FM 3-05.

230

SPECIAL FORCES BASE CAMP OPERATIONS

JULY 2003

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies only to protect technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange Program or by other means. This determination was made on 30 May 2003. Other requests for this document must bereferred to Commander, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, ATTN: AOJK-DT-SFD, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28310-5000.

DESTRUCTION NOTICE:Destroy by any method that must prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies only to protect

technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the International ExchangeProgram or by other means. This determination was made on 30 May 2003. Other requests for thisdocument must be referred to Commander, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special WarfareCenter and School, ATTN: AOJK-DT-SFD, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28310-5000.

DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that must prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction ofthe document.

ii PrefaceField Manual (FM) 3-05.230 is a “how to” guide for Special Forces (SF)conducting joint and combined operations. It provides references and describestactics, techniques, and procedures for establishing base camp operations. Itsupports the doctrinal concepts and principles of FM 3-05.20, Special ForcesOperations; FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces; and JointPublication (JP) 3-10.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for BaseDefense, and should be used in conjunction with these manuals. This FM is afocused collection of applications and practical information. It is not intended toprovide “the schoolhouse solution” to a particular problem or situation, but tohelp detachments recognize, analyze, and resolve the problems they willencounter throughout the full spectrum of operations.This manual was designed and written for SF operating in an ambiguousenvironment. The specific objective of FM 3-05.230 is to devise fabricationtechniques, recommend air-transportable equipment, and organize the campconstruction sequence, with a view toward increasing the efficiency of SF duringthe initial phases of base camp establishment. The techniques and equipmentdescribed in this manual include concepts tailored from the warning order to thetime of demobilization and disposition of the camp.This manual is unclassified to ensure Armywide dissemination and facilitate theintegration of SF in the preparation and execution of campaigns and majoroperations. It also provides guidance for SF commanders who determine the forcestructure, budget, training, material, and operational requirements necessary toprepare SF to conduct their missions and collateral activities.The most common measurements that the soldier uses are expressed throughoutthe text and in many cases are United States (U.S.) standard terms rather thanmetric. Appendix A consists of conversion tables that may be used when missionrequirements or environments change.This manual contains numerous acronyms, abbreviations, and terms. Usersshould refer to the Glossary at the back of this manual for their meanings anddefinitions.The proponent of this manual is the United States Army John F. KennedySpecial Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS). Submit comments andrecommended changes to Commander, USAJFKSWCS, ATTN: AOJK-DT-SFD,Fort Bragg, NC 28310-5000.Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do notrefer exclusively to men.

iii Chapter 1

Special Forces Role

The U.S. Army’s mission is to fight and win America’s wars. SF operations encompass war, conflict, and peacetime engagements. SF operations, although carried out at the tactical level, are characterized by their strategic and operational implications. The unique SF skills, consisting of language qualification, regional orientation, area studies, and interpersonal relations, are keys to past successes experienced by SF in the field. This chapter discusses SF organization, as well as SF and host nation (HN) relationships from base camp establishment through demobilization of the camp.

SPECIAL FORCES ORGANIZATION

1-1. SF units, along with other Army special operations forces (ARSOF), conduct special operations (SO) throughout the full spectrum of operations. The basic element of SF is the Special Forces operational detachment A (SFODA), a 12-man detachment. SF companies and battalion headquarters (HQ) have similar detachments, known as Special Forces operational detachments B (SFODBs) and Special Forces operational detachments C (SFODCs), respectively. Generically, these units are referred to as Special Forces operational detachments (SFODs). When forward-deployed, SFODBs are referred to as advanced operational bases (AOBs), SFODCs are forward operational bases (FOBs), and SF groups are Special Forces operational bases (SFOBs).

SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE)

1-2. The Special Forces group (Airborne) (SFG[A]) is a multipurpose and extremely flexible organization. Its mission is to plan, conduct, and support SO activities in any operational environment whether it is permissive, uncertain, or hostile. The SFG(A) consists of those elements described in the following paragraphs; however, FM 3-05.20 includes further details. For the purpose of this manual, only the SF battalion and its composition are discussed in detail.

HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY

1-3. The group headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) provides command and control (C2), staff planning, and staff supervision of group operations and administration. The group HHC consists of the group HQ, company HQ, and the chemical reconnaissance detachment—attached from the United States Army Special Forces Command (Airborne) (USASFC[A]).

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GROUP SUPPORT COMPANY

1-4. The group support company (GSC) provides intelligence, signal, and combat service support (CSS) to the SFOB. The GSC controls consolidated facilities and activities when SFOBs and FOBs consolidate support operations. The GSC is comprised of the following: • Military intelligence detachment HQ. • Company HQ. • Service detachment HQ. • Medical section. • Signal detachment HQ. • Personnel section.

SPECIAL FORCES BATTALION

1-5. The SF battalion of the SFG(A) plans, conducts, and supports SO activities in any operational environment. The battalion is directly responsible for isolating, deploying, controlling, sustaining, recovering, and reconstituting SFOBs and SFODAs. The SF battalion consists of the elements discussed in the following paragraphs.Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment

1-6. The battalion headquarters and headquarters detachment (HHD)

commands and controls the battalion and attachments. The HHD performs no operational mission separate from the battalion.

Battalion Headquarters and Support Company

1-7. The battalion headquarters and support company (HSC) provides routine administrative and logistics support to all elements of the battalion.

Special Forces Company

1-8. The SF company plans and conducts SO activities in any operational

environment. The company HQ is the SFODB, a 10-man team. In garrison, the SFODB commands and controls its own organic SFODAs. The SF company commander, an experienced SF major, normally has more authority and greater freedom of action than do conventional Army company commanders. When deployed, the SFODB functions as a separate operational detachment with its own assigned mission. The mission may require the SFODB to operate separately or to exercise operational control (OPCON) of a mix of organic and attached SFODAs. The SFODB is a multipurpose C2 element with many employment options. It can exercise C2 over one to six SFODAs. The SFODB’s primary missions are to act as an AOB, a special operations command and control element (SOCCE), or an isolation facility (ISOFAC). The SFODB can also deploy to conduct SF operations in a specified area of operations (AO) or joint special operations area (JSOA). 1-9. The basic building block of SF operations is the 12-man SFODA, also known as an “A detachment,” “ODA,” or “A team.” All other SF organizations are designed to command, control, and support the SFODA. The SFODA is

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designed to organize, equip, train, advise or direct, and support indigenous

military or paramilitary forces engaged in unconventional warfare (UW) or foreign internal defense (FID) activities. The commander of an SFODA is a captain. His two primary assistants are an assistant detachment commander (an SF warrant officer) and an operations sergeant (a master sergeant). The SFODA has one intelligence sergeant and two specialists in each of the four primary SF functional areas (weapons, engineer, medical, and communica- tions). By having two each of the specialties, the SFODA can conduct split- team operations when the situation does not warrant the employment of the full team or when the commander believes it is prudent to do so.

HOST NATION ASSISTANCE

1-10. SF units are uniquely chartered to assist developing nations in establishing and improving operational bases through SF’s collateral activities of security assistance (SA), counterdrug (CD) activities, personnel recovery (PR), humanitarian demining (HD) activities, and foreign humanitarian assistance (HA). SF soldiers fulfill a niche in a geographic combatant commander’s ability to assist a U.S. Ambassador’s initiatives and a Country Team’s assigned tasks. FMs 100-25 and 3-05.20 include further guidance on command relationships. 1-11. Broadly stated, the mission of SF is to advise, train, and assist HN personnel; emphasis will depend upon the environment, rules of engagement (ROE), and political and geographic characteristics of a particular area. This assistance may vary from technical and medical advice to training and equipping HN forces for offensive operations, and advising and assisting local government officials.

COUNTERPART RELATIONSHIPS 1-12. Respect and camaraderie between SF and HN personnel is a leadership issue. Showing reverence for legitimate HN culture, taboos, and unwritten laws is a proven time-tested method of earning immediate respect from the HN. This is not to imply that human rights, ethics, or other issues deemed unacceptable by our government are tolerable. 1-13. SO imperatives are a fine guide for SF to follow in building productive counterpart relationships (FM 3-05.20 discusses the SO imperatives in more detail). Although not all imperatives apply all the time, mission planning and execution concerning the following points increase the likelihood of success: • Balance security and synchronization. Insufficient security may compromise a mission. Excessive security and compartmentalization almost always causes the mission to fail due to inadequate coordination. • Understand the operational environment. SF units must understand the theater and civilian influences, as well as enemy and friendly capabilities.

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• Recognize political implications. SF units conduct operations to

advance political objectives. SF must understand the intent of the ROE despite any military disadvantages that may result. The advancement of the political objective may take precedence over the military disadvantages. • Consider long-term effects. SF units consider political, economic, informational, and military effects when faced with dilemmas since the solutions have broad, far-reaching effects. A single slip of the tongue may result in massive loss of HN rapport. • Ensure legitimacy and credibility. Significant legal and policy considerations apply to many U.S. SF missions. Legitimacy is a crucial factor in developing and maintaining indigenous and international support. • Ensure long-term sustainment. Successful SF policy, strategy, and programs are durable, consistent, and sustainable. SF units avoid starting programs that are beyond the economic, technological, or cultural capabilities of the HN to maintain without U.S. assistance. 1-14. The use of collective pronouns such as “we” and “our” in everyday vocabulary along with interpersonal relationships enhance positive counterpart relationships. Getting to know the HN families, traditions, strengths, and weaknesses of diverse cultures greatly assist in arbitration when conflict does occur. Conflict will arise—the SF elements’ decisive management of the conflict determines credibility with the HN.

CONVERSION AND DEMOBILIZATION

1-15. Conversions from a U.S.-sponsored operational base into an HN camp, or the complete demobilization of a camp are well within SF doctrinal capabilities. An example of a recent conversion is Santa Lucia Base Camp (SLBC) in the rural Huallaga River Valley, Peru. Following 7 years of joint interagency and multinational counterdrug operations known as SNOWCAP, the United States turned over the SLBC facilities to the Peruvians in 1995 and transitioned into smaller, more dispersed urban sites that dot the river valley. Though SF and the Country Team had invested years of labor and millions of dollars, the productivity of the camp had outlived its usefulness. Therefore, rather than completely demobilize the camp and cart the equipment, facilities, and defensive barriers out of country, the Embassy negotiated a mutual agreement and, with the assistance of SF, transitioned the camp into a regional police HQ. 1-16. In short, SF units are well suited to convert or demobilize U.S.- sponsored base camps. The inherent versatility and flexibility of SF allow commanders to integrate and synchronize their capabilities with a Country Team’s objectives. SF soldiers have superb collective skills and are adept in negotiating and influencing dynamic complex situations to achieve desired end states without jeopardizing future relations.

1-4 Chapter 2

Predeployment Planning Like the commanders of other Army units, SF commanders task-organize their elements into teams and task forces based on the mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available—time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC) in the battlespace. This chapter describes the mission planning process that SF commanders and staff go through in the predeployment phase.

DETACHMENT ASSIGNMENTS 2-1. In anticipation of various missions and to ensure functional coverage of all premission activities, the SFOD commander organizes a detachment staff using METT-TC. Detachment staff members perform those duties outlined in FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, for their particular functional area. Also, detachment members perform additional duties in the absence of the primary individual or at the discretion of the detachment commander. FM 3-05.20 contains more detailed information on staff organization and functions.

• Sustainment training of uncommitted SF teams.

• Civil Affairs (CA) and Psychological Operations (PSYOP) support.

DELIBERATE MISSION PLANNING PROCESS

2-3. Based on the SOC commander’s mission tasking package (MTP) and other mission guidance, SF commanders conduct their own mission planning process. The objective of this process is to develop a comprehensive plan with contingency options that provide flexible execution. SF commanders must not tie themselves to a rigid plan. They must anticipate the unexpected and remain agile enough to modify their plans as required to achieve their higher commanders’ intent. 2-4. Deliberate SF targeting and mission planning requires days or weeks to complete an adequate intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) and to prepare for commitment of an SF team. Team members must understand the political, social, economic, and military situation in the JSOA. They must know the ethnic groups, customs, taboos, religions, and other essential data that could affect mission execution. The SF team can best achieve this level of area orientation through intensive area assessments and area studies before commitment. FM 3-05.201, Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations, includes further information on the area assessment and area study.

TIME-SENSITIVE MISSION PLANNING PROCESS

2-5. When preparing for an SF mission, time may be a critical factor. A time-sensitive mission may also impose time constraints on planning and other mission preparation, particularly if no SOMPF exists for the mission. Time is a significant factor because the success of the mission depends largely on the quality of mission preparation. If there is not enough time for normal preparation, the SF base commander determines minimum essential preparation tasks. He then modifies the deliberate mission planning process to do those tasks in the time available. The SF base commander must inform the SOC or the joint special operations task force (JSOTF) commander when these minimum essential tasks cannot be accomplished without an unacceptable degree of risk of mission failure.

BASE CAMP PRINCIPLES

2-6. The base camp is comprised of independent, hardened, mutually supported platoon positions surrounding a hardened central control facility. Facilities are provided at the site for the SF team and HN personnel. The overall defensive posture of this camp is enhanced by continual, aggressive offensive operations conducted by camp personnel in their area of responsibility (AOR). The base camp concept, as presently defined by SF, embodies the following principles: • Speed of building installations: Should be defendable within 30 days. Assisted by one engineer platoon. Selected construction equipment used.

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• Desired size is such that the camp can be defended by one-fourth of the assigned strength. • Defense in depth: Primary, alternate, and supplementary defense lines. Alternate and secondary positions. Ability to limit and seal off penetrations. Internal camp changes. Reserve forces. Coordinated fire support plan. • Variations in configurations. • The interior should be compartmentalized in case a certain area of the camp is penetrated. • Resupply depends primarily on air unless the camp is situated near water. • Airstrip requirements—if an airstrip is built, it must be near enough that small arms fire can cover it. • A plentiful water supply is necessary, preferably by wells. • Prestocking of war materials, which can be banded and palletized ready for delivery. • Prestocking of a stock of two complete camps. • Use of the containers in which war materials are transported to the base campsite (containers express [CONEXs], military vans [containers] [MILVANs], or sea-land containers). • Generator use—it is best to use three-phase hook-up systems to avoid power surges or blowing generators. • Petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) storage sites separate from the main camp area. • On-hand excavation and earthmoving equipment for hasty repairs. 2-7. If the terrain dictates that the base camp be built in multiple sections, personnel should build each section as though each is a separate camp. Also, personnel must ensure defensive and protective measures support the other camps. In an area where there are several camps and the opposition activity is gaining strength, the camps are required to have— • Immediate fire support (Appendix E). • Immediate close air support. • Reaction forces available within 30 minutes, upon request.

BASE CAMP CONSIDERATIONS

2-8. The single most important consideration for the camp is its security (defense). One of the most important security considerations is camp location. Proper location allows for better defense, infrastructure support, and a myriad of other considerations based on METT-TC. Security concerns start from the very moment that the order comes to construct a camp throughout

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construction to normal camp operations. Once construction begins, the camp

location will no longer be a secret. The camp will most likely require a large security force to provide security in and around the surrounding area while area development operations are being carried out. To be successful, the base camp must have the support from the local populace. 2-9. Construction time must be kept to an absolute minimum. The camp needs to become operational as soon as possible. A connecting airfield or landing zone must also be constructed during the initial phase of construction. The camp will depend on outside support that will most likely come by air (fixed-wing and rotary-winged). 2-10. SFOD personnel must consider many factors when establishing a base camp. These include— • Fields of fire. This must be cleared first. The soldiers must be able to see the enemy to engage them with direct fire weapons. • Barriers. Sufficient time must be allowed for barrier construction. Soldiers must be able to stop or slow the opposition’s advance to prevent them from entering the area. • Evasion plans. Evasion plans must be modified, if necessary. There will be at least two evasion plans: one that is for the whole camp and one that is just for the detachment. • Patrolling. Active patrolling, listening posts (LPs), and observation posts (OPs) should be initiated the moment operations begin. Soldiers must know what is out in the surrounding area at all times. • Construction priorities. The order of building or structure construction must be prioritized. The communications bunker, tactical operations center (TOC), and medical bunker should be among the first projects completed. Along with these projects, provisions for sanitation, cooking, sleeping, and water supply must be made. SFOD personnel must have a plan and implement the plan. • Pretraining. Pretraining must be conducted before deployment. Commanders and operations sergeants must conduct training on a regular basis to prepare the detachment for operations. Engineers must maintain their skills and continue their education in areas required to construct the camp. • Camp operation standing operating procedure (SOP). A complete SOP should be developed to allow for smooth operations and incoming detachments to continue normal operations. • Immediate action drills. These must be practiced until they become second nature to all camp members. Drills should continue on a regularly scheduled and unscheduled basis covering every possible scenario. • Maintenance. SFOD personnel should develop a comprehensive plan, to include blueprints, that covers all areas of the camp (barriers, buildings, fields of fire, and equipment). Bunkers and support structures will require daily maintenance in temperate climates, and constant checks after engagements for structural damage due to near

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and direct hits, as well as wave concussions generated by crew-served

weapons and friendly artillery. • Location. SFOD personnel should determine the type of design and placement of the camp depending on location. If the camp is to be located in a wet area or one that is prone to flooding, then care should be taken in placing the camp on high ground and using construction techniques that will either allow the camp to float or stay waterproofed. If the camp is to be placed in cold or temperate climate areas, then the structures will have to be insulated and heated. The single most important thing to remember about any climate is that most designs will remain the same, but there will have to be modifications made to them to suit the environment. • Drainage. The camp will require a drainage system throughout the trench systems and under the bunker complexes. This drainage system is accomplished by placing pipes with holes in the bottom of the trenches or under the bunkers in a bed of gravel. The pipes must run away from the camp to either a drainage field or natural creek or runoff area. This work should be accomplished during the construction phase of each system. • External support. SFOD personnel should plan for the use of external support, to include Army, Air Force, Navy, United States Marine Corps (USMC), and HN engineers, as well as MP personnel.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 2-11. Planning considerations fall into two types: general and logistical. Both of these types are discussed in the following paragraphs.

GENERAL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

2-12. The organization, training, and equipment of an SF team vary with the actual mission. The FOB or SFOB/FOB commander must consider the following factors during initial mission planning: • Mode of employment (for example, low visibility or clandestine). • Method of infiltration, resupply, and exfiltration. • Scope and duration of operation. • Operational environment (permissive, uncertain, or hostile). • Availability of indigenous support mechanisms. • Communications requirements based upon the electronic threat, time sensitivity of transmission, and environmental conditions. • Use of engineers to assist in construction of the base camp. • Use of CI and MP personnel. • Collection means (visual observation, photography, surreptitious entry, and technical surveillance). • ROE and other legal or policy considerations related to the mission. • Cover (as required).

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2-13. The use of foreign or commercial materiel, tactics, and techniques may permit the deployed SF team to pass a cursory visual inspection by a hostile observer to avoid electronic identification, and to prevent identification by weapons signature. SF missions may require procurement and use of foreign or commercial— • Weapons. • Communications equipment. • Clothing. • Rations. • Maps. Other specialized materiel requirements may include— • Satellite communications (SATCOM) and other specialized communi- cations equipment. • Suppressed weapons. • Specialized equipment for collecting information, such as telescopes, night vision devices, electronic surveillance and direction-finding equipment, surreptitious entry devices, and remote sensor systems. • Terminal guidance equipment, such as radar transponders and laser target designators. • NBC defensive clothing or equipment. 2-14. A sample communications plan has been developed to fulfill the communications requirements for the base camp and the detachment (Figure 2-1, page 2-7). Equipment listed provides for a synergistic operational environment. Additional equipment will be required to outfit HN forces. 2-15. The group commander must identify his contingency requirements for such equipment. He must coordinate with the special operations theater support element (SOTSE) to procure sufficient quantities to properly train each SFOD in the equipment’s use and repair before the SFOD is committed. All equipment that could indicate the nature or operational area of the mission receives the same security classification as the mission itself.

LOGISTICAL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

2-16. Sustainment operations are constantly in progress to maintain units at a desired level. To maintain this level, planners must address the following considerations: • Maximizing the use of existing fixed facilities. • Limiting CSS requirements to mission essentials. • Minimizing the handling of supplies. • Concentrating maintenance on returning major end items to service. • Relying on airlines of communication for rapid resupply. • Anticipating high attrition during resupply missions into denied areas. • Identifying to the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) as early as possible those items that require operational floats or other special logistics arrangements.

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• Making maximum use of HN support, including local and third-country

resources.

Figure 2-1. SF Communications Connectivity

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2-17. Additional detailed logistics planning should include the following:

• Identification of time-phased material requirements, facilities, and other resources necessary to support the current operation. • Determination of logistics planning factors to be used for this operation and development of logistical requirements. Additionally, the method to determine sources for all classes of supply must be defined. • Identification of support methods and procedures required to meet the air, land, and sea lines of communication (LOCs). • A description of the interrelationship between theater and strategic LOCs, to include the need for airfields capable of supporting strategic and theater airlift aircraft. • Development of a country or theater concept of support. • Development of a plan to provide food, equipment, and medical supplies to relieve the suffering in the absence of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and information operations (IO).

SECURITY EQUIPMENT AND MEASURES

2-18. United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) forces operate in an international security environment dominated by the military power of the United States and its friends and allies. This superiority has led opposition groups to wage war systematically through terrorism. Terrorism is a strategy of intimidation by exploiting and leveraging the real-time, global dissemination of emotionally charged images produced by inflicting casualties on the United States, its friends, and allies. The resulting turbulence can provide to a terrorist group, or a rogue state, influence far out of proportion to its size or legitimacy by driving a wedge between the United States and friendly governments or weakening U.S. resolve to maintain forward presence in critical places. USASOC Directive 525-13, Force Protection, has additional information. 2-19. Commanders must plan for security of assets entrusted to them. Plans must be affordable, effective, and attainable. Plans will tie security measures together and integrate security efforts by assigning responsibility, establishing procedures, and ensuring subordinate plans complement each other. Planning must ensure that requirements at each threat condition (THREATCON) have been addressed, to include responsibility assigned for execution of measures, adequate local implementation guidance, and assurance that adequate resources are available. 2-20. Physical security measures are physical security equipment, procedures, or devices used to protect security interests from possible threats. They include, but are not limited to— • Security guards. • Military working dogs. • Physical barriers. • Badge systems. • Secure containers.

