This cause was begun on the equity side of the supreme court of the District of Columbia. The complainants named in the bill were the Cherokee Nation, and its principal chief and treasurer and sundry other citizens of the nation, suing on behalf of themselves and of citizens of the nation residing in the Indian Territory. Ethan A. Hitchcock, as Secretary of the Interior, was made sole defendant. It was claimed in the bill that, by virtue of certain treaties and a patent based thereon, the Cherokee Nation was vested with a fee-simple title to its tribal lands in the Indian Territory, and it was also averred that, by a treaty executed in 1835, there was secured to the nation the right, by its national council, to make and carry into effect all such laws as the Cherokees might deem necessary for the government and protection of the persons and property within their own country belonging to their people, or such persons as had connected themselves with them. A synopsis of the pertinent portions of the treaties above referred to is set out in the margin.a

aBy article 2 of the treaty of May 6, 1828 (7 Stat., 311), the United States, in order to secure to the Cherokee Nation a permanent home, agreed to possess the Cherokees, and to guarantee it to them forever, 7,000,000 acres of land, within described boundaries, and in addition guaranteed to the Cherokee Nation a perpetual outlet west, and a free and unmolested use of all the country lying west of the western boundary of the above-described limits, and as far west as the sovereignty of the United States, and their right of soil, extend.

By article 1 of the treaty of February 14, 1833 (7 Stat., 414), the United States, by a corrected description as to the 7,000,000-acre tract, renewed the guaranty as to such tract, the outlet, etc., contained in article 2 of the treaty of 1828, with the reservation respecting use by other Indians of the salt plain, if within the limits of the outlet. The article concluded with the statement that letters patent should be issued by the United States as soon as practicable for the land hereby granted.

By article 2 of the treaty of December 29, 1835 (7 Stat., 478), after reciting that by the treaties of 1828 and 1833 the United States guaranteed and secured to be conveyed by patent to the Cherokee Nation of Indians a described tract of 7,000,000 acres of land, and had further guaranteed to the Cherokee Nation a perpetual outlet west, etc., ceded an additional 800,000 acres of land in the following terms:

And whereas it is apprehended by the Cherokees that in the above cession there is not contained a sufficient quantity of land for the accommodation of the whole nation on their removal west of the Mississippi, the United States in consideration of the sum of five hundred thousand dollars therefore hereby covenant and agree to convey to the said Indians, and their descendants by patent, in fee simple, the following additional tract of land.

By article 3 of the same treaty the United States also agreed

that the lands above ceded by the treaty of February 14, 1833, including the outlet, and those ceded by this treaty, shall all be included in one patent executed to the Cherokee Nation of Indians by the President of the United States, according to the provisions of the act of May 28, 1830.

The act of May 28, 1830 (4 Stat., 411), conferred authority upon the President to create districts of territory in lands west of the Mississippi to be exchanged for lands held by Indians in a State or Territory. Respecting the title to the lands so to be given in exchange, it was provided in section 3 as follows:

SEC. 3. And be it further enacted, That in the making of any such exchange or exchanges, it shall and may be lawful for the President solemnly to assure the tribe or nation with which the exchange is made, that the United States will forever secure and guaranty to them, and their heirs or successors, the country so exchanged with them; and if they prefer it, that the United States will cause a patent (cont.)

The patent referred to in the bill was executed on December 31, 1838. It conveyed to the Cherokee Nation the lands secured and guaranteed by the treaties of 1828, 1833, and 1835. In the patent the 7,000,000-acre tract, together with the perpetual outlet, was described as one tract, aggregating 13,574,135.14 acres. In addition, the patent specified the boundaries of a tract of 800,000 acres ceded by the treaty of 1835. The description of the two tracts was succeeded by the following habendum clause:

Therefore, in execution of the agreements and stipulations contained in the said several treaties, the United States have given and granted, and by these presents do give and grant unto the said Cherokee Nation the two tracts of land so surveyed and hereinbefore described, containing in the whole fourteen millions three hundred and seventy-four thousand one hundred and thirty-five acres and fourteen-hundredths of an acre, to have and to hold the same, together with all the rights, privileges, and appurtenances thereto belonging to the said Cherokee Nation forever; subject, however, to the right of the United States to permit other tribes of red men to get salt on the salt plain on the western prairie referred to in the second article of the treaty of the twenty-ninth of December, one thousand eight hundred and thirty-five, which salt plain has been ascertained to be within the limits prescribed for the outlet agreed to be granted by said article, and subject also to all the other rights reserved to the United States, in and by the articles hereinbefore recited, to the extent and in the manner in which the said rights are so reserved; and subject also to the condition provided by the act of Congress of the twenty-eighth of May, one thousand eight hundred and thirty, referred to in the above-recited third article, and which condition is, that the lands hereby granted shall revert to the United States if the said Cherokee Nation becomes extinct or abandons the same.

Averring that the Cherokee Nation and its citizens possessed the exclusive right to the use, control, and occupancy of its tribal lands, it was alleged that the Secretary of the Interior, without having lawful authority so to do, was assuming the power to and was about to pass favorably upon applications for leases, and was about to grant leases of lands belonging to said nation for the purpose of mining for oil, gas, coal, and other minerals, one such successful applicant being stated to be the Cherokee Oil and Gas Company, an Arkansas corporation. Based upon general allegations of the absence of an adequate remedy at law, the necessity of relief to avoid a multiplicity of suits and to prevent the casting of a cloud the title of the nation to its said lands, and the claim the irreparable injury would be caused and wrong and oppression result, and that there would be a deprivation of property rights of the complainants and of other citizens of the Cherokee Nation, an injunction was prayed against further action by the Secretary of the Interior in the premises. A demurrer was filed to the bill upon the grounds following:

1. Said bill is bad in substance and for want of equity, and does not state facts sufficient to entitle complainants to the relief prayed for or to any relief.

