MiG.-29 Kill Ratio_ 10:28 Like the crashs they blame the losses on the pilots. Neither Russia or India is going to just say we make lousy planes,, even though Russia civil aviations record is just as bad.

Oct 21/13: Indian complaints. Aviation Week reports that India is dissatisfied with their development workshare, in a project they came late to and is close to lockdown on their partner’s side, for which they have only recently managed to produce anything resembling their specifications (q.v. April 10/13):

“We have a major opportunity in the FGFA program,” Indian air force (IAF) Deputy Chief Air Marshal S. Sukumar says. However, “at the moment [the 15% development share] is not very much in favor of Indian development. We are flagging it through the government. It should be much more focused towards indigenous development capability.”

As Aviation Week points out, 4 Russian T50 prototypes have performed more than 200 test flights since January 2010, and the VVF plans to begin inducting the fighter in 2015-2016. That doesn’t leave a ton of room for development, which requires fast decisions that begin the partnership early, when the design is still very much in need of refinement. India’s desires and its modus operandi are once again in conflict, and the question is whether the dichotomy will become a stumbling block in negotiations for the final $11 billion system development contract. At this point, the only way to square that circle would be to increase the number of differences between the Russian and Indian fighters, or to involve India in developing a “Block 10″ type successor to a fighter whose core technologies are already a huge stretch for them. Either approach would drive up overall costs for the contract under negotiation (q.v. July 15/13), and add substantial risk to India’s plans to begin manufacturing at HAL in 2022 – itself a problematic proposition, given HAL’s record. Sources: Aviation Week, “India Concerned About Fifth-Gen Fighter Work Share With Russia”.

Anatoly Isaikin, head of Rosoboronexport, Russia’s state arms exporter, was once again forced to address the string of setbacks plaguing Russian arms manufacturers in India over the past 12 months. This includes the long-suffering Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-35 fighter, whose future on the domestic and foreign markets remains unclear.

“The situation with these tenders has nothing to do with any systemic problems,” Isaikin told the Vedomosti newspaper. “To my mind, the MiG-35 fighter plane has lost the tender in India because it was not mass-produced. At the same time, French and U.S. companies were able to submit their production versions,” Isaikin added.

Some time ago, India announced its Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) tender for the purchase of 126 multi-role medium fighters, which should completely replace the rundown MiG-21 Fishbed fighter planes used by the Indian Air Force.

The tender involved the United States with its Lockheed Martin F-16IN Super Viper and Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet fighter planes; France with its Dassault Rafale fighter; the European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company (EADS) with its Eurofighter Typhoon; Sweden with its Saab JAS-39NG Gripen fighter plane; and Russia with its Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-35 Fulcrum-F fighter. The tender’s results were announced in the winter of 2012, with the contract going to Dassault Rafale.

Initial deliveries were estimated at almost $11 billion. It’s not for nothing that the media referred to this as “the mother of all tenders”. Having opted for Dassault Rafale, India will not be able to buy the 126 warplanes for this sum. Analysts note that either purchasing volumes will have to go down or the contract’s end price will reach $16-18 billion.

Causes of the MiG-35’s setbacks

Explaining the MiG-35’s setbacks by citing the fact that it is not mass-produced is a stretch. Although the Dassault Rafale fighter is currently being mass-produced, it had failed to win all recent tenders. It has only flown with the French Air Force pending the results of the MMRCA tender.

Leaving aside for the moment the Indian principles of diversifying supplies and striking balance among the main market investors, which are regarded as sacred and indisputable by Indian generals, let’s assume that this Russian-made fixed-wing aircraft fits into the concept guiding New Delhi’s military contracts.

In its time, India had ordered two virtually non-production warplanes from Russia – first, the Sukhoi Su-30K Flanker-C and then the Su-30MKI Flanker-H. Both fighters eventually struck gold during Russian military aircraft exports. In the mid-2000s, New Delhi ordered the revamped MiG-29K Fulcrum-D carrier-borne fighter.

It is hard to argue with the fact that aircraft production runs and the popularity of specific warplanes with the manufacturing country’s air force influence the choice of clients during the purchase of foreign weapons systems. As for the MiG-35, its specifications and performance, rather than its production run, are the main problems.

The MiG-35 is a descendant of the above-mentioned MiG-29K in many respects. India had no qualms about buying the MiG-29K. In fact, the Indian Navy has ordered 45 of these fighters to date. Of this number, 16 MiG-29Ks have already been shipped to India. At any rate, the production MiG-29K is not as good as the well-known Su-30MKI, which is quite popular in India.

However, the MiG-35 has been and remains substandard. The three MiG-35s being used for demonstration purposes are, in fact, a “flying offer” for prospective clients who must submit a request for proposal (RFP) in line with specific objectives.

Under the state arms procurement program through 2020, the Russian Air Force is to buy an estimated 50 MiG-35 fighter planes or so. However, the specifications and performance of the domestic fighter, due to be adopted by the country’s air force, have not been clarified to date.

