Areas of expertise: American foreign policy, Middle East policy, grand strategy, international relations, international security, counterterrorism

Andrew J. Bacevich is professor of history and international relations emeritus at Boston University. A graduate of the U. S. Military Academy, he served for twenty-three years as a commissioned officer in the United States Army. He received his Ph. D. in American diplomatic history from Princeton...

Davis retired from the US Army as a Lt. Col. after 21 years of active service and currently serves as a Defense Fellow and Military Expert for Defense Priorities. He was deployed into combat zones four times in his career, beginning with Operation Desert Storm in 1991, and then to Iraq in 2009 and...

Benjamin H. Friedman is an adjunct lecturer at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs, a graduate of Dartmouth College, and a PhD candidate in political science at the MIT. He previously worked as a Defense Analyst…

Areas of expertise: American foreign policy and national security, Middle East policy, grand strategy, international relations, international security, counterinsurgency

Gil Barndollar is a fellow at Defense Priorities, the Director of Middle East Studies at the Center for the National Interest, and the Military Fellow-in-Residence at the Catholic University of America’s Center for the Study of Statesmanship. He has written for publications including USA Today…

Rachel Bovard currently serves as Senior Director of Policy at the Conservative Partnership Institute. She has more than a decade of policy experience in Washington and has served in both the House and Senate in various roles, including as a legislative director and policy director...

Areas of expertise: American foreign policy, international relations, international security

Desch is an expert on U.S. foreign and national security policies. His current research focuses on how to bridge the gap between academic research and policymaking. He is the co-author most recently of Privileged and Confidential: The Secret History of the President’s Foreign...

Areas of expertise: American foreign policy, international relations, international security

Eugene Gholz is an associate professor of political science at the University of Notre Dame. He works primarily at the intersection of national security and economic policy, on subjects including innovation, defense management, and U.S. grand strategy. He co-wrote a well-known International Security...

WASHINGTON, DC—Today, the U.S. Senate voted to pass S.J.Res.7, a bipartisan resolution to end U.S. military support for the Saudi-UAE-led coalition’s intervention in Yemen’s civil war. The Senate passed the same resolution last Congress, following the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi.

“The Senate vote today reflects the American people’s broad support for ending U.S. involvement in yet another Middle East civil war. It is long past time to rethink our post-9/11 foreign policy.

“The Obama administration erred in 2015 when it agreed to support the Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen's civil war without congressional approval. Such a ‘necessary evil’ alliance is not necessary. No U.S. national security interest justifies American involvement. The war in Yemen has been both a strategic failure and a humanitarian disaster.

“Ending U.S. support for the Saudi-UAE campaign in Yemen will aid negotiations that could settle the civil war. That is not only good for Yemenis, but also for accomplishing U.S. counterterrorism objectives in Yemen.”

WASHINGTON, DC—On Sunday, The New York Times published an opinion editorial by Barry R. Posen, Ford International Professor of Political Science and Director of Security Studies Program at MIT and author of Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy.

In this piece, Posen argues for a reappraisal of the U.S. role in NATO, a military alliance formed during the Cold War to defend Europe from the Soviet Union.

President Trump has many bad ideas. Reconsidering America’s role in NATO isn’t one of them.

NATO, a military alliance, was formed specifically to prevent the Soviet Union from dominating Europe, whose principal powers—Germany, France, Italy and Britain—had been so devastated by World War II that they were vulnerable to Soviet coercion, subversion or conquest. NATO also became a vehicle for rehabilitating the Axis powers—Germany and Italy—under the victors’ tutelage.

America had an enduring interest in ensuring that the Continent not fall under the domination of a single, capable, hostile power: That could pose a serious threat to America. The Truman administration was clear on this point: The main purpose of stationing American military forces in Europe in the early 1950s was to stay long enough to right the balance of power, not to stay forever...

...The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 removed the last vestiges of a major security threat to NATO, and with it, the rationale for the American military presence in Europe.

...NATO’s founding mission has been achieved and replaced with unsuccessful misadventures. The United States has urgent business at home, and arguably in Asia. Though President Trump has no strategy for returning the European allies to full responsibility for their own futures, the American foreign policy establishment could better spend its time devising such a strategy than defending the counterproductive trans-Atlantic status quo.

“The United States can afford a hitch in talks. We have little to lose. With or without a deal, U.S. security vis-à-vis North Korea is already guaranteed by deterrence and North Korea's relative weakness. That gives the United States considerable leverage and the ability to patiently accept the outcome of this summit and look for future progress in other talks.

