The standoff between Chinese and Indian forces near the trijunction with Bhutan is a live, and sensitive, issue for all three countries. It has also given rise to considerable misinformation. The facts of the matter are that on June 16, Chinese forces attempted to extend a road southwards in territory that China disputes with Bhutan, immediately adjacent to India. This extension traversed a narrow gap between an Indian military outpost in Sikkim and a steep gorge in the disputed territory. Confronted by a Royal Bhutan Army patrol, the Chinese construction party attempted to push forward, involving Indian forces stationed only a few hundred meters away. On June 20, Bhutan protested officially to the Chinese government. An unarmed military standoff between Chinese and Indian forces has since continued.

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By Dhruva Jaishankar
The standoff between Chinese and Indian forces near the trijunction with Bhutan is a live, and sensitive, issue for all three countries. It has also given rise to considerable misinformation. The facts of the matter are that on June 16, Chinese forces attempted to extend a road southwards in territory that China disputes with Bhutan, immediately adjacent to India. This extension traversed a narrow gap between an Indian military outpost in Sikkim and a steep gorge in the disputed territory. Confronted by a Royal Bhutan Army patrol, the Chinese construction party attempted to push forward, involving Indian forces stationed only a few hundred meters away. On June 20, Bhutan protested officially to the Chinese government. An unarmed military standoff between Chinese and Indian forces has since continued.
To read more, please click here By Dhruva Jaishankar
The standoff between Chinese and Indian forces near the trijunction with Bhutan is a live, and sensitive, issue for all three countries. It has also given rise to considerable misinformation. The facts of the matter are that ... https://www.brookings.edu/research/indian-strategy-in-a-non-strategic-age/Indian Strategy in a Non-Strategic Agehttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/427892864/0/brookingsrss/topics/nationalsecurity~Indian-Strategy-in-a-NonStrategic-Age/
Wed, 09 Aug 2017 11:01:26 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?post_type=research&p=434932

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By Dhruva Jaishankar

Strategy is a much misunderstood, misused, and maligned concept. In general, it refers to how individuals and organisations set goals and attempt to achieve them under uncertain conditions and with limited resources. In the context of national policymaking, the term ‘strategy’ is often used as shorthand for ‘grand strategy’. Grand strategy is how a national leadership controls and utilises resources to effectively promote a country’s vital national interests and secure those interests against adversaries. A successful strategy depends in large part on its feasibility and sustainability.

As India emerges in the 21st century, evolving gradually into a middle income country with increasingly global interests, it will find itself adapting to a rapidly evolving international system. India’s resources today are
greater than at any time in its history, and it no longer confronts existential threats. But while the country may now be less vulnerable, it will have to confront different—and sometimes unprecedented—challenges.
Are India and its leaders up to the task?

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By Dhruva Jaishankar
Strategy is a much misunderstood, misused, and maligned concept. In general, it refers to how individuals and organisations set goals and attempt to achieve them under uncertain conditions and with limited resources. In the context of national policymaking, the term ‘strategy’ is often used as shorthand for ‘grand strategy’. Grand strategy is how a national leadership controls and utilises resources to effectively promote a country’s vital national interests and secure those interests against adversaries. A successful strategy depends in large part on its feasibility and sustainability.
As India emerges in the 21st century, evolving gradually into a middle income country with increasingly global interests, it will find itself adapting to a rapidly evolving international system. India’s resources today are
greater than at any time in its history, and it no longer confronts existential threats. But while the country may now be less vulnerable, it will have to confront different—and sometimes unprecedented—challenges.
Are India and its leaders up to the task?
Please click here to read more. By Dhruva Jaishankar
Strategy is a much misunderstood, misused, and maligned concept. In general, it refers to how individuals and organisations set goals and attempt to achieve them under uncertain conditions and with limited resources.https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-resignation-of-george-selim-and-the-implications-for-cve-in-the-u-s/The resignation of George Selim and the implications for CVE in the U.S.http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/429508596/0/brookingsrss/topics/nationalsecurity~The-resignation-of-George-Selim-and-the-implications-for-CVE-in-the-US/
Fri, 04 Aug 2017 14:00:50 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?post_type=opinion&p=436464

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By Eric Rosand

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By Eric RosandBy Eric Rosandhttps://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/as-tensions-with-north-korea-escalate-there-is-a-need-for-more-clarity-on-u-s-policy/As tensions with North Korea escalate, there is a need for more clarity on U.S. policyhttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/419994478/0/brookingsrss/topics/nationalsecurity~As-tensions-with-North-Korea-escalate-there-is-a-need-for-more-clarity-on-US-policy/
Wed, 02 Aug 2017 19:13:38 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?post_type=on-the-record&p=433910

THE ISSUE: Amidst pressure and criticism from President Trump, senior law enforcement officials, including Attorney General Jeff Sessions and Deputy General Rosenstein, must weigh the political value of resigning with the possibility of the president using their absence to interfere with the ongoing Russia investigation.

