The war clouds in South Asia have receded following high-level US
diplomatic efforts and the withdrawal of tens of thousands of Indian and Pakistani troops
along their 1,800-mile border. However, concerns over the outbreak of yet another war
between India and Pakistan have not completely disappeared, particularly in view of
General Pervez Musharrafs inability and unwillingness to deliver on his promise to
permanently stop terrorist incursions into Indian-held Kashmir and Indias position
that it retains the right to take military action if this promise remains unfulfilled.1 If Islamabad escalates cross-border infiltrations or if
militants launch a series of spectacular attacks, then New Delhi will be forced to respond
in some way.2 Interestingly, India has now appropriated the Bush
Administrations doctrine of preemption.

A number of recent
developments, such as the emergence of pro-Taliban Islamic parties as the third-largest
force in Pakistans October 2002 parliamentary elections, Islamabads seemingly
halfhearted efforts to tackle the al Qaeda menace, revelations of a Pakistan-North
Korea nuclear missile proliferation nexus, and, last but not least, the Indian
governments growing disillusionment with Washingtons reluctance to get tough
with Pakistan for fear of destabilizing the Musharraf regime, suggest that the conditions
surrounding the India-Pakistan nuclear standoff are likely to worsen over the next few
years.3 The two nuclear-armed countries also have embarked upon an
arms-buying spree, preparing themselves for the next war.

The recent
India-Pakistan crisis has highlighted again the long shadow that Asias rising
superpower, China, casts on the Indian subcontinent, especially during times of heightened
tensions. Though the roots of the India-Pakistan animosity are deep-seated in religion,
history, and the politics of revengeand thus predate India-China
hostilityChinas strategists recognize the enduring nature

35/36

of the
India-Pakistan enmity and exploit it to Beijings advantage. In fact, Beijing has
long been the most important player in the India-Pakistan-China triangular relationship.
Since the Sino-Indian border war of 1962, China has aligned itself with Pakistan and made
heavy strategic and economic investments in that country to keep the common enemy, India,
under strategic pressure. Interestingly, Chinas attempts to improve ties with India
since the early 1990s have been accompanied by parallel efforts to bolster the Pakistani
militarys nuclear and conventional capabilities vis-à-vis India. It was the
provision of a Chinese nuclear and missile shield to Pakistan during the late 1980s and
1990s that emboldened Islamabad to wage a proxy war in Kashmir without fear of
Indian retaliation.4

While a certain
degree of tension in Kashmir and Pakistans ability to pin down Indian armed forces
on its western frontiers are seen as enhancing Chinas sense of security, neither an
all-out India-Pakistan war nor Pakistans collapse would serve Beijings grand
strategic objectives. Concerned over the implications of an all-out war on Chinas
southwestern borders since the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States, Beijing has
been keeping a close watch on the fast-changing situation and has taken several
diplomatic-military measures to safeguard its broader geostrategic interests in Asia.
Since most war-gaming exercises on the next India-Pakistan war end either in a nuclear
exchange or in a Chinese military intervention to prevent the collapse of Beijings
closest ally in Asia, this article examines Chinas response to the recent
India-Pakistan crisis and Chinas likely response in the event of another war on the
Indian subcontinent.

Beijings
Response to India-Pakistan Tensions after 9/11

Since the late
1990s, China had become increasingly concerned over the gradual shift in the regional
balance of power in South Asia, driven by the steady rise of India coupled with the
growing US-India entente and the talk of India as a counterweight to China in
Washingtons policy circles, and by Pakistans gradual descent into the ranks of
failed states.5 Since the end of the Cold War, a
politically dysfunctional and economically bankrupt Pakistans flirtation with
Islamic extremism and terrorism, coupled with its nuclear and missile programs, had
alienated Washington. However, the 11 September 2001 attacks changed all that. Pakistan
saw an opportunity to revive its past close relations with the United States, shed its
near pariah status, and enhance its economic and strategic position

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vis-à-vis India by
instantaneously becoming a frontline state in the international coalition
fighting global terrorism. In return, Washington lifted sanctions and agreed to provide
Pakistan with billions of dollars in aid and debt rescheduling. From Washingtons
perspective, courting Musharraf made geopolitical sense because the Pakistani military not
only knew a great deal about the Taliban, Osama bin Laden, and al Qaeda, but also because
any US military operation against Afghanistan could not be successful without the bases,
logistics, personnel, and airspace in neighboring Pakistan. In Beijing, as a result, there
were great expectations of a sharp downturn in US-India relations, because in many ways
what happens on the Indian subcontinent is unavoidably a zero-sum game and Pakistans
new relationship with the United States did affect India negatively.6

