The debentures will have a 7-year and 1-month maturity with annualinterest payments starting in December 2017 and a tailor-madeamortization schedule consisting of two principal payments amountadjusted by inflation (IPCA) (i) 50% in 2022 and (ii) 50% in 2023.The debentures will have a quarterly financial covenant of NetDebt to EBITDA lower than 3.5x or in case of asset acquisition,3.85x for 36 months. Moody's anticipates that the debentures willbe issued by mid-November. The assigned ratings are based onpreliminary documentation and Moody's does not anticipate changesin the main conditions that the debentures will carry. Shouldissuance conditions and/or final documentation deviate from theoriginal ones submitted and reviewed by the rating agency, Moody'swill assess the impact that these differences may have on theratings and act accordingly.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The Ba2 rating reflect AES Tiete's relatively strong historicalcredit metrics for the rating category as well as its resilientaccess to the local banking and capital markets together withmanagement's prudent administration of the generation business.Moody's rating also incorporates the improved hydrology conditionsand the consequent better cash generation although Moody's sees alower level of revenues from 2016 onwards due to the terminationof the bilateral supply contract with Eletropaulo MetropolitanaEletricidade de Sao Paulo S.A. (Ba3, negative) set above marketprices. Capex pressures from the contractual obligation to expandgeneration capacity by 15% in the State of Sao Paulo coupled withhigh dividend payout and the judicial dispute over the costs (BRL273.2 million, provisioned as of June, 2016) from the exposure tothe spot market during the hydrological crisis weigh on theratings. The Aa1.br national scale rating represents the standingof the company's credit quality relative to its domestic peers.

What Could Change the Rating - Up /Down

The company's ratings and outlook are constrained by the sovereignrating therefore a stabilization of Brazil's rating could alsolead to a stabilization of AES Tiete's outlook.

Sales volumes below Moody's expectations or a significant mismatchon spot market exposure could prompt a downward action as well asrapid or significant deterioration of leverage and liquiditylevels. Quantitatively, the ratings could be downgraded ifMoody's sees a downturn in the company's overall credit qualityand metrics so CFO (pre-WC) to total debt falls below 25% andinterest coverage drops below 2.5x on a sustainable basis. Aweakened support of the regulatory framework could also prompt adownward action as well as further deterioration in thesovereign's credit quality. Moody's doesn't incorporate any assetacquisition or M&A activity in the current ratings.

AES Tiete is a hydropower generation company with a 30-yearconcession, granted in December 1999 to operate an installedcapacity of 2,658 MW, equivalent to around 2% of Brazil'selectricity capacity, and 1,278 MW of assured average energy. Thecompany has 9 hydro-power plants (HPPs) and 3 small hydro-powerplants (SHPPs) located in the State of Sao Paulo. AES Tiete has95% of its energy contracted for 2016 and 88% for 2017 and did notadhere to the law 13,203 that hedges the hydrological risk for apremium as negotiated with the regulator, Aneel, although Moody'sexpects the company to maintain a uncontract 10-15% cushionthrough its portfolio management.

According to Moody's standard adjustments, AES Tiete reported netoperating revenues of BRL2,064 million and EBITDA of BRL1,272million in the LTM ended in June, 2016.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was UnregulatedUtilities and Unregulated Power Companies published in October2014.

The ratings on BM&FBOVESPA are limited by those on Brazil. Thedowngrade of Brazil to the current rating occurred in February2016, after which S&P ran a stress test to assess the company'spotential resilience to hypothetical scenario of Brazil's defaultin local and foreign currencies. Previously, S&P's stress testwas focused on the scenario in which the sovereign defaulted onlyin foreign currency because at that time there was a gap betweenthe local and the foreign currency sovereign ratings. These tworatings are now aligned. Under this much harsher scenario, S&Passessed that BM&FBOVESPA won't have enough resources to absorbpotential clearing losses stemming from the joint default ofseveral clearing members. This is because, in this stressscenario, the market value of sovereign bonds posted as collateralby defaulting members would depreciate so that the clearing housemight not have enough resources within its financial safeguards.In addition, the company sold its dollar-denominated investment inCME Group Inc. (AA-/Stable/A-1+), which had been a significantcounter-cyclical asset that helped BM&FBOVESPA to meet thesolvency stress test in past periods. S&P expects the proceeds ofthe sale of to be used to complete the company's merger with CETIPS.A.-Mercados Organizados after regulatory approval.

