Joe Biden's Trip to Ukraine and Georgia

Last week, the White House dispatched Vice President Joe Biden
to Ukraine and Georgia to assuage fears that America may be
abandoning its allies in the post-Soviet space, as Washington
continues to try to push the reset button with Moscow. Instead,
fudged messages and more confusion prevailed. As Biden visited Kyiv
and Tbilisi, the Obama Administration managed to dilute a key
message--that Russia should respect the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of its neighbors.

The mere fact that the Vice President ventures into what Russia
calls its "near abroad" two weeks after President Obama's visit to
Moscow indicates that the White House has downgraded its
relationship with Ukraine and Georgia. In the past, a U.S.
President en route to Moscow would make a stopover in the Baltic
States, Ukraine, or another country in the former empire. These
visits were a signal that Washington would not have "preferred
partners" in the region.

Things have changed since the Obama Administration decided to
prioritize the relationship with Moscow in such vital areas as
Afghanistan, Iran, and arms control. While the global agenda is
important, so is U.S credibility. It is crucial to demonstrate to
U.S. allies near and far that the United States stands by its
friends. Unfortunately, Joe Biden's messages, carefully monitored
in Moscow, fell short of making that case.

"Tough Love" Toward Ukraine

Biden offered "tough love" to the political elite in Kyiv, and
deservedly so. However, his tone was pedantic, if not high
handed--something the Ukrainian political elite will surely
resent.

Biden pointed out that the promises of the Orange Revolution of
2004 have not been completely fulfilled. He publicly criticized the
lack of cooperation between President Victor Yushchenko and Prime
Minister Yulia Timoshenko, rivals in the forthcoming January 2010
presidential elections. And his team's assumption that after the
elections Ukraine will scale down Euro-Atlantic integration may be
wrong.

The Vice President called for an intensified fight against
corruption, an effort to increase energy efficiency, and an
improvement in Ukraine's abysmal economic performance (negative 14
percent of its GDP). Ukraine's dependence on Russian gas and its
inability to pay market prices to Gazprom are at the heart of the
country's strategic insecurity. Biden's criticisms on these points
were fully warranted.

Biden also announced a meeting of the U.S.-Ukraine Strategic
Partnership Commission to be held in Washington in the fall. The
intention is to implement the U.S.-Ukraine Strategic Charter,
signed in December 2008 by the Bush Administration, and to deepen
bilateral cooperation in the areas of security, economy, trade,
energy, and the rule of law.

Where Biden fell short was in the area of national security.
According to Kommersant Daily, in April 2008, then-President
Vladimir Putin told George W. Bush at the NATO summit in Bucharest
that Ukraine is "not a real state." Since then, he has pejoratively
referred to Ukraine as "Little Russia."

Vice President Biden was tight-lipped in describing what kind of
security and military cooperation the U.S. and NATO can have with
Ukraine. While he left the matter of potential Ukrainian
Euro-Atlantic integration to the Ukrainian people, Biden ignored
Russia's staunch opposition to the prospect. He also failed to call
upon America's European allies to step up Ukraine's integration
into the EU.

"Finlandizing" Georgia?

Biden's trip to Georgia was even more problematic, despite
receiving a hero's welcome there. People lined the streets with
slogans "Don't Forget Us" and "No to Occupation" in reference to
Russia's occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the summer of
2008. Biden met with the democratic opposition, which is demanding
President Mikheil Saakashvili's resignation, yet indicated that the
U.S. will not dictate an election timetable.

In a speech before the Georgian parliament, Biden correctly
rejected Russia's claims to a 19th-century-style sphere of
influence. He delivered a message that the U.S. is seeking a free,
secure, democratic, and united Georgia. Yet again, he fell short of
operational details.

Biden's call to the world not to recognize the independence of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia is the minimum Washington can do, yet
the Vice President rejected any "physical security guarantees" to
Georgia in case of a Russian attack. Nor did he articulate any
concrete roadmap intended to restore Georgia's sovereignty and hold
Moscow to its commitments to the Medvedev-Sarkozy accords of August
2008, which call for the restoration of the status quo ante
along Georgia's borders.

Behind closed doors, Biden warned against any future use of
force to liberate the Russian-occupied territories--a position
inherited from the Clinton and Bush Administrations--and rejected
Georgia's requests for defensive weapons, such as anti-tank and
anti-aircraft systems. Denying Georgia defensive weapons will
hamper its ability to defend itself in case of another Russian
attack and may be interpreted by some in Moscow as de-facto
encouragement of a tougher line toward the Saakashvili
administration.

While Biden was in Tbilisi, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister
Grigory Karasin warned that Moscow will take "concrete measures"
against any country that seeks to rearm Georgia. Particularly in
this light, Biden's declaration of a partial weapons embargo and
refusal to provide "physical security guarantees" may be
interpreted as an Obama Administration cave-in to Moscow's
pressure.

What Should the Obama Administration
Do?

The Obama Administration is walking a tightrope between trying
to improve the frayed relationship with Russia while simultaneously
rejecting Moscow's spurious claims to a "sphere of exclusive
interests" in the former Soviet Union and Eastern and Central
Europe.

To boost the confidence of U.S. allies while ensuring that
Russia remains in a cooperative mode, Washington should:

Expand cooperation with NATO allies in formulating and
implementing a joint policy that clearly delineates security "red
lines" in Europe, including contingency planning for the defense of
Eastern and Central European NATO members--something that has so
far been postponed.

Continue to cooperate with, upgrade, and improve the militaries
in the post-Soviet states, especially Azerbaijan, Georgia and
Ukraine, which are interested in NATO membership.

Work with post-Soviet states on developing democratic
institutions, transparency, the rule of law, and good governance,
as stronger institutions and stronger states also enhance national
security and improve the investment climate.

Announce a visit by President Obama to a non-Russian state of
the region in the first half of 2010. The President should deliver
a strong message of support for their sovereignty, territorial
integrity, diplomatic and security cooperation, Euro-Atlantic
integration, democratic development, and energy security.

"Don't Forget Us"

"State sovereignty must be a cornerstone of international
order," declared President Obama in his speech at the New Economic
School in Moscow on June 7. "Just as all states should have the
right to choose their leaders, states must have the right to
borders that are secure, and to their own foreign policies. That is
true for Russia, just as it is true for the United States. ...
That's why we must apply this principle to all nations--and that
includes nations like Georgia and Ukraine." Yet after Biden's
visit, these words ring somewhat hollow.

The Administration is understandably focused on Afghanistan,
Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and other priorities, but Eastern Europe
and Eurasia, the heart of the Eastern hemisphere, cannot and should
not be neglected. Nor can they be abandoned to the geopolitical
ambitions of those with transparent anti-American agendas.
President Obama and Vice President Biden should make certain that
this message rings loud and clear even before their next visit to
the region.

Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is Senior Research Fellow
in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Security
in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies,
a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for
International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation.