Friday, August 29, 2014

I fully agree with this piece by The Economist. It says that the outcome of the Scottish referendum will be the same no matter who wins, but that the negative effects on the stability of Europe and Brittain (and of Brittain in Europe) of a yes vote will be enormous. A secession referendum was irresponsible. Instead, a referendum on an agreed proposal for a shared institutional architecture would have avoided all these negative externalities. I would add that a yes victory will increase the appetite for similar referenda by national minorities but eliminate it for central governments: no one will be as reckless as Mr. Cameron. This is what The Economist says:
"The three main unionist parties—Labour, the Liberal Democrats and the
Conservatives—have each published proposals for further devolution. The
Tory report, published in June, was the most striking: a party that has
long stood for political centralisation offered Edinburgh full control
of income tax. And the nationalist government has alighted on similar
ground from the opposite side. Last November it published a 670-page
manifesto insisting that an independent Scotland could share the pound,
stay in the EU and remain closely integrated with the rest of Britain.
Over the next few weeks campaigners from both camps will assure voters
that their particular brand of semi-detachedness holds the solution to
their day-to-day gripes.
This is remarkable, and lamentable. A victory for the nationalists
would send tremors far beyond Scotland. It would trigger calls for David
Cameron, the Conservative prime minister, to resign. It would change
the arithmetic, and quite possibly the outcome, of next year’s general
election. It would embolden separatists in Spain, Belgium and elsewhere.
The difference between the campaigns’ pitches to voters may be
relatively modest, but that between a “yes” and a “no” is vast."

Tuesday, August 26, 2014

OK, Mr. Salmond won the second debate (not the first), but this fragment of an editorial by The Guardian demolishes the arguments of his last attempt to change the forecasts:
"Mr Salmond’s tactic in recent days has been to present Scottish
independence as the bulwark against attempts to privatise the NHS.
Logically the argument is a nonsense, given that the only person who
could privatise the NHS in Scotland is Mr Salmond himself. Nevertheless
his attempt to wrap himself in the NHS flag is not, from an emotional
point of view, a stupid move for a politician who needs every vote he
can get. It embodies an argument at the core of the centre-left case for
independence – that the English-dominated UK is bound upon a wheel of deregulatory fire at
the behest of global corporate power. Against this Anglo-juggernaut,
many yes voters believe, Scots have only one option – an independence
that would enable them to protect, in one part of these islands, what
remains of the postwar Labour settlement.
If Mr Salmond can persuade enough voters that institutions and
principles like those of the NHS are at risk from the union – and would
be protected under independence – he may yet manage to ride a wave to
victory next month. Even now, with all the polls still pointing to a no
vote, and while acknowledging that public opinion tends to swing towards
the status quo in the final weeks of most referendum campaigns, this
cannot be ruled out. The welfarist desire to protect the people’s social
gains, incarnated above all in the NHS, is rightly emotive. But social
gains are also issues of material self-interest for millions of people.
Such issues rightly matter to the voters, as the general election of
2015 is certain to show.
Yet the inconvenient truth for the pro-independence Scottish
centre-left is this is as true south of the border as north of it. There
is a myth in the yes campaign which casts the Scots as unusually social
democratic, fair and inclusive in ways that the English and Welsh are
not, in a Britain that has otherwise bent the knee to corporate
interests. The trouble with this is that it is not true. On issues such
as the NHS, there is little significant difference between Scottish opinion and English or Welsh. Even more significantly,
an independent Scotland would have to face the problem of protecting
the NHS and other social gains in conditions very similar to those that
confront the UK.
The reality for modern nation states is that they all face a global
economic order in which corporate power is in the ascendant, threatening
the livelihoods of the poor and averagely well-off with no respect for
borders, and against which most elected politicians can only deploy
limited authority. This is what modern politics is fundamentally about.
The NHS is caught in the crosshairs of that conflict, needing ever
larger amounts of taxpayers’ money at a time when demands for public
austerity remain strong. That would be as true in an independent
Scotland as it is in the UK.
And not just in the UK. Today in France, President Hollande attempted to relaunch his presidency with a new government from which the Socialist party’s anti-austerity left would be excluded.
It is a reminder that a similarly tough battle between politicians and
corporate power is being fought out even in France, with its
traditionally strong central state. There may be other arguments for
Scottish independence, but the illusion that an independent Scotland
could somehow escape these unavoidable contemporary policy dilemmas
should not be one of them."

