The defence
ministry was not convinced by the IAF’s reasons for abandoning a 2009 decision
to buy 75 trainers from the international market in the “Buy Global” category;
while Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) built 106 in the “Make Indian” category.

Now more
reasons are emerging for being cautious about buying additional Pilatus
trainers. It is unclear whether the IAF has informed the MoD of these.

With 53
PC-7 Mark II trainers already delivered and more on the way, Business Standard has learnt that
Pilatus is shrugging off direct responsibility for their maintenance, repair
and overhaul (MRO).

This after
Pilatus charged the MoD 80.25 million Swiss Francs (Rs 515 crore) for maintenance
knowhow to HAL in the contract signed on May 24, 2012. This so-called
“Maintenance Transfer of Technology” (MToT) was to be formalised in a separate
contract within three years.

With just
six months left for that deadline, there is no contract in sight, only
uncertainty about how the PC-7 Mark II trainers will operate over decades.

Pilatus has
told HAL --- which will eventually maintain the PC-7 Mark II fleet through its
service life after receiving maintenance technology --- to negotiate directly
with sub-vendors for licenses to use and maintain their equipment.

Pilatus
only assembles and integrates the trainer, using sub-systems bought from global
vendors. That means HAL will now have to seek licenses from sub-vendors that include
Pratt & Whitney; Honeywell Aerospace; Rockwell Collins; Claverham and
Ontic.

Pilatus has
flatly refused to be even a signatory to those licensing agreements.

According
to Pilatus, the PC-7 Mark II has 159 sub-assemblies, which are called “line
replaceable units” or LRUs (e.g. the engine supplied by Pratt & Whitney).
The MToT contract drafted by Pilatus covers just 65 LRUs. Pilatus says 72 LRUs are
non-repairable, which should just be thrown away when they go bad. Seven more
LRUs are the responsibility of the IAF; while the remaining 15 items are on
various countries’ “export control lists” and would have to be stocked in
advance.

Pilatus wants
HAL to negotiate individually with 29 global vendors that provide the 65 replaceable
items. There is no telling what price they will demand. When Pilatus charged Swiss
Francs 80.25 million for MToT, it did nothing to bind the sub-vendors to
conform to this price.

With
foreign vendors confident that the IAF has nowhere else to go, they are
negotiating for fees much higher than had been budgeted.

Contacted
for comments, Pilatus cited a confidentiality agreement with the MoD, but
stated that, “suffice it to say that we are working on this diligently to
achieve an acceptable outcome for the GOI and IAF. As Pilatus does not hold
authority over the individual companies regarding licensing of other vendor IP
rights, it is using its best endeavors to mediate between each company and HAL
to reach an acceptable position.”

A key
vendor, Honeywell, admits it is in “active discussion with HAL on this program”
for a “licensing arrangement”. Another vendor, Rockwell Collins, declined to
comment.

When the
main contract was being negotiated, HAL had alerted the IAF to clearly list Pilatus’
maintenance responsibilities. However, with the IAF eager to seal the contract,
Pilatus’s obligations remained vague.

Now the IAF
itself is passing the buck to HAL. In emailed comments, the IAF stated, “The
MToT of Pilatus was negotiated at contract negotiation stage by a team of HAL
specialists headed by a GM level officer… It will be a prudent to ask HAL
as to why they have not signed the MToT contract with Pilatus.”

Within six
months of the contract, Pilatus made it clear it would assume minimal
responsibilities. On November 30, 2012, a draft contract from Pilatus proposed
to confine MToT to facilities set up by HAL.

Pilatus repudiated
responsibility for renewing original equipment manufacturer (OEM) licences,
updating technical documents, software upgrades and maintenance of special
tools and test equipment --- which are standard MToT components. For these
India would require separate contracts at extra cost, over and above the 80.25
million Swiss Francs the main contract specified for MToT.

Under
Pilatus’ draft contract, India will have to pay for establishing maintenance
facilities like the Engine Test Bed. Pilatus would only provide the design.

According
to established norms, aircraft acquisition contracts include aspects of maintenance,
including details of initial repair kits, base spares, and licensing and
escalation mechanisms for 30 years.

