Wednesday, 24 December 2014

There was a time when South African Airways was all
powerful in its southern African domains and could seemingly do no wrong. From
the late 1940s it was a dominant player on routes to Europe, usually flew
superior equipment compared with its competitors ( DC 4s against Yorks and
flying boats, DC7Bs against Constellations, Boeing 707s v Comet 4s). It expanded its reach to
the USA and Far East and even in the days of sanctions its levels or service
and reliability and the relative ease of use of its Johannesburg hub enabled it
to dominate central and southern Africa. Its management was conservative but hard
headed and expansionist. Its fleet acquisition policies sound and relatively
risk averse. The company tended to stick with what it, its crews, engineers and
ground staff knew and what worked and did it very well. Its engineering was
world class. All a bit boring maybe but its customers didn’t mind that and many
made the detour via Johannesburg just to fly with them.

Then came the new world, both in South African
politics and management fashions. Expensive outsiders, with no past baggage or
long term interests arrived to ring the changes. In came shoals of Airbuses,
including the A340, and out went the Boeings on which several generations of
expertise had been built up. The deals looked good but carried immense new
learning curves and the associated costs of those. Politically the new South
Africa brought the challenge of achieving essential and immense changes in the
work force, something requiring time, wisdom and commitment.

At the same time the new South Africa, free of trade
sanctions, meant unprecedented waves of new and shiny competition. SAA’s two
competitors in Africa, Ethiopian and Kenya Airways have grown out of all
recognition and Kenya in particular reinvented itself if a little precariously.
They offer much of the continent a plethora of intra-African and
intercontinental high frequency connections without time consuming back
tracking. Next, to add to the pain, just at the moment when SAA must have
thought the brave new world belonged to them, along came the new generation
Gulf airlines and now Turkish. With them came the redefinition of networks,
hubs and every aspect of customer service and care. Even the American and
European legacy carriers look on with open mouths as today’s benchmarks suddenly
become last year’s model. Just when you thought you were getting somewhere….

Against this tsunami-like background it is no surprise
that SAA repeatedly seems fated to a life of difficulty and turmoil. This is partly
the result of its poor geographical position being glaringly exposed and partly
due to a plethora of self inflicted woes.

Of the first, being stuck in a cul-de-sac at the very
bottom of Africa would always be a problem for an aspiring hub carrier. Inevitably
SAA’s network lies very largely to the north plus a bit out along the arms to
Australasia, Asia and the Americas. Historically the airline’s reach for
connecting long haul traffic has been limited to a 2 hour arc embracing
Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana and (just) Angola with a lot it
it driven by a preference for transiting Johannesburg airport rather than Nairobi
in particular. Kenya’s ability to lose transfer baggage and the attitude of
some of its officials, including security operatives on the lookout for money were
much talked about. Now with the Johannesburg passenger and baggage experience
deteriorating , Addis and Nairobi improving and the glitzy Gulf airports being
another world entirely ,Ethiopian, Kenya Airways, the Gulf carriers and Turkish
make a back haul via Johannesburg just unattractive.

Of SAA’s self inflicted wounds, the long-running
Board turmoil is a fine example. The net result is a carrier with ever
deepening debts and its auditors declaring it “not a going concern” . In short it’s bankrupt.
The declared operating loss for 2012-3 is US$92million. The 20-year
Transition Plan, including a request for US$600milion support, presented to
Government in April last year has made no visible progress, to the growing frustration
of sole shareholder, the Government, in particular new Public Enterprises
Minister, Lynne Brown.

Last month 6 members of the SAA Board were replaced en-masse.
A few days later the Chairman suspended the CEO who remains ‘on leave of absence’
despite the Public Enterprise Minister directing his re-instatement. Nico Bezuidenhout, CEO of SAA subsidiary
Mango, has now been appointed interim CEO returning to the role he filled last
year following the ousting of a previous CEO.
In that first appointment he presented the 20-year Transition Plan to
Government with the memorable quote that each of the previous 9 such plans was
triggered because 60% of recommendations of its predecessors were never
implemented.

