Russian President Vladimir Putin has described the collapse of the Soviet Union as the "greatest geopolitical catastrophe" of the 20th century. Putin's actions in Ukraine reflect his determination to resurrect Russian power by reasserting historical Russian and Soviet national interests. Recognizing the geopolitics of the region could be a key to understanding and even easing the crisis in Ukraine.

The crisis contains many elements including the conflict between Ukrainian and Russian nationalism, the political and economic orientation of an independent Ukraine toward either Europe or Russia, and the religious schism between Catholicism and Russian orthodoxy (with echoes of Moscow as the Third Rome). In addition, we are witnessing the clash of civilizations, reminiscent of the 19th-century conflict between the Slavophiles and Westernizers, that Harvard professor Samuel Huntington predicted would take center stage after the Cold War. This civilizational fault line runs through the heart of Ukraine, exacerbating tensions between eastern and western sectors.

Russia's geopolitical interests center on maintaining its naval facilities in Crimea, which since the 18th century has been the home of Moscow's Black Sea Fleet. In 1999, Russia signed an agreement with Ukraine to lease naval facilities, including its base in Sevastopol. This lease, originally scheduled to expire in 2017, was extended to 2042. Under no circumstances will Russia give up this naval presence. With the need for a warm water port and unrestricted access through the Turkish Straits to and from the Mediterranean Sea, Russia considers its naval rights in Crimea a vital national security interest.

Putin also believes that reasserting dominance in Ukraine and in the wider "near abroad" is a necessary step toward re-establishing Russia as a regional and world power. Historically, both czarist Russia and the Soviet Union tried to extend influence westward into Europe and southward toward Southwest Asia and India. This meant establishing a buffer zone in Europe to improve defense against an attack, especially through Poland. During the Cold War, East European communist states were an important buffer. This buffer disappeared, however, with the demise of the communist states and their integration into the European Union and NATO. In effect, Russia saw Western influence that arrived almost overnight at its doorstep as a dangerous intruder in the region and threat to its national security.

The control of East/Central Europe has been considered a gateway toward domination of the "heartland" of Eurasia, which includes Ukraine. In the words of a 1904 analysis by British geopolitician Sir Halford Mackinder: "Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island; Who rules the World Island commands the World." This famous dictum undoubtedly resonates among the major players in this current version of the "Great Game." Putin realizes that the United States has long wanted to block Russia's control of the "heartland," considering this an unacceptable threat to its own national security.

The challenge for the parties in the current conflict over Ukraine is to recognize competing geopolitical interests and realities. The United States, the EU, and NATO should understand that Russia will not accept a Ukrainian government with a westward orientation. With no good military options and limited clout in Russia's backyard, they should refrain from further inflammatory rhetoric and not impose sanctions. All the countries, including Russia, should renounce the use of military force and focus on de-escalating tension and defusing the crisis through diplomacy.

The Crimean War in the mid-19th century that highlighted the tensions and conflicts among the players in the "Great Game" was a preview of World War I. Another Crimean war could have even more disastrous consequences.