Well, obviously it was when he came into the news, when he was arrested, when
the whole plot to arrange an uprising was uncovered, with the trials that
followed. That was the first time that the name Mandela came to my knowledge. I
was a very young lawyer then, just recently qualified from university.

... This was a trial about sabotage, overthrow of the government. Mandela
was the head of the newly formed armed wing of the ANC. In 1961, they'd
announced the existence of this policy by blowing up pylons and buildings ...

Ja, my attitude and those of my contemporaries within the National
Party--National Party supporters, not active politicians--was that here we have
something which was planned, which militated not only against the laws of South
Africa, but which in any country, with or without apartheid, would have been
punishable if people were found guilty, and within the framework of any
civilized, well-developed legal system, would have been regarded as crimes in
that sense of the word.

I got to know him as a very good listener, a man with a legal mind, taking into account all facts. Coming forth, generally speaking, with reasonable replies and reactions... Solution orientated. ...So he was a good negotiator. I also got to know him quite soon as an astute politician.

We viewed it as a normal process that the law should take its course. He was
charged in an open court. He had full facilities of a highly qualified defense
team. He had a fair trial within the framework of the law. At the same time, we
felt it was also justified because already negotiations with many other black
leaders [were] aimed at a peaceful resolution and aimed at, as we viewed it
then, bringing full political rights to all blacks in South Africa. Fact is
that prominent black leaders throughout the whole period, right up to the end,
and maybe the most prominent amongst them, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, supported the
peaceful route, and never supported the revolutionary route.

So you saw these people as dangerous.

Yes, as dangerous. It was clear that had they implemented their plans, that
many innocent civilians would have died, and the essential task of any
government is to maintain law and order, and protect the lives and property of
its citizens.

As you came into government, you first became an MP and then joined the
cabinet. Do you remember the first time Mandela might have come up in that
context and why?

From a fairly early stage, I can't remember specific dates, it was clear that
he, in any event, was nearing completion of what was, at that stage, regarded
as a normal term of imprisonment for somebody who has been sentenced to life
imprisonment, as the law then was. People were regularly released after 21
years, thereabouts. So the need for his release was discussed from time to
time. There was for me, as a jurist, the need because it was only fair. There
were also political angles. He had become, already then, an icon, and his
continued imprisonment was one of the big emotional issues which resulted in
the successful mobilization of those outside South Africa who wanted to totally
isolate South Africa. His continued imprisonment was a central theme of the
anti-South African activities throughout the world. My predecessor mainly dealt
with this. I was not an intimate part of the planning and the thought
processes, but from time to time as a cabinet member, reports were made and the
two efforts of my predecessor to have him released conditionally were discussed
at cabinet level.

There was the possibility of releasing into the Transkei, where he was born,
where he grew up, and which from South Africa's point of view, was a totally
independent state. He rejected that. There was the possibility of his being
released conditionally, in the sense that he should sign certain undertakings
and relinquish, as a person, a commitment to the armed struggle, which he
refused to do. It was becoming clear that the failure of those two situations
has led us to a point where we were almost at a dead-end. I was not part of the
behind the scenes discussions, and I was not briefed about it in the beginning
of that process. When I became leader of the party, but not president, on the
2nd of February '89, I was immediately fully briefed by Mr. Kobie Coetsee, who
was minister of justice, and from there onwards, I was fully part of the whole
process. I knew about the meeting which he would have with P.W. Botha just
before Botha's retirement. It had my approval, and from the beginning in my
pre-planning, for my presidency, his release, coupled with the release of the
other prisoners, was very high on the agenda. One of the first things I did
after the election in September 1989, was to release a high profile group of
former Robben Island prisoners.

... You say in your book that when Kobie Coetsee did tell you about these
talks ... you weren't critical, but you were surprised ...

Well, I mean surprised in the sense that I haven't been informed, and
inquisitive and surprised because such a high profile person would, from jail,
be negotiating and asking myself to what extent did he have a mandate to do
so.

That's an interesting theme, because it was a question that people on both
sides were asking.

Ja, but if I remember correctly, according to the briefings I received, I was
told that at a later stage, after initial discussions, some rules were relaxed
and President Mandela was allowed to have interaction in order to obtain a
mandate and in order to keep his power base informed about what he was doing.
Obviously, I found that acceptable, because you cannot just deal with an
individual without a mandate. It would have limited advantages, whereas could
he properly mandated, it would have had much more major implications and it
held much more promise.

... Before you become state president later that year, what, in your view,
was the agenda from the government side of those talks? What was the government
trying to achieve up till then?

