A common criticism against gender quotas is that they are anathema to meritocratic principles. This research on Sweden shows that the opposite can be true: Quotas actually increased the competence of politicians by leading to the displacement of mediocre men whether as candidates or leaders. The results may also be relevant for judging gender quotas in business.

More than 100 countries have a gender quota of some form or another in their political system (www.quotaproject.org). While accepting that they lean against underlying biases in gender representation, many opponents argue that such quotas offend meritocratic principles: women elected on the back of quotas need not be the most qualified and may displace qualified men. It would be nice to resolve these debates with hard evidence. However, relatively little is known about the impact of quotas on the competence of elected candidates – whether women or men.

Our study provides a unique window on quotas and, at the same time, pushes forward the measurement of competence in political selection. It uses the fact that, in 1993, Sweden’s Social Democratic party voluntarily introduced a strict gender quota for its candidates. In internal discussions of the reform, the party’s Women’s branch observed that some men were more critical than others. The quota became known colloquially as the “Crisis of the Mediocre Man,” since the incompetent men had the most to fear from an influx of women into politics.

Beyond the obvious point that the quota would give fewer positions to men, quotas can have strategic effects on political selection. Mediocre leaders have a strong incentive to surround themselves with mediocre followers, so as to bolster their chances of remaining in power. A less acknowledged role of quotas is to create a threat to such cozy arrangements. It is this idea that our research on Sweden has investigated. Our main finding is that gender quotas increase the competence of the political class in general, and among men in particular. Moreover, quotas are indeed bad news for mediocre male leaders who tend to be forced out.

Our research asks what happened when the central party organisation of the Social Democratic party imposed the quota on 285 local (municipal) political parties from the 1994 election and forward. Sweden has a strict party-list system where candidates for local council are elected in rank order. The quota mandated that the ballot be “zipped”, alternating male and female names throughout the list. Since a party’s elected representatives are counted from the top of the ballot, such zipping ensures a 50-50 balance in the proportion of men and women (or close to that for odd numbers of elected). On average, the proportion of elected women increased by 10 percentage points. But the starting point differed a great deal. Some localities were already near gender parity and not much affected by the reform. Others had low shares of women and saw a dramatic effect. Our study exploits this large variation.

The study also takes advantage of unique data to put forward a new way of gauging competence. Existing research has relied mostly on education levels. But our measure of competence relies on a comparison of the private incomes across people with the same education, occupation, age, and residence in the same geographical region (members of municipal councils in Sweden typically keep their private job). A competent politician, we argue, is a person who makes more than the median amongst politicians with similar characteristics. Remarkably, this competence measure is closely correlated with results from enlistments tests of the intelligence and leadership capacity of those who did military service. It is also related to measures of political success and the quality of service delivery.

Using our measure of competence, we find strong evidence of cozy arrangements prior to the quota, with mediocre leaders selecting mediocre followers. So what happened after the quota?

Within each local party, we compare the proportion of competent politicians in elections after the quota to the 1991 level. The figure below shows some striking results. The left panel illustrates our estimates for politicians of both genders with black dots showing the change in the proportion of competent representatives in a party which is forced to increase their share of women (by 100 percentage points). The right panel splits the results by men and women (blue dots for men and pink dots for women). It shows distinctly that the average competence of male politicians increased in the places where the quota had a larger impact, and that the effect is concentrated to the three elections following the quota. On average, a higher female representation by 10 percentage points raised the proportion of competent men by 3 percentage points! For the competence of women, we observe little discernible effect.

Figure 1. Estimated impact of the gender quota on the fractions of competent politicians (left) and competent men and women separately (right)

Note: Dots denote point estimates and bars 95% confidence intervals.

Subdividing the men into leaders and followers reveals another interesting finding; there is clear evidence of a reduction in the proportion of male leaders (those at the top of the ballot) with mediocre competence. This suggests that quotas work in part by shifting incentives in the composing party ballots. Mediocre leaders are either kicked out or resign in the wake of more gender parity. Because new leaders – on average – are more competent, they feel less threatened by selecting more able candidates, which starts a virtuous circle of higher competence.

