The personal blog of Peter Lee a.k.a. "China Hand"... Life is a comedy to those who think, a tragedy to those who feel, and an open book to those who read. You are welcome to contact China Matters at the address chinamatters --a-- prlee.org or follow me on twitter @chinahand.

Wednesday, May 14, 2014

Bell Tolls for the Pivot in the South China Sea

In discussing the issue of why the PRC plunked down
the drilling rig HYSY981 off the Vietnamese coast, there seems to be a certain
amount of cognitive dissonance plaguing the Western commentariat.

Apropos l’affaire HYSY 981,The Asia Society hosted a
roundtable on its website composed of the luminaries Daniel Kliman, Ely Ratner,
Orville Schell, Susan Shirk, and Carl Thayer.Almost all of them ignored the elephant in the room—the US pivot to
Asia.

Only Carl Thayer, in my opinion, gets it right in
discussing the third of his three possibilities for the PRC’s provocation:

The third interpretation stresses the
geo-political motivations behind China’s actions. The deployment of the CNOOC
mega rig was a pre-planned response to President Barack Obama’s recent visit to
East Asia. China was angered by Obama’s support for both Japan and the
Philippines in their territorial disputes with Beijing. Therefore China
manufactured the oil rig crisis to demonstrate to regional states that the
United States was a “paper tiger” and there was a gap between Obama’s rhetoric
and ability to act.

The third interpretation has
plausibility. China can make its point and then withdraw the oil rig once it
has completed its mission in mid-August. But this interpretation begs the
question why Vietnam was the focus for this crisis and why China acted on the
eve of the summit meeting of the heads of government/state of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations.I would go a step further than Mr. Thayer, and opine
that China’s South China Sea escapade is more than a one-off tantrum.It represents a “sea change” in the PRC’s
strategy for dealing with the pivot to Asia.

For US-China relations, that means:

No G2.That’s
been clear since Hillary Clinton 86’ed the concept as Secretary of State, anyway.Little more than symbolic lip service to the “new
great power” relationship founded on the comforting myth of the World War II
victors’ dispensation with the heirs to Roosevelt & Chiang Kai-shek calling
the Asian shots, a fantasy which Prime Minister Abe is working assiduously to undermine
and supersede.

And, most importantly, from the Chinese point of
view, no pivot, at least in the South China Sea.

In other words, the PRC intends to ignore the idea
that its actions in its near beyond are to be deterred by the alarm and opposition
of the US and the Asian democracies, thereby challenging the basic assumption
of the pivot: that PRC’s defiance of the pivot triggers a virtuous cycle of
escalation and anxiety, causing smaller Asian countries to cleave to the United
States more closely, thereby enhancing US influence and inhibiting the PRC’s
freedom of motion.

I would suggest that, to answer Mr. Thayer’s
rhetorical question, the reason that the PRC decided to beat up on Vietnam just
before the ASEAN summit—when, by pivot logic the PRC should be loath to
antagonize its nervous regional interlocutors and increase the risk of united,
anti-PRC action on behalf of Vietnam and the Philippines by the various spooked
ASEAN nations—the Chinese leadership did it because they could, and because
they wanted to.

Quite simply, I think, the PRC wanted to make a
statement that it would not be deterred.

Surprisingly, ASEAN went along and declined to
administer a serious flaming to the PRC, despite the vociferous complaints of
Vietnam and the Philippines concerning the rather blatant provocations by the
PRC.A communique on the issue merely
asked for “all sides” to show restraint.Wonder how much bilateral stroking and armtwisting that took.

The fact that the PRC has taken a major action to
repudiate the basic premise of the pivot—that a US-led security alliance can
deter unilateral and provocative PRC behavior and put an end to the endless
exercise of salami-slicing and cabbage-wrapping in its maritime adventures—is,
in my opinion, a pretty big deal.

The pivot, after all, is welcomed because it assumes
that the PRC, whose military is no match for the US or even, probably, Japan,
can be deterred with relatively low risk and at low cost.

If the PRC is going to ignore the consequences of
challenging the US pivot and assume, rather logically, that the US is not going
to light off a war with China over the SCS, those costs and risks
increase.Worst case, President Obama
has to fall back on Nixon’s “madman” doctrine, which is to say the United
States is prepared to inflict and endure (at least through its unlucky allies)
losses disproportionate to the interests at stake in order to maintain
credibility of the deterrent.

