Saturday, November 28, 2015

In 1883,
the plantation owners in Hawai’i introduced the mongoose to their island in
order to control the rat population that was wreaking havoc with their sugar
cane. As a result, while the rat population was unaffected – rats are nocturnal
while mongoose are diurnal – the mongoose population grew exponentially,
feeding off the eggs of birds, almost all of whom were ground nesters, until
the that population was all but extinct. From the article linked below:

“Like so many
invasive species that now run amuck on islands around the world, mongooses were
intentionally introduced to Hawaii. Sugar cane farmers took their cue from
Jamaican plantation owners who imported mongooses to control rat populations.
In 1883 the mongooses were let loose in the fields, an approach that proved to
be colossally uninformed. As it turns out, rats are nocturnal and mongooses are
diurnal. The exotic predators never came in contact with their rodent prey, and
native bird populations began crashing instead.”

What’s the lesson
here? Well, if your dealing with rats and you think that an invasion by an
alien presence will solve the “problem,” think again. Think this isn’t relevant
for politics? Well, then read a book entitled Operation Flytrap, which deals with a successful gang intervention
program in Los Angeles. That is, it was successful in the limited sense of
moderating gang behavior in the area where it was implemented. But when its
results were looked at more closely, this “success” came at a rather high
price, i.e., it devastated the families of the gang members arrested and
imprisoned, thereby reinforcing the very conditions that led to the creation of
the gangs in the first place!

Or, if you wish, just
look toward and into the Middle East, and you will see the same phenomenon
occurring. It is an interesting situation.

Thursday, November 19, 2015

People may
be forgiven for thinking that those being labeled “ISIS” are a force of nature
because that is what the powers that be want us to think. That is, those with
the power want us to think that this phenomenon, “ISIS,” has arisen,
spontaneously as it were, arising from, say, the Islamic religion and gathering
speed and power like a hurricane or a tornado. Hence, this force of nature
threatens to sweep us away as if it were a tsunami. And we had better band
together to fight ISIS, to resist this allegedly “natural” phenomenon that
threatens all of Western civilization, if not civilization simply. Needless to
say, we need to fortify those with power to fight off this potentially
overwhelming force.

Now, this
scenario obscures and even makes disappear the fact that ISIS is merely the
result of politics. That is, there is a political agenda afoot in the Middle
East, an agenda embraced by “the West” and its allies, which involves “regime
change.” George Bush’s invasion and occupation of Iraq, while disguised as an
attempt to find and destroy Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction, was part of
this agenda, an agenda that has not been repudiated by the Obama administration
or, additionally, by anyone with power in D.C. In 2006, the Democrats pretended
to repudiate it but once controlling the Congress again, did nothing to
effectuate that pretense.

Part of
this agenda was carried out in Libya, where jihadists, supported by the U.S.,
were used to overthrow and kill Kaddafi, which led eventually to the deaths of
some Americans, including the American ambassador. Of course, the powers that
be disguised this by making the issue Hillary Clinton’s alleged
irresponsibility in this situation. As a result, no one bothered to question
the original policy or agenda. Similarly, it is necessary to keep in mind that
what is being labeled ISIS today is merely the result of pursuing regime change
in Syria, where once again, as in Libya, jihadists are being used to unseat an
existing and unfriendly regime.

Insofar as
this is true, ISIS constitutes no more a threat to “the West” than those
jihadists in Libya or the Sunnis the U.S. supported during “the surge” in Iraq.
Sure, they have, can, and will do some damage but it should be recognized that
this too is not unacceptable to those seeking regime change. Some death and
destruction, especially involving those places and activities in “the West”
such as concerts or sporting events that reflect its alleged superiority to
“the Rest,” will only make it appear all the more important to get rid of
Assad, thereby getting at Hezbollah and Iran, both of whom support and are
supported by the Assad regime. And once that objective is attained, ISIS will
fade away or become, for all practicable purposes, insignificant.

So, yes,
ISIS is or reflects “just politics.” And while this is perhaps reassuring, it
is also unsettling in revealing the character of our ruling class.

