For simplicity, we have adopted the following citation conventions in
these endnotes.
Dozens of government agencies and other entities provided the Commission with more than 2.5 million pages of documents and other materials,
including more than 1,000 hours of audiotapes. In general, we cite documents and other materials by providing the agency or entity of origin, the
type of document (e.g., memo, email, report, or record), the author and recipient, the title (in quotes) or a description of the subject, and the date.We use
the following abbreviations for the agencies and entities that produced the
bulk of these documents: AAL—American Airlines; CIA—Central Intelligence Agency; DCI—Director of Central Intelligence; DHS—Department
of Homeland Security; DOD—Department of Defense; DOJ—Department
of Justice; DOS—Department of State; DOT—Department of Transportation; EPA—Environmental Protection Agency; FAA—Federal Aviation
Administration; FBI—Federal Bureau of Investigation; FDNY—Fire
Department of NewYork; GAO—General Accounting Office; INS—Immigration and Naturalization Service; NEADS—Northeast Air Defense Sector; NSA—National Security Agency; NSC—National Security Council;
NTSB—National Transportation Safety Board; NYPD—New York Police
Department; OEM—Office of Emergency Management, City of NewYork;
PANYNJ or Port Authority—Port Authority of NewYork and New Jersey;
PAPD—Port Authority Police Department; SEC—Securities and Exchange
Commission; Treasury—Department of Treasury; TSA—Transportation
Security Administration; UAL—United Air Lines; USSS—United States
Secret Service.
Interviews, meetings, briefings, and site visits conducted by Commissioners or by members of the Commission staff are cited, for example, as “George
Tenet interview (Jan. 22, 2004).” Testimony by witnesses at one of the Com449

450

NOTES

mission’s 12 public hearings is cited as “Condoleezza Rice testimony, Apr. 8,
2004.”Written statements for the record provided by witnesses at one of our
public hearings are cited as “Thomas Ridge prepared statement, May 19,
2004.”
At the request of intelligence community agencies (including the FBI),
we use the first name and last initial, only the first name, or in a few instances
an alias or title when referring to working-level employees in those agencies.
At the request of several intelligence agencies, we cite most reports from the
CIA and other intelligence agencies generically as “Intelligence report,” followed by a description of the subject and date. In a few instances in which
we were given access to highly sensitive documents or information, we cite
generically to documents or information provided to the Commission.
Our investigation built on the work of many others, including the Joint
Inquiry of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence into Intelligence Community
Activities Before and After theTerrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, which
we refer to as the “Joint Inquiry.”We cite as “Joint Inquiry report, Dec. 2002”
the Report of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and U.S.
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, S. Rep. No. 107-351,
H.R. Rep. No. 107-792, 107th Cong., 2d sess. (2002), indicating “classified
version” where appropriate.Testimony presented during hearings conducted
by the Joint Inquiry is cited as “Joint Inquiry testimony of GeorgeTenet, Oct.
17, 2002,” indicating “closed hearing” where appropriate.We cite interviews
conducted by the Joint Inquiry staff as “Joint Inquiry interview of Cofer
Black,” with the date of the interview.
Another major source for our investigation were the thousands of interviews conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation during its investigation of the 9/11 attacks, which it refers to as “Penttbom.” FBI agents write
up their interviews on forms called 302s, which we cite as “FBI report of
investigation, interview of John Smith, Oct. 4, 2001,” using the date of the
interview.We cite interviews conducted by other agencies by agency name
and date of the interview; for example, an interview conducted by the
Department of Justice Office of Inspector General is cited as “DOJ Inspector General interview of Mary Jones, July 9, 2002.”

NOTES TO CHAPTER 1

451

1 “We Have Some Planes”
1. No physical, documentary, or analytical evidence provides a convincing explanation of why Atta and Omari
drove to Portland, Maine, from Boston on the morning of September 10, only to return to Logan on Flight 5930
on the morning of September 11. However,Atta reacted negatively when informed in Portland that he would have
to check in again in Boston. Michael Touhey interview (May 27, 2004).Whatever their reason, the Portland Jetport was the nearest airport to Boston with a 9/11 flight that would have arrived at Logan in time for the passengers to transfer to American Airlines Flight 11, which had a scheduled departure time of 7:45 A.M. See Tom Kinton
interview (Nov. 6, 2003); Portland International Jetport site visit (Aug. 18, 2003).
Like the other two airports used by the 9/11 hijackers (Newark Liberty International Airport and Washington Dulles International Airport), Boston’s Logan International Airport was a “Category X” airport: i.e., among the
largest facilities liable to highest threat, and generally subject to greater security requirements. See FAA report,“Civil
Aviation Security Reference Handbook,” May 1999, pp. 117–118.Though Logan was selected for two of the hijackings (as were both American and United Airlines), we found no evidence that the terrorists targeted particular airports or airlines. Nothing stands out about any of them with respect to the only security layer that was relevant to
the actual hijackings: checkpoint screening. See FAA briefing materials, “Assessment and Testing Data for BOS,
EWR, and IAD,” Oct. 24, 2001. Despite security problems at Logan (see, e.g., two local Fox 25 television investigative reports in February and April 2001, and an email in August 2001 from a former FAA special agent to the
agency’s leadership regarding his concerns about lax security at the airport), no evidence suggests that such issues
entered into the terrorists’ targeting: they simply booked heavily fueled east-to-west transcontinental flights of the
large Boeing aircraft they trained to fly that were scheduled to take off at nearly the same time. See Matt Carroll,
“Fighting Terror Sense of Alarm;Airlines Foiled Police Logan Probe,” Boston Globe, Oct. 17, 2001, p. B1.
2. CAPPS was an FAA-approved automated system run by the airlines that scored each passenger’s profile to
identify those who might pose a threat to civil aviation.The system also chose passengers at random to receive additional security scrutiny.Ten out of the 19 hijackers (including 9 out of 10 on the two American Airlines flights)
were identified via the CAPPS system.According to the procedures in place on 9/11, in addition to those flagged
by the CAPPS algorithm, American’s ticket agents were to mark as “selectees” those passengers who did not provide correct responses to the required security questions, failed to show proper identification, or met other criteria. See FAA report,“Air Carrier Standard Security Program,” May 2001, pp. 75–76; FAA record of interview, Donna
Thompson, Sept. 23, 2001; Chuck Severance interview (Apr. 15, 2004); Jim Dillon interview (Apr. 15, 2004); Diane
Graney interview (Apr. 16, 2004). It appears that Atta was selected at random. See Al Hickson briefing (June 8,
2004).
3.The call was placed from a pay phone in Terminal C (between the screening checkpoint and United 175’s
boarding gate). We presume Shehhi made the call, but we cannot be sure. Logan International Airport site visit
(Aug. 15, 2003); see also FBI response to Commission briefing request no. 6, undated (topic 11).
4. Flight 11 pushed back from Gate 32 in Terminal B at 7:40. See AAL response to the Commission’s February 3, 2004, requests, Mar. 15, 2004.
5. See UAL letter, “Flight 175—11Sep01 Passenger ACI Check-in History,” July 11, 2002. Customer service
representative Gail Jawahir recalled that her encounter with the Ghamdis occurred at “shortly before 7 A.M.,” and
when shown photos of the hijackers, she indicated that Mohand al Shehri resembled one of the two she checked
in (suggesting they were Banihammad and Shehri). However, she also recalled that the men had the same last name
and had assigned seats on row 9 (i.e., the Ghamdis), and that account has been adopted here. In either case, she
almost certainly was dealing with one set of the Flight 175 hijackers. See FBI reports of investigation, interviews
of Gail Jawahir, Sept. 21, 2001; Sept. 28, 2001. Even had the hijackers been unable to understand and answer the
two standard security questions, the only consequence would have been the screening of their carry-on and checked
bags for explosives. See FAA report,“Air Carrier Standard Security Program,” May 2001, p. 76.
6. For Flight 11, two checkpoints provided access to the gate.The second was opened at 7:15 A.M. The FAA
conducted many screener evaluations between September 11, 1999, and September 11, 2001.At the primary checkpoints, in aggregate, screeners met or exceeded the average for overall, physical search, and X-ray detection, while
falling below the norm for metal detection. No FAA Special Assessments (by “red teams”) were done at Logan
security checkpoints during the two years prior to September 11, 2001. See FAA briefing materials,“Assessment
and Testing Data for BOS, EWR, and IAD,” Oct. 24, 2001.
7. See Air Transport Association/Regional Airlines Association (ATA/RAA) report,“Air Carriers Checkpoint
Operations Guide,”Aug. 1999; FAA report,“Air Carrier Standard Security Program,”May 2001, appendix VI.
8. Mary Carol Turano interview (Mar. 11, 2004); FBI reports of investigation, interview of Nilda Cora, Oct. 4,
2001; interview of William Thomas, Sept. 14, 2001; interview of Jennifer Gore, Sept. 12, 2001; interview of Claudia Richey, Sept. 15, 2001; interview of Rosarito Rivera, Sept. 25, 2001.
9. See TSA report,“Selectee Status of September 11th Hijackers,” undated. For boarding and seating information, see AAL record, SABRE information on Flight 11, Sept. 11, 2001.These boarding times from the American
system are approximate only; for Flight 11, they indicated that some passengers “boarded” after the aircraft had
pushed back from the gate. See AAL response to the Commission’s February 3, 2004, requests, Mar. 15, 2004.

452

NOTES TO CHAPTER 1

10. See TSA report,“Selectee Status of September 11th Hijackers,” undated; see also UAL letter,“Flight 175—
11 Sep01 Passenger ACI Check-in History,” July 11, 2002.
11.The Hazmis checked in at 7:29; the airline has not yet been able to confirm the time of Hanjour’s checkin. However, it had to have taken place by 7:35, when he appears on the checkpoint videotape. See AAL record,
SABRE information for Flight 77, Sept. 11, 2001; AAL response to the Commission’s February 3, 2004, requests,
Mar. 15, 2004; Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority videotape, Dulles main terminal checkpoints, Sept. 11,
2001.
12. See TSA report,“Selectee Status of September 11th Hijackers,” undated; see also FAA report,“Selectee List
AALA #77,” undated; FBI report of investigation, interview of Vaughn Allex, Sept. 12, 2001;Vaughn Allex interview (July 13, 2004).
13.The FAA conducted many screener evaluations at Dulles between September 11, 1999, and September 11,
2001.While the test results for physical search exceeded the national average, both the metal detector and X-ray
results were below average. See FAA briefing materials,“Assessment and Testing Data for BOS, EWR, and IAD,”
Oct. 24, 2001.
14. Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority videotape, Dulles main terminal checkpoints, Sept. 11, 2001;
see also Tim Jackson interview (Apr. 12, 2004).
15. Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority videotape, Dulles main terminal checkpoints, Sept. 11, 2001;
see also Tim Jackson interview (Apr. 12, 2004).
16. For investigation findings, see FAA report, “American Airlines Flight #77: Hijacking and Crash into the
Pentagon, Sept. 11, 2001,” undated. For screener evaluations, see Tim Jackson interview (Apr. 12, 2004).
17. See AAL record, SABRE information for Flight 77, Sept. 11, 2001;AAL response to the Commission’s February 3, 2004, requests, Mar. 15, 2004.
18. UAL record, Flight 93 EWR bag loading status, Sept. 11, 2001; UAL record, Flight 93 EWR ACI passenger history, Sept. 11, 2001; UAL record, Flight 93 EWR full bag history, Sept. 11, 2001;TSA report,“Selectee Status of September 11th Hijackers,” undated; FBI report,“The Final 24 Hours,” Dec. 8, 2003.
19.The FAA conducted many screener evaluations at Newark between September 11, 1999, and September
11, 2001. Detection rates for metal detection, physical searches, and X-rays all met or exceeded the national averages. See FAA briefing materials,“Assessment and Testing Data for BOS, EWR, and IAD,” Oct. 24, 2001; see also
FAA report,“United Airlines Flight 93, September 11, 2001, Executive Report,” Jan. 30, 2002.
20. UAL record, Flight 93 EWR ACI passenger history, Sept. 11, 2001; see also FBI report, “The Final 24
Hours,” Dec. 8, 2003.
21.While Flights 11 and 77 were at or slightly above the average number of passengers for the respective flights
that summer, Flights 175 and 93 were well below their averages.We found no evidence to indicate that the hijackers manipulated the passenger loads on the aircraft they hijacked. Financial records did not reveal the purchase of
any tickets beyond those the hijackers used for themselves. See FBI response to Commission briefing request no.
6, undated (topic 8);AAL report,“Average Load Factor by Day-of-Week,” undated (for Flights 11 and 77 from June
11, 2001, to Sept. 9, 2001);AAL response to the Commission’s supplemental document requests, Jan. 20, 2004; UAL
report, Flight 175 BOS-LAX Load Factors, undated (from June 1, 2001, to Sept. 11, 2001); UAL report,“Explanation of Load Factors,” undated.
22. See AAL response to the Commission’s February 3, 2004, requests, Mar. 15, 2004; AAL record, Dispatch
Environmental Control/Weekly Flight Summary for Flight 11, Sept. 11, 2001;AAL report,“Flight Attendant Jump
Seat Locations During Takeoff And Flight Attendant Typical Cabin Positions During Start of Cabin Service,”
undated;AAL report,“Passenger Name List, Flight 11/September 11,” undated.
23. Commission analysis of NTSB and FAA air traffic control and radar data. See AAL record, Dispatch Environmental Control/Weekly Flight Summary for Flight 11, Sept. 11, 2001; NTSB report,“Flight Path Study—American Airlines Flight 11,” Feb. 19, 2002; Bill Halleck and Peggy Houck interview (Jan. 8, 2004).The initial service
assignments for flight attendants on American 11 would have placed Karen Martin and Bobbi Arestegui in first
class; Sara Low and Jean Roger in business class; Dianne Snyder in the midcabin galley; Betty Ong and Amy Sweeney
in coach; and Karen Nicosia in the aft galley. Jeffrey Collman would have been assigned to work in coach, but to
assist in first class if needed. See AAL report, “Flight Attendant Jump Seat Locations During Takeoff And Flight
Attendant Typical Cabin Positions During Start of Cabin Service,” undated; Bob Jordan briefing (Nov. 20, 2003).
24. NTSB report, Air Traffic Control Recording—American Airlines Flight 11, Dec. 21, 2001; NTSB report,
Air Traffic Control Recording—United Airlines Flight 175, Dec. 21, 2001. Given that the cockpit crew of American 11 had been acknowledging all previous instructions from air traffic control that morning within a matter of
seconds, and that when the first reporting of the hijacking was received a short time later (the 8:19 call from Betty
Ong) a number of actions had already been taken by the hijackers, it is most likely that the hijacking occurred at
8:14 A.M.
25.An early draft of an executive summary prepared by FAA security staff for the agency’s leadership referred
to an alleged report of a shooting aboard Flight 11.We believe this report was erroneous for a number of reasons—
there is no evidence that the hijackers purchased firearms, use of a gun would be inconsistent with the otherwise

24, 2003); Linda Povinelli interview (Sept. 24, 2003); see also NTSB report,Air Traffic Control Recording—American Airlines Flight 77, Dec. 21, 2001; AAL record, Dispatch Environmental Control/Weekly Flight Summary for
Flight 11, Sept. 11, 2001.
55. Gerard Arpey interview (Jan. 8, 2004); Larry Wansley interview (Jan. 8, 2004);AAL record, System Operations Command Center (SOCC) log, Sept. 11, 2001.
56. FBI report,“American Airlines Airphone Usage,” Sept. 20, 2001; FBI report of investigation, interview of
Ronald and Nancy May, Sept. 12, 2001.
57.The records available for the phone calls from American 77 do not allow for a determination of which of
four “connected calls to unknown numbers” represent the two between Barbara and Ted Olson, although the FBI
and DOJ believe that all four represent communications between Barbara Olson and her husband’s office (all family members of the Flight 77 passengers and crew were canvassed to see if they had received any phone calls from
the hijacked flight, and only Renee May’s parents and Ted Olson indicated that they had received such calls).The
four calls were at 9:15:34 for 1 minute, 42 seconds; 9:20:15 for 4 minutes, 34 seconds; 9:25:48 for 2 minutes, 34
seconds; and 9:30:56 for 4 minutes, 20 seconds. FBI report, “American Airlines Airphone Usage,” Sept. 20, 2001;
FBI report of investigation, interview of Theodore Olson, Sept. 11, 2001; FBI report of investigation, interview of
Helen Voss, Sept. 14, 2001;AAL response to the Commission’s supplemental document request, Jan. 20, 2004.
58. FBI report,“American Airlines Airphone Usage,” Sept. 20, 2001; FBI report of investigation, interview of
Theodore Olson, Sept. 11, 2001.
59. See FAA report,“Report of Aircraft Accident,” Nov. 13, 2001; John Hendershot interview (Dec. 22, 2003);
FAA report, “Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events: September 11, 2001,” Sept. 17, 2001; NTSB report, “Flight
Path Study—American Airlines Flight 77,” Feb. 19, 2002; Commission analysis of radar data.
60. See FAA report,“Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events: September 11, 2001,” Sept. 17, 2001; NTSB report,
“Flight Path Study—American Airlines Flight 77,” Feb. 19, 2002; FAA report,“Report of Aircraft Accident,” Nov.
13, 2001.
61. See NTSB report,“Flight Path Study—American Airlines Flight 77,” Feb. 19, 2002;TSA report,“Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation for 2001,”Aug. 20, 2002, p. 41.
62. The flight attendant assignments and seating included Chief Flight Attendant Deborah Welsh (first class,
seat J1 at takeoff); Sandra Bradshaw (coach, seat J5);Wanda Green (first class, seat J4); Lorraine Bay (coach, seat J3);
and CeeCee Lyles (coach, seat J6). See UAL response to Commission questions for the record, Apr. 5, 2004; FAA
report, “Chronology of the September 11 Attacks and Subsequent Events Through October 24, 2001,” undated;
UAL records, copies of electronic boarding passes for Flight 93, Sept. 11, 2001; BobVarcadipane interview (May 4,
2004); Newark Tower briefing (May 4, 2004).
63. Although the flight schedule indicates an 8:00 A.M. “departure,” this was the time the plane left the gate
area. Taxiing from the gate to the runway normally took about 15 minutes. Bob Varcadipane interview (May 4,
2004); Newark Tower briefing (May 4, 2004).
64. Commission analysis of FAA air traffic control data. On the FAA’s awareness of multiple hijackings, see
AAL transcript, telephone call from Nydia Gonzalez to Craig Marquis, Sept. 11, 2001; Craig Marquis interview
(Nov. 19, 2003);AAL record, System Operations Command Center (SOCC) log, Sept. 11, 2001; UAL System Operations Control briefing (Nov. 20, 2003); Rich Miles interview (Nov. 21, 2003); UAL report, “Timeline:
Dispatch/SMFDO Activities—Terrorist Crisis,” undated.
65. FAA audio file, Boston Center, position 46R, 8:24:38 and 8:24:56; Peter Zalewski interview (Sept. 23, 2003).
66. On September 6, 1970, members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine hijacked a Pan American Boeing 747, a TWA Boeing 707, and a Swissair DC-8. On September 9, a British airliner was hijacked as well.
An attempt to hijack an Israeli airliner was thwarted.The Pan American plane landed in Cairo and was blown up
after its passengers were released.The other three aircraft were flown to Dawson Field, near Amman, Jordan; the
passengers were held captive, and the planes were destroyed.The international hijacking crisis turned into a civil
war, as the Jordanian government used force to restore its control of the country. See FAA report, Civil Aviation
Reference Handbook, May 1999, appendix D.
The FAA knew or strongly suspected that Flight 11 was a hijacking 11 minutes after it was taken over; Flight
175, 9 minutes after it was taken over. There is no evidence to indicate that the FAA recognized Flight 77 as a
hijacking until it crashed into the Pentagon.
67. FAA audio file, Herndon Command Center, line 5114, 9:07:13; FAA audio file, Herndon Command Center, position 15, 9:19. At 9:07, Boston Air Traffic Control Center recommended to the FAA Command Center that
a cockpit warning be sent to the pilots of all commercial aircraft to secure their cockpits.While Boston Center sent
out such warnings to the commercial flights in its sector, we could find no evidence that a nationwide warning
was issued by the ATC system.
68. Ellen King interview (Apr. 5, 2004). FAA air traffic control tapes indicate that at 9:19 the FAA Air Traffic
Control System Command Center in Herndon ordered controllers to send a cockpit warning to Delta 1989
because, like American 11 and United 175, it was a transcontinental flight departing Boston’s Logan Airport.
69. For American Airlines’ response, see AAL briefing (Apr. 26, 2004). For Ballinger’s warnings, see Ed Ballinger
interview (Apr. 14, 2004). A companywide order for dispatchers to warn cockpits was not issued until 9:21. See
UAL report, “Timeline: Dispatch/SMFDO Activities—Terrorist Crisis,” undated. While one of Ballinger’s col-

456

NOTES TO CHAPTER 1

leagues assisted him, Ballinger remained responsible for multiple flights. See Ed Ballinger interview (Apr. 14, 2004).
American Airlines’ policy called for the flight dispatcher to manage only the hijacked flight, relieving him of responsibilities for all other flights. On American Airlines’ policy, see Craig Marquis, Craig Parfitt, Joe Bertapelle, and Mike
Mulcahy interview (Nov. 19, 2003). United Airlines had no such “isolation” policy. UAL System Operations Control briefing (Nov. 20, 2003).
70. On FDR, see NTSB report,“Specialist’s Factual Report of Investigation—Digital Flight Data Recorder”
for United Airlines Flight 93, Feb. 15, 2002; on CVR, see FBI report,“CVR from UA Flight #93,” Dec. 4, 2003;
Commission review of Aircraft Communication and Reporting System (ACARS) messages sent to and from Flight
93 (which indicate time of message transmission and receipt); see UAL record, Ed Ballinger ACARS log, Sept. 11,
2001. At 9:22, after learning of the events at the World Trade Center, Melody Homer, the wife of co-pilot Leroy
Homer, had an ACARS message sent to her husband in the cockpit asking if he was okay. See UAL record,ACARS
message, Sept. 11, 2001.
71. On FDR, see NTSB report,“Specialist’s Factual Report of Investigation—Digital Flight Data Recorder”
for United Airlines Flight 93, Feb. 15, 2002; on CVR, see FBI report,“CVR from UA Flight #93,” Dec. 4, 2003;
FAA report,“Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events: September 11, 2001,” Sept. 17, 2001; NTSB report, Air Traffic Control Recording—United Airlines Flight 93, Dec. 21, 2001.
72.The 37 passengers represented a load factor of 20.33 percent of the plane’s seating capacity of 182, considerably below the 52.09 percent for Flight 93 on Tuesdays in the three-month period prior to September 11 (June
11–September 4, 2001). See UAL report, Flight 93 EWR-SFO load factors, undated. Five passengers holding reservations for Flight 93 did not show for the flight.All five were interviewed and cleared by the FBI. FBI report,“Flight
#93 ‘No Show’ Passengers from 9/11/01,” Sept. 18, 2001.
73. INS record,Withdrawal of Application for Admission for Mohamed al Kahtani,Aug. 4, 2001.
74. See FAA regulations,Admission to flight deck, 14 C.F.R. § 121.547 (2001); UAL records, copies of boarding passes for United 93, Sept. 11, 2001. One passenger reported that ten first-class passengers were aboard the flight.
If that number is accurate, it would include the four hijackers. FBI report of investigation, interview of Lisa Jefferson, Sept. 11, 2001; UAL record, Flight 93 passenger manifest, Sept. 11, 2001.All but one of the six passengers seated
in the first-class cabin communicated with the ground during the flight, and none mentioned anyone from their
cabin having gone into the cockpit before the hijacking. Moreover, it is unlikely that the highly regarded and experienced pilot and co-pilot of Flight 93 would have allowed an observer into the cockpit before or after takeoff who
had not obtained the proper permission. See UAL records, personnel files of Flight 93 pilots. For jumpseat information, see UAL record,Weight and Balance Information for Flight 93 and Flight 175, Sept. 11, 2001;AAL records,
Dispatch Environmental Control/Weekly Flight Summary for Flight 11 and Flight 77, Sept. 11, 2001.
75. Like Atta on Flight 11, Jarrah apparently did not know how to operate the communication radios; thus his
attempts to communicate with the passengers were broadcast on the ATC channel. See FBI report, “CVR from
UA Flight #93,” Dec. 4, 2003.Also, by 9:32 FAA notified United’s headquarters that the flight was not responding
to radio calls.According to United, the flight’s nonresponse and its turn to the east led the airline to believe by 9:36
that the plane was hijacked. See Rich Miles interview (Nov. 21, 2003); UAL report, “United dispatch SMFDO
activities—terrorist crisis,” Sept. 11, 2001.
76. In accordance with FAA regulations, United 93’s cockpit voice recorder recorded the last 31 minutes of
sounds from the cockpit via microphones in the pilots’ headsets, as well as in the overhead panel of the flight deck.
This is the only recorder from the four hijacked airplanes to survive the impact and ensuing fire.The CVRs and
FDRs from American 11 and United 175 were not found, and the CVR from American Flight 77 was badly burned
and not recoverable. See FBI report,“CVR from UA Flight #93,” Dec. 4, 2003; see also FAA regulations, 14 C.F.R.
§§ 25.1457, 91.609, 91.1045, 121.359; Flight 93 CVR data. A transcript of the CVR recording was prepared by
the NTSB and the FBI.
77. All calls placed on airphones were from the rear of the aircraft.There was one airphone installed in each
row of seats on both sides of the aisle.The airphone system was capable of transmitting only eight calls at any one
time. See FBI report of investigation, airphone records for flights UAL 93 and UAL 175 on Sept. 11, 2001, Sept.
18, 2001.
78. FAA audio file, Cleveland Center, position Lorain Radar; Flight 93 CVR data; FBI report,“CVR from UA
Flight #93,” Dec. 4, 2003.
79. FBI reports of investigation, interviews of recipients of calls from Todd Beamer, Sept. 11, 2001, through
June 11, 2002; FBI reports of investigation, interviews of recipients of calls from Sandy Bradshaw, Sept. 11, 2001,
through Oct. 4, 2001.Text messages warning the cockpit of Flight 93 were sent to the aircraft by Ed Ballinger at
9:24. See UAL record, Ed Ballinger’s ACARS log, Sept. 11, 2001.
80.We have relied mainly on the record of FBI interviews with the people who received calls.The FBI interviews were conducted while memories were still fresh and were less likely to have been affected by reading the
accounts of others or hearing stories in the media. In some cases we have conducted our own interviews to supplement or verify the record. See FBI reports of investigation, interviews of recipients of calls from Todd Beamer,
Mark Bingham, Sandy Bradshaw, Marion Britton,Thomas Burnett, Joseph DeLuca, Edward Felt, Jeremy Glick, Lauren Grandcolas, Linda Gronlund, CeeCee Lyles, Honor Wainio.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 1

457

81. FBI reports of investigation, interviews of recipients of calls from Thomas Burnett, Sept. 11, 2001; FBI
reports of investigation, interviews of recipients of calls from Marion Britton, Sept. 14, 2001, through Nov. 8, 2001;
Lisa Jefferson interview (May 11, 2004); FBI report of investigation, interview of Lisa Jefferson, Sept. 11, 2001;
Richard Belme interview (Nov. 21, 2003).
82. See Jere Longman, Among the Heroes—United Flight 93 and the Passengers and CrewWho Fought Back (HarperCollins, 2002), p. 107; Deena Burnett interview (Apr. 26, 2004); FBI reports of investigation, interviews of recipients of calls from Jeremy Glick, Sept. 11, 2001, through Sept. 12, 2001; Lyzbeth Glick interview (Apr. 22, 2004).
Experts told us that a gunshot would definitely be audible on the CVR.The FBI found no evidence of a firearm
at the crash site of Flight 93. See FBI response to Commission briefing request no. 6, undated (topic 11).The FBI
collected 14 knives or portions of knives at the Flight 93 crash site. FBI report,“Knives Found at the UA Flight 93
Crash Site,” undated.
83. FBI response to Commission briefing request no. 6, undated (topic 11); FBI reports of investigation, interviews of recipients of calls from Jeremy Glick, Sept. 11, 2001, through Sept. 12, 2001.
84. See FBI reports of investigation, interviews of recipients of calls from United 93.
85. FBI reports of investigation, interviews of recipients of calls from United 93. For quote, see FBI report of
investigation, interview of Philip Bradshaw, Sept. 11, 2001; Philip Bradshaw interview (June 15, 2004); Flight 93
FDR and CVR data.At 9:55:11 Jarrah dialed in theVHF Omni-directional Range (VOR) frequency for theVOR
navigational aid at Washington Reagan National Airport, further indicating that the attack was planned for the
nation’s capital.
86. Flight 93 FDR and CVR data.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid.
89. Ibid.The CVR clearly captured the words of the hijackers, including words in Arabic from the microphone
in the pilot headset up to the end of the flight.The hijackers’ statements, the clarity of the recording, the position
of the microphone in the pilot headset, and the corresponding manipulations of flight controls provide the evidence.The quotes are taken from our listening to the CVR, aided by an Arabic speaker.
90. In 1993, a Lufthansa aircraft was hijacked from its Frankfurt to Cairo route and diverted to JFK Airport in
New York.The event lasted for 11 hours and was resolved without incident.Tamara Jones and John J. Goldman,
“11-Hour Hijack Ends Without Injury in N.Y.,” Los Angeles Times, Feb. 12, 1993, p.A1.
91.The second half of the twentieth century witnessed a tremendous growth of the air transport industry, and
the FAA’s corresponding responsibilities grew enormously from the 1960s through 2001.Throughout that time,
the FAA focused on setting and maintaining safety and efficiency standards. Since no plane had been hijacked inside
the United States since 1991, sabotage was perceived as the most significant threat to civil aviation. For a broader
discussion of the perception of the threat, see section 3.3.
92. FAA report, “Administrator’s Fact Book,” July 2001; Benedict Sliney interview (May 21, 2004); John
McCartney interview (Dec. 17, 2003).
93.FAA regulations,AirTraffic Control transponder and altitude reporting equipment and use,14 CFR § 91.215
(2001).
94. DOD radar files, 84th Radar Evaluation Squadron, “9/11 Autoplay,” undated; Charles Thomas interview
(May 4, 2004); John Thomas interview (May 4, 2004); Joseph Cooper interview (Sept. 22, 2003);Tim Spence interview (Sept. 30, 2003). For general information on approaching terminals, see FAA report,“Aeronautical Information Manual,” Feb. 19, 2004. Times assigned to audio transmissions were derived by the Commission from files
provided by the FAA and the Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) based on audio time stamps contained within
the files provided by the sender. FAA tapes are certified accurate to Universal Coordinated Time by quality assurance specialists at FAA air traffic facilities. NEADS files are time-stamped as accurate to the Naval Observatory
clock.We also compared audio times to certified transcripts when available.
95. FAA Boston Center site visit (Sept. 22–24, 2003).
96. NORAD’s mission is set forth in a series of renewable agreements between the United States and Canada.
According to the agreement in effect on 9/11, the “primary missions” of NORAD were “aerospace warning” and
“aerospace control” for North America. Aerospace warning was defined as “the monitoring of man-made objects in
space and the detection, validation, and warning of attack against North America whether by aircraft, missiles, or
space vehicles.” Aerospace control was defined as “providing surveillance and control of the airspace of Canada and
the United States.” See DOS memo, Exchange of Notes Between Canada and the United States Regarding Extension of the NORAD Agreement, Mar. 28, 1996; see also DOS press release,“Extension of NORAD Agreement,”
June 16, 2000 (regarding the extension of the 1996 Agreement unchanged). For NORAD’s defining its job as
defending against external attacks, see Ralph Eberhart interview (Mar. 1, 2004).
97. DOD report,“NORAD Strategy Review: Final Report,” July 1992, p. 55.
98. For assumptions of exercise planners, see Paul Goddard and Ken Merchant interview (Mar. 4, 2004). For
the authority to shoot down a commercial aircraft prior to 9/11, granted to NORAD but not used against Payne
Stewart’s plane in 1999 after the pilot and passengers lost consciousness, see Richard Myers interview (Feb. 17,
2004). A 1998 White House tabletop exercise chaired by Richard Clarke included a scenario in which a terrorist

117. For the distance between Otis Air Force Base and New York City, see William Scott testimony, May 23,
2003. For the order from NEADS to Otis to place F-15s at battle stations, see NEADS audio file,Weapons Director Technician position, channel 14, 8:37:15. See also interviews with Otis and NEADS personnel: Jeremy Powell
interview (Oct. 27, 2003); Michael Kelly interview (Oct. 14, 2003); Donald Quenneville interview (Jan. 7, 2004),
and interviews with Otis fighter pilots: Daniel Nash interview (Oct. 14, 2003); Timothy Duffy interview (Jan. 7,
2004). According to Joseph Cooper from Boston Center,“I coordinated with Huntress [“Huntress” is the call sign
for NEADS]. I advised Huntress we had a hijacked aircraft. I requested some assistance. Huntress requested and I
supplied pertinent information. I was advised aircraft might be sent from Otis.” FAA record, Personnel Statement of
Joseph Cooper, Oct. 30, 2001.
118. Robert Marr interview (Jan. 23, 2004); Leslie Filson, Air War Over America (First Air Force, 2003), p. 56;
Larry Arnold interview (Feb. 3, 2004).
119. NEADS audio file, Weapons Director Technician position, channel 14; 8:45:54; Daniel Nash interview
(Oct. 14, 2003); Michael Kelly interview (Oct. 14, 2003); Donald Quenneville interview (Jan. 7, 2004);Timothy
Duffy interview (Jan. 7, 2004); NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander position, channel 2, 8:44:58; NEADS
audio file, Identification Technician position, channel 5, 8:51:13.
120. FAA audio file, Boston Center, position 31R; NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander position,
channel 2, 8:58:00; NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander position, channel 2, 8:54:55. Because of a technical issue, there are no NEADS recordings available of the NEADS senior weapons director and weapons director technician position responsible for controlling the Otis scramble.We found a single communication from the
weapons director or his technician on the Guard frequency at approximately 9:11, cautioning the Otis fighters:
“remain at current position [holding pattern] until FAA requests assistance.” See NEADS audio file, channel 24.
That corresponds to the time after the Otis fighters entered the holding pattern and before they headed for New
York. NEADS controllers were simultaneously working with a tanker to relocate close to the Otis fighters.At 9:10,
the senior director on the NEADS floor told the weapons director,“I want those fighters closer in.” NEADS audio
file, Identification Technician position, channel 5. At 9:10:22, the Otis fighters were told by Boston Center that the
second tower had been struck. At 9:12:54, the Otis fighters told their Boston Center controller that they needed
to establish a combat air patrol over New York, and they immediately headed for New York City. See FAA audio
files, Boston Center, position 31R.This series of communications explains why the Otis fighters briefly entered
and then soon departed the holding pattern, as the radar reconstruction of their flight shows. DOD radar files, 84th
Radar Evaluation Squadron,“9/11 Autoplay,” undated.
121. In response to allegations that NORAD responded more quickly to the October 25, 1999, plane crash
that killed Payne Stewart than it did to the hijacking of American 11, we compared NORAD’s response time for
each incident.The last normal transmission from the Stewart flight was at 9:27:10 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time. The
Southeast Air Defense Sector was notified of the event at 9:55, 28 minutes later. In the case of American 11, the
last normal communication from the plane was at 8:13 A.M. EDT. NEADS was notified at 8:38, 25 minutes later.
We have concluded there is no significant difference in NORAD’s reaction to the two incidents. See NTSB memo,
Aircraft Accident Brief for Payne Stewart incident, Oct. 25, 1999; FAA email, Gahris to Myers,“ZJX Timeline for
N47BA accident,” Feb. 17, 2004.
122. FAA memo, “Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; UAL175; New York, NY; September 11, 2001,” May 8,
2002, pp. 5–6.
123. FAA audio file, New York Center, position R42, 8:42–8:45; FAA memo, “Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; UAL175; New York, NY; September 11, 2001,” May 8, 2002, pp. 6–8; DOD radar files, 84th Radar Evaluation Squadron,“9/11 Autoplay,” undated.The FAA-produced timeline notes,“Based on coordination received from
[Boston Center] indicating a possible hijack, most of the controller’s attention is focused on AAL 11.” See FAA
report,“Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events September 11, 2001,” Sept. 17, 2001; see also David Bottiglia interview (Oct. 1, 2003); FAA memo,“Full Transcript;Aircraft Accident; UAL175; NewYork, NY; September 11, 2001,”
May 8, 2002, p. 9.
124. FAA audio file, Herndon Command Center, New York Center position, line 5114, 8:48.
125. FAA memo, “Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; UAL175; New York, NY; September 11, 2001,” May 8,
2002, pp. 12, 14.
126. Ibid., p. 15.At 8:57, the following exchange between controllers occurred:“I got some handoffs for you.
We got some incidents going over here. Is Delta 2433 going to be okay at thirty-three? I had to climb him for traffic. I let you United 175 just took off out of think we might have a hijack over here.Two of them.” See FAA memo,
“Full Transcript;Aircraft Accident; UAL175; New York, NY; September 11, 2001,” May 8, 2002.
127. See FAA report,“Summary of AirTraffic Hijack Events September 11, 2001,” Sept. 17, 2001; Evanna Dowis
interview (Sept. 30, 2004); Michael McCormick interview (Dec. 15, 2003); FAA record, Personnel Statement of
Michael McCormick, Oct. 17, 2001. See also FAA memo,“Full Transcript;Aircraft Accident; UAL175; NewYork,
NY; September 11, 2001,” May 8, 2002, p. 17.
128. FAA memo,“Full Transcript; Command Center; NOM Operational Position; September 11, 2001,” Oct.
14, 2003, pp. 15–17.

460

NOTES TO CHAPTER 1

129. FAA memo, “Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; UAL175; New York, NY; September 11, 2001,” Jan. 17,
2002, p. 3.
130.“N90 [New York Terminal Radar Approach] controller stated ‘at approximately 9:00 a.m., I observed an
unknown aircraft south of the Newark, New Jersey Airport, northeast bound and descending out of twelve thousand nine hundred feet in a rapid rate of descent, the radar target terminated at the World Trade Center.’” FAA
report,“Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events September 11, 2001,” Sept. 17, 2001. Former NORAD official Alan
Scott testified that the time of impact of United 175 was 9:02.William Scott testimony, May 23, 2003. We have
determined that the impact time was 9:03:11 based on our analysis of FAA radar data and air traffic control software logic.
131. FAA audio file, Herndon Command Center, New York Center position, line 5114, 9:02:34.
132. Ibid., 9:03; FAA audio file, Herndon Command Center, Cleveland/Boston position, line 5115, 9:05;
Michael McCormick interview (Oct. 1, 2003); David LaCates interview (Oct. 2, 2003).
133. FAA Audio File, Herndon Command Center, Boston Center position, line 5115, 9:05–9:07.
134. Joseph McCain interview (Oct. 28, 2003); Robert Marr (Jan. 23, 2004); James Fox interview (Oct. 29,
2003); Dawne Deskins interview (Oct. 30, 2003).
135. NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander position, channel 2, 9:07:32.
136. Daniel Nash interview (Oct. 14, 2003);Timothy Duffy interview (Jan. 7, 2004).
137. Because the Otis fighters had expended a great deal of fuel in flying first to military airspace and then to
New York, the battle commanders were concerned about refueling. As NEADS personnel looked for refueling
tankers in the vicinity of New York, the mission crew commander considered scrambling the Langley fighters to
NewYork to provide backup for the Otis fighters until the NEADS Battle Cab (the command area that overlooks
the operations floor) ordered “battle stations only at Langley.” The alert fighters at Langley Air Force Base were
ordered to battle stations at 9:09. Colonel Marr, the battle commander at NEADS, and General Arnold, the CONR
commander, both recall that the planes were held on battle stations, as opposed to scrambling, because they might
be called on to relieve the Otis fighters over New York City if a refueling tanker was not located, and also because
of the general uncertainty of the situation in the sky.According toWilliam Scott at the Commission’s May 23, 2003,
hearing,“At 9:09, Langley F-16s are directed to battle stations, just based on the general situation and the breaking
news, and the general developing feeling about what’s going on.” See NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander, channel 2, 9:08:36; Robert Marr interview (Oct. 27, 2003); Larry Arnold interview (Feb. 3, 2004). See also
Colonel Marr’s statement that “[t]he plan was to protect New York City.” Filson, Air War Over America, p. 60.
138. Commission analysis of FAA radar data and air traffic control transmissions.
139.The Indianapolis Center controller advised other Indianapolis Center personnel of the developing situation.They agreed to “sterilize” the airspace along the flight’s westerly route so the safety of other planes would not
be affected. John Thomas interview (May 4, 2004).
140. John Thomas interview (Sept. 24, 2003). According to the FAA-produced timeline, at 9:09 Indianapolis
Center “notified Great Lakes Regional Operations Center a possible aircraft accident of AMERICAN 77 due to
the simultaneous loss of radio communications and radar identification.” FAA report,“Summary of AirTraffic Hijack
Events September 11, 2001,” Sept. 17, 2001.
141. FAA audio file, Herndon Command Center, National Operations Manager position, line 4525; FAA audio
file, Herndon Command Center, National Traffic Management Officer east position, line 4530; FAA memo,“Full
Transcription; Air Traffic Control System Command Center, National Traffic Management Officer, East Position;
September 11, 2001,” Oct. 21, 2003, p. 13.
142. Primary radar contact for Flight 77 was lost because the “preferred” radar in this geographic area had no
primary radar system, the “supplemental” radar had poor primary coverage, and the FAA ATC software did not
allow the display of primary radar data from the “tertiary” and “quadrary” radars.
143. David Boone interview (May 4, 2004); Charles Thomas interview (May 4, 2004); John Thomas interview
(May 4, 2004); Commission analysis of FAA radar data and air traffic control software logic.
144. John Thomas interview (May 4, 2004); Charles Thomas interview (May 4, 2004).We have reviewed all
FAA documents, transcripts, and tape recordings related to American 77 and have found no evidence that FAA
headquarters issued a directive to surrounding centers to search for primary radar targets. Review of the same materials also indicates that no one within FAA located American 77 until the aircraft was identified by Dulles controllers at 9:32. For much of that time, American 77 was traveling through Washington Center’s airspace. The
Washington Center’s controllers were looking for the flight, but they were not told to look for primary radar returns.
145. JohnWhite interview (May 7, 2004); Ellen King interview (Apr. 5, 2004); Linda Schuessler interview (Apr.
6, 2004); Benedict Sliney interview (May 21, 2004); FAA memo, “Full Transcription; Air Traffic Control System
Command Center, National Traffic Management Officer, East Position; September 11, 2001,” Oct. 21, 2003, pp.
14, 27.
146. John Hendershot interview (Dec. 22, 2003).
147. FAA memo, “Partial Transcript; Aircraft Accident; AAL77;Washington, DC; September 11, 2001,” Sept.
20, 2001, p. 7.

208. USSS memo, interview of Gregory LaDow, Oct. 1, 2001, p. 1. Shortly after the second attack in NewYork,
a senior Secret Service agent charged with coordinating the President’s movements established an open line with
his counterpart at the FAA, who soon told him that there were more planes unaccounted for—possibly hijacked—
in addition to the two that had already crashed.Though the senior agent told someone to convey this information
to the Secret Service’s operations center, it either was not passed on or was passed on but not disseminated; it failed
to reach agents assigned to the Vice President, and the Vice President was not evacuated at that time. See Nelson
Garabito interview (Mar. 11, 2004); USSS memo, interview of Nelson Garabito, Oct. 1, 2001; see also Terry Van
Steenbergen interview (Mar. 30, 2004).
209. American 77’s route has been determined through Commission analysis of FAA and military radar data.
For the evacuation of the Vice President, see White House transcript, Vice President Cheney interview with
Newsweek, Nov. 19, 2001, p. 2; USSS memo, interview of Rocco Delmonico, Oct. 1, 2001 (evacuation of the White
House); see also White House notes, Mary Matalin notes, Sept. 11, 2001. On the time of entering the tunnel, see
USSS report,“Executive Summary: U.S. Secret Service Timeline of Events, September 11–October 3, 2001,” Oct.
3, 2001, p. 2. Secret Service personnel told us that the 9:37 entry time in their timeline was based on alarm data,
which is no longer retrievable. USSS briefing (Jan. 29, 2004).
210.White House transcript,Vice President Cheney interview with Newsweek, Nov. 19, 2001, p. 4; President
Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004).
211. On Mrs. Cheney, see USSS report, “Executive Summary: U.S. Secret Service Timeline of Events, September 11–October 3, 2001,” Oct. 3, 2001, p. 2 (time of arrival);White House transcript, Lynne Cheney interview with Newsweek, Nov. 9, 2001, p. 2 (joining the Vice President). For the contemporaneous notes, see White
House notes, Lynne Cheney notes, Sept. 11, 2001. On the content of the Vice President’s call, see White House
transcript,Vice President Cheney interview with Newsweek, Nov. 19, 2001, p. 5. According to the Vice President,
there was “one phone call from the tunnel. And basically I called to let him know that we were a target and I
strongly urged him not to return to Washington right away, that he delay his return until we could find out what
the hell was going on.” For their subsequent movements, seeWhite House transcript,Vice President Cheney interview with Newsweek, Nov. 19, 2001, p. 5;White House transcript, Lynne Cheney interview with Newsweek, Nov.
9, 2001, p. 2.
212. On communications problems, see, e.g., President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29,
2004). On lack of an open line, see, e.g., Deborah Loewer meeting (Feb. 6, 2004).
213. On the Vice President’s call, see President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004). For
the Vice President’s time of arrival in the shelter conference room, see White House record, PEOC Shelter Log,
Sept. 11, 2001 (9:58); USSS memo, OVP 9/11 Timeline, Nov. 17, 2001 (9:52; Mrs. Cheney arrived White House
and joined him in tunnel);White House notes, Lynne Cheney notes (9:55; he is on phone with President);White
House transcript, Lynne Cheney interview with Newsweek, Nov. 9, 2001, p. 2 (“And when I got there, he was on
the phone with the President . . . But from that first place where I ran into him, I moved with him into what they
call the PEOC”); White House transcript,Vice President Cheney interview with Newsweek, Nov. 19, 2001, p. 4
(9:35 or 9:36 arrival; he estimated a 15-minute stay); Carl Truscott interview (Apr. 15, 2004) (arrived with Rice
and the Vice President in conference room; called headquarters immediately; call logged at 10:00); President Bush
andVice President Cheney meeting,Apr. 29, 2004 (Vice President viewed television footage of Pentagon ablaze in
tunnel);White House transcript, Rice interview with Evan Thomas, Nov. 1, 2001, p. 388 (Rice viewed television
footage of Pentagon ablaze in Situation Room). For the Vice President’s recollection about the combat air patrol,
see President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004);White House transcript, President Bush
interview with Bob Woodward and Dan Balz, Dec. 17, 2001, p. 16.
214. President Bush andVice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004); see also White House transcript,Vice
President Cheney interview with Newsweek, Nov. 19, 2001, pp. 7–8.
215. Douglas Cochrane meeting (Apr. 16, 2004); Condeleeza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004). For Rice entering
after theVice President, see USSS report,“Executive Summary: U.S. Secret Service Timeline of Events, September
11–October 3, 2001,” Oct. 3, 2001, p. 2; Carl Truscott interview (Apr. 15, 2004).
216. In reconstructing events that occurred in the PEOC on the morning of 9/11, we relied on (1) phone logs
of the White House switchboard; (2) notes of Lewis Libby, Mrs. Cheney, and Ari Fleischer; (3) the tape (and then
transcript) of the air threat conference call; and (4) Secret Service and White House Situation Room logs, as well
as four separate White House Military Office logs (the PEOC Watch Log, the PEOC Shelter Log, the Communications Log, and the 9/11 Log).
217. DOD transcript, Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001. For one open line between the Secret Service and the FAA, see note 208. At Secret Service headquarters, personnel from the intelligence division were also
on a phone conference with FAA headquarters. Chuck Green interview (Mar. 10, 2004). For notification of an
inbound aircraft at 10:02, see USSS record, Intelligence Division timeline, Sept. 11, 2001; USSS record, Crisis Center Incident Monitor, Sept. 11, 2001. For the FAA’s projection, seeTim Grovack interview (Apr. 8, 2004). For Secret
Service updates, see DOD transcript,Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001.
218.White House notes, Lynne Cheney notes, Sept. 11, 2001;White House notes, Lewis Libby notes, Sept.
11, 2001.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 1

465

219. For Libby’s characterization, see White House transcript, Scooter Libby interview with Newsweek, Nov.
2001. For the Vice President’s statement, see President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004).
For the second authorization, see White House notes, Lynne Cheney notes, Sept. 11, 2001;White House notes,
Lewis Libby notes, Sept. 11, 2001.
220. Joshua Bolten meeting (Mar. 18, 2004); see also White House notes, Lewis Libby notes, Sept. 11, 2001
(“10:15–18:Aircraft 60 miles out, confirmed as hijack—engage?VP:Yes. JB [Joshua Bolten]: Get President and confirm engage order”).
221. For theVice President’s call, seeWhite House record, Secure Switchboard Log, Sept. 11, 2001;White House
record, President’s Daily Diary, Sept. 11, 2001;White House notes, Lewis Libby notes, Sept. 11, 2001. Fleischer’s
10:20 note is the first mention of shootdown authority. See White House notes,Ari Fleischer notes, Sept. 11, 2001;
see also Ari Fleischer interview (Apr. 22, 2004).
222. DOD transcript,Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001.
223. On reports of another plane, see White House notes, Lynne Cheney notes, Sept. 11, 2001;White House
notes, Lewis Libby notes, Sept. 11, 2001. On theVice President’s authorization, see ibid.; DOD transcript,AirThreat
Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001. For Hadley’s statement, see DOD transcript, Air Threat Conference Call, Sept.
11, 2001.
224. For the quotation, see White House transcript, Libby interview with Newsweek, Nov. 2001. On the aircraft’s identity, see White House record,White House Military Office Log, Sept. 11, 2001.
225. On the NMCC, see DOD transcript,Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001. On the Secret Service’s
contacts with the FAA, see notes 208, 217. On the Secret Service conveying information to the White House, see
DOD transcript,Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001; Nelson Garabito interview (Mar. 11, 2004).
226. DOD transcript,Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001.
227. Ibid.
228. Ralph Eberhart interview (Mar. 1, 2004). On the morning of 9/11, General Eberhart was in his office at
headquarters—roughly 30 minutes away from Cheyenne Mountain, where the operations center is located.
229. DOD record, Continental Region chat log, Sept. 11, 2001.
230. NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander position, channel 2, 10:32:12. For the text of the chat log
message, see DOD record, Continental Region chat log, Sept. 11, 2001.
231. For the statements of NEADS personnel, see Robert Marr interview (Jan. 23, 2004) (NEADS commander); Kevin Nasypany interview (Jan. 22, 2004) (mission commander); James Fox interview (Oct. 29, 2004)
(senior weapons director). On the understanding of leaders in Washington, see DOD transcript, Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001. For the orders to Langley pilots, see NEADS audio file,Weapons Director position,
recorder 1, channel 2, 10:10–11.
232. For evidence of the President speaking to Rumsfeld, see White House notes,Ari Fleischer notes, Sept. 11,
2001. On inability to recall this conversation, see Donald Rumsfeld interview (Jan. 30, 2004).
233. DOD note, transcript of Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001.
234. Donald Rumsfeld interview (Jan. 30, 2004).At 11:15, Secretary Rumsfeld spoke to the President and told
him DOD was working on refining the rules of engagement so pilots would have a better understanding of the
circumstances under which an aircraft could be shot down. See, e.g., DOD notes, Stephen Cambone notes, Sept.
11, 2001. DOD did not circulate written rules of engagement until sometime after 1:00 P.M. See DOD memo,
rules of engagement, Sept. 11, 2001 (faxed to Andrews Air Force Base at 1:45 P.M.).
235. David Wherley interview (Feb. 27, 2004).
236.The 113th Wing first learned from the FAA tower at Andrews that the Secret Service wanted fighters airborne.The FAA tower had been contacted by personnel at FAA headquarters, who were on an open line with senior agents from the President’s detail. See Nelson Garabito interview (Mar. 11, 2004); Terry Van Steenbergen
interview (Mar. 30, 2004). On the Secret Service agent relaying instructions, see USSS memo, Beauchamp to ADInspection, September 11 experience, Feb. 23, 2004. On the order to fly weapons free, see David Wherley interview (Feb. 27, 2004); DOD memo, interview of David Wherley, Oct. 3, 2001, p. 12.
237. President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004).
238.These estimates are based on analysis of Boeing 757 maximum operating speed data, FAA and military
radar data, and assumptions regarding how the airplane would be operated en route to the Washington, D.C., area.
The shortest time frame assumes maximum speed without regard to overspeed warnings, a straight-line path, and
no time allowed for maneuvering or slowing to aim and crash the airplane into its target.The probable time frame
allows for speeds consistent with the observed operation of the airplane prior to its final maneuvers and crash, as
well as for maneuvers and slowing in the D.C. area to take aim.According to radar data, the fighters from Langley
Air Force Base arrived over Washington at about 10:00 A.M. Two of the three Langley fighters were fully armed
(i.e., with missiles and guns); the third fighter carried only guns. Craig Borgstrom interview (Dec. 1, 2003).
239. For the pilots’ awareness, see Dean Eckmann interview (Dec. 1, 2003); Bradley Derrig interview (Dec. 1,
2003); Craig Borgstrom interview (Dec. 1, 2003). For the quotation, see Dean Eckmann interview (Dec. 1, 2003).
240. For no authority at 10:10, see NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander, channel 2. For shootdown

