Center for World Conflict and Peace

Wednesday, August 9, 2017

Nuclear Brinksmanship: North Korea and the US

Photo credit: CNN

Brad Nelson and Yohanes Sulaiman offer their thoughts on the latest news on North Korea's nuclear program.

Yohanes Sulaiman: The North Korean nuclear issue has been
sliced and diced beyond recognition -- even by us, in the past couple of years.
And the core issue remains: how much is the US and its allies willing to pay
for getting an outcome they want.

While there have been discussions that a "limited
strike" is on the table, frankly, I don't see any "limited
strike" as possible. For the North Korean regime, any
"provocation" must get a reply, especially a strike by the United
States, for one simple reason: This is a very insecure regime that has to ratchet
its provocations all way up to eleven. And any attack that goes without response,
would make the North Korean people and, more importantly, its political elite question
whether the Dear Leader has gone soft or has joined the rank of mortals, and
thus presenting an opportunity for an uprising.

In essence, there is only two major options: wait and do
nothing or go for war.

1. Wait

Some specialists argue that the regime is vulnerable due to
its weak economy, growing discontent, etc. But as we can see from many examples
all over the world, such as in Venezuela, where you have a two-bit very
unpopular autocrat ruling a country that is wrecked daily with protests from the
opposition, any determined autocrat, as long as he or she can maintain the
loyalty of political elite, can survive indefinitely.

And North Korea is a special basket case, where you have a
population that is totally subservient (they don't even riot during the great
famine period!) and a cowed political elite. Moreover, you have China next
door, who, while it loathes the regime, hates the possibility of the US
presence in the Yalu River even more. Thus, regardless of North Korean
provocations, Beijing will keep the supply lines open. And Kim Jong Un also knows
that.

2. War

This will be messy for sure. Can't sugarcoat this. Thousands
or even millions may die, with sky-high damage, and, depending on the outcome,
that would also destroy the reputation of both China and the United States in
the region, because the Korean and Japanese population would blame both China
and the US. Kim Jong Un's regime is gambling that this will be the brake that
forces both China and the US to stay in option one. Why is he confident? See
all the appeasement from the US to North Korea since Bill Clinton era and how
China keeps supporting the regime even today even after North Korea essentially
gave China the finger.

The third option is the Trump option. Trump is so bombastic and
unpredictable that he may actually convince China that war is inevitable and that
China really needs to do something about Kim Jong Un. At this point, though,
China's ineffective policy to North Korea would come home to roost simply
because China does not have any Korean policy per se, except keeping the North
Korean regime afloat. I doubt Beijing actually considers the possibility of
North Korea going rogue, considering the close relationship between Kim Jong Il
and Beijing. And even if China wants to do any regime change in North Korea,
the possibility has probably already closed when North Korean agents managed to
murder Kim Jong Un's brother in Malaysia, preempting this kind of scenario. So,
there is very little possibility that China can impose regime change without
bringing the entire country down, and Kim Jong Un knows it. And Beijing also
knows it.

Brad Nelson: As I see it, the developments over the last day have revealed three new things. (1) US intelligence has recently
estimated North
Korea could have as many as 60 nukes, which is about three times the
typical estimates that I've heard about North Korea nuclear capabilities. Most
estimates have placed the country’s nuclear arsenal at around 15-20 nukes. (2)
North Korea has the ability to miniaturize a nuclear weapon and therefore
weaponize a ballistic missile. Nuclear weapons experts have believed that North
Korea would probably perfect this technology, but that it was several years
away from doing so. (3) Arguably, the
rhetoric from the sitting US president ("fire and fury"), which
has escalated tension (North Korea possibly targeting Guam), is another new
wrinkle in this intractable situation.

First, it's certainly possible that Trump's
off-the-cuff remarks yesterday, while intended to signal strength and resolve,
could be interpreted By Kim as deeply ominous and threatening—that Trump is
seriously thinking about a 1st strike against the regime. And if that's the
case, Kim, thinking he has nothing to lose, might lash out militarily against
American interests in the region (South Korea, Guam, etc.). And second, if Trump really intend to deliver a nuclear 1st strike threat, that goes against decades of US foreign policy, which has embraced the notion of second-strike deterrent or extended deterrent threats as sufficient to protect and preserve US national security interests. Is Trump moving US nuclear policy in a more aggressive direction?

So what to do? Well, as you know, there've been many
different proposals bandied about by policymakers, scholars, and analysts over
the years. Recent pieces by Mark
Bowden and Jeffrey
A. Bader do a good job of highlighting these options, which include regime
change, targeted strikes against North Korea's arsenal, delegating the issue to China,
putting significant pressure on China to strangle Pyongyang, resuming the
six-party talks, doing nothing/acceptance (that North Korea is indeed a nuclear
power), containment/deterrence, and direct high-level bilateral negotiations
with North Korea’s leadership.

Of these, I'm in favor of a combination of
containment/deterrence and negotiations. The other options either likely won't
work and/or entail significant costs in blood and treasure (for the US, South
Korea, and North Korea). Roughly speaking, my two-track plan involves very
senior-level talks up to and possibly including Kim and Trump on freezing then
rolling back North Korea's nuclear program over time in exchange for various economic
concessions and security guarantees; at the same time, the US would also up its
missile defense in the region and on American homeland, strengthen its ties to
states throughout Asia via more military exercises and arms transfers, and
actively clamp down on North Korea's economy and military. Based on how North
Korea responds to all of this, the US could then decide whether to ease up on
containment in favor of talks, or prioritize containment over talks.

Historically for the US, this has been the most successful
path to moderating disputes and tensions. The US used this dual-track approach
vis-a-vis the Soviets during the cold war, and the Bush and Obama
administrations did likewise against Iran. Eventually, both Iran and the
Soviets came out of the cold, after they realized they couldn't compete against
the US and its allies and needed to play nice with the rest of the world. The
downside is that this two-track approach doesn't lend itself to a quick,
overnight resolution and it requires patience by American leaders--something
that's on short supply at the moment, it seems. Of course, nobody likes the
idea of Kim possessing nuclear-tipped ICBMs that can hit dozens of nations, including, it now seems, the heartland of the US. But
patience can work in the end. Kim is rational, North Korea is isolated and
poor, and China despises Kim and his antics. Plus, I see an added benefit here:
if the US sincerely reaches out to Pyongyang, which is what Beijing wants, I
suspect that China, seeing its interests taken into account by Washington, will
be willing to do more than it has on the North Korea problem.

YS: Again, I don't think that negotiation will work simply
because it cannot give both sides what they want: North Korea, at least under
Kim Jong Un, simply wants nukes for self-preservation. Kim and his cronies might negotiate, but at the end of the day, they will present the fait accompli: They
have nukes, deal with it. And that is unacceptable for everyone else. For Pyongyang,
giving up nukes at this stage would risk a massive backlash domestically, because
it would (1) signal that the Kim Jong Un's regime is as vulnerable to outside pressure, and (2) defeat the entire raison d'etre of its existence. Other states, such as
Iran, can backtrack on their military nuclear programs because they've never tied their legitimacy to them, but not North Korea, which has placed itself in a corner.

What I think we have to deal with in the future is: how to
deal with a nuclear North Korea, the possibility of further proliferation, and a
massive rearmament in South Korea and Japan. Maybe I am too pessimistic here,
but I just don't see Kim being willing or able to negotiate a freeze or roll
back of his country’s nukes.