February 2019

The Potential for a U.S.-Canadian

Spacefaring PartnershipCanada’s Role in The U.S. Return to Space LeadershipBy Sean Kelly and Christopher SandsNearly 50 years ago, the U.S. space program sent a manned mission to theMoon and returned everyone safely. That achievement served as an inspirationfor people around the world, and next door. In Ottawa, Prime Minister PierreTrudeau was moved to reach out to Washington and negotiate a partnershipbetween Canadian scientists and NASA that would lead to the formation of theCanadian Space Agency (CSA) in 1989. A young Canadian named Chris Hadfieldsaw the moon landing and determined to become an astronaut – writing anaward-winning children’s book about that experience.

Donald Trump as 45th President of the United States has seized upon spaceas a major policy priority. The Trump administration’s ambition to reclaim U.S.leadership in space and remind Americans of their heritage as a “spacefaringnation” could inspire a new generation of Canadians to follow Hadfield intospace, and provide Prime Minister Justin Trudeau with an opening to partnerwith the United States and re-launch the partnership between the UnitedStates and Canada in space.

Re-establishing Space as a U.S. National Priority

President Trump is rearranging existing institutional structures to implementthe multi-agency, multi-departmental effort in the U.S. federal government todevelop policies and priorities to realize the return to space. These institutionshave in turn delivered a number of policy directives that have given specificdefinition to U.S. space policy objectives while coordinating a whole ofgovernment effort in support of the expansion of the longstanding NASA rolein space science and exploration, the rapidly developing commercial spacesector in the United States, and an effort to secure space militarily and regulateuse of low-earth orbit.

Canada has a well-developed partnership with NASA that supports space

science and exploration, but the changes in U.S. priorities for NASA will requirea recalibration of this partnership and open new opportunities for the CSA.Canada’s small but highly regarded commercial space sector will similarlysee new business opportunities including the chance to enhance supplychain participation in the U.S. space marketplace. But an expanded US space

WILSON CENTER 2marketplace also implies expanded application of US rules in space and somein Canada may resist the extraterrestrial application of U.S. law in the same waythat prior U.S. efforts to apply rules extraterritorially in Earth-bound geopoliticsled to strong objections from many Canadians.

Extending the U.S.-Canadian military relationship into the space domain is

an opportunity that requires a strategic rethink by Canada. Will adding spaceto the operational remit of extant alliance structures like the North AmericanAerospace Defense Command (NORAD) best meet the current threats to U.S.and Canadian interests in space, or will new alliances be needed? How willCombined Space Operations help enhance the bi-lateral partnership in spaceand where do legacy alliance structures like NORAD fit in?1 And, given themany demands on Canada’s military budget, is a military role in space feasible,particularly if it can only be achieved at the expense of Canadian defense inother domains?

Before addressing Canadian policy opportunities in the U.S. space policy surge,it is important to consider the specific steps that have been taken in the UnitedStates to give effect to the Trump administration’s aspirations in space.

New Organizational Structures for U.S. Space Policy

Two bodies have been established to set policy priorities for space policy in theTrump administration: a presidential advisory council on space that was revivedand renamed the U.S. National Space Council; and the Users’ Advisory Group onSpace Policy.

National Space Council

On June 30, 2017, President Trump reinstated2 the National Space Councilthrough an executive order, a group that had been inactive since the early

1 Combined space operations refers to joint space efforts, such as the U.S. Combined SpaceOperations Center (CSpOC), that are assembled to strengthen space cooperation between the U.S.and it’s allies.2 The White House, “Presidential Executive Order on Reviving the National Space Council,” TheWhite House, (June 30, 2017).

WILSON CENTER 31990s. The council functions as an advisory body for the President, with VicePresident Mike Pence as Chairman, and is currently in the process of reviewingU.S. space policy. Among its mandates are to maintain relationships andcoordination within the space sector, and advise on United States participationin international space activities. So far, the council has convened four times--once in 2017 and three times in 2018--where they have focused on regulatoryreform3, space traffic management4, military space, and other new strategiesto ensure U.S. commercial success in space, and have advised the President onthree space policy directives.

