THE PRICE OF WASHINGTON'S
BOSNIA POLICY

By Yossef Bodansky

February 1998

If very senior Islamist terrorist leaders are to be believed, the Clinton
Administration is willing to tolerate the overthrow of the Mubarak Government
in Egypt and the establishment of an Islamist State in its stead as an
acceptable price for reducing the terrorist threat to US forces in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. This trade-off was recently raised in discussions between
the Egyptian terrorist leader Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri and an Arab-American known
to have been both an emissary of the CIA and the US Government in the 1980s.
Egypt's President Husni Mubarak is convinced this information is accurate and
has already undertaken major steps to address the challenge. Moreover,
to-date, the independent sources that provided this information have proven
highly reliable and forthcoming.

In the first half of November 1997, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of the
Jihad Organization and the Vanguard of Conquest terrorist organizations, met a
man called Abu-Umar al-Amriki [al-Amriki means the American] at a camp near
Peshawar on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. High-level Islamist leaders
insist that in this meeting Abu-Umar al-Amriki made al-Zawahiri an offer: The
US will not interfere with nor intervene to prevent the Islamists' rise to
power in Egypt if the Islamist Mujahedin currently in Bosnia-Herzegovina [B-H]
refrain from attacking the US forces. Moreover, Abu-Umar al-Amriki promised a
donation of $50 million (from undefined sources) to Islamist charities in
Egypt and elsewhere.

This was not the first meeting between Abu-Umar al-Amriki and al-Zawahiri.
Back in the 1980s, Abu-Umar al-Amriki was openly acting as an emissary for the
CIA with various Arab Islamist militant/terrorist movements then operating
under the wings of the Afghan Jihad. In the late 1980s, in one of his meetings
with al-Zawahiri, Abu-Umar al-Amriki suggested that al-Zawahiri would "need
$50 million to rule Egypt." At the time, al-Zawahiri interpreted this
assertion as a hint that Washington would tolerate his rise to power if he
could raise this money.

Thus, the mention of the magic figure -- $50 million -- by Abu-Umar
al-Amriki in the November 1997 meeting has been interpreted by al-Zawahiri and
the entire Islamist leadership, including Shaykh Usamah bin Ladin, as a
reaffirmation of the discussions with the CIA in the late 1980s. The Islamist
leaders are convinced that in November 1997, Abu-Umar al-Amriki was speaking
for the CIA -- that is the uppermost echelons of the Clinton Administration.

Meanwhile, the US has reasons to worry about al-Zawahiri's plans and
intentions. While the Clinton Administration is making a strenuous effort to
convince Congress and the American people of the need to keep US forces in
Bosnia beyond the June 1998 deadline, a drastic reversal of a position
explicitly promised to Congress, the US-sponsored government in Sarajevo is
actively preparing for a military confrontation in order to regain control
over the Republika Srpska by force, using weapons and training provided by the
US under the "Train and Equip" program. One of the scenarios contemplated by
Sarajevo since the Fall of 1997 envisions the use of Islamist terrorism
against the Americans in order to expedite the withdrawal of the US forces in
case the Clinton Administration refuses to support the Bosnian Muslim military
surge.

Terrorist forces answering to Ayman al-Zawahiri are among the best prepared
and best trained for this mission. Back in the Spring of 1996, al-Zawahiri's
people already constituted the most credible threat of spectacular and highly
lethal terrorist strikes against the US components of what was then I-FOR. A
warning issued at the time specified suicide bombing as the likely form of
attack.

The warning was issued by an Egyptian Islamist using the nom de guerre
Salim al-Kurshani -- a veteran of the Mujahedin units who married a Bosnian
woman and who now legally lives in B-H. Al-Kurshani introduces himself as the
commander of a Jihadist organization called the Islamic Group -- Military
Branch in Bosnia. However, he issued the warning in the name of a new group
called the Bosnian Islamic Jihad. The all-Islamic versions of both names are
also used by Ayman al-Zawahiri.

Al-Kurshani stressed the centrality of martyrdom to his forces and stressed
his strikes would be most effective because I-FOR had no defense against such
operations. "I have a message for NATO forces in Bosnia," he warned: "We shall
send suicide bombers to punish the United States and I-FOR for their
occupation of an Islamic land."

In his statement, al-Kurshani clarified his own, and his organization's,
affiliation with the Egyptian Islamist terrorist elite, particularly the
forward headquarters in Sofia, Bulgaria, under the command of Ayman
al-Zawahiri. Indeed, the Islamist terrorist forces under al-Zawahiri's command
were activated throughout the Balkans in early April 1996. Back in early 1996,
confident in his ability to maintain secure and solid lines of communications
to the Islamist terrorist forces in B-H, al-Zawahiri ordered the deployment of
key experts capable of planning, overseeing and leading major spectacular
terrorist strikes against such objectives as US/I-FOR facilities. The arrival
of 40 Egyptian expert terrorists was the first major forward deployment for
this purpose.

This terrorist deployment, and their Iranian shield and command support,
are still in place in B-H. Meanwhile, in late October 1997, the Vanguard of
Conquest and the Jihad Group -- both under the command of Ayman al-Zawahiri --
issued a major communique that declared a forthcoming terroristic Jihad. "The
Islamic Jihad against America's world dominance, the international influence
of the Jews, and the US occupation of Muslim lands will continue," the
communique declared. This was not an idle warning for on November 17, 1997,
Zawahiri's forces carried out the carnage in Luxor -- killing well over 60
innocent Western tourists.

The November 1997 meeting between Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu-Umar al-Amriki
took place before the Luxor slaughter. Washington did not need a reminder to
be convinced of al-Zawahiri's capabilities and resolve.

Yet, even though the Islamist leadership, including both al-Zawahiri and
bin Ladin, are convinced that the offer made by Abu-Umar al-Amriki was genuine
and legitimate -- that is, on behalf of the Clinton Administration -- the
Islamists continue their preparations for a fateful confrontation with the US.

In early December 1997, the Jihad Group, led by al-Zawahiri, determined in
a special bulletin that a fateful confrontation between the US and militant
Islam, in which the Jihad intends to "offer martyrs", is both inevitable and
imminent. "A conflict between the Muslim Ummah [nation] and the United States
is unavoidable; in fact we have no other option but to confront atheism and
its ringleader, the United States, which is confronting us everywhere. With
Allah's help, we know the United States well," the Jihad bulletin notes, "we
also know its weaknesses." The bulletin stresses that "the most vulnerable
spot of the United States and Israel is to send them the bodies of their
sons." Therefore, the Jihad declares, "we should throw in their faces the
flesh of their sons, minced and grilled. The United States must pay the price;
it must pay dearly."

The bulletin stresses that al-Zawahiri's Jihad has no doubt about the
ultimate objective of the forthcoming confrontation. "The Americans themselves
admitted half of the truth when they said that the United States' first enemy
is Islamic extremism, but they hid the other half, namely that the United
States' destruction will -- InshAllah -- be at the hands of Muslims."

Thus, by early January 1998, it is not clear how convincing Abu-Umar
al-Amriki will prove to have been. The Islamist leadership, particularly
al-Zawahiri and bin Ladin, are convinced that Abu-Umar al-Amriki in fact
delivered the Clinton Administration's acquiescence to the rise of Islamist
regimes in Egypt and, for that matter, elsewhere in the Middle East. Yet, the
latest Jihad bulletin seems to suggest that the US request for al-Zawahiri not
to strike out is not being heeded to. But then, Abu-Umar al-Amriki was talking
only about al-Zawahiri's not striking out against the US forces in B-H.
Nothing was said about transferring the Islamist Jihad to other "fronts":
Egypt, Israel, or the heart of America, for that matter.

*

Meanwhile, Cairo began learning about the Abu-Umar al-Amriki episode by mid
December 1997. Egyptian officials confirmed they had known about him and his
role as an emissary for the CIA since the 1980s. Therefore, as far as
President Husni Mubarak and his immediate advisers are concerned, the evidence
they have has been determined to be sufficiently reliable to act upon.

Indeed, there is already a sense of urgency in Cairo. Cairo knows that it
is the conviction of the Egyptian Islamists and their key sponsors -- Iran and
Sudan -- that only the massive US support for, and American bolstering of,
President Mubarak have so far prevented the Islamists from the establishment
of an Islamist state in Egypt. Official Cairo knows that the mere appearance
of a withdrawal of US support from Mubarak is sure to embolden the Egyptian
Islamists and their sponsoring states to markedly escalate their struggle, and
Cairo already has troubles withstanding the ongoing Islamist terrorism and
subversion.

Little wonder that Egyptian media has already begun preparing the public
for a drastic change in policy vis-a-vis the US, Israel and Sudan -- the
latter being the primary sponsor of Islamist terrorism against Egypt, the
safe-haven from where they strike out into Egypt. For years, Sudan's spiritual
leader, Hassan al-Turabi, has been Mubarak's arch-nemesis.

In early December 1997, within days after the first reports of the meeting
between al-Zawahiri and Abu-Umar al-Amriki first surfaced, the Egyptian
government-owned newspaper al-Jumhuriyah published a story that began as
follows: "A security source has revealed fresh information on the way foreign
parties exploit terrorist elements. The information indicates the existence of
mutual benefits between terrorist elements inside and outside Egypt in
destabilizing the country and crippling its economy. The source said that an
official of one Western security organ had a meeting with Ayman al-Zawahiri,
leader of the al-Jihad Organization, at a camp in Peshawar on Pakistan's
border with Afghanistan." The story then went on to recount the meetings held
between al-Zawahiri and Abu-Umar al-Amriki "who acts as a go-between for the
CIA" back in the 1980s, during the war in Afghanistan. However, the story
served as a notice to those who know more that official Cairo also knows more
about the subject, particularly most recent developments.

A most significant development started unfolding a month later. In early
January 1998, Egyptian media began discussing emerging CIA plots against
Egypt. The opposition paper al-Sha'b, that is well connected to, and
identifies with, the nationalist sector within the defense establishment,
published a long survey of American-Israeli conspiracy run by the CIA. The
paper observes that the new US Ambassador to Egypt, who is Jewish, "has come
to Cairo to implement US plans hostile to Egypt. Meanwhile, President Bill
Clinton's administration has started to carry out an organized plan to besiege
Egypt on all fronts that can threaten Egypt's national security." The paper
provides a long list of anti-Egyptian, as well as anti-Sudanese, political and
military activities it attributes to a joint CIA-Mossad conspiracy against
Cairo. Among the choice items mentioned is the CIA's central role in the
conspiracy to deprive Egypt's rights to Umm-Rashrash (the southern Negev and
Eilat) -- Egypt's official casus belli since August 1997.

In another article, al-Sha'b sets the logic for the sudden improvement of
relations between Cairo and Turabi's Sudan. The paper notes that Egyptian
intelligence has recently acquired critical information that sheds new light
on key crises that determined Cairo's relations with Khartoum. Cairo now knows
of the "involvement of the CIA and the Mossad in planning the assassination
attempt on President Mubarak in Addis Ababa" in 1995, not only in order to
kill the President, but also "to pin the accusation against Sudan, in an
attempt to spark an immediate war between the two countries." Egyptian
intelligence is also "examining the link between this attempt [on Mubarak] and
the recent massacre in Luxor." Egyptian intelligence has uncovered that the
CIA and the Mossad "have succeeded in indirectly recruiting some Arab Afghans
and provided the financial and military backing needed for Mubarak's
assassination attempt and the Luxor massacre." Significantly, the terrorist
commander of both the 1995 attempt on Mubarak's life and the 1997 carnage in
Luxor was Turabi's protege Ayman al-Zawahiri -- a point not lost on Mubarak's
Cairo.

Meanwhile, al-Sha'b explained that taken together the evidence of the
ongoing CIA-Mossad conspiracies against Egypt and their past duplicity in
trying to implicate brotherly Sudan in their own crimes against Mubarak
warrants a profound reexamination of Egypt's strategic priorities. "The
evidence made available to the Egyptian [intelligence] agencies have resulted
in a strategic change in Egypt's stance vis-a-vis Sudan," al-Sha'b reports.
The new policy has already caused "President Mubarak's announcement that Sudan
does not sponsor terrorism," and Dr. Hassan al-Turabi's statement that "he has
nothing to do with the attempt to assassinate Mubarak," al-Sha'b explained.
"In both cases, the conspiracy sought to divide the Arab and Islamic ranks.
The high-level Egyptian-Sudanese contacts show that both sides are serious
about exposing the role of the CIA and the Mossad in conspiring against Egypt
and Sudan and containing the consequences caused by this conspiracy over the
past years."

Meanwhile, Cairo moved swiftly in more than just propaganda. Mubarak's
Egypt has thus embarked on a crash program to improve relations with Turabi's
Sudan -- the primary and direct sponsor of any Islamist onslaught on the
Mubarak Government.

In early January 1998, "a high-powered Egyptian security delegation"
traveled to Khartoum on a mission aimed to reverse the hostility of recent
years. The Egyptian delegation was received by Sudan's President Umar Hassan
al-Bashir and his deputy Major General Muhammad Salih al-Zubayr.

Indeed, President Mubarak instructed his senior security officials to
approach Khartoum at the highest level and engage in intense talks aimed at
improving relations. The Egyptian delegation was specifically instructed not
to raise such delicate issues as Khartoum's sponsorship of the 1995 attempt on
Mubarak's life or Sudan's sheltering of Islamist terrorists wanted by Egypt.
Instead, in the words of Mustafa Usman Ismail, Sudan's state minister for
foreign affairs who is the head of the Sudanese negotiations team, both sides
embarked on "intensive activities" to revive mutual relations as soon as
possible. Ismail anticipated that the President of Sudan, al-Bashir, would
soon make a formal visit to Cairo in order to openly demonstrate the new era
of close relations. This development alone does not bode well for the US
interests in the volatile Middle East.

High-level Egyptian sources stress that their delegation has already
produced a breakthrough in relations with Sudan, resulting in "tangible and
positive improvement" in their bilateral relations.

*

Ultimately, the Abu-Umar al-Amriki and al-Zawahiri meeting episode has had
such a devastating impact on Mubarak's Cairo because its ramifications confirm
what President Mubarak wants to believe.

Back in early 1996, Mubarak gave up on the US ability to determine the
shape of the Middle East. By mid 1996, the Egyptian Armed Forces began active
preparations for a possible war with Israel. In the Spring of 1997, Mubarak
raised the issue of Umm-Rashrash as a casus belli for Egypt in a closed forum
of his high command. In the Summer, during Mubarak's brief and dramatic visit
to Damascus, Egypt joined a regional military alliance led by Iran and
comprised of Syria, Iraq and the PLO. A few days later, Cairo leaked out the
Umm-Rashrash issue. Meanwhile, the anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli virulence of
the Egyptian media have been reaching new heights -- hardly an environment
conducive for the furthering of a "peace process".

However, two factors were missing in Mubarak's scenario: (1) A reason for
the cessation of Islamist terrorism and subversion -- a source of strong
pressure on Mubarak; and (2) a formal excuse enabling Cairo to break its close
relations with Washington. Now, the Abu-Umar al-Amriki and al-Zawahiri meeting
episode, the veracity of which President Mubarak believes, has provided the
key to both issues. Cairo now has the "proof" of US-inspired conspiracy
against President Mubarak -- a legitimate excuse for a crisis in bilateral
relations -- and a motive for revisiting Egypt's relations with Sudan in order
to nip in the bud any design Turabi might have for empowering his protege
al-Zawahiri in Cairo. This episode thus contributed to the reaffirmation of
Mubarak's growing conviction that Egypt's future lies with joining the
Iran-led strategic alliance and the ensuing conflict with Israel. This course
of events will not only ensure the enduring of Egypt's prominent role in the
Arab and Muslim world, but will secure Mubarak's own survival at the helm.

In the meantime, the specter of a wave of Islamist terrorism led by bin
Ladin, al-Zawahiri, and their supporters, against the US and its allies, as
well as the realignment of forces in the Middle East to the detriment of US
strategic interests, and the growing likelihood of major crises and war in
this region -- all emerge as the actual price for Washington's desperate
effort to prevent the violent collapse of the Dayton Accords in
Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Finally, there is no doubt that the November 1997 meeting between Abu-Umar
al-Amriki and al-Zawahiri took place. There is no doubt that as diverse
leaders as bin Ladin, Mubarak and Turabi are convinced that Abu-Umar al-Amriki
spoke for the CIA and the Clinton Administration. Ultimately, whether Abu-Umar
al-Amriki indeed spoke on Washington's behalf, or for another party, is
irrelevant -- for the strategic price has already been paid.

Security Zones Defined

During Wednesday's Cabinet session, the ministers were asked to approve a
list of "security zones" that Israel would hold onto in a permanent peace
agreement with the Palestinians. While the ministers did not define exactly
what areas would remain under Israeli control, they did previously indicate
two possible plans to keep either half or nearly two-thirds of the land.

The Israeli government today released a comprehensive document linking
withdrawal to PA compliance. The unclear definitions of withdrawal is seen as
a negotiating tactic for Prime Minister Netanyahu when he visits Washington on
January 20th.[I&G News, 1/14/97]

==========

Yossef Bodansky joined the Freeman Center For Strategic Studies as
its World Terrorism Analyst in 1994. He is the author of six books (Target
America, Terror, Crisis in Korea, Offensive in the
Balkans, Some
Call It Peace and Arafat's Peace Process), as well as several book chapters,
entries for the lnternational Military and Defense Encyclopedia, and numerous articles
in several periodicals and specialized journals, including Global Affairs,
Jane's Defence Weekly, Defense
& Foreign Affairs: Strategic Policy, Nativ and Business
Week. He has also lectured widely to professional audiences in the defense,
intelligence and security fields in the United States, Europe, Latin America and Asia. Since
1988, Bodansky has been the Director of the Congressional Task Force on Terrorism and
Unconventional Warfare at the US House of Representatives.

The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and
do not necessarily reflect the views of the members of the Congressional Task
Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, the U.S. Congress, or any other
branch of the U.S. Government.