Richard Whittall:

The Globalist's Top Ten Books in 2016: The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer

Middle East Eye: "

The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer is one of the weightiest, most revelatory, original and important books written about sport"

“The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer has helped me immensely with great information and perspective.”

Bob Bradley, former US and Egyptian national coach: "James Dorsey’s The Turbulent World of Middle Eastern Soccer (has) become a reference point for those seeking the latest information as well as looking at the broader picture."

Alon Raab in The International Journal of the History of Sport: “Dorsey’s blog is a goldmine of information.”

Play the Game: "Your expertise is clearly superior when it comes to Middle Eastern soccer."

Andrew Das, The New York Times soccer blog Goal: "No one is better at this kind of work than James Dorsey"

David Zirin, Sports Illustrated: "Essential Reading"

Change FIFA: "A fantastic new blog'

Richard Whitall of A More Splendid Life:

"James combines his intimate knowledge of the region with a great passion for soccer"

Christopher Ahl, Play the Game: "An excellent Middle East Football blog"

James Corbett, Inside World Football

Wednesday, September 30, 2015

Palestine is a headache Saudi
King Salman doesn’t need as he confronts rare demands from members of his
ruling family that he and his son be removed from power, growing unease about a
seven-month old devastating military campaign in Yemen that has caused devastation
and mounting civilian casualties, widespread criticism of the kingdom’s
handling of the Haj in the wake of a deadly stampede, and concern about the
financial and economic management of the kingdom against the backdrop of
dropping oil prices.

Palestine emerged as a problem
that threatened to escalate already high emotions in the kingdom with Saudi
Arabia’s national soccer team scheduled to play a 2018 World Cup qualifier
against Palestine in the Faisal al-Husseini International Stadium in Al-Ram, a
town on the outskirts of Jerusalem. Travelling to Al-Ram would have meant that
the Saudi squad would pass through Israeli security, passport and customs
controls when it entered the West Bank from Jordan.

Doing so would have without doubt
fuelled criticism of Mr. Salman’s nine-month old reign; infuriated a deeply
conservative, anti-Israeli clergy as well as public opinion that sees the
Jewish state as an enemy; and raised further questions about his management
that has produced few tangible successes, exposed the kingdom to increased
international criticism, and positioned his young, untested son whom many have
nicknamed “Reckless” as a powerful defence and economic policy overlord as well
as the king’s potential successor.

A Saudi soccer team crossing the
King Hussein Bridge from Jordan to the West Bank would have been one step to
many despite greater Saudi willingness to acknowledge that Israel and the
kingdom despite having no diplomatic relations share common interests,
particularly with regard to the rise of Iran with international sanctions
likely to be lifted as a result of the resolution of the Iranian nuclear
crisis. The agreement with Iran has further cemented concern about the
reliability of the United States as the kingdom’s foremost ally.

The Saudi reluctance to allow its
national soccer team to cross an Israeli-controlled border was further
complicated by the fact that the United Arab Emirates had no such qualms to
allow its team earlier this month to play a World Cup qualifier in Al-Ram, the
first such match on Palestinian territory involving a squad from a country with
which Israel has no diplomatic relations. The Saudi hesitancy further
threatened to undermine Palestinian efforts to use soccer as a way to raise
Palestine’s status internationally and project itself as an independent state.

World soccer body FIFA, a
long-standing pillar of autocratic rule in the Middle East and North Africa,
had no misgivings about resolving Mr. Salman’s dilemma. In a letter to the
Saudi and Palestinian soccer associations dated September 28, FIFA ordered the
Saudi-Palestinian match because of “force majeure” to be moved from Al Ram to a
neutral venue.

FIFA offered no explanation of
what force majeure Saudi Arabia was facing that the UAE did not confront in
allowing its soccer team to play in Palestine. In doing so, it appeared to be
attempting to spare King Salman, already fighting battles on multiple fronts, a
further potentially explosive headache. The FIFA decision was one more marker
of the global soccer body’s mockery of its assertion that politics and sports
are unrelated. That mockery is evident with just a glimpse of the issues Mr.
Salman is dealing with.

In an unprecedented move, a
senior Saudi prince, a grandson of Saudi Arabia’s founder, Abdulaziz Ibn Saud,
this month, called in two letters that have gone viral on the Web for the
replacement of Mr. Salman, and his son, deputy crown prince, defence minister
and chairman of the Council for Economic and Development Affairs, Prince Mohammed
Bin Salman Al Saud.

“The king is not in a stable
condition and in reality the son of the king [Mohammed bin Salman] is ruling
the kingdom. So four or possibly five of my uncles will meet soon to discuss
the letters. They are making a plan with a lot of nephews and that will open
the door. A lot of the second generation is very anxious. The public are also
pushing this very hard, all kinds of people, tribal leaders. They say you have
to do this or the country will go to disaster,” the prince who has not been
named publicly told The Guardian.

The threat to Messrs. Salman and
Mohammed was heightened by the king’s refusal to hold anyone accountable for
this month’s stampede during the annual pilgrimage to Mecca in which more than
700 people were killed. Angry Saudis have asserted on social media that the
incident was the result of rampant corruption in the kingdom.

Saudi Arabia’s ruling Al Saud
family derive their legitimacy from being the custodians of Islam’s two most
holy cities, Mecca and Medina. A Saudi soccer squad playing on the edge of
Jerusalem at a time of Israeli-Palestinian clashes around the Al Aqsa mosque,
Islam’s third most holy site, would have further put that legitimacy in doubt.

Saudis, including many of those
in regions bordering Yemen who have tribal and family ties to the war-torn
country, are increasingly disgusted at the pictures of the Middle East’s
wealthiest country armed to the teeth with sophisticated weaponry reducing the
Arab world’s poorest nation to a heap of ruins in a military campaign that has
made progress in retaking southern Yemen from Houthi rebels but shows no sign
of securing outright victory and producing a viable, unifying Yemeni government.
Saudis also criticize what they see as a lack of a military or exit strategy.

“This is a war against the Yemeni
nation and against Yemen becoming independent. It has no legitimate political foundation
and it is not what the people want. Ninety per cent of people in Saudi Arabia
don’t want this to happen, exactly the opposite of what the media shows,” said
Sgt Maj Dakheel bin Naser Al Qahtani, a former head of air force operations at
King Abdulaziz airbase, Dhahran, who defected from the Saudi armed forces last
year.

With oil trading below $50 a
barrel, Saudi Arabia is being forced to borrow and according to the Financial
Times has withdrawn some $70 billion from overseas investments. Saudi Arabia’s
stock market index has dropped 30 percent in the last year. The International
Monetary Fund (IMF) predicted Saudi Arabia would next year have a budget deficit
of at least $107 billion.

Saudi Arabia’s budget is based on
a $90 a barrel oil price. The kingdom is believed to need a $110 a barrel price
to balance its budget given the costs of the wars in Yemen, Syria and against
the Islamic State, the jihadist group that controls a swath of Syria and Iraq.

Pictures of Saudi soccer players
subjecting themselves to Israeli controls potentially could have been the
cinder that put the House of Saud on fire where it not for the willingness of
Sepp Blatter’s FIFA fire brigade to come to Mr. Salman’s rescue on what can
only be opportunistic political grounds.

James M. Dorsey is a
senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, co-director
of the University of Würzburg’s Institute for Fan Culture, and the author of The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer blog and a forthcoming book with the same
title.

Wednesday, September 23, 2015

Inevitably, the mass exodus of
refugees from conflict areas was going to provoke the spilling into Europe of
multiple disputes in the Middle East, Central Asia and Africa. Spanish soccer
is the first to feel the weight of the baggage that has turned vast numbers
into destitute refugees. Kurdish rebels have accused a Syrian coach who was hired
earlier this month by Real Madrid after having been tripped on camera by a
Hungarian camera woman as he was running towards the border a child in his arms
of being an Al Qaeda fighter and the instigator of a deadly anti-Kurdish soccer
brawl.

The allegations raised by the
Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), believed to be associated with the
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) that is locked into escalating hostilities with
Turkey, are serious. PDY media asserted that Osama Abdul Mohsen, the coach who
landed in Spain, had been a fighter for Jabhat al Nusra, a major Syrian
jihadist militia aligned with Al Qaeda.

The PYD and a Syrian Christian
Facebook page charged further that Mr. Abdul Rahman had recently revived his
Facebook page but had deleted the Nusra flag which in the past had been his
cover photo. Also allegedly removed from the page were references to Mr. Abdul
Rahman having fought against Kurdish forces in Amudeh, Serekaniye and Afrin. “Osama
Abdul joined the rebel groups in 2011 and committed crimes against civilian
minorities, including Kurds,” the PYD said in a statement.

The PYD suggested further that
Mr. Abdul Rahman had left Syria on a journey that put him in the spotlight in
Hungary and propelled him to Spain after Kurdish forces captured in July the
Syrian town of Tel Abyad where he and his family lived.

Kurdish resentment of Mr. Abdul
Mohsen, who was the coach of al-Fotuwa SC in Deir Ez Zor from 2004-2010,
appears heightened by allegations that he was one of the instigators of a
soccer brawl in 2004 in the predominantly Kurdish city of Qamishli during which
Syrian security forces killed at least 50 Kurdish protesters.

The allegations raise serious
policy questions for European governments. An unknown number of refugees may
well have been fighters at some point in the past 4.5 years of groups that are
proscribed in the West. Some sources suggest that Mr. Abdul Rahman had been arrested
and tortured by forces loyal to Syrian president Bashar al-Assad early on in
the war.

Many may have felt they had no
choice in a brutal civil war rather than having opted to join groups like Nusra
for ideological reasons. That is all the more true in a situation in which
Western efforts to create more moderate rebel forces have failed miserably. The
failure has prompted efforts by Qatar to bring Nusra in from the cold and
sparked creeping suggestions in the West that Nusra in the fight against the
Islamic State may be the lesser of two evils.

To be sure, determining who is
who in the human mass that has swept on to the shores of Europe is no easy
feat, Nonetheless, the PDY allegations are likely to be grist on the mill of
East European opposition to accommodation of the refugees that is often laced
with racism and conservative and right-wing West European politicians and groups
with long-standing reservations about immigration.

Intelligence agencies have
further warned that some jihadists may slip into Europe with the refugees. German
intelligence said this week that the number of Islamic extremists in the
country had increased sharply in recent months and expressed concern that they
were recruiting among refugees.

There is no immediate way of
checking the PYD’s allegations, but both Syrian and Kurdish rebel groups as
well as the Assad regime have a vested interest in trying to stymie the exodus
from areas that they control. They both fear that their regions could be
depopulated and that their ability to recruit fighters would diminish.

The PYD is reported to have
barred Kurds in at least one area under its control, Efrin, from travelling to
Turkey, a gateway to Europe. A PDY rival, the Kurdish National Council (KNC) earlier
this month organised protests against migration in Hasakah province. KNC
officials said they feared Kurdish demands for autonomy, if not independence,
could be undermined by demographic changes as a result of an exodus of Kurds.
Similarly, the Assad regime opposes migration because it further undermines its
legitimacy.

Real Madrid and Mr. Abdul Rahman
have yet to comment on the allegations levied by the PYD. Irrespective of their
accuracy, the allegations raise multiple issues that go beyond security
considerations. Mr. Abdul Rahman hails from an environment that was tough even
before civil war erupted in Syria.

The more damning PYD assertion is
his alleged involvement in the soccer brawl that occurred long before the civil
war and was designed to suppress Kurdish demands for legitimate rights rather
than his association with Nusra in a situation in which people often have to
make difficult choices. Nonetheless, Mr. Abdul Rahman should also respond in
chapter and verse to his alleged association with Nusra.

The question, however, what if,
remains. Sending Mr. Abdul Rahman and his family back to Syria and retaliation
by either the rebels or the regime is not an option. The real lesson is that
refugees’ baggage is a mixed bag of the disputes that persuaded them to leave
their home countries as well as choices they made in conflict situations. It’s
easy to judge them from an armchair, but doesn’t solve the issue of what
consequences that judgement should have.

James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S.
Rajaratnam School of International Studies as Nanyang Technological University
in Singapore, co-director of the Institute of Fan Culture of the University of
Würzburg and the author of the blog, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer, and a forthcoming book with the
same title.

Tuesday, September 22, 2015

Gleaming glass skyscrapers, state-of-the-art technology,
and wealthy merchant families havereplaced theGulf’smuddytownsandvillagespopulatedbytradersandpearlfishersthatoncelackedelectricity, running water or modern communications. The
region’s modern day projection of a visionarycutting- edge, 21st century urban environment masks however the fact that some things
have notchanged.

Gulfstatescontinuetoberuledbythesamefamilies,generationaftergeneration.Thefamilieshave becomewhatanEmiratiregimecritic,YousifKhalifaal-Yousif,termed“aninstitutionofentitlement.”1 Alongsideautocrats,theregionalsoremainshometoholywarriorsandmodern-daypirates.The principle of governance that
what is good for business is good for the village-turned-nation stillguides rulers
who rank among the region’s foremostbusinessmen.

If, however, the region’s physical transformation speaks
to an almost unitary vision of modernity,its politics tell a very different story, one of
deep-seated social conservatism despite concessions insome states to cultural
attributes of expatriate communities, resistance to political change, and a
clingingto the status quo at whateverprice.

Closetribalties,intermarriagebetweenrulingfamiliesandanintertwiningoftribaleconomicrelationscompensateforweakinstitutionalization.Conceptsofconflictofinterestaremoreoverblurredwithlittledistinctionbetweentheeconomicandcommercialinterestsofthestateandthoseofrulingfamilies.Dubai’sforemostgoverninginstitutions,rulerSheikhMohammedbinRashidAlMaktoum’sExecutiveOffice, his private staff, and his Executive Council or Cabinet operate
in obscurity with no clearlegalanchor.

“TheproblemindiscussingconceptslikeleadershipandvisionisthattheGulfanditsWesternpartners use the same terms but
understand them very differently. There is no institutionalizeddecision-making in the Gulf. Leadership in the Gulf amounts to a few members of a
family taking decisions inprivate. The need for greater efficiency and demands
for more transparency are balanced with theregion’s traditional method of consensus,” said a Westerndiplomat.2

DemandsforinstitutionalizationandtransparencyreflectfarmorefundamentalchangesthatGulf leaders
have to come to grips with. Those changes are driven by populations that in
majority areunder the age of 30, oil and gas revenues that in
the medium term will be unable to sustain rulers’cradle-to- grave social
contract with their populations, and communication technologies that rendercensorship and non-transparency increasingly meaningless. They guide former
US ambassador Gary A.Grappo’s description of the environment that ailing Omani Sultan
Qaboos bin Said’s successor willencounter,but are equally true for all Gulfleaders.

“Qaboos’ successor will confront challenges nearly as
great as those Qaboos faced in the first yearsof his reign in the early 1970s.
Omanis today are much better educated and more engaged, and willwant toseechange.Theywillwanttoplayaroleindeterminingthedirectionoftheircountry.Theywillalso want
and need to see a transformation in the country’s economy away from dependenceon comparativelysparsehydrocarbonreservestootherareasthatwillensurethecountry’scontinued
prosperityandstandardoflivingand,mostimportant,producejobsforarapidlygrowingpopulation… Vision will be the defining challenge of
Qaboos’ successor,” Grapposaid.3

Thatvision,Grappoargued,wouldhavetoinvolvegradualliberalizationincludingagreaterdevolution ofdecision-makingauthoritytoaconsultativecouncil,allowingittoprepareandapprovebudgets;
greater press freedom and transparency; lifting of restrictions on civil
society organizations;economic diversification;andinclusionofminorityculturesinthepreservationofOmaniculture.Grappo’s prescriptionsareapplicableacrosstheGulf.Hislistiseasilyexpandabletoincludenotionsofagradual transition from
absolute to constitutional monarchy, decriminalization of non-violentopposition activity, and social and economic policies that areinclusionary.

Grappo’s vision entails the kind of boldness and risk
taking that has become the trademark ofDubai’s rulingAlMaktoumfamilyinthelasttwocenturiesbuthasyettobeappliedtothechallengesfacing today’srulersintheregion.Fornow,Gulfrulershavesoughttofinetunethestatusquobycasting themselvesintheroleofprotectorsofnationalandtribalidentity,traditionsandheritage;projecting themselves as agents
of the transition from energy-driven to post-oil and knowledge-basedeconomies
and of greater independence by asserting themselves politically and
militarily; and seeking toenhance their countries’ international status by
hosting mega events like the 2020 Expo in Dubai and the2022 World Cup inQatar.

