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It details the myth of German culpability concerning the Second World War itself. It involves quotes, statistics, everything relevant, I think.

Good read, indeed.

You'd be keen to take a look, no doubt.

Decent article - just put up on May 2008.

I'm going to reprint it here as a backup:

Quote:

The myth of German culpability

THE 2nd WORLD WAR - THE SEQUENCE OF AGGRESSION

By Michael Walsh

One of the great mysteries of life is that, despite the evidence to the contrary, millions of otherwise intelligent people still believe that Germany was the all-powerful aggressor during the 2nd World War. Nothing better than these myths illustrate the mind-bending power of propaganda.

The provable facts suggest that Germany was the victim and not the perpetrator of naked neighboring aggression. The subsequent Allied military triumph was followed by the triumph of the propagandists whose pressing need was to depict the victor nations as being the victim.

THE BRUTISH EMPIRE:
"Germany is too strong. We must destroy her."
- Winston Churchill, Nov. 1936.
"In no country has the historical blackout been more intense and effective than in Great Britain. Here it has been ingeniously christened The Iron Curtain of Discreet Silence. Virtually nothing has been written to reveal the truth about British responsibility for the Second World War and its disastrous results."
- Harry Elmer Barnes, American Historian
"The war was not just a matter of the elimination of Fascism in Germany, but rather of obtaining German sales markets."
- Winston Churchill. March, 1946.
"Britain was taking advantage of the situation to go to war against Germany because the Reich had become too strong and had upset the European balance."
- Ralph F. Keeling, Institute of American Economics
"I emphasized that the defeat of Germany and Japan and their elimination from world trade would give Britain a tremendous opportunity to swell her foreign commerce in both volume and profit."
- Samuel Untermeyer, The Public Years, p.347.
On September 2nd 1939 a delegate of the Labour Party met with the British Foreign Minister Halifax in the lobby of Parliament. 'Do you still have hope?' he asked. 'If you mean hope for war,' answered Halifax, 'then your hope will be fulfilled tomorrow. 'God be thanked!' replied the representative of the British Labour Party.
- Professor Michael Freund.
"In Britain, Lord Halifax was reported as being 'redeemed'. He ordered beer. We laughed and joked."
- H. Roth. ("Are We Being Lied To?")
"In April, 1939, (four months before the outbreak of war) Ambassador William C. Bullitt, whom I had known for twenty years, called me to the American Embassy in Paris. The American Ambassador told me that war had been decided upon. He did not say, nor did I ask, by whom. He let me infer it. ... When I said that in the end Germany would be driven into the arms of Soviet Russia and Bolshevism, the Ambassador replied: "'what of it? There will not be enough Germans left when the war is over to be worth bolshevising."
- Karl von Wiegand, April, 23rd, 1944, Chicago Herald American
"I felt sorry for the German people. We were planning - and we had the force to carry out our plans - to obliterate a once mighty nation."
- Admiral Daniel Leahy; U.S Ambassador

MYTH 1. THE GERMAN NATION IS AN AGGRESSIVE NATION
The facts prove otherwise. A Study of War by Prof. Quincy Wright, shows that in the period from 1480 to 1940 there were 278 wars involving European countries whose percentage participation was as follows:
ENGLAND 28%
FRANCE 26%
SPAIN 23%
RUSSIA 22%
AUSTRIA 19%
TURKEY 15%
POLAND 11%
SWEDEN 9%
ITALY 9%
NETHERLANDS 8%
GERMANY (INCLUDING PRUSSIA) 8%
DENMARK 7%
Likewise, Pitirim Sorokin, Vol.111, Part.11, Social and Cultural Dynamics, shows that from the 12th Century to 1925 the percentage of years in which leading European powers have been at war is as follows. (p.352).
COUNTRY PERCENTAGE OF YEARS AT WAR
SPAIN 67%
POLAND 58%
ENGLAND 56%
FRANCE 50%
RUSSIA 46%
HOLLAND 44%
ITALY 36%
GERMANY 28%
Sorokin concludes therefore, "that Germany has had the smallest and Spain the largest percent of years at war." Of leading modern European states, England, France and Russia show clearly twice the aggressive tendencies of Germany.
From the years 1815 to 1907 the record stands as follows:
BRITAIN 10 wars
RUSSIA 7 wars
FRANCE 5 wars
AUSTRIA 3 wars
PRUSSIA-GERMANY 3 wars

