Clinging To A Security Blanket

Mikhail Gorbachev`s proposal to remove U.S. and Soviet missiles from Europe has provoked some unfamiliar reactions among America`s allies, who seem worried that the U.S. might be too forthcoming. To forestall any such possibility, strong negative reactions to virtually all aspects of the latest Soviet proposal are being expressed.

The British have made public statements about the ``unacceptability`` of nuclear reductions not accompanied by reductions in the Soviet Union`s conventional forces.

The Germans have reminded everyone about how important it is not to decouple European and American defense.

The French have pronounced the proposal unsatisfactory and declared they would not be bound by any such agreement.

Even the Japanese have complained that the proposal is discriminatory because it would remove missiles from Europe while leaving them in Asia.

What has produced such an unaccustomed response? Why are our allies so publicly affirmative about the value of America`s nuclear missiles to their security?

First, they have been impressed with the packaging of the latest proposal. It offers--or seems to offer--Ronald Reagan two things he badly wants: It offers negotiations without conditions and it couches the offer in the language of Reagan`s own ``zero option,`` proposing a ``zero option`` for Europe as a ``first step`` to a ``nuclear-free`` world.

The allies had expected that the new proposal would flounder on the Reagan administration`s refusal to abandon the Strategic Defense Initiative. Instead, Gorbachev abandoned this condition.

Second, the British and French are concerned because they regard the planned modernization of their nuclear arsenals as a principal target of the Soviet proposal. The Soviet proposal would have Paris and London ``freeze``

their nuclear forces at current levels, and the United States cancel its commitment to sell Britain Trident II missiles needed before retirement of Britain`s aging Polaris submarines.

Europeans rely heavily on nuclear weapons to offset the Soviet advantage in conventional forces. They therefore see any diminution or possible withdrawal of America`s nuclear force as threatening. The possibility of U.S. nuclear withdrawal from Europe underscores for them the importance of an independent British and French nuclear deterrent.

What do these European reactions mean for the future and for the American position in upcoming arms negotiations?

Obviously the United States` commitment to NATO and the defense of Western Europe does not depend on the presence of American nuclear missiles in Europe. It depends on our treaty obligations, which are in turn underpinned by a sense of shared civilization. We know that, but apparently our NATO partners have persisting fears.

An agreement to eliminate U.S. and Soviet missiles (which have been deployed in Europe only since 1980) would not violate America`s legal or moral commitments to our European allies. It just might stimulate Western European countries to assume a greater responsibility for their own defense. That, of course, would be a good in itself.

The United States should do nothing to discourage tendencies to greater military self-reliance among our allies. We want and need allies who are strong. Obviously, too, the United States should not seek to do what we in any case could not do: commit Britain and France to abandon their modernization of their nuclear arsenals. That is their decision.

But we can enjoy our European friends` sudden realism about a potential Soviet threat and also about the American contribution to their security. It is refreshing to have them worry that the United States may be too eager for arms reductions.