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Wednesday, June 12, 2013

UNSG Ban's report on UNDOF/ Syria

Attached is an advance copy of the Report of the Secretary-General
on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) for the period from
1 April 2013 to 30 June 2013 for the information of the members of the Security
Council.

This report will be issued as a document of the Security Council
under the symbol S/2013/345.

12 June 2013

Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) for the Period from 1 April 2013 to 30
June 2013

I. Introduction

1. The present report gives an account of the activities of the
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) during the past three
months pursuant to the mandate contained in Security Council Resolution 350
(1974) and extended in subsequent resolutions, most recently through Resolution
2084 dated 19 December 2012.

II. Situation in the Area and Activities of the Force

2. During the reporting period, the ceasefire between Israel and
the Syrian Arab Republic was generally maintained, in an increasingly volatile
environment attributable to the ongoing conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic.
Breaches of the ceasefire by both sides are set out below. The Syrian Arab
Armed Forces (SAAF) continued their deployment of personnel and equipment
inside the area of separation and carried out military activities and security
operations against armed members of the opposition in the UNDOF area of
operation. Inside the area of separation, the presence of the Syrian armed
forces and unauthorized military equipment is in violation of the 1974
Agreement of Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian forces.

3. In the context of the ongoing clashes between the SAAF and
armed members of the opposition, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) fired across
the ceasefire line in what they considered retaliation for fire from the Bravo
side that had reportedly impacted the Alpha side. On 2 and 12 April, the
Government of Israel Liaison Officer informed UNDOF that IDF soldiers on a routine
night-time patrol west of the technical fence had been fired at by individuals
from the Bravo side. The IDF fired two tank rounds on 2 April and two anti-tank
missiles on 12 April into the area of separation in what they considered
retaliatory fire. The Senior Syrian Arab Delegate (SSAD), the main interlocutor
for UNDOF on the Bravo side, informed UNDOF that one person was killed and a
second injured in the 12 April incident. On 20 May, the IDF informed UNDOF that
an IDF night-time patrol along the technical fence was hit by fire from a
Syrian Arab Armed Forces position. UNDOF was not able to confirm the incident.
On the same day, the IDF informed UNDOF that it would return fire in any future
such incident. UNDOF requested the SSAD to take all measures necessary to
ensure that no further firing would occur across the ceasefire line. In the
early morning hours of 21 May, Syrian authorities informed UNDOF that the IDF
had fired two missiles at a Syrian armed forces position in the vicinity of Bir
Ajam. Subsequently, the IDF informed UNDOF that they had fired two missiles at
a SAAF position in the vicinity of Bir Ajam in response to heavy machine gun
fire from the SAAF position that had hit, for the second time, an IDF patrol in
the vicinity of Zbedah al Gharbia in the area of limitation on the Alpha side.
The IDF also informed UNDOF that while there were no injuries to IDF soldiers,
an IDF vehicle was damaged.

4. In identical letters addressed to the Secretary-General and the
President of the Security Council, the Permanent Representative of Syria on 21
May stated that Syria exercised its right to self-defense in response to an
Israeli vehicle that reportedly crossed the ceasefire line and that the IDF
launched two missiles from the area of Tall al-Faras. On 23 May, the Permanent
Representative of Israel addressed identical letters to the Secretary-General
and the President of the Security Council in which he stated that on 21 May,
the SAAF opened fire on an IDF patrol on the Alpha side and that the IDF, acting
in self defense, fired back at the SAAF outpost from which the fire originated.
All firing into the area of separation and across the ceasefire line are
violations of the Disengagement Agreement.

5. Intense clashes between the SAAF and armed members of the
opposition continued in Jabbata, Trunje, Ufaniyah, Al Horaye, Al Quatanyia,
Jaba, Bir Ajam, and Braika in the area of separation. Small arms firing from
inside the area of separation and artillery, mortar, main battle tank, machine
gun and anti-aircraft gun firing from the area of limitation on the Bravo side
occurred on a daily basis. Clashes between the SAAF and armed members of the
opposition also have continued in the areas of Khan Arnabeh, Al Baath and New
Hamediya, mainly along UNDOF’s main supply road. Intensive shelling was
observed towards Bayt Jinn, with SAAF troops moving into the area in pursuit of
armed members of the opposition. Since the end of January, a Syrian armed
forces main battle tank and an anti-aircraft gun have remained in the area of
separation in the vicinity of Khan Arnabeh and at Al Qunaytirah, respectively,
in violation of the Disengagement Agreement. In addition, since the end of May,
three armoured personnel carriers have been stationed at the SAAF checkpoint at
the entrance to the area of separation.

6. In the early morning hours of 6 June, armed members of the
opposition, who had gathered in areas to the east of UN Positions 60 and 60A,
launched an attack on Al Quneitra town, cutting off the main road from the town
and Bravo Gate (the entry point on the Bravo side to and from the
Israeli-occupied Golan, maintained by Syrian authorities) to Damascus. The SAAF
immediately reinforced its presence in the UNDOF area of operation. The ensuing
shelling and clashes between the SAAF and armed members of the opposition
engulfed the central part of the area of operation to the north and south of
the main road, between Camp Ziouani on the Alpha side (Israeli- occupied Golan)
and Camp Faouar on the Bravo side. UNDOF reported shelling in the vicinity of Khan
Arnabeh, Al Samdaniyah and Trunje, and mortar fire in the vicinity of United
Nations Observation Post 52, in the area of separation. Tank shells and mortars
impacted in the vicinity of United Nations Position 60A. As a result of the
fighting, Camp Ziouani was hit by a total of 34 indirect mortar and
heavy-machine gun fire. Two UNDOF military personnel at Camp Ziouani sustained
minor injuries. A number of buildings in the Camp, including accommodation
blocks and the logistics office, sustained light damage; communication lines
were affected temporarily and subsequently restored. 7. All UN personnel in
positions located in the affected area took shelter in their positions. UNDOF
personnel at the Charlie Gate (on the ceasefire line and manned by UNDOF) relocated
temporarily to the Alpha side. All UNDOF personnel present at Camp Ziouani took
shelter at the Camp. During the clashes, armed members of the opposition took
control temporarily of the Bravo Gate. After several hours of clashes between
the SAAF and the armed members of the opposition, the SAAF gained control of
the Bravo Gate. By mid-day on 6 June, the fighting in the area had subsided,
albeit with continued sporadic shelling. The following day, on 7 June, the
Alpha, Bravo and Charlie Gates, which had been closed throughout the clashes,
re-opened.

8. During the clashes on 6 June, and following reports that SAAF
tanks were moving in the general area between Kahn Arnabeh and Al Quineitra,
the UNDOF Force Commander immediately asked the SSAD that the tanks be
withdrawn as their presence was a violation of the 1974 Agreement on
Disengagement between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic. Subsequently, the
IDF informed the UNDOF Force Commander that should the movement of Syrian armed
forces tanks continue in Al Quneitra or should any shelling impact the Alpha
side, the IDF would take action. The UNDOF Force Commander conveyed the IDF
message to the SSAD, who undertook to have the tanks withdrawn and emphasized
that the presence of the tanks was solely for the purpose of fighting the armed
opposition and asked that the IDF not to take action. By late 6 June, two SAAF
armoured personnel carriers remained at the Bravo Gate, in violation of the
Disengagement Agreement.

9. The Syrian authorities informed UNDOF that five SAAF personnel
had been killed, including two of the five unarmed SSAD Liaison Officers at the
Bravo Gate while a third SSAD Liaison Officer had been abducted by armed
members of the opposition. The Government of Israel Liaison Officer informed
UNDOF that the IDF had provided emergency medical treatment to a total of 20
armed members of the opposition, all of whom according to the IDF had been
returned to the Bravo side.

10. Throughout the fighting, the UNDOF Force Commander remained in
close contact with both sides, stressing the importance of exercising maximum
restraint, in an effort to prevent an escalation of the situation across the
ceasefire line, and to ensure the safety and security of United Nations
personnel.

11. In using its best efforts to maintain the ceasefire and to see
that it is scrupulously observed, as prescribed by the 1974 Agreement of
Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian forces, UNDOF reports on any breach of
the ceasefire line. In addition, UNDOF observed and reported instances of
continued trans-border movements of unidentified individuals, some of them
armed, between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic in the northern part of the
area of separation. Since 1 April, the frequency of civilians, mainly women and
children, observed by UNDOF moving along the same route has slightly increased.

12. Syrian security forces have maintained the checkpoints
established inside the area of separation since they began military operations
in the area. The SAAF personnel have also maintained checkpoints at the eastern
entrances to the area of separation to control and restrict traffic. The
checkpoints have often interfered with the freedom of movement of UNDOF and the
United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) military observers
operationally integrated into the Force as Observer Group Golan (OGG). The
restrictions of movement of UNDOF and OGG in the areas of separation and
limitation increased as a result of the clashes between the Syrian armed forces
and armed members of the opposition. The situation has resulted in the frequent
closure of the UNDOF main supply road, thus hampering the movements of UNDOF
between Camp Faouar on the Bravo side and Camp Ziouani on the Alpha side. UNDOF
has frequently resorted to the use of bypass roads, which are not accessible at
night. The SSAD advised UNDOF that, for security reasons, all United Nations
personnel should avoid areas where clashes were ongoing and that UNDOF should
not carry out night patrols.

13. On occasions, during the clashes
between Syrian armed forces and armed members of the opposition, direct and
indirect fire impacted in the vicinity of United Nations installations forcing
United Nations personnel to seek shelter for protection and safety. On 1 April,
UNDOF observed gunfire and several detonations close to United Nations Position
31 and Observation Post 72 inside the area of separation. On 25 April, and on
30 May, artillery shells detonated in close proximity to United Nations
Position 37, while on 10 May, machine gun fire impacted the outer perimeter
wall of the same position. There was no injury to United Nations personnel. The
detonations damaged the buildings inside the position. On two occasions, on 21
April and 5 May, shots were fired at UNDOF patrols carrying out activities in
clearly marked United Nations vehicles in the vicinity of Hadar and Hanud,
respectively, in the area of separation. There was no injury to United Nations
personnel.

14. On 7 May, four UNDOF personnel travelling in two United
Nations vehicles (near United Nations Position 86) were intercepted by a large
group of armed persons that identified itself as the Al Yarmouk Martyrs
Brigade. The group forcibly took the UNDOF personnel to Al Jamlah village in
the area of limitation on the Bravo side. Throughout the incident, the United
Nations and other interlocutors used various channels to secure the release of
the peacekeepers, including close liaison between UNDOF and the SSAD in an
attempt to halt the fighting in Al Jamla where the peacekeepers were being
held. On 12 May, the peacekeepers were released safely and in good health.

15. On the same day, subsequent to the abduction of the four
peacekeepers, ten armed persons forced one peacekeeper at an UNDOF Outpost 86A
sentry box at gunpoint to leave and stole a United Nations radio and
binoculars. Another group of ten armed persons approached UN Position 86 and
demanded that the remaining eight military personnel vacate the position. The
UNDOF soldiers refused, and after a prolonged stand-off, the armed group
threatened to attack at night, if the position was not vacated and then left.
The same evening, UNDOF reinforced the United Nations position with an
additional 40 personnel. All UNDOF personnel subsequently vacated the Position
pushing through an attempted blockade by unidentified armed elements.

16. During the night of 15 May, a group of approximately 20 armed
persons broke into the compound of United Nations Observation Post 52 that was
manned by three Observer Group Golan military observers. Another 20 armed
persons, initially claiming to be SAAF soldiers, forcibly took the three
military observers to the village of Bir Ajam in the area of separation. In
response to the incident, an UNDOF rapid response group from Camp Ziouani
deployed to Observation Post 52. After about four hours, the military observers
were released unharmed and returned to observation post 52. During the
abduction of the peacekeepers, the armed group ransacked and looted the
Observation Post causing extensive damage to the facility and destroying
electronic equipment.

17. In other incidents involving United Nations personnel, on 19
April four UNDOF personnel travelling from Hadar to United Nations Position 60
in a convoy of two vehicles were stopped by four unidentified, masked armed
persons. Subsequently, the armed persons pointed their rifles at the
peacekeepers and forced them to open the vehicle doors, which they had
initially refused. One of the armed men fired two warning shots and forcibly
took one rifle, 10 magazines and 300 rounds of ammunition from the United
Nations vehicle. On 5 May, SAAF soldiers pointed their weapons at UNDOF
personnel travelling in clearly marked vehicles in the vicinity of Hanud.

18. UNDOF has protested the presence of SAAF and equipment in the
area of separation, the firing into and inside the area of separation, the
firing at United Nations personnel and facilities, and the abduction of United
Nations personnel. The UNDOF Force Commander reiterated to Syrian authorities,
including the Minister of Defence and the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs,
the obligation of the SAAF to halt military operations in the area of
separation and cease firing from the area of limitation, stressing the
importance of abiding by the terms of the Disengagement Agreement and ensuring
the safety and security of United Nations personnel on the ground. Senior
United Nations officials have conveyed similar messages to the Permanent
Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic.

19. The Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic on 5
May addressed identical letters to the Secretary-General and the President of
the Security Council claiming that Israeli aircraft fired rockets from outside
Syrian airspace, at three sites belonging to the SAAF in north-east Jamayra,
Maysalun and the airport in the Dimas area, killing and wounding many Syrian
civilians and causing widespread destruction. The Secretary-General issued a
statement on the same day expressing grave concern over reports of Israeli air
strikes in the Syrian Arab Republic, noting that the United Nations did not
have details of the reported incidents, nor was it in a position to verify
independently what had occurred. On 8 May, the Syrian Permanent Representative
addressed another letter to the Secretary-General and the President of the
Security Council claiming that Israel was providing support, including medical
services, to “terrorists” on the Golan in violation of the Disengagement
Agreement and the Charter of the United Nations. In recent weeks, Syrian
officials made public statements supporting action against Israel on the Golan.

20. Within this challenging operational environment, UNDOF
supervised the area of separation by manning static positions to ensure that
military forces of either party were excluded from it. UNDOF, through the OGG,
continued to carry out fortnightly inspections of equipment and force levels in
the area of limitation on the Alpha side. Liaison Officers from the Alpha side
accompanied inspection teams of OGG. On the Bravo side, Syrian authorities
ceased the practice of providing Liaison Officers to accompany the OGG
inspection teams following the abduction on 30 July 2012 of a Syrian Liaison
Officer accompanying the military observers by unknown armed persons in the area
of limitation. The deteriorating security situation on the Bravo side also
resulted in the temporary suspension, as of 5 March, of inspections and mobile
operations in the area of limitation. As in the past, the Force faced
restrictions on freedom of movement and its inspection teams were denied access
to some positions on the Alpha side.

21. UNDOF maintained close liaison with the IDF and the SSAD to
defuse tensions and keep channels of communication open in order to prevent an
escalation of the situation across the ceasefire line. The UNDOF ForceCommander also urged the IDF to exercise maximum restraint,
particularly with regard to incidents in proximity to the Alpha line.

22. UNDOF continued to adapt its operational posture to the
ongoing IDF training activities and new military construction in the area of
limitation on the Alpha side, Syrian civilian developments in proximity to the
ceasefire line in the area of separation and increased military activities from
the SAAF positions along the Bravo line. The IDF continued to enhance the
technical fence and established additional physical obstacles along the
technical fence to prevent crossings from the area of separation. Both sides
maintained existing defensive positions in the respective areas of limitation.
Israeli national Customs officials continued to operate periodically at the IDF
post at the UNDOF crossing gate between the Israeli-occupied Golan and the
Syrian Arab Republic.

23. As at 21 May, UNDOF in cooperation with the ICRC facilitated
the crossing of 11,700 tons of apples from the Alpha side to the Bravo side.
UNDOF continued to provide medical treatment to civilians, as well as first aid
and emergency medical treatment on a strictly humanitarian basis. During the
intense fighting between the SAAF and armed members of the opposition in the
area of Al Rafid in the area of separation in March, around 3,700 civilians
from the villages of Al Rafid, Al Asbah and Al Aishah sought temporary shelter
outside United Nations Position 80. UNDOF provided drinking water as well as
emergency medical treatment to several injured civilians. On 5 April, the
civilians returned to their villages. On 7 May, around 800 civilians sought
shelter once again outside the same position due to clashes in the vicinity of
Al Rafid village. The civilians left the vicinity of UN Position 80 on the same
day.

24. In the area of operation, especially in the vicinity of the
Alpha line in the area of separation, mines continued to pose a threat to UNDOF
personnel and local inhabitants. Owing to the long-term presence of the mines
and the deterioration of their detonation systems, the threat has increased.
With enhanced mine clearing and detection capacity, UNDOF continued to carry
out operational mine clearance.

25. Despite the limitations posed by the security situation on the
Bravo side, UNDOF continued its efforts to liaise with local authorities and
engage with the local population to explain the Mission’s mandate and
activities. This was also important in light of the security situation in the
UNDOF area of operation, and as part of the effort to ensure the safety and
security of United Nations personnel on the ground.

26. As of 25 May, UNDOF comprised 911 troops from: Austria 377,
the Philippines 341, and India 193. On 18 March 2013, the Croatian contingent
withdrew its contingent of 97 military personnel from UNDOF. The Government of
Fiji has agreed to contribute to UNDOF a contingent of 171 military personnel
to replace the Croatian and the Japanese contingents. From 14 to 21 May, a
three-member team from Fiji visited UNDOF in preparation for the deployment of
the contingent scheduled for June. Further to the recommendations of the
Military Capability Study of UNDOF conducted in January 2013, the position of
Deputy Force Commander was established in the Mission. On 15 April, the new
Deputy Force Commander, from Austria, assumed his position in UNDOF. On 6 June,
the Government of Austria announced its decision to withdraw its contingent
from UNDOF. The withdrawal of Austria, a long-standing troop-contributor to
UNDOF, will affect significantly the efforts of UNDOF to continue to implement
its mandate. In this regard, the United Nations is approaching existing UNDOF
troop-contributing countries and certain Member States in an effort to identify
urgently additional contributions and new contributors to UNDOF, respectively.
In addition, 80 military observers from UNTSO assisted the Force in carrying
out its tasks.

27. Further to the request of the Security Council in resolution
2084 (2012), UNDOF, with the support of the Secretariat continues to take steps
to ensure that the Force has the capacity necessary to fulfill the mandate in a
safe and secure way. Most of the recommendations of the Military Capability
Study of UNDOF have been implemented. UNDOF continues to adopt and update
mitigation measures in response to new threats in its operational environment.
The Mission has maintained efforts to ensure the necessary strategic reserve
and the Force’s self- sustainment capability. In addition, UNDOF continued to
implement the rehabilitation programme to maintain and upgrade its equipment
and infrastructure in an effort to maintain its operational and security
capacity. Additional armoured vehicles were deployed to UNDOF, with a view to
enhancing force protection. All UNDOF personnel are equipped with personal
protection kits and are provided with the appropriate training. The security
situation has also made it necessary for UNDOF to consider, with the
cooperation of relevant authorities, the use of alternative ports of entry and
departure for Mission personnel, including staff officers and contingent
members.

28. Given the evolving security situation in the UNDOF area of
operation, the Mission has continued to temporarily reconfigure its operations
with a view to ensuring the continued ability to implement its mandate in a
safe and secure manner. As such, UNDOF has continued to concentrate on static
activities in an effort to reduce the exposure of personnel to risk, while
focusing on enhancing situational analysis, reporting and liaison with the
parties to prevent escalation of the situation. UNDOF mobile operations remain
temporarily suspended on the Bravo side. These operational adjustments also
have involved the temporary refocus of the activities of a number of Observer
Group Golan military observers from patrolling and inspection to static
observation, liaison and situation analysis. In addition, military staff
officers from the Secretariat were deployed temporarily to UNDOF for six weeks
to fill capacity gaps within the UNDOF operations section. The Department of
Peacekeeping Operations is looking into ways of enhancing the self defense
capabilities of UNDOF, including by increasing the troop strength to about
1,250, within the parameters set forth in the Protocol to the Disengagement
Agreement. The Mission continues its efforts to ensure the necessary strategic
reserve and the Force’s self-sustainment capacity. In addition, UNDOF is
putting in place risk mitigation measures on the basis of a comprehensive risk
assessment carried out by the Mission, with the support of the Secretariat.
These measures include the reinforcement of Observation Posts manned by
Observer Group Golan in isolated locations and regular rehearsals of evacuation
operations. The Mission reviews its contingency planning on an ongoing basis
taking into account the evolving situation in the area of operation.

29. Continuous efforts have been underway to enhance the safety
and security of United Nations personnel. Since 1 March, the UNDOF security
section has been strengthened by an additional two security officers
temporarily assigned to the Mission. UNDOF has faced road closures and
restrictions affecting movement in the area of operations and between the area
of operation and Damascus on a recurring basis. A number of UNDOF national
staff work from home as they are not able to report for work on a regular basis
due to the security situation while some administrative and security staff have
been accommodated in converted offices in the Representational Office in
Damascus. The offices of some international staff have been relocated from Camp
Faouar to Camp Ziouani on the Alpha side.

III. Financial Aspects

30. By its resolution 66/276 of 21 June 2012, the General Assembly
appropriated the amount of $46.0 million for the maintenance of the Force for
the period from 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2013. The financing arrangements for
UNDOF for the period from 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2013 and the related proposed
budget for the period from 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014 are currently under
consideration by the General Assembly during the second part of its resumed
sixty-seventh session. Should the Security Council approve my recommendation
set out in paragraph 38 below with respect to the extension of the mandate of
UNDOF, the cost for the maintenance of the Force during the extension period
will be limited to resources approved by the General Assembly.

31. As at 29 May 2013, unpaid assessed contributions to the UNDOF
Special Account amounted to $18.5 million. Total outstanding assessed
contributions for all peacekeeping operations at the same date amounted to
$1,381.4 million.

32. As at 29 May 2013, amounts owed to contributors for troop
costs totalled $2.1 million. Reimbursements for troop costs and for equipment
and self-sustainment have been made for the period up to 28 February 2013 and
31 December 2012 respectively, in accordance with the quarterly payment
schedule.

IV. Implementation of Security Council resolution 338 (1973)

33. The Security Council, when deciding in its resolution 2084
(2012) to renew the mandate of UNDOF for a further period of six months, until
31 June 2013, also called upon the parties concerned to immediately implement
its resolution 338 (1973) and requested the Secretary-General to submit, at the
end of the period, a report on developments in the situation and the measures
taken to implement that resolution. The search for a peaceful settlement in the
Middle East, in particular the efforts undertaken at various levels to
implement resolution 338 (1973), was dealt with in my report on the situation
in the Middle East (A/67/342) submitted pursuant to General Assembly
resolutions 66/18, entitled “Jerusalem”, and 66/19, entitled “The Syrian
Golan”.

34. Since the discontinuation of indirect peace talks in December
2008, there have been no negotiations between the parties, and the Syrian
crisis currently impedes prospects of their resumption and progress towards
peace between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic. I look forward to a peaceful
resolution of the crisis and the resumption of efforts towards a comprehensive,
just and durable peace settlement, as called for by the Security Council in its
resolution 338 (1973) and other relevant resolutions adopted by the Council.

V. Observations

35. I remain deeply concerned about the deteriorating security
situation in the Syrian Arab Republic, its impact on the Syrian population and
its potential implications for the stability of the region. The situation has
affected the UNDOF area of operation significantly. The ongoing military
activities in the area of separation continue to have the potential to escalate
tensions between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic and to jeopardize the
ceasefire between the two countries.

36. The developments in the UNDOF area of operation, including the
intense clashes that occurred on 6 June in the area of separation, show the
volatility of the situation on the Golan. I reiterate that all military
activities in the area of separation conducted by any actor pose a risk to the
long-held ceasefire and the local civilian population, as well as United
Nations personnel on the ground. They undermine the Disengagement Agreement and
the efforts of UNDOF to implement the mandate, and will continue to be reported
as such. I call on all parties to the Syrian domestic conflict to cease
military actions throughout the country, including in the UNDOF area of
operation. There should be no military forces in the area of separation other
than those of UNDOF.

37. The presence of the SAAF and unauthorized military equipment
in the area of separation is a grave violation of the 1974 Agreement of
Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian forces. The IDF retaliatory fire
across the ceasefire line is also a serious violation of the Disengagement
Agreement. Any Israeli military action inside Syria puts the ceasefire at risk.
I call upon Israel to exercise maximum restraint to prevent an escalation of
the situation. The commitment to the Disengagement Agreement must be upheld by
both parties to maintain calm and stability on the Golan. The threats by Syrian
leaders to act against Israel on the Golan undermine the Disengagement
Agreement. In addition, I trust that both sides will take all necessary
measures to protect civilians and to ensure respect for the safety and security
of UNDOF personnel, as well as its freedom of movement throughout its area of
operation. The United Nations for its part will spare no effort in ensuring
that the long-held ceasefire between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic
continues to hold.

