The Norman Conquest of the North: The Region and Its Transformation, 1000-1135

A study of Northern England before, during and after the Norman conquest. The author explains the resistance of the Northumbria and York in geographical, historical and political terms.
History between 1000 and 1135, with a discussion of peasant society before and after 1066.

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The Repon and Its Transformation,
1000-1135
O 1979 The University of North Carolina Press
All rights resewed
Manufactured in the United States of America
ISBN 0-8078-1371 -0
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 79-10200
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Kapelle, William E
The Norman Conquest of the north.
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
I . Great Britain-History-Anglo-Saxon
period,
499-1 066. 2. Great Britain-History -Norman
period, 1066-1 154. 3. Peasantry -EnglandHistory. I. Title.
DA154.7.K36
942.02
79-10200
ISBN 0-8078-1371-0
1 . The Danes o f York
and the House of Barnburgh
2. Earl Siward and the Scots
3. The Structure of Northern Society
4. The Rule of Tostig and the
Destruction of the Nobles of York
5. Government by Punitive Expedition
6. The Impact of the Normans
on the Northern Village
7. Henry I's New Men i n the North
8. Conclusion
Abbreviations and
Selected Short References
Notes
Selected Bibliography
Index
1. Genealogy of the Earls
of Northumberland, part 1
2. Genealogy of the Earls
of Northumberland, part 2
3 . The Kings of Scotland from 1005 to 1153
4 . The composition of
Large Territorial Sokes in Yorkshire
5 . Overstocked Manors and Functioning Churches
in Yorkshire in 1086
6 . Bovate Rates in the Vicinity of Buttercrambe
[I81
1301
[401
[801
[ 1721
11801
Political Divisions of the North in 1000
Northern Geographical Names
Sketch Map of the Terrain of the North
Political Divisions of the North in 1056
The Normans in the North
Distribution of Overstocked Manors
in Yorkshire in 1086
Distribution $Functioning Churches
in Yorkshire in 1086
Manorial Types in Durham
at the Time of Boldon Book
Crop Sequences in the West Riding in 1297
The Populated Estates of Ilbert de Lacy
Henry de Ferrers's Estates in Derbyshire
AND T H E
HOUSEO F BAMBURGH
T h e Norman Conquest of the North has never been adequately
explained even though the resistance of the northerners was one of
the most dramatic episodes of the Conquest. T h e reasons for this
neglect are uncertain. It may be merely a side effect of the conviction that the South was the more important part of England. Alternatively, northern history threatens to complicate our picture of
the Conquest. A close study of the northern resistance to William
the Conqueror inevitably discloses that he made at least two blunders in dealing with the North and that he rescued himself from
the results of these mistakes by committing genocide. Emphasis on
these events fits poorly into the current appraisal of the Norman
impact on England. The behavior of the northerners in the face of
the Conquest may also reveal a distressing exception to the precocious unity of Anglo-Saxon England. T h e idea of backwoods
northerners being so impertinent as not to appreciate the splendid
unity offered them by the West Saxon kings with their shires, fyrd,
and Danegeld is undoubtedly as unpalatable to some historians as
the picture of William the Bastard making mistakes is to others. In
any case, in most accounts of the Norman Conquest, the men from
beyond the Humber come on stage long enough to revolt a few
times out of conservatism; the establishment of Norman rule in the
North immediately follows their failure.
This view is false. It is a creation of the prominence we give
to the Norman Conquest. The behavior of the Northumbrians and
Political Divisions of the North in 1000
the Yorkshire men during the reign of William the Conqueror is
inexplicable if it is separated from their pre-Conquest historyWilliam's victory at Hastings did not wipe out the past. In the 1060s
and 10'70s, the men of the North acted as much in response to past
realities as in reaction to the coming of the Normans. This chapter
will begin the difficult task of determining the political experience
and traditional concerns of the nobilities of Northumberland and
Yorkshire. 1 will discuss the more important aspects of northern
geopolitics and reconstruct the history of the North from the second period of Danish invasions to the reign of Edward the Confessor. Such an early beginning is necessary because the history of
the North has never been properly understood and the insights of
earlier northern scholars have been largely ignored in the courtcentered political narratives that dominate our picture of the Conquest.' T h e basic question to be answered is whether there was a
political side in Anglo-Saxon times to the cultural regionalism of
the North or, stated more traditionally, whether northern separatism was a serious political force in the eleventh century.
The first necessity is to define the extent of the North. To
the unwary, this may seem a straightforward task. In the eleventh
century, the North consisted, more o r less, of the present counties
of Yorkshire, Durham, and Northumberland on the east and Lancashire with the southern parts of Cumberland and Westmorland
on the west. Except for one brief period, the northern parts of the
latter two counties were included in the kingdom of Strathclyde o r
C ~ m b r i a Such
.~
a definition is reasonably accurate in a political
sense, but it contributes little to a real understanding of the region.
It is necessary to perambulate different bounds to adequately define
the North. In few parts of Anglo-Saxon England did the shape of
the land structure the opportunities for human endeavor, whether
peaceful o r warlike, with less subtlety. Northern landforms hindered internal communications, limited agricultural possibilities,
and left what good land there was open to invasion. Indeed, the
North had imposing natural defenses in only one direction: toward
the South. T h e Humber has been said to mark a line of very ancient
division among the Anglo-sax on^;^ indeed, prior to the Danish
invasions, the power of the Bretwalda did not usually cross the
Humber unless this position was occupied by the Northumbrian
king.4 The Humber was important as a dividing line probably because for most purposes the North was nearly a separate island
during this period. The Humber comes far inland before turning
north toward York, and its function as a barrier to land travel was
taken over west of the turn by the swamps along the lower Ouse.
West of the mountains, the peat moss bogs along the Mersey formed
an effective barrier between Lancashire and C h e ~ h i r e T
. ~h e only
good land routes to the Midlands were between the Ouse swamps
and the Pennine foothills on the east and through the Manchester
Northern Geographical Names
area on the west, but both these passages are crossed by transverse
rivers and were easily defended against an invading army. Moreover, these roads north were very bad in the early twelfth century,
even for small groups of travelers, and, as a result, York's main
connection with southern England was by ship, either u p the Trent
to Lincoln o r down the east coast.6
T h e North was cut off from easy communications with the
South and even more cut up internally. Beginning in the South, the
Pennines run north between the Humber and the Mersey and continue all the way to the Tyne Gap. In Cumberland they are flanked
by the Lake District, the highest and wildest area in northern England. T h e Tyne Gap runs from the head of the Solway Firth to the
North Sea, but north of it rises another range of hills that merge
into the Southern Highlands of Scotland. These highlands stretch
from Galloway on the west all the way across southern Scotland
and reach the North Sea between Lothian and Tweeddale.
Although these upland regions are not of awe-inspiring
height and can be crossed by a number of routes, they effectively
divided the North into three areas: the east coast plain, the west
coast plain with the Vale of Eden, and the uplands. These mountains and hills functioned as a serious barrier to communications
between the coastal plains and were agriculturally marginal. Except
where pierced by river valleys such as the Vale of Eden or the
Tweed-Teviot system, much of the uplands was useful only as summer pasture for the settlements in the valleys. Consequently, a big
slice of the North running from top to bottom was lightly exploited,
nearly empty land. Unfortunately, in the Middle Ages, the usual
corollary of low settlement density, pastoralism, and poor communications was a "free zone," that is, an area that was normally beyond the control of local forces of law and order and became the
refuge for the peasant's primeval enemy, the wolf, and his societal
enemy, the outlaw. Such was certainly the case in the North of
England.
Thus the North was a more complicated area than its outlines on a political map would indicate. It was cut off from the
South and had a dangerous and unproductive free zone running
up its middle. In terms of agricultural wealth, the most valuable
parts of the North were the two coastal plains, especially the one on
the east. T h e latter runs north through the Vale of York, eastern
Durham, and Northumberland to Tweeddale. Above this rich area
Sketch Map of the Terrain of the North
(the Merse) it is broken by the Lammermuirs, the eastern end of
the Southern Highlands, but reappears in Lothian and broadens
into the Midland Valley of Scotland. West of the Pennines, a poorer,
smaller plain reached from the Mersey bogs north through western
Lancashire, around the Cumberland coast to the Vale of Eden, and
finally west into Galloway south of the Southern Highlands.
The east coast plain, which was the most developed part of
northern England, was a land of moderate rainfall, indifferent to
good soils, and village agriculture, with the potential to carry a
large peasant population. T h e western plain was smaller and wetter. Its inhabitants practiced mixed agriculture and usually lived
in hamlets. Both these areas were dangerously open to invasion
from the north and the sea. T h e Southern Highlands of Scotland
could be crossed in the west either by Annandale or Nithsdale,
routes that linked Clydesdale with the Galwegian plain and thence
to Cumberland. In the east there were two routes between Lothian
and Tweeddale: by Lauderdale o r the coast road. Lothian had no
natural frontiers except to the south. Finally, the long coasts of
the North had traditionally stood open to seaborne invasion, preeminently by the Tyne and Humber, but also from the Irish Sea up
the rivers and creeks of the West.
T h e North's geography, then, divided it into three natural
regions and left the most important of these open to invasion. This
emphasis on the negative aspects of northern geography is essential for an understanding of the history of the lands beyond the
Humber. Most accounts of the Norman Conquest give one the
vague impression that Anglo-Saxon England was an ancient kingdom. In fact, the power of the West Saxon kings had come late to
the North. Northumbria had been an independent kingdom prior
to the Danish invasions of the ninth century and had stretched
from the Humber north along the eastern plain across the Lammermuirs into Lothian, probably all the way to the Firth of Forth.
During their days of greatest power, the Northumbrian kings had
also extended their rule over the Pennines into Cumberland, Lancashire, and the Galwegian coastal plain. In the ninth and tenth centuries, this kingdom collapsed. T h e Northumbrians were unable to
withstand the attacks of the Danes, who conquered Yorkshire and
probably much of the land between the Tyne and the Tees and set
up their own kingdom. T h e Northumbrians living above the Tyne
kept their independence, but were militarily weak after the loss of
Yorkshire. In the tenth century, their northern neighbors took advantage of their decline. From at least 900, the Strathclyde Britons
(the Cumbrians) expanded south over the Southern Highlands and
gained control of Cumberland and probably of L a n ~ a s h i r eSome.~
time during the same century, probably around 973, the Scots took
control of Lothian and perhaps Tweeddale, the northernmost provinces of the defunct kingdom. Meanwhile, the Danish kingdom of
York had been replaced by a Norwegian kingdom, and the rump of
Northumbria, the lands between the Tyne and the Tweed with the
northern part of Durham, endured-perhaps because it was the
most worthless part of the eastern plain.8 In 954, the situation in
the North finally stabilized when, after several abortive attempts,
the king of Wessex annexed York and Northumbria (the land between the Tees and the Tweed).
