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The Japanese decided to not bother the Russians even with the Germans engaging them in Europe because of the thrashing the Soviets did to the Japanese in 1939. This was also way the Navy's plan to take the Dutch East Indies went forward even though the Army was more or less in control of the government at the time. The Armies plan has been to take Siberia for resources. The Soviets proved too difficult so the plan was scrapped and the Navy was listened to for once.

Yes, but what of the German factor? Soviet/Japanese engagements don't take place in a vacuum. The Japanese engaging the Soviets in Siberia would have severely reduced their strength in the west. One of the reasons the Soviets was able to stop the German advance was due to the transferral of the more experienced troops from the Far East, which was only possible because they were sure (due to Espionage) that the Japanese were not going to attack.

The issue is that the far east Siberian divisions were never sent west, and only had minor percentages of their forces taken to the west as reinforcements. The "Siberian" troops that did partake in fighting against the Germans were from Central Asia.
What would not have been possible in 1942 is for the Russians to fight the Japanese and conquer all of Manchuria, but they would've beaten the Guandong army on the border regions just as easily as in 1939, due to reasons listed above.

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If the Japanese had chosen not to attack America at Pearl Harbour, and instead concentrate on defeating the soviets as the Germans attacked from the west, who knows how things could have been different?

The beginning of the Pacific War against the USA and European colonies was a massive strategic mistake, but did not fundamentally detract from the IJA's abilities in waging land war. Either way, the Japanese land forces were still bogged down in China and they were still inferior to their Soviet counterparts. So the only chance they have in beating Russia is to have not gotten involved in the invasion of China in 1937.

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Either way, there was clearly an error of communication between Germany and Japan. They were quite uncoordinated considering they shared common enemies. If they could have defeated the Soviets, defeating the rest of the Allies would have been significantly easier.

I agree that the Germans and Japanese did not coordinate well. Partly this is because they were only allied in 1940, by which point the Japanese were already set on going south and east, not north.

Had Hitler allied with Japan in the mid-30s, before China proper was invaded, it would've provided more incentive to prepare to attack Russia in tandem with Germany. However I doubt that the Japanese at that point realized exactly how badly they needed whatever help they could get.

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Originally Posted by Ithekro

The Armies plan has been to take Siberia for resources. The Soviets proved too difficult so the plan was scrapped and the Navy was listened to for once.

The Japanese saw China as their main target in the grand scheme. They jumped into the Chinese front too fast and too deeply, attacking Siberia with only a half-hearted effort. The Chinese war also led to their bankruptcy and the embargo by the US.
The Japanese also needed resources, but I don't know where those Siberian deposits lay. Siberia is big and the more remote the resources are the less the Japanese will be able to conquer or exploit them.

I would point out something else of interest from this time period. Up to 1938, Nazi Germany was supporting Nationalist China against Japan until the Sino-Soviet Pact and Hitler's policy in thinking the Japanese were more capable of dealing with the Bolsheviks than the Chinese. (the Germans and Americans both supported the Nationalists against the Communists and the Japanese at that time) Playing all sides, Germany has pacts with Japan and the Soviets in 1940 with still dealing with China economically. When everything fell apart, Germany having recognized the Japanese based client/puppet states in China and China joined the allies in declaring war in Germany in December of 1941. Russia already being at war with Germany since June of that year and Japan working on a viable solution to their energy problem via the Dutch East Indies so they could continue advancing into China.

Still the major factor is the Soviet Army defeating the Japanese badly in 1939 leading to the Japanese policy of not going there as it was a battle they did not think they could win.

The issue is that the far east Siberian divisions were never sent west, and only had minor percentages of their forces taken to the west as reinforcements. The "Siberian" troops that did partake in fighting against the Germans were from Central Asia.
What would not have been possible in 1942 is for the Russians to fight the Japanese and conquer all of Manchuria, but they would've beaten the Guandong army on the border regions just as easily as in 1939, due to reasons listed above.

