The above
shown link is the base of the text below. Though, I will add in
blue or red
colours, what apparently is incorrect and/or incomplete, in my perception.

-.-

Jebsen was born in Hamburg in 1917 (Johann-Nielsen
Jebsen; in February), heir to the shipping firm Jebsen & Jebsen. His
parents, who both died while Jebsen was still a child, were of Danish origin but
held German citizenship after they had moved the company to the country. Early
in his life, Jebsen considered his citizenship a convenience, with deep roots
remaining in his Danish ancestry. During childhood, he visited England and
became enamoured with the country, adopting the mannerisms and the language.

Jebsen attended the University of Freiburg during the 1930s, where he became
close friends with Dusko Popov. During this time, both showed distaste for the
Nazi regime that was emerging in Germany. After graduation, Jebsen moved to
England, intending to study at Oxford University, although it appears he never
did this. Over the next few years he moved amongst the London social set,
befriending P.G. Woodhouse amongst others.

At the outset of the Second World War, Jebsen joined the German military
intelligence agency, the , largely to avoid compulsory service in the army. He
was given a vague brief as an independent "researcher" and assigned the rank of
private. In reality, it meant he could continue his normal activities as an
international businessman, so long as he was available to help the Abwehr
when it required.

In 1940, Jebsen arranged an introduction between a senior Abwehr officer
in Belgrade and Duško Popov, whom the Germans hoped to recruit as an agent. The
meeting led to Popov's recruitment, upon which he instantly offered his services
to the Allies as a double (Cross)
agent. It is likely that Jebsen knew this early on and often passed information
to Popov, who believed it was intended for Allied hands.

During the war, Jebsen travelled freely on business although it was not clear
what he did. He married Eleonore Bothilde Peterson, an actress from Frankfurt,
but had a string of mistresses across Europe. Jebsen's anti-Nazi stance led to
clashes with the SS and its intelligence office, the Sicherheitsdienst
(SD)
(AOB, lacking the evidence).

Through 1943, Jebsen, Popov and his brother Ivo (also an agent, codenamed
Dreadnought (the latter in or around Brussels)
ran an operation to recruit double agents from Yugoslavia. Ivo Popov identified
potential candidates who were told they would be working for the British. First,
they were sent to Berlin, under the care of Jebsen, for training in the spy
school, before ultimately ending up in Britain (via Spain and Portugal) to work
for MI5.

On
29 April 1944, Jebsen was abducted from Lisbon,
Portugal, and driven overnight to France. Aloys Schreiber, the head of German
counter-intelligence (I H) in Lisbon, had
invited Jebsen to his office on the pretext of discussing his pending War
merit Medal(K.v.K.Kriegsverdienstkreuz II class). After a brief
struggle, Jebsen and his friend (Heinz Moldenhauer) were overpowered and bundled
into a car.

Jebsen's disappearance was a serious concern for the Allies. He had been privy
to a great deal of information, including knowledge of Popov's double agent role
and that Agent Garbo's network of subagents was a fiction. He also, most
importantly, had familiarity with many details of Operation Fortitude. If he
talked, the entire cover plan for the Normandy landings was at risk. After much
analysis, the intelligence services decided that Jebsen had been snatched
because the
Abwehr believed he was planning to defect, rather than that he had already
turned. It is possible that Jebsen was abducted to protect Popov, whom the
Germans considered one of their most important agents. As a precaution, the
Allies suspended Popov's network of fictional subagents and his transmissions to
his German handlers.

Jebsen was first taken to the
Gestapo headquarters in Berlin where his torture and
interrogation began. After a few weeks, the Allies
were encouraged, intercepts of German communications showed the Germans were
interested in Jebsen's finances (he had been defrauding a number of SS officers)
(ifthis is really
true, where is the proof?), and there was no mention of his activities as
an agent. As time progressed, it appeared that agent Artist had not cracked
under pressure and the Fortitude deception was safe. (AOB,
Rubbish!Why should the German SD (Amt IV) be thinking that he
knew about the pending invasion, as this had happened in between the moment of
his kidnapping and the moment he was caught by Amt IV about late July 1944? And,
more significant - should have been: an agent like Jebsen have been considered
essential to be informed about the so essential invasion of the European
Continent by M.I.5 civil servants, like was Mr. Masterman? When we consider the
actual raw after Ostro’s information on the precise landing area had caused such
a turmoil within the XX Committee, it is most unlikely that Jebsen/Artist
seriously had been informed!)(His
fatal capture was also due to real amateurism on behalf of M.I.5; where they
asked, via Jebsen’s channel (Hans Brandes, then Known as: Ballhorn, whether he
could get information on the M.I. 5’s menace Ostro (Paul
Georg Fidrmuc))

After July 1944, Jebsen was moved to Sachsenhausen concentration camp. When he
arrived there, he had broken ribs and was malnourished, but still harboured
thoughts of escape. He told Allied soldiers, also held in the camp that he had
been accused of helping the British and when he had refused to talk (the
main reason of this contribution, is: to confirm that he did talk,
to what extend is not given, but at least we know that he acknowledged: that he
was once in touch with the British Secret Service. And M.I.5 Major J.C.
Masterman, at least had been informed on 24 July 1945!) his
financial fraud had been investigated (also not
according the facts; he was already under suspicion by the RSHA, and by the Leiter I Obstlt. Hansen
from late 1943 or very early 1944, and likely being a Double Cross agent of the
British Secret Service). Eventually, he got a message to London via
British Commando Jack Churchill, but the War Office had no record of Jebsen's
name and so the plea for help was ignored. In February 1945, Gestapo (SD?)
agent(s) removed Jebsen from Sachsenhausen, the last sighting of him, and he is
presumed to have been murdered soon after. Several attempts to find him after
the war were unsuccessful and he was legally declared dead on
17 February 1950.

(AOB, basically, I would like to
counter the ideological ferry tails from the very facts of Jebsen’s actual
doings in Portugal and elswhere. It became apparent to the Germans, that he
was heavily engaged in dubious financial transactions, often together with Popov
(Tricycle). For instance, the endeavour on getting an oil-tanker kept by the
Swedes; though where German permission to move this ship to Portugal was
essential. But many more irregular deals.) (A
second point of nonsense, is: that it was the Gestapo who caught him from
the beginning in Berlin . See therefore: KV
2/410 on behalf of Obstlt. Kuebart, who
between February/March up to 22 July 1944 was the Head of Ausland/Abwehr in the
context of Amt Mil; though still guided by
Obst. i.G. Hansen. In a discussion, in March 1944
held in Biarritz, between Kuebart
and Obstlt. Aloys Schreiber - was the strategy decided to keep it a legal matter
inside the Wehrmacht, as to prevent intervention of the SD)(It
was, nevertheless, the intervention on behalf of, fearful, Heinrich Müllerknown as: Gestapo Müller; who - after the
assassination attempt on Hitler of 20 July 1944, -took his chance to overrule
the O.K.W. and catching Johann Jebsen; as mediator Keitel was forced to
order that Jebsen had to be hand-over to the SD) (AOB,
additional nonsense, is, that the British services should be informed; there
exist clear evidence in: KV 2/90 – KV 2/91,
that they had been informed already in the early days of May 1944)
The real problem encountered in the Wikipedia
contributions on Johann Jebsen, is, that the editor(s) is/are lacking solid
study of the quite many KV 2/xxx file series, now available!
Hampering, maybe, is, that you have to study rather many files, as only by
this means one get knowledge of whom else have to approached as well. Currently I possess > 92,500 file pages!

AOB: I consider sadly, this Wikipedia
contribution on Jebsen, not of the regular “Wikipedia quality standards”.

The first two pages provide
briefly the explanations of the various cover-words and related matters.

The purpose of digesting
these intercepts, is, that it provides what the Secret Services knew via W/T
intercepts; which stood on the basis of many

of their analyses.

The KV 2/... serials are
the file designations, and indicating what, among other materials, has, Deo
volente, to be considered during the course of this Survey.

Understanding these files
isn't always easy, as one need some experience, which might take considerable
reading time.

I yet doubt, whether I
first should approach Kuebart (KV 2/410) or the file series on Unversagt (KV
2/90 & KV 2/91).

In respect to better
understanding of the incorrect assessments on behalf of the Wikipedia editor, I
tend to re-approach Kuebart's file first.

As Obstlt. Kuebart was in
charge of the operation versus Jebsen, and it should be again noticed what laid
behind it.

The period we deal with,
are the first 7 months of 1944, during which the German Abwehr was in a
transition process, from a purely OKW controlled Ausland/Abwehr - into a RSHA
controlled, thus in the SS environment, of Amt Mil (Mil Amt).

Albeit, that very many
former Abwehr personnel, never really saw the difference, as most stood still
under the Wehrmacht personnel organisation, but were no longer guided by the OKW.

At about
the same period in the beginning ofr middle of May, Sdf. Wrede was summoned to
berlin and interrogated by Sdf Weiss (Kuebart's
assistent), who taxed Wrede with his
failure to admit Jebsen's attempt to bribe him.

Wrede confessed that he had
not revealed this, and after a certain amount of discussion with Obst. Hansen,
who whished to avoid any further trouble over this whole question, Wrede was
sent back to Paris.

(As will
seen later, Kuebart's failure to have Wrede arrested, was brought before the
People's Court (Volksgerichtshof)
with the events of July 20 1944) (notice on Wrede also: Part_I
+ Ia)

KV 2/410-1, page 49

Sonderführer Weiss (Kuebart's assistent),
of Abwehr Eins, being an astute business man himself, discovered that in reality
Ivan (Iwan, Popov)
and Jebsen intended to sell the navicorts to the oil firm for a large sum
without the knowledge of the Germans, and that Jebsen was the one of the two who
had connected the scheme. This information was subsequently confiirmed by
a report from Brandes (Jebsen knew only
his alias Ballhorn) in Portugal.

Some
time in March 1944, Brandes visited Weiss and Kuebart in Berlin, reporting that
Jebsen had arranged to bribe both himself (Brandes) and Wrede with a share of
the profits of the scheme, were it to be successful.

KV 2/410-1, page 49

Kuebart
now became alive to Jebsen's whole scheme. in which even Wrede now appeared to
be impolicated, for he had failed to reveal to Kuebart, Jebsen's attempt to
bribe him.

At the beginning of April 1944m Jebsen was ordered by the Abwehr to report to
Biarritz, but the latter replied that he was unwilling to do this on account of
"cover difficulties" asserting that if he went to Biarritz his contact with the
Abwehr might receive undue publicity. (Kuebart's claim that this was ridiculous
as, of course, Jebsen was already known in Lisbon to have had Abwehr contacts.)

Brandes then reported that Jebsen had told him (AOB,
Jebsen apparently was not aware of Ballhorn's backgrounds. He was of half Jewish
background, and not to loose his "machine-tool factory" in Germany, he kept contacts
with the Abwehr, allowing him to travel at will in- and out of German Reich
territories) that he Jebsen had not the
intention of going to Biarritz, and on the contrary intended to desert (leaving
for England). The receipt of this
news provoked considerable excitement in Abwehr circles and the situation was
discussed with Obst.
Hansen. The latter said that Jebsen's desertation had to be
prevented at all costs, for were it to take place, the S.D. (the
SS controlled Sicherheidsdienst) would
"pounce" (jump)
on the Abwehr as they had done after the Vermehren incident. (AOB,
Husband and wife Vermehren, changed over to the Britain's on 10 February 1944 in
Istanbul (Istambul).
Hitler got knowledge and ordered: that from the 12th February '44 onwards: the
Abwehr should merge with the SS controlled Amt VI)

Moreover, Hansen told Kuebart that such action by the S.D. might put an end to
schemes he had already concocting for the liquidation of Hitler and Himmler, and
the ultimate overthrow of the Nazi party (which schemes finally culminated in
the events of July 20 ....)

KV 2/410-1, page 50

It was now decided that
Kuebart should proceed to Biaritz to meet there Major Schreiber of Eins Heer (Military
Intelligence) Lisbon and discuss the
situation with regard to Jebsen, since both Schreiber and the K.O. were
completely ignorant of the real situation.

Before leaving for Biaritz, Hansen instructed Kuebart to look into the matter of
any possible difficulties arising out of Canaris' order to the K.O. Madrid to
vacate their offices in their Embassy premises and to set up elswhere on their
own (AOB, Not entirely correct, as the
Embassy was and still is controlled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it was
the Ambassador who forced the KO Spain to leave the Embassy premises. This
caused enormous troubles, as all KO employees lost their quasi-diplomatic status, and
they even necessitated a working permit. After some time this had been
solved)

KV 2/410-1, page 50

Trip to Spain.

In the beginning of April 1944, Kuebart and Weiss (his
assistent) left by air for Biarritz, where
they put Major Schreiber of K.O. Lisbon in the picture as to Jebsen and his
confederates.

Schreiber was very surprised as he had no idea of the real situation.
Kuebart then passed on to Schreiber Hansen's order that Jebsen was to be
arrested and abducted forthwith. Schreiber, however, did not know how this
action could be taken and was in great doubt concerning the difficulties of
transporting Jebsen out of Spain. It was therefore decided to continue the
discussions with the K.O. Madrid.

KV 2/410-1, page 50

Further Visit to Madrid.

After spending one day in Biarritz the three, Kuebart. Weiss and Schreiber, set
off for Madrid to see the K.O. there (such
trips were always managed by car).
Here they had discussions with Obstlt. Kiekenbusch, Leiter I, and Obstlt. von
Rohrscheidt, Leiter III (counter-espionage).
Kuebart asked the latter if he thought that Jebsen really intended to to desert.
Rohrscheidt at first replied in negative but then came round to Kuebart's
opinion that he might undertake this course. They were still unable to
decide on the means by which Jebsen was to be arrested and abducted, but agreed
to send Hansen a wire asking whether he would accept full responsibility in case
the abduction caused difficulties with the Portuguese authorities and further
asking him to absolve Schreiber in writing from all such responsibility.
Hansen replied at once accepting full responsibility and Schreiber returned to
Lisbon.

KV 2/410-1, page 51

Return to Berlin.

Kuebart and Weiss left Barcelona by car from Perpignan from whence they went by
rail to Berlin, but owing to difficulties of the journey they did not arrive in
the latter city until the end of April. Awaiting Kuebart in Berlin was a
telegram from Biarritz announcing that Schreiber had at last got Jebsen there.
Hansen, to whom Kuebart had reported fully on his journey, ordered Kuebart to
instruct the Ast Bordeaux to send Jebsen to Berlin. This order was duly
executed.

(AOB,
we learn: that both Jebsen and Moldenhauer were conveyed to Bordeaux first, and
from there, by aircraft, transported to Berlin)

KV 2/410-1, page 51

Kuebart claims not to know
the exact details of what followed, but both Jebsen and Moldenhauer were
inserted in a large box or trunks made to resemble diplomatic luggage, and
driven over the frontier without incident to Biarritz.

No direct orders had been given for Moldenhauer's
abduction, and owing to the latter's civilian status (AOB,
actually was Moldenhauer genuinely employed at Nest Cologne (Köln) though came
in some way or another in Madrid, but was frequently warned to return to Nest
Cologne, though, he moved further away to Lisbon),
Kuebart considered Schreiber exceeded his scope. However, Moldenhauer was
understood to be in the conspiracy relating to Jebsen's desertion.

KV 2/410-1, page 52

Disposal of Jebsen
and Moldenhauer:

On arrival in Berlin Jebsen and Moldenhauer were detained under military arrest
at Wünsdorf, near Zossen. Hansen made arrangements for their interrogation
by Z (Mil Amt?)(R) legal experts, but some ten days later under direct orders of Feldmarschall
Keitel, they were handed over to the S.D. (initiated
by Heinrich Müller (known as Gestapo Müller) Leiter RSHA Amt Amt IV).
Kuebart claims not to know their ultimate fate, but thinks that Jebsen "had
coming to him" as when he had previously worked for the S.D. he had been guilty
of improperly converting S.D. monies to his own use. Kuebart claims that
at the time when Keitel's orders was received, he did his best to
place difficulties in the way of Jebsen being handed over, claiming that it was
entirely a military matter and had nothing to do with the S.D. Hansen
supported him in this. No argument was put forward for the retention of
Moldenhauer.

Kuebart is at pains to point out
that he was in no way responsible for the decisions taken regarding the disposal
of these two men since Hansen alone could give a valid decision regarding
"disciplinary matters".

(Later, in August 1944, (Kuebart himself
was arrested by the S.D. & Schellenberg) because he was considered being part of the Plot against
Hitler!) as will be seen, after Kuebart's
arrest by the Gestapo, he was interrogated as to why he had placed difficulties
in the way of the S.D. in connection with the transfer of Jebsen).

KV 2/410-1, page 54

Ivan (Iwan)(=
Popov German agent name. His M.I.5. Double Cross name was Tricycle):

In the middle of May 1944, Ivan ceased making any further reports, and contact
with him was severed. Kuebart considers this may be attribute to Jeben's
disappearance. (AOB, he was suspected
within the S.D. circles already for some time)

KV 2/3568, page 9: Quote:
The Popov material was always very varied
and on the surface appeared to be good and genuine,

but in the time the
evaluating office in Berlin gained the impression that it was deception material.

Please consider next the
selected sections derived from

the one who was
responsible for Jebsen's abduction.

I had in mind another
succession, but decided that Obstlt. Dr. Aloys Schreiber had been the person
most engaged in this drama.

Hereafter, I would like to
approach Ballhorn's file, who was the one when visiting earlier in 1944 Berlin,
informed Kuebart on the bribes Jebsen was trying to manage of: Sdf. Dr.
Joachim Wrede of Sonderstab, in Paris.

This, maybe other
information as well, ultimately caused the death of both Wrede and Jebsen.

I am
sending this down to you because I think you will be particularly interested in
the references to Koessler (file no longer
existing; or being kept at unknown place elsewhere)
on page 11, 17, 18, 19, 20, XIII, XIV, XV (proving
that Koessler could have passed on quite some information),
and also references to Fanto (16-4'20:
it proved to be Hagemann's brother Hans, also engaged at Ast Brussels) on VI, XII and XXXVI.

The report on Page XLIV
(44) on the the case of Tricycle and Artist is exceptionally interesting,
and provides some positive evidence that Artist was known to the Germans to
be a traitor, and confessed to them that he had worked on our behalf.
It is surely to be presumed that he
shared Wrede's**
ultimate fate.

On Page 14 and on Page XX
there are references to Neukermans (KV
2/53) who apparently wrote a number of
letters in secret ink from this country (England).
I do not identify him, and would be grateful if you could help.

W.E Luke

B.1.a (M.I.5.)

* J.C.
Masterman was the one at M.I.5, who
dealt particularly with Double Cross.

**
Dr. Wrede. My so often referring
to: Deo volente, also in this aspect, I consider it being a real miracle. Why I don't know, but I once
started first with Dr. Wrede's file
KV
2/560, and thereafter (luckily) with
Unversagt's KV 2/90
and KV 2/91
file series. Please reconsider now the last line of paragraph 2 of the above
memo. Would you have thought that the crumbled hand-writing meant Wrede? Though,
I grasp it within a few minutes, and here we have this most relevant finding.

Please notice: that I have
decided to skip Part I (KV 2/90),
because it constitutes a Survey on who was Werner, a name rather often appearing
within Abwehr related files. Hamlet and Puppet, both operating in Portugal are
frequently noticed, but not significantly related to Werner Unversagt's case.

Nevertheless, some is
considered worth to be noticed on the Web directly:

Crown Copyright

Photo taken at
interrogation Camp (Cage) 020, in my perception: he is full of sorrow

However, the next photo is
less sad

Crown Copyright

Here we can learn that the
way we are looking at a same person, that it can look quite differently

Crown Copyright

The next photo could have
been taken somewhere in the 1960s, isn't it?

I suppose, it originates
from Hagemann's private photos; which he might have had among his belongings,
when he was arrested.

Crown Copyright

What a different
perspective can do

I nevertheless would like
to quote a single reference on Dr. Wrede', one of the reasons that I have
initiated this forensic Survey

KV 2/323-3, page 35:
(data on Sdf. Dr. Wrede)
Single, Lutheran; trustee in the Troppinwerken A.G. in Köln; father is land
owner in Bredow/Pomeranioa. Claimed to be a nephew of FieldMarshall Keitel.
Was friend of late Obstlt. Erich von Witzleben, nephew of Field Marshall von
Witzleben who had been hanged; excellent connections with the high circles
in Berlin, anti-Nazi and defeatist. Speaks French.

Since beginning 43 Leiter
of Aussenstelle of the Ast Brussels in Paris. 30 Avenue Kleber, lived
privately is a confiscated apartment on the first floor of 1 Place Victor
Hugo. The Aussenstelle was liaison office of the Ast. Brussels to the
officials of the German administration in Paris. After a visit in March
44 by Obst. Hansen and Obstlt. Huebner, Wrede went twice to Lisbon where he
was in touch with a German named “Jonny” (real
name Johannes Jebsen, British Double Cross-name Artist)
and the KO. End July 44 ordered to Wiesbaden and arrested at the office at
the office of the K.d.M. Transported to the military prison in Berlin.
Arrest reported to have been in connection with the Hansen affair. (AOB,
whatever the real
circumstances, what have counted heavily was the very fact the Jebsen had
tried to bribe Wrede, and that he did not have inform his superiors. Whereas
Jebsen had told Ballhorn this story; what was not smart, Jebsen did not
realise that Ballhorn was also an agent of KOP. This may have been regarded
as the major factor that Dr. Wrede ended his life being hung on 20 December
1944)

The next quotation makes
also sense in our context:

KV 2/324-1,page 56: Quote:

July 1944.

In July, Dr. Wrede was suddenly
summoned to K.d.M. Wiesbaden where he was arrested by two SD officials in
Major Jennewein’s office, and taken to the Military Prison, 61
Lehrterstrasse Berlin. It was common knowledge that Wrede was a personal
friend of Obst Hansen and it seems that
evidence was found on Hansen’s person, when arrested in connection with the
Hitler Plot in July (20th)
incriminating to Sdf. Wrede. Hagemann states that Wrede had previously (May)
had to answer a charge in Berlin made by Schellenberg (Leiter Amt VI
Mil/Amt) to the effect that he was negotiating in collusion with outside
sources for a post-war job with the Shell-Oil Co. in, Portugal. Wrede, on
that occasion, returned to Paris highly distraught and mentioned to Hagemann
something about threatened with torture. Wrede’s first interrogation in
Berlin, as far as Hagemann remembers, took place sometime in June 1944 (May!)

Obstlt. Von Mettenheim (see FAK 130), told
Hagemann later that he had learnt through Obst. Michael that Wrede had been
garrotted (hung by means of the
music-instrument thread) on 20th
December 1944. According to Hagemann, Fwb. Zietmann, who at the time was
employed on Obstlt. Kuebart’s office in Berlin, knows the history.

