These 10 words were printed in bold typeface on page 27 of Glencore's 1,637-page pre-float prospectus.

The risk rider, which appears in almost all prospectuses, is little more than a legal get-out clause included to stop investors from taking action should all turn sour. But in Glencore's case, they have been all too prescient.

In the three months since the commodities trading and mining giant floated in London and Hong Kong, its share price has largely headed in one direction: south. Floating at the middle of its 480-580p indicative range at 530p on May 24, its shares closed on Friday night at 347.95p.

The 35pc drop since its almost fives-times over-subscribed initial public offering – the third biggest in European history – has wiped more than £13bn of shareholder value from the company's market capitalisation. Over the same period, the FTSE 100, of which it is a constituent, has fallen by 14pc and the FTSE 350's mining index has fallen by 19.3pc.

The banking sector – Glencore's marketing business accounts for roughly one-third of underlying earnings before interest and tax – has fallen by almost 25pc. On most metrics, Glencore's float has not been the glistening success story it at first seemed destined to be.

Against a backdrop of a falling and intensely volatile market – the FTSE 100 lost £72.7bn over the past week – the company's recent fate is perhaps not surprising.

With only 12pc of its shares not held by either tied-in senior management, employees or cornerstone investors – including the likes of BlackRock and hedge fund Och-Ziff – the share swings have been significantly exacerbated as investors seek refuge in long-established equities and safe havens such as gold and certain currencies.

Nevertheless, with Glencore's shares in decline, this Thursday's half-year results could be pivotal in proving to investors that backing the IPO was worth not only the hype, but the premium paid from the outset.

It is clear from trading and price data that a certain amount of the damage was done to Glencore's share price immediately after the float. Although trading volume was relatively light immediately after the float according to broking sources, it seems that a certain amount of IPO investors sold out.

"Look, the shares were four or five times over-subscribed. Some people got rid as it wasn't enough for them," admits Michael Rawlinson, head of mining, metals, and natural resources research at Liberum Capital, the only boutique bank on the float's 23-bank roster.

But since the initial exit, liquidity has increased, with data from Friday showing a volume of 10.69m shares traded. During certain days this month as many as 20m shares have changed hands, suggesting significant recycling as there are only 8.8m shares in its free float.

But with that increase in liquidity has come a marked decline in value, with the price closing below 500p for the first time in mid-June, and below 400p for the first time at the start of this month.

For Ivan Glasenberg, the chief executive, and his top-tier of senior managers, the current share price is not thought to be an immediate distraction. Complicated lock-up agreements – in part a by-product of the Swiss tax regime in which Glencore is domiciled – staggered out as far as five years mean that sales are not even possible, should they want to. Glasenberg – whose 15.7pc stake has declined from being worth £5.76bn to £3.78bn – has said previously he will not sell a single share while he remains with the company.

But for investors who bought in ahead of the float, it is a different matter. One banker involved in the process admits: "Are my clients ****** off? Of course they are. But that would be the case with whatever I sold them at that point in the cycle."

"Glencore is a high beta stock and attracts that type of investor so it tends to be more volatile and so gets dumped more quickly," argues analyst Peter Davey of Standard Bank. "Worse, because it's only just come on to the market, the losses are quite visible."

Liberum's Rawlinson admits that during the roadshow process he always thought any share price risk would be in the first six months, as Glencore is "back-end laden" in financial terms. "The operating assets are of lower quality than its peer group, but they have transformative qualities," he said.

Glencore's 35pc stake in Xstrata - itself viewed as having lower quality assets than the likes of Rio Tinto or BHP Billiton - has also not helped, given Xstrata has seen 32pc wiped off its valuation since mid-May.

"For the downturn [in the wider market] to come now is poor timing," Rawlinson said. "We haven't seen a big flight from commodities but people are discounting the stock. That's one of the reasons why it has been weaker than most."

The other, he asserts, is "that no matter what you tell people" they still view it as a financial stock. Although much of Glencore's success is predicated on its unified model – not only mining the assets, but trading, hedging and transporting them – it would appear that its financial side is exacerbating the share price decline.

In late 2008, during the credit crisis, questions were asked in the market over Glencore's liquidity, with premiums on its credit default swaps – a form of insurance should a loan default – in Glencore's unsecured debt soaring almost ten-fold in the space of just a matter of months. Investors believed there was an increasing chance that Glencore might default.

Today, its balance sheet looks very different: it has no short-term debt, three-year credit facilities and $10bn in the bank – not to mention an ability to raise more through the markets should it want to, meaning it should not be susceptible to the current sovereign risk crisis haunting the major banks. Those fears aside, the far bigger issue, it would seem, is the market concern about commodities, amid fears that the economic slowdown will reduce demand.

