CHINA: A NEW RELATIONSHIP
Commencement Address by Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Montana)
Rocky Mountain College, Billings, Montana
Monday, May 29, 1972, 9:30a.m., M.S.T.
I would like to share with you on this day which is
of great importance to you some thoughts of world affairs. One
aspect of this subject, in particular, begs for your understanding
and attention. That is the relationship between the United States
and China. It is uppermost in my mind, at this time, because I
have only this month returned from a journey to Peking. The
i mpressions of the visit to that capital and several other Chinese
cities are still very vivid. So, too, are my discussions with
leaders of the People's Republic.
This is a notable year in U.S.-China relations. The
first significant steps in 25 years have been taken towards a
general revi sion of dealings with China. The initiative was
long overdue and, hence the backlog of unfinished business is
very heavy.
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 48, Folder 19, Mansfield Libary, University of Montana
- 2 -
Almost a quarter of a century ago, we cut ourselves
off, as a matter of deliberate policy, from all normal relations
with the largest nation on earth. We did so by misreading or
distorting, in an official sense, the implicati ons of the Chinese
revolution which brought a new government to Peking in 1949.
Thereafter, we acted on the legal pretense that the People's
Republic of Chi na did not exi st. Even as we pretended it was not
there, we invested heavi ly in an elaborate system of costly con-stra
i nts to curtail that government.
The price of this detachment fr om reality was not
trivial. Qui te apart from billions spent for counterpoises to
China throughout Asia, our present i nvolvement in Viet Nam can
be cons i dered, in large measure, to be part of the pri ce of this
c onstra i nt. So, too, was our earl i er involvement in Korea.
These and other military act ions were undertaken in the
name of a policy called "containment" which was based on a set of
assumptions about the nature of events in China, as we guessed or
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 48, Folder 19, Mansfield Libary, University of Montana
persuaded ourselves to bel i eve them to be. These assumptions were
made in a vacuum because of our isolation from the Chinese mainland.
Not surprisingly, many of them turned out to be highly inaccurate.
The tragic cost of the miscalculations can be stated
in terms of the lives lost, the bod i es maimed and the resources
squandered all around the rimlands of Asia, particularly in Korea
and Indochi na. To be sure, we cannot estimate what the alternative
costs might have been had we acted on more accurate assumptions,
or had we taken no action at all . Simpl y on the basi s of what
did happen, however, history may well record these miscalculat ions
regard i ng Chi na, as among the most costl y of all time.
I might say, parenthetically, that we are at a cruc ial
point, at the present time, in determining whether we will pers i st
i n thi s mistaken course. I refer to events in Viet Nam duri ng
the past few weeks. The new U. S. air and sea actions are vestigial
responses which arise from the old, not the new Chi na policy whi ch
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 48, Folder 19, Mansfield Libary, University of Montana
- 4 -
was signaled by the President's visit to Peking. Whatever the
success of these new war measures, they will not alter in any
way the overwhelming need of this nation to disengage completely
from the Indochina conflict. We need to do so, not to satisfy
Hanoi or Peking or Moscow, but in order to serve our own national
interests. If we have learned anything to date from thi s conflict,
it is that we have no national stake in that conflict except an
end t o further casualties and the return of the prisoners of war
and the missing in action. The course of action best calculated
t o serve these nat i onal needs remains to negotiate the best poli-tical
solution without further recourse to arms and to get out of
Indochina, lock, stock and barrel.
But, to return to the central theme of my remarks, it
is revealing t o ask ourselves how we became involved in Viet Nam
in the f i rst place. How did we permit ourselves to make such
faulty commi tments with such disastrous consequences? We get
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 48, Folder 19, Mansfield Libary, University of Montana
- 5 -
some clues, I think, when we review the spectrum of our relation-ship
wi th China over the last two centuries.
More than with other nations, our relationship with
China has been subject t ~ the ebb and flow of popular myth. We
have tended to oscillate from one oversimplified view of China
t o another. For almost two centuries, China has been viewed,
alternately, as benign or virulent, friendly or host i le, wise
or foolish.
Like the 11yin11 and 11yang 11 of Chinese cosmology which
holds that life is the product of a dualism of opposites, our
image of China has gone from one extreme to the other. On the
one hand, there has been the image of the China of wisdom, intel-ligence,
i ndustry, pi ety, stoici sm and strength. That is the
benign China of Marco Polo and Pearl S. Buck; i t i s the Chi na of
the Charlie Chan movies and of the stor i es of heroic res i stance
to Japan in the l930 1 s.
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 48, Folder 19, Mansfield Libary, University of Montana
- 6 -
On the other hand, there has been the image of the
China of cruelty, barbarism, violence, and faceless hordes.
This is the China of drum-head trials, opium dens, bandits,
summary executions, Fu Manchu, and the Boxer Rebellion.
In the late 18th century, we looked up to China as an
anc i ent civilization--superior in many aspects of technology,
culture, and social order and surrounded by an air of s plend i d
and imperial mystery. In that period, the China trade was s ought
eagerl y by the Clipper ships and Chi nese produce was highly valued
notabl y along the Eastern Seaboard and in Europe.
