Asimov's robots have positronic brains which give them full consciousness (self-awareness, intentionality, etc). They think as we do, except for being unable to violate the 3 laws.

My main point is that, IMO, goodness is not dependent on truly free will. In a sense, God lacks free will: he can't do evil because that is against his nature. And yet, he is considered the personification of goodness.

God ever put us in a state of free will? Less good comes of it because it results in some good souls unnecessarily experiencing evil done to them on earth, and it results in some souls choosing evil and not receiving a good, eternal life with God. — Relativist

I agree with you personally in saying that Christianity is false. I just think that your argument could be a tad stronger. For example, it is stated in religion that God has put these evils on earth as a sign and our free will is used to determine whether we get to live a life of good will in heaven or eternal evil in hell. But, Free will can't be stripped away after earth life because then God will be taking away his gift to us which is not omnibenevolent. So, this leads on to the fact that, again, we have the potential to do bad in heaven and good in hell BECAUSE we still would have free will, therefore making the Two illogical and God doesn't do anything that is illogical.

Furthermore, this contradicts the premise that there are free willed souls in heaven that do not sin because it is clear that this is impossible. Because if you have free will you have to sin. They come hand in hand. This is what makes heaven and hell illogical because eternal greatness and eternal evil does not exist alone. They come hand in hand. Either together or not at all. Just because they are departed souls of Christians does not mean they are far from sin, is my point.

Thanks for your comments - I agree with everything you said. If I decide to put this into an essay, I'll try to be more comprehensive. For now, I'm working through bits of it at at time.

Incidentally, I previously raised this question on a Christian forum, and almost everyone who replied actually agreed with the premise that the souls in heaven have free-will and do not sin. They could not explain why God could not just create such beings directly - they just asserted he can't. The reasoning appeared to be: he would've if he could've, but he didn't so he couldn't.

I have a lot of sympathy with the argument, but I'll have a go at Devil's Advocate:

I think what the argument might be is that what matters to God is that every being has had the opportunity to make free decisions. So the beings in heaven have had that ability and, by the decisions they chose to make, have qualified for entry to heaven. The arguments that are used to say that, for instance, a being that is shielded from temptation, or created immaculate like Mary, would not have free will, can be equally applied to say that, once in heaven, a being no longer has free will (they are now shielded from temptation, or rendered immaculate). But perhaps it is enough for an apologist that the qualified being once had free will.

Why would you say this? Clearly it's a false premise. Logical contradictions do exist, I encounter them quite often. Here's an example: the circle is square. In order to justify this premise of yours, you'd need to either show how these things which appear to exist as logical contradictions are either not contradictions, or exist as something other than contradictions.

"the beings in heaven have had that ability and, by the decisions they chose to make, have qualified for entry to heaven"
Yes, but God set up this process - he defined the qualifications, and they are contingent - God had a choice (i.e. the qualifications do not appear to be metaphysically necessary). It is basically a game that God created that will inevitably lead to harm coming to good people while on earth, and eternal harm coming to those who don't pass the test. Both sets of harm seem inconsistent with omnibenevolence. Further, it doesn't even appear that the test is administered fairly - obviously some have a harder time of it than others.

it is enough for an apologist that the qualified being once had free will.

That is certainly a distinction, and any distinction can provide an escape hatch. That's why I don't suggest my arguments could convince a committed Christian - they can always resort to "God moves in mysterious ways." Arguments such as mine are only relevant to someone who is actually willing to entertain the possibility that a 3-omni God does not exist. The real lesson is that such a God's non-existence seems more likely than his existence.

BTW, Mary being "immaculate" just means she was born without original sin (see this)

OK, contradictory semantic constructions exist - but they have no referent in the actual world. How's this?:

1. An object that is describable as a logical contradiction is metaphysically impossible. (e.g. square circles are metaphysically impossible)
2. If x exists then x is metaphysically possible (converse of 1)
3. Omnipotence entails the ability to directly create any contingent entity whose existence is metaphysically possible.
4. There exist contingent free-willed souls in heaven who do not sin (e.g. the departed souls of faithful Christians). (Christian doctrine).
5. Therefore God's omnipotence entails the ability to directly create free-willed beings that do not sin.
6. Therefore God could have created a world of free-willed beings who do not sin
7. In this world, evil befalls the innocent due to the sinful acts of free-willed individuals
8. God created this world instead of a world of free willed beings that do not sin.
9. Therefore God chose a world with needless pain and suffering.
10. Therefore God is not omnibenevolent.

BTW, Mary being "immaculate" just means she was born without original sin (see this) — Relativist

Yes I know. As a former RC I find myself constantly being tempted to correct people that say or imply that the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception says that Mary conceived Jesus without having sexual intercourse - a temptation I often fail to resist :snicker:. The question I'm raising there is whether proponents of the free will theodicy defence are cornering themselves into saying Mary had no free will, since removing a tendency to commit 'sins' (shielding her conception from the taint of original sin) sounds to me like depriving them of free will. After all, if God could do that for Mary, why didn't She just do it for everybody, and that way make sure that everybody goes to heaven?