GERMANY DID NOT WANT WAR
"I believe now that Hitler and the German people did not want war. But we declared war on Germany, intent on destroying it, in accordance with our principle of balance of power, and we were encouraged by the 'Americans' around Roosevelt. We ignored Hitler's pleadings not to enter into war. Now we are forced to realize that Hitler was right."
- Attorney General, Sir Hartley Shawcross, March,16th, 1984
"The last thing Hitler wanted was to produce another great war."
- Sir. Basil Liddell Hart
"I see no reason why this war must go on. I am grieved to think of the sacrifices which it will claim. I would like to avert them."
- Adolf Hitler, July, 1940.
Winston Churchill agrees: "We entered the war of our own free will, without ourselves being directly assaulted."
- Guild Hall Speech, July 1943.

MYTH 2. THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES OUTNUMBERED THEIR NEIGHBOURS
POLAND
30 Active Divisions
10 Reserve Divisions
12 Large Cavalry Brigades
Poland had nearly 2,500,000 trained men available for mobilisations.
FRANCE
110 Divisions
65 were active divisions
Including 5 cavalry divisions, two mechanised divisions, one armoured division, the rest being infantry. On the German borders stood the French command stood 85 Divisions and could mobilise 5,000,000-armed troops. These were supported backed by five British divisions.
BRITAIN
Britain's relatively small but high quality Regular Army was supported by the Territorial Army consisting of 26 Divisions with plans well in hand to boost this to 55 divisions. This of course was in turn supported by the then world's largest conscription army holding an empire 'upon which the sun never set.'
The British Empire consisted also of the former German 'empire' of New Guinea, Nauru, Western Samoa, South West Africa, Quattar, Palestine, Transjordan, Tanganyika, Iraq, Togoland and the Cameroons. These territories stolen from Germany added another 1,061,755 square miles to the British Empire, the equivalent of 35 Scotlands
GERMANY
Against these formidable forces Germany was able to mobilise just ninety-eight divisions of which only fifty-two were active (including Austrian divisions). Of the remaining 46 divisions only 10 were fit for action on mobilisation and even in these the bulk of them were raw recruits who had been serving for less than one month.
The other 36 divisions consisted mainly of Great War veterans over the age of forty who were unfamiliar with modern weapons and up to date military techniques.
THE BALANCE SHEET
On the balance sheets it can be seen that the Poles and French alone, not counting Britain and its Empire, had the equivalent of 130 divisions against a total of 98 German divisions of with 1/3rd were virtually untrained men.
In terms of trained soldiers the Germans were at an even bigger disadvantage. (Note at the outbreak of war over 50% of the German armed forces was horse drawn).
WAR IN THE AIR
"The superiority of the Luftwaffe has been greatly exaggerated to create the impression that Britain was the underdog; a David fighting Goliath. In the run up to the Battle of Britain (August 10th 194) the Luftwaffe had 929 fighters available; mostly single-engine Messerschmitt 109s. Of these 227 were twin-engine long-range Me110s which had a top speed of 350mph. Although it had a faster rate of climb it was inferior when turning or manoeuvring.
The ME109's range restricted its field of operation. Their real fields of operation - out and back - was a little over 100 miles, a flight time of barely 95 minutes and a tactical flight time of just 75 minutes. This was a severe handicap when it is considered that whereas the Luftwaffe pilots were operating scores of miles from their base, British pilots were often within sight of their own. This handicap was made more critical by the fact that downed RAF pilots could be rescued whilst Luftwaffe pilots were of course - if they were lucky - imprisoned.
The twin-engine ME110 was a slow flyer able to cruise at a little less than 300mph and was easily outpaced by the RAF's Spitfires. It was also 'sluggish in acceleration and difficult to manoeuvre.'
The greatest handicap for the Germans however was there primitive radio equipment. Unlike the British versions it was poor in air-to-air operation and could not be controlled by the ground.
On the British side a total surpassing 650 fighter aircraft had been amassed by mid-July, mostly Hurricanes and Spitfires although including nearly 100 of the older types. During that whole year Britain produced 4,238 fighters compared with a derisory 3,000 manufactured by Germany.
In terms of armaments the noted British military historian, B.H Liddell Hart noted: "What is quite clear, and became evident at the start, was that the German bombers were too poorly armed to be able to beat off the British fighters without a fighter escort of their own." - History of the Second World War.

