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Description: The Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale publishes thematically-based issues on the major questions currently in debate within the international philosophical community. Faithful to its principles, the journal offers an independent perspective, not tied to any particular school of thought. For certain authors and philosophical currents, the review also includes the fruits of contemporary research.

The "moving wall" represents the time period between the last issue
available in JSTOR and the most recently published issue of a journal.
Moving walls are generally represented in years. In rare instances, a
publisher has elected to have a "zero" moving wall, so their current
issues are available in JSTOR shortly after publication.
Note: In calculating the moving wall, the current year is not counted.
For example, if the current year is 2008 and a journal has a 5 year
moving wall, articles from the year 2002 are available.

Terms Related to the Moving Wall

Fixed walls: Journals with no new volumes being added to the archive.

Absorbed: Journals that are combined with another title.

Complete: Journals that are no longer published or that have been
combined with another title.

Abstract

Le but de l'article est de proposer de suivre en métaphysique la voie de l'analyse conceptuelle par intuition de cas possibles. Pour une part empirique et a posteriori, reposant sur des intuitions dont elle exploite autant les contradictions que les points communs, avant de les tester dans une perspective faillibiliste, l'analyse conceptuelle comporte aussi une partie a priori qu'elle élabore en recourant à la méthode des cas possibles, permettant ainsi de repenser les liens entre nécessité conceptuelle et nécessité métaphysique. Ainsi entendue, la démarche renoue avec l'inspiration propre à la méthode scotiste des possibles-réels qui fut à l'origine de la constitution de la métaphysique comme science. The aim of the article is to propose to follow in metaphysics the view of conceptual analysis by intuition of possible cases. Partly empirical and a posteriori, based on intuitions whose contradictions it exploits as much as what they have in common, conceptual analysis also involves an a priori part, which it elaborates through the method of possible cases, thus bringing into a new light the links between conceptual necessity and metaphysical necessity. In that respect, it renews the Scotistic method of the real-possible, which was at the origin of the constitution of metaphysics as a science.