Tuesday, November 17, 2015

When I use
to have students read The Autobiography
of Malcolm X, I would ask them to distinguish between what led Malcolm,
then Malcolm Little, to be a small time criminal and what led some of them, the
students, to want to go to law school and become lawyers. Always, the first
response was, usually expressed only in looking at me like I was insane, “Are
you kidding, Schultz?”

But,
eventually, after some discussion, they came to see that what led Malcolm to be
a small time criminal and what led them to desire a law degree and what comes
with it were exactly the same things, viz., social status, [some] wealth, and a
respectable career. Malcolm Little had acquired all three as the result of
being a small time hood, selling some drugs, burgling some homes, and strutting
his stuff, with his conked hair and zoot suit. He even had a nickname, “Big
Red,” which confirmed that he was a known quantity among his “peers.” He might
even have been called the “F. Lee Bailey” of his hood.

Eventually,
of course, Malcolm was arrested, charged, tried, convicted and sent to prison,
not just for his crimes but also, he was convinced, because he had crossed the
color line by having a white girl friend. Anyway, in prison, Malcolm “got
religion,” and became a Black Muslim. As a result of this conversion, Malcolm
cleaned up his act, gave up crime, drugs, and alcohol, and became eventually a
leading member of the Nation of Islam. He also became what he hadn’t been as a
petty crook: A subversive who was viewed as a threat to American society.

So, what
had changed? Why was Malcolm Little no threat to our society, but Malcolm X
was? You could say it was his conversion to Islam but you would be wrong, at
least for the most part. Malcolm X was concerned with actualizing what I will
call here “the Good,” whereas Malcolm Little was only concerned with being “a
success.” Yes, X’s concern for “the Good” took the form of one version of the
Islamic faith and then another. But that might be called tangential insofar as
those who become concerned with and actively strive to actualize “the Good” in
society are, almost always, seen as subversives. Think of Martin Luther King,
Jr.; think of Frederick Douglass; think of the suffragettes; think of the famous
socialist, Eugene V. Debs; or think of the Elizabeth Cady Stanton. You could
even think of those rappers who were “Straight Outta Compton,” along with the
Beatles, Elvis, or Bruce, or way back when, Beethoven or Mozart [yes, they were
viewed as subversives too].

Those
concerned with success present no threat to society, even if they pursue that
success by “breaking the law.” It is not the criminal but the outlaw who is a threat to society. What’s
this to do with ISIS? Not much but it does have a lot to do with how we think
of those who are drawn to ISIS. They are, in their minds, “doing good,” or
committing what might be labeled “righteous slaughter.” If we don’t see this,
if we continue to think and react to these people as “delusional,” “evil” in
some simplistic or Mary Poppins way, “lost sheep,” or “mindless terrorists,” we
will not grasp who they are or what they are doing. And without that knowledge,
we will spin our wheels as we revolve around in one of those “vicious circles”
reserved for those who don’t know what they or their enemies are doing.

Below is a
link to an article written by one Scott Atran, in which he argues quite
persuasively that ISIS is much worse than “mindless terrorists,” that they have
what might be called a “playbook,” entitled “Management of Savagery/Chaos.” And
of course as Atran argues this is worth studying by “the West” so as to better
understand what ISIS is about and what to expect from them.

As the
title suggests, the ISIS strategy is to create chaos in “the West,” among what
it calls “the crusaders” and “the Zionists” by attacking them where they are
“soft” or vulnerable, such as resorts or soccer stadiums or, as we know now,
Paris. They are also focused on recruiting new members, especially from the
young, who are “rebellious” and ready for sacrifice. And, conversely, the
message “the West” has are mostly “negative” and mass messaging, rather than
intimate.

This is,
for me, all quite interesting and even revealing. And surely Atran is correct
that “treating Isis as a form of “terrorism” or “violent
extremism” masks the menace. Merely dismissing it as “nihilistic” reflects a
willful and dangerous avoidance of trying to comprehend, and deal with, its
profoundly alluring moral mission to change and save the world.” Certainly,
Atran is correct to emphasize the fact that ISIS has a “profoundly alluring
moral mission,” one that appeals to the young and the despised. And this, if
taken seriously, would help “the West” understand ISIS in a way it does not
today, when it seems all too likely to dismiss this phenomenon as a kind of
insanity or simple minded “religious extremism.”

But
what Atran’s argument lacks is any consideration of how the strategy of “the
West” plays into the hands of ISIS for that strategy seems to be also the management of savagery and chaos. As has
been pointed out, here and elsewhere, “the West” seems content with fighting
what seem to be losing wars, e.g., in Afghanistan and Iraq. Why is this the
case? Perhaps because, from the perspective of those fighting these wars,
“losing” is actually “winning” in that chaos in the Middle East is the goal, to
say nothing of the fact that losing wars does little or nothing to damage those
who wield power, the ruling class. So, those in power achieve both the chaos
they seek, a chaos that is being used to advance what are labeled “regime
changes” in the Middle East, while fortifying “the West’s” allies like Saudi
Arabia and Israel. And at the same time, these power brokers are fortifying
their own status and the regime within which they operate, as any attempt at
dissent can be portrayed as almost treasonous.

The
point is this: “the West,” like ISIS, is attempting to manage savagery and
chaos, as it were. This means that “the West” is not fully committed to warding
off ISIS’s attacks, as these attacks create more chaos. Is it a dangerous game
“the West” in playing? Of course it is, extremely dangerous. And it is also
deadly, especially for the innocent, in “the West” or in the Middle East. But
if it shortsighted of “the West” to underrate the allure of ISIS, it is also shortsighted
to underrate the extent to which “the West” will go to impose its will on the
world. And while it is useful and necessary to study ISIS as Atran does so
well, it is also just as useful and necessary to study “the West” and its brand
of imperialized politics.

Sunday, November 15, 2015

The latest
attack in France, in Paris, has been labeled by the French government “an act
of war,” as if this act was initiating a war and not continuing a war already
initiated. Moreover, this rhetoric obscures the fact that the already initiated
war was initiated in part by the “victimized” France, as well as by the
allegedly “victimized” “West.” Hence, the message is: the blame lies with “the
Rest,” not with “the West.”

But this is
clearly false. “The West,” as it in called by some, has been engaged in war
with “the Rest” for some time now, starting at the very least with Reagan and
continued, by choice, by Bush I, Clinton, Bush II, and Obama, with the support
of other nations of “the West.” Repeatedly, “the West” has chosen and chooses
to make war against “the Rest.”

Starting
with Reagan, that is, leaving aside for now the U.S. choice to make war in
Korea, in Cuba, and in Vietnam, his administration and the U.S. government
generally chose to go into Afghanistan to support the jihadists there against
the Soviet Union, chose to station marines in Beirut, chose to invade Granada,
chose to make war in Nicaragua, chose to support Saddam Hussein in his war
against Iran, and chose to make war in Libya. Papa Bush chose to undertake
“Desert Storm,” invading Iraq by choice.

Similarly,
Clinton and the government generally chose to keep the war against Iraq going,
while engaging in warfare in eastern Europe. Bush II chose to invade Iraq,
after invading Afghanistan after 9/11, despite the fact that Iraq had had
nothing to do with 9/11 and had been “defanged” since “Desert Storm.” And
Obama, and the government generally, have continued Bush II’s policies in
Afghanistan and Iraq, while supporting jihadists in Libya and Syria for the
sake of “regime change.”

The point
is this: For a long time, the U.S., with the support from other members of “the
West,” has chosen to engage in wars, either full blown wars or “low intensity
conflicts,” against “the Rest.” And “the West” has done this by choice, and not because it was forced to
do so by “the Rest.”

Some have
labeled such war making “yuppie war,” because “the West” sought to conduct
these wars – or this war – in a way that did not interfere with its lavish or
posh life styles, a choice that advancing technology seemed to make more and
more prudent or realistic. But as such, it was and is important that these
choices for war making be disguised, and this in at least two ways.

First,
these wars or this war needed to be disguised as defensive or as “accidental” or
“unintentional,” as in the famous quagmire
called Vietnam. Either ‘the West” was and is merely reacting to “the Rest,” which
is necessarily labeled, as needed, an “evil empire,” the “axis of evil,” or
bloodthirsty Islamofascists. Or, conversely, “the West” gets sucked into,
against its will, another quagmire from which it could not escape, ala’
Vietnam.

