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C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000077
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T, P. ISN, IO, NEA, ISN/RA, IO/GS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2020
TAGS: AORCPARMKNNPIAEASY
SUBJECT: IAEA TECHNICAL BRIEF ON SYRIA LAYS IT ON THE LINE
REF: UNVIE 059
Classified By: Ambassador Glyn T. Davies for reasons 1.4 b and d
Summary
-------
¶1. (C) At the February 24 technical briefing on the DG's
Syria report, the IAEA underscored the need for Syrian
cooperation on an increasing number of issues, some involving
Syria's failure to report nuclear material under its
Safeguards Agreement. In particular, Director of Safeguards
Operations B Herman Nackaerts noted the Agency's rights and
responsibilities with respect to verifying the correctness
and completeness of Syria's declarations. In addition to
recounting the repeated requests for information related to
the Dair Alzour former reactor site, Nackaerts also
highlighted the information Syria must provide the Agency to
meet its reporting requirements for design and nuclear
material changes at the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor
(MNSR) in Damascus. He informed Member States that the
planned FeQuary 23 inspection at the MNSR did not take
place; Syria had informed the Agency it could not accommodate
the request because of the Board obligations of key people.
During the question and answer session, Charge asked whether
it is typical to refuse the IAEA access to a declared
facility and whether doing so in this manner was a safeguards
violation. DDG Safeguards/Heinonen acknowledged that
inspections typically can shift by a day or two (for
technical reasons) from what the Agency requests, but
normally a state offers an alternative day well in advance;
to his recolleQion no other date was offered in Syria's
case. Responding to the question of whether or not a
violation was occurring, Legal Advisor Johan Rautenbach
admitted that a flat out refusal would "not be consistent
with safeguards obligations," but quickly added that in this
case he understood discussion was underway to reschedule the
inspection.
¶2. (C) Comment: Following the briefing, Heinonen privately
expressed frustration with the Legal Advisor's downplaying of
Syria's refusal of the IAEA request to visit the declared
MNSR facility. He commented that we had been handed a
"golden ticket" with respect to Syria's refusal and it was up
to the Board to do something about it, as this was a real
"test." Syria could have postponed, he noted, but had
miscalculated with its flat out refusal. Heinonen described
how he had proposed the MNSR inspection as a means to keep
the pressure on Damascus; he was pleased that Amano had
approved their gambit, even after others in the Secretariat
had counseled a less confrontational approach. Several
likeminded colleagues noted that the Legal Advisor had caught
himself and stopped just short after audibly beginning to
articulate the word "violation." In a further development
Heinonen relayed that he had received a green light from DG
Amano to request access at the Homs facility, where Syria
produced the uranium yellowcake used in the undeclared
experiments at the MNSR. (Note: The IAEA wants to ensure
that the yellowcake at Homs, a quantity of at least
"hundreds" of kilograms, has not also been processed in
undeclared activities. End note.) This request for access at
Homs would not, at least initially, be in the form of a
special inspection and would not be in lieu of a broader
special inspection request advocated by Heinonen. Heinonen
told Mission, however, that he would need to see evidence of
strong support from member states to IAEA efforts to ensure
Syria accepts immediately the routine inspection at the MNSR
if he is to believe member states would support a subsequent
special inspection request. In this regard, we note DG Amano
reportedly told Gordon Brown's Foreign Policy advisor that
with respect to a special inspection in Syria, he "cannot
slay too many dragons at once," implying that the ongoing
Iran investigation complicated his ability to proceed on
Syria.
¶3. (C) Notably, the briefing was attended by the new Syrian
Ambassador Bassam Sabbagh, who we have learned from
likeminded had been one of the escorts on the IAEA's sole
visit to Dair Alzour in June 2008. For the second time in a
row, Syria did not speak at the technical briefing and Syrian
Atomic Energy head Ibrahim Othman sat discretely in the back
of the room. End summary and comment.
Laying out the Safeguards Case
-------------------------------
¶4. (SBU) IAEA Director of Safeguards Operations B Herman
Nackaerts delivered the February 24 technical briefing on the
DG's Syria report following his presentation on the Iran
report (septel). The majority of the briefing retold the
verification story on both the Dair Alzour investigation and
the findings at the MNSR. Nackaerts underscored the Agency's
rights and responsibilities with respect to verifying the
correctness and completeness of Syria's declarations. He
reviewed the many outstanding issues and the need for Syrian
cooperation as the key to breaking the logjam. Syria needs
to "urgently" provide access to Dair Alzour and other sites,
he emphasized, provide access and reports related to the MNSR
issue, and establish modalities with the IAEA for managed
access that would protect sensitive material in Syria.
Nackaerts specified outstanding issues related to the MNSR
that need to be addressed:
-- Syria must provide a full declaration of nuclear material
(given the materials at the MNSR that need to be added);
-- The Agency would then verify Syria's declared inventory;
-- Examination of source documents associated with
experiments and accounts of nuclear material;
-- Clarification of all experimental activities performed
with nuclear material;
-- Clarification of design information concerning
irradiation activities.
