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John Stuart Mill, The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, XXV - Newspaper Writings December 1847 - July 1873 Part IV, ed. Ann P. Robson and John M. Robson, Introduction by Ann P. Robson and John M. Robson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986).
http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/259

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NEWSPAPER WRITINGS BY JOHN STUART MILL December 1847 to July 1873

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December 1847 to July 1858

369.: EUGENE SUE EXAMINER, 11 DEC., 1847, P. 787

The Daily News had published a series of articles on 26 Oct., and 2, 9, 25, and 29 Nov., 1847, entitled “The Literature of the Lower Orders,” by William Hepworth Dixon (1821-79), journalist, historian, and traveller. The editor of the Examiner, John Forster (1812-76), excerpted from and endorsed these articles in pieces entitled “The Moral Epidemic,” 30 Oct., pp. 690-1, and “Literature of the Lower Orders,” 6 Nov., p. 709. Mill’s response, in a letter to the editor, in which Harriet Taylor probably had a hand, is his first contribution to the Examiner since August 1842 (No. 293). It appears in the “Political Examiner,” headed as title, with the subhead, “To the Editor of the Examiner.” It is described in Mill’s bibliography as “A letter signed J.S. in the Examiner of 11th December 1847 remonstrating against an attack on Sue’s novel of Martin l’Enfant trouvé”

(MacMinn, p. 69).

sir,—

You have lately quoted with approval, and thereby given additional publicity and weight to some articles in the Daily News, which purported to give an account of “The Literature of the Lower Orders,” meaning the cheap periodicals, and publications in series. The quality of the mental food and entertainment provided for the “lower orders” (if they are really the purchasers of this cheap literature) is so important a subject, that the Daily News is to be commended for directing attention to it; but that paper has unfortunately delegated the office of examining the publications in question to a person so little worthy of the judicial trust reposed in him, as to heap all the terms of moral reprobation in his vocabulary upon works with which he seems entirely unacquainted. He has already been under the necessity of retracting the words in which he had accused one publication (the production, too, of a woman), of “looseness, warmth of colouring in criminal scenes, and a false glow cast round guilty indulgences.”1 Among the other works which he has designated by name as forming the literature which he terms “a chaos of corruption,”2 there is one characterised by him in the following words, which have been quoted in the Examiner.

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Martin the Foundling, our readers already know too well as the most disgusting production of a writer who was never remarkable for his purity. In these penny numbers, largely circulated and almost universally devoured by eager female readers [the italics are the writer’s own] his most obscene and intoxicating details are reproduced with all the minute fidelity of which the English language is capable, and this very fidelity is flaunted forth as the chief recommendation of this edition. The translations current in the superior ranks are expurgated; but in spite of that necessary care for the taste and better feeling of the educated English reader, the tale is utterly disgusting.3

It is not often that a single paragraph displays such complicated unfitness in the writer of it, for having anything to do with the subject which he affects to treat of, as is shown in these sentences. So uneducated is he, as to suppose that “educated English readers” read French books in a translation. So ignorant of life and the world as not to know that the demand for M. Sue’s and all other French novels among the “superior ranks,” the “eager female readers” of the English nobility and higher classes, is so great and incessant that the libraries in Bond street cannot supply them fast enough or in quantity enough.4 And, to crown all, he has never read the book he condemns. I, having read it, doubt whether he has even looked at it. He has charged it with being what it is not, and entirely missed what it is. It does not contain “obscene and intoxicating details.” It does not describe scenes of sensuality, or introduce any licentious characters except those whom it intends in other respects to inspire disgust. Martin l’Enfant trouvé is a book which no one can read without seeing that it is written with a serious moral and even political purpose. It is a manifesto against the relation between rich and poor, such as the present institutions of society have made it. The author aims at exhibiting the moral perversion which the existing state of society engenders in a part of the rich and in a part of the poor; and this is done with something of the melodramatic exaggeration of the Mysteries of Paris,5 though in a far less degree. But he also presents, from both classes, characters of the noblest and highest principle, and the most conscientious self-control, and I do not fear to add that there are diffused through the book, and illustrated by the conduct and maxims of those characters, many principles of conduct and ideas of moral and social improvement, decidedly in advance of the age, and showing in the writer no ordinary degree of the desire and the capacity both to improve the outward Edition: current; Page: [1091] condition of mankind, and to raise the tone of their minds; notwithstanding some errors, and among the rest a very decided tendency towards Communism, which in this most improving writer further reflection will probably reduce within just bounds.

I confess I feel indignant at seeing one of the very few popular imaginative writers of our time, who aim at any noble objects or inculcate any lessons but the most beaten and trivial moralities, made a byeword by people who have never read him for the extreme contrary of all that he is and desires to be. I know nothing of M. Sue except his works, but the more recent of them, and especially Martin, have given me the highest esteem for his intentions and for many of his principles,6 and I protest, with all the force I am capable of, against the calumnious representation of them which the Daily News has sent forth, and which you have, I am sure unwittingly, assisted in diffusing.

A remonstrance, addressed to the Daily News, not having been inserted, I address this protest to you.

The banning of the culminating banquet (planned for 22 Feb., 1848), in a series designed to promote parliamentary reform, led to demonstrations, and Louis Philippe dismissed Guizot. Troops fired on demonstrators on the 23rd, and armed insurrection resulted. On the 24th Louis Philippe (aged seventy-four) abdicated in favour of his ten-year-old grandson, the comte de Paris, and went into exile in Britain (where he died three years later); revolutionary leaders set up a provisional republican government at the Hôtel de Ville. Mill is here responding to “News of the Week,” Spectator, 11 Mar., 1848, p. 237, from which the quotations are taken. The letter, headed “To the Editor of the Spectator,” is described in Mill’s bibliography as “A letter signed J.S.M. in the Spectator of 18th March 1848, on some proceedings of the Provisional Government of France”

(MacMinn, p. 69).

sir,—

The opening remarks of the commentary on French affairs in your last paper recommend, in the best possible spirit, forbearance in judging and liberality in interpreting the conduct of the Provisional Government of France. I Edition: current; Page: [1092] beg you to consider whether, in the detailed criticisms which immediately follow this recommendation, you have acted up to your own very proper canon. You blame the Provisional Government for “going beyond its provisional function to undertake legislation of a permanent character.” The first instance with which you support this censure is not felicitous. You say, “It was, for example, within its province to suspend the sitting of the Peers, but not to abolish the order of Peerage by abolishing titles.”1 Surely you must be aware that the French nonhereditary Peerage had nothing to do with titles: a vast majority of titled persons were not Peers, and a large proportion of the Chamber of Peers were not titled. With reference to the other acts of the Government on which you comment unfavourably, such as the reduction of the hours of labour,2 may it not be said in your own words, that “they are acting upon views and under compulsions which we cannot fully appreciate”? Yet even what we can already see of their situation may well be conceived amply to justify every act hitherto ascribed to them. Is it not their grand business as a Provisional Government to keep the peace and restore order? and was it possible to do this after such a revolution, unless on the foundation of a compromise which should afford some immediate satisfaction to the demands and expectations of the classes by whom the revolution was made? We must remember that no act of the Provisional Government is anything more than provisional. They very properly disclaim all right or power to make permanent laws;3 and they have convoked an Assembly who must necessarily reconsider all their acts, and who have power instantly to set those acts aside.4

The general colouring given by you to your description of events in France, tends (I am sure contrary to your intention) to encourage those who, wishing the Republican Government to fail, look out for every pretext to prophesy its failure. Where was the necessity for citing some idle rumour of an intended resignation of Lamartine, and acounting for it by supposing that he “probably discovers too much of the rude and sordid in the work of revolutionary politics”? Where is there the slightest sign in any public manifestation of M. De Lamartine, that he thinks any part of the work he is engaged in “rude and sordid”? and how unworthy must he be of such a position if he could think so? Again, you have given an entirely mistaken account of the admirable experiment which “a leading Edition: current; Page: [1093] journal,” and it may be added a leading railway company, have organized for associating the labourers employed by them in the profits of the undertaking.5 You call it, with great exaggeration, a “community of property”; and you accuse it of “subjecting the men, who have hitherto counted on regular wages, to the vicissitudes of profit and loss.” If you had read with any care the particulars given in the daily newspapers, you would have seen that the plan does nothing of the kind. Every member of the establishment continues to receive a fixed salary as before; but, after deducting this and all other expenses, and allowing 5 per cent to the proprietors, any surplus profit is to be divided among all concerned, in the ratio of their fixed gains. It is exactly the plan successfully adopted some years ago by an individual at Paris, employing some hundreds of labourers, M. Leclaire; descriptions of which have been given in the Edinburgh Review and in Chambers’s Journal.6

Amandine Aurore Lucie Dupin, baronne Dudevant (1804-76), who wrote under the name “George Sand,” attacked established views of society and marriage in her novels and her life. La Réforme published on 9 Apr., 1848, p. 3, a letter to the editor from her (dated 8 Apr.), in which she objected to “Candidature de George Sand,” an article in the short-lived feminist and socialist newspaper, the Voix des Femmes (6 Apr., p. 1), by the editor Eugénie Niboyet (1797-1883), suggesting that Sand would be an ideal candidate for the National Assembly. Niboyet also read her article at a meeting of a feminist club on the same day. In her letter Sand denied knowing the people involved in the proposal, saying she did not wish to remain silent lest the “joke” might be thought to entail her acceptance of their proposal and ideas. The Voix des Femmes reprinted her letter (10 Apr., pp. 1-2), and reported that Sand’s candidature had formally been proposed at the Jacobin Club on the 9th. The MS of this undated draft letter, in Mill’s hand but undoubtedly a “joint production” with Harriet Taylor, is in the Mill-Taylor Collection, Vol. XLI, No. 2, ff. 10-12, on paper watermarked 1846. The MS of the English draft, also in Mill’s hand and undated (printed in App. D below), is ibid., ff. 18-19. As the letter was not published, it is not listed in Mill’s bibliography.

372.: ENGLAND AND IRELAND EXAMINER, 13 MAY, 1848, PP. 307-8

The agitation for repeal of the union of Ireland with Great Britain, having died down in 1843, began again in late 1847. The French Revolution of February 1848 and the Chartist agitation sparked hopes of a bloodless revolution in Ireland, aided by the French; the Nation in April called for a national guard, and issued a radical creed. This letter from Mill, dated 5 May, is in response to “Repeal of the Union,” Examiner, 29 Apr., pp. 275-6 (from which the quotations are taken), by Thomas Carlyle. It signals the chasm that now separated their social and political views, as Mill, though one of Carlyle’s “earliest admirers,” now saw his views as pernicious, while Carlyle thought Mill’s valueless. (Their conflict over “The Negro Question” in 1849 may be compared; see CW, Vol. XXI, pp. 85-95.) This letter to the editor appears in the “Political Examiner” headed as title, with the subhead, “To the Editor of the Examiner.” It is described in Mill’s bibliography as “A letter signed M on ‘England and Ireland’ in the Examiner of 13th May 1848”

(MacMinn, p. 69).

sir,—

In your last week’s paper you published a dissertation by a writer whom, even if you had not named him, it would have been impossible to mistake, Edition: current; Page: [1096] expressive of his judgment on the question of Irish Repeal. Will you permit one of that writer’s earliest admirers to express, through the same medium, the grounds on which he feels compelled to declare unqualified dissent from the judgment thus promulgated?

Let me premise that I am not an Irishman, but an Englishman; that I do not desire Repeal, but, on the contrary, should regard it as a misfortune to all concerned. It is good government that should be agitated for, not separate government: but separation is better than bad government; and I entirely sympathize in the indignation which an Irishman is entitled to feel at the reasons given by your correspondent for refusing it.

The doctrine of your correspondent is (to quote his own words) that “the Destinies have laid upon England a heavier, terribler job of labour than any people has been saddled with in these generations”—no other than that of “conquering Anarchy:” that this, which is “England’s work, appointed her by the so-called Destinies and Divine Providences,” cannot go on unless Ireland is either English, or in English hands; and that consequently the repeal of the Union is “flatly forbidden by the laws of the universe.”

This is a new phasis of the Hebrew prophet of these later days, the Ezekiel of England. The spirit of his prophesying is quite changed. Instead of telling of the sins and errors of England, and warning her of “wrath to come,”1 as he has been wont to do, he preaches the divine Messiahship of England, proclaims her the prime minister of Omnipotence on this earth, commissioned to reduce it all (or as much of it as is convenient to herself) into order and harmony, or at all events, under that pretext, into submission, even into “slavery,” under her own power—will it or will it not.

When an assumption of this sort is coolly made, and the already ample self-conceit of John Bull encouraged to invest itself with the imaginary dignity of an appointed minister of “the laws of the universe,” the proper answer would seem to be, simply to deny the premises. Where is the evidence that England has received any such mandate from the supreme powers? Where are her credentials? By what signs has she shown that the “conquering of anarchy” is the work specially appointed to her from above?

If the test is to be (and one cannot imagine your correspondent appealing to any other), her having given proof of the capacity to do it, it so happens that England is precisely the one country among all others, which has had the opportunity of showing, and has conclusively shown, that she has not that capacity. For five centuries, to speak within bounds, has this very corner of earth in question, this Ireland, been given over to her by the “destinies and divine providences,” as a test of what capacity she has for reducing chaos into order.2Edition: current; Page: [1097] For five centuries has she had Ireland under her absolute, resistless power, to show what she could do in the way of “conquering anarchy”—and the result is the most total, disastrous, ignominious failure yet known to history. No other nation ever had such an opportunity for so prolonged a period, and made such a use of it. The Romans were in many respects barbarians, yet the Gauls, within a century after being conquered by them, were a civilized people; and the most recalcitrant of all subjects with whom they had to deal, the people who then, as now, had the strongest natural tendency to anarchy of any in Europe, the Iberian Spaniards, in 150 years after the conquest were perfectly peaceable, and far more civilized than the Romans themselves were when they conquered them. Mahomet, one of your correspondent’s heroes,3 was a savage, and a leader of savages; he lived in one of the worst times of the world’s history, yet in a century after his death the most civilized monarchy in the western world, one which kept arts, letters, and commerce alive when they seemed to have perished everywhere else, had been founded at Grenada by the descendants of his wild Arabs. These may be called conquerors of anarchy. But England! and in Ireland! For the first four and a half of her five centuries she had not so much as the wish to do aught but oppress and trample on Ireland for her own supposed benefit. I waive penal laws4 and all controversial topics, but even in the eighteenth century she purposely and avowedly crushed the nascent manufactures of Ireland (the hopeful germ of so much that Ireland still needs), lest they should compete with her own.5 And there was not one of her statesmen who would not have thought it disgracefully unpatriotic to have acted otherwise. This is no peculiar reproach to England; it was the infernal spirit of that time—a time at which England, now the liberator of the negro slave, made wars and treaties for the sake of Assiento contracts for supplying negroes to be worked to death in Spanish America.6 It is Edition: current; Page: [1098] to the honour of England that she was the first to cast off this spirit: and during the present generation, the policy of England towards Ireland has been, in point of intention, as upright and even as generous as was consistent with the inveterate English habit of making the interest of the aristocracy and of the landlords the first consideration. As between the two countries, nothing can now be more disinterested than the policy of England. It is a pity we should be obliged to add, nothing more imbecile; more devoid of plan, of purpose, of ideas, of practical resource. Omitting former times, we had, two years ago, what may prove to have been a last opportunity of regenerating Ireland. A terrible calamity quelled all active opposition to our government, and Ireland was once more a tabula rasa,7 on which we might have inscribed what we pleased. This was an occasion for English politicians to show what they had in them. Here was a field to exercise this divine gift of bringing chaos into order. Whatever ideas they had, they must have then displayed; and it proved that they had none. They spent ten millions in effecting what seemed impossible—in making Ireland worse than before.8 They demoralized and disorganized what little of rational industry the country contained; and the only permanent thing with which they endowed Ireland, was the only curse which her evil destiny seemed previously to have spared her—a bad poor law.9

The eternal laws of justice, which one might have expected that your correspondent at least would have stood champion for, will not permit that a country which has for five hundred years had the power to make what it pleased of another, and has used that power as England has done, and which has no more idea now, than it had 500 years ago, how to make any good use of the power, should now—when its unhappy dependent, weary of such government, declares that it will try what can be done by and for itself—should now say to the dependent, I am appointed to improve and civilize you, and rather than let go my hold of you, I will make you suffer “a doom that makes me shudder.” You appointed! the dependent country may well retort; then why did you not set about it before? What proof do you give that you mean to attempt it now? And even if you do, has not your capacity, both long since and down to this very hour, been weighed in the balance and found wanting?10

There might be somewhat to be said for a pretension of this sort, if made in behalf of England by a Cromwell.11 If courage and capacity of the highest order, proved through a long period of confusion, in which capacity of every sort rose to the top, had invested some eminent ruler of this island with a temporary Edition: current; Page: [1099] dictatorship, thereby enabling him more effectually and speedily to clear away all obstacles to future progress, and erect on the ground thus cleared an enduring edifice of good government, and if every part of his conduct steadily manifested that such was really his purpose, I for one should have nothing to object, if such a ruler claimed it as his duty, and consequently his right, having already Ireland under his power, to do a similar good work for it also; nor is it likely that either the duty or the right would in such case be gainsaid by Ireland itself. But at present the individual in whom England is personified, and who is to regard himself as the chosen instrument of heaven for making Ireland what it ought to be, and is encouraged to carry fire and sword through Ireland if that assumption should be disputed, is—Lord John Russell!

In regard to the 150,000,000 of subjects whom your correspondent says that the English nation has to care for; it is quite true that in India, having to do, not with “anarchy” (save in some passing exceptional case, like that of the Sikhs), but with a people inured from numberless generations to submission, the English nation does contrive to govern them some degrees better than they were governed by their tyrannical or incapable native despots. And inasmuch as England was able to do this in spite of Napoleon and of united Europe, she could probably continue to do so in spite of Ireland. As for the remainder of the 150,000,000 (except the comparatively insignificant negro colonies), I am yet to learn that England does any one thing for them which they could not do better for themselves; or that her good government of them consists when at the best, in anything better than in leaving them alone. With respect to the “world just now fallen into bottomless anarchy,” and which your correspondent seems to think may expect to be helped out of it by England, is not this the case for saying, “Physician, heal thyself!”12 The quellers of anarchy among the English ruling classes will have work enough of that sort to do at home, unless the author of Past and Present is a false prophet.13 With what sort of mental furniture they are fitted out for doing it, we have had some recent specimens in the childish panic of a few days ago, the childish exultation when the panic was over, and that precious proposal from the leaders of all the parties in the state for a “Public Order Memorial”—a thing to convulse gods and men with “unextinguishable laughter.”14 These sages are hardly yet fairly in the wood, when they begin to holloa as if they were already out of it.

Edition: current; Page: [1100]

No, sir: rely on it, that England has no mission, just now, to keep other nations out of anarchy; but on the contrary, will have to learn, from the experience which other nations are now in a way of acquiring, the means by which alone it can henceforth be averted from herself. And your correspondent, of all persons, might have been expected to acknowledge that there is not one of the working men and women now in conference with Louis Blanc at the Luxembourg on the “organization of labour,”15 who is not a degree nearer to the overcoming of this difficulty than Lord John Russell or Sir Robert Peel; since those at least know what the problem is, and (however crude and wild their present notions are) place their hopes in attaining a rational and peaceful solution of it, while the Englishmen place theirs in nothing but in crushing it down, and preventing it from being mooted at all. Before I cease to intrude on your space, let me be permitted to express the opinion that Europe, and especially France, which are accused, and by your correspondent, of rushing headlong into anarchy, are in reality affording a proof, and a most precious and salutary one, how utterly repugnant all approach to anarchy is to the present state of the European mind. For six weeks after the revolution there was no police, no organized force, the city guard was annihilated, the troops banished, the Government had no means of making itself obeyed but by argument and persuasion; nothing apparently stood between Paris and anarchy; yet nothing worse is known to have happened than a few forced illuminations in honour of trees of liberty; and even of common offences, it is said that a smaller number were committed than in ordinary times. Most remarkable is it, that so far from being an anarchical spirit, the spirit which is now abroad is one which demands too much government; it is wholly a spirit of association, of organization; even the most extreme anti-property doctrines take the form of Communism, of Fourierism,16 of some scheme not for emancipating human life from external restraint, but for subjecting it to much more restraint than it has heretofore been subject to, or ever ought to be; and the apostles of those doctrines rely avowedly on moral force and on bringing the rest of mankind to their opinion by experiment and discussion.

373.: THE REFORM DEBATE DAILY NEWS, 8 JULY, 1848, P. 3

This article was prompted by the introduction by Joseph Hume on 20 June, 1848, of a Motion on National Representation, which included household franchise, the ballot, triennial parliaments, and redistribution (PD, 3rd ser., Vol. 99, cols. 879-906). The debate (ibid., cols. 906-66) was continued on adjournment to Thursday, 6 July, when the motion was lost by a vote of 84 to 351 (ibid., Vol. 100, cols. 156-226). This is the first of many leading articles Mill wrote for the Daily News. Unheaded, it appears after the parliamentary report. It is described in Mill’s bibliography as “A leading article on the Reform Debate (1st leader) in the Daily News of 8th July 1848”

(MacMinn, p. 69).

if the condition and prospects of a great popular question may be estimated at each period by the character of the opposition to it, the reform movement has made great progress in the interval between the first debate on Mr. Hume’s motion and that of Thursday last; for the change in the complexion of the anti-reform advocacy is most perceptible. On the first occasion, the tone was that of a champion who is quite persuaded that he is safe, and only for form’s sake exchanges a few thrusts. Lord John Russell’s speech sounded like an echo of Mr. Canning in days long gone by, when nobody in parliament took reform au sérieux, and the orator well knew that what his hearers demanded from him was not reason or argument, but a colour, to put upon the vote they were predetermined to give.1 All Lord John Russell’s points were an exact repetition of Mr. Canning’s. The country did not want organic change. Our constitution was the admiration and envy of surrounding nations. In England, a man might rise from the lowest station in society to the highest. If the House of Commons were reformed, it would not be compatible with an unreformed House of Lords. All these saws Lord J. Russell had heard, twenty times from Mr. Canning, in opposition to his own motions for reform; and there was as much truth and pertinency in them then as there is now. Whether Lord John, a tardy pupil in his opponents’ school, now actually thinks that these are arguments, we do not Edition: current; Page: [1102] know; but we feel sure that Mr. Canning did not, that (to use a stale metaphor) he laughed in his sleeve at them, and that if he had ever been brought to close quarters, he would have fought the battle with weapons totally different. He estimated his tory supporters very justly in supposing that they did not require anything better, and as for reformers they were not strong enough (at least he thought so) to be worth the trouble of any more ingenious sophistry.

It is possible that Lord John Russell, when he delivered his speech against reform, may have been of a somewhat similar way of thinking. It was not then many weeks since the glorious tenth of April, when the demon revolution, or at least a noisy braggart that attempted to look like him, sneaked away at the sight of a special constable’s staff; and perhaps Lord John thought that democracy had been extinguished with Mr. Cuffey.2 If so, subsequent reflection has brought wisdom, if not to him, at least to his supporters, for on Thursday there was no renewal of this old and once serviceable style of argumentation. Nobody took down from their shelves any more of Mr. Canning’s dusty instruments of warfare, or borrowed from Lord John those which he had brushed and burnished for the former occasion. The speakers on Thursday had completely altered their tactics. They no longer took their stand in defence of “things as they are.”3 They gave up the defence of their own position, and only tried to show that their assailants where as vulnerable as themselves. The series of speeches against Mr. Hume’s motion was a succession of assaults not upon reform, but upon the details of the particular plan of reform which Mr. Hume has brought forward. The burden of the complaint was that the plan is not systematic—that it rests on no definite principles, and is open, at various points, to the double question, why go so far; and, since you go so far, why not go farther?4

The assertion is only true in a sense in which it is denied by no one. Mr. Cobden accepted the charge,5 and none of Mr. Hume’s supporters repudiate it. But it comes with an ill grace from the speakers and writers who advance it. There is not one of them who does not proclaim that he also is for reform. A member of Sir Robert Peel’s cabinet congratulates the ministry on having done with finality;6 and we find, to our great edification, that all the world are Edition: current; Page: [1103] reformers, each in his little way. Then, may not Mr. Hume retort on his assailants their cavilling objection against himself? Does any one of their little plans rest on any abstract principle any more than his, or contain in itself any demonstrative reason for doing exactly so much and no more? In what, then, do their schemes of reform differ from his? In that which is of more importance than anything else—that his proposition is for a great reform, theirs for a small one. If it is asked what principle is involved in Mr. Hume’s proposition, this is the principle. It is the principle of a large reform.

Whatever people may say, for the sake of success in a debate or in a leading article, every one knows that the question is not about any particular collection of details, about any six points, or four, or five. The question is that of a large alteration in our representative system. Any plan which is brought forward as a standard for a party to rally round, must be of the nature of a compromise. The new reform bill is neither more nor less so than the old one. There is probably as much variety of opinion among those who voted with Mr. Hume, as there was among those who voted with Lord Grey in 1831.7 But they are agreed in this, that they demand a large measure. There is no other principle in the matter, and there needs no other. The measure is intended to be such as all may vote for, who think that a large reform of parliament, in a democratic direction, but short of actual democracy, is desirable in itself, and suitable to the circumstances of the present time. In this respect the scheme perfectly fulfils its purpose. It draws the line with sufficient distinctness. Those who are for no change at all, or for such changes only as would make no difference in the spirit of the government, of course vote against it. All others may vote for it, reserving their ulterior opinions. It excludes all who do not come up to its mark, but admits all who go beyond it.

One lesson the consistent supporters of reform may take to themselves—a lesson which becomes more important in proportion as the contest ceases to be a mere mock fight and becomes a serious conflict of opposing reasons. Their practical conduct as politicians necessarily partakes of compromise. Their demands and systematic aims must often fall short of their principles. But let them not therefore cut down their principles to the measure of their demands. If they do, they lose far more in vigour of argument, and in the imposing influence of a sense of consistency and power, than they can possibly gain in charming away the fears of those who would, but dare not, follow them. Let them disclaim nothing which is a legitimate consequence of their principles. Let them tell the truth—when it is the truth—that their private opinion goes further than their public demands, and that if they ask less than what their principles would justify, it is not because they fear to avow, or are unable to defend, their principles, but Edition: current; Page: [1104] because they think they are doing more good by uniting their efforts with those of others to attain a nearer object, and one more immediately practicable.

374.: ON REFORM DAILY NEWS, 19 JULY, 1848, P. 2

This unheaded leader (following the parliamentary report), which again brings French experience to bear on English reform, is described in Mill’s bibliography as “A leading article on Reform (1st leader), in the Daily News of 19th July 1848”

(MacMinn, p. 70).

the more reasonable class of the opponents of reform do not attempt to defend the present constitution of parliament by any very confident appeal to its fruits; they find little to say in recommendation of the sort of government, or the sort of governors, which our present institutions give us; but they are unable to persuade themselves that matters would be at all mended by giving a more democratic character to the popular branch of the legislature. The fault, they say, is in the country itself; in the national education; in the state of the public mind; not in the constitution of parliament. If our statesmen are without ideas and without purposes, weak, passive, opinionless; if they have neither head nor heart to face the difficulties of any great question; if they rarely aspire to leave any of the larger interests of the people they profess to govern in a better condition than they found them; this is not (in the opinion of some persons) the fault of the men, so much as of the age and country, which have not produced better men, or have produced them only as scattered, obscure individuals, quite as likely to be overlooked by a numerous constituency as by a narrow one. If the classes who now rule in parliament are so deficient in the qualities which should belong to rulers, do the masses possess them? The knowledge, the vigour of intellect, the freedom from prejudice, the judgment undivided by selfishness or partiality, which we so deeply desiderate in the rich and high-born, do we find them in the poor? That clear-sighted justice and high-minded generosity, combined with practical resource, which the times demand—without which this great transitional period in opinions and institutions may be lengthened out in fruitless oscillations—what reason have we to flatter ourselves that these endowments, which we seek vainly among our so-called educated classes, will be found in the untaught delegates of the factory and the workshop? Is it not much, and more than we can expect, if those for whom society has done nothing, prove no worse than those on whom it has lavished all its means of instruction and improvement?

This objection assumes, as the natural and intended effect of popular institutions, that the crude opinions and unguided instincts of the working classes would be the directing power in the state. We have no such expectation from any extension of the franchise. Reformers have always maintained, and the example Edition: current; Page: [1105] of France is now before us to show, that views of things taken from the peculiar position of the working classes are not likely to predominate, or to have at all more than their just influence, even in a legislature chosen by universal suffrage. After a revolution made by workmen, not twenty members in an assembly of nine hundred are working men. Scarcely in our own parliament do opinions with any semblance of an anti-property character meet with a more hostile reception; and it is evident that the errors of the assembly are more likely to be on the side of conservatism than of revolution. Then what has France gained, it may be asked, or what would England gain by the admission of the working classes to the franchise? A gain beyond all price, the effects of which may not show themselves in a day, or in a year, but are calculated to spread over and elevate the future. This gain does not consist in turning the propertied classes out of the government and transferring it to the unpropertied, but in compelling the propertied classes to carry it on in a manner which they shall be capable of justifying to the unpropertied.

Grant but a democratic suffrage, and all the conditions of government are changed. Whoever may be the rulers, the interest of the great mass of the community must then stand foremost among the actuating principles in the conduct of public affairs. The legislature must from that time make both the real and the apparent interests of the most numerous classes an object of incessant solicitude; and whenever it does things which are opposed to those apparent interests, it must defend them by reasons drawn from the interests of those same classes, and appealing to their understandings. The consequences of this would be incalculable. The discussions of parliament and of the press would be, what they ought to be, a continued course of political instruction for the working classes. Let those classes be as ignorant, prejudiced, passionate as any one may choose to represent them; let them be full of all sorts of prepossessions against property and order—those who are interested in property and order would feel all the more strongly that their safety depended on enlightening that ignorance, prejudice, and passion. One of the first measures of the democratic government of France has been a bill to bestow gratuitous education, at the expense of the state, upon the whole rising generation of the French people.1 Where the poorest have votes, the richest can no longer be indifferent to the state of their mental cultivation. To educate the whole community up to the highest point attainable is not then a matter of choice but of fortunate necessity.

This, however, is only one, and the most obvious, of the benefits which would arise from making the labouring masses a great power in the state. Nothing can be imagined which would tend so much to regenerate the intellectual vigour of the classes, who are now letting the powers of government perish in their hands Edition: current; Page: [1106] from mere mental feebleness. Every one who knows history or the human mind is aware, that powerful intellects and strong characters are formed by conflict, and that the times which have produced brilliant developments of mental accomplishment in public stations have been those in which great principles and important social elements have been fighting each other hand to hand—times of struggle for national independence, political freedom, or religious emancipation. The present age also is an age of struggle between conflicting principles which it is the work of this time, and perhaps of many generations more, to bring into a just relation with one another. The conflict now going on is between the instincts and immediate interests of the propertied classes and those of the unpropertied. This opposition of interests—partly real, partly only apparent—is at present the grand difficulty of government. All other questions with which governments have yet begun to occupy themselves, are difficult chiefly by their connexion with this. Now, of those two opposing forces—neither of which can be disregarded, neither of which can or ought to triumph over the other, but which it is the grand business of government to attempt to reconcile—one only is represented in the British parliament. The ministry, be it what it may, exclusively represents the propertied classes; and the two houses of parliament are unanimously on the same side of the question as itself. It has to make out a case to the satisfaction solely of its own party. The murmurs of the other party it only hears at a distance, and is under no greater necessity of attending to them than the cabinet of a despot. There are no recognised organs for that other power, no way in which it can show itself above ground, and the extent of its subterraneous working will therefore only be known when some day, as at Vienna, it explodes and blows up the whole fabric of society.2

Is it not of old one of the principal and acknowledged uses of parliament, that all which agitates and divides society should make itself felt by a corresponding agitation and division there? Ought not parliament to be the place of discussion for adverse interests and principles, the arena where opposing forces should meet and fight out their battle, that they may not find themselves reduced to fight it in a less pacific field? If so, the British parliament does not fulfil its office; for the vital question with which all Europe rings, and which fills every thinking mind, both in England and on the continent, with anxiety—the question how to make the rights of property acceptable to the unpropertied classes, is unheard of in that assembly, which it ought more than anything else to occupy; and the subjects which engross parliamentary debates, compared with the great and urgent interests of the nation, form a contrast as full of irony, as the Byzantine multitude Edition: current; Page: [1107] occupying itself with the factions of the circus when Attila was at their gates.3 So it will be until the rulers of the country have to meet face to face in parliament the representatives of those interests and feelings of which they are now ignorant, or from which they superciliously turn aside. They have to learn the difficult but necessary act of looking at established institutions and opinions from the point of view of those who are not on the sunny but on the shady side of the social edifice. Defects by which other people alone suffer are seldom seen until the sufferers point them out. When the unpropertied are fairly represented in the House of Commons, their just claims will, for the first time, obtain a really impartial hearing, and their unreasonable demands will, also for the first time, be so resisted as not to leave a stinging sense of injustice behind.

375.: ELECTORAL DISTRICTS DAILY NEWS, 25 JULY, 1848, P. 2

This article returns to the issues of No. 373 (q.v.), with particular reference to Thomas Noon Talfourd’s Speech on National Representation (6 July), PD, Vol. 100, cols. 170-81. This unheaded second leader is described in Mill’s bibliography as “A leading article on Electoral Districts and against Mr. Talfourd’s speech, in the Daily News of 25th July 1848”

(MacMinn, p. 70).

the most important point in Mr. Hume’s plan of reform is the equalisation of the electoral districts. This one thing would do more towards diminishing the undue ascendancy of landed and moneyed wealth than all the other points, even of the charter,1 without it. It would reduce the nominees of the landlords in the House of Commons from about two-thirds of the whole assembly to about one-third. And by making every electoral body too numerous to be bribed, it would put an end to the obtaining seats by mere expenditure, an object for which so much virtuous zeal is so ineffectually professed by all classes of half-reformers.

This, then, being, of all the “points,” by far the most disagreeable to the present ruling powers, the opposition to it is proportionally more obstinate than Edition: current; Page: [1108] to any other. But as it is not convenient to say that the real objection to the measure is its efficacy, every encouragement is held out to the invention of sentimental objections. Electoral districts are said to be mechanical, pedantic, a rule-and-square system; and all the other phrases usually employed to throw discredit on precise and business-like modes of conducting any transaction. Serjeant Talfourd, the “good poet but bad politician,”2 lent himself as an organ for this style of declamation; and clenched his first specimen with the passage, known to all readers of poetry from Coleridge’s translation of Schiller’s Wallenstein, in which the crafty Ottavio Piccolomini inculcates on his high-minded son the superiority of tortuous courses:

So, because the lightning and the cannon-ball fly straight to their mark, nothing else should. Straightforwardness and directness of aim are declared to be discreditable things, and whatever takes the straight road to its object is an agent of destruction. Let us rather say that directness and power are the same thing or always accompany each other. If the object be to destroy, the means which are most direct are the most effectual; and so they are when the object is to preserve. When a person is in the water and drowning, Mr. Talfourd would hardly quote Schiller in favour of going round about, instead of straight in to deliver him. If it is absolutely necessary to have an illustration from visible nature, the sunbeams move in straight lines as well as the lightning; indeed more so, for the lightning makes no objection to twisting and turning in order to accommodate itself to the direction of the conducting medium. A steam-ship, also, would have been a more appropriate exemplification of rectilineal movement than a cannon-ball. The poet goes on to say that the road on which blessing travels

but the very words of the quotation suggest that the illustration and the philosophy are both antiquated, and that roads, in these days, are not made on the principle which the poet patronises. Does it not occur to the admirers of crooked paths that we are living in an age of railroads; and that, now-a-days, rather than Edition: current; Page: [1109] not go straight to our object, instead of winding round the hill we even tunnel through it? The spirit of the time requires that its machinery, whether for physical or for political purposes, shall be efficient. It is not reckoned a merit in machinery to imitate the pleasing irregularities of nature. Its beauty is in its accuracy: it works by straight lines and right angles, and works best when its lines are most correctly straight, its angles most exactly square.

Coleridge himself, though fond of quoting the passage which Mr. Talfourd cited from him,5 is an authority in favour of electoral districts. He recommended, we think in his Church and State, a new administrative division of the country, describing the present one as barbarous, and a great obstacle to improvement.6 Even Schiller is against Mr. Talfourd; for the fine verses put into the mouth of Piccolomini do not express Schiller’s opinions; on the contrary the whole tragedy is a demonstration, not for, but against Piccolomini’s maxims and conduct.

Electoral districts are mechanical. And why not? In whatever manner members of parliament are elected, there must be mechanical arrangement of some sort; and what these should be is not a question of poetry or the picturesque, but of means to an end. What is the right end, and by what means can it be accomplished? Is it the proper end of a House of Commons to make the landed and monied aristocracies the masters of the legislature? If so, keep the system as it is. Is it the object that no class shall predominate, but that all sections of the community shall be powerful in proportion to their numbers and their intelligence? A new division and constitution of the electoral body is then imperative; and the more nearly equal the number of electors in each constituency the more nearly is the end attained. There is a sentiment concerned in the matter, without doubt, but it is that of justice. When just ends are aimed at by just means, and means well adapted to their attainment, all other sentiment will take care of itself. Sentiment, and of the best kind, is sure to gather round all things which are large diffusers of good among the human race.

Unfortunately, reformers no more than anti-reformers have yet learned to make great principles their object, and in this lies the secret in the affairs of communities no less than in those of individuals, of ineffectual struggles and mean results. The world will rally round a truly great principle, and be as much the better for the contest as for the attainment; but the petty objects by the pursuit of which no principle is asserted, are fruitless even when attained.

Edition: current; Page: [1110]

376.: FRENCH AFFAIRS DAILY NEWS, 9 AUG., 1848, P. 3

This unheaded third leader, another comment on the aftermath of the February Revolution (see Nos. 370 and 374), is described in Mill’s bibliography as “A leading article on French affairs in the Daily News of 9th August 1848”

(MacMinn, p. 70).

from the day when the people of Paris expelled the ruler who had been called the monarch of the middle classes, and proclaimed a democratic republic, it has been evident that the fate of political and social improvement in Europe, for many years to come, was to be decided in France. If the revolution, after its first difficulties are over, issues in a government which at once preserves order and accelerates progress—makes the laws obeyed, and labours actively to improve them—then in England, and in all Europe, faith in improvement, and determination to effect it, will become general, and the watchword of improvement will once more be, as it was of old, the emancipation of the oppressed classes. If, on the other hand, the French people allow their republican institutions to be filched from them by artifice, or yield them up under the ascendancy of some popular chief, or under the panic caused by insurrection, or compromise them by an indefinite succession of disorders, repressed only by a succession of illegal violences on the part of the government, the tendency in this and other countries to the extension of political rights or the redress of social injustices, may be for a long time suspended. The tide will set in in a retrograde direction, and a timid conservative instinct will probably take the place of even that moderate taste for improvement which did exist in a certain portion of the influential classes of this country before February last.

The enemies of reform in England know all this, and their tactics are accommodated to it. Events in France itself are fortunately out of their power. If anything which they were able to do could make the revolution in France really a disastrous failure, it would be done. Lacking this, the most that there is any chance of accomplishing is to make it be thought a failure. And to effect this, there is hardly any exaggeration or misrepresentation which is not resorted to. Those whose notions of the state of France are taken from the leading articles of almost any English newspaper, are much worse than ignorant, they are entirely misinformed. The writers do not even preserve a decent consistency with the facts published by themselves. It has repeatedly happened, that the Paris correspondent in one column has given an authoritative denial of some slanderer’s report, which is expatiated on as an admitted truth in the same day’s editorial article.1 In other cases similar slanders, after having for several days Edition: current; Page: [1111] served their purpose as texts for blackening the revolution, or some individual or party connected with it, have been contradicted in half-a-dozen words, and in a corner, a week or more after the official contradiction had gone the round of the French newspapers. Oftener still, the denial, or positive disproof, given in the French papers, has not been noticed at all, while the calmuny has continued to be assumed as an indisputable fact. Instances of all these kinds of misrepresentations have occurred (for example), with regard to the imputed atrocities of the late unsuccessful insurgents.2 There was no limit to the absurd incredibility of the things at first asserted respecting these people. The English journals eagerly circulated them all—even the nonsense about waylaying the troops and the national guard to poison them with brandy, and such cock and bull stories, which bore their absurdity on the face of them—to which nothing but the extreme of terror and exasperation combined could have made the greatest gobemouche in Paris give credit for an instant. This, and all the tales about poisoned balls and other peculiarly murderous missiles made and used by the insurgents,3 have been proved and are now admitted to be, not exaggerations, but absolute fictions, without the smallest pretence of a fact to ground them on. There is not a single imputation of cruelty or ferocity of anything like a general character which is not now given up; the only assertions of the kind as yet unrefuted are of two or three insulated acts by individuals, and it remains to be seen whether even these will stand the test of judicial inquiry. Yet the English public are still led to believe, and do believe, that the insurrection was something unheard-of for its horrible barbarity; and the journals which led them into this belief take care not to disabuse them of it. Nor are the victors in the late contest more spared by calumny than the vanquished. We are told with the coolest effrontery in leading articles about the number of persons who have been shot by order of the present French government4—it being a notorious fact that not one person has been shot, not one life taken, by the authority of government in consequence of the insurrection, while it is expected that none will be taken even after trial. The mildness and moderation of the sincerely republican party are as conspicuous in the present head of the government and his cabinet as in the provisional government and executive commission who preceded him.

The readers of both whig and tory papers really ought to receive with distrust the statements which they find in those papers disadvantageous to France. They ought to consider how great an interest those papers have, or think they have, in putting the worst colour on French affairs. It is the only chance of preventing Edition: current; Page: [1112] reform. There is no way now of discrediting reform without blackening France. The enemies of popular institutions have lost their most potent weapon, fear of the unknown. Democracy, in the popular signification of the term, exists as a fact, among our nearest neighbours. There, under our eyes, is universal suffrage, or what is usually, though improperly, called by that name; a sovereign assembly, elected by the whole male population; no aristocracy as a clog on its movements; and the motto of this government is Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity. Here, then, is an actual trial of the experiment; with what success depends on circumstances of which no one is yet in a condition to judge; but if the result should be a social system, which, with any amount of allowance for human imperfection, does sincerely, and in a manner not to be mistaken, aim at guiding its practice by the spirit of its motto, surely it cannot have other than a beneficial influence? Other countries will not fear anything worse for themselves from popular institutions than France suffers, or than they can be made to believe that France suffers. We may be certain, therefore, that the bad side of everything will be made the most of; that every idle or malicious rumour of mischief will be circulated as a fact, and when each particular rumour is proved to be false, the general impression made by such false assertions will be studiously kept up, and that, fairly or foully, events in France will continue to be represented in the blackest colours in which there is any hope of representing them successfully. And such is, unfortunately, the general ignorance in this country respecting foreign affairs, that a large amount of misrepresentation may as yet be ventured upon without any considerable danger of detection.

377.: LANDED TENURE IN IRELAND DAILY NEWS, 12 AUG., 1848, P. 2

Mill was encouraged to return to his main Irish themes by the article on large and small farms in the Agricultural and Industrial Journal, I (July 1848), 147-71, by Robert John Kane (1809-90), Irish chemist and Professor of Natural Philosophy, appointed in 1845 President of the as-yet unopened Queen’s College at Cork, and a member of the commission investigating the potato blight. Mill’s quotations are from the article. This unheaded third leader is described in Mill’s bibliography as “A leading article on landed tenure in Ireland, in the Daily News of 12th August 1848”

(MacMinn, p. 70).

the journal of the agricultural society of ireland for last month contains an article by Sir Robert Kane, entitled, “The Large or Small Farm Question Considered,” in which he promulgates his sentiments on the economical condition of Ireland. The reputation of Sir Robert Kane, and the public position which he has held, give a sort of scientific, and at the same time official, weight to his opinions, and therefore common sense and common arithmetic, coming from him, may carry an authority which, on the wretched Edition: current; Page: [1113] subject of Ireland, they seldom obtain by their intrinsic merits. The clamourers against small holdings and the division of the land may perhaps give heed to him, when he proves by figures that small farms, in the existing circumstances of Ireland, are a necessity; since on the large farm system there would be employment for no more than two-fifths of the present agricultural population, the other three-fifths becoming paupers, to be supported from the produce raised by the labour of the former. Perhaps, too, such an authority will be believed when he says that a small farm (meaning not the thirty acres of the Farmers’ Estate Bill,1 but farms of from ten to fourteen acres), “will always,” when the skill of the farmer and his appliances are equal, “produce more, acre for acre, and pay a higher rent than the large farm;” and he sees no reason why the appliances should not be equal, for there is, according to him, among the cultivating classes of Ireland, “a vast quantity of capital which would be rapidly drawn forth under a proper small-farm system.” [Pp. 165, 166.] “If the real circumstances of the small farmers of Ireland be looked into, it will be found that the investment of a capital of from 80l. to 90l. on a farm of fourteen acres” would be by no means beyond their capability. [P. 165.] “There exists,” he continues, “amongst our poorer classes a show of poverty beyond what even the reality would justify. . . . They are afraid to let it be known they have money, lest their rent should be raised; they are afraid to improve their land, lest their rent should be raised; they are afraid to wear good clothes, lest they might appear to be deriving more from the produce of their farm than the miserable means of physical existence which their landlord will allow them to retain. Hence the money hid in thatch and buried in barns. Hence the secret and illegal deposits in savings’ banks in fictitious names.” [Ibid.]

It is hardly possible, we should think, for the most exclusive admirer of English farming to read this paper, and continue to believe that the most available remedy for Irish poverty is the clearing of estates and consolidation of small farms into large ones; and if the writer is correct in his opinion that there exists in the hands of small farmers sufficient capital for carrying on “a proper small-farm system” in such a manner as to yield, acre for acre, a greater produce than that of large farms, the road to the economical regeneration of Ireland is sufficiently plain. The reader who has followed Sir Robert Kane thus far is anxious to know how, in his opinion, this “proper small-farm system” is to be arrived at. We are sorry to be obliged to tell him that, on this subject, he will get no help from Sir R. Kane. The evils Sir Robert can understand, but on the subject of remedies nothing can be more lame and impotent than his conclusion.2 The Edition: current; Page: [1114] same fear which paralyses every minister, every member of parliament, and almost every public writer when the real evils of Ireland come into question, ties his tongue. Most gladly would they do anything for Ireland, only there must not be a word said of the one vital point in the constitution of society as it exists in Ireland—the tenure of land. To fill Ireland with soldiers, blockade her with ships, to seize presses, confiscate newspapers, and imprison men without trial under a Habeas Corpus Suspension Act3—these things are easy; but to brave the clamour of the men who call even the sale of land to pay the debts of the proprietor a “confiscation of all the land of Ireland,”4 is a thing which cannot be risked even to get rid of the main source of Irish misery and Irish disaffection together. And Sir Robert Kane, although not privileged, like a minister of state, to be ignorant of his business, can propose nothing as a remedy for Ireland but to instruct the people in agriculture: as if any quantity of instruction in farming would make people improve their farms who, on his own showing, hide their money in the thatch, for fear that if their landlord knew of it he would raise the rent! Is it not a mockery to talk of doing any good to the peasantry of a country in such a state of things as this? Who can expect agricultural improvement where the rent depends on the good pleasure of the landlords, and of such landlords?

Yet Sir Robert Kane writes strongly and boldly, while confining himself to generals:

The landlord [he says] has to learn that feudalism is extinct; that Great Britain and Ireland are the only places in the world where feudal landlordism is not extinct, except where the people are still slaves, and that there is a very large and intelligent class who think that the time is close at hand for reforming landlordism here also. The landed interests of this country, shut out by their insular position, by their ignorance and their pride, from making themselves acquainted with the forces of thought that have grown up within the last half-century, and which now govern the opinion of Europe, will only endanger their legitimate influence and position if they attempt to retain for the future the feudal privileges and territorial powers which were the natural social circumstances of the ancient times. Even in Ireland, the hospital for the aged and disabled ideas of Europe, feudalism, and the divine power of land, is dying—its worn out form crushed by the iron power of the industrial spirit.

[Pp. 167-9.]

This is excellent; but, unfortunately, Sir R. Kane does not mean it in the sense in which it can be of any practical use. For the old, worn out theory which he so justly repudiates, that landlords have the duties and are entitled to the rights of governors, he would substitute the doctrine that land falls under the same rules as any other article of commerce, and that neither law nor opinion has anything to do with the mode in which the owner manages it for his own interest.

A landowner is simply a dealer in land—a capitalist who has, either by himself or by his ancestor, invested his capital or his skill in land; he hires out the use of it to certain Edition: current; Page: [1115] parties, who pay him therefor, as they pay for the cloth for their clothes, or the furniture for their rooms; and not merely the right, but the plain duty of the landlord is, to get the highest possible price he can for his land, and to compel the payment of that price by law.

[Pp. 148-9.]

We will not comment on this absurd notion of “duty,” nor will we discuss the question—How many of the 8,000 Irish landlords ever did, either by themselves or their ancestors, invest any particle of “capital or skill,” in their land; because we readily allow that the right of property in land in the present day ought not to depend on the manner in which the land was acquired centuries ago. But we do say that this theory of the purely commercial character of contracts for land, wherever else it may be applicable, does not and cannot apply to a country in the exceptional situation of Ireland. The contract for rent, in Ireland, is not between the landlord and a capitalist farmer, who is able to take care of his own interest, and makes no bargain but such as he believes to be commercially advantageous to him. The Irish landlord’s contract is with a peasant labourer, who cultivates not for profit but for existence, and who, if he cannot obtain a piece of land, has no choice but beggary or the poor-rate. It is not peasant farming that is objectionable; on this point we wholly agree with Sir R. Kane; but peasant-farming in an over-peopled country, and at a rent fixed by competition, we hold to be the main cause of all Ireland’s evils. The competition of superabundant numbers makes the tenants promise, and legally bind themselves, to pay nominal rents, exceeding not merely their means of payment, but the entire capabilities of the soil. On the “commercial principle” the landlord could sweep away the last potato; and the only estates in Ireland which are exceptions to the general wretchedness are those of which the owners, abandoning the commercial principle altogether, have taken upon themselves the tenant’s side of the question as well as their own, and have considered, not what the tenant will offer, but what the landlord ought to accept. The public, therefore, is interested, and very greatly so, in the mode in which landlords manage their estates; and if it is their general practice to manage them on a system of which all that we see in Ireland is the natural result, it will not do to say, with Sir R. Kane, that “it is the simple right of an owner of land to sell or let it at the highest price the market will afford.” [P. 169.] It is time to revert to just principles, and to regulate the supposed right of an owner of land in such a manner as to make it at least consistent with the essential conditions of industry, prudence, and material comfort, in the agricultural population.

378.: THE FRENCH LAW AGAINST THE PRESS SPECTATOR, 19 AUG., 1848, P. 800

On 11 Aug., 1848, the National Assembly in France promulgated a law severely restricting the freedom of the press (Bull. 60, No. 621), which Mill here quotes in Edition: current; Page: [1116] translation. The article, headed “[From a Correspondent.],” is described in Mill’s bibliography as “An article headed ‘from a Correspondent’ on the French law against the press, in the Spectator of 19th August 1848”

(MacMinn, p. 70).

the decree against the press, just passed almost with unanimity by the National Assembly of France, is one of the most monstrous outrages on the idea of freedom of discussion ever committed by the legislature of a country pretending to be free. It is the very law of Louis Philippe—the September law, once so indignantly denounced—with scarcely any alteration but the substitution of the word “Republic” for “Monarchy.”1

This precious specimen of Liberal legislation declares punishable by fine and imprisonment all attacks on “the rights and authority of the National Assembly—on the rights and authority which the members of the Executive derive from the decrees of the Assembly—on the Republican institutions and the Constitution—on the principle of the sovereignty of the people and of universal suffrage—on the liberty of worship, the principle of property, and the rights of family”; [Art. 1] besides which, it ordains similar punishments for “exciting hatred and contempt towards the Government of the Republic,” [Art. 4] and for “public outrage committed (in their public character) against one or more members of the National Assembly, or against a Minister of any religion paid by the State.” [Art. 5.]

This list of subjects on which discussion is prohibited, or permitted only on one side, includes all the great political and social questions of the age. If only one set of opinions is to be permitted on any matter which involves the right of property, the rights or obligations of family, the question of Republicanism, of universal suffrage, even the particular constitution which the Assembly may hereafter adopt, or the rightfulness of abolishing that constitution—what are the subjects, worth discussing, on which freedom of political discussion is to exist? “The acts of the Executive,” says the decree. “The present provision is not to affect the right of discussion and censure on the acts of the Executive and of the Ministers.” [Art. 4.] A most liberal concession, truly! The law is worse, with only this reservation in favour of freedom, than if there were no reservation at all; for the most tyrannical court of justice which could now exist in civilized Europe would reserve more than this. It is not declared that even the actions of the Legislature may be censured, but only those of the Executive; and with regard to laws or institutions, no liberty of censure is reserved at all. There was a wretched pretence by one or two of the speakers, that no restraint was intended on the “freedom of philosophical discussion”—that nothing was to be forbidden but incitements to hatred and contempt.2 But the decree says nothing of the kind. Edition: current; Page: [1117] The decree prohibits “any attack.” [Art. 1.] The distinction is good for nothing, even if it were made. To say that attacks are permitted, but not incitements to hatred and contempt, would be to say that discussion shall be lawful on condition that it be cold, dry, and unimpressive; that the dull and the indifferent shall be allowed to express opinions, but that persons of genius and feeling must hold their peace. Under such laws, it has been truly said in one of the French journals, Rousseau’s discourse on Inequality never could have been published.3 Nor could any great writings of great reformers, religious or political, have seen the light if such laws had existed and had been obeyed.

How long shall we continue to see the regard for freedom of opinion, which all parties profess while they are on the oppressed side, thrown off by them all as soon as they are in the majority? How much longer must we wait for an example, anywhere in Europe, of a ruler or a ruling party who really desire fair play for any opinions contrary to their own? Is it not shameful that no sooner has a reforming party accomplished as much change in the institutions of the country as itself deems desirable, than it proceeds to decree that every person shall be fined or imprisoned, who proposes either to go a single step further or a step back? We are aware of the allowances to be made for men lately engaged in a desperate and at one time a doubtful contest against a determined attempt at insurrection;4 and we know too that this decree is avowedly a temporary measure, to be hereafter superseded by more deliberate legislation.5 But we lament to say, that in the tone assumed, and the doctrines professed by the speakers, we see no ground of assurance that the permanent measure will be at all different, in spirit and principle, from the transitional one.

It is not, however, for English Conservatives, either Whig or Tory, to indulge any self-complacent triumph over French Republicans. The new act of the French Assembly does not make the laws of France on the freedom of the press worse than those of England have always been. The freedom of the press, in England, is entirely an affair of opinion and custom, not of law. It exists because the laws are not enforced. The law of political libel, as laid down in all the books,6 is as inconsistent with free discussion as the laws of Russia. There is no censure of any established institution or constituted authority which is not an offence by law. And within these few months it has been seen how eagerly the Edition: current; Page: [1118] English Parliament, under the influence of a far less degree of panic, have rushed to make the laws against what was deemed seditous speaking or writing more stringent than before.7

A government cannot be blamed for defending itself against insurrection. But it deserves the severest blame if to prevent insurrection it prevents the promulgation of opinion. If it does so, it actually justifies insurrection in those to whom it denies the use of peaceful means to make their opinions prevail. Hitherto the French Government has been altogether in the right against all attempts to overthrow it. But by what right can the Assembly now reprobate any future attempt, either by Monarchists or Socialists, to rise in arms against the Government? It denies them free discussion. It says they shall not be suffered to bring their opinions to the touchstone of the public reason and conscience. It refuses them the chance which every sincere opinion can justly claim, of triumphing in a fair field. It fights them with weapons which can as easily be used to put down the most valuable truth as the most pernicious error. It tells them that they must prevail by violence before they shall be allowed to contend by argument. Who can blame persons who are deeply convinced of the truth and importance of their opinions, for asserting them by force, when that is the only means left them of obtaining even a hearing? When their mouths are gagged, can they be reproached for using their arms?

Alexander Bain (1818-1903), Mill’s friend and future biographer, who had written for the Westminster and helped Mill to revise his Logic, had held several posts as lecturer in moral and natural philosophy in Scottish universities. The pamphlet here reviewed was the first of four lectures, all on the same subject, which he had given at the Edinburgh Philosophic Institution in 1847. Mill’s review, in the “Literary Examiner,” is headed “On the Applications of Science to Human Health and Well-being, being a Lecture, introductory to a Course ‘on the Application of Physics to Common Life,’ delivered at the Edinburgh Institution in June, 1847. By Alexander Bain, [London:] A.M. Taylor [in fact, John J. Griffin]. [Glasgow: Richard Griffin, 1848.]” This review is not in Mill’s bibliography, but may be confidently attributed to him on the basis of the comment by Bain: “Chadwick had the fancy that my introductory lecture to the Edinburgh Course would be a recommendation in procuring the official consent to my being appointed [to Edition: current; Page: [1119] the Metropolitan Sanitary Commission]. Accordingly, I threw off a number of copies, and gave them as presents, and exposed some for sale with Griffin, the publisher. John Mill prepared a notice of the lecture in the Examiner newspaper.” (Bain, Autobiography [London: Longmans, Green, 1904], p. 197n.)

there is no more popular subject at present than the applications of physical science; and there can be none more appropriate for a popular lecturer, combining as it does an inexhaustible store of wonders with a direct influence on the most obvious and universal interests of life. Few persons are so competent to treat this class of topics usefully and attractively, as Mr. Bain. His knowledge of the leading departments of physical science is accurate and profound; and he has a happy faculty for clearly explaining and familiarly illustrating what he knows. To these he adds the still rarer attribute, of a mind which looks ever through and beyond its immediate subject; scrupulously exact in details, yet not treating them like a mere man of detail, but as materials towards building up a nobler and happier scheme of human existence.

These general ideas and aspirations naturally come most distinctly to view in the present publication, which is but an introductory lecture. The following extract is illustrative of this portion of the author’s views:

There are two great stages in the progress of the various arts and productive occupations of human life. The earliest set of devices are derived from men’s ordinary and unassisted observation of the usual course of nature. The methods of mining, building, ploughing, sowing, spinning, dyeing, metal working, carrying from place to place, navigating, and so forth, are got at after trying many different methods and implements until it is seen that some answer better than the rest, these being once approved of, are then handed down to posterity, and they may often remain unchanged for a long course of ages. In fact, unassisted reason soon comes to a stand-still; as we see in such nations as the Hindoos and Chinese, who have never reached scientific methods of acquiring a knowledge of Nature. The second stage of progress is entered on, when, by the perfection of the knowledge-seeking art, the hidden laws of things are brought to light, and a vast number of additional properties discovered in the various objects of the world; when, for instance, by looking into the composition of vegetable bodies, and into the matters making up the soil that nourishes them, we can specifically and exactly suit the one to the other, instead of depending on a vague experience of gross results. On this second stage the European world entered last century, in regard to the mechanical arts; so that, in fact, we are only beginning to develop the vast resources of our planet, and we have now to look forward to a long and unremitted series of improvements.

But I must next call your attention to the difference between the Arts of Life, and the Art of Living,—or between man’s powers in farming, building, manufacturing and trading, and his ability to apply the results of all these to his own life and well-being; for this is the final intention of such manifold labours. Because we have very much improved the Arts of Life, it does not follow that we have equally improved the Art of Living. We may increase our abundance of the things that are useful and good, without acquiring the skill to apply them in proper measure, and in well-timed arrangement to the highly complex structure and constitution of our living framework.

It is, beyond all question, desirable that each one of us should contrive our Edition: current; Page: [1120] arrangements and daily ongoings so as to make the very most of life; to render our existence as rich and effective, and great and brilliant, as it can be made; to combine the choicest enjoyments with the most wide-ranging and beneficial activity. Now it is only by knowledge and skill going along with adequate force of resolution, that we can so use the resources of the world on the one hand, and so control the impulses of our own nature on the other, as to maintain the highest possible pitch of vitality, and cause a constant current of our finest emotions and activities.

The Art of Living is the method of stretching out the resources of the world to the measure of human wants, desires, and capabilities. Each person has to consider his own peculiar situation and framework, and to select from among his possessions and opportunities, what will do most to yield him a grand and beautiful existence. We have all a certain command of what supports and gratifies body and mind; we have our homes, our city, our companions, our books, our means of accomplishment and instruction, our walks and excursions, the face of nature, the inspiration of art, the ongoings of the world, and many other things capable of influencing us to our very inmost being; on the other side, we are liable to burdens and toils, to violent shocks and slow miseries, to weariness and depression, to temptations and failures; and it becomes our task to dispose all these things to the making our lives joyous rather than grievous, powerful and benignant, rather than empty and hurtful.

[Pp. 6-8.]

After showing the insufficiency of merely empirical observation, without a scientific study of the powers of nature to form an adequate basis for the regulation of life, the author continues:

That the Art of Living has not yet come to great perfection is testified by the deplorable experience of the human race. The perplexity, and discord, and difficulties of life have been the theme of complaints that ring through all the ages of men; yielding Cynic and Stoic philosophies, self-inflicted tortures and immolations, voluntary banishment from the world, gloomy speculations, suicides and crimes. It is surely worth while trying whether a better knowledge of the actual course of things, and of the beneficial agencies wrapt up in the womb of nature, may not help, among other causes, to stem such a torrent of despair, and prove the possibility of a great and harmonious existence for man.

For this end we are anxious that the Art of Living should be based, not as heretofore, upon vague experience, however extensive, but on the well-sifted and thoroughly tested experience that constitutes our Exact Sciences. And it is a satisfaction to know that several of these sciences have already yielded important contributions to this great practical object.

[Pp. 10-11.]

A brief survey follows of what has been done, and of much more which is yet to be done by the various sciences, in furnishing means to lighten the burdens and increase the enjoyments and powers of human existence; not omitting the, as yet, infant sciences of the human mind and of human society.

A brief syllabus is annexed of the course, consisting of four lectures, of which the one now published was the first. The topics treated appear to have been chiefly the application to the health and comfort of life, and of what science has ascertained respecting the laws and properties of heat, water, air, and the effects of action and repose. A portion of the second lecture is given at length, relating to the bath and its uses, which affords a favourable idea of the lecturer’s talent for popular exposition of the details of his subject.

This third newspaper review of Grote’s History (see Nos. 304 and 368) is the first of two dealing with Volumes V and VI (see No. 381 for the second part). Writing to Grote in January 1849, Mill notes that he has just finished reading the two volumes (published in December 1848) with “the greatest pleasure and admiration,” adding that “Every great result which you have attempted to deduce seems to me most thoroughly made out” (LL, CW, Vol. XIV, p. 3). The review, in the “Books” section, is headed “Grote’s History of Greece,” with the heading footnoted: “History of Greece. By George Grote, Esq. Volumes V and VI. Published by Murray. [London, 1848.]” It is described in Mill’s bibliography as “A first notice of the 5th and 6th volumes of Grote’s History of Greece, in the Spectator of 3d March 1849” (MacMinn, p. 70). A large portion of this review was quoted by Mill when he revised “Grote’s History of Greece [II],” Edinburgh Review, XCVIII (Oct. 1853), 425-47 (a review of Vols. IX-XI), for incorporation into his Dissertations and Discussions, 1st ed. (1859), Vol. II, pp. 510-54 (CW, Vol. XI, pp. 307-37); in the variant notes, “59” indicates D&D.

in his former volumes Mr. Grote brought down the Grecian history only to the battle of Marathon and the repulse of the first Persian invasion. He had thus barely arrived at the times for which the historian possesses the advantage of detailed information derived from contemporary authorities; and the view which he was able to exhibit of early Grecian events was necessarily so general, was collected from such scattered sources, and required so much of inference and even conjecture to piece it together, that, except in the few concluding chapters, the author’s powers as a mere narrator were not brought to any decisive test. With so little of story to tell, he had nevertheless, by a skilful manner of grouping the few known or ascertainable facts, and by the high character of the personal and political interest with which he was able to invest the early stages of Grecian freedom and civilization, given earnest of what he was likely to accomplish when he reached the period during which it is given us to know, not only the great events in the life of the Hellenic states, but the steps by which these were brought about, and many of the striking incidents which marked their course.

In the present volumes, Mr. Grote has the assistance throughout of eminent contemporary historians. In the earlier chapters, he travels under the guidance of the candid and inquisitive Herodotus, whose veracity he successfully vindicates against its ancient and modern assailants: a writer now known to be as trustworthy as he is picturesque, and who is here speaking of events contemporaneous with his own childhood—events with the actors in which, in many cases, he must have familiarly conversed. Where Herodotus fails, a still higher authority, the thoughtful, experienced, and accurate Thucydides, succeeds. A consecutive and authentic narrative therefore is here possible. In these volumes the recital of events assumes for the first time a marked Edition: current; Page: [1122] predominance over the investigation of obscure facts, the discussion of evidence, and political and philosophical reflection. It is at this point, therefore, that the amount of Mr. Grote’s skill as a narrator can for the first time be decisively judged of.

The result of the trial is highly satisfactory. The sixth volume, especially, is a specimen of narrative which it would be difficult to surpass, in its own kind, from the writings of any English historian. Its excellence does not consist (any more than that of some of the most successful specimens of historical narrative which English literature already possessed) in the painting of mere externals. But in the truth and vividness of his conception of the events and in their essentials, and in his power of imparting this to the reader, we should be inclined to place him at the head of all English historians; and in what may be termed historical imagination—in the power of taking into his mind, at every period, the whole of the situation, and of making the reader do the same—it would not be easy to find his superior among the historians of any country. Certainly no writer on Greece had ever manifested this power; and the consequence is, that the most unexpected new lights are continually thrown even upon familiar facts of Grecian history, not by long discussion and argument, but by merely confronting them with one another.

bBut theb figure which most brightly illuminates cthis divisionc of Mr. Grote’s history is Pericles—“the Thunderer”—“the Olympian Zeus,” as he was called by his libellers, the comic dramatists of Athens.2 Seldom, if ever, has Edition: current; Page: [1123] there been seen in a statesman of any age, such a combination of great qualities as were united in this illustrious man: unrivalled in eloquence; eminent in all the acquirements, talents, and accomplishments of his country; the associate of all those among his dcontemporariesd who were above their age, either in positive knowledge or in freedom from superstition; though an aristocrat by birth and fortune, a thorough democrat in principle and conduct, yet never stooping to even the pardonable arts of courting popularity, but acquiring and maintaining his ascendancy solely by his commanding qualities; never flattering his countrymen save on what was really admirable in them, and which it was for their good to be taught to cherish, but the determined enemy of their faults and follies; ever ready to peril his popularity by giving disagreeable advice, and when not appreciated, rising up against the injustice done him, with a scornful dignity almost amounting to defiance. Such was Pericles: and that such a man should have been practically first minister of Athens during the greatest part of a long political life, is not so much honourable to him as to the imperial people who were willing to be so led; who, though in fits of temporary irritation and disappointment, excusable in the circumstances, they several times withdrew their favour from him, always hastened to give it back; and over whom, while he lived, no person of talents and virtues inferior to his was able to obtain any mischievous degree of influence. It is impossible to estimate how great a share this one man had in making the Athenians what they weree, the greatest people who have yet appeared on this planete. A great man had, in the unbounded publicity of Athenian political life, extraordinary facilities for moulding his country after his own image; and seldom has any people, during a whole generation, enjoyed such a course of education, as forty years of listening to the lofty spirit and practical wisdom of Pericles must have been to the Athenian Demos.

As the next in this gallery of historical portraits, we quote the character of another but a far inferior Athenian statesman,3 whom Mr. Grote is, we think, the very first to appreciate correctly, and bring before us in the colours and lineaments of life.

Though Nikias, son of Nikeratus, had been for some time conspicuous in public life, and is said to have been more than once Strategus along with Perikles, this is the first occasion on which Thucydides introduces him to our notice.4 He was now one of the Edition: current; Page: [1124] Strategi or generals of the commonwealth, and appears to have enjoyed, on the whole, a greater and more constant personal esteem than any citizen of Athens, from the present time down to his death. In wealth and in family, he ranked among the first class of Athenians: in political character, Aristotle placed him, together with Thucydides son of Melesias and Theramenes, above all other names in Athenian history—seemingly even above Perikles.5 Such a criticism, from Aristotle, deserves respectful attention, though the facts before us completely belie so lofty an estimate. It marks, however, the position occupied by Nikias in Athenian politics, as the principal person of what may be called the oligarchical party, succeeding Kimon6 and Thucydides, and preceding Theramenes. In looking to the conditions under which this party continued to subsist, we shall see that during the interval between Thucydides (son of Melesias) and Nikias, the democratical forms had acquired such confirmed ascendency, that it would not have suited the purpose of any politician to betray evidence of positive hostility to them, prior to the Sicilian expedition and the great embarrassment in the foreign relations of Athens which arose out of that disaster. After that change, the Athenian oligarchs became emboldened and aggressive, so that we shall find Theramenes among the chief conspirators in the revolution of the Four Hundred:7 but Nikias represents the oligarchical party in its previous state of quiescence and torpidity, accommodating itself to a sovereign democracy, and existing in the form of common sentiment rather than of common purposes. And it is a remarkable illustration of the real temper of the Athenian people, that a man of this character, known as an oligarch but not feared as such, and doing his duty sincerely to the democracy, should have remained until his death the most esteemed and influential man in the city. He was a man of a sort of even mediocrity, in intellect, in education, and in oratory: forward in his military duties, and not only personally courageous in the field, but also competent as a general under ordinary circumstances: assiduous in the discharge of all political duties at home, especially in the post of Strategus or one of the ten generals of the state, to which he was frequently chosen and rechosen. Of the many valuable qualities combined in his predecessor Perikles, the recollection of whom was yet fresh in the Athenian mind, Nikias possessed two, on which, most of all, his influence rested,—though, properly speaking, that influence belongs to the sum total of his character, and not to any special attributes in it. First, he was thoroughly incorruptible as to pecuniary gains,—a quality so rare in Grecian public men of all the cities, that when a man once became notorious for possessing it, he acquired a greater degree of trust than any superiority of intellect could have bestowed upon him: next, he adopted the Periklean view as to the necessity of a conservative or stationary foreign policy for Athens, and of avoiding new acquisitions at a distance, adventurous risks, or provocation to fresh enemies. With this important point of analogy, there were at the same time material differences between them even in regard to foreign policy. Perikles was a conservative, resolute against submitting to loss or abstraction of empire, as well as refraining from aggrandizement. Nikias was in policy faint-hearted, Edition: current; Page: [1125] averse to energetic effort for any purpose whatever, and disposed not only to maintain peace, but even to purchase it by considerable sacrifices. Nevertheless, he was the leading champion of the conservative party of his day, always powerful at Athens: and as he was constantly familiar with the details and actual course of public affairs, capable of giving full effect to the cautious and prudential point of view, and enjoying unqualified credit for honest purposes—his value as a permanent counsellor was steadily recognized, even though in particular cases his counsel might not be followed.

Besides these two main points, which Nikias had in common with Perikles, he was perfect in the use of those minor and collateral modes of standing well with the people, which that great man had taken little pains to practise. While Perikles attached himself to Aspasia, whose splendid qualities did not redeem in the eyes of the public either her foreign origin or her unchastity,8 the domestic habits of Nikias appear to have been strictly conformable to the rules of Athenian decorum. Perikles was surrounded by philosophers, Nikias by prophets—whose advice was necessary both as a consolation to his temperament and as a guide to his intelligence under difficulties: one of them was constantly in his service and confidence; and his conduct appears to have been sensibly affected by the difference of character between one prophet and another, just as the government of Louis XIV and other Catholic princes has been modified by the change of confessors. To a life thus rigidly decorous and ultra-religious—both eminently acceptable to the Athenians—Nikias added the judicious employment of a large fortune with a view to popularity. Those liturgies (or expensive public duties undertaken by rich men each in his turn, throughout other cities of Greece as well as in Athens) which fell to his lot were performed with such splendour, munificence, and good taste, as to procure for him universal encomiums; and so much above his predecessors as to be long remembered and extolled. Most of these liturgies were connected with the religious service of the state; so that Nikias, by his manner of performing them, displayed his zeal for the honour of the gods at the same time that he laid up for himself a store of popularity. Moreover, the remarkable caution and timidity—not before an enemy, but in reference to his own fellow citizens—which marked his character, rendered him pre-eminently scrupulous as to giving offence or making personal enemies. While his demeanour towards the poorer citizens generally was equal and conciliating, the presents which he made were numerous, both to gain friends and to silence assailants. We are not surprised to hear that various bullies, whom the comic writers turn to scorn, made their profit out of this susceptibility, but most assuredly, Nikias as a public man, though he might occasionally be cheated out of money, was greatly assisted by the reputation which he thus acquired.

[Vol. VI, pp. 385-90.]

We have the more willingly extracted this passage, because, like many others in these volumes, it contains lessons applicable to other times and circumstances than those of Greece; Nicias being a perfect type of one large class of the favourites of public opinion, modern as well as ancient. And the view here incidentally presented of some points in the character and disposition of the Athenian Many, will afford to readers who only know Athens and Greece through the medium of writers like Mitford, some faint idea of how much they have to unlearn.a

Edition: current; Page: [1126]

In personal contrast as well as in political opposition to Nicias, stands the celebrated Cleon;9 usually taken as the representative of everything hateful that can be ascribed to the character of a successful demagogue, combined with all that is contemptible in political imbecility and presumption. We shall quote the first introduction of this noted character upon the scene, for this among other reasons, that we have seen Mr. Grote accused of being prejudiced in his favour;10 and as, from considerable familiarity with many of Mr. Grote’s authorities, we have in vain attempted to discover in his volumes a single instance of deviation from impartiality, it is but just to him to repel this accusation. It is true that, in his opinion, the devil is not so black as he is painted. Posterity has been unwilling to believe that Cleon could ever be in the right; the outline of his character, supplied by his political and personal enemy Thucydides,11 having been filled up by a literal adoption of the bitter jests of that buffoon of genius Aristophanes,12 although in other cases, such as that of Socrates, we possess certain evidence how remote those jests were from having even so much of truth as is contained in a caricature. The following is Mr. Grote’s discriminating and unprejudiced view of Cleon’s character.

He is described by Thucydides in general terms as a person of the most violent temper and character in Athens—as being dishonest in his calumnies, and virulent in his invective and accusation. . . . The general attributes set forth by Thucydides (apart from Aristophanes, who does not profess to write history) we may well accept—the powerful and violent invective of Kleon, often dishonest—together with his self-confidence and audacity in the public assembly. Men of the middling class, like Kleon and Hyperbolus,13 who persevered in addressing the public assembly and trying to take a leading part in it, against persons of greater family pretension than themselves, were pretty sure to be men of more than usual audacity. Had they not possessed this quality, they would never have surmounted the opposition made to them: we may well believe that they had it to a displeasing excess; and even if they had not, the same measure of self-assumption which in Alkibiades14 would be tolerated from his rank and station, would in them pass for insupportable impudence. Unhappily, we have no specimens to enable us to appreciate the invective of Kleon. We cannot determine whether it was more virulent than that of Demosthenes and Aeschines,15 seventy years afterwards; each of those eminent orators Edition: current; Page: [1127] imputing to the other the grossest impudence, calumny, perjury, corruption, loud voice and revolting audacity of manner, in language which Kleon can hardly have surpassed in intensity of vituperation, though he doubtless fell immeasurably short of it in classical finish. Nor can we even tell in what degree Kleon’s denunciations of the veteran Perikles were fiercer than those memorable invectives against the old age of Sir Robert Walpole with which Lord Chatham’s political career opened.16 . . . The fact of Kleon’s great power of speech, and his capacity of handling public business in a popular manner, is better attested than anything else respecting him, because it depends upon two witnesses, both hostile to him—Thucydides and Aristophanes. The assembly and the dikastery were Kleon’s theatre and holding-ground: for the Athenian people taken collectively in their place of meeting—and the Athenian people taken individually—were not always the same person, and had not the same mode of judgment: Demos sitting in the Pnyx was a different man from Demos at home.17 The lofty combination of qualities possessed by Perikles exercised ascendancy over both one and the other; but the qualities of Kleon swayed considerably the former without standing high in the esteem of the latter.

[Vol. VI, pp. 332-4.]

The following passage characterizes the real nature of Cleon’s position in the Athenian commonwealth.

To employ terms which are not fully suitable to the Athenian democracy, but which yet bring to view the difference intended to be noted better than any others, Nikias was a Minister or Ministerial man, often actually exercising and always likely to exercise official functions: Kleon was a man of the Opposition, whose province it was to supervise and censure official men for their public conduct. We must divest these words of that sense which they are understood to carry in English political life—a standing Parliamentary majority in favour of one party: Kleon would often carry in the public assembly resolutions, which his opponents Nikias and others of like rank and position—who served in the posts of Strategus, ambassador, and other important offices designated by the general vote—were obliged against their will to execute. . . . While Nikias was thus in what may be called ministerial function, Kleon was not of sufficient importance to attain the same, but was confined to the inferior function of opposition. . . . As an opposition man, fierce and violent in temper, Kleon was extremely formidable to all acting functionaries; and from his influence in the public assembly, he was doubtless the author of many important positive measures, thus going beyond the functions belonging to what is called opposition. But though the most effective speaker in the public assembly, he was not for that reason the most influential person in the democracy: his powers of speech in fact stood out the more prominently, because they were found apart from that station and those qualities which were considered, even at Athens, all but essential to make a man a leader in political life. To understand the political condition of Athens at this time, it has been necessary to take this comparison between Nikias and Kleon, and to remark, that though the latter might be a more victorious speaker, the former was the more Edition: current; Page: [1128] guiding and influential leader; the points gained by Kleon were all noisy and palpable,—sometimes, however, without doubt, of considerable moment,—but the course of affairs was much more under the direction of Nikias.

[Vol. VI, pp. 392-5.]

We cannot help adding Mr. Grote’s very instructive comment on the first and almost only oration of Cleon, the substance of which has been preserved to us.18 His remarks go deep into the inmost essence of demagogy, and may teach some persons to recognize it in forms to which it is usual to apply much more honourable names.

If we are surprised to find a man, whose whole importance resided in his tongue, denouncing so severely the licence and the undue influence of speech in the public assembly, we must recollect that Kleon had the advantage of addressing himself to the intense prevalent sentiment of the moment; that he could therefore pass off the dictates of this sentiment as plain, downright, honest sense and patriotism, while the opponents, speaking against the reigning sentiment and therefore driven to collateral argument, circumlocution, and more or less of manoeuvre, might be represented as mere clever sophists, showing their talents in making the worse appear the better reason19—if not actually bribed, at least unprincipled and without any sincere moral conviction. As this is a mode of dealing with questions both of public concern and of private morality, not less common at present than it was in the time of the Peloponnesian war—to seize upon some strong and tolerably widespread sentiment among the public, to treat the dictates of that sentiment as plain common sense and obvious right, and then to shut out all rational estimate of coming good and evil as if it were unholy or immoral, or at best mere uncandid subtlety—we may well notice a case in which Kleon employs it to support a proposition now justly regarded as barbarous.

[Vol. VI, pp. 340-1.]

There are so many topics in Mr. Grote’s volumes which demand notice, that it is impossible to do them anything like justice in the space of a single paper: we shall return to some of them in another article.

This fourth newspaper review by Mill of Grote’s History (see Nos. 304, 368, and 380) is the second of two reviews of Volumes V and VI. It appeared in the “Books” section, headed “Grote’s Greece—Volumes V and VI,” and is described in Mill’s bibliography as “A second notice of the same [i.e., Vols. V and VI of Grote], in the Spectator of 10th March 1849” (MacMinn, p. 70). Two quotations from Grote in this review are also quoted by Mill in his Edinburgh Review notice of 1853, represented by “53” in the variant Edition: current; Page: [1129] notes, while one passage was incorporated into the 1859 revision of that notice for D&D, represented by “59” in the variant notes; see No. 380 for the bibliographical details.

one of the most interesting features in the sixth volume of Mr. Grote’s History is the large use which he has made of the speeches in Thucydides. This rich mine of materials had been little if at all worked by any former writer. Mr. Grote considers the substance of these speeches to be authentic, though the form and phraseology are unmistakeably those of the Attic historian. The following is, as nearly as we can translate it, the declaration of Thucydides himself as to their composition. “To remember accurately the very things which were said, was difficult both to myself (as to what I heard delivered) and to my various informants: but I have ascribed to each speaker what seemed to me most appropriate to the occasion, keeping as close as I could to the general opinion of what was said in reality.”1 From this we should conclude, that an outline supplied by memory or testimony was filled up from invention. And this opinion is confirmed by the internal evidence. But in whatever proportions the matter of these speeches must be shared between the orators and the historian, no documents which have descended from the ancients, except perhaps the Politics of Aristotle, contain so much of what was thought by the most instructed and able Greeks concerning themselves and their condition. One of the most important of these discourses is the famous Funeral Oration of Pericles; which is full of valuable remarks on the Athenian national character and institutions. Our space does not allow us to quote from the speech at any length, but we must make room for Mr. Grote’s comments on one sentence of it. The text is this—a“bOurb social march is free, not merely in regard to public affairs, but also in regard to tolerance of each other’s diversity of cdailyc pursuits. For we are not angry with our neighbour for what he dmay dod to please himself, nor do we eevere put on those sour looks, whichf, though they do no positive damage, are not the less sure to offendf.”a2 On this important testimony to the liberality and tolerance of Athenian social life, Mr. Grote observes as follows—

This portion of the speech of Perikles deserves peculiar attention, because it serves to correct an assertion, often far too indiscriminately made, respecting antiquity as contrasted with modern societies—an assertion that the ancient societies sacrificed the individual to the state, and that only in modern times has individual agency been left free Edition: current; Page: [1130] to the proper extent. This is preëminently true of Sparta: it is also true in a great degree of the ideal societies depicted by Plato and Aristotle; but it is pointedly untrue of the Athenian democracy, nor can we with any confidence predicate it of the major part of the Grecian cities. . . . There is no doubt that he [Perikles] has present to his mind a comparison with the extreme narrowness and rigour of Sparta, and that therefore his assertions of the extent of positive liberty at Athens must be understood as partially qualified by such contrast. But even making allowance for this, ghtheh stress which he lays upon the liberty of thought and action at Athens, not merely from excessive restraint of law but also from practical intolerance between man and man, and tyranny of the majority3 over individual dissenters in taste and ipursuiti, deserves serious notice, and brings out one of those points in the national character upon which the intellectual development of the time mainly depended. The national temper was indulgent in a high degree to all the varieties of positive impulses: the peculiar promptings in every individual bosom were allowed to manifest themselves and bear fruit, without being suppressed by external opinion or trained into forced conformity with some assumed standard: antipathies against any of them formed no part of the habitual morality of the citizen. While much of the generating causes of human hatred was thus rendered inoperative, and while society was rendered more comfortable, more instructive and more stimulating—all its germs of productive fruitful genius, so rare everywhere, found in such an atmosphere the maximum of encouragement. Within the limits of the law, assuredly as faithfully observed at Athens as anywhere in Greece, individual impulse, taste, and even eccentricity, were accepted with indulgence, instead of being a mark as elsewhere for the intolerance of neighbours or of the public. This remarkable feature in Athenian life will help us in a future chapter to explain the striking career of Sokrates [Chap. lxviii; Vol. VIII, pp. 545-676]; and it jfurtherj presents to us, under another face, a great part of that which the censors of Athens denounced under the name of “democratical licence.” The liberty and diversity of individual life in that city were offensive to Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle4—attached either to the monotonous drill of Sparta, or to some other ideal standard, which, though much better than the Spartan in itself, they were disposed to impress upon society with a heavy-handed uniformity. That liberty of individual action, not merely from the over-restraints of law, but from the tyranny of jealous opinion, such as Perikles depicts in Athens, belongs more naturally to a democracy, where there is no select One or Few to receive worship and set the fashion, than to any other form of government. But it is very rare even in democracies: nor can we dissemble the fact that none of the governments of modern times, democratical, aristocratical or monarchical, presents anything like the picture of generous tolerance towards social dissent, and spontaneity of individual taste, which we read in the speech of the Athenian statesman. In Edition: current; Page: [1131] all of them, the intolerance of the national opinion cuts down individual character to one out of a few set types, to which every person, or every family, is constrained to adjust itself, and beyond which all exceptions meet either with hatred or with derision. To impose upon men such restraints either of law or of opinion as are requisite for the security and comfort of society, but to encourage rather than repress the free play of individual impulse subject to those limits—is an ideal, which if it was ever approached at Athens, has certainly never been attained, and has indeed comparatively been little studied or cared for, in any modern society.g

The portion of Mr. Grote’s History which we are now reviewing comprises the most brilliant period of the Athenian republic; including the last stage in the growth of her democratic constitution, and the rise, progress, and fullest development of her maritime empire. On both these subjects there were deep-rooted prejudices to be removed; prejudices long fostered by the modern enemies of popular government. Mr. Grote, without disguising the faults of the Athenian people or institutions, shows the vast superiority of the latter over all other political institutions known to the age, or which probably would have been compatible with its circumstances. The following instructive appreciation of the multitudinous dikasteries, or popular courts of justice, throws also what to most readers will be a new light on the state of society and manners in Athens and other cities of Greece.

In appreciating the practical working of these numerous dikasteries at Athens, in comparison with such justice as might have been expected from individual magistrates, we have to consider, first, that personal and pecuniary corruption seems to have been a common vice among the leading men of Athens and Sparta, when acting individually or in boards of a few members, and not uncommon even with the kings of Sparta; next, that in the Grecian cities generally, as we know even from the oligarchical Xenophon, (he particularly excepts Sparta,) the rich and great men were not only insubordinate to the magistrates, but made a parade of showing that they cared nothing about them. We know also from the same unsuspected source, that while the poorer Athenian citizens who Edition: current; Page: [1132] served on shipboard were distinguished for the strictest discipline, the hoplites or middling burghers who formed the infantry were less obedient, and the rich citizens who served on horseback the most disobedient of all.5 To make rich and powerful criminals effectively amenable to justice has indeed been found so difficult everywhere, until a recent period of history, that we should be surprised if it were otherwise in Greece. When we follow the reckless demeanour of rich men like Kritias, Alkibiades, and Meidias,6 even under the full-grown democracy of Athens, we may be very sure that their predecessors under the Kleisthenean constitution would have been often too formidable to be punished or kept down by an individual archon of ordinary firmness, even assuming him to be upright and well-intentioned. Now the dikasteries established by Perikles were inaccessible both to corruption and intimidation: their number, their secret suffrage, and the impossibility of knowing beforehand what individuals would sit in any particular cause, prevented both the one and the other. And besides that the magnitude of their number, extravagant according to our ideas of judicial business, was essential to this tutelary effect, it served further to render the trial solemn and the verdict imposing on the minds of parties and spectators; as we may see by the fact, that in important causes the dikastery was doubled or tripled. Nor was it possible by any other means than numbers to give dignity to an assembly of citizens, of whom many were poor, some old, and all were despised individually by rich accused persons who were brought before them—as Aristophanes and Xenophon7 give us plainly to understand. If we except the strict and peculiar educational discipline of Sparta, these numerous dikasteries afforded the only organ which Grecian politics could devise, for getting redress against powerful criminals, public as well as private, and for obtaining a sincere and uncorrupt verdict.

Taking the general working of the dikasteries, we shall find that they are nothing but jury-trial applied on a scale broad, systematic, unaided, and uncontrolled, beyond all other historical experience; and that they therefore exhibit in exaggerated proportions both the excellences and the defects characteristic of the jury system, as compared with decision by trained and professional judges. . . . Both the direct benefits ascribed to jury-trial in insuring pure and even-handed justice, and still more its indirect benefits in improving and educating the citizens generally, might have been set forth yet more emphatically in a laudatory harangue of Perikles about the Athenian dikasteries. If it be true that an Englishman or an American counts more certainly on an impartial and uncorrupt verdict from a jury of his country than from a permanent professional judge, much more would this be the feeling of an ordinary Athenian, when he compared the dikasteries with the archon. . . . As to the effect of jury-trial in diffusing respect to the laws and constitution—in giving to every citizen a personal interest in enforcing the former and maintaining the latter—in imparting a sentiment of dignity to small and poor men through the discharge of a function exalted as well as useful—in calling forth the patriotic sympathies, and exercising the mental capacities of every individual—all these effects were produced in a still higher degree by the dikasteries at Athens; from their greater frequency, numbers, and spontaneity of mental action, without any professional Edition: current; Page: [1133] judge upon whom they could throw the responsibility of deciding for them. On the other hand, the imperfections inherent in jury-trial were likewise disclosed in an exaggerated form under the Athenian system. Both juror and dikast represent the average man of the time and of the neighbourhood, exempt indeed from pecuniary corruption or personal fear,—deciding according to what he thinks justice, or to some genuine feeling of equity, mercy, religion, or patriotism, which in reference to the case before him he thinks as good as justice—but not exempt from sympathies, antipathies, and prejudices, all of which act the more powerfully because there is often no consciousness of their presence, and because they even appear essential to his idea of plain and straightforward good sense.

[Vol. V, pp. 512-25.]

Of the maritime empire of Athens Mr. Grote furnishes an unprejudiced account, and as much of a justification as the case admits of. [Ibid., pp. 390-472; Chap. xlv.] It was originally an equal alliance, growing out of the operations against Xerxes, and intended for the naval defence of Greece, against Persian domination. Of this confederacy (which consisted of the islands, and the Greek cities of the Asiatic and Thracian coasts, recently freed from the dominion of the Persian satraps) Athens was the acknowledged head, but was only primus inter pares, performing the functions of an executive; the supreme regulation of the alliance belonging to a synod of the confederates periodically meeting at Delos. Each of the states contributed either in money or in ships of war towards the common objects of the alliance; the contingent of each having been fixed by Aristides in a manner so equitable as to command universal applause. The steps by which, without any preconceived plan of usurpation on the part of Athens, her originally equal confederates sunk into the condition of dependent or subject-allies, are traced with great clearness by Mr. Grote. When this change had been consummated, each state paid a compulsory annual tribute, in consideration of which Athens undertook the military and naval defence of the tributaries against all enemies. They were not permitted to have any fortifications or ships of war of their own, and their differences with other states they were required to refer to the judicial tribunals of Athens. With their internal institutions or administration Athens did not meddle; not even to establish democracy; for though her own example tended to make democratic principles predominate within the sphere of her influence, many of the subject-allies of Athens were, and continued to be, under oligarchical government. In this the Athenian dominion differed greatly from the subsequent supremacy of Sparta, who not only subverted the democracies and established oligarchies everywhere, but appointed Spartan governors under the name of harmosts, whose yoke was always oppressive and often intolerable. The subjects of Athens had few if any practical grievances, and scarcely pretended to have them: the tribute was a cheap price for complete military and naval protection. Their complaint was, that they were degraded by being deprived of the common privilege of autonomy or city-independence, so indissolubly connected in the Greek mind with all ideas of freedom and collective dignity.

Edition: current; Page: [1134]

This complaint, whether judged by an abstract standard or by the ideas and sentiments of the time, was well grounded. Yet let it be remarked, that this coveted autonomy was a privilege which most of the states composing the Athenian league were entirely incapable of maintaining by their own strength. Athens found them under the dominion of Persia; when separated from Athens they fell under the far harder yoke of Sparta. Let it be considered also, that it was precisely this narrow spirit of independence, this intolerance on the part of each petty town of permanent connexion with any other, which ultimately caused the ruin of Grecian freedom by the absorption of all Greece into the Macedonian monarchy. Doubtless, the true remedy for the inherent weakness of so divided a state, would have been found in a free and equal confederation. But a federal government was of all things the most alien to Grecian habits. Even in the most pressing danger, when half Greece was overrun and occupied by the troops of Xerxes, the evidence, never before so fully brought out as by Mr. Grote, showed the radical incapacity of these little communities for acting in free voluntary concert. If there was any means by which Grecian independence and liberty could have been made a permanent thing, it would have been by the prolongation for some generations more of the organization of the larger half of Greece under the supremacy of Athens; a supremacy imposed, indeed, and upheld by force—but the mildest, the most civilizing, and, in its permanent influence on the destinies of human kind, the most brilliant and valuable, of all usurped powers known to history.

That events took another course was the fault of no one so much as of the Athenians themselves, who, intoxicated by success, and having no longer a Pericles to keep them in the path of practical wisdom, were tempted to aggressive enterprises like that on Sicily, both unjust and beyond their strength. The next volume of Mr. Grote will contain the recital of this sad disaster, one of the turning-points in universal history, and one of those portions of it which are richest in epic and dramatic interest.

It is impossible to predict what number of further volumes will be necessary for the completion of Mr. Grote’s design; but no one who reads his work can wish that it were more abridged. It is not a mere summary of events known and admitted, and requiring only to be agreeably laid before the reader. It is an exploration of the sources of Grecian history; an investigation of facts previously unknown or misrepresented; a labour performed once for all; and the book is a storehouse from which future writers may draw their materials, without repeating the same toilsome and operose researches. To be this, and to be also an attractive specimen of narrative, and, more valuable than all, a profound estimate by a philosophical politician of one of the most important periods in the political history of mankind, is a threefold achievement which it has been given to few works, whether called histories or by any other denomination, to realize.

In a speech on 19 Feb., 1849 (PD, 3rd ser., Vol. 102, cols. 906-17), Lord John Russell introduced “A Bill to Alter the Oaths to Be Taken by Members of the Two Houses of Parliament Not Professing the Roman Catholic Religion,” 12 Victoria (23 Feb., 1849), PP, 1849, IV, 419-24. The bill, similar to an unsuccessful one of the year before, was designed to admit Jews to Parliament. It was debated in the Commons on 19 and 23 Feb., 7 May, and 11 June, when it passed second reading, and in the Lords on 26 June, but was not enacted. On 21 Feb., 1849, Mill had written Harriet Taylor, in France for her health, pointing out that Russell, “although he is actually abolishing the old oaths & framing new, still has the meanness to reinsert the words ‘on the true faith of a Christian’ for all persons except Jews, & justifies it by saying that the Constitution ought not avowedly to admit unbelievers into Parliament.” She replied in a letter now lost, and on 17 Mar. he said: “As you suggested I wrote an article on Russell’s piece of meanness in the Jew Bill and have sent it to [Eyre Evans] Crowe [editor of the Daily News] from whom I have not yet any answer—there has been no time hitherto fit for its publication—the time will come when the subject is to come on again in Parlt. But I fear the article, even as ‘from a correspondent’ will be too strong meat for the Daily News, as it declares without mincing the matter, that infidels are perfectly proper persons to be in parliament.” (In fact it appeared as first leader, not as “from a correspondent.”) He continues: “I like the article myself. I have carefully avoided anything disrespectful to Russell personally, or any of the marks, known to me, by which my writing can be recognized.” Four days later he reported again: “Crowe’s answer was ‘I shall be but too happy to print the article. The Jews bill is put off till after Easter, but if you will allow me I will insert it immediately.’ ” Mill adds, in what is now a mysterious as well as unpleasant allusion, “There is nothing like kicking people of the D[aily] N[ews] sort it appears. I answered telling him if he thought it would be of as much use now as about the time when the bill comes on by all means to print it now. It has not yet made its appearance.” (LL, CW, Vol. XIV, pp. 13, 18, and 20.) This first leader, headed “London, Monday, Mar. 26,” is described in Mill’s bibliography as “A leading article on the attempt to exclude unbelievers from parliament, in the Daily News of 26th March 1849”

(MacMinn, p. 71).

the bill of lord john russell for the admission of Jews into parliament, affords by the mode it adopts of effecting that purpose, an example of the rooted aversion of our practical politicians to anything like a principle. If there is a principle which is supposed to be sacred in the eyes of a Russell, it is religious freedom. If there is a maxim in politics which whigs are understood to cherish, it is that no one should be subjected to civil disabilities on the ground of any opinions which he may entertain in matters of religion. Yet a whig and a Russell,1 finding the Jews excluded from parliament by the imposition of certain Edition: current; Page: [1136] words interpreted as expressing a belief in Christianity proposes to dispense with the words, but to dispense with them for Jews only. For all who do not declare themselves to be Jews, he not only leaves the words as he found them, but actually re-enacts them. He is proposing to abolish the old oaths and to establish new, and in the oaths which he establishes he introduces de novo these very words, granting to Jews a special exemption from their use.2 He opens the door of parliament just wide enough to allow one particular class of dissenters from Christianity to slip in, and closes it, as far as depends upon him, against all others.

Why is this? If we take his own account of the matter, it is because he does not think it right to announce that sceptics and infidels ought to be admitted into parliament; therefore he declares ineligible, not only sceptics and infidels, but Hindoos, Buddhists, and Mahomedans, none of whom are commonly counted among infidels, and who compose nearly three-fourths of the population of the British dominions. But we will discuss the question as if it concerned only those whom Lord John would have it believed that he actually cares about rendering ineligible.

First, what sort of sceptics and infidels does he really suppose that his oaths will keep out of parliament? Those who take his side of the question usually profess the charitable belief that infidels are persons whom oaths will not bind. It is certain at least that an infidel who can be excluded by such words as those used, “on the true faith of a Christian,” words which rather insinuate than profess a belief in Christianity—equivocating, jesuitical words, which seem chosen on purpose to afford a loophole to the conscience—must be a person more than ordinarily under the influence of honour and moral obligation, and, therefore, more than ordinarily fit to be a member of any assembly where honest men are required; and more than usually undeserving to have any discreditable mark put upon him.

But (it will be said by Lord John Russell, or by somebody for him) the measure will not really keep anybody out. It is not meant to do so. It is only meant as a declaration that certain persons ought to be kept out. It is an admission under protest. It is a national testimony that nobody who disbelieves in Christianity can be a fit person to sit in parliament.

If it be so, it is a testimony to something which every one who has any knowledge of life knows to be not true. We say nothing about Jews, whom this very measure is intended to let in. Were Hume and Gibbon improper persons to sit in parliament?3 Conservatives, at least, will hardly be of that opinion; for they were both tories; and the sons and daughters of tories to this day get their first Edition: current; Page: [1137] notions of English politics from a History written by one of them,4 and very false notions they are. Liberals, again, would deem them valuable members of parliament for different reasons. It is not possible to imagine an assembly where great questions are to be discussed and important public business transacted, in which no good use could be made of such powers of mind as these men possessed.

It is unnecessary, however, to go back to a past age. The present times are sufficient. We should like to put a question to Lord John Russell. Let him mentally reckon up (if they are not too numerous to be reckoned), among persons now in parliament or in office, or who have been so since he entered into public life, all those whom he either positively knows, or has good ground for believing, to be disbelievers in revelation—many of them in more than revelation. We put it to him as a man of the world. Many good Christians, in their innocence and inexperience, would be astonished and shocked at the supposition we are making, but Lord John must know enough of his time, and of the men of his time, to be more or less a competent judge. We wish that after revolving in his mind the various members of the present or any former House of Commons, whom he has known or believed to be what are usually termed infidels, he would ask himself whether, among all the members composing it, these, taken collectively, were the persons whom, in his sincere opinion, the House of Commons could have best spared? We do not mean that many, or perhaps any, of these persons are Humes and Gibbons, or have ever made any public attack on religion, or are at all likely to avow unbelief; if they did, they would emperil, among many other things, all their chances of re-election. The truth is, that there is generally nothing in their conduct by which they could, as a class, be distinguished from the great majority of believers. This ought not to be: a great difference in the conscientious convictions of human beings ought to make a visible difference of some kind or other in their conduct, but in point of fact it seldom does. Certain it is that neither Lord John Russell, nor any other man of the world, would trust the unbelievers less in any relation of life, or would consider them less eligible for the great majority of public functions, than the average of Christians. On this point we should not fear to take the opinion of any man who has been minister of England in the last thirty years, could we be sure that he would speak his real sentiments.

If Lord John Russell really believed that the words he proposes would exclude from parliament all the sincere unbelievers who are now or may hereafter become members of it, we are convinced that he never would have proposed them. Why, then, has he done so? Because he believes that the exclusion will not exclude, but will be a mere brutum fulmen; and, with the usual indifference of Edition: current; Page: [1138] our statesmen to a bad principle, when they do not expect that it will be followed by specific bad consequences, he thinks he may as well make this sacrifice at the shrine of bigotry, if it will gain him an additional vote for letting in Mr. Rothschild.5 He has yet to learn that a legislature which either introduces or confirms a bad principle does more harm than is compensated by twenty good practical measures involving no principle: for it is by the principles contained in them that institutions educate the national mind, thus producing more effect for good or evil than “laws or kings” by their direct influence can either “cause or cure.”6 As long as the laws keep up nominal persecution on account of opinion, whether practically operative or not, the seal of bigotry will be upon us; and no letting in of one set of excluded persons after another by the backdoor of the constitution will avail much to make us otherwise.

383.: CORPORAL PUNISHMENT DAILY NEWS, 14 JULY, 1849, P. 4

This article responds to the report “Police. Southwark,” The Times, 6 July, 1849, p. 7 (from which the quotations are taken), concerning the case of Alexander Smith, heard on 5 July before Isaac Onslow Secker (1799-1861), barrister, magistrate at Greenwich and Woolwich. This unheaded fourth leader, the seventh jointly authored by Harriet Taylor and Mill on injustice and cruelty (for background, see No. 303), is described in Mill’s bibliography as “A leading article on corporal punishment, in the Daily News of 14th July 1849. A joint production, very little of which was mine.”

(MacMinn, p. 71.)

while, in the popular discussions on criminal law, the idea of punishment is more and more sunk in that of reformatory discipline; while what were once deemed the main ends of penal infliction—retribution to the culprit, and the deterring of future offenders—are well-nigh sinking out of view, and prisons, in the opinion of many well-meaning persons, are regarded as little more than a sort of hospitals for the morally sick, where they are to be cured of their soul’s diseases by mild alternatives; while this twist of the moral sentiment in the direction of shortsighted tenderness is increasingly manifest; in the actual administration of our criminal law, the tide is setting in the contrary direction, towards a revival of the brutal and barbarous practices of the middle ages and of the East. Amidst our talk of reformatory treatment we are returning to the most demoralising, the most brutalising, because the most degrading of punishments, Edition: current; Page: [1139] the bastinado. There have been other instances lately of this, but none hitherto that comes up to what we extract from a Southwark police report of Friday last:

Alexander Smith, described as a commission agent, was brought before Mr. Secker, charged with illegally pawning a gold watch, value 20 guineas, the property of James Mills, the master of a West India trader.

It appeared that the complainant formed a casual acquaintance with the prisoner, who prevailed upon him to accompany him to Astley’s to witness the horsemanship.1 Previously, however, to their entering the theatre, the prisoner suggested the propriety of the complainant leaving a valuable gold watch in the hands of the landlord of a public-house adjacent, where they had partaken of refreshment, adding, that the article would be much safer there than at the theatre. The complainant at once assented to this suggestion, and the watch was accordingly left with the landlord of the house. Before the performance was over, the prisoner made some frivolous excuse, and quitting the theatre proceeded to the public-house and got possession of the complainant’s watch, which it was subsequently ascertained he had pledged at a pawnbroker’s shop for 10l. Upon the discovery of the theft he promised to redeem the article, or pay the full value, neither of which he had since done; and the complainant, finding that there was no chance of obtaining restitution, gave the prisoner into custody on the charge of illegally pawning the watch.

The prisoner, a well-dressed middle-aged man, said that he had given the complainant his note of hand to pay at the rate of 10s. a week until the debt was paid.

Mr. Secker said that the mild term of “debt” could not be applied to such a fraudulent transaction. The prisoner had acted a most dishonest part in taking advantage of the absence of complainant to obtain possession of his watch.

The complainant admitted having taken a written guarantee from the prisoner, but said he did it for the purpose of strengthening the case against him.

The prisoner asserted that the watch was given him to pawn, which was flatly contradicted by the owner.

Mr. Secker denounced, in strong terms, the conduct of the prisoner, and sentenced him to pay a penalty of 5l. for illegally pawning the watch, besides 12l., the lowest value put upon the watch; and, in default of payment, to be committed for three months; and that, in addition to the above, if the prisoner omitted to pay the above sums within three days of the expiration of his imprisonment, he should be once publicly whipped within the precincts of the gaol.

The prisoner, who heard the latter part of the sentence with astonishment depicted on his countenance, was then removed from the bar.

Well might he be astonished; and his astonishment will be participated, we believe, by the majority of readers. We know that the office of police magistrate is one to which a man is appointed usually because he is fit for nothing else; because, being too stupid to fill any other appointment, he is thought good enough to be the dispenser of law, justice, and moral instruction to those who most need all these. But even a Mr. Secker must, we suppose, have some law to bear him out in such a decision as this. What law? and how has such a law been smuggled through parliament? a law permitting the infliction of the bastinado for Edition: current; Page: [1140] a pecuniary fraud—by which, if impartially enforced, half the bankrupts in England would be publicly flogged, and a London magistrate would become a Turkish Cadi. But there is another peculiarity in the case which must be wholly Mr. Secker’s. The flogging, after all, is not to be inflicted for the offence. The punishment of that is a fine of 5l., added to another of 12l., or, “in default of payment,” to be committed for three months. But, after suffering the imprisonment, he is still “to pay the above sums within three days,” and to be flogged if he “omits” to pay them. He is to be flogged therefore, not for the fraud, but for being unable to pay 17l. This is a person to be entrusted with the power of flogging!

But the pranks of police magistrates are not the worst of the political and social vices which this case illustrates. It exemplifies the total absence of true moral feeling which pervades our criminal legislation and all the functionaries who administer it, from the judges of the Court of Queen’s Bench down to this Mr. Secker. If a brutal punishment can ever be appropriate, it is in the case of a brutal offence. Every day’s police reports contain cases of ruffianly assaults, committed in the mere wantonness of brutality, against creatures whose sole offence is to be inferior in physical strength, oftenest of all against helpless children, or the slaves called wives, whose death, by a long continuance of personal torture, has of late been so frequently brought to light, and without a single exception so leniently passed over, that this has apparently become one of the safe ways of getting rid of those incumbrances. To such ruffians as these the degradation of corporal punishment would be very suitable. It does not make them brutes, it only stamps them as what they are. A coward who beats another because he is the stronger, would perhaps even be benefited by finding himself for once in the hands of a stronger than himself, and tasting of the degradation he has inflicted. But who ever hears of corporal punishment for assault? One or two months’ imprisonment is all we hear of in the most atrocious cases; while, if property is in question—if pounds, shillings, and pence have been tampered with, years of imprisonment, with hard labour (not to mention transportation) are almost the smallest penalty. And this is not peculiarly the fault of the police magistrates, whose power of inflicting punishment for assault is very limited. It is the crime more especially of legislators and of the superior courts. They, it seems, have yet to learn that there is a thing infinitely more important than property—the freedom and sacredness of human personality; that there is an immeasurable distance in point of moral enormity between any the gravest offence which concerns property only, and an act of insulting and degrading violence perpetrated against a human being. Mankind could go on very well, have gone on in time past (as well as they have ever yet gone on), with property very insecure. But subject to blows, or the fear of blows, they can be no other than soulless, terror-stricken slaves, without virtue, without courage, without peace, with nothing they dare call their own. Yet because persons in the upper Edition: current; Page: [1141] and middle ranks are not subject to personal outrage, and are subject to have their watches stolen, the punishment of blows is revived, not for those who are guilty of blows, but for middle-aged men who pawn watches. Is this to be endured?

A few weeks ago, the punishment of flogging, in the case of the young man who shot at the Queen, was omitted, it is said, at the special desire of the Queen herself.2 The forbearance was uncomplimentary to the legislatorial wisdom which had recently enacted that penalty as peculiarly fit for that particular offence: but no one can be surprised by an example of good sense, good taste, and good feeling, given by the Queen. The crime of Hamilton was not of a degraded or brutal kind, though of a wicked and grave kind, deserving, in truth, and requiring, a severer punishment than it received. To refuse so disgusting a tribute as the revival of a brutalising degradation as a punishment for offences against herself, was a worthy lesson to legislators and judges; and it was magnanimity, not like but most unlike a sovereign, to punish so serious an offence only as if it had been directed against the meanest subject. Would that her Majesty would take in hand this vast and vital question of the extinction of personal violence by the best and surest means—the illegalising of corporal punishment, domestic as well as judicial, at any age. We conscientiously believe that more large and lasting good, both present and future, to the moral and social character of the whole people, would be achieved by such an act of legislation, than fifty years of legislative efforts without it would be required to supply.

In 1848, Hungary had revolted against the Austrian Empire, but by May of 1849 Russia had rigorously suppressed the rebellion in the name of the Holy Alliance of 1815 between herself, Austria, and Prussia. During the summer of 1849 public opinion in England rallied against Austria. A crisis arose over the demand by Russia and Austria that Turkey extradite the leaders of the revolution, Kossuth, Bem, and others. The Sultan, Abd-ul-Mejid (1823-61), refused to do so. Mill’s letter, headed as title with subhead, “To the Editor of the Daily News,” is described in his bibliography as “A letter signed J.S.M. Edition: current; Page: [1142] in the Daily News of 3d October 1849 on the case of the Hungarian refugees in Turkey” (MacMinn, p. 71). (Mill’s evident wish to be identified by his initials was perhaps frustrated by the misprinting of “I.” for “J.”; however, the correct initials appeared in the second letter on the subject, No. 385.)

sir,—

Many thousands in England, and millions, I will venture to say, in Europe, are waiting anxiously to see whether the noble conduct of the Sultan in refusing to deliver up the defenders of Hungarian liberty to the crowned employers of the scourgers of women, the butchers of Warsaw and Pesth, is to have the support of England or not.

We are told that our enormous naval force is and must be kept up on account of the state of the Continent. If we ever could be called upon to use that force by any occurrence on the Continent, it is now.

Wait not for the support of France. France, in a moment of insanity, has given herself up for four years to the discretion of the relative (by marriage), and servile tool of the Emperor of Russia, by whose help he hopes to be made Emperor of France.1 But France must follow, if England at once takes the lead.

The Czar ought instantly to be told that the first movement of troops across the frontiers of Turkey in this quarrel will be a signal for the blockading of all his ports in the Baltic and the Black Sea, to be followed, if needful, by the destruction of his naval arsenals.

Any trifle is thought sufficient cause for summoning a public meeting. Shall there be no meeting to save England from the infamy of standing by while men and women, who ought to be carried in triumph through every city in Europe, are torn by main force from the protection of the Mussulman prince, who dares defy a power ten times stronger and ten times more barbarous than his own, rather than deliver up fugitive victims to the slaughterer?

A month ago it would have seemed quite needless that a public demonstration should warn a liberal ministry of such a duty. But since we have a Colonial Secretary and a Prime Minister either so base, or so infantinely weak and credulous, as to be capable, the one of sanctioning, the other of defending, the conduct of More O’Ferrall,2 it is quite time that the public should rouse itself, Edition: current; Page: [1143] and give strength to the only member of the government who stands between us and the Aberdeen policy, between us and a mean complicity with the new “Holy” Alliance.3

This paragraph follows a letter headed “What Is England to Do?” and signed “A Cambridge Man,” which calls on the public to trust the Foreign Minister, Palmerston, in his very cautious and moderate support for the Hungarian refugees (for the context, see No. 384). Mill’s paragraph is introduced by this editorial comment: “Since this letter was in type, another, with the signature of J.S.M., has been forwarded to us, taking a different view of the duty of the public in reference to this question. The writer professes no faith in the conduct or courage of the Ministers (with one exception), and speaks indignantly of the affair at Malta and its recent extenuation.1 But he adds with much truth:”. The item, which appears in the “Political Examiner,” is described in Mill’s bibliography as “A letter on the same subject and with the same signature [as No. 384] but of which a part only was printed, in the Examiner of 7th [sic] October 1849”

(MacMinn, p. 72).

but let the public also take its share of blame. If the public cannot trust the Ministers, neither can the Ministers trust the public for support in any energetic and generous course of action in foreign affairs. The Ministers think that the people care for nothing but reducing the taxes and preventing any interruption of trade. Or that if they are capable of being moved by any idea larger than this, it is by the idea of a silly, goody kind of peace. If, six months ago, we had possessed a government with spirit enough to announce as the determination of England, that neither at Rome, nor in Hungary, nor in any other place in Europe, should any foreign intervention be suffered unless England was a party to it—a declaration which, if believed, would have effectually prevented any intervention and any war—could they have expected to be supportd by the nation in assuming this attitude? Would not a junction of all the office-seeking parties Edition: current; Page: [1144] against them have been suffered by the nation to expel them from power? The official people believe that, though England will bear to be overtaxed on all sorts of idle and dishonest pretexts, no cause is so sacred in her eyes that she would be willing, rather than abandon it, to add a million to the taxes. Let England come forward and declare that this is not true. Let public meetings proclaim that England will go to war with Russia rather than suffer Turkey to be bullied into giving up vanquished fugitives to the executioner; and the fugitives will be saved, and the character of England vindicated, without a chance of war.

386.: M. CABET DAILY NEWS, 30 OCT., 1849, P. 3

In the course of a leading article, 29 Oct., p. 4, on the Catholic Church in French politics, the Daily News incidentally brought in accusations against Etienne Cabet as a swindler; Mill quotes from this article. Cabet, who had associated with Owen when in exile in England 1834-39, announced in 1847 the founding of a communal settlement, Icaria, in America. A group of settlers left in January 1848 and tried to establish themselves in a particularly unsuitable part of Texas, where they were joined by Cabet early in 1849. He took his followers to Nauvoo, the abandoned Mormon settlement in Illinois, a few months later, but the enterprise was a failure. By September he had been charged with defrauding his followers (see The Times, 20 Oct., p. 5). Condemned in his absence to two years in prison, on his return to France in 1851 he was acquitted. The letter is headed as title, with subhead, “To the Editor of the Daily News.” It is identified in Mill’s bibliography as “A letter signed D in the Daily News of 30th October 1849 on M. Cabet”

(MacMinn, p. 72).

sir,—

I have seen with surprise, in your paper of to-day, a leading article which, in the course of a discussion on a totally different subject, and for the mere purpose of illustration, aims a mortal stab at the honour and character of a man now suffering under the persecution of the authorities in his native country—M. Cabet. I have sufficient confidence in your sense of justice to feel convinced that you have only joined in the hue and cry against this ill-treated man from inadvertence, and ignorance of the real facts of the case. No one is surprised that the tory press (whether calling itself liberal or the contrary) and their foreign correspondents, who must be better informed if the editors are not, should think any amount of suppressio veri quite fair, or at least not likely to be found out, when directed against a known socialist. But as you are not to be classed with writers of this description, you will be glad to be informed or reminded of that important part of the truth which has escaped your notice. The judgment against M. Cabet on the charge of escroquerie was pronounced by default, and therefore without a hearing, M. Cabet being at the time necessarily absent, living in the midst of the very people whom he is accused of having defrauded. The judgment, which in the absence of the accused the court had perhaps no Edition: current; Page: [1145] alternative but to pass upon him, is of so little practical effect, that notwithstanding the sentence he has the power of returning at any time and standing his trial. But though the case, as it affects M. Cabet, on account of his absence was not tried at all, his friend and co-defendant, M. Krolikowski,1 who was present, was tried on the same charge, and acquitted, after having made in behalf of M. Cabet the following protest contained in the Démocratie Pacifique of 22nd September last:

Citizen Cabet, whose presence is indispensable in the Icarian colony of Nauvoo (United States), cannot possibly appear unless the court consents to postpone the trial to next April; but I will defend him in every manner. Our cause is common; and there has been so much calumny against the Icarians, and against citizen Cabet in particular, accusing him sometimes of proposing a chimerical undertaking, and sometimes of abandoning his associates, after having invited them to emigrate, that I think it necessary for our defence to publish the unanimous protest of the Icarians established at Nauvoo, which shall be produced before the judges.2

The following is the document alluded to; it bears 189 signatures of emigrants, male and female:

One of those great iniquities which would suffice to dishonour an age is, perhaps, about to be accomplished in France. Ignoble calumnies attempt to disgrace the name of Cabet, of the Christian philosopher who has consecrated the whole of a long life to the moral education of mankind; the regenerator, the intrepid apostle, who, abandoning country, family, and fortune, prepares, in remote climates, amidst dangers and privations, the happiness of the human race. We, the witnesses and objects of his affection and of his devotedness—we, already enjoying the fruits of his sacrifices and of our own perseverance, protest against accusations as absurd as infamous, the triumph of which would be a new stain on our unfortunate country.3

These are the feelings entertained towards this “convicted swindler” by his victims, he living in the midst of them—and this is the man whom your article, with a contemptuously pitying reservation in his favour as a sincere fanatic, declares culpable of “falsehood,” of “treachery,” and of attempting “to form a socialist republic, without sagacity, industry, honesty, or truth.” By what authority does your writer thus asperse a man of whose principles the very words he uses show that he knows nothing? The illusion of communists, so far as it is an illusion, consists, on the contrary, in flattering themselves that a socialist community can be founded on “sagacity, industry, honesty, and truth” alone, without the vulgar incentives of private interest.

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It need hardly be added, that the English newspapers, which have seldom let a week pass since M. Cabet’s trial without some insulting reference to him as a convicted cheat and impostor, take care never to say that he was condemned unheard, and have carefully kept from their readers the indignant protest of those whom he is pretended to have defrauded and ruined.

D.

387.: LECHEVALIER’S DECLARATION SPECTATOR, 8 DEC., 1849, P. 1165

André Louis Jules Lechevalier (1800-50) was an economist and journalist, an ardent follower of Victor Considérant and the school of Charles Fourier. On the strength of his experiences in the French colonies, he became Colonial Secretary (1843). His ideas on the emancipation of the blacks were proposed in his Rapport sur les questions coloniales, 2 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie royale, 1843-44). On 13 June, 1849, Lechevalier had taken part in protests against armed intervention by French troops in the siege of Rome. The government imposed martial law; the offices of the Tribune des Peuples, of which Lechevalier was then an editor, were closed, and three of his fellow editors were arrested. Lechevalier thereupon addressed a letter (21 June, 1849) to the Minister of the Interior, M. Dufaure, which effected the release of the three men but resulted in his own arrest and subsequent trial and conviction by the Court at Versailles (November-December 1849). Anticipating these consequences, Lechevalier, along with others, exiled himself to London in July. It was from London that he wrote his Déclaration on 8 Oct., 1849. Lechevalier had the Déclaration translated by a friend as Declaration of Citizen Andre-Louis-Jules Lechevalier (London: n.p., 1849), and sent copies to a number of British papers, but, for his quotations in this notice, Mill is evidently using the French version (not located) in his own translation. The notice appears, in square brackets (like the other brief notices) in the “Publications Received” column, headed “Déclaration du Citoyen André-Louis-Jules Lechevalier junior, accusé, ex-membre du Comité de la Presse et du Comité Socialiste.” It is described in Mill’s bibliography as “A few words on M. Jules [Lechevalier’s] letter to [Dufaure] and [his Declaration]; in the Spectator of 8th December 1849”

(MacMinn, p. 72).

the manifesto of one of the condemned by default in the late political trial at Versailles; and containing a brief recital of the exertions of a life passed in labouring for the cause of philanthropy and social improvement. M. Jules Lechevalier is known to those who have attended to the course of public discussion in France, as one of the most enlightened and most reasonable of those Reformers who, with great variety of opinions and objects, are confounded under the name of Socialists. To the general public he is best known by his efforts during many years for the abolition of Negro slavery, and for replacing it by an “organization of labour”;1 for which no more favourable practical Edition: current; Page: [1147] opportunity could possibly have presented itself, and which if tried in our Colonies would have had a chance of preventing their present difficulties. In this little brochure M. Lechevalier maintains, that “the protest on the 13th of June last was legitimate, legal, and constitutional; that in principle, insurrection would have been legitimate, but” (and of this, whoever has read the evidence on the trial must be already convinced) “in point of fact no insurrection took place, and none was desired or projected.”2 It is in itself almost a reductio ad absurdum of the alleged conspiracy, that one who is so essentially a man of peace as M. Jules Lechevalier should have been condemned and sentenced as of the number of its authors and contrivers.

388.: THE CALIFORNIAN CONSTITUTION DAILY NEWS, 2 JAN., 1850, P. 4

This article quotes a letter from California announcing the results of the convention that had met at Monterey on 4 Sept., 1849, to draw up a constitution for the new state. The constitution was adopted on 13 Oct., and submitted to the people for a vote on 13 Nov. (See Constitution of the State of California 1849 [San Francisco: printed at the Office of the Alta California, 1849].) The first legislature of the new government met on 15 Dec., 1849. This unheaded first leader is described (twice, in identical terms) in Mill’s bibliography as “A leading article on the California Constitution, in the Daily News of 2nd January 1850”

(MacMinn, p. 72).

the last mail from California has brought intelligence possessing a different kind of interest from that which attaches itself to stories of masses of gold picked up in the beds of rivers and speculations on a possible depreciation of currencies by the cheapening of their standard. The Californians have not been solely occupied with “the diggings.” They have found time also to construct a set of institutions. With the active self-help characteristic of the energetic people from whom they are an offshoot, and of whose broad federation they already form a part, this motley assemblage coming together from many quarters, united by no previous tie, and finding on their arrival no constituted government to protect them, proceeded first to organize and enforce a system of voluntary governent, with the requisite sanctions, sufficient for their protection, and then nominated a convention, after the usual American manner, to prepare a Republican Constitution. It is worthy of remark how instantaneously any body of American emigrants, as soon as they have formed a settlement, proceed to make a constitution; though European authorities of no small account in their own estimation, are never tired of assuring us that constitutions cannot be made. But Edition: current; Page: [1148] while these sages are stoutly denying the possibility of motion, the Americans, one after another, like Diogenes, rise up and walk;1 and not one stumble has yet occurred to mar the completeness of the practical confutation. Whatever other faults have been found with the Anglo-American constitutions, no one has yet said that they will not work; a fate so often denounced against all constitutions except those which, like the British, “are not made but grow,”2 or, it should rather be said, come together by the fortuitous concourse of clashing forces. Perhaps the truth is, that the constitutions which will not work are those which are made for the people, while those which do work, such as the American, are made by the people; a fact which is in itself a guarantee that the ideas which they embody are such as the people are already familiar with, and attached to, and are therefore both capable and desirous of making them “work.” It is so with the constitutions which spring into existence in the North American continent at the rate of one in every three or four years, namely, whenever either a new state is added to the Union, or the population of one of the older states resolves (like that of New York recently) on a general revision of its institutions.3 All these systems of government have, as might be expected, a family resemblance, but each new one affords in some one or other of its features a significant indication of the direction in which the general mind of America is tending.

The convention at Monterey, comprising about four-fifths of new settlers with Anglo-Saxon or German names, and one-fifth of old Spanish inhabitants (which is probably not an unfair proportion to the population), has concluded its labours; and the product of its deliberations is about to be submitted for approval or rejection to the general suffrages of the inhabitants. This proposed fundamental law of the state comprises many provisions not usually classed under the department of constitutional or political law: it includes, in fact, everything which is considered too important or sacred to be entrusted to the discretion of an ordinary legislature, and which is therefore inscribed in a sort of charter of rights and liberties, not to be altered except with peculiar formalities, and by an assembly chosen for the express purpose.

On the vital question of negro slavery, this constitution is irreproachable. By an express provision, “neither slavery, nor involuntary servitude, unless for the punishment of crimes, shall ever be tolerated in this state.” [P. 4; Art. I, Sect. 18.] California has thus the honour of being the first southern state which has Edition: current; Page: [1149] constituted itself free from that curse; and if the example be followed by New Mexico and the other states which will be formed in the newly-acquired territory, the iniquity is doomed. The slave-owners are well aware of this result; they have long ago declared that the question of the extension of slavery is the question of its existence; that once hemmed in within a corner of the confederation, it cannot long survive; that the joint moral and economical effects of closing the new territories to the export of slaves, will be rapidly fatal to the institution. In this point of view, the determined rejection of slavery by the first new state constituted in the territory which was sought and conquered (it is said) mainly for the perpetuation of slavery, is the heaviest blow which that form of tyranny has received in the United States, and is thus no unimportant event in history. In the first draft of the constitution the interdiction of slavery was accompanied by the exclusion of free negroes from settling in the state; but this provision was ultimately rejected by a vote of 31 to 8. Real improvement, however, is a slow process; a considerable remnant of injustice is still left. The negro inhabitant will be free, but not equal; the right of suffrage, otherwise virtually universal, is limited to “every white male:” and though there is a provision, expressed in grudging terms (the result, it is said, of a compromise), which permits the legislature to admit to the suffrage “Indians or the descendants of Indians,” in such “special cases” as two-thirds of the legislative body “may deem just and proper,” there is no such latitude given in favour of negroes. [P. 4; Art. II, Sect. 1.]

On one subject connected with the rights and interests of women, the Californian delegates have afforded an example which legislatures of greater importance in the world must ere long imitate. They have deemed it a fit thing to be not only enacted, but to form a part of the constitution of the state, that women shall have a right to their own property. The laws of most of the American states are on this point less unjust and irrational than those of England and of other countries of Europe. “All property, both real and personal, of the wife,” say the Californians, “owned or claimed by her before marriage, and that acquired afterwards by gift, devise, or descent, shall be her separate property; and laws shall be passed more clearly defining the rights of the wife, in relation as well to her separate property, as to that held in common with her husband.” [P. 13; Art. XI, Sect. 14.] It must be by an oversight that the wife’s earnings are not included in the property which is to be at her separate disposal. As the words stand, she will have (if the phrase “separate property” is to be understood in its obvious sense) exclusive control over what may devolve on her by any mode of acquisition except her own labour. But even thus, how superior to the law of England4—which on this, as on many other subjects, remains very little altered Edition: current; Page: [1150] from what it was in those times of barbarism when the wife was literally the slave of the man by whom she had been appropriated. It is a proof of the ineffectual and unpractical character of the law reform movement that the law respecting the property of married women remains in the state it is: a law of which every one feels the injustice in the case of any women in whom he is himself interested; and consequently, parents or relatives who give or bequeath property to women, almost always endeavour to frustrate the law (which, however, they can only do very imperfectly) by the circuitous, expensive, and often unsafe mode of a settlement in trust. Yet, imperfect as is the protection which this contrivance affords to the woman, and serious as are the hazards incurred by it in case of dishonesty or rashness in the trustee, it never occurs to parliament to render all this in a great measure unnecessary by the simple expedient of doing common justice to the woman—by letting what is hers be hers, and not, as it is by “common law,” the husband’s.

Another highly creditable part of the Californian constitution consists of its provisions for education. A superintendent of public instruction, elected by the people, is to be one of the regular officers of the government. [P. 11; Art. IX, Sect. 1.] All lands belonging to the state, and all property of persons dying intestate and without heirs, together with a tax (to be solicited from Congress), of five per cent on all sales of land within the state, belonging to the federal government, are to be formed into a permanent fund for the support of common schools [pp. 11-12; Art. IX, Sect. 2]; and a grant of unappropriated land is to be solicited from Congress for the support of a university [p. 12; Art. IX, Sect. 4]. This is according to the laudable example of the New England States, which, of all communities existing, have made, in proportion to their population, the most munificent provision for general education:5 and of whose people it has been said, that they would as soon expect to be made to pay individually for the use of the streets, as for that of the common schools.

The Californians have taken precautions against both the burthen of a national debt, and the scandal of repudiation, by prohibiting their legislature from incurring debts or liabilities exceeding in the aggregate 300,000 dollars, “except in case of war, to repel invasion, or suppress insurrection;” or unless expressly “for some specified object or work.” [P. 11; Art. VIII.] In this last case, the law which authorises the work must provide ways and means for paying off the loans, with all interest, within twenty years; and this law must be submitted to the direct suffrages of the people, and is irrepealable until the debt is wholly Edition: current; Page: [1151] paid. There will, we think, be few questioners of the justice and policy of this article of the constitution.

There are some other provisions, the policy of which is disputable—such as the entire prohibition of paper money in all its forms, and of all banks, except for the deposit of the precious metals [p. 7; Art. IV, Sect. 34]; and again, the exemption of “a certain portion of the homestead and other property of all heads of families” from “forced sale” by process of law—that is, from the claims of creditors [p. 13; Art. XI, Sect. 15]; a kind of entail, scarcely more defensible than those entails of a more ordinary description which, under the name of “perpetuities,” are prohibited by the constitution. [Ibid., Sect. 16.] By another article, whoever fights a duel, or sends or accepts a challenge, or is concerned as a second or otherwise in the transaction, is to be punished by being deprived of the suffrage, and disqualified from all public offices of profit. [Ibid., Sect. 2.] This looks like a serious intention to put down a practice which in some parts of the United States amounts to an evil of considerable magnitude: and the means used are more likely to be effectual than any others which we have heard proposed, since they attack the offence through motives of the same kind with those which generally prompt it, motives derived from the love of reputation and consideration.

The remaining provisions of the new constitution do not vary materially from the familiar features of representative democracy, as found in the older free states of the Union.

389.: THE CASE OF MARY ANN PARSONS [1] DAILY NEWS, 5 FEB., 1850, P. 4

This article, the eighth on injustice and cruelty by Harriet Taylor and Mill (for the background, see No. 303), responds to “Horrible Cruelty,” The Times, 2 Feb., 1850, beginning on p. 8 and continuing in Supplement, p. 1, which describes the coroner’s inquest and subsequent examination before magistrates resulting from the brutal death of Mary Ann Parsons at the hand of Robert Curtis Bird, a farmer, and Sarah Bird, his wife; Mill’s quotations are all from p. 8. The witnesses mentioned are James Morrish, a shoe-maker, and Richard Hooper; the victim’s mother’s name was Grace Parsons. For further comment on the case, see No. 392. This unheaded third leader is described in Mill’s bibliography as “A leading article on a case of atrocity near Bideford, in the Daily News of 5th Febry 1850. Very little of this article was mine.”

(MacMinn, p. 72.)

we would earnestly call the attention of our readers to one of the most horrible cases of brutality which have ever disgraced the superficial civilisation of our time and country: we were going to call it the most horrible, but cases approaching to it in atrocity are so incessantly recurring in the police reports, that we hesitate to pronounce even this case unrivalled in those disgraceful annals.

Edition: current; Page: [1152]

Mary Ann Parsons, a girl of fifteen, said by the master of the workhouse1 to have been “strong and healthy, although not particularly bright,” was hired as a servant from the workhouse of the Bideford union, by a man and woman named Bird, in September last. On the 5th of January she died, of such an accumulation of wounds, mutilations, and other horrible injuries, that we will not repeat the sickening list as given in the examinations before the magistrates. On the Friday before Christmas-day, the evidence of a man named Morrish shows that he saw her standing in the middle of the room where the prisoners and their four children were; that she was ordered “to go into the slee house, or back house;” that as she “went across the kitchen” he “saw that her neck and shoulders were covered with blood, which appeared to have flowed just before” he “came in;” that about ten minutes afterwards the man Bird “opened the slee door and ordered her to wash the blood off her neck.” Another man named Hooper saw her the day after Christmas day, when she “appeared to be very ill: she could not stand upright.” He “heard her making a horrid noise after she got up stairs: she was crying, and making a ‘wist’ or ‘moaning’ noise as she was going up.” This creature had seen her repeatedly flogged by both the man and woman, and neither he nor the former witness ever interfered even by a word of remonstrance. During the whole three months that she was in the service of these wretches, she appears to have been utterly friendless, uncared for, unenquired after. Her mother, who was an inhabitant of the same workhouse, never once saw her, and was ignorant of her fate until made aware of it by the ghastly spectacle which the body presented when in the coffin. The only person who seems to have said anything about the girl after she entered their service, was the master of the workhouse; this man, meeting the woman prisoner, who after a month’s trial had told him that she was an “honest, good, industrious girl,” and hearing on this occasion some complaint, gave his advice to “properly chastise” her. The instrument of torture is said in the report to have excited the horror of the spectators; it was “a strong stick of about a foot in length, to which were fastened eighteen stout sharp leather thongs, about two feet long. This formidable cat was capable of inflicting the most cruel laceration, as bad as the army whip, and worse than the cowhide of the American slave owner.” With this it was that the girl was reduced to the state in which her body appeared. The man Sermon, who gave the brutal recommendation to flog this girl of fifteen, and who admitted that he had “punished children in the workhouse,” though he “never served a child anything like that,” declared that in the army, where he had served, and had frequently seen sentences of flogging executed, the manner in which this poor victim had been treated would not have been considered fair flogging. With how much of this evidence before them does not appear, the coroner’s jury, under the direction of the coroner,2 found that the girl died “from congestion of the brain, caused by Edition: current; Page: [1153] external injuries, but how or by what means such injuries were caused there was no evidence to shew.” Fortunately for justice, the “means,” though mysterious to this “jury of respectable (!) yeomen,” were apparent enough to others. An application having been made to a magistrate, the culprits have most properly been committed to take their trial for murder; and heartily were it to be wished that the wretch who counselled “chastisement,” and the two base slaves who looked on calmly and saw—one of them the brutality itself—both of them its consequences—could be reached as accessories to the crime. From the report it would appear that justice might have been entirely defeated and the monsters might have escaped punishment, but for the clear, distinct, and manly evidence of the surgeon, Mr. Turner.3 Too many of this gentleman’s profession, in similar cases, give their evidence in softened terms, and profess doubt, from fear of injuring themselves with the lower class of their customers.

Our law, or at least its administration, takes abundant care of property, but the most atrocious personal violence it treats with a lenity amounting to actual license: even when death follows, the offence is generally pronounced to be manslaughter, and the criminal escapes with a year or two’s imprisonment. Yet whether we look to the torments inflicted, or to the depravity indicated in the perpetrators, the crime against Mary Ann Parsons is of far deeper atrocity than that of a Rush, who fires a pistol at a man and kills him.4 Rush intended death, but they intended torture, and inflicted death by torture. What the law is, and what its administrators thought of such crimes as this poor child has been the victim of, was shown in the case of the notorious Mrs. Brownrigg, who was hanged for murder, and has remained the traditional type of the worst and most odious species of murderers.5 Brownrigg flogged two of her apprentices to death—exactly what these people have done to this unfortunate servant girl. The question in law was not whether she had premeditated their death: it was enough in law and justice that she had carried diabolical cruelty to the point which caused it.

390.: THE CASE OF ANNE BIRD MORNING CHRONICLE, 13 MAR., 1850, P. 5

This article is the ninth on injustice and cruelty by Harriet Taylor and Mill (for the background, see No. 303). It comments on the trial of Anne Bird (b. 1805) for the brutal beating of a two-year-old child, Ellen Welsh, held on 8 Feb. at the Marylebone Police Edition: current; Page: [1154] Office, before George Long (1780-1868), magistrate and author. The case had been reported in “Police Intelligence—Friday. Marylebone,” Morning Chronicle, 9 Feb., p. 8. This unheaded third leader is described in Mill’s bibliography as “A leading article on the state of the law respecting assault, in the Morning Chron. of 13th March 1850. Very little of this was mine.”

(MacMinn, p. 73.)

much has been said and written, although as yet to very little purpose, on the effect which the progress of society in wealth, numbers, and education produces on the nature and amount of crime. Among many differences of opinion on this much-debated question, there is on one point a very general agreement. However it may be with offences against property, crimes of violence tend, it is generally believed, to diminution. There is nothing in which we seem to have so much the advantage over our fathers as in mildness of manners; and the delinquencies which prevail in the present generation are, according to common opinion, those which have their source in poverty or cupidity, but not in ferocity.

Though we do not deny the truth of this representation as it affects some classes of society and some offences, yet, as a general fact, we are sorry to say that it is not borne out by that authentic register of the manners and habits of the populace—the Police Reports. Far from exhibiting any decrease in crimes of violence, hardly a day passes in which that record does not bear frightful witness to their unabated prevalence. And the crimes which thus abound are, in point of moral turpitude, the worst order of crimes of violence—not the outbursts of offended irascibility against an equal, but the habitual abuse of brute strength, and the indulgence of wanton cruelty. Women and children, or young persons, are usually the sufferers. Cases succeed one another with hardly any intermission, in which men are proved to have killed their wives by brutal maltreatment; every such death being the termination of a series of sufferings, extending through years, against which the vital principle was at last unable longer to bear up. For every such extreme case, we may be assured there are hundreds which stop just short of the infliction of death, or in which death is inflicted, but not ascribed to its true cause. In another very numerous class of cases, a man or a woman is found to have kept an unhappy child for weeks and months in some disgusting domestic dungeon, until it is nearly dead from cold, hunger, and neglect—or to have scourged it day after day, until it is brought into a state which strikes horror when at last exhibited, and from which in many cases the child never recovers. In other instances a parish apprentice, or a young person hired as a servant from the workhouse, is the miserable victim.

Whoever has sufficiently attended to the proceedings of the Police Courts to have observed the deplorable frequency of these cases, must have been no less forcibly struck with the scandalous impunity of the culprits. Often, even when the victim has died from their maltreatment, they are not sent to trial. If tried, they are, in a majority of cases,acquitted—sometimes in the face of the clearest Edition: current; Page: [1155] evidence. Even if found guilty, it is only of manslaughter, and they get off with a year or two of imprisonment. Cases short of death are very seldom tried at all, but are disposed of summarily by the police magistrate. A recent instance at the Marylebone Police-office exemplifies the sort of justice usually administered. The case was one of peculiar enormity, the victim being a child two years old. The culprit, a woman named Anne Bird, was proved to have cruelly maltreated this infant with a whip. The magistrate did what magistrates in such cases usually do; he talked of the extreme atrocity of the case—as if strong words would do away with the effect of weak acts—and then sentenced the woman to the greatest penalty he could summarily inflict—a fine of five pounds, or, in default of payment, two months’ imprisonment. If this woman, under the pressure of poverty, had stolen five shillings, the magistrate would not have failed to commit her for trial, and if found guilty she would probably have been transported. But her offence being brutal cruelty, practised on a creature utterly helpless and unoffending, he did not deem it worth while to try whether a higher court would be of opinion that a case of extraordinary atrocity deserved greater punishment than two months’ imprisonment. At the end of the two months the child, no doubt, will be given back to its torturer; unless before that time, as happened in a similar case not long ago, it dies of the injuries received.

The fault is partly in the administration of the law, but chiefly in the law itself. The whole state of the law on the subject of offences against the person urgently requires revision.1 Towards offenders against property the law until very lately was ferocious, and even now it does not err on the side of gentleness; but in case of personal violence, short of premeditated murder, it is chargeable with confounding together offences the most widely separated, both in kind and degree of criminality, and with the most excessive and unwarrantable lenity towards all but the lightest. Legislators and judges have bestowed little consideration on the amount of guilt and suffering which lie disguised under the mild and euphonious designation of “common assault.” That gentle phrase stands for nearly every sort of bodily maltreatment of which death or maiming is not obviously the result. There is but that one term to denote the whole range of acts of personal violence, from a quarrel between two strong and equally matched men, one of whom knocks the other down in a fair fight, to that habitual and wanton abuse of muscular strength against the weak and defenceless which makes life a martyrdom. Even if this confounding of the gravest moral Edition: current; Page: [1156] distinctions were a mere matter of theory and classification, it would be very far from harmless in its effects on the popular mind; but, carried out as it is, to the full, in daily practice—some of the most detestable actions which one human being can perpetrate against another being punished, when punished at all, with about the amount of penalty which would be due to a simple breach of the peace—it would show a profound ignorance of the effect of moral agencies on the character not to perceive how deeply depraving must be the influence of such a lesson given from the seat of justice. It cannot be doubted that to this more than to any other single cause is to be attributed the frightful brutality which marks a very large proportion of the poorest class, and no small portion of a class much above the poorest.

Persons who are not conversant, either by their own knowledge or through the proceedings of courts of justice, with the breadth and depth of popular brutality, have very little idea of what is comprehended in the meaning of the words, “domestic tyranny.” This is now the only kind of tyranny which, in the more improved countries of the world, still exists in full vigour. Even in the worst governed countries, of any tolerable degree of civilization, it is now but rarely that Kings or public functionaries have it in their power personally to maltreat any one. The barbarities of which history is full, and which in barbarous countries flourish as rankly as ever, very few persons in a civilized country now suffer from political authorities—millions are liable to them from domestic ones. The great majority of the inhabitants of this and of every country—including nearly the whole of one sex, and all the young of both—are, either by law or by circumstances stronger than the law, subject to some one man’s arbitrary will. Every now and then the public are revolted by some disclosure of unspeakable atrocities committed against some of these helpless dependents—while, for every such case which excites notice, hundreds, most of them as bad, pass off in the police reports entirely unobserved; and for one that finds its way, even for that brief instant, into light, we may be assured that not hundreds but thousands are constantly going on in the safety of complete obscurity. If, through the accidental presence of some better-hearted person than these poor creatures are usually surrounded by, complaint is made to a magistrate, the neighbours—persons living in the same house—almost invariably testify, without either repentance or shame, that the same brutalities had gone on for years in their sight or hearing, without their stirring a finger to prevent them. The sufferers themselves are either unable to complain, from youth or ignorance, or they dare not. They know too surely the consequences of either failing or succeeding in a complaint, when the law, after inflicting just enough punishment to excite the thirst of vengeance, delivers back the victim to the tyrant.

As a matter either of justice or of humanity, these things speak so plain a language as ought to be in no need of commentary. What it is of more importance to insist upon, is their demoralizing effect. Attention has of late been much Edition: current; Page: [1157] directed to the overcrowding of the labouring population as a source of moral evils.2 Let any one consider the degrading moral effect, in the midst of these crowded dwellings, of scenes of physical violence, repeated day after day—the debased, spirit-broken, down-trodden condition of the unfortunate woman, the most constant sufferer from domestic brutality in the poorer classes, unaffectedly believing herself to be out of the protection of the law—the children born and bred in this moral atmosphere—with the unchecked indulgence of the most odious passions, the tyranny of physical force in its coarsest manifestations, constantly exhibited as the most familiar facts of their daily life—can it be wondered if they grow up without any of the ideas and feelings which it is the purpose of moral education to infuse, without any sense of justice or affection, any conception of self-restraint—incapable in their turn of governing their children by any other means than blows? The law, whose utmost exertions would not be more than enough to withstand this mass of depraving influences, makes so little use of its powers and opportunities, measures out its reproofs and punishments by such a scale, that the culprits believe almost the worst of these brutalities to be venial, and all minor ones to be actually permitted—while the victims regard their suffering and debasement as the regular course of things, which the law sanctions and the world allows; and when not crushed entirely, they seek a wretched compensation by tyrannizing in their turn, when any hapless fellow-creature comes within their power.

This review is Mill’s fifth and last in a newspaper of Grote’s History (for the context, see No. 304). It appears in the “Books” section, headed “Grote’s Greece—Volumes VII and VIII,” with the heading footnoted: “History of Greece. By George Grote, Esq. Volumes VII and VIII. Published by Murray.” It is described in Mill’s bibliography as “A notice of the 7th and 8th Volumes of Grote’s History of Greece, in the Spectator of 16 March 1850” (MacMinn, p. 73). Four passages from the review were incorporated by Mill into his 1853 Edinburgh Review notice of Grote when he revised that notice for publication in the first edition of his Dissertations and Discussions (1859), represented in the variant notes as “59”; see No. 380 for bibliographical details.

the two preceding volumes of Mr. Grote’s History exhibited the Athenian empire in its ascending and stationary periods. The present publication contains Edition: current; Page: [1158] the still more interesting and impressive recital of its decline and fall. Commencing at the temporary suspension of hostilities with the Peloponnesian confederacy, termed the Peace of Nicias, it comprises the tragedy of the Sicilian expedition; the wonderful exertion of energy by which Athens rallied after that unparalleled disaster, and succeeded once more in balancing the whole strength of her enemies, though aided by her revolted allies and by the treasures of the “Great King”;1 the closing years of the Peloponnesian war, varied by some remarkable passages in the internal history of the Athenian republic; the catastrophe of Aegospotami, the subjugation of Athens by Lysander,2 the annihilation of her maritime power and dissolution of the democracy. The narrative is continued through the brief despotism of the Thirty Tyrants,3 to the restoration of the Athenian democracy (but not of the Athenian empire,) by Thrasybulus and his associates, and the settlement of affairs which followed, so remarkable for its good sense and absence of reactionary violence. In the last two chapters Mr. Grote suspends the political, and takes up the intellectual movement; passing in review the dramatists, the rhetoricians, the sophists, and lastly, the memorable character and career of Socrates, to whom the closing chapter is exclusively dedicated. [Vol. VIII, pp. 434-676; Chaps. lxvii-lxviii.]

Both in stirring incident, and in topics for thought and reflection, these volumes are richer than any of their predecessors; and the execution worthily corresponds to the material. Those who have read Mr. Grote’s former volumes will have observed that he invariably rises with his subject, and is found most adequate to it where its requirements are greatest. The better acquainted any one is with Grecian history, and with the manner in which that history has heretofore been written, the higher will be his estimation of this work. Few books are more calculated to impress the instructed reader both with admiration of the thorough manner in which everything which the author attempts to do is done, and with surprise that almost everything was left for him to do. An enumeration of the points of Grecian history on which he has thrown new light, would comprise almost every one of its important phaenomena, or even of its interesting incidents. Yet there is not only no ostentation of originality, but the author’s mind is of the quality most remote from that which catches at glittering novelties and indulges an intellectual appetite for ingenious hypotheses. If there is anything which can be confidently predicated of Mr. Grote it is that he is a safeEdition: current; Page: [1159] historian; one who requires, not less, but more, positive evidence than common inquirers, before adopting a conclusion. His new results are not obtained by divination or conjecture; but by more diligent study and more acute cross-examination of the authorities than had ever been applied before, and by that greater power of interpreting recorded facts which flows from the possession of broader, deeper, and more many-sided views of human affairs.

With the exception of the last two chapters, the whole of both volumes is continuous narrative; without admixture of discussion beyond what was required for criticism of the evidence, or moral appreciation of the facts. During the entire period, the historian has the benefit of the high contemporary authorities, Thucydides and Xenophon: on the general march of events there is little trustworthy information except what these writers afford. The difference between one modern historian and another, as to this period, is chiefly shown by the manner in which they supply what is not told by contemporary writers, because not required by contemporary readers—namely, that basis of permanent facts, of which the passing facts recorded by the historian stand out as it were on the mere surface. Thucydides, writing for Greeks, related the incidents which disturbed the stream of Greek life, the battles, conspiracies, and the like; but what the stream in its natural state consisted of, he did not need to tell his readers, for they knew it as well as himself. Those familiar facts, however, which to them would have been superfluous information, are what it most concerns the modern historian to know. He has to discover them from the incidental hints given by Thucydides, and from the indications scattered through the mass of Greek literature. Owing to the insufficiency of the materials, a very imperfect conception is all that can be obtained; but there is a vast difference between this imperfect conception and none at all. Now the modern historians of Greece who preceded Mr. Grote, have started with what it is scarcely injustice to call, no distinct conception whatever of the general state of things in Greece, the opinions, feelings, personal relations, and actions, habitual to the persons individual or collective, whom they are writing about; and hence, when they come to speak of any particular event, they hardly ever understand what other things it implied, or what impression it must have produced on those who saw and heard it—for want of a proper understanding of what may be termed “the situation.” To illustrate our meaning, as well as to show the extent of this deficiency in former historians of Greece: we do not believe that any one of them has made (for example) these obvious remarks—that few Greek statesmen or generals were superior to pecuniary corruption, and that there were still fewer Greeks whose heads were not turned, and their capacity of rational judgment destroyed, by brilliant success. Yet even such simple general reflections as these, in the hands of Mr. Grote, help to render many things intelligible which hitherto have been either unaccounted for or totally misunderstood. To take another and a less obvious example: the curious incident of the mutilation of the statues called Edition: current; Page: [1160] Hermae,4 and the violent excitement at Athens consequent upon it, are for the first time made comprehensible by Mr. Grote, because he is the first who has mentally realized the effect of such an incident upon the religious feelings of Greeks. [Vol. VII, pp. 227ff., 267ff.] The matter had always been written about as if horror at the mere act of sacrilege had been the only religious sentiment concerned: whereas Mr. Grote points out that it was much rather a religious terror; that, according to the belief of the Athenians, such an insult to the god was certain to draw down his severest wrath upon the whole state, to the extent of utter ruin, unless they could reconcile themselves to him by detecting and rooting out all who were concerned in the impiety. This aspect of the matter both suggests a possible motive on the part of the perpetrators of an act hitherto the most enigmatical in Greek history, and explains the course of subsequent events.

Perhaps the most unmistakeable as well as the most attractive of Mr. Grote’s excellences as a narrator, consists in this ever-present and lively sense of “the situation.”ab One of the beneficial fruits of this quality is that it makes the history a philosophic one without apparent effort. There is no need of lengthened discussion to connect causes with their effects; the causes and effects are parts of the same picture, and the causes are seen in action before it appears what they are to produce. For example, the reader whose mind is filled with the greatness attained by Athens while her councils were ruled by the commanding intellect and self-restraining prudence of Pericles, might almost anticipate the coming disasters when he finds, in the early chapters of the cpresent volumesc, into the hands of what advisers Athens had already fallen. And, mark well, these evil advisers were not the demagogues, but the chiefs of the aristocracy, the richest and most highborn men in the republic—Nicias and Alcibiades. Mr. Grote had already shown grounds for believing that Cleon, and men of his stamp, had been far too severely dealt with by historians;5 not that they did not frequently deserve censure, but that they were by no means the worst misleaders of the Athenian people. The demagogues were, as he observes, essentially opposition speakers. The conduct of affairs was habitually in the hands of the rich and great, who had by far the largest share of personal influence, and on whose mismanagement there would have been hardly any check, but for the demagogues and their hostile criticism. These opinions receive ample confirmation from the course of affairs, when, there being no longer any lowborn Cleon or Hyperbolus to balance their influence, Nicias and Alcibiades had full scope to ruin the commonwealth. The contrary vices of these two men, both equally fatal, are exemplified in the Edition: current; Page: [1161] crowning act of their maladministration; the one having been the principal adviser of the ill-starred expedition to Syracuse, while the other was the main cause of its ruinous failure, by his intellectual and moral incapacity.a

One of the most important results of Grecian history, as conceived and written by Mr. Grote, is the triumphant vindication, so far as historical evidence goes, of Democracy. The moral of the history, as related by most modern historians, is that democracy is a detestable kind of government, and that the case of Athens strikingly exemplifies its detestable qualities. Mr. Grote, on the contrary, shows that the Athenian government was of surpassing excellence, its time and circumstances considered; that no other form of society known to the ancients realized anything approaching to an equal measure of practical good government; and that this was mainly owing to the nearer approach which it made to democratic institutions. A democracy in the full sense of the term it of course was not, since women, slaves, and a multitude of permanent residents of all ranks and classes who were not citizens, were “unknown to the constitution.”6 But it had many important points in common with democracy. It was a government of unlimited publicity, and freedom of censure and discussion. Public officers were subject to effective responsibility. The tribunals, being multitudinous and appointed by lot, were, like modern juries, generally incorrupt. And there was no distinction in political rights and franchises between poor and rich, lowborn and highborn. That the Athenian institutions on the whole were eminently favourable to progress, is shown by the splendid development of individual intellect during the three or four generations that this form of society lasted. It was reserved for Mr. Grote to show that the conditions also of order were realized in a degree unknown in any other community of the ancient world. Nowhere else in antiquity was respect for law so deep-rooted a principle as at Athens. Constitutional forms, and the salutary checks which the wisdom of Solon, Kleisthenes, and Pericles had provided against the inconsiderate impulses of a multitudinous popular assembly, had the strongest hold on the minds of the Demos; very rarely indeed in Athenian history were those barriers overstepped, even by the most impetuous impulse of popular passion. Nowhere in Greece were life and property so secure against every kind of legal or illegal violence: even those who were not citizens were less exposed to insult and injury than in other ancient states. In all these points the Athenian people were honourably distinguished, not only from the Greek oligarchies, but from their own oligarchical party; who showed during two intervals of ascendancy, the periods of the Four Hundred7 and of the Thirty, of what enormities they were capable; and who dought always to be present to the mind, not merely asethee dark Edition: current; Page: [1162] background to the picture of the Athenian republic, but as an active power in itd: for during the whole of its existence, such men as Critias and his compeers were prominent in the first ranks of public discussion, and continually filled the high offices of the state.