Everything that I've ever read indicates that in June 1941, the Soviets had ~5 million soldiers, with ~3 million in the western theatre and ~2 million in the "far eastern theatre". Presumably, if the Japanese had joined the Germans in attacking, those troops would have been forced to stay in the East, and a large number of soldiers would have been pinned in Siberia in order to prevent Japan from expanding further into Siberia. The Soviets were stretched thin anyway, and may not have been able to support a 2 front war.

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The beginning of the Pacific War against the USA and European colonies was a massive strategic mistake, but did not fundamentally detract from the IJA's abilities in waging land war. Either way, the Japanese land forces were still bogged down in China and they were still inferior to their Soviet counterparts. So the only chance they have in beating Russia is to have not gotten involved in the invasion of China in 1937.

While boats don't necessarily help much in the middle of Siberia, you can't forget the large number of aircraft that was also associated with the Navy, if there was no pacific war, those aircraft could have been put to good use in China, or more importantly Manchuria (as the low number of airfields in China limited the usefulness of aircraft in the interior).

Also, while in the immediate short term, the pacific campaign didn't jeopardize the strength of the IJA, it did in the long term. It meant a lot of resources had to be put into supplying the navy, building new ships and sea based aviation, which could have been put towards more guns, tanks and land based aviation, which could have helped them win the more vital campaigns of China and a possible Siberian campaign.

Also, the Japanese focus on the navy was somewhat a mistake in itself, they wasted a lot of resources on building battleships, which ultimately proved to be rather pointless in a campaign dominated by air power.

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The Japanese saw China as their main target in the grand scheme. They jumped into the Chinese front too fast and too deeply, attacking Siberia with only a half-hearted effort. The Chinese war also led to their bankruptcy and the embargo by the US.
The Japanese also needed resources, but I don't know where those Siberian deposits lay. Siberia is big and the more remote the resources are the less the Japanese will be able to conquer or exploit them.

To be fair, the Chinese army was in a rather poor state, with the entire country divided by civil war and warlordism, if there was a time to attack, that was it, and the main way they could win such a campaign would be to do it quickly. The major mistake the Japanese made (and continued to make throughout the war) was that they underestimated their enemies. The Chinese army as a whole was terrible (the German trained divisions being the main exception, ironically), but they were not the pushovers the Japanese anticipated. Likewise the Soviet army was poorly led, and subpar at the beginning of the war, but still far superior to the Japanese army. The Japanese never really took to the steps necessary to reform their army, which may be what doomed them.

As for Siberia, if the Japanese had managed to reach the region around Kazakhstan (relatively easy provided they have victory in Mongolia, and North-Western China) they could have attacked the soft underbelly of Russian industry, and perhaps crippled their war effort. The terrain here is fairly difficult, though this may have been an advantage for the Japanese due to their lack of dependence on Armor.

As for the resources there, the accessible resources would have probably been clustered around the trans-siberian railway, which you can see from the map is located close to the border with Manchuria, and so easily accessible by land invasion. I have no idea whether these resources would have been sufficient for Japan's needs, however.

EDIT:@Ithekro another interesting counter-factual is that in the long term sticking with China may have been better for Germany. The benefits would probably not have been quick enough for Germany though. The dream scenario would have been if Germany could have brokered a peace between the two to go against the Communists, though I doubt the Japanese would have accepted it.

The IJA never had the logistics to go beyond Transamur. Any notion that the IJA would be able to conquer even Mongolia before collapsing is basically a gamey idea completely out of reality. Also, the 2 million troops in the "far eastern theater" includes everything west of the Urals, with the relevant Far Eastern Military District having more troops than all the IJA forces not in China.

The Japanese were betting on the Americans not having the will for a long fight, or possibly hitting them so hard they would negotiate a peace before 1943.

Admiral Yamamoto predicted correctly that if Japan could not secure a peace with the Americans on Japanese terms within six months of Pearl Harbor, the Americans would eventually steam roll the Japanese under American industry.

Some suggest one a the problems the Japanese had was their reliance on light tanks in Asia. Such things could not handle the Soviet tanks that would being made to match the German tanks (or in many cases the German heavy tanks were being made to better the Soviet tanks).

I can't say much about the Japanese Army since most of what I studied was their Navy. I know their Navy at the start of the war had better trained sailors, pilots, and experianced commanders. Their fighter aircraft were superior in many regards to American and British fighters at that time. They had by far the best torpedo on the planet at that time and crews trained for night operations that could use them effectively.

Japanese Naval superiority lasted for six months to a year. The major losses in 1942 of aircraft carriers, aircraft, trained handling personel, and a number of pilots crippled several of their operations by 1943. The Americans started to adapt tactically and technologically to counter the Japanese. Newer aircraft could match the Japanese Aircraft in more places than earlier ones. Radar allowed easier interception of incoming attacks and radar fire control allowed for superior gunnery to overtake the Japanese in places.

American industrial strength completely overwhelmed the Japanese with numbers when technology and tactics could not. The Japanese were able to replace their carrier loses by 1944 and replace aircraft and pilots (but not so much on deck crews), but by then the American had more than doubled and possibly tripled their own numbers of carriers and aircraft. Where in 1942 the Americans and Japanese were roughly equal in numbers of carriers with a slight edge to the Japanese, by 1944, the US Navy had not only replaced the losses of 1942, but also added even more carriers of all sizes to the fleet. By the end of the War the United State Navy would have over a hundred aircraft carriers...of which only three had been in service before the war started (USS Saratoga (CV-3) USS Ranger (CV-4), and USS Enterprise (CV-6)).

The Japanese did not adapt to the situation. They never instituted convoys to protect their shipping against American and British submarines. They never instituted unrestricted submarine warfare like the American, and certainly did not go for wolfpack tactics like their German allies. Japanese submarines generally only targeted warships. Japanese anti-submarine force and tactics were quite honestly pathetic.

The Japanese Navy had a habit of keeping a large battle fleet in reserve near the Home Islands to counter an expected push from the American battlefleet (which I think had been a tactic in the US Plan Orange inthe 1930s in case of war with Japan over the Philippines...but the US didn't follow that Plan as the US battle fleet was crippled in 1941 for a few years thus requiring other tactics). Yamato and Musashi had a tendancy to sit in Truk and not operate. Well there were expensive to run and required a lot of fuel that the Empire just didn't have (thanks to US submarines). Also they didn't want to lose these two battleships in anything less than a full battle with the US Navy. Both battleships would later be lost to aircraft from American Carriers. However both proved to be very difficult to sink.

Japanese anti-aircraft batteries were inferior to the required task and Japanese airming methods were decidedly low tech (gunnery office points his sword at the target he wants the gunners to shoot). These were not enough against the large numbers of American planes.

The Japanese only built two battleships for the war. Yamato was completed right after the Attack on Pearl Harbor and Musashi a year or so later. They had two sister ships, but the third of the class, Shinano was converted into an aircraft carrier (that was sunk on her way for final fitting out by an American submarine). The fourth was scrapped for materials early in construction. A fifth was never laid down. Most other major construction went to aircraft carriers. I believe nine were completed during the war with several others under construction by the time the war ended. Unfortunately for Japan, the Americans outbuilt them by at least 10 to 1 in both Aircarft Carriers and 5 to 1 in battleships.

The Japanese either never found out, or found out late that US Intelligence was reading their coded flag officers radio messages. It allowed more than one Japanese operation to be intercepted by the US Navy. It didn't always help the Americans though. Sometimes they would only know something is coming and sort of where it was coming...but not how or from what direction. The Japanese would score victories from time to time, but eventually be overwhelmed by numbers.

A techical problem also happened because of their superior torpedo (the Long Lance). It was an oxygen powered torpedo, and had a habit of exploding when a ship catch on fire. Statistics place more Japanese cruisers and possibly destroyers were crippled or destroyed by their own torpedoes exploding after being attacked by Americans aircraft than Allied ships sunk by those torpedoes. Damage that normally would not cripple or destroy a vessle of that size...but an exploding 24 inch torpedo on the ships deck was usually enough to cause major problems.

