On Mar 9, 1:03 am, David Nyman <da...@davidnyman.com> wrote:
> On 8 March 2011 23:42, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > How can they fail to be composite when they include interactions,
> > structures and bindings? What ***are*** you on about?
>
> Say there is a pile of bricks that, under some externally-applied
> description, could be construed as a house; then that pile is what
> there is, not a pile + "a house".

Houses aren't heaps of rubble, they are bricks mortared together. And
why shouldn't I say that such-and-such mortared-together bricks are
a house - the house exists as does the bricks-and-mortar.
> Similarly if a theory says that
> what exists is just micro-physical bricks and their relations, then
> just those things are what one should expect to encounter - not those
> things + an open-ended zoo of higher-order composite entities.
One *should* expect composite entities, because the relationships
and binding between molecules are just the way they get composite
entities get composed. If you mortar bricks together you intend
to build something
> Since
> the theory of micro-bricks in relation supposes these to do all the
> work, what a priori reason would there be to posit additional
> composite entities on top of the bricks themselves?
Well, under reductive explanation, they are not additional. Nor
are they non-existent. They are identified with subsets of their
component parts.
> In fact
> composites command our attention only in the context of observation
> after-the-micro-physical-facts, in the form of the
> non-micro-physical-facts - the so-called "secondary qualities".
So? Something may seem not to be composed of smaller
parts, whilst actually being so.
> To
> dramatise this, Chalmers uses the metaphor of the zombie, for which no
> secondary qualitative composites exist,
Zombies and qualia are another and much more specific
issue.
>nor any apparent need of them.
> That's what I'm on about, but in a more general way.
But it doesn't generalise! The HP is very specific.
We can imagine zombies because we don't understand
the neuron-qualia link. But we do understand the molecule-heat
link, and the brick-house link. So it is insane to say "that is just
mortared-together bricks, not a building".
> David
>
>
>
> > On Mar 8, 9:15 pm, David Nyman <da...@davidnyman.com> wrote:
> >> On 8 March 2011 12:16, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> >> > There are uncontroversial examples of successful reduction, eg
> >> > the reduction of heat to molecular motion. In these cases
> >> > the reduced phenomenon still exists. There is still such
> >> > a thing as heat. People who sincerely think mind is reducible
> >> > to brain states, therefore sincerely hold that mind is not nothing.
> >> > If you think that is mistaken, you need to say why.
>
> >> My point has always been simply to hold materialist theory to account
> >> in its own terms. In these terms, when you have reduced heat to
> >> molecular motion, and thence to its putatively fundamental
> >> micro-constituents, you have thereby shown that there is NO HEAT at
> >> this fundamental level. To be clear: it is NOT the case that there is
> >> molecular motion AND heat;
>
> > It is also not the case that there is molecular motion, that
> > molecular
> > motion is identical to heat, and there is nonetheless no heat.
>
> > It *is* the case that there is molecular motion, *which is* heat.
>
> >>there is JUST molecular motion (or rather
> >> its fundamental constituents). I would remind you that you have been
> >> deploying a similar argument with respect to the formal nature of
> >> mathematics,
>
> > Huh? I have been saying that mathematical terms don't
> > refer. But "heat" does refer. It refers to what "molecular motion"
> > refers to. Two terms, one referent. Likewise "Muhamad Ali"
> > and "Cassius Clay". When someone says "Ali is identical to Clay"
> > they are not asserting the non-existence of either.
>
> >>which was the point of departure for this iteration of
> >> the discussion.
>
> >> Similarly, if you can reduce mind to brain states, and thence to its
> >> micro-constituents, then you have likewise shown that there is NO MIND
> >> at this fundamental level. "Heat" and "mind" are a posteriori mental
> >> constructs, supernumerary to the reduced account;
>
> > Non-existence of referent doesn't follow from redundancy of reference.
> > We don't
> > need both "Clay" and "Ali", but both terms have something
> > to refer to.
>
> >> hence the claimed
> >> "identity" with the reduced material substrate is properly an
> >> additional posit necessitated by the after-the-material-fact of mind
> >> and its constructs.
>
> >> To state this is just to state the Hard Problem.
>
> > Not in the least. You haven't even touched on the nature
> > of experience. All you have done is asserted something
> > of an identification that clearly doesn't apply to other
> > identifications. It is not the case that one of the Morning
> > Star and the Everning Star doesn't exist (which one?)
>
> >> Consequently, what is mistaken about eliminativism is that, since it
> >> must employ the fruits of mind to deny the existence of mind, it is
> >> simply incoherent.
>
> > Whatever. Eliminativism may be the worst rubbish in the
> > world. but it isn't the same thing as reductivism.
>
> >> What is mistaken about materialist identity theory
> >> is that its assumptions force it to collapse two categorically
> >> orthogonal states into one,
>
> > You say they are orthogonal. Maybe they are. But that is quite
> > distinct from your claim that reductions in general are eliminations
>
> >>which is simply to turn the meaning of
> >> "identity" on its head.
>
> > You may think that identification is impossible in this
> > case. But identification still isn't elimination, and it
> > works in some cases even if it doesn't work with mind.
