How can terrorists be identified before they perpetrate destructive attacks? From the United States to the European Union, the question is being asked; how the techniques for the filing and analysis of preventive and anti-terrorist strategy information can be streamlined. In the meantime, the terrorist escapes control. The panorama is, in fact, so vast and many-sided that it is difficult to understand and know it in its complexity. However, to intervene with the “preventive” aim, as the American anti-terrorist philosophy maintains, raises many questions in Europe. There is a need to reflect upon the errors already committed, improve the methodologies of the utilization of the data and, above all, know better the potential terrorist, before he actually becomes one, when he is still “our” very normal next-door neighbour

byEmanuela C. Del Re (EPOS)

EPOS Insights

Type of terrorism

On the 2nd June, 2007, there appeared in all the world newspapers, the arrest, in the United States, of a group who had plotted a terrorist attack to blow up the fuel deposits at the J. F. Kennedy airport of New York. The leader of the group, Russell Defreitas, American citizen, originally from Guyana, former worker of the airport; according to phoning tapping, which started in 2006, he stated that he wanted to hit one of America’s most inviolable symbols, President Kennedy, by destroying the airport which bears his name.

He also cherished a dream to carve out a place for himself in the Al Qaeda universe.

Defined by the FBI as amateurs, the members of the Antilles-Americangroupwerenotfound in possession of either arms or explosives, but were, perhaps, trying to procure them. The attack, therefore, would have been thwarted on the basis of the calculation of probabilities, on the perception of the terrorist potential of the group, in its turn, based on observation, on the analysis of the preceding and on the profile of the individuals in question.

Is there a “kind of terrorism”, an inclination or tendency towards terrorism, where a person, because of individual characteristics, aspects of the social environment in which they live, particular events during the course of their lives could be transformed, inexorably, into a terrorist?

The proliferation of hypotheses in this sense is surprising. “Interpretative ways” exist, for which certain scholars launch into the definition of the “perfect terrorist” who, at the moment, would be, generically, and following certain arrests made after terrorist attacks, like the one in London, in 2005, a person of medium to high cultural standing, socially integrated etc. etc.

Naturally, in the enormous panorama of terrorism, where one wishes to create an articulated typology, this definition would fit perfectly into only one category. In fact, the terrorism machine requires a variety of roles, connected to different activities and know-how. Further, there are distinctions of nationality, ethnic group, sex, age group, to which correspond roles, approaches, potential, impact, above all, in the successful fulfilment of the terrorist act.

From the manpower to the inventor of the project, in short, the panorama of “terrorists” certainly appears many-faceted.

The emergence of colourless individuals and, for the most part, unknown, or terrorist groups which operate independently, the so- called free-lancers, as well as new strategies of recruitment by some groups, such as the recruitment of suicide commandos, women and child terrorists and scientists who are able to invent arms of mass destruction, make us sure that the study on the sociological and psychological dynamics of the groups and individual terrorists is crucial.

A viper in the breast

The “potential terrorist”, according to the strategic approach of the European Union, would be identifiable through the use of certain specific data which, inserted in a database and cross-referenced, would lead to the definition of the degree of potential recruitment in the lines of terrorism, or of potential adherence to it in its various forms.

Since 2002, the Council of the European Union has been clear in this sense, and in its Recommendations affirms that: “To elaborate a typology of terrorist profiles signifies putting together a series of physical, psychological or behavioural variables, which have been identified as typical of the people involved in terrorist activities and which have a predictability value in such sense” (1).

What are the variables? Nationality, travelling documents, methods and means used for travelling, age, sex, race, particular physical characteristics (e.g. war injuries), level of education, strategies of cover, techniques used to avoid being discovered or to react to an interrogation, places of stay, communication methods, psycho-social characteristics of place of birth, family situations, ability in the use of advanced technology, knowledge in the use of non-conventional arms, attendance at paramilitary technique courses, flying etc.