The previous high command of the Russian Air Force was leery of the very idea of buying these warplanes and the possible modernization of operational MiG-29s. So far there is no reason to believe that the new Air Force commanders will drastically change their approach.

Some analysts openly claim that the fighter has no future. They believe that the MiG-35 is quite expensive, that it has numerous drawbacks and an unclear tactical designation. Moreover, prospects for its production remain vague against the backdrop of the brilliant T-10 fighter family, including the Su-30MKI/MK2 and the Su-35 Flanker-E, whose production poses no problems whatsoever.

Other analysts believe that the MiG-35 has export potential but add that the Russian Aircraft Corporation MiG should build some of these aircraft for the country’s air force. For its part, the Russian Air Force faces numerous internal problems, and support for national exports is not among its priorities.

Problematic growth model

All this does not amount to mistakes and failures on the part of Rosoboronexport, the Federal Service for Military Technical Cooperation or the aircraft industry. The unique fates of “non-production” export aircraft, including their unexpected successes and setbacks, are a consequence of the Russian defense industry’s growth model, which had evolved by the late 1990s, and which continues to influence the situation.

For 20 years, the state did not award major long-term contracts for the delivery of military products. The Soviet defense industry had existed as a highly specialized state within a state, even if its enterprises sometimes had to turn out civilian products. Devoid of contracts, since 1992 entire industries were unable to manufacture weapons systems and other military products. Consequently, they lost their competitive advantages and proved unable to implement modernization programs.

Exports proved to be the only source of revenues. But this implied the frugal reinvestment of the profits obtained, as well as cost-effective corporate governance and management. Some enterprises were able to assess market trends and to sell the most popular Soviet technologies following the break-up of the USSR. By so doing they managed to preserve their R&D and production potential without suffering any major setbacks.

One can therefore disagree with Anatoly Isaikin because this is a system-wide problem. However, this problem has nothing to do with the work of Rosoboronexport, which should not tackle such issues as industry development strategies or those of specific arms production facilities.

Currently, the government is trying to move away from the defense industry’s export-oriented funding model and to award more domestic contracts. This process has just been launched. The most cost-effective industries, including tactical aircraft or helicopter enterprises, signed major contracts two or three years ago, and the first products are being delivered to the Russian Armed Forces. However, all other enterprises will have to boost their production until 2020, the final deadline for implementing the state arms procurement program.

This will at least partially eliminate the need for a nerve-racking search for foreign clients wishing to buy substandard products. Such products are subsequently upgraded with the help of advance payments and loans for future projects. However, it is foreign clients who dictate the relevant policies in such cases. Setbacks seem inevitable in such situations. The concerned parties try to provide for such setbacks in any state defense contract just to compensate for the losses incurred.

Well-balanced and regular funding from diversified sources, including real-life defense industry conversion, will make it possible to calmly implement current and future R&D projects, making full use of Russia’s remaining engineering potential.

The last news had bad impact on Kremlin therefore there is a need of longer period such as five years and lots of money should the consequences need to be amortized. There is a need of at least 20 billion dollars more than the envisaged.

The fist news came from some African countries that are interested into purchase of Russian military airplanes. The offers of the Russia were rejected and probably were not considered seriously.

The second news came from India. The Indian army has announced a tender of the century regarding the armament of its army with new planes in the amount of 10, 5 billion dollars. Russians and Americans were rejected into the first round, although somebody in Kremlin tried to convince that Russia due to the prices and performances of the planes shall win the century deal.

There were few wrong steps made by Russia regarding the plane and equipment delivery in New Delhi.

Due to the bad business procedures of the Russian manufacturers that are result of the bad condition of the entire Russian aircraft production, New Delhi stopped the procedure.

Civil aircraft production

This year the only bright thing of the Russian airplane production was within the civil sector.

Sukhoj -SSJ 100 had the first commercial flight from Armenia to Moscow.

This passenger plane must succeed as a project. Maybe this is the only and the last hope of the Russian aircraft industry. Although only 50 % is produced in the western countries (most of the equipment) Boeing was asked for help and assistance.

Someone considered this of a defeat of the entire Russian aircraft industry but the rationalists and realists considered this of a success that should help new mutual projects with the western manufacturers to be realized.

Russia needs help in this field. The problems are really complex. Kremlin gives billion rubles each year from the budget in order to keep this industry into function.

This industry is very important for Kremlin thus reconstitution and rationalization with the help of western experts and companies is not even considered. They are more than necessary now.

Being worried of the poor quality plane production Medvedev and Putin bought western manufactured planes within the administrative fleet.

According to Russian sources until 2020 Russia shall need 1300 planes in order to modernize the civil fleet and cover its needs. I think that the number is higher for 400-500 planes and that the real number is 1700-1800.

Regarding the army, the situation there is much more complicated. They should think of the planes they need, their purpose, their targets and finally to decide which are the “enemies” and of course to find money for all these.

Military aircraft production

The platform T-10 is good for development and is the best export article but there are fewer buyers.

The problems within the army aircraft industry are big enough so that with each new project few planes are produced but there are not any buyers.

