The 60th Anniversary of the End of World War II has become an opportunity to honor the victims who have lost their lives. At the same time, it is an opportunity to initiate historical discussions. Unfortunately, these are often perceived through politics. Therefore, a universally accepted interpretation of some historical events is difficult to be agreed upon; it can even lead to diplomatic disputes. In the European context, increased attention is given to discussions of the so-called Ribbentrop-Molotov pact and the consequences of the February 1945 conference at Yalta.
Both issues are marked by a clash between interpretations by Russia, which is often readopting the Soviet point of view, and by the directly concerned countries. The overall objective of this study is to confront various interpretations with historical documents commonly available to the general public. On that basis, it will be possible to asses what happened shortly before World War II, during the war, and after its end.
Reflections mostly by representatives of the Baltic countries whether or not to take part in Moscow celebrations marking 60 years since the end of World War II have given birth to a new wave of discussions of this issue. Reactions by top Russian officials have interfered with discussions among Baltic politicians and historians. Continuously commented on by Russia, discussions gradually started in Poland and Finland as well.
A statement by Latvian President Vaira V??e-Freiberga has ignited most reactions. President described, in a consistent manner, the mixed feelings of the Baltic countries as regards the 60th Anniversary End of World War II:“Latvia, together with the rest of Europe, rejoices at the defeat of Nazi Germany and its fascist regime in May of 1945. However, unlike the case in Western Europe, the fall of the hated Nazi German empire did not result in my country’s liberation. Instead, the three Baltic countries of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania were subject to another brutal occupation by another foreign, totalitarian empire, that of the Soviet Union. For five long decades, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania were erased from the map of Europe. Under Soviet rule, the three Baltic countries experienced mass deportations and killings, the loss of their freedom, and the influx of millions of Russian-speaking settlers.“1
The reaction to V??e-Freiberga’s statement of January 31, 2005 from the Russian Foreign Ministry has avoided a matter-of-factly argumentation, or a substantial attempt to assess past events in critical terms. Instead, the statement denounced President who, from historian’s perspective, had not said anything new. She said, basically, that an occupation had been replaced with just another occupation, adding that Stalin actually matched Hitler. None-the-less, the reaction by the Foreign Ministry was sharp:“It is only regrettable that the leader of a neighboring country lacks respect for the day sacred to the entire civilized world. On the other hand, after the many "explanations" of Latvian President, we have had an opportunity to understand still better of what configuration is the "hand of friendship" that Madame Vike-Freiberga is extending to Russia.“ 2
Latvian President sent her written statement to the heads of government of a broad number of countries. Reactions to the statement mostly expressed an understanding of the Baltic view of the events in connection with the German-Soviet pact. Shortly before the Moscow celebrations, loud voices expressed feelings that Russia should develop a critical stance vis-a-vis the pact. Condoleezza Rice or Guenther Verheugen made statements in that sense.
This time, the Russian Foreign Ministry took a less emotional position with use of certain dosage of historical argumentation:
“Question: Russia has recently been under growing pressure to recognize and condemn the "occupation" of the Baltic countries in 1940 and to assume responsibility for this. What is the Russian position in this connection?Answer: The Russian position on the issue has been repeatedly put forward and remains unchanged. Neither the introduction of additional Red Army units nor the accession of the Baltic states to the Soviet Union contradicted the provisions of international law that were in effect at the time.
Thus, in accordance with the international legal doctrine of the mid-20th century, "occupation" meant the acquisition by a state of uninhabited territory that did not previously belong to any state by establishing effective control over it with intent to spread its sovereignty to it. In addition, the term meant temporary occupation during the course of an armed conflict by the army of one of the warring states of the territory (or part of the territory) of another state.
The term "occupation" cannot be used for a legal assessment of the situation in the Baltics in the late 1930s because there was no state of war between the USSR and the Baltic states and no military actions were being conducted, and the troops were introduced on the basis of an agreement and with the express consent of the authorities that existed in these republics at the time - whatever one may think of them. In addition, throughout the period when Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia were part of the Soviet Union, there were national bodies of power, with the exception of the time when that part of the USSR territory was occupied by Germany during the Great Patriotic War. And it is known that it was these authorities - again, regardless of how one may assess them today - as represented by the Supreme Soviets of the corresponding republics, that made decisions in 1990 that led to their secession from the USSR. So, if one were to question the legitimacy of the power bodies of the Soviet period, the question arises of the legitimacy of the promulgation of independence by the Baltic republics.
Accordingly, any claims, including demands for material compensation for alleged damage which, as some think, was the result of what happened in 1940, are without grounds.
Meanwhile, attempts to put the policy of the USSR during that period on the same footing as the actions of Hitler Germany which was waging an aggressive war in Europe in order to enslave or destroy entire peoples, are absurd if only due to the obvious fact that it was above all through the efforts of the USSR that Hitler Germany was defeated and Europe was rid of Nazism. Such insinuations have a particularly blasphemous ring on the eve of the 60th anniversary of the Great Victory.