(This is the concluding part of a two-part
series on the Pilatus trainer)

Saturday, 29 November 2014

Interviewing Dr Avinash Chander when he took over as DRDO chief last year

By Ajai
Shukla

Business Standard, 29th Nov 14

Giving the
lie to sustained media speculation about sweeping change in the Defence R&D
Organisation (DRDO), Prime Minister Narendra Modi has endorsed the current
leadership. On Friday, DRDO chief, Dr Avinash Chander was given an 18-month
extension that lets him head the organization till May 31, 2016.

The United
Progressive Alliance (UPA) government had appointed Chander for a 3-year term,
starting from June 1, 2013, even though he had already been given two
extensions of service. When the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government
took charge, rumour had swirled that Chander would not continue beyond November
31, 2014, when he would reach the age of superannuation, i.e. 65 years.

Expectation
of change was further fuelled on Modi’s first visit to the DRDO on August 20,
when he publicly criticised the DRDO’s “chalta hai” (anything goes) attitude,
and suggested that the DRDO should empower younger scientists. The PM
specifically suggested manning 5 of the DRDO’s 52 laboratories with scientists
who were all under 35 years of age.

That
speculation was put to rest today. Announcing that Dr Avinash Chander would indeed
retire from government service when he superannuated on November 30, he was
retained for another 18 months on contract.

“The
appointment of Dr. Avinash Chander beyond his date of retirement i.e.
30.11.2014 for 18 months would be on contract basis, with the same terms and
conditions as he would be entitled to Secretary (Defence R&D) before the
date of retirement. His contractual term will end on 31 May 2016”, said a
defence ministry announcement.

Besides the post of Secretary (Defence R&D), Chander is also Director General of
the DRDO (possibly being upgraded to Chairman, DRDO); and Scientific Advisor to
the Raksha Mantri (SA to RM).

Chander is a missile specialist who had, as Director of the
Advanced Systems Laboratory, Hyderabad, developed the Agni from a
1,500-kilometre missile that was of practical use only against Pakistan
(targets in China are all beyond this range) to a 3,500 kilometre range missile
that was India’s first viable deterrent against China.

Last year, as the chief controller of the DRDO’s missile
programme, Chander oversaw the development of the 5,000-kilometre Agni-5
missile and the K-15 submarine launched ballistic missile.

Mauritius and HAL sign a contract for an HAL-built Dornier at Port Louis on November 27, 2014.

In a Rs
100-crore boost to India’s defence exports, Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) have signed a contract in Mauritius for the supply of a Dornier-228 maritime
surveillance aircraft, which is manufactured in HAL’s Kanpur facility. The
aircraft will boost Mauritius’ ability to monitor its waters.

On November 28, the defence minister told parliament that India's total defence exports this year were Rs 166 crore. The sale of the Dornier boosts that figure by more than 60 per cent to Rs 266 crore.

HAL has
earlier supplied Mauritius with Cheetah, Chetak and Dhruv helicopters, and with
two maritime-version Dorniers.

The Dornier-228
is a 19-seater, lightweight, twin turboprop aircraft that can take off in 700 metres
and land within 575 metres --- essential requirements for operating from short
and semi-prepared airfields. HAL has equipped the aircraft with
customer-specified sensors like 360-degree radar, Forward Looking Infra-Red
(FLIR), traffic collision and avoidance system (TCAS) and weather radar.

India seeks to retain close links with Mauritius as an Indian Ocean partner country. Meanwhile, China is offering huge financial incentives to Indian Ocean island states, seeking to build its own relationships in India's backyard. According to various media reports, China has financed almost 50 development projects in Mauritius, including a low-interest loan of $260 million for an airport terminal at Port Louis.

Thursday, 27 November 2014

This map incorrectly shows Sikkim as disputed. The Central Sector is actually in Uttarakhand

By Ajai
Shukla

Business Standard, 27th Nov 14

Since 2003,
in 17 rounds of talks, India and China have relied on quiet diplomacy between a
top official from either side to resolve their thorny territorial dispute. Termed
“Special Representatives” or SRs, these negotiators --- who must enjoy the
confidence of their national leaders --- are mandated to bypass the endless technical
wrangling of diplomats, bureaucrats and soldiers.

