On 8 June 1969, President Richard
M. Nixon announced plans for withdrawing 25,000 troops from the Republic of
Vietnam. On 1 September the 9th Infantry Division (less its 3d Brigade), twenty
Reserve units, two engineer battalions, and one Hawk missile battalion returned
to the United States. The systematic withdrawal and reduction of U.S. forces
in Vietnam was under way. At the same time the armed forces of the Republic
of Vietnam began to accept the full responsibility for the nation's defense.
To help the Vietnamese take over and maintain the war effort, the United States
created a so-called Vietnamization program in which Army engineers played an
important part.

In recent
years it has been the policy of the United States to encourage the military
of underdeveloped nations to set up programs for using the countries' own resources
for socioeconomic development. The concept implies not only developing the ability
of governments to provide their people with goods, facilities, and services,
but also, and perhaps of greater importance, developing the people's own capacities.

The objectives of the United States
in Vietnam at this time were threefold. First was military security, which involved
the use of combat units to defeat the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese and
required the destruction of their underground government; second was Vietnamization,
improving the competence of the Vietnamese armed forces to provide continuing
military security. This mission consisted of giving formal training to South
Vietnamese military forces, providing new and modern equipment, and supervising
on-the-job training in the use of that equipment. Third was pacification, promoting
the socioeconomic development of the country in order to establish a local and
national government responsive to the needs of the people and increasing the
participation of the people in government. For the first four years of U.S.
operations in Vietnam, the major objective was military success. By June of
1969, however, emphasis was being placed on pacification and Vietnamization.
Much of the advisory effort of U.S. civilian agencies

[158]

CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL AT QUANG TRI

in Vietnam was directed toward the
support and advancement of the pacification effort, called revolutionary development,
which was sponsored by the government of Vietnam. Military activities in the
area of pacification were directed and integrated by a deputy field force commander
for Civil Operations Revolutionary Development Support, established by U.S.
Ambassador Elsworth Bunker in May 1967. This mission assumed great importance
with the decision to phase down U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The engineers fitted
into pacification chiefly through civic action projects that used non­combat
skills for the benefit of the civilian population. Included in the civic action
program, for example, were the construction and repair of schools, religious
buildings, communications facilities, hospitals, and other public buildings.
The engineers also provided electric power, medical assistance, vocational training,
and education classes. Through such construction and services the engineers
made important contributions to national development.

In spite of the priority accorded
civic action, most of the engineer troop effort remained committed to the support
of units involved in tactical operations and to formal military construction;
after June 1967 the engineers added to these the important duties of civic action
in behalf of the pacification program, which was intended to free the people
from the control of the Viet Cong guerrilla organization.

[159]

VILLAGERS AND ENGINEERS CONSTRUCT PUBLIC FISH MARKET AT RACH KIEN

Tactical
Support

Army engineer tactical support
fell into one of three categories: operational support, base development, or
lines of communication construction. Operational support included combat support
and engineer support to logistical operations. Base development included formal,
funded construction projects and maintenance of facilities. Lines of communication
construction involved the building and maintenance of all surface and air routes
of communication. In the calendar year 1968 the distribution of engineer troop
effort between these three activities was as follows: combat battalions operational
support 44 percent, base development 33 percent, and lines of communication
23 percent; construction battalions devoted 12 percent of their efforts to operational
support, 63 percent to base development, and 24 percent to lines of communication.
The operational support rendered by combat battalions consisted mainly of land
clearing designed to deprive the enemy of concealment along highways and trails
over which combat units had to pass. Operational support by construction battalions
consisted chiefly of revetment and bunker construction, airfield and bridge
repair, and improvements in petroleum product storage, transfer facilities,
and base camp defensive structures. Base development was still a large part
of the engineer effort, a significant por-

[160]

VIETNAMESE BUILD A MASONRY GATE AT BAO LOC for the agriculture school with
the aid of the 116th Engineer Battalion.

tion of which went toward providing
physical accommodations for detachments. Effort directed toward lines of communication
went chiefly into upgrading and making secure certain military essential roads
and bridges throughout Vietnam. This last program had been successful and Viet
Cong interdiction of surface traffic had been reduced substantially since 1965.

