Legal Definitions

Because legal language can often be confusing we have provided common definitions, legal defenses and sentencing guidelines relating to Criminal, DUI and Traffic law. We hope they can assist in a better understanding of your legal situation. These definitions are located in the Illinois Revised Statutes, Sections 725 ILCS and 730 ILCS et seq.

Act includes a failure or omission to take action. 720 ILCS 5/2-2.

Absolute liability. A person may be guilty of an offense without having, as to each element thereof, one of the mental states described in Sections 4-4 through 4-7 if the offense is a misdemeanor which is not punishable by incarceration or by a fine exceeding $1,000, or the statute defining the offense clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability for the conduct described. 720 ILCS 5/4-9.

Arraignment means the formal act of calling the defendant into open court, informing him of the offense with which he is charged, and asking him whether he is guilty or not guilty. 725 ILCS Sec. 102-4.

Bail means the amount of money set by the court which is required to be obligated and secured as provided by law for the release of a person in custody in order that he will appear before the court in which his appearance may be required and that he will comply with such conditions as set forth in the bail bond. 725 ILCS Sec. 102-6.

Bail bond means an undertaking secured by bail entered into by a person in custody by which he binds himself to comply with such conditions as are set forth therein. 725 ILCS Sec. 102-7.

Complaint means a verified written statement other than an information or an indictment, presented to a court, which charges the commission of an offense. 725 ILCS Sec. 102-9.

Conditional Discharge means a sentence or disposition of conditional and revocable release without probationary supervision but under such conditions as may be imposed by the court 730 ILCS Sec. 5-1-4.

Conduct means an act or a series of acts, and the accompanying mental state. 720 ILCS 5/2-4.

Conviction means a judgment of conviction or sentence entered upon a plea of guilty or upon a verdict or finding of guilty of an offense, rendered by a legally constituted jury or by a court of competent jurisdiction authorized to try the case without a jury. 730 ILCS 5/5-1-5.

Dwelling (a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this Section, “dwelling” means a building or portion thereof, a tent, a vehicle, or other enclosed space which is used or intended for use as a human habitation, home or residence. (b) For the purposes of Section 19-3 of this Code, “dwelling” means a house, apartment, mobile home, trailer, or other living quarters in which at the time of the alleged offense the owners or occupants actually reside or in their absence intend within a reasonable period of time to reside. 720 ILCS 5/2-6.

Felony means an offense for which a sentence to death or to a term of imprisonment in a penitentiary for one year or more is provided. 720 ILCS 5/2-7.

Indictment means a written statement, presented by the Grand Jury to a court, which charges the commission of an offense. 725 ILCS Sec. 102-11.

Information means a verified written statement signed by a State’s Attorney, and presented to a court, which charges the commission of an offense. 725 ILCS Sec. 102-12.

Intent. A person intends, or acts intentionally or with intent, to accomplish a result or engage in conduct described by the statute defining the offense, when his conscious objective or purpose is to accomplish that result or engage in that conduct. 720 ILCS 5/4-4.

Included Offense means an offense which(a) Is established by proof of the same or less than all of the facts or a less culpable mental state (or both), than that which is required to establish the commission of the offense charged, or (b) Consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged or an offense included therein. 720 ILCS 5/2-9.

Judgment means an adjudication by the court that the defendant is guilty or not guilty and if the adjudication is that the defendant is guilty it includes the sentence pronounced by the court. 725 ILCS Sec. 102-14.

Knowledge. A person knows, or acts knowingly or with knowledge of: (a) The nature or attendant circumstances of his or her conduct, described by the statute defining the offense, when he or she is consciously aware that his or her conduct is of that nature or that those circumstances exist. Knowledge of a material fact includes awareness of the substantial probability that the fact exists. (b) The result of his or her conduct, described by the statute defining the offense, when he or she is consciously aware that that result is practically certain to be caused by his conduct. Conduct performed knowingly or with knowledge is performed wilfully, within the meaning of a statute using the term “willfully”, unless the statute clearly requires another meaning. When the law provides that acting knowingly suffices to establish an element of an offense, that element also is established if a person acts intentionally. 720 ILCS 5/4-5.

