Mr. Spencer. Mr. Chairman, it appears to me that this
clause, giving this control over the time, place, and manner,
of holding elections, to Congress, does away the right
of the people to choose the representatives every second
year, and impairs the right of the state legislatures to
choose the senators. I wish this matter to be explained.

Gov. Johnston. Mr. Chairman, I confess that I am a
very great admirer of the new Constitution, but I cannot
comprehend the reason of this part. The reason urged is,
that every government ought to have the power of continuing
itself, and that, if the general government had not
this power, the state legislatures might neglect to regulate
elections, whereby the government might be discontinued.
As long as the state legislatures have it in their power not
to choose the senators, this power in Congress appears to
me altogether useless, because they can put an end to the
general government by refusing to choose senators. But I
do not consider this such a blemish in the Constitution as
that it ought, for that reason, to be rejected. I observe that
every state which has adopted the Constitution, and recommended
amendments, has given directions to remove
this objection; and I hope, if this state adopts it, she will
do the same.

Mr. Spencer. Mr. Chairman, it is with great reluctance
that I rise upon this important occasion. I have considered
with some attention the subject before us. I have paid attention
to the Constitution itself, and to the writings on
both sides. I considered it on one side as well as on the
other, in order to know whether it would be best to adopt
it or not. I would not wish to insinuate any reflections on
those gentlemen who formed it. I look upon it as a great
performance. It has a great deal of merit in it, and it is,
perhaps, as much as any set of men could have done. Even
if it be true, what gentlemen have observed, that the gentlemen
who were delegates to the Federal Convention
were not instructed to form a new constitution, but to
amend the Confederation, this will be immaterial, if it be
proper to be adopted. It will be of equal benefit to us, if
proper to be adopted in the whole, or in such parts as will
be necessary, whether they were expressly delegated for
that purpose or not. This appears to me to be a reprehensible
clause; because it seems to strike at the state legislatures,
and seems to take away that power of elections
which reason dictates they ought to have among themselves.
It apparently looks forward to a consolidation of
the government of the United States, when the state legislatures
may entirely decay away.

This is one of the grounds which have induced me to
make objections to the new form of government. It appears
to me that the state governments are not sufficiently
secured, and that they may be swallowed up by the great
mass of powers given to Congress. If that be the case, such
power should not be given; for, from all the notions which
we have concerning our happiness and well-being, the
state governments are the basis of our happiness, security,
and prosperity. A large extent of country ought to be divided
into such a number of states as that the people may
conveniently carry on their own government. This will
render the government perfectly agreeable to the genius
and wishes of the people. If the United States were to consist
of ten times as many states, they might all have a degree
of harmony. Nothing would be wanting but some cement
for their connection. On the contrary, if all the
United States were to be swallowed up by the great mass
of powers given to Congress, the parts that are more distant
in this great empire would be governed with less and
less energy. It would not suit the genius of the people to
assist in the government. Nothing would support government,
in such a case as that, but military coercion. Armies
would be necessary in different parts of the United States.
The expense which they would cost, and the burdens
which they would render necessary to be laid upon the
people, would be ruinous. I know of no way that is likely
to produce the happiness of the people, but to preserve,
as far as possible, the existence of the several states, so that
they shall not be swallowed up.

It has been said that the existence of the state governments
is essential to that of the general government, because [Volume 2, Page 271]
they choose the senators. By this clause, it is evident
that it is in the power of Congress to make any alterations,
except as to the place of choosing senators. They may alter
the time from six to twenty years, or to any time; for they
have an unlimited control over the time of elections. They
have also an absolute control over the election of the representatives.
It deprives the people of the very mode of
choosing them. It seems nearly to throw the whole power
of election into the hands of Congress. It strikes at the
mode, time, and place, of choosing representatives. It puts
all but the place of electing senators into the hands of
Congress. This supersedes the necessity of continuing the
state legislatures. This is such an article as I can give no
sanction to, because it strikes at the foundation of the governments
on which depends the happiness of the states
and the general government. It is with reluctance I make
the objection. I have the highest veneration for the characters
of the framers of this Constitution. I mean to make
objections only which are necessary to be made. I would
not take up time unnecessarily. As to this matter, it strikes
at the foundation of every thing. I may say more when we
come to that part which points out the mode of doing
without the agency of the state legislatures.

Mr. Iredell. Mr. Chairman, I am glad to see so much
candor and moderation. The liberal sentiments expressed
by the honorable gentleman who spoke last command my
respect. No time can be better employed than in endeavoring
to remove, by fair and just reasoning, every objection
which can be made to this Constitution. I apprehend
that the honorable gentleman is mistaken as to the extent
of the operation of this clause. He supposes that the control
of the general government over elections looks forward
to a consolidation of the states, and that the general
word time may extend to twenty, or any number of years.
In my humble opinion, this clause does by no means warrant
such a construction. We ought to compare other parts
with it. Does not the Constitution say that representatives
shall be chosen every second year? The right of choosing
them, therefore, reverts to the people every second year.
No instrument of writing ought to be construed absurdly,
when a rational construction can be put upon it. If Congress
can prolong the election to any time they please, why
is it said that representatives shall be chosen every second
year? They must be chosen every second year; but whether in
the month of March, or January, or any other month, may
be ascertained, at a future time, by regulations of Congress.
The word time refers only to the particular month
and day within the two years. I heartily agree with the
gentleman, that, if any thing in this Constitution tended to
the annihilation of the state government, instead of exciting
the admiration of any man, it ought to excite the resentment
and execration. No such wicked intention ought
to be suffered. But the gentlemen who formed the Constitution
had no such object; nor do I think there is the least
ground for that jealousy. The very existence of the general
government depends on that of the state governments.
The state legislatures are to choose the senators. Without
a Senate there can be no Congress. The state legislatures
are also to direct the manner of choosing the President.
Unless, therefore, there are state legislatures to direct that
manner, no President can be chosen. The same observation
may be made as to the House of Representatives,
since, as they are to be chosen by the electors of the most
numerous branch of each state legislature, if there are no
state legislatures, there are no persons to choose the
House of Representatives. Thus it is evident that the very
existence of the general government depends on that of
the state legislatures, and of course, that their continuance
cannot be endangered by it.

An occasion may arise when the exercise of this ultimate
power in Congress may be necessary; as, for instance, if a
state should be involved in war, and its legislature could
not assemble, (as was the case of South Carolina, and occasionally
of some other states, during the late war;) it
might also be useful for this reason--lest a few powerful
states should combine, and make regulations concerning
elections which might deprive many of the electors of a
fair exercise of their rights, and thus injure the community,
and occasion great dissatisfaction. And it seems natural
and proper that every government should have in itself
the means of its own preservation. A few of the great
states might combine to prevent any election of representatives
at all, and thus a majority might be wanting to do
business; but it would not be so easy to destroy the government
by the non-election of senators, because one third
only are to go out at a time, and all the states will be
equally represented in the Senate. It is not probable this
power would be abused; for, if it should be, the state legislatures
would immediately resent it, and their authority
over the people will always be extremely great. These reasons
induce me to think that the power is both necessary
and useful. But I am sensible great jealousy has been entertained
concerning it; and as perhaps the danger of a
combination, in the manner I have mentioned, to destroy
or distress the general government, is not very probable,
it may be better to incur the risk, than occasion any discontent
by suffering the clause to continue as it now stands. I
should, therefore, not object to the recommendation of an
amendment similar to that of other states--that this power
in Congress should only be exercised when a state legislature
neglected or was disabled from making the regulations
required.

Mr. Spencer. Mr. Chairman, I did not mean to insinuate
that designs were made, by the honorable gentlemen
who composed the Federal Constitution, against our liberties.
I only meant to say that the words in this place were
exceeding vague. It may admit of the gentleman's construction;
but it may admit of a contrary construction. In
a matter of so great moment, words ought not to be so
vague and indeterminate. I have said that the states are
the basis on which the government of the United States
ought to rest, and which must render us secure. No man
wishes more for a federal government than I do. I think
it necessary for our happiness; but at the same time, when
we form a government which must entail happiness or
misery on posterity, nothing is of more consequence than
settling it so as to exclude animosity and a contest between
the general and individual governments. With respect to
the mode here mentioned, they are words of very great
extent. This clause provides that a Congress may at any [Volume 2, Page 272]
time alter such regulations, except as to the places of
choosing senators. These words are so vague and uncertain,
that it must ultimately destroy the whole liberty of the
United States. It strikes at the very existence of the states,
and supersedes the necessity of having them at all. I would
therefore wish to have it amended in such a manner as
that the Congress should not interfere but when the states
refused or neglected to regulate elections.

Mr. Bloodworth. Mr. Chairman, I trust that such
learned arguments as are offered to reconcile our minds
to such dangerous powers will not have the intended
weight. The House of Representatives is the only democratical
branch. This clause may destroy representation
entirely. What does it say? "The times, places, and manner,
of holding elections for senators and representatives,
shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof;
but the Congress may at any time, by law, make or alter
such regulations, except as to the places of choosing senators."
Now, sir, does not this clause give an unlimited and
unbounded power to Congress over the times, places, and
manner, of choosing representatives? They may make the
time of election so long, the place so inconvenient, and the
manner so oppressive, that it will entirely destroy representation.
I hope gentlemen will exercise their own understanding
on this occasion, and not let their judgment be
led away by these shining characters, for whom, however,
I have the highest respect. This Constitution, if adopted in
its present mode, must end in the subversion of our liberties.
Suppose it takes place in North Carolina; can farmers
elect them? No, sir. The elections may be in such a manner
that men may be appointed who are not representatives of
the people. This may exist, and it ought to be guarded
against. As to the place, suppose Congress should order
the elections to be held in the most inconvenient place in
the most inconvenient district; could every person entitled
to vote attend at such a place? Suppose they should order
it to be laid off into so many districts, and order the election
to be held within each district, yet may not their
power over the manner of election enable them to exclude
from voting every description of men they please? The
democratic branch is so much endangered, that no arguments
can be made use of to satisfy my mind to it. The
honorable gentleman has amused us with learned discussions,
and told us he will condescend to propose amendments.
I hope the representatives of North Carolina will
never swallow the Constitution till it is amended.

Mr. Goudy. Mr. Chairman, the invasion of these states
is urged as a reason for this clause. But why did they not
mention that it should be only in cases of invasion? But
that was not the reason, in my humble opinion. I fear it
was a combination against our liberties. I ask, when we
give them the purse in one hand, and the sword in another,
what power have we left? It will lead to an aristocratical
government, and establish tyranny over us. We are
freemen, and we ought to have the privileges of such.

Gov. Johnston. Mr. Chairman, I do not impute any impure
intentions to the gentlemen who formed this Constitution.
I think it unwarrantable in any one to do it. I believe
that were there twenty conventions appointed, and as
many constitutions formed, we never could get men more
able and disinterested than those who formed this; nor a
constitution less exceptionable than that which is now before
you. I am not apprehensive that this article will be
attended with all the fatal consequences which the gentleman
conceives. I conceive that Congress can have no other
power than the states had. The states, with regard to elections,
must be governed by the articles of the Constitution;
so must Congress. But I believe the power, as it now
stands, is unnecessary. I should be perfectly satisfied with
it in the mode recommended by the worthy member on
my right hand. Although I should be extremely cautious
to adopt any constitution that would endanger the rights
and privileges of the people, I have no fear in adopting
this Constitution, and then proposing amendments. I feel
as much attachment to the rights and privileges of my
country as any man in it; and if I thought any thing in this
Constitution tended to abridge these rights, I would not
agree to it. I cannot conceive that this is the case. I have
not the least doubt but it will be adopted by a very great
majority of the states. For states who have been as jealous
of their liberties as any in the world have adopted it, and
they are some of the most powerful states. We shall have
the assent of all the states in getting amendments. Some
gentlemen have apprehensions that Congress will immediately
conspire to destroy the liberties of their country.
The men of whom Congress will consist are to be chosen
from among ourselves. They will be in the same situation
with us. They are to be bone of our bone and flesh of our
flesh. They cannot injure us without injuring themselves.
I have no doubt but we shall choose the best men in the
community. Should different men be appointed, they are
sufficiently responsible. I therefore think that no danger is
to be apprehended.

Mr. M'Dowall. Mr. Chairman, I have the highest esteem
for the gentleman who spoke last. He has amused us
with the fine characters of those who formed that government.
Some were good, but some were very imperious,
aristocratical, despotic, and monarchical. If parts of it are
extremely good, other parts are very bad.

The freedom of election is one of the greatest securities
we have for our liberty and privileges. It was supposed by
the member from Edenton, that the control over elections
was only given to Congress to be used in case of invasion.
I differ from him. That could not have been their intention,
otherwise they could have expressed it. But, sir, it
points forward to the time when there will be no state legislatures--to
the consolidation of all the states. The states
will be kept up as boards of elections. I think the same
men could make a better constitution; for good government
is not the work of a short time. They only had their
own wisdom. Were they to go now, they would have the
wisdom of the United States. Every gentleman who must
reflect on this must see it. The adoption of several other
states is urged. I hope every gentleman stands for himself,
will act according to his own judgment, and will pay no
respect to the adoption by the other states. It may embarrass
us in some political difficulties, but let us attend to the
interest of our constituents.

[Volume 2, Page 273]

Mr. Iredell answered, that he stated the case of invasion
as only one reason out of many for giving the ultimate
control over elections to Congress.

Mr. Davie. Mr. Chairman, a consolidation of the states
is said by some gentlemen to have been intended. They
insinuate that this was the cause of their giving this power
of elections. If there were any seeds in this Constitution
which might, one day, produce a consolidation, it would,
sir, with me, be an insuperable objection, I am so perfectly
convinced that so extensive a country as this can never be
managed by one consolidated government. The Federal
Convention were as well convinced as the members of this
house, that the state governments were absolutely necessary
to the existence of the federal government. They considered
them as the great massy pillars on which this political
fabric was to be extended and supported; and were
fully persuaded that, when they were removed, or should
moulder down by time, the general government must
tumble into ruin. A very little reflection will show that no
department of it can exist without the state governments.

Let us begin with the House of Representatives. Who
are to vote for the federal representatives? Those who vote
for the state representatives. If the state government vanishes,
the general government must vanish also. This is the
foundation on which this government was raised, and
without which it cannot possibly exist.

The next department is the Senate. How is it formed?
By the states themselves. Do they not choose them? Are
they not created by them? And will they not have the interest
of the states particularly at heart? The states, sir, can
put a final period to the government, as was observed by
a gentleman who thought this power over elections unnecessary.
If the state legislatures think proper, they may refuse
to choose senators, and the government must be destroyed.

Is not this government a nerveless mass, a dead carcase,
without the executive power? Let your representatives be
the most vicious demons that ever existed; let them plot
against the liberties of America; let them conspire against
its happiness,--all their machinations will not avail if not
put in execution. By whom are their laws and projects to
be executed? By the President. How is he created? By electors
appointed by the people under the direction of the
legislatures--by a union of the interest of the people and
the state governments. The state governments can put a
veto, at any time, on the general government, by ceasing
to continue the executive power. Admitting the representatives
or senators could make corrupt laws, they can neither
execute them themselves, nor appoint the executive.
Now, sir, I think it must be clear to every candid mind,
that no part of this government can be continued after the
state governments lose their existence, or even their present
forms. It may also be easily proved that all federal governments
possess an inherent weakness, which continually
tends to their destruction. It is to be lamented that all governments
of a federal nature have been short-lived.

Such was the fate of the Achaean league, the Amphictyonic
council, and other ancient confederacies; and this
opinion is confirmed by the uniform testimony of all history.
There are instances in Europe of confederacies subsisting
a considerable time; but their duration must be attributed
to circumstances exterior to their government.
The Germanic confederacy would not exist a moment,
were it not for fear of the surrounding powers, and the
interest of the emperor. The history of this confederacy is
but a series of factions, dissensions, bloodshed, and civil
war. The confederacies of the Swiss, and United Netherlands,
would long ago have been destroyed, from their imbecility,
had it not been for the fear, and even the policy,
of the bordering nations. It is impossible to construct such
a government in such a manner as to give it any probable
longevity. But, sir, there is an excellent principle in this
proposed plan of federal government, which none of these
confederacies had, and to the want of which, in a great
measure, their imperfections may be justly attributed--I
mean the principle of representation. I hope that, by the
agency of this principle, if it be not immortal, it will at least
be long-lived. I thought it necessary to say this much to
detect the futility of that unwarrantable suggestion, that
we are to be swallowed up by a great consolidated government.
Every part of this federal government is dependent
on the constitution of the state legislatures for its existence.
The whole, sir, can never swallow up its parts. The
gentleman from Edenton (Mr. Iredell) has pointed out the
reasons of giving this control over elections to Congress,
the principle of which was, to prevent a dissolution of the
government by designing states. If all the states were
equally possessed of absolute power over their elections,
without any control of Congress, danger might be justly
apprehended where one state possesses as much territory
as four or five others; and some of them, being thinly peopled
now, will daily become more numerous and formidable.
Without this control in Congress, those large states
might successfully combine to destroy the general government.
It was therefore necessary to control any combination
of this kind.

Another principal reason was, that it would operate, in
favor of the people, against the ambitious designs of the
federal Senate. I will illustrate this by matter of fact. The
history of the little state of Rhode Island is well known.
An abandoned faction have seized on the reins of government,
and frequently refused to have any representation
in Congress. If Congress had the power of making the law
of elections operate throughout the United States, no state
could withdraw itself from the national councils, without
the consent of a majority of the members of Congress.
Had this been the case, that trifling state would not have
withheld its representation. What once happened may
happen again; and it was necessary to give Congress this
power, to keep the government in full operation. This
being a federal government, and involving the interests of
several states, and some acts requiring the assent of more
than a majority, they ought to be able to keep their representation
full. It would have been a solecism, to have a
government without any means of self-preservation. The
Confederation is the only instance of a government without
such means, and is a nerveless system, as inadequate
to every purpose of government as it is to the security of [Volume 2, Page 274]
the liberties of the people of America. When the councils
of America have this power over elections, they can, in
spite of any faction in any particular state, give the people
a representation. Uniformity in matters of election is also
of the greatest consequence. They ought all to be judged
by the same law and the same principles, and not to be
different in one state from what they are in another. At
present, the manner of electing is different in different
states. Some elect by ballot, and others viva voce. It will be
more convenient to have the manner uniform in all the
states. I shall now answer some observations made by the
gentleman from Mecklenburg. He has stated that this
power over elections gave to Congress power to lengthen
the time for which they were elected. Let us read this
clause coolly, all prejudice aside, and determine whether
this construction be warrantable. The clause runs thus:
"The times places, and manner, of holding elections for
senators and representatives, shall be prescribed in each
state by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at
any time, by law, make or alter such regulations, except as
to the place of choosing senators." I take it as a fundamental
principle, which is beyond the reach of the general or
individual governments to alter, that the representatives
shall be chosen every second year, and that the tenure of
their office shall be for two years; that senators be chosen
every sixth year, and that the tenure of their office be for
six years. I take it also as a principle, that the electors of
the most numerous branch of the state legislatures are to
elect the federal representatives. Congress has ultimately
no power over elections, but what is primarily given to the
state legislatures. If Congress had the power of prolonging
the time, &c., as gentlemen observe, the same powers must
be completely vested in the state legislatures. I call upon
every gentleman candidly to declare, whether the state legislatures
have the power of altering the time of elections
for representatives from two to four years, or senators
from six to twelve; and whether they have the power to
require any other qualifications than those of the most numerous
branch of the state legislatures; and also whether
they have any other power over the manner of elections,
any more than the mere mode of the act of choosing; or
whether they shall be held by sheriffs, as contradistinguished
from any other officer; or whether they shall be
by votes, as contradistinguished from ballots, or any other
way. If gentlemen will pay attention, they will find that, in
the latter part of this clause, Congress has no power but
what was given to the states in the first part of the same
clause. They may alter the manner of holding the election,
but cannot alter the tenure of their office. They cannot
alter the nature of the elections; for it is established, as
fundamental principles, that the electors of the most numerous
branch of the state legislature shall elect the federal
representatives, and that the tenure of their office
shall be for two years; and likewise, that the senators shall
be elected by the legislatures, and that the tenure of their
office shall be for six years. When gentlemen view the
clause accurately, and see that Congress have only the
same power which was in the state legislature, they will not
be alarmed. The learned doctor on my right (Mr. Spencer)
has also said that Congress might lengthen the time of
elections. I am willing to appeal to grammatical construction
and punctuation. Let me read this, as it stands on paper.
[Here he read the clause different ways, expressing
the same sense.] Here, in the first part of the clause, this
power over elections is given to the states, and in the latter
part the same power is given to Congress, and extending
only to the time of holding, the place of holding, and the
manner of holding, the elections. Is this not the plain, literal,
and grammatical construction of the clause? Is it possible
to put any other construction on it, without departing
from the natural order, and without deviating from the
general meaning of the words, and every rule of grammatical
construction? Twist it, torture it, as you may, sir, it
is impossible to fix a different sense upon it. The worthy
gentleman from New Hanover, (whose ardor for the liberty
of his country I wish never to be damped,) has insinuated
that high characters might influence the members
on this occasion. I declare, for my own part, I wish every
man to be guided by his own conscience and understanding,
and by nothing else. Every man has not been bred a
politician, nor studied the science of government; yet,
when a subject is explained, if the mind is unwarped by
prejudice, and not in the leading-strings of other people,
gentlemen will do what is right. Were this the case, I
would risk my salvation on a right decision.

Mr. Caldwell. Mr. Chairman, those things which can
be may be. We know that, in the British government, the
members of Parliament were eligible only for three years.
They determined they might be chosen for seven years. If
Congress can alter the time, manner, and place, I think it
will enable them to do what the British Parliament once
did. They have declared that the elections of senators are
for six years, and of representatives for two years. But
they have said there was an exception to this general declaration,
viz., that Congress can alter them. If the Convention
only meant that they should alter them in such a manner
as to prevent a discontinuation of the government,
why have they not said so? It must appear to every gentleman
in this Convention, that they can alter the elections to
what time they please. And if the British Parliament did
once give themselves the power of sitting four years longer
than they had a right to do, Congress, having a standing
army, and the command of the militia, may, with the same
propriety, make an act to continue the members for
twenty years, or even for their natural lives. This construction
appears perfectly rational to me. I shall therefore
think that this Convention will never swallow such a government,
without securing us against danger.

Mr. Maclaine. Mr. Chairman, the reverend gentleman
from Guilford has made an objection which astonishes me
more than any thing I have heard. He seems to be acquainted
with the history of England, but he ought to consider
whether his historical references apply to this country.
He tells us of triennial elections being changed to
septennial elections. This is an historical fact we well know,
and the occasion on which it happened is equally well
known. They talk as loudly of constitutional rights and
privileges in England as we do here, but they have no written
constitution. They have a common law,--which has
been altered from year to year, for a very long period,--Magna [Volume 2, Page 275]
Charta, and bill of rights. These they look upon as
their constitution. Yet this is such a constitution as it is
universally considered Parliament can change. Blackstone,
in his admirable Commentaries, tells us that the power of
the Parliament is transcendent and absolute, and can do
and undo every thing that is not naturally impossible. The
act, therefore, to which the reverend gentleman alludes,
was not unconstitutional. Has any man said that the legislature
can deviate from this Constitution? The legislature
is to be guided by the Constitution. They cannot travel
beyond its bounds. The reverend gentleman says, that,
though the representatives are to be elected for two years,
they may pass an act prolonging their appointment for
twenty years, or for natural life, without any violation of
the Constitution. Is it possible for any common understanding
or sense to put this construction upon it? Such an
act, sir, would be a palpable violation of the Constitution:
were they to attempt it, sir, the country would rise against
them. After such an unwarrantable suggestion as this, any
objection may be made to this Constitution. It is necessary
to give power to the government. I would ask that gentleman
who is so much afraid it will destroy our liberties, why
he is not as much afraid of our state legislature; for they
have much more power than we are now proposing to give
this general government. They have an unlimited control
over the purse and sword; yet no complaints are made.
Why is he not as much afraid that our legislature will call
out the militia to destroy our liberties? Will the militia be
called out by the general government to enslave the people--to
enslave their friends, their families, themselves?
The idea of the militia being made use of, as an instrument
to destroy our liberties, is almost too absurd to merit
a refutation. It cannot be supposed that the representatives
of our general government will be worse men than
the members of our state government. Will we be such
fools as to send our greatest rascals to the general government?
We must be both fools as well as villains to do so.

Gov. Johnston. Mr. Chairman, I shall offer some observations
on what the gentleman said. A parallel has been
drawn between the British Parliament and Congress. The
powers of Congress are all circumscribed, defined, and
clearly laid down. So far they may go, but no farther. But,
sir, what are the powers of the British Parliament? They
have no written constitution in Britain. They have certain
fundamental principles and legislative acts, securing the
liberty of the people; but these may be altered by their
representatives, without violating their constitution, in
such manner as they may think proper. Their legislature
existed long before the science of government was well understood.
From very early periods, you find their Parliament
in full force. What is their Magna Charta? It is only
an act of Parliament. Their Parliament can, at any time,
alter the whole or any part of it. In short, it is no more
binding on the people than any other act which has
passed. The power of the Parliament is, therefore, unbounded.
But, sir, can Congress alter the Constitution?
They have no such power. They are bound to act by the
Constitution. They dare not recede from it. At the moment
that the time for which they are elected expires, they
may be removed. If they make bad laws, they will be removed;
for they will be no longer worthy of confidence.
The British Parliament can do every thing they please.
Their bill of rights is only an act of Parliament, which may
be, at any time, altered or modified, without a violation of
the constitution. The people of Great Britain have no constitution
to control their legislature. The king, lords, and
commons, can do what they please.

Mr. Caldwell observed, that whatever nominal powers
the British Parliament might possess, yet they had infringed
the liberty of the people in the most flagrant manner,
by giving themselves power to continue four years in
Parliament longer than they have been elected for--that
though they were only chosen for three years by their constituents,
yet they passed an act that representatives
should, for the future, be chosen for seven years--that this
Constitution would have a dangerous tendency--that this
clause would enable them to prolong their continuance in
office as long as they pleased--and that, if a constitution
was not agreeable to the people, its operation could not be
happy.

Gov. Johnston replied, that the act to which allusion
was made by the gentleman was not unconstitutional; but
that, if Congress were to pass an act prolonging the terms
of elections of senators or representatives, it would be
clearly unconstitutional.

Mr. Maclaine observed, that the act of Parliament referred
to was passed on urgent necessity, when George I.
ascended the throne, to prevent the Papists from getting
into Parliament; for parties ran so high at that time, that
Papists enough might have got in to destroy the act of settlement
which excluded the Roman Catholics from the
succession to the throne.

Mr. Spencer. The gentleman from Halifax said, that the
reason of this clause was, that some states might be refractory.
I profess that, in my opinion, the circumstances of
Rhode Island do not appear to apply. I cannot conceive
the particular cause why Rhode Island should not send
representatives to Congress. If they were united in one
government, is it presumed that they would waive the
right of representation? I have not the least reason to
doubt they would make use of the privilege. With respect
to the construction that the worthy member put upon the
clause, were that construction established, I would be satisfied;
but it is susceptible of a different explanation. They
may alter the mode of election so as to deprive the people
of the right of choosing. I wish to have it expressed in a
more explicit manner.

Mr. Davie. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman has certainly
misconceived the matter, when he says "that the circumstances
of Rhode Island do not apply." It is a fact well
known of which, perhaps, he may not be possessed, that
the state of Rhode Island has not been regularly represented
for several years, owing to the character and particular
views of the prevailing party. By the influence of this
faction, who are in possession of the state government, the
people have been frequently deprived of the benefit of a
representation in the Union, and Congress often embarrassed
by their absence. The same evil may again result
from the same cause; and Congress ought, therefore, to
possess constitutional power to give the people an opportunity [Volume 2, Page 276]
of electing representatives, if the states neglect or
refuse to do it. The gentleman from Anson has said, "that
this clause is susceptible of an explanation different from
the construction I put upon it." I have a high respect for
his opinion, but that alone, on this important occasion, is
not satisfactory: we must have some reasons from him to
support and sanction this opinion. He is a professional
man, and has held an office many years, the nature and
duties of which would enable him to put a different construction
on this clause, if it is capable of it.

This clause, sir, has been the occasion of much groundless
alarm, and has been the favorite theme of declamation
out of doors. I now call upon the gentlemen of the opposition
to show that it contains the mischiefs with which they
have alarmed and agitated the public mind, and I defy
them to support the construction they have put upon it by
one single plausible reason. The gentleman from New
Hanover has said, in objection to this clause, "that Congress
may appoint the most inconvenient place in the most
inconvenient district, and make the manner of election so
oppressive as entirely to destroy representation." If this is
considered as possible, he should also reflect that the state
legislatures may do the same thing. But this can never
happen, sir, until the whole mass of the people become
corrupt, when all parchment securities will be of little service.
Does that gentleman, or any other gentleman who
has the smallest acquaintance with human nature or the
spirit of America, suppose that the people will passively
relinquish privileges, or suffer the usurpation of powers
unwarranted by the Constitution? Does not the right of
electing representatives revert to the people every second
year? There is nothing in this clause that can impede or
destroy this reversion; and although the particular time of
year, the particular place in a county or a district, or the
particular mode in which elections are to be held, as
whether by vote or ballot, be left to Congress to direct, yet
this can never deprive the people of the right or privilege
of election. He has also added, "that the democratical
branch was in danger from this clause;" and, with some
other gentlemen, took it for granted that an aristocracy
must arise out of the general government. This, I take it,
from the very nature of the thing, can never happen. Aristocracies
grow out of the combination of a few powerful
families, where the country or people upon which they are
to operate are immediately under their influence; whereas
the interest and influence of this government are too
weak, and too much diffused, ever to bring about such an
event. The confidence of the people, acquired by a wise
and virtuous conduct, is the only influence the members
of the federal government can ever have. When aristocracies
are formed, they will arise within the individual states.
It is therefore absolutely necessary that Congress should
have a constitutional power to give the people at large a
representation in the government, in order to break and
control such dangerous combinations. Let gentlemen show
when and how this aristocracy they talk of is to arise out
of this Constitution. Are the first members to perpetuate
themselves? Is the Constitution to be attacked by such absurd
assertions as these, and charged with defects with
which it has no possible connection?

Mr. Bloodworth. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman has
mistaken me. When we examine the gentleman's arguments,
they have no weight. He tells us that it is not probable
"that an aristocracy can arise." I did not say that it
would. Various arguments are brought forward in support
of this article. They are vague and trifling. There is nothing
that can be offered to my mind which will reconcile
me to it while this evil exists--while Congress have this
control over elections. It was easy for them to mention that
this control should only be exerted when the state would
neglect, or refuse, or be unable in case of invasion, to regulate
elections. If so, why did they not mention it expressly?

It appears to me that some of their general observations
imply a contradiction. Do they not tell us that there is no
danger of a consolidation? that Congress can exist no
longer than the states--the massy pillars on which it is said
to be raised? Do they not also tell us that the state governments
are to secure us against Congress? At another time,
they tell us that it was unnecessary to secure our liberty by
giving them power to prevent the state governments from
oppressing us. We know that there is a corruption in human
nature. Without circumspection and carefulness, we
shall throw away our liberties. Why is this general expression
used on this great occasion? Why not use expressions
that were clear and unequivocal? If I trust my property
with a man and take security, shall I then barter away my
rights?

Mr. Spencer. Mr. Chairman, this clause may operate in
such a manner as will abridge the liberty of the people. It
is well known that men in power are apt to abuse it, and
extend it if possible. From the ambiguity of this expression,
they may put such construction upon it as may suit
them. I would not have it in such a manner as to endanger
the rights of the people. But it has been said that this
power is necessary to preserve their existence. There is not
the least doubt but the people will keep them from losing
their existence, if they shall behave themselves in such a
manner as will merit it.

Mr. Maclaine. Mr. Chairman, I thought it very extraordinary
that the gentleman who was last on the floor
should say that Congress could do what they please with
respect to elections, and be warranted by this clause. The
gentleman from Halifax (Mr. Davie) has put that construction
upon it which reason and common sense will put
upon it. Lawyers will often differ on a point of law, but
people will seldom differ about so very plain a thing as
this. The clause enables Congress to alter such regulations
as the states shall have made with respect to elections.
What would he infer from this? What is it to alter? It is to
alter the time, place, and manner, established by the legislatures,
if they do not answer the purpose. Congress
ought to have power to perpetuate the government, and
not the states, who might be otherwise inclined. I will ask
the gentleman--and I wish he may give me a satisfactory
answer--if the whole is not in the power of the people, as
well when the elections are regulated by Congress, as when
by the states. Are not both the agents of the people, amenable
to them? Is there any thing in this Constitution
which gives them the power to perpetuate the sitting [Volume 2, Page 277]
members? Is there any such strange absurdity? If the legislature
of this state has the power to fix the time, place,
and manner, of holding elections, why not place the same
confidence in the general government? The members of
the general government, and those of the state legislature,
are both chosen by the people. They are both from among
the people, and are in the same situation. Those who
served in the state legislature are eligible, and may be sent
to Congress. If the elections be regulated in the best manner
in the state government, can it be supposed that the
same man will lose all his virtue, his character and principles,
when he goes into the general government, in order
to deprive us of our liberty?

