Considering Afghanistan strategy, where better to start than with this CBS news story which identifies a critical weakness in our military configuration - poorly defended supply lines whose vulnerability the enemy exploits to gain funds for its insurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan?

(CBS) Billions of U.S. taxpayer dollars are fuelling corruption in Afghanistan and funding the insurgency, according to a six-month investigation by the House subcommittee on National Security and Foreign affairs.

The committee's chairman, Rep. John F. Tierney, D-Mass., told CBS News: "the business is war and the war is business and you've got 'Warlord Inc.' going on over there."

Committee investigators found that private contractors in Afghanistan have been paying local warlords, criminals, government officials and a list of others for security on Afghanistan's roads, to get much needed supplies to U.S and NATO bases. But even worse, anecdotal evidence indicates that U.S. tax dollars are also going into the hands of the Taliban, who own many of the roads and areas through which the trucking convoys have to pass, reports CBS News chief foreign correspondent Lara Logan.

That would mean that the U.S. is literally funding the enemy, as violence escalates daily in Afghanistan and more U.S soldiers and Marines are dying than ever before in this war.

"This is the tip of the iceberg," Tierney said in an interview with CBS News. "There are other contracts over there, whether they are cell phone contracts or base security, and if you're paying the wrong people to do that and fuelling corruption, then it's not really going to speak well for the reason we sent our men and women there and the reason they're sacrificing their lives".

It also means that while the U.S. has been publicly pointing fingers at the Afghan government and President Hamid Karzai for not cleaning up corruption in his government, in fact the U.S. is a huge part of the corruption problem - and until now, has done nothing about it or even acknowledged that fact.

"We can't be putting that kind of money into a situation where it's going to be corruptive ... we have to get rules in place, implement them, oversee them, get it done right, and then we can demand with much more authority and credibility that the Afghan government do the same," Tierney said.

The committee investigators focused on one contract - the Host Nation Trucking contract or HNT - that is worth $2.16 billion U.S. dollars and divided between just eight companies - three of them American, three from the Middle East and two from Afghanistan. Over six months, they conducted dozens of formal interviews, dozens more informal interviews and ploughed through more than 20,000 documents.

They discovered damning evidence of the complete lack of oversight from the U.S. military and other agencies at the sub-contractor level of those contracts - and anecdotal evidence from the eight contracting companies that payoffs were being made to the Taliban to keep the convoys on the roads.

"What shocked me is the constant call of the contractors to bring it to the attention of the Department of Defense," Tierney said.

The response from the U.S.: turn a blind eye, as long as the goods get where they need to go.

But the reality of Afghanistan is that the Department of Defense has been following a policy endorsed by the U.S. government from the very beginning of this war: to use various warlords, criminals, corrupt powerbrokers etc where the U.S. deems it necessary.

From 2001, when the CIA carried in suitcases of cash to pay off tribal leaders, the U.S. strategy has included relying on "bad guys - as long as they are 'our' bad guys."

This is part of what made U.S. allegations of corruption in Afghanistan appear so hollow to many Afghan people. It is widely known and accepted amongst Afghans that Western aid money flooding into the country has created an alternative, more lucrative economy where it's rarely the "nice guys" who are coming out on top.

It's also widely known and accepted in many areas, that to carry out any reconstruction projects or U.S. funded counter-insurgency efforts requires large payoffs to the Taliban.

Quote:
Afghanistan to complete first railway by end of year Telegraph.co.uk

Afghanistan will complete its first ever railway by the end of the year, providing a potential new supply route for Nato forces whose convoys are being harried in Pakistan.

The 47-mile route will link the trading city of Mazar-i-Sharif in northern Afghanistan to Asia's extensive rail network.

The £110 million railway project funded by the Asian Development Bank has already laid 20 miles of track through desert from Hairatan on the Uzbek border the deputy minister for public works said.

Developing a railway network for Afghanistan is an obvious move to develop and to secure the less mountainous areas of the country in the first place anyway. Trains are ideal on the flat - not so good in mountains though where they need expensive tunnels and vulnerable bridges.

So it is excellent to see a start has finally been made to Afghanistan's first 75-km stretch of commercial railway.

Al Qaeda have attacked trains often - the London Underground on 7/7 in 2005 and the Mumbai train station in 2008 to name just two examples. So I hope NATO/ISAF are prepared to defend the trains, right?