During 1968 control of national
and interprovincial roads was transferred from the Vietnamese Ministry of Public
Works to the Vietnamese Defense Ministry, and a more extensive and ambitious
line of communication program was initiated by the joint military command in
Vietnam. This program included those roads designated essential in support of
military operations as well as those contributing to pacification and economic
development. By 1969 the new surface lines of communication program was going
well, as heavy commercial construction equipment arrived in South Vietnam. This
equipment included larger dump trucks, more sophisticated compactors, and front
loaders with nearly three times the capacity of the military standard front
loader. Although the new

[161]

equipment lacked certain tactically
important characteristics such as blackout lights, it had a higher capacity.
To provide spare parts not found in the Army system and to help in maintenance
of the new equipment, a civilian contractor was hired.

U.S. ARMY, VIETNAM,
LINES OF COMMUNICATION
PROGRAM AS OF 1 MAY 1969

Status by Calendar Year

Kilometers

Completed to Central Combined
Committee Standard

897

To be completed to Central
Combined Committee Standard, 1969

441

Completed major and minor repairs

457

To be completed major and minor
repairs, 1969

64

Construction programmed, 1970

943

Construction programmed, 1971

907

The revised program in May 1969
called for 3,709 kilometers of roads to be completed by the end of 1971. The
program was reviewed quarterly and by February 1970 had been adjusted to 3,681
kilometers. The product was to be a two-lane highway built to U.S. highway standards
which if constructed in the United States would reach from Washington, D.C.,
to Las Vegas, Nevada.

The new emphasis on road building
dictated a redistribution of engineer troop effort. The proposed phase-down
of U.S. troops in Vietnam caused a rearrangement of work priorities. Much of
the effort that had been going into base development was rechanneled into the
highway program, not only into actual road building but also into the support
activities involved. Production plants operated by engineer troops but patterned
after stateside industrial layouts produced 340,000 cubic yards of rock and
60,000 tons of asphalt monthly to support the highway program.

Base development programs completed
during this period included more Military Assistance Command advisory sites
and the improvement of aircraft protection facilities, a particularly high priority
item in 1969. Expedient revetments for protecting parked helicopters were demanded
beginning in the spring of 1967. Within a few months some form of protection
by sandbags or earth-filled walls or drums had been provided for each of the
more than four thousand Army helicopters in South Vietnam. The protection sometimes
consisted of revetments arranged in an L-shape, sometimes parallel walls between
adjacent helicopters and, in other instances, walled enclosures in the configuration
of a square with one side missing. Many helicopters soon had revetments in two
or more locations. The hurried effort marked an attempt to reduce damage from
enemy long-range attacks by mortars and rockets. The long helicopter blades
and the height over which protection was desired

[162]

EMPLOYMENT OF ENGINEER
TROOPS, 18TH BRIGADE

February 1969
Percent

March 1969Percent

October 1969Percent

January 1970Percent

Operational Support

48

50

54

47

Base Development

25

18

8.5

6

Lines of Communication

20

32

37.5

47

EMPLOYMENT OF ENGINEER
TROOPS, 20TH BRIGADE

February 1969Percent

March 1969Percent

January 1970Percent

Operational Support

55

46

not available a

Base Development

24

23

not available
a

Lines of Communication

19

31

62

a
Breakdown is not available. The total for the two items is 38 percent. (Chart
6) The effort devoted to operational support included land clearing,
which had become increasingly more important to the engineer command. Clearing
was done not only in support of combat units but also to open up the countryside
and give the Vietnamese farmer more arable land.

created serious problems for engineers,
not the least of which was drainage. The standard revetment stood four feet
high, but some reached twelve feet above the parking surface. Design was made
more difficult by the aviator's insistence that the revetments allow the helicopter
to fly out of them unimpeded. Size and height of maintenance hangars also posed
difficulties. The first prefabricated hangar was built in 1966 and others were
constructed in 1967 and 1968. By 5 May 1969 the 27th Engineer Battalion had
constructed an 11,520-square-foot UH-1 maintenance hangar at Phu Bai; the 815th
Battalion was constructing a 33,450-square-foot hangar at Pleiku; and the 554th
Battalion was constructing an 11,520-square­foot hangar at Cu Chi.