However, tensions
between South Asias nuclear-armed rivals rose sharply after the terrorist attacks at
the Kashmir Assembly in October 2001 and the Indian Parliament on 13 December 2001. The
attack on the Indian Parliament triggered a major deployment of Indian troops along the
border with Pakistan, with Islamabad responding in kind. New Delhi warned of retaliatory,
punitive military strikes against terrorist camps inside Pakistani-controlled Kashmir.
Although the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson condemned these attacks, Chinese
leaders and South Asia watchers were much more circumspect and ambivalent while lauding
Pakistans contribution to the war against terrorism. A South Asia specialist from
Chinas National Defense University, Wang Baofu, noted with satisfaction that under
the new circumstances, The United States, considering its own security interests,
readjusted its policies toward South Asian countries and started paying more attention to
the important role of Pakistan in the anti-terrorism war, therefore arousing the vigilance
and jealousy of India. Wang criticized India for defin[ing] resistance
activities in Kashmir as terrorism by taking advantage of the US anti-terrorism war in
Afghanistan, thus putting more pressure on Pakistan through the United States, and
praised General Musharraf for his clear-cut attitude toward fighting against
international terrorism.7 Such a stance was not unexpected. For
almost a decade, China had rejected Indias proposal to issue a joint declaration
against terrorism lest it be interpreted as a condemnation of Pakistan.8

Pakistan President
General Musharraf made three trips to Beijing in less than a year (in December 2001,
January 2002, and August 2002) for urgent security consultations with President Jiang
Zemin and Premier Zhu Rongji and reportedly obtained firm assurances of support in
the event of a war with India. At the time of heightened tensions in mid-January
2002, General Zhang Wannian, Vice-Chairman of Chinas Central Military Commission,
met with General Muhammad Aziz Khan, Chairman of Pakistans Joint Chiefs of the Staff
Committee, and was quoted as telling Khan: For many years the militaries of our two
nations have maintained exchanges and cooperation at the highest and all levels and in
every field. This fully embodies the all-weather friendship our nations maintain.9 Zhangs reference to cooperation . . . in
every field (meaning the nuclear and missile fields) was a thinly veiled warning to
India to back off. Later, Beijing matched words with deeds by

37/38

rushing two dozen
F-7 jet fighters, nuclear and missile components, and other weapon systems to shore up
Pakistani defenses in the tense border face-off. A secret futuristic arms
development cooperation agreement was signed during General Musharrafs
five-day visit to China in December 2001 to construct, among other weapons, an
all-solid-fuel Shaheen III missile with a range of 3,500-4,000 kilometers to target all
major Indian cities.10 The Peoples Liberation Army (PLA)
troops from the Military Regions of Chengdu and Lanzhou and their respective
sub-divisions, the Xizang (Tibet) and Wulumuqi (Urumqi), along Chinas southern
borders, were also put on alert in January to test their war preparedness should the
conflict in the Indian subcontinent spill over onto Chinese soil.

The Chinese leaders
had reportedly conveyed the following message to Musharraf: China hopes Pakistan
will not initiate any assault. Pakistan should not get involved in wars and instead focus
on economic construction. However, if a war does break out between India and Pakistan,
Beijing will firmly stand on the side of Islamabad.11 Soon thereafter, President Musharraf in a televised
speech on 12 January 2002 announced a crackdown on extremist organizations waging jihad
from Pakistani territory, and as a result, Indo-Pakistani tensions somewhat subsided. The
Chinese media claimed some credit for mediating between the two
sub-continental rivals despite the Indian governments aversion to the dreaded
m word: Mediated by the United States, China, Britain, and Russia,
leaders of India and Pakistan recently expressed their desire to try to control the tense
situation.12 Interestingly, this stance contradicted
then Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singhs statement during Premier Zhus
visit to New Delhi in January 2002 that China has neither any intention, nor shall
it play any mediatory role between India and Pakistan.13 Not only that, the Chinese Foreign Minister also
succeeded in persuading his Russian counterpart to issue a Joint Declaration on the
India-Pakistan Situation, signaling to New Delhi that, for the first time, Beijing
and Moscow had a unified stand on the dispute. In concrete policy terms, it meant that New
Delhi could no longer count on the Russian veto in the UN Security Council in the event of
a war.

Then came the 14 May
2002 terrorist attack on a military base in Jammu that killed 34 people, mostly women and
children, once again escalating tensions along the border where more than one million
troops backed by heavy armor, warplanes, and missiles were deployed. There was renewed
tough talk of war, including nuclear war, on both sides of the border. Beijing called for
restraint from

38/39

both India and
Pakistan and emphasized the need for peaceful dialogue to settle outstanding disputes.
Chinese Defense Minister Chi Haotian also urged both countries to desist from a military
conflict and not to threaten each other with nuclear weapons. Describing the US diplomatic
moves (i.e., the dispatch of Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in early June 2002) to defuse the India-Pakistan military
stand-off as too little too late, the state-run media accused Washington of
showing no genuine desire to resolve the Kashmir issue.14 It noted that Washington had clearly not taken the
tensions very seriously when it went on with a ten-day joint military maneuver with India
on 16-26 May 2002, thereby implying that the Indo-US joint military exercise had
emboldened India to up the ante against Pakistan.15

