Bahrain threatens to target critical social media users

On Sunday, March 25, Bahrain’s Interior Minister Sheikh Rashid bin Abdullah al-Khalifa said that the country is tracking down and taking legal action against social media users that speak against the Bahraini government. The Gulf nation continues to target human rights proponents by stating that they are ‘sowing chaos’ and having negative effects on society and the nation.

Social media websites such as Twitter have been a popular way to rally activists and opposition figures against the government. Exiled Bahraini activist, Sayed Ahmed AlWadaei, director of the UK-based Bahrain Institute for Rights and Democracy (BIRD), has been speaking up on how Bahraini authorities are targeting human rights activists and opposition figures, as well the families of the aforementioned as a tool of intimidation. Many of AlWadaei’s family members have been targeted by the Bahraini authorities.

Qatari emir visits Russia to discuss Syrian crisis

Qatar’s leader, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani arrived in Moscow on Sunday, March 25, and met President Vladmir Putin on Monday to discuss the situations in Syria, Yemen, and Palestine. The leaders discussed a multitude of topics, notably, Russia’s support for Bashar al-Assad’s forces, Qatari support for the opposition, and the possible participation of Qatar in post-conflict reconstruction of Syria.

Saudi Arabia: Houthi missile attack kills Egyptian in Riyadh

On Monday, March 26, Saudi authorities announced they had intercepted seven ballistic missiles fired by Houthi rebels, three of which were headed towards Riyadh and five of which were headed towards the southern Saudi cities of Abha, Jizan and Najran. Colonel Turki al-Maliki also said that an Egyptian resident was killed as a result of shrapnel, while several others were injured. This attack highlights how the war in Yemen has been increasingly spilling over the borders.

However, missile experts have questioned these claims about interception. Analysts such as Jeffrey Lewis, a missile expert at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies in Monterey, California, who has previously studied other Saudi Patriot missile launches, questioned the US Patriot defense system’s suitability for intercepting missiles such as those fired by Houthis in Yemen. Defense analysts say the Royal Saudi Air Defense Forces largely rely missiles that are designed to intercept slower, shorter-range, non-separating ballistic missiles, while the Houthis are launching faster, long-range, separating ballistic missiles.

Following this news on Tuesday, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) Supreme Petroleum Council issued a statement denying Abu Dhabi’s role in reaching the agreement with Qatar Petroleum. “Al-Bunduq oilfield is shared equally by the emirate of Abu Dhabi and Qatar due to its geographic location. It has been under management by a Japanese consortium for the past four decades,” according to a statement published by the UAE state news agency WAM. “This concession was recently extended by each respective government to the Japanese consortium with no direct communication or engagement between the two states. There is no commercial or trading relationship being established between the UAE and Qatar by the extension of this concession.”

Mohammad Bin Salman visits the United States of America

Saudi Arabia’s crown prince, Mohammad Bin Salman visited the United States, arriving in Washington on Monday, March 19. The Saudi leader met political and business leaders in Washington, New York, Silicon Valley and elsewhere, on a two-week tour across the country. According to Nader Hashemi, director of the Center for Middle East Studies at the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of International Studies, the main goal of the visit was to show a positive image of Saudi Arabia to the US public.

Due to the global slump in oil prices, Bin Salman revealed a plan last year of weaning Saudi Arabia off of its dependency on oil. One of the ways to do this was to build strong ties to important US business leaders, including those in finance and technology.

In their meeting at the White House, President Trump said that he hoped the Saudi crown prince would share his country’s wealth with the US, stating that he hopes the wealth would be shared “in the form of jobs, in the form of the purchase of the finest military equipment anywhere in the world.”

The US president also asked the prince to find a solution to the Gulf crisis with Qatar.

QATAR DENIES FRESH UAE ACCUSATIONS OF AIRSPACE VIOLATIONS

On Monday, March 26, the UAE accused Qatar of intercepting two of the its passenger flights flying over Bahraini airspace. The UAE’s General Civil Aviation Authority said that two Qatari fighter jets had “dangerously approached” two UAE-registered commercial aircrafts. According to UAE state agency, WAM, one of the aircrafts was forced to “do an emergency manoeuver to avoid colliding with the Qatari jets”.

Qatar has denied these accusations and stated that this is an attempt to cover up the UAE’s multiple breaches of Qatari airspace, while also confirming the country’s commitment to the highest international aviation quality and safety standards.

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By Eric Abalahin
Bahrain threatens to target critical social media users
On Sunday, March 25, Bahrain’s Interior Minister Sheikh Rashid bin Abdullah al-Khalifa said that the country is tracking down and taking legal action against social media users that speak against the Bahraini government. The Gulf nation continues to target human rights proponents by stating that they are ‘sowing chaos’ and having negative effects on society and the nation.
Social media websites such as Twitter have been a popular way to rally activists and opposition figures against the government. Exiled Bahraini activist, Sayed Ahmed AlWadaei, director of the UK-based Bahrain Institute for Rights and Democracy (BIRD), has been speaking up on how Bahraini authorities are targeting human rights activists and opposition figures, as well the families of the aforementioned as a tool of intimidation. Many of AlWadaei’s family members have been targeted by the Bahraini authorities.
Qatari emir visits Russia to discuss Syrian crisis
Qatar’s leader, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani arrived in Moscow on Sunday, March 25, and met President Vladmir Putin on Monday to discuss the situations in Syria, Yemen, and Palestine. The leaders discussed a multitude of topics, notably, Russia's support for Bashar al-Assad’s forces, Qatari support for the opposition, and the possible participation of Qatar in post-conflict reconstruction of Syria.
The two leaders also discussed ways in which the two countries are planning on increasing cooperation and bolstering ties, particularly through trade and investment. One of the deals that has recently been announced is that Qatar Airways is set to buy a 25 percent share in Russia's Vnukovo International Airport, one of the four major airports which serves the capital, Moscow.
Saudi Arabia: Houthi missile attack kills Egyptian in Riyadh
On Monday, March 26, Saudi authorities announced they had intercepted seven ballistic missiles fired by Houthi rebels, three of which were headed towards Riyadh and five of which were headed towards the southern Saudi cities of Abha, Jizan and Najran. Colonel Turki al-Maliki also said that an Egyptian resident was killed as a result of shrapnel, while several others were injured. This attack highlights how the war in Yemen has been increasingly spilling over the borders.
However, missile experts have questioned these claims about interception. Analysts such as Jeffrey Lewis, a missile expert at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies in Monterey, California, who has previously studied other Saudi Patriot missile launches, questioned the US Patriot defense system's suitability for intercepting missiles such as those fired by Houthis in Yemen. Defense analysts say the Royal Saudi Air Defense Forces largely rely missiles that are designed to intercept slower, shorter-range, non-separating ballistic missiles, while the Houthis are launching faster, long-range, separating ballistic missiles.
Abu Dhabi and Qatar renew Al-Bunduq oil deal
Qatar Petroleum has renewed its contract with Abu Dhabi to continue operating a shared offshore oilfield, amidst the blockade against Qatar. The Bunduq Company, which operates Al-Bunduq field, is a Japanese-owned company.
Following this news on Tuesday, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) Supreme Petroleum Council issued a statement denying Abu Dhabi's role in reaching the agreement with Qatar Petroleum. “Al-Bunduq oilfield is shared equally by the emirate of Abu Dhabi and Qatar due to its geographic location. It has been under management by a Japanese consortium for the past four decades,” according to a statement published by the UAE state news agency WAM. “This concession was recently extended by each respective government to the Japanese consortium with no direct communication or engagement between the two states. There is no commercial or trading relationship being ... By Eric Abalahin
Bahrain threatens to target critical social media users
On Sunday, March 25, Bahrain’s Interior Minister Sheikh Rashid bin Abdullah al-Khalifa said that the country is tracking down and taking legal action against social ... https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/10/25/rescuing-u-s-economic-strategy-in-asia/Rescuing U.S. economic strategy in Asiahttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/478529138/0/brookingsrss/topics/bahrain~Rescuing-US-economic-strategy-in-Asia/
Wed, 25 Oct 2017 17:28:40 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?p=462543