Users’ Advisory Group

The National Space Council’s Users’ Advisory Group, serves to “foster closecoordination, cooperation, and technology and information exchange” withinthe sector. The group is made up of former astronauts and representativesacross industry and government. The group, known as the National SpaceCouncil’s “think tank,” held its first meeting5 on June 19, 2018 with presentationsfrom the Space Council’s Scott Pace, the Department of Commerce, andNASA Administrator Jim Bridenstine. The Chairman of the group, retired U.S.Navy Adm. James Ellis, announced the establishment of six subcommittees:exploration and discovery, national security space, economic development andthe industrial base, technology and innovation, outreach and education, andspace policy and international engagement.

With the advice of the Users Advisory Group, the U.S. National Space Councilhas issued three U.S. space policy directives to date (referred to here as SPD-1,SPD-2, and SPD-3). A close examination of these objectives offers insight intothe objectives and goals of the United States in space, as well as details on thespecific projects that will receive priority in the near term.

WILSON CENTER 4Space Policy Directive-1 (SPD-1): Return to the Moon and On to MarsPresident Trump’s first Space Policy Directive aimed to revitalize U.S. humanspace capabilities. The memorandum stated that the United States would‘‘lead an innovative and sustainable program of exploration with commercialand international partners to enable human expansion across the solar systemand to bring back to Earth new knowledge and opportunities.” The signeddeclaration promised to build up U.S. manned mission capacity in low earthorbit first, followed by the Moon, and eventually Mars. The United Statesanticipates robotic missions to the moon beginning as early as 2019 and nolater than 2021, laying the groundwork for manned missions to follow soonafter 6.

The President’s FY 2019 budget proposed7 that $10.9 billion of NASA’s fundingbe used for space exploration and a return to the Moon, more than half ofNASA’s total $19.9 billion budget.8 This was an increase of $370 million fromthe previous year, and further increases that would bring the total budget upto $21.5 billion are currently awaiting approval.9 The President’s priorities areechoed in NASA’s Exploration Campaign10, launched to facilitate the transitionof low-earth orbit activities to the private sector, move long-term humanspaceflight missions, such as those currently conducted on the InternationalSpace Station (ISS), to orbit the moon, and allow for long-term human androbotic exploration of the moon, with the intention of preparing for eventualmissions to Mars.

SPD-1.1 Commercial Lunar Payload Services (CLPS)

NASA is already taking steps to return to the moon and, in essence, istransitioning from the role of operator to customer. In May, NASA announced

WILSON CENTER 5the cancellation11 of their Resource Prospector program12, a lunar miningmission designed to mine resources such as hydrogen, oxygen, and wateron the moon. While some components of the Prospector will be kept, theAgency has instead opted for a more commercial approach. On April 27, NASAissued a draft request for proposals13 for a new Commercial Lunar PayloadServices (CLPS). Seeking companies capable of getting 10 kilograms to thelunar surface by 2021. Additionally, NASA sought industry’s input on a public-private program to develop two mid-sized lunar landers, which would becomplementary to the CLPS mission.

SPD-1.2 Deep Space Gateway

NASA is taking a similarly commercial approach to another important program,the Deep Space Gateway. The Gateway is intended14 to be a research anddevelopment facility stationed near the moon that would allow relativelyeasy access to both the moon and earth and eventually act as a jumping-off point for Mars missions. NASA has issued a request15 for public-privatepartnership proposals from industry on the first element of the Gateway, apower and propulsion craft. Industry is prepared to make use of, or enhancethe, capabilities of the Gateway to further commercial space business, payloadtransportation, resource requirements, and orbital preferences.

SPD-1.3 International Space Station (ISS)

In line with its overall strategy for space exploration and industry, the Trumpadministration has made an effort to promote the privatization of low-earthorbit, which would include the privatization of the ISS.

WILSON CENTER 6NASA Administrator Jim Bridenstine stated that he was speaking withcompanies interested in jointly assuming operational responsibility of ISS,16though walked back from the idea a few months later.17 Privatization of ISShas been opposed by some in Congress, including Senator Ted Cruz (R-Texas),chairman of the Senate space subcommittee. Additionally, an independentstudy by the Institute for Defense Analysis questions the station’s commercialviability by 2025, 18 and a NASA Inspector General study also questioned theamount of time proposed by the Administration to commercialize the station.19In July 2018, Cruz, along with Sens. Bill Nelson (D-Fla.) and Ed Markey (D-Mass.),introduced the Space Frontier Act.20 Among other things, the bill amendedlanguage in the National Aeronautics and Space Administration AuthorizationAct of 2010 to extend the ISS until 2030. While the bill passed in the Senate inDecember, it failed to pass in the House, effectively killing it.”21

