IRANIAN-RUSSIAN NUCLEAR TRADE

Iran has recently come under heightened U.S. scrutiny for its
deal with Russia to complete construction on two nuclear reactors
that were initially built by the Germans during the time of the
Shah. The U.S. has excoriated Iran and Russia for both pursuing
this nuclear alliance, and has worked to fashion a multilateral
effort to deny Iran any nuclear technology and has attempted to
leverage Russia from further engaging in nuclear trade with Iran.
While the security aspects of the Iranian reactors have drawn
immense scrutiny, less attention has been devoted to the economic
and environmental components of the agreement. This case study
examines both the economic and environmental aspects of the
Russian-Iranian nuclear trade.

2. Description

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Iran has used the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and other arms control agreements as
vehicles to promote increased technology transfers from the
industrialized North to the developing South. As one of the
leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Iran has vigorously
championed the rights of States Parties in good standing to acquire
sensitive dual use technologies as regulated by various arms
control agreements like the NPT, the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC), and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). In the view of
Iran and many NAM nations, the West's reluctance to impart with
these sensitive technologies reflects a bias against the economic
development of the Third World. These nations posit that the West
has used arms control fora as the avenue with which to retard the
economic growth of the South. The merits of this argument can be
debated, but Iran has effectively rallied NAM support behind this
position during the various arms control meetings. With regards to
nuclear technology, Iran has consistently interpreted Article IV to
allow for the transfer of peaceful nuclear technology to States
Parties in good standing. Iranian efforts to procure nuclear
energy technology from Russia and China reflects Iran's commitment
to furthering an agenda regulated by Article IV.

Iran was an original signatory to the NPT in 1969, and
formally forswore the acquisition, research, and production of
nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the Shah of Iran attempted to
propel Iran into the nuclear age during the early 1970s. Despite
Iran's enormous gas and oil reserves, which at the time financed
the modernization of Iran and equipped the Shah with the most
dominant qualitative military force in the Middle East, the Shah
was interested in acquiring nuclear technology for Iran. Whether
the Shah was legitimately interested in harnessing the positive
effects of nuclear technology, or whether he wanted to pursue a
clandestine nuclear weapons research and production program (in
order to transform Iran into the unquestioned regional hegemon in
the Middle East) is a riddle that remains unsolved. Nevertheless,
by 1976 the German industrial giant Siemens began construction on
two nuclear reactors near the southern Iranian coastal town of
Bushehr. The first reactor, Bushehr I, was 85 percent complete,
and the second reactor, Bushehr II, was partially completed prior
to the Iranian Revolution in 1979, which caused the stoppage of
construction on both reactors. During the Iran-Iraq War from
1980-1988, Iraqi strike aircraft managed to partially damage both
reactors, and Iran was unable to persuade Siemens to complete
construction on them, due to diplomatic pressure applied by the
United States.

After the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the nuclear aspirations of
the Shah were soon embraced by the ruling mullahs. The difference,
especially for the West and concerned nations in the region, was
that a state inimical to Western policies was now contemplating the
resumption of a nuclear energy program. The attendant fear was
that a radical Islamic state would harness its nuclear energy
capabilities to produce nuclear weapons and use them as instruments
to advance its hegemonic designs throughout the region. In the
aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War, Iran had emerged as an
international pariah, and could not count on previous Western
(i.e., West German) assistance in securing nuclear technology.
Therefore, Iran began to look into alternative paths for acquiring
such technology, and during the 1990s it has found two willing
partners: Russia and China.

By 1992, Iran had managed to operate one small research (a
5 megawatt - MW) reactor in Tehran and a small Miniature Neutron
Source Reactor (MNSR), (which operated at 27 kilowatts), but had
still not developed a significant nuclear energy network. In
order to placate rising international concerns over its nascent
nuclear energy capabilities, Iran agreed to International Atomic
Energy Association (IAEA) inspections on all of its nuclear
facilities. During inspections in February 1992 and November
1993, IAEA officials found no evidence of proliferant activity at
Iranian nuclear facilities. Iran's Permanent Representative to
the IAEA, Mohammed Sadegh Ayatollahi, underscored Iran's official
commitment to acceding to the proscriptive norms of the NPT and the
IAEA. He noted that it is Iran's intention to be, " ... open to
any kind of inspection that the IAEA as the responsible inspector
of the NPT has the duty to perform. Anytime they want to come and
see something, they are welcome."