On 15 May, a Chinese
official accompanying Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan during his visit to Islamabad told
Pakistani journalists that China would back Pakistan in any conflict with India. Concerned
over the one-sided nature of public appeals from Washington, Moscow, London,
Paris, and Tokyo to General Musharraf to halt cross-border terrorism into
Indian Kashmir, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan told US Secretary of State Colin
Powell on 27 May 2002 that the international community should encourage direct
dialogue between India and Pakistan in a more balanced and fair manner, which is the most
effective way to lead South Asia towards peace and stability.16
Apparently, the growing threat of nuclear war and the prospect of Pakistani nuclear
weapons falling into the hands of Islamic terrorists have made Washington lean heavily on
Islamabad. In contrast, Beijing repeatedly asked New Delhi to do more to end the military
stand-off while publicly calling for restraint by both sides and claiming to be
even-handed. China continued to covertly side with its long-term ally, however, and is
providing military wherewithal to Pakistan.

Meanwhile, in yet
another television address on 27 May, Musharraf pledged that all militant infiltration
across the Line of Control (LoC) would end, and he announced the banning of
Lashkar-e-Toiba, the Jaish-e-Mohammad, and the Harkat-ul-Mujahideenthe three jihadi
outfits at the forefront of terrorist activity in Indian Kashmir. From New Delhis
perspective, Indias military deployment had succeeded in bringing the international
focus on Pakistan as the home of pan-Islamic jihadis after the war in Afghanistan.

At the Conference on
Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia held in Kazakhstan in early June
2002, Chinese President Jiang Zemin pressed Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee to enter into
direct talks with Pakistani President Musharraf to prevent the Kashmir conflict from
exploding into a full-scale war. But the Indian government was so irked over
Musharrafs playing of the China card that Vajpayee refused to budge.
Later, in an interview with The Washington Post, the Indian Prime Minister
complained that he saw no basic change in Chinas policy. China continues to
help Pakistan acquire weapons and equipment.17 In an article titled Beijing as Guarantor of Pakistans
Security, a Russian weekly, Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye (Independent
Mil-

39/40

itary Review), had
reported that new security commitments have indeed been made to Pakistan by China since
9/11.18 New Delhi expressed its displeasure with Beijing by postponing
scheduled visits by Indian Army Chief Padmanabhan and Prime Minister Vajpayee to China in
October and November 2002.

The Nuclear
Connection

There were other
grounds for the cooling of relations between Beijing and New Delhi. In his testimony
before the US Senate governmental affairs subcommittee in early June 2002, the Assistant
Secretary of State for Nonproliferation, John S. Wolf, revealed that China recently
provided Islamabad with missile-related technologies, which include dual-use
missile-related items, raw materials, and other accessories essential for missile
manufacturing.19 In a sense, Chinas nuclear and
missile assistance to a volatile Pakistan over the last two decades has now created the
risk of a conventional conflict swiftly escalating into nuclear war. Beijing has not only
provided Islamabad with nuclear bombs, uranium, and plants (all three Pakistani nuclear
plantsKahuta, Khushab, and Chasma have been built with Chinese assistance) but
also their delivery systems: ready-to-launch M-9 (Ghaznavi/Hatf), M-11 (Shaheen), and a
number of Dong Feng 21 (Ghauri) ballistic missiles.20 This cooperation has continued despite Beijings
growing concerns over the Talibanization of the Pakistani state and society.
When Islamabad carried out a series of missile tests amidst heightened tensions apparently
to warn New Delhi to back off, the Indian government drew the international
communitys attention to the Pakistani missiles China connection. We are
not impressed by these missile antics, particularly when all that is demonstrated is
borrowed or imported ability. . . . The technology used in the missiles is not their own
but clandestinely acquired from other countries, said a spokesperson of the Indian
External Affairs Ministry.21

Pakistans test
of its nuclear-capable, medium-range, Shaheen ballistic missile in early October 2002,
just days before the parliamentary elections, once again provoked India to level
accusations of missile technology proliferation by China. Indias outspoken Defense
Minister, George Fernandes, long a critic of China, said that Pakistans military had
always depended on support from China ever since it was carved out as a homeland for South
Asias Muslims in 1947 following decolonization of British India. Everyone
knows what Pakistan will be without China. Its ego is boosted purely by the support it
gets from China, Fernandes said at a party convention in Mumbai.22 Earlier, when India weaponized its nuclear capability
through a series of tests in May 1998, Fernandes had described China [as] the mother
of Pakistans nuclear bomb and claimed that Indias aim was to counter
Chinas capability rather than Pakistans, drawing protests from Beijing. When
Pakistan came in the firing line following revelations in the US media about the
missiles-for-nukes barter deal with North Korea, New Delhi argued that blame should also
be put on China for making Pakistan a nuclear weapons state.23

