Washington, DC, March 20, 2014 – Unwilling to bear the political and economic burden of shoring up a key African ally all by herself, France sought to internationalize a growing political
and military crisis in Rwanda by pushing responsibility onto the United Nations in the period leading up to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. At the same time, French president Francois Mitterrand remained deeply
suspicious of Tutsi-led rebels who invaded Rwanda from Uganda, with what an aide described as "the benevolent complicity of the Anglo-Saxon world."
(Document 15)

The contradictions in Mitterrand's policy toward Rwanda are captured in French government documents, translated into English by the National Security
Archive at George Washington University and the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. The documents trace the alarm felt in Paris over military advances
by Tutsi-led rebels and frustration with the Hutu-dominated government of President Juvénal Habyarimana.

Today's postings form part of a detailed documentation of the international response to the genocide that killed between 500,000 and a million Rwandans,
predominantly Tutsi, between April and July 1994. Future briefing books will examine events before and after the onset of the genocide, including the
Arusha peace negotiations, a growing refugee crisis, and the fateful decision to withdraw the bulk of the United Nations peacekeeping force.

French President Francois Mitterand, photo courtesy of Wikimedia

The documents posted today in English and French are extracted from hundreds of documents released by a French parliamentary commission in 1998 and the so-called "Mitterrand archive," which was leaked to French researchers from 2005 onwards. While
the provenance of the Mitterrand archive remains unclear, the authenticity of the documents has been confirmed by former Mitterrand aides, French researchers, and lawyers involved in a series of cases related to the genocide.

While the documents contained in the Mitterrand archive provide a valuable insight into official French thinking, the unauthorized nature of their release also raises problems for independent researchers. It is impossible to know, for example, how many documents are missing from the archive, and the reasons for their non-disclosure. The motivations of the leaker, or leakers, also remain unclear.

French researchers have noted several glaring gaps in the collection, parts of which have been made available to journalists and other researchers at the Francois Mitterrand Institute in Paris. The documents focus on political developments and offer relatively scant details about the military cooperation between France and Rwanda between 1990 and 1994. Also missing are details of the French decision to accord protection and political asylum to leading members of the Rwandan regime following the assassination of President Habyarimana on April 6, 1994. It is important that the public be given access to these records in order to complete the picture of French decision-making about the Rwandan genocide.

The documents portray France as a reluctant, and somewhat ambiguous, supporter of the Habyarimana regime in Rwanda between 1990 and 1994. On the one hand,
Mitterrand viewed Rwanda as an integral part of French-speaking Africa, known as Francophonie, on the edge of what French officials called an "Anglophone
front." (Document 8) On the other hand, he did not want to squander too much French blood and treasure on a former Belgian — not
French — colony.

The French role in supporting the Habyarimana government has been the subject of great controversy, with some critics claiming that France was complicit in
the actions of future genocidaires. With Belgium assuming a more neutral position, Habyarimana viewed France as his primary international ally, and a
military bulwark against the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front.

After the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, Mitterrand called for the creation of multi-party democracies in Africa, and linked French economic assistance
to progress toward democratization, as reflected in his address to the Franco-African summit at Le Baule in June 1990. The documents show that he urged
Habyarimana to negotiate a compromise deal with political opponents inside the country (largely Hutus, based in the south of the country), as well as the
armed opposition outside the country (the Rwandan Patriotic Front).

After dispatching thousands of troops and military advisors to Rwanda between 1990 and 1993, France saw the Arusha peace progress, and the arrival of
United Nations peacekeepers, as a way to extricate herself from an increasingly complicated political and military situation.

A recurring theme in the documents is the conviction, shared by Mitterrand and his advisers, that the Rwandan Patriotic Front wanted to use its superior
military position to restore a Tutsi-dominated regime in Rwanda. French military advisers reported that the rebel movement had acquired surface-to-air
missiles from Uganda. When President Habyarimana's plane was shot down by a SAM missile on April 6, 1994, triggering the genocide, French officials
immediately suspected the RPF.
Other observers, among them Alison Desforges, note that there has never been a full and official investigation into who is responsible for shooting down President Habyarimana's plane, leaving many possibilities including the RPF, Hutu moderates, the president's own party, or possibly the presidential guard.[1]

Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana, photo courtesy of Wikimedia

In addition to the documents included in the chronological narrative below, we are also publishing an annex of other French government documents translated
into English by the National Security Archive and the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum. A subsequent posting will focus on French policy toward Rwanda
between April and July 1994.

Arnaud Siad is a researcher based in Paris for the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum and a PhD student at the Institute of Political Science
(Sciences Po) in Paris. Christina Graubert is a student at Oxford University, and a former intern for the National Security Archive.

