§ 3. Catalogue of motives corresponding to
that of Pleasures and Pains.

XIV. From the pleasures of the senses, considered in
the gross, results the motive which, in a neutral sense, maybe termed physical
desire: in a bad sense, it is termed sensuality. Name used in a good sense it
has none. Of this, nothing can be determined, till it be considered separately,
with reference to the several species of pleasures to which it corresponds.

XV. In particular, then, to the pleasures of the taste
or palate corresponds a motive, which in a neutral sense having received no
name that can serve to express it in all cases, can only be termed, by
circumlocution, the love of the pleasures of the palate. In particular cases it
is styled hunger: in others, thirst.[9] The
love of good cheer expresses this motive, but seems to go beyond: intimating,
that the pleasure is to be partaken of in company, and involving a kind of
sympathy. In a bad sense, it is styled in some cases greediness, voraciousness,
gluttony: in others, principally when applied to children, lickerishness. It
may in some cases also be represented by the word daintiness. Name used in a
good sense it has none. 1. A boy, who does not want for victuals, steals a cake
out of a pastry-cook's shop, and eats it. In this case his motive will be
universally deemed a bad one: and if it be asked what it is, it may be
answered, perhaps, lickerishness. 2. A boy buys a cake out of a pastry-cook's
shop, and eats it. In this case his motive can scarcely be looked upon as
either good or bad, unless his master should be out of humour with him; and
then perhaps he may call it lickerishness, as before. In both cases, however,
his motive is the same. It is neither more nor less than the motive
corresponding to the pleasures of the palate.[10]

XVI. To the pleasures of the sexual sense corresponds
the motive which, in a neutral sense, may be termed sexual desire. In a bad
sense, it is spoken of under the name of lasciviousness, and a variety of other
names of reprobation. Name used in a good sense it has none.[11]

1. A man ravishes a virgin. In this case the motive is, without scruple,
termed by the name of lust, lasciviousness, and so forth; and is universally
looked upon as a bad one. 2. The same man, at another time, exercises the
rights of marriage with his wife. In this case the motive is accounted,
perhaps, a good one, or at least indifferent: and here people would scruple to
call it by any of those names. In both cases, however, the motive may be
precisely the same. In both cases it may be neither more nor less than sexual
desire.

XVII. To the pleasures of curiosity corresponds the
motive known by the same name: and which may be otherwise called the love of
novelty, or the love of experiment; and, on particular occasions, sport, and
sometimes play.

1. A boy, in order to divert himself, reads an improving book: the motive is
accounted, perhaps, a good one: at any rate not a bad one. 2. He sets his top a
spinning: the motive is deemed, at any rate, not a bad one. 3. He sets loose a
mad ox among a crowd; his motive is now, perhaps, termed an abominable one. Yet
in all three cases the motive may be the very same: it may be neither more nor
less than curiosity.

XVIII. As to the other pleasures of sense they are of
too little consequence to have given any separate denominations to the
corresponding motives.

XIX. To the pleasures of wealth corresponds the sort of
motive which, in a neutral sense, may be termed pecuniary interest: in a bad
sense, it is termed, in some cases, avarice, covetousness, rapacity, or lucre:
in other cases, niggardliness: in a good sense, but only in particular cases,
economy and frugality; and in some cases the word industry may be applied to
it: in a sense nearly indifferent, but rather bad than otherwise, it is styled,
though only in particular cases, parsimony.

1. For money you gratify a man's hatred, by putting his adversary to death.
2. For money you plough his field for him.— In the first case your motive
is termed lucre, and is accounted corrupt and abominable: and in the second,
for want of a proper appellation, it is styled industry; and is looked upon as
innocent at least, if not meritorious. Yet the motive is in both cases
precisely the same: it is neither more nor less than pecuniary interest.

XX. The pleasures of skill are neither distinct enough,
nor of consequence enough, to have given any name to the corresponding motive.

XXI. To the pleasures of amity corresponds a motive
which, in a neutral sense, may be termed the desire of ingratiating one's self.
In a bad sense it is in certain cases styled servility: in a good sense it has
no name that is peculiar to it: in the cases in which it has been looked on
with a favourable eye, it has seldom been distinguished from the motive of
sympathy or benevolence, with which, in such cases, it is commonly associated.

