Chapter XICOBRA Preparations

The perspective within which Operation COBRA was conceived
was essentially the same as had bounded General Bradley's July offensive.
The objectives remained unchanged: Brittany was the eventual goal, the first step
toward it the Coutances-Caumont line.

According to General Montgomery's instructions of the end of June, repeated in July,
the First U.S. Army was to pivot on its left at Caumont and make a wide sweep
to a north-south line from Caumont to Fougeres so that U.S. troops would eventually
face east to protect the commitment of General Patton's Third Army into
Brittany.1
To set the First Army wheeling maneuver into motion, General Bradley decided to breach
the German defenses with a massive blow by VII Corps on a narrow front in the
center of the army zone and to unhinge the German defenses opposing VIII Corps
by then making a powerful armored thrust to Coutances. With the basic aim of
propelling the American right (west) flank to Coutances, COBRA
was to be both a breakthrough attempt and an exploitation to Coutances,
a relatively deep objective in the enemy rear--the prelude to a later drive to
the southern base of the Cotentin, the threshold of
Brittany.2

The word breakthrough, frequently used during the planning period,
signified a penetration through the depth of the enemy defensive position.
The word breakout was often employed later somewhat ambiguously or as a
literary term to describe the results of COBRA and meant
variously leaving the hedgerow country, shaking loose from the Cotentin,
acquiring room for mobile warfare--goodbye Normandy, hello Brest.

Reporters writing after the event and impressed with the results stressed the
breakout that developed rather than the breakthrough that was planned.
Participants tended later to be convinced that the breakout was planned the way
it happened because they were proud of the success of the operation, perhaps also
because it made a better story. In truth, Operation COBRA
in its original concept reflected more than sufficient credit on those who planned,
executed, and exploited it into the proportions it eventually assumed.
COBRA became the key maneuver from which a large part of the
subsequent campaign in Europe developed.

During the twelve days that separated the issuance of the plan and the commencement
of COBRA, command and staff personnel discussed in great detail
the possible consequences of the attack. "If this thing goes as it should,"
General Collins later remembered General Bradley

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saying, "we ought to be in Avranches in a
week."3
Certainly it was reasonable to hope that COBRA would
precipitate a breakthrough that might be exploited into what later came to be
called the breakout, but a justifiable hope did not prove a firm intention--particularly
when considered in relation to the stubborn German defense in the hedgerows.
Perhaps in their most secret and wildest dreams American planners had visions
of a COBRA that would slither across France, but as late as
18 July there were "still a few things that [First] Army has not decided yet."
One of those "few things" was that COBRA was to be synonymous
with breakout.4

Perhaps the best a priori evidence of how difficult it would be to achieve even
a breakthrough was the result of two limited objective attacks launched by the
VIII Corps a week before COBRA.

Preliminary Operations

A basic feature of the COBRA plan was the encirclement and
elimination of the Germans facing the VIII Corps on the Cotentin west coast.
For an effective execution of this concept, VIII Corps had to advance its
front quickly toward Coutances at the proper time. Yet two German strongpoints
in the corps zone of advance threatened to block a speedy getaway by a portion
of the corps. To have to destroy them during the COBRA
operation would retard the initial momentum of the COBRA attack.
To eliminate them before COBRA commenced, to move the
corps front closer to a more desirable line of departure, and to get the
entire corps out of Cotentin swampland became the objectives of two preliminary operations.

Because the
German strongpoints were virtually independent positions, the preliminary
operations initiated by the 83d and 90th Divisions of VIII Corps were separate,
local attacks. The actions were remarkably alike in the assault problems they
posed, in the nature of the combat, which resembled the earlier battle of the
hedgerows, and in the results attained.

The 83d Division
attacked first. Since its original commitment on 4 July, the division had fought
in the Carentan-Périers isthmus, had gained the west bank of the Taute River
near the Tribehou causeway, and had sent the 330th Infantry across the Taute to
operate with the 9th Division on the east bank. The remainder of the 83d
Division had

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attacked along
the west bank of the Taute toward Périers and had reached a causeway leading to
la Varde. In its pre-COBRA assignment, the division was
to attack across the la
Varde causeway to the east bank of the Taute. In possession of la Varde and near
the Lessay-Périers highway, the division would have a water-and-swamp obstacle
behind it and be in position to threaten encirclement of Périers from the east.
At this point it would also regain control of the 350th Infantry.
(See Map II.)

The Germans did
not hold la Varde in strength. A reinforced company was sufficient since the
flat ground around la Varde provided open fields of fire for more than a
thousand yards in all directions. Only five machine guns were at la Varde, but
they were able to fire as though "shooting across a billiard
table."5
From nearby positions at Marchesieux, German assault guns could provide effective
support.

In contrast to
the excellent assistance the terrain furnished the defense, there were no
natural features to aid the attack. Between the 83d Division on the west bank
and the Germans holding la Varde on the east bank stretched the gray-brown
desolation of the Taute River flats. The Taute River, at this point a stream
fifteen feet wide and two feet deep with about a foot of soft mud on the bottom,
flowed along the western edge of the marsh. The causeway that crossed the swamp
was a tarred two-lane road little higher than the open area of stagnant marsh
and flooded mudholes. Over a mile long, the causeway ran straight and level
through borders of regularly
spaced trees that gave the appearance of a country lane. The road in fact was
the approach--the driveway--to a small chateau on the west bank of the swamp. The
small bridge over the Taute near the chateau had been destroyed by the Germans.
Along both edges of the swamp, lush banks of trees and hedges concealed the
chateau, which was the jump-off point, and the hamlet of la Varde, the
objective. In between, there was no cover. Foxholes in the flats would quickly
fill with water. The only feasible method of attack was to crawl forward and
then charge the enemy machine guns with grenades and bayonets. The swamp was
mucky, and vehicles could not cross the causeway unless the bridge near the
chateau was repaired.6

The division
commander, General Macon, decided that an attack launched around 1800 would give
engineers five hours before darkness to lay temporary bridging across the
stream. Thus, build-up and consolidation of a bridgehead established at la Varde
could be accomplished during the night. Colonel York's 331st Infantry was to
make the assault, Colonel Crabill's 329th Infantry a diversionary attack. A
strong artillery preparation was to include considerable smoke. Though the
division tried to get tracked vehicles capable of carrying supplies across the
swamp in the event engineers could not repair the bridge over the Taute, their efforts

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failed. First
Army headquarters, after much prodding, agreed to lend the division eight
"Alligators" for one day but refused to furnish
drivers.7
Normally used on the
Normandy invasion beaches to handle supplies unloaded from ships, the Alligators
arrived in the division area too late for use in the la Varde attack.

In the afternoon
of 17 July, shortly before the main attack, reconnaissance troops of the 330th
Infantry, on the east side of the river, attempted to approach la Varde from the
east. Enemy machine gun fire stopped the effort. The diversionary attack on the
west bank, launched by the 329th Infantry in company strength, turned out to be
little more than a demonstration that "just pooped out" after taking thirteen
casualties.8
At 1830, half an hour after the diversion commenced, Colonel York
sent one battalion of his 331st Infantry toward la Varde in the main effort.