2. The court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit.

3. There is a defect of parties defendant.

or grant to be made and executed to them for the same: Provided always, That such lands shall revert to the United States, if the Indians become extinct or abandon the same.

The article of the treaty of 1835 upon which is based the claim that an exclusive right is vested in the Cherokee Nation to the use, control, and occupancy of its tribal lands is the following (7 Stat., 481):

ARTICLE 5. The United States hereby covenant and agree that the lands ceded to the Cherokee Nation in the foregoing article shall, in no future time without their consent, be included within the territorial limits or jurisdiction of any State or Territory. But they shall secure to the Cherokee Nation the right by their national councils to make and carry into effect all such laws as they may deem necessary for the government and protection of the persons and property within their own country belonging to their people or such persons as have connected themselves with them: Provided always, That they shall not be inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States and such acts of Congress as have been or may be passed regulating trade and intercourse with the Indians; and also, that they shall not be considered as extending to such citizens and army of the United States as may travel or reside in the Indian country by permission according to the laws and regulations established by the government of the same.

By the treaty of August 6, 1846 (9 Stat., 871), providing for an adjustment of the differences theretofore existing between different portions of the people constituting and recognized as the Cherokee Nation of Indians, it was provided in article 1 as follows:

That the lands now occupied by the Cherokee Nation shall be secured to the whole Cherokee people for their common use and benefit; and a patent shall be issued for the same, including the eight hundred thousand acres purchased, together with the outlet west, promised by the United States, in conformity with the provisions relating thereto, contained in the third article of the treaty of 1835, and in the third section of the act of Congress, approved May twenty-eighth, 1830, which authorizes the President of the United States, in making exchanges of lands with the Indian tribes, `to assure the tribe or nation with which the exchange is made, that the United States will forever secure and guarantee to them, and their heirs or successors, the country so exchanged with them; and, if they prefer it, that the United States will cause a patent or grant to be made and executed to them for the same: Provided always, That such lands shall revert to the United States, if the Indians become extinct or abandon the same.

The treaty of July 19, 1866 (14 Stat., 799), does not require particular notice.

Without considering or passing upon the objection of a defect of parties defendant, the trial court sustained the demurrer and entered a decree dismissing the bill of complaint. This decree was affirmed, on appeal, by the court of appeals of the District. (20 App., D. C.)

An appeal was thereupon taken to this court.

Mr. Justice WHITE, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court:

The grounds of demurrer to the bill of complaint were summarized in the following reasons embodied in a statement filed with the demurrer:

1. The matters named in the bill are matters of administration, which can not be taken away from an executive department and carried into the courts.

2. That the Cherokee Oil and Gas Company named in the bill is a necessary party to the suit, as shown by the bill.

3. That the defendant is proceeding in conformity with the act of Congress approved June 28, 1898 (30 Stat., 495), which is a valid exercise of the power of Congress over the property of an Indian tribe.

Preliminary to considering the fundamental question raised by the demurrer, it is necessary to notice two subjects not expressly referred to in the opinion below. They are, first, the objection to the formal sufficiency of certain of the averments in the bill; and, second, the claim that the Cherokee Oil and Gas Company was an indispensable party defendant. With respect to the first-mentioned ground of objection, without going into detail, we think the statements in the bill were sufficient to show that the jurisdiction of a court of equity was properly invoked. So far as the second ground of objection is concerned, we presume that the courts below omitted to pass expressly thereon, because it was deemed that the company named was properly omitted from the bill. As the bill assailed generally the want of power in the Secretary of the Interior to execute leases affecting lands owned by the tribe, and referred to the application pending for a lease made by the Cherokee Oil and Gas Company as manifesting but a particular instance in which it was charged that the Secretary of the Interior might exercise the power conferred by the statute, the corporation named was not an indispensable party to the bill. Clearly every person with whom the Secretary might contract, if he exercised the discretion vested in him by the statute were not indispensable parties to the determination of the question whether the statute had lawfully conferred such discretionary power upon the official in question. This brings us to consider the fundamental question which the case involves, that is, the contention on behalf of the Government that the decree below should be sustained because the act of June 28, 1898, is a valid exercise of power vested in Congress, and fully authorized the Secretary of the Interior to do and perform the things which the complainants seek to have him enjoined from doing.

Before noticing the pertinent provisions of the act of June 28, 1898, reference will be made to antecedent legislation by Congress which led up to the enactment of the statute in question. In the statement preceding the opinion, delivered through Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, in Stephens v. Cherokee Nation (174 U. S., 445), it was said:

By the sixteenth section of the Indian appropriation act of March 30, 1893 (27 Stat. L., 612, 645, chap. 209), the President was authorized to appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, three commissioners to enter into negotiations with the Cherokee Nation, Choctaw Nation, Chickasaw Nation, the Muscogee (or Creek) Nation, the Seminole Nation, for the purpose of the extinguishment of the national or tribal title to any lands within that territory now held by any and all such nations or tribes, either by cession of the same or some part thereof to the United States, or by the allotment and division of the same in severalty among the Indians of such nations or tribes, respectively, as may be entitled to the same, or by such other method as may be agreed upon between the several nations and tribes aforesaid, or each of them, with the United States, with a view to such an adjustment, upon the basis of justice and equity, as may, with the consent of such nations or tribes of Indians, so far as may be necessary, be requisite and suitable to enable the ultimate creation of a State or States of the Union which shall embrace the lands within said Indian Territory.

The Commission was appointed and entered on the discharge of its duties, and under the sundry civil appropriation act of March 2, 1895 (28 Stat. L., 939, chap. 189), two additional members were appointed. It is commonly styled the Dawes Commission.

