3 PREAMBLE This Cross-Sector Roadmap was conceived and developed over the last two years by industry and government thought leaders that saw the need for a unifying Roadmap to secure control systems across all critical sectors. They have succeeded in capturing the common elements of securing control systems from the many Roadmaps that have been developed by individual sectors over the last six years. However, unifying does not mean one size fits all and the crafters of this Cross-Sector Roadmap hope that other critical sectors that have not developed their own Roadmap to date will either use this document as is or use it as a starting point to develop their own brand of Roadmap to secure control systems that reflects their sector s unique needs and challenges. Cross-Sector Roadmap iii Document Revision 3.0

4 FOREWORD The Cross-Sector Roadmap to Secure Control Systems describes a plan for voluntarily improving cybersecurity across all critical infrastructure/key resources (CIKR s) that employ industrial control systems. This roadmap provides an opportunity for industry experts to offer input concerning the state of control systems cybersecurity and to communicate recommended strategies for improvement. This roadmap brings together various sector stakeholders, government agencies, and asset owners and operators, with a common set of goals and objectives. It also provides milestones to focus specific efforts and activities for achieving the goals and addressing control system s most urgent challenges, longer-term needs, and practices for improvement. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security s National Cybersecurity Division (NCSD) facilitated the development of this roadmap, with volunteers from the Industrial Control Systems Joint Working Group (ICSJWG) and industry stakeholder organizations. This roadmap provides a beginning point and a template for action as industry and government work together to achieve a common objective for securing industrial control systems (ICSs) across all CIKR s that employ ICSs. All activities within this Roadmap should be conducted in accordance with applicable laws and policies. Nothing in this Roadmap should be taken to restrict, supersede, or otherwise replace the legal authorities or regulatory responsibilities of any government agency or organization. The views expressed within this Roadmap are those of the members of the ICSJWG Roadmap Working Group and do not constitute an official agency or organization position. ICS ROADMAP WORKING GROUP Name Organization Role Perry Pederson Nuclear Regulatory Commission Co-Chair (GCC) Tim Roxey North American Electric Reliability Corporation Co-Chair (SCC) Jeff Gray Department of Homeland Security ICSJWG Program Lead Lisa Kaiser Department of Homeland Security ICSJWG Liaison John Zurcher SRA International, Inc. ICSJWG Support Chris Scholbe SRA International, Inc. ICSJWG Support Donald Allen DHS/TSA/Mass Transit Member Larry Alls GE Energy Member Thomas Asojo USAF/38 CEG Member Matt Bailey Fox Guard Solutions Member Doron Becker Department of the Navy Member Sandra Bittner Arizona Public Service Company / Palo Verde Member Nuclear Generating Station Chris Blask AlienVault Member Mark Bodily Idaho National Laboratory Member Lloyd Brake Naval Surface Warfare Center Member Chet Braun Navy NAVFAC NW Member Jim Brenton ERCOT Member Fabien Briere TOTAL France Member Tim Burkhalter Deaf Smith Electric Cooperative, Inc. Member Edwin Cadag Guam Power Authority Member Cross-Sector Roadmap iv Document Revision 3.0

9 1. INTRODUCTION eaders from the nation s critical infrastructure sectors and government agencies recognize the need Lto plan, coordinate, and focus ongoing efforts to improve control system security. Industry stakeholders agree that a concise plan, with specific goals and milestones for implementing security across individual sectors, is required to prioritize critical needs and gaps to assist CIKR asset owners in reducing the risk of future cyber attacks on control systems. In recent years, Energy, Water, Chemical, and other sector roadmaps have been developed to guide the efforts of individual sectors in securing their industrial control systems (ICSs). Roadmaps provide an opportunity for industry experts within a sector to offer their perspective concerning the state of control system cybersecurity and appropriate strategies for securing their sector. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is leveraging this industry perspective to coordinate the efforts across multiple CIKR sectors and help the sector stakeholder community develop programs and risk mitigation measures that align with the sector s plan while maintaining a cross sector perspective. In addition to the asset owners and operators, other sector stakeholders include industrial control system vendors, system integrators, and academia, which can use these roadmaps to map supporting activities with industry. Because the roadmap goals are voluntary, implementation of the ideas and concepts presented in this document are addressed based on the organizations overall cybersecurity policies and procedures. Still, roadmaps are recognized as quality documents that provide excellent descriptions of industrial control systems risk challenges and general methods for improving the security of industrial control systems over the ensuing decade. The specific challenges, goals, and priorities identified by the ICSJWG Roadmap Working Group are detailed in Section 3 of this roadmap. ROADMAP PURPOSE This roadmap builds on existing government and industry efforts to improve the security of industrial control systems within the private sector by working with sector-specific associations and agencies established to promote consistent application of standards and guidance within any given sector. Its intent is to help coordinate and guide related control system security efforts such as the International Society of Automation s (ISA) Committee on Industrial Automation Systems Security (ISA-99), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), public and private research and development, and academic institutes supporting the development and promulgation of ICS security across multiple CIKR s. This roadmap: Presents a vision, along with a supporting framework of goals and milestones, to improve the cybersecurity posture of ICSs across all CIKR s Defines a consensus-based strategy that addresses the specific cybersecurity needs of owners and operators of CIKR facilities Proposes a comprehensive plan for improving the availability, security, reliability, and functionality of ICSs Cross-Sector Roadmap 1-1 Document Revision 3.0

