United States v. Martinez-Lopez

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, South Bend Division

May 2, 2018

UNITED STATES OF AMERICAv.VICTOR HUGO MARTINEZ-LOPEZ

OPINION AND ORDER

JON E.
DEGUILIO, JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT..

The
indictment in this case charged Defendant Victor
Martinez-Lopez (“Martinez-Lopez”) with two counts
of distributing a mixture or substance containing
methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),
and one count of conspiracy to possess and distribute
methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. [DE 9]
Martinez-Lopez pled guilty with the benefit of a plea
agreement to the two distribution counts. [DE 17-1] This
Court accepted Martinez-Lopez's plea of guilty, accepted
his plea agreement, and found him guilty on November 6, 2015.
[DE 24] On August 31, 2016, the Court sentenced him to 294
months of imprisonment on each of the counts concurrently, to
be followed by six years of supervised release. [DE 58]

Now
proceeding pro se, Martinez-Lopez has filed a motion
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, attacking his sentence as well
as the sufficiency of the indictment underlying his
conviction. After instructing the government to respond and
after reviewing the instant motion, the government's
response, and Martinez-Lopez's reply, the Court will
dismiss his claims and deny the issuance of a certificate of
appealability.

FACTUAL
BACKGROUND

Martinez-Lopez
was a member of an interstate methamphetamine distribution
conspiracy. As part of his involvement, he would shuttle
drugs from a supplier in Texas to Elkhart, Indiana. There, he
would accept either cash or methamphetamine for his efforts.
He did this approximately eight times between 2014 and 2015.
Martinez-Lopez also organized other large shipments of drugs
from Texas to Indiana, sold methamphetamine to numerous
individuals throughout Indiana and Michigan, and directed
others to do so, all as part of the larger conspiracy.

The
government charged Martinez-Lopez with two counts of
distributing methamphetamine and one count of conspiracy to
possess and distribute methamphetamine. He plead guilty with
the benefit of a plea agreement to the two distribution
charges. At the change of plea hearing, the magistrate judge
elicited sworn testimony from Martinez-Lopez confirming that
he had consulted with his attorney regarding the plea
agreement, its contents, and its consequences, that
Martinez-Lopez understood those consequences, and that he
entered into the plea agreement knowingly and voluntarily.

The
case proceeded to sentencing, where the Court imposed a
294-month sentence on each of the distribution counts, to run
concurrently. As part of its Guidelines calculation, the
Court imposed a two-level enhancement for
Martinez-Lopez's role as a leader or organizer in the
conspiracy under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c). Martinez-Lopez did
not object to this enhancement, but he did successfully
oppose a separate two-level enhancement for knowingly
distributing unlawfully imported methamphetamine under §
2D1.1(b)(5). Just under a year after his sentencing,
Martinez-Lopez filed the instant § 2255 motion.

STANDARD
OF REVIEW

Section
2255(a) of Title 28 provides that a federal prisoner may
claim “the right to be released upon the ground that
the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States, or that the court was without
jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence
was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is
otherwise subject to collateral attack, [and] may move the
court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or
correct the sentence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). The
Seventh Circuit has recognized that § 2255 relief is
appropriate only for “an error of law that is
jurisdictional, constitutional, or constitutes a fundamental
defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of
justice.” Harris v. United States, 366 F.3d
593, 594 (7th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Further,
“a Section 2255 motion is neither a recapitulation of
nor a substitute for a direct appeal.” Olmstead v.
United States, 55 F.3d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 1995)
(citation omitted). Relief under § 2255 is extraordinary
because it seeks to reopen the criminal process to a person
who has already had an opportunity of full process.
Almonacid v. United States, 476 F.3d 518, 521 (7th
Cir. 2007) (citing Kafo v. United States, 467 F.3d
1063, 1068 (7th Cir. 2006)). A court may also deny a §
2255 motion without an evidentiary hearing if “the
motion and the files and records of the case conclusively
show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” 28
U.S.C. § 2255(b).

DISCUSSION

Martinez-Lopez's
claims can be divided into two broad categories. His first
set of substantive claims includes arguments that the
indictment was deficient because it did not include either
the mens rea associated with his offenses or the
drug quantity amount, and that he should not have received an
enhancement under Guidelines § 3B1.1(c) for his
aggravating role in the offense. Martinez-Lopez's second
set of claims all relate to the ineffective assistance of
counsel. The Court will first address Martinez-Lopez's
substantive claims before moving on to his claims for
ineffective assistance.

A.
Substantive Claims

Independent
from his ineffective assistance claims, Martinez-Lopez argues
that the indictment should have, but did not contain
allegations of mens rea and drug quantity [DE 64 at
5-6], and that the aggravating role enhancement he received
at sentencing should not apply to him. [DE 64-1 at 5] But
Martinez-Lopez has already waived these claims. His plea
agreement contained the following language:

I expressly waive my right to appeal or to contest my
conviction and all components of my sentence or the manner in
which my conviction or my sentence was determined or imposed,
to any Court on any ground other than a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, including any appeal under Title 18,
United States Code, Section 3742 or any post-conviction
proceedings, including but not limited to, a proceeding under
Title 28, United States Code, Section 2555.

[DE 17-1 ¶ 9(d)] In the Seventh Circuit, plea agreements
that contain waivers of collateral review are generally
enforceable. Jones v. United States, 167 F.3d 1142,
1145 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[W]aivers are enforceable as a
general rule; the right to mount a collateral attack pursuant
to § 2255 survives only with respect to those discrete
claims which relate directly to the negotiation of the
waiver.”); see also United States v. Worthen,
842 F.3d 552, 554 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Generally speaking,
appeal waivers are enforceable and preclude appellate
review.”).

Martinez-Lopez
stated under oath at his sentencing hearing that he
understood that waiver [Sent. Tr. at 37:23-38:5], and the
Court found his plea to be knowing and voluntary. Moreover,
his substantive claims do not fall within any exceptions to
the enforceability of waivers recognized by the Seventh
Circuit. See United States v. Smith, 759 F.3d 702,
706 (7th Cir. 2014).[1] Thus, the waiver here is enforceable, and
Martinez-Lopez's substantive claims fall short.

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