This Petition
for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision of the Court
of Appeals[1]in CA G.R. CV No. 56495 entitled
“Virginia Chiongbian vs. Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority”
which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court[2], 7th
Judicial Region, Branch 24, Cebu City.

The Court of
Appeals rendered its decision based on the following facts:

“Subject of the action is Lot 941
consisting of 13,766 square meters located in Lahug, Cebu City, adjoining the
then Lahug Airport and covered by TCT No. 120366 of the Registry of Deeds of
Cebu City, in the name of MCIAA.

During the liberation, the Lahug
Airport was occupied by the United States Army.Then, in 1947, it was turned over to the Philippine Government
through the Surplus Property Commission. Subsequently, it was transferred to
the Bureau of Aeronautics which was succeeded by the National Airports
Corporation.When the latter was
dissolved, it was replaced by the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA).

On April 16, 1952, the Republic of
the Philippines, represented by the CAA, filed an expropriation proceeding,
Civil Case No. R-1881 (Court of First Instance of Cebu, Third Branch), on
several parcels of land in Lahug, Cebu City,which included Lot 941, for the expansion and improvement of Lahug
Airport.

In June 1953, appellee Virginia
Chiongbian purchased Lot 941 from its original owner, Antonina Faborada, the
original defendant in the expropriation case, for P8,000.00.
Subsequently, TCT No. 9919 was issued in her name (Exh. D).

Then, on December 29, 1961, judgment
was rendered in the expropriation case in favor of the Republic of the
Philippines which was made to pay Virginia Chiongbian the amount of P34,415.00
for Lot 941, with legal interest computed from November 16, 1947, the date when
the government begun using it.Virginia
Chiongbian did not appeal therefrom.

Thereafter, absolute title to Lot
941 was transferred to the Republic of the Philippines under TCT No. 27696
(Exhs. E and 2).

Then, in 1990, Republic Act No.
6958 was passed by Congress creating the Mactan-Cebu International Airport
Authority to which the assets of the Lahug Airport was transferred.Lot 941 was then transferred in the name of
MCIAA under TCT No. 120366 on May 8, 1992.

On July 24, 1995, Virginia
Chiongbian filed a complaint for reconveyance of Lot 941 with the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 9, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-17650 alleging,
that sometime in 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC) ventured to
expand the Cebu Lahug Airport.As a
consequence, it sought to acquire by expropriation or negotiated sale several
parcels of lands adjoining the Lahug Airport, one of which was Lot 941 owned by
Virginia Chiongbian.Since she and
other landowners could not agree with the NAC’s offer for the compensation of
their lands, a suit for eminent domain was instituted on April 16, 1952, before
the then Court of First Instance of Cebu (Branch III), against forty-five (45)
landowners, including Virginia Chiongbian, docketed as Civil Case No. R-1881,
entitled “Republic of the Philippine vs. Damian Ouano, et al.”It was finally decided on December 29, 1961
in favor of the Republic of the Philippines.

Some of the defendants-landowners,
namely, Milagros Urgello, Mamerto Escano, Inc. and Ma. Atega Vda. de Deen,
appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals under CA-G.R. No. 33045-R, which
rendered a modified judgment allowing them to repurchase their expropriated
properties. Virginia Chiongbian, on the other hand, did not appeal and instead,
accepted the compensation for Lot 941 in the amount of P34,415, upon the
assurance of the NAC that she or her heirs would be given the right of
reconveyance for the same price once the land would no longer be used as (sic)
airport.

Consequently, TCT No. 9919 of
Virginia Chiongbian was cancelled and TCT No. 27696 was issued in the name of
the Republic of the Philippines.Then,
with the creation of the MCIAA, it was cancelled and TCT No. 120366 was issued
in its name.

However, no expansion of the Lahug
Airport was undertaken by MCIAA and its predecessors-in-interest.In fact, when Mactan International Airport
was opened for commercial flights, the Lahug Airport was closed at the end of
1991 and all its airport activities were undertaken at and transferred to the
Mactan International Airport.Thus, the
purpose for which Lot 941 was taken ceased to exist.”[3]

On June 3, 1997,
the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the respondent Virginia Chiongbian
(CHIONGBIAN) the dispositive portion of the decision reads:

“WHEREFORE, in the light of the
foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiff,
Virginia Chiongbian and against the defendant, Mactan Cebu International
Authority (MCIAA), ordering the latter to restore to plaintiff the possession
and ownership of the property denominated as Lot No. 941 upon reimbursement of
the expropriation price paid to plaintiff.