This was only a little over a century before the Norman
Conquest. To understand the post-Conquest history of the North,
we must know to what extent the Anglo-Saxon kings succeeded
after 954 in incorporating the North into their kingdom despite
the distractions of the second wave of Danish invasions, the period
of Danish kings, and the political crises of Edward the Confessor's
reign. These disturbances probably retarded unification. Moreover,
the kings may not have had the same success throughout the region.
The North was not homogeneous either geographically or ethnically, although this fact is usually obscured by the habit of calling all
the inhabitants of the east coast plain or any part of them "Northumbrians." This usage reflects the original meaning of "Northumbrians" and also southern English usage in the twelfth century. It
also leads to unwarranted vagueness and false conclusions. I will
follow later northern usage, in which "Northumbrians" refers to
the people living between the Tweed and the Tees. If it is necessary
to single out the people between the Tyne and the Tees, they will
be called the "men of St. Cuthbert," the "men of Durham," and
so forth. The inhabitants of Yorkshire will be called the "Yorkshire men." "Northerners" will refer to all the peoples between the
Humber and the Tweed.
Yorkshire was a large, complex area that ran roughly from
the Humber to the Tees, with a substantial extension south of the
line of the Humber on the southwest. It also included the central
Pennines and the northern part of Lancashire (the area above the
Ribble). It is an easy enough task to point out the cultural pecu-
liarities of Yorkshire east of the Pennines. T h e dialect spoken by
the natives was unintelligible to men from southern England.s In
the Pennine foothills on the west, remnants of both the Northumbrian arisiocracy and the traditional social structure of the North
survived the Danish invasions.1° Most scholars would add that these
invasions and the subsequent Danish settlement had produced a
distinctive society in the eastern part of the shire. This point will be
discussed later. For the moment it can be safely said that a Danish
aristocracy had been created in Yorkshire and that the area was
part of the Danelaw. Miscellaneous examples of Danish influence
can be found, such as its distinctive body of customary law, its system of monetary reckoning, and the names of the agricultural
tenements of its peasants." T h e relative freedom of many of the
Yorkshire peasants and the absence of the manor (in a southern
sense) in the county have also been ascribed to Danish influence;12
the attribution is doubtful, but the basic phenomenon is not.
T h e political position of Yorkshire within the kingdom was
also somewhat unusual. In particular, the king appears to have had
less power in this shire than south of the Humber. He had demesne
lands in Yorkshire, but they were small in comparison with those of
the earl, who also had the lordship of most of the small thegns.13
The earl's power thus limited the king's authority, but the king
retained important rights. The king had the power to appoint the
earls of the shire and the archbishop, and he exercised these prerogatives. He also received the pleas of the crown and heriots of
important thegns. Even though his power to enact new laws was
supposedly limited by Edgar's grant of legal autonomy to the northern Danelaw in 962 in return for their loyalty, it is doubtful if later
kings felt bound by this provision. In conclusion, the king's power
in Yorkshire has been described as essentially that of an overlord,14
but this is an understatement. The Anglo-Saxon kings had important rights in the shire and tried to exercise them. What is uncertain
is how well they succeeded.15
Northumbria (Bernicia) was as exotic as Yorkshire in its own
way. The earldom stretched from the Tees to the Tweed between
the central hills and the North Sea. This area had been spared significant Danish settlement and had an Anglian population similar
to the one in Lothian across the Tweed,16 and recent scholarship
has stressed the similarities between the somewhat archaic structure
of Northumbrian society and the cultures of the lowland Scots and
Welsh.17 In Northumbria, the nobility does not seem to have been
numerous, and the demands of lordship were not as extensive as
in southern England. Manorial dues still retained something of a
public character, and the peasants were indirectly exploited. In
fact, Northumbria was so peculiar that it stood outside the recognized threefold division of English law.18
This last point raises a very important question: in what
sense was Northumberland part of the kingdom? If it had been
regarded as part of the kingdom in a normal sense, one would
expect scholars to speak of a fourfold law system in Anglo-Saxon
England. This point would be pedantic if other evidence did not
point in the same direction. Either during o r shortly after Earl
Robert de Mowbray's rebellion in 1095, Rufus granted some charters to the St. Albans monks at Tynemouth. In one of these he
confirmed all their possessions and customs I n nort de Tyne et i n suth
de Tyne et i n Anglia ("to the north and to the south of the Tyne and
in England").Ig This phrase draws a clear distinction between England and the lands above the Tees (Northumbria). If the charter is
a forgery, this usage would still be significant. If the phrase is a
formula, it represents Anglo-Saxon conditions. In some sense there
was a distinction between Northumbria and England.
This idea is strikingly confirmed by Domesday Book, which
literally stops at the Tees; no part of Northumbria is described in its
folios. This fact has never been adequately explained. Scholars
have suggested that it was left out either because it was too devastated to be worth anything to the king or because the natives
were hostile,20but neither of these explanations will do. Yorkshire
was surveyed, yet it had been devastated very thoroughly. At the
time of the survey, Northumberland had both a Norman earl and
bishop who could have given adequate protection to the judges if
such had been necessary. In fact, Domesday confirms in a negative sense the distinction drawn in Rufus's charter: England and
Northumberland were different. T h e same idea is found in the
Dialogue of the Exchequer: the counties that belonged to the king
"of ancient right" paid their dues to the king by blanched farm,
but those acquired "through some incidental cause" paid by tale.
This second group comprised Sussex, Shropshire, Cumberland,
and N ~ r t h u m b e r l a n d . ~ ~
T h e difference between England and Northumbria might
be explained by inferences drawn from the supposed purpose of
Domesday o r similar logic based on the Dialogue of the Exchequer.
Safer evidence is available that requires no long line of sequential
reasoning. T h e difference amounted to the fact that north of the
Tees the king was literally the overlord and had no direct powers.
There is no evidence, for instance, that the king had any demesne
lands in Northumberland prior to the suppression of the earldom.
Before the reign of William the Conqueror, there were no royal
mints o r burghs in the area. It was unshired and, as mentioned
earlier, stood outside the recognized bodies of law. No royal writs
o r charters survive that relate to Northumberland, and it is clear
that the kings did not have the power to make them.22Finally, and
this is the crucial point, the king lacked the power of appointment
beyond the Tees until very late. No bishop of Durham was chosen
by the king until Siward was earl; and, even after this, the choice
seems to have lain more with the earl than with the king. Twelfthcentury Durham tradition suggests that before Siward the bishop
was elected by the clerks of the church.23With one possible exception, the earls of Northumberland were also not chosen by the
king. From at least 954 they were all members of one family, the
house of Bamburgh; and the family itself probably goes further
back into the tenth century.24The house of Bamburgh to all intents
and purposes ruled Northumberland; later evidence suggests that
they paid no tribute to the king (see Chapter 4).
In Yorkshire royal power was somewhat stronger but still
weak in comparison to the South. This situation undoubtedly went
back to the submission of the North to King Eadred in 954; perhaps it was the price of Danish and Northumbrian submission. If
so, the earls of Northumberland preserved more local autonomy
than the Danes of York. T h e important fact, for the purpose of this
discussion, is that royal weakness in the North persisted well into
the eleventh century. Politically, the North had not been well integrated into the rest of the kingdom. It must have been difficult for
the king to exercise control in York and nearly impossible for him
to do so in Northumbria.
But was this weakness politically important? Was the regional
identity of the North expressed politically? Did the Danish aristocracy of York want their own kingdom o r did the house of Bamburgh resent the overlordship of the house of Wessex? If neither of
these situations existed, royal weakness in the North meant only
that the kings received less money from the area than they might
have and there was no northern separatism. Indeed, there is no
sign that the Northumbrian earls were unhappy with their position
within the kingdom prior to 1016. Times had been hard in Northumberland before 954, when it was caught between the Vikings of
York, the Scots, and the Cumbrians, and at that time the earls must
have valued royal support.
T h e situation in Yorkshire was different. A few signs suggest
that the inhabitants cherished memories of independence, but unfortunately, there is no explicit contemporary evidence on this question. A thirteenth-century chronicle says that the Yorkshire men
did not like Athelstan being their king and taking tribute and that
in 966 Edgar feared a separatist movement in the North. This
chronicle is not, however, particularly trustworthy, and these statements, found nowhere else, are doubtful evidence. They are not, on
the other hand, inconsistent with certain other facts known about
Yorkshire after 954. All of the archbishops of the city after Wulfstan I, in the mid-tenth century, came from south of the Humber,
most of them from the eastern Danelaw, and this should be understood as an attempt by the king to provide archbishops able to deal
with the Danish inhabitants but unlikely to work for local independence. A number of these men also held a southern bishopric in
plurality, and this may have been another way to ensure their loyalty,
although the poverty of York could also have been a reason.25
This same lack of trust in natives is found in the selection of
the earls of Yorkshire. Before 1016, two of the earls, Osulf and
Uhtred, were members of the Bamburgh family; and two others,
Oslac and Elfhelm, were from south of the Humber. Only Thored
may have been a local man,26but it is equally possible that he was
Oslac's son. These appointments of archbishops and earls indicate
that the kings feared giving the Yorkshire men local leadership,
and there are signs that even outsiders could not necessarily be
trusted beyond the Humber. In 975, Earl Oslac was banished from
the kingdom. Around 992, Earl Thored disappeared without explanation, and in 1006, Earl Rlfhelm was killed at court and his
sons blinded.27No reasons for any of these events are given in the
Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, but the mortality rate is suspicious.
T h e impression that the men of York could not be trusted is
strengthened by certain aspects of the second period of Danish
invasions. In particular, the North and the Danish Five Boroughs
just to the south were left almost untouched through thirty-six
years of raids. Furthermore, on the one occasion when the Danes
did trouble the North, the men of York behaved suspiciously. In
993, when the Danes sacked Bamburgh and, after entering the
Humber, plundered Lindsey (the northern part of Lincolnshire)
and the East Riding of Yorkshire, the northerners raised an army,
but it would not fight the Danes. T h e Anglo-Saxon Chronicle says that
this happened because the leaders of the army fled, and Florence
of Worcester adds that they fled because they were descended from
Danes.2s Probably Florence was right. After 993 the Danes did not
return to the North until 1013, and this twenty-year interval could
not have been the result of chance. Swein, the Danish leader, must
have thought that the inhabitants of the northern Danelaw were
already sympathetic to his cause for otherwise he would have raided
them. He might, of course, have been deceiving himself, but the
event proved otherwise. When he sailed up the Humber and Trent
to Gainsborough in 1013, the North immediately submitted to him.
Uhtred of Northumbria led the way, and he was followed by the
Danes of the Five Boroughs, those of Lindsey, and finally all Danes
living north of Watling Street. Swein then moved south and only
began to harry the countryside after he passed Watling Street. T h e
men of York had not fought one battle to oppose him; and when he
suddenly died in 1014, his body was brought north to York where it
was felt that it could lie safe from d e ~ e c r a t i o n . ~ ~
It is difficult to be certain how to interpret these events. T h e
submission of 1013 is not particularly significant because by then
the kingdom was falling apart. Swein's sparing of the northern
Danelaw means more, and it was presumably based on the same
reading of the loyalties of the Danes of York as the one that had
lain behind the refusal of the Anglo-Saxon kings to give them
native archbishops and earls. Indeed, the Danish aristocracy probably was separatist, although they may have been merely unreliable
against Danes. At least, there is no direct evidence that they actively
aided the invaders.
