Fees

I’ve used the past few Tuesdays to post on trust accounting. I’m going off script today to call attention to a disciplinary case that strikes me as important.

Alberto Bernabe is a professor of law at the John Marshall Law School. Regular readers will recognize Professor Bernabe as a frequent member of this blog’s #fiveforfriday Honor Roll. His Professional Responsibility Blog is a fantastic source of information on legal ethics & professional responsibility.

Rule 1.5(c) allows a fee that is contingent upon the outcome of a matter; and,

Rule 1.8(i) prohibits a lawyer from acquiring a proprietary interest in a client’s cause of action but allows (1) liens authorized by law to secure fees & expenses; and (2) contracts for reasonable contingent fees.

The facts of the Tennessee case:

Client filed a pro se complaint alleging that she’d been injured by the defendant’s negligence. Soon thereafter, Client retained Law Firm. Client & Law Firm entered into a written fee agreement. Per the agreement, Client would pay Law Firm a contingent fee, plus expenses. The amount: 40% if recovery were made before an appeal, 45% if recovery made after an appeal. The fee agreement did not include any language that provided for an hourly fee. It did, however, include this provision:

“Should [Client] refuse to make any settlement which my attorneys advise me is reasonable and should be taken, then I understand that I am responsible for their fee on the basis of that offer, unless they waive this provision.”

Following discovery, the defendant offered $12,500. Attorney and another at Law Firm advised Client to accept. Client did not.

Attorney moved to withdraw. In the motion, Attorney also requested a lien in the amount of $13,605 for fees, plus $2,4528.52 for expenses. The motion asserted that Law Firm had put in 45.35 hours of work at $300 per hour. The court granted the motion to withdraw but did not rule on the request for a lien.

Eventually, Client filed a disciplinary complaint. By then, Attorney had filed two additional motions requesting a lien on any recovery. The final request referenced the fee agreement and sought 40% of the settlement offer that Client had rejected.

The “Settlement Offer Provision” was unreasonable in that it by recommending that Client accept an offer, “Attorney thereby became entitled to a fee, regardless of whether [Client] accepted the offer and regardless of whether she obtained any recovery whatsoever.”

As noted by Professor Bernabe, Faughnan on Ethics blogged on the opinion here. Like Bernabe, Faughnan is a terrific resources on professional responsibility. The post notes:

“At its core, this case explains the limits on the ability of a plaintiff’s attorney to try to guard against what happens if their client rejects the attorney’s advice on whether to accept a settlement offer. There do, in fact, have to be limits on the ability to hedge against that because the ethics rules establish explicitly that the decision whether to settle a civil case or not is the client’s decision.”

The post goes on to remind us that, generally, the rules allow lawyers who withdraw “to assert a lien as authorized by statute and pursuant to either the terms of their contract or, perhaps, depending on how things turn out for payment in the form of quantum meruit.”

Again, this is a Tennessee opinion. It’s worth noting, however, that the rules involved are identical to Vermont’s.

It might be a distinction without a difference, but when crafting the #fiveforfriday quiz or trivia-style CLE events, there are only so many ways to ask the same questions over and over again. So, it’s a question to which I’ve resorted often.

“A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses.”

The rule goes on to list “[t]he factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee.” Notably, those factors DO NOT include “whether the client agreed to it.”

Ultimately, the Vermont Supreme Court determines whether an attorney’s fee violates Rule 1.5. As the Court explained in paragraph 16 of this decision, a lawyer charged with violating Rule 1.5 will not find safety in the harbor named “but the client signed a contract agreeing to my fee.”

“This argument demonstrates [the lawyer’s] failure to comprehend the effect of Vermont Rules of Professional Conduct 1.5(a); lawyers, unlike some other service professionals, cannot charge unreasonable fees even if they are able to find clients who will pay whatever a lawyer’s contract demands.”

I found myself thinking of the Court’s statement earlier today when I read about the law firm that sought a $9.75 million “bonus fee” in a divorce case. The Chicago Tribune and the ABA Journal reported the story.

Per the Chicago Tribune, the firm “sought the bonus fee under a 2015 retainer agreement with [the client], which allowed for additional fees beyond the hourly bill to cover such things as ‘time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, the skills requisite to perform the legal services properly.’ ”

The judge denied the request. She also referred the matter to Illinois disciplinary authorities after concluding that the fee was unreasonable.