Bezuidenhout has moved quickly with the presentation
of a draft 90-day recovery plan focusing on a reduction of loss-making routes
(all long-haul services are loss-making) and a re-negotiation of aircraft
leases, in particular the A340-600s. US$118million annual saving is mentioned. Fleet renewal with possible A350 and B787
types is a pressing need. Meanwhile
Government has yet to offer cash and other guarantees to enable the business simply
to continue trading. Assuming this is
eventually forthcoming the target for the Board and CEO in tandem is to better
the historic 60% implementation failure rate. To quote Bezuidenhout “It is
challenging”.

Historically the continent’s airlines had a single
business model, – That of a national carrier owned by a Government. Most eventually folded, the pace usually
being linked to the degree of Government meddling in commercial decisions and
appointments and the rate at which losses were accumulated. Local private
operators did spring up but cash difficulties relentlessly took their toll. Today’s picture has echoes
of the past, eg, limping Air Tanzania, but new models are evolving, eg low cost
carriers, with Fastjet potentially being the biggest game-changer. The big gap to be filled is that left by a failed
national carrier such as Air Afrique, Nigeria Airways, Ghana Airways and Zambia
Airways. The initial hue and cry is always for them to be replaced like for
like (and disastrously with the same people and their cohorts, hangers on and
the rest who brought them to their knees in the first place). Fortunately the
market eventually makes the decision and somebody puts the black cap on. Air
Afrique with its 11 individual Government shareholders could never be replaced.
Eleven governments agreeing and keeping their hands off decision-making? No
chance. Nigeria Airways has the look-alike privately owned Arik but has been
denied ‘national airline’ status by Government. Despite some aspirations and
even attempts, Ghana and Zambia are without replacements although small
privately owned domestic carriers have evolved.
Of most interest, the Zambian Government has granted 5th
Freedom rights to both African and foreign operators to get all the regional connectivity
it can at no cost to itself. Six
carriers now operate between Lusaka and Harare. The Ugandan Government has so
far followed the same path following the demise last month of Air Uganda by
granting regional rights to Ethiopian Airlines and to Fastjet thereby giving
Entebbe 4 new regional routes. Governments who fear isolation without a ‘national
carrier’ should sleep more easily.

1.
EAST AFRICA

Air Uganda As previously reported, the Board
has decided to disband the company citing “irreparable damage to the company’s
image” caused by the prolonged UCAA delay in renewing its controversially
cancelled AOC plus the granting of 5th freedom Entebbe-Juba rights
to regional competitors Ethiopian and Rwandair.

Eritrean Airlines is wet-leasing an A320-200 to add to
its single B767-300.

Ethiopian
Airlines continues its expansion with plans to open a route to Los
Angeles via Dublin in mid-2015. Useful 5th
freedom rights between Dublin and Los Angeles are included. This builds further
on its Toronto and Washington routes.

Receiving AFRAA’s
Airline of the Year award CEO Tewolde
Gebremariam , long time advocate of Africa making the best possible use of its
own home grown resources, when receiving AFRAA’s Airline of the Year award urged
member carriers to recognise and use skills and services available on the
continent, notably in engineering and training, and pressed governments to urgently
to free-up reciprocal route rights and frequencies for regional carriers.

Meanwhile
the carrier may be linked with the proposed new South Sudan (niche) carrier.

Fastjet
Following an interview with CEO Ed Winter, CCO Richard Bodin and CFO Nick
Caine, we will cover this always interesting carrier in a separate post.
Suffice it to say they are undaunted by the scale of their task and determined
to stay the course.