I don't think you've avoided the problem I brought up. How do you account for the existence of impossibility? You've limited "exists" such that it can only refer to possibilities. Why privilege possibilities over impossibilities? If you allow that possibilities exist, why not also allow that impossibilities exist?

Impossibility is a property of propositions, not of the elements of reality that may be described by the propositions. True propositions correspond to elements of reality, but propositions are false because they do not correspond to elements of reality (i.e. I subscribe to correspondence theory of truth). An impossibility = a proposition that is false out of logical necessity, so it cannot correspond to an element of reality.

What corresponds, or does not correspond, with reality is the meaning of the proposition, what it means. But isn't the meaning of the proposition part of reality as well? So the meaning, what the proposition means, is real, and existent, whether it is possible or impossible.

1. An object that is describable as a logical contradiction is metaphysically impossible. (e.g. square circles are metaphysically impossible) — Relativist

" isn't the meaning of the proposition part of reality as well"
Meaning is something that exists only in the mind. It constitutes relations among other elements of the mind, so meaning is still just another abstraction. Abstractions are a special kind of existent, and one can argue that they do not actually exist. e.g. circles do not actually exist; rather, circular objects exist from which we abstract out the concept of circular via the way of abstraction.

This seems a digression. At issue is: what non-mental objects exist? Contradictions exist only as mental objects.

Abstractions are a special kind of existent, and one can argue that they do not actually exist. e.g. circles do not actually exist; rather, circular objects exist from which we abstract out the concept of circular via the way of abstraction — Relativist

Why would one try to argue that mental objects do not exist? What would be the point of this argument, and how would it be supported.

This seems a digression. At issue is: what non-mental objects exist? Contradictions exist only as mental objects. — Relativist

As far as I'm concerned what is at issue is that you are limiting your definition of "exist" so that only non-mental things can be said to exist, in order to make your argument. If your argument against God is based in the assumption that immaterial things, such as mental things, do not exist, then why don't you just take the easy route? 1) Immaterial things do not exist. 2) God is described as an immaterial thing. Therefore God does not exist. See how easy it is?

The argument from evil is an inference that a 3- omni God cannot exist, because this is inconsistent with the presence of so much evil in the world. Theists reject this with the "free-will" defense, which suggests that God "had" to allow evil because it is a necessary consequence of free will. My argument defeats this defense based in Christian doctrine: — Relativist

Good and Evil is a human subjective concept connected to law. For example, marijuana laws are changing in many places. What was once called evil, by the law, is no longer evil, where the law is revoked. The same behavior can be evil in one place but not in another place. It is all based on how human define it. Marijuana laws have nothing to do with God. However, depending on the political and legal environment, this can be called evil or not. Then some will blame God for the latest new evil that was created by man.

In natural instinct, all actions are morally neutral. The Lion can kill to eat, or the hyena can steal to survive. It is all part of the ways of nature, that allows nature to integrate in 3-D. It is humans who define good and evil and then blame God for the evil.

Bible symbolism shows Adam and Eve being told not to eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, which law. Once you do that, humans will rig the system with subjective laws to benefit themselves and their cronies.

There was also the tree of life, where good and evil do not exist. It is based on natural instinct. But you can't have it both ways, so natural human instinct disappears.

Consider President Trump revoking a wide range of rules and regulations put in place by the previous administration. Trump got rid of a bunch of subjective evil, that the previous administration can blame on God, who was not even in the meetings, when the laws were made. Minimizing law heads humans in the direction of natural instinct, where good and evil disappear.

Minimizing law heads humans in the direction of natural instinct, where good and evil disappear. — wellwisher

Good and evil do not 'disappear' in the direction of natural instinct. Instinct ultimately compels us toward happiness. It is not the instinct that is 'wrong' it is our inability to understand and thence control instinct that causes the manifestation of human evil, and the subsequent dilution or disappearance of 'good'.

Instinct is the word of 'God', as it manifests directly out of Nature and there are few who suggest that 'God' or 'Nature' is a source of evil. Humans are the only source of evil.

Evil has only one source and that is human stupidity. Stupidity has only one source and that is a misunderstanding of God/Nature/Instinct.. these are effectively and functionally synonymous.

If God is beautiful then so is instinct.

