Circuit’s decision here.

Throughout history, people have fought over beaches, including in the legal arena. In the latest case in which Cato has filed an amicus brief, a state has once again redefined property rights to take possession of highly-valued beachfront property.

In 2003, Hawaii passed Act 73, which took past and future title to accretions (the slow build-up of sediment on beaches) from landowners and gave it to the State, changing a 120-year-old rule. While waterlines are unpredictable, the original rule — common to most waterfront jurisdictions — helped establish legal consistency. Indeed, without such a rule, beachfront property becomes beachview property in just a few years.

In response to Act 73, homeowners sued the state, claiming that the law violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment or, in the alternative, the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The state appellate court held that compensation was owed only for the accretions that had accumulated before Act 73’s enactment because the right to subsequent accretions had not “vested” (the legal term for when an expectation becomes an actual property right). Hawaii’s Supreme Court declined to review that ruling, so the property owners asked the U.S. Supreme Court to do so.

Cato, joined by the Pacific Legal Foundation, filed a brief supporting that petition and argues that the appellate court’s decision was contrary to long-standing definitions of waterfront property rights. Our brief highlights the increasing need for the Court to establish and enforce a judicial takings doctrine.

More and more states are using backdoor tricks — like legislative “guidelines” and judicial creativity — to take property in violation of constitutional rights: This Hawaii case is distressingly similar to last term’s Stop the Beach (in which Cato also filed a brief). In that case, Florida took property by adding sand to the beach and then laying claim to the newly created land — in essence asserting that property that was defined by contact with the water (in technical terms, “littoral” or “riparian”) had no right to contact the water. The Court ruled that while Florida’s actions did not rise to the level of a judicial taking, a large enough departure from established common-law rules could constitute a constitutional violation.

In this latest brief, we highlight both the largeness of Hawaii’s departure from established law and the spate of such actions in recent years — which circumstance calls out for Supreme Court review. The case is Maunalua Bay Beach Ohana 28 v. Hawaii and the Court will decide later this fall whether to take it up.

David Boaz already noted Missourians’ overwhelming rejection of the individual mandate yesterday. That, combined with Monday’s decision in Virginia’s lawsuit – where the judge denied the government’s motion to dismiss, ruling that Virginia had standing to make its claims and that those claims had sufficient merit to proceed – should embolden Missouri’s Lieutenant Governor Peter Kinder. Kinder, in his personal capacity and joined by several other individuals, filed an Obamacare lawsuit last month.

I mention the Kinder suit to remind everyone that there are more challenges out there than just Virginia’s and the Florida-led 20-state suit. I have personal knowledge of groups and individuals who have sued in Michigan, Ohio, and D.C. – and there are plenty of others, I’m sure (for example, the Goldwater Institute will be filing in Arizona soon). As Michael Cannon has noted, the D.C. suit, filed by our friends at the Pacific Legal Foundation, has as its plaintiff a 29-year-old artist and former National Guardsman who served two tours in Iraq. PLF will host a liveblog to discuss their case starting at 3 p.m. today. You can read the complaint here.

Finally, PLF principal attorney and Cato adjunct scholar Tim Sandefur has a nice refutation of the argument that “well, gee, George Washington required able-bodied men to buy muskets and prepare for militia service under the Militia Act of 1792.” The upshot: sure, but 1) the Militia Act was passed under the Constitution’s militia clauses (not under the Commerce Clause, taxing power, or anything else being claimed as authority by Obamacare proponents); and 2) to say that the Constitution does not protect “a freedom from government-mandated purchases” is to read the Constitution backwards because the burden is on the government to prove that it has the constitutional authority to force people to do things they don’t want to do.

Cato adjunct scholar Tim Sandefur, who authored an amicus brief in the case of Skilling v. U.S., writes on his home blog:

Today, the Supreme Court decided the case of Jeffrey Skilling, the CEO of Enron, who had been convicted of the crime of “honest services fraud.” The statute, however, is so vague, that nobody knows what the term “honest services fraud” actually means. Pacific Legal Foundation (joined by our friends at the Cato Institute) filed a brief in the case arguing that statutes that are so vague violate the constitutional guarantee of due process of law—and that the constitutional protection against vague laws should apply in the business realm the same as anywhere else. Vague laws are dangerous because you cannot know what they prohibit and cannot therefore avoid breaking the law. It is unfair and unconstitutional to hold vague statutes over their head in such a way.

Unfortunately, the Court has in the past been reluctant to apply it outside the regular criminal context, on the theory that businesses are wealthier and can afford expert legal advice. But in a case like this, even the experts have no idea what the statute actually means. The federal circuit courts are in disarray as to what it means. And nobody should be convicted under a statute that is so broadly and vaguely worded, that even the prosecuting lawyer can’t tell you what that law actually means.