[정치경제] The political impacts on the Korean economic crisis in 1997

소개글

한국경제위기하에서의 정치적 영향을 분석한 대학원 석사 논문입니다.

목차

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER TWO
2.1 OVERVIEW
2.2 HISTORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND GOVERNMENT IVOLVEMENT
2.3 CHAEBOLS AND CRONYISM
2.4 LIBERALIZATION AND THE LURE OF FOREIGN MONEY
2.5 CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY
2.6 MORAL HAZARD
2.7 MODERNIZED VERSION OF BANK RUN
CHAPTER THREE
3.1 POLITICAL CYCLE THEORY
3.2 OPPORTUNISTIC MODLES IN KOREA

CHAPTER FOUR
4.1 THE GAME MODLE
4.2 LNSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF KOREAN CENTRAL BANK AND
APPLICATION

CHAPTER FIVE
EMPIRICAL TEST AND RESULT

CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION

BIBLOGRAPHY

본문내용

CHAPTER I

Introduction

Most Asian countries went through severe economic crises during the second half of 1997. During the same period, equity and currency markets plummeted in most affected countries. As a result, growth rates for emerging Asian economies were small or even negative during 1997 and 1998; some countries, especially South Korea, suffered outright recessions during the same period.
Financial crises usually start with bank failure. Korea’s banking system collapsed because foreign creditors began to question structural flaws that emerged in Korea’s financial system; such flaws were the result of excess debt financing, crony capitalism, and weak regulation of financial intermediaries. Korea was also affected by contagion from the financial crises in the Southeast Asian countries and Japan. These are the generally accepted explanations for the cause of Korea’s economic turmoil during the last two years. Although these explanations are certainly sound, some questions remain to be answered. For instance, Why did the collapse happen in 1997? Structural flaws in the Korean economy were not emerging problems, but rather, chronic ones which had evolved over a long period of time