TECHNICAL SYSTEMS AND TECHNICAL PROGRESS: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Miguel A. Quintanilla, University of Salamanca

THEORIES OF SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS

After more than twenty years, discussions on the truthlikeness of
scientific theories, initiated in the seventies, have not, in my opinion, arrived
at final conclusions; but they have contributed positively to improving our
comprehension of scientific progress. Niiniluoto s (1984) contribution is
especially useful to define what we may call the kernel of the current standard
view of scientific progress. This can be summarized in the following thesis:

1) The goal of science is the enlargement of scientific knowledge.
2) Scientific knowledge is characterized by a double dimension:
information content and truth value.
3) In order to characterize scientific progress as increase in
knowledge, a good strategy is to define some truthlikeness or
"similarity to the truth" function including both dimensions,
information content and truth value.

On this common basis, very different theories of scientific progress
can be defined. The differences affect the epistemic or objective construction
of truth and truthlikeness concepts, the realist or instrumentalist view of
scientific theories, and the global or local character of scientific progress.

Niiniluoto's (1984) theory is an objective, realist, and local theory of
scientific progress. Quintanilla's (1982) proposal has a more methodological
or epistemic character, but it is consistent with a realist construction of the
truth concept and with a global conception of scientific progress. Zamora's
(1996) theory has the same features, and he offers a formalization of
truthlikeness that is, in my opinion, one of the most promising proposals
made from a methodological point of view.

In discussions on truthlikeness and scientific progress, there is an issue
that has not always been emphasized, though, in my opinion, it is very
important. It is the distinction between two possible approaches to the
concept of progress: the purely cumulative approach and the teleological one.

A process in a system is characterized by a change in the value of at
least one proper variable, and it is defined as progressive if the variation of
that variable is a monotonically increasing function of time (Bunge, 1977). If
a process is teleologically progressive, then the time function describing it will
have a limit. Therefore we will say that a process is cumulatively but not
teleologically progressive if the time function describing it does not have a
definite limit.

In Quintanilla (1982) I suggested that one of the problems affecting
many formalizations of truthlikeness is that they are inspired by a
teleological view of scientific progress.

A way to appreciate the differences between cumulative and
teleological views of scientific progress is to declare what we are expected to
accept, in each case, if we claim that a given scientific contribution means
progress. Indeed, in scientific research, when a new theory is appraised as a
valuable contribution, as true progress in scientific knowledge, what is assumed
is either that, after having accepted it, we know somewhat more than we
knew before, or that we know it better (with more depth, etc.). At the same
time, we also accept that, as a result of this new contribution, new problems
will emerge but also new possibilities to study and find solutions for those
problems. So all scientific progress generates at the same time an increase of
both our knowledge and our ignorance, as Popper (1963) claimed. But nobody
should be worried by this: after every step in the development of our
knowledge, we learn that our ignorance is larger than we believed it to be, but
we also learn that we now know something new that was not known before.
This is exactly what (cumulative) progress of knowledge means. In order to
accept that our knowledge is now larger than before, we do not need to
assume that we are closer to the final and complete truth. In fact, we do not
even need to assume that such a complete truth exists. (It would be the God s
eye point of view of metaphysical realism defined by Putnam.) Truthlikeness
functions, like Niiniluoto s, have only local limits (determined by the
complexity of the language in each moment); they do not have a global limit,
since the language of science is neither globally fixed nor finite.

We may illustrate our view of cumulative progress by the graphic
below. In it, the upper line represents the growth of our ignorance; the larger
shadow area represents the growth of our knowledge; and the grey area
represents the number of old beliefs refuted by our new scientific knowledge.
All three sets grow at different rates and without limits.

In what way can this model of scientific progress help us to enhance
our understanding of technological progress?

The notion of technological progress is somewhat more complex
than that of scientific progress. First, it is not clear what the units of
technological change are. Second, the notion of technological progress
generally incorporates not only descriptive but also evaluative elements.
Finally, it is not clear how a function of technological change can be defined
that gives an accurate meaning for the concept of progress in this field.

In what follows we will try to improve the situation and to build up
the kernel of a possible standard theory of technological progress.

