Erdogan’s Turkey: strategic partner or liability for regional peace?

Turkey had been everyone’s friend as long as its foreign policy was driven by business and economic interest. Over the last couple of years, however, its ‘zero problems’ strategy has become more rhetoric than reality.

Turkey’s
internal problems have come at a time when its regional diplomatic clout seems
to have taken a setback. After warning Assad against attacking
oppressors, Turkey’s arbiter role has been rebuffed by Damascus which now
prefers to deal with the Arab League. A delegation of Arab
officials met Assad in Damascus last Wednesday, holding “frank and
friendly” dialogue. Qatari PM Sheikh Hamad al-Thani, who is heading the Arab
League delegation, noted “the commitment of the
Syrian government to work with the Arab committee to reach a solution.”

The DSCA’s announcement of a potential arms sale to
Turkey reflects Washington’s commitment to consolidating its strategic partnership
with Ankara, a trend that has been marked since Saudi Arabia’s fall from grace
following the terrorist attacks on 9/11, reinforced in the fallout of post-war
Iraq, and re-emphasised more recently with the Jasmine Revolutions.

For
many in Washington, 9/11 marked a break in U.S. foreign policy. The links
between the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks on 9/11 and Saudi Arabia’s religious establishment, the Wahabbis,
dramatically exposed the failings of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East
which had previously relied on Saudi Arabia as a force for “stability” in the
region.

Saudi Arabia,
Washington suddenly discovered, had failed in more than one respect: it had
managed the incredible feat of spreading Muslim extremism and sectarianism without
checking Iranian power, as it once was assumed to be capable of doing in the
aftermath of the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Despite Wahabbi preaching, Iran had
extended its influence beyond Syria and Lebanon, working closely with Sunni
Islamists in Palestine, Turkey and elsewhere.

‘Who would replace Riyadh?’ became one of the
key strategic questions for U.S. policy-makers in the post-9/11 world.

For
many in President Bush’s administration in 2003, the answer seemed Iraq: an
oil-rich country with an educated population and a proud history as the ‘cradle
of civilization.’ Yet, after a controversial war, a bungled post-war occupation
soon instigated a cataclysmic wave of violence and sectarianism. The hopes of a
pro-western democratic Iraq that could immediately spring from the clasp of
Saddam’s tyrannical dictatorship and assume the role of regional lead were left
in ruins.

Iraq optimists may point
today to improved security conditions and increased foreign investment since
2009, suggesting the 2003 vision could still be realized. But if it does, it
will likely take years if not decades.

Turkey, in the meantime,
appeared to be ready in the here and now. And almost overnight, Washington
seemed to notice the country’s understated strengths.

Turkey
is the world’s 17th biggest economy, and one which grew at a faster
rate in 2010 than most of the world’s big economies (with the exception of
China and India). It is,
for all its system’s flaws, a constitutional democracy. The ruling AK party
has roots in both the Islamist and conservative democratic traditions in
Turkey, and governs largely within the frameworks of the secular state Kemal
Atatürk constructed. Erdogan’s power is checked by a fiercely secular army,
albeit one that has gradually lost influence as a result of Turkey’s
democratising trends.

Turkey’s geopolitical position
lends to its role as a ‘bridge’ between east and west. For much of the last two
decades, it has enjoyed strong foreign relations with Israel and Iran, the U.S.
and the EU (it is a long-standing NATO member) as well as Russia and China.
Part of the credit for this must go to Turkey’s charismatic foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu, who has championed a ‘zero problems’
foreign policy intent on making more friends than enemies.

Armed
with these advantages, Washington hopes that Turkey can serve today as a
linchpin for regional peace, a buffer to Iranian influence, and through its
brand of ‘moderate Islam,’ offer the Muslim world an attractive alternative to
Saudi Arabia’s extreme wahabbi ideology.

The
events of the last two weeks, however, may prompt some analysts to think a
little different.

The
revival of the ‘Kurdish problem’ is not merely an issue of terrorism. Turkish
Kurds have increasingly lost faith in Erdogan’s promises, and are antagonizing
for real reform and rights. Continuing tensions between Islamists and secular
groups in Turkey add another layer of complexity, suggesting that the
country’s internal problems are yet to be resolved.

Further
analysis leads to greater concerns. Turkey managed to become everyone’s friend
when its foreign policy was less interventionist, driven more by business and
economics. In the last couple of years, however, its ‘zero problems’ foreign
policy has become more rhetoric than reality. Turkey played a heavy-handed
sectarian role in Iraq’s last elections, backing Ayad Allawi’s largely-Sunni
list Al-Iraqiya against the predominantly Shi’a lists, PM Maliki’s State of Law
and the Sadrist-dominated United Iraqi Alliance. Seen in a non-democracy light,
Turkey’s position on Syria today can also partly be attributed to sectarianism,
given the Allawite nature of Assad’s Baath party. Turkey’s silence on Bahrain
puts it on an equally hypocritical footing as Saudi Arabia, which sent
military forces to quell peaceful protesters in Bahrain and now loudly condemns
Assad resorting to similar means in his attempts to quell protesters in Syria.

A
worrying question emerges here: are the changes in Turkey’s internal dynamics
and its foreign policy two faces of the same trend? Will an increasingly
powerful AKP party take increasingly non-compromising positions at home, and
tend toward a deliberate sectarianism abroad in its attempts to replace Saudi Arabia
as the representative of the Sunni Muslim world? If this indeed proves to be the case
in the coming years, then Washington may find itself disappointed once again
with its latest choice of ‘special partner’ in the Middle East.

About the author

Educated at Oxford and Georgetown Universities, Jaffar Al-Rikabi is a researcher in Middle East politics and economics

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