‘’The completed investigation did not support the patient's having had
extended travel to European countries, including the United Kingdom, or travel
to Saudi Arabia. The specific overseas country where this patient’s infection
occurred is less clear largely because the investigation did not definitely link
him to a country where other known vCJD cases likely had been infected.’’

CDC and the Texas Department of State Health Services (DSHS) have completed
the investigation of the recently reported fourth vCJD case in the United
States. It confirmed that the case was in a US citizen born outside the Americas
and indicated that the patient's exposure to the BSE/vCJD agent most likely
occurred before he moved to the United States; the patient had resided in
Kuwait, Russia and Lebanon. The completed investigation did not support the
patient's having had extended travel to European countries, including the United
Kingdom, or travel to Saudi Arabia. The specific overseas country where this
patient’s infection occurred is less clear largely because the investigation did
not definitely link him to a country where other known vCJD cases likely had
been infected.

Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross-
contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been
manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE
statement.

*** why do we not want to do TSE transmission studies on chimpanzees $

5. A positive result from a chimpanzee challenged severly would likely
create alarm in some circles even if the result could not be interpreted for
man. I have a view that all these agents could be transmitted provided a large
enough dose by appropriate routes was given and the animals kept long enough.
Until the mechanisms of the species barrier are more clearly understood it might
be best to retain that hypothesis.

Kuru and Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease of humans and scrapie disease of sheep
and goats were transmitted to squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) that were
exposed to the infectious agents only by their nonforced consumption of known
infectious tissues. The asymptomatic incubation period in the one monkey exposed
to the virus of kuru was 36 months; that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus
of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease was 23 and 27 months, respectively; and that in the
two monkeys exposed to the virus of scrapie was 25 and 32 months, respectively.
Careful physical examination of the buccal cavities of all of the monkeys failed
to reveal signs or oral lesions. One additional monkey similarly exposed to kuru
has remained asymptomatic during the 39 months that it has been under
observation.

snip...

The successful transmission of kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, and scrapie
by natural feeding to squirrel monkeys that we have reported provides further
grounds for concern that scrapie-infected meat may occasionally give rise in
humans to Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.

Recently the question has again been brought up as to whether scrapie is
transmissible to man. This has followed reports that the disease has been
transmitted to primates. One particularly lurid speculation (Gajdusek 1977)
conjectures that the agents of scrapie, kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and
transmissible encephalopathy of mink are varieties of a single "virus". The U.S.
Department of Agriculture concluded that it could "no longer justify or permit
scrapie-blood line and scrapie-exposed sheep and goats to be processed for human
or animal food at slaughter or rendering plants" (ARC 84/77)" The problem is
emphasised by the finding that some strains of scrapie produce lesions identical
to the once which characterise the human dementias"

Whether true or not. the hypothesis that these agents might be
transmissible to man raises two considerations. First, the safety of laboratory
personnel requires prompt attention. Second, action such as the "scorched meat"
policy of USDA makes the solution of the acrapie problem urgent if the sheep
industry is not to suffer grievously.

Transmission of scrapie to the cynomolgus monkey (Macaca fascicularis).

Gibbs CJ Jr, Gajdusek DC.

Nature 236, 73 - 74 (10 March 1972); doi:10.1038/236073a0

Transmission of Scrapie to the Cynomolgus Monkey (Macaca fascicularis)

C. J. GIBBS jun. & D. C. GAJDUSEK

National Institute of Neurological Diseases and Stroke, National Institutes
of Health, Bethesda, Maryland

SCRAPIE has been transmitted to the cynomolgus, or crab-eating, monkey
(Macaca fascicularis) with an incubation period of more than 5 yr from the time
of intracerebral inoculation of scrapie-infected mouse brain. The animal
developed a chronic central nervous system degeneration, with ataxia, tremor and
myoclonus with associated severe scrapie-like pathology of intensive astroglial
hypertrophy and proliferation, neuronal vacuolation and status spongiosus of
grey matter. The strain of scrapie virus used was the eighth passage in Swiss
mice (NIH) of a Compton strain of scrapie obtained as ninth intracerebral
passage of the agent in goat brain, from Dr R. L. Chandler (ARC, Compton,
Berkshire).

IT is of my opinion, that the OIE and the USDA et al, are the soul reason,
and responsible parties, for Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE prion
diseases, including typical and atypical BSE, typical and atypical Scrapie, and
all strains of CWD, and human TSE there from, spreading around the globe.

I have lost all confidence of this organization as a regulatory authority
on animal disease, and consider it nothing more than a National Trading
Brokerage for all strains of animal TSE, just to satisfy there commodity. AS i
said before, OIE should hang up there jock strap now, since it appears they will
buckle every time a country makes some political hay about trade protocol,
commodities and futures. IF they are not going to be science based, they should
do everyone a favor and dissolve there organization.

JUST because of low documented human body count with nvCJD and the long
incubation periods, the lack of sound science being replaced by political and
corporate science in relations with the fact that science has now linked some
sporadic CJD with atypical BSE and atypical scrapie, and the very real threat of
CWD being zoonosis, I believed the O.I.E. has failed terribly and again, I call
for this organization to be dissolved. ...

