Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s OfficeNews and updates on video surveillance2020-04-21T08:16:48Zhttps://videosurveillance.blog.gov.uk/feed/Tony Porterhttps://videosurveillance.blog.gov.uk/?p=7392020-04-21T08:16:48Z2020-04-21T07:34:40ZIf you are a regular reader of my blog you will know that I began writing a series of blogs in February looking back over the six years that I’ve been Commissioner. That was because my commission was coming to an end in March. Well, it’s April and I’m still here as my commission was extended to June at the eleventh hour – a new person will be taking up the reigns when I depart. I started this series of blogs when there was a large degree of uncertainty about what was happening for me both professionally and personally. I could not have envisaged what was to unfold in the weeks to follow.

Surveillance and COVID-19

We are in the midst of a pandemic which none of us have ever seen the like of. Around 4 billion people around the world are on lockdown in an effort to limit the spread the COVID-19 virus which has claimed the lives of over 160,000 people.

We have seen the use of surveillance come to the forefront in how nations enforce social distancing measures and monitor the spread of the virus in an effort to save lives. From mobile data tracking apps to record personal contact with others, CCTV networks equipped with facial recognition, permission schemes to go outside and drones to enforce social isolation regimes. If new systems (such as data tracking apps) are to be introduced they must surely pass these most basic tests – provide accurate information about infection or immunity, have clear technical capabilities to support that requirement and ensure these tests do not infringe unfairly on human rights. Are these not the similar criteria to justify the use of facial recognition technology? Are we not coming across the same issues but via different surveillance platforms?

That sort of thing doesn’t happen here though, does it? Well, to my knowledge it hasn’t. My office have had some enquiries from police forces around using drones and automatic number plate recognition to enforce social distancing measures put in place by the Government. We also have had some organisations ask about using thermal imaging to identify people who have high temperatures entering their buildings. I must say that first and foremost these conversations have focussed on how we protect the public and keep people safe whilst protecting their fundamental human rights and freedoms. Not about the introduction of mass surveillance without oversight.

Apply the code

The police and local authorities must comply with the 12 guiding principles in the Surveillance Camera Code of Practice. Before the deployment of any surveillance camera system they must establish a legitimate aim and a pressing need. That’s principle one of the Code and it states that might include the protection of health. Once a legitimate aim and pressing need is established the organisation must comply with all the principles in the Code which cover a range of areas such as civil engagement, data protection, security measures, standards and so on. If the tests outlined above can not be met how can an organisation justify the legitimate aim and pressing need objective?

So what? You might be thinking. The what is – if the Code is followed video surveillance systems will only be used for a specified purpose, proportionately and effectively. For example. in the case of thermal imaging it might be proportionate to use this technology in the unique times we are in as a condition of entry to building where individuals have given consent. Whereas mass use without individuals’ knowledge seems disproportionate and would require much stronger justification. Equally, the use of such technology needs to be accurate enough to identify those you want it to i.e. those with raised temperatures – so the ‘kit’ would need to meet some minimum technical requirements. Lastly, people could have higher than normal temperatures for a host of reasons and how that is managed would have to be factored in. There are a number of considerations and processes to go through such as carrying out a data protection impact assessment and using my self-assessment tool – following the Code should help organisations deal with some of these issues. In short, if this technology is not good enough to ensure public trust and support it then it probably shouldn’t be used.

My role is also advisory. I provide advice to those who operate surveillance camera systems. I do not have powers of inspection like my colleague the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, nor am able to enforce sanctions like the Information Commissioner. So, I have no way of ensuring compliance myself by means of inspection or rectifying non-compliance by way of sanction. In 2013 that was good policy, but things have moved on significantly. Facial recognition is arguably as intrusive as some covert surveillance techniques. Yet other than complying with the Code and with data protection legislation there is not the same independent oversight and accountability as with covert surveillance. Specifically, authorisation and inspection. Where, particularly intrusive overt surveillance is deployed should it be subject to the same scrutiny afforded to covert surveillance? It is all surveillance after all and surveillance is an investigatory power not simply a data protection issue.

Whilst we may see authorities using surveillance cameras to deal with infractions of social distancing or identify those who may have COVID-19 this must be done within the boundaries of the law.

