The Human Factor in Pipeline Accidents

Najmedin Meshkati is a professor of civil and environmental engineering at the University of Southern California.

Updated October 28, 2011, 1:49 PM

The proposed Keystone XL pipeline would be one of the longest and most technologically complex pipeline systems in the world. For the foreseeable future, despite increasing levels of computerization and automation, such complex systems will operate under the centralized control of a few human operators.

The action or inaction of human operators in charge of monitoring of pipelined is critical, as a recent disaster in San Bruno, Calif., demonstrates.

Almost all major oil and gas pipeline systems are run by operators who use computer-based workstations in control rooms. According to a major study of pipeline accidents and spills conducted by the National Transportation Safety Board, more than half of such accidents were caused by the operators' action, reaction or inaction. The computer systems can also contribute to accidents, influencing recovery time or affecting the magnitude.

The most recent natural gas pipeline explosion, in San Bruno, Calif., that killed eight people and destroyed three dozen houses last fall, once more highlighted the critical role of human and organizational factors in the safe and spill-free operation of hazardous liquid and gas transmission pipeline systems. According to the N.T.S.B., it was “an organizational accident” that was primarily caused by “a failure of the entire system.”

Thus, before making the decision to build the Keystone XL, we must ensure that it doesn’t become another victim of those factors that have plagued pipeline systems in the U.S. And this can only be done by a total systems reorientation through strengthening the regulatory oversight and improving the management of pipeline technology. Above all, we need to devise a robust organizational and operating system, nurture a strong safety culture and improve human-systems integration.