Christine Tomlinson's boyfriend
contacted the sheriff's office after midnight and reported that, based on his
impression from a text-message exchange with Tomlinson
and her custom of driving home drunk from the club meeting she had just left,
he believed that Tomlinson was driving drunk. A deputy identified and stopped
the truck Tomlinson was driving, finding Tomlinson to be considerably considerably intoxicated. Tomlinson stipulated to
the state's case, and the district court convicted her of two counts of driving while impaired.

Tomlinson argues on appeal that the
district court should have suppressed all post-stop evidence because the deputy
lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the stop. . . .

Tomlinson v.
Commissioner of Public Safety, supra. You can, if you are interested, read about Minnesota's DWI/DUE law here.

The opinion goes on to outline the facts that resulted in
Tomlinson’s conviction:

About an hour and a half after midnight
on a Thursday night in March 2015, Jay Janzen called the Watonwan CountySheriff's Office. Janzen said that his girlfriend, Christine Tomlinson, was
driving drunk from Vernon Center to their shared home east of Ormsby. Deputy
Mark Slater drove to the couple's rural home to investigate.

Deputy Slater spoke with Janzen. He
learned from Janzen that Tomlinson was still not home, that she was driving
from a snowmobile club meeting from which she regularly drives home drunk, and
that his text-message exchange with Tomlinson informed him that Tomlinson had
become lost.

Deputy Slater found Tomlinson's pickup
truck at about 2:20 a.m. traveling rapidly down a gravel road. The deputy drove
close behind for some distance, until the truck slowed quickly and pulled to
the right. The deputy stopped the truck. Tomlinson appeared to be drunk. Deputy
Slater administered field sobriety tests, confirming his suspicion. He arrested
her, took her to jail, and administered a breath test that indicated that her
alcohol concentration was twice the per se intoxication limit.

The state charged Tomlinson with two
counts of impaired driving based separately on her physical impairment and on
her alcohol-concentration level. Tomlinson moved the district court to suppress
all evidence obtained after the stop, arguing that Deputy Slater lacked
reasonable suspicion to stop the truck.

Tomlinson v.
Commissioner of Public Safety, supra.

As Wikipedia explains, in

Terry v. Ohio, the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that a person can be stopped and briefly detained by
a police officer based on a reasonable suspicion of involvement in a
punishable crime. If the officer has reasonable suspicion the detainee is armed,
the officer may perform a `pat-down’ of the person's outer garments for
weapons. Such a detention does not violate the Fourth
Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizure, though it must
be brief. Reasonable suspicion does not provide grounds for arrest; however, an
arrest can be made if facts discovered during the detention provide probable cause that the suspect has committed a crime.

Getting back to the Tomlinson
case, the opinion also explains that the

district court conducted a hearing. The
parties presented the deputy's squad-car video recording depicting Deputy
Slater following closely and then stopping Tomlinson's pickup on the gravel
road. The deputy said he based the stop on the tip and on Tomlinson's driving.
He emphasized her rapid deceleration and her movement to the right. Tomlinson
countered, testifying that her deceleration and rightward movement was
reasonable to allow the tailing car to pass.

The district court denied Tomlinson's
motion, deeming the stop justified based on the drunk-driving tip and on
Tomlinson's driving. Tomlinson stipulated to the state's case
under Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.01, subdivision 4,
preserving for appeal her right to challenge the district court's suppression
decision. The district court found Tomlinson guilty of impaired driving. She
appeals.

Tomlinson v.
Commissioner of Public Safety, supra.

The Court of Appeals began its analysis of Tomlinson’s
appeal by noting she

asks us to reverse the denial of her
motion to suppress, arguing that the stop was unconstitutional. We review de novo a district court's conclusion that an officer had the constitutional
ground to stop a motorist. State v. Burbach, 706 N.W.2d 484,
487 (Minnesota Supreme Court 2005). Police may stop a motorist without a
warrant without offending the motorist's Fourth Amendment rights if the officer
bases the stop on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968); State v. Timberlake, 744
N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minnesota Supreme Court 2008).

Tomlinson convincingly argues that her
driving did not warrant the stop. A traffic violation itself would certainly be
sufficient. State v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818, 823 (Minnesota
Supreme Court 2004). But an objectively reasonable officer would not conclude
that Tomlinson's driving was either illegal or suspicious. A reasonable officer
would know that a late-night driver may be alarmed and act defensively upon
being approached rapidly from behind and then tailgated by an unknown vehicle.
Allowing oneself to be tailgated at high speed on a barren gravel road can be
dangerous regardless of the tailgater's condition or intentions. Cf. State
v. Brechler, 412 N.W.2d 367, 368 (Court of Appeals of Minnesota 1987) (reasoning
that a driver's conduct could have been caused by the presence of a police car
following in close proximity). At that hour a reasonable driver might also fear
that the tailgater has criminal intentions or is suffering from
some mental impairment, like, for instance, intoxication. We agree with Tomlinson that there was nothing
objectively suspicious, illegal, or unusual about her slowing and pulling to
the side of the road.

Tomlinson v.
Commissioner of Public Safety, supra.

