The Conference Board uses cookies to improve our website, enhance your experience, and deliver relevant messages and offers about our products. Detailed information on the use of cookies on this site is provided in our cookie policy. For more information on how The Conference Board collects and uses personal data, please visit our privacy policy. By continuing to use this Site or by clicking "OK", you consent to the use of cookies.
Detailed information on the use of cookies on this site is provided in our cookie policy and our privacy policy.

While a large number of publicly traded firms in the United States limit the number of multiple directorships held by their board members, the empirical evidence on whether director busyness has any effect on the firm is mixed. While several studies find that “busy” directors are associated with lower firm valuations and less effective monitoring, others either find no such association or offer mixed evidence. This report presents the findings of an experiment examining the shareholder wealth effects of an external increase in the demand for outside directors’ time, providing evidence that independent director busyness matters for firm value.