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Political and Social Problems

The only reason to treat nuclear power differently from all
the other developments in the field of physics is its staggering
possibilities as a means of political pressure in peace and
sudden destruction in war. All present plans for the organization
of research, scientific and industrial development, and
publication in the field of nucleonics are conditioned by the
political and military climate in which one expects those plans
to be carried out. Therefore, in making suggestions for the
postwar organization of nucleonics, a discussion of political
problems cannot be avoided. The scientists on this Project do not
presume to speak authoritatively on problems of national and
international policy. However, we found ourselves, by the force
of events, the last five years in the position of a small group
of citizens cognizant of a grave danger for the safety of this
country as well as for the future of all the other nations, of
which the rest of mankind is unaware. We therefore felt it our
duty to urge that the political problems, arising from the
mastering of atomic power, be recognized in all their gravity,
and that appropriate steps be taken for their study and the
preparation of necessary decisions. We hope that the creation of
the Committee by the Secretary of War to deal with all aspects of
nucleonics, indicates that these implications have been
recognized by the government. We feel that our acquaintance with
the scientific elements of the situation and prolonged
preoccupation with its world-wide political implications, imposes
on us the obligation to offer to the Committee some suggestions
as to the possible solution of these grave problems.

Scientists have often before been accused of providing new
weapons for the mutual destruction of nations, instead of
improving their well-being. It is undoubtedly true that the
discovery of flying, for example, has so far brought much more
misery than enjoyment or profit to humanity. However, in the
past, scientists could disclaim direct responsibility for the use
to which mankind had put their disinterested discoveries. We
cannot take the same attitude now because the success which we
have achieved in the development of nuclear power is fraught with
infinitely greater dangers than were all the inventions of the
past. All of us, familiar with the present state of nucleonics,
live with the vision before our eyes of sudden destruction
visited on our own country, of Pearl Harbor disaster, repeated in
thousandfold magnification, in every one of our major cities.

In the past, science has often been able to provide adequate
protection against new weapons it has given into the hands of an
agressor, but it cannot promise such efficient protection against
the destructive use of nuclear power. This protection can only
come from the political organization of the world. Among all
arguments calling for an efficient international organization for
peace, the existence of nuclear weapons is the most compelling
one. In the absence of an international authority which would
make all resort to force in international conflicts impossible,
nations could still be diverted from a path which must lead to
total mutual destruction, by a specific international agreement
barring a nuclear armaments race.

It could be suggested that the danger of destruction by
nuclear weapons can be prevented - at least as far as this
country is concerned - by keeping our discoveries secret for an
indefinite time, or by developing our nucleonic armaments at such
a pace that no other nations would think of attacking us from
fear of overwhelming retaliation.

The answer to the first suggestion is that although we
undoubtedly are at present ahead of the rest of the world in this
field, the fundamental facts of nuclear power are a subject of
common knowledge. British scientists know as much as we do about
the basic wartime progress of nucleonics - with the exception of
specific processes used in our engineering developments - and the
background of French nuclear physicists plus their occasional
contact with our Projects, will enable them to catch up rapidly,
at least as far as basic scientific facts are concerned. German
scientists, in whose discoveries the whole development of this
field has originated, apparently did not develop it during the
war to the same extent to which this has been done in America;
but to the last day of the European war, we have been living in
constant apprehension as to their possible achievements. The
knowledge that German scientists were working on this weapon and
that their government certainly had no scruples against using it
when available, was the main motivation of the initiative which
American scientists have taken in developing nuclear power on
such a large scale for military use in this country. In Russia,
too, the basic facts and implications of nuclear power were well
understood in 1940, and the experiences of Russian scientists in
nuclear research is entirely sufficient to enable them to retrace
our steps within a few years, even if we would make all attempts
to conceal them. Furthermore, we should not expect too much
success from attempts to keep basic information secret in
peacetime, when scientists acquainted with the work on this and
associated Projects will be scattered to many colleges and
research institutions and many of them will continue to work on
problems closely related to those on which our developments are
based. In other words, even if we can retain our leadership in
basic knowledge of nucleonics for a certain time by maintaining
the secrecy of all results achieved on this and associated
Projects, it would be foolish to hope that this can protect us
for more than a few years.

