Comment by Kai Nielsen on Kurtz Article

Paul Kurtz well conveys the
sense of reasonableness that is embedded in humanistic accounts of ethics and
the tragic dilemmas that often are part of the moral life. He also wisely would
have us be wary of both absolutism in ethics and relativism and seeks to define
a form of objectivism that undermines both absolutism and relativism. My problems
about his account turn on Section Four of his essay. I think too much is made
of the conflict between egoism and altruism, between self-interest and concern
for others. The moral point of view, as Kurt Baier, among others, has powerfully
argued in his The Moral Point of View, requires impartiality, not altruism.
In moral reflection each is to count for one and none to count for more than
one. The moral point of view does not require a denial of the self but willingness
on the part of the moral agent to be impartial. He counts his own interests
but he need not give them either more or less weight than the interests of anyone
else. (This is not negated by the practical, if you will, [27/28] tactical,
point that often, since most people know best what their own interests are,
we are all better off, if we, in standard circumstances, take care to protect
our own interests. There are egoiststhat is, amoralistswho do only
that or give their interests pride of place over the interests of others, but
a moral agent who tends prudently to his own interests does not do that). A
recognition of this does not make the moral point of view something which is
not universally binding, as Kurtz claims. For the moral agent, for someone committed
through and through to doing what he, morally speaking, regards as the right
thing to do, there can be no alternative but to accept the moral point of view
as universally binding. Indeed, to say this, is to say something which very
much appears to be true by definition. The problem about the universal bindingness
of the moral point of view emerges around the question, "Why should I be
moral?". An amoralist will not find the moral point of view binding at
all. He will only use moral conceptions manipulatively to achieve his own ends.
But that is not, again by definition, a possible option for a humanist. (That
is true, even if we construe humanism, as Kurtz does, in a very broad sense,
covering many tendencies of thought).

I also think that Kurtz is unclear
about his backing for his general ethical principles. He denies that they are
intuitive. But it is hard to know what to make of his claim that they are "naturalistic
and empirical phenomena." Indeed it is at least plausible to believe that
they have arisen because of common human needs and necessities, but their
origin does not decide the question of what their present status is.
Religious notions also arise out of needs, as Feuerbach and Freud show, but
this does not make religious statements empirical statements. "Have regard
for others," unlike "People tend to have regard for others,"
does not appear to be an empirical claim which is true or false in the same
way the second quoted remark is. "People must have concern for others"
seems to be no more an empirical statement of fact than "Have regard for
others." How we would establish its truth is unclear. How, more generally,
we would establish the truth or warrantability of fundamental or general ethical
principles is left quite mysterious by Kurtz. It is this problem, among others,
that I tried to deepen and confront in my own essay.

Finally, Kurtz is unfair to
Marxists, at least Marxists who have views like those of Marx or Engels. They
do not wish to "usher in a utopian system of ideal values." Indeed
their critique of utopian socialism makes it quite plain why they think that
is a mistake. Furthermore, Marx, Engels, and Lenin, as one can see from their
criticisms of the Anarchists, were definitely against terrorism. With mass support
terrorism is unnecessary, indeed just a senseless cruelty. Without that mass
support it is worse than pointless, for it will only alienate what may be potential
supporters of socialism. [28/29]

Reply by Paul Kurtz to Nielsen

Kai Nielsen opens his essay
be recognizing with me the tragic dilemmas that are often part of the moral
life and the difficulties that may arise in adjudicating conflicts in obligations
between an individual's interests and those of others.

Nielsen raises three objections,
particularly to the last section of my paper. First, he thinks that I make too
much of the conflict between egoism and altruism. The moral point of view, he
says, involves impartiality, not altruism, and is universally binding. Would
the problem be so easily resolved, for there is at times a conflict between
egoism (or self-interest) on the one hand, and impartiality on the other. Also,
many moral philosophers have held that an individual's primary obligation is
to his own self-interest or that of his immediate relatives, friends, or countrymen,
and not to the generalized other. Libertarians have argued that this indeed
is our basic duty and that if each would tend to his own garden before tending
to others, we would all be better off; this they maintain is the conclusion
that an ethically impartial spectator would reach. Thus, there is some dispute
precisely about what an impartial moral observer would find as his first
responsibility: universal beneficence vs. concern for his own well-being or
those within his immediate sphere of interest. Merely to say that the moral
point of view is universally binding is a truism—true by definition—for what
may be in dispute is what the moral point of view is.

Professor Nielsen also glosses
over the fact that many or most individuals find it difficult or impossible
to be completely impartial about matters that concern their vital interests,
although they may gladly be impartial about that which concerns others. That
is why whatever one's views of impartiality (or altruism) are, we still need
to develop a system of moral education to cultivate such a concern, for it is
not apparent or axiomatic that individuals will recognize the priority of impartiality.