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• Locking devices. • Intrusion detection systems. • Security lighting. • Assessment or surveillance systems (such as closed-circuit television). • Access control devices. • Facility hardening. 2-21. The security of the base camp depends on each individual there. By integrating the above measures and the proper equipment, the lives and equipment of the camp will be safer.

REGIONAL ANALYSIS 2-22. The military analyst must understand the nature of the complexity of the situation and understand the opposition to determine effective courses of action (COAs). His analysis must consider the following factors: • The nature of the society. • The nature of the opposition. • The nature of the government. 2-23. The analyst must identify the principal factors for each of these broad factors and study each in turn. Finally, he must weigh and compare the factors in each area and reach conclusions. These conclusions lead to development of COAs. The analyst can then predict the potential effects of each possible COA and select the best one. The process is time-consuming and may require additional expertise. FM 3-07, Stability Operations and Support Operations, contains additional information. 2-24. The analyst considers the separate analyses of the society, the opposition, and the government together. His conclusions must reflect the interaction of all factors. He must determine the dynamic with which each side attempts to mobilize human and materiel resources in its favor. This dynamic affects specific groups of people. The analyst identifies issues that concern key political, social, and economic groups. The government and opposition may offer solutions to the people’s problems and attempt to deliver on their promises within resource constraints. Measured combinations of benefits, persuasion, and coercion motivate groups to conform their behavior to the will of the government or the opposition.

TERRAIN ANALYSIS 2-25. Throughout history, the knowledge and physical effects of terrain have played a dominant role in the development of society during both peace and war. Terrain is a portion of the earth’s surface that includes man-made and natural features. Terrain analysis is the process of analyzing and interpreting these features and the influence of weather and climate on them. Terrain data (or information) is raw data in any form about a segment of terrain. Knowledge of the battlefield terrain is extremely important during all phases and levels of military planning. JP 2-03, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Geospatial Information and Services Support to Joint

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Operations; FM 5-33, Terrain Analysis; and FM 34-130, Intelligence

Preparation of the Battlefield, include additional information. 2-26. The National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) is moving toward digital maps. The foundation data concept provides for the creation of a 1:250,000-scale product in many areas where there are no mapping products. This digital data may be enhanced using mission-specific data sets to produce a larger scale product. All existing digital map and imagery data is available online via NIMA’s Gateway Data Network on the SIPRNET and JDISS systems. The SF terrain team will be able to assist the SF commander in visualizing the terrain through access to various databases. 2-27. The process of extracting, reducing, and recording data is very time- consuming. To make it faster and easier to manage, detachment members should divide terrain databases into two areas: area-specific and general data. Area-specific data is cataloged by geographic area and subject being portrayed; examples are roads, soils, and vegetation. General data files include books, scientific writings, technical literature, and other pertinent data that does not fall into area-specific files. 2-28. These highly important databases support the IPB. IPB is a systematic and continuous approach to analyzing the opposition, environmental effects, and terrain in a specific geographic area. The process plays a primary role in prebattle support. In providing terrain support to friendly forces, the SFOD must ensure that IPB assesses the terrain for both enemy and friendly operations. 2-29. Analysis of the influence of weather and climate on the natural and man-made features of a geographic area is accomplished by organizing various source materials into a single graphic manuscript. Information is extracted from various sources (maps, imagery in various formats, and literature). Data is then reduced to a uniform scale and format. 2-30. To determine the effect of terrain on the general COA available to both friendly and opposition forces, analysts evaluate terrain in terms of observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment (OAKOC). Before analysts can analyze the military aspects of terrain, they must first know— • Nature of the operations. • Types of units involved. • Seasons the operations take place. • Where the operations take place. NOTE: During Vietnam, a number of base camps were built to pacify an area. One camp in particular, named Pleiku, was built in an undesirable location of low land. High water levels had stained surrounding trees. Conventional commanders silenced the protests of U.S. SF advisors. During the first monsoon season, the camp was flooded out and eventually relocated. 2-31. If time constraints are of concern, a modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO) should be used. An MCOO shows— • Preferred movement routes.

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• What places to avoid (weather-dependent).

• What to expect for terrain, materials, and trafficability. • Where to hide. • Where the enemy is likely to hide and preferred enemy movement routes. • Where to site facilities, antennas, supplies, and so forth.NOTE: Detachment members must be careful not to overlook extremechanges in weather conditions.2-32. Terrain analysis is essential to any operation. It provides thecommander with tailored and updated products that allow him to bettervisualize the terrain in his AO. The detachment should also updatepreviously performed terrain analysis after base camps are completed.

2-11 Chapter 3

Employment This chapter provides an overview of the different areas that are covered throughout the employment phase: SFODA staff responsibilities, base camp construction, and base camp operations. This chapter also provides considerations and procedures that should be followed during the planning, construction, and operation of a base camp. Concurrently with base camp construction, military training is conducted and numerous occasions arise that require the SF team and HN personnel to defend the campsite from attack by the opposition. Due to a tremendous amount of activity at or near the site, it sometimes takes several months to build an SF base camp. The camp’s exact configuration and facilities will depend upon the functional requirements and the METT-TC factors. After infiltration, an effective area organization already in place may be found, or it may be lacking or incomplete. Regardless of its development or degree of success, constant improvements will be necessary.

SECTION I – SFODA STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES

3-1. During construction, the actual building of the camp begins and responsibilities during this phase shift from the SFOB/FOB to the detachment (FM 3-05.20 includes more information). The responsibilities of the SFODA staff are explained below. 3-2. SFODA commander. He ensures that the buildup of logistics takes place as scheduled. He has a weekly formal meeting with the HN forces to discuss the plans for the coming week. The commander does not dominate the scene with his counterparts if he can refrain from doing so. He considers his actions as on-the-job training for his counterparts and places himself in the instructor role. He also maintains frequent contact with the local officials on the status of the camp and solicits their assistance. As the camp nears completion, the SFODA commander shifts emphasis from camp construction to expanding the operational capabilities of the detachment. He identifies problem areas and seeks assistance, if necessary. He also establishes an SOP for the operation of the base camp. The SFODA commander helps develop a routine for nonoperational activities and divides responsibilities among detachment members. He lays the groundwork for the next detachment. 3-3. Assistant detachment commander. He serves as second in command. He ensures implementation of the detachment commander’s decisions and concepts, and serves as the detachment commander in the commander’s

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absence. The assistant detachment commander provides technical and

tactical advice and assistance to the detachment commander on all matters pertaining to the camp. He also provides technical and tactical experience and guidance to detachment members. 3-4. Assistant operations sergeant/S-2. The S-2 follows up on all intelligence matters initiated during the planning phase. He keeps the SFOB/FOB informed of the intelligence situation, especially any increase in the opposition. 3-5. Operations sergeant/S-3. The S-3 continues to monitor the personnel situation to ensure that the detachment remains at full strength. He also ensures that immediate replacements are provided if a vacancy occurs. He monitors the progress of the camp and maintains close coordination with the S-4 to quickly identify any problem areas and resolve them. The S-3 keeps the SFOB/FOB commander informed and develops the camp folder during this period. The minimum essential components in the camp folder are— • A map of the AOR. • A map of the route to the camp from the SFOB/FOB. • Imagery of the campsite. • One copy of the area assessment. • A status report on the critical items of equipment. • The status of personnel. • A defense plan (including a fire plan). • An evasion and recovery (E&R) plan. NOTE: The S-3 must ensure operations security (OPSEC), crime prevention, and physical security programs are in place to protect these documents. 3-6. Engineer sergeant/S-4. The S-4 coordinates all requests for supplies (including maps) and equipment. He develops a detailed air movement plan. 3-7. Medical sergeant/S-5. The S-5 follows through on CA and PSYOP projects. He keeps the SFOB/FOB commander informed on progress. The S-5 continues to develop the team and camp medical plans and develops a medical care plan for the locals. He coordinates with the S-4 on a detailed air evacuation plan. 3-8. Weapons sergeant. The weapons sergeant develops a detailed defensive and security plan of the base camp and all training areas. He coordinates with the SFOB/FOB in the development and implementation of a reaction force. The weapons sergeant coordinates with the engineer sergeant’s efforts in base camp development. He also coordinates with the operations sergeant in the development of training and training schedules. 3-9. Communications sergeant/assistant S-2. The communications sergeant coordinates all S-2 efforts with the assistant operations sergeant. The communications sergeant develops multiple communications methodologies and coordinates with the weapons sergeant on all training plans. He also assists the SFOD commander in the development of all communications traffic to or through the SFOB/FOB or higher.

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SECTION II – BASE CAMP CONSTRUCTION

3-10. Section II is devoted to one particular design that was developed after careful study and research. The design is a square-shaped outer barrier and perimeter with a square-shaped inner barrier and perimeter. This design affords the maximum use of all weapons systems, C2 elements, and protective systems in and around the camp. Camps used during the Vietnam era did not always employ inner barriers or perimeters. There was a common denominator found within a majority of the camps: trench systems (zigzag), command bunkers, and key weapons bunkers. The enemy always targeted the command bunkers, medical bunkers, and team houses as priority targets during attacks. 3-11. This new design was developed with the following in mind: security, construction process, manning, maintenance, and operation. The design was kept basic to allow a detachment to construct the camp with minimum outside assistance and to allow for ease of modification or improvisation. 3-12. This is only one design and should not be considered the “best” design for a camp. It can be modified to almost any shape to fit the situation. Terrain, environmental factors, and situation will dictate the actual design and requirements for all camps.

DESCRIPTION 3-13. The base camp is established to facilitate the assigned SF mission. The base camp not only serves as an operational base to carry the battle to the enemy, but also serves as an administrative center that must maintain constant contact and services with the population base of the local area. Support from the local population is critical to the success of the mission. 3-14. The base camp is based on the concept of independent, hardened, mutually supporting platoon and company positions surrounding a hardened central control facility. Facilities must be provided within the camp for the SF team, their HN counterparts, and for 200 to 800 soldiers with or without their dependents as the situation dictates. Appendix F outlines construction methods and requirements. Appendix G provides information on building materials. Appendix H discusses electrical requirements and Appendix I provides individual building plans. 3-15. There is no “set” geometric pattern. Squares, rectangles, circles, stars, and triangles are among the most common shapes. Appendix J depicts base camp examples. 3-16. The exact location of the camp in relation to the surrounding terrain will dictate the initial shape and size of the camp. The shape can change as improvements are made and changes to the situation occur. 3-17. The lack of a set geometric shape has necessitated the need for seven common denominators, regardless of the shape or size. Each of these common denominators is discussed in detail in the following paragraphs.

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INNER PERIMETER 3-18. The inner perimeter is the heart of the SF base camp (Figure 3-1, page 3-5). All operational, administrative, and logistics activities are controlled from this area. It also serves as the hardened core of the camp’s defensive system. A protective wall or berm that is usually constructed of earth and logs surrounds this perimeter. Bunkers for automatic weapons and numerous individual fighting positions are integral parts of this berm. 3-19. The following paragraphs describe the positions that are usually located within the inner perimeter. Helpful tips and techniques for construction, operation, and security are also included.

Inner Protective Berm

3-20. The inner berm is built above ground (Figure 3-2, page 3-6). Positions on the outer perimeter are constructed below ground. This allows the inner positions to engage targets outside the camp without having their fires masked by the outer perimeter positions. 3-21. The inner berm is usually constructed of earth and logs. Bunkers for automatic weapons and numerous individual fighting positions are integral parts of this wall. Soldiers manning these positions are protected from incoming indirect fire impacting to their rear by a splinter wall. This wall also forms an aboveground trench for movement of personnel and supplies. (Figure 3-3, page 3-6, depicts the layout of the inner berm.) 3-22. A section of chain-link fence erected 10 feet in front of each bunker will help defeat rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) rounds. This fence should be angled to prevent oblique shots from hitting bunkers (Figure 3-4, page 3-6). RPG screens or fences are excellent protection for all of the camp’s fighting bunkers. If available stocks of chain-link fence are limited, then the outer perimeter bunkers have priority over the inner perimeter bunkers.

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Figure 3-1. Inner Perimeter

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Figure 3-2. Inner Protective Berm

Figure 3-3. Inner Berm Layout

Figure 3-4. Protective Fence

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Fighting Bunkers 3-23. Two layers of logs (at least 6 inches in diameter) form the foundation of the bunker’s roof. The second layer crisscrosses the first layer. These logs extend over the sides of the bunkers at least 18 inches. 3-24. Sandbags are used to contain the blast layer of the bunker’s roof. A burster layer of logs (at least 6 inches in diameter) is often added over the blast layer. Construction of a second-layer tin roof above the existing sandbagged one is an excellent addition to these bunkers (Figure 3-5). 3-25. Each bunker contains at least one automatic weapon. These weapons are issued in addition to the defensive firepower of the reaction force when the bunker’s occupants are out on operations. 3-26. Each bunker has ample stocks of small arms ammunition (ammo), grenades, food, first-aid supplies, and water. Space in the sleeping section of these bunkers is at a premium. Triple-decked bunks are constructed to allow maximum utilization of space. Wooden floors are excellent additions to these bunkers. Although used primarily as living quarters, this section also has firing ports on the left and right sides. Chicken wire is used to screen firing ports from grenades. (Figure 3-6, page 3-8, and Appendix I, Figures I-2 through I-6, pages I-4 through I-6, show the layout of a fighting bunker.)

Inner Perimeter Security

3-27. Inner perimeter security is the responsibility of the reaction force company and augmented by reconnaissance platoon and support personnel. Normally one platoon is assigned to each side, which includes one corner of the inner protective berm. Remaining personnel take shelter in a protected area near the communications and TOC bunkers to form a replacement and reinforcement pool.

Figure 3-5. Fighting Bunker and Roof Layout

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Figure 3-6. Fighting Bunker Layout

3-28. SFOD members construct inner perimeter security force quarters

above ground with chest-high sandbagged walls protecting it. These buildings should be constructed on each side of the inner berm. 3-29. The inner perimeter security force also serves as the reserve force during camp defense with the mission of reinforcing the outer perimeter or counterattacking any breach by the enemy of that defensive position. The security force must counterattack immediately after losing a defensive position on the outer perimeter. The enemy should be caught before he has the opportunity to consolidate his gain—seconds count. Light automatic weapons, shotguns, grenades, speed, and determination are the ingredients of a successful counterattack. 3-30. All entrances to the inner perimeter are locked and guarded during the hours of darkness. SFOD members must maintain 24-hour security and adjust the security posture of the camp based on METT-TC.

U.S. Special Forces Team House

3-31. SFOD members construct this position above ground but chest-high sandbagged walls protect it. This building serves as the administrative HQ

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for the U.S. SF detachment. It contains offices for the detachment

commander and for the operations sergeant. It also has sleeping quarters for some (never all) SF personnel. SFOD members must be aware of the following security concerns: • Detachment members should never be allowed to sleep in a single location. They should be spread out over several locations. • Each team member must know where his alert position is located and the fastest route to it. • A portion of the U.S. team will always be out of the camp on operations, rest and recuperation (R&R), and so on. The operations sergeant has the responsibility of cross-leveling the alert position roster to ensure total coverage. • Visitors will be housed in either the U.S. or HN team houses. They must be briefed in advance of camp procedures and their individual actions in case of attack. • All aboveground buildings will have chest-high sandbagged walls on the inside of the building, which will prevent rapid deterioration of the sandbags (Figure 3-7).

Figure 3-7. Example of Sandbag Reinforcement

Host Nation Team House

3-32. Construction is the same as the U.S. SF team house. This building serves the same purpose as the U.S. SF team house except it is for the HN personnel.

Communications and TOC Bunkers

3-33. These positions are always underground (water table permitting) and built with the best protective materials and techniques available. These bunkers contain radio rooms (one for U.S. personnel and one for HN

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personnel) and the TOC. Entry to the TOC bunker is limited to U.S. personnel and carefully selected HN counterparts only. There should not be separate TOCs for SF and the HN—one TOC operates effectively and efficiently without the problem of two TOCs issuing different and sometimes conflicting instructions to its members. SFOD members should— • Ensure an emergency power and lighting system is provided for this bunker. Battery-powered lights are useful in this role. A small generator located near the bunker will provide power to critical equipment inside the bunker. • Stock bunker with emergency food, water, medical supplies, batteries, and small arms ammo and grenades. • Ensure bunkers always have two entrances and exits. • Bury all field lines to protect them from damage. (S-folding these lines every 20 feet or so as they are buried will create enough slack to afford protection from near-burst indirect fire rounds [Figure 3-8].) STP 31- 18E34-SM-TG, Soldier’s Manual and Trainer’s Guide, MOS 18E, Special Forces Communications Sergeant, Skill Levels 3/4, includes more information on the laying of communications wire. • Construct an additional tin roof 2 to 3 feet above the bunker’s existing sandbagged roof. This will waterproof the bunker, thus preventing the sandbags from becoming too heavy from rainwater, and may cause incoming mortar rounds to detonate before impacting the sandbagged protective layer (Figure 3-9, page 3-11). This second roof is an excellent addition to all of the larger bunkers within the inner perimeter.

Figure 3-8. Example of Incorrectly and Correctly Buried Field Lines

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Figure 3-9. Communications or TOC Bunker

Medical Bunker 3-34. This position is always underground (water table permitting). It is large enough for a treatment and operating room, a ward area, and storage for most of the camp’s medical supplies. Both U.S. and HN team medics sleep here. This bunker serves as a field hospital only during camp defense operations. Detachment members receive day-to-day treatment in the dispensary located in the outer perimeter. They should— • Ensure both entrances to this bunker are wide enough to accommodate aid and litter teams. • Stock bunker with emergency food, batteries, medical supplies, ammo, and plenty of water for drinking and for use in treatment of casualties. • Ensure an emergency lighting system is included for the bunker. Battery-powered lights and a small generator near the bunker are vital. • Construct a second tin roof above the sandbagged protective layer—the roof is an excellent addition to this bunker. • Build racks in ward area that allow for the stacking of patients on litters after treatment so that space will not become a problem during camp defense (Figure 3-10, page 3-12).

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Figure 3-10. Building Racks in Ward Area

Generator Bunker 3-35. Detachment members normally construct this bunker above ground and heavily sandbag it for maximum protection. It furnishes all electrical power for the camp. The size and number of generators depend on the size of the camp. These generators will be double-banked, which will allow one bank to run while the other is shut down for servicing or repairs. Adequate fuel supplies should be stored in the adjacent bunker below ground. SFOD members must— • Always allow 2 or 3 feet of space between the top of the sandbagged walls and the start of the protective roof so that heat does not become a problem (Figure 3-11, page 3-13). • Ensure chemical fire extinguishers are placed in this bunker. • Bury all power lines to protect them from damage. (S-folding these lines every 20 feet or so as they are buried will create enough slack to afford protection from near-burst indirect fire rounds.)

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Figure 3-11. Generator Bunker

Mortar Positions 3-36. Detachment members locate the camp’s heavy mortars within the inner perimeter. Personnel select sites to give 360-degree fields of fire. Positions built below ground house the weapons, ammo, and crew. The following operational and security concerns require SFOD members to— • Ensure the ready-ammo box contains just that—ready ammo. Rounds stored here are out of the packing cases and stacked by type (high- explosive [HE], white phosphorus [WP], illumination [ILLUM]) and in the cardboard shipping tubes (Figure 3-12, page 3-14). SFOD members remove the tape from these tubes. The objective is to have the rounds in the air in seconds—not minutes.

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Figure 3-12. Ready-Ammo Box

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• Cover the muzzle of the weapon when not in use (Figure 3-13).• Cover the entire weapon with a poncho or tarp when not in use (Figure 3-13).

Figure 3-13. Weapon Protection

• Dispose of unused powder charges (increments) from expended mortar

rounds that accumulate quickly during camp defense. These charges are dangerous. One spark can result in serious burns to the mortar crew. Place unused charges in an empty ammo can in the walls of the pit after removal from rounds (Figure 3-14). Move unused charges to a safe storage area as soon as possible until they can be burned or disposed of otherwise. FM 23-90, Mortars, includes further information on destruction methods.

WARNING Failure to properly dispose of unused charges could result in bodily injury.

Figure 3-14. Proper Disposal of Unused Charges

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• Keep a generous basic load of all types of mortar rounds in the bunker to avoid running out of ammo during the middle of a camp defense. • Remove most of the ammo from the packing cases and store by type (HE, WP, ILLUM) in wooden racks in this bunker. These rounds remain sealed in their cardboard tubes until needed. • Store additional ammo by type in wooden shipping boxes (Figure 3-15). Have the necessary tools ready in the bunker to open boxes when required. • Rotate all ammo, when restocked, to use the oldest ammo first. • Maintain communication with the TOC by both radio and field telephones. A directed mortar is invaluable during camp defense. Undirected fire is a waste of time and ammo. • Stock the bunker with food, water, first-aid supplies, flashlights, batteries, small arms ammo, grenades, and tools. • Construct a second tin roof above the existing sandbagged one—the roof is an excellent addition (Figure 3-16, page 3-17). • Preplan mortar barrages to channelize an attacking enemy, deny him access to the camp’s tactical wire, and to cover dead space within the wire.