While we have focused on politics, the results may also be relevant for judging gender quotas in other organisations. Quotas for company boards currently exist in roughly ten countries and are on the agenda of various countries, as well as in the European Union. Arguably, analysing the impacts of board quotas is more complex than for politics. The policies often have long implementation periods as well as “pre-announced” plans or warnings. There are also ways around the rules, such as delisting from the stock market. These factors make it difficult to identify who precisely is affected by the change and who to compare them with. Nevertheless, some lessons from political parties could still apply. Many firms have a history of male-dominated leadership and are sometimes accused of having “locker-room” mentalities and cosy selection rules. These reinforce the selection of men, and leaders may feel comfortable being surrounded by non-threatening mediocrity. Just as in politics, therefore, a quota has the potential to undercut the dominance of a mediocre elite.

Tim Besley is W Arthur Lewis professor of development economics and School professor of economics and political science at LSE. He is also a member of the steering group of the International Growth Centre (IGC). He served on the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee for three years. Professor Besley is also an associate of STICERD’s economic organisation and public policy programme. He previously taught at Princeton University, and is a research fellow at the Institute for Fiscal Studies, and the Centre for Economic Policy Research. His work focuses mainly on issues in development economics, public economics and political economy. He has published widely on a variety of topics, mainly with a policy focus.

Olle Folke is an associate professor in politics at the department of government at Uppsala University, Sweden. His research is in political economics, comparative politics and politics and gender.

Torsten Persson is professor of economics at Stockholm University and centennial professor at LSE, and has held visiting positions at Harvard, Princeton and Berkeley. Persson was the 2008 president of the Econometric Society, and was president of the European Economic Association in 2003. His scientific prizes include the 1997 Yrjö Jahnsson Medal, given biennially to “the best young economist in Europe”. Persson’s work has spanned macroeconomics, international economics, and public economics, but he is most well-known for his articles and books on political economics. His current research focuses on development, civil war, and climate change.

Johanna Rickne is an associate professor in economics at the Swedish Institute for Social Research at Stockholm University. Her research is in labour economics, political economics, and gender economics.

28 Comments

What is this tired image choice though? Short Skirt? High heels? Pink? What exactly are you trying to convey via this image? Editors, or whoever it is that chose this image, are you deliberately looking to undermine this article?

Male dominated systems act informally in the same manner as a quota system designed for women, or for that matter any other favoured group. We have the well articulated point that the original cozy arrangement in favour of men created a lobby group of mediocre men; well and good, but would not the same effect occur under a quota system which over time creates a lobby group for mediocre women? In other words, the study is but a partial analysis (men only in this case) of the long-term effects of straying from the individual merit principle – whether formally (quota system) or informally (male cronyism or bias).

I understand your comments but what’s your alternative? Embrace the mediocre? Maybe quotas are introduced until a representative level of parity is reached with an amount of consistency (both metrics would need defining) and then the need for the quota passes. The quota is the mechanic to fix what is broken not a permanent crutch.

The metric in this case will be the transaction cost as defined by Oliver Williamson – i.e. the costs that accrue when negotiating, monitoring and enforcing a contract; quotas raise transaction costs in a similar manner as cronyism or family run businesses and show similar long term effects. What happens is that the company or office employees will split into what one department, I recall, termed ‘professionals’ and ‘politicals’. The latter are those individuals (and it does not matter how they were initially hired, quota or merit) who take advantage of the higher transaction costs and become opportunists. I get it, that in those circumstances where you are dealing with entrenched misogyny or favouritism, that you are to have break the system with quotas, but in the long-term there is a negative unintended consequence. In India, they call this the ‘creamy layer’.

Income (controlled by occupation, education, and age) as a proxy for general ability (traditionally referred to as “g” in psychometric circles) is not necessarily completely inappropriate, since these do generally correlate.

General ability as a proxy for specific competence in political office is also not completely inappropriate, though we are now dealing with a very indirect measure.

However, given that income itself plays a role in (especially early-career) politicians’ career trajectory, and is also typically linked to class factors (i.e., family background) in addition to general ability, with class-based social connections also frequently playing a role in (especially early-career) politicians’ career trajectory, I am very dubious that the proxy is appropriate in the context.

