06KYIV4681, UKRAINE: CONFRONTATION AND COMPROMISE–A TALE OF

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KYIV 004681
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2016
TAGS: PGOVPRELPINRUP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: CONFRONTATION AND COMPROMISE--A TALE OF
TWO VIKTORS
REF: A. KYIV 4133
¶B. KYIV 4478
Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4(a,b,d).
¶1. (C) Summary. Two years after the Orange Revolution and
Yushchenko's election victory and almost five months into the
prime ministership that has marked Yanukovych's triumphant
return to the political center stage, the relationship
between the two Viktors is rocky and full of mistrust.
Although several long one-on-one meetings resulted in
settling (albeit sometimes only temporarily) immediate points
of conflict, the two Viktors have yet to come up with any
other way to address and resolve issues. The conflict
between the two is based on badly worded and imprecise
constitutional reforms that have created a dual executive and
fueled by personality differences--Yanukovych pushing
aggressively to gain the advantage and Yushchenko's
indecisiveness and preference for compromise repeatedly
backing him into a corner. Yanukovych has sought to
marginalize the President's powers this fall. Yushchenko has
fallen back on his final levers of power, the veto and
threats to rework constitutional reform or call new Rada
elections. Both sides continue to tell us that they would
like to ease tensions and begin to work together
productively. Events in the past week indicate that they
have made some compromises, but antagonistic actions by
members of their teams, a general lack of trust, and a
personal dislike will make this process slow and arduous at
best. End summary and comment.
Two Years of Handshakes and Backstabbing
----------------------------------------
¶2. (C) In December 2004, after it was clear that there would
be a new presidential election, Yanukovych offered his hand
to Yushchenko, the opponent he had just tried to defraud, and
said that in the future, one Viktor would be President and
the other Prime Minister. Given the circumstances,
Yushchenko rejected reconciliation and moved forward with an
Orange Government. However, in September 2005, in the wake
of scandals and the dismissal of the Tymoshenko Cabinet,
Yushchenko turned to Yanukovych and his Party of Regions to
strike a deal. Regions agreed to support Yuriy Yekhanurov as
Prime Minister in exchange for presidential amnesty for
almost everyone who participated in the 2004 election fraud.
¶3. (C) In the wake of the March 2006 Rada elections,
Yushchenko obsessed about whether to cooperate with his
Orange partners or with Regions in forming the first
government under the new political system. At one point he
observed to us that both Yanukovych and Tymoshenko were
deeply flawed. Regions was clear that it wanted an
orange-blue team and on June 20 Our Ukraine and Regions
initialed a coalition agreement. Yushchenko immediately
changed his mind and renewed talks with Tymoshenko, leaving
Regions to woo Moroz and the Socialists with power and money
to form the Anti-Crisis Coalition, who took office in early
August. Although Regions leaders continue to indicate to us
that they still prefer a coalition that includes Yushchenko
and Our Ukraine, they have also demonstrated their intention
to not be reliant on the indecisive President and to not put
themselves in a position where they could lose power again.
One story that a Rada MP from Tymoshenko's bloc related to us
had Yanukovych in Belarus after the CIS summit in late
November saying, "We are here to stay. We will never lose
power again."
Personalities Defined the Struggle
----------------------------------
¶4. The poorly-worded, ambiguous political reforms may have
opened the door to the current struggle for power, but it has
been the difference in style of the Yanukovych and Yushchenko
teams that has really led to the imbalance and hostility.
Yushchenko is confrontation-averse, postpones a search for
solutions until the last moment, then looks for compromise.
He has brought in a new team at the Presidential Secretariat
this fall that is more conversant in Regions' rough style of
politics, but his reluctance to take on the Prime Minister's
team directly has put him in a weakened position. In
contrast, Yanukovych and his advisers have aggressively
looked for ways to redefine power in their favor,
particularly by proposing provocative legislation that chips
away at Yushchenko's authority and challenges his role
(reftel A).
Rifts
-----
¶5. (C) Nowhere has the fight between Viktors been more public
KYIV 00004681 002 OF 004
and acrimonious than over foreign policy and Foreign Minister
Tarasyuk himself. According to the amended constitution,
foreign policy remains largely a presidential prerogative and
the President nominates the Foreign Minister (although the
nomination is confirmed by the Rada). Yanukovych first
stepped gently over the line in September when he flew to
Brussels and announced a NATO policy without clearing it with
the President's office that would include cooperation, but
also a "pause" in Ukraine's search for membership for the
time being. There then e
nsued a struggle over whether the
President had authority to approve the Cabinet's foreign
travel agenda, talking points, and public statements.