It may be asked whether we cannot achieve a monopoly on the
raw materials of nuclear power. The answer is that even though
the largest now known deposits of uranium ores are under the
control of powers which belong to the "western" group (Canada,
Belgium and British Indies); the old deposits in Czechoslovakia
are outside this sphere. Russia is known to be mining radium on
its own territory; and even if we do not know the size of the
deposits discovered so far in the USSR, the probability that no
large reserves of uranium will be found in a country which covers
1/5 of the land area of the earth (and whose sphere of influence
takes in additional territory), is too small to serve as a basis
for security. Thus, we cannot hope to avoid a nuclear armament
race, either by keeping secret from the competing nations the
basic scientific facts of nuclear power, or by cornering the raw
materials required for such a race.

One could further ask whether we cannot feel ourselves safe in
a race of nuclear armaments by virtue of our greater industrial
potential, including greater diffusion of scientific and
technical knowledge, greater volume and efficiency of our skilled
labor corps, and greater experience of our management - all the
factors whose importance has been so strikingly demonstrated in
the conversion of this country into an arsenal of the Allied
Nations in the present war. The answer is that all that these
advantages can give us, is the accumulation of a larger number of
bigger and better atomic bombs - and this only if we produce those
bombs at the maximum of our capacity in peace time, and do not
rely on conversion of a peace time nucleonics industry to
military production after the beginning of hostilities.

However, such a quantitative advantage in reserves of bottled
destructive power will not make us safe from sudden attack. Just
because a potential enemy will be afraid of being "outnumbered
and outgunned," the temptation for him may be overwhelming to
attempt a sudden unprovoked blow - particularly if he would
suspect us of harboring agressive intentions against his security
or "sphere of influence." In no other type of warfare does the
advantage lie so heavily with the agressor. He can place his
"infernal machines" in advance in all our major cities and
explode them simultaneously, thus destroying a major part of our
industry and killing a large proportion of our population,
aggregated in densely populated metropolitan districts. Our
possibilities of retaliation - even if retaliation would be
considered compensation for the loss of tens of millions of lives
and destruction of our largest cities - will be greatly
handicapped because we must rely on aerial transportation of the
bombs, particularly if we would have to deal with an enemy whose
industry and population are dispersed over a large territory.

In fact, if the race of nuclear armaments is allowed to
develop, the only apparent way in which our country could be
protected from the paralyzing effects of a sudden attack is by
dispersal of industries which are essential for our war effort
and dispersal of the population of our major metropolitan cities.
As long as nuclear bombs remain scarce (this will be the case
until uranium and thorium cease to be the only basic materials
for their fabrication) efficient dispersal of our industry and
the scattering of our metropolitan population will considerably
decrease the temptation of attacking us by nuclear weapons.

Ten years hence, an atomic bomb containing perhaps 20 kg of
active material, may be detonated at 6% efficiency, and thus have
an effect equal to that of 20,000 tons of TNT. One of these may
be used to destroy something like 3 square miles of an urban
area. Atomic bombs containing a larger quantity of active
material but still weighing less than one ton may be expected to
be obtainable within ten years which could destroy over ten
square miles of a city. A nation which is able to assign 10 tons
of atomic explosives for the preparation of a sneak attack on
this country, can then hope to achieve the destruction of all
industry and most of the population in an area from 500 square
miles upwards. If no choice of targets, in any area of five
hundred square miles of American territory, will contain a large
enough fraction of the nation's industry and population to make
their destruction a crippling blow to the nation's war potential
and its ability to defend itself, then the attack will not pay,
and will probably not be undertaken. At present, one could easily
select in this country a hundred blocks of five square miles each
whose simultaneous destruction would be a staggering blow to the
nation. (A possible total destruction of all the nation's naval
forces would be only a small detail of such a catastrophe.) Since
the area of the United States is about six million square miles,
it should be possible to scatter its industrial and human
resources in such a way as to leave no 500 square miles important
enough to serve as a target for nuclear attack.

We are fully aware of the staggering difficulties of such a
radical change in the social and economic structure of our
nation. We felt, however, that the dilemma had to be stated, to
show what kind of alternative methods of protection will have to
be considered if no successful international agreement is
reached. It must be pointed out that in this field we are in a
less favorable position than nations which are either now more
diffusely populated and whose industries are more scattered, or
whose governments have unlimited power over the movement of
population and the location of industrial plants.

