Cognitio abstractiva secundum Scotum: elementa doctrinaeSecundum Duns Scoti sententiam cognitio abstractiva est, quae ab actuali existentia obiecti non dependet, et ideo speciebus impressis niti debet. Scotus nonnulla argumenta pro necessitate speciei intelligibilis ad cognitionem abstractivam universalem perficiendam praebet. Reiectis sententiis eorum, qui causam cognitionis aut obiectumsolum, aut intellectum esse putabant, Scotus causam totalem cognitionis ex obiecto cognito et intellectu ut ex causis partialibus essentialiter ordinatis componi concludit: species intelligibilis et a phantasmate, et ab intellectu agente causatur. Hoc modo ovus repraesentationis (...) ordo oritur, in quo natura communis in modo universalitatis repraesentetur. Processus cognoscendi a Scoto ut successio dynamica actionum et passionum describitur. Ex dictis patet, Scoti de cognitione doctrinam a traditione Aristotelica discedere et germina epistemologiae modernae continere elucet.Abstractive cognition according to Duns Scotus: the Basic ApproachAccording to Scotus, abstractive cognition is independent of the actual existence of its object, and must therefore rely on the intentional species. Scotus presents several arguments in favour of the necessity of the species intelligibilis for abstractive universal cognition. After discussing opinions that ascribed exclusive causality in the process of cognition either to the intellect or to the object, Scotus arrives at the conclusion that both the object and the intellect act as essentially ordered partial causes of cognition: the intelligible species is caused both by the phantasm and the active intellect. Thus results a new order of representation, in which the common nature is represented as universal. The process of cognition is described by Scotus as a dynamic succession of active and passive phases. On the basis of these and other characteristic features, Scotus’s epistemology can be described as departing from the Aristotelian tradition, and as the locus of the first appearance of the motives of modern epistemology. (shrink)

Boethius’s short treatise On the Highest Good represents one of the remarkable and important variants of ethical aristotelianism, enriched in Boethius by neo-platonic and augustinian themes. The idea of the “philosophical way”, which exclusively can lead to blissfulness, encompassing theory as well as practice, was dismissed by theologians – counselors of Bishop Tempier. The result was an edict published in 1277, which among others condemned the ideas articulated in the treatise On the Highest Good. On closer view it appears, however, (...) that the “philosophical way” does not contradict the Christian way. Contrary to Thomas Aquinas or Bonaventura Boethius as a “professional philosopher” did not manage to include philosophy into theology. However, this is not to conceive the two as two contradicting disciplines, but rather as two different perspectives on one and the same thing. Therefore they can not be in conflict. (shrink)

The paper deals with the reception and modifications of aristotelism in the epistemology, metaphysics and theology of John Duns Scotus. As a consequence of these modifications Scotus became the founder of a new philosophical-theological vocabulary. In the first part of the contribution the history of aristotelism in the Hellenic period is outlined; the second part examines two lines of aristotelism: that developed in the Latin European West on one hand and that of the Greek-Arabic East on the other hand. The (...) reception and modification of aristotelism in the considerations of J. D. Scotus is examined in more detail on the historical-philosophical background in the third part: rational intuition, ontological conception of metaphysics as scientia transcendens, theology as a practical science. In conclusion the author shows how Scotus’s modification of aristotelism influenced the rise of modern science. (shrink)