Mental state. (a) A person is not guilty of an offense, other than an offense which involves absolute liability, unless, with respect to each element described by the statute defining the offense, he acts while having one of the mental states described in Sections 4–4 through 4–7. (b) If the statute defining an offense prescribed a particular mental state with respect to the offense as a whole, without distinguishing among the elements thereof, the prescribed mental state applies to each such element. If the statute does not prescribe a particular mental state applicable to an element of an offense (other than an offense which involves absolute liability), any mental state defined in Sections 4–4, 4–5 or 4–6 is applicable. (c) Knowledge that certain conduct constitutes an offense, or knowledge of the existence, meaning, or application of the statute defining an720 ILCS 5/4-3
Misdemeanor means any offense for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment in other than a penitentiary for less than one year may be imposed. 720 ILCS 5/2-11
Negligence. A person is negligent, or acts negligently, when that person fails to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or a result will follow, described by the statute defining the offense, and that failure constitutes a substantial deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the situation. 720 ILCS 5/4-6.

Parole means the conditional and revocable release of a committed person under the supervision of a paroling authority. 725 ILCS Sec. 102-16.

Peace Officer means (i) any person who by virtue of his office or public employment is vested by law with a duty to maintain public order or to make arrests for offenses, whether that duty extends to all offenses or is limited to specific offenses, or (ii) any person who, by statute, is granted and authorized to exercise powers similar to those conferred upon any peace officer employed by a law enforcement agency of this State. For purposes of Sections concerning unlawful use of weapons, for the purposes of assisting an Illinois peace officer in an arrest, or when the commission of any offense under Illinois law is directly observed by the person, and statutes involving the false personation of a peace officer, false personation of a peace officer while carrying a deadly weapon, and aggravated false personation of a peace officer, then officers, agents, or employees of the federal government commissioned by federal statute to make arrests for violations of federal criminal laws shall be considered “peace officers” under this Code, including, but not limited to all criminal investigators of: (1) the United States Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Agency and the Department of Immigration and Naturalization; (2) the United States Department of the Treasury, the Secret Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and the Customs Service;(3) the United States Internal Revenue Service;(4) the United States General Services Administration;(5) the United States Postal Service; (6) all United States Marshals or Deputy United States Marshals whose duties involve the enforcement of federal criminal laws; and(7) the United States Department of Defense. 720 ILCS 5/2-13.

Penal Institution means a penitentiary, state farm, reformatory, prison, jail, house of correction, or other institution for the incarceration or custody of persons under sentence for offenses or awaiting trial or sentence for offenses. 720 ILCS 5/2-14.

Preliminary Examination means a hearing before a judge to determine if there is probable cause to believe that the person accused has committed an offense. 725 ILCS 5/102-17.

Possession as Voluntary Act. Possession is a voluntary act if the offender knowingly procured or received the thing possessed, or was aware of his control thereof for a sufficient time to have been able to terminate his possession. 720 ILCS 5/4-2.

Probation means a sentence or disposition of conditional and revocable release under the supervision of a probation officer. 730 ILCS Sec. 5-1-18.

Recklessness. A person is reckless or acts recklessly when that person consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, described by the statute defining the offense, and that disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the situation. An act performed recklessly is performed wantonly, within the meaning of a statute using the term “wantonly”, unless the statute clearly requires another meaning. 720 ILCS 5/46.

Reasonable Belief means that the person concerned, acting as a reasonable man, believes that the described facts exist. 720 ILCS 5/2-19.

Recognizance means an undertaking without security entered into by a person by which he binds himself to comply with such conditions as are set forth therein and which may provide for the forfeiture of a sum set by the court on failure to comply with the conditions thereof. 725 ILCS 5/102-19.

Supervision means a disposition of conditional and revocable release without probationary supervision, but under such conditions and reporting requirements as are imposed by the court, at the successful conclusion of which disposition the defendant is discharged and a judgment dismissing the charges is entered. 730 ILCS Sec. 5-1-21.

Voluntary Act: A material element of every offense is a voluntary act, which includes an omission to perform a duty which the law imposes on the offender and which he is physically capable of performing. 720 ILCS 5/4-1.

Solicit or solicitation means to command, authorize, urge, incite, request, or advise another to commit an offense. 720 ILCS 5/2-20.

LEGAL DEFENSES TO CRIMINAL CHARGES

Use of Force in Defense of Person. (a) A person is justified in te use of force against another when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself or another against such other’s imminent use of unlawful force. However, he is justified in the use of force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm only if he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or another, or the commission of a forcible felony. (b) In no case shall any act involving the use of force justified under this Section give rise to any claim or liability brought by or on behalf of any person acting within the definition of “aggressor” set forth in Section 7-4 of this Article, or the estate, spouse, or other family member of such a person, against the person or estate of the person using such justified force, unless the use of force involves willful or wanton misconduct. 720 ILCS 5/7-1).