I’ve not seen the court’s decision or the firm’s contract with its former client. However, I was struck by the report that the fee agreement “allowed for additional fees beyond the hourly bill to cover such things as ‘time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, the skills requisite to perform the legal services properly.’ ” (emphasis added).

In Vermont, the first factors listed among those to be considered in determining the reasonable of a fee appear in Rule 1.5(a)(1). They are:

“‘time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, the skills requisite to perform the legal services properly.”

It’s not clear to me that quoting the rule creates any safer of a harbor than the client’s signature on the fee agreement. That is, a court will decide whether the amount billed is justifed by the time and labor, the novelty & difficulty, the skills required to perform the services, or any of the other factors listed in Rule 1.5(a).

For now, I think it’s important for Vermont lawyers to remember that, even when the client agrees to a fee, the fee remains subject to review for reasonableness.

An agreement to charge an hourly fee need not be in writing. That being said, I can’t imagine NOT putting the agreement in writing. As I’ve blogged, a well-written fee agreement provides a perfect opportunity to avoid complaints by setting reasonable expectations. The Oregon State Bar has also written on the importance of managing client expectations.

While there’s no requirement to reduce an hourly fee agreement to writing, a lawyer must communicate to the client the scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee within a reasonable time after commencing the representation. Per the rule, it’s preferable that the communication be in writing.

Is it hot & humid? Yes! But, you have a choice how you respond to the weather. One choice is to bemoan it & sit on the couch all day. Another is to smile at the thought of one more day to wear shorts, flip-flops, and to be outdoors! Maybe even by the grill with a cold beverage . . . on a Monday!

I choose the latter.

Friday’s questions are here. The answers follow the honor roll. Also, you’ll recall that I asked readers to share the events seared into their memories. I did so in the context of Friday being the anniversary of Princess Diana’s passing. As always with my readers, the response was fantastic and significantly outnumbered entries into the quiz.

The most-cited events were to be expected:

9/11

the space shuttle Challenger tragedy

A few others mentioned by at least 3 people:

JFK assassination

Sandy Hook

MLK assassination

the moon landing

Princess Diana

Boston Marathon bombings

Barack Obama elected

Interestingly, but perhaps not surprisingly given the frequent musical references on this blog, many of you will never forget where you were & what you were doing when you learned that a musician died. Among the musicians whose deaths were mentioned more than once:

Kurt Cobain

Jerry Garcia

John Lennon

Jim Morrison

Elvis Presley

Prince

Tupac Shakur

Anyhow, thank you again for sharing. I love your stories. Alas, to make the honor roll, you’ve got to answer the questions!

D. Whether reciprocal discipline would be imposed in Vermont as a result of Lawyer being sanctioned in another state.

Question 2

The conflicts rules are NOT relaxed for:

A. Lawyers who transfer from one private firm to another.

B. Lawyers who move from government practice to private practice.

C. Lawyers who provide short-term pro bono services under the auspices of a program sponsored by a nonprofit or court.

D. All of the above.

Vermont’s rules do not allow for the automatic screening of lateral transfers. I’ve blogged on that issue here & here. Later this month, the PRB will consider a rule change that I’ve recommended that would allow a new firm to screen a lateral transfer from another firm.

Our rules allow for screening when a lawyer moves from government practice to private practice. In addition, Rule 6.5 relaxes the conflicts rules for lawyers who provide short-term pro bono services under the auspices of a program sponsored by a nonprofit or court.

Question 3

You’re at a CLE. You hear me say: “yes, it’s okay as long as (1) your client gives informed consent; (2) there is no interference with the lawyer’s independence of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship; and (3) information relating to the representation of your client is protected as required by Rule 1.6.”

What did someone ask if it was okay to do?

A. Accept compensation for representing a client from someone other than the client. See, Rule 1.8(f).

B. Request that guardian be appointed for the client.

C. Represent co-defendants in a criminal matter.

D. Talk to the media in a client’s case.

Question 4

Client provides Lawyer with an advance payment of $2,000. Lawyer has yet to do any work for Client.

Which is most accurate?

