"I do wonder, looking back now, having the privilege of discussing with Tony [Blair] about all this: ?"

Prescott recalled witnessing "hair-raising" conversations about Iraq between Blair and George Bush. He has a relatively short slot – just one and a half hours – to explain what he heard, understood and believed in the run up to the invasion of Iraq and in its aftermath.

9.36am: Prescott begins by offering his sympathies to families who have lost loved ones in Iraq.

He explains his role in supporting Blair, and gives a long list of duties he undertook, including chairing nine cabinet committees. He says he attended 23 at least 24 war cabinet meetings and chaired several when Blair wasn't around to do so.

9.37am: Prescott explains, as Blair himself did when giving evidence, that the then prime minister watched coverage of the September 11 attacks – and his views about the terrorism threat changed.

9.41am: Lyne tells Prescott that his role as deputy prime minister gave him a lot of influence in cabinet, and asked about the fact that many discussions about Iraq were ad hoc, outside the confines of cabinet meetings and unminuted.

Prescott says there was a difference between large ad hoc meetings and smaller ones. He tells the panel he attended more meetings in the process of leading up to the war then afterwards. He felt he received enough information, through private and public meetings as well as cabinet meetings, to have his say.

He raises the issue of confidentiality in meetings because of fears of leaks. Claire Short, the international development secretary at the time of the war, told the inquiry Blair said he did not want Iraq discussed in cabinet because he did not want the fact that it was being discussed to be leaked.

9.45am: Lyne takes Prescott back to the first half of 2002. Was he part of discussions about whether the Britain should take part in military action then?

Prescott says he was, in various committee meetings that took place. He says he, like Blair, was a strong advocate of the UN resolution route. The stance from Britain at the time was that intervention should be through international consensus and the UN.

9.50am: Lyne cites Blair's admission that there were a lot of ad hoc discussions at which strategy was formed. Most of these were not minuted.

Was Prescott part of the decision making process? Prescott says he was on the sofa all the time – a reference to Blair's "sofa" style of government. He says Blair consulted key ministers, as Margaret Thatcher did before him. He wasn't in every discussion, but he was kept abreast of developments.

Prescott says he was a bit worried that military options were being worked out when there was still a feeling that the route should be through the UN. The Americans were very clear that they wanted support from the UK, he says.

George Bush and Tony Blair meet in Crawford, Texas, in April 2002. Photograph: Susan Walsh/AP

Prior to the April 2002 Crawford meeting between Bush and Blair, there were early stage papers being produced that he didn't necessarily see, but was aware they were being circulated.

His recollection is the same as Gordon Brown's – Brown told the inquiry he was "regularly kept in touch" about what was happening but didn't see the options papers drawn up before Crawford either.

9.54am: On the 45 minute claim, Prescott says he assumed its inclusion meant there must be something in it but that he was a bit "nervous" about the conclusions that this could lead to.

The impression was that there might be a nuclear element to the WMD alleged to be hidden in Iraq, he says.

When giving evidence to the inquiry, Blair said he regretted not correcting the impression given by the 45-claim (such as the "Brits 45 mins from doom" headline suggesting Iraqi missiles could hit British troops in Cyprus).

Prescott said he "took the evidence" and hoped matters would be settled through the UN.

He says Blair asked him to persuade Cook not to resign, which he tried to do. Cook did not believe there were WMD in Iraq. Prescott says he tried to relay the arguments in favour of the route Britain was taking – but Cook turned out to be right.

10.02am: Was Prescott being shown a link between WMD and the threat of terrorism from Iraq?

Lyne raises evidence given earlier this month by former MI5 head Eliza Manningham-Buller, who said the terrorist threat was coming from elsewhere.

Prescott says it was accepted that terrorism was linked to WMD. It was one of the given facts that was accepted, he adds, but says he now wonders whether he should have made that assumption.

10.06am: Prescott says he found it difficult to listen to US colleagues talking about Iraq as "unfinished business". I think he's referring to 2002.

He says he realised the US was set on upon regime change while Britain was committed to the UN route, and told Blair so.

And (not for the first time) Prescott has been asked to slow down a bit – he naturally speaks very quickly indeed!

10.07am: Prescott recalls watching a video link of talks between Bush and Blair.

He says Blair warned him not to be offended by the language, and it wasn't swearing he was talking about. Prescott hints that he was suitably shocked. He doesn't remember when this happened.

10.08am: Prashar asks whether Blair had told Prescott about the level of commitment he had given Bush.

Prescott says Blair did not tell him he had promised that he would stand with him. He says it was up to the PM to decide Britain's relationship with the US.

Prescott seems clear that Blair was intent on the UN route. Bush said he was going to go through the UN. But he says Blair told him the US was quite prepared to "go without us".

Blair went back to the cabinet, and to parliament – so even if he had made a commitment to Bush, the final decision was a political one and that meant the vote in parliament, he says.

10.14am: Prescott is asked about conversations between ministers in Britain and their counterparts in the US.

Talking about his discussions with the then vice president, Dick Cheney, he mutters: "You can't convince him of anything". Cheney certainly wasn't in favour of the UN role, and saw Iraq as unfinished business.

The only man who appeared to have changed his mind was Bush, who agreed to go down the UN route.

10.20am: The inquiry is asking about the link between talks on Iraq and commitments on the Middle East peace process.

Prescott makes clear his belief that Blair was committed to the process. He also suggests that Bush was making the right noises. It faltered, but he doesn't see that as Blair's failure.

He concurs with David Cameron that, ultimately, Britain was the "junior partner" and the US would have invaded Iraq with or without UK backing.

10.28am: Prescott is asked about UN resolution 1441. He says that, under the UN, there was the possibility of regime change – just not achieved in the way the US was intending.

Asked about the push for a second resolution in the early part of 2003, Prescott says it was critical to get an agreement on that – but it became increasingly clear agreement was not going to be reached.

10.30am: Prescott is asked whether what would be done if a second resolution was achieved had been thought through.

He points to the fact that military preparations started some months before the invasion. The cabinet asked whether it would be legal to invade without a second resolution. Lord Goldsmith said yes.

Claire Short told the inquiry that she, Brown and Blair were in a meeting together where they decided to "blame the French" for the failed attempt to get a second resolution.

Prescott says the French weren't supporting it, so it was fair to say it. It wasn't just the French who didn't support it, says Lyne. "You're right," says Prescott, but goes on to add that the French "easily come to mind" when blame needs to be dished out. He cites our geographical closeness, but also historical reasons, for why it felt OK to centre attention on Jacques Chirac.

10.35am: Prescott is asked about Jack Straw telling the inquiry that the UN security council was "close to consensus" and suggesting the failure to reach agreement was just down the French.

Prescott says that it isn't right, but goes on to suggest other countries might have been swayed by the French position.

Also, Straw would have known more about the level of entrenchment on this issue by different nations, he says. He accepts that was Straw's judgement and he can't dispute it.

They've just taken a ten-minute comfort break.

10.37am: Here's a summary of Prescott's evidence so far:

He told the inquiry he was determined to get a UN resolution before the invasion of Iraq. "I was a strong advocate, as was the prime minister, that we must secure a UN resolution" (see 10.08am).

He said it was clear that some in the US administration were determined to invade Iraq come what may. He told the inquiry Blair told him the US was quite prepared to "go without us".

Prescott said he was satisfied that the 2003 invasion of Iraq was legal. He pointed out that parliament had the opportunity to vote on the invasion.

Blair warned Prescott not to be offended by the language during a video link between the then PM and the then US president, George Bush.

Chilcot also asked Prescott to slow down when he was giving evidence, as the panel were having trouble keeping up.

10.50am: Going back to the 45-minute claim, the Press Association has filed more on this.

Prescott said he felt "nervous" about the claim published in the 2002 intelligence dossier that Saddam could launch WMD within 45 minutes. On intelligence reports on Iraq, he said some of it appeared to be "tittle-tattle".

Referring to the JIC reports on Iraq, he said:

So I got the feeling it wasn't very substantial, but it clearly was robust.

When I kept reading them, I kept thinking to myself: 'Is this intelligence?' It's basically what you have heard somewhere and what somebody else has told somebody. Presumably that's how intelligence is brought about.

10.51am: Lyne takes Prescott on to Goldsmith's advice, which changed in run-up to the invasion.

Prescott says he didn't feel the need to see all the documentation. Goldsmith was saying a military intervention was justifiable and legal due to Iraqi breaches of previous UN resolutions.

He says they just wanted a yes or no, and he didn't feel it necessary to see all the advice (which, it later emerged, said a safer course would be a second resolution).

On the "better view" the attorney general came to later that month, Prescott says Lord Boyce, then the chief of defence staff, wanted clarity.

It's clear from what Prescott says that he was happy to trust the judgment of his colleague and his legal expertise.

10.57am: In a pretty passionate defence of Goldsmith, Prescott explains the dilemma his former colleague faced. If a second resolution wasn't achieved, he knew alternative routes would be pursued and he had to clarify the legal position.

It was his interpretation, in light of material breaches, that the invasion was legal, but perhaps he was worried about whether he could win that argument in court.

10.59am: Lyne asks whether it was "politically essential" for Goldsmith to find the right position.

Prescott says US colleagues found it "quite quaint" that Blair intended to take the decision to parliament for a vote.

Is that why Goldsmith was unhappy – because he knew it all rested with him? Prescott says no one was happy, and that Goldsmith was "not a happy bunny" during this time.

It was a very difficult decision – for the prime minister as well. If it's not legal, you'd be pursued for all sorts of war criminal charges. We were very conscious of that.

He had the weight on his shoulders about having to give a legal opinon ... It was not an easy judgment to make.

He reiterates that Goldsmith was trying to argue there was a reasonable case for intervention, based on past breaches. But the reality was that a second resolution would have been better.

11.05am: What is striking about Prescott's evidence is how earnestly he tries to see things from everyone's point of view – to explain the position people found themselves in – and his strong belief that everyone did what they did in good faith.

He accepts there could not have been a political agreement without the legal advice. He does not deny he supported the invasion at the time. The support of Straw, then the foreign secretary, and Goldsmith aside, does Prescott believe his backing for military intervention made a difference to the vote in the House? He says he doesn't believe he had that much influence.

Did he ever think at the time he might not have been able to support it? he says no – he would have backed the prime minister. Otherwise he would have resigned, like Cook.

He reminds the panel New Labour were determined to avoid divisions in the government, and Iraq could have split it if the cabinet had said "no no no".

11.08am: Freedman is trying to get Prescott to draw a picture of the level of anxiety, concern and doubts from around January 2003.

Prescott had said around that time that the "talking outside the side of the mouth" had to stop. He says those kind of comments referred to the off record side swipes that would end up in the press but it was a general point, not specifically about Iraq.

He reiterates the fears over cabinet leaks, notably about Short. He didn't think she would leak details, but says her nature was outspoken. He saw his role in the cabinet as maintaining unity.

11.10am: Was he playing an important role in making sure the parliamentary party supported the government? Yes he was, he says. He says there were difficult debates ... "but we had to argue our case".

He is asked about the New Statesman interview, in which he reflected on why he "went along" with the invasion. He says he believes that each stage in the run-up was right, and then suddenly you were "staring at the next stage". Saddam was not a good man, he says.

Freedman quotes comments from his autobiography (2008) in which he says he "would do the same thing again". He appears to stand by that.

11.17am: Gilbert asks Prescott about the three war cabinet meetings he chaired. He says the discussions were more about the political aspects, such as resources and strategy.

Gilbert asks how ministers kept abreast of developments (deterioration) in Iraq after the war cabinet stopped meeting. Prescott says the discussions moved to postwar issues, so the military aspect was not there any more.

He says people were concerned about the fact that people were dying, and that military action in Iraq was affecting the threat to domestic security. He says he discussed these issues with Blair.

11.21am: Gilbert refers to Prescott's book again. In it, he says that, when things started to go wrong, they had no option but to go with the US.

Prescott stresses again that there is no doubt Britain was America's junior partner. He points out again that Blair had nonetheless managed to persuade Bush to go down the UN resolution route at first.

He says the process was bringing about democracy, meaning it wasn't possible to just pull out of Iraq. The aim was to influence decisions, but the hawkishness in the US was a problem.

Was he satisfied the UK exerted enough influence? He says that, in the aftermath of the invasion, he did not feel it was sufficient, adding: "There was certainly no satisfaction."

11.30am: Prescott says equipment was discussed in meetings – whether it was sufficient or needed to be improved. There were considerable discussions in the cabinet about it, he says.

Brown told the inquiry he had provided sufficient money for equipment. Prescott suggests that the desire from other services for equipment made it difficult for the armed forces to have everything they wanted.

He indicates that changes were made in the way meetings were run. Sometimes papers were not made available, for example.

There was a point at which he told Blair they seemed to be running things like a shadow cabinet. He spoke to Lord Butler, then the cabinet secretary, but it appears Blair did not really listen to his advice. Prescott says he wanted to move away from the "sofa" style of government, which he says at one point was leaning towards the "presidential".

11.32am: Prescott says the nature of international relations tends to turn the prime ministerial into the presidential.

He cites the example of Blair, PM, in video links with Bush, president. "You can't expect Blair to say at that point: 'Hang on a minute, I need to talk to my cabinet'. So in the end the conduct is more presidential in style."

11.35am: Freedman asks whether civil servants could have done more to mitigate the "sofa" government Prescott describes.

Prescott refers to former senior civil servants who have given evidence, and says there is a sense permanent secretaries felt they were "left out of it".

He is brought back to comments he made about the importance of parliamentary approval. The vote had come at the end of a long process – but should it have come later? He says no, citing the questions, reviews and scrutiny within parliament that took place.

And then there was the democratic vote: "What was important in Tony's mind was that they were carrying the majority of Labour party members. Tony was worried about that and those debates and issues were an important part of it. You can't say there wasn't debate and accountability, and it wasn't just that one vote. And the government won the vote (despite a Labour rebellion)."

11.52am: Earlier, Prescott discussed the evidence given to the inquiry by the former MI5 director general Baroness Manningham-Buller, who said she had made clear before the war that there was no terrorist threat from Iraq.

The Press Association has filed his full quote, in which he rejects her claim:

She was on the JIC [joint intelligence committee] that produced the document that was used by the prime minister to say: 'This is a threat' ... She was always on about the threat of terrorism. Along with it came 'Please give me more money'.

It's quite a stark remark: Prescott is essentially accusing Manningham-Buller of talking up the terrorist threat in order to get more money for the MI5 budget.

11.54am: Chilcot asks Prescott whether there is a mechanism he can imagine to help parliament feel it has enough information to make a decision in a "state of knowledge". Prescott insists there has been more democratic accountability on Iraq than any other military intervention.

The former deputy prime minister concludes by saying no one took the decision to go to war lightly and that he has agonised over every military death, both in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Leadership isn't about the vision of hindsight, he points out. In terms of the qualities needed – he lists a few, including humanity and compassion – he appears to suggest Blair had them all. It is a glowing tribute to the man under whom he served for ten years.

Over to Chilcot, who says it's now about a year since the panel began its work. He points to the substantial archive of evidence on the inquiry website.

Integrating the information is going to begin, and gaps may appear, he explains. Additional information might be sought in writing, but witnesses may be recalled. If this takes places it will do so late autumn. He has opened up the possibility of further appearances by (potentially) Blair or Brown in light of all the other evidence given so far.

He hopes the report can be published at the end of the year. Recommendations will be made about how a similar situation should be handled in future.

11.56am: Here's a final summary:

Prescott said he had doubts about the intelligence on Saddam Hussein's weapons programmes before the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Some intelligence appeared to be just "tittle-tattle", he said.

The former attorney general Lord Goldsmith was "not a happy bunny" in the run-up to the invasion. Goldsmith was under pressure to provide clear legal advice on the legality of war, Prescott said.

Prescott told the inquiry he was determined to get a UN resolution before the invasion of Iraq. "I was a strong advocate, as was the prime minister, that we must secure a UN resolution," he said (see 10.08am).

He said it was clear that some in the US administration were determined to invade Iraq come what may. He told the inquiry Blair had told him the US was quite prepared to "go without us".

Blair warned Prescott not to be offended by the language during a video link between the then PM and the then US president, George Bush.

Chilcot concluded the session by saying he hoped the report would be finished by the end of the year. He may request more evidence in writing, but may also recall witnesses in person.