Chapter 28
George Bush

George Bush served as vice president through the Reagan presidency from 1981 to 1989. In
January 1989, he succeeded Reagan as President. It was in his capacity as President that Bush
committed what will likely become his most memorable act in connection with Iran/contra. On
December 24, 1992, twelve days before former Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger was
to go to trial, Bush pardoned him.1 In issuing pardons to Weinberger and five other Iran/contra
defendants, President Bush charged that Independent Counsel's prosecutions represented the
``criminalization of policy differences.''

1 President Bush also pardoned former National Security Adviser Robert C. McFarlane,
former Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams, former CIA Central American Task Force
Chief Alan D. Fiers, Jr., former CIA Deputy Director for Operations Clair E. George, and former
CIA Counter-Terrorism Chief Duane R. Clarridge. The Weinberger pardon marked the first time
a President ever pardoned someone in whose trial he might have been called as a witness,
because the President was knowledgeable of factual events underlying the case.

The criminal investigation of Bush was regrettably incomplete. Before Bush's election as
President, the investigation was primarily concerned with the operational conspiracy and the
careful evaluation of the cases against former National Security Adviser John M. Poindexter and
Lt. Col. Oliver L. North of the National Security Council staff, prior to their indictment in March
1988. This included a review of any exculpatory material that might have shown authorization
for their conduct. In the course of this investigation, Vice President Bush was deposed on
January 11, 1988.

A year later Bush was President-elect, and OIC was engaged in the intensive preparation for
the trial of North, which began on January 31, 1989. After the completion of the trials of North
and Poindexter and the pleas of guilty of retired Air Force Maj. Gen. Richard V. Secord and
Albert Hakim, OIC broadened its investigation to those supporting and supervising Poindexter
and North. This investigation developed a large amount of new material with which it intended
to question President Bush. His interrogation was left to the end because, as President, he
obviously could not be questioned repeatedly. It was Independent Counsel's expectation that he
would be available after the completion of the 1992 Presidential election campaign.

In light of his access to information, Bush would have been an important witness. In an early
interview with the FBI in December 1986 and in the OIC deposition in January 1988, Bush
acknowledged that he was regularly informed of events connected with the Iran arms sales,
including the 1985 Israeli missile shipments.2 These statements conflicted with his more
extreme public assertions that he was ``out of the loop'' regarding the operational details of the
Iran initiative and was generally unaware of the strong opposition to the arms sales by Secretary
of Defense Weinberger and Secretary of State George P. Shultz. He denied knowledge of the
diversion of proceeds from the arms sales to assist the contras.3 He also denied knowledge of
the secret contra-resupply operation supervised by North.4

2 Bush, FBI 302, 12/12/86; Bush, OIC Deposition, 1/11/88. But Bush's recollection was very
general and he did not recall specific details of meetings in which the Iran arms sales were
discussed.

3 Bush, FBI 302, 12/12/86, p. 3; Bush, OIC Deposition, 1/11/88, p. 17. During his interview
with the FBI, Bush said he would be willing to take a polygraph examination concerning his lack
of prior knowledge of the diversion.

4 Bush, OIC Deposition, 1/11/88, p. 154.

In 1991 and 1992, Independent Counsel uncovered important evidence in the form of
withheld documents and contemporaneous notes that raised significant questions about the
earlier accounts provided by high Administration officials. The personal diary of Vice President
Bush was disclosed to Independent Counsel only in December 1992, despite early and repeated
requests for such documents. This late disclosure prompted a special investigation into why the
diary had not been produced previously, and the substance of the diary.

Following the pardons, Bush refused to be interviewed unless the interview was limited to his
non-production of his diary and personal notes. Because such a limited deposition would not
serve a basic investigative purpose and because its occurrence would give the misleading
impression of cooperation where there was none, Independent Counsel declined to accept these
conditions. A Grand Jury subpoena was not issued because OIC did not believe there was an
appropriate likelihood of a criminal prosecution. Bush's notes themselves proved not as
significant as those of Weinberger and Shultz aides Charles Hill and Nicholas Platt, and the
statute of limitations had passed on most of the relevant acts and statements of Bush.

The Bush Diary

On December 11, 1992, Chester Paul Beach, Jr., associate counsel to President Bush,
informed the OIC that a diary, kept by Bush, dating back to his vice presidency, had not been
produced to Independent Counsel. It consisted of Bush's nightly dictation concerning the events
of the day. Although the diary contained many personal and political observations, it also
contained a substantial number of references to the events surrounding the Iran/contra matter and
the subsequent investigation. Accordingly, the diary was responsive to at least two document
requests sent to the White House by the OIC in 1987 and 1992.

Bush began in November 1986 keeping a daily ``political diary'' tracking his bid for the
Presidency in 1988.5 Most of the dictation was transcribed by Betty Green, a secretary in the
Vice President's Houston, Texas, office.6 She believed she first started transcribing the dictation
in February 1987.7 Bush's Special Assistant, Don Rhodes, would receive cassette tapes from
Bush at his residence and deliver them to Green in Houston.8 On a couple of occasions, Rhodes
received transcripts from Green and returned them to Bush. Neither Rhodes nor Green knew
what Vice President Bush did with the transcripts once he received them.

