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EXCLUSIVE: In 2002, India's Fighter Jets Hit Pakistan In A Surgical Strike You've Never Been Told AboutThe untold story of an incredible Indian Air Force secret mission during Operation Parakram.

It was about 2 am on 31 July, 2002. Flight Lieutenant Rajiv Mishra, a 29-year-old fighter pilot, was woken up at his living quarters at the Ambala Air Force Station. Leave for Srinagar immediately with laser designation equipment, he was told. A transport aircraft was ready and waiting at the base.

He didn't know it then, but he had been drafted for one of the most sensitive missions carried out by the Indian Air Force, the details of which had never been revealed to the outside world, until now.

Fighter pilot using a laser guidance system from ground on border. Must Read article and highly for multiple reasons if true.

The initial plan was to send in the India Army to attack the Pakistani positions. But the plan was changed after quick consultation with the then Army Chief, General Sundararajan Padmanabhan. Instead of a ground assault, it was decided to soften Pakistani positions using the IAF

Can a major initial plan be made without looping in the Army chief. the fact that it was changed on "quick consultation" implies what

rohitvats wrote:^^^The whole story has been written in an atrocious manner.

with many holes in it... and therefore not very credible as it stands. I am happy to accept that targets were laser designated and bombed, but not quite in the way described

True.

This is what possibly happened -

1. India decides to take-out some important node across LOC in the given sector. For whatever reason, it could not be silenced with artillery or mortars.

2. Powers-that-be decide to call in the IAF - which means there was some major operation underway and this particular target across LOC was hampering us meeting our objective. India was willing to up the ante to ensure we get what we want.

3. Of course, since the target was on another side or very close to LOC, normal bombing run was not possible. That would mean flying towards the target and then releasing the bomb. IAF would've realized that even with best of effort, the strike package would cross the LOC. A strict 'No-No'.

4. So, we decide to use ground based lasing to target the Pakistanis.

By all means, this is the Loonda Post incident in the Machal Sector which was first broken by Praveen Swami.

Visited Ypres, Belgium today. I had only heard that a lot of WW1 battles were fought around the area - also known as Flanders Fields. One of the monuments in the city is an arch / gate with a list of all the men and officers who died in the war, but whose bodies were never found and cremated or buried. This is one of the few gates (or maybe the only one) where the last post is sounded every evening at 8PM.

Turns out, some of the men were from the BIA, fighting for the British empire. There is an Ashok Stambh on a field next to the gate commemorating the Indian soldiers and their contribution in both the wars. Here are some pictures.

I did a quick search on the different regiments listed. Interesting history and most of them were allocated to the Pakistan Army after partition.

27th July 1998.Lance Naik Prem Pal was in one of the LC posts in J&K. when one of the adjoining post came under heavy enemy fire. To relieve pressure his post retaliated. Since the ammunition of Automatic Grenade Launcher was depleting, he volunteered to replenish it despite withering enemy artillery fire and while doing so was hit by a splinter in his thigh. At about 1345, hrs the kerosene barrels in the post were hit by a shell due to which a fire started spreading towards ammunition bunkers. Preempting impending danger, he ran out in the open to extinguish the fire and was hit by a burst from machine gun. Undeterred, he was finally able to assist in putting off the fire. While crawling back to his shelter, he was again hit directly by an artillery shell killing him instantaneously. Lance Naik Prem Pal exhibited unparalleled sense of commitment, exceptional presence of mind, selfless devotion to duty and was posthumously awarded Vir Chakra.

I think the period from 1988 to 2003 when there was open artillery fire from Pakis to be calleed peace is a real misnomer. They used to through everything they got and thansk to Larry presseler didnt use thier F-16's

China is teaching South Indian languages such as Tamil and Malayalam to wireless radio operators of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The move is to understand intercepts of communication signals of the Indian armed forces deployed along the 3,500 km Line of Actual Control and the international border.

The PLA’s emphasis is more on the spoken aspects of these two South Indian languages, which help facilitate faster communication by the Indian Army. “No coding or decoding of cipher is required with the script and pronunciation of South Indian languages being extremely difficult for any person to comprehend without a working knowledge of these languages,” officials privy to the inputs said.

The Pakistani experience, according to sources, has taught China to learn to understand Tamil, Malayalam and a few other South Indian languages. “During the 1971 India-Pakistan war, our radio operators passed messages and commands on open channels in Tamil, which was Greek to the Pakistani forces. The Pakistanis were foxed by our Tamil and Malayalam-speaking radio operators,” said an official.

“China does not want to repeat the mistake by its all weather friend Pakistan during the 1971 war,” said an intelligent official.