If no efficient international agreement is achieved, the race
of nuclear armaments will be on in earnest not later than the
morning after our first demonstration of the existence of nuclear
weapons. After this, it might take other nations three or four
years to overcome our present head start, and 8 or 10 years to
draw even with us if we continue to do intensive work in this
field. This might be all the time we have to bring about the
re-groupment of our population and industry. Obviously, no time
should be lost in inaugurating a study of this problem by
experts.

The prospect of nuclear warfare and the type of measures which
have to be taken to protect a country from total destruction by
nuclear bombing, must be as abhorrent to other nations as to the
United States. England, France, and the smaller nations of the
European continent, with their congeries of people and
industries, are in an entirely hopeless situation in the face of
such a threat. Russia, and China are the only great nations which
could survive a nuclear attack. However, even though these
countries value human life less than the peoples of Western
Europe and America, and even though Russia, in particular, has an
immense space over which its vital industries could be dispersed
and a government which can order this dispersion, the day it is
convinced that such a measure is necessary - there is no doubt
that Russia, too, will shudder at the possibility of a sudden
disintegration of Moscow and Leningrad, almost miraculously
preserved in the present war, and of its new industrial sites in
the Urals and Siberia. Therefore, only lack of mutual
trust, and not lack of desire for agreement, can
stand in the path of an efficient agreement for the prevention of
nuclear warfare.

From this point of view, the way in which nuclear weapons, now
secretly developed in this country, will first be revealed to the
world appears of great, perhaps fateful importance.

One possible way - which may particularly appeal to those who
consider the nuclear bombs primarily as a secret weapon developed
to help win the present war - is to use it without warning on an
appropriately selected object in Japan. It is doubtful whether
the first available bombs, of comparatively low efficiency and
small size, will be sufficient to break the will or ability of
Japan to resist, especially given the fact that the major cities
like Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, and Kobe already will largely be
reduced to ashes by the slower process of ordinary aerial
bombing. Certain and perhaps important tactical results
undoubtedly can be achieved, but we nevertheless think that the
question of the use of the very first available atomic bombs in
the Japanese war should be weighed very carefully, not only by
military authority, but by the highest political leadership of
this country. If we consider international agreement on total
prevention of nuclear warfare as the paramount objective, and
believe that it can be achieved, this kind of introduction of
atomic weapons to the world may easily destroy all our chances of
success. Russia, and even allied countries which bear less
mistrust of our ways and intentions, as well as neutral
countries, will be deeply shocked. It will be very difficult to
persuade the world that a nation which was capable of secretly
preparing and suddenly releasing a weapon, as indiscriminate as
the rocket bomb and a thousand times more destructive, is to be
trusted in its proclaimed desire of having such weapons abolished
by international agreement. We have large accumulations of poison
gas, but do not use them, and recent polls have shown that public
opinion in this country would disapprove of such a use even if it
would accelerate the winning of the Far Eastern war. It is true,
that some irrational element in mass psychology makes gas
poisoning more revolting that blasting by explosive, even though
gas warfare is in no way more "inhuman" than the war of bombs and
bullets. Nevertheless, it is not at all certain that the American
public opinion, if it could be enlightened as to the effect of
atomic explosives, would support the first introduction by our
own country of such an indiscriminate method of wholesale
destruction of civilian life.

Thus, from the "optimistic" point of view - looking forward to
an international agreement on prevention of nuclear warfare - the
military advantages and the saving of American lives, achieved by
the sudden use of atomic bombs against Japan, may be outweighed
by the ensuing loss of confidence and wave of horror and
repulsion, sweeping over the rest of the world, and perhaps
dividing even the public opinion at home.

From this point of view a demonstration of the new weapon
may best be made before the eyes of representatives of all United
Nations, on the desert or a barren island. The best possible
atmosphere for the achievement of an international agreement
could be achieved if America would be able to say to the world,
"You see what weapon we had but did not use. We are ready to
renounce its use in the future and to join other nations in
working out adequate supervision of the use of this nuclear
weapon."

