Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit,
is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly
been declared to be that at which all things aim. But a certain difference
is found among ends; some are activities, others are products apart from
the activities that produce them. Where there are ends apart from the actions,
it is the nature of the products to be better than the activities. Now,
as there are many actions, arts, and sciences, their ends also are many;
the end of the medical art is health, that of shipbuilding a vessel, that
of strategy victory, that of economics wealth. But where such arts fall
under a single capacity- as bridle-making and the other arts concerned
with the equipment of horses fall under the art of riding, and this and
every military action under strategy, in the same way other arts fall under
yet others- in all of these the ends of the master arts are to be preferred
to all the subordinate ends; for it is for the sake of the former that
the latter are pursued. It makes no difference whether the activities themselves
are the ends of the actions, or something else apart from the activities,
as in the case of the sciences just mentioned.

2

If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we desire
for its own sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this),
and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for
at that rate the process would go on to infinity, so that our desire would
be empty and vain), clearly this must be the good and the chief good. Will
not the knowledge of it, then, have a great influence on life? Shall we
not, like archers who have a mark to aim at, be more likely to hit upon
what is right? If so, we must try, in outline at least, to determine what
it is, and of which of the sciences or capacities it is the object. It
would seem to belong to the most authoritative art and that which is most
truly the master art. And politics appears to be of this nature; for it
is this that ordains which of the sciences should be studied in a state,
and which each class of citizens should learn and up to what point they
should learn them; and we see even the most highly esteemed of capacities
to fall under this, e.g. strategy, economics, rhetoric; now, since politics
uses the rest of the sciences, and since, again, it legislates as to what
we are to do and what we are to abstain from, the end of this science must
include those of the others, so that this end must be the good for man.
For even if the end is the same for a single man and for a state, that
of the state seems at all events something greater and more complete whether
to attain or to preserve; though it is worth while to attain the end merely
for one man, it is finer and more godlike to attain it for a nation or
for city-states. These, then, are the ends at which our inquiry aims, since
it is political science, in one sense of that term.

3

Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as
the subject-matter admits of, for precision is not to be sought for alike
in all discussions, any more than in all the products of the crafts. Now
fine and just actions, which political science investigates, admit of much
variety and fluctuation of opinion, so that they may be thought to exist
only by convention, and not by nature. And goods also give rise to a similar
fluctuation because they bring harm to many people; for before now men
have been undone by reason of their wealth, and others by reason of their
courage. We must be content, then, in speaking of such subjects and with
such premisses to indicate the truth roughly and in outline, and in speaking
about things which are only for the most part true and with premisses of
the same kind to reach conclusions that are no better. In the same spirit,
therefore, should each type of statement be received; for it is the mark
of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so
far as the nature of the subject admits; it is evidently equally foolish
to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand from a
rhetorician scientific proofs.

Now each man judges well the things he knows, and of these he is
a good judge. And so the man who has been educated in a subject is a good
judge of that subject, and the man who has received an all-round education
is a good judge in general. Hence a young man is not a proper hearer of
lectures on political science; for he is inexperienced in the actions that
occur in life, but its discussions start from these and are about these;
and, further, since he tends to follow his passions, his study will be
vain and unprofitable, because the end aimed at is not knowledge but action.
And it makes no difference whether he is young in years or youthful in
character; the defect does not depend on time, but on his living, and pursuing
each successive object, as passion directs. For to such persons, as to
the incontinent, knowledge brings no profit; but to those who desire and
act in accordance with a rational principle knowledge about such matters
will be of great benefit.

These remarks about the student, the sort of treatment to be expected,
and the purpose of the inquiry, may be taken as our
preface.

4

Let us resume our inquiry and state, in view of the fact that all
knowledge and every pursuit aims at some good, what it is that we say political
science aims at and what is the highest of all goods achievable by action.
Verbally there is very general agreement; for both the general run of men
and people of superior refinement say that it is happiness, and identify
living well and doing well with being happy; but with regard to what happiness
is they differ, and the many do not give the same account as the wise.
For the former think it is some plain and obvious thing, like pleasure,
wealth, or honour; they differ, however, from one another- and often even
the same man identifies it with different things, with health when he is
ill, with wealth when he is poor; but, conscious of their ignorance, they
admire those who proclaim some great ideal that is above their comprehension.
Now some thought that apart from these many goods there is another which
is self-subsistent and causes the goodness of all these as well. To examine
all the opinions that have been held were perhaps somewhat fruitless; enough
to examine those that are most prevalent or that seem to be
arguable.