Respect turned to contempt, however, with China's
quick defeat i n the Opium War of 1840. There followed acts of
humil iation of China such as our part icipation i n extra-territoria l
treaty r ights and the Chinese Exclus ion Act of the last half of
the 19th century.
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 48, Folder 19, Mansfield Libary, University of Montana
- 7 -
In theearly 20th century, attitudes shi fted again ta
benevolence. American missionaries of many faiths made China
a favored field for proselytizing and education. In this period,
the Chi nese became, far this nation, a guided, guarded, and adored
people.
Chinese res i stance ta the Japanese invasion in 1937
produced another shift from benevolence ta admiration . At the
end of the Sec ond World War, admiration was displaced by dis-appointment
and frustation, as the wart ime truce between Nat ionalist
and Communist forces collapsed in internal strife. This nation
became profoundly disenchanted wi th China, a disenchantment which
was replaced abruptly in 1949 by hostility. U. S. Secretaries of
State turned the i r backs on Chinese leaders and spoke of the mehace
of "Chinese hordes" as predecessors had spoken with similar re-vulsion
of the 11 yellow peril. 11
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 48, Folder 19, Mansfield Libary, University of Montana
- 8 -
The hostility was largely a react i on, of course, to
the coming to power of a Communist regime on the Chinese mainland.
We were not only djsmayed by thi s development, we saw it almost
as a national affront. Peking was viewed as a treacherous ex-tension
of the Soviet steamroller which had reduced Eastern and
Central Europe to subservience at the end of World War II. China
became in our eyes the Eastern puppet of world communism, to be
manipulated by strings pulled in Moscow.
After Chi nese forces intervened in the war in Korea
where, incidentally, Mao Tse-tung lost his eldest son, U. S.
policy was cast anew on the premise that the government on the
Chinese mainland was an aggressor. It was seen as ready to use
force to impose international Communism anywhere in Asia. Con-versely,
it was assumed that if the endorsement of the free nations
were withheld, thi s reg ime which was said to be "alien" to the
Chinese people would wither and collapse.
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 48, Folder 19, Mansfield Libary, University of Montana
- 9 -
On this premise, it was rationalized that recognition
must not be extended to Peking. Instead, the official American
view was that the Chinese National Government, which had retreated
to the island of Taiwan, continued to speak for all of China. We
cut off trade with the Chinese mainland and did whatever could be
done to encourage other countries to follow suit. In a similar
fashion, a diplomatic campaign was conducted year after year
against the seating of the Chinese People's Republic in the United
Nations.
We drew an arc of military alliances on the seaward
side of Chi na and undergirded them with the deployment of massive
U. S. military power in bases throughout the Western Pacific. Tens
of billions of dollars were expended in this process. Much of
this immense outpouring of effort and money seems incredible now
in the light of the President's recent visits to Peking and to
Moscow. Yet, it has continued for 20 years and, of course, is
still going on, notably, in Indochina.
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 48, Folder 19, Mansfield Libary, University of Montana
- 10 -
As has been suggested, this last quarter century of
China policy has been characterized by delusion and miscalculation.
We assumed, for example, that the Chinese Communists would be unable
to govern. We assumed that the Peking government would be an ex-tension
of Soviet Communism and a willing accomplice to Soviet
purpose and design. And we assumed that the Chinese government
would be bent on territorial aggrandizement.
All of these assumptions have proved to be erroneous.
In the first place, of the numerous divisions which have arisen
within the Communist world, the differences between Moscow and
Peking have been the most significant. They so remain today
although the rasping edges of the conflict appear somewhat tempered
by the periodic flare-ups of the war in Viet Nam.
At the same time, the government of the People's Republic
has not only survived, it has provided the Chinese people with
effective leadership . Chinese society has achieved a considerable
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 48, Folder 19, Mansfield Libary, University of Montana
- ll -
degree of economic, scientific and social progress. A modern
technology has been developed which is sophisticated enough to
turn out products ranging from needles and hand-tools to thermo-nuclear
devices, earth satellites and the rockets to place them
in orbit. A powerful national momentum has been generated which
is proving sufficient to supply an enormous population with the
wherewithal of decent survival and an improving livelihood.
Notwithstanding a ssumptions to the contrary, the Chinese
government has not shown any great eagerness to use its own armed
forces to spread its control abroad. Where Chinese armies have
been employed they have been used to assert traditional territorial
claims, or in expression of concern for the safety of China's
borders. China has not become enmeshed in foreign military ad-ventures.
In Viet Nam, for example, the Chinese military involve-ment
has been peripheral. There is Chinese equipment in South
Viet Nam but there are no Chinese battal ions . In North Viet Nam
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 48, Folder 19, Mansfield Libary, University of Montana
- 12 -
reports have indicated the presence, from time to t ime, not of
Chinese combat units, but of labor troops engaged in repairing
bomb damage to roads, railroads, bridges and the like.
