In this action by an workers-compensation insurer to recover from a settlement with a liable third party the issue is whether a state insurance-department subrogation waiver override the insurer's statutory right to reimbursement.

In this retaliatory-discharge case a principal issue is whether a nurse established her claim by showing a good-faith belief that she was reporting a legal violation when she accused a doctor of failing to get a patient's proper consent for a Cesarean section.

A principal issue in this school-financing challenge to the district's alleged unequal support for certain schools is whether the parents were required to exhaust administrative remedies before suing the district on a constitutional claim. In this case parents claimed the district's disparate support among its schools violated the state Constitution's equal-rights provision. Clint school district moved to dismiss on a jurisdictional plea because the parents did not raise their challenge in an administrative proceeding before suing. The trial court granted the district's plea, but the court of appeals reversed, holding the challenge raised constitutional claims exempt from the exhaustion-of-remedies requirement.

The issues in this case brought by home-schooling parents are (1) whether, under the Texas Education Code, the parents must exhaust administrative remedies before suing the school district; (2) whether school districts can require home-schooling parents to follow curriculum guidelines to assure a bona fide education; and, if so, (3) whether requiring a certain curriculum violates the parents' 14th Amendment liberty interests. A school district attendance officer threatened the McIntyres with violating compulsory-attendance laws when they would not answer requests for their curriculum for teaching their children. In response, the McIntyres sued. The trail court ruled against the school district on its jurisdictional plea, contending the court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction because the McIntyres did not exhaust administrative remedies or give pre-suit notice to the district. The court of appeals reversed.

A principal issue in this retaliatory-discharge case is whether the appeals court erred by rejecting a legal-sufficiency challenge arguing that no evidence established discrimination or retaliation. In this case Melendez sued, alleging Kingsaire fired him for filing a workers-compensation claim after he was injured by a falling object in his demolition job. Evidence showed Kingsaire assisted him in applying for workers-comp and later told him it was placing him on family-medical leave, limiting him to 12 weeks' paid leave. But the company did not tell him when that time would end and did not tell him he would be fired if he did not return to work at the leave's end. Three days after his paid time ended, and before his physician cleared him to work, Kingsaire discharged him by letter. The letter specified he could seek reinstatement after his physician decided he could work. Melendez sued instead. The appeals court held the evidence legally and factually sufficient to affirm judgment for Melendez.

The principal issues in this medical-malpractice case are (1) whether the 10-year repose statute applied to a health care-liability claim by a minor injured before she turned 8 violates the Texas constitution's open-courts provision and (2) whether the repose statute, enacted in 2003, is unconstitutionally retroactive when applied to a claim that arose in 1996. Rivera, suing on behalf of her disabled daughter, claims the disability resulted from the hospital's failure to assess symptoms that led to an emergency cesarean birth a day after Rivera sought treatment. Rivera sued when her daughter was 14. In its defense the hospital argued that no evidence supported the claim because of the 10-year repose statute. The trial court granted summary judgment for the hospital. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the repose statute violated the Texas Constitution's open-courts provision.

The principal issues are (1) whether an appellate court may evaluate a new-trial order on the merits in a mandamus proceeding and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion by granting a new trial in the interest of justice and as a sanction for alleged violation of an order barring disclosure of an investigating officer's conclusion about seatbelt use in a rollover accident. In the underlying suit a driver's family claimed he died when he was ejected from the vehicle because its restraint system failed. After the jury found for Toyota, the family moved for a new trial, contending Toyota's counsel violated the motion in limine in closing argument by referring to the officer's conclusion that the driver was not wearing a seatbelt. The trial court granted the new-trial motion, ruling that Toyota willfully disregarded its ruling on the in-limine motion and that an instruction to jurors could not eliminate the harm. The appeals court affirmed.

The principal issues in this forfeiture action are (1) whether the state's summary-judgment evidence established a fact question on probable cause, that is, whether an affidavit based on hearsay sufficiently established probable cause in a civil action, and (2) whether the trial court erred by disposing all the state's claims when the summary-judgment motion ostensibly addressed money seizure from illegal drug activity and not the state's other claim, that the money seized was connected to money laundering. In this case the state sued for forfeiture after officers seized $90,235 in plastic bags they found after a drug-sniffing dog indicated a narcotics smell in a vehicle (and, after the search, on the money). Bueno, the driver (his real name), moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. The court of appeals affirmed.

