WILL UW EVER WIN BIG WITH RO-MOTION?

[Edit: David is a good friend of mine and one of the most passionate UW alums that I know. He refers to the teams as “we” and wants nothing but the best for his alma mater. David also wrote this shortly after the South Dakota State loss, but this is still just as timely as if it wrote it yesterday. The only thing that I’d add to this post is a snide remark about Romar being the tailor of the “cool jackets” he references occasionally.]

200 wins and counting, 6 tournament appearances, 3 sweet 16’s. In 10 years since his hire in 2002, University of Washington head basketball coach Lorenzo Romar has, by most objective metrics, accomplished more than any other Husky hoops coach in history. In the process, he has brought relevance to what was arguably considered an irrelevant basketball program, gained the admiration and envy from both coaching peers and opposing players (Romar was once voted the opposing coach players would most like to play for in the then Pac-10), and has surprisingly made Seattle one of the more attractive options in college basketball for many heralded and nationally-rated recruits. 1

Romar has also proven to be a man of outstanding moral character – a trait that undoubtedly serves him well on the recruiting trail, and a reason why a substantial number of high character athletes have played at UW. Venoy Overton notwithstanding, several players have become “men” under Romar’s guidance and have left UW clearly more mature and more polished than when they entered. Presumably, this characteristic is a large reason behind why the powers that be at UW are comfortable with giving him complete reign of the program. Indeed, in 2010, Romar signed a 10-year extension that will keep him in the purple and gold at approximately $1.7 million annually (plus handsome incentive bonuses). Barring a complete lapse of moral judgment or an unforeseen revelation of a sordid past akin to the recent scandals that have disrupted the college athletic landscape, Romar will be a fixture at Montlake until 2020.

Yet one disturbing secret lies behind this apparent success at UW: Lorenzo Romar cannot coach basketball. Despite his three-year college playing career under Marv Harshman at UW, his five-year stint in the NBA, and his nearly 20-year coaching career as both an assistant and a head coach, Romar has either never bothered to learn the most basic and fundamental principles of basketball, or knows them but has failed to effectively communicate those principles to his team because he does not place great emphasis on them (the more likely scenario). Regardless of what may in fact be the case, both explanations are completely inexcusable for a head basketball coach of a collegiate basketball program.

For a small minority of UW supporters or basketball enthusiasts that follow the program, this is no surprise. Romar’s basketball failures with respect to the fundamentals of the game has been discussed and debated in these circles following UW’s 2006-07 season – the first March UW failed to put on their dancing shoes after three consecutive appearances. And the debates have raged on with more fervor in recent years given the Huskies’ failures in close games, road games, and ultimately tournament games when coaching ability is critical. But in the wake of a historic 92-73 loss on December 18, 2011 to the South Dakota St. Jackrabbits, who absolutely dominated the Huskies from start to finish on the Huskies’ own floor, this relatively insulated secret should be a secret no more.

Not only were the 92 points given to the Jackrabbits the most points ever given up at home by a Romar-coached team in his tenure (the previous high was 96 to Arizona in 2005 in a double OT game), the 19-point loss actually constitutes the second largest margin of defeat under Romar behind a 24-point loss to a No. 17-ranked Gonzaga team in 2003. Significantly, the Jackrabbits had lost by double-digits to all three major-conference teams they have played this year (Minnesota, Georgia, and Nebraska), and in the game immediately prior to the Huskies, they surrendered 89 points in a 19-point blowout loss against a 5-6 North Dakota team.

Numbers aside, the loss highlighted and exposed the true weaknesses of Romar-led basketball teams: no half-court execution on offense when it counts, a poor and un-disciplined effort on defense highlighted by an inability to stop the opposing team’s best player, and a general and pervasive attitude amongst the players that talent and athleticism can overcome solid, fundamental basketball.2 All these traits are unequivocally reflective of a poorly-coached team and were clearly exposed in the Huskies’ epic loss.

In fact, this entire season has been a microcosm of Romar’s shortcomings and a sample set for the three major ways Romar-led teams lose.

First, there is the “we weren’t ready for what hit us loss” – in other words, the loss that people often attribute to the fact that UW did not show up and came out flat. Not only does the South Dakota St. loss fall in this category, the season-opening road loss to St. Louis – remarkably Romar’s ninth consecutive season-opening loss to a non-conference opponent on the road to start a season – showed exactly how unprepared Romar can be against well-coached teams, as the Billikens’ unequivocally are under Rick Majerus. While naysayers may point to St. Louis’ ridiculously high shooting percentage as the sole reason behind the Billikens’ 50-25 halftime lead, there is no doubt that UW’s porous, flat, and slow-to-rotate defense against Majerus’ pick-and-pop offense was equally culpable for all the open looks St. Louis had. This is major college basketball – kids can shoot at this level, especially when open.

