1. Uncompensated
obedience to a regulation enacted for the public safety, or which may hereafter
be enacted, under the police power of the state, is not a taking or damaging
without just compensation of private property, or private property affected
with a public interest. Syllabus Point 7, City of Welch v. Norfolk & W.
Ry. Co., 104 W.Va. 660, 140 S.E. 839 (1927).

2. All citizens hold property
subject to the proper exercise of the police power for the common good. Even
where such an exercise results in substantial diminution of property values,
an owner has no right to compensation therefor. Syllabus Point 1, Kingmill
Valley Public Serv. v. Riverview, 182 W.Va. 116, 386 S.E.2d 483 (1989).

3. A statute should be
so read and applied as to make it accord with the spirit, purposes, and objects
of the general system of law of which it is intended to form a part; it being
presumed that the legislators who drafted and passed it were familiar with all
existing law applicable to the subject-matter, whether constitutional, statutory,
or common, and intended the statute to harmonize completely with the same and
aid in the effectuation of the general purpose and design thereof, if its terms
are consistent therewith. Syllabus Point 5, State v. Snyder, 64
W.Va. 659, 63 S.E. 385 (1908).

Per Curiam:

Appellants appeal
the April 25, 2003, order of the Circuit Court of Preston County that denied
Appellants' complaint for declaratory judgment and ruled that Appellee Town
of Masontown complied with all notice requirements prior to its approval
of a new sewer system to which Appellants are compelled to connect. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm the circuit court.

I.

FACTS

Appellants and plaintiffs
below (See footnote
1) are Preston County citizens who live a short distance outside
of Appellee Town of Masontown (hereafter Appellee, Masontown, or Town).
Appellee avers that Appellants are residents of an unincorporated area known
as the Bretz area. (See
footnote 2) Appellants, on the other hand, claim that they
do not live in the Bretz area but that their area of residence is separated from
Masontown by the Bretz area. The parties agree, however, that Appellants do not
live within the corporate limits of Masontown. Appellants are not currently connected
to any sewer system, but instead have individual septic systems.

On December 21, 1999, Appellee
filed with the Public Service Commission (hereafter PSC) an application
for a certificate of convenience and necessity for the construction of a
new sewer system. On January 5, 2000, a legal notice of Masontown's application
for a certificate of convenience and necessity appeared in The Preston
County Journal, a weekly newspaper of general circulation. By final order
dated January 23, 2000, the PSC approved Masontown's application. The certificate
of convenience and necessity indicates that the sewer project is funded through
revenue bonds and grants pursuant to W.Va. Code § 16-13-1 et seq. The
revenue bonds of Masontown were created by ordinance pursuant to W.Va. Code § 16-13-5
(1933) and adopted by Masontown's council on July 11, 2001. Pursuant to W.Va.
Code § 16-13-6 (1981), legal notice of the ordinance was published in The
Preston County Journal on July 18, and July 25, 2001, and a public hearing
was held on the ordinance on July 30, 2001.

In July of 2002, Appellants
filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in the Circuit Court of Preston
County requesting the circuit court to declare that they could not be compelled
pursuant to W.Va. Code § 8-18-22 (1999) (See
footnote 3) to connect to Masontown's new sewer system. Under W.Va. Code § 8-18-22, the owner of a parcel which abuts
on any street on which a municipal sewer is located may be compelled by the
municipality to connect with the sewer (See
footnote 4) even if the parcel of land is located outside
of the municipality. In their complaint, Appellants argued that Masontown
failed to give proper notice under W.Va. Code § 8-18-3 (1969), prior
to the Town's resolution to apply to the PSC for a certificate of convenience
and necessity, that Appellants' properties would be affected by the new sewer
system.