Because the
causeway was the natural crossing site and because the flat straight road would
obviously be swept by German fire, Colonel York sent his assault battalion
through the spongy swamp. Using prefabricated footbridges, the infantry
struggled across muck and water sometimes neck deep. At nightfall the battalion
reached la Varde and established an insecure bridgehead. Many infantrymen who
had crawled through the swamp found their weapons clogged with silt and
temporarily useless. The mud, the darkness, and enemy fire discouraged weapons
cleaning. Though the regiment had planned to reinforce the battalion during
the night over the causeway, engineers
had been unable to erect a temporary bridge because of heavy enemy tank
destroyer fire on the bridge site. Unable to get supply vehicles, tanks, and
artillery over the flats to support the battalion at la Varde, and deeming it
impossible either to transport a sufficient supply of ammunition by hand or to
send reinforcements across the treacherous swamp, General Macon reluctantly
agreed to let the battalion at la Varde--which shortly after daylight, 18 July,
reported it was unable to remain on the east bank--fall back.

The 331st
Infantry tried again at dawn, 19 July, in an attack keyed to fire support from
the 330th Infantry on the east bank of the Taute and to concealment by smoke and
an early morning haze. Eschewing the swampy lowlands, the assault battalion
advanced directly down the causeway. Against surprisingly light enemy fire, the
troops again established a foothold at la Varde. Engineers in the meantime
installed a Bailey bridge across the Taute near the chateau. Unfortunately, a
normal precaution of mining the bridge so it could be destroyed in case of
counterattack backfired when enemy shellfire detonated the explosives. The
bridge went up with a roar. Since tanks again could not cross the swamp, the
foothold at la Varde was once more precarious. When the enemy launched a small
counterattack that afternoon, the troops retired.

The failure of
this attack ended the attempts to take la Varde. The participating rifle
companies had taken casualties of 50 percent of authorized strength, and one
battalion commander was missing in action. Difficult terrain and plain bad luck
had contributed to

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the failure, but
more basic was the ineffectiveness of the 83d Division. The division earlier that month had
incurred more casualties and received more replacements in its short combat
career than any other U.S. unit in Normandy in a comparable span of time. The
loss of trained leaders and men in the combat echelons and their replacement by
the large influx of relatively untrained personnel had diminished the division's
efficiency. "We have quite a few new men and they are really new," Colonel York
explained; "[they] don't know their officers . . . and the officers don't know
their men."9

Recognizing the
condition of the division, Generals Bradley and Middleton saw no purpose in
continuing the futile pattern at la Varde. They saw more hope in revising the
VIII Corps role in COBRA. In the meantime the 83d Division
was to train and try to assimilate its replacements.

In the same way,
the results of the 90th Division's attempts to execute a pre-COBRA mission also
contributed to a modification of the VIII Corps role in COBRA. After twelve days
of sustained action at Mont Castre and Beaucoudray, the 90th Division had also
seen its ranks depleted in the wearing battle of the hedgerows. Less than six
weeks after commitment in Normandy, the division's enlisted infantry
replacements numbered more than 100 percent of authorized strength; infantry
officer replacements totaled almost 150 percent. In comparison to the veterans
who had fought in the hedgerows, the replacements were poorly trained and undependable, as soon
became obvious in the division's new assignment.

The pre-COBRA
objective of the 90th Division was a low hedgerowed mound of earth surrounded by
swampland. Athwart the division zone of advance, the island of dry ground held
the village of St. Germain-sur-Sèves. Possessing the island and across the Sèves
River, the division would be in position not only to threaten Périers but also
to get to the Périers--Coutances highway.

Only a weak
German battalion held the island, but it had excellent positions dug into the
hedgerowed terrain, good observation, and a superb field of fire. Several
assault guns and a few light tanks supported the infantry; artillery was tied
into the strongpoint defenses.10

Two miles long
and half a mile wide, the island had been more than normally isolated by the
heavy rainfall in June, which had deepened the shallow streams along its north
and south banks. Linking the hamlet of St. Germain to the "mainland" was a
narrow, tarred road from the western tip of the island. The Germans had
destroyed a small bridge there, the only suitable site for engineer bridging
operations. Several hundred yards away, a muddy country lane gave access to the
island from the north, across a ford. How to cross level treeless swamps that
offered neither cover nor concealment was the assault problem. Although a night
attack seemed appropriate, the division commander, General Landrum, quickly
abandoned the idea. With so many newly arrived replacements he dared not risk
the problem

To help overcome
the terrain difficulties, General Landrum arranged for heavy fire support. Since
his was to be the only attack in progress in the corps zone, more than normal
fire power was available. He received the assistance of the entire VIII Corps
Artillery. Because the 83d Division had found the la Varde operation so
difficult, preparatory bombardment by tactical air was promised for the 90th
Division. To make certain of a preponderance of fire power, Landrum directed all
nonparticipating infantry units to support the attack by fire.

General Landrum
selected the 358th Infantry to make the attack. The regimental commander, Lt.
Col. Christian E. Clarke, Jr., planned to attack with two battalions abreast,
each advancing along one of the roads to the island. Once on the island, the two
battalions were to form a consolidated bridgehead. Engineers were then to lay
bridging so that tanks and assault guns could cross the Sèves and support a
drive eastward to clear the rest of the island.

Initially
scheduled for 18 July, the operation was postponed several times until artillery
ammunition problems-matters affecting the COBRA preparations--were settled. The
attack was finally set for the morning of 22 July. Poor visibility that morning
grounded not only the fighter-bombers that were to make an air strike on the
island but also the
artillery observation planes. Though in great volume, the artillery preparation
thus was unobserved.

Advancing Toward St. Germain

Since no other
actions were occurring in the area, the Germans, like VIII Corps, were able to
utilize all their fire resources within range to meet the American attack. Enemy
fire prevented the assault troops from advancing beyond the line of departure. A
battalion of the 90th Division not even taking part in the attack sustained
forty-two casualties from enemy shelling.12
American counterbattery fires plotted by map seemed to have no real effect.

Three hours after
the designated time of attack, one battalion moved forward along the muddy
country lane. Taking 50 percent casualties in the assault companies, men of the
battalion crossed the swamp, waded the stream, and reached

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the island. The
momentum of their advance carried them 200 yards into the interior. Colonel
Clarke quickly ordered the other assault battalion to take the same route, but
only one rifle company managed to reach St. Germain in this manner. Though
Colonel Clarke replaced the battalion commander with the regimental executive
officer, the new battalion commander had no more success in reinforcing the
foothold. The Germans pounded the approaches to the island with artillery and
mortars and swept the open ground with machine gun fire. The only practical
method of crossing the exposed area was by infiltration, and most men sent
toward the island lost their way.

By dark of the
first day of attack, at least 400 men were on the island. One battalion reduced
to half strength by casualties and stragglers, less its mortar platoon, plus
little more than one company of another battalion, formed a horseshoe line on
the island about 200 yards deep and a thousand yards wide, with both flanks
resting on the swamp. The troops repelled a small German counterattack, and the
positions seemed quite stable. Still, efforts to reinforce the bridgehead
failed. Because enemy fire prevented engineers from bridging the stream, neither
tanks nor tank destroyers could cross.

With the descent
of darkness, the troops on the island began to experience a sense of insecurity.
Lacking mortars, tanks, and antitank guns, the men withdrew to a defiladed road
along the north edge of the island. In the pitchblack darkness, some of the
demoralized troops began furtive movement to the rear. Stragglers, individually
and in groups, drifted
unobtrusively out of the battle area. Soldiers pretended to help evacuate
wounded, departed under the guise of messengers, or sought medical aid for their
own imagined wounds. German fire and the dark night encouraged this unauthorized
hegira and added to the problems of unit commanders in recognizing and
controlling their recently arrived replacements.