The St. Louis game also highlighted an inaccurate perception about Romar-led Husky teams: that UW is a good defensive team. UW is in fact a very poor defensive team by most fundamental standards. The occasional Tony Wroten steal 30 feet away from the hoop and the subsequent flashy finish for a bucket is not reflective of a sound defense philosophy (and in fact at the time of this writing, the Huskies only rank 176th out of 345 Division 1 teams in steals anyhow). While an over-playing defense may comport with the athletes UW tends to possess, this aggressive philosophy would make much more sense if Romar employed more presses or traps in the backcourt and in the half-court. Such a defensive style would potentially be a better fit for Romar’s direction-less offense (more on this below). But rarely, if ever, do you see UW engaging in such pressure for a consistent period of time throughout a game, a curious void in light of the deep benches and athletes Romar has had at UW. Romar ultimately allows individuals to gamble on defense without a scheme, and therefore has not exactly stressed that the team play with the discipline necessary to stop an offense for a full 35 seconds.

This was clearly borne out in the St. Louis game when Majerus pick-and-rolled UW to death. Impatient and immature, Husky defenders consistently failed to come over the top of the screen, or in the rare circumstance that the defender did, Husky defenders were extremely slow in rotating to the open man on the subsequent pass by a Billiken player, thereby leading to the plethora of open looks given to St. Louis. Given UW’s superior length, size, and athleticism, such defensive coaching is simply inexcusable. Anyone who watched the game on television could hear the initial confusion then ultimate frustration in former Villanova head coach turned color commentator Steve Lappas’ voice on every St. Louis offensive possession. At one point, Lappas seemed so irritated and annoyed at UW’s defensive effort given its talent that you would not have been surprised to see him jump out of the broadcast table and call a timeout (contrast that with the beginning of the game when you could see and hear the awe in Lappas’ face when describing the Huskies – “look at how big and athletic these guys are! They are an NBA team!!!!”).

This effort probably explains why St. Louis finished the game shooting a 52.3% clip. And in fact UW ranks 134th in the nation in defensive field goal percentage this year, and in the past five years, UW has finished no higher than 81st (in the ’07-’08 campaign) in the nation in this statistic. Individual effort and enthusiasm should never be confused with sound fundamental team defense.

Ultimately, the “we weren’t ready for what hit us loss” is directly attributable to bad coaching. A coach is responsible for getting his players ready to play, regardless of time, venue, and opponent. But as evidenced by an 0-9 record in non-conference road openers, and the Huskies’ historic loss to South Dakota St., Romar consistently fails to prepare his teams properly. 3

The second type of Romar loss is the more painful method of losing. This is the close loss in the final possession of the game, which highlights a major flaw in Romar’s head-coaching abilities: his complete failure to run any semblance of a half-court set in the final possessions of a tight game. Case in point – after the St. Louis loss, UW had an opportunity to redeem itself in the Huskies’ next road game at Nevada (following a non-event win over Houston Baptist at home). Up 61-55 with nearly five minutes to play, UW managed to score only five points for the remainder of regulation, then choked in OT after holding a four-point lead at 70-66. Say what you will about Abdul Gaddy’s inability to foul Nevada’s Deonte Burton before he launched his game-tying three at the end of regulation, but there is no excuse for scoring five points in the closing five minutes of a closely-contested game.

Fast forward a few days to the Marquette game in front of a nationally-televised audience at Madison Square Garden, and the same problem reared its ugly head again. Up 73-72 with 3:31 left to play, UW managed just four points down the stretch of the game. Notably, those four points all came from the individual efforts of Terrence Ross (an acrobatic tip-in off a missed Gaddy three and an even more acrobatic yet wild double pump shot from just inside the free throw line), and not one play was called or executed down the stretch.

Jumping back to point one for a bit, equally frustrating was UW’s defensive effort that game. Again, a few gamble and high-risk steals were attempted and in rare circumstances successful, but for the most part, the Golden Eagles had way too many interior buckets in the second half, despite UW’s superior height and length (especially considering that Marquette played essentially the entire game without a player over 6’7” as their 6’11’ center Chris Otule left the game with a knee injury just two minutes into the game). And the same problem with slow defensive rotations highlighted above came back to haunt UW on Marquette’s final possession where Jae Crowder had a wide open look from the baseline on Gant’s terribly slow rotation to the ball. Result? Swish. 79-77 Marquette.

