U.S.-Turkish relations are enjoying a somewhat warmer moment, following the resolution of the crisis over American pastor Andrew Brunson and the recent dialogue to resolve differences over U.S. cooperation with the mainly Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) militia in northern Syria.

The differences between Washington and Ankara on this issue—and over Syria—are no doubt problematic. At the same time, it is important to recognize that Turkish-Russian relations are far from a real strategic partnership. Hence, there is a pragmatic solution that Washington can pursue to resolve the impasse over the S-400s.

The shadow of history and geopolitical divergences

The most recent Russia-Turkey rapprochement stems mostly from the challenges that instability in Syria creates for Turkish national security. Yet, despite current efforts in Ankara to deepen Russian-Turkish relations and overlook disagreements, Russia has traditionally been a geopolitical rival for Turkey. The annexation of Crimea shifted the naval balance in the Black Sea to Turkey’s disadvantage, a fact that Russia’s top general Valery Gerasimov touted in 2016. Russia’s latest incident in the Kerch Strait will further consolidate Russian naval primacy in the Black Sea.

Turkey’s often unspoken (or overlooked) geopolitical rivalry with Russia is likely one of the main reasons why Ankara lists Ukraine, Georgia, and Azerbaijan as strategic partners, while Russia is referred to just as a major trade partner.

Russian-Turkish cooperation in Syria

The Syrian conflict brought the two sides into a confrontation when Turkey shot down a Russian warplane in November 2015 and Russia responded by imposing harsh economic sanctions on Turkey. Subsequently, both sides were able to patch up their differences and embarked on a process of rapprochement, with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan issuing a personal letter of regret for the incident to Russian President Vladimir Putin. Thanks to Russian consent, the Turkish military was able to conduct two cross-border operations in Syria: Operation Euphrates Shield against ISIS, and Operation Olive Branch against the Kurdish YPG—the armed wing of the Kurdish political party Democratic Union Party (PYD) in Syria—in the Afrin region of northwestern Syria.

In 2015 and 2016—when terrorist attacks originating from Syria were occurring inside Turkey and the United States remained aloof to Turkey’s calls for a buffer zone in northern Syria—Russia emerged as Ankara’s only viable partner. The close cooperation with Turkey has played into Russia’s geopolitical goal of trying to peel Turkey away from NATO. Furthermore, this cooperation also helped Russia alleviate some of the military burden of supporting the Bashar al-Assad regime by getting Turkey to convince the moderate opposition to support a ceasefire and come to the negotiation table for a long-term solution.

Since January 2017, the two have coordinated 11 rounds of peace talks in Astana, Kazakhstan, together with Iran. In September, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan convinced President Vladimir Putin to support an extended ceasefire and construction of a demilitarized zone in the northwestern province of Idlib to preempt an onslaught by Syrian regime forces into the last opposition-held area. In so doing, regional geopolitical disagreements were conveniently sidelined. In the same vein, it is notable that Ankara has not joined Western sanctions on Russia and shied away from openly criticizing Russia over the recent Kerch Strait incident.

Turkey shares a long border with Syria and benefits from its current cooperation with Russia. However, in the long run, Putin and Erdoğan have divergent interests in Syria. Most importantly, Russia continues to back the Syrian Kurds and has hosted a PYD office in Moscow since early 2016 (despite its tacit approval of Turkey’s Afrin operation). Ankara considers the PYD an offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), an organization that has been fighting the Turkish state since the early 1980s and which Turkey, the United States, and NATO consider a terrorist organization. Moscow wants the PYD to be included in the negotiations to achieve a sustainable peace in Syria. So far, Turkey has resisted PYD’s participation in the “constitutional committee” critical to advancing a political settlement in Syria, a problem that U.N. special envoy Staffan de Mistura has acknowledged.

Second, it is unclear for how long Russia will tolerate the presence of Turkish troops in Syria. Putin has on various occasions clearly stated that he wants all foreign forces to eventually leave Syria, especially those without the invitation of the Syrian government. Third, the ceasefire over Idlib is very fragile, and it would hardly be surprising to see a green light from Moscow allowing regime forces and Iran-backed militias to launch an Idlib campaign—especially if Turkey fails to rein in extremist groups defined as terrorists by the Astana process. If Idlib turns into the next battlefield in Syria, Turkey risks facing another refugee crisis with dire humanitarian consequences and potential threats to Turkey’s stability and national security.

Finally, Ankara and Moscow will continue to disagree over the future of Syrian President Assad. Unlike Putin, Erdoğan continues to entertain the idea of a future Syria without Assad.

Don’t push Turkey away

A recent public opinion survey in Turkey shows that Turks do not see Russia as a friend, but do think Turkey and Russia can cooperate in international issues. Anti-Americanism, on the other hand, is on the rise and many see the United States as threatening to Turkey.

This dampens the prospects for a meaningful rapprochement between the United States and Turkey. On the Turkish side, a constant drumbeat fed to the public about, as one analyst put it, “exiting the West” further aggravates the relationship. Rampant anti-Americanism, often encouraged by the government itself, culminates in uncritical calls for closer relations with Russia. But despite the government’s domestic narrative—including accusations that NATO is a terrorist organization that threatens Turkey—Ankara has given no sign that it will break away from the trans-Atlantic alliance. Strikingly, Erdoğan has also stopped calling on Putin to help Turkey join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in the place of the EU. Instead, the sheer reality that Turkey still needs the West—as noted by one former ambassador and deputy undersecretary of the Turkish ministry of foreign affairs—keeps Turkey reliant on NATO.

Turkey is stuck with having to buy S-400s out of the momentum built into Russian-Turkish rapprochement. But the move will in fact harm Turkey’s national security interests, since the full deployment and operationalization of the missiles would seriously undermine Turkey’s relationship with the United States and NATO. In short, Turkey cannot afford to sleepwalk out of the trans-Atlantic alliance for the sake of S-400s.

It’s important to see that while the S-400 purchase is significant, it is extremely unlikely to lead Turkey to a strategic switch toward Russia and away from the West. The United States must respond with that in mind, and should not react in a way that inadvertently pushes Turkey away from the trans-Atlantic alliance. That would only serve Russia’s interests, making it easier for Russia to pursue its geopolitical ambitions from the Baltic to the Black Sea and in the Middle East. Therefore, the issue of sanctioning Turkey and excluding it from the F-35 program should be approached cautiously. Instead, Washington, Ankara, and their NATO partners should double their efforts to find a pragmatic solution to the purchase of Russian S-400s. This could, for example, involve limiting the operationalization of missiles in a manner that does not jeopardize NATO member countries’ immediate security concerns, such as digital espionage and cyber hacking, rather than demanding at this late stage an outright cancellation of the purchase. Alternatively, the United States could revisit the possibility of selling Patriot surface-to-air missiles to Turkey that satisfies the latter’s long-standing demands on pricing and technology transfer. Given that conflict persists in the Middle East–with Iran, Syria, and others equipped with offensive missile capabilities—Turkey’s demands for a missile defense system will persist, too.

With this approach, two main goals can be achieved: Russia and Turkey can continue their pragmatic cooperation in Syria to promote relative calm and stability there, and Turkey’s missile purchase can be managed such that it doesn’t result in more fundamental problems in the trans-Atlantic alliance.

]]>
By Kemal Kirişci, Seçkin Köstem
U.S.-Turkish relations are enjoying a somewhat warmer moment, following the resolution of the crisis over American pastor Andrew Brunson and the recent dialogue to resolve differences over U.S. cooperation with the mainly Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) militia in northern Syria.
However, Ankara’s commitment to purchase S-400 surface-to-air missiles from Russia presents a big challenge with important geopolitical implications. Among other problems, the plan could get Turkey sanctioned and removed from the U.S.-led program to provide F-35 aircraft. Some experts have recently argued that Turkey is not a valuable strategic partner and that President Trump should bury the U.S.-Turkish alliance. At a moment when the relationship remains fragile, what could be done to avert yet another crisis in bilateral relations now that Turkey has decided to buy the S-400 missiles?
The differences between Washington and Ankara on this issue—and over Syria—are no doubt problematic. At the same time, it is important to recognize that Turkish-Russian relations are far from a real strategic partnership. Hence, there is a pragmatic solution that Washington can pursue to resolve the impasse over the S-400s.
The shadow of history and geopolitical divergences
The most recent Russia-Turkey rapprochement stems mostly from the challenges that instability in Syria creates for Turkish national security. Yet, despite current efforts in Ankara to deepen Russian-Turkish relations and overlook disagreements, Russia has traditionally been a geopolitical rival for Turkey. The annexation of Crimea shifted the naval balance in the Black Sea to Turkey’s disadvantage, a fact that Russia’s top general Valery Gerasimov touted in 2016. Russia’s latest incident in the Kerch Strait will further consolidate Russian naval primacy in the Black Sea.
Turkey’s often unspoken (or overlooked) geopolitical rivalry with Russia is likely one of the main reasons why Ankara lists Ukraine, Georgia, and Azerbaijan as strategic partners, while Russia is referred to just as a major trade partner.
Russian-Turkish cooperation in Syria
The Syrian conflict brought the two sides into a confrontation when Turkey shot down a Russian warplane in November 2015 and Russia responded by imposing harsh economic sanctions on Turkey. Subsequently, both sides were able to patch up their differences and embarked on a process of rapprochement, with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan issuing a personal letter of regret for the incident to Russian President Vladimir Putin. Thanks to Russian consent, the Turkish military was able to conduct two cross-border operations in Syria: Operation Euphrates Shield against ISIS, and Operation Olive Branch against the Kurdish YPG—the armed wing of the Kurdish political party Democratic Union Party (PYD) in Syria—in the Afrin region of northwestern Syria.
In 2015 and 2016—when terrorist attacks originating from Syria were occurring inside Turkey and the United States remained aloof to Turkey's calls for a buffer zone in northern Syria—Russia emerged as Ankara’s only viable partner. The close cooperation with Turkey has played into Russia’s geopolitical goal of trying to peel Turkey away from NATO. Furthermore, this cooperation also helped Russia alleviate some of the military burden of supporting the Bashar al-Assad regime by getting Turkey to convince the moderate opposition to support a ceasefire and come to the negotiation table for a long-term solution.
Since January 2017, the two have coordinated 11 rounds of peace talks in Astana, Kazakhstan, together with Iran. In September, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan convinced President Vladimir Putin to support an extended ceasefire and construction of a demilitarized zone in the northwestern province of Idlib to preempt an onslaught ... By Kemal Kirişci, Seçkin Köstem
U.S.-Turkish relations are enjoying a somewhat warmer moment, following the resolution of the crisis over American pastor Andrew Brunson and the recent dialogue to resolve differences over U.https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/12/14/how-space-based-missile-defenses-could-make-us-less-safe-not-more/How space-based missile defenses could make us less safe, not morehttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/586379042/0/brookingsrss/topics/defenseandsecurity~How-spacebased-missile-defenses-could-make-us-less-safe-not-more/
Fri, 14 Dec 2018 14:20:10 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?p=553090

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By James N. Miller, Frank A. Rose

Although the Trump administration has not yet released its Missile Defense Review, as mandated by Congress, it is considering the possible deployment of space-based interceptors. In addition, some administration officials have implied that space-based directed energy systems may receive increased funding on the path to deployment.

