In my article, I propose to discuss constructivism and realism in terms of actions instead of doing that in a usual way, in terms of theories, philosophers or general positions. To enable this, I offer two conceptual tools. First, I use modified model of four types of knowledge introduced by Andrzej Zybertowicz. It approaches any knowledge-building process as a cultural game, and recognizes reproduction, discovery, redefinition, and design of a new game. Second, I use Stanislaw Lem’s model of three types of geniuses. I illustrate my approach briefly using examples from Plato, Spinoza and Berkeley.

In the reception of Josef Mitterer’s writings up to now, there are two predominant types of motifs: the radical constructivist background of his philosophy and the ontological and epistemological foundations and consequences of non-dualism. The critics are focused rather on some problematic consequences of non-dualism, ranging from the problem of infinite regress up to the thesis assuming that Mitterer’s philosophy presupposes a world reduced to descriptions. However, these two types of readings are founded on dualizing assumptions which are not coherent with non-dualism. \\Thus, in the present paper I interpret non-dualism in the frame of non-dual-ism, based on non-dualizing assumptions. I argue that non-dualism is a rhetorical project resulting in far-reaching consequences in the field of academic and scientific debates, poetics and practice of negotiations and deliberations, as well as in ordinary discourse. Non-dualism fulfills Richard Rorty’s dream of culture as a never-ending conversation in which the argument of power is successfully replaced by the power of argument. Mitterer makes transparent the rhetorical techniques performed in the dualizing discourse (not only in situations of conflict) in order to present an alternative – the non-dualizing mode of discourse. Mitterer’s philosophy – reread in the context of Rorty’s pragmatism, Foucault’s conception of discourses, Perelman’s new rhetoric – offers the new vocabulary (in Rorty’s meaning) which may change the practice of speaking

According to constructivism, the world we can know is a construction and it is not possible to gain knowledge about the world as it is in itself. This thesis of constructivism has been criticized as being self-refuting. It is discussed whether this criticism is sound. Constructivists have tried three ways in order to avoid self-refutation. It is argued that the first two ways are unconvincing. The third solution is tenable. However, at a closer look the third solution turns out as a moderate kind of realism since it gives up the central claim of constructivism.

In this paper I argue that Josef Mitterer’s non-dualizing mode of discourse and Richard Rorty’s ironist philosophy should team up. After an introduction (1), my starting point is the portrayal of anti-representationalism which is of central importance in Rorty’s philosophical project (2). Then I argue that the nondualizing mode of discourse is the best available way to cash out anti-representationalism (3). To close this paper I will describe a type of philosopher who will most likely be sympathetic towards such a non-dualizing project (4). Here I will make use of Rorty’s ideas in calling this figure the edifying ironist. My claim is that edifying ironists should consider adopting the non-dualizing way of speaking and that non-dualists should consider becoming edifying ironists.

It is not unusual to associate the rise of Radical Constructivism and Second Order Cybernetics. For example Ranulph Glanville equalized the two terms in his formula “Radical constructivism = Second order cybernetics.” The works of Jean Piaget were absorbed by three (co)founding fathers of Radical Constructivism, namely Ernst von Glasersfeld, Heinz von Foerster and Ranulph Glanville and gained massive influence since the early seventies. While von Glasersfeld coined the term Radical Constructivism, von Foerster and Glanville spelled out many of its implications. Von Foerster quotes Piaget since 1973/74 in his discussions concerning cognition and the construction of reality. Also in the work of von Glasersfeld Piaget took a key role. Piaget’s work stands at the very beginning of his Radical Constructivism. Also Glanville’s dissertation, which was concerned with the concept of ‘object’ took many hints from Piaget’s works on the constancy of objects.

This article deals with the research tradition of Radical Constructivism and proposes four central claims for its theoretical, methodological and epistemic orientation and status. First, Radical Constructivism should be viewed as a comprehensive empirical research tradition with an emphasis on cognition, learning, living systems and organization which, in addition, developed a new general methodology for scientific operations. Second, the main opponent of Radical Constructivism, especially in the research program of Heinz von Foerster, does not lie in philosophical or epistemological terrains but in the area of the general scientific methodology and in its conventional mode of exploring the world. Third, Radical Constructivism proposed a new and alternative way for scientific explorations and world-making which produces, additionally, tangible and non-trivial effects with respect to scientific outcomes. Fourth, due to this new way of scientific world-making and due to its novel scientific methodology Radical Constructivism was only marginally interested in epistemological issues. Instead, the empirical research tradition of Radical Constructivism offered intriguing answers why the varieties of scientific realism and its allies like scientific objectivity seem so appealing and almost self-evident.