Status
of the Agency's Verification Activities in Iraq As of 8 January 2003

The following
information is provided to update the Council on the activities of
the IAEA pursuant to Security Council resolution 1441 (2002) and other
relevant resolutions. It describes the verification activities performed
thus far, next steps, and where we are at this stage.

VERIFICATION
ACTIVITIES

Inspections,
interviews and analysis

The initial
priority of the IAEA, upon resumption of its verification activities
in Iraq, was "reconnaissance": the re-establishment of its knowledge
of Iraq's nuclear capabilities, including confirmation of the locations
of major equipment, of nuclear material and significant non-nuclear
materials, and of key technical personnel.

We have already
achieved good progress in re-establishing our knowledge of Iraq's
nuclear capabilities. While we are still continuing with our reconnaissance,
we have now initiated the investigative phase, with particular emphasis
on Iraq's activities over the last four years, focussing on those
areas of concern identified by States, as well as those identified
by the IAEA on the basis of its own analysis.

Since 27 November
2002, when the Security Council-mandated inspections in Iraq were
resumed, the IAEA has conducted 109 inspections at some 88 locations.
A majority of these inspections have taken place at industrial facilities
(State-run as well as private), research centres and universities
where most of Iraq's significant technical capabilities were known
to have existed in the past. The inspections have included facilities
identified through commercial satellite imagery as having been modified
or constructed since 1998, in addition to some new locations. All
of the inspections have been carried out without prior notification
to Iraq, except where notification was necessary to ensure that specific
support would be available.

The Iraqi authorities
have consistently provided access without conditions and without delay.
They have also made available additional original documentation in
response to requests by IAEA inspectors. These documents, however,
do not include any which are relevant to the questions and concerns
outstanding since 1998, in particular as regards weapons design and
centrifuges. As previously noted, these questions and concerns, though
not unresolved disarmament issues, are nevertheless in need of further
clarification.

The IAEA has
also started the process of interviewing key Iraqi personnel. While
the determination of the modalities for interviews, including location,
is vested by resolution 1441 in the IAEA, the willingness of the interviewees
to accept the IAEA preferred modalities remains a limiting factor.
For example, in the case of the two interviews which the IAEA requested
be conducted in private, the individuals to be interviewed requested
the presence of an Iraqi government observer. Although not optimum,
the inspectors in these two instances acceded to the request by those
interviewed for the presence of an Iraqi observer with a view to gaining
whatever information was available under the circumstances. The IAEA
will continue to report on its efforts to interview Iraqi personnel
according to its preferred modalities and its degree of success in
that regard.

Analysis of
all information now available to the Agency is continuing in parallel
with, and in support of, inspection activities. In this context, the
IAEA has integrated the new declarations submitted by Iraq, including
the updated backlog of semi-annual declarations provided in September
2002 and the "Currently Accurate, Full and Complete Declaration" (CAFCD)
submitted in December 2002, with the information accumulated between
1991 and 1998 (e.g., original documents collected by the IAEA; results
of inspection activities; commercial satellite imagery; and information
provided by States) and information acquired after 1998.

Specific
issues raised by Member States

Aluminium
Tubes

In response
to IAEA questioning, the Iraqi authorities indicated that unsuccessful
attempts had been made in 2001 and 2002 to procure high-strength aluminium
tubes in connection with a programme aimed at reverse engineering
81-millimetre rockets.

With a view
to verifying information provided by Iraq on this issue, the IAEA
has conducted a series of inspections at sites involved in the production
and storage of reverse engineered rockets, held discussions with and
interviewed Iraqi personnel, taken samples of aluminium tubes, and
begun a review of the documentation provided by Iraq relating to contracts
with the traders.

While the matter
is still under investigation, and further verification is foreseen,
the IAEA's analysis to date indicates that the specifications of the
aluminium tubes sought by Iraq in 2001 and 2002 appear to be consistent
with reverse engineering of rockets. While it would be possible to
modify such tubes for the manufacture of centrifuges, they are not
directly suitable for it. It should be noted, however, that the attempted
acquisition of such tubes is prohibited under paragraph 24(a) of resolution
687 (1991), which, inter alia, proscribes the supply to Iraq of components
of arms and related matériel.