The identification method would consist in consulting the national databases, hoping to identify equivalent elements with the aim of being able, subsequently, to single out terrorists.

This is part of a complex anti-terrorism strategy of the European Union, which foresees actions at various levels, based on the idea of cooperation between the member States with regard to the Law and internal affairs, defined in 2004, in the Hague Programme Freedom, Justice and Security, which was followed, in 2005, by a quinquennial plan of action. The European plan responds to the wave of legislative adjustments which have assailed all the member States of the EU since 2001, including Italy which had made certain modifications to the regulations, also from the point of view of the definition of the concept of terrorism itself (2).

The measures provided for in the plan of action centres on the control and monitoring of people’s movements. This question has been so controversial that the Union has resisted the insistence of the USA because it permits the indiscriminate access to passengers’ personal data, with the scope of studying their movements.

The policy of the European Union although not diverging very much from that of the USA, in the case of the access to passengers’ personal data (Passenger Name Records – PNR), finds itself against the national policies with respect to privacy. To reply to the request of the USA and also respect the legislative approach to privacy, the EU has suggested that a central database be created to which all the data is sent, which will, subsequently, be made accessible – for example, to the USA – only at a later date.

The impact of the policies of control is enormous. For example, the registration of foreigners through the Visa Information System (VIS) makes the filing, for five years, of biometric data possible, future reasons for the refusal of visas and more besides, able to be cross-referenced with other data according to the criteria dictated by the needs of a particular enquiry.

Already in 1995, the SIS (Schengen Information System) had been created to counter-balance the lowering of the frontiers between France, Germany, Luxemburg and Holland, permitting State members to obtain information concerning certain categories of people and property: the member States, in their turn, adding to the database information on wanted individuals etc- In 2003, the system had already collected files on 877,655 people, plus 386,403 aliases (3).

The EU is still doing more modernization and is technical equipping the data bank of Police SIS of Schengen, foreseeing the adoption of the SIS II, which should introduce adjustments which permit the filing, transferring and requesting of biometric data like photographs and fingerprints.

For technical reasons, the operative introduction of the SIS II has been postponed to the end of 2008, but to allow the new member States of the EU to be rapidly included in the cooperation in matters of Schengen security, the EU has decided to resort to a transitory solution, the SIS ‘one for all’, which will become already operative by the end of 2007.

As has been previously mentioned, these measures have often revealed to be in contrast with the policy for the protection of privacy in the member Countries. In addition, they have raised some preoccupation also in public opinion. Even though the scope is that of increasing the possibilities of guarantee of the security, the degree of interference with the private life of a person is difficult to control, also when it concerns potential terrorists, affirms the CFR-CDF (the EU Independent Network of Experts in Fundamental Rights).

They also add that the elaboration of terrorist profiles on the basis of the characteristics above mentioned increases the risk of discrimination, and could be accepted only when it is accurately demonstrated, with statistically reliable data, that there exists a relation between the identified characteristics and the risk of terrorism.

Certain episodes like the arrest of six men at Atlanta and one at Miami, on the 22nd of June, 2006, on the charge of plotting to destroy the Sear Tower in Chicago, gives food for thought (4).

Possessing very few arms, but having great ideological fervour, the seven men were defined by the American Government as “aspiring terrorists”, having sworn allegiance to the Al Qaeda, even though they had never entered into contact with them.

It seems that the arrests of the “potential terrorists”, all American citizens, but of Haitian origin, derives from the fact that they had confided to an infiltrated agent that they were planning a more spectacular attack than the one of September 11th. However, in consideration of the means in their possession, it seems that the plan would have been extremely difficulty to realize. The arrests have raised doubts as to their being opportune.

Besides, the religious and ideological beliefs are inspired by diverse doctrines: from Marxism-Leninism to Christianity to Hebraism, certainly not only by Islam.What disturbs public opinion and puts the forces of law and order in difficulty is the great variety of provenance of potential terrorists: the variety in the work they do, in the age groups and in the level of education. There are common denominators, but they are evaluated more on the basis of religious or ideological fervour, than on recurrent variables.

Among the arrested in the United States, in 2006, all for involvement in terrorist activities, there are several students, office workers, but also ice-cream sellers. In general, they are people who are not perceived as dangerous by the community in which they live. The most frightening thing in this regard for the American society is that they develop their terrorist tendency in their very own homes – home-grown terrorists, which reveals that the political, economic, educational system, of the United States’ socialization can produce good American citizens, but also “monsters”.

How can one understand what elements lead to the failure of the social project for some individuals? Furthermore, it is not only the United States, underlines the Wall Street Journal, analysing the arrests in Great Britain of a group who were plotting to bring down some planes over the Atlantic Ocean: a group of home grown terrorists that the British society had brought up from babyhood: among whom were women and young men from the middle class with university degrees. Also here, it is very difficult to generalize.

The point of convergence is constituted by the terrorist act, not so much by the terrorist profile. Women suicide terrorists acted in Iraq and Cecenia. Women of different nationalities: one from Belgium who killed herself in the name of the Jihad (5).

Which terrorism?

In the meanwhile, preventive measures are put into function, which lead to arrests and charges that in Europe, and for some years also in Italy, are perceived, by some, as controversial. This is the case of Carlo Corrucci, lawyer, (6), who has already published several papers on the theme, referring, where possible, to the trial acts in his possession as lawyer for the defence of those accused of terrorism. He maintains that not always, in the legal system, can be found the necessary instruments to establish what are the counts of indictment which are actually applicable in complex cases in which terrorist elements are recognized: in other words, whether it is terrorism, or not. He also maintains that there have been numerous judicial errors in this field.

The first to be condemned for international terrorism, on the basis of Article 270 bis- regulations relative to terrorism which considers the association with an end to terrorism, as a crime (Art. 270 bis Criminal Code) were four North Africans, among whom the so-called travelling ex-Imam, Mohamed Rafik and Kamel Hamroui.

The elements gathered for the charge were based on the testimony of a state witness, Chokri Zouaoui, in prison for drug related crimes, who stated that the two condemned men, together with others, constituted a terrorist cell unit, which had projected attacks on the Cathedral of Cremona and on the underground of Milan, in 2002. Furthermore, during the house search were said to be found handbills bearing praises to the Jihad, a document signed by Osama Bin Laden, as well as, money deposits assigned to a training camp in Iraqi Kurdistan (7).

This happened in July of 2005. However, at the beginning of this same year, five people accused of terrorism were acquitted: the last in a long line of accused who were then released. Already in January, 2004, the daily newspaper “La Repubblica” had published and enquiry, entitled “False evidence and manipulations; Investigations on Al Qaeda boomerang” (8) and, following the releases, “Il Manifesto” (9), “Liberazione” and other daily newspapers published, at different times, reflections on whether, or not, such arrests for “terrorism” were opportune.

The terrorist profile

The question of how to identify terrorists before they act is very complex. Not only is it difficult to generalize on the level of variables tied to the person, such as race, sex, age group and geographic provenance, but to this is added also the aggregating dimension, tied to the group. Groups change continually, including the leaders and the members.

This “temporal” dimension of terrorism makes a continual updating of the database necessary, which often renders the old data obsolete. In the cases in which the terrorist groups act in specific territory, the spatial interpretation of such territory could change subsequent to the events, and, therefore, also the location becomes difficult.

New groups take the place of, or join the old groups, some of which seem to disappear becoming inactive. These, however, could suddenly return again, without warning. The fact also has to be considered that the participation in itself in the terrorist act doesn’t always see shining examples of champions of a cause, which would lead to the extrapolation of salient features of the terrorist’s profile, starting from that specific subject. Many move and act in the shadows, and constitute the “manpower” essential to the realization of the terrorist act.

