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Re: Ukraine accuses Russia of Occupation calls for help from US/UK

Originally Posted by Man of Context

I don't see Crimean independence as being something even the Crimeans want. This whole episode is predicated on Russian culture's preoccupation with pretending to be a major world power again, and the desire of ethnic Russians in Ukraine to remain part of the Russian orbit.

It wasn't a conquest because we made no plans to formally (or even informally) incorporate the territory into our system of government.

Crimea is predominately ethnically Russian, and out right annexation would be diplomatically bad, leaving Crimea and other potential Ukrainian areas the option of becoming independent like South Ossetia and Transnistria. Russia will recognize the independence and protect them from outside agression

Happy Hanukkah Cheerfull Kwanzaa
Happy Christmas Merry New Year Festivus for the rest of us

Re: Ukraine accuses Russia of Occupation calls for help from US/UK

Originally Posted by Lord Tammerlain

Crimea is predominately ethnically Russian, and out right annexation would be diplomatically bad, leaving Crimea and other potential Ukrainian areas the option of becoming independent like South Ossetia and Transnistria. Russia will recognize the independence and protect them from outside agression

Re: Ukraine accuses Russia of Occupation calls for help from US/UK

Originally Posted by Lord Tammerlain

Crimea is predominately ethnically Russian, and out right annexation would be diplomatically bad, leaving Crimea and other potential Ukrainian areas the option of becoming independent like South Ossetia and Transnistria. Russia will recognize the independence and protect them from outside agression

This line of discussion is pretty moot, really.

That said, I'm fine with moot discussions.

The vital difference between South Ossetia, Transnistria, and Crimea is that, as you said, Crimea is predominately Russian. Even in the case that Crimea became independent, I believe the endgame would be absorption into Russia.

Re: Ukraine accuses Russia of Occupation calls for help from US/UK

Originally Posted by Man of Context

This line of discussion is pretty moot, really.

That said, I'm fine with moot discussions.

The vital difference between South Ossetia, Transnistria, and Crimea is that, as you said, Crimea is predominately Russian. Even in the case that Crimea became independent, I believe the endgame would be absorption into Russia.

Over time probably but that would be a 10 year project rather then just a few months or weeks.

Of course my theory only stands provided the Ukraine does not end up with open warfare

Happy Hanukkah Cheerfull Kwanzaa
Happy Christmas Merry New Year Festivus for the rest of us

Re: Ukraine accuses Russia of Occupation calls for help from US/UK

The Ukraine situation remains a bad one. Even if Russia had not intervened, the country was ethnically divided. Those divisions could well have led to a split of the country following the political revolution that took place in Kiev. When central authority declines, the risk of fragmentation of such divided states can be high. Such fragmentation does not always take place peacefully, either. Czechoslovakia was a benign exception. Yugoslavia was a more common example.

Even if Russia withdraws its forces from Crimea (while making clear that it will defend its naval base at Sevastopol against any efforts to dislodge it), putting Ukraine back together as a single country is not an assured outcome. Events may have run to far ahead to allow that to happen. Some kind of political arrangement of autonomous regions within a loose Ukrainian confederation might be feasible (though I have my doubts about that given the parties’ profound differences and mistrust).

Tragically, as has happened time and again over the past decade, the U.S. was caught flat-footed and quickly fell behind the curve of events. The vital “what if” questions concerning the political revolution were not asked, much less addressed. The underlying assumption was that the political revolution against a leader widely opposed in western Ukraine but widely supported in eastern Ukraine would magically lead to a stable and democratic Ukraine. Another underlying assumption was that Russia would ignore whatever its interests were, including its doctrine of a compatriot foreign policy where it has asserted itself as a protector of ethnic Russian peoples in its near abroad. Such idealistic assumptions have become a hallmark of recent American foreign policy. Examples include the misplaced notion that the Syrian revolt (as opposed to the street demonstrations that preceded it) has a democratic nature, the “Arab Spring” was about democracy and would lead to stability, etc.

This problem is not solely the responsibility of the Obama Administration. It extends at least as far back as the Bush Administration. The Bush Administration had a neoconservative doctrine, but that doctrine was based on the flawed assumption of a unilateral world and American preeminence. It invited overreach. The excesses of that overreach were increasingly negative perceptions of the U.S. abroad and loss of trust of U.S. intentions. By President Bush’s second term, that doctrine was in shambles and increasingly disregarded, but the damage was largely done. That doctrine was increasingly replaced by ad hoc decision making.

Consequently, U.S. foreign policy has been running on auto pilot for nearly a decade. There has been no clear and coherent doctrine to provide guidance. Absent such a doctrine, there is no strategic direction. Instead, decisions are made ad hoc, inconsistently, and often without much though given to the larger structural dynamics driving events. Resources (fiscal, economic, and military) are allocated inefficiently and outcomes fall far short of what might otherwise be attainable. Certain nations view the U.S. as a great power on the cusp of decline or early stages of decline in terms of its power and influence. That friendly leaders in Israel and Egypt were treated with relative indifference compared to past U.S. bilateral relations raised questions about American reliability.

IMO, Crimea is probably lost to Ukraine. Economic sanctions and expulsion of Russia from the G-8 won’t change that, even as some measures need to be undertaken to mitigate damage to American credibility, as the ethnic Russian majority there almost certainly wants out of Ukraine. Their success in separating from Ukraine might embolden other sections in eastern Ukraine to follow suit.

