Tuesday, July 21, 2015

Hull City started the 2014/15 season with much optimism
after the previous year’s exploits, when they had comfortably retained their
Premier League status and reached the FA Cup final for the first time in their
history, only losing 3-2 to Arsenal after extra time in a thrilling match. It
was therefore particularly disappointing the way things turned out, as their
Europa League adventure ended almost before it had started and, most painfully,
they were relegated on the last day of the season.

Manager Steve Bruce pointed to the lack of goals: “Nearly
50% of the games we’ve played, we’ve not managed to score. That’s given us too
much to do. It’s a pretty damning statistic.” Indeed it is, but in fairness
Hull were badly affected by an appalling run of injuries, as they lost Robert
Snodgrass in the opening league game and Nikica Jelavic and Mohamed Diamé for
long periods.

Nor were they helped by some off-pitch issues with
midfielder Jake Livermore testing positive for cocaine and the temperamental
Hatem Ben Arfa unexpectedly doing a runner in December.

Steve Bruce has admitted that relegation took him by
surprise: “When the transfer window closed at the end of August, I looked at
our squad and was quite happy.” Little wonder, as owner Assem Allam had
sanctioned a huge outlay on the transfer budget.

In the summer, Hull purchased Abel Hernandez, Snodgrass,
Diamé, Livermore, Michael Dawson, Andy Robertson and Harry Maguire, while
alsorecruiting Ben Arfa and
Gaston Ramirez on loan. They later brought the total spend to more than £40
million when they also bought Dame N’Doye in the January transfer window.

This continued the trend of big spending following promotion
in 2013. In fact, Hull have splashed a hefty £66 million in the last two
seasons with a net spend of a cool £50 million. That works out to an average
gross spend of £33 million in the last two seasons, which is a massive increase
over the £5 million average in the previous seven seasons. Over the same
periods, Hull’s average spend on a net basis has shot up from £3 million to £25
million.

It may be a surprise to some, but Hull’s total net spend of
£50 million for the last two seasons was actually the 8th highest in the
Premier League. They were obviously still behind the usual suspects (Manchester
United, Manchester City, Arsenal, Chelsea and Liverpool), but around the same
level as Crystal Palace and West Ham who both outperformed the Tigers.

Given the substantial investment in the team, Hull really
should not have struggled so badly last season. The experienced Michael Dawson
summed it up best: “The players that the owners and manager have brought in –
they spent a lot of money – and we haven’t performed. We should have done
better and should be in the Premier League.”

Maybe they were distracted by all the shenanigans over
Allam’s campaign to rebrand the club as Hull Tigers, which has caused
widespread anger among City fans. The owner’s belief is that a name change
would mean that Hull would be better known globally, allowing the club to
better tap into Far Eastern markets. Commercial revenue growth is an
understandable objective, but it is by no means guaranteed that simply changing
the name would result in additional riches. In any case, the Football
Association has recently rejected Allam’s application to change the name for a
second time.

"There ain't nothing like a Dame"

Furthermore, the way that the owner has justified the change
has been a PR disaster, describing the Hull City name as “irrelevant, common
and a lousy identity”. Fans that opposed his “textbook marketing” idea of
shortening the name were labeled “hooligans and a militant minority”. As if
that weren’t enough, he then suggested that those fans "can die as soon as
they want, as long as they leave the club for the majority who just want to watch
good football.”

That’s a wonderful way to alienate the fan base, which is a
great shame, as the owner, who has lived in Hull for over 40 years since
arriving from Egypt, has done a lot of good things for Hull City since
acquiring the club in December 2010.

The previous regime had brought the club to the brink of
insolvency with the auditors stating that there was “significant doubt over the
company’s ability to continue as a going concern.” Allam effectively saved the
club by staving off a winding-up petition and repaying the debts that Hull had
built up under property investor Russell Bartlett. He has since been true to
his word to invest in the club by providing substantial funding of around £70
million and bringing a degree of financial stability.

This is reflected in the 2013/14 accounts, the most recent
figures published, which show that Hull converted a £25.6 million loss the
previous season to a £9.4 million profit, representing a £35 million
improvement following promotion to the Premier League.

Revenue grew by £67.5 million (around 400%) from £17.0
million to £84.5 million, largely thanks to the much higher television deal in
the top flight, which contributed £60 million of the increase. Match day was
also up £6.1 million, including £3.9 million from the FA Cup run, while
commercial income was £1.4 million higher. However, the higher costs of
competing in the Premier League saw wages rise by £17.4 million (67%) to £43.3
million, while player amortisation was £7.6 million higher.

There was also a £6.3 million provision made against amounts
due from the group company Superstadium Management Company Limited (SMC), which
operates the stadium and holds the leasehold of the stadium, as granted by the
local council.

"I see you, baby, Robert Snodgrass"

As a technical aside, Hull City also show parachute payments
under Exceptional Items, but I have included these in revenue to be consistent
with other football clubs.

It should also be noted that Hull shortened their reporting
period to 11 months by moving the accounting close to 30 June to be in line
with the football season. This meant that the 2013/14 figures excluded July’s
costs of £6.1 million, so the profit would have been reduced to £3.3. million
for the full 12 months.

In addition, the club’s sister company, SMC, reported losses
of £5 million, including write-offs to the stadium mortgage inherited from the
previous ownership. As Ehab Allam, Assem’s son and fellow director, said, “It’s
obviously very disappointing to be almost four years into the ownership and
still paying off the debts of the previous regime. We would have wanted to
reinvest those sums back into the squad.”

Therefore, the combined loss for Hull City Tigers Limited
and SMC would be £1.7 million, but this still represents huge progress
considering the 2012/13 accounts showed a loss of nearly £26 million.

