Considered and decided by Toussaint, Chief Judge, Forsberg, Judge,* and Mulally, Judge.**

U N P U B L I
S H E D O P I N I O N

TOUSSAINT, Chief Judge

After a Lothenbach plea
the district court found appellant Rose Marie Rosario guilty of fifth-degree
violation of controlled substance law (possession of cocaine). Rosario appeals alleging the district court
erred in concluding that the affidavit supporting the search warrant was
supported by sufficient facts. Because
the district court did not err in: (1) concluding there were sufficient facts
supporting the search warrant’s affidavit; and (2) denying Rosario’s motion to
suppress the cocaine, we affirm.

D E C I S I O N

Rose Marie Rosario argues that
the search of her apartment was unlawful because information supplied by a
confidential reliable informant (CRI) failed to provide sufficient probable
cause. The existence of probable cause
based on an informant’s tip is determined by a “totality of the circumstances”
test:

The task of the
issuing judge is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether,
given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including
the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of persons supplying hearsay
information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime
will be found in a particular place.

State v. Wiley, 366 N.W.2d 265, 268
(Minn. 1985) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103
S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983). Great
deference is given to the issuing judge’s determination of probable cause, and
we will not subject that determination to a rigorous de novo review. Wiley, 366 N.W.2d at 268. This court’s task is to determine “whether
the evidence viewed as a whole provided a ‘substantial basis’ for the judge’s
finding of probable cause * * *.” Massachusetts
v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 732-33, 104 S. Ct. 2085, 2088 (1984)
(rejecting after-the-fact de novo review); see Wiley, 366 N.W.2d at 268 (cautioning
courts “not to review each component of the affidavit in isolation from the
whole”). “[T]he resolution of doubtful
or marginal cases should be ‘largely determined by the preference to be
accorded warrants.’” Wiley,
366 N.W.2d at 268 (quoting Upton, 466 U.S. at 734, 104 S. Ct. at
2089).

In determining whether a
CRI’s information provides sufficient probable cause, the issuing judge must
consider the CRI’s veracity and basis of knowledge. State v. Souto, 578 N.W.2d 744, 750 (Minn. 1998); State v.
Ward, 580 N.W.2d 67, 71 (Minn. App. 1998) (noting “informant’s
veracity and basis of knowledge are considerations under
totality-of-the-circumstances test”).
When making this determination, “[a]ll of the facts relating to the
informant should be considered in weighing reliability.” Souto, 578 N.W.2d at 750.

Rosario does not dispute the CRI’s
veracity. Instead, Rosario argues that
the CRI did not have a sufficient basis of knowledge that she concealed cocaine
in her apartment. In assessing a CRI’s
basis of knowledge, the issuing judge should consider (1) the “quantity and
quality of detail in the CRI’s report,” and (2) “whether police independently
verified the important details of the informant’s report.” State v. Cook, 610 N.W.2d 664, 668 (Minn.
App. 2000) (citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 331-32,
110 S. Ct. 2412, 2417 (1990)). Under
the totality-of-the-circumstances test, we will not view the CRI’s basis of
knowledge in a hypertechnical fashion. See, e.g., Wiley,
366 N.W.2d at 269; State v. Quinn, 436 N.W.2d 758, 763 (Minn. 1989) (reviewing
search warrants in a practical, commonsense manner).

Here, the deputy stated in his affidavit
that:

during the past
year the CRI has been present at 125 Colorado, 2nd floor apartment on numerous
occasions and on these occasions the CRI has observed Rose trafficking in
cocaine with various customers. The CRI
states the last time the CRI has observed Rose making cocaine sales from her
residence was during the past 72 hours.

A CRI may establish his/her basis of
knowledge through “first-hand information, such as when the CRI states that he
* * * saw a suspect selling drugs to another.”
Cook,
610 N.W.2d at 668; Wiley, 366 N.W.2d at 269 (articulating
preference for “[r]ecent personal observation of incriminating conduct” as
basis of informant’s knowledge); State v. McCloskey, 453 N.W.2d 700, 703
(Minn. 1990) (reasoning basis of knowledge requirement satisfied because
informant saw cocaine when present in defendant’s house); see 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and
Seizure § 3.3(d) at 140-43 (3ded. 1996) (recognizing
basis of knowledge established where informant directly observes evidence of
crime at a certain place). By giving
the deputy a first-hand account of cocaine trafficking in Rosario’s apartment,
the CRI provided a textbook example of a basis of knowledge sufficient for
probable cause.

The CRI also provided the deputy with
Rosario’s address, a description of her vehicle and physical appearance, which
the deputy independently verified. Rosario
argues that these details failed to establish the CRI’s basis of knowledge of
drug trafficking. Rosario relies
heavily on this court’s recent decision in State v. Cook, 610 N.W.2d 664 (Minn. App.
2000),
review denied (Minn. July 25, 2000). In Cook, a “CRI’s tip included a description of Cook’s
clothing, physical appearance, vehicle, and present location.” 610 N.W.2d at 668. Police independently corroborated that the vehicle described by
the CRI was parked at the location indicated, and that a man matching the CRI’s
description of Cook entered the passenger side of the vehicle. Id.
Because this information was available to anyone and carried no indicia
of inside information on Cook, we held the CRI’s basis of knowledge was
insufficient to support probable cause.
Id.
at 669.

Cook differs from this case in
one important respect. In Cook,
the CRI never claimed that he had seen Cook selling drugs. 610 N.W.2d at 668. Here, the CRI indicated that over the previous year and during
the past 72 hours, he/she had witnessed Rosario selling cocaine from her
apartment. As discussed above, a CRI’s
first-hand observation of a suspect selling drugs provides a sufficient basis
of knowledge for probable cause. Wiley,
366 N.W.2d at 269. Cook is distinguishable from
the case at bar.

Rosario claims the deputy did not verify
important details of the CRI’s report.
While verification of Rosario’s address or physical appearance may not
constitute “corroboration of a key detail, the corroboration d[oes] lend credence
to the informant’s tip.” Wiley,
366 N.W.2d at 269; accord State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128,
136 (Minn. 1999) (“The independent corroboration of even innocent details of an
informant’s tip may support a finding of probable cause.”); McCloskey,
453 N.W.2d at 704 (“[M]inimal corroboration is at least another relevant factor
on which the judge [i]s entitled to rely in making the
totality-of-circumstances assessment”); State v. Siegfried, 274 N.W.2d 113, 115
(Minn. 1978) (“[T]he fact that police can corroborate part of the informer’s
tip as truthful may suggest that the entire tip is reliable.”) The deputy’s independent verification
enhances the CRI’s basis of knowledge.

Moreover, while a CRI’s veracity and basis of
knowledge are relevant to a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, a
deficiency in one may be compensated for by a strong showing as to the other,
or by some other indicia of reliability.
Gates,
462 U.S. at 233, 103 S. Ct. at 2329.
Here, the deputy stated in his affidavit that “[t]he CRI has also given
information to police which has resulted in the arrest and convictions of
numerous felony narcotic traffickers and the recovery of control
substances.” See Munson, 594 N.W.2d at
136 (“Having a proven track record is one of the primary indicia of an
informant’s veracity.”). The CRI’s
veracity compensates for any deficient basis of knowledge.

Under the totality of the
circumstances, the issuing judge had a substantial basis for concluding that
probable cause existed to search Rosario’s apartment. The district court did not err in refusing to suppress the
cocaine.