09TBILISI1158, GEORGIAN THOUGHTS ON ARMENIAN/TURKISH RAPPROCHEMENT

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 001158
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2019
TAGS: PRELPGOVAZTUGG
SUBJECT: GEORGIAN THOUGHTS ON ARMENIAN/TURKISH RAPPROCHEMENT
REF: TBILISI 1094
Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary and Comment: Representatives of the Georgian
government, parliament, and academia have a wide range of
opinions about recent improvements in the bilateral
relationship between Armenia and Turkey. Even within the
Georgian government, an incomplete and contradictory picture
arises, with some in favor of improved relations, some
concerned and some seeing a sinister Russian angle to it.
The MFA was positive about the prospects for Georgia and the
region with an increasing detente between the Armenians and
Turks; officials from the NSC provided contradictory opinions
on the matter; and academics speculated about the potential
for Russian exploitation of the situation and losses of
revenue for Georgian businesses. The Prime Minister said
that he welcomes any efforts that will help resolve conflicts
in the Caucasus, but expressed concern that doing so without
a role for Azerbaijan could hurt more then help. He added
that he does not think the Georgian economy will be
significantly impacted if borders are reopened between Turkey
and Armenia. The majority of interlocutors in Tbilisi appear
to be taking a wait-and-see approach to the issue, expressing
concerns about Russian influence and possible economic loss
but eager to see more stability in the region. End Summary
and Comment.
A Positive View From MFA
¶2. (C) Deputy Director of MFA's Political Department Temur
Kekelidze said improving relations between Turkey and
Armenia, including the possibility of an open border
crossing, were viewed "quite positively" by the MFA. The
Ministry seems to believe that better relations with Turkey
could allow Armenia to move itself away from Russian
dependence, and reduce the "dominance" of the Kremlin on
politics in Yerevan. Given Turkey's membership in NATO, this
improvement in the bilateral relationship could result in
future Armenian policies that move it towards the west and an
improved relationship with Tbilisi. Commenting on the impact
to the Caucasus as a whole, Kekelidze said that the move
could help Armenia and Azerbaijan discuss the thorny issue of
Nagorno-Karabakh, and would also positively impact relations
between all three countries in the Caucasus.
¶3. (C) Deputy Director of MFA's European Department Kakha
Chitaia provided a lengthy but interesting viewpoint on the
situation. While stressing that he was "Armenia's best
friend" in the Georgian MFA, he emphasized his belief that
there was little if any chance of Russian influence
increasing due to a new border crossing between Armenia and
Turkey. He went as far as to say that it was more likely
Russia would be a net loser, as Turkey would increase its
influence at the expense of Russian influence in the
Caucasus. His primary concern focused firmly on Azerbaijan,
as he believes Azerbaijan will try to derail efforts to reach
agreement. Ultimately the Turks need Azerbaijan more than
Armenia; this would ensure that Turkish policy would
seriously consider Azeri opinions on the matter. Chitaia
felt the impact on Georgia would be minimal, primarily due to
his conviction that nothing would change the situation in the
near term, and that Turkey is pushing the issue because of
its EU aspirations and hopes for improving its international
image.
NSC Not Quite Sure Yet
QNSC Not Quite Sure Yet
¶4. (C) Deputy Secretary for Georgia's National Security
Council Irakli Porchkhidze took a less favorable tone towards
detente, highlighting his concern that Russia could use this
opening as a way to increase its influence in Armenia and
further push Yerevan from Georgia. He noted that Georgia's
role as a transit hub would be reduced. NSC Director of the
Analytical Department Lasha Darsalia struck a more
even-handed tone, noting first that improved relations
between Yerevan and Ankara would undoubtedly increase
stability in the south Caucasus, which would be good for all
involved. Second, Darsalia contradicted Porchkhidze and
stressed a healthy and constructive economic relationship
would reduce the need in Armenia for Russian support, and
continue to move the countries in the Caucasus away from
their reliance on Russia.
