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In a leaked US diplomatic cable the TNA leader R. Sampanthan has been described by a senior official of the US Embassy, as a “show me the money” kind of individual.

“Sampanthan noted that he recognized the leverage the Tamil community increasingly held as a possible kingmaker in the election and he wanted to extract as many concessions as possible from General Fonseka and President Mahinda Rajapaksa before he committed his support to either candidate.” the US Embassy wrote to Washington.

A leaked US diplomatic cable, classified as “CONFIDENTIAL” recounts details of a meeting the Embassy has had with the Tamil National Alliance leader R. Sampanthan prior to the presidential election 2010 . The Colombo Telegraph found the cable from WikiLeaks database. The cable was written on December 1, 2009 by the Deputy Chief of Mission Valerie Fowler. The cable subject was given a “Show me the money: key Tamil leader delays endorsement in presidential race”.

The Deputy Chief of Mission wrote, “In a 1 December meeting with the Charge and the Polconus, TNA leader R. Sampanthan noted that he will delay his endorsement of either General Fonseka or President Rajapaksa in the January 26 presidential election.”

“Sampanthan assessed that the political environment had changed significantly in the past couple of months in Sri Lanka and that the Tamil vote had become much more important. Sampanthan divulged that many within the Tamil community had asked him to run as an independent candidate, but he assessed that it made no sense for him to win ‘a couple of hundred thousand votes and lose,’ “ she further wrote.

Placing a comment Fowler wrote “Sampnathan was extremely relaxed and appeared confident about his political position. He repeatedly stated that he had no intention of making a quick endorsement and that Fonseka and Rajapaksa would have to earn the Tamil vote.”

REF: A. COLiance (TNA) leader R. Sampanthan
stated that horsing a candidate in the
upcoming presidential election. Sampanthan noted that he
recognized the leverage the Tamil community increasingly held
as a possible kingmaker in the election and he wanted to
extract as many concessions as possible from General Sarath
Fonseka and President Mahinda Rajapaksa before he committed
his support to either candidate. The Tamil leader also noted
his concern about a credible election and the involvement of
the military in the election process. END SUMMARY.

COLOMBO 00001094 001.8 OF 002

In No Hurry to Make a Decision
——————————

¶2. (C) In a 1 December meeting with the Charge and the
Polcouns, TNA leader R. Sampanthan noted that he will delay
his endorsement of either General Fonseka or President
Rajapaksa in the January 26 presidential election.
Sampanthan assessed that the political environment had
changed significantly in the past couple of months in Sri
Lanka and that the Tamil vote had become much more important.
Sampanthan divulged that many within the Tamil community had
asked him to run as an independent candidate, but he assessed
that it made no sense for him to win “a couple of hundred
thousand votes and lose.”

Ready to Exploit Emerging Leverage
———————————-

¶3. (C) Alternatively, Sampanthan opined that the best
scenario for the Tamil community would be to extract
concessions from the presidential candidates and have the
international and domestic communities hold the candidates to
their promises after the election. The Tamil leader noted
that he would use a December 2 meeting with Rajapaksa and an
upcoming meeting with Fonseka to gauge their level of
commitment to the Tamil community. In particular, Sampanthan
opined that he was looking for the manner in which each
candidate would make promises to the Tamil community; he
noted that he would be looking for a public declaration of
commitment to the Tamils, or at a minimum, campaign promises
that the candidates could be held to account for by “key
countries” within the diplomatic community.

¶4. (C) Sampanthan noted that he would tell President
Rajapaksa in his meeting that he had not accomplished
anything for the Tamils in his first term and that he would
have to make a strong statement on what he hoped to
accomplish in his second term. Turning to Fonseka,
Sampanthan stated that he thought Fonseka’s initial public
statements and press conference were encouraging, but that
the former General had a lot of questions ned About Upcoming Election
———————————

¶5. (C) The Tamil leader noted that he was worried about
pre-election violence and that he was especially concerned

COLOMBO 00001094 002.2 OF 002

about the military’s role during the campaign period.
Sampanthan noted that he was especially disturbed by reports
he had heard that Army officers were taking leave from their
jobs and joining the campaign. Furthermore, Sampanthan
opined that he was worried about the prospect of military
personnel loyal to Rajapaksa and Fonseka clashing and
attempting to influence the electoral process.

Switzerland Conference a Success
——————————–

¶6. (C) When queried about the recent meeting of key Tamil
and Muslim leaders in Zurich, Sampanthan noted that he was
happy with the progress that had been made in Switzerland.
He stated that a consensus had emerged that minority leaders
need to forge greater unity to have an impact on the
political process. While Sampanthan acknowledged that
certain minority individuals would continue to support the
Rajapaksa government, he opined that the majority of minority
leaders ultimately would speak with one voice.

