NOTE: On December 13, 2013, the press release was revised as follows: Corrected Luxembourg with Netherlands in second and third paragraphs of the Regulatory Disclosures section. Revised release follows.

London, 23 July 2012 -- Moody's Investors Service has today revised to negative from stable
the outlooks on the Aaa sovereign ratings of Germany, the Netherlands
and Luxembourg. In addition, Moody's has also affirmed
Finland's Aaa rating and stable outlook.

All four sovereigns are adversely affected by the following two euro-area-wide
developments:

1.) The rising uncertainty regarding the outcome of the euro area
debt crisis given the current policy framework, and the increased
susceptibility to event risk stemming from the increased likelihood of
Greece's exit from the euro area, including the broader impact
that such an event would have on euro area members, particularly
Spain and Italy.

2.) Even if such an event is avoided, there is an increasing
likelihood that greater collective support for other euro area sovereigns,
most notably Spain and Italy, will be required. Given the
greater ability to absorb the costs associated with this support,
this burden will likely fall most heavily on more highly rated member
states if the euro area is to be preserved in its current form.

These increased risks, in combination with the country-specific
considerations discussed below, have prompted the changes in the
rating outlooks of Germany, the Netherlands and Luxembourg.
In contrast, Finland's unique credit profile, as discussed
below, remains consistent with a stable rating outlook.

RATIONALE FOR OUTLOOK CHANGE

Today's decision to change to negative the outlooks on the Aaa ratings
of Germany, the Netherlands and Luxembourg is driven by Moody's
view that the level of uncertainty about the outlook for the euro area,
and the potential impact of plausible scenarios on member states,
are no longer consistent with stable outlooks.

Firstly, while it is not Moody's base case, the risk
of an exit by Greece from the euro area has increased relative to the
rating agency's expectations earlier this year. In Moody's
view, a Greek exit from the monetary union would pose a material
threat to the euro. Although Moody's would expect a strong
policy response from the euro area in such an event, it would still
set off a chain of financial-sector shocks and associated liquidity
pressures for sovereigns and banks that policymakers could only contain
at a very high cost. Should they fail to do so, the result
would be a gradual unwinding of the currency union, which Moody's
continues to believe would be profoundly negative for all euro area members.
The rating agency has reflected this risk by raising the score for the
"Susceptibility to Event Risk" factor in its sovereign rating
methodology from "very low" to "low" for these
three countries.

Secondly, even in the absence of any exit, the contingent
liabilities taken on by the strongest euro area sovereigns are rising
as a result of European policymakers' continued reactive and gradualist
policy response, as is the probability of those liabilities crystallising
(as Moody's already observed in a recent Special Comment,
entitled "Moody's: EU Summit's Measures Reduce Likelihood
of Shocks but at a Cost", published on 5 July 2012).
Moody's view remains that this approach will not produce a stable
outcome, and will very likely be associated with a series of shocks,
which are likely to rise in magnitude the longer the crisis persists.
The continued deterioration in Spain and Italy's macroeconomic and
funding environment has increased the risk that they will require some
kind of external support. The scale of these contingent liabilities
is of a materially larger order of magnitude for these countries due to
their size and their debt burdens; for example, the size of
Spain's economy and government bond market is around double the
combined size of those of Greece, Portugal and Ireland. Although
the rising likelihood of stronger euro area members needing to support
other sovereigns has not yet affected Moody's assessment of these
sovereigns' "Government Financial Strength" in its rating
methodology, the rating agency nevertheless believes that it needs
to take some account of the impact that additional financial commitments
would have on the assessment of their financial strength, given
the material deterioration in these countries' fiscal metrics since
2007. Over the long term, Moody's believes that institutional
reforms within the euro area have the potential to strengthen the credit
standing of most or all euro area governments; however, over
the transitional period (which could last many years), the additional
pressure on the strongest nations' balance sheets will increase
the pressure on their credit standing.

Accordingly, Moody's now has negative outlooks on those Aaa-rated
euro area sovereigns whose balance sheets are expected to bear the main
financial burden of support -- whether because of the need to expand
the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) or the need to develop more ad
hoc forms of liquidity support. These countries now comprise Germany
and the Netherlands, in addition to Austria and France whose rating
outlooks were changed to negative on 13 February 2012. The credit
profile of these sovereigns is most affected by the policy dilemma described
above.

Finland, with its stable outlook, is now the sole exception
among the Aaa-rated euro area sovereigns. Although Finland
would not be expected to be unaffected by the euro crisis, its net
assets (Finland has no debt on a net basis), its small and domestically
oriented banking system, its limited exposure to, and therefore
relative insulation from, the euro area in terms of trade,
and its attempts to collateralise its euro area sovereign support together
provide strong buffers which differentiate it from the other Aaas.

Today's actions on the four sovereigns' outlooks incorporate
the implications of certain euro area developments, such as the
rising risk of a Greek exit, the growing likelihood of collective
support for other euro area sovereigns, and stalled economic growth.
By the end of the third quarter, Moody's will also assess
the implications of these developments for Aaa-rated Austria and
France, whose rating outlooks were moved to negative from stable
in February. Specifically, Moody's will review whether
their current rating outlooks remain appropriate or whether more extensive
rating reviews are warranted.

***

MOODY'S CHANGES OUTLOOK ON GERMANY'S Aaa RATING TO NEGATIVE

In the context of today's rating actions, Moody's has
changed the outlook on Germany's Aaa government bond ratings to
negative from stable. The Aaa rating itself remains unchanged.

The key drivers of today's action on Germany are:

1.) The rising uncertainty regarding the outcome of the euro area
debt crisis given the current policy framework, and the increased
susceptibility to event risk stemming from the increased likelihood of
Greece's exit from the euro area, including the broader impact
that such an event would have on euro area members.

2.) The rising contingent liabilities that the German government
will assume as a result of European policymakers' reactive and gradualist
policy response, which comes on top of a marked deterioration in
the country's own debt levels relative to pre-crisis levels.

3.) The vulnerability of the German banking system to the risk
of a worsening of the euro area debt crisis. The German banks'
sizable exposures to the most stressed euro area countries, particularly
to Italy and Spain, together with their limited loss-absorption
capacity and structurally weak earnings, make them vulnerable to
a further deepening of the crisis.

In a related rating action, Moody's has today changed the
outlook to negative from stable for the long-term Aaa rating and
short-term P-1 rating of FMS Wertmanagement. Like
Germany's Aaa rating, the ratings of this entity remain unchanged.

FMS Wertmanagement is a resolution agency or "bad bank" scheme for 100%
state-owned Hypo Real Estate (HRE) Group created under the Financial
Market Stabilisation legislation in Germany ("Finanzmarktstabilisierungsfondsgesetz"
-- FMStFG). The German government has a loss compensation
obligation via the government's Financial Market Stabilisation Fund (SoFFin)
who owns FMS Wertmanagement. Moody's views FMS Wertmanagement's
creditworthiness as being linked to that of the German government because
the government remains generally responsible for any losses and any liquidity
shortfalls of FMS Wertmanagement.

--RATIONALE FOR NEGATIVE OUTLOOK

As indicated in the introduction to this press release, the first
rating driver underlying Moody's decision to change the outlook
on Germany's Aaa bond rating to negative is the level of uncertainty
about the outlook for the euro area and the impact that this has on the
country's susceptibility to event risk. Specifically,
the material risk of a Greek exit from the euro area exposes core countries
such as Germany to a risk of shock that is not commensurate with a stable
outlook on their Aaa rating. The elevated event risk in turn increases
the probability that the contingent liabilities will eventually crystallise,
with Germany bearing a significant share of the overall liabilities.

The second and interrelated driver of the change in outlook to negative
is the increase in contingent liabilities that is associated with even
the most benign scenario of a continuation of European leaders'
reactive and gradualist approach to policymaking. The likelihood
is rising that the strong euro area states will need to commit significant
resources in order to deepen banking integration in the euro area and
to protect a wider range of euro area sovereigns, including large
member states, from market funding stress. As the largest
euro area country, Germany bears a significant share of these contingent
liabilities. The contingent liabilities stem from bilateral loans,
the EFSF, the European Central Bank (ECB) via the holdings in the
Securities Market Programme (SMP) and the Target 2 balances, and
-- once established -- the European Stability Mechanism (ESM).

The third rating driver is based on the German banking system's
vulnerability to the risk of a worsening of the euro area debt crisis.
German banks have sizable exposures to the most stressed euro area countries,
particularly to Italy and Spain. Moody's cautions that the
risks emanating from the euro area crisis go far beyond the banks'
direct exposures, as they also include much larger indirect effects
on other counterparties, the regional economy and the wider financial
system. The German banks' limited loss-absorption
capacity and structurally weak earnings make them vulnerable to a further
deepening of the crisis.

--RATIONALE FOR GERMANY'S UNCHANGED Aaa RATING

Germany remains a Aaa-rated credit as its creditworthiness is underpinned
by the country's advanced and diversified economy and a tradition
of stability-oriented macroeconomic policies. High productivity
growth and strong world demand for German products have allowed the country
to establish a broad economic base with ample flexibility, generating
high income levels. Germany's current account surplus supports
the resiliency of the economy. Moreover, Germany enjoys high
levels of investor confidence, which are reflected in very low debt
funding costs, leading to very high debt affordability.

--WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATING DOWN

Germany's Aaa rating could potentially be downgraded if Moody's
were to observe a prolonged deterioration in the government's fiscal
position and/or the economy's long-term strength that would take
debt metrics outside scores that are commensurate with a Aaa rating.
This could happen if (1) the German government needed to use its balance
sheet to support the banking system, leading to a material increase
in general government debt levels; (2) any country were to exit the
European monetary union, as such an event is expected to set off
a chain of financial-sector shocks and associated liquidity pressures
for sovereigns that would entail very high cost for wealthy countries
such as Germany, and cause contingent liabilities from the euro
area to increase; (3) debt-refinancing costs were to rise
sharply following a loss of safe-haven status.

--WHAT COULD MOVE THE OUTLOOK BACK TO STABLE

Conversely, the rating outlook could return to stable if a benign
outlook for the euro area, reduced stress in non-core countries
and less adverse macroeconomic conditions in Europe in general were to
ease medium-term uncertainties with regard to the country's
debt trajectory.

***

MOODY'S CHANGES THE OUTLOOK ON THE NETHERLANDS' Aaa RATING
TO NEGATIVE

Moody's Investors Service has today changed the outlook on the Netherlands'
Aaa government bond rating to negative from stable. The Aaa rating
itself remains unchanged.

The key drivers of today's action on the Netherlands are:

1.) The rising uncertainty regarding the outcome of the euro area
debt crisis given the current policy framework, and the increased
susceptibility to event risk stemming from the increased likelihood of
Greece's exit from the euro area, including the broader impact
that such an event would have on euro area members.

2.) The rising contingent liabilities that the Dutch government
will assume as a result of European policymakers' reactive and gradualist
policy response, which comes on top of a marked deterioration in
the country's own debt levels relative to pre-crisis levels.

3.) The Netherlands' own domestic vulnerabilities,
specifically the weak growth outlook, high household indebtedness,
and falling house prices, whose impact is amplified by this heightened
event risk.

--RATIONALE FOR NEGATIVE OUTLOOK

As indicated in the introduction of this press release, the first
driver underlying Moody's decision to change the outlook on the
Netherlands' Aaa bond rating to negative is the level of uncertainty
about the outlook for the euro area and the impact that this has on the
country's susceptibility to event risk. Specifically,
the material risk of a Greek exit from the euro area exposes core countries
such as the Netherlands to a risk of shock that is not commensurate with
a stable outlook on their Aaa ratings. The elevated event risk
in turn increases the probability that further contingent liabilities
will eventually crystallise, with the Netherlands bearing a significant
share of the overall liabilities.

The second and interrelated driver of the change in outlook to negative
is the increase in contingent liabilities that is associated with even
the most benign scenario of a continuation of European leaders'
reactive and gradualist approach to policymaking. The likelihood
is rising that the strong euro area states will need to commit significant
resources in order to deepen banking integration in the euro area and
to protect a wider range of euro area sovereigns, including large
member states, from market funding stress. As a large,
wealthy euro area country, the Netherlands bears a significant share
of these contingent liabilities. The contingent liabilities stem
from bilateral loans, the EFSF, the European Central Bank
(ECB) via the holdings in the Securities Market Programme (SMP) and the
Target 2 balances, and -- once established -- the European
Stability Mechanism (ESM).

The third factor underpinning this outlook change is that domestic vulnerabilities
are being amplified by the stress that is emanating from the euro area.
The Dutch growth outlook is relatively weak, both in relation to
Aaa-rated peers and to its own track record. In fact,
according to the Dutch central bank, the country's growth
performance between 2008-14 will be its lowest for any seven-year
period since the Second World War. Some of the reasons for this
are unrelated to developments in the euro area such as declining real
disposable incomes (which are expected to fall by nearly 4% in
total in 2012-13), the Netherlands' high degree of
household leverage (over 200% of disposable income, though
household assets are also substantial) and falling house prices.
However, negative developments at the euro area level are amplifying
these negative trends, which are in turn contributing to weak confidence
and an overall contraction in domestic demand. This dynamic creates
additional fiscal headwinds and means that the Dutch government's
debt burden will begin to fall later and from a higher level.

--RATIONALE FOR NETHERLANDS' UNCHANGED Aaa RATING

The Netherlands' Aaa sovereign rating is underpinned by very high
levels of economic, institutional and government financial strength.

The Netherlands is a large, wealthy and open economy that is highly
developed and diversified. Although the growth outlook over the
forecast period is quite weak relative to the country's historical
experience, the Dutch economy remains highly competitive,
a fact that is reflected in the sizeable current account surplus.
Moreover, unlike some of its fellow euro area countries, the
Netherlands has already pursued substantial labour market reform,
which has translated into a highly productive labour force whose participation
rate is above the EU average.

In view of the country's strong tradition of building consensus
on key economic policy changes, Dutch institutions have built a
robust and highly transparent institutional framework to facilitate this
process. The country also has a strong tradition of relying on
independent institutions at key points in the fiscal policymaking process.

The Netherlands also enjoys a broad, long-standing consensus
on fiscal discipline. In 1994, the Dutch introduced trend-based
budgeting with expenditure ceilings (expressed in real terms) for a government's
entire term. Under Dutch fiscal rules, revenue windfalls
cannot be used to finance expenditures and, in general, departments
need to compensate for any overspending themselves. Within a few
days of the collapse in April 2012 of the governing minority coalition
over budget negotiations, the outgoing coalition was able to reach
agreement with three opposition parties on additional fiscal consolidation
measures. The speed with which agreement could be reached illustrates
that the consensus in favour of fiscal discipline remains in place.

--WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATING DOWN

The Netherlands' Aaa rating could potentially be downgraded if Moody's
were to conclude that debt metrics are unlikely to stabilise within the
next 3-4 years, with the deficit, the overall debt
burden, and/or debt-financing costs on a rising trend.
This could happen in one of three scenarios, all of which imply
lower economic and/or government financial strength: (1) a combination
of significantly slower growth over a multi-year time horizon and
reduced political commitment to fiscal consolidation, including
discretionary fiscal loosening or a failure to respond to a deteriorating
fiscal outlook; (2) the exit of any country from the European monetary
union, as such an event is expected to set off a chain of financial-sector
shocks and associated liquidity pressures for banks and sovereigns that
would entail very high cost for countries such as the Netherlands,
and cause contingent liabilities from the euro area to increase;
or (3) a sharp rise in debt-refinancing costs following a loss
of safe-haven status.

--WHAT COULD MOVE THE OUTLOOK BACK TO STABLE

Conversely, the rating outlook could return to stable if a combination
of less adverse macroeconomic conditions, a more benign outlook
for the euro area and deficit reduction measures were to ease medium-term
uncertainties with regard to the country's debt trajectory.

***

MOODY'S CHANGES THE OUTLOOK ON LUXEMBOURG'S Aaa RATING TO
NEGATIVE

Moody's Investors Service has today changed the outlook on Luxembourg's
Aaa rating to negative from stable. The Aaa rating itself remains
unchanged.

The key drivers of today's action on Luxembourg are:

1.) The rising uncertainty regarding the outcome of the euro area
debt crisis given the current policy framework, and the increased
susceptibility to event risk stemming from the increased likelihood of
Greece's exit from the euro area, including the broader impact
that such an event would have on euro area members, including Luxembourg.

2.) The rising contingent liabilities that the Luxembourg government
will assume as a result of European policymakers' reactive and gradualist
policy response, although the country's level of gross indebtedness
is markedly lower than that of the other Aaa-rated euro area sovereigns.

3.) Concerns about the country's economic resilience in view
of its significant reliance on financial services industry for employment,
national income, and tax revenue.

--RATIONALE FOR NEGATIVE OUTLOOK

As indicated in the introduction of this press release, the first
driver underlying Moody's decision to change the outlook on Luxembourg's
Aaa bond rating to negative is the level of uncertainty about the outlook
for the euro area and the impact that this has on the country's
susceptibility to event risk. Specifically, the material
risk of a Greek exit and the broader impact that such an event would have
on euro area members exposes core countries such as Luxembourg to a risk
of shock that is not commensurate with a stable outlook on their Aaa ratings.
In Luxembourg's case, Moody's particular concern is
over the impact that this development could have on the financial services
industry, which directly accounts for 25-30% of Luxembourg's
GDP. In addition, Luxembourg is exposed to a potential rise
in contingent liabilities if additional euro area support is needed for
banks and sovereigns in financial distress. In the case of Luxembourg,
this concern is mitigated by its relatively low level of sovereign indebtedness.

In light of Luxembourg's interdependence with the euro area's
real economy and the global financial sector, Moody's has
broader concerns about the country's economic resilience.
Luxembourg's direct dependence on its financial services industry
is substantial, both due to its contribution to government taxes
and social security contributions (23% of the total) and to the
country's employment (12% of employees). Of course,
problems in the sector would inevitably generate second-order impacts
on the national economy. While Moody's notes that Luxembourg's
economy has a track record of being relatively resilient to shocks or
crises, the above factors have prompted Moody's to examine
whether this resiliency has gradually weakened.

--RATIONALE FOR LUXEMBOURG'S UNCHANGED Aaa RATING

Luxembourg's Aaa rating is underpinned by the country's position
as one of the wealthiest countries in the world on both a GDP per capita
and purchasing parity power basis. The rating also reflects the
country's solid track record of economic growth, mainly driven
by the financial services industry. In the past, the national
authorities have been able to leverage their first-mover advantage
in implementing EU directives by improving the business environment,
being able to attract a highly skilled labour force and preserving some
advantages related to bank secrecy legislation. Although the total
assets of the banking sector and financial services' overall impact
on the Luxembourg economy are very large, Moody's acknowledges
that contingent liabilities emanating from it remain low. The domestic
retail banking sector is dominated by three banks (Banque et Caisse d'Epargne
de l'Etat, BGL BNP Paribas, BIL) and has assets that
equate to just over 200% of GDP. These banks have,
in aggregate, maintained strong, double-digit core
Tier 1 ratios, thus capping the potential liabilities that could
crystallise on the government's balance sheet. The off-shore
part of the financial system is much larger and is composed of the investment
fund industry (with assets under management that equate to 50x GDP) and
the offshore banking operations (with assets that are 20x GDP).
Moody's assesses the contagion risk between and within these different
segments of Luxembourg's financial industry to be low due to minimal
balance sheet linkages between the different segments of the financial
sector (excluding intra-group exposures in the off-shore
banking system which account for around 40% of the aggregated balance
sheet of the system).

The Aaa rating is supported by the very high fiscal flexibility,
characterised by the low fiscal inertness of the government and its ability
to adjust tax rates (especially VAT considering the structure of economy),
capital expenditures (4% GDP) and social security parameters.
Luxembourg still exhibits sound fiscal metrics, relative to other
Aaa-rated countries, in spite of the fact that the government
had to use its balance sheet to support both the economy and the banking
sector during the financial crisis, which caused debt levels to
increase to a still-modest 18.2% of GDP in 2011 from
7% in 2007. In addition, the government has significant
financial buffers in the form of national pension fund assets that are
equivalent to 27% of GDP.

--WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATING DOWN

Luxembourg's Aaa rating could potentially be downgraded if Moody's
were to observe a large increase in the government's debt burden.
Luxembourg's debt level is still low relative to rating peers,
but the country's small size probably means that it is limited in
its ability to take on large quantities of additional debt. More
broadly, if events in the euro area develop in a way that undermines
the resilience of the Luxembourg financial sector or economy, that
could also result in a downgrade of the sovereign.

--WHAT COULD MOVE THE OUTLOOK BACK TO STABLE

Conversely, the rating outlook could return to stable if a benign
outlook for the euro area, reduced stress in non-core countries
and less adverse macroeconomic conditions in Europe in general were to
ease medium-term uncertainties with regard to the country's
debt trajectory and economic resilience.

***

MOODY'S AFFIRMS FINLAND'S Aaa RATING AND STABLE OUTLOOK

Moody's has today affirmed the Aaa rating and stable rating outlook
on Finland's government bond rating.

--RATIONALE FOR AFFIRMATION

The key drivers of the rating affirmation are: (1) the Finnish government's
net creditor position, with accumulated government pension assets
exceeding the government's gross financial liabilities; (2)
its fiscally conservative budgetary policies that never deviated from
strict compliance with the Maastricht Treaty criteria; (3) the country's
relatively healthy and domestically oriented banking system; (4)
its diversified export markets, with a comparatively small share
of exports (close to 33%) sold to the euro area, indicating
a limited exposure to and therefore relative insulation from the euro
area in terms of trade; and (5) the government's efforts to
reduce its exposure to potential losses on its loans to other euro area
countries through collateral agreements.

Moody's nonetheless believes that Finland's economy and public
finances will continue to be challenged as long as the euro area crisis
persists, in particular due to the structural problems facing its
key economic sectors.

--WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS DOWN

Finland's Aaa stable rating could potentially be downgraded if the
country were to experience a serious deterioration in public finances
over a lengthy period of time that would worsen debt affordability significantly
and endanger economic stability. Although Finland is in a better
position than its euro area peers to shield itself from any adverse developments
in the euro area debt crisis, should its economy and banking system
prove less resilient than expected, this could also put downward
pressure on the rating.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Sovereign Bond Ratings
published in September 2008. Please see the Credit Policy page
on www.moodys.com for a copy of this methodology.

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS PROTECTED BY LAW, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO, COPYRIGHT LAW, AND NONE OF SUCH INFORMATION MAY BE COPIED OR OTHERWISE REPRODUCED, REPACKAGED, FURTHER TRANSMITTED, TRANSFERRED,DISSEMINATED, REDISTRIBUTED OR RESOLD, OR STORED FOR SUBSEQUENT USE FOR ANY SUCH PURPOSE, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, IN ANY FORM OR MANNER OR BY ANY MEANS WHATSOEVER, BY ANY PERSON WITHOUT MOODY’S PRIOR WRITTEN CONSENT.

All information contained herein is obtained by MOODY’S from sources believed by it to be accurate and reliable. Because of the possibility of human or mechanical error as well as other factors, however, all information contained herein is provided “AS IS” without warranty of any kind. MOODY'S adopts all necessary measures so that the information it uses in assigning a credit rating is of sufficient quality and from sources MOODY'S considers to be reliable including, when appropriate, independent third-party sources. However, MOODY’S is not an auditor and cannot in every instance independently verify or validate information received in the rating process or in preparing the Moody’s Publications.

To the extent permitted by law, MOODY’S and its directors, officers, employees, agents, representatives, licensors and suppliers disclaim liability to any person or entity for arising from or in connection with the information contained herein or the use of or inability to use any such information, even if MOODY’S or any of its directors, officers, employees, agents, representatives, licensors or suppliers is advised in advance of the possibility of such losses or damages, including but not limited to: (a(b) any loss or damage arising where the relevant financial instrument is not the subject of a particular credit rating assigned by MOODY’S.

To the extent permitted by law, MOODY’S and its directors, officers, employees, agents, representatives, licensors and suppliers disclaim liability for any direct or compensatory losses or damages caused to any person or entity, including but not limited to by any negligence (but excluding fraud, willful misconduct or any other type of liability that, for the avoidance of doubt, by law cannot be excluded) on the part of, or any contingency within or beyond the control of, MOODY’S or any of its directors, officers, employees, agents, representatives, licensors or suppliers, arising from or in connection with the information contained herein or the use of or inability to use any such information.

NO WARRANTY, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, AS TO THE ACCURACY, TIMELINESS, COMPLETENESS, MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR PURPOSE OF ANY SUCH RATING OR OTHER OPINION OR INFORMATION IS GIVEN OR MADE BY MOODY’S IN ANY FORM OR MANNER WHATSOEVER.

Moody’s Investors Service, Inc., a wholly-owned credit rating agency subsidiary of Moody’s Corporation (“MCO”), hereby discloses that most issuers of debt securities (including corporate and municipal bonds, debentures, notes and commercial paper) and preferred stock rated by Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. have, prior to assignment of any rating, agreed to pay to Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. for appraisal and rating services rendered by it fees ranging from $1,500 to approximately $2,500,000. MCO and MIS also maintain policies and procedures to address the independence of MIS’s ratings and rating processes. Information regarding certain affiliations that may exist between directors of MCO and rated entities, and between entities who hold ratings from MIS and have also publicly reported to the SEC an ownership interest in MCO of more than 5%, is posted annually at www.moodys.com under the heading “Investor Relations — Corporate Governance — Director and Shareholder Affiliation Policy.”

For Australia only: Any publication into Australia of this document is pursuant to the Australian Financial Services License of MOODY’S affiliate, Moody’s Investors Service Pty Limited ABN 61 003 399 657AFSL 336969 and/or Moody’s Analytics Australia Pty Ltd ABN 94 105 136 972 AFSL 383569 (as applicable). This document is intended to be provided only to “wholesale clients” within the meaning of section 761G of the Corporations Act 2001. By continuing to access this document from within Australia, you represent to MOODY’S that you are, or are accessing the document as a representative of, a “wholesale client” and that neither you nor the entity you represent will directly or indirectly disseminate this document or its contents to “retail clients” within the meaning of section 761G of the Corporations Act 2001. MOODY’S credit rating is an opinion as to the creditworthiness of a debt obligation of the issuer, not on the equity securities of the issuer or any form of security that is available to retail clients. It would be dangerous for “retail clients” to make any investment decision based on MOODY’S credit rating. If in doubt you should contact your financial or other professional adviser.

For Japan only: Moody's Japan K.K. (“MJKK”) is a wholly-owned credit rating agency subsidiary of Moody's Group Japan G.K., which is wholly-owned by Moody’s Overseas Holdings Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of MCO. Moody’s SF Japan K.K. (“MSFJ”) is a wholly-owned credit rating agency subsidiary of MJKK. MSFJ is not a Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (“NRSRO”). Therefore, credit ratings assigned by MSFJ are Non-NRSRO Credit Ratings. Non-NRSRO Credit Ratings are assigned by an entity that is not a NRSRO and, consequently, the rated obligation will not qualify for certain types of treatment under U.S. laws. MJKK and MSFJ are credit rating agencies registered with the Japan Financial Services Agency and their registration numbers are FSA Commissioner (Ratings) No. 2 and 3 respectively.

MJKK or MSFJ (as applicable) hereby disclose that most issuers of debt securities (including corporate and municipal bonds, debentures, notes and commercial paper) and preferred stock rated by MJKK or MSFJ (as applicable) have, prior to assignment of any rating, agreed to pay to MJKK or MSFJ (as applicable) for appraisal and rating services rendered by it fees ranging from JPY200,000 to approximately JPY350,000,000.

MJKK and MSFJ also maintain policies and procedures to address Japanese regulatory requirements.