10 Proposes methods and programs that encourage participation and compliance by all stakeholders Guides efforts by industry, academia, and government Identifies opportunities for cooperative work across sectors Promotes continuous improvement in the security posture of ICSs within CIKR sectors, allowing sectors to establish baselines to measure security performance against established metrics. It should be understood that this is a living document which can and will change as the sectors mature in their security posture. ROADMAP SCOPE This roadmap addresses cybersecurity issues related specifically to ICSs owned and operated by agencies and industries whose facilities are part of the nation s CIKR s. The functional and organizational composition of CIKR sectors are defined in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) 1 and subordinate sector specific plans. Vendors that supply and maintain control systems components are an integral part of the cyber control system problem-solution space encompassed by this roadmap. 1 Designing, operating, and maintaining a facility to meet essential availability, reliability, safety, and security needs as well as process control requirements requires the careful evaluation and analysis of all risk factors, including physical, cyber, and human. Attacks on a cyber system may involve only the cyber components and their operation, but those impacts can extend into the physical, business, human, and environmental systems to which they are connected. A cyber event, whether caused by an external adversary, an insider, or inadequate policies and procedures, can initiate a loss of system control, resulting in negative consequences. This roadmap recognizes this interconnectivity, but restricts its scope by addressing the cyber issues of ICSs. 2 Interactions with physical, business, and safety systems and their security components are an accepted reality necessitating the appropriate coordination of interfaces for secure and reliable operation. Cyber risk to ICSs encompasses elements of the business network and Internet to the extent they are connected to process control systems. Securing access to and control of the business network and Internet is generally the responsibility of information technology (IT) personnel, and thus outside the scope of this roadmap. This roadmap does, however, include efforts to coordinate and interface with IT security efforts. Physical access to cyber systems is a significant contributing factor of cyber risk. Similarly, physical damage resulting from cyber compromise is one of the principal factors contributing to industrial control systems risk. This roadmap includes both of these factors in understanding and planning for cybersecurity enhancements. However, actual engagement in physical access control and physical consequence management outside of physically securing cyber assets is beyond the scope of this roadmap. This roadmap covers goals, milestones, and needs over the near (0 2 years), mid (2 5 years), and long (5-10 years) terms. Security needs encompass research and development (R&D), new technologies, systems testing, training and education, accepted industry practices, standards and protocols, policies, information sharing, and outreach and implementation. 1. The sectors are bounded by the definition contained within the NIPP. The sector definitions within the NIPP result in companies and even facilities, that are in more than one sector 2. This document uses the term industrial control system to include all process control systems, functional and operational systems, safety systems tied to operational systems, manufacturing execution systems, supervisory control and data acquisition systems (SCADA), and distributed control systems (DCS). It does not include business systems and strictly information systems. Cross-Sector Roadmap 1-2 Document Revision 3.0

