SECTION THREE

Oil companies' responses to local communities' protests

1. Lack of compensation and clean ups

Oil corporations take advantage of weak laws and lax enforcement
in Nigeria to avoid responsibility for the environmental
damage their operations cause. Communities complain that
although it is common for companies to blame spills on sabotage,
companies rarely provide evidence to support accusations
of sabotage, and no sabotage claim has ever been
proved in court.

The delegation heard many stories of spills which Shell
allowed to continue unabated, while the affected communi-ties
received no fair compensation. In some cases, Shell
apparently alleged sabotage as the cause of spills, even before
carrying out investigation on the site. From our own observations
of existing above-ground pipelines, it appeared plausible
that the rust and corrosion affecting some of these pipes
could result in leaks and spills.

Staggering under economic impacts, poor health and broken
promises, communities have little recourse under the
Nigerian legal system. They are afraid to sue for clean-up and
compensation because history shows that oil companies will
appeal repeatedly until the plaintiffs run out of money, give
up, or die.29
Going to court is something companies have no
reason to fear, because they can extend a case indefinitely.30

In Eleme, Ogoniland, we saw the site of a pipe blowout and
massive oil spill that took place in 1970 and according to
Shell has been "cleaned up". A 6-foot thick crust of car-bonized
oil material covers the soil, turning the area into a
wasteland where only a few plants have been able to survive.
Since villagers can't afford bottled water and often have
access to no other water source, they have no option but to
drink water that is visibly polluted and slick with oil. In
1984, the community took Shell to court but community
members report that no settlement has yet been reached to
this date and Shell still has done nothing to clean up water
and soil.31

Even when the oil companies do provide compensation for
damage caused by spills and leaks, their system of assessment
and payment are often very unsatisfactory. In January 1998,
40,000 barrels of light crude oil (or 1.6 million gallons,
according to other estimates) were spilled into the Atlantic
Ocean near Mobil's primary facility in Eket, Akwa Ibom
State.32
It was the biggest spill in Nigerian history. Mobil's
reaction to the spill was so slow that the oil reached the
shores of Lagos, nearly 500 km to the west. Vast coastal areas
were devastated. Mobil agreed to pay compensation to resi-dents
in oil-producing communities, but only to those indi-viduals
who were able to submit claims, which in many cases
required potential claimants to make a long and costly journey to Eket. Given that very few roads reach the villages
affected, and people do not own and cannot afford to rent
vehicles or bicycles, this proved impossible to many of the
potential claimants. Moreover, compensation was only grant-ed
to oil-producing communities, whereas many non-oil-pro-ducing
communities were affected just as much.

2. Broken promises:
Behind the whitewash PR

Our group visited several communities where multinational oil
companies make claims of community development pro-jects.
In many communities, residents related stories of
promises made and broken by multinational oil companies.

In Iko the delegation witnessed several cases where PR
claims made to unsuspecting Western observers appeared
misleading. Iko residents told us how Shell's nearby facility
had greatly degraded surrounding mangrove areas on
which the community was dependent. In the late 1980s,
after community members noticed a decline in fish stocks,
which they attributed to Shell's oil spills, the community
started protesting and requested electricity and clean
water.33
Years later Shell promised to provide a "fish pro-cessing
plant," an ironic measure considering the impact
of oil spills on aquatic life. Oil slicks are visible in some
water bodies. Though Shell claims on its website that the
company-built facility has been operational since 1996,
the facility (an impressive and large building, definitely
photo-worthy) stands unfinished, and the community
says it has never functioned. A generator was never provided
to run it.34
Another example of such a fig-leaf project
in Iko is a manual cassava grating unit Shell donated
(as a large sign in front of it clearly indicates), but which
Iko residents said worked for one week.

I want to mention [a few things] in the area of community
development and then human resources development [by] the
Nigerian Agip oil company . . . Since 1964, to the present day,
we don't have a single structure to be proud of. We don't have
a single structure [by] Nigerian Agip oil company . . . A period
of 35 years, from 1964 to 1999, you can imagine. Then the
area of human resources development, normally they [Agip] do
give out scholarships to students in post primary and tertiary
institutions. But on our own part they did not just refuse to
give us a scholarship, they issue out the scholarship with
names of their own relations bearing Epubu community as
their host community. So on one of our trips on one of our dis-cussions
we asked them [Agip] to make available documents
they were claiming they have given people from Epubu com-munity
scholarships, but all along they have been unable to
produce these documents. That is just to tell you how they
have been neglecting our people . . .