On November
24, Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced that National Security Advisor (NSA)
Ajit Doval would "conduct boundary negotiations and strategic
consultations with China".

Doval will
be India’s fifth SR; after Brajesh Mishra (2003-04); JN Dixit (2004-05); MK
Narayanan (2005-10); and Shivshankar Menon (2010-14). For a decade, China’s SR was the redoubtable
Dai Bingguo, who has been lauded by Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinsky.
Dai retired last year to be succeeded by Yang Jiechi.

Modi had
first offered the job of SR to former foreign secretary and respected
Sinologist, Shyam Saran, who declined. The rank of “principal secretary” that
Saran was offered was two ranks below his Chinese interlocutor, Yang Jiechi, who
holds the rank of State Councillor --- one rung above a minister.

Doval has
accepted the challenge at his current rank of “principal secretary”. He will
now negotiate with Yang Jiechi to decide ownership of some 1,30,000 square
kilometres (sq km) of territory that both countries claim. This is spread
across three areas --- (a) The uninhabited Western Sector in Ladakh, where the
dispute involves 38,000 sq km; (b) The small Central Sector in Uttarakhand,
which is just 2,000 sq km; and (c) The large and contentious Eastern Sector, which
measures some 90,000 sq km, practically the whole of Arunachal Pradesh.

Sources close
to the negotiations say that New Delhi has been prepared to accept Beijing’s claims
in the Western Sector, provided China accepted India’s claims in the Eastern
Sector with the relatively inconsequential Central Sector resolved through
minor give-and-take. Beijing, however, demands “substantive concessions” in the
Eastern Sector --- specifically ceding to China ownership of the strategic
Tawang district. This is unacceptable to New Delhi.

Notwithstanding
this deadlock, previous SRs negotiated an “Agreement on Political Parameters
and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the China–India Boundary
Question”, which was signed during Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to India in April
2005.

Doval will have
to translate this into a “Framework Agreement” for a final settlement, after
which a new border will be delineated and demarcated.

The
“Political Parameters” of 2005 are viewed as a triumph in New Delhi because
they include two points that favour India’s case. These are (a) Article VI:
“The boundary should be along well-defined and easily identifiable natural
geographical features to be mutually agreed upon between the two sides”; and
(b) Article VII: “In reaching a boundary settlement, the two sides shall
safeguard due interests of their settled populations in the border areas.”

Indian
diplomats see China’s acceptance of the watershed principle as tacit acceptance
of the McMahon Line, drawn along the watershed in 1914, which India claims is
the border between Arunachal Pradesh and Tibet. The clause about protecting the
settled populations is seen in New Delhi as Chinese acceptance that populous
Tawang remains with India.

China downplays
these assumptions. Beijing signed the “Political Parameters” under pressure, at
a time when New Delhi’s international profile was growing. In 2005, a burgeoning
growth rate had made India the darling of global investors. New Delhi was
edging closer to Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s Japan. With the US-India
strategic partnership flowering, and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh due to visit
Washington, Beijing clearly folded under the pressure.

Says a
senior diplomat of that era: “China apparently resolved to make Wen’s visit to
India a grand success, hoping to take some of the shine off Dr Manmohan Singh’s
forthcoming US visit. New Delhi successfully leveraged Beijing’s concerns and
pushed through a favourable “Political Parameters” agreement that the Chinese
premier signed in India on April 11, 2005.

Even so, New
Delhi failed to maintain the momentum. The global economic crisis, India’s
growth slump, and political paralysis in New Delhi gave Beijing little
incentive to continue purposeful negotiations.

With
India’s political wheel turning full circle this year, Doval will negotiate
from an expanding diplomatic space. Prime Minister Modi’s powerful domestic mandate,
revitalised ties with Japan and Vietnam, and a burgeoning US-India relationship
--- evident from President Barack Obama’s forthcoming visit to New Delhi as
Republic Day chief guest --- could induce Beijing to resume serious
negotiations.

Over time,
the SR dialogue has grown in scope. Besides the boundary question, it has become
a standing forum for strategic discussions between New Delhi and Beijing. The
two SRs discuss sensitive issues when they meet one-on-one; while the visit agenda
occasionally includes a “retreat” outside the capital, where they have ample opportunity
to exchange ideas, views and to float trial balloons.

The SR
talks are complemented by two other simultaneous dialogue tracks. One is
between India’s foreign secretary and China’s equivalent vice-minister for foreign
affairs. The second track is a Technical Group, which includes the dealing
foreign ministry officials from both sides. This resolves the nuts and bolts
issues of border management, such as confidence building measures (CBMs).

The SR
Dialogue was instituted during Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee’s visit to
China in 2003. There had been little progress in 8 rounds of talks between
officials from 1981-88; and in 14 meetings of a Joint Working Group (JWG) from
1988-2003. Both sides agreed that a political solution to the boundary question,
negotiated between empowered, top-level officials, would allow the pursuit of
broader strategic goals.

The first challenge
for Doval would be to obtain a clear negotiating mandate. So far, there has
been little clarity on India’s bottom lines. While both sides would accept a
border settlement on their own terms; reconciling those might involve
concessions. It remains for the prime minister to gauge what concessions he can
sell to parliament and the people.

Tuesday, 25 November 2014

An
ill-informed public narrative centres on expensive weapons platforms instead of
the little things that would improve capability

By Ajai Shukla

25th November 2014

Going by
the public statements made so far by Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar, one
could be forgiven for mistaking him as minister for defence procurement. In
practically every statement he promises “transparency and speed in defence
procurement”. To be fair, he admits it will take him time to grasp issues
relating to national defence. Even so, if he continues promising only faster
procurement, it might well become a self-fulfilling prophecy. It would be
worrying to have a defence minister who measures his success in capital rupees
spent. Instead, Mr Parrikar must focus on adding capability. This can be done
at relatively nominal cost.

A striking
example has been reported in Broadsword (See article below, “Advanced Towed Array Sonar contract provides major boost to navy”).
Over the last two decades, the navy has built up a powerful and enormously
expensive fleet of capital warships --- the aircraft carriers, destroyers,
frigates and corvettes that control the seas in war. Yet these warships, each
costing several thousand crore rupees and crewed by a couple of hundred
sailors, have remained desperately vulnerable to enemy submarines. This is simply
because they lack “advanced towed array sonar”, or ATAS, which the Defence
R&D Organisation (DRDO) had promised to deliver but did not. By now procuring
ATAS from the global market --- each worth a piffling Rs 50 crore --- tens of
thousands of crores worth of naval warships have become combat capable.

Such
examples abound within the military. Yet the ill-informed public narrative on
defence procurement centres on enormously expensive weapons platforms that, in
many cases, are operationally ineffective even after lavishing billions because
smaller systemic or structural drawbacks restrict their full employment. In
militaries like that of Pakistan, where money is short even after unfairly
burdening the national exchequer, there is awareness of the need to obtain bang
for the buck. India’s relative wealth has not nearly been translated into commensurate
capability.

Remaining
with the navy (ironically the most cost conscious service), there is constant breast-beating
over the submarine shortfall and China’s growing lead in submarine numbers. The
media constantly harps on how India has just 13 submarines compared to China’s
53 conventional and 5 nuclear attack submarines, though that lead could increase
this afternoon, giving how fast China is building more. Everyone’s solution, predictably,
is to throw more money at the problem, by quickly sanctioning (quickly and
transparently, as Parrikar would say!) Project 75I, which envisages building
six new submarines for a mind-numbing Rs 50,000 crore.

Yet if one
were to scrutinise the on-going Project 75, under which Mazagon Dock Ltd,
Mumbai is building six Scorpene submarines, a sane planner would be aghast to
discover that these submarines --- which have been in the works for more than a
decade --- will be operationally hamstrung when they finally roll off the line.
The submarine’s key weapon is the heavyweight torpedo and, incredibly, the MoD
has omitted to buy any for the Scorpene. In 2011, Finmeccanica subsidiary WASS
had been selected to supply 98 torpedoes for some Rs 1,850 crore. Since that
contract remains unsigned, the Scorpenes will join the fleet without their key
weapon.