11 NATIONAL CONTEXT The Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-7 Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection required NIPP to provide the collaborative framework and unifying structure for the integration of existing and future CIKR protection efforts for the government and private sector. These collaborative partnerships consist of a Sector Coordinating Council (SCC) and a Government Coordinating Council (GCC.) HSPD-7 also assigned Sector-Specific Agencies (SSA s) for each of the 18 CIKR sectors, as the lead agencies responsible for collaborating with other Federal, State, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector partners. The SSA s, among other things, implement and encourage the development of information sharing and analysis mechanisms, including the sharing of information regarding physical and cyber threats, vulnerabilities, incidents, potential protective measures, and accepted industry practices. The NIPP requires sectors to issue sector-specific plans that address security posture and initiatives to achieve security. SCCs are self-organized, self-run, and self-governed industry organizations that represent a spectrum of key stakeholders within a sector. SCCs serve as the government s principal point of entry into each sector for developing and coordinating a wide range of CIKR protection activities and issues. In 2004, DHS NCSD established the Control Systems Security Program (CSSP), which was chartered to work with control systems security stakeholders through awareness and outreach programs that encourage and support coordinated control systems security enhancement efforts. In 2008, the CSSP also established the Industrial Control Systems Joint Working Group (ICSJWG) as a coordination body to facilitate the collaboration of control system stakeholders and to encourage the design, development and deployment of enhanced security for control systems. Roadmap priorities and recommendations help inform and strengthen government programs designed to improve the protection of ICSs. Appendix A summarizes national policy guidance on cybersecurity of industrial control systems. ACTION PLAN This roadmap proposes a strategic framework for addressing industrial control system security for both industry and government bodies. As an action plan, the roadmap is designed to improve resiliency against cyber events that would disrupt operations and have negative consequence to the nation s physical and economic security. Identified in this document are the challenges and activities that should be addressed and outlines specific milestones to be accomplished over the next 10 years to achieve the goals and vision outlined. While this plan contains many actionable items, it is only useful to the extent that financial resources, intellectual capability, commitment, and leadership translate these priorities and milestones into productive projects, activities, and products within their organizations See Section 6: References Cross-Sector Roadmap 1-3 Document Revision 3.0

12 2. CONTROL SYSTEM LANDSCAPE ICSs perform various functions and exist at different stages of evolution throughout the nation s CIKR. Many of the control systems used today were designed for availability and reliability during an era when security received low priority. These systems operated in fairly isolated environments and typically relied on proprietary software, hardware, and communications technologies. Infiltrating and compromising these systems often required specific knowledge of individual system architectures and physical access to system components. In contrast, newer control systems are highly network-based and use common standards for communication protocols. Many controllers are Internet Protocol (IP) addressable. Asset owners and operators have gained immediate benefits by extending the connectivity of their control systems. They have increasingly adopted commercial off-the-shelf technologies that provide the greater levels of interoperability required among today s modern infrastructures. Standard operating systems such as Windows, UNIX, or Linux are increasingly used in ICSs, which are now typically connected to remote controllers via private networks provided by telecommunications companies. Common telecommunications technologies such as the Internet, public-switched telephone, cable, or wireless networks are often used. A typical system configuration is shown in Figure 1. Enterprise Laptop computer Workstation Mainframe Server Server Plant A Plant B Plant C Router Router Router Laptop computer Workstation Laptop computer Workstation Laptop computer Workstation File/Print Server App. Server Data Server File/Print Server App. Server Data Server File/Print Server App. Server Data Server Plant A Control System Firewall Plant B Control System Firewall Plant C Control System Firewall App. Server Controller I/O Data Server Maint. Server Controller I/O App. Server Controller I/O Data Server Maint. Server Controller I/O App. Server Controller Figure 1. Components of a Typical Industrial Control System. (Source: ISA ) I/O Data Server Maint. Server Controller I/O Copyright ISA, All Rights Reserved Cross-Sector Roadmap 2-1 Document Revision 3.0

13 Figure 2. Components of a Typical SCADA System. (Source: ISA ) Copyright ISA, All Rights Reserved The potential for system access resulting from this interoperability exposes network assets to infiltration and subsequent manipulation of sensitive operations. Furthermore, increasingly sophisticated cyber attack tools can exploit vulnerabilities in commercial off-theshelf system components, telecommunication methods, and common operating systems found in modern control systems. The ability of asset owners to discover and understand such emerging threats and system vulnerabilities is a prerequisite to developing effective security polices and countermeasures. Even though ICSs are designed for reliability (Availability, Integrity, Confidentiality), ICS security policies and practices are often poorly implemented. As operating practices have evolved to allow real-time operation and control of critical assets, protecting control systems from cyber risks has become more difficult. Some of the most serious security issues inherent in current industrial control systems include: increasing connectivity, proliferation of access points, escalating system complexity, greater interdependencies, increased outsourcing and reliance on foreign products, market restructuring, and wider use of common operating systems and platforms. These challenges contribute to the following heightened security risks in many CIKR sectors that employ industrial control systems: Cross-Sector Roadmap 2-2 Document Revision 3.0