Figure 3-15. Mortar Ammo Storage

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Figure 3-16. Mortar Pit and Ammo Bunker

Fire Arrow 3-37. Although the fire arrow is not current U.S. doctrine, it may be necessary based on HN support and as a possible contingency. This device is used to signal overhead aircraft the direction of attack, desired direction of bombing runs, resupplies, and so on. Detachment members construct this device in a location that allows for maximum aerial observation and accessibility by ground troops. It should have a primary and alternate marking system for both day and night operations. 3-38. Virtually any type of lighted or visual marking system is acceptable if all participating units are briefed and concur. Day marking or visual acquisition devices include, but are not limited to, colored smoke, mirrors, road flares, and any reflective or contrasting marker panel (space blanket). Night marking or acquisition aids may include a light gun, road flares, fire pots, flashlights, chemlights, and infrared (IR) lighting systems. Electronic navigational aid (NAVAID) markings (ZM, SST-181, GAR-1, tactical air navigation [TACAN]) may be used for either day or night operations and placed as directed by mission requirements. To construct a fire arrow, the following instructions apply: • The shaft of the arrow should be at least 10 feet long. Two sections forming the arrowhead are 3 feet in length. The entire framework is constructed from 2 x 4s (Figure 3-17, page 3-18). • A wooden spool from an electrical cable reel makes an excellent rotating base from the fire arrow. • A device must be constructed to lock the arrow in place once it is pointed in the right direction.

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Figure 3-17. Fire Arrow

S-4/Arms Room 3-39. Detachment members construct this building above ground with chest- high sandbagged walls. It must be large enough to contain all supplies and equipment that are required to sustain the camp during normal operations and during camp defense operations. The arms room will be collocated within this building and will have the capability to secure both small arms and crew- served weapons not required to be on line in the camp. Sleeping quarters for both the U.S. and HN team S-4 personnel will also be located in this building. SFOD members should— • Construct storage racks in the supply room to accommodate items to be stored on them. • Organize items by type, size, and frequency of use.

Latrines 3-40. SFOD personnel construct adequate latrine facilities in the general areas of all living and work areas. The number and size of these latrines will vary depending upon the amount of personnel in the base camp. Generally, the box (pit) or the burn-type latrines are constructed. The burn type is preferred. Detachment members situate numerous urine tubes throughout the camp and place the tubes in a pit or drum (with holes punched all around) and fill with gravel. SFOD members should— • Position latrines near living and work areas.

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• Ensure there are enough latrines to handle at least 8 percent

(4 percent U.S. and 4 percent HN) of the force at any given time. • Be aware of the two types of latrines that are easily constructed: the box (pit) and the burn type. The disadvantages of the pit type are the possibility of contaminating the ground water, overflow during the rainy season, and having to relocate it once it is full. The disadvantages of the burn type are the signature, the fumes produced, and the required duty assignment. • Ensure there are numerous urine tubes located throughout the camp that allow for the quick discharge of urine without having to walk very far. Detachment members construct urine tubes as follows: Dig a hole large enough to accommodate a 55-gallon drum with an open top. Extend pipes or bamboo tubes (minimum 1-inch diameter) from the drum at a slight angle to a height of approximately 24 to 28 inches. Place either metal or plastic funnels in the ends of the tubes and cover the top of the funnels with a piece of screen wire to prevent foreign objects and insects from entering the pipe or tube. Fill the drum with crushed stone or gravel in various layers of size and ensure the drum has several holes punched all over it to allow for drainage. Ensure that a ventilation tube with screen wire over the end of the tube is present. Bury the drum and cover the top with a layer of crushed rock or gravel. FM 21-10, Field Hygiene and Sanitation, Appendix A, Task 9, includes further information.

Ammunition Bunkers 3-41. These are always constructed underground (water table permitting). Detachment members locate these bunkers in several areas within the inner perimeter and construct them close to or in the berm. SFOD members should— • Ensure each of the camp’s fighting bunkers contains a reserve stock of ammo. All fighting bunkers should be stocked in advance. • Construct ammo bunkers close to or in the berm (one bunker per side). • Ensure doors are large enough to allow for ease of loading and unloading operations. • Construct a second tin roof above the existing sandbagged one. This roof should slope away from the bunker entrance and the communications trench. • Always stack and store ammo by type. • Always have necessary tools in the bunker to allow for rapid opening of containers.

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Vehicle Revetments 3-42. SFOD members build these above ground and use them as protective bays in which the camp’s organic vehicles park at night (Figure 3-18). Construction can be of earth and logs or dirt-filled 55-gallon drums. These bays are located in several areas within the inner perimeter. SFOD members should— • Incorporate armored vehicles into the camp’s defensive system by constructing their revetments as integral parts of the berm. • Always back vehicles into their revetments. • Always construct alternate revetments for armored vehicles.

Figure 3-18. Vehicle Revetments

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Fire-Fighting Posts 3-43. Fires are a constant danger in any camp. In fact, fire has destroyed more camp facilities than enemy actions. Fire-fighting posts should be located throughout the entire camp. These locations usually consist of 55-gallon drums filled with water and a supply of buckets. Chemical fire extinguishers are located in all vehicles, motor pool, generator and fuel bunkers, medical bunker, ammo bunker, and communications and TOC bunkers. If the situation permits, SFOD members should place a water truck with a pump and hoses within the inner perimeter. Detachment personnel should— • Fill drums with rainwater on most fire-fighting posts. The addition of gutters on nearby buildings channels the rainwater directly into the drums (Figure 3-19). During the dry season, the camp’s water truck may be used to fill the drums on a regular basis. • Paint fire buckets red to allow for easy recognition of “strays.” • Hold regular fire-fighting drills.

Figure 3-19. Use of Gutter to Fill Drum With Rainwater

3-44. 55-gallon drums may be used for field-expedient fire-fighting drums.

One method is to open the top of the drum with a chisel; however, this is a very time-consuming task. A faster and more efficient method would be to— • Remove the filler cap and empty the drum. • Transport the drum to a safe area. • Stand the drum upright with the filler cap facing up. • Place three wraps of detonating cord inside the inner rim at the top. Leave a 12-inch pigtail hanging over edge of the rim. • Prepare the firing assembly with a nonelectric cap crimped to a safe length of time fuse or fuse igniter. • Tape the firing system 6 inches from the end of the pigtail. • Detonate.

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INNER BARRIER 3-45. The inner barrier is the obstacle zone surrounding the inner perimeter (Figure 3-20, page 3-23). As the word “zone” implies, this barrier has two or more barbed wire entanglements in depth (two rows) with intervals between them. These intervals contain additional obstacle belts. The entire zone is covered by fire from positions on the inner perimeter. The inner barrier must also be wide enough to prevent the enemy from getting within grenade- throwing range. Detachment personnel leave two passages open in this barrier. The first is for the access road, which allows vehicles to enter the inner perimeter (a later section of this chapter discusses the access road in greater detail). The second is a small personnel path that leads from the inner to the outer perimeters. Both passages have guarded gates. 3-46. Detachment personnel must remember that obstacles covered by fire are barriers. These cost an enemy time and casualties to overcome. Obstacles not covered by fire are merely obstructions and can be breached or bypassed at random. The barrier itself will not halt a determined attack or even infiltrators, but it will slow them down, cause casualties, and channelize them so that effective fires can be brought upon their attack. 3-47. Starting from the berm and working outward, the inner barrier usually contains the following protective features. Helpful tips and techniques for construction, operation, and security are also included.

Double-Apron, Barbed-Wire Fence

3-48. This fence is 1 meter high by 3 meters wide. Construction techniques are covered in detail in FM 5-34, Engineer Field Data. This fence is often reinforced with additional wire when erected in the camp defense role. An attacking enemy will attempt to breach a double-apron fence by— • Explosives (bangalore torpedoes). This method will usually breach the fence but results in the loss of surprise and can have a high casualty rate if effective fire is immediately placed on the breach. • Using wire cutters to cut through the lower strands of wire in the enemy apron, the center fence, and the friendly apron (Figure 3-21, page 3-23). This is time-consuming but can result in effective breach of the barrier. • Placing improvised scaling ladders or mats on the fence and using these as ramps to cross over this barrier (Figure 3-21). Detachment members should reinforce the standard double-apron fence for its camp defense role with the addition of concertina wire. These members place two concertina rolls inside the aprons (one on the friendly side of the center section and one on the enemy side). The two concertina rolls increase the amount of wire that an enemy must cut to create an effective breach and the amount of time spent to accomplish this task. Detachment personnel defeat the effective use of scaling ladders by using two additional rolls of concertina wire in corresponding positions on the outside of both aprons. They use horizontal wires on all of these additions and stake the rolls inside the apron to the ground at the bottom. The bottoms of the rolls placed on the outside are secured every 5 feet or so to the aprons.

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Figure 3-20. Inner Barrier

Figure 3-21. Examples of Breaching a Double-Apron Fence

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Mine Belt 3-49. Mines have been employed in the defensive systems of camps in the past. Because of the potential source of danger to friendly forces and civilians, the practice of employing buried mines in the camp’s defensive systems must be carefully planned if they are to be used. Detachment members use controlled mines and defensive devices extensively throughout the entire defensive system. The M-18 claymore mines are excellent defensive weapons when properly employed. SFOD personnel place these mines in depth (two rows) so that they can be used against more than one assault from a given direction. The “Outer Barrier” section, later in this chapter, discusses other controlled mines in more detail. The following are helpful tips for SFOD members: • Select locations carefully for claymore mines before employing them in the defensive system. • Employ claymore mines in depth (at least two rows). Mines should be at least 3 meters apart in each row to prevent sympathetic detonation. • Ensure that placement of each claymore mine provides full coverage. • Always fire the outer row first. • Stagger each row to safeguard the claymore mines from the backblast of the outer rows. • Be aware that claymore mines are electrically command-detonated from friendly positions (in this case, the berm). Identify which firing wire leads to what row by simply tying a knot in the end of the wire. One knot would indicate the first row (outer), two knots the second row, and so on. • Ensure alert training includes the locations of the mines controlled from that position and the timing for their firing. Do not fire claymores at a target that can be destroyed by other means. • Avoid the centralized firing of banks of claymores (five or more) from a master control position. • Ensure claymores in the inner barrier face the rear of the outer perimeter personnel. This arrangement is not a problem during an attack as outer perimeter personnel should be in protected positions and the inner barrier claymores will only be fired in the event of an attempted breach of the inner barrier. A simple but time-consuming solution is to disconnect the firing devices each day. An alternate solution is to mount the mines to the inside lid of a used ammo crate or box. The box is then buried in the ground and filled with enough dirt to keep it in place and still allow the lid to close. The lid is then raised each night (or when required) by a wire or rope. A stake is placed in the ground behind the box to act as a stop and to prevent the lid from coming back too far and allowing the mine to fire into the air (Figure 3-22, page 3-25). Remove the metal latch to prevent infiltrators from locking it down. • Save the firing wires from expended claymore mines. SFOD members can reuse them with the addition of a new blasting cap.

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• Check all claymore mines daily to ensure that they are ready to be fired and that good circuits are present. Use the supplied test sets or a galvanometer.

Figure 3-22. Claymore Mine

Tanglefoot 3-50. Detachment members use this obstacle belt to disrupt the enemy during an assault and as a counter sapper measure. The tanglefoot usually has a minimum depth of 9 meters. SFOD personnel place stakes at irregular intervals from 1 to 3 meters apart. They also string barbed wire from these stakes in irregular crisscross patterns at varying heights of 6 to 8 inches. This process causes a crawling enemy to have to rise over the wire, thus exposing him to observation and fires. SFOD members should— • Always use metal stakes. • Incorporate trip flares in the tanglefoot. • Always rig flares on the friendly (inner) side of the obstacle belt with the trip wires running forward at an angle toward the enemy (outer) side. Doing so places the obstacle belt between an enemy and the trip flares and will prevent him from disarming them before an attack or breach.

Triple Concertina Fence

3-51. This fence is 2 meters high by 2 meters wide. FM 5-34 covers detailed construction. SFOD members should always follow these steps: • Erect from right to left while facing the outside. • Space pickets as follows: Place long pickets 5 paces apart. Place anchor pickets 2 paces from the end of long pickets. Place enemy and friendly rows of pickets 3 feet apart. Offset the friendly picket row from the enemy row. • Use horizontal wires on all three rows of a concertina wire fence to prevent the enemy from depressing the wire coils.

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• Stake the bottoms of the concertina wire coils to the ground every 8 feet or less in both the enemy and the friendly rows. 3-52. An attacking enemy will attempt to breach a triple concertina fence by— • Using explosives (bangalore torpedoes). • Using wire cutters. This is extremely time-consuming but not impossible. • Placing improvised scaling ladders under the fence and lifting up the wire in a particular section to create a tunnel under the wire (Figure 3-23). • Using scaling ladders or mats placed on the fence as platforms to depress the concertina coils to create a passage over the fence.

Figure 3-23. Use of Improvised Scaling Ladders

Channelizing Fences 3-53. These are usually triple concertina fences that crisscross the various barbed wire and obstacle belts of the inner barrier. Their purpose is to channel an attacking enemy into the fields of fire of friendly automatic weapons. Their construction is identical to the triple concertina fence described above.

Communications Trenches 3-54. These trenches zigzag through the inner barrier from the inner to the outer perimeters (Figure 3-24, page 3-27). These trenches allow the protected movement (from both friendly and enemy fires) of personnel and equipment between these two perimeters. There should be at least one trench per wall or side. SFOD members should— • Always excavate communications trenches in an irregular zigzag pattern. • Ensure trenches are at least 6 feet deep and are wide enough to permit foot traffic in both directions at once. • Always construct and emplace retaining walls to prevent cave-ins and normal erosion during the rainy season.

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• Use the strongest, most durable material available to act as the facing walls. Support in place by using pickets not smaller than 3 1/2 inches in diameter. Maximum spacing between pickets should not exceed 5 feet. Drive these pickets into the floor of the trench at least 17 inches. Anchor the pickets at the top by running wire out to stakes or to another form of tie-down located outside the trench. Use the formula and diagrams outlined in FM 5-34, Chapter 6, to determine the length of these anchor wires. • Ensure that turns at the zigzags will allow transport of a litter through them. A simple solution is to cut off the inside corners. • Lock all entrances to the inner perimeter during the hours of darkness. Each trench entrance in this perimeter should have a trapdoor arrangement constructed and kept locked except during actual alerts.

Figure 3-24. Underground Communications Trench

Trip Flares

3-55. Detachment personnel rig all barbed-wire fences in the inner barrier with trip flares. These should be inspected daily. Properly employed, trip flares will not only give early warning but also illuminate an attacking enemy. SFOD members should heed the following instructions: • Never attach trip flares to the metal pickets of any fence. This is the first place that an enemy will look. Attach flares to a separate metal or wooden stake located behind the fence and always on the friendly (inner) side. Run trip wires forward at an angle toward the enemy (outer) side. This method will prevent the enemy from disarming them before he attacks. • Place trip flares in channelizing fences (these fences are unique in that they do not have a friendly or enemy side) by locating them on separate stakes between the coils of concertina wire rows. Run the trip wires out to the right and left in an irregular pattern to the outer coils (Figure 3-25, page 3-28). This method will prevent the enemy from disarming the flares before an attack. • Inspect all fences and flares daily.

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Figure 3-25. Channelizing Fences

OUTER PERIMETER 3-56. The outer perimeter is the central defensive position of the camp (Figure 3-26, page 3-29). The majority of the camp’s reaction force and weapons defend this position. Numerous bunkers containing automatic and crew-served weapons surround it. Water table permitting, these bunkers are constructed underground. This allows the bunkers on the inner perimeter to engage targets outside the camp without having their fires masked by the outer perimeter positions. A perimeter trench links together all fighting bunkers, platoon and company command posts, mortar pits, and ammo bunkers located in the outer perimeter. Numerous individual fighting positions are integral parts of each trench section. Normally, one reaction force company is responsible for each side, to include one corner of the inner perimeter. They are connected by communications trenches, at least one per wall. These trenches allow the protected movement of personnel and equipment between the two perimeters. 3-57. The outer perimeter consists of various protective features and facilities. These are described in the following paragraphs.

Fighting Bunkers 3-58. Water table permitting, detachment members construct these bunkers underground. They should have a depth of at least 5 feet. Logs used in the construction sides and the roof should be at least 6 inches in diameter. SFOD members then add a blast layer of soil to the roof. This layer should be at least 2 feet deep. Personnel often add a burster layer over this blast layer. These bunkers have three firing ports: one to the front and one each on the left and right sides. Each bunker contains at least one automatic weapon. Personnel stock each bunker with ample supplies and small arms ammo, grenades, food, water, and first-aid supplies.

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Guard Towers 3-59. When possible, guard towers should be positioned around the outer perimeter so that the towers have interlocking visibility.

Figure 3-26. Outer Perimeter

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Sleeping Bunkers 3-60. Each of the fighting bunkers has an adjoining sleeping bunker. This bunker serves as the living quarters for the reaction force personnel manning that particular section of the perimeter (Figures 3-5, page 3-7, and 3-6, page 3-8). Though addressed as separate entities for the sake of clarity, detachment members actually construct the fighting and sleeping bunkers as one installation with the perimeter trench passing through the center dividing the two sections. All other construction details are identical. An L-shaped entrance with steps is located in the rear of each sleeping section. These steps permit entry to both the bunker and the perimeter trench.

Perimeter Trench 3-62. This trench connects all the defensive positions of the outer perimeter (Figure 3-27). This trench is usually 6 feet deep and wide enough to permit two- way traffic. Each section of this trench contains numerous individual fighting positions (bays). These positions have firing ports that cover the outer barrier, a firing step-up, and a grenade sump. The rear wall of this trench (side closest to the inner barrier) is slightly higher than the front wall containing the individual fighting positions. This arrangement protects the occupants of these positions from fires of the inner perimeter. Detachment members must provide adequate drainage for this trench system and bunkers. All other construction details are identical to those of the communications trenches described in the inner barrier section of this chapter.

Vehicle Revetments 3-63. These are identical in construction and use to those found in the inner perimeter. On the outer perimeter, vehicle revetments are constructed parallel to the perimeter trench. This location affords vehicles protection from both friendly and enemy fire.

Figure 3-27. Perimeter Trench

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Mortar Positions 3-64. Usually, SFOD members locate the camp’s light mortars (60 millimeter [mm]) in the outer perimeter. These pits are identical to those constructed in the inner perimeter. Built below ground, the pit contains the weapon, ready-ammo box, and an increment disposal can. The only difference in construction is that the mortar pits on the outer perimeter not only have steps connecting them with ground level, but also have a small passageway that connects them to the perimeter trench. An adjacent bunker (with overhead cover) serves as a crew shelter and ammo area. This bunker may also serve as living quarters for the mortar crew. Detachment members construct a triple-decked bunk in the space normally occupied by the cased mortar ammo. This arrangement not only positions the crew close to their assigned weapon, but also allows more room in the sleeping bunkers.

Ammunition Bunkers 3-65. SFOD members construct these bunkers underground (water table permitting) on the outer perimeter and facing the communications trench. They are located close to where this trench joins the outer perimeter trench. This arrangement places an ammo bunker close to the center of each reaction force company’s defensive position. There is one ammo bunker per section (side) of outer perimeter. These bunkers have a double-wide door for ease in loading and unloading operations. Detachment personnel organize and stack (by type) the ammo stored in these bunkers. The construction of a second tin roof above the existing one is an excellent addition to this bunker. This roof should slope away from the bunker entrance and the communications trench.

Company Command Post

3-66. SFOD members also construct these bunkers underground. They locate these bunkers on the rear wall of the perimeter trench, close to the center of each company’s defensive position. There is one command post per section (side) of outer perimeter. Radio and field telephones link company command posts to the TOC. SFOD personnel post maps of the camp and the surrounding area in these locations. The command post houses the company medical personnel.

Latrines 3-67. On the outer perimeter, SFOD members construct burnout-type latrines above ground. These latrines are identical to those found in the inner perimeter. Usually, detachment members construct at least three latrines per section (side) of the outer perimeter. SFOD members must ensure they account for the dead space created by these structures.

Well, Water Tanks, and Troop Showers

3-68. A plentiful water supply, preferably a well that is located within the camp’s perimeter, is essential for the survival of camp inhabitants. SFOD members will dig wells, if possible. Cisterns to catch rainwater during the rainy season and direct it to underground storage may be required. Streams and cisterns are inferior alternatives to a well as a source of water, but may have to be used if the situation dictates. When initially constructing the

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camp, detachment members must consider water storage for a camp under siege conditions. SFOD members should plan for this contingency in advance. Two 10-foot water towers should supply all the camp’s needs. Detachment personnel use pump and purification systems. Aboveground buildings serve as the shower points for reaction force personnel. SFOD members must ensure they account for the dead space created by these structures.

Dining Facility 3-69. SFOD personnel construct this building above ground. In addition to the dining area, there is also a serving line, kitchen, food storage area, and a butcher shop. Food must be sufficient in both quality and quantity. The butcher shop is a necessity. Detachment members slaughter live animals on a regular basis. This practice greatly reduces the camp’s refrigeration requirements. U.S. and HN team medical personnel must constantly monitor all sanitation procedures at the dining facility. From the standpoint of morale, food problems are major problems. U.S. personnel should attempt to eat what the HN personnel are eating.

Perimeter Road 3-70. This road allows camp personnel in vehicles to service the various installations of the outer perimeter. Detachment members construct small, single-lane trench bridges to allow vehicle passage over the communications trenches. These bridges must be sturdy enough to support the largest vehicle in camp when it is fully loaded.

Fire-Fighting Posts 3-71. Fire-fighting posts are located throughout the entire camp. These posts are identical in design to those located in the inner perimeter.

OUTER BARRIER 3-72. The outer barrier is the main obstacle zone that surrounds the camp (Figure 3-28, page 3-33). This barrier is two or more barbed-wire entangle- ments in depth with intervals containing additional obstacle belts between them. Fires from positions on both the outer and inner perimeters cover this entire zone. This barrier must be wide enough to prevent the enemy from getting within grenade-throwing range. Detachment members leave one passage open through this barrier. This passage is for the access road that allows vehicles to enter the inner perimeter.

