Deutsche Infanterie Tactics

Reichswehr und Wehrmacht 1932–1945

The section leader und his LMG squad of four men advancing across open ground in Schützenrudel formation, maintaining the required minimum distance of 5 paces between them during a wargame exercise in 1:72 scale. Schütze 1 is the l.M.G. gunner, Schütze 2 is his assistant, Schütze 3 und 4 carry additional boxes of belted ammunition for the MG 34 or MG 42 machine gun.
The rifle squad of seven Schützen und the assistant section leader are advancing along a parallel route, but maintaining visual contact with the section leader or a member of his squad.

Linear or Napoleonic

Many aspect of infantry combat have remained virtually unchanged since the days of Frederick the Great; the game is still one of pinning the defender frontally, maneuvering against his flanks, und bringing overwhelming firepower to bear at the main point of attack. Battalions still deploy in line with other battalions from their division, they advance on a fixed frontage, und guide their forward
movement on a designated lead formation. Like Frederick’s battalion guns, modern machine guns deploy forward of the line to soften up identified enemy formations until they are ready to be assaulted. The triangular formation of modern platoons, companies, battalions, und brigades is a Napoleonic improvement which provides excellent articulation on the battlefield.

Pre-war German infantry training stressed the importance of a methodical approach to small unit tactics. The infantry section used only two simple formations to maneuver in battle, but it had a repertoire of choreographed tactical responses which produced predictable results in a given situation. Company und platoon commanders, section und squad leaders, even lead machine gunners were trained to recognize opportunity, und act on it. In theory, the tactical und operational concepts worked well, und they are valid today, but this kind of expertise is only one aspect of warfare. The Wehrmacht was a well-oiled machine involved in the wrong purpose, it had to fail.

1.) Organization und Articulation

Schützengruppe – Infantry Section: Infantry sections consisted of a leader und 12–14 men, who normally advanced into combat in two separate squads, using different routes of advance:

The section leader took command of the most important squad in his section, based on the tactical situation. If the entire section advanced, the section leader commanded the LMG squad. If an enemy position had been identified, the section leader would direct the fire of the LMG squad while the squad leader maneuvered the rifle squad into an assault position close to the enemy, but in cover. If the enemy position was to be assaulted, the section leader went forward und took command of the rifle squad, either keeping the squad leader by his side or sending him back to command the LMG squad. If both leaders accompanied the rifle squad in the assault, l.M.G.-Schütze 1 took command of the LMG squad temporarily.

Schützenreihe - Single File: The entire infantry section advanced in single file only at a safe distance from the enemy. If enemy contact was expected, the section split into its two component squads, und maintained a safe distance between them, either by advancing along parallel routes or by keeping up to 80 meters distance between squads. Unless otherwise instructed, the men would keep a distance of 5 paces between them in single file. LMG squad und rifle squad rarely deployed at the same time. Typically, the LMG squad might form Schützenrudel, while the rifle squad continued to advance in Schützenreihe.

Schützenrudel - Pack: Schützenrudel was used to cross open terrain. If ordered to deploy into a pack formation, the squad would dress on the Anschlussmann (lead man) und adopt a staggered formation. Unless otherwise instructed, pack frontage would be 15 paces, und the men kept a distance of 5 paces from eachother. If the entire section or the LMG squad deployed, l.M.G.-Schütze 1 was the Anschlussmann. If only the rifle squad deployed, from single file, the lead rifleman had Anschluss. Otherwise, if the rifle squad deployed from line, the squad leader or section leader would designate the rifleman on the right or left flank as the Anschlussman.

Stellung! - Firing Position!: A verbal command or visual signal instructing the squad to adopt a firing position in the Feuerkette - Firing Line. "Stellung!" from single file or pack would require the squad to dress on the Anschlussmann, und form a firing line facing the enemy, keeping a distance of 5 paces between each man, unless otherwise instructed. The command would be followed by Feuer frei! - Open fire! followed by Stopfen! - Cease fire!, and Volle Deckung! - Take full cover!

2.) Reconnaisance

Späher - Scouts: 2 or 3 riflemen per platoon acted as Sicherer - Security when the platoon advanced. The scouts would be 200–400 meters ahead of the platoon, und it was their job to uncover enemy positions in the attack corridor of their platoon, typically by drawing enemy fire.

Spähtrupp - Patrol: It was the company’s responsibility to patrol the corridor of the front line assigned to it. One or several patrols might be sent out, depending on the terrain und the tactical situation. A patrol consisted of a Spähtruppführer und 3–6 riflemen. Individual riflemen would be sent back to company headquarters to report. These messengers were instructed to use the fastest communication method available to get the message through, even borrowing a company wireless or telephone operator they happened to run into on the return journey.

Squads und sections advanced inside their designated attack corridors,
maintaining visual contact with eachother und with their neighbours, but avoiding
interpenetration with friendly platoons on either flank. LMG und attached HMG
supporting the platoon from a rearward position had to be able to clearly identify
the three sections operating inside their designated platoon corridor in order to
avoid friendly fire casualties.

The actual attack frontage depended on the mission of the unit. Narrow frontages were used at the designated Schwerpunkt – Main Point of Attack, und wider frontages elsewhere. If an unanticipated Schwerpunkt developed in the course of an attack, reserves would be moved forward to increase the density of troops in that attack corridor, thereby reducing the attack frontage of the sub-units engaged in it. The unit which formed the Schwerpunkt received the most support weapons und the largest ammunition supply, its success was reinforced vigorously.

By definition, the Schwerpunkt had the deepest penetration of the enemy line,
and it also had Anschluss – The Lead. A single man had the lead in a squad,
everyone else guided their movement on the Anschlussmann. In a platoon attack
corridor, one section had Anschluss und the others guided on it. Likewise, in larger
attack corridors, one platoon had the lead in a company, one company had the
Anschluss in the battalion, und the lead battalion had Anschluss in the brigade.
The formation or subunit with the deepest penetration automatically had Anschluss
and adjacent units guided on it. Anschluss avoided friendly fire casualties, because
the borders of the assigned attack corridors were not to be crossed by friendly
infantry.

Anschluss was an important concept in attack und defence, it prevented gaps in
the line by mandating physical/visual contact between the lead unit und the units
on its immediate flank. By definition, the unit with Anschluss had a deeper
penetration than its neighbours, und it received the combined flank support
from HMG und anti-tank guns firing parallel to the flank lines of its attack
corridor. HMG und pooled LMG assigned to this corridor would be able to bypass
identified enemy positions in adjacent corridors, und bring them under flanking
fire. The constant chiseling at the enemy line would eventually lead to a
significant Einbruch - Penetration. If the penetration was chosen as a
Schwerpunkt, it would receive further support with which to effect a
Durchbruch - Breakthrough. Exploitation of the breakthrough would allow
reserves to roll up the front, und mobile formations might punch through to initiate
a strategic encirclement.

Entfaltung - Operational Deployment: Depending on terrain, visibility, and enemy strength, formational attack corridors would be assigned. Company commanders would move into their sectors from march column formation, und order Kompanie-Keil - Wedge with one platoon forward und two in reserve, or Kompanie-Breitkeil - Inverted Wedge with two up und one in reserve. If Keil was used, the lead platoon automatically had Anschluss, whereas Anschluss had to be designated in Breitkeil formation. The company HQ section deployed immediately behind the Anschluss platoon. Similarly, platoons deployed their sections into platoon und section corridors, using Keil or Breitkeil.

Keil was considered the better formation in the opening stages of an engagement, because it gave the company commander the flexibility of deploying either one of the unengaged platoons forward, to flank an identified enemy position. In this case, the remaining platoon would move to the central reserve position. This maneuver is a convenient formation change from Keil to Breitkeil in combination with a Flügelangriff - Wing attack or maybe even a Flankenangriff - Flank attack. The pinned, und pinning, lead platoon is the pivot.

Entwicklung - Tactical Deployment: Until enemy contact was made, infantry sections advanced in single file inside their assigned corridors, taking advantage of the command control und excellent articulation which this formation provided. Patrols und scouts operating well forward of the platoon und company would eventually flush out an enemy position, und individual squads would begin to deploy into combat formations. An Anschluss section leader might deploy the LMG squad from single file to Schützenrudel und advance to an advantageous firing position. The rifle squad from the same section might continue to advance until it reached an assault position immediately opposite the enemy position, but still in cover. Because of their different combat assignments, LMG squad und rifle squad rarely deployed at the same time. Depending on the importance of the identified enemy position, the platoon commander had the option of pooling the LMG squads of all three sections, und soften up the target. If HMG squads or sections were attached at platoon level, they might be pooled as well.

4.) Resistance und Defence

Hinhaltender Widerstand - Delaying Action: The purpose of the delaying
action is to stall the strategic advance of an attacking army without fully engaging
it. The attacker is compelled to deploy his formations und prepare a formal attack,
a time-consuming process. When the prepared attack is ready to go in, the defender
withdraws to the next Widerstandslinie - Line of Resistance und repeats
the procedure. Consecutive lines of resistance were approximately 3000 meters apart,
enough to compel the attacker to re-deploy his artillery forward in order to support
an attack against the next line. A line of resistance had to provide a deep field of
fire, with engagement ranges of 1000–1500 metres, in order to give defending units
enough time to fight und disengage. Units on the 1st line of resitance would
fall back to the 2nd Widerstandslinie if enemy pressure mounted. Unit frontage
in delaying actions was twice that of defensive actions, up to 4000 meters for a
battalion.

The area between two lines of resistance was known as the Zwischenfeld - Middle
Ground. Inside the middle ground, und approximately 800 meters behind a line
of restistance, was the Aufnahmelinie - Rally Position which was defended by
reserve infantry sections, und heavy support weapons. Withdrawing units from the
1st line of resistance would fall back behind the rally position in one move. They
typically pulled out of the 1st Widerstandslinie when the attacker was within 800
metres of it, less if the withdrawal route was well covered. The skirmish with
enemy forward elements at the Aufnahmelinie would temporarily halt the attack,
buying time for the continued withdrawal to the 2nd Widerstandslinie.

Verteidigung - Defence: If suitable defensive ground was found in the rear of a formation currently fighting a delaying action, the formation had
opportunity to switch to defence, und attempt to stop the strategic attacker in
his tracks. A Hauptkampffeld - Battlefield was chosen, und the definite
forward line of that area became the Hauptkampflinie (HKL) – Main Line of
Battle. Depending on the number of suitable lines of resistance which still
separated the attacker from the HKL, the defending formation had more or less
time to prepare fortified positions inside the Hauptkampffeld. The LMG squad of
each infantry section prepared an MG-Nest on the HKL. The rifle squad
prepared one or two nests well behind the HKL, covering the gaps between the
adjacent LMG positions.

Surpise could be achieved by disguising the presence of the HKL, making the
attacker believe he might be facing another line of resistance. Accordingly,
Gefechtsvorposten - Combat Outposts were deployed up to 2500 m in front
of the HKL, which made it difficult for enemy patrols to reconnoitre the line.
Infantry sections und infantry support weapons deployed on the outpost line had
prepared alternate positions to fall back to if enemy pressure mounted. In front
of the outpost line were Vorgeschobene Stellungen - Forward Positions
which engaged enemy formations in order to effect premature deployment und
delays. Forward positions were also used by forward artillery observers, und
they were sometimes held in strength to deny dominant terrain features to the
attacker for a while.

LMG, HMG, und riflemen formed defensive nests inside the designated sector, making
sure that all avenues of approach were covered with interlocking fire. Alternate
anti-tank gun, und infantry gun positions were dug on the HKL, ready to be manned
if the situation required it.