Chapter 7

OPERATION LIBERATION

7.1
Was there an Alternative ?

It was now clear that a military offensive
to recapture the Jaffna peninsula was imminent. Various experts put the anticipated
civilian casualties at 10 to 40 thousand and the army casualties at one to four
thousand. Internationally there was no opposition to such a venture. It was
generally felt that such action had been made necessary by the L.T.T.E.'s proven
intransigence while an apparently reasonable set of proposals were on the table.
Such a view would not have been entirely unjust. At the same time the scope
for action by the government had been restricted by past choices. Sections of
the government and the security forces had connived at racist killings of Tamils
in 1983. The government's subsequent policy towards Tamils was one that owed
little to moral considerations. Tamils of the North and East became victims
of unchecked state terror. All Tamil villages in Trincomalee District outside
the town had been systematically destroyed. The Special Task Force (S.T.F.)
was deployed in Batticaloa with what was described as a licence to kill, with
the foreign press kept out. Apart from killings during operations, killing in
the East had a casual character. A senior church official described his experience
of travelling in a convoy, where passenger vehicles had been joined in by S.T.F.
vehicles. At one point three peasants were crossing the road. The next moment
they were simply mown down with gun fire. The convoy went on as if nothing had
happened. There was no question of stopping to ask who they were or what they
were doing. If an S.T.F. official happened to remember that incident before
lunch, he may have telephoned the news agency Lanka Puwath to let them know
that three terrorists had been killed in an engagement. Lankapuwath would oblige
by adding the frills. According to information continually documented by the
Saturday Review, by January 1987, over 10,000 Tamil had become victims of government
action. Perhaps about 1000 Sinhalese civilians died as the result of Tamil militant
action. The number of soldiers killed was 689 at the end of July 1987 according
to official sources. The militant dead is believed to be lower. The L.T.T.E.
claims to have lost 631 by August 1987. Perhaps a comparable number of militants
died because of internal killings. These figures have been given as a pointer
to the state of passions in the country. The character of the Tamil insurgency
cannot be isolated from the dehumanising effect of state terror. The government
had much to do with creating the problems it was up against.

Even at this point
a bold new initiative to win over the Tamils would have given the government
the best chance of averting the humiliation that was to come. It could have
used the media to make a clean breast of its past errors and explain to the
Sinhalese the hard reality facing the country and the difficult choices involved.
If as it was widely claimed, the sticking point for the Tamils was a North-East
merger, it could have accepted this in principle and challenged the Tamils to
offer terms acceptable to the Muslims and Sinhalese in the East. This was after
all going to be a far cry from separation. If the L.T.T.E. still rejected them,
the government could have proceeded to expose its desultory course by the disciplined
conduct of its forces and by making the Tamils feel it was concerned for them.
The 11,000 or so persons on whom the envisaged operation was going to pass a
death sentence were after all citizens of this country. But the government's
moral faculties and imagination had atrophied through misuse. It was incapable
of thinking on these lines, and making an original departure from the past.
Courage too was in short supply.

What the L.T.T.E. was hoping for is hard to fathom. It had
alienated international and Indian opinion. It had divided the Tamils. It could
not count on the civilian population for anything tangible. It could only count
on the unswerving obedience of a few thousand armed men, a large number of them
in their teens. Its strength was of the negative kind. Except that the government
troops were possessed of such discipline as to avoid reprisals against civilians,
the L.T.T.E. could sour any attempts at imposing a solution. It was perhaps
this strength that it was counting on. An alarmed group of civilians had earlier
sought an interview with a prominent L.T.T.E. leader, requesting him to reconsider
his approach to India. For there seemed a likelihood that India would do nothing
as the Sri Lankan government launched its final offensive. This leader had reportedly
replied: "I will make India fall at my feet." Nor did the L.T.T.E.
consider it necessary to make overtures to other militant groups, whose trained
men had been disarmed, or to sections of the population alienated from it.

