Friday, April 29, 2016

Three years ago the Iraqi insurgency re-emerged. In April
2013 the Baathist Naqshibandi group was able to provoke Prime Minister Nouri
al-Maliki to send the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to attack the Hawija protest
site in southern Kirkuk governorate. Immediately afterward other demonstration
areas talked about taking up arms against the government, and there was a wave
of violence by all the major militant groups. Security steadily deteriorated
over the next year culminating in the fall of Mosul in 2014. The Hawija raid
then was the moment the Iraqi militants began operating out in the open once
again after their nadir following the U.S. Surge.

When the Sunni protest movement started at the end of 2012,
the Baathists attempted to take advantage of it. The demonstrations began when
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki moved against Finance Minister Rafi Issawi in December
2012 by claiming he was behind terrorist attacks. Protests started in
Anbar, Issawi’s home, and then spread to other provinces. The one in Hawija
began in January
2013, and was led by the Intifada
Ahrar al-Iraq, the political wing of the Baathist Naqshibandi insurgent
group. It wanted to provoke a conflict with the security forces that could be
used to turn the public against the government and towards violence. The
Baathists attempted to do so
in Mosul, Ramadi, and Fallujah, but failed. It finally found its moment in
Hawija.

In April 2013, the Naqshibandi was able to create a
confrontation with the ISF in Kirkuk. On April
19, a checkpoint outside the Hawija protest area was attacked leading to
several casualties. The Army then raided
the demonstration site, which caused some fighting. Intifada Ahrar al-Iraq
claimed that 114 people were arrested as well. The ISF then demanded
that the perpetrators of the checkpoint assault be turned over. Negotiations
were going on when the ISF attacked the site on April
23. The Defense Ministry claimed
20 protesters and 3 soldiers were killed in the process, while a parliamentary
committee later said 44 total died. It was widely believed
at the time that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki had grown tired of the protests
and wanted to stamp them out with force. That was the reason why he didn’t wait
for talks to come to any fruition, and sent in the ISF instead so quickly. That
played directly into the hands of the militants.

The raid upon Hawija had the desired affect of turning many
protesters towards armed struggle. First, Intifada Ahrar al-Iraq announced
that it was officially joining the Naqshibandi army, and called on others to take
up what it called a defensive jihad against Baghdad. At the Ramadi
demonstrations a speech
was given calling to take up arms. Sheikh Ali Hatem Sulaiman claimed he was
forming a Pride and Dignity Army to protect the protesters, and Sheikh Abdul
Malik al-Saadi, the religious leader of the Anbar protests called for a tribal
army. By June
the demonstrations across the country were shrinking. Many had either given up
believing that they could achieve anything peacefully, or they had joined the
new insurgency. The Baathist plan had worked perfectly. It provoked Maliki to
crackdown on Hawija, and given people a reason to take up arms. In the process
the demonstrations eventually gave way to a new wave of violence.

All of the old insurgent groups came out of the woodwork
after Hawija. There were attacks
upon the ISF in Tuz Kharmato, Baiji, Ramadi, and Fallujah, along with open
fighting in Mosul,
and the Naqshibandi temporarily seized
the town of Suleiman Beq. In a foreshadowing of what would happen a year later
in Mosul and Tikrit, soldiers were reported
to have abandoned their posts, some senior commanders resigned, and others
refused orders. Besides the Baathists, the Islamic Army (1), Ansar
al-Islam, and the Islamic
State of Iraq all claimed responsibility for attacks. Many tribes joined in
as well. A sheikh in Hawija for example named Abu Abdullah told the Global
Post after the raid upon the protest site he decided to take up arms
against the government. He didn’t think his tribe was strong enough to take on
the ISF alone, so it made a deal with ISI. The Naqshibandi also tried to co-opt
the tribes by forming Military
Councils to organize them under its leadership. By 2008 these groups had
all hit a nadir. The United States Surge had killed much of the militants’
leadership or turned their membership towards the Sahwa to fight ISI. Maliki then
neglected the Sahwa, which had too many ghost fighters to be integrated anyway,
while the Islamic State stared a campaign to kill and intimidate them to turn them
backed to militancy. The prime minister had also undermined the integrity of
the security forces by appointing men loyal to him as commanders down to the
brigade level, few of which were competent as leaders. All together this provided
a perfect environment for the insurgency to make a comeback.

