Introduction

World War II was the largest and most violent armed conflict in the
history of mankind. However, the half century that now separates us from
that conflict has exacted its toll on our collective knowledge. While World
War II continues to absorb the interest of military scholars and historians,
as well as its veterans, a generation of Americans has grown to maturity
largely unaware of the political, social, and military implications of
a war that, more than any other, united us as a people with a common purpose.

Highly relevant today, World War II has much to teach us, not only about
the profession of arms, but also about military preparedness, global strategy,
and combined operations in the coalition war against fascism. During the
next several years, the U.S. Army will participate in the nation's 50th
anniversary commemoration of World War II. The commemoration will include
the publication of various materials to help educate Americans about that
war. The works produced will provide great opportunities to learn about
and renew pride in an Army that fought so magnificently in what has been
called "the mighty endeavor."

World War II was waged on land, on sea, and in the air over several
diverse theaters of operation for approximately six years. The following
essay is one of a series of campaign studies highlighting those struggles
that, with their accompanying suggestions for further reading, are designed
to introduce you to one of the Army's significant military feats from that
war.

This brochure was prepared in the U.S. Army Center of Military History
by Lt. Col. Clayton R. Newell. I hope this absorbing account of that period
will enhance your appreciation of American achievements during World War
II.

M. P. W. Stone Secretary of the Army

Central Pacific

7 December 1941-6 December 1943

The Central Pacific Campaign opened abruptly on 7 December 1941, when
carrier-based planes of the Japanese imperial Navy launched a surprise
attack on Pearl Harbor in Hawaii. At the time it was widely believed that
the heart of the U.S. Pacific Fleet had been rendered ineffective since
the Japanese aircraft had destroyed or damaged the fleet's eight battleships.
As the war unfolded in the Pacific, however, the Navy turned to its aircraft
carriers—all of which had been at sea on 7 December—as the capital ships
that would carry the war to the enemy. Although the assault on Pearl Harbor
was but one of many virtually simultaneous attacks by the Japanese armed
forces against the United States and its Allies in the Pacific, it was
the one that struck a nerve in the American public and prompted President
Franklin D. Roosevelt to demand, and receive, an immediate declaration
of war from Congress. To declare war is one thing, but to carry the fight
to the enemy is quite another. Almost two years would pass before U.S.
Army forces tangled with the Japanese Army in the last weeks of the Central
Pacific Campaign.

Strategic Setting

Most of the Central Pacific Campaign took place in Micronesia, an area
of the globe larger than the continental United States, where a multitude
of islands lie scattered about a vast expanse of ocean. Clustered into
four major groups, these Pacific islands have a landmass of about 1,200
square miles, an area somewhat larger than the state of Rhode Island. The
most easterly of the four island groups are the Gilberts, low-lying coral
atolls, straddling the equator just west of the international date line.
North and west of the Gilberts are the Marshall Islands, a double chain
of atolls, reefs, and islets, most of which rise only a few feet above
sea level. Stretching almost due west from the Marshalls are the 550 tiny
islands of the Caroline group. The Marianas lie just north of the Carolines
in a 400-mile north-south chain.

Strategically located across the main sea lines of communications between
the United States and the Philippines, the islands of Micronesia played
a vital role in Japanese war plans. Japan had seized

Page 4

the Carolines, Marshalls, and Marianas (except Guam) from Germany during
World War I, retaining control afterward under a mandate from the League
of Nations. Its forces had occupied the rest— Guam and the Gilberts—in
the course of their initial offensive at the outbreak of war. Once garrisoned,
these islands provided Japan an outer perimeter for its expanding empire
and put its forces in an excellent strategic position to cut Allied lines
of communications.

The Central Pacific was equally important to the United States as the
path of military advance postulated in the ORANGE plans developed by the
Joint Board, composed of planners from the Army General Staff and the General
Board of the Navy, during the 1920s and 1930s. According to these plans,
in the event of war with Japan the U.S. Pacific Fleet would move from Pearl
Harbor to seize selected islands in Micronesia in a methodical advance
toward the Philippines, projecting American military and naval strength
ever westward. Although few officers truly believed it, the ORANGE plans
assumed that the American forces garrisoning the Philippines could hold
Manila Bay for up to six months while the Pacific Fleet and its accompanying
ground forces conducted an island-by-island advance.

By 1938 it was apparent to American planners that the assumptions forming
the basis of the ORANGE plans were rapidly becoming invalid. Working in
coordination with the British, they concluded that in the event of a global
war the United States would probably face Japan alone in the Pacific. While
the U.S. Navy took the view that winning the war in the Pacific should
be the nation's first priority, Army planners argued that in a war with
both Japan and Germany the largely naval war in the Pacific had to remain
an economy-of-force, or defensive, theater. The Army view prevailed. When
American planners completed the RAINBOW series of plans in June 1939, each
plan assumed that in a future war the United States would face a coalition
rather than a single enemy military power. In the event, RAINBOW 5 came
closest to what actually happened: it envisioned a rapid projection of
American forces across the Atlantic to defeat Germany, Italy, or both,
and by clear implication relegated the Pacific to a defensive theater.

The adoption of a defensive strategy in the Pacific did not necessarily
mean inaction. On the contrary, from the earliest days of the Pacific war,
American forces struck the Japanese whenever and wherever they could with
the meager resources available. As early as April 1942, American planes
took the war to the heart of the Japanese Empire with a surprise air attack
on Tokyo. Although the daring raid did little more than provide a boost
to sagging American

Page 5

morale, it put the government of Japan on notice that the American war
effort in the Pacific, even though a secondary priority for the United
States in global terms, was still going to be an all-out effort. As the
campaign in the Central Pacific got under way, however, at least one well-intentioned
early offensive produced some unexpected and, from the U.S. Army's perspective,
undesirable results.

Operations

According to the War Department organization in place at the end of
1941, the Hawaiian Department of the Army had responsibility for the defense
of the Hawaiian Islands. It reported directly to the War Department and
was the highest Army command in the Pacific. Major subordinate commands
under the Hawaiian Department included the Hawaiian Air Force and the 24th
and 25th Infantry Divisions. Although both divisions would play prominent
roles in the Pacific war and were part of Hawaii's defenses during the
Pearl Harbor attack, they did not actually participate in the ground combat
in the Central Pacific.

Operations Plan RAINBOW 5 outlined a joint Army-Navy mission to defend
the island of Oahu, site of the Navy's Pearl Harbor base and the Army's
Wheeler and Hickam Airfields. The plan specifically charged the Army's
Hawaiian Department with defending Oahu against attack; protecting against
sabotage and other internal strife; supporting naval forces in the protection
of Allied sea lines of communications; and conducting offensive operations
against Axis sea lines of communications within the tactical operating
radius of all American air bases. To implement these responsibilities the
Hawaiian Department developed three stages of alert. The department was
at the lowest stage of alert—Alert 1, defense against sabotage, espionage,
and subversive activities—when the Japanese planes from a naval task force
standing 200 miles north of Oahu launched the attack on Hawaii. The Japanese
assault took place between 0750 and 1000, bombing the U.S. Pacific Fleet,
which, except for the carriers, was in its home port at Pearl Harbor near
Honolulu. Of the 8 battleships moored neatly along battleship row, 3 were
sunk, 1 capsized, and the other 4 were damaged. In addition serious damage
occurred to 3 cruisers, 3 destroyers, and a variety of other vessels. Army
Air Forces planes, aligned in close formation at Hickam and Wheeler Airfields,
also provided lucrative targets. Attacks on those facilities resulted in
losses of 92 Navy and 96 Army planes. American casualties from the Japanese
bombing totaled 2,280 killed and 1,109 wounded. Japanese

losses were a comparatively insignificant 29 planes and 5 midget submarines.
At the end of the first day of what would eventually be designated the
Central Pacific Campaign, the United States had been dealt a stunning blow
to its military and naval prowess. The Japanese, however, failed to administer
the knockout punch.

One of the first American reactions to the Pearl Harbor debacle was
a major shakeup in the Pacific command structure. In a belated effort to
achieve unity of command ten days after the Japanese attack, all Army units
in the area, including the headquarters of the Hawaiian Department, were
placed under the operational control of the Commander in Chief, Pacific
Fleet. About the same time, the Pacific Fleet and the Hawaiian Department
and its air force received new commanders. But reorganization and new faces
at the top could not disguise the fact that the sudden arrival of war had
left American war plans in serious disarray.

With the Japanese on the offensive throughout the Pacific, the United
States could do little but watch as Allied strongpoints fell one by one:
Wake Island was overwhelmed on 23 December 1941; the British garrison at
Hong Kong surrendered on Christmas Day; British North Borneo surrendered
on 19 January 1942, the surrender of Singapore signaled the end of the
Malayan battle on 15 February; and Japanese forces landed virtually unopposed
on Dutch New Guinea on 1 April. With the fall of the Philippines on 6 May,
the Japanese seriously threatened to achieve their goal of dominating the
Pacific basin.

During the Japanese advance, British and American leaders met in Washington
to discuss a combined war strategy. President Roo-

Page 7

sevelt and Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill and their military advisers
were in general agreement on how to conduct the war, and the Arcadia Conference,
held in Washington from 24 December 1941 to 14 January 1942, was the first
of many such sessions where the Allies considered global strategy at the
highest political and military levels. Among the major decisions reached
at this conference—one that would directly affect the conduct of the Central
Pacific Campaign— was confirmation at the highest level that the focus
of the Allied war effort would initially be Germany, while the Pacific
would remain on the strategic defensive as an economy-of-force theater.
On 24 March the new British and American Combined Chiefs of Staff issued
a directive designating the Pacific theater an area of U.S. strategic responsibility.
Six days later the American Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) divided the Pacific
theater into three areas: the Pacific Ocean Area, the Southwest Pacific
Area, and the Southeast Pacific Area.

The Joint Chiefs further divided the Pacific Ocean Area (POA), which
included the Hawaiian Islands, into the North, Central, and South Pacific
Areas. They designated Admiral Chester W. Nimitz Commander in Chief, Pacific
Ocean Area (CINCPOA), with operational control over all units (air, land,
and sea) in that area. Nimitz in turn designated subordinate commanders
for the North and South Pacific Areas but retained the Central Pacific
Area, including the Hawaiian Department, under his direct command. In the
Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), General Douglas MacArthur assumed command,
but no commander was named for the Southeast Pacific Area. The effective
result of this organizational scheme was the creation of two separate commands
in the Pacific (POA and SWPA), each reporting separately to the Joint Chiefs,
each competing for scarce resources in an economy-of-force theater, and
each headed by a commander in chief (CINC) from a different service.

Although the directives to Nimitz and MacArthur were generally alike,
there were some fundamental differences. Nimitz was allowed to command
naval and land forces in the Pacific Ocean Area directly, while MacArthur
was enjoined to act through subordinate commands in the Southwest Pacific
Area. The tasks assigned to each commander also differed significantly.
MacArthur's assigned mission was essentially defensive, since he was told
only to "prepare for the offensive" while defending Australia.
Nimitz, while clearly having a defensive mission in the context of the
overall economy-of-force role of the Pacific theater, was also instructed
to "prepare for the execution of major amphibious offensives."
The directive to Nimitz further specified that the initial offensives would
be launched

Page 8

from the South and Southwest Pacific Areas, thus implying that Nimitz
would command offensives in MacArthur's area of command. As a result of
this somewhat muddled command arrangement, much of the two-year Central
Pacific Campaign was marked not by battle with Japan over control of the
Pacific but by debates among Nimitz, MacArthur, and the JCS over control
of American strategy and forces in the Pacific.

The JCS reached agreement in April 1943 on joint service and unified
command matters, but the Central Pacific Area organizational structure
did not follow their model. Of particular concern to the Army was that
Nimitz was the commander in chief of the Pacific Ocean Area as well as
the commander of the Pacific Fleet and the Central Pacific Area. The problem
was further compounded by Nimitz's desire to use nearly the same staff
while acting in all three capacities. According to the JCS agreement a
joint commander, the CINCPOA in this case, was not to assume command of
any component of his force unless directed by the Joint Chiefs. Under the
arrangements in Pacific Ocean Area, Army ground and air officers had a
real concern that their points of view might not receive adequate consideration
from what was essentially a Navy staff. This command problem remained relatively
benign while the Central Pacific was quiet, but any offensive operations
would certainly require clearer command and staff lines.

While the United States organized itself for war, Japan continued to
expand its empire. For five months the Imperial Japanese Navy's Combined
Fleet moved across the Pacific with virtual impunity. After Pearl Harbor
it managed to sink 5 Allied battleships, 1 aircraft carrier, 2 cruisers,
and 7 destroyers; damage a number of capital ships; and destroy thousands
of tons of merchant shipping and fleet auxiliary vessels. The cost to Japanese
forces was relatively small: a few planes and experienced pilots from its
aircraft carriers; 23 small naval vessels, the largest being a destroyer;
and about 60 transports and merchant ships. Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commander
of the Combined Fleet and a firm advocate of carrier operations, intended
to cap this naval campaign with a decisive blow to the crippled U.S. Pacific
Fleet. He proposed coordinated attacks in the Aleutians and on the island
of Midway that would force Nimitz into a fleet engagement in the open sea,
where the Japanese could finish the job of destroying American naval power
they had started at Pearl Harbor. While the Japanese plan included the
invasion and occupation of the Aleutian Islands and Midway, the decisive
defeat of the U.S. Pacific Fleet was the real goal. As long as the

Page 9

American fleet remained intact, any Japanese success in Midway or in
the Aleutians would be a hollow victory at best.

On 8 May Admiral Yamamoto lost the services of two of his large aircraft
carriers during the Battle of the Coral Sea, fought in the Southwest Pacific
off the coast of northern Australia. Despite having to send the carriers
Shokoku and Zuikoku back to the shipyards for major repairs after the battle,
Yamamoto still had at his disposal the most formidable naval force the
Japanese had assembled since Pearl Harbor. The main body of this fleet
consisted of a carrier force (the 4 large carriers Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu,
and Soryu) and an attack force (3 battleships, which included Yamamoto's
flagship Yamato, a light carrier, tenders and other vessels, and a screen
of 16 submarines). These forces, oriented against Midway, were supported
by numerous combat and support ships. A separate force, built around 2
more carriers, was positioned far to the north for an invasion of the Aleutians.
By late May the Japanese plans were in place and the Combined Fleet steamed
forth to do battle with the Pacific Fleet.

The Pacific Fleet in May 1942, however, was not the same naval force
the Japanese had caught by surprise at Pearl Harbor. Even though its performance
in the Coral Sea was far from flawless, the U.S. Navy had tasted at least
partial victory and discovered that its enemy was not invulnerable. Still,
the odds heavily favored the Japanese because in any encounter Admiral
Nimitz could marshal only a limited force. Two of his aircraft carriers
had been hit in the Battle of the Coral Sea: the Lexington went to the
bottom, and the Yorktown suffered serious damage. The fleet's battleships
were still on the west coast of the United States, and although the carriers
Saratoga and Wasp were on orders for the Pacific they would not arrive
until late June, too late to help counter the Japanese move. Nimitz spent
the rest of May assembling what naval forces he could. The only carriers
ready at Pearl Harbor were the Enterprise and Hornet, but the heavily damaged
Yorktown arrived on 28 May, and repair crews working around the clock miraculously
readied it for action in two days. Faced with the disparity in strength,
Nimitz put much emphasis on the carriers. He hoped to avoid a surface engagement
with the more powerful enemy, preferring that the outcome of the battle
be decided on the basis of air power. By the end of the month Nimitz put
to sea with a force of 3 carriers, 1 light and 7 heavy cruisers, 13 destroyers,
and 25 submarines. On 3 June he was 200 miles north of Midway, waiting
for the Japanese fleet.

The Japanese had enjoyed some success in their attacks on the Aleutians,
but at Midway they met disaster. To win this climactic en-

Page 10

counter, they were depending on a surprise attack as they had at Pearl
Harbor six months before. What they did not know was that American cryptologists
had broken their naval codes. As a result Nimitz was able to turn the tables
and surprise the Japanese fleet. The Pacific Fleet found the Japanese carrier
force on 4 June, shortly after it had launched its aircraft to attack the
U.S. garrison and airfield on Midway. U.S. Navy carrier-based aircraft
along with Army and Marine aircraft flying from airfields on the island
attacked the closely bunched Japanese carriers. The Akagi, Kaga, and Soryu,
especially vulnerable since their air cover had flown off to attack Midway,
were all fatally hit and sunk or abandoned. The fourth carrier, Hiryu,
managed to launch a lethal attack on the Yorktown, but it too was abandoned
by its crew after being hit by American dive-bombers.

Even though Yamamoto's attack force and his Aleutian force were still
intact, he had been outmaneuvered and outsmarted and could not bring his
battleships into play. The loss of four carriers with all their planes
and pilots was a blow from which the Japanese would never fully recover.
The Battle of Midway effectively turned the Japanese strategic offensive
into a strategic defense and pushed open the door to the Central Pacific.
It would be some time, however, before the United States would actually
enter that door, since in the aftermath of Midway U.S. strategic emphasis
shifted south into MacArthur's Southwest Pacific theater.

After mid-1942 and throughout most of 1943, relative calm reigned over
the Central Pacific while U.S. forces fought their way through the bloody
campaigns of Papua, Guadalcanal, and New Guinea in the Southwest Pacific.
During this period the Imperial Japanese Navy and Japanese merchant vessels
roamed freely through the Central Pacific soon, subject only to periodic
attacks by Pacific Fleet submarines, which were taking an ever-increasing
toll of enemy ships. The Japanese garrisons scattered throughout Micronesia
built airstrips and prepared their defenses for the day when the Americans
would resume their offensive. Even as the Japanese were consolidating their
gains in the Central Pacific, however, American planners were at work both
at Pearl Harbor and in Washington preparing for an offensive that would
take advantage of the changes brought by the Battle of Midway.

At the May 1943 Trident Conference, British and American leaders approved
a strategic plan for an offensive drive toward Japan through the Central
Pacific. Although the plan clearly stipulated that the main effort in the
American westward drive would be through the Central Pacific, not everyone
agreed that this was the

Page 11

best course of action. MacArthur especially had grave doubts about the
wisdom of giving the Central Pacific priority over his planned drive to
isolate Rabaul in the Southwest Pacific. The planners in Washington spent
the months of June and July 1943 trying to reconcile the various points
of view. At first they proposed an invasion of the Marshall Islands in
October using battle-tested Marine divisions, but MacArthur pointed out
that the only experienced amphibious assault troops available were those
in the Southwest Pacific Area. Using them would delay the beginning of
Operation CARTWHEEL, the campaign against Rabaul. The Combined Chiefs of
Staff and the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed with MacArthur that CARTWHEEL
should not be delayed, but at the same time they wanted to launch a drive
through the Central Pacific soon.

A compromise was finally reached. Admiral Nimitz would begin a ground
offensive in the Central Pacific, but it would be limited initially to
a two-division invasion of the Gilbert Islands to develop airfields and
facilities in support of a later operation in the Marshalls. On 20 July
1943, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed Nimitz to seize bases on the Gilbert
Islands and on the island of Naura, west of the Gilberts.

With the decision to invade the Gilberts, the matter of Nimitz's command
and staff arrangements came under closer scrutiny. General George C. Marshall,
Chief of Staff of the Army, argued for a truly joint staff, with Army and
Navy officers integrated throughout, and for the appointment of separate
commanders for the Pacific Fleet and the Central Pacific Area to allow
Nimitz to concentrate on his responsibilities as the POA commander. But
if Nimitz relinquished command of the Pacific Fleet, his relationship to
the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander in Chief, United States
Fleet, Admiral Ernest J. King, would significantly change, for he would
no longer be directly responsible to King. Such an arrangement would also
limit King's control, since he would be able to deal with Nimitz only as
Chief of Naval Operations, a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, not as
Commander in Chief, United States Fleet. The former was a staff relationship,
while the latter was a much stronger command relationship. Admiral King
insisted that Nimitz be continued in his multiple command roles, but, as
though to soften his position, he explained that he had already taken steps
to ensure greater Army participation in the CINCPOA staff.

Nimitz succeeded in retaining his command positions, but he also established
a Central Pacific Force to plan and conduct the Gilbert Islands offensive,
a command he gave to Rear Adm. Raymond A. Spruance, his former chief of
staff. The new Central Pacific Force

had three major commands subordinate to it: the Fifth Amphibious Force,
the Carrier Force, and the Defense and Shore-Based Air Force, all headed
by Navy admirals. However, the Fifth Amphibious Force did have a separate
ground headquarters, the V Amphibious Corps, commanded by Marine Maj. Gen.
Holland M. Smith. The question of Nimitz's joint staff would continue to
be a matter of debate, even after 6 September when Admiral Spruance announced
the establishment of a joint staff for his Central Pacific Force. The joint
staff consisted of Army and Navy officers organized into four sections:
Plans, Operations, Intelligence, and Logistics. The first two were to be
headed by Navy officers, the second two by Army officers. Nimitz did not
alter his own multiple command responsibilities, which remained an unresolved
interservice issue in the region.

During the preparation for taking the offensive in the Central Pacific,
U.S. forces sought to engage the Japanese in minor offensive actions whenever
possible. One of these early desultory actions had both unforeseen and
unfortunate results. On 17 August 1942, the 2d Marine Raider Battalion,
consisting of 221 marines, landed on Makin, one of the Gilberts' small
atolls. Early in the morning the men disembarked from two submarines, climbed
into rubber boats powered by outboard motors, and landed on the southern
coast of Butaritari, the largest island in the Makin Atoll. During a day
of sporadic firefights the marines succeeded in killing a number of the

Japanese defenders. The chief Japanese response was from the air. A
total of three air raids were flown against the marines from Japanese bases
in the Marshall Islands to the north. Although there was actually very
little Japanese resistance on the ground, the expedition cost the lives
of 30 marines, 21 during the raid itself, the other 9 captured and later
beheaded.

In retrospect the entire expedition appears to have been ill advised.
Although the primary purpose of this raid was to confuse the Japanese and
cause them to divert forces that might otherwise be assigned to Guadalcanal
in the southern Pacific, where the Allies were also preparing to go on
the offensive, there is no evidence that the raid was of any significant
or lasting value to the Allied effort. On the contrary, there is good reason
to believe that it induced the Japanese to commit far heavier forces to
the defense of the Gilberts than they had originally contemplated. Before
the August raid the only military personnel the Japanese maintained south
of the Marshalls was the small force on Makin. Immediately after the raid
they began a buildup of forces in the area that eventually resulted in
several new island strongholds, all controlled by an efficient, centralized

Page 16

base force command. Before they were finished they had also drawn in
new troops from the Marshalls, the Carolines, and the home islands of Japan.
Rather than contributing to the progress of American forces across the
Central Pacific, the August 1942 raid on Makin actually made it more difficult
when, ironically, Makin became one of the first U.S. targets in the Central
Pacific Campaign.

Operation GALVANIC, a joint Army and Marine assault to capture Tarawa
and Apamama in the Gilberts and Nauru, an island located about 390 miles
to the west, was initially scheduled for 15 November 1943. The first two
objectives were designated Marine Corps responsibilities, while the last
would be the Army's first action in the Central Pacific Campaign. Plans
initially called for a two-division Marine force, but to use the 1st Marine
Division would have jeopardized SWPA's timetable for CARTWHEEL and was
adamantly opposed by MacArthur. Even though the 27th Infantry Division,
now in Hawaii, had not yet received any amphibious training, General Marshall
offered it to King for GALVANIC. King agreed, and the division received
instructions to begin planning for an assault on Nauru Island. For the
next two months the division, whose part in GALVANIC was code-named KOURBASH,
centered its planning on Nauru. Then Admiral Spruance decided that the
capture of Nauru, with its well-entrenched defenders, would require more
troops than available naval transport could move. As a result, Nimitz approved
Spruance's recommendation that the Japanese seaplane base at Makin be substituted
for Nauru as the objective for the 27th Division, which learned of the
decision only on 28 September, less than eight weeks before the scheduled
assault.

The attack on the Gilbert Islands would be the first experience in amphibious
operations for United States forces in the Central Pacific, and the transition
from a defensive to an offensive role required many adjustments in organization
and attitude. Preparations were especially complicated since the major
assault units were from different services and widely separated, with the
27th Infantry Division still in Hawaii and the 2d Marine Division training
in New Zealand.

Every aspect of the GALVANIC operation had to be anticipated because
once the landing forces arrived at their objectives, over 2,000 miles from
Hawaii, they had to win with whatever logistical support they had brought
with them. For GALVANIC, Nimitz had at his disposal the bulk of the Pacific
Fleet, the Fleet Marine Force, and the Army's Seventh Air Force, as well
as Army combat and logistical support units from the greatly expanded Hawaiian
Department. For its part, the Army was expected to furnish not only the
as-

sault element for Makin, but also the land-based aircraft, logistical
support, and part of the garrison force. From Nimitz's point of view the
problems associated with preparing for the Gilbert operation were exacerbated
by the requirement to continue the offensive into the Marshalls two months
later. Many of the naval vessels used in GALVANIC could be used later,
but assembling additional expendable supplies and preparing fresh assault
forces would be extremely difficult in such a short time. In effect the
CINCPOA staff, newly organized as a joint headquarters with no experience
in conducting amphibious assaults, had to assemble, concurrently, two separate
task forces for two different invasions.

During the planning and preparation for GALVANIC, the 27th Infantry
and 2d Marine Divisions were subordinate to the V Amphibious Corps, although
in the invasion itself their commanders would both report to their respective
naval task force commanders. In either case the 27th Division had no Army
officer in the chain of command that stretched back to Admiral Nimitz.
It was subordinate

to a Marine headquarters during the planning phase and to a Navy headquarters
during the assault itself.

Although its previous planning for an assault on Nauru was not entirely
wasted as a result of the change in objective, the 27th Division did not
have much time to get ready for its combat debut. The division's assault
force, known as the Northern Landing Force, was limited to one regimental
combat team. The combat team was built around the 165th Infantry, reinforced
by the 3d Battalion of the 105th Infantry. The Northern Landing Force,
which totaled some 6,500 men, also included the 105th Field Artillery Battalion,
the 152d Engineer Battalion, the 193d Tank Battalion, and other supporting
elements. Maj. Gen. Ralph L. Smith, the division commander, led the landing
force using elements of his headquarters.

As planning for Makin and Tarawa continued, Nimitz organized air support
for the amphibious operations. By early September U.S. forces had 5 Central
Pacific airfields within bombing range of the Gilbert Islands: 3 (Funafuti,
Nukufetau, and Nanomea) in the Ellice Islands and 1 each on Canton and
Baker Islands. Plans called for

Page 19

U.S. air power launched from these airfields to soften up Makin and
Tarawa before the Army and Marine assault waves hit the beaches.

Rehearsals for the operation began in late October. Army units for the
Northern Attack Force (part of Task Force 52) practiced amphibious assaults
in Hawaii and, a week later, the marines of the Southern Attack Force (Task
Force 53) in the New Hebrides. With this phase completed, all the units
sailed to the objective area where by the night of 19 November a vast armada
of warships, cargo vessels, transports, and other craft were in their assigned
positions.

Meanwhile air operations had begun in earnest. Between 13 and 17 November,
heavy bombers from the Seventh Air Force had flown 141 sorties against
both the Gilbert and the Marshall Islands, dropping 173 tons of bombs.
On 19 November land-based and carrier-based aircraft joined for the final
sorties. During the early morning hours of the 20th, the battleships and
heavy cruisers began their preinvasion bombardment, the carriers sent their
planes into the air to bomb and strafe the beaches, and the transports
took their assigned stations to begin debarking the assault troops.

Makin Atoll, roughly triangular in shape, is an irregular formation
of reefs and islands around a large lagoon. Its dominant land feature is
Butaritari Island, a long ribbon-shaped landmass fishtailing at its western
end in a shallow curve. The average width of the island between the ocean
and the lagoon is only about eight-tenths of a mile and in some places
much less.

The invasion plan for the Northern Task Force was relatively complex
for such a small objective, especially since this was its first amphibious
assault. The plan called for landing on two beaches, one on each side of
Butaritari: RED Beach on the ocean side, YELLOW Beach on the lagoon. Not
only was the landing force split, but the landings were to take place sequentially
with a two-hour delay between the initial landings on RED Beach and the
later assault on YELLOW Beach.

When Task Force 52 approached Makin the Japanese offered little opposition.
A few land-based planes made ineffective passes, but the Japanese Combined
Fleet at Truk was not involved. With 173 of its carrier-based planes and
a force of heavy cruisers detailed since the beginning of November to the
defense of Rabaul, the Combined Fleet remained a spectator to the action
in the Gilberts. This did not mean, however, that the Japanese were without
resources in the area. Aircraft from fields in the Gilberts and the Marshalls
were capable of hitting Makin and Tarawa, and the submarines at Truk were
capable of wreaking havoc on the transports of the invasion force.

Largely as a result of the earlier U.S. Marine raid on Makin, the Japanese
had garrisoned Butaritari as a seaplane base with a total strength of about
800 men by the time of the 27th Division landings. The actual combat strength
was considerably less, however, since most of the troops were construction
workers from Korea or ground crews assigned to service the seaplanes. Japanese
combat troops numbered only about 300, and their prepared defenses were
minimal. The defensive perimeter around the seaplane base on Butaritari
Island consisted mainly of dual-purpose 8-cm. guns and a few machine guns.
The island also boasted two tank-barrier systems, one on each side of the
seaplane base around King's Wharf. Although not particularly formidable,
these barriers stretched across the narrow island.

The initial landings on RED Beach went pretty much according to plan
with the assault troops moving rapidly inland after an uneventful trip
on the ocean side of the island. Their progress off the beach was slowed
only by an occasional sniper and the need to negotiate their way around
the debris and water-filled craters left by the air and naval bombardment.
The troops on YELLOW Beach, however, experienced a rather different reception.

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As the landing craft approached YELLOW Beach from the lagoon, they began
to receive small-arms and machine-gun fire from the island's defenders.
The assault troops were also surprised to learn that even though they were
approaching the beach at high tide as planned, a miscalculation of the
depth of the lagoon caused their small boats to go aground, forcing them
to cover the final 250 yards to the beach in waist-deep water. Although
equipment and weapons were lost or water-soaked, only three men were killed
approaching the beach, mainly because the defenders had elected to make
their final stand not at the waterline, but farther inland along the tank
barriers.

The invasion plan was conceived in the hope of luring the enemy into
committing most of its forces to oppose the first landings on RED Beach
and thereby allow the troops landing on YELLOW Beach to attack from the
rear. The enemy, however, did not respond to the attack on RED Beach and
withdrew from YELLOW Beach with only harassing fires, leaving the troops
of the 27th Division no choice but to knock out the fortified strongpoints
one by one. Two days of determined fighting reduced enemy resistance to
the point that the issue was no longer in doubt. After clearing the entire
atoll, the 27th Division commander, Maj. Gen. Ralph C. Smith, reported
on 23 November, "Makin taken." In the end the most difficult
problem in capturing Makin, as one might have expected, was coordinating
the actions of the two separate landing forces, a problem made more difficult
because the defenders did not respond as had been anticipated.

While the Army sought to solve its coordination problems at Makin, the
marines had their hands full at Tarawa. Tarawa, where the defenders were
more numerous and the fortifications stronger, was the objective of Task
Force 53. The Japanese force numbered about 4,800 men, more than half effective
combat troops. The island itself had been converted into a veritable fortress
ringed with beach defenses equipped with 13-mm. and 7.7-mm. guns. Log and
concrete obstacles had been emplaced, along with additional obstacles and
double-apron, low-wire fences in the water. A large array of guns ranging
in size from 13-mm. to 8-inch and seven tanks completed the armament. Of
all the beaches assaulted during World War II, only Iwo Jima was more strongly
defended than Tarawa.

The complete occupation of Makin took four days and actually cost more
in naval casualties than in ground troops. Despite its great superiority
in men and weapons, the 27th Division had considerable difficulty subduing
the island's small defensive force. As compared

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to an estimated 395 killed in action, American combat casualties numbered
218 (66 killed and 152 wounded), a ratio of 6 to 1. But when the American
losses incurred during the sinking of the escort carrier Liscome Bay on
24 December by a Japanese submarine are included, the loss balance tips
toward the other side. Counting the 642 sailors who went down with the
carrier, American casualties exceeded the strength of the entire Japanese
garrison on Makin.

While Task Force 52 was having its troubles on Makin, the marines of
Task Force 53 were locked in a grim and deadly struggle on Tarawa, one
of the toughest fights the Marine Corps experienced in its long history.
In the same amount of time it took the 27th Division to capture Makin,
the 2d Marine Division followed a simple assault plan that concentrated
its units to storm the heavily fortified beaches of Tarawa, reduce the
cement and steel emplacements, and kill virtually every Japanese soldier
on the island. The cost was horrific. The division took 3,301 casualties,
of which over 1,000 were killed in action or later died of wounds.

Although by 23 November, as the 27th Division began to depart Makin,
the marines on Tarawa had finished the heaviest fighting, it took six more
days before they finally overcame all enemy resistance.

The Central Pacific Campaign finally ended on 6 December 1943, exactly
two years after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. By this time in the
war, however, it was the Japanese who were desperately looking for enough
men and equipment to carry on the fight.

Analysis

The Central Pacific Campaign, one of the longest in World War II, had
a clear and definite beginning with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor
on 7 December 1941. Its termination on 6 December 1943, however, was apparently
determined more by a desire to make it a tidy two-year campaign than by
the attainment of any particular strategic objective. The campaign was
mainly defensive, although the Battle of Midway and Operation GALVANIC
were notable offensive operations. The former finally brought the Japanese
offensive to a halt, and the latter marked the opening of the American
drive across the Pacific that would eventually end the war.

Although not a strategic objective in itself, the capture of Makin and
Tarawa, which occurred in the last weeks of the campaign, was the first
real step toward carrying the Allied offensive in the Pacific to the Japanese
homeland. Later the commander of the V Amphibious Corps would declare that
Tarawa, with its "terrible loss of

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life," had "no particular strategic importance," but
most of his colleagues agreed that from both the strategic and tactical
perspectives the invasion of the Gilberts was well worth the effort. Without
the advance bases in the Gilberts, the later operations against the Marshalls
would have been much more difficult, if not impossible.

From the tactical perspective the landings on Makin and Tarawa were
an important testing ground for American amphibious doctrine. Avoidable
errors and omissions of execution were carefully noted and studied by all
echelons of command involved in GALVANIC and steps were taken to avoid
their repetition in future amphibious landings. For example, the complexity
of the 27th Division assault plan stood in stark contrast to the simplicity
of the 2d Marine Division's plan, and future Pacific landings did not split
the assault force between widely separated beaches. These landings confirmed
that the basic techniques, tactics, and procedures were workable even under
the most demanding situations. From a wider perspective, the success of
the GALVANIC operation demonstrated that naval task forces had the capability
to control an area and to remain in that area during the assault and initial
consolidation of its land objective with an acceptable level of losses.
This capability became the cornerstone of American offensive operations
in the Pacific.

The war went on for almost two years after the Central Pacific Campaign
ended, but the groundwork laid during the campaign was significant to the
ultimate Allied victory. While the campaign was not marked by a series
of battles leading to a grand finale, it does reflect the education of
the American armed forces as they pulled themselves out of the despair
of Pearl Harbor toward victory.

Further Readings

There is no single source that covers the Army's role in the Central
Pacific Campaign in detail; however, three volumes in the Army's official
history of World War II do contain a substantial amount of information
on the campaign. Stetson Conn, Rose C. Engelman, and Byron Fairchild, Guarding
the United States and Its Outposts (1964), provides the background
for the status of the Hawaiian Department prior to Pearl Harbor. Louis
Morton's Strategy and Command: The First Two Years (1962), gives
an overview of the planning and the command relationships in the Pacific
theater. How the battle of Makin fits into the overall campaign is covered
in Philip A. Crowl and Edmund G. Love, Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls
(1955). Makin (1990), a study first printed in 1946 in the American
Forces in Action series, goes into some detail about the battle.