did so against the remonstrances of his friends, whose
predictions that what he would get out of it for himself
would be calumny, persecution, and loss of fortune,
were all fully verified; but he possessed a nature
which found its happiness in bringing high ideals
to grand fulfillment, and in applying his powers to
that object he let everything else go. Hamilton’s
career is one of the greatest of those facts that baffle
attempts to reduce history to an exhibition of the
play of economic forces.

CHAPTER IV

ALARUMS AND EXCURSIONS

The Shakespearian stage direction which heads this
chapter appropriately describes the course of administrative
experience while Washington was trying to get from
Congress the means of sustaining the responsibilities
with which he was charged by his office. Events
did not stand still because for a time anything like
national government had ceased. Before Washington
left Mount Vernon he had been disquieted by reports
of Indian troubles in the West, and of intrigues by
Great Britain—­which still retained posts
that according to the treaty of peace belonged to the
United States,—­and by Spain which held the
lower Mississippi. Washington applied himself
to these matters as soon as he was well in office,
but he was much hindered in his arrangements by apathy
or indifference in Congress. He noted in his
diary for May 1, 1790, communications made to him
of a disposition among members of Congress “to
pay little attention to the Western country because
they were of the opinion it would soon shake off its
dependence on this, and, in the meantime would be burdensome
to it.” From a letter of Gen. Rufus Putnam,
one of the organizers of the Ohio company, it appears
that in July, 1789, Ames of Massachusetts put these
queries to him: “Can we retain the western
country with the government of the United States?
And if we can, what use will it be to them?”
Putnam wrote a labored article to the effect that
it was both feasible and desirable to hold the West,
but the character of his arguments shows that there
was then a poor prospect of success. At that time
no one could have anticipated the Napoleonic wars
which ended all European competition for the possession
of the Mississippi valley, and, as it were, tossed
that region into the hands of the United States.
There was strong opposition in Congress to pursuing
any course that would require maintenance of an army
or navy. Some held that it was a great mistake
to have a war department, and that there would be
time enough to create one in case war should actually
arrive.