Friday, 16 December 2016

A U.S. Army M109A6 Paladin howitzer
conducts a fire mission at Qayyarah West Airfield, Iraq, in support of
the Iraqi forces’ push toward Mosul, Oct. 17, 2016.

The future of the self-proclaimed Islamic State (ISIS) is in doubt at
it is in danger of losing the Sunni-dominated twin cities of Mosul in
Iraq and Raqqa in Syria. Despite these developments, the decentralised
threat from ISIS remains present and may expand through the
proliferation of terrorist ideology from the returnees.
By Muhammad Haziq Bin Jani and Jasminder Singh*
On October 16, 2016, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi declared
the beginning of the assault on Mosul, some 28 months after the city was
lost to ISIS, also known as IS. The near-simultaneous attack on Mosul
and Raqqa has placed immense pressure on the ISIS leadership, which is
probably fighting for survival. While the military battles are still
going on, of great significance will be the implications of what the
loss of the two ISIS hubs would mean for the so-called Islamic State and
its fighters, including Southeast Asian jihadists.

As ISIS ‘capitals’ in Iraq and Syria, they are of great propaganda
value. The likely loss of the two cities could relegate ISIS to a
dispersed underground movement a la Al Qaeda, and undermining its claim
to being an ever “remaining and expanding” Islamic State,
notwithstanding the group’s recent gains in Palmyra.

Implications for IS

However, the eventual loss of the two cities will not signal the
death of the group. The ISIS that exists today is a result of morphing
that has taken place since 2004 and its likely defeat in the two cities
could probably lead to a new group emerging with or without al Baghdadi
as Caliph. ISIS began as Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad in 1999, before
becoming Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in 2004, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)
in 2006 (after a short-lived coalition of insurgent groups called the
Mujahideen Shura Council), the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in
2013 and finally the Islamic State (IS) in 2014.

Unlike Al Qaeda, ISIS has been able to control large territories and
run a de facto state for more than two years. Having proclaimed a
Caliphate and sustained it for more than two years, ISIS diehards are
likely to motivate like-minded groups to continue with the struggle,
especially following the humanitarian crisis that is likely to follow
with a Shia-led offensive against the two largely Sunni cities.

An immediate danger of the attacks on the two cities is the
likelihood of revenge raids on the coalition members carrying out the
attacks on ISIS. This has been the case for those who had taken part in
the ‘Sunni Uprising’ against Al-Qaeda in Iraq and its later mutations,
resulting in the various targeted assassinations and lynching conducted
at the homes of the members of the complicit tribes.

Implications for Southeast Asian Jihadists

For Southeast Asia, the eventual fall of the two cities will not mark
the end of ISIS or its threat to the region. A decentralised ISIS could
be no less dangerous as it could open up multiple fronts in many
countries. Unlike Al Qaeda which has no territories or ‘provinces’, ISIS
has an epicentre in the Levant and various ‘provinces’ and enclaves
worldwide including in Southeast Asia. While holding on to Mosul and
Raqqa has been important for ISIS, their loss is unlikely to terminate
its struggle to establish a global Islamic Caliphate.

While Iraq and Syria have been the epicentres of ISIS since June
2014, the loss of two cities could result in new centres of gravity.
They could pose a greater security threat as the West is less likely to
commit forces to counter it especially in Asia and Africa. This would
simply mean the export of ISIS struggle from the Levant to the rest of
the world, especially the Khorasan and Southeast Asia.
ISIS is also likely to launch the next phase of its offensive against
its enemies. It could attack soft and hard targets worldwide,
especially countries belonging to the coalition forces. A weakened and
decentralised ISIS would result in less predictability, and these
countries would need to be ready for such a landscape of insecurity. As
ISIS has already succeeded in spawning radical networks in the region,
the likely loss of Mosul and Raqqa would raise Southeast Asian
insecurity on two fronts.

First, Southeast Asian jihadists returning home from the battlefield,
numbering more than 1,000 to date, could pose a serious threat to
regional security. This could result in attacks in states such as the
Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Myanmar and even Singapore.
Hence, while the ‘war against ISIS’ has largely focussed on Syria and
Iraq, the end of Mosul and Raqqa as ISIS’s strongholds could open new
fronts in the region, thereby endangering regional security.

Low-level Insurgency?

Southeast Asian jihadists operating in Mosul and Raqqa, including
leaders such as Bahrumsyah, the Emir of Katibah Nusantara and Bahrun
Naim from Indonesia and Wanndy from Malaysia, could still order attacks
in Southeast Asia. The attacks could source forces either from the ISIS
Philippines in Mindanao under the leadership of Hapilon, the Maute group
in Butig, or through the returnee foot-soldiers in the region.
Also, the attacks need not be simply by nationals of individual
states but could also be through jihadi networks developed in Syria and
Iraq that could include radicalised Uighurs, Rohingyas and others who
may find expediency in the cause of establishing an Islamic Caliphate.

The threat could be in the form of a low-level insurgency or
dangerous terrorist attacks which these operationally-ready returnees –
who are well-trained, with battlefield experience, and adept in use of
modern weapon systems and military organisation – will be able to carry
out. While the returnees’ ‘lone wolf’ or packs of ‘lone wolves’ attacks
can be expected, there could also be attacks by organised small groups,
as were carried out during the Paris attacks in November 2015, or in the
Puchong (Malaysia) grenade blast in June 2016.

Returnees and Ideological Proliferation

The other major impact of the returnees or ‘escapees’ from Mosul and
Raqqa is the importing of a more radical and strident form of Sunni
Islam to their respective societies. Defeating ISIS is not just a
military battle but also a political, economic and ideological struggle.
How Southeast Asian societies cope with the returnees will be an
equally important challenge, especially in managing the radical ideas
these individuals hold. The revival of the ideological concepts, such as
a “caliphate” or sectarian enmity should not be dismissed.

A failure to deal with this ideological threat could lead to the
returnees’ ability to inspire radicalism at home and breed a new
generation of radicals, as had happened following the return of
jihadists from the Afghanistan battlefield in the 1980s. This would mean
that to deal with dangerous, violence-sanctioning ideas, states would
have to develop effective counter and de-radicalisation programmes.

Rather than be euphoric at the conquest of Mosul and Raqqa, in
Southeast Asia the appropriate response should be extra vigilance and
resilience as the next phase of ISIS threat could wreak havoc to the
peace, stability and inter-religious harmony in the region.

*Jasminder Singh is a Senior Analyst and Muhammad Haziq Jani
a Research Analyst with the International Centre for Political Violence
and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), at the S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University,
Singapore.