The previous post shows how vulnerable our military supply routes are in Afghanistan and whether it is road or rail we need our supply lines properly defended by loyal troops and/or transport police otherwise our source of strength becomes a source of weakness.

Firstly I wish to say to you that you are a braver man than me Mark Sedwill for braving the dangers of Afghanistan and very good luck to you and all your colleagues out there and thank you for your courage and dedication to a worthy cause.

Secondly, I have some loaded questions for you.

Would your Afghanistan mission not be made easier if there was a parallel NATO campaign to ferment republican revolutions through the Arab world, including north African countries such as Egypt, which are ruled by monarchs and dictators who have been directly funding or promoting by satellite TV or internet the Taliban and Al Qaeda terrorism in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere?

Specifically does NATO, ISAF, General Petraeus or anyone in command have the authority (or wish they had the authority) to stop hostile satellite TV stations such as Qatari-controlled Al Jazeera from broadcasting by jamming the satellite transmissions, knocking out satellite ground control facilities, or knocking satellites out of orbit by missiles or other means?

Or were General Petraeus's hands tied by President Obama to leave the Arab kingdom customers of US corporations well alone even when in his previous post he Petraeus was responsible for U.S. operations in 20 countries spreading from Egypt to Pakistan—including Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom?

I'd like to know if NATO's civilian and military personnel in Afghanistan are getting the political support you deserve back home?

Is there ANY sign whatsoever of robust political republican leadership against duplicitous Arab and north African rulers - monarchs and dictators - whose regimes are covertly funding or promoting our terrorist enemies - be they the Taliban in Afghanistan or other Al Qaeda type groups elsewhere?

Or are our brave men and women in Afghanistan to be tied out like sacrificial lambs and are your lives at risk a cost you, on our behalf, are paying because the politicians back home are more concerned with promoting business or political deals with back-stabbing undemocratic regimes, whose rulers have rigged elections or never even been elected and who deserve no more than to go the way of Saddam Hussein?

Specifically, are NATO personnel alert to the dangers of trying to buy your personal security or security of supplies by paying off terrorists or warlords who will only use the pay-offs to re-arm and come back stronger with greater costlier demands and in long run, bribing our enemies is no way to defeat them?

I ask because of this report -

"U.S. funds our enemy Taliban's Afghan war"

CBS wrote:
Billions of U.S. taxpayer dollars are fuelling corruption in Afghanistan and funding the insurgency, according to a six-month investigation by the House subcommittee on National Security and Foreign affairs.

The committee's chairman, Rep. John F. Tierney, D-Mass., told CBS News: "the business is war and the war is business and you've got 'Warlord Inc.' going on over there."

Committee investigators found that private contractors in Afghanistan have been paying local warlords, criminals, government officials and a list of others for security on Afghanistan's roads, to get much needed supplies to U.S and NATO bases. But even worse, anecdotal evidence indicates that U.S. tax dollars are also going into the hands of the Taliban, who own many of the roads and areas through which the trucking convoys have to pass, reports CBS News chief foreign correspondent Lara Logan.

Mark, would you take the view that if you or your supply lines could not be safe without bribing the Taliban or warlords then maybe you should either all come home for now or be urgently reinforced to a size of army which can defend its own supply lines with its own soldiers and transport police?

You will know that there is a small but significant first Afghanistan railway project underway and there are plans for further investment and development of railways there.

Would you say that an extensive Afghanistan rail network project was overdue and why has NATO not already laid a rail track for its own supplies into Afghanistan? Has NATO been timid and lacked vision with regard to major infrastructure investment? Or do we want to take everything of ours with us when President Obama orders a pull-out before the 2012 elections?

Finally, do you like my video about Afghanistan's new railway project, introduced by video of my favourite person who is just great at defending trains from terrorists.

Right, I knocked this railway map up in 20 minutes so don't think I am making any pretensions to be the new Isambard Kingdom Brunel but here it is anyway - see what you think. Just a suggestion - open to amendment or your better plans if you have any.

To secure this railway from attack by Taliban, warlord, terrorist or insurgent attack, fortified defensive machine gun nests or pillboxes would be needed every 1000 metres on each of the two borders along the railway route, closer than 1000 m where the terrain makes it easier for the enemy to sneak up close - bridges and cuttings or other cover - where you need more defensive firing angles to spot and then to stop an advance.