That said, most Premier League clubs posted profits in
2013/14, thanks to the increase in TV money allied with the financial fair play
regulations that restricted wages growth, so Hull’s £9 million surplus is not
really that special an achievement. In fact, only five of the 20 clubs reported
losses, a major improvement on previous seasons.

It is also true that clubs promoted to the Premier League
always receive a significant boost to their finances. In this way, the other
teams promoted with Hull, namely Crystal Palace and Cardiff City, also improved
their bottom line by £21 million and £18 million respectively. Cardiff still
made a loss in the top flight, but that was largely due to their decision to
book £12 million of impairment charges.

After buying the club, the Allams predicted “future trading
profitability”, but they had to absorb £55 million of losses before reaching
the Premier League: £20 million in 2010/11, £9 million in 2011/12 and £26
million in 2012/13. In fairness, most clubs lose money in the Championship and
Hull were no exception.

The chunky loss in 2012/13 was part of deliberate strategy:
“The directors made the ambitious decision to go for promotion and to this end
invested heavily in the club.” This objective was achieved, which actually
increased the loss, as it resulted in bonuses being paid out to the players,
management and staff.

Even though Hull’s accounts back in 2008 described
profit/loss resulting from player sales as “a significant figure in our
accounts”, that is not really the case with a meagre profit of just £1.2
million being made in the last nine years, partly due to the £8.3 million loss
reported in 2011.

While Hull only made £1.7 million from player sales in
2013/14, other clubs generated sizeable profits from this activity: Tottenham
£104 million (largely Gareth Bale to Real Madrid), Chelsea £65 million (David
Luiz to PSG), Southampton £32 million (Adam Lallana to Liverpool) and Everton
£28 million (Marouane Fellaini to Manchester United).

Hull’s profit from player sales will be boosted in 2014/15
by the sales of Shane Long to Southampton and George Boyd to Burnley, though
many out-of-contract players have simply been released for no fee.

The recent big spending in the transfer market has been
reflected in Hull’s P&L account via player amortisation, which surged from
£2 million to £10 million in 2013/14, much in the same way that it increased
the last time Hull were in the top flight.

However, this is still one of the smallest in the Premier
League, only ahead of Crystal Palace £6 million and WBA £5 million, though it
will surely rise again in the 2014/15 accounts. As a rule, low amortisation is
normally the result of low spending on player recruitment, while those clubs
that are regarded as big spenders logically have the highest amortisation
charges, e.g. Manchester City £76 million, Chelsea £72 million and Manchester
United £55 million.

To clarify this point, transfer fees are not fully expensed
in the year a player is purchased, with the cost being written-off evenly over
the length of the player’s contract – even if the entire fee is paid upfront.
As an example, Robert Snodgrass was reportedly bought for £6 million on a
three-year deal, so the annual amortisation in the accounts for him is £2
million.

As a result of these accounting complications, clubs often
look at EBITDA (Earnings Before Interest, Depreciation and Amortisation) for a
better idea of underlying profitability. Hull themselves have described EBITDA
as “a relevant measure, as it is a closer approximation to cash generation than
straightforward profit and loss.” On that basis, Hull’s EBITDA has invariably
been negative, though it improved considerably in 2013/14 from minus £21
million to £27 million.

That’s not too bad at all, leaving them sandwiched between
Newcastle United £27 million and Everton £25 million. Most Premier League clubs
are in a fairly narrow range of £20-30 million EBITDA, though the big boys are
in a class of their own: Manchester United (an incredible) £130 million,
Manchester City £75 million, Arsenal £632 million, Liverpool £53 million and
Chelsea £51 million.

Hull’s revenue is largely a story of whether they are
playing in the Championship or the Premier League with promotions in 2009 and 2014
increasing revenue by £40 million and £67 million respectively. The larger
increase in 2014 is due to the higher centrally negotiated Premier League TV
deal.

Hull’s revenue reduced each year in the Championship
following relegation in 2011 from £27 million to £24 million then £17 million,
purely because the parachute payments from the Premier League fell from £16
million to £13 million then £6 million.

After the 2013/14 accounts were published, Ehab Allam spoke
about his plans to expand Hull’s income, “We’re not where we want to be, but
we’re heading in the right direction.” Not any more, as relegation will take a
large bite out of these numbers.

Despite the sharp revenue growth in 2013/14, Hull’s £84
million was actually the second lowest in the Premier League, only ahead of
Cardiff City £83 million. As Ehab Allam said, “The key is where our income is
compared to our competitors. We can’t be complacent, because, as we stand, a
lot of our rivals have an advantage over us. This club needs a long-term sustainability
and we can’t do that by having the income of a side in the bottom three.”

Like every other Premier League club, Hull were in the top
40 revenue earners worldwide, according to the Deloitte Money League, which
sounds very impressive, if it were not for the fact that this does not help at
all domestically. For example, five English clubs earn more than £250 million a
season with Manchester United leading the way at £433 million – or more than
five times as much as Hull. This really highlights the magnitude of the
challenge for the smaller clubs in the Premier League.

An incredible 81% of Hull’s revenue in the Premier League
came from television with just 14% from match day and 5% from commercial
income. This was very different to the more balanced revenue mix in the
Championship: broadcasting 48%, match day 34% and commercial 18%.

As Ehab Allam explained, “If you look at our income beyond
the Premier League money, I still don’t think we’re too clever. The other
income we get, commercial activity, gate receipts, is probably less than most
clubs in the division.”

Amazingly two Premier League clubs had an even higher
reliance on TV money than Hull withCrystal Palace and Swansea City both earning around 82% of their revenue
from broadcasting, but this dependency is clearly not healthy.

