During fiscal year 1982 the Army moved forward with plans and
programs to develop modern, well-equipped, adequately supported, and fully
trained forces that would be capable of meeting military contingencies wherever
they might arise. Europe and the might of Warsaw Pact forces arrayed along
NATO's eastern flank continued to be the principal threat, and the greater
effort was made to counter it; but the need to have highly mobile, quick
reaction forces available for commitment to other critical areas, such as the
Persian Gulf, was a growing concern.

Early in the fiscal year the Vice Chief of staff directed the
Army staff to prepare a plan that would integrate and provide unified direction
for the Army's force modernization efforts. The result was the Force
Modernization Master Plan (FMMP), which was published in April 1982. It
contained a compendium of modernization goals and objectives, a detailed
"roadmap" for transition of the force from its current structure to a modernized
one, and a methodology for assessing the Army's capability to carry out its
modernization plans. From May to August the Army's major commands assessed their
ability to execute the plan. As the year closed, issues raised by the commands
were being resolved and changes were being incorporated into an updated FMMP to
be published early in fiscal year 1983. Of particular concern was the question
of unit stationing in USAREUR.

The Army 90 Transition Plan, a detailed schedule of the
actions required to implement Army 86 designs for improving the operational
effectiveness of units and increasing the combat effectiveness of both existing
and new systems, formed part of the FMMP. Major features of the plan included
converting units to new designs as major pacing items-such as the Bradley
fighting vehicle and the M1 tank-are received; converting units to transitional
designs as facilities and manpower resources become available, thus improving
the combat effectiveness of the existing force by achieving the capability to
execute advanced tactical concepts using current weapon and support systems;
converting division support commands to the maximum extent possible as

[24]

major pacing items are fielded; and converting reserve
component roundout units at the same time as their parent units in the active
Army. Reserve component divisions and separate brigades would begin converting
in fiscal year 1985. The plan also showed, through an extract from the Force
Accounting System, all currently planned unit activations, inactivations, and
conversions for fiscal years 1984-1992.

A flurry of activity had preceded publication of the first
edition of the FMMP and the Army 90 Transition Plan. During the first quarter of
the fiscal year, the Army staff reviewed tables of organization and equipment
(TOES) for the Army 86 heavy division (Division 86) prepared at TRADOC. The
review process considerably increased the size of certain divisional units, to
the point that there were more people in the division than the force structure
allowed. As a result, TRADOC received instructions in January 1982 to redesign
Division 86 within a prescribed active component ceiling of between 17,750 and
18,750. During the entire month of February a task force representing TRADOC,
USAREUR, FORSCOM (U.S. Army Forces Command), and the Army staff worked at Fort
Leavenworth on a revised Division 86 design and a transition plan for the
divisional reorganization. TRADOC presented the results of the task force's
efforts at a decision briefing on 5 March. Later in the month the Chief of Staff
approved the TRADOC design calling for nine active battalions (five tank and
four mechanized infantry) and one reserve battalion (tank for armor divisions
and mechanized infantry for infantry divisions, mechanized) with the following
changes: all medical companies would be placed in the medical battalion; rifle
squads would have ten members in both M 113- and M2 equipped squads; and the
tenth battalion of USAREUR divisions would be an active rather than reserve
component. To ensure adequate support, the Chief of Staff rejected fielding the
M1 tank and the Bradley fighting vehicle in less than full division sets. He
also approved transition plan guidelines.

Another aspect of Army 86 planning, the airborne-air assault
division, continued under study at TRADOC. As currently developed, the new
airborne division would feature nine infantry battalions plus one mobile
protected gun battalion and a cavalry brigade (air attack) as maneuver units.
Division artillery would contain three direct support battalions equipped with M198 155-mm. howitzers, but no general support battalion. Planning at the close
of the fiscal year envisaged an air assault division built around nine infantry
battalions and a cavalry brigade (air attack) having the capability to lift the
combat elements of two

[25]

maneuver battalions. Artillery components would be the same
as for the airborne division. A decision briefing for the Chief of Staff (CSA)
on operational concepts and force designs was scheduled for early 1983. Upon CSA
approval, TOES will be produced and programming for transition will begin.