(AOB,
the Wrede’s case has been dealt with quite extensively on our KV
2/560-Wrede.. website. The main reason of Dr. Wrede’s fate - was that he had
had contacts with Jonny, the German cover-name for Johannes Jebsen, British
Double-Cross name Artist. Jebsen told Ballhorn(= Hans Brandes)
that he was trying to bribe Dr. Wrede. The latter’s main mistake was, that
he had not instantly informed his superiors! Jebsen had been abducted on 29
April 44 and arrived in Berlin a few days later. Where after about 10 days
Keitel had ordered to hand over Jebsen on to “Gestapo Müller’s” Amt IV. They
managed to squeeze Jebsen and, he had told the S.D. matters, of we know at
least, that he Double Crossed the Germans. In this context we should
consider Dr. Wrede’s ultimate fate as well as, of course, also Jebsen’s.)

This forensic Survey, is, Deo
volente, to be proceed first by the file on:

KV 2/977Major Walter von Sensburg; Leiter I Ast
Brussels Digesting this file entirely, it proved,
however, that in our forensic Survey context, it does not add enough;
therefore we have to skip it.

KV
2/2133 Major Kratzer. Like the foregoing
document, some interesting small bits and pieces, albeit notice in my major
note-file, isn't considered or relevance. Hoewever: we know now who was:

"Onkel Karl" (Major Kratzer)

KV 2/2646...
KV 2/2648
Schueddekoff (Schueddekopf?) in progress. Whether
making sense we have to digest all first. (started
16-4'20)

Unexpectedly a most
interesting finding on Jebsen and Disko Popov / Tricycle!

Crown Copyright

KV 2/2647-1, page 17

Quoting:

The “Mandarin” Case.

This case
came to the knowledge of PW in the summer of 1944, through a report sent by
the Police LO (Local Office – or – Local Officer) (Schroeder) in Lisbon, to
Schellenberg.

The case
of “Mandrin” (Disko Popov)
concerned the Military Attaché in Lisbon, of the Jugoslav Government. PW (Schüddekopf)
is not certain of his name, it might have been Draginowitsch (=
Disko Popov!). Before the war, the
Yugoslaw Military Attaché knew Jebsen, a young business man in Hamburg.
Jebsen was sent by Amt “Abwehr” to Lisbon to renew contact the a/m Jugoslav.
In this he was successful, and “Mandrin” is said to have furnished, over a
considerable period, valuable reports of military nature on England. (AOB,
However, the OKW annalists suspected
the material already in autumn 1943 and concluded it being perception
material)

During 1944, a member of Stubaf. Schroeder’s (see notes on VI B 4)
“Diensstelle” in Lisbon, Kriminalkommissar Hentze, met Jebsen, whom he had
known earlier in Germany. The latter told him what he was doing in Lisbon*.
They agreed that Jebsen should furnish Hentze with any political information
he obtained of the benefit of Amt VI. In this connection, various questions
were put to the Juguslav (Popov KOP cover-name
Iwan I, British cover-name Tricycle), but at time time, he was only able to
furnish general replies to them and this was of little use to Amt VI D 2.
These replies however, definitely indicated that that the Jugoslav was well
acquainted with internal political conditions in England, and it would have
been worth while employing him. Nothing came out of it, however, as Jebsen
was recalled to Germany on charges of embezzlement (theft), and as a
political suspect. In this latter connection it was stated that he had
been in communication with pro-war English friends of him. With Jebsen’s
fall from grace went the only contact-man with whom the Jugostav (Disko
Popov) was willing to cooperate.

Later, Hentze and Htptm. Kurrer (of Mil/Amt ‘B’) to latter had handled and
briefed him – visited Jebsen in the Concentration Cap (Sachsenhausen)
in order to get him to write a letter to the “Mandarin”. This also proved
to be fruitless errand? As the Jugoslav did not return to Lisbon from
London.

* (AOB, we
may get the impression: - that Jebsen "couldn't keep his mouth" on aspects of
what he was secretly accomplishing with British S.I.S.). In this context, as
well as in respect to - what Jebsen discussed or told Ballhorn / Hans Brandes,
also a member of the German Abwehr, that he was, in some way or another, trying
to bribe someone (Sdf.
Dr. Joachim Wrede, described above);
albeit, that he did know what Ballhorn's background was. Nor did he know that
Hentze was a member of the SS controlled S.D.) (The Portuguese Government did
not approve the existence of German S.D. personnel being stationed in Lisbon,
therefore the S.D. personnel were accredited onto the German Legation; herewith
getting a diplomatic status.)

Crown Copyright

KV 2/2647-1, page 46:

→Representative
in Portugal

Staubaf Schroeder as LO
(Leading Officer?) of the German Police. (The Portuguese government would
not agree to the appointment of a police attaché) Stubaf Nassenstein (two of
his agents were Baron, a German Journalist and Pilar, a Hungarian. Stubaf
Vollbrecht, who like Stubaf Nassenstein was a member of the German Legation.

(AOB,
remarks: it seems to me, that apparently
the text does not represent Nassenstein's own words, though, the interpretation
of it, through the understanding of a British interrogator)

Crown Copyright

Brandes went to Berlin in 1944 and brought back with him special instructions
for N. (Nassenstein)
and Vollbrecht. Cramer (Fritz
KV 2/1742
and should be also considered in our forensic Survey)
subsequently found a file with instructions regarding espionage against England
signed by Schellenberg (Chief
of RSHA Amt VI)
and addressed to Vollbrecht and N. (Nassenstein)
in Vollbrecht's desk. On that same occasion he found a large sum of money
in Vollbrecht's office. (AOB,
why? Cramer was employed at KOP in an attached office, whereas Nassenstein and
Vollbrecht, as was Schroeder, where engaged on a diplomatic status at the German
Legation).

What is shown, is, that Brandes
was also engaged by Amt VI,
instead of Amt Ausland/Abwehr(KOP)
only. Or, this notice is of a later dated than 12th February 1944;
when it already had been decided: that the Amt Ausland/Abwehr
should merge with the RSHA Amt VI;
since known as Mil/Amt,
Leiter Schellenberg and up to 21th / 22th July 1944 shared
with Obst. Hansen.

Crown Copyright

What we may derive, is, that Brandes also was to be linked onto KOP, as Obstlt.
Schreiber was Leiter I H of KOP

From the Charwoman
(room cleanser!)
of 'Büro Schroeder' the British Counter Intelligence is allegedly supposed
to have learned the nature of Vollbrecht's and N's (Nassenstein's)
work and to have obtained documents from their offices.

With regard to other outstanding personalities in
K.O. Portugal, (Fritz)
Cramer (KV 2/1742)
gives the following information:

Crown Copyright

Brandes Hans (KV
2/3295): Had good connections with the
Swiss Legation in Lisbon and he obtained from them important military and
political information.

Crown Copyright

Cramer Fritz (KV 2/1742):
The most able Abwehr-man in Lisbon; formerly reception-manager at Adlon Hotel,
Berlin (Still a top ***** Hotel, in Berlin).

Brandes, Hans: Nassenstein
met him in internment in Vizela (Place
north-east of Oporto, in Portugal).
Representative of the firm "Werner A.G. Waffenfabrik." (AOB,
to what we know: the factory of his father / mother concerned a tools -
manufacture)(his
father (Jewish)
had been killed in 1939/40 and his mother lived in the vicinity of Salzburg)

Crown Copyright

N. (Nassenstein)
is not a trustworthy person. A man of strong sentiments and a 100% Nazi.
One can credit his statements with very little truth.

(AOB,
from experience for quite many years, this statement is not only touching
Nassenstein, but also is reflecting the general post-war mood - of the one who
compiled this report)

Crown Copyright

Schroeder told Cramer once that Nassenstein gave him some good reports re
England. Brandes is supposed to have helped him in that work.

Pages 117 +

Crown Copyright

At least we learn that there most likely existed also a contact onto the Amt VI
and SD controlled officials, accredited at the German Legation, in Lisbon.

Please notice the date of this
recording!

Crown Copyright

Again a Popov intermediary
statement

Erich Schroeder is chief not
only of Amt IV (Ausland SD, headed by fead Heinrich Müller "Gestapo Müller" but
also of Amt VI (military
intelligence). Nassenstein is the head man
in Amt VI (military intelligence) and Vollbrecht is No.2.

Particularly of interest for Balkan historians:

Crown Copyright

General Mihajlović
was the opponent to Tito, the Western Powers favoured more Mihajlović

Please
notice: that exact references being implemented within the photo hyperlinks.

KV 2/399
Schroeder Erich Emil; head Amt IV (incorrectly described Gestapo; should be
SD) in Lisbon.

KV 2/399-1, page 27

7. The Jebsen Affair.

Schroeder claims
that he never knew a certain Jebsen who was abducted from Portugal (29 April
1944) and returned to Germany. He recalls the name in connection with
renting a house near to the Golf Course in Lisbon, and he thinks that Jebsen
may be the person referred to in a report which Henss sent to him in 1944
while he was in Berlin. In this report, Henss told Schroeder that a certain
Johann alias Jonny had been obtaining intelligence from England and would
like to work for him. During Schroeder’s stay in Berlin, Henss is supposed
to have sent three or four of Johann’s reports to Amt VI Berlin. Henss then
lost contact with Johann.

Schroeder believes
that Johannes
alias Jonny and Jebsen were one and the same person. He says that both
Jebsen and Henss had worked for the Economic Referat of Amt VI and had met
in Berlin. Henss placed much confidence in Jebsen, and Schroeder doubts
that Henss spoke unfavourably of the man and Schellenberg or Gestapo Chief
Müller. Schroeder reports mention by Schellenberg that the Economic Referat
of Amt IV once reproached Jebsen, but Schroeder does not know why.

(AOB,
at least we notice that in some-way-or-another there existed (also) a link
between Jebsen (Popov) with the RSHA Amt VI (and Amt IV).
It isn't yet clear to what extent Jebsen knew about the background of the
Germans in Lisbon with whom he had some personal contact. What is quite confusing,
was, that since 12th
February 1944, there was
building up influence of the SS controlled
RSHA Am VI, in respect to the merging of Amt Ausland/Abwehr within RSHA Amt VI
(Amt/Mil).
(AOB, the curiosity was: that albeit that
Abwehr personnel merged with the SS controlled RSHA Amt VI (Mil/Amt), their
former Abwehr personnel were still be paid for by the OKW (Wehrmacht).
Some personnel weren't even aware whom were really in charge of them)
(The main reason was:
that personnel should not be changed in
their Wehrmacht ranking, which often was the result of a longer lasting (career)
planning or other means; the SS maintained instead their own ranking
system)

KV 2/399-2, page 39.

British S.I.S. (M.I.6)
records:

Crown Copyright

31.3.44.
According to Artist (Johannes
Jebsen), Schroeder (Leiter
representative of RSHA Amt IV in Lisbon)
was arrested on arrival in Berlin. Schroeder now cleared and
released.

14.44.
Artist reports that Schroeder recently returned from Berlin.

Crown Copyright

19.4.44. According to Tricycle
(Diško
Popov; Artist's friend), Schroeder, Police
Attaché in Lisbon and local head of Amt. IV and VI, personally took Tricycle's
S.D. report to Berlin. When Schroeder arrived in Berlin, for some unknown
reason, he was arrested for a few days and the report went straight to
Kaltenbrunner, although it was intended that it should be delivered to
Schellenberg.

The reason for this all:

Jebsen and Tricycle were
already, for some months,
distrusted by the Germans; as OKW annalists had already concluded that the
documents brought in from England by "Mandarin" Popov's German agent cover-name,
actually proved to be deception materials.

This aspect have been dealt
with in the previous forensic Survey Parts.

Jebsen refused to meet
Obstlt. Kuebart (Abwehr I) in Biarritz, in late March 1944.

For this reason, it is
quite understandable: that a courier of
the deception messages will be interrogated by the highest one in charge,
as Kaltenbrunner was the headof the RSHA (neglecting
Himmler himself). But also Schroeder
Sturmbannführer (Major) a section Leiter isn't someone to neglect when suspicion
arises.

Please notice that: apparently - the British S.I.S. (M.I.6) haven't
been sufficiently informed about the very suspicions arising against both:
Jebsen and Popov.

Bear in mind: Jebsen was a
German citizen; though Popov was a Yugoslav, and therefore abroad hardly
touchable.

However, S.I.S. (M.I.6)
on 31.1.44:

Crown Copyright

Commenting on local developments in Lisbon, Artist (Jebsen)
reports that it is definite that von Karsthof will be recalled.

Among others, Schroeder's name has been put forward as successor. He has gone to
Berlin, and probably will not return except for a few days to wind up his
affairs.

AOB: How did Jebsen know
these details, which no one in KOP will have discussed it with him?

Jebsen was quite a
womanizer, and managed to get Marie Luise von Gronau as his mistress.

Fräulein von Gronau was
a secretary at the KOP offices, this
was the way Jebsen got this information from!

Ludovico von Karsthof, an
alias of Major Ludwig Kremer von
Auenrode,
was Leiter since quite some time, but Kuebart (and Obstlt. Hansen) concluded
during foregoing visits, that Ludovico wasn't running the KOP sufficiently; and
had to be replaced.

We may consider that this
did not effect before mid May 1944, and due to airline transport problems (think
of the intervening Allied invasion of France) that he did not leave (materially)
before mid August 1944; returning to Ast Vienna (Ast XVII).

KV 2/201-1, dealt with
before, shows the implications of the engagements between Frl. Craas(s)
(indirectly) and Frl. von Gronau with Johannes Jebsen; and proving that the
Germans were rather well aware of these aspects.

Selected British RSS decrypted intercepts,
especially in regard to Sturmbannführer
Erich Schroeder, in respect to his
Portuguese engagements.

1. It now appears that
Artist - possibly on the strength of the 75.000 dollars – was being
somewhat over sanguine (optimistic) in believing that the Gruppe III
check-up himself and Tricycle (Diško
Popov) was at an end. The trouble now, it
seems, it is not the General Staff nor the Gruppe I, which letter is quite
satisfied as to Tricycles bona fides. Gruppe III, on the other hand, having
given it as their opinion that Tricycle was not reliable, are now unwilling
to admit themselves wrong. (those writing
this, knew how true Referat III actually was)

2. Schreiber
(Leiter I H KOP)
has therefore gone to Madrid to discuss the question further with
Rohrscheidt (AOB, wrong!Both Kuebart and Schreiber after meeting at
Biarritz went by car to Madrid. There Schreiber insisted - that before he
could accomplish Jebsen’s abduction, he necessitated an official document
that he could used when matters would go wrong. During this gathering at KO
Spain, there took also talks place between Schreiber and Rohrscheidt! But,
the reason was the already recognition that Tricycle deliberately was
feeding the Germans with deception materials; which was the conclusions made
after serious analysing at OKW), and Artist is
confident that, as far as Schreiber is concerned, he will uphold Tricycle
before his critics. Artist thinks it possible – though this is surmise
(guesswork) – that Heinrich and Rohleder (III-F Berlin) may also be in
Madrid taking part in the talks ..

3. Asked why Schreiber
was discussing these questions with Rohrscheidt rather than with Cramer,
Artist replied that the relations between the two men (Cramer
and Schreiber) were now so bad, that Schreiber
considered it useless to go over the case yet again with Cramer.
→

2/1742-2, page 21

Crown Copyright

Von Gronau and Craas(s).

6. Artist has
now learnt the inside story of the recall of these two (Craas(s)
and von Gronau). It appears that in Gronau’s
case the initiative originally came from Schreiber (AOB, of course, because he was the one who was
conferring with Kuebart and accordingly was informed and in corporation),
who telegraphed Berlin stating that. (KV
2/201-1, page 5 shown just below integrally),
in view of the investigations in progress and also of von Gronau’s intimacy
(mistress)
with Artist, she should be recalled for reasons of security Berlin replied
ordering the Baroness to return immediately.

(AOB,
this proves: that S.I.S. was informed, but apparently “the KOP” kept enough
secret so that S.I.S. did not get enough suspicions to respond adequately)

7. On the
strength of this success, Schreiber and Cramer decided to send Craas(s) home
without referring the matter to Berlin. (AOB,
nonsense, as KV 2/201-1, page 43 clearly proves!),
but again giving “security” as their reason. * It must be explained that
Craas(s) was generally unpopular with the K.O.P. because she was known to
have a private line of communication with Kuebart, and, previously also
Canaris, which she used to report the misdemeanours (misbehaviours)
of the various local officers. …

8. In
despatching Craas(s) home without referring the matter to headquarters. (AOB,a simple
boloney, by a Crown
Servant! Consider again KV 2/201-1, page 43: Lisbon communicating with
Berlin on 14.4.1944: …Jonny is equally au fait already with Harry’s (Schreiber’s)
order to Craass concerning further relations with Ostro (M.I.5
menace!) and remarked in this connection
thought of confirming to this order but was adhering to the instructions of
HIOB I via Ostro. (Ostro is the main
fatal reason why M.I.5. approached Jebsen (Artist) to find out information
on Ostro) As KOP cannot
continue to work in such circumstances it is urgently requested that Crass
and Gronau be immediately recalled. Giving routine reduction of staff as
justification in order not to give Jonny (Jebsen) prior warning, Signed by:
Ludovico Leiter KOP, Diaz Ii and Harry = Schreiber!

AOB,
Again: .In despatching Craas(S) home without referring the matter to
headquarters. Is the latter sentence in accordance to the foregoing message
content?

NO!

However:… the local
K.O.P. had, however, somewhat overstepped the mark. Craass had already
telegraphed from Berlin to say that the flat was to be kept on for her, as
it was possible that she might soon be returning.

(AOB, Craass at least was
in Lisbon on the day of 30 April, as she came in panic to Ostro’s wife and
told her that von Gronau had told her that when she entered Jebsen’s place
(she must have possessed a
key), that the
interior had been turned around and there existed no signs of Jebsen, what
so ever)(Paul
Georg Fidrmuc, alias Ostro PF 64447)

AOB,
Frl. Craass must at least have left for Germany say, on 1st May
44 or thereafter.

AOB:The
S.I.S. author of this document, could have never imagined, that someone
after all (76 years)knew the entire complex even the ominous omissions of the W/T message
referred onto!

“George”.

15. Cramer has
been boasting that a source of his recently opened Corlier’s safe, and was
now in a position to break Solborg’s. A few days ago, Brandes (Ballhorn)
told Artist (Jebsen)
that Cramer had “made a masterstroke” and had obtained some original Allied
material. Artist took this to meen that Cramer’s source had, in fact,
opened Solborg’s safe.

Lisbon - Berlin.
(message number)
676. To HIOB (Heer IOst Berlin)
Senior (Obst. Hansen)
through HIOB I reference our W/T of 13/4 (of
the day before) (above. According to a
communication from Jonny to Ballhorn (Hans Brandes) on morning of 14/4 Jonny (Jebsen)
has learnt from Gronau (his mistress)
and the letter on her turn from Craass, that Ostro (Paul
Fidrmuc M.I.5's menace) has been the
country for to days and has also resumed in activity in Berlin. Jonny (Artist)
asked (via Ballhorn)
whether the Ostro connections with England could be ascertained.
Jonny also knew that Hion Senior (Kuebart?)
had given permission to Ostro concerning connection of Ostro to KO
via Craass*.
Jonny is equally au fait already with Harry's (Aloys
Schreiber's) orders to Craass
concerning ban on (her)
further relations with Ostro**
and remarked in this connection that Craass has no thought of confirming to this
order but was adhering to the instructions of HIOB Ivia Ostro. A KOP cannot continue to work in
such circumstances it is urgently requested that Craass and Gronau be
immediately recalled, giving routine reduction of staff as justification in
order not to give Jonny (Jebsen)
prior warning***.
Lucovico (Leiter KOP)
DIASZ = Ii and Harry (=
Schreiber)

*
Apparently, S.I.S. did not grasp what the actual status of Ostro in the German
Abwehr was: Fidrmuc (Ostro) exceptionally possessed an extraordinary status
(since approx 1935). He was entirely independent. De factohe was not part of the Wehrmacht nor the Abwehr. However, he dedicated
his attentions in favour of the Abwehr. He was not on their personnel list.
They had to pay for his expenses and related charges. He himself decided
where and what his concerns were.

**
In some way or another, he had to pass on his gathered information onto the
Abwehr. In Portugal, this was KOP. His typed reports were handed-in in a
double-covered and sealed envelopes. Here Frl. Craass's services became
involved, as it was she who conveyed these envelopes to Obstlt. Aloys Schreiber
Leiter I H. He thereafter decided, by what means it should be passed onto to
Berlin. (diplomatic bag via a courier; or by W/T means. Unclear to me, whether
there existed a Fernschreib (FS) (telex) connection with Germany. By the way,
Frl. Craass was also a close friend of Ostro's wife.

***
Clearly herewith indicating that the Germans were already planning for an arrest
of Jebsen. Not told within this message reproduction, whether S.I.S. (M.I.6)
grasped the increasing danger of the German tactics against Jebsen, as he and
therefore also Tricycle, were suspected from late 1943 onwards - being
double-cross and delivering British deception materials.

KV 2/1742-2, page 22

Crown Copyright

Extract

PF 55032 Popov d.d. 7.3.44

Extract from a report forwarded by S.I.S.
(M.I.6)

VIII Alexander (PF
65005)

16. Artist (Jebsen) that he had heard
from von Gronau (his mistress
engaged as secretary at KOP) that Cramer,
after his success in using Alexander @ August against the British, and then the
Americans, was now trying to plant him (Alexander (PF
65005) on the Russians. Artist
(Jebsen)
suspected that this was a paper scheme evolved for the benefit of Cramer's
prestige in Berlin and doubted whether Cramer had really got anywhere with it.

(AOB, I get
the strong impression that Jebsen is over-estimating his abilities by far)

17. Artist (Jebsen)
stated that Cramer was in direct contact with one heads of the Polish
Intelligence in Lisbon working against communists in Poland. Von Gronau (Jebsen's
mistress) had said that this was
done with London's permission; Artist did not know if that meant with permission
of the Polish Government in England, or whether the British knew about it.
The contact had originally been through a Roumanian Jew who had been Minister
for King Carol's Government and who had been a regular V-Mann of Cramer's, on
his pay-roll at a rate of 50 contos per month, of which however, (Jebsen's
imaginations) Cramer probably took a cut
for himself. Cramer contacts the Pole at the Pole's house
which is near Bianchi's house, and (Jebsen's
mistress) von Gronau is nervous that one
of her visits to Bianchi might coincide with one of Cramer's visit to the Pole.
(AOB, was Jebsen's flat perhaps in
Bianchi's premises?) (24000 (S.I.S.
agent number) told me (Major
Foley of M.I.6?)
that this story relates to Kowalkwsky) (KV
2/327-1, page 70: August Waldemar von Kotlliarewski?)

KV 2/1742-2, page 23

Crown Copyright

VI. Hanke.

Artist (Jebsen)
gave the following additional information about Hanke. His reports to
Cramer consisted in the main in descriptions of the type of work being done by
different American Officials in Lisbon. Among other things he stated that
the Paramount Film Co. was largely used as a cover by the American Secret
Service.

