Libya in Transition: Opportunities, Challenges and Critical Gaps in International Assistance

The eruption of violent clashes between rival militias and demonstrators on the outskirts of Tripoli in mid-November and the consequent announcement of the state of emergency reflect the fragility and complexity of the post-Gaddafi transition process in Libya. The country is facing numerous challenges in statebuilding, including the fragmentation of societal cohesion, the persistent weakness of the central government in controlling numerous armed groups, and porous borders opening Libya to flows of drugs and illegal migrants and exposing neighbouring countries to arms proliferation risks. The purpose of the seminar is to discuss these challenges and possibilities of the international community, notably the UN and the EU, in tackling them. Are tendencies of federalism and local autonomy growing and what are their implications, as Libya is on the road to the establishment of a constitution and permanent government? How can Libya secure its borders against destabilising flows of migrants and contraband, and thus reduce the illegal incomes on which many armed groups depend? How will the country's numerous armed groups with local, tribal and ethnic affiliations be successfully integrated in the security and justice sectors? How can legal livelihoods be supported, to reduce the attractions of militia membership or smuggling?

Dr Teija
Tiilikainen, Director of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs,
gave the opening words of the seminar. She started her speech by welcoming the
audience and pointing out that Libya, one of the countries in which high hopes
were vested in the context of the Arab Spring, went through a regime change and
was seen heading towards a stable democracy; since then, the situation has
changed as new struggles and violence have emerged. Dr Tiilikainen then
welcomed the speakers, Mr Georg
Charpentier, UN Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General and
Resident & Humanitarian Coordinator for Libya, and Mr Antti Hartikainen, Head of the EU Integrated Border Assistance
Mission (EUBAM). She also called Dr Mika
Aaltola, Programme Director at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs,
to serve as Chair for the questions and answers session. Dr Tiilikainen then
gave the floor to Mr Charpentier.

Mr Charpentier, speaking under the topic "Overview of
Libya’s transition; possibilities, challenges and priorities of United Nations
Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) in assisting Libya’s transition” thanked the
organisers of the seminar for the initiative of calling Finnish citizens regularly
home to share their experiences from abroad. Mr Charpentier started by noting
that Libya remains high on the global agenda: Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon had
recently confirmed that there would be a Security Council mission to Libya. Mr Charpentier
then gave an outline of the challenges in the transition in Libya: two years
have passed since the revolution that liberated Libya of 42 years of
dictatorship, and following the revolution there was much optimism among the
Libyan people and the international community that the country would quickly
transform into a stable and prosperous democracy. Rapid resumption of oil
production towards pre-revolution levels and the holding of free and fair
elections were positive early signs, but the atmosphere today is markedly
different, with growing distrust in public institutions, proliferation of
radical groups and weapons, frequent assassinations, armed clashes between
revolutionary brigades, increasing discontent among ethnic minorities, and
rapid decline in oil profits leaving even public finances at risk. Mr
Charpentier said he wanted to talk about the challenges but also about the
opportunities that Libya is facing. He would also outline the priorities of the
UN as well as how the UN and the international community can help Libyans make
the best use of these opportunities.

First, Mr Charpentier would discuss the political
transition; second, the developments in the security sector; third, the
socio-economic situation. Before that, he gave an overview of the humanitarian
intervention: the UN and the international community mobilised quickly to put
in place a humanitarian intervention at the beginning of the revolution. The
cost of the intervention was approximately 270 million dollars and met 80
percent of the initial emergency needs. Many UN agencies participated to
provide water, food, medicine and other humanitarian support. Giving credit to
the resilience of Libyan people and local communities, Mr Charpentier pointed
out that the externally funded support could be phased out rather quickly at
the end of 2011; training and capacity building was given to local humanitarian
staff in 2012 and 2013.

On the political side, Mr Charpentier noted that in
August 2011, the National Transitional Council issued the Interim
Constitutional Declaration which provides a roadmap for the political
transition in Libya, including steps, timelines and plans for the election of
an interim legislative body, drafting and adopting a new constitution and organising
elections. This was initially the rationale for a UN special political mission
in September 2011. Mr Charpentier said that he himself was working in Libya
under a broad mandate, comprising issues within a political element such as
supporting the elections, national dialogue and constitutional process as well
as those in the security sector such as public security and also human rights
issues and transitional justice elements. Later on, the UN Security Council
added two elements to the mandate: the issue of arms proliferation and the
coordination of international assistance.

Mr Charpentier said that one of the first deviations
from the Roadmap mentioned above was when, under threat of election boycott
from the East, the constitution drafting committee was decided to be elected
not appointed. Furthermore, the political isolation law preventing high-profile
officials from the old regime holding public offices was passed under strong
pressure from revolutionary brigades; the law has been so comprehensive that its
full implementation might result in devastation and thus doesn’t seem probable.
These two controversies caused a severe delay in the timeline of the democratic
transition and were negative displays of government for the public, portraying
a political elite fighting for their own selfish interest, not for the best of
the country. This weakened the credibility of the government and strengthened
the position of the revolutionary brigades. Preparations for the constitution
drafting committee elections have started only recently with certain groups
boycotting, and the elections will likely be delayed until early 2014.

Mr Charpentier continued by stating that in response
to the precarious political situation, UN has worked on both programmatic and
political advisory tracks so to help Libya develop a more effective legislative
body, as well as collaborated with ministries and civil society. UN activities
have been complemented by the international community and actors such as the
EU. On the political advisory track, the most important effort has been
facilitating a constructive national dialogue; this way, representatives of
Libyan political forces have agreed on regulatory principles guiding the
drafting of a roadmap towards democracy. UN is also supporting the drafting of
the constitution and aims to promote awareness-raising on what the constitution
means for Libya. At Benghazi University, some key issues have been studied,
such as governance system, the role of Islam, the status of women, federalism,
democracy, as a reflection of the aspirations of the Libyan people.

On the security sector, Mr Charpentier underlined that
recent clashes by revolutionary brigades have highlighted the importance of bringing
security to state control. With no such armed force in its possession, the
state has actually been dependent on the brigades to maintain security. Alarmingly,
the brigades have begun to be seen as part of the political system and some of
them have developed significant economic interests. The UN-supported process of
building a national army and police has been focusing on the institutional
development and has so far failed to meaningfully engage the revolutionary
brigades. However, a number of Western countries will be training Libyan
soldiers in an accelerated manner. While details remain unclear, in the medium
and long term this should be a positive development for security in Libya, but
in the short run, the well-armed revolutionary brigades must be included and
made responsible in the common process of working towards the establishment of
a strong national force able to protect the country from criminal groups.

Mr Charpentier then discussed the socio-economic
situation in Libya. He pointed out that while there has been a decreasing trust
in the political system, and the security environment is unstable at best, with
the seventh highest proven oil resources in the world Libya is certainly not a poor
country. Normal oil and gas production output of 1.7 million barrels a day
allow Libya to run an economy of 50 billion dollar annual economy by a
population of only 5 million people. Initial release of frozen assets and that
of hydrocarbon output doubled the real GDP in 2012. However, groups expressing
discontent in the current government have started to compromise the oil
production system which, due to its major role in the national economy, is a
potential source of instability. Despite the riches, the political impasse has
resulted in hesitancy in making important decisions, and combined with
challenges in the governance system the delivery of public services has
remained at a low level since the end of the revolution, while not enough funds
have been divided to local levels to help maintain education, housing and
welfare. The UN is assisting in organising elections for local councils which
can hopefully assure that the role of the local level is taken into account in
the governance system. Basic services are, according to Mr Charpentier, of
vital importance to stability in Syria. The UN also helps streamlining the
government systems as well as developing services with expectation of rising amounts
of funding from the government to communities.

Finally, Mr Charpentier highlighted the importance of
reconciliation and inclusion. After 42 years of dictatorship, this will
necessarily take time: relations need to be managed between the perceived
losers and winners of the revolution in a less emotional and more rational way.
Ethnic minorities with temporary citizenship despite of long residence – an
important group especially in the south that could be empowered in security and
border control work instead of alienation – as well as those who were seen
siding with the losing side and displaced and exiled citizens in fear of
reprisals are groups that need special attention. Positive developments include
a displaced group being able to broker a deal to return home without the fear
of reprisals. The transitional justice law made it possible to release from
detainment a group that earlier sided with Gaddafi, and should help moving
power from brigades to the Ministry of Justice.