Having been labeled with a "clean bill of health" by the IAEA,
Iran began to aggressively pursue nuclear technology from China and
Russia. However, one of the concerns with the West, based on
earlier IAEA inspections in Iraq and North Korea which similarly
did not find any proliferant nuclear activity, is that a clean bill
of health by the IAEA does not automatically demonstrate compliance
with the norms established by the IAEA and NPT. The Iraqi and
North Korean cases demonstrated the failure of the IAEA to detect
clandestine nuclear weapon efforts, and this shortcoming has had a
powerful resonance in the thinking of many Western nations
concerned with nuclear proliferation. It now appears that Western
nations, especially the United States, are leery of any nuclear
technology transfers to questionable Third World nations,
regardless of their degree of compliance with the NPT or accession
to IAEA inspections.

By as early as 1993, China agreed to install two 300 MW
(electrical output) reactors located at Esteghlal, near Bushehr on
the Persian Gulf coast. The Chinese have reportedly conducted
seismic surveys at the Esteghal site, and have received a down
payment for the construction of the reactors. Recent reports
indicate that the United States has been able to persuade China to
cancel this reactor agreement, although some experts note that this
amounts only to a temporary abeyance of the two countries' nuclear
deal, and that China was motivated more by Iran's inability to
tender payment than by any U.S. leverage against the deal.

Russia and Iran formally reached a nuclear reactor agreement in
January 1995, where the Iranians would receive two VVER-1000 MW
(electrical) light water reactors at the Bushehr site in return for
payment of up to one billion dollars. The reactors are planned to
be operational within four years, and Russia has already begun
initial work on the project. The U.S. openly castigated the
deal, in spite of the international legality of the transaction,
citing proliferation concerns and the fact that with this
technology, Iran would have the ability to produce nuclear weapons
in eight to ten years. The agreement does include stipulations
where the spent fuel rods (from which weapons grade plutonium can
be extracted) are to be shipped back to Russia, in order to allay
these fears over an indigenous Iranian nuclear weapons production
capability. In November 1995, two officials from the IAEA
examined Iran's existing nuclear energy projects, and confirmed the
peaceful nature of these projects (the Bushehr reactors were
obviously not included since they are not yet completed). One of
the officials stated that Iran has made progress in the application
of nuclear analysis techniques, and in the use of accelerators and
the cyclotron in its nuclear medical and research reactor at Karaj.

From an energy perspective, the United States has cast
aspersions on Iran's commitment to a legitimate nuclear energy
program, given Iran's preponderant oil and natural gas reserves.
Iran is endowed with 92.86 billion of proven crude oil reserves
(circa 1994), equivalent to 9.3% of the world's total reserves. It
is estimated that Iran's oil reserves have a natural life of 72
years, according to 1993 production statistics. Iran also
possesses 73 billion cubic feet of natural gas, which is second
only to Russia in the ownership of gas reserves. Since natural
gas is much easier and cheaper to develop for energy purposes than
nuclear energy, U.S. analysts doubt whether Iran needs its nuclear
reactors from Russia.

However, Iranian officials have launched a determined public
relations campaign which laments the weakened state of Iran's
energy infrastructure and points to the problems associated with
its continued reliance on gas and oil to power this infrastructure.
In July 1995, the Iranian government urged people to economize on
the consumption of energy, and warned to punish producers and
importers of goods with high energy consumption. An Iranian energy
ministry official noted that Iran's industrial consumption of oil
was twice as high as in developed countries, and due to this
inordinate energy consumption rate, Iran would not have any oil to
export in twenty two years. In order to meet consumption demands,
he added that Iran would have to increase daily production to four
million barrels, up from its current total of three and six tenths
million barrels per day (two and one half million barrels are
currently slated for export). The official stated that the reason
for the high energy consumption was the heavy state subsidization
of oil, which cost $12.5 billion a year.