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By Mireya Solís, David Dollar, Jonathan Stromseth

In the aftermath of U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement, the U.S. strategy for economic engagement with Asia faces serious obstacles. American credibility is severely wounded. Across the region, confidence is low that the United States can negotiate trade agreements that will pass the domestic political test. At the same time, pervasive uncertainty about the new “America First” trade policy is inhibiting prospective partners from engaging in bilateral trade negotiations.

The perception and reality of a diminished American presence in Asia is encouraging countries in the region to hedge by seeking closer cooperation with China. By and large, Asian governments remain convinced that multiparty trade agreements yield the most economic and geopolitical benefits, and several mega trade agreements that do not include the United States are in development—notably the China-backed Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the Japan-E.U. Free Trade Agreement (FTA), and TPP11, an effort by the remaining TPP signatories to sustain the agreement in some form. Meanwhile, China has stepped up its game in the field of development finance with the successful rollout of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the launch of its One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative. In the arena of economic diplomacy, Asians appear to be moving on without the United States.

President Trump’s upcoming trip to Asia presents an opportunity for the administration to address this growing uncertainty and take steps to stabilize and enhance U.S. economic engagement with Asia. Here, we offer a series of recommendations on how this can be accomplished.

Articulate a Vision

The first priority should be to articulate the goals that will guide U.S. engagement. All countries in the region are trying to understand the changing parameters of U.S. foreign economic policy under this administration. Reducing their doubts and uncertainty will increase the chances we can pursue concrete initiatives that will create reciprocal benefits. In keeping with this approach, the administration should foster win-win economic relations with countries in the region, and prevent U.S. marginalization from the evolving regional economic architecture.

We should also compete with China, constructively. The goals here are manifold: to encourage domestic Chinese reforms, offer alternative economic integration options to Asian nations, and to disseminate high-standards of trade and investment liberalization that leverage the areas of comparative advantage for the American economy (agriculture, advanced manufacturing, e-commerce, services, and intellectual property to name a few).

Implement a Strategy

To achieve this vision, we recommend that the following action items be carried out on two levels: foreign economic policy and the related domestic political agenda.

Foreign Economic Policy

Complete ongoing trade renegotiations in a productive and timely way. Through the NAFTA redo and amendments to the South Korea-United States (KORUS) free trade agreement (FTA), the administration has an opportunity to modernize an older trade agreement and ensure effective implementation of commitments in a more recent one. Successful completion of these renegotiations will clarify to our prospective partners what has changed, or not, under an America First trade policy; it will also inform their decisions on the merits about whether to negotiate bilaterally with the United States. The road to a credible trade strategy for Asia starts with the survival of NAFTA.

The road to a credible trade strategy for Asia starts with the survival of NAFTA.

Relaunch BIT negotiations with China. The U.S. and China have gotten close to agreement on the language of a bilateral investment treaty (BIT), but important negotiations remain on the details of the list of exempted sectors. It will not be easy to reach an agreement, but continuing the negotiation is important. Many of the high-tech and service sectors in which U.S. exports are strong require foreign direct investment in China for our firms to operate successfully. Hence, the BIT is an important trade issue. BIT negotiation should be part of a larger strategy to encourage China to open up its economy. Our partners in Asia also closely follow the negotiations—they want to see Washington continuing to engage and taking the lead in pushing China to be more open. Putting the BIT on the back burner plays into the narrative that the United States is withdrawing from Asia and leaving the field to the Chinese.

Reform Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs). Work with Japan and other shareholders to reform the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and World Bank to make these multilateral development organizations more agile in their lending operations, as well as more attractive to potential clients in light of greater competition through the lending of China’s policy banks and the establishment of AIIB. China is lending about $60 billion per year for infrastructure in developing countries, far beyond what the World Bank and ADB are doing. OBOR is the brand, but the effort in fact is global with much of the lending going to Africa. Most of the lending so far has come from China Development Bank and the China Export-Import Bank, but AIIB is off to a fast start as a new competitor in this area. Even many democratic and well-managed countries are turning to China for finance because the existing development banks lack sufficient resources and are mired in regulation and bureaucracy. A U.S.-led effort to expand and reform the MDBs would be very welcome in the developing world and would provide options in addition to what China is offering.

Partner with Japan in Southeast Asia. Establish a partnership with Japan on economic cooperation projects in Southeast Asia. Tokyo responded to the establishment of AIIB by launching its own Quality Infrastructure Fund and has a longstanding presence in the region through its overseas economic assistance programs. This offers an opportunity to marry funding with expertise in countries like Vietnam and Myanmar. For instance, Japan is Vietnam’s largest bilateral donor, largest foreign investor, and one of its biggest trading partners. The United States could develop trilateral cooperation with Japan and Vietnam to sustain a strong geo-economic position in Southeast Asia in the face of China’s assertive economic diplomacy in the region. Aside from infrastructure, this cooperation could promote climate resilient development in the Mekong Delta.

Double-down on U.S.-ASEAN Connect. Taken together, the ten countries that comprise the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, boast the third-largest population in the world and a GDP of $2.4 trillion. Trade between the United States and ASEAN totals about $275 billion annually, and U.S. businesses are the largest cumulative source of foreign direct investment in the regional grouping. However, most of this trade and investment is concentrated in three countries—Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand—and U.S. companies occupy only a small share of key emerging markets such as energy infrastructure. Created last year as a U.S. government initiative, U.S.-ASEAN Connect has thus far established centers in Jakarta, Singapore, and Bangkok to coordinate and expand U.S. economic engagement in the region and facilitate networking among policymakers, entrepreneurs, and businesses. These centers aim to become one-stop-shops for different U.S. stakeholders doing business in the region. The administration should highlight this initiative during the president’s upcoming visits to Vietnam and the Philippines, and consider setting up additional centers in Ho Chi Minh City, Manila, and other ASEAN capitals or commercial centers.

