[163] The
focus of Part II is the correlation of being and God. This leads to two key
questions: the question of being and the question of God. The question of
God is the most basic theological question. The question of being is the
ontological question, and is the most basic philosophical question. God is
the answer to the ontological question. The ontological question asks ‘What
is being itself?’, as a result of a “‘metaphysical shock’”, or the threat of
nonbeing. Thought must presuppose being (i.e., nothing can be thought
without presupposing being). [163-164] However, thought can conceptualize
the negation of being, and think of the “nature and structure of being which
gives everything the power of resisting nonbeing.” [164] The ontological
question is the “ultimate question”, and it is an existential question, so
powerful that it drowns out all determinateness. This poses a problem: How
is an answer to the ontological question possible? An answer is possible by
appealing to concepts which are “Less universal than being but … more
universal than any concept designating a realm of beings.” Ontology is not
theology, but theology can benefit from the use of ontological concepts.
Ontological concepts are divided into four levels: (1) the ontological
structure implied in the ontological question, (2) the elements
of this structure, (3) the characteristics of being (i.e., the
conditions of existence), and (4), the categories of being and
knowing. These four levels will be used in all parts of this Systematic
Theology, but are now briefly augmented. Because the ontological question
presupposes a subject asking about an object, or a self asking about a
world, “The self-world structure” is the most “Basic articulation of being”.
This is level one. [165] Three primary polarities, or elements, comprise
level one (the ontological structure), and these elements are analyzed under
level two. These are individuality and universality, dynamics and form, and
freedom and destiny. Each polarity expresses the self-relatedness of being
with its first element, and the belongingness of being with its second. The
third level “Expresses the power of being to exist” and distinguishes the
duality of essential and existential being. The unity freedom
and finitude, or finite freedom, is the basis of existence, and the
“Turning point from being to existence.” Therefore the third level analyses
the polarity of finitude and infinity and its relation to the polarities of
freedom and destiny, being and nonbeing, and essence and existence.
[165-166] Level four discusses four primary categories: time, space,
causality, and substance. [166] These are categories which are theologically
significant for the primary task of this section, which is to “Develop the
question of God as the question implied in being”. The concept of
Finitude will now be the focus of this section, because “It is the
finitude of being which drives us to the question of God.” The nature and
structure of experience is determined by a priori ontological concepts. They
are prior to experience, and no experience is without them. [167] Experience
always presupposes a structure within which experience can occur. This
position is compatible with process philosophy. Further, it answers
historical relativism by offering an ontology that is not purely static.
Rather, “Ontology and theology establish a relatively but not absolutely
static a priori, overcoming the alternatives of absolutism and relativism
which threaten to destroy both of them.”

Definitions:

The
Ontological Question: The “Question implied in being”, or the “Question
of being itself. … What is that which is not a special being or a group
of beings, not something concrete or something abstract, but rather
something which is always thought implicitly, and sometimes explicitly,
if something is said to be?” [163]

Ontology: The most basic task of philosophy is to investigate “The
character of everything that is in so far as it is.” This is “‘first
philosophy,’” or, “‘metaphysics’”. [163]

Metaphysical Shock: “The shock of possible nonbeing”, “Expressed in the
question, ‘Why is there something; why not nothing?’” [163]

Concepts, Principles, Categories, Ultimate Notions: These are used by
Tillich to address the ontological question; and they are useful because
they are “Less universal than being but … more universal than any
concept designating a realm of beings.” [164]

Polarities: “Pairs of elements” which “Constitute the basic structure of
being”. The three primary polarities are “Individuality and
universality, dynamics and form, freedom and destiny. The first element
expresses the “Self-relatedness of being, its power of being something
for itself, while the second element expresses the belongingness of
being, its character of being a part of a universe of being.” [165]

Categories: “The basic forms of thought and being. They participate in
the nature of finitude and can be called structures of finite being and
thinking.” [165]

Verum, Bonum:
“The true and the good.” [166]

Esse, Unum:
“Being and oneness.” [166]

The
Concept of Finitude: “It is the finitude of being which drives us to the
question of God.” [166]

A
priori: Ontological concepts are always a priori. “They determine the
nature of experience. They are present whenever something is
experienced. A priori does not mean that ontological concepts are known
prior to experience. … On the contrary, they are products of a critical
analysis of experience. … They constitute the very structure of
experience itself.” [166]

Historical Relativism: A philosophy “Which denies the possibility of an
ontological or a theological doctrine of man by arguing as follows:
since man’s nature changes in the historical process, nothing
ontologically definite or theologically relevant can be affirmed with
regard to it; and since the doctrine of man … is the main entrance for
ontology and the main point of reference for theology, neither ontology
nor theology is really possible.” [167]

Questions:

What is
the most basic theological question?

What is
the ontological question? Why does the ontological question involve a
“Metaphysical shock”?

What is
the answer to the ontological question?

Thought
must presuppose being. Why?

The basic
ontological structure consists of four pairs of elements, or polarities.
What are these, and how do they function to provide an articulation of the
second level of ontological concepts?

The
movement from essential to existential being occurs within finite freedom.
Thus freedom united with finitude is the basis of existence. Do you agree
with this position? Why or why not?

Why are
ontological concepts a priori? What does a priori mean?

How does
Tillich’s ontology and theology resolve the criticism of historical
relativism?

[168] Though
all beings participate in the same structure of being, only human
beings have the ability to contemplate this structure. This leaves man with
a feeling of estrangement, or alienation, from the world. Hence,
though we can observe and describe nature (i.e. animal behavior), we can do
so only by analogy. This is a “Limitation of our cognitive function.” As a
result, in efforts to describe the world, man resolves to poetry,
Cartesianism, or ontology. In other words, man either gives up on the
ability to overcome his cognitive limitation and poetizes, describes the
world as a machine with many parts, or understands himself in an ontological
sense as “That being in whom all the levels of being are united and
approachable.” Of these, the third (ontology) is the strongest possibility.
[168-169] This is so because man is the being with self awareness; and the
only being that “Experiences directly and immediately the structure of being
and its elements.” [169] However, man is the most difficult being to
understand. Man not only thinks on, lives in, acts through, and is
confronted with the structures which make cognition possible, “They are he
himself.” Therefore, the self, freedom, and finitude are not objects
among objects. These are ontological concepts used to articulate a
description of being. They make the subject-object structure
possible, but are not “controlled by it.” The fact that humanity experiences
a self and a world, creates a dialectical relationship. This dialectical
relationship is the basis for the ontological structure. All experience
implies self-relatedness selfhood or self-centeredness, even in animals and
atoms. However, humans, because of self-consciousness, have the highest
level of self-consciousness (ego-self). [170] A self is both
distinguished from, and part of the environment within which it lives. Every
self both has and belongs to its environment. Like self, humanity is
both distinguished from and part of its environment. Though humans are able
to transcend the world through self-consciousness. Further, humans can grasp
and shape the world through universal norms and ideas, using language. [171]
A human can think of him or herself as a part of the universe, thereby
encountering him or herself. The most basic ontological structure from which
all other structures derive is the ego-self and world structure. This
is so because they are interdependent poles; “Both sides of the polarity are
lost if either side is lost.” The union of these two poles, or the
self-world correlation, is the resolution to some of the problems of
philosophy (such as subjective idealism, objective realism, and Cartesianism).

Definitions:

Cartesians: Persons who hold the philosophical perspective which began
with Rene Descartes. Here described as the perspective that the world
has been transformed “Aside from the knowing subject, into a vast
machine of which all living beings, including man’s body, are mere parts
(Cartesians).” [168]

Sein und Zeit:
“Being and Time”. [168] This work was written by philosopher Martin
Heidegger.

Dasein:
“(‘Being there’) the place where the structure of being is manifest. But
‘Dasein’ is given to man within himself.” [168-169]

Self-Relatedness: “Self-relatedness is implied in every experience.
There is something that ‘has’ and something that is ‘had,’ and the two
are one.” [169]

Self:
“A self is not a thing that may or may not exist; it is an original
phenomenon which logically precedes all questions of existence. The term
‘self’ is more embracing than the term ‘ego’. It includes the
subconscious and the unconscious ‘basis’ of the self-conscious ego as
well as the self-conscious (cogitation in the Cartesian sense).”
[169]

Selfhood or Self-centeredness: “Selfhood or self-centeredness must be
attributed in some measure to all living beings … One can speak of
self-centeredness in atoms as well as in animals, wherever the reaction
to a stimulus is dependent on a structural whole.” [169]

World,
Kosmos, Universum: “‘World’ is not the sum total of all beings-
an inconceivable concept. As the Greek kosmos and the Latin
universum indicate, ‘world’ is a structure or a unity of
manifoldness … The world is the structural whole which includes and
transcends all environments, not only those of beings which lack a fully
developed self, but also the environments in which man partially lives.”
[170]

Language: “Language, as the power of universals, is the basic expression
of man’s transcending his environment, of having a world.” [170]

Questions:

Why is
humanity the only being able to answer the ontological question?

Human
beings are the only beings with self-consciousness. Does this make humans
easier to describe than other beings?

Human
beings are the only beings that can transcend, grasp and shape the world.
Why is this so? Do you agree that this is so? Why or why not?

[171] This
section will discuss the relation between the self-world polarity and the
subject-object structure of reason, focusing on the way in which
objective reason and subjective reason correspond to one another.
The self is a centered structure, and the world is a structured whole,
because of reason. [172] Reason functions subjectively in the mind,
and sees the world as an objective reality. Thinking about God can be
problematic. Because thinking about God is logical/religious
objectification, we pull God down into the structure of being. This is
blasphemy, because God is neither in the world nor under the
conditions of existence. God is the ground of being, but not “one
being among others.” Logical objectification is shown in three ways:
Prophetic religion makes God a subject who has self-knowledge. Mysticism
tries to erase the subject-object distinction in an ecstatic union of the
two. [173] When God is understood as a conditioned thing. The
structure of reality is neither derived from objective things, nor
from subjective being. Ontology must maintain the self-world polarity
within which all things and persons participate (in varying degrees).
Subjectivity and objectivity are always in polar relation. [173-174] The
“Trick reductive naturalism” occurs when the subjective self should is
surrendered to the objective thing; the consequences of which are shown in
naturalism and industrial society, provoking the response of existentialism,
which wants to maintain the essential subjectivity of humanity. [174] The
“Trick of deductive idealism” sacrifices the objective thing to the
subjective self. Both tricks can be avoided with “An ontology which
begins with the self-world structure of being and the subject-object
structure of reason” wherein the subject-object relation is one of
polarity. The question “What precedes the duality of self and world, of
subject and object?”, cannot be answered by reason. “Only revelation can
answer this question.”

Definitions:

Objective Reason: “We have described the world as a structured whole,
and we have called its structure ‘objective reason.’” [171]

Subjective Reason: “We have described the self as a structure of
centeredness, and we have called this structure ‘subjective reason.’”
[171]

Logos
of Being:(Greek) Reason of Being. This context is using “Logos of
being” in relation to the organizing function that reason plays in
structuring the self and the world, within the mind. Without reason
“Being would be chaos, that is, it would not be being but only the
possibility of it (me on)”. [172]

Me
On:
Only the possibility of being. Without reason, being would not be actual
being, but only possible being, or me on. [172]

Subject/Subjective: “Originally subjective meant which has independent
being, a hypostasis of its own.” [172]

Object/Objective: ‘Objective’ used to mean “That which is in the mind as
its content. Today, especially under the influence of the great British
empiricists, that which is real is said to have objective being, while
that which his in the mind is said to have subjective being.” [172]

Logical/Religious Objectification: “In the cognitive realm everything
toward which the cognitive act is directed is considered an object … In
the logical sense everything about which a predication is made is, by
this very fact, an object. The theologian cannot escape making God an
object in the logical sense of the word, just as the lover cannot escape
making the beloved an object of knowledge and action.” This process is
objectification. [172]

Mind:
“The function of the self in which it actualizes its rational structure
is the mind, the bearer of subjective reason.” [172]

Ding:
(German) An object deprived of its subjective elements. “An object and
nothing but an object.” [173]

Bedingt:
(German) “‘Conditioned’”. [173]

Thing:
The term ‘thing’ is most adequately applied to [an object such as a
mechanical] tool”. [173]

Questions:

Logical/Religious objectification points to the fact that to speak about
anything, even God, is to objectify, or make an object of, what is spoken.
Why then is speaking of God so problematic?

Is the
basic ontological structure of being derived from an objective world, a
subjective self, or both together? How does Tillich articulate this
derivation?

How can
the question “What precedes the duality of self and world, of subject and
object?” be answered?

[174] The
contrast between universal ideas and particular individuals, and how that
contrast should best be articulated, begins this section. Examples from
philosophy and from the biblical creation story are given, to show that in
speaking of difference and individuals, universals and ideas are always
implied. [174-175] Individualization is best understood as an ontological
element or quality with which all things and all beings are constituted.
[175] A being has selfhood, self-centeredness, or individualization. These
terms imply the indivisibility of a being. However, there is a difference
between human and nonhuman beings, in relation to the way in which the
individuality of each becomes significant. Humans are both self-centered and
completely individualized. Nonhumans are significant only in so far as they
participate in human life. “Man is different.” Humans are significant as
individuals, and participate in humanity. Legal systems and political
structures presupposes both individuality and responsibility for every human
being, though some legal systems err by denying full individualization (and
denying full participation) to slaves, women, and children. [176]
Individuality and participation are interdependent. Individual nonhumans are
microcosmic, participating in the environment or natural structure within
which they exist, and the latter participates in the former. For example, an
individual leaf participates in its forest and the structure of the forest
participates in (conditions) the leaf. Humanity, however, is a microcosmos,
participating in the universe through “the rational structure of mind and
reality”. Human participation in the universe is limited in actuality, but
unlimited in potentiality, and human language proves that humans are
universal. The perfect form of individualization is personhood, and the
perfect form of participation is the communion of persons. All persons exist
in participation within the community of other persons. If there were no
communion of persons, there would be no persons. [176-177] This involves
resistance, which serves to give identity to each individual person
through the resistance of other persons (in community). In other words, just
as there can be no darkness without light, a person has identity as a person
only because there are other persons he or she is not. This
introduces the concept of participation. [177] A person, when met
with the resistance of other persons, is forced to participate in the
communion of persons (the only alternative would be to destroy the other
persons). The concept of participation relates not only to persons, but is
extended to many functions; and is, in polarity with individualization, the
basis of “the category of relation as a basic ontological element”. Relation
is dependent on individualization and participation, and participation
“guarantees the unity of a disrupted world and makes a universal system of
relations possible.” Thus individualization and participation are two poles,
connected by the relation of individual to communal participation. [177-178]
By providing a balanced and integrated view of these two poles, the
polarity of individualization and participation is a corrective for both
nominalism and realism.

Definitions:

Individualization: “Individualization is not a characteristic of a
special sphere of beings; it is an ontological element and therefore a
quality of everything. It is implied in and constitutive of every
self, which means that at least in an analogous way it is implied in and
constitutive of every being.” [174-175]

Individual: “The very term ‘individual’ points to the interdependence of
self-relatedness and individualization.”

Person: “The original meaning of the word ‘person’ (persona, prosopon)
points to the actor’s mask which makes him a definite character”; The
“perfect form” of individualization. [175,176]

Communion: “Communion is participation in another completely centered
and completely individual self.” [176]

Concept of Participation: The concept of participation involves the
participation of each individual person participating in community with
other persons, and is extended to “Many functions. A symbol participates
in the reality it symbolizes; the knower participates in the known; the
lover participates in the beloved; the existent participates in the
essences which make it what it is, under the condition of existence; the
individual participates in the destiny of separation and guilt, the
Christian participates in the New Being as it is manifest in Jesus the
Christ.” [177]

Nominalism: “According to nominalism, only the individual has
ontological reality; universals are verbal signs which point to
similarities between individual things. Knowledge, therefore, is not
participation. It is an external act of grasping and controlling things.
Controlling knowledge is the epistemological expression of nominalistic
ontology; empiricism and positivism are its logical consequences.” [177]

Realism: “[Realism] indicates that the universals, the essential
structures of things, are the really real in them.” [178]

Mystical Realism: “‘Mystical Realism’ emphasizes participation over
against individualization, the participation of the individual in the
universal and the participation of the knower in the known.” [178]

Questions:

Human
beings are both completely centered and completely individualized.
In what way does this differ from non human beings?

How do non
human beings become significant?

What is
meant by the statement that “Man alone is a microcosmos?

How does
humanity participate in the universe (the universe also participating in
man)?

What is
the polarity of individualization and participation? How does Tillich employ
this polarity?

[178] The
polarity of form and dynamics has two elements. The first is Form.
Being, comprised of both its essence and its logical structure, is a
unification of content and form. Further, the logical structure of being
allows reason to grasp and shape beings, thus grasping and shaping forms.
The polarity of individualization and participation distinguishes special
from general forms. The polarity of dynamics and form does not; because “in
actual being these are never separated.” The actualization of being can only
occur in a form. Thus no being is without form, and no form is without
being. It is a mistake to speak of form and content as separate parts of a
being. The treehood of a tree, for example, is a unity of form and
content. A tree is a tree because it has the form of treehood. And treehood
is the content of the form of a tree. There are cultural problems with the
separation of form and content. One can separate form and material (as did
Aristotle), but when one separates form and content, problems such as
formalism arise. [178-179] An example of this problem is found in cultural
creations, as when an artist loses the spiritual substance of that which is
portrayed, by superimposing a form which is an inauthentic expression of his
or her experience (unified and in conflict with his or her period). [179]
The second element in the polarity of dynamics and form, is Dynamics.
Dynamics are not being, but rather the potentiality of being. Dynamics
function as symbols, pointing to “that which cannot be named”. Philosophers
have attempted to discuss the concept of dynamics in various ways, all of
which are not non literal, and analogical. [180] The divine life of God, as
well as the experience of humanity, need to be understood within the
polarity of dynamics and form. The human experience, for example, involves
the “polar structure of vitality and intentionality”. Humans are unique, in
that the human being’s “dynamics reaches out beyond [his or her] nature”.
Human intentionality and vitality are in contrast to and conditioned by one
another. Under the polarity of form and dynamics, intentionality is the
subjective form related to and interdependent with the objective
dynamics of vitality. [181] Three examples are given: the tendency of a
being to transcend itself and create new forms while conditioned by the
conservation of its own form within which its self-transcendence is
attempted, the unity of identity and difference, rest and movement,
conservation and change, and being and becoming (process philosophy). The
polarity of self-transcendence and self-conservation in the growth of an
individual is a clear example of the interdependence of these two poles;
they must be kept in balance. Because of self-conservation, humans alone can
transcend both nature and themselves. This is done via the creativity (the
creativity of grasping and shaping reason) with which a person interacts
with the world. [182] Humans using nature “create technical forms which
transcend nature”, thereby transforming themselves. However, the biological
element of humanity cannot be trespassed.

Definitions:

Essentia:
The “definite power of being” of a thing; the unity of form and content
which is a things essence, or essential.

Formalism: The superimposition of form to the detriment of content.
[178-179]

Dynamics: That which is formed by any form. “Dynamics, therefore, cannot
be thought as something that is; nor can it be thought as something that
is not. It is the me on, the potentiality of being, which is
nonbeing in contrast to things that have form, and the power of being in
contrast to pure nonbeing.” [179]

Actus Purus:
A doctrine of God, combating the notion of God as static, with God as a
living God. [180]

Vitality: “The power which keeps a living being alive and growing …
Dynamics reaches out beyond nature only in man. This is his vitality,
and therefore man alone has vitality in the full sense of the word.”
[180]

Process Philosophy: Developed by Whitehead in “Process and Reality”, is
the view that all actual occasions (i.e. all things) are in process, or
are growing.

Questions:

Why is the
attempt to separate form and content problematic? Tillich claims that the
two cannot be separated. How does he show this? Do you agree? Why or why
not?

The term
dynamics relates to the potentiality of being. What is meant by this?

Humans are
unique beings because they can transcend both their form (nature), and
themselves. How does this relate to the polarity of form and dynamics? In
other words, what is the element of dynamics in a human which enables
transcendence?

[182] Freedom
and destiny is the third ontological polarity under discussion. This
polarity marks the turning point and fulfillment of the description
of the “basic ontological structure and its elements”. Further, this
polarity is the structural element which makes possible both the
transcendence of being (without destroying its essence), and an apprehension
of revelation. [182-183] The human being contains freedom within itself (its
structure as a human), and is confronted with destiny as interacting with a
world. [183] The polarity of freedom and destiny precedes determinism and
indeterminism as an ontological structure. This is so because a person is
not a ‘thing’ with or without a will; a ‘thing’ is a nonhuman entity. A
human is a fully developed whole self with freedom and reason. [184]
Therefore it is a mistake to attempt assessing determinacy to isolated parts
of the whole, but one can assess the determinacy of the parts by the whole.
A human stands above arguments and motives, sifts through them, and reacts
with a decision, cutting off or excluding certain possibilities, and is
responsible to answer for his or her decisions. A person is responsible for
the process of deliberation and decision, because a person has the freedom,
as a centered self, which is “the seat and organ of his freedom”. Our
decisions arise out of our destiny. [185] Our personhood, in its entirety,
(not an isolated ‘will’) makes decisions which are related to former
decisions and the nature and history which have formed us: “My destiny is
the basis of my freedom; my freedom participates in shaping my destiny.”
Freedom and destiny are poles which are interdependent upon, and affect, one
another. God does not have destiny because “[God] is freedom.”
Destiny is not the opposite of freedom. Because of its eschatological
connotation, destiny is in correlation with, not in opposition to,
freedom. Destiny encapsulates the conditions and limits of freedom. Only
human beings are “free in the sense of deliberation, decision, and
responsibility”. Analogically, the polarity of spontaneity and law can be
compared to the polarity of freedom and destiny. Just as freedom and
destiny, so also are spontaneity and law, interdependent. [186] Natural law,
for example, is a concept applied to nature by humanity, and points to
structural determinateness. But nature has no freedom either to obey or
disobey ‘laws’. “In nature spontaneity is united with law in the way freedom
is united with destiny in man.” Every being is conditioned by the law of its
self-centered structure and of the structure within which it exists;
but its spontaneity is not destroyed by these structures. “Therefore, the
polarity of freedom and destiny is valid for everything that is.”

Definitions:

Freedom: “Freedom is not the freedom of a function (the ‘will’) but of
man, that is, of that being who is not a thing but a complete self and a
rational person”; “Freedom is experienced as deliberation, decision, and
responsibility”; “The seat and organ of [a person’s] freedom” is the
centered self each person is. [183,184]

Deliberation: “Deliberation points to an act of weighing (librare)
arguments and motives.” [184]

Decision: “The self-centered person does the weighing [the weighing of
arguments and motives] and reacts as a whole, through his personal
center, to the struggle of the motives. This reaction is called
‘decision’. The word ‘decision’, like the word ‘incision’, involves the
image of cutting. A decision cuts off possibilities... .” [184]

Responsibility: “The word ‘responsibility’ points to the obligation of
the person who has freedom to respond if he is questioned about his
decisions. He cannot ask anyone else to answer for him. He alone must
respond, for his acts are determined neither by something outside him
nor by any part of him but the centered totality of his being.” [184]

Destiny: “Our destiny is that out of which our decisions arise; it is
the indefinitely broad basis of our centered selfhood; it is the
concreteness of our being which makes all our decisions our decisions”;
“My destiny is the basis of my freedom; my freedom participates in
shaping my destiny.” [184,185]

Fatum/Schicksal/Fate:
These terms relate to the eschatological implications of the term
destiny. “Fatum (‘that which is foreseen’) or Schicksal
(‘that which is sent’), and their English correlate ‘fate,’ designate a
simple contradiction to freedom rather than a polar correlation…” [185]

Spontaneity: “An act which originates in the acting self is
spontaneous.” [185]

Law:
This term “Is derived from the social sphere and designates an
enforceable rule by which a social group is ordered and controlled.”
[185-186]

Gestalten:
A German term, denoting form. [185-186]

Laws
of Nature: “The laws of nature are laws for self-centered units with
spontaneous reactions.” [186]

Questions:

In his
critique of determinacy and indeterminacy, Tillich argues for the polarity
of freedom and necessity as a better way to articulate human freedom. One of
the problems with the former position is that it attempts to define the will
of a person as “a thing among other things”. How does Tillich show this to
be problematic. In other words, why is a human being not a thing?

Why cannot
the isolated parts of a person ‘determine’ the whole of a person, yet the
whole can determine the isolated parts?

Why is a
person responsible for the decisions he or she makes?

How is
destiny related to freedom?

Humans are
the only beings free in terms of deliberation, decision, and responsibility.
Why?

How does
Tillich relate the polarity of spontaneity and law in nature to that of
freedom and destiny in humanity? Why is the polarity of freedom and destiny
“valid for everything that is”?

Changes in German:

[185]+14: [-Fatum…means to be free.] (these
9 lines are dropped in the German, apparently partly because it is
explaining the fine sense of German words to English readers and so is
simply not necessary in the German version)

[186] The
threat, or the metaphysical shock of nonbeing (not being or
being not), leads to the question of being. Only the human being can
transcend a given reality; thus only humans can ask the ontological
question. This question, which involves the mystery of being and its
negation, has a long history. Parmenides wrestled with this question,
pointing out the logical contradiction in trying to speak of nonbeing: to
speak of nonbeing gives it being. [187] Philosophers have tried to avoid the
question of nonbeing with both logical and ontological arguments. The former
by asserting that “nonbeing is a negative judgment devoid of ontological
significance”; the latter confirmed by the former. Because human beings are
structurally able to transcend a given reality and fall into error, humanity
embodies and participates in both being and nonbeing together. The mystery
of nonbeing has a dialectical character. To speak of being and nothingness
is: to lose nonbeing (each element logically functioning as a being), and to
lose the world (to speak of nothing is to lose the world). Therefore the
question of nonbeing is an ontological question with a dialectical
character. For “there can be no world unless there is a dialectical
participation of being and nonbeing”. [188] Greek terminology offers a
helpful way of articulating the dialectical character of nonbeing. The
Platonic notion of Me ontic matter is rejected and replaced by the
Christian doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. In this account, God matter
is not created out of God (non me ontic), matter is created out of nothing
at all, not even the possibility of being was present. Nonbeing has a
dialectical character, also in the doctrine of the creatureliness of
humanity; wherein the return into the nothingness from which humanity was
created necessitates the “doctrine of eternal life given by God as the power
of being-itself.” Last, the doctrine of God is another area of difficulty
with regard to the problem of nonbeing. [188-189] For affirmative theology
the living God is “the ground of the creative processes of life”. [189] The
threat of death, meaninglessness, and nothingness have surfaced in
existentialism. The dialectical problem of nonbeing cannot be avoided. But
it can be met with courage. The problem of nonbeing is the problem of human
finitude.

Definitions:

Shock
of Nonbeing: A shock or threat that can only be experienced by a human,
when the ontological question is asked. [186-187]

The
Ontological Question: The question of why there is being instead of
nonbeing, or, ‘Why is there something instead of nothing’? [186-187]

Me
On:
(Greek) “Me on is the ‘nothing’ which has a dialectical relation
to being.” [188]

Ouk
On:
(Greek) “Ouk on is the ‘nothing’ which has no relation at all to
being.” [188]

Creatio Ex Nihilo:
(Latin) Created out of nothing.

Questions:

Only
humans can ask the ontological question- the question of being. Why?

Why is the
question of nonbeing an ontological question? Why does Tillich think that
humans participate in being and nonbeing?

Tillich
concludes that “The very structure which makes negative judgments possible
proves the ontological character of nonbeing.” What does this mean?

Can the
problem of nonbeing be avoided? How does Tillich resolve to address the
problem?

[189] Being is
limited by nonbeing. This is finitude. The power of being or being
itself, however, does not fall under any limitation, because being
itself is not a ‘thing’. Being itself is the power of being. [190] To be a
being is to be finite; which includes “selfhood, individuality, dynamics,
and freedom [which] all include manifoldness, definiteness, differentiation,
and limitation.” All of these elements point to finiteness.
Self-transcendence is experienced on the human level, and involves,
simultaneously, “a decrease and increase in the power of being.” Thinking of
finitude, one must imagine infinity; thinking of death means looking beyond
one’s finiteness; and thinking of human limitations means imagining the
unlimited. The relation of infinity and finitude is different than that of
the other polarities. The infinite is a result of the free
self-transcendence of finite being, and directs the mind towards unlimited
potentiality, but does not make one an infinite being. The finite and
infinite character of the world is an “antinomy”, or paradox; and infinity
is, though not a thing, that through which space and time (which are not
‘things’) can be transcended. [190-191] Though the human mind can transcend
space and time, the human remains a finite being. [191] Through
self-transcendence, the human being can reach out beyond nonbeing, to being
itself. This means that for the human being, there is a potential for the
“presence of the infinite”. This potential negates human finitude, and acts
as the relation between being and being-itself. Anxiety is caused by
the awareness of finitude. Anxiety is “an ontological quality” because it is
the result of the ontological state of human finitude. Thus one does not
need an object to direct one’s anxiety toward. The fact that a person is
finite (the threat of nonbeing) is all that anxiety depends on. Anxiety
cannot be conquered by a finite being, because as long as one is finite (and
aware of one’s finitude), one will experience anxiety. To conquer anxiety
would be to conquer finitude. Anxiety is not fear. Fear needs an object and
is psychological; anxiety needs no object and is ontological. [191-192]
Because anxiety comes from the by the inside (instead of outside
objects) of a person, anxiety is ontological: “Anxiety is the self-awareness
of the finite self as finite.” [192] Anxiety is revelatory, in that it
reveals finitude. A discussion of inner and outer finitude, and its relation
to anxious awareness, will follow.

Definitions:

Finitude: “Being, limited by nonbeing, is finitude.” [189]

Nonbeing: “Nonbeing appears as the ‘not yet’ of being and as the ‘no
more’ of being.” [189]

Finis:
“That which is with a definite end.” [189]

Infinity: “It [infinity] is defined by the dynamic and free
self-transcendence of finite being. Infinity is a directing concept, not
a constituting concept. It directs the mind to experience its own
unlimited potentialities, but it does not establish the existence of an
infinite being ... ” [190]

Infinitude: “Infinitude is finitude transcending itself without any a
priori limit.” [191]

The
Power of Infinite Self-Transcendence: This is Tillich’s dialectical
resolution of the polarity finitude and infinity; “The power of infinite
self-transcendence is an expression of man’s belonging to that which is
beyond nonbeing, namely, to being-itself. The potential presence of the
infinite (as unlimited self-transcendence) is the negation of the
negative element in finitude. It is the negation of nonbeing.” [191]

Being-Itself: “Being-itself is not infinity; it is that which lies
beyond the polarity of finitude and infinite self-transcendence.
Being-itself manifests itself to finite being in the infinite drive of
the finite beyond itself. But being-itself cannot be identified with
infinity, that is, with the negation of the finite.” [191]

Anxiety: “Finitude is awareness of anxiety. Like finitude, anxiety is an
ontological quality, It cannot be derived; it can only be seen and
described. As an ontological quality, anxiety is as omnipresent as is
finitude. Anxiety is independent of any special object which might
produce it; it is dependent only on the threat of nonbeing … Fear as
related to a definite object and anxiety as the awareness of finitude
are two radically different concepts. Anxiety is ontological; fear,
psychological.” “Anxiety is an ontological concept because it expresses
finitude from ‘inside’ … Anxiety is the self-awareness of the finite
self as finite.” [191,192]

Questions:

What is
the difference between being itself (the power of being), and being?

Tillich
says that “Being-itself” cannot be identified with infinity, that is, with
the negation of finitude. It precedes the finite, and it precedes the
infinite negation of the finite.” Why is being-itself not identified with
infinity? Why is it important that being-itself is understood as not falling
under the conditions of existence, like all other beings?

What
causes anxiety?

Can
anxiety be conquered? Why or why not? What would be necessary to conquer
anxiety?

[192] The
human mind grasps and shapes reality through forms. These forms are called
categories. Categorical forms are inherent in “Ways of speaking”,
which are also forms of being. Thus there are two forms through which humans
relate to reality; categorical forms and logical forms. Logical forms take
from content in discourse, but do not form the content. Categories actually
are the forms which determine content. Categories are ontological,
present in everything, necessary for the human to interact with reality,
used in all dialogue, and omnipresent. Because any thought or statement
about anything- including God- require the use of categories, so too does
the question of God. Thus theology must discuss categories. [192-193]
Because categories are ontological, they are forms of finitude, have
a “double relation” to being and nonbeing, and contain both affirming and
negating elements. [193] The double relation of categories is a
“duality”, and is relevant because the task of answering the ontological
question involves “an analysis of this duality”. Further, the present
analysis will lead to the question of God. The four main categories: time,
space, causality, and substance, will be discussed; not only as they relate
negatively from the outside (as they relate to the world), but also
as they relate positively from the inside (as they relate to the
self). “Each category expresses not only a union of being and nonbeing but
also a union of anxiety and courage”; and the categories affect religious
symbolism and interpretation. “Time is the central category of finitude”,
and has both negative and positive sides. The former point out that the
present (which all beings are present in) is illusory, then being is
conquered by nonbeing. The latter discuss the irreversibility and creative
components of time. Because time is experienced in immediate
self-awareness (“uniting the anxiety of transitoriness with the courage
of a self-affirming present”), the best way to analyze time is through
ontology. The fear of the moment of one’s death is evidence that time is
ontological. Further, the anxiety about “having to die” is the inner
experience of nonbeing, and is potentially present in every moment of one’s
existence. [194] This anxiety is present in man’s essential nature (Adam)
and in man’s new reality (Christ). The positive side of man’s temporal
existence is that it “is balanced by a courage which affirms temporality”,
without which there would be a resignation from the present. Human beings,
because of consciousness, have more anxiety about time, and thereby need
more courage affirm the present. Humans must defend their present against
the conception of infinity past and future. Presence also implies the second
category of space. The present moment is a union of time and space:
“In this union time comes to a standstill because there is something on
which to stand.” Space functions in similar ways to time: uniting being with
nonbeing and anxiety with courage. Both time and space are categories of
finitude, and “subject to contradictory valuations.” All beings exist in and
strive for spatiality, both physically and socially. Striving for space is
an ontological necessity. [195] Negatively, spatiality
includes the threat of nonbeing, because a finite being faces the fear of
losing its space, thus losing being itself. Loss of space would mean loss of
time and loss of being. The fact that a being has no definite and final
space causes insecurity, and leads one to provide a secure space for
oneself. Positively, one can counter the anxiety about losing space
in the future with courage that affirms the present. And affirming
the present means affirming present space. Because to be means to be in
space, by existing, one positively affirms one’s space by courageous
acceptance. But how is this courage to accept possible? This question leads
to the third category of finitude, causality. Causality, like time
and space, is ambiguous; expressing both being and nonbeing. Positively,
causality affirms being by implying a source from which being comes. To
show cause for something affirms the reality of that something (i.e. cause
leads to effect). [196] “To look for causes means to look for the power of
being in a thing.” Negatively, causality presupposes the inability of
a being to bring itself into being; every being is dependent upon a power of
being for its existence. Only God, the power of being, is exempt from this
precondition. Only God has aseity. “Causality expresses by implication the
inability of anything to rest on itself … Causality powerfully expresses the
abyss of nonbeing in everything.” The finite category of causality, however,
does not connote determinism. No being has aseity. This leads to anxiety.
Human beings are contingent, causally determined, beings. Questions such as
why one is, and why one should continue to be, do not have clear answers.
“This is exactly the anxiety implied in the awareness of causality as a
category of finitude.” [197] A courageous person accepts contingency
(contingency is causality), and rests in his or her own self. Courage, which
ignores its finitude, is displayed by a finite being. This is a paradox, and
leads to the question; How is a courage which transcends yet is experienced
within finitude, possible? The fourth category is substance.
Substance precedes appearances, and is positively and negatively balance by
its relation to accidents. How relatively static substances experiences
change is a perplexing problem. With regard to this category, anxiety
involves the threat of loss of substance. All change points to the “relative
nonbeing” of substance; by implying the lack of substantiality in change.
This is the tension that drove the Greeks to seek that which is does not
change. [197-198] Static and dynamic elements of substance are neither
logical nor ontological does not remove anxiety about change, because “this
anxiety is anxiety about the threat of nonbeing implied in change”;
culminating in the anticipation of the final loss of substance is the
anticipation of death, resulting in loss of identity and loss of self. [198]
In response (like the Greeks) humanity has searched for something
unchangeable within the human being; resulting in arguments for the
“so-called immortality of the soul”. Dismissing these arguments because they
“are wrong”, instead holding that finite substances will continue
infinitely, is “unjustified.” The correct response, instead of searching
either for outer or inner security, is courage. Courage affirms finitude,
and enables a one to take one’s anxiety upon one’s self. Again, the question
remains, How is this courage possible? How does one accept the inevitability
that one will lose one’s substance? “The four categories are four aspects of
finitude in its positive and negative elements”; expressing the union of
being and nonbeing and articulating “the courage which accepts the anxiety
of nonbeing. The question of God is the question of the possibility of this
courage.”

Definitions:

Categories: “Categories are the forms in which the mind grasps and
shapes reality”; “[Categories] are forms which determine content”;
[Categories] are ontological, and therefore they are present in
everything.” [192]

Aseity:
“Being in, of, and by one’s self … which theology traditionally
attributes to God.” For a being to be by itself, without needing
the power of being; to be absolute and entirely independent. [196]

Absolute: Something which would have “The power of depending on itself
without a causal nexus…” [196]

Courage: “Courage accepts derivedness, contingency. The man who
possesses this courage does not look beyond himself to that from which
he comes, but he rests in himself. Courage ignores the causal dependency
of everything finite.” Courage accepts “The anxiety of nonbeing.”
[197,198]

Accidents: Changes. [197]

Questions:

Why are
categories described as ontological?

Why does
Tillich state that “A decision concerning the meaning of time cannot be
derived from an analysis of time”, but that time should be analyzed
ontologically?

Why do
humans have more anxiety and need more courage than nonhuman beings?

All of the
categories both affirm and negate being. Why do the categories involve both
negative and positive aspects?

The threat
of nonbeing, experienced through the finite categories, causes anxiety.
What, for Tillich, is the proper response to this anxiety?

[198] Finitude
is actualized in both the categories and the ontological elements, through
their polar character, which “opens them to the threat of nonbeing.” Each
polarity contains two poles, which in balance limit and sustain one
another, and in tension move in opposing directions. [198-199] The
balance implies a whole, which is not given; the tension implies
opposition. [199] Humans experience an ontological tension. We have
anxiety that by losing one or the other polar element (in all of the
polarities), we could lose the polarity. The key to this section is to
remember that the polarities are the ontological structure of a human being.
Therefore a break in the polarities means a break in our being; thus the
tension is the “threat of a possible break and its consequent anxiety” now
discussed in each of the polar elements. First, in finitude,
individualization is in tension with participation. On the one
hand, self-relatedness (i.e. individualization) threatens a loss of world.
On the other, participation (in the world) threatens loss of self. This is
the “twofold threat” experienced by humanity: the possibility of loneliness
or the possibility of belongingness (or collectivity). Second, in finitude,
dynamics and form are in tension. Dynamics seeks form, without
which neither resisting nonbeing nor self-actualization of being is
possible. This places dynamics in a position which threatens its loss in
“rigid form”, without which chaos would result. [200] Human intentionality
seeks form to embody. “But every embodiment endangers the vital power
precisely by giving it actual being.” Humans have anxiety regarding either
the extreme of losing dynamics to form (loss of vitality), or losing form to
dynamics (chaos). Philosophy and theology have failed to recognize this
tension. Third, in finitude, freedom and destiny are in
tension. The necessities destiny implies threatens the contingencies freedom
implies. This occurs in the anxiety involved in our decisions. We do not
know our destiny, and we are thereby uncertain of what we should do. As a
result, our decisions seem arbitrary, which threatens the loss of both
poles. Determinism and indeterminism fail to articulate a balanced
understanding of the tension of this third polarity. [201] Humans presuppose
a unity between these two poles, whether realized or not. A loss of destiny
would mean a loss of meaning, and a loss of being. Individually and
socially, all people experience this threat. Existentialism has taken this
threat to an unbalanced extreme, by dismissing destiny and positing absolute
freedom, thereby losing both. In finitude, we are under the threat of losing
our ontological structure, which would mean loss of self. However, this loss
is only a possibility, not an actuality. Proof of this is found in Jesus as
the Christ, who experienced all forms of anxiety, but no form of despair.
This marks the distinction between essential finitude and
existential disruption.

Definitions:

Hypostasized Tensions: “For Heraclitus everything is in inner tension
like a bent bow, for in everything there is a tendency downward (earth)
balanced by a tendency upward (fire). In his view nothing whatever is
produced by a process which moves in one direction only; everything is
an embracing but transitory unity of two opposite processes. Things are
hypostasized tensions.” [198-199]

The
Anxiety of Losing Our Ontological Structure: Anxiety of “Losing one or
another polar element and, consequently, the polarity to which it
belongs. This anxiety is not the same as that mentioned in connection
with the categories, namely, the anxiety of nonbeing simply and
directly. It is the anxiety of not being what we essentially are. It is
anxiety of disintegrating and falling into nonbeing through existential
disruption. It is anxiety about the breaking of the ontological tensions
and the consequent destruction of the ontological structure.” [199]

Destiny: “Destiny is not a meaningless fate. It is necessity united with
meaning.” [201].

Despair: “The anxiety of guilt.” [201]

Questions:

How are
the tensions within the polarities related to the anxiety we feel about the
tension? In other words, why do the tensions cause anxiety?

How is the
anxiety of losing our ontological structure, discussed in this section,
different than the anxiety related to the categories? Do you think this an
accurate distinction? Why?

In all of
the tensions discussed above, Tillich warns against losing one by clinging
too tightly to the other. Why is this warning so important?

In earlier
sections, Tillich has asked how the courage to be in but not suffocated by
finitude is possible. This section ends by hinting at Jesus as the Christ as
the answer. Does this seem like a reasonable key as to how the courage
Tillich has spoken of is possible?

[202] In a
discussion of being, the correlation of finitude and infinity is just as
important as the ontological structure and the polarities. The categories of
finitude show the relation of essential being to nonbeing. And, as
was discussed in the previous section, essential being is threatened
by disruption and self-destruction, through a potential break in the
polarities. Because of the polarity of freedom and destiny,
this break is possible. All philosophical and theological writings
presuppose the distinction between essential and existential being; by
virtue of presupposing a distortion of essential being. In other words, the
concept of essential being is a standard of measurement by which the
accuracy of propositions is measured. This leads to the question of how the
distortion of being is possible. This is an ontological question. The
question as to how being can contain both actuality and its own distortion,
is always answered (again, whether implicitly or explicitly) by
distinguishing essence from existence. The terms essence and existence are
ambiguous. [202-203] First, the term essence is ambiguous because it
functions both in an empirical and a valuating way. [203] The reason for the
ambiguity of essence is the ambiguity of existence, which both expresses and
contradicts being. “Essence is that which empowers and judges that which
exists.” Being has fallen from essence into existence. This is the
reason for law and judgment. Second, the term existence is also
ambiguous. To exist is to ‘stand out’ of mere potentiality. But this means
that the state of existence is both more than mere potentiality and less
than the power of essential nature. Three philosophical camps articulate the
essence/existence distinction: Plato, where existence is negative and
essence is positive; Ockham, where existence is primary and essence is
secondary; and Aristotle, where both essence and existence are equally
valued and dependent upon one another. Christian theology has followed
Aristotle’s position, where existence is the fulfillment of God’s creation.
[204] Here creation is positive because of existence, but negative in its
movement away from “created goodness” into “distorted existence”. Further,
the “essential structure of reality” is good. Christian theology must
confront the problem of being. The definition of the relation of essence to
existence has here been discussed, but a full elaboration of the essential
to the existential is given in the whole of this theological system. (In
other words, all five parts of Tillich’s Systematic Theology discuss
the relation of essential being to the existent being.)

Definitions:

Distortion of Essential Being: “Whenever the ideal is held against the
real, truth against error, good against evil, a distortion of essential
being is presupposed and is judged by essential being.” [202]

Essence: Essence functions in both a logical and valuating way: “Essence
as that which makes a thing what it is (ousia) has a
purely logical character; essence as that which appears in an imperfect
and distorted way in a thing carries the stamp of value. Essence
empowers and judges that which exists.” [202]

Existence: actuality, the "fallen world", or a type of thinking that
rejects essences [203]

Questions:

The threat
of disruption and self-destruction is caused by a break in one (or more) of
the polarities. Which polar element in the ontological structure of a human
determines either the break, or courage, prevails.

Why does
Tillich say that philosophy and theology always presupposes the distinction
between essential and existential being, even when it is denied? Do you
agree? Why?

Tillich
says that essence is ambiguous because existence is ambiguous. What does he
mean by this?

[204]
Philosophers and theologians have been divided for centuries over arguments
for the existence of God. Neither group has won for two primary reasons: the
concept of existence and method of argumentation employed in
these arguments. This section offers a better articulation of the concept of
God with regard to existence, and a better methodology than arguing to a
conclusion. [205] First, the concept of existence employed in these
arguments are problematic when addressing the idea of God, because, to
assert ‘the existence of God’ is to fall into contradiction, and to deny
God. The “idea of a creative ground of essence and existence” is very
different from the idea of a God that exists. The Scholastics, when speaking
of the existence of God, meant not ‘existence’ as in the ontological sense
under the conditions of existence, rather the truth of the “idea of God”.
This idea does not connote personhood, but modern arguments about God’s
existence do. The terms God and existence are
antonyms. Christian apologetics should employ this distinction; and the two
terms should only be used together when speaking of God: “Becoming manifest
under the conditions of existence … in the christological paradox. God does
not exist. He is being-itself beyond essence and existence.” Second,
arguments for God’s existence (e.g. Descartes, Aquinas, Whitehead) that
argue through conclusions also contradict the idea of God. This is the case
because these arguments derive conclusions through what is given
(i.e. the world), for “what is sought” (i.e. God). The problem is
that deriving God from world negates God’s infinite transcendence of all
finite beings; making God a being among beings. These arguments neither
argue for nor prove God’s existence. Rather, express the “question of
God which is implied in human finitude.” The proper way to approach the
question of God is to realize that the answer to the question of God lies in
the question itself. The question is true, but all answers given to the
question of God, are false. Theology should “eliminate the combination of
the words ‘existence’ and ‘God’.” [206] A natural theology elaborates, but
does not answer, the question of God. In contrast to the problematic
arguments for the existence of God, a natural theology presupposes an
awareness of God, rather than forms conclusions about God. Two arguments
will be analyzed: the ontological argument and the moral argument. First, in
the ontological argument, human awareness of finitude leads to the
question of God. In actuality or existence, humans are finite; but in
potentiality or essence, humans are infinite. This is the tension
which is the crux of existential awareness, and the motivation for his
question of God. [206-207] The presence within finitude of the
unconditional element which transcends finitude is experienced both as
the true-itself and as the good-itself. These both point to
God as being-itself as the ground of being for all beings.
[207] The absolute element in truth (Augustine), the unconditional element
in thinking (Anselm), and the moral argument (Kant) all involve the
unconditional element as a valid starting point, but they make the mistake
of identifying the unconditional element as God. The unconditional element
is not God (ontological argument). [207-208] Second, the moral argument
is valid as “ontological analyses of the unconditional element in the
moral imperative”, and also points to the source of morality in
being-itself, but it makes a mistake if it tries to posit God as “divine co-ordinator”
for morality. The important aspect of the ontological argument is the truth
it contains: “the acknowledgment of the unconditional element in the
structure of reason and reality”. Thus, the ontological argument can
be discarded, but the unconditional element which makes the question
of God possible, must be retained.

Definitions:

Ontological Argument: An argument for the existence of God which posits
God as a conclusion through the lens of the world (i.e. human
existence); “The ontological argument in its various forms gives a
description of the way in which potential infinity is present in actual
finitude. [204,206]

God:
Being-itself beyond the essence-existence distinction; the ground of
being, the ground of essence. [205]

The
Christological Paradox: The union of the infinite and the finite, ground
of being with being under the conditions of existence. [205]

Natural Theology: An elaboration of the question of God. [206]

The
Unconditional Element: The presence within finitude of an element which
transcends finitude; appearing “In the theoretical (receiving) functions
of reason as verum ipsum. [206]

Verum Ipsum:
(Latin) “The true-itself as the norm of all approximations to truth”.
This is the unconditional element appearing in theoretical (receiving)
reason, and is a manifestation of esse ipsum.[206-207]

Bonum ipsum:
(Latin) “The good-itself as the norm of all approximations to goodness”,
which is the unconditional element displayed in practical (shaping)
reason; also a manifestation of esse ipsum. [207]

Esse ipsum:
(Latin) “Being-itself as the ground and abyss of everything that is.”
[207]

Veritas Ipsa:
(Latin) Not clearly defined by Tillich, the context seems to indicate
the meaning as “An absolute element in truth”. [207]

Questions:

Tillich
complains that two problems, the concept of existence and the method of
argumentation, are problematic in the traditional arguments for the
existence of God. The concept used is one of finite existence. Why is
concept a problem when speaking about God?

The method
of argumentation in these arguments has been one deriving God from world.
How is the problem of argumentation related to the problematic concept of
existence?

Why are
arguments for God’s existence better understood as “The question of
God which is implied in human finitude”?

How does
Tillich attempt to resolve these two problems?

Why must
the unconditional element in the ontological argument be retained?

[208] The
question of God both can and must be asked. The question is possible because
of the “unconditional element in the very act” of the question. The question
is necessary because of the “threat of nonbeing”. This threat motivates man
to seek being to conquer this threat of nonbeing, and courage to conquer
anxiety; which is “the cosmological question of God.” Cosmological arguments
(like the ontological and teleological arguments) are inadequate to posit a
highest being called God. [209] The cosmological method of arguing
for God’s existence moves in two methods, or “paths”. The first path is a
narrow cosmological argument, arguing from finite being to infinite being.
The second path is the teleological argument, which argues from finite
meaning to an infinite bearer of meaning. “In both cases the cosmological
question comes out of the element of nonbeing in beings and meanings.” The
first path proceeds either from cause to God as first cause, or from
substance to God as first substance. Either angle on this first path is
problematic because it cannot surpass the categories of finitude to posit a
supra-categorical conclusion, which both angles. These two angles (first
cause and necessary substance) of arguing for the first cosmological method
are better understood as “Symbols which express the question implied in
finite being.” The cosmological question of God asks how courage is
possible. Humans need courage to overcome anxiety about the finitude of
existence. “Finite being is a question mark.” Humans ask how to accept and
overcome the temporal and spatial threats of existence, and what the ground
of being for that acceptance and victory is. [210] The second method, or
path of the Cosmological arguments is the “so-called teleological argument
for the existence of God”, motivated by the threat of the break in the
polarities (as discussed in II.I.C.9). This path argues that reality has a
telos, which implies an infinite cause of that telos. Or that
finite meaning must presuppose infinite cause for that meaning. This
argument is problematic, because it is based upon existential questions
asked in finitude. God is sought through the world. The teleological
argument is not an argument, it is the basis for the question of the “ground
of meaning”, just as the cosmological argument is question is the “ground of
being”. The key to this section is to understand that the first cosmological
method of argument relates to the categories of the ontological/essential
structure of being, asking the question of being or essence,
whereas the teleological argument relates to the polarities of the
finite/existential structure of being, asking the question of meaning
or existence. Both are helpful not as arguments for God’s existence, but
as the ground for asking the question of God in relation to the categories
(Cosmology) and the polarities (Teleology). Therefore, the twofold task:
First “to develop the question of God” expressed by the “traditional
arguments” for God’s existence and Second, to “expose the impotency of the
‘arguments’”, is complete. By showing that “the question of God is implied
in the finite structure of being”, the ontological analysis is complete.
“Traditional natural theology” is partly accepted and partly rejected,
driving “reason to the quest for revelation.”

Definitions:

The Cosmological Question: “The question of God must be asked
because the threat of nonbeing, which man experiences as anxiety, drives
him to the question of being conquering nonbeing and of courage
conquering anxiety. This question is the cosmological question of God”;
“The cosmological question of God is the question about that which
ultimately makes courage possible, a courage which accepts and overcomes
the anxiety of categorical finitude.” [208,209]

The Cosmological Argument: An argument which moves “From the special
characteristics of the world to the existence of a highest being”;
taking two main “paths”: The narrow argument from “The finitude of being
to an infinite being” (arguing for ‘first cause’ or ‘first substance’),
and the teleological path which moves “From the finitude of meaning to a
bearer of infinite meaning”. [208,209]

The Teleological Argument: The second method of the Cosmological
argument. An argument for the existence of a highest being positing God
as “An infinite bearer of meaning for being.” [209]

The human form of ontological anxiety: anxiety about
meaninglessness…it is the form of anxiety which only a being can have in
whose nature freedom and destiny are united (210).

Questions:

Why can
the question of God be asked?

Why
must the question of God be asked?

What is
the “unconditional element”?

What do
the ontological, cosmological and teleological arguments for the existence
of a highest being have in common? How does Tillich show them inadequate?

[211]
Phenomenologically speaking, the term “God” is best understood as the answer
to the ultimate concern of a finite human being. In other words, that which
concerns a person ultimately becomes ‘god’ for that person. This leads to an
“inner tension in the idea of God”; a tension between concrete finitude and
abstract ultimacy. One cannot be concerned about something that is not
encountered in concrete reality, yet ultimate concern must transcend the
finitude of human existence in order to be “the answer to the question
implied in finitude”. The result is a loss of “being-to-being relation”.
This tension is “the key to understanding the dynamics of the history of
religion, and it is the basic problem of every doctrine of God.” [212] A
phenomenological assessment of the term “god” can serve as tool with which
meanings of nature and religious phenomena can be discovered. “Gods” are
imaginary human projections of finite things. They are primitive expression
of ultimate concern, loaded with embodied meanings. Two main points are
discussed, with relation to the tension between the ultimate and the
concrete: the phenomenological ascription of power and meaning to the gods,
in the history of religion. First, in relation to power, “Gods are
‘beings.’” This means that Gods are conceptualized as finite beings, under
the categorical conditions of existence. Gods are substantive, which limits
them in power and significance. They are seen as images of humans, which is
the basis of ‘projection’. That which receives the projection, however, is
the “realm of ultimate concern.” Gods receive yet transcend finitude. [213]
Thus ultimacy and concreteness are in continual opposition. The history of
religion shows that humans have always tried to “participate in divine power
and to use it for human purposes”, which is shown in three ways: magic,
nonmagical, and mystical worldviews. First, magic depends on the
presupposition that gods are beings in whose power humans can participate,
and is a “man to gods”, “gods to man” worldview. In this worldview the
divine power is accessed without need of divine permission. Second, the
nonmagical worldview is a “person-to-person” relation to participation in
the power of gods, mediated through prayer. In this worldview the god is
seen as a “concrete god” who may or may not grant the power sought. Third,
the mystical way of accessing divine power involves a worldview wherein
ultimate power is expressed in gods, and mediated in ascetic practice. [214]
The second main point of the phenomenological description of God, focuses on
meaning. In the history of religion, gods are seen as absolutized
embodiments of “concrete values” such as truth and goodness. This relates to
human imperialism, which presupposes divine imperialism. The tension between
the ultimate and the concrete affects the way in which phenomenological
meaning is ascribed to the gods: because of the “ultimacy of the religious
concern”, humans are driven upward towards absolute ultimate/universal
value and meaning, while simultaneously driven downward toward
concrete/particular value and meaning. “The tension is insoluble.”
Concrete human finitude wants to transcend itself via its ultimate religious
concern, yet its ultimate religious concern is only possible in concrete
human finitude. Religious concern is both ultimate and concrete, and
the two are always in tension. The meaning of the term god has been
discussed both as the human relationship to the gods (power), and how
that relationship informs a phenomenological conception of the “nature of
the gods” (meaning). The gods are not phenomena, they are
phenomenological “expressions of the ultimate concern which transcends the
cleavage between subjectivity and objectivity.” Ultimate concern is not
subjective, it stands against and above finitude and subjective derivation;
‘existentially’ participating in the transcendence of subjectivity and
objectivity. [214-215] Humanity can only speak of gods through relation, and
this relation involves humanity both using gods and surrendering to gods.
[215] In the Tension in Ultimate Religious Concern, the absolute
element demands passion, as in “Protestant radicalism”; and the concrete
element leads to cult participation, as in “Catholic relativities”. This
tension “determines the religions of mankind in all their major aspects.”

Definitions:

Ultimate Concern: “Whatever concerns a person ultimately becomes god for
him, and, conversely, it means that a man can be concerned ultimately
only about that which is god for him”; “It remains to be emphasized that
an ultimate concern is not ‘subjective.’ Ultimacy stands against
everything which can be derived from mere subjectivity, nor can the
unconditional be found within the entire catalogue of finite objects
which are conditioned by each other.” [211,214]

The
Tension in Ultimate Religious Concern: “The phrase ‘being ultimately
concerned’ points to a tension in human experience. On the one hand, it
is impossible to be concerned about something which cannot be
encountered concretely … Universals can become matters of ultimate
concern only through their power of representing concrete experiences …
On the other hand, ultimate concern must transcend every preliminary
finite and concrete concern … But in transcending the finite the
religious concern loses the concreteness of a being-to-being
relationship”; “The tension is insoluble”; “The tension in the nature of
the gods, which is the tension in the structure of man’s ultimate
concern (and which, in the last analysis, is the tension in the human
situation), determines the religions of mankind in all their major
aspects.” [211,214,215]

God:
“God is the answer to the question implied in man’s finitude; he is the
name for that which concerns man ultimately. This does not mean that
first there is a being called God and then the demand that man should be
ultimately concerned about him”; Defined in a phenomenological way,
“Gods are beings who transcend the realm of ordinary experience in power
and meaning, with whom men have relations which surpass ordinary
relations in intensity and significance”. [211,212]

Anschaulich:
(German) “Gods are ‘beings.’ They are experienced, named, and defined in
concrete intuitive (anschaulich) terms through the exhaustive use
of all the ontological elements and categories of finitude.” [212]

Theories of Projection: These theories “Say that the gods are simply
imaginary projections of elements of finitude, natural and human
elements.” [212]

The
Magic Worldview: “Magic itself is a theory and practice concerning the
relation of finite beings to each other; it assumes that there are
direct, physically unmediated sympathies and influences between beings
on the ‘psychic’ level”. Magic leads to a “Man to the gods and from the
gods to man” world view. [213]

Nonmagical Worlviews: The “Nonmagical, personalistic world views lead to
a person-to-person relationship to divine power, which is appropriated
through prayer, that is, through an appeal to the personal center of the
divine being”; “Men continue to use the power of their god by asking his
favors. They demand a concrete god, a god with whom man can deal.” [213]

Mystical Worldview: “Its main characteristic is the devaluation of the
divine beings and their power over against the ultimate power, the abyss
of being-itself.” [213]

Imperialism: “Imperialism is never the expression of will to power as
such. It always is a struggle for the absolute victory of a special
value or system of values, represented by a special god or hierarchy of
gods.” [214]

The
gods: “The gods are not objects within the context of the universe. They
are expressions of the ultimate concern which transcends the cleavage
between subjectivity and objectivity.” [214]

Questions:

What
does it mean to speak of one’s “ultimate concern”?

How
does one’s ultimate concern affect his or her conception of God?

What
are “gods”, and how are they conceived by humans? Do you agree with
Tillich’s phenomenological definition of gods? Why?

How do
humans seek participation in divine power?

How do
gods offer meaning for humans?

What
are the elements in the tension of ultimate religious concern? How does
this tension relate to the way in which humans ascribe power and meaning
to the gods?

Changes in
German:

[211]+2: [-THE
MEANING OF “GOD” +GOD AS IDEA]

[213] -1:
[-The conflict between the Brahma power and the God Brahman as an object
of a concrete relation with man points to the same tension within the
structure of man’s ultimate concern which was noted above. +The same
tension exists in the conflict between the impersonal Brahman power and
the God Brahma.] (Note here corrections in errors of fact as well as
infelicity of language.)

[215]
Holiness, as a “sacred realm”, is an important “cognitive ‘doorway’ to
understanding the nature of religion”, and will receive a phenomenological
description. This description involves two elements which will be
correlated, holiness and God. A proper doctrine of God must
describe God as holy or it makes the gods as though they were “secular
objects”, which is rightly dismissed by naturalism. It must also describe
the holy as “the sphere of the divine” or it becomes too
“aesthetic-emotional” (as with Schleiermacher and Otto). The best way to
articulate a doctrine of God which avoids these mistakes is to first analyze
“the meaning of ultimate concern”, then to develop the doctrines of God and
holiness from it. The first derivation from this process, is that the holy
is best understood as “a quality” of ultimate concern. Humans cannot
have ultimate concern in something unless it has the quality of holiness.
[215-216] As with Otto’s ‘numinous’, the holy should be understood as
transcending the “subject-object structure of reality”, as both abyss and
foundation of the being of humanity. [216] Holiness involves some ambiguity,
as evidenced in the history of religion. First, holiness can be actualized
only through objects which are not themselves holy, but are holy by negating
themselves and “pointing to the divine of which they are mediums.” When this
is not realized, holy objects cease to perform their proper function and
become “demonic”, or “antidivine”. For example, nationalism and religions
are valid insofar they are understood as pointing beyond themselves. Holy
objects should never become a person’s ultimate concern. Idolatrous and
demonic holiness is judged by justice; as has occurred in Greek philosophy (Dike),
the Reformation (rejecting the holiness ascribed to objects by Catholicism),
revolutionary movements (for social justice), etc. [216-217] As a result of
these “antidemonic” struggles, the meaning of holiness was transformed into
moral asceticism seeking perfection, and has now moved into liturgy and
theological theory. [217] The unclean and the secular are two further
concepts which are contrasted with holiness. First, the term ‘unclean’ used
to mean demonic, but is now understood as immorality, which implies that the
unclean and the secular are synonymous. Holiness, becoming “moral law”, has
lost “its depth, its mystery, its numinous character.” Loss of the
mysterious and numinous character is found in Luther, but not in Calvin,
whose doctrine of God unified the holy with the unclean, leading to
Puritanism, losing the numinous character of the holy. [218] Second, in
contrast to the holy, the term ‘secular’ is the realm of “preliminary
concerns” and “finite relations”, lacking ultimate concern. However, the
holy embraces the secular, within which the divine can be manifest; giving
the secular the potential to become consecrated. Further, the holy is
dependent on the secular for its expression. But when the secular separates
the holy from itself, it can prevent the manifestation of the holy in
itself. In other words, when the secular does not see God as “all in all”,
but “in addition to other things”, it falls into “sin”, and disrupts the
actualization of the holy in itself.

Definitions:

Holiness: “The sphere of the gods is the sphere of the holiness”;
“Holiness is an experienced phenomenon; it is open to phenomenological
description”; Holiness “Is the most adequate basis we have for
understanding the divine.” [215]

The
Holy: “The holy is the quality of that which concerns man
ultimately.” [215]

Numinous:
A term used by Rudolf Otto, meaning “The presence of the divine.” [215]

Tremendum/Fascinosum:
(Latin) More terms of Otto. “When he [Otto] describes the mystery of the
holy as tremendum and fascinosum, he expresses the
experience of ‘the ultimate’ in the double sense of that which is the
abyss and that which is the ground of man’s being.” [216]

Demonic: “Holy objects are not holy in and of themselves. They are holy
only be negating themselves in pointing to the divine of which they are
the mediums. If they establish themselves as holy, they become demonic.
They still are ‘holy’, but their holiness is antidivine.” [216]

Justice: “Justice is the criterion which judges idolatrous holiness.”
[216]

Puritan: “Fear of the demonic permeates Calvin’s doctrine of the divine
holiness. An almost neurotic anxiety about the unclean develops in later
Calvinism. The word ‘Puritan’ is most indicative of this trend. The holy
is the clean’ cleanliness becomes holiness.” [217]

Secular: “The word ‘secular’ is less expressive than the word ‘profane,’
which means ‘in front of the doors’- of the holy. But profane has
received connotations of ‘unclean,’ while the term ‘secular’ has
remained neutral”; … “The German word profan preserves this idea
of neutrality. The secular is the realm of preliminary concerns. It
lacks ultimate concern; it lacks holiness. All finite relations are in
themselves secular.” [217-218]

Sin:
“The very heart of what classical Christianity has called ‘sin’ is the
unreconciled duality of ultimate and preliminary concerns, of the finite
and that which transcends finitude, of the secular and the holy. Sin is
a state of things in which the holy and the secular are separated,
struggling with each other and trying to conquer each other. It is the
state in which God is not ‘all in all,’ the state in which God is ‘in
addition to’ all other things.” [218]

Questions:

What
does Tillich mean by “demonic”, and how does he show the demonic to have
functioned throughout Church history?

How
are “holy objects” to be understood? In other words, what is the proper
function of “holy objects”?

When
uncleanness is given precedence over holiness, the result is moralism.
How does moralism demonize the holy?

When
the secular focuses concern on itself, and separates God from itself,
the holy is lost. How does this become “sin”, and demonize the holy?

Changes in
German:

[216]-16:
[-Holiness provokes idolatry.] (A deleted sentence that really should
have been left in the German!)

[218] This
section will contrast The Idea of God with its reception in The
History of Religion. Because the actualization of the holy can occur
only in the finite and concrete, “the idea of God has a history”. Religious
history is determined by and determines the history of the idea of God.
[219] Theology, though dependent on the final revelation, must analyze the
history of the idea of God. The final revelation includes recipients who
have “insight into the meaning of ‘God’”, the interpretation of which should
include both the history of religion and the component of “religious
substance” within the history of human culture. There is no clear line of
progress in the history of religion for systematic theology to trace. Final
revelation, standing over and above human history, is manifest in history;
but it “cannot be derived from history”. If theology does speak of progress
in religious history, it should mean that the ultimate and the concrete
elements in the idea of God are synthesized. Rather than speaking of
progress, theology is better served to analyze religious history through
typology, which classifies events according to the type to which each event
belongs. [220] Typology in the idea of God will now be discussed. Under both
elements: process and structure. First, the Process of
the idea of God as a type involves the forces of history as its
approximation. The idea or meaning of God has developed through “two
interdependent causes: the tension within the idea of God and the general
factors determining the movement of history (e.g. economic, political, and
cultural factors).” First, the tension is that the idea of God has developed
in, yet is not explained by, historical forces. The idea of God essentially
is not, but existentially is, dependent on historical forces. These
condition but do not produce, determine yet are transcended by, the idea of
God. In order to discuss the history and typology of the idea of God, a
concept of God which is neither too narrow nor too wide will now be
developed. [220-221] Theology should compare the “typical structures”
Christianity with those of other religions. Better, theology should look at
the “element of universal preparatory revelation” contained Christian and
non-Christian typological analogies. Only after this first step, each can be
scrutinized through final revelation. Second, the Structure of the
idea of God is discussed. Typological structures are determined by two
factors: the tension between the concrete and absolute elements in
the idea of God, and from the contrast between the holy and the
secular in the idea of God. Under the tension of the first factor the
concrete element pushes people towards “polytheistic structures”, the
absolute element towards “monotheistic structures”, and the need for a
balance between the two towards “trinitarian structures”. Under the
contrast of the second factor, the secular can be a realm of ultimate
concern, but the danger is that “divine powers can be reduced to secular
objects”. However, an essential unity of the existential separation between
the sacred and secular is possible, by pointing to the interdependence of
secular and sacred ultimates. [221-222] In this way, systematic theology can
“analyze the religious substance of the basic ontological concepts and the
secular implications of the different types of the idea of God.”

Definitions:

Final
Revelation: “An event which is prepared by history and is received in
history, but it cannot be derived from history. It stands over against
progress and regress, judging the one as severely as the other.” [219]

Typology: Involves “Types [which] are ideal structures which are
approximated by concrete things or events without ever being attained.”
[219]

Typological Concept of God: A concept of God “Needed to delimit the
discussion of the history and typology of the idea of God”, which
employs human ultimate concern and moral or logical concepts in a
balanced way. [220]

Secular Ultimates: “The ontological concepts.” [221]

Sacred
Ultimates: “The conceptions of God.” [221]

Questions:

Why
does Tillich say that there is no real “progress” of final revelation in
the history of religion?

How is
the typological method of assessing the idea of God in the history of
religion employed?

What
is the benefit of this methodology?

How do
the tensions in the idea of God, between the concrete and the absolute
come into play, with regard to polytheism, monotheism, and
trinitarianism?

[222]
Polytheism, as qualitative, is characterized by a lack of belief in a
transcending, unifying, ultimate. Polytheistic divines claim ultimacy only
in the concrete, not in the absolute element in the idea of God. Because
polytheism disregards claims of other gods outside of its situation, posing
a threat to “the unity of self and world”; and because each of its gods lays
claim ultimacy, it is demonic. Monotheistic ultimacy is always in opposition
to polytheistic concretion. This is shown in the three primary Types
of polytheism: the universalistic, the mythological, and the dualistic. The
first type, universalistic polytheism, posits universal power which
are manifest (though split and contradictory) through concrete objects,
persons, and places in the concrete world. The second type, mythological
polytheism, posits divinity through deities embodying universal meaning
and value. This is the only polytheism that provides adequate
presuppositions for its mythologies. Whereas dualistic types try to
transform the myth to interpret history. [222-223] And monotheistic types
break myths via ultimacy in the idea of God. [223] Mythological “imaginings”
result from the tension in the idea of God, as concrete concern ascribes
anthropomorphic imagery to the gods in pursuit of a person-to-person
relation. This raises an important element in religious experience: “there
is a struggle for a personal God in all religions”. A personal God points to
the concrete element of human ultimate concern, but the “subpersonal and
suprapersonal” character of mythological types show the absolute element of
human ultimate concern. This second element is seen in the “animal vitality”
of the “animal-gods”, which are “transhuman” and “divine-demonic” symbols of
ultimate concern. Star-gods also function symbolically through creative and
destructive power, as ultimate concern. Mythological deities as
“subhuman-superhuman” aim to divert equating the power of the divine with
human power. If this aim fails, gods “become glorified men” and lose “divine
ultimacy”. [223-224] As a result, religion erects “divine personalities”
capable of transcending the form of their personhood, becoming “sub-personal
or trans-personal”, mirroring the tension between concretion and ultimacy
“in man’s ultimate concern and in every type of the idea of God.” [224]
Mythological gods transcend morality. They are better understood as relating
to ontology, “structures of being and conflicts of values”. “They are
demonic, but they are not immoral.” There are monotheistic restrictions
necessary for the life of these gods, such as the characteristic of
ultimacy, which is shown in the act of prayer. Though a person may pray to
several gods, the ultimate is sought in the identity of each god. Another
restriction supporting mythological gods is shown in the hierarchy of gods,
which though “inadequate”, functions to prepare the way for monarchal
monotheism. Last, the restriction involving the component of fate, also
preparing the way for monotheism. The third type of polytheism is dualism.
This type relates to the ambiguity of holiness and the tension between
“divine and demonic holiness.” The distinction between good and evil spirits
results in a dualism “into the sphere of the holy through which it attempts
to overcome the ambiguity of the numinous beings.” [225] Religious dualism
is demonic, because it seeks to radically separate the demonic from the
divine. This occurs in Zoroastrianism, Manichaeism, and Christianity, where
divine holiness and demonic holiness are concentrated into different realms,
radically splitting the ambiguity in the realm of holiness. Yet dualism also
contains monotheistic elements. Because human ultimate concern needs an idea
of God containing both power and value, the tendency of dualism to place the
good god over the evil god, wherein the good god eventually reigns, dualism
foreshadows “the God of exclusive trinitarian monotheism.”

Definitions:

Polytheism: “Polytheism is a qualitative and not a quantitative concept.
It is not the belief in a plurality of gods but rather the lack of a
uniting and transcending ultimate which determines its character.” [222]

Universal Polytheism: “The special divine beings, like divinities of
places and realms, numinous forces in things and persons, are
embodiments of a universal, all pervading sacred power (mana), which is
hidden behind all things and at the same time manifest through them.”
[222]

Mythological Polytheism: “Divine power is concentrated in individual
deities of a relatively fixed character who represent broad realms of
being and value.” [222]

Animal-gods: “They are expressions of man’s ultimate concern symbolized
in the order of the stars and in their creative and destructive power.”
[223]

Star-gods: “They are expression of man’s ultimate concern symbolized in
the order of the stars and in their creative and destructive power.”
[223]

Dualistic Polytheism: “Is based on the ambiguity in the concept of the
holy and on the conflict between divine and demonic holiness”; “The most
radical attempt to separate the divine from the demonic is religious
dualism.” [224,225]

Questions:

How is
polytheism “demonic”?

What
is the significance of the human “struggle for a personal God in all
religions”?

What
are the problems with the notion of a personal God?

Why is
religious dualism so problematic? How does it foreshadow “trinitarian
monotheism”?

Changes in
German:

[223]+4: the
mythical as a category of religious intuition is different from the
unbroken mythology of [-a special type of the idea of God +the mythical
stadium of polytheism]

[225] (This
section will discuss four types of monotheism: monarchic, mystical,
exclusive, and trinitarian.) Polytheism is dependent on monotheistic
elements. However, monotheism, in contrast to polytheism, places the
ultimate element over that of the concrete (the two elements in the tension
of the idea of God). In neither case is either element completely destroyed.
[225-226] The first type of monotheism is monarchic monotheism.
This type involves a “god-monarch” who rules over the lower gods,
representing the ultimate in both the power and value of his
hierarchy. This type is shown in the Zeus of the Stoics. However, the
god-monarch is threatened by revolution from the lower gods, which makes
this first type too involved in polytheism. Yet there are elements of this
type in the “Lord of Hosts” of Christianity. The second type is
mystical monotheism, wherein the mystical transcends the realms of being
and value, resulting in the disappearance of their “divine representatives”
into a “divine ground and abyss”. All conflicts become swallowed in the
transcendent ultimate abyss. Thus, the ultimate element swallows the
concrete element (categories), with no differentiation in the power
of being and the ground of being and meaning (polarities). Yet the
concrete element is sought in the temporary manifestation of ultimacy. [227]
The third type is exclusive monotheism, which is the only way
that monotheism can resist polytheism. This type combines the ultimate and
concrete elements in the idea of God, overcoming demonic claim. In the
history of religion, only Israel has achieved this. Israel’s God is also the
God who judges all other nations in the world, the God who is simultaneously
absolute and concrete. Yahweh’s claim to universality is based not on
imperialism, but on justice, and is related to Israel via a covenant. Yet
Yahweh holds power whether or not Israel breaks the covenant, and destroys
Israel based on the universal principle of justice. Therefore the monotheism
of Israel negates polytheism, overcomes the demonic, and refrains from
absolutizing the holy for itself. [228] However, exclusive monotheism needs
“an expression of the concrete element in man’s ultimate concern”, which
leads to the fourth type of monotheism: trinitarian monotheism.
This type is a qualitative characterization of God, seeking to present a
living God who unifies the ultimate and the concrete elements; which is also
the trinitarian problem. The trinitarian problem is found throughout the
history of religion, wherein each type of monotheism attempts to answer this
problem. These answers are now discussed. Monarchical monotheism tries to
answer this problem with a highest god who becomes concrete in “manifold
incarnations, in the sending of lower divinities, and in the procreation of
half-gods”, and in positing a god who participates in human destiny. [229]
Mystical monotheism has expressed a distinction between concretion and
ultimacy in Brahma (concretion) and the Brahman principle (ultimacy);
culminating in the “relation of the Brahman-Atman, the absolute, to the
concrete gods of Hindu piety”. Exclusive monotheism in Christianity has
given an “abstract transcendence of the divine”, wherein the “transcendence
of the absolute command which empties all concrete manifestations of the
divine. But since the concrete element demands its rights, mediating powers
of a threefold character appear and posit the trinitarian problem.” This
occurs in three groups: “hypostasized divine qualities, like Wisdom, Word,
Glory”, the angels as divine messengers, and the “divine-human figure” of
the Messiah. All three give a transcendent and “unapproachable” God who
becomes “concrete and present in time and space”. With this move, as the
distance between God and humanity grows, the trinitarian problem became more
intense. Motives and forms of trinitarian monotheism function in the
Christian doctrine of the trinity. [229-230] However, the Christian answer
posits the Messiah-mediator, as a human being, Jesus of Nazareth, which
transforms the trinitarian problem into the christological problem.

Monarchic Monotheism: “Lies on the boundary between polytheism and
monotheism. The god-monarch rules over the hierarchy of inferior gods
and god-like beings.” [225-26]

Mystical Monotheism: “Transcends all realms of being and value, and
their divine representatives, in favor of the divine ground and abyss
from which they come and in which they disappear.” [226]

Exclusive Monotheism: “Created by the elevation of a concrete god to
ultimacy and universality without the loss of his concreteness and
without the assertion of a demonic claim”; “In exclusive monotheism an
abstract transcendence of the divine develops [in the exclusive
monotheism of Christianity].” [227,229]

Demonic: “The claim of something conditioned to be unconditional.” [227]

Trinitarian monotheism: “[Trinitarian monotheism] is an attempt to speak
of the living God, the God in whom the ultimate and the concrete are
united.” [228]

The
Trinitarian Problem: “The trinitarian problem is the problem of the
unity between ultimacy and concreteness in the living God.” [228]

Questions:

What
do all forms of polytheism have in common?

Tillich argues the Israel is the perfect example for the exclusive type
of monotheism. Do you agree? Why?

Why is
the exclusive type the only type which overcomes polytheism?

What
is the trinitarian problem, and how have the types of monotheism
attempted to answer it?

[230] A
relation of philosophy to theology distinguishes the religious attitude
which deals with the existential meaning of being through the
philosophical categories and ontological elements, from the philosophical
attitude which deals with the theoretical structure of being as
manifest through existential experience. Each relies on the other for its
expression, and both deal with the idea of God. The types
which symbolize human ultimate concern carry implications regarding the
nature of being. Philosophy dealing with these types is drawing from
theology, theoretically pulling from the existential religious. Theology can
discuss the implications of the nature of being in the types in a “double
way”: taking the philosophical grounds of the implications and applying them
as “expressions of ultimate concern on religious grounds.” The former limits
the discussion to philosophical grounds, the latter to “existential
witness”. This distinction will now be developed for an apologetic use. The
first integration of the philosophical with the theological in the analysis
of assertions about the nature of being shows that ultimacy experienced
implies an ultimate of both “being and meaning which concerns man
unconditionally because it determines his very being and meaning.”
Philosophically, this ultimate is described as being-itself (esse ipsum),
that which transcends all thought and the power of being in which all beings
participate. Every philosophy uses this concept, even those (such as
Nominalism) which reject it. Though ironically nominalistic epistemology is
the best way to recognize the nature of being and knowing. [230-231] This is
so because “If being is radically individualized, if it lacks embracing
structures and essences, this is a character of being, valid for everything
that is.” [231] The best way to proceed is to assess the nature of
being-itself and ask how being-itself can be approached in a cognitive way.
Logical positivism is defeated with the same argument against Nominalism:
its cognitive approach limits itself only to the manifestation of being that
are empirically verifiable, ironically making it the only method of
cognitive approach to being-itself. The tension (between the absolute and
concrete elements) in the idea of God is pushes the “fundamental
philosophical question” to ask how absolute being-itself “can account for
the relativities of reality”. On the one hand (absolute element) the power
of being transcends all beings participating in it, negating all
content, motivating philosophy towards absolutes (i.e. “the transnumerical
One”, “pure identity”). On the other hand (concrete element) the power of
being is the power of all concrete beings, motivating philosophy
towards pluralistic principles (i.e. “relational or process descriptions of
being”, and “the idea of difference”). The result shows philosophical
history as moving from relative to absolute, absolute to relative, and
seeking a balance in between the two. This tension is the tension of
humanity as both finite and transcending its finitude. [231-232] With regard
to polytheism: philosophy has transformed universalistic type of polytheism
into monistic naturalism, [232] the mythological type into pluralistic
naturalism, and the dualistic type of into metaphysical dualism. [233] With
regard to monotheism: philosophy has transformed the monarchical type of
monotheism into gradualistic metaphysics, the mystical type into idealistic
monism, [234] the exclusive type of monotheism into metaphysical realism,
and the trinitarian type into dialectical realism. [235] These examples have
shown that philosophical absolutes express the same tension in human
ultimate concern as do the different types of the idea of God. Ultimate
philosophical notions greatly influence the development of religious ideas
of God, and affect religious experience and theological concepts. Because
they are foundationally religious, they play a part in the history of
religion. Theology has a twofold task with respect to philosophical
absolutes: “it must ascertain their theoretical validity, which is a
philosophical question, and it must seek their existential significance,
which is a religious question.”

Definitions:

Esse Ipsum:
(Latin) The philosophical expression of “An ultimate being and meaning
which concerns man unconditionally because it determines his very being
and meaning”. It means “Being-itself, esse ipsum, that beyond
which thought cannot go, the power of being in which everything
participates.” [230]

Nominalism: “On the basis of its dissolution of the universals,
nominalism objects to the concept of a universal power of being or to
the concept of being-itself … Being is radically individualized.” [230]

Logical Positivism: A philosophy which takes “The question of being away
from philosophy and … surrender[s] it to emotion and to poetic
expression … The hidden assumption is that being-itself cannot be
approached cognitively except in those of its manifestations which are
open to scientific analysis and verification.” [231]

Deus sive natura:
(Latin) “An expression of the universalistic feeling for the
all-pervading presence of the divine.” [231]

Pantheism: “Pantheism is the doctrine that God is the substance or
essence of all things, not the meaningless assertion that God is the
totality of things.” [233-234]

Dialectical Realism: that which tries to unite the structural oneness of
everything within the absolute with the undecided and unfinished
manifoldness of the real. [235]

Transformation: “‘Transformation’ does not mean conscious acts whereby
religious symbols are changed into philosophical concepts. It means the
openness of being-itself, which is given in the basic religious
experience, is the foundation for the philosophical grasp of the
structure of being.”

Questions:

What
is the relationship of theology and philosophy?

How do
both depend on one another?

Tillich theologically discusses “Assertions about the nature of being”
in a “double way”. What does this mean?

What
is the foundation for philosophy’s grasp the structure of being?

How is
the tension between the absolute and concrete elements in the idea of
God shown to motivate philosophy?

[235] God is
not a being under the conditions of existence (i.e. under the
categories and polarities). God is being-itself, or the ground of being. If
superlatives are used to describe God, they diminish God. Speaking of God as
“highest being” is better understood as attributing unconditional power and
meaning to God. [236] Being-itself is the infinite power of being that is in
and above all things, which is the power that resists non-being. Theology
must begin its doctrine of God with God and the power of being. God, as
being-itself, is beyond the contrast of essence and existence. Thus God does
not experience the transition from essence to existence. If God did
experience this transition, it would mean that God participates in nonbeing,
and God could lose God’s being. But these cannot happen to a God who has no
being, but is being-itself, and who is logically prior to the split
characteristic of finite being. This means that it is as wrong to speak of
God as universal essence as to speak of God as existing. Universal essence
would imply subjugation to finite potentiality, and lose the element of
transcendence, resulting in pantheism. Further, God who is beyond existence
cannot be said to exist. [236-237] Aquinas tried to say this by
distinguishing two kinds of existence for God, but contradicted himself.
[237] “The question of the existence of God can be neither asked nor
answered.” Either to affirm or to deny the existence of God results
atheistic. The first step in resolving this problem is usually called
immanence and transcendence, where God transcends all beings, yet all beings
participate in being-itself. This is a double relation of beings to God and
God to beings gives God as being-itself a “double characteristic”.
Being-itself is both creative ground and abyss. God as the ground of being
has been wrongly understood through the categories of relation: causality
and substance, to “express the relation of being-itself to finite beings”,
the ground is both cause and substance of finite beings. The former
was elaborated by Leibniz and the latter by Spinoza, and both are wrong.
[238] Christianity prefers the category of causality to the category of
substance, but ends up using both as symbols. God as ground is both ground
of being and ground of the structure of being, though subjected to the
conditions of neither. Because God is the structure of being, God can be our
ultimate concern, symbolically cognizable only through the structural
elements of being-itself.

Definitions:

Being
of God: “The being of God is the being-itself. The being of God cannot
be understood as the existence of a being alongside others or above
others.” [235]

Aseity:
God is “By himself; he possesses aseity.” [236]

Pantheism: God “Pouring all his creative power into a system of forms,
[becoming] bound to these forms. This is what pantheism means”;
“Pantheism does not say that God is everything. It says that God is the
substance of everything and that there is no substantial independence
and freedom in anything finite.” [236,237-238]

Prima Causa:
(Latin) Loosely translated as ‘primary cause’.

Ultima Substantia:
(Latin) Loosely, ‘ultimate substance’.

Questions:

What
does it mean to say that God “is being-itself”, or the “power and
meaning of being”?

Why is
it important that God be understood as being-itself, beyond the contrast
of existence and essence?

Why is
it problematic to speak of God as universal essence?

Why
does Tillich say that either to affirm or to deny the existence of God
is atheistic?

Why
can we only speak about God through the “structural elements of being
itself”?

Changes in
German:

[235]+22:
[-THE ACTUALITY OF GOD +GOD AND THE WORLD]

[237]+13:
[-Being-itself is beyond finitude and infinity; otherwise it would be
conditioned by something otherwise than itself +A being which is only
infinite would be bounded by the finite]

[238] To say
that God is being-itself is not to speak symbolically. [239] Theology should
begin with the most abstract and non-symbolic statement about God: “God is
being-itself or the absolute.” Anything extending itself beyond this
statement becomes symbolism. Symbols are different than signs: a symbol
relates to and participates in “the reality for which it stands”, and does
not change, but either grows or dies. Signs neither relate to nor
participate in that to which they point and can change. Therefore the
religious symbol which points to the divine, must participate in that power
to which it points. Concrete assertions about God are symbolic expressions,
both negated and affirmed by pointing to God. Thus because “everything
participates in being-itself”, a segment of finite reality can be used to
assert something about that which is infinite. [240] Religious symbols are
true in so far as they “express the correlation of some person with final
revelation.” There is a double meaning of the truth of a symbol: it has
truth if it “is adequate to the revelation it expresses”, and it is
true if it “is the expression of a true revelation”. Theology’s task is
to interpret, not deny or confirm symbols. Religious symbols directed both
to the infinite and finite, are “double-edged”, both opening the divine for
the human and the human for the divine. [241] Last, it is important to note
that to use the term ‘symbol’ does not mean that something symbolized is not
real. This mistake occurs for three reasons: confusion between the terms
sign and symbol, the identifying reality as empirically reality, and because
some movements (i.e. Protestant Hegelianism and Catholic Modernism) have
used religious symbols to diminish their reality and seriousness.

Definitions:

Sign:
“The sign bears no necessary relation to that to which it points”, and
can change. [239]

Symbol: “The symbol participates in the reality of that for which it
stands [and does not change, but] grows and dies according to the
correlation between that which is symbolized and the persons who receive
it as a symbol.” [239]

Symbolic Expression: “A symbolic expression is one whose proper meaning
is negated by that to which it points.” [239]

Analogia Entis:
(Latin) Analogy of being; the commensurability between the divine being
and the creatures, especially humanity as the imago dei, or ‘image of
God’. [240]

Questions:

Why is
it important to distinguish symbolic from non-symbolic language about
God?

Why
does Tillich say that we can only speak about God symbolically?

What
makes a religious symbol true or false, and how are symbols of God
determined true?

How
are symbols for God such as ‘Father’ and ‘King’, shown to be a “double
edged sword”?

[241-242]
Because “life is the process in which potential being becomes actual being”,
and because the structure of being is both in unity and in tension, to say
that ‘God lives’ must be said in the sense that God lives in so far as God
is the eternal process wherein reunion overcomes separation. [242] God
symbolically pictured as living in the Old Testament as distinct from
being-itself. Because in God as God there is neither potentiality nor
actuality, God as living is a symbolic expression. The biblical
anthropomorphic language about God attempts to speak of God as living, not
simply a “pure absolute”, or “being-itself”, and enables God to become
religiously symbolic. Thus religious instruction should deepen the feeling
of anthropomorphic symbols, without diminishing the reality to which they
point. Neither should theology “weaken” these concrete symbols, rather it
should analyze and interpret them “in abstract ontological terms.” [243]
Symbols of God are dependent on the ontological structure of being. Theology
then should interpret this essential element alongside the existential
element relating to revelation. Ontological poles come from the ground of
being, from the God within which these are unified. Though the ground of
these is God, God does not stand under them. The poles contain both an
object/world side (participation, form, destiny) and a subject side
(individualization, dynamics, freedom), both of which are “rooted in the
divine life”. However, the subject/self side is the side from which symbols
derive the “existential relationship between God and man”, from which humans
apply ultimate concern in a symbolic way to God, making God, by analogy,
personal, dynamic, and free. However, theology notes the other side
(object/world) of the polarities in symbolic language about God. [243-244]
To call God a person must be balanced with the understanding that God is not
a person in “finite separation”, but only in “absolute and unconditional
participation in everything”. God is dynamic, but in an absolute and
unconditional unity with forms. God is free, but in an absolute and
unconditional identity with the divine destiny. The divine self is the
destiny. The self-world ontological structure of finite beings “is
transcended in the divine life without providing symbolic material”.
Therefore God can, strictly speaking, neither be called a ‘self’ nor a
‘world’. For both self and the world are rooted in the divine life, it is
not the other way around.

Definitions:

Life:
“Life is the process in which potential being becomes actual being; it
is the actualization of the structural elements of being in their unity
and in their tension.” [241]

Ontological structure of self and world: Two polarities that are
co-dependent where one is needs the other to function. A reality that
must be understood. An individual is a self yet one lives in a world
with other selves. [244]

Questions:

What
does it mean to say that God is a “living God”?

What
are the strengths and weaknesses of using symbolic anthropomorphic
language about God?

What
does Tillich mean when he says that “God is man’s ultimate concern”,
symbolically speaking?

Why is
it important to realize the proper place of symbols which speak of God?

What
does it mean to say that the self-world ontological structure is
transcended in God? Why is it important to make this distinction?

[244] This
section discusses problems in the history of theology with regard to its use
of symbols for God. The crux of the problem, as previously discussed, is
that symbols we use for speaking of God come from the ontological elements,
and the ontological elements apply to beings under the conditions of
existence, or finite beings; but God is neither under these conditions
expressed by the ontological elements nor a finite being. The first step in
analysis of symbols we use for God is to distinguish their proper sense
from their symbolic sense, meanwhile balancing each side of the
ontological polarities without “reducing the symbolic power of either of
them”. First, the polarity of individualization and participation
involves the symbol personal God as pointing to an existential
“person-to-person” relation, any relation less than personal could not meet
the demands of human ultimate concern. Personality includes individuality,
but we can speak of God as an individual only as an “absolute participant”.
[245] Both poles, individualization and participation, are grounded in God,
but God transcends them both. “Personal God” means God is both the ground
and power of personality. Theology made God a person by separating natural
law from moral law (Kant). Theism made God a heavenly, perfect person above
world and humanity; and atheism correctly protested the symbol of a God
without the pole of participation. As ground and aim of every life God
symbolizes participation also. Symbolically God is both poles. [246-247]
Second, the polarity of dynamics and form as symbolically applied to
God should be understood neither as actus purus or other terms
leaning too heavily on the dynamic pole, nor as “nonsymbolic, ontological
doctrine of God as becoming” which also sacrifice form to dynamics. [247]
Rather the poles should be balanced to include form as symbolizing a God who
in whom the actualization of potentiality “inescapably unites possibility
with fulfillment”, and note that “will and intellect in God” show both poles
symbolically in balance. [248] For over a century the pole of dynamics has
swallowed form (Protestantism), which before was the inverse (Catholicism);
“but theology must balance the new with the old”. Third, the polarity of
freedom and destiny should be symbolically applied to God as a balanced
unity of both poles, which means that the biblical picture of a free God
with aseity, should include an “existential correlation of man and God”
which does not condition God. [248-249] Symbolically, “in God freedom and
destiny are one”, and “God is his own destiny”.

Definitions:

Persona, Prosopon:
“Personality”; “Classical theology employed the term persona for
the trinitarian hypostases but not for God himself.” [244,245]

Personal God: “‘Personal God’ does not mean that God is a person.
It means that God is the ground of everything personal and that he
carries within himself the ontological power of personality … God is the
principle of participation as well as the principle of
individualization.” [245]

Parousia:
(Greek) “Plato uses the word parousia for the presence of the
essences in temporal existence. This word later becomes the name for the
preliminary and final presence of the transcendent Christ in the church
and in the world. Par-ousia means ‘being by,’ ‘being with’- but
on the basis of being absent, of being separated.” [245]

Universal Participation: “While active religious communication between
God and man depends on the symbol of the personal God, the symbol of
universal participation expresses the passive experience of the divine
parousia in terms of the divine omnipresence.” [245]

Dynamics: “Potentiality, vitality, and self-transcendence are indicated
in the term ‘dynamics’. [245-246]

Actus Purus:
“Potentiality and actuality appear in classical theology in the famous
formula that God is actus purus, the pure form in which
everything potential is actual, and which is the eternal self-intuition
of the divine fullness (pleroma). [246]

Ungrund:
(German) “The ‘nature in God’. [246]

Aseity
of God: “Classical theology has spoken in more abstract terms of the
aseity of God, of his being a se, self-driven. But aseity also
means that there is nothing given in God which is not at the same time
affirmed by his freedom.” [248]

Freedom (Symbolized in God): “Freedom, like the other ontological
concepts, must be understood symbolically and in terms of the
existential correlation of man and God. If taken in this way, freedom
means that that which is man’s ultimate concern is in no way dependent
on man or on any finite being or on any finite concern. Only that which
is unconditional can be the expression of unconditional concern. A
conditioned God is no God.” [248]

Questions:

Why is
it important to distinguish the “proper sense” from the “symbolic sense”
of the symbols we use to speak of God?

Why
does Tillich say that “man cannot be ultimately concerned about anything
that is less than personal”? Do you agree? Why?

What
does it mean to unite the poles of individuality and participation when
symbolically speaking about God?

When
theology has leaned too heavily on dynamics without balancing it with
form, what was the result?

What
is Tillich’s understanding of the symbol destiny applied to God? In
other words, does God have a destiny? Do you agree, and why?

Changes in
German:

[244]-8: The
symbol “[-p +P]ersonal God” (German capitalizes Personal despite not
being at the beginning of a sentence and not being a noun)

[249] To say
that God is spirit is to say that God is “the unity of the ontological
elements and the telos of life”. Spirit is an excellent symbol for
God, because it does not need to be balanced with another pole; it includes
all ontological polarities. ‘Spirit’ is here capitalized, to distinguish it
from lower case ‘spirit’, the latter uniting power and meaning. [250] “In
contrast to Nietzsche, who identified the two assertions that God is Spirit
and that God is dead, we must say that God is the living God because he is
Spirit.” The Christian doctrine of the Trinity begins by asserting that
Jesus is the Christ. However, if the presuppositions of the Christian
doctrine of the idea of God are asked, then the trinitarian principles can
be assessed, which begins with the Spirit. “God is Spirit, and any
trinitarian statement must be derived from this basic assertion.”
Trinitarian principles are “moments” within the process of God’s life as
spirit. The elements of power (the “abyss of the divine”) and meaning (the
“fullness of its content”). [250-251] The first principle, which “makes God
God”, is the ground and power of being, from which everything originates,
and that which infinitely resists nonbeing. [251] The second principle
involves the logos, which unites meaning and structure with
creativity, in which God “speaks his ‘word,’ both in himself and beyond
himself”, and without which God would be completely secluded, thus demonic.
The third principle is the Spirit, which contains and unites power and
meaning, giving actuality to the potential in the “divine ground and
‘outspoken’ in the divine logos”. Through the Spirit the finite is
united, and distinguished, though not separated, with from and to the
infinite. These trinitarian principles are not the Christian doctrine of the
Trinity, they are prolegomena to it. [252] The symbol “divine life” points
to the paradox that in God the finite and infinite are posited, though
transcending potentiality and actuality.

Definitions:

[capitalized] Spirit: “Spirit is the unity of the ontological elements
and the telos of life … Spirit is the symbolic application of
[lower case] spirit to divine life”; “Spirit is the power through which
meaning lives, and it is the meaning which gives direction to power.”
[249,250]

Telos:
(Greek) “The word telos expresses the relation of life and spirit
more precisely than the worlds ‘aim’ or ‘goal’. It expresses the inner
directedness of life toward spirit, the urge of life to become spirit,
to fulfil itself as spirit. Telos stands for an inner, essential,
necessary aim, for that in which a being fulfils its own nature.” [249]

[lower
case] spirit: “The meaning of spirit is built up through the meaning of
the ontological elements and their union. In terms of both sides of the
three polarities one can say that spirit is the unity of power and
meaning. On the side of power it includes centered personality,
self-transcending vitality, and freedom of self-determination. On the
side of meaning it includes universal participation, forms and
structures of reality, and limiting and directing destiny … spirit does
not stand in contrast to body. Life as spirit transcends the duality of
body and mind. It also transcends the triplicity of body, soul, and
mind”. [249-250]

God is
Spirit: “The statement that God is Spirit means that life as spirit is
the inclusive symbol for the divine life. It contains all the
ontological elements.” [250]

Logos:
“The classical term logos is most adequate for the second
principle, that of meaning and structure. It unites meaningful structure
with creativity.” [251]

Questions:

What
does it mean to say that “God is Spirit”? Do you think this symbol can
be applied to God? Why?

Why
does Tillich say that speaking of the trinitarian principles “must begin
with the Spirit rather than with the Logos”?

Why
does Tillich say that “without the second principle God is demonic”?

[252] The
divine life (i.e. God) actualizes itself in “inexhaustible abundance”, via
its creativity. The divine life and the divine creativity are the same,
there is no distinction; “God is creative because he is God.” Thus to ask
whether creation is either ‘necessary’ or ‘contingent’ is a moot question.
Creativity is both the destiny and freedom of God, but God is not subjected
to ‘fate’. Creation is not a “necessary” act of God, because God is not
dependent on a “necessity above him”. God has aseity, which means that
“everything he is he is through himself.” The doctrine of creation describes
the relation between God and the world, answering the question implied in
human finitude, and discovers the meaning of finitude as “creatureliness”,
which is answered in the essential nature of humanity. However, the question
is neither asked nor answered in the existential nature of humanity.
Existence means that humans ask the question of their finitude without
receiving an answer. [253] Divine creativity includes both preservation and
providence. Last, because God is essentially creative, past present
and future must be symbolically used to speak of God’s creativity. “God
has created the world, he is creative in the present moment, and
he will creatively fulfil his telos”. These three statements
will be elaborated in the following sections.

Definitions:

Doctrine of Creation: “The doctrine of creation is not the story of an
event which took place ‘once upon a time.’ It is the basic description
of the relation between God and the world. It is the correlate to the
analysis of man’s finitude. It answers the question implied in man’s
finitude and in finitude generally.” [252]

Creation: God “Eternally ‘creates himself,’ a paradoxical phrase which
states God’s freedom … Creation is not only God’s freedom but also his
destiny. But it is not a fate; it is neither a necessity nor an accident
which determines him.” [252]

Questions:

Is
there a difference between the “divine life” and the “divine
creativity”? Why?

Why
does Tillich say that God’s creativity is neither necessary nor
contingent? Why is this important?

Tillich says that the question implied in human finitude, the question
of “creature as creature” is asked and answered in human essential, not
existential nature. What does this mean and how is this claim made?

Why
are all three modes of time included in the symbol of creativity as
applied to God?

[253]
Classical Christian doctrine describes creation as creation ex nihilo.
Theology’s first task is to interpret this phrase. This doctrine is a
negation, which has been used to prevent any type of ultimate
dualism, and to differentiate Christianity from paganism. Ultimacy is
intimately related to ultimate concern, which must have ultimate dependence.
If nihilo means me on, it simply restates the Greek doctrine
of matter and form. If nihilo means ouk on, it could not be
the origin of the creature. Creatureliness implies but is more than
nonbeing, because it both contains the power of being-itself and it
participates in the creative ground of being-itself. Creatureliness
means inheriting both nonbeing (anxiety) and being (courage). The doctrine
of creation ex nihilo implies first, that existence is not “rooted in
the creative ground of being”. [253-254] Which means that it “does not
belong to the essential nature of things” (i.e. the existential is estranged
from the essential). Ontological asceticism does not reverse this, because
the tragic in finitude is conquered only through the “presence of
being-itself within the finite”. Second, creatureliness involves nonbeing,
hence death is a natural necessary but the tragic is not; the tragic is only
a potentiality. The doctrines of the incarnation and eschatology are both
based on the doctrine of creation, because it is derived from the relation
of God to the world.

Definitions:

Creatio Ex Nihilo:
(Latin) Meaning ‘Created out of nothing’. “The classical Christian
doctrine of creation uses [this phrase] … their obvious meaning is a
critical negation. God finds nothing ‘given’ to him which influences him
in his creativity or which resists his creative telos.” [253]

‘Nothing’: “‘Nothing’ is what (or where) [the word ex] comes
from. Now ‘nothing’ can mean two things … absolute negation of being, or
it can mean the relative negation of being.” [253]

Ouk
On:
The absolute negation of being. [253]

Me
On:
The relative negation of being. [253]

Questions:

What
has Christianity used the doctrine of creation ex nihilo to
avoid?

Why is
ultimacy so important in the doctrine of creation?

How
are the doctrines of the incarnation and eschatology tied by Tillich to
the doctrine of creation? In other words, what is the relation?

[254] The
Nicene Creed designates God as “everything visible and invisible”, which, as
with the trinitarian formula discussed above, functions to protect
Christianity, this time from the Platonic teaching which makes the
creator-god dependent on eternal essences or ideas. Incidentally, both
Neo-Platonism and Christian theology discussed essences as “ideas in the
divine mind”, patterns of God’s creation, but dependent on God.
Because there is “no distinction in the divine life between potentiality and
actuality”, essences are related to universals and to individuals. [255]
Later Platonists accounted for individuality, which Nominalists took to an
extreme; for they cannot deny that individuals point to a transcendence
beyond themselves. God’s creative life process is prior to essence and
existence, wherein individuals are symbolically both essential beings with
inner aim, and existential beings within the creative life process. It is
important to note that these observations are symbolic, “since we are unable
to have a perception or even an imagination of that which belongs to the
divine life.” The existence of humanity is different than its essence;
belonging to both humans are in the creative ground of God and is manifest
to itself and to “the whole of reality.” In other words, humans have left
the creative ground to actualize their “finite freedom”. Hence the
union of the doctrine’s of creation and the fall- the “most difficult and
the most dialectical point in the doctrine of creation”. This is the case
because “fully developed creatureliness is fallen creatureliness”. [255-256]
The creature is “outside the creative ground” in so far as its freedom is
actualized. This is both the end of creation and the beginning of the fall,
involving both freedom and destiny. [256] Creation and fall intersect in a
perplexing way: the universality negating individual contingency, and the
separation of existence from its unity with essence negating structural
necessity; “It is the actualization of ontological freedom united with
ontological destiny.” In summary, “being a creature means both to be rooted
in the creative ground of the divine life and to actualize one’s self
through freedom”. The self-realization of a creature, as the fulfillment of
creation, is freedom and destiny, marks a break between essence and
existence; “creaturely freedom is the point at which creation and the fall
coincide.” This leads to human creativity, which humanity has in every
direction, but divine creativity is very distinct from human creativity.

Definitions:

Creativity:
the human creativity brings new into being, but can not bring into being
from non-being. [256]

Questions:

What
is the distinction between the Platonic doctrine of creation, and the
Neo-Platonic, Christian doctrine? Why is this distinction important?

How is
the statement that “there is no difference in the divine life between
potentiality and -actuality” as resolution of the Platonic and the
Neo-Platonic doctrine of creation?

How
are individuals symbolically present both essentially and existentially
in the creativity of God?

Why
does Tillich note that we can only speak symbolically of the “creative
process of the divine life”?

Why is
the doctrine of the fall the “most difficult and most dialectical point
in the doctrine of creation”?

Changes in
German:

[256]-5: God
is primarily and essentially creative [man is secondarily and
existentially creative]

[257] The most
relevant category of finitude for this discussion, is time. This is the case
because the question of creation relates most aptly to the category of time.
The question of what ‘happened’ before creation is absurd, because of its
presupposition- that creation was an event which happened in the past. Since
Augustine, traditional theology considers time itself as having been
created. This view can imply creation’s coeternity with God, which
theologians such as Barth, reject. The proper way to answer the question of
creation and time is through the creative character of the divine life
(God). Positing the finite (i.e. finite beings, which include everything
that exists) within the “process of the divine life” implies that the forms
of finitude, which are the categories, are posited in the divine
life. The difference between the time of God and the time of finite
creatures is that God’s time is determined by the present, whereas ours is
determined by nonbeing: the ‘no longer’ ‘not yet’ time of existence. In the
divine life the moments of time are “essentially united”, but the moments of
time for humanity are existentially disrupted, due to the separation of
essence from existence. None of these conditions of existence apply to God.
The divine eternity includes temporality and transcends it. Under the
discussion of creation and time, time has a double character: “It
belongs to the creative process of the divine life as well as to the point
of creation which coincides with the fall”. In other words