No phrase is
more over-used by politicians and the private sector than “with the
benefit of hindsight”. From the public sector, it
is dismissed as an excuse. It is exploited now that rail privatisation has gone
pear-shaped. The reality is that warnings based on hindsight were there for all
who wanted to see. Worse, there were some blessed with foresight who gave warnings
before the ink was dry on the White Paper. Where railways are concerned,
politicians have doggedly ignored the lessons of hindsight.

Pricing

When the
Great War broke out in 1914, railways were sequestrated by government under an
1871 Act.Every item or person
connected to war was carried free. Government froze rail prices, whilst costs
rose 200% due to industrial inflation. After the war, government created a
court of law to control rail charges, costing railways millions.

In 1939, the
Big Four railways were sequestrated for another war - but not 60,000 hauliers.
“As railways were nearly bankrupted last time”, government promised
charges would rise to match inflation [1]. In 1940, government broke its
hindsight-based promise and froze charges 16% above pre-war until 1946. A new
profits ceiling meant over 50% of traffic was carried free [2]. Hauliers
imposed unreasonable price increases. [3] Shipping charges soared 400%.
Industrial prices increased 116%.

In 1948,
ignoring hindsight,government established
a new court of law to fix rail prices. It delayed increases to match inflation
by an aggregate 12 years, and cost British Rail billions.[4] Road transport had
no restraint.

Hindsight
was ignored in 1956, when government froze rail fares - then 43 points below
inflation - but not private sector prices, which were causing inflation. Their
“solution” to the inevitable deficit was an interest bearing loan
of £250m.

Profits

By the end
of the Great War, some railways were near bankruptcy, none was as healthy as
pre-war. Government reneged on its legal obligation under the 1871 Act, to
compensate for excessive unpaid use of railways, and imposed a nominal sum[5].
Under a 1921 Act, it pegged future profits at 1913 levels in perpetuity,
without adjustment for inflation.

In the
Second World War, ignoring hindsight, government replaced its 1913 ceiling on
rail profits by a lower ceiling. Government skimmed millions - in addition to
tax - from railways. Industry profiteered from war contracts[6]. Hauliers made
huge profits from which they funded rapid modernisation after the war.

After 1948, government's objective for
nationalised transport was to break even, “taking one year with
another”. The new law court used this to hold fares & charges below
inflation, deferring break-even to some unspecified future date. In 1952,
Churchill decreed that railways need not cover all costs and investment from
revenue - but retained the meaningless objective in his 1953 Act. Both the main
political parties enforced retention of loss making rural lines without
subsidy[7]. Hindsight would have revealed no industry had been solvent with
such policies. Inevitable losses were attributed to managerial incompetence
when such policies would have bankrupted any industry.

Competition

After the
Great War, government cut working hours for rail staff, but not for competing
road haulage or coastwise shipping. Railways were prevented from undercutting
competitors, who were legally empowered to inspect railway rate books, enabling
them to undercut! Between the wars, government ignored road haulage malpractice
on working hours, over-loading, speeding and maintenance, in contrast to
discriminatory legislation, regulations and pricing control for railways.
Delays in obtaining authority to increase railfreight rates to match costs,
lost revenue. Railways tried repeatedly to secure equality under the law to
road transport, leading finally, to a demand for a “Square Deal” .
It is a myth that war deferred conceding this demand. Government files reveal
that they had no intention of doing so, then, or after the war[8]. The rail
freight rates structure - imposed by government - was designed to subsidise
industry[9] to enable it to compete with imports. Otherwise, government would
have to subsidise industry.

When road
haulage was denationalised in 1953, government ignored the lessons of
hindsight. British Rail remained subject to the mercies of a dilatory law
court, and could not refuse any traffic, however unprofitable - road haulage
was free on both counts. Ministers were urged by The Economist to give equal freedom to BR. It was nine years before BR
freight rates were freed from control by the law court, and even then,
Ministers interfered to protect coastwise shipping for another twenty years.

Organisation

Early
railways were seen as toll roads on which all could place vehicles, the
impracticality of which soon became evident. Whilst the right was preserved for
traffic to be conveyed in privately owned wagons, all haulage was left to
railway companies, which owned the infrastructure.

In 1921,
government, with a 58 Tory majority - merged 120 railways into four “to
end competition”, and preserve insolvent rural lines without subsidy.
During the 1939-45 war, Whitehall
worked on plans for post-war nationalisation, which they saw as inevitable -
irrespective of which Party was in power - given the ruinous financial state
into which government control was driving railways.

