HEADQUARTERS
ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,Camp near Falmouth, Va., April 29,
1863.

Brigadier-General
BENHAM, Commanding Engineer Brigade.

SIR:
Your attention is called to the following extract from orders
issued yesterday, of which you were furnished a copy:

The
bridges, two at each crossing, to be laid complete
before 3.30 a.m. of the 29th, under the supervision
of General Benham, who is charged with the
responsibility thereof.

The
major-general commanding is informed that, agreeably to your
request, General Sedgwick placed at your disposal a brigade
of infantry, and he desires to know why these orders were not
complied with and those bridges laid at the hour specified.

Very
respectfully, &c.,
S. WILLIAMS,Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS
ENGINEER BRIGADE,Near Falmouth, Va., April 29,
1863.

General S. WILLIAMS, Adjutant-General, Army of the Potomac.

SIR:
I have the honor to acknowledge your letter of this date,
giving an extract from the orders of the commanding general,
which stated that I was charged with placing the bridges, two
at each crossing, to be laid complete before 3.30 a.m. of the
29th, directing me to state why those orders were not
complied with. To show how completely every effort on my part
was made to accomplish this, and through what causes it
failed, as far as known, a statement somewhat in detail may
be necessary, though it is summed up in a few words at the
close of this letter.
These orders were
communicated to me about 11 a.m. yesterday morning, as I was
mounted to go to General Sedgwick's camp, I having about one
hour previously been shown by General Butterfield a press
copy of the original in the adjutant general's office, and
immediately after my return to my camp, and finding an aide
of General Sedgwick's, I communicated through him by note the
main features of my project for laying the bridges. On
meeting General Sedgwick, it was agreed to, or approved by
him, as follows: I proposed to use all the boats of the three
bridges, or about one hundred in number, which it was
estimated would carry about 6,000 men at a single trip, which
number it was decided by General Sedgwick to throw over at
each place, as I understood it, before laying the bridges. To
avoid the alarm and consequent preparation for us, which the
sound of the pontoon boats might give to the enemy long
before we could reach the river bank, I proposed (having
previously drawn the pontoons to the edge of the woods by
animals) to have the boats carried from these points, about
two-thirds of a mile, to the river, by the men of the
command, which it was judged 72 men for each boar, forming
double reliefs, could easily do. Captain Reese having
reported to me that on trial he had found that 36 men were
ample to carry each boat to the river, with one rest; that as
soon as it could be discovered that the enemy had taken the
alarm, the pontoon equipage on its tracks, preceded by the
protecting artillery, should be ordered to come down rapidly,
during the crossing of which the boats, manned by oarsmen
from the engineers (and with each its crossing party of 60
men, previously assigned, who should be with each boat, with
an equal force awaiting there for a second trip), were to be
put in the river and thrown to the opposite bank. The
equipage was expected to be down by the time of the second
return of the boats, when the laying of the bridges was to be
commenced.
The pontoons were
to be, and were, closed up at the edge of the woods at
twilight, or soon after. It was judged best not to commence
too early, not to alarm the enemy before the usual hour of
rest. The hours were carefully discussed with General
Sedgwick, and I judged that, if the boats left the edge of
the woods at 11 or 11.30 o'clock, one hour would amply
suffice to carry them down, one hour more be more than ample
to pass the men over, and, in the moonlight, his forces would
suffice to lay the bridges, and eventually ordered the boats
to be started at 11.30 o'clock for both crossings.
I asked that
General Wadsworth's command might be assigned to aid with the
lower boats, and directed Lieutenant-Colonel [William H.]
Pettes to call on General Wadsworth as early as he should
arrive, to assign about 72 men to carry each boat, and to
have told off 60 other men with their proper officers for the
passage. This, Lieutenant-Colonel Pettes informs me, he
complied with; that General Wadsworth furnished the carrying
parties, and that he was informed that the other details were
also made.
General Pratt's
command was assigned to me for carrying parties for the upper
three sets of boats used, and General Sedgwick informed me
that General Brooks' division would be the crossing force.
When General Pratt reported to me at my camp, between 2 and 3
p.m., I requested him to assign as early as practicable the
carrying parties and order them to each boat, and I have the
pleasure of saying that he appeared to use every possible
effort to accomplish this, though I believe it was scarcely
completed till the very last hour.