The reasons which lead apparently harmless individuals to adhere to the terrorist project can be tied to many factors, among which, the economic convenience – terrorism responds to a question – a social aspiration – terrorism offers the possibility of a social ransom – a psychological condition - terrorism resolves the sense of humiliation (10).

Terrorist groups and members of the group are not easy to classify. In these groups are found individuals which present background, social context, nationality, personality, and also different objectives between them. Many maintain that the elaboration of profiles is a hazard, and it is even more hazardous to create rigid schemes in which to try to adapt every single case.

The theory which holds that terrorists are characterized by “anomalous” personalities, that is, affected by psycho-pathologies is misleading, because at the base of the terrorist act, there is rationality, a demand for coherence, which would be endangered by a disturbed personality. The psychiatric labelling would lead even more to confuse the need of precision which the definition of the profile requires. Besides, the recruiting process of the terrorists is so selective as to guarantee that there are no individuals with pathological attitudes in the groups, because they would be turned out for the obvious reason that they would jeopardize the survival of the group.

The selected terrorist must be a person whose behaviour is absolutely normal and does not raise suspicion. Nevertheless, it is possible, on the analyses of terrorist biographies, to affirm that there exist personalities which are more inclined to adhere to terrorism. It is also possible that a psychopathic individual becomes the leader of a group. A leader like Abu Nidal (leader dell’ANO), Velupillai Prabhakaran (LTTE), Shoko Asahara (Aum Shinrikyo) have been described as affected with psychopathic or socio-pathological disturbances.

The question becomes difficult for the definition of the terrorist profile, when it is discovered that, in general, the terrorist group recruits members whose physical aspect is the most normal as possible. Usually, they are young because terrorism is an intense activity, especially when it requires a military- type training. In the case of the woman, they are recruited to undertake attacks in certain situations in which they attract less attention and they are better able than men to control themselves under particular conditions of stress. The levels of education are exceedingly varied.

The leaders are often older, which means they can be from 30 years upwards. Their educational level is, generally, higher and this variable seems to affect the longevity, or not, of the group. The political analysis on the part of these leaders is often lucid, by reason of the strong ideological influences they have received. The newness in the characterization of the personality of the leader is not in the degree of culture, at all, but in the change in motivations, which from political they have become religious. The religious motivations are seen to be, in these recent years, more dangerous, insofar as they involve the use of arms of mass destruction to reach Messianic and apocalyptic objectives.

If the terrorists cannot be identified through the personality and physical aspect, are there other indicators which could lead to preventive identification? Some analysts reply that information on the selected individuals must be collected (but how is the selection made?), from which a file with descriptions, photographs etc., can be created, like threats on the part of the terrorist groups.

The thing is dubious, because the file can turn out to be ineffective, as in the case of Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, who, notwithstanding, presented peculiar characteristics and was on a list of people under observation, he passed through the United States’ Customs undisturbed. In fact, the idea that the terrorist in action can betray himself due to the stress to which he is submitted is confuted by the fact that, normally, the terrorists – particularly, the women, are able to cope with the pressure.

As indicators, those derived from the analyses of the cases already emerged, remain: age group, level of education, the ethnic group to which the subject belongs, nationality, etc.

The discussion goes back to what has been said at the beginning, and the proposed solutions by experts in Europe, as in the United States, converge and demonstrate the weakness of the strongest means at our disposal in the face of a panorama, so vast and multi-faceted.

If a young foreigner presents himself at the frontier, claims to be a student, has a healthy appearance, is around 20 years old, of Egyptian, Jordanian, Yemenite, Iraqi, Algerian, Syrian or Sudanese nationality, or perhaps Arabic with a British passport, in this exact order, then, Hudson sustains (11), further checks must be made, because these characteristics, in general, converge with those of the member-type of the Arabs, so- called “Afghani” of Osama Bin Laden.

