Given
that the simulations cited by the Joint Strike Fighter program office
and manufacturer disagree so dramatically against what is known about
the capabilities of recent Flanker variants, and their supporting
systems, there is a strong case to be made for all of these simulations
to be fully audited by an independent body such as RAND or CSBA to
determine whether representative adversary capabilities, tactics,
doctrine and supporting systems were actually employed. Such
disparities between assessments and fact parallel the findings of GAO
in vendor and program office cost assessments in the Joint Strike
Fighter program, reinforcing the case for a comprehensive Independent
Verification and Validation effort on the program's activities.
Depicted SDD Joint
Strike Fighter
Prototype AA-1 in flight. This aircraft
is a 'non-representative prototype' which predates a
series of structural and systems weight reduction measures.
(Imagery
via Air Force Link).

Abstract

Claims by the
Joint
Strike Fighter program office and manufacturer that the Joint Strike
Fighter can outperform “Sukhois” in air combat operations are
impossible to reconcile against what is known about recent developments
in Sukhoi Flanker capabilities, and the known design limitations of the
Joint Strike Fighter. This paper performs a critical analysis of these
statements against known Russian technological capabilities, tactics
and doctrine. The only
conclusion which can be drawn is that the claimed simulations which
yielded a "400 percent result" did not represent the variants of the
Flanker which the Joint Strike Fighter will have to confront in
operational service,
and did not account for known Russian doctrine and capabilities
intended to support these fighters. The
only feasible explanation for such results is therefore that the
simulated engagements were flown by Joint Strike Fighters against
legacy Flanker
variants with low power N-001 radars, 1980s generation missiles,
warning systems, defensive jammers, and supporting systems. Therefore,
a 2015 Joint Strike Fighter with its supporting systems is
pitted against a
1980s threat without its supporting systems. Such results are only
useful in assessing the effectiveness of the Joint Strike Fighter
against some African
or Middle Eastern nations and are clearly not representative of the
Asia-Pacific environment post 2010.
The reality is that the
“threat environment” the Joint Strike Fighter will confront in the
Asia-Pacific is very different to the environment expected and
envisaged when the Joint Strike Fighter was conceived during the early
1990s. There
have been significant technological advances in two metre band counter
stealth radar,
passive emitter locating systems, infrared sensors and high
power-aperture X-band phased array radars. Moreover, DRFM jammers are
proliferating, and Flankers now have the option of towed decoys like
the KEDR, both diminishing the effectiveness of the AIM-120 AMRAAM
which is to arm the Joint Strike Fighter. For all
practical purposes, technological evolution has rendered the concept
of the Joint Strike Fighter obsolete before it has even completed
Flight Test or
entered full rate production. This is a clear case of failed
technological strategy on the part of the Joint Strike Fighter planning
staff.
It is now abundantly
clear that the Joint Strike Fighter is not going to be viable in Beyond
Visual Range
air combat, just as it was clear from the outset that it would never
be a serious player in Within Visual Range air combat. Improvements
in the capability and number of internally carried missiles will not
turn this problem around, since the opposing sensor and weapons
capabilities will continue to evolve over time. The
remarkable claims about Joint Strike Fighter air combat performance
made recently by
the program executives and manufacturer's public relations staff can
be explained only if the cited simulations were conducted against
1980s Sukhoi variants, devoid of the capabilities of contemporary and
future Flanker
variants. As such these claims
clearly lack analytical
rigour and cannot be taken seriously.

The
ongoing debate surrounding the Joint Strike Fighter has seen some
remarkable claims made recently by the F-35 program executive
officer, Maj. Gen. Charles R. Davis, and the Lockheed Martin
executive vice president of F-35 program integration, Tom Burbage.
The central argument in these claims by the program executives is
that the Joint Strike Fighter will outperform Russian designed
“Sukhois” in air combat operations, indeed the opening
statement in the manufacturer's media release claims “F-35
Lightning II is at least 400 percent more effective in air-to-air
combat capability than the best fighters currently available in the
international market.”

