Intro

Should fucking in public be legalised? Yes.

Note, I'm not talking about fucking on a remote beach in the
dead of night. But somewhere like Hyde Park (central Sydney/London) or Bondi Beach at
noon. So the thesis is: Fucking in public should be
legalised.

Community standards retort

Immediately we ought dismiss the retort from community
standards. That is, fucking in public should not be
legalized because that would contradict the community
standard. When it comes to evaluating whether a particular
community standard is right or wrong, good or bad, it is no
good appealing to the community standard itself. That would
be question begging.

This manoeuvre exists due to the infestation of ethical relativism.
This is, the view that what it is right
to do for a group just depends on whatever that group
believes it is right to do. This makes any argument for
social change unreasonable.

By ethical relativism, if the group believes that women
shouldn't vote then it IS right, for that group, that woman
shouldn't vote. Anyone who lived at a time when the dominant
view was that woman shouldn't vote would have no
basis to argue that women should have the right to
vote, if ethical relativism where true.

So when we ask, "should it be legal for women to vote?" if we
hear a retort "No it shouldn't because the community standard
is for woman not to vote." then that can be dismissed as
question begging. So too when we ask, "Should
fucking in public be legalized?" the argument "no it
shouldn't because it's not the community standard." is
question begging. The question is: ought the community
standard be as it is?

History of the visibility of skin

Consider the history of community standards about the
visibility of skin in public. Once upon a time on Bondi beach
a man or woman could go nude without any fuss.

Then the invasion of Australia happened. A new dominant group
imposed a different standard. From 1833 to 1902 in the
colony of NSW to preserve decency bathing in the daylight
hours was banned.

In 1833, to preserve decency in this newly found colony,
the Governor of the day banned sea bathing completely during
daylight hours. It was not until 1902, after a lot of civil
disobedience and many arrests, that this law was finally
revoked.

During some points of the community standard of the Victorian
Era (Queen Victoria Reigned from 1837 - 1901) using the word "leg" during
some conversational contexts was shunned. The preferred euphemism
was "limb".

At least as late of 1907 many where trying to sustain the ban
on daylight bathing. For example the mayor of Waverley, R G
Watkins, argued in a newspaper interview:

The parks adjoining the bathing ground, especially at Bondi
are intended for the use of women and children. We cannot
have the surf bathers infringing upon their rights. People
who patronise them [the parks] should not be compelled to
overlook bathers whom they do not agree with.

Exposing so much as an ankle on the beach was prohibited.
Indeed on Boston Beach, 1907, Annette Kellerman, a famous Australian
swimmer, was arrested for indecency in virtue of wearing a swimming
costume that revealed her arms and legs.

In essence, over time the amount of skin that could be shown
has increased. It became fine, by the community standard, to
show ankle, knee, thigh, then a two piece costume rather than
a one piece, until we have the situation today. On Bondi
beach it's quite common and causes no fuss at all for a woman to
be wearing nothing but a G string. Men too will expose their
arse cheeks without causing any fuss as they dismount a surf
boat.

Change over time

Again just because the community standard on the visibility
of skin in public has changed over time does not, in and of
itself, mean that this change is right.

Without considering any other factor it might be change for
the worse. Perhaps, the Victorian Era had it right: When
we enter the surf we should be surrounded by a swimming
machine.

Thinking it bad makes it bad.

But the change has occurred in virtue of good reason. When we look
back we find those prior standards to be arbitrary and not
based on any legitimate concern.

For example we look back to when an exposure of knee was
prohibited, and say there is nothing necessary about a
visible knee causing physical or psychological harm.

The source of distress that a visible knee caused was
entirely due to the belief that a visible knee should excite
distress, not the knee itself. A case of the thing not being
bad, but the thinking of it, as bad, making it so.

No Public Knee, Compulsory Burqa, No Public Fucking

But we look back on the Victorian era requirement to cover a
knee not just as a quaint bygone standard but as an
immorality. We say, rightly, that this was an example of
sexual oppression. A denial of sexual freedom.

We don't have to travel too far back on time for this. The
Taliban required women to wear the Burqa.

This was
regarded by many, and rightly, as an example of sexual
oppression. A violation of a right.

Pointing at the requirement to cover, whether in Taliban
Afghanistan or Victorian Era Australia, is to point to
examples of community standards which where sexually
oppressive. An oppression of pleasure and oppression of an
important aspect of ourselves, our sexuality.

