Libya`s political scene, following the civil war in 2011 and the death of Gaddafi, has been marked by instability. An important detail to understand the current Libyan political chaos is that in Libya, party lists are not allowed, so candidates for parliament must stand independently.
After defeating Gaddafi, the National Transition Congress (an active structure during the civil war, officially recognized as legitimate by most UN countries) gave way to the General Congress of the Nation (2012), which elected as president Mohamed Yousef Al-Magariaf, who would resign in 2013 because of the law of political isolation, which prevented anyone who has held a political post with Gaddafi return to occupy a position in the new democratic Libya. After Al Magariaf was chosen the Amazigh Nuri Abu Sahmain (Islamist, close to the Muslim brothers), who in 2014 tried to perpetuate himself in power after losing the elections (once ended the general congress of the nation) starting a new civil war, in which Khalifa Haftar would be protagonist for his “Operation dignity”, launched from the parliament of Tobruk to recover the country from the hands of the Islamists of Sahmain and its militias (fomented from the executive during its mandate), that had taken control of Tripoli.
The civil war faced the National General Congress (Islamist) against the House of Representatives (Liberal). UN pressure led (2016) Sahmain to withdraw from politics and the dissolution of the NGC; The UN plan was for the NGC to be succeeded by a bicameral structure constituted by the Superior Council of State (heir of the NGC) as the upper chamber, while the House of Representatives would do the functions as lower house. Despite this, the system has been repeatedly boycotted and blocked.
At present, in Libya we find four factions fighting for the political control of the country, a conflict that has taken ethno-tribal characteristics in the south:
• The House of Representatives (moderates, Tobruk), led by Aguilah Issa and Abdullah Al Thani, and whose military arm is Commander Khalifa Haftar.
• The higher council of state (integrated in the government of national agreement), heir structure of the NGC, whose president is Fayez Al Sarraj. Moderate pro-Western nationalists.
• The Islamist groups, radical heirs of the NGC, united in the National Salvation Government and represented by groups like Dar Al Islam Libya.
• The Libyan branch of the Islamic State, currently in process of extinction after the hard blows dealt by the Libyan army in Derna and Sirte.
The conflict between these factions has spread to the pre-existing ethnic-tribal tensions in southern Libyan territory, causing some tribes to opt for either side and adding the tribal and racial differences (Tebu v. Touareg) to the already complicated political-religious cocktail of the conflict.
In this scenario, in which Libya is a failed state, a core of radicalism and violence, and one of the largest black arms markets in the world, Khalifa Haftar stands out as a relevant figure. Haftar is a Libyan general (74 years), commander of the Libyan military since 2015, but with a long history in the military command of Libya: Haftar is one of the key figures in the Libyan conflict. He participated in the Gaddafi revolution; After the war between Libya and Chad, Haftar was repudiated, became an opponent of the Gaddafi’s regime and exiled himself to the United States. After his return to Libya he has become one of the leading figures chosen to run the country, and has maintained much relation with Russia, to the point of visiting Moscow or the naval group of Admiral Kuznetsov during his return trip to Severomorsk. Haftar is Nasserist and secular.
The situation in Libya, where many international interests converge, makes the present conflict two possibilities for resolution: the extremists of the Islamic state are out of the equation and the nationalist Islamists like the Muslim brothers are too radical and, after the events of the Last 15 years, Western public opinion no longer tolerates support for radical Islamic groups. While the West seems to be pursuing a Tunisian-style, democratic and moderate government based on the figure of Al Sarraj, Russia seems to bet for a scenario more like that of Egypt, in which the power falls into the hands of a hard government that stabilize the situation. In this “hard” Egyptian-style government, Haftar could be the man who played the role of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.
It should not be forgotten that Libya is a key player in the global energy puzzle and that, after many years of uncertainty with Gaddafi, the great powers want to introduce the African country into their spheres of influence. For Russia, the arrival of Haftar in power could mean increasing its influence in the Mediterranean, although the current reality is that the Libyan conflict does not seem close to ending and the arms embargo limits the possibilities of either side to impose themselves in an armed struggle that could be extended for years, giving rise to the emergence of new independence or tribal conflicts that could definitely destroy the country. Currently the most viable final solution seems to be a real agreement between the two moderate actors in the conflict, Tripoli and Tobruk, although it could not be ruled out that, once reached such an agreement, the Libyan political game ended up placing Haftar as leader of a New Libya oriented to Russia.
In short, a conflict that evolves from chaos to dichotomy: Democracy versus authoritarianism; Islam versus secularism; West against Russia once again.