INTELLIGENCE STUDY SAYS NORTH KOREA HAS NUCLEAR BOMB

By STEPHEN ENGELBERG with MICHAEL R. GORDON,

Published: December 26, 1993

WASHINGTON, Dec. 25—
The Central Intelligence Agency has told President Clinton that North Korea probably has developed one or two nuclear bombs, according to Administration officials.

The classified assessment -- supported by virtually all intelligence agencies but disputed by the State Department's analysts -- deepens the Administration's dilemma as it tries to fulfill Mr. Clinton's pledge that "North Korea cannot be allowed to develop a nuclear bomb."

If confirmed, North Korea's nuclear status would have significant implications for Asian stability. Many American officials fear that it would touch off an arms race in the region and push Japan to develop atomic weapons. A 'Worst Case' Scenario?

Some officials contend that the Administration is playing down the recently completed intelligence study because it calls into question the effectiveness of its diplomatic efforts to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear program.

But other senior Clinton Administration policy makers question the assertions, arguing they represent a "worst case" analysis that is based not on conclusive proof but on estimates about the amount of plutonium the North Koreans could have produced and assessments on the pace of their program.

"What the intelligence community is saying is that the horse is already out of the barn," one official said. "It's too late."

Asked about the new assessment, Clinton Administration officials said they were still determined to pursue diplomacy to prevent North Korea from producing more plutonium for nuclear weapons, or, if the study proves correct, to force the country to relinquish its bombs. Not an Attractive Option

Pentagon officials have said the option of a preemptive strike against North Korea's nuclear installations is not an attractive one, because it would risk a war and American intelligence does not know where Pyongyang has hidden its plutonium or bombs.

The comprehensive review of Pyongyang's nuclear program represents the collective judgment of American intelligence agencies and was presented to Mr. Clinton and senior White House officials in recent weeks. Defense Secretary Les Aspin and Senator Sam Nunn, the Georgia Democrat who chairs the Senate Armed Services Committee, have alluded to the report's conclusions but have couched their remarks with more ambiguity than those of the document itself.

The document, called a National Intelligence Estimate, says there is a "better than even" chance that North Korea already has a nuclear bomb and holds out little hope that the Clinton Administration can derail the reclusive North Korean Government's nuclear program. It argues that diplomatic efforts or economic sanctions, a next step contemplated by some officials, are unlikely to succeed. The study said sanctions could even prompt an attack by the North Koreans against the South.

Most of the intelligence analysts agree that North Korea is investing significant amounts of its scarce cash in a program to obtain plutonium, develop the high-explosive trigger needed for a nuclear detonation and build a medium-range missile that can reach Japan.

The study estimates that North Korean could have extracted as much as 12 kilograms of plutonium, about 26 pounds, which would be enough under optimum conditions for two bombs. No Satellite Picture For Confirmation

American officials also said they have detected craters near North Korea's nuclear site at Yongbyon that are consistent with experiments with conventional munitions needed to detonate a nuclear bomb.

Still, American intelligence does not have a specific satellite picture, electronic intercept or agent's report that confirms deployment of a weapon.

The judgment that North Korea probably has a nuclear bomb is supported by almost every intelligence agency, including the C.I.A., the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency and also the Energy Department. Only the State Department's intelligence arm, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, disputes the conclusion, arguing that the data are not persuasive.

Several officials said the disagreement over North Korea's nuclear abilities turns not only on an analysis of its scientific prowess but also on a fundamental dispute over the intentions of the Government. C.I.A. analysts tend to see Pyongyang's leaders as despots who have turned to nuclear weapons to insure their hold on power. Analysts at the State Department assert there are splits within North Korea's ruling elite, and they say moderates should be encouraged through a combination of incentives and punishments.

The new intelligence assessment has important implications for efforts by the Clinton Administration to persuade North Korea to open its nuclear sites to international inspectors and abandon its nuclear program.

Those negotiations have recently showed signs of progress.

Administration officials have said, for example, that there has been progress in persuading the North Koreans to open all seven of its officially disclosed nuclear sites to international monitors. But they caution that important details need to be worked out, and there is no agreement on the separate question of whether inspectors can visit two waste dumps to see how much plutonium the North Koreans might have produced. Problems Created For South Koreans