Let us not fail to notice, however, that there is a difference
between arguments from and those to the first principles. For Plato, too,
was right in raising this question and asking, as he used to do, 'are we
on the way from or to the first principles?' There is a difference, as
there is in a race-course between the course from the judges to the turning-point
and the way back. For, while we must begin with what is known, things are
objects of knowledge in two senses- some to us, some without qualification.
Presumably, then, we must begin with things known to us. Hence any one
who is to listen intelligently to lectures about what is noble and just,
and generally, about the subjects of political science must have been brought
up in good habits. For the fact is the starting-point, and if this is sufficiently
plain to him, he will not at the start need the reason as well; and the
man who has been well brought up has or can easily get startingpoints.
And as for him who neither has nor can get them, let him hear the words
of Hesiod:

Far best is he who knows all things himself;
Good, he that hearkens when men counsel right;
But he who neither knows, nor lays to heart
Another's wisdom, is a useless wight.
5

Let us, however, resume our discussion from the point at which
we digressed. To judge from the lives that men lead, most men, and men
of the most vulgar type, seem (not without some ground) to identify the
good, or happiness, with pleasure; which is the reason why they love the
life of enjoyment. For there are, we may say, three prominent types of
life- that just mentioned, the political, and thirdly the contemplative
life. Now the mass of mankind are evidently quite slavish in their tastes,
preferring a life suitable to beasts, but they get some ground for their
view from the fact that many of those in high places share the tastes of
Sardanapallus. A consideration of the prominent types of life shows that
people of superior refinement and of active disposition identify happiness
with honour; for this is, roughly speaking, the end of the political life.
But it seems too superficial to be what we are looking for, since it is
thought to depend on those who bestow honour rather than on him who receives
it, but the good we divine to be something proper to a man and not easily
taken from him. Further, men seem to pursue honour in order that they may
be assured of their goodness; at least it is by men of practical wisdom
that they seek to be honoured, and among those who know them, and on the
ground of their virtue; clearly, then, according to them, at any rate,
virtue is better. And perhaps one might even suppose this to be, rather
than honour, the end of the political life. But even this appears somewhat
incomplete; for possession of virtue seems actually compatible with being
asleep, or with lifelong inactivity, and, further, with the greatest sufferings
and misfortunes; but a man who was living so no one would call happy, unless
he were maintaining a thesis at all costs. But enough of this; for the
subject has been sufficiently treated even in the current discussions.
Third comes the contemplative life, which we shall consider
later.

The life of money-making is one undertaken under compulsion, and
wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is merely useful
and for the sake of something else. And so one might rather take the aforenamed
objects to be ends; for they are loved for themselves. But it is evident
that not even these are ends; yet many arguments have been thrown away
in support of them. Let us leave this subject, then.

6

We had perhaps better consider the universal good and discuss thoroughly
what is meant by it, although such an inquiry is made an uphill one by
the fact that the Forms have been introduced by friends of our own. Yet
it would perhaps be thought to be better, indeed to be our duty, for the
sake of maintaining the truth even to destroy what touches us closely,
especially as we are philosophers or lovers of wisdom; for, while both
are dear, piety requires us to honour truth above our
friends.

The men who introduced this doctrine did not posit Ideas of classes
within which they recognized priority and posteriority (which is the reason
why they did not maintain the existence of an Idea embracing all numbers);
but the term 'good' is used both in the category of substance and in that
of quality and in that of relation, and that which is per se, i.e. substance,
is prior in nature to the relative (for the latter is like an off shoot
and accident of being); so that there could not be a common Idea set over
all these goods. Further, since 'good' has as many senses as 'being' (for
it is predicated both in the category of substance, as of God and of reason,
and in quality, i.e. of the virtues, and in quantity, i.e. of that which
is moderate, and in relation, i.e. of the useful, and in time, i.e. of
the right opportunity, and in place, i.e. of the right locality and the
like), clearly it cannot be something universally present in all cases
and single; for then it could not have been predicated in all the categories
but in one only. Further, since of the things answering to one Idea there
is one science, there would have been one science of all the goods; but
as it is there are many sciences even of the things that fall under one
category, e.g. of opportunity, for opportunity in war is studied by strategics
and in disease by medicine, and the moderate in food is studied by medicine
and in exercise by the science of gymnastics. And one might ask the question,
what in the world they mean by 'a thing itself', is (as is the case) in
'man himself' and in a particular man the account of man is one and the
same. For in so far as they are man, they will in no respect differ; and
if this is so, neither will 'good itself' and particular goods, in so far
as they are good. But again it will not be good any the more for being
eternal, since that which lasts long is no whiter than that which perishes
in a day. The Pythagoreans seem to give a more plausible account of the
good, when they place the one in the column of goods; and it is they that
Speusippus seems to have followed.

