Volume 95, Issue 2, April 2012

Experimental Philosophy

Mark Alfano, James R. Beebe, Brian Robinson

Pages 264-289

DOI: 10.5840/monist201295215

The Centrality of Belief and Reflection in Knobe-Effect CasesA Unified Account of the Data

Recent work in experimental philosophy has shown that people are more likely to attribute intentionality, knowledge, and other psychological properties to someone who causes a bad side effect than to someone who causes a good one. We argue that all of these asymmetries can be explained in terms of a single underlying asymmetry involving belief attribution because the belief that one’s action would result in a certain side effect is a necessary component of each of the psychological attitudes in question. We argue further that this belief-attribution asymmetry is rational because it mirrors a belief-formation asymmetry, and that the
belief-formation asymmetry is also rational because it is more useful to form some beliefs than others.