Title: "MTCR and Proliferation Control for Today and the Future." The dangers of missile proliferation are highlighted in several hot spots in Asia, including North Korea, which
has yet to sign the Missile Technology Control Regime, and India and Pakistan, whose arms race threatens the sanctity of the regime. (920527)

Author: MORSE, JANE A (USIA STAFF WRITER) Date: 19920527

Text:*EPF304 05/27/92 *

MTCR AND PROLIFERATION CONTROL FOR TODAY AND THE FUTURE
(Last in series on Missile Technology Control Regime) (1620)
By Jane A. Morse
USIA Staff Writer
The MTCR and Asia:
Proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction remains a major
concern in Asia.

Of special note is the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea),
because it is now the only country in the world capable of producing
complete MTCR-class missile systems which has not adopted the MTCR
Guidelines for limiting missile proliferation. North Korea has exported
MTCR-class missiles to instable regions; Syria and Iran are among North
Korea's willing customers.

North Korea also appears willing to sell the equipment and technology
necessary to permit other countries to build their own missile systems.
Providing production capability makes it more difficult for the world
community to stop missile programs in the recipient countries, and it
encourages irresponsible suppliers hungry for hard currency to keep their
indigenous missile efforts going.

In addition, North Korea is working on a long-range missile system in the
1000-kilometer class; Libya has already expressed an interest in obtaining
it. If successfully completed, this system will allow North Korea to
target all of the Republic of Korea (South Korea), most of Japan, as well
as many parts of China, including Beijing.

South Asia is a concern primarily for nuclear proliferation reasons, but
there is also the danger that India and Pakistan will compete in missile,
chemical, and biological weapons.

Chinese missile and weapons sales have been a concern to the United States
and other countries, but recently China has taken major steps to join the
international effort to halt proliferation.

This year, China agreed to adhere to the MTCR Guidelines and parameters. It
has also decided to participate in the Biological Weapons Convention,
negotiations to conclude a Chemical Weapons Convention, and the five-power
arms control effort for the Middle East. Of special importance, China on
March 9 acceded to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

Proliferation Concerns Outside of Asia:
The collapse of the Soviet Union has focussed attention on the countries
that inherited Soviet nuclear weapons deployed on their soil. Chief among
these are the Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus. These newly-independent
countries now appear commited to ridding their territories of nuclear
weapons.

Although Russia has pledged to adhere to the MTCR guidelines, its
interpretation of this Regime differs markedly from that of the United
States and other MTCR members. For example, the Russian plan to sell some
200-million-dollars-worth of rocket engine technology to India caused the
U.S. government to announce on May 11 that it would impose sanctions on
trade with a Russian trading firm and an Indian space organization.

Although India said the rockets are needed to carry commercial satellites
into space, U.S. officials noted that the rockets are also capable of
carrying a nuclear warhead beyond the 300-kilometer limit established by
the MTCR.

The United States, however, will continue its discussions with Russia and
India on the matter. If both the Russian and Indian governments agree to
terminate the deal, the United States could consider a waiver of sanctions.

International Nonproliferation Efforts
The MTCR is just one element of an expanding international network of formal
and informal proliferation control efforts that are gaining support from an
ever-growing number of countries. Among these are:

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This treaty entered into force in
1970 and now has 148 signatories. Membership is expanding; powerful
countries such as China and South Africa have joined, and France is about
to join. The goals of this treaty are to prevent the further spread of
nuclear weapons, foster peaceful nuclear cooperation under safeguards, and
encourage negotiations to end the nuclear arms race with a view to general
and complete disarmament.

The Nuclear Suppliers Group. Twenty-seven member countries have agreed to
require "full-scope safeguards" as a condition for nuclear export; that is,
a country receiving any significant, new nuclear-related supplies must have
safeguards on all its nuclear facilities. On April 3, the Group agreed to
control a substantial list of dual-use nuclear equipment and technology.
These steps will produce a stronger institutional framework for nuclear
non-proliferation. They increase the obstacles to acquisition of nuclear
technology by countries seeking nuclear weapons capabilities.

The Australia Group. Chaired by Australia, this group is an informal
arrangement of 22 member states which have established common export
controls for chemical and biological weapons nonproliferation purposes.
The members have adopted a list of 50 chemicals that could be used for
weapons and are adopting export controls on a list of
chemical-weapons-related equipment as well. The Australia Group is in the
process of establishing export controls on certain microorganisms, toxins,
and equipment that could be used in biological weapons programs.

Biological Weapons Convention. This agreement entered into force in 1975
and now has more than 100 signatories. Signatories agree never to develop,
produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire and retain agents or toxins for
other than peaceful purposes, or the weapons, equipment, or means of
delivering such agents or toxins. Existing materials and production
facilities must be destroyed when a country agrees to adhere to the
convention.

Chemical Weapons Convention. This proposed treaty is currently under
negotiation among the 39 members of the United Nations Conference on
Disarmament and the 42 observer countries. When completed, it will ban the
development, acquisition, production, stockpiling, transfer, and use of
chemical weapons. A number of issues are yet to be resolved. These
include ensuring effective verification, monitoring civilian chemical
industries to ensure that they do not produce chemical weapons, designing
an organizational framework that would carry out the terms of the
Convention, working out details on how destruction of chemical weapons
stockpiles and production facilities would be carried out, and protecting
data acquired during inspections. The United States has assigned top
priority to resolving these issues so that the Chemical Weapons Convention
can be ready for signing this year.

Five-Power Conference for Middle East Arms Control.

President Bush
launched this initiative on May 29, 1991, which is known in the United
States as "ACME" (Arms Control Initiative for the Middle East). It calls
for the five major suppliers of conventional arms to the Middle East -- the
United States, France, Great Britain, China, and the countries of the
former Soviet Union -- to establish guidelines for restraining
destabilizing transfers of conventional arms, weapons of mass destruction,
and related equipment and technology. The five have agreed, for the first
time, to move toward more transparency and consultation and to abide by
common guidelines concerning arms transfers.

Five-Power South Asia Nonproliferation Conference. This proposed conference
would deal with proliferation concerns in South Asia. Four (Pakistan,
China, the United States, and the Commonwealth of Independent States) of
five proposed participants have agreed to the conference, and the United
States continues to engage India with a view toward obtaining its
participation as well.

Initiatives in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. In order to
assure that these countries do not become new sources of supply or brain
power for countries seeking weapons of mass destruction, initiatives are
underway to help strengthen export controls, improve nuclear material
accountancy and control and physical protection, and redirect scientists in
meaningful non-military endeavors. So far, U.S. contacts with these
countries have been encouraging.

Is the MTCR the Wave of the Future?
Adhering to MTCR guidelines has become an international norm for those
countries that wish to be regarded as responsible members of the
international community. Countries like North Korea which seek to
circumvent the regime are working against internationally accepted norms.

Countries that associate themselves with the MTCR, either through formal
membership or adherence to the Regime's Guidelines, do so voluntarily as
sovereign states, and they reserve the sovereign right to decide on their
own exports.

Over the years, more and more countries have joined the MTCR as they
recognized the need to contain nuclear terror. They have also concluded
that the limited profits from destabilizing missile exports do not outweigh
the benefits of responsible membership in the international community. Far
from being some sort of superpower invention, nonproliferation arrangements
such as the MTCR have proven their benefits to the entire world community.

From the American viewpoint, nations which make such commitments demonstrate
their commitment to world peace and stability. A country's full, effective
implementation of its nonproliferation commitments will strengthen support
for bilateral cooperation in the United States.

The interdependent world economy depends on rules to function effectively
and safely. These rules are especially important to world stability in the
area of technology transfer and dual-use items, and the MTCR is one example
of a growing international consensus about how best to promote global
peace.

Technology transfer, not the outright transfer of whole missiles, is
becoming the main source of missile proliferation. To keep abreast of
technological and trade developments, the MTCR Annex and Guidelines are
subject to periodic review and updating. The Annex was updated in November
1991. The November 1991 Plenary decided to broaden the scope of the Regime
to cover delivery systems for all weapons of mass destruction, including
chemical and biological weapons, in addition to nuclear weapons. The
parties are actively discussing means to improve their ability to meet this
commitment.

The dangers of missile proliferation were highlighted in the Iran-Iraq War
and the Persian Gulf War, in which civilian populations were targeted by
ballistic missiles. The threats of missile and weapons proliferation
persist, especially in areas plagued by turmoil and instability such as the
Middle East, South Asia, and Northeast Asia. The world community must not
relax its efforts to control proliferation.