Search This Blog

A.P.Rent control Act - Sec. 8 , 10 , 16 etc., -mere holding property in non-commercial zone can not be considered as a suitable premises for expansion - mere holding joint interest in joint family property does not bar the landlord to evict the premises for bonafide occupation - When landlord refused to receive the rents - the only remedy to deposit the same in court by filing a petition under act - else it can not be considered as proper tendering of rents -Revision court can interfere when the finding of lower court suffers from inherent defects = Narsing Prasad....Petitioner/Landlord Dinesh Mohanlal Pardhanani.... Respondent/tenant = published in judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/filename=10480

A.P.Rent control Act - Sec. 8 , 10 , 16 etc., - mere holding property in non-commercial zone can not be considered as a suitable premises for expansion -mere holding joint interest in joint family property does not bar the landlord to evict the premises for bonafide occupation - When landlord refused to receive the rents - the only remedy to deposit the same in court by filing a petition under act - else it can not be considered as proper tendering of rents -Revision court can interfere when the finding of lower court suffers from inherent defects =Mere mentioning amount and signature with out any particulars can not be considered as a receipt of payment for particular month of rents =Both the Courts below came to the conclusion that Ex.B18is receipt issued by the revision petitioner/landlord for payment of rent forSeptember and October, 1997. 14. I have perused Ex.B18. No where in Ex.B18 it is found that the revisionpetitioner/landlord received the rents from the respondent/tenant. Ex.B18 onlycontains the amount and signature of the revision petitioner. When it is thecase of the respondent/tenant that it is a temporary receipt, Ex.B18 shouldcontain an endorsement that the revision petitioner/landlord received the amounttowards rent for the months of September and October, 1997. But no such endorsement is there on Ex.B18. It is also the case of the revision petitionerthat when printed official stamped receipts were issued for the earlier period,why the same were not issued for the months of September and October, 1997. Since Ex.B18 does not contain endorsement that the revision petitioner/landlordreceived the rent from the respondent/tenant for the months of September andOctober, 1997, it cannot be said that it is a receipt for the payment of rent ofthe months September and October, 1997. Mere sending amount to the Land lord towards rent is not sufficient - he has to deposit it by filing petition under sec. 8 (2) A.P.Rent control Act - subsequent deposit can not wipe out the earlier default committed by the tenant =Itis for the respondent/tenant to deposit the rent with the revisionpetitioner/landlord and if the revision petitioner/landlord refused to receivethe rents, he has to issue notice under Section 8(2) of the Act, under whichrent should be deposited. If still the revision petitioner/landlord failed tospecify the bank account, the respondent/tenant can send the rent by moneyorder. But in the present case, the case of the respondent/tenant is that therevision petitioner did not collect the rents, that is why he send the samethrough money order, which shows that the respondent/tenant has committed default as he has not followed the procedure envisaged under Section 8(2) of theAct. The respondent/tenant sent a registered notice dated 29.12.1997 callingupon the revision petitioner to intimate his bank account to enable therespondent to deposit the rents. Ex.B13 is the returned cover bearing theendorsement 'refused returned to sendor", but still, the respondent/tenant hasnot followed the procedure contemplated under Section 8(2) of the Act. As perrule 16 of the Rules, the respondent/tenant committed willful default in paymentof rents for the months of September and October, 1997. It is also to be seenthat to cover up the same, the respondent/tenant has filed petition fordepositing of the rent subsequently and he deposited the rents, which does notwipe out the willful default committed by the tenant of payment of rents. Evenotherwise, the respondent/tenant who examined himself as R.W.1 stated that rentswere not paid in the month of September and October, 1997 and that admission was also not considered by the Courts below properly.Mere holding joint family properties does not come as exclusive properties of Land-Lord and much more when partition suit was pending - Mere holding property in some other area other than business center does not mean holding of other non-commercial properties by Land-Lord =He has categorically denied in respect of each item stating that he isnot owning any other non residential premises and the said premises is owned byhis brother.He also stated that the suit premises is located atSiddiamberbazar, which is a business locality and any business will flourish inthat locality. Therefore, according to the revision petitioner, the locality ofthe suit premises is more suited for his business.He also stated that suitfor partition is filed among the family members and the same was partly decreedand the appeal filed against the same shows that there is dispute between thefamily members in respect of the properties.The respondent/tenant also has notshown that the revision petitioner specifically owns any other non-residentialpremises in his individual property. It