During cordial meeting with PM at
Government House March 2 to discuss deployment of Sierra Romeo IX3 (reported ref c), I took the opportunity to
inform him, in general terms (without divulging specific or
sensitive information), of items I considered would be pertinent to
his interests that were recently discussed at SEACOORD meeting. I covered the
military situation in SVN, status of
pacification, our views of Hanoi’s post-hostilities planning and the
Vietnamization program, including a word about its relation to third
country forces.

2.

The PM was very interested and
brought up several points the most important of which concerned
Vietnamization. He pointedly asked whether the U.S. was training and
equipping the RVNAF to replace
U.S. forces only or whether we also planned to replace Thai and
other allied forces. I explained to him that for the purposes of the
Vietnamization program we were now discussing the revitalized VN forces were intended to replace a
substantial share of U.S. forces in SVN but that in the longer run I assumed their
eventually replacing FWF was also
contemplated. (I had already said that some U.S. troops which would
be remaining in SVN through the
Vietnamization process would continue to provide the Black Panthers
with the various kinds of support from U.S. forces they are
receiving today; my comment was based on my discussions last week in
Saigon.) He responded that he had been under considerable pressure
from Parliament to withdraw Thai forces from SVN in face of continued U.S. and allied reductions. In
response to my direct question on whether it was his feeling that he
would be obliged to carry our reductions, he did not say he intended
to reduce the Thai troop contributions in SVN, but again stressed that he was under growing
pressure from the representatives in Parliament and said that “when
the people feel very strongly about a situation, the government must
do something to ease that situation.”

3.

I replied that I was aware of and sympathetic to his problem. The
USG had warmly appreciated his
statement that the RTG intended to
maintain the Thai forces in SVN as
long as the GVN needs them or until
Thailand itself requires those forces. I added that my government
hoped the RTG would retain all of
the Thai forces in SVN, or at least
a substantial part of them, at least during the Vietnamization
process. I had already emphasized, however, that the Vietnamization
program did not have a specific schedule for completion but its rate
depended upon intensity of enemy activity on the battlefield, the
capacity of the Vietnamese to take over the combat role and progress
in Paris, if any. I then pointed out the psychological and political
importance of having not only U.S. forces but Thai and other allied
forces as well to support the GVN
during the period of its takeover of the combat responsibility. I
also pointed out the importance of the Thai forces in protecting the
eastern and southeastern approaches to Saigon and thus freeing
GVN forces, as Vietnamization
proceeds to establish a stronger Vietnamese military presence in
remote areas along the Cambodian border. I requested that, if at any
time he felt he had to decide to withdraw some of the Thai forces, I
be given the opportunity to discuss his plans with him before he
takes any action. He said that he would discuss such plans with the
cabinet, GVN, and indicated that I
would also have an opportunity to talk with him.

4.

In connection with Vietnamization I told the PM that the U.S. forces in Thailand
might have some additional functions to perform here because some of
the combat support activities now being con-ducted in SVN such as air defense, air
interdiction and reconnaissance might, as Vietnamization proceeds,
have to be continued from outside SVN, e.g., Thailand and elsewhere. I added that while
there appeared to be a continuing need to have U.S. forces and
personnel in Thailand to support the VN effort until Vietnamization is well down the road, I
did not believe this ruled out a continuation of the gradual
reduction of U.S. forces in Thailand which we and the RTG had jointly got underway last
September. I speculated that we might have a follow-on reduction to
the present one in the next fiscal year which would reduce our
forces by about the same magnitude and that I would consult with the
RTG as our plans developed. He
acknowledged these points without comment.

5.

Comment. The PM carefully avoided
saying that he would at some point have to withdraw all or part of
the Thai forces. However, it was clear that he wished to register
the point of Parliamentary pres-sure and I did not press the matter
beyond making clear our interest in maintaining Thai forces and in
being consulted about any reduction plans. I believe that in sharing
with the PM some of our thinking on
questions I know weigh heavily on his mind we have restored some [Page 116]substance to our dialogue.
I hope I will have made available to me timely information with
which to continue such exchanges of information on matters of
importance to the Thai, which also give us an opportunity to gain
valuable insights into their thinking.

Sierra Romeo was the
codename for the Thai artillery unit which was periodically
inserted into and withdrawn from Laos in response to Communist
pressure against the Lao Government forces, mostly the Meo
tribesmen on the mountain front; see Document
29.↩