tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-80798632018-05-28T20:58:35.151-07:00the wild web[ thoughts on web privacy and security ]Sid Stammhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08788622306405563565noreply@blogger.comBlogger300125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8079863.post-30674479446602016342016-02-24T07:25:00.000-08:002016-02-24T07:27:09.507-08:00Keep the Back Door Locked<div style="margin-bottom: 0; margin-top: 0;">Sure, I want to stop bad guys, but requiring Apple to make their phones vulnerable is not the right approach. &nbsp;The current public discourse on the Apple vs. FBI "open the phone" is really a conflated mix of two issues: (1) the FBI wants help to crack open a known criminal's phone and (2) whether or not Apple should be required to create law enforcement back-doors into their products.&nbsp; Lets separate the two issues.</div><div style="margin-bottom: 0; margin-top: 0;"><br /></div><h3 style="margin-bottom: 0; margin-top: 0;">(1) Should the FBI be given access to Farook's iPhone contents?&nbsp;&nbsp;</h3><div style="margin-bottom: 0; margin-top: 0;">I think most people agree the FBI should have the data.&nbsp; <a href="http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/02/23/467785093/in-debate-over-apple-fbi-dispute-gates-and-zuckerberg-don-t-agree">Bill Gates made a statement</a> on these issues on Tuesday morning, and made his position pretty clear: "Apple has access to the information, they're just refusing to provide the access, and the courts will tell them whether to provide the access or not." If Apple does indeed have access to the information, the right way forward is for the FBI to seek the court's order requiring Apple to release the information.&nbsp; This isn't new.&nbsp; In fact, the FBI have <a href="https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2714005/SB-Shooter-Order-Compelling-Apple-Asst-iPhone.pdf">a court order</a> in hand.</div><div style="margin-bottom: 0; margin-top: 0;"><br /></div><div style="margin-bottom: 0; margin-top: 0;">Does Apple <i>really</i> have access to the data on Farook's iPhone?&nbsp; Is it <i>able</i> to comply with the court order? &nbsp;<a href="https://www.apple.com/customer-letter/">Tim Cook's messaging</a>&nbsp;indicates they do not, and Apple is pushing back saying that they will not comply with the part of the court order that goes beyond this simple data turnover: the part that says "give the FBI a tool to help us hack the phone quickly." &nbsp; This is where the discourse gets concerning; this tool could be considered a backdoor.&nbsp; It's not as egregious as "give us a master key", but it is certainly bypassing the iPhone's owner's security mechanism in a way not intended by the manufacturer.</div><div style="margin-bottom: 0; margin-top: 0;"><br /></div><h3 style="margin-bottom: 0; margin-top: 0; text-align: justify;">(2) Should Apple create a tool for the FBI that enables easy hacking of Farook's phone?&nbsp;&nbsp;</h3><div align="left" style="margin-bottom: 0; margin-top: 0; text-align: justify;">If you read&nbsp; carefully into <a href="https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2714005/SB-Shooter-Order-Compelling-Apple-Asst-iPhone.pdf">the court order</a>, the court asks apple to provide a tool that will <i>only</i> work on the <i>specific</i> subject device -- <i>not</i> all iPhones. &nbsp;The specific ask reads:</div><blockquote class="tr_bq" style="margin-bottom: 0; margin-top: 0; text-align: justify;">"<span style="font-family: &quot;courier new&quot; , &quot;courier&quot; , monospace; font-size: x-small;">Apple shall assist in enabling the search of a cellular telephone, [make, model, serial number, IMEI] on the Verizon Network, (the "SUBJECT DEVICE") pursuant to a warrant of this court by providing reasonable technical assistance to assist law enforcement agents in obtaining access to the data on the SUBJECT DEVICE.</span>"</blockquote><div align="left" style="margin-bottom: 0; margin-top: 0; text-align: justify;">This reads like a natural extension of "hand over the contents of this phone." &nbsp; It sounds quite reasonable, much like ordering a building superintendent to unlock a specific criminal's apartment for a search.&nbsp; This doesn't immediately seem different from the first issue (give us access to Farook's data).</div><div style="margin-bottom: 0; margin-top: 0;"><br /></div><div style="margin-bottom: 0; margin-top: 0;">But it is. <br /><br />If you keep reading, the court orders Apple to provide the FBI with a <b><i>tool</i></b> to override some of the security features in the phone. &nbsp;Ordinarily, Apple would not have a fast way to "unlock the apartment." They&nbsp;have&nbsp;provided people with secure phones that keep data&nbsp;private from&nbsp;everyone, including from Apple. &nbsp; But in this case the court is ordering Apple to do the FBI's job: engineer something new to reverse their phone's security.&nbsp; This is like asking the door lock manufacturer to make you a lock-picking machine for the apartment's lock.&nbsp; Doesn't the FBI usually just pick the lock or kick in the door?&nbsp; The courts don't compel the lock maker to make a lock-picking machine to do it.</div><div style="margin-bottom: 0; margin-top: 0;"><br /></div><div style="margin-bottom: 0; margin-top: 0;">There's urgency here to get everyone to pitch in to stop terrorism, and I understand this concern. Irrational bad guys are really scary. &nbsp; But this order is not routine! It is an ask to do something very abnormal to aid law enforcement. &nbsp;Assume it's a good idea: we all want to help the FBI unlock the phone, and so Apple makes the tool.&nbsp; Now what?&nbsp; Can such a tool be constructed so it cannot be used on other iPhones?&nbsp; In my opinion, and <a href="https://www.apple.com/customer-letter/">in Apple's</a>, <i>it cannot</i>.&nbsp; The existence of this tool threatens the security of <i>all</i> iPhone users when it is not limited to this individual device. If the tool fell into the wrong hands, it may be used by criminals or even the terrorists the FBI is trying to stop.&nbsp;&nbsp;</div><h3 style="margin-bottom: 0; margin-top: 0;"><br />Where does this lead?</h3><div style="margin-bottom: 0; margin-top: 0;">This neutralizes any benefits from encryption, and not just on iPhones. &nbsp;For a moment, lets assume this tool can be safely created to work against only one device. &nbsp;The requests wouldn't stop at Apple's compliance with a single phone.&nbsp; The court order could lead to companies being required to defeat their own customers' security any time law enforcement requests it.&nbsp; This is a very dangerous precedent. &nbsp;<a href="https://lawfareblog.com/not-slippery-slope-jump-cliff">Nick Weaver's analysis</a>&nbsp;is frightening: imagine if device manufacturers had to do "the dirty work" of hacking into their own products at any time.&nbsp; Currently, law enforcement must do the often substantial work to break a device, but if they can just get a court order and require someone else to put in the effort that removes any incentive to investigate carefully before pursuing a subject's data.&nbsp; </div><div style="margin-bottom: 0; margin-top: 0;"><br /></div><div style="margin-bottom: 0; margin-top: 0;">While the order itself does not create a technological backdoor, it creates one through legal precedent.&nbsp;Apple is right to appeal and ask the courts to think a bit harder about this order. Encryption is the only thing that provides any sort of confidentiality on the wild web, and we should not throw it away to decrypt one phone. &nbsp;I'm not sure where it is, but somewhere we need to draw the line somewhere between "never help the FBI catch terrorists" and "make it trivial to defeat your customers' security" -- a balance where law enforcement officers' hands are not tied and encryption still works for the good guys.<br /><br /></div>Sid Stammhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08788622306405563565noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8079863.post-82506696591030164482016-01-31T12:54:00.001-08:002016-01-31T12:54:37.751-08:00shake it upMuch has happened on the web in the last two and a half years, and of course I've been too wrapped up in it to say anything here.<br /><br />It's time to change that.<br /><br />A little over a year ago I <a href="http://www.rose-hulman.edu/news/academics/2015/sid-stamm-returns-to-his-roots,-gives-students-tools-to-meet-cybersecurity-challenges.aspx">returned to my roots</a>. &nbsp;I've always had my sights set on teaching, and it's fantastic to be back in a place so dedicated to education. &nbsp;We need to alter the Web's course and the best place for me to contribute to this goal is by preparing our future software designers and entrepreneurs to lead the charge.<br /><br />I'll admit that I got a bit tired of trying to change the Web. &nbsp;It's exhausting working on <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Do_Not_Track">an initiative</a> that has the whole force of online marketing against you. &nbsp;Skeptics and those who rely on the opacity of data trading alike are a powerful force.<br /><br />But I haven't stopped caring. &nbsp;Admittedly I backed off, but some (with more stamina than I) haven't. &nbsp;On January 20, Andreas Gal posted his thoughts with a very optimistic headline: <a href="http://andreasgal.com/2016/01/20/brendan-is-back-to-save-the-web/">"Brendan is back to save the web".</a>&nbsp; He does a great job of making a point that I've been trying to articulate for years: the economic incentives online are stuck and we need a new player to emerge with new incentives and a fresh look at how to make the Web an economy again instead of a giant data mine. &nbsp;Andreas makes a clear case that all the current web browsers cost money to produce, but nobody pays for them directly; instead they are indirectly kept aloft by whatever makes the Web go round. <br /><br />Right now that's almost exclusively advertisements.<br /><br />Somehow the web has found itself in an advertising monoculture where advertising is frequently&nbsp;aggravating&nbsp;and at <i>best </i>an unnecessary bloat in an ecosystem that should not be bogged down by distractions from <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=847124">generative content</a>. &nbsp;The web should be a place vibrant with commerce and innovation: clear of distractions and rich with creativity. &nbsp;People should not be <i>sold on&nbsp;</i>what they want, they should instead be able to <i>make</i>&nbsp;what they want. <br /><br />But the question remains:&nbsp;how do we get the web from where it is to where it should be? <br /><br />We need economic incentives that encourage Web sites without this bloat. &nbsp;We need content that is a generative "makers" platform. &nbsp;The Web should be an ecosystem where businesses get rewarded for their content and <i>not </i>the willingness to plaster solicitations all over their digital presence. &nbsp;This is what Brendan wants to do.<br /><br /><a href="https://brave.com/">Brave</a>&nbsp;is his attempt to steer the web in the right direction. &nbsp;<a href="https://brave.com/blogpost_1.html">His vision</a> is to make a web browser that is a true user agent again, and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principal%E2%80%93agent_problem">not a self-serving or web-serving agent</a>. &nbsp;People should be molding the web instead of the web molding its people.<br /><br />I agree with <a href="https://brave.com/blogpost_1.html">Brendan</a> that the web should not be an ad-blocking fight, it should be a place for novel and generative things, but we can't just turn our backs on ads. &nbsp;I'm intrigued by Brave's new approach and excited to see where Brendan and his team take us.Sid Stammhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08788622306405563565noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8079863.post-36431317863583220292013-11-21T09:22:00.000-08:002013-11-21T09:22:30.168-08:00facebook privacy in a graphicOne reason I deleted my Facebook account was what I perceived to be their <a href="http://blog.sidstamm.com/2010/08/facebook-again.html">shampoo-instruction-style erosion of privacy</a>. &nbsp;They seemed to be changing things, reacting to public outrage, rolling back a little bit, then repeating. &nbsp;Slowly, they appeared to be drawing in users and <a href="http://blog.sidstamm.com/2010/05/facebook-privacy-erosion.html">strong-arming them into letting go of some control</a> over their personal data by providing an ultimatum: "keep on top of our policy changes or leave". &nbsp;I understand they need to make money, but surely there's a more fair way than filing down peoples' control to extract more personal info.<br /><br /><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><span style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><a href="http://mattmckeon.com/facebook-privacy/"><img border="0" height="264" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-tRMVoHlsF_Y/Uo4_WjkSTyI/AAAAAAAAAw4/m-nTrMFi5K0/s320/fbinfographic.png" width="320" /></a></span></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"><a href="http://mattmckeon.com/facebook-privacy/">Credit: Matt McKeon&nbsp;<span style="text-align: start;">http://mattmckeon.com/facebook-privacy/</span></a></span></td></tr></tbody></table><br class="Apple-interchange-newline" />Browsing around today, I stumbled across&nbsp;<a href="http://mattmckeon.com/facebook-privacy/">Matt McKeon's infographic</a>&nbsp;showing the evolution of Facebook's privacy policies and&nbsp;<a href="https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/04/facebook-timeline">Kurt Opsahl's related timeline of changes</a>. &nbsp;The data only goes through 2010 (perhaps their M.O. has changed since then), but it's a striking graphic and worth a look. &nbsp;It would be fascinating if construction of such an infographic timeline were automated and it could be deployed for other sites out there.Sid Stammhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08788622306405563565noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8079863.post-37580241655546158152013-03-18T17:23:00.000-07:002013-03-18T17:24:42.076-07:00what ever happened to the second party?<br />I got into a terminology discussion with <a href="http://brendaneich.com/">Brendan</a> this week, and it turns out there's general confusion over these labels we give to businesses on the web: first party and third party. &nbsp;This topic has been <a href="http://www.w3.org/2011/tracking-protection/track/issues/10">debated ad nauseum in the TPWG</a>, but I want to share my thoughts on what it means in the context of cookies and the general browser/webpage point of view.<br /><br />The Marx brothers have a take on this in <a href="http://www.nightattheopera.net/contract.html">Night at the Opera</a>&nbsp;when they get into discussion of parties and contracts, and I think they're on to something, but on the web these party labels probably come from business-focused contractual engagements. So which party am I? &nbsp;I'm not a party (though that sounds like fun).<br /><br />In the case of cookies, the party labels are all about contractual arrangements to produce a good or service for you. You, the surfer, are not part of the contract, but you benefit from a system of first, second and third party businesses. <br /><br />Here, the <i><b>first party</b></i> is the business you seek to engage. &nbsp;The <i><b>second party</b></i> in question is a contractor doing business explicitly for the&nbsp;first party.&nbsp;For example, when you visit the grocery store, someone might help bag your groceries. Maybe they're a temp worker and are actually employed by a different company, but their sole job is to do what the grocery store asks, and they do their work in the store. In these cases there's a direct business agreement between first (business) and second (contractor) parties to produce one service or good. For all intents and purposes, the bagger seems like part of the store.<br />&nbsp; <br />Second-party cookies don't make much sense in the online cookie context since to the web browser, there's no technical distinction between the first-party or second-party web software. The assumption here is that second parties operate within the "umbrella" of the first party, so the cookies are part of the first party offering. <br /><br />Any<b><i> third party </i></b>players are peripheral to the transaction and may add value but their primary purpose is something other than the sought-after good or service. These third parties are more like the flier guy who walks around the parking lot while you shop and puts discount fliers for his car dealership on everyone's windshields. &nbsp;(Wow, zero down, $169 a month?) &nbsp;He's not stocking shelves or bagging your groceries at the grocery store, but is still a peripheral part of the whole grocery shopping experience. Customers expectations for the third party here are likely different than those for the temp worker. &nbsp;(What's maybe not obvious, is if you go to his dealership, the flyer may inform him what kind of groceries you bought, and tracking cookies can be even more invisible than these fliers -- but that's a blog post for a different day.)<br /><br />So how's this work online? &nbsp;The first party on this blog is me: blog.sidstamm.com. &nbsp;There's a second party here too, the folks who made my blog framework software. &nbsp;They maintain the software (I'm too lazy), and I use it to publish my blog, but it all comes through on this same domain name. &nbsp;When you read this, the two of us are working together with the goal of bringing you my thoughts. &nbsp;There also happen to be a "G+ Share" button and search bar on the site, but they're third party; controlled by some other entity, served over a different domain, and only showing up here to augment your experience beyond the blog you seek. <br /><br />So don't panic: the second parties are still there! &nbsp;We just don't use the term much because they're so tightly integrated with first parties, that they usually appear the same.Sid Stammhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08788622306405563565noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8079863.post-82222577053101578482013-03-06T12:13:00.000-08:002013-03-06T12:13:02.346-08:00Who uses the password manager?<br /><pre wrap="">Who uses the password manager, and why? My colleague Monica Chew tries to answer these questions and more by measuring password manager use.&nbsp;</pre><pre wrap=""><br /></pre><pre wrap=""><a href="http://monica-at-mozilla.blogspot.com/2013/02/cant-live-with-them-cant-live-without.html">Check out her blog post</a>.</pre>Sid Stammhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08788622306405563565noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8079863.post-6314296724085457802012-12-27T10:41:00.002-08:002012-12-27T10:41:44.732-08:00what is privacy?Often times when I find myself in a conversation about Privacy, there's a lack of clarity around what exactly we're discussing.&nbsp; It's widely accepted that people who are experts on privacy all speak the same language and have the same goals.<br /><br />I'm not so sure this is true.<br /><br />This came up in a discussion with <a href="http://jishnumenon.com/">Jishnu</a> yesterday, and we needed a common starting place.&nbsp; So I'd like to take a little time to lay out what I'm thinking when I talk about Privacy, especially since I'm mainly focused on empowering individuals with control over data sharing and not so much on keeping secrets.<br /><blockquote class="tr_bq"><b>Privacy</b> is the ability for an individual to have transparency, choice, and control over information about themselves.</blockquote><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-rfVcPoCc0p4/UNyG9gfJfcI/AAAAAAAAAsI/83bQ9Z4bhJM/s1600/privacy-pyramid.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-rfVcPoCc0p4/UNyG9gfJfcI/AAAAAAAAAsI/83bQ9Z4bhJM/s1600/privacy-pyramid.png" /></a></div>At the risk of sounding too cliché, I'm gonna use a pyramid to explain my thinking.&nbsp; There are three parts to establishing privacy:<br /><br />First, an organization's (or individual's) collection, sharing and use of data must be <u><i>transparent</i>.</u>&nbsp; This is crucial because choice and control cannot be realized without honesty and fairness.<br /><br />Second, individuals must be provided <u><i>choice</i></u>.&nbsp; This means data subjects (those people whose data is being collected, used or shared) must be able to understand what's going to happen with their data and have the ability to provide dissent or consent.<br /><br />Third, when it's clear what's happening and individuals have an understanding about what they want, they must be given <i><u>control</u> </i>over collection, sharing or use of the data in question.<br /><br />This means <u><i>control</i></u> depends on <u><i>choice</i></u> which depends on <u><i>transparency</i>.</u>&nbsp; You cannot make decisions unless you're given the facts.&nbsp; You cannot make your desires reality unless you've decided what you want.<br /><br />For the engineers out there (like me), this dependencies can be modeled as such:<br /><blockquote class="tr_bq"><span style="font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;,Courier,monospace;">[Transparency] = Awareness of Data Practices </span><br /><span style="font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;,Courier,monospace;">[Choice] = [Transparency] + Individual's Wants</span><br /><span style="font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;,Courier,monospace;">[Control] = [Choice] + Organizational Cooperation</span></blockquote>Control is the goal, but it requires Transparency and Choice to work -- as well as some additional inputs.&nbsp; Privacy is the whole thing: all three pieces acting together with support from both data controllers and data subjects to empower individuals with a say in how their data is used.<br /><br />The <a href="http://blog.sidstamm.com/2010/07/mind-gap.html">privacy perception gap</a> is a symptom of ineffective transparency and choice; it is the result of peoples' inability to really understand what's going on so they have no chance to establish positions about what is okay.&nbsp; When transparency and choice are built into a system, the gap shrinks and people have most of what they need to regain control over their privacy.<br /><br />What is privacy to you?Sid Stammhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08788622306405563565noreply@blogger.com11tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8079863.post-89049210695215748772012-10-11T09:14:00.001-07:002012-10-11T09:14:40.011-07:00ownership and transparency in social mediaLes <a href="http://blog.lmorchard.com/2012/10/01/privacy-and-social-media">Writes</a>:<br /><blockquote class="tr_bq">"You don’t own the spaces you inhabit on Facebook. You’re enjoying a party at someone’s house, and you barely know the guy. In fact, your content is the currency that pays for the booze (ie. the privilege of using their servers). That’s why it’s <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gratis_versus_libre#.22Free_beer.22_vs_.22free_speech.22_distinction">free-as-in-beer</a>: You’ve given them what you post, instead of money. That’s valuable stuff, if they can ever quite figure out how to sell it."&nbsp; [<a href="http://blog.lmorchard.com/2012/10/01/privacy-and-social-media">link</a>]</blockquote>It's not completely fair to expect that FB users realize the data about them that they so generously contribute to FB no longer belongs to them.&nbsp; My hypothesis is that many people feel that no matter who has facts about you and prints them, they're still *yours*.&nbsp; After all, companies have trademarks, can't things about me be mine and reserved for me?<br /><br />On a smaller scale, the monetization of facts about me is not surprising; I give an interview to a magazine, they print it, it gets syndicated, no surprise.&nbsp; On a large scale (lots of data collection,&nbsp; frequently) I think people lose track of with whom they are communicating and get immersed in the task at hand.&nbsp;<i> Is it my FB friends, or is it FB, who is helpfully telling my friends things?&nbsp; This system is flexible, crazy, complex, shiny and distracting!&nbsp; Can I use it to video chat with my friends?&nbsp; That's neat.&nbsp; Oh, geez, I forgot FB is in the middle of all this communication...</i><br /><br />People who sign up for FB are not signing up to contribute their life to this stranger throwing a party.&nbsp; They sign up assuming it is a tool they can use to communicate with their friends; it is a machine they've "bought" (for free, heh) to help them communicate.&nbsp; Nobody reads the terms of service.&nbsp; Nobody reads the privacy policy.&nbsp; They accept them since other people have and only read what their friends write.&nbsp; Many are in denial or do not realize that what they contribute to the site is just that: a contribution.<br /><br />I think there is shared responsibility here; consumers should be a little bit wary--but this isn't their area of expertise.&nbsp; As such, the site operator also has a duty to be more forthcoming with what's going on.&nbsp; My communications tool is supposed to be a communications tool.&nbsp; If you market it as a "free communications tool that sells my data," I am better informed than if it's just marketed as a "communications tool."Sid Stammhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08788622306405563565noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8079863.post-44568044775443290762012-05-22T15:37:00.001-07:002012-05-23T09:35:57.549-07:00Adding Privacy to Apps PermissionsI've been thinking about app permission models, especially as we're working on B2G and need a way for users to safely and thoughtfully manage the apps on their device.&nbsp; Most permission models strive to do precisely one thing: allow apps to ask for consent to use features.<br /><br />The problem I have with "allow/deny" consent to use features is that there's not a clear usage intention in having the access; a mirror app that asks for access to your camera probably doesn't need to store data it gets from the sensor, but it could go so far as to store video (and perhaps send it to "sneakyprivacyinvadors.com" to spy on you).<br /><br />If apps can explain their usage intentions, consumers of the apps have more context and can make better decisions about the permissions they grant.&nbsp; While the software probably can't make sure the usage intentions are actually followed, this commitment to customers puts the app developers on the hook for doing the right thing.<br /><br />Head on over to the discussion in <a href="http://groups.google.com/group/mozilla.dev.webapps/topics">mozilla.dev.webapps</a> where I've posted my thoughts, and let us know what you think.<br /><br /><i style="color: #990000;">Edit (23-May-2012 / 9:33 PDT)</i><span style="color: #990000;">:</span> Google Groups (the public archive) did not pick up my original post to the group.&nbsp; If you're not subscribed via NNTP or the dev-webapps mailing list, you can see <a href="http://groups.google.com/group/mozilla.dev.webapps/browse_thread/thread/aa0ff6e8ba9742ad#">my original post in the quoted text of the first reply by Paul. </a>Sid Stammhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08788622306405563565noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8079863.post-45243501545311904422012-03-12T16:53:00.000-07:002012-03-12T16:54:34.415-07:00making DNT easier for web sites<a href="http://twitter.com/#%21/jiboumans">Jos Boumans</a> has done some analysis about the effect of turning on Do Not Track in your browser, and his findings show that sites in general are slow to show that they support the feature.<br /><blockquote class="tr_bq"><i>"As it stands, only 4 out of 482 measured top 500 sites are actively responding to the DNT header being sent."</i> (<a href="http://jiboumans.wordpress.com/2012/02/02/the-state-of-do-not-track/">Link</a>)</blockquote>As a user, it's hard to tell if sites are honoring my Do Not Track request, and as a site developer, it might be a daunting task to hack up my back-end code.&nbsp; The <a href="http://www.w3.org/2011/tracking-protection/">W3C Tracking Protection working group at the W3C</a> are working on helping out transparency and implementations, but in the meantime Jos has released his mod_cookietrack apache module to make it easier for site owners to track their users' clicks in a respectful way -- right now.<br />The Apache module, mod_cookietrack, does all sorts of stuff like mod_usertrack, but one thing it does better is honor DNT; if a server using this module sees "DNT: 1" in an HTTP request, it replaces the tracking cookie with one that says "DNT" -- something that's not unique to a visitor.<br /><br />Apparently it was a lot of work to get DNT supported properly in mod_cookietrack, a native browser module that performs well and is safe on multiple threads, so thanks Jos for your hard work so that more organizations can <a href="http://jiboumans.wordpress.com/2012/03/09/be-do-not-track-compliant-in-30-microseconds-or-less/">support DNT on their web sites</a>. <br /><br />More:<br /><ul><li><a href="http://jiboumans.wordpress.com/2012/02/02/the-state-of-do-not-track/">The State of Do Not Track</a> </li><li><a href="http://jiboumans.wordpress.com/2012/03/09/be-do-not-track-compliant-in-30-microseconds-or-less/">Be Do Not Track compliant in 30 microseconds or less</a></li></ul>Sid Stammhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08788622306405563565noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8079863.post-18863599974321610632012-02-26T22:30:00.000-08:002012-02-26T22:48:02.186-08:00Malware and Phishing Protection in FirefoxFor a while, Firefox has included malware and phishing protection to keep our users safe on the web.&nbsp; Recently, Gian-Carlo Pascutto made some <a href="http://www.morbo.org/2012/02/new-safebrowsing-backend.html">significant improvements to our Firefox</a> support for the feature, resulting in much more efficient operation and use of the Safe Browsing API for this protection.<br /><br /><b>Privacy in the Safe Browsing API</b><br /><br />I want to take a little time to explain how this feature works and why I like it from a privacy perspective:&nbsp; Firefox can check whether or not a web site is on the Safe Browsing blacklist without actually telling the API what the web site is called.<br /><br />At a high level, using this API to find URLs on the "bad" list is like asking your friend to identify whether or not he likes things you show him through a dirty window.&nbsp; Say you hold up an apple to the dirty window and the your friend on the other side sees a fuzzy image of what you're holding.&nbsp; It looks round and red and pretty small, but he's not sure what it is.&nbsp; Your friend looks at his list of things he doesn't like and says he likes everything like that except for plums and red tennis balls.&nbsp; While he still does not know exactly what you're holding, you can know for sure he likes the apple.<br /><br />More technically, this uses a hash function to turn web URLs into numbers.&nbsp; Each number corresponds to exactly one URL.&nbsp; For each site you visit, Firefox hashes the URL and sends the first part of the resulting number to the Safe Browsing API.&nbsp; The API responds with any values on the list of bad URLs that start with the value it received.&nbsp; When Firefox gets the list of "bad" site hash values that match the first part, it looks to see if the entire hash is in the list.&nbsp; Based on whether or not it's in the provided list of bad stuff, Firefox can determined whether the URL is on the Safe Browsing blacklist or not.<br /><br />Consider this hypothetical example of two sites and their (fake) hash values:<br /><br /><table border=""><tbody><tr><th>Site</th><th>Hash Value</th></tr><tr><td>http://mozilla.com</td><td>1339</td></tr><tr><td>http://phishingsite.com</td><td>1350</td></tr></tbody></table><br />When you visit http://mozilla.com, Firefox calculates the hash of the URL, which is 1339.&nbsp; It then asks the Safe Browsing API what bad sites it knows about that start with "13".&nbsp; It returns a list of numbers including "1350".&nbsp; Firefox takes that list, notices that 1339 (http://mozilla.com) is not in the list, so the site must be okay.&nbsp; <br /><br />If you repeat the same procedure with http://phishingsite.com, the same prefix "13" is sent to the API, and the same list of bad sites (including 1350) is returned.&nbsp; In this case, however,&nbsp; the site's hash is "1350" so Firefox knows it's on the list of bad sites and gives you a warning.<br /><br />For you techies and geeks out there: yeah, I'm glossing over a few protocol details, but the gist is that you don't need to tell Google exactly where you browse in return for the bad-stuff blocking.&nbsp; <br /><br /><b>Keeping the Safe Browsing Service Running Smoothly </b><br /><br />Google hosts the Safe Browsing service on the same infrastructure as many of their other services, and they need to ensure that our users aren't blocked from accessing the malware and phishing blacklists as well as make sure they invest in the right resources to keep the service operating well.&nbsp; One of the mechanisms they <a href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=368255#c34">need for performing this quality-of-service assurance is a cookie,</a> so the first request Firefox makes to the Safe Browsing API results in the setting of a Google cookie.<br /><br />I know that not everyone likes that cookie, but Google needs it to make sure their service is working well so I've been working with them to ensure that they can use it for quality of service metrics but not track you around the web.&nbsp; The most straightforward way to do this is to split the Firefox cookie jar into two: one for the web and one for the Safe Browsing feature.&nbsp; It's not there yet, but with a little engineering work, in a future version of Firefox that cookie will only be used for Safe Browsing, and not sent with every request to Google as you browse the web.<br /><br />The cookie can be turned off entirely if you <a href="http://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/Disabling%20third%20party%20cookies">disable third party cookies in Firefox</a>.&nbsp; When you turn off third party cookies, even if the cookie has been previously set your browser will not send the Google cookie -- unless you visit a Google website. You can also <a href="http://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/Firefox%20makes%20unrequested%20connections?s=malware+protection&amp;r=1&amp;e=sph&amp;as=s#w_anti-phishing-list-updating">turn off malware and phishing protection</a>, but I really don't recommend it.<br /><br /><b>Making "Safer Browsing" </b><br /><br />While Firefox has been using Safe Browsing for a while, Google has started experimenting with a couple new features in Safe Browsing for additional malware and phishing filtering.&nbsp; Both of these new features are pretty new and it's not yet clear how effective they are or what percent of my browsing history will be traded for this improvement.&nbsp; Both new features involve sending whole URLs to Google and departing from Firefox's current privacy-preserving state requires evidence of a significant gain in protection. When Google measures and shares how much gain is encountered by their pilot deployment in Chrome, we can take a deeper look and consider whether these new features are worth it.<br /><br />For now, Firefox users are getting a lot of protection for very little in return and there does seem to be good reason for Google to use cookies with Safe Browsing.&nbsp; We are always looking out for things we can do to give Firefox users both the best of privacy and security.Sid Stammhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08788622306405563565noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8079863.post-65393160407967378862011-12-19T16:46:00.000-08:002011-12-30T10:01:36.987-08:00seat belts and airbags<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div>As much as I like giving users choice and control, bombarding people with too many options makes using software painful.&nbsp; This is why it is important to consider both defaults and flexibility of all the privacy-impacting features we roll out -- the airbags and seat belts of the software industry.&nbsp; Not everyone who cares about privacy know how to configure Firefox (or any software) to precisely suit their needs.&nbsp; Those who are both care about their privacy and know how to configure software to precisely what they want are not the same; those with both qualities are often <a href="https://www.privacyassociation.org/">Privacy Professionals</a>, or they work in a related field.<br /><br /><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-jWOeIgEIDnM/Tu_LyduUIOI/AAAAAAAAAko/m7-gr-wPjxU/s1600/privacy-know-venn.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-jWOeIgEIDnM/Tu_LyduUIOI/AAAAAAAAAko/m7-gr-wPjxU/s1600/privacy-know-venn.png" /></a></div><br />A couple of weeks ago, I was inspired by some stuff <a href="http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/staff/profiles/philosophy/guelke-john.aspx">Dr. John Guelke</a>&nbsp; said to segment my thinking on privacy into two efforts: the privacy feature seat belts and airbags.&nbsp; He approaches privacy as something driven by<i> social norms</i>, whereas until recently, I mostly thought about it as a subjective choice about what <i>I</i> want with my identity and data.&nbsp; In fact, both of these perspectives are important, and they must work together to create the most positive effect for the Web.&nbsp; There are distinctly different reasons to provide certain safe defaults than there are to provide features users ultimate control: the airbags can help protect everyone†, and the seat belts†† will protect those who know to use them.<br /><br /><b>Choice and Control (Seat Belts).</b><br /><br />It's crucial that people have all they need to maintain complete control over their experiences online, or the web becomes controlled solely by the businesses on it and not the people who live in it.&nbsp; Increasingly, people are performing more of their everyday activities online and deserve to be as much a part of their activities as they would in the real world and this is why I care so much about giving people who want it control over each bit of how they see and interact with the web.&nbsp; This is the reason Do Not Track was built into Firefox, and this is why software allows people change how the browser handles cookies. These features empower users to control their experiences online.<br /><br />Users enable and deploy these features on their own.&nbsp; Firefox <a href="http://blog.sidstamm.com/2011/11/firefox-wont-activate-dnt-by-default.html">doesn't turn on Do Not Track by default</a>, because it's a seat belt.&nbsp; People choose if they want it or not.<br /><br /><b>Social Norms (Airbags).</b><br /><br />There are expectations about what people understand that are consistently held by a society or group.&nbsp; These social norms dictate expected behavior and, though not something that limit behavior, can be seen as social defaults.&nbsp; These norms change and fluctuate with the society, but you could say they are precisely what any member of the society expect to happen.<br /><br />The Web is a society of sorts, and people carry over their social norms from physical interactions with people to those interactions with web sites and corporate entities online.&nbsp; Here is where the social norms very importantly dictate the defaults of how a web browser should work (and frankly, how web sites should work too).&nbsp; People expect a site to remember small bits of information about their interactions, such as what is in their shopping cart, and this is why cookies are enabled by default, like an airbag.&nbsp; People <i>do not</i> expect to disclose their precise location to web sites, and that is why Geolocation is not activated by default.<br /><br /><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-RX-ImsMGNs0/Tu_XtWzElGI/AAAAAAAAAk4/8ywXEJRWUOY/s1600/privacy-know-venn-2.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="177" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-RX-ImsMGNs0/Tu_XtWzElGI/AAAAAAAAAk4/8ywXEJRWUOY/s400/privacy-know-venn-2.png" width="400" /></a></div><br /><br /><b>Directing Efforts.</b><br /><br /><b> </b><br />There are two driving forces here that dictate the best paths forward for inventing and building privacy features into the web: social norms, and individual choice.&nbsp;&nbsp; It's easier to listen to the cry or predict a need for individual choice; we can create any feature as if it were a seat belt -- features that users may or may not want to enable.&nbsp; The harder direction is understanding and following <i>social norms</i>, or what people expect without request or action.&nbsp; These are hard because they differ not only with time, but also across different groups of people.&nbsp; Technologists like me can more easily understand our subculture's values and build those into our software.&nbsp; We have to be careful, though, since society as a whole may not have the same values as our smaller group of software developers.&nbsp; We as an industry need to focus on what benefits <i>all</i> as a sensible default, and that may be completely opposite of what we computer geeks think.<br /><br />We need a better understanding of social norms and how they relate to people's data online.&nbsp; That understanding can help map norms to the defaults we build into all the web-oriented software we make.&nbsp; Everything else then should then be an optional feature, like a seat belt.<br /><br />Though you may not use all of Firefox's privacy features, I do recommend wearing your seat belt.&nbsp; Really.&nbsp; It could save your life.&nbsp; :)<br /><br /><br />--- Footnotes:--- <br /><br />† = <span style="font-size: x-small;">Okay, so the analogy breaks down since airbags aren't good for you unless your seat belt is engaged, but the gist is that you don't have to think about the airbags.</span><br /><br />†† = <span style="font-size: x-small;">And sure, "everyone" knows about seat belts, but pretend for this argument that they don't and the feature is more like those glass-breaking hammers that you can buy to free you from a submerged car; you can buy and use them, but they don't usually come with your car.</span>Sid Stammhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08788622306405563565noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8079863.post-53374866836032996742011-11-09T10:19:00.000-08:002011-11-09T11:27:02.634-08:00Firefox won't activate DNT by defaultFirefox isn't gonna turn on DNT by default because then DNT won't work. <br /><blockquote>"As Do Not Track picks up steam and standardization is well underway in the W3C, people have begun asking, "If Do Not Track is so good for the web, why don't you turn it on by default?" </blockquote><blockquote>"Frankly, it becomes meaningless if we enable it by default for all our users. Do Not Track is intended to express an <i>individual's choice,</i> or preference, to not be tracked. It's important that the signal represents a choice made <i>by the person behind the keyboard</i> and not the software maker, because ultimately it's not Firefox being tracked, it's the user. "<br /><br /><a href="http://blog.mozilla.com/privacy/2011/11/09/dnt-cannot-be-default/">(Link)</a></blockquote>Sure, we could run a few engagement campaigns to inform people about the option, but we won't make that decision for our users.<br /><br /><div style="color: red;"><b>Edit</b> (9-Nov-2011 @ 11:24):&nbsp;</div><br />There are three different signals to consider in broadcasting the user's preferences for tracking:<br /><br />1. User says they accept tracking<br />2. User says they reject tracking<br />3. User hasn't chosen anything<br /><br />We're defaulting to state 3: we don't know what the user wants, so we're not sending any signals to servers.&nbsp; The signal being sent should be the user's choice, not ours, so we don't broadcast anything until they've chosen what to send.<br />Sid Stammhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08788622306405563565noreply@blogger.com8tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8079863.post-6472944564560764642011-09-28T15:09:00.000-07:002011-09-28T17:06:41.494-07:00Measuring ProgressIn the reasonably short time that I've been involved with Mozilla, we've made amazing changes to the web and our Firefox browser. We've seen the adoption of HTML5, open video, and a slew of other features. This means the web is yet even more complex and by extension, so is Firefox.<br /><br />Sometimes Firefox doesn't perform as well as it should, and it's hard for us to understand why.<br /><br />Enter the Telemetry project. Our performance team, led by <a href="https://blog.mozilla.com/tglek/">Taras Glek</a>, <a href="https://blog.mozilla.com/tglek/2011/09/20/firefox-7-telemetry-faster-startup/">developed a feature that lets us measure performance-related stuff</a> as you use Firefox. Starting with the version of Firefox released today, you have the opportunity to opt-in to send us some of these statistics. They're not tied to you, and we will take a look at the data in aggregate to see if there are widespread problems in the various bits of Firefox's plumbing.<br /><br />I posted a note about this over on <a href="http://blog.mozilla.com/privacy/2011/09/27/building-privacy-into-telemetry/">The Mozilla Privacy Blog</a>. As we deployed this feature, we worked hard to make sure that our users will have choice and control of the data they send us. This involves a few bits of critical thinking: first, we have to make sure you're not surprised about this.&nbsp; Second, we make sure that we're only collecting what we need to make Firefox better. Third, our practices must be transparent (and not just open source, like we try to be clear about what we collect).&nbsp; Fourth, we make sure that you know you're sending us this data and can make it stop if you want.<br /><br /><a href="https://wiki.mozilla.org/Privacy/Reviews/Telemetry#Architecture">We wrote down how telemetry works</a> for you to read (if you want) and <a href="https://wiki.mozilla.org/Privacy/Reviews/Telemetry#User_Data_Risk_Minimization">how the feature lines up with our promises</a> put forth in the <a href="http://blog.mozilla.com/privacy/2011/01/12/mozillas-privacy-data-operating-principles/">Privacy Operating Principles</a> that we've been working with for a while now. As we add new probes to telemetry to see where to improve Firefox, we'll be <a href="https://wiki.mozilla.org/Privacy/Reviews/Telemetry/Measurements">cataloging those as well,</a> including risk analysis for stuff that's remotely private.&nbsp; We'll never collect stuff like your address or credit card numbers through this system (that'd be weird), but we may want to know which of the add-ons you're using that are slowing down Firefox.<br /><br />This risk analysis and privacy review are the things we plan to do with new Firefox features that involve your data; whether or not we collect anything, it's important that we live up to the operating principles we've put out, and Telemetry is an early example of how we plan to keep you in control.Sid Stammhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08788622306405563565noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8079863.post-75279265014417831482011-09-22T06:28:00.000-07:002011-09-22T06:28:57.508-07:00Careful... pixel-data access is pointy<a href="http://robert.ocallahan.org/2011/09/risks-of-exposing-web-page-pixel-data.html">Robert O'Callahan writes:</a><blockquote>Some Web applications require the pixel data of Web pages to be exposed to Web applications [...] There are some pretty big security implications here. The biggest problem is cross-origin information leakage. </blockquote> He's right on. This has a bunch of subtle risks to haphazardly implementing pixel-data access. The one near and dear to my heart is the risk of defeating what we shipped a while back to <a href="http://blog.mozilla.com/security/2010/03/31/plugging-the-css-history-leak/">stop the CSS- and JavaScript-based history sniffing.</a> Draw links, read colors, defeat fix. Not good. We can't just lie to the content script attempting to access the rendered data -- once it's drawn, it's really hard to figure out what's a link and what isn't. So what do we do? Take a look at <a href="http://robert.ocallahan.org/2011/09/risks-of-exposing-web-page-pixel-data.html">this and the other issues with implementing pixel-data access over on his blog.</a> If you've got ideas, we're all ears. Sid Stammhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08788622306405563565noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8079863.post-4799385297379136832011-09-08T10:46:00.000-07:002011-09-08T10:46:44.054-07:00mozilla privacy blogHey, good news! Mozilla has a privacy blog where we will be blogging about all sorts of privacy stuff.<br /><br />I'll continue to write about it here, but check it out for more reading. The latest post by Alex Fowler announces a field guide to DNT that discusses what to do when you receive the header, and what some other sites are already doing. He also talks about how many people have turned on DNT. <br /><br />Check it out: <a href="http://blog.mozilla.com/privacy/">Mozilla Privacy Blog</a>Sid Stammhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08788622306405563565noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8079863.post-64300862273710400582011-07-14T14:28:00.000-07:002011-07-15T10:26:20.567-07:00on unifying site behavior and consentLets face it, the users of your ShinyNewWebSite(beta) will never know exactly how it works. Perhaps that's by design (look, it's magic!), perhaps that's simply because they're not computer programmers, but this is the reality.<br /><br />So there's this problem: how do I get users to provide <i>informed consent</i> to use my shiny new data collection web site? I want to do some really cool stuff, but I want the users of the site to know what's happening and feel in control.<br /><br />This is hard. I think there's a ton of value in data mining and personalization, and it's not reasonable to expect users to comprehend the entire process of how their data is collected and used. We do however need to empower users to manage trust for the organizations who collect and use their data, and one way to do this is to get them closer to understanding what happens.<br /><br />Here's one way I've been thinking about this: on one end of a spectrum are the users; they have values and want to assert protection over some of their data. On the other end of the spectrum are the web sites; they produce value from the users' data and want to be honest and compliant with users' desires. Right now there's often a <i>huge</i> gap between what users want and what sites actually do with their data. We need to shrink this gap. <br /><br /><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-mUVaskrUkLQ/Th889c4f17I/AAAAAAAAAhg/Qcetc7LoHYo/s1600/gap-closing-1.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left:1em; margin-right:1em"><img border="0" height="71" width="320" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-mUVaskrUkLQ/Th889c4f17I/AAAAAAAAAhg/Qcetc7LoHYo/s320/gap-closing-1.png" /></a></div><br />I've talked about this gap from a user's perspective before (<a href="http://blog.sidstamm.com/2010/07/mind-gap.html">the privacy perception gap</a>) and ultimately this gap leads to shock and discomfort. In Firefox 4, we deployed DNT as one feature to help shrink the gap from the user's informed-consent side.<br /><br /><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-Lk2oo1ldIzo/Th889QyqTHI/AAAAAAAAAho/1NKY7IWxvGE/s1600/gap-closing-2.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left:1em; margin-right:1em"><img border="0" height="71" width="320" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-Lk2oo1ldIzo/Th889QyqTHI/AAAAAAAAAho/1NKY7IWxvGE/s320/gap-closing-2.png" /></a></div><br />Anything we can do to help make obvious users' preferences and privacy choices shrinks the gap from the user side, but we should work from the site's side as well, and hope the efforts meet somewhere in the middle. What else can we do to help bring site behavior into to the user's mental model of what's going on?<br /><br /><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-mBQ67WGGM-8/Th889taSmuI/AAAAAAAAAhw/vmB2mZSwSyo/s1600/gap-closing-3.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left:1em; margin-right:1em"><img border="0" height="71" width="320" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-mBQ67WGGM-8/Th889taSmuI/AAAAAAAAAhw/vmB2mZSwSyo/s320/gap-closing-3.png" /></a></div><br />We need something new to improve upon privacy policies. We need something more objective than self-explanation. We need something empirical that can be measured, digested and shown to users. We need technology that makes it easier for people to peer into the opaque bits of the web and see what data is collected and how it's used. While it's not realistic to expect a silver bullet that makes all users instantly understand how sites work, we should still try hard; let's throw all the ideas that we have out on the table and approach this gap with as many tools as we have to try and shrink it.Sid Stammhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08788622306405563565noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8079863.post-66000000324995235042011-06-20T14:47:00.000-07:002011-06-22T16:47:37.451-07:00Markus Jakobsson: why we must ask "why" in designing secure systemsOn Wednesday (June 22 @ 12pm PDT), Markus Jakobsson will talk about some of the security research he's been working on. Join us to hear some stories and learn how and why to build in security from the ground up! Details below. This will be streamed to the world on <a href="http://air.mozilla.org/">air mozilla</a>, and hosted at the Mozilla HQ in Mountain View.<br /><br /><span style="color:red;">22-June-2010 EDIT:</span> The video is <a href="http://videos.mozilla.org/serv/air_mozilla/06222011_brownbag.ogg">available here</a>.<br /><br /><table><tr><td><b>Where:</b></td><td>Mozilla HQ (10-forward) and <a href="http://air.mozilla.org/marketing">Air Mozilla (marketing site)</a></td></tr><tr><td><b>Speaker:</b></td><td><a href="http://www.markus-jakobsson.com/">Dr. Markus Jakobsson</a></td></tr><tr><td><b>Subject:</b></td><td> "Why we must ask 'why' in designing secure systems"</td></tr><tr><td colspan=2><br /><b>Summary:</b> Computer security has a tradition of responding to the symptoms of problems without taking the time to ask what the sources of the problems are. Markus will argue that this approach has made the user authentication experience frustrating and vulnerable; enabled phishing; and created a tremendous market for malware. Markus will give examples of some well-known approaches that were designed without a thorough understanding of the underlying problems and limitations, and how they could be redesigned and improved. In particular, he will cover web and app spoofing; mobile passwords; and bullet-proof detection of malware.</td></tr></table><br />Join Us!Sid Stammhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08788622306405563565noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8079863.post-62383100090155600142011-05-26T14:08:00.000-07:002011-05-26T17:12:10.487-07:00managing your relationship with sites<i>This post is co-written by Margaret Lebovic and Sid Stamm. This article is <a href="http://blog.margaretleibovic.com/post/5877776043/managing-your-relationship-with-sites">cross-posted on Margaret's blog</a></i><br /><br />As the web becomes more and more complex (and AWESOME), it's important that you can manage your relationship with the variety of sites out there. Sure, Firefox 4 has a Page Info dialog that lets you control what a web page is allowed to do, including whether you want to let it store data on your computer, access your location information, open pop-up windows, and on and on. However, this dialog only lets you manage your relationship with the one page you're currently visiting, not the entire set of sites you visit on the web.<br /><br />We think it's important to be able to manage your whole relationship with web sites in an intuitive way, and that's why we're exited to show you what we've started working on: a site-based permissions interface.<br /><br /><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://blogfiles.sidstamm.com/aboutpermissionsdialog.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left:1em; margin-right:1em"><img border="0" height="154" width="400" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-uUgV8mcICFc/Td6_c7JUmXI/AAAAAAAAAfE/BxcB86UPy3s/s400/Screen%2Bshot%2B2011-05-26%2Bat%2B1.59.38p.png" /></a></div><br />This feature is still experimental, but you can give it a shot. In the future, we'll be putting some polish on the UI, adding more controls like <a href="http://forcetls.sidstamm.com/">"always access securely" (HSTS)</a>, and hopefully giving you a better view of what a site knows about you. We also want to integrate this permissions manager with the site identity block in the location bar for quick and easy access.<br /><br />Try it out! <a href="http://nightly.mozilla.org/">Grab a Firefox nightly build</a> and try out the feature by typing <a href="about:permissions">about:permissions</a> into the location bar.<br /><br /><i>(Credit: thanks to <a href="http://jboriss.wordpress.com/">Jennifer Boriss</a>, <a href="http://twitter.com/#!/mehdiisdumb">Medhi Mulani</a> and <a href="http://blog.margaretleibovic.com/">Margaret</a> for all the hard work on this project.)</i>Sid Stammhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08788622306405563565noreply@blogger.com23tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8079863.post-52404480407530986402011-05-20T09:56:00.000-07:002011-05-20T10:06:36.720-07:00Do Not Track -- Now on Firefox Mobile!Since we <a href="http://blog.sidstamm.com/2011/01/opting-out-of-behavioral-ads.html">first announced our implementation of the Do Not Track HTTP<br />header</a>, we've seen an amazing amount of <a href="http://blog.mozilla.com/blog/2011/03/30/advertisers-and-publishers-adopt-and-implement-do-not-track/">support from trade groups</a>, and even <a href="http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9214669/IE9_follows_Firefox_4_s_lead_on_Do_Not_Track_">other</a> <a href="http://arstechnica.com/apple/news/2011/04/safari-to-gain-do-not-track-support-in-lion.ars">browser</a> makers.<br />To build on our view that you should have control of how you're tracked<br />on not only desktop computers but also your mobile devices, we're<br />excited to announce that the latest <a href="http://www.mozilla.com/en-US/m/">beta of Firefox for Android</a> also includes this feature.<br /><br /><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-jDNgxjqGS5U/TdAO6ue8CxI/AAAAAAAAAes/sQvFWeHMBQk/s1600/DNT_Mobile_Final.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear:right; float:right; margin-left:1em; margin-bottom:1em"><img border="0" height="320" width="192" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-jDNgxjqGS5U/TdAO6ue8CxI/AAAAAAAAAes/sQvFWeHMBQk/s320/DNT_Mobile_Final.png" /></a></div>You can enable Do Not Track in the latest <a href="http://www.mozilla.com/en-US/m/">beta of Firefox for Android</a> through an<br />easy-to-find switch in the preferences--see image to the right, and websites will see exactly the same signal that Do Not Track-enabled desktop browsers send. Every time Firefox loads a web page, image, or advertisement it includes a "DNT: 1" signal that tells the entire web you don't want to be tracked.<br /><br />The web on your phone should be the same web as on your desktop, so to<br />provide this consistency we've put the exact same Do Not Track feature<br />in both the desktop and mobile versions of Firefox.<br /><br />Try it out today! <a href="http://www.mozilla.com/m/">Grab the latest beta of Firefox for Android</a> and turn on the feature. If you visit my blog from Firefox (mobile or desktop) with Do Not Track turned on, the widget below will glow green just for you.<br /><br /><p style="text-align:center;"><a href="http://dnt.mozilla.org/"><img src="http://dnt.mozilla.org/dnt_status.php" style="border:2px solid;padding:0;" /></a></p>Sid Stammhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08788622306405563565noreply@blogger.com6tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8079863.post-79669005654355066692011-05-15T11:36:00.000-07:002011-05-15T11:36:49.348-07:00Clearing Flash cookies using FirefoxBack in March, we shipped Firefox 4 with a feature that sends a signal to plugins like Flash and Silverlight when you clear your cookies. <a href="http://blogs.adobe.com/asset/2011/05/advancing-flash-player-privacy-and-security.html">Adobe has announced that starting with Flash Player version 10.3, they'll be listening to the signal</a>! This is exciting, because clearing your flash cookies is as easy as clearing regular cookies in this latest version of flash.<br /><br />Here's when Firefox 4 tells Flash Player version 10.3 to delete LSOs (Flash cookies):<br /><ul><li>When you clear all your cookies in Firefox using "clear recent history" [<a href="http://support.mozilla.com/en-US/kb/Clear%20Recent%20History?s=clear+cookies&as=s">how-to link</a>]</li><li>When you choose "forget about this site" in your library (history) window [<a href="http://support.mozilla.com/en-US/kb/Clear%20Recent%20History?s=forget+this+site&as=s#w_how-do-i-remove-a-single-website-from-my-history">how-to link</a>]</li><li>When you quit Firefox, if you have Firefox configured to clear your cookies automatically upon exit [<a href="http://support.mozilla.com/en-US/kb/Clear%20Recent%20History?s=forget+this+site&as=s#w_how-do-i-make-firefox-clear-my-history-automatically">how-to link</a>]</li></ul><br /><a href="http://blog.chromium.org/2011/04/providing-transparency-and-controls-for.html">Chrome</a> and <a href="http://blogs.msdn.com/b/ie/archive/2011/05/03/deleting-flash-cookies-made-easier.aspx">Internet Explorer</a> are also supporting this behavior, so this is fantastic news for everyone's privacy on the web!<br /><br />More reading for techies:<br /><ul><li><a href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=508167">The relevant Firefox bug</a></li><li><a href="https://wiki.mozilla.org/NPAPI:ClearSiteData">The NPAPI specification</a></li><li><a href="http://blogs.pcmag.com/securitywatch/2010/02/next_flash_version_will_suppor.php">Previous story about supporting Private Browsing mode</a></li></ul>Sid Stammhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08788622306405563565noreply@blogger.com13tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8079863.post-60357174963382842142011-03-24T16:08:00.000-07:002011-03-24T16:08:47.796-07:00Force-TLS compatible with Firefox 4!I've updated the <a href="https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/force-tls/">Force-TLS</a> Firefox Add-On to work with the newest version of Firefox! Force-TLS version 3.0.0 should work in all Firefox 3.0 and newer.<br /><br />So what does this mean? Well, HTTP Strict-Transport-Security (HSTS) is implemented in Firefox 4, and that's a pretty similar technology to Force-TLS. In fact, it is nearly identical except there's no UI in Firefox 4. If you install Force-TLS, you'll get a UI and also get the built-in HSTS support that's implemented much more completely and efficiently than any add-on. A while ago, <a href="http://blog.sidstamm.com/2010/10/managing-hsts-data.html">I blogged about an experimental add-on called STS-UI</a> that adds a UI to HSTS; Force-TLS shows essentially the same user interface but I've been wanting to keep both the back-end for Firefox 3.x and the front-end for all versions of Firefox in the same add-on.<br /><br />So what's new in version 3.0.0? <br /><ul><li><i>Smarter:</i> The invisible bits of Force-TLS are restructured to use the custom HTTPS-upgrading and header-noticing bits for earlier Firefox versions but use the HSTS back-end built into Firefox 4 when it's available.</li><li><i>Better:</i> A few bugs in the user interface were fixed. </li><li><i>Organized:</i> I've moved the code into an open source repository. </li></ul><br />I've got a list of enhancements queued up for the next version of Force-TLS, but not a whole lot of time to work on it. If you'd like to help make Force-TLS more awesome, send an email to <a href="mailto:forcetls@sidstamm.com">forcetls@sidstamm.com</a><br /><br />Previously:<br /><ul><li><a href="http://blog.sidstamm.com/2010/10/managing-hsts-data.html">Managing HSTS data</a><li><a href="http://blog.sidstamm.com/2010/08/http-strict-transport-security-has.html">HTTP Strict Transport Security has Landed!</a><br /><li><a href="http://blog.sidstamm.com/2009/11/update-on-https-security.html">Update on HTTPS Security</a><br /><li><a href="http://blog.mozilla.com/security/2009/07/27/locking-up-the-valuables-opt-in-security-with-forcetls/">Locking up the Valuables with Force-TLS</a><br /></ul>Sid Stammhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08788622306405563565noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8079863.post-89650856292655436492011-03-09T09:14:00.000-08:002011-03-09T09:15:13.145-08:00Do-Not-Track Standardization has BegunThanks to a lot of hard work by <a href="http://www.stanford.edu/~jmayer/">Jonathan Mayer</a> and <a href="http://www.cs.utexas.edu/~arvindn/">Arvind Narayanan</a> (the <a href="http://donottrack.us/">donottrack.us</a> guys at Stanford), <a href="http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/node/6633">we've submitted a draft specification to the IETF</a> for review. We've proposed <a href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mayer-do-not-track-00">a specification</a> that not only outlines what the DNT HTTP header should look like, but also how servers can honor a user's choice for privacy. <br /><br />This draft is just the beginning: there will be much debate, but we want you to be part of it.<br /><br />More:<br /><ul><li><a href="http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/node/6633">Link To Related Stanford Announcement</a><br /><li><a href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mayer-do-not-track-00">Link To DNT specification draft</a><br /><li><a href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-cooper-web-tracking-opt-outs-00">Link To Alissa Cooper's DNT feature round-up</a><br /></ul>Sid Stammhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08788622306405563565noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8079863.post-60312553890578105242011-02-07T11:29:00.000-08:002011-02-07T11:29:22.433-08:00Get your DNT header for older versions of Firefox!When we recently announced our intent to add a do not track header to Firefox, we focused on how it will probably be available in a future version -- Firefox 4.0. But what about people who would prefer to use previous versions of Firefox? How can you get the HTTP header into version 3.6, or even earlier versions?<br /><br />Though we recommend using our latest and greatest product, there's an add-on you can install to add the "DNT: 1" header to older versions: <a href="https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/universal-behavioral-advertisi/">Universal Behavioral Advertising Opt-Out</a> (a.k.a. UBAO). The name is a mouthful, but its operation is simple: installing this add-on is like ticking the checkbox in new versions of Firefox to send a "DNT: 1" HTTP header with all requests your browser sends out.<br /><br />There are other add-ons that send the header! <a href="https://adblockplus.org/blog/updated-roadmap-adblock-plus-135">AdBlock Plus</a> and <a href="http://hackademix.net/2011/01/28/x-do-not-track-dnt-cest-plus-facile/">NoScript</a> send the header too, but if you don't want the extra features that come along with those add-ons, <a href="https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/universal-behavioral-advertisi/">UBAO</a> is for you.Sid Stammhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08788622306405563565noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8079863.post-60128946695658446032011-01-31T10:00:00.000-08:002011-01-31T10:00:43.542-08:00Try out the "Do Not Track" HTTP headerLast week, I blogged about <a href="http://blog.sidstamm.com/2011/01/opting-out-of-behavioral-ads.html">some of the work we're doing at Mozilla</a> to help people better control how they're tracked as they browse the web. The basic idea was to give people a universal "opt out" of tracking for behavioral advertising. A Firefox user will be able to check a box in the preferences dialog and then a HTTP header would be sent with all HTTP requests so all servers know the user wants to opt out.<br /><br />Well, I'm excited to report that we've landed the first iteration of this feature into Firefox nightly builds (the pre-beta builds that are rough around the edges)! If you'd like to try out the feature, <a href="http://nightly.mozilla.org">grab a nightly build</a>; I must warn you though, these nightlies are not as stable as the beta releases.<br /><br />In the build, to enable the feature, open the preferences pane and select the advanced tab. Tick the box that says "Tell sites I do not want to be tracked" and start browsing. <br /><br /><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_fpi8w2RLvBI/TUYKiTAQY0I/AAAAAAAAAeU/fBGR24VrQFQ/s1600/dnt-pref-screenshot.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left:1em; margin-right:1em"><img border="0" height="306" width="320" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_fpi8w2RLvBI/TUYKiTAQY0I/AAAAAAAAAeU/fBGR24VrQFQ/s320/dnt-pref-screenshot.png" /></a></div><br /><br /><br />Every connection your browser makes to download content will send a signal that says "don't track me." Literally, it looks like this to servers:<br /><blockquote><pre>DNT: 1</pre></blockquote>Note: this is different from the initial experiment that used "X-Do-Not-Track" and my original post last week that said "Tracking-Preference: do-not-track"; it's both shorter and very precise. The researchers at <a href="http://donottrack.us">donottrack.us</a> are also recommending this syntax.<br /><br />I encourage you to try out the test builds, or if you'd like to wait for a more stable version, wait for an upcoming beta release with the feature in it. We do not anticipate that sites are looking for the signal yet, so you probably won't notice a difference as you browse the web. I'm hoping to have a demo site available shortly that will give you an example of what types of changes you might see using this feature -- and when I do, I'll post a link here.Sid Stammhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08788622306405563565noreply@blogger.com7tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8079863.post-40614800967673262612011-01-23T21:07:00.002-08:002011-02-09T08:58:49.585-08:00opting-out of behavioral ads<b><i>One of many planned explorations towards a more elegant and privacy-enhancing approach to user choice and control.</i></b><br /><br />I've recently been blogging about online tracking and behavioral advertising, and I think it's time to take the first step towards a solution. Complete solutions to the transparency gap and lack of user-data control are being actively explored and as part of <a href="http://firstpersoncookie.wordpress.com/2011/01/23/more-choice-and-control-over-online-tracking/">Mozilla's larger aim to improve users' control over their data</a>, we want to take the first step. I'm proposing we implement a HTTP header that Firefox users can elect to send that tells ad networks they don't want to be tracked.<br /><br /><b>What is <u>tracking</u> in the context of "Do Not Track" for Online Behavioral Ads?</b><br /><br />The definition here is hotly debated, but the general consensus seems to include at a minimum:<blockquote>Tracking is the accumulation and use of a profile by advertising networks through invisible or subtle noting of which sites an individual visits, and the use of the profile data to customize advertisements displayed.</blockquote><br />Currently, to opt-out of online behavioral advertisements, you have to get a site to set an "opt-out" cookie so they won't track you. There are various web sites that help out (<a href="http://www.networkadvertising.org/managing/opt_out.asp">NAI</a>, <a href="http://www.youronlinechoices.com/opt-out">IAB UK</a>) and there are Firefox Add-Ons (<a href="https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/targeted-advertising-cookie-op/">TACO</a>, <a href="https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/beef-taco-targeted-advertising/">beef taco</a>, etc.) that can streamline this process. But this is a bit of a hack: it's nearly impossible to maintain a list of all the sites whose tracking people may want to opt-out from. It would be more attractive if there was one universal "opt-out" signal that would tell <i>all</i> sites you want to opt out.<br /><br /><a href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=628197">Bug 628197</a> calls for the implementation of a HTTP header that is transmitted with every HTTP request that advertises the Firefox user's desire to not be tracked by advertising networks. <a href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=628198">A checkbox in Firefox's preferences panel</a> could ask if the user wants Firefox to request opt-out from tracking, and when checked the HTTP header "Tracking-Preference: do-not-track" will be sent. This is a similar approach to others that have explored an HTTP header for opt-out (<a href="http://donottrack.us">donottrack.us</a>, <a href="https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/universal-behavioral-advertisi/">UBAO</a>), and I agree it's a good step to take.<br /><br />Servers don't know about this yet, so it won't have immediate effect on tracking, but in the meantime the presence of the header can be observed by web sites (in a similar way to a cookie) to help understand how desired opt-out of OBA is. Once this feature ships in Firefox, it's time for web sites to do the right thing; honor users' choice when they receive Do Not Track HTTP headers and opt-out these users from tracking.<br /><br /><a href="http://www.open-mike.org">Mike Hanson</a> has also been thinking about this for a while. He's written <a href="http://www.open-mike.org/entry/thoughts-on-do-not-track">a good analysis</a> of problems surrounding online tracking, including a survey of some approaches we could take. An HTTP header that expresses a user's desire to opt-out seems to be the most productive step we can take that doesn't shut off important and innovative bits of the web that fund many of the services and content we make use of in our daily lives.<br /><br />Do Not Track HTTP headers for behavioral advertising are only one piece of the data choice and control puzzle.<br /><br />Improving transparency into online data collection and sharing practices is another step that we think will help set peoples' minds at ease. Additionally, we're still working on other technology at Mozilla to improve people's control over how they're tracked online -- features that aim to give people a deeper understanding of how tracking happens, and the ability to shut it down when the Do Not Track request isn't honored. In concert, I hope the HTTP header and future efforts will help people regain transparency and control over how they're profiled or tracked online.<br /><br /><strike><b style="color:red">EDIT:</b> <a href="http://ftp.mozilla.org/pub/mozilla.org/firefox/tryserver-builds/sstamm@mozilla.com-9261f22f801a/">Test builds of Firefox are available here</a> if you want to try out my initially proposed implementation. Of course it will change before we ship, but these builds provide a proof of concept.</strike><br /><br /><b style="color:red">EDIT:</b> <a href="http://www.mozilla.com/en-US/firefox/beta/">The newest Firefox 4.0 beta</a> has the initial implementation in it. <a href="http://www.mozilla.com/en-US/firefox/beta/">Download the beta</a> if you'd like to try it out!Sid Stammhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08788622306405563565noreply@blogger.com42