I propose using a dedicated Afghan railway & road supply route protection force to man the defensive machine gun positions which force would be part of the Afghan army.

I have figures for the number of Afghan army to staff the railway & road supply route protection force for a 2400km railway.

At 2 defensive positions - fortified machine gun nests or pillboxes - per kilometre - this would be a total of 4,800 defensive positions to man.

For additional security, additional fortified machine gun nests or pillboxes can be constructed which are normally unmanned. The purpose of empty defensive positions is to confuse an attacker who then may be firing at an unmanned position.

For example, if additional defensive positions are constructed, say every 200 metres, yet only 1 in 5 positions are manned then an attacker only has a 1 in 5 chance of firing at a manned position first of all.

Then 4 out 5 first attacks would miss the defenders altogether yet alert the defenders in the nearby manned positions which negates any advantage of surprise the attacker has initially.

Such additional security measures can be implemented at locations along the route where it is considered that attacks are more likely.

Such extra defensive positions can also be occupied when mobile forces arrive to respond to a sustained attack at that location.

I am assuming a 3 man team to man a defensive machine gun position at any time and to serve as lookouts.

So 3 x 4,800 = a staff of 14,400 to man the guns. Including officers to supervise, I estimate a total of 16,000 army staff on duty manning the guns at any one time.

At 3 x 8 hour shifts that is a total force of 48,000 army to defend the railway for 24 hours, 7 days a week. The off-duty staff would form a mobile reserve to respond to any sustained attacks at any point on the route and they would be best equipped with armoured vehicles to bring more fire-power to particular points on demand.

There should be enforced an exclusion border either side of the supply route which prevents anyone getting close enough to fire a rocket propelled grenade at the defensive machine gun positions. Some claim the range of an RPG can be as far as 1000 metres in the hands of a trained person, though sources vary on this question it would be cautious design to assume the need for a wider exclusion border, say 1100m on either side of the railway.

Barbed wire can help to remind civilians where not to go unless they wish to risk being shot.

For public crossing points, to cross from one side of the supply route to the other or to use a railway station, we would need to build fortified police check-points where those wanting to cross get permission from the police which is radioed to the army in the machine-gun nests when an authorised party has permission to cross.

For the crossing points, and railway stations, the police check-points would be manned by a reliable Afghan police force.

I have not calculated the numbers of Afghan police required. That depends on how many stations and crossing points you have and how busy they are, how many people need to be screened and so on and I don't have an estimate of those numbers as yet.

Now that is a lot of work for the Afghans to get busy on but better doing that than growing poppies or serving with the Taliban or warlords, demanding pay-offs to allow our supplies through, planting IEDs or becoming suicide bombers.

This is war and in war conscription is allowed. In WW2 the British men had the choice of armed service or work down the mines. The Afghan government at our demand needs to give the Afghans, especially in poppy-growing and strong Taliban-recruiting areas, where the insurgency is strong, similar war-time choices.

All with the agreement of the Afghan president of course. So we would need a Afghan president who would agree to those kind of tough measures to fix Afghanistan and if not and he was happy with poppies, IEDs, suicide bombers, civilian and military casualties then obviously such an Afghan president is siding with the Taliban enemy is violating constitutional understandings about what NATO-ISAF are demanding from Afghanistan and such an enemy president needs arresting, impeachment, removal by NATO-ISAF and there would have to be a new election for president. Hopefully it won't come to that and agreements can be reached to end this drift and chaos of supply attempted across ground controlled by the warlords and the Taliban.

After 9 years of being in Afghanistan, the US-British-led coalition, NATO-ISAF instead of having a railway and roads and secure supply routes constructed, we have 300 British dead and 1000 American dead and not much to show for it.

I prefer a more purposeful plan such as this compared to the drift we have been getting so far from the Afghan government. It seems to me we need NATO-ISAF vision and purpose and a coherent military plan to save this Afghanistan intervention from disaster.

I have revised this plan to defend against anticipated indirect fire as well. This has involved widening the security border either side of the supply route to keep enemy mortar and rocket launcher teams out of range of the supply line.

Apparently, the Taliban are being supplied indirect fire weapons from Iran so defenders need to be prepared to expect attacks using weapons such as 120 mm heavy mortars, with a range of 6200 metres and 107 mm rocket launchers with a range of 8500 metres.