14 Increased Connectivity. Today s ICSs are being increasingly connected to company enterprise systems that rely on common operating platforms and are accessible through the Internet. Even though these changes improve operability, they also create serious vulnerabilities because improvements in the security features of control systems are not concurrent. Interdependencies. Due to the high degree of interdependency among infrastructure sectors, failures within one sector can spread into others. A successful cyber attack might be able to take advantage of these interdependencies to produce cascading impacts and amplify the overall economic damage. Complexity. The demand for real-time information-sharing and control has increased system complexity in several ways: access to ICSs is being granted to more users, business and control systems are interconnected, and the degree of interdependency among infrastructures has increased. Dramatic differences in the training and concerns of those in charge of IT systems and those responsible for control system operations have led to challenges in coordinating network security between these two key groups. Legacy Systems. Although older legacy ICSs may operate in more independent modes, they tend to have inadequate password policies and security administration, no data protection mechanisms, and protocols that are prone to snooping, interruption, and interception. These insecure legacy systems have long service lives and will remain vulnerable for years to come unless these problems are mitigated. System Access. Even limited connection to the Internet exposes control systems to all of the inherent vulnerabilities of interconnected computer networks, including viruses, worms, hackers, and terrorists. Control channels that use wireless or leased lines that pass through commercial telecommunications facilities may also provide minimal protection against forgery of data or control messages. These issues are of particular concern in industries that rely on interconnected enterprise and control networks with remote access from within or outside the company. Offshore Reliance. Many software, hardware, and control system manufacturers are under foreign ownership or develop systems in countries whose interests do not always align with those of the United States. Also of concern is the practice of contracting control systems support, service, and maintenance to third parties located in foreign countries. Information Availability. Manuals and training videos on control systems are publicly available and many hacker tools can now be downloaded from the Internet and applied with limited system knowledge. Attackers do not have to be experts in control operations. A more in-depth description of typical ICSs and their vulnerabilities and currently available general security enhancements can be found on the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US- CERT) Control System website at and the soon to be completed National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication , Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security, Recommendations of the National Institute of Standards and Technology. 4 4 See Section 6: References Cross-Sector Roadmap 2-3 Document Revision 3.0

15 A FRAMEWORK FOR SECURING CONTROL SYSTEMS Protecting industrial control systems is a formidable challenge requiring a comprehensive approach that addresses the urgent security concerns of today s systems while preparing for the needs of tomorrow. Asset owners and operators must understand and manage cyber risks, secure their legacy systems, apply security tools and practices, and consider new control system architectures all within a competitive business environment. Government has a large stake in the process because infrastructure sectors are critical to national security and have interdependencies that could result in cascading impacts during a cyber attack or event. Still, cybersecurity enhancements must compete with other investment priorities, and many executives find it difficult to justify security expenditures without a strong business case. Sector specific roadmaps play an essential role in supporting the national strategy to articulate the essential goals for improving control system security and to align and integrate the efforts of industry and government to achieve those goals. This roadmap is structured around a framework of establishing a vision, defining top-level goals aimed at achieving that vision, and then identifying the challenges associated with the goals. Actions are then identified that, if implemented and successful, will address the challenges and assist in meeting the goals; a key set of these actions are identified as priorities. Finally, a set of milestones are selected from within the priorities and tied to dates so that progress towards achieving the goals can be monitored and measured. The various individual CIKR sectors control systems in total constitute a larger system of systems. Although they operate independently, their interdependencies typically express important emergent properties and critical dependencies. The system of systems approach incorporates the interactions of technology, policy, and economics in a general process including design, complexity and systems engineering, and modeling. These systems of systems typically exhibit the behaviors of complex systems with combinations of traits such as: Operational Independence of Elements Managerial Independence of Elements Evolutionary Development Emergent Behavior Geographical Distribution of Elements Inter-disciplinary Study Heterogeneity of Systems Networks of Systems The first five traits are known as Maier s criteria for identifying system of systems challenges. The remaining three traits have been proposed from the study of mathematical implications of modeling and analyzing system of systems challenges. This CIKR sector system of systems is very similar to the concept of a sustainable community where each individual system is optimized in relation to the entire community system, resulting in increased robustness, survivability, and resiliency. A similar concept is potentially applicable to the securing of control systems within the CIKR sector system of systems. Cross-Sector Roadmap 2-4 Document Revision 3.0