has to be seen that even if jointfamily members owns any non-residential premises and the revision petitioner ismember of that joint family, that will not disentitle the revision petitionerfrom seeking eviction, unless the revision petitioner/landlord individually ownsany other non-residential premises. Admittedly, suit for partition is partlydecreed and appeal against the same is pending and all the properties aresubject matter of partition suit, which shows that the revision petitioner isnot owning exclusively any other non-residential premises. As the revisionpetitioner is not exclusively owning any of the non-residential premises, he isentitled for eviction of the respondent/tenant on that ground. P.W.1 statesthat he is owning other non-residential properties. Owning properties being oneof the members of joint family does disentitle the revision petitioner foreviction of the respondent/tenant because owning property through joint family,he cannot get exclusive possession and he cannot be termed as exclusive owner ofthe premises. Therefore, the revision petitioner/landlord requires the scheduleproperty for his own personal occupation for starting his own business.Mere statement that the Land lord alone can not file eviction petition does not amount to denial of Title =the Rent Controller has held that the denialtitle by the respondent/tenant is not bonafide, but the appellate Courtreversed the said finding. Since the pleading of the respondent/tenant is thatthe revision petitioner alone cannot file the eviction petition, there was nodenial of title as such. In view of the same, it cannot be said that therespondent/tenant has denied the title of the revision petitioner. The abovesaid finding of the appellate Court is confirmed.When the findings of lower courts suffers from inherent defects as ex.A 18 - revision can court interfere = In all these judgments, it was held that in exercise of revisionaljurisdiction under Section 22 of the Act, High Court cannot reappreciateevidence."The facts in the present case on hand are different with those of thefacts in the cited decisions relied on by the learned counsel for therespondent, hence, they have no application to the present case.21. The findings of the Courts below suffers from inherent defects as Ex.A18is not correctly interpreted and are based on irrelevant material and rejectionof eviction petition is also based on surmises and conjunctures and same isliable to be interfered with in this revision petition.=Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed. Therespondent/tenant is directed to vacate the schedule premises within six (6)months from today, on condition of his paying arrears of rent, if any, and alsoan undertaking that he shall vacate the premises within six (6) months by payingthe rent for the said period. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequelthereto, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this Civil RevisionPetition, shall stand closed.

This Civil Revision Petition is filed aggrieved by the order dated
24.09.2008 in R.A. No.327 of 2006 passed by the Chief Judge, City Small Causes
Court, Hyderabad, confirming the order dated 07.11.2006 in RC No.112 of 1998
passed by the IV Additional Rent Controller, Hyderabad, wherein the petition
filed by the revision petitioner for eviction of the respondent was dismissed.
2. The revision petitioner/landlord filed R.C.No.112 of 1998 on the file ofthe IV Additional Rent Controller, Hyderabad for eviction of therespondent/tenant from the suit premises on the ground of willful default inpayment of rents and also for bona fide personal requirement.
3. The case of the revision petitioner is that he is the landlord of premises
bearing No.15-9-619, situated at Siddiamber Bazar, Hyderabad, and the respondent
is his tenant in respect of the aforesaid tenanted mulgi on a monthly rent of
Rs.750/-. The respondent paid rent up to August, 1997 and he paid rent on12.09.1997.Thereafter, he stopped payment of rent and committed willfuldefault in payment of rent from September, 1997 to till February, 1998. It isalso stated that the revision petitioner/landlord required the suit premises forhis personal occupation as he intends to start his own business in grains whichhe has been running in the name and style of Tarachand and Narsing Prasad, in atenanted premises.The owner of the said premises had filed a suit inO.S.No.4113 of 1988 on the file of the VII Assistant Judge, City Civil Court,Hyderabad, and the same was decreed and aggrieved by the said Judgment and Decree, the revision petitioner preferred appeal in AS No.147 of 1996 and thesame was also dismissed.
4. The respondent filed counter affidavit stating that the father of the
respondent by name Mohanlal H.Pardhanani established M/s.Hyderabad Automobiles
in the year 1969 and he expired on 09.08.1995. Thereafter, the respondent has
been running the said business in the said premises since then. The revision
petitioner collected Rs.1500/- from the respondent on 03.10.1997 towards rent
for the months of September and October 1997 and issued a temporary receipt
promising to send official stamped receipt later, but he failed to send the
same. Respondent sent a letter dated 25.11.1997 requesting the revision
petitioner to send official stamped receipt but the said letter was returned
with an endorsement stating that 'party continuously absent for seven days'.
Revision petitioner did not collect the rent for the month of November, 1997.
