On motion of Mr. DICKINSON to postpone
the 1st. Resolution in Mr. Patterson's plan, in order to take up the following
viz  "that the Articles of Confederation ought to be revised and
amended, so as to render the Government of the U.S. adequate to the exigences,
the preservation and the prosperity of the Union" the postponement was
agreed to by 10 States, Pen: divided.

Mr. HAMILTON, had been hitherto silent
on the business before the Convention, partly from respect to others whose
superior abilities age & experience rendered him unwilling to bring forward
ideas dissimilar to theirs, and partly from his delicate situation with respect
to his own State, to whose sentiments as expressed by his Colleagues, he could
by no means accede. The crisis however which now marked our affairs, was too
serious to permit any scruples whatever to prevail over the duty imposed on
every man to contribute his efforts for the public safety & happiness. He
was obliged therefore to declare himself unfriendly to both plans. He was
particularly opposed to that from N. Jersey, being fully convinced, that no
amendment of the Confederation, leaving the States in possession of their
Sovereignty could possibly answer the purpose. On the other hand he confessed he
was much discouraged by the amazing extent of Country in expecting the desired
blessings from any general sovereignty that could be substituted.  As to
the powers of the Convention, he thought the doubts started on that subject had
arisen from distinctions & reasonings too subtle. A federal Govt. he
conceived to mean an association of independent Communities into one. Different
Confederacies have different powers, and exercise them in different ways. In
some instances the powers are exercised over collective bodies; in others over
individuals, as in the German Diet  & among ourselves in cases of
piracy. Great latitude therefore must be given to the signification of the term.
The plan last proposed departs itself from the federal idea, as
understood by some, since it is to operate eventually on individuals. He agreed
moreover with the Honble gentleman from Va. [Mr. R.] that we owed it to our
Country, to do on this emergency whatever we should deem essential to its
happiness. The States sent us here to provide for the exigences of the Union. To
rely on & propose any plan not adequate to these exigences, merely because
it was not 1 clearly within our powers,
would be to sacrifice the means to the end. It may be said that the States
can not ratify a plan not within the purview of the article of
2 Confederation providing for alterations &
amendments. But may not the States themselves in which no constitutional
authority equal to this purpose exists in the Legislatures, have had in view a
reference to the people at large. In the Senate of N. York, a proviso was moved,
that no act of the Convention should be binding untill it should be referred to
the people & ratified; and the motion was lost by a single voice only, the
reason assigned agst. it being, that it might possibly be found an inconvenient
shackle.