Document 2: French version, English version
DATE: March 14, 1990
FROM: [French Ambassador to Rwanda] Georges Martres
TO: French Foreign Ministry
SOURCE: Mitterrand Archive
SUBJECT: "Requests for Military Order Likely to be Presented to the President of the French Republic by the Rwandan President at their Meeting on April 3,
1990 (First Part of Two)

Preparing for an official visit to France in April 1990, Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana outlined his political and security concerns to the French
ambassador in Kigali, Georges Martres. He also requested military support for his government, to counter a threatened invasion by the Tutsi-led Rwandan
Patriotic Front, based in Uganda. In these confidential diplomatic dispatches, Martres explains that Habyarimana was becoming increasingly unpopular at
home, forcing him to rely on the Rwandan army and police. Habyarimana requests a new plane and radar equipment to counter the air threat from Uganda and
the RPF. According to Martres, the president has made similar requests to Belgium over the course of many years, but they have been ignored.

Document 3: French version, English version DATE: June 20, 1990
FROM: President Francois Mitterrand
TO: Franco-African Summit
SOURCE: Council for the Liberation and Change in Congo (Website)
SUBJECT: Address to Franco-African Summit, La Baule, France

President Mitterrand's speech to the Franco-African summit of June 1990 in the western French town of La Baule represented a defining moment in French
African policy. In the aftermath of the Cold War, and the fall of the Berlin wall, Mitterrand cited democracy as a "universal principle" and urged African
leaders to introduce multi-party systems and guarantee freedom of the press. He also stated that French development aid to African countries would be
linked to progress toward democracy.

On October 1, 1990, Tutsi-led rebels from the Rwandan Patriotic Front invaded Rwanda from Uganda. These two documents reflect the French government's view
of the resulting conflict. In a diplomatic cable from Kigali dated October 7, Ambassador Martres urges French military support for President Habyarimana to
prevent "domination of the Hutus by the Tutsi minority." The following day, October 8, the chief of the French Defence Staff, Admiral Jacques Lanxade, drew
the line at direct French involvement in the fighting. He recommended turning down Habyarimana's request for aerial support and engagement of French ground
units, but approved the supply of ammunition and rockets to Rwandan government forces.

Document 6: French version, English versionDATE: October 15, 1990
FROM: [French Ambassador to Rwanda] Georges Martres TO: French Foreign Ministry
SOURCE: French Parliamentary Commission
SUBJECT: "Analysis of the Situation by the Tutsi Population"

On October 24, France responded to the RPF attack by rushing 314 French troops to Rwanda under Operation Noroit, ostensibly to protect French citizens. In
these dispatches, French officials discuss the threat of the "total elimination" of the Tutsi minority in Rwanda, in response to the RPF invasion. The
French military attaché in Rwanda predicts the "likely physical elimination" of Tutsis living inside Rwanda — between 500,000 and 700,000 people — by the
seven million strong Hutu majority in the event of a successful Tutsi-led invasion from Uganda.

Document 8: French version, English version DATE: January 23, 1991
FROM: French Council of Ministers minutes
TO: n/a
SOURCE: Mitterrand Archive
SUBJECT: "Discussion on Foreign Affairs"

French military action in Rwanda is ostensibly aimed at protecting European citizens trapped in the northern town of Ruhengeri, which is being besieged by
the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front. At a cabinet meeting, President Mitterrand depicts the fighting as a conflict between Francophone Rwanda and
Anglophone Uganda. He says that Ugandan President Museveni should be told that "it is not normal that the Tutsi minority wants to impose its will on the
[Hutu] majority" in Rwanda.

President Habyarimana paid an official visit to France in April 1991. In return for French military and diplomatic support, Mitterrand urges the Rwandan
leader to push ahead with democratization efforts, respect human rights, and negotiate a political settlement with the Tutsi-led rebels. He also calls for
the peaceful return of an estimated half a million Tutsi refugees, forced out of Rwanda following the Hutu-led "revolution" of 1959 and independence from
Belgium in 1962.

President Mitterrand's military advisor, General Quesnot, reports that an offensive by "Ugandan-Tutsi" rebels in northeast Rwanda has been "neutralized" by
the Rwandan army. He reports that a SAM-16 missile, with a range of 5 kilometers (3 miles), has been captured by Rwandan troops, marking a "new and
dangerous step in foreign assistance to the rebels."

General Quesnot reports to Mitterrand that the RPF has stepped up its offensive into northern Rwanda "with the important support of the Ugandan army,"
prior to the start of peace negotiations in Arusha, Tanzania, scheduled for July 10, 1992. He recommends that French military advisors be allowed to train
Rwandan soldiers in the use of military equipment "subject to the most extreme discretion," but should not take part in combat operations.

In January 1993, an international human rights commission arrived in Kigali to investigate allegations of Rwandan government connivance in massacres of
minority Tutsis. Ambassador Martres feared that the commission report would embarrass President Habyarimana and the French government, and predicted a
backlash by Hutu hardliners, based in northern Rwanda. An imprisoned Rwandan journalist, Janvier Afrika, told the commission that the violence was being
fueled by "death squads" linked to Hutu extremists close to Habyarimana.