MPs See Negative Financial Impact With Positive Political
Results
¶5. (C) MP Giorgi Kandelaki of the ruling United National
Party Movement, who is also Deputy Chairman of the Foreign
TBILISI 00001158 002 OF 003
Relations Committee, stated that his first response to the
new discussions on opening a border crossing was that Turkey
perhaps had become "strategically confused"; however, he also
noted that reduced tensions would be good for the region and
assist in future economic growth. On a more strategic level,
he expressed concer
n that Turkey, desiring better relations
with the Kremlin, was using this as a means to that end.
Given that Turkey remains Georgia's largest trading partner,
this was a bigger concern to Kandelaki than any possible
losses by Georgian businesses due to lost transit revenue.
The View From Academia Mixed
¶6. (C) Head of the International Programs Department of the
Georgian Institute of Public Affairs and former NSC official
Tornike Sharashenidze noted that the Georgian business
community and senior government officials were probably
unworried because past experience had made them skeptical of
the likelihood of tangible improvements actually occurring
between Turkey and Armenia. Additionally, it could take
years for anything to come out of the current rapprochement
that truly impacted the Georgian bottom line. He skeptically
stated that no one in government thought long term about
these types of regional issues unless they had a distinct
Russian angle; aside from the analytical wing of the MOIA,
few in the Georgian government conducted long term analytical
assessments of regional events and how they could impact
Georgian policy.
¶7. (C) Nika Chitadze, professor at Tbilisi State University
and President of the Georgia International and Security
Research Center, raised a possibility not discussed by any
other interlocutors. He thought improvement in relations
between Armenia, Turkey, and ultimately Russia, could provide
additional opportunities for the Russians to exploit
disgruntlement in the minority Armenian community in
Samtskhe-Javakheti and cause instability in Georgia. (Note:
While facts behind this assessment were hard to provide, this
speculation reflects the common Georgian fear - even paranoia
- about Russian omnipresence in Georgia politics, and the
immediate assumption that unexpected turns in Caucasus
politics must have a Russia focus. End note.)
PM Sees Improved Relations as an Opportunity for Georgia
¶8. (C) During the 10-11 June visit of EUR Assistant
Secretary Philip Gordon, Prime Minister Nika Gilauri stressed
that anything that decreases tension in the region is
positive (reftel). However, he noted that improved relations
between Turkey and Armenia should parallel efforts to resolve
the Nagorno-Karabakh question. In particular, he noted that
the Caucasus countries were small and depended on strategic
relationships with larger countries. For Georgia this is the
U.S., for Armenia it is Russia, and for Azerbaijan it has
been Turkey. Gilauri said that the loss of Azerbaijan's
strategic partner could cause them to look north to Russia
for support. Gilauri added that he does not fear negative
impacts to the Georgian economy from the opening of borders
between Turkey and Armenia, in fact hoping that possible
increase in traffic could do just the opposite.
¶9. (C) Comment: The contradictory and at times, uncertain
responses from individuals in Tbilisi to the signs of
rapprochement between Armenia and Turkey probably is derived
from an inherent unease about any change in the regional
Qfrom an inherent unease about any change in the regional
power balance, as well as a skepticism that true progress
might be made. Some immediately see Georgian political loss
and Russian gain, as the Turks strive for better relations
with the country in the south Caucasus most reliant on the
northern neighbor. Others, particularly in government, view
the increased stability associated with improved relations
and enhanced opportunities to move forward on
Nagorno-Karabakh as something that must be a positive for
Georgia. Regardless, the majority of observers in Tbilisi
are taking a wait-and-see approach to the issue, with an
inherent skepticism difficult to push to the side as it
pertains to improved relations and less Russian influence in
the region. Certainly in the short term, should a serious
rapprochement occur and a functioning border crossing come to
fruition, Georgian commerce could be a net loser, at least
for a while. However, in the longer term, the Georgian
economy could benefit from increased trade in the region.
Georgia remains the main bridge for trade between Armenia,
Turkey and Azerbaijan but a new border crossing would reduce
the need for Georgian transshipment of goods. However, in
the longer term, an increasingly stable situation in the
south Caucasus, with improving relations between Turkey,
Armenia, and Azerbaijan, can only benefit the regional
economic situation and further enhance political stability in
TBILISI 00001158 003 OF 003
the area. End comment.
TEFFT

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