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE 344 Ewes were experimentally inoculated with brain
homogenate obtained from a U.S. sheep with clinical Nor98-like scrapie.

Recipient ewes are bred annually to examine the placenta for evidence of a
transmissible agent. Placentas shed 2009-2013 were negative.

*** In 2013, one recipient ewe developed an unrelated disease. At
postmortem examination, abundant accumulation of PrPSc was observed only in the
cerebellum of this ewe with much less accumulation in the hindbrain obex. This
confirms that initial inoculation of these ewes has been successful. Monitoring
continues in the remaining ewes of this study.

USA, NORTH AMERICA, MBM (or any potential TSE prion disease) EXPORTS TO THE
WORLD (?) [protected by the BSE MRR policy] $$$

IN my opinion, from the following risk factors i will post below, and the
fact that the OIE and the USDA systematically did away with the BSE GBR system
for the BSE MRR system, for the legal trading all strains of TSE globally, and
the ramifications there from (BSE MRR), MY confidence level of any TSE
regulatory risk assessment is 0...that is ZERO CONFIDENCE LEVEL IN ANY REGARDS
TO THE TSE PRION DISEASES AKA MAD COW DISEASE. The BSE MRR regulations were set
up to fail, and make legal the trading of all strains of TSE prion disease
globally. the consumers were hung out to dry around the globe, and the
ramifications there from will be long and costly thanks to the OIE and the USDA
et al. ...TSS

Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment
of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of United States of America (USA)

Question N° EFSA-Q-2003-083

Adopted July 2004

Summary of scientific report The European Food Safety Authority and its
Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission
(EC) to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in the United States
of America, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being
infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in USA. This scientific
report addresses the GBR of USA as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the
period 1980-2003. The BSE agent was probably imported into USA and could have
reached domestic cattle in the middle of the eighties. These cattle imported in
the mid eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led
to an internal challenge in the early nineties. It is possible that imported
meat and bone meal (MBM) into the USA reached domestic cattle and leads to an
internal challenge in the early nineties. A processing risk developed in the
late 80s/early 90s when cattle imports from BSE risk countries were slaughtered
or died and were processed (partly) into feed, together with some imports of
MBM. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90’s when
domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low
stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with continued
imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries. EFSA concludes that the
current GBR level of USA is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed that
domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent.
As long as there are no significant changes in rendering or feeding, the
stability remains extremely/very unstable. Thus, the probability of cattle to be
(pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the BSE-agent persistently
increases.

Annex to the EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 3, 1-17 on the Assessment of the
Geographical BSE Risk of USA - 1 - European Food Safety Authority Scientific
Expert Working Group on GBR Working Group Report on the Assessment of the
Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2004

Annex to the EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 3, 1-17 on the Assessment of the
Geographical BSE Risk of USA - 7 - 2.3

Overall assessment of the external challenge

The level of the external challenge that has to be met by the BSE/cattle
system is estimated according to the guidance given by the SSC in its final
opinion on the GBR of July 2000 (as updated in January 2002). Live cattle
imports: In total the country imported 2038 (other sources) or 1128 (CD) live
cattle from BSE risk countries other than Canada, of which 327 (other sources)
or 323 (CD) came from the UK. From Canada the imports were >500,000 animals
per year. The numbers shown in table 1 are the raw import figures and are not
reflecting the adjusted imports for the assessment of the external challenge.
Broken down to 5 year periods the resulting external challenge is as given in
table 3. This assessment takes into account the different aspects discussed
above that allow to assume that certain imported cattle did not enter the
domestic BSE-cattle system, i.e. were not rendered into feed. In the case of the
USA, all the animals for which tracing information showed that they were not
rendered were excluded from the external challenge.

MBM imports:

In total the country imported 689 tons MBM (CD) or 2,230 tons MBM (other
sources) from BSE risk countries other than Canada, of which 5 tons (CD) or 101
tons (other sources) were exported from the UK (UK export data). From Canada,
the imports were about 30 000 tons per year. The numbers shown in table 2 are
the raw import figures and are not reflecting the adjusted imports for the
assessment of the external challenge. Broken down to 5 year periods the
resulting external challenge is as given in table 3. This assessment takes into
account the different aspects discussed above that allow to assume that certain
imported MBM did not enter the domestic BSE/cattle system or did not represent
an external challenge for other reasons. As it was illegal to export mammalian
MBM from UK since 27/03/1996, exports indicated after that date should only have
included non-mammalian MBM. In the case of the USA imported MBM from UK in 1989
and between 1997 and 1999 was not taken into account.

Feeding Use of MBM in cattle feed

• Until 1997 ruminant MBM (RMBM) could legally be included in cattle feed
and was indeed commonly fed to cattle of different age and type. Prior to the
feed ban the US authorities estimated that 10% of all MBM would deliberately
have been fed to cattle. Feed bans

• A ban to feed (several types of) MMBM to ruminants was put in place in
August 1997. Derogation from the ban was granted for pure porcine and equine
protein (MBM) coming from designated (single species) rendering plants. This
MMBM might still be fed to cattle. Therefore this feed ban is a ruminant to
ruminant ban.