Second,
these wars or this war must be disguised as “small” or “clean” wars, fought
with “smart” weapons used to make “surgical strikes,” thereby hiding their
brutality, their bestiality, and their inhuman character. Otherwise, it would
not be possible for the aggressors, “the West,” to react each time they are
attacked as if they were being “victimized” by those, “the Rest,” who allegedly
“hate us” for our life styles and freedom, and not because we are repeatedly
attacking them. One thing I find so interesting is how so many people genuinely
seem to believe that “the West” is being victimized. But then you can “fool
some of the people all of the time.”

And these
disguises work so well, win so many “hearts and minds,” as it were, that I am
tempted to think and say that Machiavelli was correct. That is, what appears to
be moral virtue is actually little more than a disguise behind which the
brutal, the bestial, and the inhuman hide. But even if I were to succumb to
this temptation, I would console myself with the realization that Machiavelli
knew what our current day “Machiavellians” don’t know, viz., that the brutal,
the bestial, and the inhuman are not deserving of his or our admiration. For
Machiavelli, unlike our current “Machiavellians,” was not a relativist and he
sought to improve upon or at least control those inhuman beings so often
confused with and even praised as real humans.

Friday, November 13, 2015

The current
campaign for the presidency has shown me that the United States’ war in Vietnam,
a war for “hearts and minds,” was victorious. To see this, all you need do is
to remember that the “hearts and minds” to be won were and are located here in
the United States. And as there is no one seeking the presidency from our two
major parties that rejects America’s current wars or its past wars, including
Vietnam, then the campaign for “hearts and minds” has been successful. All of
our wars, past and present, were and are “good wars,” including the Vietnam
War.

What did it
take to win the Vietnam War, so understood? Exactly what some of those in power
at the time of the war, e.g., McGeorge Bundy, thought and said it would take:
Massive bombing of Vietnam, north and south, as well as Laos and Cambodia;
killing millions of Vietnamese, north and south; and last but far from least,
sacrificing the lives of thousands of American soldiers and the bodies and
minds of thousands more, despite or rather because of the fact that the war
could not be “won” on the battlefield, as those in power knew and said, at
least privately. The men in power, “the establishment,” were right in their
strategy for winning the Vietnam War in this fashion and they have prevailed. Even
Richard Nixon died a “statesman.”

It took me
awhile to realize our victory in the Vietnam War, because I am a bit slow to
comprehend these things. But it is all-too-evident now, in 2015, as attested to
by the views of those seeking the presidency, none of which is opposed to our
war making, both past and present.

And make no
mistake: In 2016, if you vote for either candidate from the Republican or
Democratic parties, you are voting for war. There are no two ways about it. And
so when the chickens come to roost, as they always do, no complaining because,
among other things, when you wage war on others, you are legitimating them
waging war on you; because, as we Americans tend to forget, “making war” is a
two way street.

Saturday, November 7, 2015

At times,
the most amazing things happen, things that help clarify just what is going on
politically. One of those times happened today when, to pass the time, I read
an essay entitled, “Low-Intensity Conflict: A Growing Threat to Peace,” written
by Michael T. Klare and published in a book entitled, Peace: Meanings, Politics, Strategies.

To get
right to it, Klare argues that what is called “low-intensity conflict” has been
US policy for some time before 1989, when this book was published. It consists
of four particular types of military action or war making: counterinsurgency,
pro-insurgency, peacetime contingency operations, and military show of force.
As Klare puts it: “From a low-intensity conflict point of view, the United
States is at war, extensively, aggressively, and with every evidence of
continuing this activity.” [p.114]

Of course,
“low-intensity” does not mean low levels of violence, bloodshed, or savagery.
Low-intensity conflict in Guatemala took over 100,000 lives, and other actions
have taken at least that number. Moreover, low-intensity warfare is a
post-Vietnam phenomenon because it keeps “U.S. involvement . . . sufficiently
indistinct and inexpensive,” both financially and personnel wise, thereby
avoiding “the strident demonstrations and antimilitaristic attitudes of the
Vietnam era.”

It is, as Klare puts it so nicely,
“the ultimate in ‘yuppie’ warfare” as “it allows privileged Americans to go on
buying condominiums, wearing chic designer clothes, eating expensive meals at
posh restaurants, and generally living in style without risking their own
lives, without facing conscription, without paying higher taxes, and, most
importantly, without being overly distracted by grisly scenes on television.”
[p. 115] As Klare sums it up: “”Hence, by definition, low-intensity conflict is
that amount of bloodshed, torture, rape, and savagery that can be sustained
overseas without triggering widespread public disapproval at home.” [p. 115]
And, of course, as the aftermaths of 9/11 or the Boston marathon bombing
illustrated so well, even “grisly scenes on television” need not deter and will
even fortify our “yuppie war-making.”

Quite
obviously, such warfare was perfectly adaptable to the alleged “war on terror.”
But it would be prudent to keep in mind that its purposes preceded Bush’s and
even Reagan’s wars on terror, encompassing “anyone
in the Third World who calls for a radical restructuring of the global system.”
As General Maxwell Taylor put it: “As the leading affluent ‘have’ power, we may
have to fight to protect our national valuables against envious ‘have-nots.’”
Or as it was put in a Rand Corporation study of 1977: “There is a
non-negligible chance that mankind is entering a period of increased social
instability and faces the possibility of a breakdown of global order as a
result of a sharpening confrontation between the Third World and the industrial
democracies.” [p. 115]

In 1988, a
report of U.S. Commission in Integrated Long-Term Strategy said that focusing
on the USSR was tunnel vision and as such would blind us to situations that
have “an adverse cumulative effect on U.S. access to critical regions, on
American credibility among allies and friends, and on American self-confidence.”
So, in order to protect ourselves from “a world of obvious ‘have-nots’,” who
are too many to kill off or to keep out with walls, “the cheapest solution is
to hire or co-opt armies of thugs and mercenaries [or jihadists], and use them
to starve and terrorize populations to the point that they are too dispirited,
or too frightened, or too weak to resist.”

And if this seems like an extreme
interpretation of U.S. policy, just consider what is now going on in Syria,
Iraq, and the Middle East generally, including the creation of thousands upon
thousands of refugees who are threatened with homelessness and even death. What
better way “to so terrorize the population – by inculcating a constant fear of
a knock on the door in the middle of the night, followed by blindfolding,
torture, mutilation, and death – that it remains silent no matter what hideous
crimes against humanity are being committed?” [p. 117] And think how well
drones and drone strikes fit into this scenario. Now, populations can be
terrorized from thousands of miles away, with the terrorists nowhere to be
seen, and with whatever “collateral damage” that occurs serving to advance the
cause. Hence, it would seem that accidentally bombing weddings or hospitals
serve the cause of low-intensity conflicts.

Klare also points out, because
there continue to be those who oppose such conflicts, that low-intensity
warfare “is a strategy aimed not only against the envious ‘have-nots’ of the
Third World, but also against those Americans who speak out against U.S.
intervention in internal Third World conflicts . . . Domestic public opinion is
the home front in the global struggle
against U.S. ‘enemies,’ and low-intensity conflict strategy is addressed as
much to this front as to overseas fronts in Central America, South Africa, and
elsewhere.” As one spokesperson for such conflicts put it: “It is vital that
the American public and our policymakers be educated as to the realities of
contemporary conflict, and the need to fight little wars successfully.” [p.
119]

As with the Vietnam War, the hearts
and minds to be “won” were in the United States as well as in Vietnam. And, it
would seem, that campaign has been successful, at least in the United States.
For now, one must “support the troops” regardless of the war they are involved
in. Anything else seems tantamount to treason.

In his
book, Machiavelli and Empire, Mikael
Hornqvist notices the following: “The
Prince 16, which on a superficial level seemed to reiterate a conventional
theme from the mirror-of-princes genre, has on closer examination proved to
contain a direct assault on the very foundation of this traditional moralist
genre, the ethical teaching of Aristotle. Through this radical move,
Machiavelli opens up a new form of political discourse…..” [p. 179]

This
radical move may be described as follows. Whereas traditionally the
mirror-of-princes genre was based on the idea that there were certain virtues
that princes – and of course others – should practice because, well, because
they were virtues and choice worthy. It followed from this that princes should
then embrace a kind of politics that was consistent with or based upon these
virtues. Because liberality was a virtue, princes should practice liberal
politics. Thus, being liberal points to a certain kind of politics, say, a
generous politics.

Machiavelli
turns this reasoning on its head. That is, for Machiavelli, princes - or anyone
seeking success for that matter - should adopt the kind of politics that makes
liberality possible or safe. As
Machiavelli makes plain, being liberal does not guarantee one’s success and, in
fact, can breed failure by creating resentment, say, at being heavily taxed to
support liberal or generous policies. Eventually, Machiavelli turns the
question, “What virtues should princes practice?” into the question, “What kind
of politics need princes practice to ensure that liberality is successful?” And
the answer is, it would seem: To be liberal, one must be “acquisitive” or
imperialistic, because that allows a prince to be generous without burdening
his subjects to pay for his generosity.

It is
important to notice how Machiavelli’s question changes political discourse.
Whereas traditionally it was asked, what virtues should a prince practice, it
is now asked, how should princes behave to be deemed virtuous? For Machiavelli,
seeming
replaces being, and seeming virtuous replaces
being virtuous. And, of course,
once this kind of thinking is embraced, manipulation, concealment, and deceit –
in a word, “appearances” or “credibility” as we would say today – become all-important.
A politics of smoke and mirrors is only a very short step away.

Successful
rule replaces virtuous rule as the standard around which political discourse
revolves. Success is that which striven for and, when achieved, often confused
with virtue. But, in fact, success is virtue’s replacement, a fact that
Machiavelli conceals beneath his appeals to restore “ancient virtue.” In fact,
“ancient virtue” is so far from being the remedy that it is the problem. And
that which rules in the political arena will also rule in the social arena,
with “Be Successful” replacing “Be Virtuous” as the polestar for human
behavior. And when success becomes confused with virtue, we should not be
surprised as that was the goal all along.

That
Machiavelli thought in this way is evident, at least intermittently, throughout
his writings. For example, in the Discourses,
II, 13, in a chapter entitled “That One Comes from Base to Great Fortune More
through Fraud Than through Force,” Machiavelli says upfront: “I esteem it to be
a very true thing that it rarely or never happens that men of small fortune
come to great ranks without force and without fraud….Nor do I believe that
force alone is ever found to be enough, but fraud alone will be found to be
quite enough…..”

Leaving
aside the question that Machiavelli obviously wants us to debate, which is more
important for success, force or fraud? and notice that he has reduced the
possible explanations for success to two, force and/or fraud. He has left out,
apparently, two other possibilities, virtue or chance, although he does mention
inheritance, which might be a kind of chance. “Great fortune” or success is
achieved, when not inherited, by force and/or fraud, leaving virtue out of the
equation altogether. And, of course, if one uses force, it would be good to
disguise this fact in order to make people think that your success did not have
to be seized but was well deserved, was a reward at it were for one’s virtues.
So even when force is used to achieve success, fraud is necessary and
beneficial.

But note
should be taken as well at how Machiavelli reduces the world, at it were. That
is, in Machiavelli’s world, virtue plays a very small role therein.
Machiavelli’s world is a world of “movers and shakers,” of human beings “on the
make;” it is not a world of imaginers, of poets, of saints, of caregivers, of
the inquisitive as opposed to the acquisitive.One might say that the “inspired,” in Machiavelli’s world, are consigned
to the margins of society, even banished as it were from “respectable society”
as the poets were banished in Plato’s Republic.
Not just imaginary republics but imagination generally will play a very small
part in Machiavelli’s world. Modern realism, to be pragmatic, shrinks “real
reality” and, therewith perhaps, shrinks humanity itself.

Wednesday, November 4, 2015

[The
following are some reactions to a book entitled, Machiavelli and Empire, by Mikael Hornqvist.]

Machiavelli
was, obviously, “disenchanted” with “traditional political ethics.” But the
implications of his disenchantment are quite interesting.

Machiavelli’s
task was to “demystify” “traditional political ethics,” based as they were on
ideas such as natural and/or divine justice, ideas that Machiavelli thought
concealed a “frightening emptiness” insofar as these ideas were mere chimeras.
Hence, Machiavelli rejected not just the prevailing theories of “just wars,”
but he rejected “the very idea of the just and divinely sanctioned war itself.”
[p. 96]

Nothing too
controversial here. But what is often overlooked is that in Machiavelli’s
world, precisely because of its “emptiness,” manipulation, rhetoric,
concealment, and deceit acquire a status, a usefulness, that they did not have
previously, while war itself is devalued.

