Wednesday, March 2, 2011

A paper presentation to the CPD National Conference
on Traditional Authorities, Decentralisation and Rural Development
Lusaka, Zambia
February 28 – March 1, 2011

“It must always be understood that humans are an inconsistent phenomenon.
They exhibit unreasoning behaviours with or without socio-cultural structure and norms, but tending to exhibit more unreasoning behaviours when there is a breakdown in the socio-cultural structures and norms.”

1.0 INTRODUCTION
Gerald Caplan in his book “Elites of Barotseland” observes that “Barotseland had existed as an independent national entity long before the creation of Northern Rhodesia, and was legally and historically entitled to maintain or dissolve the attachment as its people wished”. The underlying assumption inherent in this assertion is that Barotseland self-rule is an inviolable entitlement that the people of Barotseland have held over time. The continuance of this entitlement before the independence of the then Northern Rhodesia, and amalgamation of Barotseland into the State of Zambia, is evidenced in the Barotseland Agreement of May 18, 1964.

However, the Barotse Question or the restoration of the Barotseland Agreement, today, merits interrogation as to the validity of the nature of influences that determine when the Barotse “people’s wishes” necessitate assertion of self-rule as presumed to be promulgated in the Agreement. Dissent to a sense of belonging to a State has myriad reasons. Dominant of them however are sustenance of a sense of belonging to a historically and colonially recognised traditionally defined nationhood; and a sense of socio-economic and political exclusion (or marginalisation) in the post-colonial State, which in Africa is sometimes simply an assemblage of ethnic groups that were defined as a nation by the colonial masters.

Arguably, a dichotomous citizenry has always emerged in post-colonial States in Africa. On one hand, is the citizenry whose sense of belonging to the new State is subsumed more by their allegiance to the traditionally defined nationhood or authority; and on the other, are the citizenry whose sense of belonging to the new State is subsumed more by a sense of socio-economic and political inclusion. In Zambia, the former are mostly the rural populations who live in areas where traditional authority is still the dominant governance authority with respect to livelihood entitlements. And, the latter are the urban populations who live in areas where statutory authority defining the State is dominant.

Undoubtedly, in a democracy like Zambia there is supposition that both ends of the citizenry dichotomy have controlling influence on the decisions and affairs of government, and that there will be equitable and equal socio-economic development. To which end, dissent to a sense of belonging to a State premised on a sense of socio-economic and political exclusion (or marginalisation) should not arise. Yet, in the Barotse Question it has!

Thus, this paper in re-examining the argument for the restoration of the Barotseland Agreement, seeks to provide a dialectical framework for interrogating emergent and or post- colonial States’ democratic governance representation within a dichotomous citizenry. The paper, further, endeavours to provide a framework for a desirable political governance mode likely to mitigate influences that can likely determine when a “people’s wishes” necessitate assertion of self-rule or secession.

The succeeding section of this paper provides a brief historic chronology on the Barotseland quest for self-rule, and then the salient features of the Barotseland Agreement. The third section interrogates the re-emergence of the Barotse Question within the assumption of a sense of socio-economic and political exclusion (or marginalisation), based on a poverty-State Governance representation comparative assay. The fourth section discusses the quest for the restoration of the Barotseland Agreement of 1964 by interrogating whether it is merely a quest for self-rule, preservation of a monarchy or federalism. This is attempted by considering the underlying political governance paradigms of the terms of the Agreement. The fifth section questions whether the Barotse Question provides governance re-think or it is merely ashes of history, and presents the likely opportunities and lessons of the Barotseland Agreement for the country’s governance re-think. The last section is the conclusion.

2.0 THE QUEST FOR SELF-RULE AND THE BAROTSELAND AGREEMENT
In discussing the Barotse Question due recognition should be made of the fact that in pre-colonial times only a few of Zambia’s ethnic groups had politically centralised chieftainships with developed bureaucracies (Roberts 1976). The Lozi Kingdom or what is referred to as Barotseland can be argued to have been the most politically centralised and socio-culturally coherent, and thus that its people have always had a sense of Lozi national consciousness.

