Star Wars Position Dims Hope For Accord

August 8, 1986|By John C. Bersia of the Sentinel Staff

The Orlando Sentinel: Will the president's announcement diminish the chances for agreement on arms control at the second superpower summit?

Jack Mendelson: If the president isn't prepared to negotiate some constraints on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program, then the chances for the Soviets to agree to some arms control reductions are very slight. The most optimistic observers of the arms control process see what they call a grand compromise in the wings. This grand compromise would be the trade of constraints on strategic defenses for reductions in offensive nuclear weaponry.

Last year the Soviet Union proposed a 50 percent reduction in such weaponry if the United States abandoned Star Wars. The Soviets now have proposed that some aspects of Star Wars research be permitted, but that both countries pledge to abide by the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty for at least 15 to 20 years. If this is the preferred U.S. outcome, the Soviets have said, then they would be prepared to take a 20 to 30 percent cut in their strategic arsenal. While the chances for a grand compromise are quite small, the possibility of it taking place would require the United States to move back from its rather adamant position regarding the deployment of Star Wars.

Q: Last week the president said that for the first time we are moving down the road toward reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. But the next day his administration announced that once and for all it would dump U.S. compliance with the SALT 2 treaty. Then he said Wednesday he would deploy Star Wars. Why such confusing signals?

A: The administration primarily has been conducting a public diplomacy campaign that gives the impression that the United States is engaged in serious negotiations. But as long as Reagan insists that Star Wars will proceed toward eventual deployment, his hopes about eventual reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons are without foundation.

Q: Do you believe that the Reagan administration is serious about negotiating an arms control accord?

A: To date there has been very little indication that the administration is prepared to make the tough decisions that will be required to forge progress in arms control. Those decisions would include bottling the Star Wars program in a way that conformed with the original intent of the 1972 ABM treaty. The threat of deploying Star Wars undercuts efforts to achieve arms control and could drive up the size of the offensive arsenals on both sides. I have only to quote Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in November 1985: 'Even a probable Soviet territorial defense would require us to increase the number of our offensive forces.'

Q: You mentioned the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty as a key to keeping the arms race under control. Do you believe that Reagan also has targeted this treaty for removal?

A: In order for Star Wars to proceed according to administration expectations, the United States will have to breach the ABM treaty, probably by the end of this decade. The administration shredded SALT 2 earlier this year, so it's very clear that the administration's next target is the ABM treaty.

The administration has gone after the treaty in several ways: First, last fall Reagan announced a scandalous reinterpretation of the intent of the treaty that would have legitimized Star Wars research. That reinterpretation provoked such an outcry that the administration backed off within 10 days. A recent administration thrust at the treaty has been an attempt to enlist the Soviet Union as a partner in proceeding with SDI development and deployment.

Q: How would apparent stubbornness by the Reagan administration to pursue arms control affect the Soviets' own willingness to bargain?

A: It will have a negative impact. That isn't to say that the Soviets will not go ahead with the summit, and that there won't be an attempt by both sides to pour out a thin gruel that they will try to pass off as major arms control. For example, they could sign a bilateral agreement declaring their intent not to proliferate chemical weapons to Third World countries.