16 VISION The vision of the ICSJWG Roadmap Working Group is: Within 10 years, control systems throughout the CIKR sectors and Federal Partners will be able to operate securely, robustly, and resiliently; and be protected at a level commensurate with risk. Control systems throughout the CIKR sectors and Federal Partners will be able to operate with no loss of critical function in vital applications during and after a cyber event without impacting the overall mission of the facility. This roadmap is envisioned to serve as an initial framework and mechanism to provide asset owners/operators, vendors, and the Federal government with goals, recommendations, and guidelines focused on enhancing control systems security to a level at which each Sector is able to mitigate cybersecurity problems in a cost effective manner relative to the risk. CONTROL SYSTEMS SECURITY GOALS Today s ICSs have become an essential element in the management of complex processes and production environments. The risk of exploitation by physical or cyber means with the intent to cause harm is real and can have negative impacts on an asset owner s business, public safety, the environment, and national security. Asset owners within the nation s CIKR must understand and manage this risk by securing their installed systems, conducting vulnerability assessments, applying security tools and practices, and considering security as they procure and install next-generation systems. Even though the majority of CIKR assets are owned and operated by private industry or local governments, the Federal government has a large stake in this effort because the consequences of these risks could have negative impacts on society and national security. Attention to ICSs cybersecurity has been increasing over the past several years. Therefore, based on this raising of awareness and lessons learned in the development of other sector roadmaps, three goals have been selected as the guiding objectives of this roadmap. These goals are structured after rather classical security models that measure and assess, protect, detect, defend (detain or eliminate as may be required), recover, build-in security (rather than attaching it as an after-thought), and provide continual improvement. These goals encompass technical, programmatic, management, and cultural achievements, and help to facilitate a partnership between asset owners, ICSs vendors, and regulators to make security an integral part of the specified and produced systems. The following list briefly describes each goal: Measure and assess security posture. Implied in the successful use of any roadmap is knowing where you are, or in the case of the ICSJWG Roadmap, knowing the current state of your security posture. Therefore, as part of the ICSJWG Roadmap, a tool and methodology are provided in order to give this capability to every sector that employs industrial control systems. Develop and integrate protective measures. As security problems are identified or anticipated, protective measures will be developed and applied to reduce system vulnerabilities, system threats, and their consequences. Appropriate security solutions will be devised by the sector, as well as vendors and R&D organizations outside the sector. However, the application of security solutions to legacy systems will be constrained by the inherent limitations of existing equipment and configurations. As legacy systems age, they will be replaced or upgraded with next-generation control system components and architectures that offer built-in, end-to-end security. This replacement will typically not be driven solely by security-related concerns. A practical goal is to encourage R&D into tying legacy systems into upcoming security solutions. Cross-Sector Roadmap 2-5 Document Revision 3.0

17 Detect intrusion and implement response strategies. Cyber intrusion tools are becoming sophisticated to the degree that any system vulnerability can become exposed to emerging threats. More effective and sophisticated exploits are more common now with less sophisticated adversaries launching them (e.g., script kiddies, rootkits, etc.) Within 10 years, CIKR Sectors will be operating networks that automatically provide contingency and remedial actions in response to attempted intrusions. Maintaining aggressive and proactive cybersecurity of ICSs over the long term will require a strong and enduring commitment of resources, clear incentives, and close collaboration among stakeholders. Over the next 10-years, CIKR Sector owners and operators will collaborate within the sector, across sectors, and with government to remove barriers to progress and create policies that accelerate a sustained advancement in securing their ICSs by continuously reiterating on the above three goals. 4 Cross-Sector Roadmap 2-6 Document Revision 3.0