Jambojet (Kenya) Kenya Airways LCC subsidiary
plans the replacement of its 3 strong B737-300 fleet with B737-700s, presumably
also from its parent, Kenya Airways. There are no signs yet to expand beyond
the April 2013 start-up network of Nairobi-Kisumu, Eldoret and Mombasa. This
seems to indicate that conceptually it has for the moment at least hit the same
buffers as its predecessor, Flamingo, constrained by the parent and an
uncertainty about exactly what it is meant to do at least until any competing
low cost carrier, notably Fastjet, challenges it in Kenyan cross-border
markets.

Kenya Airways. CEO Titus Naikuni retired after 11
years on 31st October. He has had a good innings. He inherited the
airline in fundamentally good shape. It had successfully navigated the
September 11th global downturn, ordered the 777-200s, was about to
open up to the Far East, modernised its branding, realistically replaced its
regional F class with J class, converted its B 767 J seats to flat beds and
embarked on an outward looking programme. His personal presence, well used
political and business network and charisma were welcome additions to the role
and the profits achieved since privatisation continued.

His
successor, Mbuvi Ngunze faces a tougher proposition. Not quite a hospital pass
but more a nudge towards the first aid tent maybe, this is certainly not an
easy moment to take over after eighteen months as COO .The West African routes
are affected by the ebola outbreak, Kenyan beach tourism in particular has been
hit by images of insecurity along the coast, the terminal fire destroyed the Nairobi
arrivals area and disrupted the hub operation and the Westgate shopping mall
shootings frightened many away from the country. Black ink has turned to red.
The upsides for him though include the replacement of the mixed bag of 767-300s
by new 787-8s with 6 delivered and 3 more to come (time to firm up on a few
more?),and the opening of the airline’s
dedicated departure and transfers terminal at Nairobi. Maybe there will be some
downturn- driven realism from its unions too?

Network-wise
, Delhi has been dropped. As we have mentioned before,- a 7 hour sector in a
narrowbody 737-800 may just not be saleable to a market which has other choices.

Precision Air remains determined to solve its own problems.
One measure on offer is US$40m in exchange for an equity stake. It is also
considering the sale and leaseback of 5 ATRs which could raise up to US$80m.

Rwandair has ordered an additional Q400 and another
Boeing 737-800NG added Mwanza on Lake Tanganyika, Tanzania, to its network with
a thrice weekly Q400 frequency.

SAX Tanzania .This projected low cost carrier is
anticipating an end of year start-up with a single Q400. The majority shareholder is said to be Don
Smith of Fly540 Kenya.

2.
SOUTH / CENTRAL AFRICA

Air Congo (Rep of Congo) is to benefit (?)
from an order placed by Government for 3 new Comac ARJ21s to add to its
existing fleet of MA60s. So far as we know this aircraft is new to Africa which
means that manufacturer support is likely to be needed for some time.

Air Zimbabwe has
reached an agreement with SAA Technics for the release of its 2 A320s so enabling
them to return to service.

Congo Airways (DRC) In April Govt announced the
creation of new national carrier to replace insolvent LAC, Lignes Aeriennes
Congolaises, due for liquidation. An unspecified ‘technical partner’ is to be a
shareholder alongside Govt and local citizens. Air France Consulting has now
presented a business plan.

flyafrica.com (Zimbabwe) Regulatory problems with CAA Zimbabwe
caused the first flight to be delayed from of 23 July until to 3rd November.
They plan to operate thrice weekly between Victoria Falls and Johannesburg with
a B737-500 and then start domestic flights from Harare to Bulawayo and Victoria
Falls by the end of this year.

flyafrica.com (Namibia), allied to the above, is aiming to startup
in March 2015, first linking Windhoek and Johannesburg in joint venture with
Nomad Aviation of Namibia. Flyafrica Ltd, is a Mauritius-based private equity aviation
investment group whose aims may not
be dissimilar to Fastjet’s.

FlySafair (S Africa) Having met regulatory
ownership restructuring requirements this low cost carrier launched B737-400
services from Cape Town to Johannesburg on 16th October and quickly expanded its
network to include Port Elizabeth and George .