1. To acquire the affections of a woman before marriage, to preserve them
afterwards, you do every thing, that is consistent with other duties, to make
her happy: in this case your motive is looked upon as laudable, though there is
no name for it. 2. For the same purpose, you poison a woman with whom she is at
enmity: in this case your motive is looked upon as abominable, though still
there is no name for it. 3. To acquire or preserve the favour of a man who is
richer or more powerful than yourself, you make yourself subservient to his
pleasures. Let them even be lawful pleasures, if people choose to attribute
your behaviour to this motive, you will not get them to find any other name for
it than servility. Yet in all three cases the motive is the same: it is neither
more nor less than the desire of ingratiating yourself.

XXII. To the pleasures of the moral sanction, or, as
they may otherwise be called, the pleasures of a good name, corresponds a
motive which, in a neutral sense, has scarcely yet obtained any adequate
appellative. It may be styled, the love of reputation. It is nearly related to
the motive last preceding: being neither more nor less than the desire of
ingratiating one's self with, or, as in this case we should rather say, of
recommending one's self to, the world at large. In a good sense, it is termed
honour, or the sense of honour: or rather, the word honour is introduced
somehow or other upon the occasion of its being brought to view: for in
strictness the word honour is put rather to signify that imaginary object,
which a man is spoken of as possessing upon the occasion of his obtaining a
conspicuous share of the pleasures that are in question. In particular cases,
it is styled the love of glory. In a bad sense, it is styled, in some cases,
false honour; in others, pride; in others, vanity. In a sense not decidedly
bad, but rather bad than otherwise, ambition. In an indifferent sense, in some
cases, the love of fame: in others, the sense of shame. And, as the pleasures
belonging to the moral sanction run undistinguishably into the pains derived
from the same source,[12] it may also be
styled, in some cases, the fear of dishonour, the fear of disgrace, the fear of
infamy, the fear of ignominy, or the fear of shame.

1. You have received an affront from a man: according to the custom of the
country, in order, on the one hand, to save yourself from the shame of being
thought to bear it patiently;[13] on the other
hand, to obtain the reputation of courage; you challenge him to fight with
mortal weapons. In this case your motive will by some people be accounted
laudable, and styled honour: by others it will be accounted blameable, and
these, if they call it honour, will prefix an epithet of improbation to it, and
call it false honour. 2. In order to obtain a post of rank and dignity, and
thereby to increase the respects paid you by the public, you bribe the electors
who are to confer it, or the judge before whom the title to it is in dispute.
In this case your motive is commonly accounted corrupt and abominable, and is
styled, perhaps, by some such name as dishonest or corrupt ambition, as there
is no single name for it. 3. In order to obtain the good-will of the public,
you bestow a large sum in works of private charity or public utility. In this
case people will be apt not to agree about your motive. Your enemies will put a
bad colour upon it, and call it ostentation: your friends, to save you from
this reproach, will choose to impute your conduct not to this motive but to
some other: such as that of charity (the denomination in this case given to
private sympathy) or that of public spirit. 4. A king, for the sake of gaining
the admiration annexed to the name of conqueror (we will suppose power and
resentment out of the question) engages his kingdom in a bloody war. His
motive, by the multitude (whose sympathy for millions is easily overborne by
the pleasure which their imagination finds in gaping at any novelty they
observe in the conduct of a single person) is deemed an admirable one. Men of
feeling and reflection, who disapprove of the dominion exercised by this motive
on this occasion, without always perceiving that it is the same motive which in
other instances meets with their approbation, deem it an abominable one; and
because the multitude, who are the manufacturers of language, have not given
them a simple name to call it by, they will call it by some such compound name
as the love of false glory or false ambition. Yet in all four cases the motive
is the same: it is neither more nor less than the love of reputation.

XXIII. To the pleasures of power corresponds the motive
which, in a neutral sense, may be termed the love of power. People, who are out
of humour with it sometimes, call it the lust of power. In a good sense, it is
scarcely provided with a name. In certain cases this motive, as well as the
love of reputation, are confounded under the same name, ambition. This is not
to be wondered at, considering the intimate connexion there is between the two
motives in many cases: since it commonly happens, that the same object which
affords the one sort of pleasure, affords the other sort at the same time: for
instance, offices, which are at once posts of honour and places of trust: and
since at any rate reputation is the road to power.