New Developments
----------------
¶5. (SBU) New details were briefed on Syria's February 10
letter to the Agency, in which Syria declined an IAEA request
for February 8-9 meetings to discuss the results of the
latest samples taken at the MNSR (taken November 17). In the
letter, Syria informed the Agency that more Homs yellowcake
was located at the MNSR. Nackaerts noted this material was
on the order of kilograms, according to the letter. Syria
also provided a description of the process used to convert
the yellowcake to uranyl nitrate, although no details were
given during the technical briefing. Nackaerts further added
that the information, timing, and locations of the
experiments (presumably as noted in the process description)
are inconsistent with the information previously provided by
Syria.
¶6. (SBU) Nackaerts confirmed that the yellowcake material
sampled during the November 17 visit to MNSR was "approaching
the commercial standard for uranium ore concentrate feed
material for fuel fabrication." (Comment: This is the
strongest statement to date on the potential use or relevance
of the experiments conducted at the MNSR. It should also
serve as another point of uncertainty about the scope and
nature of Syria's nuclear activities; as fuel fabrication
would have direct applicability to an operating nuclear
reactor such as Dair Alzour. End comment).
¶7. (SBU) Nackaerts also noted that the planned February 23
inspection at the MNSR did not take place. He said the
Agency received a letter on February 23 (but dated February
18) saying that Syria could not accommodate the request
because of the IAEA Board-related obligations of key Syrian
officials. During the question and answer session, Charge
asked whether it is typical to refuse the IAEA access to a
declared facility and whether this instance was a safeguards
violation. DDG Safeguards/Heinonen acknowledged that
inspections typically can change by a day or two (for
technical reasons) from what the Agency requests, but
normally a member state requesting the rescheduling offers
another day well in advance; to his recollection no other
date was offered in Syria's case. Responding to the question
of whether or not a violation was occurring, Legal Advisor
Johan Rautenbach bit off the word "violation" as he began to
use it, characterized a flat out refusal as "not consistent
with safeguards obligations," but quickly added that in this
case he understood discussion was underway to reschedule the
inspection. (Note: Heinonen told us privately after the
briefing that, had it been him, he would have stated bluntly
that this is noncompliance. End Note.)
Linkages
---------
¶8. (SBU) In a follow up question on the possibility of a link
between the uranium particles found at MNSR and Dair Alzour
(as noted in the report and technical briefing), Canada asked
what else is needed to determine a linkage (Canada sought to
underscore the access Syria needs to provide). Nackaerts
noted that currently the Agency cannot conclude a linkage one
way or the other. He said that the Agency had identified
activities, of which it was not previously aware. For
example, on the Homs material (yellowcake), the Agency needs
to understand how this material and the experiments fit into
Syria's nuclear program, whether Syria plans to convert this
material and turn it into fuel or if there are other foreseen
nuclear facilities in the future. Canada also asked if the
Agency could provide more details about the "use of natural
uranium compounds" at the MNSR that might be relevant to
allegations concerning one of the three other locations,
asking specifically which site the Agency referred to but
Nackaerts did not answer this question.
Homs
-----
¶9. (SBU) In the context of Syria's statements that
yellowcake produced at the Homs facility, Nackaerts provided
details on the Homs plant (Homs Phosphate Acid Purification
Pilot Plant) not included in the DG report:
-- Facility commission in 1998;
-- 1 cubic meter/hour throughput of raw phosphoric acid with
60 ppm uranium;
-- Second process to purify phosphoric acid to 'food grade' -
added in 2003; and
-- Agency visited the site in July 2004 and inspectors
observed hundreds of kilograms of yellowcake at that time
(this was in a footnote to the DG report).
Uranyl Nitrate
--------------
¶10. (SBU) Lastly, Australia also asked a question on the
uranyl nitrate, and how the Agency accounts for Syria's
changing explanations on the source of the uranium
contamination at the MNSR. Nackaerts noted the uranyl
nitrate could either be purchased on the open market or
produced at the MNSR from Homs yellowcake. As to why Syria
did not declare this activity, Nackaerts said he did not
know, but speculated matter-of-factly on a possible lack of
understanding of reporting obligations on Syria's part.
Comment
-------
¶11. (C) Mission detects a slowly increasing cognizance
among like-minded that the Syrian portfolio at the IAEA
remains a serious challenge with no easy end-game in sight.
Unlike the November Technical Briefing, Canada and Australia
joined us in pursuing questions of the Secretariat. In the
run-up to the meeting we urged France to do so as well, but
were told that the French Mission was instructed not to take
the floor in light of ongoing French efforts to engage the
Syrians. We reminded the French Mission that absent Syrian
cooperation with the IAEA, we are inexorably heading toward a
possible special inspection request on which the IAEA would
look to France to be supportive.
DAVIES