Other Dual
Use Items

The relocation
and consumption of some dual use materials has been among the questions
raised in connection with Iraq's backlog of semi-annual declarations.
The high explosive "HMX" is a prime example of such material. The
removal of Agency seals on the HMX and the declared relocation and
consumption of some of the HMX must be explained and documented by
Iraq before the Agency can reach a conclusion with regard to the use
of such material. The Iraqi declarations indicate that out, of the
228 tonnes of HMX available in Iraq at the end of 1998, 196 remained
at the facility where the HMX was previously under IAEA seal. Iraq
also declared that it had blended the remaining 32 tonnes with sulphur
and turned them into 45.6 tonnes of "industrial explosive" provided
mainly to cement plants for mining. The material balance, current
stock, whereabouts and final use of such material are currently being
investigated.

Uranium import
efforts

There have been
recurrent reports of Iraqi efforts to import uranium after 1991. The
Iraqi authorities deny any such efforts. The matter continues to be
pursued by the IAEA. It would be useful to receive from States any
specific information they may have in that regard.

NEXT STEPS

The Agency will
continue to seek additional clarification of certain aspects of Iraq's
past nuclear weapons programme, and will follow up any other issues
identified as a result of its field activities, its own analysis and
information that may be provided by States. To this end, the IAEA
intends to exercise of all its rights under all of the relevant Security
Council resolutions, including on-site inspection activities at any
location which the IAEA deems appropriate; collection of material
and environmental samples at known and new locations; satellite imagery
analysis; radiation monitoring; interviews with Iraqi officials and
other persons; and the use of any other technology assessed to be
necessary to enhance the IAEA's verification activities.

CONCLUDING
COMMENTS

At this stage,
the IAEA is able to report the following progress:

Through
access to buildings identified, through satellite imagery, as
having been modified or constructed during the period 1998-2002,
the IAEA has been able to clarify the nature of activities currently
being conducted at such buildings.

Although
not complete, significant progress has been made in the verification
of Iraq's explanations regarding its attempts to procure high-strength
aluminium tubes.

Steps have
been taken to clarify the disposition of the HMX that had been
subject to verification prior to 1998.

To date, no
new information of significance has emerged regarding Iraq's past
nuclear programme (pre-1991) or with regard to Iraq activities during
the period between 1991 and 1998.

To date, no
evidence of ongoing prohibited nuclear or nuclear-related activities
has been detected, although not all of the laboratory results of sample
analysis are yet available. It should be noted that IAEA's verification
activities serve not only as a mechanism for verifying that Iraq is
not currently carrying out any proscribed activities, but equally
as an important deterrent to the resumption of such activities by
Iraq.

The IAEA will
endeavour to provide the Security Council as early as possible with
credible assurance of the absence of prohibited nuclear and nuclear-related
activities in Iraq, but there still remains a significant amount of
work to do. While it has been possible to accumulate significant information
through field activities, an important part of that information will
require additional follow-up before the IAEA is able to draw definitive
conclusions.

The IAEA's efforts
to draw such conclusions will be greatly facilitated by the active
cooperation of Iraq, not only in continuing to secure access to locations,
but, importantly, in providing documentation, making available Iraqi
personnel for interview and encouraging them to accept IAEA modalities
for such interviews, and providing the IAEA with any physical evidence
which would assist it in reaching its conclusions. To this end, I
intend to visit Iraq with the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC in the
third week of this month to discuss with the Iraqi authorities outstanding
issues and to impress on them, once more, the importance of their
active co-operation.

As requested
in paragraph 5 of resolution 1441 (2002), IAEA activities and achievements
in Iraq during the two months of inspection since 27 November 2002
will be described in greater detail in an update report to the Council
to be available by 27 January.