Shortly after
nightfall, Colonel Clarke discovered that the battalion commander of the forces
on the island had remained on the near shore. When he ordered him to join his
men, the officer did so, but neglected to take his staff. Learning this later,
Colonel Clarke dispatched the staff to the island, but the officers lost their
way and did not reach St. Germain.

At daylight, 23
July, the German shelling subsided, a prelude to the appearance of three German
armored vehicles on one flank of the American positions and an assault gun on
the other. As these began to fire, a German infantry company of about platoon
strength--perhaps thirty men--attacked. Only a few Americans in the bridgehead
fired their weapons. Panic-stricken for the most part, they fell back and
congregated in two fields at the edge of the island. Hedgerows surrounded each
of these fields on three sides; the fourth, facing the swamp, was open and
invited escape. Continuing German fire across the open ground provided the only
restraint to wholesale retreat.

Officers at
regimental headquarters on the "mainland" had begun to suspect that the
situation was deteriorating when unidentified cries of "cease firing" swept
across the two fields. A shell landed in

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a corner of one field, inflicting heavy casualties on
men huddling together in fear. At this moment, despite little firing and few
Germans in evidence, a group of American soldiers started toward the enemy,
their hands up, some waving white handkerchiefs. That was the end. The rest of
the men either surrendered or fled across the swamp.

At the conclusion
of the fight for St. Germain, about 300 men were missing in action. A later
check revealed that approximately 100 men had been killed, 500 wounded, and 200
captured.

The causes for
failure were clear. Weather, terrain, a resourceful enemy, command deficiency at
the battalion level (caused perhaps by combat exhaustion during the preceding
battle of the hedgerows) had contributed to the result. The main cause, however,
was the presence of so many inadequately trained replacements. The 90th Division
had not had enough time to fuse its large number of replacements into fighting
teams.

It seemed as
though the performance of the 90th Division at St. Germain was but a logical
extension of earlier unsatisfactory behavior. General Eisenhower remarked that
the division had been "less well prepared for battle than almost any other" in
Normandy, for it had not been "properly brought up" after
activation.13
Judging that the division needed new leadership, a commander not associated with
experiences of the hedgerow battle, higher head quarters decided
to relieve the division commander. "Nothing against Landrum," General Eisenhower
remarked, adding that he would be glad to have General Landrum in command of a
division he himself had conducted through the training
cycle.14

Failure in the
preliminary operations was in many ways depressing, but American commanders
still were hopeful that COBRA would not bring another recurrence of the
difficult hedgerow fighting. The First Army that was to execute COBRA was not
the same one that had launched the July offensive. Battle had created an
improved organization, and a continuing continental build-up had strengthened
it. What the army needed was the opportunity to get rolling, and Cobra might
well provide just that.

The Troops

The hedgerow
fighting that had exhausted and depleted the ranks had also made the survivors
combat wise. Common mistakes of troops entering combat were "reliance on rumor
and exaggerated reports, failure to support maneuvering elements by fire, and a
tendency to withdraw under HE [high-explosive] fire rather than to advance out
of it."15
Each unit now had a core of veterans who oriented and trained
replacements. Most combat leaders had taken the test of ordeal by fire. The
great majority of divisions on the Continent were battle trained.

An assurance had
developed that was particularly apparent in dealings with

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enemy armor.
Earlier, when a regiment had blunted a tank-infantry counterattack, the
significant and gratifying result was that it had stopped German armor. "Glad to
know they can hold their own against tanks," was the
comment.16
But such
experience was becoming increasingly common, and definite identification of a
knocked-out Mark VI Tiger proved conclusively that even the German tank with the
strongest armor was vulnerable to American weapons. Artillery, tanks, bazookas,
tank destroyers, and tactical aircraft could and did destroy German tanks. By 11
July the First Army Ordnance Section had accumulated in collecting points
36 Mark IIIs and IVs, 5 Mark Vs and VIs.
The hedgerowed terrain had neutralized to a great extent the ability of the
Tiger's 88-mm. gun and the
Panther's 75-mm. gun to penetrate an American tank at 2,500 yards. Tanks
generally engaged at distances between 150 and 400 yards, ranges at which the
more maneuverable Sherman enjoyed a distinct
superiority.17

Though a tank
destroyer crew had seen three of its 3-inch armor-piercing shells bounce off the frontal
hull of a Mark V Panther at 200 yards range, a fourth hit had penetrated the
lower front hull face and destroyed the
tank.18
A soldier who had met and
subdued an enemy tank later reported, "Colonel, that was a great big
son-of-a-bitch. It looked like a whole road full of tank. It kept coming on and
it looked like it was going to
destroy the whole world." Three times that soldier had fired his bazooka, but
still the tank kept coming. Waiting until the tank passed, he had disabled it
with one round from behind.19

The ability to
destroy German armor generated a contagious confidence that prompted some units
to add a two-man bazooka team to each infantry battalion, not principally for
defense but to go out and stalk enemy armored
vehicles.20
With this frame of
reference becoming prevalent, the troops displayed a decreasing tendency to
identify self-propelled guns as tanks. Even such a battered division as the
83d manifested an aggressiveness
just before COBRA when it launched a reconnaissance in force that developed
spontaneously into a coordinated limited objective attack. Not the objective
gained but the indication of a spirit that was ready to exploit favorable battle
conditions was what counted.21

One of the major
problems that had hampered the First Army--how to use tanks effectively in the
hedgerow country--appeared to have been solved just before COBRA. The most
effective weapon for opening gaps in hedgerows was the tank dozer, a
comparatively new development in armored warfare. So recently had its worth been
demonstrated that a shortage of the dozers existed in Normandy. Ordnance units
converted ordinary Sherman tanks into dozers by

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Rhino Tank with hedgerow cutter crashing through a hedgerow.

mounting a blade
on the front. Some hedgerows, however, were so thick that engineers using
satchel charges had first to open a hole, which the dozers later cleared and
widened.22

Because the use
of demolitions and tank dozers was time consuming, the tanks in offensive
activity had often remained on the roads, and when crosscountry movement became
necessary, progress was inevitably slow. In order to speed up the movement of
armor, Ordnance units and tankers throughout the army had devoted a great deal
of thought and experimentation to find a device that would get tanks through the
hedges quickly without tilting the tanks upward, thereby exposing their
underbellies and pointing their guns helplessly toward the
sky. The gadgets invented in July 1944 were innumerable.

As early as 5
July the 79th Division had developed a "hedgecutter," which Ordnance personnel
began attaching to the front of tanks. Five days later the XIX Corps was
demonstrating a "salad fork" arrangement, heavy frontal prongs originally
intended to bore holes in hedgerow walls to facilitate placing engineer
demolition charges but accidentally found able to lift a portion of the hedgerow
like a fork and allow the tank to crash through the remaining part of the wall.
Men in the V Corps invented a "brush cutter" and a "green-dozer" as anti-hedgerow
devices.

The climax of the
inventive efforts was achieved by a sergeant in the 102d Cavalry Reconnaissance
Squadron, Curtis G. Culin, Jr., who welded steel scrap from a destroyed enemy
roadblock to a tank to perfect a hedgecutter with several tusklike prongs, teeth
that pinned down the tank belly while the tank knocked a hole in the hedgerow
wall by force. General Bradley and members of his staff who inspected this
hedgecutter on 14 July were so impressed that Ordnance units on the Continent
were ordered to produce the device in mass, using scrap metal salvaged from
German underwater obstacles on the invasion beaches. General Bradley also sent
Col. John B. Medaris, the army Ordnance officer, to England by plane to get
depots there to produce the tusks and equip tanks with them and to arrange for
transporting to France by air additional arc-welding equipment and special
welding crews.