As for the assessment of the repressive actions of the regime that existed in the USSR in the 1930s-1950s, it has been repeatedly given both by the Soviet Union and by Russia. Moscow does not see any sense in revisiting the issue. If somebody is trying to turn it today into real politics, this is an attempt to speculate on memory for the sake of political expediency. 3
Should one accept the logic adopted by the Russian Foreign Ministry, it is for example difficult to understand the reasons to label the 1939 entry of German troops in Czechoslovakia as “occupation.” That action was also executed following an agreement between Czechoslovakia and Germany. More to the point, there was not any direct military conflict; national and local governments and police remained functional.
In all likelihood, the path to the agreement between the two parties is the true problem. The modus operandi of the Soviet Union can be described on the example of Latvia that was the first country to find itself under repeated Soviet pressure:“On the same day [June 14, 1940] at 2 PM, deputy Soviet’s People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs V.G. Dekazonov received Urbsis who informed him of resignation of Skucas and Povilaytis. He repeated that Latvian authorities had not taken part in disappearance of Soviet troops, and pointed out the anti-Soviet stance of the Baltic Entante [thereby rebutting previous Soviet accusations]. There was no indication of a substantial turn in negotiations. However, at 11:50 PM, Urbsis was summoned to appear before Molotov who handed him a Soviet ultimatum (the text was published on June 16 in Izvestiya). The ultimatum demanded bringing Skucas and Povilaytis to justice, and forming a government that would duly respect the provisions of the agreement on mutual assistance and agree on the entry of more Russian troops on the Lithuanian territory. After having explained the entry of 3 to 4 corpuses (9 to 12 armed divisions) was to be expected, Molotov promised that the army would not interfere in internal affairs. He nevertheless stressed that the new government would have to be pro-Soviet. Molotov noted that unless his demands were met, the troops would immediately cross Lithuanian border anyhow. The deadline to meet the conditions of the ultimatum expired on June 15 at 10 AM.” 4
Latvia, as well as the two other Baltic countries a little later, accepted the ultimatum. In his memoirs, N.S. Khruschev openly acknowledges the threat of the use of military power should the conditions not be met. Moreover, he links the actions against the Baltic countries to the implementation of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact:“Потом Муссолини открыл военные действия против Греции и завяз в них. Далее Гитлер напал на Югославию и расправился с ней, потому что Германия была сильнее; почти без выстрелов оккупировал Данию и Норвегию, практически без сопротивления захватил Голландию, вторгся в Бельгию, в 1940 г. Захватил большую часть Франции. Так он обеспечил себе на довольно большом пространстве морскую линию, защиту от английского флота и на севере подошел вплотную к нашему Мурманску. Естественно, что Советское правительство тем временем реализовывало меры, вытекавшие из договора, подписанного Молотовым и Риббентропом. Мы начали осенью 1939 г. переговоры с Эстонией, Латвией и Литвой и предъявили им свои условия. В сложившейся тогда ситуации эти страны правильно поняли, что им не устоять против Советского Союза, и приняли наши предложения, заключив с нами договоры о взаимопомощи. Потом произошла смена их правительств. Само собой разумеется!“ 5
The telegram from German Ambassador to the USSR Schulenburg to Berlin indicates to what extent Moscow intended not to interfere in internal affairs of Baltic states. The telegram hinted, among other things, how the new governments would be formed. The awkward reason for the USSR to annex the Baltic countries merits our attention. The congratulation on the defeat of France is just “the best” moment of the whole text:“VERY URGENT
Moscow, June 18, 1940-1:10 a. m.
Received June 18, 1940-4 a. m.
No. 1167 of June 17

Molotov summoned me this evening to his office and expressed the warmest congratulations of the Soviet Government on the splendid success of the German Armed Forces. Thereupon, Molotov informed me of the Soviet action against the Baltic States. He referred to the reasons published in the press and added that it had become necessary to put an end to all the intrigues by which England and France had tried to sow discord and mistrust between Germany and the Soviet Union in the Baltic States.
For the negotiations concerning the formation of the new Governments the Soviet Government had, in addition to the Soviet envoy accredited there, sent the following special emissaries:
To Lithuania: Deputy Commissar of Foreign Affairs Dekanosov; to Latvia: Vishinski, the representative of the Council of Ministers; to Estonia: Regional Party Leader of Leningrad Zhdanov.
In connection with the escape of Smetona and the possible crossing of the frontier by Lithuanian army units, Molotov stated that the Lithuanian border was evidently inadequately guarded. The Soviet Government would, therefore, if requested, assist the Lithuanian Government in guarding its borders.

