Borges and the refutation of idealism: a study of tlön, uqbar, orbis tertius

This paper tries to demónstrate that Borges celebrated story -Tlón, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius,- contains a reductio ad absurdum argument of a form of subjective idealísm usually associated with Berkeley. To show the íncoherences that result from the idealísm of Berkeley, Borges makes use of ideas which may be fruitfully illuminated by comparison with kantian arguments against subjective idealísm. He puts these arguments ín the form of a cuento which illustrates the absurdities and contradictions of this ídealist position. Specifically, he demónstrales that a radically subjective idealísm is self-contradictory since it renders all objective experience indetermínate and incoherent.

Tipo de documento: Artículo - Article

Fuente: http://www.bdigital.unal.edu.co

Introducción

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Borges and the Refutation of Idealísm: A
Study of -Tlon, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius-
. i
JON STEWART
Soren Kierkegaard Forskningscenteret
E-maíl: j s ( ^ k . k u . d k
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Denmark
Abstract
This paper tries to demónstrate that Borges celebrated story, -Tlón, Uqbar, Orbis
Tertius,- contains a reductio ad absurdum argument of a form of subjective idealísm
usually associated with Berkeley. To show the íncoherences that result from the idealísm
of Berkeley, Borges makes use of ideas which may be fruitfully illuminated by
comparison with kantian arguments against subjective idealísm. He puts these arguments
ín the form of a cuento which illustrates the absurdities and contradictions of this
ídealist position. Specifically, he demónstrales that a radically subjective idealísm is
self-contradictory since it renders all objective experience indetermínate and incoherent.
Leibniz discussed at some length the concept of a possible world. This notion is
based on a distinction between tmths of fact and truths of reason. Empirical
tmths such as -the cat is on the mat- or -the dogs hair is black,- are facts ofthe
matter, which just so happen to be the case but which could easily be different
under different circumstances. If -different circumstances- are interpreted as
different possible worlds, then there is a possible world in which the dogs hair
is brown and one in which it is white and so on. Truths of reason by contrast are
necessary and thus must hold tme in every possible world. Tmths of this sort,
such as -a triangle is a figure with three sides,- are necessarily tme since to
deny them would, according to Leibniz, result in a contradictíon. There is, for
example, a confradiction in the very notion of afrianglewith four sides, whereas
there is nothing necessarily contradictory in saying that ...