(and having reviewed some of the discussion groups that insist on
misquoting me), I though it might be useful to make a couple of reflections
that show just how silly these debates can get.

First lets make the key point – in the battle between
offense and defence, the pendulum keeps swinging.

When I do a discussion with a school group about medieval
weapons and armour, I point out that the fanciest sword is no good, if it can’t
defeat a new style of armour; and the fanciest armour is no good, if offensive
weapons can defeat it. It is always about ‘does this weapon defeat the defence,
or does the defence defeat the weapon’.

In WWII this means two things.

First: that even spectacularly effective offensive aircraft
from 1939 or 1942 are usually hopeless in the same circumstances against
improved defences two years later.

Second: that technological change will require adapting new
methods.

Third: that the 'best' aircraft at a given time, is not necessarily going to do the job best at that time, if other elements of the offence vs defence balance need to be considered!

There were many torpedo bombers of course – from bad carrier
versions, like the Devestator and the Barracuda, to good land versions, like
the Beaufort and the Condor, but for the sake of the argument, I will stick to
the two contrasting torpedo bombers that make the most interesting point about
what worked best when, and why…

To put that in perspective, lets start with the significant
point that the most successful (in terms of tonnage sunk), torpedo bomber of
the war – the Fairey Swordfish – was a technological relict even before the war
began; while the most successful (in terms of being technologically advanced
and impressive to crews) torpedo bomber of the war – the TBM Avenger – was a
complete failure in its first actions!

The Fairey Swordfish is possibly the most amazing/amusing
aircraft of the war. An old style biplane, with a ridiculously slow attack
speed (only 138mph for early versions): it was nonetheless the only allied
combat aircraft to remain in production, and in front line combat squadrons,
throughout the entire war.

Known as the ‘Stringbag’ not because of its old fashioned
wire and fabric construction, but because – like an old ladies string shopping
bag – it could be adapted to an incredible range of loads and tasks: the
Swordfish was as success mainly because it could keep changing its functions.

Operating as a conventional torpedo bomber for the first
half of the war, the Swordfish – despite its antiquated appearance – had
innumerable successes. From sinking the first U-boat sunk, to manning the first
escort carriers, to rocket strikes on miniature submarines in river mouths in
the last days of the war. From disabling the Bismarck and the Italian cruiser
Zara in day actions to allow British battleships to catch them; to the first
radar guided night attacks on ships and submarines of the war. From the
spectacular success in daylight against the anchored French Fleet at Mers El
Kebir, to that at night against the anchored Italian fleet at Taranto. (Where a
mere 21 obsolescent Stringbags sunk or disabled 3 battleships, 2 cruisers, 2
destroyers, several other ships, a dozen seaplanes AND did the sort of damage
to oil an port facilities against a well defended and prepared base during
wartime that the Imperial Japanese Navy conspicuously failed to achieve with
multiple strikes by ten times the number of much more advanced aircraft at an unprepared
and practically defenceless Pearl Harbour during peacetime).

Of course the Swordfish had many failures too… failures that
point to the fact that it HAD to change its role to survive.

The incredible manoeuvrability of the Swordfish meant that
it was probably the only combat aircraft that could have slipped between the
barrage balloons defending the Italian fleet at Taranto, but the appallingly
slow speed meant it often couldn’t catch fast moving ships (like the French
Dunkerque escaping at Mers El Kebir). It’s success against the Bismarck was
partly due to the fact that it flew so incredibly slowly that the Bismarck’s
anti aircraft predictors could not slow down enough, and constantly fired
shells far in advance of the aircraft. Which was fine if there was no fighter
cover! But a few months later the 6 Swordfish that tried to strike the German
battle-cruisers and cruiser running up the Channel in daylight were sitting
ducks to German fighters in daylight (despite some inadequate attempts at
fighter escort). Both the British and German admirals commented very admiringly
of their amazing courage and determination, but very much along the lines of
the French general who witnessed the charge of the Light Brigade at
Balaclava…”it’s magnificent, but it’s not war!”

By 1942 the Swordfish, or its successor the Albacore (which
it outlasted in service in the end), simply could not operate in daylight if
the enemy had any sort of air cover. But the fact that they had Air–Surface
search radar from mid 1941 meant that they remained effective strike aircraft at
night, when the enemy COULDN’T intercept them.

This is where the TBM Avenger must be considered. Certainly
technically the best torpedo bomber of the war, and one that served well into
the 1950’s, it was nonetheless a failure at its first actions. At Midway for
instance, 5 of the 6 available were smashed out of the sky (a much higher loss
percentage than that of the slow and obsolete Devestator torpedo bombers they
were replacing).This is for the simple
reason that even the best and fastest and most advanced torpedo bombers could
not survive against fighter cover in daylight at this stage of the war. (Only
much later in the war when the allies achieved overwhelming superiority could
the Avenger’s operate safely…. But that same circumstance would have mead the
Swordfish or Albacore or Devestator completely successful day torpedo bombers
again, so that is not saying much).

So the Swordfish and Albacore could be considered more
dangerous and unstoppable torpedo aircraft than the much more advanced Avenger
for the two years it took until the Avenger could also operate as a night
bomber. (Or for the 3 years until the Avenger had overwhelming fighter cover to
get it through in daylight.)

Meanwhile of course, the Royal Navy had also adopted the
Avenger, and also fitted it for night strikes. But still found jobs a plenty
that the Swordfish could do, and the Avenger couldn’t.

First and foremost, was escort carriers. They were so small
and slow, that a loaded Avenger usually needed them to be sailing full speed
into the wind for a successful take-off, whereas a loaded Swordfish could often
take off from one at anchor in harbour if there was even a moderate breeze over
the deck. More importantly, if the convoys in the north Atlantic faced rough
weather that tossed the ships up and down dramatically, the Swordfish was slow
and manouvrable enough to continue the flying operations and landings that were
inconceivable to faster more modern aircraft.

Next is flexibility. Swordfish operated successfully as
seaplanes, floatplanes, ski-planes, land planes, and carrier planes. They
operated from land bases too short for other aircraft; from fields too rough
for other aircraft; and from frozen fjords too exposed to the elements for
other aircraft. They flew from catapults on battleships and cruisers, from Merchant
Catapult Ships, from Escort carriers and Fleet carriers. They operated as
torpedo bombers, dive bombers, level bombers, rocket bombers, depth charge
bombers; and in conditions ranging from arctic to desert airstrips, and from
tropical cyclones to Atlantic sleet storms. They operated successfully both day
and night (at a time when few other aircraft could), and continued to be
successfully deployed to new tasks when many younger designs (including some
specifically designed to replace them) failed to adapt to new needs.

After that comes survivability. Everyone was astonished how
much damage a Swordfish could absorb and still come home. Rents, tears, holes
in every surface, the Swordfish would just soldier on. (And could often be
repaired with a few canvas patches hastily glued in place, and sent straight
back into action.) The Swordfish was to aircraft what the USS Yorktown was to
ships!

Finally, the Swordfish was simply the most successful
torpedo bomber of the war. It damaged and sank more warships (German, Italian,
Japanese and French!), more submarines, more merchant ships, more torpedo
boats, more midget subs, more just about anything, than any other single type
of plane in the inventory of either Axis or Allies. On one occasion in Libya,
just three torpedoes from three land based Swordfish sank four ships (2
U-boats, a destroyer and a supply ship). In fact a single Swordfish group
varying between 12 - 27 aircraft operating from Malta sank about half a million
tons of Axis shipping in nine months – pretty much equivalent to the wartime
totals of the Condor, or Judy, or Kate, or Beaufort, or B25, or Dauntless or
Helldiver; and not much short of the total for the Avenger.

So, although there is no doubt that the Avenger was a much
better aircraft; or that the Kate had a much more dramatic impact in its few
short months of effectiveness; or the Beaufighter was incredibly more accurate:
the simple fact is that – in so many ways – the best carrier torpedo bomber of
WWII was a slow, lightly armed, almost completely obsolescent biplane, that
just kept on finding new ways to do things no other aircraft could…

About Me

A professional historian and educator challenges some assumptions.
(A sometimes tongue-in-cheek polemic, with a Socratic emphasis on challenging people to argue back. Please do so... I make some of it outrageous largely to encourage a debate).