Nielsen objects to my view that
ethical principles are "naturalistic and empirical phenomena." By
this I simply meant that they did not have some mysterious ontological status,
nor could they be discovered intuitively. To say that they are "empirical"
means that they are characteristics of human behavior or institutions that have
developed over a long period of time. It does not mean that I deny their prescriptive
or normative role, nor believe that they are descriptive assertions. He correctly
points out that if ethical principles are empirical, so are religious beliefs
and practices: they too are human, not "sacred," phenomena, growing
out of human needs and interest. Both ethics and religion are empirical
in origin and function. However, the question of how to evaluate ethical principles
is another matter and here I would suggest several criteria: (1) the relevance
of facts, (2) the analysis of means, (3) the consequences of various
courses of action. [29/30] To these, I would consider the relation of
any principles under analysis to (4) human needs, (5) existing values, and (6)
other prima facie general principles. Ethical principles are practical,
they are judged by what they accomplish in the observable world. Some of the
criteria by which we judge them are accordingly empirical and pragmatic; but
the principles themselves are prescriptive not descriptive in function.

Lastly, Nielsen maintains that
I am unfair to Marxists, who, he claims, do not wish to create a utopian system
of ideal values and are against terrorism. It is true that Marx was a critic
of utopian socialists for being unable to achieve socialism by simply enunciating
visionary views of the world. He thought that the only way to bring about socialism
was by the use of practical action. In this sense he was a realist rather than
a utopianist. But surely Marx—and many of his followers—have been motivated
by utopian ideals, for they deplore the fact that justice does not exist in
feudal and capitalist societies and they present an ideal picture of a classless
society where it would. This is a utopian vision, however unclear Marx was about
the exact contours of the society that would ensue after the destruction of
capitalism.

To deny that Marxists have defended
terrorism as a method of achieving communism and maintaining it against counterrevolution
is puzzling. Surely, Lenin used it, as did Trotsky, Stalin, and many other disciples
of Marxism. Granted that terrorism may be senseless and counterproductive, democratic
socialists have long argued that democratic methods of persuasion must be the
chief road to socialism. But Leninists have vigorously opposed this strategy.
Indeed, a profound moral tragedy of our time is precisely that Marxist revolutions
have been betrayed, that many Marxist revolutionaries who are out of power are
willing to use terroristic means to achieve it, and, once in power, to suppress
opposition to maintain themselves. It illustrates a chief problem for my paper,
namely that a Marxist theory of ideal ends is insufficient without also recognizing
the need for a theory of general ethical principles. A basic defect of Marxist
theory, in my judgment, is that it has not developed an adequate theory of ethics,
largely because of the centrality of the sociological interpretations of history.
Ethical standards allegedly reflect the conditions of production and the class
structure.

In any case, I do not believe
that humanism should be tied to a specific ideology—Marxist, liberal, conservative,
or others—but that ethical concerns transcend the limits of politics. This does
not deny that we have political convictions and that many ethical issues have
social and political solutions. But ethics, like other human interests—art,
religion, or science—cannot be reduced to a single ideological-political stance.
To attempt to do this would not only impoverish humanism, but make it narrow
in focus and banal in meaning. [30/31]

Comment by Mihailo Marković on Kurtz

While the paper of Professor
Kurtz is focused on the possibility of building a humanist ethics of responsibility,
he also deals with two other issues: (1) the meaning of humanism and humanist
morality, (2) the need of moral education. I share his critique of irrationalism,
obscurantism, and any form of totalitarian repression. Most of what he says
on moral education does not seem controversial to me. Also some of his ethical
principles certainly express a minimal basic core of any ethics.

My main difficulties with his
paper are first, to reconcile several apparently incompatible things
that he says about humanist morality, and, second, to understand
what he really means by ethical principles and how he expects to justify them.

In his attempt to characterize
humanism and humanist morality, Kurtz has at least two very different positions.

The view that prevails and which
probably is the one with which he identifies himself is what he describes as
"constructive skepticism." What characterizes this skeptical, minimalistic
position is a strong commitment to scientific rationality, secularity, and individual
freedom and a rather weak commitment to some kind of "caring" for
others (while one pursues his egoistic goals) and to "helping to relieve
distress" ("where we are able to do so"). From this point of
view the author struggles against religious irrationalism and totalitarianism,
but also against Marxist humanism. He seems to be aware that this emphasis on
freedom of isolated, unequal individuals may have conservative political and
economic implications. But he is ready to defend it philosophically by emphasizing
that hate, self-interest, jealousy, and competition are as deeply ingrained
in human nature as love, generosity, sympathy, and cooperation, and that, therefore,
one should not blame social institutions and laws for so much misery in the
human condition. Such a weak anthropological ground turns out to generate a
remarkable tolerance toward those who oppress and exploit others. Professor
Kurtz actually agrees that "humanists can be as deceitful and nasty, full
of pride and moved by the lust for fame and power" as anyone else. It looks
almost as if everyone is a humanist who chooses to label himself or herself
that way—in the same way as everyone becomes a Christian by joining a church.
The concept of humanism becomes quite uninformative and redundant if it does
not cover anything more but secular individualism. On that ground one cannot
build a very attractive ethics but at least this can be developed as a consistent
(traditional liberalist) position.

