tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-72476372019-05-23T05:38:08.601-04:00Guide to RealityIdeas and Arguments Toward an Improved WorldviewSteve Esserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03127743863789489392noreply@blogger.comBlogger340125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7247637.post-85291582872183345182014-09-08T15:30:00.002-04:002017-04-07T11:24:55.958-04:00GPPC Public Issues Forum<div style="background-color: white; color: #141823; font-family: Helvetica, Arial, &quot;lucida grande&quot;, tahoma, verdana, arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; line-height: 19.31px; margin-bottom: 6px;">UPDATE: &nbsp;For the latest schedule of GPPC-sponsored events please see the <a href="http://www.thegppc.org/" target="_blank">GPPC website</a>.<br /><br />--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />Please join us for this GPPC co-sponsored event at <a href="http://www.rosemont.edu/about-us/the-institute/upcoming-events/conferences/index.aspx" target="_blank">Rosemont College</a>, Rosemont, PA. &nbsp;It should be a lively discussion.</div><div style="background-color: white; color: #141823; font-family: Helvetica, Arial, &quot;lucida grande&quot;, tahoma, verdana, arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; line-height: 19.31px; margin-bottom: 6px;"><br /></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #141823; font-family: Helvetica, Arial, &quot;lucida grande&quot;, tahoma, verdana, arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px; line-height: 19.31px; margin-bottom: 6px;"><b><span style="font-size: medium;">Ethics in Business: A Public Issues Forum on Corporate Responsibility</span></b></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #141823; font-family: Helvetica, Arial, &quot;lucida grande&quot;, tahoma, verdana, arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px; line-height: 19.31px; margin-bottom: 6px;"><b><span style="font-size: medium;"><br /></span></b></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #141823; font-family: Helvetica, Arial, &quot;lucida grande&quot;, tahoma, verdana, arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; line-height: 19.31px; margin-bottom: 6px; margin-top: 6px;"><b>Saturday, September 27, 2014, 1:00 p.m. – 4:30 p.m.</b></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #141823; font-family: Helvetica, Arial, &quot;lucida grande&quot;, tahoma, verdana, arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; line-height: 19.31px; margin-bottom: 6px; margin-top: 6px;"><br />The Rotwitt Theater of the McShain Performing Arts Center<br />Dorothy McKenna Brown Science Building<br />Rosemont College<br />1400 Montgomery Ave., Rosemont, PA 19010</div><div style="background-color: white; color: #141823; font-family: Helvetica, Arial, &quot;lucida grande&quot;, tahoma, verdana, arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; line-height: 19.31px; margin-bottom: 6px; margin-top: 6px;"><br /></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #141823; display: inline; font-family: Helvetica, Arial, &quot;lucida grande&quot;, tahoma, verdana, arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; line-height: 19.31px;"><div style="margin-bottom: 6px;">This Public Issues Forum will explore the ethical dimensions of the relationship between business and society. Speakers include philosophers and business ethicists whose work has focused on Corporate Responsibility, Stakeholder Theory, Organizational Ethics, Moral Imagination, and Ethics and Capitalism.</div><div style="margin-bottom: 6px;"><br /><b><i>Free and Open to the Public. Refreshments will be served.</i></b></div><div style="margin-bottom: 6px;"><br /></div><div style="margin-bottom: 6px; margin-top: 6px;"><b>Speakers:</b></div><div style="margin-bottom: 6px; margin-top: 6px;">R. Edward Freeman, University Professor and Senior Fellow at the Olsson Center for Applied Ethics, University of Virginia: “<i>New Models of Business in Society</i>”</div><div style="margin-bottom: 6px; margin-top: 6px;">Patricia Werhane, Wicklander Chair in Business Ethics and Director of the Institute for Business and Professional Ethics, DePaul University: “<i>Globalization and its Challenges to CSR and Industrialized Capitalism</i>”</div><div style="margin-bottom: 6px; margin-top: 6px;">Gary Weaver, Professor of Management, University of Delaware.<br />Topic: Fostering ethical behavior in business organizations</div><div style="margin-bottom: 6px; margin-top: 6px;"><br /></div><div style="margin-bottom: 6px; margin-top: 6px;"><b>Chair:</b>&nbsp;Alan Preti, GPPC Board of Directors and Director of the Institute for Ethical Leadership and Social Responsibility at Rosemont College.</div><div style="margin-bottom: 6px; margin-top: 6px;"><a name='more'></a><br />For more information please contact Alan Preti at&nbsp;<a href="tel:610-527-0200%20ext.%202345" style="color: #1155cc;" target="_blank" value="+16105270200">610-527-0200 ext. 2345</a>&nbsp;or&nbsp;<a href="mailto:apreti@rosemont.edu" style="color: #1155cc;" target="_blank">apreti@rosemont.edu</a><br />This event is co-sponsored by the GPPC and the Institute for Ethical Leadership at Rosemont College.</div></div>Steve Esserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03127743863789489392noreply@blogger.com5tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7247637.post-43707007789853224412014-08-23T11:02:00.000-04:002014-08-23T11:38:04.866-04:00Wesley Salmon's Early Interest in Whitehead<br /><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">I was reading <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><a href="http://books.google.com/books?id=DYIdAQAAMAAJ" target="_blank">Probability and Causality: Essays in Honor of Wesley C. Salmon</a></i>, and was interested to see it included an annotated bibliography, where Salmon provides contextual commentary regarding all of his publications up to that time (1988).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>The first entry was an interesting surprise.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>While his post-doctoral work was squarely in the mid-twentieth century empiricist tradition of philosophy of science, his MA thesis in 1947 was on the topic “Whitehead’s Conception of Freedom”, about which he comments:<o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></div><br /><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">“A relic, best forgotten, of the days when I was totally committed to <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/whitehead/#WM" target="_blank">Alfred North Whitehead’s metaphysics</a>.”<o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></div><br /><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">In his later career, when stretching his empiricist commitments in search of a realist approach to causation, Salmon developed his own causal "process” theory (<a href="http://books.google.com/books?id=51HGQgAACAAJ" target="_blank">Salmon 1984</a>).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>No mention of Whitehead, but perhaps some background inspiration?<br /><br /><o:p> </o:p><br /><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">Here’s a bit longer autobiographical excerpt from <a href="http://books.google.com/books?id=CxQ5uHEKUwsC" target="_blank">Salmon’s book</a> on <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reichenbach/" target="_blank">Hans Reichenbach</a>:<o:p></o:p></div><br /><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt; text-indent: 0.5in;">“On the basis of personal experience, I can testify to Reichenbach’s qualities both as a teacher and a man. I was a raw young graduate student with an M.A. in philosophy from the University of Chicago when first I went to UCLA in 1947 to work for a doctorate. At Chicago I had been totally immersed in Whitehead’s philosophy; ironically, Carnap was at Chicago during those years, but I never took a course from him. My advisors barely acknowledged his existence, and certainly never recommended taking any of his classes. Upon arrival at UCLA I was totally unfamiliar with Reichenbach or his works, but during my first semester I was stimulated and delighted by his course, ‘Philosophy of Nature’, based upon <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Atom and Cosmos</i>. Simultaneously, I continued my intensive studies of Whitehead’s <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Process and Reality</i>. A severe intellectual tension emerged in my mind between Whitehead, the scientifically sophisticated metaphysician, and Reichenbach, the scientifically sophisticated anti-metaphysician. <o:p></o:p></div><br /><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>To the best of my recollection, the tension grew to crisis proportions when I heard Reichenbach deliver his masterful Presidential Address, on rationalism and empiricism, to the Pacific Division of the APA at its meeting in Los Angeles in December of 1947.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>This lecture was precisely what I – as a naïve graduate student – needed to make me face the crucial question: on what conceivable grounds could one make reasonable judgments concerning the truth or falsity of Whitehead’s metaphysical claims? When I posed this question to myself, as well as to teachers and fellow graduate students sympathetic to Whitehead, I received nothing even approaching a satisfactory answer.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>By the end of that academic year I was a convinced – though still very naïve – logical empiricist.”<o:p></o:p></div>Salmon, Wesley C. (1979). <em>Hans Reichenbach, Logical Empiricist</em>, Dortrecht: D. Reidel, p.8.</div>Steve Esserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03127743863789489392noreply@blogger.com4tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7247637.post-20852846413593637982014-07-09T15:25:00.001-04:002014-07-09T15:26:40.169-04:00Metaphysical Intuitions; Blog Anniversary<br /><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">First a housekeeping comment.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>It turns out that this blog went mostly dormant&nbsp;when I began full time graduate work in philosophy two years ago.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>It was a wonderful outlet for my thoughts when I had a different sort of day job, but now I have trouble making time for it. In any case, I note that its tenth blogiversary recently passed, and I’m grateful for all who have read or commented over that time.<o:p></o:p></div><br /><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">One thing I’ve been thinking about again is whether our metaphysical (modal) intuitions are any good.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Reading Ladyman and Ross (<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><a href="http://www.amazon.com/Every-Thing-Must-Metaphysics-Naturalized/dp/0199573093" target="_blank">Everything Must Go</a></i>) was one trigger for this.&nbsp; Another was reading (but not finishing) Peter Unger’s <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><a href="http://books.google.com/books/about/All_the_Power_in_the_World.html?id=OiYmHn9pe2EC" target="_blank">All the Power in the World</a></i>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>The former included a strong critique of contemporary metaphysics, making the case that its disconnection from modern physics renders it futile.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>The latter book can be viewed as L&amp;R’s worst nightmare: a freeform conversion of imagination into metaphysical conclusions which is completely unconvincing.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>(See Katherine Hawley’s review of L&amp;R <a href="http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~kjh5/OnlinePapers/EveryThingMustGoReview.pdf" target="_blank">here</a>, and Timothy O’Connor’s review of Unger <a href="https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/25237-all-the-power-in-the-world/" target="_blank">here</a> -- obviously most contemporary analytic metaphysics is much more disciplined and better argued than Unger’s book).<o:p></o:p></div><br /><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">Clearly we make mistakes relying on our imagination and common sense intuitions.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>What also perhaps could be better appreciated is the fact that leveraging insights drawn from physics (implicitly or explicitly) can easily go wrong.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>This happens both because the physics is outdated (and is always provisional anyway), and because the formalisms of physics do not and arguably cannot represent all the relevant aspects of nature.<o:p></o:p></div><br /><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">Still, along with my other interests, I will do metaphysics as best I can.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; After&nbsp;all, I only have this one shot at trying to&nbsp;</span>understand the world!<o:p></o:p></div>Steve Esserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03127743863789489392noreply@blogger.com5tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7247637.post-91454539189736217842013-09-23T16:01:00.003-04:002013-12-08T09:31:17.576-05:00Philadelphia-Area High School Ethics BowlUPDATE: 8 December 2013<br /><br />Congratulations to all the teams that took part in the ethics bowl. &nbsp;A team from Cherry Hill High School East won the competition and will represent our region in the national competition in April 2014. &nbsp;It's great that Villanova's Ethics Program, led by Dr. Mark Doorley, again organized the event and that so many volunteer judges and moderators made themselves available.<br />-------------------------------------------------------------------<br />Also, the second Philadelphia area High School Ethics Bowl will be held on&nbsp;December 7th, again hosted by Villanova University.&nbsp; Contact me if you would like information on volunteering to help with the event (I was a judge last year and it was a great experience).<br /><br /><a href="http://www1.villanova.edu/villanova/artsci/ethics/hsethicsbowl.html">http://www1.villanova.edu/villanova/artsci/ethics/hsethicsbowl.html</a>Steve Esserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03127743863789489392noreply@blogger.com4tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7247637.post-42559814591070663802013-09-23T11:38:00.001-04:002013-09-23T11:38:30.005-04:00GPPC 2013-2014 Program of Events<div style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><span style="font-family: tahoma, sans-serif;">The Greater Philadelphia Philosophy Consortium 2013-2014 program is up on the website:&nbsp;<a href="http://www.thegppc.org/" style="color: #1155cc;" target="_blank">http://www.thegppc.org/</a></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><br /></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><span style="font-family: tahoma, sans-serif;">Please check it out.&nbsp; Looking at the fall schedule, I’d ask you to please make special note of November 16<sup>th&nbsp;</sup>which is the date for our Public Issues event (see below).&nbsp;</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><span style="font-family: tahoma, sans-serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><span style="font-family: tahoma, sans-serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><i><span style="font-family: tahoma, sans-serif;">Save the Date</span></i></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><b><span style="font-family: tahoma, sans-serif;">GPPC Public Affairs Symposium:</span></b></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><span style="font-family: tahoma, sans-serif;"><b><i>America the Philosophical</i></b><b>&nbsp;by Carlin Romano and Public Philosophy in the U.S</b></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><span style="font-family: tahoma, sans-serif;">Saturday, November 16<sup>th</sup>, 2013 1pm – 4:30 pm</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><span style="font-family: tahoma, sans-serif;">Free Library of Philadelphia Central Branch (Main Auditorium)</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><span style="font-family: tahoma, sans-serif;">1901 Vine Street, Philadelphia, PA 19103&nbsp;&nbsp; Phone:&nbsp;<a href="tel:215-686-5300" style="color: #1155cc;" target="_blank" value="+12156865300">215-686-5300</a></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><br /></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><span style="font-family: tahoma, sans-serif;">Panelists:</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><span style="font-family: tahoma, sans-serif;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Anita Allen, University of Pennsylvania</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><span style="font-family: tahoma, sans-serif;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Peter Catapano Editor, "The Stone," The New York Times</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><span style="font-family: tahoma, sans-serif;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Cheryl Misak, University of Toronto/New York University</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><span style="font-family: tahoma, sans-serif;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Carlin Romano, Ursinus College</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><span style="font-family: tahoma, sans-serif;"><br /></span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><span style="font-family: tahoma, sans-serif;">Carlin Romano’s book,&nbsp;<i>America the Philosophical,</i>&nbsp;argues that philosophy, has a deep and wide role to play in American intellectual life and culture.&nbsp; The degree to which it fulfills this role today, or should do so in the future, is a question which fits naturally into our long-running Public Issues Forum series.&nbsp; A great panel of speakers will join us, and we hope you will participate as well. (Here is an essay by Carlin summarizing his thesis:<a href="http://chronicle.com/article/Is-America-Philosophical-/131884/" style="color: #1155cc;" target="_blank">http://chronicle.com/article/<wbr></wbr>Is-America-Philosophical-/<wbr></wbr>131884/</a>&nbsp;)</span></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><br /></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><br /></div>Steve Esserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03127743863789489392noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7247637.post-34076662280669584072013-09-02T16:06:00.000-04:002013-09-06T15:56:44.480-04:00Russellian Monism and the Identity Theory of Properties<br />Here&nbsp;is a draft paper on a topic discussed a fair amount on this blog in the past.<br />Comments or suggestions are welcome.<br /><br /><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin: 0in 0in 10pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"><o:p><a href="https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B9qlblWFf2EQOGl5ZDZkX0NJN1U/edit?usp=sharing" target="_blank">Russellian Monism and the Identity Theory of Properties</a></o:p><br /><o:p></o:p><br /><o:p>[UPDATE: 6 Sept. 2013 - Very slightly revised from 2 Sept. version]</o:p></div><br />Here's the introduction:<br /><br /><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin: 0in 0in 10pt; text-indent: 0.5in;">Russellian Monism is an attractive approach to the mind/body problem. It promises to put both mental and physical phenomena on a common ontological ground. By providing a place in nature for the qualitative properties featured in conscious experience, it disarms prominent conceivability arguments against materialism. Russell’s approach can be strengthened by employing elements of a more contemporary metaphysical framework. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp;</span>There is a particularly good fit with an account of the nature of properties set out by C.B. Martin and John Heil. Labeled the identity theory of properties, this view posits that properties are at once dispositional and qualitative.<o:p></o:p></div><br /><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin: 0in 0in 10pt; text-indent: 0.5in;">This paper is organized as follows. In section one I offer an overview of Russell’s theory. In section two I briefly show how a key insight from Russell’s work has figured in contemporary debates in philosophy of mind. Section three takes a closer look at Russell’s metaphysics; this prepares the way for seeing how his theory might be modified in light of more recent work. Section four introduces the idea that the metaphysics of dispositional and categorical properties can play a role in a Russell-style account. Section five outlines the identity theory of properties and argues that its features can strengthen Russellian monism. In section six I consider objections to the modified theory, and discuss where it needs to be supplemented in order to more fully address the challenges of explaining mind.<br /><br />&nbsp;</div><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin: 0in 0in 10pt; text-indent: 0.5in;">&nbsp;</div>Steve Esserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03127743863789489392noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7247637.post-66535108186492090962013-05-18T13:06:00.001-04:002013-05-18T13:09:56.499-04:00Spinoza: Notes on Body and Mind[These are notes written as part of an abandoned paper project]<br /><o:p></o:p><br /><strong>Beyond Parallelism: Body, Mind,&nbsp;and Individuation in Part II of Spinoza’s <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Ethics</i></strong><o:p></o:p><br />(Page references to <a href="http://books.google.ca/books/about/A_Spinoza_Reader.html?id=5yeKQgAACAAJ">Curley, 1994</a>)<br /><o:p></o:p><br /><em>Summary: the body is a pattern of unified activity; the mind is shaped by the interaction of this pattern with its environment.<o:p></o:p></em><br /><br /><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; To begin, the nature of the human body/mind is founded on the basic individuation of things; here’s IID7:</div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt 0.5in;">And if a number of individuals so concur in one action that together they are all the cause of one effect, I consider them all, to that extent, as one singular thing. (p.116)<o:p></o:p></div>So a composite individual is defined in terms of the coordinated <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">action </i>of its parts.<o:p></o:p><br /><br /><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;Following the discussion of the parallelism of mind and body as modes following from the corresponding attributes of God, Spinoza makes some surprising claims in IIP12 and 13:</div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt 0.5in;">Nothing can happen in that body which is not perceived by the mind […] The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body…and nothing else. (p.123)</div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">However, when it comes to human beings, both of these statements will be superseded by the account which follows.</div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;The key is to understand the nature/form/essence of the human body as opposed to simple bodies. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp;</span>Here is the start to the scholium to IIP13:</div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt 0.5in;">From these [propositions] we understand not only that the human mind is united to the body, but also what should be understood by the union of mind and body.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>But no one will be able to understand it adequately, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">or</i> distinctly, unless he first knows adequately the nature of our body.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>For the things we have shown so far are completely general and do not pertain more to man than to other individuals, all of which, though in different degrees, are nevertheless animate. (p.124)<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp;</span></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">So we need to know more about what distinguishes the human body from other bodies.</div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Now we move to the interlude on the nature of bodies which follows IIP13.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Spinoza discusses bodies in terms of their motion and rest – it must be said that he does not successfully present a complete non-circular account of bodies (there is no definition of a ground level simple body independent of its motion or vice versa).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>But overlooking this for present purposes, Spinoza gives us an account of how a number of bodies can unite to compose a further composite body or individual.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Here’s the definition following A2``:</div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt 0.5in;">When a number of bodies, whether of the same or of different size, are so constrained by other bodies that they lie upon one another, or if they so move, whether with the same degree or different degrees of speed, that they communicate their motions to each other in a certain fixed matter; we shall say that those bodies are united with one another and that they all together compose one body or individual, which is distinguished from the others by this union of bodies. (p.126)</div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">The nature and form of such an individual is defined in terms of this union.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>We see here that the component parts only matter to this nature qua their participation in the unifying action (consistent with IID7).</div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">&nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp; L4 strengthens the point by asserting that this nature or form will be retained upon substitution of like parts (p.126).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>L5 and L6, by defining the fixed relationship of motion among the united parts in terms of a ratio of motion of rest, is intended to convey a notion of yet more flexibility to the composite body to retain its nature under changing conditions.</div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp; The scholium to L7 goes further to contemplate second and third order composite bodies, each of whose components has different natures (i.e. different patterns of union), which can maintain their form in myriad additional circumstances:</div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt 0.5in;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp;</span>And if we proceed in this way to infinity, we shall easily conceive that the whole of nature is one individual, whose parts, that is, all bodies, vary in infinite ways, without any change in the whole individual. (p.127)</div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">This passage foreshadows the human striving toward God’s perfection that we find later in the Ethics.</div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;Spinoza concludes in the body postulates that the human body “is composed of a great many individuals of different natures, each of which is highly composite.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>It can “move and dispose external bodies in a great many ways” (p.128).</div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;These complex characteristics of the body underlie the complex nature of the human mind, discussed in IIP14 and IIP15.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Our ideas about external objects follow from the affects these have on our complex body. In fact, the subtlety of the complex body allows Spinoza to define imagination and memory (IIP16 and IIP17) which adds a critical temporal dimension to the workings of the associated human mind.</div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;With this in place, the subsequent propositions replace the simple picture of mind/body union which originally followed from the parallelism of thought and extension.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>The mind is associated with the complex composite body; and constituted as it is by a unified action of its many different parts, it does not know the body or itself in any simple or complete manner (IIP19):</div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt 0.5in;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp;</span>The human mind does not know the human body itself, nor does it know that it exists, except through ideas of affections by which the body is affected.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>(p.131)</div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">I interpret this as follows:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>The body is not simple passive thing sitting in a vacuum, but rather has a nature defined by an enduring pattern of complex activity (which is capable of acting as a unified higher order cause).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Within the totality of God/Nature, this pattern is defined relative to all its interactions with the world which lies outside its nature. (Note that this could include non-essential interactions which take place from “within” the spatial dimensions of the body as well as “external” bodies.)<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>The mind only knows the body (the pattern) as it is affected.</div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;In IIP20 and IIP21, another element is introduced which adds further nuance to the mind, that is, in addition to defining the mind as the idea of the body, there also exists the idea of the mind (idea of the idea).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>So to the extent the mind knows the affections of the body, it knows the ideas of these affections (IIP22).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>It follows that as the mind only knows the body via the affections, it only knows itself “insofar as it perceives the ideas of the affections of the body” (IIP23, p.133).</div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">&nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp; Looking ahead, IIP23 is cited when S wants to assert we are “conscious” of our striving to preserve our being (IIIP9)</div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;I think IIP24 is particularly helpful for deepening our understanding the human mind and the scope of consciousness:</div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt 0.5in;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">The human mind does not involve adequate knowledge of the parts composing the human body.</i>” Dem.: The parts composing the human body pertain to the essence of the human body itself only insofar as they communicate their motions to one another in a certain fixed manner… and not insofar as they can be considered as individuals, without relation to the human body. (p.133)</div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">The body’s essence is the unified pattern of action.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Each part could be separated and interact with the world in some other manner (and will do so after I die, for instance), but this has nothing to do with our essence.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Nevertheless, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">God’s</i> idea of the part includes its connections with a great many ideas which go beyond the part’s participation in our body’s essence (and thus with the idea that constitutes our mind).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Hence our mind does not know its parts as individuals.</div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp; The picture of the human being here is not that of a lump of matter, but that of an activity.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Not only that, but the human <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">mind </i>is shaped by this activity as it continually bumps up against everything else in its environment. (Again, I note that there can be things “within” the body which also don’t contribute to the pattern).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp;</span></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;While the derivation of IIIP6 and 7 is debated by scholars, it is certainly the case that the discussion of the nature of humans/composite individuals in Part II sets the stage very clearly:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>the striving to preserve the unified activity of its parts is the essence of such an individual.</div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">(Note: nothing distinguishes humans/living things/other things in terms of ontological categories: differences are due to degrees of complexity in pattern and interactions.)</div>Steve Esserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03127743863789489392noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7247637.post-60312261827811534232013-01-07T09:47:00.000-05:002013-05-18T13:09:02.202-04:00Upcoming Public Philosophy Events<br /><div class="MsoNormal">For those of us in the Philadelphia area, the <a href="http://www.thegppc.org/">GPPC</a> is sponsoring several events in the coming months which should be enjoyable and enlightening.&nbsp; Everyone is welcome.<o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal"><a name='more'></a><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal">First up is our Community Lecture next month in Cherry Hill.&nbsp; This is the third year we’ve held this event, and this year’s talk and discussion should be very special.&nbsp; Professor Winston will be discussing “The Limits of Forgiveness” in the context of Simon Wiesenthal’s <i>The Sunflower</i>.&nbsp; This is free and open to the public.&nbsp; Pre-register (optional – but it helps us to gauge headcount) by sending me an <a href="http://www.thegppc.org/2010/09/contact.html">email</a>.<o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: .5in;"><b>Community Lecture: The Limits of Forgiveness</b><o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: .5in;">Thursday, February 7, 2013, 7pm to 8:30pm.<br />Cherry Hill High School East<br />1750 Kresson Road, Cherry Hill, NJ<br /><br /><b>Speaker:</b><br />Morton Winston, PhD, Professor of Philosophy and Chairman, Department of Philosophy, Religion and Classical Studies, The College of New Jersey<br /><br /><b>Chair:</b> Frank J. Hoffman, West Chester University, Chair, GPPC Board of Directors<br /><br />This event is co-sponsored by the GPPC Board of Governors and the GPPC.<o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: .5in;"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal">Then, in March, we will have our annual Public Issues Forum.&nbsp; This is also free and open to the public.&nbsp; The motivation for this session came from reflecting on the ethical lapses in our business and financial sectors in recent years.&nbsp; We will explore what light leading philosophers can shed on the challenge of “Morality in the Marketplace”, including ideas adapted from the tradition of Virtue Ethics.&nbsp; Please join us at Rosemont College.<o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: .5in;"><b>Public Issues Forum: Morality in the Marketplace</b><o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: .5in;">Saturday, March 9, 2013, 1pm to 5pm.<br />Rosemont College, McShain Auditorium, Brown Science Building<br />1400 Montgomery Ave., Rosemont, PA 19010<br /><br /><b>Speakers:</b><br />Robert Audi, University of Notre Dame<br />Joe DesJardins, St. John's University<br />Daryl Koehn, University of St. Thomas<br /><br /><b>Chair:</b> Frank J. Hoffman, West Chester University, Chair, GPPC Board of Directors<br /><br /><b>Coordinator:</b> Alan Preti, Rosemont College, GPPC Board of Directors<br />For further information contact Alan Preti at <a href="mailto:apreti@rosemont.edu">apreti@rosemont.edu</a> or 610.527.0200<br /><br />This event is co-sponsored by the GPPC Board of Governors, the GPPC, and the Institute for Ethical Leadership and Social Responsibility at Rosemont College.<o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br />Finally, for the third year we will have a GPPC sponsored film series at the Bryn Mawr Film Institute.&nbsp; This features Philadelphia-area philosophers discussing selected films, and has been both insightful and fun.&nbsp; This year the focus is on Terrence Malick. Register <a href="http://www.brynmawrfilm.org/education/class.php?id=754">here</a>.<o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: .5in;"><br /><b>Philosophy on Film Series: Terrence Malick's World</b><o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: .5in;"><b>Location</b>: Bryn Mawr Film Institute <br />824 West Lancaster Avenue, Bryn Mawr, PA 19010<br /><br /><b>Dates, Films, and Speakers</b>:<br /><br /><u>Thursday, March 21, 2013, 7pm - 10pm.</u><br /><i>Badlands</i> (1973)<br />Presenter: Jeremy Millington, Philosophy Department, Temple University<br /><br /><u>Thursday, March 28, 2013, 7pm - 10pm.</u><br /><i>The Thin Red Line</i> (1998)<br />Presenter: Joe Volpe, PhD, Philosophy Department, La Salle University<br /><br /><u>Thursday, April 4, 2013, 7pm - 10pm.</u><br /><i>The Tree of Life</i>, part 1 (2011)<br />Presenter: John Hymers, PhD, Philosophy Department, La Salle University<br /><br /><u>Thursday, April 11, 2013, 7pm - 10pm.</u><br /><i>The Tree of Life</i>, part 2 (2011)<br />Presenter: John Hymers, PhD, Philosophy Department, La Salle University<br /><br /><b>Fee:</b> $40.00 per person (for the whole series).<br /><br />Registration opens March 1, 2012 on Bryn Mawr Film Institute’s website: <a href="http://brynmawrfilm.org/education/">http://brynmawrfilm.org/education/</a><br /><br />This event is sponsored by the GPPC and the Bryn Mawr Film Institute.<o:p></o:p></div>Steve Esserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03127743863789489392noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7247637.post-35252135302410119172012-07-29T13:59:00.001-04:002013-05-15T18:21:43.486-04:00Newman: What Russell’s Structural Argument Needs[UPDATE: 15 May 2013; edited for clarity]<br />As mentioned earlier <a href="http://guidetoreality.blogspot.com/2012/04/russell-and-structural-realism.html">here</a>, Bertrand Russell’s work in his book <i>The Analysis of Matter</i> was dealt a blow by mathematician <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Max_Newman">M.H.A."Max"Newman</a>. Russell had built an argument supporting partial realism about the physical world. He said that while we are only acquainted with our percepts, there are causal connections between these and unperceived events external to the perceiver. He gave reasons to think that as a result, a system of relations among percepts can share the same structure as that of causally connected but unperceived events. We can therefore infer a great deal about the structure of the physical world. Newman pointed out that using conventional set-theoretic definitions of these terms, a shared structure in fact would not offer much information at all about the external world; formally any collection of things (of a sufficient cardinality) can be organized in relations so as to have a given structure.<br /><br />Newman’s clearly argued and thoughtful paper, “<a href="http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/content/XXXVII/146/137.full.pdf">Mr. Russell’s Causal Theory of Perception</a>,” (also posted <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/40259458/Russell-Casual-Theory-of-Perception">here</a>) while delivering a negative result on this crucial point, was nonetheless sympathetic toward Russell’s project. Newman offered a suggestion as to what would be required in order to have a more meaningful result. He said we need to have, in addition to our individual percepts and the notion of a shared structure,&nbsp;some direct acquaintance with relations (and he points out that in some passages this sort of “modified theory” is what Russell seems to have in mind): <br /><blockquote>The conclusion that has been reached is that to maintain the view that something besides their existence can be known about the unperceived parts of the world it is necessary to admit direct apprehension of what is meant by the statement that two unperceived events are <i>causally adjoined, i.e.</i>, happen near each other, temporally and spatially, or overlap, or do something of the sort. The central doctrine is then that while of percepts we have a qualitative knowledge, of other events all that can legitimately be inferred is their structure with regard to a certain directly known relation which may be called “causal proximity”(p.148 emphasis original)</blockquote>In addition to the abstract structure, knowledge of the relation of causal proximity would give us leverage to extend our knowledge to the specific system of causal relations among the unperceived events (though still not their intrinsic qualities, in line with the “clear-cut” unmodified theory). Newman also points out potential disadvantages of introducing this modification: it adds an additional primitive notion of acquaintance or “direct apprehension” which needs to be better defined; it also might open the door to questioning why we can’t invoke even more sorts of direct knowledge of non-structural aspects of the world. He concluded the paper in this way: <br /><blockquote>It appears, then, that although a modified form of Mr. Russell’s theory makes an important assertion about our knowledge of the external world, a good deal of further argument will be necessary to show that this assertion is true. (p.148)</blockquote>Russell wrote a letter to Newman following the publication of this paper (it is included in the second volume of Russell’s <a href="http://books.google.com/books?id=4BwRMAEACAAJ">autobiography</a>). In the letter, Russell conceded the argument and went on to say: <br /><blockquote>It was quite clear to me, as I read your article, that I had not really intended to say what in fact I did say, that <i>nothing</i> is known about the physical world except its structure. I had always assumed spacio-temporal continuity with the world of percepts, that is to say, I had assumed that there might be co-punctuality between percepts and non-percepts, and even that one could pass by a finite number of steps from one event to another compresent with it, from one end of the universe to another. And co-punctuality I regarded as a relation which might exist among percepts and is itself perceptible. (p. 259, emphasis original).</blockquote>Newman’s commentary above sketches a notion of perceiving “causal proximity” or the idea of events being spatio-temporally near each other or perhaps overlapping. Russell singles out the notion of perceiving co-punctuality. If events overlap or are simultaneous, perhaps the notion of directly perceiving a relation between them is&nbsp;explicable.<br /><br />&nbsp;As I discussed <a href="http://guidetoreality.blogspot.com/2012/05/causal-knowledge-is-primitive-for.html">before</a>, Russell’s later book, <i>Human Knowledge</i>, did conclude that we must have some primitive (“animal” or “biological”) grasp of causation in order to have scientific knowledge. He also reiterated key themes from <i>The Analysis of Matter</i> (including, for example, the role of simultaneity in his theory of compresence). I didn’t see in my reading, though, that he specifically built on the notion of <i>perceiving</i> causal relations via co-punctuality as discussed in his letter to Newman.Steve Esserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03127743863789489392noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7247637.post-60292932665233549422012-06-18T11:21:00.000-04:002012-06-18T11:34:38.731-04:00Reduction as IdealizationI cannot remember who tipped me to this 1972 article in <i>Science</i>&nbsp;by&nbsp;physicist <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philip_Warren_Anderson">Philip W. Anderson</a>&nbsp;called&nbsp;<span style="background-color: white;">"</span><a href="http://www.physics.ohio-state.edu/~jay/880/moreisdifferent.pdf">More is Different</a><span style="background-color: white;">"</span><span style="background-color: white;">. &nbsp;It is an exploration of the notions of reduction and emergence. &nbsp;The main thrust of Anderson's argument is familiar:</span><br /><br /><blockquote class="tr_bq">The ability to reduce everything to simple fundamental laws does not imply the ability to start from those laws and construct the universe. &nbsp;In fact, the more the elementary particle physicists tell us about the nature of the fundamental physical laws, the less relevance they seem to have to the very real problems in the rest of science, much less to those of society<br />The constructionist hypothesis breaks down when confronted with the twin difficulties of scale and complexity. &nbsp;The behavior of large and complex aggregates of elementary particles, it turns out, is not to be understood in terms of a simple extrapolation of the properties of a few particles. &nbsp;Instead, at each level of complexity entirely new properties appear...(p.393)</blockquote><br />The article is worthwhile for a number of very nice briefly described examples of symmetry breaking and properties which emerge with scale.<br /><br />There is a absurdly simple insight lurking in these sorts of discussions which I now belated appreciate. &nbsp;We all realize that coarse-grained descriptions of phenomena which neglect fine details will be limited in their accuracy by definition. &nbsp;But while reductive analysis of natural systems is extremely fruitful, it is also always an idealization. &nbsp;Experimenters work hard to break down and isolate some phenomenon, and models and theories are constructed to best capture it. &nbsp;The environment needs to be screened out &nbsp;-- it is "noise" which we abstract from. &nbsp;But what is lost in this idealization is not trivial. &nbsp;In nature, there are no isolated systems, no ceteris paribus conditions (in fact, there is absolutely no reason to think the universe as a whole is some sharply bounded closed system). <br /><br />When this is considered, emergent properties at higher levels of scale lose the sense of being especially surprising or mysterious.Steve Esserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03127743863789489392noreply@blogger.com4tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7247637.post-19810133743109089192012-05-31T12:42:00.000-04:002012-07-29T14:08:34.594-04:00Causal Knowledge is Primitive for RussellI was rereading portions of Russell’s <i><a href="http://www.amazon.com/Human-Knowledge-Its-Scope-Limits/dp/0415083028">Human Knowledge</a></i> (and making comparisons to <i>The Analysis of Matter</i>) with the goal of understanding his arguments regarding the role of structure in linking experience to the physical world. But I was struck by something else. &nbsp;At the end of the book, his conclusions regarding how scientific inferences are justified trace this question back to the prior question of how we gain knowledge of <i>causation</i>. Causation is presumed in science, but causation is itself not explicated or justified within science: it is a pre-scientific concept.<br /><br />A main project in&nbsp;<i>Human Knowledge</i>&nbsp;is to&nbsp;identify those unacknowledged postulates which undergird our scientific pursuit of knowledge: “what must we be supposed to know, in addition to particular observed facts, if scientific inferences are to be valid?” (p.513). He ends up with five postulates in total, but notably it turns out all of them “involve the concept of ‘cause’” (p.508).<br /><br />&nbsp;How do we know these postulates, then, if indeed we do know them, given their reliance on our knowledge of causation? Russell can only point to our gaining a primitive grasp on cause via our pre-linguistic biological know-how: “Knowledge of general connections between facts has its biological origins in animal expectations “(p.514). It was advantageous in evolutionary terms for our animal expectations to roughly conform to processes in the physical world. The physical world apparently has causal laws, and animal inferences are adapted to these.<br /><br />&nbsp;When evaluating the thesis of empiricism, Russell understands that strictly speaking this kind of knowledge is something beyond experience (at least as these terms are usually employed in the debate): “Either, therefore, we know something independently of experience, or science is moonshine” (p.524).Steve Esserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03127743863789489392noreply@blogger.com5tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7247637.post-61087544454996364132012-04-10T09:40:00.000-04:002012-07-29T14:08:34.611-04:00Russell and Structural RealismMy interest in Russell’s <a href="http://www.amazon.com/The-Analysis-Matter-Bertrand-Russell/dp/0851247407"><i>The Analysis of Matter</i></a> came originally from the perspective it offers in sorting through the problem of mind. Recently, thanks to a couple of papers linked to on twitter by <a href="https://twitter.com/#!/LogicalAnalysis">@LogicalAnalysis</a>, I learned about its connection with recent work on Structural Realism in the context of philosophy of science. (This continues a long-standing tradition for me where philosophy of mind serves as a “gateway drug” leading to the exploration of a wide range of philosophical concerns - btw this analogy was inspired by this <a href="http://www.philosophynews.com/post/2012/03/24/Talk-To-Your-Kids.aspx">parody poster</a>).<br /><br />&nbsp;Very roughly, Russell said that while we only have access to percepts (units of phenomenal perception), and lack access to external objects, these percepts do lie at the end of causal chains which link them to counterparts in the world. He argued that because of this linkage, the structure of our percepts is shared with that of the counterparts, allowing us to draw inferences about this structure.<br /><br />&nbsp;In the 2001 “<a href="http://old.phs.uoa.gr/~psillos/Publications_files/SRPoS2001.pdf">Is Structural Realism Possible</a>” <a href="http://old.phs.uoa.gr/~psillos/">Stathis Psillos</a> discusses the Russellian view as one of several paths toward Structural Realism (SR). Its construction from a starting point of bottom-up empiricism marks it in Psillos’ language as an “upward path” toward SR. The “downward path” characterizes approaches which look to save a broader scientific realism from objections by limiting the realism to certain of the mathematically described structural portions of the theories.<br /><br />&nbsp; <a href="http://www.bristol.ac.uk/philosophy/department/staff/JL/jl.html">James Ladyman</a> has a very nice <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/structural-realism/">SEP entry on SR</a>, which lays out the contemporary research. In his taxonomy, he distinguishes “epistemic” SR (which includes Russell’s given its basis in concerns about knowledge of the external world) from “ontic” SR. Some versions of the latter (including Ladyman's own work) look to make the case that structure is all there is; that is, they take an anti-realist approach to non-structural elements of physical world (e.g. objects), rather than just taking an agnostic approach based on the epistemic difficulties of knowing about them.<br /><br />&nbsp;While I have a lot more to read on this topic, I have an initial suspicion that both approaches to SR have a shortcoming which has to do with causation. Russell invokes causal relations as giving rise to structure, but doesn’t provide details regarding how causation works. Without more to the story, he is apparently left with the claim that we can make the appropriate inferences based on logico-mathematical structure. And this left him open to a logically based criticism due to <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Max_Newman">M.H.A. "Max" Newman</a> (<a href="http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2249202">1928</a> – see discussion <a href="http://publish.uwo.ca/~wgdemo/Published/PhilSci1985.pdf">in this article</a> by <a href="http://publish.uwo.ca/~wgdemo/index.html">Demopoulos</a> and <a href="http://www.stanford.edu/dept/HPST/friedman.html">Friedman</a>). This criticism argues that the inference based only on structure fails because a set of relations among any set of units with sufficient cardinality can be shown to be consistent with it (for a paper which concludes this argument lacks force, see a <a href="http://www.votsis.org/PDF/Is_Structure_Not_Enough.pdf">2003 article</a> by <a href="http://www.votsis.org/">Ionnis Votsis</a>).<br /><br />&nbsp;When it comes to ontic SR, I think it is pretty clear that the formal mathematical structures in physical theories don’t provide a theory of causation, and such a theory will need to invoke additional ontology (e.g. properties, objects) to serve as part of its explanatory apparatus. Therefore, we can’t conclude structure is “all there is.” Psillos has <a href="http://www.phs.uoa.gr/~psillos/Publications_files/PSA04.pdf">another paper</a> which, in part, argues against ontic SR from this basis.Steve Esserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03127743863789489392noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7247637.post-41292396226856094472012-03-12T11:53:00.000-04:002012-04-11T09:31:13.695-04:00Upcoming GPPC events<b>Philosophy on Film Series - Estrangements</b><br /><br /><div class="MsoNormal">The <a href="http://www.thegppc.org/">Greater Philadelphia Philosophy Consortium</a>&nbsp;is sponsoring a film series at the <a href="http://www.brynmawrfilm.org/">Bryn Mawr FilmInstitute</a> again this year featuring commentaries by GPPC philosophers.&nbsp; There are 3 films on consecutive Thursday evenings beginning March 29<sup>th</sup>. <o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /><a name='more'></a><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal">Here’s the link with information on the series and how to register (the cost is $30 for the series):<o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal"><a href="http://www.brynmawrfilm.org/education/class.php?id=455">http://www.brynmawrfilm.org/education/class.php?id=455</a><o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal">This series was very enjoyable and informative last year, and this year’s program looks great.&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal">Also, please note there is a GPPC co-sponsored conference coming up at St. Joseph’s on Saturday March 24<sup>th</sup>:<o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal"><b>Aristotle and the Philosophy of Action</b><o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal">Saturday, March 24, 2012, 1pm to 5:30pm.<o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal">Haub Center, 5th Floor, McShain Hall<o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal">Saint Joseph's University, 5600 City Avenue,<o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal">Philadelphia, PA 19131<o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal">Speakers:<o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal">Ursula Coope, Oxford University, "Aristotle on Action and Teleology"<o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal">Scott Sehon, Bowdoin College, "Teleology and Free Will"<o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal">For further information contact <a href="http://www.sju.edu/academics/cas/philosophy/faculty/apayne.html">Andrew Payne</a></div><div class="MsoNormal">This event is sponsored by the GPPC and Saint Joseph’s University.<o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal">Follow the <a href="http://www.thegppc.org/">GPPC website</a> for updates on Philadelphia area philosophy events.</div>Steve Esserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03127743863789489392noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7247637.post-7943205044692872192012-02-07T11:21:00.001-05:002012-07-29T14:08:34.614-04:00Causal ConstraintThe notion of dispositional modality, discussed by Stephen Mumford and Rani Lill Anjum in <i><a href="http://www.oup.com/us/catalog/general/subject/Philosophy/Mind/?view=usa&amp;ci=9780199695614">Getting Causes from Powers</a></i>, put me in mind of another analysis of the interplay between causation and modality: that of Gregg Rosenberg in <i><a href="http://www.oup.com/us/catalog/general/subject/Psychology/CognitivePsychology/?view=usa&amp;ci=9780195168143">A Place For Consciousness</a></i> (2004).<br /><br />&nbsp;Recall (see<a href="http://guidetoreality.blogspot.com/2011/10/dispositional-modality-as-restricted.html"> prior post here</a>) that Mumford and Anjum analyze causation in terms of dispositions, or powers. These powers tend toward (dispose toward) their manifestations -- they do not necessitate them. Necessity is not the modality of causation. In addition, it is argued that dispositional modality is distinct from standard philosophical notions of possibility (logical or metaphysical possibility). Dispositional modality (dispositionality for short) does not involve “pure” possibility, since only certain manifestations are possible. In Chapter 8 of their book, the authors say: “Dispositionality…can be understood as a sort of selection function…that picks out a limited number of outcomes from all those that are merely possible.” Also: “The idea of a selection function is simply one that identifies a subset from a realm of possibilities. (p.189)”<br /><br />In his book, Gregg Rosenberg introduced a model of causation which featured a notion which seems related to the idea of the selection function: this was a <i>constraining</i> function on the space of possibilities. Rosenberg, unhappy with both the Humean perspective on causation, as well as the theories of causal responsibility or causal production on offer, endeavored in chapter 9 of his book to strip down the notion of real causation to a bare minimum. This led him to the following notion of “causal significance”: “The <i>causal significance</i> of a thing is the constraint its existence adds to the space of possible ways the world could be…Causal significance shows causation to be an operator on a space of possibility. (p.150 emphasis original)” And: “It is a theory designed to understand how constraints propagate, so it explains how the actual world comes to be just a sliver of what could have been. (p.152)”<br /><br />I say they seem like related notions, but constraint could be viewed as the negative image of selection. Selection picks out a few possibilities, while constraint rules out all of the others.<br /><br />I find causal constraint to be a beguiling idea. Tentatively, it would seem to leave “pure” possibility in place as the fundamental metaphysical notion, in constrast with Mumford and Anjum’s argument for the irreducibility of dispositional modality.Steve Esserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03127743863789489392noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7247637.post-43972432113010461012012-01-15T16:56:00.001-05:002012-07-29T14:08:34.605-04:00Short Review of Getting Causes from PowersIn this <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Getting-Causes-Powers-Stephen-Mumford/dp/019969561X">book</a>, <a href="https://sites.google.com/site/stephendmumford/">Stephen Mumford</a> and <a href="https://sites.google.com/site/ranilillanjum/home">Rani Lill Anjum</a> present their theory of causal dispositionalism, that is, causation based on dispositional properties, or powers. I highly recommend it to anyone interested in the philosophy of causation.<br /><br />Powers do the causal work in our world, according to the authors: effects are brought about by powers manifesting themselves, and the manifestation is itself a further power or set of powers.<br /><br />A central idea is that powers don't necessitate their manifestations - they dispose toward them. Causality has long been associated with the idea of necessity, and necessity (and the sense of constant conjunction) is too strong to describe causation. The main insight here is that other factors can prevent or interfere with the expected manifestation (and, indeed, they often do).<br /><br />To help demonstrate how a disposition can be enhanced or, importantly, hindered by other powers, the authors develop a vector addition diagram. Only when the sum of vectors (with various strengths and directions) exceeds some threshold do we get the manifestation. They extend the model to more complex scenarios to argue that the model is robust enough to explain non-linear and even "emergent" behavior.<br /><br />In addition to arguing strongly against necessity, the authors want to overthrow another usual notion. The authors reject as misguided the typical "two-event" conception of causation, where cause is temporally prior to effect, in part because no one has a compelling account of how you get from one to the other. Instead causes and effects are simultaneous - they are two aspects of a temporally extended process which brings about a change.<br /><br />An important and creative part of the book explores the distinctive modality of dispositions in more depth. Dispositional modality (weaker than necessity but stronger than "pure" contingency) is the primitive and fundamental modality of nature. We derive necessity and possibility from our prior experience with dispositionality. Mumford and Anjum argue that we do indeed perceive causation, and present what they see as the clearest examples of this in the case of bodily sensation and specifically proprioception.<br /><br />The book concludes with a compelling application: showing how the theory fits with processes studied in biology and genetics.Steve Esserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03127743863789489392noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7247637.post-88272209122822097792012-01-08T12:11:00.000-05:002012-07-29T14:08:34.616-04:00More on Causation and Reduction to Physics<br /><div class="MsoNormal">I finished reading <i><a href="http://www.oup.com/us/catalog/general/subject/Philosophy/Mind/?view=usa&amp;ci=9780199695614">GettingCauses from Powers</a> </i>by <a href="https://sites.google.com/site/stephendmumford/">Stephen Mumford</a> and <a href="https://sites.google.com/site/ranilillanjum/home">Rani Lill Anjum</a>.&nbsp; I recommend the book highly to anyone interested in causation, and I’ll be thinking about many of its arguments and themes for a long time to come. </div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal">As touched on at the end of my prior post, one possible challenge to models of causation, including the thesis of causal dispositionalism presented in this book, is the fact that causation doesn’t seem to comport well with physics.&nbsp;&nbsp; The authors acknowledge this in their first chapter, referencing Russell’s discussion in his "<a href="http://www.hist-analytic.org/Russellcause.pdf">On&nbsp;the Notion of Cause</a>” (1913).&nbsp; The issue is that dynamical equations associate states of a system with points in time, but nowhere do they invoke the idea of causal production.&nbsp; They are symmetric with regard to time, where causation is not.&nbsp; Mumford and Anjum respond in a couple of ways.&nbsp; First, they say, the fact that causation doesn’t appear at the level of physics doesn’t mean it isn’t present at larger scales:&nbsp; the reducibility of all phenomena to physics is a controversial idea which we are not compelled to accept.&nbsp; We don’t know that physics represents a special fundamental level of reality in any case.&nbsp; And given the provisional nature of scientific theories, should we let them trump our metaphysical reasoning?</div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal">This issue recurs as the book progresses.&nbsp; In Chapter 4, the authors show how the composition of powers in causal situations can plausibly model emergent phenomena in the form of novel powers.&nbsp; So the theory is robust if it does turn out that reduction of the phenomena in the special sciences isn’t possible.&nbsp; And the final chapter of the book (ch.10) presents an interesting and persuasive application of the theory by showing how causal dispositionalism fits quite well with examples of processes studied in biology (including genetics).</div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal">Just like the situation in philosophy of mind, one must be cautious about drawing metaphysical conclusions from the perceived character of formal physical theory.</div>Steve Esserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03127743863789489392noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7247637.post-11059450623156897922011-12-29T11:53:00.000-05:002012-07-29T14:08:34.578-04:00Determinism Doesn’t Imply Causal Necessity<br /><div class="MsoNormal">A key part of the argument for causal dispositionalism in Mumford and Anjum’s<a href="http://www.oup.com/us/catalog/general/subject/Philosophy/Mind/?view=usa&amp;ci=9780199695614"> <i>Getting Causes FromPowers</i></a> is the case against causal necessitarianism (chapter 3 in the book).&nbsp;&nbsp; Causality is commonly thought to imply a necessary connection between cause and effect:&nbsp; the authors say this is a mistake, and that the proper modality of causation is dispositional.&nbsp;&nbsp; Causes dispose toward their effects - they don’t guarantee them.&nbsp; The insight here is that other factors can prevent or interfere with the expected manifestation (and in everyday experience, they often do). &nbsp;&nbsp;In fact, such prevention is always possible in causal situations, and if one moves to evade this fact by stipulating that prevention or interference is impossible, then the resulting necessity is not really coming from the causal process itself, but is being imposed in another way.</div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal">To see this, suppose I specify the causal factors involved in some manifested effect, and then someone points out another factor which could possibly interfere (despite my match being dry, a proper striking motion made and sufficient oxygen being present, a gust of wind might prevent the match from lighting).&nbsp; Can’t I modify my scenario to specify that the threatening factor is absent (the wind is calm)?&nbsp; Leaving aside the potential problem of listing an absence as a causal factor, the objector might present another possible interferer (a passing car might splash water on the match as it is being struck).&nbsp; So, then I, in turn, specify that there is no nearby traffic, and so on.&nbsp;&nbsp; In fact, no finite list of factors will ever suffice to rule out every interferer (however unlikely).&nbsp; And by the time one is led to propose a “catch-all” condition, covering the whole state of the universe, we’re really not talking about a process of causal production anymore.</div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal">The authors note something interesting here.&nbsp; They say that their argument against causal necessitarianism does not mean they are ruling out <i>determinism</i>.&nbsp;&nbsp; This was a helpful observation for me because I have been guilty of confusion on this point.&nbsp; One might think “determinism” means “causal determinism” which means “causal necessitarianism”.&nbsp; However, determinism can be specified in other ways (including what might be the most common conception – see below).&nbsp; Then causal dispositionalism could be compatible with determinism.&nbsp; There is a causal process, and while it doesn’t necessitate effects, necessity is imposed in another way.</div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal">Note, that for the moment, we are leaving aside the idea of irreducibly probabilistic causation.&nbsp; Such causation is likely a feature of our world (in fact I think the a posteriori case for it is nearly airtight), and therefore determinism is false.&nbsp; But disentangling these ideas remains philosophically valuable.</div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal">As Mumford and Anjum say:&nbsp; “The core idea in determinism is the fixity of the future by the past (p.75)” If one wanted to build a model of a deterministic world, causal necessitarianism is probably not the best tool, since the causal process doesn’t promise to cover all the possible loopholes - for instance if there are such things as uncaused events, then they would not be addressed.</div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal">It seems to me that the most common notion of determinism (probably inspired by classical mechanics) is this:&nbsp; given a specification of all facts, and given comprehensive deterministic <i>laws of nature</i>, then the future is fixed.&nbsp; There is no reason here to even mention causation – it adds nothing to the scenario.&nbsp; One could be a Humean about causation and still endorse the deterministic picture.&nbsp; And given the fact that in this physics-inspired vision the mathematical depiction of laws is symmetric with regard to time, it would be equally true to say that the past is fixed by the specification.&nbsp; This is inconsistent with causation, which is not a symmetric process.&nbsp; One might believe that the mathematically specified physical laws comprise a model of a causal world, but the laws themselves don’t constitute a theory of causation, and may very well be inconsistent with the idea of a causal process.</div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal">On this last point, I recalled a paper I had read a few years ago by <a href="http://www.icrea.cat/Web/ScientificStaff/Carl-Hoefer-175">Carl Hoefer</a>: “<a href="http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2071/">Causality and Determinism: Tension, or OutrightConflict.</a>”&nbsp; In this paper, Hoefer defines a deterministic world specifically as one governed by deterministic micro-physical laws, and then goes on to argue that this definition is inconsistent with the presence of causation, using several philosophical theories from the literature as examples of how causation might be characterized.</div>Steve Esserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03127743863789489392noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7247637.post-42336783995035010842011-12-06T09:42:00.001-05:002012-07-29T14:08:34.603-04:00A Note on Events and Causation<br /><div class="MsoNormal">Presently I’m reading <i><a href="http://www.oup.com/us/catalog/general/subject/Philosophy/Mind/?view=usa&amp;ci=9780199695614">GettingCauses From Powers</a></i> by <a href="https://sites.google.com/site/stephendmumford/">Stephen Mumford</a> and <a href="https://sites.google.com/site/ranilillanjum/home">Rani Lill Anjum</a> (and have finished six chapters out of ten).&nbsp; I expect to blog more about this book, of which I think very highly.&nbsp; I just wanted to very briefly comment on <i>events</i>, inspired by the treatment they are getting so far in the book.<o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal">Years ago, influenced by reading (later) Russell and Whitehead, I acquired the notion that (all else equal) there is an attraction to an ontology which gave a leading role to events rather than one primarily featuring substances (or objects) and their properties.&nbsp; There seemed to be more potential for explaining the dynamic aspects of nature (including mind).<o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal">But while there has been an active modern debate on the nature of events, the most common depictions don’t seem to offer specific advantages to an event-focused ontology.&nbsp; To greatly simplify, it seems philosophers would model events either as property exemplifications, in which case they are in danger of seeming much like static facts or states of affairs; or else events would be associated with spacetime locations, in which case they are little distinguished from objects, which are the quintessential occupiers of spacetime.&nbsp; (The SEP article on events is <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/events/">here</a>; an IEP article with additional focus on the theories of Kim, Davidson, and Lewis is <a href="http://www.iep.utm.edu/events/">here</a>).&nbsp; These sorts of models of events don’t seem to bring differentiated resources to metaphysical theorizing.<o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal">The goal of the <i>Getting Causes From Powers</i> book is to develop a theory of causation based on dispositional properties, or powers.&nbsp; While powers play the leading role, their theory incorporates an intriguing view of events (at least <i>causal</i> events:&nbsp; they don’t take a position on whether there are other sorts).&nbsp; Specifically, causal events, which are manifestations of powers, are <i>temporally extended processes</i>.&nbsp; The authors reject as misguided the typical “two-event” conception of causation, where cause is temporally prior to effect, in part because no one has a compelling account of how you get from one to the other.&nbsp; Rather causes and effects are simultaneous – they are two aspects of a <i>process</i>which brings about a <i>change</i>.&nbsp; Very Whiteheadian!<o:p></o:p></div>Steve Esserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03127743863789489392noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7247637.post-17902334683418195442011-11-14T11:13:00.001-05:002011-11-21T08:43:41.941-05:00Do We Need Essences?<br /><div class="MsoNormal">I’ve just been starting to read and think more about essences, in particular the debate which has followed <a href="http://as.nyu.edu/object/kitfine.html">Kit Fine</a>’s argument in “<a href="http://as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/1160/essence.pdf">Essence and Modality</a>” (1993) that essences cannot be understood in modal terms.&nbsp; The modal understanding is that an essential property of an object is one is must have of necessity (in order to be that object), while properties it can (possibly) do without are accidental.&nbsp; Fine, on his way to advocating a definitional notion of essence, said the modal understanding was too broad:&nbsp; an object may have certain necessary attributes which are intuitively not essential.&nbsp; In the paper, he offered some examples intended to bolster this point.<o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal">Now I’ve read a few papers which take issue with Fine’s argument. In particular, one line of protest, due to <a href="http://www.yale.edu/philos/people/rocca_michael.html">Michael Della Rocca</a>, notes that Fine’s examples are of necessities which seem trivially true of all objects or existents, and the modal understanding of essence can be recast by a focus on non-trivial necessary properties.<o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal">For present purposes, though, I want to concede that there is an intuitive sense that essence seems prior to its modal understanding (even if the latter turns out to be extensionally equivalent):&nbsp; when I try to think of what properties are necessary to an object I seem to be appealing to some non-modal definition I have in mind.<o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal">But do we really want to add essences as irreducible elements in our ontology? While I’m attracted to some Aristotelian or neo-Aristotelian notions (such as causal powers), my inner Occam wants to resist essences.<o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal">One clue to a way to think about this dilemma occurred to me while reading <a href="http://faculty.cua.edu/gorman/">Michael Gorman</a>’s paper, “<a href="http://faculty.cua.edu/gorman/Gorman%20The%20Essential%20and%20the%20Accidental%20FINAL%20preprint.pdf">The Essential and the Accidental</a>”.&nbsp; Gorman highlights one of the passages about the nature of essential properties discussed by Fine in another paper (“Senses of Essence”, which I have not read):&nbsp; “An essential property of an object is a constitutive part of the essence of that object if it is not had in virtue of being a consequence of some more basic essential properties of the object; and otherwise it is a consequential part of the essence.”&nbsp; Perhaps this constitutive subset should be the real target of our idea of essence.<o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal">While Fine’s idea of distinguishing consequential properties from constitutive properties is one of logical consequence, Gorman takes this as an inspiration to develop an account of essence that depends on the notion of explanation. Perhaps the essential properties of an object are those which cannot be explained by appeal to other characteristics (while accidental properties are those that can be so explained).&nbsp; The paper elucidates this argument and considers possible objections.&nbsp; This view is distinct from the modal understanding because it can accomodate necessary but non-essential properties.<o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal">For myself, being in a very preliminary stage of studying these issues, I reserve my opinion about Gorman’s particular strategy, but am led to a desire to link essences to some other metaphysical problem, such as causation (which is obviously related to explanation).&nbsp; By the time we conceive of an object, we already have in mind something which has been caused and has its own causal powers.&nbsp; And we already know (I believe) that modality alone, say a mosaic of categorical properties distributed across possible worlds as in David Lewis, doesn’t provide a theory of causation.&nbsp; So, it shouldn’t be a surprise if there is a problem with defining essence solely in modal terms if essence relates to causation.&nbsp;&nbsp; I’ll try to see what’s been written along these lines.<o:p></o:p><br /><br />UPDATE: 20 November 2011:<br /><a href="http://www.colorado.edu/philosophy/fac_koslicki.shtml">Kathrin Koslicki</a> has posted a preprint of a chapter for a forthcoming book called "<a href="http://spot.colorado.edu/~koslicki/documents/Essence,Necessity&amp;Explanation%20November%202010.pdf">Essence, necessity, and explanation</a>" which fleshes out a discussion similar to Gorman's. &nbsp;She uses an analysis of Aristotelian notions of explanation, including cause, to account for how necessary but not essential properties follow from constitutive essential ones. &nbsp;However, the scheme here is that essence is basic and prior to cause (I was wondering if there was a way to reverse this priority.)<br /><br /><br /></div>Steve Esserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03127743863789489392noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7247637.post-88006496432076862212011-10-18T10:12:00.004-04:002011-11-09T11:17:16.433-05:00Philosophy for Children Forum: 29 OctoberComing up very soon is the next event on this year’s <a href="http://www.thegppc.org/">GPPC</a> program: our Public Issues Forum. The topic this year is Philosophy for Children. The date is Saturday October 29th, 1pm, at the University of Pennsylvania. The event is free and open to the public.<br /><br /><a name='more'></a><br /><br />We’re very excited about this event, and hope those of you in the area will consider joining us. In planning this conference over the past year I have become fascinated with the question of whether pre-college kids might benefit from philosophy. Our main speakers are philosophers who have committed their efforts to exploring how this can be done: each is working with K-12 students and teachers on introducing children to topics and methods of philosophy in an age-appropriate way.<br /><br />Detailed information is below, and please forward to anyone else you think might be interested. Email me with questions and to register (optional but appreciated).<br /><br />Thank you!<br /><br /><i><span class="Apple-style-span">The Greater Philadelphia Philosophy Consortium presents:</span></i><br /><div><span class="Apple-style-span"><i><br /></i></span><b><span class="Apple-style-span">Public Issues Forum: Philosophy for Children</span></b></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span"><b><br /></b></span>Saturday, October 29, 2011 1:00 to 5:00 p.m.</div><div><br /><i>Location</i>: University of Pennsylvania, Room 402 Claudia Cohen Hall<br />249 S.36th St., Philadelphia PA 19104</div><div><br /><i>Speakers</i>:<br />Mitchell Green, University of Virginia<br />Thomas Jackson, University of Hawaii<br />Thomas Wartenberg, Mount Holyoke College</div><div><br />Chair: Frank Hoffman, West Chester University, Chair, GPPC<br />Commentators: Dominic Sisti, Penn Center for Bioethics; Igor Jasinski, The Pingry School<br />Coordinator: Steve Esser, GPPC Board of Governors</div><div><br /><b>Free and Open to the Public</b></div><div><br />For more information and to register (optional), please contact Steve Esser, steve.esser@permitcap.com</div><div><br />This event is sponsored by the GPPC, the Penn Center for Bioethics, and the Penn Department of Philosophy</div><div><br /><a href="http://www.facilities.upenn.edu/map.php">Penn Map and Directions</a><br /><br /></div><div><b>Why philosophy for children?</b></div><div><br /></div><div>Can philosophy get kids thinking critically about issues, practical or theoretical, which otherwise they might not have the opportunity to discuss in or outside of school? Which issues can be introduced, and how can teachers foster a discussion which will enrich and inspire students?</div><div><br /></div><div>All are welcome: philosophers, educators, students, parents and friends. Please join us to hear about the “why?” as well as the “how?” of philosophy for children.</div>Steve Esserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03127743863789489392noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7247637.post-33462192333687283412011-10-10T09:41:00.001-04:002011-10-10T15:08:54.680-04:00Dispositional Modality as Restricted PossibilityI’ve been interested in the metaphysics of dispositional properties (or powers), and I’ve ordered <a href="https://sites.google.com/site/ranilillanjum/research/getting-causes-from-powers"><span style="font-style:italic;">Getting Causes from Powers</span></a>, a new book from <a href="http://sites.google.com/site/stephendmumford/">Stephen Mumford</a> and <a href="https://sites.google.com/site/ranilillanjum/">Rani Lill Anjum</a>. I look forward to reading this later in the fall, but it the meantime I have read a couple of related papers by the authors (see an earlier post<a href="http://guidetoreality.blogspot.com/2011/04/power-property-papers-perused.html"> here</a>).<br /><br />In “<a href="http://philpapers.org/archive/MUMDM.1.pdf">Dispositional Modality</a>” Anjum and Mumford argue that the modal value of dispositions is distinct from necessity and possibility: it is described as “sui generis” and “irreducible”. What I thought was interesting, though, is that the authors themselves include a nice account of dispositional modality in terms of restricted possibility, which seemed to me had the flavor of a reduction.<br /><br />I’ll pass over the first several sections of the paper, which covered some familiar ground: the fundamental disagreement with Hume about powers; the failure of the semantic reduction of dispositional ascriptions to conditionals; and the fact that dispositions, by their nature, clearly do not necessitate their manifestations (they are disposed toward, or tend toward their manifestations).<br /><br />So, dispositional modality is distinct from necessity, but what about possibility? In section 5, Anjum and Mumford argue that dispositional modality is also distinct from possibility, in the sense that it is different from “pure” possibility. By pure possibility, the authors mean the broadest sort of logical or metaphysical possibility. A glass vase is disposed to shatter when dropped. One might suppose it is logically possible that the vase will turn to jelly when dropped, but it is clearly not disposed to do so – at least in our world.<br /><br />The authors say we might think of dispositional modality as a subclass or restricted version of possibility. But this is already a familiar idea. Modal theorists talk about various nested classes of possibility: logical possibility (typically the broadest notion), various formulations of metaphysical possibility, and nomological possibility -- the subclass which holds the laws of nature fixed (some philosophers would identify one or more of these). Anjum and Mumford see dispositions as giving rise to “natural” possibility: “The reason some things are naturally possible is because there are dispositions for them.”<br /><br />The authors don’t elaborate greatly on this point, but it seems as if natural possibility is the set of all the possibilities inherent in the dispositions contained in the state of the natural world at a given time. Building on this idea: when it comes to individual natural objects or systems, in saying they possess dispositional properties (or powers), we might equally well say they possess a certain restricted bundle of possibilities. Then we might turn to a discussion of how causation is explained in terms of the “actualization” of some of these possibilities (compare the “manifestation” of a disposition), perhaps depending on how a system interacts with other systems which similarly bear possibilities.<br /><br />If one can retell the story of dispositions with restricted sets of possibilities, might this be a reductive analysis? It’s not completely clear to me, because one might say the introduction of restricted sets of possibility of the type needed is an irreducible extension of our notions of modality. And perhaps the idea of an object bearing a set of possibilities, rather than bearing properties, isn’t coherent (but maybe the terminology can be worked out). In any case, this paper’s comparison of dispositional modality to the idea of restricted possibility was very thought-provoking.Steve Esserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03127743863789489392noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7247637.post-18161089115653837742011-09-20T12:19:00.018-04:002011-11-14T12:22:20.042-05:00Aaronson on QM and Free WillOne thing that has frustrated me in the past is the fact that folks tend to think indeterministic means “just random”, where by random they mean some stochastic process (like a dice roll) where one can’t predict which outcome will be chosen from some probability distribution. Quantum indeterminism doesn’t work this way, but it’s a difficult subject and experts don’t agree on exactly how to characterize it. It seems clear one cannot simply use a “frequency" interpretation, the way you can with a classical stochastic system. There seems to be something more involved, something spontaneous which resists reduction, but I have a hard time being more precise about this.<br /><br />Computation theorist Scott Aaronson (<a href="http://www.scottaaronson.com/">home page</a>, <a href="http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/">blog</a>) recently gave a presentation on free will (at an <a href="http://fqxi.org/community">FQXi</a> conference) which was very thought-provoking (see this <a href="http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/2011/09/19/free-will-and-quantum-clones-how-your-choices-today-affect-the-universe-at-its-origin/">Sciam piece with helpful links</a>), and had an interesting take on this issue.<br /><br /><a name='more'></a><br /><br />He says (on a slide):<br /><br />“Conventional wisdom: ‘Free will is a hopelessly muddled concept. If something isn’t deterministic, then logically, it must be random—but a radioactive nucleus obviously doesn’t have free will!’ But the leap from “indeterminism” to “randomness” here is total nonsense! In computer science, we deal all the time with processes that are neither deterministic nor random…” <br /><br />As examples Aaronson cites cites nondeterministic finite automota, and more generally, algorithms designed to work for any inputs. <br /><br />I take his general point to be that there’s a difference between randomness, where the distribution of outcomes is known (or at least can be discovered in some way) versus a situation where this is impossible.<br /><br />If something is indeterministic, but there’s no way to know the probability distribution, then it is something which seems worthy of being called free.<br /><br />Free will is then defined (for the purposes of his talk) as unpredictability (even in terms of probability distribution) by any actual or conceivable technologies. Aaronson describes a “prediction game” whereby a future computer analyzes one's entire brain/body/immediate environment, and predicts your answer to questions (actually the probability distribution of your answers). <br /><br />Now, in assessing whether this will be possible, there is a key discovery we need to derive from science, which is: in a human brain, do quantum level states impact macroscopic (say, neuronal) behavior? We don’t know the answer yet for certain, although I would guess it’s extremely likely. This doesn’t mean any fancy quantum coherence in the brain; it just means quantum states at the molecular level sometimes are amplified to influence macroscopic processes.<br /><br />The next key point is that if this were to be true, then the <span style="font-style: italic;"><a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/No-cloning_theorem">quantum no-cloning theorem</a></span> would prevent prediction of human behavior by any future technology (assuming quantum mechanics is true). We cannot replicate all the relevant physical states.<br /><br />Then our behavior is described by “<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Knightian_uncertainty">Knightian uncertainty</a>”, i.e. uncertainty that one can’t even accurately quantify using probabilities. The prediction game is unwinnable.<br /><br />Even if the prediction game is unwinnable in this way, what does this have to do with free will? Even if the universe were deterministically evolving from an initial quantum state (Everettian view), the world would still be (stochastically) determined in spite of this result. It would just be that the computer couldn’t know the initial condition of the universe.<br /><br />But here’s something weird. He says: “If the Prediction Game was unwinnable, then it would seem just as logically coherent to speak about our decisions determining the initial state, as about the initial state determining our decisions!” The situation could be something like this: “…there are qubits all over the world today which have been in states of Knightian uncertainty since the Big Bang. Maybe we should call them ‘willbits’. By making a decision, you can retroactively determine the quantum state of one of these willbits. But then once you determine it, that’s it! There’s no going back.”<br /><br />A sort of backwards-in-time causation seems implied (but not one which could lead to grandfather paradoxes). In general, the picture is of spacetime history determining in retrospect what it’s own initial state was as quantum particle states get amplified to a macroscopic scale and decohere.<br /><br />(Aaronson then finishes with a speculative discussion of why this situation might fit well with <a href="http://guidetoreality.blogspot.com/2011/05/horizon-complementarity.html">black-hole complementarity</a>, but I’ll leave that aside for now.)<br /><br />Now, personally, I have an different opinion about the measurement problem. Whereas in the Everettian view all of the uncertainty could be seen as embedded in an initial state of the universe, I believe measurement collapses are happening all the time naturally. So spontaneity is introduced continually, not just all at once. But it’s not clear this matters for the present discussion (except that perhaps we wouldn’t need to discuss retrocausation). Either way, there is freedom, if one accepts the way it is defined here.Steve Esserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03127743863789489392noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7247637.post-68597451069497662982011-09-14T09:50:00.003-04:002011-09-14T10:19:08.009-04:00GPPC 2011-2012 ProgramLots of good Philly-area philosophy coming up!<br /><br />The <a href="http://www.thegppc.org/">GPPC website</a> has the <a href="http://www.thegppc.org/2011/09/2011-2012-program.html">updated program information for 2011-2012</a>. The site also has other news, including this year's discussion groups and other lectures at the member schools which are open to the public. I'm also anticipating that, like last year, there will be further GPPC-sponsored events added to the calendar as we move forward.<br /><br />Coming up soon (Saturday 1st October) is the <a href="http://www.thegppc.org/2011/09/bertrand-russell-in-pennsylvania.html">"Bertrand Russell in Pennsylvania" event at Ursinus College</a>. Three speakers will give talks inspired by the time Russell spent living west of Philadelphia in the early 1940's.Steve Esserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03127743863789489392noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7247637.post-32959410559586470502011-09-09T10:51:00.004-04:002011-09-09T12:59:16.272-04:00Priority of Actual over Potential in AristotleAquinas follows Aristotle in utilizing the interplay of potentiality and actuality to explain substance and change. And the idea that the actual is prior to the potential, which I got a bit hung up on when <a href="http://guidetoreality.blogspot.com/2011/08/thoughts-on-edward-fesers-aquinas.html">reading Edward Feser’s book <span style="font-style:italic;">Aquinas</span></a>, is from Aristotle as well.<br /><br />The relevant discussion appears in book Θ of Aristotle’s Metaphysics; a summary is included in <a href="http://faculty.washington.edu/smcohen/">Marc Cohen</a>’s <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-metaphysics/#ActPot">SEP article (section 12)</a>. <br /><br />First, Actuality is prior in sense of <span style="font-style:italic;">logos</span> (account or definition), because we cite the actuality or actualities in describing a potential (something is fragile because it is capable of being broken). I think this is a good point, as it relates to everyday examples we can describe. However, if you think there is novelty in the world, then latent potentials exist which we cannot so define. A novel actuality may very well be described after the fact in terms of potentials which were previously unknown.<br /><br />Next, Aristotle also views the actual as prior in a temporal sense: while an acorn’s potential to be a tree is prior to its actually becoming one, actual adult trees had to exist beforehand. This seems like a chicken and egg situation.<br /><br />Finally, Aristotle argues that the actual is prior “in substance” because the actuality is the end or <span style="font-style:italic;">telos</span>, and the potentiality exists for the sake of the end – actuality is the final cause of the potential. <br /><br />An added argument is that Aristotle looks at the bigger picture and sees that potentials may or may not be fulfilled, therefore they are perishable. On the other hand, something eternal would have to be imperishable, hence actual. Since the eternal can exist without the perishable, but not conversely, this is another way to see that the actual is prior in substance. Just to be devil’s advocate here, though, I can easily conceive of eternal potentials: if potentiality is truly a mode of being.<br /><br />These points about the priority and eternal nature of actuality lead us into the territory of the unmoved mover being seen as pure Act, utilized by Aquinas in arguments for God. I have been entertaining the different idea that if there is an ultimate being it should encompass both (infinite) potential and the power to act. But we’ll see how this holds up with further reading.Steve Esserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03127743863789489392noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7247637.post-34112917416181345872011-08-24T12:07:00.005-04:002011-09-05T18:14:10.949-04:00Thoughts on Edward Feser’s AquinasI recently read <span style="font-style:italic;"><span style="font-weight:bold;"><a href="http://www.amazon.com/Aquinas-Beginners-Guide-Oneworld/dp/1851686908/">Aquinas</a></span><span style="font-style:italic;"></span></span>, by Edward Feser (<a href="http://www.edwardfeser.com/">home page</a>, <a href="http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/">blog</a>). I would recommend the book; it is an excellent introduction to the thought of Aquinas (it deals with his philosophy – it is not a biography of his life and times, nor does it cover all the theology). It is very accessible to the non-expert, but is best suited for those with some background knowledge of philosophy. In about 200 well written pages, Feser both presents and advocates for Thomist positions through 4 chapters devoted respectively to metaphysics, natural theology, psychology, and ethics.
<br />
<br />I think Feser‘s greatest success is in his arguments for a re-consideration of Aquinas’ Aristotelian metaphysical ideas, especially with regard to causation, but also with regard to an ontology of potency and action, and hylomorphic (form/matter) dualism.
<br />
<br />My main criticism is that while Feser’s assumed role as Aquinas’ champion is usually a benefit to the reader, as Aquinas is presented in most sympathetic light, he is inclined to insist that all of Aquinas' ideas are equally meritorious. In some cases this leads him to present arguments which seem to go beyond what would have occurred to Thomas himself.
<br />
<br />But, with plenty of references for further reading, Feser has given the reader a roadmap for further study to follow onto his fine introduction.
<br />
<br />Below are somewhat scattershot notes and comments I made while reading the book. To briefly summarize my own views: I'm attracted to some of the metaphysical elements of Aquinas/Aristotle as they relate to causation and mind, and I'm even sympathetic to some of the cosmological arguments. On the other hand, I was unconvinced by significant parts of the Thomist package, including arguments by analogy for some of the divine attributes, God's nature as pure act and his separateness from matter, and the special nature of the human soul.<div>
<br /><a name='more'></a>
<br />----------------------------------------------------------------------
<br />Ch. 1 Aquinas (intro.)
<br />
<br />Ch. 2 Metaphysics
<br />
<br />P.12 The interplay of potency and act in explaining change is something I’m attracted to. One part of Aquinas’ view I didn’t see any motivation for was the presumed asymmetry whereby act is prior to potency. He says potency cannot exist without act, but act can exist without potency. This anticipates Aquinas’ hierarchy from God as pure act down through to prime matter as pure potency. But I think it is simpler to view all of reality as composed of both potency and act. And if God is the ultimate being, he should be the source of all potentia as well as the power to actualize them.
<br />
<br />P.21 I agree neo-Aristotelian causation has merit. There is a lot of good current work on a powers/dispositions ontology which is simpatico.
<br />
<br />P.24 Essences are difficult, and seem at first to be outmoded by the essentially quantitative differences among physical objects. However, I’m open minded: perhaps if all the infinite possibilities are considered, there is a set of overlapping ones which might define an essence.
<br />
<br />P.34 Feser’s explanation of how Aquinas comes to consider the good and true, etc. as “convertible” with being was helpful, as I didn't understand this before. Ultimately, though, the resultant “stretching” of these terms throughout the system becomes increasingly strained and unconvincing to me.
<br />
<br />P.49 Feser has an excellent discussion of the problems with post-Humean thinking on causation, and the potential superiority of the “powers” viewpoint.
<br />
<br />P.54 An interesting point is attributed to John Haldane: that indeterminism considered as resulting from natural propensities in quantum systems is in keeping with the spirit of Aristotelian view.
<br />
<br />P.58 The doctrine of analogy seems the weakest part of Thomism to me, and repeated invocations throughout the book didn’t alter my initial view on this.
<br />
<br />Ch. 3 Natural Theology
<br />
<br />P.65 The First Way. Aquinas thinks no potential can actualize itself, but I would say the spontaneity of QM phenomena seems to undermine this (in the same sense that the full-strength Liebnizian principle of sufficient reason is undermined). Contingent facts might beg for explanation, but not a complete explanation in terms of prior acts. New spontaneous acts are constrained by other/prior acts but not determined by them. </div><div>
<br />I do sympathize with the quest for ultimate explanation that leads to a necessary being as the ultimate source of creative power. I think again, though, that viewing this ultimate power as external to the material world weakens the argument (in other words I don’t see again why act is prior to potency).
<br />
<br />P.91 The Second way doesn’t seem to add much once you’ve delved into the first, and understand Aquinas’ background assumptions regarding causation. Feser here brings in a discussion of Thomas’ “existence proof” from On Being and Essence.
<br />
<br />P.92 The Third Way’s weakness is Thomas’ presentation of contingency and necessity as temporal notions. Feser helps out by noting that if we assume an infinite expanse of time, we can bring the concepts closer to the modern conception (although he says we can and should reject the “possible worlds” account of modal concepts).
<br />
<br />p.95 Feser notes an interesting criticism, due to J.L. Mackie, that even if individual contingent things go out of existence, a “permanent stock of matter” could persist indefinitely (and hence be “necessary”). Feser says Thomism shouldn’t have a problem with this. It’s OK if matter exists necessarily, as this doesn’t impact his argument for God specifically: all necessary things get their necessity from God. I think it still is simpler if we posit a panentheistic God which includes all raw materials in its being.
<br />
<br />In fact, a better argument from contingency to necessity is this: there is a set of all metaphysically possible things (events, objects, worlds, whatever). The sum of all of these must exist necessarily (there can be exactly one maximal set of possibilia).
<br />
<br />P.100 The Fourth Way. This is weak: it relies on the convertibility of the transcendentals and the doctrine of analogy. These are Aquinas’ most questionable tools.
<br />
<br />I would be tempted by a version which said there must be a maximal being in the sense of all-encompassing.
<br />
<br />P.116 The Fifth way. This is very weak IMO. If things have final causes, then one could argue there must be a greater power underlying these (as in the first or second ways), but then here he states it must be intelligent, without adequate argument.
<br />
<br />P.120 The Divine attributes
<br />Immutability: God as pure Act not justified in my view, therefore God is better seem as the sum of all that is changing and unchanging (so not immutable).
<br />Incorporeality/Immateriality: No
<br />Eternal: OK
<br />Powerful: Yes, as the source of all power.
<br />Intelligence: No argument given. Obviously, His being includes all beings which we do consider intelligent. But human intelligence is an aspect of being a finite agent in a larger context or environment. God has no larger context, so I’m not comfortable invoking analogy and calling God intelligent (or possessing a will – that’s another notion linked to intentionality which presumes an environment).
<br />
<br />P.125 To beat a dead horse, the Thomist doctrine of analogy is an all-too-flexible tool which attempts to build a bridge from the necessary being of metaphysics to the God of tradition.</div><div>
<br />Good: Is God good? Here we are stretching the convertible sense of Good into the moral sense of good. This is difficult. It makes sense that God is the source of moral facts, alongside all others, but like the discussion of intellect, this doesn’t suffice for the N.B. to earn the human-derived label.
<br />Simplicity. To be charitable, maybe the idea that God has infinite parts leads to a sense of simplicity (?)
<br />
<br />Ch. 4 Psychology
<br />
<br />P.132 The discussion of the soul I find unconvincing: thanks to science we now know that nature is continuous is a way Aristotle and Aquinas couldn’t appreciate. While I might concede that living things seem to have a “form” different from everyday non-living objects which still begs for a fuller explanation, there is no motivation for a qualitative difference between humans and our living cousins. The degree of our intelligence does distinguish us from other species, but not qualitatively.
<br />
<br />P.151 Likewise, the discussion of immateriality and immortality is unconvincing. Knowledge of universals is not sufficient to demonstrate immateriality of mind; immortality is argued based on the doctrine of asymmetry between act and potency, which we discussed above. Was this asymmetry supposed to be an intuitively obvious axiom? If act and potency are not symmetric, I can picture potency having priority as easily (or with as much difficulty) as the reverse.
<br />
<br />P.165 Feser presents a good diagnosis of the modern mind-body problem and the virtues of Aristotelian ideas. Good advocacy of hylomorphic dualism (excepting the idea that the human form is special vs. other living things)</div><div>
<br />The banishment of intentionality and qualities from nature and substitution of an inert material world is the source of the post-Cartesian conundrum. If, instead, these are ubiquitous features of the natural world, we are a long way toward solving the problem of mind.
<br />
<br />Ch.5 Ethics
<br />
<br />P.176 Briefest part of the book is the short introduction to ethics and natural law. Some good ideas here, but of course the interpretation of good as natural inclination is difficult to work out. There is again a stretching of the sense of “good”.
<br /></div>Steve Esserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03127743863789489392noreply@blogger.com0