Kulula (S Africa) This lively low cost
subsidiary of Comair has agreed a codeshare arrangement with Air France. A
similar agreement was signed with Kenya Airways earlier this year. There is no
indication of what Comair’s franchisor,BA, thinks of these arrangements.

LAC (DRC) This company is now believed to
be non-operational and in the process of liquidation by its sole shareholder, DRC Govt, which has
back from maintenance the sole aircraft, a B737-200. Air France Consulting has presented a
business plan for a new national carrier, Congo Airways.

Mango SAA’s Low Cost
subsidiary is claiming a 2013-14 profit
of US$3.6mn based on a 42% revenue growth. It anticipates receiving 2 additional
B737-800s from SAA and some domestic route growth. Fleet renewal is slated to start in 2021.

SAA Further to our headline item here are some
further details of goings on in and around the airline. First up, Public
Enterprise Minister Lynne Brown created an ‘interim board’ removing 6 members
and appointing 2 new ones. Chairperson Ms Duduzile Myeni continues
in her role. The future of CEOMonwabisi
Kalawe is uncertain. Minister Brown has endorsed the 2013 ‘Turnround
Strategy’ but is frustrated with the lack of progress due to limited capital and
board in-fighting.

Meanwhile the Board Chairwoman Dudu Myeni
suspended CEO Monwabisi Kalawe and then refused to reinstate him as instructed
by Public Enterprises Minister, Lynne Brown. The SAA Board and ‘the
shareholder’ then appointed Nico Bezuidenhout as interim CEO. Brown
subsequently agreed that ‘due process’ will be followed around Kalawe’s
continued suspension. She also directed the airline to appoint turnaround
specialists to return the company to profitability restating that Government
has no money for bail-outs. Cost effective turnaround specialists with a robust
proven track record are thin on the ground. In any case they are seldom a real
substitute for a management up to its tasks.

To round
it all off, Interim CEO Nico Bezuidenhout has presented a 90-day Recovery Plan
focused on withdrawal from loss-making routes and re-negotiation of A340-600
leases. US$118m potential annual saving is mentioned. “It is a challenge”, he
said. Do we hear a sigh?

Finally, the airline has 2 unused frequencies
under the Nigeria Air Services Agreement and talks of using them to launch Abuja
as a new destination.

Seychelles Airlines proposed, private, B767 carrier has withdrawn
its AOC application pending legal clarification on its use of the word
‘Seychelles’.

TAAG (Angola) Government has signed a 10yr
Management Concession Agreement for Emirates
to run TAAG. Emirates will have 4 seats on the 9 man Board, including the CEO,
but no equity holding. Hopefully the Emirates team will be given a free hand to
redesign and run the airline.

3.
WEST AFRICA

Air Côte
d’Ivoire
lifted ebola-related suspensions and re-started flights to Conakry, Freetown
and Monrovia from 26th October. Meanwhile the carrier has received
two new Q400s. It has options for 2 more.

CEO Rene Decurey has stated that “Airbus will renew and expand our
fleet” starting in 2015 and building up to 10 aircraft by 2017

Air Taraba (Nigeria) has applied for an AOC .
They are not alone. 16 other aspirant new carriers have also made applications.

Ceiba (Eq Guinea) has recovered its
B777-200LR which was impounded at Madrid in a legal dispute between an unpaid
UK road construction company and the Equatorial Guinea government.

Cronos Airlines (Eq Guinea) is awaiting the delivery
of an E135. The company operates domestic services between Malabo and Bata and
regionally to Cotonou, Douala and Port Harcourt.

Gambia
Bird has indefinitely delayed the re-start of its
Gatwick-Freetown route due to the ebola outbreak. Flights between Gatwick,
Banjul and Dakar continue.

Niger Airlines (Niger) has received a wet-leased B737-200
from Iraq. It has also a wet-leased F50 from Palestine. The company operates between Niamey and Ouagadougou,
Bamako and Dakar.