However,
remarkable claims require remarkable evidence, and to date no such
evidence has been forthcoming either from the program office or the
manufacturer. Historically, when Joint Strike Fighter advocates have
been challenged
to provide the supporting assumptions and methodology that were used
to compare Joint Strike Fighter capabilities to potential adversary
aircraft, the
answer has invariably been “this is
classified so we cannot
tell you”. That in itself is a dubious claim, insofar as such
analyses generally involve classification of exact results, but not
necessarily classification of how the assessment was performed and
which adversary capabilities were assessed.

The
most interesting of the recent claims are that the “F-35
enjoys a significant Combat Loss Exchange Ratio advantage over the
current and future air-to-air threats, to include Sukhois,”
made by Maj. Gen. Charles R. Davis, F-35 program executive
officer, and that “the Lockheed
Martin F-35 Lightning II is
at least 400 percent more effective in air-to-air combat capability
than the best fighters currently available in the international
market” made by the manufacturer’s public relations
office. Both claims were justified by reference to “U.S. Air
Force air-to-air combat effectiveness analysis” and “Air Force's standard air-to-air engagement
analysis model, also used
by allied air forces to assess air-combat performance, pitted the 5th
generation F-35 against all advanced 4th generation fighters in a
variety of simulated scenarios.”

Importantly,
these claims did not specify whether the results were for Within
Visual Range (WVR) or Beyond Visual Range (BVR) air combat, or some
mix of the two. Which variants of the Sukhoi Flanker, or other types
assessed, were also not disclosed. The reader was left to infer that
the simulations covered a mix of engagement types, and all aircraft
types which the Joint Strike Fighter might confront in combat.

If
we consider real world air combat scenarios, there are a wide range
of variables which can be applied to constructing a scenario. Some
basic considerations include:

Support by Airborne Early Warning & Control aircraft.
Did both sides have such support, or did only one side have it, or did
neither?

Support by surface based Early Warning or Acquisition
radars. Did both sides have such support, or did only one side have it,
or did neither?

Support by airborne or surface based passive emitter
locating systems. Did both sides have such support, or did only one
side have it, or did neither?

Support by aerial refuelling tanker aircraft. Did both
sides have such support, or did only one side have it, or did neither?

Intraflight and offboard sensor networking support. Did
both sides have such support, or did only one side have it, or did
neither?

Standoff jamming support of ground based and AEW&C
radar systems, and networks. Did both sides have such support, or did
only one side
have it, or did neither?

What was context of the simulated air combat engagements?
Was the Joint Strike Fighter performing a Defensive Counter Air (DCA)
Combat Air Patrol (CAP), a rapid alert runway launched intercept, an
Offensive Counter Air (OCA) sweep into hostile airspace, or was it
defending itself from interceptors when attacking a ground target?

These
considerations, which represent assumptions about Joint Strike Fighter
weapon types
and payloads, and assumptions about adversary aircraft types,
tactics, employment, radar design, missile design, and supporting
radar and sensor system design, will all have a large impact on the
results of any simulation. Therefore, the “exchange ratio”,
or how many “hostiles” are killed versus “friendlies”
lost, can vary significantly depending upon how these variables are
set up.

In
any aerial clash between two fighter forces, contemporary thinking is
to engage and destroy as many opposing fighters as possible at Beyond
Visual Range, such that an advantage in numbers can be gained when
the surviving enemy fighters close to visual range. At that point,
the objective is to gain firing opportunities at visual range before
the opponent does, again to inflict losses on the enemy as quickly as
possible.

The
long history of aerial combat shows that the highest numbers of kills
were accrued by pilots who practiced surprise ambush tactics against
unsuspecting opponents, and avoided close combat manoeuvring
engagements. The very same history shows that pilots flying escort or
air defence patrols scored, on average, much fewer kills.