PLA operatives’ understanding of South Indian languages will additionally help Beijing in gathering intelligence from Tamil-dominated pockets in Northeastern Sri Lanka, where the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) had a considerable sway till 2009 before being decimated by the forces of the island nation. China has a deal with Sri Lanka for majority control of Hambantota port in its southeast.

Indian forces such as the Indo-Tibetan Border Police, which guards the Indo-China border, is also training its new troops in Mandarin, the language of mainland China.

Changing Frequency Chinese wireless radio operators are learning Tamil and Malayalam to understand intercepts of the Indian Army..... During the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, Indian radio operators passed messages and commands on open channels in Tamil, which was Greek to the Pakistani forces

On This day, fifty years ago, the GOC of 17 Mountain Division, Lt. Gen. Sagat Singh (then a Major General) disobeyed orders and refused to vacate the strategic Nathu La pass in Sikkim, as demanded by the Chinese......and agreed to by certain Indian "higher ups".

At the time, India was not a nuclear power (though China was !), and had recently suffered a humiliating defeat in Chinese hands.More importantly, Gen. Sagat Singh did not have support from his Corps Commander. Undeterred, he carefully positioned his Infantry and artillery assets, ensured proper communication of his various field units (VK's excellent Blog),briefed and mobilized the men under his command...............and hit the Chinese!!!

The Chinese soon joined in an ugly battle.However in the face of the well prepared and brave Indian Soldiers of 17th Mountain Division (Jats, Rajputs and Gurkhas) , the Chinese suffered about 300 causalities and eventually called a cease fire. They realized that the Indian Army was no push over.

For his tenacity, stubbornness, and for doing the right thing for his country though his bosses did not support him, a thousand pranams from me to the great soul, one of India's boldest and most innovative soldiers', Lt. Gen. Sagat Singh.

At 0800Hr on 03 Nov 1947, Maj Somnath Sharma, 4Kumaon & Capt Ronnie Wood, 1Kumaon reported to HQ 161 Brigade to discuss the day’s patrol pgme. Consequent to the discussions, 2 Companies of 4Kumaon moved out on a patrol towards Badgam, followed shortly by another company of 1 Kumaon.

The Company of 1Kumaon subsequently moved on towards Magam and thereafter returned to the airfield at about 1 pm. That done, Maj Somnath was also ordered to start thinning out. At 2pm, one Company of 4 Kumaon moved back. Maj Somnath reported that all was quiet with villagers going about their daily business.

Little did he know that there was a huge force of raiders was gathering in the vicinity, trying to skirt the Pattan route blocked by 1 Sikh. Had the 2nd Company too moved back at 2pm, route to airfield would have been unguarded.

Too bad for the enemy, it wasn’t so.

...

By the time the epic Battle of Badgam was over,less than 100 Kumaonis had held back nearly 700 raiders & saved the airfield. The Kumaonis lost 15 killed, including Maj Somnath Sharma and 26 wounded. 1 ammo truck too was looted by enemy but they failed their objective,losing many more than they killed.

This was the closest they would get to the Airfield. EVER Hereafter, the raiders would ‘advance’ in only one direction – BACK to where they came from, i.e Westwards. In evening, 1 Punjab moved double quick to take up more blocking positions to secure the airfield. Now at night,they waited. The airfield was still vulnerable. Another determined attack by the enemy, and it could still fall .. especially at night. Yet the enemy failed to make good this opportunity of a lifetime. Reason? Khurshid, the leader of that party was injured in the leg by a bullet. Leaderless, the Pathans dithered on further course of action.

Folks, I am sharing an interesting WhatsApp forward on one of our heroes. Keeping the format and text as shared.

My father, the Param Vir Chakra Hero

In spite of being wounded in battle, Lieutenant Colonel A B Tarapore fought for six days before meeting a hero's death on the battlefield in the 1965 war.

A legend in the Indian Army, he is the highest ranking officer to be awarded the Param Vir Chakra.

His daughter Zarine M Boyce, who was 16 when her father died, remembers an extraordinary soldier and a father she lost too soon.

Archana Masih met the hero's daughter at her Pune home(2015).

"I remember so well the night they got their orders to move. I was 16. The Poona Horse (Lieutenant Colonel A B Tarapore's regiment) had won an inter regimental tournament and there was a celebratory party in the Officer's Mess.

It was the first time I was allowed into a party. I remember dancing with my father when his adjutant, Captain Surinder Singh, tapped him on the shoulder and my father went in.

Captain Jasbir Singh came and took his place. Unfortunately he too died in the same shell attack that killed my father.

Soon after, we were told that the party was over and we should go home. This must have happened at 10 pm. Around 2, 3 in the morning, we heard the tanks moving out.

They were given orders to load and leave, but there was a wall blocking the route to the road and if they circumvented it, they could have missed their boarding time.

So my dad gave instructions to go through the wall as the objective was to get to the station in time. Of course they reached on time.

