Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted
on the last-mentioned date:

PROCEDURE

1. The case originated in an application (no.
34155/96) against the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights (“the Commission”)
under former Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a national
of the United Kingdom national, G.W. (“the applicant”), on 17 October
1996. The President of the Chamber acceded to the applicant’s request
not to have his name disclosed (Rule 47 § 3 of the Rules of Court).

2. The applicant was represented by Mr B. Albuery,
a lawyer practising in Hampshire. The United Kingdom Government (“the
Government”) were represented by successive Agents, Mr Eaton, Mr Whomersley
and Mr Grainger, all of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

3. He mainly complained under Article 6 § 1 of
the Convention that his naval court-martial did not constitute an independent
and impartial tribunal.

4. The application was transmitted to the Court
on 1 November 1998, when Protocol No. 11 to the Convention came into
force (Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11).

5. The application was allocated to the Third
Section of the Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). Within that
Section, the Chamber that would consider the case (Article 27 § 1 of
the Convention) was constituted as provided in Rule 26 § 1.

6. By a decision of 5 December 2000, the Court
declared the application partly admissible.

7. The parties each filed observations on the
merits (Rule 59 § 1).

8. On 1 November 2000 the Court changed the composition
of its Sections (Rule 25 § 1) and the case was assigned to the newly
composed Fourth Section (Rule 52 § 1) .

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

9. The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in
Portsmouth. In 1980 he joined the Royal Navy.

10. In or around early 1996, he was charged, pursuant
to section 42 of the Naval Discipline Act 1957 (“the 1957 Act”),
with three civilian offences (one under the Theft Act 1968 and two under
the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981). He was also charged, inter alia,
on four counts of misapplication of public property contrary to section
30 of the 1957 Act. The charge sheet was signed by the convening authority,
Rear Admiral N.E. Rankin (Flag Officer Portsmouth).

11. By convening order dated 1 February 1996,
the convening authority acknowledged receipt of the “circumstantial
letter” and ordered the convening of a court-martial for 26 February
1996 (see paragraph 21 below). He appointed the Prosecutor by name (of
lower rank and in the convening authority’s chain of command). He
also appointed the President of the court-martial and the other four
members by name: all were subordinate in rank to the convening officer
but were not in his chain of command. The Judge Advocate was also appointed
by name by the convening authority and was not in the latter’s chain
of command.

12. Advised that he could be represented by a
civilian or naval lawyer, the applicant instructed a civilian lawyer,
his current representative.

13. The court-martial took place on board HMS
NELSON on 18 March 1996 and the applicant pleaded guilty to all charges.
Having presented evidence in mitigation of sentence, he was sentenced, inter alia,
to four months’ imprisonment, to be discharged from the navy and to
stoppages of pay in the sum of 2,655 pounds sterling.

14. By letter dated 19 April 1996 the applicant
was informed that his petition against sentence, which had been reviewed
on behalf of the Admiralty Board by the Naval Secretary/Director General
Naval Manning, had been rejected but that he could request that the
petition be further considered by the Admiralty Board.

He subsequently renewed his petition against
sentence. On 17 May 1996 he was released from prison and by letter dated
7 June 1996 he was notified that his petition had been rejected.

II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE

A. General

15. The law and procedures in respect of naval
courts-martial were contained in the Naval Discipline Act 1957 (“the
1957 Act”) and in certain statutory instruments made under the 1957
Act including the Naval Courts-Martial General Orders (Royal Navy) 1991
(“the 1991 Orders”). Following the Commission’s report in the
case of Findlay
v. the United Kingdom, certain provisions of the 1957 Act were
amended by the Armed Forces Act 1996 (“the 1996 Act”) which Act
came into force on 1 April 1997 (Findlay v. the United Kingdom, no. 22107/93, Commission’s
report of 5 September 1995 and, see also, judgment in that case of 25
February 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-I). Sections A-G below
concern the applicable law and practice prior to the entry into force
of the 1996 Act.

16. Under section 42 of the 1957 Act “civilian”
offences were also offences under the 1957 Act. Accordingly, even if
the charge amounted to a civilian offence, in most cases naval personnel
could be tried on that charge by the naval authorities under the 1957
Act.

