Winning the war against Maoists does not need combat jets or artillery. It needs police forces with counter-insurgency capacities and training.

Aizawal woke that Thursday morning to the thunder of combat jet engines and falling bombs. Earlier that week, Mizo National Army insurgents had engaged military garrisons strung across the State. Mizoram's capital fell days later. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi responded by ordering the Indian Air Force to attack the city. “Most houses in Dawrpui and the Chhinga Veng area were reduced to ashes,” a survivor recalled. No one knows for certain just how many died.

Three decades after the March 4, 1966 bombing of Aizawal, India is once again debating the use of massive military force — including air strikes — to fight an insurgency. Last week's tragedy in West Bengal, preceded by large-scale killings of civilians in Chhattisgarh, have made clear that New Delhi's offensive against the Maoist insurgency that has torn apart swathes of eastern and central India is floundering.

Policymakers are now considering committing the Army and air assets to provide logistical and fire support to counter the Maoist campaign. For the most part, the plans envisage only a limited support role for the armed forces — the use of helicopters, for example, for transporting commandos in remote forest areas, or unmanned aerial vehicles equipped with foliage-penetrating radar to locate large Maoist formations. But as public pressure mounts on a government that promised quick success against the Maoists, more aggressive military options will seem increasingly seductive to policymakers. India's rich experience of fighting insurgencies, though, shows that maximum force not only inflicts hideous levels of civilian casualties but it rarely secures decisive outcomes.

Lessons from Manipur

In June 1986, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi arrived at an agreement with the Mizo National Front, laying the foundations for a peace that has survived more than two decades. The 1986 Accord, though, was preceded by a counter-insurgency campaign of colonial-era barbarism: hundreds were executed; thousands tortured; rape was carried out on a massive scale. Designed to crush a rebellion that seemed, at one stage, to be on the edge of success, India's use of the military in Mizoram ended up engendering an insurgency that festered for decades.

Like the Maoist insurgency, the Mizoram conflict had its roots in deprivation. In 1959, the region saw a famine which claimed thousands of lives. In 1961, former Indian Army officer Pu Laldenga formed the Mizo National Famine Front to campaign against New Delhi's apathy. Laldenga later transformed the Famine Front's political offspring, the Mizo National Front, into a potent political force. But by 1963, the lack of state action to address conditions in the Mizo hills led the MNF to initiate an insurgency seeking independence from India.

The army campaign seemed, at first, to work. Forces from the Silchar-based 61 Mountain Brigade were able to rapidly recapture key towns, including Aizawal. Posts taken by the MNA were recovered and its guerrillas forced to shift their headquarters across the border into East Pakistan. The fighting was intense: the Indian forces suffered 59 fatalities, 126 were injured and 23 went missing; 95 of the MNA died and 35 were injured.

But from the summer of 1966, the MNA merged into the population and began launching guerrilla strikes against the Army. Lacking effective local intelligence, unfamiliar with the terrain, and forced to rely on a vulnerable road network for logistical support, the Army lost 95 men between March and December 1966 — more than the number killed in the first phase of fighting.

Military strategists found a template for their response in imperial Great Britain's war against the Malayan Communist Party. In much modern writing, the anti-communist campaign in Malaya is marketed as an example of how victory can be had by winning hearts and minds, rather than the application of force. The idea suffuses much writing on contemporary counter-insurgency. But, as David Benet has noted, “coercion was the reality — ‘hearts and minds' the myth.” Field Marshal Gerald Templar, the architect of the Malaya campaign, referred in 1968 to the ‘hearts and minds' doctrine as a “nauseating phrase I think I invented.”

From January 1967, the security forces in Mizoram began cutting the insurgency off from its peasant base. Eighty per cent of Mizoram's population was resettled, mostly by force, into barricaded enclaves known as Protected and Progressive Villages.

In a signal 2001 essay for the journal Faultlines, the former Assam Chief Secretary, Vijendra Singh Jafa, recorded how the village of Darzo was relocated. “My orders,” a soldier he interviewed said, “were to get the villagers to collect whatever moveable property they could and to set their own village on fire at seven in the evening. I also had orders to burn all the paddy and other grain that could not be carried away by the villagers.” The officer, Jafa recounted, ordered village elders at gunpoint to certify “that they had burnt down their own village.”

Despite this massive application of force, the insurgency did not end. Even though the MNA was enfeebled by Pakistan's decisive defeat in the 1971 war, which stripped it of its bases in what is now Bangladesh, it was able to stage a series of bloody attacks. New Delhi and Laldenga were able to agree on the contours of a peace agreement as early as 1976 but the deep anger provoked by the Army's campaign made it impossible to settle the deal.

It is not hard to see why the use of massive military power against the Maoists appears seductive to policymakers. In November last year, as Central forces began to push into Chhattisgarh, Union Home Secretary announced that “within 30 days of security forces moving in and dominating the area, we should be able to restore civil administration there.” The promise has been brutally exposed. Unless New Delhi and the naxal-infested States are first able to restore order, developmental programmes targeting the Maoists' constituency are unlikely to get off the ground.

Inadequate force

But the simple fact is this: there just aren't enough security personnel in Chhattisgarh to hold, let alone dominate, the area. The Bastar division of Chhattisgarh sprawls across 40,000 square kilometres, an area larger than the Kashmir Valley. New Delhi has pumped in 14 battalions of the Central Reserve Police Force — each made up of approximately 1,000 men — as well as 5 of the Border Security Force. There are, in addition, some 7 battalions of armed police, and some 5,000 police.

That means each battalion of security forces must engage with insurgents in areas larger than 2,000 square kilometres — and in areas where the use of roads is impossible because of the large-scale use of improvised explosive devices by Maoists. Some police stations are responsible for more than 700 square kilometres of territory.

In Jammu and Kashmir, an estimated 70 battalions of the CRPF are available for counter-insurgency duties, along with 54 battalions of the Army's Rashtriya Rifles. In addition, about a third of the Jammu and Kashmir Police's 75,000 personnel are committed to counter-terrorism work. That means approximately 145,000 personnel are available to guard the 101,437 square kilometre territory on India's side of the Line of Control—an average of one for 1.4 for every square kilometre, and one for every 53 residents of the State. Manipur, with an estimated population of 2.3 million, has 67 battalions of counter-insurgency forces, including 11 army battalions — one for 34 residents. The police in Chhattisgarh, moreover, often confront Maoist formations that outnumber them 4 to 1. Most counter-insurgency doctrines call for government forces to outnumber their adversaries by at least 12:1, or higher — the levels exceeded in both Jammu and Kashmir, and Manipur.

More men alone, though, will not solve the problem. Phnom Penh, on the eve of the triumph of Khmer Rouge in Kampuchea, had one police officer for every 60 residents. The force, however, lacked tactical skills. It is also worth recalling that the United States dropped three times more ordnance on Indochina during the Vietnam war than all combatants put together did during World War II — but still lost.

In recent decades, Indian tacticians have come to realise that well-trained police forces are key to defeating insurgencies. Many have pointed out that the Army played a frontline role in decimating the Maoist insurgency that broke out in West Bengal in 1967. In October 1969, Lieutenant-General JFR Jacob led an offensive against the Maoist groups in the State, spearheaded by the 4 Infantry Division, the 9 Infantry Division and the 50 Parachute Brigade. No written account of the campaign was maintained by the Army's Eastern Command, but participants say intelligence provided by the West Bengal police led to the success. That lesson has been driven home in recent years: India's major counter-insurgency successes — whether against the tribal insurgents in Tripura, the Maoists in Andhra Pradesh, or Khalistan terrorists in Punjab — were all police-led.

“Occasional police operations timidly carried out with inadequate forces” the theoretician of counter-insurgency, Roger Trinquier, warned in his 1964 classic Modern War, “will fail pitifully.” With the force levels and resources now available in areas like Bastar, defeat is certain. Winning the war against the Maoists doesn't need combat jets or artillery; it needs police forces with counter-insurgency capacities and training. Those forces can be raised — but New Delhi needs to get to work now, instead of wasting lives chasing the phantom of a quick victory.

@ Deepa: Yup, it should be "Lessons from Mizoram", not Manipur. Also, he should have written it as Aizawl, not Aizawal. Apart from that, this is a great article. Till now, there are many "patriotic Indians" out there at various discussion forums who argue with us that India had never bombed Mizoram and that we are just making up such lies to stain India's name. I don't blame their ignorance (or should I say stubbornness), after all, the Indian Govt had denied committing such a heinous crime. My uncle used to tell me there were many anti-MNA/MNF supporters among the Mizos whose loyalty was with India on that day. A lot of them died that day under India's bombs. Collateral damage? I certainly hope that's not what the Indian Govt is planning against the Maoists too.

from:
Kima

Posted on: Jun 4, 2010 at 15:20 IST

In the year 1966 Government of India declared Armed Forces Special Powers Act against the Mizo hills. We still demand public apology from Govt. of India for that.

from:
Zoa Tlau

Posted on: Jun 3, 2010 at 10:41 IST

Praveen Swami has done very good assessment of history of quashing Manipur insurgency and it’s aftermath. The quick fix to the problem by using military force seems alluring, but it comes with its own hangovers which could lead to further build up of more insurgents.
Use of local force is naturally level-headed solution which could root out the problem once and forever. However, police force in India is very ill-equipped and further more ill trained for handling such activities. Improved local intelligence and reconnaissance, contact with tribal people could play key role to capture tribal chieftain who are mastermind behind these military style attacks. Educating tribal people could lead to their self realization and aversion to bloody revolts improving solidarity with state of India.
Above both solutions has pros and cons, military use if quick antidote while use of police force, spreading awareness in tribal people is long and painstaking .So government should use mixed approach like to kill gorilla attackers while causing minimum civilian causalities and at the same time using local police to improve tribal support for the action.

from:
nilesh salpe

Posted on: Jun 2, 2010 at 23:44 IST

I thank the author for writing this article. I'm a mizo and through this article many readers are able to know the past hardship of the common people. Just think that in those days there were almost no national newspapers or TV anchors to report for human right violation.

from:
puia

Posted on: Jun 2, 2010 at 22:25 IST

Different phases of insurgency require different level of armed response. Ideally it should be tackled by the state police forces. However over the years, the politicisation of the police and the rampant corruption within police has made police forces most unsuitable for any armed action. They just don't have the stomach for it. It is also dangerous to arm the state police forces beyond a point.

from:
Ajay Francs

Posted on: Jun 2, 2010 at 18:27 IST

Several Maoist organisations, Peoples' Committee Against Police Atrocities, Kamtapur Liberation Organisation, etc. were formed only when the common people were dying due to deprivation. However, over the years, they deviated themselves from their ideal. Instead of "fighting for the people", they are fighting against the people, robbing and killing them, and then say, "We have committed a grave mistake. Blah, blah, blah!"

It is sad that the Security Forces are doing little to tackle such a situation.

from:
Kaushik Maitra

Posted on: Jun 2, 2010 at 12:39 IST

Brutality works but modern democracies quail at the idea of use of military force and a free hand to the military a la the Sri Lanka. However it would be naive to assume that the Maoists would sit at the same table and negotiate if they think they have the police forces on the run.

from:
Kiran Krishan

Posted on: Jun 2, 2010 at 05:11 IST

I cannot agree more that the Maoist problem can be resolved without the need for military intervention. It most certainly is a "law and order problem". These are after all citizens of India who must be dealt with as such. A resolution with a minimum of violence is much more likely to do yield stable results. I must stress once more that the Naxalites are our own people. Of course they need to be punished to the full extent of the law for their murderous tendencies but the roots of their call to arms are different from those of foreigners. We are responsible for our own people and we must shoulder that burden appropriately. Notwithstanding it is imperative to drive home the message to the Naxalites that they cannot defeat the Indian state militarily. This is a prerequisite to meaningful dialogue.

from:
Samir Mody

Posted on: Jun 2, 2010 at 01:07 IST

Insurgents in any country thrive on support from some section(s) of the people of that country. The insurgents in Kashmir and the so-called red belt get such support and therefore are able to sustain their fight with the government forces. But the Khalistani insurgents in Punjab did not get large sections of the Sikhs on their side because of the latter's economic and familial links with people of other Indian States and therefore they faded away under police assaults. Unfortunately successive governments in India have been ignoring the lesson to be learnt from this and therfore have been failing to address the root cause of the durability of the insurgency. Centuries of neglect of the tribals created and sustained the Maoist insurgency. With the media training its guns exclusively on the insurgents sparing the Central and State governments of any criticism of their failure to stop the Maoists in their tracks, the Maoist insurgents are surging ahead.

from:
K.Vijayakumar

Posted on: Jun 1, 2010 at 21:12 IST

It's really hard to understand why there have been a plethora of misconducts reported on para-military forces whenever they were deputed for a kind of special operations like counter insurgency etc. In fact this kind of notorious reputations take away the invaluable commitment given away in the form lives and setbacks suffered by the security personnel in the operations. It's high time that some morality is brought into the para-military services to supplement their otherwise admirable services.

from:
M.gnanapandithan

Posted on: Jun 1, 2010 at 19:11 IST

No development, lack of law and order situation may be the cause of birth of Maoist activity against Indian Government. But it is surprising why there is no unified political voice to find out a strategy of counter-insurgency.

from:
Radha Kumud Das

Posted on: Jun 1, 2010 at 19:02 IST

I learned a lot of things from this article. We must learn from the past and not repeat our mistakes.
I hope Maoists and our government reach an agreement and innocent lives would be spared.

from:
Abhishek Sainani

Posted on: Jun 1, 2010 at 18:43 IST

It's true, indeed a fact that use of army for such anti Maoists operation will have severe ramifications and will cause heavy collateral damage. To counter Maoists, a special force with adequate training from state police force, having knowledge of terrain and language should be developed and deployed. Hope security establishments of this country read this article and rethink their anti Maoists tactics.

from:
chandan

Posted on: Jun 1, 2010 at 17:23 IST

I think the writer meant to say 'lessons from Mizoram'

from:
Deepa

Posted on: Jun 1, 2010 at 16:03 IST

Your point seems excellent in the backdrop of Manipur and Mizoram situation. However, one must realize, that a police force by definition is just for law and order maintenance and not to combat or fight a guerilla warfare. For this force like greyhounds and C-60 should be raised from the local population. No doubt collateral damage would be there, but then it goes with out saying that's an inseparable part of any armed action, may it be within or outside the country.

from:
Roshan

Posted on: Jun 1, 2010 at 14:37 IST

In the midst of the struggle to smoke out the Maoists, it is important to realize that several lives are lost and most of which go unaccounted for.Also, it is painful to learn that the government strategies have failed to take a cue from the past failures. Killing the ideology of Maoism should be focus rather than killing the people involved for the latter method could lead to a proliferation across populations.

from:
rajiv

Posted on: Jun 1, 2010 at 13:46 IST

Very insightful. Hope someone in the administration reads this article.

You should have facebook, twitter share links to promote such articles...

from:
Nilotpal

Posted on: Jun 1, 2010 at 10:34 IST

I worked in Aizawl for a year and half and was able to sense the scars that our Military action left with the natives.

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