The situation got so far that London, though its Ambassador A.C. Kerr, asked Moscow to carry out her own military inspection of the Soviet-controlled territory. The letter by N. Bulganin from Poland to First Deputy Foreign Secretary Andry Vishinski, describes the unwillingness to allow such an action to “keep Russian Army’s freedom to take action against the military forces of ’Armia Krajowa’”.

In light of the awareness of these actions by the Stalin regime, is it possible not to understand the monstrosity of the non-intervention pact, much less stand defend it as a classic defense treaty? Today’s Russian officials, as well as former Soviet leaders, do not hesitate to use such an argument. Putin has even strengthened the Stalin-Molotov thesis of comparing the pact with the Munich agreement:“The Soviet-German document was signed on a much lower level – on the level of foreign ministers – one year later, in response to the treaty signed by the western countries, which is now called the “Munich pact”. I would also remind you – and for you as Slovaks, this is probably especially important: as a result of the Munich pact, Czechoslovakia was handed over to Nazi Germany, and the western partners, as it were, showed Hitler where he should go to fulfil his growing ambitions – to the East.“ 25
It is very likely that President Putin was not in his best shape when using this argument. The Munich agreement undoubtedly is a wrong agreement mirroring the bad state of European politics of the 1930’s. However, there is no reason comparing it with the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact.
The sole objective of both England and France to take part in the agreement was to protect Europe from war. 26 Such efforts were completely vain but it is not relevant in this context. The crucial reason for the USSR to sign the treaty with Germany was to divide Poland and take action against the Baltic countries and Finland.
The Munich agreement had proved to be a badly chosen means that did not reach its objectives. None-the-less, the pact did not have any secret provisions and its signatories did not take part in the German annexion of Czechoslovakia that is what the Soviet Union did in the case of the German aggression against Poland.
Neither England, nor France used the Munich agreement to occupy other countries. On the other hand, that is exactly what the Soviet Union did on the basis of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact when it annexed the Baltic countries and started war against Finland.
Last but not least, unlike the Soviet Union England and France abolished the Munich agreement yet before the end of World War II:“The negotiations on recognition of Czechoslovak Government in Exile between Bene? and Great Britain were closely connected with British attitude towards Munich. The British attitude was that the treaty was concluded as a valid one and ceased to be valid only after Germany broke its obligations and established the Protectorate. The question of validity of Munich was connected with the British reluctance to recognize re-establishment of Czechoslovakia in its pre-Munich borders. In August 1942 the compromise was reached between the two parties.
France took different approach towards the repudiation of Munich during WWII. The reason was that France was defeated by Germany in June 1940 and that General De Gaulle was able gradually to establish French National Committee /FNC/ in exile. In September 1942 FNC reached an agreement with Czechoslovak exile Government on the question of validity of Munich. FNC proclaimed Munich Agreement to be null and void from the very beginning. In 1944, when French Provisional Government was established, Czechoslovak Government was among the first Allied Governments, which recognized it. Again the question of French attitude towards Munich was opened and after initial problems French Provisional Government repeated the proclamation from 1942 on the Munich Agreement.“ 27
Not only Moscow defended the pact as vitally important, but over a long period of time it denied at least to the socialist bloc the existence of its secret additional protocol. The actual position on the pact is best described by the fact that the USSR kept most of the territories it had annexed on the basis of its pact with Germany.
Estonian President A. R??tel said during his radio address on January 20 that he had been told by President Putin that he had been ready to support repudiation of the pact by Russian side. 28 This information has not been confirmed by following Putin's statements. Russian President was moving rather the contrary way because the interview mentioned above for Slovak media in which he defended the pact took place just a little later.

Impacts of German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact
After the separation of Poland, Moscow began “securing“ its borders in other directions as well. First, it forced the Baltic countries to allow it to build military bases on their territories. Later, covered with the pact and using the defeat of France, Moscow annexed the three Baltic republics even though it had repeated many times that their independence was untouchable to the USSR:“Особый характер указанных пактов взаимопомощи отнюдь не означает какого-либо вмешательства Советского Союза в дела Эстонии, Латвии и Литвы, как это пытаются изобразить некоторые органы заграничной печати. Напротив, все эти пакты взаимопомощи твердо оговаривают неприкосновенность суверенитета подписавших их государств и принцип невмешательства в дела другого государства. Эти пакты исходят из взаимного уважения государственной, социальной и экономической структуры другой стороны и должны укрепить основу мирного добрососедского сотрудничества между нашими народами. Мы стоим за честное и пунктуальное проведение в жизнь заключенных пактов на условиях полной взаимности и заявляем, что болтовня о советизации прибалтийских стран выгодна только нашим общим врагам и всяким антисоветским провокаторам.“ 29
If the objective of the USSR really was to secure its borders, its agreements with the Baltic countries-as well as the military bases it built on their territories-would have been sufficient to reach that goal. Indeed, that was the Soviet Foreign Minister was confirming in his speeches:“Ввиду особого географического положения этих стран, являющихся своего рода подступами к СССР, особенно со стороны Балтийского моря, эти пакты предоставляют Советскому Союзу возможность иметь военно-морские базы и аэродромы в определенных пунктах Эстонии и Латвии, а в отношении Литвы устанавливают совместную с Советским Союзом защиту литовской границы. Создание этих советских военно-морских баз и аэродромов на территории Эстонии, Латвии и Литвы и ввод некоторого количества красноармейских частей для охраны этих баз и аэродромов обеспечивают надежную опору обороны не только для Советского Союза, но и для самих прибалтийских государств и, тем самым, служат делу сохранения мира, в котором заинтересованы наши народы.“ 30
However, Soviet ambitions were much more far-reaching and especially more aggressive. The issue of the complete annexion of the Baltic countries proves that neither passing over military bases, nor giving up a part of national sovereign could stop the USSR from fulfilling its own geopolitical goals.