The next day we went to the train station. Earlier, my mother had gathered all the women at the mess and told them 'Don't you cry!'

I can never forget the scene with the officers and their tanks on the station. My father came out to one of the flats (wagons in the train carrying the tanks) and Captain Ajai Singh, who later became general and then governor of Assam, was with him, along with Captains Jasbir Singh and Surinder Singh.

Just at the whistle blew, my father gave my mother a salute. And all the soldiers saluted us. That's my last memory. I never saw him again."

***

Zarine Mahir Boyce breaks down as she remembers that day 50 years ago when her father left to fight a war, never to return.

A legendary tank commander who led from the front; he died in the tank that he loved, surrounded by men that adored him.

During our conversation, Mrs Boyce's eyes well up several times as one tries to grasp the pain of a teenager's loss that hasn't ebbed in half a century.

Now in her mid 60s, she lives in her mother's family home in Pune and says not a day passes when she hasn't thought of her father.

Next week, she has been invited by the Poona Horse for a commemorative ceremony of the 1965 war. "The respect they have given me over the years is unsurpassable," she says. "They treat me better than the Queen of England!"

She has also been invited for tea by the President for a felicitation of the 1965 veterans at Rashtrapati Bhavan on September 22, 2015.

"My father had not told anybody but on the night we were celebrating, he had got a message from the military secretary that as soon as his tenure was over, which would have been another couple of months, he would be posted as military attache to the USA, where he would pick up his brigadier pips.

I was excited as a young girl that I would do my college in America. Of course, it never happened.

When my father was at the front we got news only through letters. We received his last letter after his death.

In that he wrote 'I could not have had finer and better men to lead.'

They say that the command that my father had on the wireless in keeping the whole regiment together was unsurpassable. They destroyed 60 enemy tanks against our 9 and not only that -- they were one regiment against a brigade which comprised three regiments with Patton tanks.

We had the old Centurions tanks that were heavier and not as fast, but he did it. He did it like they did it in the old cavalry charges. It was just sure, sheer guts. His courage was such that inspired his men.

One of the boys told me that all he said on the wireless was ' Come on gentlemen, let's go and get them' -- and he charged at full speed, followed by his men.

The young men who came to see my mother after my dad died, told us that after the battle started, the colonel opened the cupola of his tank and stood up courageously, in spite of all the firing.

They said seeing him do that gave them courage. General Ajai Singh (who was a captain then) always says that no matter what part of the battle it was, Colonel Tarapore was always there.

With no disrespect to anybody, it was the first real battle that we went into. China was bad, we couldn't help it. But in '65 even if we lacked in resources what we did not lack was courage."

*

In 1965, the Pakistan army's armour strength was superior to that of the Indian Army. Pakistan had 765 tanks against India's 720, writes Nitin Gokhale in his book 1965 -- Turning the Tide.

India was in no position to wage another war in 1965, having suffered a morale-shattering defeat in 1962. The three services were in the middle of a modernisation and expansion phase and therefore not fully trained or battle-ready.

*

"At some stage of the battle, my father's tank was blasted. He jumped out, helped his wireless officer Captain Amarjit Bal, who eventually became a general.

After they were injured and they came out of the tank, my father realised that Captain Bal was still inside the tank, so he jumped in, pulled him to safety, gave him his morphine injection and asked him to be evacuated.

A little later in that operation a shrapnel riddled my father's arm. He was told to evacuate but he didn't want to leave his men. He said he would not leave his boys and continued to fight with his hand in a sling for the next two days.

Many of the officers say that if he had not taken that stance at that time, maybe we wouldn't have been in Pakistan. And for that, the regiment treat him like God.

One of his jawans who had come to see my mother after my father passed away told my mom: 'Colonel Tarapore was Arjun.'

He wanted to be cremated on the battlefield, so they did it. Even the enemy respected him. They called his regiment Fakhr-e-Hind, the Pride of India. This is unprecedented.

*

The biggest tank battle since World War II was fought in the Sialkot sector of Pakistan in 1965. Under Colonel Tarapore's leadership, 60 enemy tanks were destroyed in fierce tank battles that are part of military folklore.

Leading from the front and unmindful of being wounded, the colonel continued to fight for six days before he died a hero's death on the battlefield. The fearless commanding officer and his men had gone into Pakistan and captured Phillora, Chawinda, Wazirwali, Jassoran, Buttar Dograndi.

In the battle of Chawinda, he led the tanks twice into the middle of the enemy's killing ground. In the battle of Phillora, 23 enemy tanks lay scattered, mauled and burning.

On the evening of September 16, his tank was hit by a shell. He and his intelligence officer Captain Jasbir Singh along with two jawans died in the attack.

Colonel A B Tarapore was cremated on the battlefield in Jassoran at 0930 on September 17, 1965. His ashes were brought back to Pune.

