Wednesday, August 27, 2014

The liquor policy of the
government of Kerala announced last week, takes into account the dramatic rise
in consumption in the state. However, it smacks trouble for the years to come.
Although much time has passed by for contemplating on the new Abkari policy it
still appears that the state government has made a hasty decision to implement
complete prohibition in Kerala over the next decade. As a prelude, bars will
shut shop and the retail outlets owned by the government will be reduced in
numbers. The decision is not without consideration of certain facts which
researchers in the field have often pointed out. A major concern is the
possible rise of illicit liquor production as well as smuggling of liquor from
outside the state. According to recent media reports the state government is
stepping up its vigil to address this concern by strengthening monitoring
through its excise department. All appears fine until this point; but certain
questions remain which will pose challenges to the state government in the
near-term. Since the present policy has been mostly one-sided with the state
government saying and citizens consenting, it is particularly important to
understand the State in relation to managing the liquor industry. Two questions
are worth examining in this context.

1.What
has been the role of the State in dealing with commodities whose consumption is
largely understood only in terms of negative externalities that they generates?

2.What
should be the role of the State?

What has been the role of the State?

Historically consumption of
intoxicants have been seen as a ‘bad’ in India. Article 47 of the Indian
constitution gives formal authority for the State to take its stand on
intoxicants. When a commodity is defined[1]
as a ‘bad’ it also creates enough space for bargaining on ‘how to deal with
such commodities’. This is a possible source for rent-seeking too. In other
words, ‘bad’ commodities generate conditions where power plays an important
role. Religion and politics have capitalized on these ‘bads’ from time
immemorial to accumulate power and establish their cause. For the State, a
‘bad’ also offers a reason for the State to exist. The reason is that it
should exist to protect its citizens from any and all influences of this ‘bad’.
The politically most efficient manner of dealing with such commodities then was
to introduce piece meal policies which could influence and reduce its harm at
various stages. Several such interventions were made by the state in the liquor
industry since independence. The current policy of taking a decade to implement
prohibition seems to follows this same strategy. Alongside such considerations,
as Foucault has pointed out, places of saturation of such ‘bads’ were created
where they were allowed to proliferate, while being monitored immeasurably by
the state. The dingy bars serving liquor has often manifested as these places
of saturation. At its heights it became a visible feature of such joints where
one could see the drunk lying outside it on the pavements. Let’s stop here and
consider the following effects of the strategies.

The success of defining a commodity as a bad: For Kerala, several
decades of discourse on liquor has developed certain observations on the
pattern of consumption as well as impacts of consumption on the society. This
discourse has generally favoured the state’s current decision. A parallel
discourse on how one can make the liquor market efficient has not successfully
made an impact. A definite counter strategy would have looked at the
possibilities and degrees to which liquor is a ‘bad’. These can provide a space
for negotiation with the state policy.

The places of saturation: For a ‘bad’, the state handled liquor as
loosely as it has handled other bads. There was no attempt to redefine the
status of this commodity. It was left to rot in dingy and notorious bars, shady
corners of the streets where you had retail outlets as well as by leaving an
entire apparatus of monitoring and control from being transparent and
efficient. In the course of time these places were themselves used as points of
negotiating with the consumers. Now dark and dingy wayside bars are considered
as sources of crime and ill health in the State.

The effect of State intervention - Consumers made to regret for no
fault of theirs

Kerala has successfully used
these two cards (production of a negative discourse on liquor and creating
shady places of saturation) to roll out its latest strategy on liquor. The
immediate effect of highlighting the pathetic condition of liquor industry in
Kerala is to make its citizens feel guilty about the condition in which their only
mistake was that they were consumers.

For a state like Kerala which has
strong undercurrents of class and caste tensions, the present government
considers this policy to successfully impact the upcoming elections to the legislative
assembly. However, we have to ask our State certain
questions before addressing the efficiency of these policy. For liquor is a
sector which reflects the State’s failure in handling activities which was
never meant for it. Kerala government could have focussed its attention on a
large number of other issues (and there is no dearth for them) rather than wasting time to be a seller of liquor
(no derogation intended on the sector). Such activities (buying and selling of
commodities which have a market value) are better played out in the market by
private players. States are good, given the extent of resources it possess, to
monitor and appoint independent regulators for the efficient functioning of
these sector. There can be well drafted rules and regulations which could
ensure competition in the market for liquor.

The present state of liquor market
in Kerala should be seen more as a failure of the federal state to assume the
role of a seller in the market than anything else. Now the burden of this
failure is being put on the shoulders of the consumers. The consumers and their
dependent are made to feel bad for the federal state’ mismanagement of the
sector. How less right could such a policy be for the ruling Right?

What should be the State’s role?

The State has time to rethink
its liquor policy and change the face of liquor industry in Kerala. Our memory
of this sector has been associated with ‘bad’ because of the largely
inefficient manner in which the State followed its strategies to saturate the
sector in infamous bars and create a one sided discourse over time. The
political use of the market is bound to fail in the near-term and raise the
social and economic costs of the state. Hence, it is not the fault of the
people who have been pin-pointed in all the media reports as well as research
documents for the notoriety that the liquor industry in Kerala has earned. It
is rather a State failure so glaring but not easily recognizable.