Security and prevention

That the EU commits itself to find absolutely essential technological solutions, in the strategy of conflict, is important. However, it is difficult to believe that if an infinity of information is gathered on any individual, without the elaboration of an interpretive grid, to adopt already at the moment of collection of the data, this data can contribute to prevention. For example, the registration of people’s movements is extremely important in the phase of re-construction after the event, or when there is a signalling. It is not useful in prevention, considering that millions of people move every day.

The tragic 11th September experience tells us that the terrorist appears extremely normal. The collection of information, therefore, must start from a thorough study of the terrorist reality.Numerous reflections and analyses exist on the subject, some also based on direct contact with terrorists and on the collection of their life stories: with socio-economic, psychiatric, political-ideological and other interpretations. Nevertheless, the systemization is completely lacking. The juridical approaches to the problem, different in the EU and in the United States, for example, do not allow a true cooperation in this field.

What is more, the perception that restrictive measures must be adopted to fight the situation, still exists. On the contrary, it is necessary to increase the possibility of potential terrorists to enter “normal” aggregations, leaving the groups, schools, associations to proliferate, allowing major circulation, on the other hand, intensifying the checking. Certainly, this requires major commitment, above all, of force in the field, but permits the reaching of more satisfactory results, because recruitment starts from the innocuous religious association, not from the declared extremist group.

A systematic reflection on the profile of the terrorist is lacking. Analysts and experts must finally dedicate themselves at a national, European and international level. One must not search for the terrorist through his profile, first; paradoxically, one must look him straight in the face.

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Note

1. Council of the European: Draft Council Recommendation on the Development of Terrorist Profiles, Brussels, 14th Oct. 2002, 11858/1/2. Rev. 1 LIMITE ENFOPOL, 117.

2. This subject has already been treated by a contribution to this same Review, No. 2. 2006, pgs. 45-60, entitled “Terrorism and Religions”.

3. Ref: B. Hayes, “Statewatch Analysis: from the Schengen Information System to SIS II and the Visa Information System: The proposal explained”. 2004.

5. The woman, Muriel Degauque, 38 years old, from a small workers’ town in South Belgium, seems to have been converted to Islam, following her first marriage to an Algerian, becoming a radical activist after her second marriage to a Moroccan. On the 9th November 2005, she drove a vehicle full of explosives against an American convoy in Iraq, but the attack was a failure insomuch as only the woman was killed. Ref: Y. Lempkowicz, Belgium woman carried out suicide attack, in: http:// www.ejpress.org/article/news/4395. (visited in August 2017).

10. “Humiliation”, it is a recurring concept in the world of terrorism – opposed to pride and means your pride is hurt as Moslems or as members of a particular section of society and, in fact, recurs also in the anti-abortion homicides. Al Zawahiri, in her presumed autobiography, defines the “new world order” a humiliation for the Moslems so, therefore, it is better for the young Moslems to bear arms and defend their religion with pride and dignity than be submitted to this humiliation”. Ref: J. Stern. The Protean Enemy, in: Foreign Affairs, July, 2003, pgs.35-43.

11. R. Hudson, The sociology and psychology of terrorism: who becomes a terrorist and why, The Library of Congress, Washington, 1999, pg. 65.

The recent developments in Pakistan’s politics particularly the relations between the civilian government and military, in the background of troubled US-Pakistan relations exacerbated by the November killing of Pakistan soldiers by US drones and killing of Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in May, will have far reaching implications not only for Pakistan, but also for Afghanistan, South Asia, and far beyond.

by Debidatta Aurobinda Mahapatra (EPOS)

EPOS Insights

The recent developments in Pakistan’s politics particularly the relations between the civilian government and military, in the background of troubled US-Pakistan relations exacerbated by the November killing of Pakistan soldiers by US drones and killing of Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in May, will have far reaching implications not only for Pakistan, but also for Afghanistan, South Asia, and far beyond. Though the controversies surrounding relationship of civilian government with military leadership is nothing new in Pakistan’s political history, but the recent developments in which the serving Prime Minister openly challenged the military on the floor of Parliament may be construed as a bold step and strong attempt to hold to reins of power despite the news of the military’s discomfiture over the ‘memogate’ and the developments aftermath.

