Void v. United States

United States District Court, District of Columbia

January 4, 2018

BRUCE E. VOID, Petitioner,v.UNITED STATES, Respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

TREVOR
N. McFADDEN United States District Judge

This
matter is before the Court on Petitioner's pro
se “Motion of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to Title 28
U.S.C. §2254(b)(1)(A) and (d)(2), and Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure 12(b)(2), and Title 28 U.S.C.
§§1333(a), 1631, and 1652, ” which is
construed as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28
U.S.C. § 2254. For the reasons discussed below, the
petition is denied and this civil action is dismissed.

“[M]ore
than two decades after [his] arrest, arraignment, indictment
and commencement of trial” in the Superior Court of the
District of Columbia, Petitioner claims to have learned of
“the possibility of egregious defects and major
irregularities in the grand jury process of his case.”
Pet. at 6. Petitioner believes that there is “no proof
that the required twelve grand jury members concurred on the
allegations levied against” him, and that “the
indictment was not filed in open court.” Id.
at 7. These purported defects, Petitioner argues,
“nullif[ied] the entire grand jury process” and
deprived the Superior Court of jurisdiction over the criminal
case. Id. at 9. According to Petitioner, the
District of Columbia courts not only “committed a
manifest miscarriage of justice by convicting and sentencing
[P]etitioner, when they lacked jurisdiction to do so, ”
id. at 17, but also rejected his many requests for
equitable relief, see generally id. at 2-5. Thus,
Petitioner “is left to endure prolonged
incarceration.” Id. at 9.

A
federal district court may “entertain an application
for a writ of habeas corpus [o]n behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the
ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution
or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(a). Courts of the District of Columbia “are
treated as ‘state' courts for purposes of federal
habeas-corpus jurisdiction, ” Gorbey v. United
States, 55 F.Supp.3d 98, 102 (D.D.C. 2014) (citing
Milhouse v. Levi, 548 F.2d 357, 360 n.6 (D.C. Cir.
1976)), and “a prisoner of the District of Columbia is
considered a State prisoner, when [he] is held under a
conviction of the D.C. Superior Court, ” Banks v.
Smith, 377 F.Supp.2d 92, 94 (D.D.C. 2005).

Unlike
any other state prisoner, however, a District of Columbia
prisoner has a local remedy under D.C. Code § 23-110,
which provides:

A prisoner in custody under sentence of the Superior Court
claiming the right to be released upon the ground that (1)
the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution of
the United States or the laws of the District of Columbia,
(2) the court was without jurisdiction to impose the
sentence, (3) the sentence was in excess of the maximum
authorized by law, (4) the sentence is otherwise subject to
collateral attack, may move the court to vacate, set aside,
or correct the sentence.

D.C. Code § 23-110(a). Further, the statute provides:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus [o]n behalf of a
prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion
pursuant to this section shall not be entertained by the
Superior Court or by any Federal or State court if it appears
that the applicant has failed to make a motion for relief
under this section or that the Superior Court has denied him
relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion
is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his
detention.

D.C. Code § 23-110(g) (emphasis added). This latter
provision “vest[s] the Superior Court with exclusive
jurisdiction over most collateral challenges by prisoners
sentenced in that court.” Williams v.
Martinez, 586 F.3d 995, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citations
omitted); see also Head v. Wilson, 792 F.3d 102,
104-05 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Only if a District of Columbia
prisoner demonstrates that his Section 23-110 remedy
“is ‘inadequate or ineffective to test the
legality of his detention'” may he seek relief in
federal court. Garris v. Lindsay, 794 F.2d 722, 726
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (footnote and citations omitted); see
also Void-El v. Haynes, 440 F.Supp.2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2006)
(“To the extent that a Section 23-110 remedy is
available, it is exclusive”). A challenge to the
Superior Court's jurisdiction is properly brought by
motion under Section 23-110. See D.C. Code §
23-110(a).

Upon
review of the petition and its attachments, it is apparent
that Petitioner has filed multiple Section 23-110 motions in
the Superior Court. These motions all concern
Petitioner's same argument, and were substantively
considered and denied by the Superior Court. See
Pet'r's Mot. Ex. 2, 4. These denials were affirmed by
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. See
Pet'r's Mot. Ex. 8. There is no indication that the
remedies in the District of Columbia courts are inadequate or
ineffective to test the legality of the petitioner's
conviction. His lack of success on these motions-and his many
other challenges to his conviction and sentence-does not
render his local remedy inadequate or ineffective. See,
e.g., Richardson v. Stephens, 730 F.Supp.2d 70,
72 (D.D.C. 2010); see also Garris, 794 F.2d at 727
(“It is the inefficacy of the remedy, not a personal
inability to utilize it, that is determinative, and
appellant's difficulty here is simply that his
circumstances preclude him from invoking it.”). Nor can
Petitioner obtain review of the District of Columbia
courts' rulings because this court lacks jurisdiction to
do so. See Id. at 725-26 (“[T]he District
Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a habeas corpus
petition attacking the constitutional validity of a Superior
Court sentence even after the local remedy, if adequate and
effective, has been pursued unsuccessfully.”) (citing
Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372 (1977)).

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;For the
foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that
the petition is DENIED and this civil action is ...

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