For his valour he was decorated with the highest war-time gallantry medal, the Param Vir Chakra posthumously. Among the places where his valour is remembered is in the Golden Temple in Amritsar where his name is etched on a plaque. His presence also graces two building complexes in Andheri, suburban Mumbai, named after him: Tarapore Gardens and Tarapore Towers.

*

"When my mother was dying of cancer, it was her wish that his Param Vir Chakra be given to his regiment.

Today it is in the Quarter Guard and every young officer who joins the regiment has to go to the portrait of my father and of Second Lieutenant Arun Khetrapal (the 21-year-old awarded the Param Vir Chakra in the 1971 war, also from Poona Horse) and then join the regiment.

When we went to give the Param Vir Chakra in 1982, there was a tank parade and my mother went up and gave the medal to General Hanut Singh, who was commanding the regiment. (Decorat ed with the Mahavir Chakra in the 1971 war, General Hanut Singh was a military legend and sadly passed away in April this year.)

I will never forget what General Hanut said. He said, 'As long as there is a Poona Horse and as long as there is a Tarapore, we will be at their service.'

You don't get this loyalty and respect anywhere. Jawans who fought under him brought their little grandchildren to my mom and said, 'Mataji aap iske sir par haath rakh dengi toh yeh bhi veer ho jayega. (Mother, if you put your hand on his head, he too will become as brave as your husband).'

I am going to give the last jacket he wore in action to the regiment. They will put it up in the Quarter Guard with love and respect."

*

Six days after Colonel Tarapore's death, the United Nations called for a ceasefire by India and Pakistan. The war ended on September 23, 1965. India held 518 square kilometres of Pakistan territory in the Sialkot sector, that was returned in keeping with the Tashkent Treaty.

The Poona Horse, the regiment to which Colonel Tarapore belonged, is one of the most decorated regiments in the Indian Army. It has been awarded two Param Vir Chakras and two Victoria Crosses.

In the 1965 war, it was also awarded two Vir Chakras and five Sena Medals. In respect for the regiment's achievement on the battlefield, the Pakistani army conferred it with the title 'Fakhr-e-Hind.'

*

"There is never a day that goes by when I don't think of him. I suppose all of us who have famous fathers are daddy's girls. There are always people who take his name with a lot of respect.

His regiment was the be all and end all of his life. It was his family. His soldiers were his children. We were also rans. He loved us, he adored us, but he had one very, very strong trait which made his men adore him.

He was commanding his regiment in Babina, near Jhansi. His jeep had got stuck in a nullah and three of them -- the wireless operator, my father and driver -- tried to push the jeep out.

When he came home covered in slush, a civilian guest visiting us asked him why didn't he get the men to push the jeep since he was the commanding officer.

I will never forget what my father said. He said, 'I am not made of sugar or salt. I am not going to melt. I can do whatever my men can do.'

*

'As long as there is a Poona Horse and as long as there is a Tarapore, we will be at their service.'

Zarine Boyce's mother, Perin Tarapore, was only 40 when her husband died. Mrs Boyce herself lost her husband when she was 32. She has two daughters, one of whom will accompany her to the regiment's commemorative function next week.

Mrs Tarapore received Rs 10,000 and a transistor set from Indira Gandhi, then the information and broadcasting minister.

When P V Cherian, then the governor of Maharashtra, discovered this when he visited Mrs Tarapore in Pune, he intervened with the defence minister until she was given a plot of land in Koregaon Park with the stipulation that she should build a house in two years.

Since Colonel Tarapore's last pay was Rs 3,000 and his pension hardly amounted to around Rs 1,000, the Parsi community stepped in and built a house at no profit. Mrs Tarapore rented out this house and that's where her main income came from.

"We managed because her father was comfortably off but we always wonder about people who aren't," says Mrs Boyce. "But now things have improved."

*

"I don't feel bitter. My father had a job to do and he did it. As much as he died, somebody else may have died too.

Students at the school he went to and was head boy don't know about him. The road outside the school is named after him, but once when I was there, I asked the students about him, and they didn't know.

What he did was for the country. In the north of India, people appreciate sacrifice and valour because they have been at the receiving end for a long time.

In Maharashtra and South India not so much because they have never had to face threats to their homes because the enemy has never come down that far.

"I do not expect people to appreciate it (a soldier's s acrifice) when they themselves have not been through it. But awareness is creeping in now.

Anywhere in Punjab, the name Tarapore or the name Abdul Hamid means a lot because they themselves have been through this trauma of invasion.

***‘My mother was in this house when we got news of his passing. Those days after his passing were terrible. My mother's younger brother became like a surrogate dad. Nothing can tide over for your loss.

