Naofumi Fujimura, "The influence of electoral
institutions on legislative representation: Evidence fromJapan's single non-transferable vote
and single memeber district systems" Party
Politics, 21 (March 2015), 209-221. [Available at http://ppq.sagepub.com/content/vol21/issue2/]

First paragraph:

In
representative democracies, legislators play a role in representing
constituencies and their interests. What determines how legislators
represent their constituencies? Why do legislators favour specific
constituencies? In particular, why do some legislators concentrate on
targeted constituencies while others advocate general constituencies?

Figures and Table

Figure 1: Percentage of votes needed to win a seat by district magnitude
Table 1: Policy classification in Japan by 12 areas
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the variables
Table 3: Regression analysis of interests represented by legislators
Figure 2: Effects of electoral systems on legislators' representation
Figure 3: Career path of legislators under the SNTV/MMD and SMD/PR systems

Last Paragraph:

This
study has discussed how the types of policies or benefits that
legislators favour differ by electoral systems. The study has
demonstrated that legislators elected in MMD/SNTV were more likely to
represent specific benefits, especially general interests, in targeted
policy areas, while those elected in SMDs were more likely to represent
diverse benefits, especially general interests, in various policy
areas. These results are consistent with the theory proposed by this
study, that electoral systems with higher district magnitude are more
likely to offer electoral incentives for legislators to represent
specific benefits, including particularistic interests in targeted
policy areas, while electoral systems with lower district magnitude are
more likely to provide electoral incentives to represent diverse
benefits, including general interests in various policy areas.