Respondent sent the rent for the said month on 05.12.1997 by money order. It
was returned on 13.12.1997. Once again, the respondent sent money order for
Rs.750/- on 15.12.1997, it was also returned on 26.12.1997. Respondent sent
registered notice dated 29.12.1997 calling upon the revision petitioner to
intimate his bank account details to enable him to deposit the rents for the
shop. The said notice was returned by postal authorities with an endorsement"party refused".Once again respondent sent two money orders one for Rs.750/-towards rent for the month of December, 1997, and for Rs.1500/- for the monthsof January and February, 1998, the said money orders were also returned as therevision petitioner refused to receive the same.In the circumstances,respondent filed RC No.71 of 1998 on the file of I Additional Rent Controller,Hyderabad seeking for permission to deposit the rents into the Court while so,revision petitioner filed petition for eviction. It is also denied that the
respondent did not pay rents from September, 1997. It is also stated that the
petitioner is having right, title and interest in the property bearing municipal
No.15-1-423, Feelkhana, Hyderabad. He acquired the said property during the
pendency of the case demolished the old building and constructed a new building
on the site of the old building consisting of three mulgies facing main road and
rear side residential building. After construction of the same, he let out one
mulgi to Smt. Bijal N. Shah under rental deed dated 05.12.2000 and said tenant
is carrying on business in the said mulgi under the name and style of M/s.Paras
Auto Springs. The said tenant vacated the said mulgi in the year 2002 and
handed over vacant possession of the same to the revision petitioner.
Thereafter, the revision petitioner let out the said premises to a tenant who is
carrying on business in the said premises under the name and style of Patel
Trading Company. In one mulgi, revision petitioner himself is carrying on
business of Food grains and he kept the third mulgi vacant without any use from
the date of construction. In these circumstances, the revision petitioner is
not entitled to maintain the eviction petition seeking eviction of the
respondent.
5. Therefore, revision petitioner alone cannot maintain the evictionpetition since he is only one of the co-owners. The revision petitioner got
right, title and interest in the residential as well as non-residential
properties bearing Municipal Nos.15-9-574/1, Siddiamber Bazar, Hyderabad, 15-1-
423, Feel Khana, Hyderabad, 5-5-1042, Chudi Bazar, Hyderabad, 14-6-131, 14-6-
132, 14-6-142 to 144, Chudi Bazar, Hyderabad, 14-6-637, 14-6-168, 15-4-309, 14-
6-381, 14-6-382 and 14-8-36 all situated at Chudi Bazar and 14-11-784, Nai
basti, Hyderabad. Non-residential buildings fell vacant from time to time andhave been let out to new tenants on higher rents and huge pagdi.
6. The revision petitioner filed rejoinder stating that mere filing of the
petition to deposit the rent by the respondent does not absolve him from the
liability of payment of rent at proper time. The respondent is a chronic
willful defaulter in payment of monthly rents. The respondent deliberately and
intentionally denied the title of the revision petitioner. Therefore, therespondent is liable to be evicted on the ground of denial of title.
The
revision petitioner denied the contents in the amended para 6(a) of the counter.
Revision petitioner also denied that during the pendency of the case, the
revision petitioner demolished the old building and constructed a new building
consisting of 3 mulgies.
It is also denied that the revision petitioner let out
the mulgi to Smt Bijal N Shah on 05.12.2000. It is also denied that the said
tenant vacated the premises and that the revision petitioner let out to one
Patel Trading Company. It is also denied that he is running the business of
food grains. It is also stated that the area which the revision petitioner is
said to have own the properties is non commercial area and the same is not
suitable for running business. It is also stated that the tenants who are in
occupation of the property using the same for godown purposes. It is stated
that the respondent is fully aware of the fact that the Feelkhana locality and
Chudi Bazar locality are totally non commercial areas, whereas Siddiamber Bazar
area is a totally commercial locality and any business which will be run in the
said area will certainly flourish and prosper and also that the area of
Siddiamber Bazar is very much famous for wholesale and retail business. It is
settled law that a tenant cannot dictate terms to the landlord for his personal
needs and the landlord is the best person to judge his own requirement basing on
the suitability and convenience and more especially the commercial activities in
the locality. It is also denied that the revision petitioner is carrying on the
food grain business and the third mulgi has been kept vacant. The respondentbeing the tenant of the revision petitioner, malafidely denied his title. The
property bearing No.15-9-574/1 is on the first floor and the same is meant for
residential purpose only and it has no access from the main road and it is a
purely residential premises so also 15-1-423 and the same is used by the
revision petitioner for his residential purpose. The revision petitioner is not
concerned with the property bearing No.5-5-1042, Gosha Mahal, Hyderabad, which
belongs to his younger brother. The properties bearing Nos.14-6-131, 132, 142 to
144, situated at Chudi Bazar, Hyderabad, are the residential properties,
consisting of small rooms, which are being used for residential purposes by the
tenants. It is also denied that the revision petitioner is the owner and
possessor of property bearing No.14-6-637. The requirement of the revision
petitioner is genuine, bonafide and pressing. He has also filed the documentary
evidence to establish the fact that he was running the business in the rental
premises. The owner of the said mulgi had filed the suit for ejectment against
the petitioner which was decreed and the said decree had been confirmed by the
Supreme Court and ultimately the revision petitioner had been evicted from the
premises No.15-9-608, Siddamber Bazar, Hyderabad.