2 The Foundation of the New Terrorism
1.“Text of World Islamic Front’s Statement Urging Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders,” Al Quds al Arabi, Feb.
23, 1998 (trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service), which was published for a large Arab world audience and
signed by Usama Bin Ladin,Ayman al Zawahiri (emir of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad),AbuYasir Rifa’i Ahmad Taha
(leader of the Egyptian Islamic Group), Mir Hamzah (secretary of the Jamiat ul Ulema e Pakistan), and Fazlul Rahman (head of the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh).
2. “Hunting Bin Ladin,” PBS Frontline broadcast, May 1998 (online at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/
shows/binladen/who/interview.html).
3. Usama Bin Ladin,“Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places,”
Aug. 23, 1996 (trans., online at www.terrorismfiles.org/individuals/declaration_of_jihad1.html).
4.“Hunting Bin Ladin,” PBS Frontline broadcast, May 1998.
5. Ibid.
6. For a classic passage conveying the nostalgic view of Islam’s spread, see Henri Pirenne, A History of Europe,
trans. Bernard Miall (University Books, 1956), pp. 25–26.
7. See Martin Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds., Fundamentalism Observed, vol. 1 (Univ. of Chicago Press, 1994).
8. See Emmanuel Sivan, Radical Islam: MedievalTheology and Modern Politics, enlarged ed. (Yale Univ. Press, 1990).
9. From the perspective of Islamic, not Arab, history, the Baghdad Caliphate’s destruction by the Mongols in
1292 marks the end not of Islamic greatness but of Arab dominance of the Muslim world. Moghul India, Safavid
Persia, and, above all, the Ottoman Empire were great Islamic powers that arose long after the Baghdad Caliphate
fell.
10. Bin Ladin,“Declaration of War,”Aug. 23, 1996.
11.The Muslim Brotherhood, which arose in Egypt in 1928 as a Sunni religious/nationalist opposition to the
British-backed Egyptian monarchy, spread throughout the Arab world in the mid–twentieth century. In some countries, its oppositional role is nonviolent; in others, especially Egypt, it has alternated between violent and nonviolent struggle with the regime.
12. Sayyid Qutb, Milestones (AmericanTrust Publications, 1990). Qutb found sin everywhere, even in rural midwestern churches. Qutb’s views were best set out in Sayyid Qutb,“The America I Have Seen” (1949), reprinted in
Kamal Abdel-Malek, ed., America in an Arab Mirror: Images of America in ArabicTravel Literature:An Anthology (Palgrave,
2000).
13. For a good introduction to Qutb, see National Public Radio broadcast,“Sayyid Qutb’s America,” May 6,
2003 (online at www.npr.org/display_pages/features/feature_1253796.html).
14. “Bin Laden’s ‘Letter to America,’” Observer Worldview, Nov. 24, 2002 (trans., online at
http://observer.guardian.co.uk/worldview/story/0,11581,845725,00.html). The al Qaeda letter was released in
conjunction with the release of an audio message from Bin Ladin himself.
15. Ibid.
16. See Arab Human Development Report 2003 (United Nations, 2003), a report prepared by Arabs that examines not only standard statistical data but also more sensitive social indicators recently identified by the Nobel
Prize–winning economist Amartya Sen. It says little, however, about the political dimensions of economic and social
trends. See Mark LeVine,“The UN Arab Human Development Report: A Critique,” Middle East Report, July 26,
2002 (online at www.merip.org/mero/mer0072602.html).
17. President Bush, remarks at roundtable with Arab- and Muslim-American leaders, Sept. 10, 2002 (online at
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020910-7.html).
18. See, e.g., Intelligence report, interrogation of Zubaydah, Oct. 29, 2002; CIA analytic report, “Bin Ladin’s
Terrorist Operations: Meticulous and Adaptable,” CTC 00-40017CSH, Nov. 2, 2000.
19.“Open resistance flared so quickly that only two months after the invasion . . . almost the entire population
of Kabul climbed on their rooftops and chanted with one voice,‘God is great.’This open defiance of the Russian
generals who could physically destroy their city was matched throughout the countryside.” General (Ret.)
MohammedYahya Nawwroz and Lester W. Grau,“The Soviet War in Afghanistan; History and Harbinger of Future
War?” Military Review (Fort Leavenworth Foreign Military Studies Office), Sept./Oct. 1995, p. 2.
20. Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network ofTerror (Columbia Univ. Press, 2002), pp. 16–23. Regarding UBL’s access to his family’s fortune, see Rick Newcomb interview (Feb. 4, 2004);William Wechsler interview
(Jan. 7, 2004).
21. Government’s Evidentiary Proffer Supporting the Admissibility of Co-Conspirator Statements, United States
v. Enaam Arnaout, No. 02-CR-892 (N.D. Ill. filed Jan. 6, 2003).
22. Intelligence report,Terrorism: Usama Bin Ladin’s Historical Links to ‘Abdallah Azzam, Apr. 18, 1997. By

KSM, Bin Ladin moved to Kandahar “by order of Emir Al-Mouminin,” that is, Mullah Omar. See Intelligence
report, interrogation of KSM, July 12, 2003. On the Taliban’s invitation to UBL, see Mike briefing (Dec. 12, 2003);
Rashid, Taliban, p. 129. Rashid has also described the move as part of Bin Ladin’s plan to solidify his relationship
with, and eventually gain control over, the Taliban.Ahmed Rashid interview (Oct. 27, 2003).
74. Intelligence report, unsuccessful Bin Ladin probes for contact with Iraq, July 24, 1998; Intelligence report,
Saddam Hussein’s efforts to repair relations with Saudi government, 2001.
75. Intelligence report, Iraq approach to Bin Ladin, Mar. 16, 1999.
76. CIA analytic report,“Ansar al-Islam:Al Qa’ida’s Ally in Northeastern Iraq,” CTC 2003-40011CX, Feb. 1,
2003. See also DIA analytic report,“Special Analysis: Iraq’s Inconclusive Ties to Al-Qaida,” July 31, 2002; CIA analytic report,“Old School Ties,” Mar. 10, 2003.We have seen other intelligence reports at the CIA about 1999 contacts.They are consistent with the conclusions we provide in the text, and their reliability is uncertain. Although
there have been suggestions of contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda regarding chemical weapons and explosives
training, the most detailed information alleging such ties came from an al Qaeda operative who recanted much of
his original information. Intelligence report, interrogation of al Qaeda operative, Feb. 14, 2004.Two senior Bin Ladin
associates have adamantly denied that any such ties existed between al Qaeda and Iraq. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM and Zubaydah, 2003 (cited in CIA letter, response to Douglas Feith memorandum,“Requested
Modifications to ‘Summary of Body of Intelligence Reporting on Iraq–al Qaida Contacts (1990–2003),’” Dec. 10,
2003, p. 5).
77. On Gulf-based donors to Bin Ladin, see Frank G. and Mary S. briefing (July 15, 2003); CIA analytic report,
“Saudi-Based Financial Support for Terrorist Organizations,” CTC 2002-40117CH, Nov. 14, 2002. On the relationship between Bin Ladin and Omar, see Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Feb. 20, 2002. On relations between the Arabs in Afghanistan and the Taliban, see ibid. On financial relations, see CIA analytic report,
“Ariana Afghan Airlines:Assets and Activities,” OTI IR 1999-170CX, July 29, 1999; CIA, NID,“Near East: UAE:
Imposition of Sanctions Could Disrupt Bin Ladin’s Finances,” June 9, 1999.
78. CIA analytic report,“Afghanistan:An Incubator for International Terrorism,” CTC 01-40004, Mar. 27,
2001; CIA analytic report, “Al-Qa’ida Still Well Positioned to Recruit Terrorists,” July 1, 2002, p. 1.
79.The number of actual al Qaeda members seems to have been relatively small during the period before 9/11,
although estimates vary considerably, from the low hundreds to as many as 5,000. For the low hundreds, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Dec. 3, 2003. For 5,000, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad,
Nov. 26, 2003. Khallad added that because pledging bayat was secret, the number of al Qaeda members can only
be speculative. On al Qaeda’s training and indoctrination, see minutes from the August 1988 meeting leading to
the official formation of al Qaeda, cited in Government’s Evidentiary Proffer Supporting the Admissibility of Coconspirator Statements, United States v.Arnaout, Jan. 6, 2003, p. 36.
80. By 1996, al Qaeda apparently had established cooperative relationships with at least 20 Sunni Islamic extremist groups in the Middle East, South Asia, Africa, and East Asia, as well as with elements of the Saudi opposition.
See CIA analytic report, “Old School Ties,” Mar. 10, 2003, p. 3. On ties with Southeast Asia and the MalaysianIndonesian JI, see, e.g., Intelligence report, interrogation of Hambali, Sept. 5, 2003. On Pakistani militant ties to Bin
Ladin, see CIA analytic report,“Terrorism: Extremists Planning Attacks Against US Interests in Pakistan,” Nov. 29,
2001, p. 1 and appendix B; see also Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, pp. 169–171, 199; Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred
Terror, pp. 286–287. On Europe, see, e.g., trial testimony of Fadl, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 6, 2001 (transcript
pp. 301, 315–316), Feb. 7, 2001 (transcript p. 368). On London, see, e.g., Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee,
Sept. 17, 1997. On Balkans, see Government’s Evidentiary Proffer Supporting the Admissibility of Co-Conspirator Statements, United States v.Arnaout, Jan. 6, 2003; Kohlmann, Al-Qaida’s Jihad in Europe.
81. See, e.g.,“Tareekh Usama” and “Tareekh al Musadat” (described in note 25). See also FBI report of investigation, interviews of Mohammad Rashed Daoud al ‘Owhali,Aug. 22–25, 1998; FBI report of investigation, interview of Nasser Ahmad Nasser al Bahri, Oct. 3, 2001, p. 8.
82.The merger was de facto complete by February 1998, although the formal “contract” would not be signed
until June 2001. See Intelligence report, Incorporation of Zawahiri’s Organization into Bin Ladin’s Al-Qa’ida, and
Recent [1998] Activities of Egyptian Associates of Al-Qa’ida, Sept. 22, 1998; see also Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Feb. 8, 2002.
83. FBI report of investigation, interview of confidential source, Sept. 16, 1999; FBI report of investigation,
interview of L’Houssaine Kherchtou,Aug. 28, 2000; Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, pp. 123–124.
84. On the group’s surveillance and photography activities, see trial testimony of L’Houssaine Kherchtou, United
States v. bin Laden, Feb. 21, 2001 (transcript pp. 1499–1500); FBI reports of investigation, interviews of L’Houssaine
Kherchtou,Aug. 18, 2000; Oct. 18, 2000; see also FBI report of investigation, interview of confidential source, Sept.
16, 1999. On Bin Ladin’s use of technical equipment to promote his intelligence/security capabilities, see Intelligence report,Terrorism: Usama Bin Ladin’s Intelligence Capabilities and Techniques, Dec. 5, 1996.
85. On the surveillance reports and the Hezbollah training camps, see FBI report of investigation, interview of
confidential source, Sept. 16, 1999; see also Intelligence report,Al Qaeda Targeting Study of U.S. Embassy Nairobi,
prepared 23 December 1993, Apr. 5, 1999; Intelligence report, Establishment of a Tripartite Agreement Among

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

471

Usama Bin Ladin, Iran, and the NIF, Jan. 31, 1997; Intelligence report, Cooperation Among Usama Bin Ladin’s
Islamic Army, Iran, and the NIF, Jan. 31 1997; FBI report of investigation, interview of Fadl, Nov. 10, 1996. Bin
Ladin told his operatives he wanted them to study Hezbollah’s 1983 truck bombing of U.S. marines in Lebanon
that killed 241 and led to the American pullout from Lebanon. See, e.g., statement of Ali Mohamed in support of
change of plea, United States v.Ali Mohamed, No. S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (S.D. N.Y.), Oct. 20, 2000 (transcript p. 30); trial
testimony of Fadl, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 6, 2001 (transcript pp. 292–293); FBI report of investigation, interview of Fadl, Mar. 10, 1997; FBI report of investigation, interview of confidential source, Sept. 16, 1999.
86. Hugh Davies,“Saudis Detain Member of Anti-American Terror Group,” Daily Telegraph (London),Aug. 2,
1997.
87. For general information on Hage, see Oriana Gill, “Hunting Bin Laden: A Portrait of Wadih El Hage,
Accused Terrorist,” PBS Frontline broadcast, Sept. 12, 2001. On returning to the United States, Hage was met at the
airport by FBI agents, interrogated, and called the next day before the federal grand jury then investigating Bin
Ladin. Because he lied to the grand jury about his association with Bin Ladin and al Qaeda, he was arrested immediately after the embassy bombings a year later.Testimony of Patrick Fitzgerald before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Oct. 21, 2003, pp. 3–4. On Hage’s phone taps, see introduction of stipulation (government exhibit no. 36),
United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 27, 2001 (transcript pp. 1575–1576). For Harun’s fax, see government exhibit no.
300A-T, United States v. bin Laden.
88.“World Islamic Front’s Statement Urging Jihad,” Al Quds al Arabi, Feb. 23, 1998; closing statement by Asst.
U.S.Attorney Ken Karas, United States v. bin Laden, May 1, 2001 (transcript pp. 5369, 5376–5377). On related activities in Kenya and Tanzania, see FBI report of investigation, interviews of Mohamed Sadeeq Odeh, Aug. 15–28,
1998.
89. FBI report of investigation, interviews of Mohamed Sadeeq Odeh,Aug. 15–28, 1998; closing statement by
Asst. U.S.Attorney Ken Karas, United States v. bin Laden, May 1, 2001 (transcript pp. 5239, 5408, 5417).
90. For the Atef fax, see government exhibit no. 1636-T, United States v. bin Laden. For the fatwa, see government exhibit no. 1602-T, United States v. bin Laden (translation of “Clergymen in Afghanistan Issue a Fatwa calling
for the Removal of American Forces from the Gulf,” Al Quds al Arabi, May 14, 1998). For the interview, see ABC
News interview,“To Terror’s Source,” May 28, 1998.
91. See closing statement by Asst. U.S. Attorney Ken Karas, United States v. bin Laden, May 2, 2001 (transcript
pp. 5426–5439); see also FBI report of investigation, interviews of Mohammad Rashed Daoud al ‘Owhali, Aug.
22–25, 1998, p. 9. Copies of the declarations issued by “The Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places”
taking credit for the operation were recovered from a raid in Baku, Azerbaijan, after the bombings in September
1998. See also government exhibit no. 1557C-T, United States v. bin Laden (“The formation of the Islamic Army
for the Liberation of the Holy Places”); government exhibit no. 1557D-T, United States v. bin Laden (“Al-Aqsa
Mosque operation”); government exhibit no. 1557E-T, United States v. bin Laden (“The Holy Ka’ba operation”).
92. Closing statement by Asst. U.S. Attorney Ken Karas, United States v. bin Laden, May 2, 2001 (transcript p.
5445).
93. ABC News interview, “Terror Suspect: An Interview with Osama Bin Laden,” Dec. 22, 1998 (conducted
in Afghanistan by ABC News producer Rahimullah Yousafsai).

3 Counterterrorism Evolves
1. Brief of the United States, United States v. Ramzi AhmedYousef, Lead No. 98-1041 (2d Cir. filed Aug. 25, 2000),
pp. 42–43; John Miller and Michael Stone, with Chris Mitchell, The Cell: Inside the 9/11 Plot, and Why the FBI and
CIA Failed to Stop It (Hyperion, 2002), pp. 95, 99.
2. On President Clinton’s tasking the NSC, see Richard Clarke interview (Dec. 18, 2003). On the role of different U.S. government agencies, see Steve Coll, Ghost War:The Secret History of the CIA,Afghanistan, and bin Laden,
from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (Penguin, 2004), p. 251.
3.Trial testimony of Brian Parr, United States v.Yousef, No. S12 93 CR 180 (KTD) (S.D. N.Y.), Oct. 22, 1997
(transcript p. 4694).
4. On the process of identification, see Joseph Malone interview (May 25, 2004).
5. United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 107–108 (2d Cir. 1998); Miller and Stone, The Cell, pp. 104–105, 107,
109. Abouhalima had fled to the Middle East after the bombing, and was picked up by Egyptian authorities and
returned to the United States in late March 1993. Brief of the United States, United States v. Mohammed A. Salameh,
Lead No. 94-1312 (2d Cir. filed Jan. 17, 1997), p. 64 and n. ***.
6. United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d at 107–108, n. 2; United States v.Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 78–79 (2d Cir. 2003);
Miller and Stone, The Cell, p. 119; Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (Random House,
2002), p. 12.
7. On Rahman’s ties to the Farouq mosque, see Miller and Stone, The Cell, pp. 54–55. On Rahman’s message,
see United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 104 (2d Cir. 1999); Brief for the United States, United States v. Siddig Ibrahim
Siddig Ali, Lead No. 96-1044 (2d Cir. filed July 3, 1997), pp. 10, 15. See also DOS Inspector General report,“Review

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NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

of theVisa-Issuance Process Phase I: Circumstances Surrounding the Issuance ofVisas to Sheikh Omar Ali Ahmed
Abdel Rahman,” Mar. 1994, pp. 6, 8, 36. On the informant’s reports, see United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d at 106–107.
On the landmarks plot, see United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d at 108–111, 123–127; Miller and Stone, The Cell, p.
116.
8.These prosecutions also had the unintended consequence of alerting some al Qaeda members to the U.S.
government’s interest in them. In February 1995, the government filed a confidential court document listing Usama
Bin Ladin and scores of other people as possible co-conspirators in the New York City landmarks plot. Ali
Mohamed, who was on the list, obtained a copy and faxed it to a close Bin Ladin aide for distribution. Statement
of Ali Mohamed in support of change of plea, United States v.Ali Mohamed, No. S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (S.D. N.Y.), Oct.
20, 2000 (transcript p. 29); Statements of Prosecutor and Judge, United States v. Bin Laden, No. S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (S.D.
N.Y.), Mar. 26, 2001 (transcript pp. 3338–3339); Patrick Fitzgerald interview (Jan. 28, 2004).
9. On Ajaj’s travels to Khaldan and interactions with KSM, see United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d at 107–108.
Ajaj had entered the United States on a B-2 tourist visa at New York City on September 9, 1991. INS alien file,
No.A72215823, Sept. 9, 1991.
10. OnYousef ’s capture and the Manila air plot, see United States v.Yousef, 327 F.3d at 79–82. On KSM, see Joint
Inquiry report (classified version), pp. 324–328; CIA analytical report,“WTC 1993:The Solid Case for al-Qa’ida
Involvement,” CTC 2002-40084H, July 11, 2002; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, May 27, 2003; James
Risen and David Johnston,“Threats and Reponses: Counterterrorism; Qaeda Aide Slipped Away Long Before Sept.
11 Attack,” New York Times, Mar. 8, 2003, p.A12.
11. For a general history of the FBI, supporting the subsequent text (unless otherwise noted), see Athan G.
Theoharis, et al., The FBI: A Comprehensive Reference Guide (Onyx Press, 1999); the FBI’s authorized history, FBI
report,“History of the FBI” (online at www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/history/historymain.htm); the FBI’s history as
told by the Federation of American Scientists, “History of the FBI,” updated June 18, 2003 (online at
www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fbi/fbi_hist.htm). For discussion of field office autonomy,see FBI letter,Kalish toWolf,
responses to questions posed by the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and Judiciary of the House Appropriations Committee, May 24, 2004, pp. 47–48.
12. See, e.g., Dan C. interview (Aug. 27, 2003); Ruben Garcia interview (Apr. 29, 2004); DOJ Inspector General interview of William Gore, Oct. 24, 2002.
13.The Washington Field Office was originally assigned the East Africa bombings case because it generally has
responsibility for investigating crimes overseas.When the attack was determined to be al Qaeda–related, responsibility shifted to the New York Field Office. See generally Kevin C. interview (Aug. 25, 2003).This created significant friction between agents in the respective offices. Edward Curran and Sidney Caspersen interview (Jan. 20,
2004). On the concept of the office of origin, see FBI memo, Kalish to Wolf, responses to questions from the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and Judiciary of the House Appropriations Committee, pp. 47–48; testimony of Robert S. Mueller III before the Subcommittee on the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the
Judiciary and Related Agencies of the House Appropriations Committee, June 18, 2003; FBI report,“Counterterrorism Program Since September 2001,”Apr. 14, 2004, p. 20.
14. On the impact of Watergate, see generally Kathryn Olmsted, Challenging the Secret Government:The PostWatergate Investigations of the CIA and FBI (Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1996).
15. David M.Alpern with Anthony Marro and Stephan Lesher,“This IsYour New FBI,” Newsweek, Jan. 5, 1976,
p. 14.
16. On the Levi guidelines and the Smith modifications, see John T. Elliff,“Symposium: National Security and
Civil Liberties:The Attorney General’s Guidelines for FBI Investigations,” Cornell Law Review, vol. 69 (Apr. 1984),
p. 785. On the line between church and state, see Floyd Abrams,“The First Amendment and the War against Terrorism,” University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law, vol. 5 (Oct. 2002).
17. On Pan Am bombing investigation, see Commission analysis of U.S. counterterrorism strategy from 1968
to 1993; FBI report,“History of the FBI.”
18. Louis Freeh interview (Jan. 6, 2004); Federation of American Scientists,“History of the FBI;” DOJ Inspector General report,“Federal Bureau of Investigation Casework and Human Resource Allocation,” Sept. 2003, pp.
iv, vi, viii, x, xiii.
19. For quote, see FBI report, “Congressional Budget Justification Book Fiscal Year 1995,” undated, p. 6. On
Freeh’s efforts, see Howard M. Shapiro, “The FBI in the 21st Century,” Cornell International Law Journal, vol. 28
(1995), pp. 219–228; Louis Freeh interview (Jan. 6, 2004). On Freeh’s budget request, see FBI report, “Congressional Budget Justification Book Fiscal Year 1995,” undated.
20. Janet Reno interview (Dec.16, 2003); Dale Watson interview (Feb. 5, 2004); Stephen Colgate interview
(May 19, 2004); OMB budget examiner interview (Apr. 27, 2004).
21. On the plan, see FBI report,“Strategic Plan: 1998–2003,‘Keeping Tomorrow Safe,’” May 8, 1998. For Watson’s recollections, see Dale Watson interview (Jan. 6, 2004).
22. For the mid-1990s numbers, see FBI memo, Freeh to Reno,“Reorganization of FBI Headquarters—Establishment of Counterterrorism Division and Investigative Services Division,” Apr. 22, 1999. For the 1998–2001 num-

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

473

bers, see DOJ Inspector General report,“Review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Counterterrorism Program:Threat Assessment, Strategic Planning, and Resource Management,” Sept. 2002, p. 67. For the failure to shift
resources, see DOJ Inspector General report,“FBI Casework and Human Resource Allocation,” Sept. 2003, pp. iv,
vi, viii, x, xiii. For the comparison to drug agents, see testimony of Dick Thornburgh before the Subcommittee on
Commerce, State, Justice, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies of the House Appropriations Committee, June 18,
2003, p. 20.
23. Dale Watson interview (Feb. 5, 2004);Virginia Bollinger interview (Feb. 2, 2004); Robert Bryant interview
(Dec. 18, 2003).
24. On the state of information technology at FBI, seeVirginia Bollinger interview (Jan. 28, 2004); Mark Miller
interview (Dec. 23, 2003). On the lack of an overall assessment, see DOJ Inspector General report,“Review of the
FBI’s Counterterrorism Program,” Sept. 2002, pp. ii–iii.
25. For training statistics, see DOJ Inspector General report,“Review of the FBI’s Counterterrorism Program,”
Sept. 2002, p. 74. For translation resources, see FBI report,“FY 2002 Counterterrorism Division Program Plan Summary,” undated, p. 4. Since 9/11, the FBI has recruited and processed more than 30,000 translator applicants.This
has resulted in the addition of nearly 700 new translators. FBI report,“The FBI’s Counterterrorism Program Since
September 2001,”Apr. 14, 2004.The FBI’s hiring process includes language testing, a personnel security interview,
polygraph, and a full background investigation.The FBI must maintain rigorous security and proficiency standards
with respect to its permanent and contract employees. Even as the FBI has increased its language services cadre,
the demand for translation services has also greatly increased.Thus, the FBI must not only continue to bring on
board more linguists, it must also continue to take advantage of technology and best practices to prioritize its workflow, enhance its capabilities, and ensure compliance with its quality control program. FBI linguists interviews (July
31, 2003–May 10, 2004); Margaret Gulotta interview (May 10, 2004). See DOJ Inspector General report,“A Review
of the FBI’s Actions in Connection with Allegations Raised by Contract Linguist Sibel Edmonds,” July 1, 2004;
Sibel Edmonds interview (Feb. 11, 2004).
26.Wilson Lowery interview (Jan. 28, 2004); Janet Reno testimony,Apr. 13, 2004; Helen S. interview (Dec. 29,
2003); Stephen Colgate interview (May 19, 2004); Robert Dies interview (Feb. 4, 2004).
27. FBI report,“Director’s Report on Counterterrorism,” Sept. 1, 2001, pp. I-1–I-14. On FBI reorganization,
see FBI memo, Freeh to Reno,“Reorganization of FBI Headquarters—Establishment of Counterterrorism Division and Investigative Services Division,”Apr. 22, 1999. On Watson’s observation, see Dale Watson interview (Feb.
4, 2004). On MAXCAP 05, see FBI memo, description of MAXCAP 05, undated (draft likely prepared after Aug.
31, 2001, for incoming Director Mueller). On field executives’ views, see FBI report, Counterterrorism Division,
International Terrorism Program,“Strategic Program Plan, FY 2001–06,” undated, p. 30.
28. International terrorism intelligence cases were designated as 199 matters; international terrorism criminal
cases were designated as 265 matters. In 2003, these designations were eliminated; all international terrorism matters now receive the same designation, 315.
29. For historical information on FISA, see Americo R. Cinquegrana,“The Walls (and Wires) have Ears:The
Background and First TenYears of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978,” University of Pennsylvania Law
Review, vol. 137 (1989), pp. 793, 802–805. For the statute, see 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801 et seq. As enacted in 1978, FISA
permitted orders authorizing electronic surveillance. It did not refer to physical searches. In 1994, the statute was
amended to permit orders authorizing physical searches. See Pub. L. No. 103-359, 108 Stat. 3423, 3443 (Oct. 14,
1994); 50 U.S.C. §§ 1821–1829. See generally, William C. Banks and M. E. Bowman, “Executive Authority for
National Security Surveillance,” American University Law Review, vol. 50 (2000), pp. 1–130.
30. On the history of courts applying the primary purpose standard, see In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 725–726
(FISC Ct. Rev. 2002), in which the FISC Court of Review concluded that these courts had ruled in error. See also
DOJ report,“Final Report of the Attorney General’s Review Team on the Handling of the Los Alamos National
Laboratory Investigation” (hereinafter “Bellows Report”), May 2000, appendix D. On DOJ interpretation of FISA,
see DOJ memo, Dellinger toVatis,“Standards for Searchers Under Foreign Intelligence Act,” Feb. 14, 1995; Royce
Lamberth interview (Mar. 26, 2004); Bellows Report, pp. 711–712; DOJ Inspector General interview of Marion
Bowman, May 28, 2003.
31. Bellows Report, pp. 711–712; DOJ Inspector General interview of Marion Bowman, May 28, 2003.
32. Bellows Report, pp. 712–714, n. 947, appendix D tabs 2, 3; Richard Scruggs interview (May 26, 2004);
Larry Parkinson interview (Feb. 24, 2004). Because OIPR had ultimate authority to decide what was presented to
the FISA Court, it wielded extraordinary power in the FISA process.
33.The group included representatives from the FBI, OIPR, and the Criminal Division. In addition, the U.S.
Attorney for the Southern District of New York was given an opportunity to comment on the procedures.The
procedures that were eventually issued were agreed to by all involved in the drafting process. As a member of the
Commission, Gorelick has recused herself from participation in this aspect of our work.
34. On Reno’s July 1995 memo, see DOJ Inspector General report,“A Review of the FBI’s Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks,” July 2004, pp. 27–34; Bellows Report, p. 709, appen-

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NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

dix D tab 23. Some barriers were proposed by OIPR in the FISA applications and subsequently adopted by the
FISC; others, less formally recorded, were believed by the FBI to be equally applicable.
35. On the misapplication of the procedures and the role of OIPR, see Bellows Report, pp. 721–722; Marion
Bowman interview (Mar. 6, 2004); Fran Fragos Townsend meeting (Feb. 13, 2004). On the OIPR as gatekeeper,
see Michael Vatis interview (Jan. 21, 2004); Larry Parkinson interview (Feb. 24, 2004). On OIPR’s stated defense,
see David Kris interview (May 19, 2004); Richard Scruggs interview (May 26, 2004). On OIPR’s threat, see Larry
Parkinson interview (Feb. 24, 2004); Thomas A. interview (Mar. 16, 2004). On the lack of information flow, see
Bellows Report, pp. 722, 724–725, 729–731.
36. For Bryant’s comment, see David Kris interview (Jan. 15, 2004); Bellows Report, p. 714. On barriers between
agents on same squads, see Larry Parkinson interview (Feb. 24, 2004); MichaelVatis interview (Jan. 21, 2004); DOJ
Inspector General interview of Thomas A., May 28, 2003. On incorrect interpretation by field agents, see Joint
Inquiry report, pp. 363, 367–368; Larry Parkinson interview (Feb. 24, 2004); MichaelVatis interview (Jan. 21, 2004);
DOJ Inspector General interview of Thomas A., May 28, 2003; DOJ Inspector General interview of Jane, Nov. 4,
2002.
37. For an example of the barriers between agents, see DOJ emails, Jane to Steve B., interpreting the wall to
apply to non-FISA information,Aug. 29, 2001; David Kris interview (Jan. 15, 2004). On the NSA barriers, see DOJ
Inspector General interview of Jane, Nov. 4, 2002.These barriers were reinforced by caveats NSA began placing
on all of its Bin Ladin–related reports and later on all of its counterterrorism-related reports—whether or not the
information was subject to the attorney general’s order—which required approval before the report’s contents could
be shared with criminal investigators. Ibid. On the several reviews of the process, see Bellows Report, pp. 709, 722;
DOJ Inspector General report,“The Handling of FBI Intelligence Information Related to the Justice Department’s
Campaign Finance Investigation,” July 1999, pp. 15–16, 255, 256, 328–330, 340, 344; GAO report, “FBI Intelligence Investigations: Coordination Within Justice on Counterintelligence Criminal Matters Is Limited,” July 2001,
pp. 3–5.
38. In December 1999, NSA began placing caveats on all of its Bin Ladin reports that precluded sharing of any
of the reports’ contents with criminal prosecutors or FBI agents investigating criminal matters without first obtaining OIPR’s permission.These caveats were initially created at the direction of Attorney General Reno and applied
solely to reports of information gathered from three specific surveillances she had authorized. Because NSA decided
it was administratively too difficult to determine whether particular reports derived from the specific surveillances
authorized by the attorney general, NSA decided to place this caveat on all its terrorism-related reports. In November 2000, in response to direction from the FISA Court, NSA modified these caveats to require that consent for
sharing the information with prosecutors or criminal agents be obtained from NSA’s Customer Needs and Delivery Services group. See DOJ memo, Reno to Freeh, E.O. 12333 authorized surveillance of a suspected al Qaeda
operative, Dec. 24, 1999; NSA email,William L. to Brian C.,“dissemination of terrorism reporting,” Dec. 29, 1999;
NSA memo,Ann D. to others,“Reporting Guidance,” Dec. 30. 1999; Intelligence report, Nov. 6, 2000. See also discussion of the history of the NSA caveats in the notes to Chapter 8.
39. See DEA report, “DEA Staffing & Budget” (figures for 1972 to 2003) (online at www.usdoj.gov/dea/
agency/staffing.htm). For USMS staffing, see DOJ information provided to the Commission.
40. On the number of agents, see INS newsletter,“INS Commissioner Meissner Announces Departure,” Jan.
2001; INS news release,“INS to Hire More than 800 Immigration Inspectors Nationwide,” Jan. 12, 2001; Gregory
Bednarz prepared statement, Oct. 9, 2003, p. 5. On the INS’s main challenges, see, e.g., Eric Holder interview (Jan.
28, 2004); Jamie Gorelick interview (Jan. 13, 2004); Doris Meissner interview (Nov. 25, 2003). On the White House
views, see, e.g.,White House press release,“Fact Sheet on Immigration Enforcement Act,” May 3, 1995. On DOJ’s
concerns, see INS newsletter, Remarks of Attorney General Reno on Oct. 24, 2000, Jan. 2001, pp. 16, 26.To assess
congressional views, we reviewed all conference and committee reports relating to congressional action on INS
budget requests for fiscal years 1995 through 2001 and all Senate and House immigration hearings from 1993 to
2001. On outdated technology, see Gus de la Vina interview (Nov. 19, 2003); Doris Meissner interview (Nov. 25,
2003).
41. On Meissner’s response, see Doris Meissner interview (Nov. 25, 2003). On the lookout unit, see Tim G.
interview (Oct. 1, 2002). On the number of denials of entry, see Majority Staff Report, Hearing on “Foreign Terrorists in America: Five Years after the World Trade Center” before the Subcommittee on Technology,Terrorism,
and Government Information of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Feb. 24, 1998, p. 145.
42. Majority Staff Report, Hearing on “Foreign Terrorists in America: Five Years after the World Trade Center,” Feb. 24, 1998, p. 152; 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(1)(A). On the low level of removals, see Daniel Cadman interview
(Oct. 9, 2003); Rocky Concepcion interview (June 15, 2004).
43. On the 1986 plan, see INS report, Investigations Division, “Alien Terrorists and Undesirables: A Contingency Plan,” May 1986; Daniel Cadman interview (Oct. 17, 2003). On the 1995 plan, see INS memo, Bramhall to
Bednarz and Hurst,“Draft Counter-Terrorism Strategy Outline,”Aug. 11, 1995. On the 1997 plan, see INS email,
Cadman to others,“EAC briefing document,” Dec. 5, 1997 (attachment titled “Counterterrorism/National Secu-

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475

rity Strategy and Casework Oversight”). On the work of the National Security Unit and the Intelligence Unit, see
Daniel Cadman interview (Oct. 17, 2003); Cliff Landesman interview (Oct. 27, 2003).
44. For number of agents on Canadian border, the Canadian situation generally, and the inspector general’s recommendations, see INS report,“Northern Border Strategy,” Jan. 9, 2001; DOJ Inspector General report,“Followup Review of the Border Patrol Efforts Along the Northern Border,” Apr. 2000 (inspection plan). On terrorists
entering the United States via Canada, see, e.g., INS record, Record of Deportable Alien,Abu Mezer, June 24, 1996.
Mezer was able to stay in the United States despite apprehensions for his illegal entries along the northern border.
45.The inspectors’ views are drawn from our interviews with 26 border inspectors who had contact with the
9/11 hijackers. On the incomplete INS projects, see Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996), §§ 110, 641.
46. For the 1996 law, see 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (1996). On unauthorized immigration, see Migration Policy Institute report, “Immigration Facts: Unauthorized Immigration to the United States,” Oct. 2003 (online at
www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/two_unauthorized_immigration_us.pdf). On the initiation of city noncooperation, see New York Mayor Ed Koch’s 1987 order prohibiting city line workers, but not police or the Department
of Corrections, from transmitting information respecting any alien to federal immigration authorities. On backlogs, see testimony of Dr. Demetrios G. Papademetriou before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and Claims of the House Judiciary Committee, Mar. 11, 2004. On the overwhelmed INS, see James Ziglar
testimony, Jan. 26, 2004.
47. On the relationship between the FBI and state and local police forces, see William Bratton et al. interview
(Nov. 20, 2003); David Cohen interview (Feb. 4, 2004). On the New York JTTF, see Mary Jo White,“Prosecuting
Terrorism in NewYork,” Middle East Quarterly, spring 2001 (online at www.meforum.org/article/25). On the pre9/11 number of JTTFs, see Louis Freeh prepared statement for the Joint Inquiry, Oct. 8, 2002, p. 18. On the effectiveness of JTTFs, see Washington Field Office agent interview (Aug.4, 2003); Phoenix JTTF member interview
(Oct. 20, 2003); Phoenix Field Office agent interview (Oct. 21, 2003);Art C. interview (Dec. 4, 2003).
48. Treasury report, “1995 Highlights of The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms,” undated (online at
www.atf.gov/pub/gen_pub/annualrpt/1995/index.htm); ATF report, “ATF Snapshot,” Jan. 30, 1998 (online at
www.atf.gov/about/snap1998.htm).
49. DaleWatson interview (Feb. 4, 2004); Frank P. interview (Aug. 26, 2003); Dan C. interview (Aug. 27, 2003);
Louis Freeh interview (Jan. 8. 2004).
50. See Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 104-264, 110 Stat. 3213 (1996), codified at 49 U.S.C.
§ 40101; Federal Aviation Authorization Act, H.R. Rep. No. 104-848, 104th Cong., 2d sess. (1996) (notes on conference substitute for § 401). On responsibility for protection, see 49 U.S.C. § 44903(b). On sabotage, see FAA
report, Aviation Security Advisory Committee, “Domestic Security Baseline Final Report,” Dec. 12, 1996; FAA
report,“Civil Aviation Security: Objectives and Priorities,” Mar. 18, 1999 (staff working paper). See also Jane Garvey prepared statement, May 22, 2003; Report of the President’s Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism (Pan
Am/Lockerbie Commission), May 15, 1990, pp. 113–114; Final Report of the White House Commission on Aviation
Safety and Security (Gore Commission), Feb. 12, 1997.While the sabotage of commercial aircraft, including Pan Am
103 in 1998, had claimed many lives, hijackings had also been deadly, including the 1985 hijacking of an Egypt Air
flight in which 60 people were killed and 35 injured; the 1986 hijacking of Pan Am 73 in which 22 people were
killed and 125 injured; and the 1996 hijacking of an Ethiopian Airlines flight in which 123 people were killed. See
FAA report,“Civil Aviation Security Reference Handbook,” May 1999. Commissioners Ben-Veniste, Gorelick, and
Thompson have recused themselves from our work on aviation security matters.
51. See GAO report,“Aviation Security:Additional Actions Needed to Meet Domestic and International Challenges,” Jan. 27, 1994; GAO report,“Aviation Security: Urgent Issues Need to Be Addressed,” Sept. 11, 1996; GAO
report,“Aviation Security: Slow Progress in Addressing Long-Standing Screener Performance Problems,” Mar. 16,
2000; GAO report,“Aviation Security: Long-Standing Problems Impair Airport Screeners’ Performance,” June 28,
2000; testimony of Kenneth M. Mead, DOT Inspector General, Joint Hearing on Actions Needed to Improve Aviation Security before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, Restructuring and the District of Columbia of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Sept. 25, 2001. On rules regulating access to
security sensitive areas of commercial airports, see FAA regulations,“Airport Security,” 14 C.F.R. § 107; FAA report,
“Air Carrier Standard Security Program,” May 2001.
52.The FAA maintained formal agreements with the CIA, FBI, Department of State, Department of Defense,
and NSA to receive data of interest as outlined in the agreement. In addition, the FAA posted liaisons with the CIA,
FBI, and Department of State to facilitate the flow of intelligence and threat information. See Claudio Manno interview (Oct. 1, 2003); Matt K. interview (Feb. 13, 2004). FAA civil aviation security officials reported that the agency’s
intelligence watch received about 200 pieces of intelligence per day. See Claudio Manno interview (Oct. 1, 2003).
The analysis regarding the passage of FBI information was based on a review of the FAA’s Intelligence Case Files.The
FBI analyst who worked on the 1998 tasking indicated that the information was shared with the FAA liaison to the
Bureau, but the liaison did not recall having seen it. Cathal Flynn interview (Sept. 9, 2003); Matt K. interview (Feb.
13, 2004).

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NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

53. Regarding intelligence reports, the Daily Intelligence Summary (DIS) prepared by the FAA’s Office of Civil
Aviation Intelligence was reviewed first by an assistant to Acting Deputy Administrator Belger, who would inform
him of any information that she felt merited his attention. Belger in turn would determine whether the information needed to be raised with Administrator Garvey. Garvey told us that she maintained an open door policy and
counted on her security staff to keep her informed on any pressing issues. Jane Garvey interview (Oct. 21, 2003);
Monte Belger interview (Nov. 24, 2003); Cathal Flynn interview (Sept. 9, 2003); Shirley Miller interview (Mar. 30,
2004); Claudio Manno interview (Oct. 1, 2003). Regarding the intelligence unit, see Nicholas Grant interview
(May 26, 2004); Claudio Manno interview (Oct. 1, 2003); Mike Canavan interview (Nov. 4, 2003); Alexander T.
Wells, Commercial Aviation Safety (McGraw-Hill, 2001), p. 308.
54. On the threat to civil aviation, see Lee Longmire interview (Oct. 28, 2003). On CAPPS, also known as
CAPS (Computer Assisted Profiling System), see FAA security directive,“Threat to Air Carriers,” SD 97-01, Oct.
27, 1997.The profile was derived from information on the Passenger Name Record and did not include factors
such as race, creed, color, or national origin. In addition to those chosen by the algorithm, a number of other passengers were selected at random, both to address concerns about discrimination and to deter terrorists from figuring out the algorithm and gaming the system. On no-fly lists, see FAA security directive, “Threat to U.S. Air
Carriers,” SD 95, Apr. 24, 2000. Some of the individuals on the no-fly list were in U.S. custody as of 9/11. See
Kevin G. Hall,Alfonso Chardy, and Juan O.Tamayo,“Mix-Up Almost Permitted Deportation of Men Suspected of
Terrorist Activities,” Miami Herald, Sept. 19, 2001; FAA security directive, “Threat to U.S. Aircraft Operators,” SD
108-1, Aug. 28, 2001. On the Gore Commission, see Final Report of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety
and Security, Feb. 12, 1997, p. 28. On the TIPOFF database (used to screen visa applicants and persons seeking permission to enter the United States against the names of known or suspected terrorists), see DOS cable, State 182167,
“Fighting Terrorism:Visas Viper Procedures,” Oct. 19, 2001. Finally, on the watchlist, officials told us that large lists
were difficult to implement, particularly when they weren’t accompanied by numeric data such as date of birth that
would enable an air carrier to distinguish the terrorist from others around the world who had his or her name. In
addition, the U.S. intelligence community was required to approve the “no-fly” listing of an individual in order to
protect sources and methods. Matt Kormann interview (Feb. 13, 2004).
55. On selectees, see James Padgett interview (Oct. 7, 2003).Their bags were either screened for explosives or
held off their flight until they were confirmed to be aboard. See FAA security directive,“Threat to Air Carriers,”
SD 97-01 Oct. 27, 1997. Under the previous noncomputerized profiling system, selectees were subject to secondary screening of their carry-on belongings, and checked baggage. See FAA security directive,“Threat to Air Carriers,” SD 96-05,Aug. 19, 1996.
56. FAA report,“Air Carrier Standard Security Program,” May 2001; FAA regulations,“Screening of Passengers and Property,” 14 C.F.R. § 108.9 (1999); Leo Boivin interview (Sept. 17, 2003).
57.“Knives with blades under 4 inches, such as Swiss Army Knives, scout knives, pocket utility knives, etc. may
be allowed to enter the sterile area. However, some knives with blades under 4 inches could be considered by a
reasonable person to be a ‘menacing knife’ and/or may be illegal under local law and should not be allowed to enter
the sterile area.” See FAA regulations,Air Carriers Checkpoint Operations Guide,Aug. 1999; see also Air Transport
Association Regional Airlines Association report,“Checkpoint Operations Guide,”Aug. 1999; Cathal Flynn interview (Sept. 9, 2003); Lee Longmire interview (Oct. 28, 2003); Leo Boivin interview (Sept. 17, 2003). A 1994 FAA
assessment of the threat to civil aviation in the United States stated that “system vulnerabilities also exist with respect
to hijackings . . . aircraft can be hijacked with either fake weapons or hoax explosive devices. Cabin crew or passengers can also be threatened with objects such as short blade knives, which are allowable on board aircraft.” See
FAA report,“The Threat to U.S. Civil Aviation in the United States,” Sept. 1994.
58. On random and continuous screening, see Janet Riffe interview (Feb. 26, 2004); FAA report,“Air Carrier
Standard Security Program,” May 2001. On the 9/11 hijackers, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Ramzi
Binalshibh, Oct. 1, 2002; FAA records, Intelligence Case File 98–96.
59. Courtney Tucker interview (June 3, 2004); Kenneth Mead prepared statement, May 22, 2003. Some air carrier officials, however, enjoyed a strong reputation for leadership in aviation security, including United Airlines’ Ed
Soliday. Bruce Butterworth interview (Sept. 29, 2003); Cathal Flynn interview (Sept. 9, 2003); Steven Jenkins interview (Feb. 24, 2004).
60. Mike Morse interview (Sept. 15, 2003). Regarding training, see FAA report,“Air Carrier Standard Security Program,” May 2001.
61. On a hardened cockpit door making little difference, see Tim Ahern interview (Oct. 8, 2004). For regulations governing the doors, see FAA regulations,“Miscellaneous Equipment” (emergency exit), 14 C.F.R. § 121.313
(2001); FAA regulations,“Closing and locking of flight crew compartment door,” 14 C.F.R. § 121.587 (2001). Also
compromising cockpit security was the use of common locks (one key fit the cockpits of all Boeing aircraft) and
the absence of procedures to properly manage and safeguard cockpit keys. Michael Woodward interview (Jan. 25,
2004). For the quote on reinforced cockpit doors, see Byron Okada,“Air Rage Prompts Call for Safety Measures:
The FAA Is Expected to Release a Report Today,” Fort Worth Star-Telegram, Jan. 10, 2001, p. 1.
62. James Underwood interview (Sept. 17, 2004); Mike Canavan interview (Nov. 4, 2003).

tic Preparedness Program in the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction,” May 1, 1997 (online at
www.defenselink.mil/pubs/domestic/toc.html).
93. John Hamre interview (Dec. 9, 2003); Henry Allen Holmes interview (Nov. 10, 2003); Brian Sheridan interview (Feb. 25, 2004).
94. Charles Allen interview (Jan. 27, 2004).
95. Commission analysis of U.S. counterterrorism strategy from 1968 to 1993.
96. President Reagan, “Remarks at the Annual Convention of the American Bar Association,” July 8, 1985
(online at www.reagan.utexas.edu/resource/speeches/1985/70885a.htm).
97. See Report of the President’s Special Review Board (Tower Commission) (GPO, 1987); Theodore Draper, A
Very Thin Line:The Iran-Contra Affairs (Simon & Schuster, 1991).
98. James Pavitt interview (Jan. 8, 2004).
99. President Clinton,“Address to the Nation on the Strike on Iraqi Intelligence Headquarters,” June 26, 1993.
100. President Clinton, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union,” Jan. 24,
1995; President Clinton,“Message to the Congress Transmitting Proposed Legislation To Combat Terrorism,” Feb.
9, 1995; President Clinton, “Message to the Congress Transmitting Proposed Legislation To Combat Terrorism,”
May 3, 1995.
101. Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-39,“U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism,” June 21, 1995.
102. President Clinton,“Remarks by the President in a Congressional Meeting,” July 29, 1996.
103. President Clinton, “Remarks Announcing the Second Term National Security Team and an Exchange
With Reporters,” Dec. 5, 1996.
104. Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-62,“Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland
and Americans Overseas,” May 22, 1998; Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-63,“Critical Infrastructure Protection,” May 22, 1998.
105. President Clinton, “Commencement Address at the United States Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland,” May 22, 1998.
106. See Ernest R. May,“Intelligence: Backing into the Future,” Foreign Affairs, Summer 1992.
107. For Congress’s domestic orientation, see Lee H. Hamilton, How Congress Works and WhyYou Should Care
(Indiana Univ. Press, 2004), pp.18–19. For presidential focus prior to 9/11, see President Clinton, “Commencement Address at the United States Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland,” May 22, 1998; President Clinton,“Keeping America Secure for the 21st Century,” Jan. 22, 1999.
108. Hamilton, How Congress Works, p. 17. Our review of the classified schedules of authorization from 1995
to 2001 found that Congress generally supported the top line requests made by the administration for intelligence,
never reducing it by more than 2 or 3 percent; however, the congressional oversight committees did reallocate the
administration’s requests significantly, sometimes increasing programs like counterterrorism that they believed were
being underfunded. On the intelligence budget, see George Tenet prepared statement, Mar. 24, 2004, pp. 23–26.
The DCI added that frustrations with getting additional funding requests arose mainly from the administration.
See ibid.
109. Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, Final Report, Dec. 1993; “Contract with America,”
1994; Statement of Rep. Saxby Chambliss, Hearing on Intelligence Gaps in Counterterrorism before the Special
Oversight Panel on Terrorism of the House Armed Services Committee, Sept. 5, 2002.
110. Hamilton, How Congress Works, p. 106; Richard Durbin interview (Apr. 27, 2004); Dianne Feinstein interview (June 1, 2004); Peter Hoekstra interview (June 2, 2004); Chris Shays interview (June 2, 2004); Dana Priest,
“Congressional Oversight of Intelligence Criticized,” Washington Post, Apr. 27, 2004, p. A1. For Tenet quote, see
George Tenet testimony, Mar. 24, 2004.
111. For neglect of airline security, see Commission analysis of the Congressional Daily Digest and the Congressional Record using the search term “aviation security.” See also FAA briefing materials, “FAA Hearing/Briefing
Activity Prior to September 11, 2001,” undated. For the focus on the Southwest border, see Commission analysis
of the hearing records of the subcommittees on immigration of the House and Senate Judiciary committees from
1993 through 2001. On restricting the FBI’s appropriations, see Robert Dies interview (Feb. 4, 2004); Stephen Colgate interview (May 19, 2004). On sanctions on Pakistan, see Strobe Talbott interview (Jan. 15, 2004); Karl Inderfurth interview (Feb. 18, 2004); Christina Rocca interview (Jan. 29, 2004). On the lack of time for oversight, see
Hamilton, How CongressWorks, p. 112; see also Center for Strategic and International Studies meeting (July 23, 2003);
Jay Rockefeller meeting (Oct. 16, 2003). On the Senate Appropriations Committee, the long-serving Chair (Ted
Stevens) and Ranking Minority Member (Daniel Inouye) of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee conduct
at least weekly oversight sessions of the intelligence community, always behind closed doors, the effectiveness of
which we cannot judge.
112. Although some members of the House sought the creation of a Select Committee on Terrorism in the
beginning of 2001, the Speaker asked the intelligence ccommittee to set up a terrorism working group instead.
Under Rep. Saxby Chambliss and Rep. Jane Harman, it held several briefings before 9/11 and became a subcommittee of the Intelligence Committee immediately afterward.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

479

113. Rep. Christopher Shays of Connecticut, chairman of the National Security Subcommittee of the Government Reform Committee, held 12 wide-ranging hearings on terrorism between 1999 and July 2001, with special attention on domestic preparedness and response to terrorist attack.Though the intelligence oversight panels’
work was largely secret, the intelligence community’s annual worldwide threat testimony before the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence was public testimony (typically followed by a closed session). From 1997 through 2001,
the threat of terrorism rose on the priority list from third (1997–1998) to second (1999–2000) to first in 2001. See
Commission analysis of congressional hearings on terrorism.
114. Congress created three commissions in 1998. One, chaired jointly by former senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman, examined national security challenges for the twenty-first century.This commission included stark
warnings about possible domestic terrorist attacks and recommended a new institution devoted to identifying and
defending vulnerabilities in homeland security. See Phase III Report of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century,“Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change,” Feb. 15, 2001.A second, chaired by
former governor James G. Gilmore ofVirginia, studied domestic preparedness to cope with attacks using weapons
of mass destruction and presented five reports. See, e.g., Fifth Annual Report to the President and the Congress of
the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction,“Forging America’s New Normalcy: Securing our Homeland, Preserving our Liberty,” Dec. 15, 2003.The third,
chaired by L. Paul Bremer, the former State Department counterterrorism coordinator, with vice chair Maurice
Sonnenberg, a member of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, focused specifically on terrorist
threats and what could be done to prepare for them. See Report of the National Commission onTerrorism,“Countering the Threat of International Terrorism,” June 2000.