Senegal Airlines has taken delivery of a Q400 on a 12
month wet lease to add to its single leased CRJ100. The company also wet-leases
a A330-200 short term for Hajj operations.

Starbow (Ghana) was temporarily grounded by the
Ghana CAA following an HS146 emergency landing. The operating certificate of
the remaining 2 HS146 was withdrawn pending airworthiness checks subsequently
completed satisfactorily. Nevertheless these 3 aircraft have been put up for
sale.

TACV (Cape Verde) has
completed the sale and lease-back of two ATR72s. The Government aims to
privatise it in 2015.

4.
NORTH AFRICA

Air Algerie The Minister of Transport has
announced route expansion plans to including Nigeria, South Africa, Ethiopia,
Chad and Djibouti by 2017. 3 more A330-200s are now on order. The current fleet totals 44 including 6 A330-200s
and 22 B737s, mainly -800s.

Afriqiyah/Libyan Airlines reports indicate that 13
of their 19 aircraft caught at Tripoli Airport during the July militia fighting
will not fly again. That total includes the 3 Afriqiyah A330s. Two new Libyan
Airlines A330s remain at Toulouse pending delivery. The Afriqiyah order for 2
new A330s is live. Tripoli terminal is all but destroyed and commercial flights
have ceased.

Royal Air Maroc is to launch B787 services to Paris
and New York in January/February 2015. 4 B787-8s on order and new routes to
Nairobi and Dar es Salaam are being planned.

The airline intends to renew its fleet and
expand from 47 to 105 aircraft by 2025.
An A380 might replace the single B747.
B737Max and A320neos are likely to vie for narrow-body orders with
SSJ100 and Emb190s contesting the 100 seat orders. Initial RFPs are expected in
2015. For now the airline has taken delivery of the first of 4 leased EMB190s

Syphax (Tunisia) The current fleet, 2 A319s
and a single A330, is to grow to 15 aircraft by 2018 including a second A330 in
2015 plus incremental A320s. New York services are planned for 2015 alongside
the existing ones to Montreal .Abidjan, Libreville and Lagos head perceived
West African opportunities.

5.
NON-AFRICAN AIRLINES

Air France reinforced its almost
unchallengeable superiority on the Paris-Abijan route by replacing B777s with
A380 on three of its seven times weekly flights.

Alitalia is hinting at withdrawing its three
weekly Lagos/Accra services in mid-2015.

Emirates. Over the
next 10 yrs CEO Tim Clark says that the company plans to add 10 new African
routes to its existing 22 and to increase frequencies.

Currently the airline is tussling with the South African
Department of Transport over its new 4th daily Johannesburg
flight. The Air Service Agreement allows
for the addition but the Department has objected. In the meantime Dar es Salaam
frequencies have increased from daily to 12 per week.

Hainan Airlines (China) is seeking to launch
Nairobi services in 2015. Hainan is also a joint venture partner in Africa World
Airlines of Ghana

Korean Air is suspending its Seoul-Nairobi
services for six months from month suspension of from December 2014 to June 2015.

TAP The Sierra Leone ebola outbreak has forced a delay to
the launch of its thrice weekly flights to Guinea-Bissau.

Turkish Airlines has re-launched its
route from Istanbul to Misrata, Libya but cancelled its November start to
Luanda. Once again Angola’s extremely difficult and protectionist authorities
have made life difficult. A further ten African destinations are however planned
within the next year.

British Airways is reducing its daily 777 frequency
between London and Nairobi to six a week. It is not clear whether this is a
temporary measure in response to a perceived insecurity-driven downturn in the
market or whether it is likely to be permanent. Kenya Airways’ response to the
market conditions by downsizing from a B777-200 to a 787 looks the better
strategic option. The business market in particular does not like blank days.

6.
MISCELLANEOUS

AFRAA says its Joint Fuel Buying Agreement
has saved members US$3m over the past 3 years.