Yet, nobody
in the military, the ministry, the government or the media is called to account
for allowing a Rs 1,850 crore procurement to stall the battle-readiness of Rs
24,000 crore worth of submarines. One can forgive the ministry, manned as it is
by generalists for whom torpedo sounds like a variety of libido. The Prime Minister’s
Office, with so many ministries to meddle in, can only focus on big bang
procurements --- and that means those that are regularly reported on, or those
that the military is pressing for. The media, especially top editors, choose
not to waste mind space on the nitty-gritty of defence economics, and instead
focus their collective gaze on high-voltage procurement contracts that can be
easily remembered by the billions they cost.

Take the
media fanfare over the selection of the medium multi-role combat aircraft
(MMRCA), an apparently fixed match that was won by the French Rafale fighter,
the least expensive of the two most expensive fighters on offer, which were predictably
ushered into the final selection. Currently, this $20 billion tender remains
the single most reported defence story, with uncounted column inches speculating
on the imminent signature of the Rafale contract. This newspaper has been
practically alone in carrying cost-benefit analyses on the Rafale proposal, and
in debating whether the opportunity cost of buying this fighter is too high.

In
contrast, there is little mind space for the little things that would improve
operational capability at little cost. Maintenance, that boring process that
can put a hundred additional Sukhoi-30MKIs into the sky just by better
inventory control and technician training. Light fighters, especially the Tejas
Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), which should be the pride of India but is sadly
the bastard child of the laughably named Indian Air Force. Force multipliers,
like airborne refuelling aircraft and airborne early warning and control
systems, can be wisely procured and deployed to make each squadron as effective
as two. But this is humdrum stuff. So are issues like night-blindness that
dramatically reduces combat capability across the three services, especially
the army.

It is these
mundane essentials that Mr Parrikar must focus on. Appointing a tri-service
chief would spare him the confusion of having to navigate the tri-service
jockeying for funds and resources. He must institute a detailed capability
audit, in which each service presents a plan for optimising their existing weapons
and platforms rather than just stretching out their palms for newer, better
and, of course, more expensive toys. It is militarily prudent to get our
existing kit working optimally --- the military equivalent of fixing the Indian
Railways before building fancy new bullet train lines.

Atlas Elektronik wins ATAS contract, poised for more gains in the massive Indian sonar market

By Ajai
Shukla

Business Standard, 25th Nov 14

On November
12, without announcement or fanfare, the ministry of defence (MoD) signed a
small contract with enormous implications for itself and the Indian Navy. This
formalized the purchase of six advanced towed array sonar (ATAS) systems from
Atlas Elektronik, the German naval systems giant, for just under Euro 40
million (Rs 306 crore).

These ATAS
systems will equip three Talwar-class frigates (INS Talwar, Trishul and Tabar) and
three Delhi-class destroyers (INS Delhi, Mumbai and Mysore), allowing them to
detect enemy submarines in the Arabian Sea, where the warm, shallow waters
confound conventional hull-mounted sonars.

Without
ATAS, all the warships the navy has built and bought since the 1990s --- each
costing a few thousand crore and crewed by a couple of hundred sailors --- would
be sitting ducks in war. Enemy submarines, lurking unseen 50-80 kilometres away,
could leisurely torpedo Indian warships.

So vulnerable
has been India’s fleet that, when INS Vikramaditya, the navy’s new aircraft
carrier, was sailing home from Russia, it was escorted through the Arabian Sea
by several Indian warships. There was no certainty that Pakistan’s Agosta 90B
submarines could be detected by sonar systems other than ATAS.

So important
is the ATAS contract that the MoD abandoned even the pretence of
indigenisation. Atlas Elektronik will build all six ATAS systems in Germany, and
has been exempted from offsets.

ATAS is
especially vital in the Arabian Sea. Warships detect underwater objects (like
submarines) with sonar --- a “ping” of sound emitted into the water that
reflects from submarines, just as radar bounces back from aircraft. In our
warm, shallow waters, the returning signal often gets lost. Since the water is
warm on the surface and cools rapidly as one goes deeper, the sharp
“temperature gradient” refracts sonar waves, bending them away from the
warship’s sensors. Unable to receive the returning signal, the warship cannot
detect the submarine.

ATAS
overcomes the “temperature gradient”, since it is towed by a cable that extends
deep below the surface, into the cooler layers where submarines lurk. With the
sensors themselves in the colder water layers, there is no “temperature
differential”. Even the faintest return signal from a submarine is detected.

The navy will fit ATAS externally onto the rear of its
warships, which have been built for this reason with an empty compartment at
the rear.

With this
contract, Atlas Elektronik has taken pole position for supplying the navy a
range of high-end sonars. Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL), which is required to
build ten ATAS with foreign partnership, has been encouraged by the navy to tie
up with Atlas so that sonar equipment is standardised across warships.

BEL is
learnt to be in discussions with Atlas for building ten ATAS for three
Shivalik-class frigates (INS Shivalik, Satpura and Sahyadri), three
Kolkata-class destroyers (Kolkata, Kochi and Chennai), and four Kamorta-class
anti-submarine corvettes (INS Kamorta, Kadmatt, Kiltan and Kavaratti).

That leaves
20 warships that will remain in naval service for some years. These include:
three aircraft carriers (INS Vikramaditya, Vikrant and Vishal); three Brahmaputra
class frigates (INS Brahmaputra, Betwa and Beas); three Talwar-class follow-on frigates
(INS Teg, Tarkash and Trikand); four Project 15-B destroyers (unnamed, under
construction); and seven Project 17-A frigates (unnamed, contract being negotiated).

Given its
first-mover advantage, the infrastructure and partnerships it will build and
its already demonstrated price advantage, Atlas hopes to supply sonar systems for
these and for other smaller surface warships and submarines. In April,
the MoD tendered for 16 Anti Submarine Warfare Shallow Water Craft (ASWC),
which need sophisticated sonar with electronically controlled beams.

Atlas
Elektronik sources say they are eager to establish a joint venture company with
either BEL or an Indian private sector company to build sonars in India. That
would grant majority ownership of 51 per cent to the Indian entity.

ATAS import
has been blocked since the mid-1990s because the Defence R&D Organisation
(DRDO) was developing an indigenous ATAS called Nagan. In 2012, the Nagan
project was officially shut down and work began on another system called ALTAS.
With this making slow progress, the DRDO finally okayed import.

In November
2012, two years ago, Atlas was declared the lowest bidder. That was followed by
a string of complaints to the MoD against Atlas, apparently motivated, since
the MoD found no wrongdoing. Even so, with the ministry painstakingly investigating
every complaint, each caused a 3-4 month delay. Earlier this year, with the
elections impending, the United Progressive Alliance decided to leave the
signing to the next government.

Sunday, 23 November 2014

Indian vendors, like Tata Power, are geared up for the mounted gun project with products like this

By Ajai
Shukla

Business Standard, 23rd Nov 14

At an apex
meeting of the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) on Saturday, the Ministry of
Defence (MoD) has tried to revive the flagging purchase of artillery for an
army that has bought no modern guns since 1987, when the procurement
environment was deeply scarred by the Bofors scandal.

Defence
Minister Manohar Parrikar, chairing his first DAC meeting, sanctioned the start
of what could be another tortuous, multi-year procurement of 814 mounted gun
systems (MGS) for an estimated Rs 15,750 crore ($3 billion).

These 155
millimetre/52 calibre guns are being bought in the “Buy & Make (Indian)”
category of the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP). In this, Indian companies
will establish joint ventures with foreign gun-makers; which will build the guns
in India. The DAC ruled that the first 100 MGS can be imported ready-built,
while the remaining 714 must be fabricated in India.

Indian
vendors have long awaited this tender, with technology partnerships tied up and
ready. The frontrunners are: L&T, with French company, Nexter; Bharat
Forge with Israeli company, Elbit; Tata Power SED with South African company,
Denel; and BEML or Punj Lloyd with a Slovakian gun company.

Over the
last two decades, artillery procurement has seen many false starts. Numerous
tenders have been floated in five categories of 155 millimetre guns. These
include the purchase of (a) 1,580 towed guns; (b) 100 tracked (self-propelled)
guns; (c) 180 wheeled (self-propelled) guns; and 145 ultralight howitzers.

This
variety caters for diverse operating scenarios. Towed guns are for regular use
in plains and mountains; tracked (self-propelled) guns are mounted in armoured
vehicles to support tank formations; wheeled (self-propelled) guns are for
fast-moving, non-armoured formations; while the ultralight howitzers, which can
be lifted by helicopters to remote locations are for mountain divisions. The
MGS is a regular 155-millimetre gun fitted onto a high mobility vehicle. This
allows it to move and come into action quicker than a conventional towed gun.

Yet these
guns have one thing in common: the MoD has not bought a single one. Several gun
trials are still continuing.

Separately,
the MoD has ordered several indigenous gun programmes. The Ordnance Factory
Board (OFB) is supplying 114 Dhanush 155-millimetre/45-calibre
guns. These are based on the technology transferred by Swedish gun maker,
Bofors AG as part of the controversial procurement of 410 Bofors guns in the
late 1980s. If these guns perform well, this order could rise to 414 guns.

Meanwhile,
the Defence R&D Organisation is spearheading the Advanced Towed Artillery
Gun (ATAG) project, to build a more powerful 155-millimetre/52-calibre gun,
with an ambitious range of 60 kilometres, and a weight of just 12 tonnes. This
all-Indian project includes private sector players like L&T, Bharat Forge
and Tata Power SED.

The DAC
meeting also reviewed, but postponed decision on, the Indian Air Force (IAF)
proposal to order 38 additional PC-7 Mark II basic trainer aircraft from Swiss
company, Pilatus, which has already won a contract to supply 75 aircraft for
Swiss Francs 577 million (Rs 3,727 crore).

While the
IAF has pressed hard for exercising the “options clause” on the Pilatus
contract, Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) told the DAC today that its
indigenous project to build the Hindustan Turbo Trainer – 40 (HTT-40) is well
along, and the home-grown trainer would make its first flight next year.

The DAC
also heard that IAF training is continuing on the Pilatus trainers already
ordered; the HTT-40 would be maintained cheaply by HAL; the Indian trainer
could be armed and sold to buyers like Afghanistan, which cannot be done with
foreign aircraft due to “end user restrictions”; and the HTT-40 is in line with
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s “Make in India” philosophy.

Furthermore,
in 2009, the DAC had itself cleared the purchase of 181 basic trainers in two
separate categories --- 75 trainers in the “Buy Global” category; and 106 built
by HAL in the “Make Indian” category. The DAC asked why the IAF was now
proposing a new “Buy & Make” category procurement to build the Pilatus in
India.

The defence
minister ordered the IAF to explain this change, which would be reviewed at a future
DAC meeting. Parrikar said the DAC’s tradition of monthly meetings did not
preclude more frequent meetings for urgent matters.

On November
26, HAL will conduct its first detailed briefing of the new defence minister,
where Parrikar will be brought up-to-date with the progress on the HTT-40. HAL
sources say the development is complete, the construction of the first trainer
is well under way and it will make its first flight by mid-2015.

Friday, 21 November 2014

A design graphic of the HTT-40, which HAL says will make its first flight next year

By Ajai
Shukla

Business Standard, 21 Nov 14

In his
first television interview as defence minister, aired on November 14, Manohar
Parrikar regretted the military’s “craze for importing everything”, including
relatively low-tech weaponry that could be designed and built in India.

“First
priority has to be to identify (equipment) for “Indian Make” and then only for
the imports, wherever required”, stated Parrikar.

On
Saturday, Parrikar’s resolve will be tested at his first Defence Acquisition
Council (DAC) meeting, which clears high-value military procurements. The DAC
will decide on the Indian Air Force (IAF) proposal for importing 38 Pilatus
PC-7 Mark II basic trainer aircraft, even as Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL)
designs an Indian equivalent, the Hindustan Turbo Trainer – 40 (HTT-40).

HAL credibly
claims it can build the HTT-40 basic trainer, having demonstrated design skills
on the far more sophisticated Tejas Light Combat Aircraft. The first HTT-40 will
fly next year, says HAL.

HAL presents
the HTT-40 as a cheaper, better trainer than the PC-7 Mark II. It is built to
Indian specifications, can be upgraded over its 30-year service life as
technology advances, and maintained and overhauled more cheaply than a foreign trainer.

HAL also
points out it can fit sensors and weapons on the HTT-40 to make it a “light
attack aircraft”, prohibited by the “end-use conditions” on foreign trainers
like the Pilatus.

Arming the
HTT-40 would facilitate export to countries like Afghanistan, which desperately
wants light attack aircraft to support Afghan soldiers combating the Taliban. Currently,
Brazil is building twenty light trainers --- the A-29 Super Tucano --- for the
Afghan Air Force, at American cost.

The MoD acknowledges
HAL’s logic. On September 29, 2009 the ministry decided to procure the IAF’s
requirement of 181 basic trainers from two sources --- 75 bought off-the-shelf
from the global market so that IAF training could continue; while HAL would
develop and build 106 HTT-40s under the “Make” procedure.

The IAF,
however, has consistently undermined this arrangement since May 24, 2012, when
it signed a Swiss Francs 577 million (Rs 3,727 crore) contract with Pilatus for
75 trainers. As Business Standard reported (July 29, 2013, “Indian Air Force at war with Hindustan Aeronautics; wants to import,
not build, a trainer”) former IAF chief, Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne,
wrote to then defence minister, AK Antony, asking him to exercise an “Option
Clause” in the contract with Pilatus to procure 38 more PC-7 Mk IIs; and then
also buy the remaining 68 trainers from Pilatus as a “Repeat Procurement”,
which requires no trials.

For Pilatus,
that would have amounted to a windfall of some Swiss Francs 700-800 million (Rs
4,500-5,150 crore). For HAL, and for India, it would mean the doors being
slammed on the indigenous HTT-40 project.

Browne told
Antony the HTT-40 was too expensive, claiming it would cost Rs 43.59 crore at
2011 prices. In contrast, said the IAF chief, the PC-7 Mark II cost just Rs 30
crore.

Incredibly,
the air chief deliberately understated the rupee cost of the PC-7 Mark II. In
fact, its price of Swiss Francs 6.09 million amounted to Rs 40 crore, because
of the depreciating rupee.

With the
MoD refusing to oblige Pilatus with an order for more trainers, the IAF then
approached HAL to build the PC-7 Mark II with technology from Pilatus. HAL,
which was making headway on the HTT-40, flatly rejected the IAF proposal.

A rattled
IAF then decided to go it alone. On October 8, 2013, Browne bizarrely stated that
the IAF’s base repair depots (BRDs) --- which are meant to overhaul aircraft
and engines --- would build the PC-7 Mark II in partnership with Pilatus. The
MoD simply ignored that proposal.

Rebuffed,
the IAF then looked towards the private sector. In March, with elections
impending, the IAF floated a “Request for Information” --- a pre-tender enquiry
--- inviting Indian companies to partner Pilatus and submit preliminary bids to
supply the IAF with 106 PC-7 Mk II trainers. In the MoD’s procurement rulebook,
this is termed a “Buy & Make (Indian)” acquisition.

In all
this, the IAF apparently lost sight of the fact that the DAC had cleared two
procurements in two separate categories --- 75 trainers in “Buy Global” and 106
in “Make Indian”.

Defence
Minister Parrikar will make a far-reaching decision in Saturday’s DAC meeting. Sanctioning
the purchase of 38 more PC-7 Mark IIs from Pilatus would whittle down HAL’s
“Make” project from 106 HTT-40s to just 68, undermining the business case for
an Indian production line.

“Pilatus is
waiting. If India exercises the option for 38 more PC-7 Mark II, the remaining
68 trainers will probably also be built in Switzerland. The HTT-40 project will
suffer a mortal blow,” says respected aviation expert, Pushpindar Singh.