After oral argument and
the submission of legal memoranda with accompanying documents and affidavits,
the circuit court of Preston County denied Appellants' complaint for declaratory
judgment. Specifically, the circuit court found that Masontown did not fund
its sewer system by an assessment on abutting landowners. As a result, the
notice provision of W.Va. Code § 8-18-3 does not apply. Instead, the
circuit court found that the sewer system was funded with bonds and grants
pursuant to W.Va. Code § 16-13-1. Accordingly, the notice provision in W.Va. Code § 16-13-6 (1981) (See
footnote 5) is applicable. The circuit court concluded:

The Town
of Masontown complied with all notice requirements under its application for
Certificate of Convenience and Necessity and Revenue Bond Ordinance. While the matter
of notices to Plaintiffs could have been better handled and could have been
more specific, the Court finds and concludes that the Plaintiffs did have
notice of [Masontown's] application for Certificate of Convenience and Necessity,
did have the right to protest to the PSC, and did receive all notices required
by the PSC and the West Virginia Code.

Shortly after the circuit court's ruling, Appellants received notices from
Masontown that they must connect to the new sewer system. Appellants now
appeal the circuit court's order denying them declaratory relief.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court has held,

In reviewing
challenges to the findings and conclusions of the circuit court, we apply a two-prong
deferential standard of review. We review the final order and the ultimate disposition
under an abuse of discretion standard, and we review the circuit court's underlying
factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard. Questions of law are subject
to a de novo review.

The sole issue before
this Court is whether Masontown gave proper notice to Appellants, prior to
approval of its new sewer system, that Appellants would have to connect to
the system. Appellants first assert that they were due personal notice and
an opportunity to be heard under constitutional due process principles. According
to Appellants, they have a property interest which is affected by the requirement
that they connect to the new sewer system. Specifically, they will lose the
value of their existing septic systems and will be required to permanently
pay monthly sewage fees over which they have little or no control. Therefore,
Appellants claim that Masontown was required to provide them with personal
notice and a hearing on the proposed sewer system prior to the Town's application
to the PSC for a certificate of convenience and necessity.

We find no merit to Appellants'
constitutional argument. First, we do not believe that the mandatory connection
to Masontown's new sewer system and the resulting abandonment of Appellants'
septic systems constitute a taking for constitutional purposes. This Court
long ago recognized that [u]ncompensated obedience to a regulation
enacted for the public safety, or which may hereafter be enacted, under the
police power of the state, is not a taking or damaging without just compensation
of private property, or private property affected with a public interest. Syllabus Point 7, City of Welch
v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 104 W.Va. 660, 140 S.E. 839 (1927). Clearly,
it is within the police power of the State to regulate sewer systems and
to delegate this power to subordinate public entities such as municipalities. See
West Virginia W. Service Co. v. Cunningham, 143 W.Va. 1, 98 S.E.2d
891 (1957) (holding that a municipal ordinance creating a sanitary board
and authorizing this board to contract for the construction of a sewage
system is within the police power of the State).

In Kingmill Valley Public
Serv. v. Riverview, 182 W.Va. 116, 386 S.E.2d 483 (1989), we addressed
the question of whether the owner of a private sewer system who has been
compelled to join the sewer lines of a public service district may claim
that the disuse of its system constitutes a de facto taking and
recover its value from the public service district. In Kingmill, the
appellant mobile home park alleged that the forced abandonment of its privately
owned sewage treatment facility constituted an unlawful taking of private
property in violation of Article III, Section 9 of the Constitution of
West Virginia and sought to recover from the public service district the
value of its system which the parties stipulated to be worth $33,700.00.
This Court concluded that the mandatory connection to the public service
district's sewer system and the forced abandonment of the private system
was not a taking and held in Syllabus Point 1 that [a]ll citizens
hold property subject to the proper exercise of the police power for the
common good. Even where such an exercise results in substantial diminution of property values, an owner has no right to compensation
therefor. Accordingly, we find that Appellants' mandatory connection
to Masontown's sewer system and the forced abandonment of Appellants' septic
systems do not amount to a constitutional taking of Appellants' property.