On November 20, 1894, and November 18, 1895, the Dawes Commission made reports of the condition of affairs in the Indian Territory. These reports, as also a report of the Senate Committee on the Five Civilized Tribes, of date May 7, 1894, were referred to and were quoted from in the statement of facts made by the court in the Stephens case. The reports asserted the existence of a state of affairs in the

Indian Territory abhorrent to the spirit of our institutions, and declared the necessity of assumption by the United States of responsibility for future conditions in the Territory and the need of independent legislation by Congress in that behalf. Thus the Senate Committee on the five Civilized Tribes of Indians in a report on May 7, 1894 (Senate Rep. No. 377, Cong., 2d sess.), said in part:

As we have said, the title to these lands is held by the tribe in trust for the people. We have shown that this trust is not being properly executed, nor will it be if left to the Indians, and the question arises, What is the duty of the Government of the United States with reference to this trust? While we have recognized these tribes as dependent nations, the Government has likewise recognized its guardianship over the Indians and its obligations to protect them in their property and personal rights.

In the treaty with the Cherokees, made in 1846, we stipulated that they should pass laws for equal protection and for the security of life, liberty, and property. If the tribe fails to administer its trust properly by securing to all the people of the tribe equitable participation in the common property of the tribe, there appears to be no redress for the Indian so deprived of his rights unless the Government does interfere to administer such trust.

By a provision in the act of June 10, 1896 (29 Stat., 321, 339), said Commission was directed to continue the exercise of the authority already conferred upon it, and was invested with further powers in respect of hearing and determining applications for citizenship in said tribes and making rolls of the members thereof.

A provision in the act of June 7, 1897 (30 Stat., 62, 84), directed said Commission to continue to exercise all authority theretofore conferred upon it to negotiate with said Five Tribes, and gave further direction respecting the making of rolls and citizenship.

The act of June 28, 1898 (30 Stat., 495), entitled An act for the protection of the people of the Indian Territory, and for other purposes, contains provisions for the completion of the rolls of citizenship of said tribes, for the reservation of town sites and the sale of lots therein, and for the allotment of the exclusive use and occupancy of the surface of all lands susceptible of allotment among the citizens of the respective tribes, with a provision as follows (sec. 11):

But all oil, coal, asphalt, and mineral deposits in the lands of any tribe are reserved to such tribe, and no allotment of such land shall carry the title to such oil, coal, asphalt, or mineral deposits.

Section 13 of said act contains provisions for leasing the oil, coal, asphalt, and mineral deposits, as follows:

That the Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized and directed from time to time to provide rules and regulations in regard to the leasing of oil, coal, asphalt, and other minerals in said Territory, and all such leases shall be made by the Secretary of the Interior; and any lease for any such minerals otherwise made shall be absolutely void. No lease shall be made or renewed for a longer period than fifteen years, nor cover the mineral in more than six hundred and forty acres of land, which shall conform as nearly as possible to the surveys. Lessees shall pay on each oil, coal, asphalt, or other mineral claim at the rate of one hundred dollars per annum, in advance, for the first and second years; two hundred dollars per annum, in advance, for the third and fourth years, and five hundred dollars, in advance, for each succeeding year thereafter, as advanced royalty on the mine or claim on which they are made. All such payments shall be a credit on royalty when each said mine is developed and operated and its production is in excess of such guaranteed annual advanced payments; and all lessees must pay said annual advanced payments on each claim, whether developed or undeveloped; and should any lessee neglect or refuse to pay such advanced annual royalty for the period of sixty days after the same becomes due and payable on any lease, the lease on which default is made shall become null and void, and the royalties paid in advance shall then become and be the money and property of the tribe. Where any oil, coal, asphalt, or other mineral is hereafter opened on land allotted, sold, or reserved, the value of the use of the necessary surface for prospecting or mining, and the damage done to the other land and improvements, shall be ascertained under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior and paid to the allottee or owner of the land by the lessee or party operating the same, before operations begin: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall impair the rights of any holder or owner of a leasehold interest in any oil, coal rights, asphalt, or mineral, which have been assented to by act of Congress, but all such interest shall continue unimpaired hereby, and shall be assured to such holders or owners by leases from the Secretary of the Interior for the term not exceeding fifteen years, but subject to payment of advance royalties as herein provided, when such leases are not operated, to the rate of royalty on coal mined, and the rules and regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior, and preference shall be given to such parties in renewals of such leases: And provided further, That when, under the customs and laws heretofore existing and prevailing in the Indian Territory, leases have been made of different groups or parcels of oil, coal, asphalt, or other mineral deposits, and possession has been taken thereunder and improvements made for the development of such oil, coal, asphalt, or other mineral deposits by lessees or their assigns, which have resulted in the production of oil, coal, asphalt, or other mineral in commercial quantities by such lessees or their assigns, then such parties in possession shall be given preference in the making of new leases, in compliance with the directions of the Secretary of the Interior; and in making new leases

due consideration shall be made for the improvements of such lessees; and in all cases of the leasing or renewal of of leases of oil, coal, asphalt, and other mineral deposits preference shall be given to parties in possession who have made improvements. The rate of royalty to be paid by all lessees shall be fixed by the Secretary of the Interior.

Section 16 contains a provision as to the payment and distribution of rents and royalties due said tribes, as follows:

That it shall be unlawful for any person, after the passage of this act, except as hereinafter provided, to claim, demand, or receive, for his own use or for the use of anyone else, any royalty on oil, coal, asphalt, or other mineral, or on any timber or lumber, or any other kind of property whatsoever, or any rents on any lands or property belonging to any one of said tribes or nations in said Territory, or for anyone to pay to any individual any such royalty or rents or any consideration therefor whatsoever; and all royalties and rents hereafter payable to the tribe shall be paid, under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior, into the Treasury of the United States to the credit of the tribe to which they belong.

As the acts done and contemplated to be done by the appellee and assailed by the bill of complaint are presumably not the subject of criticism, in the event that the act of June 28, 1898, was a constitutional and valid exercise of power by Congress, we will now address ourselves to a consideration of that statute.

