Followers

Thursday, January 21, 2016

El Adde Shows How Not To Fight Al Shabaab

In the wake of the Al Shabaab attack on a base manned by the
Kenyan contingent of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in the south
Somalia town of El Adde, many of our returning soldiers, as well as the many
who died, are being hailed as heroes. On social and mainstream media it has
become de rigueur to declare love for the Kenya Defence Forces, to hail their
bravery and martyrdom. Questioning the details of the incident only invites
appeals to national mourning or accusations of spitting on their sacrifice.

Yet the questions must be asked. If, as seems likely, reports
of tens, perhaps over a hundred killed turn out to be true, it would be the highest
one-day toll both the KDF and AMISOM have suffered in their history. It would
also demonstrate that reports of Al Shabaab’s imminent demise may be greatly exaggerated.
The immediate as well as wider reasons for both the catastrophe and for Al
Shabaab’s ability to inflict such pain must be explored if we wish to prevent
similar disasters in the future.

The facts of what happened at El Adde should give us all
pause for thought. Newly deployed and inexperienced troops came under attack,
their camp was overrun, their commander captured and the soldiers scattered to
the wind in disarray. Many died, others fled to the bush or requested shelter
from local civilians, from where we are now trying to recover them. This is not
how we should be fighting our wars.

Especially worrisome is the fact this attack did not come
out of the blue.

The troops in El Adde had only been there for two weeks,
many coming fresh from their base in Eldoret. Al Shabaab have been known to
attack AMISOM positions immediately after troop rotations, knowing that
AMISOM’s practice of replacing units of experienced soldiers with entirely fresh
soldiers guarantees they would face inexperienced opposition.

Further, despite losing much of the territory it once
controlled across Southern Somalia, the Al Qaeda-affiliated terror group has
shown time and again that it remains capable of mounting devastating attacks
across the country. Of late, the group
has developed an appetite for taking on AMISOM’s Forward Operating Bases.

The El Adde attack was the third such attack in the last
seven months. Over 50 Burundian AMISOM soldiers were reported
to have been killed when the group overran their base at Leego, 62 miles north-west
of Mogadishu. Then four months ago, they sacked the Ugandan contingent’s base
in Janale, again killing at least 19 soldiers, though media quoted
a briefing note sent to diplomats by Western military officials claiming that
around 100 soldiers were "unaccounted for" after the attack.

The tactics Al Shabaab has employed across the last two assaults
are also remarkably similar to those used in the El Adde attack, both coming
immediately after troop rotations and involving use of suicide car bombs and
large swarms of fighters to overwhelm resistance.

Even more damning are the reports
that the El Adde attack was widely anticipated and that locals had left their
homes in advance of it. It is curious that little has been said about the
Somali National Army troops that were co-located with the AMISOM troops. They
appear to have not taken part in the fighting which probably means that they
too had evacuated the area in advance of the attack. The reports indicate that this
information may even have been shared with the Kenyans!

Further, the obviously poor state of relations and distrust
between the Kenyan contingent and local people is another source of concern.
Somalia’s fractious clan divides are a dangerous minefield that would be
peacekeepers must navigate carefully. The KDF’ support for Ahmed Madobe in
Kismayo has inevitably earned Kenya the suspicion, if not hostility, of clans rivalling
the Ogadeni, including the Marehan who dominate El Adde.

All this is most troubling. There is a clear and massive
failure of leadership which left our troops at the mercy of our enemies and
that should not be swept under the carpet of a jingoistic patriotism. Once the
current search and rescue operations are done, we must set up an inquiry, learn
lessons
and hold senior officers to account. We failed
to do this following similar KDF failures at Westgate and at the Garissa
University and are once again paying the price for it in blood.

The above also invites a serious debate about Kenya’s and
AMISOM’s objectives in Somalia and what it will actually take to achieve them.

Kenya’s invasion of Somalia in October 2011 was in response
to a spate of kidnappings for ransom by Somalia-based bandit gangs which
threatened the lucrative tourist industry. Although the goals of Operation
Linda Nchi were not well articulated at the time, at the very least it was
meant to make the country safe for tourism. By that measure, the invasion was a
spectacular failure. In the time since the invasion, attacks by Al Shabaab
(which by the way had denied responsibility for the kidnappings but was
targeted by the KDF anyway) on the Kenyan homeland multiplied exponentially,
almost obliterating the tourism Linda Nchi was meant to save.

Today, little is heard about this. This is because Linda
Nchi was hurriedly would up and the Kenya forces in Somalia rehatted as AMISOM
less than a year later. They thus acquired a different set of objectives.
AMISOM is a peace support mission mandated to help restore the Somalia National
Security Forces, fight Al Shabaab and help extend the writ of the government in
Mogadishu. It does not exist to secure Kenya.

However, it is true that a stable Somalia would be a boon
for security across the region and there is no doubt Kenya would be a major
beneficiary. It is important then, as a contributor to AMISOM, that Kenyans
examine how that effort is doing.

On the surface, there is reason for hope. Since 2011, as
noted above, Al Shabaab has been pushed out of nearly all of Somalia’s major
towns including all the ports it once controlled. But while the terror group
has been degraded, the authority of the Federal Government does not extend much
outside the towns and Al Shabaab is still able to operate freely in much of
rural south Somalia. Further, as the El Adde attack demonstrates, the Somali
forces are far from ready to take on Al Shabaab.

This has critical implications for AMISOM. Its exit strategy
is predicated not just on sufficiently degrading Al Shabaab, but also on
training up effective Somali troops. The latter’s continued weakness is a
double blow to AMISOM. Firstly, it delays the date of an eventual AMISOM exit. Secondly,
one of the reasons for the UN Security Council authorising relatively low troop
numbers for AMISOM was the expectation that the SNA would fill the gap. The UN
Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) – the second phase of the initial UN
intervention, from March 1993 to March 1995 – had a similar mandate to AMISOM
and had 30,000 troops. AMISOM has just over 22,000 and for much of its time
Somalia has had much less.

The Mission also lacks crucial equipment and support
enablers. Although belatedly authorised by the Security Council in 2012, helicopters
are yet to arrive in the Mission area. Thus despite the successes it has
achieved, there remain serious questions as to whether AMISOM, as currently
constituted, can fully deliver on its mandate.

These and other issues should form the basis of an informed
public debate on the wisdom and objectives of the KDF deployment in Somalia. There is an opportunity today for Kenya to
begin to seriously examine the options it has in Somalia and for the Kenyan
public to finally have an informed say on what course to follow.

53 comments:

Anonymous
said...

I suspect that AMISOM is drifting into Kenya's 'Vietnam' and if the apparent mission drift is not arrested soon we could end up not achieving anything, or even leaving the situation worse than we found it.

What proof is there that the troops who were attacked were inexperienced? How do you know this was their first rotation into Somalia? From a basic understanding of deployments cycles and force rotations in a long war, as well as knowing the size of the Kenyan infantry forces, I would guess that every infantry battalion in the KDF has rotated into Somalia at least once and possibly many more times over the last four years since 'Linda Nchi' commenced. The two Kenyan guys who were ostensibly captured by HSM and interviewed on Radio Andalus were not rookies. If we are to believe what they said, Kamau has served for 7years and Balewa is 50years old hence both have considerable experience. Sorry to tear into your postulate but I think we are just running away from reality. Complacency and bad leadership was the cause of this disaster. Further, my personal view is that this war, as many other asymmetric conflicts around the world over the last two decades have shown is unwinnable. We are wasting precious resources for a very tenuous outcome. Our pride will not allow us to let go, but the cost will be very heavy in the end.

Hello my loved one! I want to say that this post is awesome, nice written and include almost all important information. I would like to peer more posts like this. I’ll right away grab your rss feed as I situs togel terpercaya can’t to find your email subscription hyperlink or e-newsletter service. Do you’ve any? Kindly allow me recognise so that I may subscribe.Thanks.