This
matter is before the Court on Defendants Jazeall Brown,
Janice Fairless, Laverta Barnes, and Louisa Lyles' Motion
for Summary Judgment (Doc. 83). The Motion is fully briefed
and ready for disposition. Also before the Court is Plaintiff
Benjamin William Wagner's pro se Motion for Return of
PLRA Filing Fee (Doc. 96). For the following reasons, the
Court will grant Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
and deny Plaintiff's Motion for Return of PLRA Filing
Fee.

I.
Background

On
August 18, 2015, Plaintiff, a Missouri inmate, filed this
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants in
their individual and official capacities (Doc. 1). His
complaint, as amended, alleges that Defendants impermissibly
restricted his access to incoming and outgoing non-legal mail
between July 16, 2012 and March 7, 2013, while he was
incarcerated as a pre-trial detainee at the St. Louis City
Justice Center (“SLCJC”) (Doc. 51). For relief,
he seeks damages and a declaration that Defendants violated
his rights under the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution (Id. at 12).[1] Defendants now move for
summary judgment (Doc. 84). Plaintiff has filed a response
(Doc. 87), and Defendants have replied (Doc. 89).

The
summary judgment evidence establishes the
following.[2] Plaintiff was held at the SLCJC from
approximately December 20, 2011 to March 10, 2014, while he
awaited trial in the St. Louis City Circuit Court on various
charges arising out of his alleged sexual assaults of several
minor children (Doc. 84.1 at ¶¶ 1-2).

Brown
was a receptionist at the SLCJC (Id. at 4). Her job
responsibilities did not include delivering mail to inmates;
instead, her duties included sorting all of SLCJC's
incoming mail and forwarding the inmate mail to Fairless
(Id. at ¶¶ 5-6). Fairless was a clerk in
the SLCJC mailroom; her job duties included sorting inmate
mail and forwarding any inmate mail that was under subpoena
to Lyles (Id. at ¶¶ 7-8). Lyles, a
correctional officer at SLCJC, was responsible for handling
responses to subpoenas (Id. at ¶¶ 9-10).
Barnes was an administrative assistant at SLCJC. She was not
involved with any aspect of SLCJC's inmate mail service,
did not supervise any mailroom workers, and did not order
anyone to withhold Plaintiff's mail (Id. at
¶¶ 11-13). Barnes, Lyles, Fairless, and Brown did
not have authority to make SLCJC policies (Id. at
¶ 14).

According
to Defendants, during routine processing of Plaintiff's
mail, SLCJC officials discovered that Plaintiff was
corresponding with his alleged victims and receiving
“potentially inappropriate photographs.”
(Id. at ¶ 15). SLCJC employees reported this
activity to the St. Louis Circuit Attorney's Office
(Id. at ¶ 16). Plaintiff denies that he had any
correspondence with his alleged victims or that he received
any inappropriate photographs during his confinement at the
SLCJC (Doc. 87 at 7).

On or
about July 17, 2012, SLCJC officials received a subpoena
duces tecum directed at Lyles (Id. at
¶ 17). The subpoena was issued by a detective at the
Circuit Attorney's Office and stated the following:

You are hereby commanded, that, setting aside all manner of
excuse and delay, you be and appear before our [St. Louis
City Circuit Court] on the 17th day of July, 2012 at 9 a.m.
and speak the truth, in a certain cause pending in our said
court, where in the State of Missouri is the Plaintiff and,
Benjamin Wagner, Defendant, on the part of the STATE OF
MISSOURI. You are further commanded to testify to records in
your possession or provide information relative to:
Incoming and outgoing mail for [Wagner] for mail
received or sent out by defendant Benjamin Wagner, while
confined at the St. Louis City Justice Center.

(Doc. 84.1 at ¶¶ 17-18; Doc. 84.10).

Fairless
and Lyles believed that the subpoena was valid and that they
were required to comply with it (Id. at ¶ 26).
Believing that the subpoena required her to give all of
Plaintiff's non-legal incoming and outgoing mail to the
Circuit Attorney's Office, Lyles directed Fairless to
sort Plaintiff's mail and forward it to the Circuit
Attorney's Office (Id. at ¶¶ 20-21).
Between July 17, 2012 and March 7, 2013, all of
Plaintiff's incoming and outgoing non-legal mail was
redirected to the Circuit Attorney's Office; none of his
legal mail was interrupted (Id. at ¶¶
22-23). On March 7, 2013, the Circuit Court ordered the
Circuit Attorney to return all of Plaintiff's mail that
it had received pursuant to the subpoena, and directed the
SLCJC to stop intercepting Plaintiff's mail (Id.
at ¶ 24; Doc. 84.2 at 12). After March 7, 2013, none of
Plaintiff's mail was redirected to the Circuit Attorney
(Doc. 84.1 at ¶ 25). At all relevant times, the SLCJC
had a policy relating to the processing of inmate mail;
however, the policy did not set forth any procedure for
processing inmate mail that is subject to a subpoena
(Id. at ¶¶ 27-28). On February 27, 2014,
Plaintiff was convicted on thirteen felony counts-including
forcible rape, statutory rape, forcible sodomy, statutory
sodomy, and child molestation-and two misdemeanor counts
after he entered guilty pleas pursuant to North Carolina
v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (Docs. 84.1 at ¶ 2;
84.2 at 1-9).

II.
Summary Judgment Standard

The
Court may grant a motion for summary judgment if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Peterson v. Kopp, 754 F.3d
594, 598 (8th Cir. 2014). A moving party bears the burden of
informing the Court of the basis of its motion. Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the
moving party discharges this burden, the nonmoving party must
set forth specific facts demonstrating that there is a
dispute as to a genuine issue of material fact, not the
“mere existence of some alleged factual dispute.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
247-48 (1986).

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;In
passing on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view
the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042
(8th Cir. 2011). The Court&#39;s function is not to weigh the
evidence but to determine whether there is a genuine issue
for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
“‘Credibility determinations, the weighing of the
evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the
facts are jury functions, not those ...

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