Not only was my father an astounding soldier, he was also a kind human being. He did not have any shades of grey. For him it was this or that, never a maybe. He would have been a failure in civilian life.

He was always very brave. It was in his DNA.

There is a book in Pakistan by a soldier who was fighting in the same sector and he mentions my father's courage. His courage came for the love of his men.

He would often say to me, 'If only god would give me the privilege of leading them into battle, I will think my life is worth it.' And it did happen."

thanks deejay...i heard this lady on TV ..she said when Lt Col Tarapore boarded the tanks and train steamed out the whole regiment shouted "Har Har Mahadev " .. made my hair stand and tears in eye. What a man !! its a shame that his deeds and of others are not taught in schools and we have to learn about Akbar the great !! .

The Ministry of Defence, Government of India, has decided to procure a new generation, contemporary State-of-the-Art Combat Vehicle Platform, approximately 1770 Armoured Fighting Vehicles (in various kit combinations) in a Phased Manner, along with 10 Years Performance Based Logistics, Transfer of Technology Engineering Support Package, Personnel Training, Training Aggregates including Technical Training Simulators, Documentation and spares Package for replacing a part of its ageing Armoured Fighting Vehicle fleet as part of the Modernisation Plan. This vehicle, which will be called the Future Ready Combat Vehicle (FRCV), will form the base platform for the Main Battle Tank. It is also planned to subsequently develop other need-based Family of Variants on this platform. The Future Ready Combat Vehicle is planned to be procured under the provisions of the Armoured Fighting Vehicle segment of ‘Strategic Partnership’ route as per Chapter - VII of Defence Procurement Procedure -2016. The Indigenous Manufactured Portion of the procurement is to be manufactured in India, based on design to be provided by the foreign Original Equipment Manufacturer to the selected Strategic Partner.2. The Ministry of Defence, Government of India seeks information from the Armoured Fighting Vehicle Original Equipment Manufacturers/authorised agencies for participation in Future Ready Combat Vehicle Project in accordance with Chapter-VII of Defence Procurement Procedure - 2016. The Request for Proposal for the acquisition is likely to be issued by Mid-2018.

Essential Parameters. The Future Ready Combat Vehicle will be a tracked fighting vehicle of Medium Weight Class (All up combat weight not to exceed 50Tons ± 15%) and should present a small target signature. It should be capable of all weather, day and night operations. All systems should be able to operate in an ambient temperature range of minus 300C to plus 500C.

All tech specs mentioned in the doc. Looking at them it seems difficult for anyone to make such tank with weight 50 ton or less unless perhaps 3-crew + autoloader concept is used, though the RFI doesn't specify such requirement. Can anyone compare the specs with those of Arjun MK1/MK2..? Looks very similar to that of MK2 to my noob eyes.

The discovery of human remains near a small town in northern France last year sparked a search that quickly spread half-way across the globe. The two men, it turned out, were Indian soldiers who died on French battlefields more than 100 ago during World War One.

They were finally laid to rest this month, in a ceremony especially poignant for the Indian diaspora in France.

A crowd gathers quietly at a small cemetery in Laventie. Many of them are of Indian origin and have travelled from across France, undeterred by the cold weather and distance - both physical and from events that took place so many years ago.A Hindu priest chants prayers in front of two flag-draped coffins, as Indian and French military personnel stand in respect.

For Indians who now call France home coming here wasn't just about honouring those who gave their lives in war. It is about their own place in history."This is very important for the Indian diaspora, because it gives us a link to history," says Ranjit Singh, a proud member of the French-Sikh community."It reminds us that a century ago - some soldiers came here [from India]. It isn't just something written in the books. We can feel it, we can see it today."

Some 1.3 million Indian soldiers served in the World War One and more than 70,000 died in places like northern France - where decisive battles were fought.A few kilometres away from Laventie, in Neuve Chapelle, a memorial lists the names of many Indian soldiers who died fighting for the British Empire.Nalinee Goojha, who lives in Paris, told me she was thinking of the soldiers' mothers, "whose children came to fight a war here in France, where I now live, and they never saw their children again".

Remarkably, the soldiers were identified by badges found on their bodies. After a century buried in the French mud, the number "39" was still legible when the bodies were found.That stands for the 39th Royal Garhwal Rifles - an infantry regiment raised during the time of the British Raj. Its history goes back to 1854.

The regiment was one of few in the Indian army to have two battalions, and both were sent to Europe with the Garhwal Brigade - part of the 7th (Meerut) Division - in the early part of the World War One where they fought on the Western Front.Later they took part in the Mesopotamia campaign in the Middle East.The Garhwal Rifles - as they are now called - were incorporated into the Indian army after independence and the regiment was contacted by the French authorities after the remains were found and their origins identified.