7. The revision petitioner examined himself as P.W.1 and got marked Exs.A1
to A.5. On behalf of the respondent, R.Ws.1 and 2 were examined and got marked
Exs.B1 to B22 and Exs.X1 to X8 were marked through R.W.2.
8. The 4th Additional Rent Controller, Hyderabad, dismissed the evictionpetition by order dated 07.11.2006.Against which, the revision petitionerfiled R.A.No.327 of 2006, which was also dismissed by order dated 24.09.2008.Against the same, the present Civil Revision Petition is preferred.
9. Sri K.Laxman Rao, learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner
contends that the respondent/tenant committed willful default in payment of
rents from September, 1997 to February, 1998. Though, the respondent/tenant
admitted, the said aspect was not properly appreciated by both the Courts below.
The admission of the respondent/tenant clearly goes to show that he has not paid
rents for September and October, 1997 and only paid on 25.11.1997. He would
further contend that basing on Ex.B18, receipt dated 03.10.1997, both the Courts
below found that the rents for September and October, 1997 have been paid.
However, Ex.B18 only mentioned about amount and it does not show whether it is a
receipt or temporary receipt. Both the Courts below misinterpreted Ex.B18 that
it is a temporary receipt, but no where it is mentioned it as a receipt. As
such, both the Courts below erroneously misinterpreted Ex.B18. When once,
Ex.B18 is not taken into account, there is no payment of rent for the September
and October, 1997. He would further contend that the respondent in his counter
affidavit stated that the revision petitioner has not collected rents for the
month of November, 1997, as such, the respondent/tenant sent the rent for the
said month on 05.12.1997 by money order. He further contends that the revision
petitioner used to issue rental receipts for earlier months after receiving
rents and he has not issued receipt for the disputed period as the
respondent/tenant not paid rent for the said period. The respondent/tenant has
not stated that the revision petitioner/landlord refused to receive the rents
for the month of November, 1997, but only stated that the revision petitioner
did not collect rents for the month of November, 1997. If the revision
petitioner has refused to receive the rents, then the respondent could have
issued notice under Section 8(2) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent &
Eviction) Control Act, 1960, (for brevity 'the Act) for depositing of the rents
into the Bank account of the revision petitioner and he cannot straight away
send the same by money order. If still revision petitioner/landlord refused to
furnish the Savings Bank account, it does not permit the respondent/tenant to
remit the rent by way of money order. But in the present case, the
respondent/tenant has not followed the procedure envisaged under Section 8(2) of
the Act before sending the money order. If he follows the procedure as
contemplated under Section 8(2) of the Act, then only he can file petition for
depositing of rents. He would further contend that both the Courts below have
not taken into account the rejoinder filed by the revision petitioner to the
amended counter affidavit filed by the respondent/tenant, wherein he
categorically denied that he is owning any other non-residential premises. He
has also stated that there was litigation in the family, as such, suit for
partition is filed. It is also denied that he is having any other non-
residential premises. He would further contend that some properties belonging
to the brother of the revision petitioner and this aspect was not properly
considered by both the Courts below. He also contended that the revision
petitioner/landlord was evicted by his landlord in which he was carrying on
business by virtue of Exs.A1 and A.2. As such, the revision petitioner
bonafidely requires the suit premises for starting his own business. The
revision petitioner has clearly explained in the rejoinder that he is not owning
non-residential premises for carrying out the business. It is also stated in
the rejoinder that the suit premises is located at Siddiamber Bazar, is a
commercial wherein any type of business will flourish, if established. Learned
counsel further contended that the joint family owning other non-residential
premises, therefore, it cannot be said that the revision petitioner, who is
member of joint family, owning other non-residential premises and on that ground
the revision petitioner/landlord cannot be denied eviction. All these aspects
have not been taken into account by both the Courts below.
10. In support of his contention, he relied on the following decisions:
V.Radhakrishnan v. S.N.Loganatha Mudaliar1, Lingala Kondala Rao v.
Vootukuri Narayana Rao2, Munnalal (died) by LR and others v. Englarg Pershad3,
Gulab Chand Pukhraj v. R.B.Jinender Raj and another4,
11. On the other hand, Smt. Manjari S.Ganu, learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the respondent/tenant contended that the revision petitioner/landlord
owned other non-residential premises. She also contended that the revision
petitioner suppressed owning of other non-residential premises and on this
ground also, the revision petition is liable to be dismissed. She also
contended that by virtue of Ex.B18, rents for the months of September and
October, 1997 were paid, but the landlord issued temporary receipt by way of
Ex.B18. Both the Courts, after considering the oral and documentary evidencecame to the conclusion that the rents for the months of September and October,1997 were paid. She also contends that for subsequent period also, the
respondent/tenant sent the rents by money order, which was refused by the
revision petitioner/landlord and as such, the petition was filed by the
respondent/tenant before the Rent Controller for depositing of rents and
accordingly rents were deposited. As such, there is no default much lesswillful default on the part of the respondent/tenant in payment of rents to therevision petitioner/landlord.She also contends that the revisionpetitioner/landlord has taken inconsistent pleas while having admitted that heowns other non-residential premises, he is not entitled for seeking eviction.
