James S. Robbins: Nuclear lessons in Ukraine

While the lopsided vote on the Crimean referendum on joining the Russian Federation was under way, pro-Putin news anchor Dmitry Kiselyov hosted a segment on Rossiya 1 news channel in which he graphically showed how Russia is capable of turning the United States into "radioactive dust."

This came two weeks after Russia tested a new intercontinental ballistic missile. The explicit message from Moscow was that nuclear diplomacy is alive and well, and that any debate about Western intervention in the crisis will have to factor in the possibility of Armageddon.

Russia's implicit nuclear threats are particularly grating to Ukrainians. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Ukraine inherited part of Moscow's nuclear arsenal and overnight became the world's third-ranked nuclear power. America and other countries believed this was highly destabilizing, and Ukraine was pressed to give up its nuclear weapons in exchange for billions in assistance.

This helped Ukraine stabilize its economy in the wake of the Soviet meltdown; and anyway in those heady, immediate post-Cold War days, strategists questioned the value of large nuclear arsenals. If there were no more enemies, who was there to deter? In 1994, Ukraine became a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and Russia, Britain and the U.S. signed the Budapest Memorandum guaranteeing Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The United States then set about spending millions to destroy Ukraine's nuclear weapons.

Paltry promises

The problem with Ukraine trading its most potent weapons for Russia's promise of good behavior is now evident. Kiev gave up its means of deterring Russian aggression. Now, Ukraine is overmatched in conventional forces and would have difficulty fighting off a Russian incursion.

Russia, on the other hand, has both the conventional force edge and escalation dominance. No matter what happens on the battlefield, Russia can always threaten the nuclear option.

Washington is in a weak position to extend the U.S. nuclear deterrence umbrella over Ukraine. The Obama administration has pursued a nuclear "global zero" strategy, seeking to eliminate nuclear weapons and hoping other countries will follow.

This has led to three destabilizing mistakes: Drastically reducing U.S. nuclear capabilities to the point where their deterrent value is questionable; abandoning planned missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic, in favor of a program that significantly reduces the U.S. ability to defend NATO allies and partners from missile attacks; and legitimizing the recent Russian nuclear buildup and modernization under the flawed 2010 New START Treaty.

The White House now is learning that the Cold War might be long over, but the rules of deterrence have not changed.

Cold War rules

Kiev might want to turn back the clock. A few days ago, former Ukrainian foreign minister Vladimir Ogryzko recommended pulling out of the non-proliferation treaty and re-nuclearizing Ukraine, saying this would be "the only measure which could secure (Ukraine's) security." He might be right, but Kiev is on borrowed time. If Moscow mounts a large scale military intervention to reinstall ousted Ukrainian leader Viktor Yanukovych, re-nuclearizing will be off the table. The issue then will not be nuclear strategy, but whether Ukrainian freedom fighters will mount an insurgency as they did when Ukraine was reoccupied by the Soviet Union after World War II.

The Ukraine crisis carries nuclear lessons for the rest of the world. For states pursuing nuclear capability, such as Iran, the message is to press on. For states with rudimentary nuclear capability, such as North Korea, the lesson is to build up. For those with healthy arsenals, India and Pakistan, it is never disarm. For states that could quickly achieve nuclear status if they wanted to, say Japan, the message is to give nuclear weapons serious consideration.

And for America, the message is to give up the quixotic quest for "global zero," build up missile defenses and modernize the U.S. nuclear force. To live in the 21st century, the United States will need to relearn the lessons of the 20th.

James S. Robbins, author of Native Americans: Patriotism, Exceptionalism and the New American Identity, is a member of USA TODAY's Board of Contributors.

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James S. Robbins: Nuclear lessons in Ukraine

While the lopsided vote on the Crimean referendum on joining the Russian Federation was under way, pro-Putin news anchor Dmitry Kiselyov hosted a segment on Rossiya 1 news channel in which he