He showed that "[a]n examination of all English-language scientific literature dating back more than 20 years reveals that drug law enforcement dramatically escalates drug-market violence. Contrary to conventional wisdom, a startling 82 percent of the studies found the various wars on drugs in countries and internationally simply increase violence." This is something that has been argued by scholars, and ignored by politicians with equal vigour, for the duration of the century-old 'War on Drugs'.

The voices of reason, arguing for mitigation and regulation of national drug 'problems', are getting louder, and apparently being heard more and more. However, there remains an undercurrent of narrow-mindedness about US policy making. "Voices for eradication are strong in the United States," suggests Vanda Felbab-Brown, (quote from this Foreign Policy in Focus article) but, she points out, "rural development" policies take time to establish. And that "despite a good policy — we may not see deep reductions in poppy cultivation in Afghanistan for several years."

Although from what I understand from reviews, and my limited reading (been snowed under with dissertation &c.), of Shooting Up, Felbab-Brown does not see the conflation of COIN and CONA as helping the causes of either counterinsurgency or counter-narcotics operations, this long-term approach, in which "we may not see deep reductions in poppy cultivation in Afghanistan for several years," is a key tenet of COIN theory. COIN operations take time (the British army spent twelve years subduing the Malayan Emergency) and it is often difficult to discern successes along the way.

The shift of US policy away from eradication is a good thing. Many farmers consider it an unfair practice. It is also a key factor in the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Hamid Karzai told Thomas Schweich in 2008 that the Afghan people might misunderstand aerial spraying as “some sort of poison coming from the sky.” So moving the policy away from eradication and towards policies of mitigation and regulation, rather than prohibition, as is becoming the thinking in Washington, is likely to have untold positive impacts on the COIN operations in Afghanistan.

Interestingly though, while the decision to pursue eradication programmes in Afghanistan were based on 'successful' eradication schemes in Latin America and Pakistan (Schweich again: "Eradication was an essential component of successful anti-poppy efforts in Guatemala, Southeast Asia and Pakistan."), the same 'policy parity' is not being applying retroactively. Foreign Policy in Focus writer Coletta Youngers points out, "Although the US government may have learned a lesson about forced eradication in Afghanistan, it has yet to apply it to Latin America. On the contrary, U.S. officials have consistently stated that such an approach should not be adopted in Latin America, erroneously claiming that the existence of stronger institutions provides the conditions for successful implementation of forced eradication. Yet, as in Afghanistan, forced eradication in the Andean region has failed to achieve its desired objectives." (Original emphasis).

Further, she suggests that "One key reason for this policy stagnation is that the drug war bureaucracy remains intact." This is an inevitability of bureaucracies, but it will change, given the correct focus. This is evidenced in Youngers' closing comments about the current discussions redressing the foci of drug policies away from ineffective prohibitional models and towards more fleixble and realistic policies of regulation and harm reduction.

2010.05.05

EDIT: This piece has been heavily edited in light of a comment received from Capt. Dyer himself this morning, pointing out a few things that I had missed. Says something about a lack of context, perhaps. I apologize for taking the video out of context. The field in the background of the video looked red. Once again "assume makes an ass of u and me."

So perhaps the only gripe I could have would be the use of the name "Route Dorest" to designate the road. This might just be the British army's designation, but I feel like, from what I understand about counterinsurgency, perhaps a more local sounding name would be preferable, if we're to be out of there, in the long term.

Further, Capt. Dyer pointed out that after the removal of the device, "two local nationals thanked us - they had ridden their motorbikes almost right over the device without knowing it was there. Riding slightly to the left or right would have resulted in a fatality."

For this, I apologize once again. More thorough research is perhaps required in future.

Yesterday's post on the ICOS assessment of Operation Moshtarak suggested that perhaps it isn't being as successful as NATO might have hoped. This is compounded by this piece from the New York Times, which suggests that, because "[o]pium is the main livelihood of 60 to 70 percent of the farmers in Marja, ... American Marines occupying the area are under orders to leave the farmers’ fields alone."

One of my pet hates in the counterinsurgency arena is what I call 'clumsy COIN'. The term was born in the essay that I wrote which started this adventure. Specifically, it was page 69 of this report by ICOS (then Senlis) which used the example of a piece of Taliban propaganda showing a uniformed male soldier bodily searching an Afghan woman, accompanied with the text: “We cannot stand back and watch as foreigners touch our women. Something must be done.”

So, when the American commander in charge of troops in Marjah pointed out that “Marja is a special case right now,” suggesting, as should really be obvious, “[w]e don’t trample the livelihood of those we’re trying to win over, but the picture ”

While this is not in Marjah, the general feeling of discontent among Afghan farmers, 66% of whom, according to the Mostarak: Lessons Learned Report (page 20), believe that destroying poppy crops is bad.

Maybe I should post something more positive tomorrow. Perhaps something like this, from 1st April, 2010. What's funny about this, however, is the fact that "[i]t may not feature very highly in Nato's counter-insurgency manual but British forces have discovered that one way to triumph in the most vital battle of the Afghan war, winning over the hearts and minds of the local population, is through their goats and sheep."

That makes perfect sense to me. But maybe that's just me.

Below is the section which caused offense:

Clumsy COIN is how I would describe the final few seconds of this video from the excellent Helmand Blog. In the midst of congratulating themselves for the 'success' of Moshtarak, Capt. Ciaron Dyer explains how his team dealt with an IED on 'Route Dorset' (splendidly Arabic sounding name) "ordinarily, I'd consider blowing it in-situ, having removed the components for further analysis. However, in this instance, it would have risked damaging the road too much." In light of this, the team thoughtfully remove the device from the road. However, the video then shows impressive footage of the device being detonated. In the middle of a poppy field in full flower.

“Operation Moshtarak not only failed to win the hearts and minds of the people of Marjah, but it has actually driven them further away from the international community.”

That is the conclusion of this report from the International Council on Security and Development (ICOS) in its analysis of the NATO and ANA assault on the town of Marjah in Helmand Province.

ICOS’s own research demonstrates that the operation has had an overall negative effect on the situation in that area. Their research showed that 68% of Afghans interviewed believed that the Taliban would return to the region, when NATO/ANA forces withdrew. This is particularly alarming when you consider that, according to ICOS, 96% of people surveyed believed that over the last year, more young Afghans have joined the Taliban, and that 78% of people said that they “often or always feel angry.” (page 10) The report makes no bones about the fact that this led to “legitimate grievances.” These kinds of figures don’t bode well for the counterinsurgent forces and the progress of the counterinsurgency operations there.

Another key phrase ‘agreement on ends but not means’ dominates the report. “[L]ocals do not want the Taliban to return but they also do not want to endure unnecessary suffering as part of NATO’s response to the insurgency.” (page 3) This presents a difficult situation for NATO, as it seeks to withdraw its troops and leave a sturdy Afghan security force, capable of keeping the Taliban unpopular and out of business. However, there are ways out. The ICOS report suggests that the Taliban have been able to sell NATO as invading and, worse from the point of view of a Muslim, crusading force. As Boris Johnson pointed out in his twodocumentary series on the rise of the Roman Empire, and his book, The Dream of Rome, Muslims are averse to the term 'Crusade' for obvious reasons.

It is with this in mind that ICOS report's suggestion that "Restoring Mosques and Shrines ... would also work to counteract the Taliban propaganda, which always portrays Westerners as anti-Muslim and seeking to destroy Afghanistan's cultural and religious heritage," is inspired. Coupled with this, the report also calls for a "Quran Distribution Programme," suggesting that "[p]ossesion of copy of the Holy Quran is highly valued among rural Afghans yet unattainable to many because of widespread poverty." And that this programme "would directly counter the Taliban propaganda that accuses NATO of pursuing an anti-Islamic, 'crusader' agenda." (page 24) As P.W. Singer said in his book Wired for War, “The message you think you are sending is not always the one that the other side actually receives.” (page 305) In understanding that clarity of message is vital to successful COIN, this kind of activity, restoring key facets of the Muslim faith, seems extremely important.

The report suggests the use of what it calls non-violent security instruments (NVSIs), “including measures such as refugee aid, effective counter-narcotics policies, the preparation of suitable refugee camps and medical assistance,” (page 12) were missing from the follow-on operations. Although these were, as the report points out profusely, meticulously planned, it seems that they were somewhat lacking in the application. The focus instead was on

In terms of future operations, the ICOS report suggests that these lessons must be learned quickly, before the planned NATO operation in Kandahar this summer. In concert with the assertions in the ICOS report, is this Asia Times Online article suggesting that “across the border in Pakistan, the tribal areas are not, as had been planned, cleared of militants.” This sort of mission creep is a key factor in the ‘balloon effect’.

NATO risks, indeed is, pushing the Taliban over the border into Pakistan and having to chase the problem there. The controversial drone war there is leading to significant diplomatic tensions.

Lessons need to be learned before Kandahar. Fortunately, some lessons appear to be being learned on the way. Perhaps one day they'll get the hang of it. However, both this blog and The Full Force of the Wind criticised Moshtarak in COIN terms. While provision was promised from the outset, it wasn't forthcoming.

2010.05.02

Or perhaps a move to becoming more focused. I think that this blog will continue to focus on the future of conflict, but it is also likely to become far more concerned about the role of narcotics in conflict; particularly in the conflict in Afghanistan.

This might be because I am about to embark on eighteen months of researching and writing about those topics, but it's also because this is what I think that I have been called to do. And from a second reading of Steven Pressfield'sThe War of Art, I feel like it is more important than ever that I take this up.

Pressfield's book suggests that the more "Resistance" one feels towards a particular goal, whatever it may be, the more important it is for one to pursue it. Although this might sound counter-intuitive, a lot of what he says makes a lot of sense. This post is part of the first steps to creating a better life for myself (I'll be honest with that from the outset) but also, it will be about improving the lives of people all over the world.

This is all done in the name of something unnameable, but bigger than myself. These words are not preplanned. I am simply moving my fingers on the keyboard.