To judge with accuracy of the proper extent of the federal
judicature, it will be necessary to consider in the first place
what are its proper objects.

It seems scarcely to admit of controversy that the judiciary
authority of the union ought to extend to these several
descriptions of causes. 1st. To all those which arise out
of the laws of the United States, passed in pursuance of
their just and constitutional powers of legislation; 2d. to all
those which concern the execution of the provisions expressly
contained in the articles of union; 3d. to all those
in which the United States are a party; 4th. to all those
which involve the PEACE of the CONFEDERACY, whether
they relate to the intercourse between the United States
and foreign nations, or to that between the States themselves;
5th. to all those which originate on the high seas,
and are of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction; and lastly,
to all those in which the state tribunals cannot be supposed
to be impartial and unbiassed.

The first point depends upon this obvious consideration
that there ought always to be a constitutional method of
giving efficacy to constitutional provisions. What for instance
would avail restrictions on the authority of the state
legislatures, without some constitutional mode of enforcing
the observance of them? The states, by the plan of the
convention are prohibited from doing a variety of things;
some of which are incompatible with the interests of the
union, and others with the principles of good government.
The imposition of duties on imported articles, and the
emission of paper money, are specimens of each kind. No
man of sense will believe that such prohibitions would be
scrupulously regarded, without some effectual power in
the government to restrain or correct the infractions of
them. This power must either be a direct negative on the
state laws, or an authority in the federal courts, to overrule
such as might be in manifest contravention of the articles
of union. There is no third course that I can imagine.
The latter appears to have been thought by the convention
preferable to the former, and I presume will be
most agreeable to the states.

As to the second point, it is impossible by any argument
or comment to make it clearer than it is in itself. If there
are such things as political axioms, the propriety of the
judicial power of a government being co-extensive with its
legislative, may be ranked among the number. The mere
necessity of uniformity in the interpretation of the national
laws, decides the question. Thirteen independent
courts of final jurisdiction over the same causes, arising
upon the same laws, is a hydra in government, from which
nothing but contradiction and confusion can proceed.

Still less need be said in regard to the third point. Controversies
between the nation and its members or citizens,
can only be properly referred to the national tribunals.
Any other plan would be contrary to reason, to precedent,
and to decorum.

The fourth point rests on this plain proposition, that the
peace of the WHOLE ought not to be left at the disposal of
a PART. The union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign
powers for the conduct of its members. And the responsibility
for an injury ought ever to be accompanied
with the faculty of preventing it. As the denial or perversion
of justice by the sentences of courts, as well as in any
other manner, is with reason classed among the just causes
of war, it will follow that the federal judiciary ought to
have cognizance of all causes in which the citizens of other
countries are concerned. This is not less essential to the
preservation of the public faith, than to the security of the
public tranquility. A distinction may perhaps be imagined
between cases arising upon treaties and the laws of nations,
and those which may stand merely on the footing of
the municipal law. The former kind may be supposed
proper for the federal jurisdiction, the latter for that of
the states. But it is at least problematical whether an unjust
sentence against a foreigner, where the subject of controversy
was wholly relative to the lex loci, would not, if unredressed,
be an aggression upon his sovereign, as well as
one which violated the stipulations in a treaty or the general
laws of nations. And a still greater objection to the
distinction would result from the immense difficulty, if not
impossibility, of a practical discrimination between the
cases of one complection and those of the other. So great
a proportion of the cases in which foreigners are parties
involve national questions, that it is by far most safe and
most expedient to refer all those in which they are concerned
to the national tribunals.

The power of determining causes between two states,
between one state and the citizens of another, and between
the citizens of different states, is perhaps not less essential
to the peace of the union than that which has been just
examined. History gives us a horrid picture of the dissentions
and private wars which distracted and desolated Germany
prior to the institution of the Imperial Chamber by
Maximilian, towards the close of the fifteenth century; and
informs us at the same time of the vast influence of that
institution in appeasing the disorders and establishing the
tranquility of the empire. This was a court invested with
authority to decide finally all differences between the
members of the Germanic body.

A method of terminating territorial disputes between
the states, under the authority of the federal head, was not
unattended to, even in the imperfect system by which they
have been hitherto held together. But there are many
other sources, besides interfering claims of boundary,
from which bickerings and animosities may spring up
among the members of the union. To some of these we
have been witnesses in the course of our past experience.
It will readily be conjectured that I allude to the fraudulent
laws which have been passed in too many of the states.
And though the proposed constitution establishes particular
guards against the repetition of those instances which
have heretofore made their appearance, yet it is warrantable
to apprehend that the spirit which produced them
will assume new shapes that could not be foreseen, nor
specifically provided against. Whatever practices may have
a tendency to disturb the harmony between the states, are
proper objects of federal superintendence and control.

It may be esteemed the basis of the union, that "the citizens
of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the several states." And if it be a
just principle that every government ought to possess the
means of executing its own provisions by its own authority, it will
follow, that in order to the inviolable maintenance of that
equality of privileges and immunities to which the citizens
of the union will be entitled, the national judiciary ought
to preside in all cases in which one state or its citizens are
opposed to another state or its citizens. To secure the full
effect of so fundamental a provision against all evasion
and subterfuge, it is necessary that its construction should
be committed to that tribunal, which, having no local attachments,
will be likely to be impartial between the different
states and their citizens, and which, owing its official
existence to the union, will never be likely to feel any bias
inauspicious to the principles on which it is founded.