Quote:
Iranian weapons getting through to Taliban

Heavy weapons are continuing to stream across the Afghan border from Iran despite Barack Obama's attempts to enlist Tehran's help in fighting the insurgency, officials have said.

So regretfully there is no avoiding the requirement for compulsory purchase of land and eviction of occupiers along a 19 kilometre or 12 mile wide corridor, the whole length of the supply route.

More aggressively NATO might like to consider long-range missile attacks against Iranian weapons productions facilities in Iran to dissuade the Iranians from supplying the Taliban.

STOP - Police check-point - police check civilians are unarmed and those in police or military uniform are genuine. Needs to be very robust so as to survive an enemy truck bomb.

Barbed wire - enough to keep out people and larger animals - so more than a horse can jump or cattle can trample over

No Pedestrians! Cleared ground Target zone for the machine gunners. A hostile intent should be assumed if an intruder is seen here and the intruder should be shot. The ground needs to be cleared of cover so that intruders can be easily spotted and cannot sneak their way past the machine gunners.

GUN - Fortified machine gun nests / pillboxes 3 man crew. Armour should be able to withstand an RPG hit and contains one machine gun with an effective range to 1000 metres, such as PKM or better. One every 1000 metres on both borders should be manned 24/7. Binoculars, automatic rifles such as AK47 and night vision for 3. Two or more other gun positions per 1000 m on each border are normally unmanned and don't need the expense of real guns sitting there all the time. Such extra positions confuse attackers and serve as firing positions for mobile reaction teams to occupy in emergencies and who can bring additional weapons with them.

Which machine gun? wrote:
For the on-duty-shift manned pillboxes, I suppose the better (longer effective range, heavier the bullet) a machine gun the better. At a minimum the plan needs a machine gun with a 1000 metre effective range to keep Taliban RPG out of range of the pillbox.

Ideally I suppose a heavy machine gun (say 12.7 mm ammo, 1800 metres effective range) with its longer range would be best for stopping an advance of the enemy and would give enemy snipers and heavy machine guns at long ranges something to worry about though I think the plan would work well with a medium machine gun (say 7.6 mm ammo, 1500 metres effective range).

The disadvantage about the heavy machine gun is it is a more difficult 2-man carry when the team decide to move it to another pillbox to confuse the enemy but the extra range and fire-power of a heavy machine gun may well be worth the carry.

I am very keen to suggest armoured sights which allow the machine-gunner to fire accurately despite incoming sniper or machine gun fire intended to suppress the pillbox.

If a tank-crew machine-gunner can fire from inside his tank by virtue of armoured sights, without being suppressed, so should a well designed pillbox, in my opinion.

Squad automatic weapons or light machine guns (say, 5.56 mm ammo, 900 metres effective range) would be better stored in the APC to be quickly carried into the empty pillboxes to defend an emergency attack and such lighter machine guns are also useful in the APC for responding to an attack anywhere in the secure corridor.

Access road Where authorised traffic and people can access or leave the supply route.

Mortar teams' ground Defender mortar teams arriving from mobile response depots should set up somewhere here to fire at the enemy in the dangerous ground. The mortar teams' ground should have features to help to win mortar duels with the enemy such as observation points on higher ground or tall structures to serve as observation towers.

Safe building ground Somewhere relatively safe to build a heliport, runway, supply store or other facility or base.

Supply route The road and / or railway we are defending

Crossing Where the access road crosses a supply route railway

Station - Railway station to load and unload supplies and people onto and off the supply trains.

Cross-roads - A four-way junction where the access road crosses the supply road.

Mobile reaction depot - contains single armoured fighting vehicle. This is also where the off-duty mess is so that soldiers are available to react to sustained attacks anywhere along the supply route. One every 2km. Contains additional infantry weapons and ammunition such as additional machine guns, automatic rifles, rocket propelled grenade launchers, mortars and the rest.

Armoured personnel carrier Such as an up-armoured humvee. Most mobile reaction depots have one of those. To transport soldiers to the proximity of the enemy attack where soldiers dismount to fight.

Infantry fighting vehicle or armoured combat vehicle. With stronger armour and able to fire on the enemy from enhanced weapons mounted to the vehicle, as well as able to perform the soldier transport role of the APC. Ideally the defenders would prefer the more powerful IFVs to the battle taxi APCs but fewer mobile reaction depots house IFVs because IFVs cost more and so fewer are available to the defenders than the lower performing APCs.