The president’s behavior has worked to describe law enforcement as a political entity—that is, as merely an arm of presidential power.

THE THINGS YOU NEED TO KNOW:

Both Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein and Attorney General Sessions are in a difficult position as the president publicly ridicules and places substantive demands on them.

Under normal circumstances, officials in this situation would likely resign in a fashion that makes clear the unacceptability of the president’s behavior.

But there are also important countervailing factors: as long as Sessions and Rosenstein remain in place, the investigation by special prosecutor Mueller is protected.

Thus, they have a very important role in protecting the integrity of an ongoing investigation that may affect the president on a personal level.

Many people at the Department of Justice have rallied behind Sessions and Rosenstein, stressing that they should not give in to this kind of bullying. Though the president would like to replace them, refusing to resign is an act of defiance in and of itself.

Without public pushback from senior law enforcement officials like Sessions and Rosenstein, the president’s rhetoric may infect the broader law enforcement community’s mission and the public’s view of their function.

If Rosenstein and Sessions are forced from office, either through resignation or removal by the president, there would be an immediate crisis with respect to the Russia investigation. The question of whether the president could altogether destroy the investigation, either by installing someone or by his own action, would become immediate and acute

Congress can do a number of things to prevent Trump’s intervention into the investigation. The first is to speak up very loudly about this as an unacceptable situation—Senator Grassley has already stated that there will not be a confirmation hearing for another attorney general. Senator Graham has also said that the firing of Mueller would mark “the beginning of the end of the Trump Administration”.

Another option is for members of Congress to make clear that the president cannot expect their support on any matters related to interference with the Mueller investigation or the removal of senior leaders from the Department of Justice.

This would represent a marked shift in the behavior of members of Congress from their reaction to the firing of FBI Director James Comey, about which many said nothing or actively supported the president’s action.

The fact that interference by President Trump did not end with Comey seems to have awakened lawmakers, demonstrated by an active response to denounce the removal of Sessions, Rosenstein, or Mueller.

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By Benjamin Wittes
THE ISSUE: Amidst pressure and criticism from President Trump, senior law enforcement officials, including Attorney General Jeff Sessions and Deputy General Rosenstein, must weigh the political value of resigning with the possibility of the president using their absence to interfere with the ongoing Russia investigation.
The president’s behavior has worked to describe law enforcement as a political entity—that is, as merely an arm of presidential power.
THE THINGS YOU NEED TO KNOW:
- Both Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein and Attorney General Sessions are in a difficult position as the president publicly ridicules and places substantive demands on them. - Under normal circumstances, officials in this situation would likely resign in a fashion that makes clear the unacceptability of the president’s behavior. - But there are also important countervailing factors: as long as Sessions and Rosenstein remain in place, the investigation by special prosecutor Mueller is protected. - Thus, they have a very important role in protecting the integrity of an ongoing investigation that may affect the president on a personal level. - Many people at the Department of Justice have rallied behind Sessions and Rosenstein, stressing that they should not give in to this kind of bullying. Though the president would like to replace them, refusing to resign is an act of defiance in and of itself. - Without public pushback from senior law enforcement officials like Sessions and Rosenstein, the president’s rhetoric may infect the broader law enforcement community’s mission and the public’s view of their function. - If Rosenstein and Sessions are forced from office, either through resignation or removal by the president, there would be an immediate crisis with respect to the Russia investigation. The question of whether the president could altogether destroy the investigation, either by installing someone or by his own action, would become immediate and acute - Congress can do a number of things to prevent Trump’s intervention into the investigation. The first is to speak up very loudly about this as an unacceptable situation—Senator Grassley has already stated that there will not be a confirmation hearing for another attorney general. Senator Graham has also said that the firing of Mueller would mark “the beginning of the end of the Trump Administration”. - Another option is for members of Congress to make clear that the president cannot expect their support on any matters related to interference with the Mueller investigation or the removal of senior leaders from the Department of Justice. - This would represent a marked shift in the behavior of members of Congress from their reaction to the firing of FBI Director James Comey, about which many said nothing or actively supported the president’s action. - The fact that interference by President Trump did not end with Comey seems to have awakened lawmakers, demonstrated by an active response to denounce the removal of Sessions, Rosenstein, or Mueller.
RELATED CONTENT:
The role of special counsels and the Russia probe
What to expect when you’re expecting Comey By Benjamin Wittes
THE ISSUE: Amidst pressure and criticism from President Trump, senior law enforcement officials, including Attorney General Jeff Sessions and Deputy General Rosenstein, must weigh the political value of resigning with the ... https://www.brookings.edu/podcast-episode/weapons-of-mass-destruction-and-global-health-security/Weapons of mass destruction and global health securityhttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/414077520/0/brookingsrss/topics/nationalsecurity~Weapons-of-mass-destruction-and-global-health-security/
Mon, 30 Nov -0001 00:00:00 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?post_type=podcast-episode&p=432040

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By Bonnie Jenkins, Fred Dews

Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins, a joint visiting fellow with Brookings and the University of Pennsylvania Perry World House and the former coordinator for Threat Reduction Programs in the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation at the Department of State, discusses her work on global security issues, from weapons of mass destruction to the spread of infectious diseases.

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By Bonnie Jenkins, Fred Dews
Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins, a joint visiting fellow with Brookings and the University of Pennsylvania Perry World House and the former coordinator for Threat Reduction Programs in the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation at the Department of State, discusses her work on global security issues, from weapons of mass destruction to the spread of infectious diseases.
Also in this episode: David Wessel, director of the Hutchins Center on Fiscal & Monetary Policy and a senior fellow in Economic Studies, discusses inflation in our regular “Wessel's Economic Update” segment.
Show notes:
How a U.N. treaty on nuclear weapons makes international security policy more inclusive
Nuclear Security Centers of Excellence
Can unarmed states prohibit nuclear weapons?
Ways to listen to this episode:
- Apple Podcasts - Stitcher - Google Play - iHeartRadio - Libsyn - Direct download (mp3)
Thanks to audio producer Gaston Reboredo with assistance from Mark Hoelscher, and to producer Vanessa Sauter. Additional support comes from Jessica Pavone, Eric Abalahin, Rebecca Viser, and David Nassar.
Subscribe to Brookings podcasts here or on Apple Podcasts, send feedback email to BCP@Brookings.edu, and follow us and tweet us at @policypodcasts on Twitter.
The Brookings Cafeteria is a part of the Brookings Podcast Network.
By Bonnie Jenkins, Fred Dews
Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins, a joint visiting fellow with Brookings and the University of Pennsylvania Perry World House and the former coordinator for Threat Reduction Programs in the Bureau of International ... https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/strategic-guidance-for-countering-the-proliferation-of-strategic-guidance/Strategic guidance for countering the proliferation of strategic guidancehttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/434395150/0/brookingsrss/topics/nationalsecurity~Strategic-guidance-for-countering-the-proliferation-of-strategic-guidance/
Thu, 20 Jul 2017 19:27:24 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?post_type=opinion&p=447240

Returned foreign fighters pose a significant terrorism threat to their home countries, but policies that aim to block the flow of foreigners frustrate some of these would-be jihadists. That frustration poses new problems.

Foreign fighters generally gain training and combat experience that can lead to more sophisticated and deadly attacks. Security services are rightly alarmed by the 40,000 or so volunteers who traveled to fight with the Islamic State—a historic high for the global jihadist movement. In comparing plots involving foreign fighters and those without, leading terrorism scholar Thomas Hegghammer has found that the presence of a foreign jihad veteran both dramatically increases the terrorist plot’s chance of success and the attack’s lethality. Experience in a war zone also changes an individual’s mindset. Many individuals who fight in a foreign jihad initially have no intention of using violence at home, but while in a foreign country, they become indoctrinated and come to see their former home as enemy territory. Although I’ve argued that the relative threat regarding plots and lethality per volunteer from returning Syrian fighters may be lower than the historical average, the sheer numbers of returning foreign fighters will likely result in a large security problem. Because of this problem, the decline in foreign fighters joining the Islamic State in the last year indeed demonstrates a true success against the group.

Yet, while foreign fighters pose a potential long-term danger both in combat zones and in their home countries, their decision to go abroad may lead to decreased violence in the short-term. We should prepare for an increase in violence from individuals who might have traveled abroad to fight on behalf of the Islamic State but rather opted to remain in their home countries.

Let’s start with a data and coding problem that hinders evaluation of these “frustrated foreign fighters.” Many of the Islamic State’s Western recruits are thugs, involved with gangs, petty crime, and other unglamorous forms of violence before engaging in jihad. The specific percentage of former criminals that joined the Islamic State varies by country, but for many European countries it’s one third or more of recruits. When these violent young men go abroad to fight, some die or never return to their home countries. Thus, overall violence at home falls, though this does not correlate as a fall in terrorism. If frustrated foreign fighters cannot leave, then ordinary crime may increase.