Instinct, unlike God, has the advantage of existing, and is therefore, perhaps more deserving of reverence and respect. :)

The argument from evil is an inference that a 3- omni God cannot exist, because this is inconsistent with the presence of so much evil in the world. Theists reject this with the "free-will" defense, which suggests that God "had" to allow evil because it is a necessary consequence of free will. My argument defeats this defense based in Christian doctrine: — Relativist

There are 2 classes of evil that the Argument from evil uses, and the core of the counter argument is the same for both. Compensating goods. There are 3 tests needed to meet this criteria. The first one is - the compensating good needs to be significantly better than evil, the second one is you can not have the good without the evil, and the third is there is no other way to get the good. In the first class of evil, that caused by man, the compensating good is free will. The proposition is, that it is significantly better to be a being with free will, than to be a being without free will. However this allows for choices that are evil, and you can not have this good without this evil.

The second type of evil is that not caused directly by man, such as illness or natural disasters. Finding the compensating goods in this class of evil is much more difficult. In general these discussions spin down to cognitive distance. That if there was a compensating good, we would have the ability to see it, and recognize it as such. There is no overwhelming argument that I know off that says we would. So it becomes a no-seeum defense. And your view on the validity of the proposition, that there are some states of affairs, that exist, or can exist that we are un aware off.

My argument does not depend on the non-existence of mental entities qua mental entities. I resolved your original issue when I replaced "logically impossible" with "metaphysically impossible." A state of affairs is metaphysically impossible if its existence is broadly logically impossible. A square circle is strictly logically possible (logic alone does not entail a contradiction), but it is broadly logically impossible because the meanings of "square" and "circle" entail a contradiction; i.e. its actualization would violate the law of non-contradiction.

OK, tell me if I understand you properly then. "Metaphysically impossible" depends on "broadly logically impossible", which depends on how the terms are defined. So "metaphysically impossible" is dependent on the definitions of the terms. "Square circle" could be metaphysically possible if the terms were defined such that this would not be contradictory.

Since we can define the terms however we please, how is this relevant to whether something exists or not?

An error that many make is, saying or theorizing too much about matters unknowable and indescribable.

I suggest (as an impression and a feeling, but not an assertion) that what-is, is good, and that there's good intent behind what is.

It's my feeling that little, if anything, can be said, beyond that, about such matters.

My suggestion in the paragraph before last doesn't imply that there is a physical world (or an ensemble of them) because of God's will. I suggest that a physical world is a logical-system, consisting of abstract logical implications that just "are".

So, don't blame this physical world on God.

In fact I claim that you're in a life--this one in particular--because, as the hypothetical protagonist of a hypothetical experience-story (consisting of a complex system of inter-referring abstract implications, with a mutually-consistent configuration of proposition truth-values), you're someone pre-disposed to life, with "will to life" (as someone quoted Schopenhauer). You're metaphysically prior to, and the reason for this life that you're in.

So, blame yourself, not God, for the fact that you're in a life, and the fact that you're in a life like the one that you're in..

Anyway, when the "problem of evil" is stated, there's over-emphasis on this physical world and its importance. Sure, this life matters, in the sense that how we conduct ourselves in it matters.

But this life and this world are a blip in timelessness. In fact, the long but finite sequence of lives that you're in is likewise only a blip in timelessness.

Was it not such a good idea for you to start this sequence of lives? That's moot now.

So, don't evaluate or judge all of what is, all of Reality, by this life, or this sequence of lives.

As I said above, I suggest that what-is, is good. That's outside the describable, assertable, arguable, provable realm, and it's just an impression, feeling, and unprovable opinion.

"Metaphysically impossible" depends on "broadly logically impossible", which depends on how the terms are defined. So "metaphysically impossible" is dependent on the definitions of the terms. "Square circle" could be metaphysically possible if the terms were defined such that this would not be contradictory."
That's right.

"Since we can define the terms however we please, how is this relevant to whether something exists or not? "
If you define “circle” and “square” differently from me, then you and I won’t be able to have a meaningful discussion about circles and squares. We need to agree on semantics to discuss the logic.
Consider this proposition:
Prop A: X is a circle & X is not a circle
Is it possible for X to exist? No, because it violates the law of non-contradition. Now consider this statement:
Prop B: X is a circle & X is a square.

“Square” is generally defined in such a way that it is not a circle. So with this definition in mind, Prop B entails Prop A. Therefore the X of Prop B can’t exist because it violates the law of non-contradition.

" I suggest that a physical world is a logical-system, consisting of abstract logical implications that just 'are'."

That doesn't make any sense. Logic is an epistemological tool; it applies to propositions (descriptions of some aspects of reality) not to the ontic objects of reality. If there are no intelligent minds articulating descriptions of reality, then there are no propositions (except in some abstract sense that every aspect of the world is describable, in principle).

"Anyway, when the "problem of evil" is stated, there's over-emphasis on this physical world and its importance. Sure, this life matters, in the sense that how we conduct ourselves in it matters.
But this life and this world are a blip in timelessness. In fact, the long but finite sequence of lives that you're in is likewise only a blip in timelessness."

That seems a self-defeating position. Why bother continuing to live, and to improve your life and that of your loved ones?

More importantly, why did God bother to put us into this hellhole (as it is for some, at least)? Did he want some maleficent amusement?

" I suggest that a physical world is a logical-system, consisting of abstract logical implications that just 'are'."

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Relativist replied:
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That doesn't make any sense.

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No, it doesn’t make any sense in terms of Materialism.
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Logic is an epistemological tool;

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Use it as you wish.
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it applies to propositions (descriptions of some aspects of reality) not to the ontic objects of reality.

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From what you say, it evidently doesn’t “apply to” the ontic objects of reality that you believe in.
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“Materialism must be right, because anything else would be inconsistent with Materialism.” :D
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Uncontroversially, there are abstract facts, in the sense that we can state them or speak of them.
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Uncontroversially, there are complex inter-referring systems of abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things, and various mutually-consistent configurations of the truth values of their propositions.
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I don’t claim that the antecedents of any of those implications are true.
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Among the infinity of such systems, there inevitably is one that models the events and relations of your experience.
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There’s no reason to believe that your experience is other than that, or that this physical world is other than the setting in the “experience-story” consisting of that logical system.
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There’s no physics experiment that can establish or suggest that this physical world is other than that. As Michael Faraday pointed out in 1844, physics experiments detect and measure logical/mathematical relational structure, but don’t establish some sort of objective reality for “stuff “.
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What’s that you say? “It wouldn’t be real.”? Who said it was? I make no claim about anything in describable “reality” being real.
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If there are no intelligent minds articulating descriptions of reality, then there are no propositions

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,,,no propositions being spoken of anyway.
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But that isn’t an objection to my metaphysics, because my metaphysics is subjective idealism.
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Consciousness, the experiencer, the protagonist of the experience-story, is complementary with his/her surroundings in the story, the setting of the story. Obviously, without an experiencer, it wouldn’t be an experience-story. …so the experiencer is essential, central, fundamental and primary to the experience-story.
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But yes, there’s no justification for claiming that all of the true abstract facts would suddenly become false if all conscious beings were to somehow vanish. But, more relevantly, it’s meaningless to speak of all conscious beings vanishing, or not being, in the first place. That’s because it’s uncontroversially inevitable that there are all those experience-stories.
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(except in some abstract sense that every aspect of the world is describable, in principle).

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That depends on what you mean by “the world”. Of course it’s tautologically true if you’re referring to the describable world. I don’t claim that all of Reality is describable, or that words are universally applicable and meaningful.
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I’d said:
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"Anyway, when the "problem of evil" is stated, there's over-emphasis on this physical world and its importance. Sure, this life matters, in the sense that how we conduct ourselves in it matters.
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But this life and this world are a blip in timelessness. In fact, the long but finite sequence of lives that you're in is likewise only a blip in timelessness."

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That seems a self-defeating position. Why bother continuing to live, and to improve your life and that of your loved ones?

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What it means is that you needn’t worry about it, complain about it, or agonize about it.
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But as I said, this life is real enough in its own context. Why bother to live and improve your life and those of your loved-ones? Because what else are you in this life for? You’re in a life because, as that hypothetical protagonist of that hypothetical story, you were someone who wanted, needed, or was otherwise predisposed to a life. You possessed (or were and are)what Schopenhauer called “the will to life”. So, what else is there for you to do, but to follow through with what you wanted and what you’re here for?
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If you question the advisability of starting in a life, or a sequence of lives, then I say, “Good point! But you wanted that, and so here you are.”
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More importantly, why did God bother to put us into this hellhole (as it is for some, at least)? Did he want some maleficent amusement?

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I take it that you’re referring to the God that you believe in. Good question! Maybe it should make you doubt your belief in Fundamentalism and Biblical Literalism.
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Though I don’t debate Theism vs Atheism, I do sometimes answer questions and objections, like “the problem of evil”.
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Your objection, quoted above, is one that I answered in the post to which you were replying.
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As I said, your life-experience story consists of a complex system of uncontroversially-inevitable abstract implications, about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things. Central, primary, and fundamental to that story is you, its protagonist and experiencer.
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Don’t glibly make statements about the indescribable, as by attributing those inevitable abstract implications to God’s will or making. Don’t be so quick to blame God for your being in this life that you wanted or needed.
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Initially, you had (were) the will-to-life. Then, in the course of some of those lives, you got yourself into a snarl of want, addiction, excess and guilt, leading eventually to birth in a Land-Of-The-Lost societal world such as this one. …because it’s what you were now consistent with.
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Own up to it as your own doing.
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You wanted it, but, regardless of what this physical/societal world is like, the overall whole of what-is can’t validly be characterized, judged or evaluated by this brief life in this world (or even by this long but finite sequence of lives).
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Anyway, as I was saying, however bad this planet’s societal situation is (and it is bad), worldly incarnated-life is just a blip in timelessness. …so you’re making too much of it.
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If worldly-life is just a blip in timelessness, then what purpose is there in it? Ultimately just play, of course. But try to play fair and nice.
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You’re characterizing and evaluating the whole of what-is, based on this brief life in this particular physical world and societal world. You’re overgeneralizing.
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Michael Ossipoff

