Chelsea 2-0 PSG: Mourinho takes risks late on

April 9, 2014

The starting line-ups

Chelsea recorded the 2-0 victory they required to progress on away goals.

Jose Mourinho welcomed back Samuel Eto’o upfront, although was without Nemanja Matic and Ramires in the centre of midfield. Eden Hazard started on the left, but lasted only a quarter of the game before being replaced by Andre Schurrle.

Laurent Blanc was without Zlatan Ibrahimovic, so moved Edinson Cavani upfront and brought on Lucas Moura down the right, which promised more counter-attacking thrust.

This was a tense but poor quality game for this level, and the major tactical interest was how Chelsea became more attacking late on.

Chelsea slow in possession

Chelsea’s major problem for the first hour was their inability to lift the tempo of the game. They started very slowly, seemingly surprised at being pressed high up the pitch by PSG, and therefore took a while to settle down and control the game. Even when they did manage to assert their possession dominance, the passing tempo was extremely slow in the midfield, with PSG able to shuffle back into a deep defensive block easily.

Once Chelsea found themselves trying to break down the opposition, a secondary problem was how few genuine attacking threats the home side possessed. The front four were all dangerous, of course, but were being denied space. In that kind of situation, you need players from deep capable of bring the ball forward, ‘provoking’ the opposition forward and out of their deep position towards the ball, creating space for a player higher up the pitch.

This never really happened. Gary Cahill and John Terry are competent passers but not genuinely playmaking centre-backs. The full-backs didn’t overlap sufficiently, partly because Cesar Azpilicueta is on the ‘wrong’ flank and Branislav Ivanovic is a centre-back who’s been shoved out wide in his Chelsea career – they rarely got into the final third, as the diagram below shows. Lampard and Luiz are good players technically, but neither is a proper playmaker. PSG could concentrate on denying the front four space – even Cavani sat back, very deep, with no need to press the centre-backs.

Chelsea’s opener came from an Ivanovic throw and a Schurrle finish, a very simple goal. Schurrle’s forced introduction, however, lifted the home side because he collected the ball in deep positions and ran powerfully at the PSG defence. He prefers playing on the left flank, but has been denied opportunities there because of Hazard’s fine form. It was extremely surprising Mourinho switched Schurrle and Wilian in the second half – this didn’t seem to have any great effect on Chelsea’s attacking play.

PSG counters

In truth, PSG weren’t much better. They pressed high in the early stages but then sat deep and played on the counter-attack. The breaks themselves weren’t particularly impressive, with only a couple of decent moments from Lavezzi and Lucas. The positive aspect of Chelsea’s defensive players offering so little going forward, of course, was that they were in a position to get back and defend against these breaks.

A more peculiar feature of PSG’s play was the lack of urgency when the midfielders found themselves in space, with the Chelsea defence unprotected. At times in the first half there were huge gaps in midfield, and opportunities for Thiago Motta and Blaise Matuidi to run at the defence – or feed attackers – but they turned back and played square passes. They wanted to slow the tempo of the game, certainly, but there were genuine gaps for them to break into.

Mourinho changes

The line-ups as Chelsea chased their second goal - Chelsea with three strikers, PSG with an additional centre-half

The game’s key feature was Mourinho’s attack-minded substitutions. He steadily increased the pressure by introducing two strikers for two midfielders. On 66 minutes he brought on Demba Ba for Frank Lampard, and moved Oscar a little deeper – although it was basically a 4-1-3-2, with David Luiz protecting the defence solo. Chelsea immediately hit longer passes to Ba.

On 81 minutes he went further, bringing on a third striker, Fernando Torres. Oscar made way, with Schurrle behind the three strikers, and Torres playing from the right flank.

Clearly, you can’t increase numbers in one part of the pitch without taking them away from another part, and therefore Mourinho’s strategy was a calculated risk. He decided to leave all four defenders on the pitch, probably as he was scared of PSG counter-attacks – whereas he often removes a full-back in these situations, and moves to a back three.