Use of Force in Defense of Dwelling. (a) A person is justified in the use of force against another when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to prevent or terminate such other’s unlawful entry into or attack upon a dwelling. However, he is justified in the use of force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm only if: (1) The entry is made or attempted in a violent, riotous, or tumultuous manner, and he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent an assault upon, or offer of personal violence to, him or another then in the dwelling, or (2) He reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent the commission of a felony in the dwelling. (b) In no case shall any act involving the use of force justified under this Section give rise to any claim or liability brought by or on behalf of any person acting within the definition of “aggressor” set forth in Section 7-4 of this Article, or the estate, spouse, or other family member of such a person, against the person or estate of the person using such justified force, unless the use of force involves willful or wanton misconduct. (720 ILCS 5/7-2).

Use of Force in Defense of Other Property. (a) A person is justified in the use of force against another when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to prevent or terminate such other’s trespass on or other tortious or criminal interference with either real property (other than a dwelling) or personal property, lawfully in his possession or in the possession of another who is a member of his immediate family or household or of a person whose property he has a legal duty to protect. However, he is justified in the use of force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm only if he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent the commission of a forcible felony. (b) In no case shall any act involving the use of force justified under this Section give rise to any claim or liability brought by or on behalf of any person acting within the definition of “aggressor” set forth in Section 7-4 of this Article, or the estate, spouse, or other family member of such a person, against the person or estate of the person using such justified force, unless the use of force involves willful or wanton misconduct. (720 ILCS 5/7-3).

Use of Force by Aggressor. The justification described in the preceding Sections of this Article is not available to a person who: (a) Is attempting to commit, committing, or escaping after the commission of, a forcible felony; or (b) Initially provokes the use of force against himself, with the intent to use such force as an excuse to inflict bodily harm upon the assailant; or (c) Otherwise initially provokes the use of force against himself, unless: (1) Such force is so great that he reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, and that he has exhausted every reasonable means to escape such danger other than the use of force which is likely to cause death or great bodily harm to the assailant; or (2) In good faith, he withdraws from physical contact with the assailant and indicates clearly to the assailant that he desires to withdraw and terminate the use of force, but the assailant continues or resumes the use of force. (720 ILCS 5/7-4).

Peace Officer’s Use of Force in Making Arrest. (a) A peace officer, or any person whom he has summoned or directed to assist him, need not retreat or desist from efforts to make a lawful arrest because of resistance or threatened resistance to the arrest. He is justified in the use of any force which he reasonably believes to be necessary to effect the arrest and of any force which he reasonably believes to be necessary to defend himself or another from bodily harm while making the arrest. However, he is justified in using force likely to cause death or great bodily harm only when he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm to himself or such other person, or when he reasonably believes both that: (1) Such force is necessary to prevent the arrest from being defeated by resistance or escape; and (2) The person to be arrested has committed or attempted a forcible felony which involves the infliction or threatened infliction of great bodily harm or is attempting to escape by use of a deadly weapon, or otherwise indicates that he will endanger human life or inflict great bodily harm unless arrested without delay. (b) A peace officer making an arrest pursuant to an invalid warrant is justified in the use of any force which he would be justified in using if the warrant were valid, unless he knows that the warrant is invalid. (720 ILCS 5/7-5).

Private Person’s Use of Force in Making Arrest. (a) A private person who makes, or assists another private person in making a lawful arrest is justified in the use of any force which he would be justified in using if he were summoned or directed by a peace officer to make such arrest, except that he is justified in the use of force likely to cause death or great bodily harm only when he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm to himself or another. (b) A private person who is summoned or directed by a peace officer to assist in making an arrest which is unlawful, is justified in the use of any force which he would be justified in using if the arrest were lawful, unless he knows that the arrest is unlawful. (720 ILCS 5/7-6).

Private Person’s Use of Force in Resisting Arrest. A person is not authorized to use force to resist an arrest which he knows is being made either by a peace officer or by a private person summoned and directed by a peace officer to make the arrest, even if he believes that the arrest is unlawful and the arrest in fact is unlawful. 720 ILCS 5/7-7).

Force Likely to Cause Death or Great Bodily Harm. (a) Force which is likely to cause death or great bodily harm, within the meaning of Sections 7-5 and 7-6 includes: (1) The firing of a firearm in the direction of the person to be arrested, even though no intent exists to kill or inflict great bodily harm; and (2) The firing of a firearm at a vehicle in which the person to be arrested is riding. (b) A peace officer’s discharge of a firearm using ammunition designed to disable or control an individual without creating the likelihood of death or great bodily harm shall not be considered force likely to cause death or great bodily harm within the meaning of Sections 7-5 and 7-6. (720 ILCS 5/7-8).

