At the beginning of 1944 the main lines of
strategy for the second front against Germany were fixed. To invade France
from the west was the paramount task for the year ahead. OVERLORD was to be
the greatest amphibious operation in history and the mightiest Allied
undertaking of the war. Despite the almost unbroken series of Allied
victories over the past year, Germany was far from defeated. The German war
machine and civilian morale showed no signs of cracking. In Italy the stiff
resistance put up by the German armed forces had combined with mud and
weather to bring the Allied advance to a halt. In early November 1943 Hitler
had begun to face the hard fact that Allied invasion of western Europe might
come at any time. Hitherto, whenever a crisis arose, the German High Command
had turned to the west for fresh forces. The heavy losses on the Soviet
front, the campaign in Italy, and the threat to the Balkans lead drawn off
the best German divisions. "I can no longer justify the further weakening of
the West in favor of other theaters of war," Hitler had informed his
commanders on1 November. Henceforth, he went on, forces and defenses in the
West would be strengthened to throw back the expected invasion into the sea,
or, at worst, to contain it in its beachhead.1

In the months that followed the Germans found it difficult to adhere closely
to the November directive. Demands from the Eastern Front continued and
first-class divisions were hard to come by. Nevertheless, by the spring the
Germans managed to replace their withdrawals from the West in quantity if
not in quality, and Field Marshal Rommel assumed command of the defenses of
western Europe. From information gleaned by German agents in the British
Embassy at Ankara, the Germans learned the meaning of the code word OVERLORD
in the early days of 1944 and concluded that the major Allied assault in
1844 would be in western Europe and not in the Balkans. Although they still
did not know where or when the invasion would take place, their anxiety over
the Balkans lessened, and they strove to complete the Atlantic Wall and
preparations to hold the Allies as close to the sea as possible.2

The Allies were faced with the grim

[402]

prospect that behind the reinforced defenses of the Atlantic Wall the
Germans were preparing for a desperate last-ditch effort that might hurl the
invasion forces back and snatch victory from the jaws of defeat. Until the
"big blow" across the Channel succeeded or failed, further major combined
decisions on military strategy would have to wait. In the meantime, within
the general pattern many critical problems-essentially logistical, tactical,
and administrative-had to be settled.

The hard struggle Marshall had waged in 1943 to retain freedom of action in
order to concentrate U.S. forces for the cross-Channel attack now appeared
ready to pay off. However, an important question remained. After two years
of diverting forces and resources to far-flung fronts and lines of
communications, could the staff fulfill the requirements of the highly
operational phase of global and coalition warfare and still gather enough
strength and means in time to meet General Eisenhower's needs?

Following his departure from the Mediterranean and a hurried trip to the
United States, General Eisenhower arrived in London on 14 January 1944 .
While in the United States he had conferred briefly with War Department
officials and the president on his new assignment.3Soon after his
notification in early December that he had been appointed Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, he had begun to lay
his plans and arrange his organization for OVERLORD.4In London, he
proceeded to plan for the invasion with the COSSAC staff, which he expanded
into the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). His chief
subordinates in the coalition command he was to forge included Air Chief
Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, his deputy; Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley, commander
of the First U.S. Army; General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, commanding
general of the 21 Army Group in charge of the assault phase; Lt. Gen. Carl
Spaatz, commander of U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe; Admiral Sir
Bertram Ramsay, Allied Naval Commander in Chief; Air Marshal Sir Trafford
Leigh-Mallory, Air Commander in Chief; and Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith,
Chief of Staff.5Eisenhower soon realized that much remained to be done in
planning and preparing for OVERLORD. Three days after he arrived, he wrote
to General Marshall:

It is obvious that strong and positive action is needed here in several
directions. The location of various headquarters, the exact pattern of
command, the tactics of the

[403]

assault, and the strength in units and equipment, are all questions that
have not yet been definitely settled. The most important of all these
questions is that of increasing the strength of the initial assault wave in
OVERLORD.6

In the next few months General Eisenhower and his staff
were busily engaged in settling these questions and completing the myriad
preparations necessary to carry out "the decisive act" of the war.7 Once
General Eisenhower had been put in charge and the general directives for
invading Europe had been issued, the burden of American staff work shifted
from Washington to his headquarters in London. Relying heavily on
Eisenhower's judgment, and on the "pick and shovel" work of his staff, the
CCS made their decisions on the logistical, tactical, and organizational
questions as they arose. Preparations for OVERLORD in the early months of
1944 illustrated
clearly the large role in strategic and operational planning for coalition
warfare that the overseas commander and the large theater headquarters had
come to play.

In Washington, General Marshall and his planning assistants closely followed
the course of the final preparations and planning for OVERLORD. As always,
the Army planning staff's particular preoccupation was with anything
affecting deployment of the U.S. Army in the worldwide conflict. OVERLORD,
the great effort toward which they had so long been pointing, was to be the
climax of the wearying months of planning, organizing, training, equipping,
and husbanding the citizen Army. With the decision made and the operation
entrusted to General Eisenhower, the Washington staff turned its attention
to many related problems, ranging from logistical preparations to
politico-military terms on which the war might be concluded. Through staff
studies, visits to the theater, and conferences with General Eisenhower and
his staff representatives in Washington and London, the Washington planners
sought to anticipate his needs and support his undertaking. From his vantage
point in the Washington headquarters, the Chief of Staff gave counsel and
offered suggestions to General Eisenhower-sometimes on his own initiative,
sometimes by invitation. As usual, he left final decisions to the
commander's judgment.

One interesting example where Marshall took the initiative
was in the use of airborne troops. He was much attracted by the bold and
relatively new idea of employing airborne troops strategically to execute a
vertical envelopment en masse far behind the battle

lines. In early February he therefore submitted to General Eisenhower a
proposal advanced by AAF headquarters to airdrop several divisions close to
Paris before or on D Day and thereby upset German defensive plans. To
present the specific plan he sent a small special mission composed of Brig.
Gen. Frederick W. Evans, Commanding General, Troop Carrier Command, and Col.
Bruce W. Bidwell, Operations Division airborne consultant. To Eisenhower he
wrote in advance:

The trouble with this plan is that we have never done anything like this
before, and frankly, that reaction makes me tired. Therefore I should like
you to give these young men an opportunity to present the matter to you
personally before your Staff tears it to ribbons. Please believe that, as
usual, I do not want to embarrass you with undue pressure. I merely wish to
be certain that you have viewed this possibility on a definite planning
basis.8

Nevertheless, General Eisenhower and

[405]

his staff, fearing the immobility of the force in the airhead before the
beachhead was secured and concerned with the need for immediate and close
support of the beachhead landings, felt that the plan was not feasible, at
least until after the beachhead was established.9 With some regret General
Marshall bowed to the overseas commander's decision. In concluding the
episode he wrote, characteristically:

I am sorry you do not see your way clear initially to commit the airborne
effort en masse. I hope, however, that the visit of these two officers
stimulated thought in the matter and served a useful purpose.10

From the beginning, General Marshall sought to strengthen the Supreme
Commander's position vis-à-vis his superiors and his subordinates.11 A
confirmed believer in giving the responsible commander wide latitude, he
also believed in giving him capable assistants. He was particularly
concerned that General Eisenhower be given outstanding corps and division
commanders and offered him his pick.12To place the best available personnel
in the proper slots for OVERLORD, a heavy transatlantic
correspondence flowed between the Washington Army headquarters and London in
the early months of 1944 When General Marshall felt it necessary, he would
prod tile theater staff even as he would their Washington counterparts.
Above all, General Marshall and his advisers remained on the lookout for
anything that might jeopardize the agreed strategic pattern. OVERLORD was
the key to victory in the global war, and it must not fail.

