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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 001101
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/2019
TAGS: PGOVPRELPINSPHUMKJUSKDEMASECMOPSTH
SUBJECT: CROWD CONTROL DURING RECENT PROTESTS IN THAILAND
REF: A. BANGKOK 983 (BRIEFING DIP CORPS)
¶B. BANGKOK 974 (BANGKOK CALM)
¶C. HOTR IIR 6 895 0221 09 (PROTESTS END)
¶D. HOTR IIR 6 895 0216 09 (PROTESTS AT PATTAYA)
¶E. BANGKOK 951 (SHIFT TO PATTAYA)
¶F. 06 BANGKOK 7501 (POLICE REFORM)
BANGKOK 00001101 001.2 OF 004
Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason: 1.4 (b, d).
SUMMARY AND COMMENT
-------------------
¶1. (C) The Thai Army, rather than the police, played the
leading role in quelling angry demonstrations in Bangkok
April 12-14. The Thai government's decision to rely on the
Army may have stemmed from several factors, including the
political views of leading Army and police officers, as well
as lack of confidence the police would take the actions
necessary to restore order on the streets. The failure of
police officials to prevent demonstrators in Pattaya from
disrupting the ASEAN Summit April 11 may reflect poor
planning or capabilities or a lack of will, but restrictive
rules of engagement imposed by the Prime Minister likely
exacerbated those factors; military units (navy and army) had
also deployed in Pattaya and ultimately proved no more
effective than the police.
¶2. (C) We assess that the Thai police have a reasonable
capability for crowd control. The military appears
interested in expanding its crowd control capabilities, and
at least one senior officer believed the Army's capabilities
improved thanks to the U.S.-funded Global Peace Operations
Initiative (GPOI) training. It is unclear whether the police
(or, if again involved, the Army) will in the future be more
effective in containing protests; actions taken by security
forces against political protestors will likely continue to
reflect a combination of the rules of engagement dictated by
civilian policymakers and the security forces' motivation,
skills, and equipment. End Summary and Comment.
AFTER PATTAYA, ABHISIT TURNED TO THE ARMY
-----------------------------------------
¶3. (C) On April 10-11, thousands of anti-government United
Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD) "redshirt"
protestors converged on the seaside town of Pattaya, where
Thailand was hosting a Summit meeting of East Asian leaders
(ref E). Despite forewarning in the form of public
statements from UDD leaders expressing a desire to disrupt
the Summit, both police and military officials at the site
were unable or unwilling to maintain order. Demonstrators
blocked key roads and entered a hotel complex housing
visiting dignitaries, ultimately forcing the Summit's
cancellation and leading to a severe loss of face for Prime
Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva and his administration. An
Australian diplomat on site in Pattaya preparing to support
the participation of the Australian PM told us that she took
a photo of the Pattaya police chief strolling arm in arm with
redshirt demonstrators the morning of April 11; the police
chief was subsequently transferred to an inactive post.
(Note: When the UDD protestors pushed through military lines,
the government had not yet declared a state of emergency in
Pattaya, and the soldiers were under extremely strict rules
of engagement. End Note.)
¶4. (SBU) When the UDD then resumed demonstrations in Bangkok,
Abhisit used existing provisions of Thai law to declare a
state of emergency in Bangkok and surrounding provinces on
April 12. Abhisit issued a directive that appointed Deputy
Prime Minister Suthep Thaugsuban, a civilian politician, as
both the "Authorizing Supervising Official" and as the "Chief
Official" for "resolving the emergency situation." Abhisit
gave Suthep "the powers to resolve the severe emergency
situation in accordance with the Emergency Decree on Public
Administration in Emergency Situation" and to "(c)ommand and
instruct relevant government agencies and officials..."
¶5. (SBU) Abhisit's directive also stated that "Police
officers of the National Police Bureau, military officers and
civil servants... shall be competent officials under the
(Emergency Decree)..." (Note: In this context "competent
BANGKOK 00001101 002.2 OF 004
officials" is a technical term meaning persons empowered by
the Prime Minister to perform actions under the Emergency
Decree.) Furthermore, "In cases where it becomes
necessary... military officials shall assist in the operation
(to restore order)."
WHY NOT THE POLICE?
-------------------
¶6. (SBU) When former PMs Samak and Somchai declared similar
states of emergencies in Bangkok in late 2008 in response to
People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) protests which occupied
Government House starting in August and shut down Bangkok's
airports in November, they chose alternate authorizing
officials; Samak named the Army Commander, and Somchai named
the Police Chief. In both cases, neither authorizing
official moved to use force to clear the PAD crowds, in part
citing the lack of a PM's order for them to do so.
¶7. (C) It remains unclear to us precisely how the RTG under
DPM Suthep's direction divided crowd control responsibilities
in Bangkok between the Army and the police April 12-14, but
the Army clearly served as the lead agency for dispersing and
containing crowds, while the police also remained involved.
Speaking publicly on April 17, Abhisit explained his
preference, referring vaguely to "some difficulties" which
had occurred in 2008. Among the reasons why we believe
Abhisit sought to give the Army the leading role:
- POLITICAL LOYALTIES: Both soldiers and police officials
swear their oath of allegiance to the King, but in the
current highly polarized environment, the Army has appeared
staunchly supportive of the monarchy, while many Thais
perceive the police as sympathetic toward former Prime
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, a former police officer. As
noted in ref F, during his time in office, Thaksin had
increased the influence of the police, sometimes at the
Army's expense. After Army leaders carried out the 2006 coup
d'etat, the pro-military administration, as one of its many
initiatives, made an unsuccessful attempt to carry out a
wide-ranging restructuring of Thailand's police force that
would have diminished the institution markedly. We observed
some low-ranking police officers enthusiastically
participating in UDD protests.
- RISK AVERSION: The impact on the police of the public
backlash following the October 7, 2008 clash between the
police and PAD protestors should not be underestimated, in
terms of plummeting morale and risk aversion in politicized
situations. The PAD trumpeted the clash, in which dozens
were injured, as a national trauma. There was widespread
sympathy, including from Queen Sirikit, for a female
protestor who died from the injuries she sustained. Several
separate investigations ensued, though none have reached
conclusion.
- CAPABILITIES: In the aforementioned October 7
confrontation, the police units involved demonstrated that
they were not trained very well. For example, at least one
police officer fired a tear gas canister directly into the
assembled PAD supporters, rather than aiming above the crowd.
The police also seemed to have poor quality equipment; some
critics alleged the Chinese-made tear gas canisters contained
small amounts of explosives which detonated with lethal
force. Abhisit remarked to the diplomatic corps on April 16
that, had the police been in charge of dispersing UDD
protestors, they likely would have caused more harm to
protestors than soldiers did (ref A).
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT KEY
-----------------------
¶8. (C) The growing issue of "risk aversion" cited affects not
only the police, but also civilian officials. We believe it
important to recognize that PM Abhisit and his subordinates
imposed stringent rules of engagement during the recent
protests. Written statements provided by the MFA to the
diplomatic community noted:
- In an April 13 televised address, Abhisit "stressed that
the most important guideline he had given to government
BANGKOK 00001101 003.2 OF 004
officials responsible for resolving the situation was that
the measures... shall not cause any deaths.... (T)he
government will carry out measures based on non-violence..."
- In an April 13 televised appearance, Chief of the Defense
Forces General Songkitti Jaggabatara announced that, in the
restoration of order, "(n)o weapons will be used, except for
self-defence, and measures will be imposed only when
necessary and for a period required to resolve the
situation.... Security officers are strictly instructed to
use weapons in two manners only: first, live bullets are to
be used as warning shots by shooting into the sky, and
second, blank bullets will be used in cases where protesters
advance upon security officers."
- In an April 19 televised address, Abhisit "reaffirmed that
the policy guideline he gave to security officers involved in
the operations to restore peace and order was for them to
exercise utmost restraint and avoid any use of force."
¶9. (C) Given the extraordinarily politicized environment and
the strict rules of engagement, we believe that the most
recent police attempts to contain UDD demonstrators did not
reflect the full extent of police capabilities. While a DAO
officer observed that the police offered minimal resistance
to protestors in Pattaya, military units from the navy and
army, under strict rules of engagement, as noted in para two,
above, also were present at the Summit site and similarly
failed to impede protestors (ref D).
POLICE AT THE EMBASSY - JOB DONE WELL
-------------------------------------
¶10. (C) RSO has been satisfied with the police's crowd
control actions at the Embassy (on the rare occasions when it
is required), as well as with other police efforts to protect
our mission. During a recent demonstration in front of the
entrance to the Chancery, several hundred protestors were
contained but permitted to exercise their right to
demonstrate regarding the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. The
police ensured they had barriers and sufficient officers to
send a clear signal of control. The RSO section has
exceptional relations with Special Branch police, the Bangkok
Metropolitan Police, the police SWAT operation (which has
received USG training), and each individual police precinct
that has a connection to any of our people or residences.
¶11. (C) Recently, in light of the ongoing political crisis,
RSO requested the Diplomatic Security bureau's Anti-Terrorism
Assistance (ATA) program consider offering training on crowd
control. ATA does not currently offer such a course, and RSO
is seeking to devise a course in-house, seeking input from
various U.S. police organizations which have dealt with this
problem and from other foreign missions. (So far, the RSO
has only had operational, technical and philosophical
discussions with the police on crowd control.)
ARMY CROWD CONTROL CAPABILITIES
-------------------------------
¶12. (C) Many observers -- including even a UDD co-leader (ref
B) -- believe that the Army acted with appropriate restraint
and discipline when containing and dispersing UDD protests.
(Ref C reports a DAO officer's observations.) The troops
involved were infantry soldiers from the First Army Area.
DAO personnel have in the past observed Thai soldiers
training for crowd control with appropriate gear, such as
shields, batons, and water cannon trucks. Not surprisingly,
however, the Army appears to lack the equipment for troops to
handle large crowds engaged in simultaneous demonstrations at
multiple sites. Nevertheless, DAO observed during the recent
Bangkok demonstrations that the Army's forceful presence,
including the visible deployment of light infantry weaponry
(such as vehicle-mounted machine guns), had an intimidating
effect that likely made protestors less willing to confront
the troops than they might have been to confront police.
¶13. (C) Lieutenant General Surapong Suwana-adth, Director of
Joint Intelligence at the Royal Thai Armed Forces
Headquarters, told the Defense Attache Corps after the recent
demonstrations that the Army, in its crowd control actions,
BANGKOK 00001101 004.2 OF 004
benefited from Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI)
training it had received. Surapong told us this training had
proven very useful, allowing the Army to engage protestors in
a disciplined manner, and the Army intended to pursue further
such training. (Note: We understand that GPOI training does
not specifically aim to prepare troops for the role they
played in the recent Bangkok disturbances, but some GPOI
training entails checkpoint control, and control over crowds
in a military mission environment using normal military
equipment such as flak vests and weapons, rather than
specialized crowd control gear. End Note.)
¶14. (C) A British Embassy officer told us recently that Chief
of Defense Forces GEN Songkitti intended to travel to the UK
in the near future and would discuss a potential purchase of
riot control equipment. (The British Embassy officer was
unsure whether his government would look favorably on such a
potential sale.)
JOHN