LONDON (MarketWatch) — The U.S. administration is three parts wrong and one part right in its criticism of Germany over its allegedly undervalued euro. Mistake No. 1 is sadly symptomatic of Donald Trump’s early policies. The president and his advisers appear all too ready to lash out at others about problems largely of America’s own making.

The dollar
DXY, -0.46%
has been appreciating by around 10% a year in trade-weighted real (inflation-adjusted) terms over the past 2 1/2 years. This is one of the most dramatic periods of exchange-rate fluctuations since the Second World War. The widespread belief that Trump will follow unbalanced fiscal policies, encouraging the Federal Reserve to accelerate monetary tightening, is one of the primary reasons for the dollar’s further rise since November.

The euro
EURUSD, +0.7313%
is certainly lower than the German currency would be if the Germans were outside economic and monetary union — but it is wrong to say that Germany has become grotesquely more competitive in recent years. Statistics from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development indicate that Germany’s competitiveness, measured by real unit labor costs, has hardly changed since 2010, while the U.S. has become 20% less competitive.

Trump and his advisers, rather than attacking others, should turn a self-reflecting lens towards themselves. That is unlikely for the time being. However, at some stage during Trump’s four-year term, wisdom may prevail. The dollar will surely fall of its own volition, just as it did eventually three decades ago in the helter skelter years of Ronald Reagan, marked by the Plaza accord of 1985 that capped damaging dollar strength.

In one aspect of currency-market invective, the Americans have got a point, in indicating that the eurozone distorts interest rates and exchange rates through one-size-fits-all monetary policies. Interest rates were undoubtedly too high for Germany during the first few years of EMU after it started in 1999. And they too low for the Germans at the moment, as Wolfgang Schäuble, the German finance minister, said in a weekend interview.

Schäuble and Jens Weidmann, the Bundesbank president, blame the euro’s relative weakness on the European Central Bank’s quantitative easing through large-scale government bond purchases. These are keeping overall European interest rates lower than they would otherwise be. But neither man can do much about it.

ECB policies are set by Mario Draghi, the president, and the rest of the 25-person governing council. Weidmann, part of a small minority arguing for tightening, will not anytime soon command sufficient votes to get his way.

QE — and a structurally weak euro — seem likely to last all year. The ECB wants to prop up weaker countries and their banking systems rather than normalizing interest rates. The consequence will be higher inflation in Germany than in the rest of the eurozone, and a fall in German competitiveness. These outcomes may not appeal to Schäuble and other Berlin politicians, but they are necessary (though insufficient) to maintain some kind of order in the euro system.

In two other fields of the euro debate, Trump’s team could use some correction.

First, comments on Germany’s role in instigating a “grossly undervalued” euro are likely to encourage other European countries to sharpen their habitual assault on alleged German selfishness. This will exacerbate divisions in Europe, polarize splits in Germany among backers of “more” and “less” Europe , drive more voters towards the anti-euro party Alternative for Germany and impede constructive solutions for the continent’s malaise .

Second, the American broadside neglects to consider that Germany itself is harmed by circumstances that direct resources unduly into exports, where the country is successful but vulnerable, and insufficiently into reinforcing domestic demand.

Germany’s current account surplus of 9% of gross domestic product, the biggest in the world in dollar terms, underlines an uncomfortable disequilibrium caused by EMU but extending far beyond it. Three-quarters of Germany’s current-account surplus last year was with seven counties — the U.S., the U.K. , France, Sweden, Austria, Canada and Denmark — five of which are outside the eurozone.

This year will be the 12th consecutive year in which Germany registers a surplus around or higher than 6% of GDP, making a mockery of the Europe’s pretence of controlling macroeconomic imbalances.

Wise German thinkers — including Schäuble himself — realize that years of current-account surpluses are not good news for Germany. The country has amassed €1.5 trillion in net foreign assets (half of this through poorly secured intra-ECB Target-2 lending), important parts of which will probably be unrepayable.

Both the Americans and the Germans should be talking about the perils of these kind of imbalances. Sooner or later, the world will need another Plaza agreement to bring down the too-high dollar. Some early practicing of international coordination would be welcome.

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