News about our books, authors, and more.

Unofficial dialogues can open up new approaches to intractable conflicts.

by PETER JONES

Track Two Diplomacy is a method of bringing together influential people from different sides of a conflict, on an unofficial basis, to talk and try to jointly develop new ideas as to how the conflict may be better managed or resolved. There are those who regard Track Two with suspicion. Proponents of Track Two believe that it can help to break through the barriers that official diplomacy can sometimes place on talks. This often means entering the grey area between what governments will talk about (and who they will talk to), and what they often know must be discussed if a problem is to be addressed.

Track Two diplomacy often demonstrates that new ways of approaching problems are possible.

One example, is the question of talking with those designated as terrorists. Many governments have firm policies against such talks. This view was summed up by then British Prime Minister John Major in a response to a question in the House as to whether he would talk with the IRA while fighting was still underway; “If the implication of his remarks is that we should sit down and talk to Mr. Adams and the Provisional IRA, I can say only that it would turn my stomach, and those of most Hon. Members; we will not do it. . . . I will not talk to people who murder indiscriminately.”

When it comes to adversarial states, diplomatic aims are better served by engagement, not isolation.

by GEOFFREY WISEMAN

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry at the P5+1 Talks with Iran in Geneva, Switzerland.

The current heated, even toxic, debates in the United States about the Iran nuclear deal and President Obama’s agreement with Raul Castro to restore full diplomatic relations with Cuba reflect what has long been a core US policy issue: Should the United States directly engage its adversaries? Or should it seek to isolate them.

Other Western democracies place more faith than the United States in diplomacy’s capacity to mitigate bad behavior by recalcitrant states.

For nearly a century this issue has been central to US foreign policy. Isolating an adversarial state can, of course, be expressed through trade embargoes and economic sanctions, but the United States has often also imposed a form of symbolic and formal isolation by refusing to have diplomatic relations with the state. Instead of engaging—typically through recognition and the mutual exchange of embassies and ambassadors—the path of isolation has been taken.

There are many examples of this “traditional” US refusal to establish full formal diplomatic relations with adversarial states: the Soviet Union (1917–33), the People’s Republic of China (1949–79), Cuba (1959–2015), and Vietnam (1975–95); this approach has also been applied to Libya under Qadhafi (1969–2003) and to Iran (1979–present) and North Korea (1948–present)—and more often than not, this policy has frustrated US foreign policy goals.

From Japan, to Cuba, to Iran—three snapshots of a world changed by nuclear weapons.

Atomic cloud over Nagasaki, August 9th, 1945. Public domain image.

William J. Perry, who served as Secretary of Defense during President Bill Clinton’s administration, is regarded as one of the five “Cold Warriors”—along with Henry Kissinger, George P. Schultz, Sam Nunn, and Sid Drell—who, together, have formed an influential group whose activism has profoundly impacted nuclear security. From his role in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, to his stint as Defense Secretary, to his more recent involvement in Track 2 talks facilitating the recent Iran deal, minimizing the nuclear threat—introduced to the world stage 70 years ago today—has been one of Perry’s chief preoccupations. The following post was adapted from his forthcoming memoir, My Journey at the Nuclear Brink.

I.

“The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking, and we thus drift toward unparalleled catastrophe.”

—Albert Einstein; 23 May 1946

My journey at the nuclear brink began well before the Cuban Missile Crisis, on an infamous Sunday in 1941, four years before the first atomic bomb was dropped. These were the first stirrings that would lead me to a life encompassing military service, development of Cold War reconnaissance systems, government service, university teaching, and diplomacy—much of it focused on the goal of reducing the nuclear threat.

On February 6, 1968, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., stepped up to the pulpit to warn against the use of nuclear weapons. Addressing the second mobilization of the Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam, King urged an end to the war, and warned that if the United States used nuclear weapons in Vietnam the earth would be transformed into an inferno that “even the mind of Dante could not envision.” Then, as he had done so many times before, King made clear the connection between the black freedom struggle in America and the need for nuclear disarmament:

These two issues are tied together in many, many ways. It is a wonderful thing to work to integrate lunch counters, public accommodations, and schools. But it would be rather absurd to work to get schools and lunch counters integrated and not be concerned with the survival of a world in which to integrate.

The restriction of Palestinian movement in Gaza and elsewhere has long been a central tactic of the Israeli occupation.

by ILANA FELDMAN

During the latest Israeli assault on Gaza considerable media coverage has been given to the Israeli tactic of calling people a few minutes before their homes are bombed. Some observers appear to accept the Israeli contention that this is a humanitarian gesture. Others raise the question of where, in this landscape of violence, in a tiny, densely populated strip of land with no free points of egress, the inhabitants are supposed to go. As Jon Stewart put it, “Evacuate to where? Have you seen Gaza?”