Windup of BOLERO

When General Eisenhower arrived in London in January 1944,
the American build-up for OVERLORD was Well under way. Only five months
remained before the troops would board the ships for the fateful venture
across the Channel. Fortunately, the groundwork in assembling, organizing,
training, equipping, and accommodating the forces for the great amphibious
undertaking lead been well laid by Washington and London. On the basis of
the 1942-43 experience with BOLERO, the pattern of Army staff action and
even the basic machinery for getting the troops to the United Kingdom were
already well established.13 Gone was the confusion and uncertainty that had plagued the
efforts of the planners to carry out the original BOLERO plan. Now the
cross-

[406]

Channel operation was a firm commitment and nothing was to be spared to
ensure its success. As a result of previous measures taken and plans laid on
both sides of the Atlantic, the Supreme Commander could feel reasonably
assured that the required "cutting edge" in trained and equipped divisional
strength would be available in time for the invasion.

The momentum of the build-up was greatly speeded in the
early months of 1944. The period of January through May saw the consummation
of the BOLERO movement begun by the War Department as far back as the spring
of 1942. Following successive slowdowns and delays in favor of meeting the
heavy requirements of the Mediterranean campaign and of the intensive
build-up of air forces for the United Kingdom, the dispatch of U.S. combat
divisions had been resumed in earnest in the fall of 1943. By January 1944,
about half of the required U.S. combat divisions were already in the United
Kingdom. The others were scheduled to arrive from the United States before D
Day.14 Actually, the number of combat divisions grew from eleven on 1 January 1944
to twenty by 31 May 1944. In January the 4th Armored Division completed its
overseas movement to the United Kingdom; in February, the 4th and 30th
Infantry Divisions and the 5th and 6th Armored Divisions; in April, the 90th,
79th, and 83d Infantry Divisions; and in May the
35th Infantry Division.15 Keeping
pace with the increase in divisions, the number of combat air groups in the
European theater doubled in the first five months of 1944-from 511/4 to 102
groups. 16 In the same period the
total strength of U.S. troops in the United Kingdom also doubled-rising by
the end of May to over a million and one half men.17 From the fall of 1943
to D Day, the flow of U.S. combat divisions averaged about two a month. As
in the past, many of the units were transported from the United States to
the United Kingdom in the large, fast, converted passenger liners-Queen Mary
and Queen Elizabeth. During this period an average of 150,000 men
were transported each month. The fresh American units coming from the United
States were well trained; those from the Mediterranean were battle tested.

At SEXTANT, on the basis of available ships and units, the
CCS had accepted a troop ceiling in the United Kingdom for U.S. Army
deployment of 1,476,300 by 31 May 1944, 18 The theater headquarters'
requests for D Day requirements exceeded these figures. To meet them the War
Department diverted 20,-

Equally impressive was the record of cargo shipments in the five months
preceding D Day. More than six million measurement tons poured into British
ports. The way was paved in December 1943 when the European theater gained
top priority for all necessary items of equipment. England became a bulging
storehouse.

The flow of troop and cargo shipments did not become a
really serious problem until spring. Even then the question was not
essentially one of the availability of ships, troops, or cargoes. Rather, a
crisis arose over the growing strain put on the port and inland
transportation facilities in the United Kingdom. The movement into the
United Kingdom during May overlapped the beginning of out-loading of men and
supplies for the cross-Channel operation. The limiting factor of port
capacity-itself a product of labor shortages and availability of
berths-fastened onto the entire build-up program. To meet the crisis,
various adjustments and expedients were worked out by SHAEF and the British
authorities. For its part, the War Department revised shipping schedules,
ceilings, and priority lists. One direct effect of the crisis over port
capacity was an agreement of the British authorities in late May to accept a
temporary cut in the British import program.20 In
spite of the serious strains and stresses on troop and cargo reception, the
tremendous flow of supplies and troops to the United Kingdom was maintained
in the final months preceding the invasion, though by 31 May there were
still certain shortages in service troops, the shipment of some combat units
had been deferred, and the problem of replacements had not yet been solved.21 But the SEXTANT
schedule for D Day had been exceeded by 50,000, and over a million and one
half American troops were in the United Kingdom poised for the attack.
BOLERO was at last complete.

The 90-Division Gamble

The requirements in troops for OVERLORD accented certain Army-wide manpower
pinches and made the planners take another serious look at the Army troop
basis. During the SEXTANT Conference, the Joint Logistics Committee had
estimated that there would be a serious shortage of service troops during
1944 for the war against Japan, and also a shortage of men for the B-29
program. The committee suggested that the Army troop basis be revised to
anticipate these shortages and that the United States take a calculated risk
and eliminate the fifteen infantry divisions that were to be set up in 1944.
This would leave the Army with ninety divisions-forty-three for the war in
Europe, seven for North Africa, twenty-two for the Pacific, and eighteen for
the continental reserve. If necessary, service troops could be organized
from

A Strategy Section report in late December 1943 substantiated this
estimate that ninety divisions would be enough to win the war, although
it allocated fifty-eight divisions for Europe and North Africa,
twenty-five for the Pacific, and kept only seven in reserve. The
Strategy Section recognized the possibility that the Army might not be
able to activate the additional fifteen divisions and remain within the
7,700,000-man ceiling adopted in November. The economy program had
released some 212,000 men for reassignment during 1943, but Selective
Service had fallen behind in its inductions, and the War Department was
200,000 men short of its 7,700,000 goal. On top of this, the rotation
program approved in December would require 60,000 men during 1944, and
the Air Forces had requested 130,000 men for its B-29 program. Even if
Selective Service were to meet its quotas in 1944 and make up the
200,000-man deficit, there would be a cushion of only 22,000 men left
over from the 212,000 recovered from the economy program. Besides, the
Strategy Section concluded, there were no firm requirements for the
fifteen additional infantry divisions .23

Activation of the fifteen divisions was deferred, but the
continuing scarcity of service troops led Marshall to call a conference of
theater G4's in Washington in late January to consider the problem. He wrote
personally to several theater commanders requesting their aid in effecting
any economies possible and recommended a number of expedients to relieve the
deficiency in service troops.24

Estimates submitted by General Somervell in January
anticipated a shortage of 40,000 service troops for ANVIL and 112,000 for
Pacific operations, but no increase in the troop basis was made. The Army
was trying desperately to stay within the 7,700,000 ceiling and to meet
needs from within by rigid economy and adjustment.25 Discussing the whole Army personnel problem
frankly with the JCS in early February, Marshall pointed out that the ground
forces were short about 87,000-97,000 troops and were forced to take men
from other divisions to fill up those going overseas. Economies had produced
a saving of 100,000 men but the need for manpower for the B-29 program had
eaten this up. Now there was a deficiency of 100,000 service troops for
OVERLORD, ANVIL, and western Pacific operations, and a large number of
tactical units was being used to help in the housekeeping of training
establishments in the United States in order to release service forces for
overseas duty. The need for service personnel often resulted in abbreviated
training periods and less efficient troops. Marshall estimated that
replacements and rotation fillers, added to induction shortages and ground
force and service de-

[409]

ficiencies, made the present deficit between 350,000 and 400,000 men
.26

Marshall decided that the time had come for drastic action. The Army, he
concluded, could not justify, in the face of such personnel shortages, the
Army Specialized Training Program that had been set up to educate some of
its more intelligent men in colleges. On 10 February, he cut back the
program to 30,000 men, releasing 120,000 for distribution, mainly to ground
and service forces. Later in the month he was able to secure Presidential
pressure on the War Manpower Commission and the Selective Service to review
occupational deferments and to provide the forces required by the armed
services.27 By spring, most of the induction backlog had been made up.

