This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-09-783T
entitled 'Influenza Pandemic: Greater Agency Accountability Needed to
Protect Federal Workers in the Event of a Pandemic' which was released
on June 16, 2009.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the
Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Tuesday, June 16, 2009:
Influenza Pandemic:
Greater Agency Accountability Needed to Protect Federal Workers in the
Event of a Pandemic:
Statement of Bernice Steinhardt:
Director, Strategic Issues:
GAO-09-783T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-783T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the
District of Columbia, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs.
Why GAO Did This Study:
As evidenced by the spring 2009 outbreak of the H1N1 virus, an
influenza pandemic remains a real threat to the nation and the world
and has the potential to shut down work critical to the smooth
functioning of society. This testimony addresses (1) the extent to
which federal agencies have made pandemic plans to protect workers who
cannot work remotely and are not first responders; (2) the pandemic
plans selected agencies have for certain occupations performing
essential functions other than first response; and (3) the
opportunities to improve agencies’ workforce pandemic plans.
The issues discussed in the testimony are based on the GAO report,
Influenza Pandemic: Increased Agency Accountability Could Help Protect
Federal Employees Serving the Public in the Event of a Pandemic (GAO-09-
404, June 12, 2009). In this report, GAO recommended that the Homeland
Security Council (HSC) request that the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) monitor and report to the Executive Office of the President on
the readiness of agencies to continue operations while protecting their
employees in the event of a pandemic. To help carry out its oversight
role, the Congress may want to consider requiring a similar report from
DHS. The HSC noted that it will give serious consideration to the
findings and recommendations in the report, and DHS said the report
will contribute to its efforts to ensure government entities are well
prepared for what may come next.
What GAO Found:
GAO surveyed the 24 agencies employing nearly all federal workers to
gain an overview of governmentwide pandemic influenza preparedness
efforts and found that a wide range of pandemic planning activities are
under way. However, as of early 2009, several agencies reported that
they were still developing their pandemic plans and their measures to
protect their workforce. For example, several agencies had yet to
identify essential functions during a pandemic that cannot be performed
remotely. In addition, although many of the agencies’ pandemic plans
rely on telework to carry out their functions, five agencies reported
testing their information technology capability to little or no extent.
To get a more in-depth picture of agency planning, GAO selected three
case study agencies that represent essential occupations other than
first response that cannot be performed remotely. The three case study
occupations—correctional workers, production staff disbursing federal
checks, and air traffic controllers—showed differences in the degree to
which their individual facilities had operational pandemic plans. For
example, the Bureau of Prisons’ correctional workers had only recently
been required to develop pandemic plans for their correctional
facilities. Nevertheless, the Bureau of Prisons has considerable
experience limiting the spread of infectious disease within its
correctional facilities and had also made arrangements for antiviral
medications for a portion of its workers and inmates. The Department of
the Treasury’s Financial Management Service, which has production staff
involved in disbursing federal payments such as Social Security checks,
had pandemic plans for its four regional centers and had stockpiled
personal protective equipment such as respirators, gloves, and hand
sanitizers at the centers. Air traffic control management facilities,
where air traffic controllers work, had not yet developed facility
pandemic plans or incorporated pandemic plans into their all-hazards
contingency plans. The Federal Aviation Administration had recently
completed a study to determine the feasibility of the use of
respirators by air traffic controllers and concluded that their long-
term use during a pandemic appears to be impractical.
There is no mechanism in place to monitor and report on agencies’
progress in developing workforce pandemic plans. Under the National
Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan, DHS was required
to monitor and report on the readiness of departments and agencies to
continue operations while protecting their employees during an
influenza pandemic. The HSC, however, informed DHS in late 2006 or
early 2007 that no specific reports on this were required to be
submitted. Rather, the HSC requested that agencies certify to the
council that they were addressing in their plans the applicable
elements of a pandemic checklist in 2006 and again in 2008. This
process did not include any assessment or reporting on the status of
agency plans. Given agencies’ uneven progress in developing their
pandemic plans, monitoring and reporting would enhance agencies’
accountability for protecting their employees in the event of a
pandemic.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-783T] or key
components. For more information, contact Bernice Steinhardt, (202) 512-
6543 or steinhardtb@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss our recent study of federal
agencies' plans to protect their workers in the event of an influenza
pandemic.[Footnote 1] Our report focused on the protection of federal
employees, not classified as emergency first responders, yet necessary
for ensuring the continuity of the country's critical operations.
Although some of these employees will be able to perform their
agencies' essential functions remotely through arrangements such as
telework, others, such as federal correctional workers, production
staff involved in disbursing federal payments such as Social Security
checks, and air traffic controllers, will have to work at assigned
locations where there will be an increased chance of infection due to
proximity to others. As we were recently reminded by the spring 2009
outbreak of the H1N1 virus, an influenza pandemic remains a real threat
to our nation and the world and has the potential to shut down work
critical to the smooth functioning of our society. Given the important
role that the federal government will play in the national response to
a pandemic, planning to ensure the safety and well-being of federal
employees is vital to the success of government operations.
This statement is based on our June 12, 2009 report and focuses on (1)
the extent to which agencies have made pandemic plans to protect
workers who cannot work remotely and are not first responders; (2) the
pandemic plans selected agencies have for certain occupations
performing essential functions other than first response; and (3) the
opportunities to improve agencies' workforce pandemic plans.
To address our objectives, we surveyed the pandemic coordinators from
the 24 agencies covered by the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990,
[Footnote 2] which we supplemented with a case study approach. We used
the survey to get an overview of governmentwide pandemic influenza
preparedness efforts. The survey questions asked about pandemic plans;
essential functions other than first response that employees cannot
perform remotely; protective measures, such as procuring pharmaceutical
interventions; social distancing strategies;[Footnote 3] information
technology (IT) testing; and communication of human capital pandemic
policies. The survey was conducted from May through July 2008, and the
results were confirmed or updated in early 2009. To get a more in-depth
picture of agency planning, we selected for case studies three
occupations that represent essential functions (other than first
responders): correctional workers employed by the Department of
Justice's (DOJ) Bureau of Prisons (BOP); production staff responsible
for disbursing federal payments in the Department of the Treasury's
(Treasury) Financial Management Service (FMS); and air traffic
controllers employed by the Department of Transportation's (DOT)
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). We undertook this performance
audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. The standards require that we plan and perform the audit to
obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis
for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We
believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
In summary, our report found the following:
* Agency progress in pandemic planning is uneven. Although all of the
24 CFO Act agencies reported being engaged in planning for pandemic
influenza to some degree, several agencies reported that they were
still developing their pandemic plans and their measures to protect
their workforce.
* The three case study agencies also showed differences in the degree
to which their individual facilities had operational pandemic plans.
BOP's correctional workers had only recently been required to develop
pandemic plans for their correctional facilities. Treasury's FMS had
pandemic plans for its four regional centers and had stockpiled
personal protective equipment. By contrast, air traffic control
management facilities, where air traffic controllers work, had not yet
developed facility pandemic plans or incorporated pandemic plans into
their all-hazards contingency plans.
* There is no mechanism in place to monitor and report on agencies'
progress in developing workforce pandemic plans. Instead of having the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) monitor agency readiness to
continue operations while protecting their employees during an
influenza pandemic, as originally envisioned under the National
Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan (Implementation
Plan), the Homeland Security Council (HSC)[Footnote 4] requested that
agencies certify to the council that they were addressing in their
plans the applicable elements of a pandemic checklist without including
any provisions to assess the progress agencies were making.
Background:
Approximately 2.6 million federal employees throughout the United
States and abroad execute the responsibilities of the federal
government. Federal employees work in every state, with about 90
percent outside the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area. They perform
functions across a multitude of sectors, from those vital to the long-
term well-being of the country--such as environmental protection,
intelligence, social work, and financial services--to those directly
charged with aspects of public safety--including corrections, airport
and aviation safety, medical services, border protection, and
agricultural safety.