1. If, in order to gain a place in administration, you poison the man who
occupies it. 2. If, in the same view, you propose a salutary plan for the
advancement of the public welfare; your motive is in both cases the same. Yet
in the first case it is accounted criminal and abominable: in the second case
allowable, and even laudable.

XXIV. To the pleasures as well as to the pains of the
religious sanction corresponds a motive which has, strictly speaking, no
perfectly neutral name applicable to all cases, unless the word religion be
admitted in this character: though the word religion, strictly speaking, seems
to mean not so much the motive itself, as a kind of fictitious personage, by
whom the motive is supposed to be created, or an assemblage of acts, supposed
to be dictated by that personage: nor does it seem to be completely settled
into a neutral sense. In the same sense it is also, in some cases, styled
religious zeal: in other cases, the fear of God. The love of God, though
commonly contrasted with the fear of God, does not come strictly under this
head. It coincides properly with a motive of a different denomination; viz. a
kind of sympathy or good-will, which has the Deity for its object. In a good
sense, it is styled devotion, piety, and pious zeal. In a bad sense, it is
styled, in some cases, superstition, or superstitious zeal: in other cases,
fanaticism, or fanatic zeal: in a sense not decidedly bad, because not
appropriated to this motive, enthusiasm, or enthusiastic zeal.

1. In order to obtain the favour of the Supreme Being, a man assassinates
his lawful sovereign. In this case the motive is now almost universally looked
upon as abominable, and is termed fanaticism: formerly it was by great numbers
accounted laudable, and was by them called pious zeal. 2. In the same view, a
man lashes himself with thongs. In this case, in yonder house, the motive is
accounted laudable, and is called pious zeal: in the next house it is deemed
contemptible, and called superstition. 3. In the same view, a man eats a piece
of bread (or at least what to external appearance is a piece of bread) with
certain ceremonies. In this case, in yonder house, his motive is looked upon as
laudable, and is styled piety and devotion: in the next house it is deemed
abominable, and styled superstition, as before: perhaps even it is absurdly
styled impiety. 4. In the same view, a man holds a cow by the tail while he is
dying. On the Thames the motive would in this case be deemed contemptible, and
called superstition. On the Ganges it is deemed meritorious, and called piety.
5. In the same view, a man bestows a large sum in works of charity, or public
utility. In this case the motive is styled laudable, by those at least to whom
the works in question appear to come under this description: and by these at
least it would be styled piety. Yet in all these cases the motive is precisely
the same: it is neither more nor less than the motive belonging to the
religious sanction.[14]

XXV. To the pleasures of sympathy corresponds the
motive which, in a neutral sense, is termed good-will. The word sympathy may
also be used on this occasion: though the sense of it seems to be rather more
extensive. In a good sense, it is styled benevolence: and in certain cases,
philanthropy; and, in a figurative way, brotherly love; in others, humanity; in
others, charity; in others, pity and compassion; in others, mercy; in others,
gratitude; in others, tenderness; in others, patriotism; in others, public
spirit. Love is also employed in this as in so many other senses. In a bad
sense, it has no name applicable to it in all cases: in particular cases it is
styled partiality. The word zeal, with certain epithets prefixed to it, might
also be employed sometimes on this occasion, though the sense of it be more
extensive; applying sometimes to ill as well as to good will. It is thus we
speak of party zeal, national zeal, and public zeal. The word attachment is
also used with the like epithets: we also say family-attachment. The French
expression, esprit de corps, for which as yet there seems to be scarcely
any name in English, might be rendered, in some cases, though rather
inadequately, by the terms corporation spirit, corporation attachment, or
corporation zeal.

1. A man who has set a town on fire is apprehended and committed: out of
regard or compassion for him, you help him to break prison. In this case the
generality of people will probably scarcely know whether to condemn your motive
or to applaud it: those who condemn your conduct, will be disposed rather to
impute it to some other motive: if they style it benevolence or compassion,
they will be for prefixing an epithet, and calling it false benevolence or
false compassion.[15] 2. The man is taken
again, and is put upon his trial: to save him you swear falsely in his favour.
People, who would not call your motive a bad one before, will perhaps call it
so now. 3. A man is at law with you about an estate: he has no right to it: the
judge knows this, yet, having an esteem or affection for your adversary,
adjudges it to him. In this case the motive is by every body deemed abominable,
and is termed injustice and partiality. 4. You detect a statesman in receiving
bribes: out of regard to the public interest, you give information of it, and
prosecute him. In this case, by all who acknowledge your conduct to have
originated from this motive, your motive will be deemed a laudable one, and
styled public spirit. But his friends and adherents will not choose to account
for your conduct in any such manner: they will rather attribute it to party
enmity. 5. You find a man on the point of starving: you relieve him; and save
his life. In this case your motive will by every body be accounted laudable,
and it will be termed compassion, pity, charity, benevolence. Yet in all these
cases the motive is the same: it is neither more nor less than the motive of
good-will.

XXVI. To the pleasures of malevolence, or antipathy,
corresponds the motive which, in a neutral sense, is termed antipathy or
displeasure: and, in particular cases, dislike, aversion, abhorrence, and
indignation: in a neutral sense, or perhaps a sense leaning a little to the bad
side, ill-will: and, in particular cases, anger, wrath, and enmity. In a bad
sense it is styled, in different cases, wrath, spleen, ill-humour, hatred,
malice, rancour, rage, fury, cruelty, tyranny, envy, jealousy, revenge,
misanthropy, and by other names, which it is hardly worth while to endeavour to
collect.[16] Like good-will, it is used with
epithets expressive of the persons who are the objects of the affection. Hence
we hear of party enmity, party rage, and so forth. In a good sense there seems
to be no single name for it. In compound expressions it may be spoken of in
such a sense, by epithets, such as just and laudable, prefixed to
words that are used in a neutral or nearly neutral sense.

1. You rob a man: he prosecutes you, and gets you punished: out of
resentment you set upon him, and hang him with your own hands. In this case
your motive will universally be deemed detestable, and will be called malice,
cruelty, revenge, and so forth. 2. A man has stolen a little money from you:
out of resentment you prosecute him, and get him hanged by course of law. In
this case people will probably be a little divided in their opinions about your
motive: your friends will deem it a laudable one, and call it a just or
laudable resentment: your enemies will perhaps be disposed to deem it
blameable, and call it cruelty, malice, revenge, and so forth: to obviate
which, your friends will try perhaps to change the motive, and call it public
spirit. 3. A man has murdered your father: out of resentment you prosecute him,
and get him put to death in course of law. In this case your motive will be
universally deemed a laudable one, and styled, as before, a just or laudable
resentment: and your friends, in order to bring forward the more amiable
principle from which the malevolent one, which was your immediate motive, took
its rise, will be for keeping the latter out of sight, speaking of the former
only, under some such name as filial piety. Yet in all these cases the motive
is the same: it is neither more nor less than the motive of ill-will.

XXVII. To the several sorts of pains, or at least to
all such of them as are conceived to subsist in an intense degree, and to
death, which, as far as we can perceive, is the termination of all the
pleasures, as well as all the pains we are acquainted with, corresponds the
motive, which in a neutral sense is styled, in general, self-preservation: the
desire of preserving one's self from the pain or evil in question. Now in many
instances the desire of pleasure, and the sense of pain, run into one another
undistinguishably. Self-preservation, therefore, where the degree of the pain
which it corresponds to is but slight will scarcely be distinguishable, by any
precise line, from the motives corresponding to the several sorts of pleasures.
Thus in the case of the pains of hunger and thirst: physical want will in many
cases be scarcely distinguishable from physical desire. In some cases it is
styled, still in a neutral sense, self-defence. Between the pleasures and the
pains of the moral and religious sanctions, and consequently of the motives
that correspond to them, as likewise between the pleasures of amity, and the
pains of enmity, this want of boundaries has already been taken notice
of.[17] The case is the same between the
pleasures of wealth, and the pains of privation corresponding to those
pleasures. There are many cases, therefore, in which it will be difficult to
distinguish the motive of self-preservation from pecuniary interest, from the
desire of ingratiating one's self, from the love of reputation, and from
religious hope: in which cases, those more specific and explicit names will
naturally be preferred to this general and inexplicit one. There are also a
multitude of compound names, which either are already in use, or might be
devised, to distinguish the specific branches of the motive of
self-preservation from those several motives of a pleasurable origin: such as
the fear of poverty, the fear of losing such or such a man's regard, the fear
of shame, and the fear of God. Moreover, to the evil of death corresponds, in a
neutral sense, the love of life; in a bad sense, cowardice: which corresponds
also to the pains of the senses, at least when considered as subsisting in an
acute degree. There seems to be no name for the love of life that has a good
sense; unless it be the vague and general name of prudence.