Complementary Domestic Agenda

Engage Congress. On the domestic side, it will be crucial to engage Congress and other U.S. stakeholders, particularly the business community and related trade associations, to build support coalitions in favor of such an Asia economic engagement strategy. This will be key to reassuring counterparts in the region that the range of bilateral economic initiatives that require congressional ratification have strong and sustainable domestic support in the American political system.

Build domestic social resilience to cope with fast economic change.Worker retraining programs in different platforms (e.g., community college certifications and apprenticeships), as well as expanded labor adjustment programs, will leave the American workforce better prepared to deal with the faster pace of economic change. Skills retraining will be particularly important, with curricula ideally designed with employers in mind. They will also provide a domestic foundation for international economic engagement.

By implementing the above steps, the administration would reduce the uncertainty that is currently discouraging our counterparts in Asia from embarking on a new set of bilateral initiatives that the current administration favors. These steps would also boost the credibility of U.S. economic strategy in the region and prevent a vacuum from developing that encourages hedging by others through closer alignment with China. Ideally, the administration could signal or announce support for these economic initiatives either just before or during the President’s upcoming trip to Asia, including in his planned speech at the APEC CEO Summit in Danang, Vietnam on November 10. This will maximize impact and provide confidence in U.S. staying power, demonstrating that the United States is a Pacific nation and is committed to the region for the long run.

]]>
By Mireya Solís, David Dollar, Jonathan Stromseth
In the aftermath of U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement, the U.S. strategy for economic engagement with Asia faces serious obstacles. American credibility is severely wounded. Across the region, confidence is low that the United States can negotiate trade agreements that will pass the domestic political test. At the same time, pervasive uncertainty about the new “America First” trade policy is inhibiting prospective partners from engaging in bilateral trade negotiations.
The perception and reality of a diminished American presence in Asia is encouraging countries in the region to hedge by seeking closer cooperation with China. By and large, Asian governments remain convinced that multiparty trade agreements yield the most economic and geopolitical benefits, and several mega trade agreements that do not include the United States are in development—notably the China-backed Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the Japan-E.U. Free Trade Agreement (FTA), and TPP11, an effort by the remaining TPP signatories to sustain the agreement in some form. Meanwhile, China has stepped up its game in the field of development finance with the successful rollout of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the launch of its One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative. In the arena of economic diplomacy, Asians appear to be moving on without the United States.
President Trump’s upcoming trip to Asia presents an opportunity for the administration to address this growing uncertainty and take steps to stabilize and enhance U.S. economic engagement with Asia. Here, we offer a series of recommendations on how this can be accomplished.
Articulate a Vision
The first priority should be to articulate the goals that will guide U.S. engagement. All countries in the region are trying to understand the changing parameters of U.S. foreign economic policy under this administration. Reducing their doubts and uncertainty will increase the chances we can pursue concrete initiatives that will create reciprocal benefits. In keeping with this approach, the administration should foster win-win economic relations with countries in the region, and prevent U.S. marginalization from the evolving regional economic architecture.
We should also compete with China, constructively. The goals here are manifold: to encourage domestic Chinese reforms, offer alternative economic integration options to Asian nations, and to disseminate high-standards of trade and investment liberalization that leverage the areas of comparative advantage for the American economy (agriculture, advanced manufacturing, e-commerce, services, and intellectual property to name a few).
Implement a Strategy
To achieve this vision, we recommend that the following action items be carried out on two levels: foreign economic policy and the related domestic political agenda.
Foreign Economic Policy
Complete ongoing trade renegotiations in a productive and timely way. Through the NAFTA redo and amendments to the South Korea-United States (KORUS) free trade agreement (FTA), the administration has an opportunity to modernize an older trade agreement and ensure effective implementation of commitments in a more recent one. Successful completion of these renegotiations will clarify to our prospective partners what has changed, or not, under an America First trade policy; it will also inform their decisions on the merits about whether to negotiate bilaterally with the United States. The road to a credible trade strategy for Asia starts with the survival of NAFTA.
The road to a credible trade strategy for Asia starts with the survival of NAFTA.
Relaunch BIT negotiations with China. The U.S. and China have gotten close to agreement on the language of a bilateral investment treaty (BIT), but important negotiations remain on the details of the list of exempted ... By Mireya Solís, David Dollar, Jonathan Stromseth
In the aftermath of U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement, the U.S. strategy for economic engagement with Asia faces serious obstacles. American credibility is ... https://www.brookings.edu/experts/steven-heydemann/Steven Heydemannhttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/460519214/0/brookingsrss/topics/bahrain~Steven-Heydemann/
Tue, 28 Jun 2016 15:41:25 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/experts/steven-heydemann/

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By admin

Steven Heydemann is a nonresident senior fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy and the Janet Wright Ketcham ’53 Chair of Middle East Studies at Smith College. From 2007 to 2015, he held a number of leadership positions at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) in Washington, D.C., including vice president of applied research on conflict and senior advisor for the Middle East. Prior to joining USIP, he was director of the Center for Democracy and Civil Society at Georgetown University and associate professor in the Department of Government. From 1997 to 2001, he was an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at Columbia University. Earlier, from 1990 to 1997, he directed the Program on International Peace and Security and the Program on the Near and Middle East at the Social Science Research Council in New York.

During the period from 2011 to 2015, Heydemann directed U.S. Institute of Peace Syria-related activities, including The Day After project (TDA), in which USIP, in partnership with the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Berlin, facilitated a transition planning process for Syria with the Syrian opposition. The TDA project brought together some 60 leading Syrian opposition figures for a six-month series of meetings facilitated by subject-matter experts in the areas of political transition, constitutional reform, election systems reform, post-conflict economic development, transitional justice, and rule of law. In monthly meetings, the participants developed principles and strategies to guide a transition process in Syria. The resulting document, “The Day After: Supporting a Democratic Transition in Syria,” was widely used during the early phases of the Syrian conflict, was endorsed by numerous Syrian opposition groups, as well as the European Parliament. Following the completion of the planning phase of the TDA project, Heydemann provided technical expertise in support of the creation of a Syrian-led NGO called The Day After Association, based in Istanbul. He remains an advisor to the board of the NGO.

In addition, Heydemann consults widely with the U.S. and European governments on issues relating to Syria policy and the status of the Syrian conflict. He writes regularly on Syria for major media outlets, and has appeared as a Syria expert on leading television networks, including the BBC, Al Arabiya, Al Jazeera, and PBS.

In his academic capacity, Heydemann is a political scientist who specializes in the comparative politics and the political economy of the Middle East, with a particular focus on Syria. His interests include authoritarian governance, economic development, social policy, political and economic reform, and civil society. Among his many publications are: “Authoritarian Learning and Counterrevolution,” in “The Arab Uprisings Explained: New Contentious Politics in the Middle East,” ed. Marc Lynch (Columbia University Press, 2014, with Reinoud Leenders); “Middle East Authoritarianisms: Governance, Contestation, and Regime Resilience in Syria and Iran” (Stanford University Press, 2013, co-edited with Reinoud Leenders); “Tracking the Arab Spring: Syria and Arab Authoritarianism,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 24, No. 4 (October 2013); “Social Pacts and the Persistence of Authoritarianism in the Middle East,” in “Debating Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability in Non-Democratic Regimes, ed. Oliver Schlumberger (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007); “Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World,” (Saban Center, Brookings Institution, November 2007); “Networks of Privilege in the Middle East: The Politics of Economic Reform Revisited,” edited volume (Palgrave Press, 2004); “War, Institutions and Social Change in the Middle East,” edited volume (University of California Press, 2000), and “Authoritarianism in Syria: Institutions and Social Conflict, 1946-1970” (Cornell University Press, 1999).

Affiliations:
Middle East Studies Association of North America
Project on Middle East Democracy
Project on Middle East Political Science
Mediterranean Politics
Middle East Journal
Middle East Law and Governance
International Forum, National Endowment for Democracy

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By admin
Steven Heydemann is a nonresident senior fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy and the Janet Wright Ketcham ’53 Chair of Middle East Studies at Smith College. From 2007 to 2015, he held a number of leadership positions at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) in Washington, D.C., including vice president of applied research on conflict and senior advisor for the Middle East. Prior to joining USIP, he was director of the Center for Democracy and Civil Society at Georgetown University and associate professor in the Department of Government. From 1997 to 2001, he was an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at Columbia University. Earlier, from 1990 to 1997, he directed the Program on International Peace and Security and the Program on the Near and Middle East at the Social Science Research Council in New York.
During the period from 2011 to 2015, Heydemann directed U.S. Institute of Peace Syria-related activities, including The Day After project (TDA), in which USIP, in partnership with the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Berlin, facilitated a transition planning process for Syria with the Syrian opposition. The TDA project brought together some 60 leading Syrian opposition figures for a six-month series of meetings facilitated by subject-matter experts in the areas of political transition, constitutional reform, election systems reform, post-conflict economic development, transitional justice, and rule of law. In monthly meetings, the participants developed principles and strategies to guide a transition process in Syria. The resulting document, “The Day After: Supporting a Democratic Transition in Syria,” was widely used during the early phases of the Syrian conflict, was endorsed by numerous Syrian opposition groups, as well as the European Parliament. Following the completion of the planning phase of the TDA project, Heydemann provided technical expertise in support of the creation of a Syrian-led NGO called The Day After Association, based in Istanbul. He remains an advisor to the board of the NGO.
In addition, Heydemann consults widely with the U.S. and European governments on issues relating to Syria policy and the status of the Syrian conflict. He writes regularly on Syria for major media outlets, and has appeared as a Syria expert on leading television networks, including the BBC, Al Arabiya, Al Jazeera, and PBS.
In his academic capacity, Heydemann is a political scientist who specializes in the comparative politics and the political economy of the Middle East, with a particular focus on Syria. His interests include authoritarian governance, economic development, social policy, political and economic reform, and civil society. Among his many publications are: “Authoritarian Learning and Counterrevolution,” in “The Arab Uprisings Explained: New Contentious Politics in the Middle East,” ed. Marc Lynch (Columbia University Press, 2014, with Reinoud Leenders); “Middle East Authoritarianisms: Governance, Contestation, and Regime Resilience in Syria and Iran” (Stanford University Press, 2013, co-edited with Reinoud Leenders); “Tracking the Arab Spring: Syria and Arab Authoritarianism,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 24, No. 4 (October 2013); “Social Pacts and the Persistence of Authoritarianism in the Middle East,” in “Debating Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability in Non-Democratic Regimes, ed. Oliver Schlumberger (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007); “Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World,” (Saban Center, Brookings Institution, November 2007); “Networks of Privilege in the Middle East: The Politics of Economic Reform Revisited,” edited volume (Palgrave Press, 2004); “War, Institutions and Social Change in the Middle East,” edited volume (University of California Press, 2000), and “Authoritarianism in Syria: Institutions ... By admin
Steven Heydemann is a nonresident senior fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy and the Janet Wright Ketcham ’53 Chair of Middle East Studies at Smith College. From 2007 to 2015, he held a number of leadership positions at the ... https://www.brookings.edu/book/the-arab-awakening/The Arab Awakeninghttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/171803302/0/brookingsrss/topics/bahrain~The-Arab-Awakening/
Mon, 30 Nov -0001 00:00:00 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/book/the-arab-awakening/

Even the most seasoned Middle East observers were taken aback by the events of early 2011. Protests born of oppression and socioeconomic frustration erupted throughout the streets; public unrest provoked violent police backlash; long-established dictatorships fell. How did this all happen? What might the future look like, and what are the likely ramifications for the United States and the rest of the world? In The Arab Awakening, experts from the Brookings Institution tackle such questions to make sense of this tumultuous region that remains at the heart of U.S. national interests.

The first portion of The Arab Awakening offers broad lessons by analyzing key aspects of the Mideast turmoil, such as public opinion trends within the “Arab Street”; the role of social media and technology; socioeconomic and demographic conditions; the influence of Islamists; and the impact of the new political order on the Arab-Israeli peace process.

The next section looks at the countries themselves, finding commonalties and grouping them according to the political evolutions that have (or have not) occurred in each country. The section offers insight into the current situation, and possible trajectory of each group of countries, followed by individual nation studies.

The Arab Awakening brings the full resources of Brookings to bear on making sense of what may turn out to be the most significant geopolitical movement of this generation. It is essential reading for anyone looking to understand these developments and their consequences.

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By Kenneth M. Pollack, Daniel L. Byman, Akram Al-Turk, Pavel Baev, Michael S. Doran, Khaled Elgindy, Stephen R. Grand, Shadi Hamid, Bruce D. Jones, Suzanne Maloney, Jonathan D. Pollack, Bruce Riedel, Ruth Hanau Santini, Salman Shaikh, Ibrahim Sharqieh, Ömer Taşpınar, Shibley Telham, Sarah E. Yerkes
Even the most seasoned Middle East observers were taken aback by the events of early 2011. Protests born of oppression and socioeconomic frustration erupted throughout the streets; public unrest provoked violent police backlash; long-established dictatorships fell. How did this all happen? What might the future look like, and what are the likely ramifications for the United States and the rest of the world? In The Arab Awakening, experts from the Brookings Institution tackle such questions to make sense of this tumultuous region that remains at the heart of U.S. national interests.
The first portion of The Arab Awakening offers broad lessons by analyzing key aspects of the Mideast turmoil, such as public opinion trends within the “Arab Street”; the role of social media and technology; socioeconomic and demographic conditions; the influence of Islamists; and the impact of the new political order on the Arab-Israeli peace process.
The next section looks at the countries themselves, finding commonalties and grouping them according to the political evolutions that have (or have not) occurred in each country. The section offers insight into the current situation, and possible trajectory of each group of countries, followed by individual nation studies.
The Arab Awakening brings the full resources of Brookings to bear on making sense of what may turn out to be the most significant geopolitical movement of this generation. It is essential reading for anyone looking to understand these developments and their consequences. By Kenneth M. Pollack, Daniel L. Byman, Akram Al-Turk, Pavel Baev, Michael S. Doran, Khaled Elgindy, Stephen R. Grand, Shadi Hamid, Bruce D. Jones, Suzanne Maloney, Jonathan D. Pollack, Bruce Riedel, Ruth Hanau Santini, Salman Shaikh, Ibrahim ... https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2015/05/11/saudi-arabia-to-washington-a-royal-snub/Saudi Arabia to Washington: A royal snubhttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/181032466/0/brookingsrss/topics/bahrain~Saudi-Arabia-to-Washington-A-royal-snub/
Mon, 30 Nov -0001 00:00:00 +0000http://www.brookings.edu?p=44020&preview_id=44020

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By Bruce Riedel

King Salman’s decision not to come to Washington this week for the Gulf Cooperative Council (GCC) summit is a very deliberate signal of his lack of confidence in American policy in the Middle East. The Saudis are unhappy with U.S. policy toward Iran, Syria, Iraq and Yemen. They don’t want a public argument with the Obama administration (unlike Israel) but they want a very public display of their dissatisfaction.

The timing of the decision, on the eve of the Camp David summit, is especially symbolic and intended to be embarrassing. Saudi sources are suggesting the summit was poorly prepared and lacked substantive deliverables. A reaffirmation of the Carter Doctrine of American support for the Gulf States is regarded as too little. More arms are too late. But the Saudis have known for weeks the constraints on Washington. They deliberately choose the last minute to cancel the king’s trip to send a potent signal.

At the heart of Saudi unhappiness is the Saudi fear that the nuclear deal between the P5 and Iran will lift sanctions and end Iran’s isolation. The Saudis, Emirates, and Bahrainis want Iran to be a permanent pariah under sanctions indefinitely. They are not worried about centrifuges; they are worried about subversion and intimidation. A rapprochement between the P5 and Iran leaves them dangerously exposed in their view.

The Saudis were also never comfortable with the format and venue of this summit. In Riyadh’s view the Gulf Cooperation Council is only theoretically a collection of equals— the kingdom is first among equals and should be recognized as such. Camp David is the scene of Anwar Sadat’s ‘betrayal’ of the Arab cause that led to the Saudi orchestrated ostracism of Egypt until Sadat’s assassination. It is not a symbol of peace to the Arab royals with long memories.

The Saudis also believe Washington is a halfhearted supporter of their war in Yemen. King Salman and his 29-year-old son, Defense Minister Prince Muhammad bin Salman, have invested all of their prestige and credibility in a decisive victory in Yemen. A truce is not what they want— the Houthis must be destroyed; Iran needs to be taught a lesson.

The Saudis smell blood in Syria, they hope Bashar Assad’s days are finally numbered. They want America to help finish the job, to help with the kill. Instead, they sense a deeply ambivalence in Washington. And in Iraq, the Saudis believe George Bush foolishly gave Baghdad to Tehran a decade ago, and Obama is not going to try hard to fight to get it back.

It is unlikely that Obama will change his policy on any of these issues. So from the Saudi perspective, it is better to show dissatisfaction than to be in the photo-op the United States wants to spin as a sign of unity and agreement.

To underscore the royal snub, Riyadh told its client in Manama to keep their king at home as well. Bahrain is now a wholly owned subsidiary of the kingdom.

Crown Prince Muhammad bin Nayef will put on a pleasant face for the cameras this week. There will be no Netanyahu-like scolding of the president. That would be very unlike Saudis— publicly, they say there are no disagreements on any issue. They send their messages by not coming to the table, not by unseemly food fights.

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UncategorizedBy Bruce Riedel
King Salman's decision not to come to Washington this week for the Gulf Cooperative Council (GCC) summit is a very deliberate signal of his lack of confidence in American policy in the Middle East. The Saudis are unhappy with U.S. policy toward Iran, Syria, Iraq and Yemen. They don't want a public argument with the Obama administration (unlike Israel) but they want a very public display of their dissatisfaction.
The timing of the decision, on the eve of the Camp David summit, is especially symbolic and intended to be embarrassing. Saudi sources are suggesting the summit was poorly prepared and lacked substantive deliverables. A reaffirmation of the Carter Doctrine of American support for the Gulf States is regarded as too little. More arms are too late. But the Saudis have known for weeks the constraints on Washington. They deliberately choose the last minute to cancel the king's trip to send a potent signal.
At the heart of Saudi unhappiness is the Saudi fear that the nuclear deal between the P5 and Iran will lift sanctions and end Iran's isolation. The Saudis, Emirates, and Bahrainis want Iran to be a permanent pariah under sanctions indefinitely. They are not worried about centrifuges; they are worried about subversion and intimidation. A rapprochement between the P5 and Iran leaves them dangerously exposed in their view.
The Saudis were also never comfortable with the format and venue of this summit. In Riyadh's view the Gulf Cooperation Council is only theoretically a collection of equals— the kingdom is first among equals and should be recognized as such. Camp David is the scene of Anwar Sadat's 'betrayal' of the Arab cause that led to the Saudi orchestrated ostracism of Egypt until Sadat's assassination. It is not a symbol of peace to the Arab royals with long memories.
The Saudis also believe Washington is a halfhearted supporter of their war in Yemen. King Salman and his 29-year-old son, Defense Minister Prince Muhammad bin Salman, have invested all of their prestige and credibility in a decisive victory in Yemen. A truce is not what they want— the Houthis must be destroyed; Iran needs to be taught a lesson.
The Saudis smell blood in Syria, they hope Bashar Assad's days are finally numbered. They want America to help finish the job, to help with the kill. Instead, they sense a deeply ambivalence in Washington. And in Iraq, the Saudis believe George Bush foolishly gave Baghdad to Tehran a decade ago, and Obama is not going to try hard to fight to get it back.
It is unlikely that Obama will change his policy on any of these issues. So from the Saudi perspective, it is better to show dissatisfaction than to be in the photo-op the United States wants to spin as a sign of unity and agreement.
To underscore the royal snub, Riyadh told its client in Manama to keep their king at home as well. Bahrain is now a wholly owned subsidiary of the kingdom.
Crown Prince Muhammad bin Nayef will put on a pleasant face for the cameras this week. There will be no Netanyahu-like scolding of the president. That would be very unlike Saudis— publicly, they say there are no disagreements on any issue. They send their messages by not coming to the table, not by unseemly food fights. By Bruce Riedel
King Salman's decision not to come to Washington this week for the Gulf Cooperative Council (GCC) summit is a very deliberate signal of his lack of confidence in American policy in the Middle East. The Saudis are unhappy with U.https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/an-interview-with-gregory-gause-gulf-security-and-the-us-gulf-relationship/An Interview with Gregory Gause: Gulf Security and the U.S.-Gulf Relationshiphttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/172266748/0/brookingsrss/topics/bahrain~An-Interview-with-Gregory-Gause-Gulf-Security-and-the-USGulf-Relationship/
Mon, 30 Nov -0001 00:00:00 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/research/an-interview-with-gregory-gause-gulf-security-and-the-us-gulf-relationship/

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By F. Gregory Gause

Ambassador Richard LeBaron, senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, held an online conversation with F. Gregory Gause, III, professor of political science at the University of Vermont and nonresident senior fellow with the Brookings Doha Center. They discussed the underlying motivations that drive Arab Gulf thinking when making decisions regarding regional and national security. The perceived threat from Iran continues to inform Gulf state demands of the relationship with the United States, and they clearly perceive the conflict in Syria as part of this regional competition. Gause concludes that the security relationship remains strong, despite a history of ups and downs in U.S.-Gulf ties.

The recent session of the the U.S.-Gulf Strategic Cooperation Forum produced little news about the relationship, as they were overshadowed by a Security Council resolution on Syria and the meeting with the Iranian Foreign Minister. Iran, however, plays an important role in shaping Gulf security perspectives that informs this relationship. Gause described it as one similar to the U.S.-NATO relationship during the Cold War. As relatively weak states militarily, Gulf states fear the United States could sacrifice GCC interests in the pursuit of either a stronger relationship with or increased hostility towards Iran.

Ambassador LeBaron noted that diminishing reliance on Gulf oil imports and the diminishing U.S. defense budget also sparks fears of U.S. disengagement with the region. But as Gause points out, the U.S.-Gulf relationship predates U.S. reliance on Gulf-sourced oil, partially driven by Cold War-era dynamics but also the strategic understanding that oil will remain a global commodity and is highly integrated into the global market. Effects of supply disruptions will quickly ripple through price mechanisms.

With regard to new defense assets in Gulf, advanced arms are not only a rational product of defense needs. With the increase of the price of oil, constraints of the nineties have allowed increased spending. Gause notes that the main threat to the Gulf that has emerged today remains internal instability exploited by external powers, not typical state-state conflict. New high-tech weaponry however, maintains a fundamental deterrence against this limited possibility.

Although the United States has largely ignored Iraq since its withdrawal, the importance of Iraq in Arab Gulf security has not diminished. Gause remarks how “Iraq is the hole in the Gulf doughnut.” Under the Ba’ath regime, Iraq balanced Iran throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Gulf states could once manage this balance but today Iran has enveloped Iraq’s space. Mostly out of fear, the Gulf unimaginatively exaggerates the Iran’s attempts to extend influence into the Gulf states. Nonetheless, the belief that the enemy is knocking at the door informs policies (such as those made in Bahrain) to counter a Shiite incursion.The primary fear is that, as Iraqi politics deteriorates, a creeping return to civil war will open the Iraq theater to regional powers trying to widen their influence, potentially threatening U.S. allies and regional stability.

The United States and the Gulf never shared a relationship based on a broad common agenda, making a truly coordinated policy response to regional issues such as the turmoil in Egypt and Syria extremely difficult. The relationship’s bedrock remains the bilateral security relationship. Despite the divergence of policy priorities between them, Gause characterized the relationship between the U.S. and its Gulf partners as a “Catholic Marriage”—one in which divorce is not possible, and where no other substitutes, such as China, could replace the U.S. role. The primary U.S. imperative in the region absent a major geostrategic shift—maintaining a balance such that no one country dominates the Gulf—will limit policy options going forward. The monarchies of the region are likely to remain intact, but Gause noted that the situation in Bahrain dictates that the U.S. consider the safety of its forces stationed there and consider its options.

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By F. Gregory Gause
Ambassador Richard LeBaron, senior fellow with the Atlantic Council's Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, held an online conversation with F. Gregory Gause, III, professor of political science at the University of Vermont and nonresident senior fellow with the Brookings Doha Center. They discussed the underlying motivations that drive Arab Gulf thinking when making decisions regarding regional and national security. The perceived threat from Iran continues to inform Gulf state demands of the relationship with the United States, and they clearly perceive the conflict in Syria as part of this regional competition. Gause concludes that the security relationship remains strong, despite a history of ups and downs in U.S.-Gulf ties.
The recent session of the the U.S.-Gulf Strategic Cooperation Forum produced little news about the relationship, as they were overshadowed by a Security Council resolution on Syria and the meeting with the Iranian Foreign Minister. Iran, however, plays an important role in shaping Gulf security perspectives that informs this relationship. Gause described it as one similar to the U.S.-NATO relationship during the Cold War. As relatively weak states militarily, Gulf states fear the United States could sacrifice GCC interests in the pursuit of either a stronger relationship with or increased hostility towards Iran.
Ambassador LeBaron noted that diminishing reliance on Gulf oil imports and the diminishing U.S. defense budget also sparks fears of U.S. disengagement with the region. But as Gause points out, the U.S.-Gulf relationship predates U.S. reliance on Gulf-sourced oil, partially driven by Cold War-era dynamics but also the strategic understanding that oil will remain a global commodity and is highly integrated into the global market. Effects of supply disruptions will quickly ripple through price mechanisms.
With regard to new defense assets in Gulf, advanced arms are not only a rational product of defense needs. With the increase of the price of oil, constraints of the nineties have allowed increased spending. Gause notes that the main threat to the Gulf that has emerged today remains internal instability exploited by external powers, not typical state-state conflict. New high-tech weaponry however, maintains a fundamental deterrence against this limited possibility.
Although the United States has largely ignored Iraq since its withdrawal, the importance of Iraq in Arab Gulf security has not diminished. Gause remarks how “Iraq is the hole in the Gulf doughnut.” Under the Ba'ath regime, Iraq balanced Iran throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Gulf states could once manage this balance but today Iran has enveloped Iraq’s space. Mostly out of fear, the Gulf unimaginatively exaggerates the Iran’s attempts to extend influence into the Gulf states. Nonetheless, the belief that the enemy is knocking at the door informs policies (such as those made in Bahrain) to counter a Shiite incursion.The primary fear is that, as Iraqi politics deteriorates, a creeping return to civil war will open the Iraq theater to regional powers trying to widen their influence, potentially threatening U.S. allies and regional stability.
The United States and the Gulf never shared a relationship based on a broad common agenda, making a truly coordinated policy response to regional issues such as the turmoil in Egypt and Syria extremely difficult. The relationship’s bedrock remains the bilateral security relationship. Despite the divergence of policy priorities between them, Gause characterized the relationship between the U.S. and its Gulf partners as a “Catholic Marriage”—one in which divorce is not possible, and where no other substitutes, such as China, could replace the U.S. role. The primary U.S. imperative in the region absent a major geostrategic shift—maintaining a balance such that no one country dominates the ... By F. Gregory Gause
Ambassador Richard LeBaron, senior fellow with the Atlantic Council's Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, held an online conversation with F. Gregory Gause, III, professor of political science at the University of ... https://www.brookings.edu/ar/research/%d9%85%d9%84%d9%88%d9%83%d9%8c-%d9%84%d8%ac%d9%85%d9%8a%d8%b9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%81%d8%b5%d9%88%d9%84-%d9%83%d9%8a%d9%81-%d8%a7%d8%ac%d8%aa%d8%a7%d8%b2%d8%aa-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a3%d9%86%d8%b8%d9%85%d8%a9/ملوكٌ لجميع الفصول: كيف اجتازت الأنظمة الملكية في الشرق الأوسط عاصفة الربيع العربيhttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/561851958/0/brookingsrss/topics/bahrain~%d9%85%d9%84%d9%88%d9%83%d9%8c-%d9%84%d8%ac%d9%85%d9%8a%d8%b9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%81%d8%b5%d9%88%d9%84-%d9%83%d9%8a%d9%81-%d8%a7%d8%ac%d8%aa%d8%a7%d8%b2%d8%aa/
Tue, 24 Sep 2013 04:00:00 +0000http://www.brookings.edu?p=77433&post_type=research&preview_id=77433

No Arab monarchy has fallen during the Arab uprisings, and only one – Bahrain – has had a regime-shaking crisis. These regimes have been written off for decades as anachronisms. How did they weather the region’s political storm better than their republican neighbors?

In this Analysis Paper from the Brookings Doha Center, F. Gregory Gause, III lays out the strategies that the Arab monarchies have utilized to stay in power.

The democratic wave that has swept the Arab world has put new pressure on the Gulf monarchies to pursue reform. Still, Gause writes these regimes’ hydrocarbon wealth and coalitions of domestic and international allies – their basic sources of strength – remain intact. Contrary to predictions of the monarchies’ imminent demise, then, Gause argues that these rulers are here to stay. He provides a detailed look at these regimes’ responses to the Arab Spring, including their political reforms – and whether it is realistic to push them any further.

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By F. Gregory Gause
No Arab monarchy has fallen during the Arab uprisings, and only one – Bahrain – has had a regime-shaking crisis. These regimes have been written off for decades as anachronisms. How did they weather the region’s political storm better than their republican neighbors?
In this Analysis Paper from the Brookings Doha Center, F. Gregory Gause, III lays out the strategies that the Arab monarchies have utilized to stay in power.
The democratic wave that has swept the Arab world has put new pressure on the Gulf monarchies to pursue reform. Still, Gause writes these regimes’ hydrocarbon wealth and coalitions of domestic and international allies – their basic sources of strength – remain intact. Contrary to predictions of the monarchies’ imminent demise, then, Gause argues that these rulers are here to stay. He provides a detailed look at these regimes’ responses to the Arab Spring, including their political reforms – and whether it is realistic to push them any further.By F. Gregory Gause
No Arab monarchy has fallen during the Arab uprisings, and only one – Bahrain – has had a regime-shaking crisis. These regimes have been written off for decades as anachronisms. How did they weather the ... https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2013/06/25/bridging-the-gulf-iran-and-a-changing-gcc/Bridging The Gulf? Iran And A Changing GCChttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/181032470/0/brookingsrss/topics/bahrain~Bridging-The-Gulf-Iran-And-A-Changing-GCC/
Mon, 30 Nov -0001 00:00:00 +0000http://www.brookings.edu?p=42961&preview_id=42961

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By Suzanne Maloney

Over recent weeks, Iran-watchers have been fixated – justifiably – on the domestic politics of the Islamic Republic, and their implications for the singular issue that has dominated Iran’s place in the world, the standoff with the international community over its nuclear program. And yet no one who is interested in Iran and the challenges its policies pose to international security can afford to overlook the regional context in which Iran’s presidential transition will unfold— a brutal civil war in Syria, in which Tehran is playing an increasingly central role, the often rocky and even violent path from autocracy to post-Arab Spring leadership in North Africa, and the shifts underway in the long stable Arab countries of the Persian Gulf.

Here at Iran @ Saban, Brookings scholars have offered thoughts on the role of Iran in U.S. policy toward Syria, and we expect to be returning to that issue again in the next few days. And this blog is a small part of a scholarly community that includes a host of highly-regarded experts weighing on issues across the region, including on Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Turkey and the broader Middle East and Islamic world. For today, however, it is fitting to spend a few moments considering recent events in the Gulf states and future propositions for U.S. policy toward the region.

Today, the Emir of Qatar, HRH Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani announced that he will cede power of the small, energy-rich state to fourth son, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani. The move has apparently been long in the works, and yet there is a real sense of uncertainty about what if any changes the 33-year-old new Emir will bring to Qatar’s activist agenda on regional security and global energy issues. Brookings has an office in Doha, and our director there, senior fellow Salman Shaikh, weighed in today with a commentary predicting continuity in Qatari foreign policy.

Shaikh’s analysis astutely notes that the fact:

“(t)hat the Royal Family has gone ahead with its plans in the midst of the Arab uprisings— and at such a critical time in the Syria crisis— is quintessentially Qatari. Big ideas and calculated risk-taking has got the country to where it is today.”