In 1948,
railways were nationalised. Ignoring hindsight lessons of effective organisations,
government created an untried centralised organisation under retired civil
servant Lord Hurcomb. Periodically, government tinkered with the organisation,
appointing leaders[10] without railway experience.

In
1993, ignoring hindsight, government - with all the abandon of a D-I-Y novice,
who removes a supporting wall - fragmentedthe structure and reverted to the discredited toll road concept. In
privatisation debates, ministers did not cite Brussels Directive 91/440 to
justify fragmentation, as it merely required separation of accounts - no
different to a conglomerate publishing separate group and subsidiary accounts.
Secretary of State MacGregor said on 2nd February 1993: “Vertical
integration was neither practical nor desirable ....., in a number of cases
.... it is right to allow ..... vertical integration. The Isle
of Wight can be vertically integrated”. Ten days later,
another Minister confirmed, “we do not rule out vertical
franchising”.On 25th May,
MacGregor, said of Select Committee recommendations: “We disagree with
some: the crucial one relates to vertical integration. I cannot go into it, but
there are good arguments on both sides”. On 2nd November, Tory MP Tim
Rathbone was “concerned the franchising director must submit to the Secretary
of State for approval, any proposal for vertically integrated
franchises”.

The
Directive did not require renewals and maintenance to be contracted out to
firms lacking experience of 125 mph railways. Hindsight warned that, whilst
contractors were employed to build early railways, railway managers specified
the materials used, fixed a price and supervised the work. In the 1800s, some
companies contracted out maintenance, but found it was a costly error[11]. If
pre-war privately-owned railways did not contract out, there must have been
sound reasons.

Soon
after railways were wholly in the private sector, newcomers began to find - as
professionals forecast - that 100% reliability was no more likely in respect of
railways, than in any industry. Illusory hindsight was prayed in aid:
“rolling stock and assets were decrepit”. No forecast was given of
this prospect, yet one assumes that newcomers had, at least, travelled by train
and inspected assets.

If
the assets were decrepit, how could newcomers claim to be “sweating the
assets”, “getting more train miles out of rolling stock”?
Under Railtrack, renewals were extended beyond what BR and European railway
engineers considered necessary. The average age of rolling stock is older now
than under BR.[12]

Ex-ministers
claim that problems arising from fragmentation can only be seen with the
benefit of hindsight, and yet lessons of hindsight were ignored. Hansard
records that they were warned, at the time, of the very consequences that have
arisen.

False foresight

Subsidy

Ministers forecast that the subsidy would fall. To
make it easy, they did not set a real challenge by privatising rural routes
first, but prioritised unsubsidised services, giving generous subsidies[13].
Now, ex-Ministers gloat, that some now pay a premium. Until they have repaid
subsidies plus interest, they cannot claim to have matched BR. The east coast route had a
£40m pa profit[14] and should have attracted a £40m premium from
Day One, not a subsidy of £73m. GNER will have cause to boast when they
have repaid past subsidies plus that £40m pa plus interest, and the
premium exceeds £40m - all uplifted for inflation. Even then, their boast
should be tempered with the fact that they want government to fund new rolling stock.
Subsidies increased as operators threatened to pull out or close lines or
stations.

Investment

Ministers forecast a massive inflow of investment.
This was to be from the private sector that invests abroad, where they
transferred production! There was no intention of State funding. Newcomers do
not get value for money, as investment is wasted due to inadequate planning
that led to new trains standing idle because fragmentation eliminated the
liaison that ensured infrastructure was simultaneously modernised. Avoidable
accidents, such as Hatfield, have written off BR investment long before
life-expiry. Railtrack had grants when it was supposed to be self financing,
and taxpayers are funding new rolling stock.

Monopoly

Ministers
claimed that privatisation would end BR’s monopoly. Their predecessors
admitted BR never had a monopoly [15]. Newcomers and the Franchising Director
acknowledged external competition, which had long been obvious to BR.

Economies

Ministers
forecast fewer staff, ignoring regular reports by BR of economies.[16]
contrast, government failed to cut civil service costs [17] the private sector
threw in the towel and transferred production abroad. Hundreds of
non-productive jobs have been created to oversee fragmented railways and settle
disputes over costs, delays, accidents, etc.

Unhindered
by “union power”, BR managers initiated thousands of productivity
schemes that did not provide more pay. Had industry achieved as much, the UK
would not be a net importer. Political hopes were dashed as newcomers exposed
their ignorance, causing train cancellations by ill-conceived and unsustainable
economies. Pay rise policies caused pay-leapfrogging and poaching of staff,
leading to increased training costs. Railtrack badly mishandled its first pay-deal
and caused an avoidable strike that cost BR - still then responsible for
running all trains - an 8% drop in revenue. This proved an ill-wind, when the
lower base became a benchmark to prove expansion under the private sector,
judiciously ignoring recovery from recession!

