A Flawed Resolution: Errors, Misrepresentations, and Omissions in the Resolution Before the AHA

About the Alliance for Academic Freedom: "The AAF currently consists of over 120 liberal and progressive scholars, affiliated with The Third Narrative, who are dedicated to combating academic boycotts and blacklists, defending freedom of expression and promoting empathy and civility in the debate over Israelis and Palestinians."

On
January 9, 2016, a resolution will come before the business meeting
of the American Historical Association calling on the scholarly
organization “to monitor Israeli actions that restrict the right to
education in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.” The Alliance
for Academic Freedom believes the resolution to be full of errors,
misrepresentations, omissions, and imbalanced formulations, and that
it therefore should be rejected.

Members
of the AAF are self-identified liberals and progressives who have
been critical, individually and collectively, of Israeli policies
toward the Palestinian people and supportive of the national
aspirations of both Palestinians and Jews. As our founding document
explains, in addition to supporting a two-state solution, we reject
Israeli occupation of the West Bank because it both deprives
Palestinians of fundamental rights and corrodes the “democratic
principles upon which the State of Israel was founded.”1
Like the proponents of this resolution
(http://www.historians.org/annual-meeting/business-meeting/resolution-to-be-considered-at-the-january-2016-business-meeting),
members of AAF are also concerned about obstacles to education for
students in the West Bank and Gaza.

Yet,
as our founding documents also state, we reject the all-too-common
binary approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict that seeks to justify
one side or the other as all right or all wrong, and sets out to
marshal evidence to prove a case of complete guilt or total
exoneration. Scholarship and fairness require a more difficult and
thoughtful approach. As academics we recognize the subjective
perspectives of individuals and peoples, but strive to apply rigorous
standards to research and analysis rather than to subsume academic
discipline to political expediency.

Any
resolution adopted by a broad-based professional organization such as
the AHA should be grounded in unimpeachable facts. The
AHA’s “Guiding Principles on Taking a Public Stance” call for
the facts in any resolution to be “established, to the extent that
is possible, before a public statement is drafted—much less
circulated.”2
This
resolution fails that test by a wide margin. Its factual
unreliability renders it unfit to be a basis for action by the AHA.

1. The
resolution misrepresents the accessibility of travel to and from
Gaza.

The
resolution criticizes Israel for restricting the movement of faculty,
staff, visitors, and students in the West Bank and Gaza. It would
also have the AHA call for the “immediate reversal” of such
policies. It is true that since Hamas gained power in Gaza in 2006,Israel
has restricted the mobility of students, faculty, staff, and foreign
nationals to and from Gaza via the crossing points that are under its
control. And such restrictions can impede the “regular functioning
of instruction and university activities at Palestinian institutions
of higher learning.”

But
this resolution is tendentious and deeply flawed in its discussion of
those restrictions. Problematically, it does
not make clear that Israeli policies are not the sole factor limiting
the mobility of Gazans. Other governments, including Egypt, Hamas,
the Palestinian Authority, and Jordan, are also responsible for the
travel restrictions under consideration.

Most
important is the role of Egypt. In a glaring omission, the resolution
does not mention that there is an exit from Gaza through the Rafah
gate into Egypt. Since Israel withdrew from Gaza in 2005, the
standard route for Gazan students to access higher education abroad
has been to cross at Rafah into Egypt and then to fly elsewhere from
Cairo. But in 2014, in response to mounting tension with Hamas, Egypt
largely closed the Rafah crossing (a move that the Palestinian
Authority President Mahmoud Abbas described as fair and sensible
given Egypt’s security concerns).3
Yet this
resolution does not call on the AHA to demand changes in Egypt’s
border policies, or indeed mention Egypt at all. It falsely implies
that all entrance crossings are Israel’s responsibility.

Another
crucial fact omitted altogether from the resolution is that Hamas,
too, controls the mobility of students, faculty, and foreign
nationals. Hamas has barred Palestinian students under its control
from accepting fellowships to travel to the U.S. or to engage in
educational visits to Israel intended to “plant seeds of peace.”4
According
to the State Department’s 2013
Human Rights Report,
Hamas “prevented high school students from the Gaza Strip from
participating in certain cultural and educational exchange programs,
including programs sponsored by foreign governments and international
organizations. Students on foreign exchange programs continued to
face difficulty when traveling out of Gaza to obtain permission for
onward travel abroad. In some instances families of the students
petitioned Hamas’ Ministry of Education so their children could
travel.”5
In addition, a 2010 report by the Sixth Educational International
(EI) and the Canadian Association of University Teachers (CAUT) held
that the ongoing conflict between Hamas and Fatah has negatively
affected university governance, led to university closures, resulted
in the harassment and arrest of academics and students, and produced
violations of academic freedom and basic civil liberties in both Gaza
and the West Bank.6
Hamas
has also been very slow in producing lists of students approved for
admission to foreign universities, impeding their timely travel.7

Also
implicated in travel restrictions is the Palestinian Authority. The
Palestinian Civil Affairs Committee, an organization of the PA, is
charged with providing Israel with lists of students who have
received scholarships abroad. Although students do not typically
travel abroad through Israel, Israel does allow some to do so based
on PCAC’s lists. But this committee often provides the lists late
after the academic year has started or visas have expired. These
delays also play a role in impeding academic travel.8

Finally,
Jordan contributes to the travel problems students face. Students who
exit Gaza through the Erez crossing in northern Gaza and then cross
the Allenby Bridge into Jordan need permits to fly from Amman to
their final destination. But Jordan is notoriously slow in issuing
these permits, further delaying students wishing to study abroad.
According to Gisha, an Israeli human rights organization devoted to
protecting Palestinian freedom of movement, the combined
Palestinian/Jordanian delays mean that fellowships often expire or
the term is well under way before students arrive at their intended
institutions.9
Despite all this, the resolution before the AHA makes no mention of
the roles of Hamas, Egypt, the PA, and Jordan in erecting impediments
to student travel. It thus misrepresents the problems that exist as
the responsibility of Israel alone.

Before
calling for the “immediate reversal” of all Israeli policies
regarding travel in and out of Gaza, AHA members should understand
what these policies are, the context in which they have developed,
and how they have changed over time.

After
the breakdown of peace negotiations between Israel and the
Palestinian Authority, the rise of suicide bombers and other
terrorist threats to civilians led Israel to introduce measures to
protect its population. The resolution
does not mention this vital historical context.
Nor
does it mention that Hamas, which has governed Gaza for ten years,
has a hostile relationship with not only Israel but also Egypt. Its
borders are not the equivalent of those between friendly countries
and cannot be viewed as such. In addition, Hamas’s battle with the
Palestinian Authority for control of Palestine frequently erupts into
conflict, resulting in measures that further affect education and
travel.

Since
Israel, Egypt and the PA all have security concerns that require some
restrictions on entry and exit from Gaza, restrictions
on the movements of Israelis, Palestinians, and foreigners should be
viewed in this light. For example, Gazan students are not permitted
to study in the West Bank out of concern that they might act as Hamas
operatives there. These policies are certainly open to questioning
and criticism, but the overall security context must be presented to
fully understand the issues at stake. By
omitting this essential historical context, the resolution
fundamentally misrepresents the issue at hand.

3. The
resolution ignores evidence that runs contrary to its claims.

The
resolution does not mention the important fact that Israel has been
increasingly permitting travel, through the Erez crossing. Because of
its security concerns, Israel initially restricted the movement of
Gazans into Israel to humanitarian cases. Significantly, though, in
the first six months of 2015 these exits almost doubled, from an
average of 6,270 per month to 13,832 per month.10
Since October 2014, 291 students have traveled from Gaza through
Israel on their way to study abroad.11
Unfortunately, this number does not satisfy all Gazans wishing to
study abroad, but it does show marked improvement over earlier rates
of egress. By omitting these increases in student travel, the
resolution tendentiously frames the issue.

Regrettably,
this resolution does not
encourage
Israel and Egypt to improve and expand those policies that enhance
the mobility of academics, students, and staff when feasible, as both
countries appear to have been doing in recent months.12
Rather, the resolution resorts to a blanket condemnation of Israeli
policies ignoring the actual, more complicated, nature of the facts.

Similarly,
the proposed condemnation of Israel doesn’t make sense in the
context of a country that is taking significant steps to ensure that
underrepresented populations, including Israeli Arabs and Bedouins,
gain opportunities to enroll in top Israeli universities and complete
their degrees. The rate of Arab enrollment in higher education has
increased (with some dips), from 10.1 percent in 1999-2000 to 14.1
percent from 2014-5.The
most significant increase has been for students pursuing advanced
degrees.13
The Israeli government has undertaken concrete steps to increase
minority groups’ participation in higher education. It has reduced
their dropout rates by enhancing academic counseling and preparation
classes at the high school level; established programming aimed at
supporting first-year Arab Israeli university students; awarded
tuition-free scholarships; and given employment guidance to students
in their last year of study.14
These facts, which would give a fuller and more nuanced picture of
Israeli education policies, are simply omitted.

4. The
resolution overstates the difficulty academics face in getting to the
West Bank.

In
the past few years, cases of restrictions on academics traveling to
Palestinian institutions in the West Bank have become the subject of
academic discussions. But contrary to the resolution’s
implications, academics traveling to Palestinian institutions in the
West Bank are not arbitrarily denied entry. Israel’s
procedures and regulations follow legally accepted protocol based on
the Interim Accords signed by Israel and the Palestinian Authority.15
Foreign academics are free to enter the West Bank after acquiring a
visa or permit—a
standard procedure the world over. They can receive a three-month
visa to the West Bank that can be renewed for up to twenty-seven
months. More than 90 percent of academic applications are approved.16
Denials typically occur for security reasons. Israeli decisions on
granting visas or allowing border entry are also subject to judicial
review. Visa denials perceived to be unjustified can be overturned by
the Israeli Supreme Court, to which all non-admitted persons have a
right of appeal. Israel’s policy thus resembles other that of
democratic states. In 2012, for example, only 142 Americans were
denied entry into Israel out of some 626,000 applicants—a refusal
rate of 0.023 percent. In comparison, in 2012, the United States
denied Israeli applications for “B” visas was at a rate of 5.4
percent.17
By this measure, the U.S.’s practices were far more restrictive
than Israel’s.

5. The
Islamic University’s role in the 2014 military conflict is omitted.

The
resolution claims that in the summer of 2014 Israel unfairly targeted
institutions of higher learning, including Islamic University of
Gaza. While disputes exist about Israel’s attack on Gaza in the
summer of 2014, it is widely documented that one of the explanations
for the damage to civilian institutions was Hamas’s use of those
institutions—including schools, universities, mosques, hospitals,
and hotels—to carry out attacks on Israel.18
Hamas’s policies, which themselves violate the laws of war, did
much to endanger the lives of students and academics in Palestinian
universities. Yet the resolution does not call for monitoring Hamas’s
actions. It omits any mention of Hamas’s widely condemned use of
civil institutions for military purposes.

The
role of the Islamic University is especially fraught. The resolution
includes none of the important context. On August 2, 2014, Israel
targeted the university because of its role in building, testing, and
possibly launching weapons.19
By any definition of the laws of war, a facility engaged in such
activity is a valid military target.

A
strong link has existed between Hamas and the Islamic University
dating to its founding in 1978.20
Called “Hamas U.” by the noted Middle East journalist Thanassis
Cambanis, the university has long been a stronghold of the terrorist
organization. “Hamas doesn’t run the Islamic University, but the
overlap of the party and the school is nearly seamless,” Cambanis
wrote in the Boston
Globe.
“Scientists and academics at the university double as Hamas
technocrats: doctors, engineers, economists, teachers, and media
specialists.”21
When Hamas was warring with the Palestinian Authority, Yasser Arafat
of the PA ordered a police raid of the school because it housed
explosives and other weapons; over six hours, three university guards
were arrested, and police discovered caches of knives, explosives and
suicide-bomber vests.22
In 2007, Mahmoud Abbas also ordered a raid of the university, finding
several Iranian operatives running rocket-making lessons in labs; one
committed suicide during the raid.23

Middle
East commentator Ehud Yaari has explained that the 2014 strike aimed
at an “R&D facility within the campus” that served the Izz
al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas’s military wing, “where
different components of rockets were made. In this facility
professors, lecturers and other staff members of the science
faculties were working for years on production of rockets—including
those with a range to hit deep into Israel—improving the explosive
payload and seeking ways to introduce guidance systems. On several
occasions rockets were fired from different spots within the
campus.”24
Before the AHA condemns Israel for attacks on institutions of higher
education in Gaza, such as Islamic University, it should be
definitively ascertained whether those institutions were actually
functioning as academic institutions or as de facto military
installations.

6. The
footnotes in the resolution don’t actually support the claims they
put forward.

The
assertions in the resolution should be strongly supported by evidence
if they are to serve as a basis for action. But in several cases, the
footnotes are highly misleading.

For
example, the resolution claims that Israel “routinely invades
university campuses in Jerusalem and the West Bank.” But the
evidence provided in the resolution via the corresponding footnote
(no. 5) amounts only to a single September 17, 2013 letter from Peter
Sluglett, then the president of the Middle Eastern Studies
Association. That letter in turn refers only to a single incident at
the al-Quds University that does not describe an invasion. According
to this letter, which is based on a report from the Palestinian Ma’an
news agency, Israeli forces seeking to enter the al-Quds campus
engaged in clashes with university guards and staff on September 8,
wounding two men. (No Israeli perspective was provided.)

Prof.
Sluglett’s description of the incident comes nowhere near
supporting the resolution’s broad allegation of “routine
invasions.” Further research is needed to determine whether the
incident amounted to an infringement of academic freedom by Israeli
authorities, or whether the description offered by the resolution is
even accurate.25
As it stands, the current resolution fails to meet the AHA guideline
that “in all cases, the facts should be established, to the extent
that is possible, before a public statement is drafted—much less
circulated.”26
For a claim as sweeping as the one in the resolution, substantial and
unimpeachable evidence should be furnished, not one letter regarding
a single incident.

In
some cases when Israeli authorities have entered campuses, it is at
least plausible that they were responding to threats of terrorism. On
December 23, 2015 for example, news outlets reported that a Hamas
terror cell, which was planning suicide bombings and car bombings,
involved as many as twenty-five students from al Quds University in
Abu Dis. The cell had a makeshift laboratory for making explosives.27
There have been other cases of students operating as part of
terrorist operations, according to the Israeli Security Agency.28
When students, like any other individuals, engage in planning
terrorism, military or police action would seem to be warranted. At
the least, these fact complicate the picture of an Israeli militarily
routinely and arbitrarily running roughshod over Palestinian
campuses.

A
similar lack of evidentiary support plagues another “whereas”
clause of the resolution as well. One clause, for example, asserts
that “Israel routinely refuses to allow students from Gaza to
travel in order to pursue higher education abroad, and even at West
Bank universities.” But in this case the corresponding footnote
(no. 3) actually offers evidence
to the contrary.

The
note refers to an update on the mobility of Gazan students published
by Gisha, headlined, “Israel allows 30 Gaza students to travel
abroad for their studies.” The news item states that as of March 2
2015, Israel opened the Erez crossing to allow thirty Gazan students
per week to travel abroad, even as Egypt continued to close Rafah
gate.29
In other words, the footnote illustrates that Israel is
enhancing—rather than “routinely refusing”—the mobility of
Gazan students. For a sweeping claim of “routine” behavior, as
opposed to targeted policies (however debatable), substantial
evidence should be furnished.

The
hastily drafted resolution lacks the strong evidence, even in its own
footnotes, that should be required before it is adopted by the AHA.

7. The
resolution would require the AHA to do something it lacks the
resources to do.

The
resolution calls on the AHA to “commit ... itself to continuing to
monitor Israeli actions that restrict the right to education in the
Occupied Palestinian Territories.” To monitor another country’s
actions regarding education in a serious way necessitates a
substantial investment of staff time and money. It might involve
commissioning a study, sending a delegation abroad to meet with
educational leaders, or investing in other institutions, such as New
York University’s Scholars at Risk, which monitors infringements on
academic freedom internationally. But the AHA has neither the staff
nor the funds to make this type of investment. Without dedicating
itself to serious study of the issues, its monitoring efforts will
likely translate into condemnations based on complaints without the
requisite investigations. Such blanket condemnations are more likely
to alienate those who are in a position to enhance such experiences.

8. Better
ways exist for AHA members to improve education access in the region.

Like
those proposing the current resolution, members of AAF are also
concerned about obstacles to education in the West Bank and Gaza, as
we are about impediments to education everywhere. But rather than
enjoining the AHA to “call for the immediate reversal of Israeli
policies,” “to call for the cessation of attacks on Palestinian
educational institutions,” or “to commit itself to continuing to
monitor Israeli actions,” the AAF encourages the creation of
opportunities for collaboration and exchange that would expose
Palestinians and Israelis to each other’s historical narratives and
use knowledge and mutual understanding to promote peace. Toward that
end, AHA members could, individually or collectively, support, host,
or collaborate with the many groups that already exist to promote
these goals. Many of these groups can be found on the website of the
Alliance for Middle East Peace, an umbrella organization for groups
seeking partnership and cooperation among Israelis and Palestinians.30

In
addition, we encourage the AHA to continue and, if appropriate,
strengthen, its collaboration with New York University’s Scholars
at Risk Network, of which it recently became an affiliated member.31
We also encourage AHA members who are specifically concerned with the
mobility of Gazan students to support Gisha, the Legal Center for
Freedom of Movement frequently cited both by those who support and
oppose this resolution.32

_______________

1
“Alliance for Academic Freedom,” The Third Narrative,
http://thirdnarrative.org/get-involved/alliance-for-academic-freedom/

2
“Guiding Principles on Taking a Public Stance,” Perspectives,
American Historical Association, March 2007. AHA website.

8
“Following Appeal by Gisha, COGAT Confirms 180 Students from Gaza
Will Be Allowed to Travel over the Summer to Reach Their Academic
Institutions Abroad,” Gisha,
June 2, 2015, http://gisha.org/legal/4409.

13
The Council for Higher Education, “Statistical Data: Table 14:
Undergraduate Arab Students in Institutions of Higher Education by
Type of Institution 1999/2000-2014/15,” 2015.
http://che.org.il/en/?page_id=8903.

14
The Council for Higher Education,“The Higher
Education System in Israel 2014,”