A. The fee agreement must be confirmed in writing.

B. The fee agreement must be confirmed in a writing that is signed by Client.

D. Lawyer may treat the money as Lawyer’s own if Lawyer confirms in writing (i) that the fee is not refundable; and (ii) the scope of availability or services that Client will receive. See, Rule 1.5(f) & (g).

Here, A & B are not correct. The rules do not require standard fee agreements to be reduced to writing. That being said, I think it’s a bad idea not to.

C is not correct. There’s not enough information in the question to know. For instance, if the lawyer has complied with Rule 1.5(f) and (g), then the money cannot go into trust.

Many lawyers charge “flat fees” that are “earned upon receipt” and treat the funds as their own upon receipt. This is ok ONLY IF THE LAWYER COMPLIES WITH RULE 1.5(f) and RULE 1.5(g). Otherwise, the money must go in trust until earned.

Question 5

Speaking of the JFK assassination . . .

. . . Jules Mayer was a lawyer in Dallas. In 1950, Mayer drew up a will for a client. The will named Mayer as the executor the client’s estate.

The client died in 1967. A dispute quickly arose, as the client’s family contended that the client had changed his will on his deathbed to remove Mayer as executor. Mayer refused to make the change and kept the original will.

In 1991, after a lengthy legal battle, a probate court granted the family’s petition to remove Mayer as executor after concluding that he had mismanaged the estate.

Central to the dispute was gun associated with the JFK assassination. Mayer’s client bought the gun for $62.50. After winning their legal battle with Mayer, the client’s family sold the gun for $220,000. Fortunately for the family, Mayer had safeguarded the gun, holding it in trust for 24 years.

Two-part question:

Who was Mayer’s famous client?

Who was the famous victim of the client’s gun?

Mayer’s client was Jack Ruby. The gun was used on Lee Harvey Oswald. A story of the gun is in this article in the Las Vegas Sun.

Week before last, I started a 3-part series on ethics issues related to lawyers who work “of counsel” to a firm. The first part is here. To summarize: “of counsel” and its variants are misleading if the lawyer does not have:

“a close, regular and personal relationship that is more than a mere forwarder or receive of legal business, more than an occasional consultant relationship, and more than a relationship for the purposes of one case.”

I promised two more posts. One on conflicts, another on the relationship between the fee rules and “of counsel” attorneys. I’m finally getting around to it. (Let’s be honest – it’s not the most thrilling of topics and, anyway, the weather has been fantastic the past few weeks. Summer is short in this neck of the woods!)

Anyhow, let’s pretend we’re at one of my seminars. I’ll throw the question to the audience – what’s the ethics issue that comes up when it comes to fees & the manner in which a firm compensates a lawyer who is “of counsel?”

Remember – Vermont does not allow straight referral fees. I’ve blogged on that issue here, here, and here. Rather, whenever lawyers not in the same firm want to share a fee, Rule 1.5(e) allows the division only if:

it’s in proportion to work performed, or, each attorney assumes joint responsibility for the representation; and,

the client agrees to the arrangement and the arrangement is confirmed in writing; and,

the total fee is reasonable.

Scenario 1: A former partner in a law firm is “of counsel” to the firm. The attorney has scaled back her practice, but will continue to practice through the firm. The attorney will not practice law at any other firm. Former partner works on a client matter for firm. Firm wants to pay former partner. Does Rule 1.5(e) apply?

This one is clear: no, Rule 1.5(e) does not apply. Here, though now “of counsel,” the rules treat former partner as being part of the same firm as, well, firm.

Scenario 2: Firm focuses on commercial litigation. Firm’s clients often have related tax law issues. Lawyer focuses on tax law. Firm wants to take on Lawyer as “of counsel.” Firm lawyers will consult with Lawyer on all client matters involving tax issues. Firm will disclose the relationship to clients and Lawyer’s rate will be set forth in engagement letters. Lawyer will also maintain a personal injury practice that is separate and independent from firm. Does Rule 1.5(e) apply when Firm pays Lawyer?