Prior to the act of March 3, 1871 (16 Stat., 544, 566, now sec. 2079, Rev. Stat.), which statute, in effect, voiced the intention of Congress thereafter to make the Indian tribes amenable directly to the power and authority of the laws of the United States by the immediate exercise of its legislative power over them, the customary mode of dealing with the Indian tribes was by treaty. As, however, held in Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Railway Co. (135 U. S., 641, 653), reaffirmed in Stephens v. Cherokee Nation (174 U. S., 445, 484), while the Cherokee Nation and other Indian tribes domiciled within the United States had been recognized by the United States as separate communities, and engagements entered into with them by means of formal treaties, they were yet regarded as in condition of pupilage or dependency, and subject to the paramount authority of the United States.

Reviewing decisions of this court rendered prior to the act of 1871, and particularly considering the status of the very tribe of Indians affected by the present litigation, the court commented upon a declaration made in a previous decision that this Government had admitted, by the most solemn sanction, the existence of the Indians as a separate and distinct people, and as being invested with rights which constitute them a state, or separate community. It was observed of this declaration that it fell far short of saying that they are a sovereign State, with no superior within the limits of its territory. Considering the treaty of 1835 with the Cherokee Nation, under which it is now claimed, on behalf of the appellants, that the Cherokees became vested with the sole control over the lands ceded to them, the court observed (p. 485):

By the treaty of New Echota, 1835, the United States covenanted and agreed that the lands ceded to the Cherokee Nation should at no future time, without their consent, be included within the territorial limits or jurisdiction of any State or Territory, and that the Government would secure to that nation the right by their national councils to make and carry into effect all such laws as they may deem necessary for the government of the persons and property within their own country, belonging to their people or such persons as have connected themselves with them; and, by the treaties of Washington, 1846 and 1866, the United States guaranteed to the Cherokees the title and possession of their lands and jurisdiction over their country. (Revision of Indian Treaties, pp. 65, 79, 85.) But neither these nor any previous treaties evinced any intention upon the part of the Government to discharge them from their condition of pupilage or dependency, and constitute them a separate, independent, sovereign people, with no superior within its limits.

It results, then, from the doctrine of the decisions of this court that the demurrer was properly sustained, because of the fact that the matters named in the bill were matters of administration, to which the act of June 28 was applicable, and they were solely cognizable by the executive department of the Government. The decision in Stephens v. Cherokee Nation (174 U. S., 445) is particularly in point, as that case involved the validity of the very act under consideration, and the precedent correlative legislation, wherein the United States practically assumed the full control over the Cherokees, as well as the other nations constituting the Five Civilized Tribes, and took upon itself the determination of membership in the tribes for the purpose of adjusting their rights in the tribal property. The plenary power of control by Congress over the Indian tribes and its undoubted power to legislate, as it had done through the act of 1898, directly for the protection of the tribal property, was in that case reaffirmed.

Thus, in the course of its opinion, after alluding to the legislation concerning the Dawes Commission, the court said:

It may be remarked that the legislation seems to recognize, especially the act of June 28, 1898, a distinction between admission to citizenship merely and the distribution of property to be subsequently made, as if there might be circumstances under which the right to a share in the latter would not necessarily follow from the concession of the former. But in any aspect, we are of opinion that the constitutionality of the acts in respect of the determination of citizenship can not be successfully assailed on the ground of the impairment or destruction of vested rights. The lands and moneys of these tribes are public lands and public moneys, and are not held in individual ownership, and the assertion by any particular applicant that his right therein is so vested as to preclude inquiry into his status involves a contradiction in terms.

The holding that Congress had power to provide a method for determining membership in the Five Civilized Tribes, and for ascertaining the citizenship thereof preliminary to a division of the property of the tribe among its members, necessarily involved the further holding that Congress was vested with authority to adopt measures to make the tribal property productive and secure therefrom an income for the benefit of the tribe.

Whatever title the Indians have is in the tribe and not in the individuals, although held by the tribe for the common use and equal benefit of all the members. (The Cherokee Trust Funds, 117 U. S., 288, 308.) The manner in which this land is held is described in Cherokee Nation v. Journeycake (155 U. S., 196, 207), where this court, referring to the treaties and the patent mentioned in the bill of complaint herein, said:

Under these treaties, and in December, 1838, a patent was issued to the Cherokees for these lands. By that patent whatever of title was conveyed was conveyed to the Cherokees as a nation, and no title was vested in severalty in the Cherokees, or any of them.

There is no question involved in this case as to the taking of property; the authority which it is proposed to exercise, by virtue of the act of 1898, has relation merely to the control and development of the tribal property, which still remains subject to the administrative control of the Government, even though the members of the tribe have been invested with the status of citizenship under recent legislation.

We are not concerned in this case with the question whether the act of June 28, 1898, and the proposed action thereunder, which is complained of, is or is not wise, and calculated to operate beneficially to the interests of the Cherokees. The power existing in Congress to administer upon and guard the tribal property, and the power being political and administrative in its nature, the manner of its exercise is a question within the province of the legislative branch to determine, and is not one for the courts.

In 1867 a treaty was concluded with the Kiowa and Comanche tribes of Indians, and such other friendly tribes as might be united with them, setting apart a reservation for the use of such Indians. By a separate treaty the Apache tribe of Indians was incorporated with the two former named and became entitled to share in the benefits of the reservation. (15 Stat., 581, 589.)

The first-named treaty is usually called the Medicine Lodge treaty. By the sixth article thereof it was provided that heads of families might select a tract of land within the reservation, not exceeding 320 acres in extent, which should thereafter cease to be

held in common, and should be for the exclusive possession of the Indian making the selection, so long as he or his family might continue to cultivate the land. The twelfth article of the treaty was as follows:

ART. 12. No treaty for the cession of any portion or part of the reservation herein described, which may be held in common, shall be of any validity or force as against the said Indians, unless executed and signed by at least three-fourths of all the adult male Indians occupying the same, and no cession by the tribe shall be understood or construed in such manner as to deprive, without his consent, any individual member of the tribe of his rights to any tract of land selected by him as provided in Article III (VI) of this treaty.