The great question is what provision shall we make for the happiness of our
Country? He would first make a comparative examination of the two plans 
prove that there were essential defects in both  and point out such
changes as might render a national one, efficacious.  The great &
essential principles necessary for the support of Government are I. an active &
constant interest in supporting it. This principle does not exist in the States
in favor of the federal Govt. They have evidently in a high degree, the esprit
de corps. They constantly pursue internal interests adverse to those of the
whole. They have their particular debts  their particular plans of finance
&c. All these when opposed to, invariably prevail over the requisitions &
plans of Congress. 2. The love of power. Men love power. The same remarks are
applicable to this principle. The States have constantly shewn a disposition
rather to regain the powers delegated by them than to part with more, or to give
effect to what they had parted with. The ambition of their demagogues is known
to hate the controul of the Genl. Government. It may be remarked too that the
Citizens have not that anxiety to prevent a dissolution of the Genl. Govt. as of
the particular Govts. A dissolution of the latter would be fatal; of the former
would still leave the purposes of Govt. attainable to a considerable degree.
Consider what such a State as Virga. will be in a few years, a few compared with
the life of nations. How strongly will it feel its importance &
self-sufficiency? 3. An habitual attachment of the people. The whole force of
this tie is on the side of the State Govt. Its sovereignty is immediately before
the eyes of the people: its protection is immediately enjoyed by them. From its
hand distributive justice, and all those acts which familiarize & endear
3 Govt. to a people, are dispensed to
them. 4. Force by which may be understood a coertion of laws or
coertion of arms. Congs. have not the former except in few cases. In
particular States, this coercion is nearly sufficient; tho' he held it in most
cases, not entirely so. A certain portion of military force is absolutely
necessary in large communities. Masss. is now feeling this necessity &
making provision for it. But how can this force be exerted on the States
collectively. It is impossible. It amounts to a war between the parties. Foreign
powers also will not be idle spectators. They will interpose, the confusion will
increase, and a dissolution of the Union ensue. 5. influence. he did not
mean corruption, but a dispensation of those regular honors & emoluments,
which produce an attachment to the Govt. Almost all the weight of these is on
the side of the States; and must continue so as long as the States continue to
exist. All the passions then we see, of avarice, ambition, interest, which
govern most individuals, and all public bodies, fall into the current of the
States, and do not flow in the stream of the Genl. Govt. The former therefore
will generally be an overmatch for the Genl. Govt. and render any confederacy,
in its very nature precarious. Theory is in this case fully confirmed by
experience. The Amphyctionic Council had it would seem ample powers for general
purposes. It had in particular the power of fining and using force agst.
delinquent members. What was the consequence. Their decrees were mere signals of
war. The Phocian war is a striking example of it. Philip at length taking
advantage of their disunion, and insinuating himself into their Councils, made
himself master of their fortunes. The German Confederacy affords another lesson.
The authority of Charlemagne seemed to be as great as could be necessary. The
great feudal chiefs however, exercising their local sovereignties, soon felt the
spirit & found the means of, encroachments, which reduced the imperial
authority to a nominal sovereignty. The Diet has succeeded, which tho' aided by
a Prince at its head, of great authority independently of his imperial
attributes, is a striking illustration of the weakness of Confederated
Governments. Other examples instruct us in the same truth. The Swiss cantons
have scarce any Union at all, and have been more than once at war with one
another  How then are all these evils to be avoided? only by such a
compleat sovereignty in the general Governmt. as will turn all the strong
principles & passions above mentioned on its side. Does the scheme of N.
Jersey produce this effect? does it afford any substantial remedy whatever? On
the contrary it labors under great defects, and the defect of some of its
provisions will destroy the efficacy of others. It gives a direct revenue to
Congs. but this will not be sufficient. The balance can only be supplied by
requisitions: which experience proves can not be relied on. If States are to
deliberate on the mode, they will also deliberate on the object of the supplies,
and will grant or not grant as they approve or disapprove of it. The delinquency
of one will invite and countenance it in others. Quotas too must in the nature
of things be so unequal as to produce the same evil. To what standard will you
resort? Land is a fallacious one. Compare Holland with Russia: France or Engd.
with other countries of Europe. Pena. with N. Carola. will the relative
pecuniary abilities in those instances, correspond with the relative value of
land. Take numbers of inhabitants for the rule and make like comparison of
different countries, and you will find it to be equally unjust. The different
degrees of industry and improvement in different Countries render the first
object a precarious measure of wealth. Much depends too on situation.
Cont. N. Jersey & N. Carolina, not being commercial States &
contributing to the wealth of the commercial ones, can never bear quotas
assessed by the ordinary rules of proportion. They will & must fail in their
duty, their example will be followed, and the Union itself be dissolved. Whence
then is the national revenue to be drawn? from Commerce? even from exports which
notwithstanding the common opinion are fit objects of moderate taxation, from
excise, &c &c. These tho' not equal, are less unequal than quotas.
Another destructive ingredient in the plan, is that equality of suffrage which
is so much desired by the small States. It is not in human nature that Va. &
the large States should consent to it, or if they did that they shd. long abide
by it. It shocks too much the 4 ideas of
Justice, and every human feeling. Bad principles in a Govt. tho slow are sure in
their operation and will gradually destroy it. A doubt has been raised whether
Congs. at present have a right to keep Ships or troops in time of peace. He
leans to the negative. Mr. Ps. plan provides no remedy.  If the powers
proposed were adequate, the organization of Congs. is such that they could never
be properly & effectually exercised. The members of Congs. being chosen by
the States & subject to recall, represent all the local prejudices. Should
the powers be found effectual, they will from time to time be heaped on them,
till a tyrannic sway shall be established. The general power whatever be its
form if it preserves itself, must swallow up the State powers. Otherwise it will
be swallowed up by them. It is agst. all the principles of a good Government to
vest the requisite powers in such a body as Congs. Two Sovereignties can not
co-exist within the same limits. Giving powers to Congs. must eventuate in a bad
Govt. or in no Govt. The plan of N. Jersey therefore will not do. What then is
to be done? Here he was embarrassed. The extent of the Country to be governed,
discouraged him. The expence of a general Govt was also formidable; unless there
were such a diminution of expence on the side of the State Govts. as the case
would admit. If they were extinguished, he was persuaded that great oeconomy
might be obtained by substituting a general Govt. He did not mean however to
shock the public opinion by proposing such a measure. On the other hand he saw
no other necessity for declining it. They are not necessary for any of
the great purposes of commerce, revenue, or agriculture. Subordinate authorities
he was aware would be necessary. There must be district tribunals: corporations
for local purposes. But cui bono, the vast & expensive apparatus now
