Private Registry

Replicated Private Registry Security

This document lists the security measures and processes in place to ensure that images pushed to the Replicated Private Registry remain private.

Single Tenant Isolation

The registry is deployed and managed as a multi-tenant application, but each tenant is completely isolated from data created and pulled by other tenants. Docker images have shared base layers, but the Replicated Private Registry doesn’t share these between tenants. For example, if a tenant created an image FROM postgres:10.3, and pushed the image to Replicated, all layers will be uploaded, even if other tenants have this base layer uploaded.

A tenant in the Replicated Private Registry is a team on vendor.replicated.com or console.replicated.com. Licenses and Customers created by the team are also granted some permissions to the registry data, as specified below. Cross-tenant access is never allowed in the Replicated Private Registry.

Authentication and Authorization

The Replicated Private Registry supports several method of authentication. Note that public authentication is never allowed the registry only accepts authenticated requests.

Vendor Authentication

All accounts with Read/Write access on vendor.replicated.com or console.replicated.com will have full access to all images pushed by the tenance to the registry. These users can push and pull images to and from the registry.

End Customer Authentication

A valid (unexpired) license file has an embedded registry_token value. Replicated components shipped to customers will use this value to authenticate to the registry. When authenticating using a registry_token, only pull access is enabled. A registry_token has pull access to all images in the tenants account. When a license expires (or the expiration date is changed to a past date), all future authentication (and therefore pull requests) will be denied.

Networking and Infrastructure

A dedicated cluster is used to run the Replicated Private Registry. The servers running the registry aren’t used for any services other than what’s required to run the registry.

The registry metadata is stored in a shared database instance. This contains information about each layer in an image, but not the image data itself.

The registry image data is securely stored in an encrypted S3 bucket. This results in each layer being encrypted at rest, using a shared key stored in Amazon Key Management Service. Each tenant has a unique directory in the shared bucket and access is limited to the team or license making the request.

The registry cluster is running on a harded operating system image (CentOS-based), and all instances are on a private VPC. The instances running the cluster and the registry images do not have public IP addresses assigned, instead only port 443 traffic is allowed from a layer 7 load balancer into these servers.

Additionally, there are no ssh public keys on these servers, and password-based ssh login is disallowed. The servers are not configured to have any remote access. All deployments to these servers are automated using tools such as Terraform and a custom-built CI/CD process. Only verified images will be pulled and run.

Runtime Monitoring

Replicated uses a Web Application Firewall (WAF) on the cluster that monitors and will block any unusual activity. When unusual activity is detected, access from that endpoint will be automatically blocked for a period of time, and the Replicated SRE is alerted.

Penetration Testing

Replicated has completed a formal pen test that included the Private Registry in the scope of the test. Replicated also continues to run a bug bounty program and encourages responsible disclosure on any vulnerabilities found.