T h e removals of Thored and Rlfhelm presumably indicate
that their loyalty was suspect; in any case, the inactivity of the
Danes of York was probably the result of King Ethelred's political
support in the North. Earl Uhtred of Northumbria was loyal to the
king until 1013, and it would seem that the king had raised him in
power to stand as a counterweight to the Danish inhabitants of
York. Uhtred was the son of Earl Waltheof of Northumbria of
whom little more is known than the bare fact of his existence and
that he was an old man by 1006. In that year Malcolm 11, king of
Scots, invaded Northumbria and, after the usual harrying, besieged
the newly founded episcopal city of Durham. The situation clearly
was serious, for the Danes were raiding southern England at the
time and EtheIred could send no help.30 Earl Waltheof stayed in
Bamburgh and did nothing, and Earl Elfhelm of York also apparently took no action. .Malcolm met no known opposition until
Waltheofs son Uhtred intervened. He had married the daughter
of Bishop Aldhun of Durham and held a number of estates that belonged to the church. Several other members of the upper Northumbrian nobility had held estates of Durham in the past, and these
leaseholds were probably intended to obtain protection for the
church. Certainly it worked this way in the case of Uhtred. Apparently relying on the traditional authority of his family, he called
together an army from Northumbria and (it is said) from Yorkshire
and defeated the
Uhtred achieved a great victory although it ultimately had
tragic consequences. T h e city was saved, and its walls were festooned
with the heads of the dead Scots, which had been washed and
groomed by local women in return for cows. Uhtred had proved
himself an able leader, and Ethelred allowed him to succeed his
father as earl even though the latter was still alive. T h e king also
made him earl of York, a position he had just made vacant by
killing Earl E l f l ~ e I m The
. ~ ~ joining of both earldoms in the hands
of a member of the house of Bamburgh was an expedient that had
been resorted to only once before, in the years immediately after
the reconquest of York, and its revival in 1006 indicated that once
again the West Saxon king feared for his authority in the North.
Moreover, after receiving these honors, Uhtred dismissed his
first wife, the daughter of the bishop of Durham, and married
Sige, the daughter of a rich citizen of York, Styr, son of Ulf. This
incident is usually cited to show the loose marriage customs of the
northerners, but it has a second meaning. By this marriage Uhtred
was trying to gain local political support south of the Tees. This
is made quite clear by the fact that the bishop of Durham sent
Uhtred's former wife south also and married her to an important
Yorkshire thegn.33 Bishop Aldhun and Uhtred were still working
together; their object was to assure Uhtred could rule Yorkshire.
Apparently the new earl was strong enough to govern the
Danes of York successfully, although there are no details. De Obsessione Dunelmi does say that Uhtred was quite successful in war after
becoming earl, but it does not name his enemies. It only tells a
story, somewhat confused in details, about how Uhtred refused to
desert Ethelred in favor of Swein, and this was apparently true for
Ethelred gave Uhtred his own daughter, Elfgifu, in marriage,34a
sure sign that the king valued Uhtred's support. Little is known
about Uhtred after this. In 1013, he submitted to Swein, but by
then everyone was going over to the Danes. When Swein died in
1014, Uhtred did not support his son Cnut. He seems instead
to have gone back to Ethelred's side, for the king's expedition
into Lindsey in 1014 would have been very dangerous if Uhtred
were hostile. Perhaps the earl participated in the expedition. He
did campaign with Ethelred's son, Edmund Ironside, in 1016 in
Cheshire and the surrounding shires. This was Uhtred's only known
campaign in direct support of the royal house, and it is probably
significant that it occurred the year after the two chief Danish
thegns of the Seven Boroughs had been killed. Edmund had installed himself in their place, and this change probably freed Uhtred
for operations to the south. Unfortunately, in the middle of this
campaign Cnut moved north and invaded Yorkshire, and he was
too strong for Uhtred to fight: Wessex had already submitted to
him and Earl Eadric was his ally. Uhtred therefore agreed to submit, but he was assassinated when he went to meet Cnut, who then
made a Norwegian, Eric of Hlathir, earl of Y0rkshi1-e.~~
This is the end of the story as it is usually told. T h e sources
for Cnut's reign in general are inadequate, and for the North they
are almost nonexistent. One curious tale survives from these years;
if properly understood, it throws a great deal of light both on
Uhtred's role as earl of York and on Northumberland after 1016.
This is, of course, the famous Northumbrian blood feud. Uhtred is
said to have obtained his second wife, the daughter of Styr, son of
Ulf, at a price: he had to kill Styr's enemy Thurbrand. Uhtred
failed to d o this, although he presumably tried. Thurbrand certainly came to hate Uhtred and killed him when the earl arrived
to submit to Cnut in 1016. Eadulf Cudel, Uhtred's brother, then
became earl of Northumberland and ruled for a short time. He
was followed by Earl Ealdred, Uhtred's son by Bishop Aldhun's
daughter. Ealdred avenged his father's death by killing Thurbrand,
but he was later killed in a particularly underhanded fashion by
Table 1. Genealogy of the Earls of Northumberland, part 1
WALTHEOF
earl of Northumberland
I
Ecgthryth (1) =
UH~RED
daughter of
earl of York and
Bishop Aldhun
Northumberland
ca. 1006-1016
EALDRED
earl of Northumberland
=SIWARD
daughters
earl of York and
Northumberland. see table 2.
EADULF
earl of Northumberland
ruled Northumberland
under MORCAR
killed 1067
Eadulf Cudel
earl of Northumberland
1016-?
Cospatric
killed 1064
led massacre at
Gateshead in 1080
Ealdgyth =
Maldred
brother of King
Duncan I
COSPATRIC
earl of Northumberland
1068-1072
later earl of Dunbar
Thurbrand's son Carl. T h e two had made peace and promised
to go to Rome together, but when their departure was delayed
by a storm, Carl took Ealdred to his hall and, after entertaining
him, killed the Northumbrian earl in the woods. This crime was
not avenged by Ealdred's half-brother Eadulf, who became the
next earl of Northumberland, apparently because he was killed in
1041 by Siward. Justice waited until the 1070s when Siward's son
Waltheof, grandson of Earl Ealdred through his mother, had his
soldiers kill most of Carl's sons and grandsons, who were assembled
for a banquet near Y ~ r k . ~ ~
This tale is curious as it stands, and few historians have been
able to omit the story from their accounts of the North. Usually
they employ it to show the barbarity of the Northumbrians, but it
has a greater significance. T h e story was not written down until
around 1100, by which time its general meaning had been forgotten
and only the memory of the major events remained.37 Its details,
however, suggest that the original events were not a straightforward
blood feud at all. Thurbrand in particular is a suspicious figure
because, in addition to being a rich and powerful Dane who lived
in York, he bore the title of "hold," in northern law the Danish
equivalent of a king's high-reeve, which raises the possibility that
he was the leader of the Danes of York. Thurbrand is also said to
have been the enemy of Styr, son of Ulf, a rich citizen of Y ~ r k . ~ ~
Although it has been generally assumed that their enmity stemmed
from some personal rivalry, such was not the case. A source, distinct
from the blood feud sources, records Styr's gift of some land to
Bishop Aldhun, and the details of this transaction clarify what was
actually happening. Styr made the grant when Ethelred was in
York. Part of the land had belonged to Styr, and he gave it to
Durham with the king's permission. T h e rest Styr purchased. In
the course of the transfer, Styr is described as an important sup. ~ ~discovery puts
porter of Ethelred (unius de melioribus s ~ & )This
the relationship between Uhtred and Styr in a different light. When
Uhtred married Styr's daughter, he was not simply trying to gain
political support in Yorkshire; rather, he was allying with Styr, another supporter of Ethelred, against Thurbrand, who probably
was the local Danish leader in York. Uhtred's promise to kill Thurbrand was part of this alliance. Moreover, Styr's gift of land to
Aldhun reinforces the idea that Aldhun was working with Uhtred.
T h e Northumbrian "blood feud" actually had its origin in Uhtred's
attempt to control the Danes of Yorkshire, who were sympathetic
to Swein and Cnut.
The manner of Uhtred's death puts this interpretation beyond dispute. The fullest account of this event is in De Obsessione
Dunelmi. It says that Uhtred was ambushed by Thurbrand as he was
on his way to make peace with Cnut, and the details of the murder
show that it was not an act of private vengeance. To carry out the
deed, Thurbrand used some of Cnut's soldiers, whom he hid behind a curtain in the hall where Cnut and Uhtred were to meet.
When Uhtred entered, the soldiers jumped out and killed him.
T h e use of Cnut's soldiers implies his consent as does the fact that
the killing was done literally under Cnut's nose with no ill effects for Thurbrand-despite the fact that Cnut had given Uhtred
a safe-conduct.40 Furthermore, De Primo Saxonum Adventu says
the killing was done per voluntatem Cnutonis regis ("by the wish of
King C n ~ t " ) . ~Cnut
l
clearly was as responsible for the killing as
Thurbrand. Finally, the idea that this was a feud is reduced to
absurdity by the fact that Uhtred was not the only man killed that
day: forty important Northumbrians who had come with him were
also ~ l a u g h t e r e d .T~h~e incident was, in fact, an attempt by the
Danes of York and Cnut to destroy Ethelred's main political and
military support in the North by annihilating the nobility of Northumberland. T h e implications are clear. The Anglo-Saxon kings
had not mistrusted the Danes of York without reason-they could
not be trusted in the face of a Danish invasion and were probably a
center of plots and intrigues in peaceful times. I n this sense, northern separatism existed by 1016. This reconstruction shows with
equal clarity that until 1016 the earls of Northumberland were
loyal to the kings despite the small power the kings had above the
Tees. T h e Northumbrians were not separatist, and this is not surprising given the enemies they faced on all sides.
T h e next major problem is to determine what happened in
the North between 1016 and 1041 and, in particular, whether the
rule of a Danish king had any political impact on the nobles of York
or Northumberland. T h e sources for Cnut's reign are limited, and
the few pieces of evidence that survive are obscure and conflicting.
It is not clear, for example, who ruled York for part of this period.
In 1016, Cnut appointed one of his generals, Eric of Hlathir, earl;
but Eric's last genuine signature as dux is found in 1023. For a tenyear interval between this date and 1033, when Earl Siward first
witnessed a charter, it is not known who was earl of Y ~ r k In
.~~
Northumberland, the names of the earls were remembered, but
little else. After Uhtred's death, his brother Eadulf Cudel became
earl. He lived only a short time and was followed in turn by Uhtred's
sons Ealdred and Eadulf. These Northumbrian earls are said to
have ruled in subordination to the earl of Y ~ r kbut
, ~the
~ few pieces
of information out of these years that can be reconstructed cast
doubt on this idea.
Eadulf Cudel, the first of these earls, is described as lazy and
timid, but this is probably a monk's judgment of his character based
on his only recorded act, the cession of Lothian. After he became
earl, he is said to have given Lothian to the Scots because he feared
that they would take revenge on him for Uhtred's victory over
them (presumably in 1006). In return for Lothian, Eadulf received a "firm peace" with the Scots. These events, which are recorded only in De Obsessione Dunelmi, a northern tract from around
1100,45are in direct conflict with a second northern tradition on
the loss of Lothian. The section on the Northumbrian earls in De
Prirno Saxonum Adventu asserts that King Edgar had given Lothian
to King Kenneth of Scotland in 973.46 Neither of these sources
mentions an important event that probably occurred while Eadulf
Cudel was earl. T h e narrative sources from Durham (which say
nothing about the loss of Lothian) report that in 1018, Malcolm 11
again invaded the North and annihilated a Northumbrian army
drawn from between the Tees and the Tweed at Carham, a ford
over the Tkeed. An associated source further obscures these events
by asserting that Uhtred led the Northumbrians at C a ~ - h a mThis
.~~
was presumably a major Scottish victory, yet it seemingly had no
consequences for the North. The chronicles from Durham report
neither a siege nor the plundering of the countryside.
Scholars have assumed that the problem posed by these unconnected accounts is one of reconciliation, and the better discussions of these events have endeavored to fit them together without
arbitrarily ignoring one or more of them. Because the accounts are
contradictory, this is impossible, and historians have had to content
themselves with dismissing what seemed to be the weakest element
in the supposed series. This judgment has varied. T h e battle of
Carham has been moved from 1018 to 1016 so that Uhtred could
lead the Northumbrians to defeat, and his death has been stayed
for two years to the same end. More self-confident scholars have
denied that the battle took place, that it was important, o r that
Eadulfs cession ever occurred.48 History has become remarkably
pliable at this point; but the weak element is not the occurrence of a
battle of Carham, its date, o r the year of Uhtred's death. Rather, it
is the statement in the Historia Regum that Uhtred led the army, a
mistake that stemmed from the chronicler's ignorance. Once this is
understood, the most plausible explanation is that suggested by
Marjorie 0. A n d e r ~ o n She
. ~ ~assumed that Uhtred had recovered
part of Lothian after defeating Malcolm in 1006 and that Eadulf
Cudel ceded this land to the Scots. She also believed that Eadulf
had gone over to the Scots and that this was the reason he gave up
the land, but there is no evidence to support this suggestion. In
fact, there is no need for such a hypothesis to explain Eadulfs
absence from Carham. Symeon of Durham, who gives the earliest
account of the battle, probably did not know the names of the
Northumbrian earls before Siward and was, in any case, determined to minimize their activities in favor of St. Cuthbert who was
the true defender of the N o r t h ~ m b r i a n s These
. ~ ~ considerations
suggest the less elaborate idea that it was Eadulf who lost the battle
of Carham and, after the defeat, ceded Lothian to the Scots. Presumably, the land that he gave u p was either some part of Lothian
recovered by his brother o r a section of the province (perhaps
Tweeddale) which the Scots had not obtained in 973.
The theory that Earl Eadulf gave u p some land to the Scots
because they had beaten him badly is probably correct as far as it
goes, but questions remain. Why should the earl have been particularly fearful after his defeat? He ought to have been able to expect
royal help in this circumstance, but it is known that Cnut did not
make a countermove in the North for at least nine years. Why did
he delay? In any case, how could Eadulf give up land without the
king's consent? Finally, why was there no contingent from Yorkshire
at the battle of Carham? T h e men of Northumberland were foolish
to fight the Scots alone if they could avoid it.
T h e immediate implication of these questions is that some
important aspects of the northern political situation after 1016 are
still hidden, and this impression is strengthened by the next known
incident. After Eadulf Cudel's death, his nephew EaIdred became
earl. He killed Thurbrand, his father's killer, and was killed in turn
by Carl, Thurbrand's son, in 1038-the blood feud story again.
The origins of this affair lay in the contest between Thurbrand and
Uhtred for control of Yorkshire, and the question now is whether
these killings (the second and third) represent a blood feud o r
whether the original contest continued under Carl and Ealdred.
Again the details of the story combined with outside evidence show that the latter was the case. This is initially suggested by
the fact that the slaughter should have ended with Ealdred's killing of Thurbrand. He had taken an eye for an eye and ought to
have been content; the same should have been true of Carl. But
this was emphatically not the case, for the level of murderous activity increased. Not only did Carl attempt to kill Ealdred, but
Ealdred tried to kill Carl. They plotted against each other, harassed
each other with tricks, and lay in ambush for each other,51 apparently until Carl succeeded through the stratagem mentioned
earlier. Eadulf, Ealdred's half brother, then became earl.
One might suggest that northerners took their feuds very
seriously and that this explains both the continuation of the killings
and the intensity of the attempts, but such an objection could not
be sustained. For this incident to be regarded as normal in northern
society, one would need to cite other examples of the same sort of
thing, and other examples d o not exist. Furthermore, it is clear that
Carl's true identity had been forgotten by the time the story was
written down. As mentioned earlier, there is a ten-year gap between
Earl Eric, who last witnessed a charter in 1023, and Earl Siward. A
certain Karl minister, however, began to witness in 1024, the very
next year after Eric's disappearance, and continued to witness until
1045. This man was a northerner and undoubtedly identical with
the Carl who fought with Ealdred. Presumably like his father, he
was a hold and acted as the king's high-reeve (the Northumbrian
equivalent of a hold) in Yorkshire. After 1033, when Siward became
earl of Yorkshire, Carl remained in this position for he continued
to witness-always in the company of S i ~ a r dHis
. ~ omission
~
from
the Northumbrian earl lists is not significant because they d o not
deign to mention any earl of York between Oslac and Siward except
Uhtred. If this identification is accepted, the feud between Ealdred
and Carl becomes a conflict between the earl of Northumberland
and the hold of York. Yet Cnut is unlikely to have tolerated such a
disturbance.
Once charter evidence is brought into the discussion, the
problem vanishes. Carl probably did defend Cnut's interests in the
North between 1023 and 1033. More interesting, however, is the
fact that Eadulf Cudel, Ealdred, and Eadulf do not seem to have
occupied any official position. They do not witness royal charters as
earls o r in any other capacity.53It may be objected that not enough
charters survive for this observation to be significant, but the earls
of York as well as Carl witnessed a substantial number of charters during this period, and the immediate predecessors of Eadulf
Cudel witnessed surviving charters. Earl Waltheof witnessed one,
and Uhtred witnessed five despite the Danish invasions.54T h e only
explanation for the failure of these three earls to witness is that
they did not come to court, and this must mean they were in revolt.
T h e plotting and ambushing between Carl and Ealdred was a minor
war between Cnut's representative in the North and the earls of
Northumberland. There was no northern blood feud.
This conclusion greatly clarifies the history of the North
after 1016. By this date hostility probably already existed between
the Northumbrians and the northern Danes, and the murders of
Uhtred and the nobles of Northumberland plus the prospect of a
Danish monarchy produced a revolt beyond the Tees. T h e term
"revolt," however, must be used with caution. Uhtred's successors
probably refused to make a formal submission to Cnut, and, given
the tenuous bond between Northumberland and the king, the earls
may not have viewed their action as a revolt. In the long run, of
course, their policy was hopeless because Northumberland could
not stand alone.
On the one hand, the earls faced the hostility of Carl. On the
other, they had to withstand the Scots, who were all too ready to
take advantage of the situation. When Malcolm I1 invaded in 1018,
Eadulf Cudel had to fight him without support from the South and
lost badly. Because of the revolt, Eadulf could expect no avenging
expedition and had to give up Lothian. He may even have made
some submission to Malcolm, although there is no proof.55 The
defeat at Carham also put the clerks of St. Cuthbert (of Durham)
in a difficult position. Bishop Aldhun died after learning of the
slaughter, and the clerks were unable to elect a successor for over
two years. T h e traditional explanation is that none of them wished
to become a monk, a requirement for being bishop of Durham.j6
In fact, they probably could not decide whether Carl o r the earl of
Northumberland was more dangerous. In the end they chose a
man from outside their circle, an obscure priest named Edmund,
who could take the blame for the false moves that appeared in-
evitable while the clerks rode out the storm.57T h e office of bishop
was forced on him, and he was sent south to get Cnut's approval
for his c o n s e c r a t i ~ nthereby
,~~
becoming the first bishop of Durham
known to have sought royal approval.
Edmund proved to be a good bishop, but the clerks' fears
had not been imaginary. After Eadulf Cudel's death, Ealdred and
Carl fought for some years. Probably Carl made occasional forays
into Northumberland, and Ealdred hid in the hills until he went
home. This lasted until an unspecified date when the two became
"sworn brothers,"5s supposedly at the urging of friends. Swearing
brotherhood was the northern equivalent of a peace treaty. T h e
most likely explanation for this reconciliation was Cnut's northern
expedition. This is a shadowy affair, but at some time between
1027 and 1031, the king came north and received the submission
.~~
one is likely to have
of Malcolm I1 and two northern s ~ b k i n g sNo
been eager to fight Cnut at this time, and Ealdred probably also
submitted to him and became Carl's sworn brother. While the king
was in the North, he gave Edmund some land;61 he would hardly
have done so if Ealdred was still in revolt. For a period in the
1030s, Ealdred acknowledged Cnut's overlordship, but the submission of Northumbria ended in 1038 when Carl murdered the earl.
His brother Eadulf then became earl and went back into
revolt. T h e immediate results were similar to those faced by Eadulf
Cudel in 1018: the Scots took advantage of the weakness of the
earl. Around 1040, King Duncan invaded the North, and this time
the Northumbrians did not try to meet him in the field. T h e battle of Carham was not to be repeated. They probably retreated
to their fortified places, churchyards, and into the hills. Duncan
moved south and besieged Durham, but he was defeated by the
Northumbrians, who had taken refuge in the city and fled, losing
many men.62 Eadulf probably had directed the defense of Durham, and after this success he was "exalted with pride" and ravaged the land of the Galwegians, who had undoubtedly taken part
in Duncan's e ~ p e d i t i o n Despite
.~~
this victory, the earl must have
been aware of the weakness of his position because he opened
some sort of negotiations with Hardacnut, the English king, and
went south to see him in 1041 under the king's safe-conduct. Unfortunately for Eadulf, however, Hardacnut's promise was no better than Cnut's had been for Uhtred. The king betrayed Eadulf,
and he was killed by Siward, the earl of Y ~ r k Thus
. ~ ~ died the last
earl of the house of Bamburgh through the male line-betrayed by
a Dane and killed by a ~ a n in
e circumstances remarkably similar to
those in which his brother and father had died.
The family itself was not extinct for one more son of Earl
Uhtred still lived, Cospatric, and he may have proclaimed himself
earl, although the .northern earl lists say that he did not. They
assert that upon the murder of Eadulf, Siward became earl of all of
Northumbria from the Humber to the Tweed, thus adding Northumberland to Yorkshi~-e.65A hitherto ignored source, however,
shows that Siward's acquisition of the land between the Tees and
Tweed was not that simple o r immediate. The defiance of the Northumbrians continued for another year o r two, probably under Cospatric's leadership. T h e murder of Eadulf was no more effective in
reducing Northumberland than had been the murders of Uhtred
and Ealdred. Finally in 1042 o r 1043, Siward had to invade Northumberland and waste the countryside to gain control of the province.'j6 He was successful, and Cospatric probably fled to Scotland.
The conclusions to be drawn from this reconstruction of
northern history up to 1043 are startling. It is clearly a mistake to
assume that the North was in any sense united by this date o r to
talk of some generalized northern "separatism." Separatism there
certainly was, but its content varied between Yorkshire and Northumberland. Its seriousness depended upon who was king and who,
if anybody, was invading the kingdom. Ultimately these political
feelings probably were based on cultural differences and past political experience. T h e men from above the Tees certainly hated
and feared the Danes and with good reason. The Yorkshire Danes
had not been loyal to the West Saxon kings during the invasions
of Swein and Cnut. They had been kept within the kingdom by
Earl Uhtred. There was a Danish separatism that was importantat least when Danes were invading. Finally, at the beginning of
Edward the Confessor's reign, Northumberland was a conquered
province. T h e Northumbrians had gone into revolt when Uhtred
was killed. Two more of their earls had been killed by Danes, and
they had been brought back within the kingdom by conquest. Separatism above the Tees existed by 1043, and it is very doubtful if
the accession of Edward did anything to quiet it. He may have
been a member of the royal house of Wessex, but Siward was their
earl. He undoubtedly loomed larger than the king, and he was a
conquering Dane.
Earl Siward was the last great earl of the North before the debacle
of the 1060s, and there is consequently a strong temptation to
picture him as a primitive monolith who represented the traditional order of government above the Humber. Siward, however,
cannot be used as a general symbol for the old political arrangements of northern England. He was originally an outsider, and
during the years of his power, he brought no real solution to the
problems of the North. At best, he kept his earldom quiet, and in
some ways he created new problems.
Siward was hardly an ideal earl from the English king's point
of view. No direct evidence remains to indicate Edward the Confessor's opinion on northern problems in the 1040s. At the beginning of Edward's reign, the political and military situation in the
North could not have appeared promising. T h e history of the region before 1042 reveals three basic problems. The most serious
was that the Danes of York had not been loyal to Ethelred, and
Edward probably could not expect any greater devotion from them
should the kingdom be threatened by renewed Danish invasions.
In Ethelred's days, these Danes had been kept in check only by the
power of Uhtred, earl of Northumbria and York, but Edward
could expect no such support because Northumbria was a conquered and hostile province in 1042. Thurbrand, Carl, and Siward
had made it impossible for the king to balance Danes with Northumbrians and loyal elements within Yorkshire. Finally, the Scots
were becoming a serious threat to the peace and prosperity of
northern England. They had invaded three times since 1000, taking advantage on each occasion of English distraction caused by
either the Danish invasions o r the rebellion of the Northumbrian
earls. T h e ultimate aim of these Scottish incursions was the annexation of Northumbrian lands, not an impossible hope given
conditions in the North.
Siward was therefore something of an embarrassment to the
king. He was a Danish parvenu similar to Earl Godwin of Wessex
and had risen to power under Cnut and his sons. Siward had
become earl of Yorkshire about 1033 and had added Northumberland to his earldom by conquest about 1042. When Edward became
king in 1042, Siward, along with the other great earls, was a
political reality with whom Edward had to deal. It was beyond the
king's power to remove him, even if to do so seemed desirable, and
on the level of high politics it probably did not. T h e fall of Siward
would only have increased the power of the other earls, a most
undesirable result. His remaining in power was also undesirable
because there was only a partial correspondence between his selfinterest and that of the king. He was both an ambitious new man
and a Dane, and his major interest was to maintain his own position.
He was undoubtedly popular in York because he was Danish and a
holdover from Cnut's reign and perhaps found it easier to govern
that shire than had most of his predecessors. Yet this aptness itself
raised a question: how would Siward react if a Danish fleet sailed
u p the Humber? Such an occurrence was not impossible, and
Siward would have had little reason to be loyal to Edward if it
happened. A wise counselor could have pointed out to the king the
wisdom of giving the Northumbrians an earl from their native
house and thus reestablishing the traditional relationship with the
province, but this was impossible. Siward could not be deprived of
a major portion of his earldom. T h e only point at which there was
any real correspondence between the king's interest and the earl's
was on the Scottish problem. Siward was determined to keep the
Scots out of his earldom and devoted a sustained effort to this end.
Given these factors, it should not be surprising that Siward
made no significant contribution to solving the major internal
political problems of the North. Probably they were beyond solution, and the situation had some advantages from the standpoint of
court politics-provided there were no Viking attacks, Siward's
unpopularity above the Tees meant that the earl was not as powerful as the extent of his lands suggested and that one of his main
concerns was to keep Northumbria quiet. Thus his freedom of
action was limited and he was unable to become deeply involved in
southern politics. He was not, as has been suggested, uninterested
in southern affairs.' Siward faced serious problems in the North
and, as a result, was usually loyal to the king.
In terms of policy, the requirements for governing the North
must have been clear. Siward had to keep watch on the Danes of
York, make sure that the Northumbrian rebellion did not flare up
again, and thwart Scottish raids. To accomplish these tasks, he
needed to be rich enough to maintain a large band of professional
warriors (ho~secarls),~
and apparently the resources of the earldom were not sufficient because the king gave him extra lands in
the South. Siward held Northamptonshire from (probably) the
early 1040s, and he acquired the neighboring shire of Huntingdon
in the early 1 0 5 0 ~Although
.~
the grant of this Midland earldom
may have been intended in part to ensure the earl's loyalty, the
additional revenues these shires yielded allowed him successfully to
dominate the North.
Fortified with a private army of perhaps as many as two to
three hundred housecarls, Siward governed his earldom successfully.4 T h e nobility of Yorkshire were presumably receptive to his
rule. In Northumbria he may have had more difficulties, but he
made an attempt to appease local feelings by marrying Zlfleda, a
daughter of Earl Ealdred.5 T h e latter, who had been Uhtred's
eldest son, had himself begotten only daughters, and since Northumbrian women could inherit land, it is nearly certain that by his
marriage Siward acquired part of the lands of her family6 and
possibly also some legitimacy as earl in the eyes of the Northumbrians. The Northumbrian earls, however, may have followed the
Scottish rule of succession by which brother succeeded b r ~ t h e rin
,~
which case, Cospatric, Uhtred's youngest son, would have had a
better claim to be earl than Siward.
Siward's attempts to reconcile the Northumbrians may have
included conceding to Cospatric a subordinate position in the government of the earldom, for evidence exists that Cospatric was
important in local affairs, perhaps before 1056, and he may have
worked in conjunction with Siward. This question will be discussed
later; nevertheless, Siward clearly did attempt to ally himself with
the native house of Barnburgh. By Elfleda, who was evidently his
second wife, he had a son whom he named Waltheof in honor of
the boy's maternal great-grandfather. Some fifty years later there
Table 2. Genealogy of the Earls of Northumberland, part 2
UHTRED (1) =
earl of York and
Northumberland
ca. 1006-1016
Ecgthryth
daughter of Bishop Aldhun
1
EALDRED
earl of Northumberland
killed 1038
1st wife =
son of Ligulf
I
EADULF (2) = Sigrida =
(1) Arkil
earl of Northson of Fridegist
umberland
killed 1041
Osulf
killed 1067
see table 1
2 Elffledas
= (2) Kilvert
=
(3) Arkil
son of Ecgthryth
daughter of Dolfin = Cospatric
son of Thorfinn
(of Cumberland?)
-
SIWARD
= (2) Elffleda
earl of York ca. 1033-55
earl of Northumberland
1041-1055
1
Ealdgyth
Ethelthryth
= Ligulf
= Orm
Walcher's adviser, son of Game1
killed 1080
1
Osbeorn
killed 1054
WA~THEOF
=
Judith
earl of Northampton 1065-75 niece of William I
earl of Northumberland
1072-75
Maud = King David of Scotland
was a tradition at Durham that Siward had given to Waltheof, presumably as a child, the earldom of Northumbria with the boundaries it had had in Ealdred's day.8 If the story is true, Siward may
have intended that his eldest son, Osbeorn, should become earl of
York, which Ealdred had not controlled, and this would amount to
a tacit admission that it was proper for a Dane to rule York and a
Northumbrian to rule Northumbria. T h e division never seems to
have occurred, but Waltheof considered himself a member of the
house of Bamburgh by the time he reached m a t ~ r i t y . ~
T h e success of Siward's attempts to identify himself with the
Bamburgh family is difficult to establish. He faced only shadowy
opposition in Northumbria, but this can be explained as easily on
the basis of his military strength as on the basis of his marriage.
From nine hundred years after the event, his marriage seems
prudent; to Northumbrians at the time, it may have appeared the
brash move of a parvenu bent on acquiring a local name.
T h e sensibilities of the Northumbrian nobles are unfortunately lost beyond recall. In another area, however, Siward's actions clearly struck the natives as being highhanded and aroused
resentment. He offended the most powerful body of men in the
North, the clerks of St. Cuthbert, and their feelings are part of the
historical record. These clerks constituted a privileged corporation
that tended to control the bishopric of Durham in most respects.
They elected the bishop, who was usually one of their number, and
carried out the more important functions of the cathedral church.
Being also essentially secular canons who held property and married, they occupied a unique position in Northumbrian society that
ensured their inordinate prestige. Some of these clerks were known
descendants of the original porters of the holy body of St. Cuthbert.1° This uncorrupted corpse was the most precious relic in the
North and the most powerful talisman between the Humber and
the Orkneys. During the original Danish invasions, these porters
had cared for the body after the destruction of Lindisfarne and
had trekked all over the North with it before finally reestablishing
the bishopric at Chester-le-Street." The clerks were thus not only
rich and powerful; they were also a direct link with the North's preViking past.
Siward offended these men in two ways. First, he appropriated some of their lands. Earlier in the century Bishop Aldhun
had given Uhtred several of the church's villages when the latter
had married his daughter. After becoming earl, Siward claimed
these villages in the name of his wife, who was an offspring of
Uhtred's marriage.12 This action angered the clerks, but they could
d o little to oppose it. Other northern earls had taken church lands.
The second and far more serious offense was that Siward and
Edward threatened the ancient privileges of the clerks. Hitherto
they had elected their bishop, who traditionally had been either
one of their number o r a northern cleric. In 1042, Bishop Edmund
went south to visit King Hardacnut at Gloucester. T h e reason for
the visit was not recorded although it was probably connected with
Siward's recent conquest of Northumbria. T h e Durham church is
unlikely to have come through the complicated politics of the years
after 1018 uncompromised, and, no doubt, Edmund needed to
explain some of his past actions. During the early eleventh century,
however, it had become risky for important Northumbrians to go
south, and this proved true again, for Edmund died while visiting
the king.13 T h e sources do not suggest any foul play, but certainly
Bishop Edmund's death was exceedingly convenient for Hardacnut
and Siward in that it opened the way to the establishment of royal
control over the bishopric of Durham. T h e clerks may have gone
through the usual election process to choose a new bishop, but the
sources do not explicitly say so. Rather, they report that Eadred,
the principal clerk, bought the bishopric from the king with the
church's money, apparently an innovation.14 T h e first step in the
clerks' downfall had been Edmund's trip south in 1020-21 to seek
Cnut's approval for his consecration. T h e second step came when
the clerks were required to pay for the privilege of electing their
bishop.
T h e end followed quickly-perhaps suspiciously soon. Eadred sickened after purchasing the bishopric and died within ten
months.15 This time the clerks did not select his successor. They
may have lacked the money to buy the freedom to elect a second
bishop after such a short interval. King Edward and Siward used
the opportunity of Eadred's death to control the selection of his
successor and to install Durham's first nonnorthern bishop. In
1020-21, Bishop Edmund had brought north some monks from
Peterborough to instruct him in the monastic vows he had taken to
become bishop, and Kthelric, the new bishop, was one of these
monks. One source says explicitly that Edward appointed him
bishop.16 In a way it was a reasonable choice since Kthelric had
lived at Durham for twenty years and was familiar with northern
customs and men. But the method of his elevation was bound to
arouse resentment.
His appointment was a frontal attack on the privileges and
freedom of the clerks, and they viewed it as such. They despised
him both for being an outsider and for gaining office against their
will. Ethelric in turn made the situation worse by extending the
attack on the clerks' powers. He directly reduced their administrative role by granting the most powerful position in the church
government after his own to his brother Ethelwine, who had also
been a monk at Peterborough and had come to Durham during
Edmund's episcopate. Not surprisingly, these innovations were too
much for the clerks to bear, and in 1045 or 1046 they rebelled
against Bthelric and drove him out of Durham. This action did
not, however, restore their freedom for long because the bishop
sought out Siward and obtained his support against the clerks. T h e
earl then forced them to take back the bishop, but the reconciliation was not accomplished through negotiations and compromise.
T h e clerks yielded only through fear of Siward's power, and Ethelric remained their bishop until after Siward's death." On the
surface, the policy had been successful, but its wisdom is debatable.
Siward could now count on the support of the bishop in governing
Northumbria, and this must have been his aim. Yet the clerks were
unreconciled to their loss of power and their domination by southern monks; and Siward, who was responsible for this situation,
must have been very unpopular at Durham. Furthermore, he had
left the clerks with their local prestige undiminished, a dangerous
oversight because they were destined to use it to overturn his
successor, who continued Siward's church policy.
While Siward lived, however, his control over both the
church of Durham and the house of Bamburgh remained firm,
and he was free to deal with the threat posed by the Scots to the
North, which was probably his major concern. To understand the
gravity of the situation he faced, it must be realized that the necessity of guarding the border against the Scots was not a traditional
problem of northern government. T h e imperatives of the high
medieval border were only now coming into being because the
threat to Northumbria from the Scots had greatly increased during
the early decades of the eleventh century as a result of a basic shift
in northern power relationships that was one of the fundamental
steps in the formation of the Anglo-Scottish border. This power
shift has gone unnoticed in the interplay between the fragmentary
evidence on the kingdom of Strathclyde and conceptions of the
border based on how it worked in later times.
Siward was confronted with a novel problem. For perhaps
one hundred twenty years, the main threat to the North had lain in
the West. Throughout the tenth century, the lands between the
Humber and the Forth had had a dangerous western border that
had come into being early in the tenth century with the expansion
of the British kingdom of Strathclyde o r Cumbria. This development has traditionally either been ignored o r not dealt with as part
of the general history of northern Britain even though its general
outlines are fairly clear. Around the year 900, the Cumbrians, as
they called themselves, began to expand out of Clydesdale toward
the south. They crossed the Southern Highlands of Scotland and
took control of the Galwegian coastal plain on both sides of the
Solway Firth and the Vale of Eden. At its height, their kingdom
apparently reached from the head of Loch Lomond at least to the
Rere Cross of Stainmore in the North Riding of Yorkshire,18 and
there is some evidence that it may have stretched as far south as the
Mersey.lS Thus a western kingdom in northern Britain suddenly
appeared that comprised all of the west coast plain and a large
portion of the uplands. T h e established political powers on the east
coast plain, the Danes of York, the house of Bamburgh, and the
Scots, probably found the rise of Cumbria threatening since there
is no reason to believe that the Cumbrians were any better neighbors than their southern cousins the Welsh. In fact, the expansion
of the Cumbrians represented only the initial disintegration of society on the west coast plain, for during this same period Norwegian
Vikings from Ireland began to settle along the eastern shores of
the Irish Sea from Galloway as far south as the Wirral Peninsula below the Mer~ey.~O
T h e results of this invasion on the Cumbrians as
a people and on their kingdom are exceedingly obscure. T h e Norwegians had been subject to Irish influence before settling in Britain and ultimately merged with the native Britons to produce the
people known in the twelfth century as the G a l w e g i a n ~T. ~h~e kingdom of the Cumbrians apparently survived the influx of Vikings,
and the Cumbrians were able to maintain a line of kings of their
own who are intermittently recorded down to 1018. But the reality
of the power of the Cumbrian kings is in doubt. It is known that the
Norse, who had settled around the littoral of the Irish Sea, came u p
the Clyde and crossed the Scottish Midland valley to raid the Scots
and used the Tyne Gap, the Vale of Eden-Stainmore route, and
the Wirral Peninsula-all theoretically within Cumbria except perhaps the latter-as passages by which to plunder the Northumbrians, the Danes of York, and the English Midlands. Ultimately,
Ragnall, grandson of Ivarr, was able to overwhelm the Danish
kingdom of York with an army drawn from these Norse settlers
and to reestablish his family there.22
These developments were significant because the incursions
from the West became so serious that any ruler wishing to control
the North's eastern plain had to dominate the invasion routes
through Cumbria used by these marauders. Bishop Cutheard of
Chester-le-Street, for example, created a marcher lordship that
covered the mouths of Tynedale, Weardale, and Teesdale, and the
Mercians and West Saxons sought to obtain the alliance o r submission of the Cumbrian kings. Cumbrian cooperation was useful
against the Irish Sea Vikings, although it is unclear whether this
was because they had enough power partially to control the movement of the Vikings through their kingdom o r whether it was
simply desirable that they not come raiding through the hills in
alliance with the Vikings. The direct relationship between security
in the East, on the one hand, and control of the invasion routes
from the West coupled with the submission of the Cumbrian kings,
on the other, is clear in tenth-century Anglo-Saxon sources. When
the Norwegian incursions first assumed serious proportions in the
early tenth century, the powers of the North tried to meet the
threat by banding together. Ethelflzd of Mercia allied with the
Cumbrians and the Scots against these new Vikings, and even the
Danes of York sought her protection. In addition to aiding these
allies actively, Ethelflaed built fortresses at Chester, Eddisbury, and
Runcorn to protect her northwestern frontier. After King Edward
took direct control of Mercia in 918, he followed a similar policy.
He built a number of boroughs in Cheshire and Derby, including
the ones at Manchester, Bakewell, and Thelwell, fortresses that
clearly seem designed to secure the invasion routes from the Irish
Sea littoral into the Midlands and to dominate the southern routes
east into Yorkshire, and he attempted to gain the same ends by
diplomatic activity. After he had built Bakewell in 920, the king of
the Strathclyde Welsh (the Cumbrians), the king of Scots, and the
rulers of York and Bamburgh all came to him and "chose him as
father and lord."23 Presumably this meant that they would cooperate in maintaining the peace of the North and deny passage
through their lands to the Irish Sea Vikings.
T h e same sequence of events was repeated under Athelstan
during the 920s and 930s. After he took control of the Viking
kingdom of York in 927, he moved immediately to secure the
western borders of his new province by crossing the Penninea.
Athelstan met the kings of the North at Eamont in the Vale of
Eden, which apparently marked the eastern border of the Cumbrian kingdom, and there the kings of the Cumbrians, the Welsh,
and the Scots plus the rulers of Bamburgh made peace with himeZ4
This agreement did not last for long, however, and in 934, Athelstan invaded Scotland. Although the chronicles concentrate their
attention on his war against Constantine, the Scottish king, it is
clear that this expedition also included operations against the Cumbrians because in the same year Athelstan purchased Amounderness, a large section of Lancashire above the Ribble, from the
Vikings and gave it to the archbishop of Y ~ r k Amounderness
.~~
dominated the western end of the Aire Gap, the easiest passage
between the Irish Sea and York, and control of this route was
necessary for the defense of York. T h e ascendancy in the North
which Athelstan won by the campaign of 934 and his victory at
Brunanburh in 937 ended with his death, and his successor Edmund had to retrace Athelstan's steps. His attempt to do so provides perhaps the clearest example of the importance of pacifying
the West. In 944, Edmund came north and drove out the Norwegian kings of York. T h e following year he crossed the Pennines
into Cumbria, ravaged the countryside, and gave the kingdom of
the Cumbrians to Malcolm, the king of Scots, on the condition that
the latter be his ally.26This ambitious attempt to solve the problem
of the North's western border unfortunately seems to have had no
permanent results, for there is no evidence that Malcolm had more
than nominal control over Cumbria, and the native line of Curnbrian kings was in power again within a g e n e r a t i ~ n . ~Indeed,
'
well
before that, in 954, Eric Bloodaxe, the last Norwegian king of
York, was killed in battle on the heights of Stainmore, the gateway
to York from the head of the Vale of Eden. Although the account
of this event does not disclose whether Eric was retreating o r trying
to regain his lost kingdom, neither possibility suggests that the
Scots had much control over C ~ m b r i a . ~ ~
After 954, the power of the Vikings of the Irish Sea littoral
began to decline. This was a slow process, however, that lasted
into the twelfth century, and incidents still continued to occur that
show that the North still faced danger along its western border.
In 966, for instance, a Yorkshire noble ravaged Westmorland,
undoubtedly in response to raids over S t a i n m ~ r e and
, ~ ~ six years
later Kenneth I1 harried Cumbria all the way to its southern border.30 T h e sequel shows that the mechanics of the western border
had not changed. Kenneth's expedition presumably gave him some
control over the northern end of the western frontier; probably as
a result, King Edgar "granted" him Lothian a year later.31 The
continuing need to control the West in order to hold the eastern
plain is confirmed by another incident that occurred in 973. During the summer, King Edgar brought his navy north to Chester,
where he received the submissions of six northern kings including
the Cumbrian monarch.32 Even at this date, Edgar may have been
on the border of Cumbria when he was in Chester. The Scottish
chronicle that describes Kenneth's invasion of the year before says
that he ravaged Cumbria all the way to the Dee, the river upon
which Chester stands, and if this statement is correct, Cumbria still
included L a n ~ a s h i r e .Finally,
~~
in the year 1000, King Ethelred
harried Cumbria while his fleet wasted the Isle of Man. Given the
threat from the Danes which Ethelred faced, this expedition is
again proof that the western Vikings were still dangerous and had
been raiding the North. It may also be significant that the earliest
indication that the English held southern Lancashire comes from
the will of Wulfric Spot, which dates from 1002-4, at most four
years later than Ethelred's invasion of C ~ m b r i a . ~ ~
T h e existence of this dangerous western border was a crucial element in the relations between the Scots and the English
during most of the tenth century because the Scots were themselves
threatened by the Cumbrian kings and the western Vikings. In
962, King Indulf was killed by Vikings, and as late as 971, Cullen,
Kenneth 11's predecessor, was killed by the Cumbrians. Kenneth's
invasion of their kingdom was apparently launched in revenge.35
T h e corollary of this threat was that throughout most of the tenth
century, Anglo-Scottish, o r at least Northumbrian-Scottish, rela-
tions were usually good. The only exception was the later part of
the reign of Constantine 11 (ca. 933-43) and perhaps the years
immediately afterward. He invaded the North in 937 in alliance
with the Vikings and Cumbrians, and he may have attacked the
North on a second occasion. Yet his reputation as an enemy of the
English is compromised by the fact that in 914 and 918 he had
defended the Northumbrians against Ragnall, and his later COoperation with the Vikings was probably the result of his isolation
and weakness.36 T h e usual relationship was in fact one of friendship. T h e submissions of the Scottish kings to Edward, Athelstan,
Edmund, and Edgar were essentially alliances against the extension
of Viking power through Cumbria o r against the Cumbrians themselves.37After Constantine's death there were no invasions of the
North by the Scottish kings o r any Anglo-Saxon expeditions into
Scotland.
This situation changed radically after 1000 for between this
date and the 1060s most of the elements that were to characterize
the northern border during the high Middle Ages came into being.
T h e first sign of this transformation took place in 1006, when
Malcolm I1 invaded Northumbria and tried to take Durham. This
was the first Scottish invasion of the North in over fifty years, and
it probably came as a shock to the aging W a l t h e ~ f .Why
~ ~ Malcolm invaded is problematical, but the general political context
that made his attack possible is clear. T h e Cumbrians and the
western Vikings, while not without power, were no longer the
overwhelming threat that they had been. Furthermore, both the
Northumbrian earl and the Anglo-Saxon king were now completely
distracted by the Danish invasions. Malcolm I1 thus had a freedom
of action his predecessors had lacked, and he used it to try to take
over Northumbria. After the invasion of 1006 failed, Malcolm did
not give up the new policy, which is a clear indication that his
invasion had been more than a whim. I n 1018, he moved south
again, this time presumably in alliance with the Cumbrian king,
and won the battle of Carham. T h e results of this victory were
grave in the long run because they produced a further shift in the
power relationships in the North. T h e victory perhaps resulted in
the advance of Malcolm's frontier in Lothian, as was suggested
earlier, but its real importance lay in the West because Owen the
Bald, king of Strathclyde (Cumbria), the last of his line, died in the
battle. With his death, Malcolm was able to extend his rule over a t
least the eastern part of the Cumbrian kingdom, and it is likely that
he installed his brother as ruler of the area.39 This must have
involved fighting and explains why Malcolm did not exploit his
victory at Carham by further raids in Northumbria after 1018. T h e
stakes in the West were ultimately higher because control of Cumbria would give Malcolm access to at least three important routes
between west and east (from the upper Clyde down the Tweed, the
Tyne Gap, and the Stainmore passage) and to a host of secondary
routes that in effect turned the flank of the North of England.
Scottish control of the West thus offered the hope of control of the
East, and the first attempt at the fulfillment of this hope was not
long delayed. Malcolm's grandson Duncan was the first king of
Scots to utilize his position as king of the Cumbrians to attack
Northumbria when he invaded and besieged Durham in 1040. T h e
fact that he had led the Cumbrians over the border, in addition
to his own Scots, is shown by Earl Eadulf's reprisal: he ravaged
Cumbria after Duncan's defeat.40
problem that Siward faced.
This was the basic
With the Scots in control of Cumbria, their king could lead an army
over the Tweed in a frontal attack on the earldom while sending
the Cumbrians east through the hills to raid and disrupt communications. Such tactics could place the Northumbrians in an
extremely perilous position and could ultimately lead to Scottish
control of Northumbria. Consequently, the possibility that Duncan's
invasion of 1040, the first of this type, might be repeated had to be
forestalled, and Siward applied his energies to the task. Apparently
he followed a twofold policy of expansion in the West to close the
major invasion routes combined with an attempt to put the Scottish
king in a dependent position. No chronicler, of course, says that
these were Siward's intentions, but his recorded actions indicate
that they were. To a certain extent, his policy was opportunistic.
As a result of circumstances he had had no hand in creating, Siward
possessed the perfect means with which to interfere in Scottish
affairs: he could make use of Malcolm Canmore, the son of King
Duncan.
This possibility was the direct result of the succession crisis
that marred the last years of Malcolm I1 and the short reign of his
grandson Duncan. Malcolm I1 (1005-34) had been a very powerful
king. He had invaded the North twice, and after 1018, his rule,
which encompassed Lothian as far as the T~veedand Cumbria in
Table 3. The Kings of Scotland from 1005 to 1153
T h e order of Malcolm III's sonsfollows Duncan, Scotland, p. 124, n. 6
Boite
a brother or 3rd cousin
of Malcolm I1
~ r & h= (1) Gillacorngain
mormaer of Moray
killed 1032
(2) MACBETH
LULACI:
king 1040-57
killed 1058
I
MALCOLM I1
king 1005-34
Suibne
possibly a brother
of Malcolm I1
died 1034
I
I
killed 1033
abbot of Dunkeld
I
I
DUNCAN I
king 1034-40
I
Maldred
see table 1
Malsnechtai
Ingibiorg (1)
= MALCOLM = (2) Margaret
sister of Edgar
111
died 1085 daughter of Thorfinn
earl of Orkney
the Atheling
king 1054-93
DONALD BANE
king 1093, 1094-97
DUNCAN 11
king 1093-94
Maud
=Henry 1
of Lngland
I
Edward
Edmund EDGAR
Ethelred
killed 1093
king 1097-1 107 abbot of
Dunkeld
ALEXANDER
king 1107-24
DAVID
king 11241153
Mary
=Eustace I11
count of Boulogne
addition to Scotland, had stretched further south than that of any
of his predecessors. During his later years, neither the earls of
Bamburgh, who were usually in revolt against Cnut, nor the great
Danish king himself made any serious attempt to push back his
power.41 Nevertheless, the last part of Malcolm's reign was filled
with turmoil and battle, probably because he had no male heir. He
did have a daughter, named Bethoc ("Birchtree"), who had married
Crinan the thegn, the abbot of Dunkeld, and who had had two
sons, Duncan and Maldred.42Malcolm may have wanted his grandson Duncan to succeed him, although this would have been a break
with the customary rule of succession, under which either his
brother o r a representative of a collateral branch of the royal
family would have become king before Duncan. It is probably
more likely that Malcolm's potential successors by the traditional
rule were encouraged by his lack of an heir to hasten his death.
Since he had no son, he could be killed without fear of reprisal.
There would be no one seeking vengeance and the throne ten o r
twenty years after the deed. But if this second hypothesis is correct,
Malcolm's relatives gravely misjudged him; by the time of his death
in 1034, nearly all of the possible claimants to the throne except his
own grandsons had been exterminated.
T h e king had had either a brother or a third cousin named
Boite, of whom nothing is known except that he had a son and a
daughter and that he himself predeceased Malcolm. In 1032, the
daughter's husband, Gillacomgain, the mormaer of Moray, was
burned to death, probably by Malcolm o r his agents, and a year
later Malcolm himself killed Boite's son.43 These two incidents
neutralized the descendants of Boite. In 1034, Malcolm died after
defeating an unnamed enemy. T h e circumstances of his death are
very obscure, but an Irish chronicle records that Suibne, son of
Kenneth, king of the Galwegians, also died in the same year. Given
the events of 1032 and 1033 and the common patronymic of
Malcolm I1 and Suibne, these deaths were not coincidence. Suibne,
who was probably a brother of Malcolm I1 and who had ruled
Cumbria for the king, must have died in battle against his brother
in 1034.44In any case, Malcolm 11's murderous efforts were quite
successful. By 1034, only his own grandsons and Groch, Boite's
daughter, were still alive, and Duncan, his eldest grandson, was
therefore able to become king without opposition. He reigned until 1040 when, after his unsuccessful invasion of Northumbria, he
was killed by Macbeth, the mormaer of Moray, who had married
G r o ~ hOnce
. ~ ~ he was in power, someone, probably Crinan, Duncan's father, sent the dead king's sons out of the country.46
Thus Malcolm fell into Siward's hands, and he may not have
been alone. A late source says that at this time Siward received
a number of other refugee Scottish nobles.47 Duncan's younger
brother Maldred certainly could not have felt secure in Scotland
and probably came south; this is particularly likely because he had
married a daughter of Earl Uhtred and would have been among
relatives south of the Tweed.48 In later years, Maldred's son, Cospatric, seems to have thought of himself as a Northumbrian, which
would be understandable if he had been reared among his mother's people while his father was in exile. Even Crinan may have
come south, although there is no direct evidence. T h e usefulness to
Siward of Malcolm, Maldred, and whatever other Scots were in
Northumbria was twofold. Ultimately, either Maldred o r Malcolm
could be used as an excuse for direct intervention in Scotland since
they both had claims to the throne. Short of direct action, Siward
could use their presence in Northumbria to control Macbeth simply
by threatening to allow them to come over the border with a Northumbrian army if Macbeth caused trouble. T h e earl of Northumbria
was thus in a comfortable position. Siward's ability to threaten Macbeth was perhaps the reason why the latter failed to imitate his two
predecessors by launching a major invasion of the North. Macbeth
only raided the North, and his relative restraint was certainly not
caused by his insecurity within Scotland. Regardless of the validity
of his claim to the throne, he feared no rivals when he made his
pilgrimage to Rome,49 and this security could have been possible
only if he had reached some understanding with Siward.
In addition to the diplomatic leverage that Maldred and
Malcolm supplied, there was another possibility in the situation.
Malcolm must have been a boy in the early 1040s and consequently
of little immediate use to Siward in the diplomatic game. Maldred
was older, and his claim to the throne undoubtedly took precedence over his nephew's, but Malcolm had another i m p ~ r t a n c e . ~ ~
Fordun says that Duncan had given Cumbria to Malcolm, and this
statement may have some basis in fact, despite Fordun's general
unreliability on Cumbrian affairs. Florence of Worcester refers to
Malcolm as the son of the king of the Cumbrians, and this is a
suspicious title to apply to Duncan.51 He had been, of course, their
king, but "king of Scots" o r some equivalent would have been a
more appropriate title. Florence's choice of this unlikely title to
describe Malcolm's father probably reflects what seemed important
about him to the English. If Duncan had been king of the Cumbrians, the English would have considered Malcolm his heir. This
was significant because there is evidence that Siward had taken
over Cumberland, the area south of the Solway. If Siward felt the
necessity for a legal title to these lands, Malcolm could grant it as
the "heir" to the Cumbrian kingdom. This may, in fact, have been
Siward's price for supporting the cause of Malcolm and Maldred.
T h e evidence that Siward expanded into Cumberland comes
from a unique charter that dates from between 1041 and 1065 and
probably from between 1041 and 1055.52T h e charter was granted
by Cospatric, the third son of Earl Uhtred, to Thorfinn mac Thore
and concerns certain property rights, judicial privileges, and fiscal
exemptions in Allerdale, roughly the northwestern section of the
modern county of Cumberland. The address of the charter contains the most significant information. Cospatric greets the men
"dwelling in all the lands that were C ~ m b r i a n , "and
~ ~ this establishes that by the time of the grant the lands south of the Solway
were no longer part of the kingdom of Cumbria. T h e nature of the
charter is in accordance with a change in lordship; and indeed,
such a change must have been the occasion for the making of the
charter. Apparently it is a confirmation of rights already held by
Thorfinn and probably held by his father Thore before him.54
Cospatric confirms and perhaps extends Thorfinn's holdings. This
is just the type of document one would expect to find relating to
lands that had been transferred from one kingdom to another, for
the local landholders would naturally want the new rulers to recognize the legitimacy of their tenures. It is also clear that the ultimate
lord of this area was the English king. Although Cospatric was a
great lord in Cumberland and confirms Thorfinn's possessions
without mentioning anyone else's permission, the fact that Earl
Siward had granted peace, that is, protection, to Thorfinn establishes that Siward had the general lordship of the area. Furthermore, Cospatric was geldfree, as were a number of other local
landholders, and in the charter he extends the same privilege to
Thorfinn and his retainers.55 Such a concern with not paying geld
is explicable only if the English king was the ultimate Iord of
Allerdale. This consideration negates any suggestion that these
lands were held by Cospatric under the Scottish king.56
This charter has been interpreted as containing evidence
that Anglo-Saxon control of Cumberland dated from before Siward's time because it mentions rights Thore and two other men
had had "in the days of Eadred." "Eadred" has been identified with
Earl "Ealdred," but this hypothesis is not justified on linguistic
ground^.^' Earl Ealdred had spent most of his time in rebellion
against Cnut, and it is very unlikely that he had been able to wrest
this land from the Scots. Siward was the first earl in the eleventh
century who had the power to make such a transfer. Perhaps taking
advantage of Earl Eadulfs ravaging of this area and of his control
over Malcolm, Siward had pushed through the Tyne Gap and
annexed Cumberland. The area was then linked ecclesiastically to
England. Archbishop Kynsige of York (1051-60) is said to have
ordained two bishops of "Glasgow" while at York, and the sphere
of operations of these bishops must have been in Siward's newly
won lands in the West.5s By annexing Cumberland, Siward had in
one stroke closed the two best invasion routes from the West,
Stainmore and the Tyne Gap. This important rectification of the
northern frontier meant increased protection for both Yorkshire
and Durham. T h e acquisition of Cumberland also had a secondary
advantage. T h e Cospatric who granted the charter seems to have
been Earl Uhtred's youngest son." Siward had apparently put him
in charge of the area and thereby paid off, at least partially, old
grievances.
These gains offset the Scottish annexation of the old kingdom of Cumbria and perhaps blunted the resentment of the house
of Bamburgh. It is regrettable that the charter cannot be more
closely dated than between 1041 and 1065.60 It shows only that
Siward had controlled Cumberland at some time and does not
disclose when he took it over. As a result, the chronological position
of Siward's westward expansion in the development of his Scottish
policy cannot be determined. T h e general direction of his relations
with Scotland is quite clear from the mid-1040s, however, and the
charter may well come from these years. Control over the invasion
routes from the West would seem to be a precondition for any
active intervention inside Scotland, and Siward led his first army
over the Tweed in 1045 o r 1046. This expedition is not described
Political Diuzsions of the North in 1056
SCOTLAND
in detail in the chronicle that mentions it, but it seems to have been
an exact parallel of the famous invasion of 1054 except that it
failed. Siward had apparently decided to create his own king of
Scotland, a policy that theoretically would ensure good relations
with the northern kingdom and peace for the North. The account
of the expedition, however, does not name Siward's candidate for
the Scottish throne, although it was probably Maldred, Duncan's
younger brother. The sequence of events is also difficult to reconstruct. Siward apparently had the support of a party of Scots
led by Crinan, the father of Duncan and Maldred, but it is unclear whether Crinan invaded Scotland from Northumberland or
whether he was already in Scotland and rose in revolt against
Macbeth. Probably the latter was the case, and the revolt was to be
coordinated with Siward's invasion. Crinan met Macbeth in battle,
however, and was slain. Siward subsequently led an army into
Scotland and drove out Macbeth, according to the chronicle, which
probably means that Macbeth fled into Moray in the face of Siward's
advance. The earl then raised Maldred to the throne and returned
to N~rthumberland.~'
He may have thought that he had accomplished his aim, or he may have been unable to stay above the
Tweed. Successful invasions of Scotland normally required a supply
fleet because it was all but impossible for an English army to live
off the Scottish countryside for long, and there is no indication
that Siward had one on this occasion.62 In any case, once he was
gone, Macbeth returned and recovered the kingdom.63 The fate
of Siward's king is unrecorded.
This king, who was probably Maldred, presumably was
killed, because Siward waited some eight years before he invaded
again. If Malcolm had been born in about 1031, he would have
reached the age of twenty-three by 1054, a prime age to try for a
throne that had to be won through battle. Certainly relations with
Scotland did not improve during t h e ~ eyears. Scottish border raids
on the North either began or continued after 1046.64The years
around 1050 must have been quiet, while Macbeth is said to have
gone to Rome, but this peace did not outlast his pilgrimage, for in
1052, Macbeth received the Normans who had been expelled from
England as a result of Earl Godwin's restoration and took them
into his own service.65Macbeth's employment of mercenaries who
could only be profitably used against Siward shows that the situation was becoming serious again, and the events of 1053 imply that
he was raiding the North. In that year Siward went to Scotland
and made some agreement with Macbeth; he may have conducted
a full-scale invasion, although the evidence for supposing so is not
very satisfactory. In any case, Macbeth soon broke the agreement
and continued to raid the North.'j6
Thus the stage was set for Siward's famous invasion of
Scotland. In 1054, the earl collected an army from the North which
was reinforced by a group of King Edward's housecarls and by a
contingent from Cumberland led by Dolfin, Thorfinn's son, and
obtained a fleet that could bring supplies to the army.67The object
of the expedition was to put Duncan's son Malcolm on the Scottish
throne; both Edward and Siward must have hoped that as king he
would end the hostility that had characterized the northern border
since 1006. To achieve this end, Siward moved north and defeated
Macbeth on the Day of the Seven Sleepers (July 27). T h e encounter
was apparently a pitched battle in which many Scots and all of
Macbeth's Norman mercenaries were killed. Siward lost a number
of his own and the king's housecarls. Even though Macbeth himself
escaped to Moray, where he survived for three anticlimactic years,
Siward's victory had been complete enough for Malcolm to become
king. T h e oldest accounts say no more; in fact, they fail to mention
that Malcolm replaced Macbeth. Florence of Worcester, however,
says that King Edward had ordered Siward both to make the
expedition and to establish Malcolm as king.68 Both statements are
undoubtedly true in a simple descriptive sense, but it is inaccurate
to give them a twelfth-century "feudal" meaning.69 T h e Normans
would d o this soon enough. In 1054, Malcolm did not hold Scotland as Edward's vassal. He was king of Scots by inheritance and
battle; his obligation to King Edward rested solely on gratitude.
After defeating Macbeth, Siward returned to England carrying with him a great amount of booty and probably believing that
his expedition had been a success. T h e next year he died at York
and was buried there in the monastery he had built and dedicated
to St. Olaf. His bones were thus to be protected down through the
ages by a fellow Scandinavian, an arrangement, that suggests that
the earl had remained at heart a Dane to his death. T h e stories of
his physical prowess that are based on this aspect of his character
and supported by Shakespeare's version of his war against Macbeth
give Siward heroic stature. He stands out as the last great earl of
the North; in the hands of the romantic, he becomes one of the last
Vikings.70 All this makes it very difficult to reach an accurate
appraisal of his importance. If one's view is limited to his lifetime,
Siward must be portrayed as a successful earl because he ruled
Yorkshire without any known problems from about 1033 to 1055
and because he ended the revolt of the house of Bamburgh. The
period of his strong rule gave the North a chance to recover from
the turmoil of the preceding period and perhaps resulted in the
creation of some bonds with the South. This was certainly the case
with the church of Durham, where Siward had curtailed traditional
liberties and installed its first southern bishop. Furthermore, he
made concrete moves to blunt the growing threat from the Scots by
the annexation of Cumberland, which provided protection to Yorkshire and Durham from hostile raids out of the West, and by his
support of Malcolm Canmore, which seemed to promise a period
of good relations with the Scots.
This is an impressive list of accomplishments, yet we should
accept it with caution. According to later tradition, Siward was
descended from a line of bears.71 T h e attribution of such ancestry
may be a direct reference to his physical strength, but Siward's
descent from bears can be interpreted in another way: Siward
ruled like a bear. He was formidable but lacked insight, and most
of his policies depended on force o r its threat. He had imposed an
outsider on the clerks of Durham, whom they resented. He had become earl of Northumbria by wasting the countryside, and neither
his marriage into the house of Bamburgh nor his accommodation
with Cospatric, the heir of this family, won the goodwill of the
Northumbrians. According to later tradition, they revolted against
Siward while he was invading Scotland in 1054. This story should
probably not be accepted as literally true, but it rests ultimately on
the memory of his unpopularity above the Tees.72Siward's rule did
nothing to end dissatisfaction in Northumbria; in fact, his actions
fed unrest.
Much the same conclusions can be drawn with respect to
Anglo-Scottish relations. Siward's policies did not lead to a stabilization of the border; rather, the situation deteriorated as a result of
his acts. Even though Macbeth may have been a threat to the
North, he was a peaceful neighbor in comparison to the ruler
Siward had raised u p in his place. Malcolm Canmore's loyalty to his
English benefactors lasted exactly as long as he potentially needed
their help. After this need had passed, he became a greater threat
to the North than any of his predecessors had been, and during
the next forty years he repeatedly led armies over the border. If
Siward's support of Malcolm is judged by its results, it was a grave
mistake. It brought no security to the North, only Scottish armies
that pillaged and enslaved the northern peasants.
Finally, the defeat of Macbeth had be