As for the civilian population, death
had been raining on them slowly but surely. Normal lives and education had been
severely disrupted. Those who could go abroad were slowly slipping out.

On the information available, the
problem as seen by the National Security Ministry was like this: The government
had dismissed any thought of the Tamils of the North and East being a potential
electoral asset. This meant that the feelings of Tamils were of no account.
(The President had said as much to the Daily Telegraph in July 1983.) The civilian
casualties resulting from the action to take over Jaffna must be of such an
order as could be sold to international opinion. Speed was of the essence in
such an operation. For at the time, international opinion was on the side of
the government. But if the operation was protracted and stories of civilian
suffering began to come out, international opinion might change, giving India
an opportunity to capitalise on it.

Put this way it was a problem for
a technocratic approach devoid of moral content. The government was thinking
in terms of a three-day operation, which would keep the L.T.T.E. disorganised
for months to come. Riding on the popularity resulting from a successful military
outcome, the government would call snap elections, thus strengthening its hand
domestically and internationally. To this end the army had been receiving training
from specialised foreign agencies (See section 2.1 of Volume 2). Air and naval
support had also been boosted with the annual defence expenditure running at
U.S. $500 million or 20% of the national budget. There was something to be said
for the technocratic approach. The killing rate during the army's recapture
of Vadamaratchi was of a low order compared with when an unprepared army took
on Sinhalese insurgents of the J.V.P. in 1971.

In contrast one finds a very different
attitude towards counter-insurgency against a resurgent J.V.P. in the Sinhalese
South. Iqbal Athas in his "Situation Report" in the Weekend of 20
December 1987, writes about the counter-insurgency operation in the South: "In
the North where the security forces once battled separatist terrorists before
the advent of the I.P.K.F., an encounter between the troops and their adversaries
would have meant death for whoever was not quick on the gun. But that is the
North. In the South the gun has given way to persuasive tactics."

The same article quotes
Colonel Lakshman Algama, Military Co-ordinating Officer in Embilipitiya: "When
an operation is conducted and I have taken in 100 people, only five turn out
to be miscreants. When the other 95 are released, they must go without any hard
feelings." The writer adds: "This is an unenviable task. Despite all
the good intentions of this dedicated soldier who has undergone specialised
training in the United States, the vast majority of those who are released as
innocents depart with strained feelings... the security forces and the police
have a limited role... the answer to the problem is not in their hands... they
are economic and political. The longer the delay, the bigger the problem."

This is again a technocratic
approach, morally indifferent and as cynical of the Sinhalese as was the approach
to the Tamils. The difference is that the Sinhalese are not regarded as a dispensable
electoral asset.

7.2
Operation Liberation Commences

Probing and diversionary action for
the operation to recapture the peninsula had begun by 18 May. Operation Liberation,
as the operation came to be called, was planned and executed with commendable
efficiency. Being a small country with limited resources, the manner of deployment
of resources and timing was of crucial importance. To this end the capacity
to gather and analyse intelligence had been strengthened with foreign, and particularly
Israeli, help to an admirable degree. As far as this approach went, the government
had in Mr. Athulathmudali, the National Security Minister, a competent man.

Following the advances
made earlier in the year, the entire Jaffna peninsula was within easy shelling
range. Several houses in places like Urumpirai had stacked up sand bags against
their walls. Providing such services had given rise to lucrative employment.
Constant punitive shelling and rising casualties had made life for civilians
a terror.

On 18 May, a diversionary
column of troops had marched Northwest from Elephant Pass. On seeing a log placed
across the road most of the passengers in a Colombo bound bus of the Safety
Bus Company, alighted. A few removed the log and went on. The bus received one
burst of gunfire and came to a stop. Several of the passengers had been injured.
It took a long time before the soldiers could be contacted and apprised of what
had taken place. The bus proceeded to Elephant pass with deflated tires. It
was when a North-bound doctor went back to Kilinochchi and contacted the army
commander that an ambulance was provided and some of the injured were flown
by helicopter for medical attention at Anuradhapura. Three of the injured died,
including Mr. Jegathesan, an engineer attached to Lanka Cement Limited, who
had been unsparing in his efforts at helping injured fellow passengers.

Around 20 May, diversionary
actions were also launched in Navatkuli and Palaly. Colonel Radha, the L.T.T.E.
commander for the Mannar district was killed in action at Navatkuli. Radha,
a mild-looking ex-bank officer, was noted for his daring. The Ceylon army made
a rapid advance towards Atchuvely through Iddaikkadu from Palaly. When the advance
commenced, the L.T.T.E. is said to have had 15 men in the area. More men were
then ferried in by vehicles and the advance was fiercely resisted. The Tamil
daily Uthayan reported that about nine civilians were killed by the army during
the action, including some members of a family who were sheltering in a trench.
This thrust too turned out to be diversionary as the army withdrew on the 23rd.
Throughout the whole operation, the Sri Lankan forces enjoyed unchallenged freedom
of the air. India had seemingly decided that the L.T.T.E. should at best be
able to do no more than an arduous holding operation. It did not possess anti-aircraft
weapons.

One incident demonstrated
a new, conscious, utilitarian outlook on the part of the Sri Lankan army. On
20 May, three soldiers had lost their way at Iddaikkadu and had run out of ammunition
when they ran into an L.T.T.E. party. On their expressing their willingness
to surrender, Lieutenant Kones of the L.T.T.E. went forward to accept their
surrender. The four men who were in the open were spotted by a Sri Lankan helicopter,
which promptly shelled them. All four died. Those in the helicopter could hardly
have been mistaken about their target or their own uniforms. The incident was
corroborated in the situation report in the Weekend of 24 May. Here those killed
were all claimed to have been members of the L.T.T.E.. The L.T.T.E. were never
sitting ducks for helicopter gunners. Lt. Kones must have come into the open
in the confidence that the helicopter would not fire at its own side. The authorities
must have decided that they were no longer going to be encumbered or embarrassed
by soldiers being held prisoners of war. Prisoners would mean distractive appeals
by relatives appearing in the press. The National Security Ministry had had
enough trouble with the relatives of the 11 prisoners already held. One father
from Galle appealed to a Roman Catholic clergyman after several failed attempts
at an interview with the National Security Minister. This new aspect of the
dirty war was one the sentimentally minded Sinhalese would have found hard to
accept. It was all part of the technocratic approach. To those in seats of power,
what was after all the semi-educated son of a peasant from the Galle district
to the great matters in hand?

Operation Liberation
proper, commenced on 26 May with the transformation of the radio of the Tamil
Eelam Communist Party (T.E.C.P.) into Radio Jaffna. The radio of the T.E.C.P.
had mysteriously appeared on the air towards the end of 1986, with news bulletins
in both English and Tamil. Until 26 May, when the same voice signed in as Radio
Jaffna, it was hardly known that the broadcasters were none other than the Sri
Lankan forces at Palaly. People generally listened because it gave a great deal
of inside information on what was happening within and between militant groups.
The accents were disguised and unplaceable. It may sometimes sound pro-L.T.T.E.
or pro-E.P.R.L.F. and sometimes anti-L.T.T.E.. For the first time, it made public
the impending marriages of Mahattaya and Kittu. There had been wild speculation
as to the source and origin of the broadcasts. Whatever it was, it seemed a
good lark. The announcer on Radio Jaffna would sometimes slip and use the old
signature. On the morning of 26 May, Radio Jaffna meant business. People in
the peninsula were asked to leave their homes and go to various temples and
schools which were announced as places of refuge. Such an arrangement was no
more than nominal, since the distances to such places were often impracticably
large. Besides, the sum total of the accommodation provided would only have
served a small fraction of Jaffna's population. People simply decided that if
things got hot, they would move into the nearest church, temple or school.

The L.T.T.E. meted
out harsh punishments to those who were allegedly informers. They probably would
have been surprised at the amount of information the security forces gleaned
by monitoring the L.T.T.E.'s radio communications and its public television
network, the Niedharshanam. According to Weekend's situation report column,
by listening in over a long period, code words had been broken and signatures
had been identified with particular leaders. Spies too had certainly been around.
Again a large number of civilians had made it a pastime to listen in on FM communications
between hovering bomber pilots. Some had taping devices and FM aerials installed
inside trenches for air-raid entertainment.

The opportune moment
to commence the operation came when the security forces learnt from intelligence
reports that the L.T.T.E. leader Prabhakaran was in Valvettithurai. The populated
area of Vadamaratchi is in the form of clusters towards the Northern sea coast.
A wide open space which extends from Thodamanaru lagoon geographically separates
Vadamaratchi from the rest of peninsular Jaffna. Movement across this open space
is relatively easy to monitor. Mr. Prabhakaran's presence together with this
geographical factor gave military sense to an attempt on Vadamaratchi. The control
of Vadamaratchi and the rest of the northern coastline would leave the remainder
of the Jaffna peninsula exposed along a broad front, stretching the L.T.T.E.'s
resources to impossible limits. Although Prabhakaran's presence at Valvettithurai
was then denied by the L.T.T.E., it was later admitted by L.T.T.E. men in a
conversation with Colonel Wimalaratne of the Sri Lankan army. The conversation
took place in Palaly shortly after the Indo-Lanka Accord of July 1987 and was
reported in the Situation Report Column in the Weekend of 27 September, 87.
The operation was executed by Colonel Wimalaratne and Brigadier Kobbekaduwa.
One infers from this conversation that not only were the Sri Lankan forces aware
of Prabhakaran's presence in Valvettithurai, but also had pretty good intelligence
of his location. To the question why the Ceylon army failed to seal off Prabhakaran's
escape, the Colonel replied that the army had lost some time in negotiating
booby traps. Here is an extract from the report:

Kumarappa,
one time L.T.T.E. "commander" for Batticaloa and now in the Tiger
hierarchy and his colleagues last week talked over coffee to one of Sri Lanka's
top military men in the anti-terrorist battle, Colonel Vijaya Wimalaratne at
the I.P.K.F. headquarters in Palaly. The conversation, interestingly enough
centred on some of the battles the two sides fought. A Tiger militant asked
Colonel Wimalaratne who led one brigade through Vadamaratchi during Operation
Liberation, why he did not overrun a sector in Valvettithurai where Tiger leader
Prabhakaran and area leader Soosai were trapped. "I wish we knew that,"
replied Colonel Wimalaratne, "When troops began surrounding Valvettithurai,
a section of soldiers, who encountered booby traps, delayed to reach their areas
to seal off that spot. That is where the Tiger leader slipped out from."

Independent sources have said that
both houses belonging to a businessman in Valvettithurai who had entertained
Prabhakaran were bombed a short time after the latter had left. An unspecified
number of the L.T.T.E. cadre reportedly lost their lives in the gruelling process
of getting Prabhakaran to safety by moving Eastwards and then through Mulliveli,
Southwards. Preoccupation with this had alone created considerable disarray
in L.T.T.E. ranks.

