Descartes' Theory of Ideas

Ideas are among the most important items in Cartesian philosophy. They
serve to unify Descartes' ontology and epistemology. As he says in a
letter to Guillaume Gibieuf (1583–1650), dated 19 January 1642, “I am
certain that I can have no knowledge of what is outside me except by
means of the ideas I have within
me.”[1]
Descartes never produced any formal
treatise or work dedicated specifically to the laying out of
a theory of ideas. Even so, enough is included in published
and unpublished work, as well as in correspondence, that allows for a
basic reconstruction of a theory. This entry will focus principally on the theory
of ideas and how it relates to Descartes' ontology. See the related
entry
Descartes, René: epistemology
for more on how the theory relates to Descartes'
epistemology.

According to Descartes' ontology there are three levels of
being: substance, attribute, and mode. The
levels of being are understood in terms of ontological
dependence. Modes depend on attributes for their being in a way that
attributes do not depend on modes. And, attributes depend on
substances for their being in a way that substances do not depend on
attributes. In Principles, Part I, Article 53, for example,
the language that Descartes uses is that of “presupposition.” He
claims that modes presuppose attributes (AT VIIIA 25; CSM I 210); and,
in Article 52, he claims that attributes presuppose an existing
substance (AT VIIIA 25; CSM I 210).

The essence or nature of a mind, Descartes says, is to think. If a
thing does not think, it is not a mind. In terms of his ontology, the
mind is a (finite) substance, and thought or thinking is its
attribute. Insofar as the essence or nature of a mind is to think,
where thought is the mind's defining feature, Descartes calls it the
mind's principal attribute (AT VIIIA 25; CSM I 210–11).
An idea is a mode of
thought.[2]
In light of the way that Descartes employed
the concept of mode, to say that something is a mode of X is
to say that it is a way of being X. Thus, in being a mode of thought,
an idea is understood as a way of being thought (or a way in which an
instance of thought or thinking is manifested). This is similar to
what he says about a body, its principal attribute, and its modes. The
essence or nature of a body is to be extended (in length, breadth, and
depth). A body is a (finite) substance, and extension is its
attribute. Since extension is the defining feature of a body,
Descartes refers to it as a body's principal attribute. Shape, for
example, is a mode of extension. What this means is that shape is a
way of being extended (or a way in which an instance of extension is
manifested). Thus, shape is to extension as idea is to thought.

Insofar as ideas are modes, they occupy the lowest rung on Descartes'
ontological ladder. This can be contrasted to Plato's theory, for
example, which casts ideas as substances, occupying the upper-most
rung of the ontological ladder. So, whereas for Plato ideas are the
most real things in the cosmos, for Descartes ideas are among the
least real.

Ideas are not the only modes of thought. For example, doubting and
judging are modes of thought. Even so, according to at least one
analysis Descartes provides, ideas are understood as being elements or
constituents of these other modes of thought. Early in the Third
Meditation, for instance, Descartes works out a basic division of the
modes of thought. He sorts them into two basic kinds:
ideas and the other modes of thought, which are more complex since
they include an idea and some “additional” mental feature. He writes:

First, however, considerations of order appear to dictate that I now
classify my thoughts into definite kinds, and ask which of them can
properly be said to be the bearers of truth and falsity. Some of my
thoughts are as it were the images of things, and it is only in these
cases that the term 'idea' is strictly appropriate — for example,
when I think of a man, or a chimera, or the sky, or an angel, or
God. Other thoughts have various additional forms: thus when I will,
or am afraid, or affirm, or deny, there is always a particular thing
which I take as the object of my thought, but my thought includes
something more than the likeness of that thing. Some thoughts in this
category are called volitions or emotions, while others are called
judgements. (AT VII 36–7; CSM II 25–6)

In this passage, ideas are cast as modes of thought that represent (or
present or exhibit — Descartes uses such terms interchangeably)
“objects” to the mind. Strictly speaking, it is
the only kind of mode that does this. For, even though an
instance of one of the more complex modes of thought presents an
“object” to the mind, as in the case of one's fearing a
lion or affirming the Pythagorean Theorem (where the lion and the
theorem are the “objects” presented), it is the ideational
element (the idea) that does the presenting. Even so, Descartes is
careful to not identify ideas as pictures or as visual
images, but instead says that they are as it were
[tanquam] images of things. This is a long-standing theme,
for we find it expressed as early as The World (AT XI 3–6;
CSM I 81–2) and the Optics (AT VI 112–13; CSM I 165), and as
late as the Principles (AT VIIIA 32–3; CSM I 216–17), where
in these contexts ideas are cast as representing their objects without
necessarily resembling them. This is important to the theory, since
the idea of cold or the idea of sweet, for example, insofar as they
are ideas, represent something to the mind, but they are
not visual images. The point holds for other ideas, such as
the idea of God, which he explicitly lists in the above passage. The
idea of God represents something to the mind (it represents an
infinite substance), but in line with traditional theological
doctrine, which demands that God is non-spatial and non-temporal, such
an idea must not be understood as being a visual image of
God. Descartes' qualifying tanquam (as it were)
phrase appears to align his theory with such theological demands.

