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revocation

January 30, 2012

As reported in the previous post, the Knesset’s Constitution, Statute and Law Committee met on January 22 to discuss the bill to enable 18-month publication of Israel patent applications. Reports from someone in attendance (sadly, yours truly couldn’t be there, although that didn’t stop the official minutes from stating that I was in attendance) were that progress continued to be slow, with discussion focusing on what information and documents would become publicly available at 18 months and how that information would be accessible – would the entire file history become available online, as in the USA and Europe, or would only certain pieces of information be available online, with persons interested in the contents of the files needing to either come to the ILPTO to inspect the files or ordering copies of their contents?

However, the most entertaining (or, depending on your point of view, sad) part was apparently one trade group’s approach backfiring with respect to the question of third party submissions. In particular, while the wording of the draft legislation isn’t absolutely clear about what kinds of communications third parties would be allowed to have with examiners concerning pending applications, the Justice Ministry’s view is that the amendment would permit third parties to bring to the attention of examiners information that the applicant already had an obligation to disclose, without additional comments from the third party itself.

According to both the minutes and eyewitness account, the issue was brought up by one of the trade groups opposed to broad third-party involvement, despite the fact that the proceedings had not yet reached the point of discussing this issue. Not only did this this approach fail to convince the committee chairman of the correctness of the narrow-involvement position, but it actually piqued the chairman’s interest in allowing broader third-party submissions, while effectively precluding the Justice Ministry from arguing the case for narrow involvement. The issue has not yet been settled, but it seems that in this case, the group’s hired guns scored what the British would call an own goal (or, in Yankee-speak, shot themselves in the foot).

According to the committee’s web page, the committee is scheduled to resume its deliberations on this bill on February 13 and 26.

January 22, 2012

A few minutes from now, the Knesset’s Constitution, Statute and Law Committee will continue its consideration of the bill to enable 18-month publication of patent applications. The Committee’s first hearing on this bill took place on December 7, and consisted primarily of grandiose, grandstanding statements by socialist-leaning members of Knesset (who generally made statements about “social justice” which weren’t germane to the issue of 18-month publication) and lawyers for innovator and generic pharmaceutical companies (who also included irrelevant statements), although there were also a few statements from ostensibly neutral people, viz. representatives of the Israel Bar Association (an organization to which all lawyers in Israel must belong) and a volunteer group called the Association of Patent Attorneys in Israel. A colleague who works in-house for the local branch of a global innovator drug company characterized the proceedings as “surreal”.

Very little headway on the substantive provisions was made at the first meeting; presumably such headway will be made today, accompanied by fireworks as the local generic drug industry (which has been lobbying heavily to amend this bill so as to strip the statute of teeth) attempts to impose its will. If the past is any indication, no other industries or even individuals are interested in the goings-on regarding this bill, which is a shame, since, as a law school professor of mine put it, politics is played by those who show up.

A fuller accounting of the bill and the proceedings will follow in future post. However, there is one subtle aspect in which the December 7 proceedings were more surreal than my colleague may have appreciated. That has to with the way in which Supreme Court decisions are used in political discourse in Israel. Specifically, it’s not unusual for politicians to point to statements by the Israel Supreme Court as providing moral grounding for their proposals. (Perhaps in a future post I’ll go into what I see as the sociology of this phenomenon, but in a nutshell it related in part to the fact that the same court sits as the land’s highest appellate court as well as a court of first instance in certain administrative or constitutional law proceedings.) This was certainly the case at the December 7 hearings, in which several of the speakers pointed to statements by the ILSC regarding the need to balance incentives to innovate with the public’s need for cheap drugs.

What I found ironic was that one of the recent Supreme Court cases that contains language to similar effect (Unipharm v Smithkline Beecham, Civil Appeal No. 8802/06) itself support its position by quoting an earlier Supreme Court decision (Civil Appeal By Leave 5768/94, the so-called “AShIR decision”) that the present bill seeks to overturn. AShIR is a 1998 decision in which, under a theory of unjust enrichment based in Israel’s Unjust Enrichment statute, the Court recognized intellectual property rights in certain manufactured goods for which statutory IP rights (patent or design) were not available, either because the manufacturers did not seek such rights, such rights had been obtained but expired, or the items were already known and therefore not susceptible of patent or design protection. The bill currently under consideration would preclude suits such as AShIR from being brought again in the future.

