Documents Show Errors Aboard Iowa

Propellant, Projectile Mismatched In Turret

September 10, 1989|By ROBERT BECKER Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — The guns of Turret II aboard the battleship USS Iowa were loaded with a powder that was improper for the type of projectile scheduled to be fired from the 16-inch guns, Navy documents reveal.

Despite labels on the cans of propellant warning "DO NOT USE WITH 2,700 LB PROJECTILE," five bags of propellant, designated by its Navy Ammunition Logistics Code as D846, were brought up from the Iowa's powder magazine on the morning of April 19 for use with the shell, which weighs 2,700 pounds.

Navy regulations state, "No ammunition or explosive assembly shall be used for any gun or equipment for which it is not designated." The Iowa had not received permission to use that particular combination of powder and projectile, according to Navy documents.

What role - if any - the mismatch of powder and projectile played in the explosion that killed 47 Iowa sailors is unclear.

That information, however, along with testimony about sprinkler systems in the turrets that went unrepaired for weeks, uncertified crew members operating key positions in the turret, accounts of powder bags spilling their contents all over the gunroom floor and safety briefings that were never held, combined to create what Adm. Powell F. Carter, head of the Navy's Atlantic fleet, characterized as "an impression of laxity and disregard" for regulations on the Iowa.

The Navy says in its report released Thursday the blast was most likely an act of sabotage by a lonely and suicidal sailor, Gunner's Mate Clayton M. Hartwig.

While Navy officials acknowledge they "will never know with absolute certainty" what caused the explosion, they contend that mechanical and human error were not to blame for the explosion that devastated the Iowa's No. 2 turret.

At the same time the Navy exonerates its personnel and practices, it admits the crew and officers aboard the Iowa made serious mistakes.

The report and accompanying exhibits note the "lack of an effective personnel qualification program, poor adherence to explosive safety regulations and ordnance safety and improperly supervised watch assignments were all found to exist."

Navy investigators found deficiencies from the magazine to the gun room.

Only 26 of the 169 sailors in the Iowa's three turrets had completed the personnel qualification standards the Navy says must be completed to do their jobs, according to the Navy's own findings.

Several sailors interviewed by Rear Adm. Richard D. Milligan, the officer in charge of the Iowa investigation, said they had never even seen a training book.

One sailor who worked in the powder magazine told Milligan he had never been properly certified to do his job of handling bags of powder.

Asked by Milligan what he would do if he dropped a bag of powder, the sailor replied: "I never learned anything about that."

Robert M. Burch, a boatswain's mate second class and one of the survivors of the explosion in turret No. 2, told Milligan his "formal" training as a powder handler consisted of being taken into the magazine by his predecessor, who "showed me whatever there was and how to operate it."

Burch told Milligan he had never seen a written guide to direct him in his duties.

Lt. Cmdr. Kenneth M. Costigan Sr. was the gunnery officer in charge of the Iowa's three turrets at the time of the April 19 explosion.

Costigan told Milligan he was "surprised" to learn that only five members of turret No. 2 had been certified.

Asked if he believed the Navy regulation stipulating that all crew members standing watch within the turret of a 16-inch gun be certified was being followed, Costigan paused and replied: "I thought we had a well-trained crew."

While few sailors were certified for their jobs in the Iowa's turrets, the Navy's study found that an equally small number attended safety briefings, as required by ship policy.

Before each firing of the 16-inch guns, ship policy required those sailors with key jobs to attend a meeting to discuss the upcoming firing.

Of the 100 sailors who should have attended the briefing April 18 - the day before the explosion - 40 attended.

Gunner's Mate Kendall L. Truitt told Milligan he never received special direction or safety instruction prior to firing.

"It's not a common practice to have a safety brief before firing," Truitt said.

The apparent laxity in safety practices extended to the handling of powder, according to testimony.

According to Navy documents, turrets aboard the Iowa had fired unauthorized combinations of powder and projectiles before April 19.

Twice in November 1987, the ship had fired a type or amount of propellant not suited for the projectile.

Master Chief Stephen Skelly told Milligan he had discussed variations with ballistics experts at the Naval Surface Warfare Center at Dahlgren, Va., and at Indian Head, the manufacturers of the powder.

Both Skelly and Costigan, Skelly's supervisor, said they knew that using six full bags of the powder to fire a 2,700-pound projectile could "exceed" the designed tolerances of the 16-inch gun.