Beyond engaging in crime, frustrated jihadists will likely attack at home if they cannot go abroad to fight. Data from the United States supports this trend, as U.S. law enforcement has proven far more successful than its European counterparts in stopping individuals from traveling to Iraq and Syria. According to data from START of the plots in the United States, 28 percent of returned foreign fighters participated in a plot, but a staggering 60 percent of frustrated foreign fighters became involved in a terrorist plot. For example, in 2015 Elton Simpson and Nadir Soofi attacked a “Draw the Prophet” event in Texas—Simpson tried to fight in Somalia and later in Syria, but the FBI’s arrest of some of his fellows disrupted his plans.

Not surprisingly, multiple countries are facing this problem, and the issue may grow as travel to the so-called caliphate becomes harder. As early as September 2014, when the Islamic State began its campaign against the West, a frustrated foreign fighter in Australia stabbed two police officers after the government revoked his passport to prevent him from traveling to Syria. Later that year in Canada, another frustrated fighter ran his car into two Canadian soldiers after the government seized his passport. Denmark, France, and Spain saw similar problems in 2015. In 2016, a Swedish Muslim was turned back twice in Turkey as he attempted to join the Islamic State in Syria: he ended up being arrested for constructing a bomb at home.

The Islamic State tried to bypass indoctrination in its camps by creating a propaganda machine that inspires many Muslims, especially in Europe, to conduct attacks. The Islamic State is shifting from its emphasis on hijrah, or migration to the caliphate, to attacks in the West. This change largely resulted from the difficulty in traveling to and from Syria and the shrinking power of the caliphate. As one French jihadist told the scholar Amarnath Amarasingam, “We believe that even a small attack in dar ul-kufr [the land of the infidels] is better than a big attack in Syria. As the door of hijrah closes, the door of jihad opens.”

This shift is even more dangerous as the Islamic State bridged the gap between top-down, directed attacks such as in Paris and “Lone Wolf” attacks like the Pulse nightclub in Orlando. “Lone Wolves” lack contact with Islamic State operatives to plan or execute the attack. Worth noting, some of the group’s attacks in Europe involved an Islamic State facilitator who helped recruit or direct the attackers—a capability that will help the Islamic State direct frustrated fighters.

The policy implications are clear, if unglamorous. Stopping foreign fighters often involves monitoring and disrupting a network of facilitators and operatives who facilitate individuals’ travel to Iraq and Syria and then return to operate on behalf of the group. Preventing attacks from frustrated fighters, however, requires a traditional policing and domestic intelligence function. Law enforcement can identify potential terrorists by monitoring social media and working with local communities as these individuals often display their jihadist sympathies in advance of their attacks, and their desire to travel to Syria and Iraq provides a marker for their intent. This strategy requires considerable resources. In Europe, police and security services at times knew many of those linked to recent terrorist attacks but prioritized resources toward others they deemed a more imminent threat—with more resources they would have to make fewer tough choices. The United States has a smaller problem and more resources, and thus has suffered far less.

The Middle East faces the largest danger posed by frustrated foreign fighters. The number of foreign fighters from the Middle East are exponentially larger than from other regions —more than 30,000 foreign fighters, compared with 6,000 or so from Europe. Additionally, some countries like Tunisia used the conflict in Syria as a safety valve for getting rid of disgruntled Salafis; more than 7,000 Tunisian Salafists traveled to Syria to fight with the Islamic State. Not only will this safety valve disappear as the Islamic State attracts fewer fighters, but some disgruntled foreign fighters will return, creating a lethal combination of former fighters and frustrated fighters as potential recruits. Unfortunately, Tunisia and many other developing world allies lack sufficient law enforcement capacity to handle this problem. For these allies, U.S. resources can make a difference: ranging from technical support to training programs to counterterrorism aid designed to expand police and intelligence programs in accord with the rule of law.

Ideally in the long-term, the Islamic State’s appeal will decline as its sanctuary crumbles. While its propaganda and ideas will be harder to combat, over time the group’s allure, based in part on its image as a winner and its ability to create a caliphate, will diminish. Successful counterterrorism policies both in the United States and in allied countries are vital to the continued decline of the group’s appeal. If levels of terrorism are low, the group’s stature will fall further, diminishing the danger it poses. Becoming a foreign fighter becomes less appealing, and the decreased flow means fewer fighters in the war zone to inspire and egg on their fellows back home. Eventually, few would-be jihadists would expect to be foreign fighters and thus frustration will decline and the number and lethality of attacks will go down. Getting to this long-term state, however, will take time and in the interim the frustrated fighters pose a serious danger.