Palestinians living in Gaza’s “open air prison” are not only targeted for attack, but also victimized by enforced immobility. Through years of policies of increasing control, closure, and blockade, Israel has created this vulnerability and is now deploying immobility as a lethal weapon. There is frequent reference in the media to the blockade imposed on Gaza in 2006 after Hamas won parliamentary elections, but the process of isolating Gaza began long before that. Understanding how immobility was imposed and then weaponized requires looking at the history of borders, movements, and constraints on motion that have defined this place since 1948.

Stanford faculty were joined by Governor Jerry Brown to discuss the nuclear menace.

Nuclear arms hold an exceptional place in the gamut of weapons technology. Their entrance onto the world stage has consolidated global hierarchies, intensified state rivalries, stymied foreign interventions, and, on occasion, brought the world perilously close to an as yet unprecedented level of destruction. In light of this last in particular, it comes as little surprise that the debut of the atomic bomb also precipitated the birth of the Doomsday Clock and introduced the phrase “five minutes to midnight” into our cultural lexicon—all this even though, in the entirety of their nearly 60-year lifespan they’ve only been detonated in an act of war twice.

Recently, California governor, Jerry Brown, joined Stanford professors Martin Hellman, David Holloway, and Jean-Pierre Dupuy in a panel moderated by Jon Christensen to discuss the nature of the nuclear threat and what current world conditions could portend for the future use or non-use of such weapons.

"The first step is to break open denial and bring awareness that the threat of nuclear menace is real."

“The first step is to break open denial and bring awareness that the threat of nuclear menace is real,” said Governor Brown—whose comments set much of the tone for the hour-long panel. While panelists devoted attention to both well- and lesser-known close-calls with the nuclear brink in recent decades, much of the conversation zeroed in on the tenuous insurance of nuclear deterrence and the prospects of moving toward disarmament at a moment of political and popular apathy on the subject of nuclear arms.

From the outset, ISIL intended to be more than simply a franchisee of the al-Qaeda organization or yet another radical Islamic movement.

by ARIEL AHRAM

The Islamic State today consists of an arc of towns and cities spanning the Syrian and Jazeera deserts, an archipelago coming increasingly and perilously close to Baghdad (as shown in the map below). Moving from its base in Fallujah and in eastern Syria, in the last few days ISIL has stormed Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, and taken Tikrit, midway on the highway to Baghdad. Meanwhile, Iraq’s security forces have crumbled. ISIL fighters looted hundreds of millions of bank deposits and seized untold quantities of weapons and supplies, including U.S.-supplied HUMVEES. Government troops, supplemented by the paramilitary wings of the major Shi’i parties, are trying to re-muster a defense at Samarra, just 70 miles outside of Baghdad, and are appealing to the U.S. for air support.

Iraqi and Syrian towns and cities seized by the Islamic State of the Levant (as of June 12, 2014) developed by Bill Roggio at The Long War Journal

ISIL is probably the scariest of the many radical Islamist groups to surface in Iraq since 2003. First under the leadership of the Jordanian Abu Musab az-Zarqawi, the group was so violently anti-Shi’i that even al-Qaeda’s central command deemed them over zealous. Changing the organization’s name to Islamic State of Iraq did little to dampen its penchant for brutality. When the Syrian civil war erupted, ISI turned eastward, adding the Levant to its moniker and mandate. After a public spat with Ayman az-Zawahiri over its well-deserved reputation for abusing civilians, though, ISIL formally severed ties with al-Qaeda in 2013. Since then it has fought pitched battles with other rebel factions, including the Nusra Front, al-Qaeda’s new designee for the Syrian region.

Why Gulf nations are pressuring Qatar to distance itself from the Muslim Brotherhood.

by LARRY RUBIN

In the fallout of al-Sisi’s military takeover in Egypt, members of the Muslim Brotherhood have scattered in search of refuge, with many ducking under the protective arm of Qatar. This tiny, predominantly Sunni Gulf nation has little military clout to speak of, and is rated by the Global Peace Index as the 19th most peaceful country in the world. Despite this generally non-aggressive stance, its long-standing policy of embracing the Muslim Brotherhood—which includes providing them a save haven—has rankled Qatar’s neighbors, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE—stirring so much ire that the Riyadh-led bloc recalled its ambassadors from Doha last month.

Facing so much heat, so close to home, Qatar agreed to make a number of changes to its foreign and domestic policies. Purportedly, concessions included preventing Doha-based Muslim Brotherhood leaders from appearing on Al Jazeera, deporting the Brotherhood-sympathizer, Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, and restricting Al Jazeera’s criticism of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other states. To what extent Qatar will comply with this Kuwait-brokered reconciliation—sometimes referred to as the Riyadh Agreement—remains to be seen, but in the interim, the much-discussed accord raises crucial, if fundamental, questions for analysts of international politics.