Mr Charpentier concluded by saying that one shouldn’t
be too pessimistic about the future of Libya: after a long time of
dictatorship, it should be understandable that a working public sector and
reconciliation are not achieved overnight; moreover, Libya has been able to
overcome challenges without major disruptions to national security; a large
majority of Libyans want a peaceful, united and democratic Libya with strength
in moderation against escalations; and Libyans have strong resilience and a sense
of unity in difficult times. In this situation the UN has promoted
inclusiveness, dialogue and compromise as the necessary bottom line towards
democratic development. In Mr Charpentier’s view, Libya needs a national
dialogue involving all parts of society and basic consensus on ground rules. The
UN and the international community needs to remain engaged, also financially,
but bearing in mind the respect of Libyan sovereign decision-making, while remaining
patient and confident that Libyans themselves are best fitted to solve the
current challenges and bring the country towards a successful path of stability
and development.

Mr Hartikainen then thanked the organisers and began
discussing the "Role of EUBAM in assisting Libya’s transition”. Before starting
his speech, he mentioned that there are many positions held by Finns in the
mission. Mr Hartikainen would have three main messages: according to him, first,
secure borders are necessary for wider national security; second and
conversely, borders are difficult to secure without taking into account the
questions of wider security; third, socio-economic development is hard to reach
without security. In Mr Hartikainen’s view, international support can make the
country safer, but there are limits to what can be done and the fate of Libya
is ultimately in the hands of Libyans themselves.

Mr Hartikainen affirmed that Libya’s greatest
challenge is the number of different armed groups. These groups are often
better equipped than the regular army, and amount to a greater number. Some of
them have links to terrorist groups, some to organised crime and others have
specific interests related to e.g. tribes and political groups. Mr Hartikainen
said that by undermining the state monopoly of the authorised use of force, the
armed groups threaten the stability of the state. The armed groups may also
challenge any political decisions in conflict with their own interests. Loose
borders are particularly useful for armed groups: they can e.g. smuggle out subsidised
goods. The value of smuggling out goods is about 3 billion dollars annually.
Some groups smuggle out weapons, as Libya remains full of weapons since the
time of Gaddafi, and incomes are shared and divided with groups that share
similar ideological backgrounds. Cocaine is imported from West Africa towards
Europe, and alcohol too, even if strictly forbidden. Illegal immigration may,
according to Mr Hartikainen, be used by smugglers for their own purposes and
may create an opening for more dangerous travelers. This way, loose borders
provide income for armed groups which cause instability in Libya.

Mr Hartikainen asserted that borders are dominated by
armed groups connected in a loose network of shifting alliances that run the
risk of conflicts when deeply rooted tensions surface. Additionally, smuggled
fake medicines damage the health of thousands of people each year, and
migration causes social tensions. This is why safer borders lead to a safer
Libya, as threats from extremists, criminals and drugs as well as income for
armed groups are mitigated, Mr Hartikainen stated. This is equally important
for the stability of neighbouring countries – it is vital that the whole region
can grow and prosper. Mr Hartikainen said that border management agencies cannot
do their duty if the legitimate use of force is challenged and if there are no
sanctions for crimes against them. This may be the case if the communities rely
on smuggling, and this is why investments are needed to give meaningful work
opportunities as well as reliable protection against any revenge attacks. According
to Mr Hartikainen e.g. the Libyan Coast Guard has improved its activities
significantly.

Mr Hartikainen also said that, conversely, borders
cannot be secured if there is generally no security in the country. This is why
border agencies must pursue collaboration with other security agencies. This
does not mean, of course, that nothing could be done: EUBAM and the UN can both
help Libyans make improvements in border management even with the current state
of affairs. Some of these steps forward include equipping officials with
uniforms, increasing the efficiency of the agency organisations and building
capacity on integrated border management. Compared to other countries that have
experienced a transition of power, an important part of the wider governance
system has been missing in Libya: working structures, accountability mechanisms
and rules have to be rebuilt but these are often political and contested.
Despite these challenges, according to Mr Hartikainen, progress is being made.
The neighbouring countries have little confidence over Libya’s capacity to
secure its borders. This is seen as a threat; Gaddafi’s open border policy also
lays a historical burden.

