Soto v. State

Supreme Court of Georgia

April 16, 2018

SOTOv.THE STATE.

PETERSON, JUSTICE.

Armando
Soto appeals his convictions for malice murder and other
crimes in connection with the shooting death of Angelica
Robledo.[1] Soto argues that the evidence was
insufficient to support his malice murder conviction, the
trial court erred in failing to charge on the lesser included
offenses of reckless conduct and terroristic threats, and the
trial court erred in denying his motions in limine to exclude
the victim's statements about being harassed by a
dangerous man and to exclude evidence about his immigration
status. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to
support Soto's convictions and that the trial court did
not err in refusing to charge on the lesser included
offenses. We also conclude that any evidence that was
admitted as a result of the trial court's allegedly
erroneous denial of Soto's motions in limine did not
affect the outcome of the trial. Therefore, we affirm.

Viewed
in the light most favorable to the jury verdicts, the trial
evidence showed the following. The victim, Angelica Robledo,
was estranged from her husband when she began working for
Soto installing carpet. Soto pursued a romantic relationship
with Robledo and harassed and threatened her. Soto routinely
followed her in his white van, bumped her car from behind at
least once, pointed a gun at her after she got off of work,
called her incessantly, and told her that she would not be
with anyone if she would not be with him. He also scratched
an epithet onto Robledo's car, causing more than $500 in
damage.

Robledo
told her friends and cousin about the harassment and threats.
Robledo told one friend, Juan Arriaga, about some of the
incidents, but she refused to identify the assailant to
Arriaga or make a police report. Robledo also declined to
contact the police due to her immigration status. Instead of
contacting the police, Robledo changed her phone number and
asked roommates to meet her outside her residence when she
got off work.

On the
morning of December 29, 2009, Robledo called Arriaga for a
ride so that she could pay her car insurance. After Robledo
made the payment, Arriaga drove her to work. When they
arrived in the parking lot, Soto was waiting in his white
van. Robledo told Arriaga that the driver of the van was the
person who had been following and threatening her and that
the driver was obsessed with her and wanted to be her
boyfriend. Nervous, Robledo asked Arriaga to drop her off
right in front of the store where she worked. When Robledo
got out of the vehicle, Soto pulled in front of Arriaga's
vehicle and began shooting at Robledo. She was hit six times,
including several times in the back. Soto then fired at
Arriaga, hitting the door and the front of Arriaga's
vehicle. Arriaga ducked down and drove away, hitting several
cars in the parking lot.

Police
responded to the shooting and found Arriaga injured and
Robledo unresponsive. Robledo was taken to a hospital, where
she died as a result of her gunshot wounds. A number of .380
shell casings and a .380 bullet were recovered from the crime
scene, a .380 bullet was found on the gurney on which the
Robledo was transported to the hospital, and a .380 bullet
was later removed from Robledo's body during the autopsy.
The police put out a BOLO for a person matching Soto's
description and his white van.

Meanwhile,
Soto went home to pack a few items before leaving Atlanta and
driving west through Alabama and Mississippi. A Mississippi
police officer who received the BOLO report later stopped and
arrested Soto. Police searched the van and found a Llama .380
handgun, .380 rounds, and three shell casings. A GBI firearm
examiner determined that the .380 shell casings and bullets
recovered from the crime scene and autopsy were fired from
Soto's Llama .380 handgun.

Soto
testified at trial and said that he and Robledo had been
dating for about three years until her death. Soto admitted
shooting Robledo, but disputed that he shot her in the back.
He claimed that he shot Robledo because she meant everything
to him and he became jealous and angry after seeing her
embrace and kiss another man. Soto denied ever threatening
Robledo and claimed that he supported her financially and
would follow her home at her request after she had been
drinking because she was afraid of being stopped by the
police. Soto also claimed that he shot at Arriaga because he
thought Arriaga was leaning down to retrieve a gun.

1.
The evidence was sufficient to sustain Soto's
convictions.

Soto
argues that the evidence supported only a conviction for
voluntary manslaughter, not malice murder, because he shot at
Robledo only upon becoming overwhelmed with jealousy after
seeing her embrace and kiss another man. He argues that the
State's claim that he lay in wait and planned the murder
meticulously was belied by surveillance video showing that
the events happened quickly and by evidence that he left
Atlanta with little money and made no effort to disguise
himself.

Voluntary
manslaughter requires some evidence that the defendant acted
"solely as the result of a sudden, violent, and
irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation
sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable
person[.]" OCGA § 16-5-2 (a). Although sexual
jealousy can be provocation sufficient to warrant a
conviction for manslaughter even where the defendant and the
victim are not married, see Culmer v. State, 282 Ga.
330, 335 (4) (647 S.E.2d 30) (2007), it is for the jury to
determine whether the actions alleged to have provoked the
defendant actually occurred and whether these actions were
sufficient provocation to excite the deadly passion of a
reasonable person. See Clough v. State, 298 Ga. 594,
596-597 (2) (783 S.E.2d 637) (2016). Even if there were some
provocation, however, it is not enough that "the
provocation was sufficient to excite the deadly passion in
the particular defendant"; this is both a subjective and
objective standard, as the jury must also conclude that the
provocation would excite a reasonable person.
Bailey v. State, 301 Ga. 476, 480 (IV) (801 S.E.2d
813) (2017).

It is
undisputed that Soto intentionally shot Robledo. Although
Soto claims that he shot Robledo because he was driven into a
rage by seeing the woman he loved embrace and kiss another
man, Arriaga testified that he did not have a romantic
relationship with Robledo and that she merely shook his hand
before exiting his vehicle. But even if Arriaga and Robledo
did embrace and kiss, the jury was nevertheless authorized to
conclude that such provocation would not have excited a
reasonable person to kill. Given the evidence, including
evidence of prior difficulties between Soto and Robledo, the
jury was authorized to conclude that Soto was not acting
solely as the result of a sudden, violent, and irresistible
passion, but that he shot Robledo with malice.

To the
extent Soto also challenges his conviction for aggravated
assault of Arriaga, [2] the evidence was also legally sufficient.
Soto now claims that the act of shooting at Arriaga was
merely negligent, and thus constituted either reckless
conduct or terroristic acts, because he only shot at
Arriaga's truck in an attempt to scare Arriaga so that
Soto could flee. But Soto's testimony was that he
intentionally fired at Arriaga either to repel an attack or
to scare Arriaga so that Soto could escape. And he concedes
that his actions as to Robledo at least constituted voluntary
manslaughter, a felony. That precludes Soto from claiming
self-defense, because a person is not justified in using
force when he is fleeing after the commission or attempted
commission of a felony. See OCGA § 16-3-21 (b) (2). As a
result, and as we explain in more detail in Division 2 below,
the jury was authorized to conclude that Soto's
intentional firing at Arriaga constituted the offense of
aggravated assault. See Anthony v. State, 298 Ga.
827, 829 (1) (785 S.E.2d 277) (2016).

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;2.
The trial court did not err in denying Soto's
requested charges on reckless conduct and ...

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