'Libertarianism'
affirms not freedom as such, but a freedom of a certain type, whose shape is
delineated by the thesis of self-ownership.

G.A. Cohen

This article
examines the philosophical foundations of Robert Nozick as expressed in his
book. It is not a review, nor a
comprehensive critique of his work, but a partial examination of what makes Nozick (pronounced
Nose-ick) the best known libertarian in academia, and
whether his libertarian views stand up to close scrutiny.

Robert Nozick
is very likely the only so-called libertarian that tender young political
science students will meet. Libertarianism is being taught at universities -
that's the good news - but it is Nozick's
libertarianism as found in Anarchy, State
and Utopia that is being taught. Why, you may wonder? He is not the
pre-eminent libertarian thinker - Rothbardians might
say their hero could lay claim to that. Neither does he offer strong aruments for a libertarian position - Rand is very near impregnable there.

So why Nozick?. Well, he is aProfessor
at Harvard after all. Nozick received tenure at the academically tender age of
thirty, becoming a libertarian only after
his appointment to Harvard when he met and was philosophically seduced by
Murray Rothbard and then Bruce Goldberg. The position
of University Professor is described as “Harvard’s most distinguished
professional position” but Nozick is not just any Harvardprofessor, he is to give him his full title, the "Arthur
Kingsley Porter Professor of Philosophy," who in 1998 became the
"Joseph Pellegrino University Professor."

He has kudos:
a Presidential Citation from the American Psychological Association described
him as “one of the most brilliant and original living philosophers.” J.R.
Knowles, Dean of the faculty of Arts and Sciences, said “Nozick is an eclectic
intellectual and a creative force in the faculty.” While the President of
Harvard states that not only has Nozick had an important influence on
contemporary philosophy, but “his ideas have made a real difference well beyond
his discipline, and beyond the academy. Robert has one of the most versatile,
piercing, and agile minds that I have ever encountered”. So he has stature; he
has tenure. Academics like him. This is perhaps why he is considered the
leading libertarian scholar amongst academics, particularly as he only became a
libertarian after he was entrenched at Harvard.

Nozick
certainly provides many conclusions that are very agreeable to
libertarian-minded individuals. For example he concludes that the
"taxation of earnings from labour is on a par with forced labour." He
also argues that “Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or
group may do to them (without violating their rights). So strong and
far-reaching are these rights that they raise the question of what, if
anything, the state and its officials may do. ... Two noteworthy implications
are that the state may not use its coercive apparatus for the purpose of
getting some citizens to aid others, or in order to prohibit activities to
people for their own good or
protection.”

Fine stuff
indeed, but while we may be inclined to agree with these conclusions, it is important
to ask how Nozick reached them. After all, a bad defence can often be worse
than no defence. With this in mind, let us examine some of his philosophic
foundations.

Nozick
presents his argument in the Lockean tradition, that
is, from the standpoint of natural rights theory. As John Locke argues, “every
man has a property in his own person; this nobody has any right to but himself.
The labour of his body and the work of his hands we may say are properly his.”
Nozick bases his view of natural rights on his notion of the 'meaningfulness of
life.' He argues that, "a person's shaping his life in accordance with
some overall plan is his way of giving meaning to his life; only a being with
the capacity to so shape his life can have or strive for meaningful life."

So
far, so ordinary.
Clearly, Nozick is arguing against coercion into people's lives, much like
Locke. But he bases this argument on the likelihood that such coercion prevents
them having a meaningful life. Thus, it is argued, people should be self-owners.
That is, people are to be regarded as ends unto and in themselves. He argues
that a person's ownership over their body is total and for "the existence
of distinct individuals who are not resources for others.”

While the
thesis of self-ownership is familiar to libertarian thought, this is perhaps a
unique way of arguing the case. It seems to be based on a partly utilitarian
premise - that we should maximise the meaningfulness of our lives - while his
call for individuals to be given rights in order to achieve a meaningful life
has elements similar to the Objectivist view. It does however miss one major
point that Ayn Rand makes so well.

Ayn Rand
argues that “there is only one
fundamental right ... a man’s right to his own life. Life is a process of
self-sustaining and self-generated action; the right to life means the right to
engage in self-sustaining and self-generated action - which means: the freedom
to take all the actions required by the nature of a rational being for the
support, the furtherance, the fulfilment and the enjoyment of his own life.”
Nozick fails to realise that the primary purpose of rights is to allow Man to
live by his nature. Rights allow Man to live as Man. Rand again: "The
source of rights is not divine law or congressional law, but the law of
identity. A is A - and man is man. Rights
are conditions of existence required by man's nature for his proper
survival." A meaningful life is only a secondary consequence of this, and
not the primary. Of course, a meaningful life does require a system of rights
based on the thesis of self-ownership, but it does not of itself give us the
whole argument.