Furthermore, Iranian officials have bemoaned the fact that
Iran only has 47 years of oil reserves left (compare this with the
earlier Western projection of 72 years), so given that oil is an
exhaustible resource, Iran should explore alternative energy
sources such as nuclear power. Table 1 demonstrates how Iran has
been increasingly reliant on the production of electricity (the
majority of which is oil-fired), and the concomitant rise in
domestic energy consumption.Table 1Source: Economist Intelligence
Unit Country Profile, 1994-1995: Iran

According to an 1994 Economist Intelligence Unit country
report on Iran, Iran has suffered from chronic shortages of
electricity as a result of the Iran-Iraq War, and has also suffered
from failures in power station maintenance. Peak-period demand has
led to black-outs and severe industrial problems. Currently in
Iran, 62% of electricity is produced at thermal power stations, 16%
at gas-fueled plants, and 15% by hydroelectric plants.

Therefore, faced with growing pressures on Iran's ability to
sustain industrial development with current energy policies,
Iranian officials have been quick to laud the positive benefits
that nuclear energy would accrue to Iran's economic and industrial
development.
Reza Amrollahi, director of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization
(IAEO) states that Iran " . . . plans to take 20 years to get 20
percent of its energy from nuclear [processes]." Iranian IAEA
official Mohammed Ayatollahi provided four reasons why Iran should
develop nuclear technology. First, he questioned the stereotype
that Iran was an oil-rich country, given the fact that Iran has
provided data on the exhaustability of its oil reserves. Second,
he emphasized the ecological consequences of sustained activity by
the hydrocarbon industry, since oil is a highly pollutant fossil
fuel. Third, he stressed that Iran should not put all of its
energy resources in one "basket", and that nuclear energy provides
Iran with an alternative energy source: " It is widely agreed that
the optimum for any country should be to diversify the energy
options. The main energy supplies are water, fossil fuels - oil,
gas, coke - and nuclear. A combination of these is best for
sustainable development." Finally, Iranian President Ali Hashemi
Rafsanjani opined "[T]he benefits of nuclear technology, of course,
are numerous, and we cannot forego other uses of peaceful nuclear
technology."

From an economic perspective, Iran's economy is undergoing
serious dislocations at the time, as the global drop in oil prices
has caused a massive shock to the Iranian economy. Based on the
fact that Iranian oil exports will continue to assume the lion's
share of total exports (up to 90% in 1994), the fortunes of the
Iranian economy will be inordinately tied to oscillations in the
world oil market. In addition, heightened U.S. efforts to
economically contain Iran, such as the May 1995 unilateral U.S.
embargo of all Iranian imports (the vast majority of which are oil
exports from Iran, worth almost three billion dollars in 1994) have
hurt the Iranian economy. For example, the U.S. embargo has caused
a drop in the Iranian rial during the summer of 1995.
Nevertheless, in the facing of declining oil revenues, the Iranian
government is attempting to complete its nuclear reactor deal with
Russia, even though the cost could well exceed one billion dollars,
which is a large amount considering central government expenditures
totaled slightly over $39 billion in 1993. The fact that Iran is
willing to spend such a large amount of money (which is
increasingly becoming a scare resource) on an energy method it
seemingly has little current utility indicates the seriousness Iran
attaches to nuclear energy.

Given Russia's economic hardships, the Iranian oil deal
will give it a well-needed infusion of hard currency. Currently,
the Russian economy is continuing its evolution to a free-market,
capitalist economy, and a sudden economic boon as a result of this
structural overhaul has yet to come to fruition in Russia. Recent
statistics bear out the dismal performance of the Russian economy:
economic growth has only started to recover to positive growth in
1995, after three years of double digit negative growth; the same
trend was reflected for industrial production from 1993 to 1995;
unemployment has steadily increased from five percent in 1993 to
roughly 12% in 1995. In order to improve the performance of the
Russian economy, Russia has attempted to secure increased economic
ties with Third World nations, at a time when the global economy is
squeezing Russia out of the developed world's economic affairs.
Russian ties with states like Iran will give it access to much
needed currency and will also provide access to suitable markets
for the export of other Russian goods (at a time when global
competition for market penetration anywhere is fierce).