Ironically, what the Naqshibandi started the Islamic State
would usurp. ISI made alliances with all the major militant groups and tribes
to launch the summer offensive in 2014. It was able to take Mosul, Tikrit, and
the Hawija district in June. It then demanded baya, allegiance from all the
other armed groups. Those that refused were attacked and killed. That actually
started by the end of 2013, but the other organizations chose to ignore that
and the history of ISI, which had done the same thing before the Surge. They
believed that they could carve out their own areas of control and co-exist with
the Islamic State, but that was impossible. ISI wanted to create a caliphate
under its sole leadership, which it eventually did. By 2015 all the other
insurgent groups including the Baathists that helped it seize territory were
dormant. Hawija then became a pyrrhic victory for the Naqshibandi.

FOOTNOTES

1. Al-Aalem, “Islamic Army: Year not ready for power and are
looking for a partnership and decision by Naqshibandi the wrong move to fight
Baghdad,” 4/30/13

SOURCES

Al-Aalem, “Islamic Army: Year not ready for power and are
looking for a partnership and decision by Naqshibandi the wrong move to fight
Baghdad,” 4/30/13

Thursday, April 28, 2016

The deadlock in parliament between opponents and supporters
of Iraq’s Prime Minister Haidar Abadi was temporarily overcome when lawmakers
were able to create a quorum and vote on a partial list of the premier’s new
cabinet. On April
26, 170-180 members of parliament met, confirmed that Salim Jabouri was
still the speaker, and approved five new ministers submitted by Abadi. Those
were Ali Ghani al-Mubarak for Health, Hassan al-Janabi for Water, Wafa
Jaffar al-Mahadawi for Labor, Abdul Razaq Al-Aysa for Higher Education, and Ali
Dishar for Electricity. Over one hundred MPs had been conducting a sit
in, and voted out Jabouri earlier, but the Speaker has claimed that was
illegal. They tried to disrupt
the session shouting and throwing water bottles, which was led
by members of former Premier Nouri al-Maliki’s wing of State of Law. They were
successful in driving the other lawmakers out of the main parliament room into
an alternate location, but they could not stop the proceedings. There was talk about the opposition
lawmakers trying to form a permanent block, and they were also going
to court over legality of the session. The fact that they were not able to
stop the vote however was a major defeat for them after they had been able to disrupt
the government for several days. As for the rest of the new cabinet there are
still talks going on amongst the ruling parties, and disagreements. On the
other hand, Moqtada al-Sadr called off his demonstrations outside the Green
Zone with a spokesman
saying that the vote on the ministers was a positive first step, but more was
needed.

Abadi’s changes have threatened the entire political system
in Iraq. As Mustafa Habib pointed out in Niqash,
Abadi’s proposal for new ministers has caused all kinds of splits within the
government, especially amongst the Shiite parties. State of Law was divided
between pro-Badi and pro-Maliki factions, and Sadr’s Ahrar bloc and the Supreme
Council’s Mutawin came down on different sides of the vote against Speaker
Jabouri even though they were in an alliance beforehand. More importantly, the
premier’s suggestion of a technocratic set of ministers threatens not only the
quotas that determine who gets what public offices, but the elites’ control
over the government. The ministries are the main way the parties rule by doling
out patronage and stealing from the public coffers to enrich themselves. The
new cabinet would be loyal to Abadi instead of the lists, which would
dramatically change the power dynamic in Baghdad. It was quite an
accomplishment then to get five ministers approved, although the way talks are
progressing other cabinet members maybe partisan in order to get approved.