I see an emerging argument for primary legislation to be advanced to regulate surveillance by tracking and digital contact tracing applications. Legislation should impose clear parameters, access and time limitations. Some commentators are quite rightly raising alarm bells surrounding some of the surveillance techniques being deployed or being considered. If an organisation has deployed what is deemed overt technology in-line with the requirements of the Code and other legislation on what basis are they held to independent account? Some argue that there is none. I argue that it is complex but a more robust form of oversight for all forms of overt surveillance is justified.

That is why I continue my call as I exit office for Government to commission an independent review of the laws governing overt state surveillance in a manner similar to that conducted by Sir David Anderson QC, “A Question of Trust”. I would propose that all manner of state surveillance regulation placed within a single regulatory body with judicial leadership (essentially moving my function or parts of my function under the leadership of IPCO or being more closely aligned).

When life does get back to normal how do we ensure that more intrusive surveillance measures don’t linger? How do we ensure oversight and accountability of those that may linger on or were in use before March 2020? What will we have learnt and how will we translate that into good policy that supports organisations deploying cameras and most importantly support the communities those cameras are watching? Is that the independent oversight and authorisation of the use of particularly intrusive overt surveillance camera technology? A comprehensive review of overt state surveillance could help guide us on these matters.

]]>2Tony Porterhttps://videosurveillance.blog.gov.uk/?p=7352020-02-27T08:52:37Z2020-02-27T08:52:37ZOver the past six years as Commissioner I have benefited greatly from the commitment, contribution and support received from many quarters. This has unquestionably assisted me and benefitted society and the wider surveillance camera stakeholder community in raising the standards of operating surveillance camera systems in public spaces.

Working together

What has always been clear is the huge goodwill amongst those working within the industry. What was less apparent was how the different parts of the industry worked alongside each other – the manufacturers, installers, consultants and operators. I have consistently sought to shift the debate over regulation of these matters from them being simply a data protection issue. This is patently not the case and given the complexity of these matters I launched the National Surveillance Camera Strategy in March 2017 comprising of 10 work-strands (now 11). Each strand represents an important strategic theme requiring action. Taken together they illustrate something of the complexity of the subject matter and each is led by a senior expert. So, almost three years since I launched the strategy I thought it only right to take brief look back.

Implementing a strategy

Regular readers of my blog will have heard from each of the strand leads over the past few years on what they are working on. There’s a strand looking at civil engagement so we can help the public understand how cameras both protect and impact on their human rights. This strand has delivered public debates, forums and the National Surveillance Camera Day to ensure that the public voice had a platform to influence (a note to those in authority who still call for a debate on these matters – we’ve had them, they are ongoing what we need is action). I pay tribute to ‘Liberty’ and ‘Big Brother Watch’ in particular for the well-considered challenges they consistently contribute to those debates. Equally, I pay tribute to police, parliamentarians and fellow regulators for engaging so enthusiastically.

Through the police and local authorities strands we are delivering framework service level agreement where a surveillance camera system is to be used in partnership with others, raising standards on how these partnerships work in practice. They are looking at technological solutions as well as linking in with the training strand of the strategy to identify what more is needed in this space. Also, a survey I conducted of the surveillance camera systems being used by police forces in England and Wales around the nature and extent of statutory compliance highlighted some areas of concern. These in turn led to recommendations being made by me and implemented by all Chief Constables. Marvellous commitment. A similar survey of local authorities is taking place too.

Whilst on standards, the standards strand has led and delivered on the development and delivery of a spectrum of independent and industry standard certification schemes ranging from the operator to the manufacturer. They are branded under the Surveillance Camera Commissioner logo and provide greater reassurance to buyers, users and law makers alike. Through this strand we successfully launched ‘Secure by Default’ last June – a global first where manufacturers of surveillance camera products had to hit minimum cyber security requirements as their product emerges ‘out of the box’ in order to self-certify and receive the SCC mark. Whether you are a manufacturer, installer, designer or user of a system, public or private, there is a standard to be met. Alongside all this the installer strand is refreshing the Buyers’ Toolkit and the guidance we have issued installers to ensure it is completely up to date.

Regarding my regulation strand I enjoy a healthy and productive relationship with IPCO, the Biometrics Commissioner and the Forensic Science Regulator. I have an MoU with the ICO and our joint work in delivering a DPIA for operators of systems represents an effective reduction in bureaucracy for the stakeholders we oversee.