5 The first entry in the diary reads: ``This is November 4, 1986, the beginning of what I hope
will be an accurate diary, with at least five and maybe 15 minutes a day on observations about
my run for the presidency in 1988.'' (Bush Diary, 11/4/86.) Prior to November of 1986, Vice
President Bush did, on occasion, dictate his thoughts in conjunction with a particular historical
event, such as the hospitalization of President Reagan in July 1985.

6 During his vice presidency, Bush had six offices in the following locations: the West Wing
of the White House; the Old Executive Office Building; the Dirksen Senate Office Building; the
Capitol; the Vice Presidential Residence; and Houston, Texas. The primary function of the
Houston Office was to respond to public correspondence. (Presock, FBI 302, 3/17/93, p. 1.)

7 Green, FBI 302, 2/18/93, p. 2.

8 Rhodes, FBI 302, 2/18/93, pp. 2-4.

Jack Steel, the head of Bush's Houston office, knew Green was transcribing dictation for Bush
and that it was personal, but he was not aware of the substance.9 Other than Bush, Green,
Rhodes and Steel, there is no evidence that others knew of the existence of the diary prior to
September 1992. Others knew that he would occasionally dictate his thoughts, but no one knew
that it was part of a daily diary.10

9 Steel, FBI 302, 2/18/93, p. 2.

10 OVP Chief of Staff Craig L. Fuller recalled observing Bush occasionally dictating when he
obviously was not working on correspondence. (Fuller, FBI 302, 2/19/93, p. 2.) Rose Zamaria,
Special Assistant to President Bush, was aware that Bush made ``sporadic'' dictation of his
thoughts, although she does not know when he began this practice. (Zamaria, FBI 302, 2/17/93,
p. 2.) Another special assistant, Susie Peake, transcribed some Bush dictation in 1989
concerning his trip to China and again in 1991 concerning the Gulf War. (Peake, FBI 302,
2/18/93, p. 2.) Zamaria and Peake were not aware of Bush dictating a diary that dated back to
November 1986.

The White House Response to OIC's 1987 Document Request

On March 27, 1987, OIC's request for the production of documents was circulated throughout
the White House complex, including the Office of the Vice President (OVP), by A.B.
Culvahouse, counsel to President Reagan.11 This document request represented the product of
negotiations between the White House, the congressional Select Committees and the OIC to
develop an omnibus document request.12 A cover memorandum attached to the document
request stated that the request included ``all personal and official records'' of the staff members of
the White House, NSC, and the Executive Office of the President.13 The attached request
explicitly identified relevant ``notes,'' ``diaries,'' and ``audio tapes'' among the materials required
to be produced. As a result of the prior negotiations, the document request was limited to
material from the period January 20, 1981 to January 2, 1987.14

11 Memorandum from Culvahouse to Assistants To The President, et al., 3/27/87, ARZ
003929-37. This document was generated, in part, in response to a letter from Independent
Counsel to Culvahouse's predecessor, Peter J. Wallison, dated February 27, 1987. This letter
forwarded the initial document request from the OIC to the Executive Branch.

Following the disclosure of the existence of the Bush diary, President Bush retained private
counsel. In January 1993, his counsel conducted an internal investigation and reported that Bush
did not recall reviewing the 1987 document request and was not aware that it called for the
production of personal diaries.

There was, however, substantial evidence that a copy of the March 1987 document request
was received by Vice President Bush, and that the requirements of the request, including the
demand for personal materials and documents, were communicated to Bush by his counsel, C.
Boyden Gray.

The memorandum circulated by Culvahouse was received by Craig L. Fuller in his capacity of
chief of staff for the OVP.15 On April 1, 1987, he delegated responsibility to Gray and John P.
Schmitz, deputy counsel to the Vice President.16 On April 8, 1987, Gray and Schmitz circulated
a memorandum to the ``heads'' of the OVP offices.17 They stated that the document request
``covers all personal and official records of OVP staff members.''

The Vice President's West Wing Office contained the largest collection of what would be
considered Bush personal materials. Patty Presock, an administrative assistant to Bush, was
considered the ``head'' of this office, with the only other staff person being Susie Peake. On
April 8, 1987, Presock received a memorandum from Schmitz following up on an earlier
telephone conversation and forwarding a copy of the document request.18 The last sentence of
the memorandum stated:

18 Memorandum from Schmitz to Presock, 4/8/87, ARZ 004336.

Boyden will talk to the Vice President about the extent to which this request applies to your
office's records.

Beach, in an interview with the OIC, stated that Gray informed him on December 12, 1992
that he had this conversation with Bush in 1987.19

19 Beach, FBI 302, 3/9/93, pp. 4-6. Beach's recollection of the conversation with Gray is
memorialized in contemporaneous notes Beach made during the conversation on December 12,
1992. (Beach, ``Notes of Interviews Re V.P. Diary Excerpts.'') This conversation, and the
corresponding notes, were the product of an ``internal investigation'' conducted by Beach
following the discovery of the Bush diary.

Others support Beach. Fuller said he understood that Bush reviewed the document request in
1987, although Gray was the one handling that issue.20 Fuller did not recall whether he, himself,
provided a copy of the document request to Bush or whether it was done through Gray.21 The
first Fuller learned that Bush did not recall seeing the document request was in his recent
interview with Bush's private lawyers.22

20 Fuller, FBI 302, 2/19/93, pp. 3-4.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid.

Bush's general awareness of the problem of personal notes and diaries is documented in a
January 30, 1987, Bush handwritten note, produced from a set of files known as his ``chron
files.'' 23 It includes the statement ``memo from counsel -- all notes, memos, documents etc.'' 24
This predated the March 1987 document request, but followed a narrower early document request
of the Attorney General.

23 The ``chron files'' consist of chronologically sorted daily files of various documents and
were maintained by Susie Peake. Chron file documents include correspondence, memoranda,
calendars, phone logs and personal notes written or typed by Vice President Bush.

24 Bush Note, 1/30/87, ARZ 000772.

This Bush note was followed by a February 2, 1987, memorandum from Fuller to White
House Chief of Staff Donald T. Regan concerning the production of the Reagan handwritten
notes and diary. Fuller wrote ``it's only a matter of time until someone calls for the `diary.' '' 25
The memorandum discussed the need to develop a plan to ``satisfy'' the OIC and congressional
investigators. The memorandum was initialed by Bush and stamped ``V.P. Has Seen.'' 26

25 Memorandum from Fuller to Regan, 2/2/87, ARZ 000787.

26 Collamore, FBI 302, 3/12/93, p. 2.

Culvahouse did not recall Bush being present at any meetings relating to the 1987 document
request.27 Culvahouse did recall discussions with Gray concerning Bush ``notes.'' 28 According
to Culvahouse, the OVP was handling the production of Bush ``notes'' with the same sensitivity,
and following the same procedures, as the White House was using to handle the Reagan diary.29

27 Culvahouse, FBI 302, 3/19/93, p. 4-5.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

Jack Steel and Betty Green of the Houston office both recalled receiving the 1987 document
request but did not feel that the documents in the Houston office, including the tapes, were
relevant.30 Don Rhodes, head of Bush's Dirksen Building office, received a copy of the 1987
request, but did not believe that the tapes would be relevant.31

30 Steel, FBI 302, 2/18/93, pp. 3-4; Green, FBI 302, 2/18/93, p. 3.

31 Rhodes, FBI 302, 2/18/93, p. 5.

Related to the issue of the diary was the production of the chron files. When the Iran/contra
document request was circulated, Bush instructed Peake to ``just give them everything.'' 32
Peake boxed up the entire collection of chron files and put them in Gray's office. Subsequently,
the personal notes were segregated from the other documents in the chron files in anticipation of
production of the chron files to the OIC.

32 Peake, FBI 302, 2/18/93, p 3.

Pursuant to negotiation between Gray and the OIC, Bush's November and December 1986
chron files, responsive to the 1987 document request (that cut off on January 2, 1987), were
made available for review just prior to Vice President Bush's deposition in January 1988.33 The
relevant personal notes for this period were excerpted by Gray and were also made available at
this time.

33 Prior to the discovery of the Bush diary, many of the members of Bush's staff referred to
the chron files as a ``diary.'' (Beach, FBI 302, 3/9/93, p. 7.) In fact, prior to the disclosure of the
Bush diary, the White House Counsel had acknowledged that the chron file ``diary'' was
responsive to OIC document requests calling for production of a ``diary.'' (Memorandum from
Rehnquist to File, 7/10/92, ARZ 003193-94.)

The White House Response to OIC's 1992 Document Request

On June 30, 1992, the OIC transmitted a broader document request to the White House calling
for the production of any diaries kept by George Bush during the period May 1, 1985, through
December 1, 1987.34 The primary effect of the 1992 Request was to extend the earlier request
for diaries through December 1, 1987. This request received considerable attention within the
White House during the summer of 1992. Various members of the White House Counsel's office
wrote memoranda and held meetings discussing how the White House should respond.

34 Letter from Barrett to Rehnquist, 6/30/92, ARZ 004164A-65.

There is no evidence that anyone involved in formulating the White House response knew of
the existence of the Bush diaries at the time. Each has stated that the discussions focused on the
chron files from the period January 3, 1987 through December 1, 1987. These discussions
ended when the OIC, on September 15, 1992, delayed the response date until after the November
3, 1992 Presidential election.35

35 Memorandum from Beach to Gray, 9/15/92, ARZ 003527-28.

In a memorandum to Gray and Schmitz written on September 15, 1992, Beach told them of
the extension of time to respond to the 1992 request.36 It also stated:

36 Ibid.

[The OIC has] indicated, as a ``heads-up,'' that they have a ``wealth of new information'' since
they last interviewed the President four years ago, and that they would probably ask that he
respond to some additional interrogatories -- after the election.37

37 Ibid. (emphasis in original). The White House counsel never interpreted the September
15th call extending the document-request response date to imply that the OIC had dropped its
June 1992 request. To the contrary, the White House understood that the request was ``deferred''
until after the election, when the White House was expecting the OIC to call about it. (Beach,
FBI 302, 3/9/93, p. 12.)