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Figure 3-28. Outer Barrier

3-73. Starting from the bunkers and trenches and working out, the outerbarrier usually contains the protective features discussed in the followingparagraphs. Helpful tips and techniques for construction, operation, andsecurity are also included. Some of these protective measures may beimprovised; however, all mines should be command-detonatedwhenever possible.

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Claymore Belt 3-74. This belt contains two rows of claymore mines, allowing the mines to be used against assaults from two directions. Detachment members must check claymores daily.

Punji Moat 3-75. The moat is one of the oldest forms of field fortifications. Properly constructed, it still remains a very formidable barrier against enemy attacks (Figure 3-29). SFOD members excavate a ditch (at least 8 feet deep and 8 feet wide) around the entire outer perimeter. They embed punji stakes (15 to 18 inches long) at 1-foot intervals in both the sides and floor of this moat. These sharpened stakes of bamboo or wood are excellent expedient antipersonnel devices. Several thousand stakes are required for each section (side).

Figure 3-29. Punji Stake and Moat

Punji Field 3-76. An attacking enemy will attempt to cross the moat by using improvised scaling ladders. With this fact in mind, detachment members extend a punji field from the forward edge of the moat outward for 5 meters. Detachment members embed these punjis in the ground to a depth of 3 to 4 inches at an angle of 45 degrees. The punjis will impale an attacking enemy between the knee and the ankle. For increased effectiveness, detachment members often emplace punjis in clusters of three stakes. One stake runs forward and the other two are angled out 30 degrees to the right and left.

Double-Apron Fence 3-77. A reinforced double-apron, barbed-wire fence is erected forward of the punji field. This fence is identical to the one constructed in the inner barrier.

Tanglefoot 3-78. Detachment members use this obstacle belt to disrupt the enemy during an assault and as a counter sapper measure. Tanglefoot usually has a minimum depth of 9 meters. All other construction details are identical to the inner barrier.

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Triple Concertina Fence

3-79. This fence is identical in construction to the fence erected in the inner barrier.

Controlled Mine Belt

3-80. The M-18 claymore mine is an excellent example of a controlled mine. Detachment members carefully select the locations of controlled mines before employing them in the defensive system. SFOD members place these mines in depth (at least two rows). This placement allows use of the mines against more than one assault from a given direction. Detachment members always fire the outer row first. Mines used in the controlled mine belt of the outer barrier are electrically detonated from the bunkers and individual fighting positions of the outer perimeter. The basis of the firing system uses the M-57 firing device, firing wire, and blasting cap from the claymore. (SFOD members should recover these items, if possible, after firing a mine. The used electric blasting cap can be replaced and the firing system used again.) The 30 meters of firing wire is sufficient to cover the distance from the outer perimeter firing position, across the moat, to a location just outside the leading edge of the punji field. At this point, detachment members tape the blasting cap 6 inches from the end of a length of detonating cord. Then they run the detonating cord to the controlled mine’s location, cut it, and crimp a nonelectric blasting cap to the end. SFOD personnel seal both ends of the detonating cord with a waterproofing compound. Then they connect the firing system to the controlled mine. 3-81. The method used varies from mine to mine and depends on the type of device employed: priming adapters, M-10 universal destructors, and improvised connections are used in this role. If a destructor is not available, the detonating cord and nonelectric blasting cap are inserted after the fuse well of the projectile has been firmly packed with C-4 explosive. Detachment members then bury the entire firing system, minus the portion that crosses the moat, to protect it from tampering or damage. Several other extremely effective devices may also be used in the controlled mine belt role. Grenades, detonating cord, bangalore torpedoes, shaped charges, mortar and artillery rounds, and 55-gallon drums of gasoline have a wide application as improved controlled mines. 3-82. Grenades. SFOD members should follow these instructions: • Select the location for the device and dig a small hole (5 inches deep). • Remove the fuse assembly from the body of a fragmentation WP grenade. • Wire the grenade upside down to a short V-shaped picket. (Attach the grenade approximately 10 inches up from the pointed end of the picket.) • Place picket into the ground and drive it into the ground until the grenade’s fuse well is approximately 3 inches above the hole’s surface. (The grenade should face the enemy’s approach.) • Crimp a nonelectric cap onto a short length (branch line) of detonating cord. Use waterproofing compound to seal the area where the cap joins

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the detonating cord. Install a plastic priming adapter onto the branch line near the blasting cap. • Carefully insert the blasting cap into the fuse well of the grenade and screw the priming adapter to hold this assembly in place. Refill the hole surrounding the grenade with soil to protect the blasting cap from fragments or tampering. 3-83. Detachment members employ grenades in clusters of three to five devices when used as controlled mines. The pattern of installation can be in meters. The installation process for each device is identical to the one described above. When the cluster has been completed, a ring main of detonating cord is laid behind the devices. The branch line from each device is then joined to the ring main using a girth hitch with one extra turn. The free ends of the branch lines are sealed with waterproofing compound. The free end of the ring main is run to a location just outside the leading edge of the punji field. At this point, it joins the claymore firing wire leading out from the bunker or individual fighting positions on the outer perimeter. The electric blasting cap on the claymore line is taped 6 inches from the end of the ring main and is sealed with waterproofing compound to protect it from moisture. The entire firing system (from firing point to the explosive devices) is then buried to protect it from damage. Only the portion of the firing system that crosses the moat is left exposed. (Figure 3-30, page 3-37, shows a layout of firing systems.) 3-84. Detonating cord. SFOD members should follow these instructions: • Select the location for the device. (This should be an area approximately 10 meters square.) • Enclose this entire area with a ring main of detonating cord. • Prepare four branch lines of detonating cord. In this application, the detonating cord is doubled and has overhand knots tied every 6 feet. Branch lines are approximately 9 meters long. Branch lines run lengthwise with the ring main and are spaced 2 meters apart. • Secure the branch line to the ring main using a girth hitch with one extra turn. Branch lines join the ring main at an angle of 90 degrees, and at least 6 inches of this line should be left free beyond the tie. Use waterproofing compound to seal the free end of the branch line. • Cover the loop of the ring main and the branch lines with a thin layer of soil. • Bury the remainder of the ring main and the claymore firing wire to a depth of at least 6 inches for maximum protection from damage. (When detonated during an attack, the detonating cord will cause any enemy soldier in contact with it to become a casualty. Those in close proximity to this detonation will probably become victims of shock.)

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Figure 3-30. Side View of Firing Systems Layout

3-85. Bangalore torpedoes. Bangalore torpedoes are steel tubes 5 feet

long and 2 1/8 inches in diameter. They are grooved and capped at both ends.Each tube is filled with explosives and has a 4-inch booster at each end.SFOD members prepare bangalore torpedoes for use as controlled mines(Figure 3-31, page 3-38) in the following manner: • Select the location for the device and dig a small hole approximately 5 inches deep. • Place a 5-foot U-shaped picket into the hole and drive it into the ground 12 to 14 inches. • Wire a bangalore torpedo to the picket. The lower end of the torpedo should be approximately 3 inches above the surface of the hole. (The torpedo should face the enemy’s approach.) • Crimp a nonelectric blasting cap onto a short length of detonating cord (branch line). Use waterproofing compound to seal the area where the cap joins the detonating cord. Install a plastic priming adapter onto the branch line near the blasting cap. • Carefully insert the blasting cap into the lower fuse well of the torpedo and screw the priming adapter to hold the assembly in place. Refill the hole surrounding the torpedo with soil to protect the blasting cap from damage.3-86. When used as controlled mines, bangalore torpedoes are employed inclusters of three to five devices. The pattern of installation can be in straightor staggered lines. The distance between devices is 30 meters. Theinstallation process for each device is identical to the one described above.When the cluster has been completed, a ring main of detonating cord is laidbehind the devices. The branch line from each device is then joined to thering main using a girth hitch with one extra turn. The free end of each of thebranch lines is sealed with waterproofing compound. The previouslydescribed steps are followed to complete the installation process. Theapproximate bursting radius of a bangalore torpedo is from 15 to 20 meters.

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Figure 3-31. Bangalore Torpedo Used as a Controlled Mine

3-87. Shaped charges. The M2A3 shaped charge is a moisture-resistant,

molded fiber container approximately 15 inches long by 7 inches wide. This charge is 15 pounds and contains 9 1/2 pounds of composition B explosives with a 50-50 pentolite booster weighing approximately 2 pounds. A cylindrical fiber base slips onto the end of the charge to provide a standoff distance. A cone of glass is used as a cavity liner. When using shaped charges as controlled mines (Figure 3-32, page 3-39), SFOD members— • Select the location for the device and lay the charge on its side with the cavity facing the enemy’s approach. They discard the fiber base. • Apply sandbags to each side to ensure that the charge remains pointing in the proper direction. • Place a wooden box (filled with rocks, brass casings, or machine gun links) in front of the charge as shrapnel. An entire reel of barbed wire is an excellent substitute. • Run a branch line of detonating cord from the device to a location on the leading edge of the punji field where it will eventually join the claymore firing wire. (These must not be connected at this time.)

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• Crimp a nonelectric blasting cap to the device end of the branch line. • Use waterproofing compound to seal the area where the cap joins the detonating cord. • Install a plastic priming adapter onto the branch line near the blasting cap. • Carefully insert the blasting cap into the threaded cap well of the shaped charge. Using the plastic priming adapter to hold this assembly in place, they sandbag the sides, rear, and top of the charge to protect it from damage and to prevent it from moving. • Connect the free end of the branch line to the claymore firing wire. The electric blasting cap on the claymore wire is taped 6 inches from the end of the branch line. The end of the branch line is sealed and waterproofed. The entire system is buried to protect it from damage. Only the portion that crosses the moat is left exposed. Shaped charges are powerful weapons. Only single charges, not clusters, are used as controlled mines.

Figure 3-32. Shaped Charges Used as Controlled Mines

3-88. Mortar and artillery rounds. SFOD members prepare HE or WP

projectiles for use in the following manner: • Select the location for the device and dig a small hole approximately 8 inches deep. • Place a medium U-shaped picket into the hole and drive it into the ground with the “U” facing the enemy’s approach approximately 12 inches. • Remove the fuse assembly from the projectile. • Install a properly assembled universal destructor into the fuse well. If destructors are not available, they pack the well with C-4 and make a blasting cap cavity. • Wire the projectile upside down to the U-shaped picket facing the enemy’s approach. The end of the projectile should be 3 inches from the ground. • Crimp a nonelectric blasting cap onto a short branch line of detonating cord. • Waterproof the area where the cap joins the branch line. • ,QVWDOODSODVWLFSULPLQJDGDSWHUQHDUWKHEODVWLQJFDS

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• Carefully insert the blasting cap into the destructor or C-4. (If C-4 is used then the adapter is not required.) • Waterproof the area where the cap joins the projectile. 3-89. When used as controlled mines, projectiles are employed in clusters of three to five devices. The pattern of installation can be in straight or staggered lines. The distance between devices depends on the type of projectile used. The installation process for each device is identical to those listed above. When the cluster has been completed, a ring main of detonating cord is laid behind the devices. The branch line from each device is then joined to the ring main using a girth hitch with one extra turn. The free ends of the branch lines are sealed with waterproofing compound. From this point, the installation of the remainder of the firing system is identical to the process described above for controlled mines. One advantage of using projectiles as controlled mines is, in effect, it gives SFOD members what equates to a mortar or artillery barrage exactly where they want it and when they need it. 3-90. 55-gallon drums of gasoline. To prepare gasoline drums for use as controlled mines, SFOD members— • Select the location for the device and place two sandbags on the ground end to end, parallel to the outer perimeter. • Lay a 55-gallon drum of gasoline on its side with the top of the drum (filler cap end) resting on the sandbags. • Rotate the drum so that the filler cap is in the twelve o’clock position. • Attach a 1-pound block of TNT centered in rear of the drum with adhesive paste. • Dig a small hole approximately 5 inches deep in front of the drum. • Run a branch line of detonating cord from the device to a location on the leading edge of the punji field where it will eventually join the claymore firing wire. (These are not connected at this time.) • Crimp a nonelectric blasting cap to the device end of the branch line. • Waterproof the area where the cap joins the branch line. • Install a plastic priming adapter near the blasting cap. • Prepare a second branch line approximately 8 feet long in the manner described above. • Remove the fuse assembly from a WP grenade. • Carefully insert the blasting cap on the end of the 8-foot branch line into the threaded cap well of the grenade, using the plastic priming adapter to hold this assembly in place. • Place the grenade into the hole with the free end of the branch line running toward the rear of the drum; refill the hole with soil. • Carefully insert the blasting cap on the long branch line into the threaded cap well of the TNT charge on the rear of the drum, using the plastic priming adapter to hold this assembly in place.

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• Sandbag the sides, rear, and top of the drum to protect it from damage and movement. • Waterproof the free end and then join the branch line to the main branch using a girth hitch with one extra turn. 3-91. From this point, the installation of the firing system is identical to the process described above for controlled mines. When used as controlled mines, gasoline drums are employed as single devices, not clusters. They are effective out to approximately 85 meters. A WP grenade should always be included to ensure positive ignition of the gasoline. Either plastic explosive or TNT alone will not always positively ignite fuel. In the device described above, only gasoline was used. Gasoline is adequate for an antipersonnel device. However, M4 thickener can be added to the gasoline as an enhancer. Thickened fuel burns longer and clings to anything in its path. The one major drawback is that over prolonged periods of time, thickened fuel deteriorates and must be disposed of in a time-consuming process. On the other hand, gasoline stores extremely well. Some may be lost to evaporation over a prolonged period of time, but this is easily replaced. Drums should always be emplaced with filler cap facing up.

Double-Apron Fence 3-92. This is identical in construction to the reinforced fence erected around the punji field.

Outer Punji Field

3-93. This field is identical in construction to the one that surrounds the moat. This field is 10 meters wide.

Triple Concertina Fence

3-94. This is identical in construction to the fence erected around the tanglefoot belt.

Access Road 3-95. This road allows vehicle passage to the inner perimeter. Detachment members construct a trench bridge at the point where it crosses the punji moat.

Channelizing Fences 3-96. These are triple concertina fences that crisscross the various barbed wire and obstacle belts of the outer barrier. Their purpose is to channel an attacking enemy into the fields of fire of friendly automatic weapons.

Trip Flares 3-97. All barbed-wire fences in the outer barrier are rigged with trip flares. Barrier fences are inspected daily.

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Sensors 3-98. Detachment members use detection systems, if available, on the outer perimeter to provide real-time information on enemy movement and intention. Special emphasis is placed on monitoring dead space. Two examples of detection systems are the Eagle Intrusion Detection System (EIDS) and the Observation Post Kit (OP-KIT). 3-99. The EIDS is used as a force multiplier in supplementing manpower with technology to increase security and provide real-time notification of surreptitious entries into prohibited areas. The EIDS incorporates three basic detectors: seismic, magnetic, and passive infrared to detect, classify, and report unauthorized intrusions. Camera-monitoring devices are used as a primary or alternate detection system, if feasible. Perimeter detection systems provide minimal benefit unless continuously monitored. 3-100. The OP-KIT was developed to provide a remote long-range day- or night-capable camera with remote control and transmission capability to meet a variety of operational scenarios. As stated earlier, these systems provide minimal benefit unless continuously monitored.

Miscellaneous 'HWDFKPHQW PHPEHUV EXU\ DOO ILULQJ GHYLFHV WR D GHSWK RI DW OHDVW LQFKHV WR SURWHFW WKHP IURP IUDJPHQWV DQG WDPSHULQJ 'RLQJ VR LV H[WUHPHO\ LPSRUWDQW LQ WKH DUHDV ZKHUH GHWRQDWLQJ FRUG SDVVHV XQGHU EDUULHU IHQFHV 6)2' PHPEHUV PXVW SUHYHQW FXWWLQJ WKH EDUEHG ZLUH ZKHQ GHYLFHV DUH GHWRQDWHGDQGDOZD\VFRQGXFWWHVWVKRWVLQWKHVRLOWKDWZLOOEHXQGHUWKHZLUH 3-102. Positions on the outer perimeter serve as firing points for both the claymore mine belt and the controlled mine belt, which can lead to confusion as to which firing wire detonates what mine. The knot system can be used to determine the individual rows in a belt. All the wires leading to the controlled mine belt are placed on the left side of the firing point. All wires leading to the claymore belt are placed on the right side. 3-103. Alert training should include the location of the mines controlled from that position and the timing for their firing. Controlled mines should not be fired at a target that can be destroyed by some other means. SFOD members must check all mines daily.

ADMINISTRATIVE AREA 3-104. The camp not only serves as an operational base to carry the battle to the enemy, but also as an administrative center that must maintain constant contact with the surrounding population. To accomplish this successfully, each camp should have an administrative area (Figure 3-33, page 3-43). This area is usually located between the outer barrier and the airfield. A triple concertina fence and bunkers protect the area. This area permits the camp to offer medical and administrative services to the local population while at the same time not allowing them access to the camp. 3-105. The administrative area usually contains the following facilities. Helpful tips and techniques for construction, operation, and security are also included.

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Figure 3-33. Administrative Area

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Main Gate 3-106. This gate is the only entrance to the camp and the first of several gates on the access road. It is constructed of wood and laced with barbed wire. The gate is wide enough to cover the single-lane access road and is guarded 24 hours a day. A sign is usually hung over this gate that gives the name of the camp (the camp is no longer a secret by now). A smaller gate is usually constructed on one side to allow personnel (patrols) passage at night when the main vehicle gate is blocked. This gate is guarded 24 hours a day. At night, there are at least two guards on duty at all times. During daylight hours, three or more guards are required to screen all civilians seeking entry to the dispensary or the government administrative buildings. Detachment members lock the gate during the hours of darkness. They use knife-rest devices (defined in paragraph 3-119, page 3-46) during this period to reinforce this gate. SFOD members emplace these devices in front of and behind the gate. They then chain these devices in position and lock them from the inside. The guards at this gate have the key and pass it on to their relief. These procedures also apply to the smaller personnel gate. Claymore mines and trip flares are also used to reinforce this gate. They are installed at dusk and removed at dawn.

Dispensary 3-107. SFOD members construct this building above ground, but chest-high sandbags on the inside of the building protect it. For convenience, the dispensary is located just inside the main gate. Both the camp’s reaction force personnel and the local population receive normal day-to-day medical treatment here. This building usually contains a waiting room, an office, at least one treatment room, and a ward area. Some patients may be required to remain in the ward overnight. For this reason, the dispensary is staffed for 24-hours-a-day operation. Usually, medical aides and nurses handle the night shift with U.S. and HN medical personnel on call. Patients who require prolonged treatment are evacuated to the rear area.

Guard Towers 3-108. When possible, guard towers should be positioned around the outer perimeter. Guard towers should have interlocking visibility.

Government Administration Buildings

3-109. SFOD members construct these buildings above ground, but chest- high sandbagged walls on the inside of the building protect it. These buildings are located next to the dispensary building. Their primary function is to provide office space in a protected environment for HN administrative services. These services form the vital link between the HN government and the local civilian population around the surrounding area. If the area is fairly stable, these services are located in a separate compound in one of the larger villages in the area. In this case, their protection is the responsibility of the regional forces under the command of the district chief. If there is not a viable military force in the area, then this protection will fall on the camp and its organic reaction force personnel. These buildings are only open to the public during daylight. Employees of the various government services are prime

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targets and must be protected. They are usually quartered inside the camp at night. A PSYOP and CA officer and noncommissioned officer (NCO) can provide valuable training and monitoring of these personnel and services.

Motor Pool 3-110. The motor pool is usually a large covered shed with several rooms at one end that are used for office space and storage. Detachment members use this area to service and repair the camp’s vehicles. Vehicles are parked inside the camp at night in protected revetments. Only those vehicles under repair remain in the motor pool overnight. Spare parts and tools are controlled items and must be kept locked. SFOD members keep fire extinguishers handy—the right type for each kind of fire.

Fuel Dump 3-111. This is a large revetment that serves as the central storage area for most of the camp’s fuel supplies. Detachment members construct the revetment out of earth and logs (similar to the berm) or out of dirt-filled 55-gallon drums. Revetment construction is necessary to protect fuel supplies from both enemy and friendly fires. This dump serves as the central storage area for some (never all) of the camp’s fuel supplies. Small reserve fuel supplies are located in other areas of the camp (generator bunker). Fuel supplies are normally shipped to the camp in 55-gallon sealed drums. If available, self-sealing bladders should be installed in these revetment or underground storage tanks for safer long-term storage. The fuel dump must have chemical-type fire extinguishers readily available.

Helicopter Pad 3-112. The helicopter pad allows helicopters to land inside the camp. Usually this pad is only large enough to accommodate a single utility-type helicopter at a time. Heavy-lift and multiship formations must land at the airfield. The pad can be circular or rectangular in shape. The surface of the pad must be solid enough to support the aircraft in all types of weather. The surface is marked with a large white and orange “H.” A windsock is placed near the pad to assist aviators in determining pad location, as well as wind speed and direction.Bunkers 3-113. Automatic weapons bunkers at each of the corners, the main gate, and the outer barrier gate protect the administrative area. These bunkers are identical in construction to those on the outer perimeter. Detachment members erect a section of chain-link fence 10 feet in front of each of these bunkers to defeat RPG rounds. Angling this fence prevents oblique shots from hitting the bunker. Detachment members rig the fence with trip flares and claymore mines. They install the claymore mines each night and remove them each morning. 3-114. These bunkers are manned 24 hours a day. Two of these bunkers are used as traffic control points. The main gate bunker controls the flow of local civilians seeking medical aid and administration buildings. The outer barrier gate bunker prevents these same civilians from entering the motor pool and fuel dump area or the remainder of the camp.

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Triple Concertina Fence

3-115. This fence surrounds the entire administrative area. A small section runs from the main gate bunker toward the outer barrier gate bunker. This fence prevents civilians from entering the motor pool and fuel dump area.

