1. We have to think of them as separate, because we justify our belief in them in different ways: We intuit mind,
we must deduce body

2. The thinking part (mental phenomena ) has different characteristics from
the physical part (body phenomena). Irreducibly different. Mind-talk and mind-concepts cannot be reduced to talk or concepts about body.

a. Mind is indivisible vs. divisible body (Descartes' favorite distinction) You can't cut up an idea with a scalpul.

b. Mind is private vs. body, in principle, is public. Only I have immediate access to my mental states.

D. The big problem -

1. interaction? How can two absolutely different kinds of
things, one material and one immaterial, interract causally? It just
seems impossible.

2. Descartes suggests they interact at the very
sensitive pineal gland. Doesn't solve the problem, since the pineal
gland is body.

John Locke 1632-1704

EPISTEMOLOGY
: British Empiricism

British
empiricism takes a fundamentally different
approach from Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. Aristotle and Aquinas would
have said we experience the physical object in question. For
Locke what we actually
experience are ideas. The ideas we have of sensible things are caused
by the extra-mental objects out there in the world outside our minds.
But what we are experiencing is the "movie" playing in our minds,
projected by that extra mental world.
Ideas are copies of what's out there.

I. We are tabula rasa (blank slates) before we start having experiences.

A. Ideas come from sensation (sense data) and reflection (mind's
thinking about its own operations)

III. Primary and secondary qualities -- A Quality = a power in the object to produce an idea in the mind.

A. primary qualities produce ideas which...
1.... correspond to the way things are in themselves.
2. Primary qualities are described in mathematical terms
3. Our ideas from primary qualities reflect objectivity, so we can all agree on them.

B. secondary qualities produce ideas which
... 1. ...don't reflect how things really are
2. Sense data are caused by this extra-mental object,
but the idea which is produced is not like the extra-mental object
because the info from the object interacts with the perceiver -
eg. cold, red exist only in the mind of the knower
3. So with our ideas of secondary qualities there is no objectivity.

C. Distinguish between appearance and reality. Reality will be what is ...

--mathematical
--what science can give us

D. Worrisome practical consequences. (Note that Locke himself does not draw these conclusions, but they seem
to follow from his analysis of primary and secondary qualities.)

1. Aristotelian would have said the careful
observer can come to know the world vs. Locke, whose views seem to
entail that it is only the Scientist...the guy with the
measuring instruments...who can really tell us about reality.

2. Atomism is making a comeback and Locke's view could lead to
reductionism -- the world is reduced to atoms, it's the atoms that are
really real.

IV. "Substance"

A. Qualities must be in something, holds them together

B. But the something has no qualities - it can't be
perceived, described or thought. It is just a "something
I know not what."

Berkeley 1685-1753

I. Locke
A. What we know are ideas
B. Ideas caused by qualities in the thing
C. Primary and secondary qualities
D. Substance

---------------------Berkeley's goal is to save our world of experience-------------------------

II. Idealism: As empiricists we ought to say that what we can know and
what there is is what we can experience

(-- a qualifier -- unless reason proves that we
should believe in something more.)

A. What can we know of this physical object?

1. Only what we perceive (consciously experience ).

2. Therefore physical reality is what is perceived. To be is to be perceived. Esse est percipi.

3. What is this physical object but a combination
of the ideas we have of it?

4. No gulf between material and mental...everything is mental.

5. If it were the case that absolutely nobody were perceiving an object it would not exist.

B. Four Arguments in favor of idealism (note that 2-4 are directed against Locke's empiricism in particular):

1. You can't even conceive of anything as existing unperceived
by any knower.

2. Locke said ideas related to secondary qualities exist
only in the knower (cold, red, etc.).

a. But it is impossible to conceive of
a thing with primary qualities without the secondary qualities.

b.
If secondary qualities are "all in the mind" then we ought to say that primary are, too.

3. Locke said our ideas are copies of things out there in extra-mental reality.

a. Absurd! To
know that something is a copy of some original you have to know the original.

b. But Locke says we don't have access to the original.

c. So we can't say that our ideas are copies of what's out there.

4. What about Locke's Substance? Locke said it was
that which underlies and unites the qualities in a physical object, and it is the qualities that give us ideas.

a. Locke admits that, not only can we not perceive
it, we can't even conceive of it.

b. So Berkeley concludes that it's a meaningless term.

c. But substance was an important part of the makeup
of individual, physical objects. Without underlying metaphorical glue
no reason to believe physical objects exist at all.

III. A Problem for Berkeley -- Is reality subjective? Solipsism? (All there is is just me and my movie?)

A. No, my experience shows me that it can't be that I am alone with my ideas because the ideas I have ...

1. ...seem to come from outside of me. (So I know I'm not causing them.)

2. ...relate to one another in an orderly way which I know I'm
not imposing on them.

3. And, especially telling -- I don't have to be perceiving things
for them to continue to exist -- behave in orderly way without my perceiving
them. Let's light a candle, leave the room, and come back an hour later.

B. So where does the movie in my mind come from? God!

C. What there is is God's mind and His Ideas and our minds and
our ideas. It's all mind stuff from top to bottom.

1. Gets rid of "substance"

2. Saves world of appearance

IV. Solves problem with Cartesian dualism -- yes you have
consciousness (mind) and a body, but the body is mind-stuff, too.