But let us discuss these matters elsewhere; an objection to what
we have said, however, may be discerned in the fact that the Platonists
have not been speaking about all goods, and that the goods that are pursued
and loved for themselves are called good by reference to a single Form,
while those which tend to produce or to preserve these somehow or to prevent
their contraries are called so by reference to these, and in a secondary
sense. Clearly, then, goods must be spoken of in two ways, and some must
be good in themselves, the others by reason of these. Let us separate,
then, things good in themselves from things useful, and consider whether
the former are called good by reference to a single Idea. What sort of
goods would one call good in themselves? Is it those that are pursued even
when isolated from others, such as intelligence, sight, and certain pleasures
and honours? Certainly, if we pursue these also for the sake of something
else, yet one would place them among things good in themselves. Or is nothing
other than the Idea of good good in itself? In that case the Form will
be empty. But if the things we have named are also things good in themselves,
the account of the good will have to appear as something identical in them
all, as that of whiteness is identical in snow and in white lead. But of
honour, wisdom, and pleasure, just in respect of their goodness, the accounts
are distinct and diverse. The good, therefore, is not some common element
answering to one Idea.

But what then do we mean by the good? It is surely not like the
things that only chance to have the same name. Are goods one, then, by
being derived from one good or by all contributing to one good, or are
they rather one by analogy? Certainly as sight is in the body, so is reason
in the soul, and so on in other cases. But perhaps these subjects had better
be dismissed for the present; for perfect precision about them would be
more appropriate to another branch of philosophy. And similarly with regard
to the Idea; even if there is some one good which is universally predicable
of goods or is capable of separate and independent existence, clearly it
could not be achieved or attained by man; but we are now seeking something
attainable. Perhaps, however, some one might think it worth while to recognize
this with a view to the goods that are attainable and achievable; for having
this as a sort of pattern we shall know better the goods that are good
for us, and if we know them shall attain them. This argument has some plausibility,
but seems to clash with the procedure of the sciences; for all of these,
though they aim at some good and seek to supply the deficiency of it, leave
on one side the knowledge of the good. Yet that all the exponents of the
arts should be ignorant of, and should not even seek, so great an aid is
not probable. It is hard, too, to see how a weaver or a carpenter will
be benefited in regard to his own craft by knowing this 'good itself',
or how the man who has viewed the Idea itself will be a better doctor or
general thereby. For a doctor seems not even to study health in this way,
but the health of man, or perhaps rather the health of a particular man;
it is individuals that he is healing. But enough of these
topics.

7

Let us again return to the good we are seeking, and ask what it
can be. It seems different in different actions and arts; it is different
in medicine, in strategy, and in the other arts likewise. What then is
the good of each? Surely that for whose sake everything else is done. In
medicine this is health, in strategy victory, in architecture a house,
in any other sphere something else, and in every action and pursuit the
end; for it is for the sake of this that all men do whatever else they
do. Therefore, if there is an end for all that we do, this will be the
good achievable by action, and if there are more than one, these will be
the goods achievable by action.

So the argument has by a different course reached the same point;
but we must try to state this even more clearly. Since there are evidently
more than one end, and we choose some of these (e.g. wealth, flutes, and
in general instruments) for the sake of something else, clearly not all
ends are final ends; but the chief good is evidently something final. Therefore,
if there is only one final end, this will be what we are seeking, and if
there are more than one, the most final of these will be what we are seeking.
Now we call that which is in itself worthy of pursuit more final than that
which is worthy of pursuit for the sake of something else, and that which
is never desirable for the sake of something else more final than the things
that are desirable both in themselves and for the sake of that other thing,
and therefore we call final without qualification that which is always
desirable in itself and never for the sake of something
else.

