Subject: Indonesia's 'sporadic' foreign
policy must go back to 'free and active'

Also Indonesia: A Study in Military Manipulation

The Jakarta Post November 10, 2006

RI's 'sporadic' foreign policy must go back to 'free and active'

Avian E. Tumengkol, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta

With the Democrats back in power in the House and Senate after 12
years, Indonesia may find it necessary to revive its traditional
"free and active" foreign policy, an analyst says, given the
party's bent on human rights issues.

Although the government officially states its foreign policy is
independent of alliances, or "free and active", Suzie Sudarman,
the director of the American Studies Center at the University of Indonesia
(UI), said the policy lately had been "tinged with too much
religiosity".

Suzie said Indonesia was striving to be a model Muslim democratic
nation to other Muslim countries as part of the U.S. war on terror.

"If the Democratic Congress pursued issues such as the trial of
perpetrators of the East Timor violence or begins questioning the plight
of Papua or the rights of religious minorities, Indonesia will feel
compelled ... to return to its original construct: 'diplomacy of struggle'
and will look for allies ...," she said in an e-mail interview.

Suzie, however, said Indonesia need not worry too much about the
changes brought by the U.S. midterm election, "if we constantly keep
our house in order by turning Indonesia into a governed system that is
just and prosperous".

Suzie said Democrats would compel the country to implement human rights
and environmental protections and improve law enforcement "to
invigorate its economic potentials".

"We need to swiftly change our own rule by folly, to avoid
becoming the constant focus of any American politician trying to make
political hay out of Indonesia's perennial incompetence and
mismanagement", Suzie wrote to The Jakarta Post.

A former Asia Foundation fellow who worked with the U.S. Congress,
Smita Notosusanto, said Indonesia had always been too easily influenced by
the U.S., whichever party led Congress.

Smita, a lecturer on international relations at UI, said Democrats
might lead a policy review on military cooperation, which could hurt
Indonesia's interests.

"In general, Indonesia is not even on their (U.S.) list of
priorities," she said. Indonesia was, however, "on top" of
countries that had become "victims" of U.S. foreign policy, she
said.

Although Indonesian envoys have described relations with the U.S. as
"dramatically improving", Smita said the "strategic
partnership" between the U.S. and Indonesia was largely based on
Indonesia's expectations of material benefits.

Trade here, was a vital issue, she said.

The U.S. has been increasingly active in sponsoring economic
development and guarantees of military security for Indonesia.

The war on terror and combating Islamic radicalism have been top
priorities for both countries.

A senior Indonesian diplomat said given the current international
circumstances, changes in basic U.S. foreign policy were unlikely,
particularly on terrorism and drug trafficking.

Makarim Wibisono, Indonesia's ambassador and permanent representative
to the United Nations, said U.S. foreign policy would likely be focused on
helping countries, including Indonesia, to join the war on terror by
promoting free trade agreements; ensuring foreign assistance programs did
not perpetuate "bad" policies, and better organizing efforts to
offer technical security assistance.

"The United States' move towards democracy and moderation has led
and, at the same time, placed Indonesia at the forefront of the
international stage, coincidentally with the global efforts to combat and
solve those international problems," said Makarim, who previously
served as a diplomat to the U.S.

A former U.S. diplomat to Indonesia said changes here would end up
being more important than changes in the American government.

"On human rights, the big change is not in domestic U.S. policies,
but in an improvement in the human rights situation in Indonesia. No
longer having the then-East Timor as an issue is a major factor,"
Barbara Harvey, the former U.S. deputy chief of mission to Indonesia, told
the Post.

---

The Irrawaddy

Indonesia: A Study in Military Manipulation November 2006 By Andreas
Harsono/Jakarta

Why the pursuit of enemies of the West strengthens the traditional hold
on power of East Asia’s largest army

The restoration by the US of full military ties with Indonesia, in the
common interest of combating global terrorism, has been used by Jakarta’s
generals to further their own domestic political interests as well as to
hunt down Islamic extremists.

They divided Papua into two different provinces to weaken rising Papuan
nationalism, even though the move was against Papua’s special autonomy
law. The central government managed to persuade Indonesia’s Supreme
Court to rule in favor of the division.

Jakarta also negotiated with the nationalists in Aceh province to sign
a peace agreement in Helsinki, a move widely applauded although Jakarta
later betrayed the agreement by passing a contradictory Aceh bill.
Furthermore, the Indonesian military has dragged its feet in handing over
its business empire to the government.

This continued manipulation of power by the military, and the elected
executive’s failure to reform it since the end of the Suharto
dictatorship in 1998, follows one of six scenarios put forward for
Indonesia’s future in a report by the Rand Corporation, a US think-tank,
which is closely linked with the Pentagon. The report, published in 2002
as The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, Politics, and
Power, was written by two American military strategists, Angel Rabasa and
John Haseman.

Rabasa is a senior policy analyst at Rand Corporation. Haseman is a
retired colonel and former US defense attaché in Jakarta from 1978 to
1994. He once declared that Indonesia’s military “was, is, and will
remain the most powerful and important political institution in Indonesia.”
According to Haseman, the Indonesian military has three priorities: to
maintain power, to protect its business empire and to maintain internal
control of senior assignments.

Rabasa and Haseman argued that the US should engage the Indonesian
military and restore the American military training and education program
for Indonesian officers. These programs were initially cut off after
Indonesian soldiers killed more than 200 protesters in Dili in November
1991. They were totally scrapped after Indonesian army-backed militias
ransacked East Timor after it voted for independence in 1999.

The report also delved into what the authors called Indonesia’s six
post-9/11 “scenarios.” The first, and best, scenario is a “consolidated
democracy.” This would mean developing a secular state to improve its
economic performance and to satisfy demands for autonomy, especially on
the outer islands. But this scenario is the most difficult and the most
unlikely.

Indonesia is a relatively young entity. Dutch colonialists were the
first to unite this vast archipelago comprising more than 17,000 islands
and stretching over six time zones. Its 220 million people speak more than
500 different languages and 88 percent of them are Muslim. It has a
Christian majority in eastern areas.

Since the 1950s, Aceh in northern Sumatra has struggled to secede from
Indonesia. Papua set up its own Free Papua Organization in 1965. Four
million people have been killed in Indonesia over the last six decades as
a result of “rebellion” in the pursuit of separatism.

Haseman said the Indonesian military’s concept of “reform” does
not include any enthusiasm for accountability for past transgressions and
can be expected to resist it.

The second scenario is defined as “muddling through,” in which
Indonesia continues on a democratic path but fails to make progress on
economic, political and military reform. “This scenario reflects the
current situation in Indonesia,” say Haseman and Rabasa. “A weak
Indonesian government would continue to find it difficult to take
meaningful action against terrorists and radical Islam groups.”

New York Times columnist Thomas L Friedman calls Indonesia a messy
state. Indonesia is too big to fail, but too messy to work. It has rampant
corruption. Neither the military, the parliament, the executive, nor the
remnants of the Suharto order, have the strength to assert their will.
Terrorists love such conditions. “That’s why in messy states, you
never quite know when arms are sold, people murdered or payoffs demanded,
or whether this is by design of those ostensibly in charge or because no
one is in charge,” writes Friedman.

The third scenario is a return to authoritarian rule. Messiness would
generate a fragile economy and a breakdown in order. It would later
promote the idea that a strong ruler was needed. Some media and
politicians are already talking about “the good old times” under
Suharto. But a return to authoritarian rule must have the backing of the
military, as in Pakistan and Burma.

“An authoritarian government might be better able to take more
forceful action against terrorist and radical networks,” Rabasa and
Haseman write. But it will have legal and policy restrictions on the US’s
interaction with Indonesia. It would therefore hamper meaningful
cooperation on counterterrorism efforts.