40/41

For New Delhi,
Beijings military alliance with Islamabad remains a sore point because the
Sino-Pakistani nuclear nexus has introduced a new element of uncertainty and complexity in
sub-continental strategic equations. While the attention of world leaders and the media
has been focused on the nightmarish scenario of a nuclear Armageddon in South Asia and
large-scale mutual assured destruction leading to the deaths of 12 to 30 million people,
strategic circles in Islamabad and New Delhi have been discussing the pros and cons of a
short, limited nuclear war in Kashmir. Media reports based on intelligence leaks have
revealed the forward deployment by the Pakistani military of low-yield (five kilotons or
less) tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs).24
Such small battlefield nuclear weapons have a one-mile destruction radius and could be
used effectively against large troop concentrations and advancing tank formations along
the LoC in Kashmir.

The Pakistanis seem
to have taken a page out of Chinas book on tactical nuclear warfighting capability.
Just as persistent Sino-Soviet disputes and the Soviet Unions conventional military
superiority during the 1970s and 1980s gave China strong incentives to develop and deploy
TNWs, the decade-long India-Pakistan border tensions and Indias conventional
superiority may have added momentum to Islamabads efforts to deploy TNWs. Most of
Pakistans missiles acquired from China, such as the M-9, are short-range,
solid-fueled, mobile, nuclear-capable missiles and can be used in a tactical mode.25 Asked to comment on reports that Pakistan has acquired
TNWs, the Deputy Chief of the Indian Army, Lieutenant General Raj Kadyan, was quoted as
saying that the Indian Army has trained itself to cope with a tactical nuclear
strike in the battlefield.26 Tactical nukes can be launched over an
unpopulated area from field artillery guns or aircraft to halt an enemy advance or in an
effort to intimidate a numerically stronger enemy. Since the damage is localized or
confined to a certain area, the danger of affecting the civilian population is greatly
reduced as compared to a strategic nuclear weapon of the Hiroshima kind and therefore need
not evoke massive retaliation by enemy forces. The mountainous terrain in Kashmir provides
the perfect setting for their use.

In addition to the
United States and Russia, only China is believed to have a large stockpile of about 120
TNWs or baby nukes. Some of these were apparently delivered to Pakistan
following the visit of PLA Deputy Chief and

41/42

military
intelligence boss General Xiong Guangkai (arguably Chinas most important military
figure and the man who calls Pakistan Chinas Israel) to Islamabad in
early March 2002.27 If the reports of Chinas transfer of TNWs to Pakistan are
indeed true, the question then is: Would India, which does not possess TNWs but has
strategic nuclear weapons in abundance, keep a nuclear conflict limited or escalate it to
the strategic level and respond with massive retaliation? Though New Delhi has long
maintained that even a tactical nuclear strike on its forces would be treated as a nuclear
first strike, and would invite massive retaliation, some Pakistani generals believe that a
tactical strike would circumvent retaliation from India, since such an attack on an
advancing tank regiment or infantry battalion (in contrast to a strategic strike killing
millions of civilians), would not be provocation enough for all-out retaliation. They
contend that the many layers of bureaucracy surrounding Indias nuclear capability,
the strength of world public opinion, and the fact that strategic command remains in
civilian hands places severe doubts on Indias willingness and ability to retaliate
with a massive nuclear strike against an opponent, particularly in the face of only a
limited tactical strike from Pakistan.

Some analysts
attribute the recent lessening of tensions to the belated recognition in Indias
strategic circles that New Delhi cannot afford to dismiss Pakistans repeated threats
of using nuclear weapons as mere posturing or bluffing on
Islamabads part. They point to the Pakistani militarys strong aversion to
fighting a 1965- or 1971-type conventional war with India and offer this as the rationale
behind Islamabads decision to pull back from the brink on several occasions in
recent history (in 1987, 1990, 1999, and 2002). Others believe that the tendency of Indian
strategic planners to discount the threat of nuclear escalation may well be based on some
fundamentally erroneous assumptions:28

That the United States cannot allow
Pakistan to be the first Islamic country to use nuclear weapons to settle a territorial
dispute, as it would mean the end of the global nonproliferation regime and encourage
other countries to go nuclear to settle their territorial disputes as well.

That the presence
of US forces in Pakistan will be a constraining factor.

That the
international community (the United States, United Kingdom, China, or the United Nations)
will intervene in time to prevent such a catastrophe.

And that India can
count on American and Israeli military support to seize or take out Pakistans
nuclear and missile infrastructure.

These assumptions do
not seem to be based on cold, clear-headed calculations of the strategic interests and
influence of major powers (especially the United States and China) and may well be a sign
of wishful thinking on Indias part.29 It is worth noting that new strategic and
geopolitical realities emerging in Asia since 9/11 have put a question mark over
Beijings older certainties, assumptions, and beliefs.