Thursday, August 21, 2014

Four
books are competing for my attention in these last days of the summer break,
and illustrate my always dispersed interests:

-“House of Debt,” by Atif Mian and Amir Sufi, which I bought through Amazon following the
recommendation by Nacho González. The book argues that the global economic and
financial crisis has been caused by excess debt, and that this dangerously reduces
consumption and aggregate demand. The solution is a financial system that is
less dependent on debt and more on equity-like instruments that share risk,
along the lines of the recommendations of Robert Shiller.

-“Funding the Nation,” by Irish historian Michael Keyes, which I bought in Dublin last
week. This is a book about how successful political movements, such as Irish
nationalism in the XIX and XX centuries, need financial resources, and how
these, in the case of Ireland, were found in Catholic parishes and among Irish-American
exiles. It is the story of how financing was key, and how funds were obtained
and sometimes misappropriated.

And
two books that I bought yesterday in the book-shop of Barcelona’s science museum
(“Cosmocaixa”), and that are representative of new frontiers of research –I will
probably treat my students experimentally with them this year:

-“Networks. A Very Short Introduction,” by Guido Caldarelli and Michele Catanzaro. This
belongs to the “very short introduction” collection, which has short guides on
pretty much everything by prestigious scientists and experts, with good
bibliographies and references. The analysis of social dynamics in networks has
important applications in economics, finance and politics.

Wednesday, August 20, 2014

As pointed out by Thomas Piketty in "Capital in the XXI Century", the most important debate we face today is how we adapt to global challenges such as inequality, financial instability, excess of debt or climate change. Of course there are local issues to be addressed, but it is probably too late to try to reduce the size of the problems. In this context, it does not make much sense to try to find one single exclusive sovereign area or one "demos" (Spain, Catalonia, the UK, Scotland), but to acknowledge two important facts:

-Most of us are governed by several levels of administration: local, regional, national, European, global. No referendum is going to change this or make us suddenly "free."

-Most of us have several identities, and if one believes he or she has only one identity, chances are that he or she shares the house, the street or the city with people that have other identities. There are no territories in Europe with one single "us."

Sovereingties are overlapping and shared.

This is the reality of Europe in the XXI Century and our democracy should adapt to it, not try to create another reality.

The nation-state in
Europe in the XXI century is obsolete, as brilliantly pointed out by Joschka Fischer in a recent article (did the Scottish Green read it?). Identities are social
issues, and those that naively wave them should be aware of the unintended consequences:
the path to hell is paved with good intentions.

In Catalonia, if a referendum with a
yes victory for independence was followed by a negotiation, the outcome in the
euro zone would be the same as the outcome of a referendum, much less divisive,
that rubber stamped an ex ante broad agreement. If we consider the possibility of unilaterally exiting the euro zone, that is uncertainty and probably financial ruin of the greatest scale.

As argued earlier here, the possibility that a tight majority in a relatively rich region may alter the remaining borders of a euro zone country is the ultimate commitment problem. In our institutional architecture, we need innovation, flexibility,
FOCJs (functional, overlapping and competing jurisdictions), and be aware that with globalization, states and markets should fit as much as possible in size and fluidity.

A referendum to endorse
a broad agreement among a large majority of citizens that share common values is a better way to democratically decide things than a secession referendum. This would
be as consistent as the proposed consultation in Catalonia with the existing broad support for some
kind of decision or consultation, and it would fit much better with the current
Spanish and European legal framework. It would be a way to decide on
institutional architecture that fits with the reality of bodies that are for good reasons evolving towards federalism (Spain and Europe).

