FEDERALIST No. 21

HAVING in the three last numbers taken a summary review of the
principal circumstances and events which have depicted the genius
and fate of other confederate governments, I shall now proceed
in the enumeration of the most important of those defects which
have hitherto disappointed our hopes from the system established
among ourselves. To form a safe and satisfactory judgment of the
proper remedy, it is absolutely necessary that we should be well
acquainted with the extent and malignity of the disease.

The next most palpable defect of the subsisting Confederation,
is the total want of a SANCTION to its laws. The United States,
as now composed, have no powers to exact obedience, or punish
disobedience to their resolutions, either by pecuniary mulcts,
by a suspension or divestiture of privileges, or by any other
constitutional mode. There is no express delegation of authority
to them to use force against delinquent members; and if such a
right should be ascribed to the federal head, as resulting from
the nature of the social compact between the States, it must be
by inference and construction, in the face of that part of the
second article, by which it is declared, "that each State shall
retain every power, jurisdiction, and right, not EXPRESSLY delegated
to the United States in Congress assembled." There is, doubtless,
a striking absurdity in supposing that a right of this kind does
not exist, but we are reduced to the dilemma either of embracing
that supposition, preposterous as it may seem, or of contravening
or explaining away a provision, which has been of late a repeated
theme of the eulogies of those who oppose the new Constitution;
and the want of which, in that plan, has been the subject of much
plausible animadversion, and severe criticism. If we are unwilling
to impair the force of this applauded provision, we shall be obliged
to conclude, that the United States afford the extraordinary spectacle
of a government destitute even of the shadow of constitutional
power to enforce the execution of its own laws. It will appear,
from the specimens which have been cited, that the American Confederacy,
in this particular, stands discriminated from every other institution
of a similar kind, and exhibits a new and unexampled phenomenon
in the political world.

The want of a mutual guaranty of the State governments is another
capital imperfection in the federal plan. There is nothing of
this kind declared in the articles that compose it; and to imply
a tacit guaranty from considerations of utility, would be a still
more flagrant departure from the clause which has been mentioned,
than to imply a tacit power of coercion from the like considerations.
The want of a guaranty, though it might in its consequences endanger
the Union, does not so immediately attack its existence as the
want of a constitutional sanction to its laws.

Without a guaranty the assistance to be derived from the Union
in repelling those domestic dangers which may sometimes threaten
the existence of the State constitutions, must be renounced. Usurpation
may rear its crest in each State, and trample upon the liberties
of the people, while the national government could legally do
nothing more than behold its encroachments with indignation and
regret. A successful faction may erect a tyranny on the ruins
of order and law, while no succor could constitutionally be afforded
by the Union to the friends and supporters of the government.
The tempestuous situation from which Massachusetts has scarcely
emerged, evinces that dangers of this kind are not merely speculative.
Who can determine what might have been the issue of her late convulsions,
if the malcontents had been headed by a Caesar or by a Cromwell?
Who can predict what effect a despotism, established in Massachusetts,
would have upon the liberties of New Hampshire or Rhode Island,
of Connecticut or New York?

The inordinate pride of State importance has suggested to some
minds an objection to the principle of a guaranty in the federal
government, as involving an officious interference in the domestic
concerns of the members. A scruple of this kind would deprive
us of one of the principal advantages to be expected from union,
and can only flow from a misapprehension of the nature of the
provision itself. It could be no impediment to reforms of the
State constitution by a majority of the people in a legal and
peaceable mode. This right would remain undiminished. The guaranty
could only operate against changes to be effected by violence.
Towards the preventions of calamities of this kind, too many checks
cannot be provided. The peace of society and the stability of
government depend absolutely on the efficacy of the precautions
adopted on this head. Where the whole power of the government
is in the hands of the people, there is the less pretense for
the use of violent remedies in partial or occasional distempers
of the State. The natural cure for an ill-administration, in a
popular or representative constitution, is a change of men. A
guaranty by the national authority would be as much levelled against
the usurpations of rulers as against the ferments and outrages
of faction and sedition in the community.