The newest strand of the strategy focuses on human rights, data and technology and seeks to engage in constructive dialogue with a range of important stakeholders including other regulators, civil society groups, legal experts and, crucially, those who use surveillance cameras to promote public safety. This ties in closely with the horizon scanning strand as do all the other strands.

I haven’t covered here the full multitude of work going on inside and outside of the strategy – this would have to be an entire report not a blog! However, it is important that I emphasise that those leading and contributing to the delivery of the national strategy do so voluntarily. Such is their commitment. Similarly, those supporting me on the many groups I chair take on additional burdens to their day job.

A clear framework but more to do

Through the strategy we now have a clear framework that provides a full system approach to how surveillance cameras are manufactured, installed and deployed. The strategy is due for a refresh and as I come to the end of my tenure as Commissioner this approach to surveillance camera use seems more important than ever – it is a credit to all involved that we have progressed it as far as we have over the past 3 years.

With under two weeks of my Commission left to go I remain unable to advise readers as to Government intentions for the successor to my role. There is much to do and a burgeoning portfolio of issues for that person to address. It is my heartfelt belief that maintaining a strategic approach to emerging overt surveillance is necessary for ongoing trust of its use in our society.

Hopefully, by this time next week, I will have a clearer position to report.

]]>1Tony Porterhttps://videosurveillance.blog.gov.uk/?p=7312020-02-19T11:40:44Z2020-02-19T11:32:05ZRegular readers of my blog may or may not be aware that my Commission is due to come to its natural end in March.

At the time of writing this I’ve had no clarity as to what plans there may be for the future of my role (the Surveillance Camera Commissioner (SCC)) beyond this date. I am assured by the Home Office that they have plans.

One suspects that as I, like the Home Secretary, am contributing my views to the Court of Appeal in the forthcoming case of R(Bridges) v The Chief Constable of South Wales Police (viz the use of live facial recognition technology) that a short extension to facilitate this court process may prevail. We shall see, and hopefully soon.

It is with the end in mind that I’ve decided to write a short series of blogs to highlight the successes and indeed failures over the six years I’ve held this role. So, as my tenure draws to a close the theme of this blog has been a constant refrain from me – “things need to change.”

A time for change

The role of the SCC is unique globally as a regulatory focus in England and Wales. That uniqueness has enabled many stakeholders including the Government and the public to benefit from a more intrusive and detailed regulatory insight than any other country regarding the issues facing society from the growing phenomenon of state surveillance conducted by means of a camera lens.

My role emerged from the coalition government of the day who considered that the growth of surveillance camera systems being operated by the state represented an increasing risk to the liberties of our citizens. The risks were considered to be significant enough to require an additional and specialised regulation beyond data protection legislation.

How things in the next six years changed. New surveillance camera technologies are challenging the delicate balance between privacy and security. I have seen the emergence and increase in the number surveillance cameras – body worn cameras, drones, ANPR cameras, dashboard cameras, handlebar cameras, and even dog borne cameras watching over us. At the same time the lenses in those cameras are augmented by technologies which can recognise faces, a walking gait, can predict fights, detect explosives or radiation, can read lips, can see in the dark, determine body heat, and of course can combine with other capabilities to produce quite an intrusive dive in to a broad range of our precious freedoms to whoever is behind the camera, and their partners.

By the same token, the threats facing society are similarly evolving and finite law enforcement resources must out of necessity use technology to keep us safe.

To be clear, I am and always have been strongly of the view that the police should have the tools they need to keep us safe. We have the best police in the world committed to do the right things in the right way. For me there is no question on that point. In the context of cameras, citizens and the state need the confidence in clear laws and regulation which proportionately enables the ethical use of technologies and holds such use to account now, and in he future. I continue to bang the drum on both points until the very end.

The creativity and potential of LFR by the police whether for intelligence, operational or tactical purposes requires each case to be judged on its merits against existing laws on a case by case basis. Respecting that the court in the Bridges case considers existing laws to be ‘clear’ and ‘sufficient’ (para 84 judgement) the court also acknowledged (at para 84), their view that:

a) steps could, and perhaps should, be taken further to codify the relevant legal standards; and b) the future development of AFR technology is likely to require periodic re-evaluation of the sufficiency of the legal regime.

