2007/09/28

I thought I might post short reviews of the books I read. Most of the are more or less history-related, anyway :). Here's the last one.

I keep my reading diary in Emacs and export the data from org-mode to HTML, hence that probably strange look of the article below. Let me know if you don't like the way it looks.

1.30 DONE [#6] Курылев, Олег. Убить фюрера. fiction scifi

State "DONE" 2007-09-27 Thu 00:55
This was the third book of Oleg Kurylev that I've read. The first two
books were rather simple sci-fi stories about travels in time. Both
were set in the Third Reich shortly before and during the war. I
wasn't sure if I wanted to read anything else by this author. The most
attractive feature of those two books was the author's amazing
familiarity with the details of life in the Nazi Germany. The especially
conspicous was his brilliant knowledge of the German awards, uniforms,
titles and all that. I am almost sure that Kurylev is a historian and
specializes on the history of the Central and Eastern Europe in the
first half of the XX century.

A week ago I saw his new book on the shelves. I glanced at the
annotation... and bought it. And I'm not sorry about it. The book
starts with time travel again. A worker of the Institute of Historical
Explorations in Novosibirsk is sent to 1911 to copy some books in a
Prague library. Due to some peculiarities of the temporal physics, the
time travel is actuall a travel to a parallel universe. So, the
paradox of the killed grandfather is avoided. But the time travellers
must return home before the link to the target period closes, because
every parallel universe can be contacted only once. Savva becomes a
defector. He has prepared his escape well and has a computer with a
lot of data about the events of the 1910-1950 in Germany and
nearby. He does not return in time and goes to Berlin where he begins
making money by playing in casinos (the computer supplies him with
newspaper articles where the rulette winning numbers are mentioned)
and on horse races (once again -- the computer). Then, quite of a
sudden, a man pays visit to him. He turns out to be his colleague,
Vadim Nizhegorodsky, who was sent to the past through the same
"window" when Savva missed the deadline to see if he's around and
fetch him, but the window closes and Vadim finds himself unprepared,
unlike Savva, in Prague of 1911. He manages to find Savva and they
begin joint operations.

They are two opposites. Savva is a phlegmatic planner, and Vadim is a
lively man of action. Savva is careful not to change too many events
in the history so that he would use his advantages as long as
possible. Vadim, on the other hand, is impulsive and emotional. Among
other things, he finds young painter named Hitler, lies about a sudden
death of Hitler's kin in USA who leaves thousands of dollars to Adolf,
and sends him across the Atlantic. On April 1912. You guess the name
of ship ;). Yeah, right. However, Hitler survives. Savva doesn't know
about these experiments of Vadim. He is torn between the desire to
save the people who would die during the world wars or on Titanic, but
prefers to remain a passive observer. Vadim finds Hitler once again
and advices him to pass a test on racial purity in a Berlin
clinic. Then he gives Hitler fake results saying that Adi is a Jew and
the disappointed not-yet-führer commits suicide. Savva learns of the
fact, understands that the hopes of keeping the history intact as long
as possible are lost and joins Vadim in the attempts to stop the first
world war.

First, they depart to Sarajevo and save archduke Ferdinand. The
European politicians, however, behave just as they did in our history,
and the war is getting closer. Savva prints a book on the history of
the WWI written by someone John Smartgun in early XXI century,
publishes it in huge numbers and sends copies to the most important
politicians and military leaders. They are frightened by the depth of
knowledge of the mysterious author and by the prospectives of the
4-year long war and stop the war preparations.

Once again, sometimes insufficiently original plot is compensated with
the brilliant details. The author knows everything: topography of
Prague, Berlin and Münich, biography of the Nazi predecessors, names
of German companies, ships and newspapers of that epoch and many, many
more. These details give the book an amazing credibility and I will
wait for the sequel with impatience. And the sequel is definitely
planned: on the last pages of the book the two adventurers go to
Russia and meet a funny little man named Ulyanov in a train. The book
ends with the Vadim's words: "I've got a fabulous idea!" :)

2007/09/27

1802

Emperor Alexander I restores the privilege the Magdeburg rights in Kiev. Russian cities were self-governed since the earliest times. I described the structure of their self-government in Russian history 20 and Russian history 26. After the fall of the Kievan Rus, the power of the local knyazes increased and the republican structures were dismantled. However, when a large part of the territory of modern Ukraine was controlled by Lithuanian and Polish rulers, they started to promote the cities' self-government by granting them the Magdeburg rights: Vladimir-Volynsky in 1324, Syanok in 1329, Lviv in 1352, Galich in 1367 and so on. Kiev was granted the Magdeburg rights in 1494. In XV-XVI centuries the Magdeburg rights were used in many cities, but only Lviv, Kamenets and Kiev enjoyed the full set of these rights, while in the other cities they were limited in favor of the Polish and German rulers.

The autonomy survived the re-union of Ukraine and Russia and Peter I confirmed the rights of Kiev. In 1775 the empress Ekaterina II issued the decree "On the adjoining of Kiev to Little Russia" (Little Russia was the name of the lands of modern Ukraine in the Russian empire) and since then the city was governed by the governor of Little Russia. In 1796 and 1797 emperor Pavel I restored the self-government in Kiev, but only formally. At last, in 1802 Alexander I officially confirmed the Magdeburg rights of Kiev.

Kievans collected money and by 1808 the chief architect of the city A.Melensky erected the monument as a gratitude to the emperor. It is still there, on the place where in 988 knyaz Vladimir baptized the Kievans. The monument is a column with two inscriptions: "To Saint Vladimir, the Enlightener of Russia" and "Built by the efforts of the citizens of Kiev for the confirmation of the rights of this ancient capital by the Emperor of the all Russia Alexander on September 15, 1802"

By the way, Alexander didn't know about the plans of the Kievans and was rather displeased when he finally learnt of the monument. He even issued a decree prohibiting erection of new monuments without the approval of the emperor and wrote a letter to the general-governor of Kiev A.Fensh: "As pleased as I was to see the efforts of the citizens of Kiev in the erection of the monument to the Saint Great Knyaz Vladimir, I was extremely surprised that I did not received any notifications from you on this matter... Nevertheless, I ask you to express my gratitude to the citizens of Kiev."

The Magdeburg rights of Kiev were cancelled in 1834 and the magistrate was replaced by the city Duma. Since then, the people preferred to call the monument the St. Vladimir's column, or the monument to the baptizing of Russia

1817

190 years ago, a monument to the Russian soldiers who defended Riga in 1812 was opened in this city. The Russian army that opposed Napoleon, fought in Latvia, too. They included a certain number of the native population, including Latvian partisans. In 1915, when the German troops were moving close to Riga, the monument was dismantled. The metal parts were taken to Russia, and the column was moved to Viestura garden. In 1990 the city authorities planned to erect it on the Jekaba square, but instead it was transported to a distant location, where it is still lying on the open air, covered by garbage and painted by graffiti "artists".

1938

Sergey Korolyov was sentenced to six years in prison and sent to the gold fields in Siberia. He was lucky, though. He was soon transferred to a "shabashka" (a research lab, where the the arrested scientists worked). Sergey Korolyov, the head of the Soviet space program, or simply the Chief Designer, played the absolutely crucial role in making USSR the leading country in space research. Konstantin Tsiolkovsky predicted in 1920s that the man will fly to the space in 100 years. Korolyov did this in 30 years. However, when Khruschev asked who was the designer of rocket that sent the first sputnik into space, Korolyov answered: "There is no such man. The rocket was built by the Soviet people." He was born on January 12 1907 and his 100th anniversary is celebrated by Russian and Ukrainian scientific and engineering community. Unfortunately (and inexplicably), not by the general public. In January, there was a celebration in Kremlin. Russian movie director Yuri Kara made a film Korolyov about his years in Gulag, and the premiere had to take place during this event in Kremlin, but it was cancelled.

Korolyov was a unique scientist and person and I promise to write a longer article about his life.

A group of Altay archaeologists was doing obligatory field research
before the construction of a road from Gorno-Altaysk to Urlu-Aspak
when they suddenly found a fragment of an ancient settlement (here). The settlement was relatively large, but due to the time
constraints only a small part of it that is to be buried under the
road was explored. Multiple pieces of ceramic crocks in good condition
and stone tools were found. But the most interesting things were
strange channels dug in the earthen floor of the
houses. Archaeologists still can't find a reliable explanation for
them. One version is that the ditches were a part of the heating
system: they channeled the warm air from the fireplace and warmed the
floor.

No ideas on the dating of the settlement as far. The works will
continue in the next season.

2007/09/26

This will be a short post. Not that the events are unimportant or poorly known. On the contrary, there's nothing I can add to the Wikipedia articles, so I'll just remind of these events.

1898:

The second son was born in a Jewish family of Morris and Rose Gershowitz. They came to the USA from Russia. Moisha Gershowitz worked at a shoe factory in St.Petersburg. When he was 19, he met a 15-years old Rosa Bruskin, daughter of a furrier. One day, Rosa's father thought that the rise of anti-semitism in Russia was getting troublesome and decided to emigrate to the USA (Northern American United States, as the country was then called in Russian). Between 1880 and 1896, more than 1.5 million of Jews left Russia to America. Trying to avoid the threat of being drafted into the army, in 1892 or 93 Moisha follows his beloved Rosa and leaves St.Petersburg. On July 21, 1895, they married. Rosa was only 19 then, and Morris was 23. A year later, in December 1896, the first boy, Israel (a.k.a. Ira) was born. And in 1898, his little brother is born, Yakov. George Gershwin.

1983:

Russian lieutenant colonel with a rare last name Petrov saves the world. Due to a rare meteorological coincidence of events, the early warning system falsely identified a series of missile launches from one of the American military bases. 20 years later, he recalled: "You can't analyze anything in 2-3 minutes. Only intuition works. I had two arguments. First, rocket attacks don't start from one base only. Second, the computer is stupid by definition. Who knows what he might mistake for a missile launch. Stanislav Petrov is 68 now and he's a pensioner. He lives in Fryazino, near Moscow.

2007/09/25

10 Afterword

So, in the mid-80s the USSR faced a deep crisis of the financial
system, which led to the crisis of the whole economy and caused the
sharp fall of the production and life quality, which led to the
political destabilization and then to the crash of the political
regime and the whole Soviet empire.

By the end of 90s, Russia, the heir of the USSR, formed a new open
economic system, which included a set of young and imperfect, but
working institutions: private property, convertible currency,
banking system, regulatory system that controlled stock exchanges and
natural monopolies. There was also a sufficient amount of experienced
and knowledgeable managers. All this gave a chance to begin economic
growth, to provide stable growth of the life quality, structural
changes in the economy, to stabilize the financial situation of the
country.

The structural changes went along the steps that could have been taken
by the Soviet leaders in 1986-87: capital investments, military
spendings and grain import were cut; export of raw materials was
increased, the internal consumption of these materials was
decreased. These measures caused further decrease of production and
life quality, but the currency reserves, exhausted by the end of 1991,
were restored and the budget deficit decreased to zero. Since late
1999-2000 the country was restoring the reputation of a first-class
debtor.

If the Soviet leaders took these steps earlier, the restoration
period could be shorter. But they were unable to take the crucial
decision -- to replace the socialist centralized system of the
economic management with the market system. Contrary, Russia and other
post-socialist countries went a difficult way and formed the basic
structure of the market economy.

In the same years a young and unstable democracy was formed, which
included elements of populism, political irresponsibility and
corruption. Nevertheless, the system of checks and balances was
built. This system was flexible enough and one could hope that it
might provide certain stability within the huge and multiethnical
country.

In 2000-2003 effective economic reforms enhanced the quality of the
tax and financial systems, made the federative system more
transparent.

However, since 2003-2004 the trends of the developments in the Russian
political, federative and economical systems became negative.

Till 2000-2002, Russia had a loyal, but independent parliament. The
press was controlled by groups of oligarchs, but the differences of
their interests gave a chance to see the situation from different
points of view. The organizations of businessmen and entrepreneurs
were influential and participated in the decision-making. Since 2003,
all these institutions are turning into decorative elements.

The actions of the current Russian government pave a road to the
system which may be called a closed (or managed) democracy, or soft
authoritarianism. This system has little common features with the
Soviet totalitarian system, but it begins to show weaknesses and
elements of instability typical for such systems.

Abolishment of federalism (appointment of regional governors,
introduction of the proportional electoral system and the 7% electoral
barrier for the political parties, etc.) gives strong arguments to the
nationalists and separatists.

Russian economic policy was conservative and effective in the last
years. The stabilization fund was launched, the foreign debts were
minimized. The Russian leaders have demonstrated the ability to learn
lessons from the experience of their predecessors, which is an
uncommon feature for the Russian rulers.

The government is often criticized for this fund, but this populist
rhetorics is a natural element of the political landscape. However,
the impression that the size of this fund is anomalous, is
exaggerated. By January 1 2005, the fund was 5.7% of GNP (compare to
the Norwegian 70.1% in October
Since 2005, the government began to increase the budget spendings
financed by the oil export. These spendings are still relatively
small, but they undermine the stability of the financial
system. Russian economy, like the Soviet one earlier, becomes
dependent on the prices for oil.

Currently, the risk of destabilization in Russia is much lower than it
was in the late USSR. The soft authoritarian system still includes a
lot of elements of freedom and flexibility, which gives some hope for
Russia. The share of the Russian population is much higher than it was
in the USSR which decreases the chances of serious ethnic conflicts.
Russian market economy is way more flexible than the socialist
one. And yet, the risks and the dependency of the country on the
parameters not controlled by the government remain.

2007/09/24

9 The end

9.1 Political economy of the failed coup

On June 17 Gorbachev sends a draft treaty "On the Union of sovereign
states" to the governments of the republics. On June 29-30 Gorbachev,
Yeltsin and Nazarbayev decide to sign the treaty on August 20. One day
before the treaty would be signed the vice-president, prime-minister,
defense minister, KGB chairman, leader of the military industrial
complex and the army commander supported by the chairman of the
Supreme Council (they called themselves GKChP -- the State Committee
on the Extraordinary Situation) dare to do (or so they thought) what
in their opinion Gorbachev dares not to do -- to use violence. In
three days, however, it becomes clear that it's the changed country,
not Gorbachev, that matters.

Since the end of 1980s the army officers knew that they will be made
responsible for whatever happens, and they did their best to avoid
this responsibility. The joint operation Thunder of the army, KGB and
the police aimed at the capture of the parliament building was
scheduled on the night of August 21. However, nobody in the GKChP
takes the responsibility. By the next morning it becomes clear that
the KGB detachment Alpha refused to participate in the storm, police
divisions did not move and the brigade Tyopliy Stan was gone and
nobody knew where they were.

Even if the they used violence, the outcome would be unpredictable. In
February and August of 1917 violence did not save the state. And even
if it worked, the economic situation would remain critical. Budget
deficit was about 30% of GNP. Food supplies sufficed for 15 days. 30%
of the citizens could not get the rationed food. Nobody would issue
credits to the GKChP. KGB and the participants of the plot knew it
quite well. Probably, it was this understanding that made
prime-minister Pavlov to drink so much alcohol one day before these
events that he could not take part in the coup.

9.2 Political agony

The Union does not control the army, cannot guarantee the security of
the state borders, does not control the territory. On September 5 the
Congress of the People's Deputies of the USSR dissolves itself.

The attempts to create a commonwealth of the republics were not
efficient. The Ukrainian leaders were very careful during the coup and
refused to condemn the actions of GKChP. So, to avoid the political
bankruptcy, they only had one option -- to promote the
independence. On November 8 the chairman of the Supreme Council of
Ukraine Kravchuk said: "We will oppose all attempts to create any
central organs. There should be no centre besides coordination
organs."

9.3 Political desintegration: political consequences

In the first half of 1991 Russia received from other republics 22% of
the planned amount of sugar, 30% of tea, 19% of cereals, 22% of
soap. All republics except for Russia introduced customs on the
borders and limited export of all goods. It was prohibited to export
goods to Russia, it was only possible to import them from
Russia. Ukraine and Estonia place orders in Canada to print their own
currency.

Vice chairman of the Soviet governments L.Abalkin: "In the beginning
of October I met Mr. Greenspan, the leader of US Federal Reserve
System. He asked me: 'Do you understand that you have some weeks till
the financial ruin?' I replied that according to our estimations we
have two months." The production decreased in 1991 by 15%. Forecasts
for 1992 were the decrease by 23-25%.

Ukraine, Georgia and the Baltic countries fully stop money transfers
to the budget of the Union. Other republics send some money, but these
payments turned from taxes to gifts.

The budget deficit exceeds the planned amount by 3.2 times. The reason
is the sharp fall of the incomes.

In 9 months the monetary mass increased from 989 billion rubles to 1.7
trillion rubles. In 10 months the export decreased by 31% and the
import -- by 43%. RUR/USD rate rose to 100 rubles. Actually, ruble
lost all functions of money and was replaced on the internal markets
by *barter payments. The people do not trust money and do their best
to get rid of them by buying anything -- goods, foreign currency,
gold, etc.

In November 1991 69% of Russians said that the worst times are yet to
come. 21% think that now is the worst time.

Meat reserves in St.Petersburg will last 3-4 days.

9.4 Civilized divorce

In the XX century 3 integrated empires fell before the USSR:
Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman and Russian. Yugoslavia fell apart only some
years earlier. In 3 cases out of four the crashes of the empires ended
with long wars. Only in Austro-Hungary the chain of conflicts was
stopped by the L'Entente armies.

Had someone asked informed experts in 1989 in which of the two
socialist multiethnic countries the risk of a civil war was higher, in
Yugoslavia, whose relatively liberal political system and the open
market economy brought the country closer to the assession to the EU
than any other ex-socialist country, or in the USSR, most of them
would name USSR.

Nobody knows the exact answer why the war started in Yugoslavia and
not in USSR. My opinion (says Gaidar) is: First, Milośević relied on
nationalist sentiments, that is he defined his enemy by the ethnic
criterion, and Yeltsin opposed the unpopular communist regime, that is
his opponent was a political one. Second, a certain role was played by
the nuclear weapons located in some Russia, Belorussia, Kazakhstan and
Ukraine. The data on the distribution of the nuclear warheads in the
republics are unreliable and testify the level of threat represented
by the nuclear weapons. The tactical weapons were the largest problem,
since the strategic weapons were controlled from Moscow. The decisions
on the usage of nuclear shells and mines were taken on the local
level.

The threat of the Yugoslav scenario was real. On August 26 1991 the
press-secretary of the president of Russia Voshchanov warned that
Russia may question the borders with the republics (except for
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) which would not sign the Union
treaty. These claims might include the northern Kazakhstan, Crimea and
parts of the left-bank Ukraine. On August 27-28 the mayor of Moscow
Popov layed even larger claims: Odessa and the areas near Dniester
river.

The leaders of the new independent states managed to understand that
questioning the borders, however unjust, leads directly to war. On
December 30 1991 the agreement on the strategic forces was
signed. Ukraine, Belorussia and Kazakhstan had to destroy a part of
the nuclear arms and to remove to Russia the remaining part.

By May 6 1992 the tactical nuclear weapons were withdrawn from Ukraine
to Russia. After the USA guaranteed the safety of the Ukraine, by June
1 1996 the strategic weapons were withdrawn, too. By December 13 1993
Kazakhstan became a zone free from nuclear weapons and on November 23
1996 Belorussia followed.

On December 25, 1992, after the resignation of Gorbachev, the
independence of the ex-republics turns from a political to a legal
reality. However, the dissolution of the USSR did not solve the
problems faced earlier by the USSR and now by the independent
republics.

The lesson taught by the last years of the USSR is that the seemingly
solid, but inflexible political constructions, unable to adapt to the
challenges of the constantly changing world, are fragile and break
under the influence of unpredictable situations.

The cause of the break-up of the USSR, the fall of the prices for oil,
seems to be incomparable with the consequence. Indeed, this was not
the cause, but an occasion for the break-up. The Stalin's model of
industrialization, as opposed to the Bukharin's model, became the
foundation where huge crevices were produced by relatively small
external effects.

2007/09/23

8 On the road to the state bankruptcy

8.1 Currency crisis. 1991

Since the second half of 1990 the volume of import is sharply
decreased. The laws of the republics give their central banks the
right to emit currency. The chairman of the State bank of the USSR
Gerashchenko wrote to Gorbachev: "The laws and actions of some
republics block the transfer of money to the union's budget. Ministry
of finances of the USSR has to borrow money from the State
bank... This will lead to the situation when we won't have resources
to pay to the army and the navy, to the state officials... All this
will finally end with an uncontrolled credit and monetary emission and
hyperinflation."

Export of oil decreases from 124 mln tons in 1990 to 61 mln tons
in 1991. Supplies to the Eastern Europe drop from 60 to 19 mln
tons. The credits issued to the socialist countries turn into debts to
the Eastern European countries and they demand to pay immediately at
least a part of this debt.

8.2 Grain problem

In 1990 Gosplan (the central planning agency) proposed to raise the
retail prices for bread by 3 times. Due to political reasons the plan
was rejected. In 1990 the harvest was large, 237 mln tons, but the
state received only 66.8 mln tons, 28 mln tons less than in 1978, when
an equal amount of grain was collected. Obviously, a large part of the
grain was kept by the producers. USSR decides to pass agricultural
machines to the producers in exchange for the grain.

On March 18 the grain reserves were only enough till the end of month
(except for Kazakhstan). In Moscow city, in Ivanovo, Tula, Nizhny
Novgorod, Tyumen and some other regions the reserves could last less
than 10 days. In January-March only 3.7 mln tons were imported instead
of the planned 12.4 mln tons.

In February 1991 Ukraine demands the USSR to return from the union's
grain fund 1.2 mln tons of wheat. Flour is not available in retail in
RSFSR (except for Moscow) and Ukraine. In other republics flour is
rationed. Milk production dropped in the four months of 1991: in
Russia and Belorussia by 10%, in Lithuania, Azerbaijan and Moldavia --
by 11-13%, in Latvia and Estonia -- by 15%, in Georgia and Armenia --
by 21-24%.

In Mat 21 the flour reserves were 1.5 mln tons (enough for 15 days).

The communists seem to be unaware of these problems. The Central
Committee of the CPSU demands 81.5 mln rubles for the purchase of
materials for the party typographies, 2,500 cars for the party
officials and a compensation for the party officials for the growth of
prices.

Gorbachev's aide Chernyaev: " The bread lines in Moscow are as long as
the meat lines two years ago. That there was bread in the country
turned out to be a myth. Nobody gives credits. I went all around
Moscow and the bakers are either closed or absolutely empty. Moscow
has never saw anything like this, I think, even in the years of the
worst hunger."

8.3 Prices fly upwards

On March 19 1991 the government finally dares to raise the retail
prices by 60%. The real growth, however, exceeds 90%: meat became 2.6
times more expensive, sausage -- 3.1 times, bread -- 3 times. Contrary
to the fears of the officials, no unrest followed.

This step does not enhance the situation due to the attempts to
reimburse the losses of the people by issuing compensations. The
compensations are payed from the union's budget, but the taxes go to
the republican budgets.

In December 1991 two thirds of the Soviet people think that the life
level will drop even lower before the crisis ends.

The prices of the kolkhoz markets (relatively free) were almost 6
times higher than in the state-owned shops. The share of the black
market is: consumer goods -- 30.9%, food -- 10.9%, services -- 25.7%.

8.4 Money and the fate of the empire

Growth of monetary emission, in billions of rubles:

1988

1989

1990

1991

April

4.13

3.63

2.60

4.77

May

-0.93

-1.55

0.22

5.50

June

3.40

3.48

2.62

18.74

July

3.76

2.18

2.93

19.87

August

-2.06

-0.20

5.76

17.13

The chances to receive foreign credits are disappearing. Greece, who
offered credits in 1990, in 1991 is reluctant to even discuss the
matter. $500 mln were received from Southern Korea as a gratitude for
the restored diplomatic relations. $200 mln were received from Kuwait
for the support during the conflict with Iraq. The government
confiscates $6 billion of Soviet citizens and organizations from the
Vnesheconombank (including the royalties of Gorbachev himself for his
books published abroad).

Contracts are not payed in time, Soviet ships are arrested in foreign
ports. The government doesn't know what to do with the Soviet
specialists working abroad -- there are no money to pay salaries or
buy for them tickets home. The financial assistance to the foreign
communist parties is cut. Gorbachev asks G7 to invite him and plans to
discuss the credits. He receives the invitation, but not the credits.

In the Baltic republics the independence proponents win the
elections. On the referenda the support of the independence is
overwhelming: 90% in Lithuania, 77% in Latvia, 90% in Estonia.

The specific feature of the pro-independence movements in the Soviet
republics compared to the movements in other empires, was the support
of a significant part of the people belonging to the imperial nation,
Russians in this case. In spring of 1990 Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia
proclaim independence. Moldavia, Ukraine, Belorussia and Russia follow
them.

In April 1990 USSR begins partial economic blockade of Lithuania,
which forces Lithuania to postpone the practical steps towards
independence.

In summer of 1990 Gorbachev forms an alliance with Yeltsin. They agree
on the radical broadening of the rights of the republics and
transformation of the Union into a confederation. They also agree on
the principles of an anti-crisis economic program: cut of defense
spendings, capital expenditures and economic assistance to other
countries. These measures are insufficient, but what's more important
is that the army and KGB oppose them. Gorbachev backs off and gives
them a chance to restore control by force (murders of the Latvian
customs officers). On January 7, 1991 paratroopers are sent to
Lithuania. They seize the House of Press and some other objects in
Vilnius and Kaunas. Planes and trains to Lithuania are cancelled. On
January 11, Gosteleradio (the state TV and radio committee, whose head
was Kravchenko) switches off the communication lines of an independent
news agency Interfax. The Communist party of Lithuania (the general
secretary Ermolavičius) announces that formation of the Committee of
the national rescue and attempts to take power. Chernyaev (Gorbachev's
aide) said later that the decision to send the troops was taken by the
army commander Varennikov without Gorbachev's confirmation.

The parliaments of Russia, Ukraine, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, the Moscow
and Leningrad Councils condemn the usage of violence in Lithuania. The
miners' strike committees in Kuznetsk region demand for Gorbachev's
resignation. The West threats to cancel credits. USSR backs off. On
July 30, on the meeting in Novo-Ogarevo Gorbachev agrees that all
taxes will be collected by the republics, and the Union's government
will depend on the finances transferred by the republics. Basically,
this was the dissolution of the empire.

7 Developing crisis of the socialist economical and political systems

7.1 Problems of the oil industry

In 1991 22,000 oil wells did not work because of the insufficient
supply of equipment.

7.2 Political credits

Ever since the USSR refused to pay the debts of the tsarist
government, Soviet Union always payed in time. However, since 1988
banks do not trust USSR anymore. It's getting more and more difficult
to pay debts by taking new credits. USSR increases sales of gold, but
the reserves are not too large. Under politicla liberalization, strict
stabilization measures are threatening with a political crisis. The
only solution the Soviet leaders can think of is the credits from the
Western countries.

Gorbachev agrees to accept the disadvantageous terms dictated by the West
and to cut weapons. He does it both to cut the expenses and to obtain
credits. This was the only way to avoid strict measures and political
suicide.

7.3 Price of the compromises

As long as the dialogue with the West was about the control over the
arms race, it was the dialogue on par. Now that the Soviet leaders ask
for money, equality is gone.

Usage of brute force to retain control over Eastern Europe is
impossible, since it would lead to the loss of credits. This leads to
the victory of Solidarność in Poland.

The price payed by the West for the Soviets giving up control over
Eastern Europe was not high: credits from FRG for the re-unification
of Germany, Italian and American credits. The West demands USSR to
observe human rights.

The West informs the separatists in the Baltic countries that if they
proclaim independence, USA will not guarantee their
sovereignity. However, USSR will not get any credits if the Soviets
use force against the Baltic countries.

7.4 Crisis of the empire and the national question

As it often happens in authoritarian multiethnic countries,
political liberalization calls to life political forces based on
nationalism.

In the first years of his rule, Gorbachev was convinced that there are
no national problems in the country.

In 1986, students in Alma-Ata (Kazakhstan) protest against the
appointment of a Russian candidate, G. Kolbin as the first secretary
of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan. The
unrest was put down, but the USSR shown signs of weakness, cancelling
Kolbin's appointment and replacing him with a Kazakh candidate,
N. Nazarbayev.

Like in Yugoslavia, the discrimination of Russians is widely discussed
and produces the same reaction as the discrimination of Serbs.

By summer 1988, national movements are formed in the Baltic countries,
Armenia, Georgia. Their first natural step was to find foreign
enemies. About 600,000 people flee from persecutions and become
refugees.

To save the empire without using violence is impossible. To lose the
empire and to stay in power is impossible, too. Violence will
definitely lead to the loss of credits, economic collapse and fall of
the empire.

Trying to quell the disorders in Tbilisi in 1989, the army uses
violence against a demonstration. The political leaders attempt to
avoid the responsibility and the army becomes the
scapegoat. Eventually, in May-June 1989, during the pogroms against
Meskhetian Turks in Fergana (Uzbekistan), the army refuses to act
without direct orders. 103 people died, 1011 were wounded, 757 houses
were burnt and looted.

7.5 Loss of control

In spring 1989 the communist candidates lost the elections.

Crime grows fast (1,514 thousand crimes in the first half of 1990
against 1,263 thousand in the first half of 1989). The number of
crimes involving firearms grows by 30%. Laws and regulations on the
republican, local and the union levels contradict each other.

The mixture of an inexperienced democracy and loss of the
authoritarian control makes the democratic Soviet of the People's
deputies (the parliament) to increase spendings on social programs,
worsening the financial situation. The taken decisions cannot be
fulfilled.

In summer 1988, government decides to finish the liberalization of
prices in the first half of 1989. However, nobody wants to take
decisive steps to this goal. In 1990 Gorbachev refuses to
start transition to the market economy from the liberalization of
prices, preferring more popular measures. The state expenses for the
production of all kinds of goods are 20-30% higher than the profit
from the sales.

7.6 From crisis to catastrophe

In 1989 the industrial production stopped growing. Since 1990 it
decreases. Miners' strikes result in the dropping coal
production. This leads to the lowering production in metallurgy. This,
in its turn, impedes all other industries. Devaluation of ruble makes
consumers buy more, increasing the deficit of consumer goods.

7.7 "Extraordinary efforts" instead of reforms

In the spring of 1990 Gorbachev chooses between a radical economic
program prepared by N. Petrakov and a more moderate program by
L. Abalkin. He cannot make his mind and postpones the decision.

Public opinion polls:

May '90: 50% support transition to the market economy. 60% say that it
will not give any results in short term.

December '90: 56% think that the economic situation is critical, while
37% call it unfavourable. 70% expect the situation to become
worse. 54% think that the catastrophe is possible in 1991. 49% say
that there will be mass unemployment, 42% expect famine, 51% prepare
to power and water cuts. 70% say that their wealth got worse in the
last year. The main problems identified: survival, food supplies,
raising prices, deficit of soap, clothes, fabrics, shoes, etc.

When asked when the USSR will recover from the crises, 45.8% replied
that no sooner than in 2000. 12% thought that the USSR will never
recover. 60% said that the main problems are deficit, poverty and
lines.

In the end of 1989 52% supported Gorbachev. In the end of 1990 --
21%.

First secretary of the Leningrad regional committee of the CPSU
Gidaspov: "When I go to work in the morning, I see hundreds, thousands
people standing in lines. And I think: now someone will break a glass
and the counter-revolution will start in Leningrad."

In 1990 the monetary emission grew to 26.6 billion rubles.

The food supply in Moscow and Leningrad was also a critical priority
(Soviet leaders remembered well how the revolution in 1917 began). In
early 1991 the situation even in Moscow becomes catastrophic. In other
cities it's even worse. In Nizhny Novgorod there is not enough food
even for children and pregnant women.

Oil and gas workers follow the example of the coal miners and threat
to strike. In 3 years the oil production decreased by 20%. Coal
production in 1991 was 11% less than in 1990.

The government adopts "extraordinary" decrees on strengthening the
struggle with the economic crimes and creates "extraordinary
commissions".

In April 1991 the authors of the anti-crisis program of the Cabinet of
Ministers write: "It is necessary to destroy the artificial trade
barriers built in some regions and republics and to organize the
supply of the most important resources for the agricultural
enterprises. The Cabinet of Ministers will follow the anti-inflational
policy, liberalization of prices and stimulation of business
activity."

7.8 On the edge of default

Since mid-1989 the country is on the edge of bankruptcy. USSR asks the
West for urgent help. The West is ready to help, but wants a clear
anti-crisis program.

Aeroflot company stops selling aeroplane tickets to the workers of the
Ministry of Foreign Economic Links, telephone company turns off their
telephones.

The West wants to prevent chaos in the USSR and tries to help. G. Bush
in Ukraine says on August 1 1991: "Freedom and independence are not
the same. The Americans will not help those who abuse their freedom,
replacing the earlier tyranny with a local despotism. Nor those who
are inclined to welcome the suicidal nationalism based on ethnic
hatred."

Europarliament sends food and medicine as a humanitarian
aid. Bundeswehr sends military rations.

"People in Yaroslavl are happy to see standing lines: if you stand in
the end, you may hope to buy something. But the lines are more and
more rare. Two weeks ago a new one has appeared, the most angry and
desperate one -- the bread line."

A schoolboy wrote: "Last week I stood in a terrible line for meat. I
am afraid to even say, but I spent 5.5 hours there. We had lines
before, but they were not so huge and some things could be bought
freely. Now we have lines standing for everything, from meat and shoes
to matches and salt... Had you seen our savage, mad and hungry people
in terrible, savage lines, you would be shocked."

During the first quarter of 1991 the budget gains were 4.4 billion
rubles instead of the planned 17 billion rubles. The price for oil on
the international market was 60 rubles per ton, while the budgeted
price was 105 rubles per ton.

The government discusses two options. The first is based on strict
non-economic measures to limit the incomes of the citizens: cancelling
social programs, freezing salaries, cutting capital expenditures. This
option was rejected as impossible in the current social and political
situation. The second option: to use the inflation to achieve the
macroeconomic stabilization, protecting only a limited circle of
people with fixed incomes. Industrial workers should compensate the
losses by increasing productivity and sales. This also implies that
the prices must be liberalized, except for a limited set of fixed
prices on some fuels and materials and a minimum set of the basic life
necessities. The second option is also rejected because of political
risks.

Newspapers about the miners' strikes: "There are patrols on the
streets: strong guys in white shirts. The order is ideal, there is
zero crime rate in the city. The officials gave up their power in
favor of those whom yesterday they refused to accept in their
cabinets. Kirovsk, Snezhnoye, Shakhtyorsk, Torez, Donetsk... This is
not a strike, this is a revolution."

The government faces the same choice as in 1985-86, but in a much
worse situation. The government discusses possible ways of reforms,
but adopts none.

2007/09/21

LJ user vova_l (link in Russian) posted the text of a short notice by
Posrednik publishers printed in the newspaper "Russkie
Vedomosti" on March 7, 1887. It reads:

Due to frequent requests for permission to reprint or
translate works by Leo Nikolayevich Tolstoy published by our company,
we deem it necessary to announce that all works by L. N. Tolstoy
published by Posrednik are released, according to the author's
wish, to the public domain and, hence, are free from all literature
property rights.

Another writer, Nikolay Semyonovich Leskov commented: "Now we
have to take care that the example of the man whom we love would not
be lost in vain."

120 years ago this man has understood what few of modern people
understand. Okay, he may be not the best writer I know, to put it
mildly, but I have to admit he was a great thinker. :)

6 Political economy of external shocks

6.1 USSR and the falling oil prices. The gist of the choice.

Insufficiently competitive machine building industry left no chances
to change the structure of export trade. Cutting grain import might
lead to the social crisis. Good harvests in 1986-87 allowed to soften
the consequences of the falling oil prices, but in 1988 the crisis
became even more threatening. The dependence of wheat harvests on the
weather, caused by the developing of virgin lands in the 1950s and the
low oil prices made the situation catastrophic. This was the reason of
the fall of the Soviet economic system.

Possible strategies were:

large scale raising of prices, comparable to what was done in the
1930s;

introduction of rationing;

lowering the production of the processing and building industries
and raising the export of raw materials;

cut capital expenditures and decrease the volume of import of
machines and tools from the West.

The first option was a violation of the contract between the society
and the power, formed in late 50s-early 60s and confirmed in 1962 in
Novocherkassk. Besides, increased prices wouldn't solve the problem
due to large forced savings of the people. The rationing opposed the
existing hierarchy of distribution, even though the idea was popular
(in 1991 60% of Soviet people supported this idea, while only 16%
preferred growing prices). Decrease of military spendings led to the
conflict with the army and the military industry. Similarly, decrease
of capital expenditures led to the conflict with the regional elite
and with the industrial ministries and could end with a quiet coup,
like it was with Khrushchev. It was impossible to cut the industrial
production in the cities, where only one factory gave jobs to the
majority of the population. Cuts of the oil export to the Eastern
Europe become regular. Capital expenditures and import of machinery
continued to grow. A large part of the imported tools were never used,
however.

The new leaders did not understand that attempts to avoid conflicts
with the people or with the industrial/agricultural elite only increased
the chances of the conflict with both. Traditional Soviet style of
management was oriented on the natural criteria, not the financial
ones. The problems of kettle farming were discussed by the government
more often than the budget problems. Finances were seen as a dull
accounting. Moreover, the real state of the budget was available to a
very limited circle of the top officials. Gorbachev recalled:
"Andropov asked me and Ryzhkov to analyse possible decisions and to
report to him. Trying to get to the gist, we asked for a chance to
understand the state of the budget. Andropov laughed: 'You want too
much. I won't let you see it.'" Andropov himself admitted, though,
that he knew next to nothing about economy.

Deintellectualization: from a protocol of the Central Committee of
the CPSU: "On comrade Zasyadko: they say he has quit drinking. Send
him as a minister to Ukraine." Zero economic education of the
leaders.

6.2 Chain of mistakes

By 1985, the Soviet leaders did not yet understand how deep the crisis
was, but they noticed the decrease of the oil production. For the
1986-1990 the plans of the capital expenditures in the oil and gas
industries were by almost 1/3 larger than they had been in 1981-1985
and 3 times larger than in 1971-1975. The share of the oil and gas
industries in the total amount of capital expenditures grew from 14%
in the 9th five-year plan (1971-1975) to 23% in the 12th five-year
plan (1986-1990). The growth of the industry was smaller than the
growth of the capital expenditures.

The government did not understand that the crisis was financial and
prepared two blows on the financial system: the anti-alcohol campaign
and the program of the acceleration of the economic development.

In 1985, it was planned that the income from sales of alcohol should
be 60 billion rubles. In 1986, the income was 38 billion rubles, in
1987 -- 35 billion rubles, in 1988 -- slightly more than 40 billion
rubles.

In 1986-1988 the budget gains decreased by 31 billion rubles and the
spendings grew by 36 billion rubles.

Monetary emission:

Year

Emission, billions of rubles

Emission growth, % of the previous year

1986

3.9

8.3

1987

5.9

51.3

1988

11.8

100

1989

18.3

55.1

By 1989, the government was worried by the financial situation. In
January 1989 Gorbachev announced 14.2% cuts of the military spendings
and 19.2% cuts of the weapons production.

The government finally understands the seriousness of the situation
and decides that the conflict with the administrative elite is the
lesser of the evils. However, the decisions are late and the scale of
taken steps is incomparable with the scale of the crisis.

6.3 Growing problems of the Soviet economy

The oil production began to decrease again. From time to time various
goods disappear from the shops: sugar, toothpaste, soap, washing
powder, school copybooks, batteries, not to mention meat, shoes,
etc. The 1987 program of economic reforms was buried. The control over
the monetary mass and the people's incomes was lost.

Incomes of the citizens grow by 12.9% instead of the planned 1.2% and
they grow 1.4 times faster than the expenses. In the beginning of 1990
the unsatisfied demand was 110 billion rubles against 60 billion
rubles in 1986. The Central Bank issues more and more credits to the
state budget.

By the end of 1989 the Soviet leaders are fully aware of the
problems. Western banks are worried by the growth of the USSR's
debt. Soviet Union cannot pay for the imported goods and the shipments
stop. The credits issued earlier by the USSR to the satellite states
are hopeless.

Especially dangerous was the situation with the medicine. The Soviet
industry could provide only 40-45% of the necessary drugs. Supplies
from abroad are stopping.

6.4 Currency crisis

Western banks refuse to issue new credits. In 1988, the income from
the exported goods was only 54% of the planned amount. In 1986-88,
more than one million complaints about poor quality of the exported
goods were received. The debt is two times as large as the income from
the export. Even in the trade with the socialist countries import
exceeds export. All income from the export is spent on the debt
payments.

Foreign banks refer to their governments. The Western countries tie
new credits with the economic reforms and the delimitation of the
authority of the central governments and the republics.

6.5 Economical and political liberalization against the background of financial problems

The first known official document where the necessity and possibility
of keeping the political system was questioned is the letter of
Alexander Yakovlev to Gorbachev written in December of 1985: "Today
the problem is not in the economy. The political system is the
key. Hence the necessity of full and consistent democratism. Democracy
is, first of all, freedom of choice. We have no choice, only
centralization. Now, we don't understand the ongoing historically
inevitable transformation of the time when there was no choice to the
time when successful development is impossible without the democratic
process of choice which would involve every citizen."

On September 25, 1986, chairman of KGB Chebrikov offers to set free
one third of the Soviet political prisoners and then extends the
proposal to one half. Magazines begin publishing banned texts.

The liberalization per se canot quell financial crises. And yet,
the liberalization started in 1987 heavily influenced the collapse of
the Soviet economy.

Ways to modernize Soviet economy were discussed since 1960s. However,
the ideas of its radical reconstruction were under ban till
mid-80s. The phrase "market economy" (even "socialist market economy")
were never applied to the USSR. The word "reform" was not used since
early 70s till Gorbachev first uttered it in 1986.

Free prices are a necessary requisite of the market economy, even the
socialist one. Market mechanisms do not work without free prices, as
the Polish experience of 70s-80s had demonstrated: autonomy of the
enterprises gives no stimuli to the effective production under fixed
prices.

On November 11, 1986 the law on individual labour was adopted. On May
1, 1987 individual farming was legalized. Unfortunately, unlike in
China, these measures gave no results in 1988 because of lack of trust
to the government: the Soviet people were sure that the announced
reforms will never be realized.

Enterprises demanded for more autonomy, but insist on the guaranteed
supply of tools and materials from the state.

The idea of the workers' participation in the management of the
enterprise was discussed in the early XX century, before the
revolution of 1917, and the Soviet leaders did not reject it
completely. In 1962, Khrushchev said: "Probably, we should have some
kind of a council at the enterprises, and the director will make a
report at the council monthly or quarterly. I can imagine that the
council will elect the director from a number of candidates."

In May 1988, the law on cooperation is adopted. Cooperatives buy
products for fixed prices, process them (or not) and sell for fre
prices. 80% of cooperatives were organized on the state
enterprises. Average salary in the cooperatives is 2 times higher than
on the state enterprises.

Decrees of July 6 and August 4 allow the VLKSM (communist youth
league) to go to business, giving a chance to the elite to
use the comsomol resources for commerce.

A large number of commercial banks are organized. Many of them violate
the laws and regulations on banking. Soviet leaders do not understand
that the liberalization of banking should be one of the last, but not
the first stage of the economy transformation.

In 1989 miners' strikes begin. They demand for better food supply. The
government promises to increase the supplies, but cannot fulfil the
promises. Salary is payed regularly, but the money get devalued fast.

2007/09/20

3 Causes of the instability of authoritarian regimes

3.1 Instability

The cause of instability of authoritarian regimes is the lack
of legitimacy and primitive structure of the state.

One option to fight the challenges of instability in authoritarian
regimes is the closed, or managed, democracy, when de jure
democratic institutions and procedures are retained, but the ruling
elite establishes principles of the continuity of power, controls
elections and determins their results. This is a dead end (see
Italy, Japan, Mexico).

Another option is the formation of totalitarian
structures. Authoritarian states want their citizens to stay aside of
public politics, avoid demonstrations and rallies, not contact foreign
press, etc. On the other hand, totalitarian regimes control the
private life of citizens. A messian-type ideology is typical for
totalitarism.

3.2 Mechanisms of the fall of authoritarianism

Crisis of legitimacy, lack of trust (even among police and
army). Opposition can use simple slogans (re-distribution,
nationalism) which are difficult to refute.

Nothing guarantees, however, that the fall of an authoritarian regime
results in the creation of stable democracy. External influences are
important here. In Eastern Europe: influence of the EU, chances to
become a member of EU. In Latin America: influence of USA.

4 The oil curse.

4.1 Resource wealth and economic development.

There is a reverse proportion between long-term economic growth and
the amount of natural resources.

Abundance of natural resources gives the ruling classes a way to
increase budget not caring about the increase of taxes, that is
without a dialogue with the society. Since only such dialogues allow
to build the rules of the political play and launch modern mechanisms
of the economic growth, there are less limitations on corruption
and arbitrariness in the countries with rich resources.

The distribution of profit in resource-rich countries depends on the
experience in bribery, not on the market mechanisms.

Resource wealth increases risks of political instability, connected
with the struggle for the re-distribution of profits.

A typical feature of resource-rich countries is lack of attention
towards problems of education. Probably, due to the specific demand
for work force in the mining companies and other companies producing
raw materials.

Highly volatile prices on raw materials are a problem for the economy
of such countries.

4.2 Specific features of the oil market

When most market players believe that the oil prices will stay high
for a short period only, they will stay so. When the opinion prevails
that the high prices are a new stable level for a long period, the
prices will fall

4.3 Regulation of the oil market in the XX century

Market was split in 1928 by 7 largest corporation -- agreement
of Achnacarry. Cannon boat diplomacy, exploitation of less
developed countries.

1960 -- OPEC.

1974 -- oil crisis, growing prices. Decrease of oil consumption in the
importing countries led to the decrease of demand in 1981 and the
sharp fall of prices in 1986.

4.4 Challenges linked with the fall of the raw materials prices: Mexico and Venezuela.

Mexico. Was a closed democracy in 1970-1990. Share of the state
expenses in the GNP was growing. The foreign debt increased. When the
prices fell -- tax growth, budget expenses cut, currency devaluation.

Venezuela. Stable democracy. Control over the growth of the national
currency rate. Populists come to power in 1974. By 1989 Venezuela has
84% inflation and the foreign debt equal to 54% of GNP. Labor
productivity falls. Defaulted foreign debt. Chavez comes to power
in 1992.

4.5 Response to the threats of the prices volatility

Hedging and forward contracts are political risks for the
government. Two kinds of stabilization funds: protection of the
national economy from the oscillation of prices and the fund for
future generations.

In the non-democratic countries there is high risk of corruption in
the stabilization fund management and/or ineffective investments.

Stabilization funds are an easy target for the opposition in
democratic countries. Even in Norway, under effective democracy, a
coalition in power never won the elections since the stabilization
fund was created.

5 Crevices in the foundation. USSR in early 1980s

5.1 Ineffectiveness in stability

Social stability is the typical feature of the Brezhnev's epoch. 7 out
of 9 mass protests against the regime took place in the first years of
Brezhnev's rule. In 1969-1977 there were none. In the times of
Khrushchev, the government used armed troops against the discontent in
8 cases out of 11. In the years of Brezhnev's rule -- only in 3 cases
out of 9. Since 1968 till Brezhnev's death weapon was never used
against the protesters.

Mass construction of living buildings (instead of earlier "communal
apartments") and personal garden-plots (dachas) for
growing vegetables and fruits resulted in loss of the total control
over the personal life of the citizens.

Changes of the information field. In 1950 only 2% of Soviet people had
radio receivers with short wave bands. By 1980 -- 50%. From a KGB
report of 1976: "A significant share of the persons who committed
politically harmful misdemeanours were under foreign ideological
influence. The main factor was propaganda by radio. 80% of
university students and 90% of undergraduate schoolchildren listen
foreign radiostations regularly (32% of univesity students and 59% of
schoolchildren listen them 1-2 times a week and even more often." A
report of 1970: "5 years ago most of illegal printed materials were
ideologically vicious fiction books, but now we see widely popular
political documents and programs. Since 1965 we were aware of about
400 books and articles which criticize the historical experience of
building of communist in the USSR, revising the politics of the CPSU,
offering oppositional political programs."

5.2 Growing problems and wrong solutions

1930s-1950s -- redistribution of labour resources from rural areas to
the cities. In 1960s the flow of labour force decreased.

1965: more rights given to the factories and other enterprises, the
salary now depends not only on the personal input, but also on the
financial results of the whole enterprise.

Ineffectiveness of Soviet system: USSR produced 8 times more iron ore
than the USA, made of this ore 3 times more cast iron, which was
processed into 2 times more steel. From this steel the same amount of
tools and machines was produced. Consumption of raw materials and
energy per a production unit was 1.6 and 2.1 times more
correspondingly.

After the chemical weapons were prohibited, the factories involved
into this production had to be used somehow. Millions of people became
victims of food contaminated with insecticides and other poisons.

The command system of management created in 1930s-1950s was based on
fear of severe punishment. After Stalin's death in 1953 the discipline
quickly falls.

Alcohol. The share of alcohol consumed in socially controlled places
(restaurants, caffees, etc.) was 5.5% vs. 50-70% in developed
countries. In 20 years consumption of alcohol grew 2.2 times, number
of crimes committed under alcohol intoxication grew 5.7 times, the
number of people suffering from alcoholism -- 7 times.

Loss of the effectivity of the communist ideology. The
ideological dogmata were not taken as seriously as before. They were
either dismissed or ridiculed out. Deintellectualization of the CPSU
led to gerontocracy.

5.3 Problems of the food supply

Socialism is the economy of deficit. Since late 1960s
shortages grow. In late 1980s shortages turned into a crisis.

The problem of the food supply of the cities was faced by the tsarist
government before the WWI. The revolution was a corollary. Bolsheviks
solved the problem with prodrazvyorstka (food expropriation). In the
late 1920s the problem became important again. Stalin's solution was
chosen: dekulakization, collectivization, prodrazvyorstka.

In Europe the period of the industrial growth was preceded by the
agrarian revolution (sharp growth of the effectivity of the
agriculture). In Russia, the agrarian revolution never happened, but
the agriculture grew steadily and the country was the largest exporter
of food.

Collectivization and deprivation of kolkhoz members of their right to
choose the place to live and work, nonfree non-payed work were equal
to restoration of serfdom, but now the state from one of the
exploiters became the only one. Hence, the labour ethics distorts:
work becomes a burden to avoid.

Social position of the peasants was intentionally low. Annual income
of a kolkhoz member was close to a monthly salary of a factory
worker. The socialist model created motives for the smartest and the
most energetic peasants to move to a city, in spite of the bans to
do so.

5.4 Food shortage: strategic challenge

Options: additional investments in the traditional agricultural
regions, Nechernozemye (non-Black Soil Belt); developing of virgin
lands; liberalization and de-collectivization. The first option was
proved to be ineffective later in 1970s-1980s. The second option was
chosen, in spite of the predicted instability of the harvest.

After 1958 growth of harvests stops. In 1963 the harvest was
significantly lower than before. In 1953-1960 the reserves of grain
decrease. Capital expenditures grow. Social degradation led to the low
effectiviness of agriculture. Since 1971 till 1985 capital
expenditures were 579.6 billion rubles. The result was zero.

5.5 USSR as the largest food importer

Contrary to the market economy, in the socialist economy it was
impossible to raise the retail prices, it would be a violation of the
social contract between the state and the people. The rulers, caring
primarily of their own security, rejected the use of terror, typical
for the earlier years and the fear of the state decreased among the
general population. Now the neglection of social programs led to the
conflicts, like in Novocherkassk in 1962. From a KGB order: "In the
first half of 1962 7705 anti-Soviet leaflets were registered, two
times more than in the first half of 1961. After the prices were
raised, the flow increased. Only in June there were 83 occasions of
different anti-Soviet leaflets and graffiti. In the same period, more
than 300 anti-Soviet anonymous letters received by the party and
Soviet organizations and newspapers were reported to KGB. In these
letters, people express their discontent with the low quality of life,
and call to mass protests, strikes, rallies, boycotts demanding for
the increase of salary and decrease of prices."

Eventually, the prices grow even in the socialist economy. In 1981-85
prices on bread grew by 6.6%, on potato -- by 7.9%, on cotton fabrics
-- by 17.9%, on TVs -- by 10%. In 1979 prices on luxury goods grew: on
gold -- by 50%, on silver -- by 95%, on fur -- by 50%, on carpets --
by 50%, on cars -- by 18%.

Non-equal and unjust distribution of goods: in Moscow and Leningrad
97% of people bought food in the state shops (the prices there were
lower than on the markets where kolkhoz members sold their product),
in the capitals of Soviet republics -- 79%, in oblast centres --
36%. The higher was the income of a family, the better access to
cheaper food they had.

Grain supplies to the socialist countries. Only in 1963 the grain
crisis forces the USSR to stop the supplies to the socialist countries
and to buy wheat abroad. One third of the gold reserve was spent on
wheat (372.2 tons of gold). In 1965 -- 335.5 tons more. In 1907-1913
Russia was the largest exporter of grain (45% of the world market). By
1980s USSR became the largest importer (16.4% of the world
market). There is not enough gold to buy grain and the industry is not
competitive to increase export of machines. Hence, USSR takes
credits.

5.6 Oil of the West Siberia. Illusion of rescue

Year

Production of oil in the Western Siberia, mln.tons

1965

1

1966

2.8

1967

5.8

1968

12.2

1969

21.3

1970

31.4

1971

44.7

1972

62.7

1973

87.7

1974

116.4

1975

148.0

1976

181.7

1977

218.3

1978

254.1

1979

283.5

1980

312.6

1981

334.3

1982

352.9

1983

370.1

1984

377.9

Increase of oil production and the growth of oil prices in 1973-74 and
in 1979-81 gave a chance to stop the food crisis, to increase import
of machines and tools, consumers goods, provided the financial base of
the arms race, allowed to achieve parity of nuclear weapons with the
USA and to start the campaigns like the war in Afghanistan.

Being certain that the high prices on oil are stable, USSR did not
create any financial reserves and borrowed additional foreign
credits. In 1979-1981 three successive low harvests result in the
deficit of the foreign trade. In 1980s oil prices stop
growing. Shortage of consumer goods increases, monetary emission
grows, retail prices grow. Shortage of food is compensated with their
lowering quality (like decreasing percentage of meat in sausage,
etc.). Since mid-1970s about one half of the trade growth was produced
by lowering quality of goods and increased prices. The report was
prepared and given to the chairman and the vice-chairmen of the
Council of ministers, but it was confiscated and destroyed on the next
day.

In 1982 the government of Poland asks for assistance. in 1980-81 the
financial aid was 4 billion rubles. In 1982-83 an additional 2.7
billion rubles credit was issued.

5.7 Falling oil prices: the last strike

Autumn 1981: oil supplies to the Eastern Europe are cut by 10%. In
1985 oil production begins to decrease. Supplies to the Eastern Europe
continue, but the export to the West decreases. In 1984 the Academy of
Sciences predicts stabilization of the oil prices, but in 1985 they
plunge.

5.8 Dissolution of the USSR: unexpected and logical

In the 1970s-80s nobody foresaw the fall of the USSR. The opinion of
the daemonic omnipotence of CIA and its role in the fall of the USSR,
so widespread in modern Russia, is a mirrored reflection of the point
of view prevailing in Washington that in the late 80s-early 90s the
CIA demonstrated extreme incompetence in everything related to the
USSR and Russia.

The second version of what caused the dissolution of the USSR is the
intensification of the arms race, imposed by Reagan. It is impossible
to estimate the real scale of military spendings in the USSR, the data
are irreconcilable. Besides, it is not clear whether the prices on
military equipment were based on the economic reality in any
degree. To understand whether this version is valid, one should
understand how the decisions were made in the USSR. The evidences that
the USSR increased military spendings since early 1980s are not
convincing enough. The volume of military production was not
determined by the necessities and military plans, but by the available
industrial units.

Gorbachev's aide Shakhnazarov once asked: "Why should we produce so
much weapons?" The General Staff commander Akhromeyev replied:
"Because we have built first class factories, not worse than what the
American have. Would you order them to produce tin pans?"

From the military and strategic point of view, the Western experts who
monitored the production of tanks in the USSR, could only conlude that
the Soviets plan an offensive war. In reality, the occasion behind
this decision was the certainty that should the war with the USA
begin, Americans will quickly raise the production of tanks, and the
losses of Soviet tanks in the first stage of war will be extremely
high. The main cause, however, was that the factories were built and
the workers must have job to do. The same happened to the SS-20
missiles. The decision to produce them inevitably led to the reaction
of the West -- placement of missiles in the Western Europe and
increase of the threat to the USSR. After all, USSR had to agree to
cut the number of missiles, when huge resources had already been
spent.

By 1985 the roots of a deep crisis were already prepared in the
USSR. The Soviet authorities were still sure in the stability of the
Soviet economy. When the new leaders came to power, it took about
three years to understand the situation. But it was already too late.

2007/09/19

1 Foreword

1.1 Post-imperial syndrome in Russia

Empire is a strong polyethnical state, where the power is concentrated
in the metropolitan country, and the democratic institutes (if any)
or, at least, the suffrage, are not available on the whole controlled
territory.

The problem of the country ill with the post-imperial syndrome is that
the feeling of the nostalgy to the lost empire is easy to incite, but
the attempts to restore it are unrealistic.

Many Germans forgot how they hated the monarchy in the last years of
the first World War, when it became clear that the chancellor and the
highest officials lied to them. They didn't know that it was Ludendorf
who demanded the new chancellor to sign the truce to avoid the
catastrophe on the Western front.

That the leaders of the Weimar republic were not ready to disclose the
proofs of the responsibility of the German rulers for the beginning of
the World War was one of the most important causes of the fall of the
republic.

I. Yakovenko: "Not a single political force in Russia dared to admit
that from the viewpoint of preservation and restoration of the Russian
people the dissolution of the USSR became the luckiest event of the
last half of the century."

The importance of the agreements in Belovezhskaya Pushcha should not
be overestimated. They were only a de jure recognition of the
divorce that had already happened. They did not make the fall of the
integrated empire any less painful, but helped to avoid the chances of
bloody conflicts and the nuclear catastrophe. As a result of these
agreements, by May 1992 the largest part of the most dangerous (due to
the specific of usage) tactical nuclear weapons located in other
republics, was concentrated in Russia.

The Soviet government was absolutely convinced that the state can use
unlimited violence to suppress the discontent. Such states are fragile
since they do not include flexible adaptive mechanisms which would
allow for the adaptation to the changing world.

The following picture dominates the modern Russian public opinion:

20 years ago there was a stable, powerful, developing country, the USSR.

Strange people (probably, agents of foreign intelligence) began political and economical reforms.

The results of the reforms were catastrophic.

In 1999-2000 the people who really care about the state came to the power.

Since then, the life is getting better.

This myth is as far from the truth as the legend of the unconquered
and betrayed Germany, popular in the German society of 20s-30s.

2 Greatness and fall of the empires.

2.1 Empires of the past

The European empires were formed in the age of the mercantilist
politics. The states limited import and stimulated export. Possession
of colonies increased the zone of controlled trade. Subjugated
countries could not regulate the import of goods from the metropolitan
state. Administrative coercion -- an element of the politics for the
industrial development of the metropolitan state. In 1813 India could
sell goods in Britain for prices 50-60% lower than the prices on the
analogous Britain-made goods. The customs duties (70-80%) or direct
bans made this impossible. The colonization was followed by the loss
of job by hundreds of thousands of people. The population of Dakka
decreased from 150,000 to 30-40,000 people. Between 1814 and 1835
export of British textile to India grew from 1 million to 51 million
yards per year. In the same years, export from India to Britain
decreased by four times. By 1844 it decreased by 5 times.

A typical feature of all empires is the lack of universal suffrage.

National sentiments are one of the strongest instruments of political
mobilization in the societies lacking democratic
traditions. K. Leontyev: "The notion of nationalities as it exists in
the XIX century brings a lot of destructive consequences and nothing
constructive."

2.2 Crisis of the overseas empires

Churchill, Nov 10 1942: "We plan to hold what is our property. I did
not become the prime minister to preside during the liquidation of
the British empire."

Having survived the fall of the empire, France retained democratic
institutions in the metropolitan state due to a number of causes: high
level of economy, which makes authoritarian regimes look archaic;
plans of the European integration; prestige and will of de Gaulle who
was able to dissolve the empire and retain the control over the army
and police.

2.3 Problems of the dissolution of integrated empires

In agrarian countries ethnic differences usually are not
important. The split into a privileged minority specialized in
coercion and the peasants' majority was crucial.

Economic growth and education radically change the life and begin the
erosion of traditional regimes.

An overseas empire may be abandoned. In the empires with integrated
territory the problems linked with the habitats of various ethnic
groups are more important than in the overseas empires.

The fall of an authoritarian regime is followed by a political
vacuum. The old policeman has gone, the new one is not here
yet. People with pretensions of power have no tradition behind
them. Hence a situation typical for revolutions: weak government is
unable to collect taxes and pay money, establish order, guarantee
contract obligations. In such situations the exploitation of the
simplest social instincts is a reliable way to political success.

Attempts of the elite of the metropolitan states to build the state on
the basis of ethnic identity objectively cause radical anti-imperial
sentiments among the national minorities. E.g.: "In the struggle of
the Ukrainian separatism with a more moderate federalism the former
had the same powerful assistant as other Russian separatisms -- the
imperial centralism. Its hardcore unitarian position pushed the
Ukrainians to equally hard demands." (A. Vishnevsky)

H. Besançon: Before the WWI Russia had a chance to solve social and
economic problems, but not the national ones. The liberal democratic
alternative, which was the key to the solution of the social problems,
only increased the chances of the dissolution of the empire. The
restoration of the empire in 1918-1922 was a unique case, which became
possible due to the unprecendented violence and the messian ideology
which provided for support in the non-Russian regions.

In the situation of the political competition in the multinational
empire, Austrian socialists understood that the national question is a
bomb in the foundation of the old power. Lenin's idea of the right of
nations on self-determination was a logical development of the logic
of Austrian socialists.

After the WWI the idea was accepted by the winner countries as an
instrument of dismantl of the three empires -- Germany, Austro-Hungary
and the Ottoman empire.

The notion of self-determination gives no answer whether the arbitrary
borders of regions within empires should become the natural borders of
new states, whether the will of the new national minorities should be
taken into account.

2.4 The Yugoslav tragedy

S. Woodword: "The Yugoslav society was not based on the charisma of
Tito or on the political dictatorship, but on the balance of
international interests and on the system of rights of sovereign
parts. The national identity was not suppressed. Moreover, it was
institutionalized into federal systems which guaranteed the rights of
the republics." Such system required a strict control over the
dissidence.

The stability of Yugoslavia was the result of a balance between NATO
and the Warsaw block. The fall of the Comecon (The Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance) caused an economic crisis, which required strict
measures, but the minimal rights of the federal centre led to the
political crisis. For Milośević, the only way to retain control over
Serbia under the erosion of the communist ideology was to exploit
nationalism. The answer to this rhetorics was the discrimination of
Serbs in other republics. Then the troops were sent there to protect
the Serbs. Then -- the war.

2007/09/18

I have finished reading a book written by ex-prime minister of Russia, Yegor Gaidar. The book is titled "Death of the Empire". Being a good economist, Gaidar explains the fall of the USSR by economic reasons. Some key quotations are:

"The dependence of wheat harvests on the weather, caused by the developing of virgin lands in the 1950s and the low oil prices made the situation catastrophic. This was the reason of the fall of the Soviet economic system."

"The Soviet government was absolutely convinced that the state can use unlimited violence to suppress the discontent. Such states are fragile since they do not include flexible adaptive mechanisms which would allow for the adaptation to the changing world."

"[The actions of the current Russian government] form a way to the system which may be called a closed (or managed) democracy, or soft authoritarianism. This system has little common features with the Soviet totalitarian system, but it begins to show weaknesses and elements of instability typical for such systems... However, the remaining elements of freedom and flexibility still give some hope for Russia. "

While reading the book, I made some short (well, not so short, as it turned out :)) notes and I plan to translate them into English and post here. Below is the table of contents of the book.

1 Foreword

1.1 Post-imperial syndrome in Russia.

2 Greatness and fall of the empires.

2.1 Empires of the past

2.2 Crisis of the overseas empires

2.3 Problems of the dissolution of integrated empires

2.4 The Yugoslav tragedy

3 Causes of the instability of authoritarian regimes

3.1 Instability

3.2 Mechanisms of the fall of authoritarianism

4 The oil curse.

4.1 Resource wealth and economic development.

4.2 Specific features of the oil market

4.3 Regulation of the oil market in the XX century

4.4 Challenges linked with the fall of the raw materials prices: Mexico and Venezuela.

4.5 Response to the threats of the prices volatility

5 Crevices in the foundation. USSR in early 1980s

5.1 Ineffectiveness in stability

5.2 Growing problems and wrong solutions

5.3 Problems of the food supply

5.4 Food shortage: strategic challenge

5.5 USSR as the largest food importer

5.6 Oil of the West Siberia. Illusion of rescue

5.7 Falling oil prices: the last strike

5.8 Dissolution of the USSR: unexpected regularity

6 Political economy of external shocks

6.1 USSR and the falling oil prices. The gist of the choice.

6.2 Chain of mistakes

6.3 Growing problems of the Soviet economy

6.4 Currency crisis

6.5 Economical and political liberalization against the background of financial problems

2007/09/17

As we have seen (see chapters 35 and 37), in the XIII century Lithuanian tribes, pushed by the Germans, began to form unions and groups around Lithuanian and Russian knyazes. Knyaz Mindaugas (or Mindovg) became the leader of the unification process. Having captured Russian town Novgorodok (or Novogrodek) on the upper Neman river, he spread his power to a part of Lithuanian tribes and some Russian provinces: Polotsk, Vitebsk and partially Smolensk. He used Lithuanians to occupy Russian lands and he used Russians to spread his influence among lesser Lithuanian knyazes. During all his rule, he opposed Germans with the united Lithuanian-Russian forces. He was the first knyaz who attempted to reconcile earlier hostile Lithuanians and Russians. When he felt it was useful, he agreed to accept baptisement from the Germans and received the royal crown from the Pope. When the situation changed, he returned to the paganism and attacked Germans again. His Russian politics was also flexible. So, after many conquests, when Daniil Romanovich of Galich proved to be a strong enemy, Mindaugas ceded some lands to Daniil and his daughter became wife of Daniil's son, Shvarn. In spite of this flexibility, Mindaugas was killed by Lithuanian knyazes in 1263. His son, Voishelk revenged and killed many of the assassins. One of them, Dovmont, fled to Pskov, baptised, became the knyaz of Pskov and successfully defended the city from the attacks of Germans and Lithuanians.

After the death of Mindaugas the Lithuanian state declined. Only 50 years later the power of the knyzes becomes stronger again, when knyaz Gediminas forms a new strong state from Lithuanian and Russian lands. In the times of Gediminas Lithuanian got new cities, well planned and fortified. The army is well equipped and trained. These enhancements were the result of Russian influence. Russians serve in the army and command it, they become the ambassadors of Gediminas, they run cities and provinces. Gediminas and his children were married on Russian women, Russian language was widely spoken in his country. He thought of himself as of a both Lithuanian and Russian knyaz and titled himself "Rex Litwinorum Ruthenorumque". This policy led to the unification of south-western Russian lands from Polotsk to Kiev in Gediminas' Lithuania. First, he ruled his country from the inaccessible castle in Trakai, located on an island in the middle of a lake. Later, he built a new capital on river Vilia, a tributary of Neman, called Vilnius.

Russians eagerly became citizens of this semi-Russian country and the dynasty of Gediminas managed to form the centre, which attracted all south-western Rus, which had lost its unity earlier.

Two sons of Gediminas, Olgerdas and Kestutis, ruled Lithuania together. Retaining friendly relations, they shared the power: Olgerdas knew the Russian part of the population, lived in Vilnius and fought with the north-eastern Rus. Kestutis lived in Trakai and opposed Germans. So, Russians knew Olgerdas better than his brother. They praised his talents, saying that he ruled "by wisdom, not by force". Germans, on the other hand, knew Kestutis better and spoke of him as of a knight, brave, honest and merciful. On the one hand, the brothers withstood the German attacks and on the other hand, they continued to adjoin Russian lands. The Germans were stopped and Olgerdas took Chernigov, Bryansk, Kiev, Volyn. He even attempted to increase his influence in Novgorod and Pskov and supported Tver in their struggle against Moscow. Moscow, though, was already so strong in the north-eastern Rus that managed to stop Olgerdas.

Olgerdas and Kestutis liberated southern and western Rus from Mongols and united these lands under one rule. It was very important that this power belonged to the Russian culture. From the viewpoint of the Russians, the sons of Gediminas restored the Russian culture in the traditionally Russian areas, along Dnieper. However, the following events proved they were wrong.

2007/09/07

Today our aim is the search, exploration, fixation and state registration of the whole complex of the objects reflecting the history of Northern Europe for minimum 1,400 years. But it is possible that in course of the operations and appearance of more and more discoveries our investigations will turn into the largest exposition and research project in the sphere of history which is capable of providing the scientists and society with a huge volume of new information.

Now, the web-site features a brief review of the history of Russian presence on the Baltic Sea, description of the programs of the project, catalogue and map of identified objects (buildings, necropoles, stone labyrinthes, bombs, tanks, airplanes and, of course, ships and boats). Russian version has also a video-archive, list of national and international laws on the underwater explorations, list of known and still not rescued treasures and some other sections which will eventually appear in the English version, too.

In this year, the expedition of the project found 9 ships in the Gulf of Finland. Among the most interesting finds are a Dutch XVIII century cargo ship, a Finnish patrol ship, sunken in 1944 and, the best of all, Russian 20 cannon sloop-of-war Svir', sistership of the famous Mirny, a ship of the famous expedition of Bellinsgauzen and Lazarev, the discoverers of the Antarctica. Svir' sank in autumn 1824, when she went home from topographical works in the Gulf of Finland. Sudden storm threw the ship onto the stones. The crew was rescued, but what happened to the ship remained unknown until this year.

2007/09/05

1919: Vasily Ivanovich Chapayev, the best known commander of the Red Army, was killed during the night raid of the White Army near town Lbischensk (now Chapayev) on river Ural in Kazakhstan. He was born in a poor family and his early years are not documented, so his biography is hopelessly incomplete, in spite of (and, in part, due to) the efforts of the Soviet historians. He was born in 1887 in village Budayka (now a part of the city Cheboksary), in the family of a carpenter, who never had enough money and moonlighted as a cabman. In 1897 they moved to Balakovo in Samara province (now in Saratov oblast). In 1908 Vasily returned to Budayka and married 16-year old Pelageia Metlina. They had three children. In 1915-16 he fought in the Western Ukraine and Romania, was wounded three times, became a sergeant-major, was awarded with St.George crosses and the St.George medal 4th class. In the end of the war, when soldiers were allowed to elect their commanders, he was elected the commander of the 138th regiment, which was located near Saratov. In 1917, Chapayev visited his wife, took his children and brought them into the house of his parents. When his friend Pyotr Kamishkertsev was killed, Chapayev took two his children into his own family. When in spring 1918 the Civil war began on Volga and Ural, the regiment joined the Red Army and fought against cossacks.

Chapayev was a gifted, charismatic and lucky commander. His friends recalled that he often read books about famous military leaders of the past: Hannibal, Suvorov, Napoleon. In September 1918, a division under his commandment defeated the Czech Legion and the troops of the Committee of Members of the Constituent Assembly. Then the division moved towards Uralsk and participated in the battle for this city. In November 1918, Chapayev was sent to the training courses of the General Staff of the Red Army. In January 1919 he left to Samara. Mikhail Frunze, a bolshevik military leader, highly estimated Chapayev's talents and appointed him the commander of the 25th division. This division defeated consequently 5 White divisions and captured Ufa. After this, the division was sent to the south, where they took Uralsk. On September 5, cossacks suddenly attacked the division headquarters locate near Lbischensk at night. According to the investigation held soon after his death, Chapayev drowned trying to cross river Ural being wounded. Some of his comrades said that he was lethally wounded, taken across the river by the soldiers and buried there. Since the area is now flooded, it's impossible to check this version.

In 1923, Dmitri Furmanov, ex-commisar in Chapayev's division, wrote a book Chapayev, which was made into a movie in 1934. The Soviets turned Chapayev into an icon of the Civil war and grew from a rather modest commander to a half-mythical figure. As a reaction to this hype, the people turned him and his friends, commissionaire Pyotr Isayev (Petka) and machine-gunner Maria Potapova (Anka) into characters of innumerable jokes, like this one: Petka asks Chapayev, "Why didn't you enter the military academy?", "You see, Petka, they asked me who is Caesar and I replied that this is a stallion from the second squadron." "Hey, of course, they couldn't take you! We transferred him to the fourth squadron while you were away!". Or another one: the Whites encircled the Reds. Chapayev hid in a barrel and Petka was caught. When the Whites were taking Petka to the execution, he kicked the barrel and said: "Get out, Vasily Ivanovich, we're betrayed!"

Since the body of Chapayev was never found, a lot of rumors appeared after his death. Most of them said that he had escaped, but was so ashamed of the blunder he made when set no guards around the headquarters, that he drank for a week or two and then came to Frunze. Frunze said: "You fight better as a legend than as a commander," or "We need you dead more than we needed you alive," or anything like that. Then Chapayev was either executed or sent to exile. Just legends.

Probably, more things were named after Chapayev than after any other person: villages and cities (a city near Samara was named Trotsk in 1927, but was renamed to Chapayevsk in 1929 when Trotsky turned out to be an enemy), ships and kolhozes, board games and computer games, cartoons and novels... The board game Chapayevtsy is similar to some games of the peoples of the world: you take a chess board and 16 checkers (8 for each player) and flick your checkers trying to push the enemy checkers away from the board. However, the Russian version has two immense advantage over other versions: first, it's played on a chess board (don't ask me why), and second, you can start playing checkers and, whenever you feel you're loosing, switch to Chapayevtsy.

1944: Government of the USSR proclaims the state of war with Bulgaria. In 1934, a pro-fascist dictatorship was established in Bulgaria by tsar Boris. In 1939, Bulgaria proclaimed neutrality in the World War, but continued to develop close ties with Germany and Italy. In 1940, Hitler forced Romania to sign the treaty of Craiova and to return the region of Southern Dobrudja, which was transferred from Bulgaria to Romania in 1913. This treaty was supported by USSR and Great Britain. USSR proposed an alliance to Bulgaria, offering to support the territorial claims to Greece and Turkey, but tsar Boris was consistent in his relationships with Germany and rejected the proposal. On March 1 1941, Bulgaria officially joined the Axis and the German troops entered Bulgaria to prepare to invade Greece. During 1941-1944, Bulgarian army occupied parts of Greece and Yugoslavia. Tsar Boris proclaimed war on USA and Britain, but refused to follow the example of Romania and to send Bulgarian soldiers to the Eastern front, in spite of the aerial attacks of USSR, USA and Great Britain. In 1943, various political forces of Bulgaria create the Fatherland Front, an anti-fascist resistance organization. In spring and summer of 1944, USSR some times offers the Bulgarian government to quit the alliance with Germany, but tsar Boris refuses to. Despite the persecutions, the Fatherland Front grew and by September 1944, included more than 30,000 people. On August 23, Romania officially quit the Axis block and allowed the Soviet troops to come to the borders of Bulgaria. Since August 26, the Fatherland Front begins armed rebellion in many parts of the country. Boris appoints a new prime-minister and proclaims neutrality, but continues support to the German army and then prohibits the Fatherland Front. For this reason, the Soviet Union proclaims war to Bulgaria. On September 9, the FF begins uprisal in Sofia, arrests members of the government and the royal family, establishes new government and takes power in various cities of Bulgaria. The army joins the insurgents. The Soviet army entered Bulgaria on September 8. Before the army crossed the borders, political commissars told the soldiers about the political situation in Bulgaria and about the historical ties and friendship between Bulgaria and Russia. The army marched across the country almost without a single shot, welcomed by the people. After this revolution, more than 300,000 Bulgarians fought against German and Italian fascists in Yugoslavia, Hungary and Austria. 32,000 of them were killed or missing in action. In 1946, the Bulgarian Communist Party took control over the Fatherland Front. The FF continued to exist till 1989 as a purely communist organization.

Quaerere

Notes on the tags usage

All chapters of S.Platonov's course of Russian history are tagged with the label "platonov". Click this tag to see all chapters.
The "Day in history" articles are tagged with the two labels: "date" and another one which denotes the month and includes the three first letters of the month name, like "jan", "feb", "mar", etc.
Articles on the politics of modern Russia are tagged with the label "politics".