Consistent with what he says in the above Third Meditation passage,
Descartes says in other places that an idea is “the form of any
given thought, immediate perception of which makes me aware of the
thought” (AT VII 160; CSM II 113). In his reply to Thomas Hobbes
(1588–1679), author of the Third Set of Objections, Descartes
says that an idea is “whatever is immediately perceived by the
mind” (AT VII 181; CSM II 127). In his reply to Pierre Gassendi
(1592–1655), author of the Fifth Set of Objections, he says that
the term “idea” is extended “to cover any object of
thought” (AT VII 366; CSM II 253). In a letter to Marin Mersenne
(1588–1648), dated July 1641, he says that “idea”
denotes “in general everything which is in our mind when we
conceive something, no matter how we conceive it” (AT III 393;
CSMK III 185). Traditionally, scholars have interpreted such passages
as telling us that Descartes' view is that in an idea's representing
or presenting an object to the mind, it is a mode that in some sense
possesses content (Wilson 1978, Chappell 1986). This has in
turn led scholars to interpret Descartes' theory as being among the
earlier theories of intentionality. This finds further
support in what Descartes says, for example, in the First Replies:
“…the idea of the sun is the sun itself existing in the
intellect — not of course formally existing, as it does in the
heavens, but objectively existing, i.e., in the way in which objects
normally are in the intellect” (AT VII 102–3; CSM II 75).
Such an object is solely in the intellect, “…it
is not an actual entity, that is, it is not a being located outside
the intellect…” (AT VII 103; CSM II 75) According to this
interpretation, Descartes understands the objects represented or
presented to the mind, objects that are in some sense in
ideas, as intentional (and purely mental) objects. Such objects are
those of which the mind is immediately aware.

In the Meditations, after Descartes casts ideas as modes that
represent objects to the mind, he divides ideas into kinds. He
says:

Among my ideas, some appear to be innate, some to be adventitious, and
others to have been invented by me. My understanding of what a thing
is, what truth is, and what thought is, seems to derive simply from my
own nature. But my hearing a noise, as I do now, or seeing the sun, or
feeling the fire, comes from things which are located outside me, or
so I have hitherto judged. Lastly, sirens, hippogriffs and the like
are my own invention. (AT VII 37–8; CSM II 26)

Here, Descartes considers three kinds of idea: innate
ideas, adventitious ideas, and what are sometimes
called factitious ideas. The categories are determined by
what appears to him to be differences with respect to the origins of
their contents. It will not be until later in the Third Meditation,
and arguably not until the Sixth Meditation, that the three categories
will be confirmed as genuine. The first category poses no
difficulties, for he suggests that he can account for these ideas
(their contents) — specifically the ideas of what a thing is,
what thought is, and so on — by an appeal to his own nature. He
is an existent thinking thing, and so the origin of the contents of
the ideas he mentions, the objects they represent, can be traced to
this fact about his nature. The last category of idea is also
unproblematic, for he can easily account for them again by an appeal
to himself. He puts them together, so to speak, out of other ideas
that he already possesses. Adventitious ideas, however, do pose an
immediate problem, since Nature has always taught him, he says, to
think that they are “derived from things existing outside
me” (AT VII 38; CSM II 26). So, an account of their origin
— that is, the origin of their content — may have to
include an appeal to things that exist external to, or independently
of, his mind. The problem is that at this stage in
the Meditations certain forms of doubt that have yet to be
resolved prohibit his adopting the view that there exist such
things.

The belief that some of his ideas have their origin in things that
exist external to, or independently of, his mind arises in part from
ordinary (pre-philosophical) experience: “…I know by
experience that these ideas do not depend on my will, and hence that
they do not depend simply on me. Frequently I notice them even when I
do not want to: now, for example, I feel the heat whether I want to or
not, and this is why I think that this sensation or idea of heat comes
to me from something other than myself, namely the heat of the fire by
which I am sitting” (AT VII 38; CSM II 26). Although Descartes
begins the analysis by an initial examination of adventitious ideas,
he ultimately extends it to cover the idea of God, which is the
paradigm of an innate idea. For, as we learn just a few pages
later in the Third Meditation, the idea of God is innate, and yet, as
Descartes shows, it (or its content) must have its origin in God, the
infinite substance, something that exists external to, or
independently of, Descartes' finite mind.

This is not the only place where the distinction between the
categories of innate and adventitious ideas is blurred. It arises
again, for instance, in Comments on a Certain Broadsheet,
published in 1648. There, Descartes casts innateness as a faculty
(capacity) or tendency (AT VIIIB 358; CSM I 304), which aligns with
what he had said in the Third Replies: “…when we say that
an idea is innate in us, we do not mean that it is always there before
us. This would mean that no idea was innate. We simply mean that we
have within ourselves the faculty of summoning up the idea” (AT
VII 189; CSM II 132). Descartes then turns, in Comments on a
Certain Broadsheet, to applying this view to what in
the Meditations were called adventitious ideas. Given that
the human or embodied mind has the faculty or capacity to have sensory
or adventitious ideas of pains, colors, sounds, and so on, occasioned
on the occurrence or presence of certain motions in the brain, and
nothing of the motions is transferred to the mind, and nothing
resembling the pains, colors, and sounds are present in bodies, then
the ideas of pains, colors, and sounds, he says, “must be all
the more innate” (AT VIIIB 359; CSM I 304).
Their possibility is in part rooted in an innate capacity of
an embodied mind. And so, his adventitious ideas look to be innate in
this sense.