Many
historical case studies have revealed frequent and ongoing arguments
between fighter pilots seeking to fly independently to maximise
opportunities for kills, and those whom they were tasked with
protecting, who sought to tether the fighters to their vulnerable
assets – be they bombers or surface targets. This dichotomy is
one of the unwanted realities of aerial war – wiping out the
opponent's air force favours independent fighter operations, and
ambush tactics, yet keeping critical surface and airborne assets
alive requires that fighters orbit close to these assets to defend
them from attacks.

Once
fighters are committed to protecting an airborne or surface based
asset, they will have no choice other than to patrol a volume of
airspace between those assets and the approaching enemy force. The
unavoidable geometrical reality is that the area in which they are
operating will be therefore well known to the enemy, the instant the
location of the asset is known to the enemy.

What follows in turn is a
set piece engagement scenario, where the defender plays to keep the
attacker away from the defended assets, and the attacker plays to
overwhelm or bypass the defenders.

In the contemporary air
combat game this set piece scenario unfolds in three phases:

Initial detection and mutual positioning of fighters.

Beyond visual range missile launches, some of which
succeed and some of which fail.

Surviving fighters merge and engage at visual range. Some
fighters survive in close combat, some are killed.

The only circumstance
where the defending fighter does not need to engage in close combat
is where all of the approaching attackers are destroyed early, in
Beyond Visual Range combat.

These
realities are also key factors which have determined the design foci
in the Russian Sukhoi Flanker family of fighters, especially the most
recent variants. The Flankers are designed to deliver large salvoes
of Beyond Visual Range missiles to kill as many defending fighters as
early as possible, and force evasive manoeuvring upon the survivors
to “spoil” their entry geometry once the Flankers close
to visual range and merge. The Flankers are built to excel in close
combat,
exploiting the refined aerodynamic design of the aircraft, thrust
vectoring capability, and high thrust to combat weight ratio.

The notion that air
combat will be wholly confined to Beyond Visual Range combat
presupposes that an adversary will agree to play this game, even if
it is not to their advantage. Real adversaries do not play in this
fashion, and never have.

The
claim that the Joint Strike Fighter is “at least 400 percent more
effective
in air-to-air combat capability” therefore needs to be
carefully tested against the realities of modern air combat. The
notion that an aircraft with unspectacular aerodynamic performance,
very limited missile payload, and strongly compromised stealth, is at
least half as good as the top tier F-22 is remarkable by any measure.
More so since the Joint Strike Fighter lacks the supersonic cruise
capability, radar
peak power, subsonic and supersonic agility, and all aspect penetration
orientated stealth
capabilities of the larger F-22.

If we assume that the
cited 400 percent is an “exchange ratio” as the statement
expects us to infer, it could apply to Beyond Visual Range combat or
a mix of Within Visual Range and Beyond Visual Range.

However, the claim cannot
apply to Within Visual Range combat alone since all Flankers have
better manoeuvring capability in close combat, and like the Joint
Strike Fighter are
equipped with Helmet Mounted Display/Sight technology. Even if we
assume they are both equipped with identical missile types, the
Flanker's superior agility and performance, and larger payload of
missiles, would result in a decisive advantage over the Joint Strike
Fighter. The RAND presentation's observation that the Joint Strike
Fighter is “double inferior” to the
Flanker in close combat is an unavoidable reality of the Joint Strike
Fighter's
inferior speed, acceleration, combat thrust to weight ratio, and much
higher
effective wing (ie lifting area) loading.

At present time the only
air to air missile payload planned for the Joint Strike Fighter before
2018 is a pair
of internally carried AIM-120 AMRAAM Beyond Visual Range missiles.
British Joint Strike Fighter's are to have the option of carrying the
ASRAAM Within
Visual Range missile instead.

In close combat the best
the Joint Strike Fighter can achieve against any Flanker is parity, or
a 1:1 exchange
ratio – trading one Joint Strike Fighter for every Flanker killed. This
is as
generous an assessment as is possible, given what we know about the
Joint Strike Fighter's aerodynamic performance inferiority relative to
the Flanker.