Going forward, either the current Administration or next one would do well to address the nation’s current foreign policy vacuum. Putting together a panel led by distinguished diplomats and national security authorities—examples might include Madeleine Albright, Henry Kissinger, Dennis Ross, Brent Scowcroft, etc.—to devise a coherent foreign policy doctrine would be a first step. The next step would involve aligning fiscal priorities (including research investments and space technology research) and the nation’s military posture with that doctrine. Alignment is crucial. The proposed reductions in U.S. manpower are inconsistent with the United States’ maintaining a capacity to help manage a balance of power compatible with the nation’s interests and those of its allies. Those planned reductions can only reduce American power vis-à-vis the rest of the world, especially as the conventional military technology gap is possibly narrowing courtesy of the information revolution and increasing military R&D overseas. The continued managed retreat of the U.S. from scientific research via real (after-inflation) research funding failing to keep pace with inflation could increase the risk that a qualitative breakthrough in some military technology could well occur overseas at some point in time.

Finally, neo-isolationism is not a viable solution. It is an “escapist” approach that amounts to abdication of American interests. It is an approach that would foster a power vacuum in the wake of a retreating U.S., and that vacuum won’t necessarily lead to a more secure world, much less greater respect for U.S. interests.

Re: Ukraine accuses Russia of Occupation calls for help from US/UK

Originally Posted by donsutherland1

The Ukraine situation remains a bad one. Even if Russia had not intervened, the country was ethnically divided. Those divisions could well have led to a split of the country following the political revolution that took place in Kiev. When central authority declines, the risk of fragmentation of such divided states can be high. Such fragmentation does not always take place peacefully, either. Czechoslovakia was a benign exception. Yugoslavia was a more common example.

Even if Russia withdraws its forces from Crimea (while making clear that it will defend its naval base at Sevastopol against any efforts to dislodge it), putting Ukraine back together as a single country is not an assured outcome. Events may have run to far ahead to allow that to happen. Some kind of political arrangement of autonomous regions within a loose Ukrainian confederation might be feasible (though I have my doubts about that given the parties’ profound differences and mistrust).

Tragically, as has happened time and again over the past decade, the U.S. was caught flat-footed and quickly fell behind the curve of events. The vital “what if” questions concerning the political revolution were not asked, much less addressed. The underlying assumption was that the political revolution against a leader widely opposed in western Ukraine but widely supported in eastern Ukraine would magically lead to a stable and democratic Ukraine. Another underlying assumption was that Russia would ignore whatever its interests were, including its doctrine of a compatriot foreign policy where it has asserted itself as a protector of ethnic Russian peoples in its near abroad. Such idealistic assumptions have become a hallmark of recent American foreign policy. Examples include the misplaced notion that the Syrian revolt (as opposed to the street demonstrations that preceded it) has a democratic nature, the “Arab Spring” was about democracy and would lead to stability, etc.

This problem is not solely the responsibility of the Obama Administration. It extends at least as far back as the Bush Administration. The Bush Administration had a neoconservative doctrine, but that doctrine was based on the flawed assumption of a unilateral world and American preeminence. It invited overreach. The excesses of that overreach were increasingly negative perceptions of the U.S. abroad and loss of trust of U.S. intentions. By President Bush’s second term, that doctrine was in shambles and increasingly disregarded, but the damage was largely done. That doctrine was increasingly replaced by ad hoc decision making.

Consequently, U.S. foreign policy has been running on auto pilot for nearly a decade. There has been no clear and coherent doctrine to provide guidance. Absent such a doctrine, there is no strategic direction. Instead, decisions are made ad hoc, inconsistently, and often without much though given to the larger structural dynamics driving events. Resources (fiscal, economic, and military) are allocated inefficiently and outcomes fall far short of what might otherwise be attainable. Certain nations view the U.S. as a great power on the cusp of decline or early stages of decline in terms of its power and influence. That friendly leaders in Israel and Egypt were treated with relative indifference compared to past U.S. bilateral relations raised questions about American reliability.

IMO, Crimea is probably lost to Ukraine. Economic sanctions and expulsion of Russia from the G-8 won’t change that, even as some measures need to be undertaken to mitigate damage to American credibility, as the ethnic Russian majority there almost certainly wants out of Ukraine. Their success in separating from Ukraine might embolden other sections in eastern Ukraine to follow suit.

Going forward, either the current Administration or next one would do well to address the nation’s current foreign policy vacuum. Putting together a panel led by distinguished diplomats and national security authorities—examples might include Madeleine Albright, Henry Kissinger, Dennis Ross, Brent Scowcroft, etc.—to devise a coherent foreign policy doctrine would be a first step. The next step would involve aligning fiscal priorities (including research investments and space technology research) and the nation’s military posture with that doctrine. Alignment is crucial. The proposed reductions in U.S. manpower are inconsistent with the United States’ maintaining a capacity to help manage a balance of power compatible with the nation’s interests and those of its allies. Those planned reductions can only reduce American power vis-à-vis the rest of the world, especially as the conventional military technology gap is possibly narrowing courtesy of the information revolution and increasing military R&D overseas. The continued managed retreat of the U.S. from scientific research via real (after-inflation) research funding failing to keep pace with inflation could increase the risk that a qualitative breakthrough in some military technology could well occur overseas at some point in time.

Finally, neo-isolationism is not a viable solution. It is an “escapist” approach that amounts to abdication of American interests. It is an approach that would foster a power vacuum in the wake of a retreating U.S., and that vacuum won’t necessarily lead to a more secure world, much less greater respect for U.S. interests.

Where do you think Putin will get the money to run Russia once the Europeans sanction him? Russia is not the USSR which was autonomous of trade with other nations. Putin is not stupid and knows he will lose his office if he crashes the Russian economy which now depends on oil and gas exports to survive.