Time to bury the ghosts of 1962, the war that wasn't

Anniversaries chain us to the past - histories and memories - in strange ways. And if an anniversary is a reminder of a loss - a scar on the collective mindscape - to a nation, it breeds its own myths and fears. The one-month long war between India and China in 1962 was not a full-blown war between two military powers. It was an army raid across the mountains. On October 20, Chinese troops stormed into Ladakh and NEFA (now Arunachal Pradesh), and a month later they went back to their original position in Arunachal, while setting up a base in Aksai Chin.

In 1962, neither Peking nor New Delhi declared war on each other nor did they snap diplomatic relations. The fighter jets of both India and China didn't take to the skies and naval warships didn't even stir the waters. And yet, the 30-day-long fighting between the ill-armed and poorly dressed infantries of two impoverished nations is referred to as a great war, which it wasn't. It was a symbolic gesture - a harsh one - from a communist country to a democracy trying out a mixed economy.

In China, they hardly talk about it. But here, as we approach the 50th anniversary of the war, we are busy repeating old myths. The Air Force chief says if India had used the IAF in 1962, we could have won the war. And the usual suspects are back with the usual names and scapegoats - McMahon, Henderson Brooks, Krishna Menon and Nehru. Again, we are being reminded about the importance of hard power and military spending. The ghosts of 1962 are back to haunt us again. Should we allow ourselves to be rattled by them?

The reason we still see 1962 through arguments like "Nehru was a dreamer" is because we haven't put the war in its context. In the early 1960s, the Cold War was quite hot, the Dalai Lama had just fled to India; under Nehru, India was progressing quite well and his own stature as the leader of the developing world was growing. In such an atmosphere, China wanted to make an ideological statement and reset the balance of power in Asia. A day after the Chinese crossed the border, legendary British reporter James Cameron explained the Chinese motive in just one line. "This operation is to drive India, morally and economically, to the wall," Cameron wrote in Daily Mail.

Often derided by the Indian right for not being military-minded, Nehru was not a faint-hearted man. In his exchange of angry letters with Chinese premier Zhou Enlai over the Tibetan issue and the border dispute, Nehru not only stood his ground but also gave it back to the Chinese when they pushed him. He was not just a pacifist but a practical man who knew that a poor country with meagre resources was not in a position to spend money on arms and weapons. That's why he didn't go looking for war as some right-wing nationalists in India wanted him to do. But he was mentally prepared for the worst. Speaking in Parliament on May 2, 1962, Nehru said, "India does not want, and dislikes very much, a war with China. But that is not within India's control...The Government of India hopes that the Chinese government will avoid threatening and aggressive postures which solve no problem but only create a climate of conflict..."

But till now, every anniversary of 1962 has been an occasion for Nehru bashing and things he stood for -secularism, equality, rule of law and peace. Once again, arguments are being made to make common cause with the US in checking the rise of China and militarise the Himalayan arc that makes our border with China. If we do this, we will be making exactly the same mistake Nehru didn't want India to do - become a bulwark of one power against the other.

India in 2012 is not the country of 1962. Today, trade between India and China is getting closer to $100 billion. In the fast-changing global scenario, New Delhi and Beijing cooperate with each other in world forums on trade, environment, finance and even security. Today, a democratic India and a single-party-ruled China have no conflict about their mode of development. They both tend to gain from cooperation and not confrontation. But those who are haunted by the ghosts of 1962 still want us to live in fear. It's time to bury these ghosts.

I read a similar article in The Hindu today and it focused on how businesses on both side should take a lead in developing future relationship. But I cannot find it now.

Anyway, I also think it is time to give a break and look for more integration between the two countries.

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Some of the author's assumption is under questions though. China actually has not wanted to compete with India to lead Asia, 1962 was the year that China just barely recovered from a 3-year famine, it was at the weakest point, if Nehru's Advance Policy was not countered effectively, other bigger countries will follow.

China at the time was like a cornered panda, it bit off the weakest attacker to fend itself from bites of other even stronger beasts.