The last U.S. foray into deploying space-based interceptors ended over 25 years ago when the Brilliant Pebbles program was cancelled in 1993. Space-based directed energy systems have been off the table even longer; it’s been over 30 years since a highly-regarded 1987 report by the American Physical Society concluded that any meaningful missile defense of the United States using directed energy weapons was—at least—decades away.

Technology has advanced markedly over the past several decades as evidenced by the deployment of hundreds (soon thousands) of low-cost commercial small satellites. There have also been major advances in directed energy systems, solid-state lasers in particular, and all four U.S. military services are now deploying them for tactical roles.

As a result of this technological progress, a serious national discussion on space-based interceptors and directed energy systems is coming soon. Advocates and opponents are likely to cite wildly divergent assessments of technology maturity and likely costs. The reality is that there is much uncertainty: Technology exploration will take years, and while costs almost always end up much higher than initially projected by proponents of new complex systems, the detailed costs unfold over time.

However, we can reach some strong conclusions by carefully assessing the advisability of these systems relative to North Korea on the one hand, and China and Russia on the other.

North Korea

We support the Trump administration’s efforts to attempt to negotiate the end of North Korea’s nuclear weapons, long-range missiles, and supporting infrastructure. While these negotiations should be pursued, we are skeptical that Kim Jong-un will disarm. Therefore, national missile defense remains essential for the United States.

Today, some 44 Ground-Based Interceptors are deployed to defend against the North Korean missile threat to the United States. Within the missile defense portfolio, the first priority must be to ensure that these interceptors are effective; both this administration and the last have made significant investments in improving the interceptor kill vehicle, command and control systems, and supporting sensors.

We agree with those who suggest that a second layer of defensive capability, preferably in the boost phase of missile flight, should be pursued to deal with the North Korea threat. However, this boost-phase layer can be achieved sooner and more cheaply with airborne boost-phase capabilities rather than with space-based capabilities. Moreover, because of their limited range and survivability against a peer competitor, airborne boost-phase deployments would not threaten to undermine strategic stability with Russia or China. To its credit, Congress has mandated a study of airborne boost-phase defense options for North Korea (many of which would also allow an additional hedge vis-à-vis Iran).

China and Russia

The deployment of space-based interceptors or directed energy systems by the United States would almost certainly trigger a response by Russia and China. In particular, each country likely would respond in three ways.

First, China and Russia would likely deploy additional intercontinental-range missiles, armed with countermeasures designed to defeat boost-phase intercept systems, such as short-burn boosters, hypersonic boost-glide systems, and depressed trajectory submarine ballistic missiles. Because fewer missiles might survive U.S. defenses, they would also be incentivized to further increase the number of warheads on each missile, a step that would make land-based missiles in particular both more threatening and more inviting as a target.

Second, China and Russia would likely increase their deployments of alternative delivery systems for nuclear weapons, including air-launched cruise missiles, sea-launched cruise missiles, and “special” delivery systems such as the Russian nuclear-powered multi-megaton torpedo Status 6. At the end of this process, the United States would face substantially larger and more diverse Chinese and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals, but in all likelihood, the current situation of mutual vulnerability (i.e., mutual assured destruction) would remain intact. All sides would have spent far more resources and would need to sustain this spending going forward in a new offense-defense arms race. If the United States continued to desire rough nuclear parity with Russia, it would need to expand its nuclear arsenal, perhaps significantly.

Third, China and Russia would not accept the United States owning the high ground of outer space any more than the United States could accept China or Russia being in this position. It would be a top national priority for both countries to prevent the deployment of such systems, or barring that, to be able to disable or destroy them early in any crisis or conflict. If the United States decided to proceed given this reality, it would need to plan to quickly deploy large numbers of systems and to provide for their protection and replenishment.

U.S. allies would foresee the above implications and be concerned both about a new destabilizing arms race and the diversion of U.S. defense spending away from more pressing needs. As a result, a rapid U.S. push to deploy space-based missile defense interceptors or directed energy systems would reverberate globally, potentially undermining NATO and critical U.S. alliances in the Asia-Pacific. Given that the U.S. missile defense architecture depends on allies to host key elements, allied support is essential for operational as well as geopolitical reasons.

An Alternative Approach

Instead of rushing into a costly and destabilizing deployment of space-based interceptors and/or directed energy systems, the United States should:

Focus near-term national missile defense spending on improving the current Ground-Based Mid-Course Defense system (including kill vehicles, sensors and command, control and communications [C3]), and on rapidly adding short-range boost-phase airborne interceptors in the near-term, and airborne lasers in the longer-term.

Move forward with the modernization of the U.S. strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, nuclear C3, and the supporting Department of Energy nuclear weapons infrastructure. This modernization program is needed to support deterrence and bolster strategic stability. The United States should also continue to pursue verifiable arms control with Russia and, over time, with China.

Declare a moratorium on any deployment of kinetic-kill interceptors or directed energy systems in outer space and call on China and Russia to join. At the same time, proceed with a low-level of research and development as a hedge and as an incentive to Russia and China to join the testing moratorium and to come to the table to begin a broader discussion about outer space security. Such a strategy would have the objective of developing practical norms of responsible behavior that strengthen the stability and sustainability of the outer space environment.

And because Russian and China are unlikely to abandon their existing counterspace programs in the near future, accelerate ongoing efforts to diversify, defend, and add resilience to the U.S. space architecture.

Conclusion

Due to a range of technological developments, both the strategic nuclear balance and the situation in outer space vis-à-vis China and Russia are headed into challenging times, where strategic stability will be placed under increased pressure. At a time of growing budgetary pressures as well as increased competition with other great powers, the United States can ill afford to waste precious dollars on space-based missile defenses and a new arms race that will make us less, rather than more, secure.

]]>
By James N. Miller, Frank A. Rose
Although the Trump administration has not yet released its Missile Defense Review, as mandated by Congress, it is considering the possible deployment of space-based interceptors. In addition, some administration officials have implied that space-based directed energy systems may receive increased funding on the path to deployment.
The last U.S. foray into deploying space-based interceptors ended over 25 years ago when the Brilliant Pebbles program was cancelled in 1993. Space-based directed energy systems have been off the table even longer; it’s been over 30 years since a highly-regarded 1987 report by the American Physical Society concluded that any meaningful missile defense of the United States using directed energy weapons was—at least—decades away.
Technology has advanced markedly over the past several decades as evidenced by the deployment of hundreds (soon thousands) of low-cost commercial small satellites. There have also been major advances in directed energy systems, solid-state lasers in particular, and all four U.S. military services are now deploying them for tactical roles.
As a result of this technological progress, a serious national discussion on space-based interceptors and directed energy systems is coming soon. Advocates and opponents are likely to cite wildly divergent assessments of technology maturity and likely costs. The reality is that there is much uncertainty: Technology exploration will take years, and while costs almost always end up much higher than initially projected by proponents of new complex systems, the detailed costs unfold over time.
However, we can reach some strong conclusions by carefully assessing the advisability of these systems relative to North Korea on the one hand, and China and Russia on the other.
North Korea
We support the Trump administration’s efforts to attempt to negotiate the end of North Korea’s nuclear weapons, long-range missiles, and supporting infrastructure. While these negotiations should be pursued, we are skeptical that Kim Jong-un will disarm. Therefore, national missile defense remains essential for the United States.
Today, some 44 Ground-Based Interceptors are deployed to defend against the North Korean missile threat to the United States. Within the missile defense portfolio, the first priority must be to ensure that these interceptors are effective; both this administration and the last have made significant investments in improving the interceptor kill vehicle, command and control systems, and supporting sensors.
We agree with those who suggest that a second layer of defensive capability, preferably in the boost phase of missile flight, should be pursued to deal with the North Korea threat. However, this boost-phase layer can be achieved sooner and more cheaply with airborne boost-phase capabilities rather than with space-based capabilities. Moreover, because of their limited range and survivability against a peer competitor, airborne boost-phase deployments would not threaten to undermine strategic stability with Russia or China. To its credit, Congress has mandated a study of airborne boost-phase defense options for North Korea (many of which would also allow an additional hedge vis-à-vis Iran).
China and Russia
The deployment of space-based interceptors or directed energy systems by the United States would almost certainly trigger a response by Russia and China. In particular, each country likely would respond in three ways.
First, China and Russia would likely deploy additional intercontinental-range missiles, armed with countermeasures designed to defeat boost-phase intercept systems, such as short-burn boosters, hypersonic boost-glide systems, and depressed trajectory submarine ballistic missiles. Because fewer missiles might survive U.S. defenses, they would also be incentivized to further increase the number of warheads on each ... By James N. Miller, Frank A. Rose
Although the Trump administration has not yet released its Missile Defense Review, as mandated by Congress, it is considering the possible deployment of space-based interceptors. In addition, some administration ... https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/12/13/will-europe-try-to-save-the-inf-treaty/Will Europe try to save the INF Treaty?http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/585748851/0/brookingsrss/topics/defenseandsecurity~Will-Europe-try-to-save-the-INF-Treaty/
Thu, 13 Dec 2018 19:16:41 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?p=552828

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By Steven Pifer

On December 4, U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo announced that Russia has 60 days to come back into compliance with the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Otherwise, Washington will suspend its obligations under the agreement.

The treaty’s future appears grim. The Kremlin has threatened countermeasures if the United States goes through with suspension, while Washington seems uninterested in preserving the treaty. If the treaty is to be saved, European leaders should act.

Up until recently, senior European officials said little publicly about the need for Russia to correct its violation of the treaty. They did not make that a major issue in their diplomacy with Moscow. In a recent discussion about the INF Treaty’s potential demise, a former U.S. government official even asked whether Europeans cared.

They should. While global in scope, the INF Treaty focused on enhancing European security. It resulted in the banning and elimination of U.S. and Soviet ground-launched missiles of intermediate range (500–5,500 kilometers), missiles that were deployed in large numbers between the Atlantic and the Ural Mountains in the 1980s.

While global in scope, the INF Treaty focused on enhancing European security.

Russia’s development and deployment of an intermediate-range, ground-launched cruise missile known as the 9M729 now constitutes a material breach of the treaty. U.S. officials have raised this violation with their Russian counterparts for some five years, all to no avail.

In October, President Trump said the United States would exercise its right to withdraw.