BM&FBOVESPA's SACP remains at 'a-' and reflects S&P's view of thecompany's strong business risk profile, given its dominant marketposition in Brazil and a diversified revenue mix, and lowleverage. The company's SACP incorporates a three notchesdeduction to reflect the concentration of clearing risks onto somekey Brazilian clearing members and their relatively weakercreditworthiness than those of their global peers, as well as thefact that cash margins are mainly invested into speculative-gradeBrazil government bonds. At the same time, S&P views favorablythe robustness and sophistication of BM&FBOVESPA's financialsafeguards and the staff's competence that monitors them. S&Pwill continue monitoring clearing and settlement risks to ensurethe planned integration of the four clearinghouses won't result inoverall weaker financial safeguards.

In April 2016, BM&FBOVESPA announced that its board of directorsand the board of directors of CETIP approved the terms for thecombination of operations of the two entities. The transactionwould imply a cash payment and an equity component (issuance ofBM&FBOVESPA's shares for each share of CETIP). The final price(and equity component of the deal) is tied to the price ofBM&FBOVESPA's shares at the closing. In S&P's view, thetransaction would enhance BM&FBOVESPA's already strong businessrisk profile, given the significant increase in revenue andbroader diversification in business lines that are complementaryto the company's existing ones. CETIP is the largest depositoryof corporate and fixed income securities in Brazil, providing awide range of services, including registration, custody,settlement, risk management, and market data. However, ifcompleted, the transaction could weaken BM&FBOVESPA's financialrisk profile because S&P believes part of the cash component ofthe transaction would be met with additional debt issuances.Depending on the outcome of pro forma projections, this couldeither result in unchanged SACP or in its revision to 'bbb'. Thepost-transaction SACP would depend on the debt level and financialmetrics of the combined entity, S&P's forward-looking projections,and our view of the further impact of economic developments inBrazil on BM&FBOVESPA's business and financial risk profiles.

S&P rates BM&FBOVESPA's $612 million senior unsecured notes at'BB', the same level as its long-term issuer credit. To rate theissues of market financial infrastructure entities that have anissuer credit rating of 'BB+' or below, we don't perform arecovery analysis, because these institutions are typically highlyand prudently regulated and there are limited examples ofliquidations to determine recovery. Instead, S&P assess the levelof priority liabilities in relation to total adjusted assets todefine the degree of subordination to more senior obligations.Under current levels of priority liabilities and total adjustedassets, S&P rates the company's senior unsecure notes the same asits long-term credit rating. S&P expects to reassesssubordination levels and impact on the ratings of the rated notesafter the closing of transaction with CETIP.

BRAZIL: Freezes Rio Bank Accounts---------------------------------BBC News reports that the Brazilian government has frozen the bankaccounts of Rio de Janeiro state, ordering it to pay millions ofdollars in overdue debt.

Many public workers have not been paid in months. Rio de Janeirohas been struggling with a long-standing financial crisis becauseof a drop in global oil and commodity prices, according to BBCNews.

It declared a financial emergency ahead of the Rio Olympicsearlier this year, the report notes.

State governor Luiz Fernando Pezao announced austerity measures.Mr. Pezao said that unless they were approved, the state could notguarantee that workers would receive their full salaries nextyear, the report relays.

The Rio financial secretariat said the state was "blocked frommaking any kind of payment until the amount it owes the state hasbeen paid," the report notes.

The state has been hard hit by Brazil's worse recession in acentury, and officials say it owes the federal government about$53 million (GBP43 million).

With tax revenues dropping, Rio has already made sharp budgetcuts.

Governor Pezao announced more austerity measures, including cutsto social program, a tax increase for retired people, a sales taxincrease and a transport fare rise, the report notes.

The report relays Mr. Pezao said he would travel to the capitalBrasilia to negotiate with the federal government.

Officials told Reuters news agency that they hoped to have theaccounts unfrozen in the coming days.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America onMarch 29, 2016, severe contraction that was preceded by severalyears of below-trend growth has impaired Brazil's (Ba2, negative)underlying economic strength, despite the country's large anddiversified economy, says Moody's Investors Service. Thecountry's credit rating is also coming under pressure from thegovernment's high level of mandatory spending.

The one notch downgrade reflects Rodovias do Tiete deterioratingcredit quality resulting from poor traffic performance in 2015/16that has significantly impacted revenues combined with increasingfinancial costs. Rodovias de Tiete has high leverage of BRL 1.4billion total debt for which the debt amortization schedulestarting in 2017 will exert additional pressure on the metrics.Moreover, the company needs to meet an elevated BRL 400-500million Capex program within the next six years. The State of SaoPaulo regulatory Agency (ARTESP) notifications and fines sent tothe company regarding delays in projects and maintenance as wellas environmental issues also weighed on the downgrade.Additionally, the debenture's financial covenants of debt to capand debt service coverage ratio pressured the ratings as Moody'ssee potential covenant breach starting in 2017.

