Is the GCC deal democracy for Yemen?

The GCC deal presents possibly the most realistic short term resolution to the Yemeni quagmire. It lessens the chance of civil war that would set Yemen back by decades. Nevertheless, it does not meet the demands of the vast majority of those who started the revolution.

The Gulf initiative calls for Saleh to pass on his powers to his
deputy, Abd-Rabbo Mansur Hadi, and then for Yemen to hold presidential
elections after an optimistic three-month period.

Decisively, the deal gives the President, and his family members,
immunity from future prosecution, a move that has angered the youth
movement that took to the streets of Yemen in February.

Although it is far too optimistic to say that this is the end of the
political crisis that has plagued Yemen this year, there are some
definite positives that have emerged out of this deal.

Firstly, after months of violence and an increase in fighting between
rival military factions, the deal greatly reduces the chances of civil
war in the poorest Arab state. Saleh’s sons and nephews control large
parts of the Yemeni armed forces; the GCC deal brings the hope that they
may be removed from their positions without a fight.

Secondly, the deal highlights the positive role the international
community can play. Attempts to find a way out of the crisis have been
very laborious, but gradually the US and the EU were able to get their
act together and strong-arm Saleh into signing. It is very likely that
the main reason he did sign was the asset freeze and travel ban hanging
over his head. Saleh was never a Gaddafi, once he realised the
international community was not bluffing he decided to sign the deal,
preferring it to joining the ranks of Mugabe and Assad.

However, despite the probable immediate benefit of avoiding a
disastrous civil war, there are several long-term problems that arise.

Many members of the youth movement, especially those who consider
themselves ‘independent’, i.e. not affiliated to the official opposition
parties, are completely against the GCC deal. This has been the case
since it first emerged in April, and since then there has been a
strong sentiment amongst these protesters that the JMP opposition
grouping is effectively stealing the youth revolution. The independent
youth have complained at times of being stifled by the JMP and by the
defected First Armoured Division, and have even said that they are the
reason why the revolution has taken so long.

The GCC deal may be particularly problematic in the future because of
those associated with it, namely Saleh and the GCC itself. Saleh is a
master of deception, and even now that he has signed, it is likely that
he will try and find a way to lessen the effect of the deal. He may
attempt to negotiate and ensure that his sons and other family members
remain in their positions, effectively retaining the control of Saleh’s
Sanhan sub-tribe. Saleh is back in Yemen, announcing a Presidential
Pardon for offences committed during the political crisis, apart from
the bomb attack against him. He seems to have forgotten that,
officially, he has no powers. Preliminary reports concerning the make-up
of the next cabinet say that the President’s son, Republican Guard head
Ahmed Ali Saleh, is to be one of the Deputy Prime Ministers, and the
Minister of Interior; not a particularly encouraging sign.

The GCC itself is a group of six autocratic monarchies, not
particularly inspiring for Yemenis wishing to leave the era of
authoritarianism. The strongest power in the regional alliance is Saudi
Arabia, a country known for its often negative interventions in Yemen
over the past decades. Does Saudi Arabia really want a democratic Yemen
that could potentially inspire those within Saudi itself? More
importantly, will it allow a strong Yemen, independent of Saudi control?

Has there ever been an instance of a group of effectively absolute monarchies overseeing a democratic transition?

The GCC deal presents possibly the most realistic short term
resolution to the Yemeni quagmire. It lessens the chance of civil war
that would set Yemen back by decades. Nevertheless, it does not meet the
demands of the vast majority of those who started the revolution,
people who want the complete removal of an endemically corrupt regime.
As events in Egypt currently show, those protesting in the Arab world do
not seem likely to accept solutions that do not give them all of what
they want. Revolution 2.0 may be on its way in Yemen. That is if Saleh
does not manage to wriggle free, once again.