Axis History Forum

This is an apolitical forum for discussions on the Axis nations and related topics hosted by the Axis History Factbook in cooperation with Christian Ankerstjerne’s Panzerworld and Christoph Awender's WW2 day by day.
Founded in 1999.

Carl are you pointing out the US could/would enter European war with full force or it delays US entry?

I'm not him but with no war in the Pacific we'd see no more than a continued defensive buildup by the USA there. Any delay would be minimal. The US and Germany were already in a full shooting war on the North Atlantic. A formal DoW would have been but a matter of time. Little time IMO.

thaddeus_c wrote:...
Carl are you pointing out the US could/would enter European war with full force or it delays US entry?

The first. The Occupation of FIC in October 1940-Mach/April 1941 forced a shift in the US war preparation. The thin resources on hand in this early mobilization were split with the Pacific drawing off a increasingly disportionate amount. Plus the administrative and political distraction. Absent the occupation, failed discussions over that, the bank asset freeze and embargo, and failed negotiations over that. There is far less diverted to the Pacific and the strength on hand in 1941 & early 42 is used to threaten the Axis in Europe.

Delaying US entry is not certain. The usual assumption is that without the Japanese crisis the US is not forced into war in December 1941. That is possible, but it assumes the warhawaks undistracted are able to force a decision on Hitler sooner though a even more aggressive policy. i.e: a significantly larger air and naval presence in Iceland from June 1941, or a US naval force making a port call/s in Vichy or other neutral nations near the war zone. A US squadron off Portugal or its Atlantic islands would have been inflammatory from the German PoV.

It is correct that OTL Roosevelt & the Warhawks did not have enough votes in Congress earlier for a DoW. However they may have provoked the one overriding vote, Hitlers, into being cast earlier. He had been considering the pros & cons earlier n 1941 & may have cut loose given sufficient provocation.

what could Germany actually do to affect events in the Pacific? (a redux of WWI) unless they have Soviet collaboration? send u-boats to Madagascar and/or Italian East Africa.

Thats about it. Harrass the eastern end of the sea routes to the USSR? Maybe some air flights to the China ally? OTL Germany launched five or six cargo plane flights to Japan, terminating in Manchuria. The route was Germany. Bulgaria, Persia, Afghanistan, western China, Manchuria. One seems to have been intercepted at the refueling stop in China by Soviet special force. Some special agents & others could have attempted the neutral land route of Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan. Tho Brit agents would have been stalking them.

thaddeus_c wrote:...
Carl are you pointing out the US could/would enter European war with full force or it delays US entry?

The first. The Occupation of FIC in October 1940-Mach/April 1941 forced a shift in the US war preparation. The thin resources on hand in this early mobilization were split with the Pacific drawing off a increasingly disportionate amount. Plus the administrative and political distraction. Absent the occupation, failed discussions over that, the bank asset freeze and embargo, and failed negotiations over that. There is far less diverted to the Pacific and the strength on hand in 1941 & early 42 is used to threaten the Axis in Europe.

Delaying US entry is not certain. The usual assumption is that without the Japanese crisis the US is not forced into war in December 1941. That is possible, but it assumes the warhawaks undistracted are able to force a decision on Hitler sooner though a even more aggressive policy. i.e: a significantly larger air and naval presence in Iceland from June 1941, or a US naval force making a port call/s in Vichy or other neutral nations near the war zone. A US squadron off Portugal or its Atlantic islands would have been inflammatory from the German PoV.

It is correct that OTL Roosevelt & the Warhawks did not have enough votes in Congress earlier for a DoW. However they may have provoked the one overriding vote, Hitlers, into being cast earlier. He had been considering the pros & cons earlier n 1941 & may have cut loose given sufficient provocation.

I wonder what that had to do with the US establishing a naval force on Iceland?

my understanding the decision to proceed with Operation Barbarossa was set in stone but have always wondered if the ill-fated sortie of Bismarck and requests for unlimited u-boat action were not effort(s) to refocus to ongoing naval conflict? and as crazy as it sounds to gain resources for the KM?

(the book I cited A War To Be Won has KM desire for DOW as purely expedient tactical move)

thaddeus_c wrote:... have always wondered if the ill-fated sortie of Bismarck and requests for unlimited u-boat action were not effort(s) to refocus to ongoing naval conflict? and as crazy as it sounds to gain resources for the KM? ...

