The threat to current and potential economic interests in the Sahel posed by these groups.

The use of real/exaggerated terrorist threat by local and powerful states to further their own interest in the region.

Though the above points being raised are a refreshing take on events. It is clear that the documentary was made in 2011 and fails to take into account the recent developments in the area i.e:

The fall of the Qaddafi regime and its consequences on the region.

Mass proliferation of weapons and fighters from Libya into the Sahel.

The rise of Jihadist ideology in Tunisia and Libya.

Algeria's defensive stance, and it's lack of will to take a leading role in the crisis

Algeria's military untested outside of the country.

Risk averse ruling regime is extra sensitive to the 'sea of instability' around it:

Libya's unruly situation.

Development of Jihadists in Tunisia.

The current crisis in Mali.

Supplementing the above information, we have posted an excerpt from a research paper undertaken in 2011. The aim was to analyse the evolution of local organizations and the internal and external factors that lead to adopt Al-Qaeda's creed.

The excerpt contains the theoretical background for paper and the relevant theories used. If the rest of the paper is of interest to anyone, we will publish it when it is requested.

Hassan Al Amin, the chairman of the
Human Rights and Civil Society Committee and a long time Gaddafi
opposition figure, resigned
earlier this month following numerous death threats. Justifying his
decision, he cited his inability to conduct his work as chairman in
an increasingly polarised political environment .

Al Amin's high profile resignation
serves as a reminder of the reality of Libya's new 'democratic' rule
and the state of human rights in the country. The authoritative
annual report
published by Human Rights Watch for 2013 reveals that Libya continues
to be plagued by serious rights abuses, including arbitrary arrests,
torture, and deaths in detention.

Like many Libyans, Al Amin believes
that the GNC has strayed from its mission and obligations towards the
Libyan people. It has failed to deliver on the most important issues
affecting the country during the ongoing transitional period.

The GNC has already deferred the
drafting of a new constitution to an unforeseeable time and has been
unable to maintain adequate oversight over governmental program.
Critics have also pointed to the GNC's failure to implement a
coherent plan of national reconciliation and transitional justice.

Al Amin's views and his will to
foster the respect of human rights in Libya have earned him a number
of enemies, particularly in his electorate district of Misrata.

Misrata provides an illustrative and
bleak example of everything that is wrong with Libya today.

The town is a place where
lawlessness, the "rule of the gun" and a dubious
'revolutionary legitimacy' are vaunted by armed militias. They have
come to trump the democratically elected local representatives and
civil law.

Like elsewhere in Libya, Misrata's
prisons are filled with those captured during the chaos and in the
aftermath of the revolution. Militiamen allegedly guarding these
facilities subject their captives to inhuman and degrading treatment.
Arbitrary detentions, torture and murder are a common occurrence;
perpetrated by the very men supposed to prevent them. Accountability
is non-existent and government officials tasked with preventing the
abuse such as Al Amin are branded traitors and threatened for merely
doing their job.

Though these issues affect the whole
of Libya, the current situation in Misrata fully captures the toxic
legacy of tribalism has had on the country.

Gaddafi maintained his hold on power
by manipulating old tribal grudges against his opponents. Applying
the clausewitz's concept of war being the continuation of policy by
other means, it is easy to see how tribal cleavages that kept Gaddafi
in power determined which groups supported the revolution and which
groups did not.

Entire tribes whose members
supported the old regime against the revolutionaries have been
targeted by revenge killings and abuse by armed militias while
central authorities turn a blind eye.

For example, the people of Tawergha
are unable to return to their city out of fear of revenge from
Misrata Militias. Tawerghians allied themselves with the Gaddafi
regime during the revolution. They participated in the siege of
neighbouring city of Misrata and now face persecution.

Tawerghans have been targeted for
arrest and attack by Misrata's Militias, who accuse people from
Tawergha of committing serious crimes against them during the war. It
is reported that around 1,300 people from Tawergha are detained,
missing, or dead.

Human Rights Watch went as far as
stating that abuses committed against Tawerghians may amount to
crimes against humanity and could be prosecuted by the International
Criminal Court.