What is more interesting is the fact that the entire aircraft production makes much more projects and few planes by a project than the rest of the other manufacturers around the world.

The project bureaus work very hard but the manufacturers cannot do anything about it and cannot advertise it commercially. It is matter of time if these project companies can handle this pace even though there isn’t any commercial base of the projects.

There are less conflict situations among the countries from the third world. The problems are inside the countries and not into the neighborhood. It is not only about the world finance crisis. Somalia, Sudan or Madagascar shall decide to purchase modern passenger planes, one of which costs the same as 2 super modern hunter planes.

The Russian aircraft industry should be reconstituted as soon as possible and all available things to be sold. It should be sold without any sensitivity and the rest of it should be estimate by the Russian market and the world’s market.
The pre dimensionality disease is still present.

Cooperation with the west as the one of SSJ has proved to be beneficial.
SSj should find one more Russian manufacturer and to finance it regarding the modernization and the new technologies.

Modernization of Il-96 and Tu-204 is possible and the answer is familiar to everyone:

1. Super control of the quality
2. Appliance of new materials in order to make the construction lighter ( 5-7%)
3. New motors that are available on the market and reduction of the consumption for 15-20%
4.Improvement of the aerodynamics and implementation of the western technology like the one in SSJ

If the project M21 will be approved, there will be enough plane models in Russia for export.

The Russian aircraft industry should be constantly modernized as well as the present projects should be modernized without wasting money on new ones. The cooperation with Western companies can be of benefit to Russia. There are too many people employed into this industry and the competition form Brazil and China can make this industry to collapse.

Following the collapse of electronic industry if Kremlin allows this industry to collapse then Russia should say goodbye to high technology and thus it is time for Kremlin to request help form the western partners in order to save the industry as much as it is possible.

Whether Kremlin shall request help from Airbus or Boeing it depends on the emotions and Russian pride but also stubbornness. Unnecessary costs such as billions from the Russian budget had been paid as a price for this stubbornness for several times.

In the period of two years Russia either shall sell part of this industry or shall close it.

This should be clear in Kremlin long time ago, but let’s see what moves are about to be pulled and if they are to be rational.

Dame Chkatroski is Editor of Macedonia and Western Balkans for the World Security Network Foundation. During the 1990s Dame Chkatroski has worked for Alex Br-NY, Merrill Lynch, on economic analyses for Eastern Europe. He has extensively written on the Balkans for Focus and IR Interfaith Relations, as well as for the Macedonian weekly Forum. Economist by profession, Dame also writes on topics such as foreign affairs, politics, defense in the Balkans, EuroAsia region and NATO enlargement. In 1999 and 2000 he is a winner of several awards of the World Analytic Group on his analyses "Kosovo after Milosevic" , "Russia 2000" and "The dark side of the Eastern privatization". Currently he is a senior analyst at Forum- CSRD. He is honorary member of the WAGG’s Board for the Balkans and Eastern Europe.

1)we opted for mig-29k having an average at best zhuk -me radar comparable to rdy-2 radar of mirage 2000 upgrade
its atleast 2 generations behind the modern GaA AESA and by the time(5-10 years) GaN AESA is developed it will be 3 generations behind.we needed something better for our carrier based fighter.

unfortunately zhuk-ae and fga-30,35 are still not ready and when they are in a couple of years the irst thing to do would be to replace this tardy radar

its this

vs

2)again like the mki the irst is pretty bad compared to modern standards ,with range of only 60 km from rear aspect

inda had mig 29 production line and all the relevant designs. india should have used the design of mig 29 and instead of rd33 engine should have used american ge f 414 engine the same as on lca mk2 and israelly aesa 2052 radar. this plane should have been stealth optimized with cantered tail and with gold tinted buble glass canopy and advanced composites and voila we could have our own potent medium fighter ready in no time.

inda had mig 29 production line and all the relevant designs. india should have used the design of mig 29 and instead of rd33 engine should have used american ge f 414 engine the same as on lca mk2 and israelly aesa 2052 radar. this plane should have been stealth optimized with cantered tail and with gold tinted buble glass canopy and advanced composites and voila we could have our own potent medium fighter ready in no time.

Definitely it is not that simple. but if drdo hal ada would have joined hands and given 10 yrs of R&D may be this culd have been possible. the mmrca circus is going on for 10 yrs. so we would have been flying it now.

Definitely it is not that simple. but if drdo hal ada would have joined hands and given 10 yrs of R&D may be this culd have been possible. the mmrca circus is going on for 10 yrs. so we would have been flying it now.

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Not really, Government bureaucrats are expressing doubt that a Rafale deal can be signed before the current fiscal year end in March 2015, and some media outlets are reporting a potential order cut to 80 planes.

the 1st IAF mig 29 had which version of RD 33 engines ?
y did they have a smoked trail.... un-burnt fuel ?
has this problem been solved in the latest version ?
the fuel consumption is said to be the best.......what is it & how do u calculate it ie at what altitude ?
any western engine which has a better fuel consumption for fighters.