The Illinois State Bar Association addressed this issue in Opinion 16-04: The ISBA concluded that the answer is “no,” stating:

“The question then becomes how the ‘of counsel’ lawyer can be compensated for his or her services. We have never addressed whether an ‘of counsel’ lawyer is in the same firm or in a separate firm for the purposes of fee division, but conclude that given the close nature of the ‘of counsel’ relationship, the lawyers should be viewed as being in the same firm. Accordingly, while the lawyers may choose to disclose the nature of the fee distribution between the attorneys withthe client, the lawyers should not be subject to the restrictions set forth in Rule 1.5(e). However, fee agreements with ‘of counsel’ attorneys must always meet the general requirements of Rule 1.5 that a lawyer may not charge or collect an illegal fee or an unreasonable fee.”

The Illinois opinion cites to opinions from several other states that reached the same conclusion.

Scenario 3: Change the last one a bit. Firm focuses on commercial litigation and its clients often have related tax law issues. Lawyer’s practice areas include tax and personal injury law. Lawyer is “of counsel” to firm for tax law issues, but maintains a separate personal injury practice. Firm does not handle personal injury cases. A Firm client, however, was injured in accident. Firm referred the client to Lawyer. Does Rule 1.5(e) if Lawyer wants to share the fee with Firm?

In this situation, I’d argue “yes,” because Firm and Lawyer are not part of the same firm. Rather, Firm referred the client to Lawyer’s separate and independent personal injury practice. As such, if Lawyer chooses to divide the fee with Firm, Rule 1.5(e) applies and the division may only be made:

in proportion to work performed, or, if Firm and Lawyer assume joint responsibility for the representation; and,

if PI client agrees to the arrangement and the arrangement is confirmed in writing; and,

if the total fee is reasonable.

In sum, it strikes me that the compensation issue will be governed by whether “of counsel” is working on the very matter for which client retained firm, or, whether firm referred to the “of counsel” lawyer a matter in which firm was not retained by the client.

I’ll be quick to the point, to the point no fakin’: the Vermont Rules of Professional Conduct do not prohibit non-refundable flat fees. However, Rule 1.5(f) sets out the steps a lawyer must take to treat a non-refundable fee as earned upon receipt.

Here’s a primer.

Very few lawyers charge true retainers. What we’ve come to call a retainer is really, a fee that is a paid in advance. Generally, if a lawyer accepts money from a client for work that has not yet been performed, then bills against that money as work is performed, that’s not a retainer. It’s a fee that the client paid in advance.

In 2005, the Vermont Bar Association’s Professional Responsibility Program issued advisory ethics opinion 2005-4. The Committee advised that a lawyer & client could agree that a fee paid in advance is “earned upon receipt.” The Committee further advised that such fees become the property of the lawyer upon receipt and, therefore, cannot be deposited into the lawyer’s trust account.

In 2009, the Vermont Supreme Court amended Rule 1.5(c), the rule that governs advance fees. Per the Reporter’s Note, the new rule required “deposit in a lawyer’s trust account of any fees or expenses paid in advance, no matter how designated, if the funds are to be applied as compensation for services subsequently rendered or expenses subsequently incurred.” (emphasis added).

The new rule appeared to nullify or overrule that 2005 advisory opinion. That is, “no matter how designated” suggests that a fee designated as “earned upon receipt” must, nevertheless, go into trust until earned.

Confusion reigned. Many lawyers routinely charged “non-refundable” fees and treated them as their own upon receipt. Others charged flat fees, put them in trust, then wondered when the fee became “earned.”

In 2016, the Court adopted the Professional Responsibility Program’s recommendation to amend Rules 1.5 and 1.15(c). As amended, Rule 1.5(f) authorizes lawyers to enter into non-refundable fee agreements under which the fee is earned before any services are rendered. Such fees DO NOT go into trust. Further, the rule requires such fee agreements to be confirmed in writing and to define the scope of services that the client will receive in exchange for the non-refundable fee. Even if labeled nonrefundable, the fee must be reasonable and, further, the new rule prohibits a lawyer from requiring the client to waive the right to challenge the reasonableness of the fee.

In short, if a lawyer complies with Rule 1.5(f), the lawyer may treat a non-refundable fee as earned upon receipt. In that the fee is “earned,” it does not go into trust.

Of course, the rule does not REQUIRE non-refundable fee agreements. At the same time that it amended Rule 1.5(f), the Court also amended Rule 1.15(c). The new rule states that, with the exception of non-refundable fees that comply with Rule 1.5(f), any fee paid in advance must be deposited into trust and remain in trust until earned.