This may sound fantastic, but then in nuclear weapons we have
something entirely new in the order of magnitude of destructive
power, and if we want to capitalize fully on the advantage which
its possession gives us, we must use new and imaginative methods.
After such a demonstration the weapon could be used against Japan
if a sanction of the United Nations (and of the public opinion at
home) could be obtained, perhaps after a preliminary ultimatum to
Japan to surrender or at least to evacuate a certain region as an
alternative to the total destruction of this target.

It must be stressed that if one takes a pessimistic point of
view and discounts the possibilities of an effective
international control of nuclear weapons, then the advisability
of an early use of nuclear bombs against Japan becomes even more
doubtful - quite independently of any humanitarian
considerations. If no international agreement is concluded
immediately after the first demonstration, this will mean a
flying start of an unlimited armaments race. If this race is
inevitable, we have all reason to delay its beginning as long as
possible in order to increase our headstart still further. It
took us three years, roughly, under forced draft of wartime
urgency, to complete the first stage of production of nuclear
explosives - that based on the separation of the rare fissionable
isotope U-235, or its utilization for the production of an
equivalent quantity of another fissionable element. This stage
required large-scale, expensive constructions and laborious
procedures. We are now on the threshold of the second stage -
that of converting into fissionable material the comparatively
abundant common isotopes of thorium and uranium. This stage
requires no elaborate plans and can provide us in about 5 - 6
years with a really substantial stockpile of atomic bombs. Thus
it is to our interest to delay the beginning of the armaments race
at least until the successful termination of this second stage.
The benefit to the nation, and the saving of American lives in
the future, achieved by renouncing an early demonstration of
nuclear bombs and letting the other nations come into the race
only reluctantly, on the basis of guesswork and without definite
knowledge that the "thing does work," may far outweigh the
advantages to be gained by the immediate use of the first and
comparatively inefficient bombs in the war against Japan. At the
least, pros and cons of this use must be carefully weighed by the
supreme political and military leadership of the country, and the
decision should not be left to considerations, merely, of
military tactics.

One may point out that the scientists themselves have
initiated the development of this "secret weapon" and it is
therefore strange that they should be reluctant to try it out on
the enemy as soon as it is available. The answer to this question
was given above - the compelling reason for creating this weapon
with such speed was our fear that Germany had the technical skill
necessary to develop such a weapon without any moral constraints
regarding its use.

Another argument which could be quoted in favor of using
atomic bombs as soon as they are available is that so much
taxpayers' money has been invested in these Projects that the
Congress and the American public will require a return for their
money. The above-mentioned attitude of the American public
opinion in the question of the use of poison gas against Japan
shows that one can expect it to understand that a weapon can
sometimes be made ready only for use in extreme emergency; and as
soon as the potentialities of nuclear weapons will be revealed to
the American people, one can be certain that it will support all
attempts to make the use of such weapons impossible.

Once this is achieved, the large installations and the
accumulation of explosive materials at present earmarked for
potential military use, will become available for important peace
time developments, including power production, large engineering
undertakings, and mass production of radioactive materials. In
this way, the money spent on war time development of nucleonics
may become a boon for the peace time development of national
economy.

We now consider the question of how an effective international
control of nuclear armaments can be achieved. This is a difficult
problem, but we think it to be soluble. It requires study by
statesmen and international lawyers, and we can offer only some
preliminary suggestions for such a study.

Given mutual trust and willingness on all sides to give up a
certain part of their sovereign rights, by admitting
international control of certain phases of national economy, the
control could be exercised (alternatively or simultaneously) on
two different levels.

The first and perhaps simplest way is to ration the raw
materials - primarily, the uranium ores. Production of nuclear
explosives begins with processing of large quantities of uranium
in large isotope separation plants or huge production piles. The
amounts of ore taken out of the ground at different locations
could be controlled by resident agents of the international
Control Board, and each nation could be allotted only an amount
which would make large scale separation of fissionable isotopes
impossible.

Such a limitation would have the drawback of making impossible
also the development of nuclear power production for peace time
purposes. However, it does not need to prevent the production of
radioactive elements on a scale which will revolutionize the
industrial, scientific and technical use of these materials, and
will thus not eliminate the main benefits which nucleonics
promises to bring to mankind.

