CHAPTER VI
On Mutual Duties, and First, That of Not Injuring Others
1. Next come the duties which a man must practice toward other men. Some of
them spring from the common obligation, by which the Creator willed that all
men as such should be bound together. But some flow from a definite
institution, introduced or received by men, or from a certain adventitious
status of men. The first are to be practiced by every man toward every
other; the second only toward certain persons, a certain condition or status
being assumed. Hence one may call the former absolute duties, the latter
conditional.
2. Among the absolute duties, i.e., of anybody to anybody, the first place
belongs to this one: let no one injure another. For this is the broadest of
all duties, embracing all men as such. It is also the easiest, as consisting
in mere refraining from action, unless the passions that resist reason have
somehow to be checked at times. Again, it is likewise the most necessary
duty, because without it the social life could in no way exist. For with the
man who confers no benefit upon me, who makes no interchange even of the
common duties with me, I can still live at peace, provided he injure me in
no way. In fact, from the vast majority of men we desire nothing more than
that. Benefits are generally exchanged by the few. But with the man who
injures me, I cannot by any means live peaceably. For nature has implanted
in each man so sensitive a love of self and one's own possessions, that one
cannot help repelling by every means the man who essays to injure them.
3. Moreover, this same duty is a bulwark not only to what a man has by
nature itself, for instance, life, body, members, chastity, freedom, but
also to all that has been acquired through some institution and convention
of men. Hence by this precept it is forbidden to carry off, spoil, injure,
or withdraw from our use, in whole or in part, anything that by any
legitimate title is ours. Consequently the same duty is understood to
interdict any crimes by which injury is inflicted upon others, as bloodshed,
wounding, beating, robbery. theft, fraud, violence, directly or indirectly,
mediately or immediately and the like.
4. It follows also that, if a man has been hurt by another, or a loss
inflicted in any way that can be properly laid to the other's charge, it
must so far as possible be made good by him. For otherwise it would be a
vain injunction, not to injure, or not to inflict loss, if the man who has
actually been injured must swallow his loss, and his assailant can in
security, and without refunding, enjoy the profit of the wrong he has done.
For human depravity will never refrain from mutual injuries, unless there is
the necessity of restitution. And it would be difficult for the man who has
suffered loss to make up his mind to live at peace with the other, so long
as he did not obtain reparation from him.
5. Although, properly speaking, loss appears to concern an injury to things,
the word is however understood by us here in a broad sense, to include every
injury, spoiling, diminishing, or taking away, of that which is already
ours; or intercepting of that which by a perfect right we ought to have,
whether this may have been given us by nature, or assigned us by act of man,
or by a law; or, finally, any omission or refusal on the part of another to
perform anything which he was bound to do for us in accordance with a
perfect obligation. But if things due us under an imperfect obligation
merely are intercepted, it is not considered that a loss has been inflicted,
which must be made good. For it would be unseemly to consider it a loss not
to have received, or to demand compensation for, such things as I could not
expect from another except as a voluntary gift, and things which I cannot
reckon my own, until I have received them.
6. Under the term loss, moreover, comes not only a thing of ours, or owed to
us, which is injured, destroyed, or intercepted, but also the fruits which
spring from it, whether they have been gathered in already, or are still
hoped for, provided the owner would have gathered them in. But we must
deduct the outlay necessary to the gathering in of the crops. Also the
valuation of anticipated crops is raised or lowered, according as they arc
nearer Ac uncertain outcome, or further from it. Finally also, whatever
flows later from an injury, as by natural necessity, is regarded as an
integral part of the damage.
7. It is moreover possible for a man to inflict toss upon another not only
immediately and of himself, bat also through others- And a loss caused
immediately by a man can be imputed to the other, because, by doing
something, or not doing something, he was bound to do, he has contributed to
that result. Sometimes, as between several who have concurred in the same
act, one is regarded as the principal cause, another as an accessory;
sometimes all are on an even footing. With regard to these, we must observe
that they are bound to make good the loss only in case they were realty the
cause of the loss, and were a factor in the whole loss, or a part thereof.
But when a man did not contribute any real assistance to that act itself
which occasioned the loss, and did not previously cause it to be undertaken,
and did not share in the profit, although at the time of the act he may
involve himself in some misdeed, still he will not be bound to make
restitution for Ac loss. Examples are, those who rejoice at others'
misfortunes, those who afterward praise or excuse the damage, and those who
beforehand hope it may happen, and approve or applaud at the time.