So, lawyers: if you want to treat a fee as yours upon receipt, you must comply with Rule 1.5(f). Otherwise, a fee paid in advance must remain in trust until earned.

Rule 1.5(a) prohibits a lawyers from making an agreement for, charging, or collecting an unreasonable fee. I’ve often mentioned that the Professional Responsibility Program receives few, if any, complaints about fees. Indeed, my quick research reveals that the last disciplinary decision involving Rule 1.5(a) issued in October 2002.

Still, it’s good to know what’s good and what isn’t.

Undoubtedly, you have at least one friend or relative who frequently announces how wonderful it would be to be a lawyer, if only to bill 6 or 15 minutes for a quick phone call. Earlier today, I stumbled across two cases that shed some light on that exact issue.

The ABA Journal and the Legal Profession Blog covered a recent decision from the Wyoming Supreme Court. The decision involved a client’s challenge to a firm’s practice of billing in 15 minute increments. The Court concluded that, on the record before it, the evidence supported a conclusion that the firm’s billing practice was not unreasonable.

In its decision, the Court distinguished the case from one it decided in 2014. It’s the 2014 decision that prompted this blog.

The 2014 case is here.The lawyer’s license was suspended 30 days for, among other things, charging an unreasonable fee. More specifically, the Court concluded that the lawyer violated Rule 1.5(a) by billing in 15 minute increments for tasks that, quite simply, did not take even close to 15 minutes to complete.

If your typical practice is to bill in minimum increments, the decision is worth a read. A quick summary:

An attorney’s use of a minimum billing increment is not, standing alone, a violation.

What’s key is to take a look at what the lawyer did. Remember, per the fee agreement, she billed her client in minimum 15-minute increments. The lawyer wrote down each task as it was completed. If the task did not take at least 15 minutes, she did not record how long it actually took. Thus, every single task was billed as having taken at least 15 minutes. Among other things, the lawyer:

often billed the client .25 hours to review a document and another .25 hours to sign it.

Again, it wasn’t the minimum billing increment that resulted in the sanction. Rather, per the Wyoming Supreme Court, an attorney’s billing practices necessarily involves application of “billing judgment.” That is, an exercise of professional judgment demonstrated by “writing off unproductive, excessive, or redundant hours.”

On this issue, the Court concluded that the lawyer’s “practice of billing 15 minutes for such tasks as signing subpoenas, stipulated orders, and one page letters demonstrated a complete failure to exercise business judgment, which would have required her to write off unproductive, excessive, or redundant hours.”

To be very clear: I am not telling you that a minimum billing increment violates Rule 1.5(a). I am, however, telling you that at least one Supreme Court has concluded that, if abused, the practice can lead to an unreasonable fee.

Good morning! Friday’s questions are here. Aunt Kate would’ve needed her sunglasses as she walked east on Pearl to Abernathy’s this morning. Alas, and sadly, even though it’s April 9, she also would’ve need her hat, scarf, and mittens.

Spoiler alert: the answers follow today’s Honor Roll.

Honor Roll

(hyperlinks when available. lack of a link doesn’t reflect a lesser score or lower honors)

D. none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them would be prohibited from doing so by the conflict rules, unless the conflict is a personal one and does not present a significant risk of materially limiting the representation of the client by the remaining lawyers in the firm.

There’s a rule that prohibits a lawyer involved in the investigation or litigation of a matter from making “____________________ that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will be disseminated by means of public communication and will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter.”

Attorney represents Client in matter vs. Litigant. Litigant is self-represented and does not have a lawyer.

The matter is close to resolving. Attorney has reduced a proposed settlement to writing. Attorney shows it to Litigant. Litigant asks Attorney what paragraph 2 means.

True or False: Vermont’s rules authorize Attorney to explain Attorney’s view of the proposed settlement and Attorney’s view of the underlying legal obligations created by paragraph 2.

TRUE. See, Rule 4.2, Comment [2] (“So long as the lawyer has explained that the lawyer represents an adverse party and is not representing the person, the lawyer may inform the person of the terms on which the lawyer’s client will enter into an agreement or settle a matter, prepare documents that require the person’s signature, and explain the lawyer’s own view of the meaning of the document or the lawyer’s view of the underlying legal obligations.”)

