After tragic terrorist attacks by kidnapped airlines on New York and Washington in September 2001 the interest for Al Qaeda in public and media rose immediately. Experts and analysts all over the world started to offer various explanations of Al Qaeda’s origins, membership recruitment, modes of operation, as well as of possible ways of its disruption. Journalists in search of hot topics took over and publicized most of the publicly available materials, often revising them further and making them even more exciting and attractive for wide audiences.

One could thus read or hear that Al Qaeda is “a net that contains independent intelligence”, that it “functions as a swarm”, that it “gathers from nowhere and disappears
after action”, that it is “an ad hoc network”, “an atypical organization” (Memon N.,
H. L. Larsen, 2006), extremely hard to destroy, especially by traditional anti-terrorist /
counterterrorist methods.

After catastrophic terrorist attacks by kidnapped airlines on New York and Washington in September 2001 the interest for al-Qaeda terrorist organisation in public and media rose immediately. Experts and analysts all over the world started to offer various explanations of al-Qaeda’s origins, membership recruitment, modes of operation, as well as of possible ways of its disruption. Journalists in search of hot topics took over and publicized most of the publicly available materials, often revising them further and making them even more intriguing and attractive for wide audiences.

One could thus read or hear that al-Qaeda is “a net that contains independent intelligence”, that it “functions as a swarm”, that it “gathers from nowhere and disappears after action”, that it is “an ad hoc network”, “an atypical organisation”, extremely hard to destroy, especially by traditional anti-terrorist methods.

Anmerkungen

The source is not given anywhere in the paper.

The authors refer here to themselves, although this text cannot be found in the given source, not even the term "atypical organization".

According to many counterterrorism analysts today, Al Qaeda has evolved from a centrally directed organization into a worldwide franchiser of terrorist attacks (Grier P., 2005). Since war in Afghanistan, which significantly degraded Osama bin Laden’s command and control, Al Qaeda does appear to have become increasingly decentralized. It is now seen by many as more of a social movement than coherent organization (Wikotorowicz Q., 2001).

Al Qaeda did not decide to decentralize until 2002, following the ouster of the Taliban from Afghanistan and the arrest of a number of key Al Qaeda leaders including Abu Zubaydhah, Al Qaeda’s Dean of students, Ramzi bin Al Shibh, the organizer of the Hamburg cell of 9/11 hijackers, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the mastermind of 9/11 and the financier of the first World Trade Center attack, and Tawfiq Attash Kallad, the master mind of the USS Cole attack.

In response these and other key losses, Al Qaeda allegedly convened a strategic summit in northern Iran in November 2002, at which the group’s consultative council decided that it could no longer operate as a hierarchy, but instead would have to decentralize (Joseph Felter et. al., 2005).

According to most counterterrorism analysts today, al-Qa’ida has evolved from a centrally directed organization into a worldwide franchiser of terrorist attacks.7 Indeed, since the war in Afghanistan, which significantly degraded bin Laden’s command and control, al-Qa’ida has become increasingly decentralized, and is seen by some as more of a “movement” than any other form of organization.

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In 2001, following the ouster of the
Taliban from Afghanistan, a number of al-Qa’ida leaders suddenly found themselves in
detention centers facing long months of interrogation. Abu Zubaydah, al-Qa’ida’s “dean
of students,” who directed training and placement for the group, was captured in
Faisalabad, Pakistan, in February 2002. Ramzi Bin al Shibh, the organizer of the
Hamburg, Germany cell that formed the core of the 9/11 hijackers, was captured in
Karachi, Pakistan, on the first anniversary of the attacks. These and other
counterterrorism successes ultimately led to the capture of Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the
mastermind of 9/11 and the financier of the first World Trade Center attack, in
Rawalpindi, Pakistan, in March 2003. And a month later, Tawfiq Attash Kallad, the
mastermind of the USS Cole attack, was apprehended in Karachi. In response to the loss
of key leaders, al-Qa’ida allegedly convened a strategic summit in northern Iran in
November 2002, at which the group’s consultative council came to recognize that it could
no longer exist as a hierarchy, but instead would have to become a decentralized network
and move its operations out over the entire world.10

Investigative Data Mining (IDM) offers the ability to firstly map a covert cell, and to secondly measure the specific structural and interactional criteria of such a cell. This framework aims to connect the dots between individuals and “map and measure [complex, covert, human groups and organisations”.]

Social network analysis offers the ability to firstly map a covert cell, and to secondly measure the specific structural and interactional criteria of such a cell.

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This framework aims to connect the dots between individuals and “map and measure complex, sometimes covert, human groups and organisations”.8