The work of evil that Soviet authorities launched in several waves on the annexed territory of the Baltic countries calls for a comparison between Soviet terror and Nazi terror. In light of the total population of Baltic countries, terror unleashed by the Stalin regime in the Baltic countries before as well as after World War II reached tragic dimensions: “Altogether around 139 700 persons were deported from Latvia during the reign of Stalin. During the whole Communist era 51 973 Latvians were arrested, according to official information 1 986 of those were executed. The total number of known victims of Communist genocide in Latvia – arrested, executed and deported – would thus be 191 673 persons. That number constitutes about 15 per cent of the country’s population according to the 1959 census. The real number was probably higher because far from every arrestation, execution or deportation was recorded and archived. Besides, many Latvians were killed in Russia but nobody knows the exact number. Out of the Latvians living in the Soviet Union prior to World War Two, around 70 000 were hit by the wave of terror of 1937-1939 and 25 000 among them were killed.
The total number of known victims of Communism in Lithuania, calculated in the same way, was around 360 000 persons; ca 130 000 were deported (28 000 of those died in Siberia), ca 200 000 were arrested (149 741 of those were later transferred to Communist concentration camps), 25 000 members of the resistance movement were killed as well as 2 747 prisoners in Lithuanian prisons.
In Estonia the number of victims can be summarised as follows: around 30 000 were deported, around 80 000 were arrested, around 2 000 were executed and the same number of civilians fell victims to Communist bombing, around 10 000 soldiers fell while fighting on the Russian side, (and 8 000 fighting on the German side). The population losses in Estonia were two or three times larger. That means that around 70 000 refugees, around 20 000 Baltic Germans who moved "home" to Germany prior to and during the war, around 80 000 persons who were evacuated or mobilised and sent to Russia, around 70 000 inhabitants of areas that were forcibly separated from Estonia and incorporated with Russia should be added to the above mentioned number. If one includes relatives of all those arrested, executed, deported and generally persecuted one could claim that around half the population was hit by Communist persecutions.“ 31
Stalin’s allies had a generally clear idea about the situation in the occupied Baltic countries. They had no illusions of what would become of them once war was over. In Teheran, Roosevelt was attempting to soften the inevitable development. However, the future of the Baltic countries was sacrificed to building the relationship with Stalin:“№ 63 Запись беседы И. В. Сталина с Ф. Рузвельтом
1 декабря 1943 года в 15 час. 20 мин.

Рузвельт. В Соединенных Штатах может быть поднят вопрос о включении Прибалтийских республик в Советский Союз, и я полагаю, что мировое общественное мнение сочтет желательным, чтобы когда-нибудь в будущем каким-то образом было выражено мнение народов этих республик по этому вопросу. Поэтому я надеюсь, что маршал Сталин примет во внимание это пожелание. У меня лично нет никаких сомнений в том, что народы этих стран будут голосовать за присоединение к Советскому Союзу так же дружно, как они сделали это в 1940 году.
Сталин. Литва, Эстония и Латвия не имели автономии до революции в России. Царь был тогда в союзе с Соединенными Штатами и с Англией, и никто не ставил вопроса о выводе этих стран из состава России. Почему этот вопрос ставится теперь?
Рузвельт. Дело в том, что общественное мнение не знает истории. Я хотел бы поговорить с маршалом Сталиным о внутреннем положении в Соединенных Штатах. В будущем году в Соединенных Штатах предстоят выборы. Я не желаю выдвигать свою кандидатуру, но если война продолжится, то я, может быть, буду вынужден это сделать. В Америке имеется шесть-семь миллионов граждан польского происхождения, и поэтому я, будучи практичным человеком, не хотел бы потерять их голоса. Я согласен с маршалом Сталиным в том, что мы должны восстановить польское государство, и лично я не имею возражений, чтобы границы Польши были передвинуты с востока на запад—вплоть до Одера, но по политическим соображениям я не могу участвовать в настоящее время в решении этого вопроса. Я разделяю идеи маршала Сталина, я надеюсь, что он поймет, почему я не могу публично участвовать в решении этого вопроса здесь, в Тегеране, или даже весной будущего года.