appertaining to the States. The only difficulty of a serious nature which
occurred to him, was that of drawing representatives from the extremes to the
center of the Community. What inducements can be offered that will suffice? The
moderate wages for the 1st. branch would 5
only be a bait to little demagogues. Three dollars or thereabouts he supposed
would be the utmost. The Senate he feared from a similar cause, would be filled
by certain undertakers who wish for particular offices under the Govt. This view
of the subject almost led to him despair that a Republican Govt. could be
established over so great an extent. He was sensible at the same time that it
would be unwise to propose one of any other form. In his private opinion he had
no scruple in declaring, supported as he was by the opinions of so many of the
wise & good, that the British Govt. was the best in the world: and that he
doubted much whether any thing short of it would do in America. He hoped
Gentlemen of different opinions would bear with him in this, and begged them to
recollect the change of opinion on this subject which had taken place and was
still going on. It was once thought that the power of Congs. was amply
sufficient to secure the end of their institution. The error was now seen by
every one. The members most tenacious of republicanism, he observed, were as
loud as any in declaiming agst. the vices of democracy. This progress of the
public mind led him to anticipate the time, when others as well as himself would
join in the praise bestowed by Mr. Neckar on the British Constitution, namely,
that it is the only Govt. in the world "which unites public strength with
individual security."  In every community where industry is
encouraged, there will be a division of it into the few & the many. Hence
separate interests will arise. There will be debtors & creditors &c.
Give all power to the many, they will oppress the few. Give all power to the
few, they will oppress the many. Both therefore ought to have 6
power, that each may defend itself agst. the other. To the want of this check we
owe our paper money, instalment laws &c. To the proper adjustment of it the
British owe the excellence of their Constitution. Their house of Lords is a most
noble institution. Having nothing to hope for by a change, and a sufficient
interest by means of their property, in being faithful to the national interest,
they form a permanent barrier agst. every pernicious innovation, whether
attempted on the part of the Crown or of the Commons. No temporary Senate will
have firmness eno' to answer the purpose. The Senate [of Maryland] which seems
to be so much appealed to, has not yet been sufficiently tried. Had the people
been unanimous & eager, in the late appeal to them on the subject of a paper
emission they would would have yielded to the torrent. Their acquiescing in such
an appeal is a proof of it.  Gentlemen differ in their opinions concerning
the necessary checks, from the different estimates they form of the human
passions. They suppose seven years a sufficient period to give the senate an
adequate firmness, from not duly considering the amazing violence &
turbulence of the democratic spirit. When a great object of Govt. is pursued,
which seizes the popular passions, they spread like wild fire, and become
irresistable. He appealed to the gentlemen from the N. England States whether
experience had not there verified the remark.  As to the Executive, it
seemed to be admitted that no good one could be established on Republican
principles. Was not this giving up the merits of the question: for can there be
a good Govt. without a good Executive. The English model was the only good one
on this subject. The Hereditary interest of the King was so interwoven with that
of the Nation, and his personal emoluments so great, that he was placed above
the danger of being corrupted from abroad  and at the same time was both
sufficiently independent and sufficiently controuled, to answer the purpose of
the institution at home. one of the weak sides of Republics was their being
liable to foreign influence & corruption. Men of little character, acquiring
great power become easily the tools of intermedling Neibours. Sweeden was a
striking instance. The French & English had each their parties during the
late Revolution which was effected by the predominant influence of the former.
 What is the inference from all these observations? That we ought to go as
far in order to attain stability and permanency, as republican principles will
admit. Let one branch of the Legislature hold their places for life or at least
during good behaviour. Let the Executive also be for life. He appealed to the
feelings of the members present whether a term of seven years, would induce the
sacrifices of private affairs which an acceptance of public trust would require,
so so as to ensure the services of the best Citizens. On this plan we should
have in the Senate a permanent will, a weighty interest, which would answer
essential purposes. But is this a Republican Govt., it will be asked? Yes if all
the Magistrates are appointed, and vacancies are filled, by the people, or a
process of election originating with the people. He was sensible that an
Executive constituted as he proposed would have in fact but little of the power
and independence that might be necessary. On the other plan of appointing him
for 7 years, he thought the Executive ought to have but little power. He would
be ambitious, with the means of making creatures; and as the object of his
ambition wd. be to prolong his power, it is probable that in case of a
7 war, he would avail himself of the
emergence, 8 to evade or refuse a
degradation from his place. An Executive for life has not this motive for
forgetting his fidelity, and will therefore be a safer depository of power. It
will be objected probably, that such an Executive will be an elective
Monarch, and will give birth to the tumults which characterize that form of
Govt. He wd. reply that Monarch is an indefinite term. It marks not
either the degree or duration of power. If this Executive Magistrate wd. be a
monarch for life  the other propd. by the Report from the Comtte of the
whole, wd. be a monarch for seven years. The circumstance of being elective was
also applicable to both. It had been observed by judicious writers that elective
monarchies wd. be the best if they could be guarded agst. the tumults
excited by the ambition and intrigues of competitors. He was not sure that
tumults were an inseparable evil. He rather thought this character of Elective
Monarchies had been taken rather from particular cases than from general
principles. The election of Roman Emperors was made by the Army. In Poland
the election is made by great rival princes with independent power, and
ample means, of raising commotions. In the German Empire, the appointment is
made by the Electors & Princes, who have equal motives & means, for
exciting cabals & parties. Might not such a mode of election be devised
among ourselves as will defend the community agst. these effects in any
dangerous degree? Having made these observations he would read to the Committee
a sketch of a plan which he shd. prefer to either of those under consideration.
He was aware that it went beyond the ideas of most members. But will such a plan
be adopted out of doors? In return he would ask will the people adopt the other
plan? At present they will adopt neither. But he sees the Union dissolving or
already dissolved  he sees evils operating in the States which must soon
cure the people of their fondness for democracies  he sees that a great
progress has been already made & is still going on in the public mind. He
thinks therefore that the people will in time be unshackled from their
prejudices; and whenever that happens, they will themselves not be satisfied at
stopping where the plan of Mr. R. wd. place them, but be ready to go as far at
least as he proposes. He did not mean to offer the paper he had sketched as a
proposition to the Committee. It was meant only to give a more correct view of
his ideas, and to suggest the amendments which he should probably propose to the
plan of Mr. R. in the proper stages of its future discussion. He read
9 his sketch in the words following: towit

