Nicholas Stuart is a columnist with the Canberra Times.
Nick Stuart has written three books,
Kevin Rudd: An Unauthorised Political Biography;
What Goes Up: Behind the 2007 Election; and
Rudd's Way: November 2007 - June 2010.

Saturday, November 17, 2012

STRATEGIC BOMBING

Airpower enthusiasts have always faced three
significant difficulties when it comes to converting unbelievers to their
cause. Two of these have their antecedents deeply rooted in what occurred during
the Second World War; the origin of the third objection is far subtler. In the
light of Andrew Davies’ recent post, in which he unequivocally demonstrated the
terrible effectiveness of the air offensive (http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/graphs-of-the-week-war-history-and-history-wars/) it would seem worthwhile
re-examining the actual record of strategic bombing.

Advocates have always held out the seductive
idea that airpower could achieve victory without getting involved in a long,
drawn out land campaign. It was, ironically, the mismatch between this vision
and the far more limited accomplishments of strategic bombing that was the
source of early disillusionment about its effectiveness. Although Germany
suffered a great deal of destruction in the years before mid-1944, the air
offensive was extremely costly in terms of resources. Additionally (and perhaps
most crucially) it failed to significantly cripple the German war effort. It
hadn’t lived up to its promises.

Then, in the final year of the war and just as
the air campaign was beginning to achieve its long-promised results – the
invasion of France stole the oxygen of publicity from the airmen. Indeed, after
witnessing the tactical effectiveness of strategic bombers (the ones that didn’t
miss the target and kill Allied troops) generals became reluctant to allow the
aircraft to return to their strategic role. They wanted to task the bombers for
operational missions. Even the most senior officers had no real understanding
of the extent and effectiveness of the campaign.

That’s why production of the US Strategic
Bombing Survey was not simply an attempt to determine the effectiveness of air
operations: it was also part of a post-war attempt to prove airpower worked. Of
course nobody was much surprised to discover bombing was destructive. After
all, they’d seen the devastated cities of Germany with their own eyes. The
point was that it was impossible to draw a direct link between the bomber
offensive and the collapse of the Wehrmacht – the German military itself. This
was the aim of the Survey. It would offer irrefutable evidence to the skeptics.

Except the other services had no intention
of allowing facts to get in the way of their own, institutional requirements to
ensure they continued to receive a healthy share of the budget allocation. After
all, they insisted, even in January 1945 the German army had remained capable
of launching a significant (if ultimately futile) offensive in the Ardennes
while at the same time holding ground on the eastern border (although this was
considerably assisted by Stalin’s desire not to push straight on to Berlin). The
generals and admirals insisted that airpower alone could never be decisive,
regardless of the Survey’s findings. It seemed that only boots on the ground
could ensure victory.

Using these arguments the other services
punctured the overblown claim that strategic bombing alone could be decisive. It’s
difficult not to suspect that inter-service rivalry and jockeying for resources
still continues to play an important role the ongoing debate over the role of
airpower.

In this regard (as reported in the Australian
newspaper http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/defence/more-cuts-a-risk-to-soldiers-lives-says-army-chief-david-morrison/story-e6frg8yo-1226503512684) the Army’s commander, General David
Morrison, is just the latest contributor to the debate. I’m certain he is
utterly committed, intellectually, to the case he makes so forcefully on the
enduring primacy of ground forces. Nevertheless, his argument can be
deconstructed in two ways. There’s the appeal, firstly, for greater spending on
Defence but there’s also an element of special pleading. He wants to ensure the
central role of the soldier in the foxhole (or peacemaker in the Pacific, or
special forces trooper assaulting where a bomb can’t go) is not forgotten.

The argument over the utility of airpower won’t
been settled by either examples of its success (the Bosnian conflict); apparent
success but ultimate failure (Gulf War Mark 1); nor its failure (the drone
bombing of Pakistan has failed to defeat the Taliban insurgency – no matter how
many ‘terrorists’ have been killed). The result is a continuing theoretical
battle over the utility of specific weapons systems and operational techniques.
It’s similar to the debates, before the First and Second World Wars
respectively, between those who believed that the offensive spirit would always
trump the defensive or that the horror of bombing would lead citizens to demand
their politicians to sue for peace.

Technology has changed dramatically over the
past decade. It would be surprising if these transformations don’t result in
similar, radical upheavals in the way war will be fought in future. There’s a
real need, today, to stand back and objectively examine this new reality. Hopefully
the analysis will be engaged in without preconceptions based on which service
is likely to emerge with a greater share of the seemingly inexorable shrinking
resource pie.