The surprise replacement last week of Sergei
Ivanov, a longtime ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin, with
former head of protocol Anton Vaino as presidential chief of staff
sparked a host of speculation, most of which can be safely
disregarded. But, digging through the unfounded forecasts, one can
find a clear message.

A comparison of Vaino’s credentials to those of
Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev suggests that he may well become the
new prime minister. Like Vaino, Medvedev previously worked for the
central government and was also known as a businesslike and
responsible official. Like Vaino, Medvedev was presidential chief of
staff and was not considered an independent figure. But the main
point is that the regime needs to prepare a new generation of the
elite to stand by Putin in 2018, when his current presidential term
ends, and beyond. As chief of staff, Vaino will be instrumental in
preparing this new wave of politicians.

Putin won’t take all of the members of the old
guard with him in 2018, as demonstrated by the recent removals of
officials like Russian Railways boss Vladimir Yakunin, drug tsar
Viktor Ivanov, and others. The list of retired “friends” will
only get longer. They will be replaced by a generation of special
service operatives, security guards, and technocrat-apparatchiks in
their forties and fifties.

They will be young enough to be approaching old
age in 2024 — after which Putin is constitutionally barred from
running for a third term — yet experienced enough to accompany
Putin after 2018. They will be close to the boss, yet they will have
enough distance to offer nothing but praise.

They will have enough savvy to navigate the
Byzantine intrigue at the Kremlin and the presidential
administration, but won’t be real politicians who can rival their
overlord.

The president needs to be confident that the elite
will be efficient enough to handle economic depression and possible
political upheavals, and loyal enough to ensure that 2024 won’t
bring any calamities, either to the country or to Putin himself.

Perhaps the presidential administration will start
to look the way it’s supposed to under Vaino — simply the
bureaucratic arm of the president. But the new young boss will
certainly be besieged by political and financial clans rushing to pay
their respects. Even if he simply obeys the president’s orders,
Vaino will be viewed as Putin’s avatar. He automatically becomes as
politically powerful as the prime minister, if not more so: Medvedev
has already fulfilled the political task assigned to him, while Vaino
is still on the rise.

Analysts have noted that Vaino’s grandfather,
Karl Vaino, led Soviet Estonia from 1978 to 1988. However, Anton
Vaino’s education at the Moscow State Institute of International
Relations and his career as a diplomat are much more important.
Russia’s current political regime heavily relies on military
officers, security service operatives, and diplomats. Aided by their
professional background, the new elites are ready to carry out any
order issued by any government. And this is why discussions about the
liberalization of Russian politics under Vaino are naïve.

Liberalization will happen only if the president
orders it. No secret cabinet to develop or implement reforms exists,
nor are reforms possible now in either Russia’s domestic or foreign
policy.

Some have speculated Vaino’s ideological bias
may exert influence on policy. The new chief of staff is the author
of several esoteric research publications, and his coauthors are
ultrapatriotic activists and proponents of “dynamic conservatism.”
However, even if Vaino embraces these ideas, this will have no impact
on Russia’s policy vector: it already more than satisfies all the
“dynamic conservatives.”

On the day Sergei Ivanov resigned, Russian
Railways paid its former head Yakunin a three-year bonus in a
somewhat symbolic coincidence: The system takes care of those who
leave on even relatively good terms.

The top elite are wealthy, which is only natural
in a system where those in positions of power monetize their
positions. But at a time of economic crisis, upcoming parliamentary
elections, and the president’s looming last term, these elites need
to be more humble and cautious. They need to heed public opinion,
which is largely synonymous with Putin’s opinion.

After all, there are always replacements waiting
in the wings. The rotation of the elite is not over. This is just the
beginning.

Andrei Kolnesnikov is a senior associate and
the chair of the Russian Domestic Politics and Political Institutions
Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center.