Use of Force to Prevent Escape. (a) A peace officer or other person who has an arrested person in his custody is justified in the use of such force to prevent the escape of the arrested person from custody as he would be justified in using if he were arresting such person. (b) A guard or other peace officer is justified in the use of force, including force likely to cause death or great bodily harm, which he reasonably believes to be necessary to prevent the escape from a penal institution of a person whom the officer reasonably believes to be lawfully detained in such institution under sentence for an offense or awaiting trial or commitment for an offense. (720 ILCS 5/7-9).

Execution of Death Sentence. A public officer who, in the exercise of his official duty, puts a person to death pursuant to a sentence of a court of competent jurisdiction, is justified if he acts in accordance with the sentence pronounced and the law prescribing the procedure for execution of a death sentence. (720 ILCS 5/7-10).

Compulsion. (a) A person is not guilty of an offense, other than an offense punishable with death, by reason of conduct that he or she performs under the compulsion of threat or menace of the imminent infliction of death or great bodily harm, if he or she reasonably believes death or great bodily harm will be inflicted upon him or her, or upon his or her spouse or child, if he or she does not perform that conduct.(b) A married woman is not entitled, by reason of the presence of her husband, to any presumption of compulsion or to any defense of compulsion, except that stated in subsection (a). (720 ILCS 5/7-11).

Entrapment. A person is not guilty of an offense if his or her conduct is incited or induced by a public officer or employee, or agent of either, for the purpose of obtaining evidence for the prosecution of that person. However, this Section is inapplicable if the person was pre-disposed to commit the offense and the public officer or employee, or agent of either, merely affords to that person the opportunity or facility for committing an offense. (720 ILCS 5/7-12).

Necessity. Conduct which would otherwise be an offense is justifiable by reason of necessity if the accused was without blame in occasioning or developing the situation and reasonably believed such conduct was necessary to avoid a public or private injury greater than the injury which might reasonably result from his own conduct. (720 ILCS 5/7-13).

Affirmative Defense. A defense of justifiable use of force, or of exoneration, based on the provisions of this Article is an affirmative defense. 720 ILCS 5/7-14).

MENTAL STATES REQUIRED FOR TYPES OF CRIMINAL OFFENSES

Voluntary act. A material element of every offense is a voluntary act, which includes an omission to perform a duty which the law imposes on the offender and which he is physically capable of performing. (720 ILCS 5/4-1).

Possession as voluntary act. Possession is a voluntary act if the offender knowingly procured or received the thing possessed, or was aware of his control thereof for a sufficient time to have been able to terminate his possession. (720 ILCS 5/4-2).

Mental state. (a) A person is not guilty of an offense, other than an offense which involves absolute liability, unless, with respect to each element described by the statute defining the offense, he acts while having one of the mental states described in Sections 4–4 through 4–7. (b) If the statute defining an offense prescribed a particular mental state with respect to the offense as a whole, without distinguishing among the elements thereof, the prescribed mental state applies to each such element. If the statute does not prescribe a particular mental state applicable to an element of an offense (other than an offense which involves absolute liability), any mental state defined in Sections 4–4, 4–5 or 4–6 is applicable. (c) Knowledge that certain conduct constitutes an offense, or knowledge of the existence, meaning, or application of the statute defining an offense, is not an element of the offense unless the statute clearly defines it as such. (720 ILCS 5/4-3).

Intent. A person intends, or acts intentionally or with intent, to accomplish a result or engage in conduct described by the statute defining the offense, when his conscious objective or purpose is to accomplish that result or engage in that conduct. (720 ILCS 5/4-4).

Knowledge. A person knows, or acts knowingly or with knowledge of: (a) The nature or attendant circumstances of his or her conduct, described by the statute defining the offense, when he or she is consciously aware that his or her conduct is of that nature or that those circumstances exist. Knowledge of a material fact includes awareness of the substantial probability that the fact exists. (b) The result of his or her conduct, described by the statute defining the offense, when he or she is consciously aware that that result is practically certain to be caused by his conduct. Conduct performed knowingly or with knowledge is performed wilfully, within the meaning of a statute using the term “willfully”, unless the statute clearly requires another meaning. When the law provides that acting knowingly suffices to establish an element of an offense, that element also is established if a person acts intentionally. (720 ILCS 5/4-5).