However, Professor Kurtz in
his paper tries to incorporate a number of more attractive moral ideas and these
may be shown to be incompatible [31/32] with the ethics of contemporary
business and of bourgeois society in general. He says, for example, that humanist
ethics "emphasizes independence and self-reliance, the development of one's
potentialities, the cultivation of critical intelligence and creative self-actualization.
For such autonomous persons an exuberant and full life overflowing with meanings
is readily available. This does not deny that our fullest happiness involves
other persons and presupposes some harmonious relationships with them."

This is now an essentially different
ethical position. Freedom in the sense of "development of one's potentialities"
is a very different thing from freedom in the sense of "economizing what
one wishes" (which according to Professor Kurtz is a "vital
virtue for humanist ethics"). One's potentiality to communicate meaningfully,
to reason and act creatively is an objective, universally human, latent
structure of dispositions which is present in an individual even after a very
unbearable and crippling socialization process. On the other hand, the subjective
wishes of a person who was crushed by the misery of the whole social
environment may be so limited that "becoming what one wishes—the leader
of a gang for example—could turn out to be precisely the opposite of self-realization.
Here the author who moves most of the time on traditional liberalist
ground of negative freedom (as absence of external impediments to do or become
what one actually desires) suddenly assumes the standpoint of positive freedom,
of self-realization of an autonomous person. And this is not merely a matter
of terminology since he suddenly here speaks of "cultivation of critical
intelligence" (rather than mere accumulation of positive specialized knowledge),
of "creative self-actualization" (rather than any growth), of an "exuberant
and full life overflowing with meanings" (rather than accumulation of wealth
and power).

This kind of inconsistency,
while logically unacceptable, need not be condemned if one consciously moves
from a poorer, more limited position toward a richer more general one. Only
one must also accept the implications and make necessary corrections elsewhere.
Namely his kind of humanist ethics that is based on the idea of positive freedom
(in the sense of self‑realization) is not only extremely critical toward
totalitarian, Stalinist society (and all Professor Kurtz’s critical arrows go
only in that direction) but also toward capitalist society (the oppressive dehumanizing
features have hardly been mentioned in this paper.) The vast majority of human
beings in both prevalent forms of contemporary society are utterly dependent,
they waste their potential, develop a receptive rather than critical intelligence,
produce but not create, and live anything but "exuberant, meaningful lives."

These profound and exciting humanist ethical ideals which
express the noblest strivings of our historical epoch, once formulated by Kurtz,
[32/33] disappear from the list of his ethical principles. In that list
we find elementary duties which constitute the very minimum of any morality
(such as "keeping promises," "paying debts," "not cheating
and injuring others") or very abstract categorical frameworks which wait
to be filled by content ("justice") or vague obligations (such as
"attempting to distribute goods as widely as possible"). (How resolutely
should one attempt? What does “widely” mean here?)

It is not clear what is the
theoretical status of those principles. At first they are construed as flexible,
violable, approximate guides for conduct, as conditional obligations, the fulfillment
of which is contingent upon an examination of the given situation. Furthermore,
they are regarded as mere "empirical phenomena," "they have developed
in social relationships over long periods of time as expression of human needs
and necessities, and come to be recognized as imperative in human relationships."
From here Professor Kurtz makes a jump and asserts that these are not merely
duties but principles, "because we can generalize various kinds
of action and recognize that these are general prescriptions, rules, and policies
that we ought to observe." It remains quite unclear where this ought
comes from. It is one thing to describe a variety of actual historical
patterns of conduct and moral habits. It is a completely different thing to
make a choice among them and to say that we ought to observe some of
them. Why some and not others? If we adopt certain norms merely because they
are observable over long periods of time as social facts then either we are
ignorant of other incompatible but equally empirically observable moral habits,
or we have to adopt a completely relativist approach. In the latter case
we can no longer oppose to patriarchal or feudal morality which is equally a
matter of empirical fact. On the other hand if their ought does not follow
from is, why does it in our ethics? A naturalist, humanist ethics can only be
founded on a philosophical theory of human being. Else it lacks any foundation,
stops being a (normative) ethical theory and turns into a positive (sociological)
description of various existing forms of morality.

