In re Williams

Supreme Court of Georgia

March 20, 2017

IN THE MATTER OF SAMUEL WILLIAMS, JR.

PER
CURIAM.

This
disciplinary matter is before the Court on the report of a
special master recommending that we accept the petition for
voluntary discipline filed on October 3, 2016, prior to the
filing of a formal complaint, by respondent Samuel Williams,
Jr. (State Bar No. 764123), pursuant to Bar Rule 4-227 (b)
(2). In his petition, Williams admits that he violated Rule
8.4 (a) (2) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, see
Bar Rule 4-102 (d), when in April 2012 in an Alabama state
court, he pled guilty to selling unregistered securities and
was sentenced to three to five years on
probation.[1] Williams, who has been a member of the Bar
since 2003, admits that he was the escrow officer for a
client who offered a high-yield investment program and that,
although Williams did not promote the sale of securities and
was not otherwise involved in the underlying fraud scheme, he
was responsible for holding and disbursing the funds
associated with the program using his trust account. Williams
asserts that he filed a notice to withdraw upon learning of a
criminal investigation of the program, but admits that he
nonetheless subsequently accepted $380, 000 from an investor
and then disbursed those funds in February 2010, instead of
reporting the matter to the authorities and holding the money
in his trust account as he should have done.[2]

Williams
self-reported his conviction to the State Bar of Georgia on
June 5, 2012, but the Bar did not begin disciplinary
proceedings until May 16, 2016.[3]After the appointment of the
special master, Williams filed an initial petition for
voluntary discipline on July 15, 2016, acknowledging his
violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (2) and requesting discipline in
the range from a formal admonition to a public reprimand.
However, noting that Williams had been placed on probation
for three to five years and directed to pay $380, 000 in
restitution, the special master rejected that petition in a
October 3, 2016 order, accepting the Bar's argument that
a reprimand was not appropriate discipline and that, while a
suspension could be appropriate discipline, any suspension
should last at least as long as Williams was subject to the
criminal court's jurisdiction. On the same day that the
special master issued his order denying the initial petition,
Williams filed this petition, requesting discipline in the
form of a suspension for as long as he is on probation or
otherwise subject to the criminal court's jurisdiction.

In
mitigation, Williams explains that he was under considerable
mental and emotional stress because of the near-concurrent
bankruptcy of his law firm and diagnosis of his wife with
metastatic breast cancer in the fall of 2009; that he has no
prior disciplinary history or criminal record; that he served
honorably in the military for 20 years; that he self-reported
his conviction to the disciplinary authorities and has been
cooperative; that his failure to register the securities was
negligent and unintentional; that his failure to reject or
secure the $380, 000 was negligent and without a selfish
motive; that he is sincerely remorseful; that he has
attempted to improve his own understanding of the law and to
help others avoid the mistakes he made; and that he has
complied with all of the terms of his probation. Williams
also asserts that the nearly four-year delay between his
self-reporting of the violation and the petition for
appointment of a special master should be considered in
mitigation. Additionally, the Alabama prosecutor sent a
letter to the Bar saying that Williams was inexperienced,
distressed because of his wife's illness, and extremely
remorseful, and that the trial judge concluded that
Williams's involvement in the criminal scheme was
minimal.

In its
response, the State Bar pointed out that, contrary to
Williams's assertion of an unintentional mistake, his
guilty plea required that he knowingly dealt in unregistered
securities[4] and that there was no assertion on
Williams's part that he has paid the $380, 000
restitution amount or that he would do so by the likely end
of his time on probation.[5] On October 30, 2016, the special master
held a hearing at which Williams and his wife appeared and
discussed his background, his conduct in the underlying
matter, and his remaining obligations.

On
January 9, 2017, the special master issued his report. The
special master considered the mitigating factors offered by
Williams and noted that although Williams was entitled to
have the delay in the disciplinary proceedings considered as
a mitigating factor, he had benefitted from the delay by not
being suspended since his 2012 conviction. The special master
recommended that this Court accept Williams's petition
for a suspension concurrent with his probation.

Based
upon our review of the existing record, we do not believe
that the proposed suspension is sufficient discipline.
Williams has represented that his probation will end in April
2017, meaning that he would be suspended from the practice of
law for only about a month from now. Although the Alabama
prosecutor indicated in his letter that Williams's
involvement in the criminal scheme was minimal, the
prosecutor also explained that Williams, "while not
initially aware of [the] fraudulent activity, . . . should
have abandoned his role earlier than he did after receiving
complaints from the victims." Moreover, Williams's
criminal conduct directly involved his law practice. In fact,
the prosecutor explained that by using his trust account to
hold and disburse funds as part of the fraudulent scheme,
Williams received $6, 066.26 in legal fees. In the cases
where, due to the presence of significant mitigating factors,
this Court has not simply disbarred lawyers for criminal
convictions related to their practice of law, we have imposed
a suspension considerably longer than one month. See, e.g.,
In the Matter of Youn, 300 Ga. 134, 135 (793 S.E.2d
379) (2016) (18-month suspension for misdemeanor conviction);
In the Matter of Suttle, 288 Ga. 14, 16 (701 S.E.2d
154) (2010) (two-year suspension for felony
conviction).[6]

Finally,
although it appears that the deplorable delay between
Williams's self-reporting to the Bar and the initiation
of these disciplinary proceedings was not his fault, he has
presented no evidence that he was not practicing law after
his conviction. Such evidence might justify the imposition of
a longer suspension nunc pro tunc. See In the Matter of
Watson, 294 Ga. 616, 618 (755 S.E.2d 199) (2014); In
the Matter of Onipede, 288 Ga. 156, 157 (702 S.E.2d 136)
(2010) ("[W]hen an attorney requests entry of a
suspension or voluntary surrender order nunc pro tunc, it is
the lawyer's responsibility to demonstrate that they
voluntarily stopped practicing law, the date on which their
law practice ended, and that they complied with all the
ethical obligations implicated in such a decision, such as
assisting clients in securing new counsel and facilitating
the transfer of client files and critical information about
ongoing cases to new counsel."). Accordingly, we reject
Williams's current petition for voluntary discipline.

Petition
for voluntary discipline rejected. All the Justices
concur.

---------

Notes:

[1] Rule 8.4 (a) (2) says, "It shall
be a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct
for a lawyer to . . . be convicted of a felony." A
conviction for purposes of this rule includes a guilty plea
accepted by a court. See Rule 8.4 (b) (1) (i). The maximum
sanction for a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (2) is
disbarment.

[2] The Alabama prosecutor's letter
discussed further below says that Williams sent the money to
the principal fraudster.

[3] The State Bar has acknowledged that
this delay was the Bar's fault and notes that the lawyer
responsible is no longer employed by the Bar's ...

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