Comment
——-

¶7. (C) Sampanthan was extremely relaxed and appeared
confident about his political position. He repeatedly stated
that he had no intention of making a quick endorsement and
that Fonseka and Rajapaksa would have to earn the Tamil vote.
Possibly as a reflection of his confidence, Sampanthan
agreed to bring up the Tissainayagam case during his meeting
with President Rajapaksa. On December 2, Sampanthan called
the front office to confirm that he had raised the issue, and
that the President had said he would contact the Attorney
General on the matter, noting that the AG needed to consent
in order for bail to be granted. Post will report ongoing
contact with key Tamil leaders.

“Sampanthan provided a copy of the program signed by Fonseka to Ambassador, noting that we were one of a few foreign missions to receive a copy.” the US Ambassador to Colombo wrote to Washington.

Sampanthan hoped his announcement would not only galvanize Tamil to vote Fonseka but also would convince others that Fonseka had a real chance of winning.

A leaked US diplomatic cable recount details of a meeting the embassy had had with Tamil National Alliance Chairman R. Sampanthan and the political situation after Sampantha’s announcement to support General Fonseka in the presidential election 2010. The Colombo Telegraph found the cable from WikiLeaks database. The cable written on January 1, 2010, classified as “CONFIDENTIAL” by the US Ambassador to Colombo Patricia A. Butenis.

The Fonseka signed program was also an addendum dealing with broader constitutional questions and the political devolution of power. The addendum was signed by General Fonseka and leader of the UNF Ranil Wickremesinghe but not Sampanthan. The addendum promised genuine power-sharing on a basis acceptable to Sinhala, Tamil, Muslim, and Burger communities and noted that power-sharing would take place both at the center in the periphery. It noted that in the ‘North-East’ – – a term chosen to highlight the unification of the two regions, which have been de-linked under Rajapaksas – – local executive, legislative, and judicial bodies would share responsibilities with the center except in certain key areas, such as national defense, monetary policy, immigration, etc.

The US ambassador Patricia A. Butenis wrote “ we saw Sampanthan several times in the period leading up to and following his announcement of support for Fonseka and know that the decision weighed greatly upon him. The stakes are very high for the Tamil community, which had gained new-found clout in the split in the Sinhala vote between Rajapaksa and Fonseka but also has much to lose. Sampanthan told Ambassador he agonized over the decision but ultimately had to face squarely the fact that Rajapaksa had done nothing for Tamil beyond releasing IDPs.” “ Sampanthan also told us he hoped his announcement would not only galvanize Tamil to vote Fonseka but also would convince others that Fonseka had a real chance of winning. While we will not know until election day wheather these hopes will be realized, indications are that a Fonseka victory appears more possible each day” Ambassador Butenis further wrote.

Sampanthan told Ambassador he agonized over the decision but ultimately had to face squarely the fact that Rajapaksa had done nothing for Tamil

Formally announcing Tamil National Alliance support for common opposition candidate Fonseka Sampanthan said that the TNA had consulted both candidates over the last several weeks and found that Fonseka responded to their concerns better than President Rajapaksa. Sampanthan said Rajapaksa holding office for another term would be in the interest of neither the country as whole nor Tamil-speaking people in the north east and enumerated a list of concerns. These included the government’s failure to promote reconciliation or to find an acceptable political solution to the national question, delays, Sampanthan argued, undertaken purposefully to enable the Rajapaksa government to implement a ‘hidden’ agenda to marginalize Tamils. He also called Rajapaksa’s performance on human rights and humanitarian issues “dismal,” noting that extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances had been common, mandatory constitutional provisions had been violated, and the enforcement of law and order had “collapsed.” Thus, “the rule of law and good governance have reached the nadir.”

To read the full text of the Sampandan – Fonseka pact see the below cable;

¶1. (C) On January 6, leader of the Tamil National Alliance
(TNA) R. Sampanthan formally announced the TNA’s support
for common opposition candidate General Fonseka.
Addressing a packed news conference at parliament,
Sampanthan said the TNA had consulted both candidates over
the last several weeks and had found that Fonseka responded
to their concerns better than President Rajapaksa.
Sampanthan said that Rajapaksa holding office for another
term would be in the interests of neither the country as a
whole nor the Tamil-speaking people in the north and east
and enumerated a list of concerns. These included the
government’s failure to promote reconciliation or to find
an acceptable political solution to the national question,
delays, Sampanthan argued, undertaken purposefully to
enable the Rajapaksa government to implement a “hidden
agenda” to marginalize Tamils. He also called Rajapaksa’s
performance on human rights and humanitarian issues
“dismal,” noting that extra-judicial killings and enforced
disappearances had been common, mandatory constitutional
provisions had been violated, and the enforcement of law
and order had “collapsed.” Thus, “the rule of law and good
governance have reached the nadir.”

¶2. (C) Sampanthan said little about General Fonseka and the
opposition in his public statement other than to confirm
that the TNA had found their positions on issues related to
the Tamil community much better than Rajapaksa’s and that
the TNA would support the general. The
government-controlled press the next day was scathing in
criticizing the TNA announcement as “another sell-out” and
in accusing the TNA of having arrived at a secret deal with
Fonseka and the “LTTE diaspora” that would undermine the
gains of the war victory. Sampanthan denied any secret
deal was made, but Fonseka did formulate a “Programme of
Immediate Relief Measures for War Affected Persons and
Areas or Peace,” outlining his plans for the north and
east, which undoubtedly helped solidify the TNA’s backing.
(NOTE: Sampanthan provided a copy of the program signed by
Fonseka to Ambassador, noting that we were one of a few
foreign missions to receive a copy. The full text of the
program is provided below in paragraph 5. END NOTE.) The p
rogram includes such measures as de-militarization,
decentralization of political authority, re-settlement and
rehabilitation of all IDPs, demining, restoration of
private land holdings, payment of compensation to those who
lost property, restoration of transport services, relief
packages, general amnesty and rehabilitation of former
fighters, and termination of the state of emergency. There
was no mention in the program of accountability for war
crimes.

¶3. (C) Attached to the program was also an addendum dealing
with broader constitutional questions and the political
devolution of power (see paragraph 6 below for full
text.). The addendum was signed by General Fonseka and
leader of the United National Front Ranil Wickremesinghe
but not Sampanthan. The addendum promised genuine
power-sharing on a basis acceptable to the Sinhala, Tamil,
Muslim, and Burgher communities and noted that
power-sharing would take place both at the center and in
the periphery. It noted that in the “North-East” — a term
chosen to highlight the unification of the two regions,
which have been de-linked under the Rajapaksas — local
executive, legislative, and judicial bodies would share
responsibilities with the center except in certain key
areas, such as national defense, monetary policy,
immigration, etc.

COLOMBO 00000017 002.4 OF 005

COMMENT
——-

¶4. (C) We saw Sampanthan several times in the period
leading up to and following his announcement of support for
Fonseka and know that the decision weighed greatly upon
him. The stakes are very high for the Tamil community,
which has gained new-found clout in the split in the
Sinhala vote between Rajapaksa and Fonseka but also has
much to lose. Sampanthan told Ambassador he agonized over
the decision but ultimately had to face squarely the fact
that Rajapaksa had done nothing for Tamils beyond releasing
the IDPs. When we asked him whether he feared retaliation
by the Rajapaksas, Sampanthan mentioned concerns for his
personal safety but said the Tamil community so far had
gotten nothing from the Rajapaksas and did not believe the
president’s statements that he would take positive steps on
reconciliation and a political solution after elections.
Sampanthan also told us he hoped his announcement would not
only galvanize Tamils to vote for Fonseka but also would
convince others that Fonseka had a real chance of winning.
While we will not know until election day whether these
hopes will be realized, indications are that a Fonseka
victory appears more possible each day. END COMMENT.

¶5. (C) The following is the full text of the Fonseka
program for the north and east provided to Ambassador by
Sampanthan. Grammatical irregularities are preserved from
the original.

BEGIN TEXT OF PROGRAM

PROGRAMME OF IMMEDIATE RELIEF MEASURES FOR WAR AFFECTED
PERSONS AND AREAS FOR PEACE BY THE COMMON PRESIDENTIAL
CANDIDATE, SARATH FONSEKA

¶1. Full restoration of all institutions of Civil
Administration from the Office of Grama Sevaka upwards —
free from Military, Police and Political interference.

¶2. Committees for each District headed by the respective
District Secretary (GA) and comprising:
-Nominee of the President
-Divisional Secretaries
-Other Officials (Representatives of such Officials)
-Members of Parliament/Their Representatives
-Representatives of Local Authorities
-Judicial Officers
-Security Forces/Commanders/Officers North/East
-DIG — Police /Officers
-Civil Society Representatives

To prepare Plan of Action for immediate implementation
within one month
Monthly Reports on progress to be submitted to the
President, Cabinet and Parliament.

A dedicated Secretariat to be established under the
President to monitor progress and ensure implementation.

¶1. De-mining of areas to be speedily concluded through
De-Mining Units.

¶2. Displaced persons to be returned to their original
homes, and where homes have been destroyed alternative
accommodation to be provided, with financial support to
establish themselves and develop livelihoods.

¶3. Social infrastructure requirements, such as provision of
essential Foods, Medical Centers, Hospitals, Schools,
Transport etc to be provided.

IV. Land and Agriculture
————————

¶1. Restoration of possession of private land and buildings,
now occupied by Security Forces/Police/ Government
Agencies, to those lawfully entitled to such land and
buildings.

¶2. Committees referred to in 1.2 above to arrange for such
restoration.

¶3. Committees to submit a Scheme to the Government for
payment of compensation for damage caused to buildings.

¶4. a. Eviction of persons legitimately entitled to State
Land from such Lands; b. Other instances of deprivation of
legitimate title holders of State Lands; and c. Unlawful
occupation of State Lands to be reviewed and the position
regularized on lawful and just basis.

¶5. Indiscriminate alienation of State Lands to be
terminated. Allocations thus far made to be reviewed and
cancelled, where such allocation

-has not been transparent, or
-lacked equal opportunity to all concerned, or
-lacked proper consultation with the elected
Representatives of the areas concerned, or
-are unwarranted, or
-has been on a corrupt basis.

¶6. Relief packages for full cultivation of lands.

COLOMBO 00000017 004.4 OF 005

¶7. A special law to be enacted to decide on disputes, as to
ownership and succession of lands.

¶V. Fisheries
————

¶1. Full restoration of fishing rights.

¶2. Joint Committees to be set up of Representatives of
those engaged in the fishing industry and the Navy to
ensure security.

VI. Trade and Commerce
———————-

¶1. All barriers in respect of transport of passengers,
goods, agricultural and fisheries produce to be eliminated
forthwith.

¶2. No payments (‘Kappang’) to be levied by anyone.
Stringent action to be taken against those who do so.

VII. Transport
————–

¶1. Trains service to be restored, without delay, within the
Jaffna peninsula, i.e. Elephant Pass to Point Pedro.

¶2. All impediments for shipping and air transport to be
removed, with effective facilities which would ensure a
reduction of costs and shipping and air transport.

¶3. Establishment of a new rail line, with private sector
participation, from Point Pedro to Trincomalee.

VIII. Special Relief Packages
—————————–

¶1. For dependents of all persons who have lost their lives
during the war, including military and police personnel,
and civilians.

¶2. For persons disabled as a result of the war.

IX. Persons in Detention
————————

¶1. Release of all persons in detention, within a period of
one month against whom there is no evidence, and on the
basis that such detention would not be a stigma or setback
for their future.

¶2. Rehabilitation of those persons, who had been engaged in
war activities, on the basis of a general amnesty.

¶X. [State of Emergency]
——————

As an overall measure affecting all Sri Lankans, the State
of Emergency presently in force and the Regulations made
thereunder to be terminated, since it affects the liberties
and fundamental rights of all People, in accordance with my
Pledges.

END TEXT OF PROGRAM

¶6. (C) The following is the text of the addendum to the
program dealing with devolution of political power.
Grammatical irregularities are preserved from the original.

COLOMBO 00000017 005.4 OF 005

BEGIN TEXT OF ADDENDUM

Sri Lanka is an indivisible state committed both to
protecting its territorial integrity and to genuine power
sharing on a basis acceptable to Sinhala, Tamil, Muslim and
Burgher communities. Each unit of government will be
supreme in its areas of competence. Power sharing will
take place both at the Center and the periphery.

In the North-East genuine power sharing of powers of
governance with executive, legislative and judicial powers
over a wide array of subjects, not including national
defense, foreign affairs, monetary policy, national budget,
elections to the Office of President and Parliament,
immigration and emigration, major ports and harbours, and
acceptable to the Tamil speaking peoples with adequate
financial and fiscal powers is necessary. The North East
should have Council/Councils acceptable to the Tamil
speaking peoples namely Tamils and Muslims and the
Sinhalese living in the East shall be established in
accordance with the law. All provinces will have
competence over land, law and order and its other areas
exclusive of those areas reserved only for the Center.
Appropriate institutions should be in place to secure and
advance meaningful sharing of power and the pluralistic
character of the State.

It is accepted that the experience of the country over the
last few decades in respect of initiatives embarked upon to
delineate the basic aspirations and principles in the
matter of power sharing shall be drawn upon in the
formulation of detailed provisions.

The demarcation between the central and regional powers
will be worked out in detail between the parties on the
basis of the fundamental principles stated above.