The three tribes settled under the treaties upon the described land. On October 6, 1892, 456 male adult members of the confederated tribes signed, with three commissioners representing the United States, an agreement concerning the reservation. The Indian agent, in a certificate appended to the agreement, represented that there were then 562 male adults in the three tribes. (Senate Ex. Doc. No. 27, Fifty-second Congress, second session, p. 17.) Four hundred and fifty-six male adults therefore constituted more than three-fourths of the certified number of total male adults in the three tribes. In form the agreement was a proposed treaty, the terms of which, in substance, provided for a surrender to the United States of the rights of the tribes in the reservation, for allotments out of such lands to the Indians in severalty, the fee-simple title to be conveyed to the allottees or their heirs after the expiration of twenty-five years, and the payment or setting apart for the benefit of the tribes of $2,000,000 as the consideration for the surplus of land over and above the allotments which might be made to the Indians. It was provided that sundry named friends of the Indians (among such persons being the Indian agent and an army officer) should each be entitled to all the benefits, in land only, conferred under this agreement, the same as if members of said tribes. Eliminating 350,000 acres of mountainous land, the quantity of surplus lands suitable for farming and grazing purposes was estimated at 2,150,000 acres. Concerning the payment to be made for these surplus lands, the Commission, in their report to the President announcing the termination of the negotiations, said (Senate Ex. Doc. No. 17, Fifty-second Congress, second session):

In this connection it is proper to add that the Commission agreed with the Indians to incorporate the following in their report, which is now done:

The Indians upon this reservation seem to believe (but whether from an exercise of their own judgment or from the advice of others the Commission can not determine) that their surplus land is worth $2,500,000, and Congress may be induced to give them that much for it. Therefore, in compliance with their request, we report that they desire to be heard through an attorney and a delegation to Washington upon that question, the agreement signed, however, to be effective upon ratification, no matter what Congress may do with their appeal for the extra half million dollars.

In transmitting the agreement to the Secretary of the Interior the Commissioner of Indian Affairs said:

The price paid, while considerably in excess of that paid to the Cheyennes and Arapahoes, seems to be fair and reasonable both to the Government and the Indians, the land being, doubtless, of better quality than that in the Cheyenne and Arapahoe reservation.

Attention was directed to the provision in the agreement in favor of the Indian agent and an army officer, and it was suggested that to permit them to avail thereof would establish a bad precedent.

Soon after the signing of the foregoing agreement it was claimed by the Indians that their assent had been obtained by fraudulent misrepresentations of its terms by the interpreters, and it was asserted that the agreement should not be held binding upon the tribes because three-fourths of the adult male members had not assented thereto, as was required by the twelfth article of the Medicine Lodge treaty.

Obviously, in consequence of the policy embodied in section 2079 of the Revised Statutes, departing from the former custom of dealing with Indian affairs by treaty and providing for legislative action on such subjects, various bills were introduced in both Houses of Congress designed to give legal effect to the agreement made by the Indians in 1892. These bills were referred to the proper committee, and before such committees the Indians presented their objections to the propriety of giving effect to the agreement. (House Doc. No. 431, Fifty-fifth Congress, second session.) In 1898 the Committee on Indian Affairs of the House of Representatives unanimously reported a bill for the execution of the agreement made with the Indians. The report of the committee recited that a favorable conclusion had been reached by the com-

mittee after the fullest hearings from delegations of the Indian tribes and all parties at interest. (House Doc. No. 419, Fifty-sixth Congress, first session, p. 5.)

The bill thus reported did not exactly conform to the agreement as signed by the Indians. It modified the agreement by changing the time for making the allotments, and it also provided that the proceeds of the surplus lands remaining after allotments to the Indians should be held to await the judicial decision of a claim asserted by the Choctaw and Chickasaw tribes of Indians to the surplus lands. This claim was based upon a treaty made in 1866, by which the two tribes ceded the reservation in question, it being contended that the lands were impressed with a trust in favor of the ceding tribes, and that whenever the reservation was abandoned so much of it as was not allotted to the confederated Indians of the Comanche, Kiowa, and Apache tribes reverted to the Choctaws and Chickasaws.

The bill just referred to passed the House of Representatives on May 16, 1898. (Thirty-first Congress, Rec., p. 4947.) When the bill reached the Senate, that body, on January 25, 1899, adopted a resolution calling upon the Secretary of the Interior for information as to whether the signatures attached to the agreement comprised three-fourths of the male adults of the tribes. In response the Secretary of the Interior informed the Senate, under date of January 28, 1899, that the records of the Department failed to show a census of these Indians for the year 1892, but that from a roll used in making a payment to them in January and February, 1893, it appeared that there were 725 males over 18 years of age, of whom 639 were 21 years and over. The Secretary further called attention to the fact that by the agreement of 1892 a right of selection was conferred upon each member of the tribes over 18 years of age, and observed:

If 18 years and over be held to be the legal age of those who were authorized to sign the agreement, the number of persons who actually signed was 87 less than three-fourths of the adult male membership of the tribes; and if 21 years be held to be the minimum age, then 23 less than three-fourths signed the agreement. In either event less than three-fourths of the male adults appear to have so signed.

With this information before it, the bill was favorably reported by the Committee on Indian Affairs of the Senate, but did not pass that body.

At the first session of the following Congress (the Fifty-sixth) bills were introduced in both the Senate and House of Representatives substantially like that which has just been noticed. (S. 1352; H. R. 905.)

