[About the legitimating discourse of cultural
studies, the most abstract form of 'pedagogy' in
Bernstein's sense. Note that the Abstract
claims this is 'empirically applicable', although
that application never seems to happen. Good
though, even though it doesn't mention my own
scathing critique of British Cultural Studies (Harris
1992) —was it something I said?]

The usual approaches in the sociology of education
emphasize social reproduction, but do not focus
enough on pedagogic discourse itself.
Pedagogy is seen only as a 'neutral relay for
external power relations'(79). In fact,
pedagogy has its own voice, intrinsic
features. Cultural studies shows the
possibilities [the closest he gets to empirical
pedagogy]. There are wider considerations
about linking theory to empirical descriptions,
which Bernstein does well, it is claimed.

The main focus is on the 'language of
legitimation' used by practitioners to establish
cultural studies as an academic subject.
This is an example of competition for status
resources. The dominant themes for cultural
studies include arguments for:

breaking down boundaries
between disciplines between educational
knowledge and everyday experience, an
obsession with crossing borders and
boundaries, and an insistence on studying non
official knowledge or popular culture
'bringing the profane into the realm of the
sacred. This can lead to a particular
claim for freshness and newness by criticising
older traditions, as seen in the preoccupation
with 'post' theories and various kinds of
breaks: new beginnings are endlessly declared,
as a sign of progress.

a hypothetically
boundless object for study, based on very wide
definitions of culture and the need to
understand culture and society 'in their
interwoven totality and complexity' (82)

Thick descriptions
instead of elitist and simple generalisations,
as with the developing layers of analysis of
media and audiences

radical pedagogies, in
alliance with dominated social groups, giving
voice to those groups. Giving voice is a
recurring theme, and it takes the form of
moving through analyses of class, race, gender
and sexuality as critiqued developed.
Cultural studies has been a major arena for
the development of feminism, or a studies,
queer theory and so on. Novelty has been
generated through standpoint
epistemology. This in turn has led to
critiques of positivism and foundationalism in
favour of celebrating difference and
subjectivity, multiple truths and narratives.

primary experience is
particularly valorized as opposed to the
viewpoint of the observer, seen in studies of
youth sub cultures or television audiences and
how they construct their own meanings.

If we use Bernstein's terms, we can locate
pedagogic discourse in cultural studies, although
there are problems at first. The terms
classification and framing might be used [and in
classrooms, 'strong framing is associated with
didactic teaching, and weak framing with
"progressive" pedagogy']. We can also apply
the terms collection code and integrated
code. In one application, cultural studies
looks like it shows weak classification and
framing, which would make it look like an
integrated code [I have always thought these two
terms are back to front]. However, there is
no hierarchical knowledge structure, but rather a
series of specialized languages and segments, as
in a collection code, hence the various attempts
to give voice to different groups, the breaks and
so on. However, we must not see Bernstein's
framework as contradictory [oh dear, no] - rather,
there are both characteristics in cultural
studies, one relating to pedagogic discourses, and
the other relating to 'issues of who may adopt
these procedures, study these phenomena and so
on', both what can be studied and who can study
it, the 'epistemic relation' connecting pedagogic
discourse and its object of study, and a 'social
relation' connecting pedagogic discourse to
legitimate authors or subjects. Cultural
studies claims to be both a knowledge of the world
and the legitimation of particular authors.
These are 'two distinct dimensions of its
pedagogic discourse' (86) [pretty common to all
the university discourses, I would have thought].

We can combine these characteristics to consider
different combinations of social relations and
epistemic relations, with their different
classifications and frames, to produce 'four
potential modes of legitimation', as in the
diagram below. [Actually, the discussion turns
first on a sligbhtly different undrawn table of
possible combinations of epistemic relation (ER)
and social relation (SR), each of which can be
strong or weak. Thus knowledge mode, option
B, is SR-, ER+, and knower mode, option C,
is SR+ ,ER- This diagram below spells it out using
classification and framing]

We can consider options B and C first.
Knowledge modes referred to characteristics of the
object of study, knower modes to the personal
characteristics of the subject or author.
The point is not to develop ideal type models, but
to highlight the distinction between modes of
legitimation. In practice, they often
coexist and are articulated in different ways.

In the knowledge mode, legitimation turns on
claims to have a specialized and unique knowledge
of a particular object of study. The object
requires specialist procedures to investigate it,
and these have their own truth claims. These
are classically contrasted with other possible
objects, procedures and knowledge and a strong
boundary or strong classification develops around
them. Strong controls or strong framing are
also present, maintaining boundaries with claims
based on different criteria, defending specialist
procedures. These claims are referred to
'disembodied sets of more or less consensually
agreed upon procedures, methods and criteria' (87)
which are supposed to transcend subjective
characteristics of authors. As a result,
anyone can be a subject expert [in theory]
as long as they comply with these procedures and
methods - actual authors are not strongly
differentiated or controlled, there is a weak
classification and weak framing of authors.
Natural science, or rather 'the positivistic
conception of science' provides a good example:
the epistemic dimension, which is strongly
classified and framed dominates over the social
dimension, which is not.

In the knower mode, there are no extra-personal
procedures and agreed objects of study, and
knowers have to claim privileged insight into
objects that may be 'hypothetically limitless,
difficult to define, or embrace a whole host of
disparate phenomena', in other words which are
weakly classified. There is no particularly
explicit discussion of proof or procedures, but
rather 'considerable individual discretion' in
both objects of study and procedures of enquiry,
with no strong attempts to adjudicate between them
- weak framing. However there are specific
social groups who are seen as legitimate knowers
[including particularly valued social groups, or
people who can access their knowledge] - knowers
are strongly classified. The epistemic
dimension is weakly classified and framed, with
the reverse for the social relation.
Examples 'include subjectivist, insider, or
perspectivist and standpoint theories of
knowledge'(88).

In both cases, there is an object of study and the
subject of study, the knower. Different
forms of legitimation emphasize different
relations to objects and subjects. Some
privilege the epistemic relation, others the
social relation and the unique insight of the
author. Each relation is either strongly
classified and framed or not: the epistemic
relation provides academic disciplines with their
epistemology. The social relation on the
other hand can also be differently classified and
framed, and this represents its sociology,
examining the resources it draws upon, knowers or
knowledge.

Turning to the other possible modes of
legitimation, mode A (ER-, SR-) has a weak
classification and framing for both epistemic and
social relations. Both epistem ology and
sociology are renounced. Anyone can make
knowledge claims and use any procedure [no
examples]. In mode D (ER+, SR+) both
procedures and authors are strongly classified and
framed, requiring both suitable authors and the
use of specific procedures. If mode A leads
to less than credible knowledge, mode B 'is likely
to become associated with sclerotic knowledge
development and stagnation' (89).

These principles of legitimation can be realized
empirically according to the context in a specific
language of legitimation. Here, power and
control in empirical contexts are crucial as
'enabling and evoking conditions'. The
language of legitimation may be found in
intellectual texts aimed at convincing other
knowledge producers in the same subject area, and
this is still in knower mode, but it has different
characteristics from say 'university promotional
literature or the lecture hall' [assumptions being
made here about lecturing]. Actual enacted
social practices may be different, and there may
be 'no necessary correlation between self
characterizations of practices and their
actuality', for example between emancipatory
projects and traditional forms of pedagogy and
assessment [you need Bourdieu to explain this
too]. Actors' accounts are less important
than the principles for this article.

Cultural studies legitimizes itself primarily in
knower mode. This cannot be a definitive
account, however, which would require further
analysis 'of the role of social relations of power
and the active construction of meanings' (90)
[something more like Bourdieu does, then].
The point is to illustrate knower mode.
Three [I made it four] processes seem important.

Imaginary alliances and
the procession of the excluded refers to whom
may be taken as a privileged knower, or how
alliances might be formed with them.
Cultural studies first attempted to form
alliances with the working class, through
adult education and elsewhere, and the working
class was claim to have privileged
insight. As that category became more
diffuse, instead of a theoretical account,
say to explain the persistence of social
class, we had a shift of focus. The key
move was the reentry of working class people
into HE, based on the [phantasy] of the
gramscian organic intellectual, and the
possibilities of alliances with radical
professionals [the main audience, Maton
implies, together with the 'international
intelligentsia']. There were also
certain proposed structural homologies,
between academics and proletarians, for
example, producing 'an imaginary alliance
between the "intellectual" and the
"proletarian"', a theoretical construction
producing apparently shared insights and
interests, and permitting the suppression of
real differences between academic knowers and
others. This extended to other
identities based on race or gender. [Yet
there was positive hostility towards
proletarians, eventually, and excessive
tolerance of women and black people.
This is also a bit unfair because there was
some empirical material, although it was
usually too sloppy for fear of being
positivistic]. There was a whole 'procession
of the excluded' (91) as working class people
were succeeded by ethnic minorities and women,
an endless queue as different causes were
advocated, rather than as different groups
actually appeared, say in higher education
institutions. There is always scope for
a new one to emerge.

Discursive inclusion and
idealization, increasingly necessary to keep
imaginary alliances going as physical distance
increases. Thus organic intellectuals
have to be seen in an increasing supply of
working class knowers, and this limits its
viability as working class people had failed
to dominate higher education. Discursive
inclusion takes place instead. This can
take the form of asking who is being silenced
in classrooms or in texts, according to the
status of the institution - taught courses in
cultural studies have tended to appear in low
status institutions, while key texts appear in
higher status ones.

Representation and
language become important in the absence of
actual knowers. They have to be given
voice in a way that remains faithful to them,
and this is led to inductive, qualitative and
descriptive accounts, valuing primary
experience in the form of extensive
quotation. The process of research
rather than its product dominates, and
although this is supposed to celebrate
multiplicity and diversity, there has in fact
been a privilege awarded to these particular
accounts. The whole activity of giving a
voice tends to emphasize the importance of
'discourse, language and textuality' (92) at
the expense of the material factors, say those
affecting exclusion. This produces 'a
series of idealist "turns"', with a relative
marginalisation of political economy and
policy studies.

Proliferation and
fragmentation. Increasingly, the knower
is legitimated as a person who tells a truth
or offers a voice, and this is a form of
strong classification and framing of the
social relation. Other pedagogic
discourses are rejected because they cannot
articulate a suitable voice. As more and
more voices have to be included, privileged
knowers form an increasingly fragmented group
and get strongly divided from one another -
thus working class people may be subdivided
into working class men, working class white
men, working class white heterosexual men,
working class socially mobile and well
educated men and so on. The potential
categories are endless. None can be
denied, so we get constant 'interruptions' as
in feminism. Knowers have to be
subjected to increasing strings of adjectives,
and those with the most are seen as having the
strongest claims.

The social itself gets sidelined in favour of
methodological individualism, with smaller and
smaller focuses of knowledge claims. There
is a shift in disciplinary background as well from
sociology to social psychology then to
psychoanalysis, towards autobiographical
reflection, towards narcissism and hermeneuticism
[it seems this is Gellner's phrase]. While
objects of study are supposed to be general, in
practice, we get 'thicker and thicker descriptions
of smaller and smaller phenomena'(93), for example
greater complexity among the youth cultures or
audiences.

Knower modes have to displace existing knowledge
rather than integrating it, and this turns on
including more and more people to articulate the
voices that are missing in earlier forms.
This can lead to repetitions as 'old songs will be
sung by new voices in their own distinctive
register' (94), leading to a permanent cultural
revolution, radical breaks, endless restarting.

Fragmentation into different knowers reduces the
social bases for any collective action, stresses
difference rather than similarity, and finds
itself in difficulties with institutions.
Internal struggles break out, not only between
privileged categories, but between those claiming
to give voice to them, raising issues about what
the genuine voice of the working class might be,
leading to '"prolier than thou" legitimation
struggles' [I swear he got this from me!].

This opens the discourse to criticism, including
asking whether groups need an academic voice at
all, especially if they're only going to tell
people about themselves. This makes it
particularly vulnerable to vocationalism and
functionalism. A classic defence, arguing
that society itself is important, for example, is
unavailable because there are no foundational
objects. The endless procession of the
excluded reveals a limited lifespan for claims
that group should be privileged, and they tend to
'evoke their own disrupter' (95), and,
paradoxically, if the voice becomes accepted, they
lose their marginal status. The discourse
can also be '"poached"', adding on cultural
studies to other courses and modules, another
weakness, a classic case of the suicidal tendency
of horizontal knowledge structures identified by
Bernstein, where academic subjects lose their
identity. Cultural studies has only become
accepted by being an adjunct of other subjects,
says Maton.

This is the sort of 'missing voice of pedagogic
discourse' that needs to be included [no paradoxes
recognized here]. We need to look at modes of
legitimation and their underlying principles to
see what is intrinsic to pedagogic discourses
[very limited options seem to be available].
The analysis shows how empirical descriptions
connect to theoretical narratives, and can be red
both inductively and deductively. The
analysis explains the development of academic
subjects, which have different 'intrinsic
dynamic[s]' (96), as in the features of the knower
mode described above. These characteristics
are emergent, not reducible to sociological
factors, even if not totally autonomous from
social relations of power.

The analysis asks important questions about
cultural studies and the sociology of education,
both of which have adopted knower modes, and both
of which are marginal as a result, at least in
British HE. Cultural studies show how knower
modes can bump into unintended consequences in
giving voice to marginal groups, so we might be
better able to include other voices if we realize
the processes by recovering 'the voice of
pedagogic discourse'.