One of the prominent newspapers of Pakistan, The Nation, in its report on 23 December 2011 covered in detail the speech of Prime Minister Yusuf Raja Gilani on the floor of Parliament on 22 December 2011, in which he took strong position in pronouncing the policies of his government and its approach towards the army. Gilani, known for his cool demeanor and conciliatory approach took a strong position and declared that Pakistan people cannot tolerate, ‘a state within a state,’ which was an indirect reference to army. He argued, “If they (the military) say that they are not under the ministry of defence, then we should get out of this slavery, then this parliament has no importance, this system has no importance, then you are not sovereign.” He strongly pitched his case for a civilian government by arguing, “Nobody is above the law, all the institutions are subservient to the parliament.” The same day he told at the National Arts Gallery in Islamabad, “I want to make it clear today that conspiracies are being hatched here to pack up the elected government,” and made the resolve of his government, “to fight for the rights of people of Pakistan whether or not we remain in the government.” History stands witness that no democratically government in Pakistan has completed the usual mandated five years in office; hence the determination of the current government to stay in power might have emerged in the background of recent tussles between the military establishment and civilian government which came to power in February 2008.

In fact the tussle started aftermath of the killing of bin Laden on 2nd of May last year, but that remained more latent than active. The beans were spilled in October this year when the Pakistani origin US businessman Mansoor Ijaz revealed that the civilian government had sent a memo to the US General Mike Mullen seeking US support in case of an army takeover, as the killing of Laden was interpreted differently by various quarters in Pakistan. It had certainly eroded the credibility of the army, which had claimed to emerge as a crucial partner in the global war against terrorism. The same businessman also revealed that Pakistan’s Intelligence agency Chief, General Ahmed Shuza Pasha travelled to the Persian Gulf after the killing of Laden to garner support for a coup in Pakistan. Former Pak Army Chief, Ziauddin Butt, who was appointed by Nawaz Sharif but remained in office for few days as Sharif government was overthrown and taken over by General Pervez Musharraf in 1999, told in one of his recent interviews to Pakistan Urdu daily Jung that Laden stayed in Abbotabad in full knowledge of the army and of Musharraf. It may be a rational conjecture that a high profile figure like bin Laden could not have stayed in the military garrison town of Abbotabad, not far from Islamabad, without the knowledge of army or at least some influential segments in the army. The killing might have emerged as a challenge to the formidability of some sections of army establishment which were sympathetic to Laden, but that might have as well dented the credibility of the army which fought militants in Waziristan and claimed to have played major role in the global war against terrorism.

However, this revelation famously called memogate shook the government apparatus in Pakistan and sent into tizzy the relationship between civilian government of Zardari and the army headed by Ashraf Pervez Kayani. Heads started rolling, the first being the Pak Ambassador to Washington, Hussain Haqqani, who allegedly played a key role behind this memo. He was replaced by Sherry Rehman. Similarly, the visit of Zardari to Dubai early December 2011 also shrouded with speculations, which ranged from his sickness to his exile. But all those speculations were unfounded as Zardari returned safe to Pakistan. In meantime, the developments like the Judicial Commission enquiring into the killing of bin Laden raising issues of visas to Americans, and the demand of Army Chief Kayani and Intelligence Chief Pasha that the memogate must be enquired into by the Supreme Court of Pakistan, might have further unsettled the relationship between the civilian government and the military. Taking queue from the Judicial Commission, which raised the issue of visas to Americans, Gilani argued, “I want to ask how was someone (bin Laden) living here for the past six years? On what type of visa was he living here? Why was security not taken care of, if he entered Pakistan without a visa?” This argument indirectly but strongly cast aspersions on the army behind Laden’s sojourn in Abbotabad for six long years.