If the cited 400 percent
applies to a 50:50 mix of Within Visual Range and Beyond Visual Range
engagements, then it follows that to achieve a 4:1 ratio, the Joint
Strike Fighter
must achieve a 7:1 exchange ratio in Beyond Visual Range engagements.
That is effectively claiming that it can almost match the F-22
regardless of the fact that it lacks all of the F-22's additional
performance,
sensor and stealth capabilities, and it carries at best one half the
missile payload of the F-22, and at worst one quarter.

That
a Joint Strike Fighter which is optimised for subsonic combat at medium
to low
altitudes can almost match the F-22 in air combat exchange ratios
against advanced Flankers like the Su-35BM or Su-35-1 presents a
clear non-sequitur.

The only way a simulation
can produce this type of result is if the adversary aircraft are
operated in a completely asymmetric environment, with pilots and
operational planners who actively cooperate in getting themselves
killed by:

Not using known Russian Beyond Visual Range air combat
doctrine;

Flying single aircraft sorties rather than sections of
four or more aircraft;

Turning off the InfraRed Search Track system and Missile
Approach Warning System;

Turning off the Sukhoi intra and inter-flight networks
which allow sharing of target data;

Not using jamming equipment to disrupt the networks
supporting the Joint Strike Fighter;

Turning off the Flanker's Irbis-E or Zhuk ASE high
power-aperture fire control radar;

Turning off the Flanker's Khibiny Emitter Locating System;

Not carrying a representative payload or mix of missiles;

Not using thrust vectoring to evade the AMRAAM missile;

Not using supersonic cruise to deny the Joint Strike
Fighter firing opportunities;

Not deploying supporting two metre band VHF radars which
can detect the Joint Strike Fighter;

Not deploying supporting passive Emitter Locating Systems;

Not deploying supporting AEW&C aircraft;

Not using the R-172/R-100 “AWACS-killer” missile to drive
away or kill the AEW&C and tanker aircraft supporting the Joint
Strike Fighter.

The only logical
conclusion which can be drawn is that the claimed simulations which
yielded the 400 percent result did not represent the variants of the
Flanker which the Joint Strike Fighter will have to confront in
operational service,
and did not account for known Russian doctrine and capabilities
intended to support these fighters.

The
only feasible explanation for such results is therefore that the
simulated engagements were flown by Joint Strike Fighters against
legacy Flanker
variants with low power N-001 radars, 1980s generation missiles,
warning systems, defensive jammers, and supporting systems. In other
words, a 2015 Joint Strike Fighter with its supporting systems is
pitted against a
1980s threat without its supporting systems. Such results are only
useful in assessing the effectiveness of the Joint Strike Fighter
against some African
or Middle Eastern nations and are clearly not representative of the
Asia-Pacific environment post 2010.

Su-35BM cockpit layout. At this
time there
are three discrete generations of the Flanker. The first generation was
deployed during the 1980s and is represented by the baseline Su-27S/SK
Flanker B, Su-27UB/UBK Flanker C. Direct derivatives of the first
generation Flanker include the smart weapons capable Su-27SMK,
Su-30MKK/MK2 and Chinese clone J-11B. Second generation Flankers are
the Su-30MKI and Su-30MKM and the Su-27K/UB/Su-33/33UB which
incorporate additional capabilities such as thrust vectoring and phased
array radars. The third generation of Flankers is exemplified by the
Su-35BM and new production Su-35-1 which expand on second generation
features, but include high power-aperture phased array radars, advanced
Infrared Search Track systems, advanced networking, 200 nautical mile
class "counter-ISR" missiles, and are fully digital (Sukhoi).

Flanker capability is a
moving
target as the aircraft and its systems have rapidly evolved over the
last two decades. This chart compares graphically
the peak power aperture product estimates for the Flanker radars, and
the APG-79, which considered superior to the Joint Strike Fighter's
APG-81. The latter is depicted with some provision for growth.
Hybrid array technology used in the BARS and Irbis E provide similar
total noise figure for the antenna-receiver design to that of AESA
designs like the APG-79. Growth JSF APG-81 radars will be similar to
the APG-79. Block upgrades to the BARS to convert it into an Irbis E
configuration will not present difficulties as the latter is an uprated
derivative of the former.