The Japanese did adapt to some of the problems they faced, but because of material shortages, Allied bombing raids, and sometimes just the need for more time, they did not get a lot of their improved aircraft into service in time to deal with the Americans. And even those that did had the other problem that Japan faced by the end of the war. A lack of trained pilots. In 1944, the Japanese carriers launched several attacks against the American Navy. but since their pilots were not as well trained as those in 1942, they were slaughted in what became known as the "Great Mariana's Turkey Shoot" The return effort by the American aircraft sank several Japanese vessels.

Now...what could the Japanese have done? Aside from not start a war against the United States that is. Several people might have ideas about that and it has been the subject of a lot of alternate history.

I don't have an answer for that right now. I was simply putting down what happened and where they went wrong. There are certainly other problems that would be rooted in individual people, Japanese culture, and the way their government operated in those years. There are several of the above problems that are rooted in the Japanese military officer's mindset more than any failure of men or materials in battle or construction. Sometimes it was just a case of "they could not think of any other way to do it".

I don't have an answer for that right now. I was simply putting down what happened and where they went wrong. There are certainly other problems that would be rooted in individual people, Japanese culture, and the way their government operated in those years. There are several of the above problems that are rooted in the Japanese military officer's mindset more than any failure of men or materials in battle or construction. Sometimes it was just a case of "they could not think of any other way to do it".

I'd just like to remind everyone here that this is the primary purpose of this thread. We bring up a historical problem as topic for discussion and then try to figure out its roots in order in turn to figure out what possible alternative scenario or two we can acquire by changing them.

As to changes: I am not sure of any that would have resulted in a Japanese victory. There may have been some that resulted in the continued existance of Imperial Japan. Quite simply, the kind of tension building between the United States and Japan over what was going on in China as well as other feeling pretty much made the war inevitable.

There were some that did not want war with the US. Admiral Osami Nagano wanted to avoid war with the Americans while still invading the Dutch and British colonies in Southeast Asia. Basically go around the Philippines and take Indonesia, Burma and then head for India and Australia to get the British out of the fight. The problem with this is that it leaves the Philippines alone. The Americans were already pretty friendly with the British by 1941 and it wouldn't take too much to cause an incident within the Japanese supply lines to and from Indonesia. The Japanese could not afford having a potentally hostile America right along their major oil route.

Another possible solution would be to officially declare war before attacking US interests (including Pearl Harbor). It would depend on how long the declaration was given to when the attacks start though. "Dastardly Sneak Attack" was one of the major sticking points to Pearl Harbor. The Ultimatum, even if given on time, would not have changed the American reaction as the time between the delivery of the message and the attack would have been at most an hour. Since it takes a considerable amount of time to get from Japan to Hawaii, the news media would still have classified it as a sneak attack and the "Remember Pearl Harbor" would have remained. If it had been a day earlier or so, I can imagine the media not being able to spin it as much as the base should have been able to at least be on a war footing even if they still made all the mistakes that were made that day historically. They might have paid attention to the radar operators at least when a warning about aircraft from the northeast arrived.

Other thinks would be changing their codes more often so the US couldn't read their mail. Might have allowed for several operations to succeed in 1942 where in history the Americans were able to send ships to intercept the Japanese forces in the Coral Sea and at Midway while also correctly guessing that the attack on Dutch Harbor was a diversion. Also helped the Americans recognise the sigificance of Guadalcanal to the Japanese efforts to invade Australia. It was there that the Allies broke the Japanese military and turned them back.

In terms of equipment, the Japanese might have done well to make a more standardized carrier earlier on so they could produce more of them faster. I do not consider the battlehips Yamato and Musashi to be a waste of materials. Only a waste of potental due to Japanse not using them often or effectively (though there has been some recent evidance that Yamato might hold the record for longest ship to ship shell hit at something like 31,000 yards, beating out Warspite and Scharnhorst by about 3,000 yards). Their use of their battleships was not very good since they kept expecting to meetup and engage the Americans in a Jutland style fight near the Home Islands and thus kept them in reserve. The Kongo-class Battlecruisers would receive most of the ship to ship action in the war against the Americans. The other battleship action would more rightly called a suicide run of two old Japanese battleships verses six old American battleships and a crapload of destroyers and torpedo boats.

