Category: Aviation

In R (London Borough of Hillingdon & others) v Secretary of State (Cranston J, 30 January 2017) the Government achieved an impressive strike out of the first challenge to the proposed third runway at Heathrow, following the Government’s 25 October 2016 announcements. My 15 October 2016 blog post Airports & Courts wins no prizes for predicting a series of such challenges.
Following the strike out, the draft Airports NPS was promptly published on 2 February for a 16 weeks’ consultation period.
However, was this somewhat of a lucky win? The Government’s position, accepted by Cranston J, was that the effect of section 13(1) of the Planning Act 2008 was that there can be no legal challenge of a Government announcement of a decision to publish a draft NPS, but that any challenge instead has to be made within a six week window following final designation of the NPS.
Section 13(1) provides as follows: “A court may entertain proceedings for questioning a national policy statement or anything done, or omitted to be done, by the Secretary of State in the course of preparing such a statement only if –

(a) the proceedings are brought by a claim for judicial review, and (b) the claim form is filed [before the end of] the period of 6 weeks beginning with [the day after] —

(i) the day on which the statement is designated as a national policy statement for the purposes of this Act, or

(ii) (if later) the day on which the statement is published.”

So was the 25 October 2016 announcement something done “in the course of preparing” an NPS? Hmm.
Was the operation of section 13(1) intended to be so different from sections 23 and 25 of the Acquisition of Land Act 1981, which provide for a six week deadline for challenging a compulsory purchase order from publication of notice of its confirmation and the exclusion that a CPO otherwise “shall not, either before or after it has been confirmed, made or given, be questioned in any legal proceedings whatsoever“? So, according to the 1981 Act, no challenges before the CPO has been made but the Supreme Court in R (Sainsbury’s Supermarkets Limited) v Wolverhampton City Council (12 May 2010) has entertained a judicial review of a council’s resolution to make a compulsory purchase order. Is the drafting within the 2008 Act distinguishable from the 1981 Act? Even if it is, where is the logic? With CPOs the widely understood risk of JR of the resolution to make a CPO, before section 25 cuts in to prevent further challenges until the order has been finally confirmed or rejected, is the reason why acquiring authorities commonly seek to leave as little time as possible between that final resolution and making the order. There is no reference in Cranston J’s judgment to this (surely) analogous process .

Whatever the rights and wrongs, the decision to go for a strike out – always high stakes, given the risk of adding to the time needed to dispose finally of the challenge or at least the risk of egg on face – has so far proved to be the right one, although I do not know whether the claimant local authorities plan to appeal. Even if cleared for take off, the proceedings would in any event face a bumpy ride give that judicial review is a remedy of last resort and it could be said that the claimant authorities should first be making representations to the draft NPS before resorting to litigation?
It was a good week all round for Heathrow. By a decision letter dated 2 February 2017 the Secretaries of State for Communities and Local Government and Transport allowed an appeal by the airport, permitting enabling works to allow it to implement “full runway alternation during easterly operations” (ie, basically, regular easterly departures from the northern runway), after a June 2015 (yes 2015) inquiry and initial refusal by Hillingdon Council in March 2014 (yes 2014) of the airport’s planning application.
Finally, a post script on challenges to CPO decisions, and to my 22 September 2016 blog post Regeneration X: Failed CPOs. Local Government Lawyer reports that after an oral hearing Collins J has granted Southwark Council permission to challenge the Secretary of State’s decision not to confirm the Aylesbury Estate CPO, Dove J having previously refused permission on the papers. Collins J apparently also “proposed that a meeting should be held between the two parties before any litigation began, considered that it would be unlawful for Southwark to offer more than was allowed under the Compensation Code, and recognised that the decision had significant knock-on effects for other schemes“. It would be no surprise at all to me if the decision is eventually overturned.
You may now unfasten your seat belts.
Simon Ricketts 4.2.17

The Government’s long awaited decision on airport expansion in the south east, following its interim 10 December 2015 statement, finally seems imminent. A Guardian 9 October 2016 story speculates that the decision will be taken at a cabinet meeting on 17 October (presumably meaning an announcement the following day) and that Heathrow will be favoured, in which case, according to an Independent story the same day, Gatwick will pursue expansion in any event.
New Civil Engineer on the hand speculates that both Heathrow and Gatwick will get the go ahead:“It is believed that the announcement will be made on 18 October, with government giving the green light to a third runway at Heathrow immediately and also allowing Gatwick to expand with a second runway within the next five years.

Gatwick’s 30-year agreement with local authorities not to expand is due to expire in 2019.

It is also understood that government will urge Birmingham airport to advance its proposals for an additional runway.”

Whatever the timing and content of the announcement, two things are sure:

1. The process of turning the announcement into reality will be a slow and complex process. The Government confirmed in its 10 December 2015 statement that the DCO rather than Hybrid Bill process would be used. The first step will be an Airports national policy statement to form the policy basis for a DCO application or applications to be made in due course. Once the announcement is made I will cover in a future blog post the potential complexities, which would be acute were both Heathrow and Gatwick to proceed, in terms of the coordination required between competing promoters, but equally difficult if only one airport is favoured leaving the other to object, challenge and seek to promote its own proposals independently.

2. There will inevitably be litigation at each administrative step of the process, particularly ahead of the formal submission of any DCO application (because any challenges to that process, once it is underway, can only be brought once it has concluded). The litigation will be entangled with (1) ongoing issues as to the Government’s non-compliance with the EU Air Quality Directive (2) a slowly changing basis over coming years as to the extent to which UK environmental laws are underpinned by EU legislation (3) continuing efforts by the Government to speed up the judicial review process and discourage unmeritorious claims.

Aside from the potential for the airport operators themselves to resort to litigation in response to the forthcoming decision, a number of campaign groups have also made their positions clear. For instance:
– Teddington Action Group has restated on 11 October its threat of judicial review should one of the two Heathrow options be chosen, alleging bias on the part of the chair of the Airports Commission, Sir Howard Davies.
– Gatwick Area Conservation Campaign has written to the Secretary of State for Transport on 4 August 2016 threatening judicial review, referring to John Steel QC having advised that “there are a number of potential grounds able to be considered which are sound, including that a decision to choose Gatwick as the location for additional runway capacity in the South East, if based on political expediency, would be irrational”. They assert that they expect to be supported by “two County Councils and seven Borough and District Councils” as well as a number of MPs.

Of course, resorting to the courts to try to stop airport expansion is nothing new. For instance:
– R (Hillingdon LBC) v Secretary of State for Transport (Carnwath LJ, 26 March 2010) – the challenge by various local authorities to the Government’s 2009 decision (abandoned following the 2010 General Election) to proceed with a third runway at Heathrow.
– R (Sanders) v Airports Commission and Secretary of State for Transport (Patterson J, 2 December 2013) – Stop Stansted Expansion’s unsuccessful challenge to Airport Commission’s sift criteria on which its shortlist was to be based, again alleging bias on the part of a member of the Commission.

– R (Stop Stansted Expansion) v Secretary of State for Transport (Sir Thayn Forbes, 13 March 2009) – the same group’s unsuccessful challenge to the Secretary of State’s decision in 2009 to allow planning appeals increasing the cap on passenger numbers to 35m per annum (a cap which Stansted Airport’s owner MAG is currently planning to apply to increase, according to a Telegraph September 2016 piece ).

– R (Griffin) v London Borough of Newham (Court of Appeal, 20 January 2011) – Fight The Flights’ unsuccessful challenge to Newham Council’s 2009 decision to increase the number of permitted flights to up to 120,000 per annum (since when of course the Secretary of State has now allowed a planning appeal for expansion of the airport in a decision letter dated 27 July 2016).

– R (Barraud) v CAA (2015), an unsuccessful challenge by campaign group Gatwick Absolutely NOT, again advised by John Steel QC, to the Civil Aviation Authority’s decision to implement airspace changes, on the basis of lack of consultation, referred to in a 39 Essex chambers update, where an appeal to the Court of Appeal appears to be in abeyance according to the campaign group’s website.

This list should be depressing for all of us. From one perspective, these cases, largely unsuccessful in achieving anything but delaying projects (and perhaps unnecessarily raising the hopes of those asked to crowdfund the appointed lawyers) demonstrate the dead hand of the judicial review process on controversial decision and projects. How can we make progress with any real pace when political sclerosis is then followed by years of public law litigation? On the other hand, how can we balance economic, environmental and transportation priorities in a way that does not lead to entrenched opposition and allegations of inconsistency? And, taboo question, are some projects so huge and so political that the unwritten legal burden of proof on the part of a claimant becomes almost impossibly high? Establishment of the Davies Commission was a valiant attempt to de-politicise what was always going to be a controversial process. Unfortunately we are back where we always were: mired in politics, lawyers at hand.