The Russian Ministry of Atomic Affairs (MINATOM) has seized
upon this reality and has aggressively sought to export Russian
nuclear technology to many developing nations, including Iran,
Armenia, and Cuba. The Christian Science Monitor reports that
MINATOM officials are so eager to export Russian nuclear technology
that concerns over safety and proliferation have been subsumed by
an influx of dollars and other forms of hard currencies. According
to William Potter, a proliferation expert at the Monterey Institute
for International Studies, the Russians are not as concerned with
nuclear safety as their Western counterparts and have not
cultivated a "culture of safety" that is found in Western nuclear
science programs. Despite these glaring deficiencies, Russian
nuclear technology is one of the few commodities that Russia can
produce for export that is of roughly equal quality with Western
technology. In addition, Valery Davydov, a Russian nuclear
scientist working at the Russian-American Press, posits that
MINATOM desperately needs the earnings it generates from its
nuclear sales and that it attaches little importance to
proliferation concerns. In recognition of this increased demand
for Russian nuclear technology, in 1995 MINATOM is expected to
generate $1.5 billion, up from $1.2 billion in 1994. .

In addition to Russia's economic motivations for pursuing
nuclear technology transfers with Iran, there also is a political
dimension to this policy. Increased economic and military ties
with Iran may give Russia much needed leverage to sway Iran from
extending its influence into Russia's "near abroad", especially the
former Central Asian Republics. Russia cum the Soviet Union has
long appreciated Iran's cultural ties, geographic proximity, and
ethnic affiliations with the Central Asian republics. After the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russians have been acutely
aware that the Central Asian republics are searching for their own
identity after seventy years of Soviet rule, and that the Iranian
model may serve as an attraction to some of the republics. While
this analysis is short-sighted and does not take into account a
variety of religious, political, and cultural differences between
Iran and the republics, Iran has penetrated the republics in the
economic and political spheres. The Russians would not look highly
upon a constellation of fundamentalist Islamic nations on their
southern border, and regardless of the potential for this to occur,
they have adopted policies to moderate Iranian influence in the
region.

While the aforementioned security and economic aspects of the
Russian-Iranian nuclear deal have been discussed in great detail in
many other forums, few, if any, have speculated on the possible
ecological consequences of this arrangement. As mentioned
previously, the Bushehr reactors that were constructed before the
1979 Iranian Revolution suffered extensive structural damage as a
result of Iraqi air strikes during the Iran-Iraq War. One of the
reactors was so badly damaged that the structure was until recently
sealed, and its protective dome was covered by a metal sheet. In
addition, the Russians have to figure out a way properly configure
their 1,000 MW reactors into structures that were designed to house
German 1,200 MW reactors. Therefore, based on the structural
problems inherent in the reactor deal, the possibility of a
radiation leakage due to deficiencies in the new structure is not
out of the realm of possibility.

As noted above, many nuclear physicists are not entirely
convinced of the level of safety of the Russian nuclear reactor
designs, given the explosion at the Chernobyl nuclear reactor in
1984. If a radiation leakage were to occur in the Bushehr
reactors due to existing structural damage or Russian design and
construction flaws, the resultant ecological and economic
consequences for the Persian Gulf would be catastrophic. Since
Bushehr lies in southern Iran and almost contiguous to the waters
of the Persian Gulf, the irradiated water would cause enormous harm
to the bio-diversity of the Persian Gulf. In addition, many of the
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states rely on Persian Gulf water
for human consumption and agricultural purposes (due to the lack of
indigenous fresh water sources, the lack of rainfall, arid climate,
and high temperatures endemic to the region), as networks of
desalinization plants have been erected to service water needs in
most of these countries.

The prospect of a nuclear armed Iran is quite unsettling
for most of Iran's neighbors, and there is the perception that the
Russian reactors will be the conduit to which Iran can produce a
workable nuclear device in eight to ten years. Therefore, the
possibility of a pre-emptive strike or a strike during the course
of hostilities by concerned Middle Eastern nations (e.g., Israel,
Iraq, or the GCC states) or the United States remains high. If
such an event were to occur, not only would Iran and the countries
of the region have to deal with radiation leakage into the Persian
Gulf, but they would also have to deal with nuclear fallout into
the atmosphere as a result of any military strike. One only has to
harken back to the aftermath of Chernobyl to remember the
ecological devastation caused by the release of a radioactive cloud
after the explosion at that reactor.

Other anticipated ecological consequences could be some type
of nuclear accident involving the shipment of equipment and
technology from Russia to Iran. In addition, the possibility
exists of some type of calamity due to an accident in the shipment
of the spent plutonium fuel rods from Iran back to Russia. Another
possible ecological calamity could be the possible seismic shock to
the area, and the attendant destruction this would unleash from the
damaged Bushehr reactors. Iran contains many fault lines, and
dormant fault lines ready may become "active" in the future near
the Bushehr reactor site.

One aspect of the ecological consequences of the
Iranian-Russian nuclear that has not been considered in great
detail is the possibility that the United States will be successful
in annulling the arrangement at some point in the future. If this
was to occur, the deepened Iranian reliance on its hydrocarbon
industry as the source of its energy needs could begin to have
increasingly deleterious effects on the Iranian ecological
landscape. The over reliance on oil and natural gas, without the
development of a suitable energy alternative, could begin to
overwhelm the Iranian ecological balance with devastating results.

The foregoing analysis has demonstrated that the
Iranian-Russian nuclear reactor deal affects security-related,
economic, and ecological considerations not only in the transacting
countries, but in the countries across the region as well.
Sustained attention to the issue needs to be devoted, in order to
properly examine all of the aforementioned factors in the future,
and at a bare minimum, to forestall an ecological disaster in the
Persian Gulf.

3. Related Cases

Key Words: Nuclear
Russia
Iran

4. Author

Javed Ali

, Comparative and Regional
Studies, Middle East

II. LEGAL CLUSTER

5. Discourse and Status: AGRee and INPROGress

The final resolution of the Iranian-Russian nuclear
arrangement has not yet been determined, as continued U.S.
pressure on Russia may force the Russians to abrogate the deal
entirely, or at least to suspend it temporarily.

6. Forum and Scope: IRAN and BILATateral

The arrangement is solely between Russia and Iran, and
the two countries are working within the framework of the NPT to
ensure that its conditions do not violate any terms of the treaty.

7. Decision Breadth: TWO

Russia and Iran

8. Legal Standing: TREATY

Both parties must ensure that the nuclear deal abides
by the terms of the NPT. In addition, the reactors will be subject
to inspection by the IAEA.

III. GEOGRAPHIC CLUSTER

9. Geographic Locations:

Domain: Asia

Site: WAsia

Impact: Iran

10. Sub-National Factors: NO

11. Types of Habitat: DRY

IV. TRADE CLUSTER

12. Type of Measure: Export Ban

The United States is attempting to pressure Russia not
honor the contract terms with Iran. While the Clinton
administration has been loathe to directly punish Russia (given
the delicate political balance between the two nations), the U.S.
Congress has stepped up efforts to "modify" Russia's behavior.
The Senate has considered legislation barring all U.S. trade with
nations that aid the proliferant activity of pariah states such as
Iran. In addition, threats have been made to cut off critical
Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) aid to Russia, which
assists Russia in destroying its existing weapons of mass
destruction arsenal.

The United States has also tried to unilaterally
punish Iran, and in May 1995 President Clinton announced that the
United States would ban all trade with Iran, meaning that Iran
would lose almost three billion dollars a year in exports to the
United States. This unilateral U.S. trade sanction has negatively
impacted the Iranian economy, as the Iranian currency (the rial)
has been significantly devalued. The hope is that the more the
United States can weaken Iran economically, Iran will be less able
to provide the hard currency needed to fund the Bushehr reactor
complex (as the Russians have insisted that the deal is on a strict
cash basis, and that any lack of payment will trigger a stoppage of
work).

13. Direct vs. Indirect Impacts: DIR

14. Relation of Trade Measure to Resource Impact: DIR

15. Trade Product Identification: NUCLEAR Technology

The deal calls for the Russians to complete
construction on two 1,200 MW reactors initially constructed by the
Germans in 1976. The reactors are light-water reactors, and
supposedly there is are plans for Iran to receive uranium
enrichment technology (such as a gas centrifuge). In addition, to
allay rising proliferation concerns, the spent fuel rods from the
reactors will then be transported back to Russia (since weapons
grade plutonium can be manufactured from the irradiated plutonium
in the fuel rods).

16. Economic Data

Iran currently operates two small research reactors, but it
hopes to eventually generate 20% of the country's electrical needs
from nuclear energy. Currently, Iran must produce around 65
million kilowatts of electricity for internal consumption.

17. Impact of Trade Restriction

Cost ($): High

The current U.S. trade ban on Iran will cost Iran
almost three billion dollars in export revenues, and will effect
about $600 million in U.S. exports to Iran.

Coverage (%): High

Since Iran has total export revenues of $39
billion, the U.S. trade ban will have a significant effect, as Iran
must scramble to find new buyers for its oil.

Price Effect (%): High

The global drop in oil prices, coupled with a
seven percent drop in total export revenues, will make it
increasingly difficult for Iran to finance the Bushehr reactor
deal, or any other ambitious nuclear technology projects. Since
the summer of 1995, the Iranian rial has suffered an almost 30-40%
percent drop in total value.

Competitive Effect: High

18. Industry Sector: NOTH

19. Exporters and Importers

Case Exporter: Russia

Case Importer: Iran

Leading Exporters:

The Russian Ministry of Atomic Affairs has
increased earnings from the foreign sale of nuclear technology from
$1.2 billion in 1994 to $1.5 billion in 1995.

V. ENVIRONMENT CLUSTERS

20. Environmental Problem Type: Radioactivity

The potential leakage of radioactive material into the
Persian Gulf, or around the surrounding areas in Iran, is a source
of concern. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that the
Russians will be attempting to fit 1,000 MW reactors into 1,200 MW
reactor hulls initially designed by the Germans. These reactors
also suffered structural damage from Iraqi airstrikes during the
Iran-Iraq War, and these structural deficiencies have to be
corrected before the reactors are operational. There are reports
that MINATOM is less concerned with proliferation and safety, and
is willing to overlook these problem areas in return for hard
currency cash deals.
Finally, the radioactivity concern is heightened by the
potential for a preemptive airstrike on the reactors by a number of
states (Israel, Iraq, or even the United States).

21. Number of Species: MANY

Any release of radioactivity in the Gulf would
threaten a diverse expanse of animal life.

22. Impact and Effect

Impact: HIGH

Effect: PRODUCT

23. Urgency and Lifetime: High and 100s of years

24. Substitutes: ALTERnative Energy

Iranian officials claim that nuclear energy will
fulfill Iran's future energy
needs, since Iran has an exhaustible reserve of natural
gas and oil.

VI. OTHER FACTORS

25. Culture: NO

26. Human Rights: NO

27. Trans-Boundary Issues: YES

The potential exists for radioactive pollution due to
some sort of man-made or naturally occurring disaster at the
Bushehr site. The effects of such a calamity would not be limited
to Iran, as leakage into the Persian Gulf has the potential to
contaminate wide swathes of water in the region, which would
disrupt the ecological balance in the region with devastating
effects. Also, a radioactive cloud could spread environmental
destruction over vast regions of the Middle East, and Central and
Southwest Asia.

By May 1995 150 Russian technicians had descended on Bushehr,
and the Russians claimed that it would send up to 3,000 workers to
the site. See Elaine Sciolino. "Iran's Nuclear Goals Lie in
Half-Built Plant", The New York Times, May 19, 1995, p. A1,
A10.

Under Article IV of the NPT, States Parties in good standing
(Iran is currently included in this group) will have access to
nuclear technology for legitimate civilian purposes. The current
problem with the U.S. policy of nuclear technology denial for
Iran is that such a policy is inconsistent with the NPT, a treaty
the U.S. worked so hard to indefinetly extend and quiet Third
World claims of nuclear technology denial in May 1995, during the
NPT Review Conference.

"Iranians Urged to Economize on Energy", The Xinhua News
Agency, July 3, 1995.

Watson, op. cit., p. 36; IAEA represenative Mohammed
Ayatollahi stated that Iran hopes that nuclear power will
eventually account for twenty to twenty five percent of Iran's
total energy production needs, equivalent to about 4,000 MW. See
"What Islamic Bomb? Post-Cold War Proliferation; Interview",
op., cit.

The Economist Intelligence Unit, op.cit., p. 30.

Elaine Sciolino. "Iran Says It Plans 10 Nuclear Plants But No
Atom Arms", The New York Times, May 14, 1995, p. A6, A7.
Also, Iran's long term economic modernization plans are based on a
strategy that over the next twenty years, Iran will become
primarily a natural gas rather than oil exporter. Nevertheless,
the fruition of this plan is far from being realized, and in the
near term Iran will still rely on oil export revenues. See Andrew
Rathmell. Iran's Liquid Lifeline", Jane's Intelligence
Review, Volume 7, No. 9, September 1995, p 412. However, this
view must be balanced with reports that natural gas has been
designated as the main fuel for the country's new power stations,
and over one third of Iran's natural gas output is consumed by
these new power stations. See