As this blog enters its fourth week, one theme that has consistently cropped up in the news is the issue of Chinese military developments. This post marks the first in an ongoing series tracking media and blogger reactions to the growth of China’s military capabilities.

China, facing an end to its economic miracle, and facing a demographic crisis in a mere twenty years, may find its beefed up military useful in securing resources sooner through intimidation or, in some cases, through outright seizure — particularly in Asia, where China’s military would have its strongest reach.

A Chinese military motivated by nationalism — and perhaps an even stronger interest in preserving its power and influence within China — would find it better to be in contention with the United States than in calm. This is because U.S. pressure, whether real or rhetorical, drives China’s defense development.

After two decades of military modernization it appears the PLA is pushing a hard-line agenda and becoming more willing to voice its opinion on foreign policy issues. This is a worrisome development especially as the Chinese leadership, which includes new nationalistic-minded military commanders, takes command in 2012.

There is a serious danger that the U.S. image of a more assertive and aggressive China and the Chinese notion that the United States is on the decline will feed a sense of strategic rivalry—and this could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. To assume that there will be a growing military rivalry that will eventually evolve into a Cold War-type situation is the biggest risk for the United States and China.

China’s ability to rapidly develop this technology shows that the U.S. can’t ignore high-end threats and must keep its R&D shops humming. If the J-20 isn’t designed to defeat the F-22 and F-35, it’s follow-on will be.

Global maritime cooperation? “I would very much like the PLAN to be part of that and in fact they are.” New Chinese subs and satellites? “As we all seek to do… they clearly want to assure that operational space around the mainland and the areas they consider to be vital and important.” Growing Chinese sea power in general? “[C]onsistent historically with the economic rise of powers.” If there’s a message there, it’s that the U.S. Navy isn’t looking for a confrontation.

Further Chinese militarisation will be met with further Japanese militarisation—and thus begins a dangerous cycle. By focusing on Japan’s past rather than a mutually beneficial future, and by embracing the worst elements of nationalism, Chinese leaders have sought to displace questions over legitimacy and internal political reform.

“We can’t help but have concerns about a certain lack of transparency in (China’s) defence build-up and growing maritime activities” … “Conflicts over maritime interests have been surfacing recently and we cannot ignore that they are becoming elements of regional instability,” Kan said. “We should claim Japan’s own rights openly and squarely.”

At a speech for the Friendship Exchange Council, Prime Minister Kan reaffirmed the necessity of the US bases in Okinawa, and promised “to strengthen efforts through various opportunities to seek the understanding and cooperation of those living outside Okinawa regarding the burden of hosting U.S. bases.”

The speech came as Japan and US signed a new five-year Special Measures Agreement on ‘host nation support,’ often called the sympathy budget (omoiyari yosan). Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara wants to put a stop to this nickname:

South Korean and North Korean guards at Panmunjom
(Source: Debate It Out)

North Korea’s offer of talks has finally gained it some ground as South Korea agree to high-level military talks “only if the agenda included the two events that have soured relations – the sinking of a southern warship in March, and the shelling of a southern island.”

North Korea latest proposal for talks came on Thursday following the US-China Joint Statement on North Korea in Washington. The question remains whether North Korea will be happy to talk about those events and whether the answers it gives will be sufficient for the South.

With a cautiously optimistic wind in its sales, South Korea is also looking at having preliminary talks on denuclearisation:

“If North Korea demonstrates sincerity through specific action and then six-party talks resume, our government will seek a comprehensive resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue” through its “grand bargain” idea of a one-time major deal of swapping denuclearization and concessions, he said.

“North Korea should decide on its own whether it will choose a dead-ended road of confrontation and enmity or a road of peace and prosperity,” he said

An editorial in the Chosun Ilbo guesses at the reason for North Korea’s willingness to come to the table:

On Monday, Jan 10, Defense Ministers Toshimi Kitazawa and Kim Kwan-jin agreed to pursue an eventual Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement between Japan and South Korea. They hope to finalise the ACSA by the end of the year, and it would allow for logistics sharing in joint operations (primarily UN peacekeeping operations). They also noted their mutual interest in a possible General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA).

Japan clearly has designs on formalised defence ties with South Korea, beyond being on the ends of mutual security agreements with the US, and so far so good. Japan has a stake in events on the Korean Peninsula, and it is hedging towards improved regional security. The only question is whether any agreements can withstand the shock of any contingencies around Takeshima/Dokdo or the opposition entering the Blue House once more.