A
Minister foresaw “private sector staff operating away from the
constraints of the national Rule Book”, which contained not one word that
smacked of demarcation - unlike rule books in industry. It specified safe
methods of operations - when private sector supplied equipment fails or
following accidents. Its development over 150 years, owed much to the only
people in Whitehall
who knew anything about railways - the Minister's Railway Inspectorate! They
must have cringed at his words. His aspirations were ignored or there would
have been even more accidents.

Performance

Ministers
foresaw 100% reliability with privatisation. Hindsight would have told them, as
the private sector did not deliver 100% standards, they were unlikely to do so
on railways. Hope triumphing over hindsight, they put infrastructure in the
hands of the inexpert and trains with those with worse reliability records! One
worrying forecast was that punctuality would be improved by getting drivers to
drive faster. They were unaware that trains were timed to run at the maximum
permitted safe speed of track and rolling stock.

Complaints
were forecast to vanish. As punctuality worsened, complaints soared. This was
“justified” by a rise in passengers [18], which was irrelevant.
Complaints reached 1%: 100 times as many as BR [19]. When this was realised,
the next excuse was that BR never replied to complaints. Had that been so,
annual Reports of ten “watchdog” committees [20], would have
abounded with criticism - they did not. Hansard would have done likewise - it
did not.

For
the first time, the private sector faced bodies whose existence was well
publicised by BR on stations and trains. Complaints included: unprecedented
cancellations and delays, failure to replace cancelled trains by buses, broken
connections, shorter trains and trains missing scheduled calls to make up lost
time. When a student missed an exam because a train failed stop at Gatley near Stockport - First NorthWestern said that it is entitled
to do so to make up time and reduce inconvenience to the majority [21]. The
phone would have been hot from Whitehall
had BR followed this practice. Newcomers adopted private sector euphemisms in
replies to complaints: thanks for “comments” or
“observations”. At least, the word “complaint”
vanished.

Politicians
prophesied faster trains to match France
and Japan.
They were able to cut new routes; five alternative routes for our channel
tunnel link were blocked by NIMBYs and MPs bending to voter power. The current
route involves extensive tunnelling, funded by government, not the private
sector

Genuine Foresight

The media
warned that BR could not compete with road transport without the same
commercial freedom as road transport[22]. Government refused to concede it.

Some Tory
MPs warned that the privatisation concept was flawed. Robert Adley, Tory
chairman of the Transport Select Committee told Parliament: “the Bill was
a recipe for muddle, indecision and conflict”. The Bill was developed on
the hoof, with no less than 1,400 Government amendments to the Bill - a clear
indication that the Bill was rushed and ill conceived.

In the
privatisation debate, an MP stated that the Swed­ish Railways Chairman said
that Government proposals were insane [23]. The President of JR East, Japanese
Railways had looked at the way they are trying to privatise BR, and knew it
will fail [24]. A Minister said that “Japan
and Sweden were among
countries following the same path as the UK”.[25] He was contradicted
by MPs of all Parties.

MPs and
management in private sector industries warned that privatisation would lead to
the demise of the rolling stock industry and an adverse effect on balance of
payments. In June 1993, Ministers said the lack of rolling stock orders was
nothing to do with privatisation, but to a drop in BR revenue, due to recession
[26]. Ministers said it was a matter for BR - on which they had pronounced the
death sentence - “to decide where that leasing order for £150m
should be placed”. BR and Passenger Transport Authorities had been
regularly buying from the private sector, until the concept of leasing raised doubts in the financial
markets as to the safety of such investments.

British Rail
Board warned against fragmenting the successful Business Sectors [27], which,
they pointed out, in their 1994/5 Report, caused the subsidy to double. Under
BR, subsidy would have continued a downward trend

Bill
Bradshaw (now Lord Bradshaw) - former BR Chief Operating Manager, past Western
Region General Manager, widely respected for his experience and managerial
skills - warned that the planned form of privatisation “offended against
every principle of professional railway operations and is likely to result an
outcome which will be expensive, unsuitable and unsafe”.[28]