Additional Facilities 3-116. The following facilities are also included in the administrative area: • Outer barrier gate. This entrance is identical in construction and size to the main gate. • Latrines. At least two burn-type latrines are required to service the administrative area. • Fire-fighting post. The fire-fighting post has the same requirements as for the inner and outer perimeters. • Water supply. The dispensary will require a good water supply.

ACCESS ROAD 3-117. This single-lane road is the only quick passage into the camp. It runs from a point outside the main gate to the inner perimeter. Special consideration must be given to both the construction and fortification of this road because it breaches all barriers and perimeters of the camp. 3-118. SFOD members construct gates at each barrier and perimeter entry point. At night, the personnel lock all gates and reinforce them with knife- rest devices, flares, and claymore mines. Spike boards are also emplaced across the road in front of each gate. These boards prevent the enemy from using a vehicle as a battering ram to attack the gate. The access road has three curves in its construction: • Where it joins the main road outside the camp. • At a point inside the barrier. • At a point inside the outer perimeter. Should the enemy attempt to use a vehicle to attack a gate, these curves not only force a reduction of speed but also will position the vehicle broadside to the camp’s defensive fires. 3-119. During daylight hours when the road is in use, detachment members remove all defensive obstacles. Traffic on this road is then controlled from two bunkers: one located just inside the main gate and the other at the entrance to the outer barrier. There are several types of defensive obstacles: • Knife-rest devices. These are portable wooden or metal frames strung with barbed wire. They are used to reinforce all access road gates during the hours of darkness. These devices are emplaced in front of and behind each access road gate. They are then chained in position and locked from the inside. The guard at each gate has the key and passes it on to his relief. • Claymore mines and trip flares. These are emplaced forward of the knife-rest devices each night. They are removed during daylight hours.

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• Spike boards. These devices are 10-foot sections of 2 x 8s with

numerous 30d nails driven through them. Their purpose is to deflate the tires of a vehicle that may attempt to breach the gate by ramming it. Two spike boards should be emplaced forward of each gate at night. These boards are portable and are removed during daylight hours.

SURROUNDING AREA 3-120. The surrounding area usually contains the following facilities and locations that are critical to the camp’s survivability (Figure 3-34, page 3-48). Helpful tips and techniques for construction, operation, and security are also included.

Cleared Fields of Fire

3-121. A camp is unique from all other forms of field fortifications. The size of the camp alone makes it impossible to conceal. The enemy knows its exact location. Subsequently, when clearing fields of fire for the camp, SFOD members remove all vegetation. The logs obtained from the largest trees are used in camp construction. Limbs, brush, weeds, and tall grass are removed and burned. An area at least 300 meters wide is cleared around both the camp and the airfield. Camp security patrols should follow these instructions: • Physically walk the ground and identify all dead space. All dead space in this area must be covered by the camp’s indirect fire weapons. • Start registering mortars to cover these areas after they are identified. • Physically walk this entire area every day. Patrols should not depend on visual checks of this area conducted from inside the camp. The enemy may construct jump-off positions for an attack on the camp within this area during the hours of darkness. Such construction by the enemy ceases before dawn, the work site is carefully camouflaged, and the enemy withdraws before daylight. The process is then repeated on successive nights until the project is complete. Moonless nights during the rainy season are the usual time for such activities. • Ensure that fields of fire are kept clear.

Airfield 3-122. Air is the primary means of resupplying the camp. The larger the camp, the greater the demand for logistics to support its operation. The volume of supplies needed for a single camp alone exceeds the lift capacity of all the helicopters usually assigned to a given operational area. Usually, helicopters are in great demand for operational—not administrative—missions. Hence, an airfield becomes a necessity to allow the use of fixed-wing aircraft to maintain the camp’s logistical demands. The airfield must be large enough to accept the largest aircraft operating in the camp’s area. SFOD members should always place the airfield as close to the camp as possible. The enemy will quickly recognize the airfield’s importance to the survival of the camp. The SFOD must be prepared to provide protection of the airfield from the time construction begins.

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Figure 3-34. Surrounding Area

3-123. Construction of an airfield is a major effort that requires the use of

heavy earthmoving equipment. The camp must call on outside assistance to accomplish this task. The camp’s reaction force can be expected to provide the following during the construction of the airfield: • Convoy security to move the equipment into the area.

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• Security of both the site and the equipment during construction of the airfield. • Convoy security to move the equipment out of the area after construction is completed. • Perforated steel planking (PSP) (an excellent addition to the surface of the airfield). PSP will ensure a fairly reliable all-weather airstrip. Installation of a windsock near the airfield will aid the aircrews. If the airfield will be used at night, then it must have improvised lighting installed to assist the pilots in landing and takeoffs. Firepots work great for this purpose. • A fire arrow installed on the edge of the runway to assist the pilot in determining wind direction at night. The arrow should always be pointed into the wind. (Figure 3-35 shows an example of an airfield layout.)

Figure 3-35. Airfield Layout

Perimeter Road 3-124. This is a utility road that encircles the entire camp. It is primarily used to transport personnel and equipment to camp construction and maintenance projects in the outer barrier of the camp’s defensive system. It is often easier to approach maintenance problems in this barrier from outside the camp. The opposition uses two methods to interdict roads: mines and ambushes. Of these, the use of mines is the most common form of attack. Mining operations by the opposition usually occur during the hours of darkness. These operations require a minimum number of personnel, require a very brief period of time to accomplish, and are virtually impossible to totally prevent. Roads must be swept daily by road-clearing patrols equipped with mine detectors. Since this is a very exacting task, no individual should be permitted to operate a detector for more than 20 minutes at a time. Once

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detected, mines are neutralized by using one of the following methods:

explosives, rope and hooks, or mechanical methods. Of these, explosives are the safest.

Main Road 3-125. This road serves as the primary link between the actual camp and other locations that are within the camp’s area of influence. This road services any outpost or friendly villages.

MISCELLANEOUS TIPS AND TECHNIQUES

3-126. This section consists of additional tips and techniques that SFOD members should consider in base camp development. The following paragraphs explain each of these aspects.

VEHICLES 3-127. All vehicles should have their windshields removed and their floorboards sandbagged as protection against mines. During convoy operations, SFOD members should always follow strict convoy distance and security procedures. All vehicles must carry extra fuel, spare tires, tools, and towing chains. Vehicles must be kept in a high state of repair (they may be the only way out as a last resort). A highly qualified mechanic is required for the vehicles and generators. He will need to cross-train local soldiers and civilians to assist him.

KEY PERSONNEL 3-128. A camp is in many respects like a small town: both need a wide variety of skilled workers to keep it running. Drivers, mechanics, carpenters, cooks, plumbers, barbers, tailors, nurses, and clerks are but a few of the many specialties that will be required to keep the camp running. Reaction force personnel and their dependents should be canvassed for assistance in locating the personnel required. A thorough background investigation should be conducted on all “trusted” personnel.

DEPENDENTS 3-129. In most cases, married reaction force personnel will have their families with them. This poses several problems—first and foremost, where to put them. The easy solution would be to put them in separate quarters outside the camp. However, doing so would allow the enemy to capitalize on this and use them to overthrow the camp. It would also cause the reaction force personnel to worry about their families each night. The best solution is to put them inside the camp in underground bunkers between the outer perimeter and the start of the inner barrier. Wherever they end up living, they will have to be protected and cared for; therefore, it is important to have a plan.

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CIVIC ACTION 3-130. The SF team’s approach to civic action will prove highly successful when— • It improves the capabilities of counterparts by requiring them to participate in planning and carrying out the programs. Participation improves efficiency and makes the people realize that the HN officials are concerned with their welfare. • It improves the HN system by working with the counterparts to ensure that they are aware of the support available through the HN, and encouraging or persuading them to use the government organization. • SF personnel and their counterparts encourage the local civilians to carry out self-help projects with reaction force troops providing some assistance. Experience has shown that civilians have more personal interest in projects in which they participate. • The use of reaction force troops on civic action projects helps develop good relations between troops and civilians. Civic action projects will do more for the cause of defeating the enemy in the long term than most military operations that are undertaken. 3-131. Commanders must establish a viable plan from the very beginning of establishing the camp to ensure mission success in the end. FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations, contains further information on civic actions. The functional areas of civic action are— • Health and sanitation. • Education and training. • Agriculture. • Welfare and refugees. • Transportation. • Commercial development. • Resources control.

COUNTERPART RELATIONSHIPS 3-132. The following information discusses relationship concerns between the United States and its counterparts. U.S. advisors— • Do not command their counterparts’ units. • Must establish long-standing relationships and rapport with counterparts. • Should recommend corrections to their counterparts as required. • Should support their counterparts in disputes with U.S. agencies if this support is warranted. • Should not present too many subjects at once to their counterparts. • Should ensure through testing that the counterparts understand what they have been taught.

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• Should allow counterparts to exercise their own prerogatives when

appropriate, teaching them to make sound, independent decisions. • Should ask for and seek the advice of their counterparts; they will always have a technique or solution to the problem and it may be better than that of U.S. personnel. • Do not make promises that cannot be fulfilled. • Use the native language as much as possible, but offer to teach English to the counterpart and his troops.

DEFENSIVE CONSIDERATIONS 3-133. The best defense is a good offense. The following paragraphs discuss important information for the SFOD to take into consideration. 3-134. SFOD members should establish a series of outpost and ambush sites around the camp’s surrounding area each night. They should also employ outpost and saturation patrolling during daylight hours. 3-135. SFOD members must develop a base defense plan from the beginning. It should include final protective fires and sectors of fire for machine guns, the principal direction of fire for automatic rifles, and barrages and concentration for mortars and artillery. Indirect fires should be preplanned and, if possible, preregistered. Consideration should be given to possible request for tactical air support. Range cards must be prepared for all crew- served weapons. Fires must be controlled so that preliminary enemy probes do not give away automatic weapons positions and fire plans. Normally, mortars and shoulder-fired weapons should be used against small-scale actions that do not severely threaten the camp. Night firing devices are used for indirect fire weapons. Aiming stakes and other similar devices should be used for direct fire weapons to assist in control of fire. A countermortar plan must be developed, and firing units capable of supporting this plan should be assigned specific areas of fire. 3-136. Other defensive considerations include the following: • A good barrier plan is essential; however, local security should never depend on physical barriers alone. A well-coordinated illumination plan must be developed and rehearsed. • Multiple means of communication should be established between both perimeters and the TOC. • The chain of command within all units must be well defined to preclude confusion. • Emergency plans to restore communications and provide medical aid to ensure uninterrupted defense of the area must be developed and rehearsed.

MORALE 3-137. A paramilitary organization does not have the hold on the individual soldier in regards to absences without leave (AWOLs) and deserters that a regular army unit has. Excessive AWOLs and desertions decrease combat effectiveness, and lead to less successful operations. Good food, living

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conditions, care of dependents, and athletic programs will add to the overall morale of the camp and its personnel.

WATER SUPPLY 3-138. Standard military water supply procedures should be used whenever possible. Water blivets, reverse osmosis water purification units (ROWPUs), and standard-issue water cans are a few examples of what may be available.

Springs 3-139. Springs often make an excellent source of water. They should be dug deep, and sealed, fenced, and piped to the camp. Proper development of a spring will increase the flow of ground water and lower the chance of contamination from surface water. Springs are usually of two types: gravity- seepage, where the water-bearing soil comes to the surface over hard, underlying soil; and artesian, where the water under pressure and trapped by the hard layer of soil finds an opening and wells to the surface. Detachment members should dig a small hole near the spring to determine the depth of the hard soil and whether the spring is gravity-seepage or artesian. Personnel then check uphill and nearby for sources of contamination. They have the water tested to determine purification requirements before drinking. A final point to check is to determine if the spring runs water during long, dry spells. Usually the soil is dug to the hard, underlying part, and a tank of reinforced, watertight concrete is made on all but the uphill side. The opening on the uphill side should be lined with porous concrete or stone without mortar to admit the gravity-seepage water. The uphill side can be backfilled with gravel and sand, which helps keep fine materials in the water-bearing soil from entering the spring. If the hard soil cannot be reached easily, a concrete cistern is built. A pipe containing holes that is placed in the water-bearing layer of soil can feed this cistern. With an artesian type of spring, all sides of the tank are made of watertight, reinforced concrete, but the bottom is left open. The water then enters through the bottom.

Cisterns 3-140. These are used to store rainwater and other caught or gathered water. The cistern must be watertight to prevent surface contamination from polluting the supply. Reinforced concrete is the best material since it is strong, has a long life, and can be made quite watertight. A manhole and drain must be provided so that it can be cleaned. A vent and a place to add chlorine for disinfectant are also necessary. The cistern should be able to hold at least 3,000 gallons (7 1/2 x 7 1/2 x 7 1/2 feet). To ensure that the cistern is watertight, approximately 5 1/2 U.S. gallons of water to 100 pounds of cement is used. When the concrete is mixed, it should be tamped thoroughly and the surface kept damp for at least 10 days. If possible, the walls and floor should be poured at the same time. The manhole entrance must be at least 4 inches above the cistern surface and the cover must overlap by 2 inches. The bottom of the cistern should be sloped so that one part can be more easily siphoned or bailed out when cleaning. If an overflow is installed, it should be covered with a copper screen.

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3-141. The cistern should be properly cleaned and disinfected before use and at regular intervals, as required. Downspouts from aboveground structures can be used to fill the cistern. A catchment screen and sand filter should always be installed between the cistern and incoming water source. A sand filter will prepare water for either boiling or chlorinating. The sand filter should be at least one-tenth the size of the catchment area. A typical filter will be 4 x 4 feet for a 3,000-gallon cistern. The filter will be layered from the bottom up with coarse gravel (1 inch), fine gravel (1 inch), coarse sand (1 inch), and fine, clean sand (18 inches). About every 6 months, the manhole cover to the filter must be removed and the filter cleaned. All matter from the splash plate should be removed, and the top 1/2 inch of sand should be scraped off and removed. When the depth of the sand becomes only 12 inches, it should be rebuilt with clean sand to the original 18 inches.

Water Purification Plant

3-142. A crude water purification plant can be constructed to provide safe drinking water (Figure 3-36, page 3-56). The tools and materials required are— • Three barrels (concrete tank or 55-gallon drums). • One 8-inch funnel. • Two smaller tanks (5 gallons with float valves). • Four shutoff valves. • One throttle or needle valve (if hose is used, clamps may be used instead of valves). • Pipe or hose with fittings. • Hypochlorite of lime or sodium hypochlorite (laundry bleach). 3-143. The two large barrels on the top of the structure are used to weaken the bleach. The two smaller tanks on the shelf below are for holding equal amounts of weakened bleach solution and water at a constant pressure. This arrangement makes a constant flow of the solution and water, at the same speed, into the hoses leading to the mixing points. The mix is further controlled by the valves and may be seen through the open funnel. If a throttle valve is not available, a shutoff valve may be used and a throttle action obtained by this valve and valve number 4 in series. Placing two of the barrels at a height of 10 feet causes a pressure of only about 5 pounds per square inch. Thus, plumbing does not have to be high quality except for valve number 1 and the float valve of the water holdup tank, if the rainwater supply is under higher pressure. SFOD members should follow these steps for operation: • Mix concentrated bleach with water in the concentrated barrel with all valves closed. • Fill the pipe from the mixing barrel to the solution tank with water after propping the float valve in a closed position. • Allow a trace amount of concentrate to flow into the mixing barrel by opening valve number 2. • Use a measuring stick to see how much concentrate was used.

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• Close valve number 2 and open valve number 1 so that untreated water enters the mixing barrel. • Close valve number 1 and mix solution in the mixing barrel with a stick. • Remove the prop from the float valve of the solution tank so that it will operate properly. • Open wide the metering valve and valve number 4 to clean the system; allow a gallon to drain through the system. • Close down the metering valve until only a stream of drops enters the funnel. • Open valve number 3.3-144. Detachment members must use trial-and-error methods to learn howmuch concentrate should be put in the concentrate barrel and the amount ofsolution to allow past the funnel. The result should be water with a noticeablechlorine taste in the distribution system. The flow into the funnel and thetaste of the water in the distribution system should be checked regularly toensure proper treatment and operation.

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Figure 3-36. Water Purification Plant

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SECTION III – BASE CAMP OPERATIONS

3-145. Units select base campsites that most effectively use available terrain, water supplies, and HN personnel to accomplish their mission. The base camp is established to facilitate the SF missions. A base camp is established in the JSOA when the HN requests assistance and HN personnel are trained in FID. The base camps are sometimes built in an austere and hostile environment. In many places, the United States must consider the implications of their presence. The populace tends to be suspicious of the unfamiliar; the use of CA and PSYOP should be underscored to minimize any negative effects caused by the construction of the camp. 3-146. Opening up the base camp and conducting operations and training should last no more than 60 days. Then the camp is considered capable of accomplishing its assigned mission with no supplementary forces or assistance. By this date, all nonorganic troops will be withdrawn and all logistical support will be provided through normal channels on a request basis. The average life of an operational base camp is approximately 18 months. This time is based on the fact that the opposition would either comply or move operations following the realization that the base camp could not be eliminated by various means, and that joint operations were winning the full trust of the HN people. 3-147. Consideration must be given to media reporting during the period that the base camp is operational. Appendix K provides information on media support.

SF GROUP/BATTALION STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES

3-148. The most common roles, functions, and responsibilities of the group and battalion staff are discussed below. They are not all-inclusive and they may vary due to the situation. These responsibilities include the following: • Group/Battalion S-1. The group/battalion S-1 continues to monitor the personnel situation and provides replacements as needed. • Group/Battalion S-2. The group/battalion S-2 monitors the intelligence collection capability of the detachment. He maintains close coordination with the S-2s from other HQ to quickly identify and resolve any problem areas that develop. He also follows up on all special intelligence collection requests, such as imagery, and ensures rapid dissemination down to the detachment level. • Group/Battalion S-3. The group/battalion S-3 initiates an operations and intelligence analysis during this phase and informs the SFODC S-3 of the results. He also coordinates with S-4 to ensure that the phased logistical buildup is satisfactorily completed. The group/battalion S-3 also monitors reports to ensure that any problem areas that impede operational capability are resolved. He continues to update the detachment as more information becomes available. The group/battalion S-3 also works closely with the S-2 during this phase to

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determine the effectiveness of the operations conducted by the

detachment. • Group/Battalion S-4. The group/battalion S-4 continues to monitor the logistical situation. He reviews supply requests for suitability or items requested. He also coordinates with the S-3 to determine problem areas and to assist in their resolution. • Group/Battalion S-5. The group/battalion S-5 monitors the CA programs currently in effect and those being planned. He also provides guidance to the detachment to improve their procedures. The group/battalion S-5 follows up on requests of CA materials to ensure adequate and timely response to the detachment’s needs. • Group/Battalion S-6. The group/battalion S-6 ensures that necessary communications equipment has been provided. He also coordinates with signal officers from other HQ and renders technical assistance should a problem develop.

SCREENING, CORDON, AND SEARCH OPERATIONS

3-150. Screening, cordon, and search operations are used to gain intelligence information. Screening operations identify individuals for further interrogation by CI and human intelligence collectors (HICs). These operations also obtain security information for force protection (FP) and obtain information to conduct background checks for suitability or hire, or to further assess an individual. Cordon and search operations identify and apprehend persons hostile to friendly operations. HN forces assisted by CI, interrogation, and other friendly forces should do the actual controlling of the areas. In some instances, the operation may only consist of U.S. intelligence personnel to screen for intelligence information. FM 3-05.102, Army Special Operations Forces Intelligence; FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation; and FM 34-60, Counterintelligence, include additional information. 3-151. In a conventional combat environment, screening operations are conducted to collect information from refugees, enemy prisoners of war (EPWs), and civilian internees at mobile and static locations. These operations are conducted with other elements, such as MP units, HICs, combat troops, CA, and PSYOP teams. These trained personnel assist with coordination and planning, which may include joint or combined planning

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and operation. Trained personnel also exploit cordon and search operations for individuals and information of intelligence interest. 3-152. In stability operations and support operations, cordon and search operations are used to search out the opposition infrastructure as well as individual unit elements; these cordon and search operations may use a community or area as cover for their activities or as a support base. CI agents conduct these operations, whenever possible, with HN forces and organizations. 3-153. Ideally, U.S. forces, including CI personnel, provide support while HN officials direct the entire operation. HN personnel, as a minimum, should be part of the screening and sweep elements on any cordon and search operation. In situations where there is no viable HN government, these operations may be conducted unilaterally or as part of a combined force.

SCREENING OPERATIONS 3-154. The purpose of CI screening operations is to identify persons of CI interest or verify persons referred by HICs who are of CI interest, and gather information of immediate CI interest. Based on priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and information requirements (IRs), screening can be focused in any direction to meet the commander’s requirements.

Subjects of Intelligence Interest

3-155. HICs normally conduct refugee and EPW screening at the EPW compound or refugee screening point. CI personnel conduct interrogations with the view to intercepting hostile intelligence agents, saboteurs, and subversives trying to infiltrate friendly lines. The following are examples of categories of persons of CI interest: • Persons suspected of attempting to infiltrate through refugee flow. • Line-crossers. • Deserters from opposition groups. • Persons without identification (ID) papers or forged papers (inconsistent with the norm). • Repatriated prisoners of war (PWs) and escapees. • Members of underground resistance organizations who are seeking to join friendly forces. • Collaborators with the opposition. • Target personalities, such as those on the personality list (also known as the black, gray, or white lists). • Volunteer informants. • Persons who must be questioned because they are under consideration for employment with U.S. forces or for appointment as civil officials by CA units.

