Chris Lombardi puts defense and security under the spotlight, as he shares his takes on recent NATO and EU cooperation and provides insight into the company’s own long-term strategic partnerships in Europe.

Three trends are currently driving the global electricity sector: decarbonization, decentralization and differentiation. Utilities are making significant contributions to mitigate carbon emissions, while a technology revolution is …

The Blair presidency doomed to fail?

Over the years, thousands of articles must have been written describing Tony Blair as “the most pro-EU British prime minister since Edward Heath”. Now is the time, as he takes over the presidency for the next six months, to ask whether we got it wrong.

A backward glance at Ted Heath’s own attitudes to Europe may put the question into perspective and John Campbell’s magisterial biography of the former Conservative prime minister is the best place to look. “The most radical aspect of Heath’s foreign policy,” he wrote, “was his determination not to have a special relationship with the United States. On the contrary, he was determined to assert Britain’s European identity.”

How different it has been with Blair and his fixation with President George W. Bush. Despite his earlier close relationship with Bill Clinton, who appeared his ideological twin, Blair put out immediate feelers to Bush, on the very day of his still-contested election, in November 2000, to ensure that he would be the first foreign leader invited to the White House after his inauguration in January 2001.

This action set the pattern for all his future conduct. Despite his vaunted pro-Europeanism, Blair has made it crystal clear on every subsequent occasion that if there is a conflict of loyalties between the EU and the US, the latter comes first.

Whereas he has been bold, even feckless, in his support for Bush, he has shown extreme caution in his dealings with the European Union.

This first became clear in relation to the British adoption of the euro. Blair was convinced that this would be in the UK’s own interest, but having perhaps unwisely committed himself to a referendum on the issue during the 1997 election campaign he declined to hold one soon after his victory, when his enormous popularity would surely have ensured a favourable result, despite a negative majority in the opinion polls.

This would have permitted Britain to adopt the euro at the outset and saved a great deal of future doubt and uncertainty. Instead, Blair allowed himself to be intimidated by the Europhobic popular press and agreed to submit the issue to a phoney set of economic tests administered by Gordon Brown’s treasury, which now leaves Britain further away than ever from participation.

The loss which the country has suffered from its self-exclusion from Europe’s ‘level playing field’ has been obscured by the undoubted success of Brown’s other economic policies, which have made it one of the more dynamic economies in the EU. This should not, however, disguise the fact that if the UK was in the eurozone it would be even more prosperous, as its citizens and industry would not have to bear heavy transaction costs on their currency exchanges or suffer permanently higher interest rates.

Blair has shown comparable timidity concerning the constitutional treaty, where he foolishly gave way to demands by the Europhobic press for a referendum, merely to avoid the embarrassment of the treaty becoming an issue in last year’s elections for the European Parliament (the Labour Party did abysmally in them, anyway).

More seriously, Blair’s action led to demands in other countries to follow suit. It is extremely doubtful whether either France or the Netherlands would have had a referendum without Blair’s example. He is largely to blame for the ensuing fiasco.

Finally, on the British rebate. A year ago he took the crass decision to declare it unnegotiable, missing a fine opportunity to win influential allies within the EU by backing the Commission’s proposal for a generalised corrective mechanism. He could then have negotiated on the details to ensure that he got as good a deal as possible for Britain. Instead, he finished up by having either to make a humiliating climb-down or wreck the negotiation. Last month in Brussels he chose the latter course.

It is perhaps poetic justice that in taking over the EU presidency, he has the main responsibility for starting to dig the EU out of the “profound crisis” described by Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker. Unless he shows a far greater commitment to the EU than he has previously, his efforts will be doomed to failure.

The keynote speaker at the 20th anniversary celebration of the European Medicines Agency offered some challenges to conventional thinking about the next 20 years – including carefully calculated provocations of his hosts.