Truth: Voter Tally Machines are not safe for two reasons. First, while voter tally machines are not typically connected to the Internet, a person can inadvertently or not so inadvertently connect the voter tally machine to the Internet.

Secondly: Other computers from the local election office can be connected to the internet and then be connected to the voter tally machines. Some or even many of these other computers, we know for certain have been compromised by Moscow. After being compromised by Moscow, these computers can then program these voter tallies to give Trump any amount of votes which are needed to win.

Myth 2: Election machines are safe from hacking because the government said so.

Truth: Any general statement about so many machines is likely to be untrue. More than that, there are people who hack these machines to prove how vulnerable they are, who say that they are able to physically hack these machines. Beyond that, I have personally seen in one institution where almost anyone could have private access to these election machines and hack them without anyone knowing about it.

Myth 3: There is no evidence that anyone has hacked into local election boards.

Truth: This is he easiest myth to dismiss. According to the United States Intelligence Community Assessment of January 6, 2017, Moscow has hacked into the computers within local United States Election Boards.

Myth 4: Between 3 and 5 Millions of people illegally voted for Hillary Clinton in 2016. Of these people who illegally voted not a single one voted for Donald Trump.

Truth:There is no evidence whatsoever of this. There is some evidence of voter fraud in that way where one woman has been accused of voting twice for Donald Trump (not Hillary Clinton as insisted by Donald Trump). Trump uses as "proof" that voter rolls contain voters from two different states, (which is not fraud. It is fraud only when they vote twice). In fact, people in Trump's entourage actually have their names on two different voter rolls in two different states.

Myth 5: You need millions of fraudulent votes to alter a national election.

Truth: You only need a few votes and fewer voter machines, if you focus on the swing states only. Only a handful of states were needed in 2016 to swing the election. Moreover, theoretically just one machine corrupted per state could give the desired total for Donald Trump.

Myth 6: Hacking into voting machines is difficult and time consuming and traces can be found.

Truth: Hacking is easy, quick and can leave no trace. Check out the HBO Documentary, Hacking Democracy.

Myth 7: Polls can give no indication of election fraud

Truth: Polls can give an excellent indication of fraud. When poll after poll is wildly wrong and when those same polls have been more or less on target for decades, this is an indication of election fraud.

The Center for Information Technology of Princeton University offers the following link about how easy it is to hack electronic voting machines.

To hack a voting machine remotely, you might think it has to be plugged in to the Internet. Most voting machines are never plugged directly into the Internet. But all voting machines must accept electronic input files from other computers: these “ballot definition files” tell the vote-counting program which candidates are on the ballot. These files are transferred to the voting machine, before each election, by inserting a cartridge or memory card into the voting machine. These cartridges are prepared on an Election Management System (EMS) computer. If that computer is hacked, then it can prepare fraudulent ballot-definition cartridges. Are those EMS computers ever connected to the Internet? Most of them probably are, from time to time; it’s hard to tell for sure, given the equivocations of many election administrators.

The ballot definition is (supposed to be) just data, not a computer program. So how could it convey and install a new (fraudulent) vote-counting program onto the voting machine?

Voting machines designed in the 1980s (Shouptronic, AVC Advantage, AccuVote OS, Optech-III Eagle) store their programs in EPROM (Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory). To install a new program, you need to remove the EPROM chips from the motherboard and install new ones. (Then you can reprogram and reuse the old ones using an EPROM “burner” device.) Those machines are not likely hackable through the Internet, even indirectly via corrupted EMS computers. (What if the EMS sends fraudulent ballot definition cartridges? This should be detectable through pre-election Logic and Accuracy testing, if it’s thorough. And in some cases it can be detected/corrected even after the election.)

Voting machines designed in the 1990s and 2000s took advantage of a new nonvolatile storage technology that we now take for granted: flash memory. They don’t use EPROMs to store the vote-counting program, it’s kept in flash. That flash memory is writable (reprogrammable) from inside the voting computer.

Almost any kind of computer needs a mechanism to install software updates. For most voting computers that use flash memory, the upgrade process is simple: install a cartridge that has the new firmware. For example, the Diebold AccuVote TS examines the ballot-definition cartridge; if there’s a file present called fboot.nb0 instead of (or in addition to) the ballot-definition file, then it installs fboot.nb0 as the new bootloader! Using this mechanism, it’s easy and convenient to install new firmware, but it’s also easy and convenient to install fraudulent vote-counting programs.

It’s not just the AccuVote TS that installs new firmware this way. This technique was industry-standard for all kinds of equipment (not just voting machines) in the 1990s. We can assume that it’s used on all voting computers that use flash memory. (One might imagine–one might hope–that after the voting-equipment industry came to understand this issue by reading the Feldman et al. paper, they would use a cryptographic authentication mechanism to accept only digitally signed firmware updates. But since the voting-equipment designers undoubtedly connect their own computers to the Internet, determined hackers could infiltrate and steal the signing keys.)

Some recent voting machines use PDF files as part of ballot definitions; PDF can contain all sorts of executable content through which hack attacks can be mounted.

Based on this analysis, we summarize what we know about these models of voting machines:

There are many more kinds of voting machines in use; I’ve just listed a few of them here.

Below is a quote from The Center for Information Technology of Princeton University