The government was trying to end the conflict, the violent conflict. It must be
remembered--and I have been part of the process--that already in '86, the
government had accepted a new vision, had abandoned the policy of apartheid or
separate development, and accepted a new vision of one united South Africa,
with one person one vote, with all forms of discrimination to be scrapped from
the statute book. We were already in the process of scrapping hundreds of
apartheid laws. So what the ANC wanted, the government and the National Party
had already decided in principle they should have, provided that we could
negotiate a constitutional system, which would result in peaceful transition,
and which would result in the effective protection of our many cultural
minorities. In that sense of the word, therefore, it just made common sense for
the government to say we have this new vision, it has brought something new
into the conflict, and is also coupled with that the realization that this type
of conflict really can be endless and can just escalate. That there isn't
really a solution through the barrel of a gun or through military operations,
or whatever, for this type of conflict. It is tragic that in the period after
the National Party decided to actually accept this new vision, that it was then
that the ANC stepped up their violent onslaught, and it was then that they also
decided to target civilian targets ...

I assume that before you met him ... there must have been briefings and
information available on Mandela... Do you remember anything about what your
assessment was, based on the information you had available.

The briefings obviously came from people who were in close interaction with him
then for some time. So the people behind the briefings were people like Kobie
Coetsee, like Niel Barnard, like Willie Willemse, like Fanie van der Merwe. The
picture they painted to me was a positive picture of a .man with integrity, of
an impressive person, of a highly intelligent person. In that sense, it raised
in me the expectations that I would be dealing with a leader of stature.

You could imagine another route, that the main means of bringing the parties
together would have been with the internal political leaders, who were ANC
aligned, or the external leaders. Were there particular benefits in it being
Mandela rather than those people?

Well, Mandela's standing in the ANC was beyond argument. It was clear that also
within the ANC he was regarded as a figure of great prominence, as a key
person. In that sense of the word, I didn't play off in my mind Mandela
vis-à-vis the United Democratic Front people. At all times, I believed
that there was quite close interaction between the banned ANC and the front
organizations active in South Africa in the trade union field, and in other
civil organizations.

Let's go back to your speech, which was at the time when you set out your
agenda, after having been elected. What was your goal in releasing Mandela?

Well, it fitted into a broader picture of the release of these prisoners, of
taking an initiative to create an atmosphere which would be conducive towards
negotiation, and from which could flow the end of what I really regarded as
unnecessary continued conflict. Because of this policy change which the
National Party has already made three years before that. So in a sense, the
release of President Mandela we knew from a newsworthy point of view, from the
point of view of world attention, was the crucial thing, but at all times, I
looked at the broader picture of so many other important ANC people, who have
also been in jail for very, very long periods, and in some instances, a similar
period. Therefore, his release from a planning point of view, to get the
maximum effect, was integrated in our plan with the earlier release of some
other prisoners.

You say in your book a very interesting thing about your speech of February
the 2nd, and that you had no illusion of why all the American main anchors and
these people had all flown in ...Why do you think that was?

Well, I think they all expected me to announce the release the President
Mandela. I made an ordinary typical speech, just sort of saying we are looking
at certain things, and we'll be planning some things. It would have been
regarded as another failed Rubicon speech. The expectancy was being built up.
What they didn't expect was that we would put together a package in which the
release of President Mandela, however important, would only be one of the
important aspects and the unbanning of all the organizations, the absolute
leveling of the playing field ... and for that reason, because I wanted to
retain as much initiative as possible, in order to be able to manage the
process, and to ensure that the process doesn't erupt into something
unmanageable, which could seriously harm the country and all its people, I
downplayed, actually, in my speech of the 2nd of February, the imminent release
of President Mandela. Did not announce a date and only made that announcement
quite a number of days afterwards.

Describe the first meeting a week later, when you met.

Well, no, I met him for the first time in December '89, quite some time before
I made the speech. He was brought one evening to my office in Tuynhuys, which
is his office today, and some ministers were present. I think Niel Barnard was
there, General Willemse was there, Kobie Coetsee was there ... but after brief
handshakes, they all withdrew and President Mandela and I had a one-on-one
discussion. I did not then discuss in any detail his release. If I remember
correctly, I did tell him that it is now under serious consideration, and there
was some sort of a broad discussion on this. But mainly the purpose from my
viewpoint was to get to know him, and ... to lay a foundation for future
interaction and cooperation between us.

To make an assessment, I think he very much used the opportunity, if I
interpret what he wrote in Long Walk to Freedom correctly, for the very
same purpose. In the end I could write in my book, as he has done in his, that
I went away from that meeting feeling that I was dealing with a man whose
integrity I could trust, that I could do business with. I found him quite an
impressive figure. He was taller than I expected. He had a aura of calmness and
of authority around him. And I sort of liked him. Just on appearance and on
first impressions.

Those things can be quite important.

Absolutely. Absolutely. I believe that first impressions are very important.
Then he came to see me a second time after my speech of the 2nd of February
1990 ... I then informed him of our planned date for his release, and the
details of the release. The proposal was that he would be released in
Johannesburg. He then put up a very strong case why he would like to be
released here. He also argued that he wouldn't like to be released on the date
that we had in mind, and argued that more preparation was needed for his
release. I consulted with my advisors, who were not in the room with us and
decided to make a compromise to say, "Yes, we will release you at the Victor
Verster. But we will release you on the date when we planned to release you." I
don't think he liked it, but he had to accept it.

What do you think was at stake in that negotiation?

To gain time to make an even more theatrical event of his release, with party
political purposes, which was a legitimate motivation from his side; and it was
quite legitimate from my side to ensure that that aspect, the political aspect
of it, is contained as much as possible.

The actual release date itself ... What were your concerns and on the day,
how concerned were you?

Obviously, I had concerns. Therefore, the agreement me and the major role
players within the government, who had to manage this, was that there would be,
and I wasn't directly involved in that, firm agreements not only with President
Mandela, but also with whoever would be acting from their side. Firm agreements
on how his release would be structured, so as to avoid anarchy. Firm
commitments were demanded from the ANC side and the organizers from the ANC
side, with regard to control of the crowds, with regard to where meetings would
be allowed, with regard to which routes would be followed. So a lot of
precautionary measures were put into place to avoid the situation getting out
of hand. I had, on that day, a private lunch. It was a Sunday, after church,
and we stayed on with our hosts and waited and waited, as everybody waited,
because of the very long delay, and finally watched it on television. My key
advisors knew where to find me should anything happen ...

One thing that is interesting about that time ... there were ANC people
having to deal with government people at different levels ... where up until
this moment, benevolent distrust between these two sides was the norm ... How
important was your relation with Mandela at that time in just convincing
everyone else, from both sides, that negotiations could work?

The relationship between me and President Mandela right at the beginning was
not a very well established relationship. It was based on two meetings. But it
was also based on the background of commitments having been given from both
sides in the run-up to my meetings with him. In that sense of the word, there
was a sound foundation on which we could develop a relationship. The fact that
I was positive about him, and that he apparently sent out a positive message
about me, was right from the beginning, important. His assessment of me, I
believe, played an important role in the inner thinking of the ANC. They had to
trust his judgment on that, and they had to have somewhat of an open minded
approach to me. The same applied within the National Party ranks, but because
of the number of high ranking ministers and officials involved in the run-up to
his release, there was already a core group of leaders who felt that it was the
right thing, who were strongly supportive of what we doing, and who therefore
did not have trouble to adapt. In ANC ranks ... and in UDF ranks, there must
have been a lot of agonizing about this. Therefore, our meetings thereafter and
the messages we sent to each other ... each one of them were important in
almost fast tracking the development of a workable relationship between us, of
a direct access type of relationship between us. Right from the beginning, he
had direct access to me. He could phone me and I would interrupt a meeting to
speak to him.

What are the impressions as you got to meet him more frequently?

My initial impressions were confirmed. Obviously, they were also amplified. I
got to know him as a very good listener, as a man with a legal mind, with
analytical thinking patterns taking into account all facts. Coming forth,
generally speaking, with reasonable replies and reactions towards requests,
towards suggestions. Solution orientated. When arguing against certain
proposals, saying, "But something else could be considered." So he was a good
negotiator. I also got to know him quite soon as an astute politician. As
somebody who had a wonderful capacity, and he still has it, of grabbing the
attention. He's a very good marketer. He has wonderful inbuilt public relations
capabilities. He has a lot of charisma. The longer we knew each other, I also
got to know another side of his character. That he could be, on occasion,
extremely stubborn. That he could, from my vantage point, at times, get
unreasonable. That he could lose his temper and then be quite fierce and quite
a different person.

In the initial period up to CODESA, in December of that year, the relationship
between us was never really strained. The underlying cause, which caused
strain, was his approaches to me whenever an incident occurred in which the
police were involved. His suspicion that somehow or another I was not doing
enough, or I didn't have control, and that we were not giving enough attention
to his concerns about how violence is managed. I constantly had every
allegation he made about irregularities on the police side, about the
mishandling of crowd control situations, which led to violence in which people
were hurt or killed, properly investigated, and paid a lot of attention. But
somehow or another, he felt I did not deliver ... There were times when he
would say to me, "But you are the president. You can stop the violence in
KwaZulu Natal." It was an unreasonable approach, and I think after five years
of having been president, and he himself not having succeeded to stop the
violence in KwaZulu Natal. It's still ongoing; we've recently had some terrible
incidents there. He might now agree with me that his approach was
unreasonable.

... I would guess that most of those gestures, which really captured the
attention and, at most times, were quite unexpected, came from him. Here and
there, no doubt, where an event was very carefully pre-planned one might expect
that it was part of a plan. For instance, when he and I had the one-on-one
television debate, where I felt, and everybody felt, I was winning on points in
the argument against argument ... he really pulled up level again by suddenly
reaching out and saying, "But not withstanding all this," and then praising me
and taking my hand in front of all the television cameras focused on us ... and
it's possible that that was part of a preplanned action.

... Everyone knows that politicians plan, and politicians know what helps
their political ambitions. One thing about Mandela ... most of the world's not
cynical about Mandela, which gives him a slight advantage in any political
confrontation. So an example like that, you think it was a political move just
like any other politician would have made.

I'm guessing. But I do think that the majority of his media triumphs, if I
could call it that, was an instinctive reaction from him, and he has a
wonderful talent in that regard. Quite often, in the later years, he's been
criticized because he does these things. He sometimes creates expectations in
reaching out to the Afrikaners or talking about a specific situation, and then
not always delivering on those expectations ... A little bit of a skeptical
approach has developed in many parts of civil society about his capacity to
take the ANC and his team along in fulfilling many undertakings which he has
given. This is one of the shadows over his presidency, that quite often he's
said the right thing, at the right time, but then what should have materialized
thereafter did not sufficiently materialize.

... One of the impressions ... of his presidency is that ... he came to
power at the inauguration and said, "I'm retiring after one term," and he
focused on one thing, on the nation building, the reconciliation, and really
never engaged that much in the broader sort of areas of governance.

President Mandela was not a hands on president at any time. Right from the
beginning, he never chaired the cabinet ... I and Mbeki chaired the cabinet on
a rotational basis. He attended most cabinet meetings. He did not interfere in
the day to day discussions and decisions which were taken. But he had a few
specific issues to which he gave a lot of attention. In that sense, he played
more the role, without it being written into the constitution, that a French
president plays. While leaving actually the day to day governing of the country
almost right from the beginning, to Thabo Mbeki. As the years went by, this
became more pronounced, so that I would say for the last six months or so,
actually Mbeki was running the country as a prime minister, and President
Mandela, and he actually said it in public speeches, acted more the role of a
nation builder, of a ceremonial president, of trying to be a unifying factor.

Now I'm not critical of this approach. I think for a man his age, released
after 27 years in jail, stepping into a situation which make tremendous demands
on the president of the country. At the same time, having to deal--he couldn't
ignore it--with the whole international outcry for his presences, to be seen,
to travel the world. It was virtually impossible for him to be a hands on
president as Helmut Kohl was a hands on chancellor, as I was a hands on
president, and as I think Thabo Mbeki might become a hands on president. So I'm
not critical of it. Within the framework of what could be done, really it was
too much to ask of one man his age to do everything he did, and in addition to
that, to really run the country and to have firm control over each minister in
his cabinet.

Then something in your speech and obviously I don't know about the context
of the time ... [you] made a very angry speech ...

The occasion of us receiving the Nobel Peace Prize was, in one sense, a
highlight. But when I arrived in Oslo, I arrived to face a barrage of questions
because he arrived before me, and he'd been on the media there, attacking my
integrity, and being very unfriendly towards me. I shied away from reacting and
creating a confrontation while we were there to receive the prize together. In
our personal interactions at the occasion of the hand over of the prize and the
immediate social functions, he handled me impeccably. His attitude was friendly
and there was no direct confrontation between me and him on that occasion. The
following day, when we went to Oslo, we had a sort of a banquet and there he
made a speech, which was in my presence a vicious attack, again upon me, and
what I stood for. It was embarrassing to the point that without me saying or
doing anything, some of the Swedish hosts apologized and I think were also
embarrassed by this attack.

... It was also surprising because he was recounting the things that had
been done to him on Robben Island. It was a surprisingly personal speech, he
doesn't normally talk about those things, and he chose that time ...

That is true ... his speech went beyond his normal attacks. And that in his
speech he dealt with various aspects and allowing some of the understandable
bitterness ... he is a man remarkably unbitter. But nonetheless, I don't think
that he, as anybody in his place, have successfully escaped from all elements
of bitterness. There must be some residue of feeling deprived, of feeling some
personal bitter thoughts ... It came out at the Oslo dinner, but my
recollection of the details of the speech aren't clear enough for me to really
analyze that speech in detail. It did not only contain elements which were not
there before. It once again also contained a very sharp and what I perceive to
be a very unfair attack upon me and my administration, and a lack of
recognition--not that I want to be recognized--but a lack of recognition for
the fact that if we did not do what we did, also there would not have been a
solution. On many other occasions, he gave that recognition. It is as if there
was a conflict. One day he would lift up my hand and say I'm one of the great
sons of Africa, and two weeks later, he would attack me as if I'm a man not to
be trusted. There was this constant contrasting statements, which even the
media picked up after some time.

How did you deal with that?

I, in the later stages, had a many confrontational discussions with him. Not
confrontational in an ugly sense of the word. But where I would say, "But you
have said this, and this is unfair," and where we would talk it through ...
after such an occasion, we had a discussion where I, from my side, took him to
task for what I regarded as unjustified statements, and although he would not
concede that it was unjustified, it usually ended with a hand shake and a
somewhat restored warmth in our relationship.

... Now you are one of the people to make an assessment of the role he's
played.

Let me firstly, on highs and lows, say that when President Mandela became
president, we then entered a new relationship with each other. He was
president, I was deputy president, leader of the second biggest party, the
biggest minority party, and we sat together in cabinet and there followed a
year or so of very good relationships, where my experience was being cleverly
used. I made it available to induct people who never had the experience of
parliament and of sitting in cabinet, to ensure that the transition is
peaceful, and to induct them into the new governing role that they had to play.
That was a period of good relations between me and President Mandela. The new
cause for tension between us, which then re-arose was the role that I had to
play as leader of the official opposition, the public criticism of the ANC as a
party and their policies. The public criticism of decisions taken without
consensus in cabinet, where we said we cannot support this decision, and where
we then took the ANC majority in the government to task about those decisions,
and publicly distanced ourselves from it. That caused new tension.

... after my resignation, as leader of the opposition, I was then, for one
year, leader of the opposition, and our relationship was then strained. There
were many acrimonious statements against me in parliamentary debates. At one
stage, President Mandela opted to praise some of the senior people, like Pik
Botha, Roelf Meyer, and to drive a wedge between them and me. He was then quite
a tough and fierce political opponent ... I was also tough and fierce at times.
That's the role an opposition leader had to play. When I resigned from
politics, one of the first things I did, was to go and have a cup of coffee
with him. Since then I've seen him on another occasion fairly recently. We have
a date, yet to be fixed, to have lunch together, and with his retirement and
mine, I believe that there is a wish from both sides to restore the very good
relationship which existed between us at a certain stage, and as elder
statesmen no longer actively involved in party politics, to make a contribution
towards the common goals which we developed, the common goals of nation
building.

... In the process of ... negotiations, there is one very obvious personal
factor, Mandela played the role of someone who managed to convince a lot of
white South Africans that they shouldn't be scared ... and I just wondered what
you think ... he did seem to achieve that.

If President Mandela was younger, and made himself available for another term
as president, and if the constitution provided for two votes--one for president
and one for a political party--I am absolutely convinced that President Mandela
would get a very substantially higher percentage of the total vote than the ANC
as a party would get. I think he is held in high esteem by the overwhelming
majority of all South Africans. They have forgiven him, I think, for some
serious mistakes which he made, and they have admiration and appreciation for
the moderation which he brought to the whole process, and for his commitment to
nation building and for his understanding, which is not always reflected within
the ANC. For his understanding of the fears and aspirations of our great
cultural diversity.

What did you feel that day of the (inauguration) ...

... My overwhelming feeling and emotion was a sense of fulfillment. I never
really doubted that we would end up with a situation where he, given good
health, would become the president in whatever new constitution we negotiated.
In that sense of the word, although I was somewhat disappointed in the actual
results, and I had hoped for my party to get a bigger slice of the vote, the
results held no surprises.

I felt a sense of fulfillment that an action plan which I'd laid on the table
on the 2nd of February 1990, had been fulfilled, had been properly implemented
within the time frame which I envisaged. I also had some feelings of
apprehension with the power now transferred. Not so much he, but would the
system hold up to the stresses and strains built into the situation. But
basically, as far as President Mandela is concerned, I wished him luck also in
my mind. And thought to myself that in everything which I could support from
the basis of the principles in which I believe, I would be helpful to help him
to make a success.