On 29 April 1982 the Commander, Combined Arms Center, briefed
the Chief of Staff and major command leaders on the status of Echelons Above
Corps 86 force designs and doctrine. Several issues were identified for further
study, primarily questions regarding functional (stovepipe) and operational
commands. An important result of the meeting was the publication of a draft of
FM 100-16, "Support Operations Echelons Above Corps," which serves as interim
"how to support" doctrine for the Army. During fiscal year 1983 the draft of FM
100-16 will undergo additional review before final publication.

The Army took steps during fiscal year 1982 to further its
High Technology Test Bed (HTTB) program, which consists of TRADOC and DARCOM
assets, as well as those of the 9th Infantry Division, I Corps, and Fort Lewis,
Washington. The program goal is to field a prototype of a strategically
deployable, lean, hard-hitting, and sustainable light division (HTLD) in 1985.
In October 1981 intensive work began on developing this division's operational
concept and organizational designs. In April 1982 the HTLD operational and
organizational design was approved by Headquarters, Department of the Army, and
plans were begun for testing and transition. In May the initial HTLD materiel
requirements were approved, and HTLD funding requirements were added to Army
resourcing documents. In September, plans were completed for transforming a
brigade slice of 9th Infantry Division units to the HTLD configuration in fiscal
year 1983 for evaluation and testing.

The Army initiated, through the joint Chiefs of Staff, an
analytical examination of the potential force mix needed to meet national
security objectives. Major features of the analysis included compiling all
pertinent policy guidance into a single document, establishing a methodology to
consider all facets of relevant variables, defining and refining an applicable
target base, computer modeling, and executing potential force scenarios. The
resulting product will be updated on a continuing basis and refined through the
PPBES (Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System) process to
provide force structures that can be combined with other factors, such as dollar
costs, in order to present a choice of viable alternatives for meeting national
security objectives.

[26]

Force mix analysis efforts and the damage criteria study
noted in last year's summary supported the administration's drive to modernize
and expand U.S. strategic forces. As an active participant in this effort, the
Army tried to ensure that a healthy perspective was maintained on what was
required for a balanced deterrent. While there was no question of the need for
an effective strategic deterrent, the high cost of such systems could lead to a
deficit in the conventional capabilities that were also required for a balanced
deterrent. The Army worked to ensure that conventional forces were neither
neglected nor allowed to deteriorate for, if they were, the result could be
restrictive and undesirable choices in responding to expected challenges from
potential enemies.

In October 1981, the Army began a reorganization of
division-level hospitals to improve medical care for the combat zone. A key
element of the reorganization was changing the surgical hospital (mobile army)
TOE to a new TOE which was given the name mobile army surgical hospital (MASH).
The revised structure was designed to increase mobility and better support a
fast-moving tactical scenario, while at the same time providing an acceptable
emergency surgical-resuscitative capability. In addition to the new MASH, the
reorganization would allocate one combat support hospital and two evacuation
hospitals to each combat division. Full implementation of the reorganization,
which would occur over a five-year period, would increase the number of hospital
beds from 800 to 1,060 and the number of operating rooms from fourteen to
twenty-two in each supported division; would provide a hospital unit that was
staffed and equipped to operate on a continuous 24-hour basis rather than on a
"sustained basis"; and would introduce a highly intensive, surgically oriented
unit which could be located adjacent to the division's rear boundary and which
would provide continuous support-even in-areas where helicopter air ambulances
could not be used.

The Force Development Directorate, ODCSOPS, completed work on
a revision of Army Regulation 71-11, "Total Army Analysis (TAA)," and
publication was scheduled for early fiscal year 1983. The revision changed the
TAA from an annual study to a biennial one. Following a review by the Army staff
and the major commands, the directorate hosted a three-day conference which
began on 14 September 1982 to consider the proposed TAA-89 force for development
in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) covering fiscal years 1985-1989. The
General Officer Steering Committee met on 17 September to resolve issues left
hanging at the conference, to review the base force, and to make

[27]

final recommendations for presentation at the Select
Committee (SELCOM) meeting scheduled for November 1982.

An important element in determining the composition of forces
to be developed is how well they can be sustained overseas under combat
conditions. Important factors in this regard are war reserves, POMCUS, host
nation support, and rationalization, standardization, and interoperability.