Excerpts from our interview with Mr. Okumo Epidence, Sept.
9, 1999.

Given the scarcity of roads throughout the Niger Delta, a
common request from oil-producing communities is the
development of roads. Reading oil company literature leads
one to believe that roads are a large part of development
plans for oil-producing communities. However, as we discovered
throughout our travels, roads primarily lead to the
flow stations and oil facilities, not necessarily serving the
communities.

An even more telling example of corporate misrepresentation
of aid is the Gokana General Hospital in Ogoni. Officially
supported by Shell, the facility displays shockingly unsanitary
conditions, and lacks basic amenities such as electricity and
potable water. Although Shell installed a water well for the
hospital, the head doctor and nurse told us the well pump
never worked, and patients have to drink water from an open
well instead, with the risk of acquiring parasites. We were also
told that the first shipment of pharmaceuticals sent to the
hospital by Shell was composed of expired drugs, and that
presently drugs are sold to patients at higher prices than at
street pharmacies.35
Since the hospital provides no food,
patients' families must come and cook for them. A recently
delivered autoclave stood on its crate wrapped in plastic at
the hospital's entrance, because no one knew how to operate
it, and there was no regular supply of electricity to run it. Nor
was a generator provided. Both the head nurse and head
physician explained that for the last six months they had not
been paid the portion of their salary that Shell had promised
to pay.36
We were also told that there was no anesthesia for
surgery, there were no bed sheets, and that patients often
returned home to recover from illnesses contracted at the
hospital. We met a woman who had undergone a caesarean
section without anesthesia two days before our arrival.

3. Policy of divide and rule

Instead of investing in genuine community development pro-jects,
oil companies apparently put their money into dividing
communities and destroying effective organizing for human
rights. For example, in August 1999, Elf Oil Company report-edly
paid 40 youths $2000 each to aggressively break up a
protest by 5000 women from the Egi Women's Movement
who had shut down the neighboring Elf facility for one day.37
The women were protesting non-violently for clean air and
water, and demanding Elf's involvement in community
development projects. Elf then reportedly paid the youths
another $75,000 to sign an agreement with the company
claiming that their youth group represented the entire Egi
community.38
According to the women's group, this agreement
laid out substantially weaker demands than those pre-ented
by the Egi Women's Movement. Elf did not respond to
requests for a meeting with this delegation.

Another case of suppression of grassroots justice campaigns
involves Nigeria Agip Oil Company. On July 13 and 14, 1999,
after having denied Agip permission to carry out drillings in
communal lands, the village of Epubu was attacked by mem-ers
of neighboring communities. Three people were killed,
and many others were injured, and the village was almost
totally destroyed by fire. Most of Epubu's population of 7,000
had to seek refuge in neighboring villages. Members of the
community claimed that during the attack they could easily
identify the boats carrying the attackers as belonging to Agip,
because they were used to seeing them on a nearby Agip
facility. Though the Nigerian police were summonned to the
site of the attacks, they didn't respond in time to avoid the
killings. On July 21, attackers came back on the same Agip
boats and kidnapped a pregnant woman and two other resi-ents
of Epubu, who are feared to have been murdered.39

Animosity between neighboring communities may also arise
or be fueled by the differential treatment towards one community
by oil companies in matters of compensation, reparation,
development projects, and employment opportunities.

4. Concerted repression
to organized protests

When communities organize to protest against the destruction
of their land, homes, and livelihood as a result of the
operations of the multinational oil companies, or to campaign
for their right to control their own resources, they run the risk
of becoming the victims of outright repression and violent
acts. While this was more common under previous dictatorial
regimes, it is still a reality under President Obasanjo. Our dele-gation
visited two communities where demonstrations against
Shell by local people had been violently stopped by military
intervention, allegedly at Shell's request, and ended in the loss
of many lives.40
We also interviewed individual community
leaders who gave us firsthand accounts of the torture and vio-lence
they had suffered due to their activism.

