Mr. George Mason. Mr. Chairman, this is a fatal section,
which has created more dangers than any other. The first
clause allows the importation of slaves for twenty years.
Under the royal government, this evil was looked upon as
a great oppression, and many attempts were made to prevent
it; but the interest of the African merchants prevented
its prohibition. No sooner did the revolution take
place, than it was thought of. It was one of the great causes
of our separation from Great Britain. Its exclusion has
been a principal object of this state, and most of the states
in the Union. The augmentation of slaves weakens the
states; and such a trade is diabolical in itself, and disgraceful
to mankind; yet, by this Constitution, it is continued
for twenty years. As much as I value a union of all the
states, I would not admit the Southern States into the
Union unless they agree to the discontinuance of this disgraceful
trade, because it would bring weakness, and not
strength, to the Union. And, though this infamous traffic
be continued, we have no security for the property of that
kind which we have already. There is no clause in this
Constitution to secure it; for they may lay such a tax as
will amount to manumission. And should the government
be amended, still this detestable kind of commerce cannot
be discontinued till after the expiration of twenty years;
for the 5th article, which provides for amendments, expressly
excepts this clause. I have ever looked upon this as
a most disgraceful thing to America. I cannot express my
detestation of it. Yet they have not secured us the property
of the slaves we have already. So that "they have done
what they ought not to have done, and have left undone
what they ought to have done."

Mr. Madison. Mr. Chairman, I should conceive this
clause to be impolitic, if it were one of those things which
could be excluded without encountering greater evils. The
Southern States would not have entered into the Union of
America without the temporary permission of that trade;
and if they were excluded from the Union, the consequences
might be dreadful to them and to us. We are not
in a worse situation than before. That traffic is prohibited
by our laws, and we may continue the prohibition. The
Union in general is not in a worse situation. Under the
Articles of Confederation, it might be continued forever;
but, by this clause, an end may be put to it after twenty
years. There is, therefore, an amelioration of our circumstances.
A tax may be laid in the mean time; but it is limited;
otherwise Congress might lay such a tax as would [Volume 3, Page 293]
amount to a prohibition. From the mode of representation
and taxation, Congress cannot lay such a tax on slaves as
will amount to manumission. Another clause secures us
that property which we now possess. At present, if any
slave elopes to any of those states where slaves are free, he
becomes emancipated by their laws; for the laws of the
states are uncharitable to one another in this respect. But
in this Constitution, "no person held to service or labor in
one state, under the laws thereof, escaping into another,
shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be
discharged from such service or labor; but shall be delivered
up on claim of the party to whom such service or
labor shall be due." This clause was expressly inserted, to
enable owners of slaves to reclaim them.

This is a better security than any that now exists. No
power is given to the general government to interpose
with respect to the property in slaves now held by the
states. The taxation of this state being equal only to its
representation, such a tax cannot be laid as he supposes.
They cannot prevent the importation of slaves for twenty
years; but after that period, they can. The gentlemen from
South Carolina and Georgia argued in this manner: "We
have now liberty to import this species of property, and
much of the property now possessed had been purchased,
or otherwise acquired, in contemplation of improving it by
the assistance of imported slaves. What would be the consequence
of hindering us from it? The slaves of Virginia
would rise in value, and we should be obliged to go to your
markets." I need not expatiate on this subject. Great as the
evil is, a dismemberment of the Union would be worse. If
those states should disunite from the other states for not indulging
them in the temporary continuance of this traffic,
they might solicit and obtain aid from foreign powers.

Mr. Tyler warmly enlarged on the impolicy, iniquity,
and disgracefulness of this wicked traffic. He thought the
reasons urged by gentlemen in defence of it were inconclusive
and ill founded. It was one cause of the complaints
against British tyranny, that this trade was permitted. The
revolution had put a period to it; but now it was to be
revived. He thought nothing could justify it. This temporary
restriction on Congress militated, in his opinion,
against the arguments of gentlemen on the other side, that
what was not given up was retained by the states; for that,
if this restriction had not been inserted, Congress could
have prohibited the African trade. The power of prohibiting
it was not expressly delegated to them; yet they
would have had it by implication, if this restraint had not
been provided. This seemed to him to demonstrate most
clearly the necessity of restraining them, by a bill of rights,
from infringing our unalienable rights. It was immaterial
whether the bill of rights was by itself, or included in the
Constitution. But he contended for it one way or the
other. It would be justified by our own example and that
of England. His earnest desire was, that it should be
handed down to posterity that he had opposed this wicked
clause.

. . . . .

Mr. George Nicholas wondered that gentlemen who
were against slavery should be opposed to this clause; as,
after that period, the slave trade would be done away. He
asked if gentlemen did not see the inconsistency of their
arguments. They object, says he, to the Constitution, because
the slave trade is laid open for twenty odd years; and
yet they tell you that, by some latent operation of it, the
slaves who are so now will be manumitted. At the same
moment it is opposed for being promotive and destructive
of slavery. He contended that it was advantageous to Virginia
that it should be in the power of Congress to prevent
the importation of slaves after twenty years, as it would
then put a period to the evil complained of.

As the Southern States would not confederate without
this clause, he asked if gentlemen would rather dissolve
the confederacy than to suffer this temporary inconvenience,
admitting it to be such. Virginia might continue
the prohibition of such importation during the intermediate
period, and would be benefited by it, as a tax of ten
dollars on each slave might be laid, of which she would
receive a share. He endeavored to obviate the objection of
gentlemen, that the restriction on Congress was a proof
that they would have powers not given them, by remarking,
that they would only have had a general superintendency
of trade, if the restriction had not been inserted.
But the Southern States insisted on this exception to that
general superintendency for twenty years. It could not,
therefore, have been a power by implication, as the restriction
was an exception from a delegated power. The taxes
could not, as had been suggested, be laid so high on negroes
as to amount to emancipation because taxation and
representation were fixed according to the census established
in the Constitution. The exception of taxes from the
uniformity annexed to duties and excises could not have
the operation contended for by the gentleman, because
other clauses had clearly and positively fixed the census.
Had taxes been uniform, it would have been universally
objected to; for no one object could be selected without
involving great inconveniences and oppressions. But, says
Mr. Nicholas, is it from the general government we are to
fear emancipation? Gentlemen will recollect what I said in
another house, and what other gentlemen have said, that
advocated emancipation. Give me leave to say, that clause
is a great security for our slave tax. I can tell the committee
that the people of our country are reduced to beggary
by the taxes on negroes. Had this Constitution been
adopted, it would not have been the case. The taxes were
laid on all our negroes. By this system, two fifths are exempted.
He then added, that he had not imagined gentlemen
would support here what they had opposed in another
place.

Mr. Henry replied that, though the proportion of each
was to be fixed by the census, and three fifths of the slaves
only were included in the enumeration, yet the proportion
of Virginia, being once fixed, might be laid on blacks and
blacks only; for, the mode of raising the proportion of
each state being to be directed by Congress, they might
make slaves the sole object to raise it of. Personalities he
wished to take leave of: they had nothing to do with the
question, which was solely whether that paper was wrong
or not.

[Volume 3, Page 294]

Mr. Nicholas replied, that negroes must be considered
as persons or property. If as property, the proportion of
taxes to be laid on them was fixed in the Constitution. If
he apprehended a poll tax on negroes, the Constitution
had prevented it; for, by the census, where a white man
paid ten shillings, a negro paid but six shillings; for the
exemption of two fifths of them reduced it to that proportion.

Mr. George Mason said, that gentlemen might think
themselves secured by the restriction, in the 4th clause,
that no capitation or other direct tax should be laid but in
proportion to the census before directed to be taken; but
that, when maturely considered, it would be found to be
no security whatsoever. It was nothing but a direct assertion,
or mere confirmation of the clause which fixed the
ratio of taxes and representation. It only meant that the
quantum to be raised of each state should be in proportion
to their numbers, in the manner therein directed. But the
general government was not precluded from laying the
proportion of any particular state on any one species of
property they might think proper.

For instance, if five hundred thousand dollars were to
be raised, they might lay the whole of the proportion of
the Southern States on the blacks, or any one species of
property; so that, by laying taxes too heavily on slaves,
they might totally annihilate that kind of property. No real
security could arise from the clause which provides that
persons held to labor in one state, escaping into another,
shall be delivered up. This only meant that runaway slaves
should not be protected in other states. As to the exclusion
of ex post facto laws, it could not be said to create any security
in this case; for laying a tax on slaves would not be
ex post facto.

Mr. Madison replied, that even the Southern States,
which were most affected, were perfectly satisfied with this
provision, and dreaded no danger to the property they
now hold. It appeared to him that the general government
would not intermeddle with that property for twenty
years, but to lay a tax on every slave imported not exceeding
ten dollars; and that, after the expiration of that period,
they might prohibit the traffic altogether. The census
in the Constitution was intended to introduce equality in
the burdens to be laid on the community. No gentleman
objected to laying duties, imposts, and excises, uniformly.
But uniformity of taxes would be subversive of the principles
of equality; for it was not possible to select any article
which would be easy for one state but what would be
heavy for another; that, the proportion of each state being
ascertained, it would be raised by the general government
in the most convenient manner for the people, and not by
the selection of any one particular object; that there must
be some degree of confidence put in agents, or else we
must reject a state of civil society altogether. Another great
security to this property, which he mentioned, was, that
five states were greatly interested in that species of property,
and there were other states which had some slaves,
and had made no attempt, or taken any step, to take them
from the people. There were a few slaves in New York,
New Jersey, and Connecticut: these states would, probably,
oppose any attempts to annihilate this species of property.
He concluded by observing that he should be glad to leave
the decision of this to the committee.

Elliot, Jonathan, ed. The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution as Recommended by the General Convention at Philadelphia in 1787. . . . 5 vols. 2d ed. 1888. Reprint. New York: Burt Franklin, n.d.