Of General Brooks I
requested (General Sedgwick being present at General Brooks'
bivouac, in advance and to the right of the upper trains)
that he should assign the men to cross in each boat, as I
told him, from 50 to 70 men each. He stated that he proposed
to put his left in front, and that on receiving notice of the
starting of the boats he would have the squads at the
junction of the path from his position to the river road, to
join the boats as they passed in succession, which last
appeared a good arrangement. I then left for my camp, leaving
soon after 9 p.m. with General Hunt, and, after an interview
with General Sedgwick, at nearly 11 p.m., I started to make a
second visit to the lower pontoons by way of the river road.
I gave the direction to my officers of the upper trains to
leave positively at 11.30 o'clock if I did not return by that
time, stating that I would join them before they got into
position, and I requested Captain [Richard F.] Halsted, of
General Sedgwick's staff, who accompanied me for the purpose,
to remain till the moment of starting, and then push rapidly
to inform General Brooks, that he might have his crossing
squads ready to meet and accompany the boats as they passed,
and Captain Reese, who was to lead, was charged to see that
these squads joined him as he passed. In giving the
instruction to Captain Halsted for the forwarding and
delivery of the message to General Brooks, it may, perhaps,
be proper, under the present circumstances, to state that I
found it necessary to go over and report them for the third
time, in consequence, as it appeared to me, of the difficulty
in making him understand them or of keeping his attention to
me as I stated it to him.
I then pushed
rapidly round to the other boats, and finding General
Reynolds, General Wadsworth, as also Lieutenant-Colonel
Pettes, I gave my final instruction to him, and during the
interview, finding it was then 11.30 o'clock, I directed the
pontoons to be at once dismounted and the movement to
commence, stating that I would send an officer to inform them
when the equipage and artillery should move.
Returning rapidly,
I should judge about or just before 12 o'clock, I found the
two or three leading pontoons just entering the field between
the road and the river, but without the crossing squads
accompanying them. I soon met General Brooks, however,
expressing my disappointment, and reported to him this
failure, stating to him that the mistake lay between himself,
Captain Halsted, and Captain Reese. The fear of delay to the
crossing and in the laying of my bridges from the want of
cooperation may have caused an earnestness of manner in me at
this time, but no harsh words were used to General Brooks, as
my staff can testify, and he informed me that this should be
rectified, and that the squads should join their respective
boats immediately. I then proceeded toward the river, leaving
my quartermaster at a covered position about half-way down
the field, to have the pontoons close up and the crossing
squads join them, and, taking the corporal of the pickets,
went carefully down the bank and along the shore for the
distance I judged it expedient to have the boats placed, and,
returning, I found Captain Reese at the edge of the bank, and
then went down again with him the whole distance to show him
the position, directing him to commence the placing of his
boats at once for the crossing. On my return again to the top
of the bank, I found the evidence of alarm in the signal
lights of the enemy, and at once dispatched my topographical
officer to hurry up the equipage of the two upper bridges and
my quartermaster to order down that of the two lower. This
was not far from I o'clock. I then went down the bank a third
time, and personally directed the placing of the first four
or five boats, but found them without their crossing squads.
The arrangement was, that General Pratt's carrying force was
to rest during the crossing of General Brooks' men, and then
help lay the bridges. During the packing of these boats, I
found the rebels had several small boats rowing down opposite
to us. I went to search for some officer of the crossing
force, and on the ascent of the bank encountered an officer
who told me he was General Russell, and he appeared somewhat
vexed,accusing me of having ordered his left in front, with
his rear rank to the enemy. I at once told him of his
mistake; that I had nothing to do with this at all; that it
was the plan and order of General Brooks, as announced to
General Sedgwick and myself, without appearing to convince
him, however, for he repeated that it was Captain Reese who
did it, if not myself. On finding my efforts of no avail with
him to have the crossing squads assigned to the boats when my
oarsmen were waiting, exposed to the danger of a fire that
might open at any moment upon them, I told him of the
responsibility I had for the laying of these bridges and of
the urgent necessity for the previous crossing of his men,
and asked him distinctly if he declined to obey my orders, to
which he gave no satisfactory reply other than an apparent
negative, which he made more explicit on a second meeting
with him a few minutes after, when I repeated that question.