8. When several concur in a single act from which damage results, the first
responsibility will be his, who by his authority, or in some other way
involving constraint, urged others to act. The doer of the deed, if it was
not open to him to refuse his services, will be accounted a mere instrument.
Whoever without constraint has committed a crime will himself be responsible
first of all, and then the others who contributed to the crime; with this
reservation, that if the first in order have already made restitution, the
rest are exempt (which is not the case with penalties). If several have
committed a crime by conspiracy, they are collectively responsible for the
individuals, and individually for all their companions, so that if all are
arrested, each is bound to contribute his proper share to make good the
damage. Where only one is seized, and the rest escape, he will be bound to
pay for them all. But where some of those arrested are insolvent, the rich
ones will be responsible for the whole amount. If, however, several have
concurred in a crime without a conspiracy, and it can be clearly
distinguished how much each has contributed to the damage, each will be
bound to make good that part alone which was due to himself. But if one has
paid the whole amount, the rest are exempt from restitution.
9. Not alone the man who has injured another with malice aforethought, is
bound to make good the damage, but also he who, without direct intention,
has done so through neglect, or a fault which it was easy to avoid. For it
is not the smallest part of sociability, to act so circumspectly that our
intercourse does not become formidable or insufferable to others. And then,
in consequence of a particular obligation, one is often required to use
extraordinary diligence. In fact even the slightest fault can suffice to
require restitution, provided the nature of the matter does not actually
resent, as it were, the most exact diligence; or if the blame does not
belong rather to the man who suffers the damage, than to him who causes it;
or unless great excitement, or the circumstances of the case, do not admit a
studied circumspection; for example, if one, while brandishing his arms in
the heat of battle, should injure a man standing near him.
10. But whoever injures by mere chance, and without his own fault is not
bound to make restitution. For nothing having been committed which can be
laid to the man's charge, there is no reason why the unwilling agent should
atone for an evil that was destined to happen, rather than the other, who
has suffered it.
11. Another precept in agreement with natural equity is that, if my man has
caused damage to another without my fault, I should make it good to the
injured party, or surrender my man to him. For a slave is of course
naturally liable for reparation of damage he has caused. But since he has no
property of his own, from which reparation may be made, and his person
belongs to the master, it is surely right that the master should either mend
the damage or surrender the slave. For otherwise a slave would be given
license to injure any persons at his pleasure, if damages could not be
recovered either from himself, who has nothing, not even himself, or from
his master. For if, on account of an injury, a master is ever so willing to
punish the slave with blows or imprisonment, the injured cannot possibly be
satisfied thereby.
12. The same principle also seems to be right with regard to our animals,
that when, even without our fault, and being of themselves excited contrary
to the nature of their kind, they have caused damage to another man, the
master should either make good the damage, or surrender the animal. For if I
had been injured by an animal living in its natural freedom, I could
certainly repair my loss in any way, seizing or killing the beast, -- a
right which evidently could not have been taken away by the fact of
ownership on the part of another. And since the owner receives gain from the
animal, while I have suffered a loss from the same, and since repairing a
loss finds far greater favor than making gain, it is clear that I may
rightly demand of the master of the animal, that he make good the loss, or
else, if the animal is not worth so much in his estimation, deliver it up to
me.
13. So then, if a man has without malice aforethought caused damage to
another, he is bound to make a voluntary offer of restitution, and testify
that he was far from any malice, that the injured party may not hold him an
enemy, and on his side plan acts of hostility. But one who has injured
another maliciously, is not only bound to make a free offer of restitution,
but also to show his repentance, and ask pardon. On the other side, the
injured, once he has obtained restitution, is bound to grant pardon to the
penitent who begs for it, and to be reconciled to him. For he who is
unwilling to rest satisfied with restitution and repentance, but sets out to
avenge himself anyhow with his own hand, is only humoring the bitterness of
his heart, and so for an empty reason breaking the peace among men. For this
reason even the natural law condemns vengeance, which has no other end than
to harm those who have injured us, and satisfy our feelings with their
suffering. But it is proper that men should be the more inclined to forgive
mutual offenses, the more frequently they themselves violate the laws of the
supreme Deity, and hence have daily need of forgiveness themselves.