PSG chances

Chelsea’s area of weakness was now in midfield, and therefore Luiz was completely overrun. He battled manfully, charging after opponents to attempt to win possession, but the fact remains that Matuidi plus substitutes Javier Pastore and Yohan Cabaye were all getting space in front of the Chelsea defence, and in the period after Mourinho’s attacking shift, PSG had their best two opportunities, created from this zone.

Matuidi chipped the ball over the defence for Cavani to blast over from the left channel, then Cabaye played an even better ball, for an even better Cavani chance – he failed to take advantage of the game’s best opportunity.

Chelsea plan B & C

That was the risk. But, clearly, Chelsea now had more attacking firepower. As ever, the impressive thing with Mourinho isn’t the substitutions he made in themselves (any manager can chuck on a striker or two), but the fact nothing is left to chance in terms of organisation.

As he said after the game, Mourinho had worked on the alternative shapes in training – the variation with two strikers, and the variation with three strikers. This was obvious, in the way Chelsea retained balance despite three strikers on the pitch – they weren’t fighting for the same balls.

“We trained yesterday with the three different systems we used, the one we started with, the one without Lampard and finally the one with Demba and Fernando in, and the players knew what to do.” The key wasn’t the changes, it was the preparation he’d made for the changes.

When Ba hit the winner, Mourinho darted down the touchline ‘in celebration’, but afterwards he claimed he was primarily running to tell Torres and Ba their positional instructions for the remaining six minutes of the contest, which is backed up by the pictures. Ba’s job was to sit in front of the defence and mark Alex if he ventured forward, Torres’ to man-mark Maxwell.

PSG

It’s also worth saying a word about PSG, who retreated into a very deep defensive shape in the final 10 minutes, introducing an extra centre-back, Marquinhos, to play just ahead of the other four defenders. Lavezzi and Lucas had also been removed.

Blanc will be criticised for being too defensive and reactive, but in the situation his strategy wasn’t wrong, as such, it was just poorly executed at both ends. Cavani missed the game’s best chance, while the PSG defence looked surprisingly uncomfortable playing very deep, probably because they’re completely unaccustomed to playing this way in Ligue 1. They completely failed to deal with the pressure.

Conclusion

Anyone can make attacking changes by introducing two extra strikers, but Mourinho’s “brilliance” wasn’t the changes he made, but the fact his side were prepared for them, and understood their new roles clearly.

Managers are often criticised for not having a Plan B, but equally unforgivable is a Plan B which is sprung on the players midway through a match, with strikers on top of each other fighting for the same balls. This was a controlled, pre-determined Plan B and, indeed, Plan C.

It’s the preparation, attention to detail and communication that makes Mourinho such an effective tactician, rather than the tactical decisions themselves.

13 Responses to “ Chelsea 2-0 PSG: Mourinho takes risks late on ”

super dooper bilbao trooper on April 9, 2014 at 1:18 pm

This was quite a poor game truth be told. The Chelsea build up was slow as has been commented on, but between the forward and midfield positions they were very static. Little variation in movement or rotation to get players space with/without the ball. If PSG had handled this game better they could have comfortably gone through, yes there were the missed chances, but I felt they resulted more from Chelsea having to push players forward rather than any sort of premeditated counter-attacking pattern from PSG. With a some clever movement, creating overloads and targeting specific areas of the pitch they could easily have had one goal from this game.

D on April 9, 2014 at 2:10 pm

Thanks Michael,

I would add one more point to the analysis. These Plans B and C were as much forced on Mourinho by the lack of midfield options (through Matic being cup-tied, Ramires’s suspension, van Ginkel’s injury, and Lampard’s inevitable tiredness after 60mins) as through design. In fact, the substitutions were very un-Mourinhoesque. His usual dogma—and it really is a dogma—is three central midfielders at all times. The subs I was expecting were Mikel on for Lampard and Torres/Ba on for Eto’o, with the strategy being to keep hold of possession (as Chelsea were at the start of the second half) and look for either goals from set pieces (which seemed very possible on the evidence of the first half), probably by Ivanovic, Terry or Cahill, or winning a penalty. In other words, I expected M. not to use his substitute strikers as a means of scoring themselves, but as a means of winning set pieces.