Сталин. После разъяснения Рузвельта я это понимаю.
Рузвельт. В Соединенных Штатах имеется также некоторое количество литовцев, латышей и эстонцев. Я знаю, что Литва, Латвия и Эстония и в прошлом и совсем недавно составляли часть Советского Союза, и, когда русские армии вновь войдут в эти республики, я не стану воевать из-за этого с Советским Союзом. Но общественное мнение может потребовать проведения там плебисцита.
Сталин. Что касается волеизъявления народов Литвы, Латвии и Эстонии, то у нас будет немало случаев дать народам этих республик возможность выразить свою волю.
Рузвельт. Это будет мне полезно.
Сталин. Это, конечно, не означает, что плебисцит в этих республиках должен проходить под какой-либо формой международного контроля.
Рузвельт. Конечно, нет. Было бы полезно заявить в соответствующий момент о том, что в свое время в этих республиках состоятся выборы.
Сталин. Конечно, это можно будет сделать. Я хотел бы знать, решен ли окончательно вопрос об отъезде завтра. 32
The proverb that only victors write history could only remain valid over a short period of time. It is not possible to label occupation as liberation forever. Moscow’s reactions nevertheless indicate that Russia has not yet gotten over the “single right opinion“ scheme. To put it in more exact terms, it is returning to the same mindset –after period of freedom of speech by Yeltsin- under Putin’s leadership.
Accordingly, the reaction by the Russian Foreign Ministry to the speech by President Tarja Halonen of Finland in the French Institute for International Relations33 , in which the President briefly commented on the issue of the Soviet-Finnish war, uses vicious and unjustified wording. The Ministry commented on another example of the use of the German-Soviet pact: “In late summer 1939 Germany and the Soviet Union agreed on a division of Europe into spheres of influence. The following winter Finland had to fight off an attack by the Red Army in order to preserve her independence and avoid being occupied by the Soviet Union. We had to do this alone, without significant outside help.
Five years later, in the summer of 1944, we again managed to stop the Red Army's attempts to conquer Finland. Our country was not occupied at any stage, during or after the war. We lost part of our territory, but we achieved a defensive victory. We held on to our independence as well as our democratic political system and our economic system.
For us the world war meant a separate war against the Soviet Union and we did not incur any debt of gratitude to others.“ 34
The statement by the President of Finland contains ambiguous parts. There is no doubt that Finland faced a Soviet aggression in the first war of 1940; this interpretation is beyond any doubt. Even Stalin did not hide that the war constituted an aggression by the USSR: “Первый вопрос - о войне с Финляндией. Правильно ли поступили правительство и партия, что объявили войну Финляндии? Этот вопрос специально касается Красной Армии. Нельзя ли было обойтись без войны?
Мне кажется, что нельзя было. Невозможно было обойтись без войны. Война была необходима, так как мирные переговоры с Финляндией не дали результатов, а безопасность Ленинграда надо было обеспечить безусловно, ибо его безопасность есть безопасность нашего Отечества. Не только потому, что Ленинград представляет процентов 30-35 оборонной промышленности нашей страны и, стало быть, от целостности и сохранности Ленинграда зависит судьба нашей страны, но и потому, что Ленинград есть вторая столица нашей страны. Прорваться к Ленинграду, занять его и образовать там, скажем, буржуазное правительство, белогвардейское - это значит дать довольно серьезную базу для гражданской войны внутри страны против Советской власти.
Вот вам оборонное и политическое значение Ленинграда как центра промышленного и как второй столицы нашей страны. Вот почему безопасность Ленинграда - есть безопасность нашей страны. Ясно, что коль скоро переговоры мирные с Финляндией не привели к результатам, надо было объявить войну, чтобы при помощи военной силы организовать, утвердить и закрепить безопасность Ленинграда и, стало быть, безопасность нашей страны.“ 35
In the two subsequent clashes with the Soviet Army, Finland accepted German support; the interpretation is not so clear in this point. There is room for reflection whether or not it is possible to use one devil to fight another one. This issue concerns not only Finland but also the anti-Soviet resistance in Ukraine, Baltic countries and even in the USSR.