GERMANY AND OTHER FREE COUNTRIES ATTACKED
Poland carried out the first acts of aggression. In March 1939 Poland, already occupying German territory 'acquired' in 1919 invaded Czechoslovakia. During the months running up to the outbreak of war Polish armed forces repeatedly violated German borders. On August 31st 1939 Polish irregular armed forces launched a full scale attack on the German border town of Gleiwitz.
Within hours Germany retaliated resulting in Britain and France's declarations of war on the German nation on 3rd Sept 1939. In Britain's case this declaration of war was constitutionally illegal. It was not, as it should have been, ratified by parliament.
Despite her borders being constantly attacked by the numerically superior armies of France and England, and economically strangled by world finance, Germany refused to be drawn, negotiated for peace and turned the other cheek for ten months.
Only when it accurately learned that England intended to broaden the western front by occupying the Low Countries and Norway, thus surrounding and threatening Germany's entire borders, did Germany carry out a pre-emptive strike.
Germany's defensive counter attack was launched on 10th May 1940. This resulted in the rout of 330,000 British and French troops by a significantly smaller army. It was one of the worst debacles in military history. (The British press called it 'a miracle).
Russia invaded Finland on Nov 30th 1939. Britain (not for the first time) and France invaded Norway's neutrality on 8th April 1940. To avoid attack via the Baltic Sea Germany counter-attacked. In the small battles that followed (Trondheim) 2,000 German troops routed 13,000 British troops. They were evacuated on 1st May. To save face Churchill disembarked 20,000 British troops at Narvik. They were driven out by 2,000 Austrian Alpine troops.
Canada declared war on Germany 10th Sept 1939. In June 1940 Soviet Russia invaded Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and Rumania. In June 1940, Britain declared war on Finland, Rumania and Hungary whilst also occupying defenseless Iceland. All of these acts of aggression in gross violation of international law and previously signed treaties.
On May 10th 1940, in brazen defiance of international law, Britain occupied Iceland. Icelanders regarded the British armed forces as an occupying force.
On 7th Dec 1941 a British backed coup overthrew the Yugoslav government. On 27th March 1941 British troops entered Greece. On 6th April 1941 Germany retaliated and Britain retreated again. In June 1940 Britain prepared to invade neutral Portugal.
The United States, supposedly neutral, consistently attacked German shipping and arrests or otherwise kidnapped German citizens, even those living in South American countries. In August 1941, Germany retaliated.
In 1940 alone Britain, supposedly standing alone and at bay, added 1.6 MILLION SQUARE MILES TO ITS WORLD EMPIRE occupying Italian and French colonies - Syria, Iraq and Persia. Britain's foremost military historian, A.J.P. Taylor conceded: "There can be no doubt that he (Hitler) broadened the war in 1941 only on preventive grounds."
Footnote on casualties: In terms of casualties the United Kingdom came in at number nine. Russia came first (official figures at 13.6 million, Germany 3.5, China 1.3, Japan 1.3, Romania 350,000, United States 252,000, Italy 279,000, UK 264,000, France 213,000, Hungary 200,000, Poland 123,000, Greece 88,000, Finland 82,000, Canada 37,000, India 24,000, Australia 23,000, Belgium 12,000, Czechoslovakia 10,000, Bulgaria 10,000, New Zealand 10,000 (another country threatened by Germany no doubt!), Netherlands 8,000, South Africa 6,000, Norway 3,000, Denmark 1,800, Brazil 943.