“The United States does not to take the lead in negotiating with North Korea. We should let the South Koreans do that; and really they have been the ones creating most of the progress thus far. The United States can agree to relax some sanctions if they find it useful in their talks.

“Denuclearization is an ambitious, if not impossible, goal in the near term. Negotiations with North Korea should continue as part of a process that aims to strengthen peace and allow for normalization of diplomacy and opening of North Korea. Denuclearization and other internal reforms should be seen as eventual goals.”

Lt. Col. Daniel L. Davis, USA, Ret.:

“Despite this less-than-ideal ending, the fundamentals have not changed: American security rests firmly on our unblinking military deterrent, and we are just as safe today as we were before. The long, difficult process of negotiations should nevertheless continue. Diplomacy—however slow and sometimes unsatisfying—is still in our interest and remains the best path to peace.”

WASHINGTON, DC—With President Trump set to meet Kim Jong-un in Hanoi, Vietnam, North Korea expert, David C. Kang, Director of USC's Korean Studies Institute and Maria Crutcher Professor of International Relations, provided the following explainer.

THE STAKES:

The stakes are not as high as many Washington analysts seem to think. The worst case would be both sides return to threats—but we have done that for decades. Rather, the stakes are what could happen if things go well, and here, the upside is quite high.

North Korea won’t attack us if we don’t attack them. Deterrence will hold. Threats have not worked for decades and won't work now. The best way forward is to engage and try to get the North to open up its economy and its country to outside influences, while slowly attempting to pause and even rollback its nuclear and missile programs.

No matter what, Hanoi is not the final step. It is one of the first steps toward finding a political relationship between the United States and North Korea that can slowly—hopefully—bring about movement away from nuclearization on the Korean Peninsula.

Full denuclearization is probably unrealistic, but even some movement back down the path is a positive step and should be encouraged.

EXPECTATIONS:

The idea that there has been no tangible progress is false. Given where we were in December 2017, U.S.-DPRK relations are today far better off. That the North is more willing to discuss a myriad of ways in which they might be willing to open to the outside world is significant and should be seriously pursued.

I suspect Kim Jong-un has something symbolic to give to Trump—probably not a lot, but something. Perhaps a pledge to close down Yongbyon, or to allow inspections “at some time.” The real question is: Will the U.S. have something symbolic to give in return?

That the majority of policymakers and pundits are skeptical of the Trump process for dealing with North Korea is not surprising. But this is missing the point. For the first time in a generation, there are new leaders in North Korea, South Korea, and the United States who are willing to question, and perhaps change, the status quo.

HOW TO EVALUATE THE SUMMIT:

Evaluating the outcomes from the summit should be measured by progress toward peace, not denuclearization.

This is a slow process no matter what—nothing can possibly happen quickly, but time is on our side. Creating trust, building a working relationship, and simply bringing North Korean leaders and diplomats into the world is an important step. Nobody should want to return to the decade of total non-activity that preceded these negotiations.

The goal in Hanoi is to build momentum for negotiations between the U.S. and DPRK to sustain détente past this year. After that, the United States will be consumed with a presidential election that promises to be intense.

North Korea is not a problem to be solved, but managed. There is no combination of carrots and sticks that will make North Korea denuclearize, democratize, and also stop its human rights abuses. North Korea is more than a nuclear issue—it is a country the United States has to live with.

“U.S. forces should be used for achievable missions that protect the American people, not as a tripwire meant to somehow referee Syria's civil war. Leaving behind 200 U.S. troops isn’t enough to do much other than get the United States entangled in a larger conflict. Zero ground forces is a much safer number for America.

“The three rationales offered by the White House do not justify this open-ended commitment of U.S. ground forces, especially when staying invites disaster.

“Keeping U.S. troops to fight ISIS' remnants is mission creep toward an Iraq-style, long-term counterinsurgency mission. Other actors in Syria, starting with the Syrian government and the Kurdish forces, are eager to attack ISIS. Defending against anti-American threats does not require ground forces.

“Keeping U.S. troops at al-Tanf to serve as a road block between the Syria-Iraq border seems designed only to annoy Iran or Russia. A small contingent will not significantly affect Iran’s shipments or coerce Russia, but they will risk getting into a conflict with one of those powers, for no obvious reason.