I then, stating my position and rank, placed him in arrest,
as far as I had power to do so. This arrest I directed him to
report to General Brooks, for his confirmation. Finding
myself there, powerless, with my boats and boatmen at the
river and no men to cross in them, I could only join my
staff; then sent Lieutenant [Stephen M.] Weld to report this
fact to General Sedgwick, and I remained quietly on the
river, where, in a short time, General Brooks came to me, to
whom I related the above circumstances, and distinctly put
the question to him if he acknowledged my right to command,
to which he replied in the negative, on which I asked him if
he would assume command. I then stated to him, "The
responsibility of the crossing now rests with you, but I will
aid you in any way that you wish, and all my men are at your
orders," a part of my staff being witnesses to this.
Upon this he left me, and I did not see him till the main
crossing was effected ; and I was detained in this way,
inactive and perfectly powerless, <ar39_208> for some
hours of time before the earliest daylight. I then sent
Lieutenant [Martin] Van Brocklin to General Sedgwick to
report these circumstances and request that he would come
down and take the command, and soon after I again sent to
General Sedgwick by my quartermaster, to urge him to come
down or send some officer to take command. Some time after
this, Captain [Charles A.] Whittier, of General Sedgwick's
staff, met me, and requested me to accompany him, which I
did; but he being on foot and I mounted he soon left me, and
soon after Colonel [Martin T.] McMahon came to me, and I
begged him to remain with me to aid in pushing the work; but
we also were soon separated. Some time after daylight, I was
told that General Newton had been sent down to take command,
but I did not see him, I being then superintending the laying
of the bridges, till I left for General Reynolds' column.
Some fifteen to
twenty minutes after I had noticed that the day was dawning,
I saw the first boat crossing and the firing commenced, and
in a few minutes the boats returned, and were in large
numbers, as I saw, at the bank on our side without any one
being near or ready to refill them, as some of my oarsmen
came up to me to report. I then exerted myself to the utmost
to rally the men near me, and with success, to go down the
bank and fill the boats again, during which exertions my
horse was shot under me, but, descending the bank with him, I
about this time met General Brooks, telling him what I had
done as to the ordering of his men, which he appeared to
fully approve, as I then requested him to order my men also
if he found it necessary, and at this time, in leaning over
to shake hands with General Brooks, my wounded horse
staggered so that I could not retain my seat in the saddle,
and I slipped to the ground, and immediately after, finding
my horse disabled, I sent him away by my brigade veterinary
surgeon, and ordered another to be sent down to me.
Immediately after
the second crossing of the boats, or at about 6 a.m., the
bridges of the Regulars, under Captain Reese, was commenced,
being finished at 7 o'clock; the first bridge of the
Fifteenth Regiment, under Major [Walter L.] Cassin, was begun
after 6 o'clock and finished at about 7.15 o'clock; the third
bridge, the boats of which I had brought down to use for
crossing, intending to return them to its train, was ordered
to be laid, and its equipage, sent down by General Newton's
directions, given to------.