Prior to this call from the OIC, the OIC requested full access to whatever materials existed.
The White House wanted to provide only limited access to relevant extracts that had been agreed
upon in 1987 with respect to the Reagan diaries and the 1986 Bush chron files.38 The gist of
White House internal discussions was a decision that Gray should actually begin the process of
reviewing the 1987 chron files. According to Bush counsel Janet Rehnquist, Gray was going to
conduct this review alone.

38 Memorandum from Rehnquist to file, 7/10/92, ARZ 003193-94.

Gray apparently began such a review of the 1987 chron files in the late summer of 1992.
Witnesses (including Beach, William Lytton and Rehnquist) stated that Gray had the 1987 chron
files in his office beginning some time during the summer of 1992.

Discovery of the Dictated Diary Transcript

The Bush diaries did not become known to anyone other than Bush, Rhodes, Steel and Green
prior to September 1992. Sometime between September 18 and September 24, 1992, the diary
transcripts were discovered by Presock while she was conducting an inventory of the Bush family
safes located on the third floor of the White House residence.39 The diary consisted of a typed
transcript, which had been organized in binders. Presock knew the diary notes were important to
Iran/contra investigators based on a request she had received a few months earlier for similar
documents.40

39 Presock, FBI 302, 1/19/93, pp. 1-3.

40 Presock recalled a search for a Bush diary in July 1992 by the White House Counsel's
office. She believed it was in response to the OIC request. Presock did not recall any diary being
found at that time. (Presock, FBI 302, 1/19/93, pp. 4-5.)

Presock told President Bush of her discovery early on the morning of September 25. This
meeting took place in Rose Zamaria's office adjacent to the Oval Office. Presock pointed out to
President Bush that the diary transcript made repeated references to Iran/contra. President Bush
took little interest and stated ``let's call Boyden and he can sort it out.'' 41 Later that day, Gray
came to Presock's office and reviewed the diary transcript.42

41 Ibid., p. 6.

42 When interviewed by Beach in December 1992, Gray thought he recalled Presock saying
she found the diaries in August, before the Republican Convention, and thought he might have
learned of them prior to late September. (Beach, FBI 302, 3/9/93, p. 7.) However, Gray had no
precise memory of the dates, and Presock had documentary evidence, along with Rose Zamaria's
recollection, supporting the late-September date. (Ibid.)

Knowledge of the existence of the diary went no farther than Boyden Gray until December 1,
1992. At a December 1, 1992, White House counsel meeting attended by Gray, Schmitz, Beach
and Lee Liberman, there was a brief discussion referring to document production.43 Gray did
not reveal that what had been discovered was a diary. He did refer to newly discovered material
as containing Iran/contra ``stuff'' and new 1986 Bush ``stuff.'' At this meeting Gray asked Beach
if he had heard from the OIC on its outstanding request. When Beach said no, Gray said that the
White House should probably ``goose them on it,'' because there were some 1986 materials that
had not been produced.44

43 Liberman, FBI 302, 3/16/93, p. 7.

44 Ibid., p. 6.

Gray, himself, decided to delay notifying the Independent Counsel of the existence of the
diaries.45 Gray had his secretary type up diary excerpts relevant to Iran/contra for his staff to
review.46 These excerpts were reviewed on approximately Monday, December 7, 1992. The
staff members concluded that the material was plainly relevant and should be produced.47

45 Ibid., p. 11. No discussion took place, to Beach's knowledge. Clearly uncomfortable with
the question, Beach carefully stated that he and his colleagues ``recognized that Boyden had
made a difficult decision'' regarding delayed notification.

46 Ibid., p. 4.

47 Ibid.

On December 9, 1992, the White House made its first attempt to inform the Independent
Counsel of the existence of the Bush diary.48 It was not until Friday, December 11, 1992, that
Independent Counsel actually received the information.

48 Ibid.

Production of Documents From the White House

In 1993, the OIC requested certain documents relevant to the diary production and to
Iran/contra generally. Bush's new private counsel took over the production of official documents
from the White House. They adopted a very narrow approach to the OIC document request,
allowing production of only those materials that related to the production of the diary. They
claimed that all other documents requested were protected by the attorney-client privilege.49

49 Letter from Sollers to Gillen, 1/27/93.

The OIC also requested relevant documents of each witness interviewed regarding document
production. Every witness complied except Schmitz, who asserted that his documents were
privileged work product.

Bush's counsel asserted that the failure to produce Bush's November and December 1986
diary notes was inadvertent. However, one Bush 1987 diary entry raises questions about Bush's
willingness to cooperate fully with investigators. During 1987 Secretary of State George P.
Shultz had turned over to investigators certain notes detailing personal meetings with President
Reagan that were relevant to Iran/contra. When Bush became aware of Shultz's note production,
he responded as follows in his personal diary:

Howard Baker in the presence of the President, told me today that George Shultz had kept 700
pages of personal notes, dictated to his staff . . . Notes on personal meetings he had with the
President. I found this almost inconceivable. Not only that he kept the notes, but that he'd turned
them all over to Congress . . . I would never do it. I would never surrender such documents and
I wouldn't keep such detailed notes.50

50 Bush Diary, 7/20/87.

This note, which was not among selected diary notes Bush released publicly in 1993, would
have been used to question Bush about his cooperation with investigators if he had consented to
the requested Independent Counsel deposition in 1993.