4 Responses to Al Qaeda’s Initial Assaults
1. On financing of Egyptian terrorists, see Intelligence report, Sudanese links to Egypt’s Gama’at al-Islamiya
and training of Egyptians, July 14, 1993; Intelligence report, funding by Bin Ladin of Gama’at al-Islamiya by Bin
Ladin and composition of its Sudanese wing, July 22, 1993. On aid to Yemeni terrorists, see DOS memo, attached
to Bin Ladin “Viper” file,Aug. 28, 1993. CTC documents describing Bin Ladin as an “extremist financier” include
Intelligence report, Bin Ladin links to materials related to WMD, Mar. 20, 1997; Intelligence report, Bin Ladin’s
financial support to Egyptian,Algerian, and Libyan extremists, June 17, 1997.
2. Richard Clarke interview (Dec. 18. 2003). Of the 200 people at the Center, the new Bin Ladin unit had
about 12. Mike interview (Dec. 11, 2003). Staffing of the UBL unit had risen to 40–50 employees by Sept. 11,
2001, out of about 390 CTC employees. Richard interview (Dec. 11, 2003); CIA response to Commission questions for the record, Jan. 21, 2004.
3. On Fadl, see, e.g., Intelligence reports on historical background of Bin Ladin’s army (Nov. 26, 1996;Apr. 18,
1997); on the structure of al Qaeda and leadership composition (Dec. 18, 1996; Dec. 19, 1996; Dec. 19, 1996); on
roles and responsibilities of the organizational component (Dec. 19, 1996); on objectives and direction (Jan. 8, 1997;
Jan. 27, 1997); on the financial infrastructure and networks (Dec. 30, 1996; Jan. 3, 1997); on connections and collaboration with other terrorist groups and supporters (Jan 8, 1997; Jan. 31, 1997; Jan 31, 1997; Feb. 7, 1997); on
activities in Somalia (Apr. 30, 1997); on Bin Ladin’s efforts to acquire WMD materials (Mar. 18, 1997). On the other
walk-in source, see CIA cable, Jan. 3, 1997. Material from the Nairobi cell was introduced into evidence during the
testimony of FBI Special Agent Daniel Coleman, United States v. Usama Bin Laden, No. S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (S.D. N.Y.),
Feb. 21, 2001 (transcript pp. 1078–1088, 1096–1102).
4. Mike interview (Dec. 11, 2003).
5. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of SacredTerror (Random House, 2002), pp. 269–270; Mike interview (Dec. 11, 2003); Richard Clarke interview (Dec. 18, 2003); George Tenet interview (Jan. 22, 2004).
6. On Sudanese discussions with Saudi officials, see Frank interview (Mar. 18, 2004); Ron interview (Mar. 18,
2004).Timothy Carney believed the Saudis told Sudan that they did not want Bin Ladin.Timothy Carney interview (Dec. 4, 2003).
7. The CIA official who held one-on-one discussions with Erwa said that Erwa never offered to expel Bin
Ladin to the United States or render him to another country. Mark interview (May 12, 2004). For Carney’s instructions and the lack of a U.S. indictment, see Timothy Carney interview (Dec. 4, 2003). On the indictment issue and
the supposed Sudanese offer to give up Bin Ladin, see Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004).
In early May 1996, the CIA received intelligence that Bin Ladin might be leaving Sudan.Though this reporting was described as “very spotty,” it would have been passed along to the DCI’s office because of high concern
about Bin Ladin at the time. But it did not lead to plans for a U.S. operation to snatch Bin Ladin, because there
was no indictment against him. Ron interview (Mar. 18, 2004); Frank interview (Mar. 18, 2004). It appears, however, that if another country had been willing to imprison Bin Ladin, the CIA might have tried to work out a scenario for apprehending him. CIA cable, May 8, 1996.The Sudanese government did not notify the United States
that Bin Ladin had left the country until about two days after his departure. DOS cable, Nairobi 07020, “Sudan:
Foreign Minister on Developments,” May 21, 1996.

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NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

President Clinton, in a February 2002 speech to the Long Island Association, said that the United States did
not accept a Sudanese offer and take Bin Ladin because there was no indictment. President Clinton speech to the
Long Island Association, Feb. 15, 2002 (videotape of speech). But the President told us that he had “misspoken”
and was, wrongly, recounting a number of press stories he had read. After reviewing this matter in preparation for
his Commission meeting, President Clinton told us that Sudan never offered to turn Bin Ladin over to the United
States. President Clinton meeting (Apr. 8, 2004). Berger told us that he saw no chance that Sudan would have handed
Bin Ladin over and also noted that in 1996, the U.S. government still did not know of any al Qaeda attacks on U.S.
citizens. Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004).
Alleged Sudanese offers to cooperate on counterterrorism have been the subject of much recent controversy.
After repeatedly demanding that Sudan stop supporting terrorist groups, in 1993 the U.S. government designated
the country a state sponsor of terrorism. Diplomatic discussions continued but had little impact on Sudanese support for terrorism or on other issues, such as human rights. In the fall of 1995, the United States conducted a Sudan
policy review and, supported by a vocal segment of Congress, the White House sought to pressure and isolate the
Sudanese. Susan Rice interview (Jan. 9, 2004).
After Bin Ladin left Sudan in May 1996, some State Department officials, including Ambassador Carney, criticized the NSC’s hard-line policy, which he felt provided no “carrots” for Sudanese moderates to cooperate on
counterterrorism. He also faulted the NSC for not reopening the U.S. embassy in Khartoum (closed in early 1996)
when security concerns there were reevaluated. State’s Sudan desk officer agreed, noting that the embassy was an
excellent vehicle for gathering information on terrorists.According to one State official, NSC policymakers’ views
were too firmly set to engage and test the Sudanese on counterterrorism.Timothy Carney interview (Dec. 4, 2003);
David Shinn interview (Aug. 29, 2003); Stephen Schwartz interview (Dec. 30, 2003).
But supporters of the tough line, such as the NSC’s Susan Rice, argued that any conciliatory statements from
Khartoum belied its unhelpful actions. For example, she noted, though Sudan did eventually expel Bin Ladin, his
al Qaeda network retained a presence in the country. Susan Rice interview (Jan. 9, 2004). In addition, the CIA’s
Africa Division, whose operatives had engaged the Sudanese on counterterrorism in early 1996, would conclude
that “there is no indication that Sudanese involvement with terrorism has decreased in the past year.”They saw the
Sudanese gestures toward cooperating as “tactical retreats” aimed at deceiving Washington in hopes of having sanctions removed. CIA memo,Walter to Acting DCI,“Africa Division’s Recommendations Regarding Sudan,” Dec.
17, 1996.The CIA official who ran the Sudanese portfolio and met with the Sudanese on numerous occasions told
us the Sudanese were not going to deliver, and the perceived moderates “were just flat-out lying.” Mark interview
(May 12, 2004).
In February 1997, the Sudanese sent letters to President Clinton and Secretary of State Albright, extending an
invitation for a U.S. counterterrorism inspection mission to visit Sudan.The Sudanese also used private U.S. citizens to pass along offers to cooperate. Mansoor Ijaz interview (May 7, 2004); Janet McElligot interview (Oct. 20,
2003). But these offers were dismissed because the NSC viewed Sudan as all talk and little action. U.S. officials also
feared that the Sudanese would exploit any positive American responses, including trips to the region by U.S. officials, for their own political purposes. See Joint Inquiry interview of David Williams, June 26, 2002.Today, Sudan
is still listed as a state sponsor of terrorism.
8. Mike interview (Dec. 11, 2003). On local contacts, see Gary Schroen interview (Mar. 3, 2004). On “Jeff ’s”
views, see CIA memo,“DCI Talking Points Regarding Operations Against Usama Bin Ladin,”Aug. 25, 1997.
9. See Joint Inquiry briefing by Mike, Sept. 12, 2002. For briefings to the NSC, see NSC email, Clarke to Berger,
“Threat Warning: Usama bin Ladin,” Mar. 7, 1998; Mary McCarthy interview (Dec. 8, 2003); CIA memos, summary of weekly Berger/Tenet meeting, May 1, 1998.
10. CIA memos, summary of weekly Berger/Tenet meeting, May 1, 1998.
11. Karl Inderfurth interview (Feb. 18, 2004).
12. Peter Tomsen interview (Oct. 8, 2003).
13. For State Department officials’ views, see Strobe Talbott interview (Jan. 15, 2004); Karl Inderfurth interview (Feb. 18, 2004).
14. On the civil war and UNOCAL, see Karl Inderfurth interview (Feb. 18, 2004); Robin Raphel interview
(Dec. 8, 2003).The former UNOCAL chief for the pipeline project, Marty Miller, denied working exclusively with
the Taliban and told us that his company sought to work with all Afghan factions to bring about the necessary stability to proceed with the project. Marty Miller interview (Nov. 7, 2003). UNOCAL hired, among others, Robert
Oakley, the former ambassador to Pakistan. Oakley told us that he counseled the company about the internal
dynamics of Afghanistan and Pakistan but never lobbied the State Department on UNOCAL’s behalf. Robert Oakley interview (Sept. 7, 2003); see also “Advisory Consulting Agreement” between UNOCAL and Oakley, Oct. 1996.
On giving the Taliban a chance, see Marvin Weinbaum interview (Aug. 12, 2003).
15. See Madeleine Albright, speech at Nashir Bagh refugee camp in western Pakistan, Nov. 18, 1997. For a
description of the Richardson mission, see Bill Richardson interview (Dec. 15, 2003); Karl Inderfurth interview
(Feb. 18, 2004).
16. Marvin Weinbaum interview (Aug. 12, 2003). See also Strobe Talbott interview (Jan. 15, 2004). For Zinni’s

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481

view, see Anthony Zinni interview (Jan. 29, 2004).
17. Gary Schroen interview (Mar. 3, 2004). For more details, see Steve Coll, GhostWars:The Secret History of the
CIA,Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (Penguin, 2004), p. 379.
18. Coll, Ghost Wars, pp. 343, 391; Gary Schroen interview (Mar. 3, 2004); Joint Inquiry briefing by Mike, Sept.
12, 2002.
19. For a description of the plan, the content of briefing papers, and the Berger-Tenet meeting, see CIA memo,
Jeff to Tenet,“Information Paper on Usama Bin Ladin,” Feb. 12, 1998 (with attached paper for Tenet’s meeting with
Berger on Feb. 13, 1998,“Next Steps Against Usama Bin Ladin”).The paper also briefly noted other options the
CIA could be pursuing against Bin Ladin: paramilitary or sabotage attacks—possibly lethal—against Bin Ladin’s
facilities in Kandahar and Sudan, or even intelligence support for U.S. military strikes. On the Kansi operation, see
Coll, Ghost Wars, p. 373.
20. NSC note, Simon to Berger, update on Feb. 24 meeting, Feb. 27, 1998.
21. Joint Inquiry briefing by Mike, Sept. 12, 2002; NSC email, Clarke to Berger,“Threat Warning: Usama Bin
Ladin,” Mar. 7, 1998.
22. Mike interview (Jan. 6, 2004); CIA email, Schroen to Mike,“Capture Op,” May 5, 1998; CIA cable,“Comments on [Tribals’] Planning for UBL Rendition,” May 6, 1998. For the modification of the plan, see CIA memo,
“Tentative Timeline for the Bin Ladin Capture Operation,” May 19, 1998. For details on some CIA officers’ concerns, see Coll, Ghost Wars, pp. 393–394.
23. CIA cable,“19 May 98 Briefing for JSOC,” May 27, 1998; CIA cable,“Developments in the [Tribals’] Operation at the HQs End,” May 26, 1998; Joint Inquiry interview of Michael Canavan, Sept. 3, 2002.
24. CIA memos, summary of weekly Berger/Tenet meeting, May 1, 1998.
25. CIA memo, summary of Covert Action Planning Group meeting, May 18, 1998; CIA memo, “Tentative
Timeline for the Bin Ladin Capture Operation,” May 19, 1998.The summary of the meeting notes that the initiative was not an assassination, despite the inaccurate comments of some in the NSC.
26. Mike interviews (Dec. 11, 2003; Jan. 6, 2004); Jeff interview (Dec. 17, 2003); Mary Jo White interview (May
17, 2004).
27. CIA cable, “20–24 May 98 Full Mission Profile of the U.S. Side of the Bin Ladin Capture Operation,”
May 27, 1998; CIA cable,“Developments in the [Tribals’] Operation at the HQs End,” May 26, 1998.
28. CIA memo, summary of weekly Berger/Tenet meeting, May 20, 1998. It is unclear if a decision had been
made at this point on where to bring Bin Ladin.
29. Mike interview (Dec. 11, 2003); CIA cable,“The [Tribals] Operations,” May 29, 1998.
30. Richard Clarke interview (Dec. 18, 2003), in which he also noted that Tenet did not approve of the plan.
For Clarke’s comments to the NSC, see CIA cable,“Info from State on Status of Political Approvals for [Tribals],”
May 29, 1998. See Jeff interview (Dec. 17, 2003); James Pavitt interview (Jan. 8, 2004); George Tenet interview (Jan.
22, 2004), in which he also said he did not tell the Principals Committee his reasons for canceling the operation
because there was no reason for the principals to hear details of an unsound plan. See also Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004).
31. CIA memo, DDO to Berger,“Timing of the UBL Rendition Operation,” June 15, 1998; for Schroen, see
CIA cable,“Comments on [Tribals’] Planning for UBL Rendition,” May 6, 1998.
32. See, e.g., Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004).
33. On Saudi disruptions generally, see CIA report,“Additional Background on the Saudi discovery of an UBL
Network in Saudi Arabia,” undated (appears to be May 1998). On the DCI’s visits to Saudi Arabia, see Intelligence
reports made available to the Commission.
34. See Intelligence reports made available to the Commission.
35. Coll, Ghost Wars, pp. 400–402.
36. CIA note, Pillar to Wentworth/Ramanujam, summary of Aug. 5, 1998, CSG meeting on Bin Ladin,Aug.
6, 1998.
37. See, e.g., CIA briefing materials,“Bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam—An Update,”Aug. 14, 1998.
38. DOD memo,“Chronology of Planning,” Dec. 14, 1998.
39. Richard Clarke interview (Dec. 18, 2003).
40. NSC email, Clarke to Berger,Aug. 8, 1998; Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004); CIA memo,“Khowst
and the Meeting of Islamic Extremist Leaders on 20 Aug.,”Aug. 17, 1998.
41. NSC notes, checklist re military strikes,Aug. 14, 1998 (author appears to be Clarke). On the military plans,
see DOD memo,“Chronology of Planning,” Dec. 14, 1998.
42. President Clinton meeting (Apr. 8, 2004); Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004).
43. NSC emails, Simon to Kerrick,Aug. 5, 1998. For the report of Bin Ladin’s comment, see, e.g., NSC email,
Clarke to Berger, July 15, 1998. EMPTA stands for O-ethyl methylphosphonothioic acid.
44. NSC memo, McCarthy to Berger, re Shifa,Aug. 11, 1998; Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004).
45. For a timeline of the decisionmaking events, see NSC memo to Steinberg et al.,Aug. 17, 1999.The list of
concurrences is drawn from talking points prepared for Berger’s use with the main four leaders of the House and

Simon to Berger,“Talking Points for Lott-Gingrich Meeting,” Sept. 24, 1998.
69. NSC memo, Wechsler, summary of conclusions of Nov. 16, 1998, meeting of Working Group on UBL’s
Finances.
70. Rick Newcomb interview (Feb. 4, 2004);Treasury memo, Office of Foreign Asset Control to DOS,“Draft
Cable on Meeting with Two of UBL’s Brothers,” May 19, 2000; DOS cable, State 035243,“January 2000 Meeting
Regarding UBL Finances,” Feb. 27, 2000; Frank G. interview (Mar. 2, 2004).The U.S. government team learned
that the Bin Ladin family sold UBL’s share of the inheritance and, at the direction of the Saudi government, placed
the money into a specified account then frozen by the Saudi government in 1994.
71. NSC memo, Clarke to Berger, Roadmap, Nov. 3, 1998. According to Clarke,Tenet’s deputy, John Gordon,
agreed that there was no senior CIA manager to answer these questions and promised to fix that.
72. DOS memo, McKune to Albright,“State Sponsorship of Terrorism: Pakistan,” Feb. 1998. For the rejection
of the proposed designation, see handwritten notes on the McKune memo.
73. Madeleine Albright interview (Jan. 7, 2004).
74. NSC memo, Simon to NSC officials, Oct. 6, 1998. Links between Pakistan’s military intelligence service
and Harakat ul Ansar trainees at Bin Ladin camps near Khowst were also discussed in DOS memo, Inderfurth to
Talbott,“Pakistani Links to Kashmiri Militants,”Aug. 23, 1998.
75.William Milam interview (Dec. 29, 2003).
76. By the fall of 1999, the Glenn, Pressler, and Symington amendments prohibited most economic and military assistance to Pakistan. Clinton administration officials told us that these sanctions made it impossible to offer
“carrots” to Pakistan, and that before 9/11, waiving sanctions was not feasible because of the Musharraf coup, nonproliferation concerns, and Congress’s pro-India orientation. Karl Inderfurth interview (Feb. 18, 2004); Strobe Talbott interview (Feb. 8, 2004).
77. Strobe Talbott interview (Feb. 8, 2004). Berger agreed with Talbott that using other sticks, such as blocking loans from international financial institutions, would have risked a collapse of the Pakistani government and
the rise of Islamists to power in a nuclear-armed country. Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004).
78. DOS memo, Pickering to Albright,“Berger meeting on UBL,” Nov. 3, 1998.
79.White House reports made available to the Commission. President Clinton met with Prime Minister Sharif
on December 2, 1999, and called him on December 18, 1999.
80. NSC email, Clarke to Berger, Dec. 9, 1998.The event described in the intelligence report was said to have
occurred on November 17, 1998. Intelligence officials now tell us that there are some doubts about the accuracy
of the report.
81. Michael Sheehan interview (Dec. 16, 2003). For Sheehan’s background, see Madeleine Albright, with Bill
Woodward, Madam Secretary (Miramax, 2003), pp. 369–370. For one of Sheehan’s warnings, see DOS cable, Abu
Dhabi 002212,“Messages for the Taliban,”Apr. 9, 1999.
82. Michael Sheehan interviews (Dec. 16, 2003; March 2004). For Albright’s views, see Madeleine Albright
interview (Jan. 7, 2004). NSC memo, Principals’ Decision Paper, Mar. 8, 1999. In May 1999, Albright approved a
State Department diplomatic strategy calling for increased high-level pressure on the Taliban and the three countries that recognized it—and for unilateral sanctions if this failed. DOS memo, Inderfurth, Indyk, and Sheehan to
Albright,“A New Bin Ladin Strategy,” May 15, 1999.
83. NSC email, Riedel to Berger and Clarke, June 8, 1999.
84. See Karl Inderfurth interview (Feb. 18, 2004); DOS memo, Inderfurth to Albright, May 6, 1999; Michael
Sheehan interview (Dec. 16, 2003). Although Sheehan told us he was initially skeptical about supporting the Northern Alliance, he eventually came around in the fall of 2000.
85. For aid to the exile groups, see Karl Inderfurth interview (Feb. 18, 2004); Peter Tomsen interview (July 14,
2004).The aid was later cut because of alleged accounting deficiencies. For the diplomat’s views, see Christina Rocca
interview (Jan. 29, 2004). But Peter Tomsen, the State Department’s special envoy to the Afghan resistance in the
late 1980s, believed that neither administration did enough to assemble an anti-Taliban ruling coalition inside and
outside Afghanistan. Peter Tomsen interview (Oct. 8, 2003); see also letter from Peter Tomsen to the Commission,
June 30, 2004.
86. NSC memo, Clarke to Berger, Roadmap, May 18, 1999.
87. DOS memo, Inderfurth to Albright, May 6, 1999; DOS memo, Oakley to Pickering,“Designating the Taliban a FTO,” Apr. 22, 1999; Executive Order 13129, July 4, 1999. Since 1979, the secretary of state has had the
authority to name “state sponsors of terrorism,” subjecting such countries to significant economic sanctions. Being
designated a “foreign terrorist organization” also brings sanctions and stigmatizes a regime.While the U.S. government did not use either designation against theTaliban, the sanctions under this executive order mimicked the sanctions that would have been implemented under them.
88. UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1267, Oct. 15, 1999. UNSCR 1267 demanded that the Taliban render Bin Ladin to justice within 30 days; upon noncompliance, UN member states were called on to restrict
takeoff and landing rights of Taliban-owned aircraft.The sanctions also required member states to freeze Taliban
funds and financial resources. But Taliban “charter flights” continued to fly between Afghanistan and the UAE.
Judy Pasternak and Stephen Braun, “Emirates Looked Other Way While Al Qaeda Funds Flowed,” Los Angeles

165.Theodore Kattouf interview (Apr. 21, 2004). Kattouf was the U.S. ambassador to the UAE from 1999 to
2001. He indicated that high-level UAE officials would agree to restrict Afghan flights but told him that the government had a difficult time enforcing this. For communications with the UAE, see White House letter, President
Clinton to bin Zayid, July 23, 1999; DOS memo, Sheehan to Albright, “Signs of Progress on our UBL strategy,”
Sept. 12, 1999.
166. DOS memo, Indyk and Sheehan to Albright,“UAE Gives Ultimatum to Taliban on Bin Laden,” July 16,
1999, and attached transcript of conversation between Hamdan bin Zayid and Mullah Mutawakkil,“InformalTranslation of UAE Note,” July 14, 1999; DOS cable, Abu Dhabi 04644, “Taliban Refuse to Expel Bin Ladin Despite
UAEG Ultimatum: Need to Stiffen UAE Resolve to Take the Necessary Next Steps,” July 19, 1999.
167. DOS memo, Indyk and Sheehan to Albright,“UAE Gives Ultimatum to Taliban on Bin Laden,” July 16,
1999.
168. Jeff interview (Dec. 17, 2003). Schroen, however, told us that the tribals’ reporting was 50–60 percent accurate. Gary Schroen interview (Mar. 3, 2004).
169. For discussion of the Taliban generally, see Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism
in Central Asia (Yale Univ. Press, 2000).
170. Ibid.; Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, pp. 338–399; George Tenet interview (Jan. 22, 2004).
171. George Tenet interview (Jan. 22, 2004).
172. Richard interview (Dec. 12, 2003); Gary Schroen interview (Mar. 3, 2004).
173. John Maher III interview (Apr. 22, 2004). For an account of the reporting from this period written by
Mike, see CIA memo, Jeff to Tenet,“Tracking Usama Bin Ladin, 14–20 May 1999,” May 21, 1999. Mike’s account
was also used to prepare the DCI for a May 25, 1999, Principals Committee meeting. CIA briefing materials,“Background Information: Evaluating the Quality of Intelligence on Bin Ladin (UBL) in Qandahar, 13–20 May, 1999,”
undated (probably May 25, 1999).
174. CIA email, Mike to Schroen,“Re:Your Note,” May 17, 1999.
175. John Maher III interview (Apr. 22, 2004).
176. George Tenet interview (Jan. 22, 2004); John Gordon interview (May 13, 2004).
177. Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004).
178.The May 1999 intelligence on Bin Ladin’s location in Kandahar came as criticism of the CIA over the
recent bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade was at its peak.The DCI later testified that this bombing was
the result of a CIA mistake.Testimony of George Tenet before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, July 22, 1999. On Bin Ladin’s whereabouts during the December 1998 episode, see John Maher III interview (Apr. 22, 2004).
179. Cruise missiles were readied for another possible strike in early July 1999. But none of the officials we
have interviewed recalled that an opportunity arose at that time justifying the consideration of a strike. See, e.g.,
John Maher III interview (Apr. 22, 2004).
180. Hugh Shelton interview (Feb. 5, 2004); DOD briefing materials, UBL JCS Focused Campaign, undated.
181. NSC memo, Benjamin to Berger and Steinberg, Apr. 29, 1999; NSC email, Clarke to Berger, May 26,
1999.
182. NSC memo, Clarke to Berger, June 24, 1999. For Clarke’s request to Berger to convene the Small Group,
see NSC memo, Clarke to Berger,Analysis/Options re UBL, Jun. 13, 1999. See also NSC email, Storey to Berger
and Clarke, June 24, 1999.
183. Berger notes on NSC memo, Clarke to Berger, June 24, 1999.
184. NSC memo, Clarke to Berger, June 24, 1999.
185. NSC memo, Clarke to Berger, UBL review for Dec. 3, 1999, Small Group meeting, Dec. 2, 1999.
186. NSC memo, CSG agenda, Sept. 24, 1999.
187. According to CTC talking points for the CSG in June 1999, more than 40 members of al Qaeda had
been imprisoned over the past year. CIA talking points, C/CTC TPs/Backgrounder for CSG, June 7, 1999. Figures cited in the DCI’s letter to President Clinton in October, however, are slightly different: CTC had helped render 32 terrorists to justice since July 1998, more than half of whom were al Qaeda. CIA letter,Tenet to President
Clinton,“CIA’s Counterterrorism Efforts,” Oct. 16, 1999.
188. See CIA cable,“Usama Bin Ladin:The Way Ahead,”Aug. 25, 1999, soliciting comments from various stations on “possible new approaches to capturing UBL and disrupting operations.” The evolution of some of this
thinking can be seen throughout the summer of 1999. See, e.g., CIA briefing materials, CTC UBL Update:“Must
Do Some Fundamental Rethinking,” July 20, 1999 (Afghan assets are not capable of mounting a UBL capture operation or ambush); CIA briefing materials, CTC UBL Update:“Problems with Capturing UBL,”Aug. 3, 1999 (tribals are good reporters but are unlikely to capture Bin Ladin because of the risks involved, so there is a need to
identify a new group to undertake a capture operation).
189. July 1999 Memorandum of Notification.
190. See James Baker interview (Feb. 4, 2004); Janet Reno interview (Dec. 16, 2003); Randy Moss interview
(Jan. 22, 2004); George Tenet interview (Jan. 22, 2004). On the Pakistani and Uzbek capture teams, see CIA memo,

488

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

“Outline of Program to Build Pakistan Team to Seek the Capture and Rendition of Usama Bin Ladin and his Lieutenants,” July 27, 1999; CIA memo, CIA Outline of Program to Build Uzbek and other teams to Seek the Capture and Rendition of Usama Bin Ladin and his Lieutenants, July 27, 1999; CIA briefing materials, talking points
for the DCI for the Aug. 3 Small Group meeting,Aug. 3, 1999 (Other Pakistani Involvement in Efforts to Capture
UBL; Uzbek and other programs). On the Uzbeks’ readiness, see CIA briefing materials,“Executive Summary for
UBL Conference,” Sept. 16, 1999.
191. CIA briefing materials, “Executive Summary for UBL Conference,” Sept. 16, 1999. For its preface, the
Plan quoted a memo Tenet had sent to the CIA’s senior management in December 1998: “We are at war with
Usama bin Ladin.”
192. Ibid. See also the following briefings of the Plan: CIA briefing materials, CTC/NSC Briefing on the Plan,
Sept. 29, 1999; CIA briefing materials, Executive Summary: UBL Conference, prepared for Berger, Nov. 30, 1999;
CIA briefing materials, CTC briefing for the NSC Small Group, Dec. 2/3, 1999.
193.This figure increased through the fall of 1999, from less than 5 percent on September 16 to less than 10
percent by November 30, and finally to less than 15 percent by early December. CIA briefing materials,“Executive Summary for UBL Conference,” Sept. 16, 1999; CIA briefing materials, Executive Summary: UBL Conference, prepared for Berger, Nov. 30, 1999; CIA briefing materials, CTC briefing for the NSC Small Group, Dec.
2/3, 1999. On Massoud, see also CIA briefing materials,“DDCI UBL Update,” Oct. 29, 1999; CIA briefing materials,“DCI UBL Update,” Nov. 12, 1999.
194. CIA briefing materials, “Executive Summary for UBL Conference,” Sept. 16, 1999. For the JSOC estimate, see CIA briefing materials, Executive Summary: UBL Conference, prepared for Berger, Nov. 30, 1999.

5 Al Qaeda Aims at the American Homeland
1.Though KSM and Bin Ladin knew each other from the anti-Soviet campaign of the 1980s, KSM apparently
did not begin working with al Qaeda until after the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Nov. 21, 2003; Jan. 9, 2004; Feb. 19, 2004.
2.Those detainees are Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Abu Zubaydah, Riduan Isamuddin (also known as Hambali), Abd al Rahim al Nashiri,Tawfiq bin Attash (also known as Khallad), Ramzi Binalshibh, Mohamed al Kahtani,Ahmad Khalil Ibrahim Samir al Ani,Ali Abd al Rahman al Faqasi al Ghamdi (also known as Abu Bakr al Azdi),
and Hassan Ghul.
3. On KSM’s relationship to Yousef and his ethnicity, see CIA analytic report, Khalid Sheik Muhammad’s
Nephews, CTC 2003-300013, Jan. 31, 2003. On KSM’s biography, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM,
July 12, 2003; FBI electronic communication, requests for information on KSM colleges/universities, June 10, 2002.
4. In an uncorroborated post-capture claim that may be mere bravado, KSM has stated that he considered assassinating Rabbi Meir Kahane when Kahane lectured in Greensboro at some point between 1984 and 1986. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 12, 2003. On KSM’s connection to Sayyaf, see Intelligence reports,
interrogations of KSM, July 3, 2003; July 12, 2003; FBI electronic communication,“Summary of Information . . .
with regard to . . . KSM,” July 8, 1999. On KSM’s battle experience and his electronics work, see Intelligence reports,
interrogations of KSM, July 3, 2003; July 12, 2003. On KSM’s anti-Soviet activities, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 17, 2004 (in which KSM says he apparently met Bin Ladin for the first time when the Sayyaf
group and Bin Ladin’s Arab mujahideen group were next to each other along the front line).
5. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 12, 2003 (in which KSM also notes that his group continued fighting in the Jalalabad area, and his brother Abid was killed there). KSM claims that RamziYousef visited the
NGO’s establishment in Jalalabad while Yousef was undergoing training. KSM adds that between 1993 and 1996,
he traveled to China, the Philippines, Pakistan, Bosnia (a second time), Brazil, Sudan, and Malaysia. Most, if not all,
of this travel appears to have been related to his abiding interest in carrying out terrorist operations.Although KSM
claims that Sheikh Abdallah was not a member, financier, or supporter of al Qaeda, he admits that Abdallah underwrote a 1995 trip KSM took to join the Bosnia jihad. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 23, 2003.
6. On KSM’s learning of Yousef ’s plans, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Jan. 9, 2004 (in which
KSM also contends that Yousef never divulged to him the intended target of the attack). On KSM/Yousef phone
conversations, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 17, 2004 (in which KSM also says that most of
his phone conversations withYousef were social in nature, but thatYousef did discuss mixing explosives ingredients
once or twice and that on one occasion,Yousef asked him to send the passport Yousef had in his true name,Abdul
Basit). On KSM’s money transfer, see FBI report,Tradebom investigation, Mar. 20, 1993.
7. Evidence gathered at the time of Yousef ’s February 1995 arrest included dolls wearing clothes containing
nitrocellulose. FBI evidence, Manila air investigation. On KSM’s rationale for attacking the United States, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Sept. 5, 2003 (in this regard, KSM’s statements echo those of Yousef, who
delivered an extensive polemic against U.S. foreign policy at his January 1998 sentencing). On the Manila air plot,
see Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM,Apr. 17, 2003; July 12, 2003 (in which KSM also says bojinka is not
Serbo-Croatian for “big bang,” as has been widely reported, but rather a nonsense word he adopted after hearing

NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

489

it on the front lines in Afghanistan).According to KSM, the plot was to receive financing from a variety of sources,
including associates of co-conspiratorWali Khan and KSM’s own funds. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM,
Nov. 26, 2003; Jan. 9, 2004; Feb. 19, 2004. On activities during the summer of 1994, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, May 3, 2003; July 12, 2003; Nov. 10, 2003; Feb. 21, 2004; Feb. 24, 2004.
8. On recruiting Wali Khan in Karachi, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Abdul Hakim Murad,Apr.
13, 1995; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 12, 2003 (in which KSM recounts how he knew Wali
Khan from Afghanistan). On the testing of the timer, see Brief for the United States of America, United States v.
Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, No. 98-1041(L) (2d Cir. filed Aug. 25, 2000), pp. 85–86, 88–91.The latter explosion caused
the death of a passenger and extensive damage to the aircraft, which was forced to make an emergency landing in
Okinawa. In 1996,Yousef was convicted on charges arising out of the Bojinka plot, including the bombing of the
Philippine Airlines flight. See ibid., p. 8. On KSM’s travels, see generally Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM,
July 12, 2003.Yousef managed to escape to Pakistan, but his accomplice, Murad—whom KSM claims to have sent
toYousef with $3,000 to help fund the operation—was arrested and disclosed details of the plot while under interrogation. Contrary to Murad’s confession, in which he described his intended role as one of the five operatives who
would plant bombs on board the targeted aircraft, KSM has said that Murad’s role was limited to carrying the $3,000
from Dubai to Manila. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Feb. 19, 2004; (two reports); Feb. 24, 2004;Apr.
2, 2004.This aspect of KSM’s account is not credible, as it conflicts not just with Murad’s confession but also with
physical evidence tying Murad to the very core of the plot, and with KSM’s own statements elsewhere that Murad
was involved in planning and executing the operation. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM,Aug. 18, 2003;
Jan. 9, 2004; Feb. 24, 2004 (in which KSM also claims that while he was in Qatar in February 1995, he andYousef
consulted by telephone regarding the cargo carrier plan, and Yousef proceeded with the operation despite KSM’s
advice that he hide instead).We have uncovered no evidence that KSM was present at the guesthouse in Islamabad
where Yousef ’s arrest took place, as has been suggested in the press.
9. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 12, 2003. KSM’s presence in Bosnia coincided with a police
station bombing in Zagreb where the timing device of the bomb (a modified Casio watch) resembled those manufactured by KSM and Yousef in the Philippines for the Manila air operation. FBI report, Manila air investigation,
May 23, 1999. On the Sudanese trip and Afghanistan, see Intelligence report, interrogation of SM, July 12, 2003
(in which KSM also claims to have encountered Sayf al Adl while inYemen; apparently KSM has not divulged the
substance of this meeting).
10. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Jan. 9, 2004. In another interrogation report, however, KSM
downplays the significance of his relationship toYousef in enabling him to meet with Bin Ladin. Specifically, KSM
notes thatYousef was not a member of al Qaeda and thatYousef never met Bin Ladin. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 19, 2004.
11. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, July 12, 2003; Jan. 9, 2004; Feb. 19, 2004.With respect to KSM’s
additional proposal to bomb cargo planes by shipping jackets containing nitrocellulose, KSM states that Bin Ladin
expressed interest in changing the operation so that it would involve a suicide operative. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Nov. 10, 2003.
12. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 19, 2004.
13. Probably inflating his own role, KSM says he and a small group of colleagues, including Yousef and Wali
Khan, were among the earliest advocates of attacking the United States. KSM asserts that Bin Ladin and some of
the other jihadist leaders concentrated on overthrowing Arab regimes and argued for limiting confrontation with
the United States to places like Somalia. On KSM’s description of Bin Ladin’s agenda, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Nov. 13, 2003. As discussed in chapter 2, we do not agree with this assessment. On Bin Ladin’s
reactions to KSM’s proposal, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, July 12, 2003; Jan. 9, 2004; Feb. 19,
2004. On KSM’s intent to target the United States and Bin Ladin’s interest in Somalia, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Nov. 13, 2003.
14. On KSM’s independence, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Jan. 9, 2004. Even after he began
working with Bin Ladin and al Qaeda, KSM concealed from them his ongoing relationship with Sayyaf. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 30, 2003. Although KSM says he would have accepted the support of
another organization to stage a 9/11-type operation, there is no evidence he ever peddled this idea to any other
group. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 19, 2004. On his travels after meeting Bin Ladin, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 12, 2003. Hambali also was one of the founders of Konsojaya, a Malaysian
company run by a close associate of Wali Khan. FBI report, Manila air investigation, May 23, 1999. Hambali claims
he was asked to serve on the company’s board of directors as a formality and insists that he did not recognize the
“Arabs” who were to run the company or play any role in its operations. Intelligence report, interrogation of Hambali, Nov. 19, 2003.
15. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, July 12, 2003; Feb. 19, 2004 (two reports). KSM maintains that
he provided similar services for other mujahideen groups at this time, including the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group
and a group headed by Abu Zubaydah. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 19, 2004.
16. On KSM’s understanding of Bin Ladin’s commitment, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb.

490

NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

19, 2004. On KSM’s assistance to al Qaeda, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, July 12, 2003 (two
reports). On Bin Ladin’s decision to approve 9/11 operation, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Jan. 9,
2004. KSM has observed that the East Africa bombings and the subsequent bombing of the USS Cole yielded a
recruiting bonanza for al Qaeda, as increasing numbers of Arab youth became enamored of the idea of waging jihad
against the United States. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Sept. 5, 2003.
17. On KSM’s decision to move to Kandahar, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Jan. 9, 2004. On
the media committee, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 12, 2003 (in which KSM also says that as
head of the media committee, he would take charge of producing the propaganda video al Qaeda issued following the bombing of the USS Cole). On the oath, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Nov. 13, 2003 (in
which KSM also claims his reluctance stemmed from a concern that he would lose the ability to persevere with
the 9/11 operation should Bin Ladin subsequently decide to cancel it).
18. On a possible Southeast Asian operation, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Hambali, Sept. 4, 2003.
On a possible U.S. operation, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, June 27, 2003; July 14, 2003. On a
possible Israeli operation, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, June 30, 2003. On other possible targets
discussed with Atef, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Hambali, Sept. 4, 2003 (Thailand); Intelligence report,
interrogation of KSM,Apr. 4, 2004 (Singapore, Indonesia, Maldives).
19. For an example of KSM’s popularity, see Intelligence report, interrogation of al Qaeda facilitator, Oct. 11,
2002. See also Intelligence report, interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, Nov. 7, 2002; Intelligence report, interrogation
of Nashiri, Feb. 10, 2003.
20. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Hambali, Jan. 14, 2003; Mar. 5, 2004.
21. Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (Columbia Univ. Press, 2002), pp. 187, 199.
22. On the trip to Karachi, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Hambali, Sept. 12, 2003. On Hambali’s relationship with Atef and receipt of al Qaeda funds, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Hambali, Mar. 5, 2004.
Al Qaeda began providing funds to JI for terrorist operations as early as 1999. Intelligence report, interrogation of
detainee, Mar. 3, 2004.
23. On Hambali’s role as coordinator, see Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Mar. 4, 2004. On Sufaat,
see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM,Apr. 12, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee,Apr. 30,
2003. In 1987, Sufaat received a bachelor’s degree in biological sciences, with a minor in chemistry, from California State University, Sacramento. Sufaat did not start on the al Qaeda biological weapons program until after JI’s
December 2000 church bombings in Indonesia, in which he was involved. Intelligence report, interrogation of
Hambali, Sept. 8, 2003. On Sufaat’s schooling, see Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Dec. 14, 2001.
24. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, June 9, 2003. KSM also maintains that he persuaded Hambali
to focus on “soft” targets in Singapore, such as oil tankers, the U.S. and Israeli embassies, and Western airlines. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, June 24, 2003.
25. As discussed in greater detail in section 5.2, Khallad was sent by Bin Ladin to Kuala Lumpur to case U.S.
airline flights in the Far East for possible future attacks there, whereas Hazmi and Mihdhar were on the first leg of
their travel from Karachi to Los Angeles, where they would arrive on January 15, 2000. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 31, 2003. On Hambali’s assistance at KSM’s request, see Intelligence report, interrogation of
KSM, July 31, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Aug. 8, 2003. On assistance to Moussaoui, see
Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Mar. 24, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee,Apr. 9, 2002.
According to statements attributed to Hambali and Sufaat, in each of these instances the al Qaeda guests were lodged
at Sufaat’s condominium, an apartment on the outskirts of Kuala Lumpur. Intelligence report, interrogation of
detainee, Jan. 22, 2002; Intelligence reports, interrogations of Hambali, Sept. 8, 2003; Sept. 12, 2003.
26. On Hambali’s relationship with Bin Ladin, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of Hambali,Aug. 29, 2003;
Sept. 5, 2003 (in which Hambali also explains his relationship with al Qaeda as follows: he received his marching
orders from JI, but al Qaeda would lead any joint operation involving members of both organizations). On Hambali’s objections, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 8, 2003. On KSM’s coordination with Hambali, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM,Apr. 17, 2003. On KSM’s recognition of Hambali’s domain, see
Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Aug. 18, 2003. According to KSM, his close relationship with Hambali
prompted criticism from Bashir, the JI leader, who thought Hambali should focus more directly on Indonesia and
Malaysia instead of involving himself in al Qaeda’s broader terrorist program. Indeed, KSM describes Hambali as
an al Qaeda member working in Malaysia. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM,Aug. 18, 2003. Nashiri observes
that al Qaeda’s standard security practice dictated that no senior member could manage terrorist activities in a location where another senior member was operating. Intelligence report, interrogation of Nashiri, Jan. 14, 2003.Yet
al Qaeda’s deference to Hambali’s turf apparently had limits. Khallad says he and Hambali never discussed the
intended Southeast Asia portion of the original 9/11 plan. Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Apr. 27,
2004.
27. On Nashiri’s recruitment, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Nasser Ahmad Naser al Bahri, a.k.a.
Abu Jandal, Sept. 17–Oct. 2, 2001. On Nashiri’s refusal to swear allegiance, see Intelligence report, interrogation of

NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

491

KSM, Nov. 21, 2003. On Nashiri’s idea for his first terrorist operation and his travels, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of Nashiri, Nov. 21, 2002; Dec. 26, 2002.
28. Intelligence report, interrogation of Nashiri, Dec. 26, 2002.Although Nashiri’s account of this episode dates
his return to Afghanistan in 1996, the 1997 date is likely more accurate. On Nashiri’s involvement in the missilesmuggling and embassy-bombing plots, see Intelligence report, seizure of antitank missiles in Saudi Arabia, June 14,
1998; FBI report of investigation, interview of Mohammad Rashed Daoud al Owahli, Sept. 9, 1998, p. 6.
29. For Nashiri’s version, which may not be true, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Nashiri, Dec. 26,
2002. On communication between Nashiri and Bin Ladin about attacking U.S. vessels, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Nashiri, Nov. 21, 2002.The reporting of Nashiri’s statements on this subject is somewhat inconsistent,
especially as to the exact timing of the original proposal. Some corroboration does exist, however, for Nashiri’s
claim that the original proposal was his. A detainee says that 9/11 hijacker Khalid al Mihdhar told him about the
maritime operation sometime in late 1999 and credited Nashiri as its originator. Intelligence report, interrogation
of detainee, Dec. 2, 2001.
30. Intelligence report, interrogation of Nashiri, Jan. 27, 2003. Nashiri claims not to have had any telephone
or email contact with Bin Ladin while planning the Cole operation; rather, whenever Bin Ladin wanted to meet,
he would have an al Qaeda member travel to Pakistan to summon Nashiri by telephone. Ibid.
31.As an example of Nashiri’s status, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Abu Jandal, Sept. 17–Oct. 2,
2001 (in which Nashiri is described as widely known to be one of al Qaeda’s most committed terrorists and, according to one of his mujahideen colleagues, so extreme in his ferocity in waging jihad that he “would commit a terrorist act ‘in Mecca inside the Ka’aba itself ’ [the holiest site in Islam] if he believed there was a need to do so”). On
Nashiri’s role on the Arabian Peninsula, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Jan. 14, 2004. Nashiri also
enjoyed a reputation as a productive recruiter for al Qaeda. See Intelligence report, interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, Aug. 29, 2002. On Nashiri’s discretion, see, e.g., Intelligence report, interrogation of Nashiri, Nov. 20, 2002.
On Nashiri seeking Bin Ladin’s approval, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Jan. 14, 2004. On the Limburg operation, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Nashiri, May 21, 2003. On Nashiri’s security concerns, see
Intelligence report, interrogation of Nashiri, Feb. 20, 2003.
32. See Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, July 1, 2003; Sept. 5, 2003.
33. For KSM’s learning from the first World Trade Center bombing and his interest in a more novel form of
attack, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 1, 2003. For KSM’s interest in aircraft as weapons and
speculation about striking the World Trade Center and CIA, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 19,
2004. KSM has stated that he and Yousef at this time never advanced the notion of using aircraft as weapons past
the idea stage. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM,Apr. 2, 2004.
After 9/11, some Philippine government officials claimed that while in Philippine custody in February 1995,
KSM’s Manila air plot co-conspirator Abdul Hakim Murad had confessed having discussed withYousef the idea of
attacking targets, including the World Trade Center, with hijacked commercial airliners flown by U.S.-trained Middle Eastern pilots. See Peter Lance, 1000 Years for Revenge: International Terrorism and the FBI—the Untold Story
(HarperCollins, 2003), pp. 278–280. In Murad’s initial taped confession, he referred to an idea of crashing a plane
into CIA headquarters. Lance gave us his copy of an apparent 1995 Philippine National Police document on an
interrogation of Murad.That document reports Murad describing his idea of crashing a plane into CIA headquarters, but in this report Murad claims he was thinking of hijacking a commercial aircraft to do it, saying the idea had
come up in a casual conversation with Yousef with no specific plan for its execution.We have seen no pre-9/11
evidence that Murad referred in interrogations to the training of other pilots, or referred in this casual conversation to targets other than the CIA. According to Lance, the Philippine police officer, who after 9/11 offered the
much more elaborate account of Murad’s statements reported in Lance’s book, claims to have passed this added
information to U.S. officials. But Lance states the Philippine officer declined to identify these officials. Peter Lance
interview (Mar. 15, 2004). If such information was provided to a U.S. official, we have seen no indication that it
was written down or disseminated within the U.S. government. Incidentally, KSM says he never discussed his idea
for the planes operation with Murad, a person KSM regarded as a minor figure. Intelligence report, interrogation
of KSM,Apr. 2, 2004.
34. Intelligence report, 1996 Atef study on airplane hijacking operations, Sept. 26, 2001.
35. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, July 12, 2003; Nov. 6, 2003.Abu Zubaydah, who worked closely
with the al Qaeda leadership, has stated that KSM originally presented Bin Ladin with a scaled-down version of
the 9/11 plan, and that Bin Ladin urged KSM to expand the operation with the comment,“Why do you use an
axe when you can use a bulldozer?” Intelligence report, interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, May 16, 2003.The only
possible corroboration we have found for Abu Zubaydah’s statement is Khallad’s suggestion that Bin Ladin may
have expanded KSM’s original idea for an attack using planes. Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad,Apr. 22,
2004. Neither Abu Zubaydah nor Khallad claims to have been present when KSM says he first pitched his proposal
to Bin Ladin in 1996.
36. For the scheme’s lukewarm reception, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Nov. 6, 2003. For Bin
Ladin’s response, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM,Aug. 18, 2003; Feb. 19, 2004.