For the Army engineers 1969 was
a year of transition in their support functions. The second half of the year
saw the curtailment of many base construction projects and a consistently high
emphasis on road construction projects. The lines of communication program for
1970 was even more ambitious than that for the year before. The effort expended
by U.S. Army engineers on highway construction was markedly effective in improving
military capability in Vietnam. It was also to be an important legacy to the
people of Vietnam. The opening and upgrading of major highways and feeder roads
provided the people in rural areas access to the cities and permitted transportation
and commerce between cities. For example, in 1966 the little hamlet of Plei
Xo clung tenaciously to its corner of the

[163]

CHART 6-DISTRIBUTION
OF ENGINEER EFFORT, 1965-1970

Central Highlands like a ghost
town that refused to die. Although this primitive settlement was only eighteen
miles from the bustling city of Pleiku, there was no roadway and the farmers
and charcoal makers of Plei Xo brought their merchandise to town on foot. Then
the U.S. Army engineers began to cut Highway 19 west from Pleiku to Duc Co.
By 1969 Plei Xo had a superhighway and a window to the outside world. Sturdy,
thatched homes and bright shops and churches now line both sides of the highway
at Plei Xo. Farmers trade their produce with the people of Pleiku for some of
the comforts of modern life.

Thousands of communities like Plei
Xo have been connected by the most ambitious road-building program in the nation's
history and one of the largest single engineering projects ever undertaken by
the U.S. military in a foreign country. (Map 11) When the project is
completed, modern high-speed roads will tie together the major population centers
of the country. These new asphalt lines of communication have changed traffic
patterns immensely. Instead of an occasional oxcart, steady streams of traffic
now fill the

roads. This change alone has brought
an economic uplift to Vietnam, and the peasant can see for the first time what
the government and the military can do for him.

Civic
Action

Brigadier General Harold R. Parfitt
commented upon his return from Vietnam in November 1969 on the civic action
program:

. . . The special circumstances
in this war have permitted the engineers to do a lot more work than ever before
in nation building. Construction of major road networks, opening of secondary
roads; a multiplicity of revolutionary development; all have contributed to
improving the nation in such a way that the average citizen could see and
appreciate what was being done by US troops to improve his lot. To many people
reared in poverty and misery, this was as meaningful or more so than our efforts
to prevent communist domination of their country.

Civic action was closely allied
with the highway program. Roads, besides being essential to immediate tactical
operations, were a

[166]

necessity for the sustained economic
development of the Republic of Vietnam.

There were other efforts by U.S.
Army engineers that will have a more lasting effect than any road network. Engineers
cleared land and canals and provided earth fills for schools and piers. They
designed projects for water supply systems, electrical power systems, agricultural
and logistical improvements, and irrigation. Although the engineers could devote
their efforts to civic action projects only when their duties to tactical troops
were fulfilled, their achievements in this field along with the civic action
aspect of the highway program led Lieutenant General William R. Peers to comment:
"The psychological impact upon the local population was tremendous. The
outstanding support and cooperation given by the US engineers in this regard
was most commendable."

Typical of the effort expended
by the engineers was the rehabilitation of a small Vietnamese Army training
camp near Qui Nhon. When young engineer Captain Eric A. Kevitz arrived at this
training camp as an adviser, conditions were wretched. The mud­thatched buildings
which served as barracks for the Vietnamese trainees were little more than crumbling
ruins; the straw roofs leaked, and the winds blew sheets of rain through the
windows and the broken walls. The captain decided that he would make every effort
to rehabilitate the camp. His appeal to engineer units in Qui Nhon yielded the
required construction material from surplus or salvage. He then persuaded elements
of the 623d Engineer Construction Company of the Vietnamese Army to guide the
trainees in construction of the new camp. Work began and the captain was everywhere-planning,
manipulating, directing, organizing, and supervising. Within two months eight
new barracks had been built and plans had been approved for twelve more, plus
a kitchen, a dispensary, and two mess halls. A water pump was secured, and a
generator and electrical distribution system began providing light for the camp.
Twelve months after the captain had arrived, thirty barracks had been built.
There was a 25-bed dispensary, two 300­man kitchens, four 200-man mess halls,
a motor pool, an officers' quarters, and a theater. The dreary training camp
had become thoroughly livable through the initiative and aggressiveness of one
young engineer.

Vietnamization

In 1965 the Republic of Vietnam
armed forces had very few engineers. In prior years some individuals who showed
promise had been educated in higher schools of formal engineering, for

[167]

the most part in universities in
Hanoi or France. These graduates, highly proficient in technical engineering,
were concentrated in national centers of engineering administration such as
the office of the chief of engineers of the armed forces of Vietnam, but their
number was small. Most South Vietnamese engineers were poorly trained and unfamiliar
with modern engineer equipment; facilities to provide them with the training
they needed were lacking. Units were poorly equipped and funds for procuring
new equipment were inadequate. From this corps of unskilled and ill-equipped
engineers, the United States sought to develop a well-trained, competent, and
greatly expanded engineer force in South Vietnam.