In February 1981 the U.S. Army Logistics Evaluation Agency (USALEA)
reported on its study of management policies, procedures, and programs covering
secondary items in the war reserve. The report noted four major problem areas
that hampered effective war reserve management: (1) insufficient central control
and direction; (2) ineffectual or conflicting guidance and inadequate
instructions for preparing war reserve budgets; (3) confusing, conflicting, and
cumbersome selection procedures; and (4) inadequate management information.
Short-range and long-range actions recommended in the report to correct these
problems have been accepted and are being implemented by DARCOM and the Army
staff.

To improve the accuracy of war reserve asset information
reported by major commands, the U.S. Army Logistics Center (LOGCEN) developed
and tested a standard report for worldwide use having common data elements that
would be auditable. The fruit of this effort, the War Reserve Reporting System
(ALS-8), was implemented in June 1982 as part of the Standard Army Intermediate
Level Supply System-Expanded (SAILS-ABX).

The major change in the pre-positioning of materiel
configured to unit sets (POMCUS) during fiscal year 1982 was the realignment of
logistical and medical support packages in the divisional sets. POMCUS fill increased in Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) during the year, but declined in
Central Army Group (CENTAG) because of the effects of redesigned USAREUR force
requirements and POMCUS restructuring. Funding for spare parts has raised the
fill of authorized stockage lists-prescribed stockage lists (ASL-PSL) to an
all-time high.

Construction started on shortage sites for POMCUS division
set five in Belgium and the Netherlands, and land acquisition began in the
Netherlands for set six. Although Congress deleted funding for these sets in the
fiscal year 1982 budget, this presented no problem since land procurement and
site construction had been delayed. A skeletal force from the 7th Support Com-

[28]

mand and a small element of the 54th Area Support Group moved
into the area of Rheinberg, Germany, to plan, coordinate, receive, and provide
initial support for the reinforcing divisions which are part of the NORTHAG
expansion. The 54th Area Support Group will also provide community support
activities for U.S. personnel assigned in the vicinity.

The Army continued to emphasize host nation support (HNS) to
satisfy some of its combat support and combat service support requirements. The
use of HNS resources to complement U.S. military capabilities and force
structure, within the bounds of prudent risk, is considered essential to attain
the support level necessary for maximum combat power of forward deployed and
deploying U.S. forces.

Following lengthy negotiations, the United States and the
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) signed a host nation support agreement on 15
April 1982. It calls for additional negotiations on three technical agreements
covering military support, civilian support, and reinforcement exercises. The
agreement on military support will provide for the formation of German reserve
units containing approximately 93,000 reservists, whose mission will be to
support U.S. air and ground forces in time of crisis or war. As the fiscal year
ended, U.S.-FRG working groups were putting together details of the military
support agreement; the reinforcement exercise agreement was in draft; while work
on the civilian support agreement was expected to get under way early in fiscal
year 1983.

Regarding other NATO-related HNS matters, progress was made
on the preparation of joint logistical support plans to cover the details of
host nation support provided under umbrella and general technical agreements
which the U.S. has signed with Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, the United
Kingdom, Denmark, and Italy. Also, USEUCOM initiated action to establish
logistics coordination cells to operate as in-country extensions of the command
in developing joint logistics support plans.

Host nation support in Korea is provided through the combined defense improvement
projects (CDIP) program, and in Japan by arrangements for base rentals and construction
cost avoidance. Elsewhere in the Pacific, HNS was in a rudimentary state. WESTCOM
(Western Command) has begun the friendly-allied nation support (FANS) program
to determine the ability of countries to provide support. In Southwest Asia,
U.S. policy was to begin discussions with selected countries on possible contingency
support for U.S. Forces Although the political climate has inhibited initiatives,
some progress has been made in the

[29]

areas of access agreements, pre-positioning, and the start of
HNS talks.

In the area of rationalization, standardization, and
interoperability, the primary effort continued to be the establishment of
standardization agreements (STANAG) and interoperable weapons systems,
logistics, equipment, and procedures in order to conserve resources and increase
the combined combat capability of U.S. and allied ground forces. Concept and
doctrinal issues, including AirLand Battle 2000 and land force tactical
doctrine, were also raised. The Army, through participation in an interservice
working group, actively supported the development, operation, and maintenance of
an automated system to manage the status and implementation of standardization
agreements, allied publications, and quadripartite standardization agreements.

