A call
for foreign intervention is a cry for help by an embattled opposition walking a
shaky tightrope with a tough choice ahead.

In a recent
interview, Mr. Matar Matar, a US-based ex-MP belonging to Bahrain’s largest
Shiite Islamist opposition group AlWefaq, claimed that the policy espoused by
Bahrain’s King is one of “revenge, persecution and genocide”, insisting that
the solution for the country’s political stalemate, “should be forced from
outside after agreement by the regional powers, including the United States.”

Excessive sensationalism aside, Mr. Matar’s
plea for a foreign-imposed solution to the country’s political impasse reads
like a cry for help by an embattled AlWefaq that, in spite of itself, is having to
walk the shaky tightrope between engaging with the government and maintaining
popularity amongst its disgruntled Shiite constituency.

More importantly, AlWefaq’s call for a
foreign-imposed solution reflects in my view its inability to act pragmatically
and review its position in a manner that takes into account Bahrain’s new power
configuration – one in which it no longer holds a dominant position. More than a year
and a half has elapsed since the pre-dominantly Shiite February 14 uprising
first erupted, a period during which the balance of power in Bahrain’s
political landscape has tilted alternately in favour of either the government
or the opposition, even giving birth to an increasingly unpredictable and vocal
Sunni
political movement.

The Bahrain Independent Commission
of Inquiry’s report (articles 452 and 485-488) recounts how at the height
of its power, roughly between mid-February and mid-March 2011, AlWefaq felt it
was in a position that enabled it to declare to its interlocutor the Crown
Prince that its demands were non-negotiable and that it was opposed to the idea
of entering a national dialogue inclusive of other groups in society, in
reference mainly to the Sunnis.

After weeks of relentless efforts, talks
between the Crown Prince and the opposition finally broke down on the March 13,
2011 when AlWefaq’s patriarch and the country’s foremost Shiite religious
leader Ayatollah Isa Qassim chose to exercise his veto power against them.

Today however, following a highly criticized
security campaign by the government that most recently culminated in a temporary
ban on protests and the revocation
of the citizenships of 31 opposition activists, the opposition including
AlWefaq can hardly be thought of as being in a position of strength. Yet,
AlWefaq has failed to act pragmatically and to articulate, publicly at least, a
more realistic set of demands, acceptable to both the government and Sunni
groups, that reflects the country’s new political reality, thereby doing little
to help end the stalemate.

Some question, however, AlWefaq’s ability to
negotiate effectively with its counterparts, particularly since its capacity to
win over support from the international community and to lead its own Shiite constituency
seems considerably constrained.

Conversely, incidents like the recent set
of terrorist bomb attacks that took two civilian lives are more likely to have induced
the international community to view the opposition with suspicion. To makes
things worse for itself, AlWefaq’s
initial knee jerk reaction to news of the terror attack was to question whether
the incident ever took place; Mr. Matar Matar himself suggested it was either a
government-orchestrated plot or an act committed by rogue police or a military
unit. Apparently succumbing to international pressure though, AlWefaq and its allies issued a statement
two days later condemning violence and advocating peaceful means for dissent
instead.

Others have begun to question the
effectiveness with which AlWefaq
might persuade its Shiite constituency eventually to accept a deal with the
government if one were to be made. Radical groups such as the obscure February
14 youth, Haqq and Wafa who compete over legitimacy within the largely
discontented Shiite community appear to have managed to outflank AlWefaq. Lest
it lose popular support, AlWefaq seems at times unable to avoid direct
confrontation with the government. Clearly, AlWefaq’s ordeal is exacerbated by the
ongoing pro-government
demonization campaign directed against the opposition and its leading
cleric, Ayatollah Isa Qassim.

AlWefaq has a tough choice ahead. Either to
accept Bahrain’s old-ish new political reality, partially revert back to its
pre-February 14 discourse of engagement with the government but risk losing
popular support from within the Shiite community. Or, further align itself with
more radical revolutionary groups, but lose international goodwill and risk irrelevancy
in an arguably sustainable state of low-level street violence in which the
government maintains the upper hand.

About the author

Hasan Tariq Al Hasan is a
Bahrain-based economic and political analyst.

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