Trojan Horse

How Israeli Backdoor Technology Penetrated the US =
Government's=20
Telecom System and Compromised National =
Security

by Christopher Ketcham

Since the late 1990s, =
federal agents=20
have reported systemic communications security breaches at =
the=20
Department of Justice, FBI, DEA, the State Department, and =
the White=20
House. Several of the alleged breaches, these agents say, =
can be=20
traced to two hi-tech communications companies, Verint Inc.=20
(formerly Comverse Infosys), and Amdocs Ltd., that =
respectively=20
provide major wiretap and phone billing/record-keeping =
software=20
contracts for the US government. Together, Verint and Amdocs =
form=20
part of the backbone of the government's domestic =
intelligence=20
surveillance technology. Both companies are based in Israel =
=96 having=20
arisen to prominence from that country's cornering of the=20
information technology market =96 and are heavily funded by =
the=20
Israeli government, with connections to the Israeli military =
and=20
Israeli intelligence (both companies have a long history of =
board=20
memberships dominated by current and former Israeli military =
and=20
intelligence officers). Verint is considered the world =
leader in=20
"electronic interception" and hence an ideal private sector=20
candidate for wiretap outsourcing. Amdocs is the world's =
largest=20
billing service for telecommunications, with some $2.8 =
billion in=20
revenues in 2007, offices worldwide, and clients that =
include the=20
top 25 phone companies in the United States that together =
handle 90=20
percent of all call traffic among US residents. The =
companies'=20
operations, sources suggest, have been infiltrated by =
freelance=20
spies exploiting encrypted trapdoors in Verint/Amdocs =
technology and=20
gathering data on Americans for transfer to Israeli =
intelligence and=20
other willing customers (particularly organized crime). "The =
fact of=20
the vulnerability of our telecom backbone is indisputable," =
says a=20
high level US intelligence officer who has monitored the =
fears among=20
federal agents. "How it came to pass, why nothing has been =
done, who=20
has done what =96 these are the incendiary questions." If =
the=20
allegations are true, the electronic communications gathered =
up by=20
the NSA and other US intelligence agencies might be falling =
into the=20
hands of a foreign government. Reviewing the available =
evidence,=20
Robert David Steele, a former CIA case officer and today one =
of the=20
foremost international proponents for "public intelligence =
in the=20
public interest," tells me that "Israeli penetration of the =
entire=20
US telecommunications system means that NSA's warrantless=20
wiretapping actually means Israeli warrantless =
wiretapping."

As early as 1999, the National Security Agency issued a =
warning=20
that records of US government telephone calls were ending up =
in=20
foreign hands =96 Israel's, in particular. In 2002, =
assistant US=20
Attorney General Robert F. Diegelman issued an eyes only =
memo on the=20
matter to the chief information technology (IT) officers at =
the=20
Department of Justice. IT officers oversee everything from =
the kind=20
of cell phones agents carry to the wiretap equipment they =
use in the=20
field; their defining purpose is secure communications. =
Diegelman's=20
memo was a reiteration, with overtones of reprimand, of a =
new IT=20
policy instituted a year earlier, in July 2001, in an =
internal=20
Justice order titled "2640.2D Information Technology =
Security."=20
Order 2640.2D stated that "Foreign Nationals shall not be =
authorized=20
to access or assist in the development, operation, =
management or=20
maintenance of Department IT systems." This might not seem =
much to=20
blink at in the post-9/11 intel and security overhaul. Yet =
2640.2D=20
was issued a full two months before the Sept. 11 attacks. =
What group=20
or groups of foreign nationals had close access to IT =
systems at the=20
Department of Justice? Israelis, according to officials in =
law=20
enforcement. One former Justice Department computer crimes=20
prosecutor tells me, speaking on background, "I've heard =
that the=20
Israelis can listen in to our calls."

Retired CIA counterterrorism and counterintelligence =
officer=20
Philip Giraldi says this is par for the course in the =
history of=20
Israeli penetrations in the US He notes that Israel always =
features=20
prominently in the annual FBI report called "Foreign =
Economic=20
Collection and Industrial Espionage" =96 Israel is second =
only to=20
China in stealing US business secrets. The 2005 FBI report =
states,=20
for example, "Israel has an active program to gather =
proprietary=20
information within the United States. These collection =
activities=20
are primarily directed at obtaining information on military =
systems=20
and advanced computing applications that can be used in =
Israel's=20
sizable armaments industry." A key Israeli method, warns the =
FBI=20
report, is computer intrusion.