The PRC’s willingness to challenge, provoke, and
escalate is a major issue for the pivot.

However, the clang of cognitive dissonance still seems to be faint and
ignorable for the public US Asian affairs commentariat, at least as long as the
designated victim is Vietnam, if the Asia Society round table is an indicator.

Ely Ratner and Susan Shirk, in particular, take the
tack that the HYSY981 is simply a big, stupid blunder by the big, stupid PRC.

First, Ely Ratner:

[T]he Chinese Communist Party appears
increasingly unable to reconcile predominant political and economic goals of
securing its sovereignty aims while sustaining a peaceful regional security
environment… we’ve seen China engage in bearish and clumsy actions that have
raised concerns not just in Tokyo and Manila, but also Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta
and now Hanoi. At the end of the day, this means that domestic bureaucratic and
political imperatives are overcoming the logic of strategy in Beijing, a
dangerous development for outsiders hoping that relative costs and benefits
(not politics and nationalism) will shape China’s decision-making on its
territorial disputes… These…troubling elements paint the picture of a
country whose foreign policy is untethered from strategic logic and
increasingly engaging in preemptive revisionism.

And Susan Shirk:

The diplomats in the Chinese Foreign
Ministry, especially Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who crafted China’s very
successful strategy to reassure Asian countries about China’s friendly
intentions during 1996-2009 and is trying to revive the strategy now under Xi Jinping,
must be well aware that such high-profile assertions of sovereignty will
provoke a backlash among China’s worried neighbors. When ASEAN meets next week,
the Southeast Asian countries will certainly be pointing fingers at China, as
Taylor Fravel predicts in his very informative Q & A with The New York
Times. But the Foreign
Ministry’s voice no longer dominates the foreign policy process.

What China’s actions reflect, as Ely
Ratner says, is the very dangerous possibility that Chinese security policy has
become “untethered from strategic logic.” In other words, domestic bureaucratic
interest groups and nationalist public opinion are driving toward
over-expansion of sovereignty claims in a manner that could actually harm
China’s overall national security interests.

I am no fan of the “crazy stupid psycho panda”
school when it comes to analyzing PRC moves that the US finds disturbing.Nevertheless, the CSPP school is a remarkably
durable construct in US Asia-wonk circles, perhaps in direct proportion in
faith in the genius of the pivot and the idea that it is the best and essential
tool for dealing with the PRC.

My general take is that the United States is the
only power with the wealth, military capability, and political and geographic
impunity to act really stupidly and irrationally, a characteristic, I might
say, is on full display as the Obama administration feeds Ukraine into the maw
of anarchy in order to punish Russia for the annexation of Crimea (and perhaps
distract attention from the spectacular, compounded clusterf*ck that is the US program
for building a pro-Western regime in Kyiv).

Smaller powers, regional powers, and candidate
superpowers in complicated neighborhoods, like the PRC, have to plan their
moves a little more carefully.

And Beijing has been thinking.

China’s Defense Minister, Chang Wanquan, drew a line
during his joint press conference with Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel in
early April:

China-U.S. relations is by no means
the relations between China -- between the U.S. and the former Soviet Union during
the Cold War, nor is it relation of coercion and anti-coercion. With the latest
development in China, it can never be contained.

Fast forward to the ruckus surrounding the HYSY 981:

MOFA spokersperson’s statement on May 12:

Q:
First, Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) calls for speeded-up
negotiations with China on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC).
What is China's response to that? Second, some western media believed that
China's drilling activities in the waters off Xisha Islands are in response to
the US's pivot to Asia and President Obama's recent visit to Asia. What is
China's comment?A: On your
first question, the issue of South China Sea is not one between China and
ASEAN. There is consensus between China
and ASEAN countries on jointly safeguarding peace and stability in South China
Sea. China stands with ASEAN countries to continue to work for a full and
effective implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the
South China Sea (DOC) and steadily move forward the negotiation process of COC.
[As to the second question, the spokesperson
asserted that the drilling rig operation was routine and had nothing to do with
the pivot, which I choose to interpret as a backhanded statement that the pivot
has nothing to do with the South China Sea.]