The Department of the Army International Rationalization
Office (DAIRO) was disbanded and its functions transferred to the Office of the
Deputy Chief of Staff of Operations and Plans. In conjunction with the demise of
DAIRO, AR 34-1, "U.S. Army Participation in International Military
Rationalization and Standardization Interoperability Programs," and AR 34-2,
"Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability Policy," came under
revision. The result is expected to be a single regulation which will
incorporate both policy and program.

Bilateral Army staff talks were held with the armies of the
Federal Republic of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. AirLand Battle 2000
figured prominently among the topics discussed. The U.S.-Canadian Permanent
Joint Board for Defense and the Canadian-U.S. Cooperation Committee also met to
discuss matters of mutual interest. The Army took part in NATO Army Armaments
Group (NAAG) panels and working groups. At the Military Agency for
Standardization (MAS), the Army participated in the promulgation of 31 new
STANAGs and allied publications, the amendment of 197 others, and various
actions to develop and ratify 109 more. STANAG 2868/ ATP-35(A), Land Force
Tactical Doctrine, was forwarded to participating governments for final review
and is expected to be ratified in early 1983.

Mobilization efforts during fiscal year 1982 focused on the
following issues: reviews of mobilization and deployment planning, continued
development of augmentation and preassignment programs to provide pretrained
individuals to Regular Army

[30]

and reserve component units upon mobilization or in a
national emergency, use of civilian personnel, and industrial mobilization.

Based on initiatives by the Secretary of Defense and Chief of
Staff, the Army conducted two mobilization planning reviews in March 1982. The
first, held on 6 March, considered the Mobilization Acquisition Plan, the update
to the Remedial Action Program, and FORSCOM and TRADOC Remedial Action Program
management. On 25 March the Vice Chief of Staff chaired a general officer
mobilization review which all those in charge of major commands attended. The
meeting's agenda included the Mobilization Aquisition Plan, MOBEX 83, and
mobilization issues facing FORSCOM, TRADOC, and DARCOM. If program deficiencies
uncovered at the meetings are not resolved satisfactorily, both reviews will be
conducted again in fiscal year 1983.

Full implementation of the Army Mobilization and Operation
Planning System (AMOPS) moved forward during the past year with the publication
of AMOPS Volume II, "Strategic Employment of Army Forces," and Volume IV, "Army
Crisis Action System." Volumes I and III had been published in 1981.

Following publication of a critical Inspector General report
in January 1982, the Army staff acted to develop a more timely process for
producing mobilization training requirements. The ODCSOPS Training Directorate
assisted ODCSPER in revising an automated system to give it the capacity to
produce mobilization training requirements. This joint effort neared completion
by the end of the fiscal year. The Mobilization Army Program for Individual
Training (MOB ARPRINT) was significantly refined to reflect course capacities
more accurately and to determine requirements for functional or non-MOS courses.
A special ODCSOPS task force met during the year to prepare a blueprint for
mobilization training in a constrained environment. The task force, called
WARTRAIN, examined manpower, facilities, stationing, base support, manning,
structure, and equipment requirements for providing trained manpower during a
full mobilization. The task force determined that equipment remained the pacing
item for any emergency expansion of the training base, that a continuous review
of equipment availability was necessary to project the effects on training base
capacities, and that there was a need to review and improve mobilization plans
and to focus on a comprehensive training strategy.

Implementation of the retiree preassignment and recall
program gained momentum during fiscal year 1982. The Army began issuing recall
preassignment orders in November 1981, and by the end of fiscal year 1982, more
than 97,000 retirees had

[31]

received "hip pocket" mobilization preassignment orders to
Army installations within the continental United States. Another 2,100 retirees
residing in Europe also received orders. Most were involuntarily assigned
Regular Army retirees under the age of sixty; but some 1,300 were volunteers,
both above and below age sixty and both regular and reserve retirees. Reserve
retirees can be contingently preassigned, but can be recalled only after a
declaration of war or national emergency by Congress, and only after the
Secretary of Defense has concurred with the Secretary of the Army's
determination that no other reservists are available.

During the past year the Army identified approximately 48,000
reserve retirees for preassignment. These assets will be matched against
remaining retiree requirements and, where appropriate, contingent preassignment
orders will be issued in fiscal year 1983. The Army also expanded the retiree
recall program to include preassignment to nondeploying MTOE units.

