(A Committee of Correspondence)

Entries categorized "Bolan"

30 January 2015

"The basic problem is that our policies regarding Iran are not fully aligned. That is a product of many things, including that Israel is closer and more vulnerable to this threat, and has no margin of error.

Israel’s policy is not merely to prevent Iran from having a nuclear weapon today; it is also to prevent Iran from having a nuclear weapon in the future. And Israel is very concerned that a deal will be forged that will not dismantle Iran’s nuclear-weapons capability. We are concerned that it would leave Iran with an advanced nuclear infrastructure today—relying on intelligence and inspectors to prevent Iran from breaking out or sneaking out to the bomb—and in the foreseeable future enable Iran to have an industrial-sized nuclear program, as the timeframe for this agreement runs out and all sanctions are removed. That is an outcome that is unacceptable to Israel." The Atlantic

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Does it seem odd to anyone else that the former US citizen Ron Dermer is discussing this with Jeffrey Goldberg who either is or was an IDF reservist? No matter, I fully support Goldberg's effort to pry the truth out of Dermer.

Does it amuse others that Dermer threw Boehner under the bus in this interview? To paraphrase - We Israelis always wanted to seek White House agreement but that nasty Boehner didn't let us. All the world is against us...

What Israel seems to want for the rest of the ME is a super-sized Morgenthau Plan that would reduce the surrounding countries to unindustrialized pastoral regions without the potential for manufacturing weapons.

At the same time Israel seems to want the US to continue to march in lock step with it on any issue of interest.

To that end they wish to address the Congress of the United States for the purpose of lobbying against the president of the US.

08 April 2014

According to the Wall Street Journal Online today: “Frustrated by the stalemate in Syria, Secretary of State John Kerry has been pushing for the U.S. military to be more aggressive in supporting the country's rebel forces. Opposition has come from the institution that would spearhead any such effort: the Pentagon.

Mr. Kerry and United Nations Ambassador Samantha Power have advocated options that range from an American military intervention to weaken the regime of President Bashar al-Assad to using U.S. special operations forces to train and equip a large number of rebel fighters. Such moves would go far beyond the U.S.'s current engagement.

In recent White House meetings, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Martin Dempsey and Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel have pushed back against military intervention, said senior officials….

07 October 2013

Good strategy requires the identification of an achievable
objective that can be obtained at a reasonable cost. President Obama and his senior officials have
done exactly that with respect to Iran.
President Obama has repeatedly said that America’s overriding strategic
objective is to “prevent
Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.”
This is a clear strategic objective that with honest effort on both
sides is reasonably attainable through diplomatic means.

President
Obama in his recent address to the United Nations reiterated his strategic
goal of prevention, endorsed Iran’s right to a civilian nuclear program, and
sought to reassure Iranian leaders that regime change was not the goal of U.S.
policy. Meanwhile, recently elected Iranian
President Rouhani has pledged to provide additional transparency in order
to reassure the international community that Iranian nuclear programs and
technologies are indeed purely civilian in nature. In these public statements both leaders have
thus sketched the broad outlines of a mutually acceptable deal. Iran secures international acceptance of a
limited civilian nuclear program in exchange for enhanced inspections that ensure these activities are not diverted to military
purposes. Formulating a detailed
step-by-step plan for easing sanctions tied to specific Iranian actions is the
next critical step in filling out this strategic diplomatic option.

26 February 2013

International negotiations with Iran over its nuclear
program have resumed this week in Kazakhstan.
Initial reporting suggests that Iran will be offered some limited
sanctions relief in return for restrictions on Iran’s nuclear enrichment
activities. However, these talks have a
troubled history and experienced observers are quick to tamp down any
expectations of a major breakthrough. As
any number of foreign policy pundits will be debating the significance of these
outcomes over the next several days, it would be prudent to dispel some of the
most popular (and misguided) myths surrounding the Iran policy debate.

In reading Jeffrey Record's “A War It Was Always Going to Lose: Why Japan Attacked American in 1941” (2011) I was struck that the enduring historical lessons he draws in examining this case also underscore the relative ease
with which the US and Iran could now easily drift toward war with dire consequences
for both sides. For those interested,
a shorter version of Record’s book was published in 2009 as a U.S. Army War College
publication available here.

1. “Fear and honor, ‘rational’
or not, can motivate as much as interest”: A war between the US and Iran is almost
certainly not in the objective rational interest of either party. Iran’s relatively anemic military forces
could not hope to stop the inevitable onslaught from a massive, sustained, and
technologically superior US air and naval campaign. Iranian nuclear, military, and any associated
facilities (both economic and political) would lay in absolute ruins.

In confronting this objectively miniscule but emotionally-compelling threat, the USG has undertaken the most extensive reorganization and expansion of its national security apparatus since WWII; conducted massive military interventions and enormous nation-building efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq at tremendous costs in American blood and treasure; and authorized ever-more intensive assassination campaigns in Pakistan and Yemen that include American citizens as 'legitimate' targets.