2. PROBLEMS IN THE CONCEPT OF TECHNOLOGICAL
PROGRESS

There are three possible views in philosophy of technology. We will
call them cognitive, instrumental, and praxiological views.

According to the cognitive view, technology is a form of science-
based practical knowledge that allows us to design efficient artifacts to solve
practical problems. Technological change is mainly produced through applied
scientific research and the improvement of technological knowledge.
Technical progress consists in the increase of technological knowledge and
depends, to a large extent, on scientific progress.

According to the instrumental view, technology is a set of artifacts
intentionally designed and produced to perform some definite functions and
to satisfy some human necessities. Technological change consists in the
increase of the quantity and variety of artifacts, and technological progress is
defined as a function of the quantity and importance of the human necessities
that can be satisfied by the available technological equipment.

According to the so-called praxiological approach, the basic
technological entities are neither knowledge systems nor sets of artifacts, but
some kind of complex systems formed by the artifacts plus their users or
intentional operators. We can characterize technological systems as action
systems intentionally oriented toward transforming concrete objects in order
to obtain, in an efficient way, a valuable result. Technological change
consists in the design and production of new technical systems and in the
improvement of their efficiency. Technological progress may be interpreted
as an increment of human power to control reality: new and more efficient
technical systems applied to new and larger parts of reality mean higher
capacity to adapt reality to human desires (Quintanilla, 1996).

In the last chapter of Niiniluoto (1984), he proposes some interesting
ideas on technological progress integrating, in some ways, the three views of
the philosophy of technology. Indeed, following an idea of Skolimowski
(1966), Niiniluoto compares scientific and technological progress in these
terms:

Activities can be appraised by evaluating how "good" results they
produce. Therefore, scientific progress has to be defined by the
increase that new theories contribute to human knowledge how much
new information they give and how close to the true this information
is. Technological progress has to be defined by the ability of new
tools to perform effectively their intended function or use. While
scientific progress is measured by epistemic utilities (such as truth,
information content, truthlikeness, explanatory power, simplicity),
technological progress is measured by technological utilities
(effectiveness relative to a given practical purpose (p. 260).

Then Niiniluoto points out the fact that, in different technological
areas, there may be different standards of technical efficiency, and that
different groups of persons can give different weight to the different
technological values or utilities. This could explain the existence of
"alternative technologies" and phenomena of inconmensurability (� la Kuhn)
in the area of technology:

Given a set of technological utilities and their weights, we may
speak of an unambiguous sense of progress in the development of
farm tractors, locomotives, semiconductors, computers, etc.
However, when two groups of people disagree on these utilities (e.g.,
on the weight given to sideeffects that are harmful to the natural and
social environment), their evaluations become "incommensurable."
Thus the conflict between "alternative technologies" can be reduced
to the existence of rival frameworks or "paradigms" in the Kuhnian
sense (p. 261).

Niiniluoto's point of view, in these texts, seems like a mixture of the
two views that I have named instrumental and praxiological: the units of
technological change are the artifacts, but the criterion of progress is their
effectiveness, or efficiency, in performing their intended function. But the
artifacts may have different functions, and their assessment depends on
technological contexts and on the interests of different groups of users.
Consequently, we could try to define, at best, a kind of local or contextual
measure of progress but no measure of global technological progress.

It is easy to realize that the situation here is in some way similar to
but worse than the case of scientific progress. Truthlikeness functions were
context-dependent, but they could be defined in an objective and general way.
In the case of technological progress, however, subjective value judgments
seem to be unavoidable, so that any possible concept of technological
progress will be not only local-context-dependent but also limited to
subjective interests, and thus forever controversial.

I believe nevertheless that, if the praxiological point of view is
consistently assumed, it may be possible to define an objective and general
concept of technological progress, similar in nature to the concept of
scientific progress that truthlikeness measures allow us to use. For this we will
need a more precise notion of a technical system.

3. THE STRUCTURE OF TECHNICAL SYSTEMS

The intuitive idea underlying the notion of a technical system is that
an artifact, together with its user and the materials whose transformation is
intended, constitute a technical system. For example, a domestic washing
machine is an artifact; the dirty clothes, the water, the soap and the electric
energy are the inputs that are needed so that the machine operates; but there
is also required at least one intentional agent (the user) to switch on the
machine, to introduce the clothes and the soap into it, and to select the
program to perform. The set 'machine+materials+user'is this technical
system.