If you’re going to quote someone in support of your position, you probably shouldn’t simultaneously be trying to undermine that person with the very legislation for which you seek support. But memories in the Knesset don’t seem to be very persistent.

December 04, 2011

The previous post analyzed the bill for 18-month publication that will be discussed in committee at the Knesset on December 7, and explained how one of the provisions in the bill, which would enable third-party comments on pending application, is problematic. One point I didn’t mention is that in the USA, third parties are statutorily barred from communicating with the USPTO about pending applications. See MPEP 1134 and 1134.01.

The inclusion in the bill of a provision explicitly allowing third party comments on pending applications, while maintaining pre-grant oppositions, is consistent with behind-the-scenes lobbying by the local generic drug industry. But it may just be the tip of iceberg: rumor has it that that industry wants to use the 18-month publication bill to make a host of other changes in local practice, all of which would work to the detriment of patent applicants – i.e., those parties that actually invent things, instead of free-riding on others’ investments, which is the generics’ modus operandi. The changes would adversely affect not only the innovator pharma companies that develop new life-saving medicines, but patent applicants in all fields of endeavor. [Update: the relevant Knesset Committee's web site now contains a marked-up version of the bill, including comments from the committee's legal advisor regarding the generics' wish list.]

Specifically, the generics want to (a) preclude applicants from amending their applications once those applications have published; (b) be granted rights to practice inventions that are disclosed but not claimed in the published application, and only claimed after publication (and eventually granted in the patent); and (c) be able to force early examination of others’ patent applications. I will discuss each of these in turn.

No Amendment After Publication: as discussed in an earlier post, the draft version of the bill included such an amendment, but it was removed in the bill that passed a first reading in the Knesset. To anyone who has ever engaged in patent drafting and/or prosecution, the idea that one should be precluded from amending one’s claims during prosecution is ludicrous. If you’re a reader who doesn’t fall into that category – and unfortunately, no members of Knesset, to the best of my knowledge, have ever applied for a patent, which is why the generics can try to get away with something like this – I’ll try to explain.

The patent system is meant to encourage innovation, but even when an inventor has perfect knowledge and is a soothsayer, a patent is one of the most difficult legal documents to draft properly. Not only does the invention itself have to meet the substantive requirements that it be useful, novel and non-obvious, but the patent application must meet the procedural requirement of enabling others in the field of endeavor to practice the invention. The application has to provide support for whatever is eventually claimed. And the application is frozen in time, as the addition of new matter is after filing is prohibited. In short, the deck is stacked against the applicant from the outset – here in Israel even more so than elsewhere, due to the existence of pre-grant oppositions.

And because inventors do not have perfect knowledge and are not oracles, drafting a patent application is a lot like driving down the highway with a blindfold on: you may have some idea where you want to go but you don’t what curves lie ahead. Usually, at the time a company has to file a patent application, it has incomplete information regarding what the marketplace will look or what embodiments of the invention it plans to commercialize. Often, the applicant does not have in hand all the data it needs to establish why its invention is non-obvious in view of the prior art. Or it may have tried its best to find relevant prior art but still missed something. And budgetary limitations may cause an applicant to restrict the number of claims it initially includes in its patent application, either because of constraints on attorney time or because of fees for excess claims (such as Israel’s imposition two years ago of a 500 shekel fee for each claim over 50).

So the applicant does its best to prepare and file a patent application that describes as many aspects and variations of its invention that it can, while excluding from the scope of the invention the prior art of which the applicant is aware. But the applicant may (and usually does) nevertheless find it necessary to amend its claims after filing, for example in order to overcome previously unknown prior art found by the examiner, or to better claim an embodiment that in view of clinical test results or market research obtained after filing appears more likely to be the commercial embodiment than the one that was considered the most likely commercial embodiment when the application was filed.