What Could Change the Rating - Up /Down

In light of the latest rating action and the negative outlook, anupgrade of the ratings is unlikely in the near term. The outlookcould be stabilized if traffic volume significantly recovers tosomewhat offset the negative free cash flow generation or ifliquidity improves and leverage declines. The ratings could befurther downgraded if there are material delays or costs overrunson the capital expenditure program that negatively impact revenuesor lead to non-compliance with ARTESP's schedule. Moody'sassessment of weaker shareholders support would also add pressureto the ratings.

Further deterioration of leverage and liquidity levels that leadto potential covenant breaches could also prompt a ratingdowngrade as well as a rapid or significant downturn in thecompany's overall credit quality and metrics so FFO to Debt ratiostays below 5% on a sustainable basis or DSCR below 1x. Politicalinterference in the normal course of business or a deteriorationin the supportiveness of the concession and regulatory frameworkcould also prompt a downward action.

Rodovias do Tiete holds a 30-year toll road concession granted byARTESP in April 2009 to expand, operate and maintain a 415 km tollroad system composed by five roads located in the State of SaoPaulo: SP-101 (Rodovia Jornalista Francisco Aguirra Proenáa), SP-113 (Rodovia Dr. Joao Jose Rodrigues), SP-308 (Rodovia ComendadorM†rio Dedini), SP-300 (Rodovia Marechal Rondon) e SP-209 (RodoviaProf. Joao Hipolito Martins). The service area includes 25municipalities, where the largest cities are Bauru, Campinas, andPiracicaba, with a diversified traffic profile, mainly composed byagricultural, industries and commuters. Heavy traffic accountsfor 56% of total equivalent vehicles (VEQ) with light vehiclesrepresenting the remaining 44%.

In the six months ended in June 30 2016, the company registeredBRL189 million in Net Sales, EBITDA of BRL146 million, and a netloss of BRL76 with total debt of BRL1.4 billion, as per Moody'sstandard adjustments. Rodovias do Tiete is owned by a jointventure of Atlantia Bertin Concessoes S.A. (50%) and thePortuguese ASCENDI International Holdings B.V. (50%). Atlantia-Bertin Concessoes is a joint venture between Italian toll-roadoperator Atlantia S.p.A ((P)Baa2, stable) and Brazil's GrupoBertin (not rated).

The principal methodology used in these ratings was PrivatelyManaged Toll Roads published in May 2014.

Moody's America Latina Ltda. has assigned a Ba2 global scalerating and a Aa1.br national scale rating to the BRL270 millionsenior unsecured debentures due in 2021, to be issued byConcessionaria Rod.Oeste SP Viaoeste S.A. ViaOeste's issuer andsenior unsecured ratings remain unchanged at Ba2/Aa1.br. Proceedsfrom the issuance will be used to cover capital investments. Theoutlook for the ratings is negative.

The senior unsecured non-convertible debentures are expected to beissued by Nov. 15, 2016. The debentures will benefit from aconditional corporate guarantee from ViaOeste's parent CCR S.A.("CCR" -- rated Ba3/A2.br) that will cover the early terminationof the concession contract. CCR and the state of Sao Paulo aredisputing a 2006 decision by the state's regulator ARTESP toextend the life of the company's concession from 2018 to 2022.

The current ratings are based on preliminary documentationreceived by Moody's as of the rating assignment date. Moody'sdoes not expect changes to the documentation reviewed over thisperiod nor anticipates changes in the main conditions that thedebentures will carry. Should issuance conditions and/or finaldocumentation of the debentures deviate from the original onessubmitted and reviewed by the rating agency, Moody's will assessthe impact that these differences may have on the ratings and actaccordingly.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The increase in debt from the issuance will result in a reductionof the company's Funds from Operations (FFO)-to-Debt on a proformabasis to around 43% from 56% in the LTM period ended June 30,2016. However, Moody's expects that ViaOeste's strong FFOgeneration and future debt amortization will lead the FFO/Debtratio to return to its pre-issuances levels in the next 6 to 12months.