Any one who witnessed these two games saw “Ro-Motion” in full effect. This pick-up style of offense consists of fast-break offense for the first 35 minutes of a game, followed by a frustrating five minutes of offense consisting of the following: Gaddy or Wroten checking to see if the ball still has air by pounding the rock for 15-18 seconds at the top of the key, an off the ball screen set by a post for Ross or Wilcox on the baseline (and by “screen” I am being highly complementary as our posts tend to fill space rather than set an actual screen, a trait directly attributable to poor-coaching), a subsequent pass to Ross or Wilcox on the wing, ultimately followed by either (1) a Ross or Wilcox three from the spot where the pass was received, (2) a Ross or Wilcox drive from the wing, or (3) a pass back to either Gaddy or Wroten at the top of the key for a Gaddy or Wroten drive to the hoop. In all circumstances, Romar is on the sidelines pumping his fists imploring his team to move. “Hey coach – but where should we move?”

“Ro-Motion” was particularly infuriating against Marquette. Not only do the afore-mentioned four points in the last three and a half minutes of the game highlight the lack of any offensive execution, but Gaddy’s turnover with under a minute left clearly evidenced each player’s lack of understanding of where to be or what to do when it matters. The possession started with Gaddy dribbling the ball with his back to the basket near the mid-court line for nearly 20 seconds, followed by an uncertain cut to the wing by Ross (without an off-the-ball screen this time), leading to an even more uncertain pass by Gaddy directly to a Marquette defender, eventually leading to a Marquette go-ahead lay-in, all while the three other UW players on the floor stood idly by. Further compressing each player’s hesitant and indecisive movements was UW’s final possession after Crowder’s three-pointer. Despite 6.3 seconds remaining on the clock, Gaddy took the ball from one end of the court to the other and dribbled directly into the corner of the court (where Ross and Gant were standing, forcing Gaddy to deal with a triple-team) and heaved a desperation double-pump jumper that banked off the shot clock – a play eerily similar to Overton’s desperation heave against UNC last year, only that UW actually had more time on this occasion. Such conduct is clearly reflective of a coach who does not preach or practice end-game scenarios effectively, nor one that learns from his prior mishaps.

What’s extremely frustrating about this style of offense is that UW obviously has the talent to succeed, but Romar chooses not to place emphasis on establishing an offensive system (see especially our baseline inbounds play – the most predictable inbounds play in the nation in which a post pops from the lane to the sideline to receive the inbounds pass and subsequently hands it back off to a curling inbounds passer, or if that is not available, a dangerous pass over the top of the defense to a guard who slides to the top of the key). C.J. Wilcox is recognized as one of the best shooters in college basketball, Ross and Wroten are some of the more outstanding talents in college basketball, and players like Gant and Simmons have amazing athletic ability for their size. The fact that Romar cannot get the ball in the hands of Wilcox or Ross through a designed play in at least three different ways throughout the course of a game is simply inexcusable. The way Romar handles Wilcox is particularly maddening. All Romar needs to do is pop in a tape from the 2004-05 Nate McMillan-led Sonics squad that saw Ray Allen run off double, sometimes triple screens to free him up for an open look. This should give him some easy insight into how he could get Wilcox the ball in a position to score. Yet not once this season, or last year for that matter, have we seen a multiple player screen being set for Wilcox.

Speaking of screens, when is the last time UW successfully ran a pick-and-roll? When have UW players sealed defenders following a screen and subsequently looked for the ball following the screen? When are screens ever set on the baseline for cutting players to set up a high post-entry pass for a bucket in the paint? The answers are not often, and arguably never. The absence of effective screens is clearly reflective of a coach who does not emphasize them.

Ardent Romar supporters of “Ro-Motion” point to close victories over Arizona last year in the Pac-10 tournament championship game, as well as the Marquette victory in the NCAA tournament game two years ago. However, in both instances, the essence of the offense was the same. The main reason why the Huskies won those games was the outstanding individual performances by Isaiah Thomas and Quincy Pondexter to finish the game successfully for UW. These performances only mask the glaring problem underlying UW’s offense under Romar – that there really is no offensive philosophy. In those games, as was the case when Romar could rely on Roy and even Will Conroy, the calming presence and superior individual abilities of such players offset Romar’s inability to call a play when it mattered down the stretch.