42/43

Chinas
Concerns

Much to Jiang and
his Politburos chagrin, the US-led war on terrorism has developed in ways that could
not have been foreseen, with potentially disastrous consequences for Chinas core
strategic interests. A major unintended (and unsettling, from Beijings standpoint)
consequence has been not only to checkmate and roll back Chinas recent strategic
expansion moves in Central, South, and Southeast Asia, thereby severely constricting the strategic latitude that China has enjoyed since the Cold War,
but also to tilt the regional balance of power decisively in Washingtons favor
within a short period. The supposedly brief Unipolar moment in history seems to have
turned into a long-lasting Imperial momenta Pax Americana par excellence.
More important, recent developments show how tenuous Chinese power remains when compared
to that of the United States.30

The fast-changing
strategic scene not only undercuts Chinese ambitions to expand Beijings power and
influence in Asia, but also hems in the one country in the world with the most
demonstrable capacity to act independently of the United States. Not surprisingly, the
beginning of 2002 saw Chinese leaders and generals shedding their earlier inhibitions
about publicly expressing concern over the growing southern
discomfortthat is, ever-expanding US military power and presence in southern
Asia after 9/11. Chinas Chief of the General Staff Fu Quanyou warned the United
States against using the war on terrorism to dominate global affairs by saying
counter-terrorism should not be used to practice hegemony.31 On an official visit in April 2002 in Iran, Jiang Zemin
openly repudiated the US stance against the Iranian and Iraqi regimes, saying, Our
opinion [on terrorism] is not the same as the United States. In Germany, he told the
Welt am Sonntag: We all want to fight terrorism. But the states involved in
the fight against terror each have their own specific viewpoint.32

Chinas initial
optimism that new Sino-US-Pakistan triangular cooperation in the aftermath of 11 September
2001 would wean Washington away from New Delhi turned out to be wishful thinking as Bush
Administration officials went out of their way to assure India that Americas
intensifying alliance with Pakistan would not come at Indias expense. If anything,
the current crisis has strengthened the American commitment to building stronger
relations, including defense ties, with South Asias preeminent power. However, China
does not want to see India increasing its power, stature, and profile regionally or
internationally. Beijing shares Islamabads deep mistrust of Indias strategic
ambitions and seeks to prevent Indias emergence as a peer competitor and a major
strategic rival in Asia. That is why Chinese strategists have long argued that
Chinas pursuit of great power status is a historical right and perfectly legitimate
but Indias pursuit of great power status is illegitimate, wrong, dangerous, and a
sign of hegemonic, imperial behavior.33
For its part, New Delhi has long accused Beijing of doing everything it can to undermine
Indias interests and using its ties with other states to contain India. Beijing is
also alarmed over the growing talk in some con-

43/44

servative policy
circles in Washington and New Delhi of India emerging as a counterweight to China on the
one hand and the fragile, radical Islamic states of West Asia on the other.34

Earlier, when
President Bush unveiled his missile defense plan, New Delhi responded far more positively
than did most US allies. Some Indian strategic thinkers even see in the emerging US-India
quasi-alliance an opportunity for payback to China. As G. Parthasarthy, former
Indian Ambassador to Pakistan and Burma, put it: Whether it was the Bangladesh
conflict of 1971, or in the Clinton-Jiang Declaration in the aftermath of our nuclear
tests, China has never hesitated to use its leverage with the Americans to undermine our
security.35 Growing Chinese strategic pressure on the
Malacca Straits has already led to maritime collaboration between India and the United
States, with their navies jointly patrolling the straits. More significantly, US-India
strategic engagement has scaled new heights with the announcement of a series of measures
usually reserved for close US allies and friends: joint military exercises in Alaska that
would boost Indias high-altitude warfare capabilities in the Himalayan glaciers of
northern Kashmir where it faces Pakistan and China; sale of military hardware including
radars, aircraft engines, and surveillance equipment to India; joint naval exercises and
the training of Indias special forces; and intelligence sharing as well as the joint
naval patrols in the Straits of Malacca. Washington also reportedly gave the green light
for Israel to proceed with selling the Phalcon airborne early warning and control system
(AWACS) to Indiasomething that was earlier denied to China for fear of enhancing
Beijings air surveillance and early warning capabilities in the Taiwan Strait.

