It is not a proof of vote. It would not even be something that someone
could show their employeer since it would have no identifing
information. It is a exact copy of the ballot that allows the public
full access to the information in their public election. I don't think
they should be coded to show ids or times of voting just as the
original ballot should not be. For those few who are afraid that their
voting pattern would reveal their identity, we could allow them to be
excluded from such public inspection. I think this might allow the "bad
guys" an opening they could exploit, but it is better than nothing.

We can have complete secrecy in voting (in fact the existing machines do
just that) or we can have open inspections. Something in the middle will
not restore my faith in the process. I don't know if most will agree, I
can only speak for myself.

Clint

> -------- Original Message --------
> Subject: Fwd: [OVC-discuss] Paper and machine ballot records
> From: David Mertz <voting-project@gnosis.cx>
> Date: Thu, May 19, 2005 6:39 pm
> To: Open Voting Consortium discussion list
> <ovc-discuss@listman.sonic.net>
>
> On May 19, 2005, at 5:52 PM, Marty Schrader wrote:
> > PGP ID. The grooviest thing is for the ballot to have a two-piece
> > tear-off that
> > has the PGP on one half of it and the election ID on the other half.
> > The voter
> > now has a record of voting that he can show to his boss and a record
> > of the PGP
> > of his ballot, which he can compare to public records or look up
> > through the
> > Board of Election Commissioners' web site tool.
>
> It sounds like you're providing a tool for coercers to use in making
> voters "prove" their votes. There's not much technical detail in your
> suggestion, so it's hard to be sure. But that's my first take.
>
> It might be that you think it doesn't reveal vote contents because you
> do not think in sufficiently nefarious ways. You wouldn't be the
> first, or second, or tenth person who had a scheme that they did not
> realize revealed vote content to a coercer (and about whose system I
> observed the leakage). It's sort of become a second nature to me to
> detect covert channels in voting designs.
>
> If you spell it out, I'm pretty sure I can tell you if there is an
> obvious information leakage (odds are probably 10:1 that it does).
> >
> ---
> A nice word for MS: <IMG SRC="c:\con\con">
>
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Received on Tue May 31 23:17:43 2005