The gentleman from New Hanover seems to think it
possible Congress will so far forget themselves as to point
out such improper seasons of the year, and such inconvenient
places for elections, as to defeat the privilege of the
democratic branch altogether. He speaks of inconsistency
in the arguments of the gentlemen. I wish he would be
consistent himself. If I do not mistake the politics of that
gentleman, it is his opinion that Congress had sufficient
power under the Confederation. He has said, without contradiction,
that we should be better without the Union
than with it; that it would be better for us to be by ourselves
than in the Union. His antipathy to a general government,
and to the Union, is evidently inconsistent with
his predilection for a federal democratic branch. We
should have no democratic part of the government at all,
under such a government as he would recommend. There
is no such part in the old Confederation. The body of the
people had no agency in that system. The members of the
present general government are selected by the state legislatures,
and have the power of the purse, and other powers,
and are not amenable to the people at large. Although
the gentleman may deny my assertions, yet this argument
of his is inconsistent with his other assertions and doctrines.
It is impossible for any man in his senses to think
that we can exist by ourselves, separated from our sister
states. Whatever gentlemen may pretend to say on this
point, it must be a matter of serious alarm to every reflecting
mind, to be disunited from the other states.

Mr. Bloodworth begged leave to wipe off the assertion
of the gentleman; that he could not account for any
expression which he might drop among a laughing, jocose
people, but that it was well known he was for giving power
to Congress to regulate the trade of the United States; that
he had said that Congress had exercised power not given
them by the Confederation, and that he was accurate in
the assertion; that he was a freeman, and was under the
control of no man.

Mr. Maclaine replied, that he meant no aspersions;
that he only meant to point out a fact; that he had committed
mistakes himself in argument, and that he supposed
the gentleman not more infallible than other
people.

Mr. J. Taylor wished to know why the states had control
over the place of electing senators, but not over that
of choosing the representatives.

Mr. Spaight answered, that the reason of that reservation
was to prevent Congress from altering the places for
holding the legislative assemblies in the different states.

Mr. James Galloway. Mr. Chairman, in the beginning
I found great candor in the advocates of this government,
but it is not so towards the last. I hope the gentleman from
Halifax will not take it amiss, if I mention how he brought
the motion forward. They began with dangers. As to
Rhode Island being governed by a faction, what has that
to do with the question before us? I ask, What have the
state governments left for them, if the general government
is to be possessed of such extensive powers, without control
or limitation, without any responsibility to the states?
He asks, How is it possible for the members to perpetuate
themselves? I think I can show how they can do it. For
instance, where they to take the government as it now
stands organized. We send five members to the House of
Representatives in the general government. They will go,
no doubt, from or near the seaports. In other states, also,
those near the sea will have more interest, and will go forward
to Congress; and they can, without violating the
Constitution, make a law continuing themselves, as they
have control over the place, time, and manner, of elections.
This may happen; and where the great principles of
liberty are endangered, no general, indeterminate, vague
expression ought to be suffered. Shall we pass over this
article as it is now? They will be able to perpetuate themselves
as well as if it had expressly said so.

Mr. Steele. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman has said that
the five representatives which this state shall be entitled to
send to the general government, will go from the seashore.
What reason has he to say they will go from the seashore?
The time, place, and manner, of holding elections
are to be prescribed by the legislatures. Our legislature is
to regulate the first election, at any event. They will regulate
it as they think proper. They may, and most probably
will, lay the state off into districts. Who are to vote for
them? Every man who has a right to vote for a representative
to our legislature will ever have a right to vote for a
representative to the general government. Does it not expressly
provide that the electors in each state shall have the
qualifications requisite for the most numerous branch of
the state legislature? Can they, without a most manifest
violation of the Constitution, alter the qualifications of the
electors? The power over the manner of elections does not
include that of saying who shall vote:--the Constitution
expressly says that the qualifications which entitle a man to
vote for a state representative. It is, then, clearly and indubitably
fixed and determined who shall be the electors;
and the power over the manner only enables them to determine
how these electors shall elect--whether by ballot,
or by vote, or by any other way. Is it not a maxim of universal
jurisprudence, of reason and common sense, that an
instrument or deed of writing shall be so construed as to
give validity to all parts of it, if it can be done without
involving any absurdity? By construing it in the plain, obvious
way I have mentioned, all parts will be valid. By the
way, gentlemen suggest the most palpable contradiction,
and absurdity will follow. To say that they shall go from
the sea-shore, and be able to perpetuate themselves, is a
most extravagant idea. Will the members of Congress deviate
from their duty without any prospect of advantage to [Volume 2, Page 278]
themselves? What interest can they have to make the place
of elections inconvenient? The judicial power of that government
is so well constructed as to be a check. There was
no check in the old Confederation. Their power was, in
principle and theory, transcendent. If the Congress make
laws inconsistent with the Constitution, independent
judges will not uphold them, nor will the people obey
them. A universal resistance will ensue. In some countries,
the arbitrary disposition of rulers may enable them to
overturn the liberties of the people; but in a country like
this, where every man is his own master, and where almost
every man is a freeholder, and has the right of election,
the violations of a constitution will not be passively permitted.
Can it be supposed that in such a country the rights
of suffrage will be tamely surrendered? Is it to be supposed
that 30,000 free persons will send the most abandoned
wretch in the district to legislate for them in the
general legislature? I should rather think they would
choose men of the most respectable characters.

Elliot, Jonathan, ed. The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution as Recommended by the General Convention at Philadelphia in 1787. . . . 5 vols. 2d ed. 1888. Reprint. New York: Burt Franklin, n.d.