A New Book Examines The World’s Love-Hate Relationship With The Dollar

"LUMPY, unpredictable, potentially large": that was how Tim
Geithner, then head of the New York Federal Reserve, described
the need for dollars in emerging economies in the dark days of
October 2008, according to transcripts of a Fed meeting released
last month.

To help smooth out those lumps, the Fed offered to "swap"
currencies with four favoured central banks, as far off as South
Korea and Singapore.

They could exchange their own money for dollars at the prevailing
exchange rate (on condition that they later swap them back again
at the same rate). Why did the Fed decide to reach so far beyond
its shores? It worried that stress in a financially connected
emerging economy could eventually hurt America. But Mr Geithner
also hinted at another motive. "The privilege of being the
reserve currency of the world comes with some burdens," he said.

That privilege is the subject of a new book, "The Dollar Trap",
by Eswar Prasad of Cornell University, who shares the world's
ambivalence towards the currency. The 2008 financial crisis might
have been expected to erode the dollar's global prominence.
Instead, he argues, it cemented it. America's fragility was,
paradoxically, a source of strength for its currency.

In the last four months of 2008 America attracted net capital
inflows of half a trillion dollars. The dollar was a haven in
tumultuous times, even when the tumult originated in America
itself. The crisis also "shattered conventional views" about the
adequate level of foreign-exchange reserves, prompting emerging
economies with large dollar hoards to hoard even more. Finally,
America's slump forced the Fed to ease monetary policy
dramatically. In response, central banks in emerging economies
bought dollars to stop their own currencies rising too fast.

Could Fed swap lines serve as a less costly alternative to
rampant reserve accumulation? If central banks could obtain
dollars from the Fed whenever the need arose, they would not need
to husband their own supplies. The demand is there: India,
Indonesia, the Dominican Republic and Peru have all made
inquiries.

The swap lines are good business: the Fed keeps the interest from
the foreign central bank's loans to banks, even though the other
central bank bears the credit risk. The Fed earned 6.84% from
South Korea's first swap, for example. But it is not a business
the Fed wants to be in. As one official said, "We're not
advertising."

Swap lines would help emerging economies endure the dollar's
reign. But will that reign endure? Mr Prasad thinks so. The
dollar's position is "suboptimal but stable and
self-reinforcing," he writes. Much as Mr Prasad finds America's
privileges distasteful, his book points to the country's
qualifications for the job.

America is not only the world's biggest economy, but also among
the most sophisticated. Size and sophistication do not always go
together. In the 1900s the pound was the global reserve currency
and Britain's financial system had the widest reach. But America
was the bigger economy. In the 2020s China will probably be the
world's biggest economy, but not the most advanced.

America's sophistication is reflected in the depth of its
financial markets. It is unusually good at creating tradeable
claims on the profits and revenues that its economy generates. In
a more primitive system, these spoils would mostly accrue to the
state or tycoons; in America, they back a vast range of financial
assets.

Mr Prasad draws the obvious contrast with China and its currency,
the yuan, a "widely hyped" alternative to the dollar. China's GDP
is now over half the size of America's. But its debt markets are
one-eighth as big, and foreigners are permitted to own only a
tiny fraction of them. China's low central-government debt should
be a source of strength for its currency. But it also limits the
volume of financial instruments on offer.

America has a big external balance-sheet, if not an obviously
strong one. Its foreign liabilities exceed its overseas assets.
But this worrying fact conceals a saving grace: its foreign
assets are unusually adventurous and lucrative. Its liabilities,
on the other hand, are largely liquid, safe and low-yielding.
America therefore earns more on its foreign assets than it pays
on its foreign liabilities.

Alongside its economic maturity, America also has a greying
population. This ageing is a source of economic weakness. But, Mr
Prasad argues, it may be another reason for the dollar's global
appeal. America's pensioners hold a big chunk of the government
debt that is not held by foreigners. A formidable political
constituency, they will not allow the government to inflate away
the value of these claims. Thus America's powerful pensioners
serve to protect the interests of its generous foreign creditors.

America's sophistication has one final implication: the dollar
has no long-term tendency to strengthen. That again contrasts
with its principal long-run rival. China is still a catch-up
economy. As it narrows the productivity gap with America, its
exchange rate, adjusted for inflation, will tend to rise. The
yuan has appreciated by about 35% against the dollar since
mid-2005.

A self-deprecating currency

The dollar's depreciation over that period is, of course, bad for
anyone holding American assets. But the dollar is not merely a
store of value. It has also become a popular "funding" currency.
Banks and multinational firms borrow in dollars, even as they
accumulate assets in other denominations. Since no one wants to
borrow in a currency that only goes up, this is not a role that
China's currency could easily play.

Moreover, because of its role as a funding currency, the dollar
tends to strengthen in times of crisis. That explains why
emerging economies feel a "lumpy", "unpredictable" need for
dollars. America's currency may not hold its value against
others. But in times of stress, the appeal of a dollar asset is
that it always holds its value against a dollar debt. The dollar
is a global hegemon partly because it is also a global hedge.