These are messages which I have been urging the Home Office to consider since 2015. The declared purpose of the Secretary of State’s Surveillance Camera Code of Practice (para 1.5) is:

to ensure that individuals and wider communities have confidence that surveillance cameras are deployed to protect and support them rather than to spy on them.

That strategic purpose rather like the content of the Code itself, remains unchanged since 2013 yet the ‘spying’ risks associated with the capabilities it regulates have changed considerably.

In acknowledging the considerable increase in investment and statutory capabilities inherent with data protection legislation, I have long believed that a re-evaluation of laws and regulation is necessary. Readers of my blog will know that I am of the view that effective legislation and regulation of these matters in the future should be decided upon by regarding such conduct through the prism of ‘surveillance’ – essentially looking for data to acquire and process for a particular and ECHR intrusive purpose.

I firmly believe that whenever the police or law enforcement agencies deploy a camera in public to look at people, they are conducting ‘surveillance’, that surveillance is an investigatory power however it is conducted and should be regulated as such. The court in Bridges and I are on the same page as to the need to ‘re-evaluate these matters.

Time for a review

Beyond a promise to do so within the Home Office Biometrics Strategy I have consistently failed to convince the Home Office to update the SC Code since I reviewed its contents myself against the emerging surveillance landscape in 2015. I have also failed to convince the Home Office to commission an independent review of the laws governing overt state surveillance in a manner similar to that conducted by Sir David Anderson QC, “A Question of Trust”. Indeed, my proposal to have all manner of state surveillance regulation placed within a single regulatory body with judicial leadership (essentially moving my function or parts of my function under the leadership of IPCO or being more closely aligned) similarly found no fertile ground, despite being supported by the previous Investigatory Powers Commissioner.

The debate continues

Of course, such matters are for Government and Parliament to determine. My powers are simply to advise. I am heartened however to see that the guidance I have provided, the debates I have engendered and the challenges I have laid to practitioners have resulted in higher standards of operational and regulatory approach elsewhere, and of course those debates continue.

]]>0Tony Gleasonhttps://videosurveillance.blog.gov.uk/?p=7242019-12-20T08:53:24Z2019-12-20T08:53:24ZOne of the deliverables of the local authority strand of the National Surveillance Camera Strategy is the development of a framework service level agreement (SLA). It’s designed to be used to help police forces and local authorities set up their own SLAs. The police are a key partner in this and I’m working closely with Assistant Chief Constable Jenny Gilmer who leads the policing strand of the strategy and is also the National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) lead for CCTV.

As the chair of the Public CCTV Managers’ Association, which represents managers from over 200 local authorities, working with the NPCC Specialist Capabilities Program is essential to develop partnership working and protocols in a number of areas of CCTV. I will also be working with the colleagues at the National Association of Surveillance Camera Managers and the London CCTV Managers group to get the broadest input possible to this work.

Why is this important?

Why is it important that there are agreements in place? Well, the vast majority of footage from local authority CCTV is ultimately used by the police in investigations – from minor offences to the most serious of crimes. As well as this many local authorities work closely with forces when they are responding to live incidents, for example directing officers on the ground.

Ensuring there are proper, robust and efficient agreements in place are extremely important. Although, I’m mindful that a ‘one size fits all’ approach is probably is not the right approach. What is right for one local authority and police force may not be right for another. What we are not doing is developing a template that simply is filled in by both parties, rather we are working up a framework which will cover the areas any good service level agreement should have in it.

These areas include – purpose and legitimacy, legal considerations, governance, information sharing, communication, training, surveillance types (overt and covert), finance, feedback, future technology and evaluation/review. The list is not exhaustive and some areas may not need to be used in an agreement. The point is to develop better partnership working that help local authorities and police forces work more effectively in our roles.

Properly funded and managed local authority CCTV systems are an essential tool for the prevention and detection of crime and public safety. Robust service level agreements can help put in place measures that mean local authorities can effectively evidence the value of that CCTV.

What do you think?

I’d be interested to hear views on this approach so if you have any please add a comment to this blog.

These are helpful additions in relation to the data protection implications of AFR but there are a number of other statutory considerations that the police must consider if they are deploying this technology.