1. To save yourself from being hanged, pilloried, imprisoned, or fined, you
poison the only person who can give evidence against you. In this case your
motive will universally be styled abominable: but as the term self-preservation
has no bad sense, people will not care to make this use of it: they will be apt
rather to change the motive, and call it malice. 2. A woman, having been just
delivered of an illegitimate child, in order to save herself from shame,
destroys the child, or abandons it. In this case, also, people will call the
motive a bad one, and, not caring to speak of it under a neutral name, they
will be apt to change the motive, and call it by some such name as cruelty. 3.
To save the expense of a halfpenny, you suffer a man, whom you could preserve
at that expense, to perish with want, before your eyes. In this case your
motive will be universally deemed an abominable one; and, to avoid calling it
by so indulgent a name as self-preservation, people will be apt to call it
avarice and niggardliness, with which indeed in this case it indistinguishably
coincides: for the sake of finding a more reproachful appellation, they will be
apt likewise to change the motive, and term it cruelty. 4. To put an end to the
pain of hunger, you steal a loaf of bread. In this case your motive will
scarcely, perhaps, be deemed a very bad one; and, in order to express more
indulgence for it, people will be apt to find a stronger name for it than
self-preservation, terming it necessity. 5. To save yourself from
drowning, you beat off an innocent man who has got hold of the same plank. In
this case your motive will in general be deemed neither good nor bad, and it
will be termed self-preservation, or necessity, or the love of life. 6. To save
your life from a gang of robbers, you kill them in the conflict. In this case
the motive may, perhaps, be deemed rather laudable than otherwise, and, besides
self-preservation, is styled also self-defence. 7. A soldier is sent out upon a
party against a weaker party of the enemy: before he gets up with them, to save
his life, he runs away. In this case the motive will universally be deemed a
contemptible one, and will be called cowardice. Yet in all these various cases,
the motive is still the same. It is neither more nor less than
self-preservation.

XXVIII. In particular, to the pains of exertion
corresponds the motive, which, in a neutral sense, may be termed the love of
ease, or by a longer circumlocution, the desire of avoiding trouble. In a bad
sense, it is termed indolence.[18] It seems to
have no name that carries with it a good sense.

1. To save the trouble of taking care of it, a parent leaves his child to
perish. In this case the motive will be deemed an abominable one, and, because
indolence will seem too mild a name for it, the motive will, perhaps, be
changed, and spoken of under some such term as cruelty. 2. To save yourself
from an illegal slavery, you make your escape. In this case the motive will be
deemed certainly not a bad one: and, because indolence, or even the love of
ease, will be thought too unfavourable a name for it, it will, perhaps, be
styled the love of liberty. 3. A mechanic, in order to save his labour, makes
an improvement in his machinery. In this case, people will look upon his motive
as a good one; and finding no name for it that carries a good sense, they will
be disposed to keep the motive out of sight: they will speak rather of his
ingenuity, than of the motive which was the means of his manifesting that
quality. Yet in all these cases the motive is the same: it is neither more nor
less than the love of ease.

XXIX. It appears then that there is no such thing as
any sort of motive which is a bead one in itself: nor, consequently, any such
thing as a sort of motive, which in itself is exclusively a good one. And as to
their effects, it appears too that these are sometimes bad, at other times
either indifferent or good: and this appears to be the case with every sort of
motive. If any sort of motive then is either good or bad on the score of its
effects, this is the case only on individual occasions, and with individual
motives; and this is the case with one sort of motive as well as with
another. If any sort of motive then can, in consideration of its effects, be
termed with any propriety a bad one, it can only be with reference to the
balance of all the effects it may have had of both kinds within a given period,
that is, of its most usual tendency.