B. Composition of a naval court-martial

17. At the material time a naval court-martial
consisted of between 5-9 naval officers not below the rank of lieutenant,
though the rank of the members might have been higher depending on the
rank of the accused. Not all members belonged to the same ship or naval
establishment and the captain and executive officer of the accused’s
ship could not sit on the court-martial.

18. A President of the court-martial was appointed
from the members. A Judge Advocate also took part in every naval court-martial.
The Prosecutor could be a legally qualified naval officer or any other
competent person. In exceptional cases, a civilian lawyer was appointed
to act as Prosecutor.

19. An accused was allowed to engage, inter alia, an officer or civilian counsel (“the accused’s
friend”) who advised the accused, examined the accused if he desired
to give evidence, cross-examined witnesses for the prosecution and examined
witnesses for the defence. If the accused wished to be represented by
a civilian lawyer he could apply to the convening authority for approval
of legal aid.

C. Convening authority

20. The convening authority was an officer authorised
by the Defence Council to convene a court-martial. Appendix 5 to Volume
II of the Manual of Naval Law (published by the naval authorities) gave
a list of officers who could act as convening authority: Commander in
Chief, Fleet; Commander in Chief, Naval Home Command; Flag Officer Plymouth;
Flag Officer Scotland and Northern Ireland; Flag Officer Naval Aviation;
Flag Officer Portsmouth; Flag Officer Surface Flotilla; Flag Officer
Sea Training; Commander UK Task Force; and Commander British Forces
Gibraltar.

21. An application for a court-martial to be held
was generally made to the convening authority by the Commanding Officer
by way of a “circumstantial letter”. This letter reported the circumstances
upon which a charge was based in sufficient detail to show the real
nature and extent of the offence. Any statement made by the accused
in the course of inquiries, during investigation or after he was charged
had to be forwarded in a separate document annexed to the letter. A
charge sheet in the prescribed form, a list of witnesses for the prosecution,
summaries of evidence of those witnesses and a list of exhibits which
the Prosecutor proposed to put in evidence accompanied the letter.

22. Based on the material submitted, the convening
authority decided on the charges to be retained against an accused and,
if he was satisfied with the charge sheet accompanying the circumstantial
letter, he could countersign the charge sheet. He also decided on the
necessity to hold a court-martial on the charges retained. In this latter
respect, the convening authority was guided by the principles issued
by the Director of Public Prosecutions under section 10 of the Prosecution
of Offences Act 1985 and was not to order the holding of a court-martial
unless satisfied that the charges were correct, that the evidence was
sufficient (namely, that there was a realistic prospect of a conviction)
and that there was a “service interest” in trying the matter by
court-martial. In convening the court-martial, the convening authority
appointed the date, time and place for trial.

23. The convening authority appointed the President
and other members of the court-martial. He also appointed, or directed
an officer to appoint, a Judge Advocate and a Prosecutor. He ensured
that the accused was properly assisted. In this latter respect, and
unless the accused wished to represent himself or to instruct civilian
counsel, the convening authority would nominate a competent naval officer
to act as the accused’s friend.

24. The convening authority could, in exceptional
circumstances, countermand the ordering of a court-martial before its
commencement and dissolve a court-martial during the trial if circumstances
arose which, in his opinion, rendered such action necessary (orders
13(2) and 28(2) of the 1991 Orders).

D. Judge Advocates

25. The Judge Advocate of the Fleet was appointed
by the Queen on the recommendation of the Lord Chancellor and was removable
on the same authority for inability or misbehaviour. He had to be a
barrister or advocate of not less than ten years’ standing. He acted
as legal advisor to the Admiralty Board on matters regarding the administration
of justice under the 1957 Act. It was his duty to review all contested
courts-martial whether the verdict was guilty or not guilty and, in
particular, he advised that Board whether a court-martial had been properly
conducted according to law and whether the conviction could stand, he
gave a view on the sentence and he drew attention to any gross errors
or irregularities. He also gave the Chief Naval Judge Advocate his view
as to the manner in which the naval barristers had conducted themselves
as Judge Advocate, Prosecutor and as the accused’s friend. As a result
of the latter advice, “there may well be downstream actions issuing
guidance either specifically or generally” (Manual of Naval Law, Appendix
5).

26. The Chief Naval Judge Advocate was a serving
officer of the rank of captain of the Royal Navy and he was also a barrister.
The Chief Naval Judge Advocate was assisted by a staff of serving naval
officers who were barristers. His duties included assisting and consulting
with the Judge Advocate of the Fleet, advising on the selection and
appointment of naval barristers and sitting as Judge Advocate at naval
courts-martial where the seriousness of the charges, the complexity
of the trial, the rank of the accused or the interests of the Service
so required.

27. In all other cases, a Judge Advocate was appointed
to a court-martial from the staff of the Chief Naval Judge Advocate.

28. Before the trial the Judge Advocate appointed
informed the convening authority of any defect in the constitution of
the court-martial. He advised the court-martial, whether his opinion
was requested or not, upon all questions of law and procedure which
arose and the court-martial had to accept his advice unless there were
weighty reasons for rejecting it, in which case those reasons had to
be recorded.

29. The Judge Advocate had to ensure that the
accused did not suffer any disadvantage during the hearing in consequence
of, inter
alia, the accused’s position, ignorance or incapacity to examine
witnesses. Before the closing of the trial the Judge Advocate summed
up the relevant law and evidence. The Judge Advocate was not present
when the court considered its finding and, if during the court-martial’s
deliberations on the charges further advice was required, the court-martial
had to receive that advice in open court. The Judge Advocate advised
the court-martial on sentence but not in open court.

E. The court-martial hearing

30. The accused could object to any particular
member of the court-martial and to its general constitution. If the
objection to the President was upheld the court had to adjourn until
another was appointed. If an objection to a member was upheld, another
member could be appointed from the “spare members list” and, if
an objection as to the constitution of the court-martial was upheld,
the court-martial had to adjourn and report the matter to the convening
authority. All members of the court and any other officers of the court-martial
had to take a prescribed oath or affirmation (section 60 of the 1955
Act). The opinion of the President and of each member of the court-martial
had to be given orally and on each charge separately, and their opinions
had to be given in order of seniority commencing with the junior in
rank. The vote of the majority determined sentence.

F. Procedure in the event of a plea of guilty

31. Before the court accepted a plea of guilty,
the Judge Advocate had to ensure that the accused understood the charge
to which he had pleaded and the different procedure which would result
from that plea. The Prosecutor then read the circumstantial letter.
Before the court proceeded to deliberate on sentence, the Prosecutor,
whenever possible, called relevant witness evidence on information in
the possession of the naval authorities as to the accused’s background
and history which might have rendered the accused more likely to commit
the offence, as to his service history and as to his previous convictions.
The accused could also give evidence and call witnesses in mitigation.
The court-martial had to take note of the accused’s naval record (for
example, awards for gallantry). The members of the court-martial retired
(with the Judge Advocate) to consider the sentence. The court-martial
did not give reasons for its decision on sentence.

G. Post-hearing matters

32. Having received the report of the finding
and sentence, the convening authority took the necessary steps to give
effect to the sentence (either by a committal order or otherwise) or
he could order the suspension of the sentence pursuant to section 90
of the 1957 Act. Chapter 15 of the Manual of Naval law (Volume II) pointed
out that before the convening authority gave effect to or suspended
the sentence, he (or, inter alia, the Commander in Chief) had to satisfy himself
so far as he was able, that no errors had been made in the conduct of
the court-martial likely, in his opinion, to invalidate the finding
of the court-martial. If he doubted the correctness of the finding,
in fact or in law, or the legality of the sentence, he could not execute
the sentence pending reference to the Defence Council. In such circumstances,
the accused was retained in custody or the sentence was suspended under
section 90 of the Act.

33. The convening authority (among other naval
authorities) could at any time, and had to at intervals of not more
than three months, reconsider any case of suspension and if on reconsideration
it appeared that the conduct of the offender since his conviction had
been such as to justify a remission of sentence, he had to remit the
whole or any part of it (section 92 of the 1957 Act).

34. A certified transcript of the proceedings
was completed and sent through the commander-in-chief or senior naval
officer to the Defence Council. The Defence Council could, at any time,
review a finding of guilt, any sentence awarded in respect of such a
finding and any finding by a court-martial that a person was unfit to
stand trial or was not guilty by reason of insanity. This had to be
done by the Defence Council in the case of a court-martial as soon as
practicable after the receipt of the record of proceedings (section
70(1) of the 1957 Act).

35. A convicted person could also petition the
Defence Council against the findings or sentence or both (section 70(2)
of the 1957 Act). Having reviewed the petition, the Defence Council
could, inter
alia, quash or alter findings, authorise a re-trial and annul,
remit or alter sentences. However, those powers could be, and were normally,
carried out by the Admiralty Board or by any officer so empowered by
the Admiralty Board. Once an appeal was lodged with the Courts-Martial
Appeal Court, the review functions of the Defence Council ceased.

36. The Courts-Martial Appeal Court (“CMAC”)
was established by the Courts-Martial (Appeals) Act 1951 and was confirmed
by the Courts-Martial (Appeals) Act 1968. The CMAC had the same status
and, in essence, the same procedure as the Criminal Division of the
Court of Appeal and considered appeals from courts-martial. The judges
of this court included ordinary and ex officio judges of the Court of Appeal and such judges of
the High Court as were nominated by the Lord Chief Justice. There was
no provision for an appeal against sentence only, although certain powers
of revising such sentences, pursuant to an appeal against conviction,
were available to the CMAC. Once an application to the CMAC was received
by the Registrar of the CMAC, the Defence Council’s duty to review
ceases.

H. The Armed Forces Act 1996

37. The changes to the naval court-martial system
brought about by this Act are set out in the Court’s judgment in the
case of Grieves
v. the United Kingdom ([GC], no. 57067/00, §§ 16-62, ECHR 2003-XII).

THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6
§ 1 OF THE CONVENTION

38. The applicant complained under this provision
that he did not have a fair hearing by an independent and impartial
tribunal established by law.

He submitted that his court-martial was neither
independent nor impartial within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 because
of its structure and, notably, the role of the convening authority including
the latter’s institutional connection with the prosecution and with
the members of the court-martial.

39. Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, in so far
as relevant, reads as follows:

“In the determination ... of any criminal charge
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by an independent
and impartial tribunal established by law. ...”

40. The Government maintained that the present
court-martial did not have the same deficiencies as were found to be
in violation of Article 6 § 1 in the above-cited Findlay judgment. After the adoption of the Commission’s
Report in the Findlay case (on 5 September 1995), the Royal Navy ensured
that the members of its courts-martial (including the present one) were
not in the convening authority’s chain of command. The applicant could
have challenged the composition of his court-martial but did not do
so. In addition, the “confirming stage” of a court-martial, criticised
in the Findlay
judgment, did not exist in the naval system. Moreover, a finding of
guilt was reviewed by a Reviewing Authority which was independent of
the court-martial process: while the Court in its Findlay judgment expressed concerns about the post-trial procedure,
that procedure did not affect the independence and impartiality of the
court-martial which tried the applicant.

41. The Court considers that Article 6 § 1 applies
to the applicant’s proceedings since they involved the determination
of his sentence following a plea of guilty to criminal charges. In this
latter respect, it is noted that he was charged with, inter alia, one charge under the Theft Act 1968 and two charges
under the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981 and that he was sentenced
to four months’ imprisonment (Engel and Others v. the Netherlands judgment of 8 June 1976,
Series A no. 22, §§ 82-83, the above-cited Findlay judgment, § 69, Ezeh and Connors v. the United Kingdom [GC], Nos. 39665/98
and 40086/98, §§ 69-130, ECHR 2003-X and Cooper v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 48843/99, § 80, ECHR 2003-XII).

42. The Court recalls that in order to establish
whether a tribunal can be considered “independent”, regard must
be had, inter
alia, to the manner of appointment of its members and their term
of office, to the existence of guarantees against outside pressures
and to the question whether the body presents an appearance of independence.
In this latter respect, it is also recalled that what is at stake is
the confidence which such tribunals in a democratic society must inspire
in the public and above all, as far as criminal proceedings are concerned,
in the accused. In deciding whether there is a legitimate reason to
fear that a particular court lacked independence or impartiality, the
standpoint of the accused is important without being decisive. What
is decisive is whether his doubts can be held to be objectively justified.
There are two aspects to this question: the tribunal must be subjectively
free of personal prejudice or bias and must also be impartial from an
objective viewpoint in that it must offer sufficient guarantees to exclude
any legitimate doubt in this respect (the above-cited Cooper judgment, at § 104).

Since the concepts of independence and impartiality
are closely linked, the Court will consider them together in the present
case. In addition, the present applicant did not suggest that anyone
involved in his court-martial process was subjectively biased against
him: accordingly it is the objective impartiality and independence of
the tribunal which is at issue.

43. In the Findlay judgment (cited above), the Court concluded that the
applicant’s misgivings about the independence and impartiality of
his army general court-martial, convened prior to the entry into force
of the 1996 Act, had been objectively justified. It was mainly concerned
about the conflicting roles of the “convening officer”: he had a
key prosecuting role but at the same time appointed the members of the
court-martial who were subordinate in rank to him and fell within his
chain of command. He also had the power to dissolve the court-martial
before or during the trial and acted as “confirming officer” after
the trial so that a court-martial’s verdict and sentence were not
effective until “confirmed” by that officer.

44. Following the Findlay judgment, the Commission examined the independence
and impartiality of a naval court-martial in the case of Lane v. the United Kingdom (no. 27347/95, Commission’s report
of 21 October 1998, unpublished) and found no relevant or significant
differences between the role of the convening authority in the organisation
of the naval court-martial and of the convening officer in the court-martial
at issue in the Findlay case. The convening authority was central to the prosecution
in naval courts-martial and similar connections in rank and command
structure existed between the members of naval courts-martial and that
authority. The Commission also noted that the naval convening authority
could also countermand the ordering of a court-martial before its commencement
and dissolve a court-martial during the trial (orders 13(2) and 28(2)
of the 1991 Orders). While the post court-martial “confirming” stage
did not exist in the naval court-martial procedure (a point raised by
the Government in the present case), the Commission observed that the
convening authority retained extensive powers as regards suspending
a sentence (sections 90 and 92 of the 1957 Act). The same limitations
attached to the Judge Advocate’s role in naval courts-martial as applied
in air force and army courts-martial – he was not a member of the
court-martial and his advice on sentence was not made public.

The Commission concluded, for the reasons expressed
in detail in the above-cited Findlay judgment of the Court, that Mr Lane’s naval court-martial
did not fulfil the independence and impartiality requirements of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention (see also B.E.V. v. the United Kingdom, no. 29717/96, Commission’s report
of 21 October 1998, unpublished).

45. The Court finds no reason to depart from the
conclusions of the Commission in the Lane case as regards the structural independence and impartiality
of a naval court-martial convened under the 1957 Act. It would add the
following three points.

46. In the first place, it is true that the present
court-martial was convened in such as way as to avoid a chain of command
connection between the members of the applicant’s court-martial and
the convening authority. However, the Findlay judgment also referred in that context to the superiority
in rank of the convening officer, which was the position in the present
case. While the Government suggested that the applicant should have
challenged the composition of the court-martial, they did not indicate
on what basis he could have done so when he did not question the subjective
impartiality of any member and when the court-martial was convened in
accordance with domestic law.

47. Secondly, the naval court-martial system at
issue in the present case was amended by the 1996 Act to take account
of the above-described conclusions in the Findlay judgment. In particular, the prosecuting, convening
and adjudication roles of the former convening authority were divided
between separate authorities. However, the Court has recently found
even this new system to give rise to objective independence and impartiality
issues constituting a violation of Article 6 § 1 (the above-cited Grieves v. the
United Kingdom judgment): the current naval system still provided
insufficient guarantees of independence and impartiality, in particular,
because it did not have the added guarantees of a civilian Judge Advocate
and of a Permanent President (the Grieves case, §§ 80-89), positions for which the 1957 Act
did not provide.

48. Thirdly, the Government maintained that, according
to the Findlay
judgment, the post-trial review procedure did not affect the independence
and impartiality of the court-martial. However, in its subsequent Cooper
judgment (cited above), the Court referred to the anomalous nature of
the post-trial reviewing authority and expressed its concern about a
criminal procedure which empowered a non-judicial authority to interfere
with judicial findings. Since the final decision in Mr Cooper’s domestic
proceedings lay with a judicial authority (the Courts-Martial Appeal
Court), the role of the post-trial reviewing authority was not considered
to breach the independence and impartiality requirements of Article
6 § 1 (the above-cited Cooper case, §§ 130-133). However, in the present case, the
applicant pleaded guilty and did not therefore have access to the Courts-Martial
Appeal Court on sentence: the final decision in the applicant’s proceedings
did not therefore lie with a judicial authority.