Nozick also
fails to state exactly what he means by "self-ownership."
Surprisingly, self-ownership is mentioned only in passing in Anarchy, State and Utopia with the
following; "the most important rights are rights over oneself---the
rights which constitute 'self-ownership'." The self-ownership argument is
at best only implicit in his book. Indeed, most of the discussion on his notion
of self-ownership has been done in interpretations of Nozick’s
work. G.A. Cohen does just that, arguing that:

According to the thesis of self-ownership, each person
possesses over himself, as a matter of moral right, all those rights that a
slaveholder has over a complete chattel slave as a matter of legal right, and
he is entitled, morally speaking, to dispose over himself in the way such a
slaveholders entitled, legally speaking, to dispose over his slave. A slave
holder may not direct his slave to harm other (non-slave) people, but he is not
legally obliged to place him at their disposal to the slightest degree: he owes
none of his slave's service to anyone else.

Why is an
explicit discussion of self-ownership needed? It is needed because it can be a
misleading subject. This is because the self-ownership thesis is traditionally,
and correctly, viewed as a metaphor. As you are not a separate entity from your
body, it is not strictly speaking true, that you own your body. Rather, you are your body, and must take certain
actions in order to sustain yourself.
Self-ownership is merely an analogy between the control you are entitled to
have over yourself, and the control you have over private property. Thus, you
are fully entitled to exercise such control over yourself, as you could over a
chattel slave, except that, unlike the slave, you are not owned. Taking this
metaphor literally can lead to intellectuals playing all sorts of mind games
with the concept, including using slavery to justify freedom! It's a very
slippery slope, down which intellectuals are very happy to push libertarianism.

Lets now turn to an analysis of Nozick’s basis for individual rights. Thomas Nagel argues
that, “to present a serious challenge to other views, a discussion of
libertarianism would have to explore the foundations of individual rights and
the reasons for and against different conceptions of the relation between those
rights and other values that the state may be in a position to promote.” Does
Nozick provide us with such a solid foundation? Or do we have 'libertarianism
without foundation'? Nagel maintains that Anarchy,
State and Utopiais an example of the latter,
declaring unequivocally that "Nozick's book is
theoretically insubstantial”!

Nozick admits
himself that he "does not present a precise theory of the moral basis of
individual rights," but this omission is serious, and his admission does
nothing to make it better. Nozick builds a political theory on his conception
of rights, but it is done without proper foundation. Further, because there are
several competing notions of rights, such a basis would tell us which are
likely to be fruitful. Indeed, a correct view of rights would go a very long
way to eliminate poor political philosophy. However, without this foundation
(except the frankly weak 'meaningful life' argument) Nozick leaves himself open
to criticism on his very own premises. That Nozick is the only 'libertarian'
many academics and their students will ever encounter means that the
libertarian argument is seen in academia to have a weak base - little wonder
that he is taught to young politics students to introduce them to libertarian
thought!

Nozick's weak base makes it easily pervertable: Samuel Scheffler for
example argues, “It seems clear that the alternative conception of rights is a
much more accurate specification than the Lockean
conception of rights which people actually have. For the alternative conception
assigns to each individual the right to a sufficient share of all distributable goods whose enjoyment
is necessary to have a reasonable chance of living a decent and fulfilling
life.” As incorrect as Scheffler’s claims might be,
they show how mistaken premises can lead to good conclusions being struck down
- and how convenient for the Schefflers of this world
that they now have an easily perverted alternative to Locke's conception of
rights to pervert. It almost makes one wish Nozick had stayed home sick the
night he first met Rothbard; we might then have been
spared this inconvenient ally.

For Robert
Nozick, while advocating a libertarian political philosophy is doing more harm
than good. He is considered by academics to be the leading advocate for
libertarianism and freedom amongst modern political philosophers, but his weak
arguments are too easily trumped by self-serving intellectuals who only feel
obliged to answer Nozick, rather than more substantial political thinkers like Rand. So, while his prestige does get
libertarian ideas into philosophy and political studies classes around the
world, his arguments are treated as if they are the only ones libertarians
possess. Quelhorreur!

So
why he is the leading libertarian scholar amongst academics? Nozick plays the game, as a good
Harvard professor should, and as his various prestigious awards demonstrate.
But perhaps it is the very weakness of his arguments that add to his
attraction, he is the ideal libertarian straw man - easy to knock down, and to
burn while he's down.

But Nozick
does have value. He shows us that if your arguments lack foundations you will
undo your conclusions, no matter how true they might be.