• It is planned to prohibit the use of all mammalian and poultry protein in
ruminant feed and prohibiting materials from non-ambulatory disabled cattle and
dead stock from use in all animal feed.

Conclusion on the ability to avoid recycling

• Before 1997, US system would not have been able to avoid recycling of the
BSEagent to any measurable extent. If the BSE-agent was introduced into the feed
chain, it could have reached cattle.

• After the introduction of the 1997 ban in August 1997, the ability to
avoid recycling of BSE-infectivity was somewhat improved. However, the rendering
of ruminant material (including SRM and fallen stock) is inadequate (non
pressurized), and cross-contamination potentials of cattle feed with other feeds
remain.

• Therefore, the system is still unable to avoid recycling of
BSE-infectivity if already present in the system or incoming.

Feeding

Until August 1997, RMBM was legally fed to cattle. Feeding was therefore
"not OK". In August 1997 an RMBM-ban was introduced but feeding of non-ruminant
MBM to cattle remained legal as well as feeding of RMBM to non-ruminant animals
(farm animals and pets). An RMBM ban is difficult to maintain, as only labels
can distinguish the various MMBMs. This makes control of the feed ban very
difficult because analytical differentiation between ruminant and non-ruminant
MBM is difficult if not impossible.

Due to the highly specialised production system in the USA, various
mammalian MBM streams can be separated. Such a feed ban would therefore be
assessed as "reasonably OK", for all regions where this highly specialised
system exists. However, several areas in the USA do have mixed farming and mixed
feed mills, and in such regions an RMBM ban would not suffice. Additionally,
official controls for cattle feeds to control for compliance with the ban
started in 2002. Thus, for the whole country, the assessment of the feeding
after 1997 remains "not OK", but improving.

Rendering

The rendering industry is operating with processes that are not known to
reduce

infectivity. It is therefore concluded that rendering was and is "not
OK".

SRM-removal

SRM were and are still rendered for feed, as are (parts of) the fallen
stock. SRMremoval

is therefore regarded as "not OK".

BSE-surveillance

Before 1989, the ability of the system to identify (and eliminate)
BSE-cases was

limited. Since 1990 this ability is improved, thanks to a specific
(passive) BSE

surveillance. The initiated introduction of active surveillance in risk
populations

should improve the system significantly.

On the basis of the available information, it has to be concluded that the
country's

BSE/cattle system was extremely unstable until today, i.e., it would have
recycled and

amplified BSE-infectivity very fast, should it have entered the system. The
stability of

the BSE/cattle system in the USA overtime is as given in table 4.

The present assessment modifies the stability assessment of the previous
GBR report

in 2000 mainly due to a different perception of the impact of BSE
surveillance on

stability and of the efficiency of the RMBM feed ban.

Interaction of stability and external challenge in the USA

Period Stability External Challenge Internal challenge

1980 to

1985

1986 to

1990

Moderate Possibly present

1991 to 1995

Very high

1996 to

2000

2001 to

2003

Extremely unstable Extremely high Likely to be present and growing

5. CONCLUSION ON THE GEOGRAPHICAL BSE-RISK

5.1 The current GBR as function of the past stability and challenge

• The current geographical BSE risk (GBR) level is III, i.e. it is likely
but not

confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected
with the

BSE-agent.

Note1: It is also worth noting that the current GBR conclusions are not
dependent on

the large exchange of imports between USA and Canada. External challenge
due to

exports to the USA from European countries varied from moderate to high.
These

challenges indicate that it was likely that BSE infectivity was introduced
into the

EFSA publishes Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) assessments for Australia,
Canada, Mexico, Norway, South Africa, Sweden and the United States of
America

Communiqué de presse 20 août 2004

The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) has issued today seven up-to-date
scientific reports on the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)
Risk (GBR) assessments for Australia, Canada, Mexico, Norway, South Africa
Sweden and the United States of America. While Australia’s GBR level I (i.e.
presence of BSE in domestic cattle is highly unlikely) is maintained, that of
Norway has been raised to level II (presence of BSE unlikely but not excluded),
Sweden remains at GBR level II and those of Canada and the United States have
been raised to level III (presence of BSE likely but not confirmed, or confirmed
at a lower level) following a new assessment taking into account the most recent
evidence. EFSA’s Scientific Expert Working Group on geographic BSE risk
assessment also evaluated the status of Mexico and South Africa which were
classified as level III.

About Me

My mother was murdered by what I call corporate and political homicide i.e. FOR PROFIT! she died from a rare phenotype of CJD i.e. the Heidenhain Variant of Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease i.e. sporadic, simply meaning from unknown route and source. I have simply been trying to validate her death DOD 12/14/97 with the truth. There is a route, and there is a source. There are many here in the USA. WE must make CJD and all human TSE, of all age groups 'reportable' Nationally and Internationally, with a written CJD questionnaire asking real questions pertaining to route and source of this agent. Friendly fire has the potential to play a huge role in the continued transmission of this agent via the medical, dental, and surgical arena. We must not flounder any longer. ...TSS