While some might argue that it was worth it to rid the University of Connecticut of its former football coach, there’s no doubt that an exorbitant severance agreement should never have been part of his contract.

The divorce included a $3.4 million buyout, along with fringe costs of $766,000 — as well as the cost of saying goodbye to 13 of his assistants, which came to more than $1 million in severance and fringe costs.

Ouch. Sometimes it makes sense to cut your losses, but that’s a lot to pay for failure.

It’s even worse when one considers that Mr. Diaco had a financial incentive to get fired when he did.

Under the new contract, if UConn were to fire Mr. Diaco for any reason other than “just cause,” the university would pay him a kingly sum — $5 million if he was sacked in 2016, $3.4 million in 2017, $1.7 million in 2018, and $1 million in either 2019 or 2020. He was fired effective Jan. 2, 2017.

That clause was a big mistake. To put a fine point on it: If the drama had gone on another year, and if Mr. Diaco had survived through the 2017 season and was fired in early 2018, his buyout would have been cut in half.

Nice timing for Mr. Diaco.

The extra $766,000 that he got in fringe benefits adds insult to injury, to say nothing of the $1 million-plus cost of ditching his coaches.

But here’s where UConn negotiators blew it: By promising millions for being fired and a fraction of that for success, UConn incentivized his failure.

Take, for example, the incentives offered Mr. Diaco: He would have received only $400,000 if the team won a national championship and $200,000 for playing in the semifinals. So his financial reward for getting fired was the equivalent of 8 ½ national championship bonuses.

This is backward.

Mr. Diaco’s contract structure wasn’t unique in the world of college athletic finances. But it’s just wrong.