NEW! By Barry Rubin

“There have been many hundreds of books for and against Israel but no volume presenting the essential information about its domestic politics, its society, as well as its cultural life and its economy. This gap has now been filled.”—Walter Laqueur, author of A History of Zionism

"[An] essential resource for readers interested in learning the truth about the Zionist project in the 20th and 21st centuries."—Sol Stern, Commentary

“Offering in-depth perspectives with encyclopedic breadth on the makeup of the Jewish state, focusing only briefly on Israel's struggle for self-preservation. The section "History" provides a masterful summary of Israel's past from its socialist beginnings before independence to the modern struggles with the Iranian regime. . . .”—Publishers Weekly

“A well-written portrait of a vibrant nation at the center of turmoil in the region.”—Jay Freeman, Booklist

"It is indeed just a starting point, but Israel: An Introduction, if disseminated among our universities to the extent it deserves, will at least allow students of the Middle East and of Jewish history to start off on the right foot. A glimpse into the real Israel may do more for the future of U.S.-Israeli relations than any amount of rhetoric ever could."—Daniel Perez, Jewish Voice New York

Written by a leading historian of the Middle East, Israel is organized around six major themes: land and people, history, society, politics, economics, and culture. The only available volume to offer such a complete account, this book is written for general readers and students who may have little background knowledge of this nation or its rich culture.

About Me

Barry Rubin was founder of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center--now the Rubin Center--and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. See the GLORIA/MERIA site at www.rubincenter.org.

Recent Rubin Reports

Wednesday, February 29, 2012

We are at a point in history where free speech advocates call for muzzling journalists, law professors assault those who ask too many questions, and European society is daily turned upside down. Consider this tale from staid Holland.

Naema Tahir is a Dutch author of Pakistani origin and a moderate Muslim. Interviewed on a popular Dutch talk show, she spoke of her great respect for democracy, morality, and citizens’ rights. In particular, she praised Job Cohen for his honorable behavior in politics. Cohen was until a few days ago the leader of the opposition and head of the Labor Party. He has just resigned, reportedly because he opposes the campaign by some members to shift the party to the far left.

But, she continued, there is one reporter she doesn’t like because he is right-wing, controversial, and makes fun of thing that Tahir likes. And so he should be banned.

This man’s name is Rutger Castricum and he apparently is both a fearless journalist who skewers the pretentious and a showman. So he went to Tahir’s house to ask her why she wanted to end freedom of speech and of the press for him. He took along a camera crew, knocked on the door, and politely asked to speak to Tahir.

Her boyfriend or husband--the sources differ--is Andreas Kinneging, a law professor at Leiden University and an expert on ethics. The fact that Tahir has a boyfriend or husband who is a non-Muslim would mark her for death in many Muslim communities in Europe.

But obviously Kinneging can take care of business. Oh, yes, the law professor is also a former national weightlifting champion.

In his speech on obtaining his doctorate, Kinneging spoke of the need for open debate since nobody has a monopoly on the truth. He did not apply those beliefs in dealing with Castricum.

What follows, and is caught on the video tape, is a confrontation in which Kinneging puts his hand over the camera lens and threatens Castricum. The journalist says that Kinneging strangled him; Kinneging denied this. Both men are consulting their lawyers.

On the tape, Kinneging grabs the camera and says. "I'm not involved in politics so I do not have to behave in a civilized way to you." A rather interesting take on the rules of morality from the professor who then adds, "Do you see the pond over there? Next time you folks come around here, you will go into it and your camera, too!" And later, "If I see on television any of what you have just filmed, I will find you!" Presumably, the results would be unpleasant for Castricum.

Tuesday, February 28, 2012

Reverend Harper: "Have you ever tried to persuade him that he wasn't Teddy Roosevelt?"

Abby Brewster: "Oh, no."Martha Brewster: "Oh, he's so happy being Teddy Roosevelt."Abby Brewster: "Do you remember, Martha, once, a long time ago, we thought if he'd be George Washington, it might be a change for him, and we suggested it."Martha Brewster "And do you know what happened? He just stayed under his bed for days and wouldn't be anybody."

--"Arsenic and Old Lace"

By Barry Rubin

Here’s what you need to know about the current U.S. debate on energy. Stick with me through some numbers and we’ll arrive at a very important conclusion.

According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), the official government agency for such statistics, world energy consumption will rise by 53 percent between 2008 and 2035, mostly (85 percent) due to non-Western use. Petroleum—and this is according to Obama’s “employees,” will only decline from 34 percent in 2008 to 29 percent of the total world energy use over that period.

In other words, over the next almost quarter-century, only 14 percent of current petroleum usage will be replaced by all other fuels, including algae, nuclear, solar, vegetable, and wind. And because overall consumption is rising, oil consumption will actually rise from 85.7 million barrels a day in 2008 to 111.2 in 2035.

What does this tell us?

Despite all of the vast amounts of money plowed by government decision into alternative energy sources, the transition away from petroleum will take a century and will go very slowly. During our lifetimes, oil production will be increasing.

--Given rising demand, insecurity of supply, and the using up of currently exploited reserves, prices should remain strong. Even if the current Iran war scare evaporates, there will be plenty of crises in the Middle East to maintain that insecurity.

--The advantage of private enterprise is that companies and businesspeople have an incentive to produce innovations and new technology if they can make a profit on it. This system has worked very well in American history.

--That is why “green energy” companies will almost inevitably end in scandal and bankruptcy. The money can line the pockets of the executives favored by the Obama Administration but cannot magically produce successful businesses or make effective technology magically appear, especially within the short time needed to survive economically. Remember ethanol?

Monday, February 27, 2012

Apology: On the February 27 subscription feed I had the wrong link to the full article, "Combating Media Manipulation: Just Say `No.'” I have fixed it on the article's site. And here once again is the correct link for that article. Sorry!

By Barry Rubin

Much written and said about the Middle East has always been fantasy. But nowadays the proportion of fantasy to reality is higher than ever. And number one on that list is the war hysteria with Iran.

Israel may have to attack Iran some day. But not this week, month, or even year. That's true for very good reasons.

Iran doesn’t have deliverable nuclear weapons. It is not about to have deliverable nuclear weapons. Israel is not about to attack Iran. The United States is certainly not about to attack Iran. The whole idea that the leaders of Iran are crazed suicide-oriented people who expect the twelfth imam to arrive next Thursday is simply not true.

Yes, the Iranian regime is radical and yes it throws threats in all directions and yes, too, it is the world’s biggest sponsor of terrorism. Yet after 32 years in power the Islamist regime in Tehran has yet to do something really adventurous abroad. This regime wants to stay in power and it has shown restraint. And when it committed terrorist attacks against Americans in Lebanon, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia it did so with the correct calculation that it could get away without paying any price.

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad doesn’t run Iran and many of his statements are intended for domestic consumption to boost his claim to leadership. I don’t want to say that Iran’s leaders are calm pragmatists but they are power-hungry people intent on the survival of themselves and their regime. Iran’s government is bad enough but the caricatures we are seeing go far beyond the reality.

Does this mean that we know that Iran will never ever use nuclear weapons? Of course not. But this merely tells us that there is not a 100 percent or anywhere near it certainty that they will do so. To start a war with Iran by attacking its nuclear facilities means that a full and open war exists that will be far more likely to escalate to a nuclear level in the future. In other words, an attack makes a future Iranian use of nuclear weapons far more likely than it is already.

Iran’s main goal, like that of Pakistan, is to make itself immune to any reprisals for terrorism and subversion by having nuclear weapon. In part, the rationale for the nuclear program is outdated, though that certainly won’t stop Tehran from pursuing it. The project was launched to make Iran into the leader of the Middle East and even of the whole Muslim world.

Yet the rise of Sunni Arab Islamists, notably the Muslim Brotherhood, has sharply reduced Iran’s potential sphere of influence. Tehran’s broader ambitions have been shrunk to include only Lebanon, Syria (where its ally is facing major problems), southwest Afghanistan, and Iraq (where its clients are proportionately small in size). Throw in some ambitions toward Bahrain and the ability to scare the Persian Gulf Arabs and that’s about it. Turkey has its own ambitions; the newly empowered Sunni Arab Islamists hate Iran and don’t think they need Tehran at all.

That doesn’t mean Iran might not some day attack Israel if and when it has nuclear weapons. Obviously a mixture of containment, defensive measures, and the ability plus willingness to stage a preemptive attack if necessary is vital for Israel which isn’t going to depend on Iran’s good will or assume that Tehran will never attack.

At the same time, though, the chances of avoiding a nuclear war are quite positive. What is Iran going to do, put two to six missiles on launching pads to shoot at Israel without being detected beforehand and having no second wave that can be used once devastating Israeli attacks start? Is Iran going to attack Israel purely out of spite, from blind fanaticism, knowing not only that Iran will be devastated but that Israel has a high likelihood of preempting and destroying them on the launching pad or shooting them down?

To start a war with Iran now doesn’t make any sense. It will not stop that country from getting nuclear weapons and it would make a nuclear war in the coming years more rather than less likely. Israel has no international support. Russia is practically threatening a war against Israel if it does launch such an operation.

The logistics of an attack are difficult, though not impossible. A lot can go wrong. You don’t want to try such an operation unless you really have to do so. The bottom line is that an Israeli attack on Iran at present is simply not necessary. A lot of the Israeli rhetoric is clearly intended to press the West toward greater activism and tougher sanctions.

Indeed, all of the reasons why Israel is not about to attack Iran are just plain ignored in the media. Defense Minister Ehud Barak explains that no decision is made and that Israeli policy is only to attack if Iran is about to get deliverable nuclear weapons. He suggests that this won’t happen in the next year. The biggest Israeli critic of launching an attack states that Israel decided not to do so and his worst complaint against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is that he wants to keep discussing the possibility, not that he has decided on an attack.

President Barack Obama—a man who would never attack Iran or support an Israeli action—has publicly state that Israel isn’t about to do so. The president of the United States, whatever his other faults, would not say such a thing unless he has been clearly promised by Netanyahu that it isn’t going to happen. If Israel were to break that promise the entire bilateral relationship would blow up in a way that would make recent tiffs seem like a picnic.

In short, the whole idea is nonsense. Numerous reasons can be given to explain why it is not on the agenda for this year. But the media and various analysts—many of them self-proclaimed experts—simply ignore all the evidence. Some want to get Israel into a war with Iran to please their own ideological agenda; others want to claim Israel is going to attack in order to prove their thesis that Israel is the evil cause of all regional—or even world--problems.

This hysteria really should stop. Israel isn’t going to get into a long, bloody, and avoidable war because bloggers and op-ed writers are screaming for it.

Briefly here are some other myths that deserve to be abandoned as soon as possible.

--There is an Israel-Palestinian peace process. That’s probably dead for decades because the Palestinian side doesn’t want a compromise deal. Obama’s mistakes, the Palestinian Authority-Hamas coalition, the Islamist “spring,” and the UN unilateral independence bid all makes it even more obviously deceased.

--The Muslim Brotherhood is moderate. Wake up and smell the jihad.

--The Syrian regime is about to fall. The opposition knows that without international intervention—which isn’t going to happen—they can’t win.

--Turkey is the very model of a moderate Islamic democracy. Actually, it’s a repressive Islamist dictatorship in training. Look at the massive arrests, the trumped-up treason charges, the trampling on free speech, and the assault on the country’ armed forces.

Unless there is some real understanding of what’s going on in the Middle East any hope for useful analysis, much less predicting the most likely future scenarios or charting a successful Western policy, is out of reach.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center. His book, Israel: An Introduction, has just been published by Yale University Press. He is also editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal, and Middle East editor and featured columnist at PJMedia http://pajamasmedia.com/barryrubin/. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). GLORIA Center site is http://www.gloria-center.org.His articles published originally outside of PajamasMedia are at <http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com>

A version of this article was published in the Jerusalem Post. I own the rights and ask you to read this version and link to this site.

Apology: On the February 27 subscription feed I had the wrong link to the full article for this. As given at the end of this article, this is the correct link:

By Barry Rubin

I don’t understand—and I haven’t seen anyone even try to explain it—why the Republican presidential candidates keep subjecting themselves to politically partisan, hostile journalists being in control their debates. These journalists have been highly partisan previously and seem to shield President Obama from criticism and go on the offensive to try, for example, to turn the whole debate into the pretense that these candidates want to make birth control pills illegal.

Why didn’t these candidates just get together, especially now that there are only four left, to choose their own panel, say with each of them picking one questioner? And whenever Newt Gingrich challenged the premises--and honesty--of the questioners, he was met with wild applause because both the mass media's bias and the need to challenge it openly couldn't be more obvious.

But, you might ask, does it make sense to go to war with the mass media? Of course not, unless it is already at war with you. Nothing like this has been seen in America for a century or even two. The main newspapers and television networks are determined to reelect Obama, promote the currently dominant leftist (not liberal) ideas without limit and to smear or slander critics.

Why is this so effective? Because roughly half of the American population doesn't even realize it's happening. They think the news media is fair and at least as balanced as it was 10 or 20 or 30 years ago. Consequently, Obama is a big success, the economy is recovering, man-made global warming is the biggest problem facing the planet, and the president's enemies are a bunch of racist, reactionary, stupid people. We will get a clearer picture of the exact proportions on the first Tuesday in November.

The consciously dishonest transformation of an assault on the Catholic church's freedom of religion into a plot to stop the sale of birth control is a prime example. The 100 percent effort to perform character assassination on Republican candidates compared to the near zero level of criticism regarding Obama and his team is another. The downplaying and misinformation regarding scandals from the pre-election Bill Ayers and Reverend Jeremiah Wright issues through the "green energy" rip-offs and the "Fast and Furious" operation is still another. You can, no doubt, think of more.

If you haven’t heard the video of Reverend Franklin Graham on television it is one of those moments when the mass media most obviously cross the line into pure propaganda. Graham was repeatedly asked whether he thought President Obama was a Christian and kept explaining the answer was "yes." He accepts Obama’s saying he was a Christian. But Graham also noted that, according to his own religious beliefs no one could determine someone else’s credentials in that regard, and only Obama knew in his heart whether he was truly a Christian.

Graham didn’t quite get the point—which concerns the difference between a nominal Christian and someone who has a deep personal commitment to live by that religion--across clearly. But any honest person should have understood his meaning. Yet there was a massive media assault afterward twisting his words and falsely asserting that Graham said Obama wasn’t a Christian.

What really startled me, however, was that in a later interview Graham added a critical point. He recounted that he was told beforehand the interview was going to be about the persecution of Christian by Muslim extremists in various countries. That’s why he agreed to do it, Graham explained. Under the circumstances, he was right in accepting the interview—since this is an issue virtually never covered in the mass media—but wrong in letting himself be manipulated.

Westerners tend to believe that the debate in the Arabic-speaking universe is sort of like debate in the West. Despite differences there is supposedly pragmatism, a strong sense of reality, and the underlying desire for material prosperity, stability, and peace. Of course, such things exist but often there is a strong element of fantasy and a powerful dose of hatred. Consequently, the policies and results are commensurate with that input.

And remember that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that al-Jazira is a source we should look to for real news. Here is an example of a recent al-Jazira program. The Russian guest is a vicious antisemite who writes articles accusing Israel of being responsible for all of the world's problems and especially those of the Middle East. He supports the Syrian regime. The Arab guest is a supporter of the Syrian revolution. But both of these men--who are on the opposite side-- agree that the Jews are behind everything!

Oh, yes, and they also agree that America is the other source of all evil. The Russian says that the United States is financing the revolution against the Assad regime while the Arab says the United States is keeping Assad in power. The Arab guest argues that the Zionists, who originally came from Russia, are killing Syrians; the Russian says that only Russian weapons have saved Syria from the evil Zionists.

The Arab speaker, however, has the last word, explaining that he hates Russia and all of the West, too, and promises that "millions of Chechens, Afghans, and Syrians" will take revenge by killing a lot of Russians in the future.

Is the pro-revolution Arab guest speaking on behalf of the Syrian revolution and showing us what it would be like if it took power? Maybe yes; maybe no. But the irony is that the Obama Administration collaborated with Turkey in pushing a pro-Islamist opposition leadership. The revolutionaries have largely rejected this leadership. Maybe you can't be "more Catholic than the Pope," but the Obama Administration has succeeded in being more Islamist than the Syrian revolutionaries.

Thursday, February 23, 2012

Registering to run for president of Egypt will begin March 10. The military moved it up from April 15 to show that it is handing over power to the civilians. As I've said before, I've never seen any evidence that the army is not going to turn over control of the country to a new, elected president. All of the mass media and political hysteria to the contrary, the generals don't want to hold onto the government.

Has the Brotherhood's success in parliamentary elections gone to its head? Has the weak international response to its ascendancy emboldened the Islamists to seek total power now rather than go slow and be patient? It's starting to look that way.

The Muslim Brotherhood has announced once again that it will not run a candidate for president in the elections projected for June. "The Muslim Brotherhood will not support Abdel-Moneim Abul-Fotouh or any candidate,” says Muhammad al-Badi, the leader of the Brotherhood.

But this is misdirection. The Brotherhood's influential spiritual advisor Yusuf al-Qaradawi is supporting Abul-Fotouh. And guess what? The Brotherhood is going to support Abul-Fotouh "unofficially." How? Simple, through the "independent" Justice and Development party supporting an "independent" presidential candidate.

Brotherhood leader Muhammad al-Badi now says that the president must have an "Islamic background" and by that he rules out any "secular" candidate. And the head of the Freedom and Justice Party, which everyone in Egypt but apparently not in the Western media, knows is a Brotherhood front, Muhammad Morsi, said that Egypt's new president must “be committed to the Islamic approach,” though he still says his party won't have a candidate.

Egyptian voters who backed the Brotherhood--giving it 235 seats, 47 percent of those in parliament--will vote for someone. The Brotherhood doesn’t own their votes but presumably most of them will support an unofficial Brotherhood candidate.

The Salafists, with 121 seats, almost 25 percent of parliament, will probably have their own candidate.

While this seemed impossible last year it is now conceivable that the two leading presidential candidates will be Islamists and thus Egypt will have an Islamist president. That would mean the timetable for turning the country into an Islamist Sharia state could be vastly accelerated. It's up to the Brotherhood to decide whether to move cautiously toward state power or floor the accelerator.

If the reported plan for the election is accurate, the rules drawn up by the military help the Islamists. To run for president requires endorsement by 30 members of parliament. Only four parties have that many--the Brotherhood's front group, the Salafists, the Wafd, and the Egyptian Bloc (Free Egyptians Party). Can individual Brotherhood members endorse a candidate without facing party discipline? Again, since the Brotherhood's party is nominally independent of the Brotherhood, al-Badi's statement does not restrict its freedom of decision.

According to the Egyptian media, each party can nominate one candidate. While some among the 80 members of small parties or independents could band together in some combination to nominate someone, the maximum number of candidates would be restricted to five, probably less.

Sunday, February 19, 2012

Forget Frommer, Fodor or Lonely Planet. If you’re planning a trip to Israel in the near or distant future, get a copy of Israel: An Introduction by Barry Rubin, just released by Yale University Press.

Yes, you will still need guides to specific archaeological sites like the City of David, but Rubin’s book, written with numerous co-writer/experts in various fields, is the best overview of the Jewish state I have read and the best preparation for a trip. It is also the best book for the armchair traveler and the best general purpose resource on Israel yet published.

(OBVIOUS FULL DISCLOSURE: Rubin is the Middle East editor for this site and a friend. Does this disqualify me as a reviewer? Possibly, but that would similarly disqualify a fair percentage of reviews written in many publications.)

Rubin’s book excels in two areas: historical overview and Israeli sociology.

The eighty-some pages devoted to the history of the state are a useful review of the Israel story even, I would imagine, for those who consider themselves relatively knowledgable about the subject. This survey takes us through the early days of the “yishuv” — literally “the settlement,” but actually a kind of ur-Jewish state — the often violent struggle for independence with its militant factions from the Irgun to Lehi through the UN declaration of a state of Israel and the subsequent unceasing battle to survive.

Following this narrative, remembering some events better than others, I was most struck by the depressing ironies of the post-Oslo period. Like many of my generation, although apprehensive, I was deeply moved and hopeful in 1993 watching Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin shake hands on the White House lawn under the beaming paternal gaze of Bill Clinton. That moment of optimism seems centuries ago now and, by tracing the post-Oslo steps carefully, Rubin shows how the Palestinians have yet to demonstrate a genuine interest in a two-state solution despite the good will of significant portions of the Israeli populace. The Palestinians could have had a state of their own decades ago if they had really wanted it.

But it is Rubin’s greater interest to show Israel not just as a beleaguered fortress but as a functioning, complex nation. The sociologically-oriented chapters explain in great detail the changing make-up of the country from the early period dominated by the Ashkenazi Jews of Eastern Europe, the conflict with the seemingly less-educated and relatively-impoverished Sephardic (Middle Eastern) Jews and the subsequent intermarriage and blending of the two cultures. The book also gives us a breakdown of the extraordinary number of ethnic and national groups that make up modern Israel — Moroccans, Russians, Ethiopians, Circassians, Arabs, Druze, “Yekkes” (the Yiddish word for jackets that has been applied to German Jews) and on and on.

Particularly valuable in the light of recent news events is Rubin’s analysis of the religious-secular divide in Israel. Hillary Clinton, among others, has accused Israel of discrimination against women because of actions taken by the ultra-OrthodoxHaredicommunity. Rubin sees this as less significant and it is clear that Israeli secular community may be among the most secular extant. One group just named Tel Aviv as the number one city in the world for gay tourism.

Whatever the case, Rubin makes an excellent case for the complexity of Israeli society, a culture in which supposedly-atheist, socialist kibbutzniks still devotedly celebrate Passover. And despite the legendary perpetual griping and hand-wringing of the Jewish people, Rubin’s book describes a surprisingly optimistic country. An interesting statistic cited by the author shows the vast majority of Israelis happy with their lives, although their nation is under continued existential threat. That is something we Americans can learn from.

There’s a serious split in Hamas reflecting the growing civil war among Islamists along Sunni-Shia lines. Each side is radical but the fact that they’re fighting among themselves weakens both of them.

The issues involved are tactical, not strategic. Indeed, what is ironic is that Khaled Mashal, who historically has been described as the radical, is following the approach that will seem moderate to the naïve while Ismail Haniya, described by the naive as the moderate is leading the ostensibly more radical faction.

Mashal signed a deal with Palestinian Authority (PA) leader Mahmoud Abbas for a coalition between Hamas and the PA. Of course, neither partner trusts the other in the least. Mashal wants to take over the PA; Abbas wants to tame Hamas and recapture the Gaza Strip or—at least—present the Palestinians to the world as united in order to demand a state now without any need to make peace with Israel.

In contrast, Haniya claims that this deal is a sell-out to the PA cowardly compromisers. Haniya was just in Tehran where his hosts repeatedly warned him against the “compromising’ traitors in Hamas’s ranks. Of course, the deal with the PA is nothing of the sort.

What lies behind this split is the broader conflict between the Sunni and Shia Islamist camps. Haniya is siding with the Iranians, who have a lot of money but are Shia; Mashal is linking up with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, which borders on the Gaza Strip, is Sunni, is now gaining power in Egypt, and belong to the same organization as Hamas.

I’m putting my money on Mashal. The Iranians can provide money but only the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood can ultimately be a real patron on the ground, forwarding money, men, weapons, and material goods to the Gaza Strip. If Hamas goes to war with Israel again it will be Egypt, not Iran (even if it has nuclear weapons) that will matter in the battle.

But there’s another irony here that makes sense. Mashal has spent most of his time outside of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Thus, he has had more contact with Iran. Haniya has been actually running the Gaza Strip to a large extent and thus has more contact with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. I guess familiarity breeds contempt. Each man is trying to escape the orbit of the powerful big brother he has been dealing with all these years.

The PA will not dominate Hamas and take over the Gaza Strip. Nor will Hamas be able to seize power in the West Bank, in part because Israel won’t allow that to happen. And here’s still another irony. Since Haniya is against the deal, he and his allies will make sure that Fatah cannot campaign freely in the Gaza Strip.

The projected PA elections will never come off and the Hamas-PA deal will break down, probably within the next six months. Yet the battle between the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (aided by the Jordanian branch) and Iran over influencing Hamas will continue.

In short, all of Hamas remains hardline and the only difference is over how best to wipe out Israel and commit genocide against the Jews. The Palestinians also remain badly divided. None of the leadership can deliver peace with Israel and none of these leaders want peace (and a Palestinian state based on a two-state solution) enough to make the compromises necessary to achieve it.

There is still another important element in Palestinian politics receiving almost no attention: the future leadership of the PA and Fatah. Prime Minister Salam Fayyad is a relatively honest, relatively moderate technocrat. All of Hamas and most of Fatah loathe him. He only holds his office because the Western donors want him there. Can he last out this year or the next?

The problem is that a PA-Hamas deal requires either that Abbas or a Hamas leader becomes prime minister. Remember that the post of prime minister was originally created due to Western insistence that someone be in a position to stop Yasir Arafat, Abbas’ predecessor, from stealing the money being donated.

Then there’s Abbas himself. He has been ailing and while his periodic resignation threats have been phony ways of preserving his leverage and getting things he wants, his retirement is only a matter of time. It is hard to believe he will still be leading Fatah and the PA by, say, December 2013.

Who will replace him? You can throw around various names but don’t bother. No one has the slightest idea. There is not a single serious candidate. Presumably, the Fatah barons will make the choice. Abbas originally got the job precisely because he was so weak. None of the Fatah warlords or bosses felt threatened by a man with no popular or organizational base of support.

It was also advantageous that Abbas was the most relatively moderate of the Fatah leaders and would have the best image with the Western governments and media.

Of course, when I say relatively moderate that should be considered within the spectrum of Fatah leadership. Abbas is relative more aware of the potential benefits of compromise peace with Israel and more realistic about Fatah’s inability to wipe out that country. Still, he is dead set on the idea that unless Israel agrees to take back any Palestinian who can trace his ancestry to pre-1948 residence there can be no peace.

If he is a tiny bit more willing to compromise on borders or anything else a combination of his weakness, intransigence, and knowledge of public opinion and his colleagues’ views prevents him from ever doing anything.

Abbas’s successor is almost certainly going to be more militant. There are two main factions in Fatah, and hence in the PA. The Arafat cronies, who are more corrupt and satisfied with the status quo, and the Fatah radicals, who’d like to see another round of fighting because they still believe in the group’s revolutionary ideology. The latter group includes both older and younger—notably Marwan Barghouti (he’s 53 years old but considered leader of the "young guard" which tells you something, doesn’t it?)—people who don’t work together.

In short, Palestinian politics are a mess. There are fewer real moderates proportionately than you’ll find in any Arab state, where they are also small minorities. Nobody can deliver peace; no one will actually struggle to achieve a compromise peace agreement with Israel.

The international “peace process” delusion is built on never actually examining the real Palestinian political scene. Yearning for peace is completely understandable; supporting a two-state solution is just fine. But pretending to oneself that there’s any basis for these things actually happening is quite unrealistic.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center. His book, Israel: An Introduction, has just been published by Yale University Press. He is also editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal, and Middle East editor and featured columnist at PJMedia http://pajamasmedia.com/barryrubin/. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). GLORIA Center site is http://www.gloria-center.org. His articles published originally outside of PajamasMedia are at <http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com>

Note: This article will be published in a different form in the Jerusalem Post. I own the rights and ask you to read and link to this verion..

Saturday, February 18, 2012

“A merchant in Baghdad…sent his servant to market….The servant came back, white and trembling, and said, Master, just now when I was in the marketplace…I turned I saw it was Death that jostled me….Lend me your horse, and…I will go to Samarra and there Death will not find me. The merchant lent him his horse…and as fast as the horse could gallop he went. The merchant went down to the marketplace and saw [Death] standing in the crowd. He asked, Why did you make a threating gesture to my servant…? [Death replied]…I was astonished to see him in Baghdad, for I had an appointment with him tonight in Samarra. -- W. Somerset Maugham, “The Appointment in Samarra” (1933)

By Barry Rubin

Nageeb Kashgari is a young man in a lot of trouble. The 23-year-old Saudi has been spirited back to his country from Malaysia in a manner reminiscent of a kidnapping to be put on trial for his life.

His crime? To write three Tweets that Saudi clerics have deemed to be heretical. The lynch mob is baying for his blood. Nobody in the world is helping him. Kashgari might well be doomed, despite his quick apology and erasure of the Tweets.

Even if Kashgari were an atheist or someone who renounced Islam or did indeed violated its precepts his freedom of speech and religion should be defended. But what is most interesting about his case is that he did not really do any of these things. He merely expressed a liberal, modernist-style interpretation of Islam, the kind of thing that developed in Christianity—and was sometimes punished then--about 250 years ago and became very common 150 years ago.

Nothing tells us more about the profound difficulty of reforming Islam, the totalitarian threat of Islamism, and the danger of Sharia law—to Muslims above all—than does the Kashgari case.

Let me begin, though, with a brief discussion about why freedom of speech is so important. In the U.S. Constitution, the first amendment says, “Congress shall make no law…abridging the freedom of the speech, or of the press….”

Why did they understand this to be so essential more than two centuries ago in a way that applies perfectly to today? Because once someone can decided what is legal speech—beyond a minimal limit of “fire in crowded theatres” and national security secrets endangering lives—they can interpret what is acceptable in any way they choose. And people being people, anyone in power is certain to do that in a way that enhances their own power and serves their own interest.

And that is why the very concept of “Politically Correct” is inevitably anti-democratic and will be inevitably abused. This is what we see today. When, as in Europe and Canada, courts start determining criminal expression then that country is in serious trouble.

Of course, in traditional societies such rules usually prevail and they are being reinstalled in Islamist polities, some of which have been established with Western assistance. Indeed, if the organization of Islamic states and Western supporters have their way, heresy against Islam will become an international crime for which even non-Muslims can be prosecuted.

Kashgari came from a Salafist family but developed liberal beliefs that he expressed in Tweets. There are two lessons here, showing how hard it is to develop a democracy in Muslim-majority countries or any liberal interpretation of Islam. In the first case, there is no freedom of speech on critical issues; on the second, the ability of mainstream or hardline clerics to interpret any other view as heretical will be enforced.

Earlier, Kashgari had tweeted: “No Saudi women will go to hell, because it’s impossible to go there twice.” This is, of course, a witty statement of the status of women in Saudi Arabia.

More recently, Kashgari sent three tweets, addressed to Islam’s founder on his birthday. These form the basis of his “crime.”

Friday, February 17, 2012

Barry Rubin: Dr. Spyer, please tell us about your visit to Syria, what you saw and your impressions?

Well, I spent a week in Idleb province, traveling between a number of different towns. The most striking aspect was the extent of de facto control that the opposition and Free Syrian Army have in this area. A number of towns are now entirely under their control, with FSA roadblocks at the entrance, and the rebel flag flying everywhere. At the same time, its of course clear that the government still has
intelligence networks inside the 'liberated' towns, and will reconquer them if they are able at a later date.

Barry Rubin: Many observers claim that the Bashar al-Assad regime will fall soon. What do the opposition activists think and what is your view?

The many opposition activists and fighters that I spoke to seem to be rather torn in their attitude. On the one hand, I heard none of the facile optimism that one heard among some analysts in the first months of the uprising, where Bashar's fall was described as imminent. The opposition activists understand that with the support of Iran, Russia, China and Hizballah, the regime can continue for some time to come, even if it is bleeding resources and losing manpower to the rebel army. The opposition are acutely aware of their own international isolation compared to the regime, and repeat endlessly the call for a buffer zone, and for the beginnings of western support for arming the
FSA.

At the same time, looking more broadly, the oppositionists are optimistic that they will ultimately prevail, but a number of them told me that without international assistance to their side to balance
and offset the international coalition behind Assad, the situation could drag on for months or even years.

Barry Rubin: How important are revolutionary Islamists in the opposition? Can you explain about the larger--perhaps largest--group that could be called traditional Sunnis?

In Idleb Province, where I was, there was an undoubted presence of Salafi Islamists among the FSA fighters. But they were not a majority, and I certainly had no indication at all of the presence of foreign
Islamist fighters. These were clearly local men. The regime of course has been keen to say that the opposition to it consists of 'al-Qaida.' I would advise skepticism toward any claims made by the Assad regime.

However, Idleb province is a very traditional, religious Sunni area. There is undoubtedly a strong sectarian element to the fury and hatred that people have toward the Assad regime. People stress that this does not extend to ordnary Alawi or Shia Syrians, but I would counsel caution regarding this. So I don’t think Salafi Islamism is dominating the revolt, even in very traditional and religious places
like Idleb. But at the same time, there is a strong religious and sectarian motivation among the rebels. You wont be surprised to learn that the number of secular humanists in Idleb province is rather
small.

Thursday, February 16, 2012

The transition to democracy and capitalism has not been kind to Russia. It sank from superpower to sideshow internationally. The country is hurting and stagnant; it has no sense of purpose or goals; and Russia is in the hands of a ruthless dictator who knows how to use nationalism and demagoguery to ensure his power.

Of course, Russia’s rulers are weaker, less ambitious, far less well armed, and less anti-American than the old Soviet Union. Still, though, the Russian government has a chip on its shoulder. It believes that the West betrayed it, tricked it into dropping Communism but then didn’t deliver prosperity. So the old traditional rivalry with the West and the United States has lost its Marxist element but gained a new factor.

Another new element is the search for money. Russia has two main assets: oil and the ability to export arms along with nuclear facilities that might be turned into weapons. Since the West, with a head start and superior products, has a head start, Russia has to seek riskier, more marginal clients which mean the more radical ones that the United States won't accept. In short, Russia needs allies that don’t have the option of enjoying Western allies and suppliers.

What is most notable about Russian Middle East policy is that it tends to side with the extremist forces. These friends include primarily Iran, Syria, Hizballah, and Hamas. Russia makes money by selling arms to Syria that Iran pays for, knowing that some of them will be transferred to Hizballah, and nuclear equipment to Iran. An alliance with Tehran also ensures that Iran doesn’t back Islamists within Russia. Since there is no cost to Russia for engaging in this pro-radical policy it is most attractive.

In the UN, Russia has protected Iran from stronger sanctions and the Syrian regime from tougher action to back the revolutionary forces there.

Meanwhile, Russia’s regime is involved in a far less visible strategy of rebuilding its influence in Central Asia, the south Caucasus, and Central Europe. Russian enterprises, often strongly backed by the government, are buying up assets in these places, undermining the independence of former Soviet republics and some of the ex-satellites. The countries so menaced get virtually no support from the Obama Administration. Again, Russian policy is all gain, no cost.

What's so terrible about the ideological/agenda-based domination of the mass media and academia is that people don't ask critical questions that undermine their political positions. Here's one:

The Egyptian government says it will put on criminal trial 16 people who distributed funds to Egyptian moderates from pro-democracy forces. One of them is the son of U.S. Labor Secretary Ray LaHood. The prosecutions are going forward despite Obama Administration threats to cut off all aid to Egypt, which mostly goes to the Egyptian military which happens to run the country at present.

So here's the question: If Egypt's government is ready for a confrontation risking its U.S. aid over this tiny and insignificant issue then why should we believe that the fear of losing U.S. aid will keep it from imposing Islamization on its people, sponsoring anti-Israel terrorism, becoming entangled in a war with Israel, and doing all sorts of much more important stuff?

Haven't seen that anywhere else, right? But doesn't this incident undercut all of the soothing words about how Egypt (or Libya or other countries taken over by Islamists) will be constrained by such things?

And here's a bonus question: Does anyone in those Islamist circles take Obama seriously as someone to fear?

Now if you are a real moderate in the Arabic-speaking world, Turkey, or Iran, you know that your future looks very dim. You don't draw your interpretations from the Western media. You don't tremble at being thought an Islamophobe because you probably are a Muslim yourself. So what do you do?

Another email arrives in my box. Things are getting too tough for a secular-oriented person like me, the writr says. Can you help find me a job in a place that still has academic freedom?

I already have a collection of such messages and stories. There’s the engineer who found a teaching job in China; the journalist who is now in sub-Saharan Africa after being threatened with death; and the newly arrived Turkish Jews I’ve met in England, Canada, and the United States who have no illusions about the nature of the Ankara regime.

Suddenly, there are communities of thousands of Egyptian Christians in Europe, the United States, and Canada who weren’t there a little while ago. There is the well-known blogger who is now in the New World and the democracy activist who has jumped out of the fire and into Washington DC.

Monday, February 13, 2012

There is a strong case that can be made for doing nothing about the Syrian civil war, but a stronger case can be made for doing something relatively low-cost and ineffective, indeed, precisely what the Syrian opposition is requesting.

Forget about major military intervention, which would be dangerous, costly, and above the level of available resources. Meanwhile, Syrian documents show that Tehran has provided $1 billion so far to back the regime against the rebels.

I’m also not enthusiastic about a major U.S. effort at regime change, since the Turkish regime wants an Islamist government in Damascus that might even be worse than what exists now. The less the Obama Administration is involved the more likely things are to go better. Unfortunately, the Obama Administration doesn’t seem able to tell the difference between moderates and anti-American Islamists in Syria. Come to think about it, the Obama Administration isn’t too good at making such a distinction between such people in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, or Turkey either.

Russia and China block UN action. The Arab League is talking about an international peacekeeping force but it's hard to believe either that they would ever accept any non-Arab forces or they would send in their own armies to fight the Syrian military. Most likely this will all amount to nothing

And will the Obama Administration shrug its shoulders—so to speak—and do nothing? Yes, quite probably.

There’s also an interesting political dynamic within Syria. I can’t say this with full confidence but there is evidence for the following thesis: The “official” (that is, U.S.-Turkish chosen) opposition leadership doesn’t want armed struggle and indeed seems to prefer a deal with the Assad regime.