The army moved out of Thondamanaru
on the 26th. This was accompanied by heavy aerial bombing and shelling, particularly
in Valvettithurai. There was also military activity, bombing and shelling near
the Jaffna Fort. The Government later claimed that this was diversionary. By
the 28th Udupiddy and Valvettithurai had been taken. This was the difficult
part, involving several landmine barriers. After this the L.T.T.E. resistance
petered out and Vadamaratchi was taken by 1 June. One group of soldiers were
heli-dropped at Mulli. One column took Nelliady and advanced northwards to Pt.
Pedro. Another group of soldiers advanced eastwards towards Pt. Pedro by running
in three lines. The L.T.T.E. was not given the time to regroup or to put up
fresh land mine barriers. The L.T.T.E. made a quick withdrawal abandoning its
vehicles and a large quantity of arms. About 8000 troops from the Gemunu Watch
and Gajaba Regiments were involved in the recapture of Vadamaratchi. The L.T.T.E.
was taken by surprise by what had happened. The Ceylon army had over the past
three years been motivated and trained to make a steady disciplined advance
under fire. It was not the so-called rabble army of 1983.

Surprise and initiative continued
to be on the side of the Sri Lankan army. It had the northern coast under its
control from K.K.S. eastwards. It now moved Westwards along the coast and advanced
Southwards towards Tellipallai meeting with next to no resistance. Atchuvely
was again taken after a barrage of shelling. The B.B.C.'s Mark Tully quoted
the army command at Palaly as having hopes of taking Jaffna within the next
48 hours. The L.T.T.E. was in a bad way. Though rhetoric abounded, the fleeing
southwards into Sri Lankan held territory or to India of even the L.T.T.E.'s
most ardent supporters was a reflection of current expectations. Then came the
well publicised convoy of fishing vessels from India with relief supplies on
the 3rd June, their being refused entry and then the Indian air drop of 25 tons
of relief supplies on Jaffna the following day. This marked the end of the Sri
Lankan offensive. The L.T.T.E. knew that its image had taken a beating. The
initiative was now firmly lodged across the Palk Straits. Prabhakaran issued
a statement welcoming what was termed India's humanitarian concern. Prime Minister
Rajiv Gandhi, whose government was reeling from extensive press exposure, particularly
by the Indian Express, of corruption in high places and payment of kickbacks
in arms deals (estimated at ,20,000,000 from Bofors of Sweden and ,15,000,000
from the West German submarine deal), now became the instant hero of the Tamils
of Ceylon.

7.3 Some aspects of Operation Liberation

The operation was based on a utilitarian
framework which regarded the Tamils as an expendable mass. The problem was to
pacify the Tamil areas in a manner that could be sold to international opinion.
Within this framework the technical planning and execution were creditable in
military terms. But if one regarded Tamils as equal citizens of this country,
or even as human beings whose lives and feelings should be respected, and who
should be encouraged to reassert their lost dignity, then the operation had
several objectionable features. There was much shelling into civilian areas
which had no actual conflict. A subsequent radio announcement asked people to
take refuge in places of worship and in schools, which modified an earlier announcement
designating a limited number of such places. Three places of worship which functioned
as refugee centres were shelled. One shell falling on Mariamman Temple, Alvai,
claimed over 35 lives. People discovered sheltering in trenches were summarily
shot, as were several curfew breakers even when they were evidently harmless.
The soldiers seem to have been told that those building trenches to protect
themselves from air raids and shelling must be L.T.T.E. supporters. In certain
areas designated pro-L.T.T.E., such as Vathiri and Kottawattai, several young
men were murdered without questions being asked; sometimes after they were taken
away from their parents with a pledge to release them after questioning. At
Kamparmalai soldiers went on a rampage every time they saw posters commemorating
dead militants. There was widespread looting by troops, especially of jewellery.
Such incidents were repeated in Pt. Pedro where the army surrounded Puttalai
Pillayar Kovil, a designated refugee camp on 1 June, and took away several young
men from their parents on suspicion.

An engineering student was
killed in front of his mother and other refugees simply because he had a Valvettithurai
identity card. About five were shot and thrown into a well as they were being
marched from the temple towards waiting trucks. Mr. Ragutheswaran, an Assistant
Lecturer in Mathematics, and some others who were detained at the Murugan temple
refugee camp Nelliady, were briefly interviewed at Nelliady junction by Brigadier
Kobbekaduwa on 31 May. They were then marched off in handcuffs towards Nelliady
Central College. On the way four of them were asked to run and were fired at.
Three died. Mr. Ragutheswaran was left for dead and later escaped with a hand
injury. Worse than the ordinary aerial bombing was the use of so-called barrel
bombs which were pushed out of Avro transports. These were crude devices which
could not be aimed at specific targets, and consisted of a barrel of fuel padded
with a rubber like inflammable substance. On hitting the ground the fuel would
explode. The molten padding would fly in all directions and stick to the skin
of a victim and burn itself out. A large number of these were dropped on Valvettithurai
(48 according to one count). Barrel bombs were also dropped at random in several
other parts of the peninsula. One falling on Sivan Kovil on K.K.S. Road, Jaffna
town claimed 17 victims. This seemed a sadistic extra without military purpose.

As far as the people in Vadamaratchi
were concerned, there was much material damage in and around Valvettithurai.
But in terms of loss of life the operation had been less severe than expected.
As the bombing and shelling commenced in and around Valvettithurai, most of
the able bodied persons had gone eastwards and many of them went as refugees
to Thenmaratchi. The fact that the L.T.T.E. had withdrawn after about the third
day and had no opportunity or desire to take up new permanent positions did
help to reduce civilian losses as the army moved towards Pt. Pedro. There was
some grudging admiration for the Sri Lankan army. Many were scathing about the
Tigers. "They left us in the lurch and ran away without even telling us
they were going," they said. Others such as Mr. Tharmar from Kamparmalai
took a more charitable view: "I will not say that the boys did not try
hard. Once the land mine barrier was breached, and the army was out of Thondamanaru,
there was nothing but to run for it. The boys could not face shells with AK
47's. They asked us to run and we too ran. The army kept coming like devils.
If some fell, the others did not seem to notice. We, nor the boys had expected
that." Vadamaratchi had been regarded an L.T.T.E. stronghold as it was
the home of several of its leaders including Prabhakaran. To this day, the L.T.T.E.
has not regained in Vadamaratchi the credibility it then lost. Many people were
so tired and war weary that they were prepared to come to terms with the occupation
by the Sri Lankan army. "The Sinhalese are quick tempered when they are
provoked. When they cool down they are all right," they would say. People
were hoping against hope that the L.T.T.E. would keep away from Vadamaratchi.
When the Tigers reappeared about two weeks later and attempted to lay landmines,
the army was usually given a tip. The most common feeling amongst people was
that they had had enough and needed a rest.

A notable incident related
by a senior doctor at Point Pedro hospital was to have several parallels in
the South of the peninsula as the Indian forces launched an offensive against
the L.T.T.E. in October that same year. On 30 May, about 2500 refugees were
gathered at Pt. Pedro hospital at Manthikai as the Ceylon army was poised to
advance from Nelliady. A group of leading citizens from amongst those present
appealed to the doctors to approach the L.T.T.E., explain to them the plight
of the people and request them not to resist the army from within half a mile
of the hospital. The doctor said: "These persons were prominent supporters
of the L.T.T.E.. This brings us to an unresolved moral dilemma facing the community.
When landmines went off in far away Trincomalee and Batticaloa killing government
troops, we used to applaud. We ignored what happened to innocent people around
afterwards. When the landmines are closer to home, the very people normally
given to applause think differently. In the event, the L.T.T.E. decided on its
own to withdraw without offering resistance. Non-violence is the best policy
for our community." There were several instances during the Indian offensive
when refugees were not so fortunate.