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By Daniel L Byman
Returned foreign fighters pose a significant terrorism threat to their home countries, but policies that aim to block the flow of foreigners frustrate some of these would-be jihadists. That frustration poses new problems.
Foreign fighters generally gain training and combat experience that can lead to more sophisticated and deadly attacks. Security services are rightly alarmed by the 40,000 or so volunteers who traveled to fight with the Islamic State—a historic high for the global jihadist movement. In comparing plots involving foreign fighters and those without, leading terrorism scholar Thomas Hegghammer has found that the presence of a foreign jihad veteran both dramatically increases the terrorist plot’s chance of success and the attack’s lethality. Experience in a war zone also changes an individual’s mindset. Many individuals who fight in a foreign jihad initially have no intention of using violence at home, but while in a foreign country, they become indoctrinated and come to see their former home as enemy territory. Although I’ve argued that the relative threat regarding plots and lethality per volunteer from returning Syrian fighters may be lower than the historical average, the sheer numbers of returning foreign fighters will likely result in a large security problem. Because of this problem, the decline in foreign fighters joining the Islamic State in the last year indeed demonstrates a true success against the group.
Yet, while foreign fighters pose a potential long-term danger both in combat zones and in their home countries, their decision to go abroad may lead to decreased violence in the short-term. We should prepare for an increase in violence from individuals who might have traveled abroad to fight on behalf of the Islamic State but rather opted to remain in their home countries.
Let’s start with a data and coding problem that hinders evaluation of these “frustrated foreign fighters.” Many of the Islamic State’s Western recruits are thugs, involved with gangs, petty crime, and other unglamorous forms of violence before engaging in jihad. The specific percentage of former criminals that joined the Islamic State varies by country, but for many European countries it’s one third or more of recruits. When these violent young men go abroad to fight, some die or never return to their home countries. Thus, overall violence at home falls, though this does not correlate as a fall in terrorism. If frustrated foreign fighters cannot leave, then ordinary crime may increase.
Beyond engaging in crime, frustrated jihadists will likely attack at home if they cannot go abroad to fight. Data from the United States supports this trend, as U.S. law enforcement has proven far more successful than its European counterparts in stopping individuals from traveling to Iraq and Syria. According to data from START of the plots in the United States, 28 percent of returned foreign fighters participated in a plot, but a staggering 60 percent of frustrated foreign fighters became involved in a terrorist plot. For example, in 2015 Elton Simpson and Nadir Soofi attacked a “Draw the Prophet” event in Texas—Simpson tried to fight in Somalia and later in Syria, but the FBI’s arrest of some of his fellows disrupted his plans.
Not surprisingly, multiple countries are facing this problem, and the issue may grow as travel to the so-called caliphate becomes harder. As early as September 2014, when the Islamic State began its campaign against the West, a frustrated foreign fighter in Australia stabbed two police officers after the government revoked his passport to prevent him from traveling to Syria. Later that year in Canada, another frustrated fighter ran his car into two Canadian soldiers after the government seized his passport. Denmark, France, and ... By Daniel L Byman
Returned foreign fighters pose a significant terrorism threat to their home countries, but policies that aim to block the flow of foreigners frustrate some of these would-be jihadists. That frustration poses new problems.https://www.brookings.edu/blog/unpacked/2017/06/27/the-role-of-special-counsels-and-the-russia-probe/The role of special counsels and the Russia probehttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/377801390/0/brookingsrss/topics/nationalsecurity~The-role-of-special-counsels-and-the-Russia-probe/
Tue, 27 Jun 2017 16:11:14 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?p=419652

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By Norman Eisen

THE ISSUE: Special counsel Robert Mueller is currently overseeing an investigation into ties between President Trump’s campaign and Russia, and the possibility of obstruction of justice. Despite threats of removal, Trump does not possess the direct authority to fire a special prosecutor, but could potentially order someone else to do so. Should Mueller remain and find any indication of misconduct, it remains constitutionally unclear whether a special counsel could indict a president.

A special prosecutor is appointed when investigations are so sensitive that a lawyer with an added degree of separation from the administration is required.

THE THINGS YOU NEED TO KNOW:

On May 17, 2017, the Justice Department selected Robert Mueller as the special prosecutor to oversee the investigation into ties between President Trump’s campaign and Russian officials, and the possibility of obstruction of Justice.

A special prosecutor is appointed when investigations are so sensitive that a lawyer with an added degree of separation from the administration is required.

The idea of a special prosecutor has existed since the Grant Administration.

This counsel is appointed from outside of government and acts just as a governmental prosecutor would, but with more independence.

The attorney general normally appoints a special prosecutor., but if the attorney general has a conflict, the next in charge—in this case the deputy attorney general— takes over the appointment authority.

Robert Mueller was appointed by Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein as special prosecutor because Attorney General Jeff Sessions had a conflict.