Also quintessentially Qatari has been the ability to navigate the American-Iranian fault line with unparalleled success. Doha plays a valuable role in American forward strategy in the Gulf, hosting the regional headquarters of U.S. Central Command at Al Udeid Air Base, and has lured immense sums of U.S. investment. And yet Qatar has also managed a pragmatic relationship with Iran that largely avoids the ideological and territorial feuds that have sustained friction between Tehran and the other Gulf heavyweights, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

And yet Qatar’s succession takes place amidst brewing conflicts across the region. Doha and Tehran are each massively engaged in the fight for Syria, supporting opposing sides in the conflict. At the time same, as Tehran has seen its oil revenues drastically reduced by international sanctions, Iranian officials have intensified their periodic complaints about relative depletion rates from shared fields, including Qatar’s crown jewel, the North Field non-associated gas reservoir, which is a shared geological structure with Iran’s own South Pars reservoir.

To date, these frictions appear to be held in check by regular dialogue among the two governments, including a May visit to Tehran by Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani, the influential prime minister and foreign minister who is also rumored to be stepping down as part of the succession process. As they contend with their own leadership transition, Iranian officials initially appear to be playing their cards carefully toward Qatar, with a Foreign Ministry spokesman noting that “(w)e pursue the developments closely and wait to hear more details …Tranquility and stability in Qatar and other Persian Gulf littoral states is highly important to us.”

Meanwhile, elsewhere in the Gulf, the two-year-old uprising in Bahrain remains at a low simmer. Neither two years of protests and sporadically intense unrest by the Shi’a opposition, nor the concerted efforts of the minority Sunni government, with the aid of Saudi and Emirati forces, to conclusively end the uprising have prevailed. Iran looms large over the conflict within Bahrain, as a source of past terrorist activity and destabilization efforts, as the pretext for government crackdowns against the initially peaceful protests, as the rationale for Saudi determination to preclude any meaningful liberalization by the ruling Al Khalifa family, and as the wellspring of American ambivalence toward an authentic push for democratic reform in the region.

For Washington, of course, Bahrain has a special strategic importance, as the headquarters of the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet and a vital base in the Gulf, one that is essential for deterring Iran. And yet the conflict in Bahrain has received relatively less attention in the Washington policy community precisely because the conflict appears intractable and U.S. presence there is so indispensable to America’s regional interests and allies. For this reason, I am especially pleased to have an opportunity to share an important new paper published this week by Brookings’ Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, entitled “No ‘Plan B’: U.S. Strategic Access in the Middle East and the Question of Bahrain.” The paper, written by Richard McDaniel, a U.S. Navy Commander and Federal Executive Fellow at Brookings 21CSI, offers a thoughtful consideration of the issues at stake for the U.S. military, and an important set of recommendations for American contingency planning.

I strongly urge anyone who is interested in Gulf security and U.S. policy toward Iran to read McDaniel’s paper in full here, but I want to highlight several key findings here. The paper highlights the absence of planning for alternative basing options in the Gulf, which is surprising given the endurance of unrest in Bahrain. McDaniel argues that the assumption that somehow Washington and/or Riyadh will keep the situation in check in Bahrain disregards the limitations to our control, noting the precedents (including pre-revolutionary Iran) in which similar assumptions have been upended to disastrous results. He points to the possibility that Saudi Arabia itself could experience rising levels of internal instability as compounding the need for contingency planning, and sees the alternatives to significant reform within Bahrain as repression or revolution, neither of which will facilitate a stable U.S. presence in the long term.

McDaniel offers valuable perspective on the significance of the U.S. relationship with Bahrain and the utility of the base there, and concludes with recommendations for a “Plan B” that would ensure continuity of U.S. presence and alliances if access to the naval base in Bahrain is lost. The paper offers a judicious path forward that may enable Washington to avoid any repeat of its past missteps, including in Iran, while continuing to facilitate the robust Gulf presence needed to address the challenges of the present, especially from Iran. At a time when America’s regional allies, such as Qatar, are embracing change and a proactive vision of the future, how can Washington be doing anything less?

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UncategorizedBy Suzanne Maloney
Over recent weeks, Iran-watchers have been fixated – justifiably – on the domestic politics of the Islamic Republic, and their implications for the singular issue that has dominated Iran’s place in the world, the standoff with the international community over its nuclear program. And yet no one who is interested in Iran and the challenges its policies pose to international security can afford to overlook the regional context in which Iran’s presidential transition will unfold— a brutal civil war in Syria, in which Tehran is playing an increasingly central role, the often rocky and even violent path from autocracy to post-Arab Spring leadership in North Africa, and the shifts underway in the long stable Arab countries of the Persian Gulf.
Here at Iran @ Saban, Brookings scholars have offered thoughts on the role of Iran in U.S. policy toward Syria, and we expect to be returning to that issue again in the next few days. And this blog is a small part of a scholarly community that includes a host of highly-regarded experts weighing on issues across the region, including on Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Turkey and the broader Middle East and Islamic world. For today, however, it is fitting to spend a few moments considering recent events in the Gulf states and future propositions for U.S. policy toward the region.
Today, the Emir of Qatar, HRH Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani announced that he will cede power of the small, energy-rich state to fourth son, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani. The move has apparently been long in the works, and yet there is a real sense of uncertainty about what if any changes the 33-year-old new Emir will bring to Qatar’s activist agenda on regional security and global energy issues. Brookings has an office in Doha, and our director there, senior fellow Salman Shaikh, weighed in today with a commentary predicting continuity in Qatari foreign policy.
Shaikh's analysis astutely notes that the fact:
“(t)hat the Royal Family has gone ahead with its plans in the midst of the Arab uprisings— and at such a critical time in the Syria crisis— is quintessentially Qatari. Big ideas and calculated risk-taking has got the country to where it is today.”
Also quintessentially Qatari has been the ability to navigate the American-Iranian fault line with unparalleled success. Doha plays a valuable role in American forward strategy in the Gulf, hosting the regional headquarters of U.S. Central Command at Al Udeid Air Base, and has lured immense sums of U.S. investment. And yet Qatar has also managed a pragmatic relationship with Iran that largely avoids the ideological and territorial feuds that have sustained friction between Tehran and the other Gulf heavyweights, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
And yet Qatar’s succession takes place amidst brewing conflicts across the region. Doha and Tehran are each massively engaged in the fight for Syria, supporting opposing sides in the conflict. At the time same, as Tehran has seen its oil revenues drastically reduced by international sanctions, Iranian officials have intensified their periodic complaints about relative depletion rates from shared fields, including Qatar’s crown jewel, the North Field non-associated gas reservoir, which is a shared geological structure with Iran’s own South Pars reservoir.
To date, these frictions appear to be held in check by regular dialogue among the two governments, including a May visit to Tehran by Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani, the influential prime minister and foreign minister who is also rumored to be stepping down as part of the succession process. As they contend with their own leadership transition, Iranian officials initially appear to be playing their cards carefully toward Qatar, with a Foreign Ministry spokesman noting that “(w)e pursue the ... By Suzanne Maloney
Over recent weeks, Iran-watchers have been fixated – justifiably – on the domestic politics of the Islamic Republic, and their implications for the singular issue that has dominated Iran’