INTERVIEW WITH THREE CORRESPONDENTS FROM THE CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY, THE
SAO TANG PAO AND THE HSIN MIN PAO
[1]

September 16, 1939

Correspondent: May we ask for your views on a few questions? We
have read your statement of September 1 in today's New China News; it
covers some of our questions, but there are others on which we would like
you to elaborate. Our written questions are divided into three groups and
we would be glad if you would give us your views on each of them.

Mao Tse-tung: Ishall deal with them according to your
list.

You ask if the War of Resistance has reached the stage of stalemate. I think
it has in a sense--in the sense that there is a new international situation
and that Japan is facing greater difficulties while China has stood firm
against compromise. This does not rule out the possibility that the enemy
may still launch fairly big offensive campaigns; for instance, he may attack
Pakhoi, Changsha or even Sian. When we say that the enemy's large-scale strategic
offensive and our strategic retreat have in a sense largely come to an end,
we do not altogether exclude the possibility of further offensives and retreats.
As for the specific task in the new stage, it is to prepare for the
counter-offensive, and this concept covers everything. That is to say, during
the stage of stalemate China must build up all the strength required for
the future counter-offensive. To prepare for the counter-offensive does not
mean launching it immediately, since it cannot be done unless the conditions
are ripe. What we are talking about is the strategic, and not the tactical,
counter-offensive. Tactical counter-offensives, such as our repulse of the
enemy's "mopping-up" campaigns in southeastern Shansi are not only possible
but absolutely necessary. But the time has not yet arrived for an all-out
strategic counter-offensive, and we are now at the stage of actively preparing
for it. At this stage we shall still have to repulse a certain number of
offensive campaigns the enemy may launch at the front.

To itemize the tasks of the new stage, in the enemy's rear we must keep up
guerrilla warfare, smash his "mopping-up" campaigns and defeat his economic
aggression; at the front we must strengthen our military defences and repulse
any offensive campaign the enemy may launch; in the Great Rear Area the main
thing is to work hard for political reforms. All these form the specific
content of our preparations for the counter-offensive.

Internal political reform is very important because at present the enemy
is mainly carrying on a political offensive, and so we must strengthen our
political resistance in particular. In other words, the problem of democracy
must be solved as soon as possible, for only in this way can we increase
our capacity for political resistance and build up our military strength.
China has to rely mainly on her own efforts in the War of Resistance. We
have stood for regeneration through our own efforts, and this has become
even more important in the new international situation. The essence of such
regeneration is democracy.

Question: Youhave just said that democracy is essential
to winning victory in the War of Resistance through our own efforts. How
can such a system be brought into being in the present circumstances ?

Answer: Dr. Sun Yat-sen originally envisaged the three stages of
military rule, political tutelage and constitutional
government.[2] But in his "Statement on My Departure
for the North" [3] issued shortly before his death,
he no longer spoke of three stages, but said instead that a national assembly
must be convened immediately. This shows that Dr. Sun himself modified his
views many years ago in the light of changing circumstances. In the grave
situation prevailing today, with the War of Resistance going on, both the
early convening of a national assembly and the introduction of democratic
government are imperative for averting the calamity of national subjugation
and for driving out the enemy. Opinions differ on this question. Some say
that the common people are ignorant and democratic government cannot be
introduced. They are wrong. The common people have made very rapid progress
in the war and, given leadership and proper policy, democratic government
can certainly be introduced. For instance, it has been put into practice
in northern China. Most of the heads of districts, townships and the pao
and chia there are chosen by popular vote. Even some county
magistrates have been chosen in this way, and progressive elements and promising
young people have been elected. The question should be thrown open to public
discussion.

In the second group on your list, you raise the question of "restricting
alien parties", that is, the question of the friction in various localities.
Your concern over this matter is justified. There has been some improvement
recently, but fundamentally the situation remains unchanged.

Question: Has the Communist Party made its position on this question
clear to the Central Government?

Answer: We have protested.

Question: In what way?

Answer: Our Party representative, Comrade Chou En-lai, wrote a letter
to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek as early as July. Then again on August 1,
people from all walks of life in Yenan sent a telegram to the Generalissimo
and the National Government, demanding the withdrawal of the "Measures for
Restricting the Activities of Alien Parties", which had been secretly circulated
and which are at the very root of the "friction" in various places.

Question: Has there been any reply from the Central Government?

Answer: No. But it is said that there are also people in the Kuomintang
who disapprove of these measures. As everybody knows, an army that participates
in the common fight against Japan is a friendly army, not an "alien army",
and similarly, a political party that participates in the common fight against
Japan is a friendly party, not an "alien party". There are many parties and
groups taking part in the War of Resistance and, while they vary in strength,
they are fighting in the same cause; surely they must all unite and must
in no circumstances "restrict" one another. Which party is an alien party?
The party of the traitors headed by Wang Ching-wei, the running dog of Japan,
because it has nothing in common politically with the anti-Japanese parties;
that is the kind of party which should be restricted. Between the Kuomintang
and the Communist Party there is common political ground, namely, resistance
to Japanese aggression. Therefore, the problem is to concentrate all our
strength on opposing and checking Japan and Wang Ching-wei, and not on opposing
and checking the Communist Party. This is the only basis for formulating
correct slogans. Wang Ching-wei has three slogans: "Oppose Chiang Kai-shek,"
"Oppose the Communist Party", and "Be friends with Japan". Wang Ching-wei
is the common enemy of the Kuomintang, the Communist Party and the entire
people. But the Communist Party is not the enemy of the Kuomintang, nor is
the Kuomintang the enemy of the Communist Party; they should unite and help
each other rather than oppose or "restrict" each other. The slogans on our
side must be different from Wang Ching-wei's, they must be the opposite of
his and never be confused with them. If he says, "Oppose Chiang Kai-shek",
everyone should support Chiang Kai-shek; if he says, "Oppose the Communist
Party", everyone should unite with the Communist Party; and if he says, "Be
friends with Japan", everyone should resist Japan. We should support whatever
the enemy opposes and oppose whatever the enemy supports. In articles nowadays
people often quote the saying, "Do not sadden your friends and gladden your
enemies." It comes from a letter which Chu Fou, a general under Liu Hsiu
of the Eastern Han Dynasty, wrote to Peng Chung, the prefect of Yuyang. In
context it reads, "Whatever you do, you must be sure that you do not sadden
your friends and gladden your enemies." Chu Pou's words express a clear-cut
political principle which we must never forget.

In your list of questions you also ask about the Communist Party's attitude
to what has come to be known as "friction". I tell you frankly that we are
absolutely opposed to friction between the anti-Japanese parties, which cancels
out their strength. But if anyone persists in using violence against us,
tries to bully us and resorts to repression, the Communist Party will have
to take a firm stand. Our attitude is: We will not attack unless we are attacked;
if we are attacked, we will certainly counter-attack. But our stand is strictly
one of self-defence; no Communist is permitted to go beyond the principle
of self-defence

Question: How about the friction in northern China?

Answer: Chang Yin-wu and Chin Chi-jung are the two expert
friction-mongers there. Chang Yin-wu in Hopei and Chin Chi-jung in Shantung
are simply violating all laws, human or divine, and are scarcely distinguishable
from the traitors. They seldom fight the enemy but often attack the Eighth
Route Army. We have already sent Generalissimo Chiang a mass of indisputable
evidence, such as Chang Yin-wu's orders to his subordinates to attack the
Eighth Route Army

Question: Is there any friction with the New Fourth Army?

Answer: Yes, there is. The incident of the Pingkiang massacre has
shocked the whole nation.

Question: Some people say that the united front is important but
that the Border Region Government should be abolished for the sake of
unification. What do you think of this?

Answer: Nonsense of all sorts is being talked everywhere, the so-called
abolition of the Border Region being one example. The Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia
Border Region is a democratic anti-Japanese base area and is politically
the most progressive region in the whole country. What grounds are there
for abolishing it? Moreover, Generalissimo Chiang long ago recognized the
Border Region and the Executive Yuan of the National Government officially
recognized it as long ago as the winter of the 26th year of the Republic
(1937). China certainly needs to be unified, but it must be unified on the
basis of resistance, unity and progress. If unification is sought on the
opposite basis, the country will perish.

Question: Since there are different interpretations of unification,
is there any possibility of a split between the Kuomintang and the Communist
Party?

Answer: If we are merely talking of possibilities, we can envisage
both the possibility of unity and the possibility of a split, depending on
the attitudes of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, and especially of
the people throughout the country. As far as we Communists are concerned,
we have long made it clear that our policy is co-operation, and that we not
only hope for long-term co-operation but are working hard for it. It is said
that at the Fifth Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the
Kuomintang, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek also declared that domestic problems
should not be solved by force. Confronted with a formidable enemy and bearing
in mind the lessons of the past, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party must
each persist in long-term co-operation and avoid a split. But to avoid all
possibility of a split, political guarantees for long-term co-operation must
be found, namely, perseverance in the War of Resistance and the introduction
of democratic government. With these, unity can be maintained and a split
avoided; it depends on the common effort of the two parties and the whole
nation and the effort must be made. "Persist in resistance and oppose
capitulation", "Persist in unity and oppose a split" and "Persist in progress
and oppose retrogression" -- these are the three great political slogans
our Party put forward in its Manifesto of July 7 this year. In our opinion,
this is the only way China can avoid subjugation and drive out the enemy.
There is no other way.

NOTES

1. The Central News Agency was the official Kuomintang
news agency, the Sao Tang Pao was a paper run by military circles
in the Kuomintang government and the Hsin Min Pao wasone
of the mouthpieces of the national bourgeoisie.

2. See Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Programme of National
Reconstruction. For a long time, the Kuomintang reactionary clique headed
by Chiang Kai-shek sought to justify their ruthless counter-revolutionary
dictatorship by representing it as either the stage of "military rule" or
that of "political tutelage" as envisaged by Dr. Sun.

3. This statement was made by Dr. Sun Yat-sen on November
10, 1924, two days before he left Canton for Peking at the invitation of
Feng Yu-hsiang. In this statement, which won the support of the whole nation,
Dr. Sun reiterated his opposition to imperialism and the warlords and urged
that a national assembly be called to settle the problems facing the country.
Feng Yu-hsiang originally belonged to the Chihli warlord clique, but in the
winter of 1924, when war broke out for the second time between them and the
Fengtien warlord clique, he refused to fight and led his troops back to Peking,
thus causing the downfall of Wu Pei-fu, the actual leader of the Chihli warlords.
It was then that he sent the telegram inviting Dr. Sun to Pelting.