One interpretation that resolves the above conflict casts innate ideas
as ideas that underlie all other ideas, where the relationship between
the innate ideas and all other ideas is understood in terms of the
conditions of intelligibility (Nolan 1997, Lennon 2007,
Nelson 2008). Consider, for example, the idea of the sun. Understood as
a shaped thing, an analysis of this idea would reveal that the innate
idea of extension (body) is in play, so to speak, for without it we
simply could not conceive (or experience) the sun as
shaped. Shape, recall, presupposes extension. As Descartes puts it in
the Principles, everything “which can be attributed to
body presupposes extension, and is merely a mode of an extended
thing,” and so, “…shape is unintelligible except in
an extended thing…” (AT VIIIA 25; CSM I 210). In this
sense, insofar as a shaped thing is intelligible to us, which is to
say that we have an idea of such a thing, the innate idea of extension
is present. As some scholars have put it, the innate idea underlies
the occurring idea of shape (Nolan 1997, Nelson 2008). This
interpretation finds support in what Descartes says in a letter to
Princess Elisabeth, dated 21 May 1643, where he introduces what he
calls the “primitive notions.” These are what in other
contexts he calls the innate ideas. He claims that they are
“…the patterns on the basis of which we form all our
other conceptions” (AT III 665; CSMK III 218). According to this
reading, there is a sense in which innate ideas are always
present, which puts pressure on the innateness equals
capacity view, noted above. According to this reading,
adventitious ideas rely on the innate ideas in the sense that the
latter account for the intelligibility of the former. Consequently,
the blurring between the categories of innate and adventitious ideas
is resolved.

Despite the tensions that arise among the above-considered
interpretations, scholars from both camps agree that with respect to
innate ideas, Descartes recognizes at least three: the idea of God,
the idea of (finite) mind, and the idea of (indefinite) body.

There are two very important kinds of being
or reality in Cartesian philosophy, namely, formal
and objective being or reality. Some scholars have
argued that for Descartes there is a difference between the concepts
of being and reality (Chappell 1986, Lennon 2007, Smith 2010a). This
distinction will be ignored in what follows, and focus will be given
to what scholars call the formal-objective reality
distinction. And so, in this context being
and reality will be taken as coextensive. The
formal-objective reality distinction serves as one of the basic
building blocks of Descartes' theory of ideas.

The formal reality of a thing is the reality the thing
possesses in virtue of its being an actual or
an existent thing (AT VII 41–42, 102–4; CSM II
28–29, 74–5). The objective reality of a thing,
on the other hand, is the reality a thing possesses in virtue of its
being a representation of something (ibid.). Within
the scheme of Cartesian metaphysics, only ideas will possess objective
reality, and they will possess this kind of reality by their very
nature (AT VII 42; CSM II 29).

There are two distinct hierarchies with respect to both kinds of
reality. Concerning formal reality, there are three
“levels”: infinite substance, finite substance (as defined
by its principal attribute), and mode. A finite substance depends for
its reality on the reality of the infinite substance in a way that the
reality of the infinite substance does not depend for its reality on
the reality of a finite substance. And, similarly, a mode depends for
its reality on the reality of a finite substance in a way that a
finite substance does not depend for its reality on the reality of a
mode. Another way to put this, thinking specifically in terms of
formal reality, is that the formal reality of a thing in the category
of mode is derived from the formal reality of a thing in the category
of finite substance, and the formal reality of a thing in the category
of finite substance is derived from the formal reality of a thing in
the category of infinite substance. As we shall see in a passage to be
considered shortly, it is Descartes' view that an infinite substance
possesses a greater level of formal reality than a finite substance,
and that a finite substance possesses a greater level of formal
reality than a mode. Concerning objective reality, Descartes says,
“Undoubtedly, the ideas which represent substances to me amount
to something more and, so to speak, contain within themselves more
objective reality than the ideas which merely represent modes or
accidents” (AT VII 40; CSM II 28). And, Descartes' Third
Meditation examination of his idea of God will reveal that the
objective reality that it contains or possesses is that of an infinite
substance. At the very least, the view is that the idea of God
contains a level of objective reality that is greater than that
contained in an idea representing a finite substance. Thus, the levels
of objective reality possessed by ideas, the reality they possess in
virtue of their representing things to the mind, are three: infinite
substance, finite substance, and mode. So, the categories of the
objective-reality hierarchy correspond to those of the formal-reality
hierarchy. One important difference, however, is that whereas in the
formal-reality hierarchy objects in one category, those in the
category of mode, for example, are understood as depending for their
being on the being of those objects in the higher category, in this
case those in the category of finite substance, it is not clear
whether the objects in the objective-reality hierarchy share the same
ontological dependence relationship. That is, it is not clear whether
a mode represented in an idea (this would be an idea whose level of
objective reality is that of a mode) depends ontologically on anything
whose objective reality is that of the level of a finite
substance. As we shall see shortly, the level of objective reality in
an idea, at least with respect to what Descartes will call primary
ideas, is derived from an object possessing some level of formal
reality that is either greater than or equal to the level of objective
reality contained in the idea. So, the same relation that holds
between objects in the formal-reality hierarchy may not hold for
objects in the objective-reality hierarchy. A neutral reading of this
would simply hold that the objective-reality hierarchy is determined
by the formal-reality hierarchy, where the latter is determined by the
asymmetrical ontological dependence relationships noted earlier.