The principle of regulating the contributions of the States to
the common treasury by QUOTAS is another fundamental error in
the Confederation. Its repugnancy to an adequate supply of the
national exigencies has been already pointed out, and has sufficiently
appeared from the trial which has been made of it. I speak of
it now solely with a view to equality among the States. Those
who have been accustomed to contemplate the circumstances which
produce and constitute national wealth, must be satisfied that
there is no common standard or barometer by which the degrees
of it can be ascertained. Neither the value of lands, nor the
numbers of the people, which have been successively proposed as
the rule of State contributions, has any pretension to being a
just representative. If we compare the wealth of the United Netherlands
with that of Russia or Germany, or even of France, and if we at
the same time compare the total value of the lands and the aggregate
population of that contracted district with the total value of
the lands and the aggregate population of the immense regions
of either of the three last-mentioned countries, we shall at once
discover that there is no comparison between the proportion of
either of these two objects and that of the relative wealth of
those nations. If the like parallel were to be run between several
of the American States, it would furnish a like result. Let Virginia
be contrasted with North Carolina, Pennsylvania with Connecticut,
or Maryland with New Jersey, and we shall be convinced that the
respective abilities of those States, in relation to revenue,
bear little or no analogy to their comparative stock in lands
or to their comparative population. The position may be equally
illustrated by a similar process between the counties of the same
State. No man who is acquainted with the State of New York will
doubt that the active wealth of King's County bears a much greater
proportion to that of Montgomery than it would appear to be if
we should take either the total value of the lands or the total
number of the people as a criterion!

The wealth of nations depends upon an infinite variety of causes.
Situation, soil, climate, the nature of the productions, the nature
of the government, the genius of the citizens, the degree of information
they possess, the state of commerce, of arts, of industry, these
circumstances and many more, too complex, minute, or adventitious
to admit of a particular specification, occasion differences hardly
conceivable in the relative opulence and riches of different countries.
The consequence clearly is that there can be no common measure
of national wealth, and, of course, no general or stationary rule
by which the ability of a state to pay taxes can be determined.
The attempt, therefore, to regulate the contributions of the members
of a confederacy by any such rule, cannot fail to be productive
of glaring inequality and extreme oppression.

This inequality would of itself be sufficient in America to work
the eventual destruction of the Union, if any mode of enforcing
a compliance with its requisitions could be devised. The suffering
States would not long consent to remain associated upon a principle
which distributes the public burdens with so unequal a hand, and
which was calculated to impoverish and oppress the citizens of
some States, while those of others would scarcely be conscious
of the small proportion of the weight they were required to sustain.
This, however, is an evil inseparable from the principle of quotas
and requisitions.

There is no method of steering clear of this inconvenience, but
by authorizing the national government to raise its own revenues
in its own way. Imposts, excises, and, in general, all duties
upon articles of consumption, may be compared to a fluid, which
will, in time, find its level with the means of paying them. The
amount to be contributed by each citizen will in a degree be at
his own option, and can be regulated by an attention to his resources.
The rich may be extravagant, the poor can be frugal; and private
oppression may always be avoided by a judicious selection of objects
proper for such impositions. If inequalities should arise in some
States from duties on particular objects, these will, in all probability,
be counterbalanced by proportional inequalities in other States,
from the duties on other objects. In the course of time and things,
an equilibrium, as far as it is attainable in so complicated a
subject, will be established everywhere. Or, if inequalities should
still exist, they would neither be so great in their degree, so
uniform in their operation, nor so odious in their appearance,
as those which would necessarily spring from quotas, upon any
scale that can possibly be devised.

It is a signal advantage of taxes on articles of consumption,
that they contain in their own nature a security against excess.
They prescribe their own limit; which cannot be exceeded without
defeating the end proposed, that is, an extension of the revenue.
When applied to this object, the saying is as just as it is witty,
that, "in political arithmetic, two and two do not always make
four ." If duties are too high, they lessen the consumption;
the collection is eluded; and the product to the treasury is not
so great as when they are confined within proper and moderate
bounds. This forms a complete barrier against any material oppression
of the citizens by taxes of this class, and is itself a natural
limitation of the power of imposing them.

Impositions of this kind usually fall under the denomination of
indirect taxes, and must for a long time constitute the chief
part of the revenue raised in this country. Those of the direct
kind, which principally relate to land and buildings, may admit
of a rule of apportionment. Either the value of land, or the number
of the people, may serve as a standard. The state of agriculture
and the populousness of a country have been considered as nearly
connected with each other. And, as a rule, for the purpose intended,
numbers, in the view of simplicity and certainty, are entitled
to a preference. In every country it is a herculean task to obtain
a valuation of the land; in a country imperfectly settled and
progressive in improvement, the difficulties are increased almost
to impracticability. The expense of an accurate valuation is,
in all situations, a formidable objection. In a branch of taxation
where no limits to the discretion of the government are to be
found in the nature of things, the establishment of a fixed rule,
not incompatible with the end, may be attended with fewer inconveniences
than to leave that discretion altogether at large.