To prevent an applicant from amending claims once the application has been published is the epitome of putting form over substance. In most cases, such a stricture would deprive patent applicants of the ability to obtain meaningful protection for their inventions. In some cases, it would result in inventions being maintained as trade secrets, rather than risk disclosing the invention only to be denied commercially meaningful patent claims due to formal strictures on claim amendments. And in the case of medicines, the inability to amend claims would undoubtedly lead to potentially useful medicines never being developed, because without adequate patent protection, no one will invest the hundreds of millions of dollars necessary to obtain FDA or EMA approval.

Intervening Rights: if they don’t succeed in preventing claim amendments, the generic manufacturers want the right to practice any invention that is disclosed but unclaimed in the published patent application, should the unclaimed material eventually be claimed in the patent. That would apparently work in two ways:

(a) Suppose that I file a patent application disclosing an invention that contains elements A, B and C, and optionally D and E. My published claims recite ABCD. If the generic drug companies have their way, a competitor will be able to begin work on ABC, since I haven’t claimed it. When I then broaden my claims during prosecution, so that my issued patent includes a claim on ABC, my competitor will still be free to practice ABC, even if my claim on ABC is valid.

(b) Conversely, the competitor starts to work on ABCDE. During prosecution I amend the claims so that the patent issues with claims on ABCD and ABCDE. I sue for infringement. It’s found that ABCD is invalid over the prior art, but ABCDE is valid. I still lose: since ABCDE wasn’t among my originally published claims, my competitor now has an intervening right to practice ABCD.

Like the proposal to limit claim amendments, this proposal would put form over substance, punishing an inventor for a set of claims that he didn’t realize at the time claimed more or less than he was entitled to claim. Creating intervening rights based on published patent applications would undermine the public policy behind the patent system, which says that an inventor is entitled to a patent on anything useful, new and non-obvious that he’s invented and adequately described in his patent application.

The generic companies apparently assert that they need these intervening rights because otherwise they’ll be stuck on the sidelines, waiting to see what claims the application eventually gets. But that’s specious. Aside from the stupidity inherent in making patent policy for everyone based on the interests of one narrowly-focused industry – and in Israel’s case, an industry that is based entirely on the idea of reaping the rewards of others’ efforts – the fact (to which any veteran patent attorney can attest) is that third parties, including generic drug companies, can make reasonable determinations as to what valid claims can and can’t arise from a particular patent application. But don’t take my word for it. As Unipharm, one of the local generic companies, proudly says on its web site:

“In the current pharmaceutical-IP environment where major pharmaceutical companies are protecting their product with multiple patents, Unipharm has the capabilities of accurately evaluating a product's patent protection suit [sic] and to act accordingly: either to stay off the market until the patents expire, to try to go around the still valid patents or to try to invalidate the patent and launch a generic version as soon as legally possible.”

The world’s leading patent systems allow an applicant to amend his claims during prosecution to include anything supported by the specification, whether or not that claim was present in the application as originally filed or published. They recognize that allowing such amendment is imperative if the patent system is to serve the ends to which it was created, and that there’s no good public policy reason to restrict an inventor’s protection to that which he claimed in a published application. There’s no reason for Israel to deviate from this. Unless it wants to be in the same category as such invention powerhouses as Venezuela.

Third Party Requesting of Examination: The generics also want to amend the law to allow third party requests for expedited examination of others’ patent applications. In U.S. terms, they want to be able to file requests to make special in others’ patent applications. Their argument is that the indeterminacy inherent in the delay between publication and patent grant leaves them in an untenable legal limbo, and that the big, bad innovative drug companies game the system, using multiple patent filings and prolongation of ex parte patent prosecution to keep a sword hanging over the generics’ heads.

Now, I’m the first to agree that in an ideal world, inventors would at the outset be able to conceive of the exact commercial embodiments of their inventions. They’d be able to write perfect patent applications that describe and claim exactly the inventions to which they’re entitled over the prior art – not an inch more and not an inch less. The day that patent applications were filed, they would immediately be allowed, because there would be no backlogs at any of the world’s patent offices. Competitors would know exactly what they can and can’t do in view of the immediately-granted patent, because there would be no ambiguity in any claim language.

And if pigs had wings they could fly.