10-0490 El Apple I, Ltd. v. Myriam Olivas from El Paso County and the Eighth District Court of Appeals, El Paso For petitioner: Joseph L. Hood Jr., El Paso For respondent: John P. Mobbs, El Paso A principal issue in this discrimination and retaliation suit is whether state or federal law governs attorneys-fees calculations under a state act enacted to effect a federal discrimination statute. Other issues challenge differing features of applying lodestar methods for calculating fees. In this case Olivas sued for sex discrimination and retaliation. A jury found her employer did not discriminate against her based on her gender, but that her discrimination complaint was a motivating factor in its creating a hostile-work environment. The trial court awarded attorneys fees supported by her lawyers' affidavits and not billing records, as federal law requires, and did not require the fees to break down how much time was spent separately on the discrimination and retaliation claims. The court of appeals affirmed, holding in part that the affidavits were legally sufficient to support the trial court's fees award and that work on the claims was too intertwined to separate time spent on one versus time spent on the other. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

08-1049 University of Texas at El Paso v. Alfredo Herrera from El Paso County and the Eighth District Court of Appeals, El Paso For petitioner: Sean D. Jordan, Austin For respondent: John P. Mobbs, El Paso In this complaint that the university violated the Family and Medical Leave Act, a principal issue is whether Congress abrogated the state's sovereign immunity under a provision that allows leave for an employee's serious health condition ("self-care" leave provision). The argument in part depends on whether Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, holding that Congress annulled state immunity in the family-leave act's separate "family-care provision," extends to the statute's self-care provision. UTEP argues in part that Congress acted under the commerce clause in enacting the self-care provision, a basis that cannot authorize abrogation of state sovereign immunity. The trial court denied the university's jurisdictional plea. Relying on Hibbs, the court of appeals affirmed. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

City of El Paso, et al. v. Lilli M. Heinrich from El Paso County and the Eighth District Court of Appeals, El Paso For petitioners: Eric G. Calhoun, Dallas, and Hadley A. Huchton, El Paso Respondent: Stewart W. Forbes, El Paso The Supreme Court will hear arguments on the issue of whether immunity protects pension board sued over recalculated pension. The principal issues in this lawsuit to determine a widow's pension benefits are (1) whether the city and pension-benefits board retain immunity if the suit essentially is for money damages and (2) whether officials sued as individuals had governmental or official immunity. Heinrich sued after the pension board reduced by a third the pension she received after her police officer husband's death. That reflected the board's calculation for benefits that, it contended, should have been for her son under bylaws in effect when her husband died. The board initially approved 100 percent of the benefits to Heinrich, then determined in the later recalculation that the full-benefits provision to a spouse became effective after Heinrich's husband died. At first she sued for an amount she alleged was owed, but later pleaded the suit as one to declare her rights to the pension as originally calculated. The trial court denied the board's immunity defense. The court of appeals affirmed.

In this case alleging a financial institution lost documentation creating a survivorship right in a joint account, the principal issues are (1) whether Texas Probate Code section 439(a) bars extrinsic evidence of intent in a contract-breach claim over creation of the joint-tenancy account and (2) whether the "intertwining" exception to the duty to segregate attorney's fees should include fees recovery in a related federal court proceeding. Beyer sued A.G. Edwards & Sons for conversion and breach of contract, among other claims, after the company allegedly lost an agreement that would have made Beyer joint owner of her father's investment account and sole owner when he died. Four days before her father lapsed into a coma, A.G. Edwards told her the agreement was missing, then froze the $1.19 million account after he died. When Beyer initially sued for negligence, the company submitted the proceeds to federal court to determine ownership. In this case Beyer sought as damages the money from the account split among her siblings to settle the interpleader action in federal court. The court of appeals affirmed a breach-of-contract verdict, admitting evidence that showed the father's intent to create the joint account, and affirmed attorneys fees that were not segregated because the court held the fees were inextricably intertwined.