(6) Plaintiff's Motion to Hold Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss or to Stay in Favor of Arbitration in Abeyance (Doc.
No. 67) (hereafter, “Motion to Hold in
Abeyance”).

All of
these motions have been fully briefed and are ripe for
review.

Logically,
the court should consider a motion addressing jurisdiction
first. However, because the Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Personal Jurisdiction is based on the argument that the
plaintiff has not revealed her identity as the real party in
interest, the court must first address the plaintiff's
Motion to Proceed Pseudonymously. The court finds, as set
forth below, that the plaintiff should be permitted to
proceed anonymously. However, the protective order she seeks
goes too far, and the other relief she requests is
unnecessary in light of the court's rulings on the other
pending motions. Because the court will grant the
plaintiff's Motion to Proceed Pseudonymously, the
defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction
will be denied as moot.

The
court must next consider the defendants' Motion to
Reconsider, which addresses whether the court improperly
concluded that the temporary stay and preliminary injunction
entered in a related action pending in Michigan had expired
and, therefore, that this action could proceed. (See
Order, Doc. No. 34.) If the court improperly ignored an
injunction staying this case, then any other further action
taken by the court would be invalid. The court, however, 3
reaffirms its prior decision and will deny the Motion to
Reconsider.

The
parties dispute whether the court should first consider the
Motion for Notice or the Motion to Compel Arbitration. The
plaintiff has formally requested that the court consider her
Motion for Notice first. As set forth herein, the court finds
that it must first consider the Motion to Compel Arbitration
prior to addressing the Motion for Notice. The Motion to Hold
in Abeyance will therefore be denied.

Further,
the court finds that none of the plaintiff's objections
to arbitration has merit. The Motion to Compel Arbitration
will be granted. Because all of the plaintiff's claims
are subject to arbitration under the very broadly worded
arbitration agreement, the court will dismiss this action
without prejudice rather than stay it. The plaintiff's
Motion for Notice will be denied as moot.

II.
Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed Pseudonymously and
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal
Jurisdiction

A.
Procedural and Factual Background

The
plaintiff requests authorization to proceed pseudonymously
and to submit all unredacted collective action consent forms
filed by other putative plaintiffs under seal; she also seeks
entry of a permanent protective order. (Doc. No. 49.) In
support of this motion, she has submitted her supporting
Memorandum, two sealed unredacted Notices of Consent (her own
and that of Jane Doe #2), and the Second Declaration of Jane
Doe #1. (Doc. Nos. 50, 51, 52.) The defendants have filed
their Response in opposition (Doc. No. 58), which also
constitutes their Memorandum in support of the separately
filed Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
(Doc. No. 59). The plaintiff filed a Reply (Doc. No. 65) as
well as a Response in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss
(Doc. No. 66).

The
First Amended Collective Action Complaint
(“Complaint”) is the operative pleading in this
action. In it, the plaintiff asserts claims individually and
on behalf of a putative FLSA class of similarly situated
employees and former employees of the defendants,
Déjà Vu Consulting, Inc., Déjà Vu
Services, Inc., Déjà Vu of Nashville, Harry
Mohney, and Jason Mohney (collectively,
“defendants”). She alleges that she and similarly
situated individuals worked at the defendants' various
establishments as “showgirls/entertainers (also known
as performers/dancers/strippers/exotic dancers . . .).”
(Compl. ¶ 3.) She alleges generally that she and
similarly situated performers were misclassified as
independent contractors rather than as employees, in
violation of the FLSA, and that they were improperly denied
hourly wages and required to pay defendants mandatory illegal
kickbacks.

In her
Complaint, the plaintiff specifically states that she seeks
to proceed in this court pseudonymously and, at the time she
filed the Complaint, anticipated the prompt filing of a
motion requesting court permission to do so. She stipulates
that, “[u]pon entry of a court[-]approved protective
order, Named Plaintiff will disclose her identity to Defense
counsel and certain agents of Defendants.” (Compl.
¶ 13.)[1] She also asserts that her privacy
interests “substantially outweigh the presumption of
open judicial proceedings, ” because (1) prosecution of
this suit will involve disclosure of “information of
the utmost intimacy”; (2) “the inherent danger of
disclosing her true identity in connection with her history
of performing nude or semi-nude . . . may invite opprobrium
from her family, friends, community, current employer, and/or
prospective employer”; and (3) disclosure of her true
identity gives rise to a risk of stalking and assault by
current and former patrons. (Id.) She posits that
performers engaged in nude and semi-nude dancing frequently
use fictitious stage names because of the acknowledged risk
of disclosing their true identities and that the defendants
will not be prejudiced by the court's permitting her to
proceed pseudonymously, because her identity will be
disclosed to the defendants. (Id.)