Every effort was
made to equip all tanks with this latest "secret weapon," for it enabled a tank
to plough through

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a hedgerow as
though the hedgerow were pasteboard. The hedgecutter sliced through the earth
and growth, throwing bushes and brush into the air and keeping the nose of the
tank down. The device was important in giving tankers a morale lift, for the
hedgerows had become a greater psychological hazard than their defensive worth merited.

Named Rhinoceros
attachments, later called Rhinos, the teeth were so effective in breaching the
hedgerows that tank destroyer and self-propelled gun units also requested them,
but the First Army Ordnance Section carefully supervised the program to make
certain that as many tanks as possible were equipped first. By the time COBRA
was launched three out of every five tanks in the First Army mounted the
hedgecutter. In order to secure tactical surprise for the Rhinos, General
Bradley forbade their use until
COBRA.23

Not the least
beneficial result of the July combat was the experience that had welded fighting
teams together. "We had a lot of trouble with the tanks," an infantry commander
had reported; "they haven't been working with us before and didn't know how to
use the dynamite."24
Co-operation among the arms and services had improved
simply be cause units had worked
together. Part of the developing confidence was generated by the fact that
increasing numbers of medium tanks had received the newer and more powerful
76-mm. gun to replace the less effective 75-mm. gun, and thus were better able
to deal with the enemy.25

Perhaps the most
significant improvement in team operations was the increasing co-ordination that
was developing between the ground forces and the tactical airplanes. In addition
to performing the primary mission of trying to isolate the battlefield by
attacking enemy lines of communication, the IX Tactical Air Command had employed
a large portion of its effort in direct and close ground support. The pilots had
attacked such targets as strongpoints retarding the ground advance, troop
concentrations, gun positions, and command posts. They had also flown extensive
air reconnaissance for the ground troops.26
On a typical day of action the
fighter bombers of the IX TAC exerted 40 percent of their air effort in close
support of the First Army, 30 percent in direct support of the Second British
Army, 10 percent against rail lines and communications 50 to 70 miles behind the
enemy front, and 20 percent in offensive fighter activity and ground assault
area cover.27

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Ground-air
communications were being improved. "Wish you would tell the Air Corps we don't
want them over here," an irate division staff officer had pleaded early in July
after a few strafing planes had struck an American artillery battalion and
wounded several men. "Have them get out in front [and] let them take pictures
[but] no strafing or bombing."28
Complaints of this nature were decreasing.
Pilots of a tactical reconnaissance group attended courses of instruction in
artillery fire adjustment, and as a result high performance aircraft began to
supplement the small artillery planes with good
effect.29
Particularly
interested in developing a practical basis for plane-tank communications,
General Quesada, the IX TAC commander, had very high frequency (VHF) radios,
used by the planes, installed in what were to be the lead tanks of the armored
column just before COBRA was launched. Tankers and pilots could then talk to
each other, and the basis for the technique of what later became known as
armored column cover was born. The success of the technique in August was to
exceed all expectations.30

The development
of new air operational techniques and weapons such as rocket-firing apparatus
and jellied gasoline, or napalm, also promised more effective support for the
ground troops. Experiments with radar-controlled blind dive bombing and
with the technique of talking a flight in
on target indicated that night fighter operations might soon become more
practical. Since no fields for night fighters were operational on the Continent,
the craft were based in England. Employment of night fighters in tactical
support was not usually considered profitable even though ground forces
requested it.31
In July work with radar-controlled night flights and projects
for eventually basing night fighters on continental airfields promoted hope of
round-the-clock air support.

Fighter-bomber
groups in direct tactical support of the First Army were moving to continental
airfields at the rate of about two each week. By 25 July twelve had continental
bases. Their nearness to the battle zone eliminated the need to disseminate
ground information across the channel to airfields in England as prerequisite
for ground support. American ground units desiring air support channeled their
requests to the First Army joint air operations section, which secured quick
action for specific missions.32

During July, the
American ground build-up proceeded steadily. Four infantry and four armored
divisions reached the Continent during the month

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before COBRA. The
arrival in England early in the month of the 8oth Division brought the theater
total of U.S. divisions to 22: 14 infantry, 6 armored, and 2 airborne. Four more
were expected in August. During the first twenty-five days of July, almost half
a million tons of supplies were brought into France, the bulk across the
beaches. Although the Cherbourg harbor began to be used on 16 July, port
operations there were not to become important until the end of the
month.33

To launch COBRA,
the First Army had four corps controlling fifteen divisions actually on the army
front.34
General Patton's Third Army headquarters had assembled in the
Cotentin during July and was ready to become operational. Similarly awaiting the
signal for commitment, two additional corps headquarters were in France at the
time COBRA was launched and another was to reach the Continent soon afterward.
An infantry division and an armored division, not in the line, were available
for use by the First Army in COBRA; another armored division was scheduled to
land on the Continent before the end of the month. The First Army also was
augmented by many supporting units that belonged to the Third Army: engineer and
tank destroyer groups, evacuation hospitals, and Quartermaster railhead, general
service, gas supply, graves registration, and truck companies. The Forward
Echelon of the Communications Zone headquarters was established at

Valognes by 22
July, and the entire Communications Zone headquarters would soon
arrive.35

Obviously, one
field army, the First, could not much longer effectively direct the operations
of such a rapidly growing force. To prepare for the commitment of General
Patton's army and to meet the necessity of directing two field armies, the U.S.
1st Army Group headquarters began to displace from England to the Continent on 5
July, a move completed one month later.36
In order to maintain the fiction of
Operation Fortitude, the Allied deception that made the Germans believe a
landing in the Pas-de-Calais might take place, ETOUSA activated the 12th Army
Group under the command of General Bradley. Transferred to the 12 th Army Group
were all units and personnel that had been assigned to the U.S. 1st Army Group
"except those specifically excepted," in actuality, none. The 1st U.S. Army
Group, under a new commander, thus became a nominal headquarters existing only
on paper until its abolition in October 1944. The 12th Army Group became the
operational headquarters that was to direct U.S. forces on the
Continent.37

The presence of
uncommitted headquarters in Normandy proved an embarrassing largess. General
Montgomery did not utilize General Crerar's First Canadian Army headquarters
until 23 July, when it assumed a portion of

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the Second British Army front.38
And, on the American
side of the beachhead, General Patton's Third Army, along with several corps
headquarters, was still not employed in combat. Since Brittany had been selected
as the stage for General Patton's initial operations, the U.S. First Army had to
reach the base of the Cotentin peninsula to provide the Third Army a means of
ingress. A successful COBRA was a vital step toward this achievement.