Locke's Political Theory

I. Q: Where does government get its authority? A: The consent of the
governed!

1. "Contract Theory".

2. Those of us who are big on freedom and rights and personal
responsibility are going to like the sound of that. But let's be
careful. You can run this justification different ways.

II. Hobbes' (1588-1679) Political Theory

A. Hobbes' version of the "State of Nature" (The human condition without government)

1. We desire power and stuff
. We have Equality and freedom -- equal ability to do each other damage.

2. War of all against all

3. No power to enforce moral or legal rules, so there
are no rules, chaos.

-- Note that Hobbes talks about a "natural law" but it isn't
the sort of natural law that Aristotle and Aquinas talked about. It's
just about how we can satisfy these basic desires for power and
stuff.

4. Anybody can do anything to you. No natural rights
to life, liberty or possessions (no morality outside of society).

B. People make a contract. By mutual consent they agree to...

1. Give up
equality and
freedom.

2. Turn over all their power to a sovereign (ruler) in exchange for
order.

3. Sovereign (to do the job) must have almost absolute power.

a. "There can be no unjust law." State can do whatever it wants to you.

b. There could be a "bad" law in the sense of not
doing the job of keeping order, but even that MUST be obeyed.

c.
Can you opt out of the contract? Well, yes, but then you're in a state
of nature vis-a-vis the State and everyone else, and that means they
can hunt you down like a dog and kill you.

III. Lock's State of Nature

A. Reason can tell us that...

1. there is a God who orders human
existence.

2. There is a natural law -- of the robust Aristotelian sort --
which we can recognize, which shows us proper
rules for behavior with or without/state.

B. Reason teaches that equals must be treated equally.

1. I
do not want to be harmed, enslaved, or killed

2. So I see that I
must not kill or harm others.

3. To put it another way, we all (even without state) have
natural rights. Life, liberty, property.

C. Right to property, for example, is not a function of having a government.
God gives world to all, but I make something my own by mixing my labor
with it.

--So Locke's state of nature much more benign than Hobbes'. But here's the problem with it...--

D. Everybody's on his own with respect to ...

1. recognizing the moral
law and figuring out how to apply it to the specific situation

2. judging whether or not others are obeying the moral law

3. executing the laws
(i.e., seeing that they are carried out.) This includes an individual
right to punish wrong-doers. Natural law includes right of each
individual
to punish anyone who transgresses. So...

IV. So Locke's state of nature is inconvenient in that it lacks...

A.
Known legislators who could establish laws that everyone would
recognize as binding. Laws which are a specification of the natural
law.

B. Known and objective judges

C. Recognized agents with power to enforce law

V. We agree to form a state. We make a mutual contract.

A. We give up individual power to determine, judge, and enforce
laws to government. [Difference from Aquinas - state chosen vs. just sort
of grows naturally as an intrinsic element of human society]

--N.b. Assuming
we divide up these three jobs, how many branches of government should we
have? --

B.
Why suppose there's a noumenal world at all? Maybe we're all share the
same phenomenal world, but there is no noumenal world. (Sounds a bit
like Berkeley) More important historically -- Fichte (1762-1814) Sets
up German Idealism.

C. Kantian answer -- there must be something which causes our experience of the phenomena.

D. Fichte's response -- But your claims about causation
are inherently contradictory; the claim that data comes in from the noumenal world and is
structured by the mind is
a causal explanation, but you have said that causality "exists" only in the
phenomenal world.

Kant: Ethics

I. The only intrinsically good thing is a good will. ("Will" = the mental faculty by which you make choices.)

Happiness? Intelligence? etc. No, these things are good only when coupled with a good will.

B. Not from natural inclinations (the philanthropist vs. the misanthrope)

III. Duty = The correct principle which must be both reasonable
and universal. (Logically consistent and applicable to everyone. I must
not make an exception of myself.)

IV. Categorical Imperative

A. First form: "Act only on that maxim whereby you
can at
the same time will that it should become a universal law."

1. You have to
be able to consistenly will that everyone could do this. (Aka, "universalizing your maxim")

2. You have to be
able to will that anyone could do this, even if you were in a different position in the
situation.

3. Note that he is NOT saying, "If you do this, other people
really might do it." That would be looking at consequences. No, he is just asking you to do a thought experiment
about what you can consistently will.

4. Examples --

1. Making a promise with the intention of breaking it.
2. Cheating on Test #4. 3. Failing to
help someone in need. (Not a logical contradiction like the first two,
but you still can' consistently will it.)

B. Second form: Treat people as ends in themselves, never
only as means to an end. (Lady at the McDonald's? All good, since all parties agree and are pursuing their own ends.)

V. Problems with CI

A. First form

1. We can generate contradictions by universalizing apparently
innocuous or virtuous behavior.

2. Notoriously difficult to formulate rule, so we can see exactly what it is that we are universalizing.

a. What, exactly, am I doing?

b. How general or specific should it be?
1.general? implausible consequences
2.specific? applies only to me

3. Fanatic can universalize any crazy rule

B. Second form

1. No help in resolving a conflict of claims.

2. Absurd consequences? Never use people as means to an end? "Do no injustice, though the heavens fall."