CHAPTER VI.
OF CIRCUMSTANCES INFLUENCING SENSIBILITY.
I. Pain and pleasure are produced in men's minds by the action of certain
causes. But the quantity of pleasure and pain runs not uniformly in
proportion to the cause; in other words, to the quantity of force exerted by
such cause. The truth of this observation rests not upon any metaphysical
nicety in the import given to the terms cause, quantity, and force: it will
be equally true in whatsoever manner such force be measured.
II. The disposition which any one has to feel such or such a quantity of
pleasure or pain, upon the application of a cause of given force, is what we
term the degree or quantum of his sensibility. This may be either general
referring to the sum of the causes that act upon him during a given period:
or particular, referring to the action of any one particular cause, or sort
of cause.
III. But in the same mind such and such causes of pain or pleasure will
produce more pain or pleasure than such or such other causes of pain or
pleasure: and this proportion will in different minds be different. The
disposition which any one has to have the proportion in which he is affected
by two such causes, different from that in which another man is affected by
the same two causes, may be termed the quality or bias of his sensibility.
One man, for instance, may be most affected by the pleasures of the taste;
another by those of the ear. So also, if there be a difference in the nature
or proportion of two pains or pleasures which they respectively experience
from the same cause; a case not so frequent as the former. From the same
injury, for instance, one man may feel the same quantity of grief and
resentment together as another man: but one of them shall feel a greater
share of grief than of resentment: the other, a greater share of resentment
than of grief.
IV. Any incident which serves as a cause, either of pleasure or of pain, may
be termed an exciting cause: if of pleasure, a pleasurable cause: if of
pain, a painful, afflictive, or dolorific cause.[1]
V. Now the quantity of pleasure, or of pain, which a man is liable to
experience upon the application of an exciting cause, since they will not
depend altogether upon that cause, will depend in some measure upon some
other circumstance or circumstances: these circumstances, whatsoever they
be, maybe termed circumstances influencing sensibility.[2]
VI. These circumstances will apply differently to different exciting causes;
insomuch that to a certain exciting cause, a certain circumstance shall not
apply at all, which shall apply with great force to another exciting cause.
But without entering for the present into these distinctions, it may be of
use to sum up all the circumstances which can be found to influence the
effect of any exciting cause. These, as on a former occasion, it may be as
well first to sum up together in the concisest manner possible, and
afterwards to allot a few words to the separate explanation of each article.
They seem to be as follows: 1. Health. 2. Strength. 3. Hardiness. 4. Bodily
imperfection. 5. Quantity and quality of knowledge. 6. Strength of
intellectual powers. 7. Firmness of mind. 8. Steadiness of mind. 9. Bent of
inclination. 10. Moral sensibility. 11. Moral biases. 12. Religious
sensibility. 13. Religious biases. 14. Sympathetic sensibility. 15.
Sympathetic biases. 16. Antipathetic sensibility. 17. Antipathetic biases
18. Insanity. 19. Habitual occupations. 20. Pecuniary circumstances. 21.
Connexions in the way of sympathy. 22. Connexions in the way of antipathy.
23. Radical frame of body. 24. Radical frame of mind. 25. Sex. 26. Age. 27.
Rank. 28. Education. 29. Climate. 30. Lineage. 31. Government. 32. Religious
profession.[3]
VII. 1. Health is the absence of disease, and consequently of all those
kinds of pain which are among the symptoms of disease. A man may be said to
be in a state of health when he is not conscious of any uneasy sensations,
the primary seat of which can be perceived to be anywhere in his body.[4] In
point of of general sensibility, a man who is under the pressure of any
bodily indisposition, or, as the phrase is, is in an ill state of health, is
less sensible to the influence of any pleasurable cause, and more so to that
of any afflictive one, than if he were well.
VIII. 2. The circumstance of strength, though in point of causality closely
connected with that of health, is perfectly distinguishable from it. The
same man will indeed generally be stronger in a good state of health than in
a bad one. But one man, even in a bad state of health, may be stronger than
another even in a good one. Weakness is a common concomitant of disease: but
in consequence of his radical frame of body, a man may be weak all his life
long, without experiencing any disease. Health, as we have observed, is
principally a negative circumstance: strength a positive one. The degree of
a man's strength can be measured with tolerable accuracy.[5]
IX. 3. Hardiness is a circumstance which, though closely connected with that
of strength, is distinguishable from it. Hardiness is the absence of
irritability. Irritability respects either pain, resulting from the action
of mechanical causes; or disease, resulting from the action of causes purely
physiological. Irritability, in the former sense, is the disposition to
undergo a greater or less degree of pain upon the application of a
mechanical cause; such as are most of those applications by which simple
afflictive punishments are inflicted, as whipping, beating, and the like. In
the latter sense, it is the disposition to contract disease with greater or
less facility, upon the application of any instrument acting on the body by
its physiological properties; as in the case of fevers, or of colds, or
other inflammatory diseases, produced by the application of damp air: or to
experience immediate uneasiness, as in the case of relaxation or chilliness
produced by an over or under proportion of the matter of heat.
Hardiness, even in the sense in which it is opposed to the action of
mechanical causes, is distinguishable from strength. The external
indications of strength are the abundance and firmness of no the muscular
fibres: those of hardiness, in this sense, are the firmness of the muscular
fibres, and the callosity of the skin. Strength is more peculiarly the gift
of nature: hardiness, of education. Of two persons who have had, the one the
education of a gentleman, the other, that of a common sailor, the first may
be the stronger, at the same time that the other is the hardier.
X. 4. By bodily imperfection may be understood that condition which a person
is in, who either stands distinguished by any remarkable deformity, or wants
any of those parts or faculties, which the ordinary run of persons of the
same sex and age are furnished with: who, for instance, has a hare-lip, is
deaf, or has lost a hand. This circumstance, like that of ill-health, tends
in general to diminish more or less the effect of any pleasurable
circumstance, and to increase that of any afflictive one. The effect of this
circumstance, however, admits of great variety: inasmuch as there are a
great variety of ways in which a man may suffer in his personal appearance,
and in his bodily organs and faculties: all which differences will be taken
notice of in their proper places.[6]
XI. 5. So much for circumstances belonging to the condition of the body: we
come now to those which concern the condition of the mind: the use of
mentioning these will be seen hereafter. In the first place may be reckoned
the quantity and quality of the knowledge the person in question happens to
possess: that is, of the ideas which he has actually in stores ready upon
occasion to call to mind: meaning such ideas as are in some way or other of
an interesting nature: that is, of a nature in some way or other to
influence his happiness, or that of other men. When these ideas are many,
and of importance, a man is said to be a man of knowledge; when few, or not
of importance, ignorant.
XII. 6. By strength of intellectual powers may be understood the degree of
facility which a man experiences in his endeavours to call to mind as well
such ideas as have been already aggregated to his stock of knowledge, as any
others, which, upon any occasion that may happen, he may conceive a desire
to place there. It seems to be on some such occasion as this that the words
parts and talents are commonly employed. To this head may be referred the
several qualities of readiness of apprehension, accuracy and tenacity of
memory, strength of attention, clearness of discernment, amplitude of
comprehension, vividity and rapidity of imagination. Strength of
intellectual powers, in general, seems to correspond pretty exactly to
general strength of body: as any of these qualities in particular does to
particular strength.
XIII. 7. Firmness of mind on the one hand, and irritability on the other,
regard the proportion between the degrees of efficacy with which a man is
acted upon by an exciting cause, of which the value lies chiefly in
magnitude, and one of which the value lies chiefly in propinquity.[7] A man
may be said to be of a firm mind, when small pleasures or pains, which are
present or near, do not affect him, in a greater proportion to their value,
than greater pleasures or pains, which are uncertain or remote;[8] Of an
irritable mind, when the contrary is the case.
XIV. 8. Steadiness regards the time during which a given exciting cause of a
given value continues to affect a man in nearly the same manner and degree
as at first, no assignable external event or change of circumstances
intervening to make an alteration in its force.[9]
XV. 9. By the bent of a man's inclinations may be understood the propensity
he has to expect pleasure or pain from certain objects, rather than from
others. A man's inclinations may be said to have such or such a bent, when,
amongst the several sorts of objects which afford pleasure in some degree to
all men, he is apt to expect more pleasure from one particular sort, than
from another particular sort, or more from any given particular sort, than
another man would expect from that sort; or when, amongst the several sorts
of objects, which to one man afford pleasure, whilst to another they afford
none, he is apt to expect, or not to expect, pleasure from an object of such
or such a sort: so also with regard to pains. This circumstance, though
intimately connected with that of the bias of a man's sensibility, is not
undistinguishable from it. The quantity of pleasure or pain, which on any
given occasion a man may experience from an application of any sort, may be
greatly influenced by the expectations he has been used to entertain of
pleasure or pain from that quarter; but it will not be absolutely determined
by them: for pleasure or pain may come upon him from a quarter from which he
was not accustomed to expect it.
XVI. 10. The circumstances of moral, religious, sympathetic, and
antipathetic sensibility, when closely considered, will appear to be
included in some sort under that of bent of inclination. On account of their
particular importance they may, however, be worth mentioning apart. A man's
moral sensibility may be said to be strong, when the pains and pleasures of
the moral sanction[10] show greater in his eyes, in comparison with other
pleasures and pains (and consequently exert a stronger influence) than in
the eyes of the persons he is compared with; in other words, when he is
acted on with more than ordinary efficacy by the sense of honour: it may be
said to be weak, when the contrary is the case.
XVII. 11. Moral sensibility seems to regard the average effect or influence
of the pains and pleasures of the moral sanction, upon all sorts of
occasions to which it is applicable, or happens to be applied. It regards
the average force or quantity of the impulses the mind receives from that
source during a given period. Moral bias regards the particular acts on
which, upon so many particular occasions, the force of that sanction is
looked upon as attaching. It regards the quality or direction of those
impulses. It admits of as many varieties, therefore, as there are dictates
which the moral sanction may be conceived to issue forth. A man may be said
to have such or such a moral bias, or to have a moral bias in favour of such
or such an action, when he looks upon it as being of the number of those of
which the performance is dictated by the moral sanction.
XVIII. 12. What has been said with regard to moral sensibility, may be
applied, mutatis mutandis, to religious.
XIX. 13. What has been said with regard to moral biases, may also be
applied, mutatis mutandis, to religious biases.
XX. 14. By sympathetic sensibility is to be understood the propensity that a
man has to derive pleasure from the happiness, and pain from the
unhappiness, of other sensitive beings. It is the stronger, the greater the
ratio of the pleasure or pain he feels on their account is to that of the
pleasure or pain which (according to what appears to him) they feel for
themselves.
XXI. 15. Sympathetic bias regards the description of the parties who are the
objects of a man's sympathy: and of the acts or other circumstances of or
belonging to those persons, by which the sympathy is excited. These parties
may be, 1. Certain individuals. 2. Any subordinate class of individuals. 3.
The whole nation. 4. Human kind in general. 5. The whole sensitive creation.
According as these objects of sympathy are more numerous, the affection, by
which the man is biased, may be said to be the more enlarged.
XXII. 16, 17. Antipathetic sensibility and antipathetic biases are just the
reverse of sympathetic sensibility and sympathetic biases. By antipathetic
sensibility is to be understood the propensity that a man has to derive pain
from the happiness, and pleasure from the unhappiness, of other sensitive
beings.
XXIII. 18. The circumstance of insanity of mind corresponds to that of
bodily imperfection. It admits, however, of much less variety, inasmuch as
the soul is (for aught we can perceive) one indivisible thing, not
distinguishable, like the body, into parts. What lesser degrees of
imperfection the mind may be susceptible of, seem to be comprisable under
the already-mentioned heads of ignorance, weakness of mind, irritability, or
unsteadiness; or under such others as are reducible to them. Those which are
here in view are those extraordinary species and degrees of mental
imperfection, which, wherever they take place, are as conspicuous and as
unquestionable as lameness or blindness in the body: operating partly, it
should seem, by inducing an extraordinary degree of the imperfections above
mentioned, partly by giving an extraordinary and preposterous bent to the
inclinations.
XXIV. 19. Under the head of a man's habitual occupations, are to be
understood, on this occasion, as well those which he pursues for the sake of
profit, as those which he pursues for the sake of present pleasure. The
consideration of the profit itself belongs to the head of a man's pecuniary
circumstances. It is evident, that if by any means a punishment, or any
other exciting cause, has the effect of putting it out of his power to
continue in the pursuit of any such occupation, it must on that account be
much the more distressing. A man's habitual occupations, though intimately
connected in point of causality with the bent of his inclinations, are not
to be looked upon as precisely the same circumstance. An amusement, or
channel of profit, may be the object of a man's inclinations, which has
never been the subject of his habitual occupations: for it may be, that
though he wished to betake himself to it, he never did, it not being in his
power: a circumstance which may make a good deal of difference in the effect
of any incident by which he happens to be debarred from it.
XXV. 20. Under the head of pecuniary circumstances, I mean to bring to view
the proportion which a man's means bear to his wants: the sum total of his
means of every kind, to the sum total of his wants of every kind. A man's
means depend upon three circumstances: 1. His property. 2. The profit of his
labour. 3. His connexions in the way of support. His wants seem to depend
upon four circumstances. 1. His habits of expense. 2. His connexions in the
way of burthen. 3. Any present casual demand he may have. 4. The strength of
his expectation. By a man's property is to be understood, whatever he has in
store independent of his labour. By the profit of his labour is to be
understood the growing profit. As to labour, it may be either of the body
principally, or of the mind principally, or of both indifferently: nor does
it matter in what manner, nor on what subject, it be applied, so it produce
a profit. By a man's connexions in the way of support, are to be understood
the pecuniary assistances, of whatever kind, which he is in a way of
receiving from any persons who, on whatever account, and in whatever
proportion, he has reason to expect should contribute gratis to his
maintenance: such as his parents, patrons, and relations. It seems manifest,
that a man can have no other means than these. What he uses, he must have
either of his own, or from other people: if from other people, either gratis
or for a price. As to habits of expense, it is well known, that a man's
desires are governed in a great degree by his habits. Many are the cases in
which desire (and consequently the pain of privation connected with it[11])
would not even subsist at all, but for previous enjoyment. By a man's
connexions in the way of burthen, are to be understood whatever expense he
has reason to look upon himself as bound to be at in the support of those
who by law, or the customs of the world, are warranted in looking up to him
for assistance; such as children, poor relations, superannuated servants,
and any other dependents whatsoever. As to present casual demand, it is
manifest, that there are occasions on which a given sum will be worth
infinitely more to a man than the same sum would at another time: where, for
example, in a case of extremity, a man stands in need of extraordinary
medical assistance: or wants money to carry on a law-suit, on which his all
depends: or has got a livelihood waiting for him in a distant country, and
wants money for the charges of conveyance. In such cases, any piece of good
or ill fortune, in the pecuniary way, might have a very different effect
from what it would have at any other time. With regard to strength of
expectation; when one man expects to gain or to keep a thing which another
does not, it is plain the circumstance of not having it will affect the
former very differently from the latter; who, indeed, commonly will not be
affected by it at all.
XXVI. 21. Under the head of a man's connexions in the way of sympathy, I
would bring to view the number and description of the persons in whose
welfare he takes such a concern, as that the idea of their happiness should
be productive of pleasure, and that of their unhappiness of pain to him: for
instance, a man's wife, his children, his parents, his near relations, and
intimate friends. This class of persons, it is obvious, will for the most
part include the two classes by which his pecuniary circumstances are
affected: those, to wit, from whose means he may expect support, and those
whose wants operate on him as a burthen. But it is obvious, that besides
these, it may very well include others, with whom he has no such pecuniary
connexion: and even with regard to these, it is evident that the pecuniary
dependence, and the union of affections, are circumstances perfectly
distinguishable. Accordingly, the connexions here in question, independently
of any influence they may have on a man's pecuniary circumstances, have an
influence on the effect of any exciting causes whatsoever. The tendency of
them is to increase a man's general sensibility; to increase, on the one
hand, the pleasure produced by all pleasurable causes; on the other, the
pain produced by all afflictive ones. When any pleasurable incident happens
to a man, he naturally, in the first moment, thinks of the pleasure it will
afford immediately to himself: presently afterwards, however (except in a
few cases, which is not worth while here to insist on) he begins to think of
the pleasure which his friends will feel upon their coming to know of it:
and this secondary pleasure is commonly no mean addition to the primary one.
First comes the self-regarding pleasure: then comes the idea of the pleasure
of sympathy, which you suppose that pleasure of yours will give birth to in
the bosom of your friend: and this idea excites again in yours a new
pleasure of sympathy, grounded upon his. The first pleasure issuing from
your own bosom, as it were from a radiant point, illuminates the bosom of
your friend: reverberated from thence, it is reflected with augmented warmth
to the point from whence it first proceeded: and so it is with pains.[12]
Nor does this effect depend wholly upon affection. Among near relations,
although there should be no kindness, the pleasures and pains of the moral
sanction are quickly propagated by a peculiar kind of sympathy: no article,
either of honour or disgrace, can well fall upon a man, without extending to
a certain distance within the circle of his family. What reflects honour
upon the father, reflects honour upon the son: what reflects disgrace,
disgrace. The cause of this singular and seemingly unreasonable circumstance
(that is, its analogy to the rest of the phenomena of the human mind,)
belongs not to the present purpose. It is sufficient if the effect be beyond
dispute.
XXVII. 22. Of a man's connexions in the way of antipathy, there needs not
any thing very particular to be observed. Happily there is no primeval and
constant source of antipathy in a human nature, as there is of sympathy.