Recklessness. A person is reckless or acts recklessly when that person consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, described by the statute defining the offense, and that disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the situation. An act performed recklessly is performed wantonly, within the mean (720 ILCS 5/4-6).

Negligence. A person is negligent, or acts negligently, when that person fails to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or a result will follow, described by the statute defining the offense, and that failure constitutes a substantial deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the situation. (720 ILCS 5/4-7).

Ignorance or mistake. (a) A person’s ignorance or mistake as to a matter of either fact or law, except as provided in Section 4-3(c) above, is a defense if it negatives the existence of the mental state which the statute prescribes with respect to an element of the offense. (b) A person’s reasonable belief that his conduct does not constitute an offense is a defense if: (1) The offense is defined by an administrative regulation or order which is not known to him and has not been published or otherwise made reasonably available to him, and he could not have acquired such knowledge by the exercise of due diligence pursuant to facts known to him; or (2) He acts in reliance upon a statute which later is determined to be invalid; or (3) He acts in reliance upon an order or opinion of an Illinois Appellate or Supreme Court, or a United States appellate court later overruled or reversed; (4) He acts in reliance upon an official interpretation of the statute, regulation or order defining the offense, made by a public officer or agency legally authorized to interpret such statute. (c) Although a person’s ignorance or mistake of fact or law, or reasonable belief, described in this Section 4–8 is a defense to the offense charged, he may be convicted of an included offense of which he would be guilty if the fact or law were as he believed it to be. (d) A defense based upon this Section 4–8 is an affirmative defense. (720 ILCS 5/4-8).

Absolute liability. A person may be guilty of an offense without having, as to each element thereof, one of the mental states described in Sections 4-4 through 4-7 if the offense is a misdemeanor which is not punishable by incarceration or by a fine exceeding $1,000, or the statute defining the offense clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability for the conduct described. (720 ILCS 5/4-9).

ACTING WITH ANOTHER

Accountability for conduct of another. A person is responsible for conduct which is an element of an offense if the conduct is either that of the person himself, or that of another and he is legally accountable for such conduct as provided in Section 5–2, or both. (720 ILCS 5/5-1).

When accountability exists. A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another when:(a) having a mental state described by the statute defining the offense, he or she causes another to perform the conduct, and the other person in fact or by reason of legal incapacity lacks such a mental state; (b) the statute defining the offense makes him or her so accountable; or (c) either before or during the commission of an offense, and with the intent to promote or facilitate that commission, he or she solicits, aids, abets, agrees, or attempts to aid that other person in the planning or commission of the offense.When 2 or more persons engage in a common criminal design or agreement, any acts in the furtherance of that common design committed by one party are considered to be the acts of all parties to the common design or agreement and all are equally responsible for the consequences of those further acts. Mere presence at the scene of a crime does not render a person accountable for an offense; a person’s presence at the scene of a crime, however, may be considered with other circumstances by the trier of fact when determining accountability. A person is not so accountable, however, unless the statute defining the offense provides otherwise, if: (1) he or she is a victim of the offense committed; (2) the offense is so defined that his or her conduct was inevitably incident to its commission; or (3) before the commission of the offense, he terminates his effort to promote or facilitate such commission and does one of the following: wholly deprives his prior efforts of effectiveness in such commission, or gives timely warning to the proper law enforcement authorities, or otherwise makes proper effort to prevent the commission of the offense (720 ILCS 5/5-2).

Separate conviction of person accountable. A person who is legally accountable for the conduct of another which is an element of an offense may be convicted upon proof that the offense was committed and that he was so accountable, although the other person claimed to have committed the offense has not been prosecuted or convicted, or has been convicted of a different offense or degree of offense, or is not amenable to justice, or has been acquitted. 720 ILCS 5/5-3).

Responsibility of corporation. (a) A corporation may be prosecuted for the commission of an offense if, but only if: (1) The offense is a misdemeanor, or is defined by Sections 11-20, 11-20.1 or 24-1 of this Code, or Section 44 of the “Environmental Protection Act”, approved June 29, 1970, as amended or is defined by another statute which clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose liability on a corporation; and an agent of the corporation performs the conduct which is an element of the offense while acting within the scope of his or her office or employment and in behalf of the corporation, except that any limitation in the defining statute, concerning the corporation’s accountability for certain agents or under certain circumstances, is applicable; or (2) The commission of the offense is authorized, requested, commanded, or performed, by the board of directors or by a high managerial agent who is acting within the scope of his or her employment in behalf of the corporation. (b) A corporation’s proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the high managerial agent having supervisory responsibility over the conduct which is the subject matter of the offense exercised due diligence to prevent the commission of the offense, is a defense to a prosecution for any offense to which Subsection (a) (1) refers, other than an offense for which absolute liability is imposed. This Subsection is inapplicable if the legislative purpose of the statute defining the offense is inconsistent with the provisions of this Subsection. (c) For the purpose of this Section: (1) “Agent” means any director, officer, servant, employee, or other person who is authorized to act in behalf of the corporation. (2) “High managerial agent” means an officer of the corporation, or any other agent who has a position of comparable authority for the formulation of corporation 720 ILCS 5/5-4).

Accountability for conduct of corporation. (a) A person is legally accountable for conduct which is an element of an offense and which, in the name or in behalf of a corporation, he performs or causes to be performed, to the same extent as if the conduct were performed in his own name or behalf. (b) An individual who has been convicted of an offense by reason of his legal accountability for the conduct of a corporation is subject to the punishment authorized by law for an individual upon conviction of such offense, although only a lesser or different punishment is authorized for the corporation. (720 ILCS 5/5-5).

SENTENCING PROVISIONS FOR ALL FELONIES

“CLASS 4” FELONIES; SENTENCE. 730 ILCS Sec. 5-4.5-45.

(a) TERM. The sentence of imprisonment shall be a determinate sentence of not less than one year and not more than 3 years. The sentence of imprisonment for an extended term Class 4 felony, as provided in Section 5-8-2 (730 ILCS 5/5-8-2), shall be a term not less than 3 years and not more than 6 years.

(b) PERIODIC IMPRISONMENT. A sentence of periodic imprisonment shall be for a definite term of up to 18 months, except as otherwise provided in Section 5-5-3 or 5-7-1 (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3 or 5/5-7-1).

(c) IMPACT INCARCERATION. See Sections 5-8-1.1 and 5-8-1.2 (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1.1 and 5/5-8-1.2) concerning eligibility for the impact incarceration program or the county impact incarceration program.

(d) PROBATION; CONDITIONAL DISCHARGE. Except as provided in Section 5-5-3 or 5-6-2 (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3 or 5/5-6-2), the period of probation or conditional discharge shall not exceed 30 months. The court shall specify the conditions of probation or conditional discharge as set forth in Section 5-6-3 (730 ILCS 5/5-6-3).

(i) CREDIT FOR HOME DETENTION. See Section 5-4.5-100 (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-100) concerning credit for time spent in home detention prior to judgment.

(j) EARLY RELEASE; GOOD CONDUCT. See Section 3-6-3 of this Code (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3) or the County Jail Good Behavior Allowance Act (730 ILCS 130/) for rules and regulations for early release based on good conduct.

(l) PAROLE; MANDATORY SUPERVISED RELEASE. Except as provided in Section 3-3-8 or 5-8-1 (730 ILCS 5/3-3-8 or 5/5-8-1), the parole or mandatory supervised release term shall be one year upon release from imprisonment.

“CLASS 3” FELONIES; SENTENCE. 730 ILCS Sec. 5-4.5-40.

(a) TERM. The sentence of imprisonment shall be a determinate sentence of not less than 2 years and not more than 5 years. The sentence of imprisonment for an extended term Class 3 felony, as provided in Section 5-8-2 (730 ILCS 5/5-8-2), shall be a term not less than 5 years and not more than 10 years.

(b) PERIODIC IMPRISONMENT. A sentence of periodic imprisonment shall be for a definite term of up to 18 months, except as otherwise provided in Section 5-5-3 or 5-7-1 (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3 or 5/5-7-1).

(c) IMPACT INCARCERATION. See Sections 5-8-1.1 and 5-8-1.2 (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1.1 and 5/5-8-1.2) concerning eligibility for the impact incarceration program or the county impact incarceration program.

(d) PROBATION; CONDITIONAL DISCHARGE. Except as provided in Section 5-5-3 or 5-6-2 (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3 or 5/5-6-2), the period of probation or conditional discharge shall not exceed 30 months. The court shall specify the conditions of probation or conditional discharge as set forth in Section 5-6-3 (730 ILCS 5/5-6-3).

(i) CREDIT FOR HOME DETENTION. See Section 5-4.5-100 (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-100) concerning credit for time spent in home detention prior to judgment.

(j) EARLY RELEASE; GOOD CONDUCT. See Section 3-6-3 of this Code (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3) or the County Jail Good Behavior Allowance Act (730 ILCS 130/) for rules and regulations for early release based on good conduct.

(l) PAROLE; MANDATORY SUPERVISED RELEASE. Except as provided in Section 3-3-8 or 5-8-1 (730 ILCS 5/3-3-8 or 5/5-8-1), the parole or mandatory supervised release term shall be one year upon release from imprisonment.

“CLASS 2” FELONIES; SENTENCE. Sec. 5-4.5-35.

(a) TERM. The sentence of imprisonment shall be a determinate sentence of not less than 3 years and not more than 7 years. The sentence of imprisonment for an extended term Class 2 felony, as provided in Section 5-8-2 (730 ILCS 5/5-8-2), shall be a term not less than 7 years and not more than 14 years.

(b) PERIODIC IMPRISONMENT. A sentence of periodic imprisonment shall be for a definite term of from 18 to 30 months, except as otherwise provided in Section 5-5-3 or 5-7-1 (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3 or 5/5-7-1).

(c) IMPACT INCARCERATION. See Sections 5-8-1.1 and 5-8-1.2 (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1.1 and 5/5-8-1.2) concerning eligibility for the impact incarceration program or the county impact incarceration program.

(d) PROBATION; CONDITIONAL DISCHARGE. Except as provided in Section 5-5-3 or 5-6-2 (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3 or 5/5-6-2), the period of probation or conditional discharge shall not exceed 4 years. The court shall specify the conditions of probation or conditional discharge as set forth in Section 5-6-3 (730 ILCS 5/5-6-3).

(i) CREDIT FOR HOME DETENTION. See Section 5-4.5-100 (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-100) concerning credit for time spent in home detention prior to judgment.

(j) EARLY RELEASE; GOOD CONDUCT. See Section 3-6-3 of this Code (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3) or the County Jail Good Behavior Allowance Act (730 ILCS 130/) for rules and regulations for early release based on good conduct.

(l) PAROLE; MANDATORY SUPERVISED RELEASE. Except as provided in Section 3-3-8 or 5-8-1 (730 ILCS 5/3-3-8 or 5/5-8-1), the parole or mandatory supervised release term shall be 2 years upon release from imprisonment.

“CLASS 1” FELONIES; SENTENCE. 730 ILCS Sec. 5-4.5-30.

(a) TERM. The sentence of imprisonment, other than for second degree murder, shall be a determinate sentence of not less than 4 years and not more than 15 years. The sentence of imprisonment for second degree murder shall be a determinate sentence of not less than 4 years and not more than 20 years. The sentence of imprisonment for an extended term Class 1 felony, as provided in Section 5-8-2 (730 ILCS 5/5-8-2), shall be a term not less than 15 years and not more than 30 years.

(b) PERIODIC IMPRISONMENT. A sentence of periodic imprisonment shall be for a definite term of from 3 to 4 years, except as otherwise provided in Section 5-5-3 or 5-7-1 (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3 or 5/5-7-1).

(c) IMPACT INCARCERATION. See Sections 5-8-1.1 and 5-8-1.2 (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1.1 and 5/5-8-1.2) concerning eligibility for the impact incarceration program or the county impact incarceration program.

(d) PROBATION; CONDITIONAL DISCHARGE. Except as provided in Section 5-5-3 or 5-6-2 (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3 or 5/5-6-2), the period of probation or conditional discharge shall not exceed 4 years. The court shall specify the conditions of probation or conditional discharge as set forth in Section 5-6-3 (730 ILCS 5/5-6-3). In no case shall an offender be eligible for a disposition of probation or conditional discharge for a Class 1 felony committed while he or she was serving a term of probation or conditional discharge for a felony.

(i) CREDIT FOR HOME DETENTION. See Section 5-4.5-100 (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-100) concerning credit for time spent in home detention prior to judgment.

(j) EARLY RELEASE; GOOD CONDUCT. See Section 3-6-3 of this Code (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3) or the County Jail Good Behavior Allowance Act (730 ILCS 130/) for rules and regulations for early release based on good conduct.

(l) PAROLE; MANDATORY SUPERVISED RELEASE. Except as provided in Section 3-3-8 or 5-8-1 (730 ILCS 5/3-3-8 or 5/5-8-1), the parole or mandatory supervised release term shall be 2 years upon release from imprisonment.

“CLASS X” FELONIES; SENTENCE. Sec. 5-4.5-25.

(a) TERM. The sentence of imprisonment shall be a determinate sentence of not less than 6 years and not more than 30 years. The sentence of imprisonment for an extended term Class X felony, as provided in Section 5-8-2 (730 ILCS 5/5-8-2), shall be not less than 30 years and not more than 60 years.

(b) PERIODIC IMPRISONMENT. A term of periodic imprisonment shall not be imposed.

(c) IMPACT INCARCERATION. The impact incarceration program or the county impact incarceration program is not an authorized disposition.

(d) PROBATION; CONDITIONAL DISCHARGE. A period of probation or conditional discharge shall not be imposed.

(l) PAROLE; MANDATORY SUPERVISED RELEASE. Except as provided in Section 3-3-8 or 5-8-1 (730 ILCS 5/3-3-8 or 5/5-8-1), the parole or mandatory supervised release term shall be 3 years upon release from imprisonment.

Sec. 5-4.5-70. SENTENCE PROVISIONS FOR MISDEMEANORS.

(a) SUPERVISION; ORDER. The court, upon a plea of guilty or a stipulation by the defendant of the facts supporting the charge or a finding of guilt, may defer further proceedings and the imposition of a sentence and may enter an order for supervision of the defendant. If the defendant is not barred from receiving an order for supervision under Section 5-6-1 (730 ILCS 5/5-6-1) or otherwise, the court may enter an order for supervision after considering the circumstances of the offense, and the history, character, and condition of the offender, if the court is of the opinion that:

(1) the defendant is not likely to commit further crimes;

(2) the defendant and the public would be best served if the defendant were not to receive a criminal record; and

(3) in the best interests of justice, an order of supervision is more appropriate than a sentence otherwise permitted under this Code.

(b) SUPERVISION; PERIOD. When a defendant is placed on supervision, the court shall enter an order for supervision specifying the period of supervision, and shall defer further proceedings in the case until the conclusion of the period. The period of supervision shall be reasonable under all of the circumstances of the case, and except as otherwise provided, may not be longer than 2 years, unless the defendant has failed to pay the assessment required by Section 10.3 of the Cannabis Control Act (720 ILCS 550/10.3), Section 411.2 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/411.2), or Section 80 of the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act (720 ILCS 646/80), in which case the court may extend supervision beyond 2 years. The court shall specify the conditions of supervision as set forth in Section 5-6-3.1 (730 ILCS 5/5-6-3.1).

CLASS “A” MISDEMEANORS; SENTENCE.

(a) The sentence of imprisonment shall be a determinate sentence of less than one year.

(b) PERIODIC IMPRISONMENT. A sentence of periodic imprisonment shall be for a definite term of less than one year, except as otherwise provided in Section 5-5-3 or 5-7-1 (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3 or 5/5-7-1).

(d) PROBATION; CONDITIONAL DISCHARGE. Except as provided in Section 5-5-3 or 5-6-2 (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3 or 5/5-6-2), the period of probation or conditional discharge shall not exceed 2 years. The court shall specify the conditions of probation or conditional discharge as set forth in Section 5-6-3 (730 ILCS 5/5-6-3).

(e) FINE. A fine not to exceed $2,500 for each offense or the amount specified in the offense, whichever is greater, may be imposed. A fine may be imposed in addition to a sentence of conditional discharge, probation, periodic imprisonment, or imprisonment. See Article 9 of Chapter V (730 ILCS 5/Ch. V, Art. 9) for imposition of additional amounts and determination of amounts and payment.

(d) PROBATION; CONDITIONAL DISCHARGE. Except as provided in Section 5-6-2 (730 ILCS 5/5-6-2), the period of probation or conditional discharge shall not exceed 2 years. The court shall specify the conditions of probation or conditional discharge as set forth in Section 5-6-3 (730 ILCS 5/5-6-3).

(e) FINE. A fine not to exceed $1,500 for each offense or the amount specified in the offense, whichever is greater, may be imposed. A fine may be imposed in addition to a sentence of conditional discharge, probation, periodic imprisonment, or imprisonment. See Article 9 of Chapter V (730 ILCS 5/Ch. V, Art. 9) for imposition of additional amounts and determination of amounts and payment.

(d) PROBATION; CONDITIONAL DISCHARGE. Except as provided in Section 5-6-2 (730 ILCS 5/5-6-2), the period of probation or conditional discharge shall not exceed 2 years. The court shall specify the conditions of probation or conditional discharge as set forth in Section 5-6-3 (730 ILCS 5/5-6-3).

(e) FINE. A fine not to exceed $1,500 for each offense or the amount specified in the offense, whichever is greater, may be imposed. A fine may be imposed in addition to a sentence of conditional discharge, probation, periodic imprisonment, or imprisonment. See Article 9 of Chapter V (730 ILCS 5/Ch. V, Art. 9) for imposition of additional amounts and determination of amounts and payment.