§ 1475. The original scheme of the constitution did not
embrace (as has been already stated) the appointment of
any vice-president, and in case of the death, resignation,
or disability of the president, the president of the senate
was to perform the duties of his office. The appointment
of a vice-president was carried by a vote of ten states to
one. Congress, in pursuance of the power here given, have
provided, that in case of the removal, death, resignation,
or inability of the president and vice-president, the president
of the senate pro tempore, and in case there shall be
no president, then the speaker of the house of representatives
for the time being shall act as president, until the
disability be removed, or a president shall be elected.

§ 1476. No provision seems to be made, or at least directly
made, for the case of the non-election of any president
and vice-president at the period prescribed by the
constitution. The case of a vacancy by removal, death, or
resignation, is expressly provided for; but not of a vacancy
by the expiration of the official term of office. A learned
commentator has thought, that such a case is not likely to
happen, until the people of the United States shall be
weary of the constitution and government, and shall adopt
this method of putting a period to both, a mode of dissolution,
which seems, from its peaceable character, to recommend
itself to his mind, as fit for such a crisis. But no
absolute dissolution of the government would constitutionally
take place by such a non-election. The only effect
would be, a suspension of the powers of the executive part
of the government, and incidentally of the legislative powers,
until a new election to the presidency should take
place at the next constitutional period, an evil of very great
magnitude, but not equal to a positive extinguishment of
the constitution. But the event of a non-election may arise,
without any intention on the part of the people to dissolve
the government. Suppose there should be three candidates
for the presidency, and two for the vice-presidency, each
of whom should receive, as nearly as possible, the same
number of votes; which party, under such circumstances,
is bound to yield up its own preference? May not each feel
equally and conscientiously the duty to support to the end
of the contest its own favorite candidate in the house of
representatives? Take another case. Suppose two persons
should receive a majority of all the votes for the presidency,
and both die before the time of taking office, or
even before the votes are ascertained by congress. There
is nothing incredible in the supposition, that such an event
may occur. It is not nearly as improbable, as the occurrence
of the death of three persons, who had held the office
of president, on the anniversary of our independence,
and two of these in the same year. In each of these cases
there would be a vacancy in the office of president and
vice-president by mere efflux of time; and it may admit of
doubt, whether the language of the constitution reaches
them. If the vice-president should succeed to the office of
president, he will continue in it until the regular expiration
of the period, for which the president was chosen; for
there is no provision for the choice of a new president,
except at the regular period, when there is a vice-president
in office; and none for the choice of a vice-president, except
when a president also is to be chosen.

§ 1477. Congress, however, have undertaken to provide
for every case of a vacancy both of the offices of president
and vice-president; and have declared, that in such an
event there shall immediately be a new election made in
the manner prescribed by the act. How far such an exercise
of power is constitutional has never yet been solemnly
presented for decision. The point was hinted at in some of
the debates, when the constitution was adopted; and it was
then thought to be susceptible of some doubt. Every sincere
friend of the constitution will naturally feel desirous
of upholding the power, as far as he constitutionally may.
But it would be more satisfactory, to provide for the case
by some suitable amendment, which should clear away
every doubt, and thus prevent a crisis dangerous to our
future peace, if not to the existence of the government.

§ 1478. What shall be the proper proof of the resignation
of the president, or vice-president, or of their refusal
to accept the office, is left open by the constitution. But
congress, with great wisdom and forecast, have provided,
that it shall be by some instrument in writing, declaring
the same, subscribed by the party, and delivered into the
office of the secretary of state.