In managing new cleavages between conflicting values (such as materialism and post-materialism), we cannot simply fall back on a classical approach to cleavage management. The segments surrounding the new cleavage are clearly more fluid than those surrounding the religious or socio-economic cleavages from consociationalism and neo-corporatism, such as is rightly emphasised in the network approach. In the conflict between the materialist and post-materialist value pattern, representation logic is not a given certainty. Not only the facts, but also the negotiating players and the decision-making arenas are the subject of negotiation and strategic action. This is reflected in the new forms of consultation politics. Similarly, consensus formation cannot make do with the (party) political integration of the segments because, given the conditions of post-materialism, this integration can only be partial. It seems important in the new cleavage management to devote attention to the existence of several arenas in which political interests are weighed up. For the players involved in a particular policy issue, this means the lure of strategic forum shopping and thus complication of the conflict-resolving ability of each of the forums.

The creation of quasi-autonomous organizations has spread throughout the western world. Flanders and the Netherlands both have a longstanding tradition of putting policy execution at arms' length, thereby creating so-called voi's and zbo's respectively. This raises the question whether there are comparable trajectories, forms, developments and political considerations. By comparing the developments in both countries the authors seek an answer to this question.

The establishment of quangos was very popular until the mid 1990s. However, in both countries a countermovement can be seen. The creation of quangos is believed to lead to problems for political control. Both governments have taken several measures to solve these issues.

The comparison shows that there are indeed many similarities, but also reveals interesting differences. There is no comprehensive convergence between the two neighbours. These differences are the result of differences in the politico-administrative system and the institutional culture.

Although 'integration with retention of "own" culture' has ceased to be the dominant policy principle in Dutch minority policies for quite some time now, there are still remarkably many ethnically specific policy arrangements in the Netherlands. To explain this contradiction this paper introduces an administrative mechanism: the logic of making policy categories conflicts with the logic of policy implementation. The use of 'avoidant categories' – a particular type of policy category discussed in this paper – creates an administrative opportunity structure that unintendedly promotes ethnic fragmentation instead of integration in policy implementation. We illustrate the working of this mechanism in a comparative perspective; the Netherlands is not unique in this respect and experience in other countries is instructive.