ViaOeste's ratings are supported by (i) the strong asset featuresof the company's concession which includes one of the busiesthighways in the an economically robust and populous area in thestate of Sao Paulo, a solid track record of high traffic volumesas well as a balanced traffic profile, (ii) the mature profile ofthe concession leading to relatively modest capital expendituresrequirements; (iii) solid credit metrics evidenced by a FFO/Debtand Cash Interest Coverage ratios of 56.3% and 6.8x respectivelyin the twelve months ended 30 June 2016, and (iv) a relativelysupportive regulatory environment for operating toll roadconcessionaires in the state of Sao Paulo despite uncertaintiescreated by the legal dispute over extension of the concession.

The Ba2/Aa1.br ratings also reflect : (i) the on-going decline inViaOeste's traffic volumes resulting from Brazil's prolongedrecession; (ii) the track record of high dividend distributionswhich Moody's expects will continue in the foreseeable future;(iii) the high level of investment activity of its controllingshareholder (CCR) which tends to exert more pressure on theupstreaming of dividends coming from ViaOeste.

The senior unsecured debentures will have a 5-year tenor from theissuance date with a bullet principal payment due on November2021. Interests will be payable in semi-annual installmentsstarting one year following issuance. The debentures will havecross-default clauses with other debt at ViaOeste. Accelerationevents under the debentures documentation include the non-paymentby ViaOeste of any financial obligation above BRL 60 million,change of the company's control and the termination of theconcession contract. An acceleration event would also occur uponthe payment of dividends above the minimum required by BrazilianCorporate Law if the Net Debt to EBITDA ratio exceeds 4.0 times,except in the case in which ViaOeste contracts a letter of creditequivalent to the outstanding amount of debt.

As existing debentures at ViaOeste do not benefit from anyguarantee, Moody's notes that CCR's conditional guarantee grantedto the 2021 debentures establishes a higher claims position forholders of such debentures relative to existing debentures holdersunder a scenario where the concession ends in 2018. Theoccurrence of such event could result in some differentiationbetween the ratings of the 2021 debentures and the ratings ofexisting debentures.

RATING OUTLOOK

The negative outlook is in line with the sovereign's negativerating outlook, given the domestic nature of the company'soperations, and also reflects uncertainties relative to theextension of the company's concession beyond 2018.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

In light of the negative outlook, an upgrade of the ratings isunlikely in the near term. The outlook could move to stable inthe case of a stabilization of the outlook of Brazil's sovereignrating, provided that uncertainties around the extension of theconcession have been clarified.

Further deterioration in the sovereign's rating could exertdownward pressure on the ratings. A rating downgrade could alsooccur upon an earlier than expected termination of the concessionand/or if liquidity risk arises. Quantitatively, a ratingdowngrade could occur if RCF/ CAPEX stays below 1.0x, and CashInterest Coverage remains below 3x on a sustainable basis.

ABOUT VIAOESTE

ViaOeste is an operating subsidiary of CCR, one of Brazil'slargest toll-road concession groups, which operates and maintains3,265 kilometers of toll road concessions.

ViaOeste holds a 24-year and 9-month concession to operate andmaintain the toll road services of the 169-kilometer CastelloBranco-Raposo Tavares road system, which connects the municipalityof Sao Paulo (not rated), the capital city of the State of SaoPaulo (Ba2, negative) with 11 million inhabitants, to the westernregion of the State, serving 16 municipalities, including thecapital city. In the twelve months ended June 30, 2016, ViaOestereported net operating revenues (excluding construction revenues)of BRL905 million and EBITDA of BRL685 million.

The concession was granted in March 1998 to a consortium ofconstruction companies, which sold it to CCR in 2005. CCR iscontrolled by the Andrade Gutierrez Group, the Camargo CorreaGroup and the Soares Penido Group with a combined participation of51.22%; the remaining 48.78% shares are free float. ViaOesteaccounts for approximately 14% and 15% of CCR's consolidated netoperating revenues and EBITDA, respectively. In FY2015, CCRreported consolidated net operating revenues of BRL6.1 billion andEBITDA of BRL4.2 billion.

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ASCEND TELECOM: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Nov. 28-----------------------------------------------------The creditors of Ascend Telecom Holdings Limited are required tofile their proofs of debt by Nov. 28, 2016, to be included in thecompany's dividend distribution.

BCS GLOBAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Dec. 17-------------------------------------------------The creditors of BCS Global Funds, SPC are required to file theirproofs of debt by Dec. 17, 2016, to be included in the company'sdividend distribution.

ESMERALDA INVESTMENTS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Dec. 7-----------------------------------------------------------The creditors of Esmeralda Investments are required to file theirproofs of debt by Dec. 7, 2016, to be included in the company'sdividend distribution.