18 3. CHALLENGES AND MILESTONES This section addresses the challenges facing control system security, the priorities that need to be addressed, and the goals selected to guide the efforts to improve the cybersecurity posture of individual asset owners. It also describes the selected milestones established to support the implementation of the goals. CHALLENGES FOR SECURING CONTROL SYSTEMS Challenges to cybersecurity consist not only of the direct risk factors that increase the probability of a successful attack and the severity of the consequences but also of those factors that limit the ability to implement ideal security enhancements. Risk is defined as the potential for an unwanted outcome resulting from an incident, event, or occurrence, as determined by its likelihood and the associated consequences. The three components of risk are: threat - defined as a natural or manmade occurrence, individual, entity, or action that has or indicates the potential to harm life, information, operations, the environment, and/or property; vulnerability - which is a physical feature or operational attribute that renders an entity open to exploitation or susceptible to a given hazard; and consequences - also known as the effect of an event, incident, or occurrence. o Evaluating consequences: The consequences of a cyber attack may involve impacts to confidentiality, integrity, or availability (CIA) of a control system or its data: Confidentiality impacts involve the unauthorized disclosure of information. This might involve sensitive information such as descriptions or data of control system operations, facility processes, or system security. Integrity impacts involve the loss of control over system operation or the data being used by the control system. A loss of integrity can involve the unauthorized modification, insertion, or destruction of data or controlling software. Availability impacts involve the ability of a control system to perform its function as needed. Loss of availability can arise from a denial or disruption of communications or inability of the control system to perform its designed function. The direct risk challenges include: the threat (those who seek to attack and compromise cyber system); the means of attack (which relies on taking advantage of system vulnerabilities); Cross-Sector Roadmap 3-1 Document Revision 3.0

19 the nature of the system attacked (such as the age and configuration of the system); the value of the systems; and how loss of control impacts the interaction with humans, property, and the environment. Challenges related to the implementation of security enhancements include organizational, institutional, economic, and technical factors that either limit the availability of security solutions, or increase the difficulty of implementing the optimum security enhancements. Many of these security challenges have been discussed and tabulated over the past 10 years. An example would be getting wholesale, self-motivated buy-in by the people within utilities charged with cybersecurity and encouraging/motivating companies in the sector to include implementation of cybersecurity solutions and reaching the goals in the roadmaps as part of performance reviews of the designated humans involved. MILESTONES FOR SECURING CONTROL SYSTEMS The challenges in securing control systems are minimized or overcome through the achievment of security milestones. Often these milestones begin as a simple reversal of the challenge. For example, Challenges lack of knowledge, limited standards, limited capabilities, and need for a business case lead to milestones of enhancing training, improving standards, and enhancing capabilities, and the development and use of risk analysis, respectively. A brief summary of milestone development followed by a graphical depiction of the challenges and milestones for each goal are presented below. An important part of the performance management process used to meet milestones is the setting and evaluation of SMART objectives. They are the link to overall performance and provide clear and precise measures of what is required of participants and by when. Performance objectives should relate directly to overall priorities and objectives to ensure that efforts are focused on helping the overall program meets its targets. SMART means: Specific Measurable Achievable Relevant Time-bound Describes an observable action or the end state which can be seen when the performance objective has been achieved. In other words, what specifically is to be accomplished? Quantifiable criteria for evaluating the accomplishment of the objective. In other words, how much? Determine the methods, timing and tools used to arrive at the measurement. Describes a result that can be realistically achieved even though the objective may be challenging. Directly aligned to the program priorities and objectives. Indicates the time schedule or deadline for achieving the performance objective. In other words, by when? CHALLENGES AND MILESTONES FOR GOAL 1: MEASURE AND ASSESS SECURITY POSTURE Goal 1 suggests that each participating CIKR execute a methodology such as the one outlined in Section 4: Sector Cybersecurity Posture. Although there are many methodologies, training programs, standards, and accepted industry practices to understand and measure risk (comprised of vulnerabilities, consequences, and threats) and other technical factors that could contribute to a composite measurement of cybersecurity posture, the ICSJWG Roadmap has taken a more high-level programmatic approach to Cross-Sector Roadmap 3-2 Document Revision 3.0

