their claim upon the public was for the mere sustenance
they required on service. It is true that this
partial independence of the Government whom they served
rather in the character of volunteers, than of conscripts,
was in a great measure fatal to their discipline;
but in the peculiar warfare of the country, absence
of discipline was rather an advantage than a demerit,
since when checked, or thrown into confusion, they
looked not for a remedy in the resumption of order,
but in the exercise each of his own individual exertions,
facilitated as he was by his general knowledge of
localities, and his confidence in his own personal
resources.

But, although new armies were speedily organized—­if
organized, may be termed those who brought with them
into the contest much courage and devotedness, yet,
little discipline, the Americans, in this instance,
proceeded with a caution that proved their respect
for the British garrison, strongly supported as it
was by a numerous force of Indians. Within two
months after the capitulation of Detroit, a considerable
army, Ohioans and Kentuckians, with some regular Infantry,
had been pushed forward as with a view to feel their
way; but these having been checked by the sudden appearance
of a detachment from Amherstburgh, had limited their
advance to the Miami River, on the banks of which,
and on the ruins of one of the old English forts of
Pontiac’s days, they had constructed new fortifications,
and otherwise strongly entrenched themselves.
It was a mistake, however, to imagine that the enemy
would be content with establishing himself here.
The new fort merely served as a nucleus for the concentration
of such resources of men and warlike equipment, as
were necessary to the subjection, firstly of Detroit,
and afterwards of Amherstburgh. Deprived of the
means of transport, the shallow bed of the Miami aiding
them but little, it was a matter of no mean difficulty
with the Americans to convey through several hundred
miles of forest, the heavy guns they required for
battering, and as it was only at intervals this could
be effected; the most patient endurance and unrelaxing
perseverance being necessary to the end. From
the inactivity of this force, or rather the confinement
of its operations to objects of defence, the English
garrison had calculated on undisturbed security, at
least throughout the winter, if not for a longer period;
but although it was not until this latter season was
far advanced, that the enemy broke up from his entrenchments
on the Miami, and pushed himself forward for the attainment
of his final view, the error of imputing inactivity
to him was discovered at a moment when it was least
expected.

It was during a public ball given at Amherstburgh
on the 18th of January 1813, that the first intelligence
was brought of the advance of a strong American force,
whose object it was supposed was to push rapidly on
to Detroit, leaving Amherstburgh behind to be disposed
of later. The officer who brought this intelligence
was the fat Lieutenant Raymond, who commanding an
outpost at the distance of some leagues had been surprised,
and after a resistance very creditable under the circumstances,
driven in by the American advanced guard with a loss
of nearly half his command.