Michael Ossipoff: “I suggest that a physical world is a logical-system, consisting of abstract logical implications that just 'are'.”
Relativist: “That doesn't make any sense. Logic is an epistemological tool; it applies to propositions”
Michael Ossipoff: “No, it doesn’t make any sense in terms of Materialism.”
My statement doesn’t depend on materialism being true – e.g. minds can exist as immaterial entities without entailing logic having an ontic status. It’s undeniable that logic is an epistemological tool since it provides a means to infer propositional truths from prior truths. That fact doesn’t preclude it being something more than that, but you need to make a case for it.

Michael Ossipoff: “Uncontroversially, there are abstract facts, in the sense that we can state them or speak of them.”
100 years after the big bang, no one was around to state, speak, or contemplate any such abstract facts. Did abstract facts exist at that time? My point is that these “facts” of which you speak are merely descriptive, and reality exists with or without it actually being described. If you have a different view, then make a case for it.

Michael Ossipoff: “There’s no physics experiment that can establish or suggest that this physical world is other than that. As Michael Faraday pointed out in 1844, physics experiments detect and measure logical/mathematical relational structure, but don’t establish some sort of objective reality for “stuff “.
Physics pertains to physical relations among ontic objects, relations that are describable in mathematical terms. These physical relations do not exist independently of the objects that have them.

Michael Ossipoff:” there’s no justification for claiming that all of the true abstract facts would suddenly become false if all conscious beings were to somehow vanish.”
Relations exist as constituents of states of affairs, and we can think abstractly about these relations but that doesn’t imply the relations actually exist independent of the states of affairs in which they are actualized.

Michael Ossipoff: “What it means is that you needn’t worry about it, complain about it, or agonize about it.”
Your assertion isn’t the least persuasive, and in fact it merely seems dismissive – since you aren’t actually confronting the issues.

Michael Ossipoff: “I take it that you’re referring to the God that you believe in”
No, I’m referring to a God that is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. It seems unlikely that such a God could exist given the gratuitous suffering that exists in the world.

Michael Ossipoff: “Don’t glibly make statements about the indescribable, as by attributing those inevitable abstract implications to God’s will or making. Don’t be so quick to blame God for your being in this life that you wanted or needed.”
I don’t blame a God for anything. What I do is to draw inferences about what sort of God makes sense. Given the nature of the world: a 3-omni God doesn’t make much sense.

Michael Ossipoff: “… however bad this planet’s societal situation is (and it is bad), worldly incarnated-life is just a blip in timelessness. …so you’re making too much of it.”
It seems to me that you make too little of it. You haven’t really addressed the issue of the problem of evil, you just assert it’s not a big deal.

I do truly think that with 'free will' comes evil and with that comes sin. This is because to be able to have free will, you must have the desire or will to do that which is good and bad meaning that it is innate in the 'freeness' of your will.

This is the heart of the problem of evil. We see evil all around us, with no apparent good coming out of it. A committed Christian can always rationalize it in terms of God "having a plan" beyond our understanding, but that is a non-answer to the question of "why?" The simplest answer to the " why? " is: the Creator is indifferent or he lacks the ability to prevent it. So while I acknowledge that strong faith can provide a reason to reject the argument from evil, it doesnt satisfy those who develop doubt and seriously entertain the possibility there is no God. — Relativist

Why is that a non- answer? it satisfied the saints of old. It satisfies many Christians. Do you mean the answer does not satisfy you, or the majority? What does that have to do with anything?

"The simplest answer to the " why? " is: the Creator is indifferent or he lacks the ability to prevent it."

There is another answer: He is neither indifferent not lacks the ability to prevent it, but does it for the greater good, which no human is in a position to judge or to know all the facts to judge. This is another possibility so your list of possibilities is false.

"So while I acknowledge that strong faith can provide a reason to reject the argument from evil,"

TRUE

"it doesnt satisfy those who develop doubt and seriously entertain the possibility there is no God"

TRUE.

But remember this, in a world without suffering, a single pin-prick will be sufficient reason to doubt the existence of God, I am sure.

"We see evil all around us, with no apparent good coming out of it." — FreeEmotion

as my post above, for the evil done by man, the compensating good is free will.

For natural evil ( illness, natural disaster, etc) that is harder to identify the good, and the discussion does lead to cognitive distance. if there was a good, would we know it and recognize it as such. There is much good in the world, do we know the cause of all of it ?