Chinese actions in Tibet, and along the Himalayan
frontier with India, are often cited as examples of militant
Communist aggression. Nevertheless, for centur j_es, Tibet has
been universally regarded as falling within China's over-all
boundaries. If the Peking government claims that Tibet belongs
to Ch na, so, too, does the Chinese Nat ional Government on Taiwan.
India also acknowledges such to be the case and American policy
has never officially recognized Tibet as other than Chinese
territory.
Even in Korea, the direct Chi nese military involvement
di d not begin until United Nat i ons forces approached Chi na's
borders. In any event, the last Chinese batallions left North
Korea years ago.
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 48, Folder 19, Mansfield Libary, University of Montana
- 13 -
Looking ahead, it would seem to me that Chinese energies
and resources are going t o be so preempted by internal needs over
the next two decades that there is l i ttle likelihood that Chi na
could post a serious military danger t o the United States even if
that were the inclination.
The evidence, in short, is ample to dispel some of the
most ala rming assumptions on which our past policies have been
based . Of course, there is an immense potential danger in China.
There is also an immense potential danger in every other powerful
nat ion in a world whi ch has not yet learned how to maintain
c i vilized survival in a nuclear age except on the razor's edge.
Insofar as Chi na i s concerned, the fundamenta l question for us
is not so much whether it is a danger, but whether our policies
will act t o alleviate or to exacerbate the danger.
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 48, Folder 19, Mansfield Libary, University of Montana
- 14 -
In my judgment, these policies can alleviate the danger
only to the extent that they are based on premises that correspond
more nearly to realities than has been the case in the past. It
will serve no useful purpose to flail at windmills . Now that we
have, in 1972, at last penetrated the shroud of ~bscurity surround-i
ng China, there is reason to hope that our judgments and actions
regarding China and Asia, henceforth, will be better informed.
In thi s new phase of our relat ions with China, we must
beware, of course, that the old pendulum of myth does not now
swing to the other extreme, thereby creating a new image of China
which is as unreal as the old. We must guard against becomi ng too
enamoured of the splendors of a newly rev ived amity. Banquets
and toasts and shark's fin soup do not of themselves assure a new
order of world affairs .
To keep the pendulum in equilibrium in our current ap-proach
to China, it would be well to heed a rule laid down by
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 48, Folder 19, Mansfield Libary, University of Montana
- 15 -
Lord Palmerst~n, the prime Minister of Great Britain in the
1860's, who declared:
"We have no eternal allies, and we
have no perpetual enemies. "
Our experiences in postwar World War II relations with Germany
and Japan underscore this observation.
We have not always been very astute about defining
where our real interests lie . We have often tended to confuse
them with fleeting and transitory images of friendliness or
animosity . This is all too true in the case of China where, for
25 years, we have been obsessed with the assumed threat of a per-petual
enemy. In fact, we might well have avoided the untold
misery and loss of life and resources of the peripheral war in
Indochina, had we forgone the poses of power and, instead, taken
a harder view of our national interests.
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 48, Folder 19, Mansfield Libary, University of Montana
- 16 -
While we cannot identify national interests with exacti-tude,
we do have it wi thin our means to determine much more clearly
where it is that they do not lie. The President has shown the way
in th ~ s connection. Even before his visit to Peking, he had laid
the groundwork for reestablishing more normal contact with the
People's Republic of China by the removal of discriminatory restric-tion
on travel of Americans to the Chinese mainland and by ending
the embargo on trade with China. The embargo had been imposed
during the Korean War and was of a design so tight as to exclude
even chop-sticks . The fact is, however, that for two decades, it
had had no economic impact on Chi na and had served only to injure
our own traders. By ending the boycott on the eve of his visit
China
to China, the President removed what was, at most, an irritant to I
but which would have hampered his efforts to br i ng about the
beginni ngs of a reconciliation.
As it was, President Nixon was able to lay the groundwork
for the growth of contact between the two nations. The chances
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 48, Folder 19, Mansfield Libary, University of Montana
- 17 -
are good that the months and years ahead will see a gradual increase
in exchanges between China and the United States in medicine and
health, science, j ournal ism, athleti~s, the arts and other pursuits .
An increase in trade i s also to be anticipated . The
Chinese are in an excellent position to move forward in this connec-tion.
It has been their practice to keep imports and exports, world-wide,
in rough balance . They have neither external nor internal
debt. They have ample exchange r eserves . Their international re-putati
on for integrity and reliability in commercial transati.ons
is already very good. A great range of Chinese products is avail-able
for sale in the world markets and the Chinese also have a
substantial shopping list for imports which will help to speed
their own development and strengthen their economic self-reliance .
Exchanges can take place, in my judgment, even though
the issue of Taiwan remains, f i nal l y, to be r esolved . Presi dent
Nixon has acknowledged as valid, Peking's claim that the island
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 48, Folder 19, Mansfield Libary, University of Montana
- 18 -
i s part of China. That claim, incidentally) is susta i ned by the
Ch i nese government on Taiwan. With the assur ance that the Uni ted
States wi ll not pursue a two-Chi na policy) Peki ng i s prepared to
go ahead i n ree stabl ishing contact wi th this nat ion wh1le exploring
in i ts own fas hi on t he road to reunif ; cat t on of the i sland wi th
the ma i nland.