Regions finally leaped clearly over the line on December 1
when its Rada majority voted to dismiss Tarasyuk. Yushchenko
publicly said that Tarasyuk is his man (reftel B). The
Yanukovych side refused to let Tarasyuk attend Cabinet
meetings on December 6 and 20--the later turning into a
shoving match between Regions MPs stationed in front of the
door and OU MPs who came to push their way into the
meeting--and no longer views any documents he signs as valid.
This fight over power and foreign policy was also behind the
eleventh hour attempt by the Presidential Secretariat to
cancel Yanukovych's trip to Washington at the beginning of
December because the Cabinet had not cleared the PM's
briefing papers with Yushchenko.
¶6. (C) The fighting has spanned all areas of competency and
subject matter. The Rada majority removed Interior Minister
Lutsenko, a member of Yushchenko's team, tried to remove
Defense Minister Hrytsenko, and has tabled a resolution to
remove Prosecutor General Mevedko--the latter two are
presidential appointments, according to the constitution.
Regions has been trying to remove regional appointees that
Yushchenko has the right to name. The Cabinet also demanded
the right to countersign presidential decrees. Backed into a
corner, Yushchenko vetoed the Rada's first try at a budget.
¶7. (C) Regions has periodically since the summer tabled
legislation meant to antagonize and threaten Yushchenko. The
most recent example are two bills introduced December 15 and
18 that would restore the Central Election Commission to the
composition that declared Yanukovych the winner of the 2004
presidential election. After Yanukovych made vague
conciliatory remarks about Tarasyuk, on December 26 First
Deputy Prime Minister Azarov said publicly that Tarasyuk was
not Foreign Minister anymore. The remarks followed the
decision by Regions Deputy Leonid Kozhara to introduce a
resolution to officially name First Deputy Foreign Minister
Oryzkho as Acting FM. The CabMin also filed four lawsuits
against Yushchenko in December, claiming that he was issuing
illegitimate decrees and not making decisions when he should
be.
¶8. (C) Perhaps to reassert his authority, Yushchenko issued
a decree on December 4 that said he had the right to approve
all appointments in ministries associated with national
security; he then used the decree to try to cancel the
CabMin's approval of new Interior Minister Tsushko's
nominations for his deputies. The case, like so many others
this year, is now before the Constitutional Court, which
eventually will need to weigh in to settle at least the
institutional disputes between President and Prime Minister.
Reconciliation Sought?
----------------------
¶9. (C) In the past two weeks, members of the Yanukovych team
have reiterated their commitment to seeking accommodation
with Yushchenko. On December 15, MP Raisa Bohatyreva, the
coordinator of the Rada coalition and the Regions faction
leader, told the Ambassador that the "non-radical" part of
Regions was concerned that lack of cooperation with President
Yushchenko and Our Ukraine was destructive for the country.
She said that while it is true that the entourages around the
two principals stir up a lot of the conflict, the level of
antagonism between the two Viktors also had grown
significantly. There was a tit for tat scenario at work
affecting a wide range of unrelated issues: the CabMin made
appointments that the President didn't like (a reference to
new Minister of Emergencies Nestor Shufrych), so Yushchenko
vetoed the budget, so the Rada refused to dismiss
Drizhchaniy, and so on. Yanukovych,s Chief of Staff
Lyovochkin told the Ambassador on December 20 that they were
trying to find means of communication and cooperation, but
problems in the relationship should not be solved at the
Viktor-Viktor level. Instead, he proposed that the main line
of communication for all problem-solving should be between
himself and Presidential Secretariat Chief Baloha. (Note:
In a December 29 meeting with the Ambassador, Deputy Head of
the Presidential Administration Yatsenyuk denied that
Lyovochkin had a special channel to Baloha, arguing that
KYIV 00004681 003 OF 004
Baloha's counterpart was the PM himself. End Note.)
¶10. (C) At a press conference on December 28, Presidential
Secretariat Head Baloha, his deputies Yatsenyuk and Chaliy,
SIPDIS
and NSDC Secretary Haiduk expressed a willingness to work
with the Cabinet but laid down markers of where the
President's powers lie. Baloha said that the new policy is
"competition, compromise, and consolidation" and said the
ability to compromise is a sign of strength. However, the
team also underscored that Yanukovych is head of the
government, but Yushchenko is the head of state, which gave
him a broader and higher mandate. They announced Yushchenko
will veto the law on the Cabinet of Ministers submitted by
the CabMin unless they incorporate his changes. He will also
issue a decree that will make it clear he, not the CabMin, is
in charge of the appointments of regional officials.
