Because it is the principle intent of this sacred doctrine to deliver knowledge of God, and not only according to what he is in himself, but also according to what is the principle of things and their ends, and in particular of rational creatures, as it is clear from these statements; for the exposition of this doctrine, we will first treat of God, secondly of the motion of rational creatures toward God; thirdly, of Christ, who, accordingly as human, is the way for us strive toward God.

This investigation will therefore have three parts. First we will consider those things which pertain to the divine essence; secondly those things which pertain to the distinction of persons; third, those things which pertain to the proceeding of creatures from himself.

Concerning the truly divine essence, it is first to be considered whether God exists; secondly, how he exists, or, to put it better, in which ways he does not exist; the third thing to consider will be those which pertain to his own operation, clearly his knowledge, will and power.

Circa primum quaeruntur tria.

Primo: utrum Deum esse sit per se notum.

Secundo: utrum sit demonstrabile.

Tertio: an Deus sit.

Concerning the first three things are to be asked

First, whether “God exists” is self-evident.

Secondly: whether it is demonstrable.

Thirdly: whether God exists.

ARTICULUS I Utrum Deum esse sit per se notum

ARTICLE IWhether “God exists” is self-evident.

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deum esse sit per se notum.

At first we proceed thus. It is seen that “God exists” is self-evident.

Objection 1. Those things are said to be self-evident to us, of which knowledge naturally inheres in us, as it were accessible to us from first principles. But, as Damascene says in the beginning of his book, in everyone knowledge of God existing naturally implanted. Therefore “God exists” is self-evident.

Objection 2. Moreover, those things are said to be self-evident, which are immediately known once the terms are understood: as the Philosopher grants to the first principles of demonstration in Posterior Analytics I: for when it is known what a whole and what a part is, it is immediately known that every whole is greater than its part. But when it is understood what the name “God” signifies, it is grasped immediately that God is. By this name is signified that than which nothing greater can be signified: but that is greater which is in reality and in the intellect, than that which is only in the intellect: whence when the name “God” is understood, immediately it is in the intellect, it follows therefor that it is in reality. Therefore “God exists” is self-evident.

Objection 3. Moreover, “there is truth” is self-evident: because whoever denies “there is truth”, concedes that there is truth: for if there is no truth, it is true that there is no truth. If however there is something true, it is necessary that there is truth. But God himself is truth (John 14:6): “I am the way, the truth and the live.” Therefore “God exists” is self-evident.

On the contrary, no one can think the opposite of that which is self-evident, as the Philosopher shows in Metaphysics IV and Posterior Analytics I, concerning of the first principles of demonstration. The opposite of “God exists” can be thought, however, according to Psalm 52:1: “The fool says in his heart, there is no God.” Therefore “God exists” is not self-evident.

I respond that “something is self-evident” holds in two ways: in the first way according to itself and not to us; in the second way according both to itself and to us. From this now that proposition is self-evident whose predicate is included in the ratio of the subject, as in “man is an animal”: for “animal” comes from the ratio of man. If however it is known to all what both predicate and subject are, that proposition will be self-evident to all: such lies open in the first principles of demonstration, whose terms are universal and no one fails to know, such as being and non-being, whole and part, and the like. If however for some it is not known what the predicate or subject are, the proposition is to this extent self-evident in itself: but not for those who do not know the predicate and subject of the proposition. For this reason it holds, as Boethius says in De Hebdomadibus, that there are universal conceptions of the soul and self-evident for those wise ones who know so much as that incorporeals do not have location.

I say therefore that this proposition, “God exists”, in itself is self-evident, because the predicate is the same as the subject: for God is his own existence, as will be made clear. But because we do not know of God what he is, it is not self-evident for us: but it needs to be demonstrated by way of those things that are more known to us, and less knowable by nature, namely by effects.

To the first objection we must say that to know God exists in a general way and prone to confusion, is placed into us by nature, insofar, that is, as God is man’s beatitude. For man naturally desires beatitude, and that which is naturally desired by man is naturally known by him. However, this is not to know that God exists without qualification (simpliciter); just as knowing someone is approaching is not to know it is Peter, even though it is Peter who is approaching; many suppose that the perfect good of man, which is beatitude, to be wealth; others pleasure, and others something else.

To the second objection we must say that perhaps he who hears the name “God” does not understand something signified than which nothing greater can be thought, as when some would believe God to be a body. It is granted, however, that whoever would understand by the name, “God”, we signify what has been said, namely, that than which nothing greater can be thought; it does not, however, follow that he understands that that which is signified by the name exists in reality; but only in the apprehension of the intellect. Nor can it be argued that it is in reality unless it is granted that there is in things something than which nothing greater can be thought. And this is not granted by those who posit that God does not exist.