7.4 Sinhalese and Tamils during Operation Liberation

We put down on record, some curious
instances during Operation Liberation, when Sinhalese and Tamils behaved, with
their foibles perhaps, but simply as human beings. There was no communal hatred
or malice. The old Sinhalese habit of making jokes at their own expense was
not entirely dead. During all the time when the killing was going on, several
government departments attempted to carry out their functions without regarding
the Tamils as enemies. A Sinhalese railway station master at Anuradhapura is
known to have gone beyond the call of duty to ensure that Jaffna Hospital had
its oxygen supplies at a time when transport had been dislocated. No responsible
official of the health services, the electricity board, or the K.K.S. cement
works in Jaffna, had complained that their departments acted unfairly by them.
The managements of the two cement works took unprecedented steps to ensure that
even their casual employees were paid during a prolonged closure lasting four
months. This is far from absolving the Sri Lankan government of abandoning its
Tamil subjects to the tender mercies of the military, the S.T.F. and the home
guards.

On 20 May, a doctor travelling in an ambulance reached
the Elephant Pass check point. The Ceylonese soldiers then told him that he
may not proceed. The doctor pleaded and asked: "Why can I not proceed?"
At this point shells fired by the L.T.T.E. started falling nearby. The soldiers
promptly ran for cover. The doctor who was suddenly left alone in the middle
of the road, went and stood at the back of the ambulance. At length when things
had quietened down, the soldiers re-emerged. They pointed in the direction from
which the firing came and exclaimed: "Mahattaya, mahattaya (Sir, Sir),
look! See what those boys are doing! That is why you cannot go."

When Operation Liberation
commenced on 26 May, soldiers walked into the switch room of the C.E.B. (Ceylon
Electricity Board) at Anuradhapura and ordered the power to Jaffna to be switched
off. When the C.E.B. employees in the switchroom at Chunnakam (Jaffna) discovered
the loss of supply, they got through to Anuradhapura by means of the carrier
telephone. The Sinhalese C.E.B. employees at Anuradhapura merely confirmed that
the line was switched off and put the phone down. The army remained in the Anuradhapura
switchroom and left at 6:00 in the evening after ordering the Jaffna line to
be switched on. This routine was to be followed for the remaining days of the
operation. After the army had left, the C.E.B. personnel at Anuradhapura telephoned
their colleagues in Jaffna and told them: "Sorry we cut you off that time.
The army was here, so we could not speak. If the line is switched off again
you may assume that it is on the army's orders. Do not 'phone us when the line
is switched off. But call us after it is all over. Then we will tell you everything
that happened." It is remarkable that ordinary human contact remained during
those days and that the army did not want to black out Jaffna totally.

On 28 May, at the height of
Operation Liberation, a group of weary travellers arrived at Elephant Pass in
a van and requested the army for permission to proceed. This was refused. The
travellers then asked when they could go. A soldier replied: "A party of
our boys have gone down the road. They will get a beating and come back. Then
you can go." The travellers later arrived in Jaffna through Puneryn. The
army at Puneryn used to check travellers, but never closed the route.

On 4 June, a group of travellers
to Jaffna were being checked at Omanthai. A lorry carrying Elephant House aerated
waters was also parked at the check-point. A Sinhalese soldier bought several
bottles of aerated water and started offering them to the Tamil passengers.
He said: "Do not worry, I get paid plenty. My parents were settled as farmers
in Omanthai and I was born here. This is my hometown and so it is my duty to
do the honours in welcoming people here."

The closure of the two cement
plants at K.K.S .following the L.T.T.E.'s attack on 22 April, 1987 and the reprisal
killing by the army of factory personnel was described earlier. A few weeks
later on the initiative of Lanka Cement Ltd.'s General Manager, Mr. Jayamanne,
to reopen the plants, the Harbour Engineer went with a maintenance crew to repair
the damage. They did not like the manner in which the Sri Lankan soldiers were
staring at them. Later the engineer asked the Commander of the K.K.S. Harbourview
camp whether it was really safe for them to work there. The Commander replied:
"We are both servants in this game. Our lives do not really matter. My
advice to you is to resign and leave this country." Plans to reopen the
plants were then abandoned.[Top]