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entitled 'Wildland Fire Management: Lack of Clear Goals or a Strategy
Hinders Federal Agencies' Efforts to Contain the Costs of Fighting
Fires' which was released on June 26, 2007.
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
June 2007:
Wildland Fire Management:
Lack of Clear Goals or a Strategy Hinders Federal Agencies' Efforts to
Contain the Costs of Fighting Fires:
GAO-07-655:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-655, a report to congressional requesters
Why GAO Did This Study:
Annual appropriations to prepare for and respond to wildland fires have
increased substantially over the past decade, in recent years totaling
about $3 billion. The Forest Service within the Department of
Agriculture and four agencies within the Department of the Interior
(Interior) are responsible for responding to wildland fires on federal
lands. GAO determined what steps federal agencies have taken, in
response to findings from previous studies, to (1) address key
operational areas that could help contain the costs of preparing for
and responding to wildland fires and (2) improve their management of
their cost-containment efforts. To address these objectives, GAO
reviewed previous cost-containment studies and other agency documents
and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found:
The Forest Service and Interior agencies have initiated a number of
steps to address key operational areas previously identified as needing
improvement to help federal agencies contain wildland fire costs, but
the effects on containing costs are unknown, in part because many of
these steps are not yet complete. First, federal firefighting agencies
are developing a system to help them better identify and set priorities
for lands needing treatment to reduce fuels, but they have yet to
decide how they will keep data in the system current. Second, federal
agencies have taken some steps to improve how they acquire and use
personnel, equipment, and other firefighting assets—such as
implementing a computerized system to more efficiently dispatch and
track available firefighting assets—but have not yet completed the more
fundamental step of determining the appropriate type and quantity of
firefighting assets needed for the fire season. Third, the agencies
have clarified certain policies and are improving analytical tools that
assist officials in identifying and implementing an appropriate
response to a given fire, but several other policies limit the
agencies’ use of less aggressive firefighting strategies, which
typically cost less. Fourth, federal agencies, working with nonfederal
entities, have recently taken steps to clarify guidance to better
ensure that firefighting costs are shared consistently for fires that
threaten both federal and nonfederal lands and resources, but it is
unclear how the agencies will ensure that this guidance is followed.
The agencies have also taken steps to address previously identified
weaknesses in their management of cost-containment efforts, but they
have neither clearly defined their cost-containment goals and
objectives nor developed a strategy for achieving them—steps that are
fundamental to sound program management. Although the agencies have
established a broad goal of suppressing wildland fires at minimum
cost—considering firefighter and public safety and resources and
structures to be protected—they have no defined criteria by which to
weigh the relative importance of these often-competing priorities. As a
result, according to agency officials and reports, officials in the
field lack a clear understanding of the relative importance the
agencies’ leadership places on containing costs and therefore are
likely to select firefighting strategies without due consideration of
the costs of suppression. The agencies also have yet to develop a
vision of how the various cost-containment steps they are taking relate
to one another or to determine the extent to which these steps will be
effective. The agencies are working to develop a better cost-
containment performance measure, but the measure may take a number of
years to fully refine. Finally, the agencies have taken, or are
beginning to take, steps to improve their oversight and increase
accountability—such as requiring agency officials to evaluate
firefighting teams according to how well they contained costs—although
the extent to which these steps will assist the agencies in containing
costs is unknown.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior
take several steps to improve their management of cost-containment
efforts, including establishing clearly defined goals and measurable
objectives and a strategy to achieve them, and provide this information
to Congress in preparation for the 2008 fire season. The Forest Service
and Interior generally disagreed with GAO’s findings, stating that GAO
did not accurately portray some of the agencies’ actions to contain
costs. They neither agreed nor disagreed with GAO’s recommendations.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-655].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Robin M. Nazzaro at (202)
512-3841 or nazzaror@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
To Help Contain Costs, Federal Agencies Are Taking Some Steps to Target
Operational Areas Identified as Needing Improvement, but Results Are
Unknown:
Lack of Clear Goals or a Strategy Hinders Federal Agencies' Management
of Wildland Fire Cost-Containment Efforts:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Selected GAO Products and Other Reports Reviewed:
GAO Products:
Federal or State Firefighting Entity Reports:
Department of Agriculture's Office of Inspector General Reports:
National Academy of Public Administration Reports:
Appendix III: Comments from the Forest Service and the Department of
the Interior:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: Forest Service and Interior Wildland Fire Appropriations and
Distribution, by Wildland Fire Activity, Fiscal Years 1996 through
2005:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
June 1, 2007:
The Honorable Jeff Bingaman:
Chairman:
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Larry E. Craig:
United States Senate:
The federal government's cost of preparing for and responding to
wildland fires, which burn millions of acres each year, has increased
substantially over the past decade. Five federal land management
agencies--the Forest Service within the Department of Agriculture
(Agriculture) and the Bureau of Land Management, Bureau of Indian
Affairs, National Park Service, and Fish and Wildlife Service within
the Department of the Interior (Interior)--are responsible for managing
wildland fires on federal lands. A firefighting agency's response to a
wildland fire can range from monitoring the fire while letting it burn
to aggressively suppressing it. In choosing a response, agency
officials must assess a number of factors that can affect the size and
severity of the fire as well as the value of threatened resources, such
as communities, watersheds, or natural resources. In recent years,
accumulations of fuels, due in part to past suppression policies, and
severe drought and weather in some areas of the country have
contributed to more-severe fires and longer fire seasons. At the same
time, wildland fires have increasingly threatened not only federal
lands and public resources, such as forests and watersheds, but also
nonfederal lands and resources, including homes and other structures,
as development has continued to expand into areas in or near wildlands-
-commonly known as the wildland-urban interface. Consequently,
preparing for and responding to wildland fires has become more costly.
Over the past decade, annual wildland fire appropriations to prepare
for and suppress wildland fires, including appropriations for reducing
fuels, have increased from an average of $1.1 billion from fiscal years
1996 through 2000 to more than $2.9 billion from fiscal years 2001
through 2005; adjusted for inflation, the appropriations increased from
$1.3 billion to $3.1 billion[Footnote 1].
Congress, the Office of Management and Budget, federal agency
officials, and others have expressed concerns about the mounting
federal wildland fire expenditures. Over the last decade, these
concerns have led federal agencies (including the Forest Service,
Interior, the Agriculture Office of Inspector General, and GAO) and
other organizations (including the National Association of State
Foresters and the National Academy of Public Administration[Footnote
2]) to conduct numerous reviews of the federal wildland fire program.
These reviews generally sought to identify the reasons for worsening
wildland fire severity and increasing expenditures and to recommend
possible steps that federal agencies could take to contain costs.
Despite the dozens of studies conducted, problems identified, and
hundreds of recommendations for agency action, concerns remain about
the increasing costs of preparing for and responding to wildland fires
and the effectiveness of the agencies' efforts to contain those costs.
In this context, we examined the responsible federal agencies' efforts
to contain wildland fire costs. This report discusses steps the Forest
Service and Interior agencies have taken, in response to findings from
previous studies, to (1) address key operational areas that could help
contain the costs of preparing for and responding to wildland fires and
(2) improve their management of their cost-containment efforts.
To address these issues, we reviewed selected studies--most conducted
since 2000 by federal, state, and nongovernmental entities--that
evaluated issues related to wildland fire cost containment, including
studies of several large fires. We reviewed the issues these studies
identified as needing improvement to help contain costs and categorized
them into broad areas corresponding to key operational areas of
preparing for and responding to wildland fires. To corroborate our
understanding and categorization of the issues and the steps that
federal agencies have taken to address the issues, we interviewed
officials from the Forest Service, Bureau of Land Management, and
Office of Wildland Fire Coordination within Interior at the national
offices in Washington, D.C., and at the National Interagency Fire
Center in Boise, Idaho.[Footnote 3] We also reviewed program documents
from the Forest Service and Interior agencies. These documents, along
with Congressional Research Service reports, provided information on
the costs of preparing for and responding to wildland fires. Appendix I
describes our scope and methodology in more detail, and appendix II
lists many of the studies we reviewed. We performed our work in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards, which
included an assessment of data reliability, from May 2006 through May
2007.
Results in Brief:
The Forest Service and Interior agencies have initiated a number of
steps to address issues that previous studies identified as needing
improvement to help federal agencies contain wildland fire costs, but
the effects of these steps on containing costs are unknown, in part
because many of the steps are not yet complete. These issues are
generally related to the key operational areas of reducing accumulated
fuels, acquiring and using firefighting personnel and equipment, and
selecting firefighting strategies. Concerns have also been raised about
the framework used to share firefighting costs between federal and
nonfederal entities.
² Reducing accumulated fuels. Federal firefighting agencies have made
progress in developing a system to help them better identify and set
priorities for lands needing treatment to reduce accumulated fuels.
Many studies have identified fuel reduction as important for containing
wildland fire costs because accumulated fuels can contribute to more-
severe and more costly fires. The agencies' new system, LANDFIRE, is
scheduled for completion in 2009, but the agencies have yet to decide
how they will keep data in the system current. Forest Service and
Interior officials told us they recognize the importance of ensuring
that data are periodically updated, and they are developing a plan to
operate and maintain the system, including determining how often data
will be updated.
² Acquiring and using firefighting assets. Federal firefighting
agencies have also taken some steps to improve how they acquire and use
firefighting personnel, aviation resources, equipment, and supplies--
assets that constitute a major cost of responding to wildland fires--
but much remains to be done. Agencies have computerized their systems
for dispatching and monitoring firefighting assets and for gathering
and analyzing cost data, although project officials could not quantify
the savings resulting from such efforts. Agencies have not yet improved
their systems for determining the appropriate type and quantity of
firefighting assets needed for the fire season or for effectively and
efficiently procuring them.
² Selecting firefighting strategies. The agencies have clarified
certain policies and are improving analytical tools that assist agency
officials in identifying and implementing an appropriate response to a
given fire, but shortcomings remain. Officials have a wide spectrum of
strategies available to them when responding to wildland fires, some of
which can be significantly more costly than others. For individual
fires, studies have found that officials may not always consider the
full range of available strategies and may not select the most
appropriate one, which would consider the cost of suppression; value of
structures and other resources threatened by the fire; and, where
appropriate, any potential benefits to natural resources. The agencies
use the term "appropriate management response" for a strategy that
considers these factors. The agencies updated their policies in 2004 to
require officials to consider the full spectrum of available strategies
when selecting a firefighting strategy, but studies have identified
several policies that limit the agencies' use of less aggressive
strategies, which typically cost less. The agencies are also continuing
to refine existing tools, and to develop new ones, for analyzing both
fuel and predicted weather conditions to model expected fire behavior,
information that officials can use to identify appropriate suppression
strategies. These tools are still being designed and tested, however,
and it is not yet clear to what extent these tools will affect
officials' selection of firefighting strategies.
² Sharing wildland fire costs. We and others have also reported that
the existing framework for sharing firefighting costs between federal
and nonfederal entities insulates state and local governments from the
cost of protecting homes and communities in or near wildlands, which
may reduce those governments' incentive to adopt building codes and
land use requirements that could help reduce the cost of suppressing
wildland fires. Federal agencies, working with some nonfederal
entities, have recently taken steps to clarify guidance and better
ensure that firefighting costs are shared consistently for fires that
threaten both federal and nonfederal lands and resources. It is
unclear, however, how the agencies will ensure that this guidance is
followed in the field.
The agencies have also taken steps to address previously identified
weaknesses in their management of cost-containment efforts, but they
have neither clearly defined their cost-containment goals and
objectives nor developed a strategy for achieving them--steps that are
fundamental to sound program management. To manage their cost-
containment efforts effectively, the Forest Service and Interior
agencies should, at minimum, have (1) clearly defined goals and
measurable objectives, (2) a strategy to achieve the goals and
objectives, (3) performance measures to track progress, and (4) a
framework for holding the appropriate agency officials accountable for
achieving the goals.[Footnote 4] First, although the agencies have
established a broad goal of suppressing wildland fires at minimum cost
considering firefighter and public safety and the resources and
structures to be protected, they have established neither clear
criteria by which to weigh the relative importance of these often-
competing priorities, nor measurable objectives by which to determine
if they are meeting their goals. Without such criteria and objectives,
according to agency officials we interviewed and reports we reviewed,
officials in the field lack a clear understanding of the relative
importance that the agencies' leadership places on containing costs
and, therefore, are likely to select firefighting strategies without
due consideration of the costs of suppression. Second, the agencies
have not developed a vision of how the various cost-containment steps
they are taking relate to one another or determined the extent to which
these steps will be effective. Third, the agencies are working to
develop a better performance measure for containing costs, but the
measure may take a number of years to fully refine, and, moreover, the
agencies have yet to identify the cost-containment goals they are
trying to achieve. Finally, the agencies have also taken, or are
beginning to take, steps to improve their oversight and accountability
framework--such as requiring officials to evaluate firefighting teams
according to how well they contained costs--although the extent to
which these steps will assist the agencies in containing costs is
unknown.
Without clear goals and a strategy for containing wildland fire costs,
the agencies are unable to effectively and efficiently manage their
myriad ongoing efforts to contain wildland fire costs. To help them do
so, and to assist Congress in its oversight role, we are recommending
that the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior work together to
direct their respective agencies to (1) establish clearly defined goals
and measurable objectives for containing wildland fire costs, (2)
develop a strategy to achieve these goals and objectives, (3) establish
performance measures that are aligned with these goals and objectives,
and (4) establish a framework to ensure that officials are held
accountable for achieving the goals and objectives. Because of the
importance of these actions and continuing concerns about the agencies'
response to the increasing cost of wildland fires--and so that the
agencies can use the results of these actions to prepare for the 2008
fire season--the agencies should provide Congress with this information
no later than November 2007.
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Forest Service and
Interior generally disagreed with the characterization of many of our
findings; they neither agreed nor disagreed with our recommendations.
In particular, the Forest Service and Interior stated that they did not
believe we had accurately portrayed some of the significant actions
they had taken to contain wildland fire costs, and they identified
several agency documents that they believe provide clearly defined
goals and objectives that make up their strategy to contain costs. We
added further clarifying language, where appropriate, to more
accurately characterize some of the agencies' actions. Although
documents cited by the agencies provide overarching goals and
objectives, we believe that they lack the clarity and specificity
needed by their land management and firefighting officials in the field
to help manage and contain wildland fire costs. We believe that our
recommendations, if effectively implemented, would help the agencies
better manage their cost-containment efforts and improve their ability
to contain wildland fire costs. The Forest Service and Interior's joint
comments, and our evaluation of them, are included in appendix III.
Background:
Wildland fires triggered by lightning are both natural and inevitable
and play an important ecological role in the nation's landscapes. These
fires shape the composition of forests and grasslands, periodically
reduce vegetation densities, and stimulate seedling regeneration and
growth in some species. Over the past century, however, various land
use and management practices--including fire suppression, grazing, and
timber harvest--have reduced the normal frequency of fires in many
forest and rangeland ecosystems and contributed to abnormally dense,
continuous accumulations of vegetation. Such accumulations not only can
fuel uncharacteristically large or severe wildland fires, but also can
threaten human lives, health, property, and infrastructure as more
homes and communities are built in or near areas at risk from wildland
fires. Over the past decade, the number of acres burned annually by
wildland fires in the United States has substantially increased.
Federal appropriations to the Forest Service and Interior agencies to
prepare for and respond to wildland fires, including appropriations for
fuel treatments have almost tripled, from an average of $1.1 billion
from fiscal years 1996 through 2000 to more than $2.9 billion from
fiscal years 2001 through 2005 (see table 1). Adjusting for inflation,
the average annual appropriations for these periods increased from $1.3
billion to $3.1 billion. The Forest Service received about 70 percent
and Interior about 30 percent of the funds appropriated.
Table 1: Forest Service and Interior Wildland Fire Appropriations and
Distribution, by Wildland Fire Activity, Fiscal Years 1996 through
2005:
Dollars in millions.
Fiscal year: 1996;
Total appropriations: Nominal: $772.3;
Total appropriations: Inflation-adjusted[A]: $924.8;
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage):
Preparedness[B]: 55.2%;
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage):
Suppression[C]: 44.8%;
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage):
Other[D]: N/A.
Fiscal year: 1997;
Total appropriations: Nominal: 1,081.9;
Total appropriations: Inflation-adjusted[A]: 1,273.3;
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage):
Preparedness[B]: 42.8;
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage):
Suppression[C]: 57.2;
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage):
Other[D]: N/A.
Fiscal year: 1998;
Total appropriations: Nominal: 1,119.3;
Total appropriations: Inflation-adjusted[A]: 1,301.6;
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage):
Preparedness[B]: 42.5;
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage):
Suppression[C]: 57.5;
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage):
Other[D]: N/A.
Fiscal year: 1999;
Total appropriations: Nominal: 1,159.2;
Total appropriations: Inflation-adjusted[A]: 1,330.6;
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage):
Preparedness[B]: 45.9;
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage):
Suppression[C]: 54.1;
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage):
Other[D]: N/A.
Fiscal year: 2000;
Total appropriations: Nominal: 1,588.9;
Total appropriations: Inflation-adjusted[A]: 1,787.6;
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage):
Preparedness[B]: 36.8;
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage):
Suppression[C]: 63.2;
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage):
Other[D]: N/A.
Fiscal year: 2001;
Total appropriations: Nominal: 2,863.6;
Total appropriations: Inflation-adjusted[A]: 3,147.4;
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage):
Preparedness[B]: 32.4;
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage):
Suppression[C]: 67.6;
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage):
Other[D]: N/A.
Fiscal year: 2002;
Total appropriations: Nominal: 2,269.1;
Total appropriations: Inflation-adjusted[A]: 2,447.2;
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage):
Preparedness[B]: 39.8;
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage):
Suppression[C]: 31.0;
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage):
Other[D]: 29.2%.
Fiscal year: 2003;
Total appropriations: Nominal: 3,195.6;
Total appropriations: Inflation-adjusted[A]: 3,378.1;
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage):
Preparedness[B]: 27.8;
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage):
Suppression[C]: 53.9;
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage):
Other[D]: 18.4.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Total appropriations: Nominal: 3,293.8;
Total appropriations: Inflation-adjusted[A]: 3,394.1;
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage):
Preparedness[B]: 28.1;
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage):
Suppression[C]: 52.7;
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage):
Other[D]: 19.2.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Total appropriations: Nominal: 2,998.6;
Total appropriations: Inflation-adjusted[A]: 2,998.6;
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage):
Preparedness[B]: 31.2;
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage):
Suppression[C]: 46.4;
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage):
Other[D]: 22.4.
Source: GAO analysis of Congressional Research Service data.
Note: N/A, not applicable.
[A] We adjusted the appropriations dollars for inflation, using the
chain-weighted gross domestic product price index with fiscal year 2005
as the base year.
[B] Includes appropriations for hiring, training, and paying fire
organization personnel; for acquiring needed equipment; and for
prevention activities, including public education efforts.
[C] Includes emergency supplemental and contingent appropriations that
Congress provided to fund suppression activities in years when
agencies' suppression expenditures exceeded the funds initially
appropriated.
[D] Includes appropriations for fuel reduction activities for fiscal
years 2002 through 2005; fuel reduction activities were limited before
fiscal year 2002 and are included in the suppression column.
[End of table]
Increases in the size and severity of wildland fires, and in the cost
of preparing for and responding to them, have led federal agencies to
fundamentally reexamine their approach to wildland fire management. For
decades, federal agencies aggressively suppressed wildland fires and
were generally successful in decreasing the number of acres burned. In
some parts of the country, however, rather than eliminating severe
wildland fires, decades of suppression contributed to the disruption of
ecological cycles and began to change the structure and composition of
forests and rangelands, thereby making lands more susceptible to fire.
Increasingly, the agencies have recognized the role that fire plays in
many ecosystems and the role that it could play in the agencies'
management of forests and watersheds. The agencies worked together to
develop a federal wildland fire management policy in 1995, which for
the first time formally recognized the essential role of fire in
sustaining natural systems. This policy was subsequently reaffirmed and
updated in 2001. The agencies, in conjunction with Congress, also began
developing the National Fire Plan in 2000.[Footnote 5] To align their
policies and to ensure a consistent and coordinated effort to implement
the federal wildland fire policy and National Fire Plan, Agriculture
and Interior also established the Wildland Fire Leadership Council in
2002.[Footnote 6] In addition to noting the negative effects of past
successes in suppressing wildland fires, the policy and plan also
recognized that continued development in the wildland-urban interface
has placed more structures at risk from wildland fire at the same time
that it has increased the complexity and cost of wildland fire
suppression. Forest Service and university researchers estimated in
2005 that about 44 million homes in the lower 48 states are located in
the wildland-urban interface.
To help address these trends, current federal policy directs agencies
to consider land management objectives--identified in land and fire
management plans developed by each local unit, such as a national
forest or a Bureau of Land Management district--and the structures and
resources at risk when determining whether or how to suppress a
wildland fire. When a fire starts, the land manager at the affected
local unit is responsible for determining the strategy that will be
used to respond to the fire. A wide spectrum of strategies is available
to choose from, some of which can be significantly more costly than
others. For example, the agencies may fight fires ignited close to
communities or other high-value areas more aggressively than fires on
remote lands or at sites where fire may provide ecological or fuel-
reduction benefits. In some cases, the agencies may simply monitor a
fire, or take only limited suppression actions, to ensure that the fire
continues to pose little threat to important resources, a practice
known as "wildland fire use."
An incident commander is responsible for implementing the suppression
strategy selected by the land manager, including determining the
tactics to use and ordering the firefighting assets needed to carry out
the strategy. For large and complex fires, an incident management team
comprising not only an incident commander but also a cadre of personnel
to handle command, planning, logistics, operations, and finance
functions manages suppression operations. The incident management team
orders firefighting assets--including personnel, aircraft, equipment,
and supplies--through a three-tiered system of local, regional, and
national dispatch centers.
Because one firefighting agency alone cannot handle all wildland fires
that may burn in its jurisdiction and because a single fire may burn
across federal, state, and local jurisdictions, the five federal land
management agencies work together with tribal, state, and local
firefighting entities to respond to a fire. These entities develop
agreements, often called master agreements, that guide cooperative fire
protection efforts and include provisions for sharing the costs of
these efforts. When a fire is first detected, firefighting entities
normally follow a principle of "closest available resource," whereby,
regardless of jurisdiction, the closest available firefighting
personnel and equipment respond to the fire. As the fire continues to
burn, these entities use an interagency incident management system with
an organizational structure that expands to meet a fire's complexity
and demands; this system enables entities to share firefighting assets
and facilitates an effective response.
Since the mid-1990s, when annual federal expenditures for wildland fire
suppression approached $1 billion for the first time, numerous studies
have been conducted examining steps that federal agencies could take to
contain wildland fire suppression costs (see app. II). Some of these
studies were produced in response to direction from Congress, some were
initiated by the agencies themselves, and the National Academy of
Public Administration conducted a series of five studies beginning in
2000. In addition, Agriculture's Inspector General, the National
Association of State Foresters, and GAO have all examined the agencies'
efficiency and effectiveness in wildland firefighting. In 2005, the
Forest Service hired a consultant to review 22 recent reports and to
evaluate the cost-effectiveness of the reports' more than 300
recommendations.
Because previous reports have, year after year, identified many of the
same issues as needing improvement and recommended similar steps to
address those issues, some recent studies have concluded that the
agencies lack the leadership commitment to make the changes needed to
contain wildland fire costs. The National Association of State
Foresters, for example, reported that strong national leadership and a
mechanism to hold officials throughout the agencies accountable for
their decisions are needed to effectively contain wildland fire costs.
The report concluded, however, that the Forest Service and Interior
agencies had made little progress in developing a broad and effective
response and appeared to lack the leadership commitment to make needed
changes. An independent panel convened by the Wildland Fire Leadership
Council reached a similar conclusion. Further, the Agriculture
Inspector General reported that shortcomings identified in Forest
Service management, although not specific to the wildland fire program,
have proven resistant to change. In particular, the Inspector General
noted that the Forest Service delegates broad authority to field units
but does not have adequate internal controls, including appropriate
performance measures, to ensure that agency policies are followed.
To Help Contain Costs, Federal Agencies Are Taking Some Steps to Target
Operational Areas Identified as Needing Improvement, but Results Are
Unknown:
Dozens of studies by federal agencies and other organizations examining
federal agencies' management of wildland fire have repeatedly
identified a number of similar issues related to wildland fire
operations as needing improvement to help contain wildland fire costs.
These issues generally fall into one of three operational areas--
reducing accumulated fuels, acquiring and using firefighting assets,
and selecting firefighting strategies. Recent studies have also raised
concerns about the framework used to share the cost of fighting fires
between federal and nonfederal entities. Federal agencies have a number
of efforts under way to address needs for improvement, but in part
because many of the efforts are incomplete, the results of these
efforts are unknown.
System to Help Identify and Set Priorities for Lands Needing Fuel
Treatment Is under Development but Not Yet Completed:
Numerous studies have reported that reducing accumulated vegetation and
other fuels, although not directly part of wildland firefighting, is a
key area needing attention if the agencies are to effectively contain
wildland fire preparedness and suppression costs. These fuels can
contribute to larger and more-severe wildland fires and, consequently,
to increasing preparedness and suppression costs. The studies also
identified several factors that hindered the agencies' ability to
effectively reduce fuels. For example, we issued a number of reports,
beginning in 1999, that found that the agencies lacked (1) basic data
needed to identify and prioritize lands needing fuel reduction
treatment; (2) a sound framework to ensure that funds appropriated to
reduce fuels were spent in an effective, efficient, and timely manner;
and (3) a cohesive strategy for addressing accumulated fuels and
wildland fire problems.[Footnote 7] Other organizations, including the
Agriculture Inspector General and the National Association of State
Foresters, reported similar findings. A 2001 update of the federal
wildland fire management policy also reported that no centralized
database was available to agency officials and scientists for compiling
consistent information and using that information for long-term
monitoring, research, or planning.
To help address these shortcomings, the agencies are developing a
geospatial data and modeling system, called LANDFIRE, but the agencies
have yet to decide how they will keep data in the system current.
LANDFIRE--about a $39 million undertaking shared by the Forest Service
and Interior--is intended to produce consistent and comprehensive maps
and data describing vegetation, wildland fuels, and fire regimes across
the United States.[Footnote 8] The agencies will be able to use this
information to help identify fuel accumulations and fire hazards across
the nation, help set nationwide priorities for fuel reduction projects,
and assist in identifying the appropriate response when wildland fires
do occur. According to Forest Service and Interior officials, the
agencies completed mapping the western United States in April 2007;
mapping of the eastern states is scheduled to be completed by 2008 and
of Alaska and Hawaii by 2009. The agencies are developing, but have not
yet finalized, a plan for routinely updating data to reflect changes to
fuels, including from landscape-altering events, such as hurricanes,
disease, or wildland fires themselves. Such a step is critical for
keeping the system both current and relevant over the long term and for
ensuring that the funds invested in LANDFIRE will be of more than short-
term value. Forest Service and Interior officials told us that they
recognize the importance of ensuring that data are periodically
updated, and they are developing a plan to operate and maintain the
system, including determining how often data will be updated. The
officials expect to submit this plan in June 2007 to the Wildland Fire
Leadership Council for approval.
The agencies have yet to develop a cohesive strategy, including long-
term options and associated funding, to address accumulated fuels and
wildland fire problems, although they agreed with our recommendation
that they do so. In February 2006, the agencies completed a document
titled Protecting People and Natural Resources: A Cohesive Fuels
Treatment Strategy. Our review of this document, however, showed that
it did not include long-term options and associated funding, which are
key elements of an effective cohesive strategy. Officials from the
Office of Management and Budget told us they would not allow the
firefighting agencies to publish long-term funding estimates until the
agencies had sufficiently reliable data on which to base those
estimates. As a result, we recommended that the agencies develop a
joint tactical plan outlining the critical steps, together with related
time frames, that they would take to complete a cohesive strategy. Such
a strategy and tactical plan would help Congress and the agencies in
making informed decisions about effective and affordable long-term
approaches to addressing the nation's wildland fire problems, but as of
April 2007, the agencies had developed neither a cohesive strategy nor
a tactical plan. Because containing costs is one of several goals of
the wildland fire program, developing a cohesive strategy that
addresses all aspects of the agencies' preparation for and response to
wildland fires is fundamental if the agencies are to contain costs.
Agencies Have Addressed Few of the Problems Identified in Their
Acquisition and Use of Firefighting Assets:
Federal firefighting agencies have taken some steps to improve how they
acquire and use firefighting personnel, aviation resources, equipment,
and supplies--an area that studies have identified as needing
improvement to better contain costs, especially because firefighting
assets constitute a major cost of responding to wildland fires--but
much remains to be done. Issues identified as needing improvement
included that (1) federal agencies lacked a shared or integrated system
for effectively determining the appropriate type and quantity of
firefighting assets needed for a fire season; (2) the agencies'
processes and systems for acquiring firefighting assets lacked controls
to ensure that the agencies were procuring assets cost-effectively; and
(3) the agencies sometimes used firefighting assets ineffectively or
inefficiently, often in response to political or social pressures.
Determining the Appropriate Type and Quantity of Wildland Firefighting
Assets for a Fire Season:
Studies have reported that the agencies do not use a shared or
integrated system for determining the appropriate type and quantity of
firefighting assets--personnel, aviation resources, equipment, and
supplies--that they need during a fire season to respond effectively
and efficiently to wildland fires. This problem is part of a larger
issue: the agencies have no standardized budgeting and resource
allocation process. In 2001, a team of Forest Service, Interior, and
state officials evaluated the processes used by the Forest Service and
Interior agencies to determine wildland fire budget needs and to
allocate resources among fire management activities. The team found a
number of problems.[Footnote 9] First, agencies' budgeting and resource
allocation systems differed from one to the other, and as a result, it
was difficult to evaluate and compare information across agencies. Yet
given the cooperative firefighting system used in the United States, a
common federal budgeting and allocation system would help ensure that
each agency's resources and firefighting assets are considered when
determining type, quantity, and location of firefighting assets needed
for a fire season. Second, the systems to budget and allocate resources
for different fire management activities within an agency, such as fuel
reduction and wildland fire response, were not integrated, even though
these programs can complement one another in achieving overall land
management goals and objectives. For example, funds spent to reduce
accumulated fuels may help reduce the number of severe wildland fires
and, accordingly, wildland firefighting costs. Third, the team found
that some of the systems used by individual agencies did not provide
managers with the tools to determine the most cost-effective type and
quantity of firefighting assets or where they should be located to most
effectively respond to wildland fires. Determining the appropriate
types, quantity, and location of firefighting assets is key to carrying
out a rapid, effective, and efficient response. The review team
recommended that Agriculture and Interior develop and implement a
common interagency process that would identify resource needs for the
full scope of fire management activities and develop the most cost-
effective allocation of fire program resources across and within these
activities. In 2002, the National Academy of Public Administration
similarly reported that the agencies needed a national budgeting
methodology to analyze the cost, benefit, number, composition,
location, mobility, productivity, and seasonality of each type of
firefighting asset.[Footnote 10]
Although the agencies are working on two efforts that could potentially
improve their ability to determine the appropriate type and quantity of
firefighting assets needed for a fire season, it is unclear whether
these efforts will actually do so. The first effort is development of a
Fire Program Analysis (FPA) system, which was proposed and funded to
help the agencies:
* determine national budget needs by analyzing budget alternatives at
the local level--using a common, interagency process for fire
management planning and budgeting--and aggregating the results;
* determine the relative costs and benefits for the full scope of fire
management activities, including potential trade-offs among investments
in fuel reduction, fire preparedness, and fire suppression activities;
and:
* identify, for a given budget level, the most cost-effective mix of
personnel and equipment to carry out these activities.
Recent design modifications to the system, however, raise questions
about the agencies' ability to fully achieve these key goals. A
midcourse review of the developing system resulted in the Wildland Fire
Leadership Council's approving in December 2006 modifications to the
system's design. FPA and senior Forest Service and Interior officials
told us they believed the modifications will allow the agencies to meet
the key goals. The officials said they expected to have a prototype
developed for the council's review in June 2007 and to substantially
complete the system by June 2008. We have yet to systematically review
the modifications, but after reviewing agency reports on the
modifications and interviewing knowledgeable officials, we have
concerns that the modifications may not allow the agencies to meet
FPA's key goals. For example, under the redesigned system, local land
managers will use a different method to analyze and select various
budget alternatives, and it is unclear whether this method will
identify the most cost-effective allocation of resources. In addition,
it is unclear how the budget alternatives for local units will be
meaningfully aggregated on a nationwide basis, a key FPA goal.
The agencies are also working together to develop national strategies
for the organization, procurement, and management of aviation resources
and firefighting crews. Although national Forest Service and Interior
officials originally indicated that these strategies would be completed
by the end of 2006, as of March 2007, the strategies were unfinished.
Agency officials said that it could be another year before the
strategies are completed.
Acquiring Firefighting Assets Cost-Effectively:
Studies also reported that federal firefighting agencies lacked
effective systems for acquiring needed firefighting assets cost-
effectively, that is, ensuring that vendors provided equipment of
sufficient quality at competitive prices. Once the agencies have
determined the type and quantity of firefighting assets needed, they
must decide where and how to acquire these assets. They have a variety
of procurement options to choose from:
* National contracts are used for assets that can be deployed anywhere
in the nation, including some firefighting crews; aviation resources,
such as large helicopters and air tankers; and camp resources, such as
catering and shower facilities.
* Regional contracts are similar to national contracts, but they are
executed at the regional or state level.
* Emergency equipment rental agreements are often developed before the
fire season, but they are executed only when needed; they are used for
assets such as firefighting crews, engines, bulldozers, water tenders,
and other equipment.
* Fire caches store firefighting equipment and other items that can be
delivered to a fire; 11 national caches are strategically located
around the country.
* Buying teams support an incident management team at a fire by
procuring services and supplies and renting land and equipment locally.
Several studies reported, however, that despite the agencies' growing
reliance on contracted personnel and equipment to carry out
firefighting activities, the agencies' acquisition systems had several
shortcomings. The National Academy of Public Administration reported
that the agencies' acquisition process was unable to help federal
firefighting agencies determine the best source for needed firefighting
assets--for example, in-house or contracted. The academy, the Forest
Service, and other organizations also reported problems with the Forest
Service's process for developing contracts and rental agreements for
emergency equipment, observing, for example, that requirements varied
from contract to contract and did not ensure that the agencies obtained
the most cost-effective assets. Further, inadequate administration and
oversight of the agreements by the agencies resulted in poor contractor
performance and high rental rates. A 2003 interagency report
recommended that the Forest Service and Interior agencies establish
national standards for agreements and strengthen national control and
oversight to better ensure standard operating procedures and policies.
Nevertheless, when the Agriculture Inspector General evaluated the same
issue in 2005, it found that the problems remained.[Footnote 11] The
Inspector General reported that the Forest Service's administration of
the agreements provided the agency with neither the best value nor the
best vendor for its dollar. Further, although the Forest Service
identified potential vendors and equipment before a fire season, the
agency did not use a competitive bidding process to improve either the
price or equipment quality.
Despite planned improvements in the acquisition process, the agencies
have made limited progress in implementing needed changes. The effort
to improve acquisition practices--led by the Forest Service--is
initially focused on developing a nationwide Web-based system for
managing the rental agreements for emergency equipment. Such a system
would make it easier to locate reliable, cost-effective firefighting
assets. The agencies could use the system to help choose suppliers at
the time of a fire--using information provided by contractors on
equipment specifications, price, and other information--and to evaluate
and record contractor performance afterward. A Forest Service official
said that when fully implemented, the system will let the agencies
better evaluate "best value," rather than just lowest price for
firefighting assets, although the official said that it may be
difficult to measure the system's effect on containing costs. This
effort faces some challenges, however. First, while testing a
prototype, the Forest Service found problems that are likely to delay
completion of the system by more than a year, until fiscal year 2009.
Moreover, although using this system will be mandatory for the Forest
Service, it will not be required for either Interior or state agencies,
according to Forest Service officials, and Interior agencies have
expressed concerns about the security of a Web-based system. The Forest
Service and Bureau of Land Management have also begun an effort to
evaluate the national cache system to ensure that the appropriate types
and quantities of items are maintained in the caches. A strategic plan
has been developed but, according to the Forest Service national
manager in charge of the effort, no changes to the cache system have
been made. Finally, a senior Forest Service acquisition official said
that the agencies also planned to improve national and regional
contracts, but they have not begun these efforts.
Using Firefighting Assets Effectively and Efficiently:
The agencies have taken steps to develop and implement systems to help
improve the effective and efficient use of firefighting assets--another
area that studies have identified as needing improvement. Studies have
reported that agencies sometimes used more, or more-costly,
firefighting assets than necessary, often in response to political or
social pressures. For example, firefighting assets may sit idle at a
fire rather than be released for use elsewhere because managers are
concerned that they will be unable to recall an asset if they need it
later, or air tankers may drop flame retardants when on-the-ground
conditions may not warrant such drops. Agency and other studies
reported that to more effectively use their firefighting assets, the
agencies needed to improve their systems for (1) requesting, deploying,
tracking, and releasing firefighting assets for a fire and (2)
recording and analyzing data about the cost and use of these assets at
the time of the fire. The studies also recommended that agencies should
make greater use of local incident commanders to reduce the need to
mobilize more-costly incident management teams.
The agencies have implemented two systems to help improve the use of
their firefighting assets. They completed implementation of a computer-
based dispatching system called the Resource Ordering and Status
System, or ROSS, in December 2006. For many years, agencies used a
manual, paper-based system for requesting and assigning firefighting
assets; ROSS was designed to allow the agencies to more effectively and
efficiently monitor firefighting assets during a fire or other
incident.[Footnote 12] A project official told us that he could not
quantify the actual cost savings resulting from ROSS, but he provided
us with a cost-benefit analysis for the project. This analysis
indicated potential cost savings from increasing the use of local
firefighting assets, which could hasten response and thus perhaps
reduce fire size, and from reducing the personnel needed to dispatch
resources. In addition, the agencies can also use ROSS to identify
individuals qualified and available to serve in various firefighting
positions, which may help increase the agencies' use of local incident
commanders and reduce the need to mobilize more-costly incident
management teams.
The agencies have also implemented a system, known as I-Suite, to
improve the accuracy and completeness of cost and other data needed to
effectively monitor and manage firefighting assets. The National
Wildfire Coordinating Group[Footnote 13] chartered a task group in
April 2001 to evaluate and recommend a data management application to
address what was identified as a perennial problem for incident
management teams: lack of data management tools to use at a fire. I-
Suite, completed by the Forest Service in October 2006, is a set of
computer applications designed to automate and improve business
practices at a fire through a common system to track and analyze
information about firefighting assets, such as personnel hours worked,
contractor costs, and fire costs. According to a Forest Service
official, I-Suite has helped contain costs by reducing the number of
timekeepers needed to process records for personnel and equipment and
has improved the accuracy of payment documents, although officials
could not quantify the cost savings. Only the Forest Service, however,
requires that I-Suite be used on all fires; Interior has recommended
but not mandated its use, and I-Suite is optional for state-managed
fires.
In addition to implementing these systems, the agencies have taken
other steps to improve the agencies' use of aviation resources, which
can account for about one-third of all firefighting costs on a large
fire. In 2004, the agencies assigned a helicopter coordinator to the
national dispatch center in Boise, Idaho, to monitor helicopter use and
help identify situations where less expensive helicopters could be
deployed. An estimated $1.8 million in savings were identified in 2005
as a direct result of the helicopter coordinator's efforts. In 2006,
the agencies began testing a computer program to assist the helicopter
coordinator in identifying the best-value helicopter, given a
particular fire's elevation and the temperature. Also beginning in
2006, the national dispatch center assumed control of national aviation
resources, including helicopters and air tankers, rather than leaving
them under the control of regions or incident management teams.
National control of these assets will allow the agencies to evaluate
where best to deploy them from a national perspective, rather than from
a regional or local perspective. National aviation officials said that
this step is important because little incentive exists at the local
level to contain costs. Interagency guidance states that the assignment
of national assets will be reviewed daily, and national dispatch center
officials will make the final decision.
Agencies May Miss Opportunities to Increase Their Use of Lower-Cost
Firefighting Strategies:
The Forest Service and Interior agencies have taken steps, and are
considering taking additional steps, to improve their policies on how
firefighting strategies are chosen and the analytical tools managers in
the field use to compare alternative strategies, issues that previous
studies have identified as needing improvement to help contain costs.
Although the agencies have made some progress, considerable work
remains if they are to seize additional opportunities to increase their
use of less aggressive strategies, which typically cost less.
Land managers and incident management teams have a wide spectrum of
strategies available to them when responding to wildland fires, some of
which can be significantly more costly than others. These strategies
range from having a few personnel monitor a fire while allowing it to
burn to achieve ecological benefits, a practice known as wildland fire
use, to mobilizing all available personnel and equipment to try to
control the entire perimeter of the fire or otherwise suppress it as
quickly as possible. In selecting a strategy for a particular fire,
land managers are required to consider the cost of suppression; value
of structures and other resources threatened by the fire; and, where
appropriate, potential ecological benefits. The agencies use the term
"appropriate management response" for a strategy that considers these
factors.
Previous studies have raised concerns that federal policies and
shortcomings in the agencies' analytical tools are limiting the ability
of land managers and incident management teams to use the full spectrum
of available strategies, including less costly ones. Interagency
policy, for example, directs land managers to select firefighting
strategies in accordance with local federal units' land and fire
management plans. If a plan has not been developed and approved, the
policy directs land managers to suppress the fire. A 2006 Agriculture
Inspector General report also found that for the Forest Service,
several existing policies unduly restrict land and fire managers from
using lower-cost firefighting strategies. In particular, Forest Service
policy prohibits (1) managing a fire for both suppression and wildland
fire use concurrently, (2) deciding to let a fire burn after initially
deciding to suppress it, and (3) considering potential ecological or
fuel-reduction benefits of letting a fire burn certain areas if the
decision has already been made to suppress it. Interior agencies face
similar constraints. Previous studies also reported that key elements
of the analytical tools agency managers use to compare alternative
firefighting strategies are based on subjective or incomplete
information; these tools may therefore not provide accurate information
that would enable managers to select the appropriate firefighting
strategy, that is, one that neither unnecessarily increases suppression
costs nor unnecessarily places resources at risk.
Steps to Improve Policies Regarding Firefighting Strategies:
The agencies have taken steps to clarify their policies on, and to
emphasize the importance of, selecting appropriate firefighting
strategies. For example, in 2004, the agencies updated their
Interagency Standards for Fire and Fire Aviation Operations to require
that land managers consider the full range of strategies available in
developing their response to a wildland fire. They also have emphasized
the importance of considering appropriate firefighting strategies in
the action plans they develop annually to provide guidance for the
pending fire season. In addition, agency officials told us that since
2000 they have substantially increased wildland fire use, a strategy at
one end of the response spectrum. For example, Forest Service officials
estimated that the agency managed approximately 250,000 acres for
wildland fire use in fiscal year 2005--compared with less than 70,000
acres annually in fiscal years 2000 through 2002--but we were unable to
verify the reliability of these data. According to one Forest Service
official, this trend represented an improvement, but opportunities
remained to further increase wildland fire use.
Considerable work remains if the agencies are to fulfill the potential
of using less costly strategies. First, the Forest Service and Interior
agencies are working together to revise their policies--revisions that
could allow different areas of the same fire to be managed for
suppression and wildland fire use concurrently and could allow a fire
that was previously being suppressed to be managed instead for wildland
fire use. It is still too early, however, to determine how the policies
may change or the extent to which any changes will help contain costs.
Second, Agriculture's Inspector General recently reported that the
agencies lack qualified staff to manage wildland fire use
fires.[Footnote 14] A wildland fire use official for the Forest Service
estimated that for trained staff to be located in the field where
decisions are made about whether to suppress a fire or manage it for
wildland fire use, the agency needed about 300 wildland fire use
managers. As of fall 2006, the Forest Service had fewer than 100
qualified managers, although about another 100 were being trained.
Senior Forest Service officials said that once these managers were
trained, they believed that the agency would have sufficient staff
trained in wildland fire use. An Interior official said that Interior
also needed more personnel qualified in wildland fire use, but this
official did not have any estimate of additional staff needed. Third,
we recently reported that although 95 percent of the agencies' land
management units had completed fire management plans that could allow
them to select lower-cost firefighting strategies, the agencies did not
require that these plans be updated to reflect new data, such as data
from LANDFIRE.[Footnote 15] If the plans do not contain accurate
information on current fuel conditions, land managers and incident
management teams may be more likely to select more-aggressive
firefighting strategies. Fourth, although agency policy directs land
managers to consider the full range of available strategies, our
discussions with agency officials and review of a recent Agriculture
Inspector General report show that the agencies lack a method for
ensuring that land managers follow this direction.
Steps to Improve Tools That Managers Use to Select Firefighting
Strategies:
Federal firefighting agencies, led by the Forest Service, are also
taking steps to improve decision-support tools that help land managers
select appropriate firefighting strategies, but shortcomings with these
tools remain. If firefighters are unable to contain a fire during
initial attack, land managers are directed to analyze alternative
strategies for suppressing it. The agencies have taken steps in recent
years to improve the current tool for conducting such an analysis,
which is known as wildland fire situation analysis. Forest Service
researchers, for example, have made wildland fire situation analysis a
Web-based system, and they have created different versions of the tool,
which provide additional elements for land managers to use for larger
or more-severe fires. The Web-based version, first released in 2005,
has several advantages, according to a Forest Service researcher.
First, the Web-based version is updated centrally, thus ensuring that
land managers in the field are using the most up-to-date version.
Second, it provides an easier means for managers near a fire to share
information with experts elsewhere about a fire's expected behavior and
the likely values at risk, and can provide a way for senior officials
to review the basis for strategic decisions while there is still time
to change them. Third, the Web-based version also includes some
geospatial mapping capabilities, which helps land managers and incident
management teams quickly identify key geographic features, roads,
structures, and other resources that may be threatened by the fire.
