Supreme Court Term in Review: It’s a Mixed Bag

The U.S. Supreme Court ended its 2010-2011 term Monday, deciding a slew of technology and civil rights issues, some of which have far-reaching implications for the Freedom of Information Act, intellectual property, warrantless searches of private residences, the “state secrets” privilege and freedom of speech.

The cases we tracked from October involved regulation of videogame sales, the limits of the Copyright Act’s first-sale doctrine and the power of the government to collect sensitive data on employees. Another case asked whether convicted defendants have a right to sue under a civil-rights statute to obtain modern DNA testing in an attempt to prove their innocence.

Costco Wholesale v. Omega, 08-1423

The court answered the question in the negative, but voted 4-4 with Justice Elena Kagan recused. That means there’s no nationwide precedent, but the ruling stands for the case before it.

That case concerned Costco, which was selling the Omega Seamaster watch for about $1,300, well below the $2,000 recommended U.S. price. Omega, of Switzerland, had copyrighted the watch design in the United States by imprinting the company’s emblem on the underside of the timepiece. Omega sued Costco for copyright infringement, because it was obtaining the watches from unauthorized dealers in Europe, which sold them far cheaper than U.S. Omega distributors.

But under the U.S. Copyright Act, the first-sale doctrine generally allows the purchaser of a copyrighted work to resell the work without the copyright holder’s permission. That’s why we have used bookstores, record stores, GameStop and even eBay.

That didn’t stop the Supreme Court from upholding the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, which sided with Omega. The justices, in an unsigned opinion, ruled that the first-sale doctrine did not apply to Omega watches (.pdf) because they were made overseas. That meant Costco can be held liable for copyright infringement for the unauthorized resale of Omega’s watches because Costco purchased them via unauthorized channels.

Skinner v. Switzer, 09-9000

Oral argument Oct. 13
Decided 6-3 March 7

Question presented: Do convicts have a right to to sue under a federal civil rights for post-conviction DNA testing?
Answer: Yes

The case concerned condemned Texas inmate Henry Skinner, who was convicted of the 1995 murder of his girlfriend and her two sons. Skinner claimed breaches of his Fourth Amendment due process right and Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, because he hasn’t been allowed a test of the DNA found at the crime scene.

The Texas state and federal courts — hearing Skinner’s habeas corpus pleas — refused to allow post-conviction testing of biological evidence, including blood, hair, fingernail clippings and vaginal swabs. The lower courts held that, under Texas law, a convict must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she would nothave been prosecuted or convicted had DNA testing been performed. To get DNA testing, a Texas inmate must also demonstrate that his failure to seek such testing at trial was not a strategic decision.

With nowhere else to turn, Skinner sued local prosecutors under a federal civil rights statute, and the Supreme Court halted his execution to determine whether he could gain DNA access via that legal avenue. The states claimed that such legal jockeying was a backdoor attempt to rewrite both state and federal death-penalty law.

At least 22 states told the justices that granting Skinner DNA testing through a civil rights suit would undermine their individual statutes, which spell out when an inmate is entitled to it.

“To allow this type of procedural legerdemain would both diminish the sovereign interests of the states and at the same time impose a significant burden on the states’ limited law enforcement resources,” attorneys general from the 22 states wrote.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for the majority, ruled only that inmates could sue under the civil rights statute to press a claim that they were unconstitutionally denied DNA testing in state court. Whether testing is actually granted is another story.

National Aeronautics and Space Administration v. Nelson, 09-530

Oral argument Oct. 5
Decided 8-0 Jan. 19

Question presented: Must U.S. government contractors undergo the same background checks as federal employees?
Answer: Yes

The justices were weighing a lower-court decision surrounding the concept of so-called “informational privacy.” The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals struck down intrusive background checks on nearly three dozen NASA contractors as being an invasive, unconstitutional “broad inquisition.”

The Supreme Court reversed, with Justice Kagan recused. As solicitor general, she urged the court to rule in favor of the Obama administration, which the court obliged. The high court found there was no breach in the contractors’ privacy rights. The checks were “reasonable, employment-related inquiries that further the government’s interests in managing its internal operations,” Justice Antonin Scalia concluded for the court.

The checks sought information from any and all sources about the contractors’ sex lives, finances and any drug use. The contractors being investigated were not privy to classified information.

The NASA contractors worked at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, California, where it generally engages in the scientific study of the Earth and solar system.

Federal Communications Commission v. AT&T, 09-1279

Oral argument Jan. 19
Decided 8-0 March 1

Question presented: The Freedom of Information Act exempts the government from disclosing law enforcement records if they “constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” Does that personal exemption apply to a corporation, in this case AT&T?Answer: No

The Supreme Court, with Kagan recused, reversed the 3rd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, which was the outcome the Obama administration had urged when Kagan was solicitor general.

The case concerned trade group CompTel’s FOIA request in 2005 for records AT&T forwarded to the FCC’s enforcement bureau concerning AT&T’s admitted overpricing of telecom equipment and services to Connecticut schools under the graft-ridden E-Rate program.

The FCC, against AT&T’s objections, said the records could be released because the company has no “personal privacy.” AT&T appealed to the circuit court, which said corporations were, indeed, “persons” subject to protection from disclosure.

“Corporations, like human beings, face public embarrassment, harassment and stigma,” the appeals court ruled last year. The FCC appealed.

Boeing Company v. United States and General Dynamics v. United States, 09-1298

Oral argument Jan. 18
Decided 9-0 May 23

Question presented: Can the government simultaneously claim a party owes it money and invoke the “state secrets” privilege to prevent a courtroom defense to that claim?Answer: No

The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled it could, a decision the justices reversed.

The dispute concerned the government’s assertion of the state-secrets privilege, a privilege more often used in lawsuits surrounding terrorism and national security cases. The privilege, which has been used repeatedly by the Bush and Obama administrations, often requires the courts to toss a lawsuit once the government makes the assertion that the case would endanger national security. It was first recognized by the Supreme Court in a McCarthy-era lawsuit.

The government wanted them to repay as much as $3 billion for the scuttled A-12 Avenger stealth fighter program. The government demanded the money back after Defense Secretary Dick Cheney claimed in 1991 that the companies were in default on a 1988 contract to build eight of the planes for $4.4 billion.

The justices, without questioning the government’s privilege, ruled it would not be fair for the government to win monetary awards if the government was not required to turn over evidence to the other side.

Kentucky v. King, 09-1272

Oral argument Jan. 12
Decided 8-1 May 16

Question presented: Can police create their own emergency, “exigent circumstance,” to bypass the need for a warrant to enter a private residence?Answer: Yes

The Kentucky Supreme Court had answered “no” in a legal flap to which the nation’s highest court has given little guidance — resulting in conflicting precedents on the topic across the nation.

“The Kentucky Supreme Court held that the exigent circumstances rule does not apply in the case at hand because the police should have foreseen that their conduct would prompt the occupants to attempt to destroy evidence,” Justice Samuel Alito wrote for the majority. “We reject this interpretation of the exigent circumstances rule. The conduct of the police prior to their entry into the apartment was entirely lawful. They did not violate the Fourth Amendment (.pdf) or threaten to do so. In such a situation, the exigent circumstances rule applies.”

The appeal concerned a 2005 crack cocaine sting operation in Lexington, in which an informant purchased the illicit substance from a suspect outside an apartment complex. The suspect then walked through a breezeway of the complex, and officers on foot lost track of him.

The police smelled marijuana outside an apartment, which was not the apartment the suspect had entered. They knocked and yelled ‘police,’ heard some noise inside and kicked down the door to let themselves in on a belief that drug evidence was possibly being destroyed. The suspect they were looking for was not there, but three others were arrested for marijuana and cocaine possession.

One defendant, Hollis King, challenged his arrest, claiming it was based on an illegal entry. He pleaded guilty on the condition of an appeal and was sentenced to 10 years.

In dissent, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg said the police needed a warrant before entering the apartment.

“The court today arms the police with a way routinely to dishonor the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement in drug cases,” Ginsburg wrote. “In lieu of presenting their evidence to a neutral magistrate, police officers may now knock, listen, then break the door down, never mind that they had ample time to obtain a warrant.”

Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, 08-1448

Oral argument Nov. 2
Decided 7-2 June 27

Question presented: May the states ban the sale or rental of violent videogames to minors?
Answer: No

The case the justices decided concerned a 2005 California ban adopted by state lawmakers. The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals of San Francisco in 2008 overturned the law, saying there’s not sufficient evidence that violent videogames harm youngsters under 18, and that the games were protected by the First Amendment.

Hearing California’s appeal, the high court agreed with the lower court, with Justice Antonin Scalia writing the majority.

“Our cases have been clear that the obscenity exception to the First Amendment does not cover whatever a legislature finds shocking, but only depictions of ‘sexual conduct,'” Scalia wrote. He added that the videogame law “abridges the First Amendment rights (.pdf) of young people whose parents (and aunts and uncles) think violent videogames are a harmless pastime.”

Six other states and several local governments had adopted similar bans — which provide for a $1,000 fine for sellers. Every court that has heard a challenge to all these laws has struck them down on First Amendment grounds.