Kant’s Philosophy of Religion has both negative and positive components; and one can see this duality in his famous statement in the B-Preface of the Critique of Pure Reason that he sought out the limits to knowledge [Wissen] in order to make room for faith [Glaube] (Bxxx). It is in light of this anthem that his critique of the traditional proofs for God's existence should be understood. They do not reflect the essence of Kant's Philosophy of Religion, but are rather just small pieces of a far richer position. Echoing Kant’s Lutheran upbringing, he wants to remove religion from the “monopoly of the schools” and set it on a footing suitable to “the common human understanding” (Bxxxii). He achieves this through an appeal to our shared human need for "a special point of reference for the unification of all ends" (6:5). This "point of reference" is the Highest Good, an ideal state of affairs in which there is a distribution of happiness in accordance with moral worth. However, because the Highest Good can neither be realized by us nor within the order of nature, Kant postulates God and Immortality. These are all objects of faith [Glaube] for Kant, and faith, he maintains, is an intersubjectively valid, legitimate mode of assent. That is, Kant quite sternly and repeatedly argues that faith is not the same as "wishful thinking" or rooted in grounds that have "mere private validity". Rather, faith is, despite its practical grounding, a mode of conviction [Überzeugung] that affirms its object as true (and certain). Beyond the Highest Good and its Postulates, Kant's positive Philosophy of Religion expands quite broadly into doctrines related to the nature of sin and salvation, miracles, Providence, Ecclesiology, and Eschatology. While the Highest Good and the Postulates serve as their common foundation, Kant articulates these doctrines in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, as components of what he there calls the "Pure Rational System of Religion".

Kant infamously claimed that all human beings, without exception, are evil by nature. This collection of essays critically examines and elucidates what he must have meant by this indictment. It shows the role which evil plays in his overall philosophical project and analyses its relation to individual autonomy. Furthermore, it explores the relevance of Kant's views for understanding contemporary questions such as crimes against humanity and moral reconstruction. Leading scholars in the field engage a wide range of sources from which (...) a distinctly Kantian theory of evil emerges, both subtle and robust, and capable of shedding light on the complex dynamics of human immorality. (shrink)

Are human beings essentially good or evil? Immanuel Kant responds, “[H]e [man] is as much the one as the other, partly good, partly bad.” Given this, I’d like to explore the following: What does Kant mean by human nature and how is it possible to be both good and evil? What is “original sin” and does it place limits on free will? In what respect might Kant ’s views be significant for non-believers? More specifically, is Kant saying that human beings (...) need God in order to be good or is morality possible without faith? (shrink)

While scholars are slowly coming to realize that Kants reflections on religion in parts II and III of Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason interpret religion specifically as one aspect of moral education, namely moral ascetics. After first clearly distinguishing between a cognitive and a conative aspect of moral education, I show how certain historical religious practices serve to provide the conative aspect of moral education. Kant defines this aspect of moral education as practices that render the human agent. (...) By this it is meant that certain practices can inspire moral interests either by justifying rational hope in living up to a certain standard of moral perfection or by endeavouring to unite human beings in a universal, invisible ethical community that inspires cooperation rather than adversity. (shrink)

This paper investigates the link between (radical) evil and the existence of God. Arguing with contemporary atheist thinkers, such as Richard Dawkins and Victor Stenger, I hold that one can take the existence of evil as a sign of the existence of God rather than its opposite. The work of Immanuel Kant, especially his thought on evil, is a fertile source to enliven this intuition. Kant implicitly seems to argue that because man is unable to overcome evil by himself, there (...) is a need for God to bridge the gap. Si Deus est, unde malum? Si malum est, Deus est! (shrink)

Matthew Caswell - The Value of Humanity and Kant's Conception of Evil - Journal of the History of Philosophy 44:4 Journal of the History of Philosophy 44.4 635-663 Muse Search Journals This Journal Contents The Value of Humanity and Kant's Conception of Evil Matthew Caswell Recent years have seen the development of a powerful reinterpretation of Kant's basic approach in ethical thought. Kant, it is argued, should not be read as defending the stark, metaphysics-laden formalism for which his theory is (...) so famous. Rather, the reinterpreters claim that the heart of Kantian practical philosophy is the absolute value of humanity, or human rational nature. Kant's ethics can thus be understood as a "theory of value," in which the singular value of our own end-setting capacity as rational agents is taken as supreme, or even as the source of all value. On this reading, morality is just acting in such a way that respects or promotes the value of humanity. Moreover, this value may be deduced through an immanent, regressive argument about the conditions of practical agency as such, according to which any adequate conception of ourselves as agents commits us, finally, to moral norms. The consequences of this approach to Kantian ethics for such central issues as the doctrine of transcendental freedom, ethical formalism, the meaning of Kantian deontology, and indeed the very picture of human moral life for which Kant's theory is meant to account are profound... (shrink)

