]]>Kim Jong Un’s New Year’s address got a makeover in 2019. Gone was the lectern and flowers in front of a large assembly hall, and in came an armchair and a more relaxed style. KCTV thankfully got rid of most of the absurd recorded applause that punctuated his speech in previous years, although snippets were still used at the start and end.
Kim Jong Un’s new setting for the 2019 New Year’s address. Photo: KCTV.

The broadcast was set up with a shot of the clock in Pyongyang striking midnight and then a shot of the central offices of the Workers’ Party of Korea.

Shots of the clock and Korean Workers’ Party building in Pyongyang late at night. Photos: KCTV.

The late-night shot of the Workers’ Party building is a frequently used scene in North Korean propaganda. It’s meant to show that even in dead of night, the lights are on and the party is working for the North Korean people.

Then, a shot of Kim apparently inside the building, strolling towards the room where he would give the address—another propaganda message for the people. While they were seeing in the new year, Kim Jong Un was still hard at work.

Kim Jong Un on his way to make the speech. Photo: KCTV.

The broadcast was recorded with three cameras. One providing the wide shot shown above and a couple on either side for close-ups.

Different camera angles of Kim Jong Un during the New Year’s address. Photos: KCTV.

To understand what a departure this is from previous speeches, take a look at the style from past years. This first example is from 2017 but a similar set-up has been used each year since 2013 when the broadcasts started. While the sets were consistent during that time frame, Kim did transition from the traditional Mao suit to a western-style suit in 2017.

New Year’s speech set-ups from previous years. Photos: KCTV; North Korea Tech.org.

And then there was the clock. Many have noted this oddity, perhaps oversight, already. However, once my attention was brought to it, I couldn’t take my eyes off it. The speech lasted 32 minutes on TV, and was clearly set up to be taking place at midnight. But when Kim finished speaking the clock read a little before 1 a.m.

OK, so he messed up some lines or perhaps wanted to put some more emphasis on certain topics. Anyone who has recorded video knows it’s very difficult to do it perfectly.

What was more interesting was the way this moving clock was treated. The first time we see it is after about 1 minute and 20 seconds of the broadcast.

The clock face 1 minute and 20 seconds into the broadcast. Photo: KCTV.

It shows just after midnight, so more or less correct. Here it is at 3 minutes in:

The clock face 3 minutes into the speech. Photo: KCTV.

Still on track. And 7 minutes 20 seconds into the speech:

The clock face 7 minutes and 20 seconds into the broadcast. Photo: KCTV.

Time is starting to get ahead of the speech. It clearly shows 10 minutes past the hour. Here it is at 8 minutes 45 seconds into the broadcast:

This is interesting. In those 90 seconds, the minute hand did not appear to have moved at all. It is difficult to determine the precise degree of movement due to the limited resolution of the broadcast, but the movement does not seem to be normal.

That was not the only problem. If you look at the close-up of the clock face, at one point the camera moves from side to side ever so slightly but the clock face doesn’t move in the same way.

Kim Jong Un New Year’s Address Clock

It almost appears as if a video editor has replaced the clock face, although for a few seconds Kim’s face partly obscures the clock face, which would make such a post-production replacement a more difficult job. It could perhaps come down to the way the video compression interpreted the movement, although during that sequence, nothing else in the camera frame, such as the other items on the desk, moved differently than the overall video movement.

Back to the clock hands. At 16 minutes and 15 seconds in, it was already about 27 minutes past the hour:

However, take a closer look at the hour hand. It has clearly been moved backwards from where it was before and is now only a fraction past the top of the hour, despite the minute hand being at almost half past.

At 27 minutes in, the hour hand has moved forward, but only appears to be at the half hour mark, despite the minute hand position:

The clock face 27 minutes into the broadcast. Photo: KCTV.

And to wrap things up, a few seconds before the end of the 32-minute speech, about the time is close to 52 minutes past the hour but that hour hand is still on the half hour. It is certainly a peculiar clock.

The clock face right before the end of the 32-minute speech. Photo: KCTV.

While this year’s set makeover was likely intended to make Kim Jong Un look like a more normal leader, the obvious, yet avoidable problems with the handling of this clock, as well as a few more oddities noted by other experts, seem to suggest North Korea’s propaganda team still has a lot to learn about how to handle Kim’s growing public presence.

]]>North Korea’s state broadcaster, Korean Central Television (KCTV), has had to tread a fine line covering this year’s international summits and diplomatic events.

On the one hand, the numerous summits have been something to hail, having put Kim Jong Un concretely on the global stage, broken the country’s international diplomatic isolation and potentially laid the groundwork for getting sanctions relief and boosting the North Korean economy.

But danger isn’t far away. If Kim’s regime is seen by the North Korean public to align itself too closely with foreign governments, especially South Korea and the US, it risks reversing years of anti-South Korean and anti-US propaganda. While state media has laid off those themes since the summitry began, it may need to revive them if diplomacy falls apart.