There are no permanent sets of persons who are naturally and of course the
objects of antipathy to a man, as there are who are the objects of the
contrary affection. Sources, however, but too many, of antipathy, are apt to
spring up upon various occasions during the course of a man's life: and
whenever they do, this circumstance may have a very considerable influence
on the effects of various exciting causes. As on the one hand, a punishment,
for instance, which tends to separate a man from those with whom he is
connected in the way of sympathy, so on the other hand, one which tends to
force him into the company of those with whom he is connected in the way of
antipathy, will, on that account, be so much the more distressing. It is to
be observed, that sympathy itself multiplies the sources of antipathy.
Sympathy for your friend gives birth to antipathy on your part against all
those who are objects of antipathy, as well as to sympathy for those who are
objects of sympathy to him. In the same manner does antipathy multiply the
sources of sympathy; though commonly perhaps with rather a less degree of
efficacy. Antipathy against your enemy is apt to give birth to sympathy on
your part towards those who are objects of antipathy, as well as to
antipathy against those who are objects of sympathy, to him.
XXVIII. 23. Thus much for the circumstances by which the effect of any
exciting cause may be influenced, when applied upon any given occasion, at
any given period. But besides these supervening incidents, there are other
circumstances relative to a man, that may have their influence, and which
are co-eval to his birth. In the first place, it seems to be universally
agreed, that in the original frame or texture of every man's body, there is
a something which, independently of all subsequently intervening
circumstances, renders him liable to be affected by causes producing bodily
pleasure or pain, in a manner different from that in which another man would
be affected by the same causes. To the catalogue of circumstances
influencing a man's sensibility, we may therefore add his original or
radical frame, texture, constitution, or temperament of body.
XXIX. 24. In the next place, it seems to be pretty well agreed, that there
is something also in the original frame or texture of every man's mind,
which, independently of all exterior and subsequently intervening
circumstances, and even of his radical frame of body, makes him liable to be
differently affected by the same exciting causes, from what another man
would be. To the catalogue of circumstances influencing a man's sensibility,
we may therefore further add his original or radical frame, texture,
constitution or temperament of mind.[13]
XXX. It seems pretty certain, all this while, that a man's sensibility to
causes producing pleasure or pain, even of mind, may depend in a
considerable degree upon his original and acquired frame of body. But we
have no reason to think that it can depend altogether upon that frame:
since, on the one hand, we see persons whose frame of body is as much alike
as can be conceived, differing very considerably in respect of their mental
frame: and, on the other hand, persons whose frame of mind is as much alike
as can be conceived, differing very conspicuously in regard to their bodily
frame.[14]
XXXI. It seems indisputable also, that the different sets of a external
occurrences that may befall a man in the course of his life, will make great
differences in the subsequent texture of his mind at any given period: yet
still those differences are not solely to be attributed to such occurrences.
Equally far from the truth seems that opinion to be (if any such be
maintained) which attributes all to nature, and that which attributes all to
education. The two circumstances will therefore still remain distinct, as
well from one another, as from all others.
XXXII. Distinct however as they are, it is manifest, that at no period in
the active part of a man's life can they either of them make their
appearance by themselves. All they do is to constitute the latent
ground-work which the other supervening circumstances have to work upon and
whatever influence those original principles may have, is so changed and
modified, and covered over, as it were, by those other circumstances, as
never to be separately discernible. The effects of the one influence are
indistinguishably blended with those of the other.
XXXIII. The emotions of the body are received, and with reason, as probable
indications of the temperature of the mind. But they are far enough from
conclusive. A man may exhibit, for instance, the exterior appearances of
grief, without really grieving at all, or at least in any thing near the
proportion in which he appears to grieve. Oliver Cromwell, whose conduct
indicated a heart more than ordinarily callous, was as remarkably profuse in
tears[15]. Many men can command the external appearances of sensibility with
very little real feeling.[16] The female sex commonly with greater facility
than the male: hence the proverbial expression of a woman's tears. To have
this kind of command over one's self, was the characteristic excellence of
the orator of ancient times, and is still that of the player in our own.
XXXIV. The remaining circumstances may, with reference to those already
mentioned, be termed secondary influencing circumstances. These have an
influence, it is true, on the quantum or bias of a man's sensibility, but it
is only by means of the other primary ones. The manner in which these two
sets of circumstances are concerned, is such that the primary ones do the
business, while the secondary ones lie most open to observation. The
secondary ones, therefore, are those which are most heard of; on which
account it will be necessary to take notice of them: at the same time that
it is only by means of the primary ones that their influence can be
explained; whereas the influence of the primary ones will be apparent
enough, without any mention of the secondary ones.
XXXV. 25. Among such of the primitive modifications of the corporeal frame
as may appear to influence the quantum and bias of sensibility, the most
obvious and conspicuous are those which constitute the sex. In point of
quantity, the sensibility of the female sex appears in general to be greater
than that of the male. The health of the female is more delicate than that
of the male: in point of strength and hardiness of body, in point of
quantity and quality of knowledge, in point of strength of intellectual
powers, and firmness of mind, she is commonly inferior: moral, religious,
sympathetic, and antipathetic sensibility are commonly stronger in her than
in the male. The quality of her knowledge, and the bent of her inclinations,
are commonly in many respects different. Her moral biases are also, in
certain respects, remarkably different: chastity, modesty, and delicacy, for
instance, are prized more than courage in a woman: courage, more than any of
those qualities, in a man. The religious biases in the two sexes are not apt
to be remarkably different; except that the female is rather more inclined
than the male to superstition; that is, to observances not dictated by the
principle of utility; a difference that may be pretty well accounted for by
some of the before-mentioned circumstances. Her sympathetic biases are in
many respects different; for her own offspring all their lives long, and for
children in general while young, her affection is commonly stronger than
that of the male. Her affections are apt to be less enlarged: seldom
expanding themselves so much as to take in the welfare of her country in
general, much less that of mankind, or the whole sensitive creation: seldom
embracing any extensive class or division, even of her own countrymen,
unless it be in virtue of her sympathy for some particular individuals that
belong to it. In general, her antipathetic, as well as sympathetic biases
are apt to be less conformable to the principle of utility than those of the
male; owing chiefly to some deficiency in point of knowledge, discernment,
and comprehension. Her habitual occupations of the amusing kind are apt to
be in many respects different from those of the male. With regard to her
connexions in the way of sympathy, there can be no difference. In point of
pecuniary circumstances, according to the customs of perhaps all countries,
she is in general less independent.
XXXVI. 26. Age is of course divided into divers periods, of which the number
and limits are by no means uniformly ascertained. One might distinguish it,
for the present purpose, into, 1. Infancy. 2. Adolescence. 3. Youth. 4.
Maturity. 5. Decline. 6. Decrepitude. It were lost time to stop on the
present occasion to examine it at each period, and to observe the
indications it gives, with respect to the several primary circumstances just
reviewed. Infancy and decrepitude are commonly inferior to the other
periods, in point of health, strength, hardiness, and so forth. In infancy,
on the part of the female, the imperfections of that sex are enhanced: on
the part of the male, imperfections take place mostly similar in quality,
but greater in quantity, to those attending the states of adolescence,
youth, and maturity in the female. In the stage of decrepitude both sexes
relapse into many of the imperfections of infancy. The generality of these
observations may easily be corrected upon a particular review.
XXXVII. 27. Station, or rank in life, is a circumstance, that, among a
civilized people, will commonly undergo a multiplicity of variations.
Cęteris Paribus, the quantum of sensibility appears to be greater in the
higher ranks of men than in the lower. The primary circumstances in respect
of which this secondary circumstance is apt to induce or indicate a
difference, seem principally to be as follows: 1. Quantity and Quality of
knowledge. 2. Strength of mind. 3. Bent of inclination. 4. Moral
sensibility. 5. Moral biases. 6. Religious sensibility. 7. Religious biases.
8. Sympathetic sensibility. 9. Sympathetic biases. 10. Antipathetic
sensibility. 11. Antipathetic biases. 12. Habitual occupations. 13. Nature
and productiveness of a man's means of livelihood. 14. Connexions importing
profit. 15. Habit of expense. 16. Connexions importing burthen. A man of a
certain rank will frequently have a number of dependents besides those whose
dependency is the result of natural relationship. As to health, strength,
and hardiness, if rank has any influence on these circumstances, it is but
in a remote way chiefly by the influence it may have on its habitual
occupations.
XXXVIII. 28. The influence of education is still more extensive. Education
stands upon a footing somewhat different from that of the circumstances of
age, sex, and rank. These words, though the influence of the circumstances
they respectively denote exerts itself principally, if not entirely, through
the medium of certain of the primary circumstances before mentioned,
present, however, each of them a circumstance which has a separate existence
of itself. This is not the case with the word education: which means nothing
any farther than as it serves to call up to view some one or more of those
primary circumstances. Education may be distinguished into physical and
mental; the education of the body and that of the mind: mental, again, into
intellectual and moral; the culture of the understanding, and the culture of
the affections. The education a man receives, is given to him partly by
others, partly by himself. By education then nothing more can be expressed
than the condition a man is in in respect of those primary circumstances, as
resulting partly from the management and contrivance of others, principally
of those who in the early periods of his life have had dominion over him,
partly from his own. To the physical part of his education, belong the
circumstances of health, strength, and hardiness: sometimes, by accident,
that of bodily imperfection; as where by intemperance or negligence an
irreparable mischief happens to his person. To the intellectual part, those
of quantity and quality of knowledge, and in some measure perhaps those of
firmness of mind and steadiness. To the moral part, the bent of his
inclinations, the quantity and quality of his moral, religious, sympathetic,
and antipathetic sensibility: to all three branches indiscriminately, but
under the superior control of external occurrences, his habitual
recreations, his property, his means of livelihood, his connexions in the
way of profit and of burthen, and his habits of expense. With respect indeed
to all these points, the influence of education is modified, in a manner
more or less apparent, by that of exterior occurrences; and in a manner
scarcely at all apparent, and altogether out of the reach of calculation, by
the original texture and constitution as well of his body as of his mind.
XXXIX. 29. Among the external circumstances by which the influence of
education is modified, the principal are those which come under the head of
climate. This circumstance places itself in front, and demands a separate
denomination, not merely on account of the magnitude of its influence, but
also on account of its being conspicuous to every body, and of its applying
indiscriminately to great numbers at a time. This circumstance depends for
its essence upon the situation of that part of the earth which is in
question, with respect to the course taken by the whole planet in its
revolution round the sun: but for its influence it depends upon the
condition of the bodies which compose the earth's surface at that part,
principally upon the quantities of sensible heat at different periods, and
upon the density, and purity, and dryness or moisture of the circumambient
air. Of the so often mentioned primary circumstances, there are few of which
the production is not influenced by this secondary one; partly by its
manifest effects upon the body; partly by its less perceptible effects upon
the mind. In hot climates men's health is apt to be more precarious than in
cold: their strength and hardiness less: their vigour, firmness, and
steadiness of mind less: and thence indirectly their quantity of knowledge:
the bent of their inclinations different: most remarkably so in respect of
their superior propensity to sexual enjoyments, and in respect of the
earliness of the period at which that propensity begins to manifest itself:
their sensibilities of all kinds more intense: their habitual occupations
savouring more of sloth than of activity: their radical frame of body less
strong, probably, and less hardy: their radical frame of mind less vigorous,
less firm, less steady.
XL. 30. Another article in the catalogue of secondary circumstances, is that
of race or lineage: the national race or lineage a man issues from. This
circumstance, independently of that of climate, will commonly make some
difference in point of radical frame of mind and body. A man of negro race,
born in France or England, is a very different being, in many respects, from
a man of French or English race. A man of Spanish race, born in Mexico or
Peru, is at the hour of his birth a different sort of being, in many
respects, from a man of the original Mexican or Peruvian race. This
circumstance, as far as it is distinct from climate, rank, and education,
and from the two just mentioned, operates chiefly through the medium of
moral, religious, sympathetic, and antipathetic biases.