I. "The Supreme Legislative power of the United States of America to be
vested in two different bodies of men; the one to be called the Assembly, the
other the Senate who together shall form the Legislature of the United States
with power to pass all laws whatsoever subject to the Negative hereafter
mentioned.

II. The Assembly to consist of persons elected by the people to serve for
three years.

III. The Senate to consist of persons elected to serve during good
behaviour; their election to be made by electors chosen for that purpose by the
people: in order to this the States to be divided into election districts. On
the death, removal or resignation of any Senator his place to be filled out of
the district from which he came.

IV. The supreme Executive authority of the United States to be vested in a
Governour to be elected to serve during good behaviour  the election to be
made by Electors chosen by the people in the Election Districts aforesaid 
The authorities & functions of the Executive to be as follows: to have a
negative on all laws about to be passed, and the execution of all laws passed,
to have the direction of war when authorized or begun; to have with the advice
and approbation of the Senate the power of making all treaties; to have the sole
appointment of the heads or chief officers of the departments of Finance, War
and Foreign Affairs; to have the nomination of all other officers (Ambassadors
to foreign Nations included) subject to the approbation or rejection of the
Senate; to have the power of pardoning all offences except Treason; which he
shall not pardon without the approbation of the Senate.

V. On the death, resignation or removal of the Governour his authorities to
be exercised by the President of the Senate till a Successor be appointed.

VI. The Senate to have the sole power of declaring war, the power of
advising and approving all Treaties, the power of approving or rejecting all
appointments of officers except the heads or chiefs of the departments of
Finance War and foreign affairs.

VII. The supreme Judicial authority to be vested in Judges to hold their
offices during good behaviour with adequate and permanent salaries. This Court
to have original jurisdiction in all causes of capture, and an appellative
jurisdiction in all causes in which the revenues of the general Government or
the Citizens of foreign Nations are concerned.

VIII. The Legislature of the United States to have power to institute Courts
in each State for the determination of all matters of general concern.

IX. The Governour Senators and all officers of the United States to be
liable to impeachment for mal- and corrupt conduct; and upon conviction to be
removed from office, & disqualified for holding any place of trust or profit
 All impeachments to be tried by a Court to consist of the Chief or Judge
of the superior Court of Law of each State, provided such Judge shall hold his
place during good behavior, and have a permanent salary.

X. All laws of the particular States contrary to the Constitution or laws of
the United States to be utterly void; and the better to prevent such laws being
passed, the Governour or president of each State shall be appointed by the
General Government and shall have a negative upon the laws about to be passed in
the State of which he is 10 Governour or
President.

XI. No State to have any forces land or Naval; and the Militia of all the
States to be under the sole and exclusive direction of the United States, the
officers of which to be appointed and commissioned by them.

On these several articles he entered into explanatory observations
11 corresponding with the principles of
his introductory reasoning.

11. In the transcript the following
footnote was inserted with reference mark after "observations": "The
speech introducing the plan, as above taken down & written out was seen by
Mr. Hamilton, who approved its correctness, with one or two verbal changes,
which were made as he suggested. The explanatory observations which did not
immediately follow, were to have been furnished by Mr. H. who did not find
leisure at the time to write them out, and they were not obtained. "Judge
Yates, in his notes, appears to have consolidated the explanatory with the
introductory observations of Mr. Hamilton (under date of June 19th, a
typographical error). It was in the former, Mr. Madison observed, that Mr.
Hamilton, in speaking of popular governments, however modified, made the remark
attributed to him by Judge Yates, that they were 'but pork still with a little
change of sauce.'"