XXX. What then? (it will be said) are not lust,
cruelty, avarice, bad motives? Is there so much as any one individual e
occasion, in which motives like these can be otherwise than bad? No, certainly:
and yet the proposition, that there is no one sort of motive but what
will on many occasions be a good one, is nevertheless true. The fact is, that
these are names which, if properly applied, are never applied but in the cases
where the motives they signify happen to be bad. The names of those motives,
considered apart from their effects, are sexual desire, displeasure, and
pecuniary interest. To sexual desire, when the effects of it are looked upon as
bad, is given the name of lust. Now lust is always a bad motive. Why? Because
if the case be such, that the effects of the motive are not bad, it does not
go, or at least ought not to go, by the name of lust. The case is, then, that
when I say, “Lust is a bad motive”, it is a proposition that merely
concerns the import of the word lust; and which would be false if transferred
to the other word used for the same motive, sexual desire. Hence we see the
emptiness of all those rhapsodies of common-place morality, which consist in
the taking of such names as lust, cruelty, and avarice, and branding them with
marks of reprobation: applied to the thing, they are false; applied to
the name, they are true indeed, but nugatory. Would you do a real
service to mankind, show them the cases in which sexual desire merits
the name of lust; displeasure, that of cruelty; and pecuniary interest, that of
avarice.

XXXI. If it were necessary to apply such denominations
as good, bad, and indifferent to motives, they might be classed in the
following manner, in consideration of the most frequent complexion of their
effects. In the class of good motives might begs placed the articles of, 1.
Good-will. 2. Love of reputation. 3. Desire of amity. And, 4. Religion. In the
class of bad motives, 5. Displeasure. In the class of neutral or indifferent
motives, 6. Physical desire. 7. Pecuniary interest. 8. Love of power. 9.
Self-preservation; as including the fear of the pains of the senses, the love
of ease, and the love of life.

XXXII. This method of arrangement, however, cannot but
be imperfect; and the nomenclature belonging to it is in danger of being
fallacious. For by what method of investigation can a man be assured, that with
regard to the motives ranked under the name of good, the good effects they have
had, from the beginning of the world, have, in each of the four species
comprised under this name, been superior to the bad? still more difficulty
would a man find in assuring himself, that with regard to those which are
ranked under the name of neutral or indifferent, the effects they have had have
exactly balanced each other, the value of the good being neither greater nor
less than that of the bad. It is to be considered, that the interests of the
person himself can no more be left out of the estimate, than those of the rest
of the community. For what would become of the species, if it were not for the
motives of hunger and thirst, sexual desire, the fear of pain, and the love of
life? Nor in the actual constitution of human nature is the motive of
displeasure less necessary, perhaps, than any of the others: although a system,
in which the business of life might be carried on without it, might possibly be
conceived. It seems, therefore, that they could scarcely, without great danger
of mistakes, be distinguished in this manner even with reference to each other.

XXXIII. The only way, it should seem, in which a motive
can with safety and propriety be styled good or bad, is with reference to its
effects in each individual instance; and principally from the intention it
gives birth to: from which arise, as will be shown hereafter, the most material
part of its effects. A motive is good, when the intention it gives birth to is
a good one; bad, when the intention is a bad one: and an intention is good or
bad, according to the material consequences that are the objects of it. So far
is it from the goodness of the intention's being to be known only from the
species of the motive. But from one and the same motive, as we have seen, may
result intentions of every sort of complexion whatsoever. This circumstance,
therefore, can afford no clue for the arrangement of the several sorts of
motives.

XXXIV. A more commodious method, therefore, it should
seem, would be to distribute them according to the influence which they appear
to have on the interests of the other members of the community, laying those of
the party himself out of the question: to wit, according to the tendency which
they appear to have to unite, or disunite, his interests and theirs. On this
plan they may be distinguished into social, dissocial, and
self-regarding. In the social class may be reckoned, 1. Good-will. 2.
Love of reputation. 3. Desire of amity. 4. Religion. In the dissocial may be
placed, 5. Displeasure. In the self-regarding class, 6. Physical desire. 7.
Pecuniary interest. 8. Love of power. 9. Self-preservation; as including the
fear of the pains of the senses, the love of ease, and the love of life.

XXXV. With respect to the motives that have been termed
social, if any farther distinction should be of use, to that of good-will alone
may be applied the epithet of purely-social; while the love of
reputation, the desire of amity, and the motive of religion, may together be
comprised under the division of semi-social: the social tendency being
much more constant and unequivocal in the former than in any of the three
latter. Indeed these last, social as they may be termed, are self-regarding at
the same time.[19]

9. Hunger and thirst, considered in the light of
motives, import not so much the desire of a particular kind of pleasure, as the
desire of removing a positive kind of pain. They do not extend to the desire of
that kind of pleasure which depends on the choice of foods and liquors.