Many expected Mr. Pompeo to announce that the United States had given Moscow formal notice that it would withdraw from the treaty in six months’ time, as the treaty allows. A leaked memorandum prepared by National Security Advisor Bolton, no fan of the INF Treaty, said the notice should be conveyed by December 4 and that the Pentagon should develop a U.S. intermediate-range, ground-launched missile as soon as possible.

However, apparently reflecting discussions between Mr. Trump and German Chancellor Merkel in Argentina, Mr. Pompeo instead announced the 60-day period, after which the United States would suspend its INF Treaty obligations if Moscow does not return to compliance. U.S. suspension of its obligations would relieve Russia of its obligations to implement the treaty. The treaty would technically remain in force, but neither side would be observing its terms.

Russia has shown no sign of readiness to address its violation. Neither Mr. Trump nor Mr. Bolton appears interested in maintaining the agreement, while interest in the Pentagon in having an intermediate-range missile seems to be growing.

That bodes ill for the agreement’s prospects. If America’s European allies, whose countries derive the most security benefits from the treaty, wish to preserve it, they should try three things.

First, European leaders should engage President Putin directly and forcefully on this issue. He needs to hear from Ms. Merkel, President Macron, Prime Minister Conte and other leaders that the 9M729 poses a major problem for relations with his European counterparts.

To date, Mr. Putin has taken little direct heat over this question. If European leaders want to save the treaty, they should change that.

They do not have to ask Mr. Putin to admit the 9M729 is a violation. They can instead note that the missile poses an unacceptable threat to their countries and urge him to make a critical contribution to European security by eliminating that missile. He could do it as a confidence-building measure, without admitting guilt. They also need to make clear that, if Mr. Putin does not act, this will remain a difficult issue for him in the future.

Second, Europeans need to take a serious look at military steps to respond to the 9M729. Upping the political pressure on the Kremlin would prove useful, but military steps would carry far greater weight, especially at the Russian Ministry of Defense. Moscow never would have agreed to the INF Treaty in the first place had NATO not deployed Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe in the 1980s.

Are NATO allies ready to countenance deployment in Europe of a new U.S. intermediate-range missile? That would definitely grab the Russians’ attention, but it may be a bridge too far. European allies nevertheless could immediately begin a detailed and substantive discussion about military steps that NATO should and will take to offset Russia’s 9M729. The Pentagon is ready for that exchange. That said, it would have greater impact in Moscow if it were European governments and militaries that press the question of military countermeasures.

Third, European officials should recommend to Washington that, if the Russians change course and begin to deal seriously with Western concerns about the 9M729, the Pentagon should explore ways to address Russia’s concern that the Aegis Ashore missile defense launchers in Romania could carry offensive missiles. That does not pose an intractable problem. The United States could fix it, also as a confidence-building measure.

Would these steps succeed? Russia thus far has shown no readiness to abandon its investment in the 9M729. Saving the INF Treaty would prove an uphill struggle, but the fight is not yet over.

Do Europeans care? If so, Berlin, Paris, Rome, Budapest, The Hague and other European capitals will have to decide to make preserving the treaty an urgent priority in their relations with Moscow. If they do not care, the handwriting is on the wall. In early February, the U.S. government will suspend its treaty obligations, relieving Russia from performing its treaty obligations. The INF Treaty effectively will be dead.

The clock is ticking.

]]>
By Steven Pifer
On December 4, U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo announced that Russia has 60 days to come back into compliance with the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Otherwise, Washington will suspend its obligations under the agreement.
The treaty’s future appears grim. The Kremlin has threatened countermeasures if the United States goes through with suspension, while Washington seems uninterested in preserving the treaty. If the treaty is to be saved, European leaders should act.
Up until recently, senior European officials said little publicly about the need for Russia to correct its violation of the treaty. They did not make that a major issue in their diplomacy with Moscow. In a recent discussion about the INF Treaty’s potential demise, a former U.S. government official even asked whether Europeans cared.
They should. While global in scope, the INF Treaty focused on enhancing European security. It resulted in the banning and elimination of U.S. and Soviet ground-launched missiles of intermediate range (500–5,500 kilometers), missiles that were deployed in large numbers between the Atlantic and the Ural Mountains in the 1980s.
While global in scope, the INF Treaty focused on enhancing European security.
Russia’s development and deployment of an intermediate-range, ground-launched cruise missile known as the 9M729 now constitutes a material breach of the treaty. U.S. officials have raised this violation with their Russian counterparts for some five years, all to no avail.
In October, President Trump said the United States would exercise its right to withdraw.
Many expected Mr. Pompeo to announce that the United States had given Moscow formal notice that it would withdraw from the treaty in six months’ time, as the treaty allows. A leaked memorandum prepared by National Security Advisor Bolton, no fan of the INF Treaty, said the notice should be conveyed by December 4 and that the Pentagon should develop a U.S. intermediate-range, ground-launched missile as soon as possible.
However, apparently reflecting discussions between Mr. Trump and German Chancellor Merkel in Argentina, Mr. Pompeo instead announced the 60-day period, after which the United States would suspend its INF Treaty obligations if Moscow does not return to compliance. U.S. suspension of its obligations would relieve Russia of its obligations to implement the treaty. The treaty would technically remain in force, but neither side would be observing its terms.
Russia has shown no sign of readiness to address its violation. Neither Mr. Trump nor Mr. Bolton appears interested in maintaining the agreement, while interest in the Pentagon in having an intermediate-range missile seems to be growing.
That bodes ill for the agreement’s prospects. If America’s European allies, whose countries derive the most security benefits from the treaty, wish to preserve it, they should try three things.
First, European leaders should engage President Putin directly and forcefully on this issue. He needs to hear from Ms. Merkel, President Macron, Prime Minister Conte and other leaders that the 9M729 poses a major problem for relations with his European counterparts.
To date, Mr. Putin has taken little direct heat over this question. If European leaders want to save the treaty, they should change that.
They do not have to ask Mr. Putin to admit the 9M729 is a violation. They can instead note that the missile poses an unacceptable threat to their countries and urge him to make a critical contribution to European security by eliminating that missile. He could do it as a confidence-building measure, without admitting guilt. They also need to make clear that, if Mr. Putin does not act, this will remain a difficult issue for him in the future.
Second, Europeans need to take a serious look at military steps to respond to the 9M729. Upping the political pressure on the Kremlin would ... By Steven Pifer
On December 4, U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo announced that Russia has 60 days to come back into compliance with the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Otherwise, Washington will suspend its obligations under the ... https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/12/11/what-does-survey-data-about-service-members-and-veterans-tell-us-experts-discuss/What does survey data about service members and veterans tell us? Experts discusshttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/584970122/0/brookingsrss/topics/defenseandsecurity~What-does-survey-data-about-service-members-and-veterans-tell-us-Experts-discuss/
Tue, 11 Dec 2018 21:55:53 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?p=552454

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By Adam Twardowski

Since 9/11, 3.3 million Americans have served in uniform. As of November 14, 2018, the Pentagon reports that 6,918 have died and 52,774 have been wounded in action, but as experts discussed at a recent event, this is just a fraction of those who are estimated to have been adversely impacted by the longest war in American history. On December 4, Michael O’Hanlon—senior fellow at the Brookings Institution—hosted a panel discussion with the Wounded Warrior Project (WWP) to roll out its survey on the physical, social, economic, and mental well-being of America’s veterans.

Wounded Warrior Project CEO Lt. Gen. Michael Linnington explained WWP’s mission: to transform the way America’s injured veterans are empowered, employed, and engaged in communities across the country. With the number of veterans reaching out to WWP on the rise, he argued that the information derived from its survey is important for determining the areas of greatest need and identifying trends. He offered a few sobering data points: The Pentagon’s own Defense and Veterans Brain Injury Center reports that more 380,000 have sustained traumatic brain injuries; in 2008, RAND estimated that “nearly 20 percent of military service members who have returned from Iraq and Afghanistan reported symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder or major depression.”

The data

WWP’s Director of Metrics Melanie Mousseau detailed some key survey findings. Seventy-eight percent of those whom WWP serves say they’ve identified post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as an injury they’ve incurred after their service, which isn’t an unusual trend according to Mousseau, but has been increasing slightly year over year. Mousseau also explained that the data shows U.S. troops aren’t as healthy as they should be—highlighting, in particular, high rates of obesity and lack of physical activity. And finally, she noted that WWP has used data from other surveys to organize programming related to education. While education hasn’t been a barrier to employment, Mousseau said, mental health issues have been.

O’Hanlon asked Mousseau how well the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has connected with the needs of veterans in a prompt way. She said that access to care continues to be a challenge, but the number of veterans using the VA’s services has been increasing year-over-year, while there has been a decrease in the challenges that veterans face when scheduling appointments. Mousseau also discussed the rate of veteran homeownership (which has been rising) and veteran unemployment (which though higher than the national average, has trended downward), arguing that mental health and other issues can be barriers to even higher veteran participation in the workforce.

Veterans’ relationships with the system

Tony Kurta, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for military personnel policy, discussed the relationship between the veterans and Kurta’s responsibility at the Pentagon to maintain a ready force for the country’s security today. He argued that the WWP survey provides important insights for the Department of Defense about what it can do better to transition service members from service into civilian life, better track how they’re faring and what issues they face, and figure out how the department should work with the VA and other agencies on the transition of veterans from uniform to civilian life.

Keita Franklin, national director of suicide prevention at the Department of Veterans Affairs, highlighted the alarming statistics that about 20 veterans a day end their lives by suicide, and that 6 of those 20 received healthcare in the VA system in the days and months before their death, while 14 did not. She observed that there is an increased rate among 18 to 34-year-olds committing suicide, arguing that it’s critical for the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs to collaborate. She also drew attention to data that show an increasing rate of suicides among female veterans—in fact, the female veteran suicide rate is 1.8 times higher than civilian women.

Franklin said that for her, some of the most relevant takeaways from the survey relate to how to best protect people from suicide—creating a life worth living, or things that give them hope in participating in a productive, meaningful life. One of these areas relates to employment, which she said can be a risk factor for suicide. Beyond employment for its own sake, a veteran who is gainfully employed feels that they have a mission and a sense of value that can parallel their time in the military.

How can the VA system, or organizations like WWP, help guide veterans through complex bureaucratic processes? Franklin stressed that improving veterans’ access to health care, while important and improving, isn’t enough. Many more issues have to be addressed, she argued, especially social aspects, connecting veterans to veteran service organizations, and improving access to employment. Franklin noted that a Trump administration executive order improves access to mental health care, particularly during the first 12 months after leaving active duty. Mousseau added that both data and qualitative, anecdotal feedback from veterans is important.

Kurta pointed out that the U.S. all-volunteer force comprises less than 1 percent of the American population, and there is a sense that many in the civilian world don’t understand fully the challenges faced by those who serve in uniform. One data point he highlighted was the importance respondents placed on being able to discuss their challenges with peers who have gone through a similar transition from uniformed to civilian life.