Easing the manpower situation still left the question of whether there would
be enough strategic reserve in the Army troop basis to insure the defeat of
Germany once the troops were ashore in France. Of all the calculated risks
taken by Marshall and his staff in preparing for invasion of the Continent,
the greatest gamble was the decision to hold to the go-division troop basis.
Even on the eve Of OVERLORD, there were some uneasy doubts about the gamble
in high Washington military circles. On 10 May Secretary Stimson, long an
advocate of a bold cross-Channel move, raised the issue with General
Marshall. Stimson wrote

I have always felt that our contribution to the war should
include so far as possible an overwhelming appearance of national strength
when we actually get into the critical battle. By this I mean not merely
strength on the battle front but in reserve. It has been our fate in the two
world wars to come in as the final force after the other combatant nations
had long been engaged. Our men have thus come to the field untested, even
when well trained, to fight against veteran enemies. Such conditions make
the appearance and possession of overwhelming strength on our part important
both tactically and psychologically.28

Stimson feared this might not be the case on the Continent in 1944. Against
the estimated fifty-six German divisions that were to defend France, the
United States would have barely more than an equal number available for the
offensive by the end of the summer. The average age of the men in the U.S.
divisions was now rather high, and the Army would need a large number of
replacements. Current Army calculations, both in the European theater and in
the United States, seemed to Stimson "to shave the line of sufficiency
rather narrowly instead of aiming at massive abundance." When all the
OVERLORD divisions had left the United States, there would remain in the
United States only fourteen uncommitted divisions. These would constitute
practically the only reserve for operations in France. The British could
offer no such reserve to assist the United States. As a result, the Germans
would not get a picture of overwhelming strength opposing them. Furthermore,
the estimated German reserve of eleven divisions was almost as large as the
American reserve. The German Army

[410]

was better fed than in 1918, when German morale did not break. All of this
led Stimson to fear that a stalemate might develop in November when climatic
conditions on the Continent would reduce the power to maneuver. Even the
advantageous factors of intensified air bombardment of Germany and the
Soviet advance might not be enough to insure complete victory. The Russians,
he observed, were still a long way from Germany. "Furthermore, the Russians
are already reaching boundary lines where they conceivably might stop with
their grand strategic objective of national defense satisfied by the
eviction of the invader and the gaining back of all they had lost, plus the
Baltic states." To forestall a stalemate, Stimson asked Marshall, should not
new manpower legislation be sought from Congress before the elections in
November? Should not new divisions be activated now by the War Department?

On 16 May, just three weeks before OVERLORD was launched, General Marshall
replied. He agreed that everything possible must be done to prevent a
stalemate from developing in the fall, but he disagreed with Stimson's
analysis and conclusions. Marshall wrote Stimson, "We are about to invade
the Continent and have staked our success on our air superiority, on Soviet
numerical preponderance, and on the high quality of our ground combat
units."29 Exploiting these advantages, Marshall hoped, would convince the
Germans of the futility of fighting for a stalemate. He felt "the air arm
should be our most effective weapon in bringing home to the German people
and the German Army the futility of
continued resistance." As a result of recent conversations between Harriman
and Stalin, he also believed the Russians would not break off their current
efforts until Germany was defeated. Emphasizing that the Army was relying on
the qualitative rather than the quantitative superiority of its ground force
units, he declared, "Our equipment, high standard of training, and freshness
should give us a superiority which the enemy cannot meet and which we could
not achieve by resorting to a matching of numerical strength." Marshall
pointed also to the advantages of the replacement system designed to keep
U.S. divisions in the line at full strength, the preponderance of artillery,
and the employment of air superiority in close tactical support.

Even on a strictly numerical basis, Marshall thought that the U.S. divisions
would eventually compare very favorably with the German forces. Shipping and
other logistical factors would limit the build-up in Europe to about four
divisions a month, but even at that rate, by April 1945 the fifty-nine
divisions available to the United States could be utilized. Adding some
twenty-one British divisions, and an additional ten to fifteen U.S. and
French divisions that could be made available for employment in France if a
defensive position were assured in Italy, the Western Powers would have some
ninety-five divisions to employ against the estimated fifty-six German
divisions. The most troublesome factor, he informed Stimson, would be the
comparatively slow rate of American build-up-a direct product of purely
logistical limitations. That factor, above all others, might result in
slowing down Allied operations, since the Germans, if they felt free to
transfer divisions from

[411]

other fronts, could deploy their forces more rapidly than the Americans
could build up theirs.

If, however, all current plans failed and a stalemate did
occur in November, then Marshall felt new major strategic decisions would be
required. A few additional divisions would probably not be enough to break
the impasse. If new divisions and supporting units were now created,
furthermore, "emasculating drafts" on existing divisions would result and
current plans for their deployment would be upset. Thus, he reasoned, no
far-reaching changes should be made in the Army troop basis until the
outcome of the initial stages of the invasion were clear. "Considering the
matter from all angles and with the realization of the hazards involved,"
Marshall concluded, "I believe that at the present time no increase should
be made in the over-all strength of the Army, except as may prove to be
necessary to provide replacements." Beyond "prudent" advance staff planning
for increasing the troop basis, which he had ordered the War Department
General Staff to undertake, Marshall was willing to stand pat. Clearly, he
looked upon the Allied divisions in the Mediterranean as part of the
strategic reserve for the invasion of the Continent. As the debate over
ANVIL would show, he was anxious to make what he regarded- the surplus U.S.
and French divisions in Italy available to support the main effort in
France, just as he had earlier been to extract the seven British and U.S.
divisions from the Mediterranean for OVERLORD.30

Behind the calmly reasoned and formal language of Marshall's reply to
Stimson lay one of the boldest calculations of the war.31 How great a
calculated risk was being taken was further emphasized by the concomitant
willingness of General Marshall and his staff to allocate military manpower
for the B-29 program against Japan, instead of investing in more divisions.
Only the future would disclose whether the bold calculation would be
vindicated by the still largely untested divisions of the U.S. Army, a
product of his own faith and struggles.

The problem of strengthening the initial assault was less easily resolved
than that of assembling trained and equipped troops for OVERLORD. When
General Eisenhower took up his duties in London, the formal plan for
invasion was still the outline presented by COSSAC in July 1943. That plan
had been developed on the basis of definite limits in the numbers of landing
craft, ships, and other resources prescribed in CCS instructions. In line
with the instructions, COSSAC had planned an assault by three divisions,
with two additional divisions as an immediate follow-up. GOSSAC proposed to
land the three divisions on the coast between Caen and Carentan, though a
particularly vexing problem was the fact that good-sized harbors were
lacking in this stretch of the coast. General Eisenhower, General
Montgomery, and General Bedell Smith, soon after their arrival in London,
took up the cudgels for a revised plan of assault-one that would provide for
a

[412]

stronger attack on a broader front and thereby speed the capture of
the port of Cherbourg and facilitate the breakout from the initial
bridgehead. Consequently, they insisted on a first assault by five
divisions instead of three.32

The size and scope of any landing on the Normandy beaches, however, were
limited by that ever-precious commodity, landing craft. Where could extra
landing craft be found? The United States was committed to amphibious
actions in the Pacific, and the necessary additional landing craft could not
easily be diverted in time from that theater. Southeast Asia was already
being stripped of its landing craft. The most likely source, therefore, was
the Mediterranean, but the approximately two-division lift available there
was required for ANVIL, the projected complementary attack against southern
France that was to coincide with OVERLORD. If the Mediterranean landing
craft were allocated to the OVERLORD operation, ANVIL would have to be
canceled. The search for landing craft was on again in Washington and
London. This time the increased demands for OVERLORD came into competition
with the needs for the Mediterranean operations. Directly involved were the
date of OVERLORD and the fate of ANVIL.

Debate Over OVERLORD, ANVIL, and the Italian Campaign

The ensuing Anglo-American debate in the early months of 1944 developed
first as between OVERLORD and ANVIL, and then as between ANVIL and the
Italian campaign. To obtain the additional lift for the OVERLORD assault,
Generals Montgomery and Bedell Smith early in January recommended the
abandonment of ANVIL except as a threat. On 17 January General Eisenhower
reported to General Marshall:

In order to assure themselves of what is deemed the
necessary strength, most people here, including Montgomery, Smith and a
number of others, have definitely recommended a serious reduction in ANVIL.
This seems to me to be justified only as a last resort. I clearly
appreciate-in fact much more than do these people-that the coming venture is
the decisive act of the war from the viewpoint of the British-American
effort. I know that this attack must succeed. However, I think the question
to be weighed is that of increasing our insurance in obtaining the
first-foothold on the beaches against the advantages that would accrue from
a really successful ANVIL,33

Two other considerations seemed important to Eisenhower. In the first place,
the British and Americans at Tehran had definitely promised the Russians
that ANVIL would take place. Secondly, the Americans had put a considerable
investment into the French Army. If the southern France operation were not
launched, a great number of U.S. and French forces would be locked in the
Mediterranean and wasted. Eisenhower was determined, he informed Marshall,
to explore every avenue for increasing the initial weight Of OVERLORD before
he would recommend any substantial weakening of ANVIL. General Marshall and
his advisers shared these views. To them OVERLORD and ANVIL were essential
parts of the same undertaking, and they

[413]

could not blithely accept cancellation of the one, much as they wished to
strengthen the other.

Through January the planning staffs on both sides of the
Atlantic studied the implications and costs of expanding the OVERLORD
assault and sought ways out of the dilemma. In addition to an increased
number of landing craft, more transport aircraft and additional fighter
plane squadrons would be needed. Adjustments in air requirements did not
appear to be nearly so critical.34 On one expedient to secure extra landing craft British and
American staffs could agree. If the target date for OVERLORD were postponed
from 1 May to 31 May, an extra month's production would become available.
The disadvantage of losing a month of good campaigning weather for ground
forces in the west would be balanced by the improved prospect of favorable
weather on the Soviet front and the additional time allowed for preparatory
attacks of the Allied air forces over Europe. With Eisenhower and the
British Chiefs of Staff willing, the JCS on 31 January agreed to the
postponement.

The problem of ANVIL still remained and, in fact, became
even more complicated. By the beginning of February, British opposition to
ANVIL hardened. A new factor entered the debate. The British were now as
much concerned over the additional needs for the war in Italy as they were
over those for the OVERLORD assault. They were convinced that the badly
stalled Italian campaign must be started up again in earnest. Once again the
familiar specter of the draining powers of secondary operations rose to
plague the Washington staff. They must watch the allocations-especially of
scarce resources-carefully. But Churchill, who firmly believed that a
vigorous campaign in Italy in the first half of 1944 could offer the
greatest assistance to the cross-Channel operation, felt some flexibility
was justified in order to utilize every scrap of fighting strength fully. He
later wrote, "Here the American clear-cut, logical, large-scale
mass-production style of thought was formidable."35

Washington and London were both concerned by the stalemate in Italy. By the
close of December 1943, the Allied campaign had bogged down just above the Volturno and Sangro
Rivers in the face of rugged terrain, miserable weather, and resourceful
German resistance. Following General Sir Henry M. Wilson's appointment as
Allied Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, the CCS, at Marshall's behest, on
7 January 1944 passed the executive direction of the Mediterranean to the
British.36 To serve as Wilson's deputy, General Devers,
whom Eisenhower replaced as the commanding general of the European theater,
was transferred from the United Kingdom. In addition, General

[414]

Devers succeeded Eisenhower as commander of the U.S. troops in the
Mediterranean theater. Also, General Eaker was sent from the United Kingdom
to relieve Air Chief Marshal Tedder as Allied Air Commander in the
Mediterranean.37 Ensuing changes in command assignments between the ETO
and NATO and reorganized boundaries and administrative adjustments
between NATO and USAFIME (General Royce commanding), put into effect by
the War Department in early 1944, were of a piece with the Army's
efforts to emphasize and strengthen the supporting role of Mediterranean
operations.38

At the same time, the new Allied setup in the Mediterranean permitted
Churchill to exercise a freer hand and play a more direct role in
determining the conduct of tile Italian campaign. He was determined to break
the stalemate. At a meeting with the Allied commanders at Carthage on 26
December 1943 he lead reached the decision to launch Operation SHINGLE
(amphibious operation at Anzio).39 This
decision he had confirmed in similar consultations at Marrakech on 7 and 8
January 1944.40 SHINGLE was designed as an end run
around tile right flank of the German Winter and Gustav Lines. The hope was
that the Germans facing the Allied Fifth Army at the Gustav Line would be
forced to fall back and leave tile road to Rome open.

To carry out SHINGLE the President and the Joint Chiefs agreed-much to
Churchill's delight-to a temporary delay in the departure of fifty-six LST's
scheduled for OVERLORD, on the condition that OVERLORD not be delayed. To
compensate for the probable effects on OVERLORD preparations, the President
insisted, however, that the other twelve LST's for OVERLORD depart from the
Mediterranean as scheduled, and that the fifteen "ex-Andamans" LST's
arriving in the Mediterranean on 14 January proceed directly to the United
King-

[415]

dom.41 General
Marshall agreed to permit the 504th U.S. Parachute Regimental Combat
Team, scheduled to depart for OVERLORD, to remain in the Mediterranean
for Anzio.42 He
also authorized a delay in the transfer of one medium bombardment group,
two fighter groups, and two service groups until ten days after the
SHINGLE D Day.43 On
22 January the U.S. VI Corps landed successfully at Anzio, but the
Germans contained the Fifth Army at the Gustav Line and the beachhead at
Anzio, thereby preventing the link-up and a subsequent drive on Rome.
Churchill summed up the net result neatly: "I had hoped that we were
hurling a wildcat on the shore, but all we got was a stranded whale.
44 By early February the British had concluded that the
Germans intended to fight it out in central Italy; that some of the
troops earmarked for ANVIL and a one-divisional lift for end runs should
be set aside for General Alexander, who was in charge of the ground
forces in Italy; and that the Allies must prosecute the Italian campaign
vigorously.45

General Marshall and his planning assistants were not
opposed to the prosecution of the Italian campaign, at least as far as Rome
or slightly north thereof, but they dial believe that planning and
preparations must be continued for ANVIL. If by April the Allies had still
not established themselves north of Rome, then ANVIL would of necessity have
to be abandoned since a considerable number of troops and at least a
one-divisional lift would then be needed for continuing the fight in Italy.
If, on the other hand, ANVIL were immediately called off, then there would
be no chance of launching it in the spring even if conditions were
favorable.46

