Monday, April 1, 2013

SAVUA ENQUIRY PART 2 :Savua’s dereliction of duties and failure to use riot bus

Savua Enquiry: When Police
were caught with their pants down

Part 2: Savua’s dereliction
of duties and failure to use riot bus

Summary of Part 1- Ratu Mara had named Savua and Rabuka as key players in
2000 Coup. In the aftermath of
Speight’s coup on 19 May, 2000, it was suspected that Savua was the real player
to take over from Speight. But after military refused to side with ethno-nationalist
and rebels, he got cold feet. I therefore present my Liu Muri published articles of Fiji
Daily Post newspaper to expose ignorant people to Fiji’s violent coup
history. This is to provide an insight into Fiji’s turbulent history and why
military needs to have a tight control to contain ethno-nationalists who cry
for democracy but never believed in it. Please go back and read part 1 in FIJI
PUNDIT if you missed it.

Here is PART 2:

BACKGROUND TO POLICE
COMMISSIONER’S INVOLVEMENT

We highlight issues surrounding the involvement of
the Police Commissioner, Isikia Savua in the events leading to the armed
takeover of the Parliament on 19 May, 2000.

Political Statements

Prior to May 19th, Mr. Savua had told the nation
that the Police Force wasn’t in a position to contain the crowd who were
intending to take to the street in protest against the Coalition
Government. His comments had the effect
of boosting the spirits of those involved in organising a march and deflect
attention of the Government away from security concerns at the Parliament.

Mr. Savua cautioned through his public statements
that the May 19 march would be bigger and less peaceful. He expressed concern that the police might
not be able to cope with more protesters. Reflecting one of his comments during
this period, we quote, “I really do not believe that they will continue to have
peaceful marches, they may do other things”.

The proud Police Force in Fiji were shamed by the defective leadership of Savua who failed to utilise the available resources to control crowd and enforce law and order on 19 May, 2000.

The May 19th March was a crucial part of the plan
to take over the Parliament and overthrow the elected Government. By the
Commissioner's own admission, it was likely to be bigger and less peaceful.
This should have triggered the full-scale deployment of emergency response
measures, and measures to tighten security at the Parliamentary complex -
because the marches were essentially against the People's Coalition Government.
This did not take place.

At this stage the
Commissioner should have:

(i) Formulated a strategic response to deal with a
violent march and put in place a Police
Operation Order. This did not take place.

(ii) Involved the Police Mobile Unit in planning about the police response to a
violent march.

(iii) Informed the Home Affairs Minister and through that the Prime Minister about
these developments. He did not do so.

(iv) And, through his minister, he should have
informed the Military about the
proposed march and asked that it stand by for possible support. This he did not
do so as well.

(v) He failed in all the above-that is a clear
case of dereliction of duties and negligence. How was he found innocent of any
wrong-doing by this Kangaroo court, headed by Justice Timoci Tuivaga that heard
his case in secret?

THE “NEUTRALIZING” OF POLICE MOBILE UNIT

The Police Mobile Unit has well trained personnel
with latest equipment to counter violent protest marches and civil
disturbance/disobedience. In fact the only reason why substantial resources of
the state are used to support the Police Mobile Unit is to ensure that the
Police have the rapid deployment capacity to deal with disturbances of the type
that was predicted by the Police Commissioner speedily and effectively. Why weren't its services put to use on the day of the civilian takeover and
immediately thereafter?

An Inspector opened up on the deliberate failure
to effectively deploy the Police Mobile Unit which should have come into action
on the day at both the Parliament and in controlling those involved in the
march after the conditions of the permit for the march had been breached. This
is what he has to reveal:

The
riot squad was fully equipped and capable of handling the situation on that
day. The riot squad ought to have been deployed around the parliament complex
in advance of the march given the likely threat to the parliament on that day.
Then later in the day they were instructed to sweep the city after the rioting
had already commenced - and he says that the riot squad arrived too late for it
to be effective. At a crucial time when the riot squad needed all its
resources, the Police Commissioner directed the Squad's bus to go to Yat Sen
school and pick up the Commissioner's son. This was the height of
irresponsibility.

Speight behind bars in the riot bus:George Speight and his group of treasonous terrorists used to be transported to Suva Court house in the red Mobile Unit's Riot Bus that Savua neutralised, so it could not be used to control the riot and out-of-control marchers on 19 May, 2000.

This inspector concludes that:

The
event could have been avoided if Police Mobile Unit retained its specific role
with which it was first or originally established … Our Riot Unit did our best
given the limited resource but bad and poor decisions made a lot of difference.
The Commissioner incapacitated the unit bywithdrawing its riot control gear and by ensuring that the
senior officials were unable to give directives to the unit.

Another senior police officer similarly noted that
the Police Commissioner gave instructions to his unit to take the Mobile Unit
bus to pick up his son from the School and drop him at his residence and post 4
guards at his place. This is an extremely significant issue. According to him:

The
Police Mobile Unit had with it on the day the following riot equipment, 300 gas
cartridge (tear gas), 100 hand grenades, 4 self loading rifles, 3 X .303 rifles
with 300 rounds and 3 greener guns with 100 rounds.

All these riot gear, according to both these
officers were more than adequate to control the crowd and bring the situation
at the parliament under control. However, these equipment were held in the bus.
By instructing that the bus be routed to pick up his son, the Police
Commissioner would have made sure that riot equipment were removed from the
parliament at a crucial time when the rebels were still trying to secure their
control over the parliamentary complex and the reinforcement provided through
those participating in the march not reached the parliamentary complex.

Also alarming was the fact, according to one
officer that:

There
was no gazetted officer to give instructions to disperse the crowd. So the
squad was left with the earlier instructions to let the marches pass - and thus
actually enter the parliament to bolster the numbers of the hostage takers.
This was deliberately done to cripple the effectiveness of the unit.

Suva burnt and looted by unruly crowd of marchers who were not controlled by police

The riot unit of the Police was rendered
ineffective in the critical early hours after the armed takeover of parliament.
It was submitted that this was deliberate action on the part of the
Commissioner to ensure that the takeover the Parliament was not derailed by the
actions of a professional police force. The lack of instructions and the lack
of orders to deal with the problem on that day puzzled senior offices. This was
most telling and has hurt the morale of those professional Police Officers who
felt that they could effectively have dealt with the entire situation on May
19th had proper instructions been issued, and the chain of command operated as
it ought to have. The failure of this
unit is not only traced to the incompetence of the Police Commissioner, but
also his deliberate decisions (as revealed later) to ensure that the Police did
not undermine the objectives of the terrorists on that day.

TO BE CONTINUED in PART 3: Savua had packed to shift to PM’s office: He used police resources to
commit treason