I am proposing a dedicated force within the Afghan army to secure main supply routes through Afghanistan.

Organisation.

Ranks in increasing order of seniority -

Gunner

Master Gunner

Team Leader

Shift Officer

Depot Commander

Reaction Captain

There will be higher officer ranks yet to be specified.

Duties of the ranks.

1. Gunner - infantry soldier, serves as a member of a 3-man team which serves on one GUN - Fortified machine gun nests / pillboxes position normally for an 8-hour shift.

A Gunner performs other routine duties for an hour or two each day in addition to his 8-hour shift at the gun position at the nearest Mobile reaction depot under the supervision of his Team Leader, Shift Officer and Depot Commander at which location he has quarters in the depot mess.

point out where the No Pedestrians! Cleared ground is and where it ends and where allowed ground behind the gun positions is,

understand that he is forbidden to enter onto the No Pedestrians! Cleared ground on or off duty, even if ordered to do so by anyone in his team because he may be shot if he does so,

understand that he is ordered on and off his duty shift at the GUN - Fortified machine gun nests / pillboxes position only by his own Shift Officer and own Depot Commander and he cannot be relieved of duty by his Team Leader nor by a more senior ranking Master Gunner, nor by any other Shift Officer nor Depot Commander nor by any more senior officer whom he does not know.

understand that while on duty he is not to surrender his personal assault rifle (such as an AK47) to any person, even to someone in his own team. Therefore his Team Leader cannot relieve him of duty nor demand that any Gunner surrender his personal weapon,

understand that it is the Gunner's job when on duty, his job, to shoot on sight anyone on the No Pedestrians! Cleared ground coming or going, even someone dressed in Afghan army uniform, of whatever rank who could be an intruder dressed in disguise or even be a colleague who is deserting in that direction. If he is not manning the machine gun at the time he is to use his personal assault rifle to shoot the person on the No Pedestrians! Cleared ground if they are in range, but he is not to follow in hot pursuit anyone onto the No Pedestrians! Cleared ground because again he may be shot.

understand pillbox defensive tactics as follows.

Pillbox defensive tactics wrote:
Sadly, the Taliban are not so obliging as to try to rush a machine gun position since one machine gun could probably take them all out if they were all to charge it clambering through barbed wire over open ground.

The pillbox machine guns would not be used for suppressing the enemy and therefore blasting away at where you thought an enemy was to keep his head down is just a waste of ammunition and overheats the guns to no good purpose.

The tactics to be employed for the pillboxes are different from a fight on a random battlefield where both sides are evenly vulnerable to fire and so suppressive fire make some sense.

Suppressive fire is of use on a random battlefield to keep the enemy's head down while other comrades move to get a better attacking position. Well the defenders won't be changing position. They will keep their positions in the pillbox so suppressive fire make less sense here.

Our machine gunners should have armoured telescopic sights and therefore only bother actually firing if you have the enemy clearly in your sights and then the first shot is the one that counts.

Some machine guns have a single-shot fire mode with telescopic sights and those are the machine guns we need. Single-shot will most likely be the mode used most often when you spot someone trying to sneak their way past the guns or if you can see a sniper or heavy machine gunner at an effective range, say 1800 metres or less for a heavy machine gun with telescopic sights, less for a lighter machine gun.

I seriously doubt that the enemy would ever do a mass charge across open barbed wire ground which would necessitate firing on full-auto and changing barrels but if they do then fine it is their funeral.

So yes, the gunners would need to know how to change a barrel but if they ever do, I will be questioning their tactics.

If an enemy is blasting away from a machine gun at extreme ineffective range - 2000 metres or more at the pillbox and only the occasional round is even hitting the pillbox then even though it is tempting to return fire blasting back at the position I would not even bother returning fire because that simply gives away your position and may not hit him at extreme range anyway.

Such distant firing is probably to lure the defender to return fire and identify which pillbox is manned, so as to know which pillbox to target with RPGs, recoilless rifles or guided missiles or distant fire could be to distract your attention and rather than fire back, grab your binoculars or night vision and see who is trying to sneak up on the position or past the guns. When you spot them and have an easy kill - then open fire, but in single-shot mode because that is all you will need.

The tactics change if you have a well-armoured position that cannot be suppressed.

I repeat the pillbox machine-gun is not to suppress the enemy. We want the enemy to stick their heads up and get closer to shoot at the pillbox, so the defenders can carefully target them and kill them on single-shot mode. We want the enemy to think they can sneak past the guns so we wait until they are an easy kill and only then take them out.

Master Gunners get an appropriately and differently designed skills badge and salary increment for each specialist skill learned. So typically that would be a badge with a machine-gun icon for weapons' maintenance, a badge with an APC-icon for vehicle driving and basic maintenance and so on. A Master Gunner with more badges and skills outranks a Master Gunner with fewer badges and skills.

3. Team leader A promoted post. The most experienced and able Gunner in each team of 3 on a GUN - Fortified machine gun nests / pillboxes position.

Team leaders should have multiple specialist skills and in particular the communications specialist skills is one of the required skills to be eligible to become a Team Leader. Team leaders are always the senior ranking members in every 3-man team irrespective of badges and skills. So a Master Gunner with, say, 5 skill badges does not outrank a Team Leader with, say, only 4 skills badges.

4. Shift officer - normally on duty back at the Mobile reaction depot and in command and in radio, mobile (cell) or land-line telephone contact with 4 teams, which is 12 men, on duty for an 8-hour shift. The shift officer acts as a deputy commander for the shift for 4 GUN - Fortified machine gun nests / pillboxes and for the Mobile Reaction Depot.

The Shift Officer is also in radio, mobile (cell) or land-line telephone contact with Shift Officers in neighbouring Mobile reaction depots. The Shift Officer decides whether or not to consult the Depot commander in response to a request for assistance from any of the 4 teams under his command or to a request for assistance from a Shift Officer in a neighbouring Mobile Reaction Depot.

5. Depot commander - in command of one Mobile reaction depot , the vehicle, weapons and everything therein. Commands the 3 Shift officers and 12 teams which totals 39 men under his command. He can declare a depot emergency, and call the off-duty shifts in the mess back on emergency duty.

The Depot Commander can order the depot's vehicle and men to attend and to defend the GUN - Fortified machine gun nests / pillboxes under attack or order mortar teams into action from the Mortar teams' ground.

In an emergency, the Depot Commander notifies his immediate superior officers, the Reaction Captains who are the reaction director and deputy reaction director assigned command responsibility for his Mobile Reaction Depot.

6. Reaction Captain

has some command responsibility for the reactions of 8 neighbouring Mobile Reaction Depots

is the reaction director for the central 4 depots of these 8 neighbouring depots

is the deputy reaction director for the peripheral 4 depots of these 8 neighbouring depots.

Reaction Captains direct Mobile Reaction Depots

The diagram illustrates how the command responsibility of neighbouring Reaction Captains is organised.

This overlapping organisation ensures that emergencies which are declared at any Mobile Reaction Depot can be supported if needs be by Reaction Captains with responsibility for the depot under attack ordering neighbouring depots on either side to react to the emergency.

A vehicle is assigned to each Reaction Captain who routinely drives to visit the 8 Mobile Reaction Depots for which he has command responsibility for daily meetings with the Depot Commanders and with the other 2 Reaction Captains he shares depot command responsibility with.

The Reaction Captains can arrange to receive a salute at attention from each off-duty shift twice a week with an opportunity for the Reaction Captains to boost morale by reminding the Gunners that every Reaction Captain has 8 Mobile Reaction Depots and 320 soldiers under his command and that the 2 Reaction Captains with command responsibility for a particular depot have between them 480 soldiers under their command.

So in emergencies the Secure Supply Route Protection Force is well organised to defeat any attack the enemy dares to try against any part of the supply route. They shall not pass! (No passeran!)

The Reaction Captain has a captain's office and quarters adjacent to one of the 4 Mobile Reaction Depots for which he is the reaction director and the Depot Commander of that particular Mobile Reaction Depot also serves as the Reaction Captain's secretary to take telephone calls to the Reaction Captain's Office if he is out of his office and quarters at the time.

Being so mobile in his daily routine, the Reaction Captain must be contactable via radio or mobile (cell) telephone when he is out of his office.

In the event of a major attack, the Reaction Captain will set up a tactical command headquarters at his office to direct the battle and call for further reinforcements from neighbouring Reaction Captain's offices if required.