LoominginthebackofthemindsofGulfleadersisthememoryofAlgeriawhereacollapseinoil prices
in the 1980s put an end to the social contract. Protests erupted as incomes
dropped andinflation andunemploymentincreased.Thecountryslippedintocivilwarthatultimatelyendedwitharevivalof the
social contract on the back of rising oilprices.

UnlikeAlgeria,Gulfleadershavethefinancialmuscletoweatherastormforsometime.Butmore fundamentally as The Economist recently
noted, Gulf states "may have learned many lessons from the past but there is one that remains largely
undigested. Despite innumerable warning andinnumerable failedattemptstodiversifytheireconomiesawayfromoil,nearlyallofthemstillrelyonthesticky stuff to get by. With relentlessly growing
populations and public expectations, it is still only amatter of time before
the crunchcomes."5

The Singaporemodel

GulfleaderslooktoSingapore,acitystatethathasdevelopedwithinamatterofdecadesfroman impoverished island with no resources into a
first world state and global hub with a highlydiversified economy,astheirmodel.Itisamodelthatcombinesauthoritarianismwithempowerment.Delegations fromtheGulftraveltoSingaporetodiscoverthesecretofitssuccessandenlistSingaporeaninstitutionsto assist
them in developing for example educationsystems.

“Singaporeisanauthoritariansuccessstory.ItiseverythingtheGulfwantstobeandneverwillbe,” said
a long-standing observer of both Singapore and the Gulf states. “It has the
three key attributesthe Gulf lacks: a high degree of
institutionalization; transparent rule of law; and a population thatdespite restricted
freedoms is empowered,” the observersaid.6

The UAE, home to 200 nationalities, unlike countries
like Saudi Arabia and Bahrain has adoptedone aspect of Singapore, traumatized by its
expulsion from Malaysia in the 1960s and race riots at thetime that
few analysts have focused on: the building of a society that sees diversity as
an asset andrespects differentculturesandfaiths.LikeQatar,theUAErecognizedthattightpoliticalcontroldidnotpreclude thebuildingofasocietywhoseculturalandracialtoleranceissteepedinIslaminanefforttoensure domestic
stability and counter extremism. Up to a third of the UAE’s population isnon-Muslim.

AmidmountinginternationalcriticismthatGulfstateshavefailedtopulltheirweightinwelcoming refugees from the mayhem in Syria, Gulf News
reported that some 100,000 Syrians had beenallowed intotheUAEsince2011.Inanofficialstatement,theUAEdeclaredinmid-SeptembertheSyrian refugeecrisisaforeignpolicyprioritythatitwastackling“inasustainableandhumanefashiontogether with its regional and
internationalpartners.”7

“The UAE, just like Al Andalus…is home to hundreds of
nationalities and various religions andsects, each free to practise their religious
beliefs so long as they do not attack or undermine the other. Ithas also
become a target for constant criticism by extremists for that very reason. Most
recently theUAE cameunderattackafterhavingannouncedallocationofaplotinthecapitalAbuDhabiforthe construction of a Hindu temple to serve the
Hindu population of the country (which makes up 25per cent of the
population)… The UAE stands strong against the preachers of discriminationand intolerance,withanunwaveringconvictionthatpluralismistheveryfoundationthatbuiltthiscountry,” Hanif argued in GulfNews.8

Politicsontheotherhandweavesataleofregionalrivalriesandleaders’differentvisionsofhowto balancemodernitywithsocialandpoliticalconservatismandhowtoensureregimesurvivaland maintain a regional security environment
which is dependent on a US defence umbrella thatis increasingly
perceived by Gulf states asunreliable.

Compoundingtheregion’sleadershipchallengeistheprogressivebreakdownofasocialcontractbasedon a cradle-to-grave
welfare state that assists citizens even in the cost of getting married inexchangeforsurrenderofpoliticalrights.FormorethanadecadeGulfleadersstartingwiththelateKingAbdullahofSaudiArabiahavebeennibblingawayatthewelfarestateinabidtorationalizegovernmentfinancesand foster nationalidentity.

“Cutsinsocialspendingandsubsidiesareadifficultpropositiongivenpopulationswhoexpectto receive
rather than give,” said a Gulfanalyst.10

Cloakedineleganttraditionalflowingrobesandheaddresses,Gulfleadersprojectanimageof conservatismandadversitytorisk.Yet,riskisatthecoreoftheirvariedleapstowardsmodernityfuelled byphenomenaloilandgasrevenuesandabidtofendoffpressureforchangethatinformsSaudi,Emirati and Qatari visions of the future rooted in
late 18th and early 19th century triballeadership.

Somerisksandthreatsareinevitableinthedriveformodernitysuchastheinfluxofexpatriatesand migrantlabourthathasturnedtheregion’sdemographicsupsidedownandraisedquestionsofsocieties’ sustainability and viability for which there
are no goodanswers.

Othersaretheimmutableresultofrestrictiveanddiscriminatorypoliciesthathavetransformedpopularrevoltsintobattlesrangingfrominflexibleattitudestowardsnaturalization,low-intensityconflictinBahraintocivilwarinSyria;givenholywarriorsliketheIslamicStateanewleaseonlife;drivensectarian
tensions that have sparked wars in Iraq and Yemen; and fuelled discontent amongmajorityand
minority populationsalike.

Gulfleaders’hopesthatviolenceandbrutalitythatfollowedmostofthe2011revoltscoupledwiththeirdetermined
counterrevolutionary strategies at home and abroad would cow restless
populationsweredashedthissummer.Massanti-governmentdemonstrationseruptedinLebanonandIraqdemandinganendtocorruptionandimprovedservicesandlowlypaidpolicemenandtaxauthorityofficialsprotestedinEgypt,amainstayoftheSaudiandUAE-backedregimeofgeneral-turned-presidentAbdelFattahAlSisi.

Similarly, there is little reason to assume that Gulf
states despite successful co-optation andrepressive policies are immune to anti-government
protest. Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait and Saudi Arabiawitnessed massdemonstrationsinrecentyears.Gulfyouthhavesaidinsurveysthatdemocracywasatoppriority for them even though recent developments
have dampened their hopes.11 Financial muscle hasallowed
severalGulfstatestobuyprecioustimewithgeneroushandoutsbutreducedoilrevenuesforcing economic
rationalization spotlight the fragility of such safetyvalves.

Nothing highlights the need to broaden the focus of vision
and leadership in the Gulf like the region’s lackofinclusiveness,incapabilityandunwillingnesstoaddresswhatsomeanalystsdescribeasaticking timebomb:theBidounorWithout,hundredsofthousandsofpredominantlyGulfArabswhoaredenied citizenship
despite having often populated the rank of file of national armies. Most are
Bedouinfrom theregionwithasprinklingofmigrantsfromIran,IraqandPakistanwhodestroyedtheirdocumentsin a
failed bid to ensure that they would be granted citizenship as Gulf states
achievedindependence.

IntheUAE,BidounaredeniedbenefitsenjoyedbyEmiratissuchasfreeeducation,healthcare,and housingallowances.Findingemploymentisdifficultbecausetheylackpassportsneededtoobtainwork permits. Demanding their
rights puts them at risk of arrest or deportation as writer and activistAhmed AbdulKhaleqfoundoutin2012whenhewasdeportedtoThailandforcampaignonlineforBidoun rights.12

Kuwaiti media reported that 13 of the 29 people arrested
in the wake of the attacks were Bidoun.The Islamic State claimed responsibility for the
attack.14 Afraid to single out the Bidoun, Kuwaitiofficials and analysts
were quick to identify Bidoun involvement as part of a broader process ofradicalization among SunniMuslims.

Vision withpitfalls

Gulfleadersfaceidenticalproblemsandsharesimilarvisionsoftheirplaceintheinternational community.Yet,theirstrategiestogetfromAtoB,approachestonotionsofnationalandregional security,perceptionsofdevelopment,andresponsestodomesticandinternationalcriticismvarywidely.ThedifferencesinvisionrangefromtheeconomicandcommercialbrashnessofDubai,toQatar’swellthought
through but poorly executed soft power strategy, to Saudi Arabia’s high-risk
use offinancialandmilitarymusclesupportedbytheUAE’sincreasingprojectionofitselfasaregionalmilitarypower.In
projecting itself militarily, the UAE benefitted from having participated in
virtually everyU.S.-ledcoalition campaign since1991.

The bail out together with the collapse in 2013 of low
budget airline Bahrain Air also raisedlong-term questionsabouttheGulf’sfundamentalbusinessmodelinwhichthestateistheprimaryeconomic
driver.Gulfairlineshaveemergedasmajorplayersinaviationbenefittingfromtheregion’sgeography as well as its ability
to profit from changing patterns in international trade andpolitics.

“Inapartoftheworldwherealmosteveryotherairlineissubsidized…itwasalwaysgoingtobedifficult to be truly profitable. There is not enough
point-to-point traffic, and regional connecting trafficyields are too low to
sustain an airline. So it was always going to struggle by traditional
measures,”Bahrain Air CEO Richard Nutall told The AviationWriter.15

TheDubaibailouthighlightedthedifferentvisionsoftheemirateandAbuDhabivisionsandthe dynamicsofthepowerrelationshipbetweenthetwokeystatesintheUAE.Ratherthanoptingfor Dubai’sbrashness,relativeautonomyandcommercialdrive,AbuDhabireliesonthecreationofa military-industrialcomplex,nuclearandrenewableenergyprograms,anditswealthtocementits dominant position in the federation, and
ensure its ability to project regional and internationalpower.

Meanwhile,Qatar’ssuccessfulefforttohostthe2022WorldCuphaswithUSandSwisslegalinvestigationsintotheintegrityofitsbidandwidespreadcriticismoftheGulf-widemigrantlabourkafala or sponsorship
system that puts employees at the mercy of their employers turned into apublicrelationsnightmare.

Saudi Arabia’s harsh justice system with its public
beheadings, its war in Yemen that is bombingtheGulf’spoorestnationintoevengreaterabjectpoverty,anditspuritaninterpretationofIslamthatdepriveswomenofbasicrightshasmadeitallbutapariahstatetoleratedbecauseofitsfinanciallargessand
geo-strategicimportance.

Compounding the downside of the varying visions are the
budgetary consequences of expensivehardandsoftpowerstrategiesatatimeofdroppingoilpricesthatraisethespectreofbudgetdeficitsandareforcing Gulf states to nibble at the edges of the cradle-to-grave
welfare state that underwritesrelativesocialpeace.TheIMFestimatesthatfallingglobaloilpriceswillcosttheGulfanestimated$380billionin export earnings thisyear.

“Rashid wanted the name of his town, Dubai, on the lips
of every person on earth. When a familysat downtodinnerinAmerica,RashidwantedthemtodiscussthehappeningsofDubai.Andwhentwo Englishmen
paused for a glass of beer, it was Dubai he wished them to talk about. Farmers
in China, bankersinSwitzerland,andgeneralsinRussia:allofthemmustknowaboutDubai,”wroteJimKrane, author
of City of Gold: Dubai and the Dream ofCapitalism.16

Nothing seems to bold or outrageous as long as it
fulfils Sheikh Rashid’s vision of keeping DubaiInc.intheglobalpubliceye.CatchyslogansandslickadvertisingandpublicrelationsputDubaiontheworldmap.

“Dubai and the Gulf states are very good at projecting.
On paper, they look like they are respondingto modernity and the obsessions
of the international community. It’s all the product of having hiredgood communication
companies,” said a Western official with long-standing experience in theGulf.17

SultanSoodAlQassimi,aUAEbusinessman,authorandartcollectorwhoisacriticalmemberof Sharjah’s ruling family,
quipped last month when Qatar announced for the umpteenth time inresponse
tointernationalcriticismofitslabourregimethatitwasintroducingmajorreforms:“Everyfewmonths a
Gulf state issues a similarstatement.”18

Boldgambles

MuchofDubai'scontemporarymodelisrootedinhistory.SheikhRashid'sboldnotionof'buildandthe will come' anticipated British tycoon
Richard Branson's principle of 'screw it, let’s do it.' In doingso, Rashid
set a template for development that has been to a large degree adopted by the
Gulf flushwith oil money after the 1973 oilcrisis.

For Sheikh Mohammed, the metaphor was trees. Answering a
question about the source of his vision bysomeoneclosetohim,SheikhMohammedrepliedBedouinstylebyrecountingastory.Hedescribed howheplantedtreeswhenhewasbuildingahouseinArmouninthedesert.SheikhMohammednoticed thatbirdsinterruptedtheirmigrationtospendafewdaysinhistrees.Soheplantedmoretreesandmore birds came. Eventually they settled instead
of continuing theirmigration.19

“In Sheikh Mohammed’s mind, the way to do things is by
nature and by natural law. Things taketheir naturalorder.IfheplantedtreesinDubai,ifheofferedopportunity,peoplewouldstopinDubai.Sheikh Mohammedcamefromalargefamily.Hehadtofindhisownplaceanddidthatwithnatural opportunity,” the person close to Sheikh
Mohammedsaid.

ComparingdifferingapproachesbetweenAbuDhabiandDubai,peopleclosetotherulersofboth emiratesnotedthatAbuDhabi’sgeographyofislandsmeantthattheyensuredthattheirfortswere lookinginwards.SittingontheCreek,Dubaiwasforcedtolookoutwardssothatitcouldattractthe attentionofpassingmerchantvesselsandfendoffpirates.“Thedifferenceinattitudeofthetwofamilies is reflected in how they approach
everything,” one personsaid.20

TheverypresenceinDubaioftheMaktoumssignalledtheirknackforboldgamblesthatmoreoften than
not have paid off over the past two centuries. Unhappy with internecine tribal
infightinginitiated by their cousins and later rulers of Abu
Dhabi, the Al Nahayans, the Maktoums decamped in thefirst half of the 19th century
from their ancestral oasis of Liwa and headed for an forlorn fishing villageon thecoast.21TherewasthenlittlereasontoassumethatDubaiwouldserveasausefulbase,letalone become
a 21st century, hyper-modern globalhub.

The Maktoums took their bold gamble a step further when
in the late 1890s and early 1900s theylaid the foundations for Dubai as a free port by
abolishing customs, tariffs and vessel licensing in amove thatwasalsodesignedtoensurethatDubaiwouldserveastheanchorforBritain'scolonialpresencein theGulf.ThemovesgaveDubaianedgeoverIranian-controlledportsontheArabsideoftheGulfthat had imposed taxes to provide revenue for a
cash-strapped Iranianadministration.

SheikhMaktoumbinHashersimilarlyembracedtheneedtoimportpeopletobolsterDubai’ssparse population.TheyfirsttargeteddisgruntledGulfmerchantshitbyIraniantaxincreases.Nextwasthe Iranian
business community that was offered free land and easy access to the ruler and
promisedthat the government would not intervene in their affairs. Merchants
were later enticed and co-optedwith government contracts and monopolistic tradelicenses.22

Incontrasttotoday,theMaktoumslikeotherGulfArabsatthetimeembracedtheBedouinritualof hospitalityforstrangersirrespectivewhotheywere.Migrants,unlikemoderndayexpatriatesand migrant
labour, were encouraged to make Dubai their permanent home rather than acceptan arrangement
that ended with their departure once they had fulfilled their contractualobligations.

Atthetime,theMaktoumsrecognizedthemultiplebenefitsofmigration.Itwasalessontheyhadlearntfrom
their own migration from Liwa. Migrants were the stuff that would make Sheikh
Rashid'sdreama reality. They were an asset, one that
Dubai was eager to hold on to, not the necessary evil utilitythattheGulftoleratestodaybecauseithasnochoicebutseesasathreattotheregion'sidentityandultimately
to rulers' hold onpower.

Dubai benefitted from both pre- and post-revolution
IranIan policies. Its economy thrived onitscompetitivefree-wheeling,freemarketpoliciesasopposedtotheredtapeandfinancialburdensimposedbyIran.SincetheIranianrevolution,DubaihasbecomehometomoreliberalIraniansseekingto
escape the strictures of the Islamicrepublic.

Iranians today rank among Dubai's foremost merchant
families, largest developers and majorinvestorswhileIranisoneoftheemirate'sforemosttradingpartners.Muchliketoday’smigrantworkers,theIranians
and the next wave of migrants, the Indians, fulfilled economic roles that
Dubai'slocalpopulation was too proud toembrace.

Walking thewalk

TheGulf’sdifferentstylesofleadershiparereflectedinthewaystatesprojectthemselves.SaudiArabia wears
secrecy and conservatism on its sleeve. Brash and aggressive, Dubai trumpets
its status ofbeing amodern,forwardlookingglobalcity.Itboastsbeingamulticulturalmetropole.Qatarbasksin controversy
over its idiosyncratic, counter intuitive foreign policy that forges relations
with friendand foe alike, yet squirms when it is cast under thespotlight.

For much of their recent history as independent states,
Gulf nations expressed leadership inemploying vastamountsofoilandgasrevenuestobuildrelationsanchoredontheiralliancewiththeUnitedStates with
countries across the globe; turn their backwaters into architectural landmarks
and businesshubs through investment in infrastructure and
exploitation of their geostrategic location; highprofile investmentsinWesternrealestateandglobalbrands;andthecreationofalimitednumberofworld classglobalbusinessesthatincludeSaudiArabia’snationaloilcompanyAramcoandSabic,its petrochemicalindustry;QatarGasandQatarAirways;Dubai’sglobalportmangerDPWorld,EmiratesAirlines
and Etisilat telecommunications company; and Abu Dhabi’s Ettihadairline.

Increasingly however, concepts of leadership particularly in the
smaller Gulf states havebeen challengedbyregionalthreatssuchasthe1990IraqiinvasionofKuwait,thefalloutofthe2003US invasionofIraq,themorerecentwaveofpopularrevoltsthatin2011toppledfourArableadersand sparkedacivilandproxywarinSyria,theriseofpoliticalIslam,andtheemergenceoftheIslamicState that with its eradication
of the borders between Iraq and Syria and pan-Islamist ideology thatthreatens the notion of the nation state as the basis for regional order in
the MiddleEast.

Leadership concepts have also been challenged by a wearing thin of the
strategy of talking the talkbut notwalkingthewalk.Restlesspopulationshavefornowbeencowedbythecrushingorreversalof most
of the successful revolts and intimidated by violence engulfing the region and
harshcrackdowns on domestic dissent. Yet, discontent simmers
at the surface while minorities chafe atcontinued discrimination anddisenfranchisement.

TheriseofIslamicStateandthewaveofviolenceandbrutalityhasmoreoverfocusedinternational attentiononrootcausesthatincludesectarianandintolerantideologiesaswellasalackofinclusiveness and public space for dissenting political
expression. The downside of autocratic visions ofleadership thathaveyettocometogripswiththeshadowsideofbreakspeeddevelopmenthavefurtherbeen broughtintosharpreliefwiththeGulf’srestrictivelabourregimemovingcentrestagewithQatar’s successful bid for the 2022 World Cup
hostingrights.

TheWorldCuprepresentedQatarivisionthatdifferedfundamentallyfromthatofDubaibutwasno less
bold and audacious. If Dubai’s approach was commercially-driven, Qatar’s was
politics per se.If Dubai’s was creating a commercial and
economic hub that would rank among the world’s topglobal cities while
preserving the regional status quo, Qatar’s was embracing political change
everywherebut athome.

Qatarsignalleditsintentionswiththelaunchin1996oftheAlJazeeratelevisionnetwork,the freewheelingairingofnewsandopinionsthatwerebannedfromaregionallandscapedominatedby staid state-run television stations that
never veered away from government directives. Within amatter ofyearsAlJazeerahadbecometheMiddleEast’smostpopularArabic-languagetelevisionstation,
forcing an irreversible rewriting of the region’s medialandscape.

It matched the success of Al Jazeera with its strategic alliance
with the Muslim Brotherhood,fending offsevereGulfpressuretochangeitspolicy;severalhighprofilenotalwayssuccessfuleffortsto mediate regional conflict in Lebanon,
Afghanistan and Darfur; and a strategic attempt to make sportsa pillar
of national identity and Doha a global sports hub with the World Cup as its
crowningsuccess.

The activists got nowhere with the UAE that opted for
traditional retrenchment by barring entry tothe country of critics, closing
down even mildly critical policy think tanks, unfounded portrayals oflabour conditions
that defy reality, and clumsy attempts at influencing public opinion with the
help ofhighly paid communication consultants and a string of Emirati-funded
non-governmental organizationsthat lackcredibility.Itsresponsehasfailedtocountercampaignsdenouncinglabourconditionsonhigh- profile projects like a branch of the Guggenheim Museum and a New
York Universitycampus.23

ThatisnottosaythatSheikhMohammedisinsensitivetothecriticism.Onthecontrary.Hefindsit embarrassingandastainonDubai’sreputation,accordingtopeopleclosetohim.“Dubaiseeksto projectintegrity.It’snotlikeQatarthatfeelsthatanynewsincludingbadnewsisgoodnews.Qatar doesn’t mind being vilified,” one person
said.24 Yet,
at the same time Dubai like Abu Dhabi doesnot want to be seen to be caving in to externalpressure.

RepresentativesofAmnestyInternationalandHumanRightsWatchweregrantedentry,accesstoofficialsandlabourcamps,allowedtoholdnewsconferencesandlaunchdamningreportsinDoha,andmajor Qatari institutions worked with them
to develop internationally condoned labourstandards.

TheQatarieffortdemonstratesnonethelessthedegreetowhichGulfstatesnolongercangetawaywithgoingthroughthemotionsandstatementsdesignedtomollifycriticsthatarenotbackedupbythefulfilment
of their promise. Four years of Qatari engagement that have produced little
more thanloftypromisesoflabourreformenshrinedinglossydocumentsarestartingtoturncounterproductiveasevenminimal change prove difficult toimplement.

Inthelatestroundofmissedopportunity,QatarannouncedwithfanfareinAugusttheintroductionofa WageProtectionSystem(WPS)thatwouldensurethatworkersarepaidinfullontimebyforcing companies to make fortnightly or monthly
payments by direct bank transfer, only to say days laterthat the reform had
been indefinitelydelayed.25

Transparencyisnowheretobefound.Ratherthanprovidingchapterandverseonitscontroversial WorldCupbidinanefforttocountermountingevidenceofbriberyandwrongdoing,Qatarhaslimited itselftoissuingastringofdenials,plainvanillaassertionsthatitupholdsthehigheststandardsof integrity, and
promises to cooperate with any and everyinvestigation.

Enquiries into details of the awarding of World
Cup-related contracts, including who submitted
competingbids,andthegroundsonwhichwinningconsortiawerechosenarestonewalledwith statementsconsistingofplatitudesandunrelateddetailontheprovisionofcomfortablehousingfor workers involved in the
construction ofstadia.

Qatar’sfailuretoliveuptoitspromisesisexasperatingtheUnitedNations’InternationalLabour Organization (ILO) as well as human rights
and labour activists and undermining whatevergoodwill the Gulf state hadachieved.

Frustrations were reflected in an Amnesty report in May
on Qatar’s lack of follow-upentitled, ‘PromisingLittle,DeliveringLess.’Thereportnotedthat“noneoftheproposedreformshavebeen implemented.26

RespondingtoapledgebyQatariLabourandSocialAffairsMinisterAbdullahSalehAlKhulaifito implement
reforms before the end of the year, Amnesty said: “This is not the first time
suchpromises have been made. Senior Qatari officials have reiterated their
commitment to labour rights over thepast year, usually in response to internationalcriticism.”27

DespitegrowingdoubtsaboutQatar’ssincerity,itshostingoftheWorldCupstillholdsoutthepromise of
being a rare sporting mega event that leaves a legacy of social and economic,
if not politicalchange ratherthanamountainofdebtandaslewofwhiteelephants.Ifso,itwoulddemonstratethekindof bold,
risk taking leadership and vision that matches that of the AlMaktoums.

A Pandora’sBox

Grantingworkers’rightsrisksopeningaPandora’sBoxinsmallerGulfstateswhereforeigners constituteamajorityofthepopulationandcitizensfearthattheiridentity,cultureandcontrolofsociety and state is increasingly becoming tenuous.
“Today, they don’t ask for political rights, but whatabout in a decade or
two?” said Saudi journalist JamalKhashoggi.28

Khashoggi’sarticulationofGulffearsnotwithstanding,Qatar’sresponsetopressurehasalsodented thetabooonpublicdiscussionofdemographyintermsotherthansupportofthestatusquo.Expressing analternativeviewSharjahintellectualAlQassemiarguedinanarticleintheGulfNewsthat“UAE national identity has proven to be more
resilient and adaptive to the changing environment andtimes than some maybelieve.”29

AlQasseminotedthattheUAEhadtakenafirststeptowardsamoreliberalnationalitypolicyby grantingtheoffspringofmixedEmirati-non-Emiratinationalstherighttocitizenshipratherthan restrictingittochildrenwhoseparentswerebothUAEcitizens.Hewentontopointoutthatthesuccess of
the United States was in no small part due to the contribution of immigrants.
“Perhaps it is timeto consider a path to citizenship for them that
will open the door to entrepreneurs, scientists,academics andotherhardworkingindividualswhohavecometosupportandcareforthecountryasthoughitwas their own,” Al Qassemisaid.30

Pressure on Qatar to move forward with implementation of
its promised reforms has furtherpersuaded alltheregion’sstatestotinkerinonewayoranotherwiththeirlabourregimes.Kuwait’sparliament hasgonethefurthestwiththepassingofabillthatgrantsrightstodomesticservants.Kuwaitalso became the first Gulf state to open a refuge
for femalemigrants.

Atthebottomline,GulfstatesarediscoveringwhatEuroperealizedinthewakeofthewaveofGastarbeiter
or foreign workers they invited in the 1960s to accommodate an expanding labourmarketin
the belief the workers would eventually return to their home countries. They
didn’t andeventuallywere joined by their families. In the Gulf,
it is middle class expatriates rather than unskilled andsemi-skilled labour
who are striking socialroots.

Asked recently whether he was bothered by the fact that
he had no rights, the Dubai-born,third generation son of a prosperous Indian family
answered: “No, why should I? Life is good.” Theyoung man’stonechangedabruptlywhenqueriedwhetherittroubledhimthathischildrenwouldhaveno rights
in their country of birth. “Absolutely,” he said slamming his fist on thetable.31

Theyoungmanisunlikelytoriskfamilyandfortunetostandupforhisrights.Yet,hisisawidespread, largelyunspokensentimentthatcannotsimplybeignoredorallowedtofesteruntilatimewhen circumstance makes
turning it into a public demand either opportune orinevitable.

Buyingtime

Gulf leaders are also discovering that gleaming high
rises, eight-lane freeways, and glitteringshopping mallshostingluxurybrands;payinglipservicetomodernization;andbuyingforeigntalentallowsthem toprojecttheirconservative,autocraticsocietiesonthecuttingedgeofcreativityandinnovationforat best a limited period oftime.

“Innovationtodayisnotanoptionbutanecessity,notageneralculturebutbusinessstyle.Governments andcompaniesthatdonotreneworinnovatelosecompetitivenessandcontrol.Theyareboundto regress. We have doubled our
investments in innovation and in the equipment, training andeducation ofexpertnationalcadres,becausekeepingpacewiththeworldaroundusrequiresinnovativeresources and an
environment that is supportive of innovation,” Sheikh Mohammed said lastmonth.32

Much of Sheikh Mohammed’s requirements can be acquired.
The environment is where he andother Gulf leaders feel the squeeze. Dubai’s Media
City is home to the global and regional headquarters of theworld’smajormediahouses.Effortstoaddcreativityandinnovationtotheconceptofarealestate-drivenmediahubfalteredhoweveronlegalrestrictions,physicalenvironsandlackofacreative,intellectualenvironment.

Consultants hired to help Dubai make the transition
advised the government that to achieve its goalit wouldhavetobroadenfreedomsofexpression,allowforeignersgreaterprofessionalmobility,and createaphysicalenvironmentthatencouragesthekindofcreativitynotfoundinmodernofficeblocks.

“Creativityisanorganicprocess.Apartoftownthatisattheoutsetofgentrificationistheperfect physical
environment. A kind of Soho with the freedom to experiment, and aspiring opera
singerswho earntheirkeepaswaiters.Sterileofficeblocksandvisasthatmakehavingdifferentoccupations simultaneously impossible stymie creativity.
Dubai has yet to put those building blocks in place,”one of the consultantssaid.33

Back to the
StoneAge

Rather than liberalizing, institutionalizing and
seriously rationalizing, Gulf states have in recentyears tightened the
reigns as they seek to insulate themselves from regional volatility, maintain
marketshare inrapidlychangingenergymarkets,fendoffjihadistthreats,fightproxywarsandwithlimitedsuccess assert themselves
militarily in a bid to shape the Middle East in their mould, and all of that asbudgets shrink
and oil pricestumble.

Thejuryisoutonwhetherthestrategywillwork.2015hasturnedouttobeadifficultyearforGulf leaders.
The US-fostered agreement with Iran to resolve the nuclear crisis promises to
be a mixedbag. Countries like the UAE expect an initial economic boon but the
agreement returns to theinternational fold one of the Middle East’s most powerful
nations whose system of governance is rooted inpolitical Islam and
whose policies are diametrically opposed to those of many of the Gulfstates.

The wars in Yemen, Syria and Iraq and to a lesser degree
Libya constitute powerful threats thathave highlighted the limitations of military
forces flush with some of the world’s most advancedhardware but hampered
by reluctance to commit ground troops in large numbers, a longstanding rulers’distrust ofarmedforcescapableofstagingamilitarycoup,andatraditionofwieldingfinancialratherthan militarymuscle.

SaudiandUAEsupportforAlSisi’smilitarycoupin2013thattoppledEgypt’sfirstandonly democraticallyelectedpresidenthasproducedoneoftheregion’smostrepressivedictatorships.Al Sisi’s brutal
crackdown on all dissent has fuelled an insurgency that is spilling out of the
Sinaidesert into Cairo and other major Egyptiancities.

Emiratispecialforces,widelyviewedastheregion’sbestafterIsraelasaresultofadecadeofUNpeacekeeping experience, have earned praise for
their performance in Yemen in support ofSaudi-led efforts to defeat the rebel Houthis in Yemen
and return exiled president Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadito power.

The inclusion of a woman fighter pilot in the first UAE
raid on Islamic State targets as part of theUS- ledcoalitionofferedtheEmiratesapictureperfectopportunitytoprojectitselfasanationonthecutting edgeofmodernity.TheEmiratiairforcedemonstrateditspotentialreachinattacksincooperationwith Egypt
on Islamist targets in Libya that did little to change the balance of power
between rival forcesin the North Africannation.

Yet,undeterredbythemilitarycampaignagainstit,theIslamicStateisentrenchingitsalternative,harsh governance
structures that not only challenge Gulf rulers’ vision of leadership but also
their notionsof thenation-stateasopposedtoanirredentist,expansionarypan-Islamistentityandisabletothreaten domestic stability with attacks that target
security forces and Shiite Muslimminorities.

YemendespitemajormilitaryadvancesinsouthernYementhreatenstobecometheconservativeGulf’sVietnam.RetakingnorthernYemenandthecapitalSana’awheretheHouthisenjoygreatersupportthanin
the south is likely to prove more difficult. And military victory may prove
difficult to translateintosustainablepoliticalachievement.Saudi-ledGulfinterferenceinYemenipoliticsliesatthecoreofproblems
in a nation in which many blame the Gulf states for having bombed them back to
theStoneAge in a six-month long air campaign that has wreaked humanitarianhavoc.

YemencouldaffecteffortsbytheUAEandQatar,themostrecentGulfstatestodispatchgroundtroops tothewar-torncountry,tostrengthennationalidentitywiththerecentintroductionofconscription. UAEconscriptsbarelyayearlatersufferedtheirfirstcasualtiesinYemen,leavingtheirgrieving familiesinshockandangry.Morethan50EmiratisandfiveBahrainiswerekilledinYemeninthelast six
weeks. “These young men are forced to do military service and should not be
taken to hotconflict areas.Theyarecivilianswhoaresupposedtogobacktotheirlivesandworkafterfinishingtheir service,"
Middle East Eye quoted an Emirati assaying.34

Differences
invision

Despiteattemptstoprojectaunitedfronttotheregion’smultiplecrises,responsesbyGulfleadershave laidbaredifferencesinvision.QatarandOmanwithsoftpowerstrategiesthatemphasizebeing politically
and diplomatically proactive in contrast to Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s
increasedreliance on military might and repression have
largely opted for engagement and efforts at dialogue. TheUAE remainsaloneamongGulfstatesinseeingpoliticalIslamasthegreatestthreattoGulfrulers’longevity afterKingSalmanofSaudiArabiacautiouslybegantoreversehispredecessor’swarontheMuslim Brotherhoodinabidtoformapan-SunniallianceagainstIran.TheUAE’spositionisironicgiventhat SheikhRashidin1974providedtheBrotherhoodwiththestart-upfundingitneededtoestablisha branchintheEmiratesandthefactseveralBrothersrosetoprominentincludingministerialend educationalpositions.35

Political differences are compounded by a fundamental
tension inherent in the region’ssecurityarchitecture:severalofthesmallerGulfstateshaveresistedmilitarizationofthesixmemberGulfCooperationCouncil(GCC)comprisedofSaudiArabia,theUnitedArabEmirates,Qatar,Bahrain,Kuwait and Oman, fearing Saudidominance.

Gulfleaders’divergentviewsofregionalsecurityechofarbeyondtheGulf,hometoavastUSmilitaryinfrastructuredesignedtoensuresecuritythatincludestheBahrainbaseoftheFifthFleet,whichpatrolstheGulfandaccessesfacilitiesinvariouslittoralstates;CampArifjaninKuwaitthatservesasalogisticsbase for US operations against the Islamic States; the Al-Udeid
air base in Qatar, the largest U.S.airbase in the region; and access to air base
facilities in Oman and the UAE as well as Saudiairspace.

Inararepublicoutburst,OmaniministerofstateforforeignaffairsYousefbinAlawiAlIbrahim,a onetimerepresentativeofaseparatistmovementandkeymediatorinbringingtheUnitedStatesand Irantothenegotiatingtable,rejectedin2013USandSaudiattemptstomilitarizetheGulfalliance
throughintegrationofmissiledefence.“Weabsolutelydon’tsupportGulfunion.Thereisnoagreement intheregiononthis….Ifthisunionmaterialises,wewilldealwithitbutwewillnotbeamember. Oman’s position is very clear. If there are
new arrangements for the Gulf to confront existing orfuture conflicts, Oman
will not be part of it,” hesaid.36

Alawi’scommentsandrepeatedreluctancebyvarioussmallerGulfstatestojoinpastGCCmilitaryoperationsbodesillforthecreationofaGulfmilitarycommandannouncedlatelastyear.Thecommandwould involve a force of several hundred
thousand soldiers capable of responding to regionalthreatsthat include
militant Islamists and rivalIran.

“Every effort at military unity among the Arab states
has ended in failure, to a greater or lesserdegree. Thereareplentyofreasonsforthis.Forone,smallerstatesfeardilutingtheirsovereigntyandautonomy in a larger bloc. In the 1960s, they feared
being overpowered by Egypt; now, they worry aboutSaudi Arabia,awarinessthathasalsoplayedalargeroleinpreventingtheformationofapoliticaland financial union in
the Gulf,” noted military affairs scholar Shashank Joshi in a ForeignAffairs commentary.37

A fraying
socialcontract

Dropping oil prices and revolutionizing new technologies
such as fracking pose no less a challengeto Gulf leaders. Saudi-led efforts to allow
prices to drop in a bid to undermine the US shale industryhave failed.LowerrevenuesandhigherexpenditurehaveforcedSaudiArabiatodrawonitsreservesand turntothedomesticbondmarketwhileQatarpredictsfor2016itsfirstbudgetdeficitin15years.Qatar in
September issued 15 billion riyals ($4.1 billion) of bonds to take advantage of
low borrowingcosts and replenish funds eroded by the decline in
oilprices.38

“Newpoliticalchallengeswillemergeinthecomingyearsasfiscalpolicybecomesunsustainable–and as the Gulf confronts its critical long-term
challenge, the beginning of the post-oil age. Fiscalspending in the GCC
states has soared to such an extent in recent years that they are now
chronicallydependent on high oil prices – a long-term structural
risk,” noted a Chatham House report on future trends inthe region.39

MorethreateningthantheeconomicsisthefactthatthesocialcontractonwhichautocraticGulfruleis based
is fraying at the edges and has been for more than a decade. The last time that
happened wasat theturnofthecenturywhenSaudigrossnationalproduct(GNP)percapitawasat$7,700lessthanhalf of what it had been 20 years earlier and the
kingdom encouraged frustrated young men to join theanti- Soviet jihad inAfghanistan.

Young Saudis forced to do two or three jobs to make ends
meet joined Al Qaeda as then CrownPrince Abdullah’s cost cutting measures, including
the introduction of rents in student dormitories. RealGDP growthinthekingdomis,accordingtotheIMF,likelytodrop2.8percentthisyearandanother2.4 percent
in 2016. The IMF predicts that a Saudi fiscal deficit of 19.5% of GDP thisyear.40

Yet,eventheUAEseesitselfforcedtorationalizeinlinewithIMFadvice.TheUAEinJulytiedpetrolpricestoworldmarketpricesleadingtoa30percenthikeatthepumpandpricesthatwereonly13centsbelowtheAmericanretailprice.Thehiketacklingcheappetrol,whichmanyEmiratisseeasabirthright,didnothingtorocktheboatbutlikeAbdullah’smeasuresmorethanadecadeagoconstitutedwriting on the wall. Oman and Kuwait, which backed away from
raising diesel and kerosene pricesinJanuary following a public outcry, were
quick to announce that they had no intention of followinginthe
Emirates’footsteps.

The UAE is also looking at expanding its corporate tax,
which currently applies only to foreignbanksandtheoilindustry,tothecorporatesectorassuchandintroducingasalestaxonthebackofanexpected GCCagreementtolevyavalueaddedtax(VAT)acrosstheGulfstates.41Similarly,SaudiArabiais studying whether to cut state subsidies that
keep domestic gasoline prices at some of the lowestlevels in the world
while Kuwait is mulling taxes on luxury items and tolls on highways and is
reviewingthe pricingofgoodsandfeeschargedforpublicservicesandlandrental.TheIMFwarnedinSeptember thatSaudiArabia'sgrowingbudgetdeficitcouldrapidlyerodeitsreservesunlessdrasticactionistaken. The
IMF urged Riyadh to implement urgent reforms, including bolstering energy
efficiency,reducing energy subsidies, cutting government
spending particularly on wages and diversifying theeconomy.42

“Noneofthesestatescanaffordtokeepincreasingpublicspendinginthewaytowhichtheireconomies and societies have become accustomed in the
last decade of high oil prices. All have long-termplans envisagingatransitiontoapost-oileconomy,developingamixofenergy-intensiveandknowledge- basedindustries,employingmorenationalsintheprivatesector,andconsideringtheintroductionof taxation,allofwhichwillhaveimplicationsfortheirsocialcontracts...Citizenswhowillinfutureneed to
make a greater contribution to their economies, and receive fewer economic
benefits from thestate, are likely to have very different
expectations about government transparency and accountability,”the Chatham
House reportsaid.43

“Leaner times provide the opportunity for governments to
revisit inefficiencies in their systems andto develop a more sophisticated
and effective political relationship with their citizens. Giventhe increasingly
young and informed public, building and maintaining a strong national identity
mustbe encouraged to create active citizens who produce more than they
consume,” added Zaid M. Belbagi,a memberofYoungArabLeaders(YAL),intheinauguraladditionofanewacademicjournal,Gulf Affairs.44

Grabbing the
bull by thehorns

The fraying of the Gulf’s traditional social contract
poses not only a threat but also an opportunityto ensureregimesurvival.Whileitinevitablywillprovokearestructuringoftherelationshipbetween rulersandruled,itoffersleaderswithvisionanopportunitytograbthebullbyitshorns.Thatwould havetoinvolvethekindofboldandgutsymovesthatDubai’sAlMaktoum’sandQatar’sAlThanis have made theirtrademarks.

“Social and political changes in the Gulf are certain.
The questions are rather what form they willtake andhowtheywillbemanaged.Onescenariocouldbeaconsensus-basedprocessofadaptation,building onsomeoftheexistinginstitutions,andmakingparliamentsandcourtsmoreindependent.Butthis would entail bringing in new checks on the
power of the rulers, which, in turn, would require thosein authoritytojudgethatvoluntaryreformtodaywouldultimatelycostthemlessthanhavingchangethrust upon
them in the future,” Chatham Houseconcluded.45

It’s a model that seeks to suppress inevitable demands
for greater sharing of power and resourcesandrisksexacerbatingfaultlinesthatincludedividesalongsectarianlines,betweenurbanandtribalcommunities
and between regions within the borders of various Gulfstates.

Yet, the jury is still out. It’s not what Qatari leaders
had in mind when they submitted their bid forthe 2022WorldCupbutthetournamentdespitefeetdraggingonpromisedreformscouldprovetobea Trojanhorsethatdriveschange.AscouldtheoverallstrategyofcountriesliketheUAEandBahrainto project themselves
internationally through the hosting of major sporting events and the
acquisitionof big name clubs and otherassets.

“We need to rethink this and give human rights a much
higher status,” said Theo Zwanziger beforehe steppeddownasamemberoftheFIFAexecutivecommittee.46HiswordsareechoedintheInternational Olympic Committee’s Agenda 2020 that emphasizes rights in the
awarding of thegames.47

Initial signs of change, the product of pressure not
only by FIFA and human rights and labouractivists butalsoWesterngovernmentsandcorporations,gobeyondQatar’sengagementwithcritics.They remaintentativeandhaveyettobebolsteredbyrobustlegislationandimplementationbutaresparking a
process that is likely to be irreversible, take on dynamics of its own that
Gulf regimes may findhard tocontrol,andispartofagrowingrealizationintheregionthatitcannotescapeglobaldemandsfor greater transparency and
accountability. They also keep open the promise that enlightenedleadership
can manage theprocess.

LeadersofDubaiandUAEhaveinasyetsmallwayssignalledthattheyarenotoblivioustothewinds of
change that are sweeping the Middle East and North Africa even if they have yet
towholeheartedly getinfrontofthecart.OneindicationarereportsthatQatarhasapprovedthecreationofanindependent soccerplayersunion,thecountry’sfirsttradeunionandamovethatcouldopenthedoortoamore radical restructuring of its laboursystem.

A third indication was Qatar Airways’ recent lifting of
restrictions on pregnancy and marriage forits female personnel in response to criticism by
the ILO, the UN labour organization.48 The airline saidit wasalsoreviewingrulesthatimposecurfewsonwomenanddonotallowwomentobebroughtor pickedupfromworkbymenwhoarenotfamilyoftheirs.Similarly,womeninSaudiArabia,theGulf’s mostrestrictivenation,wereinAugustallowedtoregisterforthefirsttimeformunicipalelections scheduled forDecember.

Labourreformpresentsleadersanopportunitytoprojectthemselvesasagentsofinevitablechangeand foresighted adaptation to new realities. It
is low hanging fruit because it does not involve thegranting ofpoliticalrightsandwouldtakethestingoutofthemostimmediatecriticismofGulfleadersand projectthemasenlightenedrulers.Yet,atthesametimelabourreformisastrickyandpotentially treacherous as political reform. It involves managing what are
legitimate, existential fears amongthe region’scitizenryaboutafutureinwhichdemographythreatenstheirabilitytomaintainindigenous
control of their culture andsocieties.

A report commissioned and endorsed by the Qatari
government lays out a roadmap for labourreform that would involve the introduction of
minimum wages, abolition of the sponsorshipsystem, development of unfettered labour markets,
setting of wage rates through collectivebargaining, workers’freedomtochangeemployers,andethicalrecruitmentthateradicatescorruptionandthe indenture ofworkers.49

“The kafala system exists as part of an effort by
Qataris to retain control of their country.Abolishing thesystemmeansopeningupalabourmarketinacountrywherethereisnolabourmarket.The requirementforanexitvisaispartlytheresultofQatarnothavingextraditiontreatieswithalotof countriesandwantingtopreventthosewhobreakthelawfromsimplyskippingthecountry,”added RayJureidini,authorofaQatarFoundationreportthatadvocatesfar-reachingreformofthelabour system.51

Yet, in a further sign that Qatar’s top leadership
recognizes the political, social andeconomic implicationsofthelabourissue,theDoha-basedArabCenterforResearch&PolicyStudies,an initiativefosteredbySheikhTamim,warnedthat“intheabsenceoftheestablishmentofamodernstate based on the bond of
citizenship, justice, the rule of law, and equal opportunity among all
components of society, it is extremely
difficult to assimilate immigrants. … The Gulf countries, due to the delayin the
construction of the modern state on the institutional, legal and constitutional
levels, haveextreme difficulties integrating the population of
their home societies – let alone assimilatingimmigrants.”52

ThecosttoGulfstatesofrestrictivelabourregimesisnotjustreputationalandtheriskisnotsimply demographic.Despiteperceptionsthatthekafalasystemensuresthesupplyofcheaplabour,itis provingtobedetrimentaltotheeffortsofGulfleaderstoturntheircountriesintocuttingedge,21st century knowledge-based societies. A study
by researchers of Weill Cornell Medical College inQatar arguedthatQatarwouldbenearthetopoftheUnitedNation’sHumanDevelopmentIndex(HDI)if adjustments
were made for the country’s large population of migrantworkers.53

The cost of cheap unskilled labour is magnified by the
fact that it offers little incentive togovernmentstodevelopeconomicpoliciesthatencouragetheprivatesectortofocusonexports.Businessoptsinsteadforlow-tech,labourintensiveproductsforadomesticmarketandshiesawayfromthehigherriskinvestments
in human capital, facilities and innovation that would allow companies tocompeteinternationally.Thealuminiumandpetrochemicalssectorsalthoughtheyonlymarginallycontributetodiversification
because of their dependence on oil are the exception that demonstrate Gulfcountries’ability to compete if the right policies areadopted.

IftheGulfwaseverinneedofvisionandleadershipitisintheforthcomingdecade.Thechallengesare multipleandenormous.Theyarebothdomesticandregionalandthetwooftenareinseparable.Thelist is long and includes managing almost
impossible demographics; cementing nationalidentities; institutionalization and political reform
that need not endanger the longevity of ruling families butwill havetoinvolveaccommodatingacitizenrythatwantstoseegreaterinclusion,involvementinthe political process, transparency and
accountability; transition to truly diversified, post-oileconomies; andadjustmenttoaMiddleEastinwhichIranwithitshistoryandsenseofempire,hugepopulation base,andaneconomythatafterseveralyearsofdeepstructuralreformislikelytobealongsideTurkey one of the most vibrant
in theregion.

Gulf leaders appear to be still grappling with the
enormity of these challenges. They have yet toreveal statements of vision that
address the full gamut of issues they will have to confront. Dubai, Qatarand Oman,
despite concerns about transition to a post-Qaboos era, are furthest down the
road inaddressing atleastsomeoftheissues.Indoingso,theyholdoutthepromiseofbeingbestabletomanagemultiple
processes of almost simultaneous political, social and economicchange.

In some ways, Sheikh Mohammed has set a model for
ensuring that populations are on board.“Sheikh Mohammedputsideasouttherebeforetheirtime,”apersonclosetotheDubairulersaid.“Hehasa keen
sense of supply and demand. He understands that people have demands. He leaves
his ideasout there and waits. People get their time and finally they aredesensitized.”54

JamesM.DorseyisaseniorfellowattheS.RajaratnamSchoolofInternationalStudiesasNanyang Technological
University in Singapore, co-director of the Institute of Fan Culture of the
Universityof Würzburg and the author of the blog, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer,
and aforthcoming book with the sametitle.

Sporticos

Ads

Soccer Results

The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer does not promote, link to or provide videos from any online sources who distribute illegal streaming content over the Internet with domains registered in the United States of America

Top 100 Soccer Sites

Subscribe To

Subscribe by Email

About Me

James M DorseyWelcome to The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer by James M. Dorsey, a senior fellow at Nanyang Technological University’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. Soccer in the Middle East and North Africa is played as much on as off the pitch. Stadiums are a symbol of the battle for political freedom; economic opportunity; ethnic, religious and national identity; and gender rights. Alongside the mosque, the stadium was until the Arab revolt erupted in late 2010 the only alternative public space for venting pent-up anger and frustration. It was the training ground in countries like Egypt and Tunisia where militant fans prepared for a day in which their organization and street battle experience would serve them in the showdown with autocratic rulers. Soccer has its own unique thrill – a high-stakes game of cat and mouse between militants and security forces and a struggle for a trophy grander than the FIFA World Cup: the future of a region. This blog explores the role of soccer at a time of transition from autocratic rule to a more open society. It also features James’s daily political comment on the region’s developments. Contact: incoherentblog@gmail.comView my complete profile