Daniel Leonard's letter of January 9 1775

Introduction

Daniel Leonard published these letters in the Massachusetts Gazette,
in which,
under the pen name of Massachusettensis, he argued
the case for submission to the crown and warned of
the dangers of rebellion. These letters constitute one
of the ablest statements of the Loyalist case by an
American. John Adams has reacted to this
publication in an article which he signed as Novanglus. The links in the text go to the
quotations by John Adams and how he tried to refute them.

January 9, 1775
The security of the people from internal rapacity and
violence, and from foreign invasion, is the end and design
of government. The simple forms of government are monarchy,
aristocracy and democracy, that is, where the
authority of the state is vested in one, a few, or the many.
Each of these species of government has advantages
peculiar to itself, and would answer the ends of government,
where the persons intrusted with the authority of the state,
always guided themselves by unerring wisdom and public
virtue; but rulers are not always exempt from the weakness
and depravity which make government necessary to society.
Thus monarchy is apt to rush headlong into tyranny, aristocracy
to beget faction and multiplied usurpations, and
democracy to degenerate into tumult, violence and anarchy.
A government formed upon these three principles in due
proportion, is the best calculated to answer the ends of
government, and to endure. Such a government is the
British constitution, consisting of King, Lords and
Commons, which at once includes the principal excellencies,
and excludes the principal defects of the other kinds of
government. It is allowed, both by Englishmen and
foreigners to be the most perfect system that the wisdom of
ages has produced. The distributions of power are so
just, and the proportions so exact, as at once to support
and controul each other. An Englishman glories in being
subject to, and protected by, such a government. The
colonies are a part of the British empire. The best writers
upon the law of nations, tell us, that when a nation takes
possession of a distant country, and settles there, that
country though separated from the principal establishment,
or mother country, naturally becomes a part of the state,
equal with its ancient possessions. Two supreme or
independent authorities cannot exist in the same state. It would
be what is called imperium in imperio, the height of
political absurdity. The analogy between the political and
human bodies is great. Two independent authorities in a
state would be like two distinct principles of volition and
action in the human body, dissenting, opposing and
destroying each other. If then we are a part of the British
empire, we must be subject to the supreme power of the
state which is vested in the estates of parliament,
notwithstanding each of the colonies have legislative and
executive powers of their own, delegated or granted to
them, for the purposes of regulating their own internal
police, which are subordinate to, and must necessarily be
subject to the checks, controul and regulation of the
supreme authority of the state.

This doctrine is not new, but the denial of it is. It
is beyond a doubt that it was the sense both of the parent
country, and our ancestors, that they were to remain
subject to parliament. It is evident from the charter itself, and
this authority has been exercised by parliament, from
time to time, almost ever since the first settlement of the
country, and has been expressly acknowledged by our
provincial legislatures. It is not less our interest, than our
duty, to continue subject to the authority of parliament,
which will be more fully considered hereafter. The
principal argument against the authority of parliament, is this,
the Americans are entitled to all the privileges of an
Englishman, it is the privilege of an Englishman to be exempt
from all laws that he does not consent to in person, or by
representative; `be Americans are not represented in
parliament, and therefore are exempt from acts of parliament,
or in other words, not subject to its authority. This appears
specious; but leads to such absurdities as demonstrate its
fallacy. If the colonies are not subject to the authority of
parliament, Great-Britain and the colonies must be
distinct states, as completely so as England and Scotland were
before the union, or as Great-Britain and Hanover are
now; The colonies in that case will owe no allegiance to
the imperial crown, and perhaps not to the person of the
King, as the title of the crown is-derived from an act of
parliament, made since the settlement of this province,
which act respects the imperial crown only. Let us waive
this difficulty, and suppose allegiance due from the colonies
to the person of the King of Great-Britain, he then appears
in a new capacity, of King of America, or rather in several
new capacities, of King of Massachusetts, King of Rhoda
Island, King of Connecticut, &c., &c. For if our connexion
with Great-Britain by the parliament be dissolved, we shall
have none among ourselves, but each colony become as
distinct from the others, as England was from Scotland,
before the union. . . . But let us suppose the same
prerogatives inherent in the several American crowns, as are
in the imperial crown of Great-Britain, where shall we
find the British constitution that we all agree we are
entitled to? We shall seek for it in vain in our provincial
assemblies. They are but faint sketches of the estates of
parliament. The houses of representatives or Burgesses,
have not all the powers of the House of Commons, in the
charter governments they have no more than what is
expressly granted by their several charters. The first
charters granted to this province did not impower the assembly
to tax the people at all. Our Council Boards are as
destitute of the constitutional authority of the House of Lords,
as their several members are of the noble independence
and splendid appendages of Peerage. The House of Peers
is the bulwark of the British constitution, and through
successive ages, has withstood the shocks of monarchy, and
the sappings of Democracy, and the constitution gained
strength by the conflict. Thus the supposition of our being
independent states, or exempt from the authority of
parliament, destroys the very idea of our having a British
constitution. The provincial constitutions, considered a
subordinate, are generally well adapted to those purpose
of government, for which they were intended, that is, to
regulate the internal police of the several colonies; but
have no principle of stability within themselves, they may
support themselves in moderate times, but would be merged
by the violence of turbulent ones, and the several colonies
become wholly monarchial, or wholly republican, were it
not for the checks, controuls, regulations, and support
of the supreme authority of the empire. Thus the
argument that is drawn from their first principle of our being
entitled to English liberties, destroys the principle itself,it
deprives us of the Bill of Rights, and all the benefits
resulting from the revolution of English laws, and of the British
constitution.

Our patriots have been so intent upon building up
American rights, that they have overlooked the rights of
Great-Britain, and our own interest. Instead of proving
that we are entitled to privileges that our fathers knew our
situation would not admit us to enjoy, they have been
arguing away our most essential rights. If there be any
grievance, it does not consist in our being subject to the
authority of parliament, but in our not having an actual
representation in it. Were it possible for the colonies to
have an equal representation in Parliament, and were
refused it upon proper application, I confess I should
think it a grievance; but at present it seems to be allowed
by all parties, to be impracticable, considering the colonies
are distant from Great-Britain a thousand transmarine
leagues. If that be the case, the right or privilege, that we
complain of being deprived of, is not withheld by Britain,
but the first principles of government, and the immutable
laws of nature, render it impossible for us to enjoy it. ....
Allegiance and protection are reciprocal.It is our highest
interest to continue a part of the British empire; and equally
our duty to remain subject to the authority of parliament.
Our own internal police may generally be regulated by our
provincial legislatures, but in national concerns, or where
our own assemblies do not answer the ends of government
with respect to ourselves, the ordinance or interposition
of the great council of the nation is necessary. In this
case, the major must rule the minor. After many more
centuries shall have rolled away, long after we, who are
now bustling upon the stage of life, shall have been
received to the bosom of mother earth, and our names are
forgotten, the colonies may be so far increased as to have
the balance of wealth, numbers and power, in their favour,
the good of the empire make it necessary to fix the seat
of government here; and some future George, equally the
friend of mankind with him that now sways the British
sceptre, may cross the Atlantic, and rule Great-Britain, by
an American parliament