But the logic of this argument seems rather strange: Canadian LNG exports will only commence several years hence and once they do, they are unlikely to contribute meaningfully to alleviating Europe’s dependency on Russian gas. For starters, Ukraine has no LNG import terminals and Canada has no export terminals. Of the 16 planned terminals in Canada, only three will be on the East Coast. Germany receives approximately one quarter of its natural gas as LNG from Norway but building new terminals takes at last 2-3 years. And because Japan pays much more for natural gas than Europe, North American LNG exports are more likely to go to Japan than to Europe and therefore at best indirectly affect Russian natural gas exports to the EU.

Proposals to build pipelines east and west from the tar sands, which are located almost exclusively in the landlocked central Canadian province Alberta, have been met with protests, native land claims and environmental activism. In the U.S., protests in dozens of major cities have held up the now infamous Keystone Pipeline for 5.5 years. Concomitantly, the European Union passed the Fuel Quality Directive (FQD) in 2009, which aims to reduce the greenhouse gas (GHG) intensity of all transport fuels by 6% between 2010 and 2020.

But in 2011, the EU decided to review the FQD and proposed that tar sands crude was to receive a greenhouse gas rating 22% higher than conventional oil reflecting the emissions required to turn bitumen – the tar-like substance that forms the tar sands – into oil. While Canadian officials contest the methods used to measure lifecycle GHG emissions from different oil sources, environmental groups have emphasized that high emissions fuel sources could derail EU emissions targets. However, to date, the EU has not been able to agree on this implementing measure.

Interestingly, Canada exports very little energy to Europe. In fact, Canada exports a little more than 1% of its oil to non-US destinations, and the country only shares 0.08% of EU imports. Crucially, Canada sends all of its LNG exports to the U.S.

While it may have been trade interests as much as lobbying that succeeded in getting the EU to reconsider the FQD, the cost, in both financial and political capital, has been high. According to Oliver Geden, senior research fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, “many in Brussels were disturbed by the massive scale [of the lobbying].” Additionally, it is unlikely officials in Brussels will have forgotten that Canada was the first state to refuse a second engagement period under the Kyoto Protocol.

LNG: An Opportunity to Rebrand

In this context, the Harper Government, seeks to rebrand itself in Europe and the U.S. The crisis in Crimea and the emergence of Russia’s energy hegemony in Eastern Europe as a major international political issue is a low cost opportunity to gain some goodwill towards Canadian energy. The EU would be wise, however, to recognize that Canadian energy is unlikely to play any significant role in the future.

Environmental Europe?

We are three early career researchers studying European Union environmental politics. We hope that you will enjoy this blog, where we will post regularly on ongoing environmental and climate policy developments in the EU. For regular blog updates, follow @EnvEurope on Twitter. Our contact details: Viviane Gravey (@VGravey), Jonas Schoenefeld (@JSchoenefeld), and Brendan Moore (@brmo07).