Taken together, KCTV coverage of this year’s summits shows this balancing act: while Kim Jong Un’s meetings with South Korean and US leaders have dominated world headlines, Kim’s meetings with Chinese leader Xi Jinping have received far greater coverage inside North Korea.

How KCTV Covers Kim Jong Un

Events involving Kim Jong Un take precedence over all other news and are generally broadcast several times a day outside of regular news bulletins. A typical pattern is to run a bulletin shortly after TV broadcasting begins at 15:00 then repeat it at 17:00 and 20:00, in each case pushing back the regular news bulletin. It then gets a final broadcast shortly before TV wraps up for the evening at around 22:30.

In many cases, these reports are simply an anchor in a studio reading a script. Sometimes still photos are used to illustrate the news and occasionally video images. If the news is big enough, the reports will get repeated the next day at slightly different times.

A KCTV news anchor announces the signing of a declaration between Kim Jong Un and Moon Jae-in during a bulletin on September 20, 2018.

After major events, North Korean TV follows the immediate news reports with a documentary that, unless it was used in the report, includes the first video of the event. In the past, KCTV used to produce these once every couple of months as a wrap-up of Kim Jong Un’s activities, but recently, these documentaries have been appearing after each major event. The delayed coverage has an advantage: it gives the state propaganda machine time to see the outcome of an event and figure out how it will be best framed.

The Trip to China

Kim Jong Un’s visit to Beijing between March 25 and 28 was his first known international trip as leader and first summit meeting and received more coverage on KCTV than anything else so far this year. Word of the visit leaked to international media after his train was spotted in Beijing, but state TV didn’t report anything until the day he returned home.

At 15:14 on March 28, KCTV broadcast an exceptional eight consecutive reports on different aspects of the trip. The reports were repeated three more times on March 28 and by the time broadcasts began on March 29, a 42-minute long documentary was ready to air.[1]

It debuted at 15:08 and was broadcast an additional 12 times until April 1, for a total of 533 minutes of airtime over 4 days. Unusually, it preempted the 17:00 and 20:00 news on two consecutive nights.

KCTV Documentary on Kim’s First Trip to China

Clearly, state TV was signaling to its viewers that this was an item of major importance.

The North-South Summit in Panmunjom

A huge international media operation beamed live pictures around the world of Kim Jong Un and South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s first meeting at Panmunjom on April 27, but when they shook hands across the military demarcation line at 09:30, North Korean TV wasn’t even on the air.

It began April 27 with programming as scheduled at 15:00 and ran a brief news bulletin announcing that Kim had departed Pyongyang for Panmunjom to meet Moon. For many North Koreans, this would be the first they knew about the summit. But strangely, the news bulletin wasn’t repeated at all for the rest of the day. It’s unusual that news regarding Kim Jong Un disappears so quickly.

On April 28, news of the summit was broadcast on state TV at 15:09, shortly after sign-on. The news consisted of a string of eight reports read by five different anchors, without the customary break between each report. The entire package had a single title rather than being broken up into eight reports and included no still or video images.

It was subsequently aired at 17:00, 20:00 and 21:37, and those airings included extensive video from the previous day’s events. Why this wasn’t included in the initial broadcast is unclear, although it probably had to do with the footage either not being completely edited or not approved for broadcast.

The news bulletins were repeated three times on Sunday and it wasn’t until Monday that Korean Central TV broadcast a documentary. This was a longer delay than is typical. With events happening at the border, the delay is notable.

KCTV Documentary on Inter-Korean Summit

The documentary aired 12 times over 6 days. No other documentary broadcast this year has been shown on as many subsequent days as this one.

Kim’s Trip to Dalian

News of Kim Jong Un’s second trip to China to meet with Xi Jinping, from May 7 to 8, broke with an 18-minute report preempting the 20:00 news on the day he returned. It aired later in the evening too. This same-day coverage was accompanied with no photos or video but, by the time broadcasts began on May 9, a 27-minute documentary was ready to air.

KCTV Documentary on Kim’s Second Trip to China

This notably faster pace was probably due to the less sensitive nature of the meeting. The documentary was broadcast 13 times over 5 days.

The Second Meeting at Panmunjom

On May 26, Kim Jong Un and Moon Jae-in met again in Panmunjom, this time with less fanfare from the global media. No news of the meeting was aired on May 26, but by May 27, KCTV came on the air early, airing a documentary on the meeting at 09:12. It was broadcast 11 times but was gone after 3 days.

KCTV Report on North-South Meeting of May 26

The Singapore Summit

State media was unusually confident with its coverage of the Singapore Summit between Kim Jong Un and US President Donald Trump. For the first time on one of Kim’s overseas trips, state media carried reports while the event was going on rather than waiting for Kim to get back home and the full results to be clear.

The reports were still a day late, but North Koreans were better informed than normal. It’s tempting to think this is because of the large amount of foreign media coverage of the summit that was inevitably going to leak into the country and the government’s desire to shape its message as fast as possible.