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NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

37. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 19, 2004.
38. For KSM’s joining al Qaeda, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Nov. 13, 2003. KSM has provided inconsistent information about whether Bin Ladin first approved his proposal for what became the 9/11
attacks in late 1998 or in early 1999. Compare Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Aug. 18, 2003; Jan. 9,
2004; Feb. 19, 2004;Apr. 3, 2004. For KSM’s antipathy to the United States, see Intelligence report, interrogation
of KSM, Feb. 19, 2004. For Atef ’s role, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Jan. 9, 2004. For Atef ’s death,
see DOS report,“Comprehensive List of Terrorists and Groups Identified Under Executive Order 13224,” Dec. 31,
2001.
39. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM,Aug. 18, 2003.
40. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Aug. 18, 2003; Feb. 20, 2004; Apr. 30, 2004. An earlier KSM
interrogation report, however, states that Bin Ladin preferred the Capitol over the White House as a target. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM,Apr. 17, 2003. KSM has admitted that his statement in a post-9/11 interview
with Al Jazeera reporterYosri Fouda—that an al Qaeda “reconnaissance committee” had identified 30 potential targets in the United States during the late 1990s—was a lie designed to inflate the perceived scale of the 9/11 operation. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 23, 2004. For the specific targets, see Intelligence report,
selection of 9/11 targets,Aug. 13, 2003 (citing KSM interrogation).
41. For the four individuals, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM,Aug. 18, 2003.Abu Bara al Yemeni
is also known by the names Abu al Bara al Taizi, Suhail Shurabi, and Barakat. Ibid. KSM has also stated that he did
not learn of the selection of Hazmi and Mihdhar for the planes operation until November 1999. Intelligence report,
interrogation of KSM, Apr. 2, 2004. For Mihdhar’s and Hazmi’s eagerness, see Intelligence reports, interrogations
of KSM, Jan. 9, 2004; Feb. 20, 2004 . For Bin Ladin’s instruction, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb.
20, 2004. Hazmi obtained a B-1/B-2 multiple-entry visa issued at Jiddah, Saudi Arabia, on April 3, 1999; Mihdhar
obtained the same type of visa at the same location on April 7, 1999. DOS records, NIV applicant details for Hazmi
and Mihdhar, Nov. 8, 2001. Hazmi and Mihdhar both obtained new passports shortly before they applied for visas.
FBI report,“Summary of Penttbom Investigation,” Jan. 31, 2003, p. 9.
42. For Hazmi and Mihdhar’s city of birth, see CIA analytic report,“11 September:The Plot and the Plotters,”
CTC 2003-40044HC, June 1, 2003, pp. 49–50. For their travel to Bosnia, see Intelligence report, interrogation of
Saudi al Qaeda member, Oct. 3, 2001. For their visits to Afghanistan, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of
detainee, Feb. 5, 2002; Feb. 11, 2002; Intelligence reports, interrogations of Saudi al Qaeda member, Oct. 2, 2001;
Oct. 18, 2001.
43. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Khallad, June 25, 2003; Sept. 5, 2003.
44. For Khallad’s visa application under a false name and its rejection, see DOS record, visa application of Salah
Saeed Mohammed bin Yousaf (alias for Khallad), Apr. 3, 1999; Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Aug.
20, 2003. Khallad’s visa denial was based not on terrorism concerns but apparently on his failure to submit sufficient documentation in support of his application. See DOS record, NIV applicant detail, Mar. 31, 2004. For Khallad’s 1999 mission to Yemen, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad,Aug. 20, 2003. For the U.S. point of
contact, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Aug. 22, 2003. Khallad claims he cannot remember his
U.S. contact’s full name but says it sounded like “Barzan.” According to the CIA, “Barzan” is possibly identifiable
with Sarbarz Mohammed, the person who resided at the address in Bothell,Washington, that Khallad listed on his
visa application as his final destination. Ibid. For his contacts with “Barzan” and his arrest, see ibid.; Intelligence
report, interrogation of Khallad,Aug. 20, 2003. Nashiri has confirmed that Khallad had been assigned to help procure explosives for the ship-bombing plot, and that his arrest caused work on the operation to stop temporarily.
Intelligence report, interrogation of Nashiri, Feb. 21, 2004.
45. For the interventions, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad,Aug. 20, 2003. Khallad has provided
inconsistent information as to his release date. Ibid. (June 1999); Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Jan.
6, 2004 (August 1999). Khallad’s brother reportedly has confirmed that Khallad was released from custody only
after negotiations with theYemeni director for political security in which a deal was struck prohibiting Khallad and
his associates from conducting operations inYemen. Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Oct. 1, 2002. For
his giving up on a visa and his return to Afghanistan, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of Khallad, July 31,
2003;Aug. 22, 2003.
46. For KSM’s realization of visa complications, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM,Aug. 18, 2003.
According to both KSM and Khallad, Abu Bara never applied for a U.S. visa. Intelligence report, interrogation of
KSM, Feb. 20, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Feb. 17, 2004. KSM has noted that Ramzi Binalshibh, another Yemeni slated early on to participate in the 9/11 attacks, likewise would prove unable to acquire a
U.S. visa the following year. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Jan. 7, 2004. For KSM’s desire to keep Khallad and Abu Bara involved, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Aug. 18, 2003. For Saudis being chosen
for the planes operation, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Jan. 7, 2004; Jan. 23, 2004. For KSM’s splitting the operation into two parts, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM,Aug. 18, 2003; Intelligence report,
interrogation of Khallad,Apr. 27, 2004.
47. For the second part of the operation, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM,Aug. 18. 2003. For the

NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

493

alternate scenario, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Apr. 30, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation
of Khallad,Apr. 21, 2004. Khallad has provided contradictory statements about the number of planes to be destroyed
in East Asia. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Khallad,Aug. 13, 2003;Apr. 5, 2004.According to Khallad,Thailand, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Malaysia were likely origins of the flights because Yemenis did not need visas
to enter them. Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad,Aug. 13, 2003. For the importance of simultaneity, see
Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM,Aug. 18, 2003.
48. For the four operatives’ training, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM,Aug. 18, 2003. For the elite
nature of the course and Nibras’s participation, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of Khallad, Sept. 8, 2003;
Sept. 11, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 15, 2003. For KSM’s view, see ibid.; Intelligence
report, interrogation of KSM, Aug. 18, 2003. For KSM’s visit, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb.
20, 2004.
49. For a description of the camp and the commando course, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM,
July 15, 2003. For Bin Ladin’s interest and the decision on the number of trainees, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Sept. 8, 2003.
50. For the nature of the commando course, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Sept. 8, 2003.
KSM claims that the course proved so rigorous that Mihdhar quit after a week and returned to his family inYemen.
Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM,Aug. 18, 2003. However, two of Mihdhar’s al Qaeda colleagues who were
present during the training have provided different accounts. Khallad apparently has stated both that Bin Ladin
pulled Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hazmi out of the course early and that Mihdhar actually completed the course. See
Intelligence reports, interrogations of Khallad, Sept. 1, 2003; May 21, 2004. See also FBI report of investigation,
interview of Abu Jandal, Oct. 2, 2001 (indicating that Mihdhar completed the course).
51. For instruction onWestern culture and travel, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Mar. 24, 2003;
June 15, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Aug. 21, 2003. For KSM’s mid-1999 activity and Bin
Ladin’s payment, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 20, 2004. According to KSM, he received a
total of $10,000 from Bin Ladin for 9/11-related expenses. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM,Apr. 5, 2004.
52. For Khallad, Abu Bara, and Hazmi’s travels, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, May 30, 2003.
Khallad has provided a second version, namely that all three traveled together to Karachi. Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, July 31, 2003. For Hazmi and Atta’s simultaneous presence in Quetta, see Intelligence reports,
interrogations of KSM, Feb. 20, 2004; Mar. 31, 2004. KSM maintains it was a coincidence. Ibid.
53. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Mar. 31, 2004. In his initial post-capture statements, KSM claimed
that Mihdhar did not have to attend the training because he had previously received similar training from KSM.
Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Mar. 24, 2003. KSM subsequently expressed uncertainty about why Bin
Ladin and Atef excused Mihdhar from the training. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 20, 2004.
54. For the varying accounts of the course’s length, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Aug. 18,
2003; Feb. 20, 2004; Intelligence reports, interrogations of Khallad, Nov. 6, 2003; July 31, 2003. For KSM’s description, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Mar. 24, 2003; Aug. 18, 2003; Feb. 20, 2004. For Khallad’s
description, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad,Apr. 5, 2004. KSM says that he permitted the trainees
to view Hollywood films about hijackings only after he edited the films to cover the female characters. Intelligence
report, interrogation of KSM, Nov. 10, 2003. For the use of game software and discussions of casing flights, see
Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Nov. 6, 2003. For KSM’s instructions regarding casing, see Intelligence
report, interrogation of Khallad, July 31, 2003. For visits to travel agencies, see Intelligence report, interrogation of
Khallad,Aug. 13, 2003.
55. For the travels of Khallad,Abu Bara, and Hazmi via Karachi, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM,
Aug. 18, 2003. For Mihdhar’s travel fromYemen, see FBI report,“Hijackers Timeline,” Nov. 14, 2003 (citing 265ANY-280350, serial 24808).
56. For the operatives’ knowledge, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM,Aug. 18, 2003. For Hazmi and
Mihdhar being sent to Malaysia, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 29, 2003. For passport doctoring, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM,Aug. 18, 2003. For casing, see Intelligence report, interrogation
of KSM, July 29, 2003. For Khallad and Abu Bara’s departure, as well as Hazmi’s travel, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 31, 2003. Khallad maintains that Abu Bara did not participate in the casing operation and
simply traveled to Kuala Lumpur as Khallad’s companion. Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, May 30,
2003.
57. For the trip’s original purpose and Bin Ladin’s suggestion, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, July 31, 2003. On Malaysia, Endolite, and the financing of Khallad’s trip, see Intelligence report, interrogation
of Khallad,Aug. 22, 2003.
58. On informing Hambali, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM,Aug. 18, 2003. For Hambali’s assistance, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, July 31, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of Hambali,
Sept. 4, 2003. For the colleague who spoke Arabic, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, May 30, 2003.
59. For the dates of Khallad’s travel, his mistake in seating, and his other efforts to case flights, see Intelligence
reports, interrogations of Khallad, July 31, 2003;Aug. 21, 2003. Khallad says he put the box cutter alongside tubes

494

NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

of toothpaste and shaving cream with metallic exteriors, so that if the metal detector at the airport was triggered,
the inspector would attribute the alarm to the other items. He also carried art supplies, which he hoped would
explain the presence of a box cutter if anyone asked. Ibid.
60. For Khallad’s return to Kuala Lumpur, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, May 30, 2003. For
Hazmi’s arrival and stay at the clinic, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, July 31, 2003. For Mihdhar’s
arrival, see FBI report,“Hijackers Timeline,” Nov. 14, 2003 (citing 265A-NY-280350, serial 24808). For their stay
at Sufaat’s apartment, see CIA analytic report,“The Plot and the Plotters,” June 1, 2003, p. 11; Intelligence report,
interrogation of Khallad,Aug. 22, 2003. For Khallad’s discussions with Hazmi and Khallad’s knowledge of the operation, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, July 31, 2003.
61. For the Bangkok meeting, see CIA analytic report, “The Plot and the Plotters,” June 1, 2003, pp. 49–50.
For relocation of the meeting to Bangkok, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of Khallad,Aug. 18, 2003; Jan. 7,
2004. Fahd al Quso, a close friend of Khallad’s, accompanied Nibras on the trip to Bangkok to take money to Khallad. Quso claims that the amount was $36,000. FBI report of investigation, interview of Quso, Jan. 31, 2001. Khallad claims that it was only $10,000 to $12,000. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Khallad, May 30, 2003;Aug.
18, 2003. Khallad has identified contradictory purposes for the money: a donation to charities benefiting amputees,
see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad,Aug. 8, 2003; and to advance the ship-bombing operation, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Jan. 7, 2004. Khallad has explicitly denied giving any of the money he
received from Nibras and Quso to Hazmi and Mihdhar. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Khallad,Aug. 8, 2003;
Jan. 7, 2004. Given the separate reporting from KSM that he gave Hazmi and Mihdhar $8,000 each before they
traveled to the United States, we have insufficient evidence to conclude that the Nibras/Quso money helped finance
the planes operation. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, June 15, 2004. For Hazmi and Mihdhar’s interest
in traveling to Bangkok, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Jan. 7, 2004. For Hambali’s assistance, see
Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad,Aug. 8, 2003. For Abu Bara’s return toYemen, see Intelligence report,
interrogation of Khallad, May 30, 2003.
62. For the hotel arrangements, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Jan. 7, 2004. For the two groups
not meeting with each other, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad,Aug. 18, 2003. For Khallad’s subsequent actions, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, July 31, 2003.
63. For Bin Ladin’s cancellation of the East Asian operation, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM,Aug.
18, 2003. For Hazmi and Mihdhar’s departure, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Aug. 8, 2003. For
their arrival in Los Angeles, see FBI report, “Hijackers Timeline,” Nov. 14, 2003 (citing 265A-NY-280350-CG,
serial 4062; 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 7134).
64. On Atta’s family background, see FBI report, “Hijackers Timeline,” Nov. 14, 2003 (citing FBI electronic
communication from Cairo dated Sept. 13, 2001); CIA analytic report,“The Plot and the Plotters,” June 1, 2003,
p. 23. For details on his study in Germany, see German Bundeskriminalamt (BKA) report, investigative summary
re Atta, June 24, 2002; Federal Prosecutor General (Germany), response to Commission letter, June 25, 2004, pp.
3–4. Atta’s host family in Hamburg soon asked him to move out. Between 1993 and 1998, Atta shared a onebedroom apartment in Hamburg with a fellow student, who moved out after having problems with Atta and was
succeeded by another roommate. See German BKA report, investigative summary re Atta, June 24, 2002. On Atta’s
character, see German BKA investigation of Said Bahaji, summary of interrogation of Shahid Nickels on Oct. 30,
2001.
65. On the Muslim student association in Hamburg, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Ramzi Binalshibh,
Oct. 2, 2002. On the Muslim-Christian working group and Atta, see German BKA investigation of Bahaji, summary of interrogation of Michael Krause on Oct. 11, 2001; German BKA investigation of Bahaji, summary of interrogation of Nickels on Oct. 30, 2001. Much of the information about Atta and his friends in Hamburg comes from
Nickels, a German national who converted to Islam while in high school and spent considerable time with Atta’s
circle between 1997 and 1999. Nickels testified at the trials in Germany of Mounir el Motassadeq and Abdelghani
Mzoudi on 9/11-related charges.
66. German BKA investigation of Bahaji, summary of interrogation of Nickels on Oct. 30, 2001, pp. 8, 15; federal prosecutor’s closing argument, Motassadeq trial, Feb. 5, 2003. On Atta’s fundamentalism, see FBI electronic communication,“Khaled A. Shoukry,” June 17, 2002.
67. German BKA report, investigative summary re Binalshibh, July 4, 2002; Federal Prosecutor General (Germany), response to Commission letter, June 25, 2004, pp. 3–4; FBI report of investigation, interview of Fuad Omar
Bazarah,Apr. 9, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Sept. 24, 2002. Binalshibh used various names,
such as Ramzi Omar and Ramzi al Sheiba. In May 1998, months before he was expelled from school, German
authorities had issued a warrant to arrest and deport “Ramzi Omar.” German BKA report, investigative summary
re Binalshibh, July 4, 2002. But Binalshibh was no longer using this alias, so the German authorities did not discover that he and Ramzi Omar were the same person until after the attacks of September 11. Ibid.
68. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Oct. 2, 2002; German BKA investigation of Bahaji, summary of interrogation of Nickels on Oct. 30, 2001; German BKA report, investigative summary re Binalshibh, July
4, 2002.

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495

69. German BKA report, investigative summary re Binalshibh, July 4, 2002.
70. CIA analytic report, “The Plot and the Plotters,” June 1, 2003, p. 23; German BKA report, investigative
summary re Shehhi, July 9, 2002.
71. German BKA report, investigative summary re Shehhi, July 9, 2002; Federal Prosecutor General (Germany),
response to Commission letter, June 25, 2004, pp. 3–4; FBI electronic communication, summary of testimony of
Mohamed Abdulla Mohamed Awady on Oct. 24, 2003, at the Mzoudi trial, Dec. 5, 2003.
72. German BKA report, investigative summary re Shehhi, July 9, 2002.
73. Ibid.
74. FBI electronic communication, summary of testimony of Mohamed Abdulla Mohamed Awady on Oct.
24, 2003, at the Mzoudi trial, Dec. 5, 2003.
75. Federal prosecutor’s closing argument, Motassadeq trial, Feb. 5, 2003.
76. German BKA report, investigative summary re Jarrah, July 18, 2002; Federal Prosecutor General (Germany),
response to Commission letter, June 25, 2004, pp. 3–4. In 1999, Jarrah and Senguen allegedly married in an Islamic
ceremony not recognized under German law. Senguen has only acknowledged that she and Jarrah were engaged.
German BKA report, investigative summary re Jarrah, July 18, 2002.
77. German BKA report, investigative summary re Jarrah, July 18, 2002.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid.
80. On Jarrah’s accommodations in Hamburg and his meeting with Binalshibh, see ibid. On Jarrah and Zammar, see German BKA investigation of Bahaji, summary of interrogation of Nickels on Oct. 30, 2001; see generally Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Nov. 6, 2003; Intelligence report, “Terrorism: Background
Information on Usama Bin Ladin Associate Muhammad Haydar Zammar,” Jan. 14, 2002. For Zammar encouraging jihad, see Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Jan. 14, 2002.
81. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Nov. 6, 2003; German BKA investigation of Bahaji, summary of interrogation of Nickels on Oct. 30, 2001. On one occasion, German authorities intercepted a call in which
such a gathering was mentioned. An individual phoning Zammar’s house on February 17, 1999, was told that he
was away on a trip to a distant,“bad” region, but that “people” at 54 Marienstrasse knew where he was.The same
conversation revealed that these “people” included “Said, Mohamed Amir, [and] Omar,” likely a reference to the
apartment’s original occupants, Said Bahaji,Atta, and Binalshibh. Federal Prosecutor General (Germany), response
to Commission letter, June 25, 2004, p. 9. Shehhi also appears to have lived there briefly, in November 1998 and
again in the summer of 1999. German BKA report, investigative summary re Shehhi, July 9, 2002.The Marienstrasse apartment remained an important location for the group even after Binalshibh,Atta, and Shehhi all moved
out, as some of their closest associates, including Zakariya Essabar and Abdelghani Mzoudi, moved in. See German
BKA report, investigative summary re Binalshibh, July 4, 2002.
82. German BKA report, investigative summary re Bahaji, Mar. 6, 2002. A document containing a biography
of Bin Ladin—seized from the residence of Said Bahaji, a member of Atta’s circle—also contains the phrase “Dar
el Ansar,” which refers to the name of a guesthouse Bin Ladin established in Afghanistan for mujahideen recruits.
Ibid.
83. German BKA investigation of Bahaji, summary of interrogation of Nickels on Nov. 7, 2001; German BKA
report, investigative summary re Bahaji, Mar. 6, 2002; federal prosecutor’s closing argument, Motassadeq trial, Feb.
5, 2003.The diskettes seized from Bahaji’s residence also contained bomb-making instructions. Federal Prosecutor
General (Germany), response to Commission letter, June 25, 2004, p. 10.A videotape of Bahaji’s October 9, 1999,
wedding at the Quds mosque, recovered by German authorities after the September 11 attacks, depicts Binalshibh
giving a speech denouncing Jews as a problem for all Muslims. On the videotape, Binalshibh also reads a Palestinian war poem, and Shehhi and Mzoudi sing a jihad song.Also shown attending the wedding are Jarrah and Zammar. FBI report,“Hijackers Timeline,” Nov. 14, 2003 (citing 265A-NY-280350-BN-415).
84. German BKA report, investigative summary re Essabar; CIA report, interrogation of Binalshibh, May 27,
2003; federal prosecutor’s closing argument, Motassadeq trial, Feb. 5, 2003. After arriving in Afghanistan in 2001,
he became a member of al Qaeda’s media committee. Intelligence report, interrogations of KSM and Binalshibh,
May 27, 2003.
85. German BKA report, investigative summary re Motassadeq, Oct. 22, 2001.
86. German BKA report, investigative summary re Mzoudi, Jan. 13, 2003; German BKA report, investigative
summary re Motassadeq, Oct. 22, 2001. Mzoudi and Motassadeq were both tried in Germany on charges related
to the 9/11 attacks. Mzoudi was acquitted in February 2004, in part because Binalshibh was not produced as a witness. Motassadeq was convicted in 2003 for being an accessory to the attacks and received a 15-year prison sentence, but his conviction was reversed. See Richard Bernstein,“Germans Free Moroccan Convicted of a 9/11 Role,”
New York Times,Apr. 8, 2004, p.A18.
87. Summary of Judgment and Sentencing Order by Hanseatic Regional High Court, Motassadeq trial, Feb.
19, 2003; German BKA investigation of Bahaji, summary of interrogation of Nickels on Oct. 30, 2001.According
to Nickels, who was distancing himself from the group by this time,“Atta was just too strange.” Ibid.

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NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

88. Shehhi and other members of the group used to frequent a library in Hamburg to use the Internet.According to one of the librarians, in 1999 Shehhi, unprompted, inveighed against America, and boasted that “something
was going to happen” and that “there would be thousands of dead people.” FBI electronic communication, summary of testimony of Angela Duile on Aug. 28, 2003, at Mzoudi trial, Oct. 27, 2003.Another witness who lived in
the same dormitory as Motassadeq testified that in late 1998 or early 1999, he overheard a conversation in which
Motassadeq told someone that “we will do something bad again” and that “we will dance on their graves.” The
conversation also contained a reference to the “burning of people.” FBI electronic communication, summary of
testimony of Holger Liszkowski on Sept. 9, 2003, at Mzoudi trial, Nov. 17, 2003. On another occasion, according
to the same witness, Motassadeq apparently identified Atta as “our pilot.”Another witness recalled Atta ominously
observing in 1999 that the United States was not omnipotent and that “something can be done.” German BKA
investigation of Bahaji, summary of interrogation of Nickels on Nov. 20, 2001.
89. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Oct. 7, 2002; May 20, 2003.
90. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, May 20, 2003. A detainee has confirmed Binalshibh’s
account about being advised to go to Afghanistan rather than trying to travel directly to Chechnya.The detainee
dates the Slahi meeting to October 1999.Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Oct. 17, 2003.The detainee,
however, also suggests that Slahi and Binalshibh may have met earlier in 1999 in Frankfurt, through a mutual
acquaintance. Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Oct. 27, 2003.The acquaintance apparently tells a different story, claiming that Slahi introduced him to Binalshibh and Jarrah at Slahi’s home in 1997 or 1998, and that
he later lived with them in Hamburg. Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, July 2, 2003.
91. FBI report, “Summary of Penttbom Investigation,” Feb. 29, 2004, p. 8; Intelligence reports, interrogations
of Binalshibh, Sept. 24, 2002; Mar. 4, 2003; May 20, 2003.
92. On meetings with Atef and Bin Ladin, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Dec. 10, 2002;
Mar. 4, 2003; Mar. 31, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 20, 2004.Atta reportedly had between
two and five meetings with Bin Ladin before leaving Kandahar and was the only 9/11 hijacker who knew the
entire scope of the operation from the outset. Intelligence report, comments of Binalshibh on Atta,Apr. 21, 2003.
93. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Dec. 10, 2002. According to KSM, Bin Ladin designated
Hazmi to be Atta’s second in command. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 20, 2004.
94. In addition,Atta obtained a new passport in June 1998, even though his current one was still valid for nearly
a year, a sign that he may have been following the al Qaeda practice of concealing travel to Pakistan. Federal Prosecutor General (Germany), response to Commission letter, June 25, 2004, p. 11.
95. German BKA report, investigative summary re Motassadeq, Oct. 22, 2001; Summary of Judgment and Sentencing Order by Hanseatic Regional High Court, Motassadeq trial, Feb. 19, 2003. Motassadeq continued to handle some of Shehhi’s affairs even after Shehhi returned to Hamburg. Most importantly, in March 2000, Motassadeq
paid Shehhi’s semester fees at the university, to ensure Shehhi’s continued receipt of scholarship payments from the
UAE. Ibid.
96. German BKA report, investigative summary re Motassadeq, Oct. 22, 2001.After 9/11, Motassadeq admitted to German authorities that Shehhi had asked him to handle matters in a way that would conceal Shehhi’s
absence. Motassadeq also would claim later that he did not know why his friends had gone to Afghanistan, saying
he thought they were planning to go fight in Chechnya. For assistance provided by both Motassadeq and Bahaji,
see Federal Prosecutor General (Germany), response to Commission letter, June 25, 2004, pp. 13–14.
97. Jarrah encountered a minor problem during his return trip to Hamburg. On January 30, 2000, while transiting Dubai on his way from Karachi to Germany, Jarrah drew questioning from UAE authorities about an overlay of the Qu’ran that appeared on one page of his passport.The officials also noticed the religious tapes and books
Jarrah had in his possession, but released him after he pointed out that he had lived in Hamburg for a number of
years and was studying aircraft construction there. FBI report,“Summary of Penttbom Investigation,” Feb. 29, 2004,
p. 13.
98. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Sep. 24, 2002; FBI report,“Summary of Penttbom Investigation,” Feb. 29, 2004, pp. 11, 13.According to a KSM interrogation report, Shehhi may have been present for at
least some of the training that Atta and Binalshibh received in Karachi. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM,
Mar. 31, 2004.
99. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Nov. 6, 2003. Binalshibh and the others kept their distance
from Zammar even before visiting Afghanistan and getting their instructions from Bin Ladin and Atef. Ibid.
100. On Atta, see FBI analytic report,“The 11 September Hijacker Cell Model,” Feb. 2003, p. 28. On Jarrah,
see German BKA report, investigative summary re Jarrah, July 18, 2002. Note that although Jarrah’s attitude was
now much more congenial, he told Senguen nothing about being in Afghanistan. On Shehhi’s wedding celebration, see German BKA report, investigative summary re Shehhi, July 9, 2002; on his changed appearance and behavior, see FBI electronic communication, summary of testimony of Mohamed Abdulla Mohamed Awady on Oct. 24,
2003, at the Mzoudi trial, Dec. 5, 2003.
101. German BKA report, investigative summary re Jarrah, July 18, 2002.
102. On Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, also known as Ammar al Baluchi, see FBI report,“Summary of Penttbom Investi-

NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

497

gation,” Feb. 29, 2004, p. 78. Ali, in turn, would ship these materials to his uncle, KSM, in Karachi. Intelligence
report, interrogation of Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, Feb. 11, 2004. On Jarrah, see German BKA report, investigative summary re Jarrah, July 18, 2002. Following his sudden decision to study aircraft engineering in Hamburg, Jarrah had
expressed interest in becoming a pilot around the end of 1998, well before he traveled to Afghanistan. According
to Senguen, Jarrah told her about friends of his who had interrupted their studies to join the Germany army so
that they could become pilots. Jarrah’s pre-Afghanistan interest in aviation also is confirmed by a January 22, 1999,
email recovered after the September 11, 2001, attacks, in which Jarrah told a friend from Beirut that he might “come
next year and . . . have something to tell about airplanes.” Ibid. On Binalshibh, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Sept. 24, 2002.
103. Summary of Judgment and Sentencing Order by Hanseatic Regional High Court, Motassadeq trial, Feb.
19, 2003, pp. 10–11. Zacarias Moussaoui later would benefit from the results of all this research. Following his August
2001 arrest, the FBI discovered among his possessions a fax copy of an advertisement for U.S. flight schools.According to Binalshibh, notes in the margin of the advertisement were written by Atta. Intelligence report, interrogation
of Binalshibh, Dec. 19, 2002.
104. DOS record, NIV applicant detail, Marwan al Shehhi, Mohamed Atta, Ziad Jarrah, Nov. 8, 2001.The visa
applications were destroyed by the State Department according to routine document handling practices before their
significance was known.
105. DOS records, visa applications of Ramzi Binalshibh, May 17, 2000; June 15, 2000; Oct. 25 2000. CIA analytic report, “The Plot and the Plotters,” June 1, 2003, pp. 9–10; German BKA report, investigative summary re
Binalshibh, July 4, 2002. Atta had twice explored the possibility of obtaining a U.S. green card shortly before his
November 1999 trip to Afghanistan. FBI report,“Summary of Penttbom Investigation,” Feb. 29, 2004, p. 8. Both
Binalshibh and Jarrah listed the same person as a point of contact in the United States, an Indonesian national who
had previously lived in Hamburg. Although this individual knew some members of the Hamburg cell, including
Mohamed Atta and Razmi Binalshibh, there is no indication that any of the hijackers actually contacted him while
they were in the United States. See German BKA report, investigative summary re Jarrah, July 18, 2002. Binalshibh
had applied for a visa years earlier along with Fuad Bazarah, a co-worker inYemen whose father contacted the U.S.
embassy on Binalshibh’s behalf. Bazarah obtained a visa application and moved to Los Angeles, but Binalshibh’s
application was denied. Bazarah would later live in Los Angeles with Ramez Noaman, an individual who knew
Nawaf al Hazmi in San Diego. FBI electronic communication,“Penttbom,” Oct. 23, 2001.
106. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Sept. 9, 2003; CIA analytic report, Al Qaeda travel issues, Jan.
2004, p. 1. On the role of KSM, see, e.g., Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Oct. 11, 2002. On the role
of Abu Zubaydah, see, e.g., Intelligence report, biographical information on Abu Zubayda, Feb. 25, 2002.Al Qaeda
also relied on outside travel facilitators, including fraudulent document vendors, corrupt officials, travel agencies,
and smugglers, to help move operatives around the world by obtaining fraudulent documents, arranging visas (real
or fake), making airline reservations, etc. See CIA analytic report,“Clandestine Travel Facilitators: Key Enablers of
Terrorism,” Dec. 31, 2002; CIA analytic report,Al Qaeda travel issues, Jan. 2004.
107. On passport collection schemes, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Sept. 9, 2003. On recycled
passports, see Intelligence report, Collection of passports June 7, 2002.
108. See Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Nov. 12, 2003; May 25, 2004; CIA analytic report, Al
Qaeda travel issues, Jan. 2004, pp. 1, 3, 19.A detainee has admitted attending several security and specialized courses,
including ones in counterfeiting and seal removal. Intelligence report, interrogation of al Qaeda associates,Apr. 11,
2002.Atta reportedly learned alteration techniques in Afghanistan, cleaning Ramzi Binalshibh’s passport of its Pakistani visa and travel cachets. CIA analytic report, Al Qaeda travel issues, Jan. 2004, p. 1.
109. Intelligence report, Information on Mujahideen Travel, Mar. 13, 2002.
110. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 25, 2003.A small amount of the plot’s backing came from
Shehhi’s own funds. He received a salary from the UAE military, which was sponsoring his studies in Germany,
through December 23, 2000. Binalshibh apparently used some of this money to wire just over $10,000 to Shehhi
in the United States and pay some of his own plot-related expenses.Adam Drucker interview (Jan. 12, 2004); FBI
Report,“Summary of Penttbom Investigation,” Feb. 29, 2004, pp. 20–22.
111. CIA analytic report,“Terrorism:Amount of Money It Takes to Keep al-Qa’ida Functioning,”Aug. 7, 2002;
CIA analytic report, “Terrorism: Al-Qa’ida Operating on a Shoestring,” undated (post-9/11); Frank G. interview
(Mar. 2, 2004).
112. In the wake of the East Africa embassy bombings, the NSC led trips to Saudi Arabia in 1999 and 2000 to
meet with Saudi officials on terrorist financing. These meetings, and subsequent interviews of Bin Ladin family
members in the United States, helped the U.S. government revise its understanding of Bin Ladin’s wealth. Rick
Newcomb interview (Feb. 4, 2004);William Wechsler interview (Jan. 7, 2004).
113. See William Wechsler interview (Jan. 7, 2004); Rick Newcomb interview (Feb. 4, 2004); Frank G. interview (Mar. 2, 2004); Frank G. and Mary S. briefing (July 15, 2003). See also DOS cable, State 035243,“January 2000
Meeting Regarding UBL Finances,” Feb. 27, 2000; DOS cable, Riyadh 000475, “The Saudi Binladin Group:
Builders to the King,” Feb. 16, 1999;Treasury memo, Office of Foreign Asset Control to DOS, Draft Cable on Meet-

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NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

ing with Two of UBL’s Brothers, May 19, 2000;Youssef M. Ibrahim,“Saudis Strip Citizenship from Backers of Militants,” New York Times,Apr. 10, 1994, p. 15;“Saudi Family Disassociates Itself from ‘Terrorist’ Member,”Associated
Press, Feb. 19, 1994.
114. Frank G. and Mary S. briefing (July 15, 2003); Frank G. interview (Mar. 2, 2004); Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 30, 2003; Robert Block,“In War on Terrorism, Sudan Struck a Blow by Fleecing Bin Laden,”
Wall Street Journal, Dec. 3, 2001, p. A1. Despite substantial evidence to the contrary and his own assertion that Bin
Ladin arrived in Afghanistan with no money, KSM has told his interrogators that he believes the bulk of the money
(85–95 percent) for the planes operation came from Bin Ladin’s personal fortune. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, July 30, 2003;Apr. 5, 2004; June 15, 2004.
115. Frank G. interview (Mar. 2, 2004); CIA analytic report, Financial Support forTerrorist Organizations, CTC
2002-40117CH, Nov. 14, 2002.The United States was not a primary source of al Qaeda funding, although some
funds raised in the United States may have made their way to al Qaeda or its affiliated groups. Frank G. and Mary
S. briefing (July 15, 2003).
116. Frank G. interview (Mar. 2, 2004); CIA analytic report,“Identifying al-Qa’ida’s Donors and Fundraisers:
A Status Report,” CTC 2002-40029CH, Feb. 27, 2002.
117. CIA analytic report,“Identifying al-Qa’ida’s Donors and Fundraisers:A Status Report,” Feb. 27, 2002; CIA
analytic report, spectrum of al Qaeda donors, CTC 2003-30199HC, Oct. 30, 2003; Frank G. interview (Mar. 2,
2004).
118. CIA analytic report,“How Bin Ladin Commands a Global Terrorist Network,” CTC 99-40003, Jan. 27,
1999; CIA analytic report, “Gauging the War against al-Qa’ida’s Finances,” CTC 2002-30078CH, Aug. 8, 2002;
CIA analytic report, paper on Al-Haramain, CTC 2002-30014C, Mar. 22, 2002.
119. CIA analytic report,“Al Qa’ida’s Financial Ties to IslamicYouth Programs,” CTC 2002-40132HCX, Jan.
17, 2003; CIA analytic report,Al Qaeda Financial Network, CTC 2002-40094H,Aug. 7, 2002.
120. Frank G. interview (Mar. 2, 2004); CIA analytic report, Financial Links of Al Qaeda Operative, CTC 200230060CH, June 27, 2002.
121. Frank G. and Mary S. briefing (July 15, 2003).The Taliban’s support was limited to the period immediately following Bin Ladin’s arrival in Afghanistan, before he reinvigorated fund-raising efforts. By 9/11, al Qaeda
was returning the favor, providing substantial financial support to the Taliban.
122. David Aufhauser interview (Feb. 12, 2004).We have found no evidence that Saudi Princess Haifa al Faisal
provided any funds to the conspiracy, either directly or indirectly. See Adam Drucker interview (May 19, 2004).
123. On limited Saudi oversight, see Bob Jordan interview (Jan. 14, 2004). In Saudi Arabia, zakat is broader and
more pervasive than Western ideas of charity, in that it functions not only as charity but also as social welfare, educational assistance, foreign aid, a form of income tax, and a source of political influence.
124. A hawala, at least in the “pure” form, transfers value without the use of a negotiable instrument or other
commonly recognized method for the exchange of money. For example, a U.S. resident who wanted to send money
to a person in another country, such as Pakistan, would give her money, in dollars, to a U.S.-based hawaladar.The
U.S. hawaladar would then contact his counterpart in Pakistan, giving the Pakistani hawaladar the particulars of the
transaction, such as the amount of money, the code, and perhaps the identity of the recipient.The ultimate recipient in Pakistan would then go to the Pakistani hawaladar and receive his money, in rupees, from whatever money
the Pakistani hawaladar has on hand. As far as the sender and ultimate recipient are concerned, the transaction is
then complete.The two hawaladars would have a variety of mechanisms to settle their debt, either through offsetting transactions (e.g., someone in Pakistan sending money to the United States using the same two hawaladars), a
periodic settling wire transfer from the U.S. hawaladar’s bank to the Pakistani hawaladar’s bank, or a commercial
transaction, such as the U.S. hawaladar paying a debt or an invoice, in dollars, that the Pakistani hawaladar owes in
the United States. Hawalas typically do not have a large central control office for settling transactions, maintaining
instead a loose association with other hawaladars to transfer value, generally without any formal or legally binding
agreements. See Treasury report,“A Report to Congress in Accordance with Section 359 of the [USA PATRIOT
Act]” Nov. 2002;Treasury report,“Hawala:The Hawala Alternate Remittance System and its Role in Money Laundering,” undated (prepared by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network in cooperation with INTERPOL, probably in 1996).
125. Frank G. and Mary S. briefing (July 15, 2003); CIA analytic report Al-Qa’ida Financiers, CTC 200230138H, Jan. 3, 2003. Moreover, because al Qaeda initially was living hand to mouth, there was no need to store
funds.
126. CIA analytic report,“Pursuing the Bin Ladin Financial Target,” CTC 01-40003HCS,Apr. 12, 2001; CIA
analytic report,“Couriers, Hawaladars Key to Moving Al-Qa’ida Money,” CTC 2003-40063CH, May 16, 2003.
127. For al Qaeda spending, see Frank G. and Mary S. briefing (July 15, 2003).The 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in East Africa cost approximately $10,000. CIA analytic report,“Gauging the War on Terrorism: Most 11 September Practices StillViable,” Jan. 30, 2002; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, June 3, 2003.Although there
is evidence that al Qaeda experienced funding shortfalls as part of the cyclical fund-raising process (with more
money coming during the holy month of Ramadan), we are not aware of any intelligence indicating that terror-

NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

499

ist acts were interrupted as a result. For al Qaeda expenditures, see, e.g., CIA analytic report, “Usama Bin Ladin’s
Finances: Some Estimates of Wealth, Income, and Expenditures,” CTC IR 98-40006, Nov. 17, 1998. For payments
to theTaliban, see Frank G. and Mary S. briefing (July 15, 2003); CIA analytic report,“Terrorism:Amount of Money
It Takes to Keep al-Qa’ida Functioning,” PWR080702-05,Aug. 7, 2002. On start-up funds, see Frank G. interview
(Mar. 2, 2004).
128. Doug Wankel interview (Mar. 15, 2004); Frank G. and Mary S. briefing (July 15, 2003). Although some
reporting alleges that Bin Ladin may have been an investor, or even had an operational role, in drug trafficking
before 9/11, this intelligence cannot be substantiated. Ibid. Frank G. interview (Mar. 2, 2004). No evidence indicates any such involvement in drug trafficking, and none of the detained al Qaeda operatives has indicated that this
was a method of fund-raising.
129. “Conflict diamonds” refers to rough diamonds that finance armed conflict in Africa. The international
community has tried to restrict trade in such gems. FBI report, “Allegations of Al Qaeda Trafficking in Conflict
Diamonds,” July 18, 2003; CIA analytic report,“Terrorism:Assessing al-Qa’ida and Hizballah Ties to Conflict Diamonds,” CTC 2002-40121CH, Jan. 13, 2003; CIA analytic report,“Couriers, Hawaladars Key to Moving Al-Qa’ida
Money,” CTC 2003-40063CH, May 16, 2003; DOS cable, Brussels 05994,“WP Reporter Claims More Witnesses
to 2001 Al-Qaida/Conflict Diamonds Link,” Dec. 12, 2002; DOS cable, Brussels 001054, terrorism and conflict
diamonds, Mar. 1, 2002. Greg R. interviews (Oct. 3, 2003; July 6, 2004);Alan White interview (June 23, 2004); FBI
situation reports and supporting documents from the Sierra Leone trip, Feb. 2004.
130. Highly publicized allegations of insider trading in advance of 9/11 generally rest on reports of unusual
pre-9/11 trading activity in companies whose stock plummeted after the attacks. Some unusual trading did in fact
occur, but each such trade proved to have an innocuous explanation. For example, the volume of put options—
investments that pay off only when a stock drops in price—surged in the parent companies of United Airlines on
September 6 and American Airlines on September 10—highly suspicious trading on its face.Yet, further investigation has revealed that the trading had no connection with 9/11.A single U.S.-based institutional investor with no
conceivable ties to al Qaeda purchased 95 percent of the UAL puts on September 6 as part of a trading strategy
that also included buying 115,000 shares of American on September 10. Similarly, much of the seemingly suspicious
trading in American on September 10 was traced to a specific U.S.-based options trading newsletter, faxed to its
subscribers on Sunday, September 9, which recommended these trades.These examples typify the evidence examined by the investigation.The SEC and the FBI, aided by other agencies and the securities industry, devoted enormous resources to investigating this issue, including securing the cooperation of many foreign governments.These
investigators have found that the apparently suspicious consistently proved innocuous. Joseph Cella interview (Sept.
16, 2003; May 7, 2004; May 10–11, 2004); FBI briefing (Aug. 15, 2003); SEC memo, Division of Enforcement to
SEC Chair and Commissioners, “Pre-September 11, 2001 Trading Review,” May 15, 2002; Ken Breen interview
(Apr. 23, 2004); Ed G. interview (Feb. 3, 2004).
131.The hijackers spent more than $270,000 in the United States, and the costs associated with Moussaoui
were at least $50,000.The additional expenses included travel to obtain passports and visas, travel to the United
States, expenses incurred by the plot leaders and facilitators, and the expenses incurred by the people selected to
be hijackers who ultimately did not participate. For many of these expenses, we have only fragmentary evidence
and/or unconfirmed detainee reports, and can make only a rough estimate of costs.The $400,000 to $500,000 estimate does not include the cost of running training camps in Afghanistan, where the hijackers were recruited and
trained, or the marginal cost of the training itself. Finally, the architect of the plot, KSM, put the total cost at approximately $400,000, apparently excluding Moussaoui’s expenses. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, June 3,
2003;Apr. 5, 2004. Our investigation has uncovered no evidence that the 9/11 conspirators employed hawala as a
means to move the money that funded the operation. Indeed, the surviving plot participants have either not mentioned hawala or have explicitly denied using it to send money to the United States.Adam Drucker interview (Jan.
12, 2004); Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, April 5, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee,
Apr. 2, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of Ramzi Binalshibh, Apr. 7, 2004. On domestic U.S. and foreign
government funding, see, e.g., Adam Drucker interviews (Jan. 12, 2004; May 19, 2004); Dennis Lormel interview
(Jan. 16, 2004); FBI response to Commission question for the record, July 13, 2004. As discussed in chapter 7, we
have examined three transactions involving individuals in San Diego. Based on all of the evidence, we have concluded that none of these transactions involved a net transfer of funds to the hijackers.
132. Shehhi received a salary from the UAE military, which was sponsoring his studies in Germany. Adam
Drucker interview (Jan. 12, 2004). For funds received by facilitators, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM,
Apr. 5, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh,Apr. 9, 2004. Notwithstanding persistent press reports
to the contrary, there is no convincing evidence that the Spanish al Qaeda cell, led by Imad Barkat Yarkas and al
Qaeda European financier Mohammed Galeb Kalaje Zouaydi, provided any funding to support the 9/11 attacks
or the Hamburg participants. Zouaydi may have provided funds to Hamburg associate Mamoun Darkazanli—see,
e.g., FBI letterhead memorandum,Yarkas and Spanish Cell investigation, Jan. 8, 2003—but there is no evidence that
Zouaydi provided money to the plot participants or that any of his funds were used to support the plot. Adam
Drucker interview (Jan. 12, 2004); Ed G. interview (Feb. 3, 2004).

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NOTES TO CHAPTER 6

6 From Threat to Threat
1. President Clinton was a voracious reader of intelligence. He received the President’s Daily Brief (PDB), Senior
Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB), and the State Department’s intelligence updates daily, as well as other products
episodically. Berger, Clarke, and Chief of Staff John Podesta received daily Bin Ladin “Situation Reports” from the
CIA detailing Bin Ladin’s reported location and movements. Berger told us he would tell President Clinton if there
was anything in these reports that he needed to know. Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004). Information on
distribution of Bin Ladin Situation Reports provided to the Commission by CIA.
2. President Clinton spoke of terrorism in numerous public statements. In his August 5, 1996, remarks at George
Washington University, he called terrorism “the enemy of our generation.” He usually spoke of terrorism in two
related contexts: new technologies and the greater openness engendered by post–Cold War globalization; and
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially—and increasingly over time—the threat from biological and chemical weapons. President Clinton repeatedly linked terrorist groups and WMD as transnational threats for the new
global era. See, e.g., President Clinton remarks,“On Keeping America Secure for the 21st Century,” Jan. 22, 1999
(at the National Academy of Sciences,Washington, D.C.), in which he spoke directly to these topics.
3. President Clinton spoke of theY2K computer problem in his January 19, 1999, State of the Union address.
OnY2K concerns, see John Podesta interview (Jan. 15, 2004). On concerns about extremist groups exploiting millennial opportunities, see, e.g., CIA briefing materials, CTC for the DCI,“Millennium Threat,” Dec. 16, 1999.
4. Judith Miller,“HolyWarriors: Dissecting aTerror Plot from Boston to Amman,” NewYork Times, Jan. 15, 2001,
p.A1; CIA analytic report,“Bin Ladin’s Terrorist Operations: Meticulous and Adaptable,” CTC 00-400117, Nov. 2,
2000 (appendix B:“Bin Ladin’s Role in the Anti-U.S.‘Millennial’ Plots”).
5. Ibid. On Hoshar and Hijazi, see Jason Burke, Al Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror (I. B.Tauris, 2003), p. 188.
Khaldan and Derunta were terrorist training camps in Afghanistan controlled by Abu Zubaydah.While the camps
were not al Qaeda facilities,Abu Zubaydah had an agreement with Bin Ladin to conduct reciprocal recruiting efforts
whereby promising trainees at the camps could be invited to join al Qaeda. See Intelligence report, interrogation
of Abu Zubaydah, July 10, 2002.
6. Miller,“Holy Warriors,” Jan. 15, 2001; CIA analytic report,“Bin Ladin’s Terrorist Operations,” Nov. 2, 2000
(appendix B).
7. CIA analytic report,“Bin Ladin’s Terrorist Operations,” Nov. 2, 2000 (appendix B).
8. FBI electronic communication,“Ahmed Ressam; Usama bin Ladin; Sbih Benyamin; Lucia Garofalo; Bouabide Chamchi,” Dec. 29, 1999; Miller,“Holy Warriors,” Jan. 15, 2001.The Encyclopedia is a multivolume instruction
manual containing lessons on weapons handling, tactics, covert operations, bomb making, and other topics. The
manual was originally created in the late 1980s by Afghanistan-based extremists, who considered it essential for
waging terrorist operations and guerrilla warfare in the jihad against the Soviets. For more on the origins of the
Encyclopedia, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, June 24, 2003. Although Deek’s precise role
within the extremist community is unknown, his name appears variously as a staff member, instructor, and technical guru for the Khaldan and Derunta terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. Intelligence has revealed no extant
links to the al Qaeda inner circle. For more on Deek, see FBI electronic communication,“Usama Bin Laden; Penttbomb;Taliban,” May 25, 2002.
9. Testimony of Dale Watson before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Feb. 9, 2000, p. 4; Miller,
“Holy Warriors,” Jan. 15, 2001.
10.Testimony of Dale Watson before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Feb. 9, 2000, pp. 3–4; FBI
electronic communication,“Ahmed Ressam; Usama bin Ladin; Sbih Benyamin; Lucia Garofalo; Bouabide Ghamchi,” Dec. 29, 1999; Miller,“Holy Warriors,” Jan. 15, 2001. On the fate of Hoshar and Hijazi’s accomplices, see DOS
cable, Amman 05158,“Security Court Convicts UBL Suspects of Plotting,” Sept. 18, 2000.
11. NSC note, Clarke to Berger, Dec. 4, 1999; Richard Clarke interview (Jan. 12, 2004). In the margin next to
Clarke’s suggestion to attack al Qaeda facilities in the week before January 1, 2000, Berger wrote “no.”
12. NSC memo, Berger to President Clinton, Dec. 9, 1999.
13. NSC email, Clarke to Berger, Dec. 14, 1999.The State Department, through the U.S. embassy in Riyadh,
also asked the Saudis to relay the same threat to the Taliban.The diplomat said the United States was delivering “a
strong and unmistakable message to the Taliban that should such attacks occur, they and Bin Ladin will be subject
to swift and serious response.” See DOS cable, Riyadh 003900,“Saudis on USG Warning to Taliban Concerning
UBLThreats,” Dec. 14, 1999. Berger wrote President Clinton that the State Department’s warning seemed to barely
register with the Taliban. See NSC memo, Berger to President Clinton, terrorist threat at the millennium, Dec. 18,
1999.
14. See NSC memo, talking points for Zinni, Dec. 20, 1999; Anthony Zinni interview (Jan. 19, 2004); NSC
email, Clarke to Berger, Dec. 22, 1999 (in which Clarke writes that “the Milam mission has largely failed”); NSC
memo, Riedel re Milam call (attached to the Clarke email).
15. George Tenet interview (Jan. 22, 2004); George Tenet prepared statement, Mar. 24, 2004, p. 22.
16. Randy Moss interview (Feb. 6, 2004). In sending the draft MON to the CIA, the NSC’s senior director
for intelligence programs, Mary McCarthy, cited only the August 1998 and July 1999 MONs as relevant prece-

38.Vanderbilt University,Television News Archive, Dec. 22, 1999–Jan. 4, 2000.
39. On the FBI’s standard operating procedure, see Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004); John Podesta interview (Jan. 15, 2004); James Steinberg interview (Dec. 4, 2003); Richard Clarke interviews (Dec. 18, 2004; Jan. 12,
2004); Paul Kurtz interview (Dec. 16, 2003).
40. See James Steinberg interview (Dec. 4, 2003). According to Steinberg, the millennium crisis was the only
time that the FBI effectively shared information with the NSC. Before that,White House officials complained, they
got nothing from the FBI—and were told that they were being deliberately kept out of the loop on grounds of
propriety. See also Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004); Richard Clarke interview (Jan. 12, 2004); Roger Cressey
interview (Dec. 15, 2003). In fact, it was completely appropriate for the NSC to be briefed by the FBI on its national
security investigations. Moreover, the legal bar to sharing information was often exaggerated. Only information
actually presented to the grand jury could not be disclosed. See Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which establishes rules for grand jury secrecy.
41. Intelligence report, Activities of Bin Ladin associates, Dec. 29, 1999; Intelligence report, review of 9/11
hijackers’ activities, Sept. 23, 2002; CIA cable,“Activities of Bin Ladin Associate Khalid Revealed,” Jan. 4, 2000.
42. Intelligence report, meetings between Khallad and perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks, May 30, 2003.
43. Intelligence report,Activities of Bin Ladin associates, Jan. 2, 2000; CIA cable,“Activities of Bin Ladin Associate Khalid Revealed,” Jan. 4, 2000; CIA email, CTC to NSA, Another UBL related report, Jan. 3, 2000.
44. CIA cable, “Activities of Bin Ladin Associate Khalid Revealed,” Jan. 4, 2000. His Saudi passport—which
contained a visa for travel to the United States—was photocopied and forwarded to CIA headquarters.This information was not shared with FBI headquarters until August 2001. An FBI agent detailed to the Bin Ladin unit at
CIA attempted to share this information with colleagues at FBI headquarters. A CIA desk officer instructed him
not to send the cable with this information. Several hours later, this same desk officer drafted a cable distributed
solely within CIA alleging that the visa documents had been shared with the FBI. She admitted she did not personally share the information and cannot identify who told her they had been shared.We were unable to locate
anyone who claimed to have shared the information. Contemporaneous documents contradict the claim that they
were shared. DOJ Inspector General interview of Doug M., Feb. 12, 2004; DOJ Inspector General interview of
Michael, Oct. 31, 2002; CIA cable, Jan. 5, 2000; DOJ Inspector General report,“A Review of the FBI’s Handling
of Intelligence Information Related to the 9/11 Attacks,” July 2, 2004, p. 282.
45. CIA cables,“Identification of UBL Associate Khalid Transiting Dubai,” Jan. 4, 2000;“UBL Associate Travel
to Malaysia—Khalid Bin Muhammad bin ‘Abdallah al-Mihdhar,” Jan. 5, 2000; “Arrival of UBL Associate Khalid
Bin Muhammad bin ‘Abdallah al-Mihdhar,” Jan. 6, 2000.
46. CIA cable, “UBL Associates Travel to Malaysia and Beyond—Khalid Bin Muhammad bin ‘Abdallah alMidhar,” Jan. 6, 2000.
47. CIA cable,“UBL Associates Depart Malaysia,” Jan. 8, 2000.
48. CIA cable,“UBL Associates: Flight Manifest,” Jan. 9, 2000. None of the CIA personnel at CIA headquarters or in the field had checked NSA databases or asked NSA to do so. If this had been done, on the basis of other
unreported intelligence associated with the same sources, analysts would have been able to quickly learn “Nawaf ”
was likely Nawaf al Hazmi. Such analysis was not conducted until after 9/11. After 9/11 it also was determined
that Salahsae was part of a name being used by Tawfiq bin Attash, also known as Khallad. One reason he was traveling around East Asia at this time is that he was helping to plan possible hijackings on aircraft in connection with
an early idea for what would become the 9/11 plot.
49. CIA cable,“Efforts to Locate al-Midhar,” Jan. 13, 2000.We now know that two other al Qaeda operatives
flew to Bangkok to meet Khallad to pass him money. See chapter 8.That was not known at the time. Mihdhar was
met at the Kuala Lumpur airport by Ahmad Hikmat Shakir, an Iraqi national. Reports that he was a lieutenant
colonel in the Iraqi Fedayeen have turned out to be incorrect.They were based on a confusion of Shakir’s identity
with that of an Iraqi Fedayeen colonel with a similar name, who was later (in September 2001) in Iraq at the same
time Shakir was in police custody in Qatar. See CIA briefing by CTC specialists (June 22, 2004);Walter Pincus and
Dan Eggen,“Al Qaeda Link to Iraq May Be Confusion over Names,” Washington Post, June 22, 2004, p.A13.
50. Richard interview (Dec. 11, 2003); CIA briefing materials, UBL unit briefing slides, Jan. 3–Jan. 14, 2000;
Intelligence reports,“UBL Situation Report,” Jan. 5, 10, 12, 2000; CIA email, Rob to John and others,“Malaysia—
for the record,” Jan. 6, 2000.
51. CIA cable,“Efforts to Locate al-Midhar,” Jan. 13, 2000.
52. CIA cable,“UBL Associates: Identification of Possible UBL Associates,” Feb. 11, 2000.
53. CIA cable,“UBL Associates: Identification of Possible UBL Associates,” Mar. 5, 2000. Presumably the departure information was obtained back in January, on the days that these individuals made their departures. Because
these names were watchlisted with the Thai authorities, we cannot yet explain the delay in reporting the news. But
since nothing was done with this information even in March, we do not attribute much significance to this failure
alone.
54. See, e.g., Joint Inquiry testimony of GeorgeTenet, Oct. 17, 2002, pp. 110–112; DOJ Inspector General interview of John, Nov. 1, 2002.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 6

503

55. CIA briefing, CTC Update, “Islamic Extremist Terrorist Threat,” Jan. 5, 7, 2000; George Tenet interview
(Jan. 22, 2004). Tenet described the millennium alert as probably the most difficult operational environment the
CIA had ever faced.
56. NSC memo, Clarke to Berger,“Post-Millennium Soul Searching,” Jan. 11, 2000.
57. NSC memo,“Review of Terrorism Alert and Lessons Learned,” Jan. 3, 2000 (draft).This paper is part of a
packet Clarke sent to Deputy Attorney General Thompson, copying White House officials, on Sept. 17, 2001.
58. NSC memo, McCarthy to Berger, need for new strategy, Jan. 5, 2000.
59. NSC memo, Kurtz to Berger, roadmap for March 10 PC meeting, Mar. 8, 2000.
60. NSC memo, Cressey to Berger, Summary of Conclusions for March 10, 2000, PC on Millennium AfterAction Review,Apr. 3, 2000; Samuel Berger letter to the Commission,“Comments on Staff Statements 5–8,” May
13, 2004, p. 9.
61. NSC memo,“The Millennium Terrorist Alert—Next Steps,” undated.
62. DOS memo, Sheehan and Inderfurth to Albright, “Pakistan Trip Report—A Counterterrorism Perspective,” Jan. 26, 2000; DOS cable, Islamabad 00396, ���Inderfurth Delegation Meeting with General Musharraf,” Jan.
24, 2000.
63. In February 2000, the CIA began receiving information about a possible Bin Ladin–associated plot to attack
Air Force One with Stinger missiles if President Clinton visited Pakistan; this information was deemed credible by
early March. The CIA also reviewed reported threats to the President in Bangladesh and India. CIA briefing,
“Reported Plan To Attack U.S. Presidential Plane If HeVisits Pakistan,” Feb. 18, 2000; NSC email, Clarke to Berger,
terrorism update, Feb. 29, 2000; CIA briefing, chief of CTC for the President,“Threats to the President’s Visit to
Asia,” Mar. 2, 2000; NSC memo, Kurtz,“Summary of Conclusions of March 14, 2000 Meeting on Clinton Trip to
South Asia;” NSC email, Kurtz to Berger, two new threats to assassinate the President in Bangladesh, Mar. 16, 2000.
Berger told us that the Secret Service was vehemently opposed to a presidential visit to Islamabad; it took the
extraordinary step of meeting twice with the President and offering very serious warnings. Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004).
64. President Clinton meeting (Apr. 8, 2004). President Clinton told us he offered Musharraf aid and help in
improving U.S.-Pakistani relations.A conversation that day between the two leaders in the presence of several close
advisers is described in DOS cable, State 073803, “Memorandum of the President’s Conversation with Pervez
Musharraf on March 25, 2000,” Apr. 19, 2000. A third meeting was apparently held in front of additional aides.
Berger told that President Clinton did not want to press the Bin Ladin issue too heavily at the main meeting because
ISID (Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate) members were present. Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004).
65. NSC email, Camp for Berger,“Musharraf ’s Proposed Afghanistan Trip,” May 8, 2000. Clarke wrote Berger
that Musharraf seemed to have “said the right things to Omar.” NSC email, Clarke to Berger, May 11, 2000.
66. DOS cable, Islamabad 002902,“Summary of May 26, 2000 Meeting Between Pickering and Musharraf,”
May 29, 2000.
67. DOS cable, Islamabad 79983, “DCI Meets with Chief Executive General Musharraf,” June 21, 2000.
Musharraf agreed to create a counterterrorism working group to coordinate efforts between Pakistani agencies and
the CIA.Tenet noted that he was not asking the Pakistanis to deliver Bin Ladin next Tuesday; the DCI said he was
“ambitious, but not crazy.”
68. DOS cable, State 185645,“Concern that Pakistan is Stepping up Support to Taliban’s Military Campaign
in Afghanistan,” Sept. 26, 2000.
69. UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1333, Dec. 19, 2000. UNSCR 1333 also called for countries
to withdraw their officials and agents from the Taliban-held part of Afghanistan. Sheehan said that the new UN
sanctions were aimed at the Taliban’s primary supporters: Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
Michael Sheehan interview (Dec. 16, 2003).
70. Madeleine Albright prepared statement, Mar. 23, 2004, p. 11; Madeleine Albright interview (Jan. 7, 2004).
71. Michael Sheehan interview (Dec. 16, 2003).
72.The CIA appears to have briefed President Clinton on its “Next Steps and New Initiatives” in February
2000, noting the need to hire and train the right officers with the necessary skills and deploy them to the right
places, as well as to work with foreign liaison.The CIA noted in its briefing that the President should press foreign
leaders to maintain pressure on terrorists. See CIA briefing materials,“Targeting the Terrorists: Next Steps and New
Initiatives,” Feb. 1, 2000 (for the President); NSC email, Cressey to Berger,“CT Briefing for Clinton,” Feb. 8, 2000.
73. For the CTC’s perspective, see CIA briefing materials,“Talking Points for the DCI for the Principals Committee meeting on Terrorism:The Millennium Alert—After Action Review,” Mar. 9, 2000. Deputy Chief of CTC
Ben Bonk noted in the talking points that the CTC had obligated 50 percent of its fiscal year 2000 budget by Jan.
31, 2000, spending about 15 percent of its budget directly on the millennium surge. He stated that without a supplemental, it would be impossible for the CTC to continue at its current pace, let alone increase the operational
tempo. On Tenet meeting with Berger, see George Tenet interview (Jan. 28, 2004).
74. Joan Dempsey interview (Nov. 12, 2003); George Tenet interview (Jan. 22, 2004).Tenet called the supple-

