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Tuesday, June 02, 2009

Why Classical Arminianism Needs to Become Open Theistic to Use Rebutting Defeaters to Frankfurt Counter Examples

I take it that Classical Arminianism at least affirms the thesis that God has exhaustive foreknowledge, where this means he knows the future actions of libertarian free (indeterministically free) agents.

Frequently, in debates against Calvinists, Classical Arminians claim that Calvinism cannot be true by the conjunction of a biblical premise with an extra-biblical premise. First, the biblical premise. (1) The Bible clearly teaches that men are morally responsible for their actions (all sides agree to this). Now the extra-biblical premise (Stuart Goetz recently told me via email that you cannot prove a libertarian action theory strictly from the Bible and people who think you can are sophomoric). (2) To be morally responsible for your actions requires the ability to do otherwise, otherwise known as, the principle of alternative possibility (PAP). To get a handle on PAPs I will cite some expressions of this intuition given by prominent libertarians.

The below expressions of PAP are taken from, Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibility: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities, (eds. Widerker & Mckenna, Ashgate, 2006):

"PAP: An agent is morally responsible for performing a given action A only if he could have avoided performing it" (Widerker, p.53).

"PAP: An agent S is morally responsible for its being the case that p only if S could have made it not the case that p." (Ginet, 75).

"Frankfirt-style cases (FSCs) were introduced to undermine 'the principle of alternative possibilities' or PAP. They were designed to show that a person could be morally responsible even though the person had no alternative possibilities (APs) or could not have done otherwise." [Kane, p. 91, see fn. 4 for an elaboration. Kane agrees that in *particular* cases FSCs show that an agent was morally responsible even though he could not have done otherwise just in case he had some libertarian free choices in his past that shaped his character.]

"PAP3: A person is (libertarian) free in what he has done (= A) only if there is something he did (= B) which is such that (i) he could have done otherwise than B and (ii) it is (at least in part) in virtue of his doing B that he is (libertarian) free in doing A" (Hunt, p.167). [NOTE: Hunt, though a libertarian nevertheless rejects the PAP constraint on moral responsibility.]

Since PAPs are inconsistent with there being only one future given a past divine decree (determinism), Arminians feel that, based on the intuitive strength PAPs yield, a Calvinism that posits a divine determinism cannot be the case.

Yet, there is a response. Many determinists have claimed that there are equally strong intuitions against PAP brought out by what are called in the literature, Frankfurt Counter Examples. Many libertarian free will theorists have agreed. For example, David Copp, a libertarian, writes, "Frankfurt's argument is troubling and puzzling because it brings intuitively plausible counterexamples against an intuitively plausible principle. It forces us to deal with clashing intuitions" (Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibility: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities, (eds. Widerker & Mckenna, Ashgate, 2006), p.265).

In a nutshell, Frankfurt Counter Examples propose some kind of controller that will ensure that an agent cannot do otherwise than some action A, if he were to physically try to, or even if he were about to think to try to do otherwise than A. As the story goes, though, the agent proceeds to A, and never even wavers, and so the controller does not need to "push the button" that will ensure he A's. So, the agent is morally responsible while being unable to do otherwise than A. There have been thousands of pages written on Frankfurt Counter Examples, this was intended as just an initial sketch. These counterexamples represent a defeater for PAPs, and thus a defeater to the objection to Calvinism based on the conjunction of the above (1) and (2).

Frankfurt examples seem to have escaped unscathed from almost every response to them, and thus it looks like the critique against Calvinism based on PAP has little merit, indeed, it looks false.

Yet, there are Arminians who still think Frankfurt Counter Examples do not falsify PAP. But, it seems that more and more libertarian philosophers have realized the strength of Franfurt Counter Examples. Things have funneled down to an objection libertarians think is pretty strong: the indeterminist world objection.

But if we think about it, we see that these Frankfurt examples give an incompatibilist who believes in free will no reason to abandon PAP. Incompatibilists hold that (libertarian) free will and (causal) determinism are logically incompatible: they cannot both be true. So if free will exists, then determinism is false. And if determinism is false, then indeterminism is true. If indeterminism is true, then free choices are not determined by earlier events and the laws of nature. Jones choice is determined only at the instant at which Jones chooses, and is determined by Jones. How then could Black control Jones' choice? Suppose Black has all the powers of a Laplacean demon: in a deterministic universe he can predict any state from any temporally prior state. These powers won't help him, however, in an indeterministic universe. Before Jones chooses, Black cannot predict what he will choose. He cannot foresee (by observing electrical activity in Jones' brain, say, that Jones will choose A rather than B. Black must wait for Jones to choose before he can know what he chooses. But then it is too late for Black to interfere. Jones will have made a choice, and indeed one that he might not have made. For Black to ensure that Jones will make the choice that Black desires him to make, Black must act prior to the time at which Jones chooses so as to bring it about that Jones chooses as Black desires. But then Jones is not responsible for his choice. Jones cannot be responsible for his choice if Black is part of the cause of the choice. (Emphasis mine)

Or, as Robert Kane puts it,

If free choices are undetermined then a Frankfurt controller could not ensure or control them without actually intervening and making the agent choose what the controller wants. In indeterministic worlds, as Widerker has put it, there will not be a reliable "tell" sign which lets the controller know that the agent will do. In other words, since no one can know what a free agent will do in an indeterministic world, the only way a choice (or action) controller could work is by forcing the choice he wants, which takes away responsibility for the agent (Kane, Introduction to Free Will, Oxford, 2005, p. 87-88), emphasis mine.

So, the indeterminist world objection, OKA, the Kane-Widerker Objection, states that there can be no Frankfurt controller since it is impossible to know the future free actions of indeterministically free agents.

The problem this has for the Classical Arminian should be obvious: it kicks out traditional views of foreknowledge. Another strong intuitions Calvinists have had (well, not just Calvinists, some libertarians too) is that foreknowledge is just as threatening to libertarian free will (though the argument to that conclusions runs slightly different that the determinism argument, mere foreknowledge of an event is not causation of that event). This is why both Calvinists and many non-classical Arminians have claimed that Open Theism (which, among other things, denies God's knowledge of the future actions of libertarian free agents) is the logical outworking of Arminianism. The recent objection to Frankfurt Counter Examples, the Kane-Widerker Objection, has only served to strengthen that intuition. (I should add, though I will not present the arguments, things are not at a stalemate here. Some, like Mele, have claimed that Frankfurt Counter Examples can work against even this objection. Frankfurt Counter Examples have been resilient, if anything, to various rebutting defeaters.)

Thus, it looks like the noose is tightening and Classical Arminianism will eventually be forced, logically, to the Open Theist position. On the other hand, they can drop the PAP objection to Calvinism (libertarian Dave Hunt does not hold to PAP, so that is another viable option). They would just lose a major weapon they have been wielding in the debate between the two systems. Only time will tell which one they will give.

I'm curious. Do you ever see LFW advocates who do not base moral responsibility on LFW?

I ask because I know some. I was just speaking with one--a coworker & friend--who explicitly denies Ginet and Widerker's PAP statements. And I'm curious whether that's rare in your experience. (Particularly, do you ever see it espoused in the literature?)

Have you heard of "source libertarianism"? (Basically that PAP is not necessary to libertarian free will, and PAP is not a necessary condition to moral responsibility, but determinism is still false.) i'm a philosophy student at the University of Oklahoma, and i know that Linda Zagzebski is a source libertarian.

Yes, as I indicated in my post, some libertarians deny the necessity of PAP for freedom and moral responsibility.

To be more specific, the context of dialogue in which my post occurs is against the vast majority Arminian epologists or even popularizers.

However, most indeterminsits would assume that ought-implies-can, and this post would work equally well to that end.

I am aware of source incompatibilism (and yes, Hunt is a "narrow source incompatibilist" like Zagzebski). They can have their say, but many believe it collapses into "wide source incompatibilism" (which hold to PAPs)--recently argued by Timpe in Free Will, Sourcehod, and its Alternatives (2008).

I'm not persuaded that source incompatibilism seriously undermines moral responsibility (which is what the main guns a are aimed at) for various reasons. I think the relevant sort of control can be had by something like Fischer's account of guidance control and reasons responsiveness. I also think there are troubles with babies that die in infancy and then go to heaven thus having a set will to only do good, without any sort of will-setting "crisis" ala Kane (I brought this up to Kane and he indicated he hadn't thought about that issue). I think the mind argument is troublesome for any indeterminism. And, lastly, I have theological reasons against the idea.

At any event, if a libertarian wishes to reject PAP then we can have that discussion, it just seems to be the minority view, especially among Classical Arminians (as even Hunt admits).

Narrow source incompatibilists reject the view that PAPs are necessary for moral responsibility. Wide source incompatibilists agree that sourcehood is the most relevant category for moral responsibility, agents that satisfy the ultimacy requirement also have PAPs.

Jugulum,

There are some that fit within that vein. Of course, 'freedom' is vague in your sentence. Depending on how it is defined, more or less people would think it necessary for responsibility. Let's say the analysis of freedom turned out to demand some indeterminism. I'd still think moral responsibility could be had, so I'd fit in that group. But, my view is that they are of the same coin. If you did action A freely you're morally responsible for A. If you're morally respnsible for A, you did it freely.

I also seem to recall that Gordon Clark's "resolution" to the problem of evil rejected "freedom" as a requirement for moral responsibility. I think he said all that matters is that an agent can be called to an account for his actions. Needless to say, I find that view unhelpful and unpersuasive.

See, that's the unusual thing. You're talking about Calvinist-types who reject the idea that "freedom" (in whatever definition) is required for moral responsibility.

I'm actually talking about non-Calvinist-types, who do believe that LFW is the only true free will, and that LFW is necessary for meaningfully loving & choosing God. (Requiring something like prevenient grace to enable it.) But who don't tie moral responsibility to free will.

I was surprised when my friend said that to me, and I said that it was pretty uncommon, as far as I know. Yet she knows several people who have said precisely the same thing.

That's why I said we'd have to define terms. Robert Kane, in his excellent intro to free will, mentions libertarians who draw a distinction between the two, so the view is out there, though I would say it's in the minority.

[i]The problem this has for the Classical Arminian should be obvious: it kicks out traditional views of foreknowledge. [/i]

How so? Classic Arminianism doesn’t posit that God’s foreknowledge is based on temporally prior states of affairs, nor is it based on observing electrical activity in Jones’ brain.

[i]Suppose Black has all the powers of a Laplacean demon: in a deterministic universe he can predict any state from any temporally prior state. These powers won't help him, however, in an indeterministic universe. Before Jones chooses, Black cannot predict what he will choose. He cannot foresee (by observing electrical activity in Jones' brain, say, that Jones will choose A rather than B. Black must wait for Jones to choose before he can know what he chooses. But then it is too late for Black to interfere. [/i]

Rather, foreknowledge is based in the future state of affairs.

I have three problems with the Frankfort examples is the one you point out above and also, Black ***makes*** Jones choose something (but the will cannot be forced) and finally, the will is part of our immaterial soul, so it couldn’t be measured with equipment.

I'm unclear. The *libertarians* stated, point blank, that "no one can know what a free agent will do in an indeterministic world,".

You're issue is with them. I clearly reasoned from *their assumptions* to my conclusion. Now, of course, you can deny that "no one can know what a free agent will do in an indeterministic world," but then we're not talking about *my post* anymore.

So, go complain to Vallicella and Kane (Vallicella isn't even close to being a physicalist, BTW).

"I have three problems with the Frankfort examples is the one you point out above and also, Black ***makes*** Jones choose something"

Dan, the point is that Black DOESN'T make Jones chose anything. He never has to do anything, Jones goes through with the action.

"and finally, the will is part of our immaterial soul, so it couldn’t be measured with equipment".

Well, (a) I don't see why, given a Christian conception of the deep unity between soul and body (indeed, any dualism worth its salt needs to come to terms with the interaction problem), there could be some *measuring*, i.e., that there wouldn't be some tell signs given the mind/body unity. However, (b) assuming this is all false, *God* doesn't need any equipment. That is, the counterexamples can be adjusted, and quite easily.

In conclusion, you missed the context of my post, and you also seem to not understand Frankfurt examples, and, finally, you make sweeping statements without showing an indication that you're even remotely aware of any counter arguments.

Dan, It's not clear to me that they didn't mean that "no one can know what a free agent will do in an indeterministic world,". Can you show where they really meant that "some people can know what a free agent will do in an indeterministic world"?

"Again, if they ment foreknowing in the sense you did, there statements were absurd as it's logically too late to prevent it"

Huh? It's just a statement of Open Theism that "no one can know what a free agent will do in an indeterministic world." Seems they're just stating a popular truth amongst many libertarians.

"What's on the other side matters, otherwise the Frankfurt examples don't matter".

This is why I cut off dialogue with you. You constantly fail to interact with points or show that you can grasp them.

What's on the otherside never OBTAINS, so there WAS NO force.

To call it a force is to burn a massive straw man. The point is that the controler does NOTHING.

It's your blog, so you can ban me for whatever reason you like (or simply ignore my comments). I understand your frustration, but differences of opinion can be uses for more constructive ends.

Can you show where they really meant that "some people can know what a free agent will do in an indeterministic world"?

No, because I don't think they were positively asserting that some people can know what a FW agent will do. I think they are denying that one can know what they will do, based on past events (perhaps they also mean no human could know what a person will do without divine revelation). I base that on Vallicella's explicit statements, the context of 'the tell', the absence of a discussion on divine foreknowledge and the appropriateness of their statement as a response to a Frankfort example. If you still disagree, OK. Let's look at the issue itself.

Can someone holding to divine foreknowledge argue against the Frankfort example based on a lack of a tell? Yes, divine foreknowledge isn't based on a tell, so an Arminian can deny the existence of a tell without denying foreknowledge.

What if the Frankfort example was modified from a tell to foreknowledge? Then Black could no longer prevent Jones from doing the thing foreknown, because it's logically too late. If it will happen, it will happen.

What's on the otherside never OBTAINS, so there WAS NO force.

If you remove the other side altogether, your left with one sided agent causation (i.e. the idea that an agent not an action is a cause, but the agent can only cause one thing, not two things). This might be a fruitful concept for determinist.

Likewise, if Black kills Jones killed Jones or in some other way stops Jones before he chooses , I would not have the specific problem of a forced choice and would rather focus on just the lack of a tell. But the Frankfort example posits a forced choice, so I disagree, because the will cannot be forced.

The forcing of a choice is a necessary aspect of the Frankfort example. It can't be removed and still make it's point against PAP. If the question is twofold possibilities (PAP), the other side must be possible and within the power of the agent. The Frankfort example makes it sound like a choice on both sides, but it relies on forced choice to do so.

"Frustrate" is vague. I certainly don't mean (or wouldn't want you to give) to give the impression that your "arguments" frustrate, rather, it's your lack of ability to grasp points or show familiarity with the topics you're discussing.

Your latest post is case in point. You don't bother to *show* how your reading is *clear*, you assert it, and then go off to try and make a point based on your prior misunderstandings.

What is "clear" is that Valliecella said he was basing his post of Kane'e indeterminist world objection. it is clear from reading Kane that he's objecting to "prior knowledge". Thus "the controller Black cannot know before Jones actally chooses what Jones is going to do. This is because "Jones would have had alternative possibilities, since Jones' choice of A or B was undetermined, therefore it could have gone either way." This means that "Black must act in advance" of Jones' choice to ensure an outcome, because there's no way to tell "prior" to Jones' choice which way he'll go. Therefore, "Only in a world in which all of our free actions are determined can the controller always be certain in advance how the agent is going to act" (Kane, Introduction to Free Will, pp. 87-88).

That is Vallicella's context. Moreoever, as Kane makes clear, his argument is the same (with "inessential differences") as Widerker's and Ginet's. It is no secret that Ginet beieves foreknowledge incompatibe with libertarian freedom (he's not a copatibilist, like you ;-). Moreover, Widerker discusses this very option and claims that acts done with a exhaustive, infallible foreknower, don't count as free (Widerker, Moral Responsibilities and Alternaive Possibilities, 59).

Thus, the wider dialectical context, in which tradition all the people under review are writting in, sow you to be wrong, and clearly so.

Morover, the "sign" is frequently put into quotes. It doesn't need to be some *physical* "sign," which you seem to depend on for your straw man to go through.

The problem is sometimes put more broadly that "The intervener was supposed to know in advance what Jones would do" (cf. Hasker (Emergent Self) and Bergmann (Frankfurt and Molinism)).

So, this is why Bergmann tries to show how the intervener could have knowledge without being the (sufficient, sole) cause of the action. Why would he bother with knowledge if the point was about knowledge but, rather, some physical tell sign like "blushing."

And this, Dan, is an example of why I'd just rather have you write whatever you want on your own blog. I really don't have the time for this.

As to Frankfurt, there is no force. An agent who does nothing cannot be said to "force." Furthermore, if you were conversant with the literature (which you clearly aren't), you'd note that even what you wrongly dub "forcing" isn't a *necessary* aspect to Frankfurt examples, as even admitted by Frankfurt himself (and others)! Not only do you have Bermann's FC, you have one's like Mele's, which leave some alternaive possibilities open, just not those ones robust enough for responsibility! So, you're wrong six ways from Sunday.