Second, we conclude that
Appellants were not due personal notice and a hearing under constitutional
principles prior to Masontown's approval of its new sewer system. In the Kingmill decision
noted above, this Court discussed the case of Hutchinson v. City of Valdosta, 227
U.S. 303, 33 S.Ct. 290, 57 L.Ed. 520 (1913). In Hutchinson, the City
of Valdosta, Georgia, passed an ordinance requiring owners of homes abutting
upon any street along which sewer mains had been laid to install toilets
in their houses and to connect the same to the public sewer lines within
30 days from the date of passage of the ordinance. In reviewing this ordinance,
the Supreme Court found that it was a valid exercise of the police power
and that it did not deny due process even though it afforded no prior personal
notice or an opportunity to be heard. The Court explained:

It is the commonest exercise
of the police power of a State or city to provide for a system of sewers and
to compel property owners to connect therewith. . . . It may be that an arbitrary
exercise of the power could be restrained, but it would have to be palpably so
to justify a court in interfering with so salutary a power and one so necessary
to the public health.

Hutchinson, 227 U.S. at 308, 33 S.Ct. at 292. Numerous state
courts have followed [the Supreme Court's] holding that personal notice and
a hearing are not required prior to ordering connection to a public sewer system. Alperstein v. Three
Lakes Water & Sanitation, 710 P.2d 1186, 1189 (Colo.Ct.App. 1985), citing
Nourse v. City of Russellville, 257 Ky. 525, 78 S.W.2d 761 (1935); Weber
City Sanitation Commission v. Craft, 196 Va. 1140, 87 S.E.2d 153 (1955); Houpt
v. County of Stephenson, 63 Ill.App.3d 792, 20 Ill.Dec. 851, 380 N.E.2d
1060 (1978). In Alperstein, the court relied on Hutchinson in
rejecting the plaintiffs' claim that the due process clauses of the United
States and Colorado Constitutions prohibit the sanitation district from
compelling any owners of property located within its boundaries to connect
to its sewer lines absent individual notice and the opportunity to be heard
at a judicial-type hearing. See also McNeill v. Harnett Co., 327
N.C. 552, 398 S.E.2d 475 (N.C. 1990) (concluding that statutes and ordinances
which were passed without notice and an opportunity to be heard and which
mandate connections to sewer lines as well as the payment of related connection
charges and user fees are consistent with federal due process protections
and are a valid exercise of the police power).

During oral argument before
this Court, counsel for Appellants sought to distinguish Hutchinson from
the instant case on the basis that the plaintiffs in Hutchinson who
were compelled to connect to the town's sewer system lived within town limits
whereas Appellants live outside the corporate limits of Masontown. We believe
that this distinction is legally insignificant. The Supreme Court in Hutchinson hinged
its decision on the police power of a state or a city to provide for sewer
systems and to compel property owners to connect to these systems. Our Legislature has expressly provided municipalities
with the authority to construct sewer systems outside of their corporate
limits and to compel property owners located outside of their corporate limits
to connect to those systems. (See
footnote 6) Accordingly, based on Hutchinson and
the numerous decisions that follow Hutchinson, we find that Appellants
had no constitutional due process right to personal notice and an opportunity
to be heard before Masontown approved the construction of its new sewer system.

Next, Appellants assert
that Masontown failed to give notice to them pursuant to W.Va. Code § 8-18-3
(1969), which provides, in part:

Before
the adoption of such ordinance or resolution of necessity or convenience, the
governing body shall cause notice to be given to owners or abutting property
that such ordinance or resolution will be considered before adoption at a public
meeting of the governing body at a date, time and place named in the notice and
that all persons shall at that meeting, or an adjournment thereof, be given an
opportunity to protest or be heard concerning the adoption or rejection of said
ordinance or resolution. Such notice to owners of property abutting on the portion
of the street, alley, public way or easement, or sewer right-of-way or easement,
to be improved may be by service on such owners in the manner in which process
commencing a civil action under the laws of this State is permitted to be served
at least ten days before said meeting. In lieu of such service of such notice,
the following described notice, or one in substantially the same form, may be
given, and shall be deemed to have been served on all such owners of abutting
property, by publication of such notice as a Class II legal advertisement in
compliance with the provisions of article three [§§ 59-3-1 et seq.], chapter fifty-nine of this code, and the publication area for such
publication shall be such municipality[.]