All of these
measures send an implicit signal to China of Indias growing military prowess.36 In a cover story in the authoritative Beijing Review,
one of Chinas noted South Asia specialists expressed concern over the US sale of
arms to India which enables it to become the first country to have close military
relations with the worlds two big powersthe United States and Russia.37 To make matters worse, in early May 2002 Prime Minister
Koizumi of Japan, Beijings other Asian rival, which sees China representing a clear
and future threat to its security, called for a broadening of Japans security
cooperation with India.38

44/45

Many Chinese
strategists believe India is using the war on terrorism as a pretext to militarily subdue
Pakistan or to destabilize and dismember the country. Pakistan is the only country that
stands up to India and thereby prevents Indian hegemony over the region, thus fulfilling a
key objective of Chinas South Asia policy.39 As South Asia watcher Ehsan Ahrari points out: India may end
up intensifying its own rivalry with China by remaining steadfast in its insistence that
Musharraf kowtow to its demands, especially if China calculates that US-India ties are
harming its own regional interests. China, though still concerned about the continued
activism of Islamist groups in Pakistan and contiguous areas, is not at all willing to see
the regional balance of power significantly tilt in favor of India.40

Though Beijing
welcomes the new US commitment to prop up Beijings all-weather friend
after a decade of abandonment and estrangement, most Chinese strategists worry about the
destabilizing consequences of a prolonged US military presence in Pakistan and increased
influence on the future of Sino-Pakistan ties as well as on Pakistans domestic
stability.41 The Chinese are also believed to be
highly uncomfortable with the four US military bases in Pakistan.42 Of special concern to Beijing is the US presence at Pasni
in the Baluchistan region of Pakistan, where China is constructing a deep-water naval port
at Gwadar, the inland Makran coastal highway linking it with Karachi, and several oil and
gas pipeline projects. Beijing has long been eyeing its construction of the naval base at
Gwadar, at the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf, as a bulwark against the
US presence and Indias growing naval power.43 Furthermore, the US military presence in Pakistan could sharpen
the divide within the Pakistani military into pro-West and pro-Beijing factions, with
China supporting the latter to regain ground lost since 9/11.44 The
pro-Beijing lobby within the Pakistani military is reportedly getting restive and waiting
to strike if and when General Musharraf falters. The pro-China faction within the
Pakistani military could also join hands with the pro-Islamic fundamentalist faction
opposing the US military presence on Pakistans soil. Alternatively, it could throw
its support behind those nationalist elements that find Pakistans loss of its
strategic depth in Afghanistan for elusive diplomatic gains very hard to
digest. The US arms sales to India and joint US-Indian military exercises may further sour
Chinas and Pakistans willingness to assist Washington in its war on terrorism.

War Scenarios

It is said that each
conflict simply prepares the ground for the next one or every war contains the seeds of
another. The Afghan War of the 1980s against the Soviet occupation culminated in the war
on terrorism in 2001. Whether the war on terrorism will lead to another war or a clash of
civilizations or a nuclear jihad in South Asia, only time will tell. Pakistan is, in the
words of former Italian Foreign Minister Gianni De Michelis, the fuse of the
world.45 The provinces close to the Afghan border
and home to the US military bases are now controlled by Islamic parties that created the
Taliban and are openly sympathetic to the aims and ideals of

45/46

al Qaeda. The rising
anti-American sentiment in Pakistan as demonstrated in the recent elections has made the
country increasingly unstable. Violence levels in Indian Kashmir also continue to rise.
Many observers believe that Washington may have to rethink its strategy vis-à-vis
Islamabad if the war on terrorism is to be won decisively.46 The complete dismantling of the al Qaeda terrorist
infrastructure in Pakistan seems unlikely because of the apprehension within the Pakistani
military that doing so would devalue Pakistans importance in the US security
strategy and once again make the United States turn its back on the country and make the
country vulnerable to Western pressure and sanctions. It would also deprive Pakistan of
invaluable Western aid and leverage vis-à-vis Washington and New Delhi.47

One Chinese national
security analyst argues that what worries China more is the possibility that it
could be drawn into a conflict, not between Pakistan and India per se, but between
Pakistan and the United States, with the latter using India as a surrogate.48 With the top al Qaeda and Taliban leadership fleeing into
Pakistans Wild West and Pakistani-held Kashmir, Beijing knows full well that
Pakistan is no longer the frontline state in the war on terrorism that it once
was; it is, in fact, the battlefield in the war on terror.49 Should the India-Pakistani conflict escalate into a
nuclear one, neither the geopolitical nor the radioactive fallout will remain limited to
South Asia. Indeed, the most worrisome scenario would be one where Pakistan is losing a
conventional conflict and uses tactical nuclear weapons in a desperate effort to win or to
salvage a face-saving defeat that would allow the regime to survive. (The risk-taking
nature of the Pakistani military leadership suggests that such a scenario cannot be
completely ruled out.) Should India respond by launching strategic nuclear strikes
resulting in the complete destruction of the Pakistani state, China would find it
difficult to sit idly by.

The next
India-Pakistan war also could bring the United States and Pakistan on a collision course,
with or without India acting as a US partner. Such a development would obviously present
China with difficult choices. Open support for its closest ally would jeopardize
Chinas relations with the United States and India. But nonintervention on
Pakistans behalf could encourage India to solve the Pakistan problem
once and for all, with or without a nuclear exchange, and thereby tilt the regional
balance of power decisively in its favor. As Zhang Xiaodong put it: There is the
real possibility that a new Indian-Pakistani war will take place in the future. This war
would be disastrous, as it would change

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the whole political
balance in Central and South Asia, which is currently tilted in Chinas favor.50
Unrestrained Indian power could eventually threaten Chinas security along its soft
underbellyTibet and Xinjiang.

