Wednesday, December 31, 2008

On December 31, 2008 the Coalition of the Willing will officially come to an end. That’s the date when the United Nations mandate for foreign troops to stay in Iraq will be over. In total, 40 countries sent forces to Iraq over the last five years not including the U.S., losing 314 soldiers. All but five will have to leave by the end of 2008. The Multi-National Force as it was officially known has always been a mixed bag. It was originally formed to give legitimacy to the U.S. invasion. The foreign troops then helped with the occupation. Some partook in combat operations or training, some did humanitarian missions, while others were merely for show.

Poland was in control of Multinational Division Center-South which included Armenian, Ukrainian, Latvian, Romanian and Moldavian troops, while the British commanded Multinational Division South-East originally after the invasion, but eventually just operated in Basra with a unit in Baghdad

Latvia withdrew on November 10. It originally sent forces in May 2003. It had 1,150 soldiers that worked in Kut in Wasit, Hillah in Babil, Kirkuk in Tamim, and Diwaniyah in Qadisiyah. It conducted military operations with the Poles, but those stopped in June 2007. Afterwards it concentrated on intelligence and management. It also received NATO membership in 2004.

Bosnia-Herzegovina had 86 troops in Iraq. It was supposed to leave in November 2008, but was delayed until the beginning of December. It is hoping for future NATO membeship.

Denmark pulled out most of its troops in December 2007. 290 soldiers rotated through the country after they were deployed in 2005 upon a request by NATO. Most of its soldiers were in a helicopter unit that supported the British in Basra. In August 2008 it sent 49 men to Baghdad to do guard duty at Camp Victory, while 36 soldiers that were removing unexploded ordinance in Qadisiyah were withdrawn. Afterwards, its soldiers were used to protect Danish diplomats and train Iraqis. It had 1 wounded in its three years in Iraq.

Slovenia might be the last country to withdraw. It only has two soldiers who train Iraqis. Their mission was supposed to end in February 2009, but the government wants its forces out by the end of the U.N. mandate. It originally sent in four trainers in 2006 that served in Baghdad. It received NATO membership in 2004.

Albone, Tim, “Iraq’s coalition of the dwindling,” The National, 12/11/08

Alsumaria, “Chief: No evidence to justify Iraq war,” 11/15/08- “Czech troops end military mission in Iraq,” 12/6/08- “Moldova withdraws its troops from Iraq,” 12/26/08- “Romania to keep its troops in Iraq,” 12/2/08- “South Korea ends military mission in Iraq,” 12/2/08

Associated Press, “Australia to maintain Iraq presence,” 12/24/08- “Azerbaijan to withdraw troops from Iraq,” 11/14/08- “Bulgaria to pull troops from Iraq at end of year,” 11/13/08- “Bulgarian troops return from Iraq,” 12/17/08- “Czechs to withdraw most of its troops from Iraq,” 10/1/08- “El Salvador to withdraw troops from Iraq,” 12/23/08- “SKorea to withdraw troops from Iraq in December,” 10/29/08

Tuesday, December 30, 2008

In December 2008 the International Organization for Migration (IOM) released its year-end reports on the displaced in Iraq’s eighteen provinces. One report covered Tamim, Ninewa and Salahaddin. Outside of Baghdad these are the most violent governorates in the country, and have deep seated ethnic tensions in two major cities, Mosul and Kirkuk, between Arabs and Kurds that are nowhere near being reconciled. This means there were will continue to be conflict there and displacement as was recently seen when thousands of Christians fled Mosul in October 2008. Because of these on-going disputes only a few thousand families have returned to the region. Those still displaced face a variety of problems from lack of basic services and food to jobs. As long as the three provinces remain unstable it is unlikely that the displaced will be coming back in large numbers any time soon.

The Displaced In Ninewa

Ninewa is one of Iraq’s northern most provinces located next to Anbar, Salahaddin, Dohuk and Irbil. It is rich in oil, and contains the third largest city in the country, Mosul, behind Baghdad and Basra. The city has a mix of Arabs, Kurds, Shabaks, Assyrians, Turkomen and Armenians. Security got worse in the second half of 2008 with an increase in kidnappings, assassinations, militia attacks, and general violence. Ethnic tensions also heated up when Christians were attacked in Mosul leading to almost 2,000 families fleeing. While some have come back, the majority have not and are still afraid of what might happen to them if they do. There are still military operations going on in Ninewa, specifically in Mosul. Until this situation is settled, the displaced problem will not be resolved.

Ninewa received two waves of displaced. The first came after the invasion, and consisted mostly of former Baathists and government officials from Baghdad and the south who were afraid of retribution. That would account for the large number of Iraqis from Basra 6.33% who now reside in Ninewa. There were also another group that fled military operations in the province such as a large number of Turkomen who left Telafar because of the fighting there. The second wave came in 2006 during the sectarian war. That’s shown by the fact that major reason why families fled was violence, 79.6% and fear 65.5%.

In the beginning of 2006 there were only about 100 displaced a month entering the province. After April however, it took off to around 1,400 coming in June. Displacement slowed afterwards, only to spike to its highest level of 2,000 in September. It then dropped to 250 in October, then went up against to 1,600 in November. Since then the number of refugees in the province has dropped consistently to 100 in April 2007. It has gone down to almost 0 since then with slight increases in January and October 2008.

Overall, 50% of the internal refugees in Ninewa came from Baghdad, but there were others that fled because of the Arab-Kurdish conflict. There are also a large number of displaced from within the province itself. Unlike the rest of the country, the largest displaced group is not Arab Muslims, but Assyrian Christians.

The province has no restrictions on the entry of displaced. To get food rations, families have to have their IDs, rations cards and documents, and register with the local office of the Ministry of Displacement and Migration. While the displaced have been generally welcomed in the province, resentment is growing against them as they are blamed for rising costs, especially rents, while some have joined armed groups. 59.8% say they want to go back to the original homes, while 6.4% said they want to be integrated into Ninewa.

Like the displaced in the rest of the country, those in Ninewa face a whole series of problems receiving basic services, along with finding housing and jobs. Next to legal help for retrieving their lost property, jobs was the second most important issue to displaced at 88%. In the Makhmoor and Hawiga districts there is high unemployment. Out of those surveyed by the IOM 81.1% said they had no family members working. Arabs and Turkomen especially find it hard to find work. The government is suppose to provide food rations to every Iraqi, but 56.6% of those polled said they received no rations at all. The water system in Ninewa is also in great disrepair. In the Mosul district there are villages that have no sewage system and the pipe system has been damaged by constant traffic by military vehicles. There was also maintenance done on the district’s electrical system, which reduced the number of hours per day with power to 4-6. 41.8% of displaced polled said they only got 1-3 ours of power per day on average.

A majority of the displaced said that they had received some type of aid to assist them with their predicament. 75% said they had received help. The largest provider was the Ministry of Displacement and Migration that served 43.2%. All government agencies combined provided for 45.1% of the displaced. Humanitarian groups in total helped 50.1%. That still left out a large number of people. 30.0% for example said they had no food aid. This is common throughout most of the country, and is made worse by the lack of security in the province.

Security Situation:Checkpoints 24.8%Death or injury in family 21.9%Missing family member 7.0%Need authorization to move 5.4%Other restrictions on movement 0.0%

Type of Housing:Renting 78.2%Living with host family or relatives 14.7%Other 4.7%Collective settlement 1.1%Public building 0.8%Tent near house of host family 0.6%Former military base 0.1%Tent in camp 0.0%

Status of Property Left Behind:Don’t know 61.5%Accessible 12.9%Occupied 4.6%Destroyed 3.7%Used by military 0.8%Taken over by Government 0.4%

Source of Assistance:Ministry of Displacement and Migration 43.2%Iraqi Red Crescent 31.6%Religious group 29.8%Host community 29.5%Relatives 26.6%No aid received 24.3%Humanitarian group 18.5%Other 6.8%Other government agency 1.9%

Salahaddin province is just north of Baghdad. It is mostly Arab with some Turkomen and Kurds. The city of Tikrit was a Baathist stronghold and the birthplace of Saddam Hussein. Because of this there was a lot of fighting between the Coalition and insurgents there. Although there is still violence in Salahaddin, the security situation is relatively stable. Militias and insurgents are losing influence.

Many people in Salahaddin were displaced because of the intense fighting there. The majority however, came during the sectarian war. 49.5% come from Baghdad, then Tamim 15% and Basra 12%. Most of those from the south fled to Salahaddin because they were Baathist and government officials, and were afraid of reprisals. 60.6% left their homes because of direct threats on their lives, while 47.5% gave their reason as general violence. The increase in displaced began in January 2006, with a big spike in June to 2,000. The rate declined until September 2006, and then took off again to 1,500 by December. The rate of displacement then steadily dropped until it was almost at zero by August 2007 with a few bumps up since then.

The province has no restrictions on displaced. Most have been welcomed, and received aid from the local communities. The Ministry of Interior is now telling families from Anbar and Diyala to go home because security has been established there, but the order is not being enforced. 50.1% of the displaced said they want to return to their homes, while 12.7% prefer to stay in Salahddin and resettle there. Because of the continued instability in the province, only 96 families have come back. 56 were internally displaced, while 40 came back from other countries. All of the latter are former Baathists and government officials, and are keeping low because they don’t want to face persecution for their past lives.

The displaced in Salahaddin face problems with food, jobs, and shelter. 88% said they needed food, followed by jobs 75%, and shelter 66%. Children of the displaced often have to work to support their families. Even then, only 71.7% of the displaced said they had anyone in their family working. Most displaced there have registered with the local authorities and receive their food rations, although 23.0% said they hadn’t received any yet. Salahaddin also suffered from the country’s drought during the summer. Water is still scarce in some sections of the province. In Tikrit the displaced have access to water 20 hours per day. In Samarra its 18 hours, but in other areas it goes down to only 5-6 hours. In parts of the Al-Daur district it gets as low as only 1-3 hours of water a day. Salahaddin is home to one of the country’s major power stations at Beiji. Despite this electricity is extremely scare for the displaced. 45% said they only get 1-3 hours of electricity per day. There are parts of Tikrit that receive no power at all. The province also lacks hospital staff. Only 34% of the displaced that were surveyed said they had access to the medications they need, while only 29% had been visited by a health worker in the last 30 days. The education system is also poor with many schools made out of mud, and others that need repairs.

A little under half of Salahaddin’s displaced are not being served by any organization. 47.6% said they had received no aid at all. Of those that had, local communities was the largest provider. The government on the other hand had only helped 5.8%. Humanitarian groups did a much better job reaching 50.1%. With food being their greatest need, 57.3% said they had received no food assistance. Government agencies only provided food to 1.7% of those surveyed. Even with security improving in Salahaddin, things have not improved much for the displaced there.

Security Situation:Checkpoints 9.9%Death or injury in family 8.3%Need authorization to move 6.3%Missing family member 3.5%Other restrictions on movement 1.0%

Type of Housing:Renting 67.9%Living with host family or relatives 11.9%Other 7.9%Public building 6.8%Collective settlement 3.9%Former military base 1.0%Tent near house of host family 0.4%Tent in camp 0.1%

Status of Property Left Behind:Don’t know 61.6%Occupied 13.8%Accessible 7.2%Destroyed 2.9%Used by military 1.1%Taken over by Government 0.0%

Source of Assistance:No aid received 47.6%Host community 33.4%Iraqi Red Crescent 23.0%Relatives 11.1%Religious group 9.7%Ministry of Displacement and Migration 4.4%Other government agency 1.4%Other 0.8%Humanitarian group 0.3%

Tamim was once known as Kirkuk province. Its name was changed in 1972. It is home to large oil reserves and ethnic tensions. The city of Kirkuk is one of the most contested pieces of territory in the country. Because of these divisions security worsened in the second half of 2008. Assassinations, kidnappings, attacks and explosions were al up. Violence and sexual assault against the displaced is also common.

Like Ninewa and Salahaddin, Tamim saw two waves of displacement. The first came during the Saddam years when he carried out his Arabization policy forcing out Kurds. Many of these families have since returned, but that has led to Arabs being pushed out. Then the sectarian war began, and vast more lost their homes or moved to Tamim as a result. 75% said they fled because of direct threats to their lives. Unlike other provinces in Iraq, most of the displaced in Tamim come from Diyala rather than Baghdad. The number of displaced saw a slow increase with a few ups and down until it hit its highest point in May 2007 at 1,700. It then dropped to almost zero, but with a few increases in October 2007, February 2008, and May 2008.

Tamim does have restriction on displaced entering the country. In order to register and receive food rations, families need to go to the local city council and the local branch of the Ministry of Displacement and Migration, and then go to Kirkuk for more paperwork. Many times families get rejected because of their ethnicity. There are many unregistered families living on the outskirts of Kirkuk as a result. If families don’t register they can be evicted as well. These strict rules have led many displaced to live with relatives because they can’t legally rent a place. If a family has had a member killed, kidnapped, or an orphaned child however, they can receive an exception from the Ministry of Displacement and Migration. The displaced are also treated differently depending upon whom they live with. If they are not of the same sect than they are often discriminated against. There are even reports of threats and harassment that have led some to move away.

79.0% of the displaced in Tamim say they want to return to their original homes, while 17.0% said they want to stay in their new communities. Families have begun to return to Al-Jamasa and Al-Shaheria villages in Al-Hawiga district after a Sons of Iraq unit was set up there and stabilized the area. Families that came back to Gareeb Sofla nearby found their homes destroyed, and are living without electricity, water, medical services, schools, and jobs. Some are living in mud huts. The rate of return has been limited with under 1000 individuals coming back so far. Unlike the rest of the country, they are split evenly between internally displaced and refugees who came back from other countries. The latter have been concentrated in the Daqduq district.

Displaced women are facing a number of difficulties in Tamim. Prostitution has grown in the province because of lack of jobs and poverty faced by the displaced. Families sometimes force their wives and children into the industry. In the Abo Al Shees village in Hawiga district there are pregnant women doing hard labor with little health care. Girls don’t go to school their either because they have to work, and there is a high level of child labor.

Besides jobs the major needs of displaced in Tamim are food, 96% and shelter 93%, along with a number of other issues. A whopping 98.8% of the displaced in the IOM survey said they had no one in their family working. In Kirkuk and Hawiga districts there are over 50 families facing evictions for squatting or because they can’t afford to pay their rents. In total, about 12% of the displaced said they were facing the los of their residences. Over 80% of the displaced have no to limited access to government food rations. Families in Daqduq and Dibis districts say they are regularly missing items in their packages. The major reason why the province is having such trouble delivering these goods is because of lack of security. Only 49% of the displaced in the province have access to water. In Daquq distrit there is a village with no access to water, which leads them to use a local river that increases the risk of disease. 41% say they use a broken pipe for this need. 71.6% of the displaced have access to four or more hours of electricity per day, but 16.5% had no power at all, and 11.3% said they only got it for 1 to 3 hours per day. Only 31% had access to health care, and 70% said they couldn’t get the medications they need. Just 9% were visited by a health worker in 30 days.

Government and humanitarian groups are largely failing the displaced in the province. 77% said they received no aid at all. The largest provider were unnamed groups at 16.9%. The government only helped 17.9%, while non-government organizations did worse at 11.5%. 77% received no food aid, with the government only assisting 9.8%. Like Ninewa, the lack of security there and continued instability will hamper efforts to help the displaced in this part of Iraq.

Security Situation:Death or injury in family 57.9%Checkpoints 30.3%Other restrictions on movement 25.3%Missing family member 24.1%Need authorization to move 21.4%

Type of Housing:Living with host family or relatives 28.1%Other 27.2%Renting 22.7%Public building 9.5%Tent near house of host family 8.3%Collective settlement 3.8%Former military base 0.3%Tent in camp 0.1%

Status of Property Left Behind:Don’t know 76.1%Accessible 8.1%Occupied 6.8%Destroyed 3.8%Used by military 0.4%Taken over by Government 0.2%

Source of Assistance:No aid received 60.0%Other 16.9%Ministry of Displacement and Migration 16.4%Relatives 13.2%Humanitarian group 7.9%Host community 5.7%Religious group 5.1%Iraqi Red Crescent 3.6%Other government agency 1.5%

It should be no surprise that each one of these sources records different amounts. In broad terms, icasualties has the lowest number of deaths. On their website they note, “Iraqi deaths based on news reports. This is not a definitive count. Actual totals for Iraqi deaths are higher than the numbers recorded on this site.” Iraq Body Count’s numbers are higher, and the Pentagon is right in the middle. Reports by the news services and newspapers are all over the place depending upon whom they talk to. On December 1, 2008 for example, Reuters had a body count for November 2008 based upon “government figures.” Where they came from was never identified. On November 1 Alsumaria TV had a report on October’s casualties based upon the Iraqi Defense, Interior and Health Ministries. On September 30 the Associated Press had a report on deaths based upon their own count.

Despite their differences all reports have followed the same broad trend. From the invasion to 2005 there was a steady increase in civilian and Iraqi security forces’ casualties. In February 2006 a Shiite shrine in Samarra was bombed and the sectarian war took off, and so did the dead and wounded. From January 2007 to the present deaths have declined with small increases such as in early 2008 when the government launched offensives against the Mahdi Army in Basra and then Sadr City in Baghdad.

Iraq Body Count recently released a report on trends in 2008. It found that from January to November 2008 between 8,351-9,028 Iraqi civilians were killed. That compares to 25,774-27,599 civilian deaths in 2006 and 22,671-24,295 killed in 2007. In contrast icasualties recorded 5,908 civilians and Iraqi soldiers and police killed from January to December 29, 2008, while the pentagon counted 5,580 from January to September. Average daily deaths have dropped from 76 per day in 2006, to 67 per day in 2007, to 25 per day in 2008 according to Iraq Body Count. That is the same rate as the first 20 months after the U.S. invasion from May 2003 to December 2004. Violence has declined in Baghdad the most, as it was the center of the sectarian war that is now over and the focus of the U.S. Surge. From 2006-2007 the capital accounted for 54% of all deaths. By 2008 it only accounted for 32%. The number of Iraqi police killed has also gone down from 1,891 in 2006 to 2,065 in 2007 to 928 so far in 2008. As with the November 2008 Iraq Index, Body Count found that civilians killed in bombings has hardly changed. In 2007 1,174 civilians were killed in roadside bombings compared to 1,106 in 2008 up to November.

While none of these sources look into causality the major one is the end of the sectarian war. American commentators differ on the reasons for its cessation from the Shiites defeating the Sunnis in Baghdad, to the Surge, to the Sunni Awakening, to Moqtada al-Sadr’s cease-fire, but they all agree that the civil war is over. That doesn’t mean violence has ended. Rather the source has changed. Rather than revenge and ethnic cleansing, most of the attacks appear to be based upon political disputes. Places like Mosul and Kirkuk for example are divided between Arabs and Kurds, which has meant deaths have hardly decreased there since 2007. The provincial and parliamentary elections scheduled for 2009 could also be a cause. That will probably mean Iraq will continue to see violence in certain places into the foreseeable future as long as these issues are unresolved.

Sunday, December 28, 2008

Each month the Brookings Institution puts out its Iraq Index. It’s a compendium of various statistics on violence, economic development, social indicators, and public opinion. The November 2008 edition was recently released. While it gives a good list of numbers, like previous reports, the major drawback is that many of them date back to 2006 and 2007 when newer ones are available. The latest Index shows that civilian deaths are down to the lowest level since 2003. Attacks on Coalition forces are down to 2004 levels, and attacks on Iraqi forces are the lowest since war began. There are still mass casualty bombings however at the same casualty rates as early 2005. Displacement is down to about 10,000 per month. Reconciliation is still shaky. U.S. casualties are minimal, but the psychological toll is increasing, especially with those that have deployed to Iraq for more than one tour. Finally, the aggregate economic numbers for Iraq are up, largely due to oil, while many of the country’s professionals have fled and not returned. While violence was Iraq’s most pressing issue, the Iraq Index shows that the country still has a long way to go before it becomes a healthy and stable one.

Security

Since the Surge all types of attacks and casualties are down in Iraq. Civilian deaths are at their lowest since the 2003 invasion. At the beginning of 2007 approximately 3,500 civilians were killed according to the Pentagon. Since January there has been a steady drop down to 600 in January 2008. After the security operations against the Mahdi Army that started in March, deaths have leveled off to around 500 deaths per month. This is the lowest number since the invasion. In comparison in May 2003 866 Iraqis were killed.

Coalition and Iraqi forces’ casualties are also down. The number of weekly attacks against the Coalition began dropping in June 2007. In September 2008 there were 390 per week, the lowest since 2004. Attacks on Iraqi forces are also down with only 25 killed in November 2008, a number not seen since the U.S. invasion.

Mass casualty bombings are the only thing that has not dropped as precipitously. In the first four months of 2005 there was an average of 20 bombings a month. From August to November 2008 there were an average of 19.75 such attacks. The casualties from these bombings are also down from 211 in January 2008 to 197 in June to 136 in November.

While Iraq has passed a number of reconciliation laws, the implementation has been uneven. For these reasons the Brookings Institution gives the country a mixed rating. Out of a total of 11 possible points, Iraq rated a 6.0. The 2008 budget, the Pension Law, and purging the government of extremists were given the highest rating, while the Accountability and Justice Law, which is meant to replace the deBaathification process, the Amnesty Law, integrating the Sons of Iraq, funding the provinces, the Provincial Powers Act, and the provincial election law were all given mixed reviews because they have been unevenly implemented. Dealing with Kirkuk and passing a hydrocarbon law were given failing grades as little has happened with them.

Brookings’ Rating Of Benchmark Reconciliation Acts:Note: Each issue can be given a 0, 0.5 or 1 with 0 being bad and 1 good. The highest possible score is 11.2008 Budget – 1Pension law – 1Purging extremists from the government – 1Accountability an Justice Law – 0.5Integrating Sons of Iraq – 0.5Amnesty Law – 0.5Funding of provinces – 0.5Provincial election law – 0.5Kirkuk – 0Hydrocarbon law – 0TOTAL: 6.0 out of 11

U.S. Forces In Iraq

Casualties for U.S. forces are down, but the costs of repeated deployments are increasing. U.S. killed and wounded have dropped to the lowest levels since the U.S. invasion. From March 2003 to November 1, 2008 4,182 Americans have been killed. The overwhelming majority have been active duty, 3,410, and come from the Army, 3,035. Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) use to be the most deadly weapon used against American forces, but now they are down to 2003 levels. Of the 513,000 U.S. troops that have gone to Iraq, over 197,000 of them have been deployed more than once, and 53,000 have gone three or more times. Those that have gone on multiple deployments face a greater likelihood of developing Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.

Percentage of U.S. Active Duty Military Who Have Served in Iraq or Afghanistan:57%

Insurgent Activity

As the casualty numbers reveal, violence is down across Iraq since the Surge. There are still pockets of instability however. Baghdad remains the most violent province of Iraq. Insurgent attacks have gone largely unchanged in Salahaddin, while they have increased in Ninewa. Diyala, the other unstable governorates has seen a 66% decline in insurgent activity compared to the average number of attacks from 2005-2008. In comparison, Kurdistan and much of the south are relatively peaceful.

Iraqi forces continue to grow. In January 2004 there were just over 108,000 police, soldiers, and border guards. By November 2008 there were over 550,000. There are plans for even more expansion with new equipment purchases and recruiting.

There were three rankings of Iraq’s political system in the Iraq Index. Brookings rated Iraq quite high on political freedom compared to other countries in the Middle East. Based upon elections, fairness, the right to organize, power of politicians, existence of an opposition, transparency, minority participation, corruption, freedom of assembly, press and religion, independence of judiciary, rule of law, and property rights, Iraq was ranked fourth out of 20 with a score of 5.05. Israel was ranked the most free at 8.2 with Libya the least at 2.05. Reporters Without Borders and Transparency International however ranked Iraq near the bottom in the world in terms of press freedom and corruption. In 2008 Iraq was 158 out of 173 countries in media freedom, while 178 out of 180 nations in corruption.

Iraq’s Rank In Reporters Without Borders’ Annual Press Freedom Index:2003: Rank Tied for 124 out of 166 countries2004: 148 out of 167 countries2005: 157 out of 167 countries2006: 154 out of 168 countries2007: 157 out of 169 countries2008: 158 out of 173 countries

Iraq’s Rank In Transparency International’s Corruption Index:2003: Tied for 113 out of 133 countries2004: Tied for 129 out of 146 countries2005: Tied for 137 out of 159 countries2006: Tied for 160 out of 163 countries2007: 178 out of 180

Iraq’s Political System

In 2005 Iraq held two elections for government. The first was for provincial councils, and the second for parliament. The elections were known for their sectarianism, as the major Shiite, Kurdish, and Sunni coalitions won the majority of seats. The secular Iraqi National List was the only other group to win a large number of seats. No group won an outright majority however so the cabinet positions were divided up between the major parties, along with a few independents and smaller parties.

Oil continues to dominate Iraq. The rise in oil prices is largely responsible for the growth of the Iraqi economy. Production however has been spotty since the U.S. invasion, regularly going up and down. In December 2003 Iraq produced 2.3 million barrels a day of crude, and in November 2008 there was little change at 2.39 million barrels. Exports have seen more of a gradual increase, but it is still a minimal one. In December 2003 there were 1.541 million barrels of oil exported, compared to 1.82 million in November 2008. Despite this lack of growth in production, Iraq’s economy has expanded from a -41.4% GDP decline in 2003 because of the invasion to a 7.0% GDP growth in 2008, largely funded by petroleum, and a massive influx of foreign assistance. Because of the improved security, Iraq is also finally attracting investment from other countries as well. Trade with neighboring states, especially Iran is also increasing. Not mentioned in the report however, is the fact that most of these products undermine Iraqi companies.

The United States has been the largest benefactor of Iraq since the U.S. invasion as one would expect. America has appropriated $20.8 billion for Iraqi reconstruction and security, with $20.2 billion of it obligated. That development project is coming to an end however as Iraq is expected to take on most of this responsibility next year. As the war has dragged on, the medical costs for the returning troops are also increasing with the VA medical bill reaching $1 billion in 2008 for Iraq war veterans. Including military expenditures, the U.S. will have spent $653.9 billion by the end of fiscal year 2009 on the war.

What’s interesting about the figures is that the U.S. has been unable to spend a vast majority of its money in Iraq’s provinces, something that Baghdad is regularly criticized for. In 2007 for example, America failed to spend 50% of its capital budget for projects in thirteen of Iraq’s eighteen provinces. From January to July 2008 things didn’t seem to have improved with the U.S. spending less than 10% of its money in nine governorates.

U.S. Aid For Iraq As Of November 2008:Appropriated: $20.8 billionObligated: $20.2 billionDisbursed: $19.4 billion

Like the rest of Iraq, the country’s judicial system had to start from scratch after the U.S. invasion. The Americans have been working on building up capacity, but it has been a slow and arduous process. The result is that Iraq still doesn’t have a functioning investigative or court system. The problem is with the huge amount of suspected insurgents arrested in the previous years that have completely overwhelmed the system. Violence is still directed at judges and lawyers as well. Corruption is also an issue with some. The number of judges is one indicator of progress. While the number has steadily increased, it is still not enough to deal with the caseload in the country.

There has been a massive brain drain since 2003. Many of the country’s professionals have fled the country. Even with violence subsiding since the Surge, few have come back. The Iraq Index provides numbers on Iraq’s doctors as an example of this debilitating loss of the country’s human capital.

Doctors In IraqDoctors before 2003 Invasion: 34,000Doctors who have left since 2003: 20,000 estimateDoctors murdered since 2003 invasion: 2,000Doctors kidnapped: 250Avg. salary of Iraqi doctor: 7.5 million dinars per year (around $5,100)Annual graduates from Iraqi medical schools: 2,250% of medical graduates that will work outside of Iraq: 20%

Latif has been pushing the idea of a separate Basra region for several years now. In 2005 he first presented the plan as an amendment to the constitution. At the heart of the proposal is the deep-seated conviction amongst many Basrans that the central authorities and Baghdad have ignored them for generations. In turn, Latif has said that Basra needs a share of its vast oil wealth so that it can develop. This is a sizeable amount as the province has 60% of Iraq’s oil reserves, produces 1.8 million of Iraq’s 2.6 million barrels a day of crude, has the only major port through which the majority of the country’s petroleum exports pass through. He noted that the region would not be like Kurdistan however, and sign its own oil contracts, something he has been critical of the Kurdistan Regional Government in the past. Latif just wants Basra to receive a share of the oil profits.

The proposal has already gained a wide variety of supporters and detractors. The head of the Basra provincial council and the governor of the province were the first to publicly state they were for the idea. Their party, Fadhila, has had a similar plan for quite some time as well. In 2007 they said one dollar from each barrel of oil from Basra should go into a development fund for the province, while the governor twice called for a Basra federal region in 2008. They are already organizing social groups, and using their control of the provincial government to rally support. Several Shiite independents and tribes from the area are also pro-region. Finally, a parliamentarian from the Kurdish Alliance voiced support for the idea in November 2008 as well. Those opposed are the major Shiite and Sunni parties. First, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has been centralizing power around him in 2008. He would be against a lessoning of Baghdad’s power, especially over the majority of the country’s oil reserves. Oil Minister Hussein Sharhistani, who is running with Maliki’s Dawa party in the provincial elections, has repeatedly stated that all oil profits must go through the central government as well. He recently opposed the Kurds' call for a share of the oil profits. Moqtada al-Sadr also believes in authority being centralized in Baghdad, and one of his spokesmen in Najaf said the Basra idea would be bad for the country. There have even been discussions between Dawa and the Sadrists, two deep-seated foes, to work together in the province to block the proposal. The Iraqi Islamic Party is also against, reflecting the fears of many Sunnis that the Shiites and Kurds will control much of the country’s oil. The Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), although having little influence in Basra itself, has proposed a southern Shiite region before. A separate Basra area would hamper that idea. The Communist Party in Basra, and former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List are also in opposition.

Whether the Basra federal region goes up for a vote or not in January 2009 is a huge gamble for Latif and the Fadhila Party. It will happen just before the provincial elections on January 31. If the proposal passes both Latif and Fadhila will benefit. If it fails however, they will be going into the elections from a position of weakness. The Fadhila party is already widely unpopular for its lack of providing services and growth in Basra, and was a target of the government’s crackdown in March. The proposal also pits centralists like the Prime Minister against regionalists. Not only that, but local parties like Fadhila are against larger sectarian region backers such as the SIIC. The Oil Minister is also trying to fend off the Kurds' aspirations to control their oil, while building up the state’s capacity at a time when profits are dropping, and the country’s petroleum infrastructure is in dire need of repair. Having a Basra region with most of the oil reserves and the main pipeline and port could derail his plan. All of these factors have already pitted the major national parties against the local Basra ones. Intimidation, bribery, and the use of the security forces for political ends could all ensue to sway the process.

SOURCES

Abouzeid, Rania, “A New Twist in Iraq’s Shi’ite Power Struggle,” Time, 11/16/08

Iraq History Timeline

About Me

Musings On Iraq was started in 2008 to explain the political, economic, security and cultural situation in Iraq via original articles and interviews. I have written for the Jamestown Foundation, Tom Ricks’ Best Defense at Foreign Policy and the Daily Beast, and was responsible for a chapter in the book Volatile Landscape: Iraq And Its Insurgent Movements. My work has been published in Iraq via NRT, AK News, Al-Mada, Sotaliraq, All Iraq News, and Ur News all in Iraq. I was interviewed on BBC Radio 5, Radio Sputnik, CCTV and TRT World News TV, and have appeared in CNN, the Christian Science Monitor, The National, Columbia Journalism Review, Mother Jones, PBS’ Frontline, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Institute for the Study of War, Radio Free Iraq, Rudaw, and others. I have also been cited in Iraq From war To A New Authoritarianism by Toby Dodge, Imagining the Nation Nationalism, Sectarianism and Socio-Political Conflict in Iraq by Harith al-Qarawee, ISIS Inside the Army of Terror by Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassahn, The Rise of the Islamic State by Patrick Cocburn, and others. If you wish to contact me personally my email is: motown67@aol.com