Yatsenyuk echoed this theme to the Ambassador December 29.
The two Viktors will never like each other and there is still
conflict, but Yushchenko is ready to cooperate, albeit on his
terms. The choice between conflict and cooperation lies with
the Prime Minister. He added that the Viktor-Viktor meetings
are only productive when Yushchenko holds a trump card. If
Yushchenko seems weak, Regions just ignores him, he
concluded. This observation could explain why Yushchenko's
threat to veto the budget a second time produced results.
¶11. (SBU) Another concern, which was recently highlighted
in the respected Dzerkalo Tyzhnya newspaper, may be that both
the Yanukovych and Yushchenko teams are aware of what the
squabbling looks like both at home and abroad. Key players
on both sides are starting to worry that the squabbling is
hurting their efforts to promote an image of Ukraine as a
western-style democracy with a functioning and pragmatic
government. Although it is difficult to judge whether polls
here are valid, both the PM and the President have lost
public support and in general, public disillusionment with
Ukrainian politics and politicians is growing. Particularly
telling are the low marks that Yushchenko has been getting
from the public on trust -- a sharp turn-around from public
perceptions throughout his two years in office.
Baby Steps of Progress
----------------------
¶12. (C) Thus far only face-to-face meetings between the two
Viktors seem to have paid off with any kind of results.
Observers credit the six-hour November 14 meeting between the
two with postponing a Rada vote to remove bot
h FM Tarasyuk
and Defense Minister Hrytsenko (although in Tarasyuk's case,
the agreement was only temporary). Yushchenko and Yanukovych
also met, along with the coalition leaders, on December 15;
Lyovochkin told the Ambassador this was the first time they
had all met together since August. Lyovochkin said the
meeting went well and they were working on finding a solution
to the Tarasyuk question, but that outstanding problems
remained. These included the governor of Sumy, whom
Yushchenko fired but Regions was trying to protest; the
Rada's refusal to confirm Yushchenko's dismissal SBU Chief
Drizhchaniy; and agreement on the budget, which Bohatyreva
had said was the main reason for the meeting. However, given
the complexities of coalition politics here, it is unlikely
that Yanukovych would have had the political leeway to cut
deals with Yushchenko on any of these issues in front of his
socialist and communist allies.
¶13. (C) The two Viktors met again on December 21, on the eve
of the Putin visit to Kyiv. While we have little direct
information on what was agreed, there seems to have been some
progress and resolution of several of the most immediate
problems between the two. Yushchenko signed the budget on
December 22, even though the Rada had re-passed it without
incorporating all of the President's requested changes. The
same day, the Rada approved his request to increase the
living wage and minimum wage beginning in April 2007, albeit
as a (presumably less binding) resolution, rather than as a
part of the budget law. Deputy Head of the Presidential
Secretariat Yatsenyuk told the Ambassador on December 29 that
SIPDIS
they viewed the resolution of the budget conflict as a
victory for Yushchenko.
¶14. (C) In Yatsenyuk's view, the Rada's agreement to dismiss
Drizhchaniy, per Yushchenko's request, was part of the deal.
Yushchenko also got his way in Sumy--Regions dropped their
protests about his replacing the former governor. Most
journalists and some politicians have linked the budget
signing and the Drizhchaniy dismissal as a quid pro quo
agreed on by the two Viktors at the December 21 meeting. The
postponement of the Tarasyuk question may also have been
included in the deal--Deputy Head of the Presidential
Secretariat Chaliy and the Prime Minister's foreign policy
SIPDIS
advisor Gryshchenko both told the Ambassador after the
KYIV 00004681 004 OF 004
meeting that the Tarasyuk issue had been put off for now, due
to "timing issues," possibly also related to Putin's visit.
In Chaliy's view, tensions between the two leaders had
decreased. Yatsenyuk and Chaliy also told the Ambassador
that progress had been made on the issue of how to agree on
the appointments of regional officials.
¶15. (C) Comment: With no meetings between the PM and
President on the schedule and two weeks of New Year and
Christmas holidays ahead, we anticipate no surprise
announcements in the near future. However, discussions will
continue behind the scenes as both sides seek to find a way
to make cohabitation work to their advantage.
¶16. (U) Visit Embassy Kyiv's classified website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Taylor

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