Brig Indrajit Chatterjee, Commandant of the Garhwal Rifles Regimental Centre, travelled from India for the ceremony. Two bagpipers from the regiment also played.The fallen soldiers were being cremated and laid to rest with full honours, Brigadier Chatterjee said.

The Indian soldiers saw some of their fiercest fighting in the battle of Neuve Chapelle in March 1915. The troops, both Indian and British, were commanded by Sir Douglas Haig.Rifleman Gabbar Singh Negi won the Victoria Cross and his grandson, who is now a serving Indian Army officer, was present at the ceremony in Laventie.Laventie Military Cemetery and other graves in the area are maintained by the Commonwealth War Graves Commission.

"What we try to do always is to reunite the men that are found today with the men they fought alongside 100 years ago. In this case, more than 100 years ago," says Liz Sweet from the commission.

"In the cemetery where they were buried today, there was a sizable pocket of Indian men commemorated and they were placed alongside those men."Before leaving France, the Indian army representatives filled two urns with soil from the area - a piece of the ground on which so many of their regiment fought and died.

Just finished India's Most Fearless by Rahul Singh and Shiv Aroor in one sitting. Request to all BRFITES, if you habe a nephew, niece, son or daughter please consider sharing this book. Not very expensive. Easy read. We need more books like this to spread the story of our armed forces in the mainstream.

Rashtriya Rifles: The Story Of Independent India’s Finest Military Experiment

by Syed Ata Hasnain

- Jul 23, 2017, 12:06 pm

The RR is well known as a specialist organisation created to fight terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir, but how much do people know about India’s finest military experiment since Independence.

Here’s a peep into an organisation, which is barely 25 years in being, yet has risen to become an icon in itself.

For a soldier the heart normally is where he has served with honour and where he has gained great experience. Thus for me, one of the organisations closest to the heart remains the Rashtriya Rifles, commonly referred as the RR. Within the Army, the RR is well known as a specialist organisation created to fight terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), but this knowledge is mainly in layman terms. People outside the Army may have just heard of it and brushed it aside as something too detailed to know about the Army. Yet, when an organisation, barely 25 years in being, rises to become an icon in itself, there must be something about it which is worth knowing. This story is all about that organisation to which the Indian people owe much; an organisation about which little is known and much needs to be written.

It may pay dividends in terms of capturing the reader’s mind if I commence this piece with a single statement, which actually says it all. The RR is India’s finest military experiment in 70 years of existence as an Independent nation. I never fail to repeat this wherever I go, ad nauseum.

The Origin

There is nothing official about it, but it is a conjecture that the origins of the RR go back to the days of Operation Pawan, in the perceived botched experiment of India’s first out of area (OOA) operations in Sri Lanka. Four frontline divisions were involved in the OOA insurgent situation in Sri Lanka leaving behind an adversely affected force structure to respond to the ongoing insurgency in the North East and none too stable situation on the western borders. Immediately thereafter the Army was again involved in holding the periphery to boost the confidence of the Punjab Police while the Punjab militancy raged in 1990-91.

With the continuous deployment of the Army in OOA operations and counter insurgency (CI) duties, even as conventional threats loomed large in the form of the unpredictable Pakistan Army exercise Zarb-E-Momin, it became clear that a special force was required to deal with India’s turbulent internal security situation; a credible force which would prevent frequent deployment of the Army’s frontline formations and units on internal security. Raised with the Punjab situation in mind, the changeover to Kashmir and then the Jammu region was quick. Lending credence to this theory that it was never J&K which triggered the idea of RR, is the fact that Headquarters (HQ) 8 Sector RR along with its three units, 18 RR, 32 RR and 33 RR was initially deployed in the North East and moved to its current location in the Lolab Valley only in 1999, at the height of the Kargil crisis.

RR was raised as a specialised CI/Counter Terrorist (CT) Force in 1990 to relieve the regular Army of its CI/CT commitments, so as to ensure its ready availability at all times for its primary task. It was originally planned to constitute RR with personnel on deputation from the Army, along with lateral inductees for permanent absorption and suitable ex-servicemen volunteers. It was however, later decided that the entire manpower would comprise serving personnel on deputation from the regular Army. The RR was thus raised with hundred per cent personnel on deputation from all Arms and Services of the Army.

The Organisation

The first few units which were raised had no regimental orientation or links but someone in authority (and to him we owe much) decided that one of the strengths of the Indian Army, its regimental system, also needed to be infused into this force. Thus came about the unique experiment of basing an RR unit on an Infantry Regiment as the core with another Arm (Armoured Corps, Artillery, Engineers and Air Defence) providing supplementary manpower; the logistics and support elements were provided by the Services.