On 1 October 1981, the Mobilization Designation (MOBDES)
Program was redesignated the Individual Mobilization Augmentation (IMA) Program.
All participants became members of the Selected Reserve and subject to active
duty service under the President's authority to call up 100,000 selected
reservists for a period of one year. In November the program was expanded to
include assignment to active Army MTOE units. This action significantly enlarged
the scope, size, and impact of the Army's premobilization assignment effort and,
for the first time, allowed large numbers of junior enlisted personnel to be
included in the program. By the close of the fiscal year, approximately 7,800
selected reservists were preassigned to positions they would fill upon
mobilization under the IMA Program.

Mobilization of civilians to meet wartime production and
support requirements received unprecedented emphasis during fiscal year 1982.
The Civilian Personnel Center's San Francisco field office conducted a thorough
study of civilian mobilization planning within the continental United States
during the period January-May 1982 to determine how well major Army civilian
personnel offices were carrying out assigned responsibilities in this area. The
study report recommended numerous actions to improve mobilization readiness. One
of the most significant was a complete revision of the Army's regulation on
civilian mobilization planning, which was completed by the close of the fiscal
year.

Other actions taken during fiscal year 1982 to improve
mobilization planning and management included discerning civilian employees who
are reservists or retired military members in

[32]

preparation for automating this data early in fiscal year
1982; identifying civilian positions and employee assignments according to their
status during mobilization; and determining retired military members who serve
in key positions and submitting requests for their exemption from recall to
active duty during a mobilization. In addition, civilian personnel offices
servicing more than one command were directed to establish priorities for
assigning available persons among serviced activities having common requirements
during mobilization. Overseas commands were to determine the CONUS assignments
of civilian employees who would be evacuated in the event of mobilization or
hostilities.

The Army took several actions during fiscal year 1982 in the
area of industrial preparedness to promote the development and maintenance of an
industrial base able to support military operations during peacetime and
mobilization.

Army Regulation 700-90, "Army Industrial Preparedness
Program," published in March 1982, consolidated the Army's policy and procedures
for industrial preparedness into a single document. Three new Department of
Defense regulations -4005.1, "Industrial Resources"; 4005.2, "Industrial
Preparedness Planning"; and 4005.3, "Industrial Preparedness Planning
Manual"- also provided guidance in this area. They were the product of the joint
task force formed to carry out the Department of Defense Action Plan for
improving industrial preparedness, noted in last year's report.

In another joint effort, the Undersecretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering sponsored a triservice committee which drafted a DOD
instruction supporting an expanded Army Industrial Productivity Improvement
program and an Air Force Technology Modernization program. In addition, the
instruction would encourage industry through contract incentives to increase
substantially capital. investments in productivity-enhancing technology,
processes, and modern plants and equipment for defense work. Special emphasis
would be given to increasing the productivity of subcontractors and vendors. By
the close of the fiscal year the proposed program had been informally
coordinated with the military services, with the Defense Logistics Agency, and
with industry and had been well received. Formal coordination and implementation
should be underway early in fiscal year 1983.

ODCSRDA (Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research,
Development, and Acquisition) specialists conducted numerous field trips across
the country in support of the Army's assessments of the industrial base. Prime
contractors and subcontrac-

[33]

tors were visited to determine how well their plants could
respond to multiple demands from the three military services. Extensive
interdependence among weapon systems and the supporting subcontract structure
was discerned. For example, Hughes Aircraft Corporation, the prime contractor
for the AH-64 helicopter, was a subcontractor for the TOW 2 missile. In many
cases, a single contractor supplied the military services with similar products
for use in different weapon systems.

During the spring of fiscal year 1982 the Army assisted the
Department of Commerce in a study to evaluate the nation's need for foundry
capacity during peacetime and during mobilization. The Department of Commerce
was especially interested in assessing the impact of military procurement on the
economy of the country in peace and war. The Army reported that it experienced
no difficulties in meeting casting requirements, even large or unusual ones. The
Department of Commerce study was expected to help the foundry industry project
future business and capital improvements.

The Army's training goal is to develop and sustain a
competent, combat-ready Total Army prepared to mobilize, deploy, fight, and
defeat any enemies of the United States in support of worldwide national
commitments. To this end, the Army must be ready to undertake and support
wartime missions on short notice, regardless of type unit, component, or branch.
Forces must then be sustained through well-planned, -supported, and -executed
mobilization procedures. Despite a changing world environment and threat, the
Army's training mission will not change significantly over time. It will
continue to train and develop soldiers, teams, crews, units, and forces
individually and collectively to become combat-ready combined arms forces.