The low skill level of Vietnamese
Army engineer troops went deeper than a lack of training in engineering methods.
Most Vietnamese simply lacked the education and experience to understand the
rather sophisticated techniques used in modern military construction. The roots
of the problem went back to the French educational system used in Vietnam. Only
the best students reached high school and only the superior and the richest
were educated beyond that level. As a result, most of the men in the armed forces
had almost no formal education. It was therefore necessary for the United States
to provide instruction in such basic subjects as reading and writing before
undertaking any program of formal training in the engineering sciences. Communication
between the instructor, if he was an American, and the Vietnamese pupil was
also a problem. A basic knowledge of English was a necessity in grasping the
more technical terms and concepts. There was also a psychological barrier to
overcome, both in formal training and on-the-job training. Some American instructors
felt that the Vietnamese were of inferior intelligence and unable to learn,
a misconception that came about partly because of the language barrier, partly
because the student lacked specialized training and was unfamiliar with U.S.
engineer equipment and methods. These instructors might appear to be condescending;
the Vietnamese naturally resented the implied superiority. Fortunately, such
cases were the exception rather than the rule. Generally, the relations between
representatives of the respective national engineer organizations were warm,
pleasant, and mutually beneficial. On both sides there was no lack of willingness
to cooperate.

Despite problems, by 1969 the Army
Engineer School at Phu Cuong was training 3,000 Vietnamese officers and enlisted
men a year in many specialized skills. However, the school was still unable
to meet the need for engineers. To supplement the supply of well­trained troops,
the Vietnamese chief of engineers ordered the development of an on-the-job training
program at the unit level.

[168]

Selected instructors were assigned
to units throughout the country to promote the proper training of engineer troops.

A few Vietnamese engineer officers
and noncommissioned officers were sent to the U.S. Army Engineer School at Fort
Belvoir, Virginia, to attend engineering courses. This program will contribute
to an unproved level of engineering competence throughout the Vietnamese Army
in future years.

On-the-Job
Training

The formal engineer training of
Vietnamese soldiers was an ambitious and productive operation. A more important
contribution to the training of engineer troops, however, was made through the
joint participation of Americans and Vietnamese engineers in an extensive on-the-job
training program.

Major General Joseph M. Heiser,
Jr., commanding general of the 1st Logistical Command, proposed the so-called
Buddy System in 1968 to help train the South Vietnamese soldier in logistical
activities such as supply and maintenance. The program aimed at placing Vietnamese
military units under U.S. unit sponsorship so that both the unit and the individual
could benefit from observing and participating in operations by the corresponding
type of U.S. Unit It was logical to apply the concept to engineer units engaged
in formal construction projects. Help in combat support operations by engineer
units also continued to be provided by the previously functioning unit advisers-U.S.
officers and noncommissioned officers assigned to Vietnamese battalions and
larger formations. Feeling that firsthand observation and experience on the
job would be the best way to improve the skills of the Vietnamese Army, he predicted
that the same success that had come out of the Korean Augmentation to the U.S.
Army program in Korea would be derived from the Buddy System in Vietnam. General
Creighton W. Abrams personally approved the Buddy concept in January 1969, and
assigned to U.S. Army unit commanders the responsibility for military training
assistance to the Vietnamese Army. Progress was slow at first, but the impetus
provided when General Theodore J. Conway, the head of logistical activities
on the staff at Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, established Instruct and
Advise Teams to assist Vietnamese units was more than enough to get the project
off the ground. The Buddy System gained momentum and became a tremendously effective
program for modernizing the Vietnamese Army and increasing its combat and support
capabilities. The concept was adopted with enthusiasm by the Army Engi-

[169]

BUDDY SYSTEM IN ACTION

neer, Major General William T.
Bradley, and his subordinate units were soon deeply committed to the program.

Quite often in 1969 and 1970, South
Vietnamese engineer battalions were assigned a joint project with U.S. Army
engineer battalions. Operation SWITCHBLADE which began 15 December 1969 was
one such operation. It involved three Vietnamese land clearing companies, the
218th, the 318th, and the 118th, and the U.S. Army's 62d Battalion, which was
responsible for training the three Vietnamese companies. Vietnamese trainees
were assigned to the several U.S. Army land clearing companies of the battalion
and deployed with their counterparts to War Zone C for forty-five days of land
clearing operations in support of various U.S. combat units. Equipment from
U.S. land clearing companies recently inactivated was used to equip the Vietnamese
units. Upon completion of the training, one Vietnamese land clearing company
was assigned to each of the Vietnamese I, II, and III Corps.

Working beside an American engineer
soldier on a certain piece of equipment, the Vietnamese engineer soldier demonstrated
that he could quickly learn to operate a new machine. Vietnamese

[170]

STUDYING D7E TRACTOR USED IN ROME PLOW OPERATIONS

accompanied Americans on many projects
and learned all phases of engineer operations. The American engineer soon developed
a great respect for the Vietnamese engineer and showed a sincere desire to convey
to his "buddy" as much of his own knowledge as possible. Through maximum
contact and training under the Buddy System, the Vietnamese engineer developed
a noteworthy level of competence. On-the-job training reached all levels of
the South Vietnamese Army and the lowest private developed skills that five
years earlier he would not have even understood. The success of the engineer
program of Vietnamization can be attributed to the adaptability of the Vietnamese
soldier and the determination of the American engineer to convey his own knowledge
and skill.

Equipment
Transfer and the Logistic Legacy

As the U.S. withdrew its forces
from the Republic of Vietnam, it left behind a logistic complex of bases, airfields,
petroleum product and ammunition storage areas, cantonment areas, warehouses,
maintenance shops, utility systems, and lines of communication.

[171]

BRIDGE BUILT BY VIETNAMESE ENGINEERS NEAR TUY HOA

Some prefabricated buildings were
dissembled and transferred from the sites of their original erection in Vietnam
to complexes garrisoned by U.S. troops; other structures were dismantled and
returned to the United States. For the most part, however, the products of millions
of dollars worth of construction by the U.S. Army engineers remain in Vietnam
for the use of the Vietnamese.

As withdrawal from Southeast Asia
began, a typical unit marked for transfer or inactivation continued to perform
its mission as long as possible, then turned over responsibilities and bases
to the Republic of Vietnam armed forces. The transfer of equipment was one of
the most important turnovers. In June 1969 U.S. Engineer units began shifting
equipment to Vietnamese engineer units on a massive scale. On 31 May General
Abrams had set strictly defined criteria for the transfer of equipment under
the Improvement and Modernization Program for the Vietnamese Armed Forces. These
criteria insured that all used U.S. Army equipment was safe to operate, serviceable,
and operable to the extent required for its intended purpose. Replacements for
any missing or defective parts had to be on order for delivery to the Vietnamese
armed forces be-

[172]

AERIAL VIEW OF HIGHWAY 4 AND FEEDER ROAD IN THE DELTA

fore a particular piece of equipment
was considered transferable. During September 1969, units of the 18th Engineer
Brigade transferred approximately 193 separate major items of equipment to the
40th Vietnamese Base Depot, the only engineer base depot of the Vietnamese Army.
In the same month the 20th Engineer Brigade was involved in similar equipment
transfers. The brigade was ordered to provide 200 major items; a single battalion
was designated to coordinate all activities. Units of the brigade were to deliver
end items in acceptable condition to a central collecting point at Long Binh.
Once a substantial number of items was on hand and determined ready for transfer,
a date was set for mutual inspection and receipt with Vietnamese Army representatives
as well as Military Assistance Command advisers. This equipment was subsequently
assigned to engineer units in the field. Some additional items went directly
to the Vietnamese units. Similar arrangements proceeded meanwhile in the 18th
Engineer Brigade. When the 63d Vietnamese Engineer Battalion was activated in
December 1969 at Nha Trang, the U.S. Army's 35th Group provided it with equipment.
The 864th Battalion assisted the new unit by instructing its men on operational
and maintenance procedures required by their

[173]

VIETNAMESE ENGINEERS WORKING ON HIGHWAY 9 NEAR DUC HOA

new equipment. Some new equipment
arriving in Vietnam was transferred directly to Vietnamese engineer units.

Vietnamese engineer construction
units played a more active role in the highway construction program during 1970.
A total of 165 kilometers of road was made the responsibility of the Vietnamese
Army units along with 50 bridges totaling 2,879 meters in length. As Vietnamese
engineers gained experience, additional segments of the highway program were
assigned to them, but the lines of communication construction received a lower
priority than the American engineers had afforded it. Concerned about morale,
the South Vietnamese expended considerable effort on a program aimed at providing
austere housing for military dependents, many of whom had no homes and existed
in a state little better than that of camp followers.