The
MiG-35
Zhuk AE AESAmultimode radar designed by Phazotron is
the first Russian
AESA design. An enlarged variant is in development, intended to deliver
similar power aperture performance to the F-22's APG-77 and F-15C's
APG-63(V)3/4, strongly outperforming the APG-81 in the Joint Strike
Fighter (RSK MiG).

In the simplest of terms, the Joint Strike
Fighter is "outgunned" when confronting the Flanker in air combat. With
two to possibly four missiles carried, the Joint Strike Fighter
confronts an adversary armed with up to 12 missiles (above, from
www.jsf.mil, below KnAAPO).

2005
SDD Threshold Weapons. Early F-35s will carry only two internal
missiles, either the AIM-120 AMRAAM or ASRAAM. While growth to four
missiles remains planned, timelines have not been disclosed to date
(www.jsf.mil).

The Joint Strike Fighter cannot achieve a
high exchange ratio against an aircraft like the Su-35BM or Su-35-1
for a number of very good reasons:

The advent of advanced high mobility 2 metre band VHF
"counter stealth" radars, such as the NNIRT Nebo SVU, Rezonans NE, KBR
Vostok E and CETC JY-27 will
deny much of the concealment provided by the limited stealth design of
the Joint Strike Fighter. The manufacturers of the Vostok E for
instance claim a detection range of ~40 nautical miles against the
F-117A Nighthawk, or other types with similar VHF band RCS, in a jammed
environment, and 190 nautical miles in an unjammed environment.

Advances in Emitter Locating System technology, ground
based and airborne, will provide an opponent with early warning and
location of the Joint Strike Fighter if its frequency hopping APG-81
radar is employed any other way than sporadically. Such systems include
the surveillance component of the electronic warfare suite on the
Su-35BM, and the well known 85V6 Orion/Vega,
Kolchuga and CETC YLC-20.

The advent of advanced InfraRed Search Track and Emitter
Locating systems on the Flanker will deny the element of genuine
surprise to a Joint Strike Fighter pilot. Lighting up the APG-81 radar,
lighting the afterburner,
or launching a missile will give the Joint Strike Fighter's position
away, no differently than a submarine launching a torpedo.

The advent of intra-flight and wide area networking
capabilities in the Flanker permit much more flexible tactics against
the Joint Strike Fighter, but also the use of non-radiating attacks
where the Flanker prosecutes the engagement against the Joint Strike
Fighter using only tracking data produced by sensors on the ground or
other aircraft.

The advanced Flankers are built to cruise supersonically
and that presents the lower performance Joint Strike Fighter with
genuine
challenges in positioning for a shot within the performance envelope of
the AMRAAM missile. The instant the afterburner is engaged, the Joint
Strike Fighter is exposed and compromised to the Flanker's InfraRed
Search Track sensor.

Once the Joint Strike Fighter launches its missile, the
Flanker pilot has the option of using his DRFM jammer, or towed decoy
to defeat the AMRAAM, as well as using his thrust vectoring to
outmanoeuvre the AMRAAM. The AMRAAM is not designed to turn like a
Python 4/5, AIM-9X, ASRAAM, or digital R-74.

Once the Flanker detects the Joint Strike Fighter, Russian
doctrine is to launch a salvo of two, three or four missiles, with a
mix of different seeker types, to complicate defensive manoeuvre by the
victim. With its dependency on frequent afterburner use for high
performance manoeuvres the Joint Strike Fighter is especially
vulnerable to newer heatseeking missiles. An exhaust can be shielded
and cooled, an afterburning exhaust plume cannot.

The reality is that the
“threat environment” the Joint Strike Fighter will confront in the
Asia-Pacific is very different to the environment expected and
envisaged when the Joint Strike Fighter was conceived during the early
1990s. There
have been significant technological advances in two metre band radar,
passive emitter locating systems, infrared sensors and high
power-aperture X-band phased array radars. Moreover, DRFM jammers are
proliferating, and Flankers now have the option of towed decoys like
the KEDR.

