TEXT: RICHARDSON AT 42ND SESSION OF IAEA GENERAL CONFERENCE 9/21

(Cites key elements of nuclear agenda for next 50 years) (3080)
Vienna -- U.S. Energy Secretary Bill Richardson, head of the U.S.
delegation to the 42nd Session of the General Conference of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), said September 21 that is a
time of "great transition" for the IAEA and the world community. "Over
the next five decades, we will be challenged to stay on the path of
nuclear peace and prosperity as we close the world's first nuclear
century."
Richardson called the nuclear nonproliferation regime "an impressive
global achievement. It symbolizes our commitment to protect mankind
from the horror of nuclear war and to reap the peaceful benefits of
nuclear science. This regime has withstood serious shocks, including
those created by Iraq and North Korea. I am confident it will also
survive the blow of the recent nuclear tests in South Asia."
"I join my colleagues at this Conference urging India and Pakistan to
adhere at once to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty," he said. "Let me
also underscore that I will work diligently with President Clinton to
gain United States Senate ratification of this crucial instrument that
will add to our shared arms control and nonproliferation goals."
Richardson read a statement from President Clinton, who said, "The
nuclear tests recently conducted on the Asian sub-continent are
chilling reminders of a chapter of history many of us had hoped was
closed.... The entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,
universally applied, is a global priority. We must also achieve a
global treaty ending the production of fissile material for nuclear
weapons. And we must realize the goal of all IAEA member states
concluding Additional Protocols to their safeguards agreements by the
year 2000. These are all important priorities.
"The Agency's efforts to establish globally accepted nuclear safety
practices and respond to the challenges of illicit nuclear trafficking
underscore the role the IAEA can play to assure a safe and secure
nuclear future. The IAEA's role is indispensable."
Richardson cited six "legacies" from the first 50 years of the nuclear
age and steps being taken to address them:
"One: Nuclear arsenals that are still far too large;
"Two: Vast amounts of fissile material from nuclear weapon reductions
that need to be controlled;
"Three: Nuclear weapon production complexes that must be redirected to
peaceful ends;
"Four: Proliferation concerns in Iraq and North Korea that must be
resolved;
"Five: The challenge of managing the fuel cycle's back end and
assuring the safe use of nuclear power; and
"Six: Tapping the reservoir of peaceful, humanitarian applications of
the atom."
He concluded by pointing out that, "In the coming decades, the Agency
will be called on to do even more -- whether verifying nuclear arms
reductions, combating illicit nuclear trafficking, helping states make
informed choices about nuclear power or applying nuclear techniques to
fight disease and starvation.
"I am confident that the IAEA will meet these new challenges with the
same measure of commitment that it has shown in the past."
Following is the text of Secretary Richardson's speech:
(begin text)
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BILL RICHARDSON
HEAD OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO
THE FORTY SECOND SESSION OF THE GENERAL CONFERENCE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
VIENNA, AUSTRIA
September 21, 1998
I. Introduction
I am very pleased to be here and would like to congratulate Ambassador
Lajous, our Conference President on her election. The entire U.S.
Delegation looks forward to working with you, the distinguished
representatives of the member nations here today, Director General
Mohammed ElBaradei, and the IAEA Secretariat.
I have the honor of delivering a special message from President
Clinton to this General Conference, which I will now read.
II. President Clinton's Message
On behalf of the people of the United States of America, I extend to
you warm greetings and best wishes for a successful meeting. The 1998
General Conference affords us an opportunity to reflect on the
important contributions of the IAEA to international peace and
security. It gives us an opportunity to welcome Dr. Mohammed ElBaradei
to the position of Director General. And it allows us to look ahead to
the next millennium and to the role this organization will play.
The nuclear tests recently conducted on the Asian sub-continent are
chilling reminders of a chapter of history many of us had hoped was
closed. They remind us also of the work that remains to be done. The
entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, universally
applied, is a global priority. We must also achieve a global treaty
ending the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. And we
must realize the goal of all IAEA member states concluding Additional
Protocols to their safeguards agreements by the year 2000. These are
all important priorities.
The Agency's efforts to establish globally accepted nuclear safety
practices and respond to the challenges of illicit nuclear trafficking
underscore the role the IAEA can play to assure a safe and secure
nuclear future. The IAEA's role is indispensable.
This concludes the President's message.
III. The Nuclear Century
As President Clinton suggests, this is a time of great challenge and
opportunity for the IAEA and the world community. This is also a time
of great transition.
We convene here a little more than 50 years from the dawn of the
nuclear age -- an age marked by nuclear peril and promise. Over the
next five decades, we will be challenged to stay on the path of
nuclear peace and prosperity as we close the world's first nuclear
century.
In the past 50 years, we have harnessed nuclear energy's peaceful
potential. And we created norms against the acquisition, transfer and
control over nuclear weapons and the materials needed to produce them.
The nuclear nonproliferation regime that evolved over the years stands
as an impressive global achievement. It symbolizes our commitment to
protect mankind from the horror of nuclear war and to reap the
peaceful benefits of nuclear science. This regime has withstood
serious shocks, including those created by Iraq and North Korea. I am
confident it will also survive the blow of the recent nuclear tests in
South Asia.
We stand with those who condemn the Indian and Pakistani tests as a
threat to global security and stability. We have a unique opportunity
to end nuclear testing for all time. We must not let this opportunity
slip away. To this end, I join my colleagues at this Conference urging
India and Pakistan to adhere at once to the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty.
Let me also underscore that I will work diligently with President
Clinton to gain United States Senate ratification of this crucial
instrument that will add to our shared arms control and
nonproliferation goals.
IV. The Nuclear Agenda for the Next 50 Years
Today, I would like to address key elements of the nuclear agenda for
the next fifty years. Specifically, I will address six legacies from
the first five decades of the nuclear century and steps we are taking
to meet the future challenges they present. The six are:
One: Nuclear arsenals that are still far too large;
Two: Vast amounts of fissile material from nuclear weapon reductions
that need to be controlled;
Three: Nuclear weapon production complexes that must be redirected to
peaceful ends;
Four: Proliferation concerns in Iraq and North Korea that must be
resolved;
Five: The challenge of managing the fuel cycle's back end and assuring
the safe use of nuclear power; and
Six: Tapping the reservoir of peaceful, humanitarian applications of
the atom.
The challenges are large, but I am confident that with vision and
perseverance the international community will stay on the right path.
1. Draw Down Nuclear Stockpiles
While the past 50 years witnessed the massive build-up of nuclear
forces, we have now entered a new phase of drastic and irreversible
reductions.
The United States and Russia have made significant progress under
existing arms control agreements and through unilateral steps. Since
1988, the United States has dismantled more than 12,000 nuclear
warheads and bombs; that is an average of more than 100 weapons per
month over ten years. We have also eliminated more than 900 missile
launchers and heavy bombers, 90 percent of our non-strategic nuclear
stockpile, and the warheads for more than a dozen different types of
nuclear weapon systems.
But more needs to be done. We look forward to discussions with Russia
on still deeper cuts in a START III agreement once START II is
ratified by the Russian Duma.
2. Control Fissile Materials
The second legacy to address is the vast amount of fissile materials
created during the nuclear arms race. Together, the United States and
Russia have identified approximately 100 metric tons of plutonium and
nearly 700 metric tons of highly enriched uranium as excess to defense
needs. We have pledged never to return these materials to military
use.
The United States and Russia have teamed with the International Atomic
Energy Agency under the Trilateral Initiative to design appropriate
verification arrangements for excess materials.
Even as work under the Trilateral Initiative continues, excess
materials in the United States are being internationally monitored.
Earlier this year, the IAEA verified the dilution of approximately
several tons of American highly enriched uranium -- enough material
for more than 500 nuclear bombs -- into a form of fuel not usable in
nuclear weapons.
Of course, all five nuclear weapon states share a commitment to make
excess fissile material available for international inspection as soon
as practicable. In this regard, I welcome the United Kingdom's recent
announcement identifying more than four tons of weapons-usable
material as excess to defense needs. We hope all the nuclear weapon
states will duplicate this important step.
At the Moscow Summit three weeks ago, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin
signed a Statement of Principles for long-term cooperation to dispose
of our excess plutonium with appropriate transparency and
international monitoring. Disposition is an urgent security priority.
It can help pave the way for steeper reductions of nuclear forces. It
can also help ensure that these dangerous materials are not acquired
by terrorists.
As we progressively bring nuclear weapons and material under control,
we must also end the production of new fissile material for weapons.
Last month, the Conference on Disarmament took an essential -- and
long overdue -- step. It established an Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate
a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.
Let me be clear: this treaty is critically important. It will cap
global stockpiles of military nuclear material, extend verification to
production facilities that have never been subject to international
monitoring, and freeze production in regions of concern.
We fully expect the IAEA to verify the Cutoff treaty and welcome the
opportunity to work with this Agency and members of the Conference on
Disarmament to achieve a rapid conclusion to Cutoff negotiations.
As we end fissile material production for weapons, we must also
prevent nuclear materials from falling into the hands of terrorists.
The United States and Russia are working together to secure nuclear
materials in Russia. Just three weeks ago, I joined Russian officials
at the Sheremetyevo airport in Moscow to dedicate the installation of
detection equipment, developed through joint U.S.-Russian cooperation
to protect against nuclear smuggling.
3. Redirect Nuclear Weapon Production Complexes
A third legacy relates to the changing role of nuclear weapon
production complexes in the weapon states. The Department of Energy's
national laboratories are today using their scientific and technical
expertise to address global challenges such as climate change,
pollution prevention, and disease control.
Redirecting national laboratories to more diverse missions is not just
a priority for the United States, but for others as well. The United
States Department of Energy is cooperating with Russia in developing
peaceful employment and economic opportunities for former Russian
weapon scientists.
4. Finish the Nonproliferation Job in Iraq and North Korea
The responsibility for a safe nuclear future rests not solely with the
nuclear weapon states, but with all states. Preventing further nuclear
proliferation is the fourth nuclear legacy to be addressed.
Two cases -- Iraq and North Korea -- merit our special attention.
In Iraq, we seek nothing less than full compliance with the governing
United Nations Security Council resolutions. Although the IAEA has
uncovered most facts of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons program,
crucial questions linger. More work remains to be done before the book
on Iraq's past nuclear weapons activities can be closed.
Nor is the nonproliferation job finished in North Korea. Maintaining a
total freeze on, and achieving full disclosure of, North Korea's past
nuclear activity remains our immediate and overriding goal.
I am pleased to announce that the U.S. Department of Energy will soon
resume canning of the spent fuel from North Korea's closed nuclear
reactor -- fuel that might otherwise be available for weapons. We also
continue to work with our KEDO partners in fulfilling all the terms of
the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework.
The nuclear programs of Iraq and North Korea have demonstrated the
importance of effective safeguards. The new Strengthened Safeguards
Protocol will provide the Agency with stronger tools to verify
compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The United States is proud to have been the first nuclear weapon state
to sign this protocol. I call on all other states represented here
today to join us to reach Director General ElBaradei's goal of having
all member states conclude their Additional Protocols by the year
2000.
5. Manage the Nuclear Fuel-Cycle's Back-End and Assure the Safe Use of
Nuclear Power
The fifth legacy results from growing stocks of separated civilian
plutonium, vast inventories of spent fuel, and the challenge of
assuring nuclear reactor safety. In addition, the absence of
strategies for the disposal of nuclear materials is threatening the
very viability of nuclear power.
Our task for the future is to develop internationally accepted
principles, practices and technologies for the safe, secure and
transparent disposition of civilian nuclear materials.
Existing arrangements -- such as the International Plutonium
Management Guidelines, the Convention on the Safe Management of Spent
Fuel and Radioactive Waste, the Convention on Nuclear Safety, and the
Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material -- point us in
the right direction. But more can be done. Let us start by expanding
the Convention on Physical Protection to create an international,
legally binding obligation to protect nuclear material in domestic
use.
All nuclear states face spent fuel and radioactive waste problems. In
the United States, we are moving forward with geological disposal of
these materials. Today, I announce that the Department of Energy will
convene a conference next year on global efforts to dispose of nuclear
material in geological repositories. We will share the results of our
own experience and progress and welcome the input of others. I invite
all IAEA member states to join us at this conference.
Agreement on strategies for managing the disposal of nuclear materials
is essential for the future of nuclear power. I will soon launch the
Nuclear Energy Research Initiative, which will promote research and
development on advanced nuclear power systems to meet our
nonproliferation, economic and environmental goals.
This initiative will also promote the safe operation of nuclear
reactors. The IAEA continues to play a crucial role in this area. We
welcome the Agency's efforts to assist governments in implementing
strong safety standards. We also applaud the work of the Advisory
Commission on Safety Standards in developing guidelines for nuclear
radiation, transportation and waste safety. Finally, we urge the
Agency to continue its work with Member States in the areas of
operational safety and regulatory infrastructure.
The Agency's leadership in this area is further demonstrated by its
efforts to address nuclear safety risks associated with the Year 2000
computer problem. I am pleased to announce that the United States will
provide a cost-free expert to the IAEA to help assess these risks and
coordinate appropriate responses. I urge all Member States to support
the Year 2000 Resolution that we are sponsoring at this General
Conference.
6. Expand Nuclear Technical Cooperation
The benefits of atomic energy are not limited solely to energy
production, but also include improvements to human health and welfare.
This sixth nuclear legacy is an integral part of atomic energy's
promise.
Forty years ago, the IAEA initiated a program of technical assistance
with a modest $125,000. Today, the Agency spends more than $60 million
to assist developing nations reap the benefits of nuclear science
while meeting internationally-accepted radiation safety standards.
The United States seeks to advance collaboration among nations to help
increase the availability of radioisotopes for medical purposes. By
applying the energy of the atom to the medical sciences, we are able
to reduce the cost and intrusiveness of treatments. Today I am pleased
to announce that the Department of Energy, working with Belgium and
Finland, will supply the IAEA with surplus radioisotopes for the
production of isotope generators. This effort will be part of the
Agency's Coordinated Research Program involving experts from 14
nations working on the treatment of heart disease, cancer and the
relief of bone pain.
But we must also ensure that radiation-producing devices used for
peaceful purposes are handled and disposed of safely. The United
States supports the IAEA's vital work in this area and will lend our
assistance to reduce the risk of exposing children and people
everywhere to dangerous radiation.
The United States remains fully committed to assisting the IAEA to
exploit nuclear energy's peaceful potential. In 1998, we paid our full
share to the IAEA Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund and
contributed millions of additional dollars and cost-free support for
this and other Agency activities. We will continue to support the IAEA
to our fullest ability.
V. Conclusion
The priorities and challenges before us are real and exciting
Throughout its history, the IAEA has worked to ensure that atomic
energy is used safely and peacefully, while administering the
international safeguards system with skill and competence.
In the coming decades, the Agency will be called on to do even more --
whether verifying nuclear arms reductions, combating illicit nuclear
trafficking, helping states make informed choices about nuclear power,
or applying nuclear techniques to fight disease and starvation.
I am confident that the IAEA will meet these new challenges with the
same measure of commitment that it has shown in the past.
The United States looks forward to joining the IAEA and its members in
meeting these new challenges.
(End text)