A FINAL EPITAPH FROM ONE OF ENGLAND'S FINEST POETS:
A curse for England, false and base,
Where nothing can prosper but disgrace,
Where crushed is each flower's tender form,
And decay and corruption feed the worm ....
... Sounds familiar?

Without question, any reasonably well-read, unbiased induvidual would be very hard pressed to not list Hitler as the most reasonable, and trustworthy of the major WW2 leaders. The "Big Three" were liars amongst themselves let alone to Hitler. Hitler had more honor than all three combined and was, indeed a man of his word. In my opinion Roosevelt was even larger filth than Stalin, as Stalin at least didn't pretend. Churchill did whatever was expedient for the moment. In the end the jews write the story and the magnitude to which Hitlers name is sullied is the mark of his HONOR.

Location: Congenial Hobbyland. Thinking of our antecedents & posterity. Where is the Euro-White identity, culture, faith & voice? The media vilifies our folk and its reps. Support SF for as little as $5/month.

Why did Neville Chamberlain go to Munich? How did Munich lead to World War II?

The seeds of the crisis were planted at the Paris peace conference of 1919. There, the victorious Allies carved the new nation of Czechoslovakia out of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

But instead of following their principle of self-determination, the Allies placed under the rule of 7 million Czechs 3 million Germans, 3 million Slovaks, 800,000 Hungarians, 150,000 Poles and 500,000 Ruthenians. These foolish decisions spat upon Woodrow Wilson's 14 Points, under the terms of which the Germans, Austrians and Hungarians had laid down their arms.

By 1938, Germany had arisen, re-armed and brought Austria into the Reich, and was demanding the right of self-determination now be granted to the 3 million Germans in Czechoslovakia, who were clamoring to be free of Prague to rejoin their kinsmen.
Britain had no alliance with, and no obligation to fight for, the Czechs. But France did. And Britain feared that if Adolf Hitler used force to bring the Sudeten Germans back to German rule, France might fight. And if France declared war, Britain would be drawn in, and a second bloodbath would ensue as it had in 1914.

Chamberlain went to Munich because he did not believe that keeping 3 million Germans inside a nation to which they had been consigned against their will was worth a world war.

Moreover, Britain was unprepared for war. She had no draft, no Spitfires, no divisions ready to be sent to France. Why should
the British Empire commit suicide by declaring war on Germany, to support a Paris peace agreement that he, Chamberlain, believed had been unjustly and dishonorably imposed on a defeated Germany?

Chamberlain believed not—and, after three trips to Germany that September, he effected the transfer of the Sudeten Germans to Berlin's rule, where they wished to be. He came home in triumph to be hailed as the greatest peacemaker of all time.
Why, then, are "Munich" and "appeasement" terms of obloquy?

The answer lies in what happened next.

Chamberlain returned from Munich to a rapturous reception, waving a paper he and Hitler had signed, and declared: "For the second time in our history, a British Prime Minister has returned from Germany bringing peace with honor. I believe it is peace for our time."

This was palpable nonsense. Hitler had already turned to the next item on his menu, Danzig, a city of 350,000 Germans, detached from the Reich at Versailles and made a Free City to give the new Poland an outlet to the sea. Hitler did not want war with Poland. Indeed, he wanted the kind of alliance with Poland he had with Italy. But, first, Danzig must be resolved.
Here, too, the British Government agreed: Danzig should be returned. For of all the amputations of German lands and peoples at Versailles, European statesmen, even Winston Churchill, regarded Danzig and the Polish Corridor that sliced Germany in two as the most outrageous. The problem was the Poles, who refused to discuss Danzig.