In the midst of the growing divergence of views between the War Department
and the British, Eisenhower occupied a middle ground. His position was a
difficult one. He agreed with the War Department's estimate of the
significance of ANVIL, but he was charged with the success of OVERLORD and
from his point of view the planning hazards began to make ANVIL appear less
feasible. Throughout the debate, Eisenhower welcomed the Chief of Staff's
personal views, stating at one point ". . . I feel that as long as you and I
are in complete coordination as to purpose that you in Washington and I here
can do a great deal to-

The Chief of Staff, who
considered the ANVIL issue an important one, did not hesitate to let his
views be known. To find the Americans at this late date arguing strongly for
a Mediterranean operation vis-à-vis the British could not help but strike
him as a curious turnabout. On 7 February he wrote to General Eisenhower:

Judging from the discussions and differences of opinion at the present time
the British and American Chiefs of Staff seem to have completely reversed
themselves and we have become Mediterraneanites and they heavily
pro-OVERLORD.48

Marshall quickly went on to add: "OVERLORD of course is paramount and it
must be launched on a reasonably secure basis of which you are the best
judge." As always, the landing craft problem was making Anglo-American
agreement on operations difficult. "Our difficulties in reaching a decision
have been complicated by a battle of numbers, that is, a failure to reach a
common ground as to what would be the actual facilities." British and
American planners in Washington had just agreed that there was sufficient
lift to stage a seven division OVERLORD (five divisions in the assault, two
in the follow-up) and at the same time a two-division ANVIL on the basis of
the 31 May target date. British planners in London, or Montgomery-Marshall
said that he did not know which-apparently would not agree with these
figures. Marshall asked Eisenhower whether he personally felt that, of the
number of landing craft thought
to be available, OVERLORD would take so many that only a one-division lift
would be left for ANVIL. If Eisenhower considered this to be the case, ANVIL
just would have to suffer.

Between operations in Italy north of Rome and the ANVIL operation, Marshall
raised other points for Eisenhower's consideration. If ANVIL were abandoned,
there would be eight or nine less divisions heavily engaged with the enemy.
Could Eisenhower afford to lose this pressure, especially in view of a
possible French uprising against the Germans in southern Frances Eisenhower
should count up all the divisions that would be in the Mediterranean,
consider the heavy requirements in Italy in view of the mountain masses
north of Rome, and then weigh what bearing a considerable number of
divisions engaged or advancing in southern France would have on OVERLORD. In
concluding his statement of 7 February, Marshall sympathetically but
pointedly advised Eisenhower: "I -will use my influence here to agree with
your desires. I merely wish to be certain that localitis is not developing
and that the pressures on you have not warped your judgment.49

On the staff level, the same cautionary note was sounded
by General Handy speaking via transatlantic phone the same day (7 February)
to Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith. Summarizing the gist of Marshall's
misgivings over the growing coolness toward ANVIL in the theater, he added:
"He {Marshall} wants to know how much of this business is Montgomery and how
much is Eisenhower.50

[417]

Apparently stung by the Chief of Staff's reference to "localitis," General
Eisenhower responded quickly. Step by step he traced the evolution of his
stand on OVERLORD and ANVIL. Even before his arrival in London in January,
he said, he had become convinced of the need to strengthen the OVERLORD
assault. Since his arrival he had been trying in every way to preserve ANVIL
while at the same time trying to find the necessary strength for OVERLORD.
He had resisted recommendations to abandon ANVIL. Only as a last resort
would he do that. Between ANVIL and the continuation of the campaign in
Italy he agreed with Marshall that ANVIL would be the more desirable of the
supporting operations in the Mediterranean. But he also agreed that if the
Allies could not soon achieve their aims in Italy, they would be committed
to that campaign with nothing to spare for ANVIL. In any event, time was
running out, and the Allies would soon have to make their decision. He
assured Marshall that he had formed his own conclusions on these matters. To
set Marshall's mind completely at rest, he declared:

In the various campaigns of this War, I have occasionally had to modify
slightly my own conceptions of campaign in order to achieve a unity of
purpose and effort. I think this is inescapable in Allied operations but I
assure you that I have never yet failed to give you my own clear personal
convictions about every project and plan in prospect. So far as I am aware,
no one here has tried to urge me to present any particular view, nor do I
believe that I am particularly affected by localitis. I merely recognize
that OVERLORD, which has been supported earnestly for more than two years by
the US Chiefs of Staff, represents for the United States and the United
Kingdom a crisis in the European War. Real success should do much to hasten
the end of this conflict but a reverse will have opposite repercussions from
which we would recover with the utmost difficulty.51

Eisenhower's reply cleared the atmosphere considerably and reassured
Marshall. If there were enough landing craft for a five-division lift and a
two-division follow-up for OVERLORD, and also for a two-division lift for
ANVIL, Eisenhower was in favor of ANVIL. But his response still left up in
the air the question of the sufficiency of landing craft. At this time the
"battle of numbers" between Washington and London planners entered a new
stage. A mutual understanding appeared to have been reached as to the number
of landing craft available for OVERLORD arid ANVIL. The issue had boiled
down to a technical question of loading capacities for personnel and
vehicles for OVERLORD. Involved was a difference of about 14,000 troops out
of a total number of approximately 176,000 desired for assault and immediate
follow-up for the cross-Channel attack. There was also a difference
concerning 1,000 vehicles out of a total of about 20,000.52

London Landing Craft Conference.
Now that Eisenhower was fully aware of the Washington staff's views,
Marshall felt that the JCS should follow the wishes of the overseas
commander. In order to settle the whole issue, Marshall

[418]

therefore proposed that the JCS delegate its authority to General Eisenhower
and that a conference be held between him and the British Chiefs of Staff.
To advise General Eisenhower, he further proposed that Maj. Gen. John E.
Hull of the Operations Division and a naval officer familiar with all
aspects of the landing craft problem be sent to London. General Marshall's
proposals were promptly adopted by Washington and London.53

General Hull, Admiral Cooke, and two colonels from the War Department's
planning staff, George A. Lincoln and Alexander D. Reid, hurriedly departed
for London. Arriving in the United Kingdom on 12 February, they began on the
following day a week-long series of conferences at SHAEF in Norfolk House.
There, the officers brought by General Hull and Admiral Cooke became
involved, as Colonel Lincoln wrote back to Washington, in detailed planning
and analysis, though their original conception had been that they were
"merely leg-men carrying information."54Discussions and debates over such
technical factors as capability lift and operational availability
(serviceability) rates of the various types of landing craft occupied much
of the attention of the American party.55As might be
expected, the Americans were interested in exploring every expedient
offering support for the feasibility of ANVIL. As negotiations progressed,
the Americans formed certain impressions about the British attitude toward
OVERLORD-ANVIL. On 15 February General Hull wrote to General Handy that the
British planners thought very strongly "that OVERLORD is not only the main
show but . . . the only one which would pay us dividends." They saw, Hull
believed, "no relationship between OVERLORD and ANVIL." As far as the
British were concerned, "ANVIL might be an operation in the Marshalls."56
On the following day Colonel Lincoln confirmed this impression in a
memorandum for General Roberts. "As we thought," he observed, "the local
people, except the Supreme Commander, are not impressed with the value of
ANVIL."57

While the planning and landing craft experts were calculating and
recalculating availabilities and loading lift for

[419]