XLI. 31. The last circumstance but one, is that of government: the
government a man lives under at the time in question; or rather that under
which he has been accustomed most to live. This circumstance operates
principally through the medium of education: the magistrate operating in the
character of a tutor upon all the members of the state, by the direction he
gives to their hopes and to their fears. Indeed under a solicitous and
attentive government, the ordinary preceptor, nay even the parent himself,
is but a deputy, as it were, to the magistrate: whose controlling influence,
different in this respect from that of the ordinary preceptor, dwells with a
man to his life's end. The effects of the peculiar power of the magistrate
are seen more particularly in the influence it exerts over the quantum and
bias of men's moral, religious, sympathetic, and antipathetic sensibilities.
Under a well-constituted, or even under a well-administered though
ill-constituted government, men's moral sensibility is commonly stronger,
and their moral biases more conformable to the dictates of utility: their
religious sensibility frequently weaker, but their religious biases less
unconformable to the dictates of utility: their sympathetic affections more
enlarged, directed to the magistrate more than to small parties or to
individuals, and more to the whole community than to either: their
antipathetic sensibilities less violent, as being more obsequious to the
influence of well-directed moral biases, and less apt to be excited by that
of ill-directed religious ones: their antipathetic biases more conformable
to well-directed moral ones, more apt (in proportion) to be grounded on
enlarged and sympathetic than on narrow and self-regarding affections, and
accordingly, upon the whole, more conformable to the dictates of utility.
XLII. 32. The last circumstance is that of religious profession: the
religious profession a man is of: the religious fraternity of which he is a
member. This circumstance operates principally through the medium of
religious sensibility and religious biases. It operates, however, as an
indication more or less conclusive, with respect to several other
circumstances. With respect to some, scarcely but through the medium of the
two just mentioned: this is the case with regard to the quantum and bias of
a man's moral, sympathetic, and antipathetic sensibility: perhaps in some
cases with regard to quantity and quality of knowledge, strength of
intellectual powers, and bent of inclination. With respect to others, it may
operate immediately of itself: this seems to be the case with regard to a
man's habitual occupations, pecuniary circumstances, and connexions in the
way of sympathy and antipathy. A man who pays very little inward regard to
the dictates of the religion which he finds it necessary to profess, may
find it difficult to avoid joining in the ceremonies of it, and bearing a
part in the pecuniary burthens it imposes.[17] By the force of habit and
example he may even be led to entertain a partiality for persons of the same
profession, and a proportionable antipathy against those of a rival one. In
particular, the antipathy against persons of different persuasions is one of
the last points of religion which men part with. Lastly, it is obvious, that
the religious profession a man is of cannot but have a considerable
influence on his education. But, considering the import of the term
education, to say this is perhaps no more than saying in other words what
has been said already.
XLIII. These circumstances, all or many of them, will need to be attended to
as often as upon any occasion any account is taken of any quantity of pain
or pleasure, as resulting from any cause. Has any person sustained an
injury? they will need to be considered in estimating the mischief of the
offense.. Is satisfaction to be made to him? they will need to be attended
to in adjusting the quantum of that satisfaction. Is the injurer to be
punished? they will need to be attended to in estimating the force of the
impression that will be made on him by any given punishment.
XLIV. It is to be observed, that though they seem all of them, on some
account or other, to merit a place in the catalogue, they are not all of
equal use in practice. Different articles among them are applicable to
different exciting causes. Of those that may influence the effect of the
same exciting cause, some apply indiscriminately to whole classes of persons
together; being applicable to all, without any remarkable difference in
degree: these may be directly and pretty fully provided for by the
legislator. This is the case, for instance, with the primary circumstances
of bodily imperfection, and insanity: with the secondary circumstance of
sex: perhaps with that of age: at any rate with those of rank, of climate,
of lineage, and of religious profession. Others, however they may apply to
whole classes of persons, yet in their application to different individuals
are susceptible of perhaps an indefinite variety of degrees. These cannot be
fully provided for by the legislator; but, as the existence of them, in
every sort of case, is capable of being ascertained, and the degree in which
they take place is capable of being measured, provision may be made for them
by the judge, or other executive magistrate, to whom the several individuals
that happen to be concerned may be made known. This is the case, 1. With the
circumstance of health. 2. In some sort with that of strength. 3. Scarcely
with that of hardiness: still less with those of quantity and quality of
knowledge, strength of intellectual powers, firmness or steadiness of mind;
except in as far as a man's condition, in respect of those circumstances,
maybe indicated by the secondary circumstances of sex, age, or rank: hardly
with that of bent of inclination, except in as far as that latent
circumstance is indicated by the more manifest one of habitual occupations:
hardly with that of a man's moral sensibility or biases, except in as far as
they may be indicated by his sex, age, rank, and education: not at all with
his religious sensibility and religious biases, except in as far as they may
be indicated by the religious profession he belongs to: not at all with the
quantity or quality of his sympathetic or antipathetic sensibilities, except
in as far as they may be presumed from his sex, age, rank, education,
lineage, or religious profession. It is the case, however, with his habitual
occupations, with his pecuniary circumstances, and with his connexions in
the way of sympathy. Of others, again, either the existence cannot be
ascertained, or the degree cannot be measured. These, therefore, cannot be
taken into account, either by the legislator or the executive magistrate.
Accordingly, they would have no claim to be taken notice of, were it not for
those secondary circumstances by which they are indicated, and whose
influence could not well be understood without them. What these are has been
already mentioned.
XLV. It has already been observed, that different articles in this list of
circumstances apply to different exciting causes: the circumstance of bodily
strength, for instance, has scarcely any influence of itself (whatever it
may have in a roundabout way, and by accident) on the effect of an incident
which should increase or diminish the quantum of a man's property. It
remains to be considered, what the exciting causes are with which the
legislator has to do. These may, by some accident or other, be any
whatsoever: but those which he has principally to do, are those of the
painful or afflictive kind. With pleasurable ones he has little to do,
except now and then by accident: the reasons of which may be easily enough
perceived, at the same time that it would take up too much room to unfold
them here. The exciting causes with which he has principally to do, are, on
the one hand, the mischievous acts, which it is his business to prevent; on
the other hand, the punishments, by the terror of which it is his endeavour
to prevent them. Now of these two sets of exciting causes, the latter only
is of his production: being produced partly by his own special appointment,
partly in conformity to his general appointment, by the special appointment
of the judge. For the legislator, therefore, as well as for the judge, it is
necessary (if they would know what it is they are doing when they are
appointing punishment) to have an eye to all these circumstances. For the
legislator, lest, meaning to apply a certain quantity of punishment to all
persons who shall put themselves in a given predicament, he should unawares
apply to some of those persons much more or much less than he himself
intended; for the judge, lest, in applying to a particular person a
particular measure of punishment, he should apply much more or much less
than was intended, perhaps by himself, and at any rate by the legislator.
They ought each of them, therefore, to have before him, on the one hand, a
list of the several circumstances by which sensibility may be influenced; on
the other hand, a list of the several species and degrees of punishment
which they purpose to make use of: and then, by making a comparison between
the two, to form a detailed estimate of the influence of each of the
circumstances in question, upon the effect of each species and degree of
punishment.
There are two plans or orders of distribution, either of which might be
pursued in the drawing up this estimate. The one is to make the name of the
circumstance take the lead, and under it to represent the different
influences it exerts over the effects of the several modes of punishment:
the other is to make the name of the punishment take the lead, and under it
to represent the different influences which are exerted over the effects of
it by the several circumstances above mentioned. Now of these two sorts of
objects, the punishment is that to which the intention of the legislator is
directed in the first instance. This is of his own creation, and will be
whatsoever he thinks fit to make it: the influencing circumstance exists
independently of him, and is what it is whether he will or no. What he has
occasion to do is to establish a certain species and degree of punishment:
and it is only with reference to that punishment that he has occasion to
make any inquiry concerning any of the circumstances here in question. The
latter of the two plans therefore is that which appears by far the most
useful and commodious. But neither upon the one nor the other plan can any
such estimate be delivered here.[18]
XLVI. Of the several circumstances contained in this catalogue, it may be of
use to give some sort of analytic view; in order that it may be the more
easily discovered if any which ought to have been inserted are omitted; and
that, with regard to those which are inserted, it may be seen how they
differ and agree.
In the first place, they may be distinguished into primary and secondary:
those may be termed primary, which operate immediately of themselves: those
secondary, which operate not but by the medium of the former. To this latter
head belong the circumstances of sex, age, station in life, education,
climate, lineage, government, and religious profession: the rest are
primary. These again are either connate or adventitious: those which are
connate, are radical frame of body and radical frame of mind. Those which
are adventitious, are either personal, or exterior. The personal, again,
concern either a man's dispositions, or his actions. Those which concern his
dispositions, concern either his body or his mind. Those which concern his
body are health, strength, hardiness, and bodily imperfection. Those which
concern his mind, again, concern either his understanding or his affections.
To the former head belong the circumstances of quantity and quality of
knowledge, strength of understanding, and insanity. To the latter belong the
circumstances of firmness of mind, steadiness, bent of inclination, moral
sensibility, moral biases, religious sensibility, religious biases,
sympathetic sensibility, sympathetic biases, antipathetic sensibility, and
antipathetic biases. Those which regard his actions, are his habitual
occupations. Those which are exterior to him, regard either the things or
the persons which he is concerned with; under the former head come his
pecuniary circumstances;[19] under the latter, his connexions in the way of
sympathy and antipathy.
1. The exciting cause, the pleasure or pain produced by it, and the
intention produced by such pleasure or pain in the character of a motive,
are objects so intimately connected, that, in what follows, I fear I have
not, on every occasion, been able to keep them sufficiently distinct. I
thought it necessary to give the reader this warning; after which, should
there be found any such mistakes, it is to be hoped they will not be
productive of much confusion.
2. Thus, in physical bodies, the momentum of a ball put in motion by
impulse, will be influenced by the circumstance of gravity: being in some
directions increased, in others diminished by it. So in a ship, put in
motion by the wind, the momentum and direction will be influenced not only
by the attraction of gravity, but by the motion and resistance of the water,
and several other circumstances.
3. An analytical view of all these circumstances will be given at the
conclusion of the chapter: to which place it was necessary to refer it, as
it could not well have been understood, till some of them had been
previously explained.
To search out the vast variety of exciting or moderating causes, by which
the degree or bias of a man's sensibility may be influenced, to define the
boundaries of each, to extricate them from the entanglements in which they
are involved, to lay the effect of each article distinctly before the
reader's eye, is, perhaps, if not absolutely the most difficult task, at
least one of the most difficult tasks, within the compass of moral
physiology. Disquisitions on this head can never be completely satisfactory
without examples. To provide a sufficient collection of such examples, would
be a work of great labour as well as nicety: history and biography would
need to be ransacked: a vast course of reading would need to be travelled
through on purpose. By such a process the present work would doubtless have
been rendered more amusing; but in point of bulk, so enormous that this
single chapter would have been swelled into a considerable volume. Feigned
cases, although they may upon occasion serve to render the general matter
tolerably intelligible, can never be sufficient to render it palatable. On
this therefore, as on so many other occasions, I must confine myself to dry
and general instruction: discarding illustration, although sensible that
without it instruction cannot manifest half its efficacy. The subject,
however, is so difficult, and so new, that I shall think I have not ill
succeeded, if without pretending to exhaust it, I shall have been able to
mark out the principal points of view, and to put the matter in such a
method as may facilitate the researches of happier inquirers.
The great difficulty lies in the nature of the words, which are not, like
pain and pleasure, names of homogeneous real entities, but names of various
fictitious entities, for which no common genus is to be found: and which
therefore, without a vast and roundabout chain of investigation, can never
be brought under any exhaustive plan of arrangement, but must be picked up
here and there as they happen to occur.
4. It may be thought, that in a certain degree of health, this negative
account of the matter hardly comes up to the case. In a certain degree
health, there is often such a kind of feeling diffused over the whole frame
such a comfortable feel, or flow of spirits, as it is called, as may with
propriety come under the head of positive pleasure. But without experiencing
any such pleasurable feeling, if a man experience no painful one, he may be
well enough said to be in health.
5. The most accurate measure that can be given of a man's strength, seems to
be that which is taken from the weight or number of pounds and ounces he can
lift with his hands in a given attitude. This indeed relates immediately
only to his arms: but these are the organs of strength which are most
employed; of which the strength corresponds with most exactness to the
general state of the body with regard to strength; and in which the quantum
of strength is easiest measured. Strength may accordingly be distinguished
into general and particular.
Weakness is a negative term, and imports the absence of strength. It is,
besides, a relative term, and accordingly imports the absence of such a
quantity of strength as makes the share, possessed by the person in
question, less than that of some person he is compared to. Weakness, when it
is at such a degree as to make it painful for a man to perform the motions
necessary to the going through the ordinary functions of life, such as to
get up, to walk, to dress one's self, and so forth, brings the circumstance
of health into question, and puts a man into that sort of condition in which
he is said to be in ill health.
6. See B. I. Tit. [Irrep. corp. Injuries].
7. See chap. iv. [Value].
8. When, for instance, having been determined, by the prospect of some
inconvenience, not to disclose a fact, although he should be put to the
rack, he perseveres in such resolution after the rack is brought into his
presence, and even applied to him.
9. The facility with which children grow tired of their play-things, and
throw them away, is an instance of unsteadiness: the perseverance with which
a merchant applies himself to his traffic, or an author to his book may be
taken for an instance of the contrary. It is difficult to judge of the
quantity of pleasure or pain in these cases, but from the effects which it
produces in the character of a motive: and even then it is difficult to
pronounce, whether the change of conduct happens by the extinction of the
old pleasure or pain, or by the intervention of a new one.
10. See ch. v. [Pleasures and Pains].
11. See ch. v. [Pleasures and Pains].
12. This is one reason why legislators in general like better to have
married people to deal with than single; and people that have children than
such as are childless. It is manifest that the stronger and more numerous a
man's connexions in the way of sympathy are, the stronger is the hold which
the law has upon him. A wife and children are so many pledges a man gives to
the world for his good behaviour.
13. The characteristic circumstances whereby one man's frame of body or
mind, considered at any given period, stands distinguished from that of
another, have been comprised by metaphysicians and physiologists under the
name idiosyncrasy, from idios, peculiar, and syncrasis composition.
14. Those who maintain, that the mind and the body are one substance may
here object, that upon that supposition the distinction between frame of
mind and frame of body is but nominal, and that accordingly there is no such
thing as a frame of mind distinct from the frame of body. But granting, for
argument-sake, the antecedent, we may dispute the consequence. For if the
mind be but a part of the body, it is at any rate of a nature very different
from the other parts of the body.
A man's frame of body cannot in any part of it undergo any considerable
alteration without its being immediately indicated by phenomena discernible
by the senses. A man's frame of mind may undergo very considerable
alterations, his frame of body remaining the same to all appearance; that
is, for any thing that is indicated to the contrary by phenomena cognizable
to the senses: meaning those of other men.
15. Hume's Hist.
16. The quantity of the sort of pain, which is called grief, is indeed
hardly to be measured by any external indications. It is neither to be
measured for instance, by the quantity of the tears, nor by the number of
moments spent in crying. Indications rather less equivocal may, perhaps, be
afforded by the pulse. A man has not the motions of his heart at command as
he has those of the muscles of his face. But the particular significancy of
these indications is still very uncertain. All they can express is, that the
man is affected; they cannot express in what manner, nor from what cause. To
an affection resulting in reality from such or such a cause, he may give an
artificial colouring, and attribute it to such or such another cause. To an
affection directed in reality to such or such a person as its object, he may
give an artificial bias, and represent it as if directed to such or such
another object. Tears of rage he may attribute to contrition. The concern he
feels at the thoughts of a punishment that awaits him, he may impute to a
sympathetic concern for the mischief produced by his offense.
A very tolerable judgment, however, may commonly be formed by a discerning
mind, upon laying all the external indications exhibited by a man together,
and at the same time comparing them with his actions.
A remarkable instance of the power of the will, over the external
indications of sensibility, is to be found in Tacitus's story of the Roman
soldier, who raised a mutiny in the camp, pretending to have lost a brother
by the lawless cruelty of the General. The truth was, he never had had a
brother.
17. The ways in which a religion may lessen a man's means, or augment his
wants, are various. Sometimes it will prevent him from making a profit of
his money: sometimes from setting his hand to labour. Sometimes it will
oblige him to buy dearer food instead of cheaper: sometimes to purchase
useless labour: sometimes to pay men for not labouring: sometimes to
purchase trinkets, on which imagination alone has set a value: sometimes to
purchase exemptions from punishment, or titles to felicity in the world to
come.
18. This is far from being a visionary proposal, not reducible to practice.
I speak from experience, having actually drawn up such an estimate, though
upon the least commodious of the two plans, and before the several
circumstances in question had been reduced to the precise number and order
in which they are here enumerated. This is a part of the matter destined for
another work. There are some of these circumstances that bestow particular
denominations on the persons they relate to: thus, from the circumstance of
bodily imperfections, persons are denominated deaf, dumb, blind, and so
forth: from the circumstance of insanity, idiots, and maniacs: from the
circumstance of age, infants: for all which classes of persons particular
provision is made in the Code. See B. I. tit. [Exemptions]. Persons thus
distinguished will form so many articles in the catalogus personarum
privilegiatarum. See Appendix. tit. Composition].
19. As to a man's pecuniary circumstances, the causes on which those
circumstances depend, do not come all of them under the same class. The
absolute quantum of a man's property does indeed come under the same a class
with his pecuniary circumstances in general: so does the profit he makes
from the occupation which furnishes him with the means of livelihood. But
the occupation itself concerns his own person, and comes under the same head
as his habitual amusements: as likewise his habits of expense: his
connexions in the ways of profit and of burthen, under the same head as his
connexions in the way of sympathy: and the circumstances of his present
demand for money, and strength of expectation, come under the head of those
circumstances relative to his person which regard his affections.