If the Japanese had integrated German submarines tactics they could have made efforts to cut the American and British supply lines. If they had instituted Allied style convoy systems and spent some effort on ASW they might have kept their own supply lines intact and not had as many oil and other shortages that prevented several operations and especially prevented proper training of pilots.

With well trained pilots flying upgraded aircraft, the Japanse could match the Americans in the air if the two sides brought roughly equal numbers of carriers. Again the Japanese would have the problem of numbers, but losses in 1942 were high for both sides. The Japanse lost four fleet carriers at Miday and a few light carriers in other engagements. However they also lost a lot of aircraft and pilots in those other engagements where their other two main fleet carriers survived each time. The Americans lost four fleet carriers as well that year, but did not suffer as high aircraft and pilot attrition outside the torpedo bomber squadrons at Midway. The Americans had the manpower and industrial capacity to replace all of it. Japan did not.

The Americans would only lose one more light carrier during the war along with some escort carriers. No other fleet carriers were sunk by the Japanese, though a few were badly beat up at the time (Franklin and Bunker Hill would never see action again), but most of the Japanese carriers were sunk during the remainder of the war. American task groups started running around with two fleet carriers and one light carrier to raid Japanese bases. The light carrier providing the fleet's air cover to allow the two fleet carriers to focus on attack missions.

The Japanese had another problem that could have been solved. A ridged structure of how things are done on a ship. No deviation reguardless of situation. This following of standard procedures is what is usually pointed as the reason their carriers at Midway were lost. The American bombers did not hit all of them that hard...but with armed aircraft in the hangers (two stacked hangers in some cases) the fires and explosions were too much for their damage control teams to handle. That is another things that tends to be criticized...Japanese damage control. There procedures did not seem to be up to the task of saving their ships. However there were very good at keeping records (of those that were not lose with the ships or burned by the government at the end of the war). The old traditional report is that the Battlecruiser Kirishima was hit by nine 16" shells and 40 5" shells from one American battleship after firing at it for a while at night. Kirishima was lost the next day due to scuttling. However the damage control teams report on Kirishima tells a different story. In their report, Kirishima was hit by 22 16" inch shells and several 5" shells. The flooding caused by the 16" shell made the ship list badly. This was counter flooded during the night as they tried to escape from the Americans. This counter flooding leaned the ship over too much and exposed the ship to flooding from other holes put in the ship by the Americans. More counter flooding lead enventually to the ship sinking as it became filled with more water exposing more holes to the sea. This can be seen as a failure on the part of the damage control teams. Better training might have saved the ship...for a day or so...until the American airplanes found it.

I can think up ways for the Japanese to win small engagements and score some victories, but I can't come up with some way for them to win the war. Their best bet is to get the Americans to the peace talk in 1942 after taking Midway and possibly making Hawaii a very dangerous place to be. But the US Navy is there around as the Japanese were having a had time finding the American carriers that were not called Yorktown. Plus in a few days the USS Saratoga would arrive in the area to resupply the other carriers and provide another large flight deck. USS Wasp was also on her way out. Thus even if the Japanese carriers were not as badly damaged and Yorktown was still sunk...the US has a replacement there by I think the 8th of June with aircraft and pilots enough to resupply Hornet and Enterprise. The Japanese don't have such a luxury even with the rest of the fleet arriving with Yamato as flagship. The only carrier they have with them is a training carrier (Hosho).

Personally, I think the battleships were a waste, at least considering that the materials could have been better built elsewhere. Throughout WW2 if one thing was proven it was the vast superiority of air power over sea power. The British learned it in Europe, and the Americans learnt at Pearl Harbour. With Air superiority any battleship is just a floating target, and air planes can strike that battleship at a far larger range from a carrier then a Battleship can hope to strike back at.

That said, while Pearl Harbour itself was a masterstroke, the idea of attacking the Americans and trying to get them to capitulate within 2 years was wrong headed. Any American president would have known he could easily replace their naval losses due to the large industrial capacity available in America. Likewise, due to the fact that America was attacked, they would not have any war weariness issues to deal with, as Americans citizens would be entirely behind the war effort.

However, to be fair to the Japanese, they didn't really have many options, they needed to take south east asia for war material, and they knew that if they did, the US would be quick to intervene. Also, if Germany had successfully defeated the Soviet Union, the likelihood of a favourable peace resolution for Japan was a lot higher. Japan only had to weaken America enough to keep them away long enough for Germany to win. And to be fair, they did manage that.

I would argue that for Japan their loss of Manchuria to the Soviets was as decisive as the loss of Iwo Jima or the atom bombs. The war was lost for Japan and Germany in Stalingrad.

Even so pon the subject of the battleships, Yamato entered Japanese service within a week of the attack on Pearl Harbor and Musashi was finished and in service less than a year later. By that point it would be more wasteful to scrap them or convert them as they were so close to completion regardless of what lessons were learned.

The third of them, Shinano, was converted into an armored deck aircraft carrier that was suppose to be used to extend the operational range of other carriers by being a nearly unsinkable platform to refuel aircraft from the rest of the carrier fleet, which could sit comfortably outside American carrier aircraft range. It however was sunk before it was completed becaues it was moved from one yard to another to get her final fitting...which included water-tight doors.

The fourth battleship was scrapped at 30% complete and its materials used for other things. The fifth was never laid down.

You can't learn a lesson before that lesson is given.

The Japanese high command believe the Americans had no stomach and would be unwilling to fight over a long period of time if defeated and demoralized early on. Some knew better and advised against it entirely (Admiral Osami Nagano). Others knew better but were honor bound to do what they could to defeat the Americans (Admiral Yamamoto). Only the most extreme had visions of actually invading California.

I've heard talk of if things had been different at Pearl Harbor. Like if the American carriers had been in port for instance. Or if the Japanese had attacked the oil supplies or submarine base. However I have heard that there was never a plan for a third wave. They didn't even have the fuel to mount a third attack wave even if they wanted to mount one. The Japanese show an old fashioned sense of honor in their combat preformance. Particularly in their choice of targets. They tended to attack military warships, aircraft, and other objects. They tended not to attack the infrustructire attacted to those items. They tended not to attack cargo vessels. They would mount terror attacks from time to time, as they did send submarines to shell the coast of California early on as well and their ill advised jet stream assisted ballon bombing of North America late in the war. Also their planned submarine attack on the Panama Canal using the I-400 class floatplane equipped submarines.

It was suggested that their best chances were a successful campaign against Midway and a followup of using that airbase against Hawaii and eventually trying to cutoff Hawaii from the Allies and thus the United States from a lot of things since there is nothing between Hawaii and California but 2,000 miles of ocean. The other would be to knock the Australians and British our of the war locally by invading Australia and pushing through India to Persia and possibly link up with the German Army around there. A full trade route from Germany to Japan via India would likely cripple the Allies. It would also open several possible avenues of attack for Germany should they manage to move units to say Manchuria and hit the Soviets in their less protected flank with superior technology than what the Japanese could muster.

There best option would be not to go to war in the first place, but that was decied in 1931 with the invasion of Manchuria and again when the Japanese invaded China. The US didn't stop importing oil until China was invaded. And this was in a time when the US was in a position like Saudi Arabia is now....just with a whole lot more people and indusry to back up any embargos.

I don't think Sumeragi started this topic for getting a way for Japan to survive defeat in anyway. I think she simply wants to experiment with a stronger, better prepared Japan that can participate in a joint invasion with Germany into Soviet Union. That won't translate into Axis victory, but can surely deliver hell for the Soviets, and probably will drag the war longer for a couple of years.

It's already weekend in GMT+7, so I guess she'll show us that Nomonhan report today...

I don't think Sumeragi started this topic for getting a way for Japan to survive defeat in anyway. I think she simply wants to experiment with a stronger, better prepared Japan that can participate in a joint invasion with Germany into Soviet Union. That won't translate into Axis victory, but can surely deliver hell for the Soviets, and probably will drag the war longer for a couple of years.

It's already weekend in GMT+7, so I guess she'll show us that Nomonhan report today...

Well, if the Soviet Union had been defeated in WW2, I'd say that would basically be an Axis victory. There's no way the rest of the Allies could have mounted an invasion of continental Europe against the full strength of Nazi Germany.

Though, that said, a victory for Germany might not necessarily be a victory for Japan. It would be somewhat difficult for Germany to help Japan's war effort. Furthermore, a victorious Germany mightn't even care about Japan.

I think another interesting counterfactual might be the what if of "What if Isolationists had won the US elections in 1936/1940" and so had sent no lend-lease, didn't intervene in China, and didn't embargo Japan. I doubt the allies could have kept up without the "arsenal of democracy" supplying them.

Remember that the atomic bombs were originally intended for Germany as the target rather than Japan. If Russia falls but Britain holds to August 1945...Berlin will be nuked.

As for the rest...Without an embargo against Japan, I wonder if the Germans would have tried to ally with Japan. Also wihout US aid, one has to wonder if the Nationalist in China would have gotten anywhere and thus not setting up for the populist Communists to overrun the place. Or if aid would have come more from Germany or Russia into China in the 1930s. Would the Germans find the Japanese more worthy of taking out Communists if China's communists movement didn't expand?

With no embargo, Japan would not have the need to invade either Russia or Southeast Asia while still working on China.

In Europe, the question would be if Britian would fall? They might not get lend lease stuff, but if the US followed its World War One practise, it would trade with both sides (free market and capitalism)...Britain getting more since the Royal Navy could still stop ships going to Germany and probably also stop American shipping heading to France. If the German uboat policy was similar to the World War One policy, the Germans would eventually get the American angry enough to declare war just like in 1917. Remember that Wilson ran on a ticket that was to avoid getting involved in Europe. The Republicans wanted to get straight into it that election, but lost. The unrestricted submarine warfare pushed the American under Wilson too far and they declared war. Nazi Germany pushed buttons far farther than that German Empire did in the First World War. It would become only a matter of time before there was a war.

Remember that the atomic bombs were originally intended for Germany as the target rather than Japan. If Russia falls but Britain holds to August 1945...Berlin will be nuked.

The thing is, if Russia falls, they probably fall in 42 or 43, with that the Germans will then be able to put all their resources into bombing the UK and eliminating it as a threat. I can't see Britain holding out for 2 years while America develops the bomb. Furthermore, whose to say that Germany doesn't get the bomb first? Without the stress of the eastern front, Germany's atomic programme might have progressed faster. Furthermore, Germany would likely be able to push for complete air superiority without the drain of the Eastern front, no point in having the bomb if every bomber just gets shot down before it reaches it's target.

Finally, the situation in Japan before Hiroshima/Nagasaki is different then it would be in Germany. Japan was basically defeated anyway, while in this situation Germany is controlling all of continental Europe. It might force a ceasefire, but not a surrender. Consider that at the Yalta conference the Soviets were not intimidated by US nukes. Nukes were powerful, but they weren't the civilization destroying weapons they became in the latter half of the cold war yet. They had a similar effectiveness as a very large carpet bombing raid. For comparison, about as many died in the Tokyo Firebombing as died at Hiroshima.

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As for the rest...Without an embargo against Japan, I wonder if the Germans would have tried to ally with Japan. Also wihout US aid, one has to wonder if the Nationalist in China would have gotten anywhere and thus not setting up for the populist Communists to overrun the place. Or if aid would have come more from Germany or Russia into China in the 1930s. Would the Germans find the Japanese more worthy of taking out Communists if China's communists movement didn't expand?

The Alliance with Japan I think was primarily aimed at the soviets, not the Chinese communists who were of comparatively minor significance in 1940. Also, I don't think Lend Lease had as big an effect on China as the rest of the Allies, China got delivered a lot less, and the routes available into the country were a lot more restricted (Just the Burmese road). Now the likelihood is that eventually Nationalist China would have lost to the Japanese, and I'd say in this eventuality the Communists would have remained as the primary opposition to the puppet regime set up by the Japanese. How this would have played out is an interesting question, but something of a tangent.