I attributed the
failure of the crossing of the men and the laying of the
bridges by the hours designated to the failure of the
crossing squads to join the boats as I had asked, and to the
want of the presence of some senior officer with full powers
to direct both the crossing and the laboring forces. After
the third bridge was commenced, I sent a report of the facts
to General Sedgwick by my quartermaster, and hearing that
there had been a repulse at the lower crossing, and that the
bridges had not been laid there, I proceeded to that
position, finding Generals Reynolds and Wadsworth and
Lieutenant-Colonel Pettes on the heights just above the road,
at Pollock's Mill Creek. I then distinctly learned that the
boats were for the most part in the water, but that the fire
from the other side had prevented the troops from entering
the boats to cross, and, of course, that the bridges could
not be laid as projected. General Reynolds gave a reason that
the crossing was not effected because I had ordered that the
troops should not move till forty boats were put in the
water, but I corrected this mistake, and to his satisfaction,
as I understood by the further evidence of General Wadsworth
that I had ordered that forty boats should be carried from
the woods above, and <ar39_209> not twenty, only as he
and General Wadsworth had told me the night before that my
assistant adjutant-general had ordered, stating, of which
some of my officers were witnesses at this previous
interview, that the movement of crossing with the number of
men would be at the discretion of the commanding officer,
then understood to be General Wadsworth. On examining the
rebel positions with my glass, I said to General Reynolds,
"I doubt if there are 50 men there, and there are
certainly not 300," to which he appeared to assent, when
I added, "You have 15,000." At first General
Reynolds thought he would send his men round by the upper
bridges to come down and capture that position, and some
troops were so ordered to move, but soon halted, and, after
my repetition of similar remarks again to General Reynolds,
he then directed General Wadsworth to effect the crossing,
which was done very shortly after. This was between 9 and l0
a.m. As soon as I saw the preparations fairly made for
crossing, I went down and directed the pushing on the pontoon
equipage and a few pontoons then in the field near the road,
which Lieutenant-Colonel Pettes informed me had been brought
back by the alarmed teamsters when the firing broke out. And
the men drawing the wagons down and unloading them rapidly,
as the lodgment had been effected by General Wadsworth, the
bridges were commenced at once at about 10.15 o'clock, and by
12 o'clock they were both completed and troops crossing, as
Lieutenant-Colonel Pettes has stated to me, I having left
about five minutes previously to go to General Hooker, as
directed.
The report of
Lieutenant-Colonel Pettes, a copy of which is herewith
respectfully submitted, shows that after I had left Generals
Reynolds and Wadsworth, at 11.30 p.m. of the 28th, some of
the boats were carried part way to the river by hand, and
that then General Wadsworth ordered them to reload the
pontoons on the trucks to take them down by the teams. The
redistribution of the balks on different wagons, as necessary
to protect the boats, and the finding of the teams of the
unloaded boats ordered to be sent out of the way, and finding
the different boats scattered along the road in the night,
must alone have unavoidably caused great delay, as
Lieutenant-Colonel Pettes states. Notwithstanding this, the
boats for some 1,200 men were ready in the water by 4.30
o'clock, and reported to General Wadsworth, and with my
oarsmen in them, but no men were at hand to enter them for
crossing; there being thus a failure of what I had considered
vital to the whole affair, and that I had directed
Lieutenant-Colonel Pettes to ask for, and that I requested at
my last previous interview with Generals Reynolds and
Wadsworth--that the crossing squads of about 60 each should
be detailed for and attached to and accompany each boat down
from the edge of the woods.
This failure, with
the countermand of my orders about carrying boats by hand,
was, in my opinion, the cause of the delay in crossing and
laying of the bridges at the hours directed at the lower
point, and, as I have stated, at the upper crossings, though
a large portion of the boats were down at the water's edge in
very good time, or soon after 1 a.m. The failure of the
crossing squads to be ready with the boats to cross, as
repeatedly asked for previously by me, together with the want
of an officer of rank to direct the combinations of the
operations, as previously stated by me, were the causes of
the delay at this crossing. I can only say that everything
that all my forethought could devise and my untiring
vigilance could execute, without one particle of sleep for
the forty-two hours previous to writing the first part of
this letter, of which I was some fourteen hours in the saddle
from the first, sixteen after I received the order, and with
the aid of all my staff and, as far as I know, every officer
and man attached to this brigade--all was done to secure an
implicit compliance with the orders of the commanding
general.
With the copy of
the report of Lieutenant-Colonel Pettes, the only one as yet
received, I respectfully inclose a statement of my brigade
veterinary surgeon upon one matter referred to in this
report.

SIR:
The early calls to other duty prevented my completing the
report, as I designed to make it up, on the laying of the
bridges below Fredericksburg on the morning of the 29th
instant.
I desire to say
more explicitly that, being charged by General Hooker with
the responsibility of laying the bridges by the hours stated,
and my plans being approved or ordered to be carried out, as
far as he was concerned, by General Sedgwick, at that time in
command, and the necessary troops being supplied therefor by
him, I considered myself in command, and, in fact, obliged to
give orders, when necessary, to all the troops on this duty,
to the close of these operations, equally with the force
under General Pratt, required to aid my pontoniers, and to
the force also of General Brooks, assigned by General
Sedgwick for the purpose of first passing over to protect the
laboring force, and required by a part of my plans (also
approved with the rest) as indispensable to success.