Tellingly, when recently asked about the supremely talented yet undisciplined Wroten (who is 19th in the nation in turnovers), Romar said, “There’s not a whole lot he can’t do out there on the floor. You call it summer league if you want, but he did score 70 points in a summer-league game. Everybody can’t say they scored 70 points in a summer-league game.” And therein lays a primary frustration with “Ro-Motion.” He is content with giving unprecedented freedom to his players because he believes in that style, rather than preaching execution and calling plays that are run over and over again in practice to execute in a close game.

This is a concrete example of Romar’s inability to coach basketball, and the numbers bear this out. In games decided by 5 points or less, Romar owns a disturbing 57-65 record, including a 17-26 clip since the 2006-07 season, the year after Roy’s senior season. Good coaches win close games. Romar does not. And so long as Romar does not stress the details, I suspect this trend will continue.

The third and final type of Romar-loss is the out-classed and overmatched loss – the loss that reveals UW is not ready to play in the upper echelons of the college basketball elite – as reflected by Duke’s victory over UW in December. While the 86-80 final score on paper may indicate otherwise, anyone who painfully sat through that game realized how dominant Duke was. From start to finish, UW had no answer to Mason Plumlee’s or Ryan Kelly’s physicality down low, could not (again) rotate quickly enough to contest the outside shooting of Austin Rivers, Seth Curry, or Andre Dawkins, and did not have any offensive plays ready for Duke’s disciplined defense, as evidenced by the meager four points scored in the first seven minutes of the game. But for Duke’s inability to make free throws down the stretch, the game could have easily been a 20-point victory for the Blue Devils.

This loss showed a continued pattern of UW’s failure to win against big-time college basketball teams on the national stage (see UW’s loss to UNC last year, UW’s two losses to Kentucky and Michigan St. in Maui last year, UW’s loss to West Virginia in the Sweet 16 two years ago, UW’s loss Purdue in 2009, UW’s loss to UConn in the Sweet 16 in 2006, and UW’s loss to Louisville in 2005 in the Sweet 16 as a No. 1 seed). In fact, more often than not, UW is outclassed when it plays a team that has a better coach and a better national reputation than UW, despite its roughly equivalent if not higher talent-level. The losses to UNC, Kentucky and Michigan St. last year are especially irritating as anyone who saw these games witnessed that UW actually had superior athletes and players, but could not hold on to large leads due to afore-mentioned half-court ineptitude. This disturbing trend will keep UW on the outside looking in under Romar.

To be fair, no one is arguing that Romar has not enjoyed some degree of success under his free-wheeling philosophy. But as a loyal fan-base, are we content with what Romar gives us? His formula for success consists of recruiting talented players, letting them play with tremendous levels of autonomy on the floor, hoping that the players can develop chemistry throughout the season, and making a push in March in hopes of getting as far as possible with the talent (all without calling a play). Some fans and loyal supporters of the program are perfectly content with this recipe, especially considering what Romar brings to the table off the floor.

But undoubtedly Romar’s philosophy raises some greater concerns and questions about what we should expect from a college basketball coach, and ultimately how we define a great head basketball coach. Do we accept that Romar’s off-the-court persona, his ability to recruit talent, and his occasional flirtation with the Sweet 16, are sufficient characteristics of a great coach?Or do we demand and require that in addition to excellent recruiting and good character off the floor, some semblance of fundamental basketball should be shown on the floor?

I think you know my answer. In order to be great, head basketball coaches should possess a combination a procedural and substantive knowledge of the game. The procedural aspects of the game are reflected by all the things Romar does well: recruiting, putting people in the stands, winning “character” awards (Romar won the Coach Wooden “Keys to Life” award for outstanding character in 2006), bringing respectability to the program, playing on ESPN. However, the substantive aspects of the game are all the things Romar does not do well: draw up plays down the stretch of close games, win road games, win close games, win close games against tough opponents, play solid team defense, turn the ball over less than your opponents, shoot free throws well (UW is in an inexcusable 298th out of 345 Division 1 teams in free-throw shooting this year, and in years past, have not been much better). These huge and glaring omissions from Romar’s coaching repertoire cannot be ignored. Emphasis on the substantive aspects of basketball is a fundamental baseline for every good head coach. In the absence of this trait, UW will continue down the path of hoping that talent alone will suffice to get us to the Final Four.

On this point, I believe Romar supporters falsely attribute UW’s recent half-court failures to the departures of two top assistants, Ken Bone and Cameron Dollar. I unequivocally disagree. “Ro-Motion” was always in effect even under Bone and Dollar. Can you honestly say that Romar’s offense a few years ago was any different than it is now? The difference was, as mentioned previously, that individual players stepped up to fill the coaching void down the stretch. In any event, even if Bone and Dollar somehow had a large hand in calling the plays for Romar, it is simply inexcusable for a head basketball coach to completely delegate play-calling responsibilities to an assistant coach, or to not be held accountable for a failure to call such plays.