Now such a thing happiness, above all else, is held to be; for
this we choose always for self and never for the sake of something else,
but honour, pleasure, reason, and every virtue we choose indeed for themselves
(for if nothing resulted from them we should still choose each of them),
but we choose them also for the sake of happiness, judging that by means
of them we shall be happy. Happiness, on the other hand, no one chooses
for the sake of these, nor, in general, for anything other than
itself.

From the point of view of self-sufficiency the same result seems
to follow; for the final good is thought to be self-sufficient. Now by
self-sufficient we do not mean that which is sufficient for a man by himself,
for one who lives a solitary life, but also for parents, children, wife,
and in general for his friends and fellow citizens, since man is born for
citizenship. But some limit must be set to this; for if we extend our requirement
to ancestors and descendants and friends' friends we are in for an infinite
series. Let us examine this question, however, on another occasion; the
self-sufficient we now define as that which when isolated makes life desirable
and lacking in nothing; and such we think happiness to be; and further
we think it most desirable of all things, without being counted as one
good thing among others- if it were so counted it would clearly be made
more desirable by the addition of even the least of goods; for that which
is added becomes an excess of goods, and of goods the greater is always
more desirable. Happiness, then, is something final and self-sufficient,
and is the end of action.

Presumably, however, to say that happiness is the chief good seems
a platitude, and a clearer account of what it is still desired. This might
perhaps be given, if we could first ascertain the function of man. For
just as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or an artist, and, in general,
for all things that have a function or activity, the good and the 'well'
is thought to reside in the function, so would it seem to be for man, if
he has a function. Have the carpenter, then, and the tanner certain functions
or activities, and has man none? Is he born without a function? Or as eye,
hand, foot, and in general each of the parts evidently has a function,
may one lay it down that man similarly has a function apart from all these?
What then can this be? Life seems to be common even to plants, but we are
seeking what is peculiar to man. Let us exclude, therefore, the life of
nutrition and growth. Next there would be a life of perception, but it
also seems to be common even to the horse, the ox, and every animal. There
remains, then, an active life of the element that has a rational principle;
of this, one part has such a principle in the sense of being obedient to
one, the other in the sense of possessing one and exercising thought. And,
as 'life of the rational element' also has two meanings, we must state
that life in the sense of activity is what we mean; for this seems to be
the more proper sense of the term. Now if the function of man is an activity
of soul which follows or implies a rational principle, and if we say 'so-and-so-and
'a good so-and-so' have a function which is the same in kind, e.g. a lyre,
and a good lyre-player, and so without qualification in all cases, eminence
in respect of goodness being idded to the name of the function (for the
function of a lyre-player is to play the lyre, and that of a good lyre-player
is to do so well): if this is the case, and we state the function of man
to be a certain kind of life, and this to be an activity or actions of
the soul implying a rational principle, and the function of a good man
to be the good and noble performance of these, and if any action is well
performed when it is performed in accordance with the appropriate excellence:
if this is the case, human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance
with virtue, and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance with
the best and most complete.

But we must add 'in a complete life.' For one swallow does not
make a summer, nor does one day; and so too one day, or a short time, does
not make a man blessed and happy.

Let this serve as an outline of the good; for we must presumably
first sketch it roughly, and then later fill in the details. But it would
seem that any one is capable of carrying on and articulating what has once
been well outlined, and that time is a good discoverer or partner in such
a work; to which facts the advances of the arts are due; for any one can
add what is lacking. And we must also remember what has been said before,
and not look for precision in all things alike, but in each class of things
such precision as accords with the subject-matter, and so much as is appropriate
to the inquiry. For a carpenter and a geometer investigate the right angle
in different ways; the former does so in so far as the right angle is useful
for his work, while the latter inquires what it is or what sort of thing
it is; for he is a spectator of the truth. We must act in the same way,
then, in all other matters as well, that our main task may not be subordinated
to minor questions. Nor must we demand the cause in all matters alike;
it is enough in some cases that the fact be well established, as in the
case of the first principles; the fact is the primary thing or first principle.
Now of first principles we see some by induction, some by perception, some
by a certain habituation, and others too in other ways. But each set of
principles we must try to investigate in the natural way, and we must take
pains to state them definitely, since they have a great influence on what
follows. For the beginning is thought to be more than half of the whole,
and many of the questions we ask are cleared up by it.

8

We must consider it, however, in the light not only of our conclusion
and our premisses, but also of what is commonly said about it; for with
a true view all the data harmonize, but with a false one the facts soon
clash. Now goods have been divided into three classes, and some are described
as external, others as relating to soul or to body; we call those that
relate to soul most properly and truly goods, and psychical actions and
activities we class as relating to soul. Therefore our account must be
sound, at least according to this view, which is an old one and agreed
on by philosophers. It is correct also in that we identify the end with
certain actions and activities; for thus it falls among goods of the soul
and not among external goods. Another belief which harmonizes with our
account is that the happy man lives well and does well; for we have practically
defined happiness as a sort of good life and good action. The characteristics
that are looked for in happiness seem also, all of them, to belong to what
we have defined happiness as being. For some identify happiness with virtue,
some with practical wisdom, others with a kind of philosophic wisdom, others
with these, or one of these, accompanied by pleasure or not without pleasure;
while others include also external prosperity. Now some of these views
have been held by many men and men of old, others by a few eminent persons;
and it is not probable that either of these should be entirely mistaken,
but rather that they should be right in at least some one respect or even
in most respects.

With those who identify happiness with virtue or some one virtue
our account is in harmony; for to virtue belongs virtuous activity. But
it makes, perhaps, no small difference whether we place the chief good
in possession or in use, in state of mind or in activity. For the state
of mind may exist without producing any good result, as in a man who is
asleep or in some other way quite inactive, but the activity cannot; for
one who has the activity will of necessity be acting, and acting well.
And as in the Olympic Games it is not the most beautiful and the strongest
that are crowned but those who compete (for it is some of these that are
victorious), so those who act win, and rightly win, the noble and good
things in life.

Their life is also in itself pleasant. For pleasure is a state
of soul, and to each man that which he is said to be a lover of is pleasant;
e.g. not only is a horse pleasant to the lover of horses, and a spectacle
to the lover of sights, but also in the same way just acts are pleasant
to the lover of justice and in general virtuous acts to the lover of virtue.
Now for most men their pleasures are in conflict with one another because
these are not by nature pleasant, but the lovers of what is noble find
pleasant the things that are by nature pleasant; and virtuous actions are
such, so that these are pleasant for such men as well as in their own nature.
Their life, therefore, has no further need of pleasure as a sort of adventitious
charm, but has its pleasure in itself. For, besides what we have said,
the man who does not rejoice in noble actions is not even good; since no
one would call a man just who did not enjoy acting justly, nor any man
liberal who did not enjoy liberal actions; and similarly in all other cases.
If this is so, virtuous actions must be in themselves pleasant. But they
are also good and noble, and have each of these attributes in the highest
degree, since the good man judges well about these attributes; his judgement
is such as we have described. Happiness then is the best, noblest, and
most pleasant thing in the world, and these attributes are not severed
as in the inscription at Delos-

Most noble is that which is justest, and best is
health;
But pleasantest is it to win what we love.

For all these properties belong to the best activities; and these,
or one- the best- of these, we identify with happiness.

Yet evidently, as we said, it needs the external goods as well;
for it is impossible, or not easy, to do noble acts without the proper
equipment. In many actions we use friends and riches and political power
as instruments; and there are some things the lack of which takes the lustre
from happiness, as good birth, goodly children, beauty; for the man who
is very ugly in appearance or ill-born or solitary and childless is not
very likely to be happy, and perhaps a man would be still less likely if
he had thoroughly bad children or friends or had lost good children or
friends by death. As we said, then, happiness seems to need this sort of
prosperity in addition; for which reason some identify happiness with good
fortune, though others identify it with virtue.