I remember one argument, I cannot remember the source, that although evil exists it is not necessary that God immediately put an end to it. This seems to be reasonable.

Given the existence of God, evil is not a problem to me since God's existence and creation must contain an answer to the problem that is compatible with who God is. An assumption no less, but one that is allowable.

The greater good defense is more often argued in religious studies in response to the evidential version of the problem of evil,[35] while the free will defense is usually discussed in the context of the logical version.[36] Most scholars criticize the skeptical theism defense as "devaluing the suffering" and not addressing the premise that God is all-benevolent and should be able to stop all suffering and evil, rather than play a balancing act.[37]

I simply do not understand the validity of the argument. Given the omnipotence of God, He could create a world in which evil exists and there is a greater good created by the evil that exists. Let's just say that if He did create such a world, then the argument, the 'problem of evil' will not apply.

My statement doesn’t depend on materialism being true – e.g. minds can exist as immaterial entities without entailing logic having an ontic status.

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But you believe that there’s some (undisclosed by you) “ontic-reality” that can’t be explained by my explanation. Alright, what ontic-reality would that be? Can you verify that there is that ontic-reality?
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Whatever it is that you mean by “ontic status”, there are abstract implications, at least in the sense that we can speak of them. Other than that, I don’t claim any “ontic status” for them.
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How could something with so little “ontic status” be the basis of a physical world that (you believe) has more “ontic status” than that? But can you prove that the physical world has more ontic-status than that?
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I’ve repeatedly clarified that I make no claim about the “ontic status” or “reality” of abstract facts, or of the physical world. What I’m saying doesn’t require any of those things to be “objectively real”, whatever that would mean.
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And that’s the problem, isn’t it. You’d have to be specific about what kind of “reality” or ontic status the physical world has, and which isn’t had by the hypothetical setting of a hypothetical experience-story built of inter-referring abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things, and a mutually-consistent configuration of truth-values for those propositions.
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You’re the one advocating some undisclosed special ontic-reality or ontic-status for something (this physical world). I make no such claim about anything that can be described.
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It’s undeniable that logic is an epistemological tool since it provides a means to infer propositional truths from prior truths. That fact doesn’t preclude it being something more than that, but you need to make a case for it.

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It isn’t clear what you think I’m claiming that logic is. As I said, there are abstract implications, at least in the sense that we can speak of them. I don’t claim that they’re “more than [something]”. I don’t claim any “reality” or “ontic-status” for them. I’ve already clarified that.
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I don’t know what “ontic reality” you believe in, but I refer you to what I said above in this post.

Michael Ossipoff: “Uncontroversially, there are abstract facts, in the sense that we can state them or speak of them.”
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100 years after the big bang, no one was around to state, speak, or contemplate any such abstract facts. Did abstract facts exist at that time?

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1. Presumably you’d say that physics existed at that time. Do you think that physics doesn’t comply with logic’s abstract facts (…or with mathematics, which, itself, complies with logic). Since you’re talking about a matter of physics, it would be meaningless to say that there wasn’t physics then, in some sense. …and therefore mathematics and logic, in the same sense.
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2. All that’s irrelevant, because I make no claim about the “existence” (…whatever that would mean) of the abstract facts that there timelessly are, in the sense that we can speak of them.
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3. Don’t give me Subjectivism as an objection. I don’t claim the objective existence of our surroundings independent of us, the experiencer, the protagonist of our life-experience story. I’ve already clarified that. You’re repeating an already-answered objection. I’ve been saying that Consciousness, the experiencer, the protagonist, is primary, fundamental, and central to the logical system that I call your “life-experience possibility-story”.
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4. The big-bang, and some things about physics soon after, can be inferred from current experience, such as modern physics observations and experiments, and articles you’ve read about those observations and physicists’ conclusions from the observations. So it’s unclear what your objection is.
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My point is that these “facts” of which you speak are merely descriptive

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Abstract facts can be described, and can be used in descriptions, if that’s what you mean. I’ve said only that there are those facts, at least in the sense that we can speak of them. That’s all I claim for them. Other than that, I make no claim about their “ontic status”.
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Your objection about what they merely are, seems to be a way of saying that you believe that abstract facts would need to be something more ontologically powerful, in order to produce the objectively-existent “ontic reality” that you think that this physical world is. Is that your objection?
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If so, then my answer is that you’re the one who believes that this world possesses whatever unspecified “ontic reality” or “ontic status” you’re speaking of. I’ve made no such claim.
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Your objection is similar to what Janus said. He said that I was missing the all-important distinction between logical truth and substantive truth. I asked him what he meant by “substantive”, and he said that it means (something like) “of, about or referring to our experiences”. Well of course that’s what the hypothetical experience-story, to which I refer, is all about.
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I suggest that this life and the physical world in which it is set, are completely insubstantial—That’s another wording of my claim that there’s no reason to believe that they’re other than a hypothetical logical system.
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And yes, I’ve been saying that from the beginning of this discussion as well.
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, and reality exists with or without it actually being described.

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Of course. And that’s even true of physical reality. Even if no one said anything about it, our physical surroundings would remain.
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Verbal activity isn’t necessary to the physical world around us.
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Anyway, I don’t claim that Reality is describable, other than a [it]subset[/i] of it that we talk about.
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But what you mean is that you believe in an “ontic reality” or “ontic status” for the physical world, such that it has some sort of “objective existence” that’s more than the logical system that I’ve described. Again, I mention that you’d need to be more specific about that.
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If you have a different view, then make a case for it.

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I’ve admitted that I can’t prove that this physical world doesn’t consists of some other “ontic reality” that you believe in, existing superfluously, as an unverifiable, unfalsifiable brute-fact, alongside of, and duplicating the events and relations of, the uncontroversially-inevitable logical system that I’ve described.
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Your claim is a stronger one, that the physical world has to be more than what I’ve described. That’s a strong statement, requiring strong evidence. …starting with a better specification of what you think it is.
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You don’t seem to be able to be more specific about what that other supposed “ontic reality” is, or why it’s necessary to explain the physical world.
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All I’ve been saying is that there’s no reason to believe that the physical world is more than what I’ve said it is.
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The burden (to give that reason) is on someone who claims that there is such a reason.
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Michael Ossipoff: “There’s no physics experiment that can establish or suggest that this physical world is other than that. As Michael Faraday pointed out in 1844, physics experiments detect and measure logical/mathematical relational structure, but don’t establish some sort of objective reality for “stuff “.
Physics pertains to physical relations among ontic objects

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Physics is about logical and mathematical relational-structure. I get that you believe in some “ontic objects” that you aren’t being very specific about the nature of. You’re wanting to attribute some objective, fundamental, primary reality to the hypothetical things that that logical and mathematical relational structure is about.
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But, as I said in the passage that you quoted, Faraday pointed out that there’s no reason to believe in your objectively-existent (whatever that would mean) “stuff”.
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As I said, I get that that’s your belief. Stating it isn’t the same as supporting it.
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Faraday’s point was that there’s no physical experiment that can establish or suggest that there’s objectively-existent “stuff” (the ontic objects that you believe in), in addition to the mathematical/logical relational-structure observed by physical experiments and observation.
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Logical and mathematical relational abstract facts can refer to hypothetical things. The burden of proof is on someone who wants to claim that this physical world is other than that. …when no physics experiment can establish or suggest that it is.
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, relations that are describable in mathematical terms. These physical relations do not exist independently of the objects that have them.

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I get that that’s your belief.
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That’s an expression of your unsupported belief in the objective existence (whatever that would mean) of the objects that you believe in.
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What you’re claiming has nothing to do with verifiability or observation. It has everything to do with unsupported assertion of doctrinaire, dogmatic principle.
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And, by the way, I make no claim for the “existence” or “reality” of the abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things. I’ve already said that more than once (lots more than once).
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You could ask: How could an existent physical world result from abstract facts whose existence I don’t claim?
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Answer: I haven’t claimed “existence” for anything in the describable, assertable, arguable world.
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I’ve many times clarified that too.
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And, when you claim “objective existence” for something, the burden is on you to say exactly what you mean by “objective existence”.
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You know, that’s really crucial: You’ve got to define your terms, and you’ve got to clarify exactly what it is that you’re claiming.
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Michael Ossipoff:” there’s no justification for claiming that all of the true abstract facts would suddenly become false if all conscious beings were to somehow vanish.”
Relations exist as constituents of states of affairs

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So far, so good, That’s consistent with a definition of “fact”.
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, and we can think abstractly about these relations but that doesn’t imply the relations actually exist independent of the states of affairs in which they are actualized.

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Of course. Facts are often defined as relations between things. …as well as states-of-affairs, or aspects of how things are.
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You said that we can speak abstractly about relations (…and, I’d add, about abstract facts too). That’s the only sense in which I say that there are abstract facts.
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But it’s meaningless to speak of all the conscious beings vanishing (or not being there in the first place), because every life-experience story is inevitably there. The conscious beings and their surroundings (and the abstract facts that are apparent to humans) are mutually complementary in that hypothetical logical system.
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So it would be meaningless to speculate about whether there’d be those abstract facts if there were no beings to whom for them to be apparent. The beings, their surroundings, and the abstract facts (apparent to such beings as humans), are mutually complementary—in a completely hypothetical inevitable system of logical relation.
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In a meaningful sense, from your point of view (…and what other point of view do you have?) it’s all there for and because of you.
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You ask why did you bother dreaming up all this..why are you living this hypothetical story? Because it was inevitable that there’s someone like you, in that inevitable infinity of hypothetical experience-stories with their complementary protagonists.
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How could it be otherwise?
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Michael Ossipoff: “What it means is that you needn’t worry about it, complain about it, or agonize about it.”
Your assertion isn’t the least persuasive, and in fact it merely seems dismissive – since you aren’t actually confronting the issues.

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I confronted the “problem of evil” by pointing out that the evil societal world to which you refer is only one of infinitely-many hypothetical possibility-worlds, which are settings for infinitely-many life-experience-stories.
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This world is the setting for a temporary life. And, if there are, additionally, a long but finite sequence of lives, then even that, too, is temporary.
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As I said, all that is a blip in timelessness.
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I also emphasized your own role in your birth in this world. I agree that your notion doesn’t make sense—your notion of a God who is responsible for this world or your birth in it.
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By speaking of this life and this physical world as all that there is, you’re greatly exaggerating it. ….unnecessarily fabricating something big and bad.
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I’ve been talking about the complete insubstantiality of what describably is.
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Nisargadatta had a good point when he said that, from the point of view of the sages, nothing has ever happened.
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So don’t worry so much about it.
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Yes, this societal world is bad. No, there’s nothing that we can do about that. And no, it isn’t everything.
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That isn’t un-supported dismissiveness.
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Michael Ossipoff: “I take it that you’re referring to the God that you believe in”
No, I’m referring to a God that is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent.

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Right..the one that is your one-true-God to disbelieve-in.
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Alright, I take back my statement that you believe in that God
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It seems unlikely that such a God could exist given the gratuitous suffering that exists in the world.

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You’re right to doubt that your notion of God corresponds to a God that there is.
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(A definitional quibble: Some people (and I agree with them) reserve “exist” for the things of the describable realm.)
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Michael Ossipoff: “Don’t glibly make statements about the indescribable, as by attributing those inevitable abstract implications to God’s will or making. Don’t be so quick to blame God for your being in this life that you wanted or needed.”
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I don’t blame a God for anything. What I do is to draw inferences about what sort of God makes sense. Given the nature of the world: a 3-omni God doesn’t make much sense.

I don’t claim that your notion of God makes sense.
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Your notion of “omnipotence” includes a notion that God is responsible for this world and your birth in it. That’s the objectionable part of your notion of a 3-omni God.
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“…the nature of the world”? I presume that you’re referring to this societal world. It’s at least as bad as you think it is.
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But, when Western philosophers refer to “The World”, they’re referring to Reality. They’re referring to all that is. I suggest that the whole of what is, is good. I don’t assert that or argue it, or claim to be able to prove it to you. It isn’t that kind of a topic.
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But, here’s a bit of evidence (There can be evidence even on unprovable matters):
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I’ve been saying that there’s no reason to believe that what describably is, isn’t completely insubstantial. That implies an open-ness, a lightness, of the describable realm, and of life in it.
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I’ve spoken about the arguable and supportable temporariness of this life (or finite sequence of lives). …as a temporary blip on timelessness.
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Michael Ossipoff: “… however bad this planet’s societal situation is (and it is bad), worldly incarnated-life is just a blip in timelessness. …so you’re making too much of it.”
It seems to me that you make too little of it.

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I agree that it’s real in its own context, and that, obviously, while we’re here, it matters what we do. We can make things worse for ourselves, in this life, and in this sequence of lives, if we want to.
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Obviously there’s no need to make it bad for ourselves. And, while in it, we might as well be easy on ourselves enough to like it. I make that much of it.
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You haven’t really addressed the issue of the problem of evil

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I claim that I have.
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1. This life (or finite sequence of them) is a temporary blip in timelessness.
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2. I’ve suggested (but not proved, because there’s no such thing as proof in these matters) an open-ness and lightness implied by the insubstantiality of the describable world, which includes our lives.
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3. As implied or suggested by the above points (but if you don’t think so, I can’t prove you’re wrong), I suggest that the whole of what is looks good instead of bad. …which I emphasize is a subjective matter of opinion, an impression, and not a matter for assertion, argument or proof. …because assertion, argument and proof have nothing to do with such matters.
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4. I’ve suggested that words can’t describe Reality. That includes pessimistic words. That undermines any pessimistic words purported to describe the whole of what-is.
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5. You seem to want to imply that God must be the omniponent God that you speak of, who is responsible for this world and your birth in it. but that’s an unsupported claim, and a fallacy that the “problem of evil” argument depends on.
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I don’t participate in the arguments about Theism vs Atheism, but the “problem of evil” argument made by Atheists doesn’t hold up.
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, you just assert it’s [referring to the “problem of evil”] not a big deal.

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I’ve told why it isn’t as big a deal as you think it is.
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Michael Ossipoff