Estimates suggest some $18bn was wiped off the value of global commodities the week before last, with the rout continuing throughout the last week.

"Glencore's kind of a proxy for commodities," argues Richard Hunter, head of UK equities at stockbroker Hargreaves Lansdown.

"Clearly, with the concerns about emerging market growth, and its initial pricing, it has not been a star."

"Bearish and bearish," is the response Julian Jessop, chief international economist at Capital Economics, gives when asked what the short and medium-term prospects for the commodities sector are.

"If we're talking industrial commodities, those are very closely linked to the performance of the economic cycle, not only industry but construction.

"Looking at industrial metals in particular, the bulk of demand comes from China, with 40pc of copper and aluminium demand stemming from China. We do expect Chinese growth to slow, perhaps significantly over the next few years."

Glasenberg, however, is thought to reject such assertions, remaining fairly bullish on the subject, and arguing that China's growth story remains intact.

For Glasenberg and Glencore, however, such prevailing headwinds are believed to be viewed as of lesser importance than the company's main goal: profitability.

Having been a private partnership for 37 years where the returns were delivered to the partners in the form of dividends, the focus on returns is perhaps greater than at other companies. The key metric used internally is return on equity, which has averaged 38pc a year over the last 10 years, a greater return than its competitors.

At its first-quarter results in mid-June, despite delivering a 47pc rise in profit after tax in the three months to March, Glencore's shares fell on the day as investors raised question marks over the strength of the company's marketing division, exacerbated by evidence from investment banks, whose fixed income, currency and commodities divisions have had a largely dismal year.

"The market doesn't understand the marketing business, it's a bit of a 'trust me' story," says analyst Nik Stanojevic at Brewin Dolphin. "To me, the best thing I can come up with is that somehow the revenues move in line with commodities prices – they take positions in certain commodities but don't say in what, so it's difficult to estimate."

On Thursday, Glencore is due to publish its numbers for the first-half of the year. In the last week, the company received downgrades from two of its own brokers – Citigroup and Credit Suisse – while RBS, which was also involved in the float, lowered its target price from 540p to 475p.

City sources suggest this is perhaps not a bad thing, meaning that the results are less likely to surprise on the downside. It is thought that if the publication of the first-half results – consensus forecasts suggest earnings before interest and tax in the region of $3.3bn for the first six months of the year – are more in line with expectations than those from the first quarter, there may be some respite for downtrodden investors.

"There is still demand for Glencore for those investors that are willing to be patient and take a view over the medium term," says Atif Latif, director of trading at Guardian Stockbrokers, who believes that the mid-year numbers might present a turning point.

More likely, however, the real turning point will come when the company actually begins to do what it listed to do: make acquisitions. A relatively small purchase was announced at the first-quarter results – buying a 70pc stake in a Peruvian copper project for $475m – but this is expected to be just the tip of the iceberg.

Glencore-watchers point out that the company used the last downturn to seize opportunities, opportunities not only in looking for undervalued asset classes, but also in taking advantage of the slump in valuations. Glencore's winter 2008/9 investment of $500m into Katanga Mining is often cited as a key example of its ability to see value.

Katanga, listed in Toronto but with copper and cobalt assets in the Democratic Republic of Congo, had seen a 97pc fall in its share price in just six months, before Glencore proposed its investment, which yielded it a 74pc stake in the company, a stake that is today worth $1.7bn.

Although Glencore cannot issue new shares for another three months – and even then only with the permission of the trio of banks which led its float – its $10bn acquisition war chest is likely to be burning a hole in Glasenberg's pocket. "This is the killing season for Glencore, they have cash, they're rubbing their hands with glee," says Rawlinson.

He argues, however, that rather than the sort of life-changing deal that is being seen in the technology sector, Glencore will focus on what Rawlinson terms "small, weird stuff" – little-known assets in far-off countries.

Being a cash buyer with a proven track record of making acquisitions work will aid Glencore in its ability to pounce, with some talk of the possibility of another acquisition to be unveiled alongside this week's results.

Of course, the greatest prize of all, Xstrata, may yet allude Glencore for some time to come. Despite Xstrata's own price decline – off 28.4pc since the start of August alone – it remains unlikely that a deal will be done any time soon. Issuing shares at current levels – once the restrictions have been removed – would hurt current investors and not make a great deal of financial sense.

Although many have speculated that a key reasoning behind Glencore's listing was to provide a solid market value to make an acquisition of Xstrata somewhat smoother, the irony is that since the float the valuation of both has been increasingly volatile. Perhaps for Glasenberg, those 10 little words on the pre-float prospectus, could yet prove to be the biggest downside of all.