McChrystal: Afghan War Needs More Troops, Strategy Shift

The war in Afghanistan is winnable — but only if the U.S. can get past the screwed-up strategy, the shortage of troops, the corrupt local government, and the discombobulated coalition.

That’s the conclusion from Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top American commander there. Courtesy of the Washington Post, we can now take a firsthand look at Gen. Stanley McChrystal’s assessment of the situation on the ground. and it’s not upbeat. The Afghanistan campaign, McChrystal warns, will require more troops and resources; continuing without them, his assessment states, “will likely cause failure.”

The document — posted online without a classified appendix — emphasizes more than just boots on the ground. While it points to a need for more resources (i.e., a possible troop increase), the assessment also calls for a broader re-think of strategy.

“Success is achievable, but it will not be attained simply by trying harder or ‘doubling down’ on the previous strategy,” it states. “Additional resources are required, but focusing on force or resource requirements misses the point entirely. The key take away from this assessment is the urgent need for a significant change to our strategy and the way that we think and operate.”

McChrystal’s assessment divides the problem into a “short-term” and “long-term” fight. In the next 12 months, McChrystal wants to reverse the gains by the Taliban so that Afghan security forces can begin to step up to the challenge. Failure to seize the momentum from insurgents, the assessment states, “risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible.”

A couple other points jump out. The assessment points to the already well documented weaknesses within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF, which has been hampered in the past by national caveats, lack of resources and an unwieldy command structure. ISAF, the assessment states, “is a conventional force that is poorly configured for COIN [counterinsurgency], inexperienced in local languages and culture, and struggling with challenges inherent to coalition warfare.”

And once again, McChrystal takes aim at the force protection mentality. “Preoccupied with protection of our own forces, we have operated in a manner that distances us — physically and psychologically — from the people we seek to protect. In addition, we run the risk of strategic defeat by pursuing tactical wins that cause civilian casualties or unnecessary collateral damage. The insurgents cannot defeat us militarily; but we can defeat ourselves.”

That point, in particular, resonates. As Noah recently reported from Afghanistan’s Helmand Province, some units in the field are focused on firepower, not “soft power.” Not everyone in the military takes easily to this approach, which requires minimizing the use of force. Kicking down doors may at times be necessary, but large-scale operations to kill or capture militants do not automatically spread security — and may alienate the local population.

In addition, I suspect the document may provoke some consternation in non-governmental organization (NGO) circles. In addition to military sources, the assessment also drew upon “external agencies such as GIRoA [government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan] ministries, international governmental organizations and non-governmental organizations.” As we’ve reported here before, there’s considerable worry among independent aid agencies about an apparent push by the military to collect intel from aid workers. NGOs are worried that they are perceived as “force multipliers” and intelligence sources for the coalition, rather than independent actors (although, in fairness, the assessment does not specify which NGOs provided input for the report).