Worker protection strategies are crucial to sustain an adequate
workforce during a pandemic. During the peak of an outbreak of a severe
influenza pandemic in the United States, an estimated 40 percent of the
workforce could be unable to work because of illness, the need to care
for ill family members, or fear of infection. Under the Implementation
Plan, all federal agencies are expected to develop their own pandemic
plans that along with other requirements, describe how each agency will
provide for the safety and health of its employees and support the
federal government's efforts to prepare for, respond to, and recover
from a pandemic. Because the dynamic nature of pandemic influenza
requires that the scope of federal government continuity of operations
(COOP) planning[Footnote 5] includes preparing for a catastrophic event
that is not geographically or temporally bounded, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency concluded that planning for a pandemic requires a
state of preparedness that is beyond traditional federal government
COOP planning. For example, for pandemic planning purposes, essential
functions may be more inclusive and extend longer than the 30-day
traditional COOP-essential functions.
Agencies Report Being in Various Stages of Planning for the Protection
of Their Employees in the Event of a Pandemic:
Our survey questions for the 24 agencies were drawn from pandemic
planning checklists and federal guidance[Footnote 6] to help agencies
plan for protecting their employees during a pandemic. The 24 agencies
we surveyed reported being in various stages of formulating their
pandemic plans. While most of the agencies had developed plans, several
reported that they were still formulating their plans. For example, in
February 2009, the Small Business Administration (SBA) reported that it
had begun to draft a more complete pandemic influenza annex to its COOP
plan with an estimated completion date of spring 2009. The Department
of Defense (DOD) had completed its overarching departmentwide plan, and
DOD reported that its installations were tailoring their Force Health
Protection Plans to include pandemic influenza considerations.
Identifying essential functions and enumerating the employees who would
perform them is the first step in training those employees,
communicating the risks and expectations of working during a pandemic,
and planning and budgeting for measures that would mitigate those
risks. Nineteen agencies reported that they had identified essential
functions at both the department and component levels that cannot be
continued through telework in the event of pandemic influenza or, in
the case of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID), and the National Science
Foundation (NSF), determined that all of their essential or important
government functions could be performed remotely. Of the remaining 5
agencies, DOJ reported identifying essential functions at the component
level but noted that it was revising its department-level plan. At the
time of our survey, the General Services Administration (GSA) reported
not identifying its essential functions in the event of a pandemic
while three agencies--DOD, SBA, and the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD)--were in the process of either identifying essential
functions or determining which functions could be continued through
telework. The pandemic coordinators in three agencies did not know
whether the employees who performed essential functions in their
agencies had been notified that they might be expected to continue
operations during a pandemic.
We also asked the pandemic coordinators from the 24 agencies whether
they had planned or budgeted for any of seven potential measures to
protect workers whose duties require their on-site presence during a
pandemic. The measures included in our survey included procurement of
personal protective equipment such as masks and gloves; supplemental
cleaning programs for common areas; distribution of hygiene supplies
(hand sanitizers, trash receptacles with hands-free lids, etc.);
obtaining antiviral medications; arrangements to obtain pandemic
vaccines to the extent available; prioritization of employees for
vaccinations; and prioritization of employees for antiviral
medications. Federal pandemic guidance recommends the measures
according to risk assessments for employees, and therefore, based on
the agencies' mission and activities, not all measures are equally
appropriate for all agencies. The most frequently reported measure was
procurement of personal protective equipment with 19 agencies reporting
that they had planned or budgeted for this measure. For example, DHS
reported that it had done fit testing of employees for N95 respirators
[Footnote 7] and training on the proper use of other personal
protective equipment and had pre-positioned stockpiles of the equipment
for employees in 52 locations. Prioritization of employees for
vaccinations was the measure least frequently reported with 11 agencies
reporting that they had taken this measure.
The survey showed that agencies' most frequently cited social
distancing strategies involved using telework and flexible schedules
for their workforces. Restrictions on meetings and gatherings and
avoiding unnecessary travel were also part of 18 agencies' plans.
Although many of the agencies' pandemic influenza plans rely on social
distancing strategies, primarily telework, to carry out the functions
of the federal government in the event of a pandemic outbreak, only one
agency, NSF stated that it tested its IT infrastructure to a great
extent. The agency reported assessing its telework system formally
several times each year and each day through various means. On the
other hand, five agencies reported testing their IT systems to little
or not extent. Table 1 shows the survey responses.
Table 1: Agencies' Responses on the Extent to Which They Have Tested IT
Infrastructure to Ensure That It Is Capable of Handling Telework or
Work-at-Home Arrangements during a Pandemic Influenza Outbreak:
Extent: To a great extent;
Agencies: NSF.
Extent: To a moderate extent;
Agencies: DOC, DOE, DOI, DOL, DOS, DOT, Education, EPA, OPM, NRC, SSA.
Extent: To some extent;
Agencies: DOJ, HHS, HUD, DOD, Treasury, USAID, VA.
Extent: To little or no extent;
Agencies: DHS, GSA, NASA, SBA, USDA.
Legend:
DOC = Department of Commerce,
DOE = Department of Energy,
DOI = Department of the Interior,
DOL = Department of Labor,
DOS = Department of State,
EPA = Environmental Protection Agency,
HHS = Department of Health and Human Services,
NASA = National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
SSA = Social Security Administration,
USDA = Department of Agriculture,
VA = Department of Veterans Affairs.
Source: GAO analysis of agency responses.
[End of table]
Given the potential severity of a pandemic, it is important that
employees understand the policies and requirements of their agencies
and the alternatives, such as telework, that may be available to them.
Many employees and their supervisors will have questions about their
rights, entitlements, alternative work arrangements, benefits, leave
and pay flexibilities, and hiring flexibilities available during the
turmoil created by a pandemic. Therefore, it is important that each
agency implement a process to communicate its human capital guidance
for emergencies to managers and make staff aware of that guidance.
Twenty-one of the 24 pandemic coordinators surveyed reported making
information available to their employees on how human capital policies
and flexibilities will change in the event of a pandemic outbreak.
Three agencies--DOC, GSA, and SSA--reported that they have not. Of the
agencies that reported making information available, two had done so
indirectly. HUD stated that it shared information with unions, and
Treasury reported that it briefed its human capital officers on the
human capital policies and flexibilities available to address pandemic
issues.
Pandemic Preparations for Correctional Workers, Production Staff
Responsible for Disbursing Federal Payments, and Air Traffic
Controllers Are in Various Stages of Development:
BOP Has Taken Steps to Protect Correctional Workers in the Event of a
Pandemic:
BOP, a component of DOJ, has the mission of protecting society by
confining offenders in the controlled environments of prisons and
community-based facilities that are safe, humane, cost-efficient, and
appropriately secure and that provide work and other self-improvement
opportunities to assist offenders in becoming law-abiding citizens.
Approximately 35,000 federal employees ensure the security of federal
prisons and provide inmates with programs and services.
BOP's pandemic influenza plan was developed through its Office of
Emergency Preparedness and was disseminated to its central office and
six regional offices in May 2008. BOP's pandemic plan addresses the
need for infection control measures to mitigate influenza transmission
and calls for education of correctional workers and the inmate
population. Accordingly, all facilities are instructed that they should
have readily available and ample supplies of bar soap and liquid soap
in the restrooms, alcohol-based wipes throughout the facility, and hand
sanitizers if approved by the warden. Based on a historical review of
the 1918 pandemic influenza and HHS' pandemic planning assumptions, BOP
intends to supply antiviral medication to 15 percent of correctional
workers and inmates in each facility if the influenza outbreak is
geographically spread throughout the United States.
BOP has some challenges in preparing for pandemic influenza. For
example, social distancing measures to protect correctional workers are
difficult to implement at the facility level. BOP officials said that
there are many situations in which close contact is inevitable between
correctional workers and inmates and where personal protective
equipment, such as gloves and masks, would not be feasible. A unique
pandemic planning challenge facing federal correctional workers is the
maintenance of an effective custodial relationship between them and the
inmates in federal prisons. According to BOP officials, this
relationship depends on communication and mutual trust, as correctional
workers in federal prisons do not carry weapons or batons inside the
cellblocks. Rather, they use verbal methods of communication to keep
order. BOP officials at United States Penitentiary Leavenworth said
that they would not allow a situation where correctional workers wear
N95 respirators or surgical masks but the inmates do not.
Despite the challenges BOP faces with pandemic influenza planning, the
bureau has advantages, which are unique to its facilities. Every
correctional facility is a closed and self-contained system, and each
facility is somewhat self-sufficient, maintaining a 30-day supply of
food, water, and other necessities for any type of contingency.