The image of Libya as a poster-child
for successful democratic transition has been tarnished by the brush
of tribal lawlessness. If the GNC does not take immediate and
substantial steps to remedy the situation on the ground, it risks
turning the current regime into the very thing Libyans fought and
died to overthrow.

Breaking the spiral of violence:

If the GNC fails to act, the current
status quo is likely to have disastrous consequences for the country
and its citizens. Tribal feuds can spiral into a never ending
vendetta of revenge killings. Neutralizing militias remains the most
basic prerequisite for implementing a system of governance based on
justice and the rule of law. Laws and policies cannot be drafted when
neither the parliament nor the Prime Minister's office are safe from
armed groups storming them.

Though grievances against the old
regime are justifiable, forcing officials chosen by the ballot out of
office with the barrel of a gun goes against the core principals of
public office in a democracy. Claiming authority through
'revolutionary legitimacy' is merely the exercise of control through
fear and violence, the hallmarks of Gaddafi's regime.

Reconciliation is the first building
bloc for a successful transition. The GNC should therefore deliver on
its promise to make reconciliation a priority. It ensures the return
of dignity and justice to all who have been wronged , allowing
everyone to move forward without being hampered by the past.

Reconciliation must be followed up
by an inclusive development program. Young Libyans in Militias must
be incentivized with alternative sources of income and better
prospects to develop as law abiding citizens.

Finally, NGOs and officials
overseeing the application of the law and the respect of human rights
should be treated as partners of the Government. A robust civil
society strengthens the rule of law and discourages 'tribal justice'.

Friday, 29 March 2013

This week we feature our first guest publication. The latest comes from our friends and esteemed colleagues from the SAHEL PRESS REVIEWS

SPRs provides revealing insights and perspectives from the Sahel and West African through Press Reviews of local News, Press, and Media Agencies. With recent events in Mali and elsewhere, the Sahel is recieving its deserved attention from the international community, albiet for tragic reasons.

A large portion of the information provided by international news agencies often lacks detailed context, and tend to be a rerun of French news agencies.

Seasoned political analysts wishing to have their ears closer to the ground should use more localized information as it is richer in both context and detail.

By regrouping insightful local sources and translating these into English, our friends at the Sahel Press Reviews facilitate access to pertinent information for locals wishing to learn more about their region and provide an insider's perspective for those outside.

We thank you SPRs for helping the voice of local news echo beyond the Sahel.

Tuesday, 12 March 2013

TRIBAL CLASHES UNDERMINE THE DEMOCRATIC
TRANSITION AND STABILITY IN LIBYA: There Is No Space and Time for Whimsical
Tribal Ideologies In This Day And Age

Associated Press

Libya
has recently witnessed a series of tribal clashes that left several people dead
and wounded. These clashes are not
restricted to one group or geographical area of Libya. They happen across the
country and have become significantly deadlier since the revolution.

Since
Libya is home to over 140 tribes and clans, strife and competition between
these groups has always been part of the Libyan landscape.

In
theory, Gaddafi’s ‘Al-Jamahiriya’ system was supposed to function through
direct democracy and popular committees. In reality his regime survived with
system of patronage coupled with the exploitation of tribal cleavages and
brutal repression. Yet the recent of these
clashes can be directly linked to the fallout of the revolution.

The
fall of the old regime brought with it the mass proliferation of weaponry and
the collapse of the thinly stretched state security apparatus. Furthermore, the
revolution deepened the polarization of allegiances, often pinning tribes
supporting Gaddafi against those that rose against him. All of this creates an
environment of insecurity and animosity that can make a simple dispute between
individual members spiral into a deadly fight between entire communities.

The
most recent clash took place on 11/03/2013 in Sebha between members of the Wirfalla and Qadhadhfa tribes. At least four people are reported dead and a
dozen wounded. Sebha has been the theatre of tribal clashes involving other
tribes. Earlier in January the area saw clashes between Qadhadhfa and Awlad
Suleiman tribes that left scores of dead and
wounded. Both the Wirfalla and
Awlad Suleiman tribes were hostile to the former regime and fought against
Gaddafi’s Tribe of Qadhadhfa during the revolution. Such conflicts are not
limited to Sebha; the Nafusa Mountain town of Mizdah has also seen significant
tribal strife that began on 02/03/3012. Mashashiya tribesmen fought members of the Al-Qantrar
tribe. Both groups have a history of violent clashes. In 2012 fighting between
the two tribes and their respective allies left over 100 people dead.