What Mourinho actually did seemed to me to backfire until almost the very end. So overrun were Chelsea in midfield that they simply weren’t getting enough of the ball to launch it towards Ba/Torres. Eto’o—who never plays a full game usually—ended up playing a full game half-injured: he was basically invisible for the last twenty minutes. These Plans B and C were less plans and more the only desperate options available, especially as M. seems to have lost all faith with Mikel as an option in any situation apart from sitting on a lead. All this of course supports your ultimate point: that M. recognised the limitations of his squad on the night and planned accordingly.

The return of Ramires will make a huge difference to Chelsea’s chances in the semis, not because he drastically improves the team, but because it will open up a whole range of more efficient Plan Bs, and allow M. not to have to stake so much on the continual fitness of his aged players (Eto’o, Lampard), but allow them to act as the very effective impact players that they now are. The loss of Ivanovic to suspension is a big one however; no doubt Azpilicueta will move right and Cole come in on the left, but that disrupts the back four M. is so comfortable with (it will be interesting to see whether Azpilicueta goes forward more when he’s on the right, especially against any of the brilliant counter-attacking teams—Real, Atletico, Bayern—that they are likely to face).

dearieme on April 9, 2014 at 4:22 pm

Can Azpilicueta hurl the ball as far as Ivanovic?

Harry on April 9, 2014 at 8:17 pm

Not sure I get this. Michael says the substitutes were obvious – first taking a pivot midfielder off for a striker, changing 4-2-3-1 to 4-1-3-2, then taking an advanced midfielder off for another forward for 4-1-2-3, but you say Mourinho’s dogma is always retaining 3 central midfielders. I find that very strange because the formation has been almost permanently 4-2-3-1 all season, which he changed up early in the season by taking a full-back off. It rather seems to me there’s almost NEVER been three central midfielders at any point, with a lot of attacking play effectively being 3-3-1-3 or 3-3-3-1 – Matic with the two CBs, the FBs advanced to midfield.

The gameplan for both sides seemed to be basically the same. Chelsea had to ensure that 1 goal was not scored against them, while PSG had to ensure 2 goals weren’t scored against them, which obviously allowed PSG much more scope to play. This suited each team’s standard formations of 4231 v 433, so there were no surprises in the line-ups, fitness and suspensions allowed.

PSG’s approach was revealed in the first half when a ball was played up the right wing for Jallet to chase and he simply refused to go after it. When PSG regained possession, they were content to play it between themselves in midfield, refusing to go forward unless they could get Lavezzi or Moura into a foot-race with the Chelsea full-backs.

In the face of this, Chelsea had to be careful they didn’t over-commit, so they didn’t. This may’ve seemed to be slow play, but the game-state demanded it. In the absence of Hazard their approach had to be varied, including what set-piece advantages that were on offer.

The first goal came out of the blue, but the variation caught PSG out. 5 defenders were drawn to the throw, leaving Schurrle free on the penalty spot. It was *here* that PSG were provoked out of position.

Mourinho spoke before and after the game about welcoming the pressure of over-committing. That it wasn’t done from the start of the game is neither here nor there. It came deliberately with each substitution because the context changed as the clock ran down.

The key with Mourinho is that he’s always prepared to take risks to win if the situation demands it. BUT. He isn’t win at all costs. The correct description is he wins at no cost. No chances cheaply given up when the situation doesn’t demand the risk. But being prepared to play fast and loose when the only alternative is to lose by one or lose by two. Losing is losing – the score is irrelevant. Better to lose by two than throw away the chance to win.

So, first one sub with 25 to go, then the last with 11 to go, pressure ratcheting higher and higher every minute. In the end it becomes unbearable and the dam breaks. Then, chameleon-like, the door is slammed shut by any means necessary with all previously roles forgotten. Torres at right wing-back, Ba as auxiliary man-marking 3rd centre-back.