What tomas said. On the surface, this study appears to be on rickety ground as it bases an assumption on an assumption, which is itself also based on an assumption. While I’ve not the mood or inclination to look into the study proper, I look forward to seeing the peer reviews. It’s riddled with several uncounted potential variables, but two immediate questions that jump out are:

1) How does this study account for the Swedish economic collapse of the early 90s which set its economy back so far that it still hasn’t reached its former glory? And were their any gender-related occupational effects? I.E., if industries that had more males than females were hit hardest during the crash (and vice versa) then it stands to reason you’d see this effect in play during the same time frame, regardless of quotas. This is why “education” versus “income”–especially as it’s defined below–is a better metric of competence. It’s not a slave to economic fluctuations.

2) This appears to be a quota for just one political party. Is the comparison of “competence” specific to that political party as well? And does it factor in the number of elections?

3) If it is just specific to the one political party, then does it factor in the seemingly self-evident fact (as this happens in every modern democracy) that candidates would switch to districts where they stood a better chance of winning? To put it another way: since they mandated 50/50 gender ratio and since men had more than 50% of the ratio prior, wouldn’t the most wealthy males (from the suddenly non-male districts) simply “clump” into the remaining available districts? It would certainly give the false appearance that lower income–and as defined here, “less competent”–men were suddenly being driven out.

I agree with their hypothesis, and the results would appear to make ‘sense’, but I too am concerned about their use of income as a proxy for competence.

In some fields this would appear to have perverse incentives (especially in politics!) for this who are differently motivated by things other than cash. For example, a lawyer working for a struggling NGO or non-profit that they truly care about isn’t necessarily likely to be less competent than a lawyer with a highly successful private practice. Arguably one could say they were even more suited to some circles of politics. But this proxy would appear to label the first lawyer as less competent than the latter, purely by virtue of income. You could say the same in many other professions (e.g. medicine in public setting versus private practice; shop owners or creators trading off higher income – whilst remaining comfortable – to focus on the products and projects they love rather than what will just sell).

Maybe they’ve addressed this all in their full article, but I couldn’t find it.

Maybe it’s just my own inherent bias in hoping that our competence was measured by more than how much more we earned than our peers.

I agree with your comment. Income is not a true metric of competence especially with concerns of corruption associated with politicians I don’t think this metric may be applicable to settings with weaker governance structures such as in the low and middle income countries. My first reaction after reading this was that how did authors ascertain that rise in income was solely due to competence or qualifications of the politicians? Other factors such as the global economy, development and political landscape also influences a country’s political environment and income levels of its citizens. Having said that it’s an interesting study and i look forward to read the full paper.

Not convinced. If competence is higher on the top of the list, obviously you will raise the male average by throwing out a bunch of lower guys (effect directly after quota). Over time male competence deteriorates back to the same level as before. Female competence 15-20 years after quota is seriously lower than before experiment, albeit not significantly, the ONLY significant effect is the “raise male average by throwing out the lowest”-effect…
Do we even know from this paper that the guys thrown out were “mediocre” – yes they were obviously below average in the male group, but what else do we know?

“But our measure of competence relies on a comparison of the private incomes across people with the same education, occupation, age, and residence in the same geographical region (members of municipal councils in Sweden typically keep their private job). A competent politician, we argue, is a person who makes more than the median amongst politicians with similar characteristics. ”

Using this as a measure of competence would make Donald Trump the most competent president the United States has ever had.

Hmm, 2 problems. If it is true that mediocre men get competed out of the running, it’s also true that mediocre women will be allowed into it by virtue of the quota’s rules. In the abstract then, if competence were like water in a bin, the outcome would be a wash.

But then, competence isn’t like that. What we’re left with is competent/very competent men working with competent-to-mediocre-to-incompetent women as a result of the force of quotas.

The net result is pretty bad.

In any case, the basic problem w/ quotas is that they effectively institutionalize gender discrimination. That it is against males doesn’t make it right or justifiable.

