Tuesday, September 25, 2018

Reply to Christopher Tollefsen on Abortion

Reply
to Christopher Tollefsen on Abortion

Abstract: Are you the
same thing as your body? Did you
begin at conception? Do you have a rational and free “nature” or “essence”?
Some answer ‘yes’ to all and argue that this means that abortion is wrong:

your "essence" is that of a free and rational being; that essence *makes* it wrong to kill you; you have always existed whenever your body existed; your body began at conception; and so you existed at conception and were wrong to kill; and the same is true for all other human fetuses.

I appreciate this opportunity to dialogue with Professor
Tollefsen on the topic of abortion. I will note some controversies and concerns
about his main argument. I hope these observations inspire further discussion
of the issues.

1.Metaphysics

Tollefsen begins with some discussion concerning the metaphysics of “what we are” and “when
we began.”

A.What are we?

Tollefsen argues that we are both minds and bodies: “the minded being that you are is the same being as the physical, living organism that are you. . . You are that living organism, that human
being.”

The claim isn’t merely that we have
minds and bodies. It’s that we are minds
and bodies essentially, meaning we
are identical to both. This is a
claim not just about us in the world as it actually is: it’s a claim about us
in every possiblecircumstance. And
it is, at least, a claim contrary to many people’s beliefs about what they are
and could be.

For example, many people think that
fictional stories and films involving “body swaps” (e.g., “Freaky Friday”) are,
at least, possible: you could come to exist in a different
body, a body formerly inhabited by another person. Many people also believe
that “tele-transporters” (e.g., from “Star Trek”) are possible: you could come to exist in a body made
of entirely new matter. And many people at least hope, if not confidently believe,that they will continue to exist after the death of their body in
an afterlife, with a new body or even with no body at all.[1]

These examples suggest that many
people believe they are not identical to
their body. They accept mind-body “dualism”: we are related to our bodies, but not identical
to our bodies.

Tollefsen rejects dualism, for only
briefly-developed reasons. But much more is needed to really show that dualism is
mistaken and that we are, in essence,
both minds andbodies. Since refuting
dualism is key to arguing that we were
early fetuses, Tollefsen’s case needs development.

B.When did we begin?

Tollefsen argues that “we” begin at conception. While our
bodies begin at conception, it might not be literally true that “we” begin at
conception.

To see why, we should think about
when “we” end. Typically, this is at
death of our whole bodies. “We” also end at brain death. And “we” end if we go
into an irreversible coma or permanent vegetative state. Suppose Eve was in a
coma for 10 years, with no brain activity all that time. When did Eve end? Many
would say that the person Eve ended 10
years ago, when she fell into the coma. “She
has been gone for 10 years,” we’d say.

If “we” end when our conscious permanently ends, then “we” begin when consciousness begins. And
consciousness begins later than when the body begins. So “we” begin not at conception, but likely months
later: mid-pregnancy or so when the brain and nervous system are developed
enough to produce consciousness.

Since Tollefsen’s case depends on
“us” existing at conception, these arguments also need development.

2.
Ethics

Tollefsen argues that the basis of our moral rights is an essential or necessary property of all biologically human organisms or beings: a
rational and free nature or essence. Since fetuses have
this nature or essence, they have basic moral rights, like us, as one of us.[2]

This argument depends on some
controversial metaphysics, discussed above, but there are some distinctly
ethical controversies also.

A.Moral Explanations

Tollefsen’s argument is rooted in the moral hypothesis that we have worth and are due respect because we are rational and free. This
is doubtful. We are born not rational
and free (says Tollefsen), and we often die lacking freedom or rationality.
Freedom or rationality are taken from many of us by illness and injury; some
people live their entire lives without either.

All these human beings, however,
have worth and are due respect: they have rights. Why? A simple answer is this:
they are conscious, sentient, feeling beings, and so their lives can go better
and worse for them; in short, they
can be harmed, and this is why they,
and anyone, has rights.[3] Whydo rational and free people have
rights? Becausethey can be harmed is a better explanation than because they are rational and free.

The first step in Tollefsen’s case
against abortion is doubtful, since a simpler explanation is available. We
should accept Tollefsen’s hypothesis only if the simpler hypothesis is faulty.

B. Appealing to “Natures”

Why should we think that anything (or anyone) with a
rational and free natureor essence
has rights? Tollefsen argues this is because requiring actual rationality and freedom for rights implies that babies don’t
have rights.

Perhaps, but we can acknowledge that
babies have rights on the simpler grounds they are conscious, feeling and can
be harmed. Again, we should accept Tollefsen’s abstract appeal to “natures” to
support rights for babies only if this simpler explanation fails.[4]

C. Understanding the Proposal

Finally, simplified, Tollefsen proposes something like this:

We have rights ultimately because we
have a rational nature.Anything with
a rational nature has rights.

But consider two similar proposals:

We make moral decisions ultimately
because we have a rational nature. Anything
with a rational nature makes moral decisions.

We sometimes deserve praise and
blame ultimately becausewe have a
rational nature. Anything with a rational
nature sometimes deserves praise and blame.

Facts about fetuses show that these italicized claims are
false: fetuses only have the potential
for decision-making and being praise and blameworthy. So, we are due a better
explanation why actual rights, not just potential rights, would result from
fetuses’ natures. Fetuses’ natures involve many potentials and radical capacities,
most of which make no difference to their current, actual properties. So, what current
properties fetuses do fetuses get from their natures and which do they don’t? More
explanation is needed.

3.
Conclusion

In sum, these are some concerns to be addressed in thinking
through Tollefsen’s, and similar, arguments.

[1] Many
metaphysical issues, such as these, involve attempting to know or understand
what is possible and using those
insights to understand the nature of what is actual. For an introduction to some of the challenges involved in
these tasks, see Bob
Fischer’s “Modal
Epistemology: Knowledge of Possibility & Necessity” at 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology: 1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/modal-epistemology/

[2]Suppose Tollefsen’s metaphysics is correct and we are, in
essence or nature, minds and bodies,
and we begin at conception. Some think that this immediately shows that fetuses
have basic moral rights, since we have them now and we developed from fetuses,
who were once us. But just because we are some way now doesn’t mean we’ve always
been that way. “Having rights” could be a contingent property, one that we can gain and lose, not an essential or necessary property, one that we have, and must have, whenever we
exist.

[3] This quick
theory is inspired by, and supported by, philosopher Tom Regan’s argument that
if someone is what he calls a “subject of a life,” then that someone has basic
moral rights. See his The Case For Animal
Rights (University of California Press, 1983 [2004 updated version), p.
243) or his essay “The Case for Animal Rights,” in
Peter Singer (ed.), In Defense of
Animals, Basil Blackwell, 1985, pp. 13-26. From the essay, in response to
theories that suggest that human beings without freedom or reason lack moral rights:

. . we are each of us the experiencing
subject of a life, a conscious creature having an individual welfare that has
importance to us whatever our usefulness to others. We want and prefer things,
believe and feel things, recall and expect things. And all these dimensions of
our life, including our pleasure and pain, our enjoyment and suffering, our
satisfaction and frustration, our continued existence or our untimely death -
all make a difference to the quality of our life as lived, as experienced, by
us as individuals.

Regan
argues that anyone like this, anyone who is a “subject of a life,” has basic
rights.

[4]We might also reject Tollefsen’s appeal to “natures” on the
grounds that, perhaps, a brain-dead individual retains a “rational and free”
nature, yet lacks rights. Since rights protect against harm, and such an
individual cannot be harmed, having a free and rational nature does not entail
that an individual has rights. (So, any moral obligations due to that body are
not because of that individual’s rights: something else explains it).

Ifsomeone replies that such an
individual’s relevant body parts are damaged
and so they no longer have this nature,
then if the relevant body parts are non-existent
since not yet developed (as in an embryo or fetus), that would seem to suggest that
they lack that nature also.

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"The ultimate measure of a person is not where he or she stands in moments of comfort and convenience, but where he or she stands at times of challenge and controversy." - Martin Luther King, Jr. (Morehouse, '48)