“None of this makes sense even from the perspective of the creditors. It’s like a 19th-century debtors’ prison. Just as imprisoned debtors could not make the income to repay, the deepening depression in Greece will make it less and less able to repay. […]

I believe strongly that the policies being imposed will not work, that they will result in depression without end, unacceptable levels of unemployment and ever growing inequality. But I also believe strongly in democratic processes—that the way to achieve whatever framework one thinks is good for the economy is through persuasion, not compulsion. The force of ideas is so much against what is being inflicted on and demanded of Greece. Austerity is contractionary; inclusive capitalism—the antithesis of what the troika is creating—is the only way to create shared and sustainable prosperity.

For now, the Greek government has capitulated. Perhaps, as the lost half decade becomes the lost decade, as the politics get uglier, as the evidence mounts that these policies have failed, the troika will come to its senses. Greece needs debt restructuring, better structural reforms and more reasonable primary budget surplus targets. More likely than not, though, the troika will do what it has done for the last five years: Blame the victim.”

“Indeed, the European institutions led by Germany seem to have decided that waging an ideological battle against a recalcitrant and amateurish far-left government in Greece should take precedence over 60 years of European consensus built painstakingly by leaders across the political spectrum.

By imposing a further socially regressive fiscal adjustment, the recent agreement confirmed fears on the left that the European Union could choose to impose a particular brand of neoliberal conservatism by any means necessary. In practice, it used what amounted to an economic embargo—far more brutal than the sanctions regime imposed on Russia since its annexation of Crimea—to provoke either regime change or capitulation in Greece. It has succeeded in obtaining capitulation. […]

In essence, Germany established that some democracies are more equal than others.”

“The International Monetary Fund will refuse to participate in a new bailout for Greece until there is an ‘explicit and concrete agreement’ on debt relief from the country’s eurozone creditors, an IMF official has confirmed. […]

On Wednesday, Christine Lagarde told the IMF’s board, made up of representatives of its member countries, that an IMF team should be sent to Greece. But the official said: ‘The board would not support a scheme that did not meet medium-term sustainability.’ […]

The details of the third bailout are yet to be finalised but the IMF appears to be challenging Greece’s other creditors, led by Germany, to soften their opposition to substantive debt relief.”

“That is why it is important to take note of the ideas that Varoufakis continues to espouse. Greeks and others may fault him for pursuing his agenda with too little politesse while in office. But the essence of that agenda was—and remains—largely correct. […]

Varoufakis had no control over the economic mess that Syriza inherited when it came to power, including an unemployment rate hovering around 25% and youth joblessness that had been running at more than 50% for a considerable period. He could not influence in any meaningful manner the national narratives that had sunk deep roots in other European countries and thus undermined those countries’ ability to adapt. He could not counter the view among some of the region’s politicians that success for Syriza would embolden and strengthen other non-traditional parties around Europe.

It also would have been irresponsible for Varoufakis not to work behind closed doors on a plan B.”