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Planning and Coordination

3-156. CI personnel plan these screening operations, as much as possible, in conjunction with several elements. These elements include— • Commanders. The commanders, at all levels (to include HN), are concerned with channeling refugees and EPWs through the AO, particularly in the attack, to prevent any hindrance to unit movement or any adverse effect on unit mission. • Human intelligence collectors. HICs must understand what CI personnel are looking for and have the commander’s current PIR and IRs. Close coordination with HICs is essential for successful CI operations. • Military police. MP elements are responsible for collecting EPWs and civilian internees from capturing units as far forward as possible in the AO. MP units guard the convoys transporting EPWs and civilian internees to EPW camps, and command and operate the EPW camps. • Civil Affairs. CA elements, under the G-5, are responsible for the proper disposition of refugees. • Psychological Operations. PSYOP elements, under the G-3, contribute to screening operations by informing the populace of the need for their displacement. • Civil authorities. Civil authorities in hostile areas are included in planning only if control has been returned to them.

Indicators 3-157. CI personnel use the following indicators in an attempt to identify hostile infiltrators. CI personnel look for persons— • Of military age. • Traveling alone or in pairs. • Without ID. • With unusual documents. • With suspicious wounds or apparent combat wounds. • Possessing large amounts of money, precious metals, or gems. • Displaying any peculiar activity. • Trying to avoid detection or questioning. • Using enemy methods of operating. • Having a pro-enemy background. • With a suspicious story. • With a family in enemy areas. • With a technical skill or knowledge. • Who have collaborated. • Who violate regulations in enemy areas.

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3-158. In addition to interrogation, other methods of screening EPWs and

Checkpoints 3-159. This type of screening requires personnel to prepare apprehension lists and indicators to be used by screening teams. Specialized equipment, such as metal detection kits, would significantly enhance the screening process. These teams will provide the initial screening and will detain and refer suspects to the military intelligence (MI) control element for detailed CI interrogation and possible exploitation. 3-160. Checkpoints are placed in strategic locations where there is sufficient space for assembling people under guard and for parking vehicles for search and investigation (Figure 3-37, page 3-62). These checkpoints are set up as either mobile or static missions. Local security is posted to protect the checkpoint, and a sufficient amount of personnel are posted to the front and rear to catch anyone attempting to avoid the checkpoint. The preparation needed for static and mobile checkpoints is identical to other screening operations and the indicators will remain the same. 3-161. Mobile checkpoint. A mobile checkpoint is used as a moving system by which the team, either mounted or on foot, briefly selects individuals at random. These checkpoints are located at various points for periods not to exceed one day. 3-162. Static checkpoint. Static checkpoints are those manned perma- nently by MP units or troops at the entrance to a bridge, town gates, river crossing, or similar strategic point.

CORDON AND SEARCH OPERATIONS

3-163. The basic operation is the community cordon and search operation. As the screening element sets up the collection or screening station, the sweep element escorts the residents toward the station, leaving behind one resident to care for family belongings, if required by law. 3-164. The search element follows behind the sweep element searching houses, storage areas, cemeteries, and so forth, with dogs and metal detection equipment. CI personnel search for evidence of intelligence collection operations, to include communications codes or other such paraphernalia. Each search element should include a CI team with a human intelligence collection team, as required, which will have a list of persons of CI interest.

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Figure 3-37. Example of a Checkpoint

3-165. CI personnel move suspected persons on for photographing, further

interrogation, or relocation to the screening area detention point to be taken back to a base area or area coordination center interrogation facility for detailed interrogation upon completion of the operation. 3-166. CI team members pass innocent residents through to the post- screening area where they are provided medical assistance and other civic assistance, as well as entertainment and friendly propaganda. CI personnel return immediately to the detention area any persons caught attempting to escape or break through the cordon. 3-167. When the operation is terminated, CI team members allow all innocent individuals to return to their homes, and remove the suspects under guard for further interrogation. The CI team then photographs all members of the community for compilation of a village packet, which will be used in future operations.

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3-168. In the collection or screening station, the CI team personnel bring theresidents to the collection area (or holding area) and then systematically leadthem to specific screening stations (Figure 3-38). En route to the screeningstation, CI team personnel search each individual for weapons. Then theylead the residents past the mayor or community leaders (opposition defectorsor cooperating prisoners who will be hidden from view so that they canuncompromisingly identify any recognizable opposition). These informantswill be provided with the means to notify a nearby guard or a screener if theyspot an enemy member. Once spotted, CI personnel will immediatelysegregate this individual and appropriate personnel will interrogate him.

Figure 3-38. Example of a Collection or Screening Station

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SECURITY MEASURES 3-169. Army Regulation (AR) 190-16, Physical Security, paragraph 1-5, outlines the physical security programs that will provide the means to counter threat entities during peacetime, mobilization, and wartime. These include— • Hostile intelligence services. • Paramilitary forces. • Terrorists or saboteurs. • Criminal elements. • Protest groups. • Disaffected persons. Physical security procedures include, but are not limited to— • Using physical security equipment or measures to reduce vulnerability to a threat. • Integrating physical security into contingency, mobilization, and wartime plans, and testing physical security procedures and measures during the exercise of these plans. • Coordinating base camp OPSEC, crime prevention, and physical security programs to protect against the total criminal element. • Training guards at sensitive or other storage sites in tactical defense against, and in response to, attempted penetrations. • Creating physical security awareness. 3-170. AR 190-16, paragraph 1-7, states that threat assessments are comprised of the following resources: • Monitoring. Due to diverse missions, the dispersal of forces, and various states of readiness, base camps must constantly monitor current and potential threats. Threat information is normally passed through intelligence summaries, serious incident reports, law enforcement, and security incident reports. • Analysis. Base camps will develop a local threat statement based on local area analysis and information provided by service intelligence and investigative organizations. • Security resources. The threat statement is an essential tool for the commander to use to determine the commitment of physical security resources. It is an integral part of the installation physical security or resource protection plan. 3-171. The security of the base camp depends on each individual there. By integrating the above measures and the proper equipment, the lives and equipment of the camp will be safer.

3-64 Chapter 4

Redeployment Closing out a base camp is a critical part of mission planning throughout all phases of operation. Initial plans for the disposition of the base camp must begin as soon as the mission is received. Based on U.S. Government (USG) goals and the situation on the ground, the disposition of the camp can take any of the forms discussed below. STP 31-18-SM-TG, Soldier’s Manual and Trainer’s Guide, CMF 18, Special Forces Basic Tasks, Skill Levels 3/4, and FM 3-05.20 contain additional information.

DISPOSITION OF BASE CAMP

4-1. Depending on the circumstances, there are many options available for closing out a base camp. Among these are the following: • Abandon or destroy the base camp. This can take one of two forms: an emergency evacuation, in which case the disposition of the camp should be included in the overall escape and evasion plan, or in a controlled manner when the facility has outlived its usefulness. In either case, sensitive items must be accounted for and either removed or destroyed to prevent their use by hostile forces. Prior and continuous planning of this phase is critical to ensure each person assigned to the base camp knows and understands his role during an evacuation. • Hand over the base camp to HN military or government. Turning over a facility to the HN will require specific instructions on the disposition of equipment within the compound from the State Department and U.S. military chain of command. If the intent when building the facility is to turn it over to the HN at some point, clear guidance on how this turnover is to be accomplished should be given ahead of time. Also, it should be determined whether or not the United States will be reimbursed for construction costs. • Hand over the base camp to United Nations (UN) or other international organization. As with the above option, turning over a U.S. military facility to the UN or other international organization is a political decision and must be done only with clear guidance from the State Department. • Hand over the base camp to U.S. NGO. Depending on the function of the facility, it can be turned over to a U.S. NGO. Although the camp is being handed over to another group of Americans, the transition to any NGO is a political decision and requires clear guidance from the State Department. • Hand over the base camp to U.S. military or Government. As the situation in the region develops, it may be necessary to hand over the

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base camp to another U.S. military or Government agency. For

example, a base camp set up to train and maintain CD operations may eventually be transferred to the control of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). • Hand over the base camp to other U.S. SF. Long-term operations will require the transition of the base camp from one SF detachment to another at some point. • Combination of any of the above. Based on changing requirements, the final status of the base camp can be any combination of the above or something else entirely. Whatever the final disposition of the facility, planning for this phase must be accomplished as soon as possible. 4-2. The completion of the detachment’s involvement with the base camp does not necessarily mean the end of the life of the facility. When the mission for construction of a base camp is first received, it should contain at least basic instructions for the disposition of the base camp once the detachment is ready to leave the area. If not, it is incumbent on the commander and his staff to find out what the ultimate goals are for the base camp so that operations can be planned around them. 4-3. Planning is continuous and revised concurrently with operations to reflect the existing political and military conditions in the theater. For example, the emergency evacuation plan for a base camp may initially include vehicles and other support from the HN, but can be revised when an American carrier task force shows up in the region. 4-4. CA teams may be provided to assist in closeout or handing over the facility, particularly when no suitable provisional government exists to assume control and the facility is to be turned over to other than USG agencies. 4-5. PSYOP units can be used to assist in closeout by establishing programs to explain to the local populace the steps and rationale for disposition of the base camp and to condition them for the change. NOTE: A fully functioning active base camp that is employing the local populace for its support can create a large gap in the local economy with the departure of U.S. forces. Plans for this transition should be incorporated in the final disposition of the camp to reduce its effect on the area.

FINAL CLOSEOUT 4-6. Final closeout of a base camp can be expected to include logistical and financial considerations. Some of these are— • Assembly of HN forces, to include employees of the facility, into assembly areas. • Completion of administrative records of all personnel at the facility, to include inventorying and accounting for arms, equipment, and sensitive items. • Settlement of pay, allowances, and benefits to any HN personnel employed at the facility.

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• Settlement of all claims against the HN or the United States in a fair

and prompt manner. • Recommendations for awards and decorations submitted for deserving HN personnel supporting the base camp. • Rehabilitation and employment of HN personnel supporting the base camp.4-7. The commander in charge of the final disposition of the facility isresponsible for direction, advice, and final guidance to all U.S. and HNpersonnel. Additionally, he must coordinate and supervise anydemobilization operations that fall under his jurisdiction during this phase ofthe operation.

Logistical Sustainment The U.S. Army strategy for conducting operations has changed from air- land to force projection using tailored packages. Commands have aligned their unit sustainment organizations and activities with the U.S. Army’s concept of force projection. This change allows units to integrate organic CS and CSS elements within the theater Army support structure for continuous and responsive sustainment to deployed units. FM 100-25 contains additional information.

DIRECT SUPPORT B-1. When the theater support system is in place, it can meet most unit requirements except dedicated direct support (DS), which unit CS and CSS must provide. Logistic planners then must concentrate on the following areas: • Initial entry. Planners must determine the type of sustainment required: the number of days of accompanying supplies based on the time-phased force and deployment list (TPFDL) and the unit basing needs. • Buildup and integration. Planners must coordinate and integrate logistics with the theater support system before TPFDL closure and as it continues to mature (FM 100-25, Chapter 7).

STABILITY OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS

B-2. Each operation is unique and requires mission-specific analysis that develops a tailored sustainment force. Joint, international, and interagency activities add complexity to the sustainment system. ARSOF may find themselves conducting operations outside a theater support system because of geographic location. Preparing and submitting a SOR during these types of exercises can enhance the unit’s requirement determination process and also add a final coordination check to the theater operation plan (OPLAN).

PREPARATION MODES B-3. Deliberate planning and crisis-action planning are the two methodologies of planning. In deliberate planning and preparation, ARSOF and the ASCC can fully identify support requirements in OPLANs and concept plans (CONPLANs) from a bare-based SOR down to the user level based on an established set of planning assumptions. In this way, the ASCC coordinates how to fulfill requirements from the support structure in the theater Army. In crisis-action planning and preparation, the requirements anticipated at the combatant commander’s level dictate the amount of

support and sustainment. Actual circumstances may dictate that preplanned requirements are modified, or they may generate new requirements that were unanticipated during the deliberate planning process. B-4. During deliberate planning for a mission, the theater SOC may use ARSOF (either in the theater or requested from United States Special Operations Command [USSOCOM]) to assist the planning process by conducting assessments or site surveys. These missions can also serve ASCC preparations. When feasible, planners integrate these assessments into the theater campaign plan to provide intelligence, operational, and logistics information for logistics preparation of the theater. B-5. The use of assessment teams may not be practical during crisis-action planning. When crisis-action planning occurs, the theater SOC staff, with the ASCC, must anticipate the unified command’s ARSOF support requirements. USASOC can deploy advance party personnel to assist the ASCC in receiving ARSOF and to establish access to the theater support structure.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS SUPPORT COMMAND

B-6. The geographic combatant commander establishes the command relationship involving ARSOF in his theater. However, the theater ASCC has the Title 10, United States Code (USC), responsibility, regardless of OPCON arrangements within the unified command, to provide administration and support to deployed ARSOF. Also, when directed by the geographic combatant commander, the ASCC will support and sustain designated special operations forces (SOF) of other U.S. Services and other multinational SOF. B-7. Special operations support command (SOSCOM) HQ provides C2 to its organic elements to accomplish its mission of planning and coordinating CSS, health service support, and signal support to ARSOF units supporting the war-fighting combatant commanders. When directed, SOSCOM deploys its CS and CSS battalions in DS of deployed ARSOF.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS THEATER SUPPORT ELEMENT

B-8. The SOTSE is a staff planning, coordinating, and facilitating element. It serves as the ARSOF liaison to the ASCC for matters pertaining to logistics and medical needs, and provides ARSOF advocacy within the ASCC. The SOTSE coordinates requirements identified by ARSOF and facilitates the interface of ARSOF organizational logistics functions with the services provided by the ASCC. USASOC attaches the SOTSE to the ASCC HQ for duty within the ASCC G-4 staff. The SOTSE coordinates closely with the supported theater SOC and ARSOF during the deliberate planning process. The SOTSE identifies support requirements, integrates ARSOF sustainment requirements into the ASCC support plan, and ensures timely provision of that support. B-9. A critical source of information that the ASCC needs in its coordination and facilitation functions is the SOR provided by the ARSOF units. The SOC J-4 and other logistics staffs have to be proactive and must be included in the mission planning process. The logistics planners must anticipate operational

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unit requirements at all stages of the mission. Ideally, the J-4 uses the ASCC OPLAN in preparing his CONPLAN for inclusion in the mission order. This approach allows theater support elements time to review required support before the SOF mission unit submits its mission-tailored SOR. This review is especially critical in crisis-action planning and short-notice mission changes. The SOR is a living document that requires periodic reevaluation and updating as requirements change. Determination of requirements begins with the receipt of the mission. Time and accuracy are critical factors. B-10. Although deliberate planning is the preferred method, crisis-action planning is within the framework. The key is to anticipate requirements based on emerging operations and then to use approved OPLANs.

ARSOF LOGISTICS SUPPORT EXECUTION

B-11. Conventional CSS organizations and procedures are adequate for ARSOF requirements. Standard procedures are in place to handle the few ARSOF-peculiar requirements. The ASCC provides reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI), and follow-on support and sustainment of Army forces in the theater, including ARSOF. The ASCC also provides support to Army forces in intermediate staging bases. ARSOF have some key differences that affect the type of support required for RSOI and sustainment. The following conditions occur often enough that they must receive special consideration during logistics planning: • Forward-deployed ARSOF units are usually in isolated and austere locations. Distribution is the key consideration. • Some special equipment exists; however, most equipment is Army- common and organic ARSOF assets can maintain it.

RESPONSIBILITIES B-12. Responsibilities for planning and executing theater support do not align with the levels of war or with the HQ normally associated with them. The ASCC provides the necessary capability for the Army forces assigned to a unified command. B-13. The geographic combatant commander supports SOF in his AOR. The ARSOF logistics planners identify the support requirements in the planning phase. The ASCC must also identify the logistics shortfalls for inclusion in the combatant commander’s risk assessment in his AOR. If the ASCC cannot support ARSOF, the ASCC must raise the shortfall to the supported combatant commander for resolution. B-14. The theater SOC tasks missions to ARSOF. The theater SOC works closely with the unified command staff and the theater ASCC to articulate the ARSOF requirements. The geographic combatant commander establishes priorities and allocates the available resources to ARSOF to accomplish each mission. The ASCC develops the theater support plan, which includes sustainment of ARSOF by the theater logistics organizations. The theater SOC then monitors ARSOF sustainment in the theater. B-15. The SOC and ARSOF logisticians coordinate with the ASCC to develop plans and subsequent orders to implement directives the ASCC will issue to

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support the ARSOF assigned to the unified command. The SOC advises the ASCC commander on the appropriate command and support relationships for each ARSOF mission. The SOTSE keeps USASOC informed of the status of ASCC’s supporting plans.

STATEMENT OF REQUIREMENTS FORMAT

B-16. The SOR identifies and consolidates in priority all unit requirements that exceed organic capabilities. As shown in the following outline format (Figure B-1, pages B-5 through B-11), a complete SOR addresses in detail all aspects of CS and CSS.

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(CLASSIFICATION)

1. REFERENCES.2. GENERAL. a. Unit to Be Supported. b. When Support Is Required. c. Location of Supported Unit When Support Is Required. d. Unit Points of Contact. e. Number of Personnel to Be Supported. f. Unit Identification Code. g. Force Activity Designator. h. Funding. Special funding for the operation and how to access, if applicable. Fund flow for obtaining supplies, including project code.3. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. a. Mission. State the general mission of the unit, command, or operation. b. Desired Results. Provide a concise statement of the desired results of the support being requested.4. ASSUMPTIONS. Give the conditions that are likely or must exist for this support to be required. Relate the assumptions to specific requirements, as required or appropriate.5. CONSTRAINTS. Define situation that, if experienced, will degrade operations. Give conditions to specific requirements identified, as required or appropriate.6. COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COORDINATION. Describe functional command and control of the unit.7. SUPPLIES. a. Class I. (1) Dining facility requirements. (2) Augmentation. (3) Food storage facilities. Determine which of the following food storage facilities are required to contain a 30-day supply of rations. (a) Dry space in cubic feet. (b) Chill space in cubic feet. (c) Freezer space in cubic feet. (4) Mermites. Determine requirements for mermites. List how many and how often they are required. (5) Meal payment. Determine how individuals will pay for their meals.

Figure B-1. Statement of Requirements Format (Continued)

B-11 Appendix C

Funding The purpose of this appendix is to provide information as to the proper legal use and expenditure of government monies. This section is only a guide. If there is any doubt as to the proper use of funds, a judge advocate should be consulted. The National Defense Authorization Act dated 1994 contains additional information. All leaders should be aware that Title 10, USC, is the document that provides the guidance and restrictions on all monies spent by the USG. The phrase Title 10 money refers to all funds associated with the U.S. military and is further subdivided into various funding lines to be spent in specific ways. The principal source of money for any particular unit is operation and maintenance (O&M) funding, which is budgeted on an annual basis to provide for all unit-initiated activities. Units may also have access to other types of monies, such as Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)-directed exercises funding, DA funding for operational exercises, SA funding, and humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) funding.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE MISSION FUNDING

C-1. SA is an umbrella term for all statutory programs and authorities under which the United States may provide and regulate forms of assistance and sales to foreign governments (and international organizations) for the purpose of enhancing U.S. and mutual security. C-2. CA leaders advising a supported commander should first determine whether the mission is funded as an SA mission. Unless the activity, property, service, or training in question is specifically part of the SA mission, the transfer of funds and equipment or conduct of the training is not authorized. The mission scope should be frequently reviewed to ensure that operations are not exceeding mission authority. C-3. Congress carefully scrutinizes and constantly reviews SA programs; therefore, these activities naturally have more visibility than routine deployments. Because of the many restrictions on standards of eligibility, type of materials and services to be provided, and the constantly changing nature of SA programs and activities, the advice of a judge advocate is essential. A Judge Advocate General (JAG) officer through legal channels up to the unified command level should coordinate all questions on SA programs. C-4. If not deployed on an SA mission, any requests for HN support or assistance should be coordinated through JAG channels, or the U.S. Embassy military representative (military group [MILGP] or military advisory

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assistance group [MAAG]). If deployed on an SA mission, unit members must

understand up front specifically what kinds of support and assistance can and cannot be provided to the HN.

HUMANITARIAN AND CIVIC ASSISTANCE FUNDING

C-5. HCA serves as a vital component of the nation assistance effort of the U.S. Congress, and only Congressionally approved funding may be used for these types of activities. Through Title 10, USC Section 401, Congress specifically authorizes funds for the following activities: • Medical, dental, and veterinary care provided to rural areas of a country. • Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems. • Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities. • Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. C-6. HCA activities must meet the following three requirements to be considered legal for funding under Title 10, USC: • Promote the security interests of the United States and the HN. • Promote the specific operational readiness skills of the members of the armed forces who participate in the activity. • Serve the basic economic and social needs of the local people. C-7. HCA funds are distributed to the geographic combatant commanders who are responsible for identification of HCA projects and assignment of particular missions to designated units. The unit then purchases materiel used for the HCA project. Congress has barred the use of HCA funds for projects that will benefit (directly or indirectly) individuals, groups, or organizations engaged in military or paramilitary operations. C-8. One exception to the Congressional prohibitions on the use of O&M funds for HCA is the authority to perform minor HCA activities incidental to the unit mission (under the provision of “minimal expenditures” of general O&M funds for projects in conjunction with a military exercise or operation, which must be reported to Congress by the end of the fiscal year). This exception requires a legal review before implementation to ensure compliance with U.S. law. C-9. HCA activities can be part of a larger combat exercise (for example, Cobra Gold) or may be the focal point of a smaller engineer or medical exercise (for example, Nuevos Horizontes). There is no dollar limit on the cost of the project as long as it is financed from specifically designated HCA funds. C-10. Only HCA projects identified at the combatant command level or approved by a JAG officer should be performed. Unit members should not attempt to interpret U.S. law in cases where there is any question of legality. U.S. statutes are subject to change and supplementation by local authorities. Only Title 10, USC, Section 401, funding authority may be used for HCA projects. The Stevens Amendment has been eliminated.