A technical system, ST = < C, A, O, R>, is characterized by its
components C, the set A of processes and interactions that constitute its
structure, the objectives O intended for the system, and the results R that are
effectively achieved. Among the components C there must be a subset of
intentional agents (the users or operators of the system), that conceive of
the set O of objectives and perform the subset of actions needed for the
control and management of the system.

Each technical system is an individual specific entity. But a lot of
equivalence relations among the objectives, components, structures, and
results of technical systems can be defined. Any class of equivalent technical
systems defines a technique in an extensional way: for example, the set of all
the technical systems able to wash five kilos of dirty clothes using an
electrical motor, a programmer, hot water and detergent would constitute the
extension of the concept of a "domestic automatic washing technology."

The distinction between objectives and results of a technique is
essential. We can define the objectives as the set of states of things that the
operation of the system is intended to produce, and the results as the set of
states of things that the operation of the system actually produces. For any
technical system it is assumed that both sets can be defined and eventually
measured in an objective and independent way. This means that their
description does not depend on any subjective appraisal of their interest or
importance for the user. In practice it is possible that different users give
different importance to each one of the objectives and results of a technical
system. For example it can be very important for one user that the washing
machine use little water and little electrical energy, while for another user the
most important thing will be that the clothes become thoroughly white, the
quantity of water and soap needed remaining as secondary goals. But in any
case both users can agree on the objective description (not the appraisal) of
goals and results.

The fitness of goals and results of a system has to do with the two
basic notions that we use to appraise technological progress: the notion of
effectiveness or efficacy and the notion of efficiency.

4. EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY

In spite of the importance that effectiveness and efficiency have for
technology, it is not usual to find philosophical elucidations of these
concepts. Bunge (1989) and Quintanilla (1989, 1996) are exceptions.

The effectiveness or efficacy of a technique can be understood as the
degree to which the set O of intended goals is included in the set R of the
actually obtained results. The degree of effectiveness can be measured
therefore as the ratio of actually obtained to intended objectives, that is to
say:

F = |O R|/|O|.

However, an action can be extremely effective, but not very efficient.
Usually efficiency is understood either in thermodynamic or in economic
terms. The thermodynamic efficiency of an engine is defined as a ratio of the
energy converted into useful work relative to the total amount of energy
consumed. This concept of efficiency can not be directly generalized for any
technical system, because as Skolimowski and Niiniluoto note, the efficiency
of a system is not always measured in terms of energy transformations.

The notion of economic efficiency seems to solve this problem.
Indeed the economic efficiency of an action can be calculated as the ratio of
the value of the results produced to the cost of the action carried out to
produce them. The problem in this case is that, calculated this way, the
efficiency of a technical system will depend on an economic value (for
example, the market price of the production factors and of the produced
goods) depending not on technology but on subjective appraisals or external
conditions of a social or economic nature.

To solve these problems, we (Quintanilla, 1989) proposed the
following concept of technical efficiency:
E=|O R|/|O R|.

In this equation, a maximum effectiveness may be consistent with a
low degree of efficiency. (Recall the expression "killing flies with
sledgehammers." Other meaningful examples might be combating plagues
with DDT, winning wars with atomic bombs, or maybe producing electric
energy with nuclear power stations.) As a rule, the efficiency of a system
will increase as its effectiveness does, but it will also increase if there is
stricter agreement between its results and its intended objectives, and if
superfluous or unwanted results decrease.

The main advantages of this definition are the following:

1. It can be applied to any type of objects and results of an action
or system.
2. It allows us to compute the efficiency value of an action or a
system, independent of values (economic, social, moral, etc.) assigned to
its objectives or results.

3. It is possible to calculate the efficiency of actions or systems
that are not thoroughly effective.

4. For a thoroughly effective system, if the cost of the actions is
included in the value of unwanted results (R - O), the value of economic
efficiency may be derived from that of technical efficiency.

5. For a thoroughly effective system, whose objectives and results are
characterized only in terms of energy consumption and use, technical
efficiency is equivalent to thermodynamic efficiency.