While the concept of sin plays a pivotal role in the ethico-religious philosophies of Kierkegaard and Kant, both struggle to provide an adequate account of the nature of sin. Kant’s ethical interpretation improves signifi cantly on the traditional theological account by introducing the notion of individual responsibility, but it ultimately fails to provide an explanation of the psychological mechanisms of the fall. Kierkegaard tries to unite the Kantian conception of responsibility with an essentially Hegelian interpretation of the fall, using the (...) concept of anxiety as the glue. Contrary to usual opinion, it is argued here that far from resolving the difficulties of the Kantian account, Kierkegaard ’s interpretation only serves to multiply them. But it is also shown that Kierkegaard ’s analysis of the phenomenon that he calls “ anxiety about sin” does provide the materials for an alternative interpretation of the origin of moral evil in man. (shrink)

Crockett develops a constructive radical theology from the philosophy of Kant. Reading The Critique of Judgment back into The Critique of Pure Reason, Crockett draws upon the insights of such continental philosophers as Heidegger, Derrida, Lyotard and Deleuze. This book shows how existential notions of self, time and imagination are interrelated in Kantian thinking, and demonstrates their importance for theology. An original theology of the sublime emerges as a connection is made between the Kantian sublime of the Third Critique and (...) the transcendental imagination of the First Critique. (shrink)

I define the sense of Revelation that was a very important element in the making of Kant’s Philosophy of Religion. Naturally, the Prussian philosopher analyzed Christian doctrines searching for some theoretical inspiration. However, he asserts that relevant ideas of his thought or religion were in fact inspired by the reading of the Bible ideas such as those of revelation, and radical evil. Christian faith is highly appreciated by Kant among the world’s religions, because historically it has been a formidable promoter (...) of moral education. Kant’s idealism, by the way, compels him to deny some importance to Christian theology, it is instead the true meaning of Christian doctrines, should be determined by rational theology, the part of the philosophical reflexion dealing with religions questions. The Kant’s rationalism could be corrected by greater attention to the value of Christian revelation. In conclusion, the article notes that in Kant the structure of freedom restricts the meaning of the salvific event according the Revelation. (shrink)

Although Kant argues that morality is prior to and independent of religion, Kant nevertheless claims that religion of a certain sort (“moral theism”) follows from morality, and that atheism poses threats to morality. Kant criticizes atheism as morally problematic in four ways: atheism robs the atheist of springs for moral action, leads the atheist to moral despair, corrupts the atheist’s moral character, and has a pernicious influence on the atheist’s community. I argue that Kant is right to say that moral (...) theism can help support morality, and that (for some people), morality leads to religion. But I also argue that one may refrain from accepting the existence of God and still act from respect for the moral law, resist despair, cultivate and retain a virtuous character, and pose no moral threat to one’s community. Indeed, theism, even moral theism, raises moral risks of its own. This article includes discussions of different versions of the highest good, and of two main types of atheism (skeptical and dogmatic). (shrink)

This paper engages Freud’s relation to Kant, with specific reference to each theorist’s articulation of the interconnections between ethics and religion. I argue that there is in fact a constructive approach to ethics and religion in Freud’s thought, and that this approach can be better understood by examining it in relation to Kant’s formulations on these topics. Freud’s thinking about religion and ethics participates in the Enlightenment heritage, with its emphasis on autonomy and rationality, of which Kant’s model of practical (...) reason is in many ways exemplary. At the same time, Freud advances Kantian thinking in certain important respects; his work offers a more somatically, socially, and historically grounded approach to the formation of rational and ethical capacities, and hence makes it more compatible with contemporary concerns and orientations that eschew the pitfalls of ahistorical idealist orientations. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant is among the most pivotal thinkers in the history of philosophy. His transcendental idealism claims to overcome the skepticism of David Hume, resolve the impasse between empiricism and rationalism, and establish the reality of human freedom and moral agency. A thorough understanding of Kant is indispensable to any philosopher today. The significance of Kant's thought is matched by its complexity. His revolutionary ideas are systematically interconnected and he presents them using a forbidding technical vocabulary. A careful investigation of (...) the key concepts that structure Kant's work is essential to the comprehension of his philosophical project. This book provides an accessible introduction to Kant by explaining each of the key concepts of his philosophy. The book is organized into three parts, which correspond to the main areas of Kant's transcendental idealism: Theoretical Philosophy; Practical Philosophy; and, Aesthetics, Teleology, and Religion. Each chapter presents an overview of a particular topic, while the whole provides a clear and comprehensive account of Kant's philosophical system. (shrink)