38. I also remain deeply concerned by the incidents involving
United Nations personnel on the ground. The mandate of UNDOF remains an
important element in ensuring the stability of the region. It must be recalled
that UNDOF was established by the Security Council with the agreement of Israel
and the Syrian Arab Republic, and that its mandate was prescribed by the
Disengagement Agreement and its Protocol. UNDOF is mandated to maintain the
ceasefire between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic, to see that it is
scrupulously observed and to supervise the Agreement and the Protocol thereto
with regard to the areas of separation and limitation.

39. Any hostile acts against United Nations personnel on the
ground, such as the recent abduction of the four UNDOF personnel and the three
Observer Group Golan military observers, the direct and indirect firing at them
by the SAAF or armed members of the opposition, the theft of United Nations
weapons and ammunition, vehicles and other assets, and the looting and
destruction of United Nations facilities are unacceptable. The safety and
security of UNDOF personnel and Observer Group Golan military observers remains
essential for UNDOF to continue to implement its mandate under these difficult
conditions.

40. The primary responsibility for the safety and security of
United Nations personnel in the area of separation and the area of limitation
on the Bravo side rests with the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, and I
again call on that Government to facilitate fully the efforts of the Mission to
continue implementing its mandate safely and securely. It is imperative that
respect for the privileges and immunities of UNDOF and its freedom of movement
be ensured. UNDOF’s ability to engage with the local population in its area of
operations in order to inform them of its mandate and activities is limited due
to the prevailing security situation. Armed members of the opposition operating
in the UNDOF area of operation must be clearly apprised of the mandate of the
Mission and immediately cease any actions that jeopardize the safety and
security of United Nations personnel on the ground. It remains critical that
countries with influence convey strongly to the armed opposition groups in the
UNDOF area of operation to halt all activities that endanger United Nations
peacekeepers on the ground and to accord the United Nations personnel on the
ground the freedom to carry out the mandate safely and securely.

41. It is equally critical that the Security Council continue to
bring its influence to bear on the parties concerned to ensure that UNDOF is
accorded the ability to operate freely and securely within its area of
operations in order to be able to carry out its important mandate. The need for
UNDOF to continue to have at its disposal all necessary means and resources to
carry out its mandate safely and securely, remains essential. It is vital that
UNDOF retains the confidence and commitment of troop-contributing countries.
The continued credible presence of UNDOF remains an important element in
ensuring stability on the Golan and in the region. I regret Austria's decision
to withdraw from UNDOF, which follows a longstanding and valuable contribution
to the Mission. Efforts are underway to identify urgently additional
contributions and new contributors to UNDOF, in light of the pending withdrawal
of Austrian troops from UNDOF, and to ensure that the withdrawal is conducted
in an orderly fashion. I appeal to Member States to contribute troops to UNDOF
to support the United Nations efforts to enhance the capabilities of UNDOF.

42. Given the evolving security situation in the UNDOF area of
operation, it is also necessary to consider further adjustments to the posture
and operations of the Mission, as well as additional mitigation measures. These
include, as a matter of priority, enhancing the self defense capabilities of
UNDOF, including increasing the Force strength to about 1,250 and improving its
self defense equipment, within the parameters set forth in the Protocol to the
Disengagement Agreement. UNDOF also reviews and updates continuously its
contingency plans. The support of the parties and the Security Council is
critical as UNDOF continues to make these critical adjustments.

43. The current security situation has continued to disrupt UNDOF
support and logistic activities on an almost daily basis, thus complicating
significantly the ability of the Mission to effectively carry out its mandated
tasks. It is essential that the parties provide all the necessary support to
ensure appropriate conditions for United Nations personnel on the ground and
cooperate fully in the facilitation of support and logistic activities of the
Mission.

44. Under the prevailing circumstances, I consider the continued
presence of UNDOF in the area to be essential. I therefore recommend that the
Security Council extend the mandate of the Force for a further period of six
months, until 31 December 2013. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic has
given its assent to the proposed extension. The Government of Israel also has
expressed its agreement.

45. In conclusion, I wish to express my
appreciation to the Head of Mission and Force Commander, Major General Iqbal
Singh Singha, and the military and civilian personnel serving under his
leadership. These women and men continue to perform with efficiency and
commitment the important tasks assigned to them by the Security Council under
challenging circumstances. I have full confidence that UNDOF will continue to
use its best efforts to carry out its mission. I take this opportunity to
express my appreciation to the Governments contributing troops to UNDOF and to
those providing the UNTSO military observers assigned to the Force.