Search form

Hugs for Pyongyang

This article originally appeared in the Washington Times,
October 4, 1999.

Northeast Asia will never be fully secure until the communist
dictatorship of North Korea passes from the scene. That the
so-called Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is able to
create so much unease, even in the capital of the world’s sole
superpower, by threatening one missile test demonstrates the
foolhardiness of America’s continued entanglement in essentially
peripheral security matters. Washington should begin disengaging
from the region’s unsettling quarrels.

By any normal measure, the DPRK should be irrelevant. Bankrupt,
starving, and bereft of allies, Pyongyang is becoming the least of
nations.

Arrayed against it is an imposing coalition. The Republic of
Korea (ROK) possesses 30 times the GDP and twice the population of
the North. Japan is the world’s second-ranking economic power with
a limited but potent military. Russia was once allied with
Pyongyang, but is now shipping weapons to Seoul to pay off its
debts. China has far greater economic links - trade and investment
- with the South.

The DPRK does possess a numerically large army, supplemented by
missile development and atomic research programs. There is,
however, little behind this seemingly imposing edifice. Pyongyang’s
conventional capabilities have fallen sharply, while its nuclear
program is only presumed. North Korea’s missiles are few in number
and highly inaccurate.

The North’s real trump is its willingness to play the game of
high brinkmanship. Although the new weapon probably could hit
Alaska, it is North Korea that would disappear in a radioactive
cloud. Moreover, the DPRK already possesses a missile capable of
hitting both the South and Japan. The prospective missile test
looks to be just one more attempt to shake loose some of the West’s
spare change.

For all of the perversities of North Korean behavior, the
regime’s conduct remains far more benign than in the past. The
administration has an opportunity to reconfigure present policy
with the completion of former Defense Secretary William Perry’s
review of U.S. policy towards the North.

America’s overriding goal should be to maintain peace on the
peninsula until North Korea falls into the great dustbin of
history. To encourage that end, modest concessions like the easing
of sanctions proposed by the administration are good investments.
But Washington should reverse today’s dynamic, under which
Pyongyang misbehaves in the hope of receiving more benefits.

Although the United States and its allies should continue
discussing planned missile tests with the DPRK - North Korea has
agreed to temporarily halt such launches - they should not provide
an explicit quid pro quo. Instead, they should indicate that a
number of benefits will be forthcoming if Pyongyang stops
needlessly antagonizing its neighbors.

The allies should give the DPRK increasing benefits when it
behaves, not when it misbehaves. Should it revert to its policy of
disruptive belligerence, all three countries should retaliate
quickly but quietly.

They should adopt an official attitude of insouciance - who
cares what the North does? However, without public fanfare or
threats, which would likely make the North more obdurate, the
allied states should slow or suspend positive movement on other
issues.

The goal should be to squeeze the North, but not too hard.
Again, the objective is to push the DPRK toward a more positive
stance without creating either a potentially violent implosion or
causing it to strike out. For the same reason the United States and
its allies should fulfill their commitments under the Framework
Accord. Welshing, and thereby risking a restart of the nuclear
crisis, would benefit no one.

Over the long term Washington should disentangle itself from
Northeast Asia. The United States should step back, leaving Seoul
and Tokyo to take the lead in dealing with the North. More
important, Washington should develop a phased withdrawal program
for its troops, and terminate the defense treaty when the pullout
is complete.

The ROK should then challenge the North to respond positively by
demobilizing some army units and withdrawing some advanced forces
from the Demilitarized Zone. The South’s private message should be
more blunt: negotiate for serious arms reduction, or face a
crushing arms race (including missile development) which North
Korea cannot win. And the ROK and Japan should expand security
cooperation that, despite some recent positive steps, remains
minimal.

Pyongyang’s expressed willingness to back off its planned
missile test offers only a temporary respite in a continuing game
of international chicken. The United States should begin shifting
responsibility for security in Northeast Asia onto its allies, who
benefit the most from stability. The Cold War is over; it is time
to terminate America’s obsolete Cold War deployment in Korea.