Thinking strategically: conflict and cooperation (third term 2015/16)

Learning objectivesThis course teaches some of the tools (mainly from game theory and collective action literature) available for understanding and analysing a host of social and political problems. In particular, we will offer some answers to a simple but crucial question: how to solve problems of collective action and cooperation within loosely institutionalized contexts? Or, in other words, how, when and under which conditions self-governance is possible? The aim is to show that cooperation among a group of individuals, under given circumstances, is a feasible outcome. We will then discuss the relevance of our findings when it comes to think, selecting and crafting specific development policies. ​

Course contentPolitical theory often assumes that individuals are unable to pre-commit themselves in a credible way whenever the ex-post temptation to defect from an agreement is sufficiently large, unless a third part has the power to externally enforce that agreement. The now extended literature on collective action problems deals precisely with these aspects. Collective action problems are indeed ubiquities: from international relations to daily interactions, social actors are usually called to choose between cooperation and conflict. The usual solution for handling collective action problems involves imposing a governmental mechanism. Typically this means a top-down solution, regardless of its fit to the specific problem. In this course we will show that this can be an ill-conceived public policy solution and that institutional arrangements that stimulates cooperation, under given circumstances, often craft much better mechanisms to resolve collective action dilemmas.​Required readings Lichbach M.I., The Cooperator’s Dilemma, Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 1996.Ostrom E., Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.