Kagarlitsky was invited to participate as the “expert” in a discussion on the relationship between Russian business and the state. Clearly, they didn’t read his resume carefully. The panel featured a self-described “patriotic economist,” an “aggressive” former publisher of a well-known newspaper, a brewer cum financier, and a token “small businessman” gas station owner. The topic centered around “yet another report of the patriotic economists” that pointed the finger at Russia’s oligarchs for the nation’s economic woes.

I actually wonder about this. Not in regard to the veracity of the claim, but what the “oligarchs” as blame means politically. After all these oligarchs are now Putin’s oligarchs. Their screw up can double back as his screw up. As Marx once remarked, “The executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie.” But then again, this maxim doesn’t always fit Russia. The elite has a tendency toward cannibalization, and the vozhd has historically shown to have no problem making an example of his underlings. So are the oligarchs merely lambs to the slaughter in waiting? Maybe. Let’s hope. If the Russians really want to adopt the Chinese model, then they should really adopt it. The economic crisis has revealed the oligarchs for what they really are: “billionaire-bolsheviks” who run to the state hat in hand to cover their debts, or worse continually fleece it and its people while the former use their ownership over the culture industry to propagate the lies that say that “crisis” is merely a aberrant tick in an otherwise socio-economic ubermensch.

Predictably, Russia isn’t the only place where such creatures reside. As Mark Ames recently put it in his own eloquent way: “[The Russians] had their bolsheviks; we [Americans] have our billionaire-bolsheviks. The effect of these two rapacious ruling elites is the same: the state and the people serve the tiny ruling class; and when we’re not serving them, we can fuck off and die. Literally. Because that serves them too.”

But back to Kagarlitsky. Unsurprisingly the “greedy oligarchs as guilty” meme prompted a fiery discussion, or one could say, a performance where each “shouted, squealed, called one another abusive names – almost seized the other by the hair.” Kagarlitsky continues:

The intellectual and theoretical level of discussion matched this display of tact and delicacy. The publisher said that oligarchs generate the ongoing blessings of efficiency. The others, united for a moment, condemned him; however, they then plunged into confusion and disarray as the topic devolved towards economic policy. It seems that it is necessary both to strengthen the state and give more freedom to business; at the same time, not interfere with market processes yet to provide appropriate regulation down the corporate line. Credits, which once again the government has given to corporations, will be once again plundered.. Everybody, even the publisher, took this as axiomatic. But, in the future, they all agreed, very radical steps are necessary. The system of “guaranteed loans” has to be changed . Big companies now get credit from the state against the “security” of future profits, which – it is very clear – will not be forthcoming. More tangible guarantees are necessary though the deep-thinking patriotic economist has no constructive suggestions as to what these might be.

How to disentangle this mess of rhetoric and contradictions? Instead of trying to grasp on and untie its tangled threads, Kagarlitsky simply chose to blow them apart:

Because time is running out, I have to limit myself to a very short summary: Nationalize everything, and confiscate without any indemnification. We – the people of Russia – have already paid for this property twice. The first time, when all these factories were built and then, for symbolical pennies, were given to the present owners; and now, the second time, when the owners of the companies led their businesses into bankruptcy and the state promptly bought out their debts out and, again, has left the companies with the owners.

The billionaire-bolsheviks were out bolsheviked. But Kargarlitsky’s broadside reveled something much deeper. His use of the N-word, not that N-word, but the one that throws any capitalist into a tizzy, nationalization, proved that when push comes to shove the the business class displays a uncanny measure of class unity. But there is more. And for that more, I will let Kagarlitsky speak for himself (with me adding emphasis):

The Russian businessmen and their liberal intellectuals adore complaining about the state and officials, and simultaneously about rackets, the mafia and corruption, dumping the responsibility for these phenomena on this same state. However, on a closer look, it is easy to understand that they have exactly the state they want. If you underpay taxes (which are rather low anyway), it is quite clear that the vacuum generated by the weakness of the government will be filled by corruption. You complain about bribes, but – using those bribes – you receive contracts and public funds. And all time you ask for new privileges, grants, help and indulgences. Certainly, business would prefer to not pay either taxes to the state treasury or bribes to racketeers and officials. But if you would choose between taxes and bribes, between the strong state and systematic corruption, most likely, your business without hesitation would choose the latter. And anyway the choice has long since been made. Our state – as it exists today – entirely corresponds to that that choice of our domestic bourgeoisie. As the saying goes, “two boots are a pair,” not only are they ideally similar to each other, but they are unable to function without each other.

