Considered and decided by Anderson,
Presiding Judge, Toussaint, Chief Judge, and Parker, Judge*

S Y L L A B U S

1. A motion under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02
to vacate a paternity adjudication is not identical to an action under Minn.
Stat. § 257.57, subd. 2 (2000), to declare the nonexistence of the
father-child relationship presumed under Minn. Stat. § 257.55, subd. 1
(2000), or to a proceeding to declare the nonexistence of the father-child
relationship under Minn. Stat. § 257.60(2) (2000).

2. A man adjudicated the father of a child
in a paternity proceeding may bring a motion under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 to
vacate the paternity adjudication.

3. Where a man stipulates to paternity of
a child based on the representations and sworn statements of the child’s
mother, and where subsequent genetic tests indicate that those representations
and sworn statements were false, the genetic tests may be used to seek relief
from the paternity adjudication on the basis of newly discovered evidence and
fraud under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(b), (c).

4. When considering whether to vacate a
paternity adjudication on the basis of newly discovered evidence and fraud
under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(b), (c), and where the party seeking relief admits
that he may still be adjudicated the child’s father in a subsequent paternity
proceeding, a district court shall not consider the child’s best interests in
determining whether to vacate the paternity adjudication.

O P I N I O N

G. BARRY ANDERSON, Judge

Based on the admission of
appellant Lionel Suggs, the district court adjudicated him the father of
respondent Keelia Turner’s child.
Genetic testing later excluded appellant as the child’s biological
father and appellant moved to vacate the paternity adjudication alleging, among
other things, fraud and newly discovered evidence. Without holding an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied
appellant’s motion, finding that there was no credible evidence that Turner
committed fraud on the court or on appellant.
On appeal, appellant contends that the genetic tests conclusively show
that Turner committed fraud when, in her sworn written and oral statements, she
represented that appellant was the father of the child and the only possible
father of the child. By notice of review,
respondent Ramsey County argues the district court erred by failing to appoint
a guardian ad litem for the child and by failing to conduct an evidentiary
hearing to address the validity of the genetic tests and the child’s best
interests. We affirm in part, reverse
in part, and remand.

FACTS

Between
August 1994 and May 2000, appellant and Turner, while unmarried, engaged in a
sexual relationship. Turner gave birth
on August 18, 1995, and informed appellant that he was the child’s father. Relying on Turner’s unequivocal
representations, appellant accepted responsibility for the child, treated the
child as his son, and helped care for the child. In May 1997, Turner signed a paternity affidavit stating that
there were no other possible fathers of the child. The parties’ relationship deteriorated, and, in fall 2000, Ramsey
County sought to adjudicate appellant the father of the child and to address
custody, support, and visitation issues.

At the hearing, Turner told the court that
appellant was the father of the child.
Appellant, again relying on Turner’s consistent and unequivocal
representations regarding the child’s paternity, admitted that he was the
father and waived his rights to genetic tests and to representation by
counsel. The district court found that
there were no other presumed fathers of the child and adjudicated appellant the
father, ordered him to
pay child support and other expenses, and awarded him joint legal custody as
well as reasonable visitation.

Subsequent
genetic tests of appellant and the child, arranged by appellant, excluded him
as the child’s biological father. When
appellant informed the district court of the test results, the district court
suspended appellant’s child support obligation. Appellant refused to repeat the tests and moved, in the paternity
proceeding, to vacate the paternity adjudication under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02
and Minn. Stat. §§ 548.14, 518.145 (2000). The county opposed appellant’s motion, arguing that appellant had
failed to provide adequate reasons to vacate the paternity adjudication. The county also argued that if appellant’s
motion was not denied, a guardian ad litem should be appointed for the child
and that an evidentiary hearing was required to address the validity of the
genetic tests and whether it would be in the child’s best interests to vacate
the paternity adjudication. Without
holding an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied appellant’s
motion. It concluded that there was no
credible evidence that Turner had committed fraud on the court or on
appellant. The court noted that Turner
has always maintained and continues to maintain that appellant is the only
possible father of the child. This
appeal followed.

I S S U E S

I. Did
the district court err by not appointing a guardian ad litem for the child?

II. May
a man adjudicated the father of a child in a paternity proceeding seek to
vacate a paternity adjudication under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02?

III. Did
the district court abuse its discretion when it denied appellant’s motion to
vacate the adjudication order under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02?

IV. May a child’s best interests be
considered when determining whether to vacate a paternity adjudication?

A N A L Y S I S

I.

Not distinguishing among motions to vacate paternity
adjudications, actions to establish the nonexistence of a parent-child
relationship presumed under Minn. Stat. § 257.55, subd. 1 (2000), and
actions to establish nonpaternity, Ramsey County argues that appellant’s motion
to vacate the paternity adjudication “is in the nature of an action to establish
nonpaternity” under Minn. Stat. § 257.57, subd. 2 (2000), and therefore
the district court should have appointed a guardian ad litem for the child
under Minn. Stat. § 257.60(2) (2000).

Interpretation of the Parentage Act is a question of law,
which we review de novo. Losoya v.
Richardson, 584 N.W.2d 425, 427 (Minn. App. 1998); R.B. v. C.S., 536
N.W.2d 634, 637 (Minn. App. 1995). The
Parentage Act sets out various circumstances under which a man is legally
presumed to be the father of a child.
Minn. Stat. § 257.55, subd. 1.
Under Minn. Stat. § 257.57, subd. 2, “a man alleged * * *
to be the father” of a child born out of wedlock may “bring an action”
to declare the nonexistence of a father-child relationship presumed to exist
under Minn. Stat. § 257.55, subd. 1.
When an action is brought to declare the nonexistence of a father-child
relationship, “[t]he child shall be made a party” to the action if the child is
a minor. Minn. Stat. § 257.60(2); see
also Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subd. 16 (2000) (stating that “‘[s]hall’ is
mandatory”).

Seeking to declare the nonexistence of a father-child
relationship is not the same as bringing an action under Minn. Stat.
§ 257.57, subd. 2, to declare the nonexistence of a father-child
relationship presumed to exist under Minn. Stat. § 257.55, subd. 1.[1]Cf.State ex rel. Brooks v.
Braswell, 474 N.W.2d 346, 350 (Minn. 1991) (stating that if former husband
obtained vacation of order adjudicating him presumed father of child born
during his marriage, he then “could have initiated an action for a declaration
of the nonexistence of the father and child relationship”).

Here, appellant did not seek a determination that a
father-child relationship presumed to exist under Minn. Stat.
§ 257.55 did not, in fact, exist.
Nor did he seek a determination that the father-child relationship did
not in fact exist. He moved under Minn.
R. Civ. P. 60.02(b), (c), (f), and Minn. Stat. §§ 518.145, 548.14 to
vacate the paternity adjudication.
Without more, vacating a paternity adjudication does not
necessarily destroy the presumption of paternity created by Minn. Stat.
§ 257.55, subd. 1. Thus, had
appellant been successful in obtaining a vacation of the paternity
adjudication, any presumption of paternity created by Minn. Stat. § 257.55,
subd. 1, would still exist. Here,
appellant implicitly admits this is the case by candidly acknowledging before
the district court and this court that a subsequent paternity action could be
brought against him and that, despite the genetic tests purportedly excluding
him as the child’s biological father, a subsequent paternity action could
adjudicate him the father of the child.

Moreover,
Minn. Stat. § 257.57, subd. 2, the provision under which the county
alleges appellant brought his motion, refers to bringing “an action” to declare
the nonexistence of a father-child relationship presumed to exist under Minn.
Stat. § 257.55. Here, appellant
moved, in the existing paternity proceeding, to vacate the paternity
adjudication; he did not bring the separate action required by statute. Also, the “action” allowed by Minn. Stat. §
257.57, subd. 2, must be brought by an “alleged” father. Here, when appellant moved to vacate the
paternity adjudication, he had already been adjudicated the child’s
father. Ramsey County cites no
authority for the proposition that a man who is adjudicated to be a child’s
father continues to be the child’s “alleged” father under Minn. Stat. § 257.57,
and the Parentage Act suggests otherwise.
See Minn. Stat. § 257.66, subd. 1 (2000) (stating that
adjudications of parentage under the Parentage Act are “determinative for all
purposes”).

Case law explains that if the time
for bringing the “action” to declare the non-existence of the father-child
relationship presumed to exist by Minn. Stat. § 257.55, subd. 1 has not
expired, a denial of paternity can be treated as being “in the nature of a
counter claim.” SeeBraswell,
474 N.W.2d at 350. Appellant’s motion
to vacate the paternity adjudication cannot be construed as the counterclaim
allowed by case law, however. To bring
a counterclaim, a proceeding must be pending and the party asserting the
counterclaim must seek relief from an opposing party. SeeBlack’s Law Dictionary 353 (7th ed. 1999)
(defining a “counterclaim” as “[a] claim for relief asserted against an
opposing party after an original claim has been made”). Here, nothing was pending when appellant
moved to vacate the paternity adjudication.

Thus, on this record, appellant did
not (as assumed by Ramsey County) invoke Minn. Stat. § 257.57, subd. 2. Nor did appellant seek the relief allowed by
that provision or use either of the procedural methods allowed for seeking
relief under that provision. Indeed,
appellant (as an adjudicated father) may not be allowed to even seek relief under
that provision. Additionally, actions
under Minn. Stat. § 257.57, subd. 2, to declare the nonexistence of the
father-child relationship presumed to exist under Minn. Stat. § 257.55,
subd. 1, are distinct from actions under Minn. Stat. § 257.60 (2) to declare
the nonexistence of the father-child relationship. Therefore, we must reject Ramsey County’s argument that
appellant’s motion to vacate the paternity adjudication under Rule 60.02 was
“in the nature of an action to establish nonpaternity” under Minn. Stat.
§ 257.57, subd. 2, and require appointment of a guardian ad litem under
Minn. Stat. § 257.60 (2).

II.

Appellant
moved to vacate the paternity adjudication on various bases, including Minn. R.
Civ. P. 60.02. The Parentage Act
provides that a parentage proceeding “is a civil action governed by the rules
of civil procedure.” Minn. Stat.
§ 257.65 (2000). A motion in a
paternity proceeding to vacate a paternity adjudication is apparently governed
by the rules of civil procedure. See
Braswell, 474 N.W.2d at 350 (stating that proceedings under the Parentage
Act are governed by the rules of civil procedure). The Parentage Act, however, also provides that after a judgment
is entered, “all” subsequent matters other than custody and visitation are to be
decided “in accordance with chapter 518.”
Minn. Stat. § 257.66, subd. 3 (2000). Chapter 518 includes Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2 (2000),
which addresses relief from existing orders and judgments. Therefore, arguably a motion in a paternity
proceeding to vacate a paternity adjudication is subject to Minn. Stat.
§ 518.145, subd. 2. Case law
suggests, however, that a person is not precluded from seeking relief from a
paternity adjudication under either provision.
Cf.Peterson v. Eishen, 512 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Minn. 1994)
(noting, in context of motion to vacate paternity and support orders for
voidness, both rule 60.02 and Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2 may be used
to reopen a void judgment); Reid v. Strodtman, 631 N.W.2d 414, 417-18
(Minn. App. 2001) (noting the possible application of both rule 60.02 and Minn.
Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2 to a support order issued in paternity
proceeding).

In light of Minn. Stat. § 257.65, Braswell, Peterson,
and Reid, we conclude that a person may seek to vacate a paternity
adjudication under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02.[2] Our conclusion is consistent with the
apparent limits on the relief available under Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd.
2, which provides for relief from a “judgment and decree, order, or proceeding
under this chapter.” (i.e., Chapter 518) (Emphasis added.)

III.

Appellant moved to vacate the paternity adjudication under
Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(b), alleging newly discovered evidence, 60.02(c)
alleging fraud, and 60.02(f) which allows relief for “other reason[s].” The district court denied appellant’s
motion, finding that (a) when his paternity was adjudicated, there were no
other presumed fathers for the child and that Turner had alleged that there
were no other possible fathers for the child; (b) genetic tests later excluded
appellant from being the child’s biological father; (c) even after the genetic
tests, Turner continues to maintain that appellant is the only possible father
of the child; (d) appellant has held himself out as the child’s father since
1995 and is the only father the child has known; (e) appellant indicated that
he will seek visitation with the child even if the paternity adjudication is
vacated; (f) appellant’s motion is apparently financially motivated; (g) there
was no credible evidence that Turner committed fraud on appellant or on the
court; (h) no credible evidence supports vacating the paternity adjudication;
and (i) it is not in the child’s best interests to vacate the paternity
adjudication. Appellant challenges
these determinations.

“Whether to vacate a paternity judgment under Minn. R.
Civ. P. 60.02 is discretionary with the district court” and we review the
district court’s decision to deny appellant’s motion for an abuse of that
discretion. Losoya v. Richardson,
584 N.W.2d 425, 427 (Minn. App. 1998) (citation omitted). Whether a party has committed fraud or
misconduct is within the district court’s discretion as the fact finder and
evaluator of the weight and credibility of the evidence. J.L.B. v. T.E.B., 474 N.W.2d 599, 603
(Minn. App. 1991), review denied (Minn. Oct. 11, 1991). We review a district court’s findings of
fact to determine whether they are clearly erroneous. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01.

A. Fraud

Appellant argues that the genetic tests which exclude him
as the child’s father show that Turner committed fraud against him when she
represented that appellant was the father of the child and the only possible
father of the child.

Fraud by an adverse party may justify relief under Minn.
R. Civ. P. 60.02(c), if the party alleging fraud establishes by clear and
convincing evidence that the “adverse party engaged in fraud or other
misconduct which prevented it from fully and fairly presenting its case.” Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. Medical Inc.,
405 N.W.2d 474, 480 (Minn. App. 1987); see J.L.B., 474 N.W.2d at 603; cf.
Doering v. Doering, 629 N.W.2d 124, 129-30 (Minn. App. 2001) (stating that
the standard for reopening dissolution judgment on the basis of fraud under
Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2(3), within one year after the entry of judgment,
is ordinary fraud not fraud on the court), review denied (Minn. Sept.
11, 2001). The misconduct required by
Rule 60.02(c) must not be collateral to, and must affect the ultimate issue(s)
of, the case. See Regents of Univ.
of Minn., 405 N.W.2d at 480.

It is undisputed that (a) Turner represented to appellant
he was the father of the child; (b) as a result, appellant responsibly held the
child out as his own and helped care for the child; (c) by affidavit, Turner
made a sworn statement in 1997 to Ramsey County stating that appellant was the
only possible father of the child; (d) this affidavit was attached to the
papers served on appellant to initiate this paternity proceeding; and (e) while
under oath at the paternity hearing, Turner unequivocally represented to the
court that appellant was the father of the child. The record, however, also contains the results of genetic tests
purportedly indicating that appellant cannot be the biological father of the
child.

Thus, it is evident either that Turner’s
representations to appellant and her sworn statements to Ramsey County and to
the court were false or that the genetic tests were defective. Although the district court’s order denying
appellant’s motion to vacate suggests that it implicitly determined that the
genetic tests were defective, it made no finding to that effect and, on this
record, we cannot determine how such a result was or could be reached; there
was no evidentiary hearing and the record lacks any information regarding the
genetic tests other than their results.

Moreover, although there is no explicit statement in the
record by appellant (as opposed to his counsel, who does so state) that
appellant stipulated to being the child’s father based on Turner’s statements,
a close examination of the record not just allows, but compels this
inference. Therefore, the possible
falsity of Turner’s statements was not, under Regents of Univ. of Minn.,
“collateral” to the resolution of the paternity question and we reverse the
district court’s summary rejection of appellant’s request for relief under
Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(c), and remand for an evidentiary hearing on this
issue.

The current proceeding could have been avoided if
appellant had sought genetic tests before stipulating on the paternity
question. This fact, however, cannot be
used to preclude appellant from challenging the paternity adjudication. Turner made a series of statements on which
appellant relied in stipulating to paternity, including but not limited to
unequivocal, sworn statements to Ramsey County that appellant was the
only possible father of the child and to the court that appellant was
the father of the child. When Turner
made these sworn statements, she was under oath. Minn. Stat. § 358.07(7), (10) (2000) (statutorily required
oaths stating that witnesses must swear to tell the “whole truth” and that
affiants must swear to tell the truth).

Given the nature of these sworn statements, to now
penalize appellant for not seeking genetic tests before stipulating to paternity
is to penalize him for not assuming Turner’s sworn statements were
perjured or otherwise false. To hold
that parties must preserve their rights by disbelieving sworn statements
relating to the identity of the person with whom a woman conceived a child
would result, we conclude, in a judicially mandated atmosphere of distrust and
acrimony that is contrary to public policy strongly favoring stipulations in
family cases. See, e.g., Maranda
v. Maranda, 449 N.W.2d 158, 164 (Minn. 1999) (stipulated divorce decrees
are favored); Tomscak v. Tomscak, 352 N.W.2d 464, 466 (Minn. App. 1984)
(noting that stipulations are favored).

Thus, appellant’s failure to seek genetic tests before
stipulating to paternity cannot now preclude him from alleging that those tests
showed Turner’s statements may be false.
We also note that because the current record lacks evidence addressing
the validity of the genetic tests, the district court’s implicit finding that
they were invalid is unsupported and we remand for the district court to
conduct an evidentiary hearing to address appellant’s fraud allegation.

B. Newly
Discovered Evidence

Appellant also argues that the genetic tests constitute
newly discovered evidence under Rule 60.02(b) entitling him to vacation of the
paternity adjudication. Newly
discovered evidence must be relevant and admissible at trial and likely to have
an effect on the result of a new trial; the evidence must not be merely
collateral, impeaching, or cumulative. Regents
of Univ. of Minn., 405 N.W.2d at 479-79 (citation omitted). Rule 60.02(b) allows relief for newly
discovered evidence that “due diligence” would not have discovered in time to
seek a new trial. Due diligence
requires a party to employ “reasonable investigation efforts” to find and
produce the evidence at trial. Id.

As noted above, parties, particularly those to litigation
or other proceedings addressing family related rights, are generally entitled
to believe the sworn statements of other parties to those proceedings relating
to the identity of the person with whom a woman conceived a child. Therefore, appellant’s earlier waiver of
genetic testing did not constitute a refusal and failure to exercise “due
diligence” to seek paternity-related evidence and we reverse the district court’s
summary rejection of appellant’s request under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(b) to
vacate the paternity adjudication on the basis of newly discovered
evidence. On remand, the district court
shall also address this aspect of appellant’s motion. SeeRegents of Univ. of Minn., 405 N.W.2d at 478-79
(addressing vacating judgments under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(b) for newly
discovered evidence).

Here, the district court did not address whether
appellant’s request for relief under Rule 60.02(f) was based on a reason
covered by Rule 60.02(a)-(e).
Therefore, on remand, the district court shall address whether the basis
for appellant’s request for relief under Rule 60.02(f) is for something that
would allow relief under Rule 60.02(a)-(e) and address the merits of
appellant’s 60.02(f) request only if its basis is distinct from the bases for relief
under those other provisions of the rule.[3]Chapman, 454 N.W.2d at 924; Clay,
397 N.W.2d at 578.

IV.

When denying appellant’s motion to vacate the adjudication
order, the district court concluded that the interests of the child “are
paramount” and that it would not be in the interests of the child to vacate the
paternity adjudication. On appeal,
appellant and Ramsey County disagree about whether the child’s best interests
are relevant when deciding whether to vacate the paternity adjudication. Therefore, we must also decide whether, on
remand, the district court may again consider the child’s best interests.

The objective of paternity proceedings is to correctly
identify the biological father of a child.
SeeSpaeth v. Warren, 478 N.W.2d 319, 322 (Minn. App.
1991), review denied (Minn. Jan. 30, 1992). Given that biological paternity is an objective fact, this court
has observed that

neither Minnesota’s parentage act nor the [Uniform Parentage
Act] suggests that a determination of paternity should include analysis of
whether a child’s best interests would be served by the adjudication.

Id.; see alsoid. at 323 (noting that
a “child’s best interests simply are irrelevant to the biological
determination”).[4] The failure of a paternity proceeding to
attain its biological objective, however, does not necessarily render
the resulting paternity adjudication legally defective. Seegenerally Clay v. Clay,
397 N.W.2d 571, 575-79 (Minn. App. 1986) (affirming district court’s refusal to
reopen paternity determination made in dissolution judgment where former
husband later produced blood tests showing he was not father of child), review
denied (Minn. Feb. 17, 1987); cf.R.B., 536 N.W.2d at 635
(stating “[b]iology alone does not give a father a constitutionally protected
interests in a paternity determination”).

There are
obvious and significant differences between adjudicating paternity and seeking
to vacate a paternity adjudication, and those differences are especially
pronounced for a child whose paternity is at issue. Therefore, that a child’s best interests are irrelevant to the
determination of the objective fact of biological paternity does not
necessarily mean those best interests are irrelevant to the question whether to
grant relief from an existing (albeit possibly biologically incorrect)
paternity adjudication. A child’s best
interests, however, are not part of the analysis used to determine whether to
grant relief under Rule 60.02. See,
e.g., Finden v. Klaas, 268 Minn. 268, 271, 128 N.W.2d 748, 750
(1964) (addressing the requirements for relief under Minn. R. Civ. P.
60.02). Additionally, here, appellant’s
motion to vacate the paternity adjudication is not accompanied by a motion to
declare the nonexistence of the father-child relationship or an action to
declare the nonexistence of the father-child relationship presumed under Minn.
Stat. § 257.55, subd. 1. And
appellant admits he may still be adjudicated the child’s father. Indeed, appellant’s argument is not that he
is not the child’s legal father but that Turner’s arguably false sworn
statements should not preclude him from arguing whether he should be the
child’s father. We therefore hold that,
on remand, when determining whether to vacate the paternity adjudication under
Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02, the district court shall not consider the child’s best
interests.

D E C I S I O N

Appellant’s
motion to vacate the paternity adjudication is not identical to either an
action under Minn. Stat. § 257.57, subd. 2, to declare the nonexistence of
the father-child relationship presumed under Minn. Stat. § 257.55, subd.
1, or to declare the nonexistence of the father-child relationship. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s
refusal to appoint a guardian ad litem for the child. Additionally, because appellant’s stipulation to paternity was
based on Turner’s unequivocal representations and sworn statements, and because
the genetic tests call those representations and sworn statements into
question, we reverse the district court’s summary denial of appellant’s motion
to vacate and remand for the district court to hold a evidentiary hearing and
to address appellant’s motion to vacate based on the evidence adduced at that
hearing. We affirm the district court’s
denial of relief for fraud on the court.
We express no opinion on how to decide the remanded questions.

[1] For purposes of this appeal,
we will assume that an attempt to declare the nonexistence of a father-child
relationship presumed to exist under Minn. Stat. § 257.55, subd. 1, would
require appointment of a guardian ad litem.

[2] This court
has previously stated that Minn. Stat. § 257.57, subd. 1(b), not Minn. Stat.
§ 548.14, is the “preemptive sole method available to a party to raise the
question of the non-paternity of one presumed to be the natural father of a
child.” Clay v. Clay, 397 N.W.2d
571, 579 (Minn. App. 1986), review denied (Minn. Feb. 17, 1987). Clay however, must be read
in context. SeeNadeau v.
Melin, 260 Minn. 369, 375, 110 N.W.2d 29, 34 (1961) (“A decision must be
construed in the light of the issue before the court”). In Clay, the statement that Minn.
Stat. § 257.57, subd. 1(b) is the “sole” method to question paternity was made
in the context of a husband’s challenge to a paternity adjudication occurring
in a dissolution judgment where the challenge was not raised until after
the period to challenge presumed paternity under Minn. Stat. § 257.57, subd.
1(b) had expired; the husband was essentially attempting to use Minn. Stat. §
548.14 to circumvent the unconditional three-year limitations period in Minn.
Stat. § 257.57, subd. 1(b). This court
rejected that attempt, noting that under Minn. Stat. § 645.26, a specific
statute prevails over a general statute.
Clay, 397 N.W.2d at 579.
Here, however, there is no dissolution judgment and there is no statute
of limitations question.

[3] Although the crux of
appellant’s argument is that Turner’s allegedly false statements precluded him
from presenting his case on the paternity issue, he admits that he could still
be adjudicated the child’s father.
Therefore, we cannot say that this case involves the “grossly unfair”
result required by the standard for “fraud on the court.” SeeMaranda, 449 N.W.2d at 164
(addressing “fraud on the court”). We
therefore affirm the district court’s denial of relief on that issue.

[4]
This is clearly not a case where best-interests analysis may apply to resolve
competing considerations in determining paternity between multiple presumed
fathers. SeeIn re Welfare of
C.M.G., 516 N.W.2d 555, 560 (Minn. App. 1994) (stating that “a child’s best
interests is a valid policy factor in resolving a conflict between competing
paternity presumptions”); Kelly v. Cataldo, 488 N.W.2d 822, 826 (Minn.
App. 1992), review denied (Minn. Sept. 15, 1992) (where child is a
necessary party to a paternity action or there are competing presumptions of
paternity, a guardian ad litem must be appointed and must consider the child’s
best interests). Nor is it a case with
a unique procedural posture, which would take it out of the general rule. SeeMurphy v. Myers, 560
N.W.2d 752, 756 (Minn. App. 1997) (district court did not err by considering
child’s best interests when rejecting biological father’s fraud and
misrepresentation defenses in paternity action); Nicholson v. Maack, 400
N.W.2d 160, 165 (Minn. App. 1987) (guardian ad litem must consider the child’s
best interests before initiating a paternity action on behalf of the child).