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SPECIAL FORCES EXCEPTION (TITLE 10, USC, SECTION 2011)

C-11. This action is a General Accounting Office (GAO) holding that was approved in 1992. It approves the funding of outside the continental United States (OCONUS) training missions and payment of specific HN expenses with O&M funds in certain limited circumstances. C-12. The SF Exception applies to SF, CA, and PSYOP forces. It states that the USSOCOM commander, any unified commander, or a specified combatant commander may pay or authorize payment for the following expenses: • Expense of SOF training with armed forces and other security forces of a friendly foreign country. • Expenses of deploying SOF for the training. • Where SOF is training with a friendly developing country, the incremental expenses incurred by that country as a direct result of such training. Incremental expenses include the reasonable and proper costs of— Rations. Fuel. Training ammo. Transportation. Other goods and services consumed by HN forces as a result of the training. Incremental expenses do not include the pay allowances or other normal costs incurred by HN personnel. C-13. The decision to use the SF Exception rests with the combatant commander. The primary purpose of the training mission must still be the training of U.S. SOF. Attempting to use the SF Exception for the primary purpose of training friendly foreign country forces is prohibited. If this primary test is not met, then O&M funds cannot be used to pay the expenses listed above. C-14. In most circumstances, deployments for training (DFTs) or joint combined exercises for training (JCETs) will be paid for with O&M funds from the unit which initiated the deployment. An SF group DFT will be paid for with SF group O&M funds. Commanders must report data for all DFTs that rely upon Section 2011. C-15. The SF Exception allows SOF to use O&M funds in certain limited circumstances to pay for specific expenses of the HN incurred in training exercises conducted with U.S. SOF. Normally, O&M funds cannot be used to pay for any HN expenses unless they fit the parameter of the SF Exception, and then only after review and approval (Figure C-1, pages C-4 and C-5).

Figure C-1. Prospectus (Continued)

C-5 Appendix D

Legal Considerations This appendix describes basic policies, guidance, procedures, and responsibilities regarding legal services provided during times of deployment. The matters outlined here may be augmented by specific guidance contained in the OPLAN to the various missions and contingencies.

GENERAL D-1. Mission. The Group Judge Advocate (GJA) is the primary legal advisor to the group commander and members of the group staff. The GJA also advises subordinate commanders and staff officers on all legal matters and coordinates all legal activities within the AO. D-2. Task organization. The manner in which the group legal section deploys will depend greatly upon the composition of the SFOB. In all major deployment situations, the GJA should deploy with the group battle staff, and the battalion legal NCOs must deploy with their FOBs. The remaining members of the group legal section should deploy with the group’s main body. GJA deployment information follows: • An SFOB may deploy only the GJA and the group senior legal NCO. An SFOB may add the group administrative specialist, and in some cases, the GJA will request a flyaway package from HQ, USASFC(A). The flyaway package will consist of an additional judge advocate and an additional legal NCO. The group legal office can also request a flyaway package to support split missions or to support garrison operations while the GJA deploys. • Individual mobilization augmentees are attorneys who fill a specific group legal billet. These individuals will fill positions vacated by the GJA when he deploys.

PREDEPLOYMENT D-3. Upon receiving a warning order, the GJA will immediately join the battle staff and begin conducting a mission analysis. The GJA will coordinate with the particular theater combatant commander’s judge advocate to determine ROE in effect. Afterwards, the GJA will assist the S-3 in drafting the ROE annex. The GJA will also— • Draft the legal annex. • Conduct briefings and train all deploying personnel on the law of armed conflict (LOAC), ROE, and human rights.

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• Coordinate with group budget officer and the S-4 to ensure that ordering officers and Class A agents with appropriate level of purchasing authority are appointed as needed. D-4. The GJA and the S-4 will also coordinate with higher HQ to obtain support of a contracting officer in the theater of operations.

DEPLOYMENT D-5. The GJA will be located in the group operations center (OPCEN) and will provide legal advice as discussed in the following paragraphs. D-6. International law/operational law. The GJA will function as the operational law advisor to the group commander, staff, and subordinate commanders. The duties of GJA include, but are not limited to— • Advising the command on the LOAC during wartime and LOAC concepts during stability operations and support operations, reviewing mission concepts for compliance with the LOAC, and providing a staff estimate to the commander for his decision. • Participating in planning cells and reviewing OPLANs, CONPLANs, and operation orders (OPORDs) for LOAC implications of attacking or destroying specific targets. • Reviewing target folders and advising on the LOAC implications of attacking or destroying specific targets. • Briefing the group commander at scheduled command and staff briefings concerning legal aspects of the operation. • Briefing the deploying team while they are in isolation concerning legal considerations specific to their operation, the ROE, and the laws of the country to which they are being deployed. • Attending briefbacks given by the teams and ensuring that each team member has an understanding of the legal aspects of his mission. • Attending debriefing of the teams after completion of mission, as required. • Coordinating with the S-1 and S-3 to ensure that all EPWs and detainees are properly processed and cared for. Where the status of any person in U.S. custody is uncertain, the GJA will arrange for, or assist in, the conduct of Article 5 tribunals pursuant to the Geneva Conventions. • Advising the command and briefing the group on the effects and requirements of any status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs) in effect in the AO. If no treaty or other international agreement has been concluded by the time of deployment, the GJA will contact the higher HQ Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) or the Defense Attaché Office of the U.S. Mission to the country concerned to ensure some type of SOFA is negotiated. In the absence of an international agreement, U.S. forces may be subject to the jurisdiction of the friendly HN.

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D-7. Military justice. The following paragraphs describe duties related to

military justice: • The GJA will determine jurisdictional chains of command in effect within the AOR prior to deployment. The GJA will advise the command on all matters involving military justice, represent the command in courts-martial, prepare Article 15s (Commanding Officer’s Non-Judicial Punishment), and coordinate trial defense service support for soldiers in the group. • Commanders are responsible to ensure that any misconduct by their subordinates is fully investigated. Commanders will forward sworn statements and any other results of their investigation through command channels to the GJA for evaluation for possible Uniform Code of Military Justice action. If further investigative assistance is needed, the GJA will coordinate with MP investigations or criminal investigation division assets through the applicable General Courts- Martial Convening Authority’s SJA. • U.S. personnel detained by foreign governments will be reported to the GJA using a serious incident report format. The GJA will coordinate with the component or supporting command responsible for coordination with that country and request assistance from any available CA assets in obtaining release of these personnel in accordance with (IAW) existing SOFAs or other treaties or agreements.D-8. Intelligence oversight. The GJA will advise the group commander onintelligence oversight matters, ensuring that special intelligence-gatheringequipment is maintained properly, reporting requirements are met, and that allconcerned are aware of the legal implications of noncompliance.

D-9. Legal assistance. The GJA will provide basic legal assistance to thegroup (such as power of attorney, wills, and advice) as long as it will notconflict with other GJA responsibilities.

D-10. Claims administration. The GJA will coordinate the appointment of

claims officers who will conduct initial investigations and reportingresponsibilities. The GJA will advise the claims officer on the properprocedures to follow in investigating claims.

D-11. Administrative law. The GJA will advise and represent thecommand on administrative law issues (such as initiating investigations IAWAR 15-6, Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers, andadministrative separations).

D-12. Fiscal law. The GJA will advise the S-3 on all foreign training and SAmatters to ensure that legal limitations on the use of funds, with particularregard to the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act, havebeen complied with.

D-13. Contract and procurement law. If the component or supporting

commands cannot provide contract review, the GJA will review all contracts forlegal sufficiency before any contracting officer binds the Government.

D-3 Appendix E

Fire Support Fire support planning is the continuous process of acquiring and analyzing targets, allocating fire support to targets, scheduling the attack of targets, and synchronizing all available fire support to achieve the commander’s intent and to support the scheme of maneuver. Fire support coordination is the process of executing the fire support plan. It, too, is continuous and runs concurrently with the planning process during combat operations. JP 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS), and FM 3-09.32, J-Fire Multiservice Procedures for the Joint Application of Firepower, include additional information.

FIRE SUPPORT TASKS

E-1. Effectiveness of the fire support effort is measured by achieving desired effects on the enemy, setting conditions for decisive operations, and supporting joint force operations. Effective fire support depends on planning for the successful performance of the following four basic fire support tasks: • Support forces in contact. The commander must provide responsive fire support that protects and ensures freedom of maneuver to forces in contact with the enemy throughout the AO. • Support the concept of operation. Commanders set the conditions for decisive operations by successfully attacking high-payoff targets, the loss of which prevents the enemy from interfering with friendly operations or developing their own operations. • Synchronize fire support. Fire support is synchronized through fire support coordination, beginning with the commander’s estimate and concept of operations. Fire support must be planned for continuously and concurrently with the development of the scheme of maneuver. Further, operations providing fire support must be synchronized with other joint force operations (such as air operations, intelligence operations, and SO) to optimize the application of limited resources, achieve synergy, and avoid fratricide. • Sustain fire support operations. Fire support planners must formulate fire support plans to reflect logistic limitations and to exploit logistic capabilities. Ammo, fuel, food, water, maintenance, transportation, and medical support are all critical to sustaining fire support operations.

FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATOR/FIRE SUPPORT OFFICER

E-2. The fire support coordinator (FSCOORD) and fire support officer (FSO) are responsible for fire support planning and coordination. Due to the lack of

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an internal FSCOORD/FSO, this position is usually manned by the Air Force

SOF tactical air control party (TACP). Duties include the following: • Plan, coordinate, and execute fire support. • Advise the commander on fire support matters. • Request, adjust, and direct all types of fire support. • Develop the fire support plan and execution matrix and disseminate to key personnel. • Process all lower-echelon fire support plans. • Coordinate all fire support coordination measures, target numbers and lists, location of final protective fires, and priority of fires with higher HQ. • Obtain from higher HQ— Status and location of fire support delivery systems available to the unit. Existing targets, scheduled fires, known points, high-payoff targets, and priority of target attack. Current and planned fire support coordinating measures. Verified frequencies and call signs. Army aviation available. Status of tactical air (TACAIR) missions and CAS control personnel. Naval gunfire (NGF) available.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

E-3. Many SO missions provide the joint force commander (JFC) with unconventional attack options. SOF are not a substitute for conventional forces, but a necessary adjunct to existing conventional capabilities. Typically, air, naval, and long-range ground-based fire support systems are called to deliver additional joint fire support to SOF. Figure E-1, page E-3, depicts C2 request and tasking channels.

JOINT FORCES COMMAND

E-4. The joint fires element (JFE) is part of the JFC J-3. The JFE— • Is responsible for all fire support within the theater. • Disseminates fire support guidance. • Disseminates the pulse repetition frequency (PRF) codes for laser designators. • Tasks services to provide fire support. E-5. The special operations liaison element (SOLE) coordinates SOF issues for the joint special operations component command (JSOCC). E-6. The FSCOORD is responsible for coordination measures with the JFE. The joint special operations air component (JSOAC) assigns organic SOF aviation assets to fill requests.

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Figure E-1. C2 Request and Tasking Channels

DELIBERATE FIRE PLANNING

E-7. At the lowest level, the FSO nominates targets in his sector, records this target information on the target list work sheet, and forwards it to the next- higher echelon of command. The next-higher echelon of command considers the target information, consolidates it (for example, eliminates duplications), adds targets, and forwards a copy of the target list work sheet up the chain of command. This process is repeated until the request is forwarded to the JFE and is either approved, modified, or disapproved. The JFE informs all units of any subsequent changes to the plans. Once targets are received at the SFOB, FOB, or SFODA, they prepare their fire plans and schedules to support the maneuver and allocate targets to the appropriate fire support agency or asset. Preplanned targets for organic mortars may be planned without approval by the higher HQ or JFC; however, higher HQ should be notified whenever possible of all fires planned for organic weapons. Tables E-1 and E-2, pages E-4 and E-5, discuss offensive and defensive fire planning.

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Table E-1. Offensive Fire Planning

Phase Actions to Be Taken Short of the Consider planning fire— Line of • To support the unit movement to the LD or LC. Departure • To support the unit if the attack fails and the enemy counterattacks. (LD) or Line • To impede enemy patrols and early warning systems. of Contact (LC) Provide priority of fires to lead elements. Consider planning— • Fires to suppress enemy direct-fire weapons. • Smoke to restrict enemy observation of friendly maneuver elements. • Smoke to screen friendly obstacle-breaching operations. • Fires on exposed flanks. Consider placing an observer with over watch elements. Consider recommending a preparation fire if the advantages outweigh the LD or LC disadvantages: to the • Will the enemy be forewarned of an attack if a preparation is fired? Objective • Will the loss of surprise significantly affect the chance for success? • Are there enough significant targets to justify the preparation? • Is there enough fire support ammunition to fire an effective preparation? • Can the enemy recover before the effects can be exploited? Determine when and how you will shift fires. Use one of the following methods: • Time: At a predetermined time, fires will shift. • Location: Fires shift when the maneuver unit reaches a certain location, such as a phase line. • On call: The maneuver commander directs when the fires shift. • Event: A predetermined event signals shifting of fires. Consider planning— • Fires to block enemy reinforcements and resupply by ground or air. On the • Fires to suppress enemy direct-fire weapons. Objective • Obscurants to screen friendly forces or obscure hostile ground observation when consolidating on the objective. • A signal for lifting and shifting fires. • Fires for the defense when consolidating on the objective. Consider planning fires— Beyond the • To impede enemy reinforcements. Objective • To block avenues of approach for counterattacking enemy forces. • To slow or block enemy retreat.

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Table E-2. Defensive Fire Planning

Focus Actions to Be Taken

On avenues of approach— • Target enemy avenues of approach. • Integrate fire support with direct-fire weapons. • Plan trigger points for possible moving targets. On key terrain— • Place an observer on terrain where he can provide early warning, target location, and laser designation and over watch of the battle. • Plan to obscure enemy observation of friendly movements. In Front of the On obstacles— Position • Coordinate coverage of obstacles with the engineers. • Consider the use of smoke or riot control agents to hinder breaching operations. • If available and in conjunction with the engineer, plan family of scatterable mines (FASCAM) to reseed minefields that the enemy has breached. • Plan fires to close gaps and lanes in barriers or obstacle plans. • Plan fires to help canalize the enemy. • Integrate fire support with obstacles to complement direct-fire weapons. • Accurately locate obstacles and preplanned targets. Consider— • Using groups or series to assist in withdrawal. • Using smoke to facilitate disengagement. • Planning fires on top of your battle position to help in the disengagement, to deny the enemy access to the position, and to support a counterattack. Plan final protective fires (FPFs) (a prearranged barrier of fire designed to protect friendly troops). Use the following sequence in planning FPFs, but remember the maneuver commander selects FPF locations. • Select the fire support asset to fire the FPF. This selection is based on On the allocation. Position • Adjust fire onto the FPF to determine actual firing data to be used in firing the FPF. (The tactical situation, time, or ammo supply may not allow the FPF to be adjusted.) • Determine the FPF time of flight. • Select the FPF tripper point (a permanent, visible point on terrain to the front that is used to determine when the FPF will be fired). Consider time of flight and the estimated enemy rate of movement. • Integrate the FPF into the final protective lines of the company direct-fire weapons. • Determine how the FPF call for fire will be initiated.

QUICK FIRE PLANNING

E-8. The purpose of quick fire planning is to quickly prepare and execute fire support in anticipation of an impending operation. Quick fire planning techniques constitute an informal fire plan. Quick fire planning differs from

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deliberate fire planning in that bottom-up, rather than top-down, fire

planning is conducted. In the quick fire plan, the FSO is responsible for— • Identifying targets to be engaged in the target list. • Allocating all fire support assets available to engage the targets in the plan. • Preparing the schedule of fires. • Disseminating the schedule to all appropriate fire support agencies for execution.

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

E-9. CAS is defined by JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, as “air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces.” Joint CAS is CAS conducted through joint air operations. The following conditions are required to employ CAS: • Air superiority. • Suppression of enemy air defenses. • Target marking. • Favorable weather. • Prompt response. • Aircrews and terminal controller skill. • Appropriate ordnance. • Communications. • C2. E-10. Preplanned requests for CAS include those CAS requirements foreseeable early enough to be included in the joint air tasking order (ATO) or mission orders. The requesting agency sends CAS requests through the S-3 or fire support channels to the JSOTF FSCOORD. After requests are approved, they (if sent to the JSOAC) are— • Filled by SO aircraft. • Forwarded to the joint air operations center (JAOC) (via the SOLE) to be filled using conventional aircraft. E-11. Preplanned CAS requests should be received in sufficient time to staff and coordinate at all levels and should be received by the JSOAC 36 hours before the ATO execution. Conventional preplanned CAS request channels are identified in Figure E-2, page E-7. E-12. Immediate requests for CAS are processed— • The same as a preplanned request. • Immediately via the Air Force air request net (AFARN) to the Air Support Operations Center. Immediate requests for CAS include the following: • Requirements that were identified too late to be included in the ATO.

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• The format for requesting CAS is theater-dependent. Requests can be

sent by using— United States message text format (USMTF) close air support request (CASREQ). DD Form 1972, Joint Tactical Air Strike Request. CASREQ found in JP 3-09.3.

Figure E-2. Conventional Preplanned CAS Request Channels

NOTE: This diagram does not show the SOF TACP elements. They will belocated with SF from detachment to SFOB.E-13. Special operations CAS connectivity is shown in Figure E-3, page E-8.Execution of CAS requests includes the following: • Fighter check-in (provides the controllers with all pertinent information regarding the aircraft and weapons). • CAS 9-line briefing, which includes the following: Established standards for use with fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. Threat condition information that does not dictate the CAS aircraft’s tactics. The mission brief that follows the numbered sequence (1–9) of the CAS Briefing Form. Use of a standardized briefing sequence that improves mission direction and control by allowing terminal controllers to pass information rapidly. Mission information and sequence that may be modified to fit the tactical situation.

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Figure E-3. Special Operations CAS Connectivity

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NAVAL GUNFIRE E-14. NGF ships are very mobile, which allows them to be positioned to take advantage of their limited deflection pattern. Very close supporting fire can be delivered when the gun-target line is parallel to friendly front lines. The relatively flat trajectory of NGF results in the probable error being long or short as opposed to left or right. E-15. The general mission of NGF support is to assist the ground force by destroying, neutralizing, or suppressing targets that oppose that force. Requests for NGF are processed through the S-3/G-3/J-3 channels. Communications operate on the division NGF support net (HF).

As Required  Clearance: Transmission of the fire mission is clearance to fire. Danger close is 200 m with the 105 mm, and 125 m with the 40 mm, 25 mm, and 20 mm. For closer fire, the observer must accept responsibility for increased risk. State “Cleared Danger Close” on line fire. This clearance may be preplanned.  At my command: State “At My Command” on line fire. The gun ship will call “Ready to Fire” when ready.  Adjust Fire: Only adjust for marking rounds or incorrect target. Adjust from impact by giving range (meters) and cardinal (North, South, East, West) direction.Do Not  Do not ask the gun ship to identify colors.  Do not reference clock positions.  Do not pass run-in headings/no-fire headings.  Do not correct left/right or short/long.

Figure E-6. Example of AC-130 Call for Fire

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Grid Method (Given in Two Transmissions)

“____________, this is _______________, Fire Mission. Target at ____________, Over”

Gun Target Line (From Gun to Target)

Ready/Time of Flight/Line of Fire (If Firing ILLUM) (Time of Flight in Seconds) First Salvo at Offset (Danger Close Missions Only) Summit (Max Ordnance in Feet for Air Spotter, Meters for Ground Spotter)

Changes to Call for Fire

Figure E-7. Naval Gunfire Call for Fire Example

E-18 Appendix F

Base Camp Construction, Methods,

and Requirements Prior to 1965, SF had little or no authority to choose the site of a proposed camp in South Vietnam. As a result of this policy, many camps were inconveniently situated relative to terrain and available indigenous personnel. Uprooting and relocation of indigenous people to establish a camp were found to be ineffective due to general discontent of the HN and subsequent high rate of desertion back to the areas from which they had originally come. Many of these camps were located upon the abandoned remains of old French forts. French foundations, usable buildings, and trenches were incorporated into the base camps, resulting in a considerable saving of construction time, particularly if a clearing was available for an airstrip. In principle, these camps were similar to those of their French predecessors, relying on heavy walls, moats, and trenches to thwart attacks. No geometric pattern was standard, although stars, rectangles, and triangles were among the more common shapes. Reliance upon a surrounding boundary for camp defense had a severe disadvantage. Once this boundary was breached, further defense of the camp was practically impossible and defeat was highly probable. In 1965, two significant changes occurred to facilitate the effectiveness of the SF team: 1) SF soldiers were permitted to select sites that most effectively used terrain, available water supply, and indigenous personnel to accomplish the mission; and 2) the “base camp” concept emerged, considering those factors upon which a potential base camp should be evaluated to maximize the effectiveness of an SF operation.

CAMP CONSTRUCTION METHODS AND FACILITIES

F-1. The base camp concept has been categorized into three basic operational designs based on the ground water table (GWT): subsurface, surface, and floating. F-2. Ideally, all base camps would be subsurface to provide maximum security and protection from offensive weapons. However, due to high water table or flooding conditions in certain areas, surface camps and floating camps are also required. All structures are currently provided by either prefabricated containers or prefabricated wood frame construction. To further increase speed of construction, the erection and design of all buildings have been standardized. Camps are authorized certain specific structures, the basic design of which is the same for all camps. In the past, a great deal of time was spent in the procurement of materials, both before and during construction. Prestocking and pre-positioning materials have corrected this

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deficiency. All construction materials required for a camp are precut and stored on a building-by-building basis. The building materials are then banded and palletized so they can be delivered. If only certain buildings are required (for example, rehabilitation of the existing camp), buildings are ordered by name and shipped to the site. A stock level of two complete camps is maintained. F-3. The prefabricated container is the basic element for all underground facilities and for those surface facilities required to be hardened. The machine gun bunker, communications bunker, emergency medical bunker, power generator facility, tactical operations bunker, POL storage, and ammunition bunker are typical of the facilities provided by the prefabricated container. The container is “hardened” by burying, sandbagging, or a combination of the two.