SPD-1.4 Commercial Crew Program

NASA’s Commercial Crew Program began in 2010 as a way of reinvigoratingU.S. human spaceflight capabilities through public-private partnerships. InSeptember 2014, Boeing and SpaceX as the commercial companies that wouldhelp NASA carry astronauts to the ISS using services domestically developedand launched. Boeing’s CST-100 Starliner will be launched using an Atlas VUnited Launch Alliance Rocket, while SpaceX’s Crew Dragon will be lifted intospace aboard a SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket. The first of these astronaut crews wereannounced on August 3 at the Johnson Space Center. Test flights by bothcompanies are scheduled to begin in 2019. The crew will be the first astronautsto be launched domestically to the ISS since 2011.

On February 21, 2018, the National Space Council met to discuss regulatoryreform options that would encourage commercial space activities. Since theDepartment of Commerce (DOC) and the Department of Transportation (DOT)oversee many of the regulations for the industry, they were the regulatorybodies the council focused on. The council determined that DOC wouldlead this regulatory overhaul and become a “one-stop shop” for companiesoperating in the sector. Additionally, they discussed reforming launch and re-entry licensing, commercial remote sensing, radio frequency spectrum, and areview of export licensing regulations. This led to the signing of Space PolicyDirective 2 by the President in May 2018.22

SPD-2.1 Commerce Department Reorganization

In May 2018, SPD-2 directed space-faring agencies to reform regulations inorder to create an environment more conducive for commercial space. Thememorandum directed23 the Department of Commerce to develop a proposalfor Congress to create an entity responsible for DOC space regulations. Thenew entity will be known as the Space Policy Advancing Commercial Enterprise(SPACE) Administration, and Secretary Ross has directed the Bureau of Industryand Security, International Trade Administration, National Institute of Standardsand Technology, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA),and the National Telecommunications and Information to establish a liaison towork with the new office. Additionally, DOC will consolidate the CommercialRemote Sensing Regulatory Affairs Office with the new SPACE Administrationto review DOC’s commercial remote sensing regulations, coordinate with theNational Space Council to review export licensing procedures, and develop areport on DOC spectrum management policy.

WILSON CENTER 8In addition to the proposed changes to DOC, SPD-2 also directed DOT toreview and adapt launch and re-entry licensing and regulation for a rapidlychanging commercial spaceflight industry, including a single license for alltypes of commercial space flight launch and re-entry operations; and replacingprescriptive requirements in the commercial space flight launch and re-entrylicensing process with performance-based criteria. Additionally, the directiverequested that DOT coordinate with the Department of Defense and NASA onevaluate operations at federal launch sites.

SPD 3.1 Data Sharing

The Directive designates DOC to take over the facilitation of Space SituationalAwareness (SSA) information sharing from DoD. Additionally, Commerce willbe the primary civil agency responsible for maintaining a public SSA datarepository, developing standards and protocols for the use of SSA data, andpartnering with industry and academia to ensure that information is sharedeffectively.

SPD-3.2 Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices

SPD-3 directs NASA to lead a number of standard practice and guidelineupdates in coordination with the relevant departments and agencies. This willinclude updating the U.S. Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices anddeveloping new satellite design and operation guidelines.

WILSON CENTER 9SPD-4 U.S. Space ForceSPD-4, establishes a U.S. Space Force as a separate military branch within theDepartment of Defense. Six recommendations are under consideration by thePresident that will eventually be incorporated in SPD-4. Recommendationsincluded establishing a U.S. Space Command and Space Development Agency,directing the Pentagon to submit a legislative proposal and a budget requestfor FY 2020, and to enhance coordination between the space force and theintelligence community.

President Trump initially announced his intention to establish the space

force during the Council’s meeting in in June. This policy proposal was againechoed in August by Vice President Mike Pence, who laid out twenty-five of theAdministration’s plans to establish a space force as a separate branch of the U.S.military by 2020, pending Congressional approval. The establishment of a spaceforce as a separate branch of the military goes against previous statementsfrom the Pentagon on the issue, including a letter25 that was sent last year toCongress by Secretary of Defense James Mattis, who stated that “at a timewhen we are trying to integrate the department’s joint warfighting functions, Ido not wish to add a separate service that would likely present a narrower andeven parochial approach to space operations.”

2018 Midterm Elections

Last year’s U.S. midterm elections, which resulted in a Democratic majorityin the U.S. House of Representatives, have generated an air of uncertaintyregarding the future of Trump’s space agenda. Democrats are expected to usetheir new majority to oppose the creation of the Space Force. Adam Smith (D-WA), the ranking Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee (HASC),has assumed the role of Chairman in the new Congress. HASC approval willbe required in order to establish a Space Force. While Smith has been open tosimilar proposals in the past, he has opposed26 the creation of Space Force, at

WILSON CENTER 10least in its present form. Results of the midterms also included the defeat ofmany representatives from key space states who have been allies in Congress,including representatives from Texas, California, and Colorado.

Canada’s Space Policy Framework: Ready to Partner

The origins of Canadian activity in space date back to rocket developmentactivity conducted by the Canadian military in the late stages of the SecondWorld War. Canada was the third country (after the United States and the SovietUnion) to have designed an orbital satellite, the Alouette 1, launched by NASAin September 1962.

In 1969, Canada’s partnership with NASA expanded to include joint

development of orbital research projects. Canada’s federal Ministry of State forScience and Technology was responsible for non-military space policy since1974 as the National Space Policy called for the development of a Canadianastronaut recruitment and training program. Marc Garneau, now a Memberof Parliament and Canada’s Minister of Transport, became the first Canadian inspace on October 5, 1984. The creation of the Canadian Space Agency (CSA)followed on March 1, 1989 under Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and the CSA’sfirst director Larkin Kerwin.

Canada’s objectives for its presence in space evolved from an early emphasis onspace science and research to encompass space-related aspects of commercialinnovation and national defense. Although, on a smaller scale, Canada’scapacities and ambitions in the space domain run parallel to those of theUnited States. The two space programs have experienced frequent interaction,intersection, and collaboration. Canada is a natural partner today as the U.S.emboldens its spacefaring heritage.

Organizational Structures for Canadian Space Policy

Several federal government departments have activities in the space domain.The Department of National Defence Canada takes the lead on military andintelligence uses of space, coordinating the satellite-based intelligence work

WILSON CENTER 11of the Canadian Security Establishment (CSE), Canada’s counterpart to theNational Security Agency (NSA). The civilian scientific and commercial activityof Canadians in space is the purview of the federal Ministry of Innovation,Science, and Economic Development Canada (ISED), the cabinet departmentthat includes the CSA. There are additional federal government agencies anddepartments with equities in space including the Ministry of Environment andClimate Change to the Ministry for Natural Resources.

The coordination of these activities has been governed by a series of Long TermSpace Plans (LTSPs) developed by the CSA that provide guidance on neededpublic investments, research priorities, and opportunities for cooperation withinternational partners. LTSPs adopted by the Government of Canada in 1986,1994, and 2003 expanded partnerships with the United States, encouragedthe commercial space sector in Canada, and led to Canadian developmentof the Canadarm for use in the U.S. Space Shuttles, Canadian participation inmultinational efforts to develop and operate the International Space Station,and an important scientific role for Canada in the soon-to-launch James WebbSpace Telescope by NASA, the European Space Agency, and the CSA.

The most recent LTSP was completed in 2008 but was not adopted by the then-Harper government in Canada, a setback for the Canadian space community.In its 2011 budget, the Harper government called for a National Aerospace andSpace Review chaired by David Emerson. The Emerson Review took 11 monthsand produced a two-volume report in 2012, one volume addressing Canadianaerospace, and the other Canadian space policy.

In response to recommendations by the Emerson Review, two new structures

were established to develop Canadian presence and activity in space: a SpaceAdvisory Board and a Space Program Management Board.

Canadian Space Advisory Board

The Canadian Space Advisory Board reports to the ISED minister, providing

WILSON CENTER 12input through the minister to the Canadian Cabinet on the setting of nationalspace priorities and opportunities. The Space Advisory Board members aredrawn from industry, the research and academic communities, provinces andterritories, and federal departments and agencies. The first Space AdvisoryBoard was appointed in November 2014 by the Harper government. The SpaceAdvisory Board was renewed with a change in membership by the Trudeaugovernment in 2017.