Well-trained units capable of carrying out their wartime
missions are developed by skilled commanders and leaders who know how to plan,
manage, and conduct mission-oriented training. Approved strategy gives
commanders a long-term focus for Total Army training. It creates an integrated,
war-fighting, mission-oriented theme to prepare active Army and reserve
component forces and establishes the training base for peace and war. Strategy
provides the framework to deal with the changes associated with force
modernization, doctrine, tactics, threat, organization, demography, and
technology and to realize full potential, capitalize on increased capabilities,
and exploit oppor-

[34]

tunities. The training principles of decentralization,
modernization, standardization, and sustainment provide the structure for
follow-up plans of action, such as Army Training 1990, to support the Army
readiness goal: generating and sustaining a modern, combat-ready, well-led, and
supported total force that can fight and win.

Better management of training resources continued to be
emphasized during fiscal year 1982. A major element of this effort was the
Army-wide Standardization Program, which had the objective of standardizing
procedures used by soldiers to operate and maintain major systems, thereby
saving time spent teaching local modifications of basic tasks and reducing
retraining requirements for soldiers joining a new unit. Phase I of the program,
which has already been implemented, was oriented toward combat arms units and
involved drills that relate to soldier-crew functioning on weapons or equipment,
for example, gunnery-crew drills, biological and chemical procedures, and combat
vehicle preoperational checks. Phase II of the program, which began in 1981, was
an ongoing effort by schools, centers, and major commands to identify possible
procedures for standardization. Training and Doctrine Command had overall
responsibility for the program, while schools and centers and designated chiefs
from the Department of the Army standardization branches were responsible for
all aspects of the program which pertained to their specialties. An Inspector
General investigation of the program carried out during fiscal year 1982
uncovered several problems that required attention, which will lead to some
redirection in the coming fiscal year. The inspection report also found that
commanders supported the spirit of standardization and that numerous initiatives
were under way.

Improved management of training resources was also the
objective of the Standards In Training Commission, which was formed to determine
the amount of ammunition needed to train and sustain crews and individuals at a
prescribed readiness level. The commission developed standard training
strategies for thirty-eight weapons systems, which will be implemented in the
field in fiscal year 1984, and identified training ammunition requirements,
which will be used by program and decision makers in preparing and justifying
the fiscal year 1984 budget request. Efforts were begun to expand the scope of
the commission's work to cover management of time, fuel, spare parts, and
training land and ranges.

Training devices and simulations had become increasingly
important in recent years in getting the most out of training

[35]

resources. During the past year a regulation on training
device policy and management was staffed, and publication is expected in fiscal
year 1983. In June 1982 the Training Directorate of ODCSOPS sponsored and the
Army Training Support Center hosted the Army's first Worldwide Training Devices
Conference with the objective of laying out training device strategy-how devices
are developed, acquired, supported, and used. Presentations included the work
and methodology of the Standards in Training Commission, a white paper on
streamlining acquisition of institution-type simulators, and lessons learned
from fielding battle simulation devices. During June and July of 1982 the
Defense Science Board conducted a summer study on training and related
technology. Out of it came a recommendation to consolidate and increase funding
for research in these areas.

The Director of Training, ODCSOPS, chartered the Training
Aids Work Group to develop alternatives and recommend improvements in providing
and supporting efficient and effective training for the active Army and the
reserve components. Participating in the work group would be the Training
Support Division, Directorate of Training, ODCSOPS; ANG; Office, Chief Army
Reserve (OCAR); TRADOC; DARCOM; FORSCOM; USAREUR; and USAHSC. The Training Aids
Work Group would focus its work on policy, management, organization, and
procedures for devices and simulators, literature and graphic aids, and
audiovisual products and user-operated audiovisual equipment. A report of
issues, findings, and recommendations will be provided to the Director of
Training in February 1983.