In the meanwhile, about October, 1899, the Indians had, at a general council, at which 571 male adults of the tribes purported to be present, protested against the execution of the provisions of the agreement of 1892, and adopted a memorial to Congress, praying that that body should not give effect to the agreement. This memorial was forwarded to the Secretary of the Interior by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs with lengthy comments, pointing out the fact that the Indians claimed that their signatures to the agreement had been procured by fraud and that the legal number of Indians had not signed the agreement, and that the previous bills and bills then pending contemplated modification of the agreement in important particulars without the consent of the Indians. This communication from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, together with the memorial of the Indians, were transmitted by the Secretary of the Interior to Congress. (Senate Doc. No. 76, House Doc. No. 333, Fifty-sixth Congress, first session.) Attention was called to the fact that, although by the agreement of October 6, 1892, one-half of each allotment was contemplated to be agricultural land, there was only sufficient agricultural land in the entire reservation to average 30 acres per Indian. After setting out the charges of fraud and complaints respecting the proposed amendments designed to be made to the agreement, as above stated, particular complaint was made of the provision in the agreement of 1892 as to allotments in severalty among the Indians of lands for agricultural purposes. After reciting that the tribal lands were not adapted to such purposes, but were suitable for grazing, the memorial proceeded as follows:

We submit that the provision for lands to be allotted to us under this treaty are insufficient, because it is evident we can not, on account of the climate of our section, which renders the maturity of crops uncertain, become a successful farming community; that we, or whoever else occupies these lands, will have to depend upon the cattle industry for revenue and support. And we therefore pray, if we can not be granted the privilege of keeping our reservation under the treaty made with us in 1868, and known as the Medicine Lodge treaty, that authority be granted for the consideration of a new treaty that will make the allowance of land to be allotted to us sufficient for us to graze upon it enough stock cattle, the increase from which we can market for support of ourselves and families.

With the papers just referred to before it, the House Committee on Indian Affairs, in February, 1900, favorably reported a bill to give effect to the agreement of 1892.

On January 19, 1900, an act was passed by the Senate, entitled An act to ratify an agreement made with the Indians of the Fort Hall Indian Reservation in Idaho, and making an appropriation to carry the same into effect. In February, 1900, the House Committee on Indian Affairs, having before it the memorial of the Indians transmitted by the Secretary of the Interior, and also having for consideration the Senate bill just alluded to, reported that bill back to the House favorably, with certain amendments. (House Doc. No. 419, Fifty-sixth Congress, first session.) One of such amendments consisted in adding to the bill in question, as section 6, a provision to execute the agreement made with the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache Indians in 1892. Although the bill thus reported embodied the execution of the agreement last referred to, the title of the bill was not changed, and consequently referred only to the execution of the agreement made with the Indians of the Fort Hall Reservation in Idaho. The provisions thus embodied in section 6 of the bill in question substantially conformed to those contained in the bill which had previously passed the House, except that the previous enactment on this subject was changed so as to do away with the necessity for making to each Indian one-half of his allotment in agricultural land and the other half in grazing land. In addition a clause was inserted in the bill providing for the setting apart of a large amount of grazing land to be used in common by the Indians. The provision in question was as follows:

That in addition to the allotment of lands to said Indians as provided for in this agreement, the Secretary of the Interior shall set aside for the use in common for said Indian tribes 480,000 acres of grazing lands, to be selected by the Secretary of the Interior, either in one or more tracts as will best subserve the interest of said Indians.

The provision of the agreement in favor of the Indian agent and army officer was also eliminated.

The bill, moreover, exempted the money consideration for the surplus lands from all claims for Indian depredations, and expressly provided that in the event the claim of the Choctaws and Chickasaws was ultimately sustained, the consideration referred to should be subject to the further action of Congress. In this bill, as in previous ones, provision was made for allotments to the Indians, the opening of the surplus land for settlement, etc. The bill became a law by concurrence of the Senate in the amendments adopted by the House as just stated.

Thereafter, by acts approved on January 4, 1901 (chap. 8, 31 Stat., 727), March 3, 1901 (chap. 832, 31 Stat., 1078), and March 3, 1901 (chap. 846, 31 Stat., 1093), authority was given to extend the time for making allotments and opening of the surplus land for settlement for a period not exceeding eight months from December 6, 1900; appropriations were made for surveys in connection with allotments and setting apart of grazing lands; and authority was conferred to establish counties and county seats, town sites, etc., and proclaim the surplus lands open for settlement by white people.

On June 6, 1901, a bill was filed on the equity side of the supreme court of the District of Columbia, wherein Lone Wolf (one of the appellants herein) was named as complainant, suing for himself as well as for all other members of the confederated tribes of the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache Indians, residing in the Territory of Oklahoma. The present appellees (the Secretary of the Interior, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and the Commissioner of the General Land Office) were made respondents to the bill. Subsequently, by an amendment to the bill, members of the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache tribes were joined with Lone Wolf as parties complainant.

The bill recited the establishing and occupancy of the reservation in Oklahoma by the confederated tribes of Kiowa, Comanche, and Apaches, the signing of the agreement of October 6, 1892, and the subsequent proceedings which have been detailed, culminating in the passage of the act of June 6, 1900, and the acts of Congress supplementary to said act. In substance it was further charged in the bill that the agreement had not been signed as required by the Medicine Lodge treatythat is, by three-fourths of the male adult members of the tribe, and that the signatures thereto had been obtained by fraudulent misrepresentations and concealment, similar to those recited in the memorial signed at the 1899 council.