9

For this reason also the question is asked, whether happiness is
to be acquired by learning or by habituation or some other sort of training,
or comes in virtue of some divine providence or again by chance. Now if
there is any gift of the gods to men, it is reasonable that happiness should
be god-given, and most surely god-given of all human things inasmuch as
it is the best. But this question would perhaps be more appropriate to
another inquiry; happiness seems, however, even if it is not god-sent but
comes as a result of virtue and some process of learning or training, to
be among the most godlike things; for that which is the prize and end of
virtue seems to be the best thing in the world, and something godlike and
blessed.

It will also on this view be very generally shared; for all who
are not maimed as regards their potentiality for virtue may win it by a
certain kind of study and care. But if it is better to be happy thus than
by chance, it is reasonable that the facts should be so, since everything
that depends on the action of nature is by nature as good as it can be,
and similarly everything that depends on art or any rational cause, and
especially if it depends on the best of all causes. To entrust to chance
what is greatest and most noble would be a very defective
arrangement.

The answer to the question we are asking is plain also from the
definition of happiness; for it has been said to be a virtuous activity
of soul, of a certain kind. Of the remaining goods, some must necessarily
pre-exist as conditions of happiness, and others are naturally co-operative
and useful as instruments. And this will be found to agree with what we
said at the outset; for we stated the end of political science to be the
best end, and political science spends most of its pains on making the
citizens to be of a certain character, viz. good and capable of noble
acts.

It is natural, then, that we call neither ox nor horse nor any
other of the animals happy; for none of them is capable of sharing in such
activity. For this reason also a boy is not happy; for he is not yet capable
of such acts, owing to his age; and boys who are called happy are being
congratulated by reason of the hopes we have for them. For there is required,
as we said, not only complete virtue but also a complete life, since many
changes occur in life, and all manner of chances, and the most prosperous
may fall into great misfortunes in old age, as is told of Priam in the
Trojan Cycle; and one who has experienced such chances and has ended wretchedly
no one calls happy.

10

Must no one at all, then, be called happy while he lives; must
we, as Solon says, see the end? Even if we are to lay down this doctrine,
is it also the case that a man is happy when he is dead? Or is not this
quite absurd, especially for us who say that happiness is an activity?
But if we do not call the dead man happy, and if Solon does not mean this,
but that one can then safely call a man blessed as being at last beyond
evils and misfortunes, this also affords matter for discussion; for both
evil and good are thought to exist for a dead man, as much as for one who
is alive but not aware of them; e.g. honours and dishonours and the good
or bad fortunes of children and in general of descendants. And this also
presents a problem; for though a man has lived happily up to old age and
has had a death worthy of his life, many reverses may befall his descendants-
some of them may be good and attain the life they deserve, while with others
the opposite may be the case; and clearly too the degrees of relationship
between them and their ancestors may vary indefinitely. It would be odd,
then, if the dead man were to share in these changes and become at one
time happy, at another wretched; while it would also be odd if the fortunes
of the descendants did not for some time have some effect on the happiness
of their ancestors.

But we must return to our first difficulty; for perhaps by a consideration
of it our present problem might be solved. Now if we must see the end and
only then call a man happy, not as being happy but as having been so before,
surely this is a paradox, that when he is happy the attribute that belongs
to him is not to be truly predicated of him because we do not wish to call
living men happy, on account of the changes that may befall them, and because
we have assumed happiness to be something permanent and by no means easily
changed, while a single man may suffer many turns of fortune's wheel. For
clearly if we were to keep pace with his fortunes, we should often call
the same man happy and again wretched, making the happy man out to be chameleon
and insecurely based. Or is this keeping pace with his fortunes quite wrong?
Success or failure in life does not depend on these, but human life, as
we said, needs these as mere additions, while virtuous activities or their
opposites are what constitute happiness or the reverse.

The question we have now discussed confirms our definition. For
no function of man has so much permanence as virtuous activities (these
are thought to be more durable even than knowledge of the sciences), and
of these themselves the most valuable are more durable because those who
are happy spend their life most readily and most continuously in these;
for this seems to be the reason why we do not forget them. The attribute
in question, then, will belong to the happy man, and he will be happy throughout
his life; for always, or by preference to everything else, he will be engaged
in virtuous action and contemplation, and he will bear the chances of life
most nobly and altogether decorously, if he is 'truly good' and 'foursquare
beyond reproach'.

Now many events happen by chance, and events differing in importance;
small pieces of good fortune or of its opposite clearly do not weigh down
the scales of life one way or the other, but a multitude of great events
if they turn out well will make life happier (for not only are they themselves
such as to add beauty to life, but the way a man deals with them may be
noble and good), while if they turn out ill they crush and maim happiness;
for they both bring pain with them and hinder many activities. Yet even
in these nobility shines through, when a man bears with resignation many
great misfortunes, not through insensibility to pain but through nobility
and greatness of soul.

If activities are, as we said, what gives life its character, no
happy man can become miserable; for he will never do the acts that are
hateful and mean. For the man who is truly good and wise, we think, bears
all the chances life becomingly and always makes the best of circumstances,
as a good general makes the best military use of the army at his command
and a good shoemaker makes the best shoes out of the hides that are given
him; and so with all other craftsmen. And if this is the case, the happy
man can never become miserable; though he will not reach blessedness, if
he meet with fortunes like those of Priam.

Nor, again, is he many-coloured and changeable; for neither will
he be moved from his happy state easily or by any ordinary misadventures,
but only by many great ones, nor, if he has had many great misadventures,
will he recover his happiness in a short time, but if at all, only in a
long and complete one in which he has attained many splendid
successes.

When then should we not say that he is happy who is active in accordance
with complete virtue and is sufficiently equipped with external goods,
not for some chance period but throughout a complete life? Or must we add
'and who is destined to live thus and die as befits his life'? Certainly
the future is obscure to us, while happiness, we claim, is an end and something
in every way final. If so, we shall call happy those among living men in
whom these conditions are, and are to be, fulfilled- but happy men. So
much for these questions.

11

That the fortunes of descendants and of all a man's friends should
not affect his happiness at all seems a very unfriendly doctrine, and one
opposed to the opinions men hold; but since the events that happen are
numerous and admit of all sorts of difference, and some come more near
to us and others less so, it seems a long- nay, an infinite- task to discuss
each in detail; a general outline will perhaps suffice. If, then, as some
of a man's own misadventures have a certain weight and influence on life
while others are, as it were, lighter, so too there are differences among
the misadventures of our friends taken as a whole, and it makes a difference
whether the various suffering befall the living or the dead (much more
even than whether lawless and terrible deeds are presupposed in a tragedy
or done on the stage), this difference also must be taken into account;
or rather, perhaps, the fact that doubt is felt whether the dead share
in any good or evil. For it seems, from these considerations, that even
if anything whether good or evil penetrates to them, it must be something
weak and negligible, either in itself or for them, or if not, at least
it must be such in degree and kind as not to make happy those who are not
happy nor to take away their blessedness from those who are. The good or
bad fortunes of friends, then, seem to have some effects on the dead, but
effects of such a kind and degree as neither to make the happy unhappy
nor to produce any other change of the kind.

12

These questions having been definitely answered, let us consider
whether happiness is among the things that are praised or rather among
the things that are prized; for clearly it is not to be placed among potentialities.
Everything that is praised seems to be praised because it is of a certain
kind and is related somehow to something else; for we praise the just or
brave man and in general both the good man and virtue itself because of
the actions and functions involved, and we praise the strong man, the good
runner, and so on, because he is of a certain kind and is related in a
certain way to something good and important. This is clear also from the
praises of the gods; for it seems absurd that the gods should be referred
to our standard, but this is done because praise involves a reference,
to something else. But if if praise is for things such as we have described,
clearly what applies to the best things is not praise, but something greater
and better, as is indeed obvious; for what we do to the gods and the most
godlike of men is to call them blessed and happy. And so too with good
things; no one praises happiness as he does justice, but rather calls it
blessed, as being something more divine and better.

Eudoxus also seems to have been right in his method of advocating
the supremacy of pleasure; he thought that the fact that, though a good,
it is not praised indicated it to be better than the things that are praised,
and that this is what God and the good are; for by reference to these all
other things are judged. Praise is appropriate to virtue, for as a result
of virtue men tend to do noble deeds, but encomia are bestowed on acts,
whether of the body or of the soul. But perhaps nicety in these matters
is more proper to those who have made a study of encomia; to us it is clear
from what has been said that happiness is among the things that are prized
and perfect. It seems to be so also from the fact that it is a first principle;
for it is for the sake of this that we all do all that we do, and the first
principle and cause of goods is, we claim, something prized and
divine.