Field validation testing of the Training Management Control
System (TMACS)-an automated aid to help the unit commander at the battalion,
brigade, or division level to plan training, evaluate the benefits and resource
impact of training plans, and record training accomplished and resources
expended-was successfully completed at Fort Carson, Colorado, in February 1982,
and equipment distribution to the field began. During the period
April-May 1982, FORSCOM held courses for unit trainers in the use of the system
at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The trainers then accepted TMACS equipment into
their units and instructed their own people in its use. By the close of the
reporting period, 215 TMACS sets had been delivered to the field, and the Army
was studying interfaces between TMACS and other systems to further relieve the
training management burden borne by unit commanders.

The opening class of the First Sergeant Course got under way
at the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy on 5 October

[36]

1981. The purpose of the course was to prepare senior
noncommissioned officers for the position of first sergeant in a company,
battery, troop, or similar-sized unit. The curriculum included physical
training, field operations, training management, unit administration, personnel
actions, logistics, unit security, discipline, soldier problems, and
communication skills. Five eight week classes offered in fiscal year 1982 had a
capacity of 312 students. Six classes capable of handling 384 students will be
offered in fiscal year 1983. USAREUR also planned to offer a first sergeant
course in 1983 for some 300 students.

During fiscal year 1982, 2,223 active Army and many reserve
intelligence specialists participated in the Tactical Intelligence Readiness
Training (REDTRAIN) Program. Training was focused on in-unit activities and
intelligence production. For the first time participants included intelligence
specialists assigned to special forces and psychological operations units as
well as personnel from the intelligence staffs of tactical battalions. TROJAN,
an associated program, will bring live intercepted signals to signal
intelligence specialists at two FORSCOM installations in fiscal year 1983 and to
USAREUR's 1st Armored Division.

The Skill Qualification Test (SQT) program continued to come
under fire during fiscal year 1982. At the Army Commander's Conference held in
October 1981 there was general agreement that steps should be taken to
streamline the program, make it more flexible, and minimize the "surge" aspect
of individual training and evaluation. TRADOC received the task of adapting the
program to meet these objections. Staffing of TRADOC's proposals to modify the
SQT was influenced by a draft audit of the program prepared by the General
Accounting Office (GAO), which was released in January 1982. The audit was
highly critical of the program, as was the final GAO report dated 30 March 1982.

On 22 April 1982 the Chief of Staff approved changes to streamline the SQT
program. A core or common-task test would be given to all soldiers up to the
grade of E-4. Rules for administration and the application of results for personnel
management would be flexible and based upon the local commander's judgment.
Hands-on tests of military occupational specialty (MOS) tasks would be designed
by the unit commander; the results of the evaluations would not be used directly
for consideration of promotion, but would be used by supervisors in preparing
the soldier's overall performance rating. Also, performance-based, written tests
of generic MOs skills would be given annually to most soldiers in skill levels
1-4. These test scores would be used

[37]

as objective indicators for promotions and other personnel
management decisions. To improve equity and test validity, as well as simplify
administration, test notices would only list possible tasks to be tested.

These changes closely paralleled recommendations contained in
the GAO's audit report in March. But while the Army supported the thrust of the
GAO's recommendations, it did not agree with the agency's assertion that the SQT
was ineffective. The Army continued to maintain that the SQT was "a principal
tool in the simulation and evaluation of individual skill training and
proficiency," that the program "has been an effective indicator for promotion
and other personnel management decisions," and that, except for a small number
of tests which have been discarded, "SQTs are as valid or more valid than any
comparable test instrument used to assess individual task proficiency."

Meanwhile, following a GAO briefing on the SQT audit,
Congress reduced spending for the program in fiscal year 1982 from $18 million
to $9 million in December 1981. After the Army briefed Congress in June 1982 on
the reforms made in the program, Congress restored $4 million for the
development of SQTs in fiscal year 1983.

Eight brigade task force training rotations were completed
during the first year of operations at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin,
California. Amex Corporation finished installing an extensive instrumentation
system at the center to monitor and evaluate unit performance during live-fire
exercises and force-on-force maneuvers. TRADOC and the Combined Arms Center will
analyze unit performance data to determine "lessons learned" with regard to
training doctrine and tactics.

During fiscal year 1982, Military Operations on Urbanized
Terrain (MOUT) training for NATO and CONUS-based forces continued to be limited
by a lack of training facilities. However, the increased emphasis on MOUT
doctrine and training during the previous year's programming efforts yielded the
Army's first new MOUT training facility at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. This
facility was completed in July 1982 and will serve as a prototype for future
construction in FORSCOM, USAREUR, and WESTCOM. TRADOC's Directorate for Army
Ammunition, Ranges, and Targets (DAART) has also developed a prototype MOUT
facility and a combat assault course for individual skills. FORSCOM is expected
to program some of these facilities for fiscal year 1985 and 1986, depending on
the availability of military construction funds.