In 1987, when deteriorating environmental and economic
conditions in Iko due to Shell's operations had become
unbearable, the community approached Shell to peacefully
"ask for our rights", as the local chief explained. The com-plaints
were centered around two facts: One, that Shell's
operations had led to the closure of the creeks where fishing
used to be practiced, and two, that gas flares posed a health
hazard to the community. The community was demanding
jobs for the youth in the community, and a general improve-ment
in the local environmental conditions. The Nigerian
military then burned down many of the houses in Iko. Eight
years later, in 1995, a new protest was organized by the com-munity,
and the Mobile Police (also known as the "kill and
go") invaded the village at night, burned down many houses,
and killed a schoolteacher. This surprise attack taught the
community a hard lesson—one it would not soon forget.
41

The truth about the whole situation is that Epubu was attacked
through the sponsorship of Nigerian Agip oil company. We are
appealing to the international community to come to our aid.
Specifically to rehabilitate the people of the community. All
our wealth is burned down. People are dying daily of starvation
and hunger. All our schools are closed . . . We are going back to
the primitive primordial days where people don't go to school
anymore. And for fear of possible attack, . . . teachers are afraid
to go there. [W]e are completely cut out from the state.
Transport boat[s] no longer apply. They don't go to Epubu
community. You have no communication with the outside
world. So we are appealing to the international community to
come to our aid by providing boats that will enable us [to]
communicate with the outside world, because we are completely
cut out. And also to assist [in] establish training schools, so
that our children can go to school and we too will know that is
happening. Because if you are not educated you cannot come
here and talk the way I am talking. So that is our passionate
plea to the international community.
Plea to the international community by His Royal Highness,
Chief Nikuman Ebe Obom, the Paramount Ruler of Epubu,
Sept. 9, 1999 , Port Harcourt

We heard a similar story (one that has been recorded in multiple
reports and academic articles)42
in Umuechem, where
Shell began operations in 1959. Like most communities
where the oil companies operate, this community remained
underdeveloped and suffered from oil-related environmental
woes. In 1990 the community staged a peaceful demonstration
to voice its complaints. Community members told us
that during the demonstration they were carrying simple
placards and dancing. Shell requested that the Nigerian
police come to control the situation, and this time the result
was an outright massacre. From Oct. 13 to Nov. 1, 1990, the
village was constantly bombarded by the mobile police. We
learned that over 100 people were killed during this time
including the chief, who was shot at the entrance of his
house as he came out to try and calm the situation. Houses
were burned and looted, and the police occupied the town
for months while most of the community was forced to flee.43

But Shell is not alone in this. Chevron too has employed the
military to repress community protests of its own negligent
practices.44
On May 25, 1998, a group of about 100 people of
the Ilaje community went to the Parabe platform (an off-shore
drilling facility in Ondo State operated by Chevron)
to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with the company's
practices. The unarmed group peacefully occupied a part of
the barge that was attached to the platform for 3 days, during
which time they did not interrupt operations on the
platform. On May 27, 1998, an agreement was reached
with Chevron representatives that a meeting at the village
would be held two days later if protesters would leave the
platform the next day. However, rather than wait to participate
in the agreed meeting, on May 28, 1998 at dawn,
before the protesters could start leaving, Nigerian military
troops were transported to the platform on two helicopters
belonging to Chevron, and staged an attack on the protesters,
killing two of them and seriously injuring another two.
After the attack, 11 protesters were seized and held in
inhuman conditions for several weeks.45

In an interview, Bola Oyimbo, one of the leaders of the Ilaje
protest, narrated to us how he was tortured by being hung
by his wrists from a ceiling fan for refusing to sign a confession
that he was a pirate.
46
Also, a delegation of U.S. lawyers
we met with while in Nigeria report that a Chevron security
person was on the third helicopter to land on the platform,
and so would have been able to see the soldiers open fire
on the unarmed protesters. The Chevron employee apparently
did nothing to stop the attack.47