Request to Interview Boyden Gray and John Schmitz

Much of the evidence relating to the failure to produce the diary focuses on Gray, Bush's
counsel as Vice President and as President, and his deputy, Schmitz. On January 11, 1993, OIC
wrote Gray and Schmitz requesting production of relevant documents and requesting an
interview.51 Subject to a non-waiver agreement, Gray and Schmitz produced their appointment
calendars and a folder of documents.52 Schmitz kept a personal diary that covered the relevant
period (1987-1992), but he refused to produce it, asserting that any relevant excerpts were
protected as work-product.

51 The document request was limited to ``personal and official documents and other materials
that relate in any way to your service in the Executive Branch from 1986 through the present as it
relates to any aspect of the Iran/contra matter, including document requests from this Office or
any other Iran/Contra investigation.'' (Letters from Harleston to Gray/Schmitz, 1/11/93.)

52 The non-waiver agreement stated:

This review will not waive and will be without prejudice to any privilege against disclosure
that may exist with respect to any of the documents, including the attorney-client privilege.

(Letter From Harleston to Willard, 2/10/93.)

Gray and Schmitz finally refused to be interviewed by Independent Counsel. The OIC had
been willing to limit the scope of the their interviews to questions directly related to the timing of
the production to the OIC of President Bush's diary tapes and transcripts for periods prior to 1988
and the production of the chron files.53 In addition, the OIC agreed to a non-waiver of any
privilege of Bush, excepting the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.54

53 Letter from Harleston to Willard, 3/23/93.

54 Ibid.

During the negotiations with Gray and Schmitz, the OIC learned that their lawyer, Richard
Willard, had been consulted regarding the production of Bush documents prior to Gray's
revelation of the Bush diary.55 Lee Liberman, an associate counsel to the President, stated in an
interview, that she and Beach had consulted Willard in December 1992 concerning the
production of the diary.56

55 The OIC's concern over a potential conflict with Willard serving as Gray's and Schmitz's
attorney stems primarily from a Janet Rehnquist note of a conversation she had with Willard.
The note reads:

Richard Willard:

-- Right to be concerned

-- Obstructing

-- Covering up

-- process has been sloppy over the years

-- not atty client or work product materials

-- make this kind of material in a Special way

-- shakier

(Rehnquist Note, ALU 0141477.)

Rehnquist had a poor memory of this conversation; her note is not dated. She believed it
related to the 1992 Request, but was essentially guessing when she tried to interpret the phrases.
But Rehnquist clearly remembered that she did not learn of the Bush diaries until she read about
them in the newspapers. This conversation with Willard, then, does not relate to the diaries.
(Rehnquist, FBI 302, 3/17/93, pp. 12-13.)

56 Liberman, FBI 302, 3/16/92, p.11. In fact, Liberman stated that Gray put Willard in
contact with Beach and her. (Ibid.) It was from Willard that Liberman first learned that the
``stuff'' Gray had discovered was in fact the Bush diary. (Ibid.)

Willard was thus potentially a witness. The OIC asked to question Willard before he attended
the interviews of Gray and Schmitz to determine whether a conflict existed. Willard refused to
be interviewed by the OIC and his clients refused to be interviewed without his presence as
counsel.57 Willard claimed that his involvement in the White House production of the diary was
solely as counsel to Gray and Schmitz,58 and subject to work-product protection.59

57 Letter from Willard to Harleston, 3/29/93, 026101.

58 Ibid.

59 Ibid.

The OIC then agreed to allow Willard to be present during the interviews of Gray and
Schmitz.60 Gray and Schmitz still refused to be interviewed,61 claiming that the
characterization of Willard as a potential witness could ``unfairly cast doubt on the legitimacy of
the proposed interviews.'' 62 Finally, they insisted upon a non-waiver provision that extended to
any privilege held by Gray and Schmitz as well as President Bush.63 Such a non-agreement
would have included the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and would
essentially allow Gray and Schmitz to testify under a grant of immunity. The OIC refused to
agree.64 Gray and Schmitz refused to consent to an interview.65

60 Letter from Harleston to Willard, 4/8/93.

61 Letter from Willard to Harleston, 4/16/93, 026988.

62 Ibid.

63 Ibid.

64 Letter from Parsigian to Willard, 4/21/93, 027075.

65 This was not the OIC's first encounter with non-cooperation on the part of Gray. In a May
23, 1991, FBI interview regarding Donald Gregg, Gray asserted on behalf of President Bush
attorney-client privilege to many of the questions asked involving conversations between Gray
and other members of the OVP staff. (Gray, FBI 302, 5/23/91.)

Interview of President Bush

The OIC informed the White House in the summer of 1992 that based on new information it
had obtained since last interviewing Bush in 1988, the OIC anticipated the need to ask President
Bush to respond to further questioning.66 The White House provided no response to this
statement. While President Bush made numerous public statements extolling his cooperation
with the Independent Counsel's investigation,67 that, in fact, had not been the case: Inside the
White House it appears he had little intention of cooperating with Independent Counsel. In
August 1992, there were discussions among White House counsel about not allowing the OIC to
interview President Bush.68 According to Janet Rehnquist:

66 The OIC did indicate that the questioning would probably be in the form of interrogatories.
(Memorandum from Beach to Gray/Schmitz, 9/15/92, ARZ 003527-28.)

67 For example, in a September 11, 1992, Los Angeles Times article, Bush was quoted as
stating: ``I have nothing to explain. I've given every bit of evidence I have to these thousands of
investigators. And nobody has suggested that I've done anything wrong at all.'' (``Iran-Contra
Issue Haunts GOP Ticket,'' The Los Angeles Times, 9/11/92, p. A1.)

In 1988, Bush stated publicly: ``The President and I cooperated fully with the various
investigations, turned over thousands of documents and directed our staffs to do the same.'' (``
`There Never Was a Formal Meeting' on Iran Initiative'' -- Vice President Bush's responses to
Mary McGrory's questions, The Washington Post, 1/14/88, p. 2.)

In 1989, Bush stated publicly: ``Certainly, I would see that if any documents are in control of
this administration, relevant documents, that we would live assiduously by those guidelines . . .
set up to determine what documents would be made available.'' (``Bush Doubts Contra Files
Withheld,'' The Washington Times, 4/21/89, p. 5A.)

68 Rehnquist, FBI 302, 3/17/93, p. 9.

This matter was discussed among Lytton, Schmitz, Gray and Rehnquist. Their position was
they were going to tell the OIC to ``pound sand'' on the Bush interview issue. Their position was
that interviews had already been done, that an election was going on and that enough was
enough. There was no discussion about how the newly-revealed Caspar Weinberger material that
had come to light might justify a new interview.69

69 Ibid.

The White House remained cognizant of Independent Counsel's interest in questioning Bush
through the fall of 1992.70 Following the disclosure of the Bush diary in December 1992, the
OIC reiterated that interest.71 In late February 1993, Bush informed Independent Counsel of his
unwillingness to be deposed. Specifically, his counsel set forth six professed obstacles
preventing a deposition of the kind OIC sought.72 The most serious of his objections was his
unwillingness to answer questions except regarding non-production of his diary. This position
essentially denied the OIC the opportunity to question Bush on issues pertaining to his
knowledge of Iran/contra.

70 Memorandum from Beach to Gray/Schmitz, 11/4/92, ARZ 003525.

71 On December 14, 1992, Deputy Independent Counsel Craig A. Gillen informed Paul
Beach, Associate Counsel to the President, that it would probably be necessary for the OIC to
depose President Bush. (Letter from Gillen to Sollers, 2/23/93.) On January 5, 13 and 15 and
February 9, 1993, Gillen informed King & Spalding, counsel for President Bush, of the
outstanding request to depose the President. (Ibid.)

72 The six reasons for not agreeing to a deposition addressed the following: (1) who would
conduct the deposition; (2) the scope of the deposition; (3) the imposition of a time limitation;
(4) the use of interrogatories in lieu of a deposition; (5) the location; and (6) assurances
concerning the purpose of the inquiry and Independent Counsel's intentions with regard to
President Bush. (Letter from Sollers to Gillen, 2/24/93.)

There remained the alternative of a Grand Jury subpoena. Independent Counsel concluded
that this recourse should not be used unless it was reasonably likely to lead to a criminal
prosecution. It was important to avoid the appearance of Grand Jury use to obtain material for a
report. It was also important to avoid any appearance of retaliation for the pardon of
Weinberger. Under the circumstances, particularly because of the passage of time, it was decided
that a Grand Jury subpoena would be inappropriate.

Remaining Questions for President Bush

Independent Counsel's continuing investigation exposed evidence that called into question
previous statements made by Vice President Bush concerning his knowledge of and involvement
in the Iran/contra matter. The purpose of a second interview with Bush was to resolve
inconsistencies. The second interview would have focused primarily on these areas:

1. The 1985 arms sales to Iran through the Israelis, particularly the presidential briefings
leading up to them, and the briefing and meetings leading to the January 7, 1986, meeting of the
President and his senior advisers regarding a continuation of the Iran arms sales.

2. Bush's meeting with Israeli official Amiram Nir in July 1986, particularly focusing on
Secord's recollection that after Bush's report of this meeting, Reagan authorized the resumption
of the Iran arms sales.73

3. The November 1986 period in which the President and his advisers tried to deal with the
political uproar created by the public disclosure of the Iran arms sales. Bush would have been
interrogated regarding contemporaneous notes of President Reagan's senior advisers, and his
conversations with Attorney General Meese on this subject.

4. Bush's knowledge of or involvement in any quid-pro-quo arrangements with Central
American or other countries in exchange for their support of the contras.

