Safety flaws doomed crew of shuttle Columbia, new report finds

December 31, 2008|By Mark K. Matthews, Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON -- The doomed crew of the space shuttle Columbia could have lived moments longer if certain safety measures had been taken, but ultimately the seven astronauts would not have survived the 2003 disaster, a new NASA report concludes.

The 400-page investigation, released Tuesday, uncovered several problems aboard Columbia, including defective seat belts and spacesuits that either caused or contributed to the deaths of the astronauts soon after the orbiter lost cabin pressure.

But properly working suits and seat belts would not have saved the crew, according to NASA. Their fate was sealed when a piece of foam flew off the external fuel tank during launch and punched a hole in the leading edge of the orbiter's left wing. That allowed hot gases to enter the wing, causing the shuttle to break apart during re-entry.

The main goal of Tuesday's report was to identify flaws in hopes of improving the safety of future spacecraft and crews. Overall, NASA made 30 safety recommendations because of the findings.

"The Columbia accident was not survivable," said investigators, who began working on the report in 2004. "The results of this investigation are intended to add meaning to the sacrifice of the crew's lives by making space flight safer for all future generations."

The inquiry also shed light on the crew's final, frantic seconds.

'Lethal trauma'

As Columbia disintegrated, the cabin lost pressure and the astronauts were knocked unconscious or died because they could not breathe. As the orbiter lost control, the astronauts were violently shaken because their seat belts did not properly secure their upper bodies.

"Consequently, lethal trauma occurred to the unconscious or deceased crew due to the lack of upper body support and restraint," investigators said.

The report recommended that to fix these problems, NASA take a tip from NASCAR and build seat belts and helmets that are similar to "techniques used in professional automobile racing." Astronauts also need a better spacesuit so they can work but be protected in case the cabin loses pressure.

The current suits protect astronauts from pressure loss, but only in a limited time frame because the astronauts must have their visors down.

None of the crew members had their visors down during the accident, in part because of a design defect. If the crew wears the visors for too long, oxygen builds up in the cabin -- creating a fire hazard. So they are protected from pressure loss only for a limited time.

In fact, one astronaut wasn't even wearing a helmet when Columbia lost control. But NASA officials said Tuesday that fault did not lie with the astronauts, even as NASA has revised its astronaut training to better prepare for shuttle emergencies.

"It was not a problem with crew; it was a problem with suit design, and we intend to fix it in the future," said Wayne Hale, a NASA deputy associate administrator. These changes, however, are aimed more toward the spacecraft that would replace the shuttle, which is slated for retirement in 2010.

Jeff Hanley, who heads NASA's new-spacecraft team, said NASA's new system of rockets and capsules is being designed with the report in mind. He and other NASA officials said engineers already are devising suits and seats that should have better airflow and restraints in place.

Meanwhile, Hale said the most significant change to the shuttle would be better seat belts.

"What you are learning are things that could be applied in less catastrophic situations. Just because this one was not survivable doesn't mean that there are not things that could be learned to help a future crew survive," said John Logsdon, who served on the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. That panel, convened immediately after the accident, determined falling foam punched a hole in Columbia's wing. Its findings were frequently cited in the new report.

Emotionally wrenching

That group, however, released its findings within months of assembling the data. NASA officials said it took four years to produce the current report because many of the investigators have other jobs, including ensuring the shuttle continues to fly safely.

Its release during a holiday week also was by design so the families of deceased astronauts could absorb the report during a vacation week, said Pam Melroy, an astronaut and investigator.

"This is one of the hardest things I've ever done, technically and emotionally," she said.