“The nature of an idea,” Descartes says, “is such
that of itself it requires no formal reality except what it derives
from my thought, of which it is a mode” (AT VII 41; CSM II 28).
In fact, “In so far as the ideas are (considered) simply (as)
modes of thought, there is no recognizable inequality among them: they
all appear to come from within me in the same fashion” (AT VII
40; CSM II 27–8). Each idea is simply a mode of thought, and
insofar as an idea is an existent (or actual) mode, it possesses a
level of formal reality, which is that of a mode. He continues:
“But in so far as different ideas (are considered as images
which) represent different things, it is clear that they differ
widely” (AT VII 40; CSM II 28). The differences will not only be
in terms of the “objects” represented, but, as noted
above, ideas will differ with respect to the levels of objective
reality they contain (AT VII 40; CSM II 28).

To see how this distinction works within the context of Descartes'
theory, consider an idea that has been mentioned several times
already — the idea of God as introduced in the Third
Meditation. Descartes' analysis of this idea begins with his focusing
on the fact that the idea represents to him an infinite substance (AT
VII 45; CSM II 31). The formal-objective reality distinction
suggests the following. When considered simply as an existent mode of
Descartes' mind, which is to consider it in terms of its formal
reality, Descartes sees no trouble in accounting for the origin of the
formal reality of this idea: the formal reality possessed by this idea
is derived from the formal reality of his mind. But when considered as
the object represented in the idea, which is to consider the idea in
terms of its objective reality, Descartes discovers a problem: what is
the origin of the idea's objective reality? This challenge arises in
light of Descartes' saying:

Now it is manifest by the natural light that there must be at least as
much (reality) in the efficient and total cause as in the effect of
that cause. For where, I ask, could the effect get its reality from,
if not from the cause? And how could the cause give it to the effect
unless it possessed it? It follows from this both that something
cannot arise from nothing, and also that what is more perfect — that
is, contains in itself more reality — cannot arise from what is less
perfect. And this is transparently true not only in the case of
effects which possess (what the philosophers call) actual or formal
reality, but also in the case of ideas, where one is considering only
(what they call) objective reality. A stone, for example, which
previously did not exist, cannot begin to exist unless it is produced
by something which contains, either formally or eminently everything
to be found in the stone; similarly, heat cannot be produced in an
object which was not previously hot, except by something of at least
the same order (degree or kind) of perfection as heat, and so on. But
it is also true that the idea of heat, or of a stone, cannot
exist in me unless it is put there by some cause which contains at
least as much reality as I conceive to be in the heat or in the
stone. For although this cause does not transfer any of its actual or
formal reality to my idea, it should not on that account be supposed
that it must be less real. The nature of an idea is such that of
itself it requires no formal reality except what it derives from my
thought, of which it is a mode. But in order for a given idea to
contain such and such objective reality, it must surely derive it from
some cause which contains at least as much formal reality as there is
objective reality in the idea. For if we suppose that an idea contains
something which was not in its cause, it must have got this from
nothing; yet the mode of being by which a thing exists objectively (or
representatively) in the intellect by way of an idea, imperfect though
it may be, is certainly not nothing, and so it cannot come from
nothing. (AT VII 40–1; CSM II 28–9)

The challenge in the examination of the idea of God stems from
Descartes' noticing that the level of objective reality of this idea
is greater than the formal reality of his own mind (AT VII 45–6;
CSM II 31). The challenge, in other words, is to trace the origin of
the objective reality contained in this particular idea. The level of
formal reality of Descartes' mind is at best that of a finite
substance. He determines this by noting that if he were an infinite
substance, in this case an infinite mind, one of the things he would
surely know was whether he was in fact an infinite knower (one of the
things that an infinite knower would know is that it was an infinite
knower). But this is something that he does not know (i.e., he does
not know that he is an infinite knower). So, he is not an infinite
mind, or more importantly for the argument, he is not an infinite
substance (AT VII 45; CSM II 31). So, given that the cause (or origin)
of the objective reality contained in this idea must possess a level
of formal reality that is at least as great as the idea's level of
objective reality, it follows that Descartes' mind is not (and cannot
be) its origin. (This is part of Descartes' Third Meditation argument
for the existence of God. For more, see the SEP entry on
Descartes's epistemology.)
Notice how this differs from what he says about the formal reality of
an idea, namely, that his mind is the cause or origin of an idea's
formal reality.

The examination of the idea of God follows almost directly upon the
introduction of the possible connection between the objective reality
of some of his ideas and the formal reality of extra-ideational or
extra-mental objects. This suggests a more general view on what it is
for certain ideas to “represent” objects, where the case of the idea
of God is the model. This general view is part of Descartes'
account of ideational representation, where the ideas in the account
are referred to as primary ideas, of which the idea of God
is the paradigm. For more on primary ideas see the next section of this entry.

Descartes tells us that although the objective reality of an idea may
have its origin in the objective reality of another idea, he claims
that this cannot go on ad infinitum. “[E]ventually one
must reach a primary idea, the cause of which will be like an
archetype which contains formally (and in fact) all the reality (or
perfection) which is present only objectively (or representatively) in
the idea” (AT VII 41–2; CSM II 29, emphasis mine). And so,
a primary idea is an idea whose objective reality has its origin in
the formal reality of some object, which when not the mind, is some
extra-mental object. It should be mentioned that some scholars have
taken Descartes' causal language in this context to be part of a more
general theory of occasional causation, where the presence of
the formal reality of object B, set in the right sort of relation to
some perceiver, is the occasion for (or the occasional cause of) the
objective reality contained in idea A (See Schmaltz 2008, Nadler
2011). For the sake of interpretative neutrality on this point, in
this entry the relation between the formal reality of object B and the
objective reality of idea A will be cast simply in terms
of origin.

Some scholars believe that in Descartes' brief discussion of primary
ideas there is suggested a principle of representation (Wilson 1978,
Clatterbaugh 1980, Chappell 1986, Smith 2005a, 2010a). The principle
is notoriously difficult to formulate, and there is no consensus among
scholars as to how it is best understood. However, a large number of
scholars agree on one component of the principle, which can be
expressed as a necessary (though not a sufficient) condition for
representation. The necessary condition (NC) can be expressed as
follows:

(NC) Idea A represents object B only if the objective reality of
idea A has its origin in the formal reality of object B.

Descartes does not commit himself to taking NC as claiming
that all of the objective reality in idea A must have its
origin in the formal reality of object B. Rather, he seems to commit
himself only to the view that if idea A represents object B, and idea
A is a primary idea, then at least some of the idea's objective
reality has its origin in the formal reality of object B. Even so, the
origin relation is not a sufficient condition for representation. So,
from the fact that the formal reality of object B is the cause (or
origin) of an idea's objective reality, it will not follow that this
idea represents object B.

In his analysis of this very aspect of Descartes' theory of ideas,
Vere Chappell introduced the terminology of “counterparts” (Chappell
1986, 187–88). The sun as represented in my idea, which might be taken
to be the “objective sun”, “would be an objective counterpart of that
familiar body that exists in the sky; it [the sun in the sky], in
turn, would be the actual counterpart of [the objective sun]”
(ibid., 188). The sun in the sky, the actual sun, could be taken
in this context to be the “formal sun”. In these terms, where the
objective sun (or objective-sun) is the idea of the sun taken
objectively, NC can be expressed as follows:

My idea represents the sun only if objective-sun has its origin in its
counterpart, formal-sun.

This is similar to how NC is employed in the Third Meditation:

My idea represents God only if the objective reality of this idea
has its origin in the formal reality of God.

Or, in Chappell's terms:

My idea represents God only if objective-God has its origin in its
counterpart, formal-God.

NC is also employed in the Sixth Meditation proof for the existence of
body, which can be formulated thus:

My idea represents body only if the objective reality of this idea has
its origin in the formal reality of body.

There is trouble lurking for the case of the idea of the sun, which
shall be addressed shortly, but for the moment it will be helpful to
complete the examination of the idea of God and the idea of body. As
scholars have noted, there is an important difference between the
Third Meditation proof for the existence of God and the Sixth
Meditation proof for the existence of body. Descartes' examination of
the idea of body in the Sixth Meditation reveals that the level
of objective reality possessed by this idea could easily be accounted
for by an appeal to the formal reality of his own mind. That is, his
mind possesses a level of formal reality sufficient to account for the
presence of the level of objective reality in the idea of body. This
is quite different from what we learned in the examination of the idea
of God. In the Sixth Meditation proof Descartes considers several
items that might serve as the origin of body as represented in his
idea (i.e., he considers what might be the origin of
objective-body). He considers (the formal reality of) God, his own
mind, the mind of some other being (such as an angel), and body. He
argues:

But since God is not a deceiver, it is quite clear that he does not
transmit the idea to me either directly from himself, or indirectly,
via some creature which contains the objective reality of the ideas
not formally but only eminently. For God has given me no faculty at
all for recognizing any such source for these ideas; on the contrary,
he has given me a great propensity to believe that they are produced
by corporeal things. So I do not see how God could be understood to be
anything but a deceiver if the idea were transmitted from a source
other than corporal things. It follows that corporeal things
exist. (AT VII 79–80; CSM II 55)

One way to read this is that the veracity of God guarantees the truth
of NC. Simply put, the argument is: If NC is false, then God is a
deceiver. But God is not a deceiver. So, NC is true.

However, upon closer examination, when formulated in terms of other
important ideas, such as the idea of the true and immutable nature of
a triangle, the idea of heat, or the adventitious idea of the sun
(considered earlier), NC falls prey to serious criticism. Again
consider the following:

My idea represents the sun only if the objective reality of this idea
has its origin in the formal reality of the sun.

Although Descartes speaks of the sun in the Third Meditation as though
it were an individual body that exists independently of his mind,
scholars have shown that Descartes also appears to deny that such
things in fact exist as individual corporeal substances; that is,
there are no bodies (plural) that are really distinct from one another
(Nolan 1997, Sowaal 2004, Lennon 2007). What is argued is that
Descartes holds that there are no “natural” kinds, and so
there are no things such as suns, moons, flowers, tigers, and so
on. The nature of a body is extension (its nature is to be extended in
length, breadth, and depth). And so, there is no substantial
ontological distinction to be drawn between the sun, the moon, a
tiger, etc. If we draw a distinction between individual bodies, the
distinction is a modal one; it will be a distinction made in terms of
shapes, sizes, and so on. On this reading, there are no individuated
(i.e., really distinct) corporeal substances that exist independently
of the mind, but only one corporeal substance, divided modally into
such “objects” as the sun, moon, etc. This was in fact
what Spinoza took from his study of Descartes (Smith and Nelson
2010b). Thus, according to this interpretation, the above claim about
an idea's representing the sun, cast in terms of NC, is not something
that Descartes can in the end make. It would be as problematic as
claiming:

My idea represents Pegasus only if the objective reality of this idea
has its origin in the formal reality of Pegasus.