On Friday, Jan 14, Prime Minister Naoto Kan tried to relieve pressure from the opposition by ditching Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshito Sengoku and Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism Minister Sumio Mabuchi. Without the support of the opposition, Kan would be unable to pass the ¥92.4 trillion budget.

The Cabinet shuffle leaves only one woman by Kan’s side: 43-year old Renho, also the youngest member of the Cabinet. Yosano, 72, is now the joint oldest member of the Cabinet (alongside Kitazawa) and he also has the unlikely portfolio of Social Affairs and Gender Equality (also replacing Tomiko Okazaki).

POST: In terms of Japan increasing its capabilities, the secretary of defense, when he was in China, was talking about his interest in seeing whether Japan also wanted to see Japan pursue its own fifth-generation fighter program, perhaps by purchasing U.S. technology or U.S. systems. Is that something that, given China’s modernization, that Japan will look at more seriously?

KITAZAWA: As I mentioned, the Chinese increasing military capability – mainly air and naval power – regarding this trend, Japan is open to its defense capability, mainly focusing on the defense of the southeastern island areas. And at the same time, we are producing what we call a dynamic defense force, which evolves from the traditional base defense capability concept to more of a high-readiness as well as an operating posture in order to deal with such a trend. As for the international trade regarding military equipment as well as production of military equipment, now it is an international trend to do development jointly with several countries, thereby trying to reduce the cost of a program. So we would like to consider measures to accommodate such a trend. This will have a relation to our three principles regarding arms exports, so we would like to have appropriate explorations.

POST: So does that mean you’re going to change your principles?

KITAZAWA: We will continue our studies and considerations. As you will know the basis of Japan is to pursue peace. And so we will permanently abide by this principle. But we also have to deal with the international trends as part of the international community, so we need to have measures to avoid being left behind of the trends. It has nothing to do with … changing the policies completely to become a country that exports its military equipment to other countries, thereby becoming a death march. It’s nothing like that.

It’s an interesting read, but nothing too juicy. I think there is an implied push away from Hatoyama’s devastating handling of the alliance, but again, this is nothing new: this month so far has been proof enough of a sea change.

Charlie Reed at the Stars and Stripes quotes Denny Roy of the East-West Center in Hawaii as saying:

“North Korea provides the political excuse for what would otherwise be a strategic move” against China, Roy said. “It’s a fig leaf.”

“Japan-South Korea defense cooperation is an example of what the Chinese want to avoid,” said Roy, a senior fellow at the center. “China has long understood, and feared, that its rise might cause other countries in the region to cooperate strategically against (it.)”

Certainly, regardless of what motives are behind the Japanese push for better ties, China will interpret it as US-directed encirclement. That would no doubt accelerate Chinese military development and give the Chinese a sense of urgency.

Labelling China a threat would only escalate tension and become a self-fulfilling prophecy, [Bruce Klingner at the Heritage Foundation] said. But moves to strengthen Japan-South Korea military cooperation represent long-range goals for the U.S. and its democratic Asian allies to hedge against China’s massive and growing military.

The US has to tread a delicate line between hedging against and placating China’s ambitions and Japan will play an important role in maintaining that balance. That will require a lot of foreign policy savvy on the Japanese side, something that was in short supply in 2010.

Over the past decade, China has been slowly building the capability to force the US Navy away from its coasts and deep in the Pacific. Beijing was horrified and mortified when during the 1996 Taiwan crisis, a US battle group led by the carrier “Nimitz” boldly sailed down the Taiwan Strait almost within sight of mainland China.

Imagine if a Chinese naval battle group sailed off New York’s Long Island, into the Florida Strait off Cuba, or in the Gulf of Mexico? The US would erupt in fury. But this is what the US Navy has been doing off China for half a century.

Now, Beijing’ new anti-ship missiles are putting US carrier battle groups at grave risk if they come too close to the mainland. This writer has observed numerous naval simulation war games and can attest that no surface vessels, particularly not huge carriers, can withstand barrages of high-speed anti-ship missiles fired from 360 degrees. Some will eventually leak through the US Navy’s layered defenses.

Nothing occurs in a vacuum here on Earth, and that is equally true of security matters. While it is easy to call China out for seemingly drawing the US into an arms race, we must also consider the Chinese perspective. That won’t stop the problem, but it will give both sides a chance at amelioration, dialogue and détente. The US and China are antagonistic partners now, but China is clearly hoping that it can defend ‘its’ shores, and unfortunately for the US that includes Taiwan, and for Japan, the Senkaku islands.