It remains nevertheless beyond any doubt that if the Soviet Union had not attacked Finland in 1940, the latter would not have used a year later the German attack to regain the territories lost to the previous Soviet aggression and the subsequent tough peace agreement:“Article 2
The national frontier between the Republic of Finland and the U.S.S.R. shall run along a new line in such fashion that there shall be included in the territory of the U.S.S.R. the entire Karelian Isthmus with the city of Viipuri and Viipuri Bay with its islands, the western and northern shores of Lake Ladoga with the cities of Kexholm and Sortavala and the town of Suoj?rvi, a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, the area east of M?rk?j?rvi with the town of Kuolaj?rvi, and part of the Rybachi and Sredni peninsulas, all in accordance with the map appended to this treaty...Article 4
The Republic of Finland agrees to lease to the Soviet Union for thirty years, against an annual rental of eight million Finnish marks to be paid by the Soviet Union, Hanko Cape and the waters surrounding it in a radius of five miles to the south and east and three miles to the north and west, and also the several islands falling within that area, in accordance with the map appended to this treaty, for the establishment of a naval base capable of defending the mouth of the Gulf of Finland against attack; in addition to which, for the purpose of protecting the naval base, the Soviet Union is granted the right of maintaining there at its own expense the necessary number of armed land and air forces.
Within the days from the date this treaty enters into effect, the government of Finland shall withdraw all its military forces from Hanko Cape, which together with its adjoining islands shall be transferred to the jurisdiction of the U.S.S.R. in accordance with this article of the treaty.” 36
However, the statement by the Russian Foreign Ministry does not deal with the relation between cause and effect. It only argues with the use of the peace agreement of 1947 between the Allies and Finland. From the legal point of view, there is no room for doubt: an agreement is an agreement. Unless one wishes to look into the conditions under which these agreements were signed at the end of war, we do not have to raise unnecessary questions. Over a long period of time, this was the manner in which the USSR argued against any and all mentions of Soviet partipation in the Katyn massacre:

Копия: ВАРШАВА - СОВПОСОЛ
Посетите МИД Англии и заявите следующее:
"По имеющимся у посольства сведениям, телевизионная компания Би-Би-Си намеревается показать подготовленный ею враждебный Советскому Союзу фильм о так называемом "Катынском деле". К этому же времени приурочено опубликование в Англии клеветнической книги о Катынской трагедии.
Английской стороне хорошо известно, что виновность гитлеровцев за это преступление неопровержимо доказана авторитетной Специальной комиссией, которая провела на месте расследование этого преступления тотчас же после изгнания из района Смоленска немецких оккупантов. В 1945-46 г.г. Международный военный трибунал в Нюрнберге признал главных немецких военных преступников виновными в проведении политики истребления польского народа и, в частности, в расстреле польских военнопленных в Катынском лесу.
В этой связи не может не вызвать удивления и возмущения стремление некоторых кругов в Англии вновь вытащить на свет инсинуации геббельсовской пропаганды с тем, чтобы очернить Советский Союз, народ которого своей пролитой кровью спас Европу от фашистского порабощения.
Посольство ожидает, что Министерство иностранных дел и по делам Содружества примет надлежащие меры к недопущению распространения в Англии упомянутых выше клеветнических материалов, рассчитанных, по замыслу их авторов, на то, чтобы вызвать ухудшение отношений между нашими странами".
Текст представления можете оставить собеседнику.“ 37
Both Soviet allies were aware of the Finland’s specific position. They attempted, even by the end of war, to negotiate with Moscow easier conditions for Finland. However, when Stalin did not want to back off from his position, they contented themselves with the guarantee that the USSR would not annex the whole of Finland: “A separate peace with Finland was discussed at the summit meeting of the three major powers in Teheran on December 1, 1943. Roosevelt spoke in favour of Finland, and so did Churchill, even though Britain had declared war on Finland in December 1941. Stalin admitted that “a people that had fought so valiantly for its independence deserves consideration”. He presented his terms for peace: restoration of the borders of the 1940 treaty; annexing Petsamo to the Soviet Union; a “50 per cent restitution” for the damage caused by the Finns; the expulsion of Germans from Finland; and demobilization of the army. Roosevelt and Churchill did not comment. For them, the important thing was for Finland to remain an independent and democratic society.“ 38
The question why Stalin -as he told Tito in April 194539 - eventually regarded the Americans too much and did not annex the whole of Finland, has not yet been successfully answered. Molotov later argued pointing to the stubborness of Finns: “We were wise not to annex Finland. It would have been an running sore... The people there are stubborn, very stubborn.” 40If we take into account Stalin’s above mentioned words about “a people that had fought so valiantly for its independence“it is possible that desperate courage of the Finnish people showed in two conflicts with the USSR allowed Finland to gain better position than some of the Central European countries that stood by the side of the victors only to find themselves in the Soviet sphere of influence.
Most of all, that is the case of Poland. In the beginning of the war, Poland became victim of a German-Soviet aggression. During the war, it fought the Nazi at home and abroad. It suffered horrible human and material losses only to give in to the Soviet Union large territories in the East and suffer from a Communist regime installed by the Soviet Union.