Canadian Space Program Management Board

Within the government, a deputy minister-level Space Program ManagementBoard was created to coordinate federal space activities. All agencies anddepartments with a role in the Canadian space program are required to reportto the Space Program Management Board on implementation of the policypriorities set out by Cabinet, and Space Program Management Board alsomonitors and evaluates projects on the basis of timelines and cost.

In 2014, Canada’s Space Advisory Board contributed to the development of a

Space Policy Framework that encapsulated the Harper government’s policypriorities related to civilian uses of space. The 2014 Framework established fiveguiding principles for Canada in space: (1) Placing Canadian Interests First; (2)Positioning the Private Sector at the Forefront of Space Activities; (3) Progressthrough International Partnerships; (4) Excellence in Key Capabilities; and (5)Providing Inspiration to Canadians. This last principle related to inspiring youngCanadians to pursue education in Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math(STEM) subjects to enable them to participate in space-related career fields.In an introduction to the 2014 Framework document, then-Industry MinisterJames Moore noted, “Canada’s space industry provides about 8,000 highly-skilled jobs and contributes $3.33 billion to Canada’s economy every year.” Thisrecognition of the growth of Canada’s commercial space sector, reflected in theFramework’s emphasis on private sector leadership in setting goals and seizingopportunities was a milestone in the Canadian government’s approach tospace policy.

WILSON CENTER 13While the 2014 Framework provided a clear rationale for the expansion ofCanadian activity in the space domain (apart from national security) it fell shortof a fully-developed Canadian Space Policy backed by specific programs andexpenditures.

The federal election in 2015 ended the Harper government and the newTrudeau government took time to revisit space policy. It appointed a newSpace Advisory Board (retaining several members of the Harper SAB) in 2017and the 2018 federal budget included increases in funding for science, someof which may be space-related. Yet the 2018 budget did not feature a newcommitment to space akin to that underway in the United States.

Canada’s military capabilities in the space domain have been identified as

a priority within the Trudeau government’s Defence Policy review, entitledStrong, Secure, Engaged: Canada’s Defence Policy27, which was released inlate 2017. The new Canadian defense policy calls for investment in expandedoperational capabilities in space, modernizing existing Canadian satellites,protecting Canada’s interests in the space domain, and supporting the peacefuluse of outer space. The Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) is given responsibilityto coordinate and oversee the defense space program with an emphasis onserving both domestic and international purposes while achieving seamlessintegration with Canada’s defense partners, including most prominently theUnited States.

The Trudeau government has yet to put its stamp on Canadian space policy,and in particular, it has not taken decisions on major new spending or projectsin which the Government of Canada will invest. The structures put in placeto develop Canadian space policy and priorities are adequate to the task, butdecisions must be taken to transform Canadian ambitions for a continued role

Will a U.S.-Canadian Spacefaring Partnership Emerge?

There is great potential for the Trump administration’s space policy driveto clarify the choices and opportunities available to Canada and catalyzethe Trudeau government to respond with a new Canadian Space Policy. If itdoes, the two countries’ similar priorities for greater capabilities in scientific,commercial, and military activity in space could extend from researchcooperation to joint development and operations.

A future partnership will build on decades of successful U.S.-Canadian

collaboration in the past, but will also require a recognition of some of the waysthat the Trump administration has changed the paradigm for activity in space.

♦♦ From science-forward to utility-forward missions. In the past, the

shared interest in scientific discovery and exploration made it simpler for the U.S. and Canadian programs to work together for common and relatively noncontroversial goals. Today, the U.S. has established a set of specific missions including sending humans to the Moon and to Mars, protecting U.S. interests in space, and regulating private and public sector activity in low earth orbit. Decisions on funding and priorities in the United States will shift from a science-forward approach to a utility- forward approach. To partner with the United States, Canada must share the U.S. mission objective, and while science generates knowledge for the wider world to share, utility will produce capabilities that will be available to fewer actors and may not be shared. While picking and choosing missions and project will suffice for a time, a larger debate in Canada about the objectives and orientation of Canadian space policy will be needed.

♦♦ Governments as Customers of the Private Sector, Not as Independent

Owner-Operators. For decades the U.S. government drove innovation by setting goals and then contracting with the private sector to

WILSON CENTER 15 respond with bespoke solutions that would have few, if any, additional customers. For new technology start-ups, a space related government contract was a lifeline. For established firms that often operated in the aerospace and defense sectors, such contracts fueled research and development and generated spin-offs that could be sold to government for defense or commercialized and sold to the private sector. Today, the Trump administration is seeking to leverage the growing commercial space sector to reach its goals quickly and at an affordable cost by positioning the federal government as one customer among many others, including foreign governments and private firms. In practice this means that governments that once represented most of a company’s market and could set their own terms must now adjust to competition from others for the time and attention of a growing but still limited number of space sector firms.

A U.S.-Canadian partnership can benefit the United States in two ways as it

shifts to being one customer among many for the commercial space sector.First, Canada has been in the position of being one customer among many eversince it developed a space program, and so in contracting, cost-control, andthe management of relationships Canada’s experience has value as a modelfor how U.S. government entities might adapt. Second, Canada’s commercialspace sector adds to and complements the same sector in the United States.In the Trump administration’s 2017 National Defense Strategy a distinction isdrawn between pushing the development of new defense capabilities throughcostly research and development and expanding allied capacity to deploythese capabilities. In military technology, the U.S. sees its role in capabilitydevelopment, and the allies adding to overall capacity. Something similar canbe said with regard to the space sector, and as the U.S. establishes goals thatpush for new technologies from space sector firms, Canada is already adding tothe capacity of the space industrial base.

To carry the analogy between defense and space further, Canada mightconsider expanding the mandate of the Canadian Commercial Corporation topromote exports by the Canadian space sector even to commercial customers

WILSON CENTER 16in the United States and elsewhere. The Canadian Commercial Corporation’sexperience with sensitive intellectual property and the U.S. export licensingand controls system would help firms to navigate these issues as the spacesector supply chains develop.

♦♦ A Whole of Government Approach to Space. The establishment of a

National Space Council in the United States, with broad representation from federal departments and agencies, is intended to foster a coordinated, inter-agency effort to attain national goals in space. Canadian federal government space activity and responsibility is less fragmented than in the United States, but as more federal and even provincial government authorities become relevant stakeholders and prospective partners in space, Canada will need to consider a similar whole of government approach to space. Here, the role of the National Space Council is a useful model as it incorporates cabinet level representatives with academic and private sector expertise through the Users Advisory Group. At a minimum, greater input from the Space Program Management Board could be formally introduced to the deliberative process of the Space Advisory Board, but the relationship of both groups to the Canadian cabinet is different, suggesting a cabinet committee on space policy that met regularly with the Space Advisory Board and the Space Program Advisory Board could reduce the chances of siloed decision making.

Next Steps in the Partnership

Overcoming the fragmentation of responsibility and authority withingovernment is important, but a further challenge in the development of a U.S.-Canadian spacefaring partnership is overcoming similar divisions between U.S.and Canadian space policymakers. Government remains the leading entity inspace, despite the rise in scale and expertise of the commercial space sectorin both countries. By partnering, the U.S. and Canadian governments can takesteps to remove obstacles to deepening the collaboration between the two

WILSON CENTER 17countries in space. Specifically, as part of an expanded partnership, the U.S. andCanadian federal governments should consider:

♦♦ Take steps to enable seamless cross-border research and

development, and supply chain integration of production. This will require border facilitation for flows of products and specialized personnel.

is established with political support, that mutual commitment needs to be formalized and institutionalized. This was how the two governments acted in creating NORAD in 1957 for air defense of North America. In the sixty years since, and notably in securing U.S. airspace on September 11, 2001, the institutionalized partnership let the professional military to act quickly without first querying elected leaders for approval. Where partnership makes sense, formalizing the arrangement can create a stable understanding that fosters collaboration at the working level.

♦♦ Establish a Dialogue and Work Together to Regulate Activity in Space.

Rules made by the United States on a unilateral basis will inevitably be challenged by other powers. Canada’s participation in the rules, and assistance in building multilateral support for regulation of space activity will add to the legitimacy and acceptance of the U.S. desired order. Even a dialogue with Canada on regulation of space-based activity by governments and private entities will make the rules more transparent and open to discussion. A U.S.-Canadian partnership on the regulation of activity in low earth orbit could form the basis for a wider, multilateral dialogue. The Canadian-instigated Arctic Council provides a model, since this organization helped to develop rules for activity in the Arctic domain and coordinate international efforts at monitoring and enforcement.