Appellee responds, and the circuit court found, that the notice provisions
in W.Va. Code § 8-18-3, relied upon by Appellants, are not applicable
here because these provisions apply only to sewer systems paid for by assessments
on properties. Here, there are no such assessments. Rather, Masontown's new
sewer system was paid for by grants and a bond issuance as provided for in
W.Va. Code §§16-13-1, et seq.

The circuit court's
construction of W.Va. Code § 8-18-3 is correct. We have held,

A statute
should be so read and applied as to make it accord with the spirit, purposes,
and objects of the general system of law of which it is intended to form a part;
it being presumed that the legislators who drafted and passed it were familiar
with all existing law applicable to the subject-matter, whether constitutional,
statutory, or common, and intended the statute to harmonize completely with the
same and aid in the effectuation of the general purpose and design thereof, if
its terms are consistent therewith.

Syllabus Point 5, State v. Snyder, 64 W.Va. 659, 63 S.E. 385 (1908).
Chapter 8, article 18 of the West Virginia Code pertains to, in relevant
part, assessments to improve sewer systems. Specifically, W.Va. Code § 8-18-1
(1969) authorizes municipalities to construct sewer systems and to assess
the cost on abutting property owners. According to W.Va. Code § 8-18-10
(1969), the property abutting the sewer right-of-way shall be subject to
a lien, from the date of the ordinance or resolution laying the assessment,
which has priority over all other liens except for land taxes due the State, county, municipality or preexisting
special assessments.

The record shows that Masontown
did not assess the cost of its new sewer system on abutting properties under
W.Va. Code §§ 8-18-1 et seq. Instead, it funded its sewer
project through revenue bonds and grants pursuant to W.Va. Code § 16-13-1 et
seq. According to W.Va. Code § 16-13-1(a)(2)(b) (2001), municipalities
are authorized to pay for construction of sewer systems and to issue bonds
to pay the cost of the systems. Pursuant to W.Va. Code § 16-13-15 (1986),
the payment of the bonds and interest thereon shall be paid from the revenues
of the sewer system which have been placed in a special fund for solely that
purpose. Therefore, because the cost of construction of Masontown's sewer
system was not paid for by assessment of the cost on Appellants, they are
not due notice and a hearing as set forth in W.Va. Code § 8-18-3. (See
footnote 7)
Appellants contend, however,
that W.Va. Code § 8-18-3 applies because even though Masontown did not directly
assess the costs of the sewer system, it issued bonds for the project which are
paid off by the fees charged the users of the new system. This argument must fail. The Legislature clearly set forth the statutory meaning
of assessment for the purposes of Chapter 8, article 18 of the
West Virginia Code and it does not include the issuance of bonds to pay for
a new sewer system which, as noted above, is provided for in a separate section
of the West Virginia Code. (See
footnote 8)

In sum, we determine that
Masontown did not violate constitutional due process principles in failing
to give Appellants personal notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to
approval of the construction of Masontown's new sewer system to which Appellants
are compelled to connect. (See
footnote 9) We also find that Masontown did not err in
failing to give notice and an opportunity to be heard pursuant to W.Va. Code § 8-18-3
inasmuch as that code section is not applicable to the financing of Masontown's
sewer system.