In addition to the grievance previously stated in the memorial, the charge was made that the interpreters falsely represented, when the said treaty was being considered by the Indians, that the treaty provided for the sale of their surplus lands at some time in the future at the price of $2.50 per acre; whereas, in truth and in fact, by the terms of said treaty, only $1 an acre is allowed for said surplus lands, which sum, it was charged, was an amount far below the real value of said lands. It was also averred that portions of the signed agreement had been changed by Congress without submitting such changes to the Indians for their consideration. Based upon the foregoing allegations, it was alleged that so much of said act of Congress of June 6, 1900, and so much of said acts supplementary thereto and amendatory thereof as provided for the taking effect of said agreement, the allotment of certain lands mentioned therein to members of said Indian tribes, the surveying, laying out, and platting town sites and locating county seats on said lands, and the ceding to the United States and the opening to settlement by white men of 2,000,000 acres of said lands, were enacted in violation of the property rights of the said Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache Indians, and if carried into effect would deprive said Indians of their lands without due process of law, and that said parts of said acts were contrary to the Constitution of the United States, and were void, and conferred no right, power, or duty upon the respondents to do or perform any of the acts or things enjoined or required by the acts of Congress in question. Alleging the intention of the respondents to carry into effect the aforesaid claimed unconstitutional and void acts, and asking discovery by answers to interrogatories propounded to the respondents, the allowance of a temporary restraining order and a final decree awarding a perpetual injunction was prayed, to restrain the commission by the respondents of the alleged unlawful acts by them threatened to be done. General relief was also prayed.

On January 6, 1901, a rule to show cause why a temporary injunction should not be granted was issued. In response to this rule an affidavit of the Secretary of the Interior was filed, in which, in substance, it was averred that the complainant (Lone Wolf) and his wife and daughter had selected allotments under the act of June 6, 1900, and the same had been approved by the Secretary of the Interior, and that all other members of the tribes, excepting twelve, had also accepted and retained allotments in severalty, and that the greater part thereof had been approved before the bringing of this suit. It was also averred that the 480,000 acres of grazing land provided to be set apart in the act of June 6, 1900, for the use by the Indians in common, had been so set apart prior to the institution of the suit, with the approval of a council composed of chiefs and headmen of said Indians. Thereupon an affidavit verified by Lone Wolf was filed, in which, in effect, he denied that he had accepted an allotment of lands under the act of June 6, 1900, and the acts supplementary to and amendatory thereof. Thereafter, on June 17, 1901, leave was given to amend the bill, and the same was amended, as heretofore stated, by adding additional parties complainant and by providing a substituted first paragraph of the bill, in which was set forth, among other things, that the three tribes, at a general council held on June 7, 1901, had voted to institute all legal and other proceedings necessary to be taken to prevent the carrying into effect of the legislation complained of.

The supreme court of the District, on June 21, 1901, denied the application for a temporary injunction. The cause was thereafter submitted to the court on a demurrer to the bill as amended. The demurrer was sustained, and the complainants electing not to plead further, on June 26, 1901, a decree was entered in favor of the respondents. An appeal was thereupon taken to the court of appeals of the District. While this appeal was pending the President issued a proclamation, dated July 4, 1901 (32 Stat., Appx. Proclamations, 11), in which it was ordered that the surplus lands ceded by the Comanche, Kiowa, and Apache, and other tribes of Indians, should be opened to entry and settlement on August 6, 1901. Among other things it was recited in the proclamation that all the conditions required by law to be performed prior to the opening of the lands to settlement and entry had been performed. It was also therein recited that, in pursuance of the act of Congress ratifying the agreement, allotments of land in severalty had been regularly made to each member of the Comanche, Kiowa, and Apache tribes of Indians; the lands occupied by religious societies or other organizations for religious or educational work among the Indians had been regularly allotted and confirmed to such societies and organizations, respectively; and the Secretary of the Interior, out of the lands ceded by the agreement, and regularly selected and set

aside for the use in common for said Comanche, Kiowa, and Apache tribes of Indians 480,000 acres of grazing lands.

The court of appeals (without passing on a motion which had been made to dismiss the appeal) affirmed the decree of the court below, and overruled a motion for reargument. (19 App. D. C., 315.) An appeal was allowed, and the decree of affirmance is now here for review.

Mr. Justice WHITE, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.

By the sixth article of the first of the two treaties referred to in the preceding statement, proclaimed on August 25, 1868 (15 Stat., 581), it was provided that heads of families of the tribes affected by the treaty might select, within the reservation, a tract of land of not exceeding 320 acres iextent, which should thereafter cease to be held in common, and should be for the exclusive possession of the Indian making the selection, so long as he or his family might continue to cultivate the land. The twelfth article reads as follows:

ARTICLE 12. No treaty for the cession of any portion or part of the reservation herein described which may be held in common shall be of any validity or force as against the said Indians, unless executed and signed by at least three-fourths of all the adult male Indians occupying the same, and no cession by the tribe shall be understood or construed in such manner as to deprive, without his consent, any individual member of the tribe of his rights to any tract of land selected by him as provided in Article III (VI) of this treaty.

The appellants base their right to relief on the proposition that by the effect of the article just quoted the confederated tribes of Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache were vested with an interest in the lands held in common within the reservation, which interest could not be divested by Congress in any other mode than that specified in the said twelfth article, and that as a result of the said stipulation the interest of the Indians in the common lands fell within the protection of the fifth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and such interestindirectly at leastcame under the control of the judicial branch of the Government. We are unable to yield our assent to this view.

The contention, in effect, ignores the status of the contracting Indians and the relation of dependency they bore and continue to bear toward the Government of the United States. To uphold the claim would be to adjudge that the indirect operation of the treaty was to materially limit and qualify the controlling authority of Congress in respect to the care and protection of the Indians, and to deprive Congress, in a possible emergency, when the necessity might be urgent for a partition and disposal of the tribal lands, of all power to act if the assent of the Indians could not be obtained.

