Appeared as a Preface to Robert Faurisson, Mémoire en défense, October 11, 1980

The remarks that follow are sufficiently banal so
that I feel that an apology is in order to reasonable people who may
happen to read them. If there is, nevertheless, good reason to put
them on paper -- and I fear that there is -- this testifies to some
remarkable features of contemporary French intellectual culture.

Before I turn to the subject on which I have been asked to comment,
two clarifications are necessary. The remarks that follow are limited
in two crucial respects. First: I am concerned here solely with a
narrow and specific topic, namely, the right of free expression of
ideas, conclusions and beliefs. I have nothing to say here about the
work of Robert Faurisson or his critics, of which I know very little,
or about the topics they address, concerning which I have no special
knowledge. Second: I will have some harsh (but merited) things to say
about certain segments of the French intelligentsia, who have
demonstrated that they have not the slightest concern for fact or
reason, as I have learned from unpleasant personal experience that I
will not review here. Certainly, what I say does not apply to many
others, who maintain a firm commitment to intellectual integrity. This
is not the place for a detailed account. The tendencies to which I
refer are, I believe, sufficiently significant to merit attention and
concern, but I would not want these comments to be misunderstood as
applying beyond their specific scope.

Some time ago I was asked to sign a petition in defense of Robert
Faurisson's "freedom of speech and expression." The petition said
absolutely nothing about the character, quality or validity of his
research, but restricted itself quite explicitly to a defense of
elementary rights that are taken for granted in democratic societies,
calling upon university and government officials to "do everything
possible to ensure the [Faurisson's] safety and the free exercise of
his legal rights." I signed it without hesitation.

The fact that I had signed the petition aroused a storm of protest
in France. In the Nouvel Observateur, an ex-Stalinist who
has changed allegiance but not intellectual style published a grossly
falsified version of the contents of the petition, amidst a stream of
falsehoods that merit no comment. This, however, I have come to regard
as normal. I was considerably more surprised to read in Esprit
(September 1980) that Pierre Vidal-Naquet found the petition
"scandaleuse," citing specifically that fact that I had signed it (I
omit the discussion of an accompanying article by the editor that
again merits no comment, at least among people who retain a commitment
to elementary values of truth and honesty).

Vidal-Naquet offers exactly one reason for finding the petition,
and my act of signing it, "scandaleuse": the petition, he claims,
presented Faurisson's " 'conclusions' comme si elles etaient
effectivement des decouvertes [as if they had just been discovered]."
Vidal-Naquet's statement is false. The petition simply stated that
Faurisson had presented his "finding," which is uncontroversial,
stating or implying precisely nothing about their value and implying
nothing about their validity. Perhaps Vidal-Naquet was misled by
faulty understanding of the English wording of the petition; that is,
perhaps he misunderstood the English word "findings." It is, of
course, obvious that if I say that someone presented his "findings" I
imply nothing whatsoever about their character or validity; the
statement is perfectly neutral in this respect. I assume that it was
indeed a simple misunderstanding of the text that led Vidal-Naquet to
write what he did, in which case he will, of course, publicly withdraw
that accusation that I (among others) have done something
"scandaleuse" in signing an innocuous civil rights petition of the
sort that all of us sign frequently.

I do not want to discuss individuals. Suppose, then, that some
person does indeed find the petition "scandaleuse," not on the basis
of misreading, but because of what it actually says. Let us suppose
that this person finds Faurisson's ideas offensive, even horrendous,
and finds his scholarship to be a scandal. Let us suppose further that
he is correct in these conclusions -- whether he is or not is plainly
irrelevant in this context. Then we must conclude that the person in
question believes that the petition was "scandaleuse" because
Faurisson should indeed be denied the normal rights of
self-expression, should be barred from the university, should be
subjected to harassment and even violence, etc. Such attitudes are not
uncommon. They are typical, for example of American Communists and no
doubt their counterparts elsewhere. Among people who have learned
something from the 18th century (say, Voltaire) it is a truism, hardly
deserving discussion, that the defense of the right of free expression
is not restricted to ideas one approves of, and that it is precisely
in the case of ideas found most offensive that these rights must be
most vigorously defended. Advocacy of the right to express ideas that
are generally approved is, quite obviously, a matter of no
significance. All of this is well-understood in the United States,
which is why there has been nothing like the Faurisson affair here. In
France, where a civil libertarian tradition is evidently not
well-established and where there have been deep totalitarian strains
among the intelligentsia for many years (collaborationism, the great
influence of Leninism and its offshoots, the near-lunatic character of
the new intellectual right, etc.), matters are apparently quite
different.

For those who are concerned with the state of French intellectual
culture, the Faurisson affair is not without interest. Two comparisons
immediately come to mind. The first is this. I have frequently signed
petitions -- indeed, gone to far greater lengths -- on behalf of
Russian dissidents whose views are absolutely horrendous: advocates of
ongoing U.S. savagery in Indochina, or of policies that would lead to
nuclear war, or of a religious chauvinism that is reminiscent of the
dark ages. No one has ever raised an objection. Should someone have
done so, I would regard this with the same contempt as is deserved by
the behavior of those who denounce the petition in support of
Faurisson's civil rights, and for exactly the same reason. I do not
read the Communist Party press, but I have little doubt that the
commissars and apparatchiks have carefully perused these petitions,
seeking out phrases that could be maliciously misinterpreted, in an
effort to discredit these efforts to prevent the suppression of human
rights. In comparison, when I state that irrespective of his views,
Faurisson's civil rights should be guaranteed, this is taken to be
"scandaleuse" and a great fuss is made about it in France. The reason
for the distinction seems obvious enough. In the case of the Russian
dissidents, the state (our states) approves of supporting them, for
its own reasons, which have little to do with concern for human
rights, needless to say. In the case of Faurisson, however, defense of
his civil rights is not officially approved doctrine -- far from it --
so that segments of the intelligentsia, who are ever eager to line up
and march off to the beat of the drums, do not perceive any need to
take the stance accepted without question in the case of Soviet
dissidents. In France, there may well be other factors: perhaps a
lingering guilt about disgraceful behavior of substantial sectors
under Vichy, the failure to protest the French wars in Indochina, that
lasting impact of Stalinism and more generally Leninist doctrines, the
bizarre and dadaistic character of certain streams of intellectual
life in postwar France which makes rational discourse appear to be
such an odd and unintelligible pastime, the currents of anti-Semitism
that have exploded into violence.

A second comparison also comes to mind. I rarely have much good to
say about the mainstream intelligentsia in the United States, who
generally resemble their counterparts elsewhere. Still, it is very
illuminating to compare the reaction to the Faurisson affair in France
and to the same phenomenon here. In the United States, Arthur Butz
(whom one might regard as the American Faurisson) has not been
subjected to the kind of merciless attack levelled against Faurisson.
When the "no holocaust" historians hold a large international meeting
in the United States, as they did some months ago, there is nothing
like the hysteria that we find in France over the Faurisson affair.
When the American Nazi Party calls for a parade in the largely Jewish
city of Skokie, Illinois -- obviously, pure provocation -- the
American Civil Liberties Union defends their rights (though of course,
the American Communist Party is infuriated). As far as I am aware,
much the same is true in England or Australia, countries which, like
the United States, have a live civil libertarian tradition. Butz and
the rest are sharply criticized and condemned, but without any attack
on their civil rights, to my knowledge. There is no need, in these
countries, for an innocuous petition such as the one that is found
"scandaleuse" in France, and if there were such a petition, it would
surely not be attacked outside of limited and insignificant circles.
The comparison is, again, illuminating. One should try to understand
it. One might argue, perhaps, that Nazism and anti-Semitism are much
more threatening in France. I think that this is true, but it is
simply a reflection of the same factors that led to the Leninism of
substantial sectors of the French intelligentsia for a long period,
their contempt for elementary civil libertarian principles today, and
their current fanaticism in beating the drums for crusades against the
Third World. There are, in short, deep-seated totalitarian strains
that emerge in various guises, a matter well worth further
consideration, I believe.

Let me add a final remark about Faurisson's alleged
"anti-Semitism." Note first that even if Faurisson were to be a rabid
anti-Semite and fanatic pro-Nazi -- such charges have been presented
to me in private correspondence that it would be improper to cite in
detail here -- this would have no bearing whatsoever on the legitimacy
of the defense of his civil rights. On the contrary, it would make it
all the more imperative to defend them since, once again, it has been
a truism for years, indeed centuries, that it is precisely in the case
of horrendous ideas that the right of free expression must be most
vigorously defended; it is easy enough to defend free expression for
those who require no such defense. Putting this central issue aside,
is it true that Faurisson is an anti-Semite or a neo-Nazi? As noted
earlier, I do not know his work very well. But from what I have read
-- largely as a result of the nature of the attacks on him -- I find
no evidence to support either conclusion. Nor do I find credible
evidence in the material that I have read concerning him, either in
the public record or in private correspondence. As far as I can
determine, he is a relatively apolitical liberal of some sort. In
support of the charge of anti-Semitism, I have been informed that
Faurisson is remembered by some schoolmates as having expressed
anti-Semitic sentiments in the 1940s, and as having written a letter
that some interpret as having anti-Semitic implications at the time of
the Algerian war. I am a little surprised that serious people should
put such charges forth -- even in private -- as a sufficient basis for
castigating someone as a long-time and well-known anti-Semitic. I am
aware of nothing in the public record to support such charges. I will
not pursue the exercise, but suppose we were to apply similar
standards to others, asking, for example, what their attitude was
towards the French war in Indochina, or to Stalinism, decades ago.
Perhaps no more need be said.