10. It will not be worth while, in every case, to give
an instance in which the action may be indifferent: if good as well as bad
actions may result from the same motive, it is easy to conceive, that also may
be indifferent.

11. Love indeed includes sometimes this idea: but then
it can never answer the purpose of exhibiting it separately: since there are
three motives, at least, that may all of them be included in it, besides this:
the love of beauty corresponding to the pleasures of the eye, and the motives
corresponding to those of amity and benevolence. We speak of the love of
children, of the love of parents, of the love of God. These pious uses protect
the appellation, and preserve it from the ignominy poured forth upon its
profane associates. Even sensual love would not answer the purpose; since that
would include the love of beauty.

13. A man's bearing an affront patiently, that is,
without taking this method of doing what is called wiping it off, is thought to
import one or other of two things: either that he does not possess that
sensibility to the pleasures and pains of the moral sanction, which, in order
to render himself a respectable member of society, a man ought to possess: or,
that he does not possess courage enough to stake his life for the chance of
gratifying that resentment which a proper sense of the value of those pleasures
and those pains it is thought would not fail to inspire. True it is, that there
are divers other motives, by any of which the same conduct might equally be
produced: the motives corresponding to the religious sanction, and the motives
that come under the head of benevolence. Piety towards God, the practice in
question being generally looked upon as repugnant to the dictates of the
religious sanction: sympathy for your antagonist himself, whose life would be
put to hazard at the same time with your own; sympathy for his connexions; the
persons who are dependent on him in the way of support, or connected with him
in the way of sympathy: sympathy for your own connexions: and even sympathy for
the public, in cases where the man is such that the public appears to have a
material interest in his life. But in comparison with the love of life, the
influence of the religious sanction is known to be in general but weak:
especially among people of those classes who are here in question: a sure proof
of which is the prevalence of this very custom. Where it is so strong as to
preponderate, it is so rare, that, perhaps, it gives a man a place in the
calendar: and, at any rate, exalts him to the rank of martyr. Moreover, the
instances in which either private benevolence or public spirit predominate over
the love of life, will also naturally be but rare: and, owing to the general
propensity to detraction, it will also be much rarer for them to be thought to
do so. Now, when three or more motives, any one of them capable of producing a
given mode of conduct, apply at once, that which appears to be the most
powerful, is that which will of course be deemed to have actually done the
most: and, as the bulk of mankind, on this as on other occasions, are disposed
to decide peremptorily upon superficial estimates, it will generally be looked
upon as having done the whole.

The consequence is, that when a man of a certain rank forbears to take this
chance of revenging an affront, his conduct will, by most people, be imputed to
the love of life: which, when it predominates over the love of reputation, is,
by a not unsalutary association of ideas, stigmatized with the reproachful name
of cowardice.

14. I am aware, or at least I hope, that people in
general, when they see the matter thus stated, will be ready to acknowledge,
that the motive in these cases, whatever be the tendency of the acts which it
produces, is not a bad one: but this will not render it the less true, that
hitherto, in popular discourse it has been common for men to speak of acts,
which they could not but acknowledge to have originated from this source, as
proceeding from a bad motive. The same observation will apply to many of the
other cases.

15. Among the Greeks, perhaps the motive, and the
conduct it gave birth to, would, in such a case, have been rather approved than
disapproved of. It seems to have been deemed an act of heroism on the part of
Hercules to have delivered his friend Theseus from hell: though divine justice
which held him there, should naturally have been regarded as being at least
upon a footing with human justice. But to divine justice, even when
acknowledged under that character, the respect paid at that time of day does
not seem to have been very profound, or well-settled: at present, the respect
paid to it is profound and settled enough, though the name of it is but too
often applied to dictates which could have had no other origin than the worst
sort of human caprice.

16. Here, as elsewhere, it may be observed, that the
same words which are mentioned as names of motives, are also many of them names
of passions, appetites, and affections: fictitious entities, which are framed
only by considering pleasures or pains in some particular point of view. Some
of them are also names of moral qualities. This branch of nomenclature is
remarkably entangled: to unravel it completely would take up a whole volume;
not a syllable of which would belong properly to the present design.

18. It may seem odd at first sight to speak of the love
of ease as giving to action: but exertion is as natural an effect of the love
of ease as inaction is, when a smaller degree of exertion promises to exempt a
man from a greater.

19. “Religion”, says the pious Addison,
somewhere in the Spectator, “is the highest species of self-love”.