HEARN, C.J.: The State petitioned to have
John Foley Kennedy committed to the Department of Mental Health (DMH) as a sexually
violent predator under S.C. Code Ann. § 44-48-100 (Supp. 2001). After a bench
trial, the court found beyond a reasonable doubt that Kennedy was a sexually
violent predator and committed him to the DMH. We affirm.

FACTS

In March 1991, Kennedy pleaded guilty to committing
a lewd act on a child and received a suspended sentence. The sentence was later
revoked. In 1996, he entered two Alford pleas to committing a lewd act
on a child under the age of fourteen. The first victim was a young girl, approximately
two years of age. The second victim was a boy about one year old. He was sentenced
to six years incarceration suspended upon service of five years probation.

On January 5, 1999, the State
petitioned for a finding of probable cause that Kennedy was a sexually violent
predator. On July 26, 1999, the judge entered an order finding probable cause
existed and ordered that Kennedy be taken into custody. After a probable cause
hearing, Kennedy was ordered to undergo a psychiatric evaluation. Kennedy was
evaluated by the State’s expert witness, Dr. Donna Schwartz-Watts, in August
1999, and by his own expert witness, Dr. Harold Morgan, in November 1999. A
non-jury trial was held on May 23, 2000, at which Kennedy was found to be a
sexually violent predator. He was committed to the DMH for his long-term control,
care, and treatment.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“In an action at law, on appeal of a case tried without
a jury, the findings of fact of the judge will not be disturbed upon appeal
unless found to be without evidence which reasonably supports the judge’s findings.”
Townes Assocs., Ltd. v. City of Greenville, 266 S.C. 81, 86, 221 S.E.2d
773, 775 (1976). Thus, this court must affirm if there is any evidence to support
the trial court’s findings.

DISCUSSION

Kennedy contends the trial court erred
in committing him to the DMH because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt he was a sexually violent predator and could not control his behavior. [1] We disagree.

I. State’s Proof That Kennedy Was a Sexually Violent Predator

Kennedy argues there was ample evidence
to support a finding that he was not a sexually violent predator. S.C Code
Ann. § 44-48-30(1) (Supp. 2000) provides that a sexually violent predator is
a person who:

(a)
has been convicted of a sexually violent offense; and

(b)
suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person
likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility
for long-term control, care, and treatment.

Addressing the first prong of the statute, it is clear
that Kennedy’s convictions for committing a lewd act on a child under the age
of fourteen is a sexually violent offense as enumerated in S.C. Code Ann. §
44-48-30(2)(k) (Supp. 2002). Therefore, we must look at the second prong to
determine if Kennedy suffers from a mental abnormality [2] that would make him likely to engage in acts of sexual violence.

In support of his argument, Kennedy asserts that
because he passed the Penal Plethysmography (PPG) test, which is used to test
sexual arousal to children, this was the best evidence that he would not re-offend.
He also contends that he sought treatment while in prison and voluntarily inquired
of his probation officer about possible treatment programs. He further notes
that he was released for a period of approximately seven months without incident
before he was arrested pursuant to the Act, and that he had consistently and
successfully abided by the terms of his probation.

However, there is evidence to support
the trial judge’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Kennedy was a sexually
violent predator. During trial, the State offered the testimony of Dr. Donna
Schwartz-Watts regarding Kennedy’s psychiatric illness and possible treatments.
She found that Kennedy suffered from pedophilia, frotteurism
[3] , and anxiety disorder. She testified that pedophilia is a lifelong
illness, and most significant to our analysis, she stated that Kennedy had the
propensity to commit future acts on children because of the illness.

Dr. Schwartz-Watts also testified that due to Kennedy’s
continuing denial of the events, he is less likely to pursue outpatient treatment
and therefore needs the supervision of inpatient treatment. She further testified
that the only comprehensive program in the state is the inpatient program through
the DMH. Dr. Harold Morgan, Kennedy’s court-appointed psychiatrist, also opined
that Kennedy would benefit from some type of treatment. Dr. Morgan stated that
he knew of outpatient treatment in Greenville, but did not know of specific
programs anywhere else. He also agreed that there would be no guarantee that
Kennedy would not reoffend while in an outpatient program.

While there may be some evidence
supporting Kennedy’s claim that he is not a sexually violent predator, including
a normal PPG test result, there is more than enough evidence to support the
decision reached by the trial court. Moreover, our supreme court has previously
noted that such arguments concerning evidence that an individual was not a sexually
violent predator go to the weight of the evidence and not its sufficiency.
In re Matthews, 345 S.C. 638, 647, 550 S.E.2d 311, 315 (2001), cert.
denied byMatthews v. South Carolina, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S. Ct. 1928
(May 13, 2002). Therefore, in light of our limited scope of review, we find
the trial court did not err in concluding Kennedy was a sexually violent predator
and in committing him to the DMH for treatment.

II.
Proof That Kennedy Could Not Control His Behavior

Kennedy next argues the trial court erred in finding
he was a sexually violent predator because the State failed to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that he could not control his behavior. We disagree.

South Carolina’s Sexually Violent Predator Act
is modeled on the Kansas Act. Matthews, 345 S.C. at 649, 550 S.E.2d
at 316. Kennedy cites a Kansas case, In the Matter of the Treatment and
Care of Michael T. Crane, 7 P.3d 285 (2000), in support of his argument
that it was incumbent upon the State to prove that he could not control his
behavior. This case, however, has been vacated by the United States Supreme
Court in Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002). In Crane, the
Supreme Court found that the Kansas statute “set forth no requirement of total
or complete lack of control.” 534 U.S. at 411. It further noted that “the
most severely ill people--even those commonly termed ‘psychopaths’--retain some
ability to control their behavior.” Id. at 412. However, the Court
further found that the federal constitution does not allow civil commitment
under the Act without any lack of control determination. Id.,
at 414.

Our supreme court has previously addressed the
holding in Crane in In re Luckabaugh, 351 S.C. 122, 568 S.E.2d
338 (2002). It recognized that “[t]he Crane Court failed to provide
an exact threshold between where control ends and where a lack of control begins.
. . . ‘[I]t is enough to say that there must be proof of serious difficulty
in controlling behavior.’” Id., 351 S.C. at 142, 568 S.E.2d at 348 (citations
omitted). It further found that:

Inherent within the mental abnormality prong of the Act is
a lack of control determination, i.e. the individual can only be committed
if he suffers from a mental illness which he cannot sufficiently control without
the structure and care provided by a mental health facility, rendering him likely
to commit a dangerous act.

Id., 351 S.C. at 144, 568 S.E.2d at 349. Thus, Crane
does not mandate a separate and specific lack of control determination, “only
that a court must determine the individual lacks control while looking at the
totality of the evidence.” Id., 351 S.C. at 143, 568 S.E.2d at 348 (citing
Crane, 534 U.S. at 413). Therefore, because Kennedy suffered from pedophilia,
“a mental abnormality that critically involves what a lay person might describe
as a lack of control,” we find this is inherent evidence that Kennedy suffered
from an inability to control his own behavior. Crane, 534 U.S. at 414
(citing DSM-IV 571-572 (listing as a diagnostic criterion for pedophilia that
an individual have acted on, or been affected by, “sexual urges” toward children)).
Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court’s order mandating Kennedy’s
civil commitment.

CONCLUSION

We find there was sufficient
evidence to support the trial court’s finding that Kennedy was a sexually violent
predator and could not control his behavior because he suffered from pedophilia.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is