The Register of Deeds is therefore
ordered to effect the Transfer of the Certificate Title from the defendant to
the plaintiff on Lot No. 941, cancelling Transfer Certificate of Title No.
120366 in the name of defendant MCIAA and to issue a new title on the same lot
in the name of Virginia Chiongbian.

Aggrieved by the
holding of the trial court, the petitioner Mactan Cebu International Airport
Authority (MCIAA) appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed
the RTC decision.Motion for
Reconsideration was denied[5]hence this petition where MCIAA
raises the following grounds in support of its petition:

“I.

THE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE TRIAL COURT’S JUDGMENT THAT THERE WAS A
REPURCHASE AGREEMENT AND IGNORING PETITIONER’S PROTESTATIONS THAT ADMISSION OF
RESPONDENT’S ORAL EVIDENCE IS NOT ALLOWED UNDER THE STATUE OF FRAUDS.

II.

THE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DECISION IN LIMBACO IS
MATERIAL AND APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.

III.

THE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE MODIFIED JUDGMENT IN CA-GR NO. 33045
SHOULD INURE TO THE BENEFIT OF CHIONGBIAN EVEN IF SHE WAS NOT A PARTY IN SAID
APPEALED CASE.

IV.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE RIGHT
OF VIRGINIA CHIONGBIAN TO REPURCHASE SHOULD BE UNDER THE SAME TERMS AND
CONDITIONS AS THE OTHER LANDOWNERS SUCH THAT HER REPURCHASE PRICE IS ONLY P
34, 415.00.”[6]

MCIAA contends
that the Republic of the Philippines appropriated Lot No. 941 through
expropriation proceedings in Civil Case No. R-1881.The judgment rendered therein was unconditional and did not
contain a stipulation that ownership thereof would revert to CHIONGBIAN nor did
it give CHIONGBIAN the right to repurchase the same in the event the lot was no
longer used for the purpose it was expropriated.Moreover, CHIONGBIAN’s claim that there was a repurchase
agreement is not supported by documentary evidence.The mere fact that twenty six (26) other landowners repurchased
their property located at the aforementioned Lahug airport is of no consequence
considering that said landowners were able to secure a rider in their contracts
entitling them to repurchase their property.

MCIAA also argues
that the Court of Appeals erroneously concluded that it did not object to the
evidence presented by CHIONGBIAN to prove the alleged repurchase agreement
considering that the transcript of stenographic notes shows that it manifested
its objections thereto for being in violation of the Statute of Frauds.

MCIAA also
faults the Court of Appeals for applying the ruling in the case of Limbaco
vs. Court of Appeals[7].It is the position of MCIAA that the ruling in the case of Limbaco
is not squarely in point with respect to the present case for the reason that
the Limbaco case involved a contract of sale of real property and not an
expropriation.

Moreover, MCIAA
alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the case of Escańo,
et. al. vs. Republic[8]proves the existence of the
repurchase agreement.MCIAA claims that
although the parties in said case were CHIONGBIAN’s co-defendants in Civil Case
No. R-1881, CHIONGBIAN did not join in their appeal of the judgment of
condemnation.The modified judgment in
CA G.R. No. 33045-R should not therefore redound to CHIONGBIAN’s benefit who
was no longer a party thereto or to the compromise agreement which Escańo et.
al. entered into with the Republic of the Philippines.

Finally,
assuming for the sake of argument that CHIONGBIAN has a right to repurchase Lot
No. 941, MCIAA claims that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the right
of CHIONGBIAN to purchase said lot should be under the same terms and
conditions given to the other landowners and not at the prevailing market
price.Such ruling is grossly unfair
and would result in unjustly enriching CHIONGBIAN for the reason that she
received just compensation for the property at the time of its taking by the
government and that the property is now worth several hundreds of millions of
pesos due to the improvements introduced by MCIAA.[9]

On the other
hand, aside from praying that this Court affirm the decision of the Court of
Appeals, the private respondent CHIONGBIAN prays that the petition be denied
for the reason that it violates the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, more
specifically the requirement of a certification of non-forum shopping.CHIONGBIAN claims that the Verification and
Certification on Non-Forum Shopping executed by the MCIAA on September 13, 1999
was signed by a Colonel Marcelino A. Cordova whose appointment as Assistant
General Manager of MCIAA was disapproved by the Civil Service Commission as
early as September 2, 1999.It is
CHIONGBIAN’s position that since his appointment was disapproved, the
Verification attached to the petition for review on certiorari cannot be
considered as having been executed by the “plaintiff” or “principal party” who
under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court can validly make the
certification in the instant petition.Consequently, the petition should be considered as not being verified
and as such should not be considered as having been filed at all.

After a careful
consideration of the arguments presented by the parties, we resolve to grant
the petition.

We first resolve
the procedural issue.

We are not
persuaded by CHIONGBIAN’s claim that the Verification and Certification against
forum shopping accompanying MCIAA’s petition was insufficient for allegedly
having been signed by one who was not qualified to do so.As
pointed out by the MCIAA, Colonel Cordova signed the Verification and
Certification against forum shopping as Acting General Manager of the MCIAA,
pursuant to Office Order No. 5322-99 dated September 10, 1999 issued by the
General Manager of MCIAA, Alfonso Allere.[10]Colonel
Cordova did not sign the Verification and Certification against forum shopping
pursuant to his appointment as assistant General Manager of the MCIAA, which
was later disapproved by the Commission on Appointments.This fact has not been disputed by
CHIONGBIAN.

We come now to
the substantive aspects of the case wherein the issue to be resolved is whether
the abandonment of the public use for which Lot No. 941 was expropriated
entitles CHIONGBIAN to reacquire it.

In Fery vs.
Municipality of Cabanatuan[11], this Court
had occasion to rule on the same issue as follows:

“The answer to that question
depends upon the character of the title acquired by the expropriator, whether
it be the State, a province, a municipality, or a corporation which has the
right to acquire property under the power of eminent domain.If, for example, land is expropriated for a
particular purpose, with the condition that when that purpose is ended or
abandoned the property shall return to its former owner, then, of course, when
the purpose is terminated or abandoned the former owner reacquires the property
so expropriated.If, for example, land
is expropriated for a public street and the expropriation is granted upon
condition that the city can only use it for a public street, then, of
course, when the city abandons its use as a public street, it returns to the
former owner, unless there is some statutory provision to the contrary.Many other similar examples might be given.If, upon the contrary, however, the decree of
expropriation gives to the entity a fee simple title, then, of course, the land
becomes the absolute property of the expropriator, whether it be the State, a
province, or municipality, and in that case the non-user does not have the
effect of defeating the title acquired by the expropriation proceedings.

When land has been acquired for
public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either by the exercise of
eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land,
and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different
use, without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion
to the former owner.”[12]

In the present
case, evidence reveals that Lot No. 941 was appropriated by the Republic of the
Philippines through expropriation proceedings in Civil Case No. R-1881.The dispositive portion of the decision in
said case reads insofar as pertinent as follows:

2.Declaring
the fair market values of the lots thus taken and condemning the plaintiff to
pay the same to the respective owners with legal interest from the dates
indicated therein, as follows: Lots Nos. 75, 76, 89, 90, 91, 92, 105, 106, 107,
108-P31, 977 (minus P10,639 or P21,278 as balance in favor
of Mamerto Escańo, Inc., with legal interest from November 16, 1947 until fully
paid; xxx Lot No. 941- P34,415.00 in favor of Virginia Chiongbian,
with legal interest from November 16, 1947 until fully paid; xxx

3.After
the payment of the foregoing financial obligation to the landowners, directing
the latter to deliver to the plaintiff the corresponding Transfer Certificate
of Title to their representative lots; and upon the presentation of the said
titles to the Register of Deeds, ordering the latter to cancel the same and to
issue, in lieu thereof, new Transfer Certificates of Title in the name of the
plaintiff.

The terms of the
judgment are clear and unequivocal and grant title to Lot No. 941 in fee simple
to the Republic of the Philippines.There was no condition imposed to the effect that the lot would return
to CHIONGBIAN or that CHIONGBIAN had a right to repurchase the same if the
purpose for which it was expropriated is ended or abandoned or if the property
was to be used other thanas the Lahug airport.

CHIONGBIAN
cannot rely on the ruling in Mactan Cebu International Airport vs. Court of
Appeals[14]wherein the presentation of
parol evidence was allowed to prove the existence of a written agreement
containing the right to repurchase.Said case did not involve expropriation proceedings but a contract of
sale.This Court consequently allowed
the presentation of parol evidence to prove the existence of an agreement
allowing the right of repurchase based on the following ratiocination:

“Under the parol evidence rule,
when the terms of an agreement have been reduced into writing, it is considered
as containing all the terms agreed upon, and there can be, between the parties
and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of such terms other than the
contents of the written agreement.However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the
terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading, the failure
of the written agreement to express the true intent of the parties
thereto.In the case at bench, the fact
which private respondents seek to establish by parol evidence consists of the
agreement or representation made by the NAC that induced Inez Ouano to execute
the deed of sale; that the vendors and their heirs are given the right of
repurchase should the government no longer need the property. Where a parol
contemporaneous agreement was the moving cause of the written contract, or
where the parol agreement forms part of the consideration of the written
contract, and it appears that the written contract was executed on the faith of
the parol contract or representation, such evidence is admissible. It is
recognized that proof is admissible of any collateral parol agreement that is
not inconsistent with the terms of the written contract though it may relate to
the same subject matter.The rule
excluding parol evidence to vary or contradict a writing does not extend so far
as to preclude the admission of existing evidence to show prior or
contemporaneous collateral parol agreements between the parties, but such
evidence may be received, regardless of whether or not the written agreement
contains any reference to such collateral agreement, and whether the action is
at law or in equity.

More importantly, no objection was
made by petitioner when private respondents introduced evidence to show the
right of repurchase granted by the NAC to Inez Ouano.It has been repeatedly laid down as a rule of evidence that a
protest or objection against the admission of any evidence must be made at the
proper time, and if not so made, it will be understood to have been waived.”[15]

This
pronouncement is not applicable to the present case since the parol evidence
rule which provides that “when the terms of a written agreement have been
reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon,
and there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no
evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement”
applies to written agreements and has no application to a judgment of a court.
To permit CHIONGBIAN to prove the existence of a compromise settlement which
she claims to have entered into with the Republic of the Philippines prior to
the rendition of judgment in the expropriation case would result in a
modification of the judgment of a court which has long become final and
executory.

And even
assuming for the sake of argument that CHIONGBIAN could prove the existence of
the alleged written agreement acknowledging her right to repurchase Lot No. 941
through parol evidence, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the evidence
presented by CHIONGBIAN was admissible.

Under 1403 of
the Civil Code, a contract for the sale of real property shall be unenforceable
unless the same, or some note or memorandum thereof, be in writing, and
subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent; evidence, therefore of the
agreement cannot be received without the writing or a secondary evidence of its
contents.

Contrary to the
finding of the Court of Appeals, the records reveal that MCIAA objected to the
purpose for which the testimonies of CHIONGBIAN[16]and Patrosinio Bercede[17] (BERCEDE)
were offered, i.e. to prove the existence of the alleged written agreement
evincing a right to repurchase Lot No. 941 in favor of CHIONGBIAN, for being in
violation of the Statute of Frauds. MCIAA also objected to the purpose for which the testimony of
Attorney Manuel Pastrana (PASTRANA) was offered, i.e. to prove the existence of
the alleged written agreement and an alleged deed of sale, on the same ground.[18]
Consequently, the testimonies of these witnesses are inadmissible under the
Statute of Frauds to prove the existence of the alleged sale.

Aside from being
inadmissible under the provisions of the Statute of Frauds, CHIONGBIAN’s and BERCEDE’s
testimonies are also inadmissible for being hearsay in nature.Evidence is hearsay if its probative value
is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of
another person who is not on the witness stand.[19]CHIONGBIAN,
through deposition, testified that:

“ATTY. DUBLIN (To Witness)

Q:Mrs.
Chiongbian, you said a while ago that there was an assurance by the government
to return this property to you in case Lahug Airport will be no longer used, is
that correct?

WITNESS:

A:Yes,
sir. That is true.

ATTY. DUBLIN: (To witness)

Q:Can
you recall when was this verbal assurance made?

A:I
cannot remember anymore.

Q:You
cannot also remember the year in which the alleged assurance was made?

A:I
cannot also remember because I’m very forgetful.

Q:Now,
can you tell us so far as you can remember who was that person or government
authority or employee that made the alleged assurance?

A:The
owner of the property.

Q:Now,
how many times was this assurance being made to you to return this property in
case the Lahug Airport will no longer be used?

A:2
or 3, I cannot recall.

Q:You
cannot also remember in what particular place or places was this assurance
being made?

A:In
my previous residence in Mabolo.

DEPOSITION OFFICER:

The assurance was made in my previous residence at
Mabolo.

WITNESS:

A:I
entrusted that to my lawyer, Atty. Pedro Calderon.

ATTY. DUBLIN: (to witness)

Q:You
mean the assurance was made personally to your lawyer at that time, Atty. Pedro
Calderon?

A:Yes,
sir.

Q:So
you are now trying to tell us that that assurance was never made to you
personally.Is that right, Mam?

A:He
assured me directly that the property will be returned to me.

Q:When
you said “he”, are you referring to your lawyer at that time, Atty. Pedro
Calderon

A:Yes,
sir.

Q:So,
in effect, it was your lawyer, Atty. Pedro Calderon, who made the assurance to
you that the property will be returned in case Lahug Airport will be abandoned?

CHIONGBIAN’s
testimony shows that she had no personal knowledge of the alleged assurance
made by the Republic of the Philippines that Lot No. 941 would be returned to
her in the event that the Lahug Airport was closed.She stated that she only learned of the alleged assurance of the
Republic of the Philippines through her lawyer, Attorney Calderon, who was not
presented as a witness.

BERCEDE’s
testimony regarding the alleged agreement is likewise inadmissible to prove the
existence of the agreement for also being hearsay in nature.Like CHIONGBIAN, BERCEDE did not have
personal knowledge of the alleged assurance made by the Republic of the
Philippines to his father that their land would be returned should the Lahug
Airport cease to operate for he only learned of the alleged assurance through
his father.

PASTRANA’s
testimony does little to help CHIONGBIAN’s cause.He claims that subsequent to the execution of the alleged written
agreement but prior to the rendition of judgment in the expropriation case, the
Republic and CHIONGBIAN executed a Deed of Sale over Lot No. 941 wherein
CHIONGBIAN sold the aforementioned lot to the Republic of the Philippines.
However, CHIONGBIAN never mentioned the existence of a deed of sale.[21]In fact,
the records disclose that Lot No. 941 was transferred to the Republic of the Philippines
pursuant to the judgment of expropriation in Civil Case No. R-1881 which
CHIONGBIAN herself enforced by filing a motion for withdrawal of the money
after the decision was rendered.[22] Moreover,
since the very terms of the judgment in Civil Case No. R-1881 are silent
regarding the alleged deed of sale or of the alleged written agreement
acknowledging the right of CHIONGBIAN to repurchase Lot No. 941, the only
logical conclusion is that no sale in fact took place and that no compromise
agreement was executed prior to the rendition of the judgment. Had CHIONGBIAN
and the Republic executed a contract of sale as claimed by PASTRANA, the
Republic of the Philippines would not have needed to pursue the expropriation
case inasmuch as it would be duplicitous and would result in the Republic of
the Philippines expropriating something it had already owned.Expropriation lies only when it is made
necessary by the opposition of the owner to the sale or by the lack of agreement
as to the price.[23]
Consequently, CHIONGBIAN cannot compel MCIAA to reconvey Lot No. 941 to her
since she has no cause of action against MCIAA.

Finally,
CHIONGBIAN cannot invoke the modified judgment of the Court of Appeals in the
case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Escańo, et. al.[24] where her
co-defendants, Mamerto Escańo, Inc., Milagros Urgello and Maria Atega Vda. De
Deen entered into separate and distinct compromise agreements with the Republic
of the Philippines wherein they agreed to sell their land subject of the
expropriation proceedings to the latter subject to the resolutory condition
that in the event the Republic of the Philippines no longer uses said property
as an airport, title and ownership of said property shall revert to its
respective owners upon reimbursement of the price paid therefor without
interest.MCIAA correctly points out
that since CHIONGBIAN did not appeal the judgment of expropriation in Civil
Case No. R-1881 and was not a party to the appeal of her co-defendants, the
judgment therein cannot redound to her benefit.And even assuming that CHIONGBIAN was a party to the appeal, she
was not a party to the compromise agreements entered into by her
co-defendants.A compromise is a
contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid
litigation or put an end to one already commenced.[25]
Essentially, it is a contract perfected by mere consent, the latter being
manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and
the cause which are to constitute the contract.[26] A
judicial compromise has the force of law and is conclusive between the parties[27] and it is
not valid and binding on a party who did not sign the same.[28] Since
CHIONGBIAN was not a party to the compromise agreements, she cannot legally
invoke the same.

ACCORDINGLY, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.The complaint of Virgina Chiongbian against
the Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority for reconveyance of Lot No. 941
is DISMISSED.