The president, currently, does not have the authority to directly fire the special counsel. Trump could, however, order the deputy attorney general to make the firing. He would then decide whether or not to carry out the order.

If the deputy attorney general refuses to carry out the firing, the president could call on the ‘next in line’ of succession to do it.

In the Nixon Administration, a similar chain of events led to the famous Saturday Night Massacre.

Richard Nixon ordered the Attorney General to fire the then special prosecutor, who refused and was then fired. The order was given to the deputy, who also refused and was fired as well. Finally, the solicitor general, who was ‘third in line’, executed the order.

Public outcry was so great that another special prosecutor was appointed. Their work ultimately contributed, with other factors, to Nixon’s resignation.

Down the road, Mueller may see continued periodic threats from the White House to remove him.

If President Trump does not order Mueller to be removed, we can expect that the special prosecutor will take a fair and impartial look at the evidence in order to determine whether there was any collusion with Russia on their attacks on our democratic process during the 2016 election; any obstruction of justice by the president or those around him; and any other, related, offenses.

Potentially, the special counsel could be required to make an agonizing decision that was queued up to the Supreme Court in United States v. Nixon but was never decided: Does a special counsel have the authority to indict a president?

And if he doesn’t have that authority, the special prosecutor must decide what to do if he finds evidence of misconduct, including a possible referral to the House for further investigation, hearing or impeachment proceedings.

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By Norman Eisen
THE ISSUE: Special counsel Robert Mueller is currently overseeing an investigation into ties between President Trump’s campaign and Russia, and the possibility of obstruction of justice. Despite threats of removal, Trump does not possess the direct authority to fire a special prosecutor, but could potentially order someone else to do so. Should Mueller remain and find any indication of misconduct, it remains constitutionally unclear whether a special counsel could indict a president.
A special prosecutor is appointed when investigations are so sensitive that a lawyer with an added degree of separation from the administration is required.
THE THINGS YOU NEED TO KNOW:
- On May 17, 2017, the Justice Department selected Robert Mueller as the special prosecutor to oversee the investigation into ties between President Trump’s campaign and Russian officials, and the possibility of obstruction of Justice. - A special prosecutor is appointed when investigations are so sensitive that a lawyer with an added degree of separation from the administration is required. - The idea of a special prosecutor has existed since the Grant Administration. - This counsel is appointed from outside of government and acts just as a governmental prosecutor would, but with more independence. - The attorney general normally appoints a special prosecutor., but if the attorney general has a conflict, the next in charge—in this case the deputy attorney general— takes over the appointment authority. - Robert Mueller was appointed by Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein as special prosecutor because Attorney General Jeff Sessions had a conflict. - The president, currently, does not have the authority to directly fire the special counsel. Trump could, however, order the deputy attorney general to make the firing. He would then decide whether or not to carry out the order. - If the deputy attorney general refuses to carry out the firing, the president could call on the ‘next in line’ of succession to do it. - In the Nixon Administration, a similar chain of events led to the famous Saturday Night Massacre. - Richard Nixon ordered the Attorney General to fire the then special prosecutor, who refused and was then fired. The order was given to the deputy, who also refused and was fired as well. Finally, the solicitor general, who was ‘third in line’, executed the order. - Public outcry was so great that another special prosecutor was appointed. Their work ultimately contributed, with other factors, to Nixon’s resignation. - Down the road, Mueller may see continued periodic threats from the White House to remove him. - If President Trump does not order Mueller to be removed, we can expect that the special prosecutor will take a fair and impartial look at the evidence in order to determine whether there was any collusion with Russia on their attacks on our democratic process during the 2016 election; any obstruction of justice by the president or those around him; and any other, related, offenses. - Potentially, the special counsel could be required to make an agonizing decision that was queued up to the Supreme Court in United States v. Nixon but was never decided: Does a special counsel have the authority to indict a president? - And if he doesn’t have that authority, the special prosecutor must decide what to do if he finds evidence of misconduct, including a possible referral to the House for further investigation, hearing or impeachment proceedings.
RELATED CONTENT:
Contempt for ethics hobbles Trump
Trump fires Comey: Shades of Watergate By Norman Eisen
THE ISSUE: Special counsel Robert Mueller is currently overseeing an investigation into ties between President Trump’s campaign and Russia, and the possibility of obstruction of justice. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/06/12/why-human-security-is-national-security-for-small-island-developing-states/Why human security is national security for Small Island Developing Stateshttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/358799394/0/brookingsrss/topics/nationalsecurity~Why-human-security-is-national-security-for-Small-Island-Developing-States/
Mon, 12 Jun 2017 14:00:07 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?p=417303

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By Simone Young

The history, geography, and economic circumstances of the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) of the English-speaking Caribbean have bequeathed them distinctive and interrelated vulnerabilities. These include their small size and relative isolation, environmental issues (lack of natural resources, exposure to natural hazards, and greater susceptibility to climate change), economic challenges (lack of competitive advantage, prevalence of informal economies), weak institutional structures, human resource constraints, high costs of basic infrastructure, and energy insecurity. To add, their impact is exponentially increased by social challenges that include, among others, the preponderance of female-headed households in tandem with the feminization of poverty; the loss of human capital to metropoles (“brain drain”); health challenges such as HIV and AIDS and non-communicable diseases (NCDs), as well as drug addiction; and the impact of narco and human trafficking as these states have become transshipment points, with all of the attendant impacts on human security.

All of these realities confer a unique and urgent set of challenges for the development of these SIDS. As such, traditional approaches to foreign policy and security are incapable of adequately addressing them, given their interconnected and complex nature. Redefining the region’s view of what security means—specifically with an eye toward gender issues—may be key to engaging new and imaginative approaches.

Redefining security in a people-centered foreign policy

Anne-Marie Slaughter’s call for a “people-centered foreign policy” has been instrumental in broadening the field’s focus beyond the mainly traditional notions of security to one where security is more broadly formulated and operationalized. Specifically, it’s important for foreign policy experts and practitioners to not see women as passive agents of development.

This brings to mind a vivid example of how a more nuanced, expanded understanding of gender dynamics could have influenced international policies. The “Washington Consensus” of the 1980s—whose structural adjustment mechanisms had a disproportionate impact on female-headed households in some Caribbean SIDS and other developing countries—underscored that security transcends force, militarism, war, and peace, and encompasses public health, social security, the well-being of families, and the resilience of communities. These “soft” issues are in fact the most urgent challenges, as Madeleine Albright reminds, ultimately jeopardizing the sustainability of the “harder” version of security, often operationalized to maintain public order and safety.

This is one of the best rationales for gender’s inclusion as a crosscutting issue in all policymaking, not just foreign policy. For if foreign policy is basically the collective strategies used by a state to secure its self-interests and achieve its regional and international goals, then the aim of these SIDS’ foreign policies should be to pursue strategies that best position them to maximize their development potential.

Thus, pursuing policies that safeguard the collective security of its nationals should include formulating programs that address gender-based discrimination, diversity, and a lack of equity, all of which constrain development. Doing so will allow the SIDS of the Caribbean to better uphold the principles of good governance, a hallmark of which is more robust systems for human rights protections. This aligns with what international development efforts have shown over the past few decades: that when policies expand people’s potential and capacities, we create tides that lift all boats, not just the more seaworthy ones. Ensuring that gender equity is a pillar of foreign policy is therefore central to engendering security and sustaining resilience in these SIDS, but also in any country seeking long-term sustainable development.

The need for a people-centered foreign policy in Trinidad and Tobago

A key example of the intersection between human security, gender-based inequities, and the successful anchoring of more inclusive foreign policies within a human rights framework is the recent amendment of child marriage laws in Trinidad and Tobago. The country’s colonial history bequeathed a multiculturalism characterized by ethnic and religious diversity, with Catholicism, Anglicanism, and Hinduism having the largest numbers of adherents, while Islam, Presbyterianism, Baha’i, Pentecostal, Spiritual Baptists, and Judaism are also represented.

One consequence was the regulation of marriage under four marriage acts, where the age of marriage for girls ranged from 14 to 16 and for boys was set at 18. Decades after the acts were codified, those laws remained in place, putting the country at odds with its human rights commitments. In December 2016, after several calls by civil society, the government announced its intention to amend the respective laws, triggering opposition from some Hindu, Muslim, and Spiritual Baptist leaders. The decision drew an equally incensed response to this opposition, from those advocating for change. In a step that illustrated the government’s and the wider community’s grasp of the need to definitively address the issue, the statutes were eventually amended with the legislation being unanimously passed on Friday, June 9, increasing the age of marriage to 18. However, the divisive nature of the debate highlighted—among other things—the gap between foreign policies (which on paper professed a commitment to human rights and gender equity) and domestic programs (which did not adequately operationalize or integrate those principles). This underscored the need for a clear plan of action to integrate human rights and gender equity through a whole-of-government approach.

Moreover, while it may be argued that the figures for adolescents who marry were relatively low—with UNICEF estimating that 2 percent of girls were married by 15 years old and 8 percent by 18 years old—the country’s attorney general noted that 3,478 child marriages occurred between 1996 and 2016. In a small country such as Trinidad and Tobago, this merits immediate attention. To compound the problem, of that figure, 3,404 were girls while 74 were boys under the age of 18, illustrating the pervasive influence of long-standing beliefs about the role of girls and women.