Finally, we note that the
issue herein is limited to the propriety and opportunity to be heard provided
Appellants by Masontown. Appellants did not allege in their declaratory action below or before this Court that the Public Service Commission
(hereafter PSC) failed to give Appellants proper notice. (See
footnote 10) The record shows that Masontown filed its
application for a certificate of convenience and necessity on or about December
21, 1999, and on January 5, 2000, the PSC published the required legal notice
of the application in The Preston County Journal. This legal notice,
however, nowhere specifies that the construction of the new sewer system
will affect areas outside of Masontown's corporate limits. We believe that
in the future it would be preferable for such legal notices to state with
greater specificity the areas that will be affected by the construction of
new sewer systems. (See
footnote 11) Specific notices by both the PSC and the municipalities
seeking to construct new sewer systems will doubtless prevent the kind of
misunderstandings and resulting litigation which occurred in this case. (See
footnote 12)

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons
set forth above, we affirm the April 25, 2003, order of the Circuit Court
of Preston County that denied Appellants' complaint for declaratory judgment.

Appellants
herein are Juanita Buda, James and Pamela Friend, James and Janice Polce,
Harold and Donna Rehe, and Terry and Sharalyn Shreve.Footnote: 2

The
circuit court found that Appellants live in the Masontown-Bretz area.Footnote: 3

According
to W.Va. Code § 8-18-22 (1999), in effect when the matters in this case
arose:
The owner
or owners of any lot or parcel of land abutting on any street, alley, public
way or easement on which a municipal sewer is now located or may hereafter be
constructed and laid (whether constructed and laid under the provisions of this
article or any other provisions of law) upon which lot or parcel of land any
business or residence building is now located or may hereafter be erected, not
connected with a public sewer, may be required and compelled by the municipality
or by the board of health to connect any such building with such sewer. Notice
so to connect shall be given by the municipality or by the board of health to
the owner and to the lessee or occupant of such building. Each day's failure
to comply with such notice and connect with such sewer by such owner or owners,
after thirty days from the receipt of such notice, shall be a misdemeanor and
a separate and new offense under this section, and each such offense shall be
punishable by a fine of not less than five nor more than twenty-five dollars.
Jurisdiction to hear, try, determine and sentence for any violation of this section
is hereby vested in the police or municipal court thereof when the lot or parcel
of land is within the municipality, or, where no police court or municipal court
exists, in the mayor thereof: Provided, That if said lot or parcel is located
outside of the municipality, then jurisdiction shall be vested in the circuit
court of the county wherein the lot or parcel is situated.

This code section was amended effective June 10, 2004. The amended version
added, Regardless of whether a lot or parcel is within any municipality's
geographical limits to the first sentence. Also, the new version deletes
the third and fourth sentences concerning fines for failure to connect within
specified time periods and who has jurisdiction to try the alleged violations
for failure to connect. Finally, the new version adds the following:

The owner or owners shall
connect to the municipal sewer within thirty days after notice to connect
has been sent by the municipality. Regardless of whether the owner or owners
connect to such sewer, the municipality may bill the owner or owners of the
lot or parcel and the owner or owners shall pay the municipality's charge
based on the actual water consumption on the lot or parcel. If the lot or
parcel is not metered, the

municipality's charge shall be based on the municipality's good faith estimate
of the consumption on the lot or parcel.

Appellants do not challenge the constitutionality of this code section.

According
to W.Va. Code §16-13-1 (2001), municipalities have the authority to
own, acquire, construct, equip, operate and maintain sewer systems within
and/or without their corporate limits. In addition, W.Va. Code §16-13-22
(2001), provides that municipalities have jurisdiction for the purposes
of sewage and stormwater works 20 miles outside their corporate limits
in areas from which stormwater affects or drains into the municipality.
Appellants do not challenge the constitutionality of these provisions.Footnote: 5

Pursuant
to W.Va. Code § 16-13-5 (1933), before a municipality constructs a
sewer system, it must enact an ordinance which, inter alia, directs that
revenue bonds shall be issued in such an amount as may be found necessary
to pay for the cost of the sewer system. Concerning notice of this ordinance,
W.Va. Code § 16-13-6 (1981) states:

