Mr. Linklater, I'm wondering if you can tell me why it is, given the seriousness of the problem, it has taken the bureaucracy to raise the profile of this particular issue with the ministry. How long has this particular minister been aware of the seriousness of the backlogs?

Mr. Chair, what I want to do is continue on with this line of thought. If it costs about $230 per day and that's about $84,000 per year, so wouldn't it be more expeditious if we, within a 30-day period, deemed the person inadmissible to Canada and deported that person?

Our estimates are that with the provisions contained in Bill C-31 that's generally what will happen. The claims will be heard on a much faster basis. Those who need protection will then be channeled in to the permanent resident stream much more quickly, and we wouldn't be removing those individuals. Those individuals who are found not to need Canada's protection would then be moved into the removal stream with the view that removal would take place within one year from their last negative decision at the IRB, whether that's the RPD or the new appeal division. With new tools like the assisted voluntary returns program, which Mr. Hill mentioned in his opening remarks, we feel that this is going to help incent individuals to depart Canada voluntarily as well, and will allow CBSA to focus on high-profile and serious cases for removal within that one-year period.

Could you walk me through the decision path that happens when an individual comes in one of these mass arrivals, irregular arrivals. What is your first step? If he comes in and says, “I'm a refugee claimant”, what is our first step to identify his identity, and how do we communicate with the country of origin to confirm that? Then the next stage would then be to ask if he is a true refugee, and does he pose a threat to Canada. Could you walk me through that process also in terms of time and so on?

In my opinion I think it would be much more expeditious if we can have an earlier decision to deport these people.

Operationally speaking, when a vessel arrives with several hundred individuals aboard, the first concern is health and safety. To ensure that the passengers are not suffering from some kind of communicable disease, the health issue is addressed. That's the first step.

The second step is to determine identity, which can be challenging. Individuals often arrive either undocumented or they have discarded their document overboard during the voyage. They may have attempted to destroy their documents. So it is quite a laborious and time-consuming process to confirm identity. If there is evidence, it then needs to be matched with individuals. Documentation needs to be assessed on whether it is fraudulent or was fraudulently obtained.

The agency will not attempt to communicate or exchange information with the country of origin because there are concerns about ensuring that the identity of asylum claimants is not revealed. Therefore, the agency relies on cooperation with like-minded countries and other partners, to determine whether they have information that would help confirm the identity of individuals.

The third step is then a question of admissibility, on a case-by-case basis. Once identity has been established, further checks with respect to security and database checks in partnership with Canadian agencies and international partners, confirm whether or not an individual has been associated with organized crime or crimes against humanity, or if there is any association with organizations involved in terrorism.

This process is time-consuming. It may extend over a number of countries in view of concerns about human smuggling. Generally, this is the process followed when we have a mass arrival.

I would say that it presents tremendous pressure on the CBSA to maintain the detention review schedule, which happens at 48 hours, 7 days, and 30 days. Currently, the agency is moving flat out to bring the required information to the IRB at the detention reviews, to confirm that there are concerns with respect to identity and admissibility, and to maintain detention.

That process does not serve the agency well. It was never designed for mass arrivals. One of the key proposals in this legislation is to deal with that, so that CBSA and RCMP, for example, have the time to conduct the necessary checks.

Have we learned any lessons from either the state of Israel or Taiwan? Both countries have faced issues similar to this in the past. How do you prevent potential terrorists from slipping through the net? Sometimes this information is not adequately documented anywhere in the world. On a worldwide basis, how do you prevent terrorists from slipping through the net?

You're correct about this being a global phenomenon. All countries face this, and as Mr. Linklater mentioned, for example, the Arab Spring that happened not long ago posed certain challenges to all border authorities around the world, certainly to those in Europe.

The way you have to prevent terrorists from slipping through the net goes along with what I was talking about last week—working with our key allies, having a robust prevention strategy that operates overseas, and sharing information appropriately with key allies. Oftentimes, it comes down to very strong intelligence work.

Then, should a mass arrival happen at your border, what we've learned from the MV Sun Sea and MV Ocean Lady is the key aspect that Mr. Hill just talked about—ensuring that the border authorities have the time to do the proper checks, and the time to go out and work with their international colleagues to exchange information, if necessary, to help establish identity and admissibility.

For that bill, a committee was appointed to designate safe countries of origin. With respect to designating these safe countries, the minister considers it important to have some flexibility to be able to act quickly.

What do you think about the idea of imposing a delay on the committee, rather than taking away its authority to designate countries of origin safe?