Beyond exchanges between Chi na and the Uni ted States)
there l oom la r ger quest ions of peace and security in the Western
Pac ific. Even as we meet here t oday, weawa i t the consequences
of the l atest esca lat 5on of the U. S. i nvolvement i n Vi et Nam as
well as the ful l import of the Pres i dent's di scuss i ons i n Moscow.
One can only ho pe t hat we have seen the last resort t o retali at ion
in Indochina , the f i na l burst of thi s wasting conflict and that
progress can now be expected toward a genui ne political settlement.
In all candor) the recor d of this tragic war provi des
little grounds f ar o pt imi sm in thi s respect . The i nvas i on of
Cambodia di d not produce peace . Nor di d the invasion of Laos.
Nor di d the earlier bombing enterpri ses over North Vi et Nam.
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 48, Folder 19, Mansfield Libary, University of Montana
- 19 -
Peace was the promise attached, in turn, to each of
these escalat ions of the U. S. involvement . Each, in turn, led
not to the promised peace but to -.a more ki lled and maimed, more
prisoners of war, more missing in act ion, more and more billions
in expenditures to produce more and more devastation throughout
Indochina.
The end of this war has yet to come and it is not clear
yet when i t will come. We would do well , nevertheless, to begin
to exa5ine the pos s i bilit i es of a new securi ty system, based on
the real~t ie s of the 70's . Those rea lit i es urge us to seek, in
my judgment, an equilibrium of this nation's interests with those
of China, J apan, the Soviet Union and the smaller nations of the
Western Pacific . All have a stake i n the peace of the region.
The restorat ion of contact with China furthers the
poss i bility that at some time tr ipartite discuss ions might be
held between China, J apan, and the United States, if not quadr i -
part i te talks, which would also include the Soviet Union . A
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 48, Folder 19, Mansfield Libary, University of Montana
- 20 -
development of this kind could do much to allay unfounded mutual
fears and to begin to come to grips with the question of adjustment
of valid nat ional interests. It could provide insights into such
vital questi Jns as the intentions of the various powers i n the
Western Pacifi c and how they relate to one another, the economic
needs of the Asian nations, and the prospects for curbing nuclear
conflict. Most i mportant, such discuss· ons might provi de a vehicle
for general stab ilizat i on of the Indoch ~ na peninsul a and Southeast
Asia in the post-war era.
Adjustments of thi s kind requi re fresh perspectives.
We need t o see the s i tuat i on as i t is t oday, ndas it appeared 20
years ago i n the cataclysmic upheaval of the Chi nese revolution.
We need to see the situation not through the fog of an old and
stagnant host. lity but i n the l i ght of the enduring interests of
the Uni ted States i n the Western Pac i fic whi ch are no less than a
peace of equality and mutual ity whl ch wi ll permi t a flowering of
relat i ons with all Asian nations. Nor, may I add, are they any
more.
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 48, Folder 19, Mansfield Libary, University of Montana
- 21 -
I see great relevance in young men and women thinking
deeply of the i s sues wh j_ch di vide China and the United States to
determine how they can be recast in new and uncluttered molds.
Unl i~ e my generation, you have already learned much about As i a .
You have a greater awareness of its importance to this nation
and t ~ the w~rld. Furthermore, you have not had the experience
~f nati ~ nal trauma in moving abruptly fr~m an era marked by an
almost fawning benevolence t oward China to one of thorough di.s-enchantment.
You were spared the fierce hostilities which rent
this nat ion i nternally, as a sense of warmth, sympathy, and securi ty
regarding China gave way to fee lings of revul sion, hatred and in-security.
Y::m young Americans and y:mr counterparts in Chi na wi_ll
live your ad ult years in an era in wh 1 ch much of the world's
h 1 story will be written in the Pa ~tf ic . WhRt you do , how you
relate t o one another--Chinese and Ame r icans- -will have much to
do with whether ~ r n ~ t that hi.story is wr i tten in terms of peace
and civilized human survjval.
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 48, Folder 19, Mansfield Libary, University of Montana
- 22 -
I have seen China off and on since I served there in the
Marines in the 1920's. I have seen you, your parents and your
grandparents much closer up and for a much longer period of time.
I am confident about a future that belongs to your
generation, both in China and in this country of ours. This
Republic is worthy of your best efforts not only in terms of
developing Chinese and U. S. relations, but w1 th regard to the
entire world. You can do no more than try to achieve mutual
understanding and a peace with all peoples. You can and should
do no less.
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 48, Folder 19, Mansfield Libary, University of Montana

Click tabs to swap between content that is broken into logical sections.