In other words, the generics’ tale is a good yarn, but it doesn’t stand up to scrutiny. Ours is not an ideal world. Patent applications are rarely perfectly written, and they’re never examined on the day they’re filed. Inventors and their associated small businesses usually need time and money to develop and commercialize their inventions, but they have to file patent applications before they can seek funds. In the pharmaceutical industry, patent applications have to be filed years before clinical testing begins, let alone a new drug is approved for use, and this is true regardless of whether the company is one of the industry giants or a start-up.

In short, both patent applicants and their competitors are inconvenienced by the fact that the patent system is designed and operated by people, not omniscient beings. But that’s life. What entitles generic drug companies to now receive special treatment so that they won’t be inconvenienced? Indeed, as shown by the quote from Unipharm’s web site, they’re not really inconvenienced, since they can assess what claims their competitors can validly obtain and what claims they can’t.

Moreover, Israel is a country in which private property is respected. We don’t allow one individual to tell another how and when to spend his money. But that’s just what the generic companies’ proposal would do: since patent prosecution involves an expenditure of an applicant’s resources, the proposal would allow party A to force B into spending his resources, at A’s convenience.

In fact, inventors often rely on the fact that there will be a delay between filing and examination of patent applications: as mentioned above, the post-filing, pre-examination period provides additional time to develop results demonstrating non-obviousness or to hone in on a commercially significant embodiment of the invention.

To illustrate how ridiculous, and how self-serving, the third party request proposal is, let’s look at some numbers. According to ILPTO database, in 2007 and 2008 respectively, Pfizer filed 104 and 62 patent applications in Israel; Eli Lilly’s figures for the same years were 49 and 37, respectively. (The numbers are significantly lower, and likely incomplete, for 2009 and 2010.) Now suppose that the fee for filing a third-party request is set at 1500 shekels (presently about $400), which is a relatively high fee by ILPTO standards – it’s higher than the patent filing fee as well as the fees for opposing or seeking to revoke a patent. What’s to stop one of the local generic drug companies from filing such a request against every application filed by a particular innovator drug company? According to these numbers, even in a year with lots of patent filings, it would only take about $60,000 to force early examination of every Pfizer and every Lilly application. Moreover, were all the generics band together, they would easily have the resources to force early examination of every patent application filed by an innovator company. But those companies will certainly have prioritized their research efforts differently, and no doubt are relying in part on the natural delay in the examination queue to develop results necessary to either support some of those applications or to allow them to decide to discontinue prosecution.

There’s also the problem that by forcing the unnatural allocation of examination resources on a large scale toward the applications of certain large companies, the examination corps will spend most of its time examining those companies’ applications, at the expense of examination of the applications of smaller companies (who are not yet known and won’t necessarily attract others’ attention) for whom patent grants are critical in securing funding.

Bad Ideas From Self-Serving Players: As I’ve said previously in this blog, I’m a fan of generic drugs. But I’m also a fan of new drug development. And I’m a fan of the development of new technology generally. Those new developments rely on patents. The proposals put forward by the generic drug industry and discussed in this and the previous post are the sorts of things that could only be raised by parties that don’t rely on patents for their livelihoods. Which should come as no surprise, since according to the ILPTO database, those generic drug companies whose primary or exclusive business base is Israel have negligible patent portfolios. For instance, according to the database, in its 36 years of existence Unipharm has filed four patent applications. Two of those were abandoned during prosecution and one of the granted ones was abandoned before its 20-year term. Another company, Trima, has in its nearly 50-year history filed one application.

The generics’ proposals are hyprocritical and self-serving. For years these companies have been whining because Israel doesn’t have early publication of patent applications. Now that the state seems poised to adopt early publication, the generics say they’ll somehow prejudiced because they don’t know what claims will issue, and therefore applicants should be limited in their ability to amend, and the generics should get intervening rights based on the published application, and they should be able to request that someone else’s application be examined out of turn.

The EPO has been doing early publication since its inception, yet the EPO neither precludes applicants from broadening their claims, nor grants intervening rights to third parties on the basis of the published application (although some EPO countries do grant provisional rights to the applicant based on the published application), nor allows third parties to request examination of a competitor’s patent application. The USA has been publishing applications for over 10 years now, it lets applicant broaden claims during prosecution, it doesn't grant intervening rights on the basis of the non-claimed material in published applications, and it doesn’t let third parties even communicate about pending applications, let alone request examination of another’s application.

The Israeli generic drug companies have thrived under the present patent regime. They have nothing to complain about. They don’t need 18-month publication, nor do they need any of the additional changes they would now to like to see wrought in the system. If the generics don’t like the idea of early publication, they should lobby against it. But it’s disingenuous for them to lobby for early publication, then argue that they will somehow be prejudiced by the very thing they asked for, and to demand additional entitlements. What did they do to deserve such a windfall? These proposals are greed, pure and simple, that will serve no one but the generic companies themselves, at the expense of all the others (including players far afield from the pharmaceutical industry) who do the hard work of inventing and developing new technologies.

March 14, 2010

For people who observe both the US and Israeli legal scenes, one striking difference between the two is the emphasis placed on judicial procedure.Put coarsely, the USA places more emphasis on procedure than does Israel.While this difference is most visibly reflected in the courtroom itself – from where I sit, it appears that US judges are more likely than their Israeli counterparts to enter default judgments or base other ruling on purely procedural grounds – it shows up elsewhere as well.For example, civil procedure is deemed sufficiently important in US law that US law schools teach civil procedure as a year-long, required first-year course.In contrast, in Israel civ pro is taught as a one-semester course, in the in the last semester of law school – almost as an afterthought.

Three recent decisions, two from the ILPTO, one from a US court, reminded me of this difference in emphases as it plays out in the patent sphere.The US case was the Federal Circuit’s December 22, 2009 decision in i4i vs Microsoft, which was reissued by the panel on March 10, 2010.In that case, a feature in Microsoft Word was alleged to infringe i4i’s patent.The feature at issue in Microsoft’s program was a minor one that relatively few users utilize - and that Microsoft was ultimately readily able to re-tool to be non-infringing.Microsoft was found by jury verdict in the district court to have infringed i4i’s patent, was ordered to pay close to $300 million in damages, and was enjoined from selling versions of MS Word that contained the infringing software.

Before the case went to the jury, Microsoft motioned for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) – a request that the court decide the issue right then and there on the basis of the facts as developed – on the grounds that the patent was invalid due prior sale of the invention.However, Microsoft did not move for JMOL on the basis of obviousness.

After the verdict, Microsoft appealed to the CAFC, in part on the grounds that the patent was obvious over the prior art and that the jury had erred in determining otherwise.The CAFC ignored this part of Microsoft’s invalidity challenge on grounds that because of a procedural failure on the part of Microsoft, namely Microsoft’s failure to motion for JMOL for obviousness before the case went to the jury, the CAFC could not review the jury’s findings on obviousness:

“Microsoft has waived its right to challenge the factual findings underlying the jury’s implicit obviousness verdict because it did not file a pre-verdict JMOL on obviousness for the Rita, DeRose and Kugimiya references. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a), (b)…Microsoft’s pre-verdict JMOL on anticipation, based on S4, was insufficient to preserve its right to post-verdict JMOL on a different theory (obviousness), or on different prior art (Rita, DeRose, Kugimiya) … Accordingly, we do not consider whether the evidence presented at trial was legally sufficient to support the jury’s verdict.Our review is limited to determining whether the district court’s legal conclusion of nonobviousness was correct, based on the presumed factual findings.”

A cynic could read that as the CAFC politely saying, “We don’t care if the patent is valid or not, and we don’t care about the size of the award.Procedurally, your lawyers goofed by failing to preserve your right to JMOL, and if that costs you, so be it.”Personally I’d characterize the CAFC’s approach a bit more generously: courts have heavy caseloads, and the procedural rules are there to protect the integrity of the process and the efficiency of the system for all litigants, so the procedural rules matter, and litigants choose to flaunt those rules at their own peril.