His fears
were well founded. Subsidies are out of control and safety is worse, despite
Railtrack claims [29]that
“1998 was the first year since 1902 when there was not a single passenger
fatality”. It was not. None were killed in train accidents - nineteen
were killed in 1998 in other accidents. None were killed in train accidents in
eleven years of the BR era! Train accident fatalities totalled 46 in the years
in which the industry has been fully privatised, compared to five for the
comparable final period under BR.
Despite claims of fewer broken rails, H&SE Reports show that they
increased. In the period that Railtrack was responsible, the annual average was
751. In the comparable period under BR, it was 678.[30]

Early in 1993, I warned [30]
of risks to safety, broken connections, disputes over paths, fare rises, and a
great future for lawyers and accountants. Foreseeing the downside risks if
privatisation failed, I advocated options to test the ground: a privately built
and operated high speed railway, re-opening 6,940 miles of closed railway, or
partial privatisation. I forecast that, to reduce road accidents, the hours of
haulage drivers would be cut to levels imposed on rail by government, and
comparable safety standards enforced. These would increase road costs, making
rail more competitive. New owners of railfreight soon called for a level
playing field. On 1st April 1993, on BBC Radio Stoke, I repeated these warnings
adding that newcomers will discover that too many cooks spoil the broth and
will resolve it with mergers and closures.

In view of
the available options and downside risks, why did Ministers take this leap in
the dark. Were they afraidthat BR
would give better value for money? MPs and Peers of all parties tabled
Amendments giving BR - as the only people in the UK that knew how to run railways -
the right to bid for franchises. Ministers refused. Excuses they advanced for
not doing so did not hold water.

Clearly, there was foresight to spare, and an abundance of hindsight lessons.

In conclusion

Franchises are now being
merged, resolving a problem they created. To reduce track access charges and
driver training costs, operators opted for restricted use of designated
platforms at large stations. It led to trains standing outside a station,
despite unoccupied platforms.

Had they
been asked, ex-BR managers would have forecast the consequences of significant
increases in track occupation. Having not sought that expert advice, newcomers
put too many trains on the track, and now have to withdraw hundreds to reduce
delays. Journey times have been extended to reduce delays. More intensive use,
left fewer spares to cover breakdowns. Hence, some routes had long gaps between
trains which then arrived short-formed.

Railtrack
and their apologists argued that contracting out renewal and maintenance was
common. In major industry - it is not. This policy must be reversed.

Journalists
who criticised BR in the “bad old days” are now calling for
re-nationalisation: “Bring back BR, all is forgiven”.[32] Had
critics studied facts rather than anecdotes, we might never have had the form
of privatisation forced through by the Tories.

The test of
a great gen­eral, Wellington
said, “is to know when to re­treat and to dare to do it”. It
must surely be the test of a great politician. Hopefully, it may not be too
long be­fore we see one.

[15] In
“Privatisation of BR”, Harris & Godward state "Until 1952,
the BTC was a monopoly of all non-car transport, for passenger or
freight". It was not. In 1951, 80,000 buses/coaches & 964,000 goods
vehicles were in use; the BTC owned 22,683 & 55,646 respectively. In 1956,
the Minister stated "the BTC was never a complete monopoly". See Britain's
Railways - The Reality, page 172.

[16] Some expected
economies from using track machines instead of labour. BR introduced its first
track maintenance machine in 1948 - its first year, bought more of improving
design every year & designed new machines tailored to BR requirements. See Britain's
Railways - The Reality, chapters 9 & 13.

[17] Leslie Chapman, Your Disobedient Servant.

[18] BR
pre-recession volume was not matched until 1997/8. A journey on two companies'
trains now equals two

[19] BR gross
complaints - before refund or apology, which the private sector considers voids
a complaint - were 0.009% of passengers. See Britain's Railways - The Reality.

[20] Central
Transport Consultative Committee and Transport Users Committees created by the
1947 Act. They were twice re-named. Their roles and location were publicised on
stations and trains for decades.

[21] Sunday Telegraph 13 January 2002

[22] The Times 17
April 1952, 28 April 1952, 10 December 1956; Economist 12 July 1952, 30 June
1956; Financial Times 13 June 1956; Guardian 29 June 1956. Government's
Stedeford committee made the same point. See Britain's Railways - The Reality.

[23] Hansard vol.
216, col. 772

[24] Railwatch,
December 1993.

[25] Britain's
Railways: A New Age, 1994. In the same publication, he praised BR.

[26] Ex-Ministers
said increased traffic was a benefit of privatisation - recovery from recession
was ignored.

[27] Created in
1980, not as a prelude to privatisation as stated in Guinness Railway Fact
Book, page 98. InterCity had no subsidy after 1988; Network SouthEast had none
in its last year, following a downward trend over previous years. They were
split into 18 companies, 17 of which were subsidised.