13

Since happiness is an activity of soul in accordance with perfect
virtue, we must consider the nature of virtue; for perhaps we shall thus
see better the nature of happiness. The true student of politics, too,
is thought to have studied virtue above all things; for he wishes to make
his fellow citizens good and obedient to the laws. As an example of this
we have the lawgivers of the Cretans and the Spartans, and any others of
the kind that there may have been. And if this inquiry belongs to political
science, clearly the pursuit of it will be in accordance with our original
plan. But clearly the virtue we must study is human virtue; for the good
we were seeking was human good and the happiness human happiness. By human
virtue we mean not that of the body but that of the soul; and happiness
also we call an activity of soul. But if this is so, clearly the student
of politics must know somehow the facts about soul, as the man who is to
heal the eyes or the body as a whole must know about the eyes or the body;
and all the more since politics is more prized and better than medicine;
but even among doctors the best educated spend much labour on acquiring
knowledge of the body. The student of politics, then, must study the soul,
and must study it with these objects in view, and do so just to the extent
which is sufficient for the questions we are discussing; for further precision
is perhaps something more laborious than our purposes
require.

Some things are said about it, adequately enough, even in the discussions
outside our school, and we must use these; e.g. that one element in the
soul is irrational and one has a rational principle. Whether these are
separated as the parts of the body or of anything divisible are, or are
distinct by definition but by nature inseparable, like convex and concave
in the circumference of a circle, does not affect the present
question.

Of the irrational element one division seems to be widely distributed,
and vegetative in its nature, I mean that which causes nutrition and growth;
for it is this kind of power of the soul that one must assign to all nurslings
and to embryos, and this same power to fullgrown creatures; this is more
reasonable than to assign some different power to them. Now the excellence
of this seems to be common to all species and not specifically human; for
this part or faculty seems to function most in sleep, while goodness and
badness are least manifest in sleep (whence comes the saying that the happy
are not better off than the wretched for half their lives; and this happens
naturally enough, since sleep is an inactivity of the soul in that respect
in which it is called good or bad), unless perhaps to a small extent some
of the movements actually penetrate to the soul, and in this respect the
dreams of good men are better than those of ordinary people. Enough of
this subject, however; let us leave the nutritive faculty alone, since
it has by its nature no share in human excellence.

There seems to be also another irrational element in the soul-one
which in a sense, however, shares in a rational principle. For we praise
the rational principle of the continent man and of the incontinent, and
the part of their soul that has such a principle, since it urges them aright
and towards the best objects; but there is found in them also another element
naturally opposed to the rational principle, which fights against and resists
that principle. For exactly as paralysed limbs when we intend to move them
to the right turn on the contrary to the left, so is it with the soul;
the impulses of incontinent people move in contrary directions. But while
in the body we see that which moves astray, in the soul we do not. No doubt,
however, we must none the less suppose that in the soul too there is something
contrary to the rational principle, resisting and opposing it. In what
sense it is distinct from the other elements does not concern us. Now even
this seems to have a share in a rational principle, as we said; at any
rate in the continent man it obeys the rational principle and presumably
in the temperate and brave man it is still more obedient; for in him it
speaks, on all matters, with the same voice as the rational
principle.

Therefore the irrational element also appears to be two-fold. For
the vegetative element in no way shares in a rational principle, but the
appetitive and in general the desiring element in a sense shares in it,
in so far as it listens to and obeys it; this is the sense in which we
speak of 'taking account' of one's father or one's friends, not that in
which we speak of 'accounting for a mathematical property. That the irrational
element is in some sense persuaded by a rational principle is indicated
also by the giving of advice and by all reproof and exhortation. And if
this element also must be said to have a rational principle, that which
has a rational principle (as well as that which has not) will be twofold,
one subdivision having it in the strict sense and in itself, and the other
having a tendency to obey as one does one's father.

Virtue too is distinguished into kinds in accordance with this
difference; for we say that some of the virtues are intellectual and others
moral, philosophic wisdom and understanding and practical wisdom being
intellectual, liberality and temperance moral. For in speaking about a
man's character we do not say that he is wise or has understanding but
that he is good-tempered or temperate; yet we praise the wise man also
with respect to his state of mind; and of states of mind we call those
which merit praise virtues.