General Eisenhower on 25 July gave General Bradley authority to change the existing
command structure of the U.S. forces and erect the organization envisioned by
the OVERLORD planners. At General Bradley's discretion in regard to timing, the
12th Army Group headquarters was to become operational, assume control of the
First Army, and commit under its control the Third
Army.39

Between the end
of the earlier July offensive and the launching of COBRA, there was a lull for
about a week. Not only did the period of inactivity permit plans to be perfected
and the troops to be better organized for the attack, it also gave the men some
rest and time to repair the equipment damaged in the battle of the hedgerows.
Units were able to integrate replacements. By the time COBRA got under way, all
the divisions on the Continent were close to authorized strength in equipment
and personnel and most had undergone a qualitative
improvement.40

The quiet period
before COBRA also made possible increased comforts such as hot meals, showers,
and clothing changes. Even though B rations--a nonpackaged food affording a
variety of hot meals-had reached the Continent early in July and were ready for
issue to the troops, the battle of the hedgerows had prevented their being
substituted for combat 10-in-1, K, and C rations until later in the month. With
kitchens set up to serve hot meals, "it was amazing how many cows and chickens
wandered into minefields . . . and ended up as sizzling
platters."41

As Allied leaders
searched rain-filled skies for a break in the clouds that might permit the air
bombardment planned for COBRA, a phrase of the Air Corps hymn came to mind:
"Nothing can stop the Army Air Corps." Nothing, they added, except weather.
While impatient commanders waited anxiously for sunshine, and while General
Bradley facetiously assumed the blame for having "failed to make arrangements
for proper weather," the First U.S. Army rested and prepared for the
attack.42

The Plot Against Hitler

During the lull
over the battlefield in the west that followed GOODWOOD and preceded COBRA, and
while defeats in the east gave the Germans increasing worry over the eventual
outcome of the war, a dramatic attempt was made on Hitler's life on 20 July. In
a speech

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the following
day, Hitler himself released the news to the world. "A very small clique of
ambitious, unscrupulous and stupid officers" he announced, "made a conspiracy to
kill me, and at the same time to seize hold of the German Supreme
Command."43
Within a short time Allied intelligence officers had pieced together a
remarkably accurate account of the occurrence: a cabal of high-ranking Army
officers had tried to assassinate Hitler with a bomb in order to seize political
power in Germany. The bomb had inflicted only minor wounds on Hitler, and the
Fuehrer moved swiftly to suppress the revolt. He named Heinrich Himmler--already
Reich Minister of Interior, Reichsfuehrer of the SS (and Waffen-SS),
and Chief of the Gestapo and German
Police--Commander of the Home Forces and gave him control of the military
replacement system. Hitler replaced the ailing Generaloberst Kurt Zeitzler,
chief of staff of OKH and vaguely implicated in the conspiracy, with
Generaloberst Heinz Guderian. High-ranking officers of Army, Air Force, and Navy
were quick to reaffirm their loyalty to Hitler. The immediate result of the
conspiracy was to tighten centralized control of the military in Hitler's
hands.44

Allied
intelligence had not only the facts but a plausible interpretation. The cause of
the Putsch was "undoubtedly the belief . . . that
Germany had lost the war."45

That a "military
clique," as Hitler calls them, should have been plotting to liquidate him is
encouraging; that they should have chosen this moment is exhilarating.... The
very fact that plotters reckoned that the time was ripe for a venture so
complicated as the assassination of the Fuehrer argues that they had good reason
to hope for success. . . . There seems ... no reason to disbelieve Hitler's
assertion that it was an Army Putsch cut to the 1918
pattern and designed to seize power in order to come to terms with the Allies.
For, from the military point of view, the rebels must have argued, what other
course is open? How else save something, at least, from the chaos? How else save
the face of the German Army, and, more important still, enough of its blood to
build another for the next war?46

Colonel Dickson,
the First Army G-2, believed that the Hitler government would remain in office
by suppressing all opposition ruthlessly. He saw no evidence to suppose that the
existing German Government would be overthrown by internal revolution or by
revolt of one or more of the German field armies. He was certain that only the
military defeat and the surrender of the German armies in the field would bring
about the downfall of Hitler. The first step toward that goal was to intensify
"the confusion and doubt in the mind of the German soldier in Normandy" by "an
Allied break-through on the First Army front at this time, which would threaten
to cut him off from the homeland, [and which] would be a decisive blow to the
German Seventh Army."47
On its knees, the Seventh Army had no future "save in the fact that so
long as the battle

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continues the
miracle may still take place. Buoyed up by accounts of what V1 had done, no less
than by the promise of V2, and still imbued with a discipline that has been
impaired only by the substitution of apathy for enthusiasm, the German soldier
is still on the [Nazi] party's side."48

The fact was that
very few officers in the west were implicated in the plot against Hitler. A
small but important group in the headquarters of the Military Governor of France
at Paris staged a coup that was successful for several hours, but except for
isolated individuals who knew of the conspiracy, and rarer still those who were
in sympathy with it, the military elsewhere on the Western Front were
overwhelmingly loyal to Hitler, even though some might be doubtful of the
eventual outcome of the war. Those who did play some small role in the plot had
not deliberately or unconsciously hindered field operations by treasonable
conduct. The conspiracy had virtually no effect on the military situation in the
west. The combat soldier in the "you-or-me" life-and-death struggle was too busy
trying to remain alive.49
The higher officers pledged their continuing loyalty
to Hitler. All Germans were more or less impressed with the miracle that had
saved Hitler's life.50

As a result of
the Putsch, the efficiency of the German war machine under Hitler increased,
for Himmler took immediate steps to unify the military replacement system and
eventually improved it. The Putsch also intensified
Hitler's unfounded suspicion that mediocrity among his military commanders might
in reality be treason. Rommel, recuperating at home from an injury received in
Normandy, was eventually incriminated and forced to commit suicide. Speidel, the
Army Group B chief of staff, was later imprisoned on
evidence that indicated involvement. Kluge, the principal commander in the west,
fell under suspicion nearly a month later when battlefield reverses in Normandy
seemed to give substance to whispered accusations of his friendliness with known
conspirators. Thus the Putsch, while giving Hitler
the opportunity to consolidate military control even more in his own hands,
pointed a blunt warning that the symptoms of military defeat were spreading an
infectious distrust and suspicion among the higher echelons of the German
military organization.51

On the
battlefield in Normandy the half-hearted planning for an offensive action near
Caen in August came to an end. Even before GOODWOOD had violently disrupted
German operational planning, Rommel, just before his near-fatal accident, had
estimated that the Germans could hold the Normandy front only a few more weeks
at the maximum.52
Several days later Kluge endorsed

--212--

Rommel's view. In a letter to Hitler he stated
the hard facts clearly:

In the face of
the total enemy air superiority, we can adopt no tactics to compensate for the
annihilating power of air except to retire from the battle field. . . . I came
here with the firm resolve to enforce your command to stand and hold at all
cost. The price of that policy is the steady and certain destruction of our
troops. . . . The flow of materiel and personnel replacements is insufficient,
and artillery and antitank weapons and ammunition are far from adequate. . . .
Because the main force of our defense lies in the willingness of our troops to
fight, then concern for the immediate future of this front is more than
justified. . . . Despite all our efforts, the moment is fast approaching when
our hard-pressed defenses will crack. When the enemy has erupted into open
terrain, the inadequate mobility of our forces will make orderly and effective
conduct of the battle hardly possible.53

When GOODWOOD
seemed to confirm Rommel's and Kluge's opinions, OKW became doubtful of the
value of planning an offensive. Until the Germans learned where Patton was, they
could not dispel their uncertainty about Allied intentions and consequently
could not intelligently plan offensive action or weaken the Pas-de-Calais forces
to bolster the Normandy front. On 23 July, immediately upon receipt of Kluge's
letter, Jodl proposed to Hitler that it might be time to begin planning for an
eventual withdrawal from France. Surprisingly enough, Hilter
agreed.54
But before anything came of this conversation, COBRA raised its head.