Ghana CAA is
considering limiting aircraft age for its airlines following an emergency
landing by a Starbow 25yr old HS146.
Nigeria does this at 18 years.

Guinea
Bissau’s government has announced its intention to create a new national carrier
to resume and stabilize the route to Lisbon.

Kenya’s Mombasa Airport is to be upgraded
with a new runway and terminal building. Unlike most current major Kenyan
infrastructure projects this is to be done with 85% French funding and 15%
World Bank. The financing have been signed. The very optimistic timescale for
completion is given as 2 years.

Malawi Blantyre’s Chileka Airport terminal
upgrade has ground to a halt awaiting Government payment for work so far
completed. The major funding is Chinese major. The 2013 Presidential
announcement of a new airport to be built slips to being an aspiration and
certainly current traffic levels, and even those achieved before Lilongwe’s
“new” airport opened in 1977 do not warrant it.

Malawi’s Govt has yet to find buyers for the
ex-Air Malawi ATR42 and 737-300, both 23 yrs old. The newer 737-500 is also
stored.

Nigeria will start privatization of federal
airports “soon” says the DG, Bureau of Public Enterprises. The stated aim is to “boost efficiency”.

Uganda’s government has again mentioned
re-launching failed Uganda Airlines. This one just bubbles and bubbles.
Substantial government funding would be required and unless it were created
lean and mean with a minimum level of staff and no wasted expenditure it is
unlikely to be more successful than its predecessor.

Regarding
traffic rights, the aeronautical authorities are looking to increase 5th
freedom rights for a number of foreign carriers to replace the network of Air
Uganda which ceased flying in June.

Plus …

From the
archives …… 50 years ago, on 18 December 1964, Ghana Airways
took delivery of the first of an intended three improved Standard VC10s, the
first overseas sales success for the type. With a flight crew of 4 including a navigator
and flight engineer, initially one and for 22 months a second served the
Accra-London route. This second , delivered in June 1965 was leased to MEA from
April 1967 and, along with most of the airline’s fleet, was blown up at Beirut
Airport by Israeli forces on 28th December 1968. The third was never
delivered and instead diverted to British United Airways. Government-owned
Ghana Airways was born out of West African Airways following independence, but
rising debts and inefficiencies loomed large once the airline was infected by
President Nkrumah’s grandiose and profligate plans pushed it beyond its
original appropriate and manageable fleet of 2 long haul Bristol Britannias
backed by 2 Viscounts plus DC3s and Herons on domestic and regional services. 8
turboprop Il-18s acquired at Government behest from new friend Russia had
little to do other than fly a low demand route to Moscow whose main purpose was
to rotate the aircraft through there for maintainance. The company never shook
off the resultant accumulated debt. The last straw was when the unwise 2004
operation of an AOC-expired DC10 into the USA resulted in a ban from US airspace
and the loss of a block of almost guaranteed revenue. There was no way back. The airline was liquidated in June 2005.

Tuesday, 16 December 2014

Fallback procedures were immediately implimented and worked perfectly. Flow rates were restricted and departures from the London area ,particularly Heathrow, were held back. At all times safety was paramount and nobody was in any danger. The position of each and every aircraft was on the screens as normal. A glitch had occurred and was dealt with a high degree of professionalism, calmness and efficiency and efficiently by people on the ground and in the air. Once the system was back up and running the backlogs were progressed and by the end of the day there was a near normal programme. Even BA ,which tends to reply to disruptions with extensive domestic and short haul cancellations stuck more to "Fly the Plan" than we have seen in recent years. Inevitably for those whose flights were delayed or cancelled it had been a frustrating and in some cases difficult day. Information is always a customer relations problem but usually, apart from explaining the cause, there isn't much to say until a flight has a definite new time or is cancelled. Shouting matches with gate staff or crews on aircraft are entirely unproductive for all concerned. The fact was that the sky had not fallen in, everyone was safe and would be got on their way as soon as possible.