Nevertheless, considerable progress
continued to be made in the highway program. By February 1970, 467 kilometers
of roadway had been completed in the I Corps Tactical Zone. In II Corps Tactical
Zone half of the 1,400 kilometers scheduled for completion by the end of 1970
had been finished. In the Saigon region, 451

[174]

VIETNAMESE OPERATING ROCKCRUSHER AT NUI SAM QUARRY

kilometers of a planned 1,068 had
been completed. An additional 379 kilometers were scheduled for completion in
III Corps Tactical Zone by the end of the year. The Mekong Delta, hampered by
unstable soil and a severe shortage of road building material, continued to
lag behind the rest of the country in receiving major road improvements. Ambitious
plans for the highway system, however, included support operations reaching
beyond 1970 to overcome this gap in the country's total road construction.

The Vietnamization of the engineer
support mission proceeded admirably during 1969 and 1970. Formal and on-the-job
training programs enlarged the construction capabilities of the growing Vietnamese
corps of engineers. The transfer of logistical bases and badly needed machinery
to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam enabled its engineers to apply their
new skills. Senior Vietnamese engineer officers, becoming confident of their
ability, were informally suggesting that they could handle a greater share of
the lines of communication program. The load was being passed to the Vietnamese
and there appeared to be every prospect that they would handle it successfully.

[175]

Cambodian
Incursion

For years North Vietnamese regulars
and Viet Cong had enjoyed the immunity of retreat into sanctuaries established
in Cambodia. To aid the Vietnamization process by depriving the enemy of these
sanctuaries or by seriously impeding his use of them, U.S. and South Vietnamese
forces attacked the strongholds during May and June 1970. U.S. Army engineers
led the way. The area of operations in the south was generally in the portions
of Cambodia known as the Parrot's Beak, the Dog's Head, and the Fishhook, and
in the vicinity of Snoul, Memut, and Krek. In the highlands region the area
of operation was along the axis of Highway 9, west of Pleiku.

Engineer support for the operation
was assigned by the Commanding General, 20th Engineer Brigade, to the 79th Engineer
Group. Engineer resources, in addition to the division battalions and the organic
engineer company in the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, included the 31st and
588th Engineer Battalions (Combat) and the 554th, 92d, and 62d Engineer Battalions
(Construction), as well as several separate companies and detachments. Priority
was at first given to routes of advance and forward tactical airfields, and
later to construction of forward logistical bases at the airfields and all-weather
logistical support routes. The 62d Engineer Battalion was committed primarily
to provide entry into suspected enemy supply and cache areas, a tribute to the
tactical effectiveness of Rome Plow operations.

Accomplishments under tactical pressure
were impressive. Engineer support elements built fifty-six kilometers of new
road, plus twenty-three separate fixed bridges. In addition, twenty fire support
bases were constructed for infantry, armor, and artillery units.

Of particular moment was the tactical
delivery of bridging by CH-47's and Flying Cranes. From Quan Loi, where preassembled
ramp and trestle sections had been stocked, helicopters lifted and placed at
one bridge site both the center trestle and the two connecting spans to each
abutment. The bridge was completed eight hours after the first engineer troops
had arrived by helicopter. In another instance, Flying Cranes delivered a 38-foot
bridge in two trips. These successful deliveries would have been almost impossible
by ordinary means. At the time, all suitable surface transportation was deeply
committed to other critical tasks.

The support operation was an outstanding
success. Once again the engineer soldier, career professional and draftee alike,
demonstrated the willingness and the ability to meet the challenge and overcome
formidable obstacles to accomplish a mission. Seven 20th Brigade engineers were
killed and 132 wounded in this campaign.

[176]

Major General John A. B. Dillard,
the U.S. Army, Vietnam, Engineer and senior Army engineer in Vietnam, was killed
when his helicopter was shot down while he was reconnoitering Highway 509 about
ten miles southwest of Pleiku. Colonel Carroll E. Adams, Jr., Commanding Officer,
937th Engineer Group; Lieutenant Colonel Fred V. Cole, Commanding Officer, 20th
Engineer Battalion; Captain William D. Booth, Aide-de-Camp; Command Sergeant
Major Griffith A. Jones of U.S. Army Engineer Command, Vietnam; and five others
also perished in the crash. Command Sergeant Major Robert W. Elkey was the sole
survivor.