Tuesday, April 26, 2016

Ramadi was finally cleared at the start of February 2016.
Afterward local officials warned that it would take anywhere from two to six
months for the city to be cleared of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) left
behind by the defeated Islamic State. The problem was politicians and religious
leaders were already encouraging people to go back to the city, which ended
with dozens being killed and wounded by the bombs. The military stepped in and
halted returns, while the local leaders began blaming each other for who was
responsible for the casualties.

Rising fatalities in Ramadi led to a halt in returns to the
city in April. On April
24 the Iraqi forces stopped people going back to Ramadi. Up to that point at
least 49 people had died and 79 were wounded from explosions according to the United
Nations. The process to remove the IEDs was slowed due to a lack of experts
and contractors to do the job. That didn’t stop religious and political leaders
telling people to go back to the city despite the dangers. This was despite the
fact that the head of the security committee on the Anbar council said
it would take two months or more to remove all of the explosives, while the
Khalidiya council estimated
it might take as long as six months. Those comments were made in March, while
residents had already begun returning in February almost immediately after the
city had been freed. That was obviously premature.

Anbar officials were originally touting returns. The
International Organization for Migration said
that around 71,000 people had arrived in the Ramadi area since the start of
March. In April Ramadi politicians were noting
that generators had been set up to provide electricity, water was being pumped
in from the Euphrates, ten
schools had been repaired, and 600 tents had been set up for those without
homes. When it became public that dozens of people were dying and being injured
by bombs, the tone quickly changed to an accusatory one amongst the province’s
leaders.

Who told people to go back to Ramadi became a political
dispute between the ruling Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) and the Sunni Endowment.
The Anbar Governor Suhabi al-Rawi held
the Endowment responsible for the deaths of returnees since it was given responsibility
for the process by Prime Minister Haidar Abadi. The head of the Endowment
countered by saying the authorities were stopping people from going back to
their homes, and accused the IIP of purposefully mining houses in the city. In
turn the governor created a committee to investigate the Endowment. This blame
game highlighted the struggle for power within the province. The two groups
worked closely together during he Sunni protests that started in Ramadi in
2012, but then went their separate ways. They are now competing for control of
Anbar, which the IIP has considered its base since it took power there in 2005.
As the head of the security committee on the Khalidiya council aptly pointed
out, these parties are vying for influence at the expense of the citizenry.

Anbar leaders were well aware of the dangers the recently
freed city of Ramadi still posed. The Islamic State had planted hundreds of
IEDs throughout the area as part of its defenses, and then left booby traps as
it withdrew. It was going to take months to secure the city, but the Islamic
Party and Sunni Endowment wanted to score political points by having people
back as soon as possible to build upon the success of defeating the militants.
The displaced were the ones that paid the price for this escapade. Even though
the security forces have barred further returns, there are now tens of
thousands already in Ramadi who will continue to suffer the consequences of the
political rivalry going on between the IIP and Endowment.

SOURCES

Associated Press, “Thousands Return to Iraq’s Ramadi, Where
IS Was Driven Out,” 4/10/16

Chmaytelli, Maher, “Iraqis displaced from western city of
Ramadi begin to return home,” Reuters, 4/3/16

Monday, April 25, 2016

Fears of an Islamic State spring offensive subsided the
third week of April. The number of incidents and casualties both went down
after a two-month spike. On the other hand, the government was still marching
through Anbar.

After a two month rise in violence, it decreased the third
week of April. The number of incidents went from 144 the first week of the
month, to 141 the second, to 124 the third. The number of incidents had been
going up since February, but it looks like April will have a lower total given
the dip from April 15-21. That seems to have forestalled fears that IS was
building up for a spring offensive.

There were 59 attacks in Baghdad, 16 each in Anbar and
Ninewa, 14 in Kirkuk, 12 in Diyala, 5 in Salahaddin, and 2 in Babil.

436 people died and 242 were wounded during the week. That
included 7 Hashd, 19 Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), 27 Peshmerga, and 383
civilian deaths, along with 19 Peshmerga, 19 ISF, 29 Hashd, and 175 civilians
injured.