Then, in March, Czechoslovakia suddenly began to fall apart. The Sudetenland had been annexed by Germany. Hungary had taken back its lost lands, and Poland had annexed the disputed region of Teschen. Slovakia and Ruthenia now moved to declare independence, and Prague began to march on the provinces.

Hitler intervened to guarantee the independence of Slovakia and gave Hungary a green light to re-annex Ruthenia. Czech President Hacha then asked to see Hitler, who bullied him for three hours into signing away Czech sovereignty and making his nation the German Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.

Chamberlain, now humiliated, mocked by Tory back-benchers, panicking over wild false rumors of German attacks on Romania and Poland, made the greatest blunder in British history. Unasked, he issued a war guarantee to Poland, empowering a Polish dictatorship of colonels that had joined Hitler in dismembering Czechoslovakia to drag the British Empire into war with Germany over a city, Danzig, the British thought should be returned to Germany.

It was not Munich. It was the war guarantee that guaranteed the war that brought down the Empire, and gave us the Holocaust, 50 million dead and the Stalinization of half of Europe.

Location: Congenial Hobbyland. Thinking of our antecedents & posterity. Where is the Euro-White identity, culture, faith & voice? The media vilifies our folk and its reps. Support SF for as little as $5/month.

Proponents of nonviolence are often challenged by the claim that "nonviolence wouldn’t work against the Nazis." Seldom is this statement backed up by any evidence or argument. The very existence of ruthless Nazi killers is taken to be a definitive justification for military methods.

There are various ways to respond. One is to point out that nonviolent action was seldom actually used against the Nazis: usually there was no resistance. Another is to point to the effectiveness of nonviolent action against the Nazis on a number of occasions. Jacques Semelin’s superb new book Unarmed Against Hitler is the best reference on this issue.

But rather than accepting the challenge of arguing that nonviolent methods could have stopped Hitler once he had established a regime based on terror and launched a war, another option is to turn the attention in a different direction. An important argument is that within Germany there were highly placed opponents of Nazism who were doing what they could to undermine Hitler’s rule. The existence of this opposition movement has long been known, as described for example in the book by Hans Rothfels. What is not so well known is the role of the British government in refusing to help the opposition or even heed its warnings. This story is told in an eye-opening book by Patricia Meehan, The Unnecessary War.

Before the outbreak of World War II, there were opponents of Hitler in many high positions in Germany, including top officials in the German Foreign Ministry, the military high command and the police. Their position was a delicate one. If they became too open about their views, they were likely to be arrested and possibly executed. After all, within their own country they were considered by the ruling Nazi Party as traitors to an elected government. But because they recognised the evil of the Nazis and opposed both the internal repression in Germany and the planned external aggression, they were willing to take personal risks for the greater good. The high-level opponents of Hitler were not principled practitioners of nonviolent action&endash;for example, they used secrecy and favoured the threat of force against Nazi aggression&endash;but their experiences are instructive for nonviolent activists nonetheless.

The elite opponents of Hitler looked for external support, and most of all they looked to Britain, which had the greatest moral standing at the time. Hence, the German opposition set up numerous channels of communication with British officials. They did everything they could to convince the British government to take a stand against Hitler.

In the 1920s and 1930s, the British could have opposed Hitler, but did not. Meehan, though, looks especially at the late 1930s, when Hitler made his greatest diplomatic coups. One key moment was the crisis over Czechoslovakia in 1938. Hitler threatened to attack unless his demands for territory were met.

The German opposition made extraordinary efforts to alert the British and to urge them to take a stand against Hitler’s demands. They provided detailed information about German military and economic weakness, from the very highest sources. This was supplemented by information from leading German industrialists. They also organised detailed plans to take power from the Nazis and to set up a moderate government that would renounce aggression.