Hull’s share of the Premier League television money was £67
million in 2013/14. Most of the money is allocated equally, which means each
club receives 50% of the domestic rights (£21.6 million in 2013/14), 100% of the
overseas rights (£26.3 million) and 100% of the commercial revenue (£4.3
million). However, merit payments (25% of domestic rights) are worth £1.2
million per place in the league and facility fees (25% of domestic rights)
depend on how many times each club is broadcast live.

As a result, Hull’s merit payment for finishing 16th was
worth £6.2 million, while the Tigers’ distributions were also restricted by
being broadcast live just 9 times, though they were actually paid on the basis
of 10 times, which is the contractual minimum. This meant that they only got
£8.6 million, compared to, say, Aston Villa’s £13.1 million for being shown
live 16 times.

The sensational Premier League TV money is something of a
double-edged sword. On the one hand, the £62 million that Cardiff received for
being relegated was a lot higher than some major clubs received for winning
their respective leagues, e.g. Bayern Munich (£30 million), Atletico Madrid
(£34 million) and Paris Saint-Germain (£36 million). On the other hand, as Ehab
Allam pointed out, “It might be £67 million we’re getting, but if every club
gets that, how do you become competitive? Everything is relative.”

Of course, in 2015/16 Hull will receive a lot less TV money
in the Championship, amounting to around £28 million. This will comprise a
parachute payment of £25 million and a Football League distribution of £1.7
million plus some money for cup runs, live matches, etc. That will mean a
painful reduction in TV money of £40 million year-on-year.

That might sound horrific, but most clubs in the second tier
receive just £4 million from television, regardless of where they finish in the
league, comprising the £1.7 million from the Football League pool and a £2.3
million solidarity payment from the Premier League. Note: clubs receiving
parachute payments do not also receive solidarity payments.

Parachute payments are currently worth £65 million over four
seasons (£25 million in year 1; £20 million in year 2; and £10 million in each
of years 3 and 4) and have a big influence on a club’s finances in the
Championship.

Clearly, being in the Championship will have a major adverse
impact on Hull’s revenue. On top of the estimated £40 million fall in
broadcasting, there will also be reductions in match day and commercial. I
would expect match day to fall back by £4-5 million, assuming no lengthy cup
runs and lower average attendances; while commercial income is likely to drop
by £1-2 million to 2012/13 levels, depending on whether sponsorship deals have
relegation clauses.

That would produce a total reduction in revenue of £46
million from £84 million to £38 million, though this is still likely to be one
of the highest in the Championship next season. To place this into context, in
the Championship in 2013/14 QPR boasted the highest revenue with £39 million,
followed by Reading £38 million and Wigan Athletic £37 million.

There is also the opportunity cost of relegation, as there
will be even more money available in the Premier League when the next
three-year cycle starts in 2016/17 with the recently signed extraordinary UK
deals with Sky and BT producing a further 70% uplift. My estimate is that a
club that finishes 16th in the distribution table (as Hull did in 2013/14)
would receive around £101 million a season, which would represent an increase
of £34 million.

Match day income rose £6.1 million (104%) from £5.8 million
to £11.9 million, but this is a little misleading, as it includes £3.9 million
from the historic run to the FA Cup Final. Without this “bonus”, Hull’s match
day revenue would have been around £8 million, which would have been one of the
lowest in the Premier League.

Attendances have been higher in the top flight (around the
24,000 level) compared to the Championship, though this is still lower than
almost every other Premier League club, only ahead of Swansea City in 2013/14.

This is partly due to the 25,500 capacity of the KC Stadium,
but plans to expand this to above 30,000 were abandoned after the council
refused to sell the stadium freehold to the club. Allam understandably
protested that “nobody would build an extension on a house if they didn’t own
it”, but in fairness to the council they had built the ground with £43.5
million of public money.

This was part of the justification used for the 30% increase
in ticket prices for the 2014/15 season: “Due to stadium capacity, our home
attendances are the second lowest in the Premier League and with no plans to
increase the capacity of the KC, a price rise is the only viable option in
terms of increasing revenue from ticketing.” There will be a further price rise
of 6% in 2015/16, which seems a bit steep following relegation to the
Championship.

Commercial revenue rose £1.4 million (48%) to £4.5 million,
but this was still the lowest in the Premier League, behind Crystal Palace £6.9
million and Swansea City £8.3 million. It is easy to see why Allam is so keen on growing this revenue stream. Maybe it’s not a fair comparison, but
the big boys are in another league commercially with Manchester United leading
the way with a seriously impressive £189 million.

The club recently announced Flamingo Land, a North Yorkshire
based resort, as the new shirt sponsor for the 2015/16 season, replacing 12BET,
whose deal had been described by the club as the most lucrative in its history.
The two-year agreement was originally intended to run until the end of the
2015/16 season, but there was presumably a relegation escape clause. There was
also a new kit supplier with Umbro replacing Adidas in the 2014/15 season in a
four-year partnership.

Hull’s wage bill rose £17 million (67%) from £26 million to
£43 million, but the revenue growth meant that the wages to turnover ratio
significantly improved from a typical 153% in the Championship (no doubt
inflated by promotion bonus payments) to 51% in the Premier League. As well as
higher salaries in the top tier, there was an increase of 35 in the number of
players and coaches in 2014.

Despite this growth, Hull’s wage bill of £43 million was
still the lowest in the Premier League in 2013/14, behind Crystal Palace £46
million, Norwich City £50 million and Cardiff City £53 million. There then
comes a whole bunch of clubs in the £60-70 million range before we get to the
elite clubs.

There is a strong correlation between wage bill and sporting
success, so it is perhaps not a surprise that Hull have struggled, though it is
likely that their wage bill will have been higher in 2014/15 following the
major recruitment last summer (though bonuses for staying up will be lower).