On February 8, 1993, following reports of massacres of minority Tutsis, the Rwandan Patriotic
Front launched a major offensive in northern Rwanda, capturing the town of Ruhengeri. The French government immediately called a "crisis meeting," and
authorized expanded support for the Rwandan army, "with the exception of direct participation of French forces" in the fighting.

Reporting on a trip to Rwanda and Uganda, presidential advisor Bruno Delaye describes the "disastrous" political situation in Rwanda following the RPF
attack on Ruhengeri. He warns that the rebels are in a position to "capture Kigali." Delaye attempts to negotiate a deal between "the Hutus of the North,"
gathered around President Habyarimana, who are opposed to any political concessions to the RPF, and "the Hutus of the South," who favor negotiations with
the RPF and the overthrow of Habyarimana. The French-brokered deal includes a joint denunciation of the RPF, renewed commitment to democratization, and a
resumption of the Arusha peace negotiations.

In a memorandum to French President Mitterrand, Defense Minister Pierre Joxe expresses concern at the failure of the Rwandan army to resist a Tutsi-led
invasion of the country, despite the presence of 690 French military advisors under Operation Noroit. He suggests that Habyarimana is "largely responsible"
for the "present fiasco" through his "political intransigence." He recommends pressuring Habyarimana to soften his position by threatening to withdraw
French troops and negotiate a political solution to the crisis.

Document 17: French version, English version DATE: March 3, 1993
FROM: Notes taken by Hubert Védrine taken during Council of Ministers
TO: n/a
SOURCE: Mitterrand Archive
SUBJECT: "Situation in Rwanda"

Anxious to reduce France's military exposure in Rwanda, President Mitterrand sought to internationalize the conflict "by handing it over to the United
Nations." He viewed United Nations involvement in Rwanda as the best exit strategy for France, while avoiding an outright RPF victory.

A right-wing victory in French parliamentary elections in March 1993 posed a further complication for French foreign policy, obliging President Mitterrand
to share power with a conservative prime minister, Édouard Balladur. During the first cabinet meeting of the "cohabitation" regime, Mitterrand and
Balladur agree on the need to reinforce the French presence in Rwanda with 1,000 additional troops.

In a private letter to a friend, the French pilot of Habyarimana's plane expresses concern about the possibility of an attack on the Falcon 50 jet. Colonel
Minaberry suspects that Rwandan Patriotic Front troops, who have recently taken over the parliament building in Kigali (CND), have the technical capability
to shoot down a plane landing at Kigali airport with Soviet SA-7 or SA-16 surface-to-air missiles. He discusses alternative landing approaches to
neutralize the threat.

Document 20: French version, English version
DATE: April 7, 1994
FROM: [Advisor on African Affairs to Mitterrand] Bruno Delaye
TO: President Francois Mitterrand
SOURCE: French Parliamentary Commission
SUBJECT: "Attack against the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi"

The first report to Mitterrand on the downing of Habyarimana's plane "attributes" responsibility to the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front, but does not
provide any concrete evidence. Presidential advisor Bruno Delaye reports that the Presidential Guard has begun to hunt down political opponents of the
president, both Hutus and Tutsis, and a military confrontation "appears inevitable." Delaye says the French embassy is ready to provide shelter to
Habyarimana's family, in accordance with Mitterrand's instructions.

Document 26: French version, English version DATE: December 19, 1990
FROM: [French Ambassador to Rwanda] Georges Martres
TO: French Foreign Ministry
SOURCE: French Parliamentary Commission
SUBJECT: "Joint Report of the Resident Ambassadors of the E.E.C in Rwanda"

Document 30: French version, English version DATE: August 10, 1991
FROM: [French Defense Attaché in Kigali] Colonel Bernard Cussac
TO: French Foreign Ministry
SOURCE: French Parliamentary Commission
SUBJECT: "Circumstances of Detainees at Kigali Prison, Accused of Having Taken Up Arms against Rwanda (Inkotayni)"

Document 32: French version, English version DATE: January 15, 1993
FROM: President Francois Mitterrand
TO: President of the United States, George Bush
SOURCE: Mitterrand Archive
SUBJECT: [Funding Humanitarian Aid in Rwanda]

Document 40: French version, English version DATE: August 28, 1993
FROM: [President of the Rwandan Patriotic Front] Colonel Kanyarengwe
TO: President Francois Mitterrand
SOURCE: Mitterrand Archive
TOPIC: [Letter of Thanks to the French Government for Role in Arusha]

Document 41: French version, English version DATE: September 27, 1993
FROM: President Francois Mitterand
TO: President of the United States, Bill Clinton
SOURCE: Mitterand Archive
SUBJECT: [Letter to President Clinton to Ask for Support in Plea for UN Mission in Rwanda]

Document 45: French version, English version DATE: February 11, 1994
FROM: [Military advisor to Mitterrand] General Christian Quesnot
TO: President Francois Mitterrand
SOURCE: Mitterrand Archive
SUBJECT: "Note to the Attention of the President of the Republic"