5. TWO DIMENSIONS OF TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS

In philosophy of technology, the concept of efficiency plays a role
similar to that which the concept of truth plays in philosophy of science. We
judge scientific theories by their truth value, and technological systems by
their efficiency. In a given technological context, an increase in the
efficiency of a technical system can easily be interpreted as an increase in the
human capacity to ensure that the reality to which the system is applied
behaves in agreement with human goals. Therefore a measure of the
efficiency of technical systems could be interpreted as an objective, value free
(although local-context-dependent) measure.

However, the interpretation of technical progress as an increase of
human capacity to ensure that reality behaves in agreement with our
desires as is presented, for example, by Ortega y Gasset (1939) in his
Meditaci�n de la t�cnica, seems to go beyond the simple truth that, in any
technological environment, it is always possible to obtain better and better
results. In fact technical progress is related not only with the efficiency but
also with the enlargement of technical systems.

There is here a parallelism with the notion of scientific progress as
explained through the concept of verisimilitude: it means not only an
increase of the truth value of our knowledge, but also of its information
content, richness, and depth. Something similar happens with the notion of
technological progress: it implies not only an increase in the efficiency of
technical systems but also a continuous amplification of their extension. This
second dimension of technological change is quite well represented by the
notion of radical innovation.

In technical literature an innovation is the result of transforming a
technical invention into a good with economic value. Two kinds of
innovations are usually distinguished, according to their importance:
incremental and radical. Another common distinction is that between product
and process innovations (changes in the form of producing something and
changes in the nature of the thing produced). The most radical innovations
are usually product innovations. If they are successful, they give the most
competitive advantage to the industrial firms that introduce them. They
consist in creating a new type of technical product, which implies that they
extend the sphere of technical intervention to a new part of reality.

I believe, then, that we should conceive technological development as
a process that has a double dimension: efficiency and innovation. A
normative theory of technological progress (something like a methodology
for technological development) should include two principles: the principle of
efficiency and the innovation principle. The principle of efficiency
recommends getting progressively more efficient technical systems. The
innovation principle recommends enlarging the realm of technical systems to
cover ever more kinds and parts of reality.

There are in principle several possible ways to measure technological
progress. We have already seen how an objective measure of technical
efficiency can be built. The degree of innovation could also be measured as a
distance between given states of things and intended states of things sought as
a result of the application of the new technical system. Finally, here as in the
case of truthlikeness, a measure of technological progress can be devised that
combines both dimensions.

With all these elements,what we will call the kernel of a standard
theory of technological progress could be defined. Its main theses would be
the following:
1. The objective of a technology is to increase the human power to
control and to create a reality.

2. Technological development is characterized by a double dimension:
innovation and efficiency.

3. To characterize technical progress as an increase of human power
over reality, a good strategy would consist in defining some function of
technological progress that combines innovation and efficiency.

6. TECHNOLOGICAL AND MORAL PROGRESS

Contrary to the theory of scientific progress, the theory of
technological progress can not avoid value questions moral, economic, social,
etc. The reason is very clear. On one hand, the selection of the objectives of
a technical system is an essential component of its definition. On the other
hand, the practical consequences of opting for some or other objectives will
not only affect the innovation level and technical efficiency that we can
reach, but the material conditions of human life a well.

In fact, this is one of the most radical differences between science and
technology: science itself does not create moral problems, because it does not
directly affect the life of people; but technology does. This is so because, as
Vega (1997) points out, science consists in epistemic actions that do not alter
the real world, while technology involves actions that do.

Now, in connection with the moral dimensions of technological
development, there are two types of questions: questions relative to the
influence of moral values on technological development; and questions
relative to the influence of technological values on moral development.

Questions of the first type for example, moral limits on the
development of certain biological technologies, are generally most popular.
However, questions of the second type are conceptually much more
interesting and problematic. The increase of technological possibilities
sometimes brings not only radical changes in the design of moral codes and
criteria of evaluation, but also in such other value systems as the economy,
art, and religion. The theory of technological progress should not be
interpreted as a theory of moral progress, but if we advance in the
understanding of technological progess, we will also understand the moral
problems of technology better.