So by your assertion, “what we’re left with is competent/very competent men working with competent-to-mediocre-to-incompetent women as a result of the force of quotas.” you are saying that no woman is as competent as a man, and the majority of men are more competent than women. You have just demonstrated by example the very gender-biased attitudes that need to be overcome. You apparently dismiss the probability that the majority of those positions going to women will be filled by highly competent women who were previously denied the opportunity for the position because of current selection and promoting practices that are biased against women. Since we don’t live in a gender-equal country (or world), those practices more often than not will select a less qualified, less competent male over a more competent woman. Will there be some duds that are picked up? Undoubtedly some will get through. But as there are plenty of competent women out there who can fill many of these positions, the net effect of getting more competent women into leadership roles will benefit everyone.

There are so many things wrong with this “study” that one can actually injure one’s neck by shaking their head too much…

At any rate, given the fact that it applies to Sweden’s unique (and party-centric) “zippering” method of pulling candidates from a party, all the study proves is that the Social Democratic Workers Party of Sweden is astonishingly corrupt and ranks their politicians internally by wealth, guaranteeing that the richest are always elected. The end.

When is the paper open for discussion? As stated before the true problem of the findings seams to be this:

“measure of competence relies on a comparison of the private incomes across people with the same education, occupation, age, and residence in the same geographical region (members of municipal councils in Sweden typically keep their private job)”

As the gender were not taken into consideration in this vertical comparison, this means that a male doctor with mediocre income would be left out due quotas but a cleaning lady (woman) doing two cleaning jobs would be rated as a best on her class…? What do you reckon, which one would be more suitable for example city council?

Hmm, OK. Let’s for giggles stipulate that the study’s def’n of “competence” is better than the prior one. Actually I am inclined to see a different measure of “competence” vs. income of the politician. But that is for a different post.

No, let’s say that we accept the def’n given: the pol who has the higher income is ipso facto more competent than one with a lower income. I guess then we can infer that having pols w/ higher incomes means that we get more competent, ie, better political leaders.

OK, so if that be the case then… perhaps what we ought to be doing is offering our political positions to the highest-paid members of the electorate before anyone else. So if in Jones County, VA, USA the CEO of the biggest employer in the county is also the highest-paid person, we ought to offer that person the shot to run for the office of County Executive ahead of anyone else. Sound good? Heck, let’s just pass a law *assigning* the office to the highest-paid person in the county, the job is theirs if they want it. Who needs elections, anyway?

This is how economic aristocracies are born.

Point is, elections are not about competence or measures of mediocrity. They are about the people at large getting to choose who they want to have occupy the political positions that affect them and how their money is spent. Anyone who wants the job should be able to stand for it. Screening people based on sex, income, etc., all takes us down a slippery slope very quickly. Politics is corrupted enough by all manner of things. Creating filtered candidate lists only makes things worse.

[…] One is to challenge the assumption that aiming for diversity and inclusion on boards automatically is about lowering the standards. It is not. When a board seeks inclusion, the usual first step is to diversify the channels through which board directors are recruited. Traditionally these channels have been unofficial, below-the-radar, non-transparent because directors just tapped their own networks and friends. Some even went a step ahead and made the case that not paying a headhunter was a saving for shareholders! The effect of tapping the same old networks with more men than women in the workforce has meant, for instance, that more and more men were in consideration and got on boards. This led to a sense of selection and confirmation bias in the sense that if someone is on a board, he must be competent. This is not borne out by research which shows mediocre men have been able to get these positions simply by being around in larger numbers, and not because they brought merit or skills or capabilities. But when hiring channels are diversified and more types of communities are tapped, what boards find is a range of specialist skills, experiences, and access to further and different networks of contacts. Indeed the only group that is at risk from diversity and inclusion is the mediocre male, as research has also found. […]

I can understand that there might be the case for entranced mediocrity at some level, but what guarantee do you have that you aren’t replacing mediocre men with mediocre women?! There isn’t any… decisions to penalize discrimination based on sex need to be taken case by case rather than creating a one-size fits all policy.
Plus we have very much literature on quotas used in other parts of the economy, namely trade. And there is nearly a general consensus that in the vast majority of cases, import quotas are bad, aside from favouring some export companies (even mediocre performing ones, maybe). Unfortunately, people tend to be blinded by the good intentions and we’ll probably have to wait a decade or two to realize how such proposals will have actually backfired.

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