Hanke got from Cramer 8,000 escudos a month, which was supposed to present
expenses rather than salary. The place where Cramer contacted Hanke
changed from time to time; sometimes he was picked up by a car at a quinta near
near the lighthouse at Carvavelos, but, according to von Gronau (Jebsen's
mistress), the last
meeting took place on 28th February (1944)
when he was picked up somewhere between Estoril and St. Joso.

Artist (Jebsen)
is nervous that if any action is taken to watch Hanke through von Gronau (Jebsen's
mistress) and this
might react upon Artiist's own position. Artist thinks, on the other hand,
that there is very little risk indeed of Hanke reporting back to Cramer if he is
approaching directly by the Americans, and told that they know he is working
with Cramer but, that he must in future do so under their (the
American's?) control.

KV
2/1742-2, page 25

Crown Copyright

Extract from a report by S.I.S. forwarding information from Artist (Johannes
Jebsen).

..

2.The
improvement in the Artist situation is due to prompt action by Schreiber,
Rohrscheidt (Leiter III-F Madrid) and Brandes (Ballhorn).
Schreiber urged Cramer not to lay a watch on Artist's activities (oh,
dreamers) as he said
that if Artist discovered that this was going on, it would be quite in his
character to chuck up the whole game, and to go to the front. (bullshit,
from the first moment he did everything possible to prevent himself from being
called up for military service!)
Cramer therefore telegraphed to Berlin to say that he considered a ??tch
unnecessary, or words to that effect, and did not in fact carry out plans to
watch Artist, except that a servant whome Cramer had planted on him at the
Villa Golfinho handed in some reports.

...

In a
later report it is noted that Cramer is said to be still suspicious of Tricycle
on general grounds without having any proof against him, but he no longer
mentions his suspicions since Karsthof (alias
of Leiter KOP) and
Berlin feel satisfied.

AOB:
This report smells childish; truly Infantile!

Apparently not aware, that the OKW, the addressee of Tricycle's reports from
England, came to the conclusion, after analyses that Popov's Tricycle's
reports actually contained deception information!

In a
report dated 16.4.45 it is reported that Cramer considered Tricycle's (Popov)
dossier over the last three years was against him, and ...

(no
further information available)

KV
2/1742-2, page 27

Crown Copyright

Extract from a letter from S.I.S. forwarding information given by Artist (Jebsen)

Our
Lisbon representative (Major
Foley) reported to us
as follows on 4.2.44.

Cramer
has been ordered by Berlin to give the names of Abwehr members who are believed
to be in touch with the British.

Karsthof has promised to assist Artist and has threatened to stop Cramer's
report from going to Berlin. (AOB,nonsense, as since late 1943, the Abwehr had been informed by OKW - that
Tricycle's information was deception material)
(but
it might have been, that S.I.S. did not know this, what after all - is quite
likely!)

I
would like to challenge you to draw your preliminary conclusion.

Please
notice my brief points:

Comparing what we just have been confronted with, and Jebsen's actual abduction
on 29 April 1944;

and the
disagreements about Jebsen's orders to meet Kuebart (and Schreiber) in Biarritz,
about the end of March 1944; and his pertinent refusing to obey to these German
orders.

Comparing the results of Jebsen's a bit childish optimism, with his
managed abduction from Lisbon; only a few weeks later.

And -
S.I.S. (M.I.6) representative Major Foley, likely the editor of these report
sections, who in some-way-or-another brought

everything on paper, which arrived in England.

At
least in my perception: both S.I.S. (whoever reported) and Jebsen's ignorance of
a rising conflict with the Germans;

at
least should have been less optimistic in assessing the real circumstances.

On the
other hand, the Germans well aware of the deception materials brought in by
Tricycle (Popov) (by the way: obtained for high sums of money) and the measures
to prevent Jebsen's deserting.

That
Jebsen's major informant, Frl. von Gronau his mistress (to a lesser extent Frl.
Craass), on the other hand working as secretaries in the KOP offices, was
deliberately kept out of all measures against Jebsen;

is a
proof of a set-up - as to catch Jebsen.

Astonishingly: S.I.S. actually did not grasped the dangerous implications of
their involvements!

British
intelligence generally - did not caught the facts: of the existence of a second agenda
which the German Secret Services, at least for this time, maintained in Portugal!

I suggest, and I think Miss Massey agrees, that in Madrid-Berlin message of
17.4.44 in which Werner (Unversagt
KV 2/90 - KV 2/91 PF 600055)
reports (not
traced within Unversagt's RSS intercept summary, as it stops somewhere in
1943) back to
Bergmann (real
name Major Brinkhaus whose file PF 600059 no longer exists)
reports back on 19/20th April, Kohlenklau
must be the cover-name for Hamlet (bogus!).
There seems to have been no reference under the name of Kolberg for many
months. Why this cover-name should have been used when it has
previously been used in connection with a Bolivian gentleman who has some
connections with Ast III Berlin and Brandes, but none whatsoever with
Brussels, I cannot imagine.

Yours sincerely,

T.A. Robertson (TAR)

(Lt.Colonel)

Major
F. Foley, C.M.G. (S.I.S.
(M.I.6)
representative in Portugal)

(AOB,
Kohlenklauwas the project name
given by the Germans,
for abducting Jebsen
(Artist).
In German language
Klauen = stealing
(taking something
illegally away) -
that is just what its
aim intended!)

(AOB,
just a guess:Kohle is also known in
some circles (colloquial)
as "Money" and money Jebsen inherited in a great extent; he was incredible rich.
Herewith we might have a full clue of the clever word - Kohlenklau)
(AOB, discussing this aspect with Rudolf Staritz the same day, he brought to my
attention: that "Kohlen" in Germany also stood for: "New-rich people". Jebsen's
father was the owner of a great Danish/German shipping company)

AOB:
what this letter makes clear, is - that S.I.S. in Portugal (and England)
lacked (missed) the long-planned German set-up to remove Jebsen
(Artist) from Portugal!

KV 2/2099 - KV 2/2100 - KV 2/2101 Selected papers "Washout"
AOB, I don't know yet what his real name was. This is a worthless file
series, poor reproductions and to a great extent being blanked by M.I.6
usual practices.

Next:

KV 2/1930 Weltzien (likely
Welzien) Kuno
PF 65284 Interesting - as I never heard of Weltzien, the rest does not
contributes to our forensic Survey on Jebsen

Next:

KV 2/955
Mayer Otto (PF 66190) Not of interest in respect to
our current forensic Survey on Jebsen.

Next:

KV 2/309 - KV
2/310
Lorenz Fritz Wilhelm (PF 600313) He was mainly operating as a radio
reporter in France and some time in Russia.
No sense.

Next:

KV
2/279 - KV 2/280

Alfred
Naujocks

(PF
600485)

Crown Copyright

Alfred
Naujocks

a
rather dubious and frightening SS related person.

According to what have been noticed, Naujocks never operated from the Iberian
Peninsula, thus also excluding Portugal.

Therefore we skip his files.

Next:

KV
2/1963

Konrad
Karl

PF
600263

Actually this file is a spin-off of the Weltzien's (Welzien) file

I
cannot predict whether this file will bring us information on our forensic
Survey.

Had
that day learned that the Admiral himself (Admiral
Canaris Chief of Ausland/Abwehr)
has decided he should go down to Krumholz. He - the Admiral - has said that the
work down there (Portugal) is more important than here (Ast
Niederlande in the
Hague). Counted as promotion to be transferred there. The Major had fought
hard against the transfer. Conrad had told even the Obstlt. that he did
not want to move, but the Obstlt. said everything possible had been done
to retain him, but nothing could be done in view of the Admiral's decision.
His successor, a Oblt., comes in the following week. Conrad after handing over
will have several days in Köln.

He
thinks that in Lisbon he will be attached to the Legation or the Consulate (AOB,
KOP attached to the Legation).
He has no idea what goes on there, but imagines he has to interrogate seamen who
come ashore from the ships in port. The work should be very interesting,
but he wishes it were not so far from home (Köln) (Cologne),
and Krumholz were not there.

KV
2/1963-1, page 29 - 30

Crown Copyright

23.2.41

Writes
from Lisbon that he has now been away from home for a week. He is living in a
hotel on the front from the town. Office hours 10 - 4 o'clock. Work very
slack and he cannot understanmd why Krumholz did not manage alone. Krumholz
seems to have made himself very disliked and does not appear to get on with
Kraemer (Fritz Cramer KV 2/1742 PF 602496; Part_X). Conrad (Konrad)
does not know which of them is in the right, but knowing Krumholz ...

Konrad
is going to await Cramer's
return before moving from his hotel. From his room can see all ships going
in and out. Sends his wife good wishes for her 50th birthday on the
following Sunday (2.3.41)

(AOB,
at least we notice Konrad's arrival at KOP III, in Lisbon.

KV
2/1963-1, page 30

Crown Copyright

28.2.41

Conrad
is going to move from his hotel on the following week; his present hotel too
expensive. He has a residence permit for one year. Krumholz has gone to
Oport for three days. Konrad
is going there (Oporto)
in the following month.

Page 37
ending on 28.3.42 and proceeding on page 38 on 10.3.44.

Thus
leaving a gap.

The
cover-names used could only be understand by the forgoing noticed files: KV
2/1930 Weltzien (Welzien) and KV 1742 on Fritz Cramer.

KV
2/1963-2, page 47

The red
text just tells us that it concerned once Britain's most valuable secret; also
known as MSS!

Crown Copyright

Please
digest its content yourself, but consider the explanations below

AOB,
what can we derive from these intercepts? First that in
contrast to what is suggested within the reproduced private diary on behalf of
Karl Konrad - that he was longer engaged on the Iberian Peninsula.

Not
shown, but RSS decrypt page 2 ends on 29.10.42; when he still is engaged in the
region of Algerciras, Tetuan, Tanger (Tangier).

Albeit
that that a message is recorded on 13.7.42: Berlin - Madrid For Lago.
Lopez (Konrad)
is posted to Ast Netherlands. He is to take up his post as soon as
possible. Wire date. Sommer (alias
of Leiter KO Spain)

However,

I could
have shown many more examples, though not on Jebsen and Tricycle.

?Identical
with Sonderführer Bucher or Buchner, who worked in Major Munzinger's office, the
referent for I.H. Süd-Ost. The latter no filing system in his office, and
relied on Buchner's memory. He was known to Artist, who says that he did
all Munzinger's, he possibly suspected that Artist was not genuine in his work
for the Abwehr, but would be personally loyal to him. At his request
Buchner extracted from the Abwehr files in Belgrade the adverse police report on
Meteor (Sostaric - Piscacic) which resulted later in his arrest in Greece 1942.
He also intercepted a message from Mihalovic's (opponent
to Tito) local HQ in
Belgrade, to the effect that although Meteor, was being sent out to work for the
Germans, he would in fact no do so. According to Meteor, he was introduced
to Buchner by Artist (Johannes
Jebsen) in Berlin,
just before the latter left for Athens on the 8th February 1943. Buchner
was in charge of him, while he was there, staying at the Adlon Hotel (Berlin),
he was given a telephone number to ring in case of need 21749 (?
in Berlin? if so, than the number is faulty because Berlin telephone number
counted six digits) (or,
did he have to dial first a Wehrmacht exchange and covered it a name within the
OKW internal exchange system?)
Meteor was instructed by Bucher in secret writing, but he did not seem
very expert, and was unable to answer technical questions, without first finding
out the answer, probably from a Fräulein Doktor, who was an expert in Secret
Writing, and was introduced to Meteor, by Buchner, just before he left berlin in
March. According to Artistm but apparently of equal importance.

AOB, a
query: the Adlon
Hotel in Berlin an ***** Hotel of Berlin and thus expensive.
But Jebsen himself a
rich man could easily afford to life this way.
But, may we derive
from this, that Jebsen (Artist) was employed before he went to Portugal, at the
Abwehr offices in Berlin?)

AOB:
another curious matter - using the word Artist was only known to the British,
but not directly Kraatz. Implementing this word in the text, likely implies that
the matter had been pre-cooked before.
Consequently, the text
is quite confusing as the real sequence of matters told during interrogation
might no longer being reliable, since have been typed on paper!

Nevertheless,

We
might draw a conclusion that also this office concerned had their doubts
on the reliability
of Jebsen (Artist).

Second day in Lisbon (Oct 43) went to American Embassy and was
contacted next day by our agent.

4.
Contact with OSS.

Brought to attention of OSS Lisbon in December 1943 by an
informer in whose home he was living. January - April 1944 he was contacted
through a cut-out and gave information on Abwehr organisation and personalities.
He expressed willingness to act as a double-agent and in cooperation with the
British, was given chicken-feed to pass to Germans.

During May he continued to report to OSS and to transmit chicken-feed. On
18 may he received orders to leave Lisbon on 27 May and proceed via Paris to
Bremen for re-assignment. Arrangements were made for him to contact a
representative of OSS in Paris and to report to a cover address in Lisbon.

KV
2/382-3, page 13!

Allianca Propaganda (Artist
+?) is packed into a trunk and taken
away in a automobile leaving the garage in the rear of the Buenos Aires
building. As to the reports I gave to E. (Eitel)
he is now trying to obtain sources which he can credit for this information.
He will hand the material referring to the convoys (AOB,
did the leave for Biarritz with two cars?)
to Bendixen, whereas he will hold the other two facts until the return of
Buckner (Buecking?).
E asked me who they two gentleman were who desired to speak
with him. I answered that they were both gentlemen and that I could
say nothing further. He asked me whether one of them would be a Navy man,
as this was his line or field. I replied that I could not answer his
question but if he had information of this nature to reveal, he could well give
it to me as I had some knowledge of the subject myself.

(AOB,
in my perception "Allianca Propaganda"
may well point at the couple:
Jebsen and Moldenhauer;
whom both had been abducted at the office of KOP which was situated annex the
Legation at Rua Buenos Aires, in Lisbon. They were transported in trunks that
same night (29th April 1944) to Biarritz, via Spain. Interesting to consider that maybe two cars have
got on their way to Biarritz).

Extract taken from S.I.S. (M.I.6)
Report on meeting with Artist (Johan
Jebsen) on 28.4.44 (the
day before Jebsen had been abducted)

Baumann (Dr.
Rudolf).

19. In view of Eberle's (Eitel's)
assertion that Baumann was working for I Wi, I asked Artist what he was doing at
present. Artist said that he (Baumann)
was still officially head of II (Abwehr
Referat II; sabotage),
but was deputising for Koschnick (KV 2/3159), who was on holiday ..

KV
2/384-3, page 15

Crown copyright

Eitel
Karl @ Eberle Karl

KV
2/385-1, page 45

Eitel.

With reference to B.1.W (Mr. Milmo's) memorandum of 30.4.45, Eitel has been
questioned and has no further information to add to that contained in the
paragraph of the report referred to.

Eitel has never heard the name Fidrmuc in connection with espionage in the
Middle east or in any other connection.

Photographs of Fidrmuc (OSTRO),
his wife, and Paul Falus were shown to Eitel, but failed to recognise any of
them.

(AOB, a good proof
that the special circumstances in which Fidrmuc
(Ostro)
operated, worked-out perfectly well)

(AOB, please bear in
mind: that Jebsen had been asked: whether he could provide information on Ostro,
the alias of Paul Georg Fidrmuc; this circumstance and his not being aware that
Ballhorn (Hans Brandes albeit half-Jewish, was also a member of the KO in
Portugal), was ultimately lethal)

These
files ending with KV 2/385-2

without
any relevant result.

I get
the strong impression, that also Eitel's interrogators were lacking sparkling
drives than repeating matters time and again.

Dr.
Lambertus Elfrink
Dutch, however,
arrived from South Africa, staying there in touch with Trompke and Dr. Rensburg
(Ossewa Brandwag)

Planned
British Double Cross name Hamlet

This
case is in our current context of no relevance.

Only of
interest is: that the
British Secret Services apparently maintained the Double Cross name Hamlet twice.

See KV
202 versus KV 2/327

Next?

KV
2/2454

Hans
Friedrich Grimm @ Grasshoff Harold

PF
600288

My
primary selection criterium being his connection with Portugal

Terminated without relevant information.

Next:

KV
2/858

Disko
Popov

PF
55032

Please
notice, that the entire files series are in numbers exceeding 4900 pages!

Vol. 14

Crown Copyright

Popov
Dusan Miladoroff

KV
2/858-1, page 9

Crown Copyright

Source Junior (Dr.
Ruser, Estoril Porugal)

Jebsen must be careful with Moldenhauer as Moldenhauer and Pepe are on intimate
terms. I remember that Jebsen told Moldenhauer too many things. And I have
warned him before I left when I last saw him as I never considered Moldenhauer
discret. now my mother tells me that she warned Moldenhauer to be careful
with Pepe and break off with him. He replied that he could not as Pepe
knew already too much about him.

The meeting between S.I.S. (Major
Foley M.I.6) and
Artist (Jebsen)
on 28.4.44 (the day
before Jebsen's abduction)
was referred to in my previous note. A written report has now been
received which slightly amplifies the information previously available.
The written report states that Moldenhauer was in Lisbon on 28.4.44 staying with
Artist. Artist had also reported that there was a chance of Brandes (Ballhorn)
being recalled of his failure to produce his agents. (rumours
only)
According to Artist, Brandes was worried that Tricycle should be so good an
agent as Brandes was afraid that Tricycle would report the date and place of
invasion and this prolong the war. Artist informed S.I.S. that although he
was convinced that Brandes was not trying to trap him into any admission.
Artist acted as though Brandes was so trying and therefore always reacted to
Brandes' suggestions as a good German should.

KV
2/858-1, page 13

Crown Copyright

On 30.4.44 Berlin, on
behalf of (Nest) Cologne (Köln), (to which place Abwehrstelle
Moldenhauer's control seems to have been moved back from Brussels), sent a
message to Lisbon which seems to indicate that Cologne did not at that date
suspect anything unusual had happened to Moldenhauer. On 8.5.44

KV
2/858-1, page 14

Crown Copyright

On 8.5.44 there
was a rather corrupt message from Lisbon to Berlin referring to Schreiber's
previous message from Biarritz in which he reported the success of the
undertaking Dora. (apparently
like Kohlenklau the cover-name for the abduction and conveying both captured men
Jebsen and not expected Moldenhauer too)
The corrupt message of 8.5.44 twice refers to two people by the initials J (Jebsen
= Artist) and M (Moldenhauer),
and goes on to to say that the S.D. was beginning investigations regarding their
whereabouts. The sense of the rest of the message is not absolutely clear
but probably means that Schreiber advised his superiors in Berlin to tell the
S.D. in berlin about the position, presumably so that the S.D. would stop making
enquiries, and Schreiber seems to have asked to be told the story the Abwehr in
Berlin intended to tell the S.D., presumably so that the Abwehr in Lisbon could
stick to the same story. (The initial M in the message, coupled with the
fact that Moldenhauer was staying with Artist, seems to indicate that
Moldenhauer was taken to Biarritz by Schreiber with Artist. This would fit
the earlier message about sending on J and W M from Biarritz to
Berlin, because one of Moldenhauer cover-names was Waldmann.

KV
2/858-1, page 14

Crown Copyright

On 9.5.44 Kuebart told Schreiber in Lisbon that so far no report on the
execution (abduction)
of undertaking Dora had arrived in Berlin and asked for it to be sent as quickly
as possible.

(AOB:
we may draw the conclusion that at least Schreiber was among the convoy from the
garage in the rear of Rua Buenos Aires consisted of two cars; not unlikely to
what was being noticed as:
Allianca Propaganda
at Eitel's KV 2/382-3, page 13, where they spoke of convoys and I already
noticed the the word implied at least two cars)

(AOB: I sometimes have the
feeling that Major Foley (S.I.S.)
was a bit naive. Jebsen was heavily
engaged in all sorts of financial manipulations, also doing business with the SS;
however,
one shouldn't dare to cheat these men!)

KV
2/858-1, page 23

Crown Copyright

9.5.44
Berlin to Lisbon. For Ludovico (Leiter
KOP) for Harry (Schreiber).
So far no report on execution of undertaking Dora (abduction
of Jebsen; also known as Kohlenklau)
has arrived. (likely
meant in Biarritz)
Please sent it as quickly as possible.
HION I (likely Obst.
Hansen, or a subordinate)
7761/44 Secret.

(AOB,
by this time Jebsen
and Moldenhauer must have arrived by aircraft in Berlin already)

I had a long talk with Tricycle yesterday evening. It is of course impossible to
tell him that we know Artist is in Germany*;
as far as facts go he only knows that Artist failed to keep an appointment with
our representative (likely
pointing at Major Foley)
on 5.5.44 and that our people in Lisbon have ascertained that Artist has not
been home since 29.4.44. Tricycle (Disko
Popov) also knows that
at the meeting on 28.4.44, when Artist sent him a letter, everything appeared to
Artist to be in good order.

Tricycle realises that there is a possibility that Artist may have been
kidnapped by the Germans, particularly because Artist himself suggested (as has
been made known to Tricycle) that the request for Artist (Jebsen)
to attend the meeting at Biarritz on 21.4.44**
was in Artist's opinion a possible trap to get Artist to occupied territory***.

#
Essential lessons:

*
This sentence shows clearly - that British Secret Services played games with
their (double-cross) agents. Therefore, is the Wikipedia story on Jebsen
such a rubbish - that Jebsen did not give away the information passed onto
him by the British, concerning D-Day. They considered painfully every word
what their agents should be informed of; quote:
of course
impossible to tell.

** 21st April
might indicate that the the meeting date in Biarritz has been changed
(postponed) several times; as to match to the fact that Jebsen would respond
on ultimatums set by Berlin I.

***
All were aware of the danger. Though, nowhere expressed
being the fact that British Secret Services feared the danger that Jebsen
could pass-on essential D-Day (Overlord)
information.
Simply, because they (Jebsen and Popov/Tricycle) weren't informed!

KV
2/858-1, page 51 + 52

Crown Copyright

Attention is also
drawn to paragraph 6, which shows that it is clear that the other man who has
been taken to Germany is Moldenhauer. There could hardly have been a worse
coincidence than that Moldenhauer was staying with Artist at this time in view
of the partial knowledge Moldenhauer has of the true position owing to
Artist's (Jebens's)
earlier folly in discussing his fake suicide letter with Moldenhauer*.
The initial M in the message first quoted above only fits to Moldenhauer but he
is also known by the code names Mannwald and Waldmann, This may account
for the reference to W in the earlier message about taking people from Biarritz
to Berlin. It is also likely that when Schreiber referred to
undertaking Dora (= abduction or kidnapping of Jebsen (Artist)
and Compagnion (his
friend/colleague Moldenhauer)
he was meaning that he had picked up Moldenhauer as well as Artist (Jebsen)
because he had found them together. (actually
Jebsen took Moldenhauer with him as to stand stronger in any case)

We cannot expect to
get any concrete reactions from MSS as to the extent to which Garbo (Spanish;
Juan Pujol Garcia, likely Britain's the most important double cross agent!)
is compromised. We were still speculating as to the fate of Artist (Jebsen)
as late as the evening of the 6.5.44 in spite of the fact that there was
evidence on M.S.S. as early as 30.4.44 that Artist had been kidnapped and had
passed through Madrid at 2 p.m.*
that day en route to Berlin. Similarly on the 29.4.44 were convinced, as
was Artist himself, that both his position and that of Tricycle (Disko
Popov) had never been
more secure.**
This in spite of the fact that there was evidence on M.S.S. (though in a form
unintelligible at the time) that Artist's kidnapping (Dora
or Kohlenklau) had
been planned and was imminent on the 25.4.44.***
It was put in operation the same night that our confidence in him was at its
height. M.S.S. appeared to support Artist's believe that
Schreiber was his ally and was fighting his battles against the suspicions of
the High Command (Mil
Amt Berlin), the
Abwehr and the S.D. whereas Schreiber was in fact the man chosen to carry out
his kidnapping.

(AOB:don't forget:
that the Abwehr by then was part of the SS controlled RSHA; and that not only
the Abwehr played their games - but also Schroeder's Amt IV representative in
Lisbon)

KV
2/858-1, page 57

Crown Copyright

It is difficult to speculate as to the causes of Artist's arrest****.
One can only say that this case being dealt with on the highest level by the
Germans and there is every likelihood that the S.D. (both
S.D. and Abwehr obeyed to the SS controlled R.S.H.A.)
will, as is already shown, endeavour to discredit Artist and through him the
Abwehr******.
If the Tricycle organisation (a
great word for merely nothing)
which has has for several years been suspect, could finally be proved to be
controlled there is the possibility that having won the day they will be
satisfied with their success without attempting to discredit and investigate the
Garbo organisation which in itself would be an enormous task. Any
investigation would be handicapped by the necessity of first having to convince
Felipe (Sdf
Kuehlenthal KO Spain)
that Garbo was controlled, as task which in view of Felipe's implicit confidence
in Garbo would immensely difficult. The S.D. may, or may not, be aware of
this set of facts. (AOB,
they really became aware after the event of D-Day cover-name Overlord, on
6th June 1944, where the Germans realised the misleading games played by British
Secret Services)
So far we know they have to date shown no interest whatsoever in Garbo's
activities.

#
Lesson two to be drawn

*
This fact actually is to what we know: A car convoy left the garage in the
back-yard of Rua Buenos Aires one car carrying the trunks carrying Jebsen
and Moldenhauer; new is the fact that also Schreiber joined the convoy
heading for Biarritz taking the shortest route possible via San Sebastian -
Irun and Hendaye which is situated quite near to Biarritz; arriving on
1st May 1944 in Biarritz.

**
The chicken-feed provided by British Secret Service - had been already
recognised by analysts of the OKW, and considered deception materials. In
other words, Jebsen and Popov (Artist
and Tricycle) both
were distrusted already for several months; think of late 1943.

*** Considering
the forgoing conclusions, that at some state the Abwehr had been ordered to
take, careful, but decisive, counter-actions; what ultimately happened was
the consequence of misconduct conceptions on the Allied side.

****
They weren't aware of it, because they have relied too much upon Artist's,
quite, childish assessments. Jebsen once gained a Law degree at Freiburg
University, in the 1930s; but he actually stayed to be totally weird
individual.

*****
It actually didn't work out this way as being forecasted by those losing a
"game set".

6.
Consequently, the cover plan has been to a considerable extent, though by no
means exclusively, built upon the reports of XX (Double-Cross)
agents (i.e. of all the most important of the Germans who are straight agents in
German eyes). The fact that Artist, who is fully cognisant of the Tricycle
network and who has some knowledge or at least some inkling of the other cases (parallel
games plaid with other agents),
has fallen under suspicion and been removed to Berlin by the Abwehr therefore,
prima facie, threatens the whole cover plan.

7. We cannot tell exactly why Artist has fallen under
suspicion - we only know that he is regarded as "unreliable". Such
indications as there are suggest that his "unreliability" may be connected with
his financial
operations (AOB,
I considered these manipulations already several times in the context of this
"forensic Survey"),
his intrigues with the S.D. (I
have pointed at this aspect several times before as well),
or his unwise inquisitiveness into the undertakings of Brandes (Ballhorn)
and Ostro, and not with the dealings with Tricycle at all. There is
no proof that treason on the part of Artist in connection with Tricycle is part
of the charge. But obviously ..... Artist may well betray all,
on.....******

#
Lesson three drawn

****** AOB, for the
first time British
Secret Service recognise the dubious dealing
(manipulations)
Jebsen (their
Artist) had been
engaged.
The latter
considerations painting a quite dubious acting person.
Did he really necessitate money? Not at all - he was from himself
incredible riche!

15.
This time alone makes me believe that we ought not to close down the agents,
however suspect, until at the earliest shortly before D-Day. I do not
myself think that it is at all likely that we shall have to consider seriously
the advisability of closing them down, though I do think that we shall very
likely have to switch over from the policy of the definite cover plan to that of
"confusion".

16.
My recommendations therefore are:-

i. That we continue to run the Tricycle traffic in the same
style as before and with a little change as possible - but that no Fortitude
deception is put over on it.

ii. The the other agents continue for the time being exactly
as at present.

iii. That if we get information that the situation has
deteriorated, the agents are used to fill the German mind with confusion instead
of passing over complete cover plan.

iv. That if and only if the blowing of Tricycle and Garbo is
certain, we close down all agents shortly before D-Day and deny all information
to the enemy.

B.1.a. 9.5.44
Signed J.C Masterman (Major) (AOB,
he was responsible for Double-Cross at M.I.5.)

KV
2/858-2, page 4

Crown Copyright

Tricycle left Lisbon on 12.4.44, and there is ample evidence, even if we exclude
statements made by Artist (Jebsen)
by Brandes (Ballhorn)
that at that time all who were handling the German end of this case were
completely satisfied with him. Since then events have been taking place
rapidly which require careful consideration of all available material. It
is clear that he had persuaded those he met to agree to somewhat outrageous
financial proposals, and that Wiegand (alias
of Sdf. Dr. Joachim Wrede, KV 2/560, stationed in Paris)(He
sadly became due to Jebsen's financial dealings engaged in these dubious matters
and ultimately was also hung on 10 December 1944; the execution date of Jebsen
isn't known to me) had
omitted himself to do his best to get these proposals accepted.

(AOB,
Now I tend to consider: that the latter proposals on behalf of Jebsen,
finally leading to Dr. Wrede's death)

KV
2/858-2, page 4

Crown Copyright

On 13.4.44 Schreiber (KV
2/3568, Obstlt. Dr. Aloys; Leiter I H KOP)
reported to Berlin that according to a communication from Brandes of 11.4.44
Artist (Jebsen)
was notionably trying to find out about OSTO (Paul
Georg Fidrmuc the ominous spy)
and his connections. In order to avoid accidents, the secretary, Lily
Craass
(Schreiber's shorthand
secretary), had
forthwith been forbidden any contact with Ostro. (AOB,
quite difficult as Lily was a girl-friend of Ostro's wife),
because through her connection with Baroness Marie Luise
von Gronau (Fritz
Cramer's secretary)
Artist learnt everything. Berlin's attention was drawn to a previous
communication, presumably by letter, referring to oral reports made by Brandes
to Kuebart
concerning Lilly Craass at a conference in Berlin. There also been an
earlier reference to a, presumably written, memorandum by Brandes on the subject
of Artist.

13.4.44
Lisbon-Berlin.
664. to HIOB (Heer
I Ost
Berlin)
I. According to a Ballhorn (Brandes)
communication of 11/4 Jonny is openly trying to find out about Ostro and
his connections. In order to avoid accidents Angestellte Craass
has forthwith been forbidden any contact with Ostro (hardly
realistic as Lilly was a girlfriend of Ostro's wife),
because through her connection with Angestellte von Gronau Jonny (Jebsen), as
proved, again learns everything. Forwarding of all Ostro's reports and
letters is still assured and will be discussed with Erbprinz (Wolff
Otto von Amerongen)
before he leaves by air. If Berlin discussion with Ostro should go against
the above ruling owing to the latest event not having, become known there, it is
requested that the prohibition be confirmed by FS (Fernschreiber
= telex) Your
attention is drawn to our No. 394 Leiter I of 11/4 concerning Craass
at the last conference in Berlin.
Ludovico (von
Karsthof(f) Leiter KO Portugal)
Harry (= Dr. Aloys
Schreiber, Leiter I H KOP)

KV
2/858-2, page 4

Crown Copyright

On
17.4.44 Schroeder (KV
2/399, Emil Erich Schroeder Leiter Amt IV in Portugal Legation)
the head of the S.D. in Lisbon, sent a long telegram to Berlin for Enzer?
(believed to be Schellenberg head
Amt VI (Mill Amt)
and for the head of Amt IV, for Quitting?, who is the head of the counter
espionage section of Amt IV, about Artist?. The telegram stated that
according to information from Spain it had become known that Artist possessed a
German and British diplomatic passports, and also a letter of recommendation
from Rotsschil's English headquarters to the British Embassy Madrid requesting
that Artist should be given every assistance in case of difficulties with Amt
IV. (AOB, by this time
SS controlled RSHA Amt IV. In Berlin Ausland S.D.)
(AOB, Rothschild was
mainly concerned with sabotage aspects)
Artist was said to have planned to buy up French funds through nominees for the
Rothschild banks; to smuggle 30 million Swiss francs from German occupied
territories and to conclude further shady (covered)
deals S.D. Lisbon added that as regards Artist's (Jebsen's)
relationship with Rothschild they knew from Chaker??, head of Abt. III of the
Abwehr in Lisbon, that a relationship existed with the Abwehr's agreement for
reason of camouflage. The S.D. Lisbon suggested that elucidation with
Artist on that matter should be postponed until Guetting? visited Lisbon.
The Abwehr in Lisbon had not been informed, and the S.D. in Berlin were
requested not to inform the Abwehr in Berlin. (AOB,
meant Mil Amt?)
(A mythical correspondence between Artist (Jebsen)
and Rothschild has existed for some time with the knowledge of the Abwehr, its
supposed being to explore the the possibility of Artist getting to England,
apparently as a refugee but actually to run Tricycle group of agents on the
spot. There is no foundation for the suggestion that Artist is indulging??
in financial deals with Rothschild.)

KV
2/858-2, page 5 + 6

Crown Copyright

In the meantime a
meeting took place between Artist and S.I.S. (M.I.6.
likely Major Foley) on
18.4.44. Artist was warned not to trust Brandes but the only ground
which could be given him for this advice was that we did not trust reports
Artist had previously given us for which Artist's source was Brandes. (this
is the downside of not really informing agents)
Artist reported that Brandes own position was weak because he had had difficulty
in explaining why his mystical agent could not be reproduced. Artist was
aware of the recall of the secretaries (Von Gronau and Craass),
but was unaware of the real reasons for their recall, although by 25.4.44 he had
learnt that Schreiber had von Gronau (Jebsen's
mistress) recalled in
view of the investigations in progress and Gronau's intimacy with Artist.

(AOB,
both, von Gronau and
Lilly Craass were still in Portugal on 30 April 1944; as in one of Ostro's files
Fidrmuc mentioned: that on 30 April during the day Lilly Craass came in great
panic to Ostro's house and told them that her girlfriend von Gronau found
Jebsen's apartment (apparently
she possessed an apartment key)
found everything turned upside-down and no sign of Jebsen)(I
tend to suppose: that Schroeder's men might have cleared the job)

KV
2/858-2, page 6
Maybe of secondary relevance, but it explains the wider context quite well

Crown Copyright

Artist quoted
Schreiber (KV 2/3568)
and Henss (no
file found, but an S.D. men from Oporto)
for statements that Tricycle's stock was extremely high*,
but went on that Abt. III (Leiter
Fritz Cramer; KV 2/1742, in Lisbon?)(Referat
III, was counter intelligence - just the Branch responsible)
were making a further investigation and that a series of test were likely, the
first of which had been the instructions to Artist to go to Biarritz.
Artist was confident that Brandes, as far as he was able, would keep Artist (Jebsen)
warned of future tests. (It is an open question whether the summons**
to Artist to go to Biarritz was or was not a trap, but I think it can be taken
as certain that Artist believed that it contained a trap. Artist's
statement that Abt. III were investigating may or may not be correct, but there
is no independent evidence of this. It is true , that Heinrich(?),
head of Abt. III (meant
RSHA Mil/Amt?)
was expected in Lisbon, but there is nothing to show that this had anything to
do with Artist (Jebsen)
or Tricycle.

*
This might indicate that the Germans played their game quite professionally,
in contrast to the British Services in this respect.

**
"Summons" might rightly indicate - that Jebsen had been ordered
several times previously to present himself in Biarritz. Please bear in mind:
Tricycle and therefore also Jebsen /Artist, were suspected of working for
the British Intelligence Services. We may fairly consider this was initiated
about late 1943; as Tricycle's materials proved by OKW annalists to be clear
deception materials. Since the Vermehren disaster, of early February 1944,
all alarm bells rung! According to Kuebart's statements (KV
2/410) indicate
already since late March 1944.

KV
2/858-2, page 6

Crown Copyright

On 21.4.44
Schreiber informed Kuebart in Berlin that Brandes had learned from Artist*
that the latter intended to utilise Lilly
Craass**
to a greater extent for getting his information from K.O. Portugal since
Gronau had dropped out through being given other duties. As a precaution
against further leakages Craass was was sent to Berlin on April 21st.***

*
Albeit warned several times on behalf of British Secret Services, Jebsen
proved to be ignorant for their arguments. What might have counted: was,
that the Top Secrecy of MSS forced them to express themselves so
indefinitely that Jebsen did not grasp the implications of their warnings.

**
Lilly Craass was the shorthand secretary to Schreiber Leiter I H in KOP.
Maybe not known, she was directed directly by Admiral Canaris himself,
therefore: not a simple Frl. to make a mistress.

***
Time-and-again is stated: that both women left Lisbon shortly after the
intercepted W/T messages of 13/14 April 1944. This isn't in accordance to
Ostro's (Fidrmuc's)(KV
2/196 ... KV 2/201)
statement during his interrogations by the Americans (G-2) in Germany
1946/47. Craass was a friend of Ostro/Fidrmuc's family, in particular his
wife. According Ostro/Fidrmuc: on 30 April 44 - she came in great
hurry as von Gronau approached her in panic, and told her that she went to
Jebsen's apartment (apparently she possessed a key) and discovered that the
flat had been turned upside-down. We may safely assume, the Germans had
thoroughly searched the flat. Therefore; both Frl. must have left
somewhere in May 1944. I even can imagine that both women had been
interrogated as well, before they left Portugal.

KV
2/858-2, page 7

Crown Copyright

On
25.4.44 Kuebart (KV
2/410) (and
Schreiber Leiter I H KOP)*
in Madrid sent an
immediate message to (Obst.)
Hansen in Berlin: "According today's news the carrying out of the
threatened plan (Dora)
is imminent. Request your permission to prevent this plan even if it
should become necessary to use extreme measures. Hansen replied giving
permission**.
(It seems almost certain the notification to Schreiber that Jebsen was preparing
the way with S.I.S. (M.I.6)
for certain consequences.)

*
Schreiber's version being well covered within his KV 2/3568.
The whole matter originated from: that Schreiber insisted before his taking
action against Jebsen (Artist) - that be got a confirmation from the highest
in charge in casu Obst. Hansen; his reason was that when matters went
wrong that he is cleared from impropriated acting also against the
Portuguese authorities. It is also here clear that MSS provided much
intelligence, but sometimes just lacking essential facts.

**
Kuebart's plan was to proceed after Biarritz on to Madrid, anyway. Schreiber
joined him, as KO Spain in Madrid possessed excellent facilities to
communicate with Berlin Mil/Amt directly.

KV
2/858-2, page 8

Crown Copyright

On
30.4.44 the S.D. in Berlin (RSHA Amt IV) warned their representative in Lisbon
to take extreme caution in matters relating to Artist (Jebsen),
in particular, whatever the course of events, the Abwehr had to be prevented
from learning of the collaboration planned between Artist and the S.D. (Previous
references had shown that the S.D., both in Berlin and Lisbon, had intended to
continue to use the services of Artist and Tricycle, and in fact it was for
reason that Artist was to be integrated on financial matters in Lisbon and not
brought back to Germany.)*

* Here we may
draw an interesting picture: first the Abwehr's interests. On 12
February 44 (just two-and-a-half months before, Hitler had been informed of
the dissertion of the couple Vermehren whom went over to the British side in
Turkey. Hitler's furious response was: that from now on the Abwehr should be
solved and merging within RSHA Mil/Amt; Canaris was dismissed and in March
44 he was proceeded by Obst. Hansen, who was becoming part of Mil/Amt headed
by Schellenberg. Hansen was also heavily engaged in the preparations for
eliminating Hitler. There were clear signs in conversations between Jebsen
(Artist) and Brandes; in which Jebsen had indicated that when necessary he
easily could desert to the British side. This information "rung alarm-bells"
as when this happened, what might be Hitler's response? Would it jeopardise
all preparation for eliminating Hitler's clan? Which attempts failed
on 20 July 1944.

KV
2/858-2, page 37

Crown Copyright

von Gronau and Craass.

7. The fact that von Gronau continued to see Artist up to
the time of her departure*
annoyed Schreiber, who told Henss and Schroeder (Leiter Amt IV) that she and
Craass had been recalled owing to the investigations then in progress (notice
the KV 2/201-1, page 43 references).
According to Artist (apparently
S.I.S.'s sole source in Lisbon at that time)
this was not entirely true. The Baroness was in fact recalled from
Berlin*,
but Craass'
departure had already been mooted by Bendixen (I
M) for other
reasons, and the latter did a little fixing of the telegram to make it
appear that she had been recalled by Berlin instead of being sent back from
this end.

8. Cramer (KV
2/1742)
is already missing the Baroness and told Schreiber that he was contemplating
collaborating with Artist to try and get her sent out again.**

*She had been his
mistress, this often implies sexual dependency.

** Again, both
ladies (Frl.) were for whatever circumstance in Lisbon free to move!
According Ostro's (Paul Georg Fidrmuc) statements, he recalled that on
30 April 44,
Frl. Craass
came to his private home in Estoril and told him and his wife, that her
girlfriend Frl. von Gronau came to Jebsen's apartment and found everything
turned upside-down.

Please
bear in mind, that these kinds of file reproductions reflect only what was know
and/or understood by the Secret Services in England; not necessarily need to be
true.

Terminating

KV 858
series.

Next

only
for checking whether the next file series providing some of interest as well

KV
2/859

Volume
15

PF
55032

KV
2/859-2, page 9 !

Crown Copyright

Extract from letter from Junior (Dr. Ruser in Estoril Portuga)l to Major
Masterman (responsible to Double Croos) dated 8.11.44.

Dear
Major Masterman,

Both my mother and myself, are convinced that Jebsen cannot have gone back to
Germany of his free will. He might have been extremely sporadic in his past
movements and appearances, that is to say, before he ever met him through
Moldenhauer in the summer of 1941. But, since then, things have changed
radically for him. Something, unknown to me, had turned up just before I met
him, which made it impossible for him to go back to Germany. Moldenhauer
had already referred to that before introducing me to Jebsen. And Jebsen
had left France in such a hurry, before he came to Spain, that he despatched
someone to Paris at great costs, to fetch his personal things and arrange some
urgent affairs of his. And Jebsen had, then, always showed himself
genuinely terrified at the idea of a possible order by the Nazis to go back to
Germany. He was, indeed, seriously contemplating all sorts of back-outs to
meet such an event. If he has now disappeared from the peninsular without
previously contacting you we must assume that he has been kidnapped.

The odds against me are, therefore, worse than ever. You will remember
that I have always expressed a very uncomfortable feeling at the aspect of
Jebsen carrying the knowledge of my present whereabouts around with him,
especially while engaged on so dangerous missions in Spain and Portugal.
As Pepe knew that Jebsen had frequently visited me in my hotel room just before
he fled Madrid, the Gestapo (likely
S.D.) will surely have
interrogated Jebsen on his relations to me, for whatever other reason he might
have been kidnapped. And I must say that the fact that the Nazis have no
more been searching for me, after this event, might be rather evil foreboding.
My mother is convinced that the Nazis actually did believe that I stayed in
Spain, and they have at least, until she left, always been searching for my
whereabouts. That they should have stopped that, could be taken as an indication
that Jebsen has told them where I really am (AOB,
living in Estoril Portugal)

Therefore I am more keen to go back to Spain as quickly as possible. For
only through an open reappearance in Madrid, in good time before the war has
come to a close, will be able to disprove all that what Jebsen might have said
under 'third degree' pressure.

KV
2/859-2, page 9 !

Crown Copyright

Major
Foley (S.I.S. (M.I.6)
mainly stationed in
Lisbon) and I (Major
J.C. Masterman)
interviewed Junior (Dr.
Ruser, living in Estoril Portugal)
on 7.11.44

In order that he (Dr.
Ruser) might the
better understand the difficulties of the position, Foley, at my (Masterman's)
suggestion, told him rather more about the fate of Jebsen. Foley told him
that Jebsen had disappeared and that we had no longer any connection with him
and did not know what had happened to him. We concluded that he was
in Germany and thought that he might be in trouble over his (quite
dubious) financial
dealings. This meant, of course, that he might tell the Germans
a good deal about Junior (Dr.
Ruser) Junior
said that Jebsen, who was mine of information, had always talked too much, and
had indeed dealt very extensively on the black market, into which he had also
dragged Moldenhauer. If he were caught, in Junior's view, Jebsen would
tell the Germans everything.

KV
2/859-2, page 19

Crown Copyright

Glusevic was aware that Artist (Jebsen) had been in trouble with the Gestapo
(read S.D.)
over financial matters since about May 1943. having facilities for
transporting currencies from one occupied country to another, where values
were different, Artist had been engaging in large-scale manipulations of
currency and gold. Glusevic was not clear for what German
service Artist was supposed to be working*,
but he knew that he appeared to receive facilities from the O.K.W. (OKW),
and believed that he was sharing the benefits**
of currency deals with some officials superiors***
who got into difficulties because it became apparent that they had more to
spend than could be justified by their paper incomes. Glusevic
believed that one of Artist's superiors, whose name was something like
Lechli, may have been arrested in Frankfurt in May 1943, and immediately
afterwards Artist's Greek friend Avramedes, who had been engaged
particularly in buying and selling gold in France and Greece, was arrested.
Artist himself was in great fear of arrest at this time, and in fact on one
occasion Glusevic had helped to hide Artist in Paris before Artist managed
to get away to Madrid. Artist had drawn quite unnecessary attention to
himself in Paris by his extravagance.****

*
From what is known it may well have concerned S.D. related entities (Please
don't think of Gestapo, because they had in France no jurisdiction!)

**
Just sharing the benefit is a quite continuous factor in Jebsen's doings.

***
I tend to believe more in individuals or a group of, than in intitutions.

****
Extravagance were rather negative aspects of both Jebsen (Artist) and Popov
(Tricycle) as can be found in these file series. Popov's expenditure, when
staying in Brittan, became so disgusting generally, that they were
pleased that he left Britain (I
have skipped the according references)
(AOB, In my perception: There exists an apparent difference, generally
speaking, in so-called: New-rich people, and "old money" attitudes.

KV
2/859-2, page 105

Crown Copyright

In April (1943)
Tricycle had received a letter complaining, not without justification, that his
information was inadequate and pleading for him to work better. He was
also told that the money which should have been paid, and in fact his account
was credited with 187,500 escudos at the end of April (1943).
Tricycles was warned off further use of the cover addresses:- Jose Carvallo, and
(again) Artur Soares.

(AOB,
we cannot expect that Tricycle possessed a "blanco" credit in the German
perception) (Please
remember, that the zenith of
information brought in from England was Tricycle's)

KV
2/859-3, page 15

Crown Copyright

On
16.4.44 we had no indication that there was any imminent danger of an
attempt to kidnap Artist. All we knew was that Brandes had been
reporting, apparently to Schreiber who had passed it most secretly to
Berlin, that Artist was showing noticeable curiosity about the affairs of
Ostro (Paul Georg
Fidrmuc, likely one of Britain's mysterious menace).
We had already received through Tricycle certain reports by Artist, some of
which quoted Brandes as a sub-source, and everyone who read these reports on
what Brandes was supposed to have learnt in Berlin about Tricycle* and
others, came to the conclusion that remarks made by Brandes to (about)
Artist were not trustworthy.**

* Bear
again-and-again in mind please: that the OKW thus Amt Ausland/Abwehr;
distrusted both - Tricycle and Jebsen - as the latter was an intermediate.
OKW analysts had already concluded in late 1943, that the Tricycle's
documents contained deception materials.

The
most careful consideration was given to whether we should inform Artist that
Brandes was reporting on his thirst for information, and it was accepted by all
numerous officers here who considered the position that we could not run the
risk to the source (AOB,
MSS!)
that would be involved in warning Artist (Jebsen)
that we had knowledge that Brandes (Ballhorn)
was reporting on Artist's activities.

We had considered putting this over to Artist by attributing the information to
some other agent, but had to be reject this plan because although Artist would
undoubtedly have believed that we obtained our knowledge from an agent, should
he ever be forced to confess that he had had the warning, or should he attempt
to confront Brandes, it might well have become apparent to others what our real
source was. (AOB, a
major dilemma)

KV
2/859-3, page 15 + 16

Crown Copyright

It must be remembered that the action taken about Artist was kept on a most
secret level, so much that after Artist was removed from Lisbon neither the S.D.
in Lisbon, nor Bendixen (no
file on him remained),
then acting Leiter I.O. (Leiter
I M) Portugal, knew
what was happening, and both reported with some alarm that Artist had
disappeared. (AOB, the
entire "Dora or Kohlenklau" case had been accomplished astonishingly sound)

KV
2/859-3, pages 16 + 17

Crown Copyright

I should like to add
that the fact that kidnapping was anticipated was not known to us until after
the event had taken place. There was a message, not mentioning Artist by
name, which, had we at the time sufficient knowledge to link up with Artist, we
would indicated about the day before the event took place that he was in danger
of some sort. Again because of the source (MSS),
even if we had realised that this related to Artist, we could not, because of
the source (MSS),
having taken the risk of giving him any additional warning.

How Schreiber tricked Artist into going to Germany we do know, but the proposed
trip to Oporto with Henss of the S.D. clearly had nothing to do with it,
because Henss knew nothing of Artist's disappearance until long after it had
taken place.

I have naturally given a great deal of thought to this matter and I am satisfied
that we went as far as we possibly could in protecting Artist in the light of
such information as we had on the relevant dates.

19 June 1944
Signed by T.A. Robertson (TAR) (M.I.5)

Directed to: Major Foley, S.I.S. (M.I.6)
Foley was mainly
stationed at Lisbon, and he maintained the main contacts with Popov and Jebsen.

KV
2/859-3, page 38

Crown Copyright

61.
Artist was born at Hamburg of Danish parents. All four grandparents were
Danish. When Artist was twelve years old his father became a naturalised
German and and Jebsen acquired German nationality at the same time. He
states that as a youth he was inevitably caught up in the Nazi movement but lost
all regard for the party when as a University student he begab to think for
himself and made friends with other students from other countries.

62.
Artist has not suggested that he should receive any financial rewards (he
was himself very rich)
for his cooperation with us. Conditionally on our being satisfied, when we
have full information after the war, that Artist has assisted us to the best of
his ability we have assured him that, should he desire it, we will use our best
endeavours to assist him in regaining Danish nationality; that so far as
practicable he would have freedom of travel for business purposes after the war
and that, assuming the account he had given us of his part in the dealings in
forged notes was accurate, he would be protected in any charges that might arise
after the war against those responsible for the dealings. Artist was also
assured that if any genuine German agents, (not British subjects), were caught
exclusively on reports given by him, the death penalty would not be exacted, and
that should anything happen to him we would do our best to look after his wife's
interests. Artist did not ask for financial provision for his wife as she had
already taken steps to look after her financial future.

KV
2/859-3, page 50

Crown Copyright

Another of Artist's (Jebsen's)
Madrid contacts was Franzbach (=
Paymaster of KO Spain also known as: Pago and/or ZF).
On 16.5.44 Madrid telegraphed Berlin that Franzbach was going to Berlin for
consultation by order of Obst. Heinrich. On 25.5.44 Berlin informed
Madrid that Franzbach would probably leave Berlin that evening with important
courier luggage, and on 26.5.44 Madrid was informed that Franzbach's departure
from Berlin had been delayed for a week. Whether presence of first
Rohrscheidt (Obstlt.
Leiter III Madrid) and
Franzbach in Berlin was connected with Artist is a matter of conjunction. It is
not unlikely that they might have required for consultation in Berlin upon
matters of general re-organisation arising out of the inclusion of the Abwehr in
R.S.H.A. (Mil/Amt) (AOB:
It is damm sure that Jebsen needed Franzbach as Paymaster of KO Spain, for his
many dubious financial transactions)
Date 10.6.44
Signed by Mr. Wilson (M.I.5)

KV
2/859-3, page 53

Crown Copyright

Portuguese
Registration Card

Name: Marie Luise von Gronau

Born 20 May 1920

Dactilógrafa (Shorthand secretary) Steno-typist

Estado Soleira (Single)

For
some time she was Jebsen's mistress; at the same time engaged as a secretary at
the KOP Office, in Fritz Cramer's bureau (Referatsleiter III)

I am
still concerned at the lack of definite news about the fate of Artist. I have
given Noakes all available leads in case he has the chance of making local
enquiries. Tricycle is himself going to try and seek information from
friends of Artist known to him. There is a possibility that Artist was
early this year (1945)
in Oranienberg (Oranienburg).
I have asked Hamer of Section V (M.I.6)
to ascertain from Best (among
those captured by the Germans, due to the Venlo incident, in Autumn 1939, in The
Netherlands)
who was also at one time in Oranienburg (AOB,
wasn't it Sachsenhausen?),
whether he has any news but Best was then away on indefinite leave and Hamer
could not ascertain his whereabouts (AOB, thus after Germany had
surrendered). It
might be worth while reminding Hamer and asking him to take steps to question
Best.

Another charge
made against Wrede was that he had carried letters from Jonny (Jebsen's
Abwehr cover-name like was Artist for the British)
in Lisbon and posted them to addresses in France/ These letters,
the Germans in Berlin claimed*, were addressed to Jonny's agents in France
and secret writing was discovered in them when they had been intercepted by
the Germans.** Another accusation which he (Dr.
Wrede) could deny
was the borrowing of money from Jonny for his personal use***. Wrede
also added that on that occasion he was told that Koessler and Fanto were
also in contact with Jonny (Jebsen)
and that the message sent by Fanto were well known to Jonny****

* I suppose during there processes
after both had been in captivity in Germany

** Reason for intercept not yet
known, was it coincidental?

*** Stupid borrowing money!

**** Where did they got this knowledge from? Further down
the document, but not showed here, he expressed that his knowledge
originated from Wrede himself; he lacked further information.

KV
2/860-1, page 36
Significant, as it
noticed some of the reasons to caught Jebsen.

Crown Copyright

On
arrival in Berlin (say
ca 2 à 3 May 1944)
Jebsen and Moldenhauer were detained under military arrest at Wünsdorf
near Zossen (Zeppelin?).
Hansen made arrangements for their interrogation by Mil/Amt
Z (III-F?)
(R) legal experts, but about the middle of May 1945 (1944)
under the direct orders of Keitel they were handed over to Amt IV (S.D.
Ausland Leiter Heinrich Müller; also known as Gestapo Müller)
despite the reluctance of the Abwehr to hand over one of their members.
The Sip and SD (S.D.)
had, as we know, for a long time been anxious to apprehend Jebsen because of
some (?)
alleged financial misdoings (amongst
cheating S.D. related financial manipulations),
and it is known that he had fallen foul (obscene)
of some of the leading members of Amt VI (Schellenberg's Mil/Amt) and Amt
IV because of the differences of views on the disposal of forged British
currencies.

KV
2/860-1, page 37 Dated 2nd August,
1945

Crown Copyright

Steimle
(KV 2/966)
knows all about Jebsen, while Quetting was in charge of the investigation into
his financial transactions. Apparently neither Steimle
nor Quetting have yet been located although both are very much wanted for
general interrogation purposes. If either of them come to light they could
no doubt tell us what happened to Jebsen. (AOB,
why not considering also Kaltenbrunner head of the entire RSHA!)

According to Kuebart, Jebsen used to work for the S.D. in Berlin before the war,
chiefly in connection with currency matters, Jebsen had been subsequently
transferred to Abwehr I H (Certainly
not on behalf of the SD!)
to work under a certain Obstlt. Thoering, and, later, Thoering's successor
Munzinger (Muenzinger).
In autumn of 1943, Muenzinger had dispatched Jebsen to operate in Lisbon, top
deal with currency matters and the smuggling of Jugoslav agents to England via
Spain and Portugal in connection with a certain Ivan (=
Popov @ Tricycle by the Britain's),
whose activities are described below.

Jebsen was attached for certain administrative purposes only to K.O. Lisbon (KOP).
His cover employment was with the H.V.K. (H.W.K.),
an organisation connected with the O.K.W. (OKW) which probably had something to
do with raw materials (among: Wolfram,
Tungsten), but Kuebart
is ignorant of the meaning of the abbreviation "H.W.K." and its precise
significance.

KV
2/860-1, page 45

Crown Copyright

Although Muenzinger trusted Iwan (Ivan
I), Kuebart put
little reliance on this time and states that the man "gave him an uncomfortable
feeling".

KV
2/860-1, page 48 navicerts

Crown Copyright

Sonderführer (Sdf.)
Weiss (Kuebart's
assistant), of Abwehr
Eins, however, being an astute business man himself (most
Sonderführer possess a non-military skill),
discovered that in reality Iwan I
(Ivan) (Tricycle /
Popov) and Jebsen
intended to sell the navicerts (Nautical Certificates)
to the oil firm for a large sum without knowledge of the Germans, and that
Jebsen was the one of the two who had connected the scheme.

KV
2/860-1, page 48

Crown Copyright

Kuebart instead sent Sdf. Wrede (KV
2/560 top)

down
to Portugal, briefed as follows:

1) That there was to be no question of Iwan I
(Ivan) receiving any advanced payment.

2) That the navicerts could not be obtained.

3) That they would pay Iwan I
(Ivan) after the receipt of his reports, 150,000 dollars (even
nowadays a great sum of money).

4) That they would, in addition, pay Iwan I 1,000 Swiss francs
every month for a duration of three years by way of compensation, instead of and
for Iwan's
inability to set himself up on the board of his oil firm.

Wrede duly went down to Portugal and carried out his instructions having long
talks with Jebsen and Iwan, who refused to accept Kuebart's counter-proposals.
As a result of this, frequent reports were interchanged between Berlin and
Lisboon on this subject. Kuebart held out, however. Iwan then announced
that unless his demands were fulfilled, he would abondon his work, and a
deadlock arose.

(AOB,
again keep in mind, that OKW and Hansen and Kuebart knew for months that Popov
(Tricycle) was supplying deception materials!)

KV
2/860-1, page 49

Crown Copyright

Some time in march 1944, Brandes visited Weiss and Kuebart in berlin, reporting
that Jebsen had arranged to bribe both himself (Brandes) and Wrede with a share
of the profit of the scheme, were it to be successful.

Kuebart now became alive to Jebsen's whole scheme, in which eveb Wrede now
appeared to be implicated, for he had failed to reveal to Kuebart, Jebsen's
attempt to bribe him.

(Both
Jebsen and Wrede were assassinated late 1944 and Jebsen in 1945)

KV
2/860-1, page 50
Trip to Biarritz early
April 1944

Crown Copyright

Trip
to Spain.

In the beginning of April 1944, Kuebart and Sdf.
Weiss left by air for Biarritz, where they put Major Schreiber of K.O. Lisbon in
the picture as to Jebsen and his confederates. (Popov
@ Iwan @ Tricycle)

Schreiber was very surprised as he had no idea of the real situation, Kuebart
then passed on to Schreiber, Hansen's order that Jebsen was to be arrested and
abducted forthwith. Schreiber, however, did not know how this action could be
taken and was in great doubt concerning the difficulties of transporting Jebsen
out of Spain. (consider,
for instance, the political implications)
It was therefore decided to continue the discussion with K.O. Madrid.

(AOB,
Schreiber wanted in case matters went wrong, and the political implications, at
least a telegram confirming that Hansen gave the orders)

(Foregoing,
we have already dealt with it in greater details)

(Kuebart's
statements do conflict with matters like that Schreiber met Kuebart again in
Biarritz delivering Jebsen and Moldenhauer in a trunk. But also Kuebart's being
in Lisbon later.)

During this period (Kuebart
had been arrested on 22 July in the early morning at the Belinde barracks; as he
was in direct contact with Obst. Hansen; who was directly engaged in the failed
assassination attempt on Hitler of 20 July 1944),
Kuebart was frequently interrogated by two Gestapo (correct)
officers, Sturmbannführer Guenther and Kriminalkommissar Baumer. (AOB,
the latter was likely also involved within Kuebart's trial)

He was also interrogated by an unknown Hauptsturmführer. During these
interrogations he was asked why he had not arrested Sdf. Wrede (KV
2/560) his
failure to reveal Jebsen's attempt to bribe him (KV
2/860-1, page 49).
Kuebart replied that he was not in charge of Wrede and considered such arrest to
be unnecessary since Wrede's omission ?coined? to be actuated by stupidity
rather than malice. He was also asked why he had made difficulties in handing
over Jebsen to the S.D. (correctly
used) after their
demand therefore. He replied that as Jebsen was a soldier he regarded it
as a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Abwehr (correctly
Wehrmacht) (With
regard to Moldenhauer Kuebart admits that Schreiber exceeded his scope in
arresting this man, since Moldenhauer was merely concerned with Jebsen's plans to
desert, and enjoyed civilian status. (AOB,incorrect: Moldenhauer was already in 1941 engaged in the Abwehr.
Administratively he belonged to Nest Cologne
(Köln).
Both Moldenhauer and
Jebsen were keen not get to be caught for service in the Army. Madrid was no
longer secure for Moldenhauer and he had moved next to Lisbon. Both Jebsen and
Moldenhauer knew each other already in 1941, maybe already earlier)

KV
2/860-1, page 52

Crown Copyright

Jebsen
@ Johnny (Jebsen)

Probably worked for the S.D. before the war in currency matters, in
connection with which he is alleged to have swindled them.
Subsequently transferred to Abwehr I H to work under Obstlt. Thoering and,
later, his successor Muenzinger.

KV
2/860-1, page 53

Crown Copyright

Details of
K.O. Madrid Paymaster, Pago (known
also as ZF, real name Franzbach, he remained until after the war)

Believed by Kuebart to have belonged to Legion Condor (German
Legion fighting in favour of Franco in the 1930s);
was in very close contact with Jebsen (Jebsen
necessitated him as an undesirable aid for his dubious financial transactions)
and carried on currency business with him (Jebsen).
In connection with the "Jebsen affair", Pago was called to Berlin, as it was
suspected he also might try to escape. He was not particularly
interrogated, as the S.D. (Amt
IV) had taken the matter over.
After this, he was sent back to Madrid.

94. Jebsen was kidnapped at the Portuguese-Spanish frontier in
a trunk, by Obstlt. Huebarth (Kuebarth) and another officer
whose name Schellenberg has forgotten. Hansen had given the order for the
kidnapping. Schroeder (KV
2/399) (representative
at the Legation of RSHA Amt IV, SD)
in Lisbon aided and abetted the scheme. (I
doubt, but might have know about it)
Jebsen fell under suspicion because he sent conflicting reports to different
departments, amongst them (dangerous)
Amt IV. Jebsen was handed over to Müller (known
as Gestapo
Müller) and was
accused of working for Britain (KV 2/91-1,
page 34 on this website: confirms that
Jebsen indeed acknowledged that he was also a British agent!)

KV
2/860-2, page 20

Crown Copyright

Wherever possible I have
been making enquiries about Johnny himself but so far I have got no further than
the fact that he was lodged in a Military Prison at the Lehrterstrasse in Berlin
after having been tricked back from Lisbon. I fear that his chances of
survival are probably not very high. On the other hand, there is nothing
to indicate that whatever may have happened to him he was forced to disclose
facts which we wanted kept secret. (AOB,
indeed this just what had happened)

Lisbon-Berlin.
99. For Ludovico (alias of Leiter KOP)
Harry (alias of Obstlt. Dr. Schreiber
Leiter I H). As the agreement
made with Ivan (German word IWAN I)
cannot at present be upheld, personal negotiation essential on 1(?)/5 (May).
Major Bohlen (KV 2/1975),
with full powers, is arriving in Biarritz for the purpose on 21/4. Request
that Harry (Obstlt. Schreiber KOP)
and Jonny (German alias for Jebsen)
who understands Ivan's (Iwan I's)
mentality best, be in Biarritz (small
beach-town not too far from the French-Spanish border)
on 21st. In this connection take special care with regard to Jonny's
(Jebsen's).
Recommended illegal crossing of frontier (often
managed and arranged by Uffz Furch alias Fuente of San Sebastian).
Time of rendez-vous must be adhered without fail, as affair cannot be brought
off at a later date. HIOB I (Heer
IOst
Berlin)
(main Abwehr W/T station-channel).

This radioed W/T message provoked a chain of events,

KV 2/860-3, page 41 RSS decrypted intercepts (translated)

Crown Copyright

18.4.44.

Lisbon-Berlin.
No.707. To HIOB I. On the 17th Jonny (Jebsen)
told me (Ballhorn, alias of Hans Brandes)
that he had been ordered together with Harry (Obstlt.
Dr. Schreiber Leiter I H KOP) by an FS (Fernschreiben
/telex; actually it concerned a W/T message)
and was certain that his immediate arrest was intended (this
indeed was planned for) was intended in
Biarritz. In this connection even Madrid seemed too dangerous as a
rendezvous, because according to his information 2 Germans had only recently
been arrested in Madrid for treason, in collaboration with the Spanish police (there
existed a treaty between the German and Spanish Police, in cases of criminal
affairs) Jonny (Jebsen)
added that if on the part of Berlin are to be observed, he intends to draw his
own conclusions in the very next week and will inform Iwan (Popov/Tricycle)
and Guttmann (no file available)
in good time. Ballhorn (real
name Hans Brandes) Ludovico (alias
of Leiter KOP) Harry (Obstlt.
Dr. Aloys Schreiber Leiter I H both guiding Jebsen as well as Brandes!)

KV 2/860-3, page 42
RSS decrypt, translated:

Crown Copyright

21.4.44

Lisbon-Berlin.
773. Ludovico (alias
of Leiter KOP)
DIAZ (Bedixen Leiter I
M) Harry (alias
of Schreiber Leiter I H)
to HIOB (Heer
IOst
Berlin)
I. Ballhorn (alias of
V-Mann Hans Brandes)
has learnt from Jonny that the latter intends to utilise Lilly
Craass
(shorthand secretary
to Schreiber) to a
greater extent (making
her also a mistress?)
for getting his information from the Dienststelle (KOP),
since Gronau has dropped out through being seconded to other duties. In
order to take precautions against further leakage Craass was sent to Berlin on
21.4.44 by Lufthansa. (AOB, whatever the reasons: Craass
and Gronau were in Lisbon about say 30 April 1944. Why? Because in Ostro's
(Fidrmuc's)
interrogations in 1946 he states: that Lilly Craass arrived in quite panic and
told Ostro's wife that Marie Luise
(von Gronau)
found Jebsen's apartment turned upside-down, without a trace of Jebsen).
It is not necessary to provide a substitute.4.5.44

KV
2/860-3, page 44

Crown Copyright

4.5.44
2314 (ISBA Intelligence Service British Agent)

Berlin-Biarritz. To ANST (Abwehrnebenstelle)
Biarritz III-F
(Referat
Counter-Espionage)
Most secret. Ref our message of 4.5.44. As special
machine cannot be provided to pick up J (Jonny
= Jebsen) and W (Waldmann
= Moldenhauer), they
are to be sent to Berlin immediately under the closest supervision and with all
measures for security. Responsible officer in charge is instructed to
report time of arrival promptly so that they can be met at station in Berlin.
Abwehr I H No. 1644/44 Most secret
of 4.5.55. Signature as signed.

(AOB,
in my perception this points at, at least, partially, by means of railways)

I report that on 24th February 1947 I visited Frau Petra Vermehren,
Harvesterhudeweg 24. She supplied me with the following
additional information regarding the trial of Jebsen, Jonny.

Jebsen was taken to Berlin from Oranienburg Concentration Camp and was brought
before Sturmbannführer Schmitz. He (Jebsen)
was accused by Schmitz of having betrayed the work of the SS to the Abwehr.
Schmitz is described as being a fat and overbearing in manner./ He
is said to have been aid to Schellenberg who was Himmler's adjutant.

Jebsen according to Frau Vermehren (Jebsen's
mother), had two
enemies, who were Kriminalrat Hofmeister, Martin Lutherstrasse; Berlin, who was
responsible for everything that happened to Jebsen, and Lengeling, an SS man who
was arrested in 1943 and later released. Lengeling was at first friendly
with Jebsen and later betrayed him.

Jebsen had a friend, a Jugoslav, Michael Glouchwitsch, Frankwiedel 15, Paris,
deuxieme arrondissement. It is thought that this man can supply further
information concerning Jebsen.

The above information was supplied to Frau Vermehren by a former member of the
Abwehr, Otto Kurrer (KV
2/1962), bei Graf Gotz
(Götz?),
Brinkensen, Kreis Ahfeld and der Leine, Province Hannover.

(a) She believes that Johnny Jebsen is dead. She is
emphatic, however, that he did not die in Oranienburg Concentration Camp. (wasn't
it Sachsenhausen?)

(b) She confirms the fact that she was the last person to see
Jebsen alive, apart from his interrogators (and
related SS personnel).

(c) She believes one of the interrogators to be a man called
Lange.

(d) An escort was sent from Berlin to Oranienburg.
Jebsen and another prisoner called Moldenhauer were taken away.
Moldenhauer returned on 12th April to Oranienburg and

was surprises to hear that Jebsen had not returned.

(e) When a prisoner died in Oranienburg, his personal
belongings were taken away a few days after his death and disposed of. In
this way the inmates knew if one of their comrades had died. Jebsen had no
belongings as he had been smuggled by theGestapo
KOP personnel.

(f) The address of the wife/widow of Jebsen is as ... (AOB,
she was thereafter brought by British Service to an address in Krefeld)

KV
2/861-1, page 58

Crown Copyright

In Oranienburg the prisoners were not allowed to shave themselves. Frau
Vermehren who says she was the only woman in the camp (Sippenhaft*?)
at the time received word from her son who was in solitary confinement (Sippenhaft?)
through the camp barber, that Jebsen had arrived in the camp. She
thereupon found the cell where he was and every day threw a stone against the
window until she attracted his attention. She first saw Jebsen in
September, though she believes that he came first to the camp in July, but that
as one of his ribs had been broken during an interrogation he lay on his bed for
the first month or two. He told her that the Gestapo (Abwehr)
had been abducted him and smuggled him out out of Spain (nonsense,
he was abducted in Lisbon and from there convey in a trunk to Biarritz)
in a box because had divulged (disclosed)
information to the British. MauldenhauerMoldenhauer
who was also a friend of Jebsen's in Spain (since
1941) arrived in the
camp. In Feb. 1945 she saw Jebsen for the last time. An escort was
sent from Berlin and both he and Moldenhauer were taken away. Though she
made discreet enquiries through the camp staff she was unable to obtain any
information as to his fate. On the 12th April, Moldenhauer returned
to the camp. He seemed surprised that Jebsen had not returned. (AOB,
bear in mind:
that on 9th April
Pfarrer Bonhoeffer and Admiral Canaris, among other, had been in a fake trial
convicted to death and shortly thereafter been hung in a cruel manner at
Flossenbürg Concentrationcamp).
He said he thought it possible that he may have been sent to Sachsenhausen.
On the 15th April owing to the advance of the Russians the inmates of the camp
were marched away. Those prisoners who were left behind were shot.
Frau Vermehren and her husband who were only held as hostage (Sippenhaft)
were not. It is thought that Moldenhauer was shot. (?) Frau Vermehren
eventually escaped and made her way first to Lübeck and finally to Hamburg,
where the husband is working as a solicitor and the wife for the Red Cross (Vermehrens).
5. Schreiber's Plans for Abduction.

* Sippenhaft
was that, for instance, in case of desertion to the enemy or other reasons,
it was quite possible that the rest of the family and sometimes even
relatives had been caught and kept in confinement, often with restrictions;
without being legally trailed.

KV
2/861-1, page 80

Crown Copyright

5. Schreiber's Plans for Abduction.

Schreiber decided to call both Jebsen and Moldenhauer
Jebsen to his office (Rua
Buenos Aires 25)
for a meeting in the late afternoon of 3029
April 1944(totally
incorrect: Jebsen had been invited to come to the KOP office; though:
Moldenhauer lodged by him anyway. To appear with Moldenhauer he might have
thought as to stand more strong, in any case of events. Thus: Moldenhauer
appeared unexpectedly joining Jebsen. He therefore had to be abducted too,
as to keep the entire operation secret. All calculations worked out
soundly). At
that time the office would be completely deserted. They had to be
would knocked out and while unconscious placed in two large trunks in
which they could be shipped by the car the same evening over the Portugues-Spanish
and Spanish-French border to Biarritz. (AOB,
herewith making the former statements that they first had been brought to Madrid
ridiculous!)
To guard against possible surprise at the borders, Schreiber also decided to
drug them by injections.

Two assistants would be necessary to carry out the action. Schreiber chose
Bleil fnu signal officer fnu, signal officer of KO Portugal, in whose name
the car was registered and who, according to Portuguese law, had to accompany
the car on a trip across the border and Karl Meier civilian motor officer of KO,
who was thoroughly familiar with the car and and if necessary could repair it.

Schreiber sent a wire to Hansen in Berlin to the effect that the sudden
appearance of Moldenhauer supported their suspicions and necessitated his
inclusion in the affair and the planned action would be initiated without delay.

(AOB,
I am astonished, time-and-again, that the nonsense in the first paragraph
compared with the last paragraph reflected in the word: 'sudden appearance',
has not lead to an internal correction. I personally drew the conclusion
for a long time, is:, that hardly a (British)
document had critically been reviewed! The inconsistency in printing correctly
names, were even in a single paragraph several spellings can be encountered for
the same name!)

KV
2/861-1, page 80 Corrections

Crown Copyright

At noon
30 April (29 April)
he (Schreiber)
and Meier purchased the two trunks, which Schreiber claims were large enough for
a grown person and were fitted with adequately large openings for ventilation.
The sleeping drug for the injections? Schreiber obtained in a Lisbon pharmacy.

Upon his return from Lisbon Schreiber had asked Jebsen to call at his office on
the afternoon of 30 April, using as a pretext his intention of
giving him detailed information about a decoration which Berlin wished to bestow
on Jebsen. He had also asked him to bring along his friend
Moldenhauer, ostensibly to question him on missions. Nonsense, remember the notice
"sudden appearance".

6. The Abduction.

On Saturday 30 (Friday
29) April 44 at 1800
hrs, Jebsen and Moldenhauer arrived together at Schreiber's office.
Schreiber carried on a general conversation with both of them for a short while
and then called Jebsen into another room. There he (Schreiber)
claims to have informed him of the true outcome of the discussions in Biarritz
and of Hansen's order to have him brought to Berlin by force, since he would not
go of his own free will. Jebsen made a move for the door and Schreiber
knocked him out. Meanwhile Meier had also overpowered Moldenhauer in the
adjoining room.

KV
2/861-1, page 81

Crown Copyright

According to Schreiber, he then informed both Jebsen and Moldenhauer, after they
had recovered in the presence of Bleil and Meier, how he intended to get across
the border and both of them submitted to the injections.

The Party started out about 2100 hrs (leaving
the garage at the back of the builing at Rua Buenos Aires)
to Badajoz with the two drugged victims in the trunks and Schreiber, Bleil and
Meier as the other occupants of the Studebaker sedan. The
Portuguese-Spanish border was crossed without incident between midnight
and 0200 hrs, since Bleil and Meier knew border conditions and officials
personally from previous trips both here and the Spanish-French border in Irun (passing
the bridge).

The trip through Spain was only interrupted by a few rests in the open and the
Spanish-French border at Irun (crossing
the Bridge entering France)
border was crossed at about 2400 hrs of the following night without incident.
In Biarritz Jebsen and Moldenhauer were immediately turned over to the local
Stellenleiter Obstlt Fuchs.

A motor defect kept Schreiber and his two assistants in Biarritz until 4 May,
when the returned to Lisbon, Jebsen and Moldenhauer, Schreiber claims, were
transported a few day later to Berlin in Hansen's personal plane.
(AOB, nonsense:
not in accordance to the message KV 2/860-3, page 44, quote as shown before:
As special machine cannot be provided to pick up J (Jonny
= Jebsen) and W (Waldmann
= Moldenhauer), they
are to be sent to Berlin immediately under the closest supervision and with all
measures for security. Responsible officer in charge is instructed to
report time of arrival promptly so that they can be met at station in Berlin.
Abwehr I H No. 1644/44 Most secret
of 4.5.55. Signature as signed)

KV
2/861-1, page 81

Crown Copyright

On the return journey
Schreiber stopped off in Madrid to report by W/T to Hansen in Berlin.
Shortly after his arrival in Lisbon he received an answer from Hansen expressing
his thanks for the accomplishment of the mission.

In June 1944 Schreiber again had occasion to confer with Kuebart and Sdf. Dr. Weiss in Barcelona.
They assured him that both Jebsen and Moldenhauer had arrived safely in Berlin,
were under military arrest, but that the investigation had not yet been
completely. (AOB,untrue,
as Jebsen and Moldenhauer had to be turned-over to Amt IV)

In the latter part of August 1944, during a short stay in Berlin, Schreiber
received the same answer from Bohlen (Ludwig,
KV 2/1975), Chief of
the Iberian Desk at that time.

KV
2/861-1, page 81

Crown Copyright

Schreiber knew Moldenhauer only slightly. He is, however, certain that
Moldenhauer was active in economic espionage for AstNest
Cologne (Köln)
and at times for Ast Vienna and that he worked from Madrid.

KV
2/861-2, page 7

Crown Copyright

Interrogation of Kurrer Otto (KV
2/1962) on Jebsen.

Jebsen was the son of a businessman, who had a large trade in Hongkong, Shanghai
and other parts of the world. Jebsen himself was very "international man"
man, well educated and had many important friends outside Germany, including
Colonel Lord Rothschild (AOB,
during the war he was in London, but highly interested in "sabotage' matters)
with whom he maintained correspondence during the war. At the time of his
first meeting with Kurrer in Berlin in 1942 he was approx 26 years old .
He was also said to have been strongly anti0nazi. He spoke fluent English,
French German and Danish. He was married and his wife lived in Berlin.

KV
2/861-2, page 7

Crown Copyright

Kurrer and
Jebsen became good friends and one day the latter confided in Kurrer that he was
afraid to return to Germany as he had been involved in some money swindle with
the SS. (already dealt
with this aspect before)
His story was that some SS officials had been printing foreign currency and he
ahd taken it to the respective countries and exchanged it, whenever possible in
gold value. He was now suspected of having made much profit himself and
also the SS wanted to remove him for knowing "too much". He therefore
asked Kurrer if he could help him to prolong his stay in Lisbon. Kurrer
did this and returned to Berlin.

(AOB,
Kurrer was stationed at KOP between mid 1942 and somewhere in spring 1943; he
was sent back to Berlin due to his disfunction. But, it is typical for Jebsen,
that he exploited people around him. As he did with von Gronau, apparently
Kurrer, but sadly also with Dr. Joachim Wrede (KV 2/560, dealt with at the
begin of the Survey),
who was murdered owing to financial favours asked by Jebsen. Proven in the
"forensic Surevy" several times - mainly based upon M.I.5 internal memos and
discussions)

2. The following is the description of Jebsen, Johnny given by
von Gronau: Approximately thirty (30) tears old of age (born 1916 or
1917 at Appenrade near the Danish (according Google.de:
war von 1867 bis 1920
ein Landkreis in der preußischen Provinz Schleswig-Holstein)
border (in accordance
to what I understand is meant)
as a Danish national); appears forty (40) years years old; however approximately
5' 9'' tall; reddish, blond hair, combed back; wears a heavy moustache from time
to time; very slender; body bent forward; grey blue eyes; very pronounced
cheekbones; unhealthy, pale complexion (lung disease?); smokes about 100
cigarettes per day; has brown-coloured fingers on right hand very bad teeth from
frequent smoking; always wore dark Hamburg hat, dirty rain coat, umbrella and
constantly unpolished shoes; wore ring with large ruby; eats little and drinks
only champagne; unable to drive a car; rides horseback; studied law in
Freiburg; writes philosophical books; married to a German actress named
Petersen, Lore, who lived and probably still is living with her parents at
Leipzig, Germany (her father was a schoolteacher. Lore is seven (7) years
older than Jebsen).

3. Gronau then related that she met Jebsen in Lisbon Abwehr
office in October/November 1943. Jebsen sent telegrams to Germany on three
(3) separate occasions since he worked for the department of the H.W.K. (Handels
und Wirtschaftskrieg - Trade and Economic Warfare). Both subjects (Gronau)
and Jebsen lived at Estoril which caused Jebsen to take Subject home from the
office in his car frequently. (AOB,
as we formerly have learned that Jebsen was "unable to drive a car" that he must
have had a chauffeur).
They soon very much interested in each other for the following reasons according
to Gronau: He wanted to marry her, but she was merely fascinated by his
intelligence and wide knowledge, and tried → to gain more knowledge of
philosophy and other subjects from him. →

KV
2/861-2, page 18

Crown Copyright

to gain more knowledge of philosophy and other subjects from him. → Jebsen also
asked Subject (von
Gronau) to take care
of his large house at Estoril and supervise the four (4) servants there, to
which subject agreed. Jebsen furthermore dictated to Subject (von
Gronau) some of his
business correspondence, but she can not recall any of it. Subject noted
the seemingly inexhaustible funds always at the disposal of Jebsen.
Subject (von Gronau)
was also impressed and somewhat influenced by Jebsen's frequent ambiguous
remarks about his idea of friendship, which must be international and across
borders of countries, regardless of a state of war or peace".

4. In February 1944 Subject (von Gronau) received a direct
order from Major Schreiber, head of her department, "not to see Mr. Jebsen, any
more under any circumstances". Subject (von
Gronau), as she
claims, had nothing better to do than to see Jebsen the same evening warning him
that he was under some kind of suspicion by the Abwehr. Jebsen ridiculed
the suspicion immediately and upon Subject's direct question if he was a British
agent, denied it first by ridiculing her telling her that he also could be
working for the Abwehr without her knowing it (in connection with his work in
the H.W.K.). Later on he made the following statement: "I am His
Majesty's most loyal enemy". Jebsen, from then on, kept
denying to her that he was aa British agent so frequently and in such a way as
to only suggest and confirm to Subject (von
Gronau) her
suspicion that he actually was a British agent. Subject (von
Gronau) to this day is
not sure whether Jebsen was a British agent but strongly suspect that he was.
When Subject went to Madrid for a week with Major Schreiber in February 1944,
she also met Jebsen there. Jebsen later told Subject (von
Gronau) that he met a
"friend" of his at Madrid (a Yugoslav named Gluschowtz?).

5. Subject (von
Gronau) continued to
visit Jebsen frequently. He told her early in 1944 that he went to the
British Embassy in Lisbon to send a telegram to one Rothschild, Anthony in
England as well as to a woman in England whose name he did not disclose.
It is known to Subject (von
Gronau) that Jebsen
received two (2) addresses from Rothschild, one in London and the other in
Scotland. Subject also remembers Jebsen making a secret to a certain "Duschko"
(Duško Popov =
Tricycle). These
meetings usually took place at night. "Duschko" was described by
Jebsen as a Yugoslav official at the Embassy of the Yugoslav Government in
London.

6. In early April 1944 Subject (von
Gronau) was shown a
highly classified telegram from the chief secretary in her office indicating the
arrival in Lisbon of an investigative mission of the RSHA Berlin under Müller (Heinrich
Müller nickname Gestapo Müller of Amt IV).
This mission was to investigate Johnny Jebsen and his activities. Subject
(von Gronau) claims → that she again informed Jebsen of the impending action
against him.

KV
2/861-2, page 16

Crown Copyright

He
again ridiculed this threat by claiming that he had so much information of some
SD officers in Persia (AOB,
totally nonsense, as I have myself thoroughly investigated in the area of
Persia, and in 1944 there were not a single agent in that country. Even to
before then being Franz Mayr (https://www.cdvandt.org/mayr-case.htm)
Subject (von Gronau)
claims that Jebsen was also informed about the impending investigations of his
activities by the Gestapo (actually
the S.D.)
representative in Oporto (Henss)

7. About the 18 April 1944 von Gronau received a telegram from
Berlin ordering her to leave Portugal for Berlin within forty-eight (48) hours.
Suspect, after spending her last day openly with Jebsen who even escorted to the
airport, arrived in Berlin 20 April 1944. (AOB,
something is wrong:
according Ostro, because I believe him as he had no reason for changing affairs
when interrogated by the Americans in 1946 -
that Frl. Lilly Craass came to Ostro's house in great panic and told them that
just von Gronau had informed her that she went to Jebsen's apartment
(seemingly being an
real estate, and she found Jebsen's location turned upside-down)
(AOB, whatever the
events and reasons - she must have been in Lisbon/Estoril legally or illegally
on 30 April 1944)
(AOB, I do not trust
the dates referred onto!)
Subject (von Gronau)
had an interview with Grosskopf (KV
2/3426), chief of her
department in Berlin, who at that time did not know anything about an order
recalling her to Berlin. Subject (von
Gronau) from then on
was frequently questioned by Grosskopf and a certain Sdf. Dr.
Weiss (Kuebart's
assistant) (Amt VI
Mil/Amt) (AOB, please
bear in mind: - that since 12 February after Vermehren's desertion the Abwehr
was forced to merge with RSHA Amt VI due to this merging known as Mil/Amt with
Obst. Hansen in charge)
concerning Jebsen. She was accused of having informed Jebsen of the
order prohibiting her from seeing him and also of having told Jebsen about the
telegram telling about the impeding investigation against him. (AOB,
I suppose that what she told must have taken place later in May - or even June
1944) All
this, Subject (von
Gronau) claims, she
denied instantly but told her interrogators that the Gestapo (S.D.)
representative from Oporto (Henss)
had informed Jebsen of the impeding action against him.

8. Meanwhile Subject (von
Gronau) had received a
letter from one, Scholl-Poensgen, Irmgard, secretary of the actual section in
the German Embassy, Lisbon. She wrote that Jebsen, shortly before a
proposed weekend trip to northern Portugal, had strangely disappeared and had
not been heard of since (Moldenhauer?).
Miss Scholl-Poensgen described what she knew of the incident. Jebsen
wanted to tour northern Portugal with Mr. Brandes (actually
one of Schreiber's V-Männer, alias Ballhorn and by this latter name Jebsen knew
him); half-Jewish,
working as representative for the firm Werner (was
this the one owned by his mother?)
and Company. Mr. Brandes last saw Jebsen at the Yugoslav Embassy in
Lisbon. Jebsen claimed he had some work to do, and they made an
appointment to meet again at the Yugoslav Embassy within a half hour.
Thereafter Jebsen was neither seen nor heard from any more by Brandes.
Miss Scholl-Poensgen, who intensively disliked and distrusted Jebsen, assumed in
her letter that Jebsen had gone to England and that she was right after all in
her suspicion of his (Jebsen)
being a British agent (All this happened a few days before the Normandy Invasion
- 6 June 1944. (Rubbish,
as Jebsen had been abducted in the evening of 29 April 1944!).
Brandes mysteriously turned up in Berlin also a few days after disappearance of
Jebsen. Von Gronau, who was still being questioned at various intervals,
was now asked by Sdf. Weiss whether she believed it possible that Jebsen had
gone to England. To this she made a violent negative answer.
Somewhat later Subject (von
Gronau) met a
finance clerk of the Madrid Abwehr Office in Berlin (Franzbach
"Pago" or ZF?).
Subject (von Gronau)
does not recall the name of the official but maintains that he also was a friend
of Jebsen. (AOB, Then
it must have been Franzbach. Jebsen needed him for his many financial
manipulations)

KV
2/861-2, page 20

Crown Copyright

This
official (Franzbach,
Zahlmeister KOSp.) was
recalled to Berlin for questioning as well as on the Jebsen case. This
official told Subject (von
Gronau) that Johnny
Jebsen was under arrest in a northernsouthern
suburb of Berlin Zossen charged with high treason (Hochverrat),
which hoever could not be proven. He (Jebsen)
was sentenced instead for a "Devisen Verbrechen" in connection with some
20,000,000 French francs, not reported.

9. Subject (von
Groanu) does not know
where Jebsen went after his imprisonment at Zossen nor does she have any idea
where he (Jebsen)
is saying now or whether he is alive. After the end of the war upon
Subject's (von
Gronau's) request, her
brother went to the firm, Jebson and Jessen at Hamburg for any
information on the owner, Mr. Johann (Johnny) Jebsen. He was told
that Jebsen had "died at Shanghai in 1936!" Subject (von
Gronau) also wrote to
a restaurant near Flensburg, Schleswig-Holstein, "G Rossadel Bylond" asking for
any possible hint on the whereabouts of Jebsen. Jebsen had give
Subject (von Gronau)
this address (proprieter, Hans Christiansen) with the following remark:
"Three days after the end of hostilities, a British pilot will report there (to
the restaurant) and if you are present, he will pick you up to bring you to
England" (implied to Jebsen).

10. The following is a list of people that Jebsen had frequent
contact with in Portugal, Spain and France who are also known to Subject:

a. "Duschko" (Duško)
(possibly Dusan as in paragraph Three of basic letter) - Yugoslav official at
Yugoslav Embassy in London; his closest friend who he met only secretly.

b. Dluschowitz (?) - Yugoslav national at Madrid
Yugoslav Embassy.

c. Oertzen, Baronin von - Used by Jebsen as a letter
drop at Madrid.

d. "Madeleine" - Jebsen's girl-friend in Paris whom he
contacted by mail through a Prince de Roan (?).

e. Brandes or Brandies (KOP
V-Mann, he informed Schreiber among everything he got knowledge of concerning
Jebsen!)
Representative for Werner and Co. in Lisbon. (AOB,
likely meant the Machinery Factory in Germany owned by his late father and,
likely managed by his mother).

11.
The following persons might be of assistance in locating Johnny Jebsen if he is
still alive:

e. Jebsen's wife, the former Lore Petersen, probably living at
Leipzig (since 1946
living at Krefeld in the British zone)
with her parents (father former school teacher).

f. Schreiber, Alois (Aloys)
the former Obstlt. Chief I/H KOP
in Lisbon, at present in Oberursel.

12. Agent's opinion: Marie Luise von Gronau probably does not
know at present whereabouts of Jebsen. She seems strongly interested in
what happened to he former boy-friend and, as she claims, has undertaken several
inquiries since the war's end. Of course this can only be veryfied by
interroghation of the indicated targets above. Von Gronau is
well-experienced in intelligence work and is very intellgent and well-educated,
making it understandable that she should have like Jebsen, who apparently was
somewhat her master in experience, intelligence and education. Von Gronau does
not know for certain whether Jebsen worked for the British Intelligence, but is
almost ready to believe it, since he repeatedly suggested this fact to her with
his ambiguous statements. Concerning Jebsen's activities for the G.I.S.
von Gronau has only a small amount of information. She merely disclosed the fact
that Jebsen was wrking for the H.W.K. and that his work, to her knowledge,
involved the purchase of jewellery and precious metals only. This
agent, although unable to find any flaws in Subjects (von
Gronau's) statements,
suggests that further inquiries be made about the truth of her disclosures in
the case of Johnny Jebsen before this case is turned over to the British
Authorities. There are four (4) personalities in the American zone at
present, who should have information on the Jebsen case:

a. Schreiber, Alois (Aloys)
- Obstlt. Chief I/H Lisbon, Technical Assistent at German Embassy , Lisbon at
present at MISC Oberursel, top held until interrogated on the above case by CIC
as of telephone conversation with Mr. Lierse, MISC-CI section, 24 Sept. 1946.

c. Steimle, fnu, SS_Standartenführer, formerly Chief Amt
VI B
and Mil-B:
last known to be at MISC Oberursel (Jan. 1946)

d. Sandberger, fnu, SS-Standartenführer, formerly Chief
Amt VI A
and Mil-A;
last known to be in the vicinity of Nürnberg as a trial witness.

KV
2/861-2, page 61 + 62

Crown Copyright

Belongings of J.J. (Johann
Jebsen)

During my stay in Hamburg I located the following belongings of J.J.

a) Christianssen (Hans?), Gross Adelbying near Flensburg,
a school-friend of Johnny's, has a pub in Gross Adelbylung. Johnny
sent quite a few of his belongings (carpets, pictures, silver, etc. to
Christianssen to keep for him. I have no exact details but the value
of the things left there amounts to about $5000.

b) Egon Lengeling, Oberursel near Frankfurt, Hamburger
Landstrasse 105(?) has in his safekeeping 2700 gold pieces, $20.000.- and X
thousend Swiss Francs. Lengeling is not actually in Oberursel but his
wife and family are living in his house at the above address.

c) At the Frankfurter Handelsbank A.G., Deutschherrnufer
32, Frankfurt a/M. (Director: August Rub - Frau Rub is known to us
from Abwehr) Johnny had an account on behalf of his firm Hauenschild & Co.
but under his signature only. According to Johnny's partner Ahlborn,
there should be about RM. 400.000.- in the account.

d) Some of Johnny's belongings are with Count von Kageneck
Schloss Kageneck, Munzinger near Freuburg/Breisgau.

I had no time to try and collect all these belongings as it would have
necessiated travelling round Germany to do so. I suggest giving full
powers to Dr. Bruechner and instruct him to do it on his visit to the U.K.

- -
-

Johnny's Kidnapping.

Mr. and Mrs. Vermehren were arrested and put in a concentration camp
at Oranienburg (in
Sippenhaft) after
their son Erich Vermehren went over to the British at Ankara.*

In
the camp they saw and very often talked to Johnny Jebsen. He never
told them any details but made it clear to them that he had been kidnapped
and was being held and interrogated by the Gestapo because of forged English
£5 notes.**
The last time they saw him was in February when he was taken to be
questioned to Berlin and never returned. The questioning was done by a
certain Gestapo man Schmitz.

(N)* (AOB):
The according Erich Vermehren and his wife file series KV 2/956 .. KV 2/958
sadly belonging - to a scandalous and appalling chapter within the
British Secret Services past. The
Vermehren couple defected to the British, about 7 à 8 February 1944.
In March the couple was first interrogated by S.M.I.E. in Egypt. There a
servant came to the conclusion: that the "Couple Vermehren" could not be
trusted. Why? They (using my own words) pointed that they were anti-Nazi but
the good Germany was their country. Betraying British war-interest and
hospitality? Not at all. But, they were hunted by the Secret Services
as if they were traitors, since. Here the downside of Crown Civil Servants
comes to light; as they themselves consider that they can decide the lives
of these kind of poor individuals. You don't believe me? Please read
the KV 2/956
.. KV 2/958
series yourself. M.I.5.
did their best to get the couple be expelled from Britain, though only on a
fears response by the Bishop of Canterbury prevented this. Both Vermehren's
were very religious and humble people.

**
Here in some way or another Jebsen surely did not tell the Vermehren's the
truth. In this current "forensic Survey" is already dealt with the fact,
that M.I.5 and M.I.6., were well informed on Jebsen's dubious financial
doings. They rightly discussed whether his frequent manipulations was the
cause of his disappearance. But (A)
shows that Major Masterman was in Memorandum informed that Jebsen had confessed to
the S.D. that he was a traitor and a British agent.
Sadly pulling down the drain also Dr. Joachim Wrede in the same fatal fate:
KV 2/560 in respect to Johann Jebsen's doom.

A search in my archives
brought the according notice to light

KV 2/956-2, page 29

Crown Copyright

13th March, 1944

My dear Cowgill,

You will remember asking me whether we had any objection to bring Precious (=
Vermehren) (and his wife) to this country
as an agent of your organisation (M.I.6).
I sad 'no' to your query and I still hold that there are no real security
objections to this act but I may perhaps be of interest to you to know that the
S.I.M.E. (Secret
Intelligence
Middle
East)
view of precious (Vermehren) is, that, while anti-Nazi he appears to retain
patriotic German sentiments, and they (Vermehren
including his wife) also estimate that he
or his wife may later develop patriotic or religious scruples which may
interfere with any genuine employment of them by you.

I imagine however, that you are looking for them too supply you with valuable
intelligence already in their possession and, in these circumstances, I imagine
you will not be affected by this S.I.M.E. opinion.

(AOB,
they damm were, and during the many
years the Vermehren couple made their life in England they did everything
possible to hamper the family living. Had there ever been a second
interview? No!
Put to the very end of their stay in England - they were under constant
surveillance! Reading correspondence, checking time-and-again their way of
living far in the 1950s. Only due to this
single notice!

(AOB,
similarly Guy Liddell expressed also his resentments in this way, which
only had been based upon: this single notice, just reproduced genuinely
above!)

KV
2/861-2, page 64

Crown Copyright

Toeppen. was not shot at Belgrad. His family
lives near Hannover and he is alive but actually in a working (Arbeitslager)
in the Russian zone. Up to Popov's arrest he was all right, then he was
arrested too and taken to Berlin. When the Russians occupied Berlin they freed
him. If he gets back he will certainly contact Vermehren who will advise
me.

Brandes (@ Ballhorn,
at the end Feder)
he was ex-patriated from Portugal with the last lot and is now in the American
zone. As he was mixed up a lot with the kidnapping of Johnny I think
it would be a good idea to lay hands on him for questioning (again) (AOB,
to what I remember they couldn't trace him, since).

KV
2/861-3, page 83 as not to forget his black market engagements.

Crown Copyright

Jebsen
was employed by the Abwehr (since
or before 1940) and
ran an important agent in Jugoslavia (Popov/Tricycle,
Iwan I) and another
who carried on espionage in Great Britain under our (British)
control. He travelled extensively in Europe and engaged, on his won
account, in Black Market activities which caused him to come in conflict with
the Gestapo (S.D.
or Sipo) on more than
one occasion. Towards the end of 1944 (1942/1943),
while he was in touch with S.I.S. and for several months provided him with
valuable information about other German agents and officers.

to get her pension (Lore
Petersen - Jebsen's widow?)
I think also that the same considerations apply to any action which might be
taken by Ian Wilson, who was in fact the officer who ran the Jebsen case
and I believe met him from time to time. Subject to your approval,
therefore, I propose to reply to Ian Wilson that there is nothing, that we can
do and which in our opinion he should do either. It does not,
incidentally, seem to me to be very meritorious (commendable)
case you will observe that the lady is proposing to marry again.
(AOB, was Jebsen once
not a very valuable friend in 1944?)

B.1.
18.8.1951
J.H. Marriott.

KV 2/862-1, page 11.

Crown Copyright

B.1.

I am
not aware of the details of this case and I do not know therefore whether we
should as a department do what we can to assist Mrs. Jebsen in getting a
pension from the German Government, but even if the services rendered by Jonny
Jebsen to the department were such that we are under some moral obligation to
assist his widow, I still agree with the views expressed by you, that we as a
department should not give any certificate to Mrs. Jebsen, and Ian Wilson should
be so informed.

If we are to assist Mrs. Jebsen in any way, we should I think take the
appropriate action through the Foreign Office, who could in turn approach the
Bonn Government.

S.L.B.

20.8.1951
B.A. Hill

(AOB,
time passes away, so do you friend)

KV 2/862-1, page 12 .

Crown Copyright

D.B.

With reference to Minute 1255, I have summarised the relevant points and my
summary is at 1256a. I must appologise for the unconscionable length of
summary but it has necessitated wading through some 18 volumes.

In brief my conclusions are that we have no financial and very little moral
responsibility for Mrs. Jebsen. However, if it is considered that our
slight moral responsibility is such as to make it right that we should ask the
Foreign Office to approach the Bonn Government, then this approach should be in
the terms of penultimate (last
but one) paragraph of my note at 1256a.

You may wish to pass the file to S.L.B., for his comments.

B.1.K.

3.9.1951
Courtenay Young (M.I.6.)

KV 2/862-1, page 12

Crown Copyright

Minute 1258

Reference minute 1257, I should like you(r)
opinion on this point. My own agrees with Courtenay Young's as
expressed above. to my mind there is no objection to writing to the Bonn
Government on Mrs. Jebsen's behalf, providing we do not thereby invite the
retort (reply)
that, if Jebsen worked for us (has his
mind already deteriorated so much?), we
should bear the cost of his widow's maintenance.

D.B.
D.G. White

8.9.1951

KV 2/862-1, page 13 Very significant!

Crown Copyright

Minute 1259

D.B.

I have considered Courtenay Young's able summary at 1256a. My view of this
matter is that if we are not very careful, any action we may now take might
react to Mrs. Jebsen's detriment rather than to her benefit. you will see
that her letter of the 8th July, annexed to serial 1250a, she states -"... I
have applied for a widow's pension. As Jonny, however, was not killed in
action but perished in a conzentration camp, a 'Sonderhilfsrente' (Special
rent) can be considered only".

The Bonn Government are under an obligation under International Law to make some
kind of retribution to persons who died in concentration camps. They are
not, however, under any obligation under International Law to pay a pension to
the widow of a traitor. If we take the action suggested in your
Minute 1258 it will result in the Bonn Government being fully aware of Jebsen's
activities, and they would be justified if they felt so inclined to refuse to
pay Mrs. Jebsen even the lower pension which they are at present apparently
considering paying her.

What I would suggest therefore is that Courtenay Young and I should call on the
Foreign Office and put the facts to them, and that we be guided by the Foreign
office as to whether any such approach should be made.

My own opinion, having read Courtenay Young's note, is that we have fulfilled in
every way the moral obligation which we assumed in 1943. We then merely
said that we would do our best to look after the welfare of the wife and made it
quite clear at the time that we have done and in addition have done may other
things to rehabilitate her.

I have discussed this minute with Courtenay Young who agrees in substance with
what I have said above.

S.L.B.
B.A. Hill

11.9.45

(AOB,were those your great friends?
Jebsen's fate was also due to TAR's query put forward on to Jebsen - whether he
could provide information upon Ostro;
M.I.5- and M.I.6's menace!)

KV 2/862-1, page 14

Crown Copyright

Minute 1263

D.B. through S.L.B.

Mr. Hill and I saw Mr. Reilly at
the Foreign Office this morning. We explained the Jebsen case to him and
asked him whether the Foreign office would be prepared to make an approach to
Bonn Government regarding Mrs. Jebsen. Reilly said that the Foreign Office
would not be prepared to make such an approach. He also pointed out, as
did S.L.B., that any approach might well do more harm than good.

Please
see at 1262a a draft letter to Ian Wilson. I suggest that this is somewhat
revealing it might be better if it did not go through the open post and that I
should telephone to him and ask him to come round here when I could hand it to
him. If he wishes, I will then show him the summary
at 1256a,
so as to satisfy his conscience (ethics).
I should be grateful for your views on this procedure.

B.1.
C.T. Young

21.9.1951

(we
still don't know how matters were executed)

(AOB,
maybe we should consider: that Britain's glory was long passed, and the country
lived in a recession. But still, it is quite painful know - how short-lasting
their commitments against their former agents - actually were; a Great Nation?)
(On the other hand,
these file series concerning actually Popov's files. When we notice how childish
this person behaved, once noticed: living a "Playboy" life (please
see the document reproduced when this Survey has come to an ultimate closure),
which it was; both Jebsen and Pop were
behaving rather childishand spending great amounts of money:

(No
more - no less: "Nouveaux Riches")

KV 2/862-2, page 7

Accidentally I came across a
reasonable copy of Popov's passport Popov Douchan

Aliens Order, 1920

Certificate of Registration

Crown Copyright

Name Popov Duchan

Born 10.4.1912

KV 2/862-2, page 73

In the same file we find a quite poor photograph, but as it is the only genuine
one we have access to we should use it.

Crown Copyright

Johann Jebsen

we apologise for the quite poor photo quality, but we have to the accept way it is.

Continuing with

KV 2/863

KV 2/863-2, page 60 Message sent on behalf of Popov

Crown Copyright

Tricycle Traffic.

9th September, 1942.

Message sent 2105 GMT.

No. 117: No money has yet come. Will
probably able arrange journey London over Lisbon as courier but my situation
regarding money desperate. leaving here without regulating main debts put
in danger my return. All material I possess I will bring with me because
radio man refuses send long message. Could I meet Johnny at Lisbon?

(AOB, this
message indicates that Jebsen was in Lisbon in 1942; whether staying in the two
place Lisbon and Madrid I cannot judge)

KV 2/863-2, page 67 $
10,000

Crown Copyright

26th August, 1942.

Message sent:

No. 116: I have not received the 10,000 dollars*.
Last money received was in April by bank transfer. Nothing since.
What has gone wrong with the plan about expert without hairs? Nobody
has come to me. You should take not carefully of what I said about
radioman. (see
previous message)
Most urgent you explain about money if he is to collaborate as before.

*
AOB: According Books.Google: In 1941 a technician with three years'
experience earned seventy-three dollars a month in the Saint John
Laboratory, with no meals. Making annually $ 876. We must consider that the
apparent difference: is mainly the consequence of Popov's exorbitant
life-style; considering the payments to the radioman might have exceeding
the salary of a US Laboratory technician.)

KV 2/864-2, page 35

Crown Copyright

i)
Original German Text of Special Questions given to Tricycle (S.I.S.
alias of Popov)

ii) Original German text of S.D. Questionnaire given to
Tricycle (Popov)
in Lisbon in January, 1944.

My only aim is,
in this case, to point at the very fact that since the couple Vermehren's
defection, the S.D. and likely Amt VI Mil/Amt was gaining significance.

KV 2.864-4, page 11 showing the chicken-feed was not always
accepted:

Crown Copyright

Criticism for Ivan I (Iwan
)(Popov).

The report about "Spartan Exercise" was not considered to be good. What
Iwan reported was also in the press. The divisional numbers and/or the
names of the commanders, commanding these divisions, should be reported.

I
would like to terminate the chapters dedicate to Artist / Jebsen derived from
Popov's large series of files which accumulated op to ca 4800 pages.

Dusan 'Dusko' Popov was the playboy son of a wealthy industrialist from
Dubrovnik. After graduating in law at Freiburg University in the
mid-thirties he returned to Dubrovnik and opened his own law firm. In 1940
an old University friend friend invited him to Belgrade, told him he joined the
Abwehr and persuaded him to work for German intelligence. Popov however
was not convinced, contrived a meeting with a member of M.I.6. The Germans
instructed him to travel to Britain via neutral Portugal in the guise of a
businessman exporting raw material from Yugoslavia to Britain. Popov
reported everything to M.I.6. and on arrival in Britain in December 1940 was met
by B.1.a's (M.I.5.)
driver and taken to the Savoy Hotel where he was introduced to

'Tar' Robertson. 'Tar' was favourably impressed - "We
have here an agent of high quality". Originally codenamed Scoot
(Skoot) by 'TAR' (who thought he might!) he was soon renamed Tricycle as a more
fitting name of this most promising of agents!

Tricycle became the centre of a
considerable network of agents, some imaginary (invented by B1a (Ian
Wilson).

After the war he was given
British citizenship and presented with the OBE (in
1947)
by 'TAR' at an informal ceremony in the Ritz bar. He continued his
flamboyant, playboy life and died in 1981 aged sixty nine.

(AOB, a critical note is, in my perception,
necessary:
The greatest part of the huge Popov
file series are dealing with all sorts of money matters.I becomes quite evident - this
he wasn't at the end so selfish; he had cost them huge sums of money. Also all
sorts of difficulties which Popov left behind, in the many countries that were
visited by Popov. His staying in the U.S. included!)

A
dark but essential document, which we have to take into account; whether we like
it or not.

KV
2/269-2, page 32

Crown Copyright

Reorganisation of the Abwehr.*

22. Tricycle (Popov)
report to Henss (SD
representative in Oporto).
It will be remembered that it was Artist's intention that this report should
reach the hands of Kaltenbrunner. Unfortunately, Henss gave the report to
Schroeder (Leiter
representative of Amt IV (SD)
at the Embassy in Lisbon)
who has taken it with him to Berlin and has handed it to Schellenberg (Senior
Leiter Amt VI Mil/Amt RSHA).
Artist (Jebsen)
had advised Henss to telegraph Kaltenbrunner (AOB,
I doubt that his post possessed the facilities; as this was maintained in Lisbon)
to the effect that the report intended for him has been taken by Schroeder to
Schellenberg. In any case, Artist fears the desired effect of obtaining
Kaltenbrunner's support for Tricycle has been destroyed.

*The date of
extraction 30.4.44, is coincidental the day just after Jebsen's abduction.

I went
through all the according KV 2/... files related to Kaltenbrunner directly.

Disappointing, the British Secret Services chose not to raze the query onto
Kaltenbrunner's commitment in signing the order that Jebsen had to be handed
over to Amt IV.

After
have digested the entire file series, I tend to suppose - that in someway or
another fanatic Heinrich Müller directly could have approached Keitel allegedly
on behalf of Himmler; with whom Müller handled mainly business.

As not
to disappoint you too much I have selected the following rare photo:

Crown Copyright

Car
registration Pol - 4

Pol =
Polizei (Police)

Please
take a careful look at the front, just between the head-lights, and the engine
section; we clearly recognise a V shaped plate. In the first half of the 1960s I
(AOB) drove old Mercedes type cars, and I am well acquainted with the view in
front.

I
suppose since the assassination of Heydrich in June 1942 in Prague, it had
become evident that leaders at such high level should use protected cars.

Albeit,
that in the file we also might have noticed his private Mercedes cabriolet.

The
photos were among his possessions when he was arrested in Austria, by the
Americans.

On
24 May 2020

What
next?

I will
give it again a try - whether some SD related file series may be more fruitful.

KV 2655

on
Heinrich Müller
(Mueller)

also
known by the threatening nickname:

Gestapo
Müller

I has
to be noticed that it concerns a quite brief file, as it consists of 29 pages
only.

Crown Copyright

Mueller
(Müller)
Heinrich

KV
2/2655

PF
602698

AOB,
this quite high Personal File serial number,

in my
perception, points at the very fact that they haven't monitored him from the
beginning.

He his
career started with the regular police, thought he was most of the war heading
the most feared Amt IV, including Sipo, SD, Gestapa and Gestapo.

Please
notice also the many times, this file had been taken out of R 5's storage.

I must
admit, that I have no idea what we are expecting; as this file had been
downloaded on 7 December 2018, but I have not yet looked at it.

Politics: 1942. Was in S.D. (SD)
in 1938. Originally with Stapo (Staatspolizei)
München (Munich),
expert on communism. Protégé of Heydrich. "Direktor Gen" (General)
of the Gestapo (geheime
Staatspolizei) Berlin
in 1940. August 1941, went to Madrid. Jan. 42 Police Attaché at
Lisbon (AOB, the
proceeded by Schroeder; dealt with in this document).
In 1943 Head of Amt IV of RSHA (R.S.H.A.),

KV
2/2655, page 4

Crown Copyright

Appearance: very active, gives impression of great intelligence.
Source: Ledebur

(AOB,
In one of Kaltenbrunner's file series, he explained that Müller had a poor
marriage, and additionally two of his children were handicapped, of whom one
even possessed mongoloid tendencies, and was to be kept hidden from the outside
environment)

KV
2/2655, page 5

Crown Copyright

1942

Head of
Amt IV, rank of Gruppenführer General-Major der
Polizei Regierungsrat. report on disturbances in France was sent to
him. Visited Madrid and Lisbon end of Sept. 1942.

Source
B.1.Reg. Folder No. 33 6a (M.I.5)

KV
2/2655, page 9

Crown Copyright

Subject: SS Obergruppenführer Müller (Muller)
Alias Dr. Leo Lange.

1.
Reference your PF 602698 / B.2.a / JC (M.I.5)
dated 3 August 1949

2.
This Head Quarters has no information to establish that Müller dies in the
Chancellery Bunker with Hitler. Various investigations have been
made from time to time since 1946 with a view of tracing Müller's whereabouts,
if alive, but without success.

3.
As regards the sinister Dr. Leo Lange we have no likely trace of anyone of the
name. (AOB, I consider
it not unlikely that he managed to hide somewhere, but he wouldn't be so stupid
using a formerly used alias as before; by the way, by no means proving this
assessment!)

4.
Enquiries are now being made on the strength of your above mentioned letter and
you will be informed of any further developments. (AOB,
why not started it much earlier?)

Signed
by: R.G. Hodges Capt.

For
Major-General Chief, Intelligence Division Müller

KV
2/2655, page 19

Crown Copyright

Müller
(Mueller).

Christian name unknown. Lived in Berlin-Steglitz.
Married unhappily, had two children, one a boy aged 17, called up for
service just before the end of the war – the second child was much younger.
The latter child had pronounced Mongolian features, and it is believed that
on this account Müller avoided all social intercourse between friends and
neighbours. Müller spent especially all his time in his office on account of
unpleasant conditions at home. Most of Müller’s social life was confined to
those officials of his department who like himself, had risen from
subordinate positions, i.e. Hubetr, Piffrader, Geissler, Meisinger
(AOB, was the entire war in Tokyo;
but a very disgusting person), Gotthalmseder.

KV
2/2655, page 20

Crown Copyright

Müller.

"He
was, however, polite, 'korrekt' , but perhaps too modest. He behaved in
the typical manner of those who do not know how to act in a superior position,
giving evidence of his inferiority-complex of a 'small man' at every
opportunity. He was extremely servile towards his superiors, but seemed
very hard and severe towards his subordinates. All those men, who came
from the same narrow-minded burocratic atmosphere, especially those who were
members of the Bayrische Landes-Polizei, such as Huber, Piffrader, and Meisner (he
stayed as Police Attaché the entire wartime in Tokyo, be was an extremely bad
man, that even Himmler advised to simply shoot him),
enjoyed favoured positions with him.

Müller had a remarkable memory and knew every person who ever crossed his path,
and all events. He was a living encyclopaedia for Himmler. I cannot
imagine that he ever contradicted an order emanating from Himmler or Heydrich
even it was against his own convictions. He always wanted to do everything
himself, and gave his associates no chance for independent development; in fact,
this bad habit had been criticized even by Himmler.

KV 2/22655, page 21

Crown Copyright

20th
July attempt. All the important
officials of Amt IV were engaged in these investigations. Huppenköthen handled
the major cases, among them Fromm (Ersatzheer,
Bendlerstrasse, Berlin)
and probably Canaris (indeed,
he headed the ultimate trial on the night between 8 and 9th April 1945 in which:
Pfarrer Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, Ludwig Gehre,
General-Major Oster, Dr. Friedrich von Rabenau, Generalsstabsrichter Karl Sack
and Dr. Theodor Strünck - had been convicted to death by hanging. The trial was
a "Profisorium" not worth to be called a trial. All men were hung cruelly by
means of music string-threats!)
Huppenköthen, for instance kept in close touch with Kaltenbrunner in the
investigation of from since that case involved the most delicate relations with
the Wehrmacht. Amt III was able to furnish Amt IV considerable
information about the 20 July affair.

KV
2/2655, page 8

Crown Copyright

Seemingly this page ends on 19.8.49

But
when you look closely, you can recognise that below minute 10a the page have
been covered by another blank page.

KV
2/2655, page 28

Crown Copyright

This
page should concern minute 12 - but considering the manipulated previous page,
we notice that the reference to minutes 11a and 12a have been made invisible!

What do
they have to hide? Such practice mostly originated from M.I.6 interventions.

Please
look carefully to the particulars of this page. We may see signs of various
staples holes.

May
these have previously concerned photo's or other kind of references?

We have
sadly to terminate here, as the file does not provide more evidence.

I still
regret again, that we haven't encountered references on Jebsen's fate.

The
very file concerns police, SD, Sipo and related matters in Poland and Greece; as
well as in a context Amt VI

However, as it deals with organisational Police matters, I have used the
possibilities to make enhance my collection of notes.

Next:

KV
2/104

Jost Heinz Maria Karl

PF 601879

Crown Copyright

Jost Heinz Maria Karl

Photo taken at Camp
020 in England (AOB,

KV
2/104, page 7

Crown Copyright

Prior to Nov.43

Some time prior to Nov. 43,
Artist (Jebsen) (B.1.a.case) was in Lisbon. He claims that when he found
out that Amt VI were passing British bank notes forged by Amt IV, he did all
he could to stop it. He cooperated in attacking Jost, then head of Amt VI (nonsense
that was Schellenberg), for having
authorised the use of the forgeries. Jost was dismissed as a result. Jost
still, however, has friends in Amt IV and VI who whish to take revenge
against Artist on his behalf if the can. Schellenberg replaced Jost as head
of Amt VI.

(AOB, my brief
comment: Jebsen hardly new anything of Jost, nor of Schellenberg's Amt VI; as
this message had been briefed to British Secret Services. I wonder whether the
latter weren't better informed)

What is noticed
originates from Popov's file series, but clearly had been added on behalf of the
British Secret Service.

KV 2/104, page 22

Crown Copyright

On the flight back to
Germany were quite with whom we have dealt with on our website, and some names
even within this webpage

Only Kaltenbrunner was considered being a War
Criminal, and was sentenced to death at Nürenberg (Nuremberg)
in 1946.

pob (place of birth)
born 30.08.1910 (not
noticed here: born in Essen)

emp (employment) 1932 & 1944: Army

reference PF 602765

1944: member Intelligence Service; Germany

05.10.1989: Current File Status: Red
(Why just a few days
before opening of the iron curtain?)
(all
these card are dated about like this on)

AOB:
being expected that those ones live still in the communist controlled world?
These cards are found within so files; in contrast to most file series.

KV
2/106-1, page 9

Crown Copyright

Please
notice this so-called minute-sheet

The red
stamps are encountered quite often within the KV 2/xxx series; informing us that
the genuine page retained somewhere.

What it
does not inform us, is that some has been made invisible. In my perception, this
looks like M.I.6 or S.I.S. or Section V praxis'.

KV
2/106-1, page 10

Crown Copyright

Apparently is content being considered still to be kept hidden, for historians

KV
2/106-1, page 13

Crown Copyright

Minute Sheet.

We would appreciate seven additional copies of the Report on information
obtained from PW CS/2336 Obstlt. i G.*
Ohletz (Tyrol)**,
8 May 45. C.S.D.I.C.***
SIR. 1825 11.Sept. 45. On Notes on Mil Amt C ***** and other Departments
of RSHA.

Thank
you.

V.48.F.8 (might point
at M.I.6 or S.I.S.)

*
i.G. meant "im Generalstab" implying that he went through a thorough
officers education preparing for High Commands

**
Tyrol might have been the area where he had been captured. But it also might
have been connected to the "Alpenfestung" endeavour; where selected groups
should survive and waiting for future operations. As we known: all in vain.

***
Combiner Services Detailed Interrogation Centre

****
Mil / Amt was established after the Abwehr had to merge with RSHA Amt VI.
Mil / Amt was shared between former Abwehr personnel and Amt VI personnel.
Section C (Ohletz
in command)

In our
context Ohletz file does not contain anything on the Jebsen complex.

alas!

On
26 May 2020

Next:

KV
2/964

Marcus
Carl

Double
cross name Dictionary

PF
600900

KV
2/964-1, page 4

Crown Copyright

We
spoke about this matter on 26.1.45. It seemed to me that the arrangement (he
becoming double-cross agent Dictionary)
about Marcus was somewhat outside the normal arrangement by which our accredited
agents are allowed into this country without examination at IRC. You
agreed with this view and kindly said that is any such cases arose in the future
you would see that we were informed. I think actually that in a case if
this sort S.I.S. (M.I.6)
should write to us stating their full reasons and what they intend to do with
the body (downgrading
for Mr. Marcus),
before the man is despatched. I am now in possession of the full facts and
cannot understand why this was not done. I am sending a letter in this
sense to Vivian (M.I.6).

D.B.
Guy Liddell (M.I.5)

28.1.45

KV
2/964-1, page 17

Crown Copyright

The
matter is one of very great importance, as the forgery of Bank of England notes
by the Germans has been on the whole very successful, and it is desirable to
know as much as possible about the production of them. In addition
to this it will probably be possible for the experts of the Bank of England to
tell from Marcus' replies about the production of Bank Notes whether he is
telling the truth or not.

What we
can learn that there existed an animosity between S.I.S. (M.I.6) and M.I.5
personnel.

Though,
some general information is provided but none in respect to our forensic Survey
on Jebsen.

The
second part (KV 2/965) runs into the 1950s.

It
tends to be that the British Secret Services suspected Marcus (Dictionary) being
a Russian agent in Western Germany.

Please
notice:that when you are using the
markers (x)
- that returning to where you have started from - is easily managed by pressing:
Ctr+Z
(PC users) (Apple:
Command+Z)

This
forensic Survey took me nearly two (Corona) months of rather intensive file
studies and editing, on a daily basis.

This
endeavour resulted in 19 (XIX) Parts, which successively had been published on
the web.

Part XX
should cover my conclusion.

Though,
conclusions should imply, in my perception, that every stone have been turned
'upside down' which would have blown my starting considerations: to take
into account - all British Secret Services P.F.
xxx files concerned. These serials are obtainable (downloadable) via the
British National Archives website. Luckily, 99.9 % of these files have been
filmed and provided in good reproduction quality PDF*,
for affordable expenses.

*
Archiving particular files have been straight from the beginning considered
being of historical significance and got on their jacket a red stamp
Historical.
There, however, are existing also files which weren't protected straight from
the beginning. Their reproduction quality most often is in black and white only,
and often surviving in a rather limited quality; expressing it mildly. Though,
relevant - because these often contain valuable information, essential for
completing the understanding - and/or - context of German Secret Services. Of
which, some files even originating from before the outbreak of the First World
War (<1914).

Why
have I initiated this Survey"?

Reason:
I was highly upset by what had been encountered on Wikipedia concerning Johannes
Jebsen.

(1)
The editor who once has contributed this nonsense - forced me to start up a new,
rather thoroughly documented, Survey; which I later was forced to rename it:

a
"forensic Survey".

My
objection, was, and still is, to take every source in consideration to which we
have access to - within the British National Archives KV 2/xxx file
series (>>4000).

We
possess currently > 101.000
accumulated file pages.

I omit
to repeat what someone have put on print before, because I highly doubt that
their sources being truly genuine.

But,
one never know which file actually proves to be fruitful.

As:
quite many files have been destroyed over the more than seven decades; but,
luckily quite often, some essential detail copies survived in other file series.
But you never actually know in which one.

(C)
Johannes Jebsen, wasn't born in Hamburg, as so often had been published, also at
the criticised Wikipedia contribution(1);
but according to Jebsen's girlfriend/mistress Baroness Marie Luise von Gronau
(in Lisbon): he was born in Appenrade; near the Danish border (according
Google belonging to Denmark, since 1920).

Jebsen,
was born incredible rich, and lived a playboy like life in pre-war Nazi Germany.
He, nevertheless, studied Law at the Freiburg i.Br. University, where he
graduated. Freiburg University was quite popular among none German residents. He
met there also Popov - who already, by then, became a friend of his.
Jebsen, albeit, grown-up in a Nazi environment; nevertheless, we may believe
that his fellow international student colleagues - have turned his mind and have
converted his Nazi perception into an anti-Nazi discernment.

Source
(B),
originating from Popov's file series, informs us that Jebsen apparently
already was in 1940, a member of the German Amt Ausland/Abwehr. The reason for
it might have been his aim not to become engaged within the German military
machine. An option was - to become engaged within a branch dedicated to military
intelligence abroad.

Albeit,
that he was married, he possessed in nearly all places where he went to for some
time, to become engaged with new girl-friends in casu mistresses.

Another
means were his financial engagements, which wasn't necessarily for his living,
but more for his - fun or other means (maybe even greediness). Not always smart
was his eager to be engaged within currency matters, even when he had to deal
with those of the SS, and even betraying them; but also dubious dealing
generally.

(F)
Quoting:
7. We cannot tell exactly why Artist has fallen under
suspicion -
we only know that
he is regarded as "unreliable".
Such indications as there are suggest that his "unreliability" may be
connected with
his financial
operations,
his intrigues with the S.D.,
or his unwise inquisitiveness into the undertakings of Brandes (Ballhorn)
and Ostro, and not with the dealings with Tricycle at all. There is
no proof that treason on the part of Artist in connection with Tricycle is part
of the charge. But obviously ..... Artist may well betray all,
on.....

(C)
Baroness Marie
Luise von Gronau , a girlfriend / mistress in Portugal: considered him
being a most intelligent person, but one, whom neglected is own health care. For
instance, his smoking of about 100 cigarettes a day! His teeth were poorly kept,
and even his right-hand fingers and nails showed severe brown signs due to his
heavy smoking behaviour.

AOB:
What is the difference here - between being intelligent and/or being smart? When
we compare the very facts between the warnings put forward onto him, by say, T.A.
Robertson (TAR) of M.I.5. on Ballhorn (his
real name Hans Brandes)
and his contrary believes and thus not taking the careful measures put forward
to him serious; we must come to the conclusion: that his intelligence did not
prevent him from responding rather naive and childish. In other words, he over
estimated his personal judgments - being superior to what was forwarded to him
on behalf of M.I.5. It has to be noticed though, that they (M.I.5
and M.I.6) had been seriously hampered by the very facts: that Britain's most secret asset
the information gathered by deciphering Germany's (most) secret communications,
which they gave the cover-name: Most Secret Source, or simply M.S.S. (MSS);
which was based upon continuous decrypting German machine generated secret
messages, generally known as Enigma machine codes (fore example) (think of
Bletchley Park). The failure that it went this way - was the faulty
assessments by British Secret Services, that their black spot and
menace Ostro(Paul
Georg Fidrmuc) should
be lifted desperately. And Artist (Johann Jebsen) was trustworthy and living
about the same area where Ostro lives. But Jebsen was so naive to contact
a fellow German countryman Ballhorn (Hans Brandes) who was according Jebsen a
trustworthy fellow German. But Ballhorn (alias of Hans Brandes), was a V-Mann
engaged to KOP I H in Lisbon. He informed Dr. Aloys Schreiber at KOP in Lisbon,
as well as in Berlin (Kuebart); the fact that Jebsen was "fishing" about Mr.
Fidrmuc. Please consider reference (D).
Albeit, his graduation at the Freiburg University, Jebsen apparently lacked an
adult sense for reality; in my perception, his responding proved to be rather
naive and childish!

(E)
Quoting: The meeting between S.I.S. (Major
Foley M.I.6) and
Artist (Jebsen)
on 28.4.44 (the day
before Jebsen's abduction)
was referred to in my previous note. A written report has now been
received which slightly amplifies the information previously available.
The written report states that Moldenhauer was in Lisbon on 28.4.44 staying with
Artist. Artist had also reported that there was a chance of Brandes (Ballhorn)
being recalled of his failure to produce his agents (rumours
only).
According to Artist, Brandes was worried that Tricycle should be so good an
agent as Brandes was afraid that Tricycle would report the date and place of
invasion and this prolong the war. Artist informed S.I.S. that although he
was convinced that Brandes was not trying to trap him into any admission.
Artist acted as though Brandes was so trying and therefore always reacted to
Brandes' suggestions as a good German should. (AOB,
Jebsen, apparently, did not grasp where he was talking about!)

(F)
Quoting:
7. We cannot tell exactly why Artist has fallen under
suspicion -
we only know that
he is regarded as "unreliable".
Such indications as there are suggest that his "unreliability" may be
connected with
his financial
operations,
his intrigues with the S.D.,
or his unwise inquisitiveness into the undertakings of Brandes (Ballhorn)
and Ostro, and not with the dealings with Tricycle at all. There is
no proof that treason on the part of Artist in connection with Tricycle is part
of the charge. But obviously ..... Artist may well betray all,
on.....

(G)
Quoting:
He (Kuebart*)
was also interrogated by an unknown Hauptsturmführer (late
July and/or August 44
). During these
interrogations he was asked why he had not arrested Sdf. Wrede (KV
2/560) his
failure to reveal Jebsen's attempt to bribe him (KV
2/860-1, page 49).
Kuebart replied that he was not in charge of Wrede and considered such arrest to
be unnecessary since Wrede's omission ?coined? to be actuated by stupidity
rather than malice. He was also asked why he had made difficulties in handing
over Jebsen to the S.D. after their
demand therefore. He replied that as Jebsen was a soldier he regarded it
as a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Abwehr. With
regard to Moldenhauer Kuebart admits that Schreiber exceeded his scope in
arresting this man, since Moldenhauer was merely concerned with Jebsen's plans to
desert, and enjoyed civilian status. (AOB,incorrect: Moldenhauer was already in 1941 engaged in the Abwehr.
Administratively he belonged to Nest Cologne
(Köln).
Both Moldenhauer and
Jebsen were keen not get to be caught for service in the Wehrmacht. Madrid was no
longer a secure place for Moldenhauer, and therefore he moved next to Lisbon. Both Jebsen and
Moldenhauer knew each other already in 1941, maybe even earlier)

*
Kuebart succeeded Hansen and shared the same Belinde barracks with Hansen. Both
men had been arrested in the early morning of 22 July 1944. Considered as a
close contact with Hansen, he was also arrested. And went through all SS
interrogations. Though, Hansen who really was heavily engaged in the failed plot
against Hitler, on 20 July 1944; Hansen was sentenced to death.
Whereas Kuebart, was the first one who got a different censure (5 October 1944),
he lost his military rank, pension, and was removed out of the Wehrmacht. But,
he survived. Both men appeared for the fearful Volksgerichtshof
(People's Court).

(H)
Quoting: We cannot expect to
get any concrete reactions from MSS as to the extent to which Garbo (Spanish;
Juan Pujol Garcia, likely Britain's the most important double cross agent!)
is compromised. We were still speculating as to the fate of Artist (Jebsen)
as late as the evening of the 6.5.44 in spite of the fact that there was
evidence on M.S.S. as early as 30.4.44 that Artist had been kidnapped and had
passed through Madrid at 2 p.m.
(nonsense!) that
day en route to Berlin. Similarly on the 29.4.44 were convinced, as
was Artist himself, that both his position and that of Tricycle had never
been more secure.
This in spite of the fact that there was evidence on M.S.S. (though in a form
unintelligible at the time) that Artist's kidnapping (operation: Dora
or Kohlenklau) had
been planned and was imminent on the 25.4.44.
It was put in operation the same night that our confidence in him (Jebsen)
was at its
height. M.S.S. appeared to support Artist's believe that
Schreiber was his ally and was fighting his battles against the suspicions of
the High Command (Mil/Amt Berlin), the
Abwehr and the S.D. whereas Schreiber was in fact the man chosen to carry out
his kidnapping.

Another
great nonsense encountered within Wikipedia's contribution on Jebsen:
that he had withstand all SS severe interrogation methods- and not telling them
about where to expect the future Allied invasion would ground.

This
is ridiculous and a great nonsense:
Fortitude was Britain's highest endeavour to keep the Germans expecting an
eminent invasion everywhere - but not at the actual shores of Normandy.

(J)
Quoting: I had a long talk with Tricycle yesterday evening.
It isof courseimpossible to tell him that we know Artist is in Germany;
as far as facts go he only knows that Artist failed to keep an appointment with
our representative (likely
pointing at Major Foley)
on 5.5.44 and that our people in Lisbon have ascertained that Artist has not
been home since 29.4.44. Tricycle (Disko
Popov) also knows that
at the meeting on 28.4.44, when Artist sent him a letter, everything appeared to
Artist to be in good order.

Tricycle realises that there is a possibility that Artist may have been
kidnapped by the Germans, particularly because Artist himself suggested (as has
been made known to Tricycle) that the request for Artist (Jebsen)
to attend the meeting at Biarritz on 21.4.44
was in Artist's opinion a possible trap to get Artist to occupied territory.

AOB:
Generally speaking: The British Secret Services played their agents to
believe: being well
informed and their best friend;
which actually wasn't the full truth. They were kept convincing them, but
factually: when the spell was over, they were regarded as former agents, no more
- no less!

(K)and following
correspondences:
a rather shabby - but true story: Quotation 1:
to get her pension (Lore
Petersen - Jebsen's widow)
I think also that the same considerations apply to any action which might be
taken by Ian Wilson, who was in fact the officer who ran the Jebsen case
and I believe met him from time to time. Subject to your approval,
therefore, I propose to reply to Ian Wilson that there is nothing, that we can
do and which in our opinion he should do either. It does not,
incidentally, seem to me to be very meritorious (commendable)
case you will observe that the lady is proposing to marry again.
(AOB, was Jebsen once
not a very valuable friend in 1944?)

B.1.
18.8.1951

Quotation 2: B.1.

I am not aware of the details of this case and I do not know therefore whether
we should as a department do what we can to assist Mrs. Jebsen in getting
a pension from the German Government, but even if the services rendered by Jonny
Jebsen to the department were such that we are under some moral obligation to
assist his widow,
I still agree with the views expressed by you, that we as a department should
not give any certificate to Mrs. Jebsen, and Ian Wilson should be so informed.

If we are to assist Mrs. Jebsen in any way, we should I think take the
appropriate action through the Foreign Office, who could in turn approach the
Bonn Government.

S.L.B.

20.8.1951
B.A. Hill

J.H. Marriott.

Quotation 3: Minute 1258

Reference minute 1257, I should like you(r)
opinion on this point. My own agrees with Courtenay Young's as
expressed above. to my mind there is no objection to writing to the Bonn
Government on Mrs. Jebsen's behalf, providing we do not thereby invite the
retort (reply)
that, if Jebsen worked for us (has his
mind already deteriorated so much?), we
should bear the cost of his widow's maintenance.

D.B.
D.G. White

AOB: Mr D.G. White was during Jebsen's wartime engagements already in charge! I
would like to consider: this had not been in
Jebsen's and related minds, when they offered their services to the Allied's
future.

Now our crucial query: remained Jebsen unbroken during the SS interrogations?
No
he did not! Evidence?

(L)
Quoting: The report on Page XLIV (44) on the
the case of Tricycle and Artist is exceptionally interesting, and provides some
positive evidence that Artist was known to the Germans to be a traitor, and
confessed to them that he had worked on our (British)
behalf. It is surely to be presumed that he
shared Wrede's
ultimate fate.

At about
the same period in the beginning of middle of May, Sdf. Wrede was summoned to
Berlin and interrogated by Sdf Weiss (Kuebart's
assistant), who taxed Wrede with his
failure to admit Jebsen's attempt to bribe him.

Wrede confessed that he had
not revealed this, and after a certain amount of discussion with Obst. Hansen,
who whished to avoid any further trouble over this whole question, Wrede was
sent back to Paris.

(L) As will
seen later, Kuebart's failure to have Wrede arrested, was brought before the
People's Court (Volksgerichtshof)
with the events of July 20 1944) (notice on Wrede also: Part_I
+ Ia)

AOB: To what we so far have noticed in my current Reflections
- we may at least draw some conclusions: - that Jebsen was not the person
who was painted by the editor of the first quoted (1)
Wikipedia introduction. Dr. Wrede was also murdered by the SS machinery; though,
it was Jebsen who is to blame for it directly. Why? Because Jebsen told
Ballhorn
(alias of Hans Brandes) naively about his
bribing efforts in regard to Dr. Wrede!
Jebsen admitted ultimately during his interrogation that he had been a
traitor. And: In all countries of the world "High Treason" results during a war
inevitably in a capital punishment.
Though, of course not, the cruel way the SS controlled Germans
commenced it.

A
final, critical note, may be necessary.

Dr. Schreiber (KV
2/3568) Jebsen's German
handling Abwehr officer, at some time being interrogated, noticed that Jebsen
was also an opportunist.

He may, after all, being considered a bit this way.

As his main aims seemingly above all: concerned his financial (dubious)
dealings, which were well known to his guiding - and controlling British Secret
Service officers in England.

Another, rather embarrassing behaviour particularly in respect to Popov, but
also Jebsen, was the way they managed their expenditures.

What
to say: Popov when staying in London gave M.I.5 his recent evening-meal bill to
his handling M.I.5 officer.

He was staying at the Savoy Hotel (Strand); spending for his (own) evening meal
> £9. We must bear in mind - that in those days: British £1 stood for >10 Dutch
guilders. Implying that his dinner had cost him: > 90 Dutch guilders in 1944 (we
are not on the black market)! People
spending so much, in those days, lacked the real understanding of what the value
of money constitutes!

Jebsen in other context showed also little understanding what the value of money
implies.

My, maybe, downgrading opinion (B)
is: that both men - showed that they belonged to the so-called "Nouveaux
Riche" category;
where playboys quite often belong to.

Those who really would like to gain an opinion concerning Popov's - as well as
Jebsen's papers - which are included - please obtain yourself the KV 2/845 ..
KV 2/864 file series (ca 4900 pages); but I warn you: you most likely will
become upset by Popov's expenditures - and the troubles he caused; even quite a
long time after the end of the war.

It is rather disappointing noticing his (Popov's) financial doings, partly paid
for on behalf of the British Secret Services; thus the British tax payers.