"Following a bench trial in district court, respondent law firm, Christoffel, Elliott, & Albrecht ... was declared the owner of 1,000 shares of appellant Consumers Realty and Development Co., Inc., ... corporate stock. The district court also granted CE&A sanctions of approximately $80,000 for attorney fees and costs due to appellant Grohoski's fraud and lack of compliance with discovery. We affirm."

"A Loy-Teigen agreement releases all claims against a defendant-insured except claims recoverable from the proceeds of an excess insurance policy, if any. Appellant argues that the agreement in this case did not eliminate LSS's vicarious liability. Before answering the question of LSS's vicarious liability, we must consider the effect of our answer on Tinklenberg. If she were an insured under the PR policy, a determination that LSS remained vicariously liable would not violate the provisions of a Loy-Teigen-type release. Because an insurer cannot maintain an indemnification action against its own insured, Tinklenberg, if she were an insured, would be protected from any indemnificiation claim by LSS. But Tinklenberg is not an insured under the LSS policy. Thus, if LSS remains vicariously liable and appellant is permitted to recover, Tinklenberg would be subject to indemnification claims from LSS for amounts paid to appellant.

Appellant argues that the agreement in this case was not intended to be a full release of Tinklenberg and that the district court erred in characterizing the agreement as a "Drake/Ryan [i.e., Loy-Teigen] release." We disagree. The release states that it "shall be governed and construed in accordance with the principles and rules established in the case of Teigen v. Jelco of Wisconsin, 367 N.W.2d 806 (Wis. 1985) and Loy v. Bunderson, 320 N.W.2d 175 (Wis. 1982) * * *." Holding that LSS remains liable despite the absence of excess insurance would contravene the rationale of Loy and eliminate advantages the Drake court found in Loy-type settlements.

[The vicariously liable car owner] is no longer a party; [the primary insurer] is no longer involved; [and the tortfeasor's] assets, except for the insurance contract with [the excess insurer], are no longer available for collection from a judgment * * *.

Drake, 514 N.W.2d at 790. The agreement here produced the very result anticipated in Loy and Drake: LSS was no longer a party, AF, the primary insurer, was no longer involved, and Tinklenberg's assets were no longer available for collection.[6] Denying summary judgment would have the opposite result: LSS would still be a party, AF would be asked to defend, and Tinklenberg's assets would be sought for indemnification of any judgment against LSS.

By settling all claims except those recoverable from the proceeds of the PR policy, appellant retained the right to pursue only claims recoverable from those proceeds. There are no such claims. The district court did not err in declaring that "[a]t the time the agreement was signed, the parties clearly intended it to be a `Drake/Ryan [i.e., Loy-Teigen] release'" and in holding that appellant has no right to pursue a vicarious liability claim against LSS.

"Appellant Mark N. Stageberg contends that the trial court inappropriately approved a cost-of-living adjustment in his spousal maintenance obligation because (a) even though his average income since 1992 has substantially increased, he had no such increase in 1996, and (b) he incurred a significant debt load between 1994 and 1996. We affirm."

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