First, once the emptiness of “just
and divinely sanctioned wars” is embraced, wars can only be useful or prudent;
they cannot be justified, either by nature or by God because there is no natural
or divine justice available. If there
actually were natural or divine justice, then wars could be justified, even be
obligatory, being fought in the name of such justice. Wars could be “holy” or
wars could be fought for “universal principles,” whereas for Machiavelli, wars
can only actually be useful or prudent. This would seem to mean that the world
would become less warlike, which is true for another reason as well.

Given its emptiness, the world,
Machiavelli’s world, is more malleable because it is simply matter, devoid of
form, and hence can be molded more readilty than if it were form as well as
matter. As a result, manipulation, rhetoric, concealment, deceit, even
“salesmanship,” become the new virtues replacing the old virtues of, say,
spiritedness or piety. The more malleable the world, the safer it is and can be
made to be by these means. War can be replaced by these new virtues, which of
course Machiavelli can sell as “ancient virtues,” thereby proving his point.

Moreover, Machiavelli, described as
the only non anti-Semite of his age, has no grounds for being such because to
be an anti-Semite, it is necessary to see the world as “ordered,” with some
human beings being superior and others inferior, if not beastly or sub-human.
Machiavelli’s “humanism” is, at it were, part and parcel of his “nihilism,” as
it were.

So, war is“tamed” in Machiavelli or domesticated, being
reduced to a useful or prudential action, unencumbered by delusions of
grandeur. And, similarly, so it what we call “government,” because in a
malleable world, purges, genocide, mass murders are un-necessary. And even
“inhuman cruelty” of the kind practiced by Hannibal is un-necessary or imprudent. In Machiavelli’s “new modes
and orders,” life becomes safer, less warlike, more “civilized” than life in
Rome. And it is almost possible to forget that these modes and orders have no
transcendent supports. Almost.

Monday, November 2, 2015

"Third, while highly intellectual in his own
distinctive way, Francis is clearly a less systematic thinker than either of
his predecessors, and especially than the academic-minded Benedict.
Whereas the previous pope defended popular piety against liberal critiques,
Francis embodies a certain style of populist Catholicism—one that’s
suspicious of overly academic faith in any form. He seems to have an
affinity for the kind of Catholic culture in which Mass attendance might be
spotty but the local saint’s processions are packed—a style of faith that’s
fervent and supernaturalist but not particularly doctrinal. He also
remains a Jesuit-formed leader, and Jesuits have traditionally combined
missionary zeal with a certain conscious flexibility about doctrinal details
that might impede their proselytizing work. This has often made them
controversial among other missionary orders, as in the famous debate over the
efforts of Matteo Ricci. A Jesuit in China during the late 16th and early
17th centuries, Ricci was attacked for incorporating Chinese concepts into his
preaching and permitting converts to continue to venerate their
ancestors. That Ricci is currently on the path to canonization, and his
critics are mostly forgotten, says something important about the value of
Jesuit envelope-pushing within the Church. But it also says something
important that Catholicism has never before had a Jesuit pope" (http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/05/will-pope-francis-break-the-church/389516/).

And now we know that what distinguishes Francis is caring.
Ricci cared and Francis cares for human beings as human beings, not as
“recruits” to the “one, true faith.” Seems to confirm how radical the
phenomenon of caring actually is, especially in the modern world. But I would
point out, it was radical in Aristotle’s world, the Athenian world, as well,
where Pericles was most highly honored, to say nothing of Plato/Socrates’
radicalism, as illustrated by Socrates’ execution.

Hence, by ridding ourselves of bureaucracy, for example, we don’t
guarantee that people will care. This is something I think Hummel misses and
makes his thought somewhat melodramatic. Which is not to say, of course, that
his thought isn’t worth paying a lot of attention to. Without the melodrama,
fed by the notion that our situation is “either/or”, as it were, one need not
simply turn away from the world or seek a monastic like life, although at times
perhaps this turning away is the best we can do.