On Saturday morning everything was entirely normal. Any cancellations were mainly due to aircraft and crews being out of position.

One might think that, the causal defect apart, it would have been an occasion for a round of applause. The professionals, controllers, pilots, cabin crews, operations people and others had taken it all in their stride and delivered. Surely a good story?

Unfortunately the media and politicians were on the case from entirely different angles.

"Unacceptable" said Transport Secretary Patrick McLouglin. Why did he say anything at all other than the fact is that those closest to it solved the problems on the day (what could a politician do other than get in the way?) and he had every confidence that they would now investigate what went wrong and leave it at that. The media were ready with their "Chaos" banner headlines and stories of celebrity chefs texting BA to "get a grip" and things like that. The usual "Heads must roll" theme formed the background and of course calls for independent enquiries.

In a non politicised world the summary would be simply "It happened", "It was dealt with very well" and "Yes, it could happen again but next time the cause will probably be different" and "The people who can and do fix it were on top of it throughout". That lacks the required sensationalism, shock/horror element, celebrity or political angles though.

The one silver lining for the airlines was that it has been ruled that they are not responsible for any compensation for late or cancelled flights on this occasion. Things have at least moved on from the infamous Icelandic volcanic ash saga where totally unjustifiably they had to shell out huge amounts for governmental "No fly" decisions.

Tuesday, 2 December 2014

Sometimes there's just nothing new in the sky. You may think there is and then it turns out that it's been done before.

KLM has announced that Amsterdam airport is to have a Junior Jet lounge for young passengers travelling alone. This comes as part of a package labelled Bluey. Amongst other things this also offers those up to the age of 12 a smart "crew" badge, a bag of goodies and special meals to order.

BA's predecessor BOAC first dreamed up the Junior Jet tag in 1956/7 with its Junior Jet Club which was launched an impressive and highly prized winged metal badge. Additionally there was an equally impressive and prized hard covered certificate-earning log book to be signed by the Captain. In fact the log book became so powerful in forcing parential choice of airline that in reality and unintentionally it became in a small way the world's first frequent flyer programme. In due course modernisers morphed the Junior Jet Club into a much more populist but less effective Skyfliers Club,the badge became plastic and over time the whole thing lost its allure.It was even advertised on the back of cereal packets. How exclusive and status building is that?

Now nearly 60 years later KLM ,taking over the Junior Jet title, might be about to re-invent a very (low) cost effective sales device. If they develop it further and get it right they may find it a much more powerful weapon than they had imagined. The light blues should raise a glass to the old foe, the dark blues across the North Sea.

First is whether, despite losses caused mainly by concerns about security in Kenya and especially on the coast, which is the destination of most tourists for all or at least part of their holidays and by the cutbacks to and reduced loads on West African services, taking spokes out of a hub network is the right recipe.

Second is the question of just how far will people with any kind of a choice fly on a narrowbody?

A hubbing network may initially be born almost accidentally. People use connections because they are there and usually because there is no direct point to point flight on the same day,- or at all. This can happen even if the airline has only two destinations, simplistically one north and one south. Then if it adds an east and a west it finds it has more passengers on each leg as numbers, albeit initially small ones, flow from each sector to another building a bedrock of revenue which is not affected by events in or the economy of the home base. Add more spokes and the synergy increases until eventually it drives the airline.This spreading of the sources of business frees it from some of the ups and downs of its home base and enables it to become a much bigger airline than the base country would support on its own. Historically KLM was the first airline to espouse this as a policy, something BA and its predecessors did by accident rather than design via the sheer weight of destinations and frequencies which developed out of Heathrow. Emirates, when it originally started with a single leased A300 and B727, was point to point but quickly grew out of that to be, along with its new Gulf colleagues, one of the world's greatest hubbers. Success in the game depends on adding destinations and frequencies as quickly as possible, outrunning both the less nimble competitors and the red ink. Each spoke adds a handful or more passengers to a selection of the others. Turning the clock back and dropping them risks the whole ball unravelling. In Kenya Airways' case getting rid of the Delhi service saves money here and now but it also deprives other spokes of revenue and so reduces their profitability. That's not fatal and as a one off may be the best thing to do but if further spokes are removed, especially at a time when the home base is down on appeal, the process could have very serious unintended consequences.

