The First DESOTO Patrol

By

James W. Montgomery
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (ret)

Surface ship DESOTO patrols had become operationally
routine and generally unremarkable in the early Vietnam era, when their
activities burst into the headlines and onto the international stage with
the Tonkin Gulf incidents and the Congressional "Tonkin Gulf Resolution".
Unknown at the time, their genesis lay in a single destroyer independent
operation conducted in the spring of 1962. The special operation was a
then highly-classified intelligence gathering and probing excursion by USS
DeHAVEN into waters that had not been visited by Pacific Fleet men-of-war
since the late 1940s.

This was a time of considerable unease and frequent
turmoil in the Asian-Pacific area. The Taiwan-Mainland China standoff
remained a veritable tinderbox. Seventh Fleet units patrolled the Taiwan
Straights. Multi country sovereignty disputes over potentially oil-rich
island areas were not uncommon. Maritime rights and freedom of the seas
were active items of diplomacy. Tensions were growing between the two
remaining superpowers--- as we and the Soviets were coming to be known.
The Peoples Republic of China was becoming increasingly bold in their
territorial waters claims. The Soviet Navy was extending its reach into
the open ocean area for the first time, and our forthcoming involvement in
Vietnam was just beginning to emerge. Within this geopolitical environment
the Seventh Fleet was operating in a fast-moving, wide ranging, and high
tempo mode. The DeHAVEN, as a permanently deployed Yokosuka based
destroyer, was very much a part of it.

This particular DeHAVEN mission was prompted by the
Chinese Communistís unexpected re-definition of their territorial
sovereignty to encompass all waters shoreward from lines drawn
tangentially to, and between, twelve mile circles drawn around offshore
islands. Such a declaration represented a quantum leap in expansion of
their territorial waters claims, thus increasing the likelihood and
frequency of formal diplomatic "serious warnings" issued by Peiping when
any Seventh Fleet units were perceived to transgress their claimed
sovereign areas. This was now a situation to which Commander Seventh Fleet
felt compelled to respond.

His plan was to send a ship into the Yellow Sea to an area
just off the Chinese Naval Base of Tsingtao, and to have it remain there
for seven days before returning. It would be patrolling on an established
patrol line that would periodically penetrate the disputed waters. The
ship would have on board a COMNAVFOR Japan signals intelligence collection
(SIGINT) group for naval and national intelligence collection
requirements. The shipís presence was intended to openly demonstrate a
U.S. capability and determination to send Seventh Fleet ships into
international waters wherever and whenever desired in support of our
national security interests.

DeHAVEN would be designated Task Group 72.9 and the
DeHAVEN commanding officer, designated as CTG 72.9, would be OTC (Officer
in Tactical Command). While radio communications would include an
impressive array of high level commands and activities, the ship would be
operating directly under the control of ComSeventh Fleet, with no
intervening levels of command.

Final pre-departure planning resulted in ComSeventh
Fleetís operational direction to consist essentially of the following
orders: We were not to provoke a confrontation with any Chinese units with
whom we might come in contact, but it was strongly emphasized that we were
not to be intimidated. We were not to engage in communications with any
Chinese units ashore or afloat. To any challenge or query received, our
sole response was to be our international radio call sign, NHVF,
essentially proclaiming that we were the United States Ship DEHAVEN
steaming in international waters. With the special communications group
embarked, we would be constantly monitoring the internal Chinese
communications that our presence was expected to generate. An assumption
was made that any Chinese hostile action would have to be approved by
Peiping, and our intercept capability would probably permit us to be aware
in advance. Normal Seventh Fleet rules of engagement were to apply. While
no hostile action was anticipated, ComSeventh Fleet intended to position
one of his carriers somewhat northward of its normal operating area for
support should we require any assistance.

DeHAVEN departed Yokosuka on 10 April, checked out of the
ships movement control system, chopped to ComSeventh Fleet, topped off
with fuel in Sasebo, and proceeded into the Yellow Sea. Transit to the
patrol line was uneventful. It afforded ample opportunity for detailed
briefing of the crew, repeated exercising of the ship at general quarters,
and gaming with involved officers both a range of possible Chicom actions,
and our planned responses. The DEHAVEN wore single or multiple gunnery "E"s
on all gun mounts, director, and ASW battery, as well as competitive "E"s
in Operations, Engineering, and Communications. She had recently been
touted in a Far Eastern Stars and Stripes news article as "Top Gun
of the Seventh Fleet". The morale of the crew, enthusiasm, and confidence
in DeHAVENís ability to prevail under any circumstances could not have
been higher.

Arriving at the patrol line at midnight and commencing the
patrol, with full running lights aglow, we were not long in witnessing
Chicom reaction to our presence; the appearance of a KRONSHADT-class
patrol craft , subsequently joined by two GORDY class Chinese destroyers.
Initially our terse "NHVF" replies to their early flashing light
challenges prompted no response. Being constantly shadowed between five
and ten miles, the DeHAVEN went about her business of periodically
penetrating their claimed territorial waters. Soon the flashing light "AA"
challenges were replaced by messages indicating increasing concern and
frustration with our continued presence:

"You have violated territorial waters of the Peoples
Republic of China"

"Serious warning." "Serious warning, leave at once."

Over the ensuing days the Chinese Foreign Ministry
formally issued its 197th and 198th Serious
Warnings, and, as the days wore on, the situation became a bit more
uneasy. The flashing light messages continued, we continued our laconic "NHVF"
replies, but the Chicom ships, whether shadowing singly or in a group,
were now approaching more closely, and at night steaming in a darkened
ship condition. We had as yet no indication of any hostile intent, despite
the increasing sternness of the warnings. If for nothing more than drill,
running fire control solutions were kept on our area companions.

The sweaty palms times and moment of truth came in the
nighttime hours of our fifth day on the line. Radar contact detected two
rapidly moving contacts emerging from Tsingtao harbor on a course directly
toward us. As the contacts, having been evaluated as the two GORDY
destroyers, continued to close the distance in darkened ship condition, we
went to general quarters to provide maximum readiness and greater
maneuvering capability. We were not particularly surprised to receive the
flashing light message: "This is your last and final warning." "You must
leave at once."

Our response remained the same: "NHVF".

This was the first time I felt there was a real
possibility that, because we had no intercept indication of hostile
action, some local area commander may have decided to take matters into
his own hands. We had previously decided how we would split our battery to
best combat two targets simultaneously, and the X.O. and I had previously
privately agreed and decided that we would not open fire until we actually
sustained a hit.

We continued on the patrol line with firing solutions
complete and locked on. Ammunition hoists were loaded, and we were
prepared to open fire at any time. We attempted to inform ComSeventh Fleet
of the existing situation and our intentions, but we were experiencing
extremely effective jamming, both voice and radio telegraphy, and our
capability to communicate was effectively lost. Additionally, an unknown
broadcaster with a Chinese accent usurped the Task Group call sign, and
attempted to call a station with which we had previously been
communicating.

These were indeed anxious moments. The DeHAVEN waited, at
full ready, some forthcoming decision by the GORDYs. Our decision had
already been made. At a range of something less than 10,000 yards, the
GORDYs abruptly broke off, reduced speed, changed course to parallel ours,
and subsequently turned back toward Tsingtao. Soon afterwards we regained
our communication capability and fully briefed ComSeventh Fleet. We
remained on the patrol line for the remaining scheduled two days, without
incident, and then took departure for Yokosuka.

Years later, in discussion with officers involved in the
earliest Seventh Fleet/OPNAV planning, it was learned that their need for
an operational code name for the then forthcoming DeHAVEN mission was
solved by adoption of the acronym DESOTO --- DEHAVEN Special Operations off TsingtaO.