The essay explores the meaning and implications of Milbank's claim that the post-Kantian presuppositions of modern theology must be eradicated. After defining and locating the post-Kantian element in the context of Milbank's broader concerns, the essay employs a comparison between Milbank and Barth to draw out the differences between radical orthodoxy and neo-orthodoxy with respect to the Kantian ideal of "mediation" between theology and culture. The essay concludes with comparisons of Milbank's metanarrative concerning "modern" thought with those offered by Hans (...) Blumenberg and James Edwards. The effect is not only to suggest the apparent arbitrariness of Milbank's account, but also to indicate the evident futility of arguing with Milbank's theological position on the basis of alternative accounts of the post-Kantian tradition. (shrink)

Kant rejects all of the standard accounts of the dependence of morality on religious claims or commitment. He nevertheless thinks that morality “leads to” religion. I defend an account of this “leading to” relationship, arguing that it is the result of Kant’s struggle to capture the practical import of the consequences of our actions within a moral theory that rejects the idea that we must maximize the good. On this view, the best way to acknowledge that the outcomes of our (...) actions matter, while maintaining uncompromising commitment to the moral law, is to hope in God. (shrink)

Once God is no longer recognized as the ground and the enforcer of morality, the character and force of morality undergoes a significant change, a point made by G.E.M. Anscombe in her observation that without God the significance of morality is changed, as the word criminal would be changed if there were no criminal law and criminal courts. There is no longer in principle a God's-eye perspective from which one can envisage setting moral pluralism aside. In addition, it becomes impossible (...) to show that morality should always trump concerns of prudence, concerns for one's own non-moral interests and the interests of those to whom one is close. Immanuel Kant's attempt to maintain the unity of morality and the force of moral obligation by invoking the idea of God and the postulates of pure practical reason are explored and assessed. Hegel's reconstruction of the status of moral obligation is also examined, given his attempt to eschew Kant's thing-in-itself, as well as Kant's at least possible transcendent God. Severed from any metaphysical anchor, morality gains a contingent content from socio-historical context and its enforcement from the state. Hegel's disengagement from a transcendent God marks a watershed in the place of God in philosophical reflections regarding the status of moral obligations on the European continent. Anscombe is vindicated. Absent the presence of God, there is an important change in the force of moral obligation. (shrink)

This paper explores the significance of authority for Kant’s understanding of the relationship between reason and revelation. Beginning with the separation of the faculties of Theology and Philosophy in Conflict, it will be shown that Kant sees a clear distinction between the authority of reason and that of revelation. However, when one turns to Religion, it is also clear that Kant sees an important, perhaps necessary, relationship between the two. Drawing on a variety of texts, in particular those concerning the (...) public and private use of reason, this paper then explores the relationship between the authority of reason and that of revelation. From this discussion, several conclusions will be drawn regarding Kant’s understanding of the relationship between reason and revelation, namely that while distinct, the two are not necessarily in conflict and that, ultimately, the proper functioning of public reason must include some reference to revelation. (shrink)

This book exhibits the centrality of hope in Kant's critical philosophy, and brings into question the rationality of that hope, and how the question of that rationality can be raised. The question of the rationality of hope is further explored through Kierkegaard's writing.

According to Kant, all finite rational beings are unconditionally bound to obey the moral law, expressed in the formula of the categorical imperative. The assent (the taking to be true) to this law is a practical knowledge, since its ground is objectively and subjectively sufficient. However, the immortality of the soul and the existence of God are not objects of practical knowledge but just objects of practical faith, of moral faith more precisely, for the assent to them has a barely (...) subjectively sufficient ground and is not a necessary consequence of this knowledge of the moral law. According to our interpretation of the Kantian philosophy, the ground of moral faith in God's existence and in the immortality of the soul will be found only in the finite rational being with a disposition (Gesinnung) for the actual fulfilment of the moral law. We will defend this interpretation and maintain that the radical evil of human nature, diagnosed by Kant, prevents all men from having a moral faith, which does not mean that this obstacle is unsurmountable, since the conversion of men into Good is possible. In our view, what makes this conversion feasible is the possibility (implicit in Kant's thought) of an irregular act of the free-will, that of adopting a good fundamental maxim. (shrink)