After a few opening remarks, the Secretary asked Thanat about conditions in Thailand,
remarking that he gathered the Thai are “worried” about their security.
Thanat confirmed this,
indicating that they were worried mainly about U.S. congressional
attitudes which, they fear, might limit the Administration’s ability to
fulfill U.S. commitments.

The Secretary assured him that congressional actions and attitudes would
have no effect on U.S. treaty commitments. Even the Church Amendment was
not a restriction, the Secretary explained, because the Executive would
in any case seek congressional concurrence if it wanted to use combat
troops abroad. Thanat asked why in
that case the Church Amendment was necessary. The Secretary explained
that it was inspired by concern on the Hill about the war in Vietnam and
a feeling that President Johnson and Secretary Rusk
had misled the Congress as we became involved in that conflict,
specifically in their presentation of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. Now he
said they want to be sure that they are properly informed and
consulted.

The Secretary then recalled that the SEATO Treaty contains a provision that in taking action the
signatories will follow their “constitutional processes,” to which
Thanat commented bitterly,
“Yes, an escape clause.” The Secretary continued that the Church
Amendment merely [Page 109]reiterates the
Senate’s expectation that constitutional processes will be
followed.2

Thanat observed that the Church
Amendment refers to introducing “ground combat troops” and noted that
the U.S. already has “troops” in Thailand. He wondered if those troops
had the right to defend themselves. The Secretary explained that from
our viewpoint the Church Amendment had no effect on the activities of
U.S. military personnel now in Thailand who will naturally be expected
to defend themselves if attacked. He said the amendment deals with a
possible land war in Asia and the possibility that we might become
involved in such a war without congressional approval. However, he
repeated we would seek congressional approval in any case, just as had
been done in Korea and as President Johnson thought
he had done in Vietnam through the Tonkin Gulf resolution.

Thanat remarked that the Thai do
not doubt the Administration’s words in offering such reassurances but
that the words of Congress raise doubts. He said he understands there is
a struggle going on between Congress and the Executive for the control
of foreign policy. He thought this was exemplified in congressional
questioning about U.S. activities in Laos, adding that he thought
attacks on U.S. policy in Laos were really intended indirectly for
Thailand.

The Secretary responded that the real target is the Administration, that
congressional attacks represent a feeling that Congress has not been
adequately consulted and their determination that in the future they
will be consulted. He repeated the point that the Executive would, under
any circumstances, feel obliged to consult Congress on any measures that
might involve armed combat.

Thanat asked about the “secret
agreement” (Plan Taksin) and the Rusk–Thanat
communiqué. What is the Administration’s view on these? With regard to
the latter, the Secretary recalled that when he was in Bangkok last year
he reaffirmed the Rusk–Thanat communiqué and added that
subsequent events had not in any way altered that position. As for the
“secret agreement”, he repeated the by-now-standard [Page 110]explanation that we regard this as a
contingency military plan which clearly provides that both governments
must approve before it can be put into effect. He said Congress had been
concerned because it thought it was a “secret treaty” but it is really
no more than a plan. (Thanat then
muttered, “Yes, like an executive agreement.”) The Secretary repeated
that the plan required agreement between the two governments before it
could be put into effect and that we thought of it as coming under the
SEATO Treaty with its provision
for constitutional processes.

Later in the conversation, after other subjects had been discussed,
Thanat reverted to his concern
about Congress, stating that his Prime Minister follows events on
Capitol Hill closely and is worried. He mentioned that Ambassador Unger
had given him (Thanat) shortly
before he left Bangkok a useful memorandum on congressional developments
but said the RTG is not happy. He said,
“We want to establish squarely where responsibility lies.”

The Secretary explained that from our viewpoint there is no problem at
this time. He said that when he was in Bangkok last year there had been
a problem because of strong sentiment in the United States against our
Vietnam war policy, but that the situation was now quite different. He
cited a recent Gallup poll indicating that 64 percent of the people
favored the President’s policy in Vietnam as compared with only 24
percent opposed. Previously he said there had been a problem of
congressional pressure on our Vietnam policy but this was no longer
serious except to the extent that it caused the Thai to be disturbed and
fearful that we might disengage from the region. He elaborated on the
point by comparing U.S. sentiment which had compelled President
Johnson to decide against seeking reelection
with the relative lack of interest in Vietnam today.

The Secretary expressed confidence that there is general public
acceptance today of the President’s policy, of which key elements are
that we will not disengage from our responsibilities in Asia but will
phase down our presence at a rate geared to the ability of local
governments to take over. He mentioned as an example that we now have
many troops in Korea but that, in due course, we will probably want to
reduce them gradually, though not to withdraw them entirely. In any
case, he said, we will not disengage or renege on our treaty
commitments.

Thanat commented that the Thai for
their part would also keep their promise not to call on outside manpower
to help them with their internal insurgency problem, though they will
appreciate continuing U.S. assistance.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POLUS. Secret. Drafted by Dexter; approved by Moore (EA) and Okun (S) on March 12. The memorandum is part 1
of 4; part 2 is Document 49; part 3,
entitled “Thanat Views on
Relations with China,” and part 4, entitled “SEATO Council Meeting,” are not
printed. (National Archives, RG 59,
Central Files 1970–73, POLUS) The meeting was held in the
Secretary’s office.↩

Telegram 19972 to Bangkok,
February 10, complimented Unger on the “lucidity” of his response to Thanat’s concerns as reported in
telegram 1333 from Bangkok (see footnotes
2 and 3, Document 47). It
noted that if “Thanat and
others remain uneasy despite repeated assurances and explanations by
the most authoritative U.S. Govt. spokesmen, then we have little
hope that we could put their fears to rest by prefabricating new
forensic ammunition. On the contrary we conclude that Thai concern
is based largely upon their interpretation of the facts and we
cannot deny that the facts of their situation do indeed give them
reason for concern.” It continued that “we see no profit for either
ourselves or Thai in trying to gloss over the problem by proffering
unrealistic and inflated reassurrances. We cannot rid SEA of all conditions potentially
threatening Thai security and we cannot expand our commitment to
help them beyond what is stated in the SEATO treaty.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 THAI–US)↩