First, why would Saudi Arabia, with its deep Islamic roots, oppose the Muslim Brotherhood—the same organization it protected during the 1950s and 1960s? Second, why do these states—and particularly the regional hegemon, Saudi Arabia—feel threatened by the actions of a country, like Qatar, with a very small population occupying a tiny geographic area?

An analysis of how ideas threaten states and how states react.

The answer to both questions underscores the role of ideology, and more broadly, ideas, in international politics. It is about how ideas can be a national security threat and a different type of power wielded by states. In 2011, the idea that the status quo was no longer possible and that political change was necessary brought together disparate groups across the political spectrum. Ideas about how individuals were connected across political borders through their shared experiences and identities also facilitated the transnational diffusion of these protests—protests that led to the overthrow of a number of highly entrenched regimes backed by powerful coercive apparatuses, and the world’s strongest power, the United States. In some places, such as Syria and Yemen, the fires are still burning, in other places, such as Libya, the embers may flare up at any time.

Whether you're at ISA 2014 or you wish you were, we've got some discounts to hand out: take 20% off paper and 30% off cloth and ebooks on any and all of the 53 International Studies books listed below.

In Toronto for ISA 2014? Make sure to pencil in a visit to SUP's booth where you can say hello to our International Studies & Politics editor, Geoffrey Burn (he's a delight, and he has an accent to boot).

You can also browse through our offerings in International Studies titles, and grab a few discounted books—20% off paper, 30% off cloth and ebooks. We're also honoring that discount right here. Gathered below are the titles we're featuring at ISA 2014—click on any cover that grabs your interest to learn more. If you like what you see, add it to your cart and enter this promo code at checkout: S14XISA.

(Psst—have you heard about our March Madness sale? There's one week left to grab $1o cloth and $5 paperbacks and over 600 titles from which to choose . . .)

President Obama’s recent decision to eliminate a missile defense system plan has stirred up quite a controversy in domestic and international politics. Instead of setting up a limited missile defense system in Poland to intercept potential long-range nuclear missiles from Iran – which, at present, haven’t been developed there – Obama has decided that the US should arrange a shorter range missile interceptor near Iran for the medium range missile threat. Some say that this decision is a concession to Russian complaints that the longer range set-up would provide the U.S. with an opportunity for a first-strike.

In a recent op-ed in the Short Stack column for the Washington Post, Thomas Graham co-author of Preventing Catastrophe: The Use and Misuse of Intelligence in Efforts to Halt the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, gives his opinion on Obama’s decision to change the strategy from the Bush administration’s more aggressive stance on missile defense. He explains that after a long history of unsuccessful nuclear defense plans, a more realistic plan has now been introduced. Some fear that a new wave of nuclear proliferation could soon develop, leading to more dangerous and paranoid international relations. Graham points out that by changing our missile defense plan, the Obama administration is hoping to “reset” relations with Russia while also defending from the very realistic possibility of Iranian medium-range missiles. It will be interesting to see how this decision plays out: Will it buy us more cooperation with Russia for future nonproliferation and help us to defend from the very real threat posed by Iran? Or, in terms of defending its NATO allies in Eastern Europe, is it dangerous and unwise move for U.S. foreign policy?

"In the past month or so, we have seen former Vice President Cheney aggressively respond to charges by President Obama that the Bush administration exacerbated America’s friends and foes with its policies of torture, prisoner abuse, and inadequate trials." Warshaw argues that this is because the policies of the Bush administration were very much Cheney's policies so it is only fitting that he is defending them.

Not only did Cheney have major influence over foreign policy but he also had all the legal arenas stacked with his supporters in order to push his agenda through the Justice Department. According to Warshaw, Cheney "had his hand in almost every area of domestic policy" by stacking the White House with his own staff of trusted insiders. The Bush/Cheney working relationship came to work so well because George Bush was focused on creating a moral and civil, faith-based society, leaving Cheney to take care of everything else.

Cheney staffed the administration with pro-business executives and "shaped the Bush administration’s energy, environmental, pro-business, and national security policies." From environmental regulations to government outsourcing, Cheney was bent on creating a business-friendly society.

Warshaw remarks, "I hope that The Co-Presidency of Bush and Cheney sheds new light on the limited agenda that George W. Bush had as president and the far larger agenda that Dick Cheney had as vice president – as well as the tools Cheney employed to move that agenda forward."

Lawrence Wittner has taken his vast knowledge of the history of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament and put it into a more conscise and updated book. His previous trilogy on the bomb, The Struggle Against the Bomb, is a long and detailed account of the movement to restrict the use of nuclear weapons. His new book, Confronting the Bomb, distills that information into a comprehensive account of the worldwide nuclear disarmament campaign.

In a recent post on The Page 99 Test, Wittner applies the “page 99 test” to his new book, describing what the reader will find on page 99 and putting that in the context of the entire book. From the relatively obscure battles to those that are known across the globe, Confronting the Bomb recounts the history of the worldwide campaign against nuclear proliferation and its remarkable impact.

The book is based on massive research in the files of peace groups and in previously top secret government records, as well as on interviews with peace movement leaders and government officials: from Albert Einstein to Harry Truman to Mikhail Gorbachev. With this extensive base of information, several questions arise: How has the world avoided nuclear war since 1945? Why do nuclear countries adopt policies of nuclear restraint? If nuclear deterrence works, why bother with nuclear test bans or treaties?

Wittner attempts to answer these questions in Confronting the Bomb. The nuclear bomb–both its use and nonuse–is a subject that is fraught with difficult moral, political and diplomatic questions. Wittner’s new book makes the history more accessible, and in turn, may help to answer some of the questions that surround such an explosive subject.

Krepon’s own book Better Safe than Sorry places contemporary anxieties about nuclear proliferation in historical context. Krepon moves back in time providing context for today’s nuclear fears by examining past periods of nuclear danger. From the first and second nuclear ages, to the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, all the way to the discovery of Sadam Hussein’s nuclear weapon program, Krepon provides a comprehensive historical story of “the bomb.”

Barrass addressed the fact that Obama will have to reshape US foreign policy; and he cannot do so without good intelligence. Looking back upon the lessons of the Cold War, it is crucial that a leader can get into the mind of his adversary. An excerpt from the book, which Barrass also includes in his article, tells us: "One of the things that kept the cold war scary," secretary of defense Robert Gates recalled in 2006, "was the lack of understanding on each side of the mentality of the other."

The challenges that Obama’s administration faces now are, of course, fundamentally different then those of the Cold War; but Barrass informs us that “getting inside the mind” of the enemy should remain an important concern and guiding principle in foreign relations.

When seeking efforts to deter a nuclear Iran, or even in worrying about the possibility of terrorists acquiring nuclear or biological weapons within the next 5 years, the US must know more about the fears of their enemies and work toward a better intelligence system with new technologies. Barrass believes that the history of the Cold war reveals just how important intelligence is.

“There is another lesson the US will ignore at its peril - the need to grasp an adversary's culture. After Khrushchev shattered American self-confidence by putting Sputnik into space, Congress swiftly approved the National Defense Education Act. Soon many young Americans were studying Soviet affairs. They learned to look at what was really happening, rather than accept preconceived notions, especially the one about the Soviets being unfathomable. Now there is an equally urgent need for young Americans to comprehend the intricacies of more difficult languages and complex cultures.”

Using the insights from his work as a British diplomat during the Cold War, Barrass skillfully lays out what he thinks will be essential intelligence policy not just for the government, but for the people as well.

Krepon argues that while our current nuclear situation in no way compares to that of past years from WWII through the Cold War, the bomb is still a huge concern.

“I begin this book with a snapshot of where we are and then move back in time to snapshots of previous periods of presumed maximum nuclear danger. The purpose of these vignettes is to place contemporary anxieties into histori-cal context.”

A large part of the book is dedicated to addressing the irony that, though we remain in fear of the bomb’s use, countries have, and continue to build up their nuclear arsenals. A recent New York Times report addresses the fact that even defense strategies in the United States are becoming outpaced by the build-up of nuclear weapons in Iran and Pakistan.

Krepon argues: “I also believe that a sense of irony helps when working on nuclear problems. Good intentions can produce terrible results, and good outcomes can some¬times result from nefarious plans.”

As the article in the Economist explains, Krepon uses five principles from the cold war that can still apply in circumstances today: deterrence; conventional military strength; containment; diplomatic engagement; and a readiness on both sides to engage in arms control. As the struggle between abolition and proliferation occurs in this nuclear age –something that Krepon addresses in his own article – the greatest challenge to stability will depend on the 5 principles he lays out, especially in Pakistan and Iran where nuclear weapons are becoming a more legitimate concern.

Though it concerns very real dangers, Krepon’s book is not meant to scare the reader. As he puts it: “The United States has been through far worse periods of nuclear peril, and we have found safe passage. We can get through this mess as well. This is a hopeful book.”

Search

About the Blog

The SUP blog showcases new books and Press news in addition to serving as a forum for our authors—past and present—to expound on issues related to their scholarship. Views expressed by guest contributors to the blog do not necessarily represent those of Stanford University or Stanford University Press, and all guest contributions are denoted by a byline and an author bio.

Republishing Guidelines

If you would like to republish an article from the Stanford University Press blog, please contact us at blog@www.sup.org. We can secure permission to republish from our authors and provide text and other files for easy republication.

If you wish to republish an article, we ask that you credit the Stanford University Press blog as the original publisher of the material and provide a link to the source post somewhere alongside the republished content.