The deadliest province was Ninewa with 289 fatalities. That
was due to a report of IS executions. After that there were 68 killed in Baghdad,
63 in Anbar, 7 each in Diyala and Kirkuk, and 1 each in Babil and Salahaddin.

The Iraqi Forces are still churning through Anbar. After Hit
was liberated last week, the surrounding areas were attacked
with several towns freed. Anbar officials were also happy to find Hit not
damaged much, which could hasten the return of the population. Outside
Ramadi the road
from Albu Aetha and Albu Faraj was cleared. The new Garma operation finally got
started
a week after it was announced. The joint forces have been trying to take the
town for more than two years. Finally, the security forces and Hashd are still
split on the next move. Reinforcements were sent to both the Ain Assad base and Fallujah.
The ISF would like to push west from Hit to the Syrian border, while the Hashd
have tried to take Fallujah since July of last year. These dual priorities will
continue as there is no unity of command in Anbar.

Two mass
graves were discovered in Ramadi. Some 40 bodies were found inside them, a
mix of civilians and members of the ISF killed by IS.

After seeing a sharp rise in violence, the number of
incidents in Baghdad finally went down. From April 15-21 there were 59 attacks
in the capital province compared to over 60 the previous weeks. The most dangerous
sector of the governorate remained the south with 24 attacks including 1
grenade, 1 mortar, 1 sticky bomb, 5 shootings, and 16 IEDs. After that there
were 14 incidents in the east, 10 in the north, 8 in the west and 3 in the
center. Attacks in the East appear to be more based upon crime, vigilantes and
militias than insurgents, while in the south, north and west it is almost all
IS activity, especially in the outer towns.

At the start of April the Hashd began an effort to take
Bashir in southern Kirkuk. That was eventually put on hold, but IS was still
attacking the joint forces in the area including several intense clashes that
left 1 Hashd dead and 20 wounded along with six car bombs destroyed.

In Ninewa there was a report that the Islamic State had executed
250 women that had refused temporary marriages to members of the group. Another
twelve people were executed from April 15-21 in the Mosul area including one reporter
and seven former policemen.

Also during the week there were reports that IS fired
chemical rockets and mortar shells three times at Peshmerga positions in Ninewa
leading to 27 Peshmerga deaths and 21 wounded.

The operation to clear the Makhmour district completely
ground to a halt during the week. The town of Nasir, which was supposed to be
taken on the first day was still in IS hands, and the militants were launching
counter attacks during the week. 300
more soldiers were being sent to the area to try to help move things forward. At
the same time, the U.S. used B-52
bombers for the first time to bomb a suspected weapons depot in the area.

The goal of the effort in Makhmour was to stop Islamic State
shelling of the several bases in the area. In a related incident,
volunteers organized by former Ninewa Governor Atheel Nujafi carried out an
attack upon the insurgents to protect their camp in Zilkan supported by Turkish
forces. This is the first time this group has seen combat.

Violence remained very low in Salahaddin, but the locations
of the few attacks that did occur were important. There were two attacks on the
Ajeel and Alas oil fields in the northeast, which are rather routine. There
were also four car bombs destroyed in Siniya in the Baiji district, and sniper
fire in Tikrit. Every week now there are attacks in those two areas. The
attacks in Tikrit have been small, but there have been very large clashes in
Baiji. After that district was freed the Hashd led forces moved northeast to
the Makhoul mountains. That has allowed IS to move back into the areas
previously freed to set up shop again.

On the other hand, the new governor of the province Ahmed
Abdullah al-Jabouri complained
that there were undisciplined Hashd causing problems. He went on to say that
there was a wave of lawlessness in Tikrit with robberies, some of which were
due to the Hashd.

There was not a single successful car bombing during the
week. In turn, the Iraqi forces claimed they destroyed 19 of the devices. There
were 6 in Kirkuk, 5 in Anbar, and 4 each in Ninewa and Salahaddin.

IRAQ HISTORY TIMELINE

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About Me

Musings On Iraq was started in 2008 to explain the political, economic, security and cultural situation in Iraq via original articles and interviews. If you wish to contact me personally my email is: motown67@aol.com