The fifth point will demand little animadversion. The
most bigotted idolizers of state authority have not thus far
shewn a disposition to deny the national judiciary the cognizance
of maritime causes. These so generally depend on
the laws of nations, and so commonly affect the rights of
foreigners, that they fall within the considerations which
are relative to the public peace. The most important part
of them are by the present confederation submitted to
federal jurisdiction.

The reasonableness of the agency of the national courts
in cases in which the state tribunals cannot be supposed to
be impartial, speaks for itself. No man ought certainly to
be a judge in his own cause, or in any cause in respect to
which he has the least interest or bias. This principle has
no inconsiderable weight in designating the federal courts
as the proper tribunals for the determination of controversies
between different states and their citizens. And it
ought to have the same operation in regard to some cases
between the citizens of the same state. Claims to land under
grants of different states, founded upon adverse pretensions
of boundary, are of this description. The courts
of neither of the granting states could be expected to be
unbiassed. The laws may have even prejudged the question,
and tied the courts down to decisions in favour of the
grants of the state to which they belonged. And even
where this had not been done, it would be natural that the
judges, as men, should feel a strong predilection to the
claims of their own government.

Having thus laid down and discussed the principles
which ought to regulate the constitution of the federal judiciary,
we will proceed to test, by these principles, the
particular powers of which, according to the plan of the
convention, it is to be composed. It is to comprehend, "all
cases in law and equity arising under the constitution, the
laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall
be made under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls; to all cases
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to
which the United States shall be a party; to controversies
between two or more states, between a state and citizens of
another state, between citizens of different states, between
citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of
different states, and between a state or the citizens thereof,
and foreign states, citizens and subjects." This constitutes
the entire mass of the judicial authority of the union. Let
us now review it in detail. It is then to extend,

First. To all cases in law and equity arising under the constitution
and the laws of the United States. This corresponds
to the two first classes of causes which have been enumerated
as proper for the jurisdiction of the United States. It
has been asked what is meant by "cases arising under the
constitution," in contradistinction from those "arising under
the laws of the United States." The difference has
been already explained. All the restrictions upon the authority
of the state legislatures, furnish examples of it.
They are not, for instance, to emit paper money; but the
interdiction results from the constitution, and will have no
connection with any law of the United States. Should paper
money, notwithstanding, be emitted, the controversies
concerning it would be cases arising upon the constitution,
and not upon the laws of the United States, in the ordinary
signification of the terms. This may serve as a sample
of the whole.

It has also been asked, what need of the word "equity"?
What equitable causes can grow out of the constitution and
laws of the United States? There is hardly a subject of litigation
between individuals, which may not involve those
ingredients of fraud, accident, trust or hardship, which
would render the matter an object of equitable, rather
than of legal jurisdiction, as the distinction is known and
established in several of the states. It is the peculiar province,
for instance, of a court of equity to relieve against
what are called hard bargains: These are contracts, in
which, though there may have been no direct fraud or deceit,
sufficient to invalidate them in a court of law; yet
there may have been some undue and unconscionable advantage
taken of the necessities or misfortunes of one of
the parties, which a court of equity would not tolerate. In
such cases, where foreigners were concerned on either
side, it would be impossible for the federal judicatories to
do justice without an equitable, as well as a legal jurisdiction.
Agreements to convey lands claimed under the
grants of different states, may afford another example of
the necessity of an equitable jurisdiction in the federal
courts. This reasoning may not be so palpable in those
states where the formal and technical distinction between
LAW and EQUITY is not maintained as in this state, where it
is exemplified by every day's practice.

The judiciary authority of the union is to extend--

Second. To treaties made, or which shall be made under
the authority of the United States, and to all cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls.
These belong to the fourth class of the enumerated cases,
as they have an evident connection with the preservation
of the national peace.

Third. To cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.
These form altogether the fifth of the enumerated classes
of causes proper for the cognizance of the national courts.

Fourth. To controversies to which the United States shall
be a party. These constitute the third of those classes.

Fifth. To controversies between two or more states, between
a state and citizens of another state, between citizens
of different states. These belong to the fourth of those
classes, and partake in some measure of the nature of the
last.

Sixth. To cases between the citizens of the same state,
claiming lands under grants of different states. These fall
within the last class, and are the only instance in which the
proposed constitution directly contemplates the cognizance of disputes
between the citizens of the same state.

Seventh. To cases between a state and the citizens
thereof, and foreign states, citizens, or subjects. These
have been already explained to belong to the fourth of the
enumerated classes, and have been shewn to be in a peculiar
manner the proper subjects of the national judicature.

From this review of the particular powers of the federal
judiciary, as marked out in the constitution, it appears,
that they are all conformable to the principles which ought
to have governed the structure of that department, and
which were necessary to the perfection of the system. If
some partial inconveniencies should appear to be connected
with the incorporation of any of them into the
plan, it ought to be recollected that the national legislature
will have ample authority to make such exceptions and to
prescribe such regulations as will be calculated to obviate
or remove these inconveniencies. The possibility of particular
mischiefs can never be viewed by a well-informed
mind as a solid objection to a general principle, which is
calculated to avoid general mischiefs, and to obtain general
advantages.