She also contends that the scope of revisional jurisdiction under Section 22 of
the Act is limited, as such, the concurrent finding of fact arrived at by both
the Courts below cannot be disturbed by appreciating the evidence. In support
of her contentions, she relied on the following decisions: Kunji Bai G. Chugani
v. Fashions, Secunderabad5, Ballani Ranganayakulu and others v. Mattupalli
Nageswara Rao6 and Mohammed Abdul Rahman and others v. B.Manorama and another7.
12. In view of the above rival contentions, the points that arise for
consideration in this petition are as follows:1) Whether the respondent/tenant is not guilty of willful default in payment ofrents?2) Whether the revision petitioner's requirement of the petition scheduleproperty for his personal occupation is bonafide?3) Whether the respondent denied the title of the revision petitioner during thecourse of the trial of the case?

13. Point No.1:
As far as this point is concerned, the case of the revision petitioner is
that the respondent/tenant committed default in payment of rents for the months
of September, 1997 to February, 1998.
Whereas the case of the respondent/tenant
is that he paid the rent for September and October, 1997 to the revision
petitioner and that the revision petitioner issued temporary receipt i.e.,
Ex.B18 and he has not issued printed receipt.
The respondent/tenant sent letter
dated 25.11.1997 asking the petitioner to issue the official stamped receipt and
inspite of issuance of that letter, the revision petitioner has not issued
official stamped receipt.
In view of Ex.B18, the rent for the months of
September and October, 1997 is deemed to have been paid, hence, there is no
default on the part of the respondent/tenant, as alleged by the revision
petitioner/landlord. Both the Courts below came to the conclusion that Ex.B18is receipt issued by the revision petitioner/landlord for payment of rent forSeptember and October, 1997.
14. I have perused Ex.B18. No where in Ex.B18 it is found that the revisionpetitioner/landlord received the rents from the respondent/tenant. Ex.B18 onlycontains the amount and signature of the revision petitioner.When it is thecase of the respondent/tenant that it is a temporary receipt, Ex.B18 shouldcontain an endorsement that the revision petitioner/landlord received the amounttowards rent for the months of September and October, 1997. But no such endorsement is there on Ex.B18. It is also the case of the revision petitionerthat when printed official stamped receipts were issued for the earlier period,why the same were not issued for the months of September and October, 1997. Since Ex.B18 does not contain endorsement that the revision petitioner/landlordreceived the rent from the respondent/tenant for the months of September andOctober, 1997, it cannot be said that it is a receipt for the payment of rent ofthe months September and October, 1997.
The appellate Court held that the
letter sent under certificate of posting must be presumed to be true, which is
erroneous. Exs.B7 and B12 were sent under certificate of posting and cannot bepresumed that the same amounts to service of notice, as procedure for service ofnotice as envisaged under Rules 5(4) and Rule 16 of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings(Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Rules, 1961, (for short 'the Rules') is notfollowed for tendering rents by the respondent/tenant, the same amounts towillful default. Both the Courts below have not properly appreciated Ex.B18 andalso have not taken into account the rejoinder filed by the revision petitioner,I deem it fit and proper to exercise the revision jurisdiction under Section 22of the Act and correct the illegality.
15. Both the Courts below erroneously misinterpreted Ex.B18 and came to the
conclusion that it is a temporary receipt, through
which the respondent/tenant paid the rents to the revision petitioner for the
months September and October, 1997.
Further plea of the respondent/tenant that
the revision petitioner/landlord did not collect the rent for the month of
November, 1997 and thereafter respondent/tenant sent the rent for the said month
by way of money order on 05.12.1997, which was returned on 13.12.1997. Ex.B10
is the money order coupon dated 05.12.1997. It is further pleaded by the
respondent that he again sent the said rent through money order on 15.12.1997,
but it was returned on 26.12.1997. Ex.B11 money order is evidencing this fact.
It is not the case of the respondent/tenant that the revision
petitioner/landlord refused the rent for the month of November, 1997. It is the
case of the respondent/tenant that the revision petitioner did not collect the
rent. When the respondent filed official receipts for the payments up to
August, 1997, after payment of rents, it is not known on what basis the
respondent/tenant stated that revision petitioner did not collect the rents. Itis for the respondent/tenant to deposit the rent with the revisionpetitioner/landlord and if the revision petitioner/landlord refused to receivethe rents, he has to issue notice under Section 8(2) of the Act, under whichrent should be deposited. If still the revision petitioner/landlord failed tospecify the bank account, the respondent/tenant can send the rent by moneyorder. But in the present case, the case of the respondent/tenant is that therevision petitioner did not collect the rents, that is why he send the samethrough money order, which shows that the respondent/tenant has committed default as he has not followed the procedure envisaged under Section 8(2) of theAct. The respondent/tenant sent a registered notice dated 29.12.1997 callingupon the revision petitioner to intimate his bank account to enable therespondent to deposit the rents. Ex.B13 is the returned cover bearing theendorsement 'refused returned to sendor", but still, the respondent/tenant hasnot followed the procedure contemplated under Section 8(2) of the Act. As perrule 16 of the Rules, the respondent/tenant committed willful default in paymentof rents for the months of September and October, 1997. It is also to be seenthat to cover up the same, the respondent/tenant has filed petition fordepositing of the rent subsequently and he deposited the rents, which does notwipe out the willful default committed by the tenant of payment of rents. Evenotherwise, the respondent/tenant who examined himself as R.W.1 stated that rentswere not paid in the month of September and October, 1997 and that admission was also not considered by the Courts below properly.
16. In view of the above discussion, I hold that the both the Courts below
misconstrued the documentary evidence relied on and came to the wrong conclusion
that the respondent/tenant has not committed willful default in payment of rents
for the months September and October, 1997.
17. Point No.2:As far as the bonafide requirement of the petition schedule property forpersonal occupation of revision petitioner/landlord is concerned, it is thespecific case of the revision petitioner/landlord that he is intending to starthis own business in grains which he is already running under the name and style,Tarachand Narasing Pershad, in a tenanted premises and as the owner of the saidpremises has filed a suit for ejectment in OS.No.4113 of 1988 and the same wasdecreed against him under Ex.A1, certified copy of the judgment and against thesame, he filed AS No.147/1996, which was also dismissed under Ex.A2, certifiedcopy of the judgment in the appeal.
The appellate Court in paragraph 16 while
answering point No.2, where the requirement of suit schedule property for his
bonafide personal occupation, held that by virtue of Exs.A1 and A2, revision
petitioner was directed to vacate from the tenanted premises, which he has been
carrying on business of good grains in the name and style of Tarachand Narasing
Pershad in the premises bearing No.15-9-608. The fact of the revision
petitioner carrying on business is not denied. The fact of revision petitioner
was evicted from the said premises is also not denied by virtue of Exs.A1 and
A.2. The revision petitioner was carrying on business in food grains in arented premises and he was evicted from the same. Therefore, he requirespremises for starting his own business. Both the Courts held that since thepetitioner is having another non-residential premises and he suppressed the saidfact in the eviction petition, as such, he is not entitled for relief.When therespondent/tenant filed amended counter stating that the revision petitionerowns other non-residential premises in the city, that aspect was suppressed bythe revision petitioner. The revision petitioner filed rejoinder denying thesame. He has categorically denied in respect of each item stating that he isnot owning any other non residential premises and the said premises is owned byhis brother.He also stated that the suit premises is located atSiddiamberbazar, which is a business locality and any business will flourish inthat locality. Therefore, according to the revision petitioner, the locality ofthe suit premises is more suited for his business.He also stated that suitfor partition is filed among the family members and the same was partly decreedand the appeal filed against the same shows that there is dispute between thefamily members in respect of the properties.The respondent/tenant also has notshown that the revision petitioner specifically owns any other non-residentialpremises in his individual property. It has to be seen that even if jointfamily members owns any non-residential premises and the revision petitioner ismember of that joint family, that will not disentitle the revision petitionerfrom seeking eviction, unless the revision petitioner/landlord individually ownsany other non-residential premises. Admittedly, suit for partition is partlydecreed and appeal against the same is pending and all the properties aresubject matter of partition suit, which shows that the revision petitioner isnot owning exclusively any other non-residential premises. As the revisionpetitioner is not exclusively owning any of the non-residential premises, he isentitled for eviction of the respondent/tenant on that ground. P.W.1 statesthat he is owning other non-residential properties. Owning properties being oneof the members of joint family does disentitle the revision petitioner foreviction of the respondent/tenant because owning property through joint family,he cannot get exclusive possession and he cannot be termed as exclusive owner ofthe premises. Therefore, the revision petitioner/landlord requires the scheduleproperty for his own personal occupation for starting his own business.
18. Point No.3.As far as the denial of title of the revision petitioner/landlord by therespondent/tenant is concerned, the Rent Controller has held that the denialtitle by the respondent/tenant is not bonafide, but the appellate Courtreversed the said finding. Since the pleading of the respondent/tenant is thatthe revision petitioner alone cannot file the eviction petition, there was nodenial of title as such. In view of the same, it cannot be said that therespondent/tenant has denied the title of the revision petitioner. The abovesaid finding of the appellate Court is confirmed.
