Contents

Introduction

Wikileaks has released thousands of pages of active insurgency
and counterinsurgency doctrine from the US, UK and Indian military.

The policies will be of particular interest to journalists and
academics from, or specializing in, South America, Africa, Central
Asia, Iraq and Kashmir.

The release includes several counterinsurgency doctrines
(more traditionally called "Foreign Internal Defense") which
detail how to overtly or covertly supress insurgencies or popular
revolts as well as the reverse, insurgency doctrines--how to
infiltrate a country, and stoke an insurgency to overthrow a foreign
government, commit sabotage and subversion, economic and financial
warfare as well as "nonconsensual abductions" and the wearing of
enemy uniforms in violation of the Geneva conventions.

Articles in the New York Times and Foreign Policy magazine this week
show manoeving by counterinsurgency specialists from the Center for
a New American Security and elsewhere to define an expanded role
for the US forces, and of course themselves, in Afghanistan. Indeed
Obama has selected CNAS co-founder Michele Flournoy, a former Clinton
Whitehouse staffer, to be Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

The Wikileaks release provides a partial antitote to the
shaping of public attitudes by US Gen. Petraeus and others which
journalists have uncritically relayed the last two years. Journalists
should remember that documents designed to be public, such as the
so-called "Petraeus doctrine" published by Chicago University Press
in 2007, and publicly promoted by the Pentagon, are sanitized and
should be preferentially ignored least journalists find themselves
pushing propaganda onto an unsuspecting public.

Example quotes from the Wikileaks material (in this case US Special
Forces doctrines).

"[T]he psychological effectiveness of the CSDF [paramilitary] concept
starts by reversing the insurgent strategy of making the government
the repressor. It forces the insurgents to cross a critical
threshold-that of attacking and killing the very class of people
they are supposed to be liberating."

"The United States reserves the right to engage in nonconsensual
[extra-territorial] abductions for three specific reasons..."

"Checkpoints, searches, roadblocks; surveillance, censorship, and
press control; and restriction of activity that applies to selected
groups (labor unions, political groups and the like) are further
PRC [Population and Resource Control] measures"

"U.S. policy states that the enemy's uniform may be used for
infiltration behind enemy lines. However, Article 39 of Protocol
I to the Geneva Conventions prohibits this and other uses of the
"The agent controlling the creation, flow, and access "stores
of value" wields power. Although finance is generally an operation
of real and virtual currency, anything that can serve as a "medium
of exchange" povides those who accept the medium with a method of
financial transaction. For both reasons, ARSOF understand that they
can and should exploit the active and analytical capabilities
existing in the financial instrument of U.S. power in the conduct
of UW [Unconventional Warfare]."

"In addition to intelligence and policy changes that may provide
active incentive or disincentive leverage, the Office of Foreign
Assets Control (OFAC) has a long history of conducting economic
warfare valuable to any ARSOF UW [Unconventional Warfare] campaign."

"Like all other instruments of U.S. national power, the use and
effects of economic "weapons" are interrelated and they must be
coordinated carefully. Once again, ARSOF must work carefully with
the DOS and intelligence community (IC) to determine which elements
of the human terrain in the UWOA are most susceptible to economic
engagement and what second- and third-order effects are likely from
such engagement. The United States Agency for International
Development's (USAID's) placement abroad and its mission to engage
human groups provide one channel for leveraging economic incentives.
The DOC's can similarly leverage its routine influence with U.S.
corporations active abroad. Moreover, the IO effects of economic
promises kept (or ignored) can prove critical to the legitimacy of
U.S. UW efforts. UW practitioners must plan for these effects.)"

"Actors engaged in supporting elements in the UWOA may rely on
criminal activities, such as smuggling, narcotics, or human
trafficking. Political and military adversaries in the UWOA will
exhibit the same sensitivity to official exposure and engagement
because criminal entities routinely seek to avoid law enforcement.
Sometimes, political and military adversaries are simultaneously
criminal adversaries, which ARSOF UW planners must consider a threat.
At other times, the methods and networks of real or perceived
criminal entities can be useful as supporting elements of a
U.S.-sponsored UW effort. In either case, ARSOF understand the
importance of coordinating military intelligence preparation of the
battlefield (IPB) for specific UW campaigns with the routine
intelligence activities conducted by U.S. law enforcement agencies."

"There is more SF [Special Forces] participation in developing and
advising underground [and auxiliary] elements than is widely
understood or acknowledged. Most such participation is classified
and inappropriate for inclusion in this manual."

"The advisors helped the El Salvadoran military become more
professional and better organized, while advising in the conduct
of pacification and counterguerrilla operations. Advisors were also
present at the brigade levels assisting in operations and intelligence
activities. From 1985 to 1992, just over 140 SF [Special Forces]
officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) served as advisors to
a 40-battalion army. From a poorly staffed and led force of 8,000
soldiers in 1980, SF trainers created a hard-hitting COIN force of
54,000 by 1986. U.S. forces supported U.S. interests by creating
an effective COIN force that fought the guerrillas to a standstill
and established the groundwork for a negotiated settlement by 1991. "

"An important legal aspect of a noninternational conflict is that
captured combatants do not enjoy the rights of PWs [Prisoners of
War]. They may be prosecuted as criminals under the laws of the HN
[Host Nation]. The fact that an insurgent follows the rules of war
or is in uniform will not give him PW status under international
law."

"Special Forces Exception E-15. The Comptroller General has
acknowledged that SF Soldiers have a mission to train foreign forces.
SF may train a foreign military force to test their ability to
accomplish their mission. The primary goal or benefit must be to
test SF training capabilities. Title 10 has been amended expressly
to authorize the use of O&M funds to finance SF training with foreign
forces (10 USC 2011). This training is permissible as long as it
is not comparable to or intended as SA training; that is, the
training must be conducted as an SF team and not be long-term. "