The federal state of Kerala could
reconsider its policy. The first step in this regard would be roll back from
its current status as a seller of liquor. Hand over this task to people who are
serious about this business and who can carry it out in the most professional
manner. If tax revenues are a concern, the State could liberalize the sector
and allow foreign players to enter the industry. A major benefit in this
regards would be that the competition would improve quality standards and make
the worst performers pack their bags. The time of shady bars would then be
past. The state government can ensure that they monitor and improve the
chemical testing laboratories in Kerala and prescribe standards in quality
of the product to be supplied here. Liquor and intoxicants have lasted
alongside mankind. It will continue to last in different forms. The best way to
deal with it, given our current institutional environment, is to facilitate
their stay by ensuring standard practices. Banning might just not be a suitable
option.

Rahul V Kumar

Research Consultant

Centre for Public Policy Research

[1]
This is a very tricky issue. Who should define what is good and bad?

Monday, August 11, 2014

India’s GDP of US$1.8
trillion[1]
and an expected growth rate of 6.4per cent in the year 2015[2]
is a testament to India’s present status as a rising world power. Moreover,
India’s present nuclear competence and clout, with almost 90-110 nuclear
warheads[3],
makes India’s current status unequivocal. Despite that, India seems to be
plagued with ‘interstate rivalries that resemble 19th century
Europe’[4]along
with a myriad of challenges that beset the 21st century, such as
terrorism, cyber security, climate change and maritime piracy. These challenges
are only amplified by the uncertainty omnipresent in the international arena,
with Pakistan reluctant to assure India of security from future terrorist
strikes, China unwilling to let go of its claim over Arunachal Pradesh, and a
Sinhalese led Sri Lanka refusing to give legitimacy to the wishes of the
Tamils. So is India capable of living up to its title given the uncertain
international arena it is a part of? Can India be taken seriously as a world
player when such hurdles bog it down? Lack of a long-term national strategic
plan addressing these issues and the role India should play as a world power
will soon make India’s status just a dream.

So has India
developed a long-term strategy in its foreign policy? Analysis of interviews
conducted with Government officials suggest that India has not been able to do
so as the officials, in this case the Indian Foreign Service (IFS) officers,
are overburdened with multiple responsibilities and portfolios. The problem
seems to be attributed to an understaffing problem inherent within the IFS
system, which can affect India’s capability of creating a sound long-term
national strategy.

This civil
service, assigned with the task of conducting diplomatic relations with other
countries for India, is one of the most prestigious and powerful government
bodies in India. While being a part of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA),
the IFS also works with several other bodies that are tasked with formulating
India’s foreign policy, namely, the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) and the
National Security Council (NSC). Ithas been recruiting a meagre number of 36
officers every year, double than what it used to be 30 years ago. The IFS have
been struggling with the problem of short staffing for decades now, so the
problem is not something new. However, India’s rise in the international arena
has brought this problem to the fore.

As of 2013,
around 930 professional diplomats staff India’s 120 missions and 49 consulates,
smaller than any of the BRICS countries[5].
Despite being the second most populous country in the world, India’s diplomatic
strength pales against that of world powers such as China and the US, which
have 4000 and 20,000 diplomats respectively.

The small
strength of India’s diplomatic cadre can prove to be a significant constraint
to formulating long-term national strategy when officers end up getting
encumbered with multiple responsibilities and dealing with present challenges,
leaving little or almost no time for proactive strategizing. One can only
wonder how five diplomats in charge of more than 30 Latin American and Caribbean
countries can possibly have the time for long-term strategizing.

The obvious
solution to this problem would be to recruit many more diplomats to ease each
officer’s burden. The division of labour
that would result from hiring more IFS officers would allow for some officers
to solely focus on the formulation of India’s long term strategy. However, this
may not strategically be the best way to go about addressing the issue. The IFS
would run the risk of further decreasing the quality of its workforce, another
issue the IFS seems to grapple with as a result of its lack of lucrativeness
and power in comparison to other corporate and government jobs, if it hires
more diplomats. Moreover, it may not be the best strategic move to rapidly
recruit more diplomatic personnel as it may compel other countries to stand on
their guard.

So what is the
alternative solution to the problem? While India may consider slowly increasing
its diplomatic personnel, it could also take the consultation of national
strategic expertise from Indian think- tanks to fill in the capacity gap that
seems to put a strain on the IFS’s capability to long-term strategize. However,
the IFS’s culture of privacy and security impede the ability of think tanks to
conduct useful policy research. Most Indian foreign policy and military
archives are classified and inaccessible to the public. ‘IFS officers are quite
candid about their lack of reliance on think tanks’[6],
writes ManjariChatterjee Miller in an article for the India Review. It is
imperative that the IFS change its attitude. It needs to become more
transparent and engaged with foreign policy think tanks. Consultations with
think tanks can facilitate the IFS in developing a long- term strategy while
the IFS recruits more officers dedicated to developing the same. And with a
group of IFS officers designated to long-term strategizing, India may be able
to live up to its title as a prominent global power.

* The Author worked as Research Intern at CPPR and is currently pursuing her Bachelors in International Relations from Trinity College, CT, USA