>
> >> This might be acceptable to Humpty Dumpty,
> >> but to a less idiosyncratic user of language it must appear merely ad
> >> hoc and desperate.
>
> > This is getting weirder and weirder. The Hard Problem is
> > a very specific problem to do with the nature of mind and matter.
> > However, successful reductions don't change the *meaning* of
> > identity. If anyone is doing *that* it's you!
>
> >> One can easily see how the "morning star" might be
> >> shown to be one with the "evening star", but the claim that first and
> >> third-person phenomena can be similarly collapsed without residue is
> >> of a very different order.
>
> > Fine. Then the claim is false. But the claimed identification
> > still doesn't *mean* ellimination!!
>
> >>A weaker version (the "easy" option) is
> >> the hope that one type of material state might be reliably correlated
> >> with another (e.g. the neural correlates of consciousness), which is
> >> an empirical possibility; such an approach would permit the theory to
> >> sidestep the orthogonality problem, which lingers stubbornly in the
> >> "hard" corner.
>
> >> I really don't know why you would consider the above account to be
> >> controversial, based on your arguments elsewhere vis-a-vis
> >> mathematical formalism.
>
> > What claims, for heaven's sake? If someone reduces arithmetic
> > to set theory, that doesn;t mean there is no arithmetic.
> > If sets exist, then numbers do, and if sets don't numbers
> > don't. It makes no sense to say that the one exists
> > and the other doesn't. That would be like saying Ali
> > lives and Clay does not, or the morning star
> > has been hit by an asteroid, but the evening star has not
>
> >> Of course I'm not denying that "heat" and
> >> "mind" exist; I'm just saying that nothing of the kind can be
> >> extracted A PRIORI from the fundamental reduction that is the goal and
> >> terminus of micro-physical theory.
>
> > I don't thing anyone has claimed reduction is apriori. And that
> > is at least a third non-equivalent version of the claim.
>
> >>And the point of saying this is to
> >> articulate the Hard Problem in a particularly pointed way,
>
> > You haven't articulated it at all. Your earlier claims
> > about reduction being elimination were general in nature.
>
> >> without all
> >> that distasteful talk of the undead. The end point of reduction is
> >> the a priori elimination of everything composite.
>
> > What?!?!?!?!
>
> >> Hence there are no
> >> zombies in this etiolated picture. There isn't anything composite at
> >> all; nothing above the level of the micro-physical goings-on
> >> themselves.
>
> > How can they fail to be composite when they include interactions,
> > structures and bindings? What ***are*** you on about?
>
> >> Everything else manifests after the fact of observation.
> >> And that really is the Hard Problem.
>
> >> David
>
> >> > On Mar 8, 1:02 am, David Nyman <da...@davidnyman.com> wrote:
> >> >> On 8 March 2011 00:11, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> >> >> > It's rather well known that reductivism and eliminativism are
> >> >> > not equivalent positions, for instance.
> >> >> <snip>
> >> >> > And reductive identity theorists say mind "is" a bunch
> >> >> > of micro physical goings-on, whereas their eliminativist
> >> >> > opponents say mind "Is" nothing at all.
>
> >> >> Yes, indeed they do, as I am very well aware, but I've said why I
> >> >> think that neither of these "well known" positions can adequately
> >> >> address the mind-body issues, which is what we are discussing. My
> >> >> claim is that they are using circular reasoning, assuming the
> >> >> conclusion in the premise, or are simply ignoring the very tools they
> >> >> employ to construct their case. What specifically do you find to be
> >> >> the error in this analysis?
>
> >> > If they are both 100% wrong, that does not make them
> >> > equivalent
>
> >> >> > Either or neither or both of reductivism and eliminativism can
> >> >> > be judged empirically inadequate: in no case does that
> >> >> > make them the same
>
> >> >> I have explained why I think any real distinction between the two in a
> >> >> materialist schema is fundamentally question-begging with respect to
> >> >> the mind-body problem, essentially in the terms Bruno articulated so
> >> >> succinctly.
>
> >> > I don't know what a "question begging distinction" is. People
> >> > who are proposing a theory are allowed to stipulate its principles
>
> >> >> You haven't pointed out what is wrong with my argument,
> >> >> merely that others disagree with it.
>
> >> > I don't recall you giving an argument...just insisting
> >> > that materialism means there is no mind.
>
> >> >> It would be more helpful if you
> >> >> would say simply what you find to be wrong or unclear in what I have
> >> >> said.
>
> >> >> David
>
> >> > There are uncontroversial examples of successful reduction, eg
> >> > the reduction of heat to molecular motion. In these cases
> >> > the reduced phenomenon still exists. There is still such
> >> > a thing as heat. People who sincerely think mind is reducible
> >> > to brain states, therefore sincerely hold that mind is not nothing.
> >> > If you think that is mistaken, you need to say why. If you
> >> > think the mind-to-matter reduction simply fails, that is another
> >> > issue.
> >> > A failed attempt at reduction is not at all the same thing as denialism
>
> >> > --
> >> > You received this message because you are
>
> ...
>
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