Leading Nazis portrayed German as a country unified in spirit and unified in its demands for territory to unite the Germanic peoples. In reality, there was considerable opposition. Industrial production was in a shambles and the military was weak. Organised labour, drafted to build the Siegfried line to protect against an invasion from France, obstructed work with strikes, go-slows and poor work that ensured that the fortifications were pathetically weak.

So what did the British government do with this information? Nothing. The frantic and risky warnings from the German opposition were dismissed by the British Foreign Office, which was convinced that Hitler was strong and needed to be pacified.

The German opposition was ready to act against Hitler. They waited only for a forcement statement from the British government against Hitler’s designs against Czechoslovakia. But all the opposition’s plans were for naught. Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain took the initiative to personally meet with Hitler at Munich and did everything possible to pressure the Czechoslovak government to accept Hitler’s demands. The result was that Czechoslovakia, which had a powerful military force, was ceded to the Nazis without a struggle.

The story of the British Foreign Office’s repeated refusals to act on information, warnings and pleas from the German opposition, told through memos, is a depressing one. Even after Hitler’s diplomatic bluff over Czechoslovakia succeeded - a terrible blow to the opposition - they continued their efforts to alert the British. They continued to be disappointed.

Once the war began and it was obvious that the German opposition’s concerns were valid, the Foreign Office became concerned about how their refusal to take action in the late 1930s might appear. They continued to offer no help to the German opposition.

There were several unsuccessful attempts on Hitler’s life. The only one that became known during the war was in 1944. In the aftermath, many leading members of the German opposition were tried and executed. Thousands died in a post-coup purge. The British Foreign Office was pleased! This meant that opposition members would no longer be available to point out the failures of the Foreign Office to take action against Hitler. Here is an extract from a memo from John Wheeler-Bennett, a historian in the Foreign Office Political Intelligence Department:

"It may now be said with some definiteness that we are better off with things as they are today than if the plot of July 20th had succeeded and Hitler had been assassinated. . . . By the failure of the plot we have been spared the embarrassments, both at home and in the United States, which might have resulted from such a move, and, moreover, the present purge is presumably removing from the scene numerous individuals which might have caused us difficulty, not only had the plot succeeded, but also after the defeat of a Nazi Germany. . . . The Gestapo and the SS have done us an appreciable service in removing a selection of those who would undoubtedly have posed as ‘good’ Germans after the war. . . . It is to our advantage therefore that the purge should continue, since the killing of Germans by Germans will save us from future embarrassments of many kinds."

The Foreign Office had long refused to accept that there could be any ‘good’ Germans.

Not all the opposition leaders were killed in the purge, however. Several were in foreign diplomatic postings. After the war, some of them were brought before the war crimes tribunal. They contacted their friends in the British Foreign Office for support in showing that they had been active opponents of Nazism. Alas, the Foreign Office declined to help. In a tremendous miscarriage of justice, Ernst von Weizsäcker, former head of the German Foreign Ministry and an energetic member of the opposition, was sentenced to prison, in spite of an outpouring of support from numerous well-known anti-Nazis from many countries.

Weizsäcker and others wrote their side of the story and told about the failure of the western leaders to stand up to Hitler. The British Foreign Office carefully considered how to respond to this challenge. One method was to denigate the German opposition. At one stage the publication of carefully censored documents was planned, but in the end the main method was a coverup of the historical record.

There are many lessons that can be learned from this incredible story. One is that one of the greatest weaknesses of any dictatorship is lack of internal support. Providing support to the internal opposition is of crucial importance. The allied governments undermined the opposition not only by refusing to listen to its warnings and refusing to take a stand against Hitler, but also by demanding unconditional surrender instead of offering a gesture of support, however moderate, to any post-Nazi government. By demanding unconditional surrender in the war, the allies helped to make it difficult for the opposition to recruit support.

Another message is that taking a principled, open stand can be incredibly effective. The British government refused to take such a stand against Hitler when it would have had the most impact.