Interestingly, North Korean TV dropped the still images from the final three broadcasts of the report.[2]

The following day, while the world was watching live TV images of Kim Jong Un and Donald Trump meeting in Singapore, KCTV carried a single report on Kim’s night-time outing in Singapore the evening before. It contained no still photos and was repeated throughout the day.

On June 13, with the summit done and Kim Jong Un en-route back to Pyongyang, KCTV hailed the success of the summit and the meeting with President Trump with three reports read by main anchor Ri Chun Hee.[3],[4]

At 19:00, an additional report was aired noting that Kim Jong Un had returned to North Korea. Again, it’s relatively unusual for state media to report on Kim’s comings and goings on the same day unless it’s a televised event like a military parade.

In less than 24 hours, North Korean TV had turned around the footage from Singapore and it started the Thursday broadcast with the first of what would be 11 airings of the documentary on the event.

KCTV Documentary on Singapore Summit

The Third Meeting in China

Kim Jong Un departed Pyongyang on Tuesday morning, June 19, by plane to Beijing where he met with Xi Jinping to brief him on the outcome of the summit meeting with Donald Trump. As usual, North Korean state media was silent on Tuesday about the trip.

The next two days followed the typical cycle: reports repeated throughout the day of day-old news.[5],[6] But again, there was a short turnaround for the documentary. It aired first on June 21, the day after Kim returned home, and was broadcast a total of 11 times.

KCTV Documentary on Kim’s Third Trip to China

The Pyongyang Summit

Coverage of the North-South summit in Pyongyang held September 18-20 was notable for several reasons. The first and perhaps most surprising was the live coverage from Pyongyang of Moon Jae-in’s arrival in the city and his welcoming by Kim.

I believe this might have been the first time that live images of an event in Pyongyang involving Kim Jong Un have been seen globally but not within the country. Typically, any live images out of North Korea, especially of major events, are picked up from a KCTV broadcast, but this time it was different.

Thanks to a South Korean TV pool, the world was watching Kim Jong Un live and the signals were not being managed by a North Korean producer.

With events happening at the Pyongyang Airport and the city center, and a VIP visit clearly evident to Pyongyang residents, you would think KCTV would lead with the news in the evening, right?

Wrong. Despite the events happening on its doorstep, news of Moon’s arrival and his welcome by Kim was not broadcast until the next day. Although on this occasion, the reports all included video: likely a product of it being so quickly available.

On September 19, with the summit already wrapped up, North Korean TV signed on air in the afternoon with seven special reports on the previous day’s activities but none of the reports included video.[7] The reports were repeated on Friday[8] and a documentary finally aired on Saturday.

KCTV Documentary on Inter-Korean Summit in Pyongyang

It was broadcast just five times over two days and then disappeared.

Contrasts of Coverage

The difference in the way KCTV treated these events is interesting.

It is clearly able to turn around video and produce documentaries with great speed when useful, so why the two-day delay for an event that happened in Pyongyang? Presumably, this signals another factor: most likely the question of how an event should tie into existing propaganda and what might be said in the future.

Of the major events in 2018, documentaries on all of those involving a meeting with Xi Jinping have aired the day after Kim returned to Pyongyang. The Singapore Summit and Pyongyang Summits saw a two-day delay and the Panmunjom Summit documentary came three days after the event.

And then there’s the length of coverage. The longest documentary was on the Pyongyang Summit at 71 minutes, but because it quickly disappeared, it was on air a total of just under 6 hours.

The documentary on the Singapore Summit was second longest at 42 minutes and was aired for a total of 7 hours 42 minutes. That’s about the same as those on the Panmunjom Summit and Kim’s second trip to China.

By far, the documentary that received the most airtime in 2018 was the first one of Kim’s initial trip to Beijing. It was 41 minutes long and aired for a total of just under 9 hours.

So again, China comes out as favored.

What Wasn’t Said

Just as important as what KCTV said about these events is what it didn’t.

When the idea of a summit between Kim Jong Un and Donald Trump was being considered, some in the US argued against it because of the propaganda potential. An often-heard rationale was that images of the two together would be repeatedly broadcast on North Korean TV to show Kim as an equal with Trump on the world stage.

Not only did that not happen, but it showed a misunderstanding of the way Kim Jong Un is portrayed to the North Korean public.

Kim does not need to be seen as equal to Trump because, in the eyes of the North Korean propaganda machine, he’s already ahead of all other world leaders. This claim isn’t based on his dealings with other world leaders but on the things he does himself, directly for the North Korean people. The cult of Kim Jong Un isn’t reliant external influences, but on him alone.

After the Singapore Summit, KCTV aired its customary documentary but it was no more or less a propaganda piece than similar documentaries. And since the meeting, video of the Trump-Kim summit has not been seen on North Korean TV. Neither has video of Kim meeting with Xi Jinping or Moon Jae-in for that matter.