Now, it is true that in decisions of this court the Indian right of occupancy of tribal lands, whether declared in a treaty or otherwise created, has been stated to be sacred, or, as sometimes expressed, as sacred as the fee of the United States in the same lands. (Johnson v. McIntosh (1823), 8 Wheat., 543, 574; Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831), 5 Pet., 1, 48; Worcester v. Georgia (1832), 6 Pet., 515, 581; United States v. Cook (1873), 19 Wall., 591, 592; Leavenworth, etc., Railroad Company v. United States (1875), 92 U. S., 733, 755; Beecher v. Wetherby (1877), 95 U. S., 525.) But in none of these cases was there involved a controversy between Indians and the Government respecting the power of Congress to administer the property of the Indians. The questions considered in the cases referred to, which either directly or indirectly had relation to the nature of the property rights of the Indians, concerned the character and extent of such rights as respected States or individuals. In one of the cited cases it was clearly pointed out that Congress possessed a paramount power over the property of the Indians by reason of its exercise of guardianship over their interests, and that such authority might be implied, even though opposed to the strict letter of a treaty with the Indians. Thus, in Beecher v. Wetherby (95 U. S., 525), discussing the claim that there had been a prior reservation of land by treaty to the use of a certain tribe of Indians, the court said (p. 525):

But the right which the Indians held was only that of occupancy. The fee was in the United States, subject to that right, and could be transferred by them whenever they chose. The grantee, it is true, would take only the naked fee, and could not disturb the occupancy of the Indians; that occupancy could only be interfered with or determined by the United States. It is to be presumed that in this

matter the United States would be governed by such considerations of justice as would control a Christian people in their treatment of an ignorant and dependent race. Be that as it may, the propriety or justice of their action toward the Indians with respect to their lands is a question of governmental policy, and is not a matter open to discussion in a controversy between third parties, neither of whom derives title from the Indians.

Plenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the power has always been deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial department of the Government. Until the year 1871 the policy was pursued of dealing with the Indian tribes by means of treaties, and of course a moral obligation rested upon Congress to act in good faith in performing the stipulations entered into on its behalf. But, as with treaties made with foreign nations (Chinese Exclusion Cases, 130 U. S., 581, 600), the legislative power might pass laws in conflict with treaties made with the Indians. (Thomas v. Gay, 169 U. S., 264, 270; Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U. S., 504, 511; Spalding v. Chandler, 160 U. S., 394, 405; Missouri, Kansas and Texas Ry. Co. v. Roberts, 152 U. S., 114, 117; The Cherokee Tobacco, 11 Wall., 616.)

The power exists to abrogate the provisions of an Indian treaty, though presumably such power will be exercised only when circumstances arise which will not only justify the Government in disregarding the stipulations of the treaty, but may demand, in the interest of the country and the Indians themselves, that it should do so. When, therefore, treaties were entered into between the United States and a tribe of Indians it was never doubted that the power to abrogate existed in Congress, and that in a contingency such power might be availed of from considerations of governmental policy, particularly if consistent with perfect good faith toward the Indians. In United States v. Kagama (1885), 118 U. S., 375, speaking of the Indians, the court said (p. 382):

After an experience of a hundred years of the treaty-making system of government Congress has determined upon a new departureto govern them by acts of Congress. This is seen in the act of March 3, 1871, embodied in section 2079 of the Revised Statutes: No Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty; but no obligation of any treaty lawfully made and ratified with any such Indian nation or tribe prior to March third, eighteen hundred and seventy-one, shall be hereby invalidated or impaired.

In upholding the validity of an act of Congress which conferred jurisdiction upon the courts of the United States for certain crimes committed on an Indian reservation within a State, the court said (p. 383):

It seems to us that this is within the competency of Congress. These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They are communities dependent on the United States; dependent largely for their daily food; dependent for their political rights. They owe no allegiance to the States, and receive from them no protection. Because of the local ill feeling the people of the States where they are found are often their deadliest enemies. From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal Government with them and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power. This has always been recognized by the Executive and by Congress, and by this court, whenever the question has arisen.

The power of the General Government over these remnants of a race once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom they dwell. It must exist in that Government, because it never has existed anywhere else; because the theater of its exercise is within the geographical limits of the United States; because it has never been denied, and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes.

That Indians who had not been fully emancipated from the control and protection of the United States are subject, at least so far as the tribal lands were concerned, to be controlled by direct legislation of Congress is also declared in Choctaw Nation v. United States (119 U. S., 1, 27) and Stephens v. Choctaw Nation (174 U. S., 445, 483).

In view of the legislative power possessed by Congress over treaties with the Indians and Indian tribal property we may not specially consider the contentions pressed upon our notice that the signing by the Indians of the agreement; of October 6, 1892, was obtained by fraudulent misrepresentations and concealment; that the requisite three-fourths of adult male Indians had not signed, as required by the twelfth article of the treaty of 1867, and that the treaty as signed had been amended by Congress without submitting such amendments to the action of the Indians, since all these matters, in any event, were solely within the domain of the legislative authority, and its action is conclusive upon the courts.

The act of June 6, 1900, which is complained of in the bill, was enacted at a time when the tribal relations between the confederated tribes of Kiowas, Comanches, and Apaches still existed, and that statute and the statutes supplementary thereto dealt with the disposition of tribal property and purported to give an adequate consideration for the surplus lands not allotted among the Indians or reserved for their benefit. Indeed, the controversy which this case presents is concluded by the decision in Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock (187 U. S., 294), decided at this term, where it was held that full administrative power was possessed by Congress over Indian tribal property. In effect, the action of Congress now complained of was but an exercise of such power, a mere change in the form of investment of Indian tribal property, the property of those who, as we have held, were in substantial effect the words of the Government. We must presume that Congress acted in perfect good faith in the dealings with the Indians of which complaint is made, and that the legislative branch of the Government exercised its best judgment in the premises. In any event, as Congress possessed full power in the matter, the judiciary can not question or inquire into the motives which prompted the enactment of this legislation. If injury was occasioned, which we do not wish to be understood as implying, by the use made by Congress of its power, relief must be sought by an appeal to that body for redress and not to be courts. The legislation in question was constitutional, and the demurrer to the bill was therefore rightly sustained.

The motion to dismiss does not challenge jurisdiction over the subject-matter. Without expressly referring to the propositions of fact upon which it proceeds, suffice it to say that we think it need not be further adverted to, since, for the reasons previously given and the nature of the controversy, we think the decree below should be affirmed.