So, I welcome the Information Commissioner’s views in this area and know her team have done a detailed ‘deep-dive’ in to the police use of AFR in South Wales and London. It’s the culmination of over 12 months investigation.

Should we reinvent the wheel?

I read with interest the calls for a new code to help regulate the use of AFR by the police. Regular readers of my blog will know that the Home Secretary’s Surveillance Camera Code of Practice is currently being updated by the Home Office. That statutory code already is a key part of the legal framework and I firmly believe that it can be updated in a way to provide robust advice to the police (and others) about use of AFR. So, the SC Code can be that new statutory code the Commissioner calls for – it already covers AFR, other modalities and camera types and is already on the statute books. We don’t need to reinvent the wheel.

But guidance is crucial, and I intend to update the guidance I issued to police forces – the guidance referred to by the courts. I will do this through consultation with my fellow regulators. As the opinion from the ICO stated - "it is likely to be less challenging to justify sensitive processing as part of an LFR deployment that is…targeted, intelligence led, time limited and narrow in scope".

This leads me to ponder that we may be entering the realm of directed surveillance which will no doubt be of interest to the new Investigatory Powers Commissioner – Sir Brian Leveson.

Like the Information Commissioner I would urge a degree of caution on the part of the police to regard the recent judgment as being a green light for the generic deployment of AFR. It was specific to the South Wales pilots. AFR is an intrusive tool with human rights and public confidence implications which have to be considered. There is however a heightened sense of confidence that in appropriate circumstances such use will be lawful but must be demonstrably conducted within the legal framework and demonstrate good governance and legitimacy of endeavour.

Joined up working

It’s a complex area with significant media and political interest here and across the globe. The use of this technology is not just a data protection issue, it’s not just a surveillance issue, it’s not just a biometrics issue and it’s not just about technical, operational and ethical standards. It is all of those and more. There are a number of regulators overseeing the use of AFR and we need to work together to ensure that we serve the public interest to the standards they expect, helping those who want to deploy AFR do so within a strong framework of law and guidance.

This is something that we are all committed to and I will continue to work with the police, regulators, government and others to ensure that the guidance for the public, and indeed the police, is both up to date and relevant.

]]>0Jenny Gilmerhttps://videosurveillance.blog.gov.uk/?p=7132019-10-09T09:12:58Z2019-10-09T09:12:58ZI lead the policing strand of the National Surveillance Camera Strategy for England and Wales. I’m also an Assistant Chief Constable at South Wales police and the CCTV Lead for the National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC).

I’ve been the NPCC lead and working with Tony Porter on his national strategy for about 10 months now. A key consideration for me around the use of CCTV in policing is to ensure that cameras protect communities rather than spy on them. The ethical use of surveillance cameras is extremely important to me, this is taken into consideration with all the work we do.

As part of my work as NPCC lead I have established a national working group with forces represented across all regions and representatives from key stakeholders such as regulators, local authorities and government departments. This working group also supports the work of Tony’s national strategy.

Where to focus

I’ve identified 4 key areas for the working group to focus its attention on:

Firstly, to look at the processes used to manage CCTV footage to ensure its standardised and fit for law enforcement purposes.

Secondly, to make sure that officers receive the right training with regard to CCTV. This will ensure individual’s rights are protected and staff are trained effectively to manage this information appropriately.

Thirdly, to make sure the partnership arrangements between the police and other organisations are in place and take account of effective, ethical working practices. Tony Gleason, who leads the local authority strand of the Commissioner’s strategy, will be blogging about this in detail in a couple of weeks.

Lastly, to look at the technology used to manage CCTV, making sure it’s fit for law enforcement purposes and is compatible now and in the future.

Ensuring best practice

With all of the above we are working across the industry looking to gain best practice at all stages of law enforcement where CCTV is used. It’s a very complicated environment with both public and private companies using CCTV as part of their business practices. There are many different systems and formats in use with new technology coming onto the market every day. Making sure that the footage captured by CCTV, can be used in investigations and played in court in the most effective way, is challenging but not impossible.

In many cases CCTV can make a difference in enabling the capture of criminals as well as protecting those that go missing that are vulnerable or in harm. Nationally I believe that the police need to get better at evidencing the value CCTV, where it has made a difference and shining a light on positive outcomes as a result of CCTV footage. This is something that we are also looking at within the working group.

Balancing privacy against protecting communities

We need to make sure that when we are using CCTV it is done in line with the Surveillance Camera Code of Practice and legislation such as the Data Protection Act 2018. So, I’m also extremely mindful of the competing demands between the right to privacy and keeping our communities safe and making sure that the information we gather is treated with due care, respect and ethically. We need to ensure that this is instilled within the processes we have in place around CCTV to maintain trust in the communities we serve. I’d be interested to hear views on the approach I’ve outlined in this blog so if you have any please add a comment in the comments section.

]]>2Tim Raynorhttps://videosurveillance.blog.gov.uk/?p=7062019-09-13T10:37:06Z2019-09-13T10:37:06ZHaving recently accepted the role as strand leader of the industry strand of the National Surveillance Camera Strategy, this blog is intended to provide some background on who I am, and the first steps that I intend to take to formulate work streams for the strand.

My day job is a Video Surveillance Product Manager, responsible for the product strategy of Johnson Controls in the UK and Ireland. I have been with the business for 26 years, initially starting in procurement for my first 6 years and then moving on to product management. The product strategies I am responsible for cover the whole market from small residential systems through to enterprise solutions for blue chip companies.

During my many years in this role I have seen the market move away from traditional CCTV analogue systems using VCR’s, multiplexers and box cameras, to the complex new world of networked IP video surveillance systems utilising the latest video Analytics and offering global connectivity.
I also recently accepted the role of Vice Chair of the Video Surveillance Section of the British Security Industry Association, which brings me into regular contact with a variety of members including consultants, installers, distributors, monitoring centres and manufacturers to discuss both good and best practice of providing video surveillance systems.

Vision and Scope

Firstly, to explain the term “Industry” when used in relation to this strand, this term covers any person or organisation involved in planning, designing, installing, commissioning and supporting surveillance cameras, as well as the monitoring of those systems.

My view is that the industry strand should not work in isolation to the other strands. Much of the work carried out by the members of this group will have a direct impact on the daily work of the other strands and I am very keen to collaborate and support with the other stakeholders who are supporting Tony in his role as Surveillance Camera Commissioner. My first action will be to reach out to each of the strand leads so that I can better understand the projects that they are working on and to offer the support of this strand if required.

From the feedback I receive from the other strands, I will then create the deliverables that this strand can provide to support Tony.

Clear Objectives

Following in the footsteps of my predecessor, my objectives for this strand are to define in detail what we mean when we talk about the industry providing good and best practice. “Good practice” meaning meeting minimum standards that we set, and “best practice” meaning meeting all relevant British and international standards as well as achieving certification against the Surveillance Code of Practice.
The video surveillance market has an extremely wide range of installed legacy systems from analogue to IP (and everything in between!) and our work in the strand needs to ensure that we provide recommendations and guidance that can help owners and operators upgrade to the latest standards across all of these systems, or to review and replace equipment where the age of the system means that current requirements are no longer being met.

Innovation is extremely fast in this market and the strand will need to ensure that awareness and education for video surveillance system owners and operators is regularly provided to allow them to make informed choices in line with the principles of the Surveillance Camera Code of Practice and any other associated guidance. The strand will regularly review and update the Buyers Toolkit to ensure that the guidance includes recent technological advances.

Having worked in the video surveillance market for a considerable time, I am aware that the use of a myriad of acronyms and “tech speak” appears very confusing for anyone who is not part of the industry, therefore another of my aims for the strand is to demystify these terms and to help owners and users understand in plain English what video surveillance systems are, and the numerous benefits that using these systems can provide.

Whereas AFR continues to command headline attention, to exclusively look towards AFR and indeed ‘Biometrics’ with regard to surveillance cameras is to risk missing a wider point of concern. The capability of overt state surveillance in public places is growing. There are now more drones carrying cameras in our skies, more body worn cameras walking our streets, a more modern ANPR infrastructure watching our cars, more CCTV cameras on police dashboards - far more cameras probably exist now than when my role was created in 2012.

What next? Algorithms that can identify someone by how they walk (gait analysis), lip reading technology, artificial intelligence technology that can predict fights and sensors that can detect explosives and radiation. These are all technology that’s in development and what they all have in common is that they’re linked to surveillance cameras.

I’ve always supported the notion that we should harness technology and the police should be allowed to exploit the potential which exists within technology to make us safe. Some of these technologies do make people feel safe and I recognise that.

The key point however is that the use of technology enhanced surveillance has to be conducted and held to account within a clear and unambiguous framework of legitimacy and transparency. This will ensure that in pursuit of delivering a safe society, such use does not go beyond that which is necessary and proportionate in a free society.

As the leading regulatory voice on the use of overt surveillance cameras by the police I am heartened that the courts are giving due consideration to the issue of police use of AFR, something which I have been highlighting for debate for some considerable time. I very much look forward, together with others, to the outcome of those particular proceedings to help take us all forwards.

So, what is the state of surveillance?

On the National Surveillance Camera Day I launched a compliance assessment (survey) of the overt surveillance camera capabilities of all police forces in England and Wales. This was to get a deeper understanding of the current and aspirational police surveillance camera capabilities and of the issues which their use gives rise to (and a repeat of the survey I carried out in 2017). As the final returns continue to come in to my office, I commend all those Chief Officer’s and Police and Crime Commissioners for their support to this work. They too seek better guidance.

In my view ‘surveillance’ is an ‘investigatory power’ when exercised by the state whether such conduct be overt or covert in nature. As such it should be considered, appropriately legislated for and regulated as being such.

Voices from within Government and as well as those outside have been calling for a public debate on the use of AFR. In support of those voices I would go a step further and say that we need an independent review commissioned and conducted of the statutory and regulatory framework which governs the investigatory power of overt surveillance camera use by the state.

The growing capabilities of overt surveillance technologies, the proliferation of cameras in society, the increasingly crowded regulatory space and the voices of concern are such that these matters are increasingly ‘a question of trust’ for society.

I am particularly drawn to Lord Anderson’s 5th principle in that report calling for “a single body of law, and a single system of oversight, for equivalent investigatory activities conducted by different public authorities”.

If I have learned one thing from my experience within the National Surveillance Camera Strategy it is that the framework which delivered my role and the rules by which overt state surveillance is conducted has to evolve and be future proofed by being principle based. The days of fragmenting the regulation of state surveillance on the basis of whether a camera is being used ‘covertly’ or ‘overtly’ are gone in my view.

I simply posit the view that some overt surveillance camera applications whether in themselves or combined with other technologies are so progressively intrusive in their capabilities that they can be the equal of some covert surveillance activities in terms of the intrusion caused.

I really do believe that it is time government recognised overt state surveillance as being an investigatory power rather than simply a data protection issue. An informed and esteemed independent reviewer would I am sure provide such clarity as to the way forwards.

Implicitly my role is to raise the standards of public surveillance operation, to ensure that the public are better informed, more confident and safer, to ensure that the state is clear and accountable for acting within legal and ethical boundaries. That stakeholders and industry have clarity in leadership and standards, and to help inform the evolution of laws and regulation that contribute to keeping us both safe and free. After all, these are questions of trust too.

]]>4Tony Porterhttps://videosurveillance.blog.gov.uk/?p=6822019-05-28T12:32:39Z2019-05-28T12:32:39ZVSS are operated by most Local Authorities in England and Wales and are intrinsically linked with operational policing to protect the public and ensure their safety. Indeed the whole genre of video surveillance systems (VSS) beyond the traditional CCTV is growing rapidly – Drones and Body Worn cameras, Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) and evolution of technology incorporating artificial intelligence represent the current landscape. It’s evolved in the last few decades from just a few dozen cameras to millions of cameras in operation now. They are everywhere from stadiums and trains stations, shops and high-streets, cash machines and even abattoirs.

There is of course a balance to be struck between ensuring the effectiveness of VSS and preventing serious intrusion into citizen’s private lives. So how effective are they and is the cost of installing and operating those systems really worth it?

There is little evidence to suggest that these systems help to deter crime, however VSS footage plays a major role in responding to incidents, investigating crimes and prosecuting those responsible. Such footage is useful in both low level crime cases and high profile incidents – it’s captured the movements of terrorists such as the culprit of the attack at Manchester arena in 2017 and helped to identify the suspects of the Salisbury Novichok poisoning in 2018.

But in some cases, Local Authority VSS schemes are being switched off due to a lack of funding as other important areas seek investment in resources, or because VSS is not proving to be effective in catching criminals. If systems are of limited use then it is right they should be removed. However, if they are valuable and play a crucial role in protecting the public then Local Authorities and the police should be able to explain why their use is justified and should receive adequate funding to continue providing this service.

It is therefore vital that organisations are able to demonstrate the value of the surveillance camera systems they use and for its use to be recorded as a detection factor against police crime records at every stage of the criminal process. That means looking at how many hours the police spend reviewing VSS evidence, how many times footage is used as evidence in court and how many times that footage results in a prosecution.

For several years Dorset police have been recording the number of times VSS (in this case CCTV) is used to prosecute individuals accused of committing a crime. A yearly average of 47,014 crimes were reported in the years 2015-2018, of which there were 9,556 positive outcomes. Dorset police statistics show there was a CCTV element in over a third of these cases – it is unfortunate that not all forces record their CCTV detection factors in this way and I would urge they do to ensure users of VSS can see the benefits.

It is also worth noting that police and Local Authorities in England and Wales must pay due regard to the Surveillance Camera Code of Practice when operating surveillance camera systems overtly in public places and that Section 33(4) of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 says that failure to comply with the Code may be detrimental to the use of VSS evidence in court as this can be raised within disclosure by the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and may be taken into account.

Complying with the Code, and recording the value of VSS under a standardised formal process, will help police and Local Authorities to demonstrate the value of those systems and ensure there are no missed opportunities to take criminals off our streets and protect the public from harm.

Needless to say, with the growing cyber threat to the physical estate and the ever expanding area of threat convergence having been an area I have enthusiastically espoused a view on over the last few years, I leapt at the chance.

Whilst engagement with the surveillance industry has not always been plain sailing, with the unflinching assistance of the management and technical team at Norbain, the last 9 months has seen real and significant progress. This progress is, I believe, long overdue and much needed, both for the future success of the video surveillance industry and for the ongoing protection of our critical infrastructure.

It is with no small sense of pride therefore that I am able to write about, what I believe, to be one of the biggest successes to date of my cross-cutting cyber work. To get several of the biggest and best-known brands in this industry in a room together to collaborate on a baseline standard for manufacturers. A standard that has been written by manufacturers for manufacturers. A standard that will ensure that video surveillance equipment is Secure by Design and Secure by Default.

Why? Because, like me, they genuinely agree that it is ridiculous that it is possible to buy insecure security systems. That surveillance systems intended to keep our public spaces safe and secure should not be open to tampering, misuse or damage by an attacker in cyber space.

The manufacturer standard is intended to lay out the basic areas where all video surveillance systems (VSS), regardless of their intended use, whether in public space or not, should be secure. This is very much intended to be an entry level standard, and has been written with the intention of providing manufacturers of VSS and the components that go into VSS with a minimum baseline level that all should aspire to.

Rather than opt for the ‘gold standard’ we have instead sought to develop a standard that should provide no barrier to entry for any competent and responsible manufacturer. The standard includes ensuring that passwords have to be changed from the manufacturer default at start-up, and that the chosen passwords should be of sufficient complexity so as to provide a degree of assurance, places controls around how and when remote access should be provisioned. Not only will some of these requirements help to protect the surveillance system itself but they will also reduce the risk of compromise of other systems where onward connections exist.

Working with the Commissioner and his team, we have developed a self-certification scheme that will allow manufacturers to assess their systems for compliance, and to apply for the Commissioner’s Secure by Default certification mark to display. Thereby demonstrating to installers and the people who buy their products that they are a competent manufacturer who takes the security of their product seriously.

I am indebted to Axis, Bosch, Hanhwa, HikVision and Milestone Systems for their time, honesty and contributions to this important standard. I am also grateful to them for understanding that the launch of this standard on 20 June at IFSEC, on Surveillance Camera Day, is not the end of the journey, but rather the beginning of something unique, exciting and vital for the future success of video surveillance.

It is the intention of all who work with the Commissioner on the Surveillance Camera Strategy that all organisations are using surveillance cameras in a manner that is appropriate, proportionate and lawful. Ensuring that data created by these systems and that interconnections are adequately protected remains an integral part of this, and I foresee a time in the future when these organisations will only be prepared to purchase video surveillance systems that are Secure by Design, Secure by Default.