Re: [Foucault-L] PRECISION Need reference: Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick

I agree with you entirely, Kevin. By "arbitrary" I intend only to say that
they are not given by nature, but are instead the result of human programs
and power (and that they could, therefore, be otherwise).
Nate

> Hi Nathan, Tiffany, et al,
>
> I agree with the general thrust of Nathan’s argument, but would just add
> that we need to exercise caution in using the word ”arbitrary.” On one
> level, certainly, such categories, classifications, self-identifications
> are completely arbitrary: they are historical constructs that do not refer
> to essences and could thus be otherwise. However, on another level, and
> precisely because they are historical construct, they are anything but
> arbitrary since they emerged out of very specific programmes for governing
> individuals, groups, and populations. They are political technologies that
> form objects of knowledge and sites of intervention; they are also, of
> course, technologies of the self.
>
> Affably Yours,
> Kevin
>
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: npr4@xxxxxxxxxxxx
> > Sent: Wed, 8 Feb 2012 10:07:34 +0530
> > To: foucault-l@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > Subject: Re: [Foucault-L] PRECISION Need reference: Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick
> >
> > On Wed, Feb 8, 2012 at 3:30 AM, Tiffany P.
> > <princeptiffany@xxxxxxxxxx>wrote:
> >
> >> To
> >> Nathaniel: I don't get what's wrong with your 3 propositions. I would
> >> even
> >> say
> >> I agree with all of them, I find these "categorizations" even more
> >> "natural" (meaning: intuitive) than the homo/hetero one. But maybe
> >> I'm too queer? Haha.
> >>
> >
> > Tiffany,
> >
> > Okay, so what do we mean by "more in common"? More in common **with
> > respect
> > to what**? More common with respect to sexual predilections? Yes,
> > certainly. But if that's all she's saying, she is hardly saying anything
> > at
> > all. In fact it's a complete tautology.
> >
> > Look, there are an awful lot of ways for two people to be like and unlike
> > each other, and I don't see how whether a person licks pussy or not (for
> > example) should outweigh all the others. Straight men are interpellated
> > in
> > a vast number of ways that are totally different than the way women are.
> > Sure, it is possible that one particular straight man who licks pussy may
> > have more in common with a particular woman who does. But Sedgwick is
> > saying that the mere fact of licking pussy means they will necessarily
> > have
> > more in common. And this strikes me as utterly absurd.
> >
> > So I ask: is her theoretical position simply that the kind of sexual acts
> > a
> > person likes to perform is categorically more important than any other
> > fact
> > about them? Is it more important than how they think about themselves?
> > How
> > they themselves feel about those acts? How their culture categorizes
> > them?
> >
> > Fine. Let that be her dogma. But I don't think there's any denying that
> > this is completely reductive. It's practically a paradigm case of
> > reductiveness. It not only reduces the whole of human existence to
> > behavior, but unlike the now discredited behaviorism (which at least took
> > into account the whole range of behaviors) it reduces everything even
> > further: to one type of behavior (chosen by the theorist herself).
> >
> > Ryan, your interpretation of what Sedgwick/Butler had in mind sounds much
> > more plausible to me. I am sure Sedgwick must not have meant the
> > statement
> > to be taken in a literal manner, but more as a provocation. I just happen
> > to be one of those people who values clarity and precision of thought and
> > writing. But to take up the more interesting angle you have suggested,
> > "because sexual acts cut across conventional sexual identities, they
> > reveal
> > the arbitrariness of those categories, and that erotic desire is not just
> > about who you want but also about what you want to do," I would just like
> > to add that the way we categorize sexual acts is just as arbitrary as the
> > way we categorize sexual identities. So although I accept that it may be
> > useful to pose the one against the other and see how they may conflict,
> > let
> > us not lose track of the fact that both involve arbitrary categories. And
> > it seems to me that a more fruitful avenue would be to move away from
> > ethological categories to ones that relevant to the people themselves
> > (i.e.
> > the people whose identities and acts Sedgwick and those she argue against
> > are categorizing).
> >
> > Cordially,
> > Nate
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