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Abstract

The ability to individuate entities (i.e. conceptualize one entity as distinct from two) and trace their identity (i.e. judge that an entity is the same one as an entity encountered before) is a fundamental component of the human mind and is critical to proper name reference (i.e. a proper name, like Max, refers to a unique individual, namely Max). Philosophers have proposed that sortalsconcepts which refer to kinds of individuals-support these abilities (Gupta,1980; Hirsch, 1982; Macnamara,1986; Wiggins,1967,1980). However., while adults may well have sortal concepts and learn proper names for individuals, it is an open question whether children do so also. Proponents of the Continuity hypothesis (e.g. Macnamara,1982; Pinker, 1984) argue that children arid adults have fundamentally the same conceptual resources, whereas proponents of the Discontinuity hypothesis (e.g. Piaget,1954; Quine,1960,1969) argue that children and adults have qualitatively different conceptual systems.
In this thesis, evidence is reviewed that very young infants have at least one sortal, physical object, which suggests that infants have the conceptual structure needed to support representations of kinds and individuals. Experiments probing infant understanding of the concept, person, suggest that infants have the ability to reason about the action and appearance of others, but data presented in the thesis falls short of providing conclusive evidence that infants under a year are able to individuate people. Evidence is presented that by age three-, children represent unique individuals and interpret proper names in an adultlike manner as referring to unique individuals. This rules out a discontinuity alternative, namely that preschoolers represent proper names as referring to highly similar objects or to restricted subkinds. Evidence is also presented that children as young as two years are like adults in being willing to accept a range of individuals as namable if given information which highlights the named objects' importance, such as the attribution of mental states to the object.
3
Together these findings provide support for the continuity hypothesis and suggest a number of avenues of research into children's understanding of kinds, individuals, and their names.
Thesis Supervisor: Susan Carey Title: Professor of Psychology New York University

Copyright

This record is the front matter from a document that appears on a server at MIT and is used through permission from MIT.

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United States

Language

English (United States)

This text was extracted from a PDF file.

This is the abbreviated version, containing approximately
15% of the total text.

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This record is the front matter from a document that appears on a server at MIT and is used through permission from MIT. See
http://theses.mit.edu:80/Dienst/UI/2.0/Describe/0018.mit.theses/1999-76 for copyright details and for the full document in image
form.

Submitted to the Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences on October 2, 1998 in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Cognitive Science

ABSTRACT

The ability to individuate entities (i.e. conceptualize one entity as distinct from two) and trace
their identity (i.e. judge that an entity is the same one as an entity encountered before) is a
fundamental component of the human mind and is critical to proper name reference (i.e. a
proper name, like Max, refers to a unique individual, namely Max). Philosophers have proposed
that sortalsconcepts which refer to kinds of individuals-support these abilities (Gupta,1980;
Hirsch, 1982; Macnamara,1986; Wiggins,1967,1980). However., while adults may well have
sortal concepts and learn proper names for individuals, it is an open question whether children
do so also. Proponents of the Continuity hypothesis (e.g. Macnamara,1982; Pinker, 1984) argue
that children arid adults have fundamentally the same conceptual resources, whereas
proponents of the Discontinuity hypothesis (e.g. Piaget,1954; Quine,1960,1969) argue that
children and adults have qualitatively different conceptual systems.

In this thesis, evidence is reviewed that very young infants have at least one sortal, physical
object, which suggests that infants have the conceptual structure needed to support
representations of kinds and individuals. Experiments probing infant understanding of the
concept, person, suggest that infants have the ability to reason about the action and
appearance of others, but data presented in the thesis falls short of providing conclusive
evidence that infant...