The Lozi Kingdom evolved out of a citizen and subject paradigm, where the Aluyi or Luyanas subdued or coerced other groups in most of Western Zambia , and created extensive spheres of influence and also often posted consuls to other neighbouring ethnic groups. The governance modes among the subdued and or coerced groups were based on the political institutional structures of the central authority of the Litunga. Governance inclusiveness, was however, practiced as all subjects had representation in spiritual, military and judicial roles, although supremacy of aristocratic heredity reigned.

A notable manifestation of Lozi national consciousness is June 27 1890, when King Lewanika I and the British South Africa Company signed the Frank Lochner Treaty , which made Barotseland a British protectorate. The Lochner Treaty to a considerable extent diminished Lozi autonomy.

And probably, this lose of autonomy could be the genesis of the quest for self-rule that has been evidenced overtime with first the British South Africa Company (BSAC), then the British colonial administration, and subsequent post-colonial governments of Zambia.

For instance in 1907 , King Lewanika requested the British Government that Barotseland protectorate be removed from North Western Rhodesia and company rule and be given the same status as Bechuanaland (Botswana). This request was denied by Lord Selborne, the British High Commissioner in Cape Town.

The most profound quest for self-rule was in 1921, when King Yeta III presented Prince Arthur of Connaught, the new High Commissioner, a petition that, in the main, demanded direct rule of the Imperial Government as a protected native state over the entire territory known as Barotseland North-Western Rhodesia; that all concessions granted to and agreements concluded with the BSAC be cancelled; and that, the Barotse reserve be extended to include two further areas, that is Caprivi Strip and the land from the headwaters of the Dongwe river down to where the Anglo-Portuguese boundary cuts the Zambezi river .

In 1932, the Barotse Royal Establishment held discussions with the Governor at the Colonial Office on the quest for Barotseland being a separate Native State. The discussions, again, did not yield the desired quest for self-rule. The subsequent years evidenced a plethora of demands and discussions for self-rule and restoration of the boundaries of Barotseland . Thus, in June 1948, the Barotse National Council demanded that there should be self-governing status for the Barotseland protectorate.

A phantasma of self-rule was attained in 1953, when Barotseland was declared a ‘protectorate within the protectorate’, during the processes of the federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. In addition, Barotseland’s sovereignty was recognised in section 112 of the Constitution of Northern Rhodesia. This section asserted Barotseland’s protection against alienation of any part of the territory except with the consent of the Litunga and his council. In this respect, it is often argued that King Sir Mwanawina III accepted the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland as the constitutional provisions enhanced Barotseland’s quest for self-rule.

In 1957, the Barotse Native Government through its National Council resolved that Barotseland should secede from the Federation and remain under the protection of Her Majesty’s Government in line with the 1900 Agreement should the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland be allowed to proceed to independence .

In the following year, 1960, a demand for secession from Northern Rhodesia and the Federation was instituted by the Barotse National Council, with an attendant demand that there should be a proclamation that Barotseland protectorate should be directly under the British government. To which end, it is imputed that Ngambela Imasiku said the following:

“We do not consider ourselves a part of Northern Rhodesia or as a protectorate within a protectorate. We are a different country and a different people. We have our own government.”

Thus, in 1961 Barotseland secession demands submitted to the Colonial Secretary and to the Northern Rhodesia Government mostly affirmed Barotseland’s right to self-rule and independence, and consequently that they should no longer be control of Barotseland by the Northern Rhodesia Government.

Noteworthy, is that protestations for Barotseland self-rule continued up to Zambia’s independence and even after the promulgation of the Barotseland Agreement of 1964, as the post-colonial government of Zambia in its nation-State building process enacted and made proclamations that likely abrogated the obligations and rights contained in treaties and concessions between the British government and Barotseland protectorate.

The Barotseland Agreement of May, 1964 between “Kenneth David Kaunda, Prime Minister of Northern Rhodesia of the one part and Sir Mwanawina Lewanika the Third, K.B.E., Litunga of Barotseland, acting on behalf of himself, his heirs and successors, his council, and the chiefs and people of Barotseland of the other party is signed by the Right Honourable Duncan Sandys, M.P Her Majesty's principal secretary of state for common wealth relations and for the colonies, to signify the approval of her majesty's government in the united kingdom of the arrangements entered into between the parties to this agreement” provided the governance and legitimacy framework for the creation of the independent sovereign State of Zambia.

The salient features of the Agreement are a definition of the terms under which the Litunga of Barotseland assented to Barotseland protectorate’s amalgamation with Northern Rhodesia protectorate to create the new nation-State called Zambia.

Dominant of which are the continued protection and respect by the government of Zambia of the obligations and rights contained in treaties and concessions between the British government and Barotseland, and that the “customary law of Barotseland shall be the principal local authority for the government and administration of Barotseland” , and that the Litunga of Barotseland, acting after consultation with his Council, shall be authorised and empowered to make laws for Barotseland in relation to the matters that include the Litungaship; the Barotse Government; local government land; forests; traditional and customary matters relating to Barotseland alone; the institution at present known as the Barotse native treasury; and local taxation.

In retrospect, the Barotseland Agreement of 1964 is inarguably an inherent quest for Barotseland self-rule premised on chiefly the sense of belonging to a historically and colonially recognised traditionally defined nationhood, and the consequent sense of Lozi national consciousness.

3.0 BAROTSELAND, POVERTY AND GOVERNANCE REPRESENTATION
Notwithstanding the foregoing arguments on the Barotse Question rationalised by the sense of Lozi national consciousness, the re-emergence of the Barotse Question, however, is seemingly premised on the assumption of a sense of socio-economic and political exclusion (or marginalisation). This assumption is based on the observation that most pronouncements, proclamations, and reasons for dissent, today, direct one's attention to the evident poverty and underdevelopment in Western province or Barotseland.

That Western province is the poorest and least developed province in Zambia, is not a subject of debate. But, it should also be acknowledged that all rural Zambia has comparatively been neglected for sometime in our country’s development history, is also not a subject of debate.

What is debatable and what citizen’s should question given today’s worrisome polarity of our political space is the legitimacy of criticisms of the causes of poverty and underdevelopment in rural parts of our country. Rural underdevelopment in Zambia is not a partisan question.

The objective facts of poverty in Zambia, for instance in the period 1991 to 2006, show that the incidence of poverty is characteristic of all rural provinces, as evident in Table 1.0 below.

It is inarguable from Table 1.0, that Western province has over time had the worst levels of poverty, but so do other rural provinces in the country. This trend is similar even when indices like employment levels, literacy, or nutritional status considered, as for instance the case in Figure 1.0 on nutritional status of children.
[NOTE:DOWNLOAD PDF VERSION AT http://kasisichildren.org/Barotse.pdf to view Tables and Figures in this paper]

It is clear that these statistics show a rural-urban dichotomy relative to the social-economic status the country’s population. In short, rural Zambia has always been short-changed!

The question then is why is this so, if we hold valid the assumption that “access to positions of political and administrative power is important for competing social groups in that it provides them with visible recognition, a ‘say’ in decision making and control over government resources” .

In this respect, can it be assumed that rural populations are underrepresented in our democratic governance representative framework? Or can it be assumed that inequities in governance representation at the national level have produced inequalities at the regional levels?

On the contrary, Lindemann’s (2010) governance representative indices by regional groupings and or ethnic groupings in periods of the years 1964 to 2008 do not show significant ethnic marginalisation, though variances are observable. Figures 2.0, 3.0, 4.0, and 5.0 provide an illustration of the foregoing.
[NOTE:DOWNLOAD PDF VERSION AT http://kasisichildren.org/Barotse.pdf to view Tables and Figures in this paper]

The succeeding, Table 2.0, Figures 6.0 and 7.0 show political power sharing as indicative of the composition of the civil service, measured by the inter-group distribution of permanent secretary positions.

[NOTE:DOWNLOAD PDF VERSION AT http://kasisichildren.org/Barotse.pdf to view Tables and Figures in this paper]

Inarguably the foregoing illustrations show that governance representation in Zambia has been void of inequities likely to cause ethnic dissent in the dominant ethnic groups. And that admittedly, this has been a result of Kenneth Kaunda’s policy of ‘tribal balancing’, and its continuance, though, with varying degrees during subsequent presidencies.

The objective facts of this representativeness is a trend that is not commensurate with the obtaining poverty levels in rural Zambia, as most ethnical groups have had relatively equitable representativeness, and yet the evident results of this equitable representativeness is abject poverty for most of the populations in rural Zambia.

Therefore, it can be argued that in Zambia, horizontal equality at the ‘elite level’ has produced horizontal inequalities at the mass level. To which end, the assumption that “leaders with access to positions of state power will tend to redistribute to their ‘own’ social groups” , as the mainstream argue on the case of poverty in Western province is sophism.

In addition, that the re-emergence of the Barotse Question can be attributable to a sense of socio-economic and political exclusion (or marginalisation), is merely a travesty of reason or grave sophism. The Barotse Question can arguably be more rationalised by the sense of belonging to a historically and colonially recognised traditionally defined nationhood, and the consequent Lozi national consciousness.

Admittedly, and not withstanding the foregoing, the Barotse Question has over the years been used as a tool for a more representative national governance mode. Thus, a see-saw semblance of Barotse sentiments is evident whenever Lozis feel marginalised.

For instance, Sichone and Simutanyi (1996) observe that when Lozi political leaders were marginalised in the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) and the subsequent composition of government during Frederick Jacob Titus Chiluba ascension to power, there was a re-emergence of demands for the restoration of regional autonomy under the Barotseland Agreement, in addition to the creation of a Lozi-based political party .

4.0 A QUEST FOR SELF-RULE, PRESERVATION OF A MONARCHY, OR FEDERALISM
However, the Barotseland Agreement when dialectically interrogated manifests a superfluity of governance paradigms. The paradigms are either a quest for self-rule, preservation of a monarchy, or federalism .

The quest for self-rule is manifest in the affirmation of asserting protection and respect by the government of Zambia of the obligations and rights contained in treaties and concessions between the British government and Barotseland protectorate, which duly recognised that Barotseland was an autonomous colonised nation within another colonised nation.

Further, the Agreement’s affirmation that the “customary law of Barotseland shall be the principal local authority for the government and administration of Barotseland”, and that the Litunga of Barotseland, acting after consultation with his Council, shall be authorised and empowered to make laws for Barotseland, evidences recognition of a monarchic form of governance as kingship is duly asserted. Due recognition should however be made that Barotseland had over time developed an inclusive form of traditional governance, despite royal heredity being supreme to the subjects .

But, notable is that, the Agreement also provides the government of Zambia sovereignty over Barotseland on the administration of justice ; the public service ; fiscal responsibility, administration and economic development of Barotseland ; and leasehold land administration .
Inarguably, the recognition of Barotseland quasi-sovereignty as manifest in the Agreement’s recognition of self-rule and a preservation of a monarchic governance system, and the delegation of powers to the central government over certain matters in Barotseland, provides a dichotomy of governance. Thus, the superfluity of governance paradigms from the Barotseland Agreement can be inferred to be twofold: self-rule and a monarchy; and, federalism .

In short, the character of the State of Zambia that should have evolved out of the Barotseland Agreement is a federal state . In this respect, an attempt should be made to understand the quest for self-rule in this context. In any case, for traditionalists, the sense of belonging to a historically and colonially recognised traditionally defined nationhood, and the consequent Lozi national consciousness, dates far beyond the Frank Lochner Treaty of 1890.

5.0 ASHES OF HISTORY OR A GOVERNANCE RE-THINK
The Barotse Question is characteristically a historic cohesive group dissent founded on ethnic nationalist consciousness very much different from other Zambian ethnic groups. The contemporary quest for the restoration of the Barotse Agreement provides a governance rethink. It is a framework for interrogation of governance modes of self-rule existing within a federal state.

However, it should be acknowledged that the Barotse Question’s perseverance is sustained by the dichotomous nature of political governance in Zambia, which is rooted in the country’s State-building process. The country’s political governance has evolved from a pendulum of polarity between traditionalists and nation-State building advocates or what have been termed nationalists.

There always have been the traditionalists and the nationalists, and this has historically being more pronounced in Western province, than in any other province in Zambia. Whereas the traditionalists sought to preserve their customary and or traditional authority over their subjects within an independent State, the nationalists (mostly urban subjects) favoured the creation of a more cohesive State that recognised boundaries of colonial domination of peoples with similar aspirations, traditions and culture.

Thus, although traditionalists perceived African nationalism as a challenge to their autonomy and privilege (Sichone and Simutanyi, 1996) , the resulting democratic governance modes in post-independent Zambia though recognising the polarity, created a dichotomous governance system that usurped most of the traditionalists autonomy and privilege. Consequently, the resulting political governance has been one of political and public service elitism, which has not served the socio-economic interests of most of the populations in rural Zambia that still live under traditional modes of governance.

An assumption made about Zambia’s contemporary political governance is that it necessitates that the people have controlling influence on the decisions and affairs of government; and that, the people are supreme to government” . However, it is clear that this chosen polity has not allowed citizenry controlling influence on the decisions and affairs of government despite near equitable representation in governance, as it does not reconcile the country’s governance dichotomy.

In this respect, the Barotse Question is not ashes of history, nor is it an inane emotional attachment to historical romanticism. Its re-emergence, can in part, be attributable to the usurpation of the traditionalists autonomy and privilege during the country’s State-building process.

The governance re-think premised on the opportunities the Barotseland Agreement provides, here makes the assumption that:
(a) The country’s political and public service elites have not substantively equitably determined development entitlements; and that,
(b) There is no elite bargaining based on social group or regional representation.

The Barotse Question lends credence to the fact that historical events shape inter-regional relations within a centralised State. Thus, this paper argues that the Barotse Question provides the State of Zambia the opportunity for a non-dichotomous governance system, which can integrate traditional and customary governance frameworks under which the majority of the rural populations exist.

A governance re-think premised on the Barotse Question is simply an affirmation of the need for equitably determined development entitlements, and elite bargaining based on social group or regional representation. After all, every region has its own history, traditions and culture, in addition to peculiar political, social and economic problems.

Thus, the Barotse Question’s derived governance paradigm is one of inclusive models of political governance structures of devolution of power, as a means of allowing for more regional representative structures of government. This is in recognition of the argument that the Barotse Question also provides a framework for reconciling the historic divide between political elites and traditionalists.

And the derivative political governance paradigm from the Barotse Question is federalism with its consequent self-rule for the regions .

Federalism is a reconciliatory political governance structure that recognises historic, traditional and cultural diversity. It is a governance paradigm that can provide government space for statutory institutionalisation of traditional and customary authority, which is inarguably integral to the Barotse Question.

Notable is that, federalism provides equitable local and central political and administrative representation, which is critical for populations characterised by historic, traditional and cultural diversity.

6.0 CONCLUSION
In retrospect, although this paper argues that the Barotse Question is rationalised by a people’s sense of belonging to a historically affirmed monarchic nation, it has also asserted that the Barotse Question should serve to provide a dialectic framework for interrogating political and public service governance representation within a dichotomous population.

The paper has shown that equities in governance representation at the national level have not produced equalities in socio-economic development at the regional levels. To which end, the paper has argued that economic and political exclusion (or marginalisation) can not be attributed to the contemporary re-emergence of the Barotse Question, but that it is more a product of the country’s dichotomous political governance that does not provide adequate regional political and administrative space to traditionally and culturally diverse social groups.

Thus, the paper has argued that federalism can provide a governance paradigm that can mitigate influences that can likely determine when a “people’s wishes” necessitate assertion of self-rule or secession, as it is a reconciliatory paradigm of the historic divide between political elites and traditionalists.

In conclusion, it is here argued that the Barotse Question should never be reduced to a mere political exercise of gaining political competiveness, as the underlying causes of the re-emergence of dissent on the Barotseland Agreement are historic and, in part, inherent in the contradictions of political governance representation and rural poverty.

The Barotse Question is a product of the rural poverty vis-à-vis political governance representation disconnect evident in Zambia. It is not a parody for political opportunism!

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