Gilani further argued, perhaps in a way to reflect the earlier amicable relations between the civilian government and the military, that ‘“In OBL (Osama bin Laden) case, we also stood by the establishment. Though we had some differences but we supported them. After Mumbai attacks, we also supported them and even fired General (Mahmud) Durrani.” Mahmoud Durrani was dismissed on the insistence of the army, which did not like his comments on Mumbai attacks and allegedly involvement of Pak based terrorist groups in the attacks. The Nation rightly pointed out that “the impression which the government tried to create of General Kayani’s meeting with the Prime Minister and his phone call to President Zardari that all the differences have been largely removed was incorrect.” The army’s retort early this month that the pronouncements and actions of the civilian government may lead to ‘grievous consequences’ will further vitiate the relations between the civilian government and the army.

The differences in approaches of civilian government and the military will likely affect Pakistan’s domestic policy as well as foreign policy. While the recent US drone attacks killing many Pak soldiers could bring the two together and strengthened their determination to put a strong face against drone attacks, resulting in the closure of Khyber Pass for NATO vehicles for supplying materials to Afghanistan, the recent differences will spiral Pakistan further down towards instability. It will be difficult to say whether army will take over power, or promote other opposition parties to take over power from Zardari government, but the differences point out two things clearly: that the civilian government has appeared stronger to point out its differences with army in unequivocal terms, and the army appears to have given up ambitions to topple civilian government despite strong differences. In this understanding lies the strength of Pakistan’s democracy, otherwise any instability and chaos will severely jeopardize its capabilities to put a united face in Afghanistan, or even for a stable Pakistan.

Dr Debidatta Aurobinda Mahapatra is part of the research faculty at the Centre for Central Eurasian Studies, University of Mumbai, India, and is a Transcend Media member

It will be naive to believe that the menace of terrorism will wither away with the death of Osama bin Laden in the morning hours of 2nd May 2011. At present juncture it will be difficult to predict what exact course the international terror menace will take in the era after Osama bin Laden, the most inspirational figure among the terrorists worldwide. In fact, the value of Osama was not in his person himself, but rather in the inspiration he was evoking among the terrorists worldwide...

by Debidatta Aurobinda Mahapatra (EPOS)

EPOS Insights

It will be naive to believe that the menace of terrorism will wither away with the death of Osama bin Laden in the morning hours of 2nd May 2011. At present juncture it will be difficult to predict what exact course the international terror menace will take in the era after Osama bin Laden, the most inspirational figure among the terrorists worldwide. In fact, the value of Osama was not in his person himself, but rather in the inspiration he was evoking among the terrorists worldwide, and at the same the kind of awe he was evoking among the peace lovers around the world. His life was almost elusive for more than one decade particularly aftermath of the 9/11 expect some video clips here and there to display the world that he is active and living, and guiding the world terrorism from caves of Tora Bora mountains in or from some other elusive place. His killing in Abbotabad town of Pakistan, less than 100 km from Islamabad, also provides at least partly how Pakistani state holds the clue in this international terrorism gamble.

Osama served a legend and a rallying figure among the terrorists worldwide. His origin in Saudi Arabia to a rich family and his links with organizations like Muslim Brotherhood and radical scholars like Azzam, provided bin Laden two most crucial things to boost the international network for terrorism.

His wealth played a key role in establishing the organisation and his radical ideas provided the needed ideological spin that Islam is in danger, and Al Qaeda, under his guidance could provide a front to challenge perceived injustice against Islam.

However, his primary launch pad was Afghanistan where he was trained by the US forces to fight against the Soviet Union. What appeared to be a propitious moment for the US in collusion with the radical Zia regime of Pakistan, later boomeranged against the US. The extremist religious fervour instilled among the Mujahideen including Osama later appeared to be protracted and widespread to other regions including his promoters.