CAUTION Using large caliber or crew-served weapon systems in an enclosed emplacement will require proper hearing protection and adequate ventilation of gases. Also, if using a prefabricated bunker with open-air area in the rear, a blast wall/revetment approximately 4 feet from rear and at least as high as the bunker should be built. This will help protect occupants from possible enemy indirect fires and fratricide.

F-4. The “floating” camp permits continued operation of the base camp in areas subject to periodic flooding. Surrounding the camp is an earthen wall or dyke, which permits operation of the camp during the initial stages of the rainy season. In addition, the earthen wall creates protection and an obscure view of the inside of the camp from the opposition. When the water level exceeds the capacity of the dyke to prevent flooding of the camp, two additional concepts are used for the floating camp. One concept provides a floating platform or raft constructed of empty 55-gallon drums banded to a wooden frame and floor members upon which facilities are constructed. The second concept uses an adjustable platform permitting a convenient elevation above the water level to be maintained. Rafts are used to support crew-served weapons, buildings, and airboat docking facilities. A helicopter landing pad is provided, consisting of a wooden platform supported by four containers. This configuration does not float but does manage to keep the pad above water in most cases.

DEFENSE MEASURES F-5. An intrusion barrier consisting of tanglefoot wire, concertina wire, and various anti-intrusion devices integrated with claymore mines surrounds the camp. This barrier is currently “packaged” by placing the above items in containers in sufficient quantity to provide approximately 300 meters of hasty perimeter.

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F-6. Resupply of the base camp should not depend almost exclusively on aircraft. However, each base camp should have an airstrip. An airstrip capable of landing a C-130 is desirable in addition to the helicopter pad, although the construction effort is somewhat extensive and in certain adverse terrain conditions, practically unattainable. Construction of an airstrip generally requires the greatest single camp construction effort and usually dictates the use of heavy moving equipment. Soil stabilization or landing-mat material is usually required for a pad or airstrip to reduce the severe dust conditions prevalent during the dry season and extreme mud during the rainy season.

WATER SUPPLY F-7. A plentiful water supply, preferably multiple wells located within the perimeter of the base camp, is essential for survival of camp inhabitants. Streams and cisterns are inferior alternatives to the well as a source of water.

POWER SUPPLY F-8. Electric power is provided by diesel or gasoline-driven generator sets, usually 30 to 50 kilowatt (kW) capacity each, obtained through the military supply system. The number of generator sets required depends upon the size of that particular camp.

COMMON REQUIREMENTS FOR BASE CAMPS

F-9. The following facilities are common to all base camps described above and are considered standards for camp construction by SF: • ARSOF billets. ARSOF personnel are authorized a minimum of 48 square feet per person for sleeping quarters. Where possible, personnel of the same military occupational specialty (for example, 18Cs) should not be billeted together. Ideally, the sleeping quarters will be divided among the various buildings so that individuals will be billeted in or near the building in which they work. • Cover of sufficient height. To protect a person sleeping in bed from an 81-mm mortar burst 15 meters away, cover is required around all ARSOF sleeping areas. Overhead cover for sleeping areas is also recommended, but not required. • ARSOF sanitary facilities. One bathhouse and one latrine are authorized per SFODA. • ARSOF dining, dayroom, and office facilities. A minimum of 1,000 square feet of floor space is authorized for these facilities. • Supply and joint operations facilities. A minimum of 1,300 square feet of floor space is authorized for these facilities. • Communications bunker. The communications bunker is authorized 56 square feet of floor space and must be designed to withstand a hit from small arms or an 81-mm mortar burst 5 meters away. • Dispensary. The dispensary is authorized 1,300 square feet of floor space. This building should have a waiting area, a records control area, examination area, minor surgery room with water supply and area for

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sterilization, secured drugs, equipment room, and bed space for a

minimum of eight patients. • Emergency medical bunker. This bunker is authorized 112 square feet of floor space and will be designed using the same criteria as the communications bunker. • Generator building. A minimum of 10 x 10 feet open-sided or adequately ventilated is required. The sides will be sandbagged or properly protected with a blast wall to a minimum height of 4 feet. • Water tower. Two 10-foot water towers are authorized. Wells will be dug, if possible. • Crew-served weapons pits. Mortar pits will be of standard design (FM 5-34). For every two mortars, a minimum of three pits will be constructed. • HN billeting. HN personnel are authorized 35 square feet of floor space per individual. These structures need to be constructed with a low silhouette. • HN latrine. Adequate facilities (20 seats per 400 men). • HN dining facility. This area is authorized 2,000 square feet of floor space. NOTE: All of the above facilities are addressed using minimum square footage. Storage, ammo, POL, water purification, and aircraft facilities have to be provided and approved. FM 5-103, Survivability, includes further information on thickness or sandbag-depth dimensions to be added to bunkers.

EXCAVATION AND EARTHMOVING REQUIREMENTS

F-10. Excavation and earthmoving operations are of exceptional importance in the construction of a base camp. A brief discussion of various earthmoving methods is summarized below. F-11. One of the major requirements in the construction of an SF base camp is to rapidly develop the defensive facilities so as to minimize the length of time that the personnel preparing the camp are vulnerable to attack. During the construction period, large forces of guard personnel are needed for security of the site. One of the most time-consuming tasks is that of excavating earth fortifications. F-12. The volume of earth removed for major internal camp facilities has been found to be relatively independent of the number of personnel in a camp and dependent upon the type of camp under construction. With the exception of the HN billets, major camp facilities (such as the TOC and the communications bunkers) are of a standard size, independent of the total number of people in the camp. Other facilities are estimated as to size and excavation requirements. The volume of earth to be removed to accommodate necessary structures and facilities is shown in Table F-1, page F-5. The use of explosives can also help expedite the excavation of earth for the emplacement of buildings, trenches, and so on.

CAMP CONSTRUCTION SEQUENCE

F-14. A possible construction sequence for a hypothetical base camp is outlined below. In the case of an actual base camp, the sequence followed may have to be varied, added to, or shortened to suit the particular circumstances of the case. • Initial Setup: Arrive. Set up warning outposts. Dig temporary pit latrines. Set up defensive perimeter; clear fields of fire as necessary. Set up armed points. Set up communications with FOB/AOB. Set up first-aid facilities. Lay out base camp. Set up water supply. Set up waste disposal. Set up electric power supply. Set up dining facilities. Set up fuel storage site. • Refinement and Strengthening: Establish drainage patterns. Strengthen defenses. Clear vegetation, move earth, make earthen dykes and embankments. Improve air supply facilities. Build secured storage spaces. Build dispensary facilities. Build living facilities. F-15. On arrival, the immediate requirement is to set up defense measures and establish communications with FOB/AOB and air facilities. Sanitary and waste-disposal facilities and water supply are next in order of urgency. In some areas where SF operates, digestive and other illnesses are endemic. Much of the trouble stems from the unsanitary practices of the HN population. Maintenance of a healthy environment can contribute significantly to the vitality and military effectiveness of the personnel involved, both HN and SF. In the case of a camp set up in a previously uninhabited location, sanitary practices must be followed from the beginning since it is difficult to sanitize an area once it has been fouled. F-16. Other essential functions are established next. Once the camp is in an operating condition, the facilities may be refined and strengthened.

Building Materials This section provides the necessary materials to construct a generic base camp. Any other design or size would require a modified list of building materials for construction. AR 71-32, Force Development and Documentation – Consolidated Policies; AR 415-16; AR 710-1, Centralized Inventory Management of the Army Supply System; and AR 725-50, Requisition, Receipt, and Issue System, include additional information.

MATERIALS G-1. The amounts of materials listed are based on normal construction waste residue and unforeseen construction needs. Each area of the camp has been listed separately to aid in the ordering and procuring of materials needed during any project phase. G-2. All wood should be protected against wet conditions and termites. To prevent insect, rot, and pilferage problems, materials should not be stockpiled too far in advance of utilization. G-3. Security of materials will be of primary importance during the construction process. Detachment members must ensure that all materials are stored inside a guarded perimeter at all times. G-4. All materials are ordered for a specific position or location; detachment members should not use materials that are not intended for that project. G-5. All listed materials are the minimum required amounts to construct a generic building, which can be adapted for use as any building and any specialty buildings if significantly different from the generic team house. The charts include the following (corresponding figures and tables in Appendixes H and I are shown in parentheses): • Generic team house, Table G-1, page G-2. (Figures H-1a through H-2b and Table H-1 [pages H-2 through H-4], and Figures I-1 [page I-3] and I-15 [page I-12].) • Generic bunker, Table G-2, page G-3. (Figures I-17 through I-20 [medical or communications bunker], pages I-13 and I-14; Figures I-42 through I-44 [generator bunker], pages I-25 and I-26; and Figures I-45 and I-46 [fuel bunker], page I-27.) • Guard tower, Table G-3, page G-3. (Figures I-47 through I-49, pages I-28 through I-30.) • Barriers, Table G-4, page G-4. • Vehicle revetment, Table G-5, page G-4.

GENERIC TEAM HOUSE

G-6. Table G-1 is a list of materials required to construct two team houses (20 feet by 50 feet) that will house six personnel each. The remainder of the personnel will be dispersed throughout the camp in various other buildings and bunkers (communications, medical, and others).

COMMUNICATIONS TRENCH - OPEN

G-11. Table G-6 is a list of materials required to construct 8,000 feet of open communications trenches in both the inner and outer perimeter and timber trestle bridges for vehicles to cross five places.

Electrical Requirements This section provides all electrical and air conditioning requirements for a base camp. All fixtures, circuit loads, and specifications are included in the wiring diagram, and a panel board diagram is provided for each structure within the camp.

POWER SUPPLY H-1. The electrical requirements for this camp have been calculated based on the projected electrical needs of the camp at the average daily load. Power source will be from fuel-driven generators as both the primary and alternate methods. The primary will be from two 100-kW diesel generators that will run for 12 hours each. This method allows one generator to cool and have operator’s maintenance performed, which will greatly extend the generator’s life between overhauls. The additional emergency power for the critical areas of the camp will come from separate 5-kW gasoline generators placed near the location to be serviced (medical bunker, dispensary, communications and TOC bunkers). A grid system will be incorporated to direct power to all areas of the camp, as required.

GENERATOR LOCATION H-2. The 100-kW generators will be located in separate bunkers to prevent destruction of both generators at once during an attack. In addition, the noise and emissions levels should be considered when installing the equipment so as not to interfere with sleep and operations. H-3. The communications and TOC bunkers will have battery backup power available in case of total power failure.

ELECTRICAL NOTES H-9. Figures H-7 through H-9, pages H-11 and H-12, depict switch connections in a circuit. Figure H-10, page H-12, is a diagram of an air conditioning wall unit. The following contains various electrical notes to be used for the electrical wiring of the base camp: • To determine number of lights required in a building: room square footage divided by 28 = number of lights. • To determine wattage required from amps: amps x 0.85 = watts. • Junction boxes: 2 inches x 4 inches used for lights, receptacles, and wall switches. 4 inches x 4 inches used for ceiling fans and perimeter lights. 15 inches x 15 inches used for wire connection between building safety switch and main bus line. 18 inches x 18 inches used for wire connection between perimeter light safety switch and main bus line.

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• Electrical circuits: Lighting circuit should contain no more than nine lights per circuit. Receptacle circuit should contain no more than six receptacles per circuit. No more than three circuits may be placed in the same conduit. If this is done, the circuit cannot share a common neutral. • Wiring: Unless otherwise indicated on diagrams, #12 wire will be used. Only the size wire indicated between each connection should be used. • Power loads: Between fixtures that are only used during daylight and ones only used during darkness, the total power draw should not exceed 100 kW at any one time.

Figure H-7. Connecting Multiple Switches in the Same Circuit

Figure H-8. Connecting Switch Before the Light (Fan) in a Circuit

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Figure H-9. Connecting Switch After the Light (Fan) in a Circuit

Figure H-10. Air Conditioning Wall Unit

H-12 Appendix I

Base Camp Individual Building Plans

This appendix provides the necessary plans to construct the buildings and structures used in the various configurations of base camps.

Figure I-43. Generator Bunker (Front View)

Figure I-44. Generator Bunker (Side View)

Figure I-45. Fuel Bunker (Front View)

Figure I-46. Fuel Bunker (Side View)

Figure I-47. Guard Tower (Front View)

Figure I-48. Guard Tower (Side View)

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Figure I-49. Guard Tower (Wall Section)

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Figure I-50. Vehicle Revetment (Side View)

I-31 Appendix J

Vietnam-Era Base Camp Examples

This appendix provides examples of different shapes and sizes of basecamps. During the Vietnam era, base camps were established in bothrural and urban areas. These camps did not always employ inner barriersor perimeters. There was, however, a common denominator found withina majority of the camps: trench systems (zigzag), obstacles, commandbunkers, and key weapons bunkers. Regardless of the shape, size, orlocation, care should be taken to make maximum use of all weaponssystems, C2 elements, and protective systems in and around the camp.

J-1. Base camps can be modified to almost any shape or size to fit the situation. Functional requirements and the METT-TC factors will dictate the actual design and requirements for all camps. J-2. Below are Vietnam-era base camp examples (Figure J-1, pages J-1 and J-2). The photos show the various geometric shapes that were used to form base camps.

Figure J-1. Vietnam-Era Base Camp Examples

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Figure J-1. Vietnam-Era Base Camp Examples (Continued)

J-2 Appendix K

Media Support Media reporting influences public opinion, which may affect the perceived legitimacy of an operation, and ultimately influences the success or failure of the operation. The speed with which the media can collect and convey information to the public makes it possible for the world’s populace to become aware of an incident as quickly as, or even before, JFCs and USG decision makers. Public affairs (PA) plans should provide open and independent reporting, respond to media queries that provide the maximum disclosure with minimum delay, and create an environment between commander and reporters that encourages balanced coverage of operations. Additional information may be found in JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War; FM 100-6, Information Operations, Chapter 5; FM 46-1, Public Affairs Operations, Chapter 7; and The Judge Advocate General’s School, United States Army (TJAGSA) publication, Operational Law Handbook, Chapter 30.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

K-1. The Public Affairs Operations Center (PAOC) forms the nucleus of a media support center, and is responsible to the gaining command public affairs officer (PAO) and his commander for facilitating media coverage of operations. Facilitating media coverage includes guarding OPSEC, providing briefings and escorts, registering media, coordinating media visits to units, assisting in deploying media pools when required, and coordinating logistical support for the media center, such as communications, billeting, dining, and transportation. K-2. PA operations require additional dedicated transportation assets and rely on transportation provided by supported units. Additional ground transportation requirements may be met by using leased commercial equipment; however, PA elements will commonly require access to additional tactical vehicles. Additionally, critical time-sensitive events requiring a rapid PA response, especially when they occur in remote locations, will require air transportation assets. K-3. PA operations will frequently involve transporting journalists and their equipment. Although media representatives may have their own transportation assets, unit commanders may authorize travel in Army vehicles. The Army goal of providing access to operations, units, and personnel is best accomplished by providing representatives with transportation or travel support.

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MISSION-ESSENTIAL TASK LIST

K-4. Information battlespace requires beginning-to-end, protected, seamless, electronic transfer and processing capability for the warfighter to conduct IO virtually anywhere at any time. This capability must be a multimedia network of systems that transports video, imagery, data, and voice information to create an information sphere that the battle commander can plug in and pull what he needs to visualize the battle from the current state to a successful end state. The signal support mission-essential tasks to protect and construct the information sphere are to— • Link the force to the information sphere to achieve seamless global connectivity. • Transport information with broadband, high-capability systems optimizing satellites and terrestrial signal support to connect continental United States (CONUS), intermediate staging bases (ISBs), and joint operational areas (JOAs). • Reach back through strategic entry points to power-projection platforms and information fusion centers. • Extend the communication range of battle command operations centers and fighting platforms by providing command, control, communi- cations, and computers for mobile operations. Future technology plans include the following: • Direct broadcast satellites to enable wide access to information at various echelons in real time or near-real time. This in turn will enable a new level of empowerment and self-initiative for lower echelons. • Multimedia technology will enable three-dimensional presentation of imagery and graphics to help commanders visualize their battlespace for more effective training, planning, rehearsal, and execution.

DOD MEDIA GUIDELINES FOR COVERAGE

OF DOD COMBAT OPERATIONS K-5. Open and independent reporting will be the principal means of coverage of U.S. military operations. Journalists in a combat zone will receive credentials from the U.S. military and will be required to abide by a clear set of military security ground rules that protect U.S. forces and their operations. Violation of the ground rules can result in suspension of credentials and expulsion from the combat zone of the journalists involved. News organizations will make them familiar with U.S. military operations. K-6. Journalists will be provided access to all major military units. Special operations restriction may limit access in some cases. Military PAOs should act as liaisons but should not interfere with the reporting process.

INFORMATION FROM THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE

K-7. Soldiers should follow this guide for those times when they must talk with the press. Soldiers must always work through the PAO, as well as notify and get approval from their chain of command before talking to the press.

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WHY TALK TO THE MEDIA?

K-8. News organizations work a long time to achieve a reputation for a reliable product, good service, and stability. They do this by delivering the same quality news products over and over again. That reputation is a fragile commodity for it can be destroyed by a single mishap. One bad news item is remembered forever, while one hundred good news items seem to be forgotten. K-9. If only one side of the story is available, the person being interviewed can ensure that his will be printed. The “no comment” gambit will not sit well with the viewing public (though it may be appropriate in limited cases). K-10. A senior uniformed leader in the Army is responsible for the management of resources and, more importantly, of American lives. Americans pay for the military, so they own the military and are entitled to know the “how” and “why” of the military. K-11. The men and women of the media are competent professionals as dedicated to their profession as soldiers are to theirs. Media personnel should be treated with the same respect that soldiers expect, and their capability to gather information should never be underrated. They can be tenacious and may have sources of information not available to the soldier. K-12. The command or agency has an important story to tell to the American people who support military activities. In some cases, the interviewed soldier will be the most believable spokesperson to represent them.

PREPARING TO MEET THE MEDIA

K-13. The following suggestions are for the soldier who is preparing for an interview. He should— • Find out who the reporter is. • Find out why he was involved in the interview. • Establish ground rules on what will be covered. • Set how much time will be allowed for the interview. • Anticipate questions and think through his responses. • Do his homework. • Know the key points he wants to make. • Not memorize a statement (he will appear stilted or pompous). • Read the newspaper and listen to the radio.

The “Five and Five” Rule

K-14. Soldiers should know the five worst and best things about their organization and be able to discuss them in detail any time. They also need to stay current and ensure that the detachment stays current.

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Self-Check Before an Interview

K-15. The following information is important for the soldier who is preparing for an interview. He should— • Check his appearance. • Not wear sunglasses outdoors or tinted glasses indoors. • Dress appropriately when wearing civilian clothes. • Keep jewelry simple. • Stand straight, when standing. • Keep hands relaxed. • Sit well into the chair, when seated, with hands resting on chair arms or on legs. • Be warm and friendly. • Be careful not to adopt the interviewer’s attitude. • Concentrate on the interviewer. K-16. The unit PAO or country team PAO (United States Information Service [USIS]) can give the best advice before, during, and after the interview. As soon as someone has been asked for an interview, the PAO should be brought into the action. PAOs know the media and the news business and can give sound advice on what should and should not be done. If a soldier goes into an interview or speaking engagement with a positive attitude and really cares about his points, everything will be fine. When a soldier has a story to tell, it should be done right and professionally.

BTU British thermal unit

C conduit C2 command and control CA Civil Affairs—Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-military operations. (JP 1-02) cal caliber CAS close air support CASCOM Combined Arms Support Command CASREQ close air support request CBT combatting terrorism—Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. (JP 1-02) CBU cluster bomb unit CCL combat-configured load CD counterdrug CHS combat health support—Health support services required on the battlefield to maintain the health of the soldier and to both treat and evacuate casualties in an expedient manner to preserve life. CI counterintelligence—Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. (JP 1-02) COA course of action COM chief of mission COMSEC communications security CONEX container express CONPLAN concept plan; operation plan in concept format CONUS continental United States CP-WMD counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction CS combat support CSS combat service support CST coalition support team CTA common table of allowance

OCONUS outside the continental United States

OP observation post OPCEN operations centerOPCON operational control—Transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Operational control may be delegated and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authori- tative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force comman- ders and Service and/or functional component commands. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. (JP 1-02)OPFUND operational fund OP-KIT Observation Post Kit OPLAN operation plan OPLOG operational logOPORD operation order OPSEC operations security—A process of identifying critical informa- tion and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems; b. determine indicators that hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries; and c. select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. (JP 1-02) PA public affairs PAO public affairs officer PAOC Public Affairs Operations Center PD point detonating

STU-III secure telephone unit III

TACAIR tactical air TACAN tactical air navigation TACC tactical air control center (USN) TACP tactical air control party TACSAT tactical satellite THREATCON terrorist threat condition TI time-initiated TISA Troop Issue Subsistence Activity TJAGSA The Judge Advocate General’s School, United States Army TM technical manual TOC tactical operations center TOT time on target TOW tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided (missile) TPFDL time-phased force and deployment list TRP target reference point TTADB tactical terrain analysis database TV television TVS thermal vision sight UBL unit basic load UHF ultrahigh frequency U.S. United States USA United States Army USAF United States Air Force USAJFKSWCS United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School USASFC(A) United States Army Special Forces Command (Airborne) USASOC United States Army Special Operations Command UN United Nations USC United States Code USG United States Government USIS United States Information Service USMC United States Marine Corps USMTF United States message text format

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USN United States Navy

USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command UTM universal transverse mercator UW unconventional warfare—A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predomi- nantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape. (JP 1-02) V volt(s) VA volt-ampere VAC volts, alternating current VHF very high frequency VIP very important person VT variable time VTC video teleconferencing WP white phosphorus yd yard(s)