Abstract: While there is much written on the philosophy and practice of
nonviolence, there has been little systematic analysis of the effectiveness of
nonviolent action for social movements. This is problematic, as it inhibits
nonviolent activists from learning from their collective experiences. However,
an increasing number of studies by social scientists have investigated the
effectiveness of different social movement strategies and tactics, most of which
are nonviolent, though they are not explicitly identified as such in the
literature. This article summarizes the available evidence for what works (the
conditions under which nonviolent social movements are or are not effective)
from the scholarly literature in the social sciences. It concludes with
suggestions for future research that can aid activists in nonviolent social
movement in maximizing their chances for success.

Introduction

Despite the diffusion of nonviolence as a conscious strategy through
movements around the world in recent decades, little is understood about
how or why nonviolence works as a technique for securing social change.
(Zunes 2000)

As a student of peace studies in the 1980s, I discovered nonviolence, and it
completely changed how I viewed the world: here was a method of waging conflict
that could be effective and was consistent with the moral values of
justice and compassion. Studying sociology in graduate school, I learned
something else: the power of using social scientific methods to understand how
the world really works, so that we can be more effective at improving it. And
yet, I found that there is little social scientific research on nonviolent
action. Most of the literature on nonviolence is either philosophical or
persuasive or, if it is empirical, it is descriptive rather than
explanatory--case studies of nonviolent action, or
A how to@
books that represent the accumulated wisdom of nonviolent activists but do not
systematically evaluate various strategies and tactics. Without systematic,
empirical research, we do not know for sure under what conditions various
nonviolent strategies and tactics are effective. In the absence of such
research, activists risk repeating the use of less effective techniques or
shunning more effective ones, based on tradition or ideology. For example, since
the 1970s mass civil disobedience in the United States has become very scripted:
protest organizers inform local police exactly what law they plan to break, how,
and when; at the appointed time and place, they do so (sit down/form a
blockade/cross a line); and as long as they remain polite, generally the police
are polite in return as they conduct arrests. But what effect does this have, if
any? Does it impress decision makers? Does it strengthen the commitment of
participants? In another example, we know very little about the effects of
fasting as a nonviolent tactic. When, how, and why does it work to strengthen
nonviolent movements? To soften the hearts of opponents?

Let me note that what we might call peace and justice activist culture in the
U.S. contains a wealth of useful information from seasoned activists, which I do
not wish to denigrate. This information has been useful to countless groups in
planning and carrying out nonviolent actions. Nevertheless, social scientists
know that personal experience and A
common sense@ are not always sources
of accurate information about the social world. Sociology is full of
counter-intuitive research findings (that random drug testing in high schools
does not reduce the rate of drug use by students; that women on welfare do not
bear more children in order to increase their benefits; that changes in behavior
tend to produce changes in attitudes, not the other way around).

What We Know: Current Research on Nonviolent Action

Most research on the effects of nonviolent action has been conducted by
sociologists and political scientists who study social movements. Virtually all
social movements use nonviolent tactics, while some use violent tactics as well.
In addition, the vast majority of nonviolent actions are collective
undertakings, by people involved in social movements. Hence the study of social
movements provides the richest source of empirical research findings on
nonviolent action.

Social movement scholars have looked at two sets of factors that might
influence the effectiveness of social movements: internal or movement-controlled
factors and external factors. There is conflicting evidence on the relative
importance of each set of factors, but both have been found influential.

Internal Factors

1. Factionalism decreases chances for success.

Gamson= s The Strategy of Social
Protest (1975) is most cited work in social science on the outcomes of
social movements. Gamson studied fifty-three social movement organizations,
randomly selected from hundreds that existed in the United States from 1800 to
1945. He found that 49 percent of the groups were successful, defined as
achieving most or all of the new advantages that the group sought. One clear
finding was that when movements experience internal schisms, they are less
likely to succeed. (This was confirmed by later analyses of his data (see Frey
et al. 1992).) Most likely this is because factions must compete for resources
and end up spending more time fighting each other than opponents (Frey et
al.1992).

A movement headed by a A leadership
team@ (Ganz 2000), rather than a
single leader, is likely to produce better strategic decisions. Formulating
strategy is a creative process, and so it is enhanced by multiple inputs. A team
of leaders brings together more information and ideas, and hence deliberations
can be more thorough. Both Martin Luther King, Jr. and Cesar Chavez surrounded
themselves with leadership teams, even though in the popular imagination their
successes are attributed to individual genius and charisma (Morris and
Staggenborg 2002). A King hadY
an unexcelled ability to pull men and women of diverse viewpoints together and
to keep their eyes focused on the goalY
King demonstrated...a rare talent for attracting and using the skills and ideas
of brilliant aides and administrators@
(Bennett 1970:32-33, cited in Morris and Staggenborg 2002). For example, in
Birmingham, Alabama in 1963, King and other leaders of the SCLC (Southern
Christian Leadership Conference) were planning a mass disruption of the city.
Their plan was to hold demonstrations and an economic boycott that would lead to
mass arrests and fill the city jails. However, they were encountering difficulty
mobilizing people to take part, and debated whether to allow children to
participate in such a potentially dangerous action. King left town for a
speaking engagement, and while he was gone other leaders began including
children in the demonstrations. Confronted with this reality, King accepted the
decision upon his returnB and the
campaign succeeded in disrupting the city and inspiring movement activists in
other cities (Morris and Staggenborg 2002). As brilliant as he was, if King
alone had been responsible for the planning, the campaign may well have failed.

When two or more organizations or groups are working together within a
movement, connections among leaders facilitate the sharing of information, forms
of organization, and tactics. There are numerous examples from the civil rights
movement. Hattie Kendrick was a longtime local movement leader who was crucial
in recruiting young leaders and putting leaders in contact with one another
(Herda-Rapp 1989, cited in Morris and Staggenborg 2004).

In addition, the composition of the leadership team matters. Leadership of
individuals with a variety of backgrounds, viewpoints, and skills is more likely
to formulate effective strategies (Ganz 2000). In particular, the most effective
leadership teams consist of both A
insiders,@ or indigenous leaders, and
A outsiders,@
who do not come from the movement= s
constituency (Marx and Useem 1971; Ganz 2000). Insiders understand the history
and culture of the constituency group and can use this knowledge to mobilize
support and choose appropriate tactics. For example, during the campaign of the
United Farm Workers movement for a union contract with grape growers, Mexican
and Mexican-American leaders chose to hold a crucial meeting in Our Lady of
Guadalupe Church in Delano, California, the community=
s religious center, and scheduled it for September 16, Mexican Independence Day
(Ganz 2000). Insider leaders are more apt to be trusted by their constituency.
Leaders with strong ties to the constituency group are especially effective at
recruiting participants and locating indigenous resources. They are apt to have
a strong commitment to the movement because of their personal ties to the group.

On the other hand, outsiders bring new information and alternative viewpoints
to the decision making mix. Better strategy is formulated when the leadership
team can draw from a range of potential tactics, and outsiders can bring
insights from their experience in other movements and organizations. They are
important in linking the movement with outside sources of participants,
resources, and ideas. They can be especially effective at building alliances
that further the movement= s goals.
For example, in a local antiwar group of mostly middle-class people, a leader
with ties to the working-class community would be valuable in forming a
broader-based organization.

Finally, leaders make better strategic decisions when they are held
accountable to the group= s members
through decision making procedures that are regular, open, and authoritativeB
for instance, regular meetings that are open to all members at which they can
take part in making important decisions (Ganz 2000). Accountability of leaders
is enhanced also when the organization relies on its constituents for at least
some of its resources (Ganz 2000).

3. Groups that seek to displace the opponent are less likely to succeed.

The corollary is that groups whose goals do not include replacing the
opponentB for example, that seek to
change a law but not replace the lawmakersB
are more likely to succeed (Gamson 1975; Frey et al. 1992). For example,
revolutionary groups in the United States, which seek to replace the government,
have been unsuccessful. Labor organizations that have sought concessions from
employers have had some success, while those early labor groups that advocated
that workers take over companies and run them themselves were not.

4. Disruption (but not necessarily violence) contributes to success, but only
when the target has been unresponsive to less disruptive tactics.

A number of studies have found that movements that use or threaten to use
disruptive tactics are more likely to succeed than those that do not. Note that
this is not the same as saying that violence succeeds. Disruptive tactics can be
violent or nonviolent; the defining feature is that they upset the social order,
thereby threatening the power of elites.

Piven and Cloward= s Poor People=
s Movements made a major contribution to the literature by demonstrating
that when movements of the poor succeedB
such as the industrial workers=
movement in the 1930s and the civil rights movement of the 1960sB
it is by disruption, or specifically by withholding the contributions that they
normally make to institutional life in the form of work, or rent, or obeying
laws. Cress and Snow= s (2000) study
of homeless organizations found that those that were successful either used
disruption and had allies on the city council, or used nondisruptive tactics and
were situated in cities that already had a government agency that dealt with
homelessness. Where an organization both had city council allies and was in a
responsive city, tactics were irrelevant. Whether disruptive tactics contributes
to success or not is likely dependent on the circumstances under which they are
used. When the political environment is favorable toward a movement, disruption
can be counterproductiveB it can waste
an organization= s resources and
alienate real and potential political allies (Cress and Snow 2000; Amenta et al.
1999).

Studies of the effects of using violence have produced equivocal findings.
For labor movements, the use of violence was found to be negatively associated
with success in the United States (Taft and Ross 1969) and Italy (Snyder and
Kelly 1976), but not in France (Shorter and Tilly 1971) (cited in Giugni 1999).
A study of the effects of the movement against the war in Vietnam found that
demonstrator violence and property destruction increased the number of pro-peace
votes in Congress, but decreased the number of times that Congress voted on
war-related measures (McAdam and Su 2000).

5. Tactical innovation aids movements.

Disruption depends on the target= s
lack of effective response to it. Over time, targets adapt to particular
tactics, becoming better at controlling them in order to minimize disruption.
For movements whose primary power is the power to disrupt, then, tactical
innovationB the periodic introduction
of new tacticsB is key to regaining
the initiative (McAdam 1983). The civil rights movement used tactical innovation
to maintain momentum. The bus boycotts, initiated in the mid-1950s, signaled the
beginning of mass participation in the civil rights movement. However, after a
time opponents were able to neutralize the impact of bus boycotts through legal
means and extra-legal harassment of participants. The movement experienced a
lull in activity until a new tactic, the sit-in, was introduced in 1960.
Similarly, one result of the widespread protests of the 1960s was that town
governments created a permit system for marches and demonstrations. They adapted
to the protests by providing a legal channel for them, removing much of their
ability to disrupt.

6. The presence of radical groups within the broader movement aids success.

This is termed the "radical flank effect" (Haines 1988) and it has
three components. First, the presence of radicals within a particular movement
makes moderate groups in the movement more attractive negotiating partners to
the target. The target (state officials, for example) would rather sit at the
bargaining table with moderates than deal with the radicals. Second, the
presence of radical groups tends to prompt an increase in financial support for
the movement from outsiders--again, the moderates become the preferred
organization for them to support. Third, when radical groups emerge, moderate
groups themselves tend to become more radical in their demands. The experience
of the NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People)
illustrates these effects (Haines 1988). During the 1950s the NAACP was driven
underground in the deep south; it was considered too radical for white power
structure to tolerate. When new, more radical civil rights groups were created
in the early 1960s that used direct action, like sit-ins, to confront
segregation, like SNCC and the revitalized SCLC, the NAACP suddenly looked
moderate by comparison, and over the next several years contributions to the
NAACP increased tenfold. In addition, the goals of the NAACP became more radical
during this time, though not as radical as the other groups.

7. Ideological and strategic/tactical diversity within a movement aids
success.

Though there is less systematic research on this issue, some studies have
found that the presence of different organizations with a range of ideologies
and strategies optimizes a movement= s
chances. In the civil rights movement, the SCLC was the central organization for
many campaigns. The NAACP fought and won legal battles. SNCC brought young
people into the movement who were especially willing to engage in dramatic,
risky actions like the sit-ins. CORE was a multiracial group that sponsored the
Freedom Rides to integrate interstate transportation in the south (Morris and
Clawson 2002). It is unlikely that any one of these organizations alone would
have achieved what the civil rights movement as a whole was able to. In the
feminist movement, the existence of two branches with different ideologies,
organizational styles, and strategies--the older branch, which formed NOW, and
the younger branch, which formed consciousness-raising groups and engaged in
direct action--meant that diverse women could find a
A home@
in the movement. Research on the impact on policymakers of the movement against
the Vietnam War found that different tactics were effective at different times
(Small 1987).

These findings are particularly interesting given the frequent calls for more
unity within the peace and justice movement (broadly defined) in the United
States. The diversity among peace and justice organizations is an asset that
should be maintained (though this does not preclude greater collaboration among
groups).

8. People and strategy can compensate for lack of money.

While material resourcesB money,
office space, computers, and the like--can certainly help social movements to
meet their goals, they are not necessary for success. For example, civil rights
organizations received money from wealthy donors and attracted support from
northern whites, but only after they had demonstrated their mass appeal
and power (Morris 1984). Movements can compensate for a lack of material
resources with committed people and a good strategy. As stated above, Piven and
Cloward found that movements of the poor do not win by mobilizing material
resources, but by using their powers of disruption. The homeless movements that
Cress and Snow (1996) studied that were successful had in common not money, but
leadership, outside support and advice, and office and meeting spaces. The
United Farm Workers succeeded despite very few material resources (Ganz 2004).

9. The effective framing of issues influences success.

Framing refers to the process of shaping one=
s message so that it captures the attention of and appeals to some audience.
While there is much research on how social movement organizations frame their
messages, there is little analytical research on the relationship between
framing and success. Cress and Snow (2000) found that all of the successful
homeless organizations that they studied used clear and well-articulated
diagnostic frames (which identify a problem and its cause) and prognostic frames
(which specify what needs to be done to fix the problem).

External Factors

10. Powerful allies aid social movements, but are not always necessary for
success.

Social movement scholars have addressed whether movements can succeed
directly, solely through their own efforts, or whether success only comes
indirectly, by either influencing public opinion or gaining the support of
powerful allies, like political officials. Evidence exists for the direct
effects of movements. For example, antiwar protest increased slightly the number
of pro-peace votes in the Senate between 1964 and 1973 (Burstein and Freudenberg
1978). In Mississippi, levels of nonviolent protest from 1960 to 1970 were
positively related to the number of welfare recipients (Colby 1982). A study of
the movement to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment in different states found that
the presence of powerful allies, the strength of opponents, and public opinion
all influenced success, but the movements themselves had a direct effect
regardless of these other factors (Soule and Olzak 2004). The nuclear freeze
movement of the 1980s forced President Reagan to soften his rhetoric about
fighting and winning a nuclear war and strengthened the arms control caucus in
Congress, leading eventually to the first arms reduction agreement between the
United States and the Soviet Union (Meyer 1999). At the same time, in most cases
powerful allies help. The United Farm Workers succeeded where previous efforts
had failed in part because of support from a liberal coalition of religious
groups, civic organizations, and government officials (Jenkins and Perrow 1977).

12. Repression can aid or hinder a nonviolent movement, depending on other
factors.

Most studies that have investigated the effects of government repression on
the success of social movements have looked at non-U.S. movements. Repression
tends to lead to more radical--sometimes violent--protest (Goldstein 1983;
Wilson 1976; della Porta 1995; Moore 1998). There is some evidence that in the
short term, repression inhibits protest, but in the long term it deligitimizes
the state and so increases the level of protest (Rasler 1996; Olivier 1991).
When used at the beginning and end of a protest cycle, repression may inhibits
protest, but it encourages protest when used in the middle of a cycle (Brockett
1993). Repression is more likely to spur increased protest when it is seen as
illegitimate and when protesters are encouraged to continue by their social
group (Opp and Roehl 1990).

In terms of its ultimate effect on a movement=
s success, several studies have found that repression inhibits success (Gamson
1975; Andrews 1997). During the anti-Vietnam War movement, repression of
demonstrators by police increased the number of times Congress voted on
war-related measures, but decreased the percentage of pro-peace votes (McAdam
and Su 2002).

Recommendations and Obstacles

One set of reasons for the dearth of research on the outcomes of nonviolent
action is methodological (Earl 2000). First, it is difficult to decide what
constitutes success. A movement may experience a temporary setback, then later
succeed. A specific campaign conducted by activists may be successful, while the
movement as a whole is not. A movement may achieve some of its objectives, but
not all. Movements have unintended effects. A second problem is that of
causation. When nonviolent activists achieve their goals, it is always possible
that something else besides their actions caused the change, or that their
actions contributed but were not the sole cause. For example, some sociologists
have noted that while Americans=
attitudes toward gender changed during the feminist movement of the 1970s, such
change may have also been due to the increased participation of women in the
paid workforce.

A second obstacle to conducting research on nonviolent action for the use of
activists is that most people with the expertise to do so work in colleges and
universities. These are institutions which either reward faculty for conducting
research for publication in prestigious academic journals, but not for research
intended for non-academic audiences; or, if faculty are not pressured to publish
in academic journals, then their teaching loads are heavier, leaving less time
to do any research at all. In addition, academic writing tends to be highly
technical and jargon-laden, leaving what research does exist on nonviolent
action relatively inaccessible to non-academics.

If these obstacles can be overcome, what should researchers study? The best
recommendations for research topics will come from social movement activists
themselves: they are situated to know best what information can help increase
their effectiveness. As an activist myself, I can think of a few fruitful
avenues of research.

$the effects of confrontational
tactics (property damage; pie throwing; taunting police). Peace and justice
movement activists are somewhat divided on the advisability of these tactics;
for example, the act of damaging property was hotly debated in the
anti-globalization movement following the 1999 Seattle protests. Opponents have
argued that such tactics decrease public sympathy for the movement; is this
supported by the evidence? Or do militant tactics draw in some people who might
not otherwise participate, as claimed by some? Do they keep some groups away?

$what types of frames are most
effective in specific situations. A colleague and I have been planning to
erect a freeway banner expressing opposition to the war in Iraq. Would passers
by be most receptive to a religious message--A
Love thine enemies@ --or a message
that highlights the cost, in money and lives, of the war? We live in the rural
Midwest. Would the answers to these questions be different if we lived in a
different part of the country?

$the effects of various tactics
that are commonly used by peace and justice groups, including silent vigils,
leafleting, and mass marches. Most peace and justice groups draw from the same
standard repertoire of tactics, few if any of which have been systematically
studied as to their actual effects.

$micro-interactions in protests.
Do protesters= communications with
police officers during a nonviolent action matter? How likely are the actions of
police on the A front lines@
of a protest to be influenced, positively or negatively, by what protesters do
and say?

$insider research into what
makes decision makers change their mind. Besides Small=
s (1987) research on the influence of anti-Vietnam War protests on political
leaders, there is little research into how and why nonviolence is effective in
changing the minds of decision makers. Does the size of the movement matter? Is
direct communication with leaders desirable? Is it effective to create
undesirable media coverage of targets? At what points in a campaign are
conciliatory messages more effective, and when is protest more effective?

References

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AThe Strategies and Contexts
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Colby, David C. 1982. AA
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Cress, Dan and David A. Snow. 2000. "The Outcomes of Homeless
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Gamson, William A. 1975, 1990. The Strategy of Social Protest.
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Meyer, David S. 1999. AHow
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Minnesota Press.

Moore, Will H. 1998. A
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