6. The Vice President's contacts with North, particularly an August 6, 1986, meeting -- the
period when Gregg alleged that he learned of Felix Rodriguez's role in North's contra-resupply
operation -- and Gregg's August 8 and 12, 1986, meetings with representatives of agencies
connected to contra resupply. Gregg denied reporting these meetings to Bush until December
1986, and Bush has stated that he did not learn of Rodriguez's role in the contra-resupply effort
until then.

7. Bush's failure to produce until December 1992, the diary that Bush began creating in
November 1986.

November 1986

An area of special concern in questioning Bush would have been based on the recently
obtained notes of Weinberger, Regan, and others, which provided valuable insight into the
November 1986 period and the actions of the Reagan administration officials as they attempted
to deal with the disclosure of the Iran initiative. The notes and Bush's diary also shed light on the
extent of the Vice President's involvement in those events.74

74 For example, Bush on November 5, 1986, noted in his diary:

On the news at this time is the question of the hostages. . . . [[D]iscussion of Bud McFarlane
having been held prisoner in Iran. . . . I'm one of the few people that know fully the details, and
there is a lot of flack and misinformation out there. It is not a subject we can talk about.

(Bush Diary, 11/5/86, ALU 0140191)

The question was whether high Administration officials in November 1986 sought to create a
false and inaccurate account of the Iran arms sales to protect themselves and the President from
allegations of possible illegality and a confrontation with Congress regarding President Reagan's
deliberate disregard of statutory restrictions on arms sales to terrorist countries.

On November 10, 1986, Bush was present at a meeting of the President with his senior
advisers when Poindexter described the Iran initiative as beginning in January 1986, not 1985.

On November 12, Bush was present at a briefing of the congressional leadership on the facts
of the Iran initiative when Poindexter again repeated his false and incomplete account. When
Sen. Robert Byrd asked Poindexter if any weapons had been shipped in 1985, Poindexter replied
that there had been contacts but that no materiel had been moved until 1986.75

75 Regan Notes, 11/12/86, ALU 0139132-49.

Bush had been present at McFarlane's 1985 intelligence briefings in advance of the November
1985 HAWK shipment. In his interview with the FBI in December 1986, Bush recalled having
knowledge of 1985 shipment.76 In his 1988 deposition with the OIC, he recalled the Israeli
TOW shipments and also appeared to allude to the November 1985 HAWK shipment, stating
that:

76 Bush, FBI 302, 12/12/86, p. 2.

I do recall a third country landing rights situation. I remember that distinctly and what I
remember, and this is fairly vague, but that there was an airplane that was supposed to land, pick
up weapons, and fly to Israel -- I mean to Iran -- and once it was either airborne or landed over
there, why then you were going to have this other half of this deal that I described, some
facilitation of the release of hostages, not the actual release of them -- or more; I thought it was
supposed to be more.77

77 Bush, OIC Deposition, 1/11/88, pp. 80-81. Bush also stated that the President was
informed of the 1985 shipments.

So when Bush heard Meese at the November 24, 1986, meeting of senior Administration
officials state that the November 1985 HAWK shipment was ``[n]ot legal because no finding,''
and add that the ``President g008not informed,'' 78 Bush was in a well-informed position to
know the President had known of this shipment.

Independent Counsel was also concerned whether in the November 1986 period there was an
effort to coerce Shultz into becoming more supportive of the President's Iran arms sales policy
and conforming his testimony to others', for example, President Reagan's insistence that the Iran
initiative was not an arms-for-hostages exchange.79

Earlier that month, Shultz unsuccessfully tried to persuade Bush to refrain from denying that
the Iran initiative was an arms-for-hostages deal. On November 9, Shultz met privately with
Bush and refuted Bush's public denial that there had been an arms-for-hostages exchange with
Iran. In his book published in 1993, Shultz recalled the meeting and said he reminded Bush that
he had been present when arms-for-hostages had been discussed.80 Shultz recounted the
meeting as follows:

79 Address by the President to the Nation, 11/13/86, ALU 018811-14. News Conference by
the President, 11/19/86, ALU 016817-27.

80 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph (Chas. Scribner's Sons 1993), p. 809.

I put my views to him: I didn't know much about what had actually transpired, but I knew . . .
such an action would never stand up in public. Bush admonished me, asking emphatically
whether I realized that there are major strategic objectives being pursued with Iran. He said that
he was very careful about what he said.

``You can't be technically right; you have to be right,'' I responded. I reminded him that he
had been present at a meeting [January 7, 1986] where arms for Iran and hostage releases had
been proposed and that he had made no objection, despite the opposition of both Cap and me.
``That's where you are,'' I said. There was considerable tension between us when we parted.81

81 Ibid. (emphasis in original).

Bush noted the meeting with Shultz in his diary, stating that he was concerned about reports
that Shultz might resign and that he felt ``cut out'' on the Iran initiative. Bush gave the following
account:

Indeed, he [Shultz] had felt cut out. And, he was dealing from less than a full deck on the Iran
situation. He distrusts not only North, but he feels that I'm in jeopardy . . . myself. He thought he
had heard me say something that later proved to be a lie, and his advice to me as a person
interested in my future, ``don't get involved in this.'' 82

82 Bush Diary, 11/9/86, ALU 0140194.

Bush's diary is replete with mentions of the behind-the-scenes intrigue regarding how to
handle the growing political crisis over the disclosure of the Iran arms sales, with Shultz pushing
for a public disclosure of the facts and Poindexter and Casey opposing this. By November 14,
Bush and Regan were also pushing for a public disclosure of the facts. Bush's diary entry on
November 14 notes:

I keep urging total disclosure, and not making statements that are not accurate. I know
George Shultz feels this way. Also, being sure that our mechanical procedures inside the White
House are proper. It leads me to feel, again, certainly for the future, that we should not have CIA
Director as part of the cabinet; that all findings should be properly found. There's friction -- a
little between Don [Regan] and Poindexter now.83

83 Ibid., 11/14/86, ALU 0140198-99.

By the next day, Bush observed in his diary that Shultz was again the topic of discussion.
``[S]hultz . . . Don Regan whispered to me that we're having real problems with Shultz. That
Shultz was not on board at all. I told him that I'd call him [Shultz] on Sunday.'' 84 On
November 16, Bush called Regan regarding his comments about Shultz the previous day:

84 Ibid., 11/15/86, ALU 0140200.

I called him [Regan] today to see what he meant and he said that Shultz wanted to come out
and say, ``well, from now on, it would all be done in the State Department and no more arms of
any kind to Iran.'' Regan's point is that this makes the President look like he was ``wrong''. . . .
I'm not sure that we've [seen] the end of all of this.85

85 Ibid., 11/16/86, ALU 0140201.

By November 18, Bush recorded that two different sources were reporting that ``Howard
Baker would be willing to be Secretary of State, and that he wouldn't run from that post against
me [in the 1988 presidential race]. We'd been told this once before, a couple of years ago. I love
Howard, but it does seem like the vultures are circling over George Shultz.'' 86

86 Ibid., 11/18/86, ALU 0140202.

Bush noted that he met with the President privately the next day. ``We talked about the need
to get the Shultz resignation stories in shape. In fact, there was friction between State and the
White House. Shultz feeling he was closed out. The White House feeling that Shultz was
cutting and running . . . separating himself out.'' 87 On November 20, Bush again met privately
with the Reagan:

87 Ibid., 11/19/86, ALU 0140203.

The President tells me that at lunch, ``I really had a shocker. Don Regan has just told me that
George Shultz has told him Poindexter has to go or he goes.'' It doesn't sound like George, this
kind of ultimatum. We talked at length and I suggested to the President that the only thing he
could do was call a Monday meeting which he decided to do to get the key NSC players together
and to get them all to lay it on the table and to just simply say, ``we're going to hammer this thing
out and what are you upset about, George? What are you upset about, Poindexter?'' The problem
is -- and I showed him certain clippings -- that Poindexter, Don Regan and George are all out
there with leaks and peddling their own line. Regan, for example, says, ``I'm a team player.['']
Everybody at State rallies around George, and it gets him all upset. And, when Regan says, or
uses the word ``negotiate'' or allegedly makes some comment about Israel, everybody -- State and
NSC -- gets upset with him.88

88 Ibid., 11/20/86, ALU 0140204-05.

Bush continued his discussion of this meeting with the President in his diary notes on the
following day. He noted that when the President told him that about Shultz's ultimatum, ``I told
the President, `you simply cannot be held hostage. I love George Shultz. I want him to stay. It
will hurt your short run. But, no President can have a Cabinet set the terms under which he will
stay. It is impossible.' '' In the same diary entry, Bush expressed concern about Poindexter:
``On Poindexter, I'm concerned because today -- on Friday -- some new revelation that there were
arms shipped in September of '85. The President having said that none were and I don't know
what that's all about, but I walked into Don Regan's at lunch today and he said, `well, there's a
new bomb shell.' '' 89

89 Ibid., 11/21/86, ALU 0140206.

Bush and Regan had been aware of the September 1985 TOW shipment, as was the President.
Thus the ``bombshell'' was not the fact of the shipment, but that it had been made public.

Bush's diary entry for November 24 described the afternoon meeting of the President and his
senior advisers. Unlike the notes of Weinberger and Regan, he did not record the substance of
the meeting -- including Meese's report on his weekend inquiry and the possibility that the
November 1985 HAWK shipment was in violation of law.

The Bush Diary

Had a final Bush interview occurred, the questioning regarding the non-production of Bush's
diary would have focused on the decision of Bush and or Gray not to disclose the existence of the
diary initially in April 1987, in response to OIC's document request, and to delay its ultimate
production until December 1992. The questioning would have addressed Bush's familiarity with
the 1987 OIC and congressional document requests, and his knowledge of the production of the
Reagan diary in 1987. It would have sought an explanation of his previously described July 20,
1987, diary note condemning Shultz for producing Charles Hill's daily notes of Shultz's
thoughts, discussions and activities.

It also would have covered Bush's diary entry of November 25, 1986, regarding a telephone
call he had with North following his firing, and the substance of information he obtained from
North and relayed to President Reagan regarding the fact that Israeli officials were extremely
upset about the day's events.