DRAWING BACK THE CURTAIN OF SECRECY

RESTRICTED DATA DECLASSIFICATION DECISIONS
1946 TO THE PRESENT

(RDD-5)

January 1, 1999

U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Declassification

NOTICE

This document provides a historical perspective on the sequence of declassification actions
performed by the Department of Energy and its predecessor agencies. It is meant to convey the
amount and types of information declassified over the years. Although the language of the
original declassification authorities is cited verbatim as much as possible to preserve the
historical intent of the declassification, THIS DOCUMENT IS NOT TO BE USED AS THE
BASIS FOR DECLASSIFYING DOCUMENTS AND MATERIALS without specific
authorization from the Office of Declassification. Classification guides designed for
that specific purpose must be used.

This document supersedes Drawing Back the Curtain of Secrecy, Restricted Data Declassification Policy - 1946 To The Present (RDD-4), January 1, 1998. This is the fifth edition of the document first published in June 1994. The Office of Declassification anticipates periodic updates to this document. This edition includes editorial corrections to RDD-4, all declassification actions that have been made since the January 1, 1998, publication date of RDD-4 and additional declassification actions which were subsequently discovered or confirmed.

A New Approach:The breakup of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War, and other national and international events of recent history have enabled our national leadership to reconsider the constraints placed on both classified and unclassified Government information. The Department of Energy is committed to an openness program under Secretary Richardson. The openness program involves a comprehensive concerted effort to declassify and release information to the public consistent with the requirements of national security.

In furtherance of this openness program, a comprehensive review of the Department's classification policy toward information concerning defense applications of nuclear technology was under taken in March 1995. The Fundamental Classification Policy Review was tasked to determine which information required continued protection, with the objective of declassifying and releasing all information no longer warranting such protection. Technical experts from the weapon laboratories and representatives from the Department of Defense and other government agencies participated in the study. More than 70 recommendations for declassification of weapons-related information were made. Those declassification actions that have been formally approved by the date of this document, any other declassifications that have been made since publication of RDD-4, and recently found declassified information from earlier years are included in this document and are identified by a vertical line in the left margin. The older declassifications are inserted chronologically in the appropriate chapter.

For the initial edition of the RDD series (RDD-1), a search of the Department's files for all previous declassification actions was made. The result of this search was a document which provided a compilation of information regarding the topics which had been declassified over the years up to the date of publication. This update of that document continues to provide historical perspective on the sequence of declassification actions performed by the Department of Energy and its predecessor agencies. It is meant to convey the amount and types of information declassified over the years. Although the language of the original declassification authorities are cited verbatim as much as possible to preserve the historical intent of the declassifications, this document is not intended nor does it provide the reader sufficient basis or authority to decide whether other documents are classified or not. These decisions can only be made by specially trained individuals who are certified by the DOE as authorized derivative declassifiers. Nevertheless, it is hoped that this document will help enlighten the public on the technical policy decisions that underlie the Department's formidable classification responsibility. Public input is welcomed regarding how the Department may release information of legitimate interest to the public, while maintaining control of information important to national security.

Historical Background: The first atomic detonation, test shot Trinity, on July 16, 1945, near Alamagordo, New Mexico, was a device developed and produced under the Manhattan Project. This was followed at Hiroshima, Japan, on August 6, 1945, and Nagasaki, Japan, on August 9, 1945; these detonations heralded the end of World War II. Immediately following World War II, the academic and industrial sectors of the country placed considerable pressure to declassify and release information developed during the Manhattan Project. It is well to remember that at this point in time there was no Atomic Energy Act, no Atomic Energy Commission, and no Restricted Data category of information.

In November 1945, General L. R. Groves, head of the Manhattan Project, asked Dr. R. C. Tolman to develop a declassification policy for the classified information which had been developed to date. Dr. Tolman, who was the Dean of the Graduate School at the California Institute of Technology and had served as a science advisor to General Groves during the war, selected a distinguished group to help him in this task. The Tolman Committee developed declassification guidance that was accepted by General Groves and published in March 1946 as a Declassification Guide for Responsible Reviewers. The declassification guidance for the year 1946 is based on the work of the Tolman Committee. The outline of topics used in the 1946 declassification guidance provided the basic outline for the topics in this compendium. Modifications have been made to accommodate additional categories of information which have been declassified since that time.

The Atomic Energy Act, approved on August 1, 1946, established the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and provided the historical and legal basis for its successor agencies, the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) (January 20, 1975, through September 30, 1977) and the current Department of Energy. Among other things, it recognized the need for the close relationship between the AEC and the Department of Defense (DOD), and has facilitated the approval of joint AEC/DOD guides containing classification and declassification actions for almost a half century. The Act also recognized that classified atomic energy information is of a special and unique type, identified it as a new and distinct category, "Restricted Data," and defined this category as all data concerning the manufacture or utilization of atomic weapons, the production of fissionable material, or the use of fissionable material in the production of power other than that information that had been declassified by an appropriate authority.

The first International Declassification Conference was held in Washington, D.C., November 14, 15, and 16, 1947, among representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada to discuss revisions to the Declassification Guide for Responsible Reviewers. As a result of that meeting a revised guide was adopted and published as the Declassification Guide for General Application, dated March 15, 1948.

The Commission established the Weapon Effects Classification Board in August 1948, to determine the proper classification of nuclear weapon effects. Under the chairmanship of Dr. N. E. Bradbury, the Board met at Los Alamos on August 13, 1948 and recommended classification guidance for the weapon effects area. This guidance was used to declassify certain items of information recommended by the Board.

The 1946 Atomic Energy Act was amended and enacted as the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Among other things, the new Act modified the definition of Restricted Data to include "design" of atomic weapons and changed the words "fissionable material" to "special nuclear material." It also provided for the declassification of Restricted Data following a determination that such information can be published without undue risk to the common defense and security. In addition, this 1954 Act provided for the transclassification of information related primarily to the military utilization of atomic weapons. Transclassification changes the information from Restricted Data to Formerly Restricted Data and causes it to be protected as National Security Information except when it is exchanged with a foreign country. These different categories of information are all classified but have different security requirements based on the sensitivity of information in each category.

Information Versus Documents. In the discussion of classified matters, it is important to note the distinction between "information" and "documents." Information is regarded as facts, data, or knowledge, whereas documents or material are the means through which information is conveyed. When an item of Restricted Data information is declassified, that bit of declassified information becomes eligible for public release regardless of the nature of the documents of which it may be a part. A classified document will always contain some classified information, will normally contain some unclassified information, and may contain declassified information. Such a document cannot be released until all of the classified information is deleted. The declassification of an item of information may result in the release of an entire undeleted document; then again, the declassification may have little effect due to the continued classified nature of the remaining document content. Likewise, sensitive unclassified information of many kinds contained in a document may preclude full release of the document.

Public Release. The philosophy of declassification and release of information changed with the passage of time. In view of national objectives in the 1940s, literally everything concerning atomic energy programs was classified. Immediately after World War II, an effort was made to remove many of the constraints on information concerning nuclear chemistry, metallurgy, physics, etc. This was followed by declassification of certain information regarding nuclear weapons tests, reactors, materials production, and even some weapon design and utilization data. However, declassification of information did not necessarily equate to its public release. As scientists ascertained that certain information had been declassified, they published reports, attended meetings, and, indeed, spread the word about their specific area of interest. But, for the greatest part, the fact that information was declassified went only to classification officers whose duties required it; seldom did such action reach the attention of the public in general.

Customers Use. The publication of this compendium is intended to provide information about which the public may have been generally unaware. It is felt that many people do not know that there have been declassification actions since the beginning of the atomic age, especially since most of these actions were considered to be of little interest to the public as a whole and, therefore, were not publicly announced. The document at hand provides a description of the declassification actions that are known to have been taken.

In addition to enhancing the knowledge of the general public, this document should be of interest and utility to historical researchers and individuals who are interested in information security. Perhaps it contains bits of information which may add to the larger picture or even solve certain problems encountered. Its value in this area can only be assessed at a point in the future.

Explanation of sources. This document is the result of a search reaching back for over half a century. During that time, the records were maintained under three Government agencies with differing goals and philosophies. The files were also affected by several internal reorganizations, relocations, amendments to document retention regulations, and complete personnel changes at all levels. However, with the able assistance of those responsible for records maintenance, the voluminous data contained in this document was recovered from the files.

The declassification actions were gleaned from many and varied source documents. They included staff papers, minutes of meetings, action memorandums, correspondence, classification and declassification guides, press releases, and classification bulletins. While the declassification actions themselves are not classified, most of their source documents remain classified due to the remainder of their content. Topics in this compilation are quotes from the original source documents to the extent possible. Where an exact quote is not possible, the editorial adjustments made for clarity have been kept to a minimum consistent with maintaining the intent of the declassification action. Some topics may appear terse, non-explanatory, incomplete or inconsistent, but they are copied as exactly as possible from their source document.

Each topic is followed by a reference number indicating the year of the declassification and its place in the chronological order of declassification actions for that year. For example, 49-2 is the second declassification action in 1949. Some declassification actions contain only a single topic, while most are actions with multiple topics. In addition, many topics list exceptions to the declassification action. The exceptions identify information which remained classified as of the date of the declassification action. These exceptions are printed in italics in this compendium. In many cases, the excepted topics were subsequently declassified in whole or in part. These subsequent declassifications are listed below the original topic where possible.

As time has passed, many declassified topics were superseded by more recent declassifications. Early day exceptions often no longer apply; they have been overtaken by other events. For example, in 1955 the only declassified information concerning the Controlled Thermonuclear Reactor was the fact of interest in such a program and the sites where work was underway. In 1959, all information regarding this program was declassified. There are many such examples, but, in the interest of completeness, this compendium incorporates all of the declassifications uncovered.

Users of this compilation should note that it is possible that the files hold other declassification actions which have not yet been discovered. This new edition provides a case in point. Recent discoveries of a previously overlooked series of classification bulletins issued during a nine-year period from 1957 to 1966 provide many new entries. While not generally very broad, these declassifications do fill in gaps in the declassification histories of several programs. As additional topics are declassified or previously undiscovered declassification actions are found, they will be included in the next edition of the compendium.

Although this compendium contains declassification actions for weapon test yields where declassification documentation could be located, it is clear that not all weapon test yields are included. For those that are included, the quoted yields may have been based on early estimates that were later refined as more information was obtained. For these reasons, a better source of weapon test information can be found in document DOE/NV-209 (Rev, 14) dated December 1994.

This document has been approved and issued by the Office of Declassification (NN-52). Comments, recommendations, and requests for copies should be sent to the following address:

It has long been the policy of the Department of Energy and its predecessor agencies to conduct as much of its research and development work as possible on an unclassified basis. This policy is meant to promote the free interchange of ideas essential to scientific and industrial progress while assuring that classified information is not compromised. To this end, guides have been issued to assist in the identification of the fields of research and development that are unclassified or have been declassified. RDD-5 provides a historical perspective on the sequence of declassification actions performed by the Department of Energy and its predecessor agencies. It is meant to convey the amount and types of information declassified over the years. The language of the original declassification authorities is cited verbatim as much as possible to preserve the historical intent of the declassification. In recognition of RDD-5's utility as the sole source for documenting certain declassification actions, all Derivative Declassifiers are authorized to use RDD-5 as a basis for declassifying documents and material. Because RDD-5 does not contain the detailed context for declassification actions found in guides and bulletins, it is intended that this authority be used sparingly and in accordance with the following guidelines. Derivative Declassifiers should use RDD-5 as a basis for declassification only when:

- no other classification guidance exists;

- the information being reviewed falls in a classified subject area identified in the Derivative Declassifiers current description of authority or in an area that has no potential of containing classified or unclassified sensitive information (e.g., commercial reactors, biological effects of radiation, uranium mining and milling, etc.); and

- the declassification action identified in RDD-5 clearly pertains to the information being reviewed.

If there is any doubt as to the relevance of an RDD-5 topic or the availability of other guidance, the local classification officer, classification representative, or the Office of Declassification should be consulted. When RDD-5 is used as a basis for declassifying documents or materials, it should be cited as such. RDD-5 is the source of last resort when making declassification decisions.

The following is a list of subject areas which are, for the most part, unclassified. It must be recognized that there may be facets of each which must remain classified because of the relationship with nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, or nuclear propulsion programs.

The fact, time, location, and yield range (e.g., less than 20 kiloton or 20-150 kiloton) of U.S. nuclear tests;

General descriptions of nuclear material production processes and theory of operation;

DOE special nuclear material aggregate inventories and production rates not revealing size or details concerning the nuclear weapons stockpile;

Types of waste products resulting from all DOE weapon and material production operations;

Operations solely relating to the public and worker health and safety or to environmental quality; and

Heavy water production technology.

These unclassified subject areas relate only to information that was once within the Restricted Data definition. It is obvious that many cover basic scientific information that has always been unclassified and publicly available.

This document addresses information previously classified as Restricted Data, and includes no information classified under any other information control system.

Information within the scope of publications, "Atomic Energy for Military Purposes," by Dr. H. D. Smyth, and other accredited releases concerned with project information. (46-1)

Information already published in scientific or technical literature which was developed outside the Manhattan Project. (It must be fully understood that the mention of particular subject matter in the Smyth Report or in the scientific or technical literature does not make it proper to release information beyond that which is actually disclosed in the publication concerned. Furthermore, unaccredited publication of classified Project scientific or technical information does not constitute authority for declassification or for repeated publication of that information.) (46-1)

Mass spectrograph and other methods of isotopic analysis, including analytical procedures and special instruments provided the procedure does not permit an accuracy of analysis better than 0.1% of the isotopic abundance for heavy elements. (Care must be taken not to reveal classified purity specifications.) (48-1)

Physical instrumentation and chemical and metallurgical techniques provided they do not reveal otherwise classified data. (47-1)

All chemistry of non-classified substances not directly involved in production or utilization of fissionable materials and all methods of chemical analysis provided these do not reveal process details by inference. (47-1)

The basic chemistry of all elements if not restricted by the following topics: (48-1)

Reactions used, or alternates reasonably employable, in the classified technology of classified materials.

Modifications through variations in reagents, reaction conditions, or equipment of general methods already employed in a classified process.

New procedures reasonably employable as technological processes for the preparation of classified materials.

Procedures used, or reasonably employable in a direct way, as analytical controls in classified processes.

Effects of Radiation

Physical and chemical effects of high energy levels of radiation on matter, except for special construction materials and chemicals used in production processes. The values of radiation levels in production piles should not be released. (46-1)

Basic studies of the chemical and physical effects of radiation but restricted by the classified information described by the following topics: (48-1)

(1)

The effect of intense radiation on structural properties of reactor materials and all important accessory reactor equipment (such as graphite or materials used in the instrumentation inside the reactor).

(2)

The technologically important effects of intense radiation on chemical substances as employed or reasonably employable in the extraction and purification chemistry of elements 90 and above in production and pilot plants.

All theory on the effects of radiation on materials except for theoretical recipes specifically intended to fit substances of special significance to the Project. (Care should be taken that classified experimental information is not revealed either by inclusion or by implication.) (50-4)

All effects of radiation on all substances, including basic studies of the chemical effects of radiation, except where limitations are stated in the examples below: (50-3), (50-4)

(1)

Electrical thermal conductivities, except for materials of special interest for reactors, such as possible refractories.

(2)

Hall effect.

(3)

All effects in semi-conductors.

(4)

Mechanical properties, except for creep data directly applicable to the design of reactors obtained under condition of pile irradiation or thermal effects in reactor fuel elements.

The extra-nuclear properties of all elements of atomic number 90 and above as well as their alloys, mixtures and compounds.

(c)

The extra-nuclear characteristics in fuel-bearing solutions, slurries or suspensions and in reactor fuel elements and critical reactor components.

(8)

The effect of radiation on the properties of solvents and other chemicals used in the extraction and decontamination of fissionable materials, although it is not intended to prohibit declassification of properties which are of no vital importance to the process. (Water is excluded provided conditions in reactors are not revealed).

(9)

Effects of radiation on the corrosion characteristics and heat transfer properties of coolant systems, although it is not intended to prohibit declassification of properties of basic scientific value provided these are not vital to reactor development.

Pure and applied chemistry including analytical chemistry of all elements except: (50-3) (50-4)

Analytical techniques for the detection of critical impurities in liquid metal coolants.

The quantitative aspects of the use of organic solvents, or complexing agents on elements 93 and above.

Technological application of ion-exchange studies for all elements of atomic number 90 and above.

Procedures reasonably employable in the technology of source or fissionable material or weapons, or the alternates or modifications of such procedures.

New procedures, reasonably employable in the preparation of source or fissionable material or weapon components, or important to the improvement of the process.

Important new extraction processes for uranium or thorium from either low-grade or intermediate-grade raw materials.

Important new methods and processes for separation of zirconium from zirconium-hafnium mixtures.

Overall details, flow sheets, diagrams, production rates, operating procedure and policy, engineering and construction data, of production and pilot plants making special materials for the Project.

Special precautions taken in plants producing fissionable materials with respect to critical mass.

The production technology of the following substances: deuterium, tritium, special high-purity graphite, fission products, polonium, actinium, thorium metal, uranium metal, the compounds UF6 and UCl4, the isotopes U233 and U235, plutonium and its compounds, and alloys, compounds or mixtures containing fissionable materials intended for use as fuel elements. This includes description of actual manufacturing operations, or reasonable alternates, and laboratory work from which the nature of these operations could be clearly inferred. Amounts of these vital materials less than certain established minimal quantities need not be considered classified.

NOTE: This does not prohibit the release of information on the laboratory-scale separation of the fission products from one another. Care must be exercised not to reveal information regarding the large-scale production of specific radioactive products of fission. It is not intended to prevent the release of basic physical and chemical work concerned with irradiation of materials which could be used for the production of tritium, nor the methods of handling tritium gas on a small scale.

The use of organic solvents and complexing agents on all elements. (The significance to project technology of these agents and solvents should not be stated or implied.) Also refer to I.C.11.a. above. (50-3) (50-4)

The analysis of source and fissionable materials for other elements, excepting those prohibited by I.C.11.f.(1) and (2) above. (50-3) (50-4)

The analysis of source and fissionable materials as minor constituents of samples, provided process or other critical information is not revealed. (50-3) (50-4)

Improvements in existing unclassified extraction processes for uranium or thorium from intermediate-grade raw materials. Major improvements should be subject to review prior to their unclassified use. (50-3) (50-4)

Methods for the analysis of gold and mercury in source, fissionable and reactor materials since such data are already fully covered in the open literature. (53-6)

All nuclear and extra-nuclear properties of all isotopes except those prohibited by the following topic and in Tables A and B. (48-1) (Tables A and B are located in Appendix A.)

(1)

Spontaneous fission of all elements of atomic number 90 or above. Number of neutrons released per fission and thresholds and cross-sections for fission induced by neutrons below 25 Mev energy in all elements of atomic number 90 or above.

Quantitative information on all thermal (n, gamma) reactions and reactions on all isotopes where Z is 90 or greater, except where the following nuclei are targets: (50-1)

(1)

U235 for which no information about these reactions may be released.

(2)

U233, U234, U236, Pu239 and Pu240 for which only the existence of the reactions may be released. (50-1)

All nuclear and extra nuclear properties of all isotopes except as prohibited by the following topics. (50-3) (50-4)

(1)

The nuclear properties of U233, U235, U236, U238, Pu239 and Pu240 except as permitted by topics II.H.7 through II.H.10, II.L.4. through II.L.7 below, and Appendix B.

(2)

The neutron absorption cross section of Xe135 for all energies.

(3)

The absorption cross section, for thermal neutrons, of carbon isotopes, of their natural mixture, and of high purity graphite specifically manufactured for use as a moderator, except as permitted by topic I.D.1.f. below.

Yield information must be expressed only in terms of numbers of particles per fission and not in terms of partial cross sections, in case the particular fission cross section is not declassifiable. (50-4)

Any information on neutron cross sections concerning carbon or graphite which does not reveal a thermal cross section of less than 4.5 mb. (50-4)

Elementary theory of neutron diffusion and general pile theory. (47-1)

It is the intent of these topics to release only that information which is of particular value for teaching the basic theoretical principles of reactors and for describing the use of these reactors as tools for scientific research. This excludes the release of information on the design of small reactors. (48-1)

(1)

The theory and methods of measurement of criticality and fluctuations insofar as they do not release knowledge of such quantities as the number of neutrons per fission. (48-1)

(2)

The theory of control rods for reactors. (48-1)

(3)

All theoretical methods of treating neutron diffusion and slowing down problems for stationary media. Care should be exercised that examples cited do not involve semi-empirical methods leading to the calculation of the optimum lattice structures of chain reacting systems. Furthermore, great care must be exercised not to reveal empirical constants or give too narrow a range of values when citing examples. (Declassification of any work carried out directly or indirectly for Los Alamos must have written approval from the Director of the Los Alamos Laboratory.) (48-1)

(4)

The theory and results obtained from the sigma pile but not those from exponential piles. The theory of exponential experiments and the results obtained from their use for determining the design and operating characteristics of reactors must remain classified. (48-1)

Experimental studies of the equation of state of all elements with atomic number less than 90 provided the methods used do not reveal information about applications or methods of use of items critical in the construction of weapons. (50-3) (50-4)

Theoretical methods for calculating opacities. (50-3) (50-4)

Theory of blast in air but without reference to theory and design of weapons. (50-3)

Experimental methods of studying air blast but without reference to theory and design of weapons, application or methods of use of items critical in the construction of weapons, or destructive effects of specific bombs except those already used. (50-3)

All theoretical methods of treating neutron diffusion and slowing down problems for stationary media. Care should be exercised that examples do not disclose constants whose release is prohibited. (50-4)

Reactor theory applicable to those reactors listed below1 including the calculation of optimum lattice structures when illustrated by values permitted under topics I.D.1.e., II.H.7, II.H.9, and II.L.4. (50-4)

Slowing down calculations involving neutrons produced from the thermal fission of U235 or neutrons from non-fission sources. (50-4)

The equation of state studies for all elements under conditions other than those revealing classified information. (67-1)

Information on equations of state and opacities of certain materials not of significance to weapon design. (72-11)

The calculated equation of state (EOS) data from theoretical models for certain materials (for Z less than 72 all materials; but for Z=72 and higher, only materials at pressures whose EOS data is not useful for designing nuclear weapons). (83-6)

Information concerning Equation-of-State (EOS).

(1)

Static data for Z of 93 and 94 at pressures equal to or less than 20 kb. (89-1)

(2)

Static data for Z greater than 94 at pressures equal to or less than 1 mb. (89-1)

Metallurgical techniques for elements below 90 excepting polonium. (If a treatment of an element substantially parallels a treatment of a classified element, this must not be stated or implied.) (48-1)

Ceramics without reference to uranium or plutonium production. (46-1)

Ceramic techniques except as prohibited by the following topics. (48-1)

(1)

The use of particular ceramic materials in the production or utilization of fissionable materials.

(2)

The development or manufacture of new ceramic materials specifically designed for the production or utilization of fissionable materials.

Physical instrumentation and chemical and metallurgical techniques provided they do not reveal otherwise classified data. (47-1)

Physical and process metallurgy and fabricating techniques of elements 89 and below. (This permits the declassification of metallurgical techniques, even if the treatment substantially parallels the metallurgy of an element above 89, provided this parallel is not stated or implied.)2 (50-4)

Crystal structures of all metal and alloy phases except data on changes in the extra-nuclear characteristics produced by ionizing radiations of energy above 1 Kev and by neutrons on fuel bearing solutions, slurries or suspensions and on reactor fuel elements and critical reactor components.

Physical and mechanical properties, such as density, thermal expansion, melting point, elasticity, electrical and thermal conductivities, magnetic properties, self diffusion, etc. (Care must be taken that anisotropic effects important in reactor technology are not revealed.)

Deformation mechanisms of single crystals.

All information in the field of ceramics, whether of a fundamental or applied character except ceramic substances which are specifically developed for the production or technological use of fissionable materials. (This topic is not intended to restrict unclassified development of high temperature ceramics for power piles or other devices.) (50-3) (50-4)

The use of MgO crucibles having a capacity of 50cc or less for metallurgical studies provided that this does not disclose the purity specifications required for uranium or plutonium technologies. (50-3) (50-4)

Physical instrumentation which may be of use in the laboratory practices of the country. Care should be taken that the motivation for developing the instruments and the applications for which they were used should be disclosed only when the application itself is declassified. (46-1)

Examples:

-

Counters.

-

Ionization chambers.

-

Energy-insensitive neutron detectors.

-

Mass spectrographs.

-

Electronic circuits.

-

Electric controls and circuits of all kinds.

-

Cyclotrons, Van de Graaff and other ion accelerators.

-

Special sources of neutrons and gamma rays omitting reference to their applications.

Physical instrumentation and chemical and metallurgical techniques provided they do not reveal otherwise classified data. (47-1)

Physical instrumentation which may be of use in the laboratory or industrial practice of the country. (Care should be taken that the motivation for developing theinstruments and the applications for which they were used are disclosed only when the application itself is declassified.) (48-1)

Examples:

-

Counters

-

Ionization Chambers

-

Neutron detectors including fission chambers used for this purpose. (Care must be exercised not to reveal classified properties of the fissionable materials.)

-

Mass Spectrographs (However, see I.F.4. below)

-

Electronic circuits

-

Electric controls and circuits of all kinds

-

Cyclotrons, Van de Graaffs, betatrons and other particle accelerators.

-

Sources of neutrons and gamma rays and sources of neutrons, omitting reference to their classified applications and excepting production technology and methods of handling high intensity gamma ray sources intended for classified applications.

Mass spectrograph and other methods of isotopic analysis, including analytical procedures and special instruments provided the procedure does not permit an accuracy of analysis better than 0.1% of the isotopic abundance for heavy elements. (Care must be taken not to reveal classified purity specifications). (48-1) (50-4)

Vacuum equipment such as diffusion pumps, oils, gaskets, gauges, and leak detectors without reference to application in classified plants. (48-1)

The related fact that complex and bulky cryogenic equipment was associated with the Mike test. (74-5)

The catalytic chemical exchange, water distillation, hydrogen distillation, and electrolytic processes for the large scale production of heavy water. (53-3)

The composition of the catalyst and the design and actual production rates for the entire Trail plant. (53-3)

The design production rates of the catalytic chemical exchange, water distillation, (except for Savannah and Dana), and hydrogen distillation process plants and the electrolytic process plants associated with them. (53-3)

Sale price of D20. (55-1)

A reasonable sale price ($28.00 per pound) for heavy water. (55-4)

All information on the production technology of heavy water. (56-6)

The fact of boosting, the fact that deuterium and tritium are used as boosting fuels in High Explosive Assembly weapons and that they are contained in components known as reservoirs or cartridges which are shipped between the Savannah River Plant and the AEC weapon facilities, the military and the United Kingdom. (72-11)

Fact that gaseous deuterium (D) and tritium (T) are used as boosting fuel. (83-2)

The fact that the thermonuclear fuel used in the Mike test (10/31/52) of the Ivy series was liquid deuterium. (74-5)

The fact that the tritium - deuterium mixture of the George test (5/8/51), the first thermonuclear test explosion, burned well. (74-8)

Production of critical materials; tritium (H3): Quantities up to and including 40 liters total. (53-4)

Research scale methods for the production of tritium and helium-3. (53-6)

The fact that the U.S. has a large-scale tritium production program. (59-17)

The fact that the Savannah River plant is the center of U.S. tritium production activities. (59-17)

The USAEC has a tritium production program which is centered mainly at Savannah River, Georgia. Tritium is produced in the United States in amounts beyond that produced incidentally in reactors. The operation of tritium plants and the handling of tritium involves the loss of a fraction of the tritium, some of which escapes into the atmosphere. There is no reason to believe that other countries producing tritium are more successful in avoiding a similar loss. The tritium escaping into the atmosphere may compete with cosmic ray and bomb tritium in atmospheric tracer studies. (60-2)

The fact that tritium in unspecified form is shipped in containers or reservoirs from Savannah River Operations. (67-1)

Distribution of tritium on the surface in the vicinity of the [Greenland] crash (excluding that picked up on aircraft debris) (69-2)

Enclosed Area1(square meters)

Tritium Deposition2

(Curies) :

(% of total)

1.97 x 1031.10 x 1042.49 x 1043.90 x 104

365
657
986
1337

27.2
49.1
73.7
100

1Consecutively larger areas corresponding to the fall-out pattern.

2Total out to the specified boundary.

The fact of boosting, the fact that deuterium and tritium are used as boosting fuels in HEA weapons and that they are contained in components known as reservoirs or cartridges which are shipped between the Savannah River Plant and the AEC weapon facilities, the military and the United Kingdom. (72-11)

Fact that gaseous deuterium (D) and tritium (T) are used as boosting fuel. (83-2)

The fact that compounds of Li6 containing tritium are used in the design of weapons as TN fuel. (72-11)

The fact that the tritium - deuterium mixture of the George test (5/8/51), the first thermonuclear test explosion, burned well. (74-8)

The fact that the Contingency Tritium Production Program (CTPP) contemplated the possible use of commercial Light Water Reactors in the production of tritium. (89-2)

Fact that tritium is associated with some unspecified pits. (92-4)

The fact that some unspecified pits include or contain tritium, no further elaboration. (94-14)

As part of the 1958 United States - United Kingdom Mutual Defense Agreement, there have been three barter agreements. The United States received plutonium totaling 5,366 kilograms from the United Kingdom under the Barter A, B, and C Agreements during the period 1960 - 1979. The United States gave the United Kingdom 6.7 kilograms of tritium and 7,500 kilograms of highly enriched uranium for the plutonium. (94-15)

The amount of tritium in a reservoir is typically less than 20 gm. (95-5)

Mint was the material nickname for tritium. (96-2)

For the palladium diffusion process - detailed sequence of operations, including times, temperatures, or pressures used for primary separation where the nominal conditions are: a temperature of 400 °C, atmospheric pressure, and a nominal throughput rate of less than 5 standard litres per minute, provided accurate production rate of tritium (T) is not revealed. (98-14)

For the Thermal Cycling and Absorption Process (TCAP) - detailed (quantitative) sequence of operations (processing parameters), including, but not limited to, times, temperatures, or pressures, where: the nominal temperature range is from -50 to 150 °C, operating pressures range from atmospheric to 8 atmospheres, nominal throughput is 0.5 standard litres per minute, provided accurate production rate of T is not revealed. (98-14)

For the thermal diffusion process - detailed (quantitative) sequence of operations, including temperature, pressure, or times of operation used for the thermal diffusion column, where: the nominal temperature range is 1000 °C, nominal pressure is atmospheric, and nominal throughput is 0.1 standard litres per minute, provided accurate production rate of T is not revealed. (98-14)

For tritium transfer and storage by the metal hydride process - times, temperatures, or pressures used in metal hydride or other systems for general storing and pumping of tritium, if the nominal temperatures range from -50 to 500 °C, and nominal pressures are from 0 to 2.5 atmospheres providing inventories in storage beds can not be determined. (98-14)

Energies, angular distributions and numbers per fission of protons, alpha particles and prompt gamma rays; and relative yields and energies of delayed neutrons.

Frequency of occurrence of ternary and quaternary fission and angular distribution of fragments.

NOTE: Yield information must be expressed only in terms of numbers of particles per fission and not in terms of partial cross sections in case the particular fission cross section is not declassifiable.

Technical efforts on development of new standard operating procedures for the above when carried on in specific equipment for production.

All information concerning the conversion of ore concentrates to uranium metal at the Destrehan Street, St. Louis and the Weldon Spring, Mo. feed materials facilities. Maintain as classified technological details concerning the process used at Fernald. This declassification does not include production rates for years prior to 1955. (58-12)

Past and current production rates or capacities concerning these same facilities for the production of uranium metal and intermediate compounds. (58-12)

The fact that the Commission is stockpiling uranium ore concentrates. (59-13)

Statistics on the production and procurement of U3O8. (59-14)

Use in weapons of normal, depleted or fully enriched uranium and the identification of the fissionable materials used in a specific fission weapon. (59-16)

All details of imports of uranium and thorium ores and concentrates (60-5)

The existence of 97.5% highly enriched uranium (HEU); the fact that it is produced at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant for use in weapons research and development; and the fact that it may be used in a device for NTS test. (62-1)

Fact of use in specified or unspecified weapons of normal uranium or depleted uranium of any assay. (67-1)

Uranium-zirconium hydride reactor technology (SNAP). (72-3)

The quantity of depleted uranium on-site and processed at Rocky Flats, as represented by periodic inventory data and processing totals, as long as weapons design, production rate or quantities, or other classified information that is protected by classified inventory data is not revealed. (94-6)

The fact that intermediate enrichments of uranium are used in U.S. nuclear weapons. (94-10)

The amount of uranium element that was enriched by the Portsmouth and K-25 Gaseous Diffusion Plants to above 20 percent in U235. (94-10)

The total Y-12 highly enriched uranium inventory as of December 31, 1993 in terms of the quantity of uranium element enriched to above 20 percent in U235. Also declassified is the maximum amount of enriched uranium stored at the Y-12 plant in the past. (94-10)

The total current Portsmouth uranium inventory enriched to 20 percent U235 and above, expressed in terms of uranium element. (94-10)

The Rocky Flats Plant current total uranium inventory enriched to over 20 percent, provided quantities in weapons components or other classified data is not revealed. (94-10)

As part of the 1958 United States - United Kingdom Mutual Defense Agreement, there have been three barter agreements. The United States received plutonium totaling 5,366 kilograms from the United Kingdom under the Barter A, B, and C Agreements during the period 1960 - 1979. The United States gave the United Kingdom 6.7 kilograms of tritium and 7,500 kilograms of highly enriched uranium for the plutonium. (94-15)

The quantities of uranium, actual or planned, from the U.S. nuclear weapons program, that is enriched to greater than 20 percent in U235, that will be offered to the International Atomic Energy Agency for inspection or used for other unclassified purposes. (94-16)

The specific assays of intermediate enriched uranium (enriched to between 20 percent and a nominal 90 percent) that were produced for weapons usage. (94-16)

Quantities of uranium element enriched to over 20 percent produced in any time period by the K-25 and Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plants. (94-16)

The total quantity of highly enriched uranium element and U235 isotope transferred from the United States to the United Kingdom under the Mutual Defense Agreement from 1944 to 1996. (98-4)

The mere fact that spent reactor fuels are "blended up" and recycled through Hanford in order to increase Neptunium237 production. (62-1)

Palm which was replaced by Birch which was replaced by Brandy which is the material nickname for Neptunium (Np237). The association of any of these nicknames with either of the others is also unclassified. (96-2)

Energies, angular distributions and numbers per fission of protons, alpha particles and prompt gamma rays; and relative yields and energies of delayed neutrons.

Frequency of occurrence of ternary and quaternary fission and angular distribution of fragments.

NOTE: Yield information must be expressed only in terms of numbers of particles per fission and not in terms of partial cross sections in case the particular fission cross section is not declassifiable.

Physical properties of plutonium metal which have little military significance but are of basic scientific interest. (53-6)

The fuel value of $12 per gram for plutonium metal. (56-5)

Information concerning methods for the reduction of plutonium compounds to metal for civil uses and for the preparation of alloys of plutonium (plutonium content 50 atomic percent or less) for civil uses. (56-6)

Information on the fabrication technology of plutonium alloys containing up to 50 atomic percent plutonium. (56-6)

Information on:

The physical metallurgy and the mechanical properties of plutonium alloy containing up to 50 atomic percent plutonium, subject, however, to the restriction that no release of information on plutonium alloys of special interest to the weapons program will be made, and (56-6)

The thermal conductivity of plutonium and its alloys containing over 50 atomic percent plutonium. (56-6)

The $12-45 "buy-back" schedule of prices and the $30 single value plutonium "buy-back" price schedule and future single value plutonium in "buy-back" prices, which are not usable to calculate classified production rates. (57-3)

Information concerning the metallurgy of plutonium:

Fabrication technology of plutonium alloys containing up to and including 90 atomic percent plutonium. (58-5)

Fabrication methods for laboratory preparation (up to about 100 gms) of plutonium and its alloys except as prohibited by the following: (58-5)

(1)

All information on plutonium or its alloys of special interest to the weapons program.

(2)

Fabrication Technology for plutonium and its alloys containing more than 90 atomic percent plutonium except the description of method used in fabrication of materials under II.M.15.a. above beyond statement of basic method used, such as rolling, casting, etc.

The physical metallurgy and mechanical properties of plutonium alloys containing up to and including 90 atomic percent plutonium. (58-5)

The following physical constants of plutonium and its alloys containing over 90 atomic percent plutonium (the pressure not exceeding 10,000 atmospheres) except for information on plutonium or its alloys of special interest to the weapons program. (58-5)

(1)

Melting point

(2)

Density

(2)

Number of phases, transition temperature, and thermodynamic functions

(4)

Expansion coefficients

(5)

Electrical properties

(6)

Elastic constants and sound velocities

(7)

Magnetic properties

(8)

Crystal structures

(9)

Thermal conductivity

This is intended to permit the release of complete phase diagrams, including metallographic descriptions, which do not reveal additional data.

Information concerning the preparation, properties and use of plutonium alloys except the phase stabilized alloys containing more than 90% of plutonium which are of specific significance to weapons. (59-6)

The isotopic content of the plutonium fuel used in the Plutonium Recycle Test Reactor and in the Plutonium Recycle Test Reactor Critical Facility. (61-7)

The mere fact that "barter" plutonium is to be or is being obtained from the UK. (62-12)

The isotopic composition of "barter" Plutonium obtained from the U.K. (65-2)

Information concerning the composition and properties of phase-stabilized alloys of plutonium containing more than 90 atomic percent plutonium. (63-7)

The isotopic composition of plutonium as now produced in Hanford and Savannah River Plants. (64-4)

The isotopic enrichment of Pu238 when classified use is not revealed. (65-6)

Revealing the general fact of existence of nuclear weapons which contain only Pu239. (67-1)

The mere fact that delta phase Pu has been or is used in weapons. (67-1)

The isotopic enrichment of Pu238, when classified use is not revealed. (67-1)

The fact that reactor grade plutonium can be used to make nuclear weapons. (67-9)

The mere fact that high irradiation level reactor-grade plutonium can be used to make nuclear weapons. (67-10)

The fact that approximately 6 kgs of plutonium were involved in the Thule, Greenland accident. (68-4)

Best estimate of the amount of plutonium removed from the site. (68-4)

The fact that ERDA has an interest in the separation of plutonium isotopes by laser methods. (75-1)

The fact that a nuclear test was conducted using reactor grade plutonium and that it successfully produced a nuclear yield. (77-4)

As the sole fissile material in unspecified implosion assembled weapons, or in the pit of unspecified staged weapons. (93-2)

Special nuclear materials masses: That about 6 kg plutonium is enough hypothetically to make one nuclear explosive device. (93-2)

Hypothetically, a mass of 4 kilograms of plutonium or uranium-233 is sufficient for one nuclear explosive device. (94-1)

NOTE: The average masses of special nuclear materials in the U.S. nuclear weapons or special nuclear materials masses in any specific weapon type remain classified.

The total quantities of plutonium produced or processed at Richland. (93-3)

The total quantity of weapons grade plutonium including supergrade plutonium produced at the Savannah River Plant. (93-5)

The Savannah River approximate total post-August 1988 plutonium inventory. (93-6)

The United States total production of weapon-grade plutonium. (93-7)

The current plutonium inventory at the Rocky Flats Plant. (93-8)

The current total plutonium inventory at the Argonne National Laboratory-West.
(93-8)

The current total plutonium inventory at the Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. (93-8)

The quantity of plutonium involved in the fire in Room 180 in Building 771 on September 11, 1957, and the quantity of plutonium involved in the fire in Buildings 776 and 777 on May 11, 1969, as represented by inventory data, the amount recovered, the amounts allocated to other disposition categories such as normal operating loss, and the amount considered inventory difference as long as weapon design, manufacturing, material composition or properties, or other classified information that is protected by classified inventory data is not revealed. (94-5)

The historical quantity of plutonium produced for any time period in the Savannah River reactors and information that only reveals Pu production. (94-9)

The quantity of plutonium separated, or otherwise modified, to other forms (such as oxide or metal) at the Savannah River Plant during any time period. (94-9)

Plutonium quantities at the Savannah River Plant for any time period, provided other classified information such as weapons design are not revealed. (94-9)

The total quantity of plutonium involved in all nuclear weapons tests performed by the United States. (94-11)

As part of the 1958 United States - United Kingdom Mutual Defense Agreement, there have been three barter agreements. The United States received plutonium totaling 5,366 kilograms from the United Kingdom under the Barter A, B, and C Agreements during the period 1960 - 1979. The United States gave the United Kingdom 6.7 kilograms of tritium and 7,500 kilograms of highly enriched uranium for the plutonium. (94-15)

During the period of 1960-1979, the following materials were exchanged: (97-3)

Barter A: Barter B: Barter C:

480 kg UK plutonium for 6 kg of U.S. tritium
4,073 kg UK plutonium for 7.500 kg of U.S. HEU
813 kg UK plutonium for 0.7 kg of U.S. tritium

The fact that plutonium combined with any stated weight percent gallium exists: (1) stabilized as an alloy in the delta phase in nuclear weapons, providing neither weapon or alloy nickname (other than Headwind) is specified, and (2) as an oxide in the weapons program, providing the source of the plutonium is not specified by weapon or alloy nickname (other than Headwind). (95-1)

The sum of the quantity of plutonium at the Pantex site and in the nuclear weapons stockpile was 66.1 metric tons on September 30, 1993. (95-6)

Palmolive which was replaced by Birchbark which was replaced by Brandywine which is the material nickname for Plutonium (Pu238). The association of any of these nicknames with either of the others is also unclassified. (96-2)

"Olive" which was replaced by "Bark" which was replaced by "Wine" which is the material nickname for Pu238. The association of any of these nicknames with either of the others. (98-13)

The fission yield of any of the isotopes leading to delayed neutron fission.

Technology - Information on the laboratory scale separation of the fission products from one another, but care must be exercised not to reveal information regarding the large scale production of specific radioactive products of fission. (48-1)

Data on techniques for preparing and handling high intensity fission product sources so that they may be made available for industrial study as well as for studies in fundamental science and medical applications. (53-6)

Production of Critical Materials; lithium and its compounds: Normal lithium hydride in excess of 100 lbs. when associated with thermonuclear weapons. (53-4)

Production of Critical Materials; lithium 6: When not revealing nature or existence of large scale production process up to and including 25 gms total. (53-4)

Lithium enriched in the isotope Li6; Material up to and including 1 Kilogram contained Li6 total. (54-2)

Lithium enriched in the isotope Li7; Material up to 15 kilograms total contained Li7. (54-2)

Other normal lithium compounds. (54-2)

Mere fact that lithium is irradiated at the Savannah River or Hanford plants. (57-5)

50 kg of Li6 is now [January 1962] available for unclassified research (doubling the 25 kg previously available). Up to 1550 liters of He3 may be released for unclassified use, in addition to the 1500 liters already declassified and made available. (62-1)

Partial cross sections of lithium and its isotopes for neutrons of energies between 1 Mev and 25 Mev. (61-2)

Any quantity of Li6 or Li7 allocated for unclassified research. (62-7)

The fact that lithium, deuterium (Li6D, LiD) are used in unspecified thermonuclear weapons. (62-10)

The association of lithium hydride with the weapons laboratories. (62-10)

The mere fact that normal lithium deuteride (LinD) is used in unspecified TN weapons. (67-1)

The assay of top product of Li6 production plant or the fact that this top assay is used in weapons. (67-1)

The fact that Li6H is used in unspecified weapons for hardening. (67-1)

The fact that Li7H or LinH may be used as mockup materials in the weapons program. (67-1)

The fact that compounds of Li6 containing tritium are used in the design of weapons as TN fuel. (72-11)

General description of the processes used or investigated for the separation of lithium isotopes. (73-8) (74-6)

The fact that the device fired in the Bravo test (2/28/54) of the Castle series used lithium deuteride as its thermonuclear fuel. (74-5)

The quantity of depleted lithium hydroxide currently stored at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant or other Department of Energy facilities. (94-3)

The production rates and quantities of Li6 and Li7 (amalgam or hydroxide) produced by COLEX, or other processes, and information classified to protect production quantities. Such data would include, for COLEX, but not be limited to lithium tails inventories, plant capacity indicators such as number of columns, trays, pumps, etc. (94-4)

For elements of atomic number 90 or above declassification of those aspects of their behavior under neutron bombardment, of their spontaneous fission, and of the number and energy of neutrons emitted in their fission which do not have any bearing on weapons or production information. (47-1)

Information that AEC projects have up to 1 milligram of Am-241. (50-1)

New isotopes in microgram quantities or less may be revealed provided that their half lives are shorter than 6 months. (50-1)

Production of Critical Materials; Helium 3: Quantities up to and including 15 liters total. (53-4)

Certain production methods for uranium, graphite and heavy water. (53-6)

All information on the production technology of the separation of zirconium-hafnium mixtures. (56-6)

The mere fact that Cerium144 is used in the ANP and SNAP programs. (58-6)

The fact that up to 20,000 curies of Krypton is trapped at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant and shipped to Oak Ridge for radioisotope sale. (58-7)

The association of yttrium in quantities no greater than 1 kilogram with the Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion Program. (58-7)

Information on the use of Tungsten (W) in weapons research and development:

Mere interest of the weapons laboratories in tungsten;

Procurement of high density tungsten by the weapons laboratories;

The fact that tungsten is used in weapons;

The quantities of tungsten processed in the weapons laboratories. (58-7)

Two items on the program for production of research quantities of transplutonium elements:

Total quantity of transplutonium element produced by HFIR-ORO.

Mere fact that 12 kg. of Pu239 has been irradiated in the SROO reactors for this program. (60-5)

In connection with the program on transplutonics, the mere fact that there is or has been a high Pu240 irradiation and recovery program at Savannah River for the Hanford PRTR. (60-6)

The fact that plastic cases are used in weapons. (62-10)

Fact of interest in hydriding of fissile materials. (88-4)

Information about mercury inventories procured for use in Li6 enrichment at the Oak Ridge Y-12 plant (or their value). (93-1)

Size (area) of the amalgamaker system and its operating temperature. Included is the number and size of the amalgamaker trays. (93-1)

Mercury/thallium information:

The fact of use of mercury and/or thallium (Hg-Tl) in electrical switches in specified or unspecified weapons. (93-2)

The fact of use of Hg and/or Tl in weapons, use unspecified, quantity per weapon unspecified. (93-2)

The quantity of mercury or thallium in an unclassified component. (93-2)

The total quantity of mercury or thallium involved in normal operations at a specified Department of Energy facility (e.g., production or weapon dismantlement) provided other classified information is not revealed, eventhough it may reveal that there are classified uses of mercury and/or thallium in weapons or production processes. (93-2)

Electrical controls and circuits of all kinds omitting reference to classified installations. (46-1)

Experimental and theoretical physics of the electromagnetic separation plant provided they do not reveal production details or processes. (47-1)

Electrical insulators of high-voltage, high-temperature type, without disclosure of design details actually used and without reference to classified installations. (50-3)

Experimental and theoretical physics and chemistry, engineering designs and operating performance of single electromagnetic process units without identification as components of the Electromagnetic Production Plant. (52-3)

Note: The AEC staff paper explained that this permitted the declassification of the following:

(1)

Experimental and theoretical work on general phenomena of discharges in magnetic fields, experimental and theoretical work in ion optics, data on high-voltage breakdown in vacuum, characteristics of electrical insulators of the high-voltage, high-temperature type, research on
filament and insulator failure, and theory and design of magnetic shims. (52-3)

(2)

Full design data on basic components of a single calutron, ion source, filament, power supply and heater system, butwithout revealing the exact system for drain control. (52-3)

(3)

Design data on single magnetic coils including shims. (52-3)

(4)

Full operating data on a single calutron unit (Alpha or Beta) but without identification as a component of the Electromagnetic Production Plant. Data may include ion current, enrichment, collector efficiency, and performance of magnetic shims. (52-3)

(c) Technical efforts on development of new standard operating procedures for the above when carried on in specific equipment for production.

General theory and experimental work for other methods of isotopic separation for elements of atomic number below 90, but see Table A. (Care should be exercised that the information released for non-classified isotopes does not substantially aid work on classified isotopes.) (Table A is located in Appendix A) (48-1)

General theory and experimental work for other methods of isotopic separation for elements of atomic number below 90, except deuterium, tritium, special purity graphite, polonium and actinium. (50-4)

Information about the "isotron" isotope separator experiments and theory. The "isotron" is an electromagnetic separation device. (52-1)

The calutron drain control system (at Y-12 Plant). (53-8)

The design of large magnet arrays (at Y-12 Plant). (53-8)

The theory, engineering design, capacity, and performance of electromagnetic plants including high intensity ion sources. (56-6)

General theory of thermal diffusion in gases without application to classified installations. (46-1)

(1)

Information concerning the theory of the thermal diffusion method of isotope separation. (55-2)

Basic theoretical work on cascade design, kinetic chemistry, and thermal diffusion not revealing production methods in the diffusion plant. (47-1)

General theory of thermal diffusion in gases without reference to UF6 or the application to classified installations. (50-3)

Chemistry

Theoretical work on chemical kinetics such as was developed in connection with corrosion problems, but without reference to the conditioning of barriers. (46-1)

(1)

Theoretical work on chemical kinetics without reference to fluoride corrosion problems or conditioning of plant equipment. (50-3)

Fluorocarbon chemistry and manufacture, but without reference to application in plants for the production of classified substances. (46-1)

(1)

Fluorocarbon chemistry and manufacture but without reference to UF6 or to application or requirements in plants for the production of fissionable material. (50-3)

Fluorine chemistry, including industrial preparation, (but without reference to application in plants for the production of classified substances), except for the methods of preventing barrier plugging and corrosion . (46-1) (50-4)

Fluorine and fluorocarbon chemistry and technology. (47-1)

Design and construction of a fluorine cell plant and a fluorine packaging, storage, and compression plant. (50-3)

Analytical methods for materials used in the gaseous diffusion plant except insofar as they may reveal plant practice and production. (50-3)

Some information in the fields of fluoride surface chemistry and gas bearings. (53-6)

Industrial Aspects

The technique of plating inside of pipes so as to protect against corrosion. (46-2)

Vacuum pumps and compressors without reference to characteristics which may be unique to the diffusion plant. (46-2)

Bellows-sealed reciprocating pumps. (46-2)

Special high speed rotary pumps. (46-2)

Special precautions in handling process gas. (46-2)

The fact of cooling the enriched stream (A-line cooling) in diffusion plants. (76-2)

Theory of centrifuge, except that experimental work on, and detailed mechanical design for, the centrifuge method of isotope separation for elements 90 and above must remain classified. (48-1)

The total annual construction and operating dollars in the gas centrifuge program commencing with FY-1971. (71-4)

The fact that the Equipment Test Facility and the Component Preparation Laboratories are associated with the U.S. gas centrifuge program. (71-4)

The fact that the U.S. does not have and has not had a gas centrifuge pilot plant. (71-4)

The fact that the Component Test Facility is a gas centrifuge pilot plant. (72-2)

The financial breakdowns of construction projects in the gas centrifuge. (72-2)

The AEC total annual funding for capital equipment not related to construction for the gas centrifuge program for uranium enrichment. (72-2)

The total annual operating and capital equipment funding for each minor contractor (the University of Virginia, Yale, and Electro-Nucleonics, Inc.) active in gas centrifuge work on uranium enrichment. (72-2)

The following information concerning the gas centrifuge program.

Pilot plant construction and operating costs. (73-5)

Full-scale production plant separative capacity, separative work costs, and costs for construction and operation. (73-5)

Information concerning the gas centrifuge program. (74-2)

Rotor diameter studied through the pilot plant stage.

Fact that upper suspension contained a magnet.

Fact of interest in bearings other than pivots.

Fact of interest in composite materials for rotor construction.

Fact of rotor and end cap balancing.

Fact of use of aluminum alloy.

Fact of supercritical operation.

Procurement quantities which may imply the number of machines in a pilot plant.

Total power level required for a centrifuge enrichment facility. (76-5)

Techniques of particle size and surface area measurements without reference to barrier construction. This information should be of a scientific character and should not include data from which information could be inferred as to the size of the particles used in barrier construction. (46-1)

Specifications, performance data, and useful design features of compressors, filters, pumps, blowers, motors, valves, diffusers, heat exchangers, piping, flow meters or other process equipment when their release can be made without reference to characteristicswhich may be unique to a diffusion plant and without disclosing the contribution of the equipment concerned to the productivity or capacity of a plant. (52-4)

Arrangement of stages in series ("badger arrangement" and modifications thereto). (53-2)

Arrangement of cells in series within each building. (53-2)

Total number of stages and cells. (53-2)

Information concerning gas bearings.

Some information in the fields of fluoride surface chemistry and gas bearings. (53-6)

Certain information concerning the theory of gas bearings for compressible gases for both journal and thrust bearings, as well as some experimental work on journal and thrust bearings. (55-2)

The theory, design, manufacture and operation of all types of gas bearings, subject to the restriction, however, that no release will be made on: (56-6)

(1)

Features of gas bearing technology specially relating to the diffusion plant, and

(2)

Specifications and performance data of complete gas bearing compressor units for use in a gaseous diffusion plant.

A charge for separative work of $30 per kilogram of uranium. (62-5)

That independent work3 (and all data resulting therefrom) on the development of porous materials not developed for but suitable for use as gaseous diffusion barrier may be published without undue risk to the common defense and security. (66-1)

Production rates of uranium enriched in the isotope U235 subsequent to January 1, 1967. (66-4)

The rates of production of uranium enriched in the isotope U235 and the separative capacity of gaseous diffusion plants prior to January 1, 1967. (73-8)

Information concerning the gaseous diffusion program. (85-3)

All cascade uranium hexafluoride pressures.

All cascade barrier and uranium hexafluoride temperatures of 240 degrees Fahrenheit or higher and all those below 240 degrees Fahrenheit if the barrier forepressures are 10 psia or lower.

Cascade and stage gas-phase inventory values.

Cascade stage separation factors, interstage flows, and power levels.

Cascade side and top purge rates, and vent rates, total.

Compressor blade angles and tip clearances.

Fact of use of vented cavity seals.

Note: All declassifications related to the cascades apply to information generated since October 1, 1980. Corresponding information before this date remain Confidential to protect certain enriched uranium stockpile quantities and other classified information.

The amounts and assays of materials returned to the gaseous diffusion plants (refeed material) and of cascade feed rates at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant for the period September 1, 1971, through September 30, 1977, for intermediate assay feed. Note: This action declassified all historic refeed activities at the gaseous diffusion plants.

Cascade tails withdrawal rates at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant for the period September 1, 1971, through September 30, 1997.

Estimates of special nuclear material masses in weapons which are obtained by indirect methods involving production rates.

The fact of AEC interest in the separation of uranium isotopes by laser methods is unclassified.

General descriptions of excitation methods based on scientific data published in the literature as of July 1, 1973 are unclassified.

Papers dealing with fundamental science, including spectroscopy of uranium and its compounds, where there is no recognizable association with or application to successful isotope separation, are unclassified.

Laser schemes for uranium isotope separation, where the processes do not show a reasonable potential for the separation of practical quantities of special nuclear material, are unclassified.

Total AEC dollars budgeted for research and development in uranium isotope separation using lasers, broken down by installations, and showing separate identification of operational, equipment or construction costs, is unclassified.

The fact that ERDA has an interest in the separation of plutonium isotopes by laser methods. (75-1)

Fact of two-step laser irradiation of the cooled gas in the ultraviolet and infrared regions.

Fact of disassociation of UF6 to UF5 as a result of irradiation.

Information concerning the AVLIS process: (90-2)

The fact that iron or other specific commonly used element is alloyed with uranium to lower the melting point of the uranium and concentrations of the alloying element at the enrichment facility boundary, provided feed or product concentrations or other classified information is not revealed.

Non-critical details for constructing production and pilot plants if they are similar to ordinary plant construction. (53-6)

All information relating to the thermal diffusion method of separating uranium isotopes. (56-6)

Research and development work on any method of isotope separation (other than gaseous diffusion and gas centrifuge) (unless declassified by the Commission) would be unclassified as long as the Commission is satisfied that the method does not have a reasonable potential for the separation of practical quantities of special nuclear materials. After a method has advanced to the point of having such potential, all additional work would be classified Secret Restricted Data until specifically declassified by the Commission. (67-3)

Research on novel methods of isotope separation -- i.e., it is unclassified until it has a "reasonable potential for the separation of practical quantities of special nuclear-material." (See III.F.3. above) This policy does not apply to information and methods previously declassified by Commission action, e.g. electromagnetic and liquid thermal diffusion. (72-7)

General description of the processes used or investigated for the separation of lithium isotopes. (73-8)

The possibility or fact that the plutonium AVLIS process will access one or more metastable levels in the excitation and ionization of plutonium atoms and that the wavelength range of interest for plutonium AVLIS is 560 to 800 nm. (88-1)

The fact that the capability to use staging in the AVLIS process exists and is being implemented for the separation of plutonium. (88-1)

Design and operating characteristics of small experimental piles in which enriched material or heavy water is used, provided the pile generates power at a level under 100 KW. No information is to be released beyond the minimum necessary for the successful design and operation of such a small unit and in information essential for the successful design and operation of a production pile. (46-1)

Information can be released as to which non-classified isotopes and fission products can be produced in a pile. Caution must be exercised not to reveal production capabilities by disclosing critical data as to the amounts of such substances on hand or the rate at which they can be made. (46-1)

Design and operating characteristics of small experimental piles in which enriched material or heavy water is used, provided the pile generates power at a level under 100 KW. The chemistry of decontamination is not included. (47-1)

Information on small reactors may be released (declassified) if it is of a particular value for teaching the basic principles of small reactors. This excludes the release of information on the design of small reactors. (47-1)

The neutron fluxes for the following reactors only (48-1):

United States

Argonne National Laboratory

CP-1 (graphite)

CP-2 (graphite)

CP-3 (heavy water)

Clinton Laboratory

Graphite Air Cooled Pile

Los Alamos Laboratory

Low Power Water Boiler

High Power Water Boiler

United Kingdom

Harwell

GLEEP

BEPO

Canada

Chalk River

ZEEP

NRX

The design power of these reactors may also be declassified butin no event are actual operating power levels to be released. Neutron distributions in space should be limited to smooth trends without details which might reveal lattice cell sizes. The external dimensions of these reactors and the thickness of shielding may be revealed. (48-1)

The dimensions, neutron fluxes and velocity distributions of the thermal columns for all of the reactors listed above. (48-1)

The dimensions of lattices, rods and their assemblies, and of the hole diameters through which the rods are mounted for the following reactors: (50-1)

United States - Argonne National Lab CP-3 (Heavy Water)

The critical mass of the reactors listed in IV.A.5. above. (50-4)

("Class I" REACTORS) All information necessary for the design, construction and operation of the following reactors as designed at January 1, 1950, but not necessarily the results of work done with the reactor. (50-3 and 50-4)

United States

Argonne National Laboratory

CP-1 (graphite, natural uranium)

CP-2 (graphite, natural uranium)

CP-3 (heavy water, natural uranium)

Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory

Low Power Water Boiler (light water, enriched uranium)

High Power Water Boiler (light water, enriched uranium) versions 1, 2, and 3

United Kingdom

Harwell - GLEEP (graphite, natural uranium)

Canada

Chalk River - ZEEP (heavy water, natural uranium)

("Class II" REACTORS). The following reactors are primarily used for research purposes but incorporate features of value in the design of production, power or mobile reactors ("Class III" reactors). For Class II reactors, only certain features can be declassified while other features must remain classified. (50-3 and 50-4)

United States

Brookhaven National Laboratory

Graphite Air Cooled Reactor

Oak Ridge National Laboratory

Graphite Air Cooled Reactor

Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory

Plutonium Fast Reactor

United Kingdom: Harwell - BEPO

Canada: Chalk River, N.R.X. Pile

Critical mass of Class II reactors on an individual basis to facilitate the teaching of reactor technology in universities and engineering institutions. (53-6)

The qualitative characteristics of fast, intermediate and thermal reactors, provided that such information was of the same general type as has already been released on natural uranium reactors and provided it does not reveal information about composition and design of projected reactors or about relative merits of individual materials of construction or about relative merits of possible combinations of materials. (50-1)

The qualitative principles of breeding, but excluding numerical information on actual gain factors likely to be achieved. Whether a particular system will not breed is not declassifiable. (50-1)

Examples of possible moderators, ceramics, coolants, and structural materials but not including information about composition and design of projected reactors or about relative merits of individual materials of construction or about relative merits of possible combinations of materials. (50-1)

The general problems of refueling but not to include any detailed information on chemical reprocessing. (50-1)

Laboratory-scale corrosion data in the absence of reactor or simulated reactor radiation. This includes static, dynamic and other types of corrosion data in monometallic or small multimetallic systems except corrosion data involving uranium and plutonium. (50-4)

Basic theoretical and experimental heat transfer and pressure-drop data of simple round-tube, flat-plate, or annuli configurations, including constructional details of laboratory equipment used, provided that the actual construction details of a reactor or full-scale heat exchanger are not revealed. (50-4)

Any component part of a large-scale liquid metal heat transfer system except for drawings, design data, and performance and operating data of individual components of the large-scale liquid metal heat transfer system insofar as they reveal details of the reactor, their relationship to a reactor coolant system or the over-all design. (50-4)

Applications of liquid metal coolants in connection with uses other than as primary or secondary reactor coolants. (50-4)

The revelation of interest in a given element or alloy as a heat transfer fluid provided that no reference is made to the special reactor or the reactor system for which this element or alloy is intended. (50-4)

The remaining classified technology developed in the Lithium Cooled Reactor Experiment (LCRE) and the SNAP-50 program. (73-3)

Fact that application of nuclear energy to production of electric and other power to meet military needs is under investigation. (53-4)

Fact that program is joint effort of Army and AEC. (53-4)

Contractor involved. (53-4)

Reactor concepts being considered for use. (53-4)

All equipment within the reactor container (Reactor container is vessel inclosing nuclear reactor and its controls together with primary coolant contained therein) and designed data pertaining to this equipment is classified except:

Fact that a particular material is to be studied as coolant. (53-4)

Fact that a particular type of fuel is being considered for use. (53-4)

Control activating mechanisms except as they reveal dimensions and size of core, location and nature of control elements and nature of control problem. (53-4)

Reactor container except as it reveals design of core, reflector and control. (53-4)

Declassification of all information concerning the Army Nuclear Power Package except the following: (55-3)

Information revealing strategic defense plans (i.e., the fact that such a reactor is to be located at a specific defense outpost, etc.).

Information revealing the non-declassifiable nuclear properties of fuel materials (i.e., on the cross-section of U235 for neutrons having an energy above .1 Mev).

Information revealing the exact degree of

U235 enrichment if the assay is greater than 90%.

Information on the methods to be used to inhibit, control, or alleviate the effects of radiation on materials to be used in the construction of the reactor.

The methods developed to fabricate the fuel elements.

The method to be used to inhibit or control corrosion, erosion, crud formation, or activity in the coolant stream.

Information developed as a result of shielding studies which materially helps solve the problem of developing a shield of limited size and/or weight.

Army Package Power Reactor No. 2. (58-17)

The currently envisioned design, construction and operation of the GCRE-1, GCRE-II, and ML-1 prototype reactors are declassified. (59-10)

All information necessary to the design, construction, and operation of civilian power reactors with the exception of that information primarily applicable to military propulsion, production reactors, or Army Package Power Reactors. (56-6)

Information relating to the chemical processing of reactor fuels and blanket materials irradiated in civilian power reactors. (56-6)

All nuclear data (concerning reactor technology) except that which has or may have significance to the weapons program. (56-6)

All chemistry and chemical processing except that revealing the quantities and specifications of the materials that are produced primarily for military purposes. (59-3)

All work and information originated in the civilian reactor field for civilian purposes, provided no classified information from other sources is incorporated in the work or information. (61-1)

Information developed in the Medium Power Reactor Experiment (MPRE) program. (67-12)

Reactor production capabilities for certain isotopes (excluding Pu239 and tritium) based on nominal power levels so that one could reveal the extent to which theseisotopes, having specific peaceful applications, could be produced on a large scale. (68-2)

Unit costs for production of certain isotopes (excludingPu239 and tritium) having peaceful applications, when not revealing production rates (or costs of weapon materials) more accurately than estimates derivable from the nominal reactor power levels. (68-2)

Integrated and/or peak flux for specific tubes in a reactor, provided it does not reveal actual reactor power level or actual production rates of material for military use. (68-2)

Value of average flux in specific tubes, or time cycles, when influencing a particular experiment but not revealing time operated efficiency of the reactor. (68-2)

Location of specific tests within a reactor when this does not reveal flux pattern or flux distribution for the reactor. (68-2)

Coolant flow rates and temperature rises corresponding to declassified nominal power levels -- Hanford only (those for Savannah River will remain classified): (68-2)

Small Hanford Reactors

Nominal coolant flow Nominal temperature

84,000 gpm68oC

Hanford K-Reactors

Nominal coolant flow Nominal temperature rise

210,000 gpm
72oC

Items of less sensitive reactor technology, not related to power levels or production rates, would also become unclassified such as: (68-2)

Percentage composition of reactor atmosphere and relations of atmosphere to graphite temperature, growth and annealing

The following information concerning the N-Reactor: (71-5)

Power levels of the N-Reactor before December 1, 1965.

All N-Reactor production and production rate information.

All direct and residual costs of operating the N-Reactor such as:

(1)

The cost of fuel element manufacture at Fernald and Ashtabula.

(2)

The cost of operating the extrusion line.

(3)

The cost of running the reactor.

(4)

The cost of reprocessing.

Total quantities of Krypton and Xenon per site as released to the atmosphere as a result of the operation of production reactors and associated operations at Hanford, Idaho Falls and Savannah River beginning March 1, 1971. (71-6)

The fact that we do not now trap Krypton and/or Xenon produced in production reactors and associated operations. (71-6)

Krypton and Xenon releases from F and H canyons [at the Savannah River Site] and whether any rare gases were or were not trapped prior to March 1, 1971. (94-9)

Note: This action does not apply to production reactors other than N-reactor.

The Hot Die Size (HDS) process for cladding fuel and target elements, including the end bonding operation. (85-2)

Historical plutonium production information and associated rare gas releases for the decommissioned production reactors at the Hanford site for the period 1944 through 1960. (89-4)

Information concerning Hanford reactors:

Plutonium production and associated reprocessed quantities of products and rare gas releases, from 1961 to the shutdown of the decommissioned Richland reactors, and Hanford-produced tritium quantities. This action will declassify all Hanford weapons materials production quantities from the decommissioned reactors and amounts recovered. Comparisons with Savannah River production and any associations with intelligence activities will remain classified. (92-1)

All process times, temperatures, pressures, and classified compositional parameters for the early Hanford-developed cladding and canning technology including the hot press bonding, triple dip, lead dip (including the similarparameters for the Savannah River triple dip and lead dip processes), and the unbonded "B" and "C" processes. (92-1)

Information concerning Savannah River reactors:

The total quantity of weapons grade plutonium including supergrade plutonium produced at the Savannah River Plant. (93-5)

The historical quantity of plutonium produced for any time period in the Savannah River reactors and information that only reveals Pu production. (94-9)

The quantity of plutonium separated, or otherwise modified, to other forms (such as oxide or metal) at the Savannah River Plant during any time period. (94-9)

Details of reactor shields, including such items as heat generation and removal within shields, apertures, labyrinths, ducts, plugs, etc., when such design details reveal the design criteria or the overall design of specific reactor shields.

Detailed discussion of distribution of various shield elements for reactor shielding purposes.

NOTE: The above exceptions do not refer to the reactors listed in paragraph IV.A.5. Rather, it is the intent of these exceptions to classify advances in the solution of the problem of developing a shield of limited weight and/or size for submarine and aircraft reactors.

Materials Test Reactor (MTR) and Low Intensity Test Reactor (LITR)

The thermal neutron and gamma flux distribution in all experimental holes outside the reactor core. (53-3)

The fast neutron flux available for irradiation experiments. (53-3)

The design power; the design inlet and outlet water temperature and water flow rate. (53-3)

The reactor cooling system (primary cooling system) external to the reactor tank, except for specific points of sabotage vulnerability, and excepting data on procedures used to insure quality control of water and data on the effects of radiation on decomposition of water as well as on the corrosive action of water. (53-3)

Auxiliary reactor systems such as the raw water and air system (except sabotage vulnerability points). (53-3)

Description of the reactor container perseexcept insofar as it reveals details of the core reflector, the core cooling system, and controls. (53-3)

Identification of materials used as moderator or reflector, or for structural support (no elaboration beyond mere identification). (53-3)

All side faces of the reactor; the reactor top with the top plug in place. (53-3)

The general type of control rods (except sabotage vulnerability points). (53-3)

The control actuating mechanisms (insofar as they do not reveal core details and specific nature and location of control elements, and excepting sabotage vulnerability points). (53-3)

The shield composition, geometry, and method of cooling, not including radiation attenuation data. (53-3)

The fact that the SNAP-III project proposed by Westinghouse Electric is for the development of a small power supply for Vanguard. (58-6)

The Merchant Ship Reactor, a pressurized water reactor built by Babcock and Wilcox. (58-6)

ZPR-IV, ZPR-V, ZPR-VII and the Three Foot Exponential project at Argonne National Laboratory. (58-8)

Boiling Reactor Experiment No. V (BORAX V) reactor. (58-15)

The fact that Atomics International is investigating the potential of thermocouples for direct conversion in the SNAP-II program. (59-1)

The Enrico Fermi and Fast Oxide Breeder Reactors. (59-1)

Design engineering studies on systemized organic-cooled and pressurized water reactors at Argonne National Laboratory. (59-1)

The Neutron Irradiation Facility at Argonne National Laboratory. (59-3)

The Argonne High Flux Research Reactor AHF-1. (59-7)

The experimental Organic Cooled Reactor (EOCR). (60-1)

The following areas of reactor research: (60-5)

Army Power Reactor PM-3A for McMurdo Sound, Antarctica

Development of AL2O3 coated UO2 dispersed in graphite under BMI contract.

Development of pyrolytic graphite-coated UO2 and UC2.

The BONUS (Boiling Nuclear Superheat) Reactor. (61-1)

Identification of lithium as a coolant in the Indirect Cycle Reactor. Also, the fact of use of columbium-1% zirconium alloy in fuel elements, coolant piping, container or structural materials in the Pratt and Whitney reactor program. (61-2)

The isotopic content of the plutonium fuel used in the Plutonium Recycle Test Reactor and in the Plutonium Recycle Test Reactor Critical Facility. (61-7)

The mere fact that Pu238 can be used in isotopic SNAP devices and was used in the Transit 4A device, including the quantity used. (61-5)

Research and development on the coating with BeO of UO2 particles ranging in size from microns to spheres required for the Pebble Bed Reactor. (61-6)

Fuel element fabrication processing and performance information, including the composition of improved fuel materials and additives;

Hydrogen retention barrier composition and techniques of application;

Details of hydriding process and welding techniques specifically developed for SNAP claddings;

Certain reactor subsystem design information; e.g., new control mechanisms, use of "honeycomb" in SNAP shields;

Changes in shield design or material which result in the development of a shield of reduced size and/or weight;

Processing and fabrication techniques specially developed for SNAP shield materials;

Significant new concepts and technology; and

Military mission data.

Isotopic Heat Source

Detailed specifications of the manufacturing processes for radioisotopic heat sources which reveal the effects of isotopic heat and radiation on the process.

The concept of a self-energized thermoelectric converter where a semi-conductor and Pu238 (as an isotopic heat source material) are combined in an integral body ofsemi-conducting material and research and development work on such a device; provided significant advances, breakthroughs or information that reveals the fact or manner of use of these systems where necessary to protect information classified by the user agency are not revealed. (68-6)

Fact that development of atomic warheads for guided missiles or artillery is underway - Any elaboration must be cleared by AEC and DOD prior to publication. (51-1)

Mere fact that gun assembly may be used to achieve criticality. (51-1)

Mere fact that implosion may be used to achieve criticality. (51-1)

Mere fact that either method may be used to achieve criticality Component parts of the system will be accorded a classification corresponding to the extent that the part reveals essential nature of the system. (53-1)

In-flight insertion; mere fact that U.S. has a system for nuclear arming of bombs while carrier is in flight (no other details). (56-3)

Weapon reliability; Inspection of weapons: Mere fact that such inspections are made. (56-3)

Mere existence of the phenomenon of predetonation. (56-3)

The term "one point detonation" is declassified in connection with 1955 safety experiments. Use in connection with either planned safety experiments or a weapon accident is also unclassified. (58-14)

The fact of existence of weapons with tailored outputs, e.g., enhanced x-ray, neutron or gamma-ray output; that we are hardening our weapons to enhanced weapon outputs and that high-Z materials are used in hardening nuclear weapons against high-energy x-rays. (72-11)

The fact of existence of a deep-earth penetration fuzing option. (72-11)

Limited Try - That feature of a coded switch which permits insertion of code possibilities only up to an established number; code tries in excess of an established number may result in a delay or lockout. (73-4)

The fact that the IFI (in-flight insertion of a nuclear material capsule or other nuclear part) safing method was applied to designated, retired weapons. (80-1)

The term dial-a-yield (DAY) and fact of its applicability to undesignated weapons. (89-3)

Fact that non-spherical parts are used in some weapons, part unidentified, weapon undesignated. (91-1)

Fact that multipoint detonation systems are used in undesignated weapons. (91-1)

The fact of the use of high explosives in pure fusion weapon research. (98-2)

Experiments done with High Explosive (HE) systems which do not resemble implosion assembled device HE systems. (98-12)

Specially designed systems intended to create strong shocks propagating down a cylinder that do NOT use classified material properties in design calculations and do NOT drive materials with classified material properties into classified regions of their equations-of-state. (98-12)

The experiments that were accomplished with systems listed in r. and s. above unless they (the experiments) drove materials with classified equation-of-state properties into regions which in themselves (the regions) were classified.

Identification of the type of fissionable materials used in Trinity, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Bikini-Able, and Bikini-Baker models. (53-1)

(1)

Mere fact that Pu239 alone was used in the Trinity, Nagasaki, and Crossroads events. (65-6)

Use in weapons of normal, depleted [any assay] or fully enriched uranium [>90% U235] and the identification of the fissionable materials used in a specific fission weapon. (59-7) [60-4]

Lithium and its compounds:

(1)

The fact that lithium, deuterium (Li6D, LiD) are used in unspecified thermonuclear weapons. (62-7)

(2)

The mere fact that normal lithium deuteride (LinD) is used in unspecified TN weapons. (67-1)

(2)

The assay of top product of Li6 production plant or the fact that this top assay is used in weapons. (67-1)

(4)

The fact that Li6H is used in unspecified weapons for hardening. (67-1)

(5)

The fact the Li7H or LinH may be used as mockup materials in the weapons program. (67-1)

(6)

The fact that compounds of Li6 containing tritium are used in the design of weapons as TN fuel. (72-11)

Fact of use of Pu238 in milliwatt isotopic power sources for possible use in the Prescribed Action Link (PAL) program. (63-4)

Revealing the general fact of existence of nuclear weapons which contain only Pu239. (67-1)

Use of normal cascade top product in specific weapons. (67-1)

Fact of use in specified or unspecified weapons of normal uranium or depleted uranium of any assay. (67-1)

Quantity of Be used outside the nuclear assembly systems. (67-1)

The total quantity of Be used in the nuclear weapons program. ( 67-1)

The fact of use of B-10 for hardening in unspecified nuclear weapons. (67-1)

The mere fact that delta phase Pu has been or is used in weapons. (67-1)

The fact that reactor grade plutonium can be used to make nuclear weapons. (67-9)

The mere fact that high irradiation level reactor-grade plutonium can be used to make nuclear weapons. (67-10)

The mere fact that Be is used in the nuclear assembly system of designated weapons. (72-11)

The concept of storing hydrogen isotopes in solid or liquid compounds in undesignated weapons. (88-4)

Fact of use of boron carbide in undesignated weapons. (91-1)

Fact that the thermal stability of pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN) in an undesignated weapon is improved by baking or by adding tripentaery thritol octanitrate, polysaccharide, or other specific additions. (92-2)

Fissile shell information: The fact of use of thin spherical shells of fissile materials in weapons, without elaboration. (93-2)

Special nuclear materials masses: That about 6 kg plutonium is enough hypothetically to make one nuclear explosive device. (93-2)

Hypothetically, a mass of 4 kilograms of plutonium or U233 is sufficient for one nuclear explosive device. (94-1)

NOTE: The average masses of special nuclear materials in the U.S. nuclear weapons or special nuclear materials masses in any specific weapon type remain classified.

The presence of and a maximum amount of non-SNM hazardous materials used in nuclear weapons or weapon components in the event of an accident or other emergency situations. In concert with this declassification, currently unclassified information pertaining to the amount of HE in nuclear weapon assembly systems likewise may be released in the event health, safety, or environmental concerns arise. (98-4)

Estimates of special nuclear material masses in weapons which are obtained by indirect methods involving production rates. (98-10)

External Characteristics

Visible size and shape only of specifically listed obsolete weapons of historic interest including replicas and miniatures including nickname, code and model designations: (53-1)

Visible size and shape of externally carried bombs4 when object is not specifically identified as an atomic weapon and no other information concerning the nature or purpose of the object is revealed to observers. (53-1)

Thermonuclear test devices shipping and handling container not revealing nuclear or military characteristics. When object is not specifically identified as an atomic weapon and no other information concerning the nature or purpose of the object is revealed. (53-4)

The size, weight and shape of the 280 MM Atomic Artillery Shell, Mod 0-22 (Army designation: M-354, AEC designation Mark 9). The declassification of the size, weight and shape of artillery-fired atomic shells other than the MK 9 will be considered by AEC-DOD on an individual basis. (54-2)

The actual shape, dimensions and weight of any artillery (or naval rifle) shell whose diameter is equal to or greater than 8 inches. This information will be classified only if the existence of the delivery system is considered classified by the DoD. (57-4)

The size, weight and shape of some thermonuclear weapons (Any information which reveals the existence of thermonuclear weapons with diameter less than 24" or weight less than 2000 lb is classified). (59-7)

(1)

Size, weight and shape of some thermonuclear weapons (Any information which reveals the existence of thermonuclear weapon with diameter less than 18 inches or weight less than 690 pounds is classified). (60-1)

Only such information on the weight of the assembled Davy Crockett weapon as revealed by observation of the physical handling. Note should be taken of the great importance of safeguarding the yield of the Davy Crockett. (60-1)

The size, weight, and shape of weapons or missile warheads when in the hands of troops for training, or when final flight test configuration is reached. (62-7)

Moments and Products of Inertia for free-fall bombs in production or stockpile prior to July 1, 1967. Remarks: The Moments and Products of Inertia for new weapons of these types which are produced on or after July 1, 1967 will be evaluated on an individual basis and the appropriate classification listed in individual guides as is the case with size, weight and shape of these weapons. (67-11)

Design Process /Tools

The idea of the implosion, not including compressional properties, need not be considered classified. However, direct reference to it is not permitted. Rather itis intended that subjects otherwise declassifiable should not continue classified solely because, by implication, they might reveal the idea of implosion. Details of the implosion are to continue to be treated as highly classified information. (50-3) (50-4)

-

All theoretical equation of state studies if not of specific interest to the implosion. (50-3) (50-4)

-

Explosive studies if not of specific interest to implosion or to other special weapon studies. (50-3)

-

Theoretical work on shock hydrodynamics if not of specific interest to the implosion. (50-3)

The fact that a weapon is in an AEC-DOD Weapon Program Phase. (62-7)

Fact that multidimensional radiation - hydrodynamic codes are used for weapons design. (83-5)

The concept and definition of a "split levitated" pit, with no elaboration. (98-2)

The mere fact that weapons may be safed by the insertion of inert materials into the pit. (72-9)

The mere fact that some of our nuclear weapons are inherently safe. (72-9)

The fact of use in high explosive assembled (HEA) weapons of spherical shells of fissile materials, sealed pits; air and ring HE lenses; that multipoint detonation systems may be used in weapons, and a definition of pre-initiation-proof weapons (weapon, the yield of which is not sensitive to initiation of the nuclear reaction at a time earlier than the planned time). (72-11)

(1)

The concept or existence of preinitiation-proof nuclear weapons and the term "preinitiation-proof weapon." (98-2)

The fact of boosting, the fact that deuterium and tritium are used as boosting fuels in HEA weapons and that they are contained in components known as reservoirs or cartridges which are shipped between the Savannah River Plant and the AEC weapon facilities, the military and the United Kingdom. (72-11)

(1)

The fact that some high-explosive assembled (HEA) weapons (specified or unspecified) may be boosted or are boosted. (83-2)

(2)

Physical state of boosting fuel in HEA weapons. (83-2)

(3)

Fact that gaseous deuterium (D) and tritium (T) are used as boosting fuel. (83-2)

(4)

The fact that gas boosting is used in specified weapons. (83-3)

(5)

Declassification of reservoir information: The safety factor, defined as the ratio of test pressure to maximum working pressure that a reservoir is calculated to experience during its use, for unspecified or specified reservoirs. (93-2)

(a)

General gas boost reservoir design information, including such technologies as helium-3 filtering and solid storage, that do not reveal boost gas quantities, composition, or technology deployed on specified weapons. (Hardware and test information which would reveal engineering details or the technology used in specified weapons remains classified.) (98-2)

(b)

Vessel lifetimes of unspecified or specified reservoirs. (98-11)

(c)

Maximum service life of fill for unspecified or specified reservoirs. (98-11)

(d)

The fact that some tritium reservoirs will last the expected weapon service life for unspecified or specified weapons. (98-11)

(6)

The term "hollow boosting." (93-2)

(a)

Its definition: "A method wherein the boost gas is in a hollow pit at detonation time." (93-2)

The fact that the MK7 nuclear weapon employed an in-flight-insertion, "levitated pit" design of the type having an airspace between the tamper and core. (79-2)

General statements concerning the relationship of commonly known nuclear reactions of the light elements to developmental work on thermonuclear weapons. (51-1)

The date or estimate of the date when a thermonuclear weapon may be an actuality. (54-2)

The fact that in thermonuclear (TN) weapons, a fission "primary" is used to trigger a TN reaction in thermonuclear fuel referred to as a "secondary". (72-11)

The fact that, in thermonuclear weapons, radiation from a fission explosive can be contained and used to transfer energy to compress and ignite a physically separate component containing thermonuclear fuel. (79-2)

The fact that certain of our operational missiles have thermonuclear warheads. (62-7)

The fact that tests were conducted of designs which could lead to an entirely new class of U.S. weapons which could have relatively low weights and extremely high yields, with the fission contributions decreased to only a few percent of the total yield. (63-1)

The fact that the yield-to-weight ratios of the new class of weapons would be more than twice that which can now be achieved in the design of very high yield weapons using previously developed concepts. (63-1)

The United States, without further testing, can develop a warhead of 50-60 Mt for B-52 delivery." (63-3)

"... some improvement in high yield weapons design could be achieved and that new warheads -- for example, a 35 Mt warhead for our Titan II -- based on these improvements, could be stockpiled with confidence." (63-3)

Information revealing the mere existence of TN devices with total yield equal to or greater than 5 kt. (68-8)

The fact that the thermonuclear fuel used in the Mike test (10/31/52) of the Ivy series was liquid deuterium. (74-5)

The related fact that complex and bulky cryogenic equipment was associated with Mike. (74-5)

The fact that the device fired in the Bravo test (2/28/54) of the Castle series used lithium deuteride as its thermonuclear fuel. (74-5)

The existence of, or the capability to design, a thermonuclear (TN) weapon assembly system with a diameter of 8 inches or more. (88-4)

Primary/secondary information: The identity of a designated device nickname/acronym as a primary or secondary. (93-2)

(1)

The statement that the interval time for a staged weapon is between 0.001 microseconds and 100 microseconds, with no elaboration. (98-2)

Note: Some declassifications in this area refer to nominal data, defined as values pertaining to a 20 kt burst, or to similar data for any other assumed yield which are derived from 20 kt data by application of well-known physical concepts (scaling). Nominal data also includes data on all pre-SANDSTONE shots (Trinity, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Bikini-Able, Bikini-Baker) and to data taken from SANDSTONE and Post-SANDSTONE shots when these data are scaled up or down to 20 kt equivalent bursts. Another term used is hypothetical yield, defined as any yield not identifiable as the yield of an actual detonation, weapon, or device.

Mathematical expressions or graphical presentations resulting from a compilation of blast and shock data as a function of distance and hypothetical yield. (Provided height of burst or depth of burst is not specified.) (56-3)

(1)

Peak overpressure.

(2)

Peak dynamic pressure.

(3)

Time of arrival of shock front.

(4)

Positive phase duration of overpressure and dynamic pressure.

(5)

Peak density or peak material velocity.

(6)

Mach characteristics and height of triple point.

(7)

Overpressure and dynamic pressure impulse.

(8)

Crater dimensions for surface bursts.

(9)

Variation of crater dimensions with depth of burst as obtained from unclassified TNT data.

Variations of the following air blast and shock parameters at surface level with distance or time as a function of height or depth (including composite curves for a number of heights or depths of burst), or in free air with distance or time, as a function of yield. Classification depends on classification of yield. (59-1)

(1)

Peak overpressure

(2)

Peak dynamic pressure

(3)

Time of arrival of shock front

(4)

Positive phase duration of overpressure and dynamic pressure

(5)

Peak density or peak material velocity

(6)

Mach characteristics and height of triple point

(7)

Overpressure and dynamic pressure impulse

(8)

Crater dimensions for other than surface bursts.

Variation of any of the parameters under (b) above or other shock or wave characteristics with distance or time as a function of depth of burst (including composite curves for a number of depths of burst) in ground or water as a function of yield. Classification depends on classification of yield. (59-1)

Relative efficiencies of any of the parameters in b. or c. with respect to TNT or other standard of comparison. (59-1)

Mathematical expression or graphical presentations resulting from a compilation of fireball data as a function of hypothetical yield. (56-3)

(1)

Maximum fireball radius. (56-3)

(2)

Radius of fireball related to time for scaled time. (56-3)

Thermal Phenomena

Mathematical expressions or graphical presentations resulting from a compilation of thermal data as a function of hypothetical yield. (56-3)

(1)

Shape of radiation pulse

(2)

Thermal yield

Incident thermal radiation energy at a given distance for a hypothetical yield. (56-3)

Existence of, and circuitry used in devices such as bhangmeters. (56-3)

(1)

Bhangmeter design criteria. (59-1)

(2)

Bhangmeter calibration data or records. Classification of bhangmeter records identified with classified yields depends on the classification of the yield. (59-1)

Mathematical expressions or graphical presentations resulting from a compilation of thermal data as a function of hypothetical yield. Thermal radiation as a function of time after the 1st millisecond. (59-1)

Mathematical expressions or graphical presentations resulting from a compilation of nuclear radiation data as a function of distance and hypothetical yield. Information will be classified on basis of classification of diagnostic information that may be involved. (56-3)

Mathematical expressions or graphical presentations resulting from a compilation of radioactive fall-out or residual radiation data as a function of hypothetical yield and burst conditions. "Clean" and "salted" weapons or devices will not be included. (56-3)

Damage to and description of specific material and ships - Nominal, Japan and Trinity. (48-2)

Comparisons of damage effectiveness of the different bombs. All of the same order, but acknowledge that the U.S. has now achieved explosives up to twice the strength of Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs. (48-2)

Effects which would have been produced in City and Harbor of New York, Nominal (20 kt). (48-2)

Civil defense problems, not related to a specific agent or weapon. (49-2)

100 ton test and scale tests including radiological. (48-2) (49-1)

Effects of 20,000 ton explosion described in the Weapon Effects Handbook of the U.S. or the Civil Defence Handbook of the U.K., unless classified characteristics of the weapon can be determined therefrom. (50-3)

The mere fact that the U.S. is interested in pursuing a program to determine the characteristics of an "enhanced radiation" weapon (neutron bomb). (63-5)

The fact that the W-79 is an enhanced radiation weapon. (78-1)

Minimum Residual Radiation (MRR) Weapons

The fact that we are interested in and are continuing studies on a weapon for minimizing the emerging flux of neutrons and internal induced activity. (67-1)

The fact of weapon laboratory interest in MRR devices. (76-3)

The fact of successful development of MRR devices. (76-3)

Nuclear Directed Energy Weapons (NDEW)

The fact that DOE weapon laboratories are engaged in a research program to explore the feasibility of a nuclear explosive driven directed energy weapon. (82-2)

The fact that research is being conducted on the specific concept of a nuclear pumped X-ray laser. (82-2)

The fact that the DOE is interested in or conducting research on NDEW concepts of certain specified generic types of output; i.e., visible light, microwaves, charged particles, kinetic energy. (85-4)

The fact that underground tests at the Nevada Test Site have been and are a part of the NDEW research program. (85-4)

The fact that a specified NDEW could engage multiple targets by using multiple beams from a single platform and hence is a high leverage system. (85-4)

The fact that an NDEW could have lethal ranges of thousands of kilometers. (85-4)

The fact that a kill mechanism for an x-ray laser is ablative shock. (85-4)

The fact that standard laser techniques (e.g., lenses, rods, slabs, and oscillators) were considered in the nuclear-pumped x-ray laser program without discussion of details or experimental results. (94-2)

The use of materials for the x-ray laser program, provided otherwise classified information about nuclear device performance is not revealed. (98-3)

Nuclear Directed Energy Systems (NDES)

Generalized description of DNES principles, as well as general qualitative or quantitative information on the physics and technology of low-power DNES research, that does not substantially: (86-1)

(1)

Assist others in development of DNES weapons; or

(2)

Contribute to feasibility assessment of DNES weapon development; or

(3)

Reveal programmatic directions.

General qualitative descriptions of DNES program goals or objectives that do not reveal classified milestones or achievements or specific design characteristics. Classified milestones and their achievements will be reviewed for release on a case-by-case basis. (86-1)

General studies of DNES special nuclear materials and their physical properties. Specific special nuclear materials which are developed for (and the specificconditions of their association with) classified DNES projects and test device designs will remain classified. (86-1)

General studies of other DNES materials and their physical properties. No material identities or associations will be declassified where such information may be used to infer classified DNES characteristics. (86-1)

The fact that a military weapons system (such as the 280 mm gun, airplanes of various types including fighters and fighter bombers, and guided missiles of various types) has a capability to deliver atomic weapons provided that the existence of the military weapons system itself is not classified and that any elaboration of the statement of capability will be classified in accordance with the nature of the additional information revealed. (53-1)

Mere fact that the U.S. has developed a munition suitable for demolition work. (57-5)

The fact that one of the proof tests of a complete nuclear weapons system involved the ASROC (Anti-Submarine Rocket) weapons system. (63-1)

Information related to the Polaris:

(1)

The fact that the POLARIS MARK 2 Re-entry System may have more than one nuclear warhead. (66-3)

(2)

The actual number of MARK 58 nuclear warheads which the POLARIS MARK 2 Re-entry System may have. (66-3)

The term or concept of clustered or multiple nuclear warheads when not associated with a specific missile system or project. (67-1)

The fact that the total number of Spartan and Sprint interceptors planned for the 4-site option at Minuteman sites is 120 Spartans and 264 Sprints. (71-3)

The nuclear device to be tested in the Cannikin event is related to the optimum development of a warhead for the Spartan missile of our Safeguard Ballistic Missile Defense Program. The measurements of device performance which will be obtained from the test are essential to our optimum defense deployment of safeguards for protection of our Minuteman missile sites. (71-9)

The maximum number of warheads the Poseidon and Minuteman III are designed to carry. (73-4)

The fact that ICBM's and SLBM's are hardened. (73-4)

The fact that a designated nuclear weapon or missile system is hardened against specified nuclear effects. (77-1)

The fact that the Navy RB500 has a maneuvering capability. (80-2)

The fact that the Trident I missile has a design capacity for 8 Re-entry Bodies. (80-2)

Nuclear Weapons Stockpile

Existing storage site.

(1)

Official names(s), nickname(s), and/or location, when association with the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP) or AEC is not revealed. (53-1)

(2)

AEC storage sites (as pertains to all weapons in custody of AEC at a National Storage Site (NSS) and an Operational Storage Site (OSS)). (56-3)

(3)

Location

(a)

When information does not explicitly reveal installation is a storage site for nuclear weapons. (56-3)

(b)

DoD storage sites (as pertains to weapons in DoD custody only). With delivery organizations and operating forces in the U.S. or overseas. (56-3)

-

Fact that particular aircraft squadron, naval vessel, or special weapons organization has capability of storing or handling nuclear weapons. (56-3)

(4)

The approximate location of some of the national stockpile sites and operational stockpile sites provided no indication is given as to the total number of storage sites. (59-7)

Future storage sites

(1)

Official name(s), nickname(s), and/or location, when association with AFSWP or AEC is not revealed. Future storage sites become existing storage sites at the time of administrative manning. (53-1)

"In certain areas Soviet nuclear technology equals and in some areas even exceeds that of the U.S., although our overall capability and means of delivery are believed to be superior to the Soviets." (62-1)

"The U.S. has a nuclear weapon in stockpile with a yield of approximately 25 megatons." (62-4)

"The world was shocked by the 60 megaton test on October 30th. The U.S. analysis has shown that this device used a lead jacket around the fusion materials, and gave only a few megatons fission. Thus, the Russians reduced the fallout, especially that which might have fallen on their own country. If lead were replaced by uranium, the Russian device would give 100 megatons or slightly more." (62-4)

The identification of U.S. TX, XW, or Mark numbers with U.S. missile names. (62-7)

"In order to achieve it, we maintain a total number of nuclear warheads, tactical as well as strategic, in the tens of thousands." (63-3)

The fact that we have deployed thousands of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. (63-4)

(1)

The fact that the total kiloton yield of these weapons is well in excess of ten thousand times the total yield of the nuclear weapons used at the end of World War II. (63-4)

"This country and the Soviet Union already have produced enough explosive force to equal ten tons of TNT for every man women and child on the face of the earth." This statement was to be used by the President on January 21, 1964 at a Disarmament Conference in Geneva. (64-2)

The fact that during the period December 1960 - January 1961 two nuclear artillery shells were in stockpile, the 280 mm and the 8" gun-type nuclear weapons. (64-5)

"In presenting this proposal, it could be stated that 'several thousand' nuclear weapons could be involved." This statement is contained in a U.S. Position paper on the Destruction of Nuclear Weapons to Obtain Fissionable Materials for Transfer Under a Cutoff and Transfer Agreement. (65-3)

"The number of nuclear warheads in strategic alert forces has increased from 850 on June 30, 1961 to 2700 estimated as of June 30, 1965." (65-5)

"The fact that U.S. strategic forces have an inventory of nuclear warheads in excess of 5,000, that the number of nuclear warheads furnished to the Alliance and stored in inventory in Western Europe has exceeded 5,000 nuclear warheads, and that this number will increase by more than 20% during the next six months." (65-7)

The minimum spacing for specific nuclear weapons or nuclear components in storage or transit. (67-1)

Statements that qualitatively reveal that a nuclear weapon is satisfactory. (67-1)

The fact that U.S. nuclear artillery shells are located in Germany. (73-6)

The estimated costs for the proposed improved nuclear artillery shells as $452,000 each for the MK-74 (155mm) and $400,000 each for the MK-75 (8 inch). (73-6)

The fact that any particular reactor product is being or has been stockpiled for military use. (73-8)

Information concerning the weapons stockpile: (81-1)

Fiscal Year

Number of non-nuclear components

1945

1946

1947

1948

1. Gun-type

0

0

(0)

(2)

2. Implosion

2

9

(29)

(53)

Number of nuclear components

3. Gun-type

0

0

0

0

4. Implosion-type

2

9

13

50

Numbers in parentheses declassified in 1976.

Descriptions of historical and future trends in the total number of nuclear weapons in, or megatonage of, the total stockpile which are:

(1)

Qualitative. (82-1)

(2)

Expressed as a percentage change over any time period or on an unscaled graph with a scaled time axis for the past, present, or future up to and including the approved period of the current Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum (usually five fiscal years beyond the current fiscal year). (82-1)

Note: Remains classified if dramatic trend changes result from significant unplanned events such as major technical or production problems, sabotage, natural or man-made disasters, etc.

Descriptions of trends for any time period in nuclear weapon production or retirement rates which are qualitative, including relative comparisons of the production rate versus the retirement rate. (82-1)

The fact that the total nuclear weapons stockpile contains a few tens of thousands of weapons (no numbers specified). (82-1)

The unelaborated fact of the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in the U.K. (84-1)

The megatonage of the United States nuclear stockpile, by year, for year 1945 to 1994. (94-12)

Note: See the data table at Appendix D for exact data released. Inactive weapons are attributed zero yield. Megatonnage value different from the attached table must be approved by Headquarters prior to public release. Specifications by weapon type remains classified.

aa.

The total quantity of the United States nuclear stockpile, indicated by year, for years 1949 to 1961. The total stockpile quantities for years 1945 to 1948 were already unclassified. (94-12)

Note: Total quantity values that are different from the table at Appendix D. must be approved by Headquarters prior to public release. Specification by weapon type remains classified.

bb.

The total number of nuclear weapons built by the United States, for weapon types fully retired, by year, for years 1945 to 1989. (94-12)

Note: These are total builds per year only. Specification by weapon type remains classified. Total build numbers that are different from the table at Appendix D. must be approved by Headquarters prior to public release.

cc.

The total number of nuclear weapons retired by the United States, by year, for years 1945 to 1989. (94-12)

Note: Retirement numbers declassified do not include weapons retired from active status and placed in the inactive stockpile or inactive weapons returned to activestatus as shown in some classified databases. Retirement numbers that are different from the table at Appendix D must be approved by Headquarters prior to public release. Specification by weapon type remains classified. The table at Appendix D includes the number of weapons disassembled by year for years 1980 through 1994. Disassemblies listed in the Appendix reflect only those weapons dismantled for actual disposal. Total disassemblies by year have been unclassified for some time.

dd.

The total number of nuclear weapons in the United States active and inactive stockpile, by year, for years 1945 to 1961. (94-12)

Note: There were no inactive weapons in the stockpile during this time frame. However, it does allow comment that prior to 1962, all weapons were 'active' and that there were no inactive weapons.

Accidents

The salvage value of the Mark 28 Nuclear Weapon recovered off the coast at Palomares, Spain, was $164,000.

The fact that approximately 6 kgs of plutonium were involved in the Thule, Greenland accident. (68-4)

(1)

Best estimate of the amount of plutonium removed from the site. (68-4)

(2)

Distribution of Tritium on the surface in the vicinity of the crash (excluding that picked up on aircraft debris) (69-2)

Enclosed Area1(square meters)

Tritium Deposition2

(Curies) :

(% of total)

1.97 x 1031.10 x 1042.49 x 1043.90 x 104

365
657
986
1337

27.2
49.1
73.7
100

1Consecutively larger areas corresponding to the fall-out pattern.

2Total out to the specified boundary.

The following information concerning the Palomares, Spain accident. (74-5a)

Tower construction and drawings not revealing nature of installation to be placed thereon. (56-3)

(2)

Layouts of individual instrument buildings which do not reveal purpose for which building is erected, or radiation or other weapon effects it is to withstand. (56-3)

(3)

Layout of laboratory buildings which do not reveal nature of activities conducted therein so as to indicate scope of scientific program. (56-3)

General Scientific Information; Shipping and handling container for assembled nuclear test device, providing it is not identified, and providing details giving size, weight, or shape of device are not divulged. (56-3)

Developmental and test detonations at NTS. If detonation is clearly identifiable as an actual or probable stockpile weapon (such as detonation of an air-to-air rocket or gun-fired projectile) the yield is Secret. (57-7)

Currently classified information about historical device locations and movements at the Nevada Test Site or other U.S. nuclear weapons test sites. (98-9)

Long Range Detection - Monitoring Data.

Continental tests. (53-1)

U.S. overseas tests after announcement of occurrence. (53-1)

Number and sizes of particles collected. (53-1)

Quantitative reports of activities of fission products. (53-1)

(1)

Total activity or total beta activity.

(2)

Breakdown of total activity by time and location.

Long range detection techniques that only involve the following: (53-1)

Yields of developmental and test weapons or devices as follows: (56-1)

(a)

Sandstone, Trinity, and Crossroads. (56-1)

(b)

Approximate yield for any shot under 1MT when not identifiable with a specific shot (identification of yield with named test operation or proving ground is not considered "identification with a specific shot") The Number 1 or nearest whole number multiple of 10 or 100; i.e., 1kt, 10 kt, 20 kt, etc., 100 kt, 200 kt, 300 kt, etc. (56-1)

The following information concerning the Pinon shot of Operation Hardtack nuclear test operation. These declassifications were related to a special shot for UN observers.

(1)

The location and scheduled and actual time of shot. (58-5)

(2)

The device to be tested is contained in a cylindrical container about 5 feet in diameter, and 12 feet long which will weigh about 8 tons including the contents. Also the center of gravity to the extent that it may be revealed by weighing under each of the four corners of the cradle. (58-5)

(3)

The bomb fraction tracer will be 20 tons of uranium (isotopic composition will remain classified). (58-5)

(4)

The total yield as measured by fireball photography (Only the predicted range of yield will be announced in advance of the test). (58-5)

(5)

Cloud samples as collected on filter paper and any information which might be derived from analyzing them without the use of any classified information. (58-5)

(6)

Fission yield as determined by radiochemistry at UCRL, Berkeley. The participants will observe this determination and may actually assist in carrying out the analyses and in this determination. (58-5)

(7)

Identification of the device being tested as a stockpile weapon. (58-5)

(8)

The fact that at some unspecified previous test a five megaton total yield device was detonated. (58-5)

The device to be tested in Cannikin will have a yield less than five megatons. (71-2)

oo.

The predicted (80 kt) and the actual yield of the Miniata event. (71-7)

pp.

Event:

Date:

Yield:

HupmobilePackard

January 18, 1968January 15, 1969

7.4 kt (71-8)10 kt (71-8)

qq.

The nuclear device to be tested in the Cannikin event is related to the optimum development of a warhead for the Spartan missile of our Safeguard Ballistic Missile Defense Program. The measurements of device performance which will be obtained from the test are essential to our optimum defense deployment of safeguards for protection of our Minuteman missile sites. (71-9)

rr.

Unannounced atmospheric tests conducted at Eniwetok Atoll. (72-8)

Event Name

Date

Type of Burst

YumaKickapooIncaMohawkPisoniaFigQuince

05/27/5606/13/5606/21/5607/02/5607/17/5808/18/5808/06/58

TowerTowerTowerTowerBargePlatformPlatform

Safety Experiment:

Scaevola

07/14/58

Barge

ss.

The following information concerning NTS test events: (73-9)

Event

Yield

Date

MississippiCommodoreCalabashFlaskCarpet BagDelphiniumStarwort

110 kt250 kt110 kt105 kt220 kt15 kt79 kt

10/5/625/20/6710/29/695/26/7012/17/709/26/724/26/73

tt.

Information concerning three previously unannounced tests. (74-4)

Event Name

Date

Time GCT

Location

Type of Burst

Remarks

BernalMisty NorthMing Blade

11/28/735/2/726/19/72

15:3019:1516:00

NTSNTSNTS

UndergroundUndergroundUnderground

Under 20 ktUnder 20 ktUnder 20 kt

uu.

The fact that the yield of the King test (11/15/52) of the Ivy series was 500 kt. (74-5)

vv.

The fact that the Hybla Fair test event occurred at NTS on October 28, 1974, at a yield under 20 kt. (74-7)

ww.

The fact that the tritium - deuterium mixture of the George test (5/8/51), the first thermonuclear test explosion, burned well. (74-8)

xx.

The mere fact that the Item event of the Greenhouse series was the first test of the boosting principle. (75-2)

UNITED STATES, UNITED KINGDOM, AND SOVIETNUCLEAR EVENTS(Yield in Kilotons)

Inclusive Years

Fission Yield*

Total Yield

Air Burst

Ground Surface Burst

Water Surface Burst

Air Burst

Surface Burst

1945-1951

190

550

20

190

570

1952-1954

1000

15000

22000

1000

59000

1955-1956

5600

1500

6000

11000

17000

1957-1958

31000

4400

4600

57000

28000

*A value of 50% has been arbitrarily selected for the fission to total yield ratio for all Soviet thermonuclear tests. As indicated in the tables, 50% is about the average fission to total yield ratio for all US/UK thermonuclear tests.

SOVIET NUCLEAR EVENTS(Yield in Kilotons)

Inclusive

Total Fission Yield*

1945-1951
1952-1954
1955-1956
1957-1958

60
500
4000
21000

*A value of 50% has been arbitrarily selected for the fission to total yield ratio for all Soviet thermonuclear tests. As indicated in the tables, 50% is about the average fission to total yield ratio for all US/UK thermonuclear tests.

UNITED STATES AND UNITED KINGDOM NUCLEAR EVENTS(Yield in Kilotons)

Year

Total Fission
Yield

Total Fission Yield From Greater than
1MT Total Yield Events

1945
1946
1948
1951

60
40
100
500

1952-1954
1955
1956
1957-1958

37000
200
9000
19000

36000

8000
14000

The fact that tests were conducted of designs which could lead to an entirely new class of U.S. weapons which could have relatively low weights and extremely high yields, with the fission contributions decreased to only a few percent of the total yield. (63-1)

The fact that one of the proof tests of a complete nuclear weapons system involved the ASROC (Anti-Submarine Rocket) weapons system. (63-1)

The fact that a specific event which has been approved for announcement by the Commission is a "nuclear weapons related, PNE device development, or Vela test". (68-8)

The emplacement of a nuclear weapon at some point above the bottom of the hole for purposes of debris containment. Information revealing the effectiveness of debris containment techniques is not being proposed for declassification and remains classified Secret Restricted Data. (68-8)

Mechanical closure mechanisms, fast gates, and hydrodynamic closures per se including number used on a specific event and their location on systems currently in use. However, modifications to existing Line of Sight systems which could result in a major improvement in underground testing techniques or capabilities should be reviewed by the Division of Classification, HQ, for classification prior to unclassified release. (68-8)

For the future, the mere fact that the United States conducts simultaneous underground nuclear tests. (70-1)

Information on foreign nuclear tests. (70-2)

Year

Country and Location

Number
of Tests

Approximate Yields
(Megaton)
FissionTotal

1966

Communist China-Lop Nor
France-South Pacific

35

0.5
0.8

0.6
0.9

1967

Communist China-Lop Nor
France-South Pacific

23

2.0
0.2

3.0
0.2

1968

Communist China-Lop Nor
France-South Pacific

15

1.5
4.2

3.0
4.7

1969

Communist China-Lop Nor

1

1.5

3

The sum of estimated fission yields for all events conducted underground at the Nevada Test Site through 1993, with an effective date of January 1, 1994, that were detonated below or within 100 meters of the water table: (94-2)

(1)

on Pahute Mesa

(2)

on testing areas other than Pahute Mesa

The sum of estimated masses, by isotope, of unfissioned fissile materials, fission products with a half-life in excess of 1 year, and neutron-activated radionuclides with a half-life in excess of 1 year either left in or created in the detonation cavities formed by events described in VI.C.3.i. above through 1993 with an effective date of January 1, 1994. (94-2)

The sum of the estimated mass of tritium either left in or created in the detonation cavities described in VI.C.3.i. through 1993 with an effective date of January 1, 1994. (94-2)

The estimated activity, in curies, through 1993, with an effective date of January 1, 1994, of each of the isotopes described in VI.C.3.j. above. (94-2)

The estimated activity, in curies, through 1993, with an effective date of January 1, 1994, of the tritium described in VI.C.3.k. above. (94-2)

The total estimated mass of reportable toxic or hazardous materials either left in or created in the detonation cavities formed by events described in VI.C.3.i through 1993, with an effective date of January 1, 1994. (94-2)

The fact that one or more hohlraums are on a specified nuclear test for auxiliary experiments. (98-9)

The concept of a closure system for nuclear tests or experiments. (98-9)

Currently classified information about past test event associations with the United Kingdom. (98-9)

Currently classified information [about] event yields inferred from seismic measurements made by non-U.S. Government agencies or contractors. (98-9)

Currently classified estimates of radiation doses from debris in the atmosphere. (98-9)

Hypothetical unclassified values of normally classified weapon parameters, such as time dependence of reaction rates, provided well defined constraints are followed. (98-9)

Other projects. No unclassified disclosure of this information may be made without specific authorization by AEC and DOD. (53-1)

Information about laying of keel or completion date of nuclear powered vessels. (53-1)

(1)

SSN (571) (STR Mark II) - Keel. (53-1)

(2)

Completion Date. No unclassified disclosure of this information may be made without specific authorization by the AEC and the DOD. (53-1)

(3)

SSN No. 2 (SIR Mark B). (53-1)

(4)

Other nuclear powered vessels. (53-1)

Shield: Constructional features of shielding arrangements exterior to the reactor container although they may reveal the location and thickness of lead or water, or other materials in the secondary shield. Access to working areas where tanks, lead sheeting, etc., exterior to the reactor container are revealed would not require the safeguards of Restricted Data (R.D.). Drawings or correspondence involving the same information would likewise not constitute R.D. (53-1)

All other equipment outside reactor container except as they reveal reactor design criteria and reactor core characteristics other than design temperatures5. (53-1)

Reactor Core Design

Blanket-to-seed power ratios. (77-5)

The mere fact that existing cores utilize Zircaloy 2, 3, or 4. (77-5)

Reactor metallurgy

Properties of silver, indium, cadmium or elemental boron from an operating prototype or ship reactor. (77-5)

Research and development on lasers will be classified if power level exceeds 100 gigawatt, or pulse energy exceed 1 kilojoule. Any laser application (for any power whether or not classified) that achieves DT ignition will be classified Restricted Data. DT ignition is defined to be a 1% rise in temperature or mean charged-particle kinetic energy at any point in the gas [target]. (64-7)

B.

Summaries and results of two-dimensional calculations of laser heating on slab geometries composed of either homogeneous or non-homogeneous materials without inertial compression. (72-4)

C.

The implosion of a pellet of homogeneous material by the interaction of laser radiation with the outer layers of material and the subsequent confirmation of the density and temperature condition required for efficient burn of the thermonuclear fuel. (72-4)

Information in connection with the publication of the Laser-Fusion Classification Guide, CG-LF-2.

The design and performance of pushers on spherical and non-spherical pellets. (74-3)

The design and performance of multi-layered spherical and non-spherical pellets. (74-3)

Two and three dimension calculations on spherical and non-spherical pellets. (74-3)

G.

The fact that, in some ICF targets, radiation from the conversion of the focused energy (e.g., laser or particle beam) can be contained and used to compress and ignite a physically separate component containing thermonuclear fuel. (79-2)

H.

The fact that implosion symmetry and stability are usually considered in the design of X-ray driven targets. (83-4)

I.

The fact that fuel preheat is usually considered in the design of X-ray driven targets. (83-4)

J.

The association of Halite and/or Centurion with ICF experiments using nuclear explosives at Nevada Test Site (NTS). No further elaboration. (88-3)

K.

The fact that ICF targets located in a hollow chamber may be driven by trapped energy, nature unspecified, created in the chamber by one or more energetic beams penetrating the chamber through holes in the chamber walls. No further elaboration. (88-3)

L.

Laboratory Hohlraums

Fact of holes, their number, relative location and function (entrance, diagnostic) in the hohlraum wall. (90-1)

Fact that hole closure is an issue in laser-driven hohlraums, as well as the fact that either laser or x-ray (or both) mechanisms may play a significant role in hole closure. (90-1)

For particle-beam drive, fact that the particles pass through the radiation container and deposit energy in a converter material. (90-1)

Note: Calculated performance values derived from a classified code (e.g., LASNEX) for the above list are unclassified (except for fuel radialconvergence, which is experimental only) for one- or two-dimensional calculations, even when identified as coming from a classified code.

Declassify all information relevant to the energy applications of inertial confinement fusion, consistent with the other declassification recommendations, except for results of classified codes (pending review by the Office of Declassification). (93-9)

For unclassified targets, this would include time-dependent output spectra of:

Neutrons

Gamma rays

X rays (limited to no more than a three-temperature blackbody fit)

Fuel atoms

Reaction products

Target debris

Output information for targets that have been tailored for weapons effects remain classified.

Characteristics, design, and functional information pertaining to components and equipment within the reactor container is classified, except:

Coolants except new or unusual coolants.

Control actuating mechanisms except as reveal dimensions and size of core, location and nature of control elements and the nature of the control problem. It is intended to retain classification on the overall control system and on the control elements themselves. (51-1) (53-1)

The fact that beryllium and/or beryllium oxide are used in the Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion program as moderator or reflecting materials, and that lithium hydride and tungsten are used as shielding materials. (59-13)

Association of any quantity of europium and gadolinium with the Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion program. (59-13)

Note: With this declassification, all technology developed in military reactor programs not used in operational military systems is now unclassified. There is no change in the naval nuclear propulsion program classification policy.

Mere fact that the U.S. has developed atomic munitions suitable for use in demolition work. (58-8)

The cost of fabricating and firing a device 30" in diameter and of a few kt yield, all from fission, would approximate $500,000 when made available in small numbers. (58-9)

The cost of fabricating and firing a device 30" in diameter of a few 10's of kt yield, all from fission, would approximate $750,000 when made available in small numbers. (58-9)

The cost of fabricating and firing a device 60" in diameter in the yield range up to 5 Mt, of which 5% of the yield was from fission and 95% from fusion, would be approximately $1,000,000 in small quantities. (58-9)

In the event of multiple firing in the same location, or in using large numbers of devices, the cost per firing would be substantially reduced. (58-9)

The fact that the AEC can supply a Plowshare device having a diameter of 30 inches and a yield of 300 kt. (59-3)

These costs are only those incident to the fabrication of the device, emplacing it in its firing location, making the firing attachments, firing, and studies to assure public safety and to determine the results of the detonation. It does notinvolve such possible activities as preparing a hole or other structure for the firing or studies to determine the results of industrial utility. (58-9)

The fact that a specific PNE device will have no more than a few kt of fission. (64-3)

The fact that the yield of PAR, an October 9, 1964 Plowshare NTS development test, was "about 30 kt". Also any later yield based on new data. (65-2)

"Nuclear explosives have not been designed specifically for underground engineering applications. When conditions warrant, such special designs could be undertaken. It is reasonable for industry to assume, for first generation designs, that yields of 100 kt could be obtained in a canister with an outside diameter of 11 inches, suitable for emplacement in a standard 13-3/8 inch OD casing designed with at least a 12-1/8 inch clear inside diameter, or when appropriate, an open hole of the same minimum size. Unusual formation pressures and temperatures may present special problems requiring larger diameters than the above." (66-6)

The following data relative to the synthesis of heavy elements through exposure of target material such as U238 to a high neutron flux of a nuclear detonation: (68-3)

Target mass (if 300 grams or less).

Mere fact that the target is located within the device.

Target isotopic composition.

Identities and quantities of nuclides formed or expected to be formed by neutron induced radiation in the target.

The predicted (80 kt) and the actual yield of the Miniata event. (71-7)

The external appearance (size, weight, and shape) and the expected and actual yields of the Diamond explosive for Rio Blanco and Wagon Wheel. (72-6)

The fact that the Diamond device will be enclosed in an approximately 16-foot long container, not less than 7.8 inches in diameter, between two slightly smaller diameter sections, such that the total package will be about 30-feet long. (72-6)

The fact the yields ranging from 20-100 kt can be obtained within the 7.8 inch by 16-foot container. (72-6)

The fact that the Diamond device is of the fission type. (72-6)

The fact that the produced Carbon-14 per explosive is expected to be small in comparison with the 7.5 curies observed in the Gasbuggy experiment. (72-6)

Post-shot measurement of Carbon-14. (72-6)

The predicted and actual amounts of the following radioactivities:

(1)

Krypton - 85 - approximately 23 Ci/kt. (72-6)

(2)

Total tritium - current upper limit number based on expected rock composition are: less than 3,000 curies from the three 30 kt explosives in Rio Blanco and less than 10,000 curies from the five 100 kt explosives in Wagon Wheel. (72-6)

The three charges of Rio Blanco (5/17/73) each yielded 30 kt for a total event yield of 90 kt. (73-3a)

The yields without elaboration, of the following nuclear tests/detonations conducted underground at the Nevada Test Site as part of the Plowshare Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) program: (97-1)

NOTE: On December 22, 1997, at an Openness Press Conference held in Washington, D.C., DOE released updated information on the yields of PNE events. This information on Plowshare yields supersedes information provided in previous editions.

(1) - Classification will be retained on all information on production capacity and stocks available.

(2) - This includes
description of actual manufacturing operations or reasonable alternates, and laboratory work from which the nature of these operations could be clearly inferred.

(3) - Classification will be retained, for the present, on small scale production methods.

(4) - This refers only to high purity graphite manufactured specifically for use as a moderator.

(5) - The kinetic energies and all nuclear properties of fission products may be declassified (but see 10-181) except: (a) Slow neutron capture cross-sections above 100 barns for radioactive fission products. (b) The absolute fission yield of delayed neutrons. (c) The fission yield of any of the isotopes leading to delayed neutron fission.

(6) - This does not prohibit the release of information on the laboratory scale separation of the fission products from one another, but care must be exercised not to reveal information regarding the large scale production of specific radioactive products of fission.

(7)
- No information is to be disclosed from which the interest of the Project in the use of this substance for classified purposes or its large scale production may be inferred.

(8)
- Unless permitted by Table B.

(9) - No physical or mechanical properties of solid or liquid states of plutonium metal may be declassified.

(10)
- Information concerning new elements should not be released until approval is received from the Declassification Office.

LIST OF ISOTOPES TO WHICH FIRST COLUMN APPLIES
(Information obtainable only by the use of amounts greater than
those in the table below or which otherwise reveals the existence
of greater amounts may not be declassified.)

1) Developmental and test weapons or devices are classified except as follows:

a) Sandstone, Trinity, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Crossroads, and Ivy Mike

U

b) Approximate yield for any shot under 1 MT when not identifiable with a specific shot (identification of yield with named test operation or proving ground is not considered as identification with a specific shot.

2 It is often necessary to reveal the purity of substances critical to the production of materials of special Project interest as well as that of materials
of special Project interest in discussing basic metallurgical data. In so doing, one would be liable to reveal the specifications of production metal,
uranium for example. (By specification is meant the purity requirements to which the material is manufactured and not the composition of any
particular sample.) In such cases, no mention should be made of the size of the lot of uranium the specimen came from, nor should mention be
made of the fact that it is production metal or specially prepared metal of high purity for specific studies. In addition, if the content of an element
in a sample is less than 0.01 percent by weight, the analytical data should not be revealed, though it would be permissible to state the content to
be less than 0.01 percent.

3 Independent work is non AEC-sponsored work performed without the use of any classified data.

4 This item is included in recognition of the fact that operationally it is impossible to prevent unauthorized observers from seeing or photographing objects
externally carried by airplanes. However, it is not necessary to identify the object for such observers or photographers or to reveal to them detailed
specifications concerning the size and shape of the object. Such information can and should be protected.