Germany’s Incoherent Foreign Policy

Germany has a chance to change the narrative about the transatlantic relationship. But it won’t. What was billed as a major speech by foreign minister Sigmar Gabriel on December 5 in Berlin amounted to a confused presentation of the challenges Germany faces.

Gabriel, a Social Democrat, pressed lots of the right buttons. He said his country has to think and act strategically. It has to define its interests. It has to accept the fact that the United States is no longer “a reliable guarantor of Western-influenced multilateralism.” The global order and regional balances of power are shifting, with China, Russia, Turkey, and Iran “on the offensive.”

Yet for all that, the long speech failed to address three fundamental issues. One is the future of Atlanticism. The second is how to deal with Russia. The third, astonishingly absent from mention, is how digitization is affecting the conduct of diplomacy, economies, politics, and democracy.

First, Atlanticism. It is becoming fashionable to refer to a “post-Atlanticist era.” This is correct in one sense. Even before Donald Trump was elected president, the United States was slowly withdrawing from Europe. But the United States is still Europe’s security guarantor. And without the United States, the European Union would not exist. Just imagine Germany without the EU. And whether Europeans want to accept this fact or not, the United States and Europe together represent the liberal values that underpin democracy, the rule of law, and open economies.

However, the current definition of Atlanticism and the West has become too narrow and exclusive. Instead of arguing that Europe, the United States, and Canada are entering the post-Atlanticist era, it would be more useful to argue for a new Atlanticism that would include Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and several countries in South America.

These countries cherish the same values. They have vibrant democracies. There is no reason why they could not forge closer ties to NATO. As it is, their ties to the EU are growing stronger, thanks to trade deals that are immensely important for projecting values about procurement rules, transparency, the norms for market economies, and a plethora of exchanges that boost this wider definition of the West. Values and interests coalesce.

For Gabriel, “a focus on values alone, as we Germans like to underline in our foreign policy, will no longer be enough to enable use to stand our ground in a world characterized by economic, political, and military egoism.” Relate that to Russia and one will quickly understand Germany’s—and especially the Social Democrats’—obsession about not wanting to alienate Moscow.

Gabriel brought up Nord Stream 2, the second pipeline that Russia, German, and other big western European energy companies are building under the Baltic Sea. It will bring gas directly from Russia to Germany. Both the Obama and the Trump administrations opposed Nord Stream.

European energy companies doing business with Russia had initially been targeted for sanctions by the United States. “The sanctions that the U.S. Congress imposed on Russia last summer also affect existing German pipelines that run to Russia. These sanctions pose an existential threat to our own economic interests,” Gabriel said.

Existential threat? What economic interests? If it’s about Gazprom offering Germany cheap gas, knowing that the price is Germany remaining dependent on Russian energy, is that really in Germany’s interests?

Gabriel then went on to argue that there is “no such thing as a German Ostpolitik today.” Nord Stream surely disproves that. Instead, he called for a European Ostpolitik if “our new NATO and EU partners in central and eastern Europe are on board.”

Essentially, Germany’s Social Democrats still hanker after a détente with Russia, as if the Cold War years were comparable to today’s crises.

To achieve this new détente, Gabriel proposed to Russia a lasting ceasefire in eastern Ukraine. Europe would help rebuild Donbas “and also initiate the first steps towards removing sanctions.” It would fall short of fulfilling the Minsk accords, Gabriel argued. But it would be a “major step towards a new policy of détente with Russia.”

It’s as if Russia’s decision to tear up the 1975 Helsinki Final Act (that endorsed the inviolability of borders) when it annexed Crimea and invaded eastern Ukraine in 2014 didn’t matter. If all the other EU countries bought into Gabriel’s plan it would make a mockery of the EU’s democratic principles and values, in addition to undermining the West.

These values and principles are increasingly under threat from the digital revolution that Russia, China, and other authoritarian countries are adept at exploiting. Democracies and their open societies are only beginning to grasp the scope of the disruption on traditional forms of governing and elections and security and defense. That existential threat to the West didn’t occur to Gabriel.

Yet the digital revolution could be a chance for a new Atlanticism, in which members would understand how values and principles need to be upheld as shifting alliances and interests of non-Western players challenge much that the West stands for. It could be a chance to establish guidelines, practices, and new regulatory procedures with giant social media companies. The task would be gargantuan. But Western democracies have to grasp what is at stake as the contest for influence from new players increases. One awaits Germany’s input.

The article makes reference to Gabriel’s (Germany’s FM) speech at the Berlin Foreign Policy Forum.
An objective analysis of this speech contradicts many of the historic references made by Gabriel.
As painful as it is to write it, Europe is not a victim. The war of 1914-1945, originated there. It started as a war between Empires (France was a Republic with a colonial empire), and eventually engulfed the world, with many nations fighting alongside the European empires. The US had a decisive contribution in WWI, stopping a revived German offensive after the collapse of the Eastern front. This is when the US European project begun, with Wilson vision of the League of Nations; Keynes also warned that the seconds act will follow. The US didn’t join, but the global hegemon of that time was the British Empire.
The US interfered positively many times, outside the League of Nations, Kellogg-Briand Pact, signed even by Germany in 1928, which is still in effect.
Gabriel refers to Marshall, but that was version 2.0 of the project.
This might be an omission, but referencing Metternich and Palmerston as artists is easily refutable (support of the Ottoman Empire, 1848).
However, it is not this very personal interpretation of history that is questionable, it is the references made to the present. No mention of India, a rising hyper power; no reference to SCO, even if the G-X world. Obama’s ERI continues apace, getting even more money, INF is under discussion. In spite of these Gabriel still thinks that Europe’s defense is still our main concern.
Dempsey’s analysis misses what should have been done long time ago, if we share so much with Europe: a union based on the four EU commandments. Europe was devastated, and the US was intact, but there was a common foundation, more back then than now, Keynes, not MPS and the astute entertainers behind it.
Dempsey also misses the rise of India and SCO. It is hard to believe that Gazprom would subsidize the natural gas sold to Western Europe (although anything is possible), but China and India could probably absorb it, especially if a pipeline to India will come to life. Actually, anything that can take Germany of her lignite addiction is good for the planet.
It is hard to believe that the global advertisers will ever relinquish profits for the common good, or would make serious efforts to protect personal information (analyzing and selling it makes money); cybersecurity standards, that will never happen, and it could too late anyway.

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Franco DeC

December 30, 20176:35 am

NeoCon values are not European values. Neither is hip-hop /Kardashian culture our European culture.
We have a lot in common with Russia and Russians. Russians are fellow Europeans and Christians or lapsed Christians. We need not fear Russia and we certainly need to utilise it's immense resouces for mutual benefit. What we need to stop is the the invasion of Europe by Muslims and Africans because the EU basically has removed our borders..
The digital revolution did indeed bring problems in its wake. But at least it challenged the monopoly of the American MSM whose controllers seem to think that they have the right to remove democratically-elected presidents both in the United States and overseas
Sigmar Gabriel was spot on about Russia. Sanctions should be removed in Europe. Americans can do what they want so long as they don't threaten European companies.

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