In the big picture of US government spying on Americans, =
the=20
story ties into 1994 legislation called the=20
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act,=20
or CALEA, which effected a sea-change in methods of =
electronic=20
surveillance. Gone are the days when wiretaps were conducted =
through on-site tinkering with copper switches. CALEA =
mandated=20
sweeping new powers of surveillance for the digital age, by =
linking=20
remote computers into the routers and hubs of telecom firms =
=96 a=20
spyware apparatus linked in real-time, all the time, to =
American=20
telephones and modems. CALEA made spy equipment an =
inextricable=20
ligature in our telephonic life. Top officials at the FBI =
pushed for=20
the legislation, claiming it would improve security, but =
many field=20
agents have spoken up to complain that CALEA has done =
exactly the=20
opposite. The data-mining techniques employed by NSA in its=20
wiretapping exploits could not have succeeded without the =
technology=20
mandated by CALEA. It could be argued that CALEA is =
the hidden=20
heart of the NSA wiretap scandal.

THE VERINT =
CONNECTION

According to former CIA =
officer=20
Giraldi and other US intelligence sources, software =
manufactured and=20
maintained by Verint, Inc. handles most of American law=20
enforcement's wiretaps. Says Giraldi: "Phone calls are =
intercepted,=20
recorded, and transmitted to US investigators by Verint, =
which=20
claims that it has to be =91hands on' with its =
equipment to=20
maintain the system." Giraldi also notes Verint is =
reimbursed for up=20
to 50 percent of its R&D costs by the Israeli Ministry =
of=20
Industry and Trade. According to Giraldi, the extent of the =
use of=20
Verint technology "is considered classified," but sources =
have=20
spoken out and told Giraldi they are worried about the =
security of=20
Verint wiretap systems. The key concern, says Giraldi, is =
the issue=20
of a "trojan" embedded in the software.

A Trojan in information security hardware/software is a =
backdoor=20
that can be accessed remotely by parties who normally would =
not have=20
access to the secure system. Allegations of massive Trojan =
spying=20
have rocked the Israeli business community in recent years. =
An AP=20
article in 2005 noted, "Top Israeli blue chip =
companies=85are=20
suspected of using illicit surveillance software to steal=20
information from their rivals and enemies." Over 40 =
companies have=20
come under scrutiny. "It is the largest cybercrime case in =
Israeli=20
history," Boaz Guttmann, a veteran cybercrimes investigator =
with the=20
Israeli national police, tells me. "Trojan horse espionage =
is part=20
of the way of life of companies in Israel. It's a culture of =
spying."

This is of course the culture on which the US depends for =
much of=20
its secure software for data encryption and telephonic =
security.=20
"There's been a lot discussion of how much we should trust =
security=20
products by Israeli telecom firms," says Philip Zimmerman, =
one of=20
the legendary pioneers of encryption technology (Zimmerman =
invented=20
the cryptographic and privacy authentication system known as =
Pretty=20
Good Privacy, or PGP, now one of the basic modern standards =
for=20
communications encryption). "Generally speaking, I wouldn't =
trust=20
stuff made overseas for data security," says Zimmerman. "A =
guy at=20
NSA InfoSec" =96 the information security division of the =
National=20
Security Agency =96 "once told me, =91Foreign-made crypto is =
our=20
nightmare.' But to be fair, as our domestic electronics =
industry=20
becomes weaker and weaker, foreign-made becomes inevitable." =
Look at=20
where the expertise is, Zimmerman adds: Among the ranks of =
the=20
International Association for Cryptological Research, which =
meets=20
annually, there is a higher percentage of Israelis than any =
other=20
nationality. The Israeli-run Verint is today the provider of =
telecom=20
interception systems deployed in over 50 countries.

Carl Cameron, chief politics correspondent at Fox News =
Channel,=20
is one of the few reporters to look into federal agents' =
deepening=20
distress over possible trojans embedded in Verint =
technology. In a=20
wide-ranging four-part investigation into Israeli-linked =
espionage=20
that aired in December 2001, Cameron made a number of =
startling=20
discoveries regarding Verint, then known as Comverse =
Infosys.=20
Sources told Cameron that "while various FBI inquiries into =
Comverse=20
have been conducted over the years," the inquiries had "been =
halted=20
before the actual equipment has ever been thoroughly tested =
for=20
leaks." Cameron also noted a 1999 internal FCC document =
indicating=20
that "several government agencies expressed deep concerns =
that too=20
many unauthorized non-law enforcement personnel can access =
the=20
wiretap system." Much of this access was facilitated through =
"remote=20
maintenance."

