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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BUDAPEST 000391
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/NCE; PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR ADAM STERLING
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2018
TAGS: PGOVPREVKDEMPHUMHU
SUBJECT: TWENTY QUESTIONS: FIDESZ TURNS 20
Classified By: P/E COUNSELOR ERIC V. GAUDIOSI; REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)
¶1. (C) Summary: FIDESZ celebrates its twentieth anniversary
in a position of unprecedented popularity, having channeled
broad public discontent with the Gyurcsany government's
policies to build an imposing lead in opinion polls. A
movement long before it became a political party, FIDESZ's
identity and its agenda continue to evolve under Viktor
Orban's leadership. Its current incarnation is increasingly
moderate, substantive, and Atlanticist; its current
opposition is divided, defensive, and increasingly focused on
minimizing the magnitude of their defeat in the next
elections. Skeptics near and far, however, continue to
impose a heavy burden of proof regarding the distance FIDESZ
has put between its present policies and its populist
rhetoric, its nativist impulses, and its political
associations. End Summary.
POPULARITY POPULISM = OPTIMISM
¶2. (C) Despite the reflexive fears of some in the party that
the Socialists will somehow manage to rally before the next
elections, many FIDESZ members are becoming
uncharacteristically optimistic about their political
fortunes. Polling shows over two-thirds of committed voters
expressing support for FIDESZ, and 42 percent in favor of new
elections. MSzP and SzDSz officials can agree about little
other than the probability of a FIDESZ victory in the
elections of 2009 and 2010, and FIDESZ Parliamentary Faction
Leader Tibor Navracsics believes the party's "Open Arms"
approach can retain many of the Socialist swing voters who
sided with them during the recent referendum to form a
long-term majority (reftel).
¶3. (C) If they are bullish on their own political future,
however, they remain overwhelmingly negative regarding the
country's. FIDESZ members young and old frequently rail that
"Communism, corruption, and clientism" are undermining the
principles and the promise of 1989. Orban has managed to
capitalize on this frustration with a deft bit of political
alchemy, positioning FIDESZ as "the party of hope" by
comparing it to "the government everyone hates." Addressing
diplomatic and corporate representatives March 31, Orban
described FIDESZ as the only means to break with decades of
"rule by a self-proclaimed liberal elite" which has "made
corruption the rule rather than the exception." Many party
members see Hungary losing credibility abroad and time (and
for that matter population) at home.
TAKING STOCK
¶4. (C) From our perspective, FIDESZ has worked hard to
burnish its Atlanticist credentials and ) albeit more slowly
) to take the political center. This has been a conscious
decision and a delicate balancing act with a voting base that
can be anti-Russian without necessarily being pro-American.
(As the saying goes, "Hungary is a small country - we have
only one mob.") Orban now feels confident that Hungarians
see the difference between "an unstable government and a
stable opposition."
¶5. (C) To seal the deal, however, FIDESZ will have to
continue to define itself by what it supports in addition to
what it opposes. That will mean answering the following
lingering questions from Hungarian voters, international
investors, and foreign governments:
IDEOLOGY: THE HOBGOBLIN OF SMALL MINDS
¶6. (C) As one Ambassador recently asked Orban, "aren't you
awfully leftist to be a conservative?" Others have leveled
the same charge, noting the party's frequent resort to
populist rhetoric ) particularly on the state's role in the
economy, its occasional broadsides against foreign investors,
and its reflexive support for public ownership. SzDSz
Prsident Janos Koka dismisses FIDESZ's platform as a
"populist pamphlet," and Gyurcsany advisor Klara Akots
condemns the opposition for "going through three elections
with no ideas."
¶7. (C) Disquiet with FIDESZ's current stand is often
compounded by long memories. Although voters continue to
feel a strong personal connection to Orban, many are uneasy
with his circumnavigation of the political spectrum from
liberal to populist. His recent comments regarding the
importance of promoting competitiveness, reforming the tax
structure, and maintaining fiscal discipline are welcome to
investors, but corporate officials in particular recall with
disquiet his comments before the 2006 elections, when he
responded to questions regarding his campaign promises by
assuring them they could "ignore what I say."
BUDAPEST 00000391 002 OF 004
¶8. (C) Orban himself has downplayed ideology altogether of
late, focusing primarily on proving to the public - and
assuring President Solyom - that the party is "ready to
govern." "I never use the word 'conservative' in Hungary,"
he commented recently, and he has argued that parties should
be judged by "their principles and not by their policies."
