The central message of the Buddha—suffering, its origin, its cessation and the way leading to its cessation—is directly concerned with causality. Therefore, causality has been the
central issue in Buddhist thought.(1) The Buddha is reported
to have said, "He who sees the pratiityasamutpaada (causality
or dependent co-arising) sees the Dharma (Truth), and he who
sees the Dharma, sees the pratiityasamutpaada.''(2) Many
people hold that all Buddhists have accepted the principle of
causality as the objective law governing the constituents
of the universe although they have different expressions of
the meaning of the pratiityasamutpaada. Some scholars even
claim that the Buddha and his disciples believed causality is
"necesarily," "eternally," and "universally," as well as
"objectively," valid.(3)

But in fact, not all Buddhists regard causality as the
objective law of the world. It is debatable that the Buddha
believed in the absolute validity of the principle of
causation. According to Naagaarjuna, the father of Mahaayaana
Buddhism, pratiityasamutpaada is sunyataa (empty); causality
is neither rationally nor empirically verificable. For the
Maadhyamikas, the concept of causality as the cosmic
principle or reality of all things is as untenable as the
concepts of aatman and dharmas. The Buddha's use of causality
is soteriological in character; his teaching of
pratityasamutpaada did not aim to give a description or an
explanation of the universe,but to"empty" one's attachments.

Once all illusions are cleared up, causality should be
discarded.
Naagaarjuna's school of thought is known as the San-lun
Tsung(a) (the Three Treatises School) in China, Korea and
Japan, for it is based upon three main texts; namely, (1) the
Middle Treatise (Chung-lun), (2) the Twelve Gate
Treatise. (Shih-erh-men-lun), and (3) the Hundred Treatise
(Pai-lun). According to Chinese San-lun masters, one
should study these texts together in order to gain a broad philosophical understanding of
Buddhist thought.(4) But contemporary Buddhist scholars have
seldom studied them together(5) and hence inadequately hold
that the Maadhyamikas accept causality as the governing
principle of all phenomena(6) or "the nature of reality."(7)
Naagaajuna is even said to be "Hiinayaanistic" or
"Abhidharmic" in asserting the validity of the chain of
twelve causal conditions.(8) Other scholars claim that the
Maadhyamikas "raise causality (pratiityasamutpaada) to the
level of the transcendental."(9) But in fact the
Maadhyamikas accept neither empirical nor transcendental
justification of the principle of causality. The first thing
Naagaarjuna wanted to do in the Twelve Gate Treatise was to
criticize various views of causality, and the first point he
wanted to make was that the chain of twelve causal conditions
and all other causal relations are not justifiable. For the
Madhyamikas, pratiityasamutpaada is not a metaphysical theory
nor specualtion on the world. Like Emptiness and the Middle
Way, it is primarily a pedagogic tool (chiao-ti); it has
no intellectual validity, merely practical value, helping
sentient beings rid themselves of ignorance and illusions. If
any one fails to see the "empty" nature of this device, he
cannot see the Buddha's Dharma.

The main purpose of this paper is to present from Chinese
sources the San-lun Madhyamika treatment of the problem of
causality. In what follows, I will first show how the San-lun
Madhyamikas repudiate the intellectual justification of
causality as the ultimate principle of the universe and
clarify Nagarjuna's standpoint concerning the chain of twelve
causal conditions. I will then expound the San-lun Madhyamika
teaching of pratiityasamutpaada as Emptiness and the Middle
Way, and reveal how they use causality as a soteriological
device to refute various erroneous views. Finally, the central
message of Buddhism will be briefly re-examined in the light
of the Maadhyamika teaching of causality as soteriology.

II.

The so-called pratityasamupada is traditionally given in the
following formula:

"When this is, that is;
This arising, that arises;
When this is not, that is not;
This ceasing, that ceases."(10)

Most people interpret this principle as saying:

"When this entity exists, that entity exists;
This entity arising, that entity arises;
When this entity does not exist, that entity does not exist;
This entity ceasing, that entity ceases."

They give ontic status to the principle, interpreting the
terms "this" and "that" in the formula as referring to
entities or objects which possess essential nature or
self-nature. The principle of causal relation is the
objective law governing the constituents of the universe.
This is the onotological interpretation of causal relation,
which most early scholastic Buddhists seemed to follow. For
them, this principle gives "the real description" of the
reality of the universe. Whatsoever exists is a cause; cause
and existence are synonymous.

The notion of causation is used by Hinayana Buddhists to
describe both moral and physical phenomena. The principle of
causal relations shows necessary connections between various
events and can be stated as a moral law and a physical law.
When the principle is enunciated as a moral law, it means
that there are good deeds and rewards for them; and there are
bad deeds and punishments.(11) When the principle is stated
as a physical law, it means that every individual fact is
conditioned by or dependent on something else;
pratiityasamutpaada is the causal law regulating the rise and
fall of all factors or elements (dharmas).(12) There are four
"external" causal conditions (wai-yin-yuuan)(13) and twelve
"internal" causal conditions (nei-yin-yuuan)(14) which are
usually enumerated in early Buddhist treatises. Each of these
is conditioned (paticcasamuppanna) as well as conditioning
(paticcasamuppaada) .(15) When viewed from the antecedent
cause, each is an effect, but when viewed from the effect,
each is a cause. The chain or cycle of twelve causal
conditions is the true picture of the wheel of existence.
The principle of causality was believed by early Buddhists
to be "objectively," "necessarily," and "eternally" as well
as "universally" valid.(16) But
according to Nagarjuna, the thesis that pratiityasamuttpaada
is the objective law governing the constituents of the world
can be stated and known only from the standpoint of
conventional truth. Ordinary experience seems to show that a
thing or event is never found by itself alone, but always
together With others which stand around it and constitute its
circumstances and "causal conditions." Causality is useful in
our ordinary life. However, were we to try to find out
intellectually what a causal relation or a causal process
actually is, we would be baffled.

Naagaarjuna argued that it is impossible to explain the
relationship between a cause and an effect and to relate
entities. Any view of causation leads to certain
contradictions or absurdities. In his writings, he critically
examined many possible relationships between cause and effect.
(17)
Naagaarjuna used the tetralemma as the main logical
apparatus to investigate the rational explanation of causal
relationships. The so-called tetralemma states that there are
four possible views for every aspect of reality: (1) thesis,
(2) antithesis, (3) both thesis and antithesis, and (4)
neither thesis nor antithesis. If there is a causal relation
among things in the universe, Naagaarjuna asked, what is that
relation? Is an effect already real in a cause and then is
produced by the cause? Is an effect at the outset unreal in a
cause and yet is produced by the cause? Is an effect both
real and unreal in a cause and then is produced by the cause?
Is an effect neither real nor unreal in a cause and yet is
produced by the cause?(18) By showing that all these causal
relations cannot be established, Naagaarjuna argued that
causal production is really impossible.

"An effect is real in a cause and then is produced by the
cause," for the Maadhyamikas, this is an absurd statement.
For the so-called effect is that which is caused, made or
produced. But before causal making or production, there is
not that which is made or produced. How can there be any
effect in the cause? If the so-called effect is not that
which is made, but that which is yet to be made, an effect
cannot be real in a cause either, for that which is yet to be
made is not yet real. How can it be real in a cause?
Furthermore, if an effect is already real in a cause, why
must it be produced again? It is like that which has been
done does not need to be done, and that which has been
achieved does not need to be achieved. Nothing new is produced and
hence there cannot be a causal production in this case. If
there were causal production, then there would be sons,
grandsons, great-grandsons and
great-great-grandsons in the womb of a mother, for effects
are, in principle, already real in a cause;but this is
absurd. Besides if an effect is already real in a cause, the
so-called "cause" would be only a location and cannot be
called a cause. It may be argued that the claim that "an
effect is real in a cause and then is produced by the case"
means that an effect is "potentially real" in a cause and
becomes "actually real" later on. But, for
the Maadhyamikas, this is unintelligible. For how
can one and the same thing or entity be potential and actual
in that way? If it were real in that way, it would have two
opposite or different essences or natures, and hence would
not be "one" and the "same" thing. Moreover, if an effect
were potentially real in a cause, it should be observable,
for whatever can be conceived to exist can be perceived to
exist. But the effect is not perceivable before production.
So the thesis that an effect is real in a cause and then is
produced by the cause cannot be established.(19)

On the other hand, one cannot claim that an effect is at
the outset unreal in a cause and yet is produced by the
cause. Nagarjuna argued that if an effect is unreal in a
cause and yet is produced by the cause, then, in principle,
anything should be capable of being produced from anything
else. For example, carts, horses, food and other things would
be produced from strings. If "something" can be produced from
"nothing," why are only rugs produced from strings? Actually,
if an effect were at the outset unreal in a cause, there
would be no "particular or distinct" relation between the two
and hence the one would not be the "real cause" of the
other.(20) Thus in Madhyamika thought, the denial of the
thesis that an effect is real in a cause does not entail the
validity of the antithesis that an effect is unreal in a
cause. Nagarjuna's critical analysis of causality was not
meant to establish any view of causation but to refute all
possible views. For him, the third view that an effect is
both real and unreal in a cause is also untenable. "For
'real' and 'unreal' are contradictory in nature. How can
those that are contradictory in nature be together?"(21) The
third view may mean that an effect is partially real and
partially unreal in a cause, and hence it does not involve a
contradiction.However, this viewpoint implies (1) that an
effect can be real in a cause and then is produced by the
cause and (2) that an effect can be unreal in a cause and yet
is produced by the cause. But both (1) and (2) have already
been shown to be untenable. So the third viewpoint is also
unten
able. According to Naagaarjuna, to say that an effect is
neither real nor unreal in a cause is tantamount to accepting
that there is no causal relation between the cause and the
effect. If there is no causal relation, how can one be called
a cause, and the other an effect? So one cannot say that an
effect is neither real nor unreal in a cause.(22)

Thus Naagaarjuna refuted all possible rational
explanations of causal relation and thereby showed that
causal relations are empty. Since causal relations cannot be
established, it makes no sense to say that all things an
"causally related" and that there is a "necessary connection"
between cause and effect.
Naagaarjuna also argued that causality as such cannot be
established. Hence it also makes no sense to assert that
causation is universal and uniform. If there is a reality of
casuality or an act of causal production, it must be
"self-caused, " "other-caused, " "both self-caused and
other-caused," or "noncaused." A thing cannot cause itself.
If a thing causes itself, it is the subject and the object at
the same time. But this is impossible because the subject and
the object are two different things. A thing cannot be said
to be caused by another either. If a thing is caused by
another, it has the other as its substance. But how can they
have the same substance? If they have the same substance, they
are one and the same thing. The so-called other cannot be
called "other." And one cannot say that a thing is both
self-caused and other-caused either, for this implies that
there can be the acts of self-caused production and
other-caused production. But this is impossible because there
can be neither self-caused nor other-caused production. For
Naagaarjuna, the act of non-caused production is not possible
because "a thing is caused by no cause" is a contradiction in
terms and hence makes no sense. If something can come from no
cause, anything can be the cause of anything else;but this is
absurd.
A cause is often defined or described as either a
necessary condition or a sufficient condition or as both
necessary and sufficient conditions for the occurrence of an
event. As pointed out, early Buddhists held that all things
are conditioned by four causal conditions. The Maadhyamikas
contented that these conceptual and other ontological
interpretations of causation cannot be the right description
of the occurrence of real events or entities in the world.
They argued that it is unintelligible to hold that there are
real events or entities in causal conditions, or that real
events or entities are con
ditioned or dependent upon something else. Naagaarjuna asked,
"How is it possible for a real event or an entity which has
essential nature to be something which is caused?"(23)
According to him, it involves contradiction, for "to be
caused" is "to be conditioned"or "to be dependent upon
something else." But a real event is supposed to have a
certain definite or essential nature; and a thing which
has essential nature is not something which is produced, but
something which is independent of other things.(24) If an
entity is caused, it is something which is dependent upon
something else. But this is impossible. So the causal
principle cannot be the causal principle of entities or real
events.

People might argue that, although causal relation or
causality cannot be established on rational or logical
grounds, it can be established by experience.Our past
experience shows us that there is a causal relation between
thing. For example, when we examine our empirical facts we
see that sesame oil is always produced out of sesame, but we
have never seen sesame oil produced out of sand. So our
experiences justify our claim that there is a causal relation
between oil and sesame, but not between oil and sand. Hence
we seek oil in sesame, not in sand. But, for Naagaarjuna, the
principle of causation cannot be justified even by
experience. The observation of the constant conjunction of
events does not justify the principle of causation. To say
that we do observe is not a good answer, but rather it just
begs the question. Why? If causation had been established,
then one could say that since we have seen that sesame
produces oil but have never seen sand produce oil, we seek
oil in sesame but not in sand. However, whether there is such
a thing as causation or production has not yet been
established, and hence one cannot legitimately make that
claim. Therefore, the example that we have seen sesame
produce oil is based upon the very notion of causation which
is to be established. In short, according to Naagaarjuna, any "empirical" justification of the principle of causation
assumes the very principle it tries to prove.(25)
One of the main reasons why Buddhists have spent so much
time in discussing causality is that they want to know the
nature of human life. The so-called chain of twelve causal
conditions (shih-erh-yin-yuan)(h) is often given to explain
the causal process of human existence. Naagaarjuna's position
about the reality of the chain of twelve causal conditions is
not clearly presented in the Sanskrit Muulamadhyamakakaarikaa and
the Chinese Middje Treatise.(26)
This has made many Madhyamika scholars perplexed about
Nagarjuna's viewpoint and even led them to think that his
position is Hinayanistic. For example, Kenneth K. Inada says,

With the discussion of Nirvaana in the last chapter
(Chapter XXV of the Muulamadhyamakakaarikaa) the treatment
from the stanpoint of the Mahayana had basically come to
a close. In this chapter and the final one to follow
(Chapters XXVI andd XXVII of the Muulamadhyamakakaarikaa),
Nagarjuna goes into the analysis of Hinayanistic
doctrines. The present chapter discusses the twelvefold
causal analysis which is the basis of the endless process
of suffering incurred by all living beings. The
discussion is Hinayanistic and it reveals that the source
of trouble lies in ignorance which in turn initiates all
kinds of mental conformations...The discussion of the
doctrine of causal analysis indicates the strong
influence of Hinayanistic or Abhidharmic teachings during
this period.(27)

It seems that the question whether Naagaarjuna's
standpoint is Hinayaanistic can be solved by study of the
first chapter of the Twelve Gate Treatise in which he has
clearly presented his view of the chain of twelve causal
conditions, and demonstrated that the chain of twelve causal
conditions cannot be conceived as the causal law of the,
world. He even used a scriptural passage from the Seventy
Treatise to support his standpoint:

[The chain of twelve] causal conditions really have no
production. If it is said that they have production, do
they have it in one mind-moment or in many mind-moments?
(28)

The chain of twelve causal conditions are supposed to be
the internal causal phenomena of the world
(nei-yin-yuan-fa).(i) Naagaarjuna argued that if they are the
real causal law of the world, they must happen or be produced
(a) in one mind-moment, or (b) in many mind-moments. But one
cannot say that all twelve causal factors appear in one
mind-moment, for if they occur in one mind-moment, then
causes and effects happen at the same time. This is
impossible because a cause is supposed to be prior to an
effect. Nor can one say that the twelve causal factors appear
in many mind-moments,
for if they occur in many different mind-moments, they are
distinct from one another and have no particular relation to
each other. Each would occur within a certain particular
mind-moment and then disappear within that mind-moment. If
this is the case, how can anyone of them be a causal
condition? Thus, the cases, (a) and (b) , cannot be
established, and hence the chain of twelve causal conditions
cannot conceivably be the real internal causal law: they are
empty.

As pointed out, early Buddhists considered that the
principle of causation was a moral law as well as a physical
law: for any good deed, there must be a reward; and for any
bad deed, there must be a punishment. But the Madhyamikas
argue that the "necessary connection" between a good deed and
a reward and between a bad deed and punishment cannot be
rationally
explained and justified.(29) They are not "objective laws" in
the world nor in society, but just the subjective projection
of the mind. Naagaarjuna said, "Defilements, karmas, doers,
rewards, and punishments are all similar to mirages,dreams,
shadows and echoes."(30)

III

According to the San-lun Maadhyamikas, the Buddha is a
pragmatic teacher. The chief aim of his teachings is not to
make a report about the world but to help people to get rid
of ignorance and illusions so as to obtain salvation. In
order to save all sentient beings, the Buddha has presented
different teachings to different people in compliance with
their abilities. All statements given by the Buddha are
simply skillful means (fang-pien, upaaya). In the strict
sense, they are nothing but words and letters, and should not
be considered as standing for any definite entities or
realities in the world. Actually, the entities which the
words are supposed to denote are empty. They are "utterly
empty, like a dream, like a phantom, nothing but the thoughts
of deluded worldings."(31) Kumaarajiva (344-413 A.D.), who
introduced Maadhyamika Buddhism to China,(32) said,
"Not apprehending and not craving the dharma is my
Buddha-Dharma."(33)

Although all verbal and conceptual teachings and
doctrines of the Buddha are empty, without absolute
intellectual validity, they have practical value. They can
help people to gain enlightenment. According to Chi-tsang(k)
(549-623 A.D.), the greatest Chinese San-lun Maadhyamika
master, they serve as
"convenient means to lead sentient beings and to enable
them to be free from various attachments."(34)
Like all other teachings of the Buddha,
pratityasamutpaada, according to the Maadhyamikas, should not
be understood as an actual description of the reality of the
universe but rather as a soteriological device. It is
presented by the Buddha as a tool of salvation. For the
Madhyamikas, although causality is neither rationally
justifiable nor empirically verifiable, it can serve as a
useful means of helping people rid themselves of ignorance
and illusions. Naagaarjuna did not deny that, from the
practical, conventional point of view, all things appear to
be produced from causes and conditions. What he did deny was
that this causal principle can be proved and that it is the
"ultimate principle" of the universe. Naagaarjuna's critique
of causality does not "raise causality to the level of the
transcendental" as some scholars say it
does.(35)

Naagaarjuna seemed to find that while people are
searching for the knowledge of the true-nature of things,
they tend to describe the true state of things as "real" or
"unreal" and advocate absolutism or nihilism. The Buddha's
teaching of pratiityasmutpaada serves to keep one from
falling into these extreme views. The true state of things
cannot be absolutely real, because all things appear to be
impermanent and are dependent upon causes and conditions. If
a thing is absolutely existent, it should be self-existent
and is not subject to causal change. But things seem to be
dependennt upon something else and are subject to change. So
the true nature of things cannot be absolutely real. Nor can
the true nature of things be absolutely unreal. If all things
are absolutely non-existent, there would be no changing
phenomena and sensible appearances would not arise. But
myriad things do appear to arise from various causal
conditions and hence cannot be absolutely non-existent. This
point was succinctly stated by Seng-chao(1)(374-414 A.D.) as
follows:

For what reason? If you say that they exist, their
existence arises non-absolutely. If you say that they
non-exist, their forms have taken shape. Since they have
forms and shapes, they cannot be the same as the
non-existent. So, this explains the idea of the emptiness
of the non-absolute.(36)

Thus, pratiityasamutpaada performs the same
"soteriological" function as the Middle Way and Emptiness in
avoiding the extreme views of absolutism and nihilism:hence
Nagarjuna once said,
"It is pratiityasamutpaada that we call Emptiness;it is a
provisionary name; it is also the Middle Way."(37)
In Madhyamika thought, Emptiness, the Middle Way and
pratiityasamutpaada are interchangeable. The word "empty" or
"emptiness," for the Maadhyamikas, has no meaning by itself
but obtains a meaning in the process of salvation. The
doctrine of emptiness is not a metaphysical theory;it is,
instead, primarily a soteriological device for eliminating
extreme views so that one may be "empty" of any attachment.
The doctrine was first expressed as the doctrine of the
Middle Way in the Buddha's First Sermon.(38) The so-called
Middle Way is a way of emptiness as it is a path refuting all
speculative reasonings. Like the Middle Way,
pratiityasamutpaada is essentially a way of emptiness; it is
a path for freeing one from conceptual speculation.
Naagaarjuna opened the Middle Treatise with these words:

I salute the Buddha,
The foremost of all teachers.
He has taught
The doctrine or dependent co-arising (pratiityasamutpaada),
The cessation of all conceptual games.(39)

The Buddha's teachings of Emptiness, the Middle Way and
pratiityasamutpaada all have the same purpose, namely, the
liberation of one's mind from metaphysical speculation.
Conceptual reasoning, for the Maadhyamikas, is often the
svabhaavic or substantive way of thinking. When one is
engaged in philosophical reasoning he tends to ascribe a
definite nature or essence to an object, thing or event. The
object is believed to possess a determinate or
substantial nature,and is regared as the ultimate reality or
basic element of the universe. Traditional Hindu philosophers
employed this way of thinking and held that AAtman is the
ultimate reality of the universe. Early scholastic Buddhists
also used the svabhaavic way of thinking and held that
dharmas are the real constituents of the world. For the
Maadhyamikas, the monistic philosophy of traditional Hinduism
is an extreme view, and the pluralistic philosophy of
scholastic Buddhism is another extreme view. All those
philosophers have the same error, namely, the svabhaavic way
of reasoning. Pratiitysamutpaada has been used by the
Madhyamikas to refute this. The concept of a definite nature
or real essence (whether it is ascribed to AAtman, dharmas or
other ontological entities) is contradictory to or at least
incompatible with the empirical phenomena that things are
subject to causal change. So it cannot be used to describe
the true state of our experience. Consequently, it is
unintelligible to use Atman, dharmas or other ontological
entities to explain the reality of the universe. Naagaarjuna
said, "Things are produced from various conditions, and hence
have no self-nature (tzu-hsing,(m) svabhaava). If they have
no self-nature, how can there be such things?''(40) Thus
causality serves as a means to refute the concept of
self-nature and thereb to eliminate the ontologization of
any entiey or object.

The Buddha's teaching of pratiityasamutpaada, according
to the Maadhyamikas, is concerned not only with the
conceptual description of the reality of the universe but
also with the conceptual explanation of human behavior. The
fatalist claims that all things are causally determined and
man cannot shape his future, while the fortuitist argues that
everything happens by chance and man is not responsible for
his actions. For the Buddha, fatalism and fortuitism were two
extreme views: either one could make human responsibility and
religious discipline impossible. He refuted them by teaching
pratiityasamutpaada. Fatalism is untenable because it is
contradictory to the empirical fact that the existence of
everything is conditional and subject to change. Moreover,
the absolute "necessary connection" beween events cannot be
established and hence it makes no sense to hold that all
things are absolutely predetermined and man cannot change his
future. Fortuitism is also untenable because it is also
contradictory to the fact that all things are dependent upon
causal conditions. Thus, pratityasamutpada is, again, used
as a way of avoiding the extreme views of fatalism. and
fortuitism, and hence makes human responsibility and reigious
discipline
possible. So pratiityasamutpaada is given to "save" or to
acount for the possibility of moral evaluation and religious
training in daily life.(41)

IV.

The way of pratiityasamutpaada as Emptiness and the Middle
Way is essentially the way of salvation. To see
pratiityasamutpaada is to have the unattached insight that
all things are empty and that all speculative reasonings are
unintelligible and should be eliminated. This unattached
insight is enlightenment. It, for the Maadhyamikas, is the
central message of the Buddha's Dharma. So, the Buddha said,
"He who sees the pratiityasamutpaada sees the Dharma, and he
who sees the Dharma sees the pratiityasamutpaada.'' The aim
of the Buddha's Dharma is not to find the cause of suffering
or to have a conceptual understanding of any causal
phenomenon, but rather to see that all things, including
suffering and its cause, are empty, and hence to cease all
conceptualization. So, when someone wanted to discuss the
cause of suffering with the Buddha, he remained silent:

'Is suffering made by itself?' The Buddha kept silent
and did not answer. 'World-honoured! If suffering is not
made by itself, is it made by other?' The Buddha still
did not answer. World-honoured! Is it then made by itself
and other? ' The Buddha still did not reply.
'World-honoured! Is it then made by no cause at all?' The
Buddha still did not answer. Thus as the Buddha did not
answer these four questions, we should know that suffering
is empty."(42)

The so-called Four Noble Truths, according to San-lun
Buddhists, were given by the Buddha from the practical,
conventional standpoint. Ordinary people believe in the
"reality" of suffering and the "universal" and "objective"
validity of causality. In order to help sentient beings to
obtain enlightenment, the Buddha used words, such as
"suffering" and "happiness," "the origin of suffering" and
"the cessation of suffering," "cause" and "effect," "true"
and "false," to expound his Dharma. Actually, all the words
and statements he made are empty. Naagaarjuna said,
"Words have no essence. Whatever is expressed by them is
also without essence."(43)

The Buddha's verbal teachings, for Naagaarjuna and his
San-lun followers, are merely instruments to assist people in
eliminating conceptualization so that they may be "empty" of
all intellectual and emotional attachments. Once one realizes
this "empty" nature of the Buddha's Dharma, he will have
abandoned conceptual speculation of everything, even the Four
Noble Truths. Naagaarjuna said,

"In Suunyataa (emptiness) one gives up conceptualization
or playing the language game."(44)
"Things are not obtainable,
Conceptualizations are eliminated.
There is neither man nor place (nirvaana).
The Buddha has nothing to say either."(45)

If one is attached to causality and insists on speculating
about the cause of suffering, he cannot see the Buddha's
Dharma.

NOTES

1. See David J. Kalupahana, Causality: The Central
Philosophy of Buddhism, Honolulu, University of Hawaii
Press, 1975. See also T. R. V. Murti, The Central
Philosophy of Buddhism, London, Allen and Unwin, 1970,
p. 166, and N. Dutt, Aspects of Mahaayaana Buddhism
and Its Relations to Hiinayaana. London, Luzac,
1-930,p.51.
2. Majjhima-nikaaya,I,190-191.
3. See David J. Kalupahana, Op. Cit., pp. 89-109. See also
T. R. V. Murti, OpCit., pp. 167-168. Scholars such as
Fritjof Capra compare the Buddhist concept of the
pratiityasamutpaada to the 'bootstrap" theory of
high-energy physics The so-called bootstrap theory holds
that the universe is an extremely complex dynamical
mechanism which is self determining. In terms of high
energy sub
atomic particles (hadrons), each particle helps generate
other particles which in turn generate it. The whole set
of particles generates itself this way, or pulls itself
up by its bootstraps. The existence, quality and
characteristic of each particle is determined or defined
by its relation to all other particles. For this new
interpretation of the Buddhist theory of causality, see
Fritjof Capra, "Bootstrap and Buddhism," American Journal
of Physics 42, Jan., 1974, pp. 15-19;see also Donald W.
Mitchell, "Buddhist Theories of Causation," Philosophy
East and West vol. 25, 1 Jan., 1975, pp. 104-106.
4. These works comprise the canonical literature of the Ssu
lun Tsung(n) (the Four Treatises School), the Pan-jo
Tsung(o) (the Wisdom School), the K'ung Tsung(p) (the
Emptiness School, the Chung-tao Tsung(q) (the Middle Way
School) , the Cheng-shih Tsung(r) (the Satyasiddhi
School), the Ching-t's Tsung(s) (the Pure Land School)
and the Hua-yen Tsung(t) (the Garland School).
5. Modern Maadhyamika scholars have paid little attention to
the Twelve Gate Treatise which exists only in Chinese.
They accept the Prasannapadaa of Candrakirti (c. 600-650
A.D.) as the authentic Mulamadhyamakakaarikaa of
Nagarjuna and usually use it as the main source of
Madhyamika thought. Actually, the Chinese three treatises
were composed more than two hundred years before the
Prasannapadaa was written.
6. T.R.V.Murti, Op.Cit.
7. See Frederick J. Streng, "The Significance of
Pratiityasamutpaada for Understanding the Relationship
between Samvrti and Paramaarthasatya in Nagarjuna, " The
Problem of Two Truths in Buddhism and Vedaanta, ed. by
Mervyn Sprung, Boston, D. Reidel Publishing Company,
1973, pp. 27, 30 and 36.
8. See Kenneth K. Inada, Naagaarjuna: Translation of His
Mulamadhaymakakaarikaa With An Introductory Essay,
Tokyo,The Hokuseido Press, 1970, p. 160.
9. David J. Kalupahana, Buddhist Philosophy: A Historical
Analysis, Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1976,p.
139.
10. See Walpola Rahula, What the Buddha Taught (New York:
Grove Press, Inc., 1962), p. 53; Majjhima-nikaaya, III
(PTS edition) , p. 63; Samyutta-nikaya. II (PTS
edition),pp.28 and 95.
11. This sometimes called the special theory of causation;
see Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, vol. 1,p..136.
12. This is called the general theory of causation. Ibid.
13. The so-called four conditions are the following: (a) The
cause condition (yinyuan).(u) This acts as the chief
cause, for example, the wlnd and water that cause the
wave. (2) The sequential condition (tz'u-ti-yuan).(v)
This immediately follows a preceding condition, such as
waves following one another.(3) The appropriating
condition (yuan-yuan) .(w) This is the objective (or
subjective) environment,like the basis or the boat. (4)
The upheaving condition (tseng-shang-yuan).(x) This is
that which brings all conditions to the climax, such as
the last wave that upsets the boat.
14. The twelve internal causal conditions can be stated as
follows: (1)suffering, such as old age and death; which
is due to (2) birth; which is due to (3) formation of
being; which is due to (4) our mental clinging to
objects; which is due to (5) thirst or desire for
objects; which is due to perception; which is due to (7)
contact; which is due to (8) the six sense organs;which
are due to (9) name-form; and these cannot happen without
(10) conscious mind; which is due to (11) the will to
live;which is due to (12)ignorance.
15. Walpola Rahula,Op. Cit.,p.54.
16. See David J. Kalupahana, Causality: The Central
Philosophy of Buddhism, pp. 89-109.
17. For example, he critically discussed the following
possible causal relations:
(1) An effect is real in a cause (or an assemblage of
causes and conditions), or an effect is unreal in
a cause.
(2) A cause gives to an etfect a causal nature before
it ceases to be, or a cause does not give to an
effect a causal nature before disappearing.
(3) A cause and an effect appear together simultaneously,
or a cause and an effect do not appear together
simultaneously.
(4) A cause becomes an effect, or a cause does not
become an effect. (5) A cause is within an effect,
or an effect is within a cause.
(6) A cause is identical with an effect, or a
cause is different from an effect. Generally
speaking, the way Naagaarjuna criticized each
relation is more or less the same. In this paper
I will briefly discuss the first of these
relationships and show how he critically analyzed
pratiityasamutpaada. For a detailed discussion, see the
first three chapters and the last four chapters of the
Twelve Gate Treatise.
18. The issue of whether an effect is already real in a cause
or at the outset unreal in a cause is also the issue of
whether an effect pre-exists in a cause or not.
19. The Twelve Gate Treatise, II, (Taishoo 1568) , pp
160b-161c.
20. Ibid., pp. 161c-162a;the Middle Treatise, I:6.
21. Ibid.,p, 162a;the Mlddle Trearise,I:7.
22. (Ibid.
23. The Middle Treatise. XV:1 and 2a.
24. Ibid.,XV:2b.
25. The Twelve Cate Treatise. II,p.161c-162a.
26. Naagaarjuna stated the chain of twelve causal conditions
in Chapter XXVI.
27. Kenneth K. Inada, Op. Cit. A. K. Warder even claims that
Naagaarjuna's philosophy as a whole is not against
Hiinayaanism. See Warder's article, "Is Nagarjuna a
Mahayanist?" in The Problem of Two Truths in Buddhism and
Vedaanta, pp. 78-88.
28. The Twelve Gate Treatise. I:2.
29. Sea the Middle Treatise, XVII: 1-32.
30. Ibid.,XVII:33.
31. Kumaarajiiva, Ta-ch'eng-ta-i-chang(y) (Taisho 1856),
section 12.
32. He translated the Middle Treatise, the Twelve Gate
Treatise and the Hundred Treatise into Chinese.
33. Kumaarajiiva, Op. Cit., section 15.
34. Chi-tsang, San-lun-hsuan-i(z) The Profound Meaning of
Three Treatises, Taishoo 1852,p. 7.
35. David J. Kalupahana, Buddhist Philosophy: A Historical
Analysis, pp. 138-139.
36. Seng-chao, Chao-lun,(aa) part II.p. 152.
37. The Middle Treatise, XXIV: 18.
38. For a detailed discussion of the San-lun Maadhyamika
doctrines of Emptiness and the Middle Way, see my
article, "Zen and San-lun Maadhyamiks Thought: Exploring
the Theoretical Foundation of Zen Teachings and
Practices," which will be published in Religious Studies,
September, 1979.
39. The opening statement of the Middle Treatise
40. The Twelve Gate Treatise. 1:1, See also the Middle
Treatise, I; 2, 13 and XV:1-4
41. See the Twelve Gate Treatise, VIII and the Middle
Treatise, XXIV.
42. The Twelve Gate Treatise, X,p. l66a.
43. Naagaarjuna,Hui-cheng-lun,(ab) 25.
44. The Middle Treatise, XVIII: 5. For the San-lun
MaadhyamikaS,language is like a game. 'The meaning of a
term lies in the context rather than in an "object"
outside the language.
45. Ibid.,XXV:24