Similarly, Hull’s wages to turnover ratio of 51% is also one
of the lowest/best in the Premier League, about the same as one of the other
clubs promoted in 2013, Crystal Palace. However, the other club promoted that
season, Cardiff City, had a much worse ratio of 64% and went straight back
down, so spending is not always a guarantee of success.

The Allams are paid via management charges from their
company Allamhouse Limited. Although these charges went up from £112,000 to
£165,000 in 2013/14, this is still a relatively low sum compared to many other
clubs.

The wage bill will be substantially lower in the
Championship due to relegation clauses, as outlined by Steve Bruce: “Everybody
concerned takes a huge reduction in salary. The club has had a really stringent
policy, so that if we do get relegated, it does not fall into drastic times
which a lot of clubs do. Most players take a 40-50% reduction in their salary.”
Of course, the quid pro
quo is that these players also have a reasonable buy-out clause in
their contracts, so it is easier for them to leave.

Net debt was cut by £7.4 million from £72.2 million to £64.8
million, as gross debt was reduced by £5.6 million from £72.9 million to £67.3
million, while cash balances rose £1.8 million from £0.7 million to £2.5
million. The debt is entirely owed to Allam’s company with no external bank
loans or overdrafts outstanding. The club’s financial problems required an
immediate £41 million loan from the owners in 2010/11 and the debt to the owner
has risen by £26 million since then.

In addition, Hull owe £13.5 million of transfer fees to
other clubs and have £3.4 million of contingent liabilities to players
depending on number of appearances and results.

Hull are mid-table in terms of debt in the Premier League,
but this has almost certainly increased in the 2014/15 season with the club
noting that “new signings costing in excess of £47 million have been made”
after the accounts closed. Some have speculated that the debt could be as high
as £100 million now, but this will only be revealed once the 2014/15 accounts
are published. As long as Allam is happy, this should not be a problem, but it
is a worrying amount of debt to take into the Championship.

Unlike many other football club owners, Allam charges around
5% on his loans, which has amounted to around £3 million interest paid in each
of the last two years. This is by no means the highest in the Premier League,
as Manchester United pay £27 million following the Glazers’ leveraged buy-out
and Arsenal pay £13 million for the Emirates Stadium financing, but it is a
relatively large burden for a club of Hull’s size.

The cash flow statement highlights the changes in Hull’s
approach and the issues that the club now faces after relegation. As a rule,
Hull have negative cash flow from operating activities – unless they are in the
Premier League. These shortfalls plus any expenditure on player purchases have
been covered by loans from the Allams, which got as high as £72 million in
2013.

This is not a problem, so long as Allam does not turn the
taps off. When asked about this possibility, his answer was interesting, “It is
a lot of money I have put in. So far I am comfortable with it, as long as we
are achieving results.” Relegation must therefore be a cause for concern, as
that is by definition not achieving results.

It is also a little strange that the Allams were so quick to
reduce their commitment once the money started to flow from the Premier League.
Ehab noted, “Whatever we’ve made has been put back into the squad. As you can
see, we’re not here to make money for ourselves.” That may well be true, but
their debt was reduced by £4.7 million in 2013/14.

Just to add to Hull’s challenges, they have been fined
€200,000 by UEFA for not being compliant with Financial Fair Play (FFP)
regulations. They will have to pay an additional €400,000 if their accounts are
not in order for the 2015/16 season. In fairness, this is harsh on Hull, as
they were only investigated after qualifying for the Europa League and had
little chance to compensate for the large losses in the Championship.

"The drugs don't work"

One minor success story is the academy, which has achieved
the appropriate standard to be awarded Category Two status, but even this is
not without controversy, as this was helped by building an indoor 3G pitch in
the Airco Arena for the academy’s exclusive use, which meant that a number of
community sports groups that had been using the facility were told to leave.

The big question now is whether Allam will still want to
continue as chairman and owner. From a purely financial perspective, this will
be increasingly difficult, as the man himself outlined: “I cannot keep throwing
money into it. There must be a limit. Our target is for the club to be
self-finance, relying on its own resources.” This will be easier said than done
in the Championship.

He may well also walk away now that the FA has again blocked
his proposal for a name change. He actually did put the club up for sale in
April 2014 the first time that his request was denied, but has not found the
right investor yet: “not the quality buyers I would sell to.” Of course, after
relegation the club is a less attractive prospect, so the price would have to
come down accordingly.

"Ground Control to Major Tom"

In many ways, Allam is a good owner for Hull City, as he
explained: “I am a Yorkshireman, I came here more than 40 years ago, yet they
still call me a foreign owner. I have never used the football club to make
money for myself, I don’t need it. If you go to the stadium, there is not a
single mention of me or my company. I saved this club from administration,
because I believe that was the best thing I could do for this city. Football is
vital to the community. I wanted to give something back. Businessmen should
look after their community.”

If only he could resist the temptation to change the club’s
name and avoid putting his foot in his mouth when engaging with the fans, he
would almost be the perfect owner. He’s a mixture of good and bad, but nothing
is ever completely black and white (or should that be amber?) in the world of
football.

In the meantime, Allam has effectively paid nearly £70
million for the club to stand still. His son Ehab admitted, “We’re financially
strong as long as you make the assumption we stay in the Premier League”, and
that has obviously not happened.

"Don't bring me down, Bruce"

Steve Bruce said that the objective was “to compete at the
top end of the Championship and bounce straight back into the top flight”, but
this will be a severe challenge in one of the most competitive leagues around.

He has already lost a number of key squad players, including
Stephen Quinn, Tom Ince, Paul McShane, Liam Rosenior, Maynor Figueroa, Steve
Harper and Yannick Sagbo, while others are surely in the departure lounge,
including Nikica Jelavic, Dame N’Doye, Mo Diamé and Robbie Brady.

Bruce will certainly need to recruit to have any chance of
promotion. Either way, it is difficult to disagree with Michael Dawson’s view
that “it is going to be a slog in the Championship.”

Tuesday, July 14, 2015

As West Bromwich Albion prepare for their sixth consecutive
season in the Premier League, it’s fair to say that they have managed to have
rid themselves of the unwanted tag of being a “yo-yo” club that constantly bounces
between the Championship and the top flight.

However, the fight to retain their Premier League status has
not been without problems in the last two years. They narrowly avoided
relegation in 2013/14 when they finished in 17th place, while Albion looked in
some danger last season before the Tony Pulis effect kicked in with the results
under the experienced manager enough to guide the team to mid-table security.
Chairman Jeremy Peace said that this was “testament to the relentless intensity
that (Pulis) brings to the challenge” and the team’s improvement fully
justified his decision to bring in the Welshman in January.

This coaching change was nothing new for West Brom, who have
got through a fair number of managers in their determination to stay in the lucrative
Premier League. Since Roy Hodgson left West Brom for the England job three
years ago, they have employed no fewer than five managers. First up was Steve
Clarke, who guided the club to its highest ever Premier League position of 8th
in 2012/13, before a lengthy run of poor results ended in his sacking.

He was replaced by Keith Downing, temporarily elevated from
his coaching role, before the former Betis coach Pepe Mel took charge until the
end of the 2013/14 season. It was then the turn of Alan Irvine, who was shown
the door after a worrying run of only four wins in 19 league games left the
club perilously close to the relegation zone, only for Pulis to come in and
work his particular brand of magic.

"All the things he Saido"

Throughout this period of managerial upheaval, West Brom
have maintained their “steady as she goes” approach, refusing to gamble on the
club’s future, resulting in a financial record that is the envy of many. As
Peace explained, “We strive to deliver Premier League football whilst growing
the club within our means.”

This conservative approach was echoed by chief executive
Mark Jenkins, “The club has continued to invest in its playing squad, both in
transfer fees and wages. However, with careful budgeting and tight financial
controls, we have managed to match our revenue to our costs.” Granted, this
might not be the most thrilling of manifestos, but it has clearly worked to
date.

While some fans would clearly like the club to spend more on
players, that is no guarantee of success. Indeed, they only have to look at
Birmingham City, another West Midlands club, to underline this fact, as the
Blues were overly reckless and ended up in deep trouble.

In contrast, West Brom have been a model of stability with
Peace describing them as “a sound company – an extremely solid football club
with no debt, significant assets, a developing infrastructure and reasons to be
confident about the future.” That’s a pretty strong sales pitch, which is
possibly no coincidence, as the club has effectively been in the shop window
for the last few months.

"James Morrison - light my fire"

Peace admitted that the board was “considering strategic
options for the future development and legacy of the club”, leading to a number
of potential investors from China, America and the Far East expressing interest
in acquiring West Brom. This month the chairman confirmed that exclusivity had
been granted to one interested party.

The purchase price is believed to be around £150 million,
which might sound a little steep for a mid-table club, but it is obviously
linked to the riches available to those competing in the Premier League from
the new broadcasting deal. This would represent a significant gain for Peace,
who holds an 88% share of the club through his company West Bromwich Albion
Holdings Limited, and has been in charge at The Hawthorns since 2002.

Although the prospective buyers are now conducting due
diligence, Peace says that he does not want this to be a long-running saga that
might become a major distraction to the club’s preparations for next season. If
a deal cannot be concluded early in the summer, then any takeover would be put
on hold for at least another season.

One of the main reasons that West Brom might be attractive
to an investor is its strong financial record. Unlike many football clubs, they
have been consistently profitable and have virtually no debt. The latest
published accounts from the 2013/14 season once again confirmed their ability
to make money, as profit before tax more than doubled from £6.0 million to
£12.8 million (£10.8 million after tax).

The near £7 million improvement in profit was largely due to
the £17 million (24%) revenue growth to a record £87 million, almost entirely
from the new Premier League three-year TV deal that started in the 2013/14
season. However, this was offset by higher costs with wages surging £11 million
(21%) to £65 million, player amortisation up £2 million (80%) and other
expenses rising £3 million (33%).

The figures were then boosted by a £7 million increase in
the profit made from player sales to £10 million, mainly from the transfers of
Shane Long to Hull City and Peter Odemwingie to Cardiff City.

In most years West Brom’s £12.8 million would have been one
of the highest profits in the Premier League, but the times they are a-changing
in England’s top flight, as a combination of higher TV money and the financial
fair play rules that restrict wage growth meant that no fewer than 15 clubs
reported profits in 2013/14.

West Brom had the 8th highest profit in the Premier League,
which is still to be commended, especially as the profits of five of the seven
clubs above them were significantly influenced by player sales. While West
Brom’s £10 million from this activity was not too shabby, it was still lower
than Tottenham £104 million, Chelsea £65 million, Southampton £32 million,
Everton £28 million and Newcastle United £14 million.

Most of these profits came from one major sale, e.g. Gareth
Bale from Tottenham to Real Madrid, David Luiz from Chelsea to Paris
Saint-Germain, Adam Lallana to Liverpool and Marouane Fellaini from Everton to
Manchester United, but West Brom’s profits come from a more predictable model.

Variety may be the spice of life, but consistency pays the
bills, as can be seen by West Brom’s admirable performance off the pitch, where
they have reported profits in eight of the last 10 years. This is a great
achievement, especially as three of those years were spent in the Championship,
where almost all teams lose money as they strive to reach the Premier League.

West Brom’s aggregate profit of £38 million over the last
four seasons is actually the 5th highest in the Premier League and about the
same as mighty Manchester United £39 million. This is only surpassed by
Tottenham £77 million, Arsenal £63 million and Newcastle United £63 million.

In terms of consistency, West Brom are one of only three
clubs that have reported profits in each of those four seasons, which is a
seriously impressive accomplishment in the highly competitive Premier League.
The only other clubs to achieve this feat are Arsenal, the poster child for
financial responsibility, and Newcastle United, largely thanks to Mike Ashley’s
lack of investment.

In fact, the only occasions that West Brom have recorded a
loss in the past decade, 2006 and 2009, were driven by aggressive use of impairment
accounting for player values, which increased costs by £9.4 million in 2006 and
£17.8 million in 2009. If these items were excluded, West Brom would have also
reported profits in both of those years.

On the other hand, their results have been helped in other
years by booking reversals on past impairment losses on player registrations,
notably £3.0 million in 2007. Similarly, the large £18.9 million profit in 2011
was boosted by the waiver of £7.6 million of inter-company debt with West
Bromwich Albion Heritage Limited as part of the group reorganisation.

To better understand the reasons for the player impairment,
we need to explore how football clubs account for player purchases.
Importantly, transfer fees are not fully expensed in the year a player is
purchased. Instead, the cost is written-off evenly over the length of the
player’s contract via player amortisation – even if the entire fee is paid
upfront.

As an example, if a player was bought from for £10 million
on a four-year deal, the annual amortisation in the accounts for him would be
£2.5 million. After two years, the cumulative amortisation would be £5 million,
leaving a value of £5 million in the accounts. However, if the directors were
to assess the player’s achievable sales value as £3 million, then they would
book an impairment charge of £2 million. Impairment could thus be considered as
accelerated player amortisation.

As we have seen, while West Brom may be considered a selling
club, they do not really make big money from this activity, though it is
undoubtedly a useful revenue stream. The only double digit profit from player
sales in the past few years was the £18 million received in 2008, mainly for
the transfers of Diomansy Kamara, Jason Koumas and Nathan Ellington.

Player amortisation has been falling from the £17 million
peak in 2006, though this has obviously been impacted by the impairment
provisions. Although it rebounded to £5 million in 2014, this is still the
lowest in the Premier League.

The only other clubs with annual amortisation below £10
million were Crystal Palace £5.7 million and Hull City £9.9 million, while this
is a far more important expense at the big spenders, e.g. Manchester City £76
million, Chelsea £72 million and Manchester United £55 million. This is a reflection
of West Brom’s limited spending in the transfer market, though it is likely to
have increased in the 2014/15 accounts following the acquisition of the
relatively expensive Brown Ideye and Callum McManaman.

With player trading not playing that big a part in West
Brom’s model, their profits have largely been down to their underlying
business, which can be seen by looking at the club’s EBITDA (Earnings Before
Interest, Taxation, Depreciation and Amortisation). Apart from a couple of
blips, this has been positive year after year in a steady range of £5-10
million.

That said, although EBITDA improved by £2 million in 2014,
West Brom’s £9 million was still the second lowest in the Premier League, only
ahead of Fulham £2 million. In fairness, few people would expect them to
compete with elite clubs such as Manchester United £130 million and Manchester
City £75 million, but this is still a long way below the likes of Norwich City
£33 million, Crystal Palace £30 million and Southampton £28 million. This highlights
how well West Brom have done in balancing the books when their core business
generates so little cash (relatively speaking).

Revenue rose 24% (£17.1 million) from £69.7 million to £86.8
million in 2013/14, almost entirely due to broadcasting, which rocketed 32%
(£16.7 million) from £52.6 million to £69.3 million on the back of the new
Premier League deal. Commercial income also rose 5% (£0.5 million) to £10.5
million, but gate receipts fell 2% (£0.1 million) to £7.0 million.

In fact, almost all of West Brom’s revenue growth over the
last few years is attributable to centrally negotiated rises in the Premier
League TV deal. Revenue has increased by an impressive £63 million since 2007,
but £60 million of this is from TV money. Commercial income has also risen £4
million, but gate receipts are actually £1 million lower in this period.

Clearly, revenue was much lower in the Championship on
account of the far smaller TV deals in the Football League, though this was
somewhat cushioned by parachute payments in West Brom’s case. In addition,
commercial revenue and gate receipts are also reduced in the second tier.

Despite the healthy growth, West Brom’s revenue is still
only the 18th highest in the Premier League, ahead of Hull City £84 million and
Cardiff City £83 million. To place this into context, Manchester United’s £433
million is almost exactly five times as much, while there are four other clubs
earning more than £250 million: Manchester City £347 million, Chelsea £320
million, Arsenal £299 million and Liverpool £256 million.

Even though every Premier League club is now in the top 40
in the Deloitte Money League, thanks to the amazing TV deal, this does not help
domestically when the disparity is so enormous. As Pearce put it, “Every season
it is getting tougher competing in the Premier League. You’ve got the huge
clubs and the rest of us.”

Unsurprisingly West Brom’s business is dominated by
broadcasting, which now contributes 80% of their total revenue, up from 76% the
previous season. Commercial is down to 12%, while match day has fallen to just
8%.

Incredibly three Premier League clubs had an even higher
reliance on TV money than West Brom with Crystal Palace and Swansea City both
earning around 82% of their revenue from broadcasting. Given the importance of
the TV money, it is little wonder that Pulis was recruited with his record of
never being relegated in his 22 years of management.

Considering the significance of Premier League television
money to West Brom, it is worth exploring how this is distributed in some
detail. In 2013/14 West Brom’s share rose 36% (£17.5 million) from £48.3
million to £65.8 million. This is based on a fairly equitable distribution
methodology with the top club (Liverpool) receiving around £98 million, while
the bottom club (Cardiff City) got £62 million.

Most of the money is allocated equally to each club, which
means 50% of the domestic rights (£21.6 million in 2013/14), 100% of the
overseas rights (£26.3 million) and 100% of the commercial revenue (£4.3
million). However, merit payments (25% of domestic rights) are worth £1.2
million per place in the league table and facility fees (25% of domestic
rights) depend on how many times each club is broadcast live.

In this way, West Brom falling from 8th to 17th in the league
directly cost them £11.2 million, as their merit payment was only worth £4.9
million, compared to the £16.1 million that 8th placed Southampton received.
Thus, the improvement to 13th place in the 2014/15 season will boost West
Brom’s Premier League money to £72.9 million, an increase of £7.1 million.

What is also clear is that West Brom’s distributions have
been restricted by being broadcast live no more than 10 times, which is the
contractual minimum, receiving £8.6 million, compared to, say, Aston Villa’s
£13.1 million for being shown live 16 times. This is a hidden way in which the
more “glamorous” clubs receive more money.

Of course, there will be even more money available when the
next three-year cycle starts in 2016/17 with the recently signed extraordinary
UK deals with Sky and BT producing a further 70% uplift. My estimate is that a
club that finishes 13th in the distribution table (as West Brom did in 2014/15)
would receive around £111 million a season, which would represent an additional
£38 million, compared to the current £73 million.

West Brom’s match day revenue of £7 million is the lowest in
the Premier League, though four other clubs are also below £10 million: Stoke
City £7.7 million, Cardiff City £8.3 million, Swansea City £9.2 million and
Crystal Palace £9.3 million. Although not great from the perspective of the
bottom line, West Brom have done the decent thing by applying big price
reductions in 2012/13 season by a freeze on prices for the next two seasons.

However, as Echo & The Bunnymen once said, nothing lasts
forever and the club has recently announced that tickets will rise by up to 14%
for the 2015/16 season, though Peace noted that “we remain one of the lowest
priced clubs in the top two divisions”, adding that “adult prices for next
season will still be 10% lower than a decade ago.” The justification for the
increase was competitive pressure: “It is not something the club would have
introduced had we not felt it necessary in the quest for West Bromwich Albion
to remain as competitive as possible in a league which is relentless in its
advances.”

Despite the ticket price reduction and subsequent freeze,
attendances have remained fairly flat at around the 25,000 level, albeit higher
than the crowds in the Championship. The average of 25,194 in the 2013/14
season was the 16th highest in the Premier League, slightly higher than Fulham.

There had been plans to increase the capacity of The
Hawthorns from around 27,000 to 33,000 by redeveloping the West Stand, but
these have since been shelved following the lack of improvement in attendances,
which Pearce ascribes to the poor economic environment and the increasing
number of televised games. Instead, Pearce said, “we will now find ways of
adding seats within the existing stadium rather than building new capacity and
creating indebtedness within the football club.”

Commercial revenue rose 5% (£0.5 million) to £10.5 million
in 2013/14, despite the absence of £0.8 million solidarity money from UEFA that
was booked the previous season. Commercial income was up 17% (£1.1 million) to
£7.6 million, while merchandising was slightly higher at £2.9 million.

Although this is the fifth lowest in the Premier League,
that’s a pretty good performance, only just behind Premier League stalwarts
Everton £12.7 million and Fulham £12.3 million. As might be expected, clubs
like Manchester United £189 million and Manchester City £166 million are out of
sight, but that’s not really a valid comparison.

Similarly, West Brom’s shirt sponsorship is one of the smallest
in the top flight. In 2013/14 the shirts sponsor was Zoopla, but they ended
their £1.5 million deal at the end of that season, partly in response to the
actions of former striker Nicolas Anelka who is alleged to have made a gesture
known as the quenelle,
which many consider to have anti-Semitic connotations.

As a result, West Brom had to rapidly find a new sponsor
with Intuit Quick Books stepping in, albeit at a reduced rate of £1.2 million
for the 2014/15 season. Recently the club has announced that their sponsor for
the 2015/16 season will be TLC Bet, an Asian betting company, with a better
deal approaching £2 million.

No such problems with the kit supplier, as Adidas have
recently extended the deal originally signed in 2011/12 to the end of the 2015/16
season, though some supporters were unhappy with last season’s white, pinstripe
kit. Even though Pearce claimed that this was West Brom’s best-selling shirt,
they will return to the traditional dark blue-and-white stripes next season.

The wage bill shot up 21% (£11.5 million) from £54.0 million
to £65.5 million, though the wages to turnover ratio actually improved from 77%
to 75% in line with the high revenue growth. Understandably, the wage bill has
fluctuated depending on whether West Brom are in the Championship or the
Premier League, but wages have been steadily increasing since promotion in
2010, rising by 190% since then. This is pretty much in line with the revenue
growth of 209% in the same period, a clear sign of the Board’s desire to “control
costs in a prudent manner.”

This sensible approach includes a large performance-related
element, as Pearce explained: “You have some appearance money. We have a
retention of status bonus if we stay up. They get a certain amount per point.
We have flex-downs (up to 50%), so if we get relegated, we have the downside
covered on the commitment on the wages.”

Indeed, Albion are one of the few clubs that mention the
future wage liability for the remainder of player contracts in their accounts,
though it should be noted that this had increased to £94 million following the
purchase of players after the end of the 2013/14 season.

Nevertheless, it is still a real challenge for a club of
West Brom’s size to pay enough wages to be competitive, as chief executive Mark
Jenkins explained, “Of all the Premier League clubs, we commit the highest
percentage of our revenue to salaries, the bulk of which is to fund a squad to
challenge at the top level.” He is absolutely correct, as West Brom’s wages to
turnover ratio of 75% is the highest (worst) in the top tier with only Fulham
approaching the same level in 2013/14.

This is not because of an outlandish wage bill, as West
Brom’s £65 million is the 12th highest in the Premier League, but that becomes
a problem when it is out of line with the revenue, which is only 17th highest.
The temptation to spend more on wages is perfectly understandable, given the
close correlation with success on the pitch, especially as so many clubs spend
between £60-70 million.

In fact, there has been a clear convergence of clubs in this
range, as the traditional bigger spenders like West Ham and Aston Villa have
only grown a little, while the nouveaux
riches like Stoke City, Swansea City, Southampton and indeed West
Brom have all had to significantly increase their wage bill in order to
compete. The Baggies are likely to further increase their wages in 2014/15
after bringing more players in and paying higher bonuses for the better league
finish.

One point worthy of attention is the £1.022 million
remuneration given to the highest paid director, who is not named, but
presumably is Peace. Although this is lower than the previous season’s £1.341
million, it is still a tidy sum for a business of this size.

West Brom have rarely been big spenders in the transfer
market, which has been a source of frustration to some fans, though the brief
has been “to ensure our limited resources are invested wisely.” However, this
prudent approach has changed recently with a significant increase in spending
in the last two seasons. The average annual gross spend has doubled from £8
million between 2006 and 2013 to £16 million between 2013 and 2015, while net
spend has risen from a paltry £2 million to £10 million in the same period.

However, everything is relative, Even after this increase,
West Brom are no higher than mid-table in terms of net spend in the Premier
League, still behind the likes of Crystal Palace, West Ham, Hull City and Aston
Villa, as well as the usual suspects (United, City, Arsenal, Chelsea and Liverpool).

As a natural consequence of Albion’s parsimonious approach,
their net debt is very low at just £2.1 million, which comprise a bank
overdraft secured on the club’s assets of £3.6 million less cash balances of
£1.5 million. Following promotion in 2010, debt has been cut from £10 million.

The balance sheet also includes £2.1 million owed to group
undertakings, but this is more than covered by £8.5 million owed by group
undertakings. In addition, there are contingent liabilities of £2.4 million in
respect of player purchases, which are dependent on things like the number of
appearances that a player makes.

The reality is that West Brom are effectively debt-free,
which is a magnificent achievement for a club of their resources operating in
the Premier League, as can be seen by the amount of debt other clubs of their
level have built up, e.g. Cardiff City £135 million and Hull City £67 million.
It is therefore no great surprise that they appear to have loosened the purse
strings a little, especially with the blockbuster Premier League deal on the
horizon.

Basically, West Brom operate a self-sustaining model that
does not require additional loans or increases in share capital, so you might
expect them to be firm proponents of Financial Fair Play (FFP), which
essentially forces clubs to live within their means.

However, that is not the case, as Peace explained: “We were
not in favour of the introduction of these regulations. Whilst it is our view
that all football clubs should be financed in a sustainable manner that is
guaranteed, we would prefer to operate in a market free from other regulations.
We regard Financial Fair Play as a misnomer. We believe the new rules are
anti-competitive and will further reinforce the existing pecking order in the
Premier League. No longer will a major investor be able to join a club and
change the Premier League landscape.” He added, “The new FFP rules mean that we
will, more than ever, have to think outside the box to ensure our limited
resources go further.”

"Hong Kong Gardner"

This might mean an increasing focus on youth to produce
talent such as the exciting forward Saido Berahino. According to Peace, the
club invests £3 million a year in their Academy (net £2.2 million after a
subsidy of £800,000) and has been awarded Category One status. New facilities
were unveiled in January by Baggies legend Tony ‘Bomber’ Brown.

Then again, this brings its own challenges with Berahino
openly talking about hoping to “move on to bigger things.” In much the same
way, Albion lost the talented Izzy Brown to Chelsea for nominal compensation,
due to the much criticised Elite Player Performance Plan. Even so, there is
still optimism about some of the youngsters at the Academy, such as forwards
Adil Nabi and Jonathan Leko.

Peace is the first to admit that West Brom have had “a
couple of difficult seasons during which we have not made the progress we
wanted”, but things have markedly improved since the arrival of Tony Pulis and
he will have the whole summer to “address the playing squad more fully and
re-shape it into something more akin to his specifications.”

"Is Vic there?"

A change in ownership is something that could complicate
this objective, but Peace has said that any new management would commit to “the
management model which I believe has served the club so well.” He promised that
any transition to new owners “should be smooth and devoid of upheaval.”

Let us hope that he is correct, as there is much to admire
in West Brom’s under-stated approach, As Peace said, “We are plugging away,
trying to compete in the most high-profile, difficult league in the world,
punching way above our weight.” The club deserves a lot of credit for that,
while at the same time remaining profitable and debt-free.

A takeover could provide additional impetus to West Brom,
though Financial Fair Play regulations mean that a new owner could not operate
with complete freedom. In any case, it might be worth remembering the old
saying, “the grass isn’t always greener on the other side.”

Praise for The Swiss Ramble

"Blogger of the Year 2013 - It’s testament to the effect that Kieron has had on the blogosphere that so many fans take his word as gospel. Putting to use his career in the world of finance, his insights into balance sheets and simple explanations of complex ideas appeal to the hardcore financial whizz and casual fan alike." - The Football Supporters' Federation