Depicted
an Su-35 Flanker E (KnAAPO Image)

This
is a by-product of the systematic focus in Russian, former Soviet
republic, and Chinese industry and research communities on developing
technology to defeat the principal technological monopoly of the US
military, that is, stealth. While these advances are not strong
enough to nullify the top end stealth designs, such as the B-2A and
F-22A Raptor, and may never be, they are now rendering the “economy
stealth” design of the Joint Strike Fighter susceptible to detection.
For all
practical purposes, technological evolution has rendered the concept
of the Joint Strike Fighter obsolete before it has even completed
Flight Test or
entered full rate production. This is a clear case of failed
technological strategy on the part of the Joint Strike Fighter planning
staff.

Central
to the Joint Strike Fighter's weaknesses in air combat is its limited
payload of
internally carried missiles, which simply compounds the problems
arising from the Joint Strike Fighter's inferior aerodynamic
performance relative to
advanced Russian designed fighters. The baseline for the Joint Strike
Fighter is a
payload of only two AIM-120 missiles, with long term growth to four
internal missiles feasible. The claim that six 'superpacked' missiles
might be carried remains to be demonstrated.

QF-4 drone. In combat
the
AIM-120 AMRAAM has delivered kill probabilities of the order of ~50
percent against targets which cannot be considered challenging either
aerodynamically or electronically. The standard drone against which the
AIM-120 has been tested, including the latest AIM-120D prototypes, is
the QF-4, which is not capable of replicating the performance of any
Flanker variant, especially not second generation Flankers with thrust
vectoring, and third generation Flankers with supersonic cruise and thrust vectoring (US DoD).

The
limited number of missiles carried exacerbates the problems arising
from the limited ability of even later variants of the AIM-120 to
deal with high G manoeuvring targets, equipped with advanced DRFM
jammers. The AIM-120 was conceived to defeat massed raids by Soviet
era tactical strike aircraft, which had limited manoeuvre performance
and poor defensive systems, and could thus be picked off easily.
While the seeker and propulsion in the AIM-120 have evolved
considerably since the AIM-120A, its basic aerodynamic design and
flight profile are not adequate to kill a high G manoeuvring late
model Flanker. Claims that the AIM-120 has killed manoeuvring targets
in trials should be assessed carefully, since the US has no drone
aircraft which can aerodynamically match the supercruising thrust
vectoring and extremely agile late model Flanker.

While seeker
improvements, and derivative AIM-120 designs equipped with other
seekers, such as derivatives of the AGM-88 and AIM-9X designs, would
overcome the susceptibility of the active radar seeker to DRFM jammer
technology, they cannot overcome the inherent aerodynamic limitations
of the
AIM-120 airframe design when confronting high G manoeuvring targets.

Where a missile's ability
to kill a target is uncertain, the basic strategy to overcome this
limitation is to fire salvoes of two, three or four missiles against
a single target. The Russians have adopted this model with the later
Flanker variants, typically carrying up to twelve Beyond Visual Range
missiles. This permits six two round salvoes, four three round
salvoes or three four round salvoes for an especially difficult
target.

With
two, maybe four missiles, the Joint Strike Fighter cannot play this
game, and will
never be able to do so.

It is now abundantly
clear that the Joint Strike Fighter is not going to be viable in Beyond
Visual Range
air combat, just as it was clear from the outset that it would never
be a serious player in Within Visual Range air combat. Improvements
in the capability and number of internally carried missiles will not
turn this problem around, since the opposing sensor and weapons
capabilities will continue to evolve over time.

The
remarkable claims about Joint Strike Fighter air combat performance
made recently by
the program executives and manufacturer's public relations staff can
be explained only if the cited simulations were conducted against
1980s Russian Sukhoi variants, devoid of the tactics, sensors,
weapons and supporting systems contemporary and future Flanker
variants will employ. As such
these claims clearly lack analytical
rigour and cannot be taken seriously.