20 determining cybersecurity posture. The ICSJWG Roadmap represents the consensus of those who have contributed to its making as one method to holistically and effectively measure cybersecurity posture. While the ICSJWG Roadmap outlines a means to overcome some of the current challenges to the precise quantification of cybersecurity postures, there is clear recognition that these challenges won t go away and must be addressed. There is general agreement that while many challenges remain, the CIKR Sector and hence the Nation are best served by providing even a high-level assessment today as we transition to a more mature and quantifiable process tomorrow. Currently, asset owners and operators can have difficulty obtaining necessary inventories of their critical assets and associated ICSs. Also, an understanding of the risk (threats, vulnerabilities and consequences) of a cyber attack is often inadequate. The growing number of nodes and access points has made identifying vulnerabilities more complex. Many industry practices exist for ICS risk measurement, metrics, and measuring tools do exist and are reflected by many standards, metrics, and specifications across the sector, but there is no industry consensus on even the most basic notion of how to measure cybersecurity. However, tools, methods and standards for measuring security are essential to assessing the security/risk of these increasingly complex control systems and all of their components and links. CHALLENGES: Understanding Risk Inventory of critical assets, their associated ICSs, and the risk of cyberattacks are often not adequately known or understood Knowledge and understanding of risk, including threat, vulnerability, defense, and consequence analysis capabilities across CIKR sectors are limited Cybersecurity risk factors are neither widely understood nor commonly accepted by technologists and managers Security vulnerability assessments (SVA), ideally supplemented with an external SVA, are needed to determine the consequences of specific cybersecurity compromises of ICSs o The DHS developed Cybersecurity Evaluation Tool (CSET) provides one way for users to perform a security vulnerability assessment Developing a Sector-Wide understanding of the cybersecurity posture Physical Issues Physical and electronic isolation (air gap) of many facilities may provide a false sense of security from a broad range of advance persistent threats Measuring Risk Metrics, Standards, Quantifications Cybersecurity threats are difficult if not impossible to quantify, but quantified values are required for quantified risk estimation. Sometimes only a qualitative understanding of threat is available and hence, only an impact style evaluation can be developed. In these cases the development of the consequences and vulnerabilities are needed. Current standards for assessment of cyber vulnerabilities must be chosen carefully Many existing standards lack meaningful and measurable specification relating to ICSs cybersecurity Consistent metrics are necessary but not always readily available to measure and assess cybersecurity status Metrics to quantify cybersecurity and/or improvements over time and across the sector are needed but not available MILESTONES: Near-Term Cross-Sector Roadmap 3-3 Document Revision 3.0

21 There are two components to the first near-term milestone. The first component will focus on the deployment and adoption of the Cybersecurity Posture Assessment tool which includes the use of the Cybersecurity Evaluation Tool (CSET) for ICS security vulnerability assessments. The second component (on a parallel track) will focus on the establishment of common metrics for benchmarking ICSs risk through CIKR Sectors; the integration of security into operation plans; and the dissemination of accepted ICSs standards and guidelines that enable the tools and metrics to be effectively deployed. Mid-Term Mid-term milestones involve the implementation and use of automated assessment tools in ICSs and the development of real-time security assessment capabilities for new and legacy systems. These milestones also involve sector-wide dissemination of training programs and recommended guidelines, in conjunction with the CSET which will continue to assist and improve capabilities of asset owners and operators in performing cybersecurity self-assessments against cybersecurity vulnerabilities. However, most facilities still require guidance and support to use these tools. Long-Term The long-term milestone associated with this goal helps to institutionalize the practice of ICSs risk assessment with the development and implementation of fully automated security state monitors and response systems in most ICSs networks, and the practice of actively measuring performance and benchmarking with other sectors. GCC and SCC can develop more specific and accurate understandings of the Sector s security posture and reflect this in the annual update to the SSP. Due Date: Near Term (0-2 years) Adopt and use the Cybersecurity Posture Assessment tool Integration of security into all operational plans Development of common risk assessment metrics and standards Development of automated tools to assess cybersecurity and compliance with pertinent regulations Implementation of risk assessment tools throughout the CIKR Sectors as asset owners and operators begin performing self-assessments Mid Term (2-5 years) Implementation of training programs throughout the CIKR Sectors on the control system security recommended guidelines Integration of control system security education, awareness, and outreach programs into CIKR Sector operations Implementation of standardized or consistent risk assessment tools throughout the CIKR Sectors Long Term (5-10 years) Development of fully automated security state monitors in most control systems networks Industry-wide active assessment of ICS security profiles including benchmarks against other sectors Cross-Sector Roadmap 3-4 Document Revision 3.0