Contrast that decision with the ILPTO’s decisions in opposition proceedings against patent applications nos. 120382 and 151450, and in a revocation action against Israel Patent No. 168574, where the amounts of money at stake weren’t anywhere close to the $300 million of the i4i case.(Copies of the decisions can be downloaded here 120382, 151450 and here 168574; due to a mistake on the ILPTO’s web site, no decisions regarding patents from 2009 are presently downloadable there.)Patent revocation actions in Israel (also sometimes called cancellation actions) are sort of like inter partes reexaminations in the USA, but with teeth: both are conducted before the respective patent offices, but unlike so-called US inter partes reexam, Israel revocations proceedings really areinter partes.Ditto for opposition proceedings, except that Israel oppositions are conducted pre-grant.In both types of actions, both sides participate fully throughout, with submission of written direct testimony and cross-examination of witnesses.

A word about the procedure in both types of proceedings.Opposition proceedings commence with the filing of a notice of opposition (and payment of a fee, of course), which must be filed within three months of publication of the acceptance of the application by the ILPTO.The opposer then has a month to file its pleadings, and the applicant has three months to file its pleadings in response.The opposer then has three months to file its written evidence-in-chief; the applicant then has three months to file its written evidence in reply.The opposer then has three months to file supplemental evidence to rebut points made in the applicant’s evidence.Thereafter there’s a hearing at which the parties cross-examine each other’s witnesses, followed by written summations.

Revocation proceedings follow a similar trajectory, except that in accordance with Regulation 103(a), the party seeking revocation must come out with all guns blazing: the request to revoke the patent must be accompanied not only by the required fee but by the requestor’s pleadings and written evidence.Thereafter the proceedings are akin to those of an opposition.The logic behind requiring revocation requestors, but not opposers, to file everything at once would seem to be that whereas the opposer only gets to look at the application file upon publication (as explained here), and therefore may require more time to get its pleadings and evidence in order, the revocation requestor has had time to evaluate the patent and marshall its forces for attacking the patent.Therefore, for the sake of efficiency, the requestor has to lay all its cards on the table from the get-go.

In both opposition and revocation proceedings, the pleadings (referred to in the regulations as the “statement of arguments”) are supposed to “specify the grounds for the opposition [or revocation]” and “the facts upon which the opposer’s [or requestor’s] pleadings are based”.In the oppositions to Wyeth’s patent applications nos. 120382 and 151450 (a parent and its divisional), the opposer filed pleadings that evidently included a statement of the prior publications upon which it planned to rely, and then, after the applicant had filed its pleadings, motioned to file written evidence that relied upon additional publications not mentioned in the opposer’s own pleadings.(I say “evidently” because, as discussed in an earlier post, the ILPTO’s online database doesn’t include file histories or papers filed in oppositions, so my knowledge of what transpired here comes from the ILPTO’s decision itself.)The applicant opposed the motion, not per se on grounds that the new publications should have been mentioned in the pleadings, but on the related grounds that the applicant would be prejudiced by this late inclusion, and that in any event, since the publications weren’t mentioned earlier, the request for their late inclusion should have been supported by an affidavit.

The adjudicator deciding the case agreed that, as set forth in the relevant regulations, publications impacting the patentability of the invention upon which an opposer plans to rely should be mentioned in the pleadings.Consequently, in order to rely on previously unmentioned publications, the opposer should have filed a motion to amend its pleadings, explaining why such late inclusion was necessary and including an affidavit in support of the motion.Such motions, wrote the adjudicator, are not granted as a matter of course, as it is the exchange of pleadings that establishes the scope of the disagreement between the parties.Consequently, allowing an opposer to amend its pleadings after the applicant has filed its own pleadings could be prejudicial to the applicant.

Furthermore, said the adjudicator, the “purity of the patents register” – a phrase commonly invoked by opposers when seeking late introduction of evidence, used by opposers to imply that having an invalid patent on the register would constitute a crime against humanity, and therefore it is imperative that the ILPTO allow that evidence into the record – was not per se reason to allow amendment of the opposer’s pleadings.The adjudicator even went so far as to say, “As explained supra, there is great importance in the procedural rules pertaining to the deadlines for the submission of the parties’ pleadings and their content, as these establish the bounds of the disagreement between the parties…In view of the foregoing, I must deny the opposer’s motion.”

So far, this doesn’t sound different from the US approach.But then, if you’re a champion of procedure, the adjudicator inexplicably snatched defeat from the jaws of victory:

“Nevertheless, since the opposer has repeatedly asserted that there is nothing in the prior publications it now seeks to introduce to expand the scope of the disagreement, and in view of the particular circumstances before me, I accede to the request to allow the opposer’s declarant to rely on publications that were not listed in the pleadings and appended to his declaration, provided that they will be insufficient to tip the scales in the decision in the opposition proper.For this purpose, I do not find it necessary to order the opposer to submit a declaration in support of its motion.” [emphasis in the original]

Talk about paying lip service to procedure.The adjudicator didn’t explain how the “particular circumstances” here warranted treatment that deviated from the procedures established by the regulations.And what does it mean that the publications will only be allowed in as long as they’re “insufficient to tip the scales in the decision in the opposition proper”?If those publications prove critical to the opposer’s case, will the adjudicator really be capable of ignoring the additional publications when deciding the matter?

As to the revocation proceedings, IL 168574 was granted in March 2006.The request to revoke the patent was filed in February 2009, without any evidence in support of the request.In April 2009 the patentee asked for summary judgment in view of the lack of evidence supporting the revocation request.Apparently the SJ request was denied, as the patentee filed its response (including evidence) in July 2009 (presumably after having been granted an extension to file), and in October 2009 the requestor filed (a) evidence in reply, (b) with additional pleadings, and (c) a declaration that was intended to serve as evidence-in-chief – i.e. a declaration that should have been filed with the revocation request itself some eight months earlier.

The patentee objected to both the filing of the supplemental pleadings, as well as the late filing of the evidence-in-chief, and motioned that both documents be stricken from the record.The ILPTO adjudicator did not hesitate in acceding to the motion regarding the supplemental pleadings: the regulations don’t provide for a requestor to file supplemental pleadings as a matter of right, only supplemental evidence, and the requestor didn’t ask for leave to file the supplemental pleadings.Hence the supplemental pleadings were out.Score one for procedure.

The late-filed evidence-in-chief should have received the same treatment, a fact admitted to by the adjudicator herself: not only did the requestor fail to file evidence-in-chief with her revocation request, per the statute and regulations, but she didn’t even seek to file such evidence when responding to the motion for summary judgment for lack of requestor’s evidence.As the adjudicator wrote,

“I find the requestor’s behavior deficient.Once the date for submission of her declaration was set, it was not up to her to take the law into her own hands, to not timely file the declaration, and then late in the proceedings to request an extension to file the declaration.”

At this point it sounds like the requestor is about to get tossed out on her ear – as according to the regulations she should have been.But, continued the adjudicator,

“Nevertheless, under the circumstances, I believe the request [to file the declaration late] should be granted, and the requestor shouldn’t be denied her day in court just because failed to follow the procedural rules.”

The adjudicator then cited two cases that purportedly supported the proposition that deviation from procedurals rules is ok.However, the adjudicator conveniently ignored that one of the two cases was a district court case, and therefore of no precedential value; and she also ignored that the other case, a Supreme Court case, was distinguishable, inter alia on grounds that in that case, it was the respondant, not the movant, who was late in filing his declaration, and he missed the deadline by only a week, not eight months.In other words, in that case, neither party was really prejudiced by the grant of the extension.

But the adjudicator’s real reason for not tossing out the requestor’s declaration was that the requestor was acting pro se.“This is not to say that a different law applies to pro se litigants”, said the adjudicator, but, “Nevertheless, I believe that when the situation warrants it, a certain amount of flexibility in the application of procedural rules is called for when dealing with procedural mistakes by pro se litigants”.To the extent the other side is prejudiced by the pro se litigant’s behavior, said the adjudicator, that can be compensated for in the award of costs at the end of the proceedings.

Seems like the adjudicator may as well have written, “A different law doesn’t apply to pro se litigants…except when it does”.By giving the requestor in this case the opportunity to file evidence-in-chief after the patentee had already filed its pleadings and evidence, she turned the entire revocation procedure on its head.But hey, it’s only procedure, right?Those procedural rules probably appeared out of thin air.It’s not like there was any thought that went into them, right?

Curiously, in anotherpro se litigant case, an ex parte matter concerning several design applications, the same adjudicator took a strict view with regard to the pro se party.But that’s a case for a different post.