The fourth scenario is radical Islamic influence or control. This is
partially happening today where more than 30 Indonesian regencies have
produced Shariah-based laws, including the diktat that women must wear
headdresses. The Rand report says that under this scenario it is not
realistic to expect Western engagement with the Indonesian military.

The fifth scenario is a radical decentralization. A much weaker Jakarta
might accept wide-ranging autonomy initiatives that replicate the Acehnese
and Papuan special privileges. For this to happen, Jakarta might finally
only control defense, foreign affairs, fiscal policy and the core legal
system. Such an Indonesian state is likely to be unstable as centrifugal
pressures force it apart.

A loose federation would make it harder to achieve counterterrorism
objectives. The Jakarta government might be powerless to control terrorist
activities in the provinces. Some areas of Indonesia could end up like the
lawless tribal areas of Pakistan on the Afghan border, where the Taliban
moves freely.

The sixth and last scenario is Indonesia’s disintegration. Weak
government and chaotic conditions would make the central government less
relevant, and rich provinces would challenge their subordinate political
and economic relationship with Jakarta.

Only months after the Rand report was published, two night clubs were
blown up in Bali, killing 202 people and crippling Bali’s tourism
industry. The victims were mostly young foreign tourists. Many Balinese
working in the Kuta beach area were also killed. Hundreds more suffered
horrific burns and other injuries.

The suspected culprit was Jemaah Islamiyah, an al-Qaida satellite group
in Southeast Asia, led by Muslim cleric Abu Bakar Basyir. In his hometown
Solo, several hours after the bombings, Basyir blamed the US and Israel
for the attacks.

The vice president at that time, Hamzah Haz, who initially denied any
terrorist activity in Indonesia and even visited some radical Islamist
groups, suddenly found himself in a corner. The then president, Megawati
Sukarnoputri, however, remained aloof. She ordered her chief security
minister, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, to hunt down the bombers.

Dozens of militants were arrested. In 2003, a Bali court found some of
them, alumni of the Afghan jihad campaign, guilty of planning and
organizing the bombing. Three Islamists were sentenced to death. Several
others were given jail terms. They claimed that they disliked “infidels”
polluting Indonesia’s Islamic community. Basyir was additionally found
guilty of producing fake identities.

Other bombings took place in Bali and Jakarta, including one outside
the Australian embassy. The US had no option but to reinstate its military
ties with Indonesia. Both the State and Defense departments in Washington
petitioned to reinstate two agreements­the International Military and
Education Training arrangement, known as IMET, and the Foreign Military
Finance pact­as a demonstration of Washington’s gratitude for
Indonesian assistance in the global war on terrorism.

The Bush administration and Republican allies in Congress said the
previous policy of punishing Indonesia for human rights violations had not
paid dividends; the hoped-for reform of the Indonesian military and
security apparatus had not taken place.

In 2004, Yudhoyono ran for presidential office against his former boss,
Megawati Sukarnoputri. Yudhoyono, a retired three-star general educated in
the US, won Indonesia’s first direct presidential election and
immediately lobbied Washington to fully restore military ties with his
country.

In February 2005, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice declared that
the Indonesian military had reformed itself sufficiently to merit the
resumption of IMET status; in November, the restrictions on FMF and
defense exports were lifted.

In Minahasa, northern Sulawesi, a small group of politicians declared a
Free Minahasa Movement in September 2006, saying the Christian minorities
in Indonesia, including Minahasa, were continually being discriminated
against.

It is too early to predict which of the six scenarios laid out by
Rabasa and Haseman­if any­will develop in Indonesia. The first and sixth
scenarios are improbable in the future. A combination of a messy state
peppered with growing Islamist influence and sporadic decentralization
drives is perhaps more likely.

The world is changing after September 11, 2001, and it is still not
clear in which direction Indonesia is going.

Andreas Harsono is head of the Pantau media organization in Jakarta,
and is writing a book, From Sabang to Merauke: Debunking the Myth of
Indonesian Nationalism.