Immediately following the Cameron report, Comverse =
Infosys=20
changed its name to Verint, saying the company was =
"maturing." (The=20
company issued no response to Cameron's allegations, nor did =
it=20
threaten a lawsuit.) Meanwhile, security officers at DEA, an =
adjunct=20
of the Justice Department, began examining the agency's own=20
relationship with Comverse/Verint. In 1997, DEA transformed =
its=20
wiretap infrastructure with the $25 million procurement from =
Comverse/Verint of a technology called "T2S2" =96 =
"translation and=20
transcription support services" =96 with Comverse/Verint =
contracted to=20
provide the hardware and software, plus "support services, =
training,=20
upgrades, enhancements and options throughout the life of =
the=20
contract," according to the "contracts and acquisitions" =
notice=20
posted on the DEA's website. This was unprecedented. Prior =
to 1997,=20
DEA staff used equipment that was developed and maintained =
in-house.=20

But now Cameron's report raised some ugly questions of=20
vulnerability in T2S2.

The director of security programs at DEA, Heidi =
Raffanello, was=20
rattled enough to issue an internal communiqu=E9 on the =
matter, dated=20
Dec. 18, 2001, four days after the final installment in the =
Cameron=20
series. Referencing the Fox News report, she worried that =
"Comverse=20
remote maintenance" was "not addressed in the C&A =
[contracts and=20
acquisitions] process." She also cited the concerns in =
Justice=20
Department order 2640.2D, and noted that the "Administrator" =
=96=20
meaning then DEA head Asa Hutchinson =96 had been briefed. =
Then there=20
was this stunner: "It remains unclear if Comverse personnel =
are=20
security cleared, and if so, who are they and what type of=20
clearances are on record=85.Bottom line we should have =
caught it." On=20
its face, the Raffanello memo is a frightening glimpse into =
a=20
bureaucracy caught with its pants down.

American law enforcement was not alone in suspecting T2S2 =
equipment purchased from Comverse/Verint. In November 2002, =
sources=20
in the Dutch counterintelligence community began airing what =
they=20
claimed was "strong evidence that the Israeli secret service =
has=20
uncontrolled access to confidential tapping data collected =
by the=20
Dutch police and intelligence services," according to the =
Dutch=20
broadcast radio station Evangelische Omroep (EO). In =
January=20
2003, the respected Dutch technology and computing magazine, =
c't, ran a follow-up to the EO scoop, headlined =
"Dutch=20
Tapping Room not Kosher." The article began: "All tapping =
equipment=20
of the Dutch intelligence services and half the tapping =
equipment of=20
the national police force=85is insecure and is leaking =
information to=20
Israel." The writer, Paul Wouters, goes on to discuss the =
T2S2=20
tap-ware "delivered to the government in the last few years =
by the=20
Israeli company Verint," and quoted several cryptography =
experts on=20
the viability of remote monitoring of encrypted "blackbox" =
data.=20
Wouters writes of this "blackbox cryptography":

"=85a very important part of strong cryptography is a =
good=20
random source. Without a proper random generator, or worse, =
with an=20
intentionally crippled random generator, the resulting =
ciphertext=20
becomes trivial to break. If there is one single unknown =
chip=20
involved with the random generation, such as a hardware =
accelerator=20
chip, all bets are off=85.If you can trust the hardware and =
you have=20
access to the source code, then it should theoretically be =
possible=20
to verify the system. This, however, can just not be done =
without=20
the source code."

Yet, as Wouters was careful to add, "when the equipment =
was=20
bought from the Israelis, it was agreed that no one except =
[Verint]=20
personnel was authorized to touch the systems....Source code =
would=20
never be available to anyone."

Cryptography pioneer Philip Zimmerman warns that "you =
should=20
never trust crypto if the source code isn't published. Open =
source=20
code means two things: if there are deliberate backdoors in =
the=20
crypto, peer review will reveal those backdoors. If there =
are=20
inadvertent bugs in the crypto, they too will be discovered. =
Whether=20
the weaknesses are by accident or design, they will be =
found. If the=20
weakness is by design, they will not want to publish the =
source=20
code. Some of the best products we know have been subject to =
open=20
source review: Linux; Apache. The most respected crypto =
products=20
have been tested through open source. The little padlock in =
the=20
corner when you visit a browser? You're going through a =
protocol=20
called Secure Socket Layer. Open source tested and an =
Internet=20
standard. FireFox, the popular and highly secure browser, is =
all=20
open source."

THE CALEA =
CONNECTION

None of US law enforcement's =
problems=20
with Amdocs and Verint could have come to pass without the =
changes=20
mandated by the Communications Assistance for Law =
Enforcement Act of=20
1994, which, as noted, sought to lock spyware into telecom =
networks.=20
CALEA, to cite the literature, requires that terrestrial =
carriers,=20
cellular phone services and other telecom entities enable =
the=20
government to intercept "all wire and oral communications =
carried by=20
the carrier concurrently with their transmission." T2S2 =
technology=20
fit the bill perfectly: Tied into the network, T2S2 =
bifurcates the=20
line without interrupting the data-stream (a T2S2 =
bifurcation is=20
considered virtually undetectable). One half of the =
bifurcated line=20
is recorded and stored in a remote tapping room; the other =
half=20
continues on its way from your mouth or keyboard to your =
friend's.=20
(What is "T2S2"? To simplify: The S2 computer collects and =
encrypts=20
the data; the T2 receives and decrypts.)

CALEA was touted as a law enforcement triumph, the work =
of=20
decades of lobbying by FBI. Director Louis Freeh went so far =
as to=20
call it the bureau's "highest legislative priority." Indeed, =
CALEA=20
was the widest expansion of the government's electronic =
surveillance=20
powers since the Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, =
which=20
mandated carefully limited conditions for wiretaps. Now the=20
government could use coercive powers in ordering telecom =
providers=20
to "devise solutions" to law enforcement's "emerging=20
technology-generated problems" (imposing a $10,000 per day =
penalty=20
on non-compliant carriers). The government's hand would be=20
permanently inserted into the design of the nation's telecom =
infrastructure. Law professor Lillian BeVier, of the =
University of=20
Virginia, writes extensively of the problems inherent to =
CALEA. "The=20
rosy scenario imagined by the drafters cannot survive a =
moment's=20
reflection," BeVier observes. "While it is conventionally =
portrayed=20
as =91but the latest chapter in the thirty year history of =
the federal=20
wiretap laws,' CALEA is not simply the next installment of a =
technologically impelled statutory evolution. Instead, in =
terms of=20
the nature and magnitude of the interests it purports to=20
=91compromise' and the industry it seeks to regulate, in =
terms of the=20
extent to which it purports to coerce private sector =
solutions to=20
public sector problems, and in terms of the foothold it =
gives=20
government to control the design of telecommunications =
networks,=20
the Act is a paradigm shift. On close and =
disinterested=20
inspection, moreover, CALEA appears to embody potentially =
wrong-headed sacrifices of privacy principles, flawed and =
incomplete=20
conceptions of law enforcement's ends and means, and =
an=20
imperfect appreciation of the incompatible incentives of the =
players=20
in the game that would inevitably be played in the =
process of=20
its implementation."(emphasis mine)

The real novelty =96 and the danger =96 of CALEA is that =
telecom=20
networks are today configured so that they are vulnerable to =
surveillance. "We've deliberately weakened the computer and =
phone=20
networks, making them much less secure, much more vulnerable =
both to=20
legal surveillance and illegal hacking," says former DOJ =
cybercrimes=20
prosecutor Mark Rasch. "Everybody is much less secure in =
their=20
communications since the adopting of CALEA. So how are you =
going to=20
have secure communications? You have to secure the =
communications=20
themselves, because you cannot have a secure network. To do =
this,=20
you need encryption. What CALEA forced businesses and =
individuals to=20
do is go to third parties to purchase encryption technology. =
What is=20
the major country that the US purchases IT encryption from =
overseas?=20
I would say it's a small Middle Eastern democracy. What =
we've done=20
is the worst of all worlds. We've made sure that most =
communications=20
are subject to hacking and interception by bad guys. At the =
same=20
time, the bad guys =96 organized crime, terrorist operations =
=96 can=20
very easily encrypt their communications." It is notable =
that the=20
first CALEA-compliant telecom systems installed in the US =
were=20
courtesy of Verint Inc.

THE AMDOCS =
CONNECTION

If a phone is dialed in the =
US, Amdocs=20
Ltd. likely has a record of it, which includes who you =
dialed and=20
how long you spoke. This is known as transactional call =
data.=20
Amdocs' biggest customers in the US are AT&T and =
Verizon, which=20
have collaborated widely with the Bush Administration's =
warrantless=20
wiretapping programs. Transactional call data has been =
identified as=20
a key element in NSA data mining to look for "suspicious" =
patterns=20
in communications.