The 'global war on terrorism' was a flawed strategic framework from its inception appealing primarily to the appreciable fear of the American public in the wake of the horrific attacks of 9-11 and eschewing an objective assessment of the scale and nature of the threat. Terrorism as a tactic of the weak will always be with us. It will never be eliminated. This report demonstrates that this threat has clearly been reduced to a manageable level. The Al-Qa'ida organization that attacked us on 9-11 is a shadow of what it was. Targeted attacks on its leadership and support networks wherever they operate can most effectively and efficiently be facilitated by close cooperation with local law enforcement, intelligence, and as needed, special operations forces.

In these times of fiscal constraints and 'tough choices', U.S. citizens and taxpayers should demand a reality-based discussion of the military, security, and intelligence forces needed to defend critical American national interests here and abroad. Our political and military leaders should lead this rational debate. Nevertheless, many politicians, defense lobbyists, and those working in the national security and foreign policymaking apparatus (both government and civilian) will be tempted to employ hyperbolic exaggeration of the threats confronting us as a justification for continued U.S. interventions across the globe. The rise of China as a conventional military and economic competitor and the potential for Iran to develop nuclear weapons are prime candidates to replace terrorism as the next great security 'threat' demanding exorbitant expenditures of America's treasure and resources. Let's at least insist on a rational and fact-based debate over these issues.

The author is a professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Army War College. The views expressed are his own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Army.

30 May 2012

The broad outline for a negotiated deal over Iran’s nuclear program that would satisfy essential U.S. and Iranian national interests is fairly clear. Iran would agree to limit its nuclear enrichment activities (to levels between 3-5 % seems to be a consensus figure) while allowing for rigorous international inspections designed to minimize prospects for the diversion of civilian nuclear materials and technologies to military programs. In return for these Iranian concessions, U.S. and other international officials would agree to meaningfully ease and eventually lift (assuming continued Iranian cooperation) economic and financial sanctions.

However, as rumors circulated earlier this week about the potential for a successful negotiated deal along these lines, two primary obstacles have re-emerged. One of the main obstacles on the international stage is Israel. Unsurprisingly, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has adopted an exceptionally tough position regarding international negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program insisting that Iran “stop all enrichment, ship all its nuclear material outside the country, and dismantle its nuclear installation at Qom.” Of course, each of these conditions would be a deal-breaker from the standpoint of Iranian officials. After all, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (to which Tehran, unlike Israel, is a signatory) guarantees states the right to develop civilian nuclear programs which presumably include the ability to produce nuclear fuel. Israel, as a sovereign state, is free to pursue and advocate policies as it sees fit. President Obama, however, is sworn to defend the interests of the American people and should be solely focused on taking those actions that advance American national interests. No other country should divert the President from that single focus.

Much of the Zelikow memo is written in legal-ease. The essence of his argument is that many of the "enhanced interrogation techniques authorized for employment by the CIA...[are] intrinsically cruel, inhuman, [and] degrading...[and should] be barred even if there is a compelling state interest asserted to justify them." The memo goes on to more explicitly make the case that specific coercive techniques including water boarding and stress positions are unconstitutional; while other measures such as sleep and food deprivation may be legal "depending on the circumstances and details of how these techniques are used."

Nations often reflect the aspirations, hopes, and fears of their people and leaders. In the of 9/11, many Americans have become overly fearful and only too willing to sacrifice personal liberties and bypass constitutionally-guarantee legal protections in the pursuit of an imagined (and unachievable) sense of security. Thankfully, President Obama has put some of the uglier aspects of the 'global war on terror' behind us. However, other aspects such as warrantless searches, 'targeted assassinations', and indefinite detentions remain. We will yet need many more citizens, politicians, and officials to demonstrate the courage of their convictions.

﻿The author is professor of national security studies at the U.S. Army War College. The views expressed are his own and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

06 April 2012

Several recent events can only reinforce the assessment that after a decade of tremendous expenditures of American blood and treasure, the U.S. strategy of military invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq was ill-conceived from the start, poorly executed throughout, and ultimately has failed to advance U.S. national interests in any meaningful way. Let's briefly review the anticipated achievements, the key developments in U.S. strategy, and the outcomes as they are manifested today.

16 March 2012

Another shoe has dropped on the path toward war against Iran. A potentially deadly game is brewing between the International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors and Iran over access to military facilities at Parchin. Deadly – because similar stand-offs with UN inspectors led to U.S. missile attacks in 1998 against suspected Iraqi WMD facilities and provided the rationale for the subsequent full-scale military invasion of Iraq in 2003.

In the current atmosphere of increasingly heated rhetoric threatening military strikes against Iran, these disputes at Parchin or other similar sites could quickly (if unintentionally) spiral into direct military confrontation. US, Israeli, and Iranian officials alike should take this moment to carefully consider the potentially catastrophic consequences of their next steps.

In announcing the US missile strikes against suspect Iraqi nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons facilities in December 1998, President Clinton cited Saddam’s failure to “cooperate with the United Nations weapons inspectors called UNSCOM.” In particular, he observed that “Iraq repeatedly blocked UNSCOM from inspecting suspect sites [and]… restricted UNSCOMs ability to obtain necessary evidence.” In his speech to the United Nations Security Council in February 2003, Secretary of State Powell similarly based the American case for war on a pattern of incomplete Iraqi cooperation with UN inspectors suggesting that “Saddam Hussein and his regime are concealing their efforts to produce more weapons of mass destruction.”