SCIENS IG: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Nov. 30------------------------------------------------The creditors of Sciens IG SPV Ltd. are required to file theirproofs of debt by Nov. 30, 2016, to be included in the company'sdividend distribution.

SUN MIRACLE: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Dec. 8-------------------------------------------------The creditors of Sun Miracle Inc. are required to file theirproofs of debt by Dec. 8, 2016, to be included in the company'sdividend distribution.

The downgrades follow the downgrade on Nov. 7, 2016, of the ElSalvador's government's bond rating to B3, from B1, in line withincreased liquidity risks facing the government stemming from itspersistently high and rising short-term debt and the legislativeimpasse that has so far this year prevented the approval of long-term debt issuance to retire short-term paper. Bancolombia ownsEl Salvador's largest bank, Banco Agricola, S.A., the assets ofwhich represented 7% of the parent's total, as of June 2016.

The deterioration of the country's institutional strength andincrease in government liquidity risk reflected by the downgradeof the Salvadoran sovereign prompted a reassessment of thecountry's Macro Profile to "Very Weak +," from "Weak." As aresult, Moody's lowered Bancolombia's weighted Macro Profile,which also considers the bank's exposures to Panama and Guatemala,to "Moderate," from "Moderate +," the Macro Profile for Colombia.The bank's Macro Profile reflects the riskiness of the operatingenvironments to which Bancolombia is exposed and provides thecontext within which its financial profile is assessed.

The downgrade of El Salvador and the reassessment of its macroprofile comes on top of a substantial increase of Bancolombia'srelative exposure to Central America over the last 18 months, toone-third of assets as of June 2016, from just over a quarter asyear-end 2014, as a result of the depreciation of the Colombianpeso since mid-2014 and the consolidation of the bank's Guatemalansubsidiary, Grupo Financiero Agromercantil (unrated), the holdingcompany of Banco Agromercantil de Guatemala, S.A. (BAM, unrated)in December 2015. Guatemala, which has a "Weak" Macro Profile,now accounts for another 7% of Bancolombia's exposures. However,the bank's largest Central American operation is Banistmo, S.A.(unrated), the second largest bank in Panama, which has a"Moderate" Macro Profile. Banistmo accounts for about 20% ofBancolombia's total assets.

The downgrade of the BCA also considers the bank's low adjustedcapitalization, and hence loss absorption capacity, which declinedsubstantially in recent years. As a result of significantincreases in intangibles and risk-weighted assets (RWAs) due tothe depreciation of the Colombian peso, tangible common equity(TCE) has fallen to just 6.2% of fully adjusted RWAs as of June2016 from 8.8% since 2014. Even the bank's reported Tier 1 ratiois relatively modest at just 8.5%. However, Moody's expects amodest rebound in capital due to slowing loan growth and reducedcapital consumption. Notwithstanding the decrease in capital andincreased exposure to higher risk operating environments, the BCAcontinues to be supported by the bank's proven earnings generationcapabilities, broad access to core funding, and good assetquality.

Despite the downgrade of the BCA, Moody's nevertheless affirmedBancolombia's deposit and senior unsecured debt ratings at Baa2 toreflect the very high probability that Bancolombia will receivegovernment support in a situation of financial stress, which nowresults in two notches of uplift from the bank's ba1 BCA. Thebank's subordinated debt rating, which does not benefit fromgovernment support was downgraded in line with the BCA. The subdebt is notched down from the BCA to reflect lower expectedrecovery in the event of a bank failure given its lesser priorityof claim.

The stable outlook considers Moody's expectation that the bank'skey financial indicators will prove resilient to the slowdown ineconomic growth in Colombia.

What Could Change the Rating Up or Down

While Bancolombia's outlook may be stable, the BCA and ratings arenevertheless weakly positioned at current levels and arevulnerable to further downward pressure in the event of arelatively modest but sustained deterioration of the bank'sfinancial fundamentals. Specifically, the BCA could be downgradedif nonperforming loans rise above 2% of gross loans, or if thebank's capitalization remains below 6.5% and loan loss reservecoverage falls below 2-times nonperforming loans. If the BCA islowered to ba2, the debt and deposit ratings would likely belowered as well, notwithstanding public support.

The BCA is unlikely to face upward pressure unless the bank'sTCE/RWAs rises above 9%. Even if the BCA increases, however,Bancolombia's deposit and senior unsecured debt ratings areunlikely to be affected because they are at the same level asColombian government's bond rating.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Banks"published in January 2016.

Mr. Despradel said in addition to the alleged ballooned cost ofmore than US$1 billion, the Brazilian multinational's turnkeycontract requires it to seek its own financing in case ofunforeseen events, according to Dominican Today.

The minority party lawmaker said Odebrecht has yet to comply withits commitments, "because the high level of pollution generated bycoal energy has prevented access to soft financing such as thoseavailable in the World Bank and the Inter-American DevelopmentBank (IDB)," the report notes.

To deal with the situation, the deputy for Alianza Pais proposesan immediate audit by the Accounts Chamber on the Punta Catalinaproject, and for the authorities to subsequently call for tendersto convert the plants to natural gas and conclude the work, thereport adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America onJuly 1, 2016, Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook onthe Dominican Republic's long term issuer and debt ratings topositive from stable. The ratings have been affirmed at B1.

The downgrade and review of the ratings of Trustco II is promptedby the Nov. 7, downgrade of El Salvador government bond rating toB3 from B1 with a negative outlook.

Trust II's B2 CFR and senior unsecured ratings reflect theguarantors' consolidated credit profile given the joint andmultiple guaranties provided by each of these regulated utilitieswhich represent a senior unsecured obligation of each guarantor.The B2 ratings further reflect Trust II's dependence on theguarantors' payments under a promissory note to service the$310 million Notes.

The rating action factors in the country's significantmacroeconomic deterioration and fiscal challenges. The guarantorshave experienced growing delays to receive electricity subsidiesfrom the government's Comision Ejecutiva Hidroelectrica (CEL).Those subsidies currently range between $5 and $6 million permonth, equivalent to around 10% of the guarantors' consolidatedrevenues. Since 2012 CEL is the conduit through which thegovernment funds electricity subsidies in El Salvador.

The rating action captures a number of strengths including thatthe guarantors recorded end of October a cash balance of$36 million and that a 3-year $16.5 million committed creditfacility remains available until early February 2017. Inaddition, under the terms of the Notes, the structure has a six-month interest only debt service reserve account. The ratingaction also considers the financial covenant embedded in the $310million Notes that limits the guarantors' ability to incurincremental indebtedness to a maximum total capitalization to debtof 65%. It further assumes that AES will reduce the dividendpressure on its El Salvadorian subsidiaries should they faceliquidity challenges. Moody's anticipates that the guarantorswill be able to record robust consolidated performance leading tostrong metrics for the rating category. Specifically, CFO pre-W/Cto debt will continue to exceed 5% on a sustainable basis. Theguarantors' financial and liquidity profile as well as theirlimited dependence on the local capital markets further supportsthe Trustco II ratings.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE

The prospects of an upgrade of Trustco II's B2 ratings are limitedgiven the negative outlook and the current sovereign rating for ElSalvador. Trustco II's outlook could be stabilized should theoutlook of El Salvador be changed to stable assuming theguarantors' liquidity profile is adequate for the B2 rating.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN DOWNGRADE

A downgrade of Trustco's B2 ratings is likely to follow adowngrade of the sovereign ratings. Negative momentum on therating is likely if the government's fiscal challenges and/orCEL's financial difficulties impact the guarantors' liquidityprofile and/or their ability to extend the committed creditfacilities. Moody's assessment that the guarantors' financialand/or liquidity profiles are no longer appropriate to maintainthe one-notch difference between Trustco II's ratings and thesovereign rating could also result in a downgrade.

In addition, downward pressure on the ratings is likely if Moody'sperceives a deterioration in the regulatory framework that reducesthe predictability and consistency in which the regulation isapplied and/or an outcome of the next tariff review (due inDecember 2017) that is not credit supportive. Negative momentumis also likely if the consolidated key credit metrics deterioratesignificantly; Specifically, if the consolidated interest coverageratio and the CFO pre-W/C to debt fell below 2x and 5%,respectively, for an extended period. An aggressive distributionpolicy particularly amid the current delays to collect the subsidypayments, would also likely result in a downgrade.

The guarantors' ultimate parent company is AES which holdsindirect ownership stakes that range in between 80.08% (CLESA),75.11% (CAESS) and 89.11% (EEO), averaging 80% overall. For theLast Twelve Month period ended September 2015, the guarantorsreported CFO of around US$105 million (excluding net interest) andconsolidated assets of $735 million.

===========M E X I C O===========

MEXICO: Peso in Free-Fall as Trump Looks Set to Win---------------------------------------------------EFE News reports that the growing lead for Donald Trump inTuesday's U.S. presidential election drove the Mexican peso downto a record low against the dollar.

The Mexican currency was trading at 20.70 to the greenback,Citibanamex said on its Web site, down 11 percent from Nov. 8'sclose, according to EFE News.

The peso's dive began after the results from the key swing stateof Florida began trending in favor of Trump in his race againstDemocrat Hillary Clinton, the report notes.

The value of the peso has fluctuated with the U.S. electoral pollsin recent months as a result of Trump's promises to build a wallon the U.S.-Mexico border and to renegotiate -- if not scrap --the North American Free Trade Agreement, the report relays.

In comments to Televisa television, analyst Luis de la Calle spokeof predictions that the peso could fall to 23 to the dollar ifTrump wins the White House, the report notes.

But when asked about the potential effects of a Trump presidencyon the Mexican economy, De la Calle said that a crisis is notinevitable, the report discloses.

What Mexico cannot avoid, he said, is a "period of uncertainty."

The Mexican government has taken steps to cushion the economy fromany turbulence arising from a Trump win, Finance Secretary JoseAntonio Meade said, the report relays.

Those steps include drafting a 2017 budget "that brings us back toa primary surplus," putting aside funds to meet all sovereign debtobligations that come due during the first five months of nextyear, and presenting a new business plan for state oil companyPemex, Meade told Radio Formula, the report notes.

"All this allows that this volatility we are already seeing doesnot affect any real (economic) variable," he said.

"We are calm," Mr. Meade said, adding that should Trump win, theMexican government will closely monitor the reactions in financialmarkets.

"We are alert and we have instruments to react according to whatwe are seeing," he said, downplaying the likelihood of anydramatic announcements in Mexico on the day after the U.S.election, regardless of the outcome, Mr. Meade adds.

=================N I C A R A G U A=================

NICARAGUA: Moody's Retains B2 Rating on Economic Growth-------------------------------------------------------Nicaragua's economy is one of the fastest growing in LatinAmerica, but the nation is also one of the poorest and smallest ofall sovereign issuers rated by Moody's Investors Service. Thenation's B2 rating reflects these dynamics, as well as Nicaragua'slow scores in World Bank governance indicators and other surveysthat measure ease of doing business and perceived corruptionlevels, says Moody's in a report.

Of the 131 countries that Moody's rates, only 21 have economiesthat are smaller than Nicaragua's, which had nominal GDP of $12billion in 2015. Nonetheless, Nicaragua's economy has grown by anaverage of 5.2% per year over the past five years, above the 4.3%median for B-rated nations.

A high share of foreign currency-denominated government debt (92%)exposes the government's balance sheet to exchange rate risk. Lowfiscal deficits coupled with concessional external debt at veryfavorable terms, however, mitigate rollover and governmentliquidity risks. The central government debt ratio has remainedat around 30% of GDP since 2007 coming well below the 49% medianof B-rated countries.

Nicaragua's susceptibility to external shocks stemming from itstrade and financing links with Venezuela has been considered arelevant credit weakness. Under the Petrocaribe program,Nicaragua pays for oil imports from Venezuela at full marketprice, but then receives half the amount back in the form ofconcessional loans.

However, the vulnerability to shocks emanating from the programhave diminished considerably over the last year, says ArianeOrtiz-Bollin, an Analyst at Moody's.

"Because of lower oil prices, Nicaragua has received fewer loansfrom Petrocaribe," says Ortiz-Bollin. "A large portion of thoseloans were used to fund energy subsidies, and lower oil priceshave meant less spending on subsidies. Social and infrastructurespending that was previously financed with these loans has alsobeen reduced, or incorporated into the government's balance sheet,with only a moderate impact on the fiscal deficit."

Moody's report also assesses the potential impact of the"Nicaraguan Investment Conditionality Act," which was passed bythe US House of Representatives and is now under discussion in theUS Senate.

A hearing for the consideration of the final approval of theDisclosure Statement and the confirmation of the Plan and ofobjections as may be made to either will be held on Dec. 7, 2016,at 9:00 a.m.

Any objection to the final approval of the Disclosure Statementand the confirmation of the Plan will be filed on or before 14days prior to the date of the hearing on confirmation of the Plan.

Acceptances or rejections of the Plan may be filed in writing bythe holders of all claims on or before 14 days prior to the dateof the hearing on confirmation of the Plan.

The Debtors will file with the Court a statement setting forthcompliance with each requirement in U.S.C. Section 1129, the listof acceptances and rejections and the computation of the same,within seven working days before the hearing on confirmation.

Air Sub Corp filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection (Bankr.D.P.R. Case No. 16-01709) on March 2, 2016, estimating its assetsat up to $50,000 and liabilities at between $500,001 and $1million. Nilda M. Gonzalez Cordero, Esq., at Gonzalez Cordero LawOffices serves as the Debtor's bankruptcy counsel.

N & N Sub Corp. Filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection (Bankr.D.P.R. Case No. 16-02596) on April 1, 2016, estimating its assetsat up to $50,000 and its liabilities at between $100,001 and$500,000.

Subway Senorial Parana Corp. filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcyprotection (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 16-02597) on April 1, 2016,estimating its assets at up to $50,000 and its liabilities atbetween $100,001 and $500,000.

TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Could Lose US$429-Mil. From FTA, IDB Says------------------------------------------------------------Trinidad Express reports that a new study by the Inter-AmericanDevelopment Bank (IDB), authored by IDB economist Jeetendra Khadanand The University of the West Indies (UWI) senior economicslecturer Roger Hosein, has found Trinidad and Tobago stands tolose the most in the Caribbean from a Caribbean Community(Caricom) Canada Free Trade Agreement (FTA).

The October 2016 paper "Trade, Economic and Welfare Impacts of theCaricom-Canada Free Trade Agreement" was released last month.In it, Khadan and Hosein said: "The four Caricom countriesexpected to experience the most losses in actual dollars fromliberalising tariffs on Canadian imports are Trinidad and Tobago(US$429 million), Jamaica (US$411.4 million) and The Bahamas(US$199.9 million)," according to Trinidad Express.

TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Job Losses as Hotel Occupancy Crashes--------------------------------------------------------Trinidad Express reports that a lack of efficiency in thetransportion system between Trinidad and Tobago, as well asincreased competition are being blamed for the drastic decrease inhotel occupancy rates recently.

And as a result workers are being sent home, according to TrinidadExpress.

Hoteliers have two main suggestions to solve the problem: haveproper transport and market Tobago, the report notes.

Wendy Hamlin, reservations manager for Blue Haven Hotel inScarborough said five workers have already been sent home sincethe occupancy rate dropped a 40 per cent in the last two months,the report relays.

Mr. Hamlin told the Express: "Most of our guests are local. It isnot the tourist season and the majority of them can't get on (aflight or vessel) can't come. Obviously we need bettertransportation. "

Hundreds of passengers were left stranded at the ANR InternationalAirport in Tobago because there were technical difficulties on oneof the aircraft expected to bring them to Trinidad, the reportrelays. There were several other reports of difficulties with CALaircrafts along the domestic air-bridge.

Roger Patino, one of the owners at Enchanted Waters at ShirvanRoad said he has not sent home workers but the restaurant thatsupposed to be reopened in October was closed until November 23.He said out of a staff of eight, two resigned and the others wereallowed to work elsewhere until the restaurant re-opens, thereport says.

Mr. Patino told the Express: "My restaurant is not open because Iam just not seeing the people on the island, so the reopening dateof the restaurant has been pushed back because it does not makeany sense. Financially, your cash dropped. We are going to comeback, but to come back and not seeing people sitting down on thechairs, then financially it is very difficult. You are justputting out money in expenses and you can't survive."

Mr. Patino said: "This is normally a slow period, September intoOctober but the people are not seeing the number of touristswhether foreign or local tourists that Tobago should have. A lotof business, restaurants or whoever may be, a lot of people aresuffering because there is not that many people on the island,"the report notes.

Mr. Patino said: "We need to market the destination and fix theair and the sea bridge. You can't market your destination if youcan't even get here."

And Curtis Lee, general manager of Blue Waters Inn in Speysidesaid although no workers have yet been sent home, the occupancyrate has dropped, the report says.

Mr. Lee said the high season would usually be in November,December and January and would consist mostly of tourists fromEurope who wanted to get away from the cold, the report notes.

Local tourists were not travelling as much he said and as aresult, there was a rush to woo tourists by hoteliers since therewere so few, the report adds.

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Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicativeprices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outsidesources during the prior week we think are reliable. Thosesources may not, however, be complete or accurate. The MondayBond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades. Pricesfor actual trades are probably different. Our objective is toshare information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buyor sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entityaffiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in theissuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies withinsolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on thelatest balance sheets publicly available a day prior topublication. At first glance, this list may look like thedefinitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at historical costnet of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm'sassets. A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet forliabilities that may never materialize. The prices at whichequity securities trade in public market are determined by morethan a balance sheet solvency test.

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