Old-fashioned paper trails can make digital voting less vulnerable.

Fears that the Russians could hack the voting system on Nov. 8 and wreak havoc in the presidential election are running high amid suspicions that Russians hacked into computers at the Democratic National Committee and after foreign intruders managed to get into voter registration databases in Arizona and Illinois.

While computer scientists and election experts will never say never, hacking the actual voting systems is highly implausible. But if the worst happened — hackers seeking to manipulate the outcome — you’d want a foolproof backup system. Yet voting systems in nearly a third of the states lack a key safeguard: a paper record of individual votes.

Five states — Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, New Jersey and South Carolina — use paperless electronic voting machines as their primary equipment statewide. Nine others, including swing states Pennsylvania and Virginia, use them in some counties, according to a report by the Brennan Center for Justice.

After the 2000 Bush v. Gore election fiasco, where hanging chads left the vote in doubt and sent the election to the Supreme Court, Congress and election officials couldn’t get away from paper ballots fast enough. A 2002 federal law pushed the country into the modern era of electronic voting, a vast improvement. But the pendulum swung too far, as many states banished paper altogether.

Since then, most states have moved to systems that marry new digital technology with a paper trail, which allows voters to verify that their ballot is accurate before leaving the booth and keeps a paper record that can be checked later. One system uses paper ballots filled out by hand and fed into scanning machines. Another uses a touch screen with a monitor where voters can see their votes and that keeps a paper trail.

After a human or machine malfunction, paper trails have saved the integrity of numerous elections:

In a 2012 municipal election in Palm Beach County, Fla. — where a confusing ballot design contributed to the 2000 presidential election meltdown — a malfunction credited votes meant for one candidate to a different candidate. Two candidates with fewer votes appeared as winners, until a court-approved hand count of paper ballots corrected the mistake.

In Pottawattamie County, Iowa, the original count from machines showed a challenger defeating an incumbent in a 2006 primary. A subsequent hand count of paper ballots showed the incumbent winning handily.

Beyond the threat of hacking, more mundane issues plague voting. Many digital systems purchased after 2000 are based on 1990s technology and are aging out. In 14 states, machines are at least 15 years old and nearing or exceeding their expected life spans. Some election officials have difficulty finding parts for old systems. And officials from 22 states who want to buy new equipment fear they won't have the money.

As for this fall’s election, there are some bright spots. Hackers find it easier to intrude when systems are connected to the Internet. The vast majority of voting systems do not use the Internet at all. And so far, it appears that while the Illinois intruders took some personal voter data, both intrusions in that state and Arizona were quickly discovered, and neither disrupted the systems in ways that would affect the election.

Even so, election authorities everywhere should be taking steps to ensure no one can credibly claim that the election was "rigged," either by domestic agitators opposed to Donald Trump or foreign operatives who might support him.

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