For additional information about the collections held by the Archives and Special Collections at the University of Montana--Missoula, please visit the web site: http://www.lib.umt.edu/asc. To suggest a keyword or share what you might know about this item, email: library.archives@umontana.edu.

Transcript

CHINA: A NEW RELATIONSHIP
Commencement Address by Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Montana)
Rocky Mountain College, Billings, Montana
Monday, May 29, 1972, 9:30a.m., M.S.T.
I would like to share with you on this day which is
of great importance to you some thoughts of world affairs. One
aspect of this subject, in particular, begs for your understanding
and attention. That is the relationship between the United States
and China. It is uppermost in my mind, at this time, because I
have only this month returned from a journey to Peking. The
i mpressions of the visit to that capital and several other Chinese
cities are still very vivid. So, too, are my discussions with
leaders of the People's Republic.
This is a notable year in U.S.-China relations. The
first significant steps in 25 years have been taken towards a
general revi sion of dealings with China. The initiative was
long overdue and, hence the backlog of unfinished business is
very heavy.
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 48, Folder 19, Mansfield Libary, University of Montana
- 2 -
Almost a quarter of a century ago, we cut ourselves
off, as a matter of deliberate policy, from all normal relations
with the largest nation on earth. We did so by misreading or
distorting, in an official sense, the implicati ons of the Chinese
revolution which brought a new government to Peking in 1949.
Thereafter, we acted on the legal pretense that the People's
Republic of Chi na did not exi st. Even as we pretended it was not
there, we invested heavi ly in an elaborate system of costly con-stra
i nts to curtail that government.
The price of this detachment fr om reality was not
trivial. Qui te apart from billions spent for counterpoises to
China throughout Asia, our present i nvolvement in Viet Nam can
be cons i dered, in large measure, to be part of the pri ce of this
c onstra i nt. So, too, was our earl i er involvement in Korea.
These and other military act ions were undertaken in the
name of a policy called "containment" which was based on a set of
assumptions about the nature of events in China, as we guessed or
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 48, Folder 19, Mansfield Libary, University of Montana
persuaded ourselves to bel i eve them to be. These assumptions were
made in a vacuum because of our isolation from the Chinese mainland.
Not surprisingly, many of them turned out to be highly inaccurate.
The tragic cost of the miscalculations can be stated
in terms of the lives lost, the bod i es maimed and the resources
squandered all around the rimlands of Asia, particularly in Korea
and Indochi na. To be sure, we cannot estimate what the alternative
costs might have been had we acted on more accurate assumptions,
or had we taken no action at all . Simpl y on the basi s of what
did happen, however, history may well record these miscalculat ions
regard i ng Chi na, as among the most costl y of all time.
I might say, parenthetically, that we are at a cruc ial
point, at the present time, in determining whether we will pers i st
i n thi s mistaken course. I refer to events in Viet Nam duri ng
the past few weeks. The new U. S. air and sea actions are vestigial
responses which arise from the old, not the new Chi na policy whi ch
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 48, Folder 19, Mansfield Libary, University of Montana
- 4 -
was signaled by the President's visit to Peking. Whatever the
success of these new war measures, they will not alter in any
way the overwhelming need of this nation to disengage completely
from the Indochina conflict. We need to do so, not to satisfy
Hanoi or Peking or Moscow, but in order to serve our own national
interests. If we have learned anything to date from thi s conflict,
it is that we have no national stake in that conflict except an
end t o further casualties and the return of the prisoners of war
and the missing in action. The course of action best calculated
t o serve these nat i onal needs remains to negotiate the best poli-tical
solution without further recourse to arms and to get out of
Indochina, lock, stock and barrel.
But, to return to the central theme of my remarks, it
is revealing t o ask ourselves how we became involved in Viet Nam
in the f i rst place. How did we permit ourselves to make such
faulty commi tments with such disastrous consequences? We get
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 48, Folder 19, Mansfield Libary, University of Montana
- 5 -
some clues, I think, when we review the spectrum of our relation-ship
wi th China over the last two centuries.
More than with other nations, our relationship with
China has been subject t ~ the ebb and flow of popular myth. We
have tended to oscillate from one oversimplified view of China
t o another. For almost two centuries, China has been viewed,
alternately, as benign or virulent, friendly or host i le, wise
or foolish.
Like the 11yin11 and 11yang 11 of Chinese cosmology which
holds that life is the product of a dualism of opposites, our
image of China has gone from one extreme to the other. On the
one hand, there has been the image of the China of wisdom, intel-ligence,
i ndustry, pi ety, stoici sm and strength. That is the
benign China of Marco Polo and Pearl S. Buck; i t i s the Chi na of
the Charlie Chan movies and of the stor i es of heroic res i stance
to Japan in the l930 1 s.
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 48, Folder 19, Mansfield Libary, University of Montana
- 6 -
On the other hand, there has been the image of the
China of cruelty, barbarism, violence, and faceless hordes.
This is the China of drum-head trials, opium dens, bandits,
summary executions, Fu Manchu, and the Boxer Rebellion.