He explains to us privately that "it's not complicated - we
are telling the people that we will restore the nation's
greatness and telling the business community what they can
expect from a FIDESZ government." Although he asserts that
FIDESZ has always been ) and will always be ) a "Christian,
patriotic, family-oriented party dedicated to serving the
Hungarian nation," he has also admitted that his tactics will
vary. "The only standard," he concluded in responding to
questions regarding the party's orientation, "is whether our
measures are reasonable, timely, and appropriate." It is a
testament to Orban's ability to evoke a strong response that
this quote will be seen by some as pragmatic ( and by others
as unprincipled.
DEFINING VICTORY
¶9. (C) These concerns extend to FIDESZ's ultimate goal.
Akots and others in the MSzP suggest that their objective is
to secure not only a victory in the next elections but a
two-thirds majority. This would allow them to make
fundamental changes in Hungary's governing structures, and
she believes their priority would be the establishment of
strong Presidency along the lines of the French model ( with
Orban as President.
¶10. (C) Akots charges that FIDESZ has vilified their
political opponents, exaggerated Hungary's economic straits,
and exacerbated its social tensions, "attacking the
government both for its actions and its inaction." The
goal, she argues, is to "make people believe that the system
itself does not work." Even conservatives such as
commentator Ivan Baba concede that "Orban has an
authoritarian streak," and former SzDSz President Gabor
Kuncze recalls that Orban had "ridiculed the Horn government
for not taking full advantage of its two-thirds majority in
the 1990s." As a result, he concludes, for many in the MSzP
) and in his party as well - the goal is not victory in the
next elections but rather denying Orban a super-majority.
WHO'S NEXT TO WHO'S IN CHARGE?
¶11. (C) To all appearances, Orban continues to dominate the
party's decision-making (and reportedly its purse strings).
Originally a triumvirate of Orban, Janos Ader, and Laszlo
Kover, FIDESZ has broadened into a political corporation, led
by Orban in recent years. Ader has been largely sidelined
despite his status a Deputy Speaker of Parliament, and Kover
has limited his public profile, serving as the party's point
man on intelligence and national security issues.
¶12. (C) In their place, the party has brought a broad array
of officials into the spotlight. The party tends to direct
certain issues to certain designated spokespersons. Their
leaders and especially their staff are increasingly open to -
and well-scripted for - contacts with the diplomatic
community. They have entered the information age with
initiatives such as their chat room "Right Click."
¶13. (C) This new degree of diversity has inevitably led to
widespread conjecture regarding divisions within the party,
and our diplomatic colleagues confess to a degree of
"Kremlinology" in handicapping the maneuvering within the
party. Tactically, Orban continues to prefer the direct
approach in confronting the Gyurcsany government. "Sooner is
better," he told Ambassador Foley regarding his desire to
replace the Prime Minister, concluding that FIDESZ will be
prepared to move quickly in the face of a divided MSzP. He
believes a year of activism including tax reduction will
yield results that will "look big compared to where we are
now."
¶14. (C) Orban's more aggressive approach stands in contrast
to the more gradualist approach of moderates including
popular Debrecen Mayor Lajos Kosa (who has outpolled Orban in
personal popularity), former Minister of Education Zoltan
Pokorni, and Parliamentary Faction Leader Tibor Navracsics,
who all seem in less of a hurry to inherit the dilemmas
currently confronting the government. Moderates in the party
note that Orban's personal approval ratings remain much lower
than the party's, most recently in a survey that found him
enjoying only a 10-point lead over Prime Minister Gyurcsany.
¶15. (C) That said, Orban still reigns supreme. His
instincts have seemingly been vindicated by the results of
BUDAPEST 00000391 003 OF 004
the March referendum, and he has been extremely jaunty of
late. If there is a decision as to whether Orban will be the
party's Prime Ministerial candidate next time around, at the
moment the decision appears to be Orban's alone to make.
Whatever the shades of gray within the party, there are no
signs that anyone is abandoning ship. To the contrary,
foreign policy commentator Anita Orban tells us that many
moderate conservatives ) herself included ) are "coming
home" to FIDESZ. Their recent events have been very
well-attended, and party leaders also hold out great hope
that the strong conservative sentiment among younger voters
means that "the future is ours."
HOW CLOSE TO THE RIGHT IS JUST RIGHT?
¶16. (C) But holding the center will mean abandoning the
party's relationship with the far right. Political Scientist
Zoltan Kiszelly tells us that Orban has always held to one
cardinal rule throughout his career: never expose yourself to
attacks from the right. That has led the party to coexist -
and occasionally cohabitate - with the far right, which has
traditionally served as an important source of support in
national elections.