ANVIL and OVERLORD, General Eisenhower, as representative for the
JCS, and the British Chiefs were trying to arrive at a final decision on
ANVIL. General Hull put forward the War Department contention that
planning for ANVIL should be continued until early spring at least and
then, if necessary, the operation might be called off General Eisenhower took the
same flexible stand-planning for ANVIL should be continued until it was
obvious that the operation would have to be abandoned. To meet OVERLORD
requirements for a strengthened assault and still retain sufficient craft
for a two-division lift for ANVIL, General Eisenhower on 19 February
recommended a shipping compromise whereby six U.S. AKA's would be
reallocated from OVERLORD t0 ANVIL, and twenty British LST's and twenty-one
British LCI (L)'s would be reallocated from ANVIL to OVERLORD. This would
still leave a shortage of fifteen LST's for OVERLORD. Seven of these, he
proposed, would be made up from U.S. production and the remainder by
increasing the load of LST's and the utilization of LCT's.58

By this time the British Chiefs felt ANVIL should be
immediately and completely canceled. To them the proposed shipping
allocations would skimp both OVERLORD and ANVIL. Moreover, they contended,
there was another and more important -threat to be considered. The Italian
campaign was not developing as expected, and the slow progress and heavy
demands of that struggle made the prospect of ANVIL more remote than ever.
As they saw it, Hitler had decided to fight it out south of Rome.
The opportunity thereby offered to bleed the German divisions would be in
the best interests of the Allies. The requirements of the campaign in Italy
should therefore be given priority above all others in the Mediterranean.59
On 21 February Montgomery wrote General Eisenhower, "I recommend very
strongly that we now throe the whole weight of our opinion onto the scales
against ANVIL. Let us have two really good major campaigns-one in Italy and
one in OVERLORD."60

In Washington U.S. staff concern over the British attitude
toward ANVIL led to a swift reaction. The JCS asked for a conference with
the President to discuss the subject. At the special meeting held on the
2lst the President and JCS agreed that ANVIL should not be canceled. The
President was particularly concerned about the Soviet reaction. He doubted
that the Russians would favor cancellation and felt that the question should
not even be taken up with the Russians at this time. He directed Eisenhower
to call the attention of the British to the fact that, aside from military
considerations, the Americans and the British were committed to the Russians
and that no move should be made to abandon ANVIL without first taking the
matter up with them."61Eisenhower, fortified in his compromise stand by the
support of the JCS and the President, refused to

On 24 February a compromise was agreed upon by Eisenhower and the British
Chiefs of Staff whereby ANVIL was kept alive. The campaign in Italy was to
have overriding priority over all other operations in the Mediterranean,
current and prospective. Subject to that priority, the Allied commander in
chief in the Mediterranean would prepare alternative plans to support
OVERLORD. Of these, the first alternative would be ANVIL on approximately
the date and scale originally planned (a two-division assault, to be
launched simultaneously with OVERLORD. The reallocations of assault shipping
and landing craft between OVERLORD arid ANVIL proposed by General Eisenhower
on 19 February would be put into effect and the craft were to sail in
April. However, the compromise would be reviewed on 20 March in the light of
the situation in Italy. If at that time it was decided that ANVIL was
impracticable, the lift over and above that for one division would be
withdrawn from the Mediterranean for OVERLORD. The President, the Prime
Minister, and the CCS accepted this arrangement.63

Cancellation of a Simultaneous ANVIL. The compromise of late February did not settle the problem. The debate
went on. General Eisenhower became
more and more uneasy over permitting planning for the OVERLORD assault to
remain unsettled because of uncertainty about the available landing craft.
In the Mediterranean Generals Wilson and Alexander, concerned over the
situation at Anzio, wanted the proposed transfers of LST's from the
Mediterranean to the United Kingdom delayed-a suggestion that appealed to
the British Chiefs of Staff as strongly as it was resisted by the U.S.
Chiefs.64 In the War Department the search for more lift for OVERLORD and
ANVIL continued.

Inevitably, the spotlight shifted to Pacific allocations. In mid-March,
General Somervell raised the issue. Observing that the approved deployment
of assault lift and landing craft for the spring of 1944 gave the lion's
share to operations in the Pacific, commonly regarded as the secondary
effort, he asked whether the main effort in Europe might not be reinforced
at the expense of the Pacific. General Handy's swift reply was in the
negative. General Eisenhower had been given everything in the way of lift
that he had requested except a small percentage of LST's and LCI (L)'s. The
critical type of assault shipping for both OVERLORD arid ANVIL was the LST.
The Navy had stated that it had made every effort to get LST's to OVERLORD.
It had sent none to the Pacific for several months and was taking so many of
them from its training establishments that during a part of April none would
be left to train new crews. Everything that could be gotten out of new
production was going to Europe and craft could not be shifted from the

How heavily the strains and stresses of uncertainty were weighing on the
SHAEF planning staff was reflected in a conversation between General Bedell
Smith in London and Generals Handy and Hull in Washington on 17 March 1944:

Handy: Our thought is this-I am only giving yon mine and Ed Hull's --we
better hang on to that [ANVIL] as long as we can. I am afraid you are the
people who are going to regret more than anybody else cancelling it in the
long run.

Smith: I thoroughly agree with you. But you can't imagine the
difficulties here in planning. It is enough to drive you mad with this
uncertainty and these changes. When you have to sit down and figure the
balance of divisions, the loading table and everything of that sort and
you don't know what kind of craft you are going to load them in or
whether you are going to have as many as you think you are going to
have, it is enough to drive a man insane.66

What made it worse, Smith went on to say, was that, "in order to keep ANVIL
alive," SHAEF had gone fifteen to seventeen LST's short of its minimum
requirements. As he put it, the SHAEF planning estimate was the "very
lowest, skimpiest, measliest figure that we can possibly calculate to get by
on in the assumption there would be a strong landing in the Mediterranean.
Any time anybody will guarantee us there will be a strong landing in the
Mediterranean we will stick by that measly figure, but time is getting
short."67

Nobody in Washington or London could give that guarantee. Despite the
vigorous and costly Allied attacks on the main front at Cassino in February
and mid-March, the situation in Italy did not improve. The stalemate
continued. There was still a gap between the bridgehead and the main battle
line, and it became increasingly clear that the Allies could not soon start
their drive on Rome. Between the demands of OVERLORD and the Italian
campaign, ANVIL was being crushed.

When the time set for reviewing the Mediterranean
situation came, General Wilson and the British Chiefs insisted that a
simultaneous ANVIL be abandoned. It would be impossible, they argued, to
withdraw troops from the battle line in Italy or landing craft from the
Anzio beachhead in time. General Wilson could not promise a junction of the
bridgehead and the main line before 15 May at the earliest. Generals Wilson
and Eisenhower were now in agreement that the landing craft in the
Mediterranean should be reduced to a one-division lift. On 21 March General
Eisenhower also concluded that ANVIL as an operation to be carried out
simultaneously with OVERLORD must be canceled. Their recommendations were
adopted, and the landing craft in question were ordered to be reallocated to
the United Kingdom from the Mediterranean.68

[422]

Planning for an expanded OVERLORD
assault could go forward, but even so landing craft for the operation had
been so closely figured that there would be few to spare.69

The move to strengthen the OVERLORD assault made a tight situation tighter.
Direct repercussions resulted in planning for the Mediterranean, the by-now
accepted secondary theater in the European war. Intensifying the competition
for the precious lift between supporting undertakings for OVERLORD, it
compelled the U.S. and British staffs to make choices between them. ANVIL
had been pinched out-temporarily at least---by the demands of the now higher
priority Italian campaign and the top-priority cross-Channel assault.

In other ways, cancellation of a simultaneous ANVIL
offered a welcome relief to the two theaters. Aside from assault shipping,
it removed the competition between the Mediterranean operations for cargo
shipping, combat aircraft, and U.S. assault divisions. Ground troops on both
of the Italian fronts were battle-weary, and units earmarked for ANVIL
especially the 3d and 45th Divisions were needed at Anzio. To have opened a
new front in the Mediterranean before the Italian land battle was decided,
the Washington planners realized, would have been difficult, if not
impossible. Postponement of ANVIL also permitted adjustments and transfers
of combat fighter aircraft and earmarked personnel between the European and
the Mediterranean theaters to go forward .70

Nevertheless, certain pinches-particularly in service troops and
replacements -continued in the Mediterranean. The effect of an expanded
OVERLORD simply highlighted world-wide shortages. The War Department had
early warned General Devers, as it had General Eisenhower, of the need to
conserve manpower. To meet, in part, the critical shortage in service
personnel, it lead approved a plan to ship the 2d Cavalry Division and other
combat units to the Mediterranean and reorganize them into service units.
Arriving at Oran, North Africa, on 9 March 1944, the 2d Cavalry Division was
inactivated on to May.71To help solve his overhead and service problems as
the Allies prepared to carry the attack northward, General Devers had
already begun to close down Army supply and administrative installations in
North Africa. As Devers expressed

[423]

it, "we are trying in every way to roll up our tail as soon as
possible."
72

By 31 May, despite the stringencies and uncertainties in Mediterranean
plans, the War Department had sent the U.S. divisional strength from its
carefully hoarded pool to the Mediterranean as planned. By that date eight
U.S. divisions were in the Mediterranean theater -six, the 3d, 34th, 36th,
45th, and 88th Infantry Divisions and the 1st Armored Division, were in the
theater by the end of 1943; the 85th Infantry Division completed its
transfer by 9 January, and the gist arrived between 18 April and 10 May.

ANVIL Postponed Indefinitely. The decision in late
March to forego a simultaneous ANVIL by no means ended the debate over ANVIL
versus the Italian campaign. The U.S. and the British Chiefs remained in
agreement that the Anzio bridgehead must be joined with the main battle line
in Italy. Prolonging the stalemate threatened not only to jeopardize the
safety of the forces on the beachhead but also to upset the timetable for
OVERLORD. The deadlock must be broken. What the major course of action
should be in the Mediterranean once the bridgehead was linked to the Fifth
Army front remained a question. Fruitless discussion continued in late
March. Old differences between the two staffs were reargued. They now boiled
down to a matter of options. Once the deadlock was broken, the British
wanted to continue the Italian campaign, the Americans to launch ANVIL. The
British argued that when an all-out offensive was launched in Italy it
should continue until June, and then a final decision could be made on ANVIL
in the light of the situation on the Italian and Normandy fronts. The U.S.
Chiefs of Staff insisted that once the two Italian fronts were joined,
nothing should interfere with ANVIL. If the British would agree to making
plans and preparations for a 10 July
two-division ANVIL, the Americans were even willing at one point to divert
to the Mediterranean landing craft due to leave for the Pacific in late May
and June. But as Marshall put it to Eisenhower, "We will not make this
diversion which means a serious delay in the Pacific with the possibility of
losing our momentum unless some sizable operation of the nature of ANVIL is
on the books."
73Landing craft would be diverted to the Mediterranean only for
ANVIL. In the opinion of the JCS, the proposed 10 July ANVIL should even
take precedence over getting to Rome, an objective to which the British
attached great importance.74

The offer to divert landing craft from the Pacific was
turned down with regret. The British, who would have been quite happy to
receive this windfall for increasing the general reserve in the
Mediterranean, were not willing to accept it for a definitely scheduled
ANVIL. To explain to the British staff the pointed American stand for a
guaranteed quid pro quo, Dill reminded the British Chiefs of the
strong pressures in the United States for greater action in the Pacific. The
U.S. Chiefs had been, he indicated, "shocked and pained to find out . . .
how gaily we proposed to accept

[424]

their legacy while disregarding the terms of the will." How
magnanimous an offer the Americans felt they were making could be
understood "in view of the fact that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff are
continually being abused for neglecting their theater. "
75

Back of the continued American pressure to keep ANVIL alive lay the familiar
staff desire to end the war against Germany quickly, decisively, and with
the fewest political embroilments. As General Roberts summed it up:

If we cancel ANVIL completely, the following will be true:

a. We get into political difficulties with the French.

b. OVERLORD will lose at least ten fighting divisions.

c. Our service forces continue to support the western Mediterranean.

d. Our divisions and the French divisions will be committed to a costly, unremunerative, inching advance in Italy. The people of both the United
States and France may or may not take this indefinitely.

e. Once committed to Italy, we have our forces pointed
towards Southeastern Europe and will have the greatest difficulty in
preventing their use for occupation forces in Austria, Hungary and
southern Germany.76

As always, the fear of finding a sizable number of Allied combat divisions
contained in the Mediterranean, instead of supporting the major offensive
aimed at the heart of Germany, was haunting the Army Staff. To General
Roberts, the "least worst" course was to transfer some craft back to the
United Kingdom and pull off an ANVIL as soon as possible.

The issue was dragging on and a decision had to be reached. The British could not agree that preparations for
an ANVIL should have priority over continuation of the battle in Italy once
the bridgehead had been linked up with the main battle line.77In early
April Churchill joined actively in the debate, urging that the choice be
deferred. The option between Italy and ANVIL would not exist, he stated,
unless the landing craft scheduled for the Pacific were diverted to the
Mediterranean.78Marshall countered that if any option were to exist,
preparations for ANVIL would have to be started at once. Without a guarantee
of a definite ANVIL, the United States would not feel justified in
sacrificing the momentum that had been attained in the Pacific and was so
important to shortening the war against Japan.79To Marshall, Churchill
further explained:

It is of course very painful for us to forego the invaluable addition to our
landing craft in the Mediterranean which you so kindly offered under certain
conditions and had no doubt great trouble to obtain. What I cannot bear is
to agree beforehand to starve a battle or have to break it off just at the
moment when success, after long efforts and heavy losses, may be in view.

He went on to say:

Dill tells me you had expected me to support ANVIL more vigorously in view
of

[425]

my enthusiasm for it when it was first proposed by you at Tehran. Please do
me the Justice to remember that the situation is vastly changed. In
November we hoped to take Rome in January and there were many signs that
the enemy was ready to move Northwards up the Italian peninsula. Instead of
this, in spite of our great amphibious expedition . . . the enemy has
brought down to the battle South of Rome the 8 mobile divisions we should
have hoped a full scale ANVIL would have contained .. . . .
The whole of this difficult question only arises out of the absurd shortage
of LST's. How it is that the plans of two great Empires like Britain and the
United States should be so much hamstrung and limited by a hundred, or two
of these particular vessels will never be understood by history.80

As a way out of the impasse, the British Chiefs proposed a compromise
directive for General Wilson; the U.S. Chiefs on 18 April agreed to go along
with it in order to forward operations in the Mediterranean without further
delay.81Neither the target date for ANVIL nor additional landing craft for
the Mediterranean were mentioned. Allied resources and strength in the
Mediterranean were to be deployed in an all-out offensive in Italy that was
to have first priority. Within these terms, plans and preparations for ANVIL
or to exploit further the campaign in Italy might go forward. OVERLORD would
have to make its own way. ANVIL was deferred indefinitely.

On 12 May a full-scale ground offensive (Operation DIADEM
was launched
by the Allied command in Italy. The bridgehead and the main battle line were
soon linked up and the deadlock in Italy was broken. On 4 June, two days
before OVERLORD was launched, the Allies finally captured Rome.

Decline of the Turkey and
Aegean Projects

The decision in favor of the Italian campaign did not mean that the U.S.
staff had lost out completely and irrevocably to the British over
Mediterranean policy. However chagrined the Americans were by the deferment
of ANVIL, the same pressures of time and conflicting demands generated by
OVERLORD also operated against Churchill's lingering hopes for Turkey and
the Aegean. At the end of December 1941 he had observed to the British
Chiefs of Staff: "I recognize that if the Turks will not play, we may have
to sacrifice the Aegean policy, especially if it is marked up so high and so
slow."82The price that would interest the Turks in playing remained high.
British negotiations with Turkish leaders bore no fruit, and by the end of
January 1944 the forces and resources earmarked to support Turkey's entry
into the war were interfering with the build-up for the approved operations
against Germany. General Wilson urged delay in Turkey's entry, and the
American staff, concerned lest the United States would have to commit forces
and resources to the eastern Mediterranean, recommended suspension of plans
to use Turkey as a base of operations. The British abandoned their
negotiations and agreed to cancel

[426]

arrangements to operate from Turkey and to release the forces and the
equipment.83Churchill reluctantly became resigned to Turkish neutrality.

At the same time, any hope that he might have had for a
more active Allied Balkan policy could not have been encouraged by the
American coolness toward his suggestion for a joint expedition into
Yugoslavia. At the meeting on 21 February with the JCS, the President
informed them that he had refused to consider Churchill's proposal for an
expedition composed of British troops under an American commanding general.
The President would not even consider a "token" U.S. force for such a
project. In agreeing with the President's stand, General Marshall stated
emphatically "that would be very bad indeed and would probably be bound to
result in a new war.84

Undoubtedly these blows to Churchill's Mediterranean policy made him look
more eagerly than ever toward a concentrated attack in Italy and the capture
of Rome. This was one way-perhaps the only remaining way-of keeping alive
his hopes for a more active course in the Mediterranean. Whether the new
turn in that policy would result, as Army planners feared, in eventually
pointing U.S. forces toward southeastern Europe, and in the permanent
abandonment of ANVIL, only the future would disclose.

Despite his previous misgivings about
OVERLORD, and whatever last card the Prime Minister might yet choose to play
in the Mediterranean, encouraging reports of the Prime Minister's attitude
toward the cross-Channel undertaking filtered back to Washington. In March
he wrote to General Marshall: "I am hardening very much on this operation as
the time approaches in the sense of wishing to strike if humanly possible
even if the limiting conditions we laid down at Moscow are not exactly
fulfilled."
85War Department officials visiting the Prime Minister in
London sent back to Washington equally heartening news. In April John J.
McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, recorded that the Prime Minister told
General McNarney and himself that he had opposed the operation during the
past two years but now was for it.

I asked him how he really felt about it now and he said that if he had been
responsible for the planning, he would have done it on a broader front and
he would have liked to have had Turkey on our side and the Danube under
threat as well as Norway cleaned up before we undertook this, but he was
satisfied and all would find him completely committed with all his energy
and all his spirit to the battle.86

A similar report was forwarded by General Wedemeyer:

Both Eden and the P.M. [Prime Minister] reflect confidence relative to OVERLORD.
The P.M. did state that if he had been able to persuade the Chiefs of
Staff, the Allies

[427]

would have gone through Turkey and the Balkans from the south and
into Norway on the north, thus surrounding the enemy and further
dispersing his forces. He added, however, that the die is cast and that
we must carry OVERLORD through vigorously to a successful conclusion.87

Meanwhile, the desire to ensure the success of OVERLORD led the U.S. and
British staffs to explore other than military ways of weakening the Germans'
resistance and hastening their surrender. By the beginning of 1944 Allied
planners had virtually given up the hope, embodied in the RANKIN plans, that
Germany might surrender before OVERLORD D Day. They were hopeful, however,
that a proper approach to the Germans, in conjunction with OVERLORD, might
bring the war to a quick end.88Inevitably, they considered the
practicability of the unconditional surrender formula -the announced war aim
of the Allies-as a propaganda weapon.

During the year that had passed since President Roosevelt
had announced the unconditional surrender formula at Casablanca, the
intention of the Western Allies to fight on until the Axis Powers
surrendered unconditionally had been reiterated at each succeeding
conference. The Army planners had accepted without question the presidential
dictum as a basic concept in their strategic planning. To the military,
unconditional surrender provided a clear-cut objective-the decisive defeat,
of the enemy-completely divorced from the
problems of negotiated settlements or military stalemates. As long as
political objectives and military considerations seemed compatible,
unconditional surrender appeared a tenable concept.

The President's position had been fairly consistent since his Casablanca
pronouncement. During the discussions between the United States and Great
Britain on the Italian surrender, he had informed Churchill, "My thought is
that we should come as close as possible to unconditional surrender followed
by good treatment of the Italian people."89This strong adherence to the
principle while admitting some flexibility in its application was typical of
his approach to the problem. It is true that on the part of the military
there had been some apprehension that the logic of applying the formula
vigorously to Italy might mean, in effect, that General Eisenhower, the
military commander, would have to take over the government of Italy. But
there seems to be little doubt that during the Italian surrender
negotiations the Army planners had been content to follow the President's
lead without dissent.

The surrender of Italy in September 1943 had given the
formula its first trial as a practicable basis for ending a war, but because
of the peculiar conditions prevailing in Italy the results had been
inconclusive. The Germans were still in control of the greater part of the
country and of many of the Italian armed forces, and it had been impossible
for the new Italian Government to enforce obedience to its orders to
surrender. With the Italian declaration of war against Germany in October
and the

[428]

Allied recognition of Italy as a cobelligerent, the situation had become
even more confused. Although no immediate change in the surrender terms had
been made, application of some of the fairly rigorous "Long Terms" of
surrender that the Italians had signed on 29 September had been held in
abeyance while Italy demonstrated her good faith in fighting on the side of
the Allies.90Thus, Italy could not be considered as a fair test case for
unconditional surrender.

By the end of January 1944, with all eyes on OVERLORD,
there were indications that some of the British planners harbored doubts as
to the wisdom of clinging to the formula. The British Joint Intelligence
Committee asked their American counterparts several pertinent questions.
Pointing out that the German propaganda machine was using the unconditional
surrender theme to stiffen German resistance at home and in the armed
forces, they asked the American military to estimate the value of
unconditional surrender in the light of past and present experience. They
also asked for American opinion as to the desirability of amplifying the
concept in order to weaken German armed resistance and to avoid complicating
surrender negotiations with Germany.91

The U.S. Joint Intelligence Committee, in their study of the problem,
concluded that although unconditional surrender added a "background of
determination" to the Allied coalition and eventually might have a material
effect in breaking down German resistance,
the German propaganda agencies were placing great stress on the policy as an
indication of Allied intent to exterminate the German nation, enslave its
people, and inflict all sorts of inhuman treatment upon the populace. In the
absence of statements by the Allied leaders contradicting this propaganda,
the German publicists were having considerable success in increasing the
will to resist. The committee felt that any steps taken to counter this
propaganda would help speed the German collapse.92

Assistant Secretary of War McCloy was sharply critical of any softening of
the unconditional surrender concept. Pointing out that the Germans' chief
fear was the Soviet Army and what it might do once it reached Germany, he
went on: