England use of the batting powerplay is short-circuiting their efforts

Andy Flower's reaction to the tie between England and India spoke volumes about his side's limp finish to a great run chase

Billy Bowden lays down the law to India's captain MS Dhoni regarding the positioning of Zaheer Khan, left, during a powerplay in the tied match in Bengaluru. Photograph: Indranil Mukherjee/AFP/Getty Images

Tuesday 1 March 2011 19.06 EST
First published on Tuesday 1 March 2011 19.06 EST

Like many, I was riveted to Sunday's epic contest, an advertisement for 50-over cricket that Madison Avenue's finest would struggle to match. Innings of sustained brilliance, first from Sachin Tendulkar and then Andrew Strauss, and some inspirational bowling from Tim Bresnan and Zaheer Khan set things up for climax that will surely not be challenged during this competition.

For both teams there was relief and disappointment in equal measure, and the realisation that between them they had created something memorable for the millions who witnessed it, which, I suppose, is the reason they became cricketers in the first place. But instead of being drawn to the players for their immediate post-match reaction, it was that of Andy Flower which struck me.

This is not a curmudgeonly man, but his tight-lipped expression spoke volumes: notwithstanding the contributions from Strauss, Bresnan and Ian Bell in particular, he knew that England botched a run-chase of which, until they decided to take their batting powerplay at an inappropriate time, they were in total control. The chance was there and they blew it.

Two differing conclusions have been drawn from the outcome. The first suggests that the nature of the game – England and the pre-tournament favourites hammering themselves into equality – means that both sides have shown the capacity to be potential World Cup winners. My view is rather different, for however thrilling the match was taken in isolation, all I saw were two teams, neither of which possesses the range of requisite skills to challenge the best in subcontinental conditions.

In India, I saw a side whose undeniably stellar batting, particularly on familiar pitches, ought to be able to bat other teams into oblivion but whose generally mediocre bowling and pedestrian fielding was unable to defend 338 against a batting side as lacking in depth as England's.

In England, I saw a thin bowling attack, shallow batting, and fielding that has yet to come up to scratch. Thus far at any rate, neither look a patch on South Africa, for whom Imran Tahir is a huge bonus, or even Sri Lanka, or Pakistan or Australia.

That said, Strauss was a revelation. I can own up to misgivings about his value at the top of the order in 50-over cricket, a judgment based on his reluctance or inability to hit over the top with a field set tight, and relative weakness when hitting down the ground off the front foot, all of which ought to be fundamental to the armoury of anyone opening the batting in Asian conditions, where the new ball is there to be plundered.

Instead, his 158 means that Strauss now has three of the five highest scores by an England player in this form of the game. The six he hit over long-on was only his 23rd in 122 matches but it was a decent blow by any standard, particularly so in what is an uncharted area for him. So, all in all, I can but tip my hat to the captain and chew on the humble pie.

What struck me, however, was the way in which India bowled short and wide to a batsman that they know hangs on the back foot looking to cut and pull. Better bowling sides will surely be less accommodating.

In the end, though, it was the batting powerplay, or at least the timing of it, that proved to be England's undoing. These five overs are a moveable feast, something to be used tactically but an area which no side as yet appear to have mastered.

In theory, it gives an advantage to the batting team because the field has to be brought in. In practice, however, it is proving to be as much a hindrance to progress as an asset. Timing is everything. Ideally, two batsmen need to be well set. In the first innings, given a reluctance to take it as early as possible – could they use it after 10 overs and put the onus on the fielding side for the bowling powerplay? – providing there are wickets in hand, and the pitch is good.

An ideal time would seem to be around 34 overs, when the reconditioned ball is brought into play, which in theory should go better from the bat. When chasing, however, it is less clear-cut. If things are not going well, then it can be used as a resort to try to shift the impetus. In the case of England on Sunday this was not necessary as Strauss and Bell were going along so comfortably that they would actually view the powerplay as an encumbrance.

In this kind of circumstance, where India were on the receiving end of a large partnership, and England just two wickets down and cruising home, I still find it astonishing that the fielding captain does not consider creating a powerplay of his own by bringing the field in rather than leaving it spread and hoping for a mistake.

As often as not, the imperative to start finding the boundary leads to a fall of wickets. Why England took the powerplay when they did, after 42 overs, is still not clear, apart from the fact that Bell was cramping up. But was that reason enough?

The closer they could get to the total without taking it, the greater the chance of the win was my interpretation at the time. The three overs thus gained might well have guaranteed the victory. Instead, the wickets of Bell and Strauss fell to successive deliveries and what seemed like a simple task was derailed. It was naïve.