Finland

The Era of Russification

The Russian Empire in the late nineteenth century faced
a
number of seemingly intractable problems associated with
its
general backwardness. At the same time, ethnocentric,
authoritarian Russian nationalism was on the rise, as
manifested
both in an aggressive foreign policy and in a growing
intolerance
of non-Russian minorities within the empire. The Russian
government began implementing a program of Russification
that
included the imposition of the Russian language in schools
and in
governmental administration. The goal of these measures
was to
bring non-Russian peoples into the Russian cultural sphere
and
under more direct political control. Poles bore the brunt
of the
Russification policies, but eventually other non-Russian
peoples
also began to feel its pressure.

Russian nationalists considered the autonomous state of
Finland an anomaly in an empire that strove to be a
unified
autocratic state; furthermore, by the 1890s Russian
nationalists
had several reasons to favor the Russification of Finland.
First,
continued suspicions about Finnish separatism gained
plausibility
with the rise of Finnish nationalism. Second, Finnish
commercial
competition began in the 1880s. Third, Russia feared that
Germany
might capitalize on its considerable influence in Sweden
to use
Finland as a staging base for an invasion of Russia. The
Russian
government was concerned especially for the security of
St.
Petersburg. Fourth, there was a growing desire that the
Finns,
who enjoyed the protection of the Russian Empire, should
contribute to that protection by allowing the conscription
of
Finnish youths into the Russian army. These military
considerations were decisive in leading the tsarist
government to
implement Russification, and it was a Russian military
officer,
Nikolai Ivanovich Bobrikov, who, in October 1898, became
the new
governor-general and the eventual instrument of the
policy.

The first major measure of Russification was the
February
Manifesto of 1899, an imperial decree that asserted the
right of
the tsarist government to rule Finland without consulting
either
the Finnish Senate or the Diet. This decree relegated
Finland to
the status of the other provinces of the Russian Empire,
and it
cleared the way for further Russification. The response of
the
Finns was swift and overwhelming. Protest petitions
circulated
rapidly throughout Finland, and they gathered more than
500,000
signatures. In March 1899, these petitions were collected,
and
they were submitted to the tsar, who chose to ignore this
so-
called Great Address. The February Manifesto was followed
by the
Language Manifesto of 1900, which was aimed at making
Russian the
main administrative language in government offices.

In spite of the impressive show of unity displayed in
the
Great Address, the Finns were divided over how to respond
to
Russification. Those most opposed to Russification were
the
Constitutionalists, who stressed their adherence to
Finland's
traditional system of government and their desire to have
it
respected by the Russian government. The
Constitutionalists
formed a political front that included a group of Finnish
speakers, called the Young Finns, and most Swedish
speakers.
Another party of Finnish speakers, called the Old Finns,
represented those who were tempted to comply with
Russification,
partly out of a recognition of their own powerlessness and
partly
out of a desire to use the Russians to undermine the
influence of
Swedish speakers in Finland. These Finns were also called
Compliants, but by 1910 the increasingly unreasonable
demands of
the tsarist government showed their position to be
untenable. The
SDP favored the Constitutionalists, insolar as it favored
any
middle-class party.

The measure that transformed Finnish resistance into a
mass
movement was the new conscription law promulgated by the
tsar in
July 1901. On the basis of the February Manifesto, the
tsar
enacted a law for Finland that dramatically altered the
nature of
the Finnish army. Established originally as an independent
army
with the sole mission of defending Finland, the Finnish
army was
now incorporated into the Russian army and was made
available for
action anywhere. Again the Finns responded with a massive
petition containing about half a million signatures, and
again it
was ignored by the tsar; however, this time the Finns did
not let
matters rest with a petition, but rather followed it up
with a
campaign of passive resistance. Finnish men eligible for
conscription were first called up under the new law in
1902, but
they responded with the so-called Army Strike--only about
half of
them reported for duty. The proportion of eligible Finns
complying with the draft rose in 1903, however, from about
half
to two-thirds and, in 1904, to about four-fifths. The high
incidence of non-compliance nevertheless convinced the
Russian
military command that the Finns were unreliable for
military
purposes, and, as a consequence, the Finns were released
from
military service in return for the levy of an extra tax,
which
they were to pay to the imperial government.

The Finns' victory in the matter of conscription was
not
achieved until the revolution of 1905 in Russia. In the
meantime,
the Russian government had resorted to repressive measures
against the Finns. They had purged the Finnish civil
service of
opponents of Russification; they had expanded censorship;
and, in
April 1903, they had granted dictatorial powers to
Governor-
General Bobrikov. These years also witnessed the growth of
an
active and conspiratorial resistance to Russification,
called the
Kagal after a similar Jewish resistance organization in
Russia.
In June 1904, the active resistance succeeded in
assassinating
Bobrikov, and his death brought a lessening of the
pressure on
Finland.

The first era of Russification came to an end with the
outbreak of revolution in Russia. The general strike that
began
in Russia in October 1905 spread quickly to Finland and
led
there, as in Russia, to the assumption of most real power
by the
local strike committees. As in Russia, the revolutionary
situation was defused quickly by the sweeping reforms
promised in
the tsar's October Manifesto, which for the Finns
suspended, but
did not rescind, the February Manifesto, the conscription
law,
and Bobrikov's dictatorial measures.

In 1906, the tsar proposed that the antiquated Finnish
Diet
be replaced by a modern, unicameral parliament. The Finns
accepted the proposal, and the Eduskunta was created. Also
included in the tsar's proposal was the provision that the
parliament be elected by universal suffrage, a plan that
the
Finns accepted, thanks to the spirit of national
solidarity they
had gained through the struggle against Russification. The
number
of eligible voters was increased thereby from 125,000 to
1,125,000, and Finland became the second country, after
New
Zealand, to allow women to vote. When the new parliament
met in
1907, the SDP was the largest single party, with 80 of 200
seats.

Partly out of frustration that the revolution of 1905
had not
accomplished more, the Finnish SDP became increasingly
radical.
Foreshadowing the civil War, the short-lived revolutionary
period
also brought about, in 1906, the first armed clash between
the
private armies of the workers (Red Guard) and the middle
classes
(Civil Guard or White Guard). Thus the Finns were
increasingly
united in their opposition to Russification, but they were
split
on other major issues.

By 1908 the Russian government had recovered its
confidence
sufficiently to resume the program of Russification, and
in 1910
Russian prime minister Pyotr Stolypin easily persuaded the
Russian parliament, the Duma, to pass a law that ended
most
aspects of Finnish autonomy. By 1914 the Finnish
constitution had
been greatly weakened, and Finland was ruled from St.
Petersburg
as a subject province of the empire.

The outbreak of the World War I had no immediate
effects on
Finland because Finns--except for a number of Finnish
officers in
the Russian army--did not fight in it, and Finland itself
was not
the scene of fighting. Finland suffered from the war in a
variety
of ways, nevertheless. Cut off from overseas markets,
Finland's
primary industry--lumber--experienced a severe decline,
with
layoffs of many workers. Some of the unemployed were
absorbed by
increased production in the metal-working industry, and
others
found work constructing fortifications in Finland. By 1917
shortages of food had become a major problem, contributing
further to the distress of Finnish workers. In addition,
sizable
contingents of the Russian army and navy were stationed in
Finland. These forces were intended to prevent a German
incursion
through Finland, and by 1917 they numbered more than
100,000 men.
The Finns disliked having so many Russians in their
country, and
all of this discontent played into the hands of the SDP,
the main
opposition party, which in the 1916 parliamentary
elections won
103 of 200 seats in the Eduskunta--an absolute majority.

There were no longer any doubts about Russia's
long-term
objectives for Finland after November 1914, when the
Finnish
press published the Russian government's secret program
for the
complete Russification of Finland. Germany appeared as the
only
power capable of helping Finland, and many Finns thus
hoped that
Germany would win the war, seeing in Russia's defeat the
best
means of obtaining independence. The German leadership,
for its
part, hoped to further its war effort against Russia by
aiding
the Finns. In 1915, about 2,000 young Finns began
receiving
military training in Germany. Organized in a jaeger (light
infantry) battalion, these Finns saw action on the eastern
front.

By 1917, despite the divisions among the Finns, there
was an
emerging unanimity that Finland must achieve its
independence
from Russia. Then in March 1917, revolution broke out in
Russia,
the tsar abdicated, and within a few days the revolution
spread
to Finland. The tsarist regime had been discredited by its
failures and had been toppled by revolutionary means, but
it was
not yet clear what would take its place.