It is magnificent. Pure drama and thriller and horror at the same time. No-one can be unmoved by it. The winners progress. The losers destroyed by the emotional catastrophe of defeat. This is football as life and death. Just as it has to be.

damndude on April 9, 2014 at 10:10 pm

Nice article haha, you have given me a better comprehension of some things.

Michael on April 9, 2014 at 4:58 pm

“Managers are often criticised for not having a Plan B, but equally unforgivable is a Plan B which is sprung on the players midway through a match”

Could not agree more.

Laurent (not)B. on April 9, 2014 at 6:43 pm

“Blanc will be criticised for being too defensive and reactive, but in the situation his strategy wasn’t wrong, as such, it was just poorly executed at both ends.”

Absolutely agree with that. More than a problem of execution, there was a problem of attitude from Cavani: If you pull the graph of forward passes by PSG from StatsZone, you’ll notice a corridor at the center of the pitch, between midfield and Chelsea’s box (essentially in David Luiz’s back). Very few forward passes were made towards that zone (if any), where you would expect a center forward would be calling for balls right left an center.

That center forward was supposed to be Cavani and he’s been moaning in the press all week about how frustrated he was to be pushed to the wings by Zlatan. He was finally given the chance to play at the center and performed very poorly…

t on April 11, 2014 at 6:03 am

this was a poor game by psg and cavani didn’t take his chances. lucas was terrible and it was quite obvious what maurinho was trying to do. the fact that psg didn’t go for another goal to kill off the game was the main issue here. this was a poorly executed plan by psg in letting chelsea back in at 1-0. the worst thing was in the last 10 minutes psg decided to defend deep – this was a great mistake especially having brought on pastore who never tracked back. cavani was terrible- the big difference between zlatan and why he is world class is he takes his chances while all other strikers lose too many chances. if you tell me psg didn’t have the players to score another goal that would be wrong, but psg certainly didn’t have players capable to defend deep hanging out till the last minute. the fact was it should be obvious to blanc that chelsea was capable to score another goal and psg should have put pressure on chelsea not invite pressure.

bigwillystyoe on April 9, 2014 at 7:39 pm

Cavani and Luiz seem to have a genuine dislike for one another, do not forgot Cavani received a yellow from a clever dick move by Luiz. In the first leg both received yellows for a tustle.

Dave on April 10, 2014 at 2:51 am

I don’t know why Mourinho still persists with Lampard. He can’t do anything meaningful anymore.

Leslie on April 10, 2014 at 3:15 pm

this may not be the correct thread to post here but i really want to ask for your opinion

Jose Mourinho always being criticized for not having a effective attacking formation and utilized his creative players, he also being criticized for not being able to break through teams parking the bus. I want to know is that really his problem or he does not have the players/forwards he wants to have?

I personally think that Jose Mourinho prefer hard working and physical presence to break through defense rather than creative players playing one-twos and penetration. His team always have slow attacking speed as his attacking players always will not have a lot of movements, however I will think that this is because he is aware of opponent counter-attack

I believe that breaking through a very defensive minded team has several ways to do it
1. utilize the width of the pitch, pushing full-back overlapping
2. hoofing the ball into the box and try to have a tall strong striker to try to imply physical presence in the box
3. have quick wingers to try to force 2 or even more defenders and try to either pass it out and get into the box or even try to beat their man by themselves to create chances

At the moment Chelsea still do not have the physical presence in the box, eto and Torres really cannot do this and besides Hazard, there is no other players can draw the defense attention. His players always stand still instead of running around I think is always aware of opponent’s counter attack…

Do you have any ideas? sorry my English is not good

alex on April 10, 2014 at 11:02 pm

I just wanted to say that Mourinho’s teams definitely do not have a slow attacking speed. His Real Madrid side (especially the one of 11-12 season) was the fastest counter attacking unit in recent memory, while his Inter and Chelsea (1st tenure) teams were deadly on a fast break as well. The only time Mourinho teams could appear slow is when they are forced into possession play when they can look clueless at times.

Leslie on April 11, 2014 at 9:44 am

sorry i should specific as having possession play
they simply do not have tons of movement in attacking plays but I think is only to remain the shape to aware of counter attack