Many critical inputs to wildland fire situation analysis are estimates,
whose accuracy depends to a great extent on the knowledge and
experience of land managers in the field, and this knowledge and
experience can vary. The firefighting strategy ultimately used--which
greatly influences a fire's final cost--is chosen largely on the basis
of these estimates. First, the range of firefighting strategies
considered in the analysis depends on the knowledge and experience of
the land managers in the field who identify possible alternatives.
Second, estimating the probability of success for each alternative is
critical to making an informed decision in selecting a firefighting
strategy; yet this estimate is based on the manager's subjective
assessment of fuel conditions, topography, weather predictions, and the
availability of firefighting resources. Third, the expected suppression
cost for each alternative is also an estimate, often based on the cost
per acre of suppressing previous fires in the area--which may or may
not be an accurate predictor of future costs--and on the final size of
the fire, which is also an estimate. Finally, land managers identify
structures and other resources that may be threatened by the fire, but,
agency officials told us, there is no consistent method for estimating
the value of the identified structures and resources. Senior Forest
Service and Interior officials told us that professional judgment is an
inherent element of managing wildland fires, and local managers'
estimates and predictions are important in selecting appropriate
firefighting strategies, but that they also recognized the importance
of establishing robust processes and tools to assist managers in making
informed decisions.
Forest Service researchers are developing a new tool, called the
wildland fire decision support system, which may alleviate some of
these shortcomings. The exact capabilities of the new tool are still
being determined, but it is expected to greatly increase the analytical
power available to land managers. For example, the new tool will likely
allow managers in the field to predict the probability that a wildland
fire will reach certain areas--considering the fire's current location,
adjacent fuel conditions, and forecast weather conditions--and to
identify nearby structures and other highly valued resources. The
results of this analysis can be combined to provide land managers and
incident management teams with a map illustrating the probability that
a particular wildland fire, barring any suppression actions, will burn
a certain area within a specified time and which structures or other
resources may therefore be threatened. In addition, the tool is
expected to improve the precision of the cost estimates for different
suppression strategies. Having such information would better help land
managers and incident management teams understand the resources
threatened by a wildland fire, the costs associated with different
firefighting strategies, and the probability of successfully
suppressing the fire, and it could result in less intensive, and
therefore less costly, responses. Although the new tool will not be
available to managers in the field before 2009, Forest Service
researchers have begun to use several of its components to provide
analysis to land managers. The researcher leading this effort said that
information on predicted fire spread and the locations of structures
and other highly valued resources at risk has been provided for more
than 70 fires since 2005 and that the information contributed to
strategic decisions that likely reduced costs, although he was unable
to estimate the impact. For example, for a 2006 fire in Idaho, he said
that managers in the field used the information to identify where best
to position firefighting assets and to determine that fewer assets were
needed than initially projected, thus reducing costs.
Several challenges have been identified, however, to the full
development and deployment of the wildland fire decision support
system. First, the fire spread probability model relies on data from
LANDFIRE about fuel conditions, and, as we previously discussed, the
agencies have yet to decide how they will keep data on fuel conditions
updated over time. If LANDFIRE data do not reflect current fuel
conditions, land managers and incident management teams are unlikely to
trust the fire spread probability maps, which we believe could result
in the selection of more-aggressive and more-costly firefighting
strategies than necessary. Second, according to the lead researcher,
successful deployment of the system requires (1) training staff in the
field to use it, (2) acquiring new computer hardware capable of quickly
running data-intensive calculations, and (3) ensuring adequate
bandwidth in field locations to allow remote access to complex Web-
based applications. Third, although the tool would help managers
estimate the probability that particular locations will burn, an
element of risk is inherent in decisions about firefighting strategies.
According to the lead agency researcher, whether the wildland fire
decision support system results in less aggressive and less costly
strategy decisions will depend greatly on the framework the agencies
establish to define acceptable levels of risk and to ensure that
managers in the field select appropriate strategies.
Agencies Have Updated Guidance for Sharing Suppression Costs with
Nonfederal Entities but Have No Clear Plan for Ensuring That
Appropriate Cost-Sharing Methods Are Used:
Finally, we and others have reported that federal and nonfederal
entities need to work together to better share wildland fire
suppression costs.[Footnote 16] For example, we reported that agencies
lacked clear guidance on how federal and nonfederal entities should
share the cost of fighting fires that burned or threatened both federal
and nonfederal lands, an issue of increasing importance because of the
rising number of homes in the wildland-urban interface and the
increasing costs of protecting these homes from fires. We further
reported that the existing framework for sharing costs insulates state
and local governments from the cost of protecting the wildland-urban
interface, which may reduce those governments' incentive to adopt
building codes and land use requirements that could help reduce the
cost of suppressing wildland fires.
Federal agencies, working with nonfederal entities, have recently taken
steps to clarify guidance and better ensure that firefighting costs are
shared consistently for fires that threaten both federal and nonfederal
lands and resources. In early 2007, the Forest Service and Interior
agencies approved an updated template that land managers can use when
developing master agreements--which establish the framework for sharing
costs between federal and nonfederal entities--as well as agreements on
how to share costs for a specific fire. It may take several years to
fully incorporate this new guidance into master agreements because they
are normally updated every 5 years. Although the guidance states that
managers must document their rationale for selecting a particular cost-
sharing method, according to officials, the agencies have no clear plan
for how they will provide oversight to ensure that appropriate cost-
sharing methods are used.
Lack of Clear Goals or a Strategy Hinders Federal Agencies' Management
of Wildland Fire Cost-Containment Efforts:
To effectively manage their cost-containment efforts, the Forest
Service and Interior agencies should, at a minimum, have (1) clearly
defined goals and measurable objectives, (2) a strategy to achieve
these goals and objectives, (3) performance measures to track their
progress, and (4) a framework for holding the appropriate agency
officials accountable for achieving the goals.[Footnote 17] The
agencies, however, have yet to clearly define their goals or establish
measurable objectives for containing costs or to develop a strategy for
achieving those goals. In addition, while the agencies have adopted a
new cost-containment performance measure and have taken, or are
planning to take, steps to improve accountability within the agencies
for containing costs, the extent to which these steps will help contain
costs is unknown.
Agencies Lack Clear Cost-Containment Goals and Objectives:
Federal firefighting agencies have yet to establish clear goals and
measurable objectives for their wildland fire cost-containment efforts.
Since 2000, the agencies have issued many documents--including updates
to the federal wildland fire policy, agency strategic plans, and annual
interagency fire and aviation operations plans--that recognize the
importance of cost containment. These documents may have raised
awareness in the agencies about containing costs, but none of them
clearly states the agencies' cost-containment goals and objectives. For
example, several key documents--including the 2001 Review and Update of
the 1995 Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy, the Interagency
Standards for Fire and Fire Aviation Operations, and the Forest
Service's and Interior's policy manuals--state that wildland fires are
to be suppressed at minimum cost, considering firefighter and public
safety and resources to be protected. The agencies, however, have
established neither clear criteria by which to weigh the relative
importance of the often-competing elements of this broad goal, nor
measurable objectives by which to determine if they are meeting the
goal. Without such criteria and objectives, the importance of
containing costs, relative to the other elements, is not clear. As a
result, according to agency officials we interviewed and reports we
reviewed, managers in the field lack a clear understanding of the
relative importance that the agencies' leadership places on containing
costs and are therefore likely to continue to select firefighting
strategies without due consideration of the costs of suppression.
Agencies Lack a Clear Strategy to Contain Wildland Fire Costs:
The Forest Service and Interior agencies have also yet to establish an
overall cost-containment strategy. Without a strategy designed to
achieve clear cost-containment goals, the agencies (1) have no
assurance that the variety of steps they are taking to help contain
wildland fire costs are prioritized so that the most important steps
are undertaken first and (2) are unable to determine to what extent
these steps will help contain costs and if a different approach may
therefore be needed. The agencies have issued several documents
addressing the increased costs and severity of wildland fires, but none
of the documents we reviewed provided an overall strategy for how the
agencies would contain costs. For example, the 2005 Quadrennial Fire
and Fuel Review Report identifies several factors contributing to more-
severe fires and higher costs but does not indicate the steps the
agencies would take to respond effectively to those factors. In
contrast, a March 2003 document, Large Fire Cost Reduction Action Plan,
lists many steps the agencies planned to take to help contain costs but
does not indicate to what extent the steps would in fact do so.
Although senior fire officials in both the Forest Service and Interior
said the agencies did not have a written strategy for containing costs,
some of these officials said they believed the steps they were taking
were useful and reflected a sound approach to containing costs.
Performance Measures for Containing Costs Have Improved, but Concerns
Remain:
Recent reports, as well as Office of Management and Budget reviews,
have raised concerns that the Forest Service's and Interior agencies'
performance measures do not allow the agencies to measure their
progress effectively or report their accomplishments in containing
wildland fire costs. The Forest Service, in its strategic plan for
fiscal years 2004 through 2008, established as its primary cost-
containment performance measure the percentage of large fires in which
the value of protected resources exceeded the cost of suppression. This
measure, however, evaluates neither the effectiveness nor the
efficiency of the agencies' suppression activities. For example, the
Forest Service might carry out suppression activities that cost less
than the value of the resources protected, but those actions might not
contribute to containing the fire and might therefore be unnecessary.
In other cases, the agency might have been able to protect the same
resources by taking different, less costly actions. The Forest Service
has recognized the shortcomings of this performance measure and has not
reported any results for the measure in its annual performance and
accountability reports for fiscal years 2004 through 2006. Unlike the
Forest Service, Interior has not adopted any performance measures
related to containing wildland fire costs in its strategic plan. In
conjunction with the Forest Service and nonfederal partners, however,
Interior adopted a performance measure in the May 2002 10-Year
Comprehensive Strategy as part of the National Fire Plan to track the
average suppression cost per acre for wildland fires (1) in different
size classes and fire regimes, (2) near and away from the wildland-
urban interface, and (3) in areas with and without approved fire
management plans. Such information, collected and tracked over time,
could assist the agencies in gauging their progress in containing
costs. However, the agencies have not reported the results of this
measure, in part because of difficulties in obtaining accurate data,
according to Forest Service officials.
To address these concerns, federal firefighting agencies have adopted a
new performance measure that may improve their ability to evaluate
their progress in containing costs.[Footnote 18] Since 2005, the
agencies, led by the Forest Service, have been developing a measure
known as the stratified cost index. This index is based on models that
estimate suppression costs for a particular fire on the basis of the
costs of previous fires with similar characteristics.[Footnote 19] The
new performance measure identifies the percentage of fires whose
suppression costs exceeded the cost estimated by the stratified cost
index. The Forest Service has reported that 31 of 117 fires (26
percent) in fiscal year 2005 cost significantly more than predicted by
the stratified cost index, and that 24 fires (21 percent) cost
significantly less than predicted by the index. In part because of the
development of the index, the Office of Management and Budget recently
recognized that the Forest Service has improved the wildland fire
program's performance measures, although it also stated that further
improvement is needed.
Several concerns have been raised about the stratified cost index.
First, although the agencies have improved their data on suppression
costs and fire characteristics in recent years, additional improvement
is needed. In particular, cost data for "fire complexes"--that is, two
or more fires burning in proximity that are managed as a single
incident--are particularly difficult to identify. Thus, the costs of
many of the largest fires are not included in the models, limiting
their effectiveness. Second, the wide variation in the costs of past
fires with similar characteristics means that the models' ability to
estimate suppression costs is limited. For example, although the models
estimated an average cost of $317 per acre for fires in fiscal year
2005, the range of estimated costs was $88 to $1,132.[Footnote 20] This
range is expected to narrow over time as data from more fires are
incorporated into the models. Third, to date, the models are based
solely on fires managed by the Forest Service. Forest Service
researchers are developing, at Interior's request, similar models for
fires managed by the Interior agencies. However, it will be several
years, at the earliest, before enough data have been collected for the
model to be useful. In addition, we are concerned that because the
stratified cost index is based on costs from previous fires--and
because the agencies have only recently emphasized the importance of
using less aggressive suppression strategies--the index does not
include data from many fires where less costly firefighting strategies
were used. As a result, the index may not accurately identify fires
where more, or more-expensive, resources were used than needed.
According to Forest Service officials, data from recent fires will be
added to the models annually; therefore, over time, the models should
include more fires where less aggressive firefighting strategies were
used.
Agencies Have Yet to Establish an Effective Oversight and
Accountability Framework:
Federal firefighting agencies lack effective oversight mechanisms to
increase accountability for containing costs, according to previous
studies. Even though land managers and incident management teams make
critical decisions affecting suppression costs, previous studies have
found that managers and teams have few incentives to consider cost
containment in making those decisions. Some of these and other studies
have also reported that despite longtime recognition of the lack of
incentives, the agencies have not yet established effective oversight
mechanisms to increase managers' and teams' accountability. The
agencies, for example, do not consistently review decisions made in the
field that affect suppression costs. The studies reported that the lack
of a clear and valid measure evaluating both the benefits and costs of
alternative suppression strategies was a key impediment to the
agencies' establishing more effective oversight mechanisms. In
addition, an independent panel convened by the Wildland Fire Leadership
Council concluded that the current budget framework was perceived as
providing a "blank check" for firefighting and provided few incentives
for the agencies to contain costs. To increase such incentives, the
panel recommended that the agencies allocate suppression funds on a
regional basis and penalize regions that exceed their allocation by
reducing the funds from the region's other accounts, such as those for
land management activities.
Federal firefighting agencies have taken a number of steps to establish
or improve oversight mechanisms, but the extent to which these steps
will assist the agencies in containing costs is unknown. These steps
include:
* Reviewing the costs of large fires. The Forest Service has reviewed
the costs of many large fires, a practice that could help identify
instances where officials could have taken less costly actions. Since
2003, the Forest Service has directed its regional offices to review
all fires in each region that cost more than $2 million to suppress,
and directed the Washington, D.C., office to review fires costing more
than $5 million. Agriculture's Inspector General, however, recently
reported that the Forest Service reviewed only 11 of the 91 fires (12
percent) requiring regional review and 7 of the 50 fires (14 percent)
requiring national review.[Footnote 21] Forest Service officials told
us they did not review more of these fires because it would have taken
too much staff time to complete all of the reviews. They therefore
decided to conduct fewer but more-detailed reviews. These officials
also said that they are in the process of changing their policy to
require regional reviews of fires costing more than $5 million and
national reviews of fires costing more than $10 million. In addition,
Congress directed the Forest Service to establish an outside
independent review panel to examine, beginning in fiscal year 2004,
Forest Service fires with suppression costs that exceeded $10 million.
Together, these reviews identified many steps that local land managers
and incident management teams could have taken to help contain costs.
However, some studies have questioned the effectiveness of these
reviews because, for example, managers were not required to respond to
the issues the reviews raised or to implement the recommended steps.
Forest Service officials told us that, beginning with fires that
occurred in fiscal year 2006, land managers are required to respond to
recommendations made in the reviews, either by agreeing to implement a
recommendation or by explaining why not.
* Clarifying land managers' responsibility for containing costs. The
agencies have issued guidance clarifying that land managers, not
incident management teams, have primary responsibility for containing
wildland fire costs, but they have not yet determined how the land
managers are to be held accountable for doing so. Rather, the agencies
have taken several incremental steps intended to assist land managers
in carrying out this responsibility. First, a Forest Service official
told us that because many land managers lack both wildland fire
experience and the time to closely monitor incident management teams,
the agencies require that an "incident business advisor" be assigned to
fires expected to cost more than $5 million and recommend that an
advisor be assigned to fires expected to cost more than $1 million. An
incident business advisor represents the land manager's interest in
containing costs by observing firefighting operations and working with
the incident management team to identify ways those operations could be
more cost-effective. For example, an incident business advisor may
observe the types and quantity of firefighting personnel and equipment
assigned to a fire and how they are used, observe how equipment and
supplies are procured, and ensure that the most expensive personnel and
equipment are released first as a fire comes under control. The overall
impact of incident business advisors has most likely been moderate,
Forest Service officials told us, in large part because the advisors do
not examine the firefighting strategies being used. Second, the
agencies require land managers to include cost containment as a
consideration when they delegate authority to an incident management
team to fight a particular fire and to evaluate the team for how well
it achieves the land managers' goals. These requirements are intended
to provide a mechanism for land managers to hold a team accountable for
achieving cost-containment goals. The Forest Service officials told us,
however, that there is no clear method of evaluating the cost-
effectiveness of the firefighting actions taken by the incident
management team. Moreover, land managers may be reluctant to identify
instances where firefighting actions were not cost-effective, since
poor performance by the incident management team also reflects poorly
on the land managers. Third, the agencies have adopted policies
requiring land managers to consider expected fire suppression costs
when developing land and fire management plans. Decisions made in these
plans can affect future suppression costs, and this requirement is
intended to ensure that managers consider this impact. It is too early
to determine the effectiveness of this requirement.
* Establishing a comptroller to monitor costs. In August 2006, the
Chief of the Forest Service established a comptroller position to
oversee Forest Service wildland fire suppression expenditures. The
current comptroller, the Associate Deputy Chief for State and Private
Forestry, told us that the duties of the position are not defined,
although in 2006 he reviewed several high-cost fires, including fires
in California and Washington. During these reviews, to identify
opportunities for achieving firefighting goals at a lower cost, the
comptroller discussed with managers in the field, and with the
appropriate regional foresters, the firefighting strategies selected
and the quantity of firefighting assets used. The comptroller told us
he believed these efforts were helpful, in part because managers in the
field were aware that their decisions could be reviewed, but he could
not provide an example where his involvement led directly to a change
in strategy or tactics that could have reduced costs. The role of the
comptroller for 2007 and later is still being determined. The Forest
Service has also indicated that, beginning with fires in 2007, it will
designate a small team to monitor fires having the potential to be
costly or otherwise complex and to work with field managers and
regional officials to represent the Chief's interest in containing
costs.
Although the agencies have taken some steps to improve their oversight
of wildland fire costs, they have made little progress in two key areas
identified by previous studies. First, the agencies have yet to
establish a clear measure to evaluate the benefits and costs of
alternative firefighting strategies, even though some studies have
concluded that absence of such a measure fundamentally hinders the
agencies' ability to provide effective oversight. Second, the agencies
considered the recommendation to provide budgetary incentives to
regions to contain wildland fire costs but decided against pursuing it,
in part because of concerns that transferring funds from other
appropriations accounts would violate appropriations law. The co-chair
of the Wildland Fire Leadership Council panel recently testified before
the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources that the panel
continues to believe that this recommendation provides the greatest
opportunity for the agencies to contain wildland fire costs.
Conclusions:
Continuing concerns over the last decade about the mounting federal
cost of preparing for and responding to wildland fires have spurred
numerous studies and actions by federal wildland fire agencies to
address areas needing improvement, but little in the way of a
coordinated and focused effort to rein in these costs. Although the
agencies have taken--and continue to take--steps intended to contain
wildland fire costs, the effect of these steps on containing costs is
unknown, in part because the agencies lack a clear vision for what they
want to achieve. Without clearly defined cost-containment goals and
objectives, federal land and fire managers in the field are more likely
to select strategies and tactics that favor suppressing fires quickly
over those that seek to balance the benefits of protecting the
resources at risk and the costs of protecting them. Further, without
clear goals, the agencies will be unable to develop consistent
standards by which to measure their performance. Perhaps most
important, without a clear vision of what they are trying to achieve
and a systematic approach for achieving it, the agencies--and Congress
and the American people--have little assurance that cost-containment
efforts will lead to substantial improvement. Because cost-containment
goals should be considered in relation to other wildland fire program
goals--such as protecting life, resources, and property--it is
important that the agencies integrate cost-containment goals within the
overall cohesive strategy for responding to wildland fires that we
previously recommended. The conditions that have contributed to
increasing wildland fire severity and expenditures are complex, have
been decades in the making, and will take decades to resolve.
Developing an effective and affordable strategy for addressing these
conditions is therefore critical, particularly in light of the large
federal deficit and the long-term fiscal challenges facing the nation.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Without clear goals and a strategy for containing wildland fire costs,
the agencies are unable to effectively and efficiently manage their
myriad ongoing efforts to contain wildland fire costs. Thus, to help
manage these efforts and to assist Congress in its oversight role, we
recommend that the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior work
together to direct their respective agencies to take the following four
actions:
* Establish clearly defined goals and measurable objectives for
containing wildland fire costs.
* Develop a strategy to achieve these goals and objectives.
* Establish performance measures that are aligned with these goals and
objectives.
* Establish a framework to ensure that officials are held accountable
for achieving these goals and objectives.
Because of the importance of these actions and continuing concerns
about the agencies' response to the increasing cost of wildland fires-
-and so that the agencies can use the results of these actions to
prepare for the 2008 fire season--the agencies should provide this
information to Congress no later than November 2007.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Forest Service and
Interior generally disagreed with the characterization of many of our
findings; they neither agreed nor disagreed with our recommendations.
In particular, the Forest Service and Interior stated that they did not
believe we had accurately portrayed some of the significant actions
they had taken to contain wildland fire costs, and they identified
several agency documents that they believe provide clearly defined
goals and objectives that make up their strategy to contain costs. We
acknowledge that the agencies have established a broad goal of
suppressing fires at minimum cost, considering firefighter and public
safety and resources to be protected, but we also found that the
agencies have established neither clear criteria by which to weigh the
relative importance of these often-competing priorities nor measurable
objectives by which to determine if they are meeting this goal. Our
review suggests that without measurable objectives, the importance of
containing costs relative to the other program priorities is not clear
and that managers in the field are therefore likely to select
firefighting strategies without due consideration of suppression costs.
Therefore, we continue to believe that our recommendations, if
effectively implemented, would help the agencies better manage their
cost-containment efforts and improve their ability to contain wildland
fire costs. The Forest Service and Interior's joint comments, and our
evaluation of them, are included in appendix III.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report
until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies
of this report to interested congressional committees, the Secretaries
of Agriculture and the Interior, the Chief of the Forest Service, the
Director of the Bureau of Land Management, and other interested
parties. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In
addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web
site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have questions about this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-3841 or nazzaror@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are
listed in appendix V.
Signed by:
Robin M. Nazzaro:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine the steps that federal agencies have taken to address the
areas identified by previous studies, we first reviewed selected
studies--most conducted since 2000 by federal, state, and
nongovernmental entities--that examined issues related to wildland fire
cost containment. Studies reviewed included independent reviews by GAO,
the Department of Agriculture (Agriculture) Office of Inspector
General, the National Academy of Public Administration, the National
Association of State Foresters, and the Wildland Fire Leadership
Council, as well as studies by the Forest Service and Department of the
Interior (Interior) agencies, including several reviews of individual
wildland fires. Forest Service and Interior officials at the national
offices in Washington, D.C., reviewed our list of studies and agreed
that we had included those key to addressing issues related to cost
containment. We reviewed the issues these studies identified as needing
improvement to help contain costs and categorized them into broad
operational areas corresponding to key aspects of preparing for and
responding to wildland fires. To determine the steps that federal
agencies have taken to address these issues--and to corroborate our
understanding and categorization of the issues--we interviewed
officials from the Forest Service, Bureau of Land Management, and
Office of Wildland Fire Coordination within Interior at the national
offices and at the National Interagency Fire Center in Boise, Idaho. To
determine the current status and results or intended results of the
steps that the agencies identified, we reviewed relevant agency
documents, including agency policies, manuals, other guidance,
implementation strategies, and project plans. We also interviewed
pertinent agency officials and nonagency officials, including those
from the National Academy of Public Administration and state
representatives on the Wildland Fire Leadership Council's independent
panel.
To determine steps that the agencies have taken to improve their
management of their cost-containment efforts, we reviewed wildland fire
program reviews by the Office of Management and Budget, agency
documents--including strategic plans and performance and accountability
reports, federal wildland fire policy documents, and National Fire Plan
documents--and interviewed agency officials. We also interviewed
officials from the Office of Management and Budget. To determine
management steps that agencies are required to take and best management
practices, we reviewed relevant statutes and guidance, including the
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 and GAO's Standards for
Internal Control in the Federal Government,[Footnote 22] as well as
other GAO reports on improving federal agency management.
We performed our work in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards, which included an assessment of data reliability,
from May 2006 through May 2007.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Selected GAO Products and Other Reports Reviewed:
To identify areas potentially in need of improvement for federal
firefighting agencies to contain the costs of fighting wildland fires,
we reviewed dozens of reports, most issued since 2000. In addition to
our own reports on wildland fire issues, we also reviewed reports
prepared or commissioned by Agriculture, Interior, the Agriculture
Office of Inspector General, the National Association of State
Foresters, and the National Academy of Public Administration. The
following list does not include all of the reports we reviewed but is
intended to illustrate the range of related topics that we examined.
GAO Products:
Wildland Fire Management: Lack of a Cohesive Strategy Hinders Agencies'
Cost-Containment Efforts. GAO-07-427T. Washington, D.C.: January 30,
2007.
Wildland Fire Suppression: Lack of Clear Guidance Raises Concerns about
Cost Sharing between Federal and Nonfederal Entities. GAO-06-570.
Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2006.
Wildland Fire Management: Update on Federal Agency Efforts to Develop a
Cohesive Strategy to Address Wildland Fire Threats. GAO-06-671R.
Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2006.
Wildland Fire Management: Important Progress Has Been Made, but
Challenges Remain to Completing a Cohesive Strategy. GAO-05-147.
Washington, D.C.: January 14, 2005.
Wildland Fire Management: Additional Actions Required to Better
Identify and Prioritize Lands Needing Fuels Reduction. GAO-03-805.
Washington, D.C.: August 15, 2003.
Forest Service: Little Progress on Performance Accountability Likely
Unless Management Addresses Key Challenges. GAO-03-503. Washington,
D.C.: May 1, 2003.
Wildland Fire Management: Improved Planning Will Help Agencies Better
Identify Fire-Fighting Preparedness Needs. GAO-02-158. Washington,
D.C.: March 29, 2002.
Severe Wildland Fires: Leadership and Accountability Needed to Reduce
Risks to Communities and Resources. GAO-02-259. Washington, D.C.:
January 31, 2002.
Western National Forests: A Cohesive Strategy Is Needed to Address
Catastrophic Wildfire Threats. GAO/RCED-99-65. Washington, D.C.: April
2, 1999.
Federal or State Firefighting Entity Reports:
Secretary of Agriculture Independent Cost-Control Review Panel. FY 2005
Large Cost Wildfires Report. Washington, D.C.: April 2006.
System Planning Corporation. Prioritizing Wildland Fire Cost
Containment Strategies. A report prepared for the U.S. Department of
Agriculture, Forest Service. Arlington, VA: March 2006.
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service; U.S. Department of the
Interior; and the National Association of State Foresters. Quadrennial
Fire and Fuel Review Report. Washington, D.C.: June 2005.
Secretary of Agriculture Independent Cost-Control Review Panel. FY 2004
Large Cost Wildfires Report. Washington, D.C.: March 2005.
Wildland Fire Leadership Council. Large Fire Suppression Costs:
Strategies for Cost Management. Washington, D.C.: August 2004.
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, and U.S. Department of
the Interior. Developing an Interagency, Landscape-Scale Fire Planning
Analysis and Budget Tool. Washington, D.C.: November 2001.
National Association of State Foresters. Cost Containment on Large
Fires: Efficient Utilization of Wildland Fire Suppression Resources.
Washington, D.C.: July 2000.
Department of Agriculture's Office of Inspector General Reports:
Audit Report: Forest Service Large Fire Suppression Costs. Report No.
08601-44-SF. Washington, D.C.: November 2006.
Audit Report: Implementation of the Healthy Forests Initiative. Report
No. 08601-6-AT. Washington, D.C.: September 2006.
Management Challenges. Washington, D.C.: August 2006.
Audit Report: Forest Service Emergency Equipment Rental Agreements.
Report No. 08601-40-SF. Washington, D.C.: July 2005.
National Academy of Public Administration Reports:
Containing Wildland Fire Costs: Enhancing Hazard Mitigation Capacity.
Washington, D.C.: January 2004.
Containing Wildland Fire Costs: Utilizing Local Firefighting Forces.
Washington, D.C.: December 2003.
Containing Wildland Fire Costs: Improving Equipment and Services
Acquisition. Washington, D.C.: September 2003.
Wildfire Suppression: Strategies for Containing Costs. Washington,
D.C.: September 2002.
Managing Wildland Fire: Enhancing Capacity to Implement the Federal
Interagency Policy. Washington, D.C.: December 2001.
Appendix III: Comments from the Forest Service and the Department of
the Interior:
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
The Department of Agriculture:
The Department of the Interior:
Washington:
May 24, 2007:
Robin M. Nazzaro, Director:
Natural Resources and Environment:
United States Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Ms. Nazzaro:
We appreciate the opportunity to review and comment on the draft
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, GAO-07-655, "Wildland
Fire Management: Lack of Clear Goals and Strategy Hinders Federal
Agencies' Efforts to Contain the Costs of Fighting Fires." As we
discussed with you recently, the fire community has found GAO reports
and recommendations to be constructive in addressing issues related to
the fire program. However, the agencies generally disagree with the
characterization of many of the findings in this report and believe
that GAO has not accurately portrayed some of the significant actions
the agencies have taken to address large fire suppression costs and
management efficiencies.
Our goal continues to be the protection of life, property and
resources. While accomplishing our goal of protection, we continue to
strive aggressively to contain the costs of fire suppression.
GAO concludes the steps the Forest Service and Interior agencies have
taken to contain costs are unknown because these steps are not
complete, and recommends we establish clearly defined goals and
objectives, a strategy to achieve them, and corresponding performance
measures. We do have objectives and clearly defined goals that make up
our strategy for better managing large fire suppression costs. The
Federal Wildland Fire Policy, the Healthy Forests Initiative, Healthy
Forests Restoration Act, and the 10-Year Strategy Implementation Plan
provide overarching interagency goals and objectives.
When we discussed our concerns with GAO regarding this report, we
provided numerous, important clarifying comments on the draft. We did
not see significant acknowledgment of these clarifications in the
subsequent draft, and are concerned that important miscommunications
remain. GAO presents an incomplete view on four key areas we discuss
below that we believe will help us better manage and contain costs:
Appropriate Management Response (AMR), Fire Program Analysis (FPA),
LANDFIRE and the stratified cost index (SCI).
GAO failed to recognize, and include in their report, a major component
of our cost containment management strategy which we believe to be a
significant improvement over past suppression strategies. AMR moves the
agencies from aggressively attacking wildfires of all sizes to a more
risk-informed, performance-based strategy that will reduce costs by
increasing flexibility in wildland firefighting decisions. The
transition to AMR has been underway for some time, and improvements
have been made in using Wildland Fire Use as a tool for achieving
desirable environmental outcomes with reasonable cost expenditures.
Further use of AMR is expected in 2007 and 2008 as the agencies
aggressively apply AMR more widely.
GAO takes exception to recent FPA design modifications that they say
may compromise the agencies' ability to fully achieve key goals. GAO
goes on to say it is unclear whether this method will identify the most
cost-effective allocation of resources, and that it is also unclear how
budgets for local units will be meaningfully aggregated on a national
basis. We strongly disagree. Additional information was supplied by the
FPA project manager, although it was not incorporated or acknowledged.
To restate:
In December 2006, the Wildland Fire Leadership Council called for
development of a revised analytical system for FPA. The revised system
will be used to systematically evaluate alternative investment
strategies and identify options that best reduce wildland fire losses,
improve ecological conditions, and minimize cost. The system is
designed to explicitly address uncertainty and risk in predicting
future wildland fires. A combination of simulation models, GIS
analyses, and sophisticated decision analysis tools array alternatives
using quantitative performance measures that readily display inherent
risks and trade-offs at both FPU and national levels. This approach
provides a more robust basis for modeling real-world complexities than
the linear optimization approach used in Phase 1, while maintaining the
ability to compare the performance and effectiveness of alternative
funding decisions.
GAO views LANDFIRE as an unproven work in progress and they question
our ability to complete and maintain LANDFIRE but offer no explanation.
We strongly disagree with this characterization. LANDFIRE is an
important tool to prioritize our fuels work through geospatial data and
modeling that will help identify fuel accumulations and fire hazards
across the nation, set nationwide priorities for fuel reduction
projects, and assist in identifying the appropriate response when
wildland fires do occur. Two of the four milestones are complete, the
third milestone is 1/3 complete and work has begun on the fourth
milestone. In addition, it was utilized during FY 2006 on more than 60
wildland fire incidents to assist in maximizing firefighting safety,
pre-position resources and evaluate wildland fire behavior under a
variety of fire weather conditions. GAO also questions our ability to
maintain the system but then acknowledges that the agencies are
submitting a maintenance plan to the Wildland Fire Leadership Council
in June 2007. Development of this plan has been underway for some time
now and clearly indicates that we have planned for the necessity of
routinely updating the data to reflect changing landscape conditions.
Regarding the stratified cost index performance measure, GAO expresses
concerns about cost data for fire complexes, the ability to precisely
estimate suppression costs and that, to date, the data are based solely
on Forest Service managed fires. The report also says that the agencies
have not identified the goals we are trying to achieve with this
measure. The agencies have openly, freely and frequently acknowledged
that the SCI will continue to be refined and improved in the coming
years as data is added to the model. However, in its current form, the
SCI still provides very useful information that was not previously
available and assists field managers in better managing their large
fire suppression costs. Furthermore, the SCI is not meant, nor was it
ever intended to, "precisely" estimate suppression expenditures.
Instead, it was developed to provide managers with an acceptable
expenditure range based on historic data. With the multitude of
unknowns that occur daily on every large fire suppression incident, it
is naive to believe that anything has the ability to "precisely"
estimate expenditures.
We disagree with GAO's conclusion that the agencies have not identified
goals for this measure. SCI was adopted under Goal 1 of the 10-Year
Strategy Implementation Plan which is to improve fire prevention and
suppression. In addition, specific targets have already been set for
the Forest Service. We first stated our goals for future years for this
measure in the OMB PART reassessment in July 2006. We established the
baseline in 2005 and subsequently established future year targets.
These targets are also in the revised Forest Service Strategic Plan.
GAO also says Interior has not adopted any performance measures related
to containing wildland fire costs in its strategic plan and that it
will be several years at the earliest before enough data have been
collected for DOI for the SCI model to be useful. This is inaccurate.
DOI adopted the stratified cost index measure in its new Strategic Plan
(2008-2012) and expects to have the research results this summer. We
expect 2006 data to be reported as baseline data and plan to report on
the SCI in FY 2007.
GAO also states in the report that agencies have updated guidance for
sharing suppression costs with nonfederal entities, but have no clear
plan for ensuring that appropriate cost-sharing methods are used.
