Paramilitary forces: A change of bosses?

Few are aware of the fact that the actions of the Defence Ministry are generating considerable resentment in the higher echelons of the Home Ministry. The cause for the current ill feeling is a study paper field by the Indian army, which, if accepted, could considerably reduce the clout of the Home Ministry.

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O. Gupta

November 25, 2013

ISSUE DATE: March 31, 1981

UPDATED: October 1, 2014 13:36 IST

A truck-load of paramilitary forces: A need to define their role

Few are aware of the fact that the actions of the Defence Ministry are generating considerable resentment in the higher echelons of the Home Ministry. The cause for the current ill feeling is a study paper field by the Indian army, which, if accepted, could considerably reduce the clout of the Home Ministry.

The bone of contention is the control of 15 paramilitary outfits made up of about 250,000 men. The paper argues for the rationalised regrouping of all paramilitary forces and the placing of all border-guarding units under the Defence Ministry, with officers from the armed forces. The paper is currently being circulated in the Home Ministry for comments - and the bosses there are not exactly pleased about it.

The controversy has its origins in May 1979. The United Services Institutions (USI) of India is a 111-year-old organisation set up for "the promotion of military art, science and literature". In keeping with its objectives, USI undertakes to publish occasional papers, and organises seminars and lectures by expert on problems of national security.

In fact, so influential is the body that most of the 17 papers published by it to date have formed the basis of many changes and reforms in the organisation and planning of the armed forces. The last chief of the army staff, the late General T.N. Raina accepted as much when he said that several steps he took relating to the retiring age for Army personnel were prompted by a seminar and the subsequent paper published by the USI.

Old Attempt: In the recent case of the paramilitary forces too, what is now being expressed as the official view of the Army was, originally, merely a USI-initiated study paper. Its author was the then Director Military Operations, Lt General M.L. Chibber, who is now the adjutant general. Chibber is the highest authority on the subject and lectures frequently at the National Defence College.

The executive committee of the USI which decided on the Chibber report comprised the then director military training, joint secretary (general) defence, director naval training, director training air headquarters, a retired lieutenant general and a representative of the Finance Ministry. The joint secretary (general) defence was Harminder Singh, a former Army officer. After Chibber completed his work in late 1979, the next executive committee ratified the paper explaining that the views expressed therein had the tacit approval of the top brass of the Army.

Though the argument came out into the open only in 1979, the question of controlling the paramilitary forces has been exercising Army minds ever since the Border Security Force (BSF) took an active part in the 1971 operations against Pakistan. According to a brigadier who operated on the then East Pakistan front, the Army has since raised the issue at every available opportunity, but with little success. But now Glibber's report has given their argument just the impetus it needed.

Arguments: According to a former director general of the BSF, the idea of having a paramilitary force was conceived 150 years ago with the intention that it combine the dual functions of the Army and the police. Over the years their functions have grown and today they are engaged in a variety of activities - war, quelling riots, flood control and even road construction. As things, stand now, a majority of these outfits - among them the BSF, Assam Rifles, and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) - are under the jurisdiction of the Home Ministry. The Railway Protection Force comes under the Railway Ministry while the Shipping and Transport Ministry has charge of the Border Roads Organisation.

Rustamji (left) and Chibber: Big debate

The argument for the takeover of the paramilitary by the Defence Ministry runs that duplicity of roles and dual commands have reduced the potential of these forces in war time and have only meant needless increased spending. The budget for the paramilitary has shot up from Rs 3.2 crore to over Rs 300 crore today.

For example, similar functions are performed by the BSF, Assam Rifles, ITBP and the Uttar Pradesh Special Police Force. Secondly, argues Chibber, the duties of the disputed units have militarised them to such a great extent that they have been oriented to treat citizens of the country as enemies. To substantiate his stand, Chibber points to the fighting of insurgents in Mizoram, the tackling of the Assam situation and the occasional calls for putting down riots. He also states that the days, when ultimatums were issued prior to the actual fighting in a war are over. Conflicts can escalate now at short notice and without immediate provocation.

Strongly Opposed: But senior officers who have been actively involved with the paramilitary are strongly opposed to any such step. Said K.F. Rustamji, the first director general of the BSF: "Nowhere in the world are borders guarded by the Army in peace time. No nation can afford to call in the Army time and again at the mildest provocation. The BSF and other paramilitary forces act as a buffer between the Army and the local police. If such a step is taken, it will greatly reduce the effectiveness of the Home Ministry."

N.S. Saxena, a retired director general of the Central Reserve Police Force, had another argument to offer. Said he: "An army is trained to deal with the enemy. Problems like insurgency are not military problems. Nor are they law and order issues. They are primarily emotional problems. Therefore, the paramilitary is the best instrument to deal with them."

Another officer of the BSF explained that during peace time, the routine requirements are more for the police than the Army. There are instances of encroachment on agricultural land, straying of cattle and poultry, smuggling and sometimes even love affairs across the border. The Army was not required to handle such minor cases, he contended. On the contrary, the Army's presence could worsen a situation.

The Genesis: While Chibber makes a point about high expenditure, a defence expenditure analyst in South Block counterpoints this on the ground that the cost of maintaining an Army battalion is much higher than that of keeping a paramilitary force battalion because it does not require the kind of sophisticated arms that the Army does. If the units are militarily reoriented, he said, it could cost more than an additional Rs 100 crore annually.

Though the arguments from both sides run forcefully, the genesis of the proposal and the subsequent argument lies elsewhere. It lies in the composition of the BSF, the largest of the 15 forces, with more than 100,000 men in its ranks. Of a total of 1,347 officers of the force, 533 are released emergency commissioned officers. 18 are Army officers on deputation and 19 are re-employed Army officers.

These men form a major pressure group within the organisation and are strongly inclined towards the Army culture. In spite of a fair length of time with the BSF, the hangover of the Army remains. The salaries, perks and trappings in the Army are more attractive, and they are unable to forget that. It is this group which has time and again made the BSF alter its uniform's colour, insignia, band el al to make it resemble the Army. What is more, this large slice of officers continues to enjoy the patronage of their godfathers in South Block.

Possible Compromise: The nostalgia of this coterie also coincides with the long-cherished desire of an influential section of the Army's top brass to play a bigger role in public life. If the Army is allowed to guard the borders in normal time and to maintain peace in disturbed areas, it will mean two distinct advantages: for one, a greater amount of money will be theirs to command and, secondly, their political influence will also grow.

Though the Home Ministry hates to admit it, the ITBP, with its management of local defence and anti-guerrilla activities, resembles the Army more than any other paramilitary outfit. The number of army officers in this organisation is also quite large. If a compromise is worked out to solve the current tangle, it is possible that the Home Ministry will relinquish its hold over the ITBP to retain its control over a larger and more prestigious outfit - the BSF.

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