19. a) In V.Radhakrishnan v. S.N.Loganatha Mudaliar (supra), it is observed asfollows:
12. On a plain reading of Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act,it appearsto us that the legislature intended that a landlord seeking eviction of thetenant could be disentitled from claiming possession of the non-residentialpremises where he requires those premises for his own use, if he is occupying anon-residential building of his own. Similarly, the landlord would also bedisentitled from claiming possession of non-residential premises for the benefitof a member of his family, if that member of the family was in occupation of anon-residential building of his own. Any other interpretation of this sectionwould not only be doing violence to the plain language of the section but wouldresult in absurdity inasmuch as the benefit of the provision would stand deniedto the family members of the landlord, who do not occupy any premises of theirown and for whose benefit eviction is sought, if the landlord himself is inoccupation of a non-residential premises of his own. The fact that the landlord,who seeks eviction for the benefit of a member of his family, is himselfoccupying a building of his own, cannot operate as a bar to the landlord seekingeviction for the benefit of a member of his family, who does not occupy anypremises of his own. Thus, it follows and we hold that the law laid down inJagannatha Chettiar case1 is not the correct law. The learned Single Judge inChettiar case1 did not notice, let alone consider the three earlier judgments inIndian Plywood3; K. Chettiar4 and Annamalai and Co.5 In our opinion, thejudgments in Kannan case2, Indian Plywood Manufacturing Co. case3, K. Chettiar case4 and Annamalai and Co. case5 lay down the correct law, which we hereby approve."

10. We hold that joint Hindu family premises in which joint family businessis being run and wherein the landlord too has a share and interest and juridicalpossession on account of being a member of the family would not disentitle thelandlord from seeking recovery of possession from the tenant of a non-residential building exclusively owned by him subject to his satisfying otherrequirements of Section 10(3)(a)(iii).

c) In Gulab Chand Pukhraj v. R.B.Jinender Raj and another, (supra) itis observed as follows "12. In J. Pandu v. R. Narsubai6 this Court held that a landlord,notwithstanding his occupation of a non-residential building, can still seekeviction of his tenant from his business premises if the landlord is able tosatisfy that the non-residential building occupied by him is not sufficient andsuitable for the purpose of expansion of his business or for the purpose of anew business which he bona fide proposes to commence or that the shifting of hisbusiness has become inevitable. This Court has taken the same view in SarojKumar Das (Dr.) v. Arjun Prasad Jogani7.

14. Obviously, there is clear conflict of opinions of this Court in theaforementioned cases. In Boorgu Jagadeshwaraiah & Sons3 a three-Judge Bench ofthis Court examined all these three decisions given in D. Devaji8, Saroj KumarDas (Dr.)7 and J. Pandu6 and came to the conclusion that the aspects of quality,size and suitability of the building have been totally put out of consideration.Non-consideration of the quality, size and suitability of the building would beto frustrate the purposes of the Act.

d) In Munnalal (died) by LR and others v. Englarg Pershad (supra), it isheld as under:"9. Rule 5(1) of the Rules lays down the procedure, when a tenant isdesirous of depositing the rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8, or 9 orSection 11 of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) ControlAct, 1960 (for short 'the Act'). Rule 5(4) of the Rules lays down the procedurefor service of a notice of deposit and specifies that it shall be done inaccordance with Rule 16 of the Rules. 10. Rule 16 of the Rules reads as under: 16.(1) All notices under the Act issued by the Controller or theappellate authority and all orders passed by the Controller or the appellateauthority if not pronounced in open Court shall be served on the personconcerned; (a) personally by delivering or tendering to him the notice ororder; or (b) if such person is not found, by leaving the notice or order athis last known place of abode or business of by giving or tendering the same tosome adult member of his family; or (c ) if such person does not reside in the area within thejurisdiction of the Controller or the appellate authority, by sending the sameto him by registered post, with acknowledgment due; or (d)........... (not relevant for the present controversy). 13. Since the tendering of rents was not communicated by way of anotice in terms of Rules 5(4) and 16 of the Rules, the appellate Court was rightin coming to a conclusion that it was a case of willful default." The above judgments cited by learned counsel for petitioner are applicableto the facts of the case.
20. Learned counsel appearing for respondent/tenant relied on the
following decisions:a) Kunji Bai G. Chugani v. Fashions, Secunderabad (supra), it is held asfollows:20. Each case has to be decided on its own facts and circumstances. Where in a case the landlord is in possession of several non-residential premises andis entitled for their possession and when he is seeking eviction of a tenantfrom a non-residential premises it appears that the landlord must plead that theother non-residential premises held by him are not suitable in size, locationetc., for the business he proposes to start or for the purpose of a businesswhich he is carrying on, on the date of application."

