A. Assault on the Third World
"Whatever you may think is happening to the cigarette market of the USA
and the UK, the tobacco business world-wide is still very much a growth
business and BAT distinguishes itself from the world average growth rate
of 2.5 percent by growing at a point or two above this."

So declared the then-chair of BAT, Peter Macadam, in an address to the
American Chamber of Commerce in London in 1980 <BAT100506546/6551>.
In the nearly two decades since that speech, the international markets
have taken on ever greater importance for the tobacco multinationals.
Philip Morris and R.J. Reynolds, the two leading U.S. companies, sell
nearly two-thirds of their cigarettes in foreign markets, and earn nearly
half of their profits overseas.

The tobacco papers disclosed in connection with the Minnesota litigation
provide additional insight into just how highly Big Tobacco values markets
in the Third World and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the
steps it has taken to thwart international tobacco control activism, its
broad market development strategies overseas, its efforts to block national
tobacco control legislation and more. But as revealing as they are, because
the disclosed tobacco papers are those requested by the state of Minnesota
in relationship to its litigation, the documents provide only a glimpse
into Big Tobacco's overseas strategies and activities. What is undoubtedly
the overwhelming majority of important industry documents relating to
the international market remain sealed in industry file cabinets.

Fear of the domino effect
Following its practice in the United States on domestic issues, the tobacco
industry has moved rapidly to confront any upsurge in international tobacco
control activities, whether they come from U.S.-based activists concerned
about international issues, or activists in other countries focusing on
international issues or on domestic tobacco control.

One special reason for rapidly addressing any overseas tobacco control
measure has been industry fear of the domino effect: the notion that strong
regulations in one country will serve as an example for similar measures
elsewhere, including perhaps the United States.

"A policy whereby the Institute is involved in combating the intensive
foreign anti-cigarette activity is necessary, because there has been no
abatement of such activity, which bids fair to go to such extremes that
harsh measures will be taken that will become precedents for similar measures
in this country," wrote the Tobacco Institute, the industry trade association
and political representative, in a 1973 draft memorandum proposing that
it undertake a new program to address overseas issues <RJR502429369/9373>.

A similar sentiment appeared in a Philip Morris analysis of an industry
legislative campaign in Argentina: "The impact of anti-tobacco legislation
may have a domino effect in neighboring countries. Congressional approval
of restrictions such as those contained in Argentina's Neri Bill can inspire
other governments in the region to adopt similar legislation. Similarly,
a presidential veto in one country can influence initiatives in nearby
countries" <pm2023005316/5320>.

The industry has gone to extraordinary lengths to monitor and counteract
the effect of the tri-annual World Conference on Tobacco or Health. Hundreds
of internal industry papers report on what was scheduled to take place
at the conferences, what actually happened, who attended and how much
media coverage they received.

In anticipation of the fourth world conference, in 1979, the industry
established a special task force to monitor and counter the efforts of
tobacco control advocates. A subcommittee proposed a long list of surveillance
and high-level political and public relations actions:

"Public relations agency to provide names of Third World delegates
to the conference."

"Contact to be made through appropriate channels with: Agricultural
Ministers of influential tobacco-growing countries to enable them to
communicate the commercial interests of their respective tobacco industry
to their official Health Ministers attending the conference."

"Oblique/indirect contact to be made with WHO [World Health Organization]
governors from Third World countries to suggest to them that the extreme
WHO anti-smoking position could be detrimental to the well-being of
their countries."

"Position papers to be prepared for modification during the Conference
on Third World accusations. Timely distribution will then be made to
lead companies in Third World countries."

"Contact may possibly be made with FAO [Food and Agricultural Organization]
(as natural ally) with the view to asking FAO to write WHO in advance
of Conference and possibly to send a telegram during the Conference"
<pm2501015341>.

A follow-up memo, written a month later in February 1979 by a Philip
Morris executive, indicated that the industry was proceeding with its
delegate monitoring ("I have been told that the number of definite acceptances
is as yet very, very limited, and that a first list will probably not
be available before April 20"), preparation of position papers and contact
of agricultural ministries. The memo expresses some uncertainty about
the wisdom of approaching FAO <pm2501015287/
5288>.

The internal industry papers show ongoing industry concern with
the activities of the WHO. The 1973 Tobacco Institute proposal suggesting
expansion of the Institute's activities to include international matters,
for example, asserted that "The foreign anti-cigarette activity is largely
a result of constant preaching by the World Health Organization delegates,
who return home from conventions on smoking and health to badger their
governments into taking action against tobacco" <RJR502429368/ 9371>.
As the World Bank in the early 1990s decided to abandon support for tobacco
projects and support tobacco control measures as a matter of sound economic
development, Philip Morris worried in a 1992 memo about "the integration
of the World Bank into the anti-tobacco-front formed mainly by WHO <PM2028464078>.
(To head off the Bank joining anti-tobacco forces, the Philip Morris memo
suggests, "Shouldn't we react maybe by alerting tobacco-growing countries,
farmers unions, etc?")

One industry response to its concern about WHO has been to smear the
agency. The Philip Morris files contain a fax from the PR firm Burson
Marstellar of a 1989 paper by Paul Dietrich, a Catholic University researcher,
attacking WHO "for funding wasteful programmes and top-heavy monument
addresses rather than the critical health issues in the developing world"
<PM 2501047810/7812>. Atop the paper is a notation that it should
be circulated to tobacco trade press, travel trade press and feature editors.

Labeling Concessions
The industry papers are replete with detailed rationalizations of tobacco
companies' overseas behavior, many prepared as backgrounders for dealing
with media questions. "The Activities of Philip Morris in the Third World,"
for example, asserts that the company follows the laws of countries in
which it operates, that its ads do not encourage smoking but only lure
smokers from other brands and that the tobacco business creates jobs,
raises taxes and helps the economy <pm2015006010/6021>. A Brown
& Williamson draft letter makes similar points, adding that tobacco
exports from the United States help the U.S. trade balance <BW536502252>.
The same language is recycled again and again, in policy fights in countries
across the globe.

Much more interesting than standard public relations stonewalling is
top-level discussions within Philip Morris of the idea of adding U.S.-style
health warnings on all of its exported cigarettes. In a July 24, 1991
memo, Murray Bring, counsel to Philip Morris and a lawyer at Arnold
& Porter, a top Washington, D.C. firm suggested to Michael Miles,
then Philip Morris CEO, "that we should consider placing health warnings
on all of our exported cigarettes" <PM2023003838>.

"I have been in favor of doing this for some time," Bring wrote. "I believe
that doing so would improve our litigation posture somewhat in the product
liability area, and would eliminate a focus of considerable criticism
from health organizations, shareholders and even some friendly members
of Congress."

He added that when Geoffrey Bible -- the current CEO of Philip Morris
-- headed Philip Morris International, "he had just about concluded that
it would be sensible to place warnings on all exported cigarettes." Others,
he wrote, including former CEO Hamish Maxwell, have not "object[ed] to
the concept, in principle," but "have felt that we should not make this
concession without getting something for it in return. For example, we
might be able to use it as a bargaining chip in legislative negotiations."

Bring followed up in October 1991 with another note to Miles urging again
that Philip Morris, quietly and voluntarily, add health warnings to its
exports. He suggested issuance of a statement of policy that "Starting
[date], all cigarettes exported by Philip Morris contained health warnings.
To the extent that those warnings are not required by local law, we have
placed the rotating United States Surgeon General's warnings which are
required under U.S. law. "The warnings are set forth in the language of
the country to which the cigarettes are being shipped" <PM2023003853/3854>.
Philip Morris did in fact place labels on its exports, although it appears
the company uses English language warnings rather than those in the language
of the recipient country.
sabotaging public health
The industry has succeeded in aggressively organizing to stop numerous
tobacco control initiatives in Latin America, through methods detailed
in the tobacco papers.

A Philip Morris document, "Veto of Anti-Tobacco Law, Case Analysis: Argentina,"
describes an industry-orchestrated campaign to defeat a far-reaching legislative
proposal to eliminate tobacco advertising and promotion, and to restrict
smoking in public places <pm2023005316/5321>. The bill passed the
Argentine lower house in 1990 and the upper house on September 30, 1992,
leaving the president with 10 days to veto the legislation or it would
become law. "Industry's objective was to create an atmosphere in which
presidential veto would be politically acceptable," the analysis states.
Immediately, the industry activated an alliance of advertising agencies
and others formed following passage of the bill by the lower house in
1990. "On October 5, tobacco industry organized a closed door working
session with media owners, sports figures, advertising executives and
other interested parties to initiate a campaign in favor of a presidential
veto," according to the analysis. The result: "129 articles appeared in
newspapers and magazines between October 1-15 of which 105 were favorable
to the industry's arguments. Total estimated cost of coverage if media
space and time had been purchased: US$2.8MM." On October 13, President
Menem vetoed the bill.

Among the conclusions of the Argentine case study: "When a crisis situation
emerges, such as the Argentine Congress' approval of tobacco advertising
ban, a rapid response is essential. A contingency plan which clearly defines
the role and responsibilities of each affected party is a prerequisite
to effective, broad based counteraction."

Similarly, in Uruguay, a Philip Morris memo reports on a successful effort
to head off proposed tobacco control legislation. "During the course of
the past six months, the tobacco industry in Uruguay has demonstrated
how industry-government deliberations can lead to a successful resolution,"
states a December 1982 memo <pm2023274146/4148>. Following proposal
of a bill to ban tobacco advertising, require health warnings and restrict
sales to minors, "Abal Ilnos., SA working with other industry members
through the local cigarette manufacturers association took immediate action,"
contacting members of the parliamentary committee working on the bill
and working closely with advertisers. "After a series of negotiations,
the Public Health Commission of the State Council repealed the proposed
legislation to ban advertising."

In each of these cases, well-organized industry associations played a
key role in defeating public health legislation. The importance of local
industry organization in Third World countries had long been impressed
on Big Tobacco. In a hand-written note at the bottom of a 1970 memo from
a Mexican cigarette manufacturer, a writer who appears to be a Philip
Morris official states, "suggest if not already so constituted Mexico
City manufacturers form a group of themselves to adequately represent
industry. We have learned many lessons in countries. Prevention at minimum
alleviates and buys time" <pm10051238982>.

Fighting The Ets Asian Contagion
In the United States, the tobacco industry has faced some of its most
difficult challenges with the second-hand smoke (also referred to as passive
smoking or environmental tobacco smoke, ETS) issue. The tobacco papers
show it fears the spread of the issue to other countries. Notably, a February
1990 report titled "Asia ETS Consultant Status Report" describes an elaborate
joint effort by Philip Morris, R.J. Reynolds, British American Tobacco
and also Japan Tobacco to develop a roster of Asian scientific consultants
who could refute public health activists' claims about the hazards of
second-hand smoke <PM250048976/8999>. The target countries for finding
consultants were: Hong Kong, the Philippines, Taiwan, Korea, Japan, China,
Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia.

"One key objective of the project has been to recruit and educate scientists
who then would be available to testify on ETS in legislative, regulatory
or litigation proceedings in Asia or elsewhere," the report states.

It explains: "This objective was based on recognition of the fact that
there were essentially no local scientists with a background in ETS issues
and that experience elsewhere has shown that it is essential to have credible,
local scientists prepared to speak out when ETS becomes an issue, which
often occurs on short notice."

Among the initial consultants, according to the report, was Dr. Wongphanich
in Thailand. "Although not expected to act as a full-fledged consultant,
our consultant relationship with Dr. Wongphanich was agreed to because
of her position as president of the Asian Association of Occupational
Health and her potential, partly as a consequence of that position, to
support our activities in the Asia region." The project also recruited
the expected successor to Dr. Wongphanich as president of the Asian Association
of Occupational Health.

An example of the kind of research the consultants were expected to undertake
was the "Asia Cities Monitoring Project," which would monitor air pollution
in Asian cities, with the findings used to argue that "air pollution (particularly
pollution from motor vehicles) is a serious problem in the target Asian
cities and that the much less serious indoor air pollution problems that
exist in those cities are, in turn, caused largely by pollutants that
are generated outdoors."

Reporting as the project was moving into its second year, and following
extensive efforts to "orient" the new consultants through industry conferences
and exposure to industry-chosen scientific papers, the project coordinators
were optimistic about the future of project. "Having now achieved a reasonable
command of the relevant literature, and with a substantial level of enthusiasm
for the project, our consultants are prepared to do the kind of things
they were recruited to do -- which, in the final analysis, is the project's
real test."

B. Philip Morris in China
For nearly a century, China has represented the Holy Grail for multinational
tobacco companies. But with Communist China's market closed for more than
four decades, Big Tobacco allowed its attention to stray elsewhere around
the globe.

By 1993, Philip Morris concluded that the Chinese market opening was
real, and "a bigger opportunity than we'd really focused on," according
to a November 1993 memo from company CEO Michael Miles <pm204698206/8207>.
Comments by company director and media mogul Rupert Murdoch, as well as
a BusinessWeek story describing General Electric's Jack Welch's emphasis
on China, Miles wrote, "doesn't 'prove' it's there for us, but it certainly
indicates that our sense of a truly huge opportunity is shared by some
other, very savvy international businessmen." Miles implored fellow executives
"to at least think big," suggesting some consideration be given to the
idea that Philip Morris offer "something in the billions for all or part"
of the China National Tobacco Company (CNTC).

Three sets of Philip Morris three-year plans for China, all written in
the 1990s, plus marketing analyses, suggest three company preoccupations
-- gaining rights to produce in China, marketing and pricing issues --
plus some concern about a nascent anti-smoking movement in China.

Entering China
The first challenge confronting Philip Morris, as well as the other tobacco
multinationals, is entering the China market, given government restrictions
on imports and foreign investment.

Although the company's strategic plans show a desire to work with
the U.S. government to open the market to imports, the company plans to
expand its market share through locally manufactured cigarettes. "Over
the long term," notes the 1992-1994 plan, "local production appears to
be the only means through which we can gain broad access to the total
Chinese market, as any growth in the domestic import segment will be severely
limited by the tight foreign exchange controls and import quotas imposed
by the CNTC to protect the Chinese tobacco industry" <pm2504007940/7964>.

For the foreseeable future, local production would be through joint venture
agreements with the CNTC. The 1992-1994 Philip Morris plan notes that
BAT, RJR and the South African Rothmans all had cooperative arrangements
with the CNTC. Philip Morris' arrangements at the time included two factories
at which it was providing technical assistance. Closer ties had been thwarted
by a conflict over Marlboro licensing disputes. Philip Morris has since
entered into much closer joint venture agreements with the CNTC.

A marketing review by Philip Morris Asia shows a gigantic leap in smoker
awareness of Marlboro <pm2504052490/2501>. In 1981, 42 percent of
smokers in Guangzhou, the southeastern city formerly known as Canton,
were aware of Marlboro; that number soared to 100 percent in 1991. Marlboro
brand recognition in Shanghai jumped from 57 percent to 99 percent over
the same period. And in Xiamen, the Marlboro brand awareness rate rose
from 28 percent in 1981 to 99 percent a decade later.

British American Tobacco's 555 brand, Marlboro's major direct foreign
competition in China, achieved similar leaps in brand recognition, rising
from 36 percent in Guangzhou, 8 percent in Shanghai and 37 percent in
Xiamen to 98, 91 and 99 percent respectively.

These spikes in brand awareness of Marlboro and its chief competitors
were the result of determined efforts by the foreign tobacco multinationals
to publicize their brands aggressively and to attach certain images to
them. The companies monitored the success of these efforts through
careful research such as that documented in a Philip Morris "Premium Brands
Study," based on a door-to-door study of 500 random smokers in Shanghai
<pm2504019119/9149>. That study concluded that "Marlboro has no
clear edge over 555 with regard to product image, class and trendiness.
However, Marlboro is stronger in terms of masculinity and youthfulness."

The Philip Morris papers show significant concern over the competitive
challenge of 555, also known as SE 555. "SE555 is close behind our heels
in terms of marketing expenditure," says a presentation on the 1994-1996
Philip Morris plan for China <pm2504033297/3321>. "SE 555 builds
huge outdoor signs to create a 'big brand' image and is aggressive at
retail. It's also active in sports sponsorships."

To meet the 555 challenge, the Philip Morris documents show company plans
to capitalize on Marlboro's "American" image, to build its association
with youthful vitality through sports sponsorships and to rely heavily
on television advertising:

"We will continue to run Marlboro Country theme advertising, in addition
to the World of Sports program," says the 1992-1994 plan. "Publication
of a regular Marlboro World of Sports magazine is being evaluated."
<pm2504007940/7964> The 1994-1996 plan reiterates these plans,
emphasizing soccer as the company's major focus <pm2504033297/3321>.

"We will maintain [Marlboro's] extensive media mix, with particular
focus on wide-reach media like television to stimulate consumer demand,"
says the 1991-1993 plan. "We are also exploring possibilities for sponsorship
of a breakthrough event that would benefit us through increased government
contacts and widespread favorable publicity" <pm2500098237/8268>.

Versus 555, "Marlboro has a high brand awareness, and the Marlboro
Country represents American heritage which is aspirational to the Chinese
consumers," according to a presentation of the 1994-1996 plan <pm2504033297/3321>.
"Our brand is in a better position to appeal to young adult smokers.
We also have a strong leadership on TV, the most effective medium."

"Our strategies behind Marlboro are to strengthen the young and modern
image of the brand," says the presentation of the 1994-1996 plan <pm2504033297/3321>.
"We need to add aspirational value by promoting its international image.
We will also focus promotions behind the box packaging to project quality
and prestige."

Philip Morris has also sought ways to introduce other brands in the Chinese
market, including especially Parliament. "Parliament's imagery appeals
to consumers' aspirations for upscale western life styles," says the 1991-1993
plan, "and we believe the brand has good potential in Northern urban cities
like Shanghai and Beijing, where living standards are higher than average"
<pm2500098237/8268>.

The relative prosperity that many Chinese citizens have enjoyed in the
last decade is heavily concentrated in eastern coastal areas, and so are
Philip Morris marketing efforts. A presentation on the 1994-1996 Philip
Morris plan for China effectively writes off the Chinese interior: "Under
the austerity program [of the Chinese government], remote inland provinces
will be hard hit by recession. Consumption power will be weakened. Therefore,
we must rationalize our marketing resources to focus on priority markets"
<pm2504033297/3321>.

The 1994-1996 plan identifies four key markets: Tianjin (located outside
of Beijing), Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzen, a city bordering Hong Kong.
It also designates seven cities as secondary markets, all but one on the
eastern coast.

The Price of Success
For all its marketing success, pricing remains a serious issue for Philip
Morris in China. Marlboro and Parliament are in the premium range of the
cigarette market, and face competition not only from other premium cigarettes,
but also from lower-priced products hawked by the CNTC. Brand choice is
price sensitive, the Philip Morris papers show, but the problem for the
company is that it does not control crucial price-determining factors.

Bumps in price in 1993 led Marlboro smokers to switch to lower priced
local brands, according to the presentation of the 1994-1996 plan.

The restrictions on domestic manufacturing has meant that foreign cigarettes
sold in China are largely imports. As a result, import taxes can have
a decisive effect on product price, and the Philip Morris strategic plans
show company efforts to persuade the government to lower tax rates.

Changes in the exchange rate, the 1994-1996 plan presentation explains,
will significantly determine sales opportunities. In fact, China's currency
has slightly appreciated from the estimate used in the presentation, meaning
U.S. imports such as Marlboros are relatively cheaper for Chinese customers.

While seeking to manage external factors that increase price, the strategic
plans show, Philip Morris has also sought to increase price gradually
to improve profitability without price shocks that would cause Marlboro
smokers to switch brands.

Countering Anti-Tobacco Sentiment
The Philip Morris papers also document some slight concern with the growth
of anti-smoking sentiment China, almost surely a more substantial concern
for the company now than at the time the available strategic plans were
written.

Still, the tobacco industry is nothing if not always prepared. The 1991-1993
plan in particular reports company strategies to address an upsurge in
anti-smoking sentiment in a country where almost 90 percent of men (but
few women) smoke. Most disturbing, perhaps, is the suggestion that Philip
Morris will spur the CNTC -- which in the early 1990s was open to collaborating
with foreign public health advocates on developing tobacco control measures
that would deter smoking and limit the influence of foreign companies
-- to develop aggressive pro-smoking initiatives.

"Though immediate impact is not likely, we are preparing for increased
anti-smoking activities," says the 1991-1993 plan. "Our key action will
be to strengthen cooperation with CNTC, especially in sharing with them
our expertise and resources to counter anti-smoking initiatives."

C. The USTR Connection
Following the Reagan and Bush administration's widely condemned practice
of using the threat of trade sanctions to break open Asian markets for
tobacco, the Clinton administration swept into office in 1993 with a promise
that it would not promote tobacco exports.

In practical terms, this promise primarily meant that the Office of the
U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) would not push parochial tobacco interests
in bilateral or multilateral trade negotiations. It also would govern
the activities of a wide range of other government agencies, including
the State Department and U.S. embassies around the globe.

In 1996, the U.S. embassy in Thailand appeared to violate the informal
policy with a strongly worded letter demanding that the Thai government
provide a cost-benefit analysis to justify an ingredient disclosure law.

Now internal tobacco industry documents show not that the USTR violated
the no-tobacco promotion policy, but how USTR officials expressed regret
about not being able to advance tobacco companies' interests and advised
Big Tobacco on how to work around the no-tobacco policy.

Dancing With USTR
Mickey Kantor, a tobacco industry lawyer, worked as the Clinton administration's
first U.S. Trade Representative. He recused himself from all tobacco-related
issues, putting Deputy USTR Charlene Barshefsky -- the current U.S. Trade
Representative -- in charge of tobacco matters.

The Philip Morris papers show that, in May 1993, Leo Burnett Worldwide,
a key tobacco industry public relations firm, arranged a meeting with
Barshefsky and USTR staff to discuss a proposed tobacco ad ban in Taiwan
<pm2500052165/2166>. Representatives from the tobacco industry did
not attend the meeting; instead, Big Tobacco's interests were represented
by the International Advertising Association, the American Association
of Advertising Agencies and Hearst Publications.

"We discussed first the importance of USTR representing market access
for freedom of commercial speech in trade negotiations with other nations
generally," says a Leo Burnett letter to Philip Morris Asia's director
of corporate affairs. "We then discussed the specific Taiwan situation,
explaining that it was an advertising issue, not a tobacco issue."

"Ms. Barshefsky was intrigued by our positioning of the issue at a distance
from a pure tobacco industry issue," the letter adds.

Barshefsky "encouraged" the tobacco industry's proxies "to again write,
as we did last fall, to everyone in the administration who plays a role
in determining American trade policy," according to the letter.

"We didn't win, but we are farther away from losing than we were before
we had this meeting."

In August 1993, Craig Fuller -- a tobacco industry lobbyist and close
adviser to former President George Bush -- met with USTR officials to
discuss a range of issues. A memo from Fuller <pm2046988364> reports
that the USTR officials asked Philip Morris for help -- to forestall a
major political fight over approval of Most Favored Nation (MFN) trade
status for China. "USTR's representatives were most interested in having
us do anything we could to comment to both U.S. officials and Chinese
officials on the importance of having clear steps defined and taken to
avoid a crisis over MFN."

But while USTR officials were eager to help Philip Morris on beer-related
issues, Fuller was told not to expect help on tobacco-related business.
"We were informed that despite personal feelings to the contrary, USTR
career officials are under instructions not to engage in any discussions
regarding tobacco issues."

Supporting Ustr
Whatever the efforts to circumvent the Clinton administration's tobacco
and trade policies, the cigarette makers must have been disappointed with
the change from the battering-ram style of the Reagan/Bush USTR. Under
Republican rule, the USTR forced open tobacco markets in Japan, South
Korea and Taiwan.

The effect was stark: according to a General Accounting Office (GAO)
study, smoking rates rose from 18 to 29 percent among teenage boys in
South Korea in the single year after South Korea opened its market to
U.S. cigarettes. The rate among girls quintupled, to 8.7 percent, in the
same year.

With the Bush USTR eagerly knocking down trade barriers in Asia, the
task for industry was not to persuade USTR to take action, but to provide
the agency with political space to do the industry's dirty work. Philip
Morris created a USTR task force and a full-fledged "USTR Support Plan."

Philip Morris was particularly worried about the then-pending GAO report
and the adverse publicity it might generate, as well growing involvement
of U.S. and Asian tobacco control groups in protesting the actions of
USTR.

The task force "agreed we should implement a plan that would have PM,
other U.S. tobacco companies and third parties more aggressively tell
our side of this story both here and in Asia," according to a June 16,
1989 memo <pm2023263571/3575>.

In a follow-up June 19 memo, Philip Morris articulated its USTR support
plan, relying on help from the PR firm Burson-Marstellar and the well-connected
law firm Arnold & Porter <pm2023263568/3570>. The memo outlines
plans to: prepare brochures for distribution in Congress and the public;
commission studies on the U.S. economic benefits of cigarette exports
and on Asian cigarette consumption trends; develop material for U.S. embassies;
design press material for Asia and the United States; write opinion pieces
for daily newspapers; prepare print ads "for possible use if the issue
escalates;" write a comparison of how other industries use USTR; "ask
our friends in Congress to contact the GAO and either add to the scope
of the current investigation or begin another investigation focusing on
a wider range of issues;" and rely on Burson-Marstellar "to try to find
an expert on the changing lifestyles of Asian women to show that smoking
is only part of a larger picture."