Saturday, August 16, 2014

This is an excellent book by two decent conservative economists. Decent because they make explicit their absolute support for democracy, although they distinguish between liberal democracy and populist democracy. And decent because as opposed to other right-wing economists, they do not have any problem in qualifying governments such as Pinochet's in Chile as a "brutal dictatorship" (and not only a military government). They combine economic theory, history and political science to give a political economy account of the evolution of banking systems and financial regulation in several countries. Unfortunately, none of their examples include continental Europe. They explain the political nature of the web of contracts that make banking possible. Depositors must trust bankers, and bankers must trust debtors, and the relationships among all of them are possible because there is some government that enforces property rights and the rule of law. They explain very well the trade-off between deposit insurance and competitive incentives. The idea of unregulated laissez-faire banking is non-sense. Besides, states need banks to finance their increasing needs when the democratic franchise expands, and because they need to maintain expensive armies. States need banks and banks need states. It is impossible to understand the evolution of banking without understanding the political underlying forces behind banking structures. In some countries, history has been such that the political equilibrium has been a banking industry too much inclined towards risk, such as the United States, whereas in other countries history has been such as to make possible stable banking, such as it happened in Canada. The authors rightly argue that what matters is this basic structure, and that individual regulators or regulatory agencies are just responsive to these underlying forces, and therefore we should not have too much faith in these regulatory solutions. Calomiris and Haber emphasize the relationship between increasing risk taking by politicized financial institutions and redistributive pressures. If the latter are not addressed through the appropriate instruments of transparent tax and transfers, distortions such as reckless risk taking may have very costly consequences in the long run. They spend considerable space explaining this argument, but they seem to be left without arguments on the relationship between the Thatcher revolution in the UK, which they very much admire, and the financial crisis there, about which they merely spend a couple of pages. Perhaps the question marks they leave open will be answered by my next reading, the book by Atif Mian and Amir Sufi, "House of Debt."

Monday, August 11, 2014

I have been in Dublin for the last few days, on holidays. People drive on the left, buy in Tesco supermarkets, speak English, have Boots pharmacies, two level buses... I mean, perhaps they had good reasons to completely secede from the Unted Kingdom in 1922 (although they had to fight a civil war about that because the moderate nationalists were not in favour of full independence), but today the Irish society looks the closest thing that one can imagine to a British society, at least in the capital Dublin. After independence, it took decades for them to prosper, and no doubt after joining the EU they experienced rapid growth, which stopped, as in the UK, with the global financial crisis of 2008. Of course, there was a big difference between the UK and Ireland back in 1922 and possibly today: Ireland is a Catholic country. As an independent state, it took decades for them to separate church from state, as in the UK they still have some lingering remnant of unnecessary Protestant influence (the Queen is the head of the Anglican church). But if that is the big difference, that one country is Catholic and the other is Protestant, to an atheist like me, this does not seem to be a big difference either. In the part of Ireland that did not secede, these two branches of the Chirstian religion have been fighting and killing each other in the streets until recently. Was all this necessary? Given all the good that membership in the EU has done to both countries, it seems to me that this is the way ahead: increased cooperation in a unified Europe. Actually, it was close cooperation and a European and global perspective what brought the best that both countries have achieved in their history: peace in Norhern Ireland in the late 1990s. But it is still a fragile peace, non the least because of the remaining influence of radical nationalists (not only Irish Catholics, but also radical Unionists).

Tuesday, August 5, 2014

I just submitted a paper about the institutional architecture of regulation and competition, with an application to the recent regulatory reform in Spain. This is the conclusion: "Competition policy and the regulation of liberalizing
industries must be coordinated. This coordination is not easy because several
market failures and other public concerns interact. There are few examples in
the world where this coordination is achieved through full integration of
regulation and antitrust agencies, the Spanish reform analyzed above being thus
an extreme case. The reason is that there are good policy and incentive reasons,
reviewed above, to keep separate agencies with different mandates. Although the
influence of the decision of separation vs integration on regulatory capture is
theoretically ambiguous, in countries with very powerful large firms with
national and international champions ambitions, the large firms could have a
preference for as few regulators as possible and keeping them as close as
possible to the executive powers. The incumbents have long term strategies of
political connections and international expansion, and may prefer to have a
single agency to lobby no matter its size, and to deal with a government that
keeps most of the relevant decisions. In addition to this, different industries
and policy instruments require different levels of regulatory independence; and
there is a trade-off between regulatory independence, which requires
accountability, and multi-dimensional tasks, which makes this accountability
more difficult. Industries that are being partially liberalized should be
regulated balancing the trade off between the need to have clear objectives and
the economies of scale and scope that come from regulating similar industries. The Spanish case analyzed above illustrates that independent
regulatory agencies are fragile institutions.
If this is the case in Spain, a member state of the European Union, what may
not happen in countries that are less constrained from an institutional point
of view. The EU should reflect about the difficulties experienced, not only in
Spain, but also in Denmark and other countries, with de facto independence. It
apparently seems that the institution of regulatory independence lacks the
resilience and public support that, at least until recently, enjoyed central
bank independence (now this is also questioned after the global financial
crisis). There is a broad consensus among scholars and practitioners
that institutional quality is important, but it is more difficult to say which
specific attributes conducive to institutional quality should be adopted. Many
of the relevant attributes are probably difficult to measure and define:
credibility, stability, good appointments... Both written and non-written rules
matter. Institutions are endogenous and they are not good travellers, in the
sense that they must fit and complement the previous institutional endowment (see
Levy and Spiller, 1994, and Spiller and Tommasi, 2007). In future research, the analysis of regulation and
competition laws and institutions should take bounded rationality seriously into
account (lack of immediate feedback, biases that especially affect experts): ex
post evaluation of regulatory decisions, and de-biasing strategies should be
contemplated in any reform (see Cooper and Kovacic, 2012, and Rachlinski and Farina
2002). Behavioral economics insights may include that the saliency of one or
several ex ante agencies could help them in their conflict with ex post
concerns, when these occur. Monopolistic agencies likely tend to aggravate
biases such as confirmation or overconfidence. But one size does not fit all. There is no universal blueprint
and policy experiments are necessary as a learning process when there is
technological, institutional and demand uncertainty. A good appointment as head
of a merged agency might overcome any of the problems of an integrated agency
that have been raised here. In the case of the integration of agencies in
Spain, to evaluate its future performance the focus will have to be on the
wisdon of appointments, and on the ability of the regulators to build a
reputation for independence from government and from incumbent firms.The structure of regulation and supervision is only
one aspect that affects its effectiveness and efficiency. This paper has only focused on the
institutional architecture at the national level. In many EU countries, this
level is strongly constrained from above by EU treaties and directives and from
below from decentralization.Cihak and Podpiera (2006) claim that “The literature generally concludes that
the question of the most appropriate structure for regulation and supervision
is to a large extent a practical one and the answer depends on the interaction
of a number of factors that, moreover, evolve over time. Therefore, there is no
strong theoretical argument for any particular organization of supervision;
there are only potential advantages and disadvantages of various setups, the
importance of which depends on the conditions in place in a given jurisdiction”. The key issue remains that regulation takes into account
other market failures (such as externalities or information asymmetries),
public objectives (such as equity) and dynamic considerations, that are
typically not considered by competition policy. Of course these additional
considerations open the door to special interests. How (taking into account the
imperfections of government and the imperfections of individuals) democratic
societies deal with these concerns under any institutional architecture is a fundamental
aspect of their future evolution.