Clearly, Descartes would consider the idea of Pegasus to be a
factitious idea, which at the very least would mean that there is no
Pegasus counterpart. That is, there is no formal-Pegasus. The idea of
the sun is arguably like the idea of Pegasus in that there is no
formal-sun. Instead, there is simply formal-body (i.e., an actually
existent corporeal substance). Reading Descartes this way opens a new
proverbial can of worms, however, for the initial distinction drawn
between adventitious ideas, such as the idea of the sun, and
factitious ideas, such as the idea of Pegasus, is blurred. Moreover,
and perhaps more importantly, what the analysis of the idea of the sun
shows is that if NC expresses a principle of representation in
Descartes' theory of ideas, it seems to apply only to the idea of his
own (finite) mind, the idea of God, and the idea of body (for a
fourth, see Nelson 2008). If this is correct, and NC applies solely to
primary ideas, then these ideas (the innate ideas, or as he calls them
later, the primitive notions) are the only primary ideas in Descartes'
theory. (For an argument that shows how both the many bodies
view and the one body view are actually compatible, see
Smith 2010a.)

It would be no exaggeration to claim that the matter surrounding
Descartes' view on ideational representation is among the most
controversial in Descartes scholarship. In addition to those already
mentioned, the controversy has given rise to at least two competing
interpretations. The first is what is called
a representationalist reading of Descartes' theory of ideas,
and is the reading this entry has considered thus far. It is a
long-standing reading of Descartes. The second
is what is called a direct realist reading of Descartes'
theory of ideas. This second interpretation is based on a distinction
that Descartes introduced in the Preface To The Reader of
the Meditations, the material-objective distinction, which
will be discussed next.

There is a second distinction that Descartes introduces,
the material-objective distinction. Some scholars have argued
that it is importantly different from the distinction considered
earlier, the formal-objective reality distinction (Smith
2005a, 2005b, 2010a). Even so, on their surface they appear no
different, which has led some scholars to claim that they are in fact
one and the same (Grene 1986, Nadler 1989). This second distinction is
not clearly formulated in the body of the Meditations, though
Descartes finds himself relying on it, for instance, in his reply to
Antione Arnauld (1612–1694), author of the Fourth Set of
Objections, though what he says is confusing — a confusion that
has received much attention from scholars. (See, for example, Kenny
1968, Wilson 1978, Wells 1984, Normore 1986, Smith 2005a, 2005b,
2010a, Wee 2007, De Rosa 2010.) In fact, this second distinction is
not “officially” introduced in the Meditations
until Descartes writes the book's Preface To The Reader, which was
very likely written after the Meditations and the
texts now referred to as the “Objections and Replies”. In
the Preface, Descartes notes an ambiguity in the word
“idea”. He says:

‘Idea’ can be taken materially, as an operation of the
intellect, in which case it cannot be said to be more perfect than
me. Alternatively, it can be taken objectively, as the thing
represented by that operation; and this thing, even if it is not
regarded as existing outside the intellect, can still, in virtue of
its essence, be more perfect than myself. (AT VII 8; CSM II 7)

Descartes tells us that there are two ways to take or to conceive an
idea. The first is to take an idea as an act or operation of the
mind. In this sense, the idea is simply an actual or existent mode or
modification of the mind, and insofar as it is, its formal reality is
derived from the formal reality of the mind. And given that an effect
cannot possess more reality than its cause, it follows that its
“level” of formal reality cannot be greater than that of
the mind. This is what Descartes means when claiming that his ideas,
understood as modes or as acts of the mind, cannot be “more
perfect” than his mind. When taking an idea in this sense,
Descartes says that we take the idea materially. Secondly, we
can take an idea as that which is represented to the mind by way of
this act or operation. Here, we would be taking or conceiving the idea
in terms of its representational aspect. To take an idea in this
sense, as he says in the above passage, is to take the
idea objectively. As just noted, on its surface the
material-objective distinction looks to be simply an alternate
formulation of the formal-objective reality distinction. But,
understanding them as being different actually suggests a way of
settling the conflict between the representationalist and direct
realist readings of Descartes' theory of ideas. This is worth a brief
look. First, then, it will be shown how the two distinctions differ,
which will be followed (in the next section of this entry) by an
extended though brief discussion of these two competing interpretations.

When an idea is taken as a mode of mind, we take the idea in terms of
its formal being or reality, and so take it, as Descartes will
say, formally. And as we also know, when an idea is taken as
an act or operation of the intellect, we take the
idea materially. Now, given that to take an idea as an act or
operation is to take it as a mode, it would seem that formal
and material are synonymous. And, as noted earlier, scholars
have made this very argument (Grene 1986, Nadler 1989). But, there is
a way of understanding the distinctions that shows that they are
different, which in turn shows that the terms formally
and materially are not synonymous.