The Breakthrough Plan

The persons most
intimately connected with COBRA were General Bradley, who conceived it, and
General Collins, who executed it. These officers, warm personal friends, each of
whom seemed to be able to anticipate what the other was about to do, worked
together so closely on the plans and on the developing operations that it was
sometimes difficult to separate their individual contributions. Their teamwork
was particularly effective within the American concept of command where the
higher commander often gives his subordinate great leeway in the detailed
planning of an operation. On the basis of reconnaissance, terrain study, road
conditions, and photo analysis, the subordinate commander could recommend
modifications that might alter quite basically the original idea. With fine
communications at their disposal, the American commanders at both echelons
(indeed at all levels of command) could and did exchange information and
suggestions, and measures proposed by the subordinate could be approved quickly
by the higher authority. Where mutual confidence abounded as it did in the case
of Generals Bradley and Collins, the closest co-operation resulted, with great
credit to both.

General Bradley
presented the COBRA idea at a conference with his staff
and his corps commanders
on 12 July. He characterized the battle of the hedgerows as "tough and
costly . . . a slugger's match . . . too slow a process,"
and spoke of his hope for a swift advance

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made possible by
"three or four thousand tons of bombs" from the air. He stated that aggressive
action and a readiness to take stiff losses if necessary were the keys to the
success of COBRA. "If they [the Germans] get set [again]," he warned, "we go
right back to this hedge fighting and you can't make any speed." He insisted,
"This thing [COBRA] must be
bold."55

Requisites for
the COBRA operation were many and complex, and General Bradley could only
estimate that they in fact were fulfilled. He assumed that the Germans in the
Cotentin, under the pressure of the July offensive, would withdraw to an
organized and stable defensive line. He had to determine where they would be
likely to erect their defense. He had to be certain that the Americans were in
contact with the main line of resistance when the operation commenced. He had to
be sure that the enemy line would not be so strongly fortified as to defy rapid
penetration. He had to have firm ground beyond the Cotentin marshes that would
not mire and delay mobile columns. He had to have a region traversed by a
sufficient number of roads to permit quick passage of large numbers of troops.
Finally, he had to be reasonably sure he could shake his armor loose before the
Germans could recuperate from the
penetration.56

Reasoning that
the Germans would withdraw to the vicinity of the Lessay-St. Lô highway,
General Bradley chose that road
as the COBRA line of departure. The COBRA
battleground--the Coutances-St. Lô
plateau--was to be south of the highway. It was a region of typical bocage,
an area of small woods and small hills, land
bounded on the west by the ocean, on the east by the Vire River. The sombre
hedgerowed lowland gave way to rolling and cheerful terrain, the swamps
disappeared, arable land was more plentiful and fertile, the farms more
prosperous, the hedgerowed fields larger. Pastoral hillsides replaced the
desolation of the prairies and the over-luxuriant
foliage of the Carentan lowlands. Roads were plentiful, for the most part tarred
two-lane routes. There were several wider highways--four main roads leading south
and three principal east--west roads across the Cotentin. Road centers such as
Coutances, Marigny, St. Gilles, le Mesnil-Herman, and Notre-Dame-de-Cenilly
assured an adequate communications network. Streams were relatively small.

A jumble of small
ridge lines and low hills at first glance, the Coutances-St. Lô plateau contains
a series of east-west ridges that rise toward the south for about eight miles
from the Lessay-St. Lô highway. Forming cross-compartments that would hinder an
advance to the south, the ridges favored lateral movement across the First Army
front. When in July the VII Corps had attacked down the Carentan-Périers isthmus
toward the plateau, General Collins had indicated awareness of the advantages of
swinging the offensive to a lateral axis in that region. He had pointed out that
if infantry forces reached Marigny, armored troops might well drive westward

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along the highway from St. Lô to Coutances in
exploitation.57
General Bradley's COBRA
plan took advantage of the terrain in the same way. After air force bombs
facilitated the infantry penetration, mobile troops were to veer westward and
drive to the Coutances, thereby encircling the Germans on the west coast of the
Cotentin.

General Bradley
called upon the VII Corps to make the main effort. He therefore changed the
corps boundary to reduce the corps zone to a width of four and a half miles. He
also enlarged General Collins' force to a total of three infantry and two
armored divisions. (Map 10 )

As outlined by
the army plan, COBRA would start with a tremendous air bombardment designed to
obliterate the German defenses along the Périers-St. Lô highway opposite the VII
Corps. Two infantry divisions, the 9th and the 30th, were to make the
penetration and keep the breach open by securing the towns of Marigny and St.
Gilles, thereby sealing off the flanks of the breakthrough. Two armored
divisions, the 3d and the 2d (the latter after being moved from the V Corps
sector), and a motorized infantry division, the 1st (also after having been
moved from the V to the VII Corps zone), were then to speed through the
passageway--the three-mile-wide Marigny-St. Gilles gap--in exploitation. Tactical
aircraft were to have already destroyed river bridges around the limits of the
projected COBRA area to isolate the battlefield, and the exploiting forces on
the left were to establish blocking positions on the eastern flank and
along

the southern edge
of the battlefield to prevent the Germans from bringing in reinforcements. The
forces in the main exploiting thrust, on the right (west), were to drive toward
the Cotentin west coast near Coutances and encircle the enemy opposite VIII
Corps. The VIII Corps in turn was to squeeze and destroy the surrounded enemy
forces. At the conclusion of COBRA, the First Army would find itself
consolidating on the Coutances-Caumont line. If the air bombardment and ground
attack paralyzed German reaction completely, the troops were to be ready to
exploit enemy disorganization still further by continuing offensive operations
without consolidation.58

Since the larger
and basic American maneuver defined by Montgomery was to be a sweep through the
Cotentin around a go-degree arc with the pivot at Caumont, the U.S. troops east
of the Vire had the subsidiary role of containing the enemy forces. While XIX
Corps remained in place and supported the VII Corps effort, V Corps was to make
a diversionary attack on the second day of the COBRA operation. Both corps

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MAP 10
Operation COBRA
VII Corps Plan
20 July 1944

--216--

were to tie down
German troops that might otherwise be moved to seal off a COBRA
penetration. The
XIX Corps was also to be ready to displace west of the Vire River and assume a
new zone; as VII Corps veered westward toward Coutances, XIX Corps was to be
prepared to take over the left portion of the VII Corps zone and drive to the
south along the west bank of the river.59

The rather
general concept expressed in the army outline plan was developed into a detailed
course of action by the VII Corps. Corps planners also made two major
modifications that affected the weight of the infantry assault and the routes as
well as the relative strengths of the exploiting units.

Because the 9th
and 30th Divisions were near exhaustion from their battle in the Taute and Vire
region, General Collins requested and received the 4th Division as well, and
assigned to it a role in the initial infantry assault. Though General Bradley
had planned to retain the 4th in army reserve, he acceded to Collins' request in
order to insure a quick follow-up of the air bombardment and a speedy
penetration.60

More important
was the modification of the
exploitation, which virtually changed the character of COBRA. According to the
army plan, the mobile forces were to use two main highways leading south, the
Marigny-Carantilly road on the right (west) and the St. Gilles-Canisy road on
the left. One armored division, presumably the 3d, after moving south for six
miles to Carantilly, was to swing in a wide arc for eleven miles--southwest,
west, and northwest--to encircle Coutances in the corps main effort. The other
armored division, the 2d, after pushing five miles south to Canisy, was to split
into three columns and drive southeast, south, and southwest in order to protect
the main effort developing toward Coutances. At the conclusion of its advance,
the 2d Armored Division was to set up blocking positions across the fronts of
both the VII and the VIII
Corps--at Bréhal, Cérences, Lengronne, St. Denis-le-Gast, and Hambye, also
inferentially at Villebaudon and Tessy-sur-Vire--and thereby across the entire
Cotentin. In advance of the forces actually encircling and destroying the enemy
near Coutances, the blocking positions were to prevent the Germans from bringing
in reinforcements from the southeast and from the south. The motorized 1st
Infantry Division was to provide reserve strength to reinforce either armored
thrust, or both.61

Less concerned
with the possible arrival of enemy reinforcements than with the strength already
facing the VII and VIII Corps
in the Cotentin, General Collins redistributed the power available to him. He
re-formed and strengthened

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the main attack
force and rerouted it along a more direct approach to Coutances. He transformed
the drive along the original and longer route to Coutances into a subsidiary and
protective effort. He consolidated the blocking force on the left from three
dispersed columns into two compact thrusts.

As formulated by
Collins, the plan of exploitation assigned the main encirclement to the
motorized 1st Division, with Combat Command B of the 3d Armored Division
attached. Armor and infantry, after driving south to Marigny, were to attack
westward along the excellent highway directly to Coutances in order to block and
help destroy the Germans facing the VIII Corps. The 3d Armored Division, less
CCB, was to follow the original and more roundabout route to Coutances; it was
to seize the southern exits of Coutances and provide flank protection on the
south for the main effort. The 2d Armored Division, strengthened by the
attachment of the 22d Regimental Combat Team of the 4th Division, was to drive
along the left (east) flank of the corps. One thrust was to go directly to le
Mesnil-Herman to cover the movement of the other exploiting forces and prepare
for further movement to Villebaudon and Tessy-sur-Vire, two critical points of
entry for possible German reinforcements from the southeast. Another 2d Armored
Division force was to be ready to go southwest from Canisy through
Notre-Dame-de-Cenilly to block German reinforcement from the south, but instead
of driving all the way to Bréhal near the Cotentin west coast it was to stop at
Cérences. The armor was to halt at Cérences in order to provide a coastal
corridor for an advance to the south by the VIII Corps, to avoid "a hell of a scramble" likely to
come if VII and VIII Corps units intermingled south of Coutances, and to prevent
the 2d Armored Division from being "strung out too badly."62

The COBRA plan in
final form thus called for three infantry divisions, the 9th, 4th, and 30th, to
make the initial penetration close behind the air bombardment and create a
"defended corridor" for exploiting forces, which were to stream westward toward
the sea. The motorized 1st Division, with CCB of the 3d Armored Division
attached, was to thrust directly toward Coutances. The reduced 3d Armored
Division was to make a wider envelopment. The 2d Armored Division, with the 22d
Infantry attached, was to establish blocking positions from Tessy-sur-Vire to
the Sienne River near Cérences and, in effect, make a still wider envelopment of
Coutances.63

The VII Corps
plan expressed a concept quite different from the army idea. The corps plan
reinforced the initial infantry assault. It massed more power against Coutances.
It strengthened blocking positions. It projected three encircling columns across
the Cotentin and around Coutances. Instead of cutting across the VIII Corps zone
of advance, it provided a corridor for the VIII Corps to exploit further a
successfully completed COBRA. As a result of these changes,
COBRA was no longer
a plan designed primarily to encircle Coutances after penetration; it had become

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a plan to
encircle and secure Coutances, disrupt the German defenses west of the Vire
River, and set up a situation suitable for further exploitation, presumably by
the VIII Corps.

Expecting the VII
Corps ground attack to complete the penetration six hours after the bombardment,
General Bradley originally scheduled the VIII Corps attack for that time. The
failure of both preliminary operations in the VIII Corps zone caused him to
modify this arrangement. If the German resistance to the pre-COBRA operations at
la Varde and St. Germain was typical of what the Americans could anticipate in
COBRA, then six hours was not enough time. General Bradley consequently
postponed the VIII Corps attack. If COBRA were launched in the morning, VIII
Corps would attack at dawn of the following day; if COBRA were launched in the
afternoon, VIII Corps would attack on the morning of the third
day.64

One other change
in plan came as a result of the preliminary operations. Instead of reverting to
control of the 83d Division, the 330th Infantry east of the Taute River flats
remained a separate unit. Although still considered formally under control of
the VIII Corps, the regiment was to begin the COBRA attack with the VII
Corps.

Since COBRA's
success depended essentially on VII Corps progress, General Collins had six
divisions under his control, virtually an army. The armored units augmented the
corps strength still more since both were "old type" or "heavy" armored
divisions, the only ones in the theater. All the divisions scheduled to make the VII
Corps COBRA attack were
combat experienced; three--the 2d Armored, the 1st, and the 9th--had fought in
North Africa and Sicily. While the 9th and 30th manned the corps front in
mid-July, the other divisions slated for commitment in COBRA assembled in the
rear, careful to avoid contact with the enemy lest their identity be revealed.
Tactical surprise was to be as important in COBRA as was the concentration of
strength.

In keeping with
the mission of VII Corps, First Army gave the corps a large part of its
artillery: 9 of its 21 heavy battalions, 5 of its 19 mediums, and all 7
of its nondivisional lights.
Nondivisional artillery pieces of all types under corps control
totaled 258.65
For the anticipated duration of the attack--five days--the army allocated the VII
Corps almost 140,000 rounds of artillery
ammunition.66
Because ammunition
restrictions made all-inclusive prearranged fires difficult, the VII Corps
Artillery (Brig. Gen. Williston B. Palmer) did not draw up an over-all fire
plan. Attaching to the divisions all seven of the light battalions the army had
made available, the corps suballocated to the divisions the greater part of its
supply of ammunition.67
The division fire plans included

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concentrations on
known or suspected enemy installations, some to strike as far as 3,000
yards south of the Périers-St. Lô
highway, most to fall on the main enemy defenses near the road. All fire plans
emphasized striking specific targets rather than furnishing general
support.68
The VII Corps Artillery was to control 174 pieces of medium and heavy caliber,
plus the artillery of the divisions initially in reserve. Adjacent corps
artillery units were to assist.

The major
preattack bombardment was to come from the air. Planes were to assume the normal
artillery missions of disrupting the enemy's communications, neutralizing his
reserves, and reducing his will to fight. Far beyond the resources of the
artillery available to the First Army, the air bombardment that General Bradley
had in mind encompassed terrifying power. To be certain that air commanders
appreciated the extent of the support desired, General Bradley went to England
on 19 July to present his requirements to the air chiefs in person.

Bradley's primary
desire was to obtain "blast effect" by the use of heavy
bombers.69
He wanted
the air attack concentrated in mass, the planes to strike in a minimum duration
of time. To avoid excessive cratering, which might impede the ground troops, and
to prevent the destruction of villages located at critical road junctions, he
requested that only relatively light bombs be
used.70
He designated a rectangular target immediately
south of the Périers-St. Lô highway, 7,000 yards wide and 2,500 yards deep. To
prevent accidental bombing of VII Corps front-line troops, Bradley planned to
withdraw them 800 yards from the bomb target. Though 800 yards left no real
margin of safety, General Bradley wanted the ground troops close enough to the
target for immediate exploitation after the bombardment. To provide additional
protection for the ground forces, General Bradley recommended that the planes
make their bomb runs laterally across the front, parallel to the front lines,
instead of approaching over the heads of American troops and perpendicular to
the front. Recognizing that pilots preferred a perpendicular approach to
minimize antiaircraft interference, he suggested that the planes use the sun for
concealment--if the attack occurred in the morning, the bombers could fly from
east to west; in the afternoon, they could attack over a reverse course. In
either case, the straight road between Périers and St. Lô would be an
unmistakably clear landmark as a flank guide.

For their part,
the air chiefs were unable to meet all the requirements. Although they promised
blast effect by a mass attack, agreed to use comparatively light bombs, and
concurred in the choice of the target, they demurred at making lateral bomb runs
and objected to the slender 800-yard safety factor.

A lateral bomb run, the air chiefs

--220--

pointed out,
meant approaching the target area on its narrow side, that is to say along a
narrow corridor. In an operation on the scale requested by General Bradley, this
would cause congestion over the target and make the completion of the attack
impossible in the brief time desired. To gain the effect of mass, the bombers
had to approach from the north over the heads of the ground troops. Admitting
that this posed some dangers to the ground troops, the air chiefs noted that the
highway would serve as a clearly distinguishable "no bomb line." In addition,
the less effective enemy aircraft interference during a perpendicular approach
would enable pilots and bombardiers to bomb more
accurately.71

Despite the fact
that the highway made an excellent landmark, the air chiefs wished a true safety
ground factor of 3,000 yards. They nevertheless agreed, in light of General
Bradley's desire to get the ground troops to the target area quickly, to reduce
the safety factor to 1,500 yards. Bradley, for his part, refused to withdraw his
troops more than 1,000 yards from the
highway.72
The final result was a
further compromise. The ground troops were to withdraw only 1,200 yards, but the
heavy bombers were to strike no closer to the ground troops than 1,450 yards.
The interval of 250 yards was to be covered by fighter-bombers, which attacked at lower
altitudes than the heavies and thus could bomb more accurately.

Participating
units in the COBRA air attack were to include all the heavy bombers of the
Eighth U.S. Air Force and all the medium bombers and fighter-bombers of the
Ninth U.S. Air Force. Fighter planes from the Eighth U.S. Air Force and from the
RAF 2nd Tactical Air Force were to fly cover. The RAF Heavy Bomber Command, with
planes equipped to carry only large bombs, were excluded because of Bradley's
desire to avoid excessive destruction and
cratering.73
Air Chief Marshal
Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander, provided top-level supervision. Air Chief
Marshal Leigh-Mallory, commander of the AEAF, was to set the time and the date
of the operation. General Brereton, commanding the Ninth U.S. Air Force, was to
plan the attack of the bombers. General Quesada, commander of the IX Tactical
Air Command, was to co-ordinate the air attack with the ground
forces.74

The air
bombardment was to begin eighty minutes before the ground attack with a
twenty-minute strike by 350 fighter-bombers. Most fighter-bombers were to attack
the narrow target strip immediately south of and adjacent to the road, although
several flights were to bomb and strafe six enemy strongpoints north of the
Périers--St. Lô highway.75

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Following
immediately, 1,800 heavy bombers, in an hour-long strike, were to blast the main
target area, a rectangular "carpet" adjacent to and south of the narrow strip.
Upon conclusion of the heavy bomber attack--the beginning of the ground
attack--350 fighter-bombers were to strafe and bomb the narrow strip again for
twenty minutes. Ten minutes after the completion of this strike, 396 medium
bombers were to attack the southern half of the rectangle for forty-five
minutes. Throughout the duration of the bombardment, 500 fighters were to fly
bomber cover.76

For the ground
troops, the narrow strip was the threshold, the target area the entrance to the
Marigny-St. Gilles gap. To blast open a passageway on the ground, approximately
2,500 planes in a bombardment lasting two hours and twenty-five minutes were to
strike a target area of six square miles with almost 5,000 tons of high
explosive, jellied gasoline, and white phosphorus.

This kind of air
power, many times the equivalent of available artillery, required careful
co-ordination to avoid striking U.S. troops, particularly since the employment
of heavy bombers intensified the usual problems and dangers of close air
support. The size of the individual plane bomb load gave each bomber a
considerable casualty-producing potentiality, but since heavy bombers attacked
in units, with a lead bombardier
controlling the bomb release of a dozen or so planes, an error in computation or
a failure to identify a landmark properly could easily result in disaster. The
absence of direct radio communication between the troops on the ground and the
heavy bombers in flight made reliance on visual signals necessary. To define the
northern limit of the heavy bomber target area during the air attack, artillery
was to place red smoke every two minutes on the narrow fighter-bomber
strip.77
This precaution was far from foolproof, for strategic aircraft bombed from high
altitudes, and ground haze, mist, dust, or a sudden change of wind direction
might render visual signals worthless. Ground troops on the front were to
withdraw one hour before the air attack, leaving a protective shell of light
forces in position until twenty minutes before the air bombardment, when they
too were to withdraw. After the withdrawal, the ground troops were to mark their
locations with fluorescent panels. All units participating in
COBRA were to have
repainted the Allied white-star insignia on their vehicles and
tanks.78

In the same way
that infantry failure to follow an artillery preparation closely tends to cancel
the effect of a well-delivered concentration, the inability of the COBRA ground
attack to take quick advantage of the bombardment would waste the blast effect
of the bombs on the enemy. The ground troops were to cross the three quarters of
a mile that

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separated them
from the air target at the conclusion of the heavy bomber strike while
fighter-bombers still were strafing and bombing the narrow strip immediately
south to the Périers-St. Lô road. The arrival of the infantry at the line of
departure and the conclusion of the fighter-bomber strike were to be
simultaneous. Medium bombers were then to commence attacking the southern half
of the carpet and to continue until the ground troops were across the road and
the narrow strip. To insure coordination, the units on the ground were to move
forward at the rate of one hundred feet a
minute.79
Artillery was to deliver
normal preparatory fires, reinforced by tank destroyer concentrations and
antiaircraft artillery ground fire, on the area between the troops and the
bombarding planes.

One hour after
the ground attack jumped off, all the fighter-bombers of the IX Tactical Air
Command and one group of RAF Typhoon planes were to be available to support the
First Army for the rest of the day with assault area cover, offensive fighter
operations, armed reconnaissance, and air support request missions. Six hours
after the ground attack, medium bombers, after having returned to England for
refueling and reloading, were to become available for

additional
missions as necessary. Dive bombers were to be ready for missions on one hour's
notice. If the infantry divisions made rapid progress and the exploiting forces
were employed at once, fighter-bombers were to furnish column cover by flying
protection and reconnaissance for the armored
spearheads.80

This was the plan
on which the Allies counted so much, and on 23 July Allied weather experts
expressed a cautious hope that COBRA might soon be launched. Predicting that a
slight overcast might break in the late morning of 24 July and that morning haze
and light fog would disappear later that day, the forecasters reported that the
weather on 24 and 25 July would be favorable for ground operations and
moderately favorable for air activity.81
After a week of waiting, the Allies
found the prospect tempting. With Caen and St. Lô in Allied hands, the arrival
of fresh infantry and armored divisions on the Continent, mounting stocks of
supplies and equipment increasingly available, and the Germans suffering from
attrition, a lack of supplies, and an absence of air support, the situation
appeared favorable for the breakthrough operation. Air Chief Marshal
Leigh-Mallory gave the green light, and the dormant body of COBRA prepared to
strike.