Saturday, January 9, 2016

The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania recently denied a debt collector's motion for judgment on the pleadings as to allegations that use of a "QR code" or barcode visible through a glassine window on an envelope containing a collection letter constituted a violation of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).

A debt collector mailed a collection letter in an envelope addressed to the debtor. The return mailing address was not physically printed on the envelope. Rather, the return address was visible through a glassine window and read, in part, as follows: "Department # 5996 P.O. Box 1259 Oaks, PA 19456." A barcode was printed directly below the return address and visible through the glassine window.

The barcode, when electronically scanned, would allegedly reveal the debtor's account number. The alleged violation at issue was the debt collector's alleged disclosure of the consumer's account number, which was embedded in a barcode visible on the face of the debt collection envelope. The consumer alleged that, by disclosing the barcode to the general public, the debt collector supposedly increased the risk that the consumer would be a victim of identity theft.

The debt collector argued that the FDCPA was not intended to prohibit the disclosure of benign symbols on any envelope sent by a debt collector as means of communicating with a consumer by use of the mails.

As you may recall, the FDCPA "prohibits a debt collector from using `unfair or unconscionable means' to collect a debt." Douglass, 765 F.3d at 302 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692f). Section 1692f "sets out a nonexclusive list of conduct that qualifies as unfair or unconscionable." Id. The consumer alleged that the debt collector violated subparagraph 8 of section 1692f, which prohibits a debt collector from:

[u]sing any language or symbol, other than the debt collector's address, on any envelope when communicating with a consumer by use of the mails or by telegram, except that a debt collector may use his business name if such name does not indicate that he is in the debt collection business.

15 U.S.C. § 1692f(8).

Although the debt collector conceded that section 1692f(8) of the FDCPA prohibits any language or symbol from appearing on a debt collection envelope, the debt collector argued that the section was intended merely to prevent debt collectors from embarrassing debtors by announcing the delinquency on the outside of a debt collection letter envelope. As we have noted in our prior updates (example), when interpreting section 1692f(8), have held that "benign" language or symbols do not violate FDCPA's prohibitions.

The debt collector also argued that "[t]he only way to view the information stored in the barcode at issue requires illegal action by a third party, making the imposition of liability under the FDCPA inappropriate." The debt collector noted that when a barcode is visible on an envelope sent through the U.S. Postal Service, the consumer's privacy is protected by 18 U.S.C. § 1702, which prohibits individuals from taking another's mail with the specific intent to obstruct correspondence or pry into the business or secret of another. The debt collector also referenced 18 U.S.C. § 1703, which allows "[o]nly U.S. Postal workers . . . to handle the mail, and even then, federal law prohibits those employees from tampering with the mail."

In response, the consumer argued that the court need not decide whether a benign symbol exception should be adopted because the barcode at issue was not benign. In support of this argument, the consumer relied upon the Third Circuit's decision in Douglass v. Convergent Outsourcing, 765 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 2014).

In Douglass, the defendant debt collector argued "that to prevent absurd results" the Third Circuit "must adopt a `benign language' exception to the FDCPA that would allow for markings on an envelope so long as they do not suggest the letter's purpose of debt collection or humiliate or threaten the debtor." Douglass, 765 F.3d at 303.

The Third Circuit found that the defendant's disclosure of the plaintiff's account number implicated "a core concern animating the FDCPA—the invasion of privacy." Id. The Third Circuit stated that the plaintiff's account number was "a core piece of information pertaining to [plaintiff's] status as a debtor and [defendant's] debt collection effort." Id.

Moreover, the Third Circuit held that "disclosure [of the account number] has the potential to cause harm to a consumer that the FDCPA was enacted to address." Id. As a result of the foregoing, the Third Circuit concluded that the plaintiff's account number was "impermissible language or symbols under § 1692f(8)" because "[c]onstruing § 1692f(8) in accord with the FDCPA's purposes in § 1692(a), we find the statute not only proscribes potentially harassing and embarrassing language, but also protects consumers' identifying information." Id. at 306.

The Third Circuit also went on to state that the disclosure of the plaintiff's account number was not benign because by divulging such information to the public meant it "could be used to expose [the plaintiff's] financial predicament." Id. at 303. However, the Third Circuit expressly declined to decide whether "section 1692f(8) contains a benign language exception because even if such an exception existed, [the plaintiff's] account number is not benign." Id.

Of note, however, the Third Circuit's ruling in Douglass was not a QR code or bar code case. In fact, the Douglass opinion expressly states in fn 4: "Douglass no longer presses her argument that [the defendant in that case] violated the FDCPA by including the QR Code on the envelope. Appellant Br. 5 n. 2. We therefore do not decide that issue."

The trial court here also referenced that, in Styer v. Prof'l Med. Mgmt., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92349 (M.D. Pa. July 15, 2015) (Nealon, J.), the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania applied Douglass to circumstances similar to those alleged by the plaintiff consumer in this case.

In Styer, the parties submitted cross motions for summary judgment on the plaintiff's sole claim raised, specifically whether the defendant's disclosure of a QR code that, when electronically scanned, revealed the plaintiff's name, address, and account number constituted a violation of section 1692f(8) of the FDCPA. The court in Styer determined that the disclosure of that QR code on a debt collection envelope was prohibited under section 1692f(8) of the FDCPA and thus, judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff.

Here, the Court applied Douglass and Styer, and denied the debt collector's motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding that the plaintiff consumer pled sufficient facts to state a claim for relief under the FDCPA that is plausible on its face.

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Friday, January 8, 2016

The District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida, Fifth District, recently held that the trial court erred by denying the borrower's motion to involuntarily dismiss a foreclosure action, because the plaintiff mortgagee's counsel failed to properly introduce evidence to reestablish the lost note, prove that it had standing to foreclose, prove the amount owed, and demonstrate compliance with the mortgage's condition precedent of giving notice of default.

A servicer foreclosed alleging that the borrower defaulted under the note by failing to make the payment due on March 1, 2009 and all subsequent payments. The loan owner mortgagee was substituted as the plaintiff, and after multiple amendments to the pleadings, the case went to trial nearly four and a half years after filing.

At trial, the new plaintiff mortgagee did not introduce any exhibits into evidence and called one witness, an employee of the loan servicer. The servicer's witness testified that he was familiar with the plaintiff mortgagee's records, that they were kept in the ordinary course the mortgagee's business, that it was the mortgagee's regular practice to make and keep the records, the records were made at or near the time of the event recorded by someone with knowledge, that he had reviewed the note and proposed final judgment and that the amount owed corresponded with the records, and that the mortgagee had complied with the condition precedent of mailing a specific notice of default and acceleration required by the mortgage.

The borrower's counsel cross-examined the plaintiff mortgagee's witness about his personal knowledge of the original plaintiff's business practices, its standing for foreclose, the loss of the note, the amount of the debt, and compliance with the condition precedent under the mortgage. The borrower's counsel then moved several times for involuntary dismissal, arguing that the plaintiff mortgagee had not proven a prima facie case.

The trial court denied the motion for involuntary dismissal and entered final judgment of foreclosure in favor of the plaintiff mortgagee. The borrower appealed.

On appeal, the Fifth District first agreed with the borrower's argument that the plaintiff mortgagee failed to reestablish the lost note, noting that "[o]n direct examination, not a single question was asked … about the lost note."

The Court further noted that, on cross examination, the witness "was unable to confirm that loss of possession was not the result of a transfer or lawful seizure, nor did he have the requisite personal knowledge to testify regarding how the note was lost while in the possession of [the lender]." The witness could only confirm that when servicing was transferred, the note was not in the file, that the prior servicer searched for it but could not find it and completed a lost note affidavit. Although the lost note affidavit was attached to the servicer's verified amended complaint, "it was not offered or received into evidence."

The Fifth District also agreed with borrower's argument that "the note cannot be enforced because there as insufficient testimony regarding the terms of the note." Although a copy of the note was identified by the servicer's witness, it was not admitted in evidence. Because "[a] document that was identified but never admitted into evidence as an exhibit is not competent evidence to support a judgment", the Court found that the plaintiff mortgagee "did not properly reestablish the lost note."

Turning to the issue of standing, the Fifth District found that the plaintiff mortgagee "failed to demonstrate standing to foreclose." Although the plaintiff mortgagee filed "several different versions of the note, assignments, and allonge," it "did not introduce into evidence any version of the alleged lost note, the allonge, or any of the assignments. The Court noted that, even if a copy of the note had been received into evidence, the blank endorsement attached to one copy of the note placed in the court file would be insufficient to establish standing at the commencement of suit because the endorsement is undated and cannot be used to prove that original plaintiff "had standing to sue when this suit was initially filed."

The Court held that the plaintiff mortgagee had to either introduce the original note or reestablish it pursuant to section 673.3091 of Florida's Uniform Commercial Code in order to prove standing. Because the plaintiff mortgagee "did not tender the original note and did not properly reestablish the note, it failed to demonstrate that the original plaintiff … had standing to foreclose on the note on the date the initial complaint was filed."

On the issue of the amount owed on the note, the Fifth District found that because the plaintiff mortgagee "did not introduce its business records into evidence", it did not need to discuss whether the plaintiff mortgagee's sole witness "really had sufficient knowledge to lay the business records foundation for the loan documents pursuant to section 90.803(6), Florida Statutes (2014)."

The Court reasoned that the plaintiff mortgagee failed to prove the amount owed because it did not introduce the proposed final judgment into evidence and, "[r]emarkably, … also did not introduce any documents, such as the loan payment history, which reflect the current debt owed under the note. Likewise, there was no testimony or documentary evidence at trial regarding or supporting the award of interest, taxes, property inspections, property evaluations, or attorney's fees, aside from [the sole witness'] testimony that the figures were accurate and came from" the plaintiff mortgagee's business records. Because the business records were not introduced into evidence, the Court held that the plaintiff mortgagee "did not establish the amount [the borrower] supposedly owed."

The Court also held that the plaintiff mortgagee failed to comply with the condition precedent in paragraph 22 of the mortgage, which required that a default letter be sent to the borrower by first class mail or actually delivered. The Court noted that the plaintiff mortgagee it did not offer into evidence "any document purporting to be the default letter or a copy of the letter. Thus, there was no proof that the default letter, even if it was sent, complied with the requirements of paragraph 22."

Finally, the Court noted, the plaintiff mortgagee's witness "could not confirm that the default letter was mailed vial first class" and "had no knowledge as to whether [the borrower] actually received the default letter."

The Fifth District concluded that, because the plaintiff mortgagee "failed to reestablish the note, prove standing, the amount owed on the note, and compliance with the conditions precedent in the mortgage …[t]he record does not contain competent substantial evidence to support the final judgment of foreclosure. Thus the trial court erred by refusing to grant [the borrower's] multiple motions for involuntary dismissal."

Accordingly, the final judgment was reversed and remanded to the trial court with directions to enter an order of involuntary dismissal in the borrower's favor.

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Thursday, January 7, 2016

The District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida, Fourth District, recently held that a lender cannot be held liable for its customer's suicide because it does not have any special relationship with the customer that gives rise to a duty to prevent the customer's suicide.

The personal representative of the estate of a mentally ill decedent sued the decedent's bank and its senior vice president for wrongful death. The amended complaint alleged that the decedent suffered from a type of severe anxiety that made him unable to deal with complex financial information.

The decedent and several of his family members met with the lender's representative about a obtaining a loan, and the lender allegedly agreed not to contact the decedent about any substantive or complex financial information. Representatives from the lender also allegedly met with the decedent's doctor to discuss his fragile mental condition.

However, the lender allegedly sent a letter to the decedent denying his loan application and a representative spoke with him on two occasions thereafter. The decedent then went to a motel, took an overdose of medications, and died 3 days later in the hospital.

The trial court granted the lender's motion to dismiss with prejudice because the lender owed no duty to decedent to prevent his suicide.

On appeal, the personal representative of the potential borrower's estate argued that the trial court should not have dismissed the complaint because the decedent's death was foreseeable and the lender assumed a duty when it agreed not to contact the decedent with negative substantive financial information.

The Court began its analysis with the black letter rule of tort law that a claim for negligence requires that the defendant owe a duty of care to the plaintiff, which is a question of law for the court. Whether a legal duty exists depends on foreseeability. The harm must be reasonably foreseeable in order for a duty to exist.

Under Florida law, when a person undertakes or agrees to provide a service, whether gratuitously or for consideration, he or she has a duty to act carefully and not expose others to an undue risk of harm.

Also under Florida law, the general rule is that there is no liability for another person's suicide unless there exists a specific duty of care, such as by "taking custody and control over another." For example, a duty to prevent suicide exists when a patient is committed to a mental hospital or where a child is under a school's supervision. Some Florida courts have also imposed liability on mental health providers whose negligent care results in the patient's suicide.

The Court noted, however, that "[a] legal duty requires more than just foreseeability alone. … A duty requires one to be in a position to 'control the risk.'" It then found that in the case at bar, the lender did not assume any specific duty to prevent the decedent's suicide because, even though it agreed not to share financial information with the decedent, the decedent was not in the lender's custody or control. Unlike a mental hospital, which has the ability to observe and control a patient, the lender "simply had no ability or responsibility to protect the decedent from committing suicide."

The plaintiff argued that one can be found liable for another's suicide so long as the suicide is foreseeable, citingthe principle of maritime law that a ship owner has a duty to prevent foreseeable, self-inflicted injury to crew members. The Court rejected this argument because lenders and their customers "do not share the same, close relationship as ship owners and their seamen. A bank neither supervises its clients' day-to-day activities, nor exerts any type of supervisory control over them."The Court reasoned that the lender does not have such supervisory responsibility, and does not have any duty to "protect its clients against self-inflicted injury."

The Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal order, holding that because the lender had no duty or responsibility to the decedent arising from their relationship, it did not even have to reach the question of whether the suicide was foreseeable.

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Wednesday, January 6, 2016

In a non-precedential ruling, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently affirmed a district court ruling finding that telephone calls placed to a pro se consumer's cellular telephone number did not violate the federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, et seq. ("TCPA") because the calls were placed manually, and not using an automatic telephone dialing system ("ATDS").

In so ruling, the Seventh Circuit focused on the company's representative's declaration and the company's call log establishing that the calls were initiated by a live representative, who made the calls by entering all numbers by hand.

As you may recall, the TCPA defines an ATDS as equipment "which has the capacity - (a) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (b) to dial such numbers." See 47 U.S.C. 227(a)(1).

The TCPA prohibits any person within the United States, or any person outside the United States if the recipient is within the United States to make any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any ATDS or an artificial or prerecorded voice to any telephone number assigned to paging service, cellular telephone service, specialized mobile radio service, or other radio common carrier service, or any service for which the called party is charged for the call. Id. at 227(b)(1).

The Seventh Circuit began its analysis of the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant company and against the plaintiff consumer by examining the evidence presented by the consumer.

The plaintiff consumer cited to the company's website, which advertises that its capabilities "include" ATDSs. He also swore in a declaration that when he answered calls from the company, he heard a "pause," "clicking," and "dead air." The consumer further referred to a guide from the Federal Communication Commission ("FCC"), which explains that use of an ATDS "often" results in "hang ups" and "dead air."

The defendant company submitted a declaration from its vice president and a log of the calls to the consumer's phone to show that the calls at issue were not placed using an ATDS. The declaration stated that the company's system used to call cell phones lacks the capacity to make calls using an ATDS, and that the system requires a live representative to enter all phone numbers by hand.

The district court granted summary judgment for the company. First, it considered and rejected the consumer's objection to the company's declaration. The consumer argued that because the executive did not place the calls to the consumer himself, he lacked personal knowledge of those calls. However, the lower court held that the call records and the declaration were admissible evidence because the vice president was the "custodian of the records" and "familiar with the company's recordkeeping practices."

Therefore, the lower court held, even if the vice president did not make the calls to the consumer's cell phone personally, he could swear to the company's business records and practices.

By contrast, the lower court held that the consumer's evidence was insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact. The company's website did not describe the practice for the calls made to the consumer. And, the lower court also ruled the FCC's guide was inadmissible hearsay; furthermore, even if admissible, it did not refute the company's evidence that no call to the consumer was made using an ATDS.

On appeal, the consumer disputed the district court's grant of summary judgment. The consumer argued that in accepting the vice president's declaration and the call log over his own declaration about clicks and pauses and the FCC guide, the district court improperly weighed evidence, and did not view the consumer's evidence in the light most favorable to him.

The Seventh Circuit disagreed and found that the district court's evidentiary rulings were permissible. First, the Seventh Circuit held that the vice president's declaration and the call logs were admissible – i.e., business records, such as the company's call logs, are admissible when authenticated by a custodian. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(6); Woods v. City of Chicago, 234 F.3d 979, 988 (7th Cir. 2000).

The Seventh Circuit further found that the vice president was the custodian because he was familiar with the company's record keeping practices, and he did not need to have personally made the calls to the consumer to testify about the meaning of the records. See Cocroft v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 796 F.3d 680, 686 (7th Cir. 2015); Thanongsinh v. Bd. of Educ., 462 F.3d 762, 775–77 (7th Cir. 2006).

Next, the Seventh Circuit found that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in excluding as hearsay the excerpt from the FCC guide about "dead air." That excerpt, the Court held, does not fit into any of the relevant hearsay exceptions for public records: the excerpt does not describe the FCC's activities, a matter that it observed, or its factual findings of an investigation. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(8)(A).

However, the Seventh Circuit noted that, even if an exception applied, the evidence was insufficient to create a fact dispute. The FCC guide said only that autodialers often produce dead air; it did not say the converse — that dead air means that a call was autodialed.

The Court noted that calls could be dropped or paused for many reasons; the FCC guide could therefore not tell a rational factfinder why the consumer experienced dead air or a pause on his calls. Finally, the Seventh Circuit held that no genuine fact dispute came from company's website. Instead, the Court noted, the website said only that the company's capabilities include autodialers, but not that it used that capability always or even often, let alone in cases like the consumer's.

The Seventh Circuit held that, with the call log showing that the company manually called the consumer, and no contrary evidence about those calls in the record, the district court correctly granted summary judgment, as no reasonable jury could conclude from this evidence that an ATDS was used to call the consumer. See Ira Holtzman, C.P.A. v. Turza, 728 F.3d 682, 685 (7th Cir. 2013).

Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the company.

It is important to note that the plaintiff consumer in this case was not represented by counsel, and that the Seventh Circuit ruling is non-precedential.

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Sunday, January 3, 2016

Florida's Third District Court of Appeals recently reversed a trial court's mortgage foreclosure judgment against non-signatory co-owners, holding that ratification did not apply where the non-signatory owners received no benefit from the loan proceeds and did not authorize an attorney-in-fact to sign mortgage on their behalf. In so ruling, the Appellate Court rejected the mortgagee efforts to impose an equitable lien on the collateral property.

In October of 2005, a mother and father, who had purchased their home over 30 years ago, signed and recorded a quitclaim deed conveying title to themselves, their son and his wife as joint tenants.

Several months after the quitclaim deed was executed, the son's wife took out a $201,500 mortgage loan. The other three owners did not sign the note or mortgage. In addition, the parents did not receive any of the loan proceeds and never made a payment on the loan.

The borrower defaulted in February of 2009 and the holder of the mortgage sued to foreclose. In 2010, the son and daughter divorced, re-conveying their interests in the collateral to the parents.

At trial, the former daughter-in-law testified that the purpose of the loan was to "collateralize a loan for another property that was to be used for a daycare business." The parents testified that they added their son and then daughter-in-law to the title for estate planning purposes.

The trial court entered final judgment of foreclosure based on an equitable lien and the doctrine of ratification, but stayed enforcement until the parents no longer resided in the property. The court also ordered the parents to pay the property taxes advanced by the lender and taxes going forward if they had the ability to do so.

The plaintiff mortgagee moved for rehearing and the court amended the final judgment to require the parents to report to the court every six months whether the property remained their principal residence. The plaintiff mortgagee appealed and the defendants cross-appealed.

The Third District Court of Appeal began its analysis by reasoning that because the parents never signed the mortgage, the plaintiff mortgagee's ability to foreclose "turns on the applicability of the principle of ratification. Ratification of a mortgage by a non-signatory property owner has been upheld in Florida in two distinct types of cases: (a) went the nonsignatory owner has received the benefit of the mortgage loan proceeds; or (b) when the non-signatory owner has authorized an attorney-in-fact to execute the mortgage on behalf of the owner."

Citing its own precedent, the Court defined ratification as "conduct that indicates an intention, with full knowledge of the facts, to affirm a contract which the person did not enter into or which is otherwise void or voidable." It then found that the parents "neither received loan proceeds, nor otherwise benefitted from the application of those proceeds, nor made any monthly payment, nor acquired full knowledge of the material details of the mortgage loan."

Turning to the second type of case in which ratification of a mortgage by a non-signatory property owner has been upheld, the Third District Court of Appeal reasoned that the lender could have, but did not, protect itself by insisting on the execution of a power of attorney pursuant to section 695.01(1), Florida Statutes, which "provides protection to creditors and purchasers who accept a conveyance or lien signed by an attorney-in-fact on behalf of a property owner (and then recorded), so long as the power of attorney itself is also recorded before the accrual of rights by 'creditors or subsequent purchaser for a valuable consideration and without notice'".

The Court also rejected the argument that the other owners ratified the loan after it closed because "the ratification of the act of an agent previously unauthorized must, in order to bind the principal, be with full knowledge of all the material facts", and there was no evidence that the former daughter-in-law or anyone else informed the parents or her former husband of the material facts of the loan and mortgage.

The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment to the extent that it found that (a) the former daughter-in-law signed the note, received the loan proceeds and is liable under the note; (b) the mortgage was not a lien on the parents' homestead property; and (c) the plaintiff mortgagee only had a lien for any property taxes paid while the case was pending, enforceable when the parents no longer resided on the property.

The final judgment was reversed as to the imposition of an equitable lien for the loan's principal and interest, with instructions that on remand, the trial court should clarify that the parents and their adult son are not personally liable on the note.

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PLEASE NOTE:

The editor and sponsoring law firm of this blog represent and serve banks, lenders, loan buyers, loan servicers, debt collectors, and other financial services companies. We do not represent consumers.

Please note that any communications or information obtained may be provided to our clients, including for the purpose of debt collection.

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Ralph Wutscher's practice focuses primarily on representing depository and non-depository mortgage lenders and servicers, as well as mortgage loan investors, distressed asset buyers and sellers, loss mitigation companies, automobile and other personal property secured lenders and finance companies, credit card and other unsecured lenders, and other consumer financial services providers. He represents the consumer lending industry as a litigator, and as regulatory compliance counsel.

Ralph has substantial experience in defending private consumer finance lawsuits, including cases ranging from large interstate putative class actions to localized single-asset cases, as well as in responding to regulatory investigations and other governmental proceedings. His litigation successes include not only victories at the trial court level, but also on appeal, and in various jurisdictions. He has successfully defended numerous putative class actions asserting violations of a wide range of federal and state consumer protection statutes. He is frequently consulted to assist other law firms in developing or improving litigation strategies in cases filed around the country.

Ralph also has substantial experience in counseling clients regarding their compliance with federal laws, and with state and local laws primarily of the Midwestern United States. For example, he regularly provides assistance in connection with portfolio or program audits, consumer lending disclosure issues, the design and implementation of marketing and advertising campaigns, licensing and reporting issues, compliance with usury laws and other limitations on pricing, compliance with state and local “predatory lending” laws, drafting or obtaining opinion letters on a single- or multi-state basis, interstate branching and loan production office licensing, evaluations and modifications of new or existing products and procedures, debt collection and servicing practices, proper methods of responding to consumer inquiries and furnishing consumer information, as well as proposed or existing arrangements with settlement service providers and other vendors, and the implementation of procedural or other operational changes following developments in the law.

Ralph is a member of the Governing Committee of the Conference on Consumer Finance Law. He is also the immediate past Chair of the Preemption and Federalism Subcommittee for the ABA's Consumer Financial Services Committee. He served on the Law Committee for the former National Home Equity Mortgage Association, and completed two terms as Co-Chair of the Consumer Credit Committee of the Chicago Bar Association.

Ralph received his Juris Doctor from the University of Illinois College of Law, and his undergraduate degree from the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA). He is a member of the national Mortgage Bankers Association, the American Bankers Association, the Conference on Consumer Finance Law, DBA International, the ACA International Members Attorney Program, as well as the American and Chicago Bar Associations.

Ralph is admitted to practice in Illinois, as well as in the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the United States District Courts for the Northern and Southern Districts of Illinois, and the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, and has been admitted pro hac vice in various jurisdictions around the country.