22 CHALLENGES AND MILESTONES FOR GOAL 2: DEVELOP AND INTEGRATE PROTECTIVE SOLUTIONS Goal 2 calls for actionable efforts, when security vulnerabilities are identified and security postures assessed, to implement and apply protective solutions as well as developing new solutions to reduce system vulnerabilities, system threats, and their consequences. Periodic nondestructive testing of control systems should be implemented to verify that the systems, as designed, installed, and maintained, are effective in detecting, isolating, and automatically responding to cyber attacks. For legacy systems, protective solutions often include the application of proven best practices and security tools, procedures and patches for fixing known security flaws, training programs for staff at all levels, and retrofit security technologies that do not degrade system performance. As these legacy systems age, they will be replaced or upgraded with next-generation control system components and architectures that offer built-in end-to-end security. Many ICSs have poorly designed connections between control systems and enterprise networks, use unauthenticated command and control data, and do not use adequate access control for remote access points. For example, the widespread use of wireless communication and remote access has opened up additional vulnerabilities that need to be mitigated with secure and cost efficient systems and components. In some cases, access control capability is available for ICSs, however, it may not have been enabled or implemented properly (e.g., by using the default vendor passwords or allowing sharing of passwords). In addition, security improvements for legacy systems are limited by the existing equipment and architectures that may not be able to accept security upgrades without degrading performance, which indicates that R&D should be encouraged to do more to improve the access control security of legacy systems. CHALLENGES Access Issues (open environments, remote access, multiple access points) Widespread and continuous connectivity of IT and ICSs, and generally, with remote access by multiple parties or devices Many ICSs have remote access points without appropriate or adequate access control Many ICSs have been designed, built, and operated within open communication environments Existing ICSs have numerous access points, use default vendor accounts/passwords/ shared passwords, and have poor firewall implementation Many ICSs operate using unauthenticated command and control data Basic security features are often not enabled on ICSs The complexity of ICSs increases exponentially with an increase in the number of nodes. The use of COTS greatly increases the risk of an ICSs Legacy Upgrade and Patch Management Issues The unavailability of patch management that conforms to a 24/7 operating environment with extended vulnerability windows and without regularly scheduled maintenance opportunities Older operating platform (legacy and hybrid) systems may have limited or no vendor support, thus limiting their ability to secure the system Security upgrades are hard to retrofit to legacy ICSs, may be costly, and may degrade system performance, thus lessening incentives to upgrade those systems Cross-Sector Roadmap 3-5 Document Revision 3.0

23 MILESTONES Near-Term Near-term milestones for this goal involve the development of control system protection guidelines that assist in ensuring existing access controls are properly implemented and enabled. These guidelines should be disseminated widely throughout all CIKR Sectors, along with additional training materials regarding cyber and physical security for control systems. Also during this time, mechanisms should be established for sharing information between asset owners and operators and vendors to develop improved protection tools. Lastly, security patches for common vulnerabilities should be developed, implemented and widely distributed among asset owners and operators. Mid-Term Mid-term milestones focus on the implementation of new protective tools as well as securing the interfaces between ICSs and business systems. This includes securing connections between remote access points and control centers. The milestones also call for training programs to support proper use and protocol for these new tools and systems. Training courses for asset owners and operators should continuously be developed and updated to help increase awareness and facilitate culture shifts in ICSs security practices. Ideally, there should be a forum within the ICSJWG putting asset owners and vendors together to describe what s needed based on the recommended practices and what s possible in the short and long term regarding actual solutions. Because the application of control systems varies across sectors, the sector should identify, publish, and disseminate recommended practices regarding control system security. These recommendations should cover such diverse topics as securing connectivity with business networks and for providing physical and cybersecurity for remote facilities. Long-Term The long-term milestone for Goal 2 focuses on securing the integration of ICSs to any external system as well as the installation of cyber resilient ICSs architectures that have built-in security and use systems and components that are secure-by-design. Due Date: Near Term (0-2 years) Development of control system protection guidelines for existing ICSs Development and implementation of security patches for legacy systems Establishment of mechanisms to enhance information sharing between asset owners and operators and vendors Development of guidance and education material associated with applicable project regulations Development of guidelines to secure or isolate ICSs communications from public networks and communication infrastructures Mid Term (2-5 years) Implementation of new protective tools and appropriate training Implementation of secure interfaces between ICSs and business systems Cross-Sector Roadmap 3-6 Document Revision 3.0

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