What Kind of Data Reliability Do We Sacrifice?

Matthew Hutson

Because its electronic underpinnings are so modular,
geographically dispersed, and redundant, cyberspace is essentially
indestructable. You can't demolish it by cutting links with backhoes or
sending commandos to blow up electronic installations, and you can't even
nuke it. (p.110)

He has a point here, but what kind of data reliability do we
sacrifice for this kind of reliability? We may have multiple copies of our
data, but what happens during a power failure? Obviously this data is no
good if we can't access it. If it comes to nuclear war, then the chances
are that many of the copies, if not all, will be inaccessible. And what
about evolving technologies? The governement has already spent millions of
dollars converting paper media to electronic media, but these media are
already disintegrating, and the technology used to access it is obsolete
and irreplacable. What will a scientist do if she picks up a floppy disk
100 years in the future? Will she know how to read it?

Under pressure from cops and cold warriors, who anticipate being
thwarted by impregnable fortresses in cyberspace, the US federal government
has doggedly tried to restrict the availability of strong encription
software. (123)

You may sympathize with the attempts of local authorities to
control kittie porn, but how about suppression of dissident political
speach? (148)

This brings up the issue of who is to have the last word when it
comes to security/privacy. Do we have a right to hold and distribute any
data we choose, or should the government have the right to "protect" us
from dangerous information, such as the plans of terrorists and kittie
pornogrophy distributors? What exactly does crying Fire! in a crowded
cybertheater constitute?