Question 5:

Alan Page was elected to the Minnesota Supreme Court in 1992 and served until reaching mandatory retirement age in 2015. When first elected, Page had been working for several years as an Assistant Attorney General in Minnesota.

I often blog on the duty of competence. Prior to becoming a lawyer, Page excelled in a different profession. Indeed, as a member of the famed “Purple People Eaters,” Page was among the most competent ever to do that particular job.

What was Page’s job prior to becoming a lawyer.

Alan Page was a professional football player. He was the NFL MVP in 1971 and is in the Pro Football Hall of Fame. Page was a defensive lineman for the Minnesota Vikings (and, at the end of his career, for the Chicago Bears.) The “Purple People Eaters” were the defensive line for the Vikings teams that went to 4 Super Bowls in the 70’s.

D. Not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee. V.R.Pr.C. 1.5(a).

Question 2

Fill in the blank.

The third comment to a particular rule defines __________ ___________ as involving “the same transaction or legal dispute or if there otherwise is a substantial risk that confidential factual information as would normally have been obtained in the prior representationw would materially advance the client’s position in the subsequent matter.”

“A” is most likely to be a rules violation. Violations including contacting a represented party and engaging in dishonest conduct. For more, see these advisory opinions from the District of Columbia, New Hampshire & Massachusetts.

Reviewing a juror’s public Twitter feed is not a violation. Arguably, the duty of competence requires it.

A woman named Linda passed away earlier this week. She was 76 and grew up in Topeka, Kansas. I don’t know whether anyone who reads this blog ever met her. But, I’m positive that nearly every single person who reads this blog & who went to law school read about her in class.

What was Linda’s last name?

Linda Brown was 8 years old when she was turned away from Sumner Elementary School in Topeka. 4 years later, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Brown v. Board of Education. Linda’s passing was covered by many outlets, including NPR, the Huffington Post, the Chicago Tribune, and the New York Times.

Your post today brought back some fond memories for me as well, I grew up in Northern NJ and used to watch channel 11 regularly. As for the Carvel commercials and can still hear “Cookie Puss” and “Fudgie the Whale” in my mind if I close my eyes…

Get Smart was a silly favorite of mine.

How could you forget the classic (and now most politically incorrect!) F Troop?! Sgt. O’Rourke, Cpl. Agarn, the Hekawi’s. Only 65 episodes

Carvel’s was almost closest to my house; not as high quality as Marcus Dairy, out on Rt. 7, but closer…and we always had a craving for their “Flying Saucers”, wonderful ice cream sandwiches with crispy chocolate wafers! Bought them by the dozen to put in the freezer. I even remember “Mr. Carvel” who did the tv ads…can’t remember the pitch, but he was an “old guy” with a mellifluous voice.

What about The Mod Squad!?!? Linc was the best! Peggy Lipton won an Emmy!

WPIX – Home of the Yankees. My sister’s roommate in college was Cindy Rizzuto, The Scooter’s daughter. “Holy Cow, can you believe that?” AND …..There was nothing I wanted more on my birthday than a Carvel Ice Cream Cake.

Did you actually watch Yankee games on WPIX? How did your Dad allow that?

Wow, that Magic Garden song made me laugh out loud.

I did live near a Carvel – and yes – that was a treat – BUT, what I recall was going to a place called Jahn’s Ice Cream Parlor. They had “everything but the kitchen sink” and it served at least 8. It was served in a mini kitchen sink – with all flavors. Kind of disgusting, actually. They also had a .02 cent plain. This was a glass of seltzer. I love how your intros each week bring back memories.

Your blog on Carvel and WPIX brought back so many memories. Hours spent watching Abbott and Costello reruns, Superman, Batman and not to mention Chiller Theater. It was the only station on TV that regularly got me into trouble. My mom thought Batman was way too violent and Chiller was beyond the pale. That being said, she had no objections to watching The Bells of St. Mary’s or John Wayne in the Quiet Man, movies that ran almost monthly on WPIX. Between WPIX in the afternoon and MAD magazine, I expressed my grade school rebellion. Oh those days.

Love your blog this am,Especially since I grew up in Queens and Carvel was the height of taste bud heaven. To this day, I love ice cream! And who says ice cream doesn’t help one’s bp? Here’s to Carvel and WPIX!