Chevron operates in our area, in Ilaje area
in Ondo State. During their operation
we've not got one thing for development
apart from a wooden six-classroom block,
and a potable drinking water system that
was not working from the first day that is
was commissioned. So, there was nothing
coming to us, so we decided to write
[Chevron] a letter to call them to dialog.
The writing of letters began [in] 1989.
Then in 1998 we decided to go to government
to report our case to government
directly. We wrote a letter to the deputy
governor. [H]e invited Chevron and us to
a meeting but Chevron refused to turn up.
. . . So we now invited them a second time
again, on the 15th of May [1998]. When
they refused to turn up, saying they have
no office in our state we decided to protest
to their working zone. On the 25th of May
we made a peaceful demonstration to their
place, when we got there we talked to the
naval personnel that was hired for security
and the mobile policeman. They decided
to call Chevron to tell them that the Ilajes
are around. When they called them,
[someone from] public relations [wanted to
speak] to us but we refused to speak to
him, we wanted to talk to a decision-maker,
we wanted to talk to Kirkland who
is the managing director here. So later
they linked us to Lagos where they have
their head office, we talked to [the
Community Relations Manger] he said he
was coming over but we said we would not
listen to him if we don't see Kirkland . . .
So on the 26th [the Community Relation
Manger] came on board the barge saying
what [Chevron] wanted. We told him we
can not discuss with him, he insisted that
he should dialog with us. We said no, he
should go back and either call Kirkland or
he should go back to [our] community to
discuss with the elders . . . On the 27th
they went to our community where they
had a meeting . . . [Our community] gave
them our proposal: we need portable drinking
water, employment, [we want
Chevron] to resume their pledge of scholarship
- because they always promise to give
us scholarships without paying, and we
need a medical facility. Since our water
has been polluted they should compensate
the people in the area for the damage to
the area . . . [The Chevron representatives
said] that before they could take any decision
we should leave the barge and they . .
. [would] arrive at a good conclusion on
the 29th. So on the night of the 27th they
sent news to us on the barge that we
should prepare to leave the barge so we
could meet with . . . [the Community
Relations Manager and] be part of the discussion
[in our community] on the 29th.
But surprisingly on the 28th, as early as
6:45 in the morning before the sun could
come up, what we saw was choppers with
military men, soldiers, and mobile police
inside. They started shooting before they
even landed, start shooting indiscriminately
. . . The end result was that we lost two
of our boys and a lot of them got injured .
. . Some of them jumped overboard and
they were later rescued. Then the balance
of us, we refused to [leave the barge].
Personally, I refused to go because if you
can kill two why not add me? So they
decided to arrest 11 of us. We were first
taken to a Nigerian naval base at Warri.
We were kept for four days in a cell. Then
on June 1st they transferred us to another
cell [in a different town] before taking us
to the state security service at the Fort of
Ortacuri where we were detained for 22
days before being released again . . .
Chevron . . . first accused us of sabotage . .
. And then later, I don't know if they
induced the police but [Chevron] asked
them to make me sign an undertaking that
we destroyed their chopper, vandalized
their equipment—which was a lie. [Then] I
was hanged up by the handcuffs on my
wrists on the hook on the ceiling fan.
They asked me to sign a statement that I
lead a team to the Parabe platform and that
we vandalized the things there . . . but I
refused . . . The day they took us to Warri
naval base, one of [the soldiers] was telling
us that [Chevron] promised them each 10
thousand Naira to come and do the shoot-ing.
But after I was released, because I knew
some of them I went to them and asked,
"why did you have to come and shoot us"?
They said that it backfired because they
promised them 10 thousand Naira but they
only ended up giving them 3 thousand
Naira (approx. 30 US dollars). When they
brought us to the naval base the Chevron
representative handed them their money
and actually there was a row between them,
there was a disagreement that was not the
amount they had agreed on.

Excerpts from our interview with Bola
Oyimbo, Sept. 20, 1999, Lagos.
Mr. Oyimbo also told the delegation that
soon after he had spoken to some lawyers
from the United States, Chevron offered
money (700 thousand Naira) to members
of his community so that they would not
speak to the lawyers.

On January 4, 1999, Chevron again apparently aided an
attack by military forces on the villages of Opia and Ikenyan
in Delta State, in response to ongoing public protests about
environmental damage caused by oil extracting operations,
and demands for reparation and compensation. In both com-munities
the military killed and injured people, destroyed
churches, religious shrines, and water wells, burned down
homes, killed livestock, and destroyed canoes and fishing
equipment.48
According to the lawsuit filed in California
against Chevron,49
the military acted at the request of and
with the participation and complicity of Chevron's person-nel.
As with the Parabe incident above, recent data included
in the lawsuit reveal that Chevron provided helicopters and
sea trucks (large boats) with pilots and other crew members
to transport its own personnel (including company security
officials) along with the Nigerian military and/or police to
those communities. The helicopters are housed within
Chevron's facilities at Escravos, in Delta State.50