Just one of the Legacies of 9/11
August 4, 2011
by Kevin FentonBoilingfrogs

Two of the terrorist hijackers who flew a jet into the Pentagon, Nawaf
al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar, communicated while they were in the United
States to other members of al Qaeda who were overseas. But we didn't know
they were here, until it was too late.

The authorization I gave the National Security Agency after September the
11th helped address that problem in a way that is fully consistent with my
constitutional responsibilities and authorities. The activities I have authorized
make it more likely that killers like these 9/11 hijackers will be identified
and located in time.

-President Bush, December 17, 2005

In the aftermath of 9/11, reams of newsprint were given over to discussing
the CIA and FBI failures before the attacks; the agency had some of the hijackers
under surveillance and allegedly lost them, the bureau was unable even to inform
its own acting director of the Zacarias Moussaoui case. However, the USA's largest
and most powerful intelligence agency, the National Security Agency, got a free
ride. There was no outcry over its failings, no embarrassing Congressional hearings
for its director. Yet, as we will see, the NSA's performance before 9/11 was
shocking.

It is unclear when the NSA first intercepted a call by one of the nineteen
hijackers. Reporting indicates it began listening in on telephone calls to the
home of Pentagon hijacker Khalid
Almihdhar's wife some time around late 1996. However, although Almihdhar
certainly did stay there later, it is unclear whether he lived there at that
time. The house, in the Yemeni capital of Sana'a, was a key target for the US
intelligence community as it was Osama bin Laden's communication hub, run by
Almihdhar's father-in-law Ahmed
al-Hada.

The NSA kept the Yemen communications hub secret from the rest of the US intelligence
community. However, Alec Station, the CIA's bin Laden unit, found out
about it through an agency officer loaned to the NSA. Even after the discovery,
the NSA refused to provide transcripts of the calls, meaning Alec Station could
not crack the simple code the al-Qaeda operatives used. This was one reason
the 1998 East African embassy bombings--assisted by al-Hada--were
successful despite the bombers being known to numerous intelligence agencies.

hijack The first time the NSA is known for certain to have intercepted a call
involving the hijackers was in early 1999, when the call involved Almihdhar
and his fellow Flight 77 hijacker Nawaf Alhazmi. The NSA did not disseminate
a report on this call, although the heavily redacted text of the Congressional
Inquiry's 9/11 report indicates it should have. The NSA continued to intercept
Almihdhar's calls throughout 1999, when he apparently spoke to al-Qaeda
leader Khallad bin Attash, now languishing in Guantanamo Bay.

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