Over the last decade, Amdocs has been the target of =
several=20
investigations looking into whether individuals within the =
company=20
shared sensitive US government data with organized crime =
elements=20
and Israeli intelligence services. Beginning in 1997, the =
FBI=20
conducted a far-flung inquiry into alleged spying by an =
Israeli=20
employee of Amdocs, who worked on a telephone billing =
program=20
purchased by the CIA. According to Paul Rodriguez and J. =
Michael=20
Waller, of Insight Magazine, which broke the story in =
May of=20
2000, the targeted Israeli had apparently also facilitated =
the=20
tapping of telephone lines at the Clinton White House =
(recall Monica=20
Lewinsky's testimony before Ken Starr: the president, she =
claimed,=20
had warned her that "a foreign embassy" was listening to =
their phone=20
sex, though Clinton under oath later denied saying this). =
More than=20
two dozen intelligence, counterintelligence, law-enforcement =
and=20
other officials told Insight that a "daring =
operation," run=20
by Israeli intelligence, had "intercepted telephone and =
modem=20
communications on some of the most sensitive lines of the US =
government on an ongoing basis." Insight's chief=20
investigative reporter, Paul Rodriguez, told me in an e-mail =
that=20
the May 2000 spy probe story "was (and is) one of the =
strangest I've=20
ever worked on, considering the state of alert, concern and=20
puzzlement" among federal agents. According to the =
Insight=20
report, FBI investigators were particularly unnerved over=20
discovering the targeted Israeli subcontractor had somehow =
gotten=20
his hands on the FBI's "most sensitive telephone numbers, =
including=20
the Bureau's =91black' lines used for wiretapping." "Some of =
the=20
listed numbers," the Insight article added, "were =
lines that=20
FBI counterintelligence used to keep track of the suspected =
Israeli=20
spyoperation. The hunted were =
tracking the=20
hunters." Rodriguez confirmed the panic this caused in =
American=20
Intel"It's a huge security nightmare," one senior US =
official told=20
him. "The implications are severe," said a second official. =
"All I=20
can tell you is that we think we know how it was done," a =
third=20
intelligence executive told Rodriguez. "That alone is =
serious=20
enough, but it's the unknown that has such deep =
consequences." No=20
charges, however, were made public in the case. (What =
happened=20
behind the scenes depends on who you talk to in law =
enforcement:=20
When FBI counterintelligence sought a warrant for the =
Israeli=20
subcontractor, the Justice Department strangely refused to=20
cooperate, and in the end no warrant was issued. FBI =
investigators=20
were baffled.)

London Sunday Times reporter Uzi Mahnaimi quotes =
sources=20
in Tel Aviv saying that during this period e-mails from =
President=20
Clinton had also been intercepted by Israeli intelligence.=20
Mahnaimi's May 2000 article reveals that the operation =
involved=20
"hacking into White House computer systems during intense=20
speculation about the direction of the peace process." =
Israeli=20
intelligence had allegedly infiltrated a company called =
Telrad,=20
subcontracted by Nortel, to develop a communications system =
for the=20
White House. According to the Sunday Times, "Company =
managers=20
were said to have been unaware that virtually undetectable =
chips=20
installed during manufacture made it possible for outside =
agents to=20
tap into the flow of data from the White House."

In 1997, detectives with the Los Angeles Police =
Department,=20
working in tandem with the Secret Service, FBI, and DEA, =
found=20
themselves suffering a similar inexplicable collapse in=20
communications security. LAPD was investigating Israeli =
organized=20
crime: drug runners and credit card thieves based in Israel =
and=20
L.A., with tentacles in New York, Miami, Las Vegas, and =
Egypt. The=20
name of the crime group and its members remains classified =
in=20
"threat assessment" papers this reporter obtained from LAPD, =
but the=20
documents list in some detail the colorful scope of the =
group's=20
operations: $1.4 million stolen from Fidelity Investments in =
Boston=20
through sophisticated computer fraud; extortion and =
kidnapping of=20
Israelis in LA and New York; cocaine distribution in =
connection with=20
Italian, Russian, Armenian and Mexican organized crime; =
money=20
laundering; and murder. The group also had access to =
extremely=20
sophisticated counter-surveillance technology and data, =
which was a=20
disaster for LAPD. According to LAPD internal documents, the =
Israeli=20
crime group obtained the unlisted home phone, cell phone, =
and pager=20
numbers of some 500 of LAPD's narcotics investigators, as =
well as=20
the contact information for scores of federal agents =96 =
black info,=20
numbers unknown even to the investigators' kin. The Israelis =
even=20
set up wiretaps of LAPD investigators, grabbing from =
cell-phones and=20
landlines conversations with other agents =96 FBI and DEA, =
mostly =96=20
whose names and phone numbers were also traced and grabbed. =

LAPD was horrified, and as the word got out of the =
seeming total=20
breakdown in security, the shock spread to agents at DEA, =
FBI and=20
even CIA, who together spearheaded an investigation. It =
turned out=20
that the source of much of this black Intel could be traced =
to a=20
company called J&J Beepers, which was getting its phone =
numbers=20
from a billing service that happened to be a subsidiary of =
Amdocs.=20

A source familiar with the inquiries into Amdocs put to =
me=20
several theories regarding the allegations of espionage =
against the=20
company. "Back in the early 1970s, when it became clear that =
AT&T was going to be broken up and that there was an =
imminent=20
information and technology revolution, Israel understood =
that it had=20
a highly-educated and highly-worldly population and it made =
a few=20
calculated economic and diplomatic discoveries," the source =
says.=20
"One was that telecommunications was something they could =
do:=20
because it doesn't require natural resources, but just =
intellect,=20
training and cash. They became highly involved in=20
telecommunications. Per capita, Israel is probably the =
strongest=20
telecommunications nation in the world. AT&T break-up =
occurs in=20
1984; Internet technology explodes; and Israel has all of =
these=20
companies aggressively buying up contracts in the form of =
companies=20
like Amdocs. Amdocs started out as a tiny company and now =
it's the=20
biggest billing service for telecommunications in the world. =
They=20
get this massive telecommunications network underway. Like =
just=20
about everything in Israel, it's a government sponsored =
undertaking.=20

"So it's been argued that Amdocs was using its billing =
records as=20
an intelligence-gathering exercise because its executive =
board over=20
the years has been heavily peopled by retired and current =
members of=20
the Israeli government and military. They used this as an=20
opportunity to collect information about worldwide telephone =
calls.=20
As an intelligence-gathering phenomenon, an analyst with an =
MIT=20
degree in algorithms would rather have 50 pages of who =
called who=20
than 50 hours of actual conversation. Think about =
conversations with=20
friends, husbands, wives. That raw information doesn't mean=20
anything. But if there's a pattern of 30 phone calls over =
the course=20
of a day, that can mean a lot. It's a much simpler =
algorithm."

Another anonymous source =96 a former CIA operative =96 =
tells me that=20
US intelligence agents who have aired their concerns about =
Verint=20
and Amdocs have found themselves attacked from all sides. =
"Once it's=20
learned that an individual is doing footwork on this [the=20
Verint/Amdocs question], he or she is typically identified =
somehow=20
as a troublemaker, an instigator, and is hammered =
mercilessly," says=20
the former CIA operative. "Typically, what happens is the =
individual=20
finds him or herself in a scenario where their retirement is =
jeopardized =96 and worse. The fact that if you simply take =
a look at=20
this question, all of a sudden you're an Arabist or =
anti-Semitic =96=20
it's pure baloney, because I will tell you first-hand that =
people=20
whose heritage lies back in that country have heavily worked =
this=20
matter. You can't buy that kind of dedication."

The former CIA operative adds, "There is no defined =
policy, at=20
this time, for how to deal with this [security issues =
involving=20
Israel] =96 other than wall it off, contain it. It's not =
cutting it.=20
Not after 9/11. The funeral pyre that burned on for months =
at the=20
bottom of the rubble told a lot of people they did not need =
to be=20
=91politically correct.' The communications nexuses [i.e.=20
Amdocs/Verint] didn't occur yesterday; they started many =
years ago.=20
And that's a major embarrassment to organizations that would =
like to=20
say they're on top of things and not co-opted or =
compromised. As you=20
start to work this, you soon learn that many people have =
either=20
looked the other way or have been co-opted along the way. =
Some=20
people, when they figure out what has occurred, are highly=20
embarrassed to realize that they've been duped. Because many =
of them=20
are bureaucrats, they don't want to be made to look as =
stupid as=20
they are. So they just go along with it. Sometimes, it's =
just that=20
simple."