For EUBAM, migration is only one of the issues on the
table and the mission aims not to give a picture of it focusing only on
migration. Mr Hartikainen stated that EUBAM wants to enhance stability in Syria
by following two tracks: firstly, using the strategic approach of institutional
development and secondly, a tactical approach of capacity building and
mentoring. Both are needed in order to secure both tangible results and
institutional development. Concrete results are important for gaining the
support of the Libyan people and EU taxpayers as well, but so is the strategic
level because support from top level political leadership such as ministers is
vital for any lasting progress to be made. An example of this is a new border
management working group. One of the challenges is that border agencies
themselves would like to go ahead, but the inertia on the political level due
to the inefficient decision-making system slow down the process. Even EUBAM
proposals may be met with no definite political decisions necessary for
implementation. Ministries should be contacted more frequently, but due to
security challenges and an isolation law this has proved to be difficult. Finally,
Mr Hartikainen reminded that while the EU has an important leading role in
Libyan border management, the future of Libya is in the hands of Libyans. Not
everything can be achieved in a day, and it must be Libyans who set the
priorities.

Serving as the Chair of the seminar, Dr Mika Aaltola,
Programme Director at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, thanked
the speakers and opened the questions and answers section of the seminar which
proved to be particularly lively. Dr Aaltola himself asked, referring to the
ideal of ultimately handing over the control to Libya, whether the interests of
the international community may at times deviate from those of Libyans. A
member of the audience, referring to a Gaddafi quote about Libya as the
Pandora’s box, asked whether the developments in Libya were expected by the
West or happened as a surprise. Another wanted to underline the gravity of the
situation and that the governability of the country is at great risk. A third audience
member was interested in concrete examples of challenges in reaching the
political level and ministries, and a fourth one inquired whether the idea of a
common Libyan people is even supported in a very diverse country.

Mr Charpentier stated his view that Libyan people got
and wanted to get rid of a regime that limited the freedom of expression,
livelihood and thought. Regime change was the aspiration of common Libyans, not
something the international community wanted to put in place in order to be
dealt with easier. However, building a new political system after a
revolutionary war will take time – maybe generations – and this requires trust
by the international community in Libyans. On national identity, Mr Charpentier
noted that certain divisions were actually accentuated by the past regime and
that overall Libyans do feel like one people despite the tensions and tribal
differences. What is important is the inclusion of each and every one in the
political process towards a renewed state. For example, certain ethnic
minorities are temporary citizens without the right to vote. Mr Charpentier
also underscored that despite a national identity, Libyans want a more
decentralised state than in the time of the Gaddafi regime. Mr Hartikainen
agreed by affirming that the government should focus more on regions:
decentralisation should be implemented by giving more power to regions and
local communities.

Referring to the question about conflicts between the
interest of the international community and that of Libya, Mr Hartikainen said that
even if a shared commitment to migration issues has only developed over time,
at least border security interests are shared. Mr Hartikainen didn’t see Libya
as a failed state but shared the concern with the audience member of a huge
risk if the situation should fail to be stabilised. Mr Hartikainen asserted
that weapons should be collected from citizens and armed groups, but this is an
enormous challenge because armed groups see the weapons as a means of
protecting themselves and believe they have the ownership to the revolution. As
a concrete example of difficulties in connecting with the political level, Mr
Hartikainen mentioned a project proposal on border control governance submitted
as early as last summer but not having been decided on as of December despite
frequent inquiries.

An audience member pointed out that the international
community doesn’t accept states that differ too much from the general rule, and
even if Gaddafi had begun moving Libya in the acceptable direction, the
transition finally took the form of a revolution. Another noted that there was
some intelligence predicting the upcoming instability in Libya and that this failed
to be recognised so to prevent the violence. Finally responding to a question
about governability and corruption, Mr Hartikainen admitted that this is a
problem: because Libya produces a relatively small number of goods and much is
therefore imported, the corruption of customs is a significant threat. Mr Charpentier
hoped, on the other hand, that the dynamism of a renewed civil society would
imply that an equitable sharing of resources in Libya would be more probable
now than in Gaddafi’s time. He also said that many foreign workers have indeed
not returned after the war, but this happens in proportion with the economic
situation and the number of those will increase as the economy starts growing
again. With the questions and answers sessions in its conclusion, Dr Aaltola
closed the seminar.