More than ten years after the end of the Cold War, tactical nuclear
weapons (TNWs) retain their two essential roles: deterrence and
warfighting. Only the context has changed. The 1991 Gulf War illustrated
the important deterrent role of tactical nuclear weapons. Many observers
estimate that the threat of nuclear retaliation dissuaded Saddam Hussein
from using chemical and biological weapons against either the Allied troops
or Israel. Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September against the United
States, there is talk about the possible role of TNWs in Afghanistan or
elsewhere in the war against States that harbour terrorists. Under current
circumstances, TNWs are being considered mainly as a military option.
While I do not believe that TNWs will in fact be used, the United States
administration is not going to forego this option, and nor ought it. The
bottom line is that the deterrent value of a weapon is directly related to the
credibility of the threat that it will be used.

Since the 1991 unilateral declarations by former Presidents Bush and
Gorbachev, both the United States and Russia have eliminated a large
number of TNWs. Nevertheless, the 1991 TNWs regime is still commonly
portrayed as weak and inadequate, and there are calls for new and drastic
measures to further reduce or perhaps completely eliminate the two
countries' TNW arsenals, or for a new multilateral TNWs reduction treaty
involving all nuclear-weapon States. I believe that there are substantial
difficulties with all of these suggestions and that even if we proceed with the
further reduction of TNWs, piling up treaty upon treaty is certainly not an
appropriate path to follow.

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