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With no embargo, Japan would not have the need to invade either Russia or Southeast Asia while still working on China.

Yes, and I'd say Pearl Harbour would not have occurred. And the Japanese may have been able to gain victory in China more easily.

On the flipside, I think the likelihood of attacking South-East Asia would have still been high. The Japanese had a goal of seizing all the European colonies, and the British were weak. I doubt the US really cared one whit about helping Britain keep it's Empire. They certainly didn't care during the cold war. If the US had an isolationist stance, I'd say the Japanese would have felt assured that they could attack South East Asia without the Americans getting involved.

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In Europe, the question would be if Britian would fall? They might not get lend lease stuff, but if the US followed its World War One practise, it would trade with both sides (free market and capitalism)...Britain getting more since the Royal Navy could still stop ships going to Germany and probably also stop American shipping heading to France. If the German uboat policy was similar to the World War One policy, the Germans would eventually get the American angry enough to declare war just like in 1917. Remember that Wilson ran on a ticket that was to avoid getting involved in Europe. The Republicans wanted to get straight into it that election, but lost. The unrestricted submarine warfare pushed the American under Wilson too far and they declared war. Nazi Germany pushed buttons far farther than that German Empire did in the First World War. It would become only a matter of time before there was a war.

I would say that the US would probably end out getting involved, but too late to save the Soviets. How long the British would have lasted without lend lease is interesting, primarily because Britain was the most dependent of all the allies on supplies from the US. However, if the Soviet Union had fallen to Germany, I think the idea of not helping Britain in her hour of need would have been deeply unpopular with the American public, and so the US would have been forced to intervene.

However, if the Nazis could mount an Operation Sealion in the time it took for the US to mobilize it's war industry, you could still see Britain fall to Germany.

Should we truly consider the possibility Soviet Union falling here ? They will still have the defensive terrain advantage that can screw every invader once the winter knocks the door. It's not like we're assuming better planning and timing for Barbarossa in this scenario anyway. Remember that Transamur will be the natural limit for Japanese expansion northward. No question of Japanese Siberia whatsoever.

It will just mean that Soviet Union will come out of the war even more devastated then OTL, but they will still most likely make it through. Their capability to project counter attack will be affected and perhaps both East Germany and North Korea can be avoided this way. More prolonged war will inevitably give way for more nukes to be emplyed in the war. More bitterness and frustration from an even longer war will lead to a harsher war settlement for the losers, primarily Germany.

The basic problem with Operation Sealion is that it shouldn't be able to work at all. Germany just did not have the ability to mount enough on an offensive across the Channel. Maybe later, but the British still had places outside of Luftwaffe bombing range while the Royal Air Force could still effectively bomb any invasion forces. That and the Germans were never able to effectively neutralize the Royal Navy, even with air power.

As for the German nuclear program. From what I've read they wouldn't be able to make a bomb at any point before the Americans simply because their scientists wer either stalling intensionally, or working along the wrong path. Their project seemed to be centered about nuclear power rather than weaponry. (that and the reason for the US project to exist in the first place was that other scientists realized that a bomb was possible and that it would not be in the world's interest should the Nazis get one). Even an isolationist President could probably see the threat or advantage of a super bomb. Only a pacifist President would ignore a warning from Einstein about the bomb, and I don't think we had any of those running with the major parties back then.

The German trouble with the Soviets was that the Soviets could always fall back. The Urals are along way from Germany and Siberia is even farther. The Communists and Russian peoples were in no way going to give into the Germans. Stalin's cult of personality was way too strong in the 1940s to allow for defeat. They would just fall back so far that the Germans could not follow without needing to massively rebuild the parts of the Soviet Union they occupied to fuel, repair, or feed their military. They needed new airbases if they wanted to keep up the pressure on the Russians beyond the Urals. About the only advantage the Germans would get would be a chance to take Persia and the Middle East for British oil and maye link up with the Japanese in India.

But with that much of the world in a mess, I wonder how ling even the isolationists could keep the US out of it. Especially if trade was maintianed. And the horror stories that would come out of Germany...can't forget about those.