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NOTES TO CHAPTER 6

mental appropriation “a lifesaver.” See, for example, the request for supplemental appropriations in CIA briefing
materials,“Targeting the Terrorists: Next Steps and New Initiatives,” Feb. 1, 2000 (for the President).
75. Richard Clarke interview (Feb. 3, 2004).
76. James Pavitt interview (Jan. 8, 2004).
77. Richard Clarke interviews (Dec. 18, 2003; Feb. 3, 2004).
78. CIA memos, summary of weekly Berger/Tenet meeting, Apr. 5, 12, 2000; NSC memo, “April 19, 2000
Agenda for Deputies Committee Meeting on CT:The MillenniumThreat FY00 and FY01 Budget Review;” NSC
memo, “Summary of Conclusions of April 18, 2000 CSG Meeting,” Apr. 26, 2000. On May 2, 2000, Berger was
updated on budget issues relating to the CIA and other agencies; there was agreement on the most critical items
to be funded, but not on the source of that funding. In CIA’s case, it had already reprogrammed over $90 million,
but Tenet wanted to use most of this money on non-counterterrorism programs. NSC memo, Kurtz to Berger,
“Budget Issues,” May 2, 2000. On June 29, 2000, the President authorized raising the CIA’s covert action funding
ceiling. NSC memo, McCarthy to CSG, “DCI Wants to Raise Funding Ceiling,” May 8, 2000; NSC memo,
McCarthy to others July 7, 2000 (appendix on authorities). But funding issues in other agencies remained unresolved. Clarke complained that neither Treasury nor Justice would identify offsets. Clarke encouraged OMB to tell
both departments that if they would not identify offsets then OMB would. NSC email, Clarke to Rudman and
Mitchell, May 9, 2000. On August 1, 2000, Clarke wrote Berger that one of five goals by the end of the Clinton
administration was to secure appropriations for cybersecurity and millennium after-action review projects. NSC
memo, Clarke to Berger,“Goals andWildcards,”Aug. 1, 2000.As late as September 2000, Clarke was advising Berger
that unfunded counterterrorism requests continued to be his number one priority. NSC note, Clarke to Berger,
Sept. 9, 2000.
79. Executive Order 13099 (Aug. 20, 1998); Rick Newcomb interview (Feb. 4, 2004); Robert McBride interview (Nov. 19–20, 2003); NSC memo, Kurtz to Berger, June 28, 2000. OFAC did freeze accounts belonging to
Salah Idris, the owner of the al Shifa facility bombed in response to the East Africa embassy bombings. Idris filed
suit against his bank and OFAC. OFAC subsequently authorized the unfreezing of those accounts. James Risen,
“To Bomb Sudan Plant, or Not: A Year Later, Debates Rankle,” New York Times, Oct. 27, 1999, p. A1.The inability
to freeze funds is attributed in part to a lack of intelligence on the location of Bin Ladin’s money, OFAC’s reluctance or inability to rely on what classified information there may have been, and Bin Ladin’s transfer of assets into
the hands of trusted third parties or out of the formal financial system by 1998. Even if OFAC had received better intelligence from the intelligence community, it would have been powerless to stop the bulk of the problem.Al
Qaeda money flows depended on an informal network of hawalas and Islamic institutions moving money from
Gulf supporters to Afghanistan.These funds would not therefore have touched the U.S. formal financial system.
OFAC’s authorities are only against U.S. persons, financial institutions, and businesses. Frank G. and Mary S. briefing (July 15, 2003); Rick Newcomb interview (Feb. 4, 2003).
80. Executive Order 13129;Treasury memo, Newcomb to Johnson,“Blocking of Taliban-Controlled Assets,”
undated (probably Oct. 18, 1999).
81. DOS cable, State 184471, Sept. 30, 1999; 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.
82. The Financial Action Task Force, a multilateral government organization dedicated to standard setting,
focused on money laundering, particularly as it related to crimes such as drug trafficking and large-scale fraud that
involved vast amounts of illegally procured money.Although the UN General Assembly adopted the International
Convention for the Suppression of Financing Terrorism in December 1999, the convention did not enter into force
until April 2002.
83. Doug M. interview (Dec. 16, 2003); Frank G. interview (Mar. 2, 2004). See also Mike interview (Dec. 11,
2003), setting forth the goals of the UBL station; none relate specifically to terrorist financing. Another witness
recalled that the UBL station made some effort to gather intelligence on al Qaeda financing, but it proved to be
too hard a target, the CIA had too few sources and, as a result, little quality intelligence was produced. Ed G. interview (Feb. 3, 2004). Some attributed the problem to the CIA’s separation of terrorist-financing analysis from other
counterterrorism activities.Within the Directorate of Intelligence, a group was devoted to the analysis of all financial issues, including terrorist financing. Called the Office of Transnational Issues (OTI), Illicit Transaction Groups
(ITG), it dealt with an array of issues besides terrorist financing, including drug trafficking, drug money laundering, alien smuggling, sanctions, and corruption. ITG was not part of the CTC, although it rotated a single analyst
to CTC. Moreover, OTI analysts were separated from the operational side of terrorist financing at CTC, which
planned operations against banks and financial facilitators.William Wechsler interview (Jan. 7, 2004); Frank G. and
Mary S. briefing (July 15, 2003).
84. CIA analytic report,“Funding Islamic Extremist Movements:The Role of Islamic Financial Institutions,”
OTI 97-10035CX, Dec. 1997.
85. Mike interview (Dec. 11, 2003).
86. CIA analytic reports,“Usama Bin Ladin: Some Saudi Financial Ties Probably Intact,” OTI IR 99-005CX,
Jan. 11, 1999; “How Bin Ladin Commands a Global Terrorist Network,” CTC 99-40003, Jan. 27, 1999; “Islamic
Terrorists: Using Nongovernmental Organizations Extensively,” CTC 99-40007,Apr. 9, 1999.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 6

505

87. See NSC memo, Kurtz to Berger, June 28, 2000; NSC document,TNT to Berger, Nov. 3, 1998, roadmap
for Small Group, undated.The problem continued until 9/11. Intelligence reporting was so limited that one CIA
intelligence analyst told us that, unassisted, he could read and digest the universe of intelligence reporting on al
Qaeda financial issues in the three years prior to the 9/11 attacks. Frank G. and Mary S. briefing (July 15, 2003).
88. Richard Clarke interview (Feb. 3, 2004); see, e.g., NSC memo, Clarke to CSG,“Concept of Operations for
Task Force Test of the Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Center,” Nov. 1, 2000; Treasury memo, Romey to Sloan,
“FTAT SCIF,” May 17, 2001;Treasury memo, Newcomb to Sloan,“Response to Romey Memo,” May 23, 2001.
Despite post-9/11 declarations to the contrary, on the eve of 9/11 FTAT had funds appropriated, but no people
hired, no security clearances, and no space to work.Treasury memo, Newcomb to Dam,“Establishing the Foreign
Asset Tracking Center,”Aug. 3, 2001. One Treasury official described CIA’s posture as “benign neglect” toward the
Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Center (FTATC), and characterized the CIA as believing that financial tracking
had limited utility. Treasury memo, Mat Burrows to O’Neill, “Your PC on Counterterrorism on 4 September,”
Sept. 4, 2001. National Security Advisor Rice told us she and her staff had determined by spring 2001 that terrorist financing proposals were a good option, so Treasury continued to plan to establish an office for 24 financing analysts. Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004). In fact, as noted above,Treasury failed to follow through on the
establishment of the FTATC until after 9/11.
89.This assessment is based on an extensive review of FBI files and interviews with agents and supervisors at
FBI Headquarters and various field offices.
90. Although there was an increased focus on money laundering, several significant legislative and regulatory
initiatives designed to close vulnerabilities in the U.S. financial system failed to gain traction. Some of these, such
as a move to control foreign banks with accounts in the United States, died as a result of banking industry pressure. Others, such as the regulation of money remitters within the United States, were mired in bureaucratic inertia and a general antiregulatory environment. In any event, it is an open question whether such legislative or
regulatory initiatives would have significantly harmed al Qaeda, which generally made little use of the U.S. financial system to move or store its money.
91.Treasury report,“The 2001 National Money Laundering Strategy,” Sept. 2001.
92. NSC email, Berger’s office to executive secretaries,“Millennium Alert After Action Review,” Mar. 9, 2000.
93. PDD-62, “Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas,” May
22, 1998, pp. 8–9; NSC email, Berger’s office to executive secretaries, “Millennium Alert After Action Review,”
Mar. 9, 2000.
94. PDD-62, May 22, 1998; PDD-39,“U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism,” June 21, 1995, p. 2.
95. NSC email, Berger’s office to executive secretaries,“Millennium Alert After Action Review,” Mar. 9, 2000.
96. PDD-62, May 22, 1998, p. 9. Congress had authorized the Alien Terrorist Removal Court at the request
of the Justice Department in 1996, and it was established in 1997. Clarke noted the court had not been “highly
useful.” NSC email, Berger’s office to executive secretaries,“Millennium Alert After Action Review,” Mar. 9, 2000.
Indeed, it had not been used at all.
97. PDD-62, May 22, 1998, p. 8; NSC memo, Clarke,“Summary of Conclusions for March 31, 2000 Millennium Alert Immigration Review Meeting,”Apr. 13, 2000. One provision from PDD-62 not updated and reiterated
in 2000 was a directive to CIA to ensure that names (and aliases) of terrorists were collected and disseminated to
State, INS, and the FBI in a timely way, so that the border agencies could place them on a watchlist and the FBI
could identify them in the United States.
98. NSC email, Berger’s office to executive secretaries,“Millennium Alert After Action Review,” Mar. 9, 2000.
99. Richard Clarke interview (Feb. 3, 2004); Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004); Scott Fry interview (Dec.
29, 2003); Scott Gration interview (March 3, 2004); NSC email, Clarke to Berger, Mar. 2, 2000. Clarke apparently
took the comment as a presidential instruction to take another look at what additional actions could be taken against
Bin Ladin. Given diplomatic failures to directly pressure the Taliban through Pakistan, the NSC staff saw increased
support to the Northern Alliance and Uzbeks as alternative options. NSC memo,“The MillenniumTerrorist Alert—
Next Steps,” undated.
100.A good account of the episode is found in Steve Coll, GhostWars:The Secret History of the CIA,Afghanistan,
and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (Penguin, 2004), pp. 487–491; see also ibid., pp. 495–496,
502–503, 517–519; Richard interview (Dec. 11, 2003). “Richard” told us the attack had already occurred when
CIA headquarters heard about it;“within this building, they were breathless,” he remarked.The CIA concern was
apparently over possible casualties and whether, by sharing intelligence with Massoud on Bin Ladin’s possible location, the CIA might have violated the assassination ban.Tenet did not recall the incident, saying it was no doubt
just “a blip” on his screen within the context of the millennium alerts. George Tenet interview (Jan. 22, 2004).The
incident was, however, noticed by the NSC counterterrorism staff, which pointedly asked to be kept in the loop
in the future. NSC memo,“Review of Terrorism Alert and Lessons Learned,” Jan. 3, 2000 (draft).
101. See, e.g., CIA officers’ visits to Tashkent noted in CIA briefing materials, DCI Update,“Islamic Extremist Terrorist Threat,” Feb. 18, 2000; CIA briefing materials, EXDIR Update,Visit to Tashkent, Apr. 5, 2000. CTC
teams were deployed to Afghanistan to meet with Massoud on March 13–21, 2000, and possibly on April 24–28,

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2000. CIA briefing materials, EXDIR Update,“Islamic ExtremistTerroristThreat,” Mar. 6, 2000; CIA briefing materials, “CTC PowerPoint,” Apr. 3, 2000. Massoud’s representatives also met with Clarke, the State Department’s
Michael Sheehan, and CIA senior managers in Washington. CIA briefing materials,“DDO Update,” May 22, 2000.
102. On Black and Clarke’s positions, see Cofer Black interview (Dec. 9, 2003); Roger Cressey interview (Dec.
15, 2003). On reasons for caution, see, e.g., Strobe Talbott interview (Jan. 15, 2004).
103. See, e.g., CIA briefing materials, CTC Update for the DDCI, July 7, 2000 (“Direct engagement with
Massoud will enhance our ability to report on UBL and increase retaliation options if . . . we are attacked by UBL”).
104.The deputy chief for operations of CTC,“Henry,” told us that going into the Afghanistan sanctuary was
essential. He and Black proposed direct engagement with Massoud to the CIA’s senior management, but the idea
was rejected because of what “Henry” called “a question of resources”—the CIA did not have effective means to
get personnel in or out of Afghanistan.When he proposed sending a CIA team into northern Afghanistan to meet
with Massoud in August 2000, the idea was turned down; local helicopters were not deemed airworthy, and land
access was too risky. Henry interview (Nov. 18, 2003); Henry briefing (Apr. 22, 2004).
105. The alleged attempt was reported on August 10, 2000; see CIA memo, Bonk to McCarthy and Clarke,
“Attempted Interdiction of Suspect Bin Ladin’s Convoy,”Aug. 11, 2000. For doubts as to whether the tribals made
this attempt, see Cofer Black interview (Dec. 9, 2003); Richard interview (Dec. 11, 2003).
106. The Joint Chiefs of Staff Warning Order of July 6, 1999, was still in effect. See DOD memo, “Military
Response Options,” Oct. 23, 2000.
107.The 13 options included B-2 bombers, missiles, AC-130 gunships, the armed UAV, and raids to capture
and destroy al Qaeda leaders and targets. DOD briefing materials, Joint Chiefs of Staff,“Operation Infinite Resolve
Brief,” June 2000.
108. Scott Gration interview (Mar. 3, 2004). See also Scott Fry interview (Dec. 29, 2003).
109.This quotation is taken from Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of SacredTerror (Random House,
2002), p. 318. President Clinton confirmed that he made this statement. President Clinton meeting (Apr. 8, 2004).
110. President Clinton meeting (Apr. 8, 2004); Hugh Shelton interview (Feb. 5, 2004);William Cohen interview (Feb. 5, 2004).
111. Scott Gration interview (Mar. 3, 2004); Scott Fry interview (Dec. 29, 2003).
112. NSC memo, Clarke to CSG members, “Follow-Up to bin Ladin Review,” Apr. 25, 2000. See also CIA
briefing materials, “DDCI Update,” Apr. 21, 2000 (J-39 “has decided to do everything possible to support CIA’s
UBL efforts”).This reportedly included J-39’s belief that it would be able to pay for all costs—though, as it turned
out, that would not be the case. CIA managers were reluctant to go ahead with either the telescope or the Predator options. Executive Director David Carey told us they saw the projects as a “distraction” that would pull personnel and resources away from other, high-priority activities, such as worldwide disruptions. The telescope
program, for instance, was considered too challenging and risky for the CIA’s Afghan assets; development continued through the summer, but the idea was eventually dropped. David Carey interview (Oct. 31, 2003); Scott Fry
interview (Dec. 29, 2003); Scott Gration interview (Mar. 3, 2004).
113. According to Charles Allen, the CIA’s senior management, especially within the Directorate of Operations, was originally averse to the Predator program mostly because of the expense—approximately $3 million,
which the directorate claimed it did not have. Charles Allen interview (Jan. 27, 2004).The argument between CIA
and DOD over who would pay for proposed operations continued for months. On the CIA side see, for example,
CIA briefing materials,“DDO Update,” May 22, 26, 2000 (at which the DCI was told that unless funding was identified within the next 10 days, the military advised that the Predator could not be deployed that fiscal year; the military was waiting for an NSC request that it fund the projects). See also NSC memo, Clarke to Tenet, June 25, 2000
(“The other CSG agencies are unanimous that the Predator project is our highest near-term priority and that funding should be shifted to it”). Clarke noted that the CSG plan was to use DOD money to jump-start the program.
On the cost-sharing agreement, see NSC memo, Kurtz to Berger, June 28, 2000; NSC memo, “Small Group
agenda,” June 29, 2000. Eventually,“after some pushing,” the CIA found $2 million from its funds to pay for two
months of trial flights. DOD agreed to fund $2.4 million. NSC memo, Kurtz to Berger, June 28, 2000.
114. NSC memo, Kurtz to Berger, June 28, 2000. On UAV tests, see CIA briefing materials, “DCI Update,”
July 14, 2000. On modifications, see NSC memo, Clarke to Berger, update, July 18, 2000.
115. NSC memo, Clarke to Berger,“Predator,”Aug. 11, 2000.
116. NSC memo, Cressey to Berger,Aug. 18, 2000 (underlining in the original); NSC memo, Cressey to Berger,
Aug. 21, 2000 (attaching informational memo to President Clinton).
117. NSC note, Clarke to Berger, Sept. 9, 2000.
118. John Maher III interview (Apr. 22, 2004).The CIA’s Ben Bonk told us he could not guarantee from analysis of the video feed that the man in the white robe was in fact Bin Ladin, but he thinks Bin Ladin is the “highest
probability person.” (Bin Ladin is unusually tall.) Ben Bonk briefing (Mar. 11, 2004). Intelligence analysts seem to
have determined this might have been Bin Ladin very soon after the September 28 sighting; two days later, Clarke
wrote to Berger that there was a “very high probability” Bin Ladin had been located. NSC note, Clarke to Berger,
“Procedures for Protecting Predator,” Sept. 30, 2000.

222. Donald Rumsfeld interview (Jan. 30, 2004). Rumsfeld had been a member of the Bremer-Sonnenberg
Commission on Terrorism, created by Congress in 1998.
223.Tommy Franks interview (Apr. 9, 2004).
224. For Annex B, see NSC memo, draft National Security Presidential Directive, undated (attached to NSC
email, Biegun to executive secretaries, July 13, 2001).The annex said that Pentagon planning was also to include
options to eliminate weapons of mass destruction that the al Qaeda network might acquire or make.
225. Stephen Hadley meeting (Jan. 31, 2004).
226. Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004).
227. President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004).
228. Ibid.
229. John Ashcroft interview (Dec. 17, 2003).
230. NSC email, Clarke to Rice and Hadley,“Courtesy call on AG,” Feb. 22, 2001.
231. On the FBI strategy, see FBI report, Counterterrorism Division, InternationalTerrorism Program,“Strategic Program Plan FY 2001–2006,” undated (appears to be from summer 2000). On Watson’s recollections, see Dale
Watson interview (Jan. 6, 2004). On the FBI budget proposal, see statement of Attorney General John Ashcroft,
Hearing on U.S. Federal Efforts to Combat Terrorism before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, and State,
the Judiciary, and Related Agencies of the Senate Appropriations Committee, May 9, 2001. See DOJ memo, Comments on Staff Statement 12,Apr. 7, 2004.
232.Testimony of John Ashcroft, Hearing on U.S. Federal Efforts to Combat Terrorism before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies of the Senate Appropriations Committee, May 9, 2001. On DOJ’s priorities, see DOJ memo, Ashcroft to Heads of Department Components,
“Guidance for Preparing FY 2003 Budgets,” May 10, 2001. On Watson’s reaction, see Dale Watson interview (Jan.
6, 2004).
233. DOJ letter, Ashcroft to Daniels, transmitting the Department of Justice FY 2003 budget request, Sept.
10, 2001;Thomas Pickard interview (Jan. 21, 2004). Pickard told us that he approached Ashcroft and asked him
to reconsider DOJ’s denial of the FBI’s original counterterrorism budget request in light of the continuing threat.
It was not uncommon for FBI budget requests to be reduced by the attorney general or by OMB before being
submitted to Congress; this had occurred during the previous administration.
234. In chapter 3, we discuss how this problem arose. By 2001, it had become worse. During 2000, the FBI
had erred in preparing some of its applications for FISA surveillance, misstating how much information had been
shared with criminal prosecutors and the nature of the walls between the intelligence and law enforcement functions within the FBI. In March 2001, Judge Royce Lamberth, chief judge of the FISA Court, chastised the FBI,
sending a letter to Ashcroft announcing he was banning an offending supervisory agent from appearing before the
court. Judge Lamberth also met personally with Ashcroft and his acting deputy, Robert Mueller, to complain about
the performance of the FBI and the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR). Judge Lamberth letter to
Ashcroft, Mar. 9, 2001; John Ashcroft interview (Dec. 17, 2003). In May 2001, Ashcroft altered the FISA application process to ensure greater accuracy. See DOJ memo,Ashcroft to Freeh,“The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (FISA) Process,” May 18, 2001.
In July 2001, the General Accounting Office criticized the way the 1995 procedures were being applied and
criticized OIPR and FBI for not complying with the information-sharing requirements of the 1995 procedures.
This was the third report in as many years by a government agency indicating that the procedures were not working as planned. In October 2000, December 2000, and March 2001, proposals for reform to the 1995 procedures
were put forth by senior DOJ officials. None resulted in reform. One impediment was that the respective DOJ
components could not agree on all the proposed reforms. A second impediment was a concern that such reforms
would require a challenge to the FISA Court’s position on the matter.This was considered risky because the FISA
Court of Review had never convened, and one of the judges had previously voiced skepticism regarding the constitutionality of the FISA statute. Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson did ask the court to accept the modifications described in the text, which were distributed as part of his August 2001 memorandum reaffirming the
1995 procedures. See DOJ memo, Thompson to the Criminal Division, the Office of Intelligence Policy and
Review, and the FBI,“Intelligence Sharing,”Aug. 6, 2001.
235.This tasking may have occurred before Rice’s March 15, 2001, meeting with Tenet. See CIA memo,“Talking Points for DCI Meeting with Rice,” Mar. 15, 2001. For Rice’s recollections, see Condoleezza Rice meeting
(Feb. 7, 2004).Attorney General John Ashcroft told us he told Rice on March 7, 2001, that his lawyers had determined that the existing legal authorities for covert action against Bin Ladin were unclear and insufficient, and that
he suggested new, explicit kill authorities be developed. John Ashcroft testimony, Apr. 13, 2004. On the CIA draft
documents, see CIA memo,“Talking Points for the DCI on the Draft Afghanistan Counterterrorism Finding and
the Draft UBL MON,” Mar. 27, 2001. For the description of the meeting, see CIA memo, Moseman to Tenet, Mar.
28, 2001.
236. NSC memo, Sturtevant to Griffin, Levin, Krongard,Watson, and others, July 12, 2001.
237. See, e.g., NSC note, Clarke to Berger, Sept. 23, 2000; Richard Clarke interview (Feb. 3, 2004).

7 The Attack Looms
1. FBI report,“Summary of Penttbom Investigation,” Feb. 29, 2004 (classified version), p. 16.
2. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, May 19, 2003.Although KSM’s stated reasons for sending Hazmi
and Mihdhar to California do not seem especially compelling, we have uncovered no evidence tending to establish any more plausible explanation for the California destination.The possibility that the two hijackers were pursuing another al Qaeda mission on the West Coast, while certainly conceivable—see, e.g., CIA analytic report,

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“Alternate View:Two 11 September Hijackers Possibly Involved in Previous US Plot,” CTC 2002-30064, July 5,
2002—conflicts with the organization’s preference for having its 9/11 operatives concentrate on that mission exclusively.
3. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, May 19, 2003;Aug. 14, 2003.
4. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Aug. 18, 2003.According to Hambali, in late 1999 or early 2000
KSM sent an al Qaeda operative named Issa al Britani to visit Hambali in Malaysia.At the end of the visit, Issa provided Hambali with two addresses—one in the United States (“possibly in California”) and one in South Africa—
and told Hambali he could contact “people in those locations” if he “needed help.” Hambali claims he never
contacted anyone at either address or passed either address to anyone else, and claims not to remember the addresses.
Intelligence report, interrogation of Hambali, Sept. 12, 2003. In an assessment of KSM’s reporting, the CIA concluded that protecting operatives in the United States appeared to be a “major part” of KSM’s resistance efforts. For
example, in response to questions about U.S. zip codes found in his notebooks, KSM provided the less than satisfactory explanation that he was planning to use the zip codes to open new email accounts. CIA report, Intelligence
Community Terrorist Threat Assessment,“Khalid Shaykh Muhammed’s Threat Reporting—Precious Truths, Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies,”Apr. 3, 2003, pp. 4–5.
5. Notably, as discussed in chapter 5, precisely such arrangements—in the form of lodging and travel assistance
provided by Hambali’s minions—were in place when the first contingent of operatives (including Hazmi and Mihdhar) journeyed to Kuala Lumpur in late 1999 and early 2000.
6. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, May 19, 2003.
7. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, May 19, 2003;Aug. 14, 2003. KSM also has stated that in addition to providing Hazmi and Mihdhar with a San Diego telephone book, he gave them another directory “possibly covering Long Beach, California.” Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, June 15, 2004.
8. Although Hazmi and Mihdhar told immigration authorities on January 15, 2000, that they would be staying at the Sheraton Hotel in Los Angeles, their names do not appear in the hotel’s registration records for the second half of January. FBI searches of the records of other hotels near the airport and smaller establishments in Culver
City failed to locate the hijackers, as did our own investigation. See FBI report,“Hijackers Timeline,” Nov. 14, 2003
(Apr. 3, 1999, entry, citing 265A-NY-280350-CG, serial 4062; 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 7134); Commission
investigation in Culver City;Vicki G. interview (Sept. 30, 2003).
9. For the FBI source’s claims, see FBI letterhead memorandum, Penttbom investigation, Oct. 8, 2002. For
Abdullah’s recollections, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Mohdar Abdullah, Jan. 15, 2002. Other reporting indicates that Hazmi and Mihdhar spent time at the King Fahd mosque.A scholar lecturing at the mosque was
reportedly approached by either Hazmi or Mihdhar about performing a wedding ceremony. Khalil A. Khalil interview (Feb. 24, 2004). On “Khallam,” see FBI electronic communication, “Fahad Althumairy,” Sept. 4, 2002; FBI
electronic communication,“Ziyat Kharfan,” Jan. 8, 2002 (giving description of visitor with whom Hazmi and Mihdhar met at mosque).The Khallam story has never been corroborated.The FBI considered the possibility that Khallam might be Khallad, the al Qaeda member whose role in the 9/11 plot and the Cole attack we discussed in chapter
5.This speculation was based on reporting that Khallad was in the United States in June 2000 and was seen in the
company of Fahad alThumairy, an imam at the mosque. FBI electronic communication, investigation of Cole bombing, interview of witness, Mar. 19, 2003; CIA cable, source reporting, Mar. 18, 2003. Neither we nor the FBI have
found any travel documentation establishing Khallad’s presence in the United States at any time.We doubt that the
person allegedly seen with Thumairy actually was Khallad.
10. Patrick J. McDonnell,“Saudi Envoy in L.A. Is Deported,” Los Angeles Times, May 10, 2003, p. B1; Michael
Isikoff and Daniel Klaidman, with Jamie Reno,“Failure to Communicate,” Newsweek,Aug. 4, 2003, p. 34.As of January 2000,Thumairy was employed by the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Religious Endowments and
Religious Guidance, to act as the consulate’s liaison to the mosque. FBI electronic communication,“Fahad Al Thumairy,” Sept. 4, 2002. Before 9/11, Saudi imams employed by the ministry often were dispatched to help serve Muslim communities around the world, sometimes—as in Thumairy’s case—with diplomatic status in the host country.
On Thumairy’s leadership, see FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Mohammed bin Suleiman al
Muhanna, July 9, 2003; FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Mohamed Ibrahim Aliter, Dec. 2, 2002.
11. FBI electronic communication,“Abdulaziz Alroomi,”Apr. 2, 2003.
12. FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Khaled Charif, Dec. 4, 2002. After 9/11, arguments arose
within the Saudi government over whether to allow reputedly radical imams, including Thumairy, to work for the
Saudi government in the United States. FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Mohammed bin Suleiman
al Muhanna, July 9, 2003. In May 2003, the U.S. government settled the matter, at least in Thumairy’s case, by refusing to let him back into the country. DOS memo, Karl Hoffman to the Commission, June 8, 2004, and the attached
materials.
13. On Thumairy’s religious views, see FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Mohamed Aliter, Dec.
2, 2002; Fahad alThumairy interviews (Feb. 23–25, 2004). However, two witnesses we interviewed who knewThumairy and used to hear him preach at the King Fahd mosque deny that he promoted extremism. Sami A. Mekhemar interview (Apr. 21, 2004); Interview (Apr. 23, 2004). Despite the disparate views as to whether Thumairy

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qualified as an extremist while he was in Los Angeles, it does appear that both the Saudi Arabian government and
the leadership of the mosque attempted to discipline him in the summer of 2002 and early 2003 for espousing
extremist views. Thumairy denies incurring any such disciplinary measures. Fahad al Thumairy interviews (Feb.
23–25, 2004); FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Mohammed bin Suleiman al Muhanna, July 9, 2003.
On Bayoumi, see Khalil A. Khalil interview (Feb. 24, 2004). Bayoumi and Thumairy had numerous telephonic contacts between December 1998 and December 2000. Specifically, Bayoumi called Thumairy’s home telephone 10
times during this period, and Thumairy called Bayoumi’s cellular and home phones 11 times between December
3 and December 20, 2000. FBI electronic communication, “Fahad Al-Thumairy,” Nov. 20, 2002. Bayoumi recalls
consulting with Thumairy, solely on religious matters, both by telephone and in person at the mosque. Omar al
Bayoumi interview (Oct. 16–17, 2003).As to Thumairy’s contact with Mohdar Abdullah, see FBI electronic communication,“Fahad Althumairy,” Oct. 25, 2002; FBI report of investigation, interview of Mohdar Abdullah, July 23,
2002.According to one individual,Abdullah visited the mosque frequently and was “very close” to radical followers of Thumairy. FBI electronic communication,“Fahad Althumairy,” Oct. 25, 2002.
14.We have checked, for example, the records for apartments where Thumairy is known to have placed Saudi
visitors during 2001.The most intriguing lead concerns an Arabic-speaking taxicab driver, Qualid Benomrane, who
was arrested on immigration charges in early 2002.When asked to look at a series of photographs that included
the 19 hijackers involved in the 9/11 attacks, Benomrane responded ambiguously, seeming first to pick out the
photographs of Hazmi and Mihdhar but then denying that he recognized them. Later in the interview, Benomrane told the FBI about driving “two Saudis” around Los Angeles and to San Diego’s Sea World after being introduced to them by Thumairy at the King Fahd mosque before 9/11. According to Benomrane, someone at the
consulate had asked Thumairy to assist the two Saudis, who had recently arrived in Los Angeles and had moved to
an apartment near the mosque. FBI electronic communication,“Fahad Althumairy,” Sept. 4, 2002;Ashour E. interview (May 20, 2004); FBI reports of investigation, interviews of Qualid Moncef Benomrane, Mar. 7, 2002; Mar. 13,
2002; May 23, 2002.Working with agencies of the U.S. government, we have attempted to locate and interview
Benomrane overseas, since he was deported in 2002. After checking many possible avenues of corroboration for
this story, our investigation has not substantiated the hypothesis that Benomrane’s “two Saudis” were Hazmi and
Mihdhar. In fact, we have established that Benomrane did not obtain a taxi license, or even a driver’s license, until
months after he could be supposed to have chauffeured Hazmi and Mihdhar. Moreover, before his deportation,
Benomrane described the two Saudis as sons of a sick father who was seeking medical treatment in Los Angeles.
Ibid.We have found evidence corroborating this account.
15. FBI document made available to the Commission; Caysan Bin Don interview (Apr. 20, 2004); Omar al
Bayoumi interview (Oct. 16–17, 2003); Interview (Apr. 23, 2004). In Bin Don’s presence, Bayoumi met with a stillunidentified consular employee whom Bayoumi already knew and whom Bin Don says he saw in Anaheim as
recently as November 2003.The employee provided Bayoumi with Qur’ans and other religious materials during
the February 1, 2000, meeting. Omar al Bayoumi interview (Oct. 16–17, 2003). At the time of the February 1,
2000, restaurant encounter, Bin Don, a U.S. citizen, went by the name Isamu Dyson.
16. Caysan Bin Don interview (Apr. 20, 2004); FBI report of investigation, interview of Isamu Dyson, Oct. 8,
2001.
17. See Caysan Bin Don interview (Apr. 20, 2004); FBI report of investigation, interview of Isamu Dyson, Oct.
8, 2001. Bin Don himself has been inconsistent about visiting the mosque. In his initial interviews, he recalled praying with Bayoumi at the consulate before lunch and visiting the mosque only once, after the meal; when we interviewed him recently, however, he stated that both prayer sessions took place at the mosque. For Bayoumi’s visits to
Los Angeles, see FBI report of investigation, recovery of hotel records, Jan. 15, 2002.Although Bayoumi might deny
visiting the mosque on February 1 to conceal some contact he may have made there that day, we have seen no evidence of such contact.
18. Saudi Civil Aviation Authority employment records for Bayoumi, Mar. 2000–Jan. 2002 (provided by the
FBI); FBI report of investigation,“Connections of San Diego PENTTBOMB Subjects to the Government of Saudi
Arabia,” undated; FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Bayoumi,Apr. 15, 2002.While in San Diego, Bayoumi was officially employed by Ercan, a subsidiary of a contractor for the Saudi Civil Aviation Administration,
although a fellow employee described Bayoumi as a “ghost employee,” noting that he was one of many Saudis on
the payroll who was not required to work. In April 2000, Bayoumi received a promotion and his status was also
adjusted from “single” to “married” (despite the fact that he was already married). As a result, his salary was raised
and his “other allowances” stipend increased significantly, from approximately $465 to $3,925 a month, remaining
at that level until December 2000. In January 2001, the stipend was reduced to $3,427. It stayed constant until August
2001, when Bayoumi left the United States. Saudi Civil Aviation Authority employment records for Bayoumi, Mar.
2000–Jan. 2002 (provided by the FBI); Richard L. Lambert prepared statement, June 26, 2003, pp. 7–9; FBI reports
of investigation, interviews of Samuel George Coombs,Apr. 8, 2002; July 24, 2002;Aug. 26, 2002.
19. On Bayoumi’s activities, see FBI electronic communication, interview of Bayoumi, Sept. 17, 2003.Although
Bayoumi admits knowingThumairy, no telephone records document any contact between the two just before Bayoumi’s lunch with Hazmi and Mihdhar in Los Angeles. Nor do individuals who regard Thumairy as an extremist

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place Bayoumi in Thumairy’s circle of associates. KSM has denied knowing Bayoumi. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM,Aug. 18, 2003.
Bayoumi was once the subject of an FBI counterterrorism investigation, prompted by allegations about him
that appear to have been groundless. On the closing of the investigation, see FBI electronic communication,“Omar
Ahmed Al Bayoumi,” June 7, 1999. Another possible source of suspicion is his passport, which contains a cachet
that intelligence investigators associate with possible adherence to al Qaeda. It is a marking that can be obtained
by especially devout Muslims.Although we believe the marking suggests the need for further inquiry, it is not the
kind of fraudulent manipulation that would conclusively link the document with a terrorist organization. INS
records, copy of Bayoumi passport; CIA analytic report, Al-Qa’idaTravel Issues, CTC 2004-40002H, Nov. 14, 2003,
pp. ii, 18.
20. On Abdullah’s assistance to the hijackers, see FBI electronic communication, Abdullah investigation, May
19, 2004. In a post-9/11 interview with law enforcement, Abdullah claimed that Bayoumi specifically asked him
“to be the individual to acclimate the hijackers to the United States, particularly San Diego, California.” FBI report
of investigation, interview of Mohdar Abdullah, July 23, 2002. Bayoumi, however, denies even introducing Hazmi
and Mihdhar to Abdullah, much less asking him to assist them. Omar al Bayoumi interview (Oct. 16–17, 2003).
21. FBI report of investigation, interview of Mohdar Abdullah, July 23, 2002; FBI electronic communication,
“Osama Bassnan,” Oct. 17, 2001; FBI report of investigation, interview of Mohdar Abdullah, Sept. 22, 2001; FBI
electronic communication, “Shareef Abdulmuttaleb el Arbi,” Feb. 4, 2003. For the possibility of the notebook
belonging to someone else, see FBI report, Behavioral Analysis Activity, Oct. 4, 2001.
22. FBI electronic communication, interview of Charles Sabah Toma, May 18, 2004.
23. On Abdullah’s claims of advance knowledge, see FBI electronic communication, interview, May 17, 2004.
On Abdullah’s telephone use after August 25, 2001, and acting strangely, see FBI report of investigation, interview,
Sept. 24, 2001; FBI report of investigation, interview of Mohdar Abdullah, July 23, 2002; Danny G. interviews (Nov.
18, 2003; May 24, 2004).
24.The hijackers’ mode of transportation and the exact date of their arrival in San Diego are not known. On
their locating Bayoumi on February 4 and his assistance, see Richard L. Lambert prepared statement, June 26, 2003,
pp. 6–7; Omar al Bayoumi interview (Oct. 16–17, 2003); FBI report of investigation, interview of Omar al Bayoumi,Aug. 4–5, 2003.The rental application states that Hazmi and Mihdhar resided in Bayoumi’s apartment from
January 15 to February 2, 2000, but Bayoumi denies it, and we have found no reason to dispute his denial.According to Bayoumi, he was in such a hurry to complete the rental transaction that he signed the application form without reading it. Bayoumi also denies receiving any money from Hazmi or Mihdhar for helping them with the
apartment. Omar al Bayoumi interview (Oct. 16–17, 2003). On opening an account, see FBI report,“Summary of
Penttbom Investigation,” Feb. 29, 2004, p. 12.
Contrary to highly publicized allegations, we have found no evidence that Hazmi or Mihdhar received money
from another Saudi citizen, Osama Bassnan.
25. Omar al Bayoumi interview (Oct. 16–17, 2003).According to Bayoumi, he originally intended to hold the
party at his own apartment, but moved it to the hijackers’ apartment when one of the guests created an awkward
social circumstance by bringing his wife; Bayoumi solved the problem by having the friend’s wife stay with his own
wife in Bayoumi’s apartment and moving the party to the hijackers’ residence. Bayoumi maintains that a visiting
sheikh was the party’s principal honoree. Ibid.Although Bin Don has recalled that the party was intended to welcome Hazmi and Mihdhar to the community, this is belied by the hijackers’ apparent decision to sequester themselves in the back room, and by the account of another party attendee. Caysan Bin Don interview (Apr. 20, 2004);
Khalid Abdulrab al Yafai interview (Feb. 24, 2004). Of the two operatives, only Mihdhar appears briefly on the
video shot by Bin Don. Bayoumi videotape of party (provided by the FBI).
26. On the hijackers’ efforts to relocate, see Omar al Bayoumi interview (Oct. 16–17, 2003); Interview (Apr.
23, 2004); FBI report,“San Diego Brief to 9/11 Commission,” June 26, 2003, p. 17.Telephone records indicate that
on February 9 and February 14, 2000, Bayoumi’s cell phone was used to call the landlord of the operatives’ acquaintance, Hashim al Attas, who had decided to vacate his apartment. On February 15, 2000, when the landlord returned
a page from Bayoumi’s cell phone, Hazmi answered the phone. Steve O. interview (Nov. 17, 2003); FBI report of
investigation, interview of George Harb, Oct. 30, 2001. Hazmi and Mihdhar appear to have used Bayoumi’s cell
phone until telephone service (subscribed in Hazmi’s name) was installed in their apartment.
27. FBI report of investigation, interview of George Harb, Sept. 16, 2001.The hijackers may actually have lived
in Attas’s apartment for a short while. Bayoumi has stated that he recalls hearing that Hazmi and Mihdhar moved
into the apartment for two weeks but then returned to their original apartment while Bayoumi was in Washington, D.C. FBI report of investigation, interview of Omar al Bayoumi,Aug. 4–6, 2003.This account is confirmed by
Attas’s girlfriend, who recalls that Attas met Mihdhar and Hazmi either through friends or at the mosque, and that
the pair moved into Attas’s apartment for approximately two weeks before moving out and taking Attas’s furnishings with them. FBI report,“San Diego Brief to 9/11 Commission,” June 26, 2003, p. 18.
28. Interview (Apr. 23, 2004). Hazmi and Mihdhar did not officially vacate their first apartment until May 31,
2000. FBI report,“Hijackers Timeline,” Nov. 14, 2003 (citing 265A-NY-280350-SD, serial 1445).The exact details

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517

of the hijackers’ move to their final San Diego address are not altogether clear, as their landlord—who has been
interviewed many times by the FBI and once by us—has provided various accounts of how he first met them. See
also FBI electronic communication, Penttbom investigation, Oct. 3, 2001. On Mihdhar’s travels, see Interview (Apr.
23, 2004); FBI report,“Summary of Penttbom Investigation,” Feb. 29, 2004 (classified version), p. 46. On Hazmi’s
departure, see FBI report,“San Diego Brief to 9/11 Commission,” June 26, 2003, p. 18.
29. On the purchase of the car, see FBI report, “Hijackers Timeline,” Nov. 14, 2003 (citing Bank of America
records). Law enforcement officials recovered the blue 1988 Toyota from the parking lot at Dulles International
Airport on September 11. On the wire transfer, see FBI report of investigation, interview, Sept. 17, 2001.After 9/11,
the mosque administrator came forward because he feared he had unwittingly aided the hijackers. He recalled Hazmi
and Mihdhar arriving at the mosque on their own and describing themselves as clerks employed by the Saudi Arabian government.The two said they needed help finding a school where they could study English, which neither
spoke well enough, in the administrator’s opinion, to permit them to become pilots.The administrator also suspected that Mihdhar might have been an intelligence agent of the Saudi government.After first declining Hazmi’s
request for a loan, the administrator agreed to permit him to use the administrator’s bank account to receive the
$5,000 wire transfer. Claiming to have been suspicious of the entire transaction, the administrator distanced himself from Hazmi and Mihdhar, but not before they had received the assistance they needed. Ibid.We have no evidence contradicting the administrator’s account.
30. On visits to other mosques, see FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Ali Ahmad Mesdaq, Jan. 28,
2002; FBI reports of investigation, interviews of Samir Abdoun, Oct. 28, 2001; May 15, 2002. On Bayoumi’s assistance, see Richard L. Lambert prepared statement, June 26, 2003, p. 7; FBI electronic communication,“Jay Steven
Barlow,” Sept. 24, 2002. On April 12, 2000, Hazmi registered for a one-month class in conversational English. FBI
report,“Hijackers Timeline,” Nov. 14, 2003 (Apr. 12, 2000, entry, citing Bank of America records).
31. Even before learning of Abdullah’s alleged jailhouse conversations, we attempted to interview him in
November 2003, while he was incarcerated and awaiting deportation. Through counsel, Abdullah refused to be
interviewed unless he was released from custody.The U.S. Department of Justice declined to obtain an order of use
immunity so that Abdullah’s testimony could be compelled. See Commission letter to Daniel Levin, DOJ, Dec. 31,
2003; DOJ letter, Daniel Levin to the Commission, Jan. 5, 2004. On Abdullah’s deportation, see FBI electronic communication, Abdullah investigation, July 1, 2004. Abdullah appears to be at liberty in Yemen, although he claims
Yemeni authorities are watching him. H. G. Reza, “Deported Friend of Terrorists in Report,” Los Angeles Times,
June 17, 2004, p.A31.
32. On Awadallah, see FBI electronic communication, interview of Osama Awadallah, June 6, 2002; FBI electronic communication, interview of Osama Awadallah, Feb. 4, 2003. On Bakarbashat, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Omar Bakarbashat, Sept. 17, 2001; FBI electronic communication, Penttbom investigation,Apr.
11, 2002. Another associate of Hazmi and Mihdhar allegedly referred to them after the September 11 attacks as
“more than heroes.” FBI letterhead memorandum,“Diah Thabet,” Oct. 25, 2002.
33. On Anwar Aulaqi, see Wade A. interview (Oct. 16, 2003).The FBI investigated Aulaqi in 1999 and 2000
after learning that he may have been contacted by a possible procurement agent for Bin Ladin. During this investigation, the FBI learned that Aulaqi knew individuals from the Holy Land Foundation and others involved in raising money for the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas. Sources alleged that Aulaqi had other extremist connections.
FBI electronic communication, background searches, Feb. 3, 2000; FBI report of investigation, interview, Sept. 24,
2001; FBI electronic communication, interview, Oct. 8, 2002. None of this information was considered strong
enough to support a criminal prosecution. For evidence of possible early contacts between Hazmi/Mihdhar and
Aulaqi, see Steve O. interview (Nov. 17, 2003), noting that four calls took place between Aulaqi’s phone and Bayoumi’s phone on February 4, 2000, the day Bayoumi helped Hazmi and Mihdhar find an apartment and perhaps
lent them his phone.
One witness remembered meeting Hazmi through Aulaqi and Mohdar Abdullah, and later meeting Mihdhar
at Aulaqi’s mosque.This same witness recalled seeing Hazmi and Mihdhar in the guest room on the second floor
of the mosque and, on one occasion, leaving the room just after Aulaqi, at the conclusion of a meeting. FBI reports
of investigation, interviews of Samir Abdoun, Oct. 28, 2001; May 15, 2002; FBI report of investigation, interview
of Anwar Aulaqi, Sept. 25, 2001; FBI electronic communication, Penttbom investigation, Sept. 15, 2002.
34. FBI reports of investigation, interviews of Anwar Aulaqi, Sept. 17, 2001; Sept. 19, 2001.
35.Aulaqi took a position at the Dar al Hijra mosque in early 2001. By the time we sought to interview him
in 2003, he had left the United States, reportedly returning to Yemen.We attempted to locate and interview him
in Yemen, working with U.S. agencies and the Yemeni government, as well as other governments that might have
knowledge of his whereabouts.Those attempts were unsuccessful.
36.Whereas Hazmi managed to speak broken English, Mihdhar did not even have this much command of the
language, which he appeared uninterested in learning. Interview (Apr. 23, 2004); FBI report of investigation, interview of Omar Bakarbashat, Sept. 17, 2001; FBI report of investigation, interview of Ramez Noaman, Oct. 1, 2001.
On April 4, 2000, Hazmi took his first flying lesson, a one-hour introductory session at the National Air College
in San Diego. Exactly one month later, Hazmi and Mihdhar purchased flight equipment from an instructor at the

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Sorbi Flying Club in San Diego. On May 5, both of them took a lesson at Sorbi, followed by a second lesson at the
same school five days later. FBI report,“Summary of Penttbom Investigation,” Feb. 29, 2004, p. 18.
37. On the Sorbi Flying Club, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Khaled al Kayed, Sept. 15, 2001.
For other instructors’ views, see FBI electronic communication, Penttbomb investigation,Apr. 11, 2002.
38. On Mihdhar’s phone calls, see, e.g., FBI report,“Hijackers Timeline,” Nov. 14, 2003 (Mar. 20, 2000, entry,
citing 265A-NY-280350-19426). On Mihdhar’s travels, see FBI report,“Summary of Penttbom Investigation,” Feb.
29, 2004 (classified version), p. 17. On KSM’s views, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, May 19, 2003.
On Mihdhar’s status, see INS record, NIIS record of Mihdhar, June 10, 2000.
39. On KSM’s communication methods, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Oct. 15, 2003. Even
here, the West Coast operatives’ language limitation posed a problem, as KSM had to send emails in Arabic using
the English alphabet. Ibid. In addition to having his nephew Ali Abdul Aziz Ali transmit funds to the operatives in
the United States, KSM used Ali as an intermediary for telephone messages. Intelligence report, interrogation of
detainee, Jan. 7, 2004. On Khallad’s role, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Oct. 15, 2003; Aug. 18,
2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Feb. 17, 2004. On KSM’s annoyance with and views on Mihdhar, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, June 15, 2004; May 19, 2003.
40. Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Feb. 17, 2004; FBI report of investigation, interview, Sept. 24,
2001; FBI electronic communication, Penttbom investigation, Sept. 15, 2001; FBI electronic communication, interview, July 26, 2002; Interview (Apr. 23, 2004); FBI electronic communication, Penttbom investigation, Sept. 15,
2001. Both KSM and Khallad were aware of Hazmi’s interest in finding a bride, and KSM reportedly went so far
as to promise Hazmi a monthly stipend of $700 in the event he succeeded in marrying. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM,Aug. 6, 2003; Jan. 9, 2004.Although Hazmi did not use his housemate’s telephone to make calls,
he apparently received calls on it, including calls from an individual named Ashraf Suboh, who called the house 16
times between July 20 and November 18, 2000. Suboh’s name and address appear in a printed email recovered during searches at an al Qaeda site in Pakistan in May 2002.The document was dated Jan. 9, 2001, and included his
name and a mailing address. FBI letterhead memorandum, San Diego investigation, July 2, 2002.
41. Salmi arrived in San Diego on August 7, 2000, and three days later moved into the house where Hazmi
resided. Omar al Bayoumi—who reported (at least nominally) to Salmi’s uncle at the Saudi Civil Aviation ministry—found this accommodation for Salmi, although Salmi claims not to have known Bayoumi before coming to
San Diego. FBI report of investigation, interview of Yazeed al Salmi, Oct. 8, 2001. On Salmi’s move to Abdullah’s
house in La Mesa, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Salmi, Sept. 21, 2001. On possible financial links,
see FBI report, “Hijackers Timeline,” Nov. 14, 2003 (citing 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 59279); FBI electronic
communication, Information and questions re Salmi interview, June 9, 2004; FBI report of investigation, interview
of Salmi, June 17, 2004. For Salmi’s possible link to Hanjour, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Abdullah, July 23, 2002.We made efforts with the assistance of the FBI to interview Salmi, but without success.The FBI
interviewed Salmi on its own in June 2004 but failed to ask about his reported childhood ties to Hanjour. FBI
report of investigation interview of Yazeed al Salmi, June 14, 2004.
42.At KSM’s direction, Khallad notified Hazmi that another operative, who turned out to be Hanjour, would
be joining Hazmi soon. Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Feb. 17, 2004. On Hazmi’s work at the gas
station and his statement about becoming famous, see FBI report of investigation, interview, May 21, 2002. The
owner of the gas station, Osama Mustafa, and the manager of the station, Iyad Kreiwesh, have both been the subject of FBI counterterrorism investigations. The investigations did not yield evidence of criminal conduct.Thumairy, the Saudi imam in Los Angeles, allegedly presided over Kreiwesh’s wedding at the King Fahd mosque,
witnessed by Abdullah and Benomrane, likely around September 2000. FBI report of investigation, interview of
Mohdar Abdullah, July 23, 2002; 4377 Parks Avenue, San Diego record,“Application to Rent and Rental Deposit,”
Sept. 21, 2000.
43. On Hanjour’s travel to San Diego, see INS record, NIIS record of Hanjour, Dec. 8, 2000. Hazmi’s housemate remembers him taking an unexplained trip to the San Diego airport around this time. FBI report of investigation, interview, Sept. 24, 2001. On Hanjour and Hazmi leaving San Diego and the visit to the gas station, see FBI
report of investigation, interview of Mohdar Abdullah, Sept. 19, 2001. On Hazmi’s comment to his housemate, see
Interview (Apr. 23, 2004). Although Hazmi’s housemate claims that the “Hani” whom Hazmi introduced him to
is not the same person pictured in Hanjour’s photograph, we have little doubt that the housemate did in fact see
Hanjour on the day he and Hazmi left San Diego. Ibid.; FBI electronic communication, Penttbom investigation,
Sept. 15, 2001.
44. On Hazmi’s contact with Abdullah, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Mohdar Abdullah, Sept.
19, 2001; FBI report of investigation, interview of Ramez Noaman, Oct. 1, 2001. On Hazmi’s contact with his
housemate, see FBI reports of investigation, interviews, Sept. 24, 2001; July 26, 2002. On Hazmi’s contact to acquaintances in San Diego, see Danny G. interviews (Nov. 18, 2003; May 24, 2004).
45. For Shehhi’s arrival, see INS record, NIIS record of Shehhi, May 29, 2000; Customs record, secondary
inspection record of Shehhi, May 29, 2000. For Shehhi going to NewYork City, see FBI report,“Hijackers Timeline,” Dec. 5, 2003 (May 30, 2000, entry citing Dresdner bank records). For Atta’s travel to the Czech Republic,