In the late 18th century, we looked up to China as an
anc i ent civilization--superior in many aspects of technology,
culture, and social order and surrounded by an air of s plend i d
and imperial mystery. In that period, the China trade was s ought
eagerl y by the Clipper ships and Chi nese produce was highly valued
notabl y along the Eastern Seaboard and in Europe.
Respect turned to contempt, however, with China's
quick defeat i n the Opium War of 1840. There followed acts of
humil iation of China such as our part icipation i n extra-territoria l
treaty r ights and the Chinese Exclus ion Act of the last half of
the 19th century.
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 48, Folder 19, Mansfield Libary, University of Montana
- 7 -
In theearly 20th century, attitudes shi fted again ta
benevolence. American missionaries of many faiths made China
a favored field for proselytizing and education. In this period,
the Chi nese became, far this nation, a guided, guarded, and adored
people.
Chinese res i stance ta the Japanese invasion in 1937
produced another shift from benevolence ta admiration . At the
end of the Sec ond World War, admiration was displaced by dis-appointment
and frustation, as the wart ime truce between Nat ionalist
and Communist forces collapsed in internal strife. This nation
became profoundly disenchanted wi th China, a disenchantment which
was replaced abruptly in 1949 by hostility. U. S. Secretaries of
State turned the i r backs on Chinese leaders and spoke of the mehace
of "Chinese hordes" as predecessors had spoken with similar re-vulsion
of the 11 yellow peril. 11
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 48, Folder 19, Mansfield Libary, University of Montana
- 8 -
The hostility was largely a react i on, of course, to
the coming to power of a Communist regime on the Chinese mainland.
We were not only djsmayed by thi s development, we saw it almost
as a national affront. Peking was viewed as a treacherous ex-tension
of the Soviet steamroller which had reduced Eastern and
Central Europe to subservience at the end of World War II. China
became in our eyes the Eastern puppet of world communism, to be
manipulated by strings pulled in Moscow.
After Chi nese forces intervened in the war in Korea
where, incidentally, Mao Tse-tung lost his eldest son, U. S.
policy was cast anew on the premise that the government on the
Chinese mainland was an aggressor. It was seen as ready to use
force to impose international Communism anywhere in Asia. Con-versely,
it was assumed that if the endorsement of the free nations
were withheld, thi s reg ime which was said to be "alien" to the
Chinese people would wither and collapse.
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 48, Folder 19, Mansfield Libary, University of Montana
- 9 -
On this premise, it was rationalized that recognition
must not be extended to Peking. Instead, the official American
view was that the Chinese National Government, which had retreated
to the island of Taiwan, continued to speak for all of China. We
cut off trade with the Chinese mainland and did whatever could be
done to encourage other countries to follow suit. In a similar
fashion, a diplomatic campaign was conducted year after year
against the seating of the Chinese People's Republic in the United
Nations.
We drew an arc of military alliances on the seaward
side of Chi na and undergirded them with the deployment of massive
U. S. military power in bases throughout the Western Pacific. Tens
of billions of dollars were expended in this process. Much of
this immense outpouring of effort and money seems incredible now
in the light of the President's recent visits to Peking and to
Moscow. Yet, it has continued for 20 years and, of course, is
still going on, notably, in Indochina.
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 48, Folder 19, Mansfield Libary, University of Montana
- 10 -
As has been suggested, this last quarter century of
China policy has been characterized by delusion and miscalculation.
We assumed, for example, that the Chinese Communists would be unable
to govern. We assumed that the Peking government would be an ex-tension
of Soviet Communism and a willing accomplice to Soviet
purpose and design. And we assumed that the Chinese government
would be bent on territorial aggrandizement.
All of these assumptions have proved to be erroneous.
In the first place, of the numerous divisions which have arisen
within the Communist world, the differences between Moscow and
Peking have been the most significant. They so remain today
although the rasping edges of the conflict appear somewhat tempered
by the periodic flare-ups of the war in Viet Nam.
At the same time, the government of the People's Republic
has not only survived, it has provided the Chinese people with
effective leadership . Chinese society has achieved a considerable
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 48, Folder 19, Mansfield Libary, University of Montana
- ll -
degree of economic, scientific and social progress. A modern
technology has been developed which is sophisticated enough to
turn out products ranging from needles and hand-tools to thermo-nuclear
devices, earth satellites and the rockets to place them
in orbit. A powerful national momentum has been generated which
is proving sufficient to supply an enormous population with the
wherewithal of decent survival and an improving livelihood.
Notwithstanding a ssumptions to the contrary, the Chinese
government has not shown any great eagerness to use its own armed
forces to spread its control abroad. Where Chinese armies have
been employed they have been used to assert traditional territorial
claims, or in expression of concern for the safety of China's
borders. China has not become enmeshed in foreign military ad-ventures.
In Viet Nam, for example, the Chinese military involve-ment
has been peripheral. There is Chinese equipment in South
Viet Nam but there are no Chinese battal ions . In North Viet Nam
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 48, Folder 19, Mansfield Libary, University of Montana
- 12 -
reports have indicated the presence, from time to t ime, not of
Chinese combat units, but of labor troops engaged in repairing
bomb damage to roads, railroads, bridges and the like.
Chinese actions in Tibet, and along the Himalayan
frontier with India, are often cited as examples of militant
Communist aggression. Nevertheless, for centur j_es, Tibet has
been universally regarded as falling within China's over-all
boundaries. If the Peking government claims that Tibet belongs
to Ch na, so, too, does the Chinese Nat ional Government on Taiwan.
India also acknowledges such to be the case and American policy
has never officially recognized Tibet as other than Chinese
territory.
Even in Korea, the direct Chi nese military involvement
di d not begin until United Nat i ons forces approached Chi na's
borders. In any event, the last Chinese batallions left North
Korea years ago.
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 48, Folder 19, Mansfield Libary, University of Montana
- 13 -
Looking ahead, it would seem to me that Chinese energies
and resources are going t o be so preempted by internal needs over
the next two decades that there is l i ttle likelihood that Chi na
could post a serious military danger t o the United States even if
that were the inclination.
The evidence, in short, is ample to dispel some of the
most ala rming assumptions on which our past policies have been
based . Of course, there is an immense potential danger in China.
There is also an immense potential danger in every other powerful
nat ion in a world whi ch has not yet learned how to maintain
c i vilized survival in a nuclear age except on the razor's edge.
Insofar as Chi na i s concerned, the fundamenta l question for us
is not so much whether it is a danger, but whether our policies
will act t o alleviate or to exacerbate the danger.
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 48, Folder 19, Mansfield Libary, University of Montana
- 14 -
In my judgment, these policies can alleviate the danger
only to the extent that they are based on premises that correspond
more nearly to realities than has been the case in the past. It
will serve no useful purpose to flail at windmills . Now that we
have, in 1972, at last penetrated the shroud of ~bscurity surround-i
ng China, there is reason to hope that our judgments and actions
regarding China and Asia, henceforth, will be better informed.
In thi s new phase of our relat ions with China, we must
beware, of course, that the old pendulum of myth does not now
swing to the other extreme, thereby creating a new image of China
which is as unreal as the old. We must guard against becomi ng too
enamoured of the splendors of a newly rev ived amity. Banquets
and toasts and shark's fin soup do not of themselves assure a new
order of world affairs .
To keep the pendulum in equilibrium in our current ap-proach
to China, it would be well to heed a rule laid down by
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 48, Folder 19, Mansfield Libary, University of Montana
- 15 -
Lord Palmerst~n, the prime Minister of Great Britain in the
1860's, who declared:
"We have no eternal allies, and we
have no perpetual enemies. "
Our experiences in postwar World War II relations with Germany
and Japan underscore this observation.
We have not always been very astute about defining
where our real interests lie . We have often tended to confuse
them with fleeting and transitory images of friendliness or
animosity . This is all too true in the case of China where, for
25 years, we have been obsessed with the assumed threat of a per-petual
enemy. In fact, we might well have avoided the untold
misery and loss of life and resources of the peripheral war in
Indochina, had we forgone the poses of power and, instead, taken
a harder view of our national interests.
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 48, Folder 19, Mansfield Libary, University of Montana
- 16 -
While we cannot identify national interests with exacti-tude,
we do have it wi thin our means to determine much more clearly
where it is that they do not lie. The President has shown the way
in th ~ s connection. Even before his visit to Peking, he had laid
the groundwork for reestablishing more normal contact with the
People's Republic of China by the removal of discriminatory restric-tion
on travel of Americans to the Chinese mainland and by ending
the embargo on trade with China. The embargo had been imposed
during the Korean War and was of a design so tight as to exclude
even chop-sticks . The fact is, however, that for two decades, it
had had no economic impact on Chi na and had served only to injure
our own traders. By ending the boycott on the eve of his visit
China
to China, the President removed what was, at most, an irritant to I
but which would have hampered his efforts to br i ng about the
beginni ngs of a reconciliation.
As it was, President Nixon was able to lay the groundwork
for the growth of contact between the two nations. The chances
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 48, Folder 19, Mansfield Libary, University of Montana
- 17 -
are good that the months and years ahead will see a gradual increase
in exchanges between China and the United States in medicine and
health, science, j ournal ism, athleti~s, the arts and other pursuits .
An increase in trade i s also to be anticipated . The
Chinese are in an excellent position to move forward in this connec-tion.
It has been their practice to keep imports and exports, world-wide,
in rough balance . They have neither external nor internal
debt. They have ample exchange r eserves . Their international re-putati
on for integrity and reliability in commercial transati.ons
is already very good. A great range of Chinese products is avail-able
for sale in the world markets and the Chinese also have a
substantial shopping list for imports which will help to speed
their own development and strengthen their economic self-reliance .
Exchanges can take place, in my judgment, even though
the issue of Taiwan remains, f i nal l y, to be r esolved . Presi dent
Nixon has acknowledged as valid, Peking's claim that the island
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 48, Folder 19, Mansfield Libary, University of Montana
- 18 -
i s part of China. That claim, incidentally) is susta i ned by the
Ch i nese government on Taiwan. With the assur ance that the Uni ted
States wi ll not pursue a two-Chi na policy) Peki ng i s prepared to
go ahead i n ree stabl ishing contact wi th this nat ion wh1le exploring
in i ts own fas hi on t he road to reunif ; cat t on of the i sland wi th
the ma i nland.
Beyond exchanges between Chi na and the Uni ted States)
there l oom la r ger quest ions of peace and security in the Western
Pac ific. Even as we meet here t oday, weawa i t the consequences
of the l atest esca lat 5on of the U. S. i nvolvement i n Vi et Nam as
well as the ful l import of the Pres i dent's di scuss i ons i n Moscow.
One can only ho pe t hat we have seen the last resort t o retali at ion
in Indochina , the f i na l burst of thi s wasting conflict and that
progress can now be expected toward a genui ne political settlement.
In all candor) the recor d of this tragic war provi des
little grounds f ar o pt imi sm in thi s respect . The i nvas i on of
Cambodia di d not produce peace . Nor di d the invasion of Laos.
Nor di d the earlier bombing enterpri ses over North Vi et Nam.
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 48, Folder 19, Mansfield Libary, University of Montana
- 19 -
Peace was the promise attached, in turn, to each of
these escalat ions of the U. S. involvement . Each, in turn, led
not to the promised peace but to -.a more ki lled and maimed, more
prisoners of war, more missing in act ion, more and more billions
in expenditures to produce more and more devastation throughout
Indochina.
The end of this war has yet to come and it is not clear
yet when i t will come. We would do well , nevertheless, to begin
to exa5ine the pos s i bilit i es of a new securi ty system, based on
the real~t ie s of the 70's . Those rea lit i es urge us to seek, in
my judgment, an equilibrium of this nation's interests with those
of China, J apan, the Soviet Union and the smaller nations of the
Western Pacific . All have a stake i n the peace of the region.
The restorat ion of contact with China furthers the
poss i bility that at some time tr ipartite discuss ions might be
held between China, J apan, and the United States, if not quadr i -
part i te talks, which would also include the Soviet Union . A
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 48, Folder 19, Mansfield Libary, University of Montana
- 20 -
development of this kind could do much to allay unfounded mutual
fears and to begin to come to grips with the question of adjustment
of valid nat ional interests. It could provide insights into such
vital questi Jns as the intentions of the various powers i n the
Western Pacifi c and how they relate to one another, the economic
needs of the Asian nations, and the prospects for curbing nuclear
conflict. Most i mportant, such discuss· ons might provi de a vehicle
for general stab ilizat i on of the Indoch ~ na peninsul a and Southeast
Asia in the post-war era.
Adjustments of thi s kind requi re fresh perspectives.
We need t o see the s i tuat i on as i t is t oday, ndas it appeared 20
years ago i n the cataclysmic upheaval of the Chi nese revolution.
We need to see the situation not through the fog of an old and
stagnant host. lity but i n the l i ght of the enduring interests of
the Uni ted States i n the Western Pac i fic whi ch are no less than a
peace of equality and mutual ity whl ch wi ll permi t a flowering of
relat i ons with all Asian nations. Nor, may I add, are they any
more.
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 48, Folder 19, Mansfield Libary, University of Montana
- 21 -
I see great relevance in young men and women thinking
deeply of the i s sues wh j_ch di vide China and the United States to
determine how they can be recast in new and uncluttered molds.
Unl i~ e my generation, you have already learned much about As i a .
You have a greater awareness of its importance to this nation
and t ~ the w~rld. Furthermore, you have not had the experience
~f nati ~ nal trauma in moving abruptly fr~m an era marked by an
almost fawning benevolence t oward China to one of thorough di.s-enchantment.
You were spared the fierce hostilities which rent
this nat ion i nternally, as a sense of warmth, sympathy, and securi ty
regarding China gave way to fee lings of revul sion, hatred and in-security.
Y::m young Americans and y:mr counterparts in Chi na wi_ll
live your ad ult years in an era in wh 1 ch much of the world's
h 1 story will be written in the Pa ~tf ic . WhRt you do , how you
relate t o one another--Chinese and Ame r icans- -will have much to
do with whether ~ r n ~ t that hi.story is wr i tten in terms of peace
and civilized human survjval.
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 48, Folder 19, Mansfield Libary, University of Montana
- 22 -
I have seen China off and on since I served there in the
Marines in the 1920's. I have seen you, your parents and your
grandparents much closer up and for a much longer period of time.
I am confident about a future that belongs to your
generation, both in China and in this country of ours. This
Republic is worthy of your best efforts not only in terms of
developing Chinese and U. S. relations, but w1 th regard to the
entire world. You can do no more than try to achieve mutual
understanding and a peace with all peoples. You can and should
do no less.
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 48, Folder 19, Mansfield Libary, University of Montana