1. In the early twentieth
century, the vitalist view was championed by Hans Driesch (1908–9) and
(1914).

2. See McLaughlin 1992,
section IV, for further discussion of Mill on this point.

3. Broad supposed the case
for emergence is generally empirical in character, based on the
strikingly different form of confirmed high-level laws and the
inability of theorists to derive them from lower-level laws, or even
conceive how this might in principle be done. However, he also
believed there is a good a priori argument for the emergent status of
secondary qualities, such as color:

The concepts of the various colours -- red, blue, green, etc. -- are
not contained in the general concept of Colour in the sense in which
we might quite fairly say that the concepts of all possible motions
are contained in the general concepts of Space and of Motion. We have
no difficulty in conceiving and adequately describing determinate
possible motions which we have never witnessed and which we never
shall witness. We have merely to assign a determinate direction and a
determinate velocity. But we could not possibly have formed the
concept of such a colour as blue or such a shade as sky-blue unless we
had perceived instances of it, no matter how much we had reflected on
the concept of Colour in general or on the instances of other colours
and shades which we had seen. It follows that, even when we
know that a certain kind of secondary quality (e.g., colour)
pervades or seems to pervade a region when and only when such and such
a kind of microscopic event (e.g., vibrations) is going on
within the region, we still could not possibly predict that such and
such a determinate event of the kind (e.g., a circular
movement of a certain period) would be connected with such and such a
determinate shade of colour (e.g., sky-blue). The
trans-physical laws are then necessarily of the emergent type. (1925,
pp. 80)

4. The major source for
Alexander is his series of Gifford Lectures, Space, Time, and
Deity (1920). He cites Morgan’s Instinct and Experience
(1912), though Morgan’s most important work came just after - his own
series of Gifford Lectures, the crucial first volume of which is
Emergent Evolution (1923).

7. Silberstein and McGeever
(1999) might share this view of the failure of supervenience for
emergent properties, but they do not address this point
explicitly. Here is what they do say:

By [ontological emergence] we mean features of systems or wholes
that possess causal capacities not reducible to any of the intrinsic
causal capacities of the parts nor to any of the (reducible) relations
between the parts. Emergent properties are properties of a system taken
as a whole which exert a causal influence on the parts of the system
consistent with, but distinct from, the causal capacities of the parts
themselves. Ontological emergence therefore entails the failure of
part-whole reductionism, as well as the failure of mereological
supervenience. ( p.182)

8. Humphreys writes that
usually the fusion operation results in a mere concatenation of
properties; of course, concatenated properties do not lose their
identity. Concatenation is denoted by ‘+’. To simplify
matters, we will assume that fusion only produces emergents. To that
end we distinguish fusion from concatenation.

9. This picture obviously
draws its inspiration from relational holist interpretations of
quantum mechanical ‘superpositional’ states. (See Teller 1986, 1992,
and also Richard Healey’s entry
holism and nonseparability in physics.)
But Humphreys appears to allow that it may have application outside
this microscopic domain.

11. Shoemaker first
suggested this move in correspondence to one of us (TO), and it is
discussed in O’Connor 1994 and 2000b. Shoemaker has since set out this
picture as a way of explicating the concept of emergence in
“Kim on Emergence.” We do not take Shoemaker’s proposal to
be a friendly amendment to the emergentist picture, for reasons
indicated in O’Connor and Wong [forthcoming].

12. Some agree with this
assessment for qualitative features of conscious experience only,
whereas others will extend it to intentional features as well. On
qualitative character, see Jackson (1982) and Chalmers (1996). On
intentional properties, see Searle (1992), whose exact view, however,
is difficult to pin down.