PER CURIAM.
Defendant-Appellant Audra Ellis appeals as of right the order granting plaintiff?s motion
for summary disposition in this declaratory judgment action and thereby holding that plaintiff
has no duty to defend or indemnify defendant Hunter Long in the underlying civil action that
Ellis brought against him, which is predicated on Long having sexually assaulted her. We
affirm. This case is being decided without oral argument under MCR 7.214(E).
This Court reviews a trial court?s grant of summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10)
de novo. Peden v Detroit, 470 Mich 195, 200-201; 680 NW2d 857 (2004).
If no theories of recovery asserted against an insured fall within the coverage of the
insurance policy, an insurer does not have a duty to defend the insured in the matter. Auto Club
Group Ins Co v Burchell, 249 Mich App 468, 480-481; 642 NW2d 406 (2001). Here, it is
undisputed that the insurance policy at issue only provided coverage for an ?occurrence,? defined
in the policy as ?an accident that results in bodily injury . . . .? Further, the policy included an
exclusion from coverage for ?bodily injury . . . reasonably expected or intended by the insured.?
Ellis argues that the trial court erred by granting plaintiff?s motion for summary
disposition because Long testified in his deposition that he intended to have consensual sex with
Ellis during the incident and did not intend, and should not reasonably have expected, to injure
her. We disagree. Defendant?s position is inherently illogical. On the one hand, Ellis relies on
Long?s deposition testimony that he did not intentionally sexually assault her as establishing

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plaintiff?s duty to provide insurance coverage on the theory that Long neither intentionally
harmed her nor reasonably should have expected to harm her. On the other hand, Ellis? tort
claims of assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress in the underlying suit
are necessarily premised on Long having intentionally harmed her or at least having been
reckless1 with regard to whether he harmed her. See VanVorous v Burmeister, 262 Mich App
467, 482-483; 687 NW2d 132 (2004), quoting Espinoza v Thomas, 189 Mich App 110, 119; 472
NW2d 16 (1991) (civil assault claim requires showing of ?intentional unlawful offer of corporal
injury to another person by force, or force unlawfully directed toward the person of another?);
VanVorous, supra at 483, quoting Espinoza, supra at 119 (battery claim requires showing of
?wilful and harmful or offensive touching of another person which results from an act intended
to cause such a contact?); VanVorous, supra at 481, quoting Roberts v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 422
Mich 594, 602; 374 NW2d 905 (1985) (intentional infliction of emotional distress claim requires
showing of intent or recklessness).
Further, Ellis? position simply makes no sense because it is the nature of defendant?s
claims against Long, not his denial of having committed conduct essential to establishing those
claims, that is critical to assessing whether plaintiff has a duty to defend those claims. In other
words, regardless of any assertions by Long that he only intended to have consensual sex with
Ellis, plaintiff has no possible liability with regard to defendant?s claims because the claims are
premised on Long having intentionally sexually assaulted her. Accordingly, plaintiff has no
obligation to provide insurance coverage for the claims at issue because (1) they are plainly not
premised on the occurrence of an ?accident? as that term is commonly understood, and (2)
coverage is further excluded by the plain language of the policy exclusion for intentionally
inflicted bodily injury. Because no theory of liability asserted against Long in that suit falls
within the coverage of the insurance policy, plaintiff has no duty to provide coverage in the
underlying suit. Burchell, supra at 480-481.
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Patrick M. Meter

1 Reckless misconduct ?constitutes the functional equivalent of willfulness in that it shows an
??indifference to whether harm will result as to be the equivalent of a willingness that it does.???
Echelon Homes, LLC v Carter Lumber Co, 261 Mich App 424, 443-444; 683 NW2d 171 (2004),
quoting Jennings v Southwood, 446 Mich 125, 140; 521 NW2d 230 (1994), quoting Burnett v
Adrian, 414 Mich 448, 455; 326 NW2d 810 (1982). Because reckless conduct requires such a
degree of indifference to whether harm results as to be the functional equivalent of a willingness
that it does, recklessness requires an intentional disregard of a known and substantial risk of
harm so that a person who acts recklessly with regard to the possibility of harming another
person in a certain way necessarily would reasonably expect that such harm to the other person
could result.