Should
post-Musharraf Pakistan disintegrate or be taken over by Islamic extremists, a new level
of instability would rock the region and increase tensions among Pakistan, India, and
China. Another dreadful scenario is one in which Chinese-made Pakistani nuclear weapons
fall into the hands of the United States, Israel, or even India in the event of a civil
war should al Qaeda or the Taliban declare jihad against Pakistanthe weakest ally in
the US-led anti-terrorism coalition.51
India would be tempted to militarily intervene in Pakistan if Islamists gain control over
the nuclear weapons of its neighbor, either through a coup or civil war.52 Such a scenario could reveal information regarding
Chinas own nuclear program and the extent of help provided by Beijing to Islamabad.
The scenario of Pakistan in splinters, with one piece becoming a radical Muslim state in
possession of nuclear weapons, can no longer be simply rejected as an alarmist fantasy.

Difficult
Choices

These scenarios put
Beijing on the horns of a dilemma. Some Chinese strategists see in the current South Asian
crisis an opportunity to recover lost ground and thwart Indias ambitions to
challenge Chinas future economic and military primacy in Asia. Should another war
between India and Pakistan break out, New Delhis high hopes of an India-US alliance
to counter China may never materialize, a welcome development from Chinas
perspective. Some hawks in the PLA see China even benefiting from an India-Pakistani
nuclear war. Hideaki Kase, a former special advisor to Japanese Premiers Takeo Fukuda and
Yasuhiro Nakasone, believes that China wants an Indo-Pakistan war, possibly a
nuclear conflict, to weaken India.53
At the time of the 1999 Kargil War, one Chinese military official had reportedly told a
Western diplomat that should India and Pakistan destroy themselves in a nuclear war,
there would be peace along Chinas southwestern frontiers for at least three decades,
and Beijing needs 20 to 30 years to consolidate its hold over restive Tibet and Xinjiang
provinces.54 However, this remains a minority
viewpoint, as a nuclear war would have worldwide repercussions in terms of global economic
depression, humanitarian crises, WMD proliferation, and Chinas developmental
priorities.

Most Chinese
analysts and policymakers believe that Beijing should have absolutely minimum involvement
in a situation where there can be no clear winners. Some argue that Beijing should seize
the opportunity to coordinate its South Asia policy with Washington as it is in the
interests of both countries to avert the worlds first nuclear exchange and to use
India-Pakistan tensions to strengthen Sino-US ties.

While the Pakistanis
are confident thatif war comes with India, China will throw its weight behind
Pakistan, diplomatically as well as militarily,55 the Indians remain adamant that the Chinese would not do so for
fear of India playing

47/48

the Taiwan and
Tibet cards.56 Interestingly, on 31 May 2002, the day
Pakistans new UN Ambassador, Munir Akram, issued an explicit nuclear warning to
India, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman denied a Times of India report that
Chinese President Jiang Zemin had assured a US congressional delegation that China would
not favor Pakistan in the existing tensions, and claimed that the report was not
based on facts.57 A Chinese South Asia analyst at Fudan
University in Shanghai, Shen Dingli, told The Wall Street Journal: China
needs to send a message: For my own security I will intervene.58
Though Beijing may not overtly intervene in a limited war, Chinas geopolitical
imperative requires it to come to Pakistans defense if the latters existence
as a nation-state is threatened by India. Clearly, there is a great deal more to the
Chinese role in South Asia than meets the eye.

In the final
analysis, Beijings response to the next India-Pakistan war will be shaped by its
desire to protect Chinese national interests, no matter what the cost. Geostrategic
concerns require China to covertly side with Pakistan, while publicly calling for
restraint by both sides and appearing to be even-handed. In the triangular power balance
game, the South Asian military balance of power is neither pro-India nor pro-Pakistan, it
has always been pro-China. And Beijing will take all means possible, including war, to
ensure that the regional power balance does not tilt in Indias favor. Even in the
absence of a war, Pakistan hopes to continue to reap significant military and economic
payoffs not only from the intensifying Sino-Indian geopolitical rivalry in southern Asia
but also from what many believe is the coming showdown between China and the United
States, which will further increase the significance of Chinas strategic ties
with Pakistan.59 In the meantime, a major consolation for Beijing is that a
stronger Pakistan aided by the United States, Western Europe, Japan, and international
financial institutions would be better able to balance and contain rival India.

NOTES

1. On 6 June 2002,
General Musharraf promised to US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Armitage that he
would permanently end Pakistans support of terrorist activity in
Kashmir. It now seems that the promise was nothing more than a temporary tactical
retreat that would eventually be overridden by Pakistans compelling strategic
imperative of bleeding India by a thousand cuts through a low-intensity
conflict. See J. Hoagland, Misreading Musharraf, The Washington Post,
23 May 2002, p. 33.

