United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services (UN OIOS) 30 Mar 2007 report titled "Audit of Operations in Egypt [AR2006-131-04]" relating to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The report runs to 17 printed pages.

Simple text version follows

UNITED NATIONS
Office of Internal Oversight Services
UNHCR Audit Service
Assignment AR/2006/131/04 30 March 2007
Audit Report R07/R009
AUDIT OF UNHCR OPERATIONS IN EGYPT
Auditors:
Alpha Diallo
Humphrey Kagunda
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UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES
Office of Internal Oversight Services
UNHCR Audit Service
AUDIT OF UNHCR OPERATIONS � EGYPT (AR/2006/131/04)
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In November 2006, OIOS conducted an audit of UNHCR Operations in Egypt. The audit covered
activities with a total expenditure of US$ 5.2 million in 2004 and 2005. A draft of the report was
shared with the Director of the Bureau for MENA and the Representative in January 2007, on
which comments were received by February 2007. The Director and Representative have accepted
most of the recommendations and are in the process of implementing them.
Overall Assessment
� OIOS assessed the UNHCR Operation in Egypt as average, it was adequately run but although
the majority of key controls were being applied, the application of certain important controls
lacked consistency or effectiveness. In order not to compromise the overall system of internal
control, timely corrective action by management is required.
Programme Management
� For the two partners reviewed, reasonable assurance could be obtained that UNHCR funds
were properly accounted for and disbursed in accordance with the Sub-Project Agreements.
� CARITAS made loans to and from UNHCR sub-projects, without adequately disclosing them
and without UNHCR's knowledge and prior agreement. The balance of the loan owed to
CARITAS or to UNHCR was unknown, as it had not been calculated for several years. The
Regional Representation informed that a system would be established with CARITAS so that
transactions to and from the bank account can be properly accounted for.
� A balance of over US$ 140,000 was still available in CARITAS' bank account after the
submission of the final 2005 SPMR that showed an unspent balance of only US$ 268. In
OIOS' view considering that CARITAS had a separate bank account for UNHCR funds, and
by deducting 2006 remittances and disbursements in the account, there should not have been a
difference between the two balances. CARITAS stated that the balance of US$ 140,000
represented various loans made over several years to pre-finance UNHCR activities that had
not been recovered from the UNHCR bank account. OIOS recommended that a review be
conducted to establish whether or not these funds belong to UNHCR or CARITAS. The
Regional Representation will closely monitor the balances in the UNHCR special bank
account.
� OIOS assessed that programme financial monitoring was regularly and satisfactorily carried out,
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with monitoring reports available for all partners.
Use of UNVs
� Despite the fact that the Regional Representation had been handling what has been considered
as "the largest urban refugee population in the world" the office has lacked over the past
several years the necessary (regular) UNHCR protection staff to carry out the work effectively.
As a result, they have had to heavily rely on national UNVs to deliver essential core protection
activities. Most of the national UNVs had no prior work experience, and were hired from
universities to occupy sensitive and responsible positions. For years, the number of national
UNVs represented from 75 to over 85 per cent of the staff in the Protection Section. OIOS
recommended that the Bureau and the Regional Representation re-assess the number of UNVs
used in the operation with the aim of replacing them with regular UNHCR staff.
� The Regional Representation has been experiencing a high turnover rate of its national UNVs
(over 65 per cent in 2005). This has had a negative impact on the day-to-day administration of
the office, with up to 40 per cent of the time spent by the administration section devoted to
UNV staffing issues, not to mention the loss of induction programme costs.
� The Regional Representation stressed that the issue of the use and management of consistently
high numbers of UNVs over several years is an issue larger than UNHCR Cairo. The Regional
Representation informed that over the past years UNHCR Cairo has in all its submissions for
post-creations in the COPs requested the creation of General Service posts to decrease the
over reliance on national UNVs. The number of UNVs has gradually reduced to 20 at the
beginning of 2007, but the workload still exceeds the capacity of regular posts.
Procurement
� UNHCR procurement procedures were generally complied with. There was a need however to
re-assess the competitiveness of the current security company which was selected ten years
back, as well as other services. Action would be taken once the Regional Representation moves
to its new offices.
Security and Safety
� According to the UNDP/Field Safety Officer, the office of the Regional Representation was
not MOSS compliant. OIOS notes however that the proposed new building would be classed as
MOSS compliant once all the recommendations for security enhancements made in the Senior
Field Security Advisor's mission report of July 2006 have been implemented.
Administration
� In the areas of administration and finance, the office of the Regional Representation in Egypt
generally complied with UNHCR's regulations, rules, policies and procedures, and controls
were operating effectively during the period under review. The areas brought to the attention
of the Regional Representation are being addressed.
March 2007
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER Paragraphs
I. INTRODUCTION 1-4
II. AUDIT OBJECTIVES 5
III. AUDIT SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 6-8
IV. AUDIT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Review of implementing partners 9-19
B. Other Programme Issues 20-39
C. Supply Management 40-44
D. Security and Safety 45
E. Administration 46-53
V. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 54
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I. INTRODUCTION
1. From 19 November to 2 December 2006, OIOS conducted an audit of UNHCR
Operations in Egypt. The audit was conducted in accordance with the International Standards
for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing. OIOS reviewed the activities of the
UNHCR Regional Representation in Egypt and two of its implementing partners.
2. OIOS' previous audit of UNHCR in Egypt was conducted in February 2001. That
review focused on the 1999 and 2000 programme activities covering expenditure of US$ 4.4
million. The main audit issues raised were the need to review the policy on urban refugees for
the continual payment of financial assistance and assistance to vulnerable irregular movers, to
re-design the then programme strategy, and to shift the responsibility for Refugee Status
Determination (RSD) to the Government of Egypt. Reception, Registration and Refugee
Status Determination activities are still performed today by UNHCR due to the unwillingness
of the government to take over these responsibilities. UNHCR has still not finalized its Urban
Refugee policy. OIOS continues to monitor the status of this policy.
3. In Egypt, UNHCR provides protection and basic humanitarian assistance to the largest
urban refugee population in the Middle East: some 20,000 refugees, originating mainly from
Sudan (78 per cent) and Somalia (17 per cent). Over the past decades, difficulties continued
to persist in the Government of Egypt's willingness and ability to put in place the necessary
arrangements for the reception and registration of refugee applicants and the determination of
their refugee status. UNHCR has therefore been providing the necessary protection to
refugees under its mandate by carrying out registration and RSD, and coordinating with the
relevant authorities.
4. The findings and recommendations contained in this report have been discussed with
the officials responsible for the audited activities during the exit conference held on
3 December 2006. A draft of the report was shared with the Director of the Bureau for
MENA and the Representative in January 2007, on which comments were received by
February 2007. The Director and Representative have accepted most of the recommendations
and are in the process of implementing them.
II. AUDIT OBJECTIVES
5. The main objectives of the audit were to evaluate the adequacy and effectiveness of
controls to ensure:
� Reliability and integrity of financial and operational information
� Effectiveness and efficiency of operations
� Safeguarding of assets
� Compliance with regulations and rules, Letters of Instruction and Sub-Project
Agreements
III. AUDIT SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
6. The audit focused on the 2004 and 2005 programme activities under projects
04&05/AB/ARE/LS/401 with expenditure of US$ 4.2 million. Our review concentrated on
the activities implemented by CARITAS � expenditure of US$ 2.9 million and Catholic
Relief Services (CRS) � expenditure of US$ 0.9 million. OIOS also reviewed activities
directly implemented by UNHCR with expenditure of US$ 0.3 million.
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7. The audit reviewed the administration of the office of the Regional Representation in
Egypt with administrative expenditure totalling US$ 1 million for the years 2004 and 2005,
and assets with acquisition costs totalling US$ 460,000 and current value of US$ 107,000.
The number of staff working for the UNHCR Operation in Egypt was 46. This included staff
on regular posts and United Nations Volunteers. There were 4 vacant posts.
8. The audit activities included a review and assessment of internal control systems,
interviews with staff, analysis of data and a review of the available documents and other
relevant records.
IV. AUDIT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Review of Implementing Partners and Programme Monitoring
9. For the two partners reviewed, reasonable assurance could be obtained that UNHCR
funds were properly accounted for and disbursed in accordance with the Sub-Project
Agreements.
10. Audit certificates for 2004 and 2005 were available for all partners, with unqualified
opinions expressed.
(a) CARITAS
11. CARITAS continued to run two general accounting systems in parallel; one a manual
system, the other automated. This was despite a previous recommendation from their external
auditors that only one system should be used. Both systems generated the same information
for the preparation of UNHCR financial reports, and were operated by the same employee.
While the final SPMRs were satisfactorily reconciled to CARITAS' ledgers, OIOS was of the
view that maintaining two systems was labour-intensive and not cost effective, and draws
unnecessarily on scarce resources that could have been used for other tasks. CARITAS
indicated that it preferred keeping the two systems running in parallel as it helped them
ensure the integrity of financial information, while also adhering to local requirements to
maintain a manual system.
12. CARITAS did not comply with the budgetary provisions. According to the Sub-
Project Agreement, budgetary transfers by CARITAS were authorized at the `item' level,
which meant that such transfers should not change the total amount under the relevant Sector-
Activity level. Under Sector C, however, CARITAS spent LE 105,486 (US$ 18,500) over the
budget. No authorization was sought from UNHCR for this overrun. The Representation
informed that the budgetary overruns were known, and were a result of the emergency that
arose in late 2005. Due to administrative and other reasons the Representation was unable to
revise the budget. The Representation assured OIOS that there would be regular follow-up to
ensure budget amounts are adhered to or the budget is revised in a timely manner.
13. In 2005 (and in previous years) CARITAS borrowed funds from UNHCR projects to
pre-finance its own projects, and/or loaned its funds to UNHCR sub-projects. These loans,
however, were not clearly reflected in the ledgers, and had never been reconciled to the loans
paid out. Hence, it was very difficult (even impossible) to determine the net balance owed to
either party. According to the Assistant Director, CARITAS had thought of doing this in the
past but never had the time to do it, but indicated that a reconciliation would be carried out by
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the end of 2006. Upon our request CARITAS calculated (using their main office' accounting
system) that for 2005 alone, it owed LE 237,161 (US$ 41,600) to UNHCR and UNHCR
owed LE 287,123 (US$ 50,370) to CARITAS. These calculations were not evidenced by
adequate supporting documentation.
14. Similarly, a special UNHCR bank account maintained by CARITAS (and operated on
a joint-signatory basis) showed a net credit balance of LE 806,120 (US$ 141,420) in its bank
statement dated 31 March 2006 (after deducting the 2006 instalments and the relevant 2006
project disbursements). The final 2005 SPMR showed an unspent balance of only LE 1,533
(US$ 268). These two amounts should have been equal since no funds other than UNHCR
instalments were deposited into the account. CARITAS explained that the money represented
various loans made to UNHCR over the past 15 years, which had never been recovered from
the UNHCR bank account. They further indicated that they would draw a cheque for the full
balance on the UNHCR account to reimburse CARITAS.
Recommendations:
The UNHCR Regional Representation in Egypt should request
CARITAS to ensure that all loans made to and from UNHCR
sub-projects are clearly recorded in the accounting system, are
well documented and all refunds are made in a timely manner
to reflect a zero-balance. If such accounting cannot be
implemented, the practice should be discontinued (Rec. 01).
The UNHCR Regional Representation in Egypt should closely
monitor balances in the UNHCR special bank account, and ensure
that funds totalling US$ 140,000 genuinely belong to CARITAS
(Rec. 02).
15. For recommendation 01 above, the Regional Representation informed that it agreed
to the practice as CARITAS has three offices involved in the implementation of UNHCR
projects; assistance programmes in Cairo and Alexandria and CARITAS's headquarters.
CARITAS Egypt advances all expenses during the year and they are refunded at the end of
each year. The Regional Representation stated that a system would be set-up with CARITAS
to ensure loans are clearly recorded and all refunds are made on a timely basis. If such an
accounting system cannot be established, CARITAS will be requested to discontinue the
practice. OIOS takes note of the proposed action, and will keep the recommendation open
pending confirmation that UNHCR funds can be properly tracked and monitored.
16. For recommendation 02 above, the Regional Representation will closely monitor the
balances in the UNHCR special bank account, and will ensure that funds deposited genuinely
belong to UNHCR. OIOS takes note of the action taken and will maintain the
recommendation pending confirmation that these funds totalling US$ 140,000 belong to
CARITAS.
17. Despite the fact that the payments of bi-monthly allowances to refugees were made
through the bank, CARITAS kept petty cash on an imprest basis at a ceiling of LE 100,000
(US$ 17,540). CARITAS explained that the petty cash was to pay vulnerable refugees and
those refugees who were not able to present themselves to the bank. The petty cash balance
carries insurance coverage of up to LE 100,000 (US$ 17,540) in case of theft.
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18. OIOS noted that the cashbook used to record cash movements did not show any
carrying (running) balance following the posting of receipt or disbursement of cash. The cash
on hand was only calculated at month-end, and included cheques on hand (instead of cash
only). Given that the cash disbursements were often recorded in bulk for a given period, it
was not possible to determine whether the petty cash ceiling was complied with. Moreover,
there was no evidence of any cash verification, except for a few unannounced cash counts.
OIOS recommended that the Regional Representation request CARITAS to maintain
adequate cashbooks showing a running/available balance following each cash transaction;
cash verifications should also be periodically conducted, with evidence kept on file. OIOS
was informed that in November 2006, CARITAS changed its cash recording system showing
the cash balance at the end of each day. OIOS takes note of the enhancements made. The
new procedures (as documented) are satisfactory to enable the daily cash balance to be
established. OIOS is of the opinion however that each cash transaction should be separately
recorded in accordance with good accounting practices.
(b) Catholic Relief Services
19. OIOS assessed that the internal controls and financial records at CRS were
satisfactory. The activities were mainly focused on one line item relating to the provision of
education grants to refugee children at primary level and lower secondary level. The SPMRs
were satisfactorily reconciled to CRS' ledgers. The expenditure was adequately supported
and had been appropriately reviewed and authorized prior to payment.
B. Other Programme Issues
20. OIOS assessed that project financial monitoring and implementation were regularly and
satisfactorily carried out, with monitoring reports available for all partners. However, at the
Regional Representation there was a need to address various programme and protection issues.
(a) Use of National United Nations Volunteers (NUNVs)
21. UN Volunteers have served a very useful role at the Regional Representation over the
past several years. It appears though, that contrary to the original spirit for the use of UNVs,
the consistently high numbers hired by the Regional Representation suggest they have been
deployed as substitutes for regular staff on a long-term basis. This is contrary to UNHCR's
Policy on the Use of UNVs where it states that UNVs "should not be deployed as substitutes
for regular staff on a long term-basis."
22. OIOS acknowledges and appreciates that due to the fact that regular posts for staff
have not been established, the Regional Representation does not have many options but to
hire UNVs. Nonetheless, alternatives need to be more seriously considered and in the short-
term there are a number of issues in the areas of recruitment and management of UNVs that
should be addressed.
Experience and contractual arrangements of UNVs
23. The availability of a large pool of experts is supposed to be one of the advantages
linked to the use of UNVs at UNHCR. OIOS noted, however, that the vast majority of the
national UNVs hired for UNHCR in Egypt were university students without any work
experience, thus requiring intensive training prior to taking up their assignment. According to
the UNV Guidance note (Bonn, March 1998), there are two main National UNV categories:
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National UNV specialist, with minimum experience of five years or more, and National UNV
field workers, with two years' minimum relevant working experience. This prerequisite
working experience, which would qualify them as providers of much needed technical
expertise in a given field, had not been adequately taken into consideration when recruiting
UNVs to work with UNHCR in Cairo.
24. OIOS met a UNDP/UNV officer in Cairo, who expressed strong reservations on the
actual use of UNVs by the Regional Representation, and the abnormally significant turnover
rate of UNVs. For example, young inexperienced national UNVs (with no professional
maturity) were tasked to perform key functions, such as visiting persons in prisons and
conducting interviews there during the events of December 2005. UNDP/UNV in Cairo
explained that they were not a human resource office for UNHCR, and the UNV programme
is not designed to address the staffing shortage experienced by the Regional Representation.
UNVs should not be seen as substitute staff, particularly in such high numbers. UNDP/UNV
also stated that they did not have the staffing resources to deal with the administrative
procedures of the high number of UNVs required by UNHCR, as well as the high turnover of
UNVs experienced by the Regional Representation. UNDP/UNV also pointed out that the
UNV programme and the nature of the positions held by UNVs at the Regional
Representation (such as registration) are different from and unusual compared with the
activities normally undertaken by UNVs.
25. OIOS found that since the beginning of 2006, UNHCR had completely taken over the
responsibility for the labour-intensive recruitment process from UNDP (except for advertising
the post and the issuance of contracts). Despite UNHCR absorbing most of the administrative
work, UNHCR continued to pay a 10 per cent overhead cost to UNDP. This was estimated at
about US$ 16,000 in 2006. OIOS noted that the new arrangement and responsibilities by the
Regional Representation had not been formalized in any written official document. Such an
informal arrangement is not in accordance with the terms of the MoU between UNHCR and
UNDP. It clearly states in paragraph 3.6 "in the event that UNHCR carry out the programme
and administrative activities on behalf of UNV/UNDP........... the extent of such activities
must be agreed upon between UNHCR and UNV/UNDP and a reduced level of overhead
charges to UNHCR should become applicable based upon an agreement of the
partners........" The present agreement (if it continues to be the only alternative) needs to be
formalized and a reduced overhead rate agreed. OIOS is not in accord with such an
arrangement whereby the Regional Representation continues to take on board additional
administrative activities. OIOS agrees that the Regional Representation should make the final
decision on the individual UNVs to be hired, but UNDP/UNV's responsibilities should be
extended beyond advertising the vacancies and issuing contracts. It should include identifying
suitable candidates and in setting up interview panels (although a UNHCR staff member
could be on the panel). The Regional Representation's responsibility should be limited to
providing UNDP/UNV with the required number of national UNVs and the relevant Terms of
Reference.
26. OIOS noted that the procedures for the recruitment of UNVs by the Regional
Representation had not been formalized. While a draft "SOP for the recruitment of a UNV"
was recently developed, this had still not been finalized by the time of the audit. Under the
terms of the draft, UNDP/UNV was not required to participate in the interview panel.
According to the Programme/Administrative Officer, from her arrival in June 2006 up to
November 2006, she had conducted four recruitments of UNVs, and only in one instance did
UNDP send someone to attend. This in OIOS' opinion is not correct and a requirement
should be made in the SOP that UNDP are systematically involved.
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Recommendations:
The UNHCR Bureau for North Africa and the Middle East in
conjunction with the Regional Representation in Egypt should
re-assess the number of UNVs used in the operations with the
aim of replacing them with staff on regular UNHCR contracts
(Rec.03).
The UNHCR Regional Representation in Egypt should, in their
2007 Letter of Understanding with UNDP/UNV, clarify the
respective roles and responsibilities of UNDP/UNV and
UNHCR in the recruitment process of national UNVs. The
labour-intensive recruitment process should remain the
responsibility of UNDP and not UNHCR (Rec. 04).
27. The Regional Representation stressed that the issue of the use and management of
consistently high numbers of UNVs over several years is an issue larger than UNHCR Cairo.
Reference was also made to the total number of UNVs engaged in UNHCR and that this had
arisen due to the non-creation of regular posts, and the phase out of project staff. OIOS is
aware of the number of UNVs engaged in UNHCR and the particular constraints certain
operations have had in obtaining the level of regular staff required to implement the activities
effectively.
28. For recommendation 03 above, the Regional Representation informed that over the
past years UNHCR Cairo has in all its submissions for post-creations in the COPs requested
the creation of G-S posts to decrease the over reliance on national UNVs. While the number
of UNVs has gradually reduced from 27 in [2004] to 22 in 2006, and 20 at the beginning of
2007, it remains a fact that the workload exceeds the capacity of regular posts. OIOS takes
note that the number of UNVs has decreased in recent years. OIOS also appreciates that
UNHCR's budgetary constraints can result in Representations seeking alternative staffing
arrangements. Nonetheless, OIOS is still of the opinion that the operation in Egypt is too
reliant on the services of UNVs. OIOS will keep the recommendation open pending
confirmation that the number of UNV, as assessed by the Bureau, has been reduced to a
reasonable and manageable level.
29. For recommendation 04 above, the Regional Representation clarified that they
worked in close collaboration with UNDP/UNV, but had taken extra steps to ensure
transparency, fairness and objectivity in the nomination process. The Representation took
note of OIOS' observation that UNDP/UNV was generally not present during the interview,
but interview reports were shared and the final selection of candidates was done in
consultation with UNV Cairo. The Regional Representation undertook however to include a
clear definition of the respective roles and responsibilities of UNDP/UNV in the recruitment
process in the LOU. The planned date for implementation of this recommendation is April
2007. OIOS takes note of the comments and will keep the recommendation open pending
confirmation that the Letter of Understanding with UNDP/UNV clarifies the respective roles
and responsibilities of UNDP/UNV and UNHCR in the recruitment process.
Breaking of existing UNV Contracts
30. UNVs serving at the Regional Representation were sometimes offered a regular staff
appointment despite the fact that they were still under a UNDP/UNV contract. For example,
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for one person, her last UNV contract ran from 1 January through to 31 December 2004, but
was subsequently hired by the Regional Representation at the G-S level starting on 1 July
2004. Another person whose last contract was from 1 January through to 31 December 2005
was offered a Fixed Term Appointment contract with UNHCR starting on 1 September 2005.
While OIOS appreciated that the selection of those serving UNVs might have been made
because of their in-house experience (and training by the Regional Representation) the
practice did not comply with the MoU between UNHCR and UNDP/UNV. Paragraphs 4.4
and 4.5 states "UNVs shall not normally be appointed to regular UNHCR posts prior to
completion of their contracts with UNV. In circumstances where UNHCR may wish to
consider a serving UNV for appointment to a regular UNHCR post, the parties agree, intra
alia, that there shall be no foreshortening of an effective contract for the purposes of
appointing a UNV as a regular UNHCR staff member, without prior agreement between
UNV and UNHCR". OIOS did not obtain any evidence that such agreement was reached
with UNDP. OIOS recommended that the Regional Representation comply with the terms of
the MoU with UNDP/UNV and refrain as much as possible from foreshortening UNVs
contracts to hire them as regular staff. The Regional Representation justified its position with
regard to the hiring of UNVs as regular staff, and stated that in as much as possible, they try
to avoid to foreshorten national UNV contracts. Also, the recruitment does not take place
without prior consultation with and agreement by UNDP/UNV Cairo.
High turnover rates of national United Nations Volunteers
31. OIOS noted that the Regional Representation had been experiencing a significantly
high turnover rate of UNVs. This had a negative impact on the day-to-day administration of
the office, as well as on key protection activities. For example, the turnover rate (staff leaving
and replaced by new staff) was 64 per cent in 2005 and 32 per cent by October 2006. This
resulted in the waste of training costs and time (two weeks paid orientation programme) and
increased recruitment costs (new interviews, contracts, etc.). According to the Protection
Officer, the high turnover rate (some UNVs leave after only two weeks) has been taking
between 30 and 40 per cent of her time, which has been devoted to dealing with
departure/hiring issues, following up with UNDP, etc. It takes between one to two months to
finalize the hiring of new UNVs. Also, according to the Administrative/Programme Officer
about 10 to 15 per cent of her time has been for such activities, not to mention some 5 per
cent of the Programme Assistant's time for the same purpose. This level of involvement is not
acceptable and could be detrimental to the effectiveness of the operations in Egypt if not
resolved.
32. In their letter dated 22 February 2006, UNDP/UNV informed the Regional
Representation that in 2005 alone, it had contributed over US$ 18,000 in staff time, and that
the high turnover rates experienced by the Regional Representation over the past years had
resulted in a significant increase "in staff time and administrative transactions to support the
operation of UNVs in UNHCR". Consequently, UNDP/UNV requested UNV Bonn to send
an evaluation mission to assess the UNV Programme in UNHCR (Cairo).
33. According to a mission report issued by the joint assessment team in August 2006,
one of the main reasons for the high turnover rate was that UNVs, after their
training/induction programme, become sought after by other operations, including UNHCR's.
Personal reasons, such as securing permanent employment, family issues, furthering studies,
etc., were also considered factors contributing to the high turnover. The team also established
that UNHCR developed an expectation of employment from UNVs when it appointed
national UNVs to regular local positions resulting in the foreshortening of UNV contracts.
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34. With regard to UNVs' expectation to secure permanent employment with UNHCR,
OIOS noted that in at least one instance a UNV had served for eight years (from 1997 to
2005) at the Regional Representation and exercised functions not in line with the purpose of
UNVs, such as Senior Secretary, Telecommunication operator, etc.). These were clerical
and/or purely administrative support functions, and should not have been tasked to UNVs
under the UNV Programme mandate. This situation also contravenes UNHCR's policy that
UNVs should not be deployed as substitutes for regular staff on long-term basis (maximum
incumbency is four years).
Recommendation:
The UNHCR Regional Representation in Egypt should, based
on the conclusions of the joint assessment mission, and in
conjunction with UNDP/UNV and the UNV focal point at
Headquarters, explore new ways/alternatives with a view to
reducing the high turnover rate of UNVs. The Regional
Representation should also, through proper induction briefings
to national UNVs ensure that no false expectations are raised
for future preferential career prospects with UNHCR (Rec. 05).
35. The Regional Representation informed that action has already been initiated to
implement the assessment mission's recommendations aimed at reducing the high turnover
rate. Also as recommended by OIOS, in the framework of the induction training, briefings
will be given to ensure that false expectations are not raised for future preferential career
prospects with UNHCR. OIOS takes note of the action taken and will keep the
recommendation open pending confirmation that the recommendations made by the joint
assessment mission have been fully implemented to the satisfaction of the parties involved.
Key protection functions vested on UNVs
36. OIOS noted that some UNVs had been exercising certain functions (confirmed by
their terms of reference) normally performed exclusively by UNHCR's regular staff. For
example, the RSD Team Leader was an international UNV, and was responsible to "co-
ordinate and supervise the work of Eligibility Assistants carrying out RSD" and to "approve
the recommendations on RSD made by Eligibility Assistants". She explained that only more
complicated issues, if any, were referred to her supervisor (the Senior Protection Officer). In
our view, the responsibility of approving RSD recommendations by a UNV is not in line with
UNHCR's policy that states, "the final signing off for decisions on RSD must be taken by
UNHCR staff members". Moreover, the national UNVs were working under the supervision
of the international UNV, and not directly under the supervision of a UNHCR staff member.
This contravenes the relevant UNHCR's policies on the use of UNVs, which states that
"UNVs, irrespective of their professional competencies and qualifications, or the functions
assigned to them, must work under the direct supervision of UNHCR". We appreciate that
the RSD Team Leader reports in turn to a UNHCR international staff member, however, the
policy requires that UNVs should be directly supervised by regular UNHCR staff (and not by
another UNV). OIOS recommended that the Regional Representation ensure that UNVs work
is performed under the direct supervision of UNHCR regular staff. The Regional
Representation stated that as of 1 January 2007, given the recent creation of a further NOA
protection post, the team-leader of the Refugee Status Determination team is a regular
UNHCR staff member, thereby eliminating a situation in which UNVs are not directly
supervised by a regular UNHCR staff.
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Creation of a UNV pilot project
37. To address the various UNV issues and shortcomings, UNDP/UNV has proposed
together with UNHCR to establish a pilot UNV project: a paralegal programme titled
"Building capacity among young committed graduates on Human Rights and Refugee law in
Egypt", aiming to build the capacity of up to 20 young committed graduates in Egypt. A
roster of UNVs would then be established to serve UNHCR operations in Egypt. The project
would entail the appointment of an international UNV (titled Human Resources Specialist),
whose post would be located at the Regional Representation (though the position would be
financed by UNDP/UNV). The international UNV would be tasked with the recruitment,
management and follow up of UNVs, including the establishment of the roster of UNVs.
38. OIOS was concerned, however, that in substance the project was not much different
from the present UNV arrangement, and that it is merely the result of UNDP/UNV trying to
shift/transfer its administrative responsibilities relating to national UNVs onto the Regional
Representation. One of the objectives of the project is to create a "pool of human resources"
(20 UNVs). In our view, maintaining a pool or a roster of 20 national UNVs does not, in
anyway guarantee that they would be available to serve at UNHCR when need be. It is our
understanding that, in fact, these national UNVs would already be working at the Regional
Representation under the same conditions as at present; hence OIOS did not see how the
creation of this project could address the issue of high turnover, other than having the
advantage of clarity and transparency in the actual use of national UNVs. In OIOS' view this
looks very much like a `project staff' arrangement that was phased-out some few years back.
(b) Refugee status determination (RSD)
39. RSD for Sudanese nationals was suspended in June 2004 following the peace accord
in Sudan. It was initially limited to six months, and then extended a number of times during
which the number of asylum-seekers had drastically increased, with an estimated figure of
13,000 Sudanese to date. The Regional Representation informed that decisions on the
continuation of suspension of automatic RSD for Sudanese nationals have been taken in close
consultation with Headquarters. In our view, given the current staffing level, it would be
extremely difficult (if not impossible) to carry out fully-fledged RSD, except for limited
vulnerable cases. OIOS witnessed some of the daily influx of asylum-seekers (an average of
200 individuals per day according to the Regional Representation). OIOS understands that it
takes four to five months from the distribution of the registration forms to actual registration
of asylum-seekers. In our view, this is too long a delay, given that the delivery of a residence
permit by the Egyptian authorities is dependant upon beneficiaries producing yellow or blue
cards. The Regional Representation explained that this was mainly due to the lack of
adequate reception facilities and security. It is expected that this `waiting period' will be
significantly reduced with the facilities at the proposed new building. The Deputy
Representative further pointed out that most likely, UNHCR would not resume automatic and
general individual RSD for Sudanese asylum-seekers registered with UNHCR in Egypt given
that they possess a particular legal status under the Four Freedom's Agreement signed
between the Arab Republic of Egypt and Sudan in 2004. Asylum-seekers (yellow cards) enjoy
the same protection as blue-card holders (no refoulement), allowing each of the two groups
to have renewable residence permits of six months. Only in cases of Sudanese asylum-seekers
with special needs or protection concerns in Egypt is full RSD conducted.
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C. Supply Management
(a) Procurement
40. OIOS assessed that the Regional Representation's procurement procedures were
generally satisfactory. A Local Committee on Contracts had been established to deal with
cases above US$ 20,000, and a Local Purchase Committee to deal with small purchases from
US$ 1,500 up to US$ 20,000. OIOS would question the cost effectiveness of having a Local
Purchasing Committee, whereby purchases between US$ 1,500 and US$ 20,000 are
submitted and approved.
41. There was a need to re-assess the competitiveness of the current security company that
was selected about 10 years ago. The service contracts for security had not been reviewed for
years (no evidence of review since 1996). This was also the case for cleaning services,
maintenance of photocopy machines, etc. The Regional Representation explained that it was
planning to re-tender most of the services currently provided once it moves to the new office
premises.
42. OIOS noted that procurement procedures by the implementing partner, CARITAS
were not always evidenced. For example, under payment voucher # 1320, CARITAS
procured two computers and a printer for LE 18,900 (US$ 3,315) from a local supplier. There
was no document evidencing the bidding process. CARITAS explained that it had been
"instructed" by their regional office to procure from a specified supplier (Global brands).
CARITAS indicated that in 2004, it had also been instructed by UNHCR to purchase a
photocopying machine from a particular supplier. OIOS appreciates that the Regional
Representation may have determined through its procedures the best suppliers, however,
instructing partners to use specific suppliers blurs the distinction between direct
implementation and implementation by partners. If the Regional Representation was of the
opinion that CARITAS did not have the capacity to carry out a transparent competitive
bidding process, then the items should have been directly procured by the Regional
Representation, and handed over to the partner. For the computers procured, OIOS noted that
CARITAS had paid VAT (10 per cent), which could have been saved had UNHCR made the
procurement directly. OIOS recommended that the Regional Representation in Egypt refrain
from instructing implementing partners to make their procurement from any particular
supplier. The Regional Representation accepted OIOS' recommendation and implemented it
immediately. OIOS appreciates the positive action taken.
(b) Asset management
43. AssetTrak was generally well maintained and up-to-date, though there was a need to
bar-code some items. For example, two of the office' vehicles (a Volvo 940 and a Volvo S60)
and TV and video equipment had not been properly registered. Corrective action for the
motor vehicles was taken by the end of the audit.
44. The Regional Representation informed OIOS that a number of pieces of office
furniture at the current office premises actually belonged to the landlord, and that the office
was unable to determine which ones. This is because not only were no records taken of the
furniture available in the building prior to moving in, but also the lease agreement had made
no reference to any furniture belonging to the landlord, making it even more difficult to
identify on a reliable basis. OIOS understands that UNHCR is using the landlord's records of
his furniture to establish what furniture belongs to UNHCR. A handwritten list is being
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compiled and so far 227 items have been identified as belonging to UNHCR. The items
belonging to the landlord have yet to be documented and cleared with him. OIOS
Recommended that although the new building to which UNHCR will move in
February/March 2006 is leased unfurnished, the Regional Representation should ensure that
assets presently owned by UNHCR are fully accounted for.
D. Security and Safety
45. The Regional Representation was not MOSS compliant. However, it was expected
that the proposed new building to which UNHCR will move in February/March 2007 would
be MOSS compliant once all the recommendations for security enhancements in the Senior
Field Security Advisor's (SFSA) mission report dated 10 July 2006 have been implemented.
The new location has been security-cleared by UNDSS' Security Advisor. In light of events
that led to the refugee demonstrations and shortcomings associated with the existing security
arrangements at the current premises, the Regional Representation should ensure that the
recommendations made by the SFSA are duly implemented at the new premises.
E. Administration
46. In the areas of administration and finance, the Regional Representation generally
complied with UNHCR's regulations, rules, policies and procedures and controls were
operating effectively during the period under review.
(a) Management System Renewal Project (MSRP)
47. The MSRP system was rolled out to the Regional Representation in October 2006.
OIOS was informed that there were a number of problems encountered in moving from FMIS
to the new MSRP system, although many of them were resolved. Nonetheless, the office was
still experiencing a number of recurring problems. This may be due to a misunderstanding by
the staff responsible or limitations of the system. For example, the Finance Assistant
complained about the need to select and print each and every voucher one at a time, when
under FMIS, as many vouchers as needed could be selected and printed in one go. Given the
number of payments vouchers (PVs) that have significantly increased in 2006 (up to 30 PVs
per week for the repatriation only), the process has proved very time-consuming and
inefficient. One another example, while PVs were being processed (on a Sunday, which was
a working day in Egypt), a problem occurred in the system, despite a request of assistance
made to Headquarters, the MSRP emergency unit informed the Regional Representation that
it would need to wait until Monday (working day in Geneva) to sort out the problem. The
Regional Representative explained that Headquarters is planning for 2007 to outpost three
regional MSRP posts in Cairo, and it is expected that most of the current problems
experienced with MSRP will be resolved.
48. The Regional Representation informed OIOS that resources have been stretched with
the implementation of MSRP. For example, for the Voluntary Repatriation project (Sudanese
caseload), the Regional Representation currently processes 30 payment vouchers and cheques
per week (from only 10 PVs per week with FMIS). The Regional Representative indicated
that he currently signs as many as 55 cheques and vouchers each day. OIOS took note of this,
and suggested that such tasks could in part be delegated to another international staff member
with designated authority when necessary. OIOS was also of the opinion that, as far as
payments to refugees are concerned, and given that there are many, it is not practical to issue
a payment voucher and a cheque for each of them. Instead, a single cheque could be issued to
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a professional staff member as an operational advance (recorded in a suspense account) for
onward distribution and accounting for this advance once payments have been effected
(appropriately evidenced on cash payment sheets discharged by the beneficiaries). This has
been the practice in many other UNHCR operations, and if sound internal controls are in
place it should reduce the administrative burden of the office. The Regional Representation
informed that the new arrangement has impacted positively on the workload and efficiency of
the process, and that in fact the endeavours to find an alternative solution had started as
early as in November 2006 in consultations with the Finance Section at Headquarters, and
that confirmation by OIOS that the practice could be implemented was appreciated.
49. For several years, the Regional Representation has been consistently experiencing
problems with its present bank, as evidenced by the significant number of complaint letters
sent to the bank. OIOS had previously raised this issue in its 2001 Audit Report
(AR2001/301/02 refers) and had recommended that the Regional Representation conduct a
bank survey with a view to obtaining better service. OIOS noted that while a survey was
conducted, no report outlining the assessment and recommendations could be found, and that
the same bank has continued to be used.
50. The situation has not improved over the years with, for example, the bank not
complying with proper cut off dates, errors consistently made in the computation of charges
and/or interest, and late issuance of bank statements. In light of these persistent problems,
OIOS could not understand why the same bank was still being used, especially given that the
Regional Representation was informed that the main UN agencies including UNDP, UNICEF
and WHO were all using another bank. In our view, serious steps should be taken to
discontinue the use of the present bank. A market survey should be conducted (including
consultation with other UN agencies) and a change be considered taking into consideration
the plan to move the current office premises from downtown Cairo to the new location (some
40 km away).
Recommendation:
The UNHCR Regional Representation in Egypt should conduct a
market survey and consult with other UN agencies in Cairo with the
aim of improving its bank services, taking into consideration the
move to the new office premises (Rec. 06).
51. The Regional Representation informed that a survey was conducted in January 2007
and another relevant survey to identify the major banks near the new location of UNHCR's
premises. The invitation to bid invitation was sent out to six major and a decision is expected
by April 2007. OIOS is pleased to note the positive action taken and will keep the
recommendation open pending confirmation that a new bank has been selected.
52. There was a "dormant" bank account maintained in local currency at MISR
International Bank, with a current balance of LE 30,000 (US$ 6,000). The account had been
opened in 2002 and was for the receipt of donations from fundraising activities. These funds
relate to donations received in 2003. Since then, there had been no movement recorded on the
bank account, except for debits pertaining to bank commissions, etc. OIOS recommended that
the Regional Representation re-assess the need to maintain its bank account at MISR
International Bank based on activities in the foreseeable future. If no fundraising activities
are planned, the account should be closed, with a decision taken on how the balance of US$
6,000 could be used. The Regional Representation informed that the arrival of the Senior
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Regional Global PUI Officer will result in renewed impetus and efforts in local fund-raising.
This may mean that the bank account will become again operational. Meanwhile the
Regional Representation will seek Headquarters authorization to use the current available
balance of approximately USD 6,000. OIOS takes note of the comments made and is
confident that appropriate action will be taken.
53. The deadlines in 2004 for the submission of monthly accounts were in most cases not
complied with, while in 2005 and 2006 none of the submissions were made by the required
date of the 10th day of the following month. OIOS appreciates that with the introduction of
MSRP, this should no longer be an issue, as monthly accounts are now online. OIOS noted
that bank reconciliations were often prepared after much delay, attributed to the late receipt of
bank statements. For example, the monthly accounts together with the bank reconciliations
for March 2006 were only submitted in early May 2006. In line with the recommendation to
conduct a market survey of identifying a more suitable bank, the Regional Representation
should ensure that one of the criteria to be considered is the obtaining of bank statements on a
timely basis.
V. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
54. I wish to express my appreciation for the assistance and cooperation extended to the
auditors by the staff of UNHCR and its implementing partners in Egypt.
Eleanor Burns, Acting Chief
UNHCR Audit Service
Office of Internal Oversight Services
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