In Ballani Ranganayakulu and others v. Mattupalli Nageswara Rao (supra) itis observed as follows:"6. Thus on general principles a party who has an order in its favour isentitled to show that the order is justified on some ground which was decidedagainst it in the Court below. The said general principle is not inconsistentwith Section 20 of the Rent Control Act for there is no provision for filingcross-objections."

In Mohammed Abdul Rahman and others v. B.Manorama and another (supra), it is observed that:"5. It is now well settled that jurisdiction of High Court under Section22 of the Act is revisional jurisdiction. Though the power is a little widerthan revisional jurisdiction, it is not equal to appellate jurisdiction. Alimited scrutiny is to see that order passed by appellate authority is notvitiated by illegality, irregularity or impropriety. Mere possibility of adifferent conclusion in background facts does not enable High Court to reversefinding of appellate authority. A reference may be made to Mudigonda ChandraMouli Sastry v Bhimanepalli Bikshalu, 1999 (5) ALD 101 (SC) = (1999) 7 SCC 66 = AIR 1999 SC 3095, N.Prabhakar Rao v. J.R.Ramesh Kumar, 2002 (1) ALD 127 (SC) = (2002) 1 SCC 176 = AIR 2002 SC 95, Harshavardhan Chokkani v. Bhupendra N.Patel, (2002) 3 SCC 626 = AIR 2002 SC 1373= 2002 AIR SCW 1207 and Champa Lal v Shaik Najmuddin, (2002) 5 SCC 20 = AIR 2002 SC 2076. Except last cited authorityother three decisions were rendered by Apex Court while interpreting Section 22of the Act. In all these judgments, it was held that in exercise of revisionaljurisdiction under Section 22 of the Act, High Court cannot reappreciateevidence."The facts in the present case on hand are different with those of thefacts in the cited decisions relied on by the learned counsel for therespondent, hence, they have no application to the present case.21. The findings of the Courts below suffers from inherent defects as Ex.A18is not correctly interpreted and are based on irrelevant material and rejectionof eviction petition is also based on surmises and conjunctures and same isliable to be interfered with in this revision petition.
22. In view of the above discussion and the law laid down by this Court aswell as Apex Court as discussed above, I am of the opinion that the orderspassed by the Courts below are liable to be set aside and the same are herebyset aside and the eviction petition is ordered by allowing this Civil RevisionPetition.Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed. Therespondent/tenant is directed to vacate the schedule premises within six (6)months from today, on condition of his paying arrears of rent, if any, and alsoan undertaking that he shall vacate the premises within six (6) months by payingthe rent for the said period. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequelthereto, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this Civil RevisionPetition, shall stand closed.

The Hon’ble Sri Justice B.Chandra Kumar Appeal Suit No.144 of 2012 Dated 9th August, 2012Judgment: The appellant filed this appeal challenging Order, dated27-01-2012, passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Darsi, in CFR.No.90 of 2012, refusing to register the suit filed by him on the ground that the same is barred by limitation . The plaintiff filed the suit for specific performance basing on agreement of sale, dated 13-11-2008. As per the terms and conditions of the agreement of sale, the balance amount of Rs.4 lakhs out of the total sale price of Rs.9 lakhs was to be paid within two months from the date of expiry of the limitation of the said agreement of sale. The case of the appellant is that though he had been requesting the respondent to receive the balance sale consideration and register the sale deed in his favour, the respondent did not come forward; that therefore, he got issued a legal notice to the respondent on12-10-2011; that the respondent acknowled…

Or.18, rule 17 and sec.151 C.P.C - petition filed for reopen and examination of the executant of Ex.A1 the sale deed to fill up the lacuna in evidence pointed out at the time of arguments not maintainable =in VadirajNaggappa Vernekar (deceased by L.Rs) v. Sharad Chand Prabhakar Gogate (supra), it is held as follows: "17. It is now well settled that the power to recall any witness underOrder 18 Rule 17 CPC can be exercised by the Court either on its own motion oron an application filed by any of the parties to the suit, but as indicatedhereinabove, such power is to be invoked not to fill up the lacunae in theevidence of the witness which has already been recorded but to clear anyambiguity that may have arisen during the course of his examination. Of course,if the evidence on re-examination of a witness has a bearing on the ultimatedecision of the suit, it is always within the discretion of the Trial Court topermit recall of such a witness for re-examination-in-chief with permis…

The 1st respondent herein filed O.S.No.101 of 2011 in the Court of III
Additional District Judge, Tirupati against the appellants and respondents 2 to
5 herein, for the relief of perpetual injunction in respect of the suit schedule
property, a hotel at Srikalahasti, Chittoor District. He pleaded that the land
on which the hotel was constructed was owned by the appellants and respondents 2
and 3, and his wife by name Saroja, and all of them gave the property on lease
to M/s. Swarna Restaurant Private Limited, 4th respondent herein, under a
document …