After
such ordinance shall have been adopted, an abstract of the ordinance, determined
by the governing body to contain sufficient information as to give notice of
the contents of such ordinance, together with the following described notice,
shall be published as a Class II legal advertisement in compliance with the provisions
of article three [§§ 59-3-1 et seq.], chapter fifty- nine of this Code,
and the publication area for such publication shall be the municipality. The
notice shall state that said ordinance has been adopted, and that the municipality
contemplates the issuance of the bonds described in the ordinance, and that any
person interested may appear before the governing body upon a certain date, which
shall not be less than ten days subsequent to the first date of publication of
such abstract and notice which shall not be prior to the last date of publication
of such abstract and notice, and present protests. At such hearing all objections
and suggestions shall be heard and the governing body shall take such action
as it shall deem proper in the premises: Provided, however, That if at such a
hearing written protest is filed by thirty percent or more of the owners of real
estate situate in said municipality, then the governing body of said municipality
shall not take further action unless four fifths of the qualified members of
the said governing body assent thereto.

The circuit court found, and the record shows, that Masontown published a legal
notice of the public hearing on the bond ordinance in The Preston County Journal on
July 18 and July 25, 2001.Footnote: 6

In
contrast, W.Va. Code § 8-18-22, set forth in n. 3, supra, does apply
to compel Appellants to connect to Masontown's sewer system because, according
to its plain terms, it applies to any municipal sewer whether constructed
and laid under the provisions of this article or any other provisions of
law.Footnote: 8

Also,
Appellants argue that if the notice requirements of W.Va. Code § 8-18-3
are not applicable, Masontown had no statutory notice requirements which,
they claim, is contrary to constitutional due process. We have previously
disposed of Appellant's constitutional arguments.Footnote: 9

Appellants
also contend that their right to present evidence was denied by the circuit
court in this matter because the circuit court did not hold an evidentiary
hearing for Appellants to establish that they did not receive actual or
specific notice of the proposed sewer project. Because we have found no
error in the circuit court's order, we do not deem it necessary to consider
this issue. Footnote: 10

According
to W.Va. Code § 24-2-1 (2003), the PSC's jurisdiction extends to sewer
systems servicing 25 or more persons or firms other than the owner of the
sewer systems. No municipality shall construct a sewer system over which
the PSC has jurisdiction until it obtains from the PSC a certificate of
public convenience and necessity requiring construction of the new system.
The PSC is to give notice of this application in the proposed area of operation
by Class I legal advertisement which states that a formal hearing may be
waived in the absence of protest, made within 30 days, to the application. See W.Va.
Code § 24-2-11 (1983).Footnote: 11

We
emphasize that the PSC should be extremely careful to ensure that the notice
required by W.Va. Code § 24-2-11 is meaningful and effective. This
means that the notice should indicate which persons in which areas will
be affected by the proposed sewer project regardless of whether these persons
are located inside or outside of the municipality applying for the certificate
of public convenience and necessity.Footnote: 12

There
are exhibits in the record that appear to suggest that at least some of
the Appellants had actual notice that Masontown's proposed new sewer system
would include areas outside of the Town's corporate limits. For example,
there is a copy of the minutes of a July 10, 1997, Masontown Town Council meeting in which it is recorded
that Appellant Janice Polce and others who reside outside of Masontown questioned
why their area had to be included in the proposed sewer project. There is
also a copy of a petition which indicates that We, the people of Bretz
and outlying areas do not wish to be included in Masontown's waste water
treatment project. Signatures on the list include those of Appellants
Terry and Sharalyn Shreve and Janice Polce. Finally, there is a copy of a
legal notice which appeared in The Preston County Journal on February 24
and March 3, 1999, the stated purpose of which was to provide notice to Masontown
residents and residents of the Bretz area on the plans for the sewer
project.