Army forces participated in ten exercises directed by the JCS
and thirty-two exercises coordinated by the ICS in fiscal year

[38]

1982 at a cost of $67 million. These included two command
post exercises sponsored by the JCS; two major field training exercises, TEAM
SPIRIT 82 in Korea and BRIGHT STAR 82 in Egypt; and BOLD EAGLE, a large-scale
USCINCRED field training exercise carried out in the continental United States.
Joint exercises provided the opportunity, often not obtainable in any other
training situation, to accomplish specific objectives in the areas of mobility,
command and control, and communications.

REFORGER 82, conducted in September 1982, was the largest JCS
exercise of the year and the fourteenth in the annual series of exercises begun
in 1968. It involved the deployment of over 18,000 Army soldiers and their
equipment from the continental United States to Europe in 212 C-141 and C-5A
aircraft and in 3 roll-on-roll-off (RO-RO) ships, which moved over 1,500 wheeled
and tracked vehicles to Europe. Army CONUS units included most of the 1st
Infantry Division (Mechanized), the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, the 3d Brigade
(-) of the 82d Airborne Division, the III Corps battle staff, and an engineer
battalion of the USAR.

Over 58,000 USAREUR soldiers participated with the CONUS
deploying forces in Europe. CENTAG's CARBINE FORTRESS was a field training
exercise conducted in the central and eastern parts of the Federal Republic of
Germany involving over 72,000 NATO personnel.

Major innovations in REFORGER 82 included a substantial
effort to adhere to and evaluate war plans; a no-notice exercise, GOLDEN
THUNDER, which rapidly deployed an Army battalion from CONUS to Europe;
deployment of a USAR engineer battalion to Europe; deployment from CONUS of two
airborne battalions, which parachuted into Germany; and tactical crossings of
the Rhine and Main rivers.

The Army Study Program is designed to provide the means,
through formal analytic effort, for the Army to examine critical problems and
improve the quality and usefulness of analyses in support of planning,
programming, and budgeting decisions. Studies are defined as a broad class of
intellectual activity characterized by the application of the tools of
operational and systems analysis.

Approximately 360 studies were worked on during fiscal year
1982, about 54 percent of which were continuations of efforts begun earlier. The
studies covered a wide range of topics, from

[39]

innovative concepts to applications of new technology. About
two-thirds of the studies were conducted solely by Army military and civilian
members of study organizations; about half of the balance that were conducted
under contract also had participation by Army study personnel.

Studies related to operations and force structure required
over 55 percent of the in-house analytical staff time and accounted for about 24
percent of the contract funds. Studies dealing with science, technology,
systems, and equipment accounted for about 17 percent of the in-house staff and
about 34 percent of the contract funds. The balance of contract effort (42
percent) was distributed over personnel, logistics, management, intelligence,
and planning studies. Total contract expenditures were about $15 million;
in-house staff time represents about $117 million. Thus the total study program
in fiscal year 1982 was somewhat more than $130 million.

A major new development in support of the Army Study Program
was the establishment of an Army studies and analysis element at the California
Institute of Technology's Jet Propulsion Laboratory. The element, which began
conducting Army studies late in the fiscal year, will meet the need for
forward-looking policy and technical studies to support Army planning and
programming for future change.

During the past year the Chief of Staff changed the
methodology used to choose the subjects addressed by Army studies. Priority
problem area analysis, the previous technique, consisted of ten general
areas-including force design, manpower, modernization, and training-used to
guide studies toward problems of critical importance to the Army. While
logically appealing, the procedure suffered from three basic problems: the
priority areas were very broad; in the field, the problems changed by the time
the elaborate analytical process identified them; and the process was not
universally understood. The Office of the Chief of Staff found no convincing
evidence that the effort expended produced a commensurate improvement in studies
management. After some experimentation with substituting major mission
statements for priority area analysis, the Office of the Chief of Staff issued a
statement on 7 December 1981 of Total Army goals and performance management
initiatives, which directed that each staff agency assign one point of contact
for Army studies.