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March 29, 2013

From the State Department Archives

And I'm back in the Democratic Republic of Congo for a week.

So I was doing a little bit of research on US assistance to the Congo. There's actually a longish history -- we've been sending various forms of aid here for nearly sixty years now -- so it seemed worth at least checking to see whether anyone else had already attempted what we're trying to do. I didn't get a firm answer on that, but and I did run across some mildly interesting old documents from the 1970s.

A bit of background for those of you who aren't history nerds: from 1962 to 1997, the Congo -- renamed "Zaire" -- was run by a dictator named Mobutu Sese Seko. Mobutu ran his country into the ground. At the end of his term, Congo was poorer than it had been when he took power, 35 years earlier. 16 years after he was chased out of power, the country is still suffering the consequences of his misrule; Congo remains one of the poorest countries in the world.

But whatever else you can say about Mobutu, he was very, very good at getting money and military assistance from the US. He was a major aid recipient for three decades, give or take. Why? Well, mostly because he was very good at gaming our fear of Communism and its spread in Africa.

During President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger's meeting with President
Mobutu, they discussed
world issues and bilateral relations with Zaire, including minerals
trading and PL-480 assistance. The meeting
took place in the Oval Office of the White House.

Ambassador Hinton reported on a speech by
President Mobutu critical
of U.S. Africa policy in general and the nomination of Nathaniel Davis as Assistant
Secretary of State for African Affairs in particular.

Ambassador Hinton explained that were he to
carry out instructions in telegram 15843 (Document 268, he might face expulsion from Zaire. He
added that his reaction had most likely reached President Mobutu through his aides.

In his cover memorandum to
the MTAT report, Rockwell noted that preparation
of the report was seen by Zaire as prima facie evidence that the
United States had decided to increase military assistance to Zaire.
He strongly recommended that the United States take tangible steps
toward such assistance.

Secreretary Kissinger and his staff discussed
deteriorating U.S. relations with Zaire and its impact on
developments in Angola, as well as the need to send a high-level
representative to talk directly to President Mobutu.

Secretary Kissinger expressed his belief that
allegations of U.S. involvement in a plot against President
Mobutu was a result of
a misunderstanding between the United States and Zaire, and proposed
sending former Ambassador to Zaire Sheldon Vance to Kinshasa for
consultations.

Mulcahy reminded Kissinger that President Mobutu had accepted the offer to
send Ambassador Vance and
Director Cutler to Kinshasa to
discuss coup allegations and Angola, and presented U.S. goals for
the discussions.

Mulcahy offered four options
for gaining approval of the $20 million
aid package for Zaire.
Kissinger chose to have Assistant
Secretary Sisco or INR Director Hyland speak to Senate leaders to
dissuade them from holding hearings.

Chargé Walker transmitted an assessment by
the Embassy's political and economic reporting officers regarding
U.S. policy in Zaire and Angola. They noted that Mobutu's interests were not
entirely congruent with U.S. interests and cautioned against being
drawn too deeply into the Angolan conflict.

Hyland responded to the
analysis presented in Zaire telegram 9078 (Document 286), finding that it contained some valid
observations, but that its recommendations were ultimately naïve and
almost guaranteed to produce the results it warned against.

Mulcahy presented two options
for pursuing Congressional approval of
an AID Loan to Zaire. Kissinger approved the second option: continue to
seek approval of an AID loan to
Zaire, but without agreeing to help
Tanzania and Zambia.

Secretary Kissinger instructed Ambassador
Cutler to pass a letter to
Mobutu, informing him
that the United States was working actively on his request for
economic and military assistance, and that Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld was prepared to
visit Zaire in July.

Rockwell presented the
report of his second mission to Zaire. He indicated that Soviet
designs on Southern Africa represented a well-defined threat to
Zaire, and advised that substantial outside assistance was required
to meet the threat.

Secretary Kissinger, Under Secretary for
Economic Affairs Robinson, Assistant Secretary of State for
Congressional Relations Robert McCloskey, and Assistant Secretary
Schaufele discussed an
economic aid package for Zaire.

The Embassy transmitted a
memorandum of conversation of Rumsfeld's
June 18 meeting with President Mobutu in which they discussed
threats from Soviet and Cuban backed
regimes in neighboring
countries and U.S. military assistance
to Zaire.

Comments

"January 23, 1975, ... The Department instructed Ambassador Hinton to tell President Mobutu directly that his comments about the Davis nomination were an improper interference in U.S. domestic affairs."

- sounds a bit hilarious, considering that the US itself usually isn't shy at all about "commenting" about "domestic affairs" of other nations.