Space. A formal alliance aligns perceptions of national interest and shared, mutual responsibilities that can help reinforce the need for

WILSON CENTER 18 expensive capabilities when other fiscal priorities loom larger in voter perceptions. As the smaller partner, Canada must work to avoid the public characterization of space as an opt-in, opt-out domain for the defense of Canadian interests; the opt-in opt-out approach to nuclear weapons and missile defenses led to Canada opting out while the United States bore the responsibility and cost of defending both countries on its own. “The weaponization of space” is a charge that the United States has addressed directly, countering that China and Russia have already developed offensive capabilities in low earth orbit and integrated space into their war fighting plans against satellite- dependent U.S. technology. Canada’s new defense policy echoes the need to catch up to the vulnerability of space-based assets, so the government to government dialog on this point should be straightforward, but formalizing this understanding in an alliance will make the public case for collaboration in space defense. The newly formed U.S. Combined Space Operations Center (CSpOC), which was erected to strengthen space cooperation between the U.S. and its allies, as well as space situational awareness are natural opportunities for in-space partnership. Boosting collaboration on missions that are supported by space, such as Navigational Warfare (NAVWAR), could also improve the alliance.

The NORAD Agreement might be adaptable as a platform for alliance in low

earth orbital defense. Originally focused on threat assessment and warning inthe air defense of Canada and the United States, in 2006 the two governmentsadded maritime threat assessment and warning to the NORAD mandate. Thereis a precedent and some complementarity to adding space responsibilityto NORAD, and this would make further sense for Canada since the RoyalCanadian Air Force has the lead role in Canada’s space defense.

WILSON CENTER 19ConclusionThe United States and Canada have a great deal in common in space interestsand aspirations, and a long history of successful space collaboration to buildupon. Realizing the potential for the U.S.-Canadian partnership will requireleadership and vision in both governments, and the good will to pursue sharedinterests together.

The Trump administration has catalyzed a resurgence of U.S. leadership and

action evolving America’s role as a pioneering and spacefaring nation. It hasdone so carefully, establishing national decision-making structures to translatevision into quick results.

Canadian governments have put in place a similar structure, and have

deliberated seriously on how Canada can participate in the scientific,commercial, and national security opportunities in space building on apartnership with the United States and other spacefaring nations that had itsorigins in the Second World War.

This review of recent space policy decisions taken in the United States andCanada point to the potential for the two countries to work together. Thecountries have similar goals, and now the structures necessary in place tofacilitate action and partnership. With smaller budgets and a smaller spacesector, as well as a preference for collaborating with other countries on spacerelated scientific endeavors, Canada’s space policy development has been heldback while the United States put its attention and resources elsewhere. Therenewed U.S. engagement on space provides the missing element for Canada:a set of missions and goals it can consider and even partner with the UnitedStates to attain.

If they do, as young Americans and Canadians watch the first human set footon Mars in the not too distant future, they may be inspired by this sharedachievement to take innovation to new heights and reinforce the partnership,alliance, and friendship of the United States and Canada.

WILSON CENTER 20Sean Kelly is a space policy specialist affiliated with Hudson Institute who has written on thesubject for The Hill, The Weekly Standard, The National Interest, and for Policy Options in Canada. Seanis currently the manager of public programming and special projects at Hudson Institute. He holdsdegrees in Economics and Political Science from Western Washington University.

Christopher Sands is a Senior Research Professor and Director of the Center for CanadianStudies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), a graduate division ofJohns Hopkins University. Professor Sands teaches courses on Federalism in North America and Europe(SA.840.705) and Middle Power Diplomacy (SA.840.706) and an annual Policy Consulting Practicum(SA.840-718). He serves as a faculty advisor to the Johns Hopkins University Research Administration(JHURA), the university-wide office for sponsored research, and on the editorial board of the SAISMagazine. Previously, he taught as the G. Robert Ross Distinguished Visiting Professor in the College ofBusiness and Economics at Western Washington University (2012-2017) and as an adjunct professor atthe American University School of Public Affairs (2005-2012).