Clarifying the guidance was recommended in an earlier GAO report. We
clarified the guidance as GAO recommended. As our formal responses to
the earlier report stated, the guidance will serve as a place to begin
negotiations with our partners, but the final cost-sharing method will
be based on a multitude of factors that will be determined at the
incident. The agencies work in partnership with our cooperators, so we
cannot guarantee or ensure that our preferred cost-sharing method will
be the one selected on an incident.
Finally, GAO says that the agencies need to establish a framework to
ensure that officials are held accountable for achieving cost
containment goals and objectives. We have established a framework to
hold officials accountable for achieving cost containment goals. The
Forest Service has already adopted significant elements this year, and
Interior is also addressing these on an interagency basis as
appropriate. These include a line officer certification process, a
competency in their annual performance appraisals, and oversight on
significant incidents by a "Chief's Principle Representative". Both
agencies continue interagency large fire cost reviews that require
regions to respond to and implement recommendations made by the review
teams.
If you have any additional questions or concerns, please contact Sandy
T. Coleman, Forest Service Assistant Director for GAO/OIG Audit Liaison
staff, at 703-605-4699, or Deborah Williams, DOI/GAO Liaison at 202 208-
3963.
Signed by:
Abigail R. Kimbell:
Chief:
U.S. Forest Service:
U.S. Department of Agriculture:
Signed by:
James E. Cason:
Associate Deputy Secretary:
U.S. Department of the Interior:
GAO's Comments:
1. Our draft report stated that the effects of the steps the agencies
are taking to contain costs, not the steps themselves, are unknown. We
recognized that the agencies established--in several documents,
including the federal wildland fire management policy--a broad goal of
suppressing fires at minimum cost, considering firefighter and public
safety and resources to be protected. However, because the different
components of this broad goal often compete, our review suggests that
it is also important for the agencies to establish clear criteria by
which to weigh the relative importance of the components, as well as to
establish clear objectives to measure their progress. We therefore
recommended that the agencies take these steps. We believe that the
importance of establishing clear goals and objectives will increase as
the agencies continue their transition to using less aggressive
firefighting strategies under their "appropriate management response"
policy.
2. We fully considered the agencies' comments and clarified our draft
report as appropriate to address the four key areas raised (see
comments 3 through 6).
3. Our draft report discussed the agencies' transition to using less
aggressive firefighting strategies in appropriate circumstances,
although it did not use the phrase "appropriate management response."
We have added this phrase to the report. Our review, however, found
that several agency policies limit the agencies' use of such
strategies, a finding also recently reported by the Department of
Agriculture Office of Inspector General.
4. We continue to believe that the modifications may not allow the
agencies to meet key FPA goals. As we noted in our draft report, the
agencies believe that the modifications will achieve key FPA goals, but
because they provided no analysis, we also stated that it is possible
that the modifications may not do so. The paragraph that the agencies
cite in their comments clearly acknowledges a difference between the
two designs. However, this paragraph consists of summary, general
assertions about the benefits of the modifications, and the agencies
provided no detailed, comparative supporting analysis. Thus, it remains
unclear how or how much the designs differ in identifying the most cost-
effective alternatives, either locally or nationally. We remain
concerned because, as officials told us, the agencies have not yet done
a formal comparison of the differences between the modified and the
original design.
5. We removed from the report the statement questioning the agencies'
ability to complete the LANDFIRE system. Our draft report stated that
the agencies recognized the importance of updating LANDFIRE data and
expected to submit a plan for doing so in June 2007 to the Wildland
Fire Leadership Council for approval. The plan, however, is not yet
final, and it is therefore not clear how data will be updated.
6. We acknowledge that the stratified cost index is an improvement over
the agencies' previous performance measures, but our report also raises
several concerns about the index. The Forest Service and Interior seem
to have misinterpreted our concern about the agencies' lack of goals.
Our concern does not pertain to the stratified cost index performance
measure itself. Rather, we believe that in general, for performance
measures to be useful, they must accurately measure progress toward
established goals and objectives, and we found that the agencies had
not established clear cost-containment goals and objectives. We agree
with the Forest Service and Interior that the index was not intended to
precisely estimate suppression costs and have removed the word
precisely from the report. The Forest Service and Interior also
disagree with our statements that Interior had not adopted a
performance measure related to containing costs in its strategic plan
and that it would be several years before Interior would have
sufficient data for the stratified cost index to be useful. Our review
of Interior's strategic plans for 2003 through 2008 and for 2007
through 2012, the most recent plan available, did not identify any
performance measure related to cost containment, including the
stratified cost index. We do acknowledge that Interior is developing a
stratified cost index, but our discussions with a key official
developing this index indicates that to date it is based on data from
few fires and that it will be several years for sufficient data to be
available to refine the index's underlying models.
7. We acknowledge that the agencies have clarified their guidance, as
we previously recommended. The guidance is an important first step in
ensuring that suppression costs are shared equitably between federal
and nonfederal entities. We agree that the agencies need to work with
their nonfederal partners and that there may be disagreement about
which cost-sharing method is appropriate in a given situation.
Nonetheless, we believe that it is important that the federal agencies
provide sufficient oversight of, and support to, their officials in the
field as this guidance is implemented. Without such oversight and
support, we believe that the guidance they have adopted may not address
a concern our May 2006 review identified--that inconsistent application
of cost-sharing methods was leading to inequities in how the federal
government was treating nonfederal entities in different states.
8. Our draft report acknowledged several of the actions the agencies
cite to enhance their oversight of wildland fire costs but also found
that the agencies had not established a clear measure to evaluate the
benefits and costs of alternative firefighting strategies, a key
shortcoming identified by previous studies. As the agencies continue
the transition to appropriate management response, such a measure is
critical if--as the agencies state in their comments-- appropriate
management response is to be a performance-based approach. We continue
to believe that such a measure is needed to help the agencies evaluate
decisions about firefighting strategies and to hold officials
accountable for those decisions.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Robin M. Nazzaro, (202) 512-3841 or nazzaror@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact person named above, David P. Bixler,
Assistant Director; Ellen W. Chu; Brian Chung; Elizabeth Curda;
Jonathan Dent; Janet Frisch; Timothy Guinane; Carol Henn; Kevin
Jackson; Richard Johnson; Chester Joy; and John Warner made key
contributions to this report.
[End of section]
(360717):
FOOTNOTES
[1] Federal expenditures are a more direct measure of the federal
government's investment in wildland fire activities, but the Forest
Service and Interior agencies were unable to provide us with consistent
data on these expenditures for the years we reviewed. As a result, we
are instead reporting appropriations data. We adjusted the
appropriations dollars for inflation, using the chain-weighted gross
domestic product price index with fiscal year 2005 as the base year.
[2] The National Association of State Foresters is a nonprofit
organization representing the directors of the forestry agencies of the
50 states, the District of Columbia, and 8 United States territories.
The National Academy of Public Administration is an independent,
nonpartisan organization chartered by Congress to help federal, state,
and local governments improve the management and administration of
government agencies.
[3] The National Interagency Fire Center is the nation's support center
for wildland firefighting. Representatives from each of the five
wildland firefighting agencies, as well as from the National
Association of State Foresters, National Weather Service, and Office of
Aircraft Services, are located there and work together to coordinate
and support wildland fire and disaster operations.
[4] Principles of sound program management for federal agencies are
established in, among other sources, the Government Performance and
Results Act of 1993 and GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the
Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1999).
[5] The National Fire Plan is a joint interagency effort to respond to
wildland fires. Its core comprises several strategic documents,
including (1) a September 2000 report from the Secretaries of
Agriculture and the Interior to the President in response to the
wildland fires of 2000, (2) congressional direction accompanying
substantial new appropriations in fiscal year 2001, and (3) several
approved and draft strategies to implement all or parts of the plan.
[6] The Wildland Fire Leadership Council is composed of senior
Agriculture and Interior officials, including the Agriculture
Undersecretary for Natural Resources and Environment; the Interior
Assistant Secretary for Policy, Management, and Budget; the Interior
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Business Management and Wildland Fire;
and the heads of the five federal firefighting agencies. Other members
include representatives of the Intertribal Timber Council, the National
Association of State Foresters, and the Western Governors' Association.
[7] GAO, Western National Forests: A Cohesive Strategy Is Needed to
Address Catastrophic Wildfire Threats, GAO/RCED-99-65 (Washington,
D.C.: Apr. 2, 1999); Severe Wildland Fires: Leadership and
Accountability Needed to Reduce Risks to Communities and Resources, GAO-
02-259 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2002); Wildland Fire Management:
Additional Actions Required to Better Identify and Prioritize Lands
Needing Fuels Reduction, GAO-03-805 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 15, 2003);
Wildland Fire Management: Important Progress Has Been Made, but
Challenges Remain to Completing a Cohesive Strategy, GAO-05-147
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 14, 2005); and Wildland Fire Management: Update
on Federal Agency Efforts to Develop a Cohesive Strategy to Address
Wildland Fire Threats, GAO-06-671R (Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2006).
[8] A fire regime generally classifies the role that wildland fire
plays in a particular ecosystem on the basis of certain
characteristics, such as the average number of years between fires and
the typical severity of fire under historic conditions.
[9] U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, and U.S. Department
of the Interior, Developing an Interagency, Landscape-Scale Fire
Planning Analysis and Budget Tool (Washington, D.C.: November 2001).
[10] National Academy of Public Administration, Wildfire Suppression:
Strategies for Containing Costs (Washington, D.C.: September 2002).
[11] U.S. Department of Agriculture, Office of Inspector General, Audit
Report: Forest Service Emergency Equipment Rental Agreement, Report No.
08601-40-SF (Washington, D.C.: July 2005).
[12] This effort came not in response to reports issued since 2000 but
rather from investigations and interagency management reviews of
disasters in 1994 involving the loss of life and property. Findings
from the investigations and reviews at that time cited shortcomings in
the dispatch systems for fire and other incidents, insufficient
documentation on the status of firefighting personnel and equipment,
and the inability to mobilize appropriate resources in a timely manner.
The Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior, in a December 1995
policy memorandum, directed the agencies to correct the deficiencies in
the dispatch process.
[13] The purpose of the National Wildfire Coordinating Group is to
coordinate programs of the participating federal and state wildfire
management agencies.
[14] U.S. Department of Agriculture, Office of Inspector General, Audit
Report: Forest Service Large Fire Suppression Costs, Report No. 08601-
44-SF (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 20, 2006).
[15] GAO-07-427T.
[16] GAO, Wildland Fire Suppression: Lack of Clear Guidance Raises
Concerns about Cost Sharing between Federal and Nonfederal Entities,
GAO-06-570 (Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2006).
[17] Principles of sound program management for federal agencies are
established in, among other sources, the Government Performance and
Results Act of 1993 and GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1.
[18] The Forest Service used this measure in its July 2006 submission
to the Office of Management and Budget and has indicated that it will
also adopt the measure in its revised strategic plan, which is
currently being developed. The Forest Service and Interior agencies,
along with their nonfederal partners, also adopted this measure in a
December 2006 update to the 10-Year Comprehensive Strategy, although
data for Interior are not yet available.
[19] Forest Service researchers have developed two regression models to
date, one for the western United States (Forest Service regions 1
through 6) and one for the eastern United States (Forest Service
regions 8 and 9). Characteristics affecting suppression costs include
fire size; fuel types; fire intensity; physical terrain; proximity to
the nearest community; total value of structures close to the fire; and
special management considerations, such as whether the fire was burning
in a wilderness or other designated area.
[20] The range of $88 to $1,132 per acre reflects one standard
deviation from the mean; several fires' cost per acre were outside of
this range.
[21] U.S. Department of Agriculture, Office of Inspector General, Audit
Report: Forest Service Large Fire Suppression Costs.
[22] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
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