In fact, coverage of 2018’s diplomatic events has not been woven into any of the propaganda pieces that, accompanied with revolutionary music, fill the gaps between programs on North Korean TV. The composition of those remains consistent: Kim Jong Un conducting on-the-spot guidance, being welcomed by cheering workers and inspecting military units.

]]>North Korea’s Wi-Fi Story: The Mirae is Todayhttps://www.38north.org/2018/12/mwilliams120418/
Tue, 04 Dec 2018 17:04:16 +0000https://www.38north.org/?p=16642Korean Central Television recently broadcast a couple of reports about a new outdoor wireless data service in Pyongyang. The service…

]]>Korean Central Television recently broadcast a couple of reports about a new outdoor wireless data service in Pyongyang. The service is apparently based on Wi-Fi but unusually requires a SIM card for access.

It’s called “Mirae,” which means “future,” and is up and running in central Pyongyang, according to the reports. It’s the first time an outdoor Wi-Fi service has been mentioned in North Korean media and runs alongside two cellular networks operating in the country that provide wireless data service.

Both the Wi-Fi and cellular services offer citizens access to North Korea’s nationwide intranet and not the global Internet.

The first of the two broadcasts was on October 21, 2018, and focused on a new tablet PC called the Daeyang 8321 (대양8321). One of the features that makes it popular, according to the report, is its ability to access a data network set up on Ryomyong Street in the capital city.

The tablet PC was supposedly developed by the Mankyungdae Martime Technology Exchange Center (중구해양기술교류사), which is part of the Central Science Technology Supply Agency (중앙과학기술보급국).

In all likelihood (and despite scenes that show workers examining LCD screens in a workshop) the tablet was probably bought from a Chinese OEM supplier with custom branding for Daeyang.

In the report, a regular SIM card was shown being inserted into the unit. SIM cards are typically used for cellular services, but the TV report didn’t specify the type of network being used. An earlier report in Japan’s Choson Sinbo newspaper and a later TV report said it is a Wi-Fi service.

That’s an unusual use of SIM technology and probably helps ensure that authorities can maintain tighter access to the network and more easily track what individual users are doing online.

Inserting a SIM card into the Daeyang 8321 tablet PC. (Photo: KCTV.)

The TV report showed the service in use via a pair of antennas installed above a pedestrian area that appear to be outdoor Wi-Fi base stations.

A pair of outdoor Wi-Fi base stations shown. (Photo: KCTV.)

The same antenna was shown in a report about the new service in the Japanese Choson Sinbo newspaper in August. It showed the Daeyang 8321 alongside one the antennas and what appears to be an Arirang 171 smartphone.

(Photo: Choson Sinbo.)

The photo above shows the Korean Central News Agency intranet site (which looks remarkably similar to its external Internet site) and reports have also said users can access the Rodong Sinmun newspaper and Kim Il Sung University pages among others.

The data speed of the service is said to be up to 70 Mbps, which is a speed attained by Wi-Fi and cellular 4G services. To-date, North Korea is not known to have a 4G network.

An image showing the top speed from the DPRK Today site. (Photo: DPRK Today.)

The second report was part of a package on the recently concluded Exhibition of IT Successes. It showed an Arirang 171 smartphone being used to access the Mirae network.

The report did not mention much about the network but said the smartphone—again, likely from a Chinese OEM supplier—featured a fingerprint reader and access to the Mirae network through a Wi-Fi SIM card.

The phone is marketed in North Korea by the Arirang Information Technology Exchange Agency (아리랑정보기술교류사).

]]>North Korea and the Internet: Building for the Futurehttps://www.38north.org/2018/08/mwilliams080118/
Wed, 01 Aug 2018 17:41:19 +0000https://www.38north.org/?p=15943Construction of the new Internet Communication Bureau headquarters (평양인터네트통신국건설) in Pyongyang appears to be near externally complete, more than two…

]]>Construction of the new Internet Communication Bureau headquarters (평양인터네트통신국건설) in Pyongyang appears to be near externally complete, more than two years after it first broke ground.

The purpose of the agency is unclear, although it appears to be focused on the global Internet and not North Korea’s national intranet and implies that Internet usage and access is growing in the DPRK, although still at a low level.

The new headquarters is located on the bank of the Taedong River, just a couple of blocks south of Kim Il Sung Square. Commercial satellite imagery shows a steady pace of construction on the building since its groundbreaking ceremony in November 2015. As of July 12, 2018, the building seems to be near externally complete. However, construction appears to have started on another new building in a neighboring plot to the south sometime between April and October 2017, and continues to date. The purpose of this second building is yet unknown.

Figure 1. Commercial satellite imagery show the Internet Communication Bureau headquarters site prior to and the progression of construction from May 2015 to October 2017.

A photograph shot by Matt Pointon on September 9, 2017, shows the general shape of the building: a covered entrance way, five floors tall with the roof rising to a lip in one corner at the front.

Figure 3. Pyongyang’s Internet Communication Bureau building is seen in the foreground of this photo.

(Photo: Matt Pointon)

The groundbreaking ceremony for this building took place on November 25, 2015. The importance of the project was underlined by the attendance of Kim Kwang Chol (김광철), the DPRK’s Minister of Posts and Telecommunications, and Ri Kwang Gun (리광근), the country’s Vice Minister of External Economic Relations, according to state media.

Kim Kwang Chol spoke at the groundbreaking and said the Internet Communication Center would help modernize the communications network in the country.

Also in attendance was Tit Shan Sandy Cheng, chairman of Thai Loxpac, which is also known as Loxley Pacific, and is responsible for running the Internet in North Korea. Star, the sole North Korean Internet provider, is a joint venture between Loxley Pacific and the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications.

Figure 4. Groundbreaking for the Pyongyang Internet Communication Bureau on November 25, 2015.

(Photo: DPRK Today)

Figure 5. Groundbreaking for the Pyongyang Internet Communication Bureau on November 25, 2015.

(Photo: DPRK Today)

It appears the new building plays a part in facilitating Pyongyang’s connection to the greater global Internet, but its exact role hasn’t been reported. It could perhaps be meant to hold servers that provide the handful of sites that Pyongyang has on the web or as a gateway center to monitor and help control all traffic flowing between North Korea and the rest of the world.

We can probably rule out any subversive purpose—such as a hacking center—as such a facility is unlikely to have been publicized by state media and involve a foreign company. However, subversive online activities launched from North Korea would likely still flow through here if everything we know about the North Korean Internet is correct.

While the average North Korean doesn’t have access to the Internet, connections are available in some government departments, trading companies and universities. Access is monitored, and users don’t have complete freedom to visit any site they wish, but foreign technical databases, such as World Bank indexes, can be particularly useful. Some content is downloaded from the Internet and made available to a wider audience on the country’s national intranet service.

With Kim Jong Un’s new focus on building the economy in 2018 and his trips to China, it is tempting to think that some relaxation of the restrictions on Internet access could be coming for North Korea. If that happens, it will almost certainly continue to be focused on using the network to gain information and knowledge from overseas and for commercial trading. Kim’s regime still relies on tight information control to keep public order and so any change there would have to be accompanied by a major shift in how the country operates and how the government controls its people.

]]>Launch of the “Korea Computer Center”: An E-library of North Korean Softwarehttps://www.38north.org/2018/01/mwilliams011818/
Thu, 18 Jan 2018 19:27:35 +0000https://www.38north.org/?p=14332In late December, Will Scott, an American computer scientist who once taught at the Pyongyang University of Science and Technology…

]]>In late December, Will Scott, an American computer scientist who once taught at the Pyongyang University of Science and Technology (PUST), launched an ambitious effort to create an open library of North Korean software.

The site is called the “Korea Computer Center,” somewhat cheekily borrowing the name of Pyongyang’s main computer programming center. It features items from Scott’s collection of North Korean software, providing a rare opportunity for users to examine it first hand and learn more about the country’s IT infrastructure. It will also act as a depository for other users who might have North Korean software and devices to share information and deepen the open source understanding of the hardware and software ecosystem inside the country.

Upsides and Downsides to Greater Scrutiny

The site was launched in conjunction with what has become an annual discussion of North Korea’s consumer technology at the Chaos Computer Club’s annual conference in Germany. The first lecture was in 2014, when Scott first introduced the Red Star Operating System (OS), and was followed in 2015 and 2016, with hackers providing a fascinating glimpse into North Korea’s electronic document control and tracking systems built into its operating systems.

However, much can be learned about North Korea’s domestic IT landscape from further examination of its software. For instance, the way that devices have been programmed to access the national intranet can tell us something about its structure and the security settings will provide detail on how much network-level surveillance takes place. For organizations interested in infiltrating North Korea with information, such data can be very valuable.

Perhaps controversially, Scott also understands that programmers will discover bugs and publish them, which means that North Korean computer scientists will also learn from this examination and may be able to patch their software.

“The current situation is the worst-case scenario for them,” he said. “They have to assume that foreign intelligence agencies have access to their devices because they know things are getting exfiltrated. But those things aren’t public so, from Korea’s perspective, foreigners are going to figure out what the bugs are and install malware, but they don’t get the benefit of more eyes looking at it.”

Scott said that from this project, North Korean programmers will also get a “free backchannel” of what may need improvement in the next version. While this may not be the effect that foreign intelligence services would like to happen, he thinks the benefits outweigh the risks.

Specs and Findings

At the time of the website’s launch, Scott’s collection showed that North Korea has made impressive advancements since the original Red Star OS days.

One of the releases is a full software image of a Pyongyang 2407 Android smartphone. The 8GBs of files include the basic Android operating system and all of the customized files that North Korean programmers added to the phone.

Pyongyang 2407 was made by Gionee Communication Equipment, a major Chinese smartphone producer. The same phone is on sale in India as the Gionee V5, which means the phone image can be loaded onto an Indian model to recreate the Pyongyang 2407 experience. Armed with the appropriate technical skills, a programmer could do this to investigate the various modifications and controls added to Android by North Korean programmers.

There are also Android apps from a Samjiyon tablet, including an encyclopedia, a cooking app, a dictionary and a library of works by Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. The apps were custom-written for the Samjiyon so many won’t run easily on other Android devices as of yet.

“The hope is that it will inspire some people to modify the apps so they are installable on any device,” Scott said. He hopes people will do this “because they think it’s cool and will make it more accessible.”

(Photo: Martyn Williams)

He’s also uploaded 4GBs of North Korean educational texts in PDF format that span several subjects but are centered on computer science.

(Photo: Martyn Williams)

Through those we see, for example, some screenshots of the domestic intranet.

Here’s a low-resolution shot of the Kwangmyong service from 2001.

(Photo: Martyn Williams)

And an email app from the same era:

(Photo: Martyn Williams)

And a more contemporary look from 2010:

(Photo: Martyn Williams)

By examining the books, it’s clear that some are translations of foreign texts. Some have even appeared within a year of them being published in English—a sign that North Korea is serious about current programming techniques.

“This is evidence that they are really keeping up with what the outside world is doing in terms of their focus on taking these external knowledge curriculum and text books and bringing it into their internal education system,” explained Scott.

(Photo: Martyn Williams)

In publishing the PDF files, the team running the site had to strip out tracking code that had been inserted into the files by the Red Star OS. The software adds a hard-drive serial number to files when they are opened, potentially allowing the government the ability to determine all the computers on which a file has been viewed.

With the initial website launch, Scott is hoping that people will do more than just download the files. “There’s a lot of people who have various devices out there, and there has been a huge reluctance to share stuff,” he said. He hopes other people with North Korean software, apps and devices will get in touch and send or lend the things to his team so they can duplicate the data. If it’s safe to release, they’ll add it to the website’s collection.

The files are available via BitTorrent links. To download them, you’ll need a BitTorrent client on your computer, such as µTorrent that runs on Windows, Mac and Linux.

]]>Russia Provides New Internet Connection to North Koreahttps://www.38north.org/2017/10/mwilliams100117/
Mon, 02 Oct 2017 00:34:40 +0000https://www.38north.org/?p=13789A major Russian telecommunications company appears to have begun providing an Internet connection to North Korea. The new link supplements…

]]>A major Russian telecommunications company appears to have begun providing an Internet connection to North Korea. The new link supplements one from China and will provide back-up to Pyongyang at a time the US government is reportedly attacking its Internet infrastructure and pressuring China to end all business with North Korea.

The connection, from TransTeleCom, began appearing in Internet routing databases at 09:08 UTC on Sunday, or around 17:38 Pyongyang time on Sunday evening. Internet routing databases map the thousands of connections between telecom providers and enable computers to figure out the best route to a destination.

Until now, Internet users in North Korea and those outside accessing North Korean websites were all funneled along the same route connecting North Korean ISP Star JV and the global Internet: A China Unicom link that has been in operation since 2010.

Global Internet connectivity to Star JV. The orange denotes the China Unicom connection and blue the TransTeleCom. The graphic shows the Russian connection coming online around 0900 UTC, a short period of instability then a stable connection with two networks. (Dyn Research)

“The addition of Russian transit would create new internet path out of the country, increasing its resilience and international bandwidth capacity,” said Doug Madory, who analyzes global Internet connectivity at Dyn Research.

After this report was published, TransTeleCom issued a brief statement that didn’t directly address the link but didn’t dispute it.

“TransTeleCom (TTK) has historically had a connection to the communication network of North Korea under the agreement with Korea Posts and Telecommunications Corp, which was signed in 2009,” it said.

The new link comes at an interesting time.

On Saturday, The Washington Post reported that US Cyber Command has been carrying out denial of service attacks against North Korean hackers affiliated with the Reconnaissance General Bureau. The attacks attempt to overwhelm their computers and the Internet connection with traffic making them slow or impossible to use.

The US cyber attack was due to end on Saturday, reported the Post. That means the new Russian connection went online just after the US Cyber Command attack ended.

TransTeleCom, or TTK, is one of Russia’s biggest telecommunications companies and a subsidiary of the Russian railway operator. Fiber optic lines are laid alongside the railway and, according to a map on its website, on a route from Vladivostok right up to the North Korean border.

A map of the TTK network shows a link running right up to the North Korean border.

That’s presumably at the Friendship Bridge, a railway crossing over the Tumen River that connects Khasan in Russia with Tumangang in North Korea. It’s the only connection between the two countries.

This isn’t the first time North Korea has had alternate routes for Internet connectivity.

From 2012 for about a year, a second link to Star JV existed via Intelsat, an international satellite telecommunications operator, but in recent years the Chinese link has been the sole connection to Star JV.

Relying on one Internet provider has always left North Korea in a precarious situation.

More than once the link has been the target of denial of service attacks. Most were claimed by the “Anonymous” hacking collective, but on at least one previous occasion, many wondered if US intelligence services had carried out the action.

North Korea has few Internet users, but access to the network is available at major universities, to foreigners via smartphone, at government departments and major companies. Elite families are also suspected of having access. The cyber units of North Korea’s military also enjoy access.

The link is also vital for overseas researchers and academics who rely on access to North Korean state media websites for information.

On September 25, the BBC launched its Korean-language service, adding another voice to radio stations already targeting North Koreans with news and information.

BBC Korea is part of a major expansion of BBC language services and comes after a grassroots campaign to get the BBC on air alongside South Korea’s KBS and two US networks: Voice of America and Radio Free Asia. A handful of religious broadcasters also target North Korea as does South Korea’s National Intelligence Service.

Officially, the BBC says its broadcasts are intended for the “Korean peninsula”—no doubt an attempt to partially deflect complaints from the North Korean government—but there is little doubt of who the real target is.

So, will anyone listen and will it do any good?

There’s no reliable way to measure radio audiences in the country and the authorities aggressively attempt to jam foreign broadcasts, but there is evidence that North Koreans are tuning in to broadcasts from overseas.

Defectors have talked of listening to overseas broadcasts, some crediting the programs with helping them make up their minds whether to defect. As with any data based on defector interviews, the sample is skewed to people who were dissatisfied with their government and, in many cases, lived near the border where overseas radio reception is easier, but that is the best data we have.

Much of the listening happens late at night, when atmospheric propagation helps radio signals travel further distances and when people can secretly listen at home with less chance of being discovered.

A 2010 survey carried out by the Broadcasting Board of Governors, which oversees Voice of America and Radio Free Asia, found audiences began climbing at 9:00 PM local time and spiked in the 11:00 PM to midnight hour.[1] More than half of the entire survey group reported listening each hour between 11:00 PM and 1:00 AM.

And so the BBC’s Korean service is broadcasting from midnight until 3 AM Pyongyang time. The full broadcast is carried on two shortwave frequencies, from Taiwan and Tashkent, and the middle hour is relayed on mediumwave, from Mongolia.

Mediumwave is more common than shortwave on North Korean radios, so it’s a smart choice, but the signal from Mongolia will be weak by the time it reaches Pyongyang. Shortwave signals will be stronger, but the BBC still faces a battle in getting a good signal into North Korea.

As listening to foreign radio is illegal, the government makes a great effort to prevent people from doing so. At the most basic level, it modifies radios so they cannot be tuned into anything but state-run channels, although that can be later reverse engineered.

A much bigger problem is radio jamming, where loud noise is deliberately broadcast over a foreign station to make it difficult or impossible to listen to.

On its first evening of broadcasts to North Korea, both BBC shortwave channels were aggressively targeted.

It wasn’t possible to evaluate whether the mediumwave channel was also targeted.

Despite the jamming, foreign broadcasters think it’s worth continuing. Radio, while not as sexy as smuggled soap operas on USB sticks, remains the only way that up-to-date news can be quickly sent into North Korea. While broadcasters have shifted to satellite TV and the Internet in targeting other countries, North Korea remains stuck in the 1980s in terms of options.

North Koreans that do listen to foreign radio are keen consumers of information.

A 2012 study by InterMedia found elite listeners relied on foreign broadcasts as a key source of external information and analytical reporting.

In its first night on air, BBC Korea carried news and sports that was more broadly focused than the fare found on U.S.-broadcasters. The Korean service has its own team of reporters but also draws on the global newsgathering resources of the BBC, so alongside an interview with Ban Ki Moon, there was a report on the German elections, the Kurdish independence vote and a possible eruption of a volcano in Indonesia. The news ended with a weather forecast for North Korea.

There’s also an “essential English conversation” language learning program, offering lessons such as: “Hi, my name is Phil. Nice to meet you.” Such educational programming could help differentiate the BBC from other broadcasters that are more focused on news or North-South issues.

Beyond the people tuning in, the information carried on such broadcasts can also have a second life when it is relayed to others. The 2010 BBG study found just over two out of five people said they passed on news and information from foreign broadcasts to their friends and neighbors. Just over a quarter confessed to sharing it with family members and a third of people, illustrating the risk involved, said they shared it with no-one.

InterMedia’s report found that more than three quarters of all foreign radio listeners were in their 30s and 40s. Two thirds lived in urban areas and counted South Korean stations as their most-trusted source of information (32%), followed by foreign stations in Korean (16%).

Some of the BBC’s Korean language output is also available on the Internet: bbc.com/korean.

Broadcast frequencies for the radio programs are 5810 kHz and 9940 kHz shortwave and 1431 kHz mediumwave. From October 28, 2017, until March 24, 2018, the shortwave broadcasts will be carried on 5810 kHz and 5830 kHz.

]]>Thanks to YouTube, North Korea Has Just Become Even More Opaquehttps://www.38north.org/2017/09/mwilliams092217/
Fri, 22 Sep 2017 17:42:26 +0000https://www.38north.org/?p=13736YouTube’s decision to delete North Korean YouTube channels has served to highlight the sometimes-unintended consequences of sanctions and the absolute…

]]>Screenshot of Uriminzokkiri channel on YouTube before it was taken down.

YouTube’s decision to delete North Korean YouTube channels has served to highlight the sometimes-unintended consequences of sanctions and the absolute power enjoyed by Internet companies over their users. In doing so, the company has cut off a vital supply of video used by open source researchers, which means there is now less visibility into what’s happening in North Korea. The Western world’s understanding of North Korea is limited to begin with, cutting off access to these few windows into North Korean thinking and life further hampers our knowledge of the country.

On September 8, some in the open source intelligence community logged on to YouTube to find the “Uriminzokkiri” (우리민족끼리) channel was gone.

The only explanation from Google was a simple notice: “This account has been terminated for violating YouTube’s community guidelines.” At about the same time, the same message appeared on the “StimmeKoreas” YouTube channel.

Both had been on YouTube for about 7 years, each had thousands of archived videos and millions of views, and had become essential references for video from the DPRK. There were hours of news videos, documentaries and military programming that had enabled researchers to uncover numerous secrets about the DPRK over the years. Needless to say, those researchers were not pleased.

Adam Cathcart, a well-known North Korea scholar at the University of Leeds in the UK, wrote the termination of the two channels and a third, “Tonpomail,” had caused “harm to the open source intelligence community, and to scholars who have used the channels to analyze North Korean discourse, leadership, intentions, and missile capabilities.”

Curtis Melvin, who runs the popular North Korean Economy Watch blog, was more direct: “So today @Google and @Youtube seriously fucked OSINT community’s ability to monitor developments in North Korea. An ‘own-goal’ for our side.”

So, what happened?

At first, Google didn’t want to answer. In what’s become standard practice for major Internet companies, it remained silent on its decision.

On the surface, none of the three channels appeared to violate YouTube’s terms of service but, as others have found out before, Silicon Valley Internet companies can pull service for just about any reason and will rarely entertain debate.

Earlier this week, in an article appearing in Foreign Policy, Cathcart criticized North Korea for its closed internet and argued that the inability of North Korean elites to access our media without filters would lead to more misunderstandings. According to Cathcart, “…now the shoe is on the other foot.”

“I am sure that other scholars and analysts are shaking their heads today, all for their own specific reasons,” he wrote. “The research landscape is suddenly less abundant, and the granular insights we had had into North Korea’s propaganda apparatus and some of the methods by which Kim Jong-un controls the country are now no longer possible.”

A few days later, after a handful of media reports, YouTube quietly restored Uriminzokkiri and StimmeKoreas. But just as researchers had begun rejoicing, Uriminzokkiri was gone again. This time it was for a different reason: “This account has been terminated due to a legal complaint.”

Curiously, StimmeKoreas remained online but the operator of the channel was just as much in the dark about what was going on. He did not get any information why the channel was blocked and then unblocked a day later. Things finally became clear when YouTube started replying to queries from reporters.

“We love that YouTube is a powerful platform for documenting events and shining light on dark corners around the world, but we must comply with the law,” it wrote. “We disable accounts that repeatedly violate our Community Guidelines or Terms of Service and when we are required by law to do so.”

It seems the root of the action was new sanctions from the United Nations Security Council. Resolution 2375 froze the assets of the DPRK government’s propaganda and agitation department, which the UN said, “has full control over the media.” That includes Uriminzokkiri, which is a government mouthpiece run from a base in China.

Thus, for YouTube, the decisive factor was whether a channel is operated by the North Korean government. If so, under the new sanctions, it must take it offline. StimmeKoreas, which has remained online, carries North Korean video content but is operated by a private citizen. As the founder said in a statement, “I’m very interested in Korea so I started the channel to gather information about the DPRK in their own perspective. It’s always important to see both sides, and this is a channel to see the DPRK’s point of view, no matter what your personal believes [sic] are.”

The issue highlights the fragile Internet links that North Korea relies on to get its message out to the world. Those links are just as fragile for researchers.

The Uriminzokkiri website, which is hosted by China Unicom, is still online and it has quietly started a new YouTube channel. It also hosts video on its own site and almost 8,000 videos on Chinese video streaming platform Youku. If China is to get stricter on implementing UN sanctions, their days could be numbered as well.

The incident also highlights the need for researchers to save and store as much as possible, and to keep local copies of everything. Because with increased sanctions and attention on North Korea, you never know when an account could get zapped and you could lose everything.