2. In a recent
interview with the British Broadcasting Corporations Hardtalk program,
Indias National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra warned that if something big
were to happen India would not hesitate to hit back. See Paks Done
Absolutely Nothing, US Promised More: Mishra Hardtalk, Indian Express, 28
November 2002, p. 1; C. W. Dugger, India-Pakistani Tensions Subside, but Nuclear
Fear is Far From Over, The New York Times, 20 June 2002, p.1.

15. For its part,
the Indian government was critical of the United States and other major powers for not
taking a tough stand on Pakistans missile tests which amounted to nuclear
blackmail by a terrorism-sponsoring state.

24. See cover story
on Pakistans tactical nukes by N. A. Gokhale, Small Is Scary, Outlook,
10 June 2002; and A. Faruqui, The U.S. Role in South Asia, Far Eastern
Economic Review, 27 June 2002, p. 24.

27. N. K. Pant,
Is China Wanting to Have an Indo-Pak War? Free Press Journal, 28 August
2002; William Triplett II, Gen. Xiong Pays a Visit to Pakistan, Washington
Times, 19 March 2002, p. 17. Intelligence reports claimed that about 20 to 30
Pakistani nuclear and missile engineers were sent to China in late February 2002.

29. Knowing full
well that Washington, with all its powers of persuasion and coercion, could not stop
Islamabad from going nuclear and ballistic in 1998, some influential strategic analysts in
New Delhi continue to argue that the United States has the power to seize, control,
neutralize, or destroy the Pakistani nuclear arsenal. For Indias faith in the United
States taking out Pakistani nukes, see P. Hoodbhoy, Nuclear Gamblers, Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 2002, pp. 26-27.

30. China
Feels Encircled, Economist, 8-14 June 2002.

31. China
Warns US against Using Terrorism Fight to Expand Influence, Agence France-Presse, 16
January 2002.

33. The Chinese
certainly do not want to see India playing a role beyond South Asia. See Chen Tieyuan,
People Are Concerned over Indias Dream of Becoming a Great
Power, Zhongguo Qingnian Bao, 8 May 2001, trans. in FBIS-CHI, 8 May
2001; Shao Zhiyong, Indias Big Power Dream, Beijing Review, 12
April 2001, p. 10; and Malik, South Asia in Chinas Foreign Relations.

37. See Rong Ying,
Can India Become a Military Power? Beijing Review, 28 February 2002,
pp. 14-15. Discussion here is largely based on the authors private conversations
with Chinese diplomats and military officials during December 2001 to April 2002.

39. For example, see
Zhang Xiaodong, China
and the Western Regions, Asia Times Online, 10 July 2002,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/DG10Ad03.html.

40. E. Ahrari,
The Waiting Game in South Asia,Asia Times Online, 15 May 2002.

41. R. Marquand,
China Worries about US Troops in Pakistan, Christian Science Monitor,
19 September 2001, p. 1. Information here is based on private conversations with Chinese
and Pakistani analysts, September 2001 to June 2002.

42. See Pakistan
Today, 11 January 2002; China Threatens to Walk Out of Pak Military Port
Project, 7 January 2002, http://www.rediff.com.

51. News reports
during operations against the Taliban and al Qaeda in October 2001 speculated on a
possible joint Israeli-US attack on the Pakistani nuclear weapons cache to prevent jihadis
within the military from gaining control of it. Unconfirmed reports talked of moving
Pakistani nukes to China for safekeeping. See B. Fenton, US Special Unit
Stands By to Steal Atomic Warheads, The Times (London), 29
October 2001, p. 1.

55. On Pakistani
expectations of Chinese support in the event of a war, see E. Haider, Our Lack of
Knowledge about China, Friday Times, 31 May - 6 June 2002.

56. See S. Gupta,
Keeping the Heat On, India Today, 20 May 2002, p. 27. Indias
China specialists argue that China will not be allowed to repeat the 1965-type
intervention on Pakistans behalf and that New Delhi would raise
significant costs for Beijing by extending diplomatic recognition to Taiwan and the
Tibetan government-in-exile. Discussions with Indias China specialists at the
Institute for Defense Studies & Analyses and Center for Policy Research, New Delhi,
1-4 May 2002.

Dr Mohan Malik is Professor of Security Studies at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security
Studies, Honolulu, Hawaii. He previously taught at Deakin University in Australia, where
he was director of the postgraduate defense studies program. He obtained his Ph.D. in
international relations from the Australian National University, M.Phil. in Chinese
studies from Delhi University, and an advanced diploma in the Chinese language from
Beijing University. He has lectured and published widely on Asia-Pacific security issues.
As with all Parameters articles, the views expressed are those of the author and
do not necessarily reflect the position of any agency of the US government.