In designing charter school legislation, policymakers
have focused a great deal of attention
on the specifics of the authorizer-charter school
bargain (i.e., that charter schools are given certain
freedoms as long as they produce results).
If charter school leaders cannot improve student
performance, operate a financially viable
organization, and satisfy parents who have a
choice about whether to send their children to
this school, then the school will be closed. On the other hand, if a school meets and exceeds
the terms of its charter, it can continue to operate
and even expand.

As with any bargain, there are two sides to this
relationship. The research literature19 and the
focus of charter school legislation itself indicate
that policymakers have given far less attention
to the authorizer side of the bargain. What happens
if the authorizer does not set up a rigorous
screening process? Monitor schools consistently?
Hold schools accountable for results? Experience
suggests that student performance suffers
if these responsibilities are not carried out.

So, how should policymakers hold authorizers
accountable for their performance? What types
of entities should oversee the authorizer? What
should they monitor? How should they measure
results? How much oversight is desirable, and
how much would be burdensome? What role, if
any, should the public play in this process?

Charter school legislation regarding authorizer
oversight varies greatly from state to state, both
in terms of what agencies provide the oversight
and what their roles are. To move toward a
more coherent policy, one that manages the balance
between responsible oversight and freedom
to act, policymakers need to know more
about what works best. The experiences of the
authorizers featured in this guide offer some insights
into what types of entities generally hold
authorizers accountable and how they exercise
their oversight responsibilities, but there is more
work to be done to determine how authorizers
themselves should be held accountable for
overseeing a system of high-performing schools.
By directing more resources to examine these
emerging questions, policymakers, foundations, advocacy groups, and government offices could
improve our understanding of what level and
type of oversight is most desirable.20

On the surface, there are multiple levels of oversight
for the authorizing staff in the Ferris State
University Charter Schools Office. Staff members
report to the university’s vice president
for academic affairs and the dean of extended
learning, and, ultimately, to the university
Board of Trustees, which has the final say on
all decisions about charter approval, renewal,
and closure. But in actuality, these offices rarely
intervene in the operations of the authorizing
office. Neither the university administrators
nor the board sets policy or guides the office’s
mission. Instead, they focus on the big picture:
ensuring that no charter school poses a serious
risk to its students, its community, or the
university. This hands-off role leaves the daily
work and decision-making to the authorizing
staff, which has the expertise and tools to work
most effectively with its schools.

Authorizers in Massachusetts, New York, and
California make recommendations to state-level
bodies that ultimately grant charters and approve
closures. In California, this takes the form
of an appointed Advisory Commission on Charter
Schools that makes recommendations to the
State Board of Education, which then makes all
final decisions. Through advocacy, presentations,
and annual reports, the California charter
office answers to both of these groups for the
integrity of its relationship with its schools and
for the quality of their academic performance.
The situation in Massachusetts, where the statewide
authorizer is the only authorizer, is similar.
The Massachusetts office answers directly to the
state commissioner of education, who makes recommendations to the Massachusetts Board of
Education. The state board ultimately makes all
decisions. The NYC Office of Charter Schools
also makes recommendations to the NYC public
schools chancellor who then proposes them to a
legislatively empowered board—the New York
State Board of Regents—for final decisions regarding
charter approval, renewal, and closure.

In the cases of Massachusetts and California, the
state board almost always follows the charter
office's recommendation. This is not the case
with NYC, where the New York State Board of
Regents has been known to reject the recommendations
made by the charter office. This
situation is attributable in large part to differing
levels of risk tolerance. In general, the NYC Office of Charter Schools is more open to innovative
school models than the Board of Regents.
When the Board of Regents disagrees with the
proposed leadership, education focus, or location
of a new charter school, its word is final.

Because of the way the charter school law is
structured in Minnesota, the state commissioner
of education ultimately approves and renews
the charter, but the authorizing staff acts as a
"sponsor" in the sense that it is responsible for
ongoing oversight responsibilities. The state education
commissioner in Minnesota does occasionally
deny an application, particularly if the
commissioner does not believe the authorizer
will implement strong oversight practices.

As part of the Volunteers of America of Minnesota
(VOA of MN), the Charter School Sponsorship
Program also answers to the board of
directors of this larger nonprofit for key aspects
of its operations, such as its mission and budget.
Yet it has a lot of freedom to design its own processes and to make decisions. The CEO of
its parent organization—VOA of MN—is actively
involved to the extent that he participates in
the application process and is familiar with the
processes and the schools, but the charter office director and school liaison have built the
actual day-to-day operations themselves. They
have created the materials and processes, and
they field all school inquiries.

In every state with a charter school law, the state
itself is ultimately responsible for the quality of
education offered by charter schools. State policymakers
can meet this responsibility by holding
the authorizing organizations that directly
monitor charter school quality accountable for
results. In order to do so, the individuals who
sit on these oversight bodies—the state board
of education, the board of the larger nonprofit
(as is the case with VOA of MN), and the university
board of trustees (as is the case with FSU
and SUNY)—must themselves be familiar with
strong authorizing practices.