And May 13:

Q:
The US Secretary of State John Kerry held a phone conversation with Foreign
Minister Wang Yi today. The US side asked China to stop taking provocative
actions. What is China's response to that?A: You
mentioned the word "provocative". It is true that provocative actions
have been seen in the South China Sea recently. But they are not taken by
China. It is nothing but the wrong words and actions made by the US side on
maritime issues that have emboldened some countries to take provocative
actions. We would like the US side to
think hard on this: if they really want the Pacific region to be pacific, what
kind of role should they play? What actions should they take to truly contribute
to the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region?…Wang Yi … urged the US to treat these issues
with objectivity and fairness, live up to its commitment, watch its words and
actions, and avoid emboldening relevant parties' provocative actions.

Emphasis added.

I am not torturing prose here to interpret these
remarks as “China cannot be contained” (Chang actually said that), and that the
declaration that the PRC will work together with ASEAN to “jointly safeguard
peace and stability” is meant to convey that the United States has no
legitimate front-line interests in the South China Sea and the main job of the
United States is to “watch its words and actions” to avoid exacerbating the
problems.

In other words, the PRC is working to maneuver the
South China Sea issues away from the rather canard-esque “freedom of
navigation” issue that Hillary Clinton used to claim a compelling US interest
in the South China Sea disputes in 2010.

Instead, the drilling rig episode highlights the
fact that the real issues in the South China Sea are the local matters of
territory, sovereignty, fisheries, hydrocarbon reserves and delineation of
Exclusive Economic Zones or EEZ (Vietnam cannot claim an uncontested EEZ at the
site of the HYSY 981; beyond the notorious Chinese cow-tongue claim, the rig is
too close to the Paracels, which have their own, as yet undefined EEZ
potential).

This framing is more factual and practical, and more
problematic for the United States and the pivot in the South China Sea.

The US doesn’t take positions of sovereignty issues
concerning the miserable rocks of the South China Sea and has had to hang its
hat on “no forcible change of the status quo” as American policy.That might work for the Senkakus in the East
China Sea, but offers limited consolation for Vietnam in its hopes of
recovering the Paracels, or for the Philippines in its travails over the
Scarborough Shoal.

As for the headaches of EEZ delineation occasioned
by the ridiculous fruit salad of sovereignty claims and disputes in the South
China Sea, the US—which has been unable to ratify the UN Convention on the Law
of the Sea even as it announces its adherence to its provisions—has even less
ability to complain.

So the PRC is now claiming a pretty big chunk of salami—declaring
that it doesn’t recognize a US role in the South China Sea.

As to why the PRC is making this provocative move,
I’ve argued before that it is moving preemptively, in response to President
Obama’s pivot and also expecting an extremely unfriendly constellation of
forces in Asia once Hillary Clinton becomes president.

So I am inclined to believe that Xi Jinping has
decided it’s time to challenge the pivot, carefully and via Vietnam, but
openly.

In terms of proximate causes, I wonder if it was a
smart move to send President Obama to Asia for a trip explicitly & exclusively
designed to promote the pivot, lobby for Japanese collective self defense,
conclude a new military agreement with the Philippines, leave the PRC off his
itinerary, and expect the PRC to be mollified by visits from Michelle Obama and
Chuck Hagel?

The PRC apparently didn’t think so, judging from
Chang’s pugnacious remarks at the joint news conference with Hagel.In addition to announcing his rejection of any
China-containment strategy, Chang devoted much of his time to complaining about
the perceived transgressions of US allies the Philippines and Japan.

Also, I think Ukraine is a factor.While demonstrating US fecklessness as a
security partner for its allies, it also served as an object lesson in the US
willingness to escalate recklessly when it sees a chance to stick it to a
designated adversary.

The fact that the United States has seen fit to
drive Vladimir Putin into Xi Jinping’s arms just as the PRC was looking at an
extremely tough decade of isolation and confrontation with the US and its Asian
neighbors will, I am sure, provide ample grist for future students of
international relations.

For now, I find it rather mystifying that the PRC
challenge to the pivot is ignored in the popular, pundit-driven press.

Maybe it’s me.

But maybe there’s some kind of code of omerta, an
agreement that this issue won’t be bruited about until the US government has
settled on a suitable public riposte.

A USS Blue Ridge-embarked
helicopter photographed two Chinese navy ships May 5 near the site of a heavily
contested shoal that has sparked a months-long standoff between China and the
Philippines in 2012.

The Navy’s photo release of
two Chinese Navy ships near Scarborough Shoal sparked some online news outlets
to label the encounter a confrontation, which 7th Fleet officials disputed
Friday.

The USS Blue Ridge is the command and control
flagship that runs things for the US Seventh Fleet.The two Chinese ships—PLAN ships, not the
usual maritime patrol vessels that harass the Philippines—were presumably in
the area to monitor a joint Philippine-US military exercise.

And I presume that the USS Blue Ridge sailed past
the Scarborough Shoal in order to yank the PRC’s chain, and not just because
that was the quickest way to Thailand, which the US Navy claimed as the reason
for the approach.

This represents something of an escalation of the US
presence in the area of the Philippines vis a vis the PRC, especially compared
to the US government’s discrete behind the scenes assistance to the Philippine
government’s resupply mission (and media jamboree) to the derelict freighter on
the Second Thomas Shoal.By sailing the USN Blue Ridge around down there and
flying helicopters to take a gander at the Chinese warships, I think that the
US wanted to put the PRC on notice that dispatching the HYSY 981 to Philippine
waters will be a more complicated and fraught undertaking than the Vietnam
exercise.

Whether the PRC finds it expedient to heed that
warning is something we may find out about in the next few months.

Below the fold for reference are excerpts from Chang
Wanquan’s remarks at his press conference with Secretary Hagel, and from the
MOFA press conferences addressing the oil rig issue:

Indeed, there is someone trying to stirring up troubles in the surrounding
situations -- surrounding China. I'd like to make clear several points on this
issue.
First, since Abe administration made a series of wrong remarks indeed- since
he took office, causing severe difficulties -- and imposing severe impacts on
regional peace and stability, causing severe difficulty in China-Japan relations.
Japan takes reversed course of history and confronts the right with the
wrong. Moreover, Japan insists on hotline and is provocative all the time,
leading the tension of the situation.
Thirdly, the rights of political -- (inaudible) -- is quite worrisome. This
is what should arouse the international community's high attention and
vigilance.
Furthermore, Japan still has huge amount of nuclear material, which exceeds
its practical needs. The international community should also be alarmed against
this.
Second, disguising itself as a victim, the Philippines repeatedly breaks the
promise they made. They even submitted the memorial to the arbitral tribunal on
the South China Sea disputes between China and the Philippines in the name of
the international law.
I think they did the math in the wrong way. The fact is that it is the
Philippines who illegally occupy part of China's islands and reefs in the South
China Sea.
China has made it clear on several occasions that it does not accept and
will not participate in the international arbitration initiated the
Philippines.
Third, China's position on South China Sea and East China Sea issue is clear
and consistent. China has indisputable sovereignty over Diaoyu Islands, Nansha
Islands, and their adjacent waters.
As to sovereignty dispute over islands and reefs, and the sea boater
delimitation issue, China stands ready to resolve the issue through negotiation
with the countries directly involved.
Fourth, I will actually reiterate that territorial sovereignty issue is China's
core interest. On this issue, we will make no compromise, no concession, no
trading, not even a tiny bit of violation is allowed.
Fifth, it is the Chinese military's mission to safeguard national
sovereignty, security, and the territorial integrity. We are prepared at any
time to cope with all kinds of threats and challenges. Upon the request of the
party and the people, the Chinese military can assemble as soon summoned, fight
immediately upon arrival and win any battle, as long as they fight. Thank you.

…

MIN. CHANG (through translator): It's quite a coincidence, during my visit
with the U.S. last August, I was also asked a question concerning the U.S.
rebalancing strategy in Asia Pacific. Today, it came up again.
I would like to reiterate my position.

Both China and the U.S. are important countries in Asia-Pacific region. And the
U.S. is a country of worldwide influence. I think the Pacific Ocean is huge
enough to hold both China and the U.S. for common development, and also huge
enough to hold the other Asian-Pacific countries.
Second, China-U.S. relations is by no means the relations between China --
between the U.S. and the former Soviet Union during the Cold War, nor is it
relation of coercion and anti-coercion. With the latest development in China,
it can never be contained.
Third, the two sides are positively building the new model of major country
relations featuring no conflict, no confrontation, mutual respect and win-win
cooperation, according to the consensus reached between the two heads of state.
This new model of major country relationship should take shape firstly in
the Asia-Pacific region. The common interests of China and U.S. in the
Asia-Pacific outweigh their differences. We respect the U.S. presence and
influence in Asia-Pacific region.
We hope that the U.S. rebalancing strategy is helpful for safeguarding the
regional peace and stability. And we also hope that the U.S. side can respect
China's interests and concerns in a dear way.
During my discussion with Secretary Hagel, we agree that we should
strengthen communication and coordination and try to manage the crises and the
risks, and work together with the regional countries to safeguard the peace and
stability in the Asia-Pacific region.
Cyberspace issue is also a topic of common interest. We talked about this
issue both in small-scale discussion as well as the larger scale discussion.
I'd like to make clear three points on this issue. First, cyberspace is
faced with severe security threats and challenge. All the countries in the world
should make good use of the cyberspace and protect it. On cyberspace, China
adheres to the principle of peace, security, openness, and cooperation.
The defense activity of the PLA in cyberspace abides by the domestic law and
the universally recognized law. It will not pose a threat to others.
Third, the two militaries maintained in contact on this issue. Both China
and the U.S. have extensive common interests in cyberspace, and the two
militaries have conducted productive and candid dialog on this issue.
Both sides should earnestly implement the important consensus between the
two heads of state and strengthen communication under the framework of
strategic security dialog, prevent any military highly risky activity or
miscalculation.
The Chinese side takes note of Secretary Hagel's statement that the U.S.
does not seek the militarization of cyberspace. It is quite important to
maintain the peaceful nature of the cyberspace, and the Chinese side stands
ready to deepen the communication with the U.S. side and together, to transfer
this vision into policy and concrete actions.

Q:
First, Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) calls for speeded-up
negotiations with China on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC).
What is China's response to that? Second, some western media believed that
China's drilling activities in the waters off Xisha Islands are in response to
the US's pivot to Asia and President Obama's recent visit to Asia. What is
China's comment?A: On your
first question, the issue of South China Sea is not one between China and
ASEAN. There is consensus between China and ASEAN countries on jointly
safeguarding peace and stability in South China Sea. China stands with ASEAN
countries to continue to work for a full and effective implementation of the
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and steadily
move forward the negotiation process of COC. China and ASEAN countries are in
close communication on this point. At the same time, we hope relevant ASEAN
countries can earnestly respect and implement DOC, make positive efforts along
with China to safeguard peace, stability and maritime security of South China
Sea and create enabling conditions for COC negotiations.On your
second question, last week, Deputy Director General Yi Xianliang of the
Department of Boundary and Ocean Affairs of the Foreign Ministry held a press
briefing. He talked in details about the Vietnamese vessels' disruptions of
Chinese enterprise's normal operations in the waters south to Zhongjian Island.
He mentioned that the drilling operation did not just start a few days ago.
China has been carrying out these drilling operations for a decade, so the
operation this time is just a routine continuation of what China has begun a
decade ago.

Q:
The US naval vessel "Blue Ridge" had an encounter with Chinese naval
vessels in waters near the Huangyan Island. Can you give us more details and
what is China's comment?A: China has
indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea, including the
Huangyan Island, as well as the adjacent waters. It is legal and legitimate for
Chinese naval vessels to carry out routine patrols in relevant waters. There is
no need to be surprised at something that is perfectly normal.

Q:
The US Secretary of State John Kerry held a phone conversation with Foreign
Minister Wang Yi today. The US side asked China to stop taking provocative
actions. What is China's response to that?A: You
mentioned the word "provocative". It is true that provocative actions
have been seen in the South China Sea recently. But they are not taken by
China. It is nothing but the wrong words and actions made by the US side on
maritime issues that have emboldened some countries to take provocative
actions. We would like the US side to think hard on this: if they really want
the Pacific region to be pacific, what kind of role should they play? What
actions should they take to truly contribute to the peace and stability of the
Asia-Pacific region?This
morning, Foreign Minister Wang Yi held a phone conversation with the US
Secretary of State John Kerry as scheduled. Wang Yi emphasized that to further
develop a new model of major-country relations between China and the US is an
important consensus reached by the two heads of state, which is in line with
the common interests of China and the US. Both sides need to enhance
cooperation, protect bilateral ties from disruptions, and ensure sound and
steady development of China-US relationship. Going forward, a series of important
exchanges will be held between China and the US. Both sides need to collaborate
closely to strive for positive outcomes.With regard
to the current maritime situation, Wang Yi clarified the historical context,
the hard facts and China's principles and positions on relevant issues. He
urged the US to treat these issues with objectivity and fairness, live up to
its commitment, watch its words and actions, and avoid emboldening relevant
parties' provocative actions. Kerry said that the US takes no position or side
on the issues of territorial sovereignty, neither does it intend to make
judgement. The US hopes that all parties can properly handle relevant issues
and ensure regional peace and stability.