But the court also went on to explain that

there was more than Tomlinson's
driving. We assess the constitutionality of a traffic stop on all relevant
circumstances, including the time, the location, and the officer's ability to
draw inferences and conclusions based on his training. Appelgate v.
Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 402 N.W.2d 106, 108 (Minnesota Supreme Court1987).
And reasonable suspicion may arise from information supplied by an
informant. Marben v. State, Dep't of Pub. Safety, 294 N.W.2d
697, 699 (Minnesota Supreme Court 1980). Although Tomlinson admitted to the
district court that she had informed Janzen that she had been drinking, the
record does not indicate that he relayed this specifically to the deputy.

The deputy nevertheless was aware of
the following details: Tomlinson was driving very late, after midnight;
Tomlinson reportedly customarily drives home drunk after she leaves the club
meeting she had just left; Tomlinson got lost despite her apparent familiarity
with her route; Tomlinson had still not found her way home in the 45 minutes
between the time of the call and the time the deputy encountered her on the
road; and Tomlinson's boyfriend, who lives with Tomlinson, believed that her
communication to him indicated that she was drunk. These circumstances would
allow any reasonable officer to suspect that Tomlinson may have been driving
drunk. This reasonable suspicion warrants the minimal intrusion of the brief
traffic stop. Immediately after the stop the deputy saw that Tomlinson appeared
to be drunk, justifying the longer detention necessary for the deputy to
administer field sobriety tests.

Tomlinson v.
Commissioner of Public Safety, supra.

The court also pointed out that Tomlinson argued that

Deputy Slater's knowledge of tumult in
her and Janzen's relationship undermines the reliability of Janzen's tip. We
reach a different conclusion. When an informant gives sufficient detail
allowing police to locate him and hold him accountable if his information turns
out false, the officer can assume that the informant is telling the
truth. City of Minnetonka v. Shepherd, 420 N.W.2d 887, 890
(Minnesota Supreme Court 1988). Janzen identified himself to the sheriff's
office and then spoke at his home in-person with the deputy. Janzen's open
exposure to punishment constituted a weighty counterbalance to the possibility
that he might be trying to trouble Tomlinson by a false police report.

Tomlinson v.
Commissioner of Public Safety, supra.

The Court of Appeals went on to explain that

[w]e are not persuaded otherwise by
Tomlinson's contention that Janzen's report lacked credibility because he did
not personally observe Tomlinson—or even hear her speak—before he told police
she was intoxicated. The
contention has only faint support in the caselaw. In Olson v.
Commissioner of Public Safety, for example, the Supreme Court
invalidated a stop that rested on an anonymous caller's `bare assertion of a
possibly drunk driver on the road.’ 371 N.W.2d 552, 556 (Minnesota Supreme
Court 1985). Similarly, in Rose v. Commissioner of Public Safety, we
concluded that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion when he relied on a
gas-station attendant's report that a driver was intoxicated, reasoning that the informant had not personally
observed the driver and the circumstances did not inform the officer how the
attendant concluded that the driver was intoxicated. 637 N.W.2d 326, 330 (Minnesota Court of Appeals 2001), review
denied (Minn. Mar. 19, 2002).

But Olson and Rose are
easily distinguished from this case. Janzen was not an anonymous informant who
provided only a `bare assertion’ of `possibly’ drunk driving, like the
informant in Olson. 371 N.W.2d at 556. Nor was he a
stranger-informant who failed to provide any basis for his conclusion, like the
informant in Rose. 637 N.W.2d at 330. Janzen expressed that Tomlinson was intoxicated,
not just possiblyintoxicated,
and he was convinced of it based on his personal experience with Tomlinson's
regularly driving home drunk after her snowmobile club meetings and on her
getting lost after leaving the meeting late that night. As for the nature of
the contact between Janzen and Tomlinson, we recognize that a written exchange
would almost certainly not prove intoxication.
But even a text-message communication, particularly between people very
familiar with each other, might raise the suspicion of intoxication either by its
substance or its form.

Tomlinson v.
Commissioner of Public Safety, supra (emphasis in the original).

The court therefore found that

[t]his case is sufficiently similar to
those in which the informant confidently communicated drunk driving and in
which the basis for the report was apparent. In Shepherd, the
supreme court affirmed a stop based on a gas-station attendant's reporting that
he saw a drunk driver leave the station.City of Minnetonka v. Sheppherd, 420 N.W.2d 887, 890 (Minnesota Supreme
Court 1988).

In Playle v. Commissioner of
Public Safety, we deemed a fast-food employee's tip sufficient after
the employee reported encountering a drunk driver at a drive-up
window. 439 N.W.2d 747, 748–49 (Court of Appeals of Minnesota 1989). And
in Jobe v. Commissioner of Public Safety, we held that the
stop was justified when the informant stated that he saw the reported driver
swerving. 609 N.W.2d 919, 920, 923 (Court of Appeals of Minnesota 2000).
The deputy here was reasonably satisfied from the informant's familiarity with
Tomlinson's habits and from their contemporaneous communication that Tomlinson
may be driving drunk.

The district court appropriately denied
Tomlinson's motion to suppress the evidence that followed the traffic stop.