General Sedgwick is
my witness that I planned, and in his presence, about sunset
on the 28th, urged on General Brooks that his crossing squads
of about 60 men each should be assigned to and accompany the
pontoons as they were leaving the limits of concealment at
the edge of the woods, my reasons for which had been
given--the fear that these squads would otherwise fail in
joining the boats properly. General Sedgwick was a witness to
General Brooks' proposition to have the squads join at
another point, which I assented to reluctantly, and only on
condition that General Brooks would be responsible for their
accurately joining there on having due notice from me, and
which notice on the afternoon of the next day he admitted to
have received from Captain Halsted; yet it is a fact that is
undeniable that, on returning from a rapid ride to the lower
column, at the last moment, and very nearly, if not exactly,
at midnight, found that some of the leading pontoons had
passed the points designated without being joined by the
crossing squads; that, from a strong sense of my own
responsibility for the fulfillment of the orders given me by
the time indicated, and for the saving of the lives of our
men, on meeting General Brooks, whom I fully believed then to
be under my orders for the duty, I expressed to him my strong
feeling of disappointment at his failure, but in no words
personally harsh to himself, and, to his offer to make
explanations, I said, "I have no time for explanations;
I want no explanations; I want the men." This
<ar39_211> he said he would attend to, and at my last
interview, above alluded to, he informed me that these squads
did join the boats while they were closing up on the upper
bank; that is, during the next forty or fifty minutes. This
is very possible, but it is also certain that, as the leading
boats passed down to the river's edge about or just after 1
a.m., these squads were not with any of the first four or
five boats, for I personally superintended the placing of
these boats, inquired for them, and went round the boats to
assure myself of their presence, if possible, and it could
not have been 1.30 o'clock when I met General Russell, who
complained that I had inverted the order of his men, &c.,
or that Captain Reese so ordered it. A subsequent explanation
with Captain Reese satisfied me that this arose from his
understanding an order of mine for closing up the boats on
the upper bank to be intended for the lower or river edge.
But it did not relate to the men, nor, from the precautions I
took, did it change the placing of the boats from where I
intended. As General Russell then would not acknowledge my
authority to direct him as to the placing of his men, which I
considered so vital to the success of the operation, I did
not see what I could possibly do further than to let the
boats pass down and become filled whenever it might happen;
but, meeting General Russell again, I again made the effort
to have him obey me, and, on his refusal, I arrested him and
reported it, as stated previously. The interview with General
Brooks shortly after was, as can be proved, entirely calm,
and showed only an earnest wish on my part that there should
be but one directing head, as I think he admits, for, when I
found he refused to allow me to direct in relation to his
troops, I asked him if he would, or requested him to, take
the direction of the whole operations, telling him the
responsibility rested with him, and in my first impulse said,
" I will obey your orders," but, recollecting
myself, said, "I will endeavor to have your wishes
complied with, and all my men are at your disposition,"
to which I heard no reply from him; and this refusal of his
was also duly reported to the general in command. I then
awaited until after I discovered the approach of daylight and
the first movement of the boats before I could take effective
action, for which my first efforts were to have the boats
filled to cross over the protecting force, and as soon as
possible after the boats were available the two bridges first
ordered were commenced and completed within one to one and a
half hours, as reported.
The first interview
with General Russell and his refusal occurred at very nearly
1.30 o'clock, not later, I feel certain, and I had no
effective control of the troops from that time until after
daylight, more than three hours, which were thus lost toward
laying the bridges.
That I had reason
to believe the troops of General Brooks were under my
direction as well as the others, these being engaged in a
precedent part of the operations, I think that, independent
of other reasons, the necessity of the case, my security,
&c., I feel that I need only appeal to the report I had
the honor to make to the commanding general on the 18th of
March, expressly stating that for such and similar operations
I considered it indispensable to success that the force
aiding and protecting the engineer troops should all be under
the direction of one head, and upon which report was
indorsed, by the proper staff officer of the general, that
when troops were needed for such purposes they would be
furnished. These were now needed and had been furnished, and,
I could only suppose, furnished according to the terms under
which I had asked them and had supposed this approved. If
anything further were needed, I had the words of General
Sedgwick to myself personally as follows, or this effect:
"General Pratt will be ordered to report to you for the
carrying force, and General Brooks' command will furnish the
protecting squads to cross."
No other head than
myself could be suspected to be there upon the field, nor, in
fact, could any other or staff officer be supposed to be
effective, if newly arrived upon the field, for directing
such operations and combinations.
It is, of course,
to be presumed that General Brooks had not been made aware of
the nature of that report of mine or of the indorsement upon
it, though how General Sedgwick's order was given to him, I,
of course, am not advised.
As to the lower
trains of General Reynolds, the same arrangements were made.
Lieutenant-Colonel Pettes states that, according to my orders
(and request, repeated to General Wadsworth in person, as
stated at 11.30 p.m. of the 29th), he called on General
Wadsworth for the 72 carriers and 60 men for crossing squads
to go with each pontoon, which were promised and the carriers
furnished, but that five pontoons only were carried at all,
and these only a part less than half the distance, when
General Wadsworth ordered Major [Edmund O.] Beers to reload
the pontoons, which consumed so much time that only about
twenty boats could be got in the water at 4.30 a.m., and
these being reported to General Wadsworth as ready for his
men and able to carry 60 each, Lieutenant-Colonel Pettes says
no men were present ready to cross in them.
That the carrying
of the pontoons as proposed was practicable is proved by the
noble endurance of General Pratt's command, who brought some
three-fourths of the boats of two trains down in excellent
time, the distance being about the same as for the lower
trains. That enough men, 72 each, were asked for, is shown by
the fact that not only this number did the duty for the upper
trains, but that Captain Reese had reported that 36 only
could do it, with one rest.
That it was of the
utmost importance that this plan should be followed is
evidenced by the fact, as reported to me, that the rebel
lieutenant at the upper crossing stated that they had notice
at 11 p.m. the night previous that we were to cross at that
point, and that they were directed to listen for the sound of
the pontoon wagons, the officer reporting this to me (the
commanding officer of the Sixty-ninth Pennsylvania Regiment,
I believe), adding, "I have no doubt this saved 500
lives," for there cannot be a doubt that even with all
this delay this crossing was really a surprise.
I may be permitted
to add, in conclusion, that, in everything except as to the
delay beyond the hour required by the order, which I trust
has been satisfactorily accounted for as not chargeable to me
in any way, I consider the laying of those five bridges in
times ranging from one hour to one hour and forty-five
minutes as only an instance of signal, if not unprecedented,
success, which resulted only from the exact compliance with
the directions given by, as far as I learned, every officer
and man of the Engineer Brigade and the most hearty
assistance of that fine officer, General Pratt, and his
command, consisting of the excellent officers and men of his
brigade and Colonel [Alexander] Shaler's.

Statement
of operations of Engineer Brigade in laying and removing
fourteen bridges, between April 28 and May 6, upon the
Rappahannock River:
April 27, Captain
[Timothy] Lubey, Fifteenth New York Engineers, was sent to
Washington, with orders to get a canvas pontoon train, take
it to Alexandria, and thence by railroad to Bealeton Station
by 10.30 a.m. of the 28th. He reports that he was there,
reporting to Captain Comstock by 7.30 a.m. on that day
(28th); that he found teams ready, and at once proceeded to
Kelly's Ford, where he arrived at 5.30 p.m. on that day, and
laid his bridge by 7.45 p.m. on the 28th.
On April 28, about
11 a.m., I received orders to have two bridges laid at the
Franklin Crossing and two near the mouth of Pollock's Mill
Creek, all complete, by 3.30 a.m. of the 29th. The boats of
the first two were ready at the bank for the most part at 1
to 2 a.m., but the covering force not accompanying the boats
as planned, and their general not complying with my
requisitions and orders, the crossing of this force was
delayed till 4.30 to 5 a.m.
Between 5.45 and
7.15 a.m. the two bridges were laid at the Franklin Crossing,
as ordered, and within the next three hours a third bridge by
the orders of Major-General Newton. At Pollock's Mill Creek
my orders were countermanded by the general commanding the
working and covering force, for after the pontoons were
dismounted and a few carried a short distance by hand, they
were ordered to be reloaded on the wagons. This delayed the
operations so that it was only at 4.30 a.m. that twenty boats
were in the water, enough for 1,000 men, but no men were
there to cross to protect the labor on the bridge, and the
enemy shortly after opening fire upon the working force
there, no further attempt was made to lay the bridge for some
hours.
Upon hearing at the
upper crossing of the repulse, I went to meet General
Reynolds, and the result of our interview was, about 9 a.m.,
an attempt to cross on the part of his troops, which was at
once successful, and the two bridges were laid between 10 and
11.45 a.m.
On April 30, I was
ordered to have one of the bridges at each of these crossings
taken up after dark and transported to Banks' Ford, and have
them in position to be laid before daylight the next morning.
These bridges were taken up after 8 p.m. and transported to
the points named, about 15 to 16 miles, and were with the
rear train entering into park there about 6.15 a.m. the 1st
instant, a few teams being delayed by the upsetting of four
or five pontoons and other wagons.
May 3, the enemy
having left Banks' Ford about 1.30 to 2 p.m., and no
countermand arriving, with the concurrent opinion of General
[Henry J.] Hunt, although we then had no great force on
either side there, one bridge was laid between 3 and 4.30
p.m., when an order arrived to send the second bridge to
United States Ford for a third bridge there. This bridge, or
sixteen boats of it, then harnessed, were started under
Colonel [Clinton G.] Colgate within fifteen minutes, these
sixteen being deemed amply sufficient there, as only fourteen
had been needed in the bridge just laid at Banks' Ford, and
the balance of the two trains, being fourteen boats, were
retained for a second bridge at Banks' Ford in case an
emergent necessity arrived for it. That necessity arrived,
and the bridge was prepared for it, having been laid (a part
of the time under a severe fire of shot and shell) in the
afternoon of the 4th instant, and it was by these two bridges
that General Sedgwick's corps and all his tram and artillery,
fifty-five pieces passed in less than one' hour (between 2
and 3 a.m. May 5), immediately after which these bridges were
taken up, the boats concealed, and eventually brought away
safely on the 6th instant.
On May 3, Captain
Reese was ordered to move his bridge from Franklin's Crossing
near to the old railroad bridge site, and Major Cassin to
take his from the same place to the Lacy house, and both were
towed up and relaid at the points named at about 5.30 a.m.,
May 3. May 3, Major Beers, from Pollock's Mill Creek, was
ordered to remove his bridge by teams, and relay it at the
Lacy house, which was done by 6.30 a.m., May 3.
As to Colonel
Colgate's and Major Spaulding's trains, at upper or United
States Ford--April 28, Major Spaulding was first ordered with
his two trains from his old encampment, on Warrenton rosA, to
Banks' Ford; then, on April 29, he was ordered to United
States Ford, where, on April 30, he laid down his two
bridges. On May 3, at 10.30 p.m., Colonel Colgate arrived at
United States Ford with a third bridge, which was laid down
on the 4th instant, 10 to 11.30 a.m. These three bridges,
after the recrossing of the main army, were taken up on the
5th by 8 a.m., and arrived at or near this camp last night
(Colonel Colgate the night before), every officer and man of
the Engineer Brigade having, as far as I am able to learn, I
have the pleasure of stating, done his duty in the most
praiseworthy manner. And to this I am gratified to sad that
every requisition upon the Quartermaster's Department has
been most kindly and promptly met by Colonel Ingalls and his
assistants, Major [William] Painter and Captains [William G.]
Rankin and [Luther H.] fierce.
I may state here
that after I had removed the bridges at Banks' Ford, on May
5, at about 9 a.m., I heard there was an order for me to
report at United States Ford. I searched for the written
order at the telegraph office and elsewhere, but it did not
reach me till between 1 and 2 p.m., and at about the latter
hour I started with my staff and orderlies to report as
directed, arriving at and over United States Ford at about 4
p.m., and from there reported by an aide at general
headquarters. This aide informed me that I was authorized to
return to my camp if I had good officers to leave there, so I
at once returned to the charge of the trains here, starting
at 5.30 o'clock, and, after communicating with General
Sedgwick's headquarters on my way, arrived here at about 11
p.m. on the 5th instant.
I respectfully
submit a tabular schedule of times, places, &c., of the
laying of the pontoon bridges during the last movement,
which, perhaps, may be deemed desirable.

I have
the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient
servant,
H. W. BENHAM, Brigadier-General.