Introduction:

India provided sanctuary, training, weapons and finance to 20,000 Sri
Lankan Tamil militants operating out of 33 camps from October 1983 to June
1987. New Delhi's decision to spawn violence in Sri Lanka was directed by
geopolitical and ethnic compulsions in Tamil Nadu. Despite the publication
of the photographs of these training camps in the vibrant Indian press,
Indian officials denied the existance of these camps on Indian soil.

South Africa permitted the LTTE to establish a propaganda, fund raising,
training, procurement and shipping network in February 1996. Similarly to
the Indian response, embarassed South African officials continue to deny
the existance of political and military training bases in South Africa.

South Africa battled hard to refute both domestic press reports and
allegations by Sri Lanka that hard-liners of the South African National
Congress is providing military hardware, finance and political support to
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

The response of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of South Africa, South
Africa House in London, and the South African High Commission in New Delhi
was that "as a policy" South Africa does not provide support to "liberation
movements." South Africa refused to label the LTTE as a terrorist
organisation and remove Sri Lanka from the list of countruies to which
South Africa has banned arms sales.

Although Sri Lankan officials tried to hide their disappointment, South
African diplomats from New Delhi accredited to Colombo towed the policy
advocated by hardline ANC activists in the South African government. For
fear of earning the wrath of the ANC hardliners, the visiting diplomats did
not persue a political but an economic agenda from double taxation to
trade. When High Commissioner Jerry Matsila met with President Kumaratunge
for three hours, he advanced the LTTE agenda of persuading Colombo to agree
to the good offices of South Africa.

Colombo has persistantly misperceived South Africa's intentions vis-a-vis
the LTTE and vis-a-vis Sri Lanka. It began in early 1997 when President
Mandela visited London and at a reception for foreign envoys, he met with
the Sri Lankan High Commissioner S.K. Wickramasinghe. President Mandela
shook hands with High Commissioner Wickramasinghe and asked him: "How is
President Chandrika?" High Commissioner Wickramasinghe perceiving that
Mandela was well disposed towards Sri Lanka dampened all government efforts
to confront South Africa with evidence of LTTE activity in South Africa.
Mandela government was fully supportive of the Sri Lankan
government. High Commissioner Wickramasinghe argued that the LTTE had no
presence in South Africa.

With such charm, Sri Lankan policy and decisionmakers could have never
beleived that South Africa was playing a dual role. High Commissioner
Wickramasinghe's flawed assessment was nothing new - Sri Lankan political,
diplomatic and intelligence leaders had made similar assessments when India
was providing sanctuary, training, finance and weapons to some 20,000 Sri
Lankan militants in 33 camps from October 1983 to June 1987. Fifty years
after independence Sri Lankan decisionmaking process was flawed because
successive governments had failed to build the institutions and processes
for collective thinking. Sri Lanka lacked political,security
and foreign policy think tanks for formulating immediate and long range
policy.

The Context:

Away from the glare of the international media, several terrorist groups
operate in South Africa. The deteriorating political and security
conditions are conducive for the operation of terorist and criminal groups.
The LTTE was quick to exploited that situation and developed a series of
training camps to train nationalist Tamil South Africans.
After about 3-400 South African Tamils were trained, the LTTE formed
South African Tamil Tigers. Many of them were trained by LTTE trainers from
Sri Lanka and retired South African service personnel drawn from Koevoet
and 32 Battalion, two elite military organisations of the Apartheid era.
These organisations spearheaded the counter insurgency drives against the
guerrillas of the African National Congress (ANC) who were operating out of
bases in South Angola and Northern Namibia. Koevoet
and 32 Battalion troops fought not only ANC and SWAPO guerrillas but also
regular Angolan and Namibian forces. There are also reports that LTTE
activists from Sri Lanka received specialised training on South African
soil.

The Beginings:

The LTTE established their influence in South Africa through a series of
front organisations established in 1994. Since 1995, LTTE began to operate
a series of training camps in South Africa. The LTTE established the
training program by registering itself as a "closed corporation" by paying
200 Rand in February 1995. In a closed corporation, both the company name
and constituent members can change without informing the registrar. For
expediency, the company was providing private security
guards to private and government organisations. The compounds of the camps
were well concealed from the public eye - the perimeter was protected by
barbed wire, spikes and highwalls. The first three camps were established
in three Tamil neighbourhoods.

The camps provided accommodation and facilities to train recruits in
guerrilla warfare. Initially, all the trainers were Sri Lankan Tamils but
gradually South Africans joined in. Each camp had between 20 to 10 trainers
many of whom rotated. For instance, one camp had 18 trainers. Of these, 4
trainers instructed the recruits on the history of "Eelam Tamils." After
rigorous physical training (PT) by 6 trainers, the recruits were provided
basic military training by 2 trainers. The training included armed and
unarmed combat. There was instruction on how to evade surveillance,
counter-intelligence, explosives use and communication. The other trainers
- Sri Lankan and South African - were silent and observed the performance
of the recruits. The training period for each batch was three months,
comparable to the LTTE training provided in India to some
Indian Tamil groups such as the Tamil National Retrieval Army and the basic
training provided to LTTE recruits in Sri Lanka. Upon graduation, the best
were transported to Sri Lanka. They were inducted to Sri Lanka via India by
boat and via Maldives by air. Reports of some being transferred to Sri
Lanka by LTTE ships, frequenting South African ports, is currently under
investigation.

The South African agency, the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), became
aware of the training camps within a year of their operation but the
influence of ANC hard-liners within the NIA prevented NIA from advising the
South African government to close down the camps. But, the NIA inducted an
agent who provided them details of the
training and trainers. One of the major factors which led South Africa to
adopt such a position was the effectiveness of LTTE propaganda and the
susceptibility of the ANC government towards supporting violent movements.
In fact, the confidential South African Foreign Ministry assessments
criticises Sri Lankan military atrocities and not the LTTE atrocities.
Among the South African diplomats who supported the LTTE quite openly was
Jacky Selebi, the former South African Ambassador in Geneva and Chair of
the UN Human Rights Commission and since currently Director General,
Foreign Affairs Department, Pretoria. On a visit to Geneva, he met with
representatives of LTTE fronts on August 10, 1998 and pledged his support
towards their cause.

LTTE-ANC:

The ANC and LTTE relations dates back to contacts in London and Paris in
the late 1970s. Through the umbrella organisation - Friends of Palestine -
LTTE activists frequently met with ANC representatives at the Arab League
Building, UK. LTTE also established links with the South West African
People's Organisation which had close relations with the ANC. This long
relationship - including some military assistance to ANC guerrillas -
opened the door for the LTTE to enter South Africa when Mandela assumed
office. Some of the influential ANC activists in the UK distanced
themselves from the LTTE after the LTTE assassinated Dr. Rajini Thiranagama
(an LTTE activist turned human rights activist) in 1989. She had forged
LTTE-ANC relations in the UK. After the LTTE assassinated Rajiv Gandhi in
1991, the ANC activists in the UK resented the LTTE.

Post-1994 relations witnessed the LTTE activists travelling to South Africa
including Tharmalingam Shanmugam Kumaran alias Kumaran Pathmanathan, the
head of the LTTE International Network. Close links between South African
Tamils and the LTTE were forged through the International Secretariat in
London. The LTTE links with the Mandela government was consolidated in late
1994 when LTTE activists won over a few ANC hard-liners. The LTTE also
established contacts with South African missions in Canberra, New Delhi and
London. The LTTE continues to feed South African missions with propaganda,
particularly the UK mission.

After the ANC government came to office, Foreign Minister Lakshman
Kadirgamar was the first Sri Lankan dignitary to visit South Africa. ANC
hard-liners in the Mandela government did not wish to displease the LTTE.
Around the same period Minister Kadirgamar visited South Africa in early
1996, a 14 member LTTE delegation was received by President Mandela in his
office. Three delegates were women. Except one delegate who joined the team
from South Africa, the others came from Sri Lanka via India on
airline tickets issued by the South African government. Their program was
organised by the ANC with the assistance of the South African High
Commission in New Delhi. Research Analysis Wing, India's agency for
gathering foreign intelligence and conducting overseas operations, had
failed to monitor the ANC-LTTE link. Indian Intelligence Bureau had failed
to monitor the use of India as a transit point. This high level meeting was
followed by several meetings between ANC and LTTE representatives in
India. Among the ANC officials was a South African foreign ministry
official. The South African mission in India, particularly the Office of
the Deputy High Commissioner, was involved with these discussions.

Before Minister Kadirgamar left South Africa he received an official
briefing from a White South African intelligence official. Although Sri
Lanka through the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) supported the ANC, Sri Lanka
and the Apartheid regime maintained intelligence liaison. This was a
necessity because Sri Lankan groups were training both in Lebanon and
Syria, particularly in the Bekha valley with the Palestinian Liberation
Organisation, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the ANC.
Senior Sri Lankan intelligence officials visited South Africa and South
Africans assisted Sri Lanka to develop its war-fighting and intelligence
gathering capability. The intelligence official explained to Minister
Kadirgamar that the LTTE was disseminating propaganda and raising funds
through four front organisations and that there were about 100 Sri Lankan
Tamil families in South Africa.

The post-Mandela NIA was NIA and ANC intelligence wing combined. Many ANC
intelligence types entertained the view that South Africa had an obligation
to assist their former allies - meaning the groups that had assisted them
such as the PLO and LTTE and the countries that had stood by them such as
Iran and Libya. Therefore, the ANC hard-liners in the NIA were annoyed that
a Sri Lankan government minister was briefed of LTTE activities. Within a
few days, the intelligence official was transferred
out. This exacerbated the tension between the NIA old guard and the new
additions.

Influence:

The LTTE influence continued to grow in South Africa throughout 1996. As a
mark of respect for President Mandela, the LTTE magazine Hot Spring,
published out of UK, carried messages and quotes from the celebrated
African leader. Quotes from Mandela were published from his book "Long Walk
to Freedom, The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela" (Abacus, UK, 1994). Hot
Spring of October 1997 provided wide coverage of Mandela's visit to Libya
and criticised the US role in Libya. Hot Spring of December 1997 carried
two quotations next to each other. The first quote by a Johannesburg woman
on Winnie Madikizela-Mandela's role in several apartheid-era murders and
abductions said: "Winnie is a murderer. What can a murderer do for our
country ?" The second quote by the Johannesburg nurse Jemina Litabe said:
"Whether she killed people or not, she was fighting for the rights of our
people "

A message from Mandela to be publicised at an LTTE organised conference in
Australia was obtained by the LTTE in June 1996. The Peace with Justice
International Conference, co-organised by the Australian Human Rights
Foundation and the Australasian Federation of Tamils, two LTTE fronts, was
attended by Lawrence Tilagar, the then head of the LTTE International
Secretariat and Pravin Gordhan, an influential South African supportive of
the LTTE. The LTTE had obtained the message through Gordhan, a former ANC
leader and currently a parliamentarian representing the ANC. Some Sri
Lankan Diaspora organisations overseas wrote to President Mandela
protesting for issuing a message to the LTTE.

Gordhan, the go-between who secured the message in the form of a letter
from Mandela to the "Human Rights conference" was an ANC ideologue rather
than a terrorist. His ANC background has made Gordhan a powerful figure in
Mandela's South Africa. He served as co-chairperson of the Transitional
Executive Committee and was engaged in the drafting of the newly completed
Constitution of South Africa. Some South African colleagues of Gordhan
believe that he had been duped by the LTTE into believing that the LTTE
struggle against Colombo is similar to the erstwhile conflict between White
and Black South Africans. Even some of the better educated South
Africans, particularly those of Indian Tamil origin, view the LTTE struggle
through the lens of Apartheid. Although there is no evidence to indicate
that Gordhan has accepted money from the LTTE for his services, there is
evidence to show that the LTTE has paid for him to travel to Australia in
mid-1996.

The LTTE network in South Africa is both a covert and an overt network. At
a political level, they mobilise Tamil support in South Africa for
demonstrations, rallies, seminars and lobbying. For instance on June 4,
1996 when Sri Lanka's national airline Air Lanka flew into South Africa,
100 Tamils demonstrated in Durban. The LTTE placards said "Sri Lanka go
home, Stop fighting before flying." To satisfy the Indian community, the
placards also called for South Indian intervention in Sri Lanka. Durban, a
strong Indian Tamil community was the first stop of the flight. Air Lanka
flew both to Durban and Johannesburg. Through their ANC colleagues, the
LTTE monitored the deliberations of the Sri Lankan delegation engaged in
promoting the airline. The delegation had arrived in South Africa on May
28, 1996. LTTE also infiltrated Travel Directions (Pty) the Air Lanka
General Sales Agent in South Africa. For economic reasons, Air Lanka
stopped flying to South Africa from April 1, 1997. Sri Lanka continued to
make efforts to influence South Africa in her favour. For instance, Justice
and Constitutional Affairs Minister Dr G.L. Pieris met with his counterpart
in South Africa early 1997. But, without a Sri Lankan mission in South
Africa, Colombo could not advance its foreign policy goals because the LTTE
propaganda machinery was already operational.

Propaganda:

A central figure in the organisation of the propaganda network in South
Africa was Father S.J. Emmanuel, the former Vicar General of the Jaffna
Diocese. Dr. Emmanuel, who is a key figure in the LTTE international
network, used his relationship with Archbishop Desmond Tutu of South
Africa, to cultivate key figures in South Africa. In addition to attending
a series of high powered meetings, Emmanuel also gave a damning interview
to South African radio. His book, Let My People Go, published by the
Tamil Catholic Chaplaincy, Osnabrueck in Germany drew its title from the
autobiography of the great South African leader Albert Luthuli, nobel peace
laureate, 1961. The LTTE and their fronts used the strategy of drawing
parallels between Sri Lanka and South Africa. They attempted to equal the
treatment of Tamils in Sri-Lanka to that of the blacks.

As a direct outcome of propaganda, South Africa has banned the sale of
weapons to Sri Lanka. Despite efforts by the Government of Sri Lanka to
explain its position to Ibrahim Ibrahim, Chair, Portfolio Committee on
Foreign Affairs and Kader Asmal, Chair, Portfolio Committee on Defence,
South Africa has not revoked its decision. This explains the influence of
the LTTE, which they had painstakingly built in South Africa over the
years. The LTTE continues to lobby and receive support from some
of the 11 South African Indian Parliamentarians. The South African Tamil
parliamentarians were more vulnerable towards supporting LTTE interests in
South Africa.

Sri Lanka established a mission in late 1997, specifically after the
government realised the need for stronger ties between Pretoria and
Colombo. South Africa will be a major challenge to Sri Lankan High
Commissioner Gamini Munasinghe, a respected diplomat, posted to South
Africa in March 1998.

Mandela Embarassed:

Since March 1997, leaks within the South African government led Sri Lankan
government officials to believe that there were LTTE combatants in South
Africa and some were receiving specialised training. There were also
reports that ANC had provided funds to the LTTE. An intelligence agency
reported to the Government of Sri Lanka: "Recent intelligence indicate
that the LTTE plans to develop South Africa as one of their main stations
for operating in the African region where weapons are inexpensive. The LTTE
plans to establish relations with some of the other African regimes and
groups through ANC. These developments calls for a review of South
Africa-Sri Lanka relationship and the need to develop effective political,
diplomatic and informational counter measures to alert South Africa that
the LTTE and the ANC are neither electorally nor politically comparable and
the Sri Lankan conflict cannot be understood through the lens of
Apartheid."

Based on fresh information, Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar
formulated a dual strategy both to win over President Mandela and to
confront South Africa with information of LTTE activity. Minister
Kadirgamar proposed inviting President Mandela as chief guest to the 50th
anniversary celebrations of Sri Lanka's independence day. Mandela was under
pressure from the Tamil lobby not to accept the invitation. South African
Tamil activists, at the invitation of LTTE had written to Mandela stating:
"Mrs. Kumaranatunga is scheming to use the upcoming 50th anniversary of
British departure from Ceylon to invite world leaders and proclaim it is a
tacit acceptance of
her policies of ethnic decimation. The Tamils have nothing to celebrate. We
are sure that you have courage and wisdom to tell Mrs. Kumaranatunga that a
person like you who has passed through the baptism of fire in the fight for
racial justice to take part in a charade to celebrate 50 years of ethnic
iniquity is sacrilegious. Please tell her to 'Let the Tamil people go'."
President Mandela declined the invitation.

While LTTE activists attempted to lobby Graca Machel, the then companion of
President Mandela during the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in
Edinburgh in October 1997, President Kumaratunge approached President
Mandela and informed the South African leader about LTTE activities in
South Africa. The 80 year old President Mandela, who had much respect for
Mrs. Sirima Bandaranaike and remembering the support of NAM for ANC,
promised an immediate investigation. President Mandela and his officials
were somewhat embarrassed by the manner in which President Kumaratunge had
accosted him on a sensitive issue but it produced results. Within 24 hours,
NIA reported to President Mandela the extent of the LTTE organisation and
operations in South Africa. Based on the NIA report President Mandela
ordered the dismantling of the camps. On October 29, 1997, at the crack of
dawn South African troops assisted by NIA operatives simultaneously raided
the three LTTE camps in South Africa. The camps were in Laudium near
Pretoria, Lenasia near Johannesburg and New Castle near KwaZulu-Natal. The
camps in the outskirts of Laudium and Lenasia were between built up areas.
Investigations by the South African authorities revealed that 24 hours
before the camps were raided the LTTE had been
informed by a high-level source that the Government of South Africa had
made a decision to raid the LTTE camps.

LTTE Resilience:

With their arsenal, the trainers and the trainees, had moved out to other
LTTE safe houses in South Africa. Neither the trainees nor the trainers
were arrested. They had perceived the dismantling of their training
infrastructure as a temporary set back. The ANC hard-liners passified them
stating that this was a necessity and will not recur. Within a month the
LTTE resumed training but at a lower scale and in smaller groups. This
level of training is continuing todate. It will continue as long as South A
frica is hesitant to take effective action to disrupt the LTTE support
network in South Africa.

Due to political and electoral pressure, President Mandela did not request
the South African criminal-justice system either to proscribe the LTTE or
their front prganisations. The support network remained intact offering the
prospect of revival. Today, the LTTE front organisations for disseminating
propaganda and fund raising continues to operate in South Africa. Among the
most active LTTE fronts are: People Against Sri Lankan Oppression (PASLO),
Gauteng with branches throughout South Africa; Movement Against Sri Lankan
Oppression (MASLO), Cape Town and Durban; Dravidians for Peace and Justice
(DPJ), Gauteng an off-shoot of PASLO; Tamil Eelam Support Movement (TESM),
Durban; Peace for Sri Lanka Support Movement (PSLSM) in Pretoria, an
alliance of several groups; and the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation
(TRO). LTTE's principal fund raising organisation - the TRO - acts as a
central conduit for channelling money out of South Africa. The latest
organisation
the LTTE established was PSLSM in Pretoria in March-April 1998. To wield
their influence, LTTE also attempted to infiltrate other Tamil
organisations in South Africa. They are the Natal Tamil Federation, South
African Tamil Federation, the Tamil Federation of Gauteng and the World
Saiva Council of Chatsworth.

The Nexus::

The link between these fronts and the South African Tamil Tigers is clear.
For instance, G.M. Veerabadren of Dravidians For Peace and Justice (DPJ),
is the spokesperson of the South African Tamil Tigers. When he spoke to
Prega Govender of Sunday Times, South Africa, he identified himself as
Thamizh Veerabadren. The latest wave of discussions between Sri Lanka and
South Africa is following an article and a photograph of armed men in the
Sunday Times of South Africa on October 25. The photograph taken by Nicky
De Blois had the caption: "Armed and ready: some South African Tamil Tiger
supporters have had military training. They say, they are ready to fight
for the cause of a separate state in Sri Lanka. This determined group was
pictured in the bush in Gauteng." Thamizh Veerabadren said that LTTE
members regularly slipped into the country to receive secret training in
the latest weapon technology: "We also have a highly disciplined and
militant group of Tamils here who have received training in explosives and
tracking....they are prepared to make the supreme sacrifice for the Tamils
of Sri Lanka." The same person, but as G.M. Veerabadren had written
letters on DPJ letterheads, lobbying for the LTTE. For instance, on
February 4, 1998, he wrote to several prominent persons in South Africa:
"Dravidians For Peace and Justice, South African Chapter, is a Human Rights
Organisation monitoring Human Rights Abuses Worldwide. Presently our focus
is on Sri Lanka......."

In addition to disseminating propaganda and raising funds, these fronts
organise public events and engage in lobbying. For instance on July 4,
1998, the TESM staged a "play of conscience" called "God is Silent." The
play centred around the Sri Lankan conflict was held in Regional Hall,
Arena Park, was organised in support of the LTTE. The advertisement said:
"Thousands of Tamils are being massacred and raped in Sri Lanka. Don't just
sympathise with the cause. Do something about it."

For financial or ideological reasons, there are about 20 influential South
African Tamils who promote the interests of the LTTE. Among the South
African activists, who have come to the attention of the South African
authorities are Dr. P. Lingam, V. Pillai, Tommy (Tony) M. Padotan, M.
Peddy, M.T. Pillay, T.D. Pillay, Kisten Chinappan, Y. Chetty, Ned Pillai
and Kumbesan Sandrasegaran. To keep an eye on LTTE activism, particularly
LTTE political and military activists who visit South Africa from time to
time, the NIA has stepped up its surveillance on these organisations.

State-support?

The attitude of the South African government is shaped by the level of
propaganda and lobbying. It is incorrect to assess that there is no
opposition to the LTTE in South Africa. After President Mandela met with
President Kumaratunge, his attitude towards the LTTE changed at least for a
while. In fact in December 1997, a South African Tamil activist wrote to
President Mandela: "... recent statements made by your officials reflect a
number of misconceptions and missing conceptions about the situation in
Sri-Lanka." Therefore, South African opinion vis--vis Sri Lanka is not
monolithic. There are prominent South Africans, including South African
Tamils who are aware of LTTE's role in the Gandhi assassination, who does
not wish to support the LTTE. But they form the silent majority.

Former UN expert Elizabeth Bennette, with the prestigious South African
think tank, the Institute of Strategic Studies in Johannesburg is openly
critical of LTTE's role in recruiting and deploying child combatants. As
the current head of the institute's project on Children in Armed Conflict
and formerly with the National Children's Rights Committee in South Africa,
she is working towards an ad hoc tribunal that will prosecute both
governments and rebels who "commit war crimes against children." She is
specifically examining the use of children under 15 in warfare by Laurent
Kabila of the Democratic Republic of Congo; Kony of the Lord's liberation
Army in Southern Sudan; and the LTTE.

Because of President Mandela's aversion to violence, the fronts of the LTTE
have adopted a technique to portray themselves as peace organisations. The
LTTE and their fronts regularly called South Africa to promote
negotiations.

UN Intervention:

In preparation for NAM, LTTE appealed in a message to President Mandela to
use his good office "to impress upon the Government of Sri Lanka to abandon
its aggressive military policy and seek a negotiated settlement based on
the principles enunciated at Thimpu talks." The message addressed to the
NAM Chair President Mandela dated August 29, 1998, was widely distributed.
Further, the LTTE fronts staged a demonstration outside the venue of the
meeting n Durban. The demonstrators called South Africa to ban Colombo from
attending NAM and carried placards: "Sri Lanka kills their own people" and
"Child murderers Our sincere greetings and well wishes.

President Mandela, subjected to the influence of LTTE propaganda, called
for UN intervention in Sri Lanka at the UN General Assembly. President
Kumaratunga's response at the UN was a direct rebuttal to President
Mandela's comments. On her return, President Kumaratunge had a three hour
discussion with Jerry Matsila, the South African envoy on October 13.
Matsila, as instructed from South Africa, pleaded ignorance of LTTE
procurement and shipping from South Africa. Matsila also denied the
presence of LTTE training camps on South African soil. Matsila provided the
standard South African official response that South Africa was
investigating the LTTE. Since the LTTE run camps were raided in South
Africa in October 1997, this has been the standard response.

Reaping the Whirlwind:

By South Africa permitting the LTTE and support groups to operate in South
Africa, it is tacitly encouraging the transfer of new technologies from
Africa to boost the war-fighting capability of the LTTE. This will mean
intensification of the war creating more military, LTTE and civilian
fatalities and injuries. In general, governments are concerned about
international procurement because new technologies often provide the
cutting edge increasing the lethality of any force. The 37 million Rands in
funds, sophisticated armaments and dual technologies, and trained
combatants transferred from South Africa to the LTTE will mean an increase
in capability of the LTTE. At a time when the LTTE has suffered heavily as
a result of a sustained offensive by the Sri Lanka military, the
opportunity to grow and operate in South Africa is a great blessing for the
LTTE.

President Mandela's stature as a towering statesman has suffered by the
continuous exposure of South Africa harbouring violent groups and South
Africa's relations with states supporting terrorism. To please a political
constituency or to accommodate the request of a political or a personal
ally and permit or turn a blind eye and tolerate
the presence of terrorist infrastructure is a high crime against a friendly
state. Like India has lost its moral right to talk about terrorist
infrastructure in Pakistan spawning terrorism in India, the unprecedented
wave of crime, corruption and provision of facilities for groups engaged in
terrorism elsewhere is eroding the image of post-Mandela's free South
Africa. If the LTTE threat is not controlled, South African security is
likely to suffer the same way Indian security suffered. The short, mid and
long term consequences of permitting the LTTE to operate in South Africa,
will not be very different from India permitting Tamil militants to operate
both in north and south India. It is
natural that there will be a resurgence of Tamil nationalism; proliferation
of weapons; flow of narcotics; corruption; and organised crime in South
Africa.

In addition to the impact on Sri Lanka and South Africa, there will be
other implications of permitting the LTTE to operate in South Africa. South
Africa will become a meeting point for existing and emerging groups to
exchange intelligence, conduct joint procurement and even plan common
strategies. This will impact on international security. The LTTE is also
bound to expand its scope of operation further into Africa from its central
base in South Africa. Already LTTE has cells in Reunion,
Madagascar, Fiji, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Swaziland. It is
question of time that from South Africa, the LTTE network will expand into
the rest of Africa.

The Future:

There are many similarities and dissimilarity between South India from 1983
to 1987 and South Africa from 1994 to 1998. Like the leaders of New Delhi
were susceptible to the Tamil ethnic vote, the leaders of South Africa are
also vulnerable to ethnic compulsions. South Africa politicians and law
enforcement is as vulnerable as their South Indian counterparts. The Tamil
communities in both the countries are vulnerable to LTTE influence. Such
calculations will feature in determining the future of LTTE politics in
South Africa.

There is evidence to indicate that in Mandela's South Africa, not only are
the Whites feeling isolated but also the Indians. In context, the UK-based
Sri Lankan researcher Dushmantha Ranetunge makes an astute observation:
"Sri Lankan Tamils and South African Tamils are both minorities with
influence far above their ethnic representation. Are the South African
Tamils fearful that their influence may be trimmed by the African majority
as the Sri Lankan Tamils were by the Sinhalese? Is that why we are hearing
of South African Tamil Tigers? Is this an alliance between two insecure
minorities?" Ranetunge argues that the South African Tamils seems to be
feeling isolated and "South African Tamil Tigers" may be a pre-emptive
strike at the black majority, fearing a Sinhala style cutting down to size
of Tamils in South Africa."

On October 28, 1998, President Mandela placated the Indian South Africans
by saying not to regard themselves as a minority but to become part of the
majority in order to play a major role in the democratic transformation of
the country. "Move away from the sidelines and come to the centre, and
become a part of the majority", the President said. In the light of these
developments the future of South Africa is uncertain. South African leaders
of the 1990s - like their Indian counterparts in the 1980s - have
under-estimated the LTTE, a pan-Tamil organisation. Towards, pan-Tamil
nationalism, the LTTE has specially established a newspaper Theni Seide
which is distributed free in South Africa.

The LTTE can be effectively denied access to South Africa only if the
government decides to legally designate the LTTE as an illegal organisation
and pass legislation to proscribe the LTTE front organisations and
companies operating in South Africa. It is highly unlikely that South
Africa will take such measures because the LTTE influence has significantly
grown since 1994 and the Indian Tamil lobby is formidable in South Africa.

Foreign Minister Kadirgamar is likely to visit South Africa within this
month to raise the issue of LTTE training camps, procurement, shipping,
propaganda and fund raising. In the past, questions about the presence of
LTTE in South Africa has been discussed between the two presidents and the
two foreign ministers. They have had an impact on the LTTE organisation and
operations in South Africa but not to dent the LTTE permanently. Will the
forthcoming visit of Minister Kadirgamar create a significant impact
because the South African media itself has raised the issue? Today, it is a
daunting challenge for the Sri Lankan political leaders, intelligence
community and foreign service to advance Sri Lankan interests in South
Africa.