And what about loud quarrels, with breaking of dishes? The same can happen, even in families. The falling out of lovers is the renewal of love.

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On April 18, OAO Gazprom, the Russian state-owned gas monolith, gained the controlling stake in Sakhalin Energy Investment Company Ltd. (50% + 1 share) that it had been promised in December after the internationally publicised‘scandal’ surrounding the allegations made against the company by the Federal Service for the Supervision of Natural Resources (“Rosprirodnadzor”), the Russian government’s environmental watchdog.

The predominant strand of Western commentary, which maintains that Gazprom is an instrument of state-sponsored bullying, has been steadfast in its resilience since September when the affair became public. In the meantime, Anna Politkovskaya was murdered outside her Moscow apartment (October 7), Aleksandr Litvinenko was poisoned to death in London (November), Belarus was dealt a repeat of the gas cut-off suffered by Ukraine (January), and Russia and its ‘crumbling’ democracy has been a regular focus of the mainstream media. With the passing of Boris Yeltsin on April 23, many foreign commentators, both politicians and journalists, could not resist the temptation to at least make sidelong implications hinting at the current president’s ‘regressiveness’, compared with Mr. Yeltsin’s legacy as a ‘defender of democracy’ and the ‘conqueror of Communism’.

There is hardly a need to recount the allegations brought against Putin’s Russia. They are, by now, very familiar and verging on monotony. Europeans are concerned for their energy security, investors are weary, democracy pundits are up in arms, whilst the US government seems to seriously believe that the “defensive” anti-missile shield being developed in Poland and the Czech Republic is not an affront against Russia’s international perspective.

It would be na?ve and foolish to suggest that democracy in Russia is not in grave danger. Presidential appointment, rather than popular election, has become the normative vehicle for accession to governmental and judiciary positions. Political opposition is on its last legs, with popular protest restricted and liberal candidates being struck off electoral ballots for allegedly collecting forged signatures. The perceived freedom of the press is diminishing rapidly with every mysterious journalist death, while Gazprom and friends buy up more and more of the main media outlets.

But is Gazprom’s state-sponsored strategy really world domination? Is the company just a foreign policy tool with the expressed aim of re-establishing a second post-Soviet Moscow-centric empire, this time through economic means? Has the Kremlin succeeded in embracing and manipulating capitalism to reignite the old flame of its expansionist ambitions?

The answer is, inevitably perhaps, both yes and no. Yes because the company is owned by the state, and, like all commercial enterprises, its strategy includes expansion and increased profits; because the board of directors is composed of Putin allies and government ministers (including supposed presidential hopeful and First Deputy Premier Dmitriy Medvedev); because imperialist and nationalist sentiments are growing in Russia, fuelled by war, politics, media, literature, and theatre; because Russia has interests, either directly or indirectly, in a number of geopolitical disputes, from Kosovo through Transdniestr, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Kuril Islands north of Japan, and of course Chechnya, and is too reluctant to cede any ground to allow for any other foreign influences, especially those of the USA.

However, some degree of perspective is needed before condemning Russia and Gazprom too hastily – and not just because the arguments raised against them might be equally applicable to our own governments and corporations.

It is universally agreed that Russia’s ability to be seen as a threat has been brought about during President Putin’s tenure through unprecedented economic growth, the driving force of which is mineral exports – mainly oil and gas. Widespread wealth is a virgin concept to Russia, and the Moscow of today is a vastly different landscape to that of even five years ago, and the fruits of the county’s newfound prosperity have begun flowering also in the regions.

But the country is far from developed by any non-GDP-measured standards: healthcare is lagging behind drastically, social safety nets are still non-existent, housing is sub-standard, child poverty is rife, and a million people are homeless. The reported crime rate has been on the rise since the lost years of the late 90s. Hundreds of thousands of abandoned and orphaned children live in state institutions, the majority of which will never be integrated into mainstream society. Outside Moscow and a few of the very biggest cities, infrastructure is limited. It is indicative that, in the country with the largest gas resources in the world, only 54% of the population is directly supplied with domestic gas – this figure falls to 34% in rural areas.

The problem with the typical western analysis of Gazprom’s strategy, therefore, is that it does not take into account the domestic front on which it operates. In a country still very much in transition to market principles and economic stability, both the government and Gazprom have an entire system to overhaul and bring in line with the global regime. By doing so, they not onlystabilise Russia’s economy, but by proxy, they significantly contribute to the overall energy security of Europe and the world at large.

The domestic gas market in Russia is, in truth, not a market at all. Staggering differences in prices and incomes between Russia at the collapse of the Soviet Union and the West meant that domestic gas has been heavily subsidized by Gazprom and the government until now, as it was in communist times. Meanwhile, demand only grows both at home and abroad, while (Western-influenced) geopolitical concerns in the Middle East and Nigeria, as well as US antagonism with a number of South American regimes, maintain energy security in a state of tension and global prices remain high. The result is that Russia is increasingly called upon, from both East and West, to supply export fuel.

Gazprom currently makes a loss on its domestic gas sales, which limits the investiture it can embark on in order to exploit more of its abundant subsoil resources. The company is therefore straining to ensure that it can continue to meet rising demand and honour long-term supply contracts it has signed with a number of destination countries in Europe, whilst also trying to build relations with Asian markets such as India, China, Japan and South Korea. This is, of course, a worry for Gazprom itself and for all governments and citizens who rely on fossil fuel resources for their energy needs (and whilst the Green Revolution remains confined to a few OSCE countries, and alternative energy development is hardly revolutionary in its progress, this is essentially everyone) because it is the purses of the ordinary consumer which will be hardest hit by any prospective crisis in energy supply. The strategy laid out by the government is to gradually raise gas prices through its tariff system, gradually introducing long-term supply contracts market pricing with an aim of having a fully market-based and sustainable system by 2011.

Contrary to Western opinion, Gazprom and the Federal Government are not two mirror-image manifestations of Soviet-style hegemony conspiring to conquer Russia, the former Soviet Union, and eventually the rest of the world. As with any pluriform political system, there are ideological divisions and tensions permeating the administration at every level: President Putin has, after all, preferred variety and continuity as to be a defining feature of his cadre, unlike Mr. Yeltsin who dispatched a seemingly endless string of ministers as soon as their opinion started to differ from his own. Internal talks regarding market liberalization, export policy, taxation, and so on, have stalled repeatedly due to relativistic differences (the government, for example, is proposing a sixfold increase in gas extraction tax, which Gazprom is vehemently opposing). The presence of disagreement and debate is, of course, perfectly typical of any legitimate democratic institution, and accusations of resurgent totalitarian authority are revealed to be, if not totally misplaced (debate is a fairly exclusive feature of the upper echelons after all, with only limited details reaching the eyes and ears of the press), then certainly a hysterical overreaction.

While Mr. Putin’s favoured doctrine of “sovereign” or “controlled” democracy comes under frequent attack on this side of the divide, where Politkovskaya, Kasparov, Berezovsky and other militant Putin-haters are given a practical monopoly of editorial exposure, the predominant, and undoubtedly not enforced perspective (the legacy of Russian dissidence is far too strong for that) in Russia itself is both more balanced and varied. It is recognized and conceded that statist reforms are a necessary counterweight to the rampant kleptocracy pervaded by the self-serving pro-business bratva of the Yeltsin-era, that the oligarchs had to be brought in check (and for all the injustices committed against Mikhail Khodorkovsky, insofaras as he was singled out and packaged as a universal warning, let us not forget that he was legitimately found guilty of tax evasion and fraud), and that enforced counter-insurgent pacification was the only way to stop the bloodshed in Chechnya.

The case of Sakhalin Energy is no different. The original Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) was signed in 1994, when Russia was a still fragile capitalistic embryo desperate for foreign investment and willing to accept almost any conditions. Multinational energy corporations are hardly known for their compromising nature, while the Russian authorities of the time were far from reaching any recognized apex of accountability. The recent action can therefore be interpreted as a Russified reverse model of the successful attempt of the British and American governments in overthrowing the Iranian Shah in 1953 for threatening to nationalize oil interests there. Furthermore, there is no reason to suppose that Sakhalin Energy was not in violation of environmental protocols (although, equally, there is no evidence to suggest that the newly Russian-controlled enterprise is making any attempt to rectify any infringement).

Mr. Putin’s speech at the Munich conference on Security Policy in February and the subsequent reactions signified the start of a new era of US-Russian tension, and talk of a new cold war has abounded. Conflicts of interest exist in almost every sphere of political activity: the new “space race” being waged over the control of global satellite surveillance (the US’s GPS vs. Europe’s Galileo vs. Russia’s GLONASS), the struggle for influence in Middle Eastern affairs (with Russia increasing its stake in the Palestinian conflict, renewing speculation on the possible formation of a new OPEC-style gas cartel, cooperating with Iran over nuclear power, etc.), Russia’s renewed friendliness with Japan, a traditionally staunch US-ally, and its increasing diplomatic and strategic cooperation with Europe (especially Germany) are all cause for concern for Republicans and Democrats alike.

One key area in which the US has been striving to increase its holding is Central Asia, doggedly supporting the colour-revolutions (recently revealed to be a false dawn in Ukraine) and rapidly expanding its energy interests in Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and other resource-rich countries. Meanwhile, it has been vociferous in the assault against Gazprom for forcibly raising gas prices in Ukraine, Georgia and Belarus. There is a fatal contradiction at play here which is plain to see for anyone who cares to look: if the West is so stridently in favour of market liberalism and democracy, and principally against a “repressive” and “anti-democratic” Russia re-establishing its sphere of influence over its new sovereign neighbours, why on earth would they want Russia to carry on subsidizing their gas consumption, negating the development of the desired economic principles and maintaining an economic leash with which to rein them in at will? On the contrary, Moscow has throughout this decade made a string of concessions to the CIS states to establish their independence and re-mould them into strong, strategic partners, rather than subservient, and therefore reliant, puppet regimes. It is only in cases of open hostility (such as Georgia) that severe measures have been taken to draw a line in the sand. The outcomes of the price disputes of recent winters should be interpreted as the controlled release of the adolescent flock from the parental nest, and not as a threat to Europe, the US, or anyone else.

The question remains: what of the future? Russia is approaching an all-important crossroads, in the form of the March 2008 Presidential Elections. Suffice it to say that Putin will almost certainly not be a candidate, while common wisdom has it that former Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov and Dmitriy Medvedev (current Chairman of Gazprom) are the main contenders. The end of the Putin era will signify the closing chapter of a Golden Age for many Russians, while it cannot be supposed that much systemic change will be implemented by either victorious candidate.

In the meantime, we in the West must recognize that Russia is completing a crucial and at times painful first phase of transition from totalitarianism to capitalist democracy. Unreasoned hostility will only push the regime towards greater antagonism, as has been witnessed in the rise of Islamist militancy throughout the years of the War On Terror. Baiting the bear will only increase our own security worries, while positively encouraging liberal reform through cooperation and trade will serve to continue the ascendance of stability, democracy and reform in this most turbulent of countries. If alignment is what we wish from the Russians, then we must stop blindly criticising them.

Simon Lewis is an occasional writer on Russian and other international affairs. He studied Russian and Linguistics at Oxford University, and has worked as a teacher, orphanage volunteer, translator and writer in Russia. He is now employed in Russian oil and gas research in London.

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One hundred years ago today, the First International Women’s Congress adopted International Women’s Day as a day of struggle for women’s rights. But in Russia, where the holiday, what was once a day calling for a “struggle against patriarchy,” has in many ways become patriarchy’s reinforcement.

The new issue of the New Left Review has two articles on Russia worth reading. The first, “Russia Redux?” by Vladimir Popov, examines the macroeconomic trends Russia has experienced since Putin became president. Though “there is more stability in Russia today than during the rocky 1990s,” Popov argues, compared to other post-Soviet republics “Russia’s performance is not that impressive.” Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and, to some extent, Armenia all “reached or exceeded their pre-recession (1989) levels of output by 2006, whereas Russian GDP was still only at 85 per cent of the 1989 level.”Further he states the reason for Russia lax growth rate is due to the ruble’s overvalue and economy’s sandy foundations:

The reason for the 2001–06 deceleration in growth was the overvaluation of the real exchange rate—the typical Dutch disease that Russia has developed once again. It first arose in 1995–98, leading to the currency crisis of August 1998, and it now seems that history is repeating itself. Optimists argue that, unlike in 1998, Russia currently has large foreign exchange reserves (over $250 billion), but pessimists point out that if oil prices drop and capital starts to flee at a rate of $5 billion a week, as it did in July–August 1998, these reserves would be depleted very quickly. A future devaluation could take the form of either a currency crisis or a ‘soft landing’, but there is little doubt that it will eventually take place.

Besides, current growth is not based on solid foundations: wages and incomes in recent years have been growing systematically faster than productivity, so that the share of consumption in gdp has increased at the expense of investment. As a result, whereas Russian personal and public consumption has already exceeded the pre-recession level, investment is still below 40 per cent of what it was in the last year of existence of the USSR. Russian gross savings are large—over 30 per cent of GDP—but they have been funnelled away via the outflow of private capital and the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves; gross investment therefore amounts to less than 20 per cent of GDP.

In regard to where Russia is headed, Popov prognosis is that Russia’s future depends on how it chooses to reconcile one of its longest running historical conundrums:

Russia now needs more than anything to strengthen law and order and to restore the institutional capacity of the state. Democracy is also needed, but only later, when the rule of law has been established. There is, of course, a danger that the leadership will use political centralization to line everyone up along the ‘vertical of power’ and eliminate opposition in order to live in serene comfort at the citizens’ expense—and perhaps also to embark on the occasional escapade. This has happened in Russia before. But one must choose the lesser of two evils. Strengthening law and order is only possible under a centralized system. Without centralization, there is no chance at all of it happening; unbounded chaos and lawlessness would rule. This seems to be the choice facing Russia today.

Popov’s article is nicely supplemented by Tony Wood’s “Contours of the Putin Era.”Taking off from Popov’s economic analysis, Wood probes further into how Russian society has faired under Putin in terms of the distribution of wealth, the fissures in the elite, the reorientation of informal practices, and the costs of crime and the Chechen War.

One of the more interesting points Wood makes concerns the character of Russia’s ruling class. He notes that while “the melding of security services and political power is a salient characteristic of Putin’s Russia,” more striking is “the swelling presence of business in the state.”

Business has been a significant source of state cadres. This applies at all levels: a whole section of Putin’s Presidential Administration was drawn from the ranks of Al’fa Bank, while as Table 1 shows, by 2003 some 20 per cent of the government was drawn from business, which provided almost the same proportion of Duma deputies. The representation of business in the upper house of the Russian Federal Assembly was still higher: in 2002, almost a third of Federation Council members came from private enterprises.More than a dozen Russian regions, resource-rich ones prominent among them, are now headed by businessmen from major local companies.

Wood’s conclusion is an answer to Popov’s notion that Russia must choose between a lesser of two evils:

Popov concludes by emphasizing the need to choose the lesser evil of centralization and potential authoritarianism over the inevitable unravelling and chaos that will accompany any other course. Stability is the prime consideration; democracy can wait until more favourable circumstances develop. The question that immediately arises is: stability for whom? From the foregoing analysis, it should be clear that Russia’s rulers have little interest in the fortunes of the general populace; the current priority is rather to use the country’s natural resources to leverage a greater role in global affairs, and so carve out further opportunities for the internationalization of Russian capital. Entry into the wto will assist in the latter goal, though it will also bring with it a dismantling of the protections that have served Russian industry well, and undermine recent attempts to revive manufacturing in the automobile and aviation sectors. To the dangers Popov lists, then, we should add the exposure to international capitalist pressures and widening of existing inequalities that inevitably accompany WTO accession. These forms of destabilization will, of course, largely bypass the fractions of business and state most actively seeking them.

Finally, there is the matter of the lesser evil. Popov poses the alternatives in stark terms: the status quo or utter disaster. Such logic has long helped to rally critics of various kinds to otherwise unpalatable governments. But it is precisely the immunity from challenge or debate that enables crime, coercion and corruption to flourish; conversely, it is the availability of alternative proposals for future paths of development that constitutes the political health of a nation. Popov’s analysis presents many points from which such a discussion could begin.