Sunday, August 3, 2014

There are very interesting parallels between financial and network industries' regulation. Public interventions in network industries have
historically addressed a number of concerns. Market power is perhaps the most
prominent one, but there also concerns with externalities (positive and negative) and with asymmetric information. Equity concerns have also played a
role, for example in universal service policies or secutirty of supply. Some of
these policies have different time horizons: allocative efficiency concerns
have typically a short run horizon but universal policy or security of supply
have a longer run horizon. Some of the interventions operate ex ante (typically
regulation), and others operate ex post (typically antitrust). Sometimes ex
ante and ex post concerns are complementary and in other occasions theu are
substitutes. These policies interact: for example, it is difficult to maintain
universal service policy in the absence of new policy instruments when an
industry is liberalized. In this sense, network industries are not very
different from other industries, such as financial industries, where a
numberof market failures and policy
concerns interact, as the global financial crisis has made clear. A lender of
last resort instrument (which has a clear distributive component) cannot exist
without instruments of monetary policy, and the lender of last resort
effectiveness depends on the effectiveness of policies of financial supervision
(which have to do mainly with asymmetric information problems). And all these
operates on an industry (banking) that is imperfectly competitive, and where
the degree of competition, together with the degree of insurance guaranteed by
the lender of last resort, affect the risks taken by agents (institutions and
individuals). In the global financial crisis, market power concerns have
clearly been trumped by the other concerns.
Politicians
are better at making decisions when the policy has far reaching redistributive
implications so that compensation of losers is important; criteria of aggregate
efficiency do not easily pin down the optimal policy; and if there are
interactions across different policy domains so that policy packaging or
evaluating controversial trade-offs is required to build consensus or achieve
efficiency. The introduction of
multi-dimensionality and distributive concerns in banking regulation and
monetary policy after the global financial crisis has caused Central Bank
independence becoming more vulnerable. In the field of
monetary policy and financial regulation, although banking supervision and
monetary policy interact (as it is widely acknowledged after the global
financial crisis), given the difficulty of measuring output on supervisory
tasks, the systemic risk supervisor must necessarily be more accountable and
less independent than central banks are on their monetary task. And since
explicit incentives are not very useful, they must develop a strong culture and
ethic, a sense of intrinsic preferences for doing their job well, because
little credit is given if things go well, but a great deal of scrutiny and
criticism are given if things go badly (specially for some interest groups). Although the literature argues that a
single, large supervisory authority is better able to attract, develop and
maintain professional staff expertise, this has not been found to be the case
in other domains, where specialized agencies can offer a congenial environment
to the experts in that field irrespective of size. Enlarging the focus of
regulatory agencies has thus organizational and incentive costs. But as it was
seen with the financial crisis (for example with the Northern Rock debacle in
the UK), the central bank’s absence from supervision has also enormous costs.

Friday, August 1, 2014

The US President Woodrow Wilson, at the end of the first World War, to finish with the power of empires, proposed to implement the right of
self-determination for all nations: a state for each nation. He became to our
days a myth for several nationalist generations all over the world. With the
benefit of hindsight, it is easy to see Wilson’s mistake in the origin of many later
problems: the expansion of Germany prior to the second world war, Ukraine,
Yugoslavia, the wars in Israel…

The great Italian writer
Claudio Magris summarizes in his book Danubio, all the problems of
implementing Woodrow’s receipt, at least in the European continent. It is impossible
to cut the map of Europe in separated nations, because national groups are
mixed in each and every one of the corners of Europe.

The economist William Easterly
in his new book “The Tiranny of Experts” explains the contraditions between
looking for freedom for peoples and pursuing freedom for individuals: for
example, Wilson wanted peoples’ self-determination but defended racial segregation at home.

In the XXIst century
nation-states are a bad unit of analysis and of action. We need more
institutional diversity tan that. Terry O’Rourke remarked that “Wilson's legacy proved to be a hodge-podge of simplistic and
emotion-laden concepts, which Hitler successfully used to manipulate and divide
Western opinion.”

Margaret MacMillan says that “The Paris Peace
Conference was only partly about making peace settlements and about making a
better world; it was also the focus of the hopes and expectations of nations
trying to reconstitute themselves, in the case of Poland, who wanted their
independence from an empire, in the case of the Baltic states, or who were new
nations such as Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, or Kurdistan. Paris was in the six
months between January and June 1919 the centre of world power, perhaps even a
sort of world government. The peacemakers rapidly discovered that they were
dealing with an agenda which kept on growing.”