The US could realize the vehemence of Laden when he declared every US taxpayer as his enemy, and vowed to fight the US and its injustice and his forces attacked World Trade Centre and Pentagon in 2001. What made Osama most dangerous was probably not his declaration of enmity against a particular country or a group of countries, but his intolerance of values democratic and liberal and peaceful. He attempted to give a colour of Crusade against whatever, according to his interpretation, is against Islam.

Two of his statements can be cited here to attest this view point. In October 2003, he evoked the Supreme Power to ‘bestow his triumph upon the Mujahideen everywhere in Palestine, Iraq, Chechnya, Kashmir, the Philippines and Afghanistan.’And in April 2006, he declared that the conflicts in various regions including Somalia, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Chechnya and Pakistani tribal regions as ‘examples of rancorous Crusade war.’ The Al Qaeda and its franchise organizations wreaked havoc and mayhem around the world, leaving no corner untouched.

The killing of Osama may deprive the Al Qaeda and its sister organizations an inspirational figure to rally with. But that in no way sounds death knell to the massive empire he built. Rather, his death may even prove more dangerous for peace in the world.Without any leader, many franchise organizations inspired by Al Qaeda will be masters unto themselves and will indulge in devastative activities around the world. It may not be ruled out that the world will witness retaliatory activities to avenge the killing of Osama. The Taliban has already threatened to avenge the killing.

Reportedly, the Al Qaeda number two, Ayman Al Zawahiri is likely to take over the leadership, and with his long association and experience in organizational skills he will lead the organization with equal vengeance. While Osama provided money and leadership to the organization, it was in fact the Egyptian doctor, Zawahiri who played a key role in strengthening and widening the base of Al Qaeda in various countries including Yemen, Sudan, Philippines, etc.

However, the killing of Osama in the Pakistani town of Abbotabad has raised many questions than answers. Though many leaders around the world have welcomed the killing, it is difficult to ascertain the exact nature of operation and the role of the US and Pakistan in killing the dreaded terrorist. The news reports suggest that the operation was kept in dark from the Pakistan intelligence agencies, while the Pakistani agencies cooperated with the US in tackling terrorism. It is also not yet clear why bin Laden chose to stay in a town which also housed one of Pakistan’s premier military academies.

The mansion in which Osama was staying in highly securitized area less than a kilometre from the academy was built in 2005, and that could not have been possible without cognizance of the Pakistani intelligence agencies. Perhaps the coming days will reveal more about the mystery of his hiding in that particular place, and the role of various agencies involved in the killing operation named operation kill Laden.

The killing will have its impacts not only in Pakistan, but also in the wider region including Af-Pak, South Asia and the wider world. Interestingly, one radical leader in Kashmir, Syed Ali Shah Gilani on 2nd May called Osama a ‘martyr,’ as he fought against injustice. But, he does not elaborate, how the fighting against injustice includes in its ambit killing of innocent civilians across the divide of religions and nation states. The US may rejoice at the sense of victory, but the game in Afghanistan is still on. And Al Qaeda does not end with the end of Osama.

The recent case in which about four hundred Taliban prisoners escaping the prison in Afghanistan, and still the impenetrable Taliban in Afghanistan with formidable networks like Haqani network, and other sister organizations such as Lashkar-e-Toiba, and Jaish-e-Mohammad bring forth the deep rootedness and invincibility of terrorism in Afghanistan with implications for the world.

These organizations will carry forward the mission of Al Qaeda with vengeance. The positive thing that has been achieved with the killing of Osama is that one of the behemoth symbols of terrorism has been wiped out though the menace is still pervasive.

Dr Debidatta Aurobinda Mahapatra is part of the research faculty at the Centre for Central Eurasian Studies, University of Mumbai, India.