In the
Declaration submitted in support of her motion, the plaintiff
attests that she would “have serious concerns for [her]
privacy, safety, and personal well-being” if not
permitted to proceed pseudonymously. (Doe 2d Decl., Doc. No.
52 ¶ 1.) She avers that she uses a stage name when
performing to protect her identity from customers and that
this is “common in the adult industry . . . to avoid
customers who may seek to contact[] dancers outside of work,
for fear that this could escalate to stalking or
violence.” (Doc. No. 52 ¶ 10.) She also contends
that her parents are “devout members of a Christian
church” and that, given her “family's
involvement with the church and their religious beliefs,
[she] fear[s] that if [she] was publicly identified as an
adult entertainer then it would invite criticism and
negativity towards [her] and [her] family.” (Doc. No.
52 ¶ 7.) In addition, she fears that in this “day
of social media, ” disclosure of her identity could be
easily disseminated and used to harass her and her family.
(Doc. No. 52 ¶ 11.) And finally, she fears that, without
entry of a protective order, the defendants, who are
“powerful people in the adult entertainment industry,
” could use knowledge of her true identity to hurt her
career. (Doc. No. 52 ¶¶ 13-14.)

On the
basis of these allegations, the plaintiff seeks to pursue
this case pseudonymously and requests that the court enter a
permanent protective order requiring the defendants to
maintain the confidentiality of her identity. In their
Response in opposition to the motion, the defendants argue
that the plaintiff has not carried her burden of showing that
her privacy concerns substantially outweigh the presumption
in favor of open judicial proceedings. Specifically, they
contend that (1) an unspecified fear of retaliation does not
weigh in her favor; (2) she has not provided evidence of a
threat of stalking or physical violence; and (3) mere
embarrassment about performing as a nude dancer does not
outweigh the presumption of open proceedings. They also point
out that numerous exotic dancers have brought suit in their
own names. (See Doc. No. 58, at 11 n.2 (collecting
cases).) The defendants request that, upon denial of the
plaintiff's motion, her Complaint be dismissed unless she
refiles promptly under her legal name. Their Motion to
Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction is premised on
their argument that the plaintiff has not shown that she
should be permitted to proceed pseudonymously.

B.
Standard of Review

“As
a general matter, ” Rule 10 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure requires that a complaint state the names of
all parties. Doe v. Porter, 370 F.3d 558, 560 (6th
Cir. 2004); Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(a). It is, however, within a
district court's discretion to excuse a plaintiff from
the requirement that she identify herself if she shows that
her “privacy interests substantially outweigh the
presumption of open judicial proceedings.”
Porter, 370 F.3d at 560. Considerations relevant to
that inquiry include, but are not necessarily limited to:

(1) whether the plaintiffs seeking anonymity are suing to
challenge governmental activity; (2) whether prosecution of
the suit will compel the plaintiffs to disclose information
“of the utmost intimacy”; (3) whether the
litigation compels plaintiffs to disclose an intention to
violate the law, thereby risking criminal prosecution; and
(4) whether the plaintiffs are children.

Although
the defendants are correct that numerous entertainers in the
adult industry have chosen to pursue litigation in their own
names, it nonetheless appears that courts presented with
properly supported motions to proceed pseudonymously in this
context have typically granted them. See, e.g.,
Balance Studio, Inc. v. Cybernet Entm't, LLC,
204 F.Supp.3d 1098, 1102 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (granting the
plaintiff/counter-defendant's motion to proceed
anonymously where she worked “in adult sexual education
in the area of bondage and sadomasochism”); Jane
Roes 1-2 v. SFBSC Mgmt., LLC, 77 F.Supp.3d 990 (N.D.
Cal. 2015) (granting nude dancers' motion to proceed
pseudonymously). But see 4 Exotic Dancers v.
Spearmint Rhino, No. 08-4038, 2009 WL 250054 (C.D. Cal.
Jan. 29, 2009) (denying nude dancers' motion to proceed
pseudonymously). Here, the court finds that the balance of
factors weighs in favor of permitting the plaintiff to file
suit pseudonymously, to proceed pseudonymously through this
stage in the proceedings, and to maintain the confidentiality
of her identity even after dismissal of the suit.

In
support of her motion, the plaintiff testifies that she fears
the risk of stalking and physical violence by customers. The
defendants argue that such a threat of harm is largely
attenuated and hypothetical, pointing out that the plaintiff
has not worked for the defendants for more than a year, that
only her legal name, and not her stage name, would be present
on the pleadings and court filings, and that it is unlikely
that any customer from over a year ago would still be
interested in finding her and doing her harm and be able
identify her by her real name.

The
defendants acknowledge, however, that it is customary in the
industry for exotic dancers to use stage names in order to
minimize the risk of harassment. (Doc. No. 58, at 7-8.)
Moreover, the fact that the plaintiff has not worked for the
defendant in over a year is largely immaterial. The plaintiff
states in her Declaration: “In my profession, I use a
stage name to protect my identity from customers.”
(Doc. No. 52 ¶ 3.) This statement indicates that she
continues to pursue a career in the world of adult
entertainment, even though she does not work for the
defendants. And, regardless of whether she continues to work
in that field, she runs the risk of having past customers and
other unsavory characters pose a threat to her. In light of
the ease with which information and images are disseminated
in this age of the internet and myriad platforms of social
media, the court accepts as true, for purposes of the
plaintiff's motion, that the mere fact that a plaintiff
self-identifies as an exotic or nude dancer, per se,
may place her at risk of harassment and stalking, including
cyberstalking. The plaintiff is not required to prove a
substantial risk of serious harm by pointing to some concrete
or particularized threat. Accord Jane Roes 1-2 v. SFBSC
Management, LLC, 77 F.Supp.3d 990, 995 (N.D. Cal. 2015)
(rejecting similar argument and finding that this factor
weighed in favor of the motion to proceed pseudonymously,
noting that the defendants actually admitted that exotic
dancers customarily used stage names for reasons of privacy
and personal safety and that disclosure of an exotic
dancer's true identity “presents a substantial risk
of harm”). The court finds that this factor weighs in
favor of granting the plaintiff's motion.

The
plaintiff also argues that she fears stigmatization and
condemnation, not only for herself but also for her family,
if it becomes known in her family's religious community
that she works in the sex industry. The defendants, in
response, argue that mere embarrassment is not sufficient to
support a motion to proceed pseudonymously and that this case
is “completely unlike the situation” in Doe
v. Porter, where the court found that requiring the
plaintiffs to reveal their personal religious beliefs could
subject them to harassment. 370 F.3d at 560.

To the
contrary, issues of religion and sexuality, as a cultural
matter, are tightly interwoven and are, perhaps, equally
highly charged in our society, as the plaintiff's
Declaration suggests. Moreover, the possibility of social
stigma cannot necessarily be equated with mere embarrassment.
See Doe v. Rostker, 89 F.R.D. 158, 161, 162 (N.D.
Cal. 1981) (observing that the “common thread”
uniting cases where the plaintiffs had been permitted to
proceed pseudonymously “is the presence of some social
stigma or the threat of physical harm to the plaintiffs
attaching to [public] disclosure of their identities, ”
and distinguishing such cases from 9 those involving the risk
of “some embarrassment or economic harm”). Here,
the plaintiff alleges that her parents are devoutly religious
members of a Christian church and that, in light of their
involvement in the Church and the public's tendency to
equate nude dancing (which is legal) with prostitution (which
is not), she fears that her public identification as an adult
entertainer “would invite criticism and
negativity” toward herself and her family, as well as
the possibility of confrontation, harassment, and invasion of
privacy. (Doc. No. 52 ¶¶ 7-8.) The social
stigmatization that the plaintiff could face goes beyond
allegations of mere embarrassment. This factor, too, weighs
in favor of anonymity. Accord SFBSC Mgmt., 77
F.Supp.3d at 994 (noting that the case brought by exotic
dancers fell “into what may be roughly called the area
of human sexuality” and that “courts have often
allowed parties to use pseudonyms when a case involves topics
in this ‘sensitive and highly personal'
area”); see Id. (“For purposes of the
anonymity discussion, it is enough to observe that courts
have regularly responded to the especially sensitive nature
of this area and have been willing to grant parties
anonymity. The same judicial instinct should apply
here.”).

The
defendants here have not identified any possibility of
prejudice that might arise from granting the plaintiff's
motion, and the court can find none. It is clear from the
Declaration of Edwin Culbert (Doc. No. 41-1), filed by the
defendants, that the defendants are already aware of the
plaintiff's true identity. (See also Stipulated
Temporary Protective Order, Doc. No. 46 ¶ 11
(“Counsel for Plaintiffs shall provide to Counsel for
Defendants the name, stage name, and approximate performance
dates of Jane Does 1-2 as soon as possible upon entry of this
Stipulated Order.”).) The fact that, as set forth
below, the plaintiff will be required to pursue her claims
through arbitration further minimizes any risk of prejudice
to the defendants that might be caused by allowing her
identity to remain sealed. Moreover, the vast bulk of the
court record remains open to the public. The mere fact that
the record will not disclose the plaintiff's true name
will not impede “public scrutiny of this case's
operative issues.” SFBSC Mgmt., 77 F.Supp.3d
at 997.

In
light of the absence of prejudice to the defendants or to the
public, the court finds that the plaintiff's
“privacy interests substantially outweigh the
presumption of open judicial proceedings.”
Porter, 370 F.3d at 560. The court will therefore
grant her motion to file suit pseudonymously and to maintain
the confidentiality of her identity beyond the dismissal of
this action. Having reached that conclusion, the court will
deny as moot the defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack
of Personal Jurisdiction.

The
plaintiff also seeks to submit all future unredacted
collective action consent forms filed by other putative
plaintiffs under seal. Because this case will be dismissed in
favor of arbitration, the plaintiff's request to file
future consent forms under seal will be denied as moot.

The
plaintiff also seeks entry of her proposed Permanent
Protective Order (Doc. No. 49-1). This portion of the
plaintiff's motion will be granted in part. While the
court finds that the plaintiff is entitled to maintain her
public anonymity in this action, the terms of the proposed
Protective Order are overly broad, particularly given that
this case will be referred to arbitration. The court will,
however, enter an order directing the defendants to maintain
the names and personally identifying information of Jane Doe
#1 and #2 in complete confidence and not to disclose the
information to any other person, party or entity except as
strictly necessary to pursue their defense of this matter in
arbitration.

III.
Motion to Reconsider

The
defendants seek an order vacating the court's previous
Order (Doc. No. 34) granting the plaintiff's request to
be permitted to proceed with this litigation in light of the
entry of the Opinion and Order Granting Motion for Final
Approval of Settlement in Doe v. Déjà Vu
Services, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-10877 (E.D. Mich.) (the
“Michigan Action”), by the Honorable Judge
Stephen J. Murphy, III. The plaintiff has filed a Response in
opposition (Doc. No. 64), and the defendants have filed a
Reply (Doc. No. 68). Addressing this motion requires the
court to summarize some of the procedural background in this
case and in the Michigan Action.

On
January 23, 2017, the same day she filed her amended
Complaint, the plaintiff filed her Motion for Notice (Doc.
No. 6). Rather than responding to that motion in a timely
fashion, the defendants submitted a Notice of Filing
Preliminary Injunction Order Enjoining Case (Doc. No. 11) on
March 9, 2017, to which were attached a copy of two orders
entered in the Michigan Action-an Opinion and Order Granting
the [Defendants'] Joint Motion for Preliminary Injunction
and a subsequent Order amending the first. (Doc. Nos. 11-1,
11-2.) In the first Order, entered February 9, 2017, issued
under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, Judge Murphy
enjoined all related actions against any
“Déjà Vu-Affiliated Nightclubs”
from proceeding, pending approval of a nationwide
collective-action settlement of the FLSA claims of current
and former performers at those establishments. (Doc. No.
11-1, at 3-4.) The Amended Order lifted the injunction as to
four cases that had already “either been resolved or
ordered to private arbitration” prior to issuance of
the original injunction. (Doc. No. 11-2, at 1.) The case now
before the undersigned was specifically listed among the
enjoined actions in both Orders. (Doc. Nos. 11-1, at 4, 11-2,
at 2.) The court takes judicial notice that, of the three
other federal cases listed in the Amended Order, two have now
been voluntarily dismissed, [2] and the third was referred to
arbitration.[3]

This
court conducted a case management conference on April 17,
2017 with counsel for both parties, including defense counsel
in the Michigan Action. At that conference and later by
written Order, the court directed plaintiff's counsel to
file a motion for authorization to proceed with this action,
in light of the injunction issued in the Michigan Action.
Before the parties had finished briefing that issue, however,
the plaintiff filed a Notice of Termination of Michigan All
Writs Act Injunction and Plaintiff's Withdrawing Her
Motion for Permission to File a Reply and for a Hearing.
(Doc. No. 33.) To this Notice, the plaintiff attached a copy
of Judge Murphy's June 19, 2017 Opinion and Order
granting the parties' joint Motion for Final Approval of
Settlement and dismissing the action with prejudice. (Doc.
No. 33-2.) That Order does not mention the preliminary
injunction or temporary stay at all and does not enter the
permanent injunction anticipated by the parties' original
Joint Motion for Preliminary Injunction. This court construed
the language of both the original Order granting the motion
for preliminary injunction and the Order granting final
approval of the settlement to mean that the preliminary
injunction expired with the court's granting of final
approval. The undersigned therefore granted the plaintiff
leave to proceed. (See June 22, 2017 Order, Doc. No.
34.)

The
defendants seek reconsideration of this court's
determination that the preliminary injunction expired with
the entry of the final approval of settlement. They argue
that the preliminary injunction remains in effect until the
judgment in the Michigan Action becomes final and
that it did not expire merely because the Michigan court
granted final approval of the settlement. They further point
out that the judgment in the Michigan Action has not become
final, since several notices of appeal were, in fact, filed
by objectors to the settlement, and those appeals remain
pending. This court now adheres to its prior decision, for
several reasons.

First,
the Joint Motion for Preliminary Injunction, on its face,
requested only a stay of other cases against the defendants
“pending approval of proposed settlement” and
anticipated the entry of a permanent injunction enjoining any
FLSA plaintiffs who had opted into the Michigan Action from
filing any lawsuits or claims relating to the settled
matters. (See Joint Motion, Mich. Doc. No. 27, at 1,
4.[4])
The parties represented to the Michigan court that they
believed “a preliminary injunction enjoining all
Pending Proceedings against Defendants nationwide- pending
approval of the proposed settlement-enjoining all FLSA opt-in
plaintiffs . . . from filing new lawsuits or claims relating
to the settled claims” was necessary to facilitate the
pending nationwide settlement. (Id.) The relief they
sought was basically consistent with that representation:
they specifically moved the court to “issue a
preliminary injunction enjoining all Pending Proceedings
against Defendants nationwide pending approval of the
proposed settlement and enjoin all FLSA opt-in
plaintiffs . . . from filing new lawsuits relating to the
settled claims.” (Id. (emphasis added).)

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;It is
widely accepted, as the defendants themselves have
acknowledged, that settlements of the type they were putting
together in the Michigan Action go through two stages of
approval: a preliminary approval and a final approval.
(See Doc. No. 68, at 2 (&ldquo;Generally, as to the
approval of a class action settlement agreement,
&lsquo;final&#39; refers to the approval stage. There is a
preliminary approval, which precedes notice to the
class, and then a final approval, if appropriate,
following notice and the opt-in/opt-out period.”).) At
the time they filed their Joint Motion, their Motion for
Preliminary Approval was still pending. The Michigan court
granted that motion (Mich. Doc. No. 31) before addressing
their Joint Motion for ...

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