Recall the formal-objective reality distinction. When applied
to primary ideas, the distinction traces out the two kinds of reality
possessed by an idea. Taking the idea formally, the distinction traces
out the formal reality of the idea to the formal reality of the mind,
of which it is a mode. Taking the idea objectively, the distinction
traces out the objective reality of the idea ultimately to the formal
reality of some object, which, when not the mind, is some object that
exists external to, or independently of, the mind. This distinction,
then, emphasizes two relations: the relation that the idea has (as
mode) to the mind, and the relation that the idea has (as representer)
to the object it represents.

Now recall the material-objective distinction. Taking the idea
materially, the distinction takes the idea as an act or operation of
the intellect. Presumably, the act or operation is the act of
representation. Taking the idea objectively, the distinction takes the
idea as the object as represented by way of this act or
operation. No doubt this is coextensive with objectively in
the formal-objective reality distinction. Here is what is important:
unlike the formal-objective reality distinction, the
material-objective distinction emphasizes only one relation:
the relation between the idea as act and the idea (the very same idea)
as the object presented or exhibited to the mind by way of this
act. In other words, the material-objective distinction brings to
light the internal relation between the idea as act of representation
and the idea as representational content, a relation that is in fact
not recognized in the formal-objective reality distinction.

This analysis of the two distinctions suggests the following:

Consider again the idea of God. In light of the formal-objective
reality distinction, the “features” of this idea can be
analyzed into two categories:

(1) Features whose origin is (solely) the mind,

and,

(2) Features whose origin is the mind and God.

Those features falling under (1) are formal features. They
are simply those features derived from the mind, of which the idea is
a mode. Thus, the idea's formal reality is a feature falling under
(1). By contrast, those features falling under (2)
are objective features. They are those features that link the
idea's representational content to God. Even so, the mind is included
among the origin of such features, since Descartes will tell us that
the objects as represented, that is, the objective beings, will not
exist “outside the intellect” (AT VII 8; CSM II 7). So, insofar as
God as represented, that is, objective-God, is an
entity that does not exist external to, or independently of, the mind,
its being must have some dependence on the mind. For lack of better
names, call (1)-type features “non-representational features” and
(2)-type features “representational features”.

The material-objective distinction specifically allows for a further
analysis of representational features. For example, taken materially
the idea of God is taken as an act or operation of the mind. And,
insofar as this operation plays a part in producing the object
presented or exhibited, the objective being — objective-God in
the case now being considered — depends in some important sense
on the mind (this says nothing more than that mental objects
depend in some sense on the mind). Even so, insofar as the object
presented or exhibited is God, and not some other object, the
object presented or exhibited depends on something other than this
operation. It depends on something in God. This, in fact, is precisely
what NC claimed. So, representational features can be analyzed
thus:

(2a) Features regarded in terms of the representational operation,

and,

(2b) Features regarded in terms of God.

These are two ways of regarding
representational features. Considering the idea in terms of
that by way of which God is presented or exhibited to (or in)
the mind, we understand the representational feature in terms of
(2a). Here, we take the idea as an operation of representation. This
is to take the idea materially. By contrast, considering the
idea in terms of God, that is, in terms of the object it represents,
we understand the representational feature in terms of (2b). This is
to take the idea objectively. If this is correct, then taking or regarding
an idea formally is identified with category (1), whereas
taking or regarding an idea materially is identified with
category (2a). Since (1) and (2a) are not identical
categories, formally and materially are not
synonymous.

As noted earlier, the representationalist reading of
Descartes' theory of ideas is a long-standing reading in the
secondary literature. Relatively recently scholars have introduced a
possible alternative reading, which is called the direct
realist reading. Steven Nadler, for example, has located this
interpretation in Arnauld, a contemporary of Descartes' (as noted
earlier, Arnauld is the author of the Fourth Set of Objections).

As the name suggests, the representationalist reading takes ideas as
principally representations of things. According to some versions of
the theory, an idea is referred to as a tertium quid, that
is, as a third thing. Such a “thing” serves as a sort of
bridge between the mind and the world that exists external to, or
independently of, the mind. Understood this way, ideas form what
scholars have referred to as a “veil of perception.” Ideas are the
direct “objects” of perception, whereas it is via our ideas that we
only indirectly perceive extra-mental objects (assuming such
exist) (Kenny 1968, Wilson 1978, Chappell 1986). (The “veil of
perception” phrasing has its origin in Bennett 1971.)

The direct realist reading rejects the notion of a veil of perception
(Yolton 1984, Nadler 1989). On this reading, in cases of perceiving
extra-mental objects, where such perceptions are veridical, the
objects that are directly perceived are in fact the objects
that exist external to, or independently of, the mind. There is no
“third thing” that stands between the mind and external or
extra-mental objects.

As noted earlier, the direct realist reading has its roots in a
certain interpretation of the material-objective distinction. Recall
that when applied to an analysis of ideas, this distinction tells us
the following: when taken materially, we take an idea as
an act or operation of representation. By contrast,
when we take this very same idea objectively, we take the idea in
terms of its representational content, which belongs to (and is
generated by) this act or operation. According to Nadler's account of
direct realism, Descartes' view is that all ideas are ultimately to be
understood as act-ideas (Nadler 1989). Ideas in this context
are said to be “directed at” their objects. So, in the
case of the sensory idea of the sun, the idea can be understood to be
directed at the sun, that is, at the sun itself, the object in the
heavens. In taking the idea as act in this context, it is
taken materially. But every act-idea also possesses representational
content (Nadler 1989). When considered as such, the idea is taken
objectively. The point to stress is that the mind is directed
at the sun, at the extra-mental object, and not at
the content of the idea.