Connecting veterans and civilians

What can average civilians do to support veterans, especially those currently transitioning out of uniformed life?

Mousseau advocated increasing familiarity with the kinds of experiences that veterans are undergoing. Kurta observed that there are men and women in uniform, and veterans, in virtually every community in the United States, arguing that it is vital for civilians to find ways to interact with them and serve their needs. Finally, Franklin highlighted a program inside the VA and Department of Defense called “Be There,” which seeks to rally Americans around veterans’ issues in small ways, such as through socializing or providing transportation.

During the Q&A session, Franklin observed that the VA has worked to proactively reach out in the final 12 months of a service member’s active duty and in the first year (and beyond) afterwards to ensure their needs are best being met. On the question of socializing, Kurta observed that there are generational differences in the way veterans interact with each other, and it’s essential to be mindful of that. Asked whether there should be a greater focus on overall career trends—rather than just finding a job–Kurta replied that having a job is key to an individual’s resilience, hence the focus on it. He added: “We’ve now started to talk more about the socially protective factors, a sense of belonging. You lose some of that sense of mission, the esprit de corps, the camaraderie that you have from the uniform way of life.” So equipping veterans with education through the GI Bill and other mechanisms can help provide veterans with tools to build a career beyond the term of their first job out of uniform.

]]>
By Adam Twardowski
Since 9/11, 3.3 million Americans have served in uniform. As of November 14, 2018, the Pentagon reports that 6,918 have died and 52,774 have been wounded in action, but as experts discussed at a recent event, this is just a fraction of those who are estimated to have been adversely impacted by the longest war in American history. On December 4, Michael O’Hanlon—senior fellow at the Brookings Institution—hosted a panel discussion with the Wounded Warrior Project (WWP) to roll out its survey on the physical, social, economic, and mental well-being of America’s veterans.
Wounded Warrior Project CEO Lt. Gen. Michael Linnington explained WWP’s mission: to transform the way America’s injured veterans are empowered, employed, and engaged in communities across the country. With the number of veterans reaching out to WWP on the rise, he argued that the information derived from its survey is important for determining the areas of greatest need and identifying trends. He offered a few sobering data points: The Pentagon’s own Defense and Veterans Brain Injury Center reports that more 380,000 have sustained traumatic brain injuries; in 2008, RAND estimated that “nearly 20 percent of military service members who have returned from Iraq and Afghanistan reported symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder or major depression.”
The data
WWP’s Director of Metrics Melanie Mousseau detailed some key survey findings. Seventy-eight percent of those whom WWP serves say they’ve identified post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as an injury they’ve incurred after their service, which isn’t an unusual trend according to Mousseau, but has been increasing slightly year over year. Mousseau also explained that the data shows U.S. troops aren’t as healthy as they should be—highlighting, in particular, high rates of obesity and lack of physical activity. And finally, she noted that WWP has used data from other surveys to organize programming related to education. While education hasn’t been a barrier to employment, Mousseau said, mental health issues have been.
O’Hanlon asked Mousseau how well the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has connected with the needs of veterans in a prompt way. She said that access to care continues to be a challenge, but the number of veterans using the VA’s services has been increasing year-over-year, while there has been a decrease in the challenges that veterans face when scheduling appointments. Mousseau also discussed the rate of veteran homeownership (which has been rising) and veteran unemployment (which though higher than the national average, has trended downward), arguing that mental health and other issues can be barriers to even higher veteran participation in the workforce.
Veterans’ relationships with the system
Tony Kurta, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for military personnel policy, discussed the relationship between the veterans and Kurta’s responsibility at the Pentagon to maintain a ready force for the country’s security today. He argued that the WWP survey provides important insights for the Department of Defense about what it can do better to transition service members from service into civilian life, better track how they’re faring and what issues they face, and figure out how the department should work with the VA and other agencies on the transition of veterans from uniform to civilian life.
Keita Franklin, national director of suicide prevention at the Department of Veterans Affairs, highlighted the alarming statistics that about 20 veterans a day end their lives by suicide, and that 6 of those 20 received healthcare in the VA system in the days and months before their death, while 14 did not. She observed that there is an increased rate among 18 to 34-year-olds committing suicide, arguing that ... By Adam Twardowski
Since 9/11, 3.3 million Americans have served in uniform. As of November 14, 2018, the Pentagon reports that 6,918 have died and 52,774 have been wounded in action, but as experts discussed at a recent event, this is just a ... https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/12/10/how-much-should-the-united-states-spend-on-defense/How much should the United States spend on defense?http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/584723506/0/brookingsrss/topics/defenseandsecurity~How-much-should-the-United-States-spend-on-defense/
Mon, 10 Dec 2018 14:14:01 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?p=552021

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By James N. Miller, Michael E. O'Hanlon

Almost two years into the Trump administration, there is much to like about the overall direction that Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis has taken at the Pentagon. Most impressive is the National Defense Strategy of early 2018 that prioritizes great-power competition and deterrence over the forever wars of the Middle East and South Asia.

However, the Mattis revolution is incomplete at best, and now it appears to be imperiled by a recent shift in political and budgetary winds. President Donald Trump increased the U.S. national defense budget substantially in his first two years in office—it is now $716 billion for fiscal year 2019 (which began October 1), still less than the peak war years of 2007-2011 under presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, but up by roughly $100 billion from two years ago. That figure counts war costs and Department of Energy nuclear weapons expenses in addition to Department of Defense base funding. However, according to his national security advisor, John Bolton, President Trump now appears interested in flattening or even reducing the budget to about $700 billion for fiscal year 2020. The Pentagon had been expecting something more like $733 billion; indeed, Secretary Mattis, Joint Chiefs Chairman General Joseph Dunford, and most recently the independent Congressionally-mandated National Defense Strategy Commission had all advocated ongoing real growth of at least 3 percent a year into the indefinite future, prior to the administration’s apparent change of heart.

The Democratic takeover of the House of Representatives, and the persistent presence of Tea Party Republicans in the Congress as well, will reinforce the administration’s own recent trend towards modest fiscal belt-tightening. Today’s national defense spending is affordable for the country in one sense; it represents 3.5 percent of GDP, when Cold War norms were 5 to 10 percent. But given the realities of U.S. domestic politics, it is hard to believe that meaningful reduction of the country’s nearly $1 trillion annual federal deficit will happen without a broad sense of shared national sacrifice. Moreover, a boom-and-bust approach to defense spending results in billions being wasted through inefficiency.

How to cut $33 billion out of the planned 2020 national defense budget? Fortunately, there is a lodestar that Pentagon officials, and the Congress, can reference to guide their work—consistent, we believe, with Mattis’s central priorities and with the nation’s strategic needs. Put bluntly, the military should not grow in size, as all of the services currently intend. Prioritization should be given to longer-term innovation and modernization, as well as unit-by-unit readiness, of the current force.

The army now wants to grow its current active-duty force from some 480,000 soldiers to at least 500,000. The navy wants to increase the size of its fleet from some 285 ships to 355 (in fairness, that latter goal dates back to the latter Obama years). The air force came out with a plan this fall to increase its own force structure from 312 operational squadrons (of all types of aircraft combined, and including the Guard and Reserve) to 386.

To be sure, there are good reasons for the services to want larger forces. Our soldiers, sailors, Marines and airmen are stressed from extended deployments. And we have been asking a lot of their equipment as well. The two tragic navy ship collisions of 2017, higher accident rates in recent training exercises, personnel shortages for military specialties like pilots and serious readiness challenges in certain categories of equipment (like Marine Corps helicopters due to lagging maintenance) have been the results.

The solution, however, is not a larger force, but a more consistently funded, efficiently operated and modern one. Congress needs to help, by providing budgets on time and predictably. It also needs to provide ample resources; that $700 billion figure should be a floor on the 2020 budget (naturally, there would be advantages to having the full $733 billion), not a waystation towards even deeper cuts. Authorizing another round of base closures would also help and is long overdue—though net savings wouldn’t accrue for half a decade.

We need a more modern and ready force, not a larger one.

And the military services, with support from civilian leadership, need to do things differently too. The army is overworked partly because it maintains deployments of several thousand soldiers in Korea and Poland through frequent rotations of multiple units, rather than permanent stationing of individual brigades in these locations. Excessive deployments to the Mexican border have not helped. The air force could consider similar changes in how it maintains key units in parts of the Middle East. The navy still focuses too rigidly on maintaining a permanent presence in the broader Persian Gulf and Western Pacific regions; more flexible and unpredictable deployments can ease the strain on the force without giving adversaries any solace.

Today’s military is big enough to meet the reasonable requirements of ongoing commitments and great power competition, provided that it is ready, and modernized, and resilient against the kinds of cyber, anti-satellite and other asymmetric attacks future adversaries would be sure to employ. We need a more modern and ready force, not a larger one.

]]>
By James N. Miller, Michael E. O'Hanlon
Almost two years into the Trump administration, there is much to like about the overall direction that Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis has taken at the Pentagon. Most impressive is the National Defense Strategy of early 2018 that prioritizes great-power competition and deterrence over the forever wars of the Middle East and South Asia.
However, the Mattis revolution is incomplete at best, and now it appears to be imperiled by a recent shift in political and budgetary winds. President Donald Trump increased the U.S. national defense budget substantially in his first two years in office—it is now $716 billion for fiscal year 2019 (which began October 1), still less than the peak war years of 2007-2011 under presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, but up by roughly $100 billion from two years ago. That figure counts war costs and Department of Energy nuclear weapons expenses in addition to Department of Defense base funding. However, according to his national security advisor, John Bolton, President Trump now appears interested in flattening or even reducing the budget to about $700 billion for fiscal year 2020. The Pentagon had been expecting something more like $733 billion; indeed, Secretary Mattis, Joint Chiefs Chairman General Joseph Dunford, and most recently the independent Congressionally-mandated National Defense Strategy Commission had all advocated ongoing real growth of at least 3 percent a year into the indefinite future, prior to the administration’s apparent change of heart.
The Democratic takeover of the House of Representatives, and the persistent presence of Tea Party Republicans in the Congress as well, will reinforce the administration’s own recent trend towards modest fiscal belt-tightening. Today’s national defense spending is affordable for the country in one sense; it represents 3.5 percent of GDP, when Cold War norms were 5 to 10 percent. But given the realities of U.S. domestic politics, it is hard to believe that meaningful reduction of the country’s nearly $1 trillion annual federal deficit will happen without a broad sense of shared national sacrifice. Moreover, a boom-and-bust approach to defense spending results in billions being wasted through inefficiency.
How to cut $33 billion out of the planned 2020 national defense budget? Fortunately, there is a lodestar that Pentagon officials, and the Congress, can reference to guide their work—consistent, we believe, with Mattis’s central priorities and with the nation’s strategic needs. Put bluntly, the military should not grow in size, as all of the services currently intend. Prioritization should be given to longer-term innovation and modernization, as well as unit-by-unit readiness, of the current force.
The army now wants to grow its current active-duty force from some 480,000 soldiers to at least 500,000. The navy wants to increase the size of its fleet from some 285 ships to 355 (in fairness, that latter goal dates back to the latter Obama years). The air force came out with a plan this fall to increase its own force structure from 312 operational squadrons (of all types of aircraft combined, and including the Guard and Reserve) to 386.
To be sure, there are good reasons for the services to want larger forces. Our soldiers, sailors, Marines and airmen are stressed from extended deployments. And we have been asking a lot of their equipment as well. The two tragic navy ship collisions of 2017, higher accident rates in recent training exercises, personnel shortages for military specialties like pilots and serious readiness challenges in certain categories of equipment (like Marine Corps helicopters due to lagging maintenance) have been the results.
The solution, however, is not a larger force, but a more consistently funded, efficiently operated and modern one. Congress needs to help, by providing budgets on time and predictably. It ... By James N. Miller, Michael E. O'Hanlon
Almost two years into the Trump administration, there is much to like about the overall direction that Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis has taken at the Pentagon. Most impressive is the National Defense ... https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/12/09/%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%8a%d9%85%d9%86-%d8%a8%d8%b9%d8%af-%d8%a7%d9%86%d8%b3%d8%ad%d8%a7%d8%a8-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b3%d8%b9%d9%88%d8%af%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d9%85%d8%a7-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b0%d9%8a-%d8%b3%d9%8a%d8%aa%d8%ba/اليمن بعد انسحاب السعودية: ما الذي سيتغيّر؟http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/584532002/0/brookingsrss/topics/defenseandsecurity~%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%8a%d9%85%d9%86-%d8%a8%d8%b9%d8%af-%d8%a7%d9%86%d8%b3%d8%ad%d8%a7%d8%a8-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b3%d8%b9%d9%88%d8%af%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d9%85%d8%a7/
Sun, 09 Dec 2018 10:44:56 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?p=552013

Pressure is mounting on Saudi Arabia to pull out of Yemen. The Pentagon announced on November 9 that it would stop aerial refueling of Saudi planes conducting operations in Yemen, ending assistance that began under President Obama in 2015, when Riyadh first began its bombing campaign. Last week, the Senate broke with the White House voted 63 to 37 to advance a resolution to end U.S. military support for the Saudi-led war. Democrats in the House of Representatives have promised to use their impending majority to end U.S. support for the Saudi war. So far, the president himself remains unconvinced and loyal to his Saudi friends, but Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Secretary of Defense James Mattis both called for a ceasefire, suggesting the administration position on the Yemen war may be softening.

The Saudi campaign has been an unmitigated disaster for Yemen, transforming the country’s civil war from bad to horrific. Yemen’s humanitarian crisis is the worst in the world, with hundreds of thousand already dead and millions at risk of disease and starvation. Although Riyadh did stop the Iran-supported Houthi rebels from consolidating power, the Houthis have hung on and still control much of the country.

An end to the Saudi intervention is long overdue—but even if it occurs, don’t expect Yemen’s nightmare to draw to a close. For a change in Saudi policy to have the most impact, it must be coupled with a broader pullout of foreign powers and a ceasefire among Yemen’s many warring factions.

By itself, an end to the Saudi bombing campaign and blockade would be a milestone. The air strikes have killed thousands of Yemenis, including many children. The bombing also destroyed much of Yemen’s already-tottering infrastructure, making medical care and food distribution even more difficult. Less visibly, but more deadly, the Saudi blockade of many of Yemen’s ports and airport—done in the name of stopping Iranian arms from entering Yemen—has prevented food and humanitarian aid from entering the country as well. This has contributed to the massive famine.

Strategically, a close to the Saudi intervention would also benefit a key U.S. ally in the region—Saudi Arabia. Riyadh justified its intervention as a way to counter Iran, fight terrorism and restore a stable government in Yemen. But terrorists remain active in Yemen, and stability is farther off than ever. The Saudi-backed president of Yemen, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, has no power base and little popular support. Perhaps most important from Riyadh’s point of view, Iran’s position in Yemen is stronger than ever. The war has increased the Houthis’ dependence on Iran for arms and financial support. In addition, the court of world opinion has come to see Saudi Arabia, not Iran, as the aggressor in the conflict, and it is Saudi Arabia whose reputation is damaged by the ongoing disaster there.

Yet even if Saudi Arabia comes to its senses or is compelled to do so, an end to the intervention would only be the beginning of what is needed. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) would still be militarily involved in the fighting against the Houthis, and it is a much more active player than Saudi Arabia on the ground in Yemen. Local actors would continue to fight: The country is highly divided, and the main factions themselves are further divided. Yemen today is a failed state, and there is no accepted political leadership to pick up the pieces. The Houthis, Iran’s ally, would be the strongest of the factions, and they are brutal and authoritarian as well as tied to Tehran. Terrorist groups like al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula would remain active, trying to establish themselves in any areas that lack a strong rival. Perhaps most important from Riyadh’s point of view, Tehran can claim a victory over its long-time rival. Although Houthi reliance on Iran would decrease as well, the alliance is likely to endure, and Iran will have influence on yet another of Saudi Arabia’s borders. Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, who championed the Yemen war, would be admitting his intervention failed.

To improve both the strategic and humanitarian situation, any decrease in the Saudi military campaign must become the impetus for broader measures to end the war and decrease the suffering. Most important, Iran and the UAE should also be pressed to end their involvement. Yemen’s fires won’t be extinguished if outsiders no longer fuel them, but they will diminish. Hoping to seize the moment, U.N. envoy Martin Griffiths is currently trying to arrange a ceasefire and ensure the key Yemeni port of Hodeidah is open for international aid to enter the country. Griffiths is also fostering a broader dialogue, and key parties to the conflict are expressing a willingness to negotiate—a willingness that might grow if Riyadh moves to end its bombing campaign and other forms of intervention.

The United States should continue to offer Saudi Arabia assistance with its territorial defense from any Houthi missiles. In addition, the Saudis are more credibly able to hold Iran responsible for Houthi missile attacks on the Kingdom after a withdrawal if Washington is behind them, so U.S. support for deterrence is vital. Because terrorist groups remain a concern, the United States must also continue counterterrorism operations in Yemen. All this must be supplemented by a rapid and massive humanitarian effort to move Yemenis away from the brink of starvation. An end to the Saudi intervention is a good first step to ending this suffering, but by itself it will not be enough.

]]>
By Daniel L. Byman
Pressure is mounting on Saudi Arabia to pull out of Yemen. The Pentagon announced on November 9 that it would stop aerial refueling of Saudi planes conducting operations in Yemen, ending assistance that began under President Obama in 2015, when Riyadh first began its bombing campaign. Last week, the Senate broke with the White House voted 63 to 37 to advance a resolution to end U.S. military support for the Saudi-led war. Democrats in the House of Representatives have promised to use their impending majority to end U.S. support for the Saudi war. So far, the president himself remains unconvinced and loyal to his Saudi friends, but Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Secretary of Defense James Mattis both called for a ceasefire, suggesting the administration position on the Yemen war may be softening.
The Saudi campaign has been an unmitigated disaster for Yemen, transforming the country’s civil war from bad to horrific. Yemen’s humanitarian crisis is the worst in the world, with hundreds of thousand already dead and millions at risk of disease and starvation. Although Riyadh did stop the Iran-supported Houthi rebels from consolidating power, the Houthis have hung on and still control much of the country.
An end to the Saudi intervention is long overdue—but even if it occurs, don’t expect Yemen’s nightmare to draw to a close. For a change in Saudi policy to have the most impact, it must be coupled with a broader pullout of foreign powers and a ceasefire among Yemen’s many warring factions.
By itself, an end to the Saudi bombing campaign and blockade would be a milestone. The air strikes have killed thousands of Yemenis, including many children. The bombing also destroyed much of Yemen’s already-tottering infrastructure, making medical care and food distribution even more difficult. Less visibly, but more deadly, the Saudi blockade of many of Yemen’s ports and airport—done in the name of stopping Iranian arms from entering Yemen—has prevented food and humanitarian aid from entering the country as well. This has contributed to the massive famine.
Strategically, a close to the Saudi intervention would also benefit a key U.S. ally in the region—Saudi Arabia. Riyadh justified its intervention as a way to counter Iran, fight terrorism and restore a stable government in Yemen. But terrorists remain active in Yemen, and stability is farther off than ever. The Saudi-backed president of Yemen, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, has no power base and little popular support. Perhaps most important from Riyadh’s point of view, Iran’s position in Yemen is stronger than ever. The war has increased the Houthis’ dependence on Iran for arms and financial support. In addition, the court of world opinion has come to see Saudi Arabia, not Iran, as the aggressor in the conflict, and it is Saudi Arabia whose reputation is damaged by the ongoing disaster there.
Yet even if Saudi Arabia comes to its senses or is compelled to do so, an end to the intervention would only be the beginning of what is needed. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) would still be militarily involved in the fighting against the Houthis, and it is a much more active player than Saudi Arabia on the ground in Yemen. Local actors would continue to fight: The country is highly divided, and the main factions themselves are further divided. Yemen today is a failed state, and there is no accepted political leadership to pick up the pieces. The Houthis, Iran’s ally, would be the strongest of the factions, and they are brutal and authoritarian as well as tied to Tehran. Terrorist groups like al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula would remain active, trying to establish themselves in any areas that lack a strong rival. Perhaps most important from ... By Daniel L. Byman
Pressure is mounting on Saudi Arabia to pull out of Yemen. The Pentagon announced on November 9 that it would stop aerial refueling of Saudi planes conducting operations in Yemen, ending assistance that began under President ... https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/12/04/japans-national-security-council-at-five/Japan’s National Security Council at fivehttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/583715752/0/brookingsrss/topics/defenseandsecurity~Japan%e2%80%99s-National-Security-Council-at-five/
Tue, 04 Dec 2018 20:27:51 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?p=551199

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By Adam P. Liff

On 4 December 2018, Japan’s National Security Council (NSC) marks its fifth anniversary. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s administration established the NSC after a decades-long reform movement aimed at strengthening the prime minister’s office and addressing perceived weaknesses of previous national security institutions. Its creation was, and remains, a big deal. Leading experts on Japan’s foreign policy have deemed it “the most ambitious reorganization of Japan’s foreign and security policy apparatus since the end of World War II.”

Over the past half-decade, the NSC has come to play a central role in shaping Japan’s strategic trajectory that has attracted so much global attention in the Abe era. Though its existence and structure hardly make for eye-grabbing headlines, appreciating the NSC’s behind-the-scenes role is crucial to understanding some of Japan’s major policy decisions in the past five years, as well as how the country plans to cope with current and future challenges.

The NSC facilitates top-down decision making on national security issues, deeper integration and inter-agency coordination for strategic planning and crisis management, and a more robust, political demand-driven intelligence cycle. It is designed to be a Cabinet-based ‘control tower’ for national security decision making. The council also serves longer-term efforts by Japan’s leaders to expand and strengthen the ‘prime ministerial executive’ at the expense of its historically powerful bureaucracy.

Though established under Abe, the NSC was the culmination of longer-term trends. Critics had recognised institutional deficiencies for decades. The NSC’s immediate predecessor, the Security Council, was judged to be insufficient to handle increasingly severe and diverse security challenges requiring more effective ‘whole-of-government’ decision making, planning, intelligence gathering and assessment.

Salient drivers on the eve of the NSC’s establishment included the March 2011 ‘triple disaster’ in Tohoku, a January 2013 hostage crisis involving Japanese citizens in Algeria, North Korea’s repeated nuclear weapons and ballistic missile tests, and grey zone challenges such as China’s provocative operational assertion of its sovereignty claim to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands after September 2012. Considering the difficulty of responding to these diverse crises, Japan’s leaders judged that an institution better suited to formulate and carry out a more proactive, comprehensive and ‘whole-of-government’ strategy was a national security imperative.

While it appears to be functioning well to date, the NSC’s longer-term significance will hinge on its future form and function.

Thus, the NSC’s establishment was motivated by a desire to more flexibly and independently cope with a rapidly changing, increasingly complex and ever more uncertain security environment in East Asia and beyond. It was also based on an understanding of national security that recognises the importance of threats beyond traditional military or defence affairs such as cyber technology, space, finance, and man-made and natural disasters (such as 3/11).

The NSC’s most significant institutional innovation is its core Four-Minister Meeting comprised of the prime minister, chief cabinet secretary and ministers of defence and foreign affairs. Meetings of these national security principals can be expanded as needed — usually through the Nine-Minister Meeting framework inherited from the NSC’s predecessor or the Emergency Situation Minister Meeting. The NSC met 48 times in 2016 and 46 times in 2017 — a rate dwarfing that of analogous meetings in the pre-NSC era.

The National Security Secretariat (NSS) provides support to the NSC. The NSS was established in 2014 and staffed primarily with career civil servants from the ministries of foreign affairs and defence, as well as officers from Japan’s Self-Defense Forces. It is organised into three regional and three functional teams addressing policy integration, crisis management, information and intelligence sharing, coordinating with foreign counterparts and ad hoc project support.

Together with the NSS, the NSC has become the nexus for major decisions and draft legislation defining Japan’s foreign policy and security posture. This includes Japan’s 2013 National Security Strategy, the controversial July 2014 reinterpretation of Article 9 of Japan’s ‘Peace Constitution’ to enable limited exercise of collective self-defence, and a major package of security legislation to support this reinterpretation passed in September 2015. The NSC and the NSS also play a key diplomatic function by serving as the Cabinet-based contact point for foreign governments.

While it appears to be functioning well to date, the NSC’s longer-term significance will hinge on its future form and function, especially after Abe and his inaugural NSS secretary-general, close advisor and retired career diplomat Shotaro Yachi, are no longer running the show. Japan’s 2013 National Security Strategy — its first-ever — as well as the NSS’s ability to cooperate with Japan’s historically powerful ministries and agencies, are two other important variables to watch.

The NSC has proved to be one of Japan’s most significant institutional reforms in decades. It is also the key achievement of the Abe administration’s ambitious agenda to strengthen political leadership of Japan’s national security decision making. Japan’s leaders face an increasingly complex, challenging, and fast-evolving regional security environment. Time will tell if the NSC is up to the challenge.

]]>
By Adam P. Liff
On 4 December 2018, Japan’s National Security Council (NSC) marks its fifth anniversary. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s administration established the NSC after a decades-long reform movement aimed at strengthening the prime minister’s office and addressing perceived weaknesses of previous national security institutions. Its creation was, and remains, a big deal. Leading experts on Japan’s foreign policy have deemed it “the most ambitious reorganization of Japan’s foreign and security policy apparatus since the end of World War II.”
Over the past half-decade, the NSC has come to play a central role in shaping Japan’s strategic trajectory that has attracted so much global attention in the Abe era. Though its existence and structure hardly make for eye-grabbing headlines, appreciating the NSC’s behind-the-scenes role is crucial to understanding some of Japan’s major policy decisions in the past five years, as well as how the country plans to cope with current and future challenges.
The NSC facilitates top-down decision making on national security issues, deeper integration and inter-agency coordination for strategic planning and crisis management, and a more robust, political demand-driven intelligence cycle. It is designed to be a Cabinet-based ‘control tower’ for national security decision making. The council also serves longer-term efforts by Japan’s leaders to expand and strengthen the ‘prime ministerial executive’ at the expense of its historically powerful bureaucracy.
Though established under Abe, the NSC was the culmination of longer-term trends. Critics had recognised institutional deficiencies for decades. The NSC’s immediate predecessor, the Security Council, was judged to be insufficient to handle increasingly severe and diverse security challenges requiring more effective ‘whole-of-government’ decision making, planning, intelligence gathering and assessment.
Salient drivers on the eve of the NSC’s establishment included the March 2011 ‘triple disaster’ in Tohoku, a January 2013 hostage crisis involving Japanese citizens in Algeria, North Korea’s repeated nuclear weapons and ballistic missile tests, and grey zone challenges such as China’s provocative operational assertion of its sovereignty claim to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands after September 2012. Considering the difficulty of responding to these diverse crises, Japan’s leaders judged that an institution better suited to formulate and carry out a more proactive, comprehensive and ‘whole-of-government’ strategy was a national security imperative.
While it appears to be functioning well to date, the NSC’s longer-term significance will hinge on its future form and function.
Thus, the NSC’s establishment was motivated by a desire to more flexibly and independently cope with a rapidly changing, increasingly complex and ever more uncertain security environment in East Asia and beyond. It was also based on an understanding of national security that recognises the importance of threats beyond traditional military or defence affairs such as cyber technology, space, finance, and man-made and natural disasters (such as 3/11).
The NSC’s most significant institutional innovation is its core Four-Minister Meeting comprised of the prime minister, chief cabinet secretary and ministers of defence and foreign affairs. Meetings of these national security principals can be expanded as needed — usually through the Nine-Minister Meeting framework inherited from the NSC’s predecessor or the Emergency Situation Minister Meeting. The NSC met 48 times in 2016 and 46 times in 2017 — a rate dwarfing that of analogous meetings in the pre-NSC era.
The National Security Secretariat (NSS) provides support to the NSC. The NSS was ... By Adam P. Liff
On 4 December 2018, Japan’s National Security Council (NSC) marks its fifth anniversary. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s administration established the NSC after a decades-long reform movement aimed at strengthening the ... https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/11/29/how-the-u-s-military-became-the-exception-to-americas-wage-stagnation-problem/How the U.S. military became the exception to America’s wage stagnation problemhttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/582940582/0/brookingsrss/topics/defenseandsecurity~How-the-US-military-became-the-exception-to-America%e2%80%99s-wage-stagnation-problem/
Thu, 29 Nov 2018 22:05:14 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?p=550466

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By Brendan R. Stickles

Earlier this week, Brookings scholar Richard Reeves published an enlightening analysis of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) data on income inequality. His piece, “Restoring middle class incomes; redistribution won’t do,” described what frustrated Americans have felt for years: Since 1979, the wealthiest Americans experienced the most significant income gains. Counterintuitively, Reeves also highlighted that the lowest earners—the bottom quintile of household income—kept roughly on pace with the growth rates of the highest earners.

His analysis focuses on income stagnation and policy solutions for the Americans in the middle. While the top and bottom quintiles grew at 79 and 78 percent respectively, middle-class household income rose at a tepid 46 percent. Unlike the decades after World War II, when every income level increased at comparative rates, in recent years the middle class lagged woefully behind.

With one important exception. Over the last 18 years, active duty military pay increases significantly outpaced their civilian counterparts. A combination of economic forces and political obligations inverted the earning potential for uniformed personnel. With very little fanfare, military service became one of the last bastions of middle class social mobility.

An April 2018 demographic analysis by the Council on Foreign Relations indicated that the modern military draws heavily from middle-class families. Over 60 percent of 2016 enlistments came from neighborhoods with a median household income between $38,345 and $80,912. The quintiles below and above that band were underrepresented, with the poorest quintile providing 19 percent of the force and the richest Americans enlisting at a rate of 17 percent. The modern force comes predominantly from the middle-class households highlighted in Reeves’ article.

Historically, those middle-class enlistees expected a comparatively low salary paired with exceptional benefits. This traditionally included a tax-free housing allowance and fully compensated medical care, but more recently incorporated full tuition coverage from the GI Bill. Over the last 20 years as civilian wages plateaued, military compensation for the post-9/11 force steadily increased.

A mid-grade enlisted sailor, soldier, or airman (at an E5 paygrade) made 10 percent less than the median American in 2000 and at the time (as John McCain pointed out) was eligible for food stamps. By 2011, service members of the same rank were making 10 percent more than the median American, even without including benefits. The most recent jobs report indicated a national wage increase of 3.1 percent, slightly higher than the 2019 military pay raise of 2.6 percent. But for now, even excluding housing cost and medical insurance an “E5” is making an above-average American salary. It’s not that the Pentagon was “keeping up with the Joneses.” It’s just that in the last 20 years, the Joneses weren’t keeping up with the military.

While the military is traditionally immune to the fluctuations and volatility of their private sector counterparts, the remarkable swing over the last decade was the result of two once-in-a-century events occurring in concert. The economic recession began in 2008, around the same time as the so called “surge” in Iraq and the continuation of the war in Afghanistan. Those unrelated events created an unprecedented shift in military compensation relative to the rest of the public sector. In other words, the worst economic collapse since the Great Depression corresponded with the longest war in U.S. history.

Sources: Social Security Administration (https://www.ssa.gov/OACT/COLA/central.html); Defense Finance and Accounting Service (https://www.dfas.mil/militarymembers/payentitlements/Pay-Tables/military-pay-charts.html); FederalPay.org (https://www.federalpay.org/military/raises). This data compares historic “median net compensation” provided by the Social Security Administration with the annual salary of an “E5” with over four years of service in the U.S. military. There are no adjustments for inflation, and “military base pay” does not include the value of any “benefits,” most notably delayed compensation from pension, medical insurance, tax benefits, or housing allowances.

The temptation for future defense budgets will be to neglect military compensation increases and regress to the historical pay gap as personnel expenditures currently encapsulate one-third of the defense budget. But, the Department of Defense (DOD) must keep an eye on the horizon and proactively anticipate and act on civilian sector economics and public policy changes. The regional implementation of tuition-free college (as instituted in Tennessee), increasing momentum behind “Medicare-for-all,” and increasing civilian wages would dramatically affect the middle class, and therefore the pool of military recruits. The Pentagon got a head start over the last decade recruiting and retaining a high-caliber team despite nearly full employment. That advantage won’t last forever.

The 2018 National Defense Strategy recognized that “the security environment is also affected by rapid technological advancements and the changing character of war” and “the drive to develop new technologies is relentless.” The modern military is competing with the private sector for skilled labor and technological savvy. If properly nurtured and maintained, the inversion of the civil-military pay gap enables the recruitment and retention of high capability talent. The DOD should take advantage of these national economic trends to improve the capability as well as capacity of the force.

Conversely, scholars like Reeves and his Brookings team at the “Future of The Middle Class Initiative” could gain insight from studying the modernization of the military. As the DOD transitions a growing segment of its workforce into the knowledge-based economy, leaders and stakeholders in the civilian world may glean important lessons that can restore prosperity and mobility to the middle class. We, as a nation, would all benefit from their success.

Nobody should join or remain on active duty for financial reasons. As Reeves points out, the sluggish increase in middle-class growth is a significant problem in America. But it may create an opportunity for the DOD to build a more skilled and competitive force. Ironically, the men and women in uniform are some of the few members of the middle class capable of achieving the American dream they have sworn to defend.

The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Navy, U.S. Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

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By Brendan R. Stickles
Earlier this week, Brookings scholar Richard Reeves published an enlightening analysis of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) data on income inequality. His piece, “Restoring middle class incomes; redistribution won’t do,” described what frustrated Americans have felt for years: Since 1979, the wealthiest Americans experienced the most significant income gains. Counterintuitively, Reeves also highlighted that the lowest earners—the bottom quintile of household income—kept roughly on pace with the growth rates of the highest earners.
His analysis focuses on income stagnation and policy solutions for the Americans in the middle. While the top and bottom quintiles grew at 79 and 78 percent respectively, middle-class household income rose at a tepid 46 percent. Unlike the decades after World War II, when every income level increased at comparative rates, in recent years the middle class lagged woefully behind.
With one important exception. Over the last 18 years, active duty military pay increases significantly outpaced their civilian counterparts. A combination of economic forces and political obligations inverted the earning potential for uniformed personnel. With very little fanfare, military service became one of the last bastions of middle class social mobility.
An April 2018 demographic analysis by the Council on Foreign Relations indicated that the modern military draws heavily from middle-class families. Over 60 percent of 2016 enlistments came from neighborhoods with a median household income between $38,345 and $80,912. The quintiles below and above that band were underrepresented, with the poorest quintile providing 19 percent of the force and the richest Americans enlisting at a rate of 17 percent. The modern force comes predominantly from the middle-class households highlighted in Reeves’ article.
Historically, those middle-class enlistees expected a comparatively low salary paired with exceptional benefits. This traditionally included a tax-free housing allowance and fully compensated medical care, but more recently incorporated full tuition coverage from the GI Bill. Over the last 20 years as civilian wages plateaued, military compensation for the post-9/11 force steadily increased.
A mid-grade enlisted sailor, soldier, or airman (at an E5 paygrade) made 10 percent less than the median American in 2000 and at the time (as John McCain pointed out) was eligible for food stamps. By 2011, service members of the same rank were making 10 percent more than the median American, even without including benefits. The most recent jobs report indicated a national wage increase of 3.1 percent, slightly higher than the 2019 military pay raise of 2.6 percent. But for now, even excluding housing cost and medical insurance an “E5” is making an above-average American salary. It’s not that the Pentagon was “keeping up with the Joneses.” It’s just that in the last 20 years, the Joneses weren’t keeping up with the military.
While the military is traditionally immune to the fluctuations and volatility of their private sector counterparts, the remarkable swing over the last decade was the result of two once-in-a-century events occurring in concert. The economic recession began in 2008, around the same time as the so called “surge” in Iraq and the continuation of the war in Afghanistan. Those unrelated events created an unprecedented shift in military compensation relative to the rest of the public sector. In other words, the worst economic collapse since the Great Depression corresponded with the longest war in U.S. history.
Sources: Social Security Administration (https://www.ssa.gov/OACT/COLA/central.html); Defense Finance and Accounting Service (https://www.dfas.mil/militarymembers/payentitlements/Pay-Tables/military-pay-charts.html); FederalPay.org ... By Brendan R. Stickles
Earlier this week, Brookings scholar Richard Reeves published an enlightening analysis of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) data on income inequality. His piece, “Restoring middle class incomes;https://www.brookings.edu/research/ai-and-future-warfare/The role of AI in future warfarehttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/582799268/0/brookingsrss/topics/defenseandsecurity~The-role-of-AI-in-future-warfare/
Thu, 29 Nov 2018 05:01:26 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?post_type=research&p=550162

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By Michael E. O'Hanlon

To illustrate how artificial intelligence (AI) could affect the future battlefield, consider the following scenario based on a future book I am writing entitled The Senkaku Paradox: Risking Great Power War over Limited Stakes. The scenario, imagined to occur sometime between now and 2040, begins with a hypothesized Russian “green men” attack against a small farming village in eastern Estonia or Latvia. Russia’s presumed motive would be to sow discord and dissent within NATO, weakening the alliance. Estonia and Latvia are NATO member states, and thus the United States is sworn to defend them. But in the event of such a Russian aggression, a huge, direct NATO response may or may not be wise. Furthermore, the robotics and AI dimension of this scenario, and a number of others similar to it, will likely get more interesting as the years go by.

A hypothetical scenario in which Russia creates a pretext to slice off a piece of an eastern Baltic state, occupying it in purported “defense” of native Russian speakers there, could cause enormous problems if NATO chose to reverse the aggression. In that event, it could require a massive deployment of Operation Desert Storm-like proportions to liberate the territory while facing down any Russian reinforcements that might be sent. In a less successful case, Russia could interdict major elements of that attempted NATO deployment through some combination of cyberattacks, high-altitude nuclear bursts causing electromagnetic pulse, targeted missile or aerial strikes on ports and major ships, and perhaps even an “escalate to de-escalate” series of carefully chosen nuclear detonations against very specific targets on land or sea.1 While the latter concept of nuclear preemption is not formally part of Russian military doctrine, it could influence actual Russian military options today.2 Alternatively, the NATO deployment could succeed, only to face subsequent Russian nuclear strikes once evidence of NATO’s conventional superiority on the Baltic battlefields had presented Moscow with the Hobson’s choice of either escalating or losing.3

By 2040, some aspects of this kind of scenario could improve for American and NATO interests. The clarity and perhaps the scale of NATO’s security commitments to the Baltic states might have strengthened, reducing the chances of deterrence failure in the first place and improving the initial capacity for resistance to any Russian aggression.4 But on balance, technological innovation, including advancements in robotics and AI, makes it quite possible that things could also get worse.

To be sure, missile defenses will improve. But so will the missiles they have to counter, in terms of their speed and ability to maneuver warheads, along with the use of multispectral sensors or seekers.

Most aspects of the nuclear situation are unlikely to change. Missile defenses may improve, and may include lasers for point defense in some places. These laser defenses could help protect ships or ports or airfields against various types of attack. But because such laser weapons inevitably fall off rapidly in power (as the square of the distance between the weapon and its target), it will be challenging for missile defenses to provide area protection. Thus, while it is at least conceivable that ports and airfields could become much better protected, it is hard to escape the prediction that rail lines, road networks involving large numbers of bridges, tunnels, or elevated routes, and large concentrations of supplies in depots or warehouses will be at least as vulnerable in 2040 as they are today. To be sure, missile defenses will improve. But so will the missiles they have to counter, in terms of their speed and ability to maneuver warheads, along with the use of multispectral sensors or seekers.

Satellites in space are likely to remain highly vulnerable to nuclear attack. That is especially true of satellites in low Earth orbit (LEO), as they are located at altitudes similar to those traversed by ballistic missiles on typical flight trajectories, so they can be attacked by ballistic missile defense technologies. Such objects are also vulnerable, over a period of months, to the residual effects of nuclear detonations in the Van Allen belts—areas of the Earth’s magnetic field where protons and electrons generated by nuclear explosions can “get stuck,” damaging satellites on each orbital pass. Shielding can, in theory, protect against more distant explosions and against such radiation-pumped Van Allen belts, at a typical cost of perhaps 10 percent of the overall satellite. However, it is unlikely that most commercial satellites will be shielded unless the government subsidizes such endeavors. Even with shielding, advanced imaging satellites and other high-value assets in LEO will remain vulnerable since they may be individually and directly attacked by an adversary.5

By 2040, many cyber systems controlling NATO weaponry and other platforms should be more resilient to attack. That is because NATO will have had two decades to address problems that are now widely understood. That is unlike the case 20 years ago, when, even though the Y2K debacle and other scares should have sobered people to the risks of inadequate computer security measures, a general sense of complacency about great-power relations discouraged meaningful action against threats to electronics from hacking, high-altitude nuclear bursts, malicious supply-chain actors who might compromise the integrity of semiconductor chips, and so on. Admittedly, this conclusion assumes greater vigilance on the part of NATO states than will perhaps prove to be the case. However, progress in this arena will probably not be uniform. It seems relatively unlikely to result in meaningful hardening of the critical civilian infrastructure on which militaries depend.

Even if classic computer hacking, spoofing, advanced persistent threats, and related measures gradually lose some of their effectiveness, a new set of challenges is appearing on the horizon. One challenge could be a more efficient form of advanced persistent threat in which efforts to penetrate an adversary’s computer systems employ automated capabilities with massive raw computational power that continually adjust tactics to the defenses encountered.

Even if classic computer hacking, spoofing, advanced persistent threats, and related measures gradually lose some of their effectiveness, a new set of challenges is appearing on the horizon.

Another major complicating development could be the advent of constellations or swarms of smart robotic devices. For example, by 2040, large numbers of smart sea mines could pose enormous threats to shipping; in the scenario of Russian aggression, NATO would need to mount a response to these threats.6 The devices might in effect be miniature submarines, with sensors and explosives as payload. Russia is already strong in submarine technology7 and could probably master this type of technology in the years to come. Such unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) could be widely deployed in places like the Baltic Sea in times of crisis. Rather than having to hunt for a couple dozen Russian submarines, as might be the case today—already a daunting proposition—NATO forces seeking to reach Baltic ports might need to search for hundreds or even thousands of potent threats. It seems implausible that arms control agreements would prevent the development and deployment of such autonomous systems, not only because of the verification challenges but also because the United States itself will feel powerful incentives to create more autonomous systems, including those with the ability to employ lethal force under certain types of conditions, as Paul Scharre has convincingly argued.8

In another scenario, swarms of quadcopters (unmanned helicopters with four rotors), each packing several kilograms of explosives—thus able to destroy a modern jet if detonated at the right location—might attack NATO air bases and the aircraft on them. Terminal defenses using lasers could possibly destroy some of the incoming threat devices or weapons, but the swarm could then choose a different attack route or seek to overwhelm a defense with a saturation attack. Swarms could also deploy in the airspace surrounding an airfield, staying out of range of any such directed-energy defenses and attempting to strike aircraft as they left or approached a runway.

There are some situations that pose particular challenges. Imagine loitering aerial devices akin to the sensor fuzed weapon (SFW) that have been part of the U.S. armamentarium for years. This weapon is somewhat controversial: it is categorized as a “cluster munition,” a type of weapon banned by international convention, though the United States is not a party to the accord.9 However, it is better thought of as a type of robotic weapon. The benefit of such technologies in combat was discussed extensively as far back as 1998, when a RAND study envisioned their use in situations such as an Iraqi armored vehicle attack against Saudi Arabia on major highways. In that model, which considered technologies available at the time, some 10,000 weapons carrying 40 Skeet submunitions, or perhaps the Brilliant Anti-Tank (BAT) weapon, would suffice to destroy several thousand armored vehicles and effectively halt an enemy assault. The total cost of the ordnance was estimated at several billion dollars.10 Such munitions could be used in a similar way against NATO movements on major roads in Europe, advancing from western points toward Poland and the Baltic states, with the munitions delivered in the future by small robotic devices. Swarms of robotic devices carrying munitions payloads could also be used to attack trains or road convoys in transit, perhaps after being positioned by special forces that had penetrated into NATO territory.

Another type of robotic swarm might be used to create an interconnected network of unmanned aquatic systems functioning, in effect, as mobile mines or torpedoes. This is not presently a technology concept that the U.S. Navy has come close to operationalizing; a 2013 RAND study lists the technology maturity of such systems as between 1 and 3 on a Technology Readiness Level scale that goes from 1 to 9.11 However, the constituent technologies, such as automated sensors, are already largely available.12 As AI improves, a constellation of such devices could be made largely autonomous.

Much of the relevant technology is already available. Drug-trafficking organizations have been using semisubmersibles to transport drugs to the United States for years, now craft with very slender vessel designs that are efficient at cutting through waves (though still slower than most warships).13 A decade ago, it was already possible to build such boats with a payload of 10 tons and at a cost of less than $1 million per vessel; they were often manned then, but making them fully autonomous would not be a major leap.14

Clearing operations against what would in effect be mobile and self-healing minefields populated by devices that can communicate with each other and reposition themselves to create dense, lethal networks will be much more difficult than clearing current threats.

Such capabilities create the specter of not just “smart mines” (able to distinguish one type of ship from another before detonating) but mobile, re-deployable, and agile mines operating as autonomous networks. Since mines have been responsible for most U.S. Navy ship losses since World War II, this is a particularly unsettling prospect.15 In modern times, the U.S. Navy has primarily avoided mines by staying clear of waters where they might be deployed, as opposed to having any particularly effective counter to them. The main alternative, as outlined by Caitlin Talmadge, would be to conduct extensive clearing operations to create relatively narrow channels for movement, if enough time is available for such purposes. (Talmadge estimated a month or more in a scenario in which Iran mined the Persian Gulf and the U.S. Navy and allies then sought to clear the waterways.)16 Used against America’s enemies of recent decades, this might have been a doable proposition. But when a U.S. Navy vessel has to approach a Baltic port against a Russian foe of 2025 or 2030 or 2035 or 2040, the situation could be very different. Clearing operations against what would in effect be mobile and self-healing minefields populated by devices that can communicate with each other and reposition themselves to create dense, lethal networks will be much more difficult than clearing current threats.

If NATO figured out how to jam the communications between smart, unmanned, mobile mines, the adversary’s robotic systems might simply be deployed in redundant patterns to be sure there were no gaps in coverage. They could also be programmed to change their positions every so often to elude neutralization and to repair any potential gaps in their coverage—even if there were no central data processor that actually knew where the gaps were located and even if space-based navigation systems were disabled (since the UUVs could have various types of inertial or bottom-following guidance).17 The network could be set up simply to play the odds, in an environment of little communication and poor information exchange.

How many such UUVs might be needed to achieve the desired effect of rendering transport ships highly vulnerable as they approached a port such as Talinn or Riga? As one possibility, the devices might be released from Kaliningrad with instructions to move eastward toward the littoral waters of those port cities. Even existing battery technology makes a “swim” of such distance within reach.18 Progress in nanomaterials and other constituent elements of batteries may further improve performance in the years ahead.

One way to estimate the quantitative requirements for such a UUV network is to compute how long a picket line might be needed near those ports to cover all possible lines of approach, and then estimate the needed density of separate armed devices along that line. Whatever estimate followed from this simple calculation might then be multiplied by two or three or four to account for attrition of some devices as a result of NATO anti-mining efforts or malfunction.

The approach to Riga, Latvia, is through a body of water about 40 miles wide at points near the port. The picket line might be set up roughly three-to-five miles offshore, where water depths are 100 feet or more—making it hard to detect any submersible object visually.19 The math might go something like this:

If the range of each UUV’s lethal mechanism is similar to that of a modern torpedo such as the U.S. Mark 48, then they might be spaced every one-to-five miles—based on the fact that these torpedoes can typically lock on to targets from a distance of 4,000 yards.20

To improve the density of the picket line and allow multiple shots to be taken at a given transport, the spacing might be kept at perhaps one mile, meaning that 40 UUVs would be needed to populate a given picket line.

With multiple picket lines, perhaps 200-to-500 UUVs in all, at a cost of no more than several hundred million dollars, it would be very difficult to approach the wharves at Riga.

Of course, the United States and other NATO countries could attempt to thwart the operations of these UUVs. They could try to destroy them en masse at their source before the UUVs could be released. They could also create their own robotic swarms designed to find, identify, and neutralize the attacking weapons.

But there would be a fundamental difference from today’s situation. The kind of impunity that U.S. forces have enjoyed for decades during intercontinental movement would be threatened to some degree and could no longer be assumed. And even Russia’s relatively modest military resources would still be ample for the kinds of investments needed in these domains, in purely financial terms, as the above calculations underscore.

If necessary, NATO could avoid some of these problems by staying out of the Baltic Sea. U.S., Canadian, and U.K. forces could deploy to France or the Netherlands or Germany and then move eastward toward Russia, picking up allied help along the way. This strategy might eventually work—but with considerable time delays and with vulnerabilities during movement along road and rail networks. Moreover, Russia might doubt that NATO would have the will to mount such a response. Thus, the key goal of upholding deterrence might be lost, even if, in theory, a war could eventually be won.

Robotics and AI could take on a central, and very important, role in warfare by 2040—even without anything resembling a terminator or a large killer robot.

Because of NATO’s strategic depth and its enormous resource disparity when measured against Russia’s—two advantages the United States and its Pacific allies would likely not have in the Pacific theater against China—NATO would still be favored to win a conventional-only conflict in eastern Europe 20 years from now. But the degree of difficulty would be quite considerable and the degree of escalatory risk highly unsettling. In my book, I attempt to offer Washington and other NATO capitals some policy options. For the purposes of this essay, the simple point is this: robotics and AI could take on a central, and very important, role in warfare by 2040—even without anything resembling a terminator or a large killer robot.

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By Michael E. O'Hanlon
To illustrate how artificial intelligence (AI) could affect the future battlefield, consider the following scenario based on a future book I am writing entitled The Senkaku Paradox: Risking Great Power War over Limited Stakes. The scenario, imagined to occur sometime between now and 2040, begins with a hypothesized Russian “green men” attack against a small farming village in eastern Estonia or Latvia. Russia's presumed motive would be to sow discord and dissent within NATO, weakening the alliance. Estonia and Latvia are NATO member states, and thus the United States is sworn to defend them. But in the event of such a Russian aggression, a huge, direct NATO response may or may not be wise. Furthermore, the robotics and AI dimension of this scenario, and a number of others similar to it, will likely get more interesting as the years go by.
A hypothetical scenario in which Russia creates a pretext to slice off a piece of an eastern Baltic state, occupying it in purported “defense” of native Russian speakers there, could cause enormous problems if NATO chose to reverse the aggression. In that event, it could require a massive deployment of Operation Desert Storm-like proportions to liberate the territory while facing down any Russian reinforcements that might be sent. In a less successful case, Russia could interdict major elements of that attempted NATO deployment through some combination of cyberattacks, high-altitude nuclear bursts causing electromagnetic pulse, targeted missile or aerial strikes on ports and major ships, and perhaps even an “escalate to de-escalate” series of carefully chosen nuclear detonations against very specific targets on land or sea.1 While the latter concept of nuclear preemption is not formally part of Russian military doctrine, it could influence actual Russian military options today.2 Alternatively, the NATO deployment could succeed, only to face subsequent Russian nuclear strikes once evidence of NATO’s conventional superiority on the Baltic battlefields had presented Moscow with the Hobson’s choice of either escalating or losing.3
By 2040, some aspects of this kind of scenario could improve for American and NATO interests. The clarity and perhaps the scale of NATO’s security commitments to the Baltic states might have strengthened, reducing the chances of deterrence failure in the first place and improving the initial capacity for resistance to any Russian aggression.4 But on balance, technological innovation, including advancements in robotics and AI, makes it quite possible that things could also get worse.
To be sure, missile defenses will improve. But so will the missiles they have to counter, in terms of their speed and ability to maneuver warheads, along with the use of multispectral sensors or seekers.
Most aspects of the nuclear situation are unlikely to change. Missile defenses may improve, and may include lasers for point defense in some places. These laser defenses could help protect ships or ports or airfields against various types of attack. But because such laser weapons inevitably fall off rapidly in power (as the square of the distance between the weapon and its target), it will be challenging for missile defenses to provide area protection. Thus, while it is at least conceivable that ports and airfields could become much better protected, it is hard to escape the prediction that rail lines, road networks involving large numbers of bridges, tunnels, or elevated routes, and large concentrations of supplies in depots or warehouses will be at least as vulnerable in 2040 as they are today. To be sure, missile defenses will improve. But so will the missiles they have to counter, in terms of their speed and ability to maneuver warheads, along with the use of multispectral sensors or seekers.
Satellites in space are likely to remain highly vulnerable to nuclear attack. That is especially ... By Michael E. O'Hanlon
To illustrate how artificial intelligence (AI) could affect the future battlefield, consider the following scenario based on a future book I am writing entitled The Senkaku Paradox: Risking Great Power War over Limited Stakes.