As much as the prohibition of a knee in public is an unjust
sexual oppression, as much as a compulsory Burqa is an unjust
sexual oppression, so too is the prohibition against fucking
in public.

The End of the Progression ...

If we believe that the recent history of the visibility of
skin on Bondi beach - being permitted at first to expose an
ankle, then knee, thigh, and today breasts and arse cheeks -
is a progression, where should that end?

You might agree that in the same way that there is nothing
inherently harmful about a visible knee, there is nothing
inherently harmful about a visible genital. You might say,
then, that the end point of the progression ought be when
Bondi beach returns to its former status as clothing
optional.

But just as there is nothing inherently harmful about a
visible knee, nor a visible genital, there is nothing
inherently harmful in the visibility of other people using
these exposed body parts to give each other pleasure.

There exists no reason to suppose that public displays of
sexual pleasure might, in and of themselves, cause or
constitute harm.

More Arguments

There are more arguments to consider. For example there
are the retorts. "It will devalue sex."; and "What about
ugly people?" I'll leave those for now.

Summary

Should fucking in public be legalized? Yes.

To say that it shouldn't because it violates a community
standard is question begging. We are evaluating whether the
community standard is right.

The history of the visibility of skin demonstrates a series
of arbitrary prohibitions. There is nothing inherently bad
about a visible knee, it was the mere thinking of it as bad
that made it so.

We judge the Taliban Afghanistan or the Victorian Era
requirement to cover bodies as an unjust sexual oppression.
It follows that we must judge the requirement, in our own
time and place, to cover our bodies, even if it's a smaller
part of it, as an unjust sexual repression. We ought be free
to go nude in public.

Furthermore, Just as there is nothing inherently harmful
about a visible knee nor visible genital there is no reason
to suppose that the visibility of other people using these
body parts to pleasure themselves is inherently harmful.

Conclusion

While there are more pressing injustices, the illegality of
fucking in public counts as a grotesque injustice. The
illegality is based on a long and continuing belief that,
ultimately, there is something disgusting about sex. The only
thing harmful about fucking in public is the belief that it
is so.

Retorts, Points and Questions

Any blockquote bellow will represent a paraphrase of a retort,
point or question made on the night or during personal conversation.

Link between the history of nudity and public fucking unclear.

The link is: the same kind of considerations that lead to a prohibition against
bathing in the daylight hours or the prohibition against a woman exposing her face
is the same kind of consideration behind the prohibition against public fucking.

There are some moral differences. For example, the prohibition against public fucking
isn't sexist. The compulsory burqa was a sexist requirement. Men didn't have to wear one. The prohibition against
public bathing while being applied equally to men and women was argued for in part on sexist grounds.
Men could handle the sight of bathers but women couldn't. These moral differences
don't prevent the common consideration from being identified.

The common consideration underlying the prohibitions is a fear that the witnessing of other
people might cause the witness to have sexual thoughts. If that fear was unwarranted in the case
of public bathing why should it be warranted when it comes to public fucking? ...

The question should be evaluated on its merits, independent of the past.

The concern to prohibit public fucking might be warranted because
public fucking is different from public nudity. They are separate cases that
might have different consequences.

There are differences between these cases and there could be different outcomes.
But there is no reason, at the moment, to suppose there are significant moral differences.

You can consider public fucking in isolation. But you lose the value of the
relevantly similar cases.

Using relevantly similar cases is how we move in the world at all.
To take an extreme example. When we turn the car's
wheel to the left we can't be absolutely certain that the car will not move to
the right. Each time we want to turn the car to the left we don't weigh up the likelihood
of the consequences in virtue of this being a new case. Instead we rely on the previous
cases, those times we have turned the wheel to the left which resulted in the car
moving to the left.

If there is a suspected significant moral difference or different consequence between the prohibition against bathing,
against nudity, against the exposure of a woman's face, and public fucking then by all means
put that on the table.

Isn't answering the question ultimately empirical?

I'm suspicious that it is.

The suspicion does NOT arise from the Hume's is-ought distinction.
The Wikipedia entry has a useful encapsulation:

the is-ought problem has been misunderstood as related to a
less deep, but more common, issue. Namely, many people think the is-ought problem is related to the arguably true claim that, just because
something is the case, that doesn't mean that it ought to be the case.
On this misunderstanding, Hume was arguing against those complacent
moralists who hold that the world is just fine as it stands, and needs
no improvement. This is, of course, not Hume's point he meant to challenge
the transition from any set of descriptive claims ['is'] to any prescriptive claim ['ought'].

So I take Hume NOT to be arguing against facts being important in applying
particular moral concepts. For example, take a moral principle like
"You shouldn't cause pain or loss of function to another (without
any competing moral consideration)". Hume would allow that to determine whether
the case "someone is knifed in the guts on whim" violates the moral principle is
an empirical matter. The fact that knifing someone in the guts causes pain and/or loss of
function makes the case a violation of the moral principle.

Instead, Hume is arguing against coming up with the moral principle in the first
place by discovering fact, by an empirical investigation. For example,
why is pain or loss of function pertinent to morality? That can't be answered by
an appeal to descriptions of the world.

Here, we have a GIVEN moral principle, something
like:
"Acts that cause harm to others ought be subject to prohibition (weighed against other moral considerations)"
It seems, then, our task is just to establish whether public fucking causes
harm. If it does then it seems straightforwardly subject to the given moral principle.
As we assume the moral principle, not trying to establish it, Hume would have no problem with
this manoeuvre. So my suspicion is not based on Hume's is-ought distinction.

Patricia Peterson, in "Morality, Sexual Facts &
Fantasies", has some reflections about the possible relationship between fantasy and
harm that gives pause to the idea that "Should fucking in public be legalised?" is merely
an empirical question. Her opening claim:

I don't think that in itself it is immoral to fantasize about anything.
This includes fantasizing about raping children and beating up spouses.

Patricia Peterson 1999, "Morality, Sexual Facts & Fantasies", P 40.

She holds to this even when assuming a correlation between fantasizing and
doing harmful acts that is so strong we can identify it as a causal relationship:

... suppose that it turns out that there is a strong correlation
between people engaging in fantasies the content of which are harmful and engaging
in harmful acts in real life. What should we say about "harmful" fantasies then?
... Let's assume that certain types of fantasies can cause us to behave in immoral
ways and let's then look at whether these fantasies in themselves are bad.

Patricia Peterson 1999, "Morality, Sexual Facts & Fantasies", P 47.

Her answer to her question, what would we say about harmful fantasies if
we assume they cause us to act badly?:

it isn't the case that fantasizing about anything is bad in-itself,
it is deciding to do something nasty to someone in real life and then doing
it that is bad. ...the moral culpability lies ... at the moment I decide to act
[not merely fantasize].

Patricia Peterson 1999, "Morality, Sexual Facts & Fantasies", P 48.

Her argument:

In the fantasizing case, I decide to engage in the fantasy,
I decide to act it out, and I act it out. There is much scope here
for mind changing, but most important engaging in the fantasy
and not acting out the fantasy.

Patricia Peterson 1999, "Morality, Sexual Facts & Fantasies", P 48.

Therefore her concluding claim:

It isn't immoral to fantasize about things, which if acted out would be
bad to do. ... If one knows that by fantasizing about engaging in a harmful sexual
activity, one will be inclined towards acting out one's fantasy in real life,
then it would be prudent for one not to engage in that fantasy.

Patricia Peterson 1999, "Morality, Sexual Facts & Fantasies", P 49.

We must note the
distinction Petersen makes between prudence and morality.

... we do not consider the smoker to be doing something immoral by privately smoking
and adversly affecting his or her health. We typically consider the smoker
imprudent for participating in such self-destructive behaviour.
Similarly, although by engaging in sexual activity of a particular kind one may
damage one's health, it doesn't follow that by participating in such activity
one is committing an immoral act. It is important to recognise that there is
a distinction to be drawn between imprudent and immoral acts.

Indeed this is an important distinction. One of the most unrecognized and
undervalued distinctions. The failure to distinguish leads both to poorly lived lives
and great injustice. With this distinction we can, and for clarity ought, understand
ethics more narrowly than traditionally understood. Traditionally
ethics, or synonymously "morality", has been understood as entailing any claim about
what one ought do or not do.
We can more usefully understand ethics as: Claims about what one ought do,
or not do, where one's actions directly and foreseeably effect others' welfare.

On the other hand matters of prudence, or matters of self-interest, can
be distinguished off as: Claims about what one ought do, or not do, where
one's actions directly and foreseeably effect one's welfare.

So if Petersen's concluding claim is right then it's possible
that even if public fucking caused harm then public fucking would not necessarily
be immoral.

While Petersen's opening claim is true her concluding claim, alas, is false
(if I've represented it and understood it fairly).

She assumes a strong correlation and causal relationship between fantasizing
about a harmful act and acting it out. It's understood that the fantasizer will be
aware of this relationship. The moral culpability does not lie at the point of deciding
to act but at the point where you know the effect will follow. The moral culpability
lies as soon as you engage in the fantasy knowing it will lead you to act badly.
To engage in a fantasy may well be not bad in itself but when you know it will lead
to your bad acting (this is assumed) then it is immoral.

Her claim that "There is much scope here
for mind changing, but most important engaging in the fantasy
and not acting out the fantasy." contradicts her assumption of the strong correlation
between fantasy and acting it out. The stronger the correlation the narrower the scope.
For this hypothetical to have the requisite value we must assume a correlation so
strong so as to leave no significant scope.

Whether it's imprudent or prudent is not established by the assumptions in the case.
If the fantasizer about rape is lead, in virtue of the fantasy, to act it out,
derive some psychological joy in acting it out, can reasonably expect not
to get caught, then acting it out would be prudent: in their self interest.
It would still be immoral.

Petersen's argument might instead by employed to get at the distinction between intention and
foreseeablity. Peter singer (2004) helps to clarify this distinction:

Moralists who support the distinction [between 'foreseeable' and 'intended']
usually say that whether you intended an outcome of your action can be determined by
asking if you would have acted as you did if you believed that the outcome would not
have occurred. So, for example, Bush could truthfully say that he would have bombed the
restaurant in which Saddam was believed to be even if that would not have killed any
civilians.

Peter Singer 2004, The President Of Good & Evil, The Ethics Of George W. Bush, P74

Petersen assumes the fantasizer knows that indulging the fantasies will
lead them to commit harmful acts.
The fantasizer intends the fantasy and merely foresees the consequent harmful acts.

The fantasies are not bad in and of themselves, regardless of whether the harmful acts
that will follow are intended or not. I push a button that leads to a bomb that kills
my bank manager, to borrow a Petersen example. This does not making pushing buttons in general,
or pushing this button in particular, bad in and of itself. Pushing that button is
extrinsically bad.

So too the fantasies are extrinsically bad. They foreseeably lead to bad acts.
To engage in a fantasy foreseeing this will lead you to commit bad acts,
even if not intended, is immoral.

By the way, we have been assuming, on Petersen's lead, a strong causal connection between
fantasy and acting them ought. There is no reason to suppose such a connection in fact exists.
So, for example, we need not ban the bible for fear its depictions of crucifixion will
excite this fantasy in others and lead them to act out crucifixion.

So my suspicion that answering "Should fucking in public be legalised?" is not
ultimately an empirical question does not arise from Petersen's reflections. At least
not directly.

My suspicion arises, rather, from three aspects of causation.

The strength, the probability, of the causal link;

Whether a contributing cause is morally relevant; and

Whether there are third party agents anywhere along the causal chain.

Let's take the issue of the morality of the strength of casual links first.
Often it's useful to distinguish mere thought from act, as Petersen has done above.
At other times it's useful to conflate the two. To count thoughts as actions too.
Especially in the case before us where a mere thought is assumed to have a causal
consequence that has moral significance: bad acts will be done.
Let's then take thoughts to count as acts.

There is an act I perform, here a fantasy, that has the effect of me doing bad acts.
There is the act then the casually determined event. Simply, there is act then effect.
Even assuming that the event is an effect of the act, morally culpability for the
act is still open. It depends on the strength of the causal relationship between
act and effect. For example, there is a causal relationship between the act of Barry driving cars
and killing a pedestrian. In Australia there are about 200 annual passenger road deaths

.
For at least some of these deaths the responsibility will be largely down to a driver who, like
Barry, takes all reasonable precaution every time he drives. Despite taking all reasonable
precaution when Barry drives he increases the risk that we will be causally responsible
for killing a pedestrian. The causal link between Barry's act, driving a car, and the effect,
killing a pedestrian, is not very strong. The risk of the effect is low.

Therefore even when increased harm is causally established, here between driving and
killing pedestrians, the strength of the causal link might be so low that the acts
are deemed socially acceptable. By the way, this doesn't tell against Petersen's reflection, she
assumed a strong correlation (and causation), not a weak one.

Let's take another example to look at the second issue of the moral relevance of
causes. In any year in Australia there will be some number of knifing murders/manslaughters

.
Note that for any event to occur multiple causes contribute.
When we speak of "a cause" for an event this is a short hand for the
signficant cause. Here one of the causes will
be the manufacture of a knife. We don't hold the knife manufacture morally
responsible for the murder. While the manufacture of the knife is a contributing
cause of the murder we don't say it is morally significant cause.
This is true even though the manufacturer reasonably can foresee there is a risk
that their knife will be used in a murder.

So even if fucking in public is a cause of some harmful effect, it may not not be a morally
significant cause.

Thirdly, even if there is a much stronger correlation than in the previous
two examples between act and effect there is still one way in which the acter may
not be morally responsible. That is, in the case where the effect occurs through
third party intermediaries, that is agents. Imagine the school playground. Barry punches Bill.
Barry ends up in the principals' office and defends himself with "Lisa told
me to do it." The cliched argument from the principal might be "If Lisa
told you to stick your head in the oven, would you do it?"

The principals' argument is intended to demonstrate that each of us is responsible
for the acts we perform whether they be acts of self-interest or morality.

It could be countered that the principals' argument may well show we are all
responsible for the acts we do but not that the goader, here Lisa, is without
moral responsibility.

I can only make the appeal that the principals' argument does show Lisa
not to be morally responsible. Lisa is not morally responsible
for Bill's bloody nose even though she may have causally contributed to it.

So even if public fucking causes some sort of harm then
it does not follow that public fucking is a morally relevant cause...

It would increase rape.

... For example even if public fucking increased the incidence of rape then public
fucking ought not be identified as the morally relevant cause. The rapists who allow themselves,
in some bizarre but assumed way, to be inspired by fucking in public are the morally
relevant cause. Moral culpability ought be located with the agenct that commits the act.

This argument, that public fucking would increase rape, was surprising. I just
couldn't see any basis to suppose that would be a plausible consequence. On further
reflection I can see why it would be a candidate consequence.

Not so long ago defence barristers in rape cases may have asked the rape
victim whether she was wearing a short skirt or similar. The implication was in causally
contributing to her own rape, by being more desirable to men, she was morally responsible.
Even allowing that causal contribution to exist I would have thought this reasoning now dead.
It's an example of blaming the victim for the crime, the immorality, of the perpetrator.

We ought take from this that we hold the (mentally competent) perpetrator responsible
for their deeds even when there is an external causal account to give.
Bill Clinton put it well when talking about his affair saying something like:
"An explanation is not a justification."

Sex just is a private matter.

It's tricky to try and make this not question begging. The whole question is:
"should sex be a private matter?" For the sake of a response I'll ignore its question
begging feel.

Firstly, the proposition is not to compel anyone to fuck in public. So anyone
who feels that the sex they have ought be a private matter, would be free to
arrange it that way.

Secondly, "Sex just is a private matter" can't mean everyone just wants
to have sex in private. George Micheal doesn't:

Outside
I think I'm done with the sofa
I think I'm done with the hall
I think I'm done with the kitchen table, baby

If that's a misrepresentation of Mr Michael's stance, and it may well be
that this response to his 7 April 1998 arrest for "engaging in a lewd act" is
a mere artistic outpouring rather than a sincere thesis, then I don't.

Thirdly, we might mean that there is some biological/evolutionary desire implanted
in humans that tends most humans to want to fuck in private. If that's right then
we would have to account for why we are the only(?) sexual species implanted with it. Even
if there is this biological impulse there is no requirement we defer to it.
There may be biological impulses to anger or fear. No need to put up with these.

I wouldn't want my kids to be sexualized.

This retort was put with the qualification that there is the issue of
giving kids adequate sex education.

To give my own detail to this qualification. It is desirable
that kids do have a minimal sexual knowledge, namely about how to minimise the risks of
pregnancy and Sexually Transmitted Disease through Safe Sex. They ought have this
knowledge before they expose themselves to this risk. The median age of first
vaginal intercourse for men and women is now, in Australia, 16

It was a representative population-based survey of the sexual health behaviours,
attitudes and knowledge of Australian people. Telephone interviews were conducted
with 19,307 respondents between the ages of 16 and 59 years in 2001/2002...
Half the men born between 1941 and 1950 had vaginal
intercourse by age 18 and this declined to 16 for men born between 1981 and
1986. For women the age at first vaginal intercourse declined from 19 to 16.

This qualification is tangential to the retort. The retort is that children,
in bearing witness to public fucking, will suffer is some way. They
will be perplexed, frightened, or collapse from the horrible sight of adults
convulsing vehemently, faces tight, sighing, and panting...

This is the same concern that lies behind R G Watkins' argument.
If is argument is not warranted then why should it be warranted now?
When we take a child on a walk around Bondi
beach we don't sheild the child's gaze from the woman in the G-string.
When we take a child to the swimming pool we have no qualms about them entering
the change rooms where they will bear witness to nude adults.

I'm really not clear on precisely what the imagined difficulty that
a child might face when bearing witness to adults fucking in hyde park.

It is the prohibition on public fucking, rather, that may have the corrupting
effect on the developing child: that they may grow up
to believe there is something wrong with public fucking based on habit,
and in the absence of good reason.

We can be generous with Watkins' argument and make it: two groups have
irreconcilable preferences for the use of a particular space. The majority preference
ought prevail. Yes, then, Watkins' argument may well be sound and useful for moral thinking.

Only in limited cases, however. Imagine a group of us walking in the bush and there arises
an option to visit the mountain or the lake, the group wants to stay together,
and we can't visit both. Then, in the absence of any other consideration, a vote ought
be taken. The majority preference should prevail. Here utilitarianism, the greatest happiness (or preference)
for the greatest number, serves us well.

Utilitarianism can't work in all cases. One classic counter example is the gang rape case.
The sum of ten mens' happiness may outweigh the suffering of the one woman they gang rape.
The woman has no friends or family, the men can reasonably expect not to get caught, it
will be an isolated incident that they will keep secret. They will kill her afterward to
minimise her suffering. If you think the pain of the woman
will outweigh the happiness of the ten, imagine one hundred men.

Under utilitarianism the men are morally obligated to gang rape the woman. That
outcome is so obviously counter to our pre reflective moral beliefs that we can
reject utilitarianism's applicability in this case. What's going on here?
We say that the woman deserves rights, that some preferences, here the preference
not to be raped, trump competing preferences no matter how many there are. Majority
preferences ought not always prevail.

Therefore R G Watkins' argument, essentially utilitarian, will be applicable in some
cases and not applicable in others. It ought not be applied to cases that involve
how an individual attires themselves or how they choose to give themselves, and
other consenting individuals, sexual pleasure. A persons sexual pleasure is something
they ought have a right to, consistent with allowing others a similar sexual freedom,
no matter how many people would like to suppress it.

Harm, Offence, and Eyesaw

It has been pointed out when considering what ought be in public there are
three common sets of candidate objections: harm, offence, and eyesaw.

I've been arguing for the legalisation of public fucking against a consideration
of possible harm. Another candidate consideration is when
another finds something offensive. That an act or expression ought be limited on the
grounds that it offends another, or a group, is a widespread silliness and so deserves
a full treatment at another time. I'll write nothing more against offence except to
say that it seems to be a psuedo moral concept that people use when they have no
good reason for their stance.

The third candidate objection could be "eyesaw". A billboard or a housing development
might be objected to not on the grounds that it harms (or offends as such) but that it
is an eyesaw. In a general form "eyesaw" might be nothing other than the Time/Place/Manner
limits that often, and rightly, restrict free expression (and free acts).

Time/Place/Manner may rightly be used to prohibit a range of public expressions
and acts. A rock band playing at 3:00am in a residential area; a speaker with a megaphone
in the local temple; the aforementioned size and placement of a billboard.

Could public fucking be objected to on Time/Place/Manner grounds? Sure. But would a person
who objected to the sight of people fucking on a beach on such grounds be similarly disturbed by
the public display of grecko-roman wrestling? Grecko-roman wrestling can be just as, if not more,
vivid in manner as fucking.

Maybe the ultimate motive for the prohibition, for some, is not a disgust at sex, but rather,
a shyness.