Given the magnitude of the changes sweeping
the country and the fragile state of Libyan stability, there is no space and
time for whimsical tribal ideologies in this day and age. Libyans cannot afford
another revolution. Regardless of which tribes are involved or where it is
taking place, the outcomes is always the same.

Besides the unnecessary death and injury of
combatants/civilians, violent clashes often cause the suspension of all social
activity. Schools and local businesses are often closed down during these
disruptions. Furthermore, attacks on property can destroy local infrastructure
and amenities causing disruptions to civil life. Yet the responsibility for
these affairs cannot be entirely blamed on conflicting tribes. The current
government should do more to help these regions overcome their differences.

The lack of a strong governmental presence in
the region exacerbates the Crisis:
Unrest and insecurity have continued to plague the
south of Libya since the end of the revolution, with the state exercising
minimal control over many areas. In December 2012, Congress representatives for
the region walked out of parliament in protest of the deteriorating situation
of their constituencies and the “crippling silence” of the central authorities
in Tripoli.

The political vacuum and the absence of central government
from the area foster an environment suitable for the proliferation of gangs and
armed criminals that are often behind many of the clashes. The central
government should make its presence felt in these troubled areas and dedicate
more resources on the ground.
To be
fair, tribalism in Libya runs deep and cannot be eradicated overnight. Only a gradual and relentless approach will
eliminate tribal violence from Libyan society.

The most important factor behind the violence remains the
absence of basic security and the widespread availability of weapons. In the
short term, these are the first issues the government should tackle not only in
areas of tribal fighting, but throughout the Libyan territory.

Secondly, the central
authorities need to establish the primacy of the rule of law and build the
necessary institutions to maintain it. This is a long term effort that cannot be
imposed from Tripoli and has to arise from local consent. The current
relationship with the influential tribal elders need to be strengthened and
weaved into the structure of new institutions or these would fail.

Libyans
should embrace their eclectic culture and how each tribe contributes to the
country’s social fabric. Cultural/tribal differences and allegiances should not
be exploited by petty politics. Such instrumentalization is a divisive force
than can only lead the country down the path of violence and destruction.
Gaddafi relied on such strategies to maintain his grip on power. Yet, the new
authorities possess something far more powerful: democratic legitimacy and the
opportunity to create a Libya where inclusive institutions and the rule of law
trump old ideologies and tribal kinship.

Thursday, 7 March 2013

Libya’s Culture of Corruption threatens the
Democratic Gains of the Revolution.

This week, the Libyan
Justice Minister Salah Margani urged the Attorney General to release the
newspaper editor Amara Abdalla Al-Khatabi who had been arrested on the
19/12/2012 following the publication of a list containing the name of 84 judges
allegedly involved in corruption.

The phenomenon of
corruption is neither new to Libya nor unique to the country. However,
comparing Libya to the rest of the world paints a grim picture. NATO estimated
that Gaddafi and his associates had around $150 billion stashed abroad. In
2012, Libya ranked 160thamongst
the 176 countries covered by Transparency International’s authoritative
Corruption Perception Index. An improvement from the previous year (2011: 168/176),
but it till classifies Libya as a highly corrupt country.

The scourge of corruption
has long been identified as a major problem by the new regime.As the leader of the National Transition
Council (NTC), Mustapha Abdul Jalil had acknowledged in that it would take
years to overcome the “heavy heritage’ of corruption in Libya. Yet, allegations
of corruptions surfaced during the turbulent period of NTC rule.

