The Nicaraguan Conflict

President Suazo Córdova had foreshadowed the Honduran ambivalence
toward the Contras in a July 1983 letter to President Reagan, in which
Suazo Córdova stated that "our people are beginning to ask with
greater vigor if it is convenient to our own interests to be so
intimately linked to the interests of the United States if we receive so
little in exchange." Although 1983 and 1985 public opinion polls
had shown that a majority of Hondurans supported United States policy in
Central America, there was still a growing uneasiness over the country's
role as reluctant host to Nicaraguan rebel forces. At the height of the
conflict with the Sandinista Popular Army (Ejercito Popular
Sandinista--EPS), in the mid 1980s the Contra forces reportedly totaled
between 12,000 and 17,000, depending on the source of the estimate. This
force level rivaled that of the entire Honduran armed forces. This fact
and the continued close ties between Honduras and the United States made
it doubtful that the armed forces would expel the Nicaraguan rebels from
Honduran territory by force. However, the prospect of an EPS victory
over the Contras, which most observers considered inevitable, raised the
disturbing prospect of a foreign armed force trapped on Honduran soil.
Most Hondurans believed that, under such circumstances, the Nicaraguans
would fail to assimilate well into the Honduran population and would
resort to banditry in order to survive. Honduran politicians reflected
little faith in the willingness of the United States to assist them
should events take such a negative turn. Most believed that, following a
Contra defeat, Washington would cut its losses and withdraw all support
from the group.

Continued and sharply increased United States military aid to
Honduras was the counterbalance to the prospect of United States
withdrawal from the Nicaraguan conflict. For the years 1975-80, the
total aid to Honduras had been US$16.3 million. From 1981-85, the total
reached US$169 million. Meanwhile, the percentage of the military budget
coming directly or indirectly from the United States increased from 7
percent in 1980 to 76 percent in 1985.

As the Nicaraguan conflict spread, Hondurans were left to ponder the
merits of the deal the armed forces had brokered. On March 22, 1986,
approximately 1,500 EPS ground troops crossed the Honduran border and
engaged Contra forces near the hamlet of Las Vegas. The EPS withdrew
into northern Nicaragua without making contact with Honduran forces.
Honduran officials acknowledged the incursion publicly, but only after
United States spokespersons had trumpeted the incident as proof of the
Sandinistas' aggressive intentions toward their northern neighbor.
Shortly thereafter, the United States Congress approved US$100 million
in military aid to the Contra forces. Other EPS incursions into Honduran
territory followed, notably in December 1986 and June 1987. How much
human suffering passed in the frontier region without public notice by
any government remained unknown. As in decades past, the spillover of
the Nicaraguan conflict into more peaceful Honduras demonstrated the
interrelatedness of events in all of the states of Central America.