The South African
Military History SocietyDie Suid-Afrikaanse Krygshistoriese Vereniging

Military History Journal Vol 8 No 4 - December 1990

HISTORIC AIR COMBAT OVER GREAT BRITAIN

edited by Flt Lt Peter R Fox, RAFVR

The indecent haste with which the reunification of
Germany is being bulldozed into history has stirred
memories and misgivings alike among Allied ex-service
people generally, and survivors of the 1940/41 attack on
Britain by the Luftwaffe in particular.

Though a half-century has passed, one still grieves for
the 146 777 civilians who died in the Nazi blitz and
1 503 of 'the few' who were killed in air combat overhead
or on the English airfields below by enemy action.

In August 1940, Britain was bracing itself for a
German invasion. The Nazi hordes and the welcoming
Fifth Column had subdued France in a campaign lasting
five weeks. In the 'miracle' of Dunkirk 224 585
British and 112 546 French and Allied troops had been
rescued from the Continental beaches, but they had
abandoned almost all their heavy equipment. It was left
to Churchill to remind the House of Commons that
'wars are not won by evacuations'.

The fall of France had brought the seemingly
invincible German army to the Channel coast. While the
Huns observed the white cliffs of Dover through the
warm summer haze, Hitler brooded over his invasion
plans. With the Royal Navy still intact and the
Kriegsmarine unable to challenge it directly, he needed
air superiority over the Channel before he dare launch
Operation Sealion, the invasion of south-eastern England.

Only the organisation and spirit of RAF Fighter
Command stood in the Führer's way, and in a series of
directives he ordered its destruction. Fortunately for
the Free World, he entrusted the task to a criminal
drug-addict called Göring.

Even more fortunate for our side was Hugh
Dowding's wisdom which had created an air defence
mechanism for the United Kingdom that stood up to all
that was thrown against it - including the attacks of
misled subordinates.

Between 1930 and 1936 Dowding served the Air
Council as member for Supply and Research; here he
was a vigorous advocate of the development of fast new
monoplane fighters and of radar, two of the keys to
victory in 1940. Becoming Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief
Fighter Command inJuly 1936 he initiated experiments
which led to a third key - radio telephony to
control his fighters from the ground.

By the outbreak of war, Dowding had expanded
Fighter Command from a single group in south-east
England to an integrated defence system covering the
entire United Kingdom. It featured not only modern
eight-gun fighters but also anti-aircraft guns,
search-lights, balloons, radar stations and observer posts over
all of which he exercised higher operational control.

Hawker Hurricanes on patrol

In November 1940, on the morrow of his great victory,
Dowding had to yield his place to Sholto Douglas. He
departed justifiably aggrieved at the precipitate and
clumsy manner in which his sacking had been handled;
he had been given twenty-four hours' notice to vacate
his office! He retired from the RAF in 1942 and was
raised to the peerage six months later. On his death in
1970 his ashes were buried in Westminster Abbey.

If Dowding was the strategic victor in the battle of
Britain, Keith Park was certainly the tactical victor. This
New Zealander served as an artilleryman at Gallipoli
and on the Somme before transferring to the RFC. He
ended World War Tin command of a squadron, with the
MC and Bar, DFC and Croix de Guerre. In 1938 he became
Dowding's Senior Air Staff Officer . . . and in
April 1940 he took command of 11 Group, which bore
the brunt of the Luftwaffe's assault.

Close study of the refinements and developments of
Park's handling of his twenty squadrons as the battle
wore on confirm that he was a superb defensive tactician.
But that did not save him from the plotting of
Leigh-Mallory and cronies. Like Dowding, Park was
fired immediately after the battle. After a spell by
Flying Training Command, he became Air Officer
Commanding Egypt in 1942 and then the successful Air
Chief on Malta. After a year as AOC Middle East, he
became Allied Air Commander South East Asia - ironically
taking the post given to Leigh-Mallory.

After his retirement Park returned to New Zealand
where he remained until his death at the age of 82 -
the same tall, energetic and friendly person as ever.

Trafford Leigh-Mallory was chosen to form 12 Group,
covering the Midlands and East Anglia, in 1937. The
Group's main role in 1940 conflict became back-up for
11 Group, at the latter's call. The occasional failure of
12 Group fighters to turn up on time helped foster the
ill-feeling between Park and Leigh-Mallory that led to
Park's downfall.

Taking over 11 Group in December 1940, the ambitious
Leigh-Mallory pursued his obsession with 'Big Wing'
formations in the more suitable activity of offensive
sweeps over the continent. He became AOC-in-C
Fighter Command in November 1942. A year later he
was appointed to command the Allied Expeditionary
Air Force with masses of machines at his disposal to
sweep from the skies a Luftwaffe which was already a
spent force in the west.

After the winding-up of AEAF, he was appointed
AOC-in-C South East Asia. He left Northolt for New
Delhi on 14 November 1944 despite unfavourable
weather reports and the pilot's suggestion that the flight
be postponed. He and his companions, his wife among
them, disappeared from view among mountains in
south-eastern France. Not until June 1945 were their
bodies found.

The AOC of 10 Group, covering the west of England,
was the genial and distinguished South African, Sir
Christopher Quintin Brand. His achievements in the
First World War earned him the DSO, MC and DFC and
he soon added a knighthood for his partnership with
Pierre van Ryneveld in the epic Silver Queen flight of
1920.

During the battle, Brand's eight squadrons were heavily
engaged in defending their own area or reinforcing 11
Group. Park pointedly compared their trouble-free
partnership with the strained relations with Leigh-Mallory.
Brand remained at 10 Group after the battle,
retiring in 1943. He died in Rhodesia during 1968.

Dublin-born Richard Saul commanded 13 Group,
responsible for an area that stretched from 50 miles north
of York to John 0' Groats, with isolated sectors in the
Orkneys and Northern Ireland. He had flown as an observer
in the RFC, winning a DFC. His sporting prowess at rugby,
hockey and tennis was renowned in the inter-war years.
His Group provided essential recuperation space for
battered squadrons from the south. He went on to become
AOC Egypt in 1943 and retired in 1944.

Across the Channel, the fat Reichmarschall Herman
Göring was convinced that in the summer of 1940 his
Luftwaffe would destroy the RAF.

Such grandiloquence was typical of Göring's style.
His publicists conveniently omitted to mention that
Baron Manfred von Richthofen had rebuked him severely
for shooting at an Allied pilot parachuting to earth after
being shot down; that he took part in the abortive 1923
Munich putsch; that he spent time being treated
unsuccessfully for morphine addiction; that he commanded
Hitler's stormtroopers; or that he set up the brutal
Gestapo and the early concentration camps.

Little wonder that he was such a bad commander in
1940; he simply had too many fingers in too many pies.
During the July build-up, for example, he spent at least a
fortnight's leave enjoying the sights of Paris and stealing
priceless works of art. He took 'personal control' of
the Eagle attack in mid-August from his luxury train for
a few days only. He was particularly hated by the RAF,
who never forgave him for his authorization of the
cold-blooded murder of 50 escapees from Stalag Luft III.
The judges at Nuremberg spoke of 'the enormity of his
guilt' and sentenced him to death. But he cheated the
hangman by swallowing a cyanide capsule.

One of the ablest German commanders of World
War II, Albert Kesselring, led Luftflotte 2 in northern
France from early 1940. Throughout the battle he was
continually misled by faulty intelligence and his pilots'
claims, and he eventually concluded that the RAF
could not be beaten. He paid tribute to the gallantry of
the English, and claimed 'an honourable draw'!

In December 1941, 'Smiling Albert' began his
infamous command of the Mediterranean theatre, including
the defensive campaign in Italy. He too was sentenced
to death for war crimes, but this was commuted
to life imprisonment of which he served only 15 years.

Hugo Sperrle, a professional airman of the old school
who commanded Luftflotte 2 in northern France, had
directed the Condor Legion in Spain. Initially controlling
about 1 200 aircraft for the cross-Channel onslaught,
Sperrle's frustration mounted as he saw his Stuka
dive-bombers pulled out of the fighting, and most
of his Messserschmitt fighters transferred to Luftflotte 2
to escort the daylight bombers - leaving his own
bombers to operate mainly by night.

At the crisis early in September 1940, when Hitler
pressed for the bombing of London, the old giant
favoured continuing the offensive against the RAF airfields.
To the Germans' cost, his views were disregarded.
He still commanded Luftflotte 3 when D-Day happened
on 6 June 1944; with 310 planes available in Normandy,
he faced more than 12 000 Allied fighters and bombers.
He was put on trial at the end of the war, but acquitted.

Hans-Jürgens Stumpff, in command of Luftflotte 5 in
Scandinavia, was also a veteran of the First World War.
In 1940, his resources were limited to 115 bombers and
45 Bf 110 long-range fighters. Their first day of major
action, 15 August, was such a fiasco that it was also their
last.

In 1944, he was given the unenviable job of commanding
Luftflotte Reich, in charge of the entire air defence
of Germany. He wrought wonders with his fighters and
flak, but there was nothing he or anybody could
do to prevent the ultimate retribution.

The air battle began in earnest on 10 July, and for
three weeks the opposing air forces exchanged opening
blows over Channel shipping, while the RAF set about
updating for survival its hopelessly outmoded air combat
techniques which dated back to the Hendon air displays.

In Fighter Command's formative years it was wrongly
thought that their pilots would meet only enemy bombers
and that the introduction of modern high-speed planes
had rendered dogfighting a thing of the past. Now, the
RAF found itself involved in combat similar to that
fought over the Western Front during the First World
War and pitted against pilots with recent experience of
such fighting in Spain. There they had developed the
classic operational formation of loose pairs and fours
that every air force in the world has since adopted.
Against this flexible and practical system, the RAF's
V-formations of three aircraft, found themselves at a grave
disadvantage.

During the period 1 July to 12 August, Fighter
Command losses amounted to 99 aircraft destroyed and
37 damaged. The Luftwaffe lost 258 destroyed and 99
damaged. British fighter production totalled 699 aircraft
in this period. Some idea of the difficulties facing
intelligence officers trying to submit accurate reports of
the combats can be gained from the fact that Fighter
Command claimed 360 'confirmed' and 236 'unconfirmed'
in the same period, while the Luftwaffe pilots made
claims for 209 British fighters plus 85 bombers
and other types.

By 13 August, when the Luftwaffe finally launched
the much-vaunted, oft-postponed Adlerangriff (Attack of
the Eagles) to gain air superiority over Britain, the
radar-directed fighter defence system was working well
and had survived the first severe enemy attacks on its
stations ... at Dover and Dunkirk, near Canterbury in
Kent and at Pevensey and Rye in Sussex; these were put
out of action for only a few hours. Junkers Ju 88 bombers
put Ventnor radar on the Isle of Wight out of action,
but it was replaced by a mobile station within three days.

The morning of Eagle Day was dull and overcast, and
again Göring postponed the attack until the afternoon.
But the cancellation failed to reach some units, which
took off without fighter cover. When the weather improved
in the afternoon, Luftflotten 2 and 3 mounted
heavy attacks on the Coastal Command airfield at
Detling and on the Bomber Command base at Andover.
Middle Wallop section station was slightly damaged.

Altogether the Germans flew 1 485 sorties that day
(two-thirds of these by fighters) against 727 by Fighter
Command. On this first day of intensified air war the
RAE lost 14 fighters against 20 Luftwaffe bombers and
24 single and twin-engined fighters.

On 15 August, the Luftwaffe suffered its worst losses
in a single day of the battle. Luftflotten 2 and 3 were
briefed to attack airfields and radar stations across
southern England and to engage as many British fighters
as possible. Up in the north-east Luftflotte 5 was
committed for the first time - as a result of faulty
intelligence.

Shortly after midday, the airfields at Lympne, Hawkinge,
Biggin Hill and Manston were hit, but timely interception
by 54 and 501 Squadrons prevented serious damage.
Interrupted supply to radar installations at Dover, Rye
and Foreness was restored by evening.

Off Newcastle at around 14:00, 72 He 111 bombers
and 21 escorting Bf 110 fighters were attacked from all
directions by Spitfires and Hurricanes of 72, 79, 605 and
41 Squadrons; soon afterwards Ju 88s from Aalborg
crossed the coast near Flamborough Head and were
smartly dealt with by 616 and 73 Squadrons. The invaders
lost 21 aircraft and crews, the defenders nil.
Luftflotte 5 had been so severely mauled that it did not
fly again in the battle.

Shortly after 15:00, radar stations started to report
wave after wave of bandits approaching the southern
cost along almost its entire length. Adolf Galland
scored three kills in the course of the afternoon.
Low-level raids on Martlesham Heath and Manston caused
extensive damage as did attacks by Do 17s, heavily
screened by Bf 109s, on Eastchurch and Rochester;
more than 300 bombs were dropped here, some of which
hit the Shorts aircraft factory and set back production
of the four-engined Stirling heavy bomber three months.

Targets for mass attacks during the late afternoon
and evening included Middle Wallop, Worthy Down
naval air station, Odiham bomber station, Portland
naval base, Croydon (mistaken for Kenley) and West
Mailing, a new airfield under construction.

The Germans had wasted hundreds of sorties on
relatively unimportant airfields and their timing was bad;
their lack of co-ordination had allowed the British fighters
to refuel and rearm throughout the day. 'Black Thursday'
cost the Luftwaffe 69 aircraft and 7190 aircrew, while
Fighter Command lost 34 planes and only 13 pilots.

Luftwaffe losses on the 18th were almost as bad - 65
aircraft downed against RAF losses of 36. That Sunday
was also the moment of truth for the Ju 87 dive
bombers. In attacks on the airfields at Gosport, Thorney
Island and Ford, and the radar station at Poling, many
Ju 87s were caught by British fighters when they were at
their most vulnerable, pulling up after a dive. Thirty
Stukas were written off that day.

Poor weather between 19 and 23 August provided
some respite for Fighter Command. In the ten days
since Eagle Day, the RAF had sustained 150 aircraft
destroyed and 51 damaged. Luftwaffe losses for the same
period were 266 destroyed and 70 damaged.

The German assault was resumed on Saturday 24
August and during the next two weeks there were to be
only two days of relative respite. The south-eastern
airfields and radar stations were again the prime targets.

The first few days of this critical fortnight saw the
demise of the Defiant turret fighters of 264 Squadron.
On the 24th, two trios of Ju 88s were claimed, but any
elation was offset by the loss of eight Defiants; those
killed included their commanding officer Philip Hunter.
On the 26th 264 claimed six Dorniers but three more
Defiants fell to the escorting Messerschmitts. And two
days later, four were destroyed and five more damaged,
two of them severely. The turret fighter had proved
inadequate despite the courage of its crews, and was
withdrawn from daylight operations. It returned later as a
night fighter and then as an air gunnery trainer.

The night of 25 August saw RAF bombers raiding
Berlin in reprisal for the previous night's bombing of
London. The 81 Hampdens did little significant damage,
but the shockwave they sent through the German High
Command and the ridicule heaped on Göring was soon
to exercise a crucial influence on the course of the
battle.

Meanwhile, the attrition of Fighter Command continued
as the daily onslaught against the airfields of the
Home Counties went on unabated. September opened with the
redoubling of Luftwaffe efforts to force a decision, and
Sunday the first was one of the most ineffective
days for the gallant defenders. For the loss of 15
precious fighters and six more badly damaged, they shot
down just two Germans and damaged eight more. Also
on this day Biggin Hill suffered its fifth big raid in two
days and was reduced to a shambles.

A new offensive against British fighter production
facilities was made by twenty Bf llOs carrying bombs on
Wednesday the 4th. Their target was the Vickers factory
at Weybridge; a number of damaging hits caused over
700 casualties, including 85 deaths. Eight of the
attacking force were shot down. More heavy fighting on the
6th cost the Luftwaffe 33 destroyed; several of the losses
were actually to the anti-aircraft guns.

Exhaustion had now set in among 11 Group's squadrons.
Many of its best units were worn out and their replacements
were quite inexperienced and consequently
vulnerable. Several of the all-important sector stations
lay in ruins, while the forward airfields in eastern Kent
could no longer be used other than as refuelling bases.
Major elements of the radar chain had also suffered
serious damage.

Between 24 August and 6 September Fighter Command
losses had reached 275 aircraft, from which just
over one-third of the pilots had escaped unscathed.
German losses during this period were 286 destroyed
and 80 damaged. Losses of experienced RAF pilots had
increased, including several of the decorated aces and a
dangerously high proportion of formation leaders. Five
squadron leaders had been killed and eight wounded,
while losses among flight commanders had reached
eight killed and nine wounded.

Luftwaffe pilots and crews were equally tired and
worn. Although their fighting spirit also remained, they
were disillusioned. Their leaders had promised them
swift conquest, yet it had not been forthcoming; day
after day they had been attacked by 'those last fifty
Spitfires'. Instead of recognizing his own defects Göring
continued to revile his fighter units. However courageous
the pilots, they were nagged by the ever-present anxiety
that aircraft endurance allowed only ten minutes'
fighting time over England and that the Channel
waited to swallow them up if empty fuel tanks forced
them down. They had grown to hate the Channel and
had many abusive names for it, including 'The Sewer'.
Under-achievement and Göring's incessant recriminations
had sapped their morale. Combat fatigue in the
Luftwaffe was known as kanalkrankeit (Channel sickness);
principal symptoms included stomach cramps and vomiting,
loss of appetite and acute irritability.

There was an unexpected lull on the morning of
Saturday 7 September and it was not until 15:45 that
radar began to show a massive build-up across the
Channel. Nearly 350 bombers and more than 600 fighters
formed up in layers before crossing the coast in two
waves. The first came up the Thames Estuary, dropped
its bombs and fled for the Channel. The second wave,
an hour later, passed over central London and then
turned towards the East End. Every effort was made to
break up the formations, the RAF ultimately committing
a total of 21 squadrons from 10, 11 and 12 Groups.
But the Hurricanes and Spitfires could not get through
the Messerschmitt escort.

As the Luftwaffe retreated, it left enormous fires
burning along the Thames waterfront. Impossible to control,
these acted as beacons for the night raiders to come.
Of the 41 German raiders destroyed, 26 were Bf 109s
and llOs. Fighter Command lost 28 aircraft and 19
pilots killed.

Twilight came, and Londoners in the West End and
nearby suburbs noticed a strange phenomenon - the
sun appeared to be setting in the east. For several miles
below Tower Bridge the Thames flowed red between walls
of flame engulfing the great warehouses and factories
on both banks. The worst fire of all was at Surrey
Commercial Docks; a vast area of some 25 acres
containing thousands of standards of timber burst into
flame. Incendiary bombs also ignited the built-up deck
cargoes of many ships in the docks. Faced with this
inferno, the local Fire Chief sent an exasperated message:
'Send all the bloody pumps you've got. The whole bloody
world's on fire!'.

During this first night of heavy bombing 430 people
were killed and another 1 600 seriously injured. For all
the heroism of the Air Raid Precautions workers and the
Auxiliary Fire Service the night had proved an unquestioned
victory for the Germans. The provision of shelters over
most of the East End has proved monstrously
inadequate and the arrangements for dealing with the
homeless even worse.

The period 7-14 September marked a decisive turn
in the course of hostilities. Pressure on the sector stations
and forward airfields eased as the big raids continued to
go for London, day and night, with diversionary attacks
on coastal cities. This gave Dowding the breathing
space he needed. Airfields were put back into some sort
of shape and vital communications were restored. But
the combat casualties mounted, notwithstanding. Fighter
Command losses during the week were 123 destroyed
and 58 damaged, against the Luftwaffe's 146 destroyed
and 61 damaged.

The weather was fine over south-eastern England on
15 September - commemorated annually for fifty years
as Battle of Britain Day. Churchill chose that morning
for one of his periodic visits to the 11 Group operations
room at Uxbridge. As he sat watching the map table,
the WAAF plotters were receiving radar reports that
showed groups forming up by the score and assembling
behind the French coast until the swarm was being
counted in hundreds.

For once Park had time to bring all his squadrons to
standby, with pilots waiting in their cockpits. He also
asked 10 and 12 Groups for maximum support as required.
The vast Luftwaffe armada approached England
stepped up from 15 000 to 26 000 ft [4 500-8 000 m],
making landfall at three main points - between Dover
and Folkstone, near Ramsgate and slightly north of
Dungeness. Just after 11:00 the Spitfires of 72 and 92
Squadrons from Biggin Hill were heading for Canterbury
to intercept the German fighter escort. Behind
them came the Hurricanes of 501, 253 and seven other
squadrons from 11 Group, plus 609 from Middle Wallop
in 10 Group. More units joined in and at last the Big
Wing of five squadrons from 12 Group arrived.

The sheer weight of Fighter Command's onslaught
broke up the German formations, causing bombers to
lose their escorts and jettison their loads before turning
frantically to head for the safety of the French coast.
Those Dorniers that did get through scattered their
bombs over a wide area. One bomb hit Buckingham
Palace.

The fight was over by 12:30 and Londoners sat down
to lunch with the enemy clear of their sky. At Uxbridge,
Churchill had watched anxiously as the squadrons landed,
one by one, to refuel and rearm. When all were
down he asked Park what reserves he had. 'None',
replied the Air Vice-Marshal.

Thanks to poor planning on the part of the
Luftwaffe, 11 Group was allowed a precious hour and a
half to bring its forces back to readiness. The second
and bigger mass attack in the early afternoon developed
in two waves. Park threw 23 squadrons into action, the
12 Group wing waded in again and 10 Group provided
three squadrons. Anti-aircraft guns successfully shook
out the formations of the first wave; then the second
wave flew into a strong fire. Like their colleagues in the
RAF, the gunners gave a good account of themselves.

A one-man operation was conducted by RFC veteran
Stanley Vincent, station commander at Northolt (later
AOC 221 Group in Burma). Flying a Hurricane, he met
a large formation of German fighters and bombers.
'There were no British fighters in sight, so I made a
head-on attack on the first section of bombers, opening
at 600 yds and closing to 200.' He broke up the group
and they retreated.

Portland was bombed later but little damage was
done, and a group of Bf 11Os attacked the Spitfire
factory at Woolston - unsuccessfully, thanks to the AA guns
at Southampton.

Post-war examination of the Luftwaffe Quartermaster
General's returns showed a total of 53 aircraft destroyed
and 22 damaged; a total of 155 German aircrew had
been killed or made POWs and another 23 returned
wounded. RAF losses were 26 aircraft and 13 pilots.

September the fifteenth 1940 confirmed to Hitler
that the RAF was stronger than ever, and that Göring
had failed his Führer. His courageous aircrews could
not control the skies over southern England for the
intended invasion. The entry for 17 September in the
diary of the German Armed Forces High Command reads:
'The enemy air force is still by no means defeated;
on the contrary it shows increasing activity . . . the
Führer, therefore, decides to postpone Sealion
indefinitely.'

The battle was far from over. For many weeks to
come, there was little let-up on the beleaguered Fighter
Command. Strenuous daylight attacks were directed
against centres of aircraft production . . . Supermarine at
Woolston, making Spits, the Bristol works at Filton, the
Westland factory at Yeovil, and at Hatfield where the De
Havilland Mosquito was being built. Hundreds of their
workers were killed or injured, while the nightly attacks on
London and other cities continued to kill or maim civilians.

There was heavy fighting. For instance, on 27 September
the Luftwaffe lost no fewer than 55, its third
highest day-loss in the entire battle. Fighter Command
lost thirty aircraft. And on the 30th, 41 planes were lost
in combat by the Germans - 23 by the RAF. The
Luftwaffe leaders needed no further convincing; mass
bomber raids on Britain in daylight ceased.

Vickers Supermarine Spitfire

Throughout October, while the main bomber forces
pounded away at London by night, the fighter-bombers
kept up a stream of harassing attacks by day to apply
long-term pressure on the British air force, population
and economy. By the end of October it had become
clear to the British that although they were doing none
too well in the night battle (the boffins were still busy
with airborne radar), they had won the strategically vital
daylight battle. Raids continued spasmodically into
November, but the Luftwaffe had run out of ideas. It
had exhausted every tactical means open to it to eliminate
the RAF and it had completely failed in the task.
Göring had become the Great German Blunder.

During the period 16 September to 30 November,
Fighter Command lost a deeply regrettable 278 destroyed
and 110 damaged, while Luftwaffe losses totalled
417 destroyed and 247+ damaged.

Among the many factors contributory to the outcome
of this historic conflict, probably the most important is
the fact that the British were operating a scientific
system of air defence, intelligently devised and built up
with special skill and vigour in the last few years of
peace. The radar, the observer posts, the control of
fighters from the ground, the eight-gun monoplanes
with their incomparable Merlin engines, the balloon
barrages, the anti-aircraft guns and searchlights - these
were the most apparent elements of the most advanced
air defence system in the world at that time.

For behind the practical brilliance of Dowding, Park
& Co lay the technical genius of men like Sydney Camm
and Reginald Mitchell, designers of the Hurricane and
Spitfire, Henry Tizard and Robert Watson-Watt who
gave the RAF its radar. It was proven again and again
that in the defeat of a resolute, skilful and powerful
aggressor, last-minute measures will not suffice. Nor will
that personal heroism displayed so abundantly by those
marvellous young people in the air and on the ground.
That will also always be required; but in air defence
there is no substitute for a system which utilizes to the
full the scientific know-how of a nation. That is a lesson
as valid today as it was in 1940, when the strength and
quality of Britain's air defence prevented the horrors of
a Nazi invasion.

And nothing can diminish the accolade, expressed in
unambiguous terms below the Dowding statue outside
the RAF church in London, St Clement Danes: 'His
wise and prudent judgement and leadership helped to
ensure victory against overwhelming odds and thus
prevented the loss of the Battle of Britain and probably
the whole war.'