The Federalist No. 9

The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and
Insurrection

Independent JournalWednesday, November 21, 1787[Alexander
Hamilton]

To the People of the State of New York:

AFIRM
Union will be of the utmost moment to the peace and liberty of the States, as a
barrier against domestic faction and insurrection. It is impossible to read the
history of the petty republics of Greece and Italy without feeling sensations of
horror and disgust at the distractions with which they were continually
agitated, and at the rapid succession of revolutions by which they were kept in
a state of perpetual vibration between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy. If
they exhibit occasional calms, these only serve as short-lived contrast to the
furious storms that are to succeed. If now and then intervals of felicity open
to view, we behold them with a mixture of regret, arising from the reflection
that the pleasing scenes before us are soon to be overwhelmed by the tempestuous
waves of sedition and party rage. If momentary rays of glory break forth from
the gloom, while they dazzle us with a transient and fleeting brilliancy, they
at the same time admonish us to lament that the vices of government should
pervert the direction and tarnish the lustre of those bright talents and exalted
endowments for which the favored soils that produced them have been so justly
celebrated.

From the disorders that disfigure the annals of those
republics the advocates of despotism have drawn arguments, not only against the
forms of republican government, but against the very principles of civil
liberty. They have decried all free government as inconsistent with the order of
society, and have indulged themselves in malicious exultation over its friends
and partisans. Happily for mankind, stupendous fabrics reared on the basis of
liberty, which have flourished for ages, have, in a few glorious instances,
refuted their gloomy sophisms. And, I trust, America will be the broad and solid
foundation of other edifices, not less magnificent, which will be equally
permanent monuments of their errors.

But it is not to be denied that the portraits they have
sketched of republican government were too just copies of the originals from
which they were taken. If it had been found impracticable to have devised models
of a more perfect structure, the enlightened friends to liberty would have been
obliged to abandon the cause of that species of government as indefensible. The
science of politics, however, like most other sciences, has received great
improvement. The efficacy of various principles is now well understood, which
were either not known at all, or imperfectly known to the ancients. The regular
distribution of power into distinct departments; the introduction of legislative
balances and checks; the institution of courts composed of judges holding their
offices during good behavior; the representation of the people in the
legislature by deputies of their own election: these are wholly new discoveries,
or have made their principal progress towards perfection in modern times. They
are means, and powerful means, by which the excellences of republican government
may be retained and its imperfections lessened or avoided. To this catalogue of
circumstances that tend to the amelioration of popular systems of civil
government, I shall venture, however novel it may appear to some, to add one
more, on a principle which has been made the foundation of an objection to the
new Constitution; I mean the ENLARGEMENT of the
ORBIT within which such systems are to revolve, either
in respect to the dimensions of a single State or to the consolidation of
several smaller States into one great Confederacy. The latter is that which
immediately concerns the object under consideration. It will, however, be of use
to examine the principle in its application to a single State, which shall be
attended to in another place.

The utility of a Confederacy, as well to suppress faction
and to guard the internal tranquillity of States, as to increase their external
force and security, is in reality not a new idea. It has been practiced upon in
different countries and ages, and has received the sanction of the most approved
writers on the subject of politics. The opponents of the plan proposed have,
with great assiduity, cited and circulated the observations of Montesquieu on
the necessity of a contracted territory for a republican government. But they
seem not to have been apprised of the sentiments of that great man expressed in
another part of his work, nor to have adverted to the consequences of the
principle to which they subscribe with such ready acquiescence.

When Montesquieu recommends a small extent for republics,
the standards he had in view were of dimensions far short of the limits of
almost every one of these States. Neither Virginia, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,
New York, North Carolina, nor Georgia can by any means be compared with the
models from which he reasoned and to which the terms of his description apply.
If we therefore take his ideas on this point as the criterion of truth, we shall
be driven to the alternative either of taking refuge at once in the arms of
monarchy, or of splitting ourselves into an infinity of little, jealous,
clashing, tumultuous commonwealths, the wretched nurseries of unceasing discord,
and the miserable objects of universal pity or contempt. Some of the writers who
have come forward on the other side of the question seem to have been aware of
the dilemma; and have even been bold enough to hint at the division of the
larger States as a desirable thing. Such an infatuated policy, such a desperate
expedient, might, by the multiplication of petty offices, answer the views of
men who possess not qualifications to extend their influence beyond the narrow
circles of personal intrigue, but it could never promote the greatness or
happiness of the people of America.

Referring the examination of the principle itself to
another place, as has been already mentioned, it will be sufficient to remark
here that, in the sense of the author who has been most emphatically quoted upon
the occasion, it would only dictate a reduction of the SIZE
of the more considerable MEMBERS of the Union, but would
not militate against their being all comprehended in one confederate government.
And this is the true question, in the discussion of which we are at present
interested.

So far are the suggestions of Montesquieu from standing in
opposition to a general Union of the States, that he explicitly treats of a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC as the expedient
for extending the sphere of popular government, and reconciling the advantages
of monarchy with those of republicanism.

"It is very probable," (says he1) "that mankind would
have been obliged at length to live constantly under the government of a
SINGLE PERSON, had they not contrived a kind of
constitution that has all the internal advantages of a republican, together with
the external force of a monarchical government. I mean a CONFEDERATE
REPUBLIC.

"This form of government is a convention by which
several smaller states agree to become members of a larger one,
which they intend to form. It is a kind of assemblage of societies that
constitute a new one, capable of increasing, by means of new associations, till
they arrive to such a degree of power as to be able to provide for the security
of the united body.

"A republic of this kind, able to withstand an
external force, may support itself without any internal corruptions. The form of
this society prevents all manner of inconveniences.

"If a single member should attempt to usurp the
supreme authority, he could not be supposed to have an equal authority and
credit in all the confederate states. Were he to have too great influence over
one, this would alarm the rest. Were he to subdue a part, that which would still
remain free might oppose him with forces independent of those which he had
usurped and overpower him before he could be settled in his usurpation.

"Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the
confederate states the others are able to quell it. Should abuses creep into one
part, they are reformed by those that remain sound. The state may be destroyed
on one side, and not on the other; the confederacy may be dissolved, and the
confederates preserve their sovereignty.

"As this government is composed of small republics,
it enjoys the internal happiness of each; and with respect to its external
situation, it is possessed, by means of the association, of all the advantages
of large monarchies.

I have thought it proper to quote at length these
interesting passages, because they contain a luminous abridgment of the
principal arguments in favor of the Union, and must effectually remove the false
impressions which a misapplication of other parts of the work was calculated to
make. They have, at the same time, an intimate connection with the more
immediate design of this paper; which is, to illustrate the tendency of the
Union to repress domestic faction and insurrection.

A distinction, more subtle than accurate, has been raised
between a
confederacy and a consolidation of the States. The essential
characteristic of the first is said to be, the restriction of its authority to
the members in their collective capacities, without reaching to the individuals
of whom they are composed. It is contended that the national council ought to
have no concern with any object of internal administration. An exact equality of
suffrage between the members has also been insisted upon as a leading feature of
a confederate government. These positions are, in the main, arbitrary; they are
supported neither by principle nor precedent. It has indeed happened, that
governments of this kind have generally operated in the manner which the
distinction taken notice of, supposes to be inherent in their nature; but there
have been in most of them extensive exceptions to the practice, which serve to
prove, as far as example will go, that there is no absolute rule on the subject.
And it will be clearly shown in the course of this investigation that as far as
the principle contended for has prevailed, it has been the cause of incurable
disorder and imbecility in the government.

The definition of a confederate republic seems
simply to be "an assemblage of societies," or an association of two or
more states into one state. The extent, modifications, and objects of the
federal authority are mere matters of discretion. So long as the separate
organization of the members be not abolished; so long as it exists, by a
constitutional necessity, for local purposes; though it should be in perfect
subordination to the general authority of the union, it would still be, in fact
and in theory, an association of states, or a confederacy. The proposed
Constitution, so far from implying an abolition of the State governments, makes
them constituent parts of the national sovereignty, by allowing them a direct
representation in the Senate, and leaves in their possession certain exclusive
and very important portions of sovereign power. This fully corresponds, in every
rational import of the terms, with the idea of a federal government.

In the Lycian confederacy, which consisted of
twenty-three CITIES or republics, the largest were
entitled to three votes in the
COMMON COUNCIL, those of the middle class to two,
and the smallest to one. The
COMMON COUNCIL had the appointment of all the judges and
magistrates of the respective CITIES. This was certainly
the most, delicate species of interference in their internal administration; for
if there be any thing that seems exclusively appropriated to the local
jurisdictions, it is the appointment of their own officers. Yet Montesquieu,
speaking of this association, says: "Were I to give a model of an excellent
Confederate Republic, it would be that of Lycia." Thus we perceive that the
distinctions insisted upon were not within the contemplation of this enlightened
civilian; and we shall be led to conclude, that they are the novel refinements
of an erroneous theory.