Basketball is not akin to football, where assistant coaches are integral to the success of a team, and coordinators are needed to call plays on both sides of the ball. Especially in college, where 85 scholarship players roam the sideline, and 10-15 more walk-ons add to the massive confusion of a college football game, delegation is absolutely necessary. The complexities of an 11-on-11 game also make for clear and distinct duties on the field that require assistant coaching. But in basketball, the program is comprised of 12-15 players, and 3-4 assistant head coaches. This is a much more limited universe, and a universe in which a head basketball coach needs to adopt socialistic principles and instill, from the top-down, an emphasis and attitude that failure to follow the fundamental and substantive aspects of basketball will not be tolerated.

There is a reason why Romar has never advanced past the Sweet 16, and Brad Stevens, with obviously a lot less experience and talent has reached the National Championship game two years in a row with Butler. Absent a willingness to commit to playing a brand of team basketball emphasizing the game’s finer details, UW will continually lose in the three different manners described above: they will come out flat and unprepared, they will lose close games, and they will consistently be outclassed by top programs despite having the talent to play at the same level.

Again, to be clear, no one is accusing Romar of not achieving some degree of success at UW. And certainly no one is clamoring for the Romar’s immediate termination. But certainly we can and we should expect more from a head basketball coach. While we are happy in our corner of the country about what we have achieved, UW is clearly not in the upper echelon of the college basketball elite. Thus, if we are content with the Sweet 16 as our ceiling, happy with winning the annual pillow fight that the Pac-12 has now become, and ultimately satisfied with where our program is simply because of where we are from, Romar is our guy. But if we want to ask ourselves how we can get better from this moment and strive for excellence and a chance to be in the Final Four, we should seriously question whether we are comfortable with Romarville being a permanent resident of Montlake for the next ten years. Barring radical changes to the way we execute, or a miraculous run in the tournament where we somehow catch fire and actually make it past the Sweet 16, you will probably find me in the minority respectfully requesting Romar’s departure.

–FOOTNOTES–

1 Although query whether Romar has been a successful recruiter outside the Seattle-area and whether his success owes more to the Puget Sound’s recent transformation from northwest backwater to basketball hotbed.2 Following UW’s narrow escape over UCSB on December 16, Darnell Gant astutely commented, “[w]e knew we couldn’t just outscore this team and we had to play defense.” This comes from your senior co-captain who has had four years under Romar.3 Objectors here may point to the fact that players play and coaches coach. Indeed, Romar was quoted after the SDSU game: “”We tried to help our team understand how good of a basketball player Nate Wolters was” (which on some levels can be viewed as Romar throwing his players under the bus). Regardless, even if Romar tried, he failed. It is Romar’s responsibility to get his players ready and if he does not succeed, the effectiveness of his communication should be questioned.4 UW also turned the ball over frequently in these games – 18 times against Nevada and 16 times against Marquette. These high turnover numbers are another frustrating characteristic of Romar’s teams.

5 Romar also had one timeout in his back pocket for this final possession. While there are disagreements over whether such timeouts should be used after giving up a go-ahead basket, what cannot disputed is a head coach’s responsibility to call a timeout when you see an innately hesitant player in Gaddy dribbling directly in front of you and into the corner and into a potential triple-team while your four other players clearly have no clue where to go. I encourage you to watch this last play on-line and you will see exactly what I am talking about. [Edit: here it is, fast forward to 8:07ish and you’ll see.]

6 A comparative analysis of the great coaches in college basketball shows how far Romar lags behind his peers. For instance, in games decided by 5 points or less, Jim Boeheim is 182-109; Jim Calhoun is 155-102; Mike Krzyzewski is 131-106; Ben Howland is 84-57; John Calipari is 76-59; Bill Self is 73-58; Tom Izzo is 68-58; and Mark Few is 59-28. See http://statsheet.com/7 Notably, there is even a smaller minority within the minority of Romar dissenters that believe prior coach Bob Bender played a significant role in turning UW hoops around. And they may have a point: Bender led UW to two tournament appearances and one sweet 16, and also recruited the likes of Todd MacCullough, Donald Watts, Nate Robinson, Will Conroy, and Brandon Roy (yes, he recruited Roy, not Romar). Nevertheless, it’s probably hard to argue that Romar is not a good recruiter.8 Dollar’s role revolved around recruiting (not a surprise) and defense, so Dollar had no hand in Romar’s offensive scheme anyhow.