Between the SpeciesCopyright (c) 2015 California Polytechnic State University All rights reserved.http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts
Recent documents in Between the Speciesen-usTue, 05 May 2015 14:06:54 PDT3600Review of Kemmerer, Animals and World Religionshttp://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol17/iss1/9
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol17/iss1/9Tue, 08 Jul 2014 10:42:48 PDTSidney Blankenship MAAn Interview with Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlickahttp://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol17/iss1/8
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol17/iss1/8Tue, 08 Jul 2014 10:42:46 PDT
Angus Taylor interviews Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka, authors of Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights (Oxford University Press, 2011).
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Angus TaylorKing of the Meat Eatershttp://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol17/iss1/7
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol17/iss1/7Tue, 08 Jul 2014 10:42:45 PDT
This article is a word for word reproduction of an unexpected resignation speech. It was given as—or rather, in place of—the presidential address of a recent annual meeting of ISEA (the International Society for the Eating of Animals). Because this is a secret society, the speaker’s and the transcriber’s names have been omitted. Those of us who were there for this speech will remember the anger and outrage that it provoked. Many of us still cannot believe the ridiculous spin-off resignations that this underwhelming speech somehow managed to provoke. This speech is reprinted here (where it cannot be returned to sender) so that certain recent members can rethink the irrationality and indefensibility of their recent resignations. At the time, and in the heat of the moment, this speech may have seemed to contain an argument. It does not. Consequently, it should be recognized as the feckless claptrap that it is.
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AnonymousShared Responsibility in a Multispecies Playgroundhttp://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol17/iss1/6
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol17/iss1/6Tue, 08 Jul 2014 10:42:43 PDT
While conducting research on urbanised hyenas in Harar, Ethiopia, I was approached by a young hyena named Willi. In contrast to other hyenas, who tolerated my presence but otherwise had little interest in me, Willi insisted on some kind of engagement. Through biting, chase play, combing, following and standing by one other, Willi and I went beyond our species limitations and created an improvised intersubjectivity based on a will to understand. However, our friendship led to some harmful consequences for which I felt responsible. This led me to question the ethics of engagement with non-humans: if unforeseen harms can result from this kind of friendship, then is it better to keep animals at a safe distance? In the end, I argue that the solution is a deeper engagement, from which we might recognise the capacities of non-humans as agents and learn how to act responsibly in the presence of Others.
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Marcus Baynes-RockRecognizing Nonhuman Moralityhttp://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol17/iss1/5
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol17/iss1/5Tue, 08 Jul 2014 10:42:41 PDT
Claims that some sorts of genuine moral behavior exist in nonhuman beings are increasingly common. Many people, however, remain unconvinced, despite growing acceptance of the remarkable behavioral complexity of animals and despite the admission that there may be significant differences between human and nonhuman moral behavior. This paper argues that the rejection of “moral animals” is misplaced. Yet at the same time, it attempts to show how the philosophical task of exhibiting the possibility of nonhuman moral behavior is often misguided, leaving claims about nonhuman morality unnecessarily exposed to philosophical rejection.
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Simon J. CoghlanKorsgaard and Non-Sentient Lifehttp://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol17/iss1/4
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol17/iss1/4Tue, 08 Jul 2014 10:42:40 PDT
Christine Korsgaard argues for the moral status of animals and our obligations to them. She grounds this obligation on the notion that we share a common identity, our animal nature, with them and that animal pain represents a public reason that binds us; nevertheless, her distinctive attempt to enlist Kantian arguments to account for our obligations to animals has a startling implication that she fails to adequately consider: that we have direct duties to plants as well.
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Gregory L. BockGood Eatshttp://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol17/iss1/3
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol17/iss1/3Tue, 08 Jul 2014 10:42:38 PDT
If one believes that vegetarianism is morally obligatory, there are numerous ways to argue for that conclusion. In this paper, classic utilitarian and rights-based attempts to ground this obligation are considered, as well as Cora Diamond’s reframing of the debate in terms of the proper way to view other animals. After discussion of these three ways to ground the obligation and their problems, an attitude-based approach inspired by Diamond’s view (though different from it in important ways) is advanced. It is argued that such a view, by focusing moral attention on the attitudes of agents as opposed to the actions they undertake, captures the important insights of all three views, while offering a better grounding for the obligation. This view is superior in that it (1) succeeds in explaining the wrongness of a problem case, (2) without committing one to rights or to a troublingly subjective understanding of moral concepts.
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Elizabeth ForemanTowards a coherent theory of animal equalityhttp://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol17/iss1/2
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol17/iss1/2Tue, 08 Jul 2014 10:42:37 PDT
In this article I want to construct in a simple and systematic way an ethical theory of animal equality. The goal is a consistent theory, containing a set of clear and coherent universalized ethical principles that best fits our strongest moral intuitions in all possible morally relevant situations that we can think of, without too many arbitrary elements. I demonstrate that impartiality with a level of risk aversion and empathy with a need for efficiency are two different approaches that both result in the same consequentialist principle of prioritarianism. Next, I discuss that this principle can be trumped by an ethic of care principle of tolerated partiality, and a deontological principle of basic right. These three principles represent different kinds of equality that can be applied to animal ethics. Finally, the predation problem leads to the introduction of a triple-N-principle that is related to the value of biodiversity.
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Stijn BruersNonhuman Animals: Not Necessarily Saints or Sinnershttp://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol17/iss1/1
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol17/iss1/1Tue, 08 Jul 2014 10:42:34 PDT
Higher-order thought theories maintain that consciousness involves the having of higher-order thoughts about mental states. In response to these theories of consciousness, an attempt is often made to illustrate that nonhuman animals possess said consciousness, overlooking an alarming consequence: attributing higher-order thought to nonhuman animals might entail that they should be held morally accountable for their actions. I argue that moral responsibility requires more than higher-order thought: moral agency requires a specific higher-order thought which concerns a belief about the rightness or wrongness of affecting another’s mental states. This “moral thought” about the rightness or wrongness is not yet demonstrated in even the most intelligent nonhuman animals, thus we should suspend our judgments about the “rightness” or “wrongness” of their actions while further questioning the recent insistence on developing an animal morality.
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Cheryl E. AbbateBack Coverhttp://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol9/iss3/17
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol9/iss3/17Thu, 20 Mar 2014 11:59:23 PDTState of the Arkhttp://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol9/iss3/16
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol9/iss3/16Thu, 20 Mar 2014 11:59:22 PDTGeorge SukolComing to Meet the Wolfhttp://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol9/iss3/15
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol9/iss3/15Thu, 20 Mar 2014 11:59:21 PDTMerritt CliftonFireflieshttp://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol9/iss3/14
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol9/iss3/14Thu, 20 Mar 2014 11:59:20 PDTKathryn WinogradPage of Stonehttp://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol9/iss3/13
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol9/iss3/13Thu, 20 Mar 2014 11:59:18 PDTD. L. OlsonFamily Traditionhttp://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol9/iss3/12
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol9/iss3/12Thu, 20 Mar 2014 11:59:17 PDTWe Speak in the First Personhttp://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol9/iss3/11
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol9/iss3/11Thu, 20 Mar 2014 11:59:16 PDT
Submitted by Danne W. Polk of the Philosophy Department, Villanova University, these reflections are the cumulative result of a thought experiment in which the 38 students in an Ecofeminism course were asked to imagine that if nonhuman beings could speak to us and we could understand their languages, what would they say?
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Danne W. PolkBill, Why Do You Stare at That Dog as if He Could Tell You Somethinghttp://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol9/iss3/10
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol9/iss3/10Thu, 20 Mar 2014 11:59:15 PDTBill KaulThe Rights of Students in Courses Using Animalshttp://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol9/iss3/9
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol9/iss3/9Thu, 20 Mar 2014 11:59:14 PDTKaren DavisAhimsa (Noninjury) Revisitedhttp://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol9/iss3/8
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol9/iss3/8Thu, 20 Mar 2014 11:59:13 PDTMichael W. FoxEducated Folly About Animal Minds and Animal Sufferinghttp://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol9/iss3/7
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol9/iss3/7Thu, 20 Mar 2014 11:59:12 PDTWillem A. Landman