¶17. (C) FIDESZ is now making attempts to distance themselves
from a recent spate of extremist statements and actions. By
eventually opposing the formation of the Magyar Garda,
speaking out against the Magyar Garda,s discrimination of
Roma, organizing the April 7 counter-demonstration against
neo-Nazi protestors, and participating in the April 11
National Roma Intellectual Conference, FIDESZ distanced
itself from the Garda (and implicitly from its sponsors in
the far-right Jobbik party). However, FIDESZ differs with
the government regarding the controversial Arpad flag, a
historical symbol whose orgins date back to the arrival of
the Hungarian tribes but whose more recent associations
include the fascist World War II-era Arrow Cross.
¶18. (C) Party members bridle at charges of association with
anti-Semitic elements, often alleging that the accusation is
a long-time Socialist tactic to smear the opposition. Some
go so far as to charge the government with "creating" the
Magyar Garda in order to demonize FIDESZ, and many minimize
the extent of anti-Semitic sentiment in the country - as do
many members of the Jewish community. The party's response
to an article by founding FIDESZ member Zsolt Bayer, in which
he said &the mere existence of Jews justifies
anti-Semitism,8 was ambiguous and left room for
misinterpretation. Critical statements from FIDESZ members
including the Chairman of the Parliamentary Human Rights
Committee and Orban's Chief of Staff followed, but so did
photos of Orban with Bayer at a FIDESZ anniversary event.
¶19. (C) After a week of small but visible neo-Nazi
demonstrations in Budapest, the issue is drawing renewed
attention. FIDESZ has the opportunity to separate themselves
even further from the far right, and sources close to Orban
tell us privately that they are committed to "depriving the
far right of oxygen." But their approach is likely to be
deliberate - too deliberate to please critics who believe
that only the center-right can defeat the far-right.
THE NEIGHBORHOOD, THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND THE TRANS-ATLANTIC
COMMUNITY
¶20. (C) FIDESZ has scored impressive successes in coming in
from the cold with regard to the trans-Atlantic community.
Orban has privately acknowledged the damage done to his
reputation and his relationship with the U.S. over his
decisions on the Gripen purchase and Hungary's Iraq
deployment, and over the past years he has hewed closely to a
robustly pro-Atlanticist line on issues ranging from NATO
enlargement to energy security. Orban has raised his
international profile considerably, including as
Vice-President of the European Peoples Party, and made trips
to both Belgrade and Doha in the past week. He told
Ambassador Foley April 11 that consensus on Afghanistan and
other key foreign policy issues would continue, confiding
that he had even reached a "secret agreement" to support
plans for Hungary's 2011 EU Presidency.
¶21. (C) FIDESZ staffers in Parliament are not unmindful of
the political advantages of this approach, regarding the
International Community as the Gyurcsany government's
greatest source of support during the demonstrations of 2006.
They believe that Gyurcsany's international status has
eroded considerably in the past 18 months, and that his
government's trans-Atlantic bona fides are vulnerable to
attack. They also see a European political landscape that is
much more to their advantage. FIDESZ has reached out to
conservative parties throughout Europe, most notably in the
BUDAPEST 00000391 004 OF 004
UK and Germany, both to seek advice and to establish
themselves more firmly in the European conservative
mainstream.
¶22. (C) Our colleagues in the diplomatic community here tell
us the results have been mixed, however. Some share domestic
concerns regarding the party's populist rhetoric, and many
feel that a FIDESZ government would be a disruptive force in
the region due to its long and deep commitment to ethnic
Hungarian communities abroad. Ambassador Istvan Gyarmati,
Director of the International Center for Democratic
Transition (ICDT), highlights FIDESZ's tendency to blur the
distinction between "the country and the nation." As a
result, he assesses that an Orban government would be "better
with Washington, not bad with Brussels ( and a problem in
the region."
TOO EASY?
¶23. (C) Comment: If the Gyurcsany government continues on
its present downward trajectory, FIDESZ will continue to gain
support by default. As Orban himself stated, "even people
who hate me prefer my government to no government at all."
He is clearly thriving on the present chaos - and on
describing the present as chaos. He believes that "all is
uncertain for now except one thing - that we will win."
Indeed, he tells us privately that he "has never had it so
easy so early" in an election cycle. So easy, in fact, that
his only concern is that "it might be too easy." This
current margin may obscure the progress made in grappling
with questions regarding the party's future, and may limit
their motivation to provide details to a public more eager
for a change than a platform. It may also undermine the
motivation for making a clean break with a past that
continues to concern many of the voters who will have to be
convinced to realize the party's vision of a lasting
majority. End Comment.
FOLEY