“Polish Munich”
Although the Polish leadership in the West had no illusions of the consequence of the war for Poland, the result of the Yalta conference were terrible:“VII. POLAND
The following declaration on Poland was agreed by the conference:
"A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of the western part of Poland. The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.
"M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized as a commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganization of the present Government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.
"When a Polish Provisional of Government National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the U.S.S.R., which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States of America will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government National Unity, and will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.
"The three heads of Government consider that the eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometers in favor of Poland. They recognize that Poland must receive substantial accessions in territory in the north and west. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course of the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the peace conference." 41
Poland was more or less let down upon Moscow by its Western allies. The Soviet army and security personnel were very active immediately upon their arrival to the conquered territory. “In Eastern Poland, the bloody situation from between 1939-1941 took places all over again. Armija Krajowa officers, representatives of conspiratory parties and groups, and the intelligence were sent to prisons. Again, transports deporting the condemned took their way to the USSR. The circulation of the Polish press was discontinued; social organizations did not restore their activity. There was constant pressure to move beyond the Curzon line fueled both by the authorities and Ukrainian partisan units.“ 42
During the war, the Soviet regime was continuously building a parallel structure to the Polish government in exile, with seat in London, and its military forces. The objective was to build a strong base for these structures, as it was clear that they would not survive without Soviet support. Creating such positions led through destruction of the Polish resistance, and in particular Armia Krajowa officers. The army suffered heavy losses in direct hits by Soviet military forces. It also lost most of its strength in the Warsaw insurrection.
After the USSR successfully got its way as regards the government of Poland -in spite of Stalin’s Yalta commitments- the door to communizing Poland was opened. It is then little surprising that Poland was bewildered at the statement by the Russian Foreign Ministry of February 12, 2005 that described Yalta as the place where “the allied powers affirmed their shared desire to see Poland strong, free, independent and democratic.“
“Question: Please comment on the assessments that have appeared in Polish media recently of the outcome and consequences of the allied powers' Crimean (Yalta) Conference.
Commentary: We have learned with regret about the attempts being made in Poland and a number of other countries to misinterpret the outcome of the Crimean Conference of the heads of the leading allied powers of the Anti-Hitler Coalition, which concluded these February days 60 years ago.
Its most important result was, as is well known, the agreeing of the plans for the final defeat of the armed forces of Nazi Germany and Japan, and the determination of the basic principles regarding the post-war world arrangement, including the establishment of the United Nations.
It was in Yalta that the allied powers affirmed their shared desire to see Poland strong, free, independent and democratic. As a result of the Yalta-Potsdam arrangement Poland received a substantial increase of its territory on the north and on the west. Security was guaranteed Poland not only by the United States and Britain, but also by the USSR.
Over the postwar decades none other than the Soviet Union was the chief stimulator of the final establishment of the Polish border along the Oder-Neisse line, which found reflection in the treaties on Poland's border with the GDR in July 1950, and subsequently with the FRG in November 1990. The status of the new Polish borders was reconfirmed in the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany of September 12, 1990, of which the Soviet Union was a participant along with the US, Britain and France.
So it's wrong for our Polish partners to complain about Yalta. And then too to "rewrite" the history of World War II by snatching historical events out of the context of that era is an unscrupulous thing to do.“ 43
Besides necessary “pity” to have abused history, stated by Russian side, the argument that “Poland received a substantial increase of its territory on the north and on the west“ merits our attention. A well-versed reader attempting here to look for a mention of the territories lost in the East would be looking for vain.
Like in other cases that were or were not quoted earlier, interpretation of history by Russian authorities differs seriously from interpretation used outside Russian borders. Concerning Yalta we can remit to speech delivered in Riga before Moscow's commemoration by President Bush. President summed up results of conference critically enough. He acknowledged historical responsibility of all participants of Yalta conference including President Roosevelt. Such step has not yet done by Russian side: “For much of Germany, defeat led to freedom. For much of Eastern and Central Europe, victory brought the iron rule of another empire. V-E Day marked the end of fascism, but it did not end oppression. The agreement at Yalta followed in the unjust tradition of Munich and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Once again, when powerful governments negotiated, the freedom of small nations was somehow expendable. Yet this attempt to sacrifice freedom for the sake of stability left a continent divided and unstable. The captivity of millions in Central and Eastern Europe will be remembered as one of the greatest wrongs of history.“ 44
A simple statistics -if ones does not intend to believe in theory of conspiracy- indicates that the Russian perspective of selected past events is not without problems. The reasons for this situation are not to be sought in a lack of understanding of Russia’s own history; our attention should be given to the political ambience of the Putin regime. Current interpretations of the Soviet history in today's Russia mirror this atmosphere quite exactly.
In March, the statement by the Military Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation did not help things, saying that the Katyn massacre did not constitute an act of genocide. Moreover, the Office announced that while it was ready to hand over to Poland a portion of Katyn - related documents, 116 files would remain closed and classified as “top secret.“
The statement by the Seym of Poland of March 22, 2005 reacted to both issues:“Sejm Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej wyra?a r?wnocze?nie ubolewanie, ?e do dzi? zbrodnia katy'ska jest przedmiotem politycznych dzia?a?, zmierzaj?cych do jej zrelatywizowania i pomniejszenia, a tak?e rozmycia odpowiedzialno?ci sprawc?w. Jeste?my przekonani, ?e tylko ujawnienie pe?nej prawdy o zbrodni a tak?e napi?tnowanie i ukaranie wszystkich jej sprawc?w b?dzie s?u?y? zabli?nieniu ran i kszta?towaniu dobros'siedzkich stosunk?w mi?dzy Rzecz?pospolit? Polsk? a Federacj? Rosyjsk?. Pojednanie i przyja?? mi?dzy narodami s? mo?liwe jedynie na fundamencie prawdy i pami?ci, a nie przemilcze?, p??prawd i k?amstw. Dlatego - wierni pami?ci niewinnych ofiar spoczywaj?cych w Katyniu, Miednoje i Charkowie - oczekujemy od narodu rosyjskiego i w?adz Federacji Rosyjskiej ostatecznego uznania ludob?jczego charakteru mordu na polskich je?cach, tak jak to zdefiniowano podczas proces?w w Norymberdze. Oczekujemy te? wyja?nienia wszystkich okoliczno?ci tej zbrodni, a zw?aszcza wskazania miejsca pochowania ogromnej grupy zamordowanych je?c?w, kt?rych grob?w do dzi? nie uda?o si? odnale??. Uwa?amy tak?e, ?e nazwiska wszystkich sprawc?w zbrodni katy'skiej - nie tylko mocodawc?w, ale i wykonawc?w - powinny by? publicznie ujawnione i napi?tnowane. Wyra?amy ubolewanie z powodu umorzenia ?ledztwa w sprawie zbrodni katy'skiej przez prokuratur? Federacji Rosyjskiej. Oczekujemy od strony rosyjskiej wydania wszystkich dokument?w zgromadzonych w trakcie prowadzonych ?ledztw.“ 45
The statement refers to the Nuremberg War Crime Trials, during which the USSR itself described the Katyn massacre as an act of genocide. An act committed by Germans, indeed: “By shooting the Polish prisoners of war in Katyn Forest, the German invaders consistently realised their policy for the physical extermination of the Slav peoples." 46
When the USSR pushed this point through to the agenda of the Nuremberg War Crime Trials, it intended to forever blame the massacre on a false culprit. The ruling by the trial has since caused trouble to Russian officials. It is obvious in reactions by the usually epic Russian Foreign Ministry. In reaction to the statement by the Seym, the Ministry avoids answering the Seym’s demands. It rather quotes earlier statements:“Question: How does Moscow regard the adoption by the Polish Sejm of a resolution calling upon Russia to condemn the execution of the Polish servicemen in 1940?
Commentary: Disclosing the truth about the Katyn crime back in the early 1990s, the leadership of our country took a principled position on this question, which found reflection also in the joint statement of the Russian and Polish presidents as they signed the Treaty on Friendly and Good-Neighborly Cooperation between the two countries on May 22, 1992. We would consider it relevant to quote it:
"The memory of the victims of totalitarianism is sacred. Russia and Poland, condemning the antihuman essence of totalitarianism in all its manifestations, declare their resolve to overcome the negative legacy of the past and to build qualitatively new bilateral relations in the future based on the positive values in the history of both peoples and states as well as on international law, democracy and the observance of human rights."
We also recall the statement of five years ago by then Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Poland Jerzy Buzek at the ceremony on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Katyn tragedy: "Katyn - this symbol of Polish torments - can become a symbol of common memory, a pledge to jointly overcome the difficult part of history for the sake of a common future, for the sake of strengthening the friendly feelings between Poles and Russians and for the sake of building friendly relations between our two counties."
As we understand, these assessments remain relevant to this day.“ 47
In this case, Russian authorities clearly avoided condemning words. Why, then? Although Russia is the legal successor to the USSR, she does not bear responsibility for crimes committed by the Soviet regime. None-the-less, official statements tend to defend past actions by the USSR, regardless of likely and pointless suffering of relations with former Soviet satellites.
Unless changes are made, these relations shall bear the burden of history. Instead of reconciliation, Russia turns to acting outraged dignity that often replaces even the mildest penitence.
The example of Germany can be used here. Since the end of World War II, Germany has shown significant efforts to build trust with the countries that suffered from the Nazi aggression. The image of Willy Brandt kneeling down in front of the memorial of Westerplatte defenders has become a symbol of the Germans‘ genuine plea for forgiveness. Can we imagine Putin in a similar position at Katyn graves…