Books in Review

Conservatism

Right Thinking

Conservatism: An Anthology of Social and Political Thought.
Edited by Jerry Z. Muller. Princeton University Press. 450 pp. $44.95 cloth,
$19.95 paper.

Daniel J. Mahoney

Conservatism has undoubtedly established its presence on the American
political and intellectual landscape, but most of us would be at a loss
to define it with any kind of precision. To begin with, one must separate
American conservatism as a political movement, a broad coalition of forces
that defends the integrity of civil society against the collectivist encroachments
of the state, from the larger currents of intellectual conservatism that
have European origins and are often less libertarian or anti-statist in
orientation. Despite an occasional nod to Edmund Burke or Friedrich Hayek,
most American conservatives actively engaged in political life are singularly
uninterested in attaining clarity about the character of conservatism as
an intellectual movement.

This should not surprise us, since conservatism entails the rejection
of abstract and doctrinaire theoretical approaches to political life. But
it was Burke himself who tried to persuade the gentlemen of his day and
party that they must defend themselves and political decency in general
against theoretical currents that undermined the integrity of "sound
practice." So conservatives, who have a distaste for political theories,
must nonetheless theorize about politics. Here we arrive at a paradox that
Jerry Z. Muller's anthology of conservative thought richly highlights:
conservatism is that theory which aims to protect sound practice against
corrosive and corrupting theory. It is a political philosophy deeply suspicious
of "metaphysical" or "literary" politics.

From David Hume and Edmund Burke to Michael Oakeshott and Friedrich
Hayek (each of whom is amply represented and thoughtfully commented upon
in this book) conservative theorists have criticized "contractualist"
and "constructivist" approaches to political life that ignore
the dependence of the social fabric upon institutions, customs, and habits
that are not the product of human design. In his excellent introduction,
Muller emphasizes the conservative critique of "theory," of what
Burke called "the abuse of reason." Muller locates conservatism
in an approach that he calls "historical utilitarianism." It
emphasizes the wisdom of long-established historical practices, the latent
functions served by seemingly obsolete institutions and traditions, the
indispensable role of custom and habit as a "second nature,"
and the unintended consequences that stem from efforts to radically transform
the social order. Conservatives, despite their substantive disagreements
about the ultimate nature of things, have resisted liberal and radical
calls for "transparency" in social life precisely because they
understand that society cannot withstand a too systematic or energetic
analysis of its sometimes fragile foundations.

But Muller is careful to differentiate conservatism from orthodoxy.
He locates conservatism in a profound skepticism regarding knowledge of
the nature of man or a natural order of things--hence his choice of David
Hume as the founder of a modern, enlightened, skeptical, and "utilitarian"
conservatism. What are we to make of this seemingly idiosyncratic choice
of origins?

Muller is undoubtedly correct to distinguish conservatism both from
orthodoxy and from a radical conservatism that aims to uproot liberal civilization
in the name of vitalistic and nationalist values. But, in my view, he understates
the important connections that persist between conservatism and orthodoxy.
By "orthodoxy" I mean any political-philosophical approach that
admits the possibility and necessity of theoretical metaphysics and philosophical
ethics rooted in a reflection on the "nature" of things. Muller
is right to emphasize the conservative critique of rationalism and the
strongly historicist or anti-universalist character of many conservative
thinkers. He is also right to raise the question of whether the conservative
emphasis on the utility of institutions and social practices does not ultimately
undermine belief in "the truth of existing institutions, or indeed
in the idea of truth as such." But that objection to historicist conservatism
was raised, as Muller notes, by Leo Strauss, certainly a conservative thinker,
at least in the sense that classical political philosophy is a major source
of modern conservatism. By overemphasizing the historicist and utilitarian
character of conservative thought, Muller inevitably is forced to downplay
an equally fundamental conservative theme: the critique of moral and philosophical
relativism in the name of a permanent order of things.

I believe that Muller's mistake is rooted in a too facile assimilation
of Hume and Burke (Burke attacked metaphysical politics and not metaphysics
per se, and assuredly believed that custom as "second nature"
was deeply rooted in an unchangeable human and social nature) and in a
general failure to confront fully the important conservative critique of
relativism and historicism. He provides rich selections from Irving Kristol,
Peter Berger and Richard John Neuhaus, and the German writer Hermann Lubbe
that stress the limits of social and cultural "emancipation."
But he understates the anti-relativistic character of that critique because
he is rather dogmatically attached to a skeptical (e.g., Humean) conception
of conservatism.

It seems to me that a whole range of more or less conservative thinkers
aim to steer a middle way between a deductive, natural law approach to
political things and the anti-rationalism highlighted by Muller. For example,
the Hungarian-born moral and political philosopher Aurel Kolnai speaks
for a conservatism that attempts to do justice to the reality of a natural
order as well as to the prudential requirements of political life. In a
remarkable review of Michael Oakeshott's Rationalism in Politics in the
English journal Philosophy (January 1965) that ought to be read by all
self-described conservatives, Kolnai wrote:

The concept of "nature" has been artificially overworked by
metaphysicians of various kinds, but there is something unreal and artificial
also in the studied negation of the natural order of things. And this very
observation, for what it may be worth, has, I think, a conservative rather
than a subversive point.

This fundamental caveat aside, Jerry Muller (and Princeton University
Press) are to be applauded for providing a first-rate anthology of conservative
thought. Muller's general introduction, afterword, and particular introductions
to the individual selections provide an eloquent and learned overview of
some of the greatest conservative themes.

His selections are drawn broadly from British, French, and German as
well as American writers and hence avoid the parochialism typical in American
discussions of conservatism. Some of the readings are little gems: Justin
Moser's 1772 warning about the dangers associated with "Diminished
Disgrace of Whores and Their Children in Our day"; T. E. Hulme's "Essays
on War" (1916), which respond to Bertrand Russell's arguments for
pacifism; and Winston Churchill's "Speech on Rebuilding the House
of Commons" (1943), a remarkable critique of "rationalism in
politics" by a Burkean-minded statesman.

But the book is nonetheless marred by the absence of any selection from
Alexis de Tocqueville (whose influence on contemporary conservative theorists
is duly noted by Muller) or of any contemporary French conservative liberals,
such as Raymond Aron or Bertrand de Jouvenel, who operate within a broadly
Tocquevillian framework. In my view, no thinker better highlights the necessity
or dignity of intermediary associations (a conservative theme par excellence)
nor provides a deeper account of the dependence of modern liberal democracy
upon the "moral capital" of premodern times. Better than any
other conservative theorist, Tocqueville appreciated both the comparative
justice of modern democracy as well as the threat it poses to the higher
excellences of human nature. And I know of no figure who better inoculates
thoughtful people against the utopian temptations of both left and right.

But omissions and biases notwithstanding, general readers and scholars
alike will find Muller's anthology an excellent place to begin the necessary
conversation on the meaning of conservatism in the modern world.

Daniel J. Mahoney is Associate Professor of Politics at Assumption College
in Worcester, Massachussetts, and the author, most recently, of DeGaulle:
Statesmanship, Grandeur, and Modern Democracy (Praeger 1996).