Essabar may have been intended to replace Binalshibh. Like Atta, Shehhi, and Jarrah, Essabar obtained a new
passport even though his old one was nearly a year from expiration, evidently to conceal his prior travel to
Afghanistan during the first half of 2000. On December 12, 2000, and January 28, 2001—after Binalshibh’s four
U.S. visa applications had been denied—Essabar made two unsuccessful U.S. visa applications, stating that he wished
to visit the United States during the week of February 15, 2001. DOS records, Essabar visa applications, Dec. 12,
2000; Jan. 8, 2001. See Federal Prosecutor General (Germany), response to Commission letter, June 25, 2004, p. 14.
Neither Binalshibh nor Essabar were denied visas based on terrorism concerns.
53. FBI report,“Summary of Penttbom Investigation,” Feb. 29, 2004 (classified version), p. 82.
54. For KSM sending Moussaoui to Malaysia, see Intelligence Report, interrogation of KSM, Mar. 24, 2003.
For Moussaoui not finding a flight school, see Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Jan. 22, 2002. For the
ammonium nitrate purchase, see Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee,Apr. 9, 2002; Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee,Apr. 12, 2004. For the cargo planes operation, see Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee,
Apr. 12, 2004. For KSM’s reaction, see Intelligence Report, interrogation of KSM, Mar. 24, 2003. For Moussaoui’s
and Binalshibh’s trips and Moussaoui’s emails, see FBI report,“Summary of Penttbom Investigation,” Feb. 29, 2004
(classified version), p. 85.There are no witnesses who report that Moussaoui and Binalshibh actually met in London, but Moussaoui’s subsequent travel to Afghanistan implies that he received instructions from Binalshibh. See
ibid., p. 86. Somewhere in his travels, Moussaoui obtained the funds he would bring to the United States. He
declared $35,000 upon arrival on February 23, 2001, and he deposited $32,000 into a Norman, Oklahoma, bank
account on February 26. FBI report,“Summary of Penttbom Investigation,” Feb. 29, 2004, p. 78.
55. For Hanjour’s entry, see INS record, NIIS record of Hanjour, Oct. 3, 1991. For his university studies, see
FBI report,“Hijackers Timeline,” Dec. 5, 2003 (Oct. 14, 1991, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-PX, serial 3792). For
Hanjour being religious, see FBI letterhead memorandum, Penttbom investigation, Jan. 4, 2004, p. 10. One witness
interviewed by the FBI after 9/11 remembers Hanjour and Nawaf al Hazmi becoming so entranced during a prayer
that both men began to cry. FBI report of investigation, interview of Mourad Jdaini, Sept. 22, 2001. For Hanjour’s
trip to Afghanistan, his initial studies in the United States, his rejection by the Saudi flight school, and his desire for
flight training in the United States, see Intelligence report, interviews of Saudi hijackers’ families, Dec. 22, 2001;
FBI report of investigation, interview of Adnan Khalil, Sept. 29, 2001.
56. For Hanjour’s 1996 trip to the United States, see, e.g., FBI report,“Hijackers Timeline,” Dec. 5, 2003 (Apr.
1, 1996, entry citing 265A-NT-280350, serial 2746; 265A-NT-280350-302, serial 9130). For his interest in flight
training in Florida and his training in California, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Adnan Khalil, Sep.
14, 2001; FBI report, “Hijackers Timeline,” Dec. 5, 2003 (Sept. 3, 1996, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-SF, serial
1847). For his 1996 flight instruction in Arizona and return to Saudi Arabia, see ibid. (Sept. 29, 1996, entry citing
265A-NY-280350-IN, serial 953; Nov. 26, 1996, entry citing INS: 265A-NY-280350-NK). For his return to
Florida, see FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Bandar al Hazmi, Jan. 15, 2002. For his 1998 flight training in Arizona, see FBI report, “Hijackers Timeline,” Dec. 5, 2003 (Feb. 2, 1998, entry citing 265A-NY-280350IN, serial 4468). For his flight training in Arizona with his two friends, see ibid. (Feb. 24, 2000, entry citing
265A-NY-280530-IN, serial 4468). Hanjour initially was nervous if not fearful in flight training. FBI letterhead
memorandum, investigation of Lotfi Raissi, Jan. 4, 2004, p. 11. His instructor described him as a terrible pilot. FBI
letterhead memorandum, interview of James McRae, Sept. 17, 2001.
We have seen no evidence of a familial relationship between Bandar al Hazmi and hijackers Nawaf al Hazmi
and Salem al Hazmi.TimT. interview (Jan. 5, 2004); KenWilliams interview (May 11, 2004). Bandar al Hazmi claims
he met Hanjour in Florida, as they were both studying at the same English-language institute. FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Bandar al Hazmi, Jan. 15, 2002. Rayed Abdullah, who knew Bandar al Hazmi from high
school, says he moved to Florida to become a commercial pilot after speaking with Bandar al Hazmi, and claims
he met Hanjour upon arriving in Florida. FBI report of investigation, interview of Rayed Abdullah, Sept. 15, 2001;
FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Abdullah Rayed Abdullah, Nov. 16, 2001, p. 8.This account is not
credible, because Abdullah arrived in the United States on November 15, 1997, the day before Hanjour arrived. Ken
Williams interview (May 11, 2004); FBI report,“Hijackers Timeline,” Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 265A-NY-280350-NK,
serial 1379).The three of them did attend language school together but not until after all three had arrived in the
United States. FBI report of investigation, interview of Rayed Abdullah, Sept. 15, 2001.The Phoenix FBI office
remains suspicious of Abdullah and Hazmi and their association with Hanjour. Ken Williams interview (May 11,
2004). (Williams is the FBI agent who authored what is referred to as the “Phoenix memo,” discussed in chapter 8.)
For Hanjour obtaining his pilot’s license in three months, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Amro
Hassan, Sept. 17, 2001, p. 2. For Hanjour receiving his commercial pilot’s license, see FBI report,“Hijackers Timeline,” Dec. 5, 2003 (Apr. 15, 1999, entry citing 265A-NY-280350-PX, serial 334). For Hanjour’s apparent return to
Saudi Arabia, see ibid. (Apr. 28, 1999, entry citing INS I-94, 265A-NY-280350-NK, serial 1379). Bandar al Hazmi
continued his training at Arizona Aviation with intermittent trips home to Saudi Arabia, before departing the United
States for the last time in January 2000.Tim T. interview (Jan. 5, 2004); FBI report of investigation, interview of
Amro Hassan, Sept. 19, 2001. Rayed Abdullah trained at Arizona Aviation and obtained a private pilot’s license in
December 1998. FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Rayed Abdullah, May 5, 2001, p. 9.Abdullah then

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521

worked as a computer programmer in Arizona before resuming flight training during the summer of 2001. FBI
report of investigation, interview of Rayed Abdullah, Sept. 16, 2001, p. 5.
57. Intelligence report, interviews of Saudi hijackers’ families, Dec. 22, 2001.
58. Al Qaeda figures at the university or in Tucson included Mubarak al Duri, reportedly Bin Ladin’s principal procurement agent for weapons of mass destruction; Muhammad Bayazid, an al Qaeda arms procurer and trainer;
Wadi al Hage, an operative convicted for the East Africa bombings; and Wail Julaidan, a Saudi extremist with ties
to al Qaeda. CIA and FBI joint analytic report, “Arizona: Long Term Nexus for Islamic Extremists,” May 15,
2002, p. 3.
59. Rayed Abdullah, who lived and trained with Hanjour, was a leader at the Islamic Cultural Center in Phoenix
and reportedly gave extremist speeches at the mosque. Ken Williams interview (Jan. 7, 2004); FBI electronic communication, Rayed Abdullah, Sept. 22, 2003. Another Hanjour associate, Faisal al Salmi, took flight training with
Rayed Abdullah but wanted to keep his training secret. FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Rayed Abdullah, May 5, 2001; FBI report of investigation, interview of Malek Seif, Oct. 25, 2001.When polygraphed on whether
he had taken flight training at the behest of an organization, al Salmi’s negative response was deemed deceptive.
FBI electronic communication, investigation of Zakaria Soubra, June 5, 2002, p. 8.
60. For al Qaeda activity in Arizona, see Ken Williams interview (Jan. 7, 2004). On al Qaeda directing individuals in the Phoenix area to enroll in flight training without telling them why, see FBI electronic communication,
investigation of Rayed Abdullah, Sept. 22, 2003. Ghassan al Sharbi, who was captured in March 2002 in Pakistan
along with Abu Zubaydah, studied at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in Prescott,Arizona. Greg Krikorian,
“Detainee Facing Deportation Summoned to Probe,” Los AngelesTimes, Jan. 24, 2003; Ken Williams interview (Jan.
7, 2004). Although Sharbi has not been tied to the 9/11 attacks, he reportedly attended the training camps in
Afghanistan and swore bayat to Bin Ladin during the summer of 2001. FBI memorandum, investigation of Hamed
al Sulami,Aug. 1, 2002, p. 6.
After he left the camps, Sharbi looked for his friend Hamdan al Shalawi, another student in Arizona, for a secret
project. Shalawi reportedly trained in the camps in November 2000, learning how to conduct “Khobar
Towers”–type attacks that he and a colleague planned to execute in Saudi Arabia. FBI electronic communication,
investigation of Hamdan al Shalawi, Oct. 16, 2003, p. 2; Intelligence report, trace request on Shalawi, Nov. 27, 2000.
Shalawi, however, denies this, claiming to have been studying in Arizona at the time, which neither the FBI nor
we have been able to confirm. Shalawi was involved in a widely publicized incident in November 1999, when he
and his friend Muhammed al Qudhaieen were detained because the crew of a cross-country America West flight
reported that Qudhaieen had attempted to open the cockpit door on two occasions. FBI letterhead memorandum,
Hamed al Sulami, July 25, 2002, p. 7. After the 9/11 attacks, FBI agents in Phoenix considered whether the incident was a “dry run” for the attacks. See, e.g., FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Fahad al Wahedi, Nov.
8, 2002, p. 4. In our interviews of Shalawi and Qudhaieen, they both claimed that Qudhaieen was only looking for
the lavatory on the plane. Mohammad al Qudhaieen interview (Oct. 25, 2003); Hamdan al Shalawi interview (Oct.
22, 2003). Shalawi admits having gone to Afghanistan, but only once in the late 1980s after the war with the Soviet
Union. Shalawi interview (Oct. 22, 2003).
Finally, another admitted associate of Hani Hanjour in Arizona, Hamed al Sulami, has had telephone contact
with Sulayman al Alwan, a radical Saudi cleric from Qassim Province who was reported to be Abu Zubaydah’s spiritual advisor and, as discussed later in this chapter, may have had a role in recruiting one or more of the muscle
hijackers. FBI memorandum, investigation of Hamed al Sulami,Aug. 1, 2002, p. 2; FBI memorandum, investigation
of Fahad al Wahedi, Nov. 8, 2002, p. 4; CIA analytic report,“The Plot and the Plotters,” June 1, 2003, p. 27.
61. For Hanjour’s meeting KSM, experience in the camp, and incorporation into the 9/11 operation, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 20, 2004. It is unknown how Hanjour got to the camps or who may
have directed him to go there. For new arrivals’ procedures, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, May 15,
2003.
62. For Hanjour returning home and obtaining a visa, see DOS records, visa applications for Hanjour, Sept.
10, 2000; Sept. 25, 2000. For Hanjour’s statement to his family, see Intelligence report, interviews of Saudi hijackers’ families, Dec. 22, 2001. For the meeting, see Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Jan. 7, 2004.
63.Ali initially gave Hanjour $3,000 to open the account and later deposited another $5,000 into the account.
See FBI report, financial timeline of 9/11 hijackers, Dec. 9, 2004, p. 36 (Dec. 5, 2000, and Jan. 28, 2001, entries).
Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Feb. 11, 2004. Hanjour also maintained another account, into which
more than $9,600 was deposited. While in the United States, he accessed both accounts via ATM. FBI Report,
“Summary of Penttbom Investigation,” Feb. 29, 2004, pp. 9, 11, 13, 17–18, 19. For Hanjour’s travel and supposed
destination, see INS record, NIIS record of Hanjour, Dec. 8, 2000; DOS record, Hanjour visa application, Sept. 25,
2000. For his enrollment but failure to attend, see FBI report, “Hijackers Timeline,” Dec. 5, 2003 (Nov. 6, 2000,
entry citing 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 11165; 265A-NY-280350-SF, serial 160).
64. For Hanjour’s refresher training, see FBI report, “Hijackers Timeline,” Dec. 5, 2003 (Dec. 13, 2000, entry
citing 265A-NY-280350-IN, serial 29652). For his desire to train on multi-engine planes, his language difficulties,
the instructor’s advice, and his reaction, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Rodney McAlear, Apr. 10,

edge that the commander of al Faruq training camp was known to urge trainees to swear bayat. Moreover, peer
pressure certainly appears to have been a factor in swaying recruits to choose “martyrdom.” Intelligence report,
interrogation of KSM,Apr. 30, 2004.
100. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 18, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Jan.
8, 2004.
101. Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Feb. 18, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Jan.
7, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Feb. 8, 2003.
102. CIA analytic report,“Afghanistan Camps Central to 11 September Plot,” June 20, 2003, pp. 2–3.
103. Ibid., p. 8; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, May 15, 2003.
104. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, May 15, 2003; Jan. 9, 2004;Apr. 2, 2004; Intelligence report,
interrogation of Khallad, Apr. 13, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Apr. 14, 2004. For description of martyrdom video filming, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, May 21, 2004.
105. Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Apr. 13, 2004; Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM,
Aug. 20, 2003;Apr. 13, 2004;Apr. 5, 2004;Apr. 3, 2004.
Dates of U.S. visas obtained in 2000:Ahmed al Ghamdi (September 3), Saeed al Ghamdi (September 4), Hamza
al Ghamdi (October 17), Mohand al Shehri (October 23),Wail and Waleed al Shehri (October 24),Ahmed al Nami
(October 28),Ahmad al Haznawi (November 12), Majed Moqed (November 20), and Satam al Suqami (November 21). Five Saudi muscle hijackers obtained visas in 2001: Ahmed al Nami (April 23), Saeed al Ghamdi (June
12),Khalid al Mihdhar (June 13),Abdul Aziz Omari (June 18) and Salem al Hazmi (June 20). For Nami, Ghamdi,
and Mihdhar, this was their second visa, and each applied using a new passport. Banihammad, the only non-Saudi
muscle hijacker, also obtained his visa much later than most of the Saudi muscle hijackers, on June 18, 2001. See
Commission analysis of DOS records; CIA analytic report,“The Plot and the Plotters,” June 1, 2003, p. 55.According to KSM, the three hijackers who obtained their first visas much later than the others were not replacements
for unsuccessful candidates. KSM simply wanted to get as many hijackers into the United States as possible to
enhance the odds for success, even if each flight ended up with as many as six or seven. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 20, 2004.
106. Only the passports of Satam al Suqami and Abdul Aziz al Omari were recovered after 9/11. Both had been
doctored. According to KSM, two hijacker passports were damaged in the doctoring process. These may have
belonged to Saeed al Ghamdi and Ahmed al Nami, as both acquired new passports and new U.S. visas, although
the old visas were still valid. Of the hijacker visa applications we were able to review, all were incomplete.Tourist
visas were granted anyway. On obtaining “clean” passports and the two damaged passports, see Intelligence reports,
interrogations of KSM, July 3, 2003; Sept. 9, 2003.Wail and Waleed al Shehri had a family member in the Saudi
passport office who provided them with new passports for their trip to the United States. See CIA analytic report,
Al Qaeda Travel Issues, CTC 2004-40002H, Jan. 2004, p. 12.
107. Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad,Apr. 5, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Mar.
20, 2004. The candidate operatives were
1. Muhammad Mani Ahmad al Kahtani. Currently in custody, he is the last known Saudi muscle candidate to be sent to the United States, in early August 2001, to round out the number of hijackers.
As discussed later in this chapter, he was refused entry. Secretary of Defense interview with David Frost
(BBC), June 27, 2004, available at www.defenselink.mil. CIA analytic report, “Threat Threads: Recent
Advances in Understanding 11 September,” CTC 2002-30086CH, Sept. 16, 2002, p. 4; Intelligence report,
interrogation of KSM, July 3, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee,Apr. 3, 2003.
2. Khalid Saeed Ahmad al Zahrani. He traveled to Afghanistan illegally after being prohibited by
Saudi authorities from leaving Saudi Arabia.After being assigned to a mission in the U.S., he secretly reentered the Kingdom but failed in an attempt to have his name removed from the list of prohibited travelers so that he could obtain a U.S. visa. See Intelligence reports, interrogations of detainee, Apr. 20, 2002;
Oct. 4, 2002; Apr. 3, 2003.
3. Ali Abd al Rahman al Faqasi al Ghamdi. (aka Abu Bakr al Azdi) He reportedly was to have
been part of the planes operation but was held in reserve by Bin Ladin for a later, even larger operation.
Like other muscle hijackers, he reportedly set out for Chechnya but diverted to Afghanistan. See Intelligence reports, interrogations of Abu Bakr al Azdi, July 23, 2003; Sept. 25, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Nov. 6, 2003.
4 and 5. Saeed al Baluchi and Qutaybah al Najdi. Both were sent to Saudi Arabia via Bahrain,
where Najdi was stopped and briefly questioned by airport security officials. Both were so frightened by
the experience that they withdrew from the operation. KSM urged Baluchi to obtain a U.S. visa, but
Baluchi refused, fearing that he might be watchlisted at the U.S. embassy. See Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, July 9, 2003; Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Mar. 27, 2003; July 3, 2003;
Feb. 20, 2004.
6. Zuhair al Thubaiti: He has reportedly admitted membership in al Qaeda, stating “proudly” that

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he was among a select number of operatives who had the personal endorsement of Bin Ladin. He was not
ultimately selected for the 9/11 attacks because the al Qaeda leadership considered him too high-strung
and lacking the necessary temperament. CIA analytic report,“Threat Threads,” Sept. 16, 2002, p. 3; Intelligence reports, interrogations of detainee, May 21, 2002; June 17, 2002; June 20, 2002; Intelligence reports,
interrogations of KSM, Feb. 20, 2004 (two reports).
7. Saeed Abdullah Saeed (“Jihad”) al Ghamdi. He arranged to travel to Afghanistan in March
2000, swore allegiance to Bin Ladin (agreeing to serve as a suicide operative), and was sent to Saudi Arabia by KSM with 9/11 hijacker Ahmad al Haznawi to obtain a U.S. visa, but his visa application was denied
because he appeared to be intending to immigrate. DOS record, Ghamdi visa application, Nov. 13, 2000.
CIA analytic report,“Threat Threads,” Sept. 16, 2002, p. 4; Intelligence reports, interrogations of detainee,
Apr. 11, 2002; Sept. 11, 2002; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 20, 2004.
8. Saud al Rashid. Describing him as headstrong and immature, KSM says he disappeared after being
sent to Saudi Arabia for a U.S. visa, either because he had second thoughts or because his family interceded
and confiscated his passport. Passport photos of Rashid and three 9/11 hijackers—Nawaf al Hazmi, Mihdhar, and Omari—were found together during a May 2002 raid in Karachi.After discovery of the photos
in 2002, Rashid turned himself in to the Saudi authorities, but he has since been released from custody.
In a Commission interview, he has admitted training in Afghanistan but denies hearing of al Qaeda before
returning from Afghanistan or meeting Bin Ladin, KSM, or any 9/11 hijacker other than Ahmad al Haznawi, whom he claims seeing only once or twice at a guesthouse. He has no credible explanation why
photos of him were found with those of three other hijackers, or why others identified him as a candidate
hijacker. See Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Mar. 27, 2003; June 11, 2003; July 3, 2003; Feb. 20,
2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, July 9, 2003; Saud al Rashid interview (Feb. 24, 2004).
9. Mushabib al Hamlan. Sent to Saudi Arabia to acquire a U.S. visa, he and his travel companion,
9/11 hijacker Ahmed al Nami, both applied for and received visas on October 28, 2000. Hamlan never
returned to Afghanistan, probably dropping out either because he changed his mind or because his family intervened.
In December 1999, while still in high school in Saudi Arabia, Hamlan became involved with a group
that gathered periodically to watch jihad propaganda tapes, and was encouraged by a mentor named Bandar Marui to pursue jihad, especially as practiced in the Bosnia-Herzegovina and Russian-Afghan wars
and a book titled Gladiator of Passion.As instructed, Hamlan acquired a passport, on February 15, 2000, and
agreed to go to Afghanistan after the hajj in mid-March 2000. He and two travel companions obtained
Pakistani visas in Sharjah, UAE, and traveled to Islamabad, where al Qaeda facilitator Hassan Ghul took
them to a guesthouse managed by Abu Zubaydah. Days later, two men helped Hamlan cross the PakistanAfghanistan border.
At the Khaldan camp, Hamlan received military training courses. Upon hearing that the camp was to
be closed, he and others traveled to al Faruq camp near Kandahar, where they received more training. He
also met and proclaimed allegiance to Bin Ladin at this time. Injured during a further training session,
Hamlan was assigned to guard the airport, where he met future hijacker Ahmed al Nami (whose recent
laser eye surgery had interrupted his training).An individual named Abu Basir alYemeni indoctrinated the
two in Bin Ladin’s anti-U.S. position and extolled the virtues of martyrdom. Hamlan and Nami eventually agreed to approach Abu Hafs al Mauritani about participating in a suicide operation.The day after visiting Abu Hafs, Hamlan and Nami heard from Abu Basir that Bin Ladin was planning an attack against the
United States. After taking their passports, Abu Basir arranged for Hamlan and Nami to meet Bin Ladin
and instructed them to use the following phrase to express their desire to become martyrs:“I want to be
one of this religion’s bricks and glorify this religion.”The al Qaeda leader accepted both applicants.
In October 2000, Abu Basir took Hamlan and Nami to Kandahar to meet KSM, who impressed on
them the high expectations for martyrs and instructed them on using coded telephone numbers. He
returned their passports, which had been altered and now contained forged tourism stamps for Singapore,
Malaysia,Turkey, and Egypt. KSM told them to meet with Atef before returning to Saudi Arabia, where
they should contact hijacker future 9/11 hijacker Waleed al Shehri for additional documentation.
After meeting with Atef, Hamlan and Nami traveled by car and by air to an address KSM had given
them inTehran, where arrangements were made for them to fly to Qatar. From Qatar they traveled onward
to the UAE and then to Mecca. Nami contacted KSM and received coded instructions to go to Jeddah,
call Waleed al Shehri, and obtain visas at the U.S. consulate. In Jeddah, they briefly shared an apartment
with Shehri, who provided them with directions to the consulate and showed them how to fill out the
visa application. After acquiring visas, Hamlan and Nami presented their passports to Shehri for inspection and returned to Mecca. Nami called KSM, who told them to return to Afghanistan the next day.
Despite instructions to the contrary, Hamlan insisted on calling his family before leaving Saudi Arabia because he had begun to have second thoughts after acquiring the visa.Told by his brother that their
mother had fallen ill. Hamlan decided not to return to Afghanistan even after Nami reminded him of his

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527

allegiance to Bin Ladin and commitment to complete the suicide mission. In Riyadh, he told his brothers that he had been on jihad in Chechnya. Fearing that they might ask for his passport, he removed the
U.S. visa—as later confirmed by forensic analysis performed by Saudi authorities. Hamlan returned to college and resumed living with his parents, who confiscated his passport.
Thereafter, Hamlan received a visit at the college from a former associate at al Faruq camp, Khalid
al Zahrani, who asked why he had not returned to Afghanistan. Zahrani admitted having been sent by
KSM to convince Hamlan to return to Afghanistan. Hamlan never did. Intelligence report, interrogation
of detainee, Mar. 16, 2003.
10. Abderraouf Jdey, a.k.a. Faruq al Tunisi. A Canadian passport holder, he may have trained in
Afghanistan with Khalid al Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hazmi and received instruction from KSM with Atta
and Binalshibh.A letter recovered from a safehouse in Pakistan, apparently written by Sayf al Adl, also suggests that Jdey was initially part of the 9/11 operation at the same time as the Hamburg group. A videotape of Jdey’s martyrdom statement was found in the rubble of Atef ’s house near Kabul following a
November 2001 airstrike, together with a martyrdom video of Binalshibh. While both Binalshibh and
Khallad confirm Jdey’s status as an al Qaeda recruit, KSM says Jdey was slated for a “second wave” of attacks
but had dropped out by the summer of 2001 while in Canada. FBI briefing (June 24, 2004); Intelligence
report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Sept. 11, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, May 21,
2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 1, 2003.
108. On the few operatives fully aware of the plot and Abu Turab’s training, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 23, 2004.Abu Turab was the son-in-law of Ayman al Zawahiri. Intelligence report, interrogation
of Zubaydah, Feb. 18, 2004. KSM also taught the muscle hijackers English and provided lessons about airplanes.
Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Apr. 2, 2004. Binalshibh also has discussed this training in post-capture
statements, describing it as hand-to-hand combat training. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Jan. 8,
2004. According to Binalshibh, after returning to Afghanistan, muscle hijacker recruits fought on the front lines
alongside the Taliban and participated in the March 2001 destruction of the giant Buddha statues in Bamian
Province,Afghanistan. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Mar. 31, 2004.
109. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 23, 2004.According to KSM, the muscle hijackers learned
about the specific targets and the Atta’s completed operational plan only in late August. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM,Apr. 2, 2004.
110. On the facilitator’s comments, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of detainee, Sept. 14, 2002; Oct. 3,
2002; May 5, 2003 (two reports), in which he claims also to have assisted the Hamburg pilots and Binalshibh. On
KSM’s funding of the hijackers, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, June 15, 2004; July 25, 2003.
111. On Ali’s role and the transit of the hijackers, see Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Feb. 12,
2004. According to the detainee, the operatives arrived with their own money to buy plane tickets and anything
else they needed. Ali referred them to places where they could obtain travelers checks. He also helped Ahmed al
Ghamdi, one of the earliest operatives to transit Dubai, acquire a mobile phone account so that the operatives could
use that number as a travel agency point of contact. Ibid.
112. In May 2001, however,Ali asked KSM to participate in a suicide mission and offered to travel to the United
States and assist the operatives there.As discussed in a set of Atta-Binalshibh exchanges in August 2001,Ali (referred
to by the nickname “Losh”) appears to have contacted Atta and expressed the desire to join the operation.Ali actually applied for a U.S. visa on August 27, 2001, listing his intended arrival date as September 4 for a one-week stay.
His application was denied because he appeared to be an economic immigrant. DOS record, visa application of Ali
Abdul Aziz Ali,Aug. 27, 2001. Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Nov. 17, 2003; Intelligence report, documents captured with KSM, Sept. 24, 2003; CIA notes,“DRG Research Notes,” Jan. 17, 2004; FBI report,“Summary of Penttbom Investigation,” Feb. 29, 2004, p. 72.
113. Intelligence reports, interrogations of detainee, May 6, 2003; Jan. 8, 2004. See also Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Sept. 11, 2003. Hawsawi’s role as financial facilitator appears to have begun when he and
hijacker Banihammad opened bank accounts at the same UAE bank while Banihammad was his way to the United
States. Banihammad, who was from the UAE, was familiar with the country’s procedures and helped Hawsawi complete his account application. Banihammad gave Hawsawi roughly $3,000 and granted him power of attorney over
his account so that Hawsawi could forward the bank card to him in the United States. After Banihammad arrived
in the United States, Hawsawi deposited $4,900 into the account. FBI report, “Summary of Penttbom Investigation,” Feb. 29, 2004, p. 29.
114. All but 2 of the 15 muscle hijackers were admitted as tourists, affording a six-month stay in the United
States (except in the case of Mihdhar, who received four months).The first pair to arrive were Waleed al Shehri
(Flight 11) and Satam al Suqami (Flight 11), who flew from the UAE to London and arrived in Orlando on April
23, 2001, where Atta most likely met them. Suqami was admitted as a business visitor, allowing him only a onemonth stay and thus making him an illegal overstay by May 21, 2001. INS records, NIIS records ofWaleed al Shehri
and Satam al Suqami, Apr. 23, 2001. Suqami was the only hijacker not to obtain a U.S. identification document.

141. On Binalshibh’s meeting with Bin Ladin, Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Dec. 11, 2002;
Sept. 24, 2002; Feb. 18, 2004; Apr. 7, 2004. KSM claims that the White House and the Capitol were both acceptable targets and had been on the list since the spring of 1999. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Apr. 2,
2004. On Binalshibh’s receipt of money, Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Oct. 23, 2002; Dec. 11,
2002. In one report, Binalshibh says that Atef provided him with $3,000; in another he claims it was $5,000.
142. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Sept. 24, 2002; Oct. 23, 2002; Dec. 11, 2002.
143. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Sept. 24, 2002; Dec. 11, 2002.
144. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Oct. 1, 2002; Mar. 7, 2003;Apr. 8, 2004.
145. FBI report,“Summary of Penttbom Investigation,” Feb. 29, 2004, p. 48. Intelligence reports, interrogations
of Binalshibh, Oct. 1, 2002; Mar. 7, 2003; Dec. 21, 2002.Atta had a stopover in Zurich, where he bought two Swiss
Army knives and withdrew 1,700 Swiss francs from his SunTrust bank account. He may have intended to use the
knives during the attacks. It is unknown why he withdrew the money. FBI report,“Summary of Penttbom Investigation,” Feb. 29, 2004, p. 47.
Although U.S. authorities have not uncovered evidence that anyone met with Atta or Binalshibh in Spain in
July 2001, Spanish investigators contend that members of the Spanish al Qaeda cell were involved in the July meeting and were connected to the 9/11 attacks. In an indictment of the Spanish cell members dated September 17,
2003, the Spanish government relies on three main points. First is a 1997 trip to the United States by Ghasoub al
Abrash Ghalyoun, a Syrian living in Spain. During the trip, Ghalyoun videotaped a number of U.S. landmarks,
including the World Trade Center.The Spanish indictment alleges that an al Qaeda courier was in Ghalyoun’s town
in Spain shortly after the trip and that the courier probably delivered the tape to al Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan.
Second, the Spanish government contends that during the relevant time period, an individual named Muhammed
Belfatmi was near the town where the Atta-Binalshibh meeting took place. and that Belfatmi traveled to Karachi
shortly before September 11 on the same flight as Said Bahaji, one of Atta’s Hamburg associates, and even stayed at
the same hotel. Finally, Spanish authorities rely on an intercepted telephone conversation between cell leader Imad
Eddin Barakat Yarkas and an individual named “Shakur” in August 2001, in which “Shakur” describes himself as
entering “the field of aviation” and “slitting the throat of the bird.”“Shakur” has been identified by Spanish authorities as Farid Hilali. Although we cannot rule out the possibility that other facts will come to light as the Spanish
case progresses to trial, we have not found evidence that individuals in Spain participated in the July meeting or in
the 9/11 plot. See Baltasar Garzon interview (Feb. 13, 2004); Indictment, Central Investigating Court No. 5, Madrid,
Sept. 17, 2003, pp. 151–200, 315–366; Superseding Indictment, Central Investigating Court No. 5, Madrid, April
28, 2004.
146. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Oct. 1, 2002; Mar. 7, 2003;Apr. 17, 2003.
147. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Oct. 1, 2002; Mar. 7, 2003; Sept. 11, 2003; Oct. 11, 2003;
Feb. 18, 2004;Apr. 7, 2004. KSM claims to have assigned the Pentagon specifically to Hanjour, the operation’s most
experienced pilot. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 20, 2004.
148. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Mar. 7, 2003; Oct. 11, 2003. Binalshibh since has denied
that the term electrical engineering was used to refer to a potential nuclear target despite having said so earlier. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Sept. 11, 2003. KSM has admitted that he considered targeting a nuclear
power plant as part of his initial proposal for the planes operation. See chapter 5.2. He has also stated that Atta
included a nuclear plant in his preliminary target list, but that Bin Ladin decided to drop that idea. Intelligence
report, interrogation of KSM, Mar. 12, 2002.
149. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Oct. 1, 2002; Mar. 7, 2003; Feb. 18, 2004.
150. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Sept. 24, 2002; Oct. 1, 2002; Mar. 7, 2003;Apr. 17, 2003.
151. On Binalshibh’s new phones, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Dec. 21, 2002. On Binalshibh’s call to KSM, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Oct. 1, 2002; Mar. 31, 2003. CIA cable,
Sept. 10, 2003; CIA report, Director’s Review Group, Oct. 2003.
152. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Oct. 31, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh,
Nov. 1, 2003. KSM may also have intended to include these documents as part of the historical file he maintained
about the 9/11 operation. He says the file included letters and email communications among those involved with
the attacks, but was lost in Afghanistan when he fled after September 11. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM,
Oct. 15, 2003.
153. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Nov. 1, 2003; Oct. 11, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Oct. 31, 2002.
154. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Oct. 31, 2002; Dec. 19, 2002; Apr. 17, 2003; Oct. 11,
2003; Nov. 1, 2003; Intelligence report interrogation of KSM, Sept. 11, 2003.
155. FBI letterhead memorandum, Penttbom investigation, Mar. 20, 2002, p. 60; FBI report,“Hijackers Timeline,” Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 315N-NY-280350-302, serial 20874); Jarrah travel documents (provided by the FBI).
156. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Dec. 11, 2002;Apr. 8, 2004.
157. According to Binalshibh, Jarrah was not aware of Moussaoui or the wire transfers. Intelligence reports,

NOTES TO CHAPTER 7

531

interrogations of Binalshibh, Dec. 11, 2002;Apr. 17, 2003. FBI report,“Summary of Penttbom Investigation,” Feb.
29, 2004 (classified version), pp. 89–90.
158. FBI report, Moussaoui, Zacarias, a.k.a. Shaqil, Aug. 18, 2001, pp. 7, 11; FBI briefing materials, Penttbom,
Dec. 10–11, 2003, p. 148 (citing 315N-NY-280350-302, serial 98252).
159. FBI report,“Summary of Penttbom Investigation,” Feb. 29, 2004 (classified version), p. 90; DOJ Inspector
General interview of JohnWeess, Oct. 22, 2002; FBI letterhead memorandum,“Moussaoui, Zacarias,”Aug. 31, 2001.
160. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 2, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Sept.
11, 2003.
161. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, July 1, 2003; July 8, 2003. In addition to Moussaoui, the two
al Qaeda operatives identified by KSM as candidates for the second wave of attacks were Abderraouf Jdey, a.k.a.
Faruq alTunisi (a Canadian passport holder, discussed earlier as a candidate hijacker) and Zaini Zakaria, a.k.a. Mussa
(a Jemaah Islamiah member who worked in Hambali’s Malaysia stronghold and was directed by Atef to enroll in
flight training sometime in 2000, according to KSM). Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 8, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of Hambali, Mar. 4, 2004.
162. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh,Apr. 17, 2003.According to Binalshibh, KSM said that the
operative had been raised and educated in Europe and that his arrest resulted, at least in part, from his having been
insufficiently discreet. KSM identified this operative as an exception in Bin Ladin’s overall record of selecting the
right people for the 9/11 attacks. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Dec. 18, 2002. Subsequently, however, Binalshibh has sought, somewhat incredibly, to exculpate a host of individuals, including Moussaoui, from complicity in the 9/11 plot. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh,Apr. 2, 2004.
163. For Binalshibh’s claims, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Nov. 7, 2002; Feb. 13, 2003;
Feb. 27, 2003. On KSM, see intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 2, 2003.
164. Jarrah returned to the United States on August 5, 2001. INS record, arrival record of Jarrah,Aug. 5, 2001.
165. FBI report,“Hijackers Timeline,” Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 315N-NY-280350-302, serial 14139; Boston electronic communication).The communications were recovered from materials seized during the March 2003 capture of KSM. For background, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Aug. 13, 2002 (two cables);
Intelligence report, documents captured with KSM, Sept. 24, 2003.
166. Intelligence reports, interrogation of KSM, Aug. 12, 2003. Binalshibh, however, has denied that law and
politics referred to two separate targets; he claims that both terms referred to the U.S. Capitol, even though in the
context of the exchange it seems clear that two different targets were contemplated. Intelligence report, interrogations of Binalshibh, Sept. 11, 2003 (two reports).
167. CIA notes,“DRG Research Notes,” Jan. 17, 2004. In another exchange between Atta and Binalshibh on
September 9—two days before the attacks—it still appears as though the White House would be the primary target for the fourth plane and the U.S. Capitol the alternate. See CIA report, Documents captured with KSM, Sept.
24, 2003.
168. On the Atta-Binalshibh communication, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Sept. 11, 2003.
On Kahtani’s attempt to enter the U.S., see INS record, withdrawal of application for admission of Kahtani,Aug.
4, 2001. For Hawsawi, see Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee,Apr. 3, 2003.
169. On Atta’s trip to Newark, see FBI report,“Summary of Penttbom Investigation,” Feb. 29, 2004, p. 50. On
arrivals in Florida, see FBI report,“Hijackers Timeline,” Dec. 5, 2004 (citing 315N-NY-280350, serials 388, 5860;
315N-NY-280350-BS, serial 294; 315N-NY-280350-302, serial 66933). On travel to Las Vegas, see ibid. (citing
315N-NY-280350-LV, serial 53299; 315N-NY-280350-302, serial 110).Atta’s flight fromWashington, D.C., arrived
in Las Vegas within an hour of Hazmi and Hanjour’s arrival. Ibid.The three hijackers stayed in Las Vegas only one
night, departing on August 14. Ibid. (citing 315N-NY-280350-DL, serial 829; 315N-NY-280350-SD, serial 569;
315N-NY-280350-302, serial 165970). Detainee interviews have not explained the Las Vegas meeting site. See,
e.g., Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Nov. 5, 2003.
170. FBI report, “Summary of Penttbom Investigation,” Feb. 29, 2004, pp. 52–57. Hanjour successfully conducted a challenging certification flight supervised by an instructor at Congressional Air Charters of Gaithersburg,
Maryland, landing at a small airport with a difficult approach.The instructor thought Hanjour may have had training from a military pilot because he used a terrain recognition system for navigation. Eddie Shalev interview (Apr.
9, 2004).
171. FBI report,“Summary of Penttbom Investigation,” Feb. 29, 2004, pp. 57–60.According to Binalshibh,Atta
deliberately selected morning flights because he anticipated that the most people would be at work then. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, June 3, 2004.
172. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Oct. 1, 2002; Dec. 17, 2002; Dec. 21, 2002.
173. On KSM’s receipt of date of attacks, see Intelligence report, interrogations of KSM and Binalshibh, May
27, 2003. Although Binalshibh also has claimed that he called KSM with the date after receiving the information
from Atta, KSM insists that he learned of the date in a letter delivered by Essabar, and that it would have been a
serious breach of communications security to communicate the date over the phone. Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Oct. 1, 2002; Dec. 17, 2002. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 20, 2004. Most

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NOTES TO CHAPTER 7

recently, Binalshibh has claimed that he neither called nor sent a letter to KSM, but rather passed a verbal message
via Essabar. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Apr. 8, 2004. On Binalshibh’s communication to Essabar, see Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, Dec. 17, 2002; Nov. 6, 2003;Apr. 8, 2004.
174. On Binalshibh’s travel, see FBI report,“Summary of Penttbom Investigation,” Feb. 29, 2004 (classified version), p. 84. On Binalshibh’s communication with Atta, see Intelligence report, Documents captured with KSM,
Sept. 24, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Sept. 11, 2003. On Atta’s call to his father, see Intelligence report, re Atta, Sept. 13, 2001. On Jarrah’s letter, see German BKA report, investigative summary re Jarrah,
July 18, 2002, p. 67.
175. Shortly after 9/11,Abdullah told at least one witness that the FBI was asking questions about his having
received a phone a call from Hazmi in August. FBI report of investigation, interview, Sept. 24, 2001. In a July 2002
FBI interview,Abdullah asked whether the FBI had taped the call. FBI report of investigation, interview of Mohdar
Abdullah, July 23, 2002. Also on possibility of Hazmi-Abdullah contact shortly before 9/11, see Danny G. interviews (Nov. 18, 2003; May 24, 2004). On the change in Abdullah’s mood, see FBI report of investigation, interview
of Mohdar Abdullah, July 23, 2001. On the sudden interest of Abdullah and Salmi in proceeding with marriage
plans, see FBI report of investigation, interview, Sept. 24, 2001; FBI report of investigation, interview of Samir
Abdoun, Oct. 21, 2001. On anticipated law enforcement interest in gas station employees and September 10, 2001,
meeting, see FBI report of investigation, interview, May 21, 2002.
176. Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Feb. 5, 2002.
177. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM,Aug. 14, 2003; Feb. 20, 2004.
178. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, June 3, 2003; Feb. 20, 2004;Apr. 3, 2004.
179. Intelligence reports, interrogations of detainee, Nov. 27, 2001; Feb. 5, 2002. Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, May 30, 2002.
180. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Jan. 9, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, June
27, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Feb. 5, 2002. KSM also says that he and Atef were so concerned about this lack of discretion that they urged Bin Ladin not to make any additional remarks about the plot.
According to KSM, only Bin Ladin,Atef,Abu Turab al Jordani, Binalshibh, and a few of the senior hijackers knew
the specific targets, timing, operatives, and methods of attack. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Oct. 27,
2003; Feb. 23, 2004. Indeed, it was not until midsummer that Egyptian Islamic Jihad leader Ayman al Zawahiri
learned of the operation, and only after his group had cemented its alliance with al Qaeda and Zawahiri had become
Bin Ladin’s deputy. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Jan. 9, 2004.
181. See Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 24, 2003.
182. On Omar’s opposition, see, e.g., Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, May 30, 2002, in which the
detainee says that when Bin Ladin returned after the general alert during July, he spoke to his confidants about
Omar’s unwillingness to allow an attack against the United States to originate from Afghanistan. See also Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Oct. 27, 2003. There is some discrepancy about the position of Zawahiri.
According to KSM, Zawahiri believed in following the injunction of Mullah Omar not to attack the United States;
other detainees, however, have said that Zawahiri was squarely behind Bin Ladin. Intelligence report, interrogation
of detainee, June 20, 2002; Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, June 27, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Sept. 26, 2003.
183. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Jan. 9, 2004; Intelligence reports, interrogations of detainee,
June 27, 2003; Dec. 26, 2003. On Abu Hafs’s views, see Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Oct. 7, 2003.
184. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, Oct. 27, 2003; Sept. 27, 2003, in which KSM also says Bin
Ladin had sworn bayat to Omar upon first moving to Afghanistan, following the Shura Council’s advice. KSM claims
he would have disobeyed even had the council ordered Bin Ladin to cancel the operation.Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Jan. 9, 2004.
185. See Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 24, 2003.
186.Abdul Faheem Khan interview (Oct. 23, 2003); see also Arif Sarwari interview (Oct. 23, 2003).
187. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, May 8, 2003; July 24, 2003.
188. FBI report, “Hijackers Timeline,” Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 315N-NY-280350, serial 3112; Western Union
records; 315N-NY-280350-302, serials 28398, 37864). In addition, Nawaf al Hazmi attempted to send Hawsawi
the debit card for Mihdhar’s bank account, which still contained approximately $10,000.The package containing
the card was intercepted after the FBI found the Express Mail receipt for it in Hazmi’s car at Dulles Airport on
9/11. FBI report,“Summary of Penttbom Investigation,” Feb. 29, 2004, p. 61.
189. FBI report, “Hijackers Timeline,” Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 315N-NY-280350-WF, serial 64; 315N-NY280350-BA, serials 273, 931, 628; 315N-NY-280350-302, serials 10092, 17495).
190. FBI report,“Hijackers Timeline,” Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 315N-NY-280350, serials 6307, 9739). In the early
morning hours of September 11, Jarrah made one final call to Senguen from his hotel. FBI report,“HijackersTimeline,” Dec. 5, 2003.The conversation was brief and, according to Senguen, not unusual. FBI electronic communication, Penttbom investigation, Sept. 18, 2001, pp. 5–6.
191. FBI report, “Hijackers Timeline,” Dec. 5, 2003 (citing 315N-NY-280350-FD-302; 315N-NY-280350-

8 “The System Was Blinking Red”
1. Beginning in December 1999, these briefings were conducted based on slides created by the CIA’s Bin Ladin
unit. See Richard interview (Dec. 11, 2003).We were able to review the slides to identify the subjects of the respective briefings.
2.The exact number of persons who receive the PDB varies by administration. In the Clinton administration,
up to 25 people received the PDB. In the Bush administration, distribution in the pre-9/11 time period was limited to six people. The Commission received access to about four years of articles from the PDB related to Bin
Ladin, al Qaeda, the Taliban, and key countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, including all the
Commission requested. The White House declined to permit all commissioners to review these sensitive documents.The Commission selected four representatives—the Chair, theVice Chair, Commissioner Gorelick, and the
Executive Director—as its review team.All four reviewed all of the more than 300 relevant articles. Commissioner
Gorelick and the Executive Director prepared a detailed summary, reviewed by the White House for constitutional
and especially sensitive classification concerns, that was then made available to all Commissioners and designated
staff. Except for the August 6, 2001, PDB article, the summary could not include verbatim quotations, for example the titles of the articles, but could paraphrase the substance.Two of the articles—the December 4, 1998, hijacking article (in chapter 4) and the August 6, 2001, article discussing Bin Ladin’s plans to attack in the United States
(in this chapter)—were eventually declassified.
3.The CIA produced to the Commission all SEIB articles relating to al Qaeda, Bin Ladin, and other subjects
identified by the Commission as being relevant to its mission from January 1998 through September 20, 2001.
4. See CIA, SEIB, “Sunni Terrorist Threat Growing,” Feb. 6, 2001; CIA cable, “Intelligence Community Terrorist Threat Advisory,” Mar. 30, 2001.
5. See NSC email, Clarke to Rice, Briefing on Pennsylvania Avenue, Mar. 23, 2001.
6. See NSC email, Clarke to Rice and Hadley,Terrorism Update, Mar. 30, 2001; NSC email, Clarke to Rice,
Terrorist Threat Warning,Apr. 10, 2001.
7. See FBI electronic communication, heightened threat advisory,Apr. 13, 2001.
8. See NSC email, Cressey to Rice and Hadley,Threat Update,Apr. 19, 2001; CIA, SEIB,“Bin Ladin Planning
Multiple Operations,”Apr. 20, 2001; NSC memo, Clarke for Hadley,“Briefing Notes for al Qida Meeting,” undated
(appears to be from April 2001).
9. For threats, see CIA, SEIB, “Bin Ladin Public Profile May Presage Attack,” May 3, 2001; CIA, SEIB, “Bin
Ladin Network’s Plans Advancing,” May 26, 2001; FBI report, Daily UBL/Radical Fundamentalist Threat Update,
ITOS Threat Update Webpage, May 7, 2001 (the walk-in’s claim was later discredited). For Attorney General briefing, see CIA briefing materials,“Briefing for the Attorney General, 15 May 2001, Al-Qa’ida,” undated. For more
threats and CSG discussion, see Intelligence report,Threat Report, May 16, 2001; NSC memo, CSG agenda, May
17, 2001.
10. See CIA, SEIB, “Terrorist Groups Said Cooperating on US Hostage Plot,” May 23, 2001; FAA information circular,“Possible Terrorist Threat Against American Citizens,” IC-2001-08, June 22, 2001 (this IC expired on
August 22, 2001); CIA, SEIB,“Bin Ladin Network’s Plans Advancing,” May 26, 2001; NSC email, Clarke to Rice
and Hadley,“A day in the life of Terrorism intelligence,” May 24, 2001.
11. See NSC email, Clarke to Rice and Hadley, Stopping Abu Zubaydah’s attacks, May 29, 2001. For threat
level, see White House document,“Selected Summer 2001 Threat Response Activities,” undated, pp. 1–2 (provided
to the Commission by President Bush on Apr. 29, 2004).
12.The information regarding KSM was not captioned as a threat. It was part of a longer cable whose subject
line was “Terrorism: Biographical Information on Bin Ladin Associates in Afghanistan.”The cable reported further
that KSM himself was regularly traveling to the United States. See Intelligence report, June 12, 2001. This was
doubted by the CIA’s Renditions Branch, which had been looking for KSM since 1997. It noted, however, that if
the source was talking about the “real” KSM, the CIA had both “a significant threat and opportunity to pick him
up.” See CIA cable, request additional information on KSM, June 26, 2001.A month later, a report from the source
indicated that the information regarding KSM’s travel to the United States was current as of the summer of 1998.
It noted further, however, that KSM continued his old activities but not specifically the travel to the United States.
Significantly, it confirmed that the source was talking about the “real” KSM. See CIA cable, follow-up source on

36. President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004). For Rice’s reaction to the August 6
PDB article, see Condoleezza Rice testimony,Apr. 8, 2004.
37.The CTC analyst who drafted the briefing drew on reports over the previous four years. She also spoke
with an FBI analyst to obtain additional information. The FBI material was written up by the CIA analyst and
included in the PDB.A draft of the report was sent to the FBI analyst to review.The FBI analyst did not, however,
see the final version, which added the reference to the 70 investigations. Barbara S. interviews (Apr. 12, 2004); Joint
Inquiry interview of Jen M., Nov. 20, 2002. Because of the attention that has been given to the PDB, we have investigated each of the assertions mentioned in it.
The only information that actually referred to a hijacking in this period was a walk-in at an FBI office in the
United States who mentioned hijackings among other possible attacks.The source was judged to be a fabricator.
FBI report, Daily UBL/Radical Fundamentalist Threat Update, ITOS Threat Update Webpage,Aug. 1, 2001.
The FBI conducted an extensive investigation of the two individuals who were stopped after being observed
taking photographs of two adjacent buildings that contained FBI offices.The person taking the photographs told
the FBI that he was taking them for a co-worker in Indiana who had never been to New York and wanted to see
what it looked like.The picture taker was in New York to obtain further information regarding his pending citizenship application. He had an appointment at 26 Federal Plaza, where the relevant INS offices were located.This
same building houses portions of the FBI’s New York Field Office. Before going into the building the individual
pulled out the camera and took four photographs.When the FBI attempted to contact the co-worker (and roommate) who had requested some photographs, it was determined that he had fled without receiving his last paycheck
after learning that the FBI had asked his employer some questions about him. Further investigation determined
that he was an illegal alien using forged identity documents. Despite two years of investigation, the FBI was unable
to find the co-worker or determine his true identity. The FBI closed the investigation on June 9, 2003, when it
concluded that it was unable to connect the men’s activities to terrorism. Matthew interview (June 18, 2004); FBI
case file, no. 266A-NY-279198.
The 70 full-field investigations number was a generous calculation that included fund-raising investigations. It
also counted each individual connected to an investigation as a separate full-field investigation. Many of these investigations should not have been included, such as the one that related to a dead person, four that concerned people
who had been in long-term custody, and eight that had been closed well before August 6, 2001. Joint Inquiry interview of Elizabeth and Laura, Nov. 20, 2002; FBI report,“70 UBL Cases,” undated (produced to the Joint Inquiry
on Aug. 12, 2002).
The call to the UAE was originally reported by the CIA on May 16. It came from an anonymous caller. Neither the CIA nor the FBI was able to corroborate the information in the call. FBI report, Daily UBL/Radical Fundamentalist Threat Update, ITOS Threat Update Webpage, May 16, 2001.
38. See CIA, SEIB,“Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in US,” Aug. 7, 2001; see also Roger Cressey interview
(June 23, 2004).The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence testified that the FBI information in the PDB was
omitted from the SEIB because of concerns about protecting ongoing investigations, because the information had
been received from the FBI only orally, and because there were no clear, established ground rules regarding SEIB
contents. John McLaughlin testimony,Apr. 14, 2004.
39. Intelligence report, Consideration by Abu Zubaydah to Attack Targets in the United States,Aug. 24, 2001.
40. George Tenet interview (July 2, 2004).
41. Condoleezza Rice testimony,Apr. 8, 2004; Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004).
42. Stephen Hadley meeting (Jan. 31, 2004).
43. It is also notable that virtually all the information regarding possible domestic threats came from human
sources.The information on overseas threats came mainly from signals intelligence. Officials believed that signals
intelligence was more reliable than human intelligence. Roger Cressey interview (June 23, 2004).
44. NSC memo, Clarke to Rice, al Qaeda review, Jan. 25, 2001 (attaching NSC memo,“Strategy for Eliminating the Threat from the Jihadists Networks of al Qida: Status and Prospects,” Dec. 2000). Clarke had also mentioned
domestic terrorist cells in connection with the possibility of reopening Pennsylvania Avenue. See NSC email, Clarke
to Rice, Briefing on Pennsylvania Avenue, Mar. 23, 2001.
45. Roger Cressey interview (June 23, 2004).
46.This approach was consistent with how this same issue was addressed almost exactly a year earlier, despite
the fact that by 2001 the threat level was higher than it had ever been previously. On June 30, 2000, NSC counterterrorism staffers met with INS, Customs, and FBI officials to review border and port security measures. The
NSC staff ’s Paul Kurtz wrote to then national security adviser Samuel Berger,“We noted while there was no information regarding potential attacks in the U.S. they should inform their officers to remain vigilant.” NSC email,
Kurtz to Berger, Steinberg, and Rudman, warning re: UBL threat reporting, June 30, 2000.
47. FAA briefing materials, Office of Civil Aviation Security, “The Transnational Threat to Civil Aviation,”
undated (slide 24).The presentation did indicate, however, that if a hijacker was intending to commit suicide in a
spectacular explosion, the terrorist would be likely to prefer a domestic hijacking. Between July 27 and September
11, 2001, the FAA did issue five new Security Directives to air carriers requiring them to take some specific secu-

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NOTES TO CHAPTER 8

rity measures.Two continued certain measures that had been in place for at least a year. Others related only to carrying specific passengers. See FAA security directives, SD 108-98, July 27, 2001; SD 108-00, July 27, 2001; SD 10800, July 27, 2001; SD 108-01, Aug. 21, 2001; SD 108-01, Aug. 31, 2001. In order to issue more general warnings
without directing carriers to take specific action, the FAA issued Information Circulars. Of the eight such circulars issued between July 2 and September 11, 2001, five highlighted possible threats overseas. See FAA information
circulars,“Possible Terrorist Threat—Arabian Peninsula,” IC-2001-11, July 18, 2001;“Recent Terrorist Activity in
the Middle East,” IC-2001-03B, July 26, 2001; “Continued Middle Eastern Threats to Civil Aviation,” IC-200104A, July 31, 2001; “Violence Increases in Israel,” IC-2001-07A, Aug. 28, 2001; “ETA Bombs Airports in Spain,”
IC-2001-13,Aug. 29, 2001. One, issued on August 16, warned about the potential use of disguised weapons. FAA
information circular,“Disguised Weapons,” IC-2001-12,Aug. 16, 2001.
48. FAA report,“Record of Air Carrier Briefings—4/18/01 to 9/10/01,” undated.
49. See Condoleezza Rice testimony, Apr. 8, 2004; NSC memo, U.S.Terrorism Alert, July 3, 2001; FBI electronic communication, HeightenedThreat Advisory,Apr. 13, 2001. For the lack of NSC direction, see Roger Cressey
interview (June 23, 2004).
50.Thomas Pickard interview (Apr. 8, 2004). For example, an international terrorism squad supervisor in the
Washington Field Office told us he was not aware of an increased threat in the summer of 2001, and his squad did
not take any special actions to respond to it.The special agent in charge of the Miami Field Office told us he did
not learn of the high level of threat until after September 11. See Washington Field Office agent interview (Apr.
1, 2004); Hector Pesquera interview (Oct. 3, 2003).
51. Dale Watson interview (Jan. 6, 2004).
52. See Thomas Pickard interviews (Jan. 21, 2004; Apr. 8, 2004); Thomas Pickard testimony, Apr. 13, 2004;
Thomas Pickard letter to the Commission, June 24, 2004; John Ashcroft testimony,Apr. 13, 2004.We cannot resolve
this dispute. Pickard recalls the alleged statement being made at a briefing on July 12.The Department of Justice
has informed us that the only people present at that briefing were Pickard,Ashcroft, Deputy Attorney General Larry
Thompson, and Ashcroft’s chief of staff, David Ayres. There are no records of the discussions at these briefings.
Thompson and Ayres deny Ashcroft made any such statement. Dale Watson, who did not attend any of the briefings, told us that Pickard complained after one of the briefings that Ashcroft did not want to be briefed on the
threats because “nothing ever happened.” Ruben Garcia, head of the FBI’s Criminal Division, who attended some
of Pickard’s briefings of the Attorney General but not the one at which Pickard alleges Ashcroft made the statement, recalls that Ashcroft was “not enthusiastic” about the classified portions of the briefings that related to counterterrorism.We have been told that Pickard and Ashcroft did not have a good relationship.This may have influenced
their views on the facts surrounding their meetings. Larry Thompson interview (Jan. 29, 2004); Dale Watson interview (June 3, 2004); Ruben Garcia interview (Apr. 29, 2004);Thompson and Ayres letter to the Commission, July
12, 2004.
53. See Thomas Pickard interviews (Jan. 21, 2004; Apr. 8, 2004); John Ashcroft meeting (Dec. 17, 2003); John
Ashcroft testimony,Apr. 13, 2004.
54. Indeed, the number of FISA warrants in effect in the summer of 2001 may well have been less than it was
at the beginning of the year. Because of problems with inaccuracies in the applications, FISAs were allowed to lapse
rather than be renewed with continuing inaccuracies. Michael Rolince interview (Apr. 12, 2004); Marion Bowman interview (Mar. 6, 2004).
55. See CIA cable, Base/FBI comments on draft cable, Nov. 27, 2000; FBI electronic communication, USS
Cole investigation, Nov. 21, 2000; FBI electronic communication, USS Cole investigation, Jan. 10, 2001 (draft).
56. For the recollection of the FBI agent, see Al S. interviews (Aug. 26, 2003; Sept. 15, 2003). See also FBI
report of investigation, interview of source, July 18, 2000; attachment to FBI electronic communication, USS Cole
investigation, Jan. 10, 2001 (draft); FBI electronic communication, UBL investigation, Jan. 16, 2001.
57. For speculation regarding identities, see CIA cable,“Photo of UBL Associate,” Dec. 27, 2000. Retrospective analysis of available information would have answered that question, but that analysis was not done until after
9/11. For analysis, see Intelligence report, Retrospective review of 11 September 2001 hijackers’ activities, Sept. 23,
2002.
58. CIA cable, “Request for January 2000 Malaysian Surveillance Photos,” Dec. 12, 2000; CIA cable, “Photo
of UBL Associate,” Dec. 27, 2000; CIA cable,“Review of Malaysia ‘Khaled’ Photos,” Jan. 5, 2001.
59.The CIA knew that Mihdhar and Khallad had both been to Bangkok in January 2000.They had not yet
discovered that Khallad, traveling under an alias, had actually flown to Bangkok with Mihdhar. Still, as Director
Tenet conceded in his testimony before the Joint Inquiry, the Kuala Lumpur meeting took on additional significance once Khallad was identified as having attended the meeting. See Joint Inquiry report, p. 149.
60. For Tenet and Black testimony, see Joint Inquiry testimony of George Tenet, Oct. 17, 2002; Joint Inquiry
testimony of Cofer Black, Sept. 26, 2002. For documents not available to CIA personnel who drafted the testimony, see, e.g., FBI electronic communication, UBL investigation, Jan. 16, 2001; FBI emails between Al S. and
Michael D., re: source, Jan. 9-11, 2001; FBI electronic communication, USS Cole investigation, Jan. 4, 2001; DOJ
Inspector General interview of Jennifer M., Dec. 9, 2002. For the views of the FBI investigators, see DOJ Inspec-

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537

tor General interviews of Steve B., Sept. 16, 2002; Nov. 14, 2002; Al S. interviews (Aug. 26, 2003; Sept. 15, 2003).
The DOJ Inspector General came to the same conclusion. See DOJ Inspector General report,“A Review of the
FBI’s Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks” (hereinafter “DOJ IG 9/11
Report”), July 2, 2004, pp. 308–310.
61. DOJ Inspector General interview of Michael D., Nov. 6, 2002; Michael D. interview (May 4, 2004); DOJ
Inspector General interview of Chris, Nov. 27, 2002.
62. For the internal CIA reports to which the FBI did not have access, see CIA cable,“UBL Operative Khallad,” Jan. 3, 2001; CIA cable, source debriefing, Jan. 5, 2001.The FBI agent informed us that he was unaware how
such internal CIA communications worked, or that the operational cables even existed, and so did not know to ask
for them. Such messages are routinely not shared in order to protect intelligence sources and methods. In this case,
application of the routine procedure did not serve that purpose because the FBI agent was aware of the source’s
identity as well as the methods used to obtain the information. Moreover, the FBI agent also may have been absent
from the room when the identification was made.The source had brought a sheaf of documents with him that the
FBI agent left the room to copy while the interview of the witness continued. Because of the circumstances of the
interview site, the agent would have been absent for a significant period of time. In addition, the case officer was
frequently given photographs from a broad range of CIA stations to show to this particular witness. He did not
focus on the purpose of showing the photographs; he was only concerned with whether the source recognized the
individuals. DOJ Inspector General interview of Michael D., Nov. 6, 2002; Michael D. interview (May 4, 2004);
DOJ Inspector General interview of Chris, Nov. 27, 2002.
63. John interview (Apr. 2, 2004). See also CIA email, Dave to John, “Re: Liaison Response,” May 18, 2001.
The old reporting from early 2000 that was reexamined included CIA cable, “Transit of UBL Associate Khalid
Through Dubai,” Jan. 4, 2000; CIA cable,“Recent Influx of Suspected UBL Associates to Malaysia,” Jan. 5, 2000;
CIA cable,“UBL Associates: Flight Manifest for MH072,” Jan. 9, 2000; CIA cable,“UBL Associates: Identification
of Possible UBL Associates,” Mar. 5, 2000. For cable information, see CIA records, audit of cable databases.
64. For a record of the exchange between John and Dave, see CIA emails, Dave to John, May 17, 18, 24, 2001;
CIA email, Richard to Alan, identification of Khallad, July 13, 2001. For the account of John’s FBI counterpart, see
Michael Rolince interview (Apr. 12, 2004). For John’s focus on Malaysia, see DOJ Inspector General interview of
John, Nov. 1, 2002.
65. DOJ Inspector General interview of John, Nov. 1, 2002.
66. For the account of the desk officer, see DOJ Inspector General interview of Michael D., Oct. 31, 2002. For
cable information, see CIA records, audit of cable databases.
67. DOJ Inspector General interviews of Jane, Nov. 4, 2002; July 16, 2003.
68. DOJ Inspector General interview of Jane, Nov. 4, 2002; DOJ Inspector General interview of Dave, Oct.
31, 2002.
69. DOJ Inspector General interviews of Jane, Nov. 4, 2002; July 16, 2003.
70. DOJ Inspector General interview of Jane, Nov. 4, 2002; DOJ Inspector General interview of Dave, Oct.
31, 2002; DOJ Inspector General interview of Russ F., Sept. 17, 2002; DOJ Inspector General interview of Steve
B., Sept. 16, 2002.
71.“Jane” did not seek OIPR’s permission to share this information at the meeting.“Jane” also apparently did
not realize that one of the agents in attendance was a designated intelligence agent, so she could have shared all of
the information with that agent regardless of the caveats. No one who was at the meeting suggested that option,
however. DOJ Inspector General interview of Steve B., Sept. 16, 2002; DOJ Inspector General interview of Jane,
July 16, 2003.These caveats were different from the legal limits we discussed in section 3.2.The Attorney General’s
July 1995 procedures concerned FISA information developed in an FBI intelligence investigation.This, however,
was NSA information.These particular caveats were the result of the Justice Department’s and NSA’s overabundance of caution in December 1999. During the millennium crisis,Attorney General Reno authorized electronic
surveillance of three U.S. persons overseas. Because the searches were not within the United States, no FISA warrant was needed. Reno approved the surveillances pursuant to section 2.5 of Executive Order 12333 with the proviso that the results of these particular surveillances not be shared with criminal investigators or prosecutors without
the approval of the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review. Because of the complexity of determining whether
particular reporting was the fruit of particular surveillances, NSA decided to place these caveats on all its Bin
Ladin–related reporting, not just reporting on the surveillances authorized by Reno.As a result, these caveats were
placed on the reports relating to Mihdhar even though they were not covered by Reno’s December 1999 order.
See DOJ memo, Reno to Freeh, FISA surveillance of a suspected al Qaeda operative, Dec. 24, 1999; NSA email,
William L. to Karen C.,“distribution restrictions,” Dec. 10, 1999; NSA email,William L. to Anthony L.,“doj restrictions,” Dec. 20, 1999; NSA email,William L. to Brian C.,“dissemination of terrorism reporting,” Dec. 29, 1999. See
also NSA memo,Ann D. to others,“Reporting Guidance,” Dec. 30, 1999.
In May 2000, it was brought to the Attorney General’s attention that these caveats prevented certain attorneys
in the Terrorism and Violent Crime Section (TVCS) from reading the reporting. After discussions with NSA, the
caveats were changed to specifically permit dissemination of these reports to designated attorneys in the TVCS and

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NOTES TO CHAPTER 8

two attorneys in the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York. See NSA memo, Joan R. to
Townsend and Reynolds,“Resumed Delivery of Classified Intelligence to TVCS,” June 9, 2000; NSA memo, Hayden to Asst.Attorney General,“Proposal to Provide UBL-related Product to U.S.Attorney’s Office/Southern District of New York,”Aug. 30, 2000.
72. For the facts known by Dave at this time, see CIA records, audit of cable databases; see also CIA email, Dave
to John, timeline entries, May 15, 2001. For CIA analyst’s role, see DOJ Inspector General interview of Dave, Oct.
31, 2002. For Jane’s account, see DOJ Inspector General interview of Jane, July 16, 2003.
73. DOJ Inspector General interview of Mary, Oct. 29, 2002.
74. For Mary’s account, see DOJ Inspector General interview of Mary, Oct. 29, 2002. For the reporting regarding Mihdhar and Hazmi, see CIA cable, Khalid’s passport, Jan. 4, 2000; CIA cable, Mihdhar’s visa application, Jan.
5, 2000; CIA cable, Hazmi entered U.S., Mar. 6, 2000. For Mary’s cable access information, see CIA records, audit
of cable databases.
75. DOJ Inspector General interview of Mary, Oct. 29, 2002; DOJ Inspector General interview of Jane, Nov.
4, 2002.
76. DOJ Inspector General interview of Mary, Oct. 29, 2002; Intelligence report, Watchlisting of Bin
Ladin–related individuals,Aug. 23, 2001; Joint Inquiry testimony of Christopher Kojm, Sept. 19, 2002.The watchlist request included Mihdhar, Nawaf al Hazmi, Salah Saeed Mohammed Bin Yousaf (they did not yet realize this
was an alias for Tawfiq bin Attash, a.k.a. Khallad), and Ahmad Hikmat Shakir (who assisted Mihdhar in Kuala
Lumpur).
77. Jane told investigators that she viewed this matter as just another lead and so assigned no particular urgency
to the matter. DOJ Inspector General interviews of Jane, July 16, 2003; Nov. 4, 2002. For the draft lead, see attachment to FBI email, Jane to Craig D., “Re: FFI Request,” Aug. 28, 2001. For the final version, see FBI electronic
communication,“Request to Open a Full Field Investigation,”Aug. 28, 2001.
78. FBI email, Craig D. to John L., “Fwd: Re: FFI Request,” Aug. 28, 2001; FBI email, John L. to Steve and
others,“Fwd: Re: FFI Request,”Aug. 28, 2001. For an introduction to these legal limits and “the wall,” see section
3.2. In December 2000, pursuant to concerns of the FISA Court, the New York Field Office began designating
certain agents as either intelligence or criminal agents. Intelligence agents could see FISA materials and any other
information that bore cautions about sharing without obtaining the FISA Court’s permission or permission from
the Justice Department’s OIPR. FBI electronic communication,“Instructions re FBI FISA Policy,” Dec. 7, 2000.
79.While one witness recalls a discussion with a senior FBI official, that official denies that such a discussion
took place. The other alleged participant does not recall such a meeting. John interview (Apr. 2, 2004); Michael
Rolince interview (Apr. 12, 2004); Jane interview (July 13, 2004); DOJ Inspector General interview of Rodney
M., Nov. 5, 2002. For investigation’s goal, see FBI electronic communication,“Request to Open a Full Field Investigation,”Aug. 28, 2001.
80. DOJ Inspector General interviews of Jane, July 16, 2003; Nov. 4, 2002; DOJ Inspector General interviews
of Steve B., Sept. 16, 2002; Nov. 14, 2002; Jane interview ( July 13, 2004). FBI email, Jane to John L.,“Fwd: Re: FFI
Request,”Aug. 29, 2001.
The analyst’s email, however, reflects that she was confusing a broad array of caveats and legal barriers to information sharing and rules governing criminal agents’ use of information gathered through intelligence channels.
There was no broad prohibition against sharing information gathered through intelligence channels with criminal
agents.This type of sharing occurred on a regular basis in the field.The court’s procedures did not apply to all intelligence gathered regardless of collection method or source. Moreover, once information was properly shared, the
criminal agent could use it for further investigation.
81. FBI email, Jane to Steve, NSLU Response,Aug. 29, 2001.“Jane” says she only asked whether there was sufficient probable cause to open the matter as a criminal case and whether the criminal agent could attend any interview if Mihdhar was found. She said the answer she received to both questions was no. She did not ask whether
the underlying information could have been shared. Jane interview (July 13, 2004). The NSLU attorney denies
advising that the agent could not participate in an interview and notes that she would not have given such inaccurate advice.The attorney told investigators that the NSA caveats would not have precluded criminal agents from
joining in any search for Mihdhar or from participating in any interview. Moreover, she said that she could have
gone to the NSA and obtained a waiver of any such caveat because there was no FISA information involved in this
case.There are no records of the conversation between “Jane” and the attorney. “Jane” did not copy the attorney
on her email to the agent, so the attorney did not have an opportunity to confirm or reject the advice “Jane” was
giving to the agent. DOJ Inspector General interview of Sherry S., Nov. 7, 2002.
“Jane” asked the New York agent assigned to the Mihdhar search to sign a FISA acknowledgment form indicating the agent understood how he had to treat FISA information. Because no FISA information was involved,
she should not have required him to sign such a form. To the extent she believed, incorrectly, that the Attorney
General’s 1995 procedures applied to this situation, there was in fact an exception in place for New York. DOJ
Inspector General interview of Sherry S., Nov. 7, 2002. More fundamentally,“Jane” apparently understood the welter of restrictions to mean, in workday shorthand, that any information gathered by intelligence agencies should

NOTES TO CHAPTER 8

539

not be shared with criminal agents.This was incorrect. DOJ Inspector General interviews of Jane, July 16, 2003;
Nov. 4, 2002.
82. FBI emails between Steve B. and Jane, re: NSLU Response, Aug. 29, 2001.While the agent expressed his
frustration with the situation to “Jane,” he made no effort to press the matter further by discussing his concerns
with either his supervisor or the chief division counsel in New York.
83.Attorney General Ashcroft testified to us that this and similar information-sharing issues arose from Attorney General Reno’s 1995 guidelines, discussed in chapter 3, and specifically from a March 1995 memorandum of
then Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick. John Ashcroft testimony, Apr. 13, 2004; DOJ memo, Gorelick to
White, “Instructions on Separation of Certain Foreign Counterintelligence and Criminal Investigations,” Mar. 4,
1995.
We believe the Attorney General’s testimony does not fairly or accurately reflect the significance of the 1995
documents and their relevance to the 2001 discussions.Whatever the merits of the March 1995 Gorelick memorandum and the subsequent July 1995 Attorney General procedures on information sharing, they did not apply to
the information the analyst decided she could not share with the criminal agent. As discussed earlier, the reason
“Jane” decided she could not share information was because the initial information on Mihdhar had been analyzed
by the NSA.This reason was unrelated to either of the 1995 documents.The Gorelick memorandum applied to
two particular criminal cases, neither of which was involved in the summer 2001 information-sharing discussions.
As the FBI agent observed in his email, Part A of the 1995 procedures applied only to information obtained pursuant to a FISA warrant. None of the Mihdhar material was FISA information.There was an exemption for the
Southern District of New York from Part B of the 1995 procedures, so they did not apply. Also, the 1995 procedures did not govern whether information could be shared between intelligence and criminal agents within the
FBI, a separation that the Bureau did not begin making formally until long after the procedures were in place.The
1995 procedures governed only the sharing of information with criminal prosecutors. Even in that situation, the
restriction obliged running the information through the OIPR screen.
What had happened, as we discussed in chapter 3, was a growing battle within the Justice Department during
the 1990s, and between parts of Justice and the FISA Court, over the scope of OIPR’s screening function and the
propriety of using FISA-derived information in criminal matters.The FISA Court’s concern with FBI sloppiness
in its FISA applications also began to take a toll: the court began designating itself as the gatekeeper for the sharing of intelligence information; the FBI was required to separately designate criminal and intelligence agents; and
the court banned one supervisory FBI agent from appearing before it. By late 2000, these factors had culminated
in a set of complex rules and a widening set of beliefs—a bureaucratic culture—that discouraged FBI agents from
even seeking to share intelligence information. Neither Attorney General acted to resolve the conflicting views
within the Justice Department. Nor did they challenge the strict interpretation of the FISA statute set forth by the
FISA Court and OIPR. Indeed, this strict interpretation remained in effect until the USA PATRIOT Act was passed
after 9/11.
Simply put, there was no legal reason why the information the analyst possessed could not have been shared
with the criminal agent. On August 27,“Jane” requested the NSA’s permission to share the information with the
criminal agents, but she intended for the information only to help the criminal agents in their ongoing Cole investigation. She still did not believe they could be involved in the intelligence investigation even if the NSA permitted the information to be shared. DOJ IG 9/11 Report, July 2, 2004, p. 339.The next day the NSA notified its
representative at FBI headquarters that it had approved the passage of the information to the criminal agents. NSC
email, Carlene C. to Richard K.,“Response to FBI Sanitization Request,”Aug. 28, 2001.Thus,“Jane” had permission to share the information with the criminal agent prior to their August 29 emails.
84. DOJ Inspector General interview of Robert F., Dec. 18, 2002; FBI electronic communication, Los Angeles lead, Sept. 10, 2001.
85. Hazmi and Mihdhar used their true names to obtain California driver’s licenses and open New Jersey bank
accounts. Hazmi also had a car registered and had been listed in the San Diego telephone book. Searches of readily available databases could have unearthed the driver’s licenses, the car registration, and the telephone listing. A
search on the car registration would have unearthed a license check by the South Hackensack Police Department
that would have led to information placing Hazmi in the area and placing Mihdhar at a local hotel for a week in
early July 2001.The hijackers actively used the New Jersey bank accounts, through ATM, debit card, and cash transactions, until September 10. Among other things, they used their debit cards to pay for hotel rooms; and Hazmi
used his card on August 27 to purchase tickets on Flight 77 for himself and his brother (and fellow hijacker), Salem
al Hazmi.These transactions could have helped locate them if the FBI had obtained the bank records in time.There
would have been no easy means, however, to determine the existence of these accounts, and obtaining bank cooperation pre-9/11 might have been problematic.The most likely means of successfully finding the men in the short
time available was one not often used pre-9/11 for suspected terrorists: an FBI BOLO (be on the lookout) combined with a media campaign.This alone might have delayed or disrupted the plot, even if the men had not been
physically located before September 11. But this would have been considered only if the FBI believed that they
were about to carry out an imminent attack. No one at the FBI—or any other agency—believed that at the time.

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NOTES TO CHAPTER 8

See FBI report, financial spreadsheet re: 9/11 hijackers, undated; South Hackensack, N.J., Police Department report,
Detective Bureau Report, Oct. 17, 2001 (case no. 20018437). According to Ramzi Binalshibh, had KSM known
that Moussaoui had been arrested, he would have canceled the 9/11 attacks. Intelligence report, interrogation of
Ramzi Binalshibh, Feb. 14, 2003. The publicity regarding Mihdhar and Hazmi might have had a similar effect
because they could have been identified by the airlines and might have jeopardized the operation.
86. Joint Inquiry report, pp. xiii, 325–335; DOJ IG 9/11 Report, July 2, 2004, pp. 59–106.
87. FBI electronic communication, Phoenix memo, July 10, 2001.
88. Ibid.; Joint Inquiry report, pp. 325–335; DOJ IG 9/11 Report, July 2, 2004, pp. 59–106.
89. DOJ Inspector General interview of Kenneth Williams, July 22, 2003.
90. Unlike Moussaoui, the typical student at Pan Am Flight Academy holds an FAA Airline Transport Pilot rating or the foreign equivalent, is employed by an airline, and has several thousand flight hours. Moussaoui also stood
out for several other reasons. He had paid nearly $9,000 in cash for the training, yet had no explanation for the
source of these funds; he had asked to fly a simulated flight from London’s Heathrow Airport to New York’s John
F. Kennedy Airport; and he was also particularly interested in the operation of the aircraft doors. FBI electronic
communication, Request OIPR permission to contact U.S.Attorney’s Office regarding Zacarias Moussaoui,Aug.
18, 2001. For a detailed, step-by-step chronology of activities taken regarding Moussaoui prior to September 11,
see DOJ IG 9/11 Report, July 2, 2004, pp. 109–197.
91. FBI electronic communication, Request OIPR permission to contact U.S. Attorney’s Office regarding
Zacarias Moussaoui,Aug. 18, 2001.
92. DOJ Inspector General interview of Harry S., June 6, 2002; DOJ Inspector General interview of Greg J.,
July 9, 2002; FBI letterhead memorandum, Zacarias Moussaoui,Aug. 19, 2001.
93. DOJ IG 9/11 Report, July 2, 2004, p. 128.
94. Criminal search warrants must be approved by Department of Justice attorneys before submission to the
court.Therefore, approval from the Minneapolis U.S.Attorney’s Office was required before a criminal search warrant could be obtained. DOJ Inspector General interview of Coleen Rowley, July 16, 2002. Another agent, however, said that he spoke to an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Minneapolis office and received advice that the facts
were almost sufficient to obtain a criminal warrant. DOJ Inspector General interview of Greg J., July 9, 2002.The
Assistant United States Attorney said that if the FBI had asked for a criminal warrant that first night, he would have
sought it. He believed that there was sufficient probable cause for a criminal warrant at that time. DOJ Inspector
General interview of William K., May 29, 2003. Mary Jo White, the former U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, told us that based on her review of the evidence known pre-9/11, she would have approved a
criminal search warrant. Mary Jo White interview (May 17, 2004). Because the agents never presented the information to the Minneapolis U.S.Attorney’s Office before 9/11, we cannot know for sure what its judgment would
have been or whether a judge would have signed the warrant. In any event, the Minneapolis agents were concerned
that if they tried to first obtain a criminal warrant but the U.S. Attorney’s Office or the judge refused, the FISA
Court might reject an application for a FISA warrant on the grounds that the agents were attempting to make an
end run around the criminal process.Therefore, it was judged too risky to seek a criminal warrant unless it was certain that it would be approved. DOJ Inspector General interview of Greg J., July 9, 2002. In addition, FBI headquarters specifically instructed Minneapolis that it could not open a criminal investigation. DOJ IG 9/11 Report,
July 2, 2004, p. 138. Finally, the Minneapolis Field Office mistakenly believed that the 1995 Attorney General procedures required OIPR’s approval before it could contact the U.S. Attorney’s Office about obtaining a criminal
warrant.
95.The FISA definition of “foreign power” includes “a group engaged in international terrorism or activities
in preparation therefor.”
96. FBI electronic communication, Request to contact U.S. Attorney’s Office regarding Zacarias Moussaoui,
Aug. 18, 2001. For CTC contact, see FBI email, Harry S. to Chuck F.,“Please Pass To [desk officer],”Aug. 24, 2001;
FBI email, Harry S. to Chuck F.,“Re: Fwd: 199M-MP-60130 (Zacarias Moussaoui),”Aug. 24, 2001.
97. DOJ Inspector General interview of Greg J., July 9, 2002; FBI electronic communication, Moussaoui investigation,Aug. 22, 2002; FBI electronic communication, Moussaoui investigation,Aug. 30, 2002.
98. FBI letterhead memorandum, Zacarias Moussaoui, Aug. 21, 2001; CIA cable, subjects involved in suspicious 747 flight training,Aug. 24, 2001; CIA cable,“Zacarias Moussaoui and Husayn ‘Ali Hasan Ali-Attas,”Aug. 28,
2001; Joseph H., interview (May 4, 2004); FBI letterhead memorandum, Zacarias Moussaoui, Sept. 5, 2001.
99. FBI teletype,“Zacarias Moussaoui—International Terrorism,” Sept. 4, 2001.
100. DOJ Inspector General interview of Greg J., July 9, 2002.
101. Minneapolis may have been more concerned about Moussaoui’s intentions because the case agent and
the supervisory agent were both pilots.They were, therefore, more highly sensitized to the odd nature of Moussaoui’s actions and comments regarding flying. DOJ Inspector General interview of Greg J., July 9, 2002; DOJ
Inspector General interview of Harry S., June 20, 2002.
102. DOJ Inspector General interview of Michael Rolince, May 5, 2004; Michael Rolince interview (Apr. 12,
2004); DOJ IG 9/11 Report, July 2, 2004, pp. 168–170, 188.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 8

541

103. CIA briefing materials, DCI Update, “Islamic Extremist Learns to Fly,” Aug. 23, 2001. Deputy Director
of Central Intelligence John McLaughlin testified that he was told about Moussaoui several days before Tenet was
briefed, although he did not recall the specific date of the briefing. John McLaughlin testimony,Apr. 14, 2004.
104. George Tenet interviews (Jan. 28, 2004; July 2, 2004).
105. For the renewed request, see FBI letterhead memorandum, Zacarias Moussaoui, Sept. 11, 2001. For the
initial British response, see British Security Service memo, re: Zacarias Moussaoui, Sept. 12, 2001; information provided to the Commission by the British government; British liaison telex,“Zacarias Moussaoui—Background Information,” Sept. 13, 2001. See also Joseph H. interview (May 4, 2004).
106. Joint Inquiry report (classified version), pp. 340–341. Notably, the FBI analyst “Mary” who was looking
at the Mihdhar information suggested that the U.S. government talk to Ressam to see if he knew anything about
Mihdhar. See CIA email, Mary to John, seeking identification by Ressam,Aug. 21, 2001.There is no evidence that
Ressam was asked about Moussaoui or Mihdhar prior to 9/11.
107.According to Ramzi Binalshibh, had KSM known that Moussaoui had been arrested, he would have cancelled the 9/11 attacks. Intelligence report, interrogation of Ramzi Binalshibh, Feb. 14, 2003.
108. Joint Inquiry report (classified version), pp. 329–331; Joint Inquiry interview of Mike, Alice, Larry, John,
Terry,Aug. 12, 2002.
109. CIA cable, Key UBL personalities, Sept. 25, 2000.
110. CIA cable, Mukhtar information, May 23, 2002.
111. CIA cable, Biographical Information on Key UBL Associates in Afghanistan, June 11, 2001; Intelligence
report, biographical information on Bin Ladin associates in Afghanistan, June 12, 2001. For the subsequent identification, see CIA cable, follow-up source on KSM, July 11, 2001.
112. For the reporting identifying Mukhtar as KSM, see CIA cable, source information re: KSM,Aug. 28, 2001.
113. John interview (Apr. 2, 2004).

9 Heroism and Horror
1. For the WTC’s layout, see Port Authority diagrams, “World Trade Center Concourse Level,” “Concourse
Level,” and “Plaza Level,” undated. For the number of square feet of office space, see Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) report, “World Trade Center Building Performance Study,” undated. For the number of
workers and passersby, see Port Authority briefing (May 13, 2004).
For the dimensions, see FEMA report,“World Trade Center Building Performance Study,” undated. In addition, the outside of each tower was covered by a frame of 14-inch-wide steel columns; the centers of the steel
columns were 40 inches apart.These exterior walls bore most of the weight of the building.The interior core of
the buildings was a hollow steel shaft, in which elevators and stairwells were grouped. Ibid. For stairwells and elevators, see Port Authority response to Commission interrogatory, May 2004.
2. See Port Authority response to Commission interrogatory, May 2004.
3. Ibid.These deviations were necessary because of the placement of heavy elevators and machine rooms, and
were located between the 42nd and 48th floors and the 76th and 82nd floors in both towers. For the doors being
closed but unlocked, see Port Authority briefing (May 13, 2004).
4. For rooftop access and evacuations, see Port Authority response to Commission interrogatory, May 2004.
For the helipad not conforming, see PANYNJ interview 14 (July 8, 2004). In the interests of promoting candor
and protecting privacy, we agreed not to identify most individuals we interviewed. Individuals are identified by a
code, and individuals’ ranks or units are disclosed only in a broad manner.
5. For the 1993 attack’s effect, see Alan Reiss testimony, May 18, 2004. For the attack’s testing the city’s response
capability, see FDNY report,“Report from the Chief of Department,Anthony L. Fusco,” in William Manning, ed.,
The World Trade Center Bombing: Report and Analysis (FEMA, undated), p. 11.
6. For the towers’ loss of power and the other effects, see New York City report,“Report of the World Trade
Center Review Committee,” 1995, p. 4. For generators’ shutting down, see Port Authority briefing (May 13, 2004).
For the rescue efforts, see FDNY report,“Report from the Chief of Department,Anthony L. Fusco,” in Manning,
ed., The World Trade Center Bombing, p. 11. For the evacuation time, see PANYNJ interview 5 (May 15, 2004).
7. For information on rooftop evacuations, see Port Authority response to Commission interrogatory, May
2004; NYPD interview 25, Aviation (June 21, 2004). For the rappel rescue, see Port Authority response to Commission interrogatory, May 2004. For figure of 15 hours, see “World Trade Center Bombing,” NY Cop Online Magazine, Dec. 12, 2000 (online at www.nycop.com). For the general false impression, see Civilian interview 3 (May
4, 2004); Commission analysis of letters written to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
concerning the September 11 attacks. For the WTC fire safety plan, see Port Authority response to Commission
interrogatory, May 2004.
8. For the upgrades, see Port Authority memorandum to the Commission for Nov. 3, 2003, meeting; Port
Authority briefing (May 13, 2004).
9. For the upgrades, see Port Authority memorandum to the Commission for Nov. 3, 2003, meeting; Port

Bank meetings, see “Washington Is Seeking Support to Handle Protests at 2 Meetings,” New York Times, Aug. 18,
2001, p.A8;Arlington County,“After-Action Report,” pp. 12,A-4, C-26.
194. For a list of the response agencies, see James Schwartz and Christopher Combs,“Incident Command, Joint
Operations Center and Incident Communications,” July 28, 2003 (presented at conference in Arlington,Va.,“Local
Response to Terrorism: Lessons Learned from the 9/11 Attack on the Pentagon”).When the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms moved from the Department of the Treasury to the Department of Justice after 9/11 in connection with the creation of DHS, it was renamed the Bureau of Alcohol,Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (still
abbreviated ATF); see ATF press release,“ATF Moves to the Department of Justice,” Jan. 24, 2003.
195. For the establishment of incident command on September 11, see Arlington County, “After-Action
Report,” appendix 1, p. 1-1; Schwartz and Combs,“Incident Command.”
196. Arlington County, “After-Action Report,” appendix 1, p. 1-1. Other sources put the time of the partial
collapse as late as 10:14. See Edward P. Plaugher,“Fire & EMS,” July 28, 2003 (presented at conference in Arlington,Va.,“Local Response to Terrorism: Lessons Learned from the 9/11 Attack on the Pentagon”).
197. Ibid., pp.A-30–A-31.
198. Edward A. Flynn,“Law Enforcement,” July 28, 2003 (presented at conference in Arlington,Va., on “Local
Response to Terrorism: Lessons Learned from the 9/11 Attack on the Pentagon”).
199.Arlington County,“After-Action Report,” pp. 12–13.
200. For the estimate, see NIST report, “WTC Investigation Progress,” June 22–23, 2004. For the updated
death certificate information, see New York City report, “WTC Victim List,” June 21, 2004.The analysis in this
paragraph is based upon the following sources: CNN, “September 11: A Memorial,” updated 2004 (online at
www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/memorial/index.html); company contacts, June 29, 2004 (online at
http://worldtradeaftermath.com/wta/contacts/companies_list.asp?letter=a); CNN, WTC tenants, 2001 (online
at www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/trade.center/tenants1.html); September 11 personal tributes, June 19, 2004
(online at www.legacy.com/LegacyTribute/Sept11.asp); September 11 personal profiles, Oct. 11, 2003 (online at
www.september11victims.com/september11Victims); New York Times, Portraits: 9/11/01:The Collected “Portraits of
Grief” (Times Books, 2002). It is possible that a person who worked above the impact zone had not yet reached
his or her office and was killed below the impact zone, either by falling debris, by the fireballs that exploded into
the lobby, or by being trapped in an elevator. Individuals below the impact zone may have been killed for the
same reasons. Individuals may also have been killed while in the process of evacuating.
201. Ironically, had the towers remained up longer, scores more first responders would have died.Twenty-six
additional FDNY companies—more than 150 firefighters—were en route at the time of the South Tower’s collapse, and scores more PAPD officers on Church and Vesey were preparing to enter the towers.
202.The “advisory” announcement directed by protocol (without the expanded instruction for occupants to
return to their floors) would have given greater leeway to those who judged, based on a firsthand awareness of conditions on their floors (e.g., some could feel heat from North Tower explosion), that evacuation was warranted. In
retrospect, occupants would only have had to reach a point below the 77th floor to be safe.
203.Appended to the directive was a list of different types of emergencies with designated Incident Commanders.Terrorist incidents were subdivided according to the types of attack. Conventional weapons and bomb threats
were assigned to the NYPD, while chemical, biological, and nuclear attacks designated “NYPD or FDNY” as the
Incident Commander.The directive noted:“The handling of a threat of a chemical or biological release or the use
of conventional weapons falls to the NYPD. Dealing with the consequences of the explosion or release is the responsibility of the FDNY.The investigation that follows, once the consequences of the event have been mitigated, is the
responsibility of the NYPD. Any conflicts regarding the issue of Command at these incidents will be resolved by
OEM.” New York City memo, Office of the Mayor,“Direction and Control of Emergencies in the City of New
York,” July 2001.
204. For the NYPD clearing lanes, see, e.g., FDNY interview 43, Chief (Mar. 3, 2004).
205. For the Mayor and Police Commissioner’s consultation with the FDNY Chief of Department, see
Rudolph Giuliani interview (Apr. 20, 2004).
206.The FDNY’s lack of command and control had some unintended positive consequences. One battalion
chief was dispatched to the South Tower but instead responded to the North Tower, where he was instrumental in
saving many lives after the South Tower collapsed. Some FDNY units dispatched to the South Tower—where they
would have perished—instead were mistakenly sent to the North Tower and in many cases survived.
207. For the FDNY addressing these issues, see generally FDNY report, McKinsey & Company, “FDNY
Report,” Aug. 19, 2002; Peter Hayden interview (Jan. 14, 2004). For the PAPD not changing standard operating
procedures or training, see PAPD regulations,“Manual of Police Division Instructions,” undated (in existence before
and after 9/11); Barry Pickard interview (Nov. 24, 2003).
208. One instance in which the FDNY/NYPD rivalry may have had an impact on the total fatalities was the
alleged failure of ESU officers descending past at least two firefighters after 9:59 in the North Tower to share their
evacuation instructions. It should be noted, however, that at least one firefighter has conceded that he, too, descended
past other stationary firefighters without telling them to evacuate. In addition, according to one of the ESU offi-

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cers and one of the firefighters in the North Tower, at least some FDNY personnel were unwilling to take evacuation orders from police that morning.
209. Based on more than 100 interviews we conducted and our review of 500 internal FDNY interview transcripts, we conclude that out of these 32 companies, all on-duty members of 19 companies are likely to have known
to evacuate (Engine Companies 1, 4, 7, 9, 15, 16, 21, 24, 28, 33, 39, and 65; Ladder Companies 1, 5, 6, 8, 9, 110; and
Rescue 1).We also conclude that at least some members of each of five companies knew to evacuate (two firefighters from Ladder Company 10; the officer of Ladder Company 20; all but the officer of Engine Company 10; at
least two firefighters from Squad 18; and at least three firefighters from Engine 6).We do not know whether members of the eight other companies knew to evacuate (Engine Companies 55, 207, and 226; Rescue 2, 3, and 4; Hazmat 1; and Squad 1) because they all died, and we have come across no on-point eyewitness accounts related to
their operations. It is very possible that at least some of these firefighters did hear the evacuation order but nevertheless failed to evacuate in the only 29-minute period between the collapse of the two towers. In addition, it is
possible that several of the eight companies for which we have no record of their receiving evacuation instructions
were in the South Tower and thus died in its earlier collapse.
210. Eric Lipton,“A New Weapon for Firefighters,” New York Times, May 30, 2004, p. 27.

10 Wartime
1.All times are Eastern Daylight Time. Sometime around 10:30, after the decision had already been made not
to return to Washington, a reported threat to “Angel”—the code word for Air Force One—was widely disseminated in the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) and aboard Air Force One. Notes from the morning indicate that Vice President Cheney informed President Bush in a phone conversation shortly after 10:30 that
an anonymous threat had been phoned into the White House that was viewed as credible.At about the same time,
news of the threat was conveyed on the air threat conference call.
The Secret Service’s Intelligence Division tracked down the origin of this threat and, during the day, determined that it had originated in a misunderstanding by a watch officer in the White House Situation Room.The
director of the White House Situation Room that day disputes this account. But the Intelligence Division had the
primary job of running down the story, and we found their witnesses on this point to be credible. During the afternoon of September 11 the leadership of the Secret Service was satisfied that the reported threat to “Angel” was
unfounded.
At the White House press briefing on September 12, spokesperson Ari Fleischer described the threat to Air
Force One as “real and credible.”White House transcript, Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer, Sept. 12, 2001 (online at
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/print/20010912-8.html). Fleischer told us he cited the information
in good faith. Indeed, Fleischer had conferred withVice President Cheney and Karen Hughes before the briefing,
and they had decided to let people know about the threat, all of them believing it was true.According to Fleischer,
only weeks later did he learn—from press reports—that the threat was unfounded. We have not found any evidence that contradicts his account.Ari Fleischer interview (Apr. 22, 2004); Chuck Green interview (Mar. 10, 2004);
Deborah Loewer meeting (Feb. 6, 2004); Ralph Sigler meeting (May 10, 2004); Andrew Card meeting (Mar. 31,
2004); Edward Marinzel interview (Apr. 21, 2004); Secret Service briefing (Jan. 29, 2004).
2. Edward Marinzel interview (Apr. 21, 2004); USSS memo, interview with Edward Marinzel, Oct. 3, 2001;
President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004);Ari Fleischer interview (Apr. 22, 2004); Deborah Loewer meeting (Feb. 6, 2004);White House record, PEOC Watch Log, Sept. 11, 2001.
3. Commission analysis of Air Force One radar data; Edward Marinzel interview (Apr. 21, 2004); USSS memo,
interview with Edward Marinzel, Oct. 3, 2001; Deborah Loewer meeting (Feb. 6, 2004).
4.White House record, Situation Room Communications Log, Sept. 11, 2001.
5.White House transcript, Rice interview with Bob Woodward of the Washington Post, Oct. 24, 2001, p. 367.
In the interview, Rice also said the President characterized the war as “global in nature.” Ibid.
6. See White House transcript, Rice interview with Scott Pelley of CBS, Aug. 2, 2002, p. 408; but see Rice’s
statement to Bob Woodward:“In the first video conference, the assumption that everybody kind of shared was that
it was global terrorists. . . . I don’t believe anybody said this is likely al Qaeda. I don’t think so.” White House transcript, Rice interview with Bob Woodward, Oct. 24, 2001, p. 367.
7. NSC memo, Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting (held by secure teleconference),
Sept. 11, 2001.
8.The Secretary’s decision was broadcast on the air threat conference call at 10:43. A minute later, Secretary
Rumsfeld spoke to the Vice President, and he asked Rumsfeld to run the issue by the President. At 10:45 conferees were told to “hold off ” on Defcon 3, but a minute later the order was reinstated. Rumsfeld believed the matter was urgent and, having consulted DOD directives, concluded he had the authority to issue the order and would
brief the President. Rumsfeld briefed the President on the decision at 11:15. See DOD transcript,Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001; Stephen Cambone interviews (July 8, 2004; July 12, 2004); DOD notes, Stephen Cambone notes, Sept. 11, 2001.

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555

9.The 9/11 crisis tested the U.S. government’s plans and capabilities to ensure the continuity of constitutional
government and the continuity of government operations.We did not investigate this topic, except as needed in
order to understand the activities and communications of key officials on 9/11.The Chair,Vice Chair, and senior
staff were briefed on the general nature and implementation of these continuity plans.
10.White House transcript, Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation, Sept. 11, 2001 (online at
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html).
11.White House transcript, Rice interview with Bob Woodward, Oct. 24, 2001, p. 371.
12. Joshua Bolten meeting (Mar. 18, 2004); see also Steven Brill, After: How America Confronted the September 12
Era (Simon & Schuster, 2003), pp. 50–51.
13.The collapse of the World Trade Center towers on the morning of September 11 coated Lower Manhattan with a thick layer of dust from the debris and fire. For days a plume of smoke rose from the site. Between September 11 and September 21, 2001, EPA issued five press releases regarding air quality in Lower Manhattan. A release
on September 16 quoted the claim of the assistant secretary for labor at OSHA that tests show “it is safe for New
Yorkers to go back to work in New York’s financial district.” (OSHA’s responsibility extends only to indoor air
quality for workers, however.) The most controversial press release, on September 18, quoted EPA Administrator
Christine Whitman as saying that the air was “safe” to breathe.This statement was issued the day after the financial
markets reopened.The EPA Office of Inspector General investigated the issuance of these press releases and concluded that the agency did not have enough data about the range of possible pollutants other than asbestos to make
a judgment, lacked public health benchmarks for appropriate levels of asbestos and other pollutants, and had imprecise methods for sampling asbestos in the air; it also noted that more than 25 percent of the bulk dust samples collected before September 18 showed the presence of asbestos above the agency’s 1 percent benchmark. EPA Inspector
General report,“EPA’s Response to theWorldTrade Center Collapse: Challenges, Successes, and Areas for Improvement,”Aug. 21, 2003.
We do not have the expertise to examine the scientific accuracy of the pronouncements in the press releases.
The issue is the subject of pending civil litigation.
We did examine whether the White House improperly influenced the content of the press releases so that they
would intentionally mislead the public.The EPA press releases were coordinated with Samuel Thernstrom, associate director for communications at the White House Council on Environmental Quality. Oral reports, interviews
with EPA officials, and materials on the EPA’s Web site were not coordinated through the White House.Although
the White House review process resulted in some editorial changes to the press releases, these changes were consistent with what the EPA had already been saying without White House clearance. See, e.g., David France and
Erika Check, “Asbestos Alert; How much of the chemical does the World Trade Center wreckage contain?”
Newsweek Web Exclusive, Sept. 14, 2001 (quoting EPA Administrator Whitman as saying the air quality is not a health
problem); Andrew C. Revkin,“After the Attacks:The Chemicals; Monitors Say Health Risk From Smoke Is Very
Small,” NewYork Times, Sept. 14, 2001, p.A6 (EPA says levels of airborne asbestos below threshold of concern); Hugo
Kugiya, “Terrorist Attacks; Asbestos Targeted in Cleanup Effort; EPA’s Whitman: ‘No reason for concern,’” Newsday, Sept. 16, 2001, p.W31 (Whitman says there is no reason for concern given EPA tests for asbestos).There were
disputes between the EPA’s communications person and the White House coordinator regarding the press releases.
The EPA communications person said she felt extreme pressure from the White House coordinator, and felt that
they were no longer her press releases. EPA Inspector General interview of Tina Kreisher,Aug. 28, 2002.The White
House coordinator, however, told us that these disputes were solely concerned with process, not the actual substance of the releases. Samuel Thernstrom interview (Mar. 31, 2004). Former EPA administrator Christine Whitman agreed with the White House coordinator. Christine Whitman interview (June 28, 2004) The documentary
evidence supports this claim. Although Whitman told us she spoke with White House senior economic adviser
Lawrence Lindsey regarding the need to get the financial markets open quickly, she denied he pressured her to
declare the air was safe due to economic expediency.We found no evidence of pressure on EPA to say the air was
safe in order to permit the markets to reopen. Moreover, the most controversial release that specifically declared
the air safe to breathe was released after the markets had already reopened.
The EPA did not have the health-based benchmarks needed to assess the extraordinary air quality conditions
in Lower Manhattan after 9/11.The EPA and the White House therefore improvised and applied standards developed for other circumstances in order to make pronouncements regarding air safety, advising workers at Ground
Zero to use protective gear and advising the general population that the air was safe.Whether those improvisations
were appropriate is still a subject for medical and scientific debate. See EPA Inspector General report, “EPA’s
Response to the World Trade Center Collapse,”Aug. 21, 2003, pp. 9–19.
14. Brill, After, pp. 47–50.
15.We studied this episode and interviewed many of the participants.The NYSE,Amex, and Nasdaq have developed plans for coordination and cooperation in the event of a disaster affecting one or all of them, but these plans
do not include other exchanges or international components.The White House efforts during the crisis were coordinated by the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, a group created in the 1980s.
16. Brill, After, pp. 53–55, 89–91. Following interim reports in 1999 and 2000, a congressional commission

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chaired by former senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman, and directed by retired general Charles Boyd, had, in
January 2001, recommended the creation of a cabinet department dedicated to “homeland security.” In May 2001,
President Bush namedVice President Cheney to head a task force on problems of national preparedness. His recently
hired coordinator,Admiral Steven Abbot, had started work just before the 9/11 attack.
17. Ashcroft told us that he established a “hold until cleared” policy because of the high rate of flight from
deportation proceedings. John Ashcroft testimony,Apr. 13, 2004. For closure of hearings and secrecy of the detainee
names, see DOJ email, Chief Immigration Judge Michael Creppy to all immigration judges,“Cases requiring special procedures,” Sept. 21, 2001.This policy has been challenged in two U.S. courts of appeals.The Sixth Circuit
held that there is a constitutional right of public access to these hearings; the Third Circuit reached the opposite
result.The Supreme Court has not yet decided to resolve this “circuit split.” See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303
F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002); North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v.Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S.Ct.
2215 (2003). For the length of the clearance process, see DOJ Inspector General report, “The September 11
Detainees:A Review of the Treatment of Aliens Held on Immigration Charges in Connection with the Investigation of the September 11 Attacks,”Apr. 2003, p. 51.
18. DOJ Inspector General report,“The September 11 Detainees,”Apr. 2003, pp. 142–150, 195–197.
19. John Ashcroft testimony, Apr. 13, 2004; DOJ record, “Special Interest Cases,” Sept. 16, 2003.These numbers do not add up to 768 because we have not included all categories. Some of those remanded to the Marshals
Service were held as material witnesses, and individuals were released “on bond” only after they were “cleared” by
the FBI of any connection to 9/11. For the response to our questions about the 9/11 detainee program, see DOJ
emails, Daniel Levin to the Commission, July 9, 2004; July 13, 2004.There is one exception to the statement in the
text that the detainees were lawfully held on immigration charges; one detainee was held for a short time “despite
the fact that there was no valid immigration charge.” DOJ Inspector General report,“The September 11 Detainees,”
Apr. 2003, p. 15, n. 22. See also Khaled Medhat Abou El Fadl testimony, Dec. 8, 2003.
20. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, May 10, 2003.
21. The complete title of the Act is Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat.
273 (signed into law Oct. 26, 2001).
22. John Ashcroft interview (Dec. 17, 2003).
23. On the early development of the Patriot Act, see, e.g., Brill, After, pp. 73–76, 120–125.
24. During the morning of September 11, the FAA suspended all nonemergency air activity in the national
airspace.While the national airspace was closed, decisions to allow aircraft to fly were made by the FAA working
with the Department of Defense, Department of State, U.S. Secret Service, and the FBI.The Department of Transportation reopened the national airspace to U.S. carriers effective 11:00 A.M. on September 13, 2001, for flights out
of or into airports that had implemented the FAA’s new security requirements. See FAA response to Commission
questions for the record, June 8, 2004.
25.After the airspace reopened, nine chartered flights with 160 people, mostly Saudi nationals, departed from
the United States between September 14 and 24. In addition, one Saudi government flight, containing the Saudi
deputy defense minister and other members of an official Saudi delegation, departed Newark Airport on September 14. Every airport involved in these Saudi flights was open when the flight departed, and no inappropriate actions
were taken to allow those flights to depart. See City of St. Louis Airport Authority, Lambert–St. Louis International
Airport response to Commission questions for the record, May 27, 2004; Los Angeles International Airport response
to Commission questions for the record, June 2, 2004; Greater Orlando Aviation Authority, Orlando International
Airport response to Commission questions for the record, June 8, 2004; MetropolitanWashington Airports Authority,Washington Dulles International Airport response to Commission questions for the record, June 8, 2004; Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey, JFK Airport response to Commission questions for the record, June 4,
2004; Massachusetts Port Authority, Logan International Airport, and Hanscom Airfield response to Commission
questions for the record, June 17, 2004; Las Vegas–McCarran International Airport response to Commission questions for the record, June 22, 2004; Port Authority of NewYork and New Jersey, Newark Airport response to supplemental question for the record, July 9, 2004.
Another particular allegation is that a flight carrying Saudi nationals from Tampa, Florida, to Lexington, Kentucky, was allowed to fly while airspace was closed, with special approval by senior U.S. government officials. On
September 13,Tampa police brought three young Saudis they were protecting on an off-duty security detail to the
airport so they could get on a plane to Lexington. Tampa police arranged for two private investigators to provide
security on the flight.They boarded a chartered Learjet. Dan Grossi interview (May 24, 2004); Manuel Perez interview (May 27, 2004); John Solomon interview (June 4, 2004); Michael Fendle interview (June 4, 2004).The plane
took off at 4:37 P.M., after national airspace was open, more than five hours after the Tampa airport had reopened,
and after other flights had arrived at and departed from that airport. Hillsborough County Aviation Authority,Tampa
International Airport response to Commission questions for the record, June 7, 2004.The plane’s pilot told us there
was “nothing unusual whatsoever” about the flight other than there were few airplanes in the sky.The company’s
owner and director of operations agreed, saying that “it was just a routine little trip for us” and that he would have

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557

heard if there had been anything unusual about it.The pilot said he followed standard procedures and filed his flight
plan with the FAA prior to the flight, adding,“I was never questioned about it.” Christopher Steele interview (June
14, 2004); Barry Ellis interview (June 14, 2004). FAA records confirm this account. FAA supplemental response to
Commission questions for the record, June 8, 2004.When the plane arrived at Lexington Blue Grass Airport, that
airport had also been open for more than five hours. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Airport Board, Blue Grass
Airport response to Commission questions for the record, June 8, 2004.The three Saudi nationals debarked from
the plane and were met by local police.Their private security guards were paid, and the police then escorted the
three Saudi passengers to a hotel where they joined relatives already in Lexington. Mark Barnard interview (June
7, 2004).The FBI is alleged to have had no record of the flight and denied that it occurred, hence contributing to
the story of a “phantom flight.”This is another misunderstanding.The FBI was initially misinformed about how
the Saudis got to Lexington by a local police officer in Lexington who did not have firsthand knowledge of the
matter.The Bureau subsequently learned about the flight. James M. interview (June 18, 2004).
26. Richard Clarke interview (Jan. 12, 2004).
27.Andrew Card meeting (Mar. 31, 2004); President Bush andVice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004);
Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004); Prince Bandar interview (May 5, 2004); Richard Clarke interview (Jan.
12, 2004); Richard Clarke testimony, Mar. 24, 2004 (“I would love to be able to tell you who did it, who brought
this proposal to me, but I don’t know”). Instead, the matter was handled as follows.Within days of September 11,
fearing reprisals against Saudi nationals, Rihab Massoud, the deputy chief of mission at the Saudi embassy in Washington, D.C., called Dale Watson, the FBI’s assistant director for counterterrorism, and asked for help in getting
some of its citizens out of the country. Rihab Massoud interview (May 11, 2004).At about the same time, Michael
Rolince, chief of the FBI’s international terrorism operations section, also heard from an FBI official in Newark
about a proposed flight of Saudis out of the country. Michael Rolince interview (June 9, 2004).We believe this was
the Saudi deputy defense minister’s flight. Rolince says he told the Newark official that the Saudis should not be
allowed to leave without having the names on their passports matched to their faces, and their names run through
FBI case records to see whether they had surfaced before. Rolince and Watson briefed Robert Mueller, the director of the FBI, about the issue and how they were handling it.The State Department played a role as well in flights
involving government officials or members of the royal family. State coordinated with the FBI and FAA to allow
screening by the FBI of flights with Saudi nationals on board. There is no evidence that State tried to limit the
screening. DOS record, Log of USA 9-11 Terrorist Attack Task Force, Sept. 13, 2001; Jack S. interview (June 14,
2004).The FBI effectively approved the Saudi flights at the level of a section chief. Having an opportunity to check
the Saudis was useful to the FBI.This was because the U.S. government did not, and does not, routinely run checks
on foreigners who are leaving the United States.This procedure was convenient to the FBI, as the Saudis who wished
to leave in this way would gather and present themselves for record checks and interviews, an opportunity that
would not be available if they simply left on regularly scheduled commercial flights.
28.These flights were screened by law enforcement officials, primarily the FBI. For example, one flight, the
so-called Bin Ladin flight, departed the United States on September 20 with 26 passengers, most of them relatives
of Usama Bin Ladin. Screening of this flight was directed by an FBI agent in the Baltimore Field Office who was
also a pilot. This agent, coordinating with FBI headquarters, sent an electronic communication to each of the field
offices through which the Bin Ladin flight was scheduled to pass, including the proposed flight manifest and directing what screening should occur. He also monitored the flight as it moved around the country—from St. Louis to
Los Angeles to Orlando to Washington Dulles, and to Boston Logan—correcting for any changes in itinerary to
make sure there was no lapse in FBI screening at these locations.Again, each of the airports through which the Bin
Ladin flight passed was open, and no special restrictions were lifted to accommodate its passage. James C. interview
(June 3, 2004).
The Bin Ladin flight and other flights we examined were screened in accordance with policies set by FBI headquarters and coordinated through working-level interagency processes. Michael Rolince interview (June 9, 2004).
Although most of the passengers were not interviewed, 22 of the 26 people on the Bin Ladin flight were interviewed by the FBI. Many were asked detailed questions. None of the passengers stated that they had any recent
contact with Usama Bin Ladin or knew anything about terrorist activity. See, e.g., FBI report of investigation, interview of Mohammed Saleh Bin Laden, Sept. 21, 2001.As Richard Clarke noted, long before 9/11 the FBI was following members of the Bin Ladin family in the United States closely. Richard Clarke testimony, Mar. 24, 2004.
Two of the passengers on this flight had been the subjects of preliminary investigations by the FBI, but both their
cases had been closed, in 1999 and March 2001, respectively, because the FBI had uncovered no derogatory information on either person linking them to terrorist activity.Their cases remained closed as of 9/11, were not reopened
before they departed the country on this flight, and have not been reopened since. FBI electronic communication,
Summary of Information Regarding Flights taken by Saudi Citizens Out of the U.S. Shortly After September 11,
2001, Oct. 29, 2003, pp. 9–10.
29. Michael Rolince interview (June 9, 2004). Massoud corroborates this account. He said the FBI required
the names and personal information of all departing passengers sponsored for departure by the Saudi Embassy. Rihab
Massoud interview (May 11, 2004).

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NOTES TO CHAPTER 10

30. Jack S. interview (June 14, 2004).
31.The FBI checked a variety of databases for information on the Bin Ladin flight passengers and searched the
aircraft. Because it was not clear to us whether the TIPOFF terrorist watchlist was checked by the FBI, the Terrorist Screening Center checked the names of individuals on the flight manifests of six Saudi flights against the current TIPOFF watchlist at our request prior to our hearing in April 2004.There were no matches. At our request,
based on additional information, theTerrorist Screening Center in June and July 2004 rechecked the names of individuals believed to be on these six flights, the names of individuals on three more charter flights, the names of individuals on the flight containing the Saudi Deputy Defense Minister, and the names of Saudi nationals on commercial
flights that journalists have alleged are suspect.There were no matches.Tim D. interviews (Apr. 12, 2004; June 30,
2004; July 9, 2004); FBI memo, Terrorist Screening Center to Director’s Office, “Request by 9/11 Commission
Task Force to screen the airline passenger lists through the TDSB and TIPOFF databases,” Mar. 30, 2004.
32.White House transcript,Vice President Cheney interview with Charlie Gibson of ABC, Sept. 4, 2002, p. 11.
33.“The only . . . true advice I receive is from our war council.” White House transcript, President Bush interview with Bob Woodward and Dan Balz of the Washington Post, Dec. 20, 2001.
34. On Secretary Rumsfeld’s remarks, see White House transcript, President Bush interview with Bob Woodward and Dan Balz, Dec. 20, 2001.The President’s adviser, Karen Hughes, who was in the interview, listed the points
Rumsfeld made at the smaller NSC meeting. Ibid.
35. On the President’s tasking in the earlier meeting held that day, see NSC memo, Summary of Conclusions
for NSC Meeting Held on September 12, 2001, Dec. 17, 2001. On the paper that went beyond al Qaeda, see NSC
memo, Deputies Draft Paper (attached to Agenda for NSC Meeting Scheduled for Sept. 12, 2001).The Summary
of Conclusions for the afternoon meeting indicates that the paper was discussed.
On giving priority to preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, see White House transcript, Hadley interview with Dan Balz and Bob Woodward, Jan. 11, 2002, p. 535.
36. NSC memo, Summary of Conclusions for Principals Committee Meeting Held on September 13, 2001.
In addition to the usual members of President Bush’s war cabinet, Secretary of Transportation Mineta and FAA
security chief Canavan also attended.
37. DOS cable, State 158711,“Deputy Secretary Armitage’s Meeting with General Mahmud:Actions and Support Expected of Pakistan in Fight Against Terrorism,” Sept. 14, 2001. On September 14, 2001, the U.S. Embassy
in Islamabad sent Musharraf ’s answer to the State Department by cable.
38. DOS cable, Islamabad 5123,“Musharraf Accepts the Seven Points,” Sept. 14, 2001.
39. NSC memo, Summary of Conclusions of NSC Meeting Held on September 13, 2001. According to the
Summary of Conclusions, this meeting of the President and his advisers took place in the White House Situation
Room; however, the agenda alerting agencies to the meeting specified that it would be conducted via the secure
video teleconference system (SVTS).Thus, it is unclear whether the attendees met face-to-face at the White House
or held their meeting remotely via SVTS.
40. State Department memo, “Gameplan for Polmil Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan,” Sept. 14, 2001
(tasked by President Bush).The paper was sent to the White House on September 14, 2001.The demand to free
all imprisoned foreigners reflected the U.S. government’s concern about the welfare of several foreign aid workers
in Afghanistan who had been imprisoned by the Taliban in August 2001.Two young American women, Heather
Mercer and Dayna Curry of the organization “Shelter Now International,” were among those arrested and charged
with promoting Christianity.The Taliban and other Islamists found their activities an affront to Islam and in violation of Afghanistan’s laws and the regime’s tenets.Wendy Chamberlin interview (Oct. 28, 2003). Powell stated that
the President wanted to get the hostages out but that desire would not restrain American action.White House transcript, President Bush interview with Bob Woodward and Dan Balz, Dec. 20, 2001.
41. State Department memo,“Gameplan for Polmil Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan,” Sept. 14, 2001.
42.White House transcript, President Bush interview with Bob Woodward and Dan Balz, Dec. 20, 2001.
43. Stephen Hadley meeting (Jan. 31, 2004). Hadley told us that the White House was not satisfied with the
Defense Department’s plans to use force in Afghanistan after 9/11. Ibid.; see alsoWhite House transcript, Rice interview with John King of CNN,Aug. 2, 2002, p. 421.
44.Tommy Franks interview (Apr. 9, 2004).
45. NSC memo, Hadley to recipients,“Discussion Paper for NSC meeting at Camp David on 14 September,”
Sept. 14, 2001.
46. CIA memo,“Going to War,” Sept. 15, 2001.
47.White House transcript, President Bush interview with Bob Woodward and Dan Balz, Dec. 20, 2001.
48. DOD briefing materials, “Evolution of Infinite Resolve Planning (AQ, UBL),” undated (provided to the
Commission on Mar. 19, 2004). According to Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, the President
responded to Shelton by saying that the boots-on-the-ground option was an interesting idea. He wanted to know
what the CIA would do when ground forces were in Afghanistan.White House transcript, Hadley interview with
Dan Balz and Bob Woodward, Jan. 11, 2002, p. 545.
49. NSC memo,“Conclusions of National Security Council Meeting,” Sept. 17, 2001;White House transcript,
President Bush interview with Bob Woodward and Dan Balz, Dec. 20, 2001.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 10

559

50. NSC memo,“Conclusions of National Security Council Meeting,” Sept. 17, 2001.
51. See NSC memo, Rice to Cheney, Powell, O’Neill, Rumsfeld,Ashcroft, Gonzales, Card,Tenet, and Shelton,
Sept. 16, 2001.
52. NSC memo,“Conclusions of National Security Council Meeting,” Sept. 17, 2001.
53. NSC memo, Summary of Conclusions of Terrorist Fund-raising Meeting Held on September 18, 2001.
54. DOS briefing materials,“Fact Sheet on Response to Terrorist Attacks in US,” Sept. 17, 2001.
55. DOS cable, State 161279,“Deputy Secretary Armitage–Mamoud Phone Call,” Sept. 18, 2001.
56.White House transcript,Vice President Cheney interview with Dan Balz and BobWoodward, Jan. 18, 2002,
pp. 7–8.
57. Stephen Hadley meeting (Jan. 31, 2004).
58. See National Security Presidential Directive 9, Oct. 25, 2001.
59. President Bush andVice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004). On Iran, see Condoleezza Rice testimony,Apr. 8, 2004.
60. Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror (Free Press, 2004), p. 32. According to
Clarke, he responded that “al Qaeda did this.”When the President pressed Clarke to check if Saddam was involved
and said that he wanted to learn of any shred of evidence, Clarke promised to look at the question again, but added
that the NSC and the intelligence community had looked in the past for linkages between al Qaeda and Iraq and
never found any real linkages. Ibid.
61. President Bush told us that Clarke had mischaracterized this exchange. On the evening of September 12,
the President was at the Pentagon and then went to the White House residence. He dismissed the idea that he had
been wandering around the Situation Room alone, saying,“I don’t do that.” He said that he did not think that any
president would roam around looking for something to do.While Clarke said he had found the President’s tone
“very intimidating,” (“Clarke’s Take on Terror,” CBSnews.com, Mar. 21, 2004, online at www.cbsnews.com/stories
/2004/03/19/60minutes/printable607356.shtml), President Bush doubted that anyone would have found his manner intimidating. President Bush andVice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004). Roger Cressey, Clarke’s deputy,
recalls this exchange with the President and Clarke concerning Iraq shortly after 9/11, but did not believe the President’s manner was intimidating. Roger Cressey interview (June 23, 2004).
62. NSC memo, Kurtz to Rice, Survey of Intelligence Information on any Iraq Involvement in the September 11 Attacks, Sept. 18, 2001. On 60 Minutes (CBS, Mar. 21, 2004), Clarke said that the first draft of this memo
was returned by the NSC Front Office because it did not find a tie between Iraq and al Qaeda; Rice and Hadley
deny that they asked to have the memo redone for this reason.
63. See DOD notes,Victoria Clarke notes, Sept. 11, 2001; DOD notes, Stephen Cambone notes, Sept. 11, 2001.
Cambone’s notes indicate this exchange took place at 2:40 P.M. on September 11, 2001. Steven Cambone interview (July 15, 2004).
64. Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004). For an account of Rumsfeld’s and Wolfowitz’s position on Iraq,
see Bob Woodward, Bush at War (Simon & Schuster, 2002), pp. 83–84. Rice told us that the Bush at War account of
the Camp David discussions on Iraq accorded with her memory.
65. DOD memo, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,“War on Terrorism: Strategic Concept,”
Sept. 14, 2001.
66. Colin Powell interview (Jan. 21, 2004). Rumsfeld told Bob Woodward that he had no recollection of
Wolfowitz’s remarks at Camp David. DOD transcript,“Secretary Rumsfeld Interview with the Washington Post,”
Jan. 9, 2002 (online at www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2002/t02052002_t0109wp.html).
67. Colin Powell interview (Jan. 21, 2004). Powell raised concerns that a focus on Iraq might negate progress
made with the international coalition the administration was putting together for Afghanistan.Taking on Iraq at
this time could destroy the international coalition. Ibid.
68. Colin Powell interview (Jan. 21, 2004).
69.White House transcript, President Bush interview with Bob Woodward and Dan Balz, Dec. 20, 2001.
70. Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004).
71. NSC memo,“Conclusions of National Security Council Meeting,” Sept. 17, 2001.
72. Condoleezza Rice testimony, Apr. 8, 2004; see also BobWoodward, Plan of Attack (Simon & Schuster, 2004),
p. 22.
73. DOD memo, Wolfowitz to Rumsfeld, “Preventing More Events,” Sept. 17, 2001. We review contacts
between Iraq and al Qaeda in chapter 2.We have found no credible evidence to support theories of Iraqi government involvement in the 1993 WTC bombing.Wolfowitz added in his memo that he had attempted in June to get
the CIA to explore these theories.
74. DOD memo,Wolfowitz to Rumsfeld,“Were We Asleep?” Sept. 18, 2001.
75. DOD memo, Rumsfeld to Shelton,“Some Thoughts for CINCs as They Prepare Plans,” Sept. 19, 2001. In
a memo that appears to be from Under Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith to Rumsfeld, dated September 20, the
author expressed disappointment at the limited options immediately available in Afghanistan and the lack of ground
options.The author suggested instead hitting terrorists outside the Middle East in the initial offensive, perhaps delib-

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NOTES TO CHAPTERS 10-11

erately selecting a non–al Qaeda target like Iraq. Since U.S. attacks were expected in Afghanistan, an American attack
in South America or Southeast Asia might be a surprise to the terrorists.The memo may have been a draft never
sent to Rumsfeld, or may be a draft of points being suggested for Rumsfeld to deliver in a briefing to the President. DOD memo, Feith to Rumsfeld,“Briefing Draft,” Sept. 20, 2001.
76. Hugh Shelton interview (Feb. 5, 2004).
77.Tommy Franks interview (Apr. 9, 2004).
78. NSC memo, memorandum of conversation from meeting of President Bush with Prime Minister Blair,
Sept. 20, 2001.
79.Tommy Franks interview (Apr. 9, 2004).
80.White House transcript, President Bush’s Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People,
Sept. 20, 2001. British Prime Minister Tony Blair attended the session.
81. Ibid. Several NSC officials, including Clarke and Cressey, told us that the mention of the Cole in the speech
to Congress marked the first public U.S. declaration that al Qaeda had been behind the October 2000 attack.Clarke
said he added the language on this point to the speech. Richard Clarke interview (Feb. 3, 2004); Roger Cressey
interview (Dec. 15, 2003).
82.White House transcript, President Bush’s Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People,
Sept. 20, 2001. President Bush told the Washington Post that he considered having Powell deliver the ultimatum to
the Taliban, but determined it would have more impact coming directly from the president. White House transcript, President Bush interview with Bob Woodward and Dan Balz, Dec. 20, 2001.
83.White House transcript, President Bush’s Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People,
Sept. 20, 2001.
84. Ibid.
85. Tommy Franks interview (Apr. 9, 2004).Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers and
Major General Del Dailey, commander of Joint Special Operations Command, also attended the September 21
meeting.The meeting was in direct response to the President’s September 17 instruction to Rumsfeld to develop
a military campaign plan for Afghanistan.The original “Infinite Justice” name was a continuation of a series of names
begun in August 1998 with Operation Infinite Reach, the air strikes against Bin Ladin’s facilities in Afghanistan
and Sudan after the embassy bombings.The series also included Operation Infinite Resolve, a variety of proposed
follow-on strikes on al Qaeda targets in Afghanistan.
86. DOD Special Operations Command and Central Command briefings (Sept. 15–16, 2003;Apr. 8–9, 2004;
Apr. 28, 2004); Tommy Franks interview (Apr. 9, 2004). On death of Atef, see Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon,
Age of Sacred Terror, p. 349; Henry, “The CIA in Afghanistan, 2001–2002,” Studies in Intelligence (classified version),
vol. 47, no. 2 (2003), pp. 1, 11. See Donald Rumsfeld testimony, Mar. 23, 2004 (nearly two-thirds of the known
leaders of al Qaeda had been killed or captured).

11 Foresight—and Hindsight
1. Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor:Warning and Decision (Stanford Univ. Press, 1962), p. 387.
2. Intelligence Community analytic report, “The Foreign Terrorist Threat in the United States,” NIE 95-13,
July 1995, pp. v, vii–viii, 10–11, 13, 18.
3. Intelligence Community analytic report,“The ForeignTerrorist Threat in the US: Revisiting Our 1995 Estimate,” ICB 97-8,Apr. 1997, p. 1.
4. For Bin Ladin being mentioned in only two other sentences, see ibid.
5.Titles are drawn from articles in the National Intelligence Daily and the Senior Executive Intelligence Brief.
6. John McLaughlin interview (Jan. 21, 2004).
7. Ibid.; Pattie Kindsvater interview (Sept. 12, 2003).
8.Tim Weiner,“U.S. Hard Put to Find Proof Bin Laden Directed Attacks,” New York Times,Apr. 13, 1999, p.A1.
9. Paul R. Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy (Brookings Institution Press, 2001), p. 23; see also ibid., pp. 5,
21–22.
10. For a concise statement of the role of the national estimate process, see Task force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, Making Intelligence Smarter:The Future of U.S. Intelligence (Council on Foreign Relations,
1996), pp. 34–35 (additional views of Richard Betts).
11.Waldo Heinrichs, Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry into World War II (Oxford Univ.
Press, 1988), p. 215.
12.For the response being routine,see Gordon Prange,At DawnWe Slept:The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor (McGrawHill, 1981), pp. 732–733. For a brief summary of these routines and the reasons why the intercepts were not properly
digested, see Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 2d ed. (Longman, 1999), p. 194, n. 72.
13. PDBs were not routinely briefed to congressional leaders, though this item could have been in some other
intelligence briefing. It was not circulated in the NID or SEIB. For the September 1998 report, see Intelligence
report,“Terrorism: Possible Attack on a U.S. City,” Sept. 8, 1998.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 11

561

14. For the August report, see Intelligence report,“Terrorism: Alleged Threat by Arab Terrorists to Attack the
World Trade Center in New York,” Aug. 12, 1998. An FAA civil aviation security official believed the plan was
improbable because Libyan planes were required to operate within airspace limitations and the Libyans did not possess aircraft with the necessary range to make good on the threat. Jack S. interview (June 13, 2004). On September
30, 1999, the FAA closed the file on the August report after investigation could not corroborate the report, and the
source’s credibility was deemed suspect. FAA report, Transportation Security Intelligence ICF Report 980162,
undated; but see FAA/TSA rebuttal to the Joint Inquiry’s Sept. 18, 2002, staff statement, undated, p. 1 (stating that
the FAA did not formally analyze this threat).The Algerian hijackers had placed explosives in key areas of the cabin.
However, there was some speculation in the media based on reports from a passenger aboard the plane that the
hijackers had discussed crashing it into the Eiffel Tower. FAA report, FAA Intelligence Case File 94-305, undated.
15. For Murad’s idea, see chapter 5, note 33.
16. For Clarke’s involvement in the 1996 Olympics, see Richard Clarke interview (Dec. 18, 2003). For the
1998 exercise, see Chuck Green interview (Apr. 21, 2004); NSC briefing paper, Nov. 10, 1998.
17. For the report of the National Transportation Safety Board, see NTSB report, “Aircraft Accident Brief,”
Mar. 13, 2002 (online at www.ntsb.gov/Publictn/2002/aab0201.htm). For the early 2000 CSG discussion, see NSC
note, CSG SVTS agenda, Jan. 31, 2000.
18. Richard Clarke testimony, Mar. 24, 2004.
19. FAA memo, Office of Civil Aviation Security Intelligence,“Usama Bin Ladin/World Islamic Front Hijacking Threat,” Intelligence Note 99-06,Aug. 4, 1999, pp. 5–6.
20. Ibid.
21.As part of his 34-page analysis, the attorney explained why he thought that a fueled Boeing 747, used as a
weapon, “must be considered capable of destroying virtually any building located anywhere in the world.” DOJ
memo, Robert D. to Cathleen C.,“Aerial Intercepts and Shoot-downs:Ambiguities of Law and Practical Considerations,” Mar. 30, 2000, p. 10. Also, in February 1974, a man named Samuel Byck attempted to commandeer a
plane at Baltimore Washington International Airport with the intention of forcing the pilots to fly into Washington and crash into the White House to kill the president.The man was shot by police and then killed himself on
the aircraft while it was still on the ground at the airport.
22. For NORAD’s hypothesis of aircraft as weapons, see, e.g., Ralph Eberhardt interview (Mar. 1, 2004). For
the 2001 Positive Force 01 exercise, see DOD briefing (Apr. 29, 2004);Tom Cecil and Mark Postgate interview
(June 7, 2004).
23. For the Gates report’s recommendations, see DCI task force report,“Improving Intelligence Warning,” May
29, 1992. For strengthening of the warning official, see DCI memo,“Warning,” July 17, 1992. For the recommendations languishing, see Charles Allen interview (Sept. 22, 2003). For CTC having responsibility for warning, see
RobertVickers interview (Sept. 17, 2003). For the Board’s warnings, see, e.g., Community Counterterrorism Board
report,“Intelligence CommunityTerroristThreat Advisory: Bin Ladin Orchestrating Possible Anti-US Attacks,” June
30, 2000.
24. CIA briefing materials,“DCI Update,”Aug. 23, 2001.
25. James Pavitt interview (Jan. 8, 2004). For more on this meeting, see Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7,
2004); George Tenet interview (Jan. 28, 2004).
26. For the briefing to the President-elect, see James Pavitt interview (Jan. 8, 2004).The CIA’s formal analysis
of what would happen if Bin Ladin alone was removed as compared with the importance of shutting down the
sanctuary was offered in several places. See, e.g., CIA analytic report,“Likely Impact of Taliban Actions Against Al
Qaeda,” Feb. 21, 2001 (provided as background for Tenet meetings with Rice on Feb. 23 and Mar. 7, 2001).
27. Richard Clarke testimony, Mar. 24, 2004.
28. Mike interview (Dec. 11, 2003) (reading from CIA email, Mike to Winston Wiley,Aug. 27, 1997).
29. For President Bush’s statement of al Qaeda’s responsibility for the Cole attack, see White House transcript,
“Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People,” Sept. 20, 2001 (online at
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html).
30. For Pavitt’s view, see James Pavitt interview (Jan. 8, 2004).
31. Hugh Shelton interview (Feb. 5, 2004). Zinni was concerned about excessive collateral damage caused by
Tomahawk strikes. See Anthony Zinni interview (Jan. 29, 2004).
32. For Shelton’s view, see Hugh Shelton interview (Feb. 5, 2004). For Cohen’s view, see William Cohen interview (Feb. 5, 2004).
33. Russell Honore interview (Oct. 29, 2003).
34. James Pavitt interview (Jan. 8, 2004).
35. Ibid.
36. Cofer Black interview (Dec. 9, 2003).
37. Rich interview (Dec. 11, 2003).
38. CIA memo,Tenet to Gordon and others,“Usama Bin Ladin,” Dec. 4, 1998, p. 2.
39. See, e.g., Joan Dempsey interview (Nov. 12, 2003); Jeff B. interview (Dec. 11, 2003); Louis Andre interview

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NOTES TO CHAPTER 11

(Nov. 10, 2003); Mary C. interview (Oct. 25, 2003); Maureen Baginski interview (Nov. 15, 2003);Thomas Wilson
interview (Dec. 4, 2003). Assistant DCI Charles Allen did redouble his efforts to coordinate and improve collection at the tactical level, but this was not a plan to address larger weaknesses in the fundamental capabilities of the
intelligence community. See Charles Allen interview (Sept. 22, 2003).
40. For Dempsey’s action, see Joan Dempsey interview (Nov. 12, 2003). For Minihan’s view, see Joint Inquiry
interview of Kenneth Minihan, Sept. 12, 2002. For the CIA viewing the memorandum as intended for non-CIA
intelligence agencies, see Dave Carey interview (Oct. 31, 2003).
41. George Tenet interview (Jan. 22, 2004); James Pavitt interview (Jan. 8, 2004).
42. For the New York Times article about the Jordanian arrests, see Reuters,“Jordan Seizes 13 and Links Them
to Afghan Explosives Training,” NewYork Times, Dec. 16, 1999, p.A13. For the Ressam story being on the front page,
see, e.g., Sam HoweVerhovek with Tim Weiner,“Man Seized with Bomb Parts at Border Spurs U.S. Inquiry,” New
York Times, Dec. 18, 1999, p. A1. For television coverage, see Vanderbilt University Television News Archive, Dec.
13, 22–31, 1999.

12 What to Do? A Global Strategy
1. For spending totals, see David Baumann, “Accounting for the Deficit,” National Journal, June 12, 2004, p.
1852 (combining categories for defense discretionary, homeland security, and international affairs).
2.White House press release,“National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,” Feb. 2003 (online at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030214-7.html).
3. “Islamist terrorism is an immediate derivative of Islamism.This term distinguishes itself from Islamic by the
fact that the latter refers to a religion and culture in existence over a millennium, whereas the first is a political/religious phenomenon linked to the great events of the 20th century. Furthermore Islamists define themselves as
‘Islamiyyoun/Islamists’ precisely to differentiate themselves from ‘Muslimun/Muslims.’ . . . Islamism is defined as ‘an
Islamic militant, anti-democratic movement, bearing a holistic vision of Islam whose final aim is the restoration of
the caliphate.’” Mehdi Mozaffari,“Bin Laden and Islamist Terrorism,” Militaert Tidsskrift, vol. 131 (Mar. 2002), p. 1
(online at www.mirkflem.pup.blueyonder.co.uk/pdf/islamistterrorism.pdf). The Islamist movement, born about
1940, is a product of the modern world, influenced by Marxist-Leninist concepts about revolutionary organization. “Islamists consider Islam to be as much a religion as an ‘ideology,’ a neologism which they introduced and
which remains anathema to the ulamas (the clerical scholars).” Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, trans. Carol
Volk (Harvard Univ. Press, 1994), p. 3. Facing political limits by the end of the 1990s, the extremist wing of the
Islamist movement “rejected the democratic references invoked by the moderates; and as a result, raw terrorism in
its most spectacular and destructive form became its main option for reviving armed struggle in the new millennium.” Gilles Kepel, Jihad:The Trail of Political Islam, trans.Anthony Roberts (Harvard Univ. Press, 2002), p. 14.
4. Opening the Islamic Conference of Muslim leaders from around the world on October 16, 2003, then
Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohamad said:“Today we, the whole Muslim ummah [community of believers] are treated with contempt and dishonour. Our religion is denigrated. Our holy places desecrated. Our countries are occupied. Our people are starved and killed. None of our countries are truly independent.We are under
pressure to conform to our oppressors’ wishes about how we should behave, how we should govern our lands, how
we should think even.” He added:“There is a feeling of hopelessness among the Muslim countries and their people.They feel that they can do nothing right.They believe that things can only get worse.The Muslims will forever be oppressed and dominated by the Europeans and Jews.”The prime minister’s argument was that the Muslims
should gather their assets, not striking back blindly, but instead planning a thoughtful, long-term strategy to defeat
their worldwide enemies, which he argued were controlled by the Jews. “But today the Jews rule the world by
proxy.They get others to fight and die for them.” Speech at the Opening of the Tenth Session of the Islamic Summit Conference, Oct. 16, 2003 (online at www.oicsummit2003.0rg.my/speech_03.php).
5. CIA map,“Possible Remote Havens for Terrorist and Other Illicit Activity,” May 2003.
6. For the numbers, see Tariq interview (Oct. 20, 2003).
7. For Pakistan playing a key role in apprehending 500 terrorists, see Richard Armitage testimony, Mar. 23,
2004.
8. For Pakistan’s unpoliced areas, see Tasneem Noorani interview (Oct. 27, 2003).
9. Pakistanis and Afghanis interviews (Oct. 2003); DOD Special Operations Command and Central Command
briefings (Sept. 15–16, 2004); U.S. intelligence official interview (July 9, 2004).
10. Pervez Musharraf,“A Plea for Enlightened Moderation: Muslims Must RaiseThemselves UpThrough Individual Achievement and Socioeconomic Emancipation,” Washington Post, June 1, 2004, p.A23.
11. For a review of ISAF’s role, see NATO report, “NATO in Afghanistan,” updated July 9, 2004 (online at
www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan).
12. United States Institute of Peace report,“Establishing the Rule of Law in Afghanistan,” Mar. 2004, pp. 1–3
(online at www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr117.html).
13. For the change, see Lakhdar Brahimi interview (Oct. 24, 2003); U.S. officials in Afghanistan interview (Oct.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 12

563

2003). For the request that the United States remain, see Kandahar province local leaders interview (Oct. 21, 2003).
For the effect of the United States leaving, see Karim Khalili interview (Oct. 23, 2003).
14. Some have criticized the Bush administration for neglecting Afghanistan because of Iraq. Others, including General Franks, say that the size of the U.S. military commitment in Afghanistan has not been compromised
by the commitments in Iraq.We have not investigated the issue and cannot offer a judgment on it.
15. Even if the U.S. forces, stretched thin, are reluctant to take on this role, “a limited, but extremely useful,
change in the military mandate would involve intelligence sharing with civilian law enforcement and a willingness
to take action against drug warehouses and heroin laboratories.” United States Institute of Peace report,“Establishing the Rule of Law in Afghanistan,” Mar. 2004, p. 17.
16. For barriers to Saudi monitoring of charities, see, e.g., Robert Jordan interview (Jan. 14, 2004); David
Aufhauser interview (Feb. 12, 2004).
17. For the Saudi reformer’s view, see Members of majles al-shura interview (Oct. 14, 2003).
18. Neil MacFarquhar,“Saudis Support a Jihad in Iraq, Not Back Home,” New York Times, Apr. 23, 2004, p.A1.
19. Prince Bandar Bin Sultan,“A Diplomat’s Call for War,” Washington Post, June 6, 2004, p. B4 (translation of
original in Al-Watan, June 2, 2004).
20. President Clinton meeting (Apr. 8, 2004).
21. For Jordan’s initiatives, see testimony of William Burns before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and
Central Asia of the House International Relations Committee, Mar. 19, 2003 (online at www.house.gov
/international_relations/108/burn0319.htm). For the report, see United Nations Development Programme
report, Arab Human Development Report 2003: Building a Knowledge Society (United Nations, 2003) (online at
www.miftah.org/Doc/Reports/Englishcomplete2003.pdf).
22. DOD memo, Rumsfeld to Myers,Wolfowitz, Pace, and Feith, “Global War on Terrorism,” Oct. 16, 2003
(online at www.usatoday.com/news/washington/executive/rumsfeld-memo.htm).
23. For the statistics, see James Zogby, What ArabsThink:Values, Beliefs, and Concerns (Zogby International, 2002).
For fear of a U.S. attack, see Pew Global Attitudes Project report, Views of a ChangingWorld: June 2003 (Pew Research
Center for the People and the Press, 2003), p. 2. In our interviews, current and former U.S. officials dealing with
the Middle East corroborated these findings.
24. For polling soon after 9/11, see Pew Research Center for the People and the Press report, “America
Admired,Yet Its New Vulnerability Seen as Good Thing, Say Opinion Leaders; Little Support for Expanding War
on Terrorism” (online at http://people-press.org/reports/print.php3?ReportID=145). For the quotation, see Pew
Global Attitudes Project report,“War With Iraq Further Divides Global Publics But World Embraces Democratic
Values and Free Markets,” June 3, 2003 (online at www.pewtrusts.com/ideas/ideas_item.cfm?content_
item_id=1645&content_type_id=7).
25. For the Occidentalist “creed of Islamist revolutionaries,” see, e.g., Avishai Margalit and Ian Buruma, Occidentalism:The West in the Eyes of Its Enemies (Penguin Press, 2004).
26.We draw these statistics, significantly, from the U.S. government’s working paper circulated in April 2004
to G-8 “sherpas” in preparation for the 2004 G-8 summit.The paper was leaked and published in Al-Hayat. “U.S.
Working Paper for G-8 Sherpas,” Al-Hayat, Feb. 13, 2004 (online at http://english.daralhayat.com/Spec/022004/Article-20040213-ac40bdaf-c0a8-01ed-004e-5e7ac897d678/story.html).
27. Richard Holbrooke,“Get the Message Out,” Washington Post, Oct. 28, 2001, p. B7; Richard Armitage interview (Jan. 12, 2004).
28. Testimony of George Tenet, “The Worldwide Threat 2004: Challenges in a Changing Global Context,”
before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Feb. 24, 2004.
29. U.S. Department of Energy Advisory Board report,“A Report Card on the Department of Energy’s Nonproliferation Programs with Russia,” Jan. 10, 2001, p. vi.
30. For terrorists being self-funding, see United Nations report, “Second Report of the [UN] Monitoring
Group, Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1390,” Sept. 19, 2002, p. 13.
31. For legal entry, see White House report, Office of Homeland Security,“The National Strategy for Homeland Security,” July 2002, p. 20 (online at www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/index.html). For illegal entry, see
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations task force report, Keeping the Promise: Immigration Proposals from the Heartland (Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 2004), p. 28.
32.The names of at least three of the hijackers (Nawaf al Hazmi, Salem al Hazmi, and Khalid al Mihdhar) were
in information systems of the intelligence community and thus potentially could have been watchlisted. Had they
been watchlisted, the connections to terrorism could have been exposed at the time they applied for a visa or at
the port of entry.The names of at least three of the hijackers (Nawaf al Hazmi, Salem al Hazmi, and Khalid al Mihdhar), were in information systems of the intelligence community and thus potentially could have been watchlisted. Had they been watchlisted, their terrorist affiliations could have been exposed either at the time they applied
for a visa or at the port of entry.Two of the hijackers (Satam al Suqami and Abdul Aziz al Omari) presented passports manipulated in a fraudulent manner that has subsequently been associated with al Qaeda.Based on our review
of their visa and travel histories, we believe it possible that as many as eleven additional hijackers (Wail al Shehri,

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Waleed al Shehri, Mohand al Shehri, Hani Hanjour, Majed Moqed, Nawaf al Hazmi, Hamza al Ghamdi,Ahmed al
Ghamdi, Saeed al Ghamdi, Ahmed al Nami, and Ahmad al Haznawi) held passports containing these same fraudulent features, but their passports have not been found so we cannot be sure. Khalid al Mihdhar and Salem al Hazmi
presented passports with a suspicious indicator of Islamic extremism.There is reason to believe that the passports
of three other hijackers (Nawaf al Hazmi,Ahmed al Nami, and Ahmad al Haznawi) issued in the same Saudi passport office may have contained this same indicator; however, their passports have not been found, so we cannot be
sure.
33. Khallad Bin Attash, Ramzi Binalshibh, Zakariya Essabar,Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, and Saeed al Ghamdi (not the
individual by the same name who became a hijacker) tried to get visas and failed. Kahtani was unable to prove his
admissibility and withdrew his application for admission after an immigration inspector remained unpersuaded that
he was a tourist. All the hijackers whose visa applications we reviewed arguably could have been denied visas because
their applications were not filled out completely. Had State visa officials routinely had a practice of acquiring more
information in such cases, they likely would have found more grounds for denial. For example, three hijackers made
statements on their visa applications that could have been proved false by U.S. government records (Hani Hanjour,
Saeed al Ghamdi, and Khalid al Mihdhar), and many lied about their employment or educational status.Two hijackers could have been denied admission at the port of entry based on violations of immigration rules governing terms
of admission—Mohamed Atta overstayed his tourist visa and then failed to present a proper vocational school visa
when he entered in January 2001; Ziad Jarrah attended school in June 2000 without properly adjusting his immigration status, an action that violated his immigration status and rendered him inadmissible on each of his six subsequent reentries into the United States between June 2000 and August 5, 2001.There were possible grounds to
deny entry to a third hijacker (Marwan al Shehhi). One hijacker violated his immigration status by failing to enroll
as a student after entry (Hani Hanjour); two hijackers overstayed their terms of admission by four and eight months
respectively (Satam al Suqami and Nawaf al Hazmi).Atta and Shehhi attended a flight school (Huffman Aviation)
that the Justice Department’s Inspector General concluded should not have been certified to accept foreign students, see DOJ Inspector General’s report,“The INS’ Contacts with Two September 11 Terrorists:A Review of the
INS’s Admissions of Atta and Shehhi, its Processing of their Change of Status Applications, and its Efforts to Track
Foreign Students in the United States,” May 20, 2002.
34. John Gordon interview (May 13, 2004).
35. For a description of a layering approach, see Stephen Flynn, America the Vulnerable: How the U.S. Has Failed
to Secure the Homeland and Protect Its People from Terrorism (HarperCollins, 2004), p. 69.
36.The logical and timely rollout of such a program is hampered by an astonishingly long list of congressional
mandates. The system originated in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
and applied to all non-U.S. citizens who enter or exit the United States at any port of entry. Pub. L. No. 104-208,
110 Stat. 3009 (1996), § 110.The Data Management Improvement Act of 2000 altered this mandate by incorporating a requirement for a searchable centralized database, limiting the government’s ability to require new data
from certain travelers and setting a series of implementation deadlines. Pub. L. No. 106-215, 114 Stat. 337 (2000),
§ 2(a).The USA PATRIOT Act mandated that the Attorney General and Secretary of State “particularly focus” on
having the entry-exit system include biometrics and tamper-resistant travel documents readable at all ports of entry.
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001), § 1008(a). In the Enhanced Border Security andVisa Entry Reform Act,
Congress directed that, not later than October 26, 2004, the attorney general and the secretary of state issue to all
non-U.S. citizens only machine-readable, tamper-resistant visas and other travel and entry documents that use biometric identifiers and install equipment at all U.S. ports of entry to allow biometric authentication of such documents. Pub. L. No. 107-173, 116 Stat. 543 (2002), § 303(b).The Act also required that increased security still facilitate
the free flow of commerce and travel. Ibid. § 102(a)(1)(C).The administration has requested a delay of two years
for the requirement of tamper-proof passports.Testimony of Thomas Ridge before the House Judiciary Committee, Apr. 21, 2004 (online at www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=45&content=3498&print=true). Program
planners have set a goal of collecting information, confirming identity, providing information about foreign nationals throughout the entire immigration system, and ultimately enabling each point in the system to assess the lawfulness of travel and any security risks.
37.There are at least three registered traveler programs underway, at different points in the system, designed
and run by two different agencies in the Department of Homeland Security (outside the U.S.VISIT system), which
must ultimately be the basis for access to the United States.
38. For the statistics, see DOS report,“Workload Statistics by Post Regions for AllVisa Classes” June 18, 2004.
One post-9/11 screening process, known as Condor, has conducted over 130,000 extra name-checks. DOS letter,
Karl Hofmann to the Commission,Apr. 5, 2004.The checks have caused significant delays in some cases but have
never resulted in visas being denied on terrorism grounds. For a discussion of visa delays, see General Accounting
Office report,“Border Security: Improvements Needed to Reduce Time Taken to AdjudicateVisas for Science Students and Scholars,” Feb. 2004.We do not know all the reasons why visa applications have dropped so significantly.
Several factors beyond the visa process itself include the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System, which
requires additional screening processes for certain groups from Arab and Muslim countries; the Iraq war; and per-

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haps cyclical economic factors. For the cost to the United States of visa backlogs, see National Foreign Trade Council report,“Visa Backlog Costs U.S. Exporters More Than $30 Billion Since 2002, New Study Finds,” June 2, 2004
(online at www.nftc.org/newsflash/newsflash.asp?Mode=View&articleid=1686&Category=All).
39.These issues are on the G-8 agenda.White House press release,“G-8 Secure and Facilitated Travel Initiative (SAFTI),” June 9, 2004 (online at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040609-51.html). Lax passport issuance standards are among the vulnerabilities exploited by terrorists, possibly including two of the 9/11
hijackers. Three models exist for strengthened prescreening: (1) better screening by airlines, such as the use of
improved document authentication technology; (2) posting of border agents or inspectors in foreign airports to
work cooperatively with foreign counterparts; and (3) establishing a full preinspection regime, such as now exists
for travel to the United States from Canada and Ireland. All three models should be pursued, in addition to electronic prescreening .
40. Among the more important problems to address is that of varying transliterations of the same name. For
example, the current lack of a single convention for transliterating Arabic names enabled the 19 hijackers to vary
the spelling of their names to defeat name-based watchlist systems and confuse any potential efforts to locate them.
While the gradual introduction of biometric identifiers will help, that process will take years, and a name match
will always be useful.The ICAO should discuss the adoption of a standard requiring a digital code for all names
that need to be translated into the Roman alphabet, ensuring one common spelling for all countries.
41. On achieving more reliable identification, see Markle Foundation task force report, Creating a Trusted Information Network for Homeland Security (Markle Foundation, 2003), p. 72 (online at www.markle.org).
42. General Accounting Office report, MassTransit: Federal Action Could HelpTransit Agencies Address Security Challenges, GAO-03-263, Dec. 2002 (online at www.gao.gov/new.items/d03263.pdf).

13 How to Do It? A Different Way of Organizing the Government
1.The Bush administration clarified the respective missions of the different intelligence analysis centers in a letter sent by Secretary Ridge, DCITenet, FBI Director Mueller, andTTIC Director Brennan to Senators Susan Collins
and Carl Levin on April 13, 2004.The letter did not mention any element of the Department of Defense. It stated
that the DCI would define what analytical resources he would transfer from the CTC to TTIC no later than June
1, 2004. DCI Tenet subsequently told us that he decided that TTIC would have primary responsibility for terrorism
analysis but that the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency would grow their own analysts.TTIC will have tasking authority over terrorism analysts in other intelligence agencies, although there will need to be a board to supervise deconfliction. George Tenet interview (July 2, 2004).We have not received any details regarding this plan.
2.“TTIC has no operational authority. However,TTIC has the authority to task collection and analysis from
Intelligence Community agencies, the FBI, and DHS through tasking mechanisms we will create.The analytic work
conducted at TTIC creates products that inform each of TTIC’s partner elements, as well as other Federal departments and agencies as appropriate.” Letter from Ridge and others to Collins and Levin,Apr. 13, 2004.
3. Donald Rumsfeld prepared statement, Mar. 23, 2004, p. 20.
4. In this conception, the NCTC should plan actions, assigning responsibilities for operational direction and
execution to other agencies. It would be built on TTIC and would be supported by the intelligence community
as TTIC is now.Whichever route is chosen, the scarce analytical resources now dispersed amongTTIC, the Defense
Intelligence Agency’s Joint Interagency Task Force—Combatting Terrorism (JITF-CT), and the DCI’s Counterterrorist Center (CTC) should be concentrated more effectively than they are now.
• The DCI’s Counterterrorist Center would become a CIA unit, to handle the direction and execution of tasks
assigned to the CIA. It could have detailees from other agencies, as it does now, to perform this operational
mission. It would yield much of the broader, strategic analytic duties and personnel to the NCTC.The CTC
would rely on the restructured CIA (discussed in section 13.2) to organize, train, and equip its personnel.
• Similarly, the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division would remain, as now, the operational arm of the Bureau to
combat terrorism. As it does now, it would work with other agencies in carrying out these missions, retaining the JTTF structure now in place.The Counterterrorism Division would rely on the FBI’s Office of Intelligence to train and equip its personnel, helping to process and report the information gathered in the field.
• The Defense Department’s unified commands—SOCOM, NORTHCOM, and CENTCOM—would be
the joint operational centers taking on DOD tasks. Much of the excellent analytical talent that has been assembled in the Defense Intelligence Agency’s JITF-CT should merge into the planned NCTC.
• The Department of Homeland Security’s Directorate for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
should retain its core duties, but the NCTC should have the ultimate responsibility for producing net assessments that utilize Homeland Security’s analysis of domestic vulnerabilities and integrate all-source analysis
of foreign intelligence about the terrorist enemy.
• The State Department’s counterterrorism office would be a critical participant in the NCTC’s work, taking
the lead in directing the execution of the counterterrorism foreign policy mission.

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The proposed National Counterterrorism Center should offer one-stop shopping to agencies with counterterrorism and homeland security responsibilities.That is, it should be an authoritative reference base on the transnational
terrorist organizations: their people, goals, strategies, capabilities, networks of contacts and support, the context in
which they operate, and their characteristic habits across the life cycle of operations—recruitment, reconnaissance,
target selection, logistics, and travel. For example, this Center would offer an integrated depiction of groups like al
Qaeda or Hezbollah worldwide, overseas, and in the United States.
The NCTC will not eliminate the need for the executive departments to have their own analytic units. But
it would enable agency-based analytic units to become smaller and more efficient. In particular, it would make it
possible for these agency-based analytic units to concentrate on analysis that is tailored to their agency’s specific
responsibilities.
A useful analogy is in military intelligence.There, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the service production
agencies (like the Army’s National Ground Intelligence Center) are the institutional memory and reference source
for enemy order of battle, enemy organization, and enemy equipment.Yet the Joint Staff and all the theater commands still have their own J-2s.They draw on the information they need, tailoring and applying it to their operational needs.As they learn more from their tactical operations, they pass intelligence of enduring value back up to
the Defense Intelligence Agency and the services so it can be evaluated, form part of the institutional memory, and
help guide future collection.
In our proposal, that reservoir of institutional memory about terrorist organizations would function for the
government as a whole, and would be in the NCTC.
5. The head of the NCTC would thus help coordinate the operational side of these agencies, like the FBI’s
Counterterrorism Division.The intelligence side of these agencies, such as the FBI’s Office of Intelligence, would
be overseen by the National Intelligence Director we recommend later in this chapter.
6.The quotation goes on:“It includes gaps in intelligence, but also intelligence that, like a string of pearls too
precious to wear, is too sensitive to give to those who need it. It includes the alarm that fails to work, but also the
alarm that has gone off so often it has been disconnected. It includes the unalert watchman, but also the one who
knows he’ll be chewed out by his superior if he gets higher authority out of bed. It includes the contingencies that
occur to no one, but also those that everyone assumes somebody else is taking care of. It includes straightforward
procrastination, but also decisions protracted by internal disagreement. It includes, in addition, the inability of individual human beings to rise to the occasion until they are sure it is the occasion—which is usually too late. . . .
Finally, as at Pearl Harbor, surprise may include some measure of genuine novelty introduced by the enemy, and
some sheer bad luck.” Thomas Schelling, foreword to Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor:Warning and Decision (Stanford Univ. Press, 1962), p. viii.
7. For the Goldwater-Nichols Act, see Pub. L. No. 99-433, 100 Stat. 992 (1986). For a general discussion of the
act, see Gordon Lederman, Reorganizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff:The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 (Greenwood, 1999);
James Locher, Victory on the Potomac:The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon (Texas A&M Univ. Press, 2003).
8. For a history of the DCI’s authority over the intelligence community, see CIA report, Michael Warner ed.,
Central Intelligence; Origin and Evolution (CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2001). For the Director’s view
of his community authorities, see DCI directive,“Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1/1:The Authorities
and Responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence as Head of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” Nov. 19,
1998.
9. As Norman Augustine, former chairman of Lockheed Martin Corporation, writes regarding power in the
government,“As in business, cash is king. If you are not in charge of your budget, you are not king.” Norman Augustine, Managing to Survive inWashington:A Beginner’s Guide to High-Level Management in Government (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2000), p. 20.
10. For the DCI and the secretary of defense, see 50 U.S.C. § 403-6(a). If the director does not concur with
the secretary’s choice, then the secretary is required to notify the president of the director’s nonconcurrence. Ibid.
For the DCI and the attorney general, see 50 U.S.C. § 403-6(b)(3).
11.The new program would replace the existing National Foreign Intelligence Program.
12. Some smaller parts of the current intelligence community, such as the State Department’s intelligence bureau
and the Energy Department’s intelligence entity, should not be funded out of the national intelligence program
and should be the responsibility of their home departments.
13. The head of the NCTC should have the rank of a deputy national intelligence director, e.g., Executive
Level II, but would have a different title.
14. If the organization of defense intelligence remains as it is now, the appropriate official would be the under
secretary of defense for intelligence. If defense intelligence is reorganized to elevate the responsibilities of the director of the DIA, then that person might be the appropriate official.
15. For the information technology architecture, see Ruth David interview (June 10, 2003). For the necessity
of moving from need-to-know to need-to-share, see James Steinberg testimony, Oct. 14, 2003. The Director still
has no strategy for removing information-sharing barriers and—more than two years since 9/11—has only
appointed a working group on the subject. George Tenet prepared statement, Mar. 24, 2004, p. 37.

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16.The intelligence community currently makes information shareable by creating “tearline” reports, with the
nonshareable information at the top and then, below the “tearline,” the portion that recipients are told they can
share.This proposal reverses that concept.All reports are created as tearline data, with the shareable information at
the top and with added details accessible on a system that requires permissions or authentication.
17. See Markle FoundationTask Force report, Creating aTrusted Information Network for Homeland Security (Markle
Foundation, 2003); Markle Foundation Task Force report, Protecting America’s Freedom in the Information Age (Markle
Foundation, 2002) (both online at www.markle.org).
18. Markle Foundation Task Force report, Creating a Trusted Information Network, p. 12.The pressing need for
such guidelines was also spotlighted by the Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee appointed by Secretary
Rumsfeld to advise the Department of Defense on the privacy implications of its Terrorism Information Awareness Program.Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee report, Safeguarding Privacy in the Fight Against Terrorism (2004) (online at www.sainc.com/tapac/TAPAC_Report_Final_5-10-04.pdf). We take no position on the
particular recommendations offered in that report, but it raises issues that pertain to the government as a whole—
not just to the Department of Defense.
19.This change should eliminate the need in the Senate for the current procedure of sequential referral of the
annual authorization bill for the national foreign intelligence program. In that process, the Senate Armed Services
Committee reviews the bill passed by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence before the bill is brought before
the full Senate for consideration.
20.This recommendation, and measures to assist the Bureau in developing its intelligence cadre, are included
in the report accompanying the Commerce, Justice and State Appropriations Act for FiscalYear 2005, passed by the
House of Representatives on July 7, 2004. H.R. Rep. No. 108-576, 108th Cong., 2d sess. (2004), p. 22.
21. Letter from Ridge and others to Collins and Levin,Apr. 13, 2004.
22. For the directorate’s current capability, see Patrick Hughes interview (Apr. 2, 2004).