One interesting feature of this reading is that
what determines the idea's content is not necessarily the
extra-mental object at which the mind is directed (Nadler 1989,
127–28). In other words, the idea's content is not
necessarily related to the object at which the mind is directed. And
so, in the case where an act-idea is directed at the sun, for
instance, the idea's content is not necessarily “of” the
sun, but could in fact exhibit to the mind some other object, such as
the moon, which might occur in a case of hallucinating. Likewise, an
act-idea might be directed at certain motions in the brain (in which
case the act-idea is not directed at the sun), but the idea's content
nevertheless exhibits to the mind the sun. This might occur in a case
of recollecting the sun. But if this is correct, what determines what
an idea is “of”? Is an idea “of” the sun
insofar as the sun is the object at which the act-idea is directed, or
is the idea “of” the sun insofar as the sun is the object exhibited in
the idea's content? It is not clear how this reading of Descartes can
answer these questions.

There is another version of the direct realist reading, this one based
primarily on a distinction found in Aquinas, which attempts to resolve
the above mentioned sort of difficulty (Hoffman 2002). Here, the
theory tells us that objects such as the sun itself are what possess
the two distinct kinds of reality, formal and objective
reality. Insofar as the sun possesses formal reality, it is a thing
that exists independently of the mind. This is the sun that exists in
the heavens. Insofar as this same object, the sun, possesses objective
reality, it is that which the mind is aware of when perceiving the
sun. There is an underlying identity between formal-sun and
objective-sun. “The sun as it exists objectively is able to
represent the sun as it exists formally in the heavens precisely
because it is the same thing that has these two different modes of
existence” (Hoffman 202, p, 168). Objective and formal reality
are simply two different aspects of one and the same object, the
sun. They are two different ways in which the sun
exists. Thus when one perceives the objective sun, one
perceives the sun itself (or, rather, one aspect of it). In this way,
when one perceives the sun, and objective-sun is identical to the sun
itself (it is simply one way of being the sun), the sun
is directly perceived.

There are troubles lurking for these interpretations. To help bring
some of the troubles to light, consider the following analogy: the
analogy of Socrates standing before a mirror. The analogy will hold
for what were earlier called primary ideas.

Socrates and the mirror exist independently of one another. Yet both
are necessary for the image of Socrates (located on the mirror's
surface). Destroy either Socrates or the mirror, and we destroy the
image of Socrates. It is easy to locate the various elements of
Descartes' theory of ideas in this analogy. To begin, let the image of
Socrates be analogue to an idea. It is that which represents
Socrates. When considering this image objectively, then, we take it in
terms of what it is “of” or in terms of that which it
represents, which is Socrates. When considering this image materially,
however, we take it in terms of the operation of representation, which
in this case would be something like the shiny surface of the
mirror. For, it is by way of this shiny surface that the mirror is
able to represent Socrates. According to the representationalist
reading, the bearer of the image, the mirror, looks to be analogue to
the mind. Lastly, Socrates, who stands before the mirror, is analogue
to an extra mental object.

According to Descartes' ontology, both Socrates and the mirror, in
being existent things, will possess some level of formal reality (in
this case, the level will be that of a finite substance). Recall that
according to the representationalist reading, Descartes is committed to
the view that Socrates and the image on the mirror are importantly
related. The image (its objective reality) is importantly related to
the formal reality of Socrates. Thus, if Socrates does not stand
before the mirror, the image will not be (and cannot be)
“of” Socrates. (This is what NC would claim: The idea
represents Socrates only if objective-Socrates has its origin in its
counterpart, formal-Socrates.) The troubles associated with this
reading have been discussed. So, only troubles associated with the two
direct realist readings will be considered in what remains.

According to the first direct realist reading (Nadler's), the tie between
the objective reality of an idea and the formal reality of anything
external to, or independently of, the mind is not necessary. That is, the
external object at which the mind is directed need not play any role
in determining the representational content of an act-idea. Rather,
the act-idea is solely responsible for determining such
content. Thinking now in terms of the analogy, this would be like
saying that whatever stands before the mirror need not play any role
in determining what the image is “of.” Instead, what determines what
the image is of is the shiny surface of the mirror (here, analogue to
taking the act-idea materially). This implies, then, that
there can be mirror images of Socrates even though Socrates is not
standing in front of the mirror. This is no doubt a problem for this
reading. What about the second direct realist reading (Hoffman's)? It, recall,
locates the idea (taken objectively) on such objects as the sun. In
light of the analogy, this would be analogous
to locating the image on Socrates (as opposed to locating it on the
mirror). This implies that there can be mirror images of Socrates even
though there were no mirrors. This is a problem lurking for this reading.

It should be clear that Descartes' theory of ideas has been, and
continues to be, a difficult theory to pin down. Much of the
literature following in Descartes' wake, beginning with his
contemporaries, has been dedicated to providing interpretations of the
theory. And, this history includes a list of significant and serious
critics, including Arnauld, Malebranche, Leibniz, Spinoza, Locke,
Berkeley, Hume, and Kant. It would not be an exaggeration to say that
Descartes' theory of ideas, whether directly or indirectly, has helped
to frame modern Western philosophy as it emerged from the
seventeenth century.