49. In such circumstances, the Court considers
it evident that the court-martial system convened under the 1957 Act
to try the applicant did not fulfil the requirements of independence
and impartiality of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. Indeed, in their
observations following the Grieves judgment, the Government did not suggest that it did.

The applicant’s court-martial proceedings were
consequently unfair (the Grieves case, § 91) and it is not considered necessary also
to examine his additional submissions about the fairness of the proceedings
including the reasonableness of the decision against him and the lack
of a non-custodial sentencing option.

II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF
THE CONVENTION

50. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation
of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law
of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation
to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction
to the injured party.”

A. Damage

51. The applicant claimed certain sums of money
in respect of both pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss referring to the
loss of his job and home and to the consequent financial difficulties,
suffering and distress for him and his family. The Government argued, inter alia,
that the consistent case-law was to the effect that there were no grounds
for believing that the applicant would not have suffered the same or
similar consequences if the court-martial had been organised to comply
with Article 6 § 1 and submitted that no causal link had been established
between the breach of the Convention alleged and the losses claimed
(Wilkinson
and Allen v. the United Kingdom, nos. 31145/96 and 35580/97, § 33,
6 February 2001).

52. The Court recalls that in the above-cited Findlay
judgment it decided not to award compensation for either pecuniary or
non-pecuniary damage on the ground that it was impossible to speculate
as to the outcome of the court-martial proceedings had the violation
of the Convention not occurred (at §§ 85 and 88. See also the above-cited Wilkinson and
Allen case, § 33, Coyne v. the United Kingdom judgment of 24 September 1997, Reports
1997-V, § 62 and Cable and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 24436/94 et
seq. § 26, 18 February 1999).

53. In such circumstances, the Court considers
that it is inappropriate to award the applicant compensation for the
pecuniary loss to which he referred and that the finding of a violation
in itself affords him sufficient reparation for any non-pecuniary damage
suffered.

B. Costs and expenses

54. The applicant also claimed the sum (inclusive
of value added-tax – “VAT”) of 2259.03 pounds sterling (GBP) for
legal costs and expenses. The bill of costs (submitted with his claim
for just satisfaction in January 2001) indicated the work done by the
partner on the case (assisted by a trainee solicitor) since 1996, the
differing charge out rates applicable (GBP 52-68 for the successive
trainees and GBP 125-148 for the partner) and the other outlay and expenses.
The Government maintained that the case was not complex for representatives
who were experienced in court-martial matters and they did not consider
that fees incurred during telephone calls to the media were necessarily
or reasonably incurred. They suggested that the sum of GBP 1500 (inclusive
of VAT) would be a reasonable sum.

55. The Court recalls that, according to the criteria
laid down in its case-law, it must ascertain whether the sum claimed
in costs and expenses was actually and necessarily incurred and was
reasonable as to quantum (Witold Litwa v. Poland, no. 26629/95, § 88, ECHR 2000-III). The
Court does not consider the case a particularly complex one given the
adoption of the Findlay judgment and its application by the Commission (in
the above-cited Lane and B.E.V. cases) prior to the admissibility of the present case.
On the other hand, the applicant’s bill of costs was very detailed
and was submitted as early as January 2001 following which certain work
was required by the Court on the case and, in particular, on observations
requested by the Court following the adoption of the above-cited Grieves
judgment.

56. Making its assessment on an equitable basis,
the Court considers it reasonable to award the applicant EUR 2900 for
his costs and expenses (inclusive of VAT), to be converted into pounds
sterling at the date of settlement.

C. Default interest

57. The Court considers it appropriate that the
default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the
European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

1. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention;

2. Holds that the finding of a violation constitutes in itself
sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage sustained
by the applicant;

3. Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay
the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment
becomes final according to Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 2900
(two thousand nine hundred euros) in respect of costs and expenses,
to be converted into pounds sterling at the rate applicable at the date
of settlement;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned
three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the
above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European
Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just
satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing
on 15 June 2004, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.