A look at a typical RR unit’s organisation will explain this little better to a layman. One of the high achieving units, 36 RR, is organised with a little over 50 per cent manpower from The Garhwal Rifles, 30 per cent from the Artillery and rest of the elements coming from Engineers (one Engineer platoon), Signals (a communication platoon), EME (one Field Repair Increment – FRI), ASC (one Mechanical Transport Platoon), Ordnance (storemen) and AMC personnel. The total manpower comes to about 1,200 all ranks (against 840 of an Infantry unit) but the capability to have six RR companies is a definite plus.

This affords an ideal six point deployment i.e. occupation of six company operating bases (COBs) with one of the companies being co-located with the battalion HQ. The logistics is kept to the bare minimum with specialists available in each field thus obviating any training of general duties personnel in specialist fields involving logistics. The Engineers complement is a major asset because it can be employed for anti-Improvised Explosive Device (IED) role, bomb disposal, demolition tasks in CT operations and very importantly for electrification, construction of habitat and maintenance tasks. Similar is the case with Signals.

In many ways an RR represents a battalion group which can be reorganised for tailor made tasks because of the inherent flexibility. It can latch on to any logistics node or specialist logistics establishment for its logistics needs and is completely self-contained in transport.

Two other aspects need to be known. First, that RR budget is additional to Army budget under a separate head. The budget operates on Payment Book Debit System. All financial rules as applicable to the regular Army are also applicable to the RR budget. Second, the manpower is supplementary to the authorised manpower of the Army and thus comes under Composite Table II. It means that it requires a special approval of its mandate for a fixed period after which the mandate has to be approved again and that too at the highest level. This has sometimes caused problems in functioning as such approvals are known to get delayed with resultant effects on the budget.

The initial organisational concept was based upon two to three RR units functioning under a Sector HQ (equivalent to a Brigade HQ). This was supplemented in 1994 with the raising of the two HQ Counter Insurgency Forces (CIF); Victor for the Kashmir Valley and Delta for Doda in Jammu region. The CI/CT grid came under the two Force HQ which too were lean and mean, devoid of all the add on supporting units associated with a division HQ. In fact, the first ‘light division’ concept in India had thus taken birth. With the expanding arc of militancy through the nineties, it was not possible to execute the CI/CT role over the large swathe of areas North and South of the Pir Panjal with these two Forces alone. The 8 Mountain Division (from North East) became a permanent asset in the Kashmir Valley (before its move to Kargil) with the Rajouri based division and another reserve Infantry Division doing service in Jammu region.

The void created by move of 8 Mountain Division to Kargil and the increasing pressure of counter infiltration and LoC management in the Jammu region forced the raising of the additional Force HQ for the Valley and south of Pir Panjal. Kilo, Uniform and Romeo Force HQ thus came into existence. That is where it rests today with the strength of units going up from 36 in 1999 to 63 by 2003. There are 15 Sector HQ to control these, along with the five Force HQ. The Directorate General of Rashtriya Rifles (DGRR), located as part of the Integrated HQ of the MoD (Army) at Delhi, controls the non-operational part of the management of the Force.

The Ethos And Mode Of Functioning

Keeping the North East model as the backdrop, interoperability between the RR and the regular Army was ensured. Thus RR units form part of regular Infantry formations just as an RR Sector HQ can have regular Infantry units placed under it.

The CO is mostly an Infantryman from the same regiment as the Infantry troops. While an officer may have his core competence based on his Arm or Service, no one denies him an operational role in the command of troops. This gives huge fillip to the self-esteem of officers who proudly wear the RR badge, shoulder titles and lanyard, temporarily casting aside their original embellishments. The Military Secretary’s branch has done its bit by ensuring that service in RR (usually 30 months) fetches the qualitative requirements (QRs) for consideration for foreign postings and career courses of instruction. While many an old timer from the Infantry may consider CI/CT operations as a purely Infantry domain based upon core competence of Infantry officers, the RR experience has proved beyond doubt that ultimately it is an officer’s personal involvement, willingness to learn and bond with troops from all Arms and Services and flexibility of the mind which makes him a competent CI/CT leader. I can say with confidence that besides numerous Infantry officers who perform outstandingly, there are an equal number of officers from Armoured Corps, Artillery, Air Defence, Engineers or Signals who perform exceptionally well under the most stressful conditions. Equally, I have found officers from the ASC who go about the operational task most competently. A Regimental Medical Officer (RMO) is a must, considering the fact that casualties are frequent and the rule of Golden Hour applying in most cases, necessitating the presence of an RMO at the site of operations.