Perhaps the most important message is that opponents of repression and aggression should not rely on governments to take action. The German opposition looked to the British government and was repeatedly disappointed. Unfortunately, this pattern has been repeated over and over. For example, after the military coups in Fiji in 1987, members of the ousted government tried to gain support by visiting government leaders in New Zealand, Australia, Britain and elsewhere. It did them little good. For dictatorships to be supported by other governments is the rule rather than the exception. The United States government, among others, supported Saddam Hussein’s bloody regime in Iraq for years before the Gulf war. The Australian government, among others, has supported the Indonesian government, lending tacit support to the genocide in East Timor.

Another lesson from The Unnecessary War is that it is wise not to trust history as written by the victors. World War II is routinely presented as a necessary war against an otherwise unstoppable regime. The role of other governments in accommodating Hitler and the Nazis has been suppressed, as has the rehabilitation and recruitment of Nazi criminals by western governments after the war, as documented for example in books by Tom Bower and Christopher Simpson.

In discussions about the Nazis, it is usual to assume that there were only two options: do nothing or go to war. This was certainly the assumption of the British government, which preferred to deal with the legal German government, to believe its rhetoric about German unity and to dismiss the opposition as self-interested and ineffectual. Neville Chamberlain’s stance of appeasement is often equated with pacifism. Actually, it was just acquiescence.

The idea of nonviolent action is an alternative to the usual limited choice between acquiescence and violence. When someone challenges you with the claim "nonviolence wouldn’t work against the Nazis," you might reply "what would you have done if you had worked in the British Foreign Office in 1938 and leading German opponents of Hitler told you they were ready to act to topple the Nazi regime if only the British government would make a forceful statement condemning Hitler’s designs against Czechoslovakia?" Not a simple question! That’s precisely the point. Issues concerning the Nazis and nonviolence are not nearly as obvious as they are usually made out to be.

Location: Congenial Hobbyland. Thinking of our antecedents & posterity. Where is the Euro-White identity, culture, faith & voice? The media vilifies our folk and its reps. Support SF for as little as $5/month.

Location: Congenial Hobbyland. Thinking of our antecedents & posterity. Where is the Euro-White identity, culture, faith & voice? The media vilifies our folk and its reps. Support SF for as little as $5/month.

To note the source below is falsely attributed to Hitler (it was made by a French lawyer who created a fake document called "The Hitler-Bormann Documents" for his personal profit; nevertheless, as he stated "it's what Hitler would have said" (and there's some point to that lol):

The National Socialist doctrine, as I have always proclaimed, is not for export. It was conceived for the German people.

A war waged in 1938 would have been a swift war - for the emancipation of the Sudeten Germans, the Slovaks, the Hungarians and even of those Poles who were under Czech domination. Great Britain and France taken by surprise and discountenanced by the course of events would have remained passive - particularly in view of the fact that world opinion would have been on our side. Finally, Poland, the main prop of French policy in eastern Europe, would have been at our side. If Great Britain and France had made war on us in these circumstances they would have lost face. In actual fact, I'm quite sure they would not have gone to war; but they would have lost face all the same. Once our arms had spoken, we could have left till later the settlement of the remaining territorial problems in eastern Europe and the Balkans without fear of provoking the intervention of the two Powers, already discredited in the eyes of their protégés. As far as we ourselves were concerned, we should thus have gained the time required to enable us to consolidate our position, and we would have postponed the world war for several years to come. In fact, in these circumstances I doubt very much whether a second world war would, indeed, have been inevitable.

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In Churchill's single-minded decades-long obsession with preventing a single hegemonic power from arising on the European continent that would pose a threat to the British Empire, he failed to see that his alliance with Stalin produced exactly that. "As the blinkers of war were removed," John Charmley writes, "Churchill began to perceive the magnitude of the mistake which had been made." Churchill is alleged to have blurted out after finally realizing the scale of his blunder: "We have slaughtered the wrong pig!"