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How much Security for Switching a Light Bulb – The SOA Way Sebastian Unger, Stefan Pfeiffer, Dirk Timmermann University of Rostock, Germany Institute of Applied Microelectronics and Computer Engineering

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Motivation 08/30/2012Sebastian Unger – University of Rostock – Q: What will you get from this presentation (or from reading the paper)?

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Motivation 08/30/2012Sebastian Unger – University of Rostock –

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Motivation Q: What will you get from this presentation (or from reading the paper)? A: Introduction to problems with security for distributed embedded devices 08/30/2012Sebastian Unger – University of Rostock –

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Agenda Introductive scenario and derived key features State of the art and problem statements Outlook Conclusion 08/30/2012Sebastian Unger – University of Rostock –

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Scenario: Security Key Features IoT Seemless integration of new devices, includes negotiation of suitable authentication Securely remove devices from network Let participants gather security information about each other 08/30/2012Sebastian Unger – University of Rostock –

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Scenario: Security Key Features IoT Seemless integration of new devices, includes negotiation of suitable authentication Securely remove devices from network Let participants gather security information about each other Plus: all this across different trust domains 08/30/2012Sebastian Unger – University of Rostock –

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Scenario: Security Key Features IoT Seemless integration of new devices, includes negotiation of suitable authentication Securely remove devices from network Let participants gather security information about each other Plus: all this across different trust domains 08/30/2012Sebastian Unger – University of Rostock –

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Problem Statement Development of (new) security concepts is cumbersome and expensive Technology designers tend to fall back on existing security techniques (even, if they are not ideal) 08/30/2012Sebastian Unger – University of Rostock –

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Terminology What are those techniques and why are the not ideal? 08/30/2012Sebastian Unger – University of Rostock –

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Conclusion Network Stack Security Existing basic security mechanisms not ideal for embedded devices Solve single aspects only and are not suitable for embedded devices  Security should be covered on application layer 08/30/2012Sebastian Unger – University of Rostock –

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Conclusion Application Layer Security 08/30/2012Sebastian Unger – University of Rostock – Security often not considered at all If considered, then… … employed technologies not suitable for embedded devices … only single issues solved  No interoperability between approaches

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Although often employed, existing basic technologies (IPSec, TLS, …) not ideal Many approaches on application layer security exist but they often solve single aspects only are not interoperable  Future WS Compact Security has the potential to form a basis for an interoperable security concept for distributed embedded devices (disregarding the base technology) 08/30/2012Sebastian Unger – University of Rostock – Conclusion