Musharraf all set for an ignoble exit now that his misdeeds have caught up with him

It is curtains down for the high-voltage drama that Pervez Musharraf has staged ever since he seized power on October 12, 1999. He had scripted it, directed it, played the leading, indeed the solo, role in it with a mix of bluff, bluster, swagger, insouciance, candour and, above all, dupli-city on such a scale that it has become the prime instrument of state power in Pakistan.

All of this came to nought when, fearing arrest after the Islamabad high court denied him bail and was about to arrest him, he fled the scene and sought refuge in his well-appointed farmhouse on the outskirts of the capital.

Even the entry of Musharraf on the stage could not have been more spectacular. Nawaz Sharif, then the prime minister, had refused permission for the aircraft carrying the army chief from Colombo to land in Pakistan. The latter swiftly got his cronies in the army to thwart the move. Sharif’s act of defiance cost him dear: Musharraf staged a coup, arrested the prime minister and eventually sent him packing to Saudi Arabia — a friend, much like China, in all seasons.

He then moved swiftly to consolidate his power by first appointing himself Chief Exe-cutive — a nomenclature that does not exist in Pakistan’s Constitution — and then president in 2001. He also gave himself a limitless term as army chief and, a year later, held a referendum followed by a general election to lay the basis for a ‘grassroots’ democracy in the country. Accusations of massive rigging in his favour in both polls flew thick and fast. But Musharraf denounced them as the final rants of a dying order.On other counts too, he dep-loyed his skills for duplicity in ample measure.

It is thus that he projected an image of a liberal Muslim who would bring radical Islamist groups to book. In a blaze of publicity, he did arrest a few of their leaders but then quietly released them. Likewise, he vowed to bring the Islamic seminaries that provided recruits for such groups under the government’s purview. But he soon dropped the idea and went on to forge electoral alliances with the religious parties.

Similarly, he allowed private TV channels to multiply and assured them that they, like the print media, could function in an unfettered manner. Yet, he took steps to see that they did not cross the lines drawn by him: no criticism of the armed forces and no adverse comments on Pakistan’s ‘ideology’.

He also pledged to clamp down on tax evaders — the landed feudal gentry and large business houses. Some arrests were made but that campaign didn’t last long. Along the way, he tampered with the Constitution to reinforce his power, and when that failed to yield the desired result, imposed a state of emergency. And finally, he took a decision that would mark the beginning of the end of his rule: he dismissed the chief justice of the Supreme Court.

The end would come when, under western pressure, security forces stormed the Red Mosque in Islamabad to flush out those very Islamist radicals whom he had earlier courted. This single act triggered the mushroom growth of violent extremist groups who now began to target the army itself. Pakistan continues to reel under this onslaught.

Duplicity was also at stake in the way Musharraf conducted Pakistan`s foreign policy. He backed the Taliban regime to the hilt to ensure a ‘strategic depth’ for Pakistan. But after the 9/11 attacks, he took a U-turn and closed ranks with the Americans to oust the Taliban from power. Yet, he did not snap links with all terrorist outfits. He continued to nurture them as ‘assets’ to further Pakistan`s strategic interests in Afghanistan and India.

The less said about India, the better. Musharraf was the architect of Kargil. On his first visit to India, he made sure that he wrecked the Agra summit. Later, however, he struck a chord, first with Atal Bihari Vajpayee and then with Manmohan Singh. He promised the former that he would not allow terror groups based in Pakistan to stage attacks in India. And with the latter he came close to settling contentious issues, including Kashmir.

Whether these moves were for real or mere tactical manoeuvres is hard to tell: Musharraf was forced to pass on the baton to General Kayani on November 29, 2009 and soon afterwards went into exile to London and Dubai.

Nothing seemed to work in his favour when he finally returned home. The public response was tepid as was the response of the media. The election commission rejected all four of his applications to contest the general elec-tion. And last week, the high court in Islamabad ordered his arrest.

All the same, reports suggest that Musharraf is as cool as a cucumber and that he enjoys making rings of smoke as he savours his Havana cigar. But his fate looks increasingly like those smoke rings: destined to blow away at the slightest whiff of a breeze. That would be an apposite image to signal his final exit from the stage on which he sought, with a measure of success, to fool Pakistan and much of the outside world.