“Keeping U.S. troops to help Turkey create a ‘safe zone’ in northeast Syria makes no sense, given that the Kurds there want to be kept safe from the Turks. The United States’ temporary alignment was based on a shared interest with the Kurds in attacking ISIS; it does not mean we are compelled to agree with all their aims and perpetually back them in their local conflicts. There is every reason to anticipate the Kurds can cut a deal with the Syria government to restore something similar to the pre-war order where they were left in peace without autonomy, and the United States can encourage that.

“The mission to liberate ISIS-held territory is complete. The best course for America is for a full and immediate withdrawal of U.S. soldiers.”

WASHINGTON, DC—In tonight’s State of the Union address, President Trump outlined a significant change in U.S. foreign policy, calling for an end to “endless wars,” including our 17-year war in Afghanistan and our military entanglement in Syria’s civil war.

“In response to the attacks on 9/11, the United States was right to go to war in Afghanistan to decimate al-Qaeda and the Taliban government which harbored them. America won that war.

“Since then, we have been losing a second war fought to extend the Afghanistan central government’s rule to the whole country. After 17-plus years; more than a trillion dollars expended, much of it debt financed; 2,400 American servicemembers killed; and many more wounded, it is past time to end the U.S. war there entirely.

“The cost of building a modern Afghan state is unrelated to core U.S. security and thus unjustified by a permanent commitment. It is irresponsible for U.S. leaders to keep wasting U.S. military lives and burning taxpayer funds in an evident failure.

“U.S. counterterrorism does not require continuing the war there. What denies al-Qaeda haven in Afghanistan now is what will deny it after U.S. ground forces leave: the political will to strike terrorist bases that arise, the surveillance and strike capability to do so, and the ability to deter local actors from harboring terrorists. Washington should have abandoned the myth that U.S. safety depends on endless counterinsurgency missions long ago.”

“President Trump is certainly correct to call for an end to U.S. military commitments in Syria and Afghanistan, places where we have achieved all we can as an outside actor. Now it is time for local actors to step up. If they will not or cannot, we ought to make our peace with those groups who can.

“It is well past time to wrap up America’s longest war and bring the troops home from Afghanistan. The al-Qaeda elements responsible for 9/11 and the Taliban who provided safe haven have long been destroyed. With the successful military mission to liberate ISIS-held territory, it is time to withdraw U.S. forces from Syria, as well.

“Our problem is that since the end of the Cold War, the United States has too quickly abandoned diplomacy. Diplomacy, like military force, is an indispensable tool of statecraft. It is time to start using all of the tools at our disposal rather than relying on our military, and that means negotiating exit strategies from Syria and Afghanistan.”

“War is the extension of policy, aimed at national goals. Otherwise it is just waste. It is plain that we have no actual strategic policy in Afghanistan—no plausible purpose other than using taxpayer money, the lives of American soldiers and the deaths of Afghan civilians caught in the crossfire to protect U.S. leaders against the possibility of future blame. America’s longest war should stop.”

“The U.S. withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty is unfortunate but not the disaster many analysts make it out to be.

“The INF Treaty’s end will do little to alter the balance of power in Europe, and it will do even less to affect U.S. security. Europe’s GDP, military spending, and population advantages over Russia will keep it safe, not to mention U.S. backing.

“The INF Treaty emerged in the vastly different geopolitical circumstances of the late Cold War and had more to do with European security than America’s. The treaty had two virtues: reducing the missile threat to Europe, including U.S. forces deployed there, and helping the Soviet Union (now Russia) and the United States limit spending on missiles and missile defenses.

“Since the U.S. and Russia possess more than 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons, it is in America’s security interest to improve U.S.-Russia relations and continue arms control efforts, especially by negotiating an extension to New START, an important arms control agreement which is set to expire in 2021.

“Exiting the INF Treaty does risk unleashing needless and expensive U.S. intermediate range missile deployments in Europe and Asia. Many U.S. defense analysts seem to believe that U.S. security requires mirroring Chinese or Russian weapons development. That ignores the vast differences in geography, circumstance, and security needs that make intermediate range missiles far less useful for the United States.

“If intermediate range missiles would help defend the U.S.’s European and Asian partners, those states should deploy them, not rely on the United States to do it for them. American companies can develop and sell missiles and associated surveillance systems to those states, as U.S. interests dictate. But letting partners take the lead in managing local threats is a cheaper and safer option for the United States.”

WASHINGTON, DC—Defense Priorities policy director Benjamin H. Friedman issued the following statement in response to the ongoing peace talks between the Trump administration’s special representative for Afghanistan, Former U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, and the Taliban:

“It is good news that the Taliban has agreed to a framework where it will keep terrorists out of territory it holds. But U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan does not require the Taliban’s goodwill or effectiveness. With congressional authorization, the United States can always target terrorists who threaten Americans—and whoever tolerates them. Denying terrorists haven serves the self-interest of the Taliban’s leadership.

“The United States long ago achieved the aims that caused us to go to war in Afghanistan: largely destroying the al-Qaeda network that organized the 9/11 attacks and overthrowing the Taliban regime that hosted them. Since then, the U.S. war in Afghanistan has been a failed attempt at the far more ambitious, and unnecessary, goal of building an Afghan state that runs all of the country without insurgent resistance. That goal is neither possible at reasonable cost nor necessary to U.S. counterterrorism success.

“It is past time for U.S. military forces to stop fighting in Afghanistan.”

WASHINGTON, DC—Defense Priorities senior fellow Lt. Col. Daniel L. Davis, USA, Ret. issued the following statement in response to reports of the deaths of U.S. soldiers and civilians in Syria:

“This tragic loss of life should remind everyone of the grave risks involved when keeping U.S. military in Syria. This is exactly why the president was right to order the immediate, unconditional withdrawal of U.S. troops last month.

“With the military mission to liberate territory previously held by ISIS nearly complete and Russia firmly entrenched in the western region, the United States has achieved all it reasonably can in Syria. Staying comes with great cost to America with little to no reward.

“The reality is that even after our withdrawal, ISIS will still be locked in lethal struggles with Syria, Russia, and Iran—our leaving does not do them any favors.

“The longer the Trump administration delays the previously announced withdrawal, the more we needlessly risk U.S. servicemembers' lives.

“The security of our homeland is preserved through aggressive global intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, along with robust homeland security. It is time to expedite the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Syria before any more troops are killed.”

Trump is right to accept victory in Syria. By September, ISIS had lost 99 percent of the territory its vaunted caliphate once held, according to a Pentagon Inspector General’s report. With the last vestiges of Islamic State territory in Syria falling to U.S.-backed forces in recent days, the goal that got the U.S. into Syria is achieved.

ISIS’s demise means there is nothing left worth fighting to win there. The risks of blundering into a war with a rival power are profound, and no possible benefit justifies them. We should not pay the costs of managing the end game of Syria’s civil war so that Russia and Iran do not. The Assad regime is winning its civil war, and supporting rebels merely prolongs the fighting and its tragic consequences. The United States is not obligated to fight for the Kurds or anyone else there. The decision to pull troops is the right one, however one feels about messenger and process that produced it.

The administration’s move to get out of Syria, and consider a similar path in Afghanistan makes mission creep more difficult. Given the volatility of the Middle East, there will always be some reason or another to justify a U.S. troop presence in as many countries as possible, whether it is to protect Israel, Saudi Arabia, or the Kurds, push back against Iran or Russia, or fight some militant or terrorist group. Some of these goals are definitely worthy, but can be achieved through diplomacy, surgical strikes, or by working with America’s partners in the region. An expensive, open-ended U.S. troop presence in multiple Middle Eastern countries certainly isn’t necessary to protect our national security objectives.

Charles Peña goes on to debunk the recycled talking points of the foreign policy elite in The Hill:

What neoconservatives should be concerned about is the potential consequences of Russian intervention on behalf of Assad. Why should we run the risk of direct confrontation with Russia—the only country in the world with enough nuclear weapons to destroy the United States—over a regime in Damascus that does not pose a threat to our national security?

And while Sen. Graham is concerned that "[a]n American withdrawal will put the Kurds ... at tremendous risk," he should be more concerned about the American people he serves and the Constitution he is sworn to uphold—which is "to provide for the common defense," not defending other people or countries.

Ultimately, the primary and overriding criteria for putting the U.S. military in harm’s way should be when U.S. national security is directly at stake. That has never been the case in Syria.

The president needs to override the Washington interventionists on this matter, because the overwhelming weight of evidence is on his side: there is no threat to America’s security that justifies the deployment of lethal military power, there is great strategic risk for our country because of the still-burning civil war there, and as important, it has never been authorized by Congress.

It’s important to note that the troops in Syria were originally sent there by the Obama Administration for the purpose of helping the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces drive ISIS from their so-called ‘capital’ of Raqqa. That mission was successfully completed in October 2017.