WAHL, J.: Galen Decker appeals from the trial court's dismissal for failure to
state a claim in his action asking the trial court to set aside an office lease entered into
by the Kansas Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS) and KANSA
Development Corporation (KDC).

SRS published notice of its desire to rent an office location prepared to its
specifications for its field office in Liberal, Kansas. KDC's proposal to prepare and lease
such office space for a 10-year term was accepted by SRS. Decker also presented a
proposal, but it was not selected. Decker filed an action against SRS, claiming the
lease should be set aside or he should receive damages based on SRS's failure to
select the office space by a competitive bid process. KDC was originally a defendant in
the action but was dismissed on Decker's motion.

SRS filed a motion to dismiss the suit, claiming Decker failed to state a claim on
which relief could be granted. Decker filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial
court granted SRS's motion to dismiss and denied Decker's motion for summary
judgment. Decker filed a timely notice of appeal.

The standard of review on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is set
out in Noel v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 15 Kan. App. 2d 225, 231, 805 P.2d 1244, rev.
denied
248 Kan. 996 (1991):

"In essence, we [appellate courts] are required to assume that the facts alleged by the
plaintiffs
are true, and we are required to make any reasonable inference to be drawn from those facts. In
addition,
it is our duty to determine whether those pleaded facts and inferences state a claim, not only on
the theory
which may be espoused by the plaintiffs, but on any possible theory we can divine."

"When a motion to dismiss under K.S.A. 60-212(b)(6) raises an issue concerning the
legal
sufficiency of a claim and the trial court receives and considers matters outside the pleadings, the
motion
shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided under K.S.A. 60-256."

The trial court made factual findings based, at least in part, on the affidavit
Decker filed with his motion for summary judgment. Therefore, this case should be
considered as a summary judgment case.

"The burden on the party seeking summary judgment is a strict one. The trial court is
required
to resolve all facts and inferences which may reasonably be drawn from the evidence in favor of
the
party against whom the ruling is sought. Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show
that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a
matter of law." Mitzner v. State Dept. of SRS, 257 Kan. 258, 260, 891 P.2d 435
(1995).

In the case before us, there appears to be no genuine issue of material fact.
This court must, therefore, determine whether SRS was entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.

Decker alleged that SRS was required to select its "build to suit" lease
pursuant to K.S.A. 75-3739(a), which provides:

"All contracts for construction and repairs, and all purchases of and contracts for supplies,
materials, equipment and contractual services to be acquired for state agencies shall be based on
competitive bids, except that competitive bids need not be required: (1) For contractual services
when,
in the judgment of the director of purchases, no competition exists; or (2) when, in the judgment
of the
director of purchases, chemicals or other material or equipment for use in laboratories or
experimental
studies by state agencies are best purchased without competition, or where rates are fixed by law
or
ordinance; or (3) when, in the judgment of the director of purchases, an agency emergency
requires
immediate delivery of supplies, materials or equipment, or immediate performance of services;
or (4)
when any statute authorizes another procedure or provides an exemption from the provisions of
this
section."

Determination of the issue before us requires interpretation of K.S.A. 75-3739(a).
"Interpretation of a statute is a question of law. An appellate court's review
of a question of law is unlimited." Foulk v. Colonial Terrace, 20 Kan. App. 2d 277,
Syl. ¶ 1, 887 P.2d 140 (1994), rev. denied 257 Kan. 1091 (1995).

"When a statute is plain and unambiguous, the court must give effect to the
intention of the legislature as expressed, rather than determine what the law should
or should not be." Martindale v. Tenny, 250 Kan. 621, Syl. ¶ 2, 829 P.2d 561
(1992).
"'The several provisions of an act, in pari materia, must be construed together with a
view of reconciling and bringing them into workable harmony and giving effect to the
entire statute if it is reasonably possible to do so.'" Guardian Title Co. v. Bell, 248
Kan. 146, 151, 805 P.2d 33 (1991).

We can distill the issue into whether the "build to suit" lease is a contract for
construction and repairs or a purchase of or contract for supplies, materials,
equipment, or contractual services. The document itself is entitled "Real Estate
Lease." The lease term is for 10 years. The work required to prepare the building to
meet SRS specifications would probably not be performed over a significant portion
of those 10 years, if during any portion of that time. Although KDC would probably
have to do some construction work in order to meet the SRS specifications, the
major part of the agreement between SRS and KDC is a real estate lease, not a
contract for construction and repairs. K.S.A. 75-3739(h), another subsection within
the statute which refers to when competitive bidding is required, applies to leases,
stating:

"Except as otherwise specifically provided by law, no state agency shall enter into any
lease of
real property without the prior approval of the secretary of administration. Such state agency
shall
submit to the secretary of administration such information relating to any such proposed lease as
the
secretary may require. The secretary of administration shall either approve, modify and approve
or
reject any such proposed lease."

It is a well-accepted principle of statutory construction that

"[g]eneral and special statutes should be read together and harmonized whenever possible,
but to the
extent a conflict between them exists, the special statute will prevail unless it appears the
legislature
intended to make the general statute controlling." Kansas Racing Management, Inc. v.
Kansas Racing
Comm'n, 244 Kan. 343, 353, 770 P.2d 423 (1989).

K.S.A. 75-3739(h) applies directly to leases and, therefore, is specifically
applicable to the factual situation at hand, while K.S.A. 75-3739(a) is not.

The competitive bid procedure is under the supervision of the director of
purchases. K.S.A. 75-3740. Under K.S.A. 75-3739(h), the procedure for getting
leases approved by the secretary of administration does not involve the director of
purchases. Leases are specifically provided for in a manner different from contracts
for construction and repairs.

The trial court was correct, as a matter of law, in holding the K.S.A. 75-3739(a)
competitive bid procedure was not applicable to the present case.