Reply by Paul Kurtz to Marković

Mihailo Markovic asks whether
the position that I am defending is anything more than a form of "secular
individualism." He claims to find this incompatible with other views that
I express in my paper, especially my emphasis on creative actualization and
moral development. It is clear that humanism has been identified with
the classical liberal position. I share [33/34] this libertarian viewpoint.
It does not necessarily imply, however, a rampant egoism immune to moral development.
This surely was not the case for John Stuart Mill, who was a libertarian humanist
and who emphasized the need to develop the higher pleasures: moral, aesthetic
and intellectual. Nor was it the case with John Dewey who sought to cultivate
growth and democratic values in education. For the liberal humanist freedom
in both senses, negative (freedom from) and positive (freedom to), are
essential and not incompatible.

Accordingly, I would affirm
the need of humanist ethics to develop an appreciation for the moral virtues
of caring, helping others, having a regard for justice, nonmalfeasance, beneficence
and other basic moral principles. (Incidentally, this is not a distinctively
humanist position. Surely Christianity has emphasized the altruistic virtues.)
I would also include in my catalogue of moral principles many others, such as
fairness, equality, fraternity, etc. Professor Marković is entirely correct
that I prize individual freedom—of creatively developed persons—in
the last analysis as a central, but not the only, value. Marxists have all too
often been willing to sacrifice individual freedom at the altar of Social Reconstruction.
The kind of Marxist-humanism which Marković represents has not done this
(thus far it has not met with much success); and it has attempted to keep alive
an appreciation for human rights and freedom. In my view it is unfortunate that
twentieth century humanism had been identified with certain repressive varieties
of Marxism. Leninism, Stalinism and Maoism consider themselves to be "humanistic"
in so far as they have a "humanitarian" concern for justice and progress,
but they have abandoned freedom in the process. In retrospect, I consider Marxist
communism to be the opium of the intellectuals and the poison of the masses,
for it has led to hatred and intolerance. On balance, it is more destructive
of humanist values than most of the systems that it seeks to replace. Humanists
have surely not defended the status quo. They have been critics of the inequities
of capitalist societies. They have sought to reform societies, to remove obstacles
to individual growth, such as poverty and discrimination, to enhance individual
development by helping to satisfy basic economic needs and providing for educational
and cultural opportunity, and other ameliorative programs. It seems to me to
be apparent, based upon the historical evidence thus far, that voluntary pluralistic
societies that encourage individual initiative and innovation are more likely
to achieve both freedom and a better life for the common man than are controlled
totalitarian societies.

Intellectuals in general and
humanists in particular have not recognized the moral contributions that democratic
capitalism can make to human freedom and well-being. On the contrary, if you
eradicate all economic freedom, and centralize control in a state bureaucracy
or in a one [34/35] party system, you end up by losing most other
freedoms—political, intellectual and cultural. What is the point of dreaming
about the theoretical democratic possibilities of an ideal Marxist-humanism
when empirical reality vividly demonstrates the opposite.

I reiterate that I do not believe
that humanism—as a secular ethic of freedom—should be tied to a specific ideology
or even a specific economic, political or social system. If it was humane for
humanists to have defended socialism at one period of history as a way to guarantee
and enhance freedom, to do so now is questionable, especially in view of what
has happened to human rights and freedoms in so-called Marxist societies. Accordingly,
one can surely be a humanist today and defend humanistic capitalism. Perhaps
other social systems will emerge in the future more appropriate to world
conditions, and humanists along with others will need to revise their ideological
commitments. The terms "conservative," "liberal," or "bourgeois"
meanwhile have lost all identifiable meanings. In one sense, a democratic
humanism is still the most radical of ethical postures in so far
as it wishes to expand the dimensions of human freedom. Its chief enemies today
are authoritarianism and totalitarianism, whether communistic or capitalistic,
secularist or ecclesiastical.

Marković's last point concerns
obligation. I can find no ultimate basis for ought. I can find
no roots for moral principles in God or History, only in human needs, interests
and ideals. Obligations can only be tested in the last analysis by their consequences
in human experience. In this sense I remain a situationist and pluralist in
ethics, though modified 'by my commitment to a set of prima facie ethical
principles. I view such ethical principles as the common heritage of the human
race, based upon funded experience. That is why I believe that it is vital that
they be psychologically grounded in human motivation—in feeling as well as thought—by
programs of moral education. While obligations are relative to human situations,
they need not be subjective, but are amenable to reflective criticism and can
be revised in the light of a process of inquiry. In this sense, the position
that I hold is a form of objective relativism.