The organisational ethos has refined over time with every effort to ensure that each RR unit has a fixed number of Infantry and other Arm units to subscribe the manpower. RR companies are a proportional mix of Infantry and the main Arm which provides the manpower. It should be noted that the Indian Army’s concept of service in an operational area is quite different to that of Western armies where a single tour of duty of its servicemen is no more than six months. Officers and jawans in RR units serve for approximately 30 months during which there is no absence for training, temporary duties etc; the only time an officer or jawan may not be present is during the period of his authorised leave. Every effort is made to ensure that these personnel proceed home on leave at least once in three months. There are no training courses or promotion cadres in the RR, which can keep jawans away from operations. The central government’s decision to provide two free railway warrants to personnel in operational areas has paid dividends in terms of morale. The various chartered flights to Srinagar have also contributed towards this.

A senior DG of a Central Armed Police Force (CAPF) once after spending a day with an RR unit at his request, expressed his perception. In his view it was the regimental system which was the glue which had the right portion to give these units a high. Of course, he had volumes to speak about the professionalism of the RR officers and men, the flexible yet firm control that the Sector and Force HQ ensured over all operational activities, the readiness to learn from mistakes and very importantly the continuity of presence in a given area of deployment where the unit gelled with the local population. He also observed how much importance was being given to intelligence gathering, briefings and debriefings.

A word on continuity. An RR unit turns over almost 50 per cent of its manpower every year, which means 600 men come and 600 go, making it an average of 50 a month. An RR CO may see as many as 2,000 personnel through his command tenure. At any time, there is transition which is on, but the fact that the unit remains static except for minor tactical redeployment contributes to its hold over its area. The terrain is well known, the sources are more loyal, the SOPs are easier to follow and lessons of the past are always applicable to the same ground. Besides a very simple direction is followed; no man can operate unless he undergoes pre induction training at the Corps Battle Schools (CBS) of either 15 or 16 Corps. These are very important institutions where the continuity factor is also ensured. Commonality of understanding the mission, the force ethos and the ramifications of various actions have to be starkly brought to the mind of every man. General Officers and Sector Commanders have to ensure they address their men right there at the CBS. It makes a world of a difference when you have such a focused command.

Operational Aspects

The RR has evolved over a period of time confronting first the hard core cadres of the Ikhwan (later a counter group), Hizbul Mujahideen, JKLF and Harkatul Ansar and then confronting the foreign terrorists who started to enter the Valley in droves. As cadres of the Lashkar e Taiba (LeT), Al Badr and Jaish-e-Mohommad (JeM) started to emerge in greater strength the degree of coordination from across the LoC enhanced exponentially. Operational concepts had to rely on large scale cordon and search operations (CASO) of urban areas bringing the RR into direct contact with the people. There was then little need for intelligence, so intense and dense was the presence of the terrorists. They employed IEDs at will and even confronted the RR troops frontally in encounters in the jungles of Rajwar, Hafruda and Rafiabad. It needed diligence and a degree of risk to move for operations. The terrorist cadres then used simple VHF radio for communications. This moved on to mobile technology before resting on satellite phones (Thuraya). The emergence of the jihadi radical as a modern technical whiz kid (4th Generation Warrior) employing social media and Skype for communication forced the RR to technicalise both with authorised equipment and a lot of jugaad. The RR today reflects the technical savviness of the modern generation. A major challenge that any RR unit faces today is the absolute need to ensure minimum collateral damage during an operation. The kinetic aspect of disproportionate use of force of which CI/CT units are often blamed remains a critical component of execution and operations may be delayed for long only for this need.

The RR has also travelled through the transforming conflict with aplomb. It is now also doing service in counter infiltration in the vicinity of the LoC in various areas and is optimised to be available for conventional role too. Its primary role in conventional conflict remains Rear Area Security. However, it has gone on to train and be ready for confrontation at the LoC itself. The transforming internal conflict scenario has also left many in a quandary about understanding the RR’s role in conflict stabilisation and conflict termination. For a professional, it is important to realise that with derived clarity of the continuously changing role of the RR this one aspect will remain constant. This is the original task; the mainstreaming of the people of J&K with mainstream India. It has never been articulated, but is the intellectually evolved role which should have been spelt out at the outset. Thus, while many may bemoan the fact that today in some areas in Jammu division there are very few terrorists for the RR to eliminate and the romanticised and gung ho role may be over, the more difficult task starts now; the task of continuity of stability. No organisation is better suited for this than the RR. With intimate knowledge of the socio-cultural landscape and sensitivities this Force now needs the right orientation to hold the periphery and assist in the integration effort which must be undertaken by the central and state governments in earnest. Its quasi-military experience of executing the hearts and minds game most innovatively over the years should give confidence to the various stake holders.

Last, the RR has the experience, the organisational capability and the leadership like no other organisation in India. If J&K has to be fully mainstreamed in mind and spirit a long continuation of the RR’s mandate is an absolute must.

(Adapted from the original in South Asia Defence & Strategic Review, by the author who wrote the original piece too)

The writer is a former GOC of India’s Srinagar based 15 Corps, now associated with Vivekanand International Foundation and the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies.