In 1995 the Islamic regime in Iran endured a year of economic hardship but domestic political quiescence. On January 20 Iran’s outstanding nonclerical political figure, Mehdi Bazargan, died. (See OBITUARIES.) He was the country’s first prime minister following the 1979 revolution and the only surviving secular leader accepted by the Islamic regime. His death left a marked gap in the ranks of the opposition, since few other Iranians had been permitted publicly to attack the regime with impunity. Ahmad Khomeini, son of the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, died on March 17. He represented an uncompromising face of the Islamic revolution, but his departure was not expected to significantly weaken the hard-line wing of the regime.

A major challenge to the authority of the government came in June when the trial began of officials accused of embezzling funds from the state-owned Bank Saderat. One of the defendants was Morteza Rafiqdoust, brother of Mohsen Rafiqdoust, the powerful head of the Foundation of the Oppressed (Bonyad Mostazafin & Janbazan). The trial added to public disquiet over allegations that officials in the Islamic Republic had consistently taken illicit pecuniary advantage of their positions. In July a senior mullah, Ayatollah Mahdavi Kani, resigned as secretary-general of the Society of Combatant Clerics, which suggested a trend toward a weakening of the direct role of senior religious leaders in political life. In August two bomb attacks occurred in Tehran, and in Ahvaz an oil pipeline was damaged in a separate incident. These bombings indicated that terrorism against the regime had not been entirely suppressed.

In foreign affairs the country remained a pariah state. Relations with the U.S. worsened as a result of an executive order by Pres. Bill Clinton in May that placed a ban on U.S. trade with Iran. Although allies of the U.S. did not adopt similar trade sanctions, other issues, such as the death sentence levied against novelist Salman Rushdie, gave cause for concern. An initiative by the European Union (EU) in June to get this death threat revoked failed, but the Iranian authorities noticeably played down the matter during the year. Nonetheless, the Norwegian ambassador was withdrawn from Tehran because of differences with Iran on the Rushdie affair. Commercial relations between the EU states and Iran improved.

In the Middle Eastern arena Iran continued to be regarded with suspicion. Tehran was entirely opposed to the Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement and maintained its moral and material support for Islamic fundamentalist causes across the region. Iran kept up a strong backing for the territorial integrity of Iraq despite its reservations concerning Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. The defection from Iraq of two of Hussein’s politically powerful sons-in-law and their families to Jordan was not welcomed in Iran. It was seen as a prelude to greater U.S. intervention in Iraq and possibly the unwelcome emergence there of a pro-U.S. government.

The domestic economy fared badly in 1995. Oil production ran at some 3.6 million bbl per day. The annual budget forecast oil revenues for the fiscal year from March 1995 to March 1996 at approximately $15 billion, with actual receipts in the first half of that period meeting the budgetary target. Other economic indicators were less promising. The currency came under great stress, partly as a result of the U.S. trade sanctions, and there was a marked fall in the value of the rial on the black market, which dropped at one stage to 6,000 rials to the U.S. dollar, against the official rate of 1,750 rials, used for the import of essential commodities. (The fixed rate of 3,000 rials was used for all other foreign transactions.) Attempts to ban private-sector dealings in foreign currency and to fix the rial at a stable rate were largely ineffectual and triggered a reshuffle of Pres. Hojatolislam Rafsanjani’s Cabinet in August. Inflation rose to 58.8%, according to the central bank, and even higher in practice. Iran’s foreign borrowing was at last brought under control but in total stood at more than $30 billion, according to British banking sources. Despite some improvement in exports of non-oil goods to $4 billion a year, the overall foreign exchange position was risky, and the government remained unable to initiate economic recovery for a population increasingly disillusioned with rising prices and deteriorating living standards. Keith S. McLachlan

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