It is perhaps evident therefore, that the fact that such laws were retained suggests first, a degree of societal comfort at some level, with the philosophy and value system underpinning the marriage of young girls’; and second, a lack of urgency on the part of government agencies and society with respect to seriously addressing increasing rates of domestic violence and the overall treatment of women and girls. Finally, the inadequate integration of human rights and gender equity into foreign policy perpetuates a narrow view of what constitutes domestic and regional security.

A Human Rights-based Approach can expand the definition of security

There is a way to rectify this.

The bedrock human rights principles of empowerment, participation, accountability, transparency, non-discrimination, and international cooperation are integral to strengthening systems of governance that can sustain resilience. Applying a Human Rights-Based Approach (HRBA) to mainstreaming gender in foreign policy can therefore help expand how security is defined in its broadest terms. This is of key importance, since the main goal of every state’s foreign and domestic policy is to achieve or to enhance its security. Importantly for SIDS of the English-speaking Caribbean—countries that have been on the periphery economically, politically, geographically, and historically for a number of reasons—an HRBA also has the immediate benefit of creating the policy space for such countries to highlight issues peculiar to them, such as the nexus between development and gender equity and other issues like climate change.

In providing a clear framework for determining who has obligations and rights, an HRBA also tends to foster more participatory systems of communication and governance, and can heighten a government’s awareness of its obligations in clear, universally accepted language—which is invaluable for countries currently developing or strengthening their human rights architecture.

Ultimately, by invoking the question of human rights, foreign policy makers can address issues that previously received scant attention with a greater sense of urgency and a sustained commitment to fulfilling international obligations. This will be key to these SIDS achieving their sustainable development goals.

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By Simone Young
The history, geography, and economic circumstances of the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) of the English-speaking Caribbean have bequeathed them distinctive and interrelated vulnerabilities. These include their small size and relative isolation, environmental issues (lack of natural resources, exposure to natural hazards, and greater susceptibility to climate change), economic challenges (lack of competitive advantage, prevalence of informal economies), weak institutional structures, human resource constraints, high costs of basic infrastructure, and energy insecurity. To add, their impact is exponentially increased by social challenges that include, among others, the preponderance of female-headed households in tandem with the feminization of poverty; the loss of human capital to metropoles (“brain drain”); health challenges such as HIV and AIDS and non-communicable diseases (NCDs), as well as drug addiction; and the impact of narco and human trafficking as these states have become transshipment points, with all of the attendant impacts on human security.
All of these realities confer a unique and urgent set of challenges for the development of these SIDS. As such, traditional approaches to foreign policy and security are incapable of adequately addressing them, given their interconnected and complex nature. Redefining the region’s view of what security means—specifically with an eye toward gender issues—may be key to engaging new and imaginative approaches.
Redefining security in a people-centered foreign policy
Anne-Marie Slaughter’s call for a “people-centered foreign policy” has been instrumental in broadening the field’s focus beyond the mainly traditional notions of security to one where security is more broadly formulated and operationalized. Specifically, it’s important for foreign policy experts and practitioners to not see women as passive agents of development.
This brings to mind a vivid example of how a more nuanced, expanded understanding of gender dynamics could have influenced international policies. The “Washington Consensus” of the 1980s—whose structural adjustment mechanisms had a disproportionate impact on female-headed households in some Caribbean SIDS and other developing countries—underscored that security transcends force, militarism, war, and peace, and encompasses public health, social security, the well-being of families, and the resilience of communities. These “soft” issues are in fact the most urgent challenges, as Madeleine Albright reminds, ultimately jeopardizing the sustainability of the “harder” version of security, often operationalized to maintain public order and safety.
This is one of the best rationales for gender’s inclusion as a crosscutting issue in all policymaking, not just foreign policy. For if foreign policy is basically the collective strategies used by a state to secure its self-interests and achieve its regional and international goals, then the aim of these SIDS’ foreign policies should be to pursue strategies that best position them to maximize their development potential.
Thus, pursuing policies that safeguard the collective security of its nationals should include formulating programs that address gender-based discrimination, diversity, and a lack of equity, all of which constrain development. Doing so will allow the SIDS of the Caribbean to better uphold the principles of good governance, a hallmark of which is more robust systems for human rights protections. This aligns with what international development efforts have shown over the past few decades: that when policies expand people’s potential and capacities, we create tides that lift all boats, not just the more seaworthy ones. Ensuring that gender equity is a pillar of foreign policy is therefore central to engendering security and ... By Simone Young
The history, geography, and economic circumstances of the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) of the English-speaking Caribbean have bequeathed them distinctive and interrelated vulnerabilities. These include their small size and ...