The narrow body question may or may not be part of the problem on this sector but it is worth consideration. At the end of the 707/DC8/VC10 era it was considered that narrowbodies were dead for anything much more than a 4 hour trip. Indeed when the A300 first appeared there were fears that on the shorthaul routes it flew any competing narrowbody had little chance. As time went on that turned out not to be the case especially where narrowbodies enabled higher frequencies. As result SAS did not keep their A300s long and as a type they didn't dominate ever Europe. On longer hauls however the story was different and once a wide body appeared the narrowbodies were pretty much dead. Hence the development of smaller widebodies, first the 3 engined DC10 and Lockheed Tristar then the first of the big twins, the A300/310 and the B767.

Since then there have been some slow inroads by narrowbodies pushing their way back into shorter long haul business. First came 757s used by inclusive tour operators. They have been accepted as a way to get the lowest possible seat prices and flights out of local airports but with Thompsons and others now introducing 787s their days on those trips are probably numbered. Then came their use by the major carriers on UK and Europe hub-avoiding sectors trom secondary airports to the eastern USA and Caribbean. If flying Bristol or Birmingham direct to New York in a 757 was the price to pay for not fighting ones way to and through Heathrow then that was OK. Run a 787 or other wide body against it though and it's game over for the narrowbody.

One wonders if Africa may not also be tiring of long distance narrowbodies too. It's true that trans continental multi stopping 737s can provide links which would otherwise be absent but once each point can stand on its own feet the demand for nonstops to the hub is difficult to resist and it's a question of how long a narrowbody can hold out before a Gulf carrier puts in a widebody whose economics are also helped along by its much greater cargo capacity.We have touched on it before but one can see the attraction of finance people of the lower purchase and operating costs of a stretched 737-800 compared with the 787-8 which does not offer that many more seats. Putting aside,-and one shouldn't,- that additional cargo potential of the widebody, the first sight lower risk attraction of the narrowbody is obvious. Who though would choose to fly on one if there is someone else offering a widebody alternative,- and there is from a large number of African countries to the Gulf and a plethora of points beyond? That's even before other factors such as flying via glitzy, easy/a pleasure to use airports rather than Addis or Nairobi come into it. It looks as if for some at least, transiting one of these may be preferable to 7 or so hours nonstop in what is essentially a short haul aircraft.

This brings us onto the third point. Essential to a hub's successs is it not being outflanked by:

a)Being overwhelmed by the network and/or frequencies of a neighbour.

or

b)Being out- positioned geographically (ie flown over, around, behind, in front of) as has happened to Europe for much of the world east and south by the Gulf hubs who in turn for some destinations have been jumped by Turkish. The Asian carriers have suffered similarly to the Middle East and Europe as the Gulf operators offer a vastly greater number of destinations, In Europe the vast majority of these bypass the national capitals and avoid the much disliked ternational to domestic connections.

or

c) The vital home hub airport losing out in sheer attractiveness or ease of use to others in comparative attractiveness or ease of use. For example even Heathrow can claw back some domestic business currently flowing out of the UK provinces over Europe, Turkey or the Gulf if the transfers were made easy, hassle-free, seamless ,and reliable.

Or any combination of all three or any two of these.

It looks as if Nairobi based Kenya Airways may be suffering from elements of such outflanking to add to the first two questions, It's not a problem exclusive to them or to Kenya. It's how an airline handles the whole constantly shifting hub game that matters. That's what makes the Delhi announcement possibly significant and interesting way beyond that first impression.