The sortie makes sense in the context of the situation. The mid Atlantic submarine battle was ramping up. There had been several successful sorties by single and paired warships. There was at least some VLR reconnaissance now regularly over the Atlantic, some success in breaking British naval cones & other sig intel. Consolidating five large warships for raids in coordination with submarine patrols was worth a gamble.

thaddeus_c wrote: ... would it be possible for China to do any better in Battle of Shanghai (realistically?)

it seems one - two blow of losing Shanghai and Nanking decided Germany would ally with Japan?

I'm not clear on the question of the decision to cease support of China. Never read anything behind that.

It is possible for the KMT armies to do 'better' at Shanghai, or elsewhere. That requires a change in strategic thinking, perhaps some fundamental changes within the KMT. It also depends on what the definition of 'better' is. Given the will to commit cannon fodder and the better quality soldiers it is possible for the Chinese to kill a lot more Japanese soldiers & expend Japanese ammunition and other supplies. That may not keep Shanghai or other major cities in KMT control, but it pushes the Japanese army further along the attrition curve, and moves the Japanese war hawks closer to discreditation. I'm unsure that causes a major Japanese change in policy before 1942, but its a valid question.

One of the two or three important PoD, perhaps the core one, is somehow focusing Chinese leaders on fighting the Japanese. Assorted political agendas and corruption steered them towards a strategy or policy of favoring high cost battles and withdrawing from the threat of severe losses. Reversing that will cost the KMT more in soldiers and equipment, but its liable to cost the Japanese as much as their trained field armies attrition away.

thaddeus_c wrote: ... would it be possible for China to do any better in Battle of Shanghai (realistically?)

it seems one - two blow of losing Shanghai and Nanking decided Germany would ally with Japan?

I'm not clear on the question of the decision to cease support of China. Never read anything behind that.

It is possible for the KMT armies to do 'better' at Shanghai, or elsewhere. That requires a change in strategic thinking, perhaps some fundamental changes within the KMT. It also depends on what the definition of 'better' is. Given the will to commit cannon fodder and the better quality soldiers it is possible for the Chinese to kill a lot more Japanese soldiers & expend Japanese ammunition and other supplies. That may not keep Shanghai or other major cities in KMT control, but it pushes the Japanese army further along the attrition curve, and moves the Japanese war hawks closer to discreditation. I'm unsure that causes a major Japanese change in policy before 1942, but its a valid question.

One of the two or three important PoD, perhaps the core one, is somehow focusing Chinese leaders on fighting the Japanese. Assorted political agendas and corruption steered them towards a strategy or policy of favoring high cost battles and withdrawing from the threat of severe losses. Reversing that will cost the KMT more in soldiers and equipment, but its liable to cost the Japanese as much as their trained field armies attrition away.

my only reading on the subject was that China was considered a failed state after losing their capital, and it gave Ribbentrop upper hand regarding German alignment (hate to call it alliance) in the Pacific?

always wonder the effects of larger Chinese air force, but only because that aspect of the conflict is more interesting, not because it's very plausible. (historically they had under 200 aircraft, decimated at Shanghai)

thaddeus_c wrote:we drifted over into the Atlantic ... far away from the OP ... would it be possible for China to do any better in Battle of Shanghai (realistically?)

it seems one - two blow of losing Shanghai and Nanking decided Germany would ally with Japan?

Do better as in "hold Shanghai"? I doubt that's possible given the superior firepower and logistics of the Japanese. The best course of action would have been not to try to hold either but fight a strategic delaying action right away.

always wonder the effects of larger Chinese air force, but only because that aspect of the conflict is more interesting, not because it's very plausible. (historically they had under 200 aircraft, decimated at Shanghai)

My back of the envelope estimate is enough aircraft that 800 to 1000 operational planes could be kept up. If those concentrated on LoC bombing, bridges, railways, harbors, and supply dumps they might slow Japanese supply significantly on important battlefronts.

always wonder the effects of larger Chinese air force, but only because that aspect of the conflict is more interesting, not because it's very plausible. (historically they had under 200 aircraft, decimated at Shanghai)

My back of the envelope estimate is enough aircraft that 800 to 1000 operational planes could be kept up. If those concentrated on LoC bombing, bridges, railways, harbors, and supply dumps they might slow Japanese supply significantly on important battlefronts.

my speculative scenario would be for HS-123 biplane, seems appropriate for rough conditions and they were used historically by KMT.

if an air force began to be assembled wonder if a butterfly might be development of long range "German aircraft? for liaison