Pierson v. Poast wrote:No, the "when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332." part applies to all the claims listed in 1367(b).

I think we're talking past each other, then. I'm just saying, supplemental jurisdiction isn't fine just if the joined parties maintain diversity.

Nevermind, I think you're right. OP: if you have the E&E, I think Chapter 16 Question 8 is this situation.

Ah great find. Thanks so much.

Just for anyone reading this, the problem basically was

A (NY) v. B (OH)B impleads (R. 14) C (OH)A files a claim against C

E&E says no supplemental jurisdiction over A's claim against C, since 1367(b) doesn't allow it-- even though it doesn't destroy diversity. However, the E&E adds that there may be an independent basis of SMJ; the parties are diverse, so if it meets the amount in controversy requirement, the court can hear it on diversity grounds.

Pierson v. Poast wrote:No, the "when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332." part applies to all the claims listed in 1367(b).

I think we're talking past each other, then. I'm just saying, supplemental jurisdiction isn't fine just if the joined parties maintain diversity.

Nevermind, I think you're right. OP: if you have the E&E, I think Chapter 16 Question 8 is this situation.

Ah great find. Thanks so much.

Just for anyone reading this, the problem basically was

A (NY) v. B (OH)B impleads (R. 14) C (OH)A files a claim against C

E&E says no supplemental jurisdiction over A's claim against C, since 1367(b) doesn't allow it-- even though it doesn't destroy diversity. However, the E&E adds that there may be an independent basis of SMJ; the parties are diverse, so if it meets the amount in controversy requirement, the court can hear it on diversity grounds.

Pierson v. Poast wrote:No, the "when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332." part applies to all the claims listed in 1367(b).

I think we're talking past each other, then. I'm just saying, supplemental jurisdiction isn't fine just if the joined parties maintain diversity.

Nevermind, I think you're right. OP: if you have the E&E, I think Chapter 16 Question 8 is this situation.

Ah great find. Thanks so much.

Just for anyone reading this, the problem basically was

A (NY) v. B (OH)B impleads (R. 14) C (OH)A files a claim against C

E&E says no supplemental jurisdiction over A's claim against C, since 1367(b) doesn't allow it-- even though it doesn't destroy diversity. However, the E&E adds that there may be an independent basis of SMJ; the parties are diverse, so if it meets the amount in controversy requirement, the court can hear it on diversity grounds.

Wait...so is Acing wrong? Doesn't it say that supplemental jurisdiction over a Rule 14 claim would be allowed as long as it doesn't destroy diversity?

Nevermind, I think you're right. OP: if you have the E&E, I think Chapter 16 Question 8 is this situation.

Ah great find. Thanks so much.

Just for anyone reading this, the problem basically was

A (NY) v. B (OH)B impleads (R. 14) C (OH)A files a claim against C

E&E says no supplemental jurisdiction over A's claim against C, since 1367(b) doesn't allow it-- even though it doesn't destroy diversity. However, the E&E adds that there may be an independent basis of SMJ; the parties are diverse, so if it meets the amount in controversy requirement, the court can hear it on diversity grounds.

Wait...so is Acing wrong? Doesn't it say that supplemental jurisdiction over a Rule 14 claim would be allowed as long as it doesn't destroy diversity?

I'm going to throw out some hypos.. some of which may conflict with the way you guys seem to have been taught (My prof has explicitly said that diversity can be destroyed under supplemental jurisdiction, ala Finley). But just to add to the confusion (these are adapted from my professor, using the answers he supplied):

A(CA); B(NV); C(OR); D(CA); E(NV); For simplicity: all claims arise out of the same transaction/occurrence. All original claims are based in diversity.

A sues B for 100k; B impleads D for 100% of the liability; There is original jurisdiction over the second claim.

A sues B for 100k; A joins D under rule 20; There is no supplemental jurisdiction under 1367(b): since it is by the plaintiff against someone joined under rule 20.

A sues B for 100k; B impleads E as a joint tortfeasor; There is supplemental jurisdiction. It is the same transaction or occurrence and 1367(b) does not apply since it is not a claim by a plaintiff nor by someone joined under rules 19 or 24. (NOTE: no complete diversity, so your professor may vary on this one, but this is the answer mine gave).

A sues B for 100k; A joins C for 10k; There is no supplemental jurisdiction since it is a claim made by the plaintiff against someone made a party under rule 20.

A sues B for 100k; A joins C for 100k (original jurisdiction); C crossclaims against B for 10k; There is supplemental jurisdiction since it is not a claim made by a plaintiff or by anyone made a party under 19 or 14 (and the amount-in-controversy does not have to be met).

As I understand it, 1367b just codifies Kroger : the fear is that if P has a claim against an in-state D that he'd rather sue in federal court, P could bring claim against an out of state D on the assumption that D would bring in that 3rd party in-state D against which P has a claim. 1367b thus prevents P from backdooring a claim against an in-state D.

342848386278 wrote:As I understand it, 1367b just codifies Kroger : the fear is that if P has a claim against an in-state D that he'd rather sue in federal court, P could bring claim against an out of state D on the assumption that D would bring in that 3rd party in-state D against which P has a claim. 1367b thus prevents P from backdooring a claim against an in-state D.

342848386278 wrote:As I understand it, 1367b just codifies Kroger : the fear is that if P has a claim against an in-state D that he'd rather sue in federal court, P could bring claim against an out of state D on the assumption that D would bring in that 3rd party in-state D against which P has a claim. 1367b thus prevents P from backdooring a claim against an in-state D.

I was taught the same thing.

I want to say Souter said that 1367 was actually promulgated as a response to Finley (where she tried to join like, a flash mob she was part of or something), but that piece of my casebook is in my locker. The situation you're describing is more generally handled by 1332(a)(1) / Strawbridge, which says you must always have complete diversity no matter what. 1367(b) would be unnecessary without 1332.

So talked to my prof in office hours today and he confirmed that it codifies Kroger and should apply only when it would be inconsistent with diversity. So I think that goes against the Acing book. Good luck figuring it out everyone...maybe best to ask your professor.

342848386278 wrote:As I understand it, 1367b just codifies Kroger : the fear is that if P has a claim against an in-state D that he'd rather sue in federal court, P could bring claim against an out of state D on the assumption that D would bring in that 3rd party in-state D against which P has a claim. 1367b thus prevents P from backdooring a claim against an in-state D.

I was taught the same thing.

I want to say Souter said that 1367 was actually promulgated as a response to Finley (where she tried to join like, a flash mob she was part of or something), but that piece of my casebook is in my locker. The situation you're describing is more generally handled by 1332(a)(1) / Strawbridge, which says you must always have complete diversity no matter what. 1367(b) would be unnecessary without 1332.

God, now I'm just being anal.

My exams just require that I do analysis w/out the need to cite all that much, so I don't really have any of that sort of information in mind atm.

My prof confirmed that the Acing interpretation is incorrect regarding 1367b. There is also an inconsistency in Acing's Erie analysis regarding Hanna I and Hanna II. These have apparently been corrected in some of the 3rd editions.

NonTradHealthLaw wrote:My prof confirmed that the Acing interpretation is incorrect regarding 1367b. There is also an inconsistency in Acing's Erie analysis regarding Hanna I and Hanna II. These have apparently been corrected in some of the 3rd editions.

Blah, thanks a lot. I didn't even realize there was a 3rd edition. How could a civ pro professor mess up such a basic thing?

NonTradHealthLaw wrote:My prof confirmed that the Acing interpretation is incorrect regarding 1367b. There is also an inconsistency in Acing's Erie analysis regarding Hanna I and Hanna II. These have apparently been corrected in some of the 3rd editions.

Blah, thanks a lot. I didn't even realize there was a 3rd edition. How could a civ pro professor mess up such a basic thing?

Seriously. I didn't read the 1367b issue as problematic until the night before my final. Just went based on what was taught in class and got clarification afterwards. Prof rolled his eyes at Spencer - apparently this isn't uncommon???

NonTradHealthLaw wrote:My prof confirmed that the Acing interpretation is incorrect regarding 1367b. There is also an inconsistency in Acing's Erie analysis regarding Hanna I and Hanna II. These have apparently been corrected in some of the 3rd editions.

Blah, thanks a lot. I didn't even realize there was a 3rd edition. How could a civ pro professor mess up such a basic thing?

Seriously. I didn't read the 1367b issue as problematic until the night before my final. Just went based on what was taught in class and got clarification afterwards. Prof rolled his eyes at Spencer - apparently this isn't uncommon???

342848386278 wrote:As I understand it, 1367b just codifies Kroger : the fear is that if P has a claim against an in-state D that he'd rather sue in federal court, P could bring claim against an out of state D on the assumption that D would bring in that 3rd party in-state D against which P has a claim. 1367b thus prevents P from backdooring a claim against an in-state D.

NonTradHealthLaw wrote:With Spencer - has some issues in his textbook too. Not sure why he selected the casebook. Hate it.

What the hell is Spencer? For that matter, what the hell is this Acing thing. I'm way too scared to touch anything other than the casebook - my outline is basically a condensed version of it.

Our class is actually going to cover joinder next week, so I'll fight with more fire and fireworks after that? Unitl then, 1332 always always always governs diversity, unless you squeak in on a federal question. I just wouldn't worry about these questions of people potentially fraudulently acquiring supplemental jurisdiction. It should be apparent to the judges, I'd think.

NonTradHealthLaw wrote:With Spencer - has some issues in his textbook too. Not sure why he selected the casebook. Hate it.

What the hell is Spencer? For that matter, what the hell is this Acing thing. I'm way too scared to touch anything other than the casebook - my outline is basically a condensed version of it.

Our class is actually going to cover joinder next week, so I'll fight with more fire and fireworks after that? Unitl then, 1332 always always always governs diversity, unless you squeak in on a federal question. I just wouldn't worry about these questions of people potentially fraudulently acquiring supplemental jurisdiction. It should be apparent to the judges, I'd think.

NonTradHealthLaw wrote:Seriously. I didn't read the 1367b issue as problematic until the night before my final. Just went based on what was taught in class and got clarification afterwards. Prof rolled his eyes at Spencer - apparently this isn't uncommon???

I dunno about this-I have Spencer for CivPro and he's an unmitigated badass, by far my favorite prof. I know that some profs don't like his reading of 1367(b)-for example, Spencer thinks that Exxon made clear that the failure to include Rule 20 plaintiffs in the language of 1367(b) means that Rule 20 plaintiffs can get supplemental jurisdiction over claims against Rule 14 third party defendants, even if they aren't diverse. {i.e., NY & NY v. DE v. NY; either P should be able to bring a supplemental claim against the third party even though they aren't diverse, and the supplemental claim is piggybacking on a diverse claim}

Other CivPro profs think this is abominable because it seems to defeat the diversity requirement. He's mentioned this in class-evidently, this is what civpro profs get lathered up over.