Two scandals emerged in
2012 surrounding funds set up to compensate revolutionary fighters and their
medical treatment abroad, respectively. Both funds were eventually halted due
to widespread misuse and fraud. Commenting
on the medical-fund scandal, former Interim Health Minister Fatima Hamroush clarified
the prevailing attitudes succinctly when she said: “there was a fear
from a dictator and that’s why order was kept without law basically. Law wasn’t
applied, but there was order. Now there’s no order, everything’s a mess because
there’s no fear”.

The scandals draw
attention to two issues concerning corruption in Libya. Firstly, they point to
the authorities’ ineptness
in curtailing corruption. Secondly, they highlight the prevalence
of a ‘culture of corruption’. The head of Libya’s Audit Bureau Ibrahim Belkheir
acknowledged the widespread nature of the problem amongst Libyans: “As they are so used to it, it does not seem to be corruption to them."

While
it is worth noting that this was a turbulent time for the country, the issue of
corruption and government’s will (or lack thereof) to tackle it remains in the
headlines. On 18/01/2013 Prime Minister Ali Zeidan announced a number of
measures taken by his administration to fight corruption. These included close
cooperation with the Audit Bureau, the establishment of a central bidding
committee to ensure transparency in contract awards, enlisting the help of the
secret service in investigations, and new measures to prevent irregular recruitment
of government employees. He also urged the Libyan people to play their part and
to report those who violate the law.

Zeidan’s government appears committed to
curbing corruption, at least on the surface. The Prime Minister’s 23/02/2013 surpriseannouncement about the sacking of a number of government officials allegedly involved
in corruption. Details and names have yet to emerge, but Zeidan did stress that
he “will not allow the misuse of public funds and I will take the
strongest procedures against corruption”. Due to the lack of details or
subsequent action, the statement should be seen as more than populist rhetoric.
It should interpret as a warning addressed to all officials including those
under investigations. Zeidan’s words have yet to turn to action as a recent
whistleblower case indicates.

The government seems
unable or unwilling to address public accounts of alleged corruption. The deputy
minister of Culture and Civil
Society, Ms. Awatif al-Tushani, announced her resignation on 7/02/2013
citing alleged financial and administrative irregularities in the
ministry. She claims to have raised such
issues to the Prime Minister, but no action was taken. Furthermore, reports
indicate that she was forced to resign and that her stand against dishonest
practices at the ministry made her a target for personal harassment.

A
more comprehensive approach needs to be taken by the Libyan Government. The International
anti-corruption group Global Witness says that the new government should learn
from the previous regime’s practices and implement reforms in Libya’s oil and
gas sector. The strategic importance of the sector and the prevalence of shady
practices in the industry make this the most important area for reform the new
government.

Global
Witness’ ‘blueprint for reforms’ (2012) should provide sufficient guidance to
prevent large-scale corruption in the new Libya. Their recommendations include
the promotion of transparency through the publication
of all existing and future oil contracts, to work with international audit
organisations to improve accounting and auditing practice within the National
Oil Company so that revenues can be accurately measured and reported on. Furthermore,
real commitment to transparency should be enshrined into Libya's new
constitution, and all current and future contracts should be subject to
parliamentary scrutiny.

Nothing
could indicate a stronger commitment to fighting corruption and illegal practices
than a comprehensive reform in the oil sector. Such actions would
not only promote an image of ‘responsible governance’ but would improve the trust
of Libyans in their nascent democratic institutions. It would also
facilitate a change in the entrenched
attitudes about corruption at both the institutional and individual levels.

Wednesday, 6 March 2013

A brief breakdown of the Algerian Government's 2013 Budget by Ministerial sectors. Data was obtained directly from the Algerian press Agency .The Algerian 2013 budget bill was discussed and signed by The President Abdelaziz BOUTEFLIKA during the cabinet meeting held on the 26th of December in EL MOURADIA. This budget is considered commensurate with the national economy's development level. Since, 6,879.8 billion DZD were allocated to cover the major expenses of the country of which 4,333.6 billion DZD were assigned to the operating budget and 2,544.2 billion DZD to the equipment.An In-depth analysis of the budget and its implications will follow soon. Maghreb Caravan serves the freshest cous cous, that's always worth the wait...A big thank you to Anas.B. Zerhouni (researcher at Brunel University) for putting together the table.