This brings us to the chapter on Socrates; which, after so much that is valuable, is in our estimation the most instructive chapter in the book. hWe have not space to giveithe briefest analysis of a dissertation so rich in matter, ori the smallest specimen of the delineation of this remarkable character, now brought into clearer light than ever before—a philosopher inculcating, under a supposed religious impulse, pure reason and a rigid discipline of the logical faculty. But we invite attention to the estimate, contained in this chapter, of the peculiarities of the Socratic teaching, and of the urgent need, at the present and at all times, of such a teacher. Socrates, in morals, is conceived by Mr. Grote as the parallel of Bacon in physics. He exposed the loose, vague, confused, and misleading character of the common notions of mankind on the most familiar subjects. By apt interrogations, forcing the interlocutors to become conscious of the want of precision in their own ideas, he showed that the words in popular use on all moral subjects (words which, because they are familiar, all persons fancy they understand) in reality answer to no distinct and well-defined ideas; and that the common notions, which those words serve to express, all require to be reconsidered. This is exactly what Bacon showed to be the case jinj respect to the phrases and notions commonly current on physical subjects. It is the fashion of the present day to decry negative dialectics; as if making men conscious of their ignorance were not the first step—and an absolutely necessary one—towards inducing them to acquire knowledge. “Opinio copiae,” says Bacon, “maxima causa inopiae est.”10 The war which Bacon made upon confused general ideas, “notiones temere a rebus abstractas,”11 was essentially negative, but it constituted the epoch from which, alone, advancement in positive knowledge became possible. It is to Bacon that we owe Newton and the modern physical science. In like manner, Socrates, by convincing men of their ignorance, and pointing out the conditions of knowledge, originated the positive movement which produced Plato and Aristotle. With them and their immediate disciples that movement ceased, and has never yet been so effectually revived as to be permanent. The common notions of the present time on moral and mental subjects are as incapable of supporting the Socratic cross-examination as those of his own age: they are, just as much, the wild fruits of the undisciplined Edition: current; Page: [1164] understanding—of the “intellectus sibi permissus,”12 as Bacon phrases it; rough generalizations of first impressions, or consecrations of accidental feelings, without due analysis or mental circumscription.h As the direct antagonist of such unsifted general notions and impressions on moral subjects, Socrates occupies an unique position in history; and the work which he did requires to be done again, as the indispensable condition of that intellectual renovation, without which the grand moral and social improvements, to which mankind are now beginning to aspire, will be for ever unattainable.

See No. 389 for earlier comment on this case; the subsequent trial of the Birds had been reported in “Assize Intelligence. Western Circuit—Exeter, March 22,” Morning Chronicle, 25 Mar., p. 7, from which the quotations are taken. This is the tenth of the joint articles on injustice and cruelty by Harriet Taylor and Mill (for the background, see No. 303). This unheaded third leader is described in Mill’s bibliography as “A leading article on the Bideford case, in the Morning Chronicle of 26th March 1850. Very little of this was mine.”

(MacMinn, p. 73.)

the case of mary ann parsons, who died a cruel death from maltreatment, at Buckland, near Bideford, in January last, has terminated in a more complete frustration of public justice than, in our worst surmises, we had imagined possible. The criminals, Robert and Sarah Bird, have not been convicted of murder—nor of manslaughter—nor even of a common assault. They have escaped totally unpunished—unpunished, except by public execration, which, it is to be hoped, will cling to them the more closely that they have not expiated their guilt by the retribution which the law appoints for such malefactors, but which in this instance, as in too many others, it has failed to inflict. Let any one who reads the report of the trial which appeared in our paper of yesterday, judge whether there can be the faintest shadow of doubt as to the facts—whether the two prisoners will not carry to their graves the merited designation of acquitted murderers. The worst features of the case, as it appeared against them in the preliminary investigation, were all confirmed, and more than confirmed, by the evidence on the trial. Several witnesses swore to repeated acts of brutal maltreatment. Several others swore to admissions of such acts by the female prisoner, both as respected herself and her husband. The state in which the poor girl’s body was found was sworn to by Mr. Turner, the surgeon who made the post-mortem examination, in these clear and straightforward terms:

On the legs and thighs I saw several wounds, varying in extent, and evidently inflicted Edition: current; Page: [1165] by some irregular or rough weapon. It struck me to have been by a birch. There was a bruise on the chest. The face was discoloured, and the forehead, and some abscesses were on the arms and fingers. The skin over the bowels was discoloured. On the left arm there was an abscess, and the skin immediately round it was discoloured, as if it had been bruised some time, perhaps a fortnight. The abscess had burst below the elbow. There was another abscess just forming. The nails of the little and fore finger were gone, apparently some time. The two middle finger nails were also gone, apparently more recently, and in one the bone protruded. On the right arm there was also an abscess that had also burst. On the right hip there was a large slough. On the posterior part of the hips were several wounds, apparently inflicted some time. They were covered with plaster, and appeared to be old sores. Between the shoulders were two trivial bruises. There was also a mark on the face, from the temple down to the cheek. On removing the scalp I found another bruise on the back of the head, with considerable extravasation of blood diffused between the scalp and the skull.

Then, after stating that he observed congestion of the membranes of the brain, and at the base of the brain extravasation of blood, and that he “found the cause of death in the head,” Mr. Turner continued:

In my judgment, death was the result of the external injuries. I could not form a judgment how that violence had been inflicted. I don’t think the injuries I saw in the head were produced from falls. The condition of the girl must have been extremely reduced before death, and the powers of life weakened. The injuries I observed would have produced an effect on the nervous system, which is connected with the brain.

Another medical witness, Mr. Edge, a surgeon to the hospital at Exeter, “conceives that Mr. Turner is correct in the opinion that he formed, as to the time of death, and the cause.”

After such evidence—unless the testimony was disbelieved, which it was not—it seems incredible that the Judge (Mr. Justice Talfourd) should have charged the jury for an acquittal. Every reader must be astonished at such a course, and must be anxious to know how so extraordinary a judgment came to be pronounced on such a state of facts. The explanation, however, is instructive, by the illustration which it affords of the state either of the law, or of the mind of this Judge—certainly not one of the worst of its administrators. Though there were statements and physical facts sufficient to convince the mind most recalcitrant to evidence, that the death of the girl was the work of the two prisoners, there was not, it seems, legal evidence to bring it home to them. “The case,” in the opinion of the judge, “had failed.” But when we see in what points it was considered to have failed, we cease to wonder—or rather, our astonishment changes its object, and we wonder how there should ever be legal evidence of a murder committed in the manner in which these two culprits caused the death of their victim.

The grounds of acquittal were two; and which of them is the strangest it would not be easy to decide. The first was, that although there was superabundant evidence of brutality by the prisoners sufficient to cause the frightful state of the corpse, it was not proved that anybody struck the particular blow on the head to Edition: current; Page: [1166] which the congestion of the brain, said to be the immediate cause of death, was thought to be more especially owing. The second reason was, that even if the blow had been struck by one of the prisoners, there was no evidence “to fix it upon one of these parties more than the other.” But it is by no means clear that, in the opinion of the medical witnesses, the blow on the head was exclusively the fatal injury. Mr. Turner, according to our report, “found the cause of death in the head”—meaning the congestion; but he distinctly said, “In my judgment death was the result of the external injuries.” “The injuries I observed”—being those on the body generally—“would have produced an effect on the nervous system, which is connected with the brain.” The other medical witness professed an unqualifed agreement in Mr. Turner’s opinion. It would thus appear that neither of these gentlemen ascribed the cerebral congestion to any local injury to the head, but to general injuries, affecting the brain not directly, but indirectly through “the nervous system.” Even assuming, however (what, it is fair to say, some of the reports of the trial appear to bear out),1 that death was more immediately caused by that particular injury, among the many of which the sufferer bore the hideous marks—that circumstance does not abate one iota from the moral certainty of the prisoners’ guilt. They were proved to have been in the habit of inflicting, up to nearly the time of the girl’s death, cruelties quite equal to the one assumed to have caused it. There was no direct proof that either of them struck that particular blow; but there was not the smallest evidence accounting for it in any other way. It was for them to rebut the presumption raised by their other brutalities. An adequate cause had been shown for any result, however fatal, in their daily treatment of their victim. On them lay the burden of disproving the connection by proving the existence of some other cause for the catastrophe. If a man were found murdered on the highway, his body covered with wounds, some of which only were mortal, the assassins who were proved to have fallen upon him, and to have inflicted some of those wounds, would not be suffered to escape because no one could swear that the particular wounds inflicted by them were the mortal ones. It would be enough that they did wound him, that no other cause of death appeared, and that he died.

With respect to the very nice and scrupulous doubt—as to which of the two prisoners is answerable—it is easily disposed of. Both are answerable. The guilt rests on both, until one of them can get rid of it by throwing it exclusively on the other. If the atrocious acts—some one or all of which destroyed the victim—had been proved only against one of the prisoners, that one would justly have been made responsible for the catastrophe. But those acts were proved against both, and against both equally. Both, therefore, are accountable; just as is the case if a person is found with a gang of robbers at the commission of a crime—it is on himself that the burden rests of proving his non-participation in their guilt.

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Under the jurisprudence of Mr. Justice Talfourd, it is virtually proclaimed to such people as Robert and Sarah Bird that there is impunity for murder, on condition of their adopting the commonest precautions. If the person to be murdered is an inmate of their house, and under their power, they must be dull indeed if they cannot effect their purpose without supplying those links of evidence for want of which the death of Mary Ann Parsons goes unpunished. It matters not though the whole neighbourhood testifies to daily cruelties more than adequate to produce death. It matters not that the corpse excites universal horror by its glaring manifestations of those cruelties. They can surely contrive that no one shall be able to swear to the particular wound inflicted on a particular day, or to prove that this wound was given by one of the murderers, that by another—and the victim, who alone knew, is not alive to tell. This is not justice. If it be law, which, in opposition to a judge’s dictum, we do not pretend to decide, it is law which cannot too soon be altered. When the law places any one—and that a person of inferior physical strength—under the power of another, who may be such a creature as these Birds, it exposes the individual to peculiar risks, and ought, therefore, to guard him by peculiar precautions. What is called the ordinary protection of law is not sufficient. The ordinary protection of law is protection to those who can help themselves—who can in general keep themselves out of harm’s way, or, at least, who can tell their own story. The victims of domestic brutality cannot protect themselves; and there is no protection for them, if, when death ensues, and violence is proved sufficient to cause death, the prosecutors are obliged to produce direct evidence connecting the death with the brutality. It is on the accused that the burden of exculpating themselves should in such cases rest. Death, and maltreatment sufficient to cause death, are the sole facts of which positive evidence ought to be required. Those to whom power over others is given, and who brutally misuse that power, should be thus far held responsible for the safety of those over whom they tyrannise. Otherwise there is no security even for the lives of any of those who have the wretched and disgracefully common lot of being in the power of a brute.2

393.: THE CASE OF SUSAN MOIR MORNING CHRONICLE, 29 MAR., 1850, P. 4

This article, quoting from “The Inquest on Mrs. Moir,” Morning Chronicle, 28 Mar., p. 2, is the eleventh by Harriet Taylor and Mill on injustice and cruelty (for background, see No. 303). This unheaded third leader is described in Mill’s bibliography as “A leading article on the Coroner’s Inquest on Susan Moir, in the Morning Chronicle of 29th March 1850. A joint production.”

(MacMinn, p. 73.)

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only three days have elapsed since we held up to public indignation the frightful details of the Bideford abominations, and the scandal of an acquittal, decisive of Mr. Justice Talfourd’s calibre both as a judge and as a man.1 Already another case has presented itself, fully equal in its atrocious features, and in which, unless the public look well to it, similar impunity will probably be the result.

Our yesterday’s paper contained the Coroner’s inquest on Susan Moir, wife of Alexander Moir, carrying on business as a baker at No. 24, Brydges-street, Covent-garden. “When the sheet,” says our report, “with which the remains were covered was thrown aside, an expression of horror escaped all present, the body, from head to foot, being literally covered with bruises and contused wounds of old and recent date.” The surgeon, Mr. Watkins,2 deposed—“The integuments and muscles of the head were contused in a manner I never saw before—in fact they were a perfect jelly.” The following are the statements of the other witnesses:

The first witness, Mary Ann Bryant, a cousin of the deceased, said that she

called upon her on Saturday last, about half-past one o’clock, when deceased complained of having been very much ill-used by her husband. Deceased begged witness to ask him to allow her to go to bed, as she had been up all the previous night. She said to witness, “You might say to him, let Susan go and lie down.” Witness did ask her husband, as requested, but he refused to allow her to go to bed, and said she must mind the shop. Witness remained with deceased until half-past three o’clock, and during that interval her husband frequently boxed her ears as hard as he could with his open hand, and once, when she got up to serve a customer in the shop, he kicked her behind with great force, because, as he said, she did not move quick enough. He requested witness to examine her head, remarking that he knew he had hurt her. Witness did so, and found her left ear and all that part of the head dreadfully bruised. There were also cuts upon the head, and the hair was matted with congealed blood that had issued from them. Witness told deceased’s husband how much she was injured, but he did not appear to take any notice of it.

About six the same afternoon, on returning to the house,

he asked her whether she had supplied certain customers; and she replied that she had not; upon which he swore at her, and boxed her ears as hard as he could. He then directed her to put some bread in the shop-window; and while she was in the act of doing so she fell insensible on the shop-floor. Witness ran towards her, and saw that the blood was spirting from a wound in her temple. Witness then called out, “Oh, good God, uncle; cousin is in a fit—pick her up.” He replied that he would not. Deceased presently revived a little, and walked with witness into the back parlour. While doing so, she said, “I am in a fit, and a very bad fit. Don’t leave me, for God’s sake—don’t leave me, Mary Ann.” These were the last words she ever uttered. Witness wished to put her to bed, but her husband said she should never go into a bed of his again. Deceased was then standing over a sink; and presently her strength appeared to fail, and she sank down upon the floor with her head resting on the kitchen step.

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She never rallied, and died on the following Monday morning.

John Johnson, a journeyman baker in this wretch’s employment, said that on Tuesday night, soon after eleven o’clock,

he heard a great noise overhead, as of two persons quarrelling, and a cry of distress from the deceased woman. The noise was similar to that of one person dragging another across the room, and it continued up to three o’clock to such an extent that witness could not get any sleep. Witness did not hear any words distinctly, but he could tell that his master was speaking in a very ferocious manner. On the Saturday afternoon witness saw his master knock deceased about, and shortly afterwards she fell down insensible. Deceased’s cousin asked witness to assist in raising her, but his master would not allow him. He said, “D—n her, let her get up herself.”

Amelia Meredes, who had lodged in the house for the last two months,

had frequently seen deceased with black eyes in that time; and on Saturday, about five o’clock, during a dreadful noise of quarrelling, she came down stairs into the passage, and while there heard deceased scream out and cry, “Oh, oh! you’ll kill me, you’ll kill me!” Her husband replied, “Yes, I will kill you. I’ll murder you before I have done with you.” Witness also heard deceased’s little boy call out at the same time, “You’ll kill my mother, father.”

It was after such evidence as this that the Coroner’s jury brought in a verdict of manslaughter! And were the ruffian to be tried (as he has been committed) on this verdict, and not on a bill of indictment sent before the grand jury, he would be tried for manslaughter only, and not for murder! We have, however, much satisfaction in perceiving, from the result of the examination which took place at Bow-street yesterday,3 that public justice will be spared this indescribably outrageous insult; and that, despite the enormous folly and heartlessness of the fifteen “highly respectable” jurymen, the prisoner will be put on his trial for the capital offence.4

To prevent justice from being foiled in instances like these ought ever to be the primary object of all who have any power in the case. The parish officers, or any other public authority within whose competence it is to see that the most horrible crimes do not escape unpunished, are under a deep responsibility if they do not, when others fail in their duty, indict such culprits for murder. And when the case is not taken up by those who are most bound to do so, a public subscription ought to enable the relatives or friends of the unfortunate victim to take the proper means of invoking condign punishment on the murderer.

It is necessary that it should be, once for all, understood by juries that to beat a human being to death is not manslaughter, but murder. If it were otherwise, the Edition: current; Page: [1170] famous Mrs. Brownrigg was hanged contrary to law.5 What she was convicted of was a series of brutalities exactly resembling this, and the Bideford case. And she would most assuredly have been acquitted had she been tried before Mr. Justice Talfourd. He would have said that there had been “chastisement of which he did not approve,” but that there was no proof that the death of the victim was caused by the “chastisement.”6

In the Brydges-street case it is in evidence that the prisoner actually, and at the very time, said to the unhappy victim that he would murder her; and though this, or any other ruffianly speech under such circumstances, does not amount to proof that the speaker meant the full import of his words, experience shows what interpretation would have been put upon them if the case had been reversed, and if the woman had been charged with killing the man. If the husband had died in circumstances similar to the case of Ann Merrett,7 and such a speech could have been proved to have been uttered by the wife—no matter under what circumstances of just exasperation—she would not have had a chance to escape a capital conviction.

Is it because juries are composed of husbands in a low rank of life, that men who kill their wives almost invariably escape—wives who kill their husbands, never? How long will such a state of things be permitted to continue?

394.: QUESTIONABLE CHARITY SUNDAY TIMES, 19 MAY, 1850, P. 2

This letter to the editor was introduced by an editorial comment: “A correspondent, in the following letter, finds fault with our strictures, under the above heading, upon an institution lately opened in Marylebone, by certain charitable ladies, for the instruction of young friendless and poor children, in needle work and other pursuits calculated to enable them to procure an honest livelihood.” The paragraph Mill quotes was headed “Questionable Charity,” Sunday Times, 5 May, p. 2. The letter was the twelfth newspaper contribution jointly authored by Harriet Taylor and Mill (for background, see No. 303), and their first to appear in the Sunday Times. Headed as title, it is described in Mill’s bibliography as “A letter signed D in the Sunday Times of 19th May 1850, commenting on a paragraph in that paper headed ‘Questionable Charity.’ A joint production.”

(MacMinn, p. 74.)

mr. editor,—

Agreeing cordially with many of the sentiments expressed in your journal of Sunday, May 5, and with much of the tone and spirit of your Edition: current; Page: [1171] paper generally, I regret to see one paragraph in which, as it appears to me, you not only give blame where praise is deserved, but countenance erroneous opinions on such important subjects as the direction of charity and the employment of labour. The following is the passage:

In Marylebone, a society of ladies has formed a female school for the purpose, as they state, of instructing the poor in such branches of useful knowledge as are calculated to enable them, in after life, to gain a honest livelihood. So far, excellent. The object is laudible, but is greatly defeated by the very founders of this charitable institution, who, in order to save the money which they should otherwise pay for the making of their apparel, bring that apparel to the school, and get it made free of cost by the children. Thus in the name, and under the guise of charity, they unintentionally inflict a gross injustice, rob honest industry of its fair reward, and drive to the workhouse or to prostitution the industrious and deserving female, who is willing to toil from the rising to the setting sun, and even half the night during the whole week, for a pittance scarcely sufficient to keep body and soul together.

I know nothing of the facts, and assume them to be as here stated. What I object to is the doctrine that, whenever, in return for charitable assistance, the recipients are required to do anything useful, to perform any productive labour which any other persons might be paid to do, an injustice is done to those other persons, and a wrong to the world at large.

Your objection, if good at all, is good against every possible employment of labour. You cannot employ anybody without enabling it to be said that you prevent yourself from employing somebody else. If it is wrong to employ children, because of taking employment from needlewomen, by the same reasoning to employ one needlewoman, is taking employment from another. If it is wrong to employ children in needlework, instead of employing needlewomen, it must be wrong to teach the children needlework, for the express purpose of enabling them “in after life to gain an honest livelihood” by practising needlework, and so competing with the needlewomen.

You will, perhaps, say that, at all events, the assistance so conferred is no longer charity, but an ordinary commercial transaction. I contend, on the contrary, that charity is much more charity, because much more useful when conferred in this way. The best kind of relief or assistance is that for which, as far as the case admits, a return is required to be made in useful labour. Especially is this the case when the very object in view is to train up children to gain their living by labour. If they are to be taught needlework they must be made to do needlework, and would it be an improvement in their education that it should be useless needlework, as paupers have been employed to dig holes and fill them up again, for fear of displacing other labour?

But there is another aspect of the matter which is of still wider application. You seem to think that if you pay labourers to do nothing at all, or nothing useful, you do not take away employment from any one, but that you do so if you require a return in productive industry. The truth, I apprehend, is the very Edition: current; Page: [1172] opposite. It is by what you give to one person that you diminish your means of employing others; not by the work you make him do in return; on the contrary, making him work in return is the only mode by which, while you give to him, you can still have undiminished means of employing others. If what you have given to a labourer comes back in the value of that which he produces, or, what amounts to the same thing, in the saving of an equal sum of money, which you must otherwise have expended at a shop, you have conferred the benefit on him, and yet have as much money in your possession to make purchases, or employ labourers with, as if you had not given him anything. I do not mean to say that this money will find its way to the same shops, or the same labourers, but it will be spent at other shops, or on other labourers; if there is a disadvantage to some people, there is an advantage to others, and no detriment to the labouring class on the whole.

Objections are sometimes made, on similar erroneous grounds, to the introduction of useful labour into prisons—although useful labour is the only production of good prison discipline, and of the reformation of criminals—for want of considering, that since the prisoners must at any rate be supported, whatever they cause to be withdrawn from the support of honest labour is equally withdrawn, whether the prisoners work or not; while, by making them work, the value, or part of it, is got back, and may be used in giving employment to other labourers.

This subject, sir, will amply repay a more attentive consideration than, as it seems to me, the writer of the paragraph in your last Sunday’s paper has yet given to it, and if what I have written should induce him to meditate further on things so closely connected with many of the important questions which come under the notice of journalists, I shall feel that I have been of some use.

395.: THE LAW OF ASSAULT MORNING CHRONICLE, 31 MAY, 1850, P. 4

This article is the thirteenth by Harriet Taylor and Mill on injustice and cruelty (for background, see No. 303). An unheaded third leader, it is described in Mill’s bibliography as “A leading article in the Morning Chronicle of 31st May 1850 (except the second sentence) on the state of the law of assault. Very little of this article was mine.”

(MacMinn, p. 75.)

we have on former occasions pointed out the defective state of the law and of its administration with respect to crimes of personal violence, and we have Edition: current; Page: [1173] especially commented on the absence of protection for women and young persons, and for all those who are under the power of others, against domestic brutality. The case on which the Court of Queen’s Bench pronounced judgment yesterday,1 exceptional as it is in some material respects—more particularly as regards the apparent absence of habitual or deliberate cruelty on the part of the defendant—recalls our attention to this very important subject; and we proceed to offer some further remarks on the general question of the social and legal wrongs affecting the most helpless portion of the community.

It is evident to all who take any pains to read the indications of the feelings of the populace, that they are impressed with the belief of their having a right to inflict almost any amount of corporal violence upon their wife or their children. That any one should claim to interfere with this supposed right, causes them unaffected surprise. Is it not their wife or child? Are they not entitled to do as they will with their own?2 These phrases are not, to their apprehension, metaphorical. The shoes on their feet, or the cudgel in their hand—the horse or ass that carries their burdens, and that dies a lingering death under their cruelties—the wife and children—all are “theirs,” and all in the same sense. They have the same right, in their own opinion, over their human as over their inanimate property. Doubtless they are aware that they are not at liberty to inflict death; but when they actually do so, and find that they are to be tried for murder, they seem to receive the information with a kind of stolid astonishment; and it may well appear to them anomalous that a creature is given up to their power to be kicked or beaten, at the peril of life, as often as temper or intoxication may prompt—and yet that, on some one day when they have done no worse than they had done hundreds of times before, they are told that they are liable to be hanged. Not that they ever are hanged for these enormities, even though death ensue. If they are tried at all (which in general they are not), the jury are not convinced that they intended death, and they consequently escape with a verdict of manslaughter. This interpretation of the law had the sanction of Mr. Baron Alderson, in the recent case of Alexander Moir.3 If it be a correct interpretation, the law is, in this matter, grossly inconsistent; for many acts, venial in comparison with Moir’s, are held by law to be murder when death ensues as an unintended consequence. “If one intends,” says Blackstone, “to do another felony, and undesignedly kills a man, this is murder.” If any one kills an officer of justice, or even a private person, who is endeavouring to suppress an affray or to apprehend a felon, it is murder. “It were endless,” continues Blackstone, “to go through all the cases of homicide which have been adjudged either expressly or impliedly malicious,” and which are, therefore, legally regarded as murder.4Edition: current; Page: [1174] According to Mr. Baron Alderson, a wretch like Moir is less criminal in the eye of the law than a person who, intending only to take the property of another, undesignedly causes death. But surely a man who, though he does not intend to kill, perpetrates such ruffian-like maltreatment that death is a natural consequence, commits an offence that is at least equal in depravity to most cases of murder.

Some good would be done, if, even in this extreme case, it were felt that there is no immunity for domestic ruffianism, and that the law has as much severity for the man who kills those whom he is peculiarly bound to protect, as it has for the one whose victim had no claims on him save those inherent in humanity. But, though even this would be some improvement, much more is required. It would be but a feeble restraint on habitual brutality to make the offender responsible for an extreme consequence which may or may not happen, and which may or may not be capable of being traced to its real cause. The arm of the law should be made to reach the tyranny of bodily strength in every instance in which it comes to light. The atrocious cases now summarily disposed of by magistrates with a forty-shilling fine or two months’ imprisonment, should be tried with judicial solemnity in the courts which try other grave offences, and should be visited with a just gradation of penalties, rising to the highest secondary punishment. Whatever additional legislation is required for this purpose should be provided. Legislation is also needed to disabuse the people of false notions of their legal rights. At present it is the universal belief of the labouring class, that the law permits them to beat their wives—and the wives themselves share the general error. We assume that it is an error. We take for granted, that the old saw, which most people have heard—if it ever was law in the savage times of our ancestors—has long been obsolete.5 If there be any doubt of this, there is the more reason why there should, without delay, be an authoritative termination to the doubt. There should be a declaratory Act, distinctly setting forth that it is not lawful for a man to strike his wife, any more than to strike his brother or his father. This would be merely doing what was done by the first settlers of New England. The seventeenth century was not remarkable for the mildness of its manners, nor were the Puritans by any means moderate in their notions of family discipline and authority. Their standard of social morals was taken from the Old Testament and the Patriarchs, not from Christ and the Sermon on the Mount.6 Yet the fundamental regulations of the first Puritan colonists in New England, as we read them in the latest published history of the United States, formally abrogated that provision, or reputed provision, of the common law of England, which permitted men to beat their wives.7 We hope that it is not too much to Edition: current; Page: [1175] expect from the English Legislature now, the same amount of justice and humanity which was shown by its cast-out children two hundred years ago. It seems almost inconceivable that the smallest blow from a man to a man should be by law a criminal offence, and yet that it should not be—or should not be known to be—unlawful for a man to strike a woman.

There is yet another feature in the law and in its administration, connected with this subject, which, we would fain hope, need only be pointed out to be irrevocably condemned by public opinion. At present, no amount of brutal violence, nor even of deliberate cruelty, although judicially proved, has the legal effect of depriving the criminal of the power which he has misused. A man is convicted and imprisoned for the horrible maltreatment of his wife—and yet, when his imprisonment expires, the victim is again delivered into his hands, to suffer everything which brutality infuriated by revenge, or malignity made more cautious by detection, may inflict. Any words which might be used to characterize such a state of the law could hardly strengthen the impression which ought to be made by the simple knowledge of it. Apart from all that is revolting in the fact itself, and viewing the question in the coldest manner as one of mere legislative expediency, it is impossible to expect that these domestic atrocities should ever attain judicial publicity except by accident, when such are the consequences which the sufferers have to expect from complaining. Accordingly, these cases are hardly ever made known by the injured parties themselves; and if they happen to be brought before a magistrate or a criminal court by some one who casually becomes cognizant of them, the charge continually breaks down from the impossibility of inducing the trembling victim to speak the truth with sufficient plainness to procure a conviction, or to adhere to it when it has been spoken in the first instance.

It is a dictate of common sense—recognised and acted upon by the laws of almost all countries—that legal rights may be either suspended or forfeited for a certain amount of judicially proved misuse. If this is a reasonable and proper provision with regard to legal rights generally, it is so, above all, with respect to the powers which any one is allowed to exercise over the persons of human beings. The law confers every such power on the presumption (however fallacious) that it will be exerted for the good of those over whom it is given, and it cannot be justified except on that presumption. That there should be a slavery in civilized life, from which the most savage maltreatment, judicially proved, cannot liberate the victim, would be scarcely credible, if it were not notoriously true; and such a state of things cannot, we hope, be much longer tolerated, unless existing laws are deemed more sacred than the primary ends for which all laws profess to exist.

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This evil might be removed without interfering with existing institutions on any other point, or raising discussion on any more general question. All that would be requisite is a short Act of Parliament, providing that judicial conviction of gross maltreatment should free the victim from the obligation of living with the oppressor, and from all compulsory subjection to his power—leaving him under the same legal obligation as before of affording the sufferer the means of support, if the circumstances of the case require it. We earnestly recommend this subject to the attention of those philanthropists who desire to signalize themselves by an eminently useful contribution to the work of mitigating the sufferings and raising the moral condition of the poor and the dependent.

396.: PUNISHMENT OF CHILDREN SUNDAY TIMES, 2 JUNE, 1850, P. 2

Edward Vaughan Hyde Kenealy (1819-80) was tried before Lord Campbell for assaulting his illegitimate six-year-old child, Edward Hyde, on 11 May, 1850. See “Law Intelligence. Court of Queen’s Bench—Saturday. The Queen v. Kenealy, Esq.,” Standard, 13 May, 1850, p. 7, from which the quotations are taken. Kenealy, who had acknowledged the child and taken responsibility for rearing him, was sentenced to imprisonment for only one month; the punishment was not decreed until 30 May (The Times, 31 May, p. 7). This article, the fourteenth by Harriet Taylor and Mill on injustice and cruelty (for background, see No. 303), is the seventh leader in the “Political Enquirer,” headed as title. It is described in Mill’s bibliography as “A leading article in the Sunday Times of 2nd June 1850, headed ‘Punishment of Children.’ Very little of this article was mine.”

(MacMinn, p. 75.)

the case of edward kenealy, a man holding the rank of a barrister, who has been convicted by the Court of Queen’s Bench of an assault on his illegitimate child, a boy six years old, cannot be allowed to pass without comment. The facts of the case, disgusting though they be, are such as we are accustomed to see in every day’s newspaper, and no wonder, while, not police magistrates only, but a Chief Justice, like Lord Campbell in the present case, treats ferocious personal violence as if it were the merest peccadillo—a pardonable overstepping of the strict limits of the law, hardly deserving any moral blame. We shall first quote the evidence of the surgeon:1

I saw the child on the day after it was found. I found a mark round the front and sides of the neck, but not on the back part of the neck. On the front of the throat the skin had been removed by pressure. Scabbing had taken place in some portion. Others were undergoing suppuration, that had been produced by pressure, or some substance rubbing. The whole of the back, from the shoulders to the lower part of the posteriors, was covered with Edition: current; Page: [1177] bruises. They were long in form, as if inflicted by castigation, and were in different states of inflammation. From the posteriors to the ankles there were marks of the same castigation. Great violence must have been used. From the shoulders to the hands there was evidence of the same kind of treatment, and apparently by the same instrument—by a rod or cane.

The following were Lord Campbell’s remarks:

There must be a verdict of guilty against the defendant. His chastisement of the child, for some unaccountable reason, had been infinitely beyond moderation. Though there was no doubt that a parent had a right to correct a child, and that the defendant here seemed to have had the welfare of the child in view, still, after the evidence of the surgeon, it was clear that he had done what the law did not justify. It was impossible to say that this was moderate chastisement of a child six years old.

It will hardly be believed, after such evidence, and after such an opinion given by himself on the evidence, that Lord Campbell, in his address to the jury, could say—

He rejoiced that the whole truth had come out, and that no serious stain would attach to the character of Mr. Kenealy, who appeared to have taken some care of this child, which was his illegitimate child, and to have bestowed pains upon it in giving it an education. Was not the charge here made out? The defendant, though not the legitimate father of the child, was its parent by the law of nature, and was entitled, under the circumstances of its living with him, to all the authority and rights of a father. Still, in exercising those rights in the way of punishment of the child, he was bound to observe moderation. The jurors would declare whether, with a good conscience, they could say that he had done so; for if not, as immoderate punishment could not be justified in law, he must be found guilty.

Whether because the offender’s station in life was nearer than usual to his own, or from a total absence of moral sense in the mind of the judge, we know not, but his address is almost an apology to the prisoner for convicting him; and he tells the offender—he, the guardian and vindicator of the law, declares to a man who, in his own showing, has broken the law, by such treatment of a child of tender years as the surgeon’s evidence discloses, that “no serious stain would attach to his character,” and this because the poor infant said in his evidence that the prisoner kissed and gave him playthings and toys, and taught him “to spell, and read, and say his prayers,” as if the most brutal parents in anything like Mr. Kenealy’s rank of life did not do such things as these. Lord Campbell would seem to have adopted the doctrine of Mr. Whately,2 the prisoner’s counsel, who thought it “a thing to be applauded,” in the defendant, “that he did not, like many other people, leave his illegitimate child to poverty and misery.”

Why does not the unbrutal part of the public—the part which does not sympathise with cruelty, rouse itself and demand of the legislature how much longer the flogging of children shall be sanctioned by law? On the flogging of grown-up persons public opinion is made up. That practice, at last, by force of Edition: current; Page: [1178] general feeling against the vehement remonstrances of those who had the power of inflicting the brutality, has been almost abolished.3 But it is assumed, and goes uncontradicted, that a punishment which is brutalising and degrading to grown men is quite fit and proper for helpless infancy; unfit to be inflicted, according to prescribed rules, by men called judges, after solemn inquiry and in the full light of publicity, but, “by the law of nature” (as Lord Campbell says), quite proper to be administered at discretion by men called fathers in the secrecy of their own houses, subject, when some peculiarly atrocious case accidentally comes to light, to a gentle admonition. It is only the other day that the House of Commons decided, after a long debate, that boys might be scourged at the discretion of two magistrates, but that men might not; the distinction, it appeared, between men and boys being the difference between thirteen years and fourteen.4 It is as possible to govern children without the aid of the lash as grown persons. It is even much easier; their bad habits, if they have been allowed to acquire any, not being deeply rooted. A parent or teacher who cannot rule without the lash shows as much incapacity as brutality. There is no difference of nature between grown persons and boys, that what is most deeply degrading to the character of the one should not be so to the other. If the boy has no consciousness of his degradation the worse for him: it is a proof that his character is irreclaimably imbued with it. Mr. Whately said that they had all—judge, jury, and counsel—been flogged in their boyhood, and were much the better for it. This merely proves that Mr. Whately’s sense of degradation depends, not on the fact, but on other people’s opinion, and that nothing is revolting to him which is legal and customary. Take any naturally sensitive boy, who has been habitually flogged, and one who has never suffered that indignity, compare them, observe the difference in self-respect, and in all that depends on self-respect, which will mark those two human beings throughout life? On a boy of a dull, hard nature, its effect is to render him ten times harder than he would be without it—to qualify and prepare him for being a bully and a tyrant. He will feel none of that respect for the personality of other human beings which has not been shown towards his own. The object of his respect will be power. He will crouch to power in others, and will have nothing in his own nature to prevent him from trampling on those whom he has power over. If he does not do so, it will be from nothing better than fear of opinion or fear of punishment.

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397.: CONSTRAINTS OF COMMUNISM LEADER, 3 AUG., 1850, P. 447

In the previous issue of the Leader, 27 July, p. 416, over the signature “Ion,” appeared “One of the Consequences Considered,” by George Jacob Holyoake, the paper’s manager. This response, which was Mill’s first contribution to the Leader, appeared in the regular “Open Council” section, which was introduced by the editorial comment: “In this department, as all opinions, however extreme, are allowed an expression, the editor necessarily holds himself responsible for none.” The letter is dated “Aug. 1, 1850,” and headed “Constraints of Communism,” though the entry in Mill’s bibliography says: “A letter signed D. and (improperly) headed ‘Restraints of Communism’ in the Leader of 3d August 1850”

(MacMinn, p. 75).

sir,—

A correspondent of your last week’s paper, writing in defence of what he calls “associative views,” meaning, I suppose, the organization of industry on the communistic principle, employs himself in combating people who, he says, find fault with communism, because “the harmony and competence likely to result” are supposed to be “so overwhelming that a surfeit of enjoyment is dreaded;” and this absurdity he attributes to “a recent work” called Principles of Political Economy,1 which, he says, “foreshadowed the inanity and monotony which must supervene when the spur of animal want was conquered and withdrawn.” Your correspondent has misunderstood the argument in the Political Economy. No such notion is there to be found as that “the sharp pangs of hunger” are necessary to prevent life from being inane and monotonous. So far is this from the truth, that the drudgery to which hunger, and the fear of hunger, condemn the great mass of mankind, is the chief cause which makes their lives inane and monotonous. If communism, or what is generally called by that name, would make life a dull routine, it is not because it would make everybody comfortable. When the rich are ennuyés it is not because they are “above the fear of want,” it is generally because they are not “above the fear” of other people’s opinions. They do not cultivate and follow opinions, preferences, or tastes of their own, nor live otherwise than in the manner appointed by the world for persons of their class. Their lives are inane and monotonous because (in short) they are not free, because though able to live as pleases themselves, their minds are bent to an external yoke. Now, it is this bondage which I am Edition: current; Page: [1180] afraid of in the coöperative communities. I fear that the yoke of conformity would be made heavier instead of lighter; that people would be compelled to live as it pleased others, not as it pleased themselves; that their lives would be placed under rules, the same for all, prescribed by the majority; and that there would be no escape, no independence of action left to any one, since all must be members of one or another community. It is this which, as is contended in the Political Economy, would make life monotonous; not freedom from want, which is a good in every sense of the word, and which might be ensured to all who are born, without obliging them to merge their separate as well as their working existence in a community. No order of society can be in my estimation desirable unless grounded on the maxim, that no man or woman is accountable to others for any conduct by which others are not injured or damaged.

D.

398.: STABILITY OF SOCIETY LEADER, 17 AUG., 1850, P. 494

Mill here comments on W. Thomas, “Speaking Out,” Leader, 13 July, 1850, pp. 374-5, from which the first set of quotations is taken. This letter to the editor, like No. 397, appeared in the “Open Council” section. It is dated 14 Aug., 1850, and headed as title. The entry in Mill’s bibliography reads: “A letter signed C. and headed ‘Stability of Society’ in the Leader of 17th August 1850”

(MacMinn, p. 75).

sir,—

Your “Open Council,” I presume, is an arena for the discussion, not merely of opinions, but of modes of arguing; and few things require discussion more. Availing myself of this liberty, I will put a few questions to one of your correspondents (signing himself W. Thomas) who is a very active questioner of others, and is much dissatisfied that nobody is willing to be “plain” and “precise.” Mr. Thomas stands up for the indissolubility of the marriage contract for the following plain and precise reason: “The stability of society rests upon the permanence of the marriage tie; loosen that, and society is on a sandbank.” These he thinks threatening words, since he puts them in italics. I ask, what he intends to be understood by them. “The stability of society” is an expression I have often heard before; but I cannot say I have ever been instructed what it meant. Indeed, I have remarked that it is mostly used by people who are not in the habit of attaching any very particular meaning to what they say. If the foundations of a house give way, the house falls, and there is no longer a house. What is it that happens if society falls? And what is this thing called “society” that requires to be protected from falling? Has it anything to do with you, and me, and the remainder of the men and women in the world? Does it mean the men and women themselves? If so, what is meant by the stability of the men and Edition: current; Page: [1181] women? If it does not mean the men and women, does it mean anything belonging to them? And if so, what? And what is the precise nature of the mischief to be apprehended in case this something, I know not what, should come upon a “sandbank”? When a ship comes upon a sandbank, I know what happens; the ship breaks to pieces and the passengers are drowned. I want to have it made equally clear to me what would happen if, in consequence of permitting facility of divorce, “society” should, as Mr. Thomas says it will, come upon a sandbank.

I am the more desirous to be enlightened on this matter as I cannot call to mind any great improvement in human affairs, or the eradication of any deep-rooted and long-standing evil, which was not, at the time when it happened, represented as subverting the foundations of society. The abolition of slavery; what a laying prostrate of the whole fabric of society was there! There was a time when even the boldest speculators were afraid to entertain such an idea. The destruction of the temples and altars of the old divinities, by the introduction of Christianity, was, according to the gravest people, the demolition of society altogether. The Reformation! another dreadful blow to the stability of society. The Revolution of 1688, which expelled God’s anointed and set up the people’s delegate;1 nay, the Reform Bill, and even Catholic emancipation, all made society crack and totter. Cheap newspapers, teaching the people to read; this last was a thing after which, we were told by many people, society could not much longer exist. A Turk thinks, or used to think (for even Turks are wiser now-a-days), that society would be on a sandbank if women were suffered to walk about the streets with their faces uncovered. Taught by these and many similar examples, I look upon this expression of loosening the foundations of society, unless a person tells in unambiguous terms what he means by it, as a mere bugbear to frighten imbeciles with. The utmost it can mean is, that the thing so characterized would be a great change—of some sort; which change may either be for the better or for the worse. I am one who thinks that not only divorce, but great changes in most matters are needed; and I confidently hope for many more as complete subversions of the foundations of “society” as were made by Christianity, the Reformation, and the enfranchisement of the slave.

I cannot conclude without a word or two on the naïve selfishness of another letter, in the same number of your paper and on the same question, but on the contrary side of it, in favour of Divorce. The writer shows the most unaffected unconsciousness that anybody has an interest in the matter except the man, whom he purposes to liberate from the consequences of an “act of youthful folly or inexperience.”2 Not a word of the woman, who is in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred the chief sufferer, as is inevitable so long as the law gives all the power Edition: current; Page: [1182] to the man; and on whose account, far more than even on that of the man, it is necessary that the yoke should be lightened. But this entire ignoring of women, as if their claim to the same rights as the other half of mankind were not even worth mentioning, stares one in the face from every report of a speech, every column of a newspaper. In your paper of the 27th ultimo, there is a long letter signed Homo, claiming the “right of the suffrage” as justly belonging to every man, while there is not one line of his argument which would not be exactly as applicable if “woman” were read instead of “man;” yet the thought never appears to occur to him.3 In a Conservative this would be intelligible—monopoly, exclusion, privilege, is his general rule; but in one who demands the suffrage on the ground of abstract right, it is an odious dereliction of principle, or an evidence of intellectual incompetence. While the majority of men are excluded, the insult to women of their exclusion as a class is less obvious. But even the present capricious distribution of the franchise has more semblance of justice and rationality than a rule admitting all men to the suffrage and denying it to all women.

The MS draft, Brotherton Library, Leeds, bears a note in Mill’s hand: “left at the office 1st Feb. 1851.” The “office” was that of the Weekly Dispatch, a Sunday paper, in which appeared the article to which Mill is objecting, “The Round of the Clerical Circle,” 26 Jan., p. 49, from which the quotations are taken. Being unpublished, the letter is not listed in Mill’s bibliography.

sir,—

I cannot remain quite silent on the unjust and unfounded attacks made by the Dispatch on those whom it calls by the old-fashioned appellation of sceptics. In the first article of the number for January 26th, there is a charge against all who hold merely negative opinions on religion, of being “Epicureans” who “take the world as they find it”—of “believing in nothing,” being “earnest in nothing,” being “merely a speculative, disquisitive, logical, thinking machine.” Whoever wrote these accusations, believing them to be true, is as ignorant of life and the world, and of the opinions of instructed persons in the present age, as a Church of England parson. I affirm that nearly all the persons I have known who were, and are, eminently distinguished by a passion for the good of mankind, hold the opinions respecting religion which your article stigmatizes, that is, they Edition: current; Page: [1183] think that nothing can be known on the subject. The very phrase “believing nothing” as a synonyme for believing no religious creed, as if nothing were true or false, right or wrong, except with reference to some theory of creation, is one of the calumnies of shortsighted and ignorant intolerance. But your writer, like other heretics, must have a scapegoat, to whom to pass on the slanders thrown upon themselves, and be able to say to the bigots, It is not I, it is my brother. According to him, those who pull down one positive religion, if it is to put up another, however slight and flimsy, are heroes, but if they see no sufficient evidence for any belief as to the origin and purpose of the world, and will not succumb to the vulgar by professing any, against them you indorse the accusations of the orthodox. The smallest rag of dogmatic religion is enough, in the opinion of its professors, to entitle them to call themselves infinitely higher and worthier than those who profess no dogmatic belief. But as all my own experience and observation lead me to an exactly opposite conclusion, I strenuously deny the accusation in the Dispatch, and charge the writer of it with bearing false witness against his neighbour.1

J.S.M.

400.: WIFE MURDER MORNING CHRONICLE, 28 AUG., 1851, P. 4

This is the fifteenth newspaper article on injustice and cruelty by Harriet Taylor Mill and J.S. Mill, who had married in April 1851; for the background, see No. 303. An unheaded second leader, it is described in Mill’s bibliography as “A leading article in the Morning Chronicle of August 28th 1851, on some cases of wife murder. This, like all my newspaper articles on similar subjects, and most of my articles on all subjects, was a joint production with my wife.”

(MacMinn, p. 76.)

in his recent charge to the grand jury at the opening of the Central Criminal Court, the Recorder said—

He was sorry that he could not congratulate them on the lightness of the calendar; for, although it did not contain any charge of murder, yet he was sorry to see that there were several charges of manslaughter, and also a great number of cases of personal violence; and it was very much to be regretted that, in a great majority of the cases, the violence was committed by men upon the persons of those whom they were bound to love and protect—namely, upon their wives.1

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It is well that Mr. Wortley should have said thus much—little though it was—on this disgraceful subject; and it is to be hoped that the feelings which dictated his brief remarks will still be in operation when, in the course of the next few days, it may become his duty to pass sentence on cases of this description. But he need not have confined his observation to the present sessions; for every sessions, every assizes, afford proof of the lamentable prevalence of this class of crimes, and of the impunity, or next to impunity, with which they are passed by. Within these few days we have recorded, almost simultaneously, four cases of men tried, or committed for trial, on the charge of killing their wives; and among these the case of Edmund Curtis stood conspicuous, both in atrocity and in the flagrant inadequacy of the punishment.2 The wife, an industrious woman, had passed the day in working as a charwoman, to earn money for the husband. In the evening, according to the testimony of the woman for whom she worked, he came to the house, and the wife

spoke to him, desiring him to come home. He refused. She said his place was at home, and he said, “So is yours.” They then both left the room. He was sober. After they left the house—about three minutes after—I heard a violent shriek. I went out, and saw her lying across a low iron railing in my garden. He had hold of her over the left shoulder with his right hand, and was striking her on the head with his clenched fist. When I got out the shriek had ceased. I heard no noise after. I told him he would kill her, if he had not done so, and desired him to loose her. He did not do so. I called out William Kirkland, who pulled him from her, and she fell on her left side on the ground, apparently lifeless. I told him he had killed her. I called assistance. She was lifted up and put in a chair. She fetched three sighs and died.3

These were the facts; and now for Mr. Baron Martin and his judgment. He said that nothing could justify a man in striking a woman; that the prisoner “indulged in a very violent degree of passion,” but that he could “well believe” that he “did not mean to kill her;” that “no doubt, when this result occurred,” he was “sincerely sorry for it;” and that, “considering all the circumstances,” the “justice of the case” would be satisfied by imprisoning him for six months with hard labour!4 Such are the judgments which are to protect all the women of the country against domestic ruffianism; and such is the caprice which presides over Edition: current; Page: [1185] the apportionment of penalties in English criminal justice. The day afterwards, in a case not more atrocious, the culprit was sentenced by the same judge to transportation for life.5 If Curtis had killed, in any similar manner, some other man’s wife instead of his own—instead of the woman whom, as Mr. Wortley said, he was bound to protect—there can be little doubt that he would have been indicted for murder, and probably hanged. The vow to protect thus confers a licence to kill.

Two of the cases adverted to in the Recorder’s charge have since come on for trial before Mr. Justice Wightman.6 In one, the prisoner was acquitted on the ground of insanity. In the case of Andrew Maclean also, the culprit was acquitted, to the disgrace both of the jury and of the judge. The report says,

Early in the morning of the 4th of August, the persons lodging in the next room were disturbed by the cries of the prisoner’s children, and their calling out, “Oh, father, let mother down.” They got up in consequence, and went into the prisoner’s room, where they found his wife hanging by the neck from the cupboard, and the prisoner was sitting upon the bed. The body of the unfortunate woman was quite suspended, and she was nearly black in the face. Upon the prisoner being told that he was a good-for-nothing villain for attempting to hang his wife, he replied that he would do it effectually the next time; and one of the witnesses answered that he would have done it effectually this time, if his wife had not been cut down. The prisoner was slightly intoxicated, it appeared, at the time of the occurrence. The prisoner, in his defence, asserted that his wife had hanged herself.7

The wife was not called as a witness, the reason of which appears from the previous examination before the magistrate—on which occasion the unfortunate creature, either from habitual fear or from the expectation that she would be given back into his power, exculpated the man, stating that she had spoken provokingly to him, and also that he had hanged her only in jest. Her dread of appearing against him was not surprising; for what would have been the consequence to her of having given strong evidence against him, in the event of his acquittal? But her testimony was not needed to show the state of the case, after proof of such facts as those contained in the above extract. Yet “Mr. Justice Wightman, in summing up, said that the case was undoubtedly left in some obscurity by the absence of the wife’s testimony. If she had been called, she could have proved distinctly how the matter occurred; and in the face of the prisoner’s declaration that his wife had hung herself, it was for the jury to say whether the other evidence was sufficient to justify them in convicting him of so serious an offence.”8 On this encouragement the jury returned a verdict of not Edition: current; Page: [1186] guilty; and consequently the woman is again given in to the power of the man, that he may, as he threatened, “do it effectually the next time.” We scarcely believe that there is an offence in the whole criminal code of which a prisoner would have been acquitted, in the face of such evidence, except that of an attempt at wife-murder.

In default of the judges, it is for the Legislature to apply vigorous measures of repression to this growing evil. The baser part of the populace think that when a legal power is given to them over a living creature—when a person, like a thing, is suffered to be spoken of as their own—as their wife, or their child, or their dog—they are allowed to do what they please with it; and in the eye of the law—if such judgments as the preceding are to be taken as its true interpretation—they are justified in supposing that the worst they can do will be accounted but as a case of slight assault. It is the duty of the Legislature to teach them the contrary. There ought to be severer penalties for killing or ill-treating a wife or child than for killing or ill-treating, in a similar manner, any other person. A greater severity is enjoined by all the motives which ought to regulate the adaptation of punishment to crime. The crime is greater; for it is a violation of more solemn obligations—it is doing the worst injury where there is the most binding duty to cherish and protect. It is also baser—for it is committed upon one who has trusted the culprit, who is in his power, and who is generally without sufficient bodily strength to resist or retaliate. Those who are exposed to these atrocities—the wives and children of the brutal part of the population—have not the means which all other persons possess of guarding themselves against the evil. Other people are but occasionally and rarely liable to ill-treatment; but these are exposed to it at every hour and every moment of their lives. Being thus far more in need than any other persons of the protection of the law, they ought to have it in fuller measure. The domestic tyrant can perpetrate his tyrannies with the utmost facility, and need never wait for an opportunity; and a stronger motive therefore is required, where the brutality exists, to deter from its indulgence. Finally, there is no crime in the whole catalogue of offences in which the single act which incurs the penalty of the law is an index to such an amount of undetected and unpunished wickedness, and to so vast a mass of horrible suffering. Such a spectacle as the final scene of the life of Hester Curtis is unspeakably revolting; but what is the suffering of a few minutes, to the prolonged death which in every such case must have been suffered for years previously, and to the pangs of thousands of women in the power of similar miscreants, who have enough of caution just to stop short of the point which terminates the existence of their victims? There is not to be imagined a position so degraded, or so hopelessly miserable, as that of the women thus at the mercy of ruffians; and it is a deep disgrace to our Government that, in the fifteenth year of the reign of a woman, nothing has yet been done for their relief.

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401.: STREET ORGANS MORNING CHRONICLE, 28 OCT., 1851, P. 6

In this letter Mill is responding to the report of the judgment against an Italian organ player, Jean Zanezzi, by Thomas Henry (1807-76), a Bow Street magistrate: “Police Intelligence—Friday. Bow Street,” Morning Chronicle, 25 Oct., p. 7. The letter, headed as title, with subhead, “To the Editor of the Morning Chronicle,” is described in Mill’s bibliography as “A letter headed ‘Street Organs’ and signed D in the Morning Chronicle of October 28, 1851”

(MacMinn, p. 76).

sir,—

Will you allow me to draw attention to a case of great injustice, reported in Saturday’s papers. An Italian organ player was brought before Mr. Henry, the Bow-street magistrate, charged by a tradesman with having, though desired by the tradesman to leave off, continued to play on his instrument, whereupon the tradesman’s horse, left in charge of a boy, ran away with and damaged his gig.1 The Italian denied having heard the order to cease playing, and said that he had plied his instrument for six years in the streets of London, and had never before been charged with any offence—a plea which, in the case of English offenders, always carries great weight. It carried none, however, in this instance. The magistrate fined the Italian 40s., besides £10, the amount of the damage; and unless he pays this sum, which doubtless he never in his life possessed, sentenced him to a month’s imprisonment.

I would ask this magistrate—is the business of a street organ player an unlawful occupation? If so, the police are strangely neglectful of their duty in allowing it to be carried on. But if the Italian had a legal right to grind his organ in the streets, was he to leave off playing every time a carriage passed by? Has every man in a gig a right to prohibit this man from gaining his subsistence? As to frightening the horse, it must be uncertain whether this was the particular noise, among all others, at which the horse took fright. And, supposing that it was, the fault was more the owner’s than the organ player’s. Horses which cannot bear London noises ought not to be brought into London streets. If a tradesman in the pursuit of a livelihood drives a gig into the clang and crash of the streets of London, other people are not bound to cease pursuing their livelihood till he has gone by. Whether it would be right or wrong to suppress these people, they ought not to be punished by an ex post facto law. While their occupation is unprohibited, to fine and imprison them for practising it is gross injustice.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

D.

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402.: THE RULES OF THE BOOKSELLERS’ ASSOCIATION [1] REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF A MEETING (1852), P. 8

John Chapman (1821-94), physician, bookseller and publisher, now proprietor and editor of the Westminster Review, undertook in January 1852 to sell imported American books at a larger discount than that permitted by the group of London publishers who controlled the Booksellers’ Association. As a consequence Chapman was excluded from the Association and undertook a campaign against their monopoly. He appealed to many authors for support, and in the Westminster for April 1852 (n.s. I, 511-54) published his article “The Commerce of Literature,” an effective attack on the Association’s policies. The Booksellers met on 8 Apr. and decided to submit their case to a committee headed by Lord Chief Justice Campbell. On 4 May, Chapman was host to a meeting of rebels, particularly authors, presided over by Charles Dickens, and including such well known writers as Francis W. Newman, Wilkie Collins, G.H. Lewes, and Herbert Spencer. Dickens read letters from some who could not attend, including Carlyle, Cobden, Gladstone, and this one from Mill. Resolutions against the monopoly were forwarded to Lord Campbell’s committee, which on 19 May voted unanimously against the Booksellers’ Association and in favour of free trade in books. Mill’s letter, dated “East India House, March 5, 1852,” is printed in A Report of the Proceedings of a Meeting (Consisting Chiefly of Authors), Held May 4th, at the House of Mr. John Chapman, 142, Strand, for the Purpose of Hastening the Removal of the Trade Restriction on the Commerce of Literature (London: Chapman, 1852), p. 8. This and No. 403 are described in Mill’s bibliography as “Two Letters on the Rules of the Booksellers’ Association, printed in two pamphlets on that subject circulated in 1852, the one by Mr. John Chapman, bookseller, the other by Messrs. Parker” (MacMinn, p. 76). The MS of Mill’s letter is in the Hollander Collection, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. The text below is the printed version, which agrees in substantives with the MS. Both are dated “East India House, March 5, 1852.”

sir,—

There is no case to which, in my opinion, the principles of free trade are more completely applicable than to the question in dispute between the London Booksellers’ Association, and those who claim a right to sell books at a less profit than that prescribed by the rules of the Association.

Not only in the book trade, but in all others, I conceive that the profits of distributors absorb at present a very undue proportion of the proceeds of industry; and it appears to me impossible to maintain that their contenting themselves with a lower rate of remuneration would be injurious to the producers. It is self-evident, that whatever part of the profits publishers and retailers are willing to forego, must be gained either by authors or buyers, and if by buyers it would still benefit authors by increasing the sale of books.

I am, Sir, Your obedient servant

J.S. Mill

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403.: THE RULES OF THE BOOKSELLERS’ ASSOCIATION [2] THE OPINIONS OF CERTAIN AUTHORS ON THE BOOKSELLING QUESTION (1852), P. 47

On 30 Apr., 1852, John William Parker (1792-1870), Mill’s publisher from the time of his Logic, had circulated a letter “To Authors, and Others Connected with Literary Property,” which he also sent to The Times, in which, saying the publishers and booksellers had had their say, he put this question: “If a retail bookseller, of ascertained credit and respectability, applies to the publisher to purchase any book in which you may be directly or indirectly interested, on the terms at which those books are offered to the trade at large, but with the avowed intention of retailing his purchases at a smaller profit than that provided for between the wholesale rate and the selling price of single copies, do you consider the intention to sell at a low rate of profit a good and sufficient reason why the publisher should refuse to sell the books, which such retailer is ready to purchase and to keep in stock at his own risk?” He gathered the replies in The Opinions of Certain Authors on the Bookselling Question and Additional Letters on the Bookselling Question (both London: Parker, 1852). Mill’s reply (in the former) is dated “East India House, May 8th, 1852.” See No. 402 for the bibliographic entry describing this letter.

dear sir,—

I think that there is no case in which a combination to keep up prices is more injurious than in the sale of books; and I wish success to the booksellers in their resistance to the trade regulations which restrict their liberty of selling books at a low price.

I am, yours, very truly,

J.S. Mill

404.: THE INDIA BILL, I MORNING CHRONICLE, 5 JULY, 1853, P. 5

The 1833 renewal of the charter of the East India Company, 3 & 4 William IV, c. 85, was due to expire in 1854. On 30 June, after four nights of debate in the Commons, the second reading was approved of “A Bill to Provide for the Government of India,” 16 Victoria (9 June, 1853), PP, 1852-53, III, 181-96 (enacted as 16 & 17 Victoria, c. 95). (For the debate see PD, 3rd ser., Vol. 128, cols. 605-74, 734-78, 814-903, and 977-1074.) The proposals had been introduced on 3 June by Sir Charles Wood, then President of the Board of Control in the Aberdeen administration (PD, 3rd ser., Vol. 127, cols. 1092-1169). In his nearly five-hour-long speech Wood (see especially cols. 1147-50) had frequently cited opinions of Mill’s that resemble those here expressed. For further discussion, see No. 405. The article, headed as title (but without the “I”), with the subtitle, “[From a Correspondent],” is described in Mill’s bibliography as “An article headed ‘The India Bill—from a Correspondent’ in the Morning Chronicle of 5th July 1853”

(MacMinn, p. 79).

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according to the parliamentary maxim that the second reading of a Bill implies the adoption of its principle, the assent of the House of Commons to the second reading of the India Bill has decided the continuance, in some form, of what is called the double government.1 So far as depends on the House of Commons, the government of a hundred millions of people, who, in almost every point of character and social condition, are unlike and opposed to Europeans, will not be given up to the sole administration of a Secretary of State, having no acquaintance but with European ideas, no experience but of European life, and who is both selected at first, and changed every two or three years, according to the exigencies, not of India, but of English party politics. A voice in the government, and even the decisive voice, must necessarily reside in the Minister; but, unless by the rarest accident, no Minister possesses, when he comes into office, a particle of the special knowledge without which he is unfit to carry on the administration of Indian affairs, and which it is the business of many years to acquire. There is, then, no safety but in associating with the Indian Minister a Board or Council possessing this special knowledge, and sufficiently independent of him to command his deference, and, when necessary, to resist his will.

At present, the Court of Directors is such a council, and that it shall continue to exist is the first point which the vote of the House of Commons has decided. The second is, that in maintaining its existence an attempt shall be made to improve its composition. The maintenance of the Court of Directors, and its improvement, are the leading objects of the Bill. To both, the House has now in principle assented. In what the improvement shall consist, and by what means it may be effected, remains to be considered in committee.

When two powers are required to act together, either for joint deliberation or mutual check, whatever else may be requisite, this at least is essential—that one of the two authorities shall not be appointed by the other. If it is, there are not two powers, but only one. Yet, by the present Bill, the Crown—that is, the Indian Minister—has the appointment of one-third of the co-ordinate body.2 This provision is no less inconsistent with the principle of the Bill than with Sir Charles Wood’s declared opinions, and can be defended on no principle.3 It does not go far enough, if the intention is that the Court of Directors should be simply an instrument of the Indian Minister. It goes too far, if they are intended as a check and restraint upon him. If only an instrument, all authorities should have the choice of their own instruments; the Minister should nominate, not six—not a mere fraction—but the whole eighteen or twenty-four. But if the Court of Directors are to remain, as they have hitherto been, a power in the Indian Edition: current; Page: [1191] government, having an opinion and a will of their own, which the Minister may overrule, but cannot pass by—without whose initiative he cannot act, to whose reasons he is compelled to listen, and, if he does not adopt, is bound to answer and confute them—then neither the whole nor any part of the body which is to be a check to his power, ought to hold their offices by his appointment. It would not be borne that the House of Lords should appoint a third of the House of Commons. There are many bad modes of selecting a jury, but the worst of all would be that it should be nominated by the judge; yet the judge would be the fittest person to select the jury, if any man could be allowed to select those who are to check himself. In judicial matters, Englishmen so feel the necessity of a check, and so prize entire independence as the condition of its efficacy, that to make sure of it they place even the ignorance of the jury as a check upon the knowledge of the judge; but this Bill proposes that a Minister should appoint those whose knowledge is to be a check on his ignorance.

It is not Sir C. Wood, nor the Government, that need to be reminded how considerable a check, limited as their power is, the Court of Directors have hitherto been. The body who recalled Lord Ellenborough,4 who recorded an indignant condemnation of the greatest iniquity in modern Indian history—the seizure of Scinde (the joint act of their two bitterest enemies, Lord Ellenborough and Sir Charles Napier)—who were willing to go to prison rather than sign the spoliation of Oude for the benefit of a set of grasping money-lenders, and by their resistance compelled the Cabinet to investigate the case, and to retract the honestly-intended but ill-considered mandate of the then President of the Board of Control, Lord Glenelg5—such a body is a power which no Indian Minister can despise, and whose remonstrances, in any important case, he must think twice before he disregards. These are the glorious pages in the recent history of the Court of Directors; and if actual collisions have not been frequent—if, like other checking bodies, the Directors sacrifice much to keep on harmonious terms with the stronger authority—there is the more reason against adding so great a weight to the side of obsequiousness and subservience as would probably divest the body altogether of the character of a check, and convert it into a screen.

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There is no need to go further than Sir C. Wood’s speech, and his correspondence with the Directors, to find the principles which condemn the nomination clause. To the Directors he says, “We are most anxious to preserve the independence of that body, and its freedom from all undue political influence, on which we believe that its efficiency for executing the high trust reposed in it so essentially depends.”6 To the House of Commons he said that it had been suggested that the six Directors should be appointed by their colleagues, but that this was objectionable, because, thus appointed, they would be dependent on those who appointed them.7Mutato nomine de te8—it is proposed that they be appointed by the Minister; is it intended, therefore, that they should be dependent on the Minister? What becomes, then, of the “anxiety to preserve their independence”? How explain this inconsistency between the words of the President of the Board of Control and his acts? Is it that the words express his own opinion—the acts, what he thinks the necessities of his position? There was a clamour without, which seemed formidable, and to which it was thought necessary to make concessions. It was not very obvious what was to be done—therefore what is condemned in principle is adopted in detail, by way of doing something. But it is better to make no change than a change decidedly for the worse. It were better to leave the Court of Directors as it is, than to make a change in its constitution unfitting it for its most important function.

The difficulty of framing a constitution for the Court of Directors is great and serious, and lies in the very nature of things. There is no unexceptionable organ of choice. Nomination could only be by the Minister, or his majority in Parliament; and there are no good materials for a constituency. It is impossible to find any body of electors in England whose interest is identified with the good government of India. The present electors, slightly as they are connected in personal interest with India are as much so as any other constituency which could be framed. Yet many modes of extending the franchise have been suggested, which would be admissible in principle, and might possibly be beneficial in practice. The present electors are a particular class of Indian fundholders;9 all other holders of Indian debt might be included. All who have served a certain length of time in India, and returned to England, might be added to the constituency. The suffrage might even be extended to all who have lived in India some given number of years. In any case, the choice ought to rest with persons likely to be more or less acquainted with the public repute of candidates who have served in India; and the more numerous body would be less accessible to the Edition: current; Page: [1193] corrupt influences which have been so ludicrously exaggerated in speeches and pamphlets, but which, if they were twenty times greater than they are, would be worth no more, as an argument for the changes proposed, than the bribery at Parliamentary elections is worth as an argument for abolishing popular representation, and giving to the Crown the nomination of the House of Commons.

The only practical defect alleged in the present composition of the Court of Directors is, that it does not contain a sufficient number of experienced Indian functionaries; and for this reason, it is to be presumed, the nominees of the Crown are to be selected from Indians exclusively.10 It will surprise most people to be told that the real tendency of the present constitution of the Court is to make the Indian services engross it entirely. Before the last Charter, the Company was a commercial body, and naturally included among its Directors many commercial men. When its mercantile character ceased, this ceased also. Of the thirty present Directors, seventeen have been elected since 1834; and of these, all but two had served the Company many years, either in India, in China, or in the naval service—several of them being, by universal admission, among the most eminent of the public officers of their time—while no Indian of eminence who has offered himself, and has chosen to persevere, has failed to be elected. But, it is said, many have been deterred from offering themselves by the “degradation” of the canvass.11 It is a new doctrine in England that canvassing is a degradation, especially from members of the House of Commons. Will they vote for prohibiting it at elections, as the Bill proposes that it should be prohibited at the India House?12 We may take for granted that what men of such a nice sense of honour as members of Parliament claim to be, find not too insupportable to be gone through once in every few years, cannot be too shocking for the susceptibilities of men who aim at a seat in the direction. The labour and expense of the canvass (though not its degradation) do, we believe, deter some of the fittest men from the one contest as from the other; and we therefore heartily wish success (though with no confident hope) to the attempt made by the Bill to prevent canvassing altogether. If this succeeds, the evil complained of is at an end, and needs no further remedy. But if it be indeed necessary to reserve a certain number of seats for men too diffident, or too dignified, or too little desirous of the office, to stand a popular election, it would be far better that those seats should be filled by the choice of the other Directors, who have a stronger interest than anyone else in whatever sheds lustre on their body. Yet appointment even by the Directors, subject to the veto of the Minister, would be Edition: current; Page: [1194] objectionable, being likely in practice to become, as the appointment of the Governor-General now is, appointment by the Minister.13

405.: THE INDIA BILL, II MORNING CHRONICLE, 7 JULY, 1853, P. 5

For the background, see No. 404, the argument of which is here continued. The article, headed as title, with the subhead, “[From a Correspondent],” is described in Mill’s bibliography as “An article headed ‘The India Bill No. II—from a Correspondent’ in the Morning Chronicle of July 7th 1853”

(MacMinn, p. 79).

the clause in the india bill which diminishes the total number of Directors from 24, or more properly 30, to 18, or (excluding the six Government nominees) to 12, forms no essential part of the measure, and is liable to such serious objections that its omission would not only not impair, but would greatly improve the Bill.1 A reason has been assigned for the change in the mode of appointment of a portion of the Directors; namely, that some, and, it is affirmed, even a considerable number, of those who are fittest for the office, do not find their way to it in the mode hitherto provided.2 But, granting that the expedient adopted in the Bill for correcting this defect were the best or the only one that could be invented—supposing it were a conceded, instead of a disputed point, that a certain number of Directors should derive their office from nomination by the Minister, and that these nominated Directors cannot possibly be added, but must necessarily be substituted for an equivalent number of the elected—even then no reason would have been shown for a greater diminution of the elective body than is sufficient to make room for the additional members. But the Bill does more—its destructive operation is threefold as great as its constructive. It abolishes six Directors to replace them by nominees, six to get rid of the rotation system, and six for no reason at all.

We say no reason, because the reason which the case itself would suggest is barred by the emphatic declarations of the Ministers. One who knew nothing of the objects of the Bill but what the Bill itself indicates would be at no loss in assigning a motive for this provision. He would say, The elected Directors are reduced to 12, instead of 18 or 24, in order to give greater power to the six nominees. But Sir Charles Wood, both in his own behalf and on that of his colleagues, distinctly disavows this purpose.3 It has never been professed by Edition: current; Page: [1195] Ministers that the object of introducing nominees into the Court of Directors is to exercise ascendency over the body by means of them. On the contrary, this is an effect which Ministers, if they thought there was any danger of it, would earnestly deprecate; for it is impossible to affirm more distinctly than they do, that the independence of the Court of Directors, and its freedom from undue political influence, are indispensable conditions of fitness for its duties. The reason which they give for introducing a new mode of appointment, is to admit some persons—they do not say better qualified, but—as well qualified as the best of the present Directors, and who are unwilling to go through the labour and expense of an election by the proprietors. If six be the number requisite for this purpose, six will suffice for it, whether the number of the remaining Directors be twelve or twenty-four. It is not in the smallest degree necessary to the object that these six should be a third of the whole. On the contrary, as Directors appointed by a Minister are, to say the least, less independent, and more liable to political influence, than those elected by the proprietors, it must, we imagine, be the wish of the Government to attain the specific object of admitting the excluded class, with the least possible diminution of the independence of the body; and, therefore, to take no artificial means of enabling the nominees to exercise greater power in the Court than the same number of persons can do under its present constitution. It is hardly necessary to point out that the proposed diminution in the aggregate number of Directors is entirely at variance with this purpose.

Apart from any question as to the mode of appointing the Court, we are at a loss to imagine on what principle it can be expected that a diminution of its numbers will render it better adapted to its functions. If the Court of Directors, or any other public body, could be purged only of its least efficient members, retaining the most efficient, nobody can deny that it would be improved. But the proposed purgation is indiscriminate. There is no ground for supposing that, in future elections, the able will bear a larger proportion to the incompetent in the smaller than in the more numerous body. The reduction of the total number would in the end subtract as great a proportion from the best as from the inferior members; and, unfortunately, while by the one consequence much would be lost, by the other very little would be gained. If, by the abstraction of eighteen out of thirty, only three superior men should be sacrificed, it would be more than an equivalent for getting rid of fifteen mediocrities. The value of any public body is equal to that of the able men contained in it; a few more or less of the others are of little moment, for they are sure to be numerous enough to outnumber the men of eminence, were it not that, in the long run, mediocrity is always led by talent. The Court of Directors is rather remarkable among public bodies for the small number it contains of decidedly inferior men, and the more than ordinary proportion of men of ability; but those who disparage its merits ought strenuously to oppose any reduction of its numbers, for the fewer able men it habitually contains, the less it can afford to lose any of its chances of obtaining them.

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All principle, in the case of a body like the Court of Directors, is in favour of maintaining at least the present number. An executive body should be small, to secure vigour and promptitude of action; but a deliberative body ought to be numerous, that it may include the needful variety of knowledge and experience. The Court of Directors is not an executive Board, but a Council, a sort of Parliament of India; and every department of the Indian services should be represented in that body. It should contain persons from Bengal, from Madras, from Bombay, the North West Provinces, and, hereafter, the Punjaub; engineer officers, military officers, naval officers; persons of fiscal, judicial, and political or diplomatic experience; persons who have administered the zemindaree system, the village system, and the ryotwar system.4 As now constituted, the Court generally does contain persons of all these classes, and more than one of each: with the reduced number, it is not likely to do so. Besides, the Court is regularly divided into three Committees, each of which superintends and controls an amount of business corresponding to that of five or six Ministerial departments and public Boards in England.5 Every despatch sent to India, except in the Secret Department, passes through one of these Committees, and there undergoes a minute examination and criticism; every act sanctioned by the Court of Directors originates in one or other of them. Seven or eight members for each Committee is not too ample a provision, allowing for illness, relaxation, and accident, and supposing the average proportion of the ineffective to be no greater than in the best constituted Board of seven or eight persons which performs any portion of the public business of England.

406.: A RECENT MAGISTERIAL DECISION MORNING POST, 8 NOV., 1854, P. 3

This article reports on the trial of William Ebbs, an elderly bootmaker, for attempting to cut the throat of his wife, Matilda. Evidence was given by George Ebbs, their son. The case was heard on Friday, 3 Nov., before George Chapple Norton (1800-75), who had Edition: current; Page: [1197] been M.P. for Guilford 1826-30, and a stipendiary magistrate at the Lambeth Street Police Court since 1845; however, it was on Saturday, 4 Nov., that Norton discharged the man (see 1197b-b). Mill quotes from the report “Police. Lambeth,” The Times, 6 Nov., 1854, p. 9. The letter, Mill’s only contribution to the Morning Post, is related to the series on domestic cruelty that he wrote with Harriet (see No. 303), though he does not identify it as a joint production. It is dated 6 Nov., 1854, and headed as title, with the subhead, “To the Editor of the Morning Chronicle.” It is described in Mill’s bibliography as “A letter signed M. and headed ‘A recent Magisterial decision’ in the Morning Post of Nov. 8, 1854” (MacMinn, p. 88). The text below is that of the Morning Post, which has been collated with the MS draft in the Mill-Taylor Collection. In the variant notes the manuscript reading is signalled by “MS”.

sir,—

Will you allow me to call your attention to the extraordinary decision of Mr. aNortona, in the case of a man named William Ebbs, on bFridayb last? This ruffian, after brutally beating his unfortunate wife (then ill of a fever, and with her baby in her arms), deliberately attempted to cut her throat with a razor, which was only prevented by the son, scarcely less brutal than the father, who advised the father not to beat his mother any more, because he had given her enough now! This son, who was himself brought to the police-court for assaulting the officer in order to rescue the father, made, to screen him, the evidently false, and, if true, frivolous excuse, that his mother had given provocation by her ill temper. The fellow, on being remanded for a week, threatened that he would do worse when he went home, or would not go home at all. At the end of the week Mr. cNortonc releases the man, gives him money (sent for his use by a “benevolent gentleman”), and warns the unfortunate woman not to make “such free use of her tongue in abuse of her husband.”

Is it thus that Parliament intended the new act for the protection of wives to be carried into effect?1 The man Ebbs, on the showing even of the son who begged him off, had been in the frequent habit of brutally ill-using his wife. After his threatening, and attempting, to cut her throat, she is again given into his power, without his being even required to give security for keeping the peace, which, from his circumstances, he probably could have given. Can it be doubted that only the most atrocious cases come to light? dAndd is it to be wondered at that even these are not at all diminished in frequency, when the perpetrators may hope for complete impunity, and the victims are entirely insecure of getting any eredress? Whilee, failing of redress, their situation, in the absolute power of a vindictive master, is frightful to contemplate.—I am, sir, your obedient servant,

M.

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407.: THE LAW OF LUNACY DAILY NEWS, 31 JULY, 1858, P. 4

According to the provisions of 16 & 17 Victoria, cc. 96 and 97 (1853), to be committed to a lunatic asylum a person did not have to be certified by a Commission of Lunacy (which generally employed a jury) if relatives or friends applied to a magistrate for a reception order; in that case, the person could be committed on the strength of a private hearing and a certificate signed by two people, each “a physician, surgeon, or apothecary.” Mill’s letter, headed as title, with the subhead, “To the Editor of the Daily News,” is described in his bibliography as “A letter signed P. and headed ‘The Laws of Lunacy’ in the Daily News of July 31, 1858”

(MacMinn, p. 92).

sir,—

It has become urgently necessary that public attention should be called to the state of the law on the subject of Lunacy, and the frightful facility with which any persons whom their heirs or connexions desire to put out of the way, may be consigned without trial to a fate more cruel and hopeless than the most rigorous imprisonment.

Recent circumstances have made it a matter of notoriety, that confinement in a madhouse is the easiest means of getting rid of, or bringing to terms, refractory wives. Your paper of Monday contained one instance, on which you have very rightly and ably commented;1 within the last fortnight the whole country has heard of another;2 and the number which never see the light does not admit of any probable estimation.

A criminal cannot be sentenced to six months’ imprisonment without the Edition: current; Page: [1199] verdict of a jury, preceded by a public investigation and opportunity of defence. But a perfectly innocent person can be fraudulently kidnapped, seized, and carried off to a madhouse on the assertion of any two so-called medical men, who may have scarcely seen the victim whom they dismiss to a condition far worse than the penalty which the law inflicts for proved crime. Convicts are not delivered over to the absolute power of their gaoler; nor can be subjected to the ruffianly treatment revealed by the York inquiry. Convicts can appeal against ill treatment; but to the other unfortunates the ordinary use of speech is virtually denied; their sober statements of fact, still more their passionate protests against injustice, are held to be so many instances of insane delusion. And this fate any two medical men may secretly inflict. Any practitioner may be selected—knaves who will give every certificate desired for the sake of their fee; or weak creatures who will certify to anything affirmed by a gentleman and a man of position; or men who, knowing nothing, either practically or theoretically, about the signs of insanity, can be made to see with the eyes of their prompter. In a few days the victim perhaps succumbs, and having consented to every demand, is pronounced not mad by a different authority, and restored to real or nominal liberty, with a statement from the successful party that there has been a satisfactory arrangement. I am not speculating as to what has been, but describing what evidently may be.

The obvious remedy is to require the same guarantees before depriving a fellow-creature of liberty on one pretext as on another. The inquiry by a jury, which is now the exception, ought to be the rule; it should be an imperative preliminary to the putting an alleged lunatic in a place of confinement. A jury could be as speedily impanelled in a case of sudden madness as of sudden death; and if any restraint be necessary in the short interval, let it be in the patient’s home. Juries, in such cases, are foolish and credulous enough, and only too willing to treat any conduct as madness which is ever so little out of the common way; but at least the publicity of the inquiry is some protection, and tends to fix attention on any unavowed motive which may actuate the promoters of the proceeding. It would also apprise others of the existence of the alleged lunatic, and the place where he, or she, is confined; and would thus render somewhat more difficult the evasion which it is so easy to practise on the vigilance of the Commissioners at their annual visitation of lunatic asylums. Many other improvements in the law and procedure in these cases are urgently needed, and might easily be suggested; but my object is to indicate the importance of the subject, its growing urgency, and the large scope which it affords for the exertions of intelligent reformers in and out of Parliament. I earnestly intreat you to continue your efforts at rousing public opinion on a matter so vital to the freedom and security of the subject.

P.

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March 1863 to July 1873

408.: POLAND PENNY NEWSMAN, 15 MAR., 1863, P. 9

The Polish uprising of 1830-31 had been followed by a period of repression, during which Poland had been reduced to the status of a Russian province; attempts to extinguish Polish nationality continued under the milder rule, beginning in 1855, of Tsar Alexander II (1818-81). The revolt of January 1863 had as its immediate cause an ordinance conscripting Poles into the Russian army at the arbitrary discretion of the government. By the time of Mill’s letter, a Provisional Government had been formed by the rebels.

On 8 Mar., p. 1, the Penny Newsman, edited by Mill’s friend of forty years, Edwin Chadwick, published “The Polish Insurrection,” which prompted Mill to write to Chadwick on 9 Mar.: “I send a paper on the Polish question, in the form of a letter to the Editor. If you like you can alter the form to that of an article from a correspondent; but on the whole probably it is better as it is. I have signed it with my initials, and have no objection to being known as the author. . . . Proofs would be agreeable if there is time and it is not inconvenient.” The next day he wrote again: “I have returned the proof, corrected, to the Editor. [paragraph] I have no objection to being named in your leader, but I wish only my initials to be put to the letter itself; and I would rather that, in your first sentence, my name was introduced more indirectly. You might say ‘we feel thankful to a correspondent, whose initials sufficiently indicate his name’ or some such words, and you might then go on mentioning me by name as at present. [paragraph] I would rather you did not add the sentence proposed in your letter, because I do not wish to be understood as having peculiar sources of information. Herzen’s and Ogareff’s writings are open to all the world, and the notification by the Insurrectionary Committee to which my letter refers was mentioned by the correspondents of some of the English newspapers. [paragraph] Many thanks for your offer of separate slips, but I do not care to have any.” (LL, CW, Vol. XV, pp. 847, 847-8.) In a long introductory paragraph (pp. 8-9), Chadwick followed Mill’s wishes.

Mill’s letter, headed “(To the Editor of the Penny Newsman),” is his only contribution to that paper. It is described in his bibliography as “A letter on Poland, signed J.S.M. in the Penny Newsman for March 15, 1863”

(MacMinn, p. 94).

sir,—

The view which you have taken in your last and some previous numbers1—or, I should rather say, the view which you appear disposed to take of—Polish and Hungarian affairs, seeming not to be characterised by your usual accuracy of information, you will, I hope, permit a warm friend and admirer of your principles and purposes to endeavour to set right what he regards as a complete misapprehension of the events now taking place in those countries.

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You appear to look with suspicion on the great national movements in Poland and in Hungary as being aristocratic movements; not likely to confer any good upon the mass of the population; not provoked by the tyranny under which aristocracy and people alike suffer, but rather by the benefits which the Emperors of Russia and Austria are desirous of conferring upon the people, and which the aristocracy would be glad to intercept.2

The true state of the case, both in Poland and in Hungary, is very far from this. I limit myself for the present to Poland, leaving Hungary for, perhaps, a future occasion. In Poland, then, the present insurrection is essentially a popular one. The higher nobility and great landholders have, hitherto, for the most part stood aloof; not from want of sympathy with the movement, but because they regarded it as premature. The Insurrectionary Committee have, in consequence, thought it necessary to issue a general summons to the aristocracy, both in Poland and in exile, threatening that if they do not join the insurrection they shall be deprived of their lands.3

Next, as to the benefits which the Emperor designs for the labouring classes, and which you seem to think are a cause of displeasure to the authors of the insurrection. Let me first say, the enfranchisement of serfs is not now the matter in question. There are no serfs in Poland; and there are none in Russia since the 2nd March.4 Let the Emperor Alexander have all honour for this great triumph of justice. But though there is now no question between the peasantry and their former masters respecting their personal freedom, there is a great and fundamental question still open relating to the land. The peasants maintain that, along with their freedom, they ought to receive, in full ownership, the portion of land which was previously assigned to them to be cultivated by themselves and their families. This claim is resisted by the landowners. From the peculiar character of the agricultural economy of the country, which it would be too long at present to enter into, both sides have much that they can justly urge for their view of the question. The Emperor has decided the point in favour of the landlords. The leaders of the insurrection have decided it in favour of the peasants.

The Insurrectionary Committee have entered into a public engagement that the land, which is the subject of dispute, shall be given absolutely (without any payment, present or future) to the peasants who have hitherto tilled it; and that Edition: current; Page: [1203] the landowners shall receive compensation at the cost of the State, the only mode by which the burthen can be fairly shared between the two parties. Some months before the insurrection broke out, the leaders had already announced to their friends in England, as part of their programme, what they have now pledged themselves in the face of the world to carry into effect.5

Thus, if the insurrection were successful, the labouring population of Poland would acquire, without internal conflict or wrong to any one, that proprietorship in the land which the rural population of France gained by the Revolution, and the acquisition of which was an ample return for the sacrifice of a whole generation.

Even if this great benefit to the masses were not, as it is, one of the direct objects of the insurrection, I submit that, in the more backward countries of Europe any revolution, any bursting of the bonds by which all the energies of the people are now cramped and paralyzed, must be an improvement, must be the commencement of a new era. The resurrection of Polish nationality would at least let in the light. It would bestow a free press, freedom of public discussion, representative assemblies, national education. It would let in the ideas of civilised Europe; and not the ideas only, but the industry and capital also; and before these combined influences, the barbarism, which has been prolonged till now chiefly by the benumbing influence of foreign bondage, would rapidly pass away. A foreign tyranny necessarily regards intelligence and education as its greatest dangers. Any national government in the situation of Poland, much more one which is certain to be a free and popular government, will feel its safety and prosperity entirely dependent on the amount of popular intelligence and popular energy which it can array in its defence.

If you would only learn what the Liberals and Democrats of Russia itself think and feel about Poland; if you would inquire what is thought and felt by the editors of the Bell, Mr. Herzen and Mr. Ogareff, who, by their newspaper, clandestinely circulated at St. Petersburg, are already shaking the whole fabric of Russian despotism;6 if you will ascertain their opinion, you will no longer mistake one of the most unanimous and profoundly popular political manifestations in history Edition: current; Page: [1204] for a class movement to perpetuate the domination of an aristocracy. If you would see, on the other hand, a vivid representation of the old type of a haughty aristocrat, sincerely zealous for the dignity and nationality of his country, as identified with his class, but reckless of any amount of cruel oppression inflicted upon the multitude, read the sketch in last week’s Spectator of the principal agent of Russian tyranny over Poland at the present moment, the Marquis Wielopolski.7

J.S.M.

409.: THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES OUR DAILY FARE (PHILADELPHIA), 21 JUNE, 1864, PP. 95-6

Our Daily Fare was issued from 8 to 21 June, 1864, in connection with the Great Central Sanitary Fair of that year held in Philadelphia by the United States Sanitary Commission. Established in the spring of 1861, this was a voluntary civilian organization that supplied medical aid, financial relief, and material and spiritual comfort to the soldiers and sailors of the Union forces. Mill’s interest in their work continued: a year later, the Daily News (3 Apr., 1865, p. 3), reported from Boston papers that Mill, “who has all along been a good friend of the United States, has directed that whatever copyright may be allowed by the American publishers of his works shall be given to the Sanitary Commission or some similar object of national charity.” The Editorial Committee, to whom the letter here printed is addressed, was chaired by George W. Childs (1829-94), publisher and philanthropist, to whom Mill had earlier written (LL, CW, Vol. XV, pp. 729-30). Dated “Avignon, May 25,” and headed, “Written to the Editorial Committee of Our Daily Fare,” this letter is Mill’s only contribution to the paper. It was republished in the Daily News, 25 July, p. 5, and the Penny Newsman, 31 July, p. 1, and also in the New York Times, 10 July, p. 6, and the National Reformer, 6 Aug., p. 327. It is described in Mill’s bibliography as “A letter to the Philadelphia Sanitary Paper dated May 25, 1864, reprinted in the Daily News of [July 25] and in the Newsman of July 31, 1864” (MacMinn, p. 95). The variant notes derive from collation with the Daily News and Penny Newsman, signified in the notes by “DN” and “PN”.

i am sincerely thankful to the Editing Committee for including me among those from whom they have invited a public expression of sympathy with the cause in which the Free States of America are so heroically shedding their best blood.

aThe war, justifiable and laudable even if it had continued to be, as it was at first, one of mere resistance to the extension of slavery, is becoming, as it was easy to foresee it would, more and more a war of principle for the complete extirpation of that curse. And in proportion as this has become apparent, the Edition: current; Page: [1205] sympathies of nearly all in Europe whose approbation is worth having, are resuming their natural course, and the cause of the North will soon have no enemies, on this side of the Atlantic, but those who prefer any tyranny, however odious, to a triumph of popular government.

bIt would be unpardonable, did I omit, on an occasion like this, to express my warmest feelings of admiration for the Sanitary Commission. History has caffordedc no other example—though it is to be hoped that it will hereafter afford many—of so great a work of usefulness extemporized by the spontaneous self-devotion and organizing genius of a people, altogether independently of the Government.

dBut while the present struggle has called into brilliant exercise all the high qualities which the institutions of the American Republic have made general among her citizens, it has also laid open—as eis the nature of trying times to do—all the weak points in her national habits, and in the working of her institutions. These are doubtless far better known to thoughtful Americans than they are likely to be to any foreigner, and this great historical crisis will be doubly blessed if it directs attention to them. In all states of society the most serious danger is that the national mind should go to sleep on the self-satisfied notion that all is right with it; but the great awakening of the public conscience which is taking place on the one political and social abomination which has done more than all other causes together to demoralize American politics, has probably removed all danger of this sort for one generation at least; and warrants the hope that the American people will not rest satisfied with the great advantages which no other people and no other Government fpossessf in so high a degree; but will resolve that their democracy shall not be behind any nation whatever in those elements of good government which have been thought to find a more congenial soil in other States of society and gunderg other political institutions.

John Stuart Mill

410.: ENGLAND AND EUROPE DAILY NEWS, 1 JULY, 1864, P. 5

In February 1864 Austria and Prussia invaded Denmark to take possession of Schleswig and Holstein. The Liberal British cabinet under Palmerston, though sympathetic to the Danish cause, resolved on 28 June not to intervene. Disraeli moved a motion censuring Edition: current; Page: [1206] the government for its inaction, which was debated at length on 4, 5, 7, and 8 July in the Commons (PD, 3rd ser., Vol. 176, cols. 709-817, 826-930, 952-1073, 1198-1300). Mill’s letter, headed as title, with the subhead, “To the Editor of the Daily News,” is described in his bibliography as “A letter headed ‘England and Europe’, signed J.S.M. in the Daily News of July 1st 1864” (MacMinn, p. 95). It is probably referred to in a letter of 4 July to Chadwick, editor of the Penny Newsman, giving him permission to reprint an article which had appeared in another paper (LL, CW, Vol. XV, p. 946); at any rate it was reprinted in the Penny Newsman, 10 July, p. 7. The text below is that of the Daily News, which has been collated with the Penny Newsman, yielding one substantive variant; in the note the reading of the latter is signalled by “PN”.

sir,—

Allow me to invite your attention to one of the aspects of the question about to be tried next week between the present Government and the Tories, which does not seem to have received the amount of attention that is its due.

The Government of this country is called to a severe account for conduct which is said to have lowered the country in the estimation of the world. And what has thus impaired the reputation of the country is supposed to be, that it has used strong language when it did not intend to support that language by fighting; that it spoke its mind about the perpetration of a great public iniquity, which it was not willing to go to war to prevent. This is what England lately did in the case of Poland,1 and what it is reproached with doing in the present case of Denmark.

Now this is simply complaining that England has done what as civilisation advances the more high-principled nations are certain to do more and more; and that it has set the example of a practice which, when it becomes general, will be one of the greatest steps in advance ever made in international proceedings.

In times past nations have scarcely ever gone to war unless for their own supposed interest or dignity. It appears to be the general opinion that they ought to persist in thus acting, and I am not going to discuss just now whether, or how far, this opinion is right. But there is one point in which the practice of past times may very properly be altered, even if the alteration goes no further. In former days, governments, when a wrong did not affect themselves, did not care enough about the interests of others, or about wrong merely as such, to put themselves out of their way to incur the ill will of powerful neighbours by giving to wrong its proper name. The present government, though not the first, have been among the first, to break through this selfish and cowardly forbearance. As the British government, and in the name of the British nation, they have, in the two cases of Poland and of Denmark, given public expression to the reprobation of a crime, although its consequences did not touch themselves, and although they were not Edition: current; Page: [1207] prepared to brave all the evils and difficulties involved in arresting the crime by armed interference.

There are those who think this a fit subject for reproach. To me it appears to be the inauguration of the practice of bringing international and political wrongs under a moral police, by a demonstration of disinterested disapproval. Not an insignificant thing in itself; and if the time ever comes when such wrongs will be repressed by a sharper mode of interference on the part of disinterested bystanders, this milder method will be the necessary precursor and preparation for it.

But this plan of speaking our mind without backing our expression of asentimenta by blows is a new thing in a government, because governments have never yet cared enough about justice and honesty for their own sake, or been sufficiently indignant against violations of them, to adopt it. The majority of governments are still in this condition of moral callousness and indifference, and are not even able to understand that any government can care about a wrong which is no prejudice to itself. In consequence, a government which begins the practice of speaking out honestly when circumstances do not allow it to act chivalrously, must lay its account with incurring, in the first instance, some loss of what is termed consideration. The consideration of a government still depends, as that of an individual once did, upon the degree of readiness ascribed to it to draw its sword whenever any of its sentiments is offended. If, therefore, it shows any offended feeling, and the sword does not come forth, it is for a time suspected of being wanting either in sincerity or in spirit. But England is able, and should be willing, to show that the kind of consideration which is given to a Drawcansir is a kind that she can do without.2

The feeling of the country did not allow the government to go to war for Poland, and would not, probably, allow it to go to war for Denmark. But this being granted, I hope there are very few Englishmen who would have preferred that, not intending to fight, England should have remained silent. I trust that if Poland had been desolated and Denmark plundered without a word of protest on our part there would have been far greater dissatisfaction with our government, and a far deeper sense of shame and national humiliation, than I believe to exist now. As it is, we need not fear any permanent loss of prestige, even with those with whom the only thing which gives it is the power and willingness to resort to force. They will soon find out whether the change which has taken place in us is that we have grown more afraid of war, or only more prone to denounce and stigmatise great public iniquities, even when the sacrifices required for stopping Edition: current; Page: [1208] their perpetration are greater than it is the duty of a single power to incur in a quarrel not its own.—I am, &c.,

J.S.M.

411.: ON HARE’S PLAN SPECTATOR, 29 APR., 1865, P. 467

In his A Treatise on the Election of Representatives, Parliamentary and Municipal (1859), Thomas Hare (1806-91) put forward a scheme for proportional representation that Mill immediately adopted (see, e.g., CW, Vol XIX, pp. 358-70). Hare advanced particular proposals for applying the plan to Metropolitan elections in On an Organization of the Metropolitan Elections (London: National Association for the Promotion of Social Science, 1865), a paper read at the Association’s meeting in London on 10 Apr., 1865, at which Mill spoke (see “Metropolitan Elections,” Daily News, 11 Apr., p. 2). The issues were taken up in the article referred to in Mill’s first sentence, “Metropolitan Elections,” Spectator, 15 Apr., pp. 405-6. The letter, headed “Mr. John Stuart Mill on Mr. Hare’s Plan,” with subhead, “To the Editor of the ‘Spectator,’ ” is described in Mill’s bibliography as “A letter on Hare’s System in the Spectator of April 29th 1865”

(MacMinn, p. 96).

sir,—

In your paper of Saturday, the 15th, while commenting on the proposal of Mr. Hare for the experimental adoption of his system of representation in the metropolitan constituencies, you give to that system the credit which it deserves of opening the representation of the capital to the eminent men of the whole empire; but you seem to think that it would exclude all others, and that local men, qualified and disposed to attend to the local interests of the constituency, would under that system no longer be elected.

Nothing can more strongly exemplify the need of discussion on the subject than the appearance of such a misconception in a paper like yours; for it seems to me evident that Mr. Hare’s plan could not have the effect which you apprehend, and that of all the objections which have been made to it this is one of the most untenable.

Mr. Hare’s plan would enable every person to be elected for the metropolis who was voted for by a twenty-second part of the whole number of votes given. Is it supposed that not so many as a twenty-second part of the metropolitan electors would desire a local representative? Were this so, it would be a clear proof that local representatives were not needed. But they are needed, and they would consequently be voted for, not by once or twice or three times, but by ten or twelve times the number of the quota. In Mr. Hare’s system, as in the present, the real danger would be lest local feelings and interests should predominate too much. They would certainly fill as great a place in the representation as they do in the minds of the represented; for Mr. Hare’s system does not swamp the real wishes of any portion of the electors, all other systems do.

Edition: current; Page: [1209]

The misapprehension is probably occasioned by a momentary forgetfulness of the main difference between Mr. Hare’s mode of election and the existing one. If the result of the poll were to be determined in the present way, by comparative majorities, it would be possible, though not probable, that men of national reputation, known to all, and voted for in every part of the metropolis, might obtain a majority over all the local candidates, each of whom might be known and supported only by the inhabitants of a particular district. But under Mr. Hare’s system, the man of general celebrity could not have an unlimited number of votes counted for him, but a certain number only; when he had obtained that number, he would be returned, and the remainder of his supporters would have their votes counted for some one else. The return of the useful and hardworking local candidate would not depend upon his obtaining more votes, for example, than Mr. Gladstone;1 he would be sure of his election if he obtained the 2,000 or 5,000 suffrages which might represent a twenty-second part of the total number of votes given. The clubs and political parties whose influence you dread, would be well aware of this, and as it would be their strongest interest that their list should be composed of such names as would conciliate every large section of the constituency, they would be sure to include in it a sufficient number of the most competent local men of their party.

The power which would undoubtedly be exercised by these clubs and managers of parties, is a consideration of greater moment, which deserves and requires a full discussion. Lord Stanley touched on it at the Social Science meeting, not as an objection, but as a difficulty; unfortunately towards the close of the discussion, when time did not admit of its receiving the prominence due to it.2 My answer would be, that party organization will always be a great power, but that the power is at present greater instead of less than it would be under the proposed system. As things now are, the party which can obtain the numerical majority returns all the members, and nobody else is represented. If neither party is confident of a majority the two parties, by an understanding with one another, can divide the representation without a contest between regular party men of both sides. And these party men, in the majority of cases, are not the best or ablest men of either party, but its landed or moneyed nullities. Under the proposed system, no party, however well organized, could engross all the representation, unless it embraced all the constituency: it could never be represented in a greater proportion than that of its numerical strength, and to thus much it is indisputably entitled. If the opposite party, or if independent electors, anxious only to elect the best man, could make up, not a half, or a third, or a tenth, but a bare twenty-second part of the number of actual voters, they would obtain one, at Edition: current; Page: [1210] least, of the twenty-two representatives. Meanwhile the great parties, though they would of course strive for the election of their political friends, would be obliged to select from among their friends those who would do most credit to the proposers. It would not do for them to make up a list of less worthy or less distinguished names than the rival lists. They would have the strongest motives for proposing among party men those who were also something more than party men; who, besides the party support, might have a chance of obtaining by their personal merit votes which would have been refused to them as mere party organs. For the electors who care for things above party would not then, as now, have only a choice between party candidates; if the party names proposed did not satisfy them they would have the power of returning some candidates of their own.

Allow me, Sir, in conclusion, to entreat your more deliberate consideration of this great subject. Your paper is honourably distinguished from most others by looking forward to a perhaps distant future, which instead of deprecating, you desire, but because you are sufficiently interested in it to perceive in what direction its special difficulties and chances of failure lie, you are anxious to provide it in time with the appropriate correctives. I have the deepest conviction that no corrective ever yet thought of for the peculiar inconveniences of a commercial and industrial democracy approaches in efficacy to the system of Mr. Hare; while it is equally suitable to the state of things under which we now live, since it would at once assure to that minority in the constituencies which consists of the operative classes, the share in the representation which you demand for them, and which they cannot obtain in any other mode yet proposed except by extruding from the same privilege other large and important portions of the electoral body.—I am, &c.,

J.S. Mill

412.: THE WESTMINSTER ELECTION [1] UNPUBLISHED [CA. 28 APR., 1865]

This item and No. 414 are concerned with the parliamentary election of 1865, in which Mill was a successful candidate. One of the two Westminster seats had become vacant with the retirement of George de Lacy Evans (1787-1870), who had represented the borough 1833-41 and 1846-65; the other was held by Sir John Villiers Shelley (1808-67), like Evans a Liberal, and M.P. since 1852. The first new Liberal candidate for the election of 1865 was Robert Wellesley Grosvenor (1834-1918), a representative of the wealthy Grosvenor family, headed by the Duke of Westminster, whose estates included much of Westminster. On 13 Feb., however, the Liberal electors held a meeting at which they resolved to solicit eminent men to run as their representatives; Mill and Viscount Amberley were suggested (see The Times, 14 Feb., 1865, p. 6). Mill explained his principles in two letters, which were published, to James Beal (1829-91), the Committee Chairman, who Edition: current; Page: [1211] had announced to him that he was their choice (see LL, CW, Vol. XVI, pp. 1005-7). He also urged the Committee to persevere in their proposed plan of soliciting names of candidates from the Liberal electors at large. The following MS draft of a letter to be used for this purpose is in Mill’s hand in University College London, attached to a copy of his letter to Chadwick of 28 Apr., 1865 (LL, CW, Vol. XVI, pp. 1038-9). Whether it is of Mill’s own composition, or is a revision of someone else’s is not known. It is not listed in the bibliography of his published writings, and no published version has been found; however, the opinions are those he expressed elsewhere.

“a committee of —” or “The Liberal Committee” (or whatever is its proper designation) having taken into consideration the prospect of a vacancy in the representation of Westminster, have determined, before nominating any candidate to ascertain by a direct appeal to the electors, what candidates they would prefer, and have appointed a Special Committee for carrying this resolution into effect, whose names are adjoined.

You are therefore, as an elector of Westminster, earnestly requested to read and consider the documents herewith submitted, and having done so, to fill up the form hereunto annexed, with the names of the two persons for whom, without any personal solicitation, you would be willing to vote.

The Committee have adopted this mode of proceeding for the following reasons.

1st. To afford to the electors a wider range of choice, and enable them to obtain a better quality of representatives. They do not think it worthy of Westminster to accept the first man, of wealth or aristocratic connexion, who offers himself under the appellation of a Liberal. The largest and most intelligent constituencies in the Kingdom should aim at being represented by persons of proved capacity for public service, and of a high order of intellect. It is for the electors to select, among such persons, those whom they would most wish to adopt as their candidates, in order that the necessary steps may be taken to give effect to their wishes.

2dly. To avoid the useless and wasteful expenses, by which the choice of the electors is virtually limited to rich men, and seats in parliament are, in effect, made purchaseable by money, for no higher purposes than personal distinction or party convenience.

3dly. To give to every elector an equal opportunity for expressing his opinion, with the least possible trouble and inconvenience, and without the intrusion of paid canvassers, or the exertion of undue influence to obtain the promise of his vote.

The Committee were desirous of bringing before the electors, along with the names now submitted, the greatest number possible of other persons whose character, and proved qualifications, would render them suitable representatives of a place which, like Westminster, has for a century aspired to be represented by the most eminent names in the party of Reform and Progress. But, of the persons Edition: current; Page: [1212] known to possess such qualifications as would make them worthy to be elected without personal solicitation and free of expense, some were prevented by other engagements, and some by personal reasons, from consenting to be proposed to the electors. The Committee have been thus precluded from submitting authentic statements of the claims of any other candidates than those herein specified. They do not, however, presume or desire to put any restrictions on your choice, but will gladly receive and record the expression of your preference in favour of any person by whom it would be more agreeable to you to be represented.

After the receipt of replies from a sufficient number of electors, the two persons for whom the greatest number of preferences have been expressed, will be put in nomination at the hustings. It would have been gratifying to the Committee if the friends of the sitting member, and those of the gentleman who first presented himself to supply the vacancy, would have consented to refer the pretensions of their candidates to the same test. This, however, they have refused. It now, therefore, rests with the electors to declare, whether they are so perfectly satisfied with the qualifications of these gentlemen, as to prefer them to the candidates now submitted for your choice, and to all others who could be obtained. The Committee earnestly hope that by returning the paper with the blanks filled up, you will afford them the means of judging whether this is the case with yourself.

Mill’s review is of Public Responsibility and Vote by Ballot. By an Elector (London: Ridgway, 1865), by Henry Romilly (1805-84), businessman and magistrate, son of Sir Samuel Romilly and brother of John, 1st Baron Romilly. Romilly included Mill’s review (calling it a “letter,” perhaps because it was signed with Mill’s initials) in the 2nd ed. of his pamphlet, which had the subtitle: To Which Are Appended, A Letter from John Stuart Mill to the Editor of the Reader, 29 Apr., 1865, and Observations Thereon (London: Ridgway, 1867). (A copy is in SC, without marks.) Mill’s only contribution to the Reader, this notice is in the “Current Literature” section, headed “Public Responsibility and the Ballot,” with the subhead, “Public Responsibility and Vote by Ballot. By an Elector. (Ridgway.) 1865.” It is described in Mill’s bibiliography as “Review of a pamphlet on the Ballot (by Mr. Henry Romilly) in the Reader of April 29, 1865; afterwards reprinted by Mr. Henry Romilly, in a pamphlet replying to it”

(MacMinn, p. 96).

this pamphlet is a defence of the Ballot, or, rather, an answer to the objections to it. The writer is evidently a man of intelligence and knowledge, and accustomed to discussion. It is always fortunate when disputed questions are treated, not in a rhetorical, but in a dialectical spirit. The pamphlet contains Edition: current; Page: [1213] incidentally many true and useful thoughts, and some others which excite surprise that the writer can have gone through the process of putting them on paper without perceiving their untenableness. To the present reviewer (who must be understood as speaking for himself only) the discussion appears, as to its main object, a failure.

The arguments for and against the Ballot are so trite and familiar, that the world is excusably tired of them. But in the answers to them there is still room for novelty, and it is in these that the main stress of the practical controversy lies. The author of the pamphlet directs his principal efforts against one of the anti-Ballot arguments, which he is quite right in regarding as the strongest; namely, that the franchise is a trust for the public, and the voter should be responsible to the public for the use made of it.

There are two ways in which a writer might meet this argument. He might admit the moral responsibility of the elector, and the beneficial effect on his mind of fulfilling his trust under the eye and criticism of those who are interested in its right fulfilment; but, he might say, the voters are in such a state of helpless dependence—each of them, so to speak, has a tyrant with eyes so fiercely glaring on him—that since his vote, if known to his friends and family, will be known to his master, the salutary influences of honour and shame cannot be admitted without letting in, along with them, the more powerful ones of terror. Darkness is the only element in which the voter can be free to do his duty; and we must trust, for a good vote, to such spontaneous feelings of conscience and patriotism as may not need the support of publicity. This would reduce the question to one of fact, on which every one would form his own opinion. He who thinks that the electors, or a large proportion of them, are in this state of compulsory subjection, will probably be a supporter of the Ballot; though, even then, he ought to ask himself whether this slavish dependence is likely to last, whether the whole of the changes now taking place in society do not tend to its diminution, and even extinction. There might be a good case against its being yet time to abolish the Ballot, if we had always had it, and yet no case in favour of introducing, for a temporary purpose, a novelty which, when the time comes for which we ought to be looking, will be mischievous, and which has a decided tendency to unfit men for that coming time.

This, however, in our judgment, is the only line of defence for the Ballot which can ever be, to a certain extent, tenable. The author of the pamphlet has not chosen this mode. He prefers to reject the principle of electoral responsibility altogether. He does not deny the voter to be discharging a duty, for which he is accountable to conscience; on the contrary, a high sense of duty to the public is always present to the author’s mind. But he thinks that responsibility to public opinion will seldom operate with much force; that, when it does, it will as often operate on the wrong side as on the right; and that the voter is more likely to vote well if left to his personal promptings, uninfluenced by praise or blame from Edition: current; Page: [1214] anyone. For, “if you place him by the Ballot quite beyond the reach of the improper control of other men, you leave to the elector no intelligible interest except that of the body of which he is a member—his interest as a citizen.” (P. 12.) It would hardly be fair to hold the author to this dictum, to which, we are sure, he could not, on consideration, adhere. Has no elector any private interest but what other people’s bribes or threats create for him? We will not take advantage, against the author, of his own exaggerations. We will give his argument a liberal construction. He means, and in many places says, that in the absence of other motives to an honest vote, we may safely rely on the voter’s interest as a citizen; his share of the public interest.

Now, we venture to say that this motive, in the common course of things, does not operate at all, or only in the slightest possible degree, on the mind either of an elector or of a member of Parliament. When he votes honestly, he is thinking of voting honestly, not of the fraction of a fraction of an interest which he, as an individual, may have in what is beneficial to the public. That minute benefit is not only too insignificant in amount, but too uncertain, too distant, and too hazy, to have any real effect on his mind. His motive, when it is an honourable one, is the desire to do right. We will not term it patriotism or moral principle, in order not to ascribe to the voter’s state of mind a solemnity that does not belong to it. But he votes for a particular man or measure because he thinks it the right thing to do, the proper thing for the good of the country. Once in a thousand times, as in a case of peace and war, or of taking off taxes, the thought may cross him that he shall save a few pounds or shillings in his year’s expenditure if the side he votes for prevails. But these cases are few, and, even in them, the interested motive is not the prevailing one. It is possible, indeed, that he or his class may have a private interest acting in the same direction with the public interest, as a man who has speculated for a fall in corn has an interest in a good harvest; and this may determine his conduct. But, in that case, it is the private interest that actuates him, not his share of the public interest.

Since, then, the real motive which induces a man to vote honestly is, for the most part, not an interested motive in any form, but a social one, the point to be decided is, whether the social feelings connected with an act, and the sense of social duty in performing it, can be expected to be as powerful when the act is done in secret, and he can neither be admired for disinterested, nor blamed for mean and selfish conduct. But this question is answered as soon as stated. When, in every other act of a man’s life which concerns his duties to others, publicity and criticism ordinarily improve his conduct, it cannot be that voting for a member of Parliament is the single case in which he will act better for being sheltered against all comment.

The author, indeed, says with truth, and it is his strongest point, that public opinion is itself one of the misleading influences. In the first place, the public opinion nearest to the voter may be that of his own class, and may side with, Edition: current; Page: [1215] instead of counteracting, the class interest. Besides, the opinion of the general public has its aberrations, too, and its most violent action is apt to be its worst. “At periods of political excitement, the practical sense to an elector of the phrase, ‘Responsibility to public opinion,’ is too often this: Go up to that polling-booth and, at your peril, vote for any candidate but the popular candidate.” (P. 42.) Such cases of physical violence are not what we have here to consider. If voters are liable to be mobbed, and if the state of society, as at Rome in the time of Cicero, is so lawless that the public authorities cannot protect them, cadit quaestio the Ballot is indispensable; though, in that case, even the Ballot is a feeble protection. We are for leaving the voter open to the penalties of opinion, but not to those of brute force. The author overlooks what, under this limitation, is the most important feature of the case; he supposes that, if public opinion acts on the elector at all, it must act by dictating his vote. When it is violently exerted, it does so; but its more ordinary operation consists in making the voter more careful to act up to his own sincere opinion. It operates through the quiet comments of relatives, neighbours, and companions; noting instances of variance between professions and conduct, or in which a selfish private purpose or a personal grudge prevails over public duty. In countries used to free discussion, it is only in times of fierce public contention that a man is really disliked for voting in conformity to the opinion he is known to hold. If he is reproached even by opponents, it is for something paltry in the motive; and, if there is a paltry motive, it is generally no recondite one, but such as the opinion of those who know him can easily detect, and therefore may be able to restrain.

The author deems it a fallacy to distinguish between the election of members of a club and that of members of Parliament, on the ground that the voters in a club have no public duty. [Pp. 4-12.] They have a duty, he says, to the members of the club. This we altogether dispute. A club is a voluntary association, into which people enter for their individual pleasure, and are not accountable to one another. What is there wanted is, that each should declare by his vote what is agreeable to himself; whatever has then a majority is proved to be agreeable to the majority, and whoever dislikes it can leave the association. But if we were all born members of a club, and had no means, except emigration, of exchanging our club for any other, then, indeed, the voter would really be bound to consult the interests of the other members, the case would be assimilated to that of an election to Parliament, and the Ballot, accordingly, would be objectionable.

There is no room to follow the writer though all his arguments, but we cannot leave unnoticed the answer he makes to the objection that the Ballot would lead to lying. To this he replies, that lies are of very different degrees of criminality; that there are many greater moral delinquencies than “the lie of legitimate self-defence;” [p. 67] that a dishonest vote, given from a selfish motive, is worse; that such a vote ought to be called a falsehood; and that to think so rigorously of the mere breach of verbal truth, and so gently of a grave violation Edition: current; Page: [1216] of public duty, is shallow and false morality. In all this we heartily concur; but the fact remains, that the majority of mankind do feel the lie an offence and a degradation, and do not so feel respecting the breach of public duty. We would gladly make them think a dishonest vote as bad as a lie, but it is to be feared we should only succeed in making them think a lie no worse than a dishonest vote. When people have only a few of the moral feelings they ought to have, there is the more danger in weakening those few. This is a truth which many moral saws in general circulation overlook. We are often told, for example, that an equivocation is as bad as a lie. It is well for mankind that everybody is not of this opinion, and that not all who will equivocate will lie. For the temptation to equivocate is often almost irresistible; indeed, the proposition, that everything which can be termed an equivocation is necessarily condemnable, is only true in those cases and those relations in life in which it is a duty to be absolutely open and unreserved. But to confine ourselves to what is really culpable: a person may be a habitual equivocator of a bad kind, he may have no scruple at all in implying what is not true, and yet, if when categorically questioned he shrinks from an express falsehood, this ultimate hold on him makes it still possible for his fellow-creatures to trust his word. Let no one underrate the importance of what mankind would gain if the precise literal meaning of men’s assertions could be kept conformable to fact. There may be much unworthy cunning and treachery notwithstanding, but the difference for all human purposes is immense between him who respects that final barrier and those who overleap it.

Did space permit, we might point out some cases in which the author, though habitually candid, yields to the temptation of caricaturing an opponent’s argument; as in charging a writer (pp. 31-2 and 48) with arguing as if all votes, given under the shelter of the Ballot, would be base or selfish, when the only thing asserted, or needed was that some would.1 But we prefer to quote a passage which tells strongly against the writer, and in favour of our own case:

A century ago, before the virtuous example of the first William Pitt had made it dishonourable in members of Parliament to hold their votes at the disposal of the dispensers of the public money, it might almost have been a question whether the incontestable advantages of publicity were not too dearly bought at the cost of that mass of political turpitude which it would have been possible, by means of the Ballot, to sweep from within the walls of Parliament.

(P. 24.)

If, at the time spoken of, our ancestors, to get rid of this mass of turpitude, had introduced the Ballot into the House of Commons, they would have done the exact parallel of what we should do if we adopted it in Parliamentary elections. And ought not the fact that all this profligacy has been got rid of without the Edition: current; Page: [1217] Ballot to be a lesson to us for the other case? We see that the progress of the public conscience could and did, in the space of a single generation, correct political immoralities more gross and mischievous than those which now remain, and apparently harder to remove, because affecting the élite, socially speaking, of the nation. Such an example in times when the public conscience was much less alive, and its improvement far less rapid than now, ought to reassure us, to say the least, as to the necessity of the Ballot, and should deter us from putting on the badge of slavery at the very time when a few more steps and a very little additional effort will land us in complete freedom.

J.S.M.

414.: THE WESTMINSTER ELECTION [2] THE TIMES, 22 JULY, 1865, P. 2

For the background, see No. 412. William Henry Smith (1825-91), head of the well-known bookselling firm, a liberal-conservative, had since entered the race, and Sir John Villiers Shelley had retired; on 12 July Mill and Grosvenor were elected with votes of 4525 and 4534 respectively. Mill’s letter of thanks appeared in other papers on 22 July, including the Daily News. Headed “Westminster Election,” the letter (not listed in Mill’s bibliography) is introduced by this note: “The following letter from Mr. J.S. Mill, M.P., to the Liberal electors of Westminster, has been forwarded to us for publication:”. In the Daily News it is dated “Blackheath Park, July 21.” The text below is that of The Times, which has been collated with the Daily News, 22 July, 1865, p. 2; in the variant notes the text of the latter is signalled by “DN”.

gentlemen,—

The triumphant reassertion of the principle of purity of election in its largest sense, by the selection of a representative in Parliament on public grounds alone, against an unexampled combination of personal and pecuniary influences, is a lasting honour to Westminster and benefit to the popular cause. The victory is wholly yours, not mine, since I only appeared among you in the last stage of the contest to meet the desire expressed for a fuller explanation of my opinions. But the address just issued by the committee1 seems to demand that I should join with them in hearty and grateful acknowledgments to the Liberal electors generally, and especially to the great number who, by their strenuous and disinterested personal exertions, renewed the lesson so often forgotten, of the power of a high and generous purpose over bodies of citizens accustomed to free political action.

aElectors!a your work is done, and mine has now to be commenced. The Edition: current; Page: [1218] unsought confidence which you have placed in me has laid on me an obligation which it would heavily tax powers far superior to mine adequately to fulfil. That I may not fall so far below your hopes as to make you regret your choice, will be my constant and earnest endeavour.

415.: THE BALLOT DAILY NEWS, 31 JULY, 1868, P. 5

John Bright (who had been closely allied with Mill on many issues in the House of Commons) gave a speech to his constituents on 24 July, 1868, in which he predicted that the ballot, especially in the large constituencies, would be required “merely as a matter of election machinery.” He went on: “Even Mr. Stuart Mill, who had long objected to the ballot, was becoming a convert, and was of opinion that it might be tried in Ireland” (“Mr. Bright at Birmingham,” The Times, 25 July, p. 12). Mill’s response (not listed in his bibliography) is headed “Mr. Mill on the Ballot” with the subhead, “To the Editor of the Daily News,” and is dated “Blackheath-park, July 29.” It appeared also in the Beehive, 8 Aug., 1868, p. 7, without substantive variants.

sir,—

As it would appear from the report of Mr. Bright’s eloquent speech at Birmingham that there exists some misapprehension concerning my present opinion on the ballot, I should be obliged by your permitting me to state that my opinion is as decidedly unfavourable to the ballot as it ever was; that I should see its adoption with regret in any part of the United Kingdom; that I spoke against it in a meeting of my constituents on the same evening on which Mr. Bright was speaking at Birmingham; and that I voted against its adoption in Ireland at the division on it this session.1—I am, etc.,

J.S. Mill

Edition: current; Page: [1219]

416.: GLADSTONE FOR GREENWICH THE TIMES, 22 SEPT., 1868, P. 7

Gladstone having become unpopular in his constituency of South Lancashire because of his position on the Irish Church, he was put forward as a candidate for Greenwich without his solicitation, and in the event elected there, while losing his South Lancashire seat. The committee proposing him called a meeting at Deptford on 16 Sept., inviting Mill and others to speak. (See “Election Intelligence. Greenwich,” The Times, 17 Sept., p. 10.) As Mill explained in a letter to William Cox Bennett on 14 Sept., “Mr. Dickson, whom I understand to be the Secretary for Deptford, wrote to me during your absence, asking me either to attend or to write a letter; and as I was unable to attend, I sent him a letter for the purpose of being read at the meeting, the receipt of which he has acknowledged” (LL, CW, Vol. XVI, p. 1440). The letter, dated “Avignon, August 28,” and headed “Mr. John Stuart Mill and Mr. Gladstone,” is introduced by the following sentence: “The following is the text of the letter from Mr. John Stuart Mill, read at the meeting held at Deptford, on Wednesday evening, to support the election of Mr. Gladstone for the borough of Greenwich:”. A shortened version of the letter appeared also in the Daily News, 17 Sept., 1868, p. 3, under the heading “Election Intelligence / Greenwich.” The letter is not listed in Mill’s bibliography.

dear sir,—

I am greatly honoured by your invitation to be present at your meeting for promoting the election of Mr. Gladstone for the borough of Greenwich, and should have been very happy to attend it had I been in England. The example which Greenwich is now setting is a valuable one, which we may hope to see more generally followed when the true importance of political action is more justly appreciated, and when politics arouse more of the interest that is justly due to them. The example of electing a public man, without any solicitation on his part, and without any consideration of whether he may also be elected elsewhere, as a tribute to his character, and as an expression of the strength of the feeling in his favour, is happily not new in our political history. It is too natural a thing to do, when people feel as warmly as they often ought to feel, and the unanswerable evidence of public confidence it gives in a great man too obviously must strengthen him and the cause he serves, for the example not to have been set on several occasions (in the cases of Mr. Cobden and Lord Brougham, among others),1 when political feeling was strong and the merits of the public man conspicuous. It would be much to be regretted if such examples as these were allowed to die out; and Greenwich is doing a public service by reviving them, by strengthening a statesman whose public services have aroused Edition: current; Page: [1220] a bitterness which is the best tribute of their value, and by adding to his power to carry through some more of the many important reforms that must not be long retarded if England is to hold its honourable place among nations.—I am, &c.,

J.S. Mill

417.: BOUVERIE VERSUS CHADWICK THE TIMES, 22 OCT., 1868, P. 3

For the election of 1868, Mill wished to find a seat for his friend Edwin Chadwick; by strongly endorsing him for the borough of Kilmarnock, he incurred the ire of Edward Pleydell Bouverie (1818-89), a Liberal hostile to Gladstone who had represented the borough since 1844. The Times of 16 Oct., 1868, p. 10, printed a letter of Bouverie’s to Mill complaining of Mill’s sowing dissension in the Liberal party, as well as Mill’s reply, and Bouverie’s further rejoinder (Mill’s reply is in LL, CW, Vol. XVI, pp. 1453-4). The paragraph printed here introduces another reply by Mill (ibid., pp. 1460-4), which is not listed in his bibliography. On the envelope of the MS draft of that reply at Johns Hopkins is written in Mill’s hand “For publication as chiefly Helen’s” (i.e., his step-daughter Helen Taylor’s). The letter is headed “Mr. Mill and Mr. Bouverie,” with the subhead, “To the Editor of The Times,” and is dated “Avignon, Oct. 19.” On the same day the letter appeared in the Daily News (p. 5) under the heading “Mr. Mill on the Character of Liberal Candidates. / To the Editor of the Daily News.”

sir,—

Mr. Bouverie having forwarded to you a correspondence between us, and his last letter having appeared in The Times before I had received it, I take the liberty of asking permission to reply to it through The Times.—I am, &c.,

This letter was addressed to Julia Ward Howe (1819-1910), reformer and author, the President of the New England Woman’s Suffrage Association, founded in Boston in 1868 chiefly by Lucy Stone (1818-93) and including prominent reformers such as Wendell Phillips. The association, having been unsuccessful in enfranchising women along with negroes in the 15th amendment to the Constitution, was now working for a 16th. The letter, dated “Avignon, April 18, 1869,” is not listed in Mill’s bibliography. It appeared, under the heading “Woman Suffrage / Letter from J. Stuart Mill—the XVIth Constitutional Amendment,” as part of an account beginning, “Boston, May 26. A Public meeting, which was largely attended, was held by the New-England Woman’s Suffrage Association, in Horticultural Hall, today, Julia Ward Howe presiding. Prayer was offered by the Rev. Mrs. P.N. Hannaford. Letters, sympathizing with the movement, were received from Robert Collyer, Anna Dickinson, J. Stuart Mill, George William Curtis, Mrs. E.D. Cheeny, and the Hon. George T. Hoar. The following is the letter of Mr. Mill:”.

Edition: current; Page: [1221]

dear madame,—

I am very much honored by the wish of the New-England Woman’s Suffrage Association that I should be present at their annual meeting, but they have been misinformed as to my having any present intention of visiting America. Should I ever contemplate such a visit, there are no persons on your side of the Atlantic with whom it would give me more pleasure to exchange marks of sympathy than with those who are working so energetically for a cause so dear to me as that of the equal claim of all human beings, independent of sex, to the full rights of citizenship, and freedom of competition, on equal terms, for all social advantages.

I am, etc., very sincerely yours,

J.S. Mill

419.: THE CASE OF WILLIAM SMITH UNPUBLISHED LETTER TO THE DAILY NEWS [LATE 1869 TO EARLY 1870]

William Smith, police constable, had been tried and punished for striking an Irish labourer and felt-maker, Patrick Macgovern, in the course of stopping Macgovern’s assault on his wife Eliza. The case was reported in “The Police Courts. Thames,” Daily News, 25 Dec., 1869, p. 2, from which Mill quotes. For Mill’s efforts to interest the Attorney-General, Sir Robert Porrett Collier, and the editor of the Daily News, Frank Harrison Hill, in Smith’s reinstatement, see LL, CW, Vol. XVII, pp. 1677-9, and 1705-6. A long leader appeared in the Daily News, 18 Jan., 1870, pp. 4-5; one may assume that a fair copy of this unsigned draft (MS, Yale) was sent to the Daily News (which did not print it) as part of Mill’s unsuccessful campaign. The letter, being unpublished, is not in Mill’s bibliography.

sir,—

I beg you to receive the inclosed £5 as the commencement of a subscription for the benefit of the police constable William Smith, No. 151 K, who as I learn from your paper of Dec. 25 has been sentenced by Mr. Benson, the Thames Police magistrate,1 to a month’s imprisonment and hard labour for striking with his staff a man who had only knocked down his own wife in the street.

“The assault,” said Mr. Benson, meaning not the man’s assault upon his wife but the constable’s assault upon the man, “was unprovoked, brutal, and unjustifiable” and it has gone forth from the seat of justice to the whole brutal part of the population, that for a man to knock down a woman, provided that woman is his wife, is no “provocation” and that a month’s penal servitude is a proper penalty, not for the ruffian himself but for the appointed guardian of the public peace who interferes with his authorized brutality.

For my own part, it seems to me that the policeman who thinks that men’s wives are within the pale of legal protection and who, astonishing as the idea Edition: current; Page: [1222] was to the man himself and to the magistrate, thinks it his duty not to look on passively and see them maltreated, deserves a signal mark of public approbation, which cannot in this instance take a better shape than that of a subscription to compensate him for the suffering and degradation as well as the pecuniary loss inflicted on him by this iniquitous sentence.

420.: THE EDUCATION BILL SPECTATOR, 9 APR., 1870, P. 465

At a National Education League meeting, held Friday, 25 Mar., 1870, chaired by Sir Charles Dilke, Mill was the principal speaker (The Times, 26 Mar., p. 5). The meeting was called to protest the power given to School Boards to found denominational schools at public expense, in the Government’s “Bill to Provide for Public Elementary Education in England and Wales,” 33 Victoria (17 Feb., 1870), PP, 1870, I, 505-42. (In the event, when the Bill became law as 33 & 34 Victoria, c. 75, the powers of the denominations were much curtailed.) The Spectator commented on the issues and Mill’s views in “The Secularists in Full Cry,” 2 Apr., pp. 425-6, from which the quotations are taken. Mill’s letter, not listed in his bibliography, is in the “Letters to the Editor” column, headed “Mr. J.S. Mill and the Education Bill,” with the subhead, “To the Editor of the ‘Spectator.’ ”

sir,—

Having full belief in your not intending to misrepresent, though (if you will allow me to say so) not equal confidence in the carefulness and accuracy of all your representations, I do not doubt that you will permit me to correct a serious misstatement which pervades the whole of your last Saturday’s comments on the Education meeting at St. James’s Hall. The writer affirms again and again, with sundry uncomplimentary remarks on the inconsistencies and other irrationalities therein implied, that in my speech at that meeting I advocated and asked for the system of the British Schools,1 which he describes as the merely formal reading of a portion of the Bible “as a kind of grace before meat to secular lessons.” I challenge your writer to point out a single word of my speech which either expresses or implies approval of the “British system,” or of the employment of the Bible in rate-supported schools at all. I referred to the British system only as a proof that the Dissenters do not desire their distinctive doctrines to be taught in schools, and would consequently derive no advantage from the fund which the Bill gives them, where they are the stronger party,2 of practising this injustice to the detriment of the Established Church.

For myself, though I regard the British system as greatly preferable to the Edition: current; Page: [1223] merely denominational, yet, on any other footing than as the less of two evils, I decidedly object to it, as unjust to Catholics, Jews, and the Secularists, and for other reasons.

421.: THE TREATY OF 1856 [1] THE TIMES, 19 NOV., 1870, P. 5

On 31 Oct., 1870, the Russian government issued a declaration repudiating the neutralization of the Black Sea required by the Treaty of Paris of 1856. The declaration, sent by Prince Gortschakoff to Baron Bunnow, was communicated to Earl Granville on 9 Nov. (see “The Treaty of 1856: Prince Gortschakoff’s Note,” The Times, 18 Nov., p. 3). The action caused a war scare in England. Mill sent this letter to The Times through Leonard Courtney (see LL, CW, Vol. XVII, p. 1775), who was a leader writer for The Times, and may have been responsible for leading articles on 16, 17, and 19 November professing the attitudes to which Mill was objecting. In her continuation of Mill’s Autobiography, Helen Taylor says this and the following letter (No. 422) “were called forth by a cry, that arose at that time in a portion of the English press, for plunging England into a war with Russia. They were the first protest that appeared in any well known name against such a war; they called forth others and helped calm down the warlike excitement that was being aroused.” (CW, Vol. I, p. 626.) Mill’s “Treaty Obligations” in December took up the same issues (CW, Vol. XXI, pp. 341-8), as does No. 423. This letter, headed “Mr. Mill on the Treaty of 1856,” with the subhead, “To the Editor of The Times,” is described in Mill’s bibliography as “A letter in the Times of Nov. 19, 1870 on the threatened war with Russia”

(MacMinn, p. 99).

sir,—

Without wishing, at least for the present, to discuss the character of the declaration just made by the Russian Government—a discussion which would raise questions, both moral and political, more intricate and difficult than people Edition: current; Page: [1224] seem to be aware of—may I hope from your impartiality that you will allow expression to be given through your columns to the opinion of at least one Englishman, which he believes to be shared by multitudes of his countrymen, that for England to let herself be drawn into war by this provocation or on this account would be nothing less than monstrous.

This is not the doctrine of a partisan of peace at any price. Had we, at the first breaking out of the present hateful war,1 declared that whichever nation first invaded the territory of the other should have England also for its foe, we should, at an extremely small risk to ourselves, in all human probability have prevented the war, and perhaps given commencement to a new era in the settlement of international differences. To effect this great good to humanity and to public morals, we did not choose to incur a mere chance of being involved in a war, and in my opinion we were wrong, and have exposed ourselves to the just recriminations of the suffering people—I do not speak of the governments—of Germany and France. Were we now to plunge into a war infinitely more dangerous to ourselves, and for which we are materially speaking totally unprepared, those among us who are the causes of our so doing will, in my judgment, deserve and receive the execration of the people of England.

The honour of England is not concerned either in the protection of Turkey or in the humiliation of Russia. Treaties are not made to be eternal, and before we go to war for the maintenance of one it behoves the nation at least to consider whether it would enter into it afresh at the present day.2 We should have learnt little, indeed, from the spectacle that has been going on before our eyes during the last four months if we allow our journalists to hurry us into a war under the plea of honour, merely because of the manner or the form in which Russia has thought fit to throw off an obligation the substance of which we all admit we ought to be ready to reconsider.

I am, &c.,

J.S. Mill

422.: THE TREATY OF 1856 [2] THE TIMES, 24 NOV., 1870, P. 3

Anthony Ashley Cooper, 7th Earl of Shaftesbury, criticized the views of Mill expressed in No. 421, in a letter headed “Lord Shaftesbury on the Russian Note,” The Times, 22 Nov., p. 3, from which Mill quotes in this reply, headed “The Treaty of 1856,” with the subhead, “To the Editor of The Times.” It is described in Mill’s bibliography as “A further letter on the same subject [as No. 421] in the Times of Nov. 24, 1870”

(MacMinn, p. 99).

Edition: current; Page: [1225]

sir,—

The letter in which Lord Shaftesbury, in your paper of Tuesday, the 22d, animadverted upon a letter of mine which you did me the favour to insert, deserves so much respect for its manifestly conscientious feeling, and states the question, besides, so neatly and compactly, that I must address myself to your courtesy for an opportunity of, if possible, setting myself right with him.

The opinion which I maintain concerning treaties is very remote indeed from that which Lord Shaftesbury ascribes to me. He understands me to have said that a country is not bound “to observe” the terms of a treaty “unless they be so convenient that the country would be ready to enter on them afresh.” What I did say is, that a country is not bound to enforce the observance of terms which it has imposed on others, “until it has considered whether it would impose them afresh at the present day.”1 And if it not only would not, but, according to its present judgment, ought not to impose them afresh, it is not merely not bound to go to war for their enforcement, but would commit a great crime if it did so.

There is a wide difference between affirming that I may break a promise, as soon as it is inconvenient to me to keep it, and maintaining that if another person breaks a promise made to me I am not necessarily bound to shed his blood. I cannot believe that Lord Shaftesbury, with the two doctrines before him, will hold the latter to be “one in principle” with the former.

Let the people of England, then, deliberately consider whether a stipulation denying to a country the legitimate liberty possessed by all other countries, of maintaining military and naval defences on its own coast, is one which they think they have a right permanently to impose. If not, then in however objectionable a manner the claim may be disputed we shall be criminal if we go to war to enforce it.

Having now, as I hope, cleared myself from the very serious charge brough against me by Lord Shaftesbury, allow me to make one more remark.

Treaties are the promises of nations; and in the breach of a treaty, as in that of a private promise, there are all degrees of guilt, from some of the gravest to some of the most venial. The degree of Russia’s guilt in this particular repudiation of treaty is not to be decided off hand. I have no desire to extenuate it, but it is not pertinent to the question. It is sufficient that treaties and other engagements will be broken if they are imposed without limit as to duration. An individual, however, has no power of promising anything beyond the duration of his mortal life; but nations have the wild folly to make, and to exact, engagements for all time. Mankind, happily, are now beginning to find out that anything whatever to which a nation attempts to bind either itself or others in perpetuity, be it a Constitution, a dynasty, an irrevocable law, a particular disposition of public or private property, or whatever else, will assuredly, at some time or other, require to be, and will actually be, shaken off by those to whom it is injurious. The present generation has had sufficiently convincing experience that to this rule Edition: current; Page: [1226] treaties are no exception. Lord Shaftesbury warns England, if the Russian doctrine be admitted, to “take good care never to contract another” treaty. The warning I would give is, if we wish to be able successfully to combat the Russian doctrine, to make no more treaties except for terms of years.

Seeking support for the views expressed in Nos. 421 and 422, Mill sent this letter to The Times as a cover for one from Emile Louis Victor, baron de Laveleye (1822-92), a Belgian political economist for whom he had a high regard. The letter, headed “M. de Laveleye on the Eastern Question,” with the subhead, “To the Editor of The Times,” is not listed in Mill’s bibliography.

sir,—

I shall be obliged if you will give a place in The Times to the accompanying extract from a private letter written by M. Emile de Laveleye, and showing in what light the war which we are urged to undertake is regarded by one of the most enlightened public writers of the Continent, from the impartial position of a Belgian citizen.

424.: THE SOCIETY OF ARTS DAILY NEWS, 27 MAR., 1871, P. 5

In the Daily News of 25 Mar., p. 5, the following notice appeared: “Mr. John Stuart Mill is expected to take the chair, next Wednesday, at the Society of Arts, when Miss Emily Faithfull will read a paper on ‘Women’s work, with special reference to industrial employment.’ ” Faithfull (1835-95) was the founder of the Victoria Press, which employed women compositors and printed, among other things, the Transactions of the National Association for the Promotion of Social Science. The address she delivered at the meeting on 29 Mar. was printed as “Woman’s Work, with Special Reference to Industrial Edition: current; Page: [1227] Employment,” Journal of the Society of Arts, XIX (31 Mar., 1871), 378-83. Mill’s letter (not in his bibliography), is dated only from “Blackheath-park, Kent,” and headed “Mr. Mill and the Society of Arts,” with the subhead, “To the Editor of the Daily News.” A copy also appeared under the heading “The Penalties of Celebrity,” in The Times, 27 Mar., p. 12. The text below is that of the Daily News, which has been collated with that in The Times; in the variant notes the latter is signalled by “TT”.

sir,—

The assertion which appeared in ayour papera of Saturday, bMarch 25b, that I am expected to take the chair at a meeting of the Society of Arts next Wednesday is without any foundation. I have no intention of being present at the meeting at all. I am glad to take this opportunity of protesting against a habit which is growing up, of making those misleading statements through the medium of the public press or otherwise. It has gained ground to such a degree as to have become a nuisance to almost every man whose name is well known; placing him under the alternative of making public contradictions of such statements, or of allowing his name to be used for the purpose of exciting false expectations. I shall be obliged by your giving publicity to this, and remain, sir,

425.: ADVICE TO LAND REFORMERS EXAMINER, 4 JAN., 1873, PP. 1-2

In 1869 Mill was Chairman of the Provisional Committee to establish the Land Tenure Reform Association, and was responsible in large measure for its proposals, published as Programme of the Land Tenure Reform Association, with an Explanatory Statement by John Stuart Mill (London: Longmans, et al., 1871); in CW, Vol. V, pp. 687-95. The work of the Association, along with the women’s suffrage movement, absorbed most of his energy in his last years, and it is appropriate that his last three newspaper writings should be on land tenure, and that they should appear in the Examiner, where the bulk of his journalism appeared. Helen Taylor’s continuation of Mill’s Autobiography concludes: “In the autumn and winter [of 1872] he wrote . . . two articles for the Examiner (published January 4th and 11th, 1873) on Land Reform” (CW, Vol. I, p. 627). In a letter to Cairnes of 8 Jan., 1873, after welcoming Cairnes’ agreement with him on the question of the land held by endowed institutions, Mill remarks that he and his daughter are occasionally sending articles to the Examiner now, hoping to help build it up once more as “an organ of opinion allied to our own” (LL, CW, Vol. XVII, p. 1933).

This article, in the “Political and Social” section, is headed as title, and is described in his bibliography as “An article headed ‘Advice to Land Reformers’ in the Examiner of 4 Edition: current; Page: [1228] January 1873” (MacMinn, p. 101). The article was combined by Helen Taylor with No. 426 and printed in the posthumous fourth volume of Dissertations and Discussions (London: Longman, et al., 1875), under the title “Advice to Land Reformers,” pp. 266-77 (in which this article ends at p. 272.31).

now, when the question of the constitution and limits of property in land has fairly come to the front, and a majority of Liberal politicians find it needful to include in their programme some improvement in the existing arrangements on that subject, it is time to consider which among the minor modifications that alone find favour with the more timid or more cautious innovators deserve to be supported by those who desire greater changes, and which are those that should be opposed, either as giving a renewed sanction to wrong principles, or as raising up new private interests hostile to a thorough reform. There are at present two proposals affecting property in land which engage a considerable and increasing amount of public attention: one, the abrogation of the right of primogeniture, and the abolition or great restriction of the power of making settlements of land;1 the other, that corporations and endowed institutions should be required to sell their lands, and invest the proceeds in the funds or other public securities.2 The difference between these two projects affords an illustration of the principles which, we think, should guide the judgment of land tenure reformers in matters of this nature. The former of the two is, in our opinion, entitled to their full support; the latter should be strenuously resisted by them.

Before proceeding farther, it is right to explain whom we mean by land tenure reformers. On so new a question there are naturally many shades of opinion. There are some with whose plans we agree, others from whom we differ; we address ourselves equally to both. There are those who aim at what is called the nationalisation of the land; the substitution of collective for individual property in the soil, with reasonable compensation to the landowners. Their doctrine is far from being so irrational as is pretended; they have much to say for themselves. Nor is theirs a wholly untried theory. It has the feudal traditions, and the general practice of the East, on its side. Nevertheless, for reasons which we shall have many opportunities of stating, we are decidedly of opinion that, whatever may possibly be the case in a distant future, this scheme is altogether unsuited to the present time. But, short of this, there are modifications of the rights of landed property of a more or less fundamental character, which have already numerous supporters, and are likely, as we believe, before long to become widely popular. Edition: current; Page: [1229] There is the principle asserted by the Land Tenure Reform Association; that, inasmuch as land in a prosperous country brings in a constantly increasing income to its owner, apart from any exertion or expenditure on his part, it may and ought to be subjected to special taxation in virtue of that increase.3 Again, it is maintained that, inasmuch as the acknowledged end for which land is allowed to be appropriated, is that it may be made more productive, the right of property ought not to extend to that which remains unproductive: and that if large tracts of land are kept in a wild state by their owners, either for purposes of amusement, or because they cannot be let at a rent (though they might amply remunerate a labourer cultivating for himself) the State should resume them, paying only their present value.4 Again, there might be a limit set to the extent of territory which could be held by a single proprietor.5 Many other changes might be proposed, more or less extensive, more or less expedient, but all compatible with the maintenance of the institution of landed property in its broad outlines. Now, the reforms which are proposed on the subject of primogeniture, and of entails and settlements, are of a different character. Instead of limiting, they would increase the power over the land of the existing generation of landowners; and accordingly, the supporters of more drastic changes are much divided as to whether these particular measures ought or ought not to be supported.

Among the reasons for getting rid of the law of primogeniture and the existing laws of entail and settlement, the one which we oftenest hear, and which carries most weight with many of the assailants of those laws, is that by keeping land out of the market they detain it in too few hands, and that their abolition would increase the number of landed proprietors. The long and obstinate prejudice which existed against peasant properties, grounded on the densest ignorance of their actual operation in the countries where they prevail, has given way before more correct information. Those who fancied that peasant proprietors must be wretched cultivators because cottier tenants are so, have learnt that some of the best agriculture in the world is to be found where such properties abound: those who thought that peasant proprietorship breeds over-population, and converts a country into a “pauper-warren,”6 now know that its tendency is rather towards the other extreme. Within a few years, therefore, the existence of peasant properties has come to be regarded by English philanthropists as eminently desirable, and the removal of all obstacles to it has become an aim of advanced politicians; and primogeniture and entail being such obstacles, their abolition is advocated on that ground. But it has come to pass that the same thing which recommends this measure to one class of land reformers, renders another class worse than indifferent to it. Multiplication of proprietors is not the kind of reform Edition: current; Page: [1230] which finds favour with a large section of the more thoroughgoing land reformers. Many of them believe that an addition to the number of private owners of land is but an addition to the number of the enemies of the larger changes which they meditate. They think, and in this they are not mistaken, that the wide diffusion of landed property in some Continental countries, and especially in France, is in these countries the great obstacle to any improvement in the conditions of ownership: and they look with no good will on anything which tends, in ever so small a degree, to approximate, in this respect, the British state of things to the French.

We agree, to a considerable extent, with the general views on which this judgment is grounded; but we do not think that the question of abolishing primogeniture and entail is a case for their application. Whether the creation of a class of peasant-proprietors would be a good thing or a bad, we are of opinion that the reforms in question would not have that effect; while they would produce benefits which, even from the exclusive point of view of the land-reformers, might well outweigh some amount of the inconvenience they apprehend.

To what extent these measures would practically operate in causing land to be brought into the market, it is very difficult at present to foresee; but there is no probability that, of such as might be sold, much would come into the hands of small proprietors. As long as the private wealth of the country and its social condition are what they are, the rich will always outbid the poor in the land market. We are speaking, of course, of rural land, of which alone the possession is an object of desire to the wealthy classes. Land in towns, or so close to them as to be available for streets, might often obtain a higher price in small lots; such lots as would enable prudent and economical working people to become the owners of the houses they live in; which we hold to be an unqualified good: nor is it likely that even the most extreme plans of land reform would disturb such persons in the possession. The land of the country at large outside the towns might possibly come to be shared among a greater number of rich families than at present; but sales by the rich to the rich do not really add to the number of those whose interests and feelings are engaged on the side of landlordism; for the rich who wish to be landlords are already as much wedded to landlord privileges as they would be when they actually became so. Reformers, therefore, either moderate or extreme, need have no fear that the facilitation of the sale of land already appropriated should raise up additional obstacles to their projects.

On the other hand, the measures in question would be attended with no small amount of positive benefit. In the first place, whatever transfers of landed property might really be occasioned by these changes would be in the direction of agricultural improvement. True it is that, according to the present ideas of landed property, landlords are neither required nor expected to do anything for the land; but some landlords are more disposed to do so than others; and the purchasers are Edition: current; Page: [1231] almost always a more improving class of landowners than those from whom they purchase. It is the capitalist and man of business who buys; it is the needy and the spendthrift who sell. The whole tendency is thus to improve the cultivation and increase the produce of the country. But there is a still greater benefit than this, and one which is often not sufficiently appreciated. The principle of the laws of primogeniture and entail is radically wrong; and to get rid of a bad principle, and put a better in its place, is equivalent to a very considerable amount of practical gain. The preference of one child above all the rest, without any superiority of personal claims, is an injustice. The power given to an owner of property to exercise control over it after it has passed into the hands of those to whom it devolves on his death, is, as a rule (with certain obvious exceptions), both an injustice and an absurdity. Moreover, the end for which these institutions are kept up ought to be their sufficient condemnation in the eyes of advanced reformers. The purpose of their existence is to retain the land, not only in the families which now possess it, but in a certain line of succession within those families, from eldest son to eldest son. They are a contrivance for maintaining an aristocratical order in unimpaired territorial wealth from generation to generation, in spite of the faults which its existing members may commit, and at the sacrifice both of justice between the heir and the other children, and of the interest which all the existing members of the family may have in selling the land. The aristocratic spirit, more powerful than the personal interest of each living member of the body, postpones the private wishes of the existing generation to the interest of the order in maintaining an aristocratic monopoly of the land. The possession of the land is the centre round which aristocratic feeling revolves; and the removal of the two props of the monopoly, though its immediate practical effect would probably be small, should be welcome to all who wish to dissolve the connection between landed property and aristocratic institutions.

We think, then, that all land reformers, whatever may be their ulterior views, should unite in supporting the abrogation of the law of primogeniture and the reform of the law of settlement. We must reserve for another article our reasons for thinking quite otherwise of the proposal recently broached (and which has derived importance from the strong advocacy of the Times and from the interpretation put upon a speech of Mr. Goschen) for requiring all corporate bodies and endowed institutions to part with their lands by sale to private individuals.7

J.S. Mill

Edition: current; Page: [1232]

426.: SHOULD PUBLIC BODIES BE REQUIRED TO SELL THEIR LANDS? EXAMINER, 11 JAN., 1873, PP. 29-30

For the background of Goschen’s proposal and The Times’ support, and for the article’s appearance in Dissertations and Discussions, Vol. IV, pp. 272-7, see No. 425. This leader, in the “Political and Social” section and headed as title, is described in Mill’s bibliography as “An article headed ‘Should public bodies be required to sell their lands?’ in the Examiner of 11th January 1873” (MacMinn, p. 101). This is the final entry in Mill’s bibliography.

a considerable sensation seems to have been excited by the quite unexpected appearance a few weeks ago, in the Times, of two articles strenuously contending that corporate bodies and endowed institutions should no longer be permitted to withhold land from the market, and that the principle of the Mortmain Acts1 should be so far extended as to compel all such bodies or institutions to sell their lands and invest the proceeds in Government securities. The coincidence of this manifestation by the Times with a speech of Mr. Goschen, some expressions in which were supposed to point to a similar conclusion, has led to a suspicion that the Government is throwing out feelers preparatory to some actual proposal of the kind suggested. And the papers that are bitterly hostile to the present Government, whenever its political and social policy is other than that of keeping things as they are, have not missed the opportunity of upbraiding the Government with making an unworthy concession to the land tenure reformers, who are represented as grasping at the opportunity of attacking landed property at its most easily assailable point.2

It is an odd supposition that reformers who are asserted to have, and some of whom really have, for their object the extinguishing of private and hereditary landed property altogether, desire to begin their operations by making a great mass of landed property private and hereditary which was not so before. Nothing could be more opposed to the principles and purposes of thorough-going land tenure reformers of every shade of opinion, than any further conversion of what is still, in some sense, a kind of public property, into private. The point on which they are all agreed, whether they desire anything further or not, is that, at all events, the appropriation of the land of the country by private individuals and families has gone far enough; and that a determined resistance should be made to any further extension of it, either by the stealing, euphemistically termed the inclosure, of commons, or by the alienation of lands held upon trust for public or semi-public objects. Far from allowing any land which is not already private Edition: current; Page: [1233] property to become so, the most moderate of these land reformers think that it may possibly be expedient, in districts where land not already appropriated does not abound, to redeem some part of that which is in private hands, by repurchasing it on account of the State.

Those countries are fortunate, or would be fortunate if decently governed, in which, as in a great part of the East, the land has not been allowed to become the permanent property of individuals, and the State consequently is the sole landlord. So far as the public expenditure is covered by the proceeds of the land, those countries are untaxed; for it is the same thing as being untaxed, to pay to the State only what would have to be paid to private landlords if the land were appropriated. The principle that the land belongs to the Sovereign, and that the expenses of government should be defrayed by it, is recognised in the theory of our own ancient institutions. The nearest thing to an absolute proprietor whom our laws know of is the freeholder, who is a tenant of the Crown; bound originally to personal service, in the field or at the plough, and, when that obligation was remitted, subject to a land tax intended to be equivalent to it. The first claim of the State has been foregone; the second has for two centuries been successfully evaded:3 but the original wrongdoers have been so long in their graves, and so much of the land has come into the hands of new possessors, who have bought it with their earnings at a price calculated on the unjust exemption, that the resumption of the land without indemnity would be correcting one injustice by another, while, if weighted with due compensation, it would be a measure of very doubtful profit to the State. But, though the State cannot replace itself in the fortunate condition in which it would now have been if it had reserved to itself from the beginning the whole rent of the land, this is no reason why it should go on committing the same mistake, and deprive itself of that natural increase of the rent which the possessors derive from the mere progress of wealth and population, without any exertion or sacrifice of their own. If the Grosvenor, Portman, and Portland estates belonged to the municipality of London, the gigantic incomes of those estates would probably suffice for the whole expense of the local government of the capital.4 But these gigantic incomes are still swelling; by the growth of London they may again be doubled, in as short a time as they have doubled already: and what have the possessors done, that this increase of wealth, produced by other people’s labour and Edition: current; Page: [1234] enterprise, should fall into their mouths as they sleep, instead of being applied to the public necessities of those who created it? It is maintained, therefore, by land reformers, that special taxation may justly be levied upon landed property, up to, though not exceeding, this unearned increase; excess being guarded against by leaving the possessors free to cede their land to the State at the price they could sell it for at the time when the tax is imposed, but no higher price to be claimable on account of any increase of value afterwards, unless proved to have been the effect of improvements made at the landlord’s expense.5 Now, if the nation would be justified in thus reasserting its claim to the unearned increase of value, even when it has allowed the legal right to that increase to pass into the hands of individuals; how much more ought it to prevent further legal rights of this description from being acquired by those who do not now possess them? The landed estates of public bodies are not family property; the interest that any individual has in them is never more than a life interest, often much less; the increase of value by lapse of time would go to enrich nobody knows whom, and its appropriation by the State would give no one the shadow of a moral title to compensation. But if these lands are sold to individuals, they become hereditary, and can only be repurchased by the State at their full value as a perpetuity.

Neither would this compulsory sale be attended with any of the advantages in the form of increased production, which would result from facilitating the voluntary sale of land by individual to individual. As long as, by the theory and practice of landed proprietorship, the landlord of an estate is a mere sinecurist quartered on it, improvement by the landlord is an accident dependent on his personal tastes. But he who sells his land, voluntarily or from necessity, is almost always below the average of landlords in disposition and ability to improve; the tendency of the change of proprietors is, therefore, in favour of improvement. But there is no reason to think that public bodies in general are worse than average landlords in any particular; it is matter of common remark that they are less grasping: and, if they do not come up to the most enterprising landlords in what they themselves accomplish, they leave more power of improvement, and more encouragement to it, to their tenants, than the majority of private landlords. It would, therefore, be no gain, but all loss, to reinforce the enemies of the reform of landed tenure by the addition of a new class of wealthy hereditary landholders, quartered upon land which is as yet devoted more or less faithfully to public uses. If public bodies are required to part with their lands, they should part with them to the State, and to that alone.

Whether it is desirable that such bodies should be holders of lands; whether it is wise that their time and attention should be divided between their appointed duties, certain to be enforced with increasing strictness as improvement goes on, and the management of a tenantry, with the duties which, if private property in Edition: current; Page: [1235] land continues to exist, are sure to be more and more attached to it,—is a question of the future, which it may be left to the future to decide. We do not think it can be properly decided, until the fermentation now going on in the public mind respecting the constitution of landed property, has subsided into a definite conviction respecting the end to be aimed at and the means of practically drawing nearer to that end. But the time has come for announcing with the utmost decision, and we hope to see land reformers uniting as one body in the demand, that no private appropriation of land, not yet private property, shall hereafter take place under any circumstances or on any pretext.

J.S. Mill

427.: THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY IN LAND EXAMINER, 19 JULY, 1873, PP. 725-8

This is the last of three articles on land reform (see Nos. 425-6). Not listed in Mill’s bibliography, it appeared posthumously, headed as title, in the “Political and Social” section of the Examiner, Mill having died in Avignon on 7 May, 1873. A footnote to the title reads: “We regret that, owing to unexpected delays, it has not been possible to compare the following paper with the original manuscript of Mr. Mill. This paper was written for the Land Tenure Reform Association.—Ed. Ex.” It appeared as a pamphlet, The Right of Property in Land. Reprinted from the Examiner of July 19, 1873 (London: Dallow, [1873]), and, edited by Helen Taylor, in Dissertations and Discussions, Vol. IV, pp. 288-302. A version printed from the MS (now lost) appeared as Appendix B in The Letters of John Stuart Mill, ed. Hugh S.R. Elliot, 2 vols. (London: Longmans, Green, 1910), Vol. II, pp. 387-95. The text below is that of the Examiner, which has been collated with those of the pamphlet, Dissertations and Discussions, and Elliot. In the variant notes, “E” signals Elliot’s version, and “P” signals the pamphlet and Dissertations and Discussions (which agree in substantives).

rights of property are of several kinds. There is the property which a person has in things that he himself has made. There is property in what one has received as a recompense for making something for somebody else, or for doing any service to somebody else, among which services must be reckoned that of lending to him what one has made, or honestly come by. There is property in what has been freely given to one, during life or at death, by the person who made it or honestly came by it, whatever may have been the motive of the gift,—personal affection, or because one had some just claim on him, or because he thought one would use it well, or as he would awish it to be used. All these are rights to things which are the produce of labour; and they all resolve themselves into the right of every person to do as he pleases with his own labour, and with the produce or earnings of his labour, either by applying them to his Edition: current; Page: [1236] own use, or exchanging them for other things, or bestowing them upon other persons at his own choice.

But there is another kind of property which does not come under any of these descriptions, nor depend upon this principle. This is the ownership which persons are allowed to exercise over things not made by themselves, nor made at all. Such is property in land; including in that term what is under the surface as well as what is upon it. This kind of property, if legitimate, must rest on some other justification than the right of the labourer to what he has created by his labour. The land is not of man’s creation; and for a person to appropriate to himself a mere gift of nature, not made to him in particular, but which belonged as much to all others until he took possession of it, is primâ facie an injustice to all the rest. Even if he did not obtain it by usurpation, but by just distribution; even if, at the first foundation of a settlement, the land was equitably parcelled out among all the settlers (which has sometimes been the case), there is an apparent wrong to posterity, or at least to all those subsequently born who do not inherit a share. To make such an institution just, it must be shown to be conducive btob the general interest, in which this disinherited portion of the community has its part.

The general verdict of civilised nations chasc hitherto been that this justification does exist. The private appropriation of land has been deemed to be beneficial to those who do not, as well as to those who do, obtain a share. And in what manner beneficial? Let us take particular note of this. Beneficial, because the strongest interest which the community and the human race have in the land is that it should yield the largest amount of food, and other necessary dord useful things required by the community. Now, though the land itself it not the work of human beings, its produce is; and to obtain enough of that produce somebody must exert much labour, and, in order that this labour may be supported, must expend a considerable amount of the savings of previous labour. Now we have been taught by experience that the great majority of mankind will work much harder, and make much greater pecuniary sacrifices for themselves and their immediate descendants than for the public. In order, therefore, to give the greatest encouragement to production, it has been thought right that individuals should have an exclusive property in land, so that they may have the most possible to gain by making the land as productive as they can, and may be in no danger of being hindered from doing so by the interference of eany onee else. This is the reason usually assigned for allowing fthef land to be private property, and it is the best reason that can be given.

Edition: current; Page: [1237]

Now, when we know the reason of a thing, we know what ought to be its limits. The limits of the reason ought to be the limits of the thing. The thing itself should stop where the reason stops. The land not having been made by the owner, nor by any one to whose rights he has succeeded, and the justification of private ownership ging land being the interest it gives to the owner in the good cultivation of the land, the rights of the owner ought not to be stretched hfartherh than this purpose requires. No rights to the land should be recognised which do not act as a motive to the person who has power over it, to make it as productive, or otherwise as useful to mankind, as possible. Anything beyond this exceeds the reason of the case, and is an injustice to the remainder of the community.

It cannot be said that landed property, as it exists in the United Kingdom, conforms to this condition. The legal rights of the landlord much exceed what is necessary to afford a motive to improvement. They do worse; they tend, in many ways, to obstruct, and do really obstruct, improvement.

For one thing, the landlord has the right, which he often exercises, of keeping the land not only unimproved, but uncultivated, in order to maintain an inordinate quantity of wild animals for what he calls sport. This right, at all events, cannot be defended as a means of promoting improvement.

Again, if the purpose in allowing private ownership of the land were to provide the strongest possible motive to its good cultivation, the ownership would be vested in the actual cultivator. But in England almost all the land of the country is cultivated by tenant-farmers, who not only are not the proprietors, but, in the majority of cases, have not even a lease, but may be dispossessed at six months’ notice. If those lands are well cultivated, it cannot be in consequence of the rights of the landlord. If those rights have any effect iat all on cultivation,i it must be to make it bad, not good. If farmers with such a tenure cultivate well, it is a proof that property in land is not necessary for good cultivation.

Butj, it will be saidj, if the mere cultivation can be, and is, satisfactorily carried on by tenants-at-will, it is not so with the great and costly improvements which have converted so much barren land into fertile. The returns to kthosek improvements are slow; and a temporary holder, even if he has the lnecessaryl capital, will not make them. They can seldom be made, and, in point of fact, seldom are made, by any one but the proprietor. And, as a certain number of landed proprietors do make such improvements, the institution of property in land is thought to be sufficiently vindicated.

Giving all the weight to this consideration which it is entitled to, the claim it gives to the landlord is not to all the possible proceeds of the land, but to such Edition: current; Page: [1238]mpartsm of them only as are the result of his own improvements, or ofn improvements made by predecessors in whose place he stands. Whatever portion of them is due, not to his labour or outlay, but to the labour and outlay of other people, should belong to those other people. If the tenant has added anything to the value of the land beyond the duration of his tenancy, the landlord should be bound to purchase the improvement, whether permanent or temporary, at its full value. If the nation at large, by their successful exertions to increase the wealth of the country, have enhanced the value of the land independently of anything done by othe landlord or the tenant, that increase of value should belong to the nation. That it should do so is not only consistent with the principles on which landed property confessedly depends for its justification, but is a consequence of those very principles.

Now, the labours of the nation at large do add daily and yearly to the value of the land, whether the landlord plays the part of an improver or not. The growth of towns, the extension of manufactures, the increase of population consequent on increased employment, create a pconstantlyp increasing demand for land both for the habitations of the people and for the supply of food and qthe materials ofq clothing. They also create a constantly increasing demand for coal, iron, and all the other produce of mining industry. By this increase of demand the landed proprietors largely profit, without in any way contributing to it. The income from rural lands has a constant tendency to increase; that from building lands still more: and with this increase of their incomes the owners of the land have nothing to do except to receive it.

The Land Tenure Reform Association claim this increase for those who are its real authors.1 They do not propose to deprive the landlords of their present rents, nor of anything which they may hereafter add to those rents by their own improvements. The future Unearned Increase is what the Association rseekr to withdraw from them, and to retain for those to whose slabourss and sacrifices, from generation to generation, it will really be due. The means by which it is proposed to accomplish this is Special Taxation. Over and above the fair share of the landlords in the general taxation of the public, they may justly be required to pay hereafter a special tax, within the limits of the increase which may accrue to their tpresentt income from causes independent of themselves.

Against this proposal it is objected that many landholders have bought the Edition: current; Page: [1239] lands they hold, and in buying them had in view not only their present rental, but the probability of future increase; of which increase, therefore, it would be unjust to deprive them. But the Association do not propose to deprive them of it without compensation. In the plan of the Association the landlords would have the right reserved to them of parting with their land to the State, immediately or at any future time, at the price for which they could sell it at the time when the plan is adopted. By availing themselves of this option, they would not only get back whatever they had paid for the prospect of future increase, but would obtain the full price for which they could have sold that future prospect at the time when the new system was introduced. They would be left, therefore, in a pecuniary sense, exactly as well off as they were before: while the State would gain the difference between the price of the land at the time and the higher value which, according to all probability, it would afterwards rise to. There would be no transfer of private property to the State, but only an interception by the State of an increase of property, which would otherwise accrue at a future time to private individuals without their giving any value for it; since they would have been reimbursed whatever money they had given, and would even have received the full present value of their expectations.

There is another objection commonly made, which is disposed of by the same answer. It is often said that land, and particularly land in towns, is liable to lose value as well as to gain it. Certain quarters of London cease to be fashionable; and are deserted by their opulent inhabitants; certain towns lose a portion of their trading prosperity when railway communication enables purchasers to supply themselves cheaply from elsewhere. Those cases, however, are the exception, not the rule: and when they occur, what is lost in one quarter is gained in another, and there is the general gain due to the prosperity of the country besides. If some landlords, for exceptional reasons, do not partake in the benefit, neither will they have to pay the tax. They will be exactly where they are now. If it be said that as they took the chance of a diminution they ought to have the counter-balancing chance of an increase, the answer is that the power of giving up the land at its existing price, in which both chances are allowed for, makes the matter even. Indeed, more than even. No one would benefit so much by the proposed measure as those whose land might afterwards fall in value; for they would be able to claim the former price from the State, although they could no longer obtain so much from individuals. By giving up the rise of value, they would obtain an actual State guarantee against a fall. And this would be no loss to the State; for every such fall in one quarter, unless owing to a decline of the general prosperity, implies a corresponding rise somewhere else, of which rise the State would have the benefit.

A third objection is sometimes made. Land, it is said, is not the only article of property which rises in value from the mere effect of the advance of national wealth, independently of anything done by the proprietor. Pictures by the old Edition: current; Page: [1240] masters, ancient sculptures, rare curiosities of all sorts, have the same tendency. If it is not unjust to deprive the landlord of the unearned increase of the value of his land, by the same rule the increase of value of Raphaels uandu Titians might be taken from their fortunate vpossessorv and appropriated by the State.

Were this true in principle it would lead to no consequences in practice, since the revenue which could be obtained by even a very high tax on these rare and scattered possessions would not be worth consideration to a prosperous country. But it is not true, even in principle.

Objects of art, however rare or incomparable, differ from land and its contents in this essential particular, that they are products of labour. Objects of high art are products not only of labour but of sacrifice. The pains, patience, and care necessary for producing works which will be competed for by future ages, are far from being those from which the greatest immediate, and especially the greatest pecuniary, advantage is reaped by the artist. Such works almost always imply renunciation of a great part of the gains which might easily have been obtained by hasty and marketable productions; and often could not be produced at all, unless the few purchasers who are able to distinguish the immortal from the ephemeral, could feel that they might, without imprudence, pay a high price for works which would be a fortune to their descendants. The prospective rise in price of works of art is by no means an unearned increase: the best productions of genius and skill alone obtain that honour, while the increasing value of land is indiscriminate. Governments do not think it improper to disburse considerable sums in order to foster high art and encourage the taste for it among the public. Much more, then, should they not grudge to the artist what may come to him spontaneously from the estimate which good judges form of what his productions wwillw sell for long after he is dead. xWex grant that in many cases the increased value does not reach the artist himself, but is an addition, and sometimes an unlooked-for addition, to the gains of a middleman, who may have bought, at a very moderate price, works which subsequent accident or fashion suddenly ybringsy into vogue. This is a contingency to which artists, like all other workmen, are liable; if they are unable to wait they may be obliged to sell their future chances below the true value, to somebody who can. But they obtain, on the average, a higher remuneration for their labour than they could obtain if they had no such chances to sell. And it must be remembered that, along with his chances of profit, the dealer takes the risk of loss. Changes in the public taste and judgment may take place either way: if some works which may have been bought cheap acquire a high value, others for which a high price has been paid go out of fashion, gradually or even suddenly. If dealers are exposed to the one chance, Edition: current; Page: [1241] they must have the benefit of the other. Were they deprived of it, their useful function, by which, until replaced by something better, artists are greatly benefited, could not be carried on.

Neither can it be said, as in the case of land, that receiving the market price of the day would compensate the holder for the chances of future increase. There is no market price of such thingsz, and the future increase has no common standard of estimationz; it is a matter of individual judgment; and, even if an average could be struck, it would not compensate any one for the disappointment of his own expectation. The objection, therefore, from the supposed parallel case fails in its application: the cases are not really parallel.*

Other objectors say that, if it is allowable to take the unearned increase of the value of land, it must, for the same reasons, be allowable to take for the public the unearned increase of the price of railway shares. But the fallacy is here so transparent as scarcely to require pointing out. In the first place, every penny which is obtained by railway shareholders is not the gift of nature, but the earnings and recompense of human labour and thrift. In the next place, railway shares fall in price as frequently as they rise, which is far from being the case with land. If it be said that the prosperity of the country tends to increase the gains of railway shareholders as well as those of landlords, the same national prosperity leads to the creation of competing railroads, and of new and comparatively unproductive branches, so as to take away from the old shareholders with one hand nearly, if not quite, as much as it bestows on them with the other. The two cases, therefore, differ in the essential point.

We have now, we think, exhausted the objections of principle which are usually made to the detention by the State of the unearned increment of rent. It has, we think, been shown that they are all of them such as a very little Edition: current; Page: [1242] consideration of the subject is sufficient to dispel. But, besides these theoretical, there are practical objections, in appearance more formidable, but, as we shall be able to show, quite as inconclusive.

It is alleged that, granting the justice of claiming the unearned increase for the State, there are no means of ascertaining what it is. It would be impossiblea, it is said,a to distinguish the increase of rent which arises from the general progress of society, from that which is owing to the skill and outlay of the proprietor: and in intercepting the former there would be perpetual danger of unjustly encroaching upon the latter.

There would be some ground for this objection in a country of peasant proprietors. The improvements made by such a class of landowners consist more in the ungrudging and assiduous application of their own labour and care, and in attention to small gains and petty savings, than in important works, or in the expenditure of money. It would really be very difficult, if not impossible, to determine how much the proprietor and his family had done in any given number of years to improve the productiveness or add to the value of the land.

But it is quite otherwise with the improvements made by rich landlords, like those who own nearly all the soil of the British Islands. What they do for the land is done by outlay of money, through the agency of skilled engineers and superintendents. It is easy to register operationsb, for instance,b of thorough drainage, and to ascertain and record, as one of the elements in the case, the cost of those operations. Their effect in adding to the value of the land has a natural measure in the increased rent which a solvent tenant would be willing to pay for it; and the whole of that increase, whether great or small, we would leave to the landlord.

The possibility of a valuation of unexhausted improvements is assumed as a matter of notoriety in all the discussions, now so common, respecting Tenant Right. It is already a custom in many parts of England to compensate an outgoing tenant for these cimprovements. Whatc is a custom in many places will soon, it is probable, be made a legal obligation in all; and among the objections made to its imposition by law, we are never told of the impossibility of doing it. But if it is possible to value the deffectd of temporary improvements, why should it be impossible to value the effect of permanent improvements? A Bill compelling a valuation of both, and giving compensation etoe both alike, has been introduced into the House of Commons by a high agricultural authority, Mr. James Howard, and has met with influential support.2

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Yet if this be possible, the object is completely attained, for there is no other difficulty. The fact of an increase of rent is easily ascertained. There is nothing needed but the trouble and expense of registering the facts. It might be necessary to have a survey of the whole country, ascertaining and recording the conditions of every tenancy, and to renew this operation periodically, say every ten or twenty years. This is not so difficult as the cadastral operations of some continental countries, or the revenue surveys of British India, for these undertake to determine, by special inquiry, what rent each piece of land is capable of yielding. In the proposed survey it would suffice to record what it does yield; allowing the landlord, if he can, to prove that it is under-rented, in which case he ought not to suffer for his past moderation.

It should be understood, also, that no intention is entertained of paring down the increment of rent to the futmostf farthing. We assert in principle, the right of taking it all: in practice we have no desire to insist upon the extreme right, at any risk of going beyond it. No doubt, the option allowed to the landlord of giving up the land at its existing value, would secure him against pecuniary wrong; but we should be sorry to trade upon his reluctance to give up an ancestral possession, or one endeared to him by association. We would leave, therefore, an ample margin by way of insurance against mistakes in the ginstitutiong. We would not insist upon taking the last penny of the unearned increase. But we hmaintainh that within that limit taxation on the land, in addition to the landlord’s share of all other taxes, may justly be, and ought to be, imposed. We contend that a tax on land, not preceding but following the future increase of its value, and increasing with that increase, is a legitimate financial resource; and that it is for the individual landlord, by making an authentic record of what he does for the land, to preserve evidence that its increase of rent is the consequence and rightful reward of his own intelligent improvements.

This is the meaning of the fourth article in the programme of the Land Tenure Reform Association;3 and the reasons which have now been given are its justification. The more it is considered the more general, we believe, will be the adhesion to it of those whose regard for property is not a superstition but an intelligent conviction, and who do not consider landlords as entitled to pecuniary privilege but only to equal justice.

J.S. Mill

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APPENDICES

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Appendix A

CAVAIGNAC’S DEFENCE EXAMINER, 24 APR., 1831, PP. 266-7

For the context and for the introduction Mill wrote to this translation by him of Godefroy Cavaignac’s speech during his trial, see No. 101. Cavaignac’s father, Jean Baptiste Cavaignac (1762-1829), was a Montagnard during the Convention, which he served on various missions. Proscribed as a regicide, he died in Brussels. In the Examiner the speech appeared in quotation marks, here removed.

my father was one of those who, on the benches of the National Convention, proclaimed the republic in the face of victorious Europe.1 He defended it in our armies. For this he died in exile, after twelve years of proscription; and, while even the Restoration was forced to leave France in possession of the fruits of that revolution which he had sowed; while it loaded with its favours the men whom the republic had raised, my father and his colleagues suffered alone for the great cause which so many others betrayed; a last homage of their impotent old age, to that country which they had so vigorously defended.

That cause, then, is bound up, gentlemen, with all my feelings as a son; the principles which it embraced are my inheritance. Study has fortified me in the direction which my political ideas so naturally assumed; and now, when I have at length a fit occasion, I hasten to utter a word which others proscribe. I declare, without affectation, as well as without feigning, that in my heart, from conviction, I am a republican.

But it would not have been in me a sufficient reason for adopting my opinions, that a republic seemed to me, in itself, the least imperfect of governments: I have endeavoured to form an estimate of the times, to judge whether a republic is practicable, and I have perceived, not only that it is possible, but that it is inevitable; that all things are moving in that direction; the course of events, the human mind, and outward things. I have perceived, that it is impossible for the movement which now rules the world to end in any thing but in a republic.

This tendency, gentlemen, has long been pointed out. Napoleon acknowledged Edition: current; Page: [1248] it;2 M. de Châteaubriand has more than once proclaimed it,3 although neither of them can well be suspected of partiality for republican principles. The present government itself has admitted this tendency: it declared itself at first a monarchy surrounded by republican institutions:4 and, although the union of these words is truly monstrous; although, as has been said, they howl at finding themselves together, it was imagined that they were seen engraved by the cannon-balls of July on the walls of the Hotel de Ville.

Gentlemen, this futurity, now so near to us, which is perceived even by those who turn away their faces in terror, is the true source of republicanism in those who are capable of reflecting upon it, and who do not embrace it from schoolboy enthusiasm. They cultivate it, for this reason, that every man of sense prepares himself beforehand for a result which he foresees, of which he will be a witness, and which he judges to be infallible. They are not republicans in remembrance of Rome or of Athens, that would be too silly: they are not so on account of the past, but on account of the future.

Now, it is precisely because the future appears to them certain, that they do not conspire. Why should they? If there is a party in France that does not conspire, it is the republican party, for it is convinced that it has only to let things alone. That those should conspire for whom every day is a chance the less; who are obliged to have recourse to their personal energy, to try a toss of the political dice-box, because their age rejects them, because they have no resource but plots, no futurity but what they must stake their heads for, that I can conceive. No doubt, there is at least one party of this sort in France; but the republican party must be mad if they compromised a cause of which the success is infallible, by ineffectual attempts. They must be frantic indeed if they exposed to the justice of kings, heads which may safely rest themselves upon the fortune of the people.

Gentlemen, if that party had chosen to conspire, they had the power. They had the power in the great week, and that under the open sunshine of July, in the public streets. They had the power, and the proof is, that it was thought advisable to negociate with them: my defender can attest it if necessary. Even on the 30th of July several of us, among whom were Guinard and myself, were conducted to the lieutenant-general of the kingdom.

And I declare it openly, we spoke to him with the same freedom which I employ now; we have long professed the opinions which I profess still; and hence all this distrust of our intentions: but (not to mention that it would have been a little too ingenuous) nobody asked him to proclaim a republic. “Consult Edition: current; Page: [1249] the nation, it alone has the right to choose its government.” That is what we advised, that is what we think: the sovereignty of the people is the foundation of our principles; and when we are accused of wishing to impose upon the people an order of things which they alone have the right to establish, what is asserted is a falsehood.

Gentlemen, with what we have to wait for, it is easy to wait. Those who know that the future is theirs, can afford to have patience: besides, we are young, and in these days the world moves rapidly: and to express our idea in its completeness, I shall repeat what we have sometimes said to those who thought that more might have been done in July. You will understand the better, how any conspiracy must appear to us the act of simpletons.

A revolution, however admirable, however easy it may have been, is always followed by immense difficulties. Monarchy has taken upon itself the task; so much the worse for monarchy, and the better for us: if it is unsuccessful this time, all is over with it; and our conviction is, that it cannot be successful; for nations in these days are eaten into by so deep-seated, so inexplicable, so corrosive a disease, there is in society so powerful a principle of dissolution acting upon all the machinery of power, that the machine needs to be entirely renovated; and really, looking at the wants which torment the world, it would seem that even a God would find it easier to reconstruct it altogether than to govern it.

This new combination, we said, satisfies many minds; it is counted upon. General Lafayette has rallied round it, with all the ascendancy of his immense popularity. Let us suffer the experiment to be complete; let us leave the burthen to those who take it; let us allow men and systems to be tried and laid down, one after another, for some time longer. When your turn comes, you will still have enough to do. In the rapid course into which society has been projected, men and systems succeed one another to conduct it to its destination: the last relay is the one which will arrive, and that one is you. We are living in the age of suicide-governments. The monarchy will do our work; it will exhaust itself without your interference; it will conspire for you.

Yes, it is thus, gentlemen, that we understand our position. We do not conspire; we hold ourselves ready. At an epoch when the whole of a people mingle in politics, there are no more conspiracies; that was well enough at a time when the contest was among a few persons, alternately conquerors and conquered; when an entire party was held in the hand of one principal conspirator. In our days, there is no man who has a hand sufficiently large, sufficiently strong. The public streets are the only theatre large enough for those masses, which act at nobody’s will and pleasure, which it is no more possible for any one to raise, than it is to resist them when they have risen.

In the era of revolutions, conspiracies are good for nothing. We know it of old. We conspired for a long time against the Bourbons. What came of it? A mere Edition: current; Page: [1250] unavailing protest against foreign usurpation: a break in the line of prescription, sufficient to keep alive the consciousness of a right to resist oppression. With this, the flight of some, the ruin of others, the death of those who have shed upon the scaffold their blood, the purest blood of patriots. Then, one fine day, the people, who did not conspire, threw themselves into the streets, and extemporized in a few hours that deliverance so long sought for.

This is what we have learnt, and what we shall not forget: and the evidence has proved it. Let others, too, remember it, and renounce for the future this bugbear of republican conspiracies. We hope that this trial will put them out of conceit with it. We are not children, and we have a better use to make of our lives than to stake them for what is unavailing. This court has so often resounded with the words, “plot against the safety of the state,” that there are, perhaps, here some echoes to prolong the sound, but none will hereafter be found out of doors. Charlatans will cease to make their profit out of this imaginary evil, and our accuser will have done this service to the country, in default of a better.

The accused have perhaps a right to claim some share in this service. Placed before you, without any celebrated name to join itself to their cause, they have had confidence in you and in themselves, for you and they are men of honour, who need nobody’s assistance to serve the truth: and if this trial is of use to our country, we find our reward already in the means which it affords us of loudly and openly making answer to our calumniators.

Our blood is not our own,—it belongs to our country—to our country which we love, because it deserves that its children should love it; because it has made them free, because it is great, because it is dear, useful, and formidable, to the rest of the world. It is to the country that we are devoted—devoted, body and soul; not like fanatics, who are intoxicated by a word, but like brave men, who are happy to find something in this world to which it is noble, just, and sweet to consecrate their affections and their lives.

These, gentlemen, are our sentiments, these our principles, for we do not separate the one from the other. And yet we are here, we are in the place where several of our brothers stood to hear their sentence of death pronounced in the name of Louis XVIII. Were I to turn round, and see in the caps of the soldiers who guard us that tri-coloured cockade which we have restored to them, I could not believe my eyes. Were they the Swiss, or the soldiery of the royal guard, I should understand it. Then, we should go back to the time of our dear and ill-fated Bories,5 and thinking that Charles X still reigned, we should not be astonished that it is wished to make us victims, as Charles X would have done if he had been the conqueror eight months ago.

Appendix C

ENFANTIN’S FAREWELL ADDRESS MORNING CHRONICLE, 27 APR., 1832, P. 1

After the Saint Simonians had given up Le Globe (see No. 158) and their attempts at proselytism as a result of government hostility, their leader Enfantin, with some forty disciples, retired to a semi-monastic existence at Ménilmontant outside Paris. His farewell address, which appeared translated in the Morning Chronicle, headed “St. Simonianism—Parting Address to the Public,” is not mentioned in Mill’s bibliography. However, it is identified as Mill’s translation in a letter to d’Eichthal and Duveyrier: “I did as d’Eichthal wished in regard to Father Enfantin’s parting address: after ascertaining that Black would print it, I translated it for him & it appeared in the Morning Chronicle (it was however very incorrectly printed)” (EL, CW, Vol. XII, p. 109).

i, the father of the new Family—

Before I impose silence on the voice, which every day announces to the world what we are, design that it should tell what I am.

God has given me a mission to call the poor, and women, to a new destiny;

To give admittance into the sacred Family of Man, to all those who have hitherto been excluded from it, or treated only as minors therein;

To realise that Universal Association, which the cries of liberty uttered by all the enslaved classes have been calling for, ever since the beginning of the world.

I have first addressed myself to the poor.

In the name of my Master, Saint Simon, I have announced to them the destruction of all the privileges of birth, by which the industrious are weighed down, and delivered up to the will and pleasure of the idle;

The termination of the wars which decimate them, and water with their blood that earth which is already bathed in their tears, and in the sweat of their brows;

The end of that hostile competition, which brings forth bankruptcy and indigence, crime, and the scaffold.

I spoke these things; but I spoke them in order to be heard, especially by those who ought to be the first to hear; by those who have the power to enfranchise, and who domineer; who have the power to unite, and who divide; who have the power to purify, and who corrupt.

I spoke to them, and they endeavoured not to listen; but my word has entered into their ears in spite of themselves, and they are now pouring it forth from their lips, though they know it not.

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I may, therefore, now leave to them the task of propagating it.

Men of all parties! I have drawn you into a new field of discussion; I leave you there. It is good for you that you should there see each other face to face, and seek in vain for the guide who has led you thither.

I affirm to you, that from this day forward there are no politics for you but that which was taught to us by our Master, and which, for the last seven years, we have unintermittingly proclaimed.

Parliamentary Government, and its bourgeois mysticism, are expiring;

Republicanism, and its popular anarchy, are unable to struggle into existence;

Legitimacy, and its privilégiés de château will not be resuscitated.

All social institutions must have for their end the improvement of the condition, moral, physical, and intellectual, of the poorest and most numerous class;

To each, labour according to his vocation, and recompence according to his works.

This is the Charter of Equality and Subordination of the time to come.

This, I say, is henceforth the only politics. For, from the moment when I shall have ceased to place every day under your eyes that Journal, in which, for sixteen months past, I have caused the Charter of the time to come to be engraven in characters ever new; from the moment when The Globe, which I have compelled you to read by giving it to you gratuitously, shall have ceased to appear, each of you will find in himself some fragments of that Paper which he will recite aloud as his own.

Once more, I affirm to you that ours is henceforth the only politics. For the inheritance we leave behind us is an arsenal, where those who wish to destroy will find weapons more potent than all those which they have employed up to this time; and it is also a treasure of strength and riches, when those who wish to preserve and to construct will find materials finer than the finest débris of the past, more solid than the gingerbread patchings-up of our own times.

I have next addressed myself to Woman.

I have called upon her to listen, with good-will and respect, to the man whose life is devoted to the destruction of prostitution;

To receive with kindness and affection the word of the man who also seeks to deliver the world from adultery;

To listen to me and sympathise with me, who have undertaken the sacred task of saving the feeble from oppression, because I am strong, and the strong from fraud, because I am sincere.

Now, there are still many men who consider slaves, servants, and the poor, as their property, and who claim fidelity and devotedness from that living property, in exchange for the imperious protection and the contemptuous patronage which they extend to it. However, the number of these men has been diminished every day by the preaching of Christian paternity.

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But, from the daughter of Kings to the daughter of the Pauper, I know not that there exists so much as one woman from whom man does not think himself entitled to exact fidelity, devotedness, obedience, in exchange for the insulting guardianship which his haughty reason and his brute strength deign to grant to the being whom he regards as a child, destitute of strength and destitute of reason.

Had I cause, then, to be astonished, that the call to freedom and equality which I addressed to woman should be stifled by shouts of outrage?—No! I relied more on the effect of the reproaches which would be cast by man upon the liberation of woman, than on the power of my own words.

I leave to woman this inheritance of liberty. I know how great has hitherto been the power of destruction residing in this word liberty, when flung into the midst of slaves, fettered and gagged; but, thanks be to God, the slave in this case is woman: and it is not by disorder and brutality that she achieves her triumphs.

One phasis of my life is now accomplished: I have spoken: I will now act. But I have need for some time of repose and silence.

A numerous family surrounds me, the Apostolate is now founded.

I take forty of my sons with me: I confide to my other children the task of continuing our labours in the world; and I retire.

I retire to the place where my childhood was passed, on one of the heights which overlook Paris: for I wish still to hear and see that cradle of the New World, and I love also to renew the recollections of my past life; they are good and pleasant to look back upon.

He who speaks to you has lived in the midst of you; his life has not been solitary; he has been known to many of you, and among these he is not aware of one who has not loved him: and yet he is now handed over to the laughter and calumny of the world.

His mother gave him a name of good omen—Prosper—because he smiled in coming into the world; God surrounded his young years with pleasures and riches; his brother, a child of poetry, fed him with harmony and light; his infancy and youth were happy, in the midst of children and young men who cherished his friendship: this man, however, you now overwhelm with sarcasm and outrage.

He has known what your men of science know; he has seen and done what your men of industry do; he has appeared in your meetings and your fêtes, and even on your battle-fields, with his brother-scholars of your Grande Ecole (the Polytechnic School): you all came to him with affection, because you felt that he loved you; you all had confidence in him, because you could read in his heart. And now, because this man takes upon himself in the name of God to moralise your lives, you fling scorn and reproach upon him.

He who has been loved by you will not call you to account for your inconsistencies; he will bide his time and act.

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Consider, that one who announces to the world such promises as mine, and who yet, in so short a time, has caused his word to be everywhere re-echoed, cannot be accused of insanity; for his accusers would confess their own madness in having paid so much attention to him. Listen then, once more, before I withdraw from among you.

Your altars are no more, your thrones are shaken, your families are torn by dissension: God, Kings, and love, are no more to be seen in the world. A new religion, a new politics, a new morality, are what I bring you.

The man who dares to speak thus, must be heard, for he has already proved that he could make himself heard.

You have his word; you shall soon have his acting.

But, I repeat to you, I will now rest and hold my peace: for you have need of my silence, that yourselves may speak.

I retire then, with my children—glory to them! who so powerfully aid their father to accomplish the will of God.

My dear Children—This day has been glorious in the world for eighteen centuries: this day died the Divine Liberator of the slave.

To commemorate the anniversary, let our retirement commence this day; and let the last trace of servitude, the condition of a menial, disappear from amongst us.

Enfantin

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Appendix D

GEORGE SAND UNPUBLISHED [AFTER 9 APR., 1848]

For the background to this draft letter (dated on internal evidence), see No. 371, the fuller French version, with its notes.

i am an old admirer of george sand and was one of the first to give her honour public and private. When all other persons in England abused her as an immoral and indecent writer I and my circle of friends, persons not without influence, were the first to s’écrier against the charges universally made 15 years ago against her writings and to appeal to all who condemned them, from their judgment then to their judgment now, and the event has justified the appeal. How then can I express my astonishment, mortification and grief to find that when a great political crisis of the world has arrived, brought about by the noble [élan]1 of Paris, Mme G. Sand alone remains behind—not only takes no initiative, puts forth no principles, but in a manner worthy only of a timid and commonplace lady, repudiates the kindly flatteries made to her in your paper.

Her letter to the Réforme protesting against the use of her name in your paper is to me incomprehensible for its fatuity. I can only attribute it to a fear that her literary vanity may be compromised by the connexion of her established reputation with your unestablished—However this may be, the reply to her letter, in your paper, is as superior in dignity and disinterestedness to hers as her literary reputation to yours. I have only now to say for myself and for all women of strong mind and large heart I can only say I wish you all possible success in your undertaking and I only hope you will treat the disavowal of connexion with you by any woman whether George Sand or any other with the silent pity which is the tribute one pays to weakness and timidity.

Une anglaise.

Sand is like one of our English writing women (I do not know how the case may be in France) who always commence by declaring that they do not intend to advocate the emancipation of women although to the partial emancipation of women gained by more generous spirits it is alone owing that they are able to Edition: current; Page: [1261] make their voices heard and to take up that position in society and literary influence which they are afraid to compromise by any attempt to help on the same cause. English literary women have been hitherto particularly distinguished by their little basenesses caused by timidity.

I agree with you in your expressions of admiration of her fine talent, beautiful stories and admirable style but I think you are making a great error and one most injurious to the cause of women in applying the term philosophe to her. If there be anything characteristic of Sand’s writings it is the presence of imagination and feeling and the absence of thought.

She means to écraser them du haut de sa supériorité which as a thinker or a practical person certainly does not exist.2 Latterly however I have feared that she was destined, contrary to what I had hoped, to be no otherwise useful to the cause of women (from which the best interests of society can never be separated) than, in the manner in which all eminent women are so, by the mere fact of being women.

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Appendix E

DEATH OF FRANCIS PLACE SPECTATOR, 7 JAN., 1854, P. 13

This obituary, headed “Francis Place” and subheaded “[From a Correspondent],” appears in the “Topics of the Day” section. Though not listed in Mill’s bibliography, it is assigned to him by G.J. Holyoake in his John Stuart Mill as Some of the Working Classes Knew Him (London: Trübner, 1873), p. 6, and also in his Sixty Years of an Agitator’s Life, 2 vols. (London: Unwin, 1909), Vol. I, p. 216. Holyoake cites no evidence; there is no corroboration elsewhere, and the piece is not characteristic of Mill’s usual style.

another man of mark has passed from amongst us. Francis Place has departed from the world in which he was so long a stirring mover. Few men have done more of the world’s work with so little external sign. He was ever ready with pen and person to aid the uplifting of humanity, ever ready to fill full of his own knowledge any other men willing to work and to get the credit of it. He was essentially a public man, but his work usually lay behind the curtain as a prompter. He was no orator, but much oratory was of his prompting. He was a man of the last age and of the present, before the French Revolution and since. Born to no inheritance but a clear brain, an iron will, and an indomitable love of freedom, he was one of the few London tradesmen who achieved an ample competence, not merely without truckling, but in spite of the odium and discouragement cast on all Reformers under the old oppressive Tory rule. But more remarkable than all this was the fact, that in the days when “books, plate, and pictures,” were important items in all rich men’s wills, he was the almost solitary tradesman who possessed a library, earned, collected, and paid for by himself, which many public men envied him the possession of, and to which many public men of less energy and purpose were glad to have recourse. The room which held that library was for many years a well-known meeting-place for Members of Parliament to discuss popular questions.

An early member of the London Corresponding Society—an intimate acquaintance of Hardy, Tooke, Richter, and others,1 in the days when opinion was crime,—never losing any opportunity of promoting freedom—he one day Edition: current; Page: [1263] stood in Covent Garden with a friend watching a Westminster Election contested between Whigs and Tories. The brewer candidate brought a dray to the front of the hustings to propitiate “sweet voices.”2 The beer was staved and ran into the kennels, and the miserable mob threw themselves on their faces and wallowed like swine. Francis Place and his friend left the spot, vowing never to cease their labours till the elections of Westminster were reformed. Just as Cobden and Bright3 with their friends brought about Corn-law abolition, so did Francis Place and his friend gather round them a nucleus with the motto “Purity of Election.” About that time, Sir Francis Burdett made a speech in public such as a young Greek might have made in Athens.4 “The man for the People!” said Francis Place; and Burdett was applied to. He returned for answer, that he had spent twenty thousand pounds in contested elections, and would spend no more. This was precisely what the Westminster electors meant. He was elected triumphantly, and the very shilling was found for him on taking the oath at the bar of the House—so runs the tradition; and from that election dates Reform in Parliament.

There was scarcely any public man on the Liberal or professed Liberal side that was not acquainted with Francis Place. He was the intimate friend of James Mill the historian of India, and of Jeremy Bentham. He was one of the original promoters of and contributors to the Westminster Review. Godwin often came to him. Sir Samuel Romilly and Henry Brougham held him in respect. Campbell the poet would talk to him by the hour of “what was to be done for the Poles.”5 John Cam Hobhouse was there indoctrinated in popular lore, and Edward Lytton Bulwer matriculated for his first election. Neither Burdett nor Hobhouse nor Bulwer were more than imaginations to Francis Place,—they said they were Reformers, and he took them at their word, and they travelled by his side. When they left the path, he went onwards just the same. People of all classes and conditions who had purposes to serve sought him out. The engineers—the elder Maudslay, the elder Brunel, Galloway, John Hague,6 and others—would all Edition: current; Page: [1264] come to tell him of their new plans, and ask for his council and influence. Mulready the artist used to visit him.7 Joseph Hume was a constant conferrer; and people from the new Republics ever found him out. He was an authority of much weight amongst working people, whose condition he ever strove to raise; and the unions always sought his help; but he was too sound a political economist ever to give them hopes of success by strikes. He was one of the few men whom Cobbett held in respect when he quarrelled with the Westminster Committees. He was essentially a man of business, the very opposite of Cobbett; and therefore it was not possible for them to agree. If perchance a journal of his life has been preserved and it falls into fitting hands, it will be a remarkable book—a record of the old changing into the new.8 His industry was extraordinary; his perceptive faculties in the direction of his sympathies, acute; and his reasoning powers strong. In the poetical faculty, which was so strong in Cobbett, he was entirely lacking: he was for the utter exclusion of poetry from the pages of the Westminster Review! This will account for much that appeared hard in his character; though there never existed a man more ready to assist others to rise. Many now holding prominent positions can trace their first move to the help of Francis Place. Great faculties and abilities were ever warmly greeted by him, and he was wholly devoid of either envy or jealousy. He had considerable mechanical aptitude, and would have been a skilful engineer if educated to it. His spirit was ever fresh and buoyant, and at all that spoke of the new or the progressive he seemed to leap alive. Like most self-educated framers of their own fortunes, he had a dislike of hereditary aristocracy, but withal no want of “handsome acknowledgment for merit in a lord.” But he had on the other hand not the slightest taint of the servility not uncommon in the newly-risen. As in similarly-educated men, the spirit of self-assertion was strong in him; a quality traceable chiefly to the ungenerous class spirit which refuses to acknowledge rising merit till the acknowledgment is superfluous—an ordeal that most authors have to undergo to the great risk of their philosophy and manysidedness. He held the manly conviction that he had earned his fellowship in the republic of letters, and thereby was every man’s equal in the nobility of nature. Such men are more common now, and the world thinks less of them. He had the higher merit of working his own way out of the slough, of achieving property hardly, and education still more hardly, at the time when books were a costly luxury, not to be borrowed, but bought at high prices. He was generous with his money, and generous with his books; letting all who would drink of his fountain of knowledge, thinking it ample payment that he was thus contributing to build up the world’s progress. The faculties that he possessed, had they been worked in a Edition: current; Page: [1265] worldly fashion, would have lifted him into what is called a higher position—a greater “success”: but he did not covet it. He loved quiet power for the purpose of promoting good ends, but never sought to attain it by rubbing shoulders with the influential. It is true that he would at times seek out and besiege the influential; but ever for a public purpose. It is to be doubted if he ever asked or received a personal favour in his life. He was the kind of man who in the United States would have become a member of the Legislature; but being in England, he acted only as consulting politician and economist to others.

Francis Place has died, at the ripe age of eighty-two, as he lived, in the full possession of his faculties to the last. Statues have been erected to and honours conferred on many less deserving. His honours will be in the respectful memories of the worthy of all ranks, amidst the large crowd of those who knew him.

Edition: current; Page: [1266]

Appendix F

Textual Emendations

in this list, following the page and line numbers, the reading of the copy-text is given first, and then the amended reading in square brackets, with an explanation if required. If there is no explanation, it may be assumed that there is an obvious typographical error, or else that the change is made for sense or for consistency within the item. For a description of changes not here listed, see cxiv-cxv above. “SC” indicates Mill’s library, Somerville College, Oxford. Typographical errors in versions other than the copy-text are ignored.

3.25 apppears [appears]

3.26 language, [language.]

4.3 economists [economist]

4.12 days [days’]

4.16 cent; [cent.;]

4.29 day’s [days’]

4.32 former, [former]

5.5 therefore [therefore,]

6.9 day’s [days’]

6.11 days’ [days]

6.16 the-merchant [the merchant]

7.22 England, [England;]

8.22 principles. Sympathizing [principles, sympathizing]

18.22 furnish-nishing [furnishing]

19.3 war [War]

19.21 reimportation [re-importation]

22.24 Sandeson [Sanderson]

26.14 deprived [derived]

30.12 101 [161] [as in Source]

30.22 well-intention [well-intentioned]

31.29 oc-operating [co-operating]

32.10 opinion, [opinion;]

32.14 Custom House [Custom-house]

32.15 opinion, [opinion;]

33.11 occation [occasion]

36.13 being [been]

37.8 1739—1740 [1739-1740]

38.6 and thereby [thereby]

Edition: current; Page: [1267]

38.7 aggravattng [aggravating]

38.16 accouuting [accounting]

38.23 effecting [affecting]

45.2 occurred—Suppose [occurred.—Suppose]

48.21 Resurrection Men [Resurrection-Men]

48.37 ceses [cases]

48.37 resurrection men [resurrection-men]

50.23 medical surgical [medical-surgical]

51.20 thnrefore [therefore]

52.28 requistite [requisite]

52.41 capitaiist [capitalist]

53.1 value which depends [value depends]

53.11 objectionalble [objectionable]

53.23 and les [and let]

55.3 reward the [reward of the]

55.9-10 itself, is that . . . arguments, is also this—if [itself is that, . . . arguments, so also this, if]

Appendix G

Corrections to Mill’s List of His Published Articles

the following list includes all the places where editorial corrections have been made in the list (British Library of Political and Economic Science, Mill-Taylor Collection, Vol. XXXVI). The page and line numbers are followed by the reading in the manuscript, and then the corrected reading is given in square brackets. In a few cases our reading differs from that of MacMinn.

30.29 letter and [letter on]

42.9 point [pointing]

60.21 Technalities [Technicalities]

80.14 AM. [A.M.]

85.26 AM. [A.M.]

106.15 AB. [A.B.]

111.7 Thee [Free]

116.16 Lamoignen [Lamoignon]

164.10 ex-ministers [ex-ministers”] [restyled in this ed.]

181.3 April April 1831. [April 1831]

193.11 28. Nov. 1830., . . . Ballet [28 Nov. 1830, . . . Ballot]

205.3 Ballet [Ballot]

209.8 Ballet [Ballot]

212.13 Track [Truck]

216.12 Agriculturists [Agriculturists”]

218.4 Track [Truck]

228.11 Frebry [Febry]

228.10 AB. [A.B.]

307.31 Melle. [Mlle]

310.6 Melle. [Mlle]

310.7 22d, [22d]

318.8 to to [to]

327.26 Whateley [Whately]

329.25 Examiner; [Examiner”;] [restyled in this ed.]

347.10 Bill” and “the [Bill and the]

347.36 1831. [1831]

397.8 Eviniensis [Erinensis] [as in text and Source]

404.12 Charta [Charter]

411.20 Experiences [Experience]

Edition: current; Page: [1278]

419.24 from the [from “the] [the closing quotation marks are there, following a space left blank after operatives of, presumably because the scribe could not make out Todmorden]

425.10 AB. [A.B.]

436.7 Flewer’s [Flower’s]

465.4 M. Pambertin’s [Mr. Pemberton’s]

494.21 Mamborough Head” [Flamborough Head] [the scribe here has made a nonsense of what JSM wrote, which may have been account of “The Fisherman at Flamborough Head”]

Appendix H

Signatures

the following list gives, in alphabetical order, all the signatures used by Mill in these volumes. The years of Mill’s first and last use are given in parentheses following the relevant item numbers. Many of these, especially the early ones, are evidently chosen as appropriate to the subject and the comment on it; others, including the initials not deriving from Mill’s name, indicate continuity within a series, though sometimes not all the items in a series have the signature, and some initials, used only once, are unexplained. Two of the initials were used by Mill also in periodical articles: “A.” (originally as standing for “Antiquus”) and “S.”, both used in the London and Westminster Review, the former more commonly.

Appendix I

Newspapers for Which Mill Wrote

in the following alphabetical list, “W” signals a weekly newspaper, “D” a daily one. The years of Mill’s first and last contributions to each paper are given in parentheses following the relevant item numbers. No. 158, which appeared in Le Globe, was also published in English (our copy-text) in the Monthly Repository (the French translation is in App. B), as was No. 255, which was intended for Le National; they are attributed here to the French papers for which they were intended. Also No. 287 appeared (as Mill himself notes) in both the Spectator (from which we take the copy-text) and the Morning Chronicle, and, as explained in the Textual Introduction, three items did not actually appear in newspapers: the total here listed, therefore, is not 427 but 425.

Appendix J

Index of Persons and Works Cited, with Variants and Notes

like most nineteenth-century authors, Mill is cavalier in his approach to sources, sometimes identifying them with insufficient care, and occasionally quoting them inaccurately. This Appendix is intended to help correct these deficiencies, and to serve as an index of names and titles (which are consequently omitted in the Index proper). Included here also are (at the end of the appendix and listed alphabetically by country) references to parliamentary documents and to statutes. The material otherwise is arranged in alphabetical order, with an entry for each person or work reviewed, quoted, or referred to in the text proper and in Appendices A-E (the page numbers in the appendices are given in italic type). Anonymous articles in newspapers are entered in order of date under the title of the particular newspaper. Speeches are listed in chronological order. References to mythical and fictional characters are excluded. The following abbreviations are used: ADB (Allgemeine deutsche Biographie), BU (Biographie universelle), DAB (Dictionary of American Biography), DBF (Dictionnaire de biographie française), DNB (Dictionary of National Biography), DPF (Dictionnaire des parlementaires français), EB (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th ed.), GDU (Larousse, Grand dictionnaire universel du XIXe siècle), GE (Grande encyclopédie), MEB (Boase, Modern English Biography), PD (Parliamentary Debates), PP (Parliamentary Papers), SC (JSM’s library, Somerville College, Oxford), WWBMP (Who’s Who of British Members of Parliament), WWG (Who Was Who in the Greek World), WWR (Who Was Who in the Roman World).

The entries take the following form:

1. Identification of persons: birth and death dates are followed by a biographical source; if no source is indicated, available details are given in a note.

3. Notes (if required) giving information about JSM’s use of the source, indication if the work is in his library, Somerville College, Oxford, and any other relevant information.

4. Lists of the pages where works are reviewed, quoted, and referred to.

5. In the case of quotations, a list of substantive variants between Mill’s text and his source, in this form: Page and line reference to the present text. Reading in the present text] Reading in the source (page reference in the source).

The list of substantive variants also attempts to place quoted passages in their contexts Edition: current; Page: [1285] by giving the beginnings and endings of sentences. The original wording is supplied where Mill has omitted two sentences or less; only the length of other omissions is given. There being uncertainty about the actual Classical texts used by Mill, the Loeb editions are usually cited.

Anon.Domestic Prospects of the Country under the New Parliament. London: Ridgway, 1837.

note: 3rd ed. reviewed in CW, VI, and this passage quoted.

quoted: 799-800

799.39-800.1 “embarrass the Government”] All parties, those for the Ballot—those for extended Suffrage—those for the Abolition of Church Rates—those for grand plans of Public Education—those for the Appropriation Clause—those for Municipal Institutions in Ireland—those for yielding to Canada a more democratic form of Government than at present exists there, should one and all enter upon the new Session with this conviction thoroughly impressed upon their minds, that there is not one of these questions, no not one, which is not secondary to the great object of maintaining Lord Melbourne’s Cabinet free from every species of embarrassment. (41)

Anon. “Events of the Quarter.” See Law Magazine.

Anon. “Extraordinary Case of the Royal Associates of the Royal Society of Literature.” See Englishman’s Magazine, June 1831.

Anon. “Paper of Observations and Suggestions on Several Clauses of the East-India Bill” (10 July, 1833). In Papers Respecting the Negotiation with His Majesty’s Ministers on the Subject of the East-India Company’s Charter and the Government of His Majesty’sEdition: current; Page: [1287]Indian Territories, for a Further Term after the 22d April 1834. London: Cox, 1833, 317-28.

Attwood, Thomas (1783-1856; DNB). A Letter to the Right Honourable Nicholas Vansittart, on the Creation of Money, and on Its Action upon National Prosperity. Birmingham: Wrightson; London: Baldwin, et al., 1817.

referred to: 34

— Prosperity Restored; or, Reflections on the Cause of the Public Distresses, and on the Only Means of Relieving Them. London: Baldwin, et al., 1817.

referred to: 34

Audry de Puyravault, Pierre François (1773-1852; DBF).

note: JSM uses the spelling Puyraveau.

referred to: 517-18, 518, 661, 695, 696

— Speech on the Draft Address to the King (6 Jan.), Moniteur, 1834, 41-2.

—, trans. Victor Cousin. Report on the State of Public Instruction in Prussia. London: Wilson, 1834.

note: see also Cousin, Rapport.

reviewed: 727-32

quoted: 729-30, 730-1, 731, 731-2

729.32 point; how] point. How (ix)

729.36 education, the] education. The (ix)

729.40 desideratum] desideratum (ix)

730.10 duty] duty (x)

730.13 principle.] principle.* [footnote omitted] (x)

730.16 might] ought (xi)

730.19 advantages. Are] advantages. “Persons,” says the able writer just quoted, “of uncultivated and torpid minds are not aware to what an extent education can raise, enlarge, and stimulate the understanding; in how great a measure it ensures a person’s happiness, and makes him both independent of the world and a safe and peaceable member of society.” Here and there we find an individual to whom strong good sense and a lively curiosity reveal the magnitude of his want; but a man has already got beyond the first rudeness and apathy of ignorance who longs for knowledge. Are (xi)

note: this ed. gives the wording cited in the indirect quotation, which is taken from the Brighton Guardian. See also next entry.

quoted: 322-3

322.38-323.1 man was but the minister . . . nature;”] Man, as the minister . . . nature, does and understands as much, as his observations on the order of nature, either with regard to things or the mind, permit him, and neither knows nor is capable of more. (31)

— “Of Revenge.” In The Essayes or Counsels, Civill and Morall (1625). In Works, VI, 384-5.

quoted: 901

901.9 “wild justice”] Revenge is a kind of wild justice; which the more man’s nature runs to, the more ought law to weed it out. (384)

Edition: current; Page: [1291]

— Of the Dignity and Advancement of Learning (1605). In Works, IV, 273-V, 119.

quoted: 524

524.25 “immersed in matter”] Next comes another diversity of Method, namely that the method used should be according to the subject-matter which is handled. For there is one method of delivery in the mathematics (which are the most abstracted and simple of knowledges), another in politics (which are the most immersed and compounded). (451-2)

— The Twoo Bookes of Francis Bacon of the Proficience and Advancement of Learning Divine and Humane (1605). In Works, III, 261-491.

quoted: 524

524.25 “immersed in matter”] [paragraph] Another diversity of Methods is according to the subject or matter which is handled; for there is a great difference in delivery of the Mathematics, which are the most abstracted of knowledges, and Policy, which is the most immersed: and howsoever contention hath been moved touching an uniformity of method in multiformity of matter, yet we see how that opinion, besides the weakness of it, hath been of ill desert towards learning, as that which taketh the way to reduce learning to certain empty and barren generalities; being but the very husks and shells of sciences, all the kernel being forced out and expulsed with the torture and press of the method; and therefore as I did allow well of particular Topics for invention, so I do allow likewise of particular Methods of tradition. (406)

Bacon, Nicholas (1509-79; DNB). Referred to: 282

Baillie, James (ca. 1737-93). Speech on the Slave Trade (2 Apr., 1792). In The Parliamentary History of England, from the Norman Conquest, in 1066, to the Year 1803. Ed. William Cobbett and John Wright. 36 vols. London: Bagshaw, Longmans, 1806-20, Vol. XXIX, cols. 1073-83.

— On the Applications of Science to Human Health and Well-being. Being a Lecture, Introductory to a Course, “on the Application of Physics to Common Life,” Delivered at the Edinburgh Philosophical Institute in June, 1847. London and Glasgow: Griffin, 1848.

1263.21 “what was to be done for the Poles.”] “No,” he said, “it is more than bodily pain—it is the thought that so many gallant patriots are starving! . . . What is to be done?” and, turning earnestly to his friend, waited for an answer. (III, 110)

note: cited for ease of reference. The details of first publication are given under the separate titles.

— The Book of Fallacies; from the Unfinished Papers of Jeremy Bentham. Ed. Peregrine Bingham. London: Hunt, 1824.

note: in Works, II, 375-487.

referred to: 241, 469, 473

— Constitutional Code. London: printed Heward, 1830.

note: in Works, IX. One volume of a projected three was published in 1827, according to Bowring; no more were published until the complete work appeared in Bowring’s edition, first in 1841 when the edition was appearing in parts, then in 1843 in the eleven-volume set. The references are to the word “securities” used in the Philosophic Radical sense; that at 102 is in a quotation from James Mill; that at 874 is in a quotation from Grote.

referred to: 40, 62-4, 102, 130, 144, 184-5, 489, 490, 492, 503, 874

— Defence of Usury. London: Payne, 1787.

note: in Works, III.

referred to: 473

Edition: current; Page: [1294]

— Draught of a New Plan for the Organization of the Judicial Establishment in France. London: McCreery, 1790.

note: in Works, IV, 285-406.

referred to: 64, 470-1, 473

— The Elements of the Art of Packing, As Applied to Special Juries, Particularly in Cases of Libel Law. London: Wilson, 1821.

note: in Works, V, 61-186; the reference is inferred.

referred to: 92

— A Fragment on Government. London: Payne, 1776.

note: in Works, I, 221-95.

referred to: 469, 471, 473

— An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. London: Payne, 1789.

note: in Works, I, 1-154.

referred to: 473

— An Introductory View of the Rationale of Evidence. [London, 1810.]

note: in Works, VI, 1-218. The reference is in a quotation from Chadwick.

note: the references at 640 are in a quotation from Harriet Martineau.

referred to: 70, 640, 1222

— New Testament. Referred to: 1084

— Old Testament. Referred to: 869, 1174

— Daniel.

note: the quotations are indirect.

quoted: 176, 1098

— Deuteronomy.

note: the quotation at 170 is in a quotation from Ross; the indirect quotation at 172 is in a quotation from the Quarterly Review, via the Morning Chronicle (see also Joshua); the reference at 559 is in a quotation from W.J. Fox.

996.6 These . . . Israel!] And the Lord said unto Moses, Go, get thee down; for thy people, which thou broughtest out of the land of Egypt, have corrupted themselves: They have turned aside Edition: current; Page: [1297] quickly out of the way which I commanded them: they have made them a molten calf, and have worshipped it, and have sacrificed thereunto, and said, These . . . Israel, which have brought thee up out of the land of Egypt. (31:7-8)

— Ezekiel. Referred to: 1096

— Genesis.

note: the reference, to the Deluge, is in a quotation from Thornton.

referred to: 898

— Isaiah.

note: the indirect quotation is in a quotation from the Nation.

quoted: 965

— Job.

note: the quotation is indirect.

quoted: 295

— John.

note: the quotation is indirect. The reference is to Jesus’ first command, “that ye love one another, as I have loved you” (15:12).

quoted: 908

referred to: 812

— Joshua.

note: the indirect quotation is in a quotation from the Quarterly Review, via the Morning Chronicle.

quoted: 172

— Judges.

note: the reference, in a quotation from W.J. Fox, is to Jephtha, known for the vow that resulted in the sacrifice of his daughter.

referred to: 558

— I Kings. Referred to: 917, 1081

— Luke.

note: the quotations at 310 and 557 are indirect; the reference is to the Sermon on the Mount.

quoted: 310, 557, 1099

referred to: 1174

1099.26 “Physician heal thyself!”] And he said unto them, Ye will surely say unto me this proverb, Physician heal thyself: whatsoever we have heard done in Capernum, do also here in thy country. (4:23)

— Mark. Referred to: 921

— Matthew.

note: the quotations at 972 and 1075 are indirect; for the indirect quotation at 965, which is in a quotation from the Nation, see also Mark, 12:40, and Luke, 20:47; the reference at 1174 is to the Sermon on the Mount.

quoted: 31, 902, 965, 972, 1075, 1096

referred to: 7, 135, 211, 1031, 1067, 1173, 1174

31.7 “Swear . . . all,”] Again, ye have heard that it hath been said by them of old time, Thou shalt not forswear thyself, but shalt perform unto the Lord thine oaths: But I say unto you, Swear . . . all; neither by heaven; for it is God’s throne: Nor by the earth; for it is his footstool: neither by Jerusalem; for it is the city of the great King. (5:33-5)

902.24-5 “to him that hath shall be given.”] For whosoever hath, to him shall be given, and he shall have more abundance: but whosoever hath not, from him shall be taken away even that he hath. (13:12)

1096.20 “wrath to come,”] But when he saw many of the Pharisees and Sadducees come to his baptism, he said unto them, O generation of vipers, who hath warned you to flee from the wrath to come? (3:7)

— Amendment to the Address to the King (3 Dec.), Moniteur, 1832, 2068-9.

referred to: 532

— Speech on Foreign Affairs (7 Jan.), Moniteur, 1834, 53-4.

referred to: 665

Bird, Anne (b. ca. 1805).

note: a woman of Horace Street, Edgware Road, accused of beating a child.

referred to: 1155

Bird, Robert Curtis (b. ca. 1815).

note: a farmer; accused of causing the death of Mary Anne Parsons.

referred to: 1152, 1153, 1164-7

Bird, Sarah (b. ca. 1815).

note: wife of Robert Curtis Bird.

referred to: 1152, 1153, 1164-7

Bishop, Henry (b. 1792).

note: born in Oxford, he received a B.A. from Oriel College in 1814 and an M.A. in 1816, and was ordained a priest in 1817. He acted an Assistant Commissioner as well as Commissioner for the Poor Law Inquiry, writing a controversial report on Oxford. He seems not to have served in a parish, but to have passed his latter years quietly at 7, Grove Hill, Tunbridge Wells.

referred to: 744, 778

Black, John (1783-1855; DNB).

note: all references to “the Editor of the Morning Chronicle” simply as recipient of letters are excluded.

— The Prize Essay, Addressed to the Agricultural Committee of the Royal Dublin Society. On the Management of Landed Property in Ireland; the Consolidation of Small Farms, Employment of the Poor, Etc. Etc. Dublin: Curry; Belfast: Archer; Armagh: M‘Waters; London: Rodwell, 1834.

quoted: 927-8, 928, 928-9, 929-30, 1046

referred to: 927-30, 942, 974

927.33 that] I would therefore propose, that (33)

928.2 practicable, [or] where] practicable; likewise, where the interference with the private rights of individuals seems to be least objectionable; for example, where (34)

928.4 place. In this] place; in this (34)

928.6-8 where . . . proved.] [not in italics] (34)

928.8 proved. Suppose Government to] proved; suppose government to (34)

928.11 an . . . perpetuity] [not in italics] (34)

928.12 conduct. Their own] conduct; their own (34)

928.13 lots, be] lot be (34) [treated as typographical error in this ed.]

928.14 agriculturist.] agriculturist, to be dealt with exactly as I have already described. (34)

928.19 Government, . . . should] In prosecuting such a plan as this, government should (34)

928.21 Let . . . industry] [not in italics] (34)

928.21 fruit] fruits (34)

928.21 raise] rouse (34)

928.23-4 above-mentioned. [paragraph] Suppose a] above mentioned. [2-sentence omission] All the details of a measure, like the foregoing, are not to be expected in a treatise like this: but suppose a (35)

928.28 40s. or 50s. advanced] 40s. to 50s. advanced (35)

928.30 America] America (35)

928.31 in the] into the (35-6)

928.32 independent.] independent; and it is evident, that if this plan was carried into effect, government could never suffer loss, on the contrary, a large profit would be derived by the extra rate of interest, and the additional rent produced by the improvement of the land, and the money being only advanced to supply the means of industry, the labour added to it would always afford ample security for its repayment, the land being always benefited much more than the advance made. (36)

928.36 It] [no paragraph] It (35) [this is the opening of the 1st sentence omitted at 928.23-4 above]

928.39 home. . . . I] [ellipsis indicates 1½-page omission] (35-6)

929.1 whatever. In] whatever; and as the removal of each settler from his immediate neighbourhood would leave a space to be filled up by the adjoining population, the benefit of an experiment of this kind, in any one place, would be thereby diffused generally, throughout the kingdom, and no one who has had any experience of the anxiety to obtain land, under a fair and liberal landlord, when it can be done without apprehension of danger, (even where they obtain no lease whatever,) will for a moment apprehend any want of settlers. In (37)

929.3-4 let . . . rent] [not in italics] (37)

929.6 cultivation.] cultivation, and thus the object of giving employment would be accomplished, at the same time exonerating government from having any further trouble in the business. (37)

929.42 I] [no paragraph] But I (7)

929.42 industry] industry (7)

930.1 proofs. . . . The spirit] proofs. [JSM skips back 5 sentences] The effect of a just settlement of the past, and the hopes arising from a fair charge for the future, will have an immediate effect in removing any such despondency, and if to this is added some assistance in the cultivation of their farms, the spirit (7)

930.5 knowledge.] knowledge, for I have tried the experiment, and can bear testimony to the good it produced. (7)

1046.27 if . . . house] [in italics] (23n)

Edition: current; Page: [1300]

1046.30 subject.”] subject, and I think it will not appear extraordinary, that such should be the case, to any one who reflects that the English farmer of 700 to 800 acres, is a kind of man approaching to what is known by the name of a gentleman farmer in this country. (23n)

1173.38 malicious,”] malicious: these therefore may suffice as a specimen; and we may take it for a general rule, that all homicide is malicious, and of course amounts to murder, unless where justified by the command or permission of the law; excused on a principle of accident or self-preservation; or alleviated into manslaughter, by being either the involuntary consequence of some act, not strictly lawful, or (if voluntary) occasioned by some sudden and sufficiently violent provocation. (IV, 201)

Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine. Referred to: 175, 691

Blake, William (1774-1852).

note: F.R.S., President of the Geological Society 1815-16, writer on currency.

referred to: 853

— Observations on the Principles Which Regulate the Course of Exchange; and on the Depreciated State of the Currency. London: Lloyd, 1810.

— The Public Economy of Athens, in Four Books; to Which Is Added, A Dissertation on the Silver-Mines of Laurion. Trans. from the German [by Henry Tufnell and George Cornewall Lewis]. 2 vols. London: Murray, 1828.

— “Evidence Given before the Select Committee.” In “Report of the Select Committee on the State of the Poor in Ireland; Being a Summary of the First, Second and Third Reports of Evidence Taken before That Committee: Together with an Appendix of Accounts and Papers,” PP, 1830, VII, 667-97.

note: the indirect quotation is in a quotation from the “Third Report of the Commissioners for Inquiring into the Condition of the Poorer Classes in Ireland,” 1836, q.v.

321.13-14 “a . . . sentiment.”] [paragraph] If the respect for literary men be a . . . sentiment, are there any circumstances remaining to justify it? (2)

321.16 “respect . . . veneration.”] The respect . . . veneration, which their successors had for them has clung to the profession of literature to this day, and it is praised and honored for what it once did not for what it now does. (2)

321.18 men.”] men; but the mine of antiquity has long been exhausted, and all the ore which it contained extracted and put to use. (2)

321.20 “is] [see collation for 321.16]

321.23 Do] [no paragraph] Do (2)

321.25 Punch] punch (2)

321.28 symbols [cymbals],] symbols, (2)

322.27 however, . . . go] however go (2)

322.33-4 “it is . . . death;”] It is . . . death, which, for force and accuracy, have never been surpassed. (2)

322.35 “It] [paragraph] It (2)

322.36-7 Trade;” . . . “a . . . produce:”] Trade, in which he advocated, if not with as many felicitous illustrations as subsequent events taught adam smith, yet clearly and forcibly, those principles of Free Trade which have lately, by a want of markets for own [sic] produce, been brought into general favour. (2)

322.37-323.1 “it is upwards . . . that . . . nature;”] [paragraph] It is now upwards . . . “that . . . Nature;” and upwards of 100 since locke repeated and enforced that great principle in his peculiar form, viz. “that all our knowledge of the extreme world is acquired by means of our senses,” which has now been a popular maxim in England, repeated, parrot-like by thousands of scribblers since the days of that great philosopher and patriot. (2)

325.7 there that is] there is (2) [treated as printer’s error in this ed.]

— “Literature and Patronage,” 15 June, 1831, 2.

note: the quotation is a quotation from No. 109.

quoted: 330

referred to: 329-30

330.16 “with the tribe of dunces.”] Our remarks, however, have touched some people to the quick, and we are called a “perverse person,” classed with the “tribe of dunces,” and our article is described as being of “inconceivable Vandalism.” (2)

— Letter to the Chairman of the Buckinghamshire Meeting, Held 13th April 1780, at Aylesbury; on the Duration of Parliaments, and a More Equal Representation of the People (1780). In The Works of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke. 8 vols. London: Dodsley (Vols. I-III), Rivington (Vols. IV-VIII), 1792-1827, V, 226-31.

note: Vols. III-V formerly in SC.

referred to: 502

— Mr. Burke’s Three Letters Addressed to a Member of the Present Parliament on the Prospects for Peace with the Regicide Directory of France. Letter II: On the Genius and Character of the French Revolution as It Regards Other Nations. In Works, IV, 352-457.

quoted: 122

122.38-9 “an insurrection of the talents] Jacobinism is the revolt of the enterprising talents (IV, 424)

— “Speech on American Taxation” (19 Apr., 1774). In Works, I, 507-80.

quoted: 767

767.31-2 “the shameful parts of the constitution,”] When this child of ours [America] wishes to assimilate to its parent, and to reflect with a true filial resemblance the beauteous countenance of British liberty; are we to turn to them the shameful parts of our constitution? are we to give them our weakness for their strength; our opprobrium for their glory; and the slough of slavery, which we are not able to work off, to serve them for their freedom? (I, 575)

Edition: current; Page: [1307]

— Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents (1770). In Works, I, 409-505.

note: the quotation at 757 is in a quotation from Senior, who used another ed.; this one used for consistency of reference.

1114.9 “confiscation of all the land of Ireland,”] He considered this Bill nothing more nor less than confiscation; and, by carrying it into operation as it then stood, their Lordships would do that which Mr. O’Connell was, during nearly the whole of his life, attempting to do, namely, effect the repeal of the Union, and confiscate the property of the Protestant landlords of Ireland. (1029-30)

649.3-4 . . . a tool / Which knaves . . . fool.] Some hold the one, and some the other; / But, howsoe’er they make a pother, / The diff’rence was so small, his brain / Outweigh’d his rage but half a grain; / Which made some take him for a tool / That knaves . . . Fool. (I, 7; Pt. 1, Canto 1, ll. 31-6)

note: source of the anecdote about Alexander Pope: “It is remarkable that the expletive Mr. Pope generally used by way of oath, was ‘God mend me!’ One day, in a dispute with a hackney coachman, he used this expression—‘Mend you! says the coachman, it would not be half the trouble to make a new one.’ ” (303.)

quoted: 590

Campbell, George (1719-96; DNB). Referred to: 16

Campbell, John (1779-1861; DNB).

note: the quotations are from “Law Intelligence,” Standard, 13 May, 1850, q.v. for the collation. See also “The Bank of England,” The Times, 14 Aug., 1833.

1096.11-13 “the Destinies . . . England a heavier . . . generations”] That the stern Destinies . . . England a terrible job of labour in these centuries, and will inexorably (as their wont is) have it done: a job of labour terrible to look upon, extending superficially to the Indies and the Antipodes over all countries, and in depth, one knows not how deep; for it is not cotton-spinning and commercing merely; it is (as begins to be visible) governing, regulating, which in these days will mean conquering dragons and world-wide chimeras, and climbing as high as the zenith to snatch fire from the gods, and diving as deep as the nadir to fling devils in chains:—and it has been laid upon the poor English people, all this; a heavier . . . generations! (275)

1096.14 “conquering Anarchy:”] Conquering Anarchy; which is not conquerable except by weapons gained in Heaven’s armoury, and used in battles against Orcus;—so that we may say of him that conquers it, as the Italians were wont to say of Dante: Eccoui l’uom ch’é stato all’inferno! (275)

1096.14-15 “England’s . . . Providences,”] The candid Irish Confederation admits that such is really the fact; that England’s work will be effectually stopped by this occupation of her back-parlour; and furthermore that they, the Irish Confederation, mean it so—mean to stop England’s . . . Providences. (275)

1096.17 “flatly . . . universe.”] I grieve to say it; but so the matter is: flatly . . . universe in these current centuries, and not to be ventured upon as an investment by any person whose capital of money, logic, rhetoric, wind-eloquence, influence, courage, strength, old soda-water bottles, or other animal or spiritual possession, is precious to him. (275)

1096.24 “slavery,”] Fruitless futile insurrections, continual sanguinary broils and riots that make his dwelling-place a horror to mankind, mark his progress generation after generation; and if no beneficent hand will chain him into wholesome slavery, and, with whip on back or otherwise, try to tame him, and get some work out of him,—Nature herself, intent to have her world tilled, has no resource but to exterminate him, as she has done the wolves and various other obstinately free creatures before now! (276)

— “Report on the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population of Great Britain.” In “Report to Her Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for the Home Department, from the Poor Law Commissioners, on an Inquiry into the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population of Great Britain,” House of Lords Sessional Papers, 1842, XXVI.

note: also published separately (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1842). The specific reference at 826 mistakenly refers to Leeds instead of Birmingham.

note: many of the references are to “the Bourbons” during the Restoration; the reference at 129 is to him as “a priest-ridden despot”; that at 139 is to the “roi cagot”; the first at 170 is in a quotation from the Standard; the second at 170 and the first at 171, in a quotation from the Morning Chronicle, are to him as a “foolish” monarch and “a priest-ridden old man”; that at 260 is to him as constituting “the executive”; those at 1248 are in a speech by Godefroy Cavaignac.

308.30 “our lively neighbours,”] Applying this general principle to the question before us, we conceive it impossible to deny, and quite unnecessary to prove, that the advantage is very decidedly on our side, on a comparison with our lively neighbours. (363)

308.30 “our lively neighbours,”] [paragraph] In the first reception they gave to the system of Locke, the French seemed in an extraordinary degree to overlook one great portion of his theory—that which attributes to one entire class of our ideas, another origin beside direct sensation, viz. reflection. But this is quite in the mode of our too lively neighbours. (164)

— The First Part of the Institutes of the Lawes of England; or, A Commentarie upon Littleton. London: Society of Stationers, 1628.

note: the quotation at 469 is indirect.

quoted: 60, 469

60.30 “the perfection of human reason,”] And therefore if all the reason that is dispersed into so many several heads were united into one, yet could he not make such a Law as the Law of England is, because by many successions of ages it hath been fined and refined by an infinite number of grave and learned men, and by long experience growne to such a perfection, for the government of this Realme, as the old rule may be justly verified of it, Neminem oportet esse sapientiorem legibus: No man (out of his own private reason) ought to be wiser than the Law, which is the perfection of reason. (97; II, 6, 138).

— The Friend: A Series of Essays, in Three Volumes, to Aid in the Formation of Fixed Principles in Politics, Morals, and Religion, with Literary Amusements Interspersed. 3 vols. London: Rest Fenner, 1818.

quoted: 323

323.23 “ignorance of . . . books”] For a crime it is (and the man who hesitates in pronouncing it such, must be ignorant of . . . books, what he himself owes to them in spite of his ignorance) thus to introduce the spirit of vulgar scandal and personal inquietude into the Closet and the Library, environing with evil passions the very Sanctuaries, to which we should flee for refuge from them! (II, 306)

— On the Constitution of Church and State According to the Idea of Each; and Lay Sermons: I. The Statesman’s Manual, II. “Blessed are ye that sow beside all waters.” Ed. Henry Nelson Coleridge. London: Pickering, 1839.

note: in SC.

referred to: 1108

— The Piccolomini; or, The First Part of Wallenstein, a Drama in Five Acts Translated from the German of Frederick Schiller. London: Longman and Rees, 1800.

note: the first quotation is taken from Talfourd’s speech of 6 July, 1848, q.v.

Edition: current; Page: [1318]

quoted: 1108

referred to: 1108

1108.11-13 Straightforward flies / The lightning flash, and straight the cannon-ball, / Shattering that it may reach, and shattering what it reaches.] [no paragraph] Straight forward goes / The lightning’s path, and straight the fearful path of the cannon-ball. Direct it flies and rapid, / Shatt’ring that it may reach, and shatt’ring what it reaches. (22; I, iv, 70-3)

— Article on the French Peerage, Globe and Traveller, 24 Nov., 1831, 2.

quoted: 365n

365n.4-6 “the . . . without exception . . . (before . . . revolution)] No greater number of peers has been created than was necessary to secure a majority in favour of the bill, and the . . . without exception . . . before . . . revolution (2)

— “France. Important Trial before the Chamber of Peers of Count Kergorlay, Ex-Peer of France, for a Political Libel,” Morning Chronicle, 26 Nov., 1830, 1-2.

1225.19 “one in principle”] Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that all which that Power seeks to abrogate rests on the basis of solemn Treaty; and I tremble to see that so high an authority as Mr. Mill, though widely different in spirit and in style, is, in respect of the binding nature of covenants, at one in principle with the Russian Chancellor. (3)

1226.2 “take . . . another”] If this view be confirmed by public opinion, it will be well that England at least, having got rid of the present Treaty, should take . . . another for any purpose or with any people. (3)

note: the reference at 527 is in a quotation from Le National. Anonymous articles follow, listed chronologically.

referred to: 527, 528, 529

Edition: current; Page: [1321]

— Leading article, 26 Oct., 1832, 3.

note: the reference is in a quotation from Le National.

referred to: 527

— “Recommendations of the Poor Law Commissioners,” 24 Feb., 1834, 3.

referred to: 686

— Leading article on the Poor Law Bill, 2 May, 1834, 2.

quoted: 715

715.14 “bashaws,”] But, however this may be, the Pacha never carried tyranny and interference with private concerns further than it is proposed to carry them by this measure. (2)

— Leading article on the New Colony in South Australia, 1 July, 1834, 4.

quoted: 742

742.10-11 “as . . . possible”] But instead of this [giving land grants in proportion to capital] the projectors of the New Colony proceed upon a totally different principle, which is, to render their Colony as . . . possible. (4)

note: the quotation is in a quotation from Roebuck, q.v. for the collation.

quoted: 589

referred to: 572, 727-32

— Report on the State of Public Instruction in Prussia. See Sarah Austin.

Cowper, William (1731-1800; DNB). The Task: A Poem in Six Books, to Which Are Added by the Same Author, An Epistle to Joseph Hill, Esq.; Tirocinium, or a Review of Schools; and The History of John Gilpin. London: Johnson, 1785, 1-283.

quoted: 296

296.6 War is a] But war’s a (190)

296.7 Kings would not play at; nations] King’s should not play at. Nations (190)

1038.19 Napoleon will] Napoléon—still in all its power and vigour—will (217)

1039.31-2 “every . . . France,” . . . “the . . . Philippe;”] [paragraph] We have thus given our readers a summary, very much abridged as to details, but sufficiently copious in general facts and consequences, of this most curious and important survey of the agricultural, and to a corresponding extent, of the moral and social state of France, and we think it cannot be doubted that,—discarding altogether the bias of M. Mounier, and the more inveterate prejudices of M. Rubichon,—there are on the face of the unquestionable statistical documents strong reasons for the apprehension with which we believe every . . . France, and especially, if we are not misinformed, the . . . Philippe, regards the progressive operation of the subdivision of property. (237)

1040.34 “There] And accordingly, we have in the volumes abundant evidence that there (216)

Edition: current; Page: [1323]

1040.35 peasant. . . . 2,600,000] peasant. We have before seen that there are 2,600,000 (216)

1042.35-6 “on . . . inheritance”] But however that may be, it is obvious that under the unremitting action of the law, the ten thousand 690l. incomes of one generation must become in the next (on . . . inheritance), thirty thousand of 230l.; and although there is at work an antagonist process of reconstruction or accumulation by marriage, purchase, and collateral inheritance, it is altogether inadequate to stem the dispersing torrent. (212)

1050.8 “creating a . . . France,”] “In short,” says M. Rubichon in one of his bursts of indignation, “while England is striving to extirpate the old Irish system, our government is creating a . . . France.” (230)

1145.30-1 “falsehood,” . . . “treachery,” . . . “to] M. Cabet, however, never practised a greater deception than that which sent the Roman expedition; nor was he guilty of greater falsehood, greater treachery, or a larger amount of human misery. [paragraph] Indeed between the communism of M. Cabet, and the catholicism of General Oudinot, we cannot see any wonderous difference; except that the one is idiotic and the other brutal; the one a nefarious attempt to establish bigots and tyranny by the sword; the other a foolish enterprise to (4)

1221.33 “provocation”] The defendant [William Smith] immediately afterwards came up, and, without uttering a word, and without the slightest provocation of any kind, struck him [Macgovern] on the temple with his truncheon, and felled him to the ground. (2)

1089.28 indulgences.”] indulgencies, are their bane; but, unfortunately, these qualities are hardly sufficient to separate them from much of the literature of the day, which aspires to different rank, and proposes to itself a higher kind of audience. (3)

1089.29 “a chaos of corruption,”] Far from that: the whole mass of this low literature is a chaos of corruption. (3)

note: as JSM’s source for his quotations has not been located, the PD version is used for ease of reference. The quotation at 28 is attributed by JSM to Marryatt, but reflects Douglas’s remarks; that at 29 is not found in any of the speeches in PD, but may reflect Douglas’s closing remarks.

quoted: 28, 29

referred to: 29

Dresser, Richard (1801-46).

note: an accountant, the deceased patient of Dr. James Ellis.

referred to: 875-7

Drinkwater, William.

note: a boy.

referred to: 1187

Edition: current; Page: [1328]

Drummond, Henry (1786-1860; DNB). Referred to: 327

— Dialogues on Prophecy. 3 vols. London: Nisbet, 1827-29.

referred to: 229

Dryden, John (1631-1700; DNB). Alexander’s Feast; or, The Power of Musique. An Ode in Honour of St. Cecilia’s Day. London: Tonson, 1697.

note: the quotation is indirect.

quoted: 1009

— King Arthur; or, The British Worthy. London: Tonson, 1691.

note: the quotation is indirect.

quoted: 831

831.2-3 war is the game of kings,] Mistake me not, I count not War a Wrong: / War is the Trade of Kings, that fight for Empire; / And better be a Lyon, than a Sheep. (19; II, ii)

325.39 “encouragement to literature”] Many more reasons than we can at present notice, have been assigned for the fact [that England now ranks below Continental nations in science and knowledge], but among the principal are the flagrant mismanagement of sundry public institutions, and the remarkable apathy of the government to the great cause of literature, and to the encouragement of its most successful and assiduous cultivators. (263)

Fielding, Henry (1707-54; DNB). Amelia (1752). In The Works of Henry Fielding, with Life. 12 vols. London: Richards, 1824, X-XI.

note: in SC.

referred to: 44-5

— The History of the Life of the Late Mr. Jonathan Wild, the Great (1743). In Works, IV.

note: in SC. The work, separately paginated, occupies the second half of Vol. IV.

referred to: 665

— The History of Tom Jones, a Foundling (1749). In Works, VI-IX.

note: in SC, where the quoted passage is underlined in pencil, as is the conclusion of the sentence (which JSM does not quote), “I am . . . correction.”

quoted: 115

115.4-7 “that . . . not.”] [paragraph] Just as he arrived at Mr. Allworthy’s outward gate, he met the constable and company, with Molly in their possession, whom they were conducting to that . . . which lesson, if they do not learn, I am afraid, they very rarely learn any other good lesson, or improve their morals, at the house of correction. (VI, 191-2; IV, xi)

— Tom Thumb: A Tragedy (1730). In Works, II, i-58.

note: published under the pseudonym of H. Scriblerus Secundus. In SC.

quoted: 608

608.12-13 “They made the giants first, and then they killed them.”] [Lord Grizzle] I tell you, Madam, it was all a trick, / He made the giants first, and then he kill’d them; / As fox-hunters bring foxes to the wood, / And then with hounds they drive them out again. (II, 24; I, v, 32-5)

— Hymn of the Polish Exiles by the Siberian Sea; Composed by the Author of “Musical Illustrations of the Waverley Novels,” “Songs of the Seasons,” &c. The Words from “The Charmed Sea, a Tale,” by Harriet Martineau. London: Novello and Fox, 1833.

reviewed: 554-5

quoted: 555

555.8 again,”] again! (4)

— Mignon’s Song; or, A Foreign Sky Above by the Author of the Musical Illustrations of the Waverley Novels, &c. London: Novello, [1833].

note: the British Library copy has an inked date of 1838 for the entry in the Stationer’s Hall, but JSM’s review (in which he says the work is published by Novello) is in April 1833.

557.8-9 “of being] Poor Hetty’s primeval calamity was that of being (165)

557.27 To] [no paragraph] To (166)

557.27-8 and must proceed with children by] and with children must proceed by (166)

557.29 better.] better; for by neglecting timely correction, they will contract a stubbornness and obstinacy which are hardly ever after conquered, and never without using such severity as would be as painful to me as to the child. (167)

558.23 “effectually . . . down”] Had not her will been effectually . . . down by the process which has been described, she must have seen the fallacy of its being a duty to make a profession of everlasting love from which her nature recoiled. (174)

558.33 grave.—And] grave. [paragraph] And (174)

558.37 “she] She (176)

559.1 “it cannot] The substance of their wretchedness was simply this: they made a religious contract to pass the remainder of their lives with persons who turned out to be so uncongenial that the only alternative was the irregular suspension of the performance of the contract, or a state of endurance which cannot (170-1)

1029.2-5 “on Monday, would apply . . . £150,000.”] ”Would on Monday apply . . . 150,000l., so that this year they were secure of an expenditure of more than twice the amount of value of the barony. (3)

Fréville. See Villot de Fréville.

“A Friend to the ‘Lower Classes.’ ” See Black Dwarf, 7 Jan., 1824.

“G.J.G.” See Morning Chronicle, 26 Dec., 1823.

Galignani’s Messenger.

note: one anonymous article follows.

referred to: 526

— Unheaded article, 24 Oct., 1832, 4.

note: the quotation, which is in a quotation from Le National’s article on Ireland, is indirect.

note: engineer with large works at Smithfield, sometime Chairman of the Association of Master Manufacturers. An active Radical, he was Assistant Secretary of the London Corresponding Society (1798). In 1835 he was a Common Councillor in London.

referred to:1263

“Gallus.” See Republican, 29 Nov., 1822.

Galt, John (1779-1839; DNB). Referred to: 529

Gama, Vasco da (1469?-1524; EB). Referred to: 1087

Garat, Dominique Joseph, comte (1749-1833; DBF). Referred to: 520

Garnier, Joseph Heinrich (ca. 1800-55).

note: a native of Baden, he taught modern languages at Freiburg and was Paris correspondent for liberal German papers (1829) before being exiled early in 1834. He worked as a journalist and translator in London, returning to Baden in 1848.

— “Poor Laws, British and Foreign, from Senior’s Statement of Provisions for the Poor, etc.,” 22 June, 1835, 1-2.

referred to: 776

— “Poor Law Report—Union of Parishes,” 9 Sept., 1835, 3.

referred to: 778

— Leading articles on the House of Lords, 29 and 30 Sept., 1, 2, 3, 7 and 8 Oct., 1835, all on 2.

referred to: 779-82, 782-5

— Leading article on the House of Lords, 9 Oct., 1835, 2.

referred to: 785

— “Suicide at Waterloo-Bridge,” 23 Oct., 1846, 4.

quoted: 917

referred to: 917

917.5 him. Her] him. At first she conducted herself with sufficient propriety, but latterly abandoned herself to dissipated habits, frequenting the night wine vaults in the vicinity of the theatres. Her (4)

917.6 “proved] Several witnesses proved (4)

— Leading article on Relief in Ireland, 15 Dec., 1846, 2.

quoted: 1008, 1008-9

referred to: 1008-11

1008.20 “would] He [O’Brien] has said that £10,000,000 must be spent in effecting this operation; and we cannot find that either he, or any one else, has shewn that this large advance of the national capital would (2)

note: the Globe and Traveller, an evening paper, here replied to JSM’s leader (No. 346) of the morning of the same day; JSM alters the passage in quoting it.

quoted: 1016

referred to: 1016

1016.9-14 “catching . . . proprietors.”] What we object to, or rather what we regard as an Irish Utopia, is the project of planting, at a single stroke, multitudes of destitute peasantry, who have no idea of any but the rudest mode of existence, gratuitously, on lands reclaimed at the public expense. . . . We did and do doubt whether you can catch up out of the depths of destitution, and convert, with the touch of an administrative Harlequin’s wand, into thriving proprietors, masses whose utmost ambition hitherto has been to vegetate on potatoes. (2)

— Leading article on Waste Lands in Ireland, 5 Jan., 1847, 2.

note: a reply to No. 352.

quoted: 1030, 1031, 1032, 1033

referred to: 1030-3

1030.14-15 “extremely . . . opinion”] [paragraph] We should be extremely . . . opinion put forward by the Chronicle yesterday—that so much of the forthcoming plan of the government for the relief of Ireland as concerns “the reclamation of waste land,” is “in danger of being defeated, and the whole question exclusively prejudged, through the operation of the Treasury Minute communicated to the Board of Works in Mr. Trevelyan’s letter of the 15th of last month.” (2)

Edition: current; Page: [1340]

1030.29-30 “an . . . value”] The owner also has, as we think, an . . . value to the waste as to the cultivated portion of his estate; and that whether he draw the capital so employed from resources of his own, or from those of one willing to lend it to him. (2)

1031.22-5 “if . . . system,”] That if . . . system, is certainly one reason why the government should do the work. (2)

1031.26 “vile system.”] On the other hand, it is to be remembered, that the vile system objected to did not originate with, and is not now willingly continued by, any of that class of Irish landlords who are likely now voluntarily to sink capital in the improvement of their estates. (2)

1032.8 his] Assuming, as the Chronicle does, that he is right in his estimate, his (2)

1032.9 return. . . . Now] return. We should like to know how much of the “cultivated” land of Ireland, or of England either, would yield such a return. Not much, we suspect. Now (2)

1032.11 ever.”. . . If] ever;” and, so far, the case against the Treasury seems to fall to the ground. If [for the ellipsis, see preceding entry] (2)

1032.12 now] now (2)

1034.8-10 “the . . . and the . . . country.”] We presume it [the government] is sufficiently alive to the . . . and to the . . . country, to prefer, in all cases, leaving them to private hands where private hands can be got to do the work required. (2) [cf. the entry under the next article for 1033.28]

1033.28 “as a necessary evil,”] For instance, we are of opinion, as we said yesterday, that if the reclamation of waste lands by the government be made a part of the government scheme, it will only be introduced “to make good the deficiencies of the owners”—that it will be entered upon as a necessary evil, and with a full sense of “the peculiar value of individual agency, and the danger and difficulty attending all official interference, however well contrived, with either the agriculture or the commerce of the country.” (2) [cf. the entry in the preceding article for 1034.8-10]

— Leading article in answer to the Morning Chronicle, 7 Jan., 1847, 2.

Good, John Mason (1764-1827; DNB). Letter to J.C. Hippisley, 7 June, 1823. In John Cox Hippisley (1748-1825; DNB). Prison Labour, Etc.: Correspondence and Communications Addressed to His Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for the Home Department, Concerning the Introduction of Tread-Mills into Prisons, with Other Matters Connected with the Subject of Prison Discipline. London: Nicol, 1823, 23-66.

quoted: 68

referred to: 67-8

68.10 position . . . work] [in italics] (32)

68.18 labour; and] labour! and (32)

68.20 work.] work; thus confirming a remark I long since took the liberty of making to you, I mean that, when an organ is directed to any kind of labour, for which it is not naturally intended, no perseverance will ever give it facility of action, or take off the original distress. (32-3)

note: Secretary of National Colonization Society, subsequently Colonial Secretary and then Colonial Treasurer of South Australia; returned to England in 1844. See also Edward Gibbon Wakefield, A Letter from Sydney.

referred to: 272, 734

Goulburn, Henry (1784-1856; DNB). Referred to: 111, 112, 113, 268

Gournay, Vincent de (1712-59; GDU). Referred to: 155

Gracchus, Gaius Sempronius (153-122 bc; WWR).

note: the reference is to the Gracchi.

referred to: 664

Gracchus, Tiberius Sempronius (163-133 bc; WWR).

note: the reference is to the Gracchi.

referred to: 664

Edition: current; Page: [1342]

Grafton, Richard (d. 1572; DNB). Grafton’s Chronicle; or, History of England. To Which Is Added His Table of the Bailiffs, Sheriffs, and Mayors of the City of London. From the Year 1189, to 1558, Inclusive. London: Johnson, et al., 1809.

note: the reference, which paraphrases Grote, is general; this ed. cited merely for the title.

236.25 “proprietors of Parliament,”] The proprietors of boroughs have taken that right [of cities and towns to return members to Parliament] away; they have made public right private property; they have left indeed to the town the name of the return, and have imposed on the town the hardship and insult of their own nomination. (III, 334)

Grégoire, Henri, abbé (1750-1831; DBF). Referred to: 317

Gregory VII (Pope) (ca. 1020-85; EB).

note: JSM refers to him as Hildebrand.

referred to: 819

Gregory XVI (Pope) (1765-1846; EB). Referred to: 423, 429

Gregory, John (1724-73; DNB). A Comparative View of the State and Faculties of Man, with Those of the Animal World. London: Dodsley, 1765.

Grenville, William Wyndham (Baron) (1759-1834; DNB). Essay on the Supposed Advantages of a Sinking Fund, Part the First. London: privately printed, 1828.

referred to: 765-6

Edition: current; Page: [1343]

— Speech on Fox’s East India Bill (21 Nov., 1783; Commons). In The Parliamentary History of England, from the Earliest Period to the Year 1803. Ed. William Cobbett. London: Longman, et al., 1814, XXIII, 1224-31.

quoted: 1161

1161.16 “unknown to the constitution.”] What was it but to lift a right hon. gentleman into a situation wholly unknown to our constitution; a situation from which he could not be driven or moved till he chose voluntarily to abdicate his dictatorship? (1229)

588.14 “Representation, not Nomination.”] Your Lordships must, I am sure, answer this question in the negative, when you consider that under the form and name, but without anything of the reality, of an election, persons are returned to the House of Commons under the false and insulting title of Representative of the people, while they are, in fact, the mere nominees of peers, or of wealthy persons, who pretend that they have now converted a public trust into their own private property, and that they have a right to use it for their own individual benefit, and without any reference to the interests of the people. (936)

705.29 lesson. It was a] lesson from that which the hon. Member had learnt. They taught him, that unless such illegal societies were checked in time, they were likely to grow into power; and then would come what had come in France, a (943)

note: Irish surgeon, brother of writer Gerald Griffin. Member of the Royal College of Surgeons 1822, he was physician to County Limerick Infirmary, Consultant Physician to the Limerick Lying-in Hospital, and author of several books and articles.

referred to: 828n

— An Enquiry into the Mortality Occurring among the Poor of the City of Limerick. N.p., 1840.

quoted: 828n

Edition: current; Page: [1344]

828n.16 “I find] Now I find (16)

828n.18 the child] a child (16)

Griffith, Richard John (1784-1878; DNB). “Return of the Probable Extent of Waste Lands in Each County in Ireland.” In “Report from H.M. Commissioners of Inquiry into the State of the Law and Practice in Respect to the Occupation of Land in Ireland,” PP, 1845, XIX, 48-52.

quoted: 963, 964

referred to: 963-4, 996

963.29-30 “coarse . . . cattle,” . . . “might . . . crops.”] [paragraph] In summing up the data contained in the foregoing statements, it would appear that Ireland altogether contains 6,290,000 acres of unimproved and comparatively waste land; of which 1,425,000 acres might . . . crops; 2,330,000 acres might be drained for coarse . . . cattle; and 2,535,000 acres would appear to be unsuitable for improvement, inasmuch as it would not repay the expense of effective draining. (52)

note: the review at 867-75 is of Vols. I-II; that at 1084-8 is of Vols. III-IV; those at 1121-8 and 1128-34 are of Vols. V-VI; that at 1157-64 is of Vols. VII-VIII. The references at 1084 and 1086 are to Vols. I-II; that at 1121 is to Vols. I-IV; that at 1157 is to Vols. V-VI.

1126.20 accusation. . . . The] accusation.1 [footnote omitted] [text:] Aristophanes, in his comedy of the Knights, reproduces these features with others new and distinct, as well as with exaggerated details comic, satirical, and contemptuous. His comedy depicts Kleon in the point of view in which he would appear to the knights of Athens—a leather-dresser, smelling of the tan-yard—a low-born brawler, terrifying opponents by the violence of his criminations, the loudness of his voice, the impudence of his gestures—moreover, as venal in his politics—threatening men with accusations and then receiving money to withdraw them—a robber of the public treasury—persecuting merit as well as rank—and courting the favour of the assembly by the basest and most guilty cajolery. The (VI, 332)

1127.6 opened. . . . The] The talent for invective possessed by Kleon, employed first against Periklês, would be counted as great impudence by the partisans of that illustrious statesman, as well as by impartial and judicious citizens; but among the numerous enemies of Periklês, it would be applauded as a burst of patriotic indignation, and would procure for the orator that extraneous Edition: current; Page: [1345] support at first which would sustain him until he acquired his personal hold on the public assembly1. [footnote omitted] [text:] [paragraph] By what degrees or through what causes that hold was gradually increased, we do not know; but at the time when the question of Mitylênê came on for discussion, it had grown into a sort of ascendency which Thucydidês describes by saying that Kleon was “at that time by far the most persuasive speaker in the eyes of the people.” The (VI, 333-4)

1127.30-1 opposition. . . . As] opposition: we shall see in the coming chapter how he became as it were promoted, partly by his own superior penetration, partly by the dishonest artifice and misjudgement of Nikias and other opponents, in the affair of Sphakteria. [2-sentence omission] As (VI, 394-5)

1127.35 most] more (VI, 395)

1128.9 If] [no paragraph] If (VI, 340)

1129.24 “Our] And our (VI, 193)

1129.27 looks,] looks3, [footnote omitted] (VI, 193)

1129.30 This] [no paragraph] This (VI, 199)

1130.4 cities. . . . There] cities. [paragraph] I shall hereafter return to this point when I reach the times of the great speculative philosophers: in the mean time I cannot pass over this speech of Periklês without briefly noticing the inference which it suggests, to negative the supposed exorbitant interference of the state with individual liberty, as a general fact among the ancient Greek republics. There (VI, 199-200)

1130.27 Xenophon,] Xenophon,1 [footnote omitted] (VI, 201)

1130.41 them.] them1. [footnote omitted] (V, 512)

1130.42 source,] source2, [footnote omitted] (V, 512)

1131.6 Alkibiades,] Alkibiades1, [footnote omitted] (V, 513)

1131.9 firmness,] firmness2, [footnote omitted] (V, 513)

1131.15 effect,] effect1— [footnote omitted] (V, 515)

1131.15 further] farther (V, 515)

1131.17 numbers] numbers1, [footnote omitted] (V, 516)

1131.20 understand.] understand2. [footnote omitted] (V, 516)

1131.28 judges. . . . Both the] judges. [ellipsis indicates 3½-page omission] Accordingly, when we read these encomiums in modern authors, we shall find that both the (V, 517-21)

1132.35 archon. . . . As] archon. The juror hears and judges under full persuasion that he himself individually stands in need of the same protection or redress invoked by others: so also did the dikast. As (V, 522)

note: the speech as given in the Moniteur is the version by Guizot, the Minister of the Interior, in the Chamber of Deputies; the Moniteur of 15 Sept., 1093, in mentioning Broglie’s speech of the same day in the Peers, refers to Guizot’s for the text.

referred to: 144

— Speech on the Press (8 Nov.), Moniteur, 1830, 1425-6.

referred to: 204

— Speech on the Public Disorders and Good Government (19 Feb.), Moniteur, 1831, 349-50.

7.1 “Christianity is part and parcel . . . England.”] For to say, religion is a cheat, is to dissolve all those obligations whereby civil societies are preserved, and that Christianity is parcel . . . England; and therefore to reproach the Christian religion is to speak in subversion of the law. (189)

Hall, Basil (1788-1844; DNB).

note: the references are to him (mistakenly) as the Quarterly reviewer; the article was by Charles Ross, q.v.

referred to: 168, 169, 172, 172-80

Edition: current; Page: [1347]

Hall, Robert (1764-1831; DNB). Referred to: 16

Hallam, Henry (1777-1859; DNB). The Constitutional History of England from the Accession of Henry VII to the Death of George II. 2 vols. London: Murray, 1827.

referred to: 280

Halliday, Charles (b. 1822).

note: a travelling hawker.

referred to: 1184-5

Halliday, Elizabeth (d. 1851).

note: wife of Charles Halliday.

referred to: 1184

Hamilton, William (b. ca. 1826).

note: in some reports called John; an Irish bricklayer’s mate who fired a pistol at Queen Victoria.

Hardyng, John (1378-1465; DNB). The Chronicle of Ion Hardying. Containing an Account of Public Transactions from the Earliest Period of English History to the Beginning of King Edward the Fourth. Together with the Continuation by Richard Grafton, to the Thirty Fourth Year of King Henry the Eighth. London: Rivington, 1812.

note: the reference, which paraphrases Grote, is general; this ed. cited merely for the title.

referred to: 870

Hare, Thomas (1806-91; DNB). Referred to: 1208

— On an Organization of the Metropolitan Elections. London: National Association for the Promotion of Social Science, 1865.

note: a paper read at the Association’s meeting in London on 10 April, 1865. JSM took part in the discussion, as reported in The Times, 11 Apr., 1865, 10.

note: the quotations are all of the term “the spirit of the age,” which JSM used as the title for the series of articles: Nos. 73, 77, 82, 92, 97, 103, and 107; probably derives from Ernst Moritz Arndt’s Der Geist der Zeit (1805), referred to by Hazlitt in the Examiner, 1 Dec., 1816, 759. Hazlitt used the term in “The Drama. No. IV,” London Magazine (Apr. 1820), 433, but JSM probably was struck by the title of the work here cited (in which there is an account of Bentham).

quoted: 228, 238, 252, 278, 289, 304, 312, 598

Heber, Reginald (1783-1826; DNB). Referred to: 356

Heine, Christian Johann Heinrich (1797-1856; EB). Referred to: 748

— Buch der Lieder. Hamburg: Hoffmann and Campe, 1827.

referred to: 748

Henley, Lord. See Robert Henley Eden.

Henri IV (of France) (1553-1610; GDU).

note: the reference is in a quotation from Young. See also Lacretelle.