An agreement on a higher level, involving more mutual trust
and understanding, would be to allow unlimited production, but
keep exact bookkeeping on the fate of each pound of uranium
mined. Certain difficulty with this method of control will arise
in the second stage of production, when one pound of pure
fissionable isotope will be used again and again to produce
additional fissionable material from thorium. These could perhaps
be overcome by extending control to the mining and use of
thorium, even though the commercial use of this metal may cause
complications.

If check is kept on the conversion of uranium and thorium ore
into pure fissionable materials, the question arises how to
prevent accumulation of large quantities of such material in the
hands of one or several nations. Accumulations of this kind could
be rapidly converted into atomic bombs if a nation would break
away from international control. It has been suggested that a
compulsory denaturation of pure fissionable isotopes may be
agreed upon - they should be diluted after production by suitable
isotopes to make them useless for military purposes (except if
purified by a process whose development must take two or three
years), while retaining their usefulness for power engines.

One thing is clear: any international agreement on prevention
of nuclear armaments must be backed by actual and efficient
controls. No paper agreement can be sufficient since neither this
or any other nation can stake its whole existence on trust into
other nations' signatures. Every attempt to impede the
international control agencies must be considered equivalent to
denunciation of the agreement.

It hardly needs stressing that we as scientists believe that
any systems of controls envisaged should leave as much freedom
for the peace development of nucleonics as is consistent with the
safety of the world.

The development of nuclear power not only constitutes an
important addition to the technological and military power of the
United States, but also creates grave political and economic
problems for the future of this country.

Nuclear bombs cannot possibly remain a "secret weapon" at the
exclusive disposal of this country, for more than a few years.
The scientific facts on which their construction is based are
well known to scientists of other countries. Unless an effective
international control of nuclear explosives is instituted, a race
of nuclear armaments is certain to ensue following the first
revelation of our possession of nuclear weapons to the world.
Within ten years other countries may have nuclear bombs, each of
which, weighing less than a ton, could destroy an urban area of
more than five square miles. In the war to which such an
armaments race is likely to lead, the United States, with its
agglomeration of population and industry in comparatively few
metropolitan districts, will be at a disadvantage compared to the
nations whose population and industry are scattered over large
areas.

We believe that these considerations make the use of nuclear
bombs for an early, unannounced attack against Japan inadvisable.
If the United States would be the first to release this new means
of indiscriminate destruction upon mankind, she would sacrifice
public support throughout the world, precipitate the race of
armaments, and prejudice the possibility of reaching an
international agreement on the future control of such
weapons.

Much more favorable conditions for the eventual achievement of
such an agreement could be created if nuclear bombs were first
revealed to the world by a demonstration in an appropriately
selected uninhabited area.

If chances for the establishment of an effective international
control of nuclear weapons will have to be considered slight at
the present time, then not only the use of these weapons against
Japan, but even their early demonstration may be contrary to the
interests of this country. A postponement of such a demonstration
will have in this case the advantage of delaying the beginning of
the nuclear armaments race as long as possible. If, during the
time gained, ample support could be made available for further
development of the field in this country, the postponement would
substantially increase the lead which we have established during
the present war, and our position in an armament race or in any
later attempt at international agreement will thus be
strengthened.

On the other hand, if no adequate public support for the
development of nucleonics will be available without a
demonstration, the postponement of the latter may be deemed
inadvisable, because enough information might leak out to cause
other nations to start the armament race, in which we will then
be at a disadvantage. At the same time, the distrust of other
nations may be aroused by a confirmed development under cover of
secrecy, making it more difficult eventually to reach an
agreement with them.

If the government should decide in favor of an early
demonstration of nuclear weapons it will then have the
possibility to take into account the public opinion of this
country and of the other nations before deciding whether these
weapons should be used in the war against Japan. In this way,
other nations may assume a share of the responsibility for such a
fateful decision.

To sum up, we urge that the use of nuclear bombs in this war
be considered as a problem of long-range national policy rather
than military expediency, and that this policy be directed
primarily to the achievement of an agreement permitting an
effective international control of the means of nuclear
warfare.

The vital importance of such a control for our country is
obvious from the fact that the only effective alternative method
of protecting this country, of which we are aware, would be a
dispersal of our major cities and essential industries.