Hair and religion have a long and complex past, as any tonsured monk might tell you. Yesterday, that relationship was made a tiny snip simpler as a judgment was handed down in the case of Noah v Desrosiers. Last year, 19-year-old Muslim Bushra Noah sued Sarah Desrosiers, owner of the King's Cross salon Wedge, for religious discrimination after she was turned down for a job on the grounds that she wore a headscarf.

Desrosiers cuts my hair. She is responsible for the barnet in that smug photo of me top left. I daresay that my own metro short-back-and-sides is not a great challenge to someone of her skill, but I choose to have my hair done by someone who quite obviously cares about their own hair style, which in Desrosiers' case, is very much on display in all its pink glory.

Indeed, Desrosiers' defence hinged on her assertion that in her business, the hair of the staff acts as an advert to potential clients, and therefore should be visible at all times. The judges of the Central London employment tribunal ruled that Desrosiers' wish for her staff to display their hair does not qualify as direct religious discrimination, as they were satisfied that she would make the same demand on any woman who insisted on covering their hair in work.

Intuitively, this seems right: you wouldn't want to buy a suit from a tailor wearing overalls. But employment law is a minefield, and the employment equality regulations exist to protect potential and actual employees from religious (or sexual) discrimination. And before you go all disgusted of Tunbridge Wells, this is not the nanny state, these are important human rights. The legislation exists to redress the balance of overt and low level discrimination that minorities have historically been subjected to. The law is not even limited to actual belief either. Should I apply for a job with the Catholic church, the fact of my atheism could not legitimately be used as a reason for not offering me the position.

One can almost hear Richard Littlejohn bellowing a victory for common sense. However, the tribunal did decide that despite her claim that promotion of the business via visible hair was a legitimate aim, the burden of Desrosiers' proof only constituted a "risk" of lost business rather than it being a certainty. Furthermore, the tribunal decided that this practice does constitute indirect discrimination because it puts all Muslim women who cover their hair at a potential disadvantage. Thus, Desrosiers is liable for £4,000 damages to Noah for "hurt feelings".

It's important not to resort to glib cliches to explain this ruling, especially ones involving waning sanity and the words "political" and "correctness". However, there is an undeniable wider cultural context, and this type of story is grist for middle England and the conservative media's mill. Last month, we suffered the latest tedious instalment in the tale of Lydia Playfoot. In 2007, she took her school to court for banning her wearing a ring boasting of her decision not to have sex until married. The judge ruled that the so-called "purity ring" was not an essential part of Christian faith. Undeterred, Playfoot is now taking it to the high court. In the same week, British Airways decided to allow staff to wear symbols of their faith outside their uniform, following on from the high-profile case of Nadia Eweida. A mile up the road from Wedge, Lillian Ladele is claiming that her employer, Islington council, has discriminated against her because as a Christian, she refuses to conduct same-sex civil partnerships. Although her discomfiture was initially accommodated, homosexual colleagues complained that her beliefs were homophobic. It must scramble the noggin of your average Daily Mail reader, with Muslims, Christians and gays all using the same politically correct regulations to vie for social justice.

The National Secular society rushed to Desrosiers' defence, God bless 'em, and free of charge provided her with counsel. But it seems to me that unlike those other cases, ultimately this one was less about religion and more about the business of hairdressing, and our somewhat litigious society. Desrosiers is liable for damages effectively because she did not display the cynicism that many employers do in not mentioning the real reason why they choose not to take someone on. In this test case, there was a specific principle at stake: is the hairdresser's hair inherent to their business? The judgment half-heartedly says yes. Desrosiers was not discriminating directly against Noah, but yes, that policy does have an indirect effect on a sizeable minority. I'm not sure what a hairdresser is to do other than be extremely cautious. But the risk is that the only practical impact Noah's partial victory will have on potential employers will be to encourage more cynicism when giving reasons for failed applications.