Correctional facilities also have well-tested experience in emergency
and health hazard planning and management and infection control, which
provides them with a solid foundation to build on for pandemic
influenza preparedness. Additionally, correctional facilities generally
have strong ties with their local communities, important because
pandemic influenza will be largely addressed by the resources available
to each community it affects.
FMS Has Operational Pandemic Plans for Production Staff Responsible for
Disbursing Federal Payments:
FMS, a component of Treasury, provides central payment services to
federal agencies, operates the federal government's collections and
deposit systems, provides governmentwide accounting and reporting
services, and manages the collection of delinquent debt owed to the
government. FMS has four regional financial centers that are production
facilities that rely heavily on integrated computer and
telecommunications systems to perform their mission. However, they also
rely on light manufacturing operations to print and enclose checks for
releasing at specific times of the month. Nearly 206 million of FMS's
payments were disbursed by check in fiscal year 2008.
A regional center Deputy Director said that the organization is aware
that the basis of part of the U.S. economy rests on the regional
financial centers and that they will need to issue payments even during
a pandemic. For the most part, the regional financial centers are
planning that in the event of a pandemic, the nature of their business
will be unchanged, but there will be issues with sickness, absenteeism,
communication, and hygiene that they must address. Employees whose
positions require, on a daily basis, direct handling of materials or on-
site activity that cannot be handled remotely or at an alternative
worksite are not eligible for telework. According to an FMS official,
even with a minimum crew on-site to produce paper checks, there will be
instances when employees will need to be within 3 feet of other
employees.
As part of the regional center pandemic plans, officials researched the
types of supplies they would need based on the risks faced in their
facilities. For example, in the Kansas City regional financial center
the janitorial staff now routinely wipes off door handles, tabletops,
and other high-traffic areas. As another part of the Kansas City
regional plan, the center stocks such items as N95 respirators, gloves,
hand sanitizers, disinfectants, and fanny packs that include items such
as ready to eat meals, hand-cranked flashlights, small first-aid kits,
and emergency blankets.
The FMS regional financial centers face some unique pandemic planning
challenges. Since the centers are production facilities with large open
spaces as well as enclosed office areas, pandemic planning requires
different responses for different areas. An FMS official noted that
employees' response and diligence in following disease containment
measures in the different areas would be what determines the success of
those measures. Scheduling of production personnel is also a challenge.
Since the production of the checks must be done according to a deadline
and internal controls must be maintained, schedules are not flexible.
FMS officials had not made any arrangements for pandemic pharmaceutical
interventions for the regional financial centers in part because the
relatively small number of essential employees required to be on-site,
as well as the large open spaces in the regional facilities, make
social distancing measures more feasible.
FAA Pandemic Plans to Protect Air Traffic Controllers Are Not Ready for
Implementation:
FAA, a component of DOT, expects the National Airspace System to
function throughout an influenza pandemic, in accordance with the
preparedness and response goal of sustaining infrastructure and
mitigating impact to the economy and the functioning of society.
Maintaining the functioning of the National Airspace System will
require that FAA's air traffic controllers, who ensure that aircraft
remain safely separated from other aircraft, vehicles, and terrain,
continue to work on-site. While FAA expects the demand for air traffic
control, which manages cargo as well as passenger travel, to be reduced
in the event of a severe pandemic outbreak, its contingency plans
assume full air traffic levels as a starting baseline. According to an
FAA official, although passenger travel may be diminished, the shipping
of cargo may increase.
The Air Traffic Organization, FAA's line of business responsible for
the air traffic management services that air traffic controllers
provide, had not directed facilities, such as its air route traffic
control centers, to develop pandemic-specific plans or incorporate
these pandemic plans into their all-hazards contingency plans. FAA
officials said that all-hazards contingency and continuity plans are
adapted to the facility level and are regularly implemented during
natural disasters such as hurricanes. Although these plans are not
specific to a pandemic, FAA officials reported that the all-hazards
plans allow the Air Traffic Organization to mitigate the impact of
adverse events, including reduced staffing levels on National Airspace
Systems operations. The Air Traffic Organization plans to direct its
facilities to develop pandemic-specific plans or enhance their
preexisting all-hazards contingency plans at the local field facility
level after a number of actions, such as the development of an FAA
workforce protection policy, are completed.
Protecting air traffic controllers in the event of a pandemic outbreak
is particularly challenging for several reasons. Air traffic
controllers work in proximity to one another; the 6 feet of separation
recommended for social distancing during a pandemic by the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention and the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration is not possible for them. In addition, air traffic
controllers cannot use personal protective equipment such as N95
respirators or surgical masks, as these impede the clear verbal
communication necessary to maintain aviation safety. FAA recently
completed a study examining the feasibility of air traffic controllers
using powered air purifying respirators.[Footnote 8] Because of a
number of concerns with using the respirators, such as noise,
visibility, and comfort, FAA officials concluded that their long-term
use during a pandemic appears to be impractical. Moreover, cross-
certification of air traffic controllers is problematic. Attaining full
performance levels for the controllers takes up to 3 years, and air
traffic controllers proficient in one area of airspace cannot replace
controllers proficient in another airspace without training and
certification. Finally, FAA regulations on medication for air traffic
controllers are strict because certain medications may impair an air
traffic controller's performance. The Office of Aviation Medicine's
policy on the use of antiviral medication for prophylactic use by on-
duty controllers was still in draft as of early 2009.
Monitoring and Reporting on Agencies' Pandemic Workforce Protection
Plans Could Improve Efforts to Protect Employees in the Event of a
Pandemic:
The survey results from the 24 CFO Act agency pandemic coordinators, as
well as information from the case study agencies, indicate that a wide
range of pandemic planning activities are under way and that all of the
agencies are taking steps to some degree to protect their workers in
the event of a pandemic. However, agencies' progress is uneven, and
while we recognize that the pandemic planning process is evolving and
is characterized by uncertainty and constrained resources, some
agencies are clearly in the earlier stages of developing their pandemic
plans and being able to provide the health protection related to the
risk of exposure their essential employees may experience.
Under the HSC's Implementation Plan, DHS was charged with, among other
things, monitoring and reporting to the Executive Office of the
President on the readiness of departments and agencies to continue
their operations while protecting their workers during an influenza
pandemic. DHS officials reported that in late 2006 or early 2007 they
asked HSC representatives with direct responsibility for the
Implementation Plan for clarification on the issue of reporting
agencies' ability to continue their operations while protecting their
workers during a pandemic. DHS officials said they were informed that
they did not have to prepare a report. Instead, according to White
House counsel representatives, the HSC planned to take on the
monitoring role through its agency pandemic plan certification process.
In November 2006, the HSC issued Key Elements of Departmental Pandemic
Influenza Operational Plan (Key Elements), which covered areas such as
dealing with the safety and health of department employees and
essential functions and services and how agencies will maintain them in
the event of significant and sustained absenteeism during a pandemic.
The Key Elements document stated that to ensure uniform preparedness
across the U.S. government, the HSC was including a request that by
December 2006 the agencies certify in writing to the HSC that they were
addressing applicable elements of the checklist. Subsequently, in
August 2008, the HSC revised the Key Elements to reflect current
federal government guidance on pandemic planning and included a request
for recertification.
However, the HSC's certification process, as implemented, did not
provide for monitoring and reporting as envisioned in the
Implementation Plan regarding agencies' abilities to continue
operations in the event of a pandemic while protecting their employees.
In addition, as originally envisioned in the Implementation Plan, the
report was to be directed to the Executive Office of the President,
with no provision in the plan for the report to be made available to
the Congress.
Concluding Observations and Prior Recommendations:
The spring 2009 outbreak of H1N1 influenza accentuates the
responsibility of agencies to have pandemic plans that ensure their
ability to continue operations while protecting their workers who serve
the American public. As evidenced by our survey results and case
studies, some agencies are not close to having operational pandemic
plans, particularly at the facility level. In addition, there is no
real monitoring mechanism in place to ensure that agencies' workforce
pandemic plans are complete. A monitoring process should be in place
that would ensure that federal agencies are making progress in
developing their plans to protect their workforce in the event of a
pandemic and that agencies have the information and guidance they need
to develop operational pandemic plans.
To address this issue, our report recommended that the HSC request that
the Secretary of Homeland Security monitor and report to the Executive
Office of the President on the readiness of agencies to continue their
operations while protecting their workers during an influenza pandemic.
The reporting should include an assessment of the agencies' progress in
developing their plans including any key challenges and gaps in the
plans. The request should also establish a specific time frame for
reporting on these efforts. We also suggested that to help support its
oversight responsibilities, the Congress may want to consider requiring
DHS to report to it on agencies' progress in developing and
implementing their pandemic plans, including any key challenges and
gaps in the plans. The HSC commented that the report makes useful
points regarding opportunities for enhanced monitoring and reporting
within the executive branch concerning agencies' progress in developing
plans to protect their workforce. DHS commented that our
recommendations would contribute to its future efforts to ensure that
government entities are well prepared for what may come next.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this completes my
statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you
might have.
Contacts and Acknowledgments:
For further information on this testimony, please contact Bernice
Steinhardt, Director, Strategic Issues, at (202) 512-6543 or
steinhardtb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this
testimony. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony
include William J. Doherty, Assistant Director, Judith C. Kordahl,
Senior Analyst, and Karin Fangman, Deputy Assistant General Counsel.
[End of section]
Appendix I: Chief Financial Officers Act Agencies:
Department of Agriculture:
Department of Commerce:
Department of Defense:
Department of Education:
Department of Energy:
Department of Health and Human Services:
Department of Homeland Security:
Department of Housing and Urban Development:
Department of the Interior:
Department of Justice:
Department of Labor:
Department of State:
Department of Transportation:
Department of the Treasury:
Department of Veterans Affairs:
U.S. Agency for International Development:
Environmental Protection Agency:
General Services Administration:
National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
National Science Foundation:
Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
Office of Personnel Management:
Small Business Administration:
Social Security Administration:
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO, Influenza Pandemic: Increased Agency Accountability Could Help
Protect Federal Employees Serving the Public in the Event of a
Pandemic, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-404]
(Washington, D.C.: June 12, 2009).
[2] 31 U.S.C. § 901. A list of the 24 CFO Act agencies appears in app.
I. The CFO Act agencies employ nearly all federal employees.
[3] Social distancing is a technique used to minimize close contact
among persons in public places, such as work sites and public areas.
[4] The HSC was established pursuant to Executive Order 13228, on
October 8, 2001, for purposes of advising and assisting the President
with respect to all aspects of homeland security and to serve as a
mechanism for ensuring (1) coordination of homeland security-related
activities of executive departments and agencies and (2) effective
development and implementation of homeland security policies. The
Congress subsequently established the HSC for the purpose of more
effectively coordinating the policies and functions of the federal
government relating to homeland security. See Homeland Security Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296 (Nov. 25, 2002), 6 U.S.C. § 491 and § 494. On
May 26, 2009, President Obama issued a statement outlining his decision
to integrate White House staff supporting national security and
homeland security. The HSC will be maintained as the principal venue
for interagency deliberations on issues that affect the security of the
homeland, such as terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, natural
disasters, and pandemic influenza.
[5] COOP planning is an effort conducted by agencies to ensure that the
capability exists to continue essential agency functions across a wide
range of potential emergencies.
[6] The Web site, [hyperlink, http://www.pandemicflu.gov], provides
access to U.S. government avian and pandemic influenza information and
guidance.
[7] An N95 respirator is designed to protect an individual from
breathing in very small particles, which might contain viruses. This
type of respirator fits tightly to the face so that most air is inhaled
through the filter material. To work most effectively, N95 respirators
must be specially fitted for each person who wears one.
[8] Powered air purifying respirators use a powered blower to force air
through a filter. They typically have a hood connected by a flexible
hose to a blower unit that is equipped with a filter and powered by a
battery.
[End of section]
GAO's Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance
and accountability of the federal government for the American people.
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]
and select "E-mail Updates."
Order by Phone:
The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO’s actual cost of
production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the
publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and
white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO’s Web site,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm].
Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or
TDD (202) 512-2537.
Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card,
MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional
information.
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]:
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov:
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Congressional Relations:
Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4400:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7125:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Public Affairs:
Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4800:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
Washington, D.C. 20548: