After pre-match doubts about which formation Italy would use, Cesare Prandelli opted for a back four in combination with a diamond in midfield. Providing the diamond's sparkle was Andrea Pirlo, who dictated the tempo of the game from deep with short, sideways passes, but also provided the game's most incisive balls.

Pirlo was always likely to be Italy's main threat, and Roy Hodgson instructed his two strikers to drop deep so England had extra bodies in midfield, where Italy used four central players. When England's shape was compact, both Wayne Rooney and Danny Welbeck were goalside of Pirlo, but it was Rooney who had the main responsibility for stopping him. Rooney's performance was reminiscent of his display in the 2011 Champions League final, when he spent the first few minutes picking up Barcelona's deepest midfielder, Sergio Busquets, before switching off and neglecting his defensive duties. That day, Sir Alex Ferguson spent much of the first half shouting at Rooney to pick up his man – here, it was Joe Hart who intervened from 50 metres away towards the end of the first half, when Pirlo's dominance had become clear.

Italy's most presentable chance of the first half came when Pirlo picked up the ball in his own box, ambled forward without a challenge for 30 yards, before hitting a long ball over the top to Mario Balotelli to run on to. This was essentially a new test for the England back four – in their first three games of this tournament, they had not caught the opposition offside once. That is not necessarily a damning indictment of the defence – it simply reflected the fact that England defended extremely deep in the group stage, and opponents were not able to play the ball into space behind them. Then again, none of England's previous opponents possessed a deep-lying passer in the class of Pirlo.

England's second problem was the advance of the Italian full-backs, Ignazio Abate and Federico Balzaretti. As Italy dominated possession, Prandelli's four central midfielders sucked Ashley Young and James Milner narrow, and the centre of the pitch became congested. The only width from either side came from the full-backs, who were in direct combat down the touchlines. The game was reminiscent of so many Serie A matches over the past couple of years, when the midfield zone is neutralised, so any attacking thrust has to come from deep. Naturally, this suited Italy – Abate and Balzaretti are accustomed to that environment, and overlapped energetically. Glen Johnson had attacked well in the opening minutes of the game, and popped up in the box for the game's first clear chance, but once Italy wrestled control of the game, he was barely allowed out of his own half.

It was remarkable how little the game evolved tactically: neither coach changed shape, remaining confident in their starting system. Prandelli and Hodgson had both enjoyed success with previous substitutions in this tournament – Antonio Di Natale and Balotelli had scored from the bench for Italy, Theo Walcott had done likewise for England. But no replacements significantly altered the shape of this game – Alessandro Diamanti buzzed around but offered no end product, Walcott theoretically gave England directness but never received the right pass, while Andy Carroll was at least a target for aerial balls.

The more Italy dominated possession, the deeper England defended. This did not suit Italy – the space in behind had vanished, and Pirlo's passing was less incisive. He played one brilliant ball for Balotelli at the start of extra time, seconds after Rooney had lost the ball in the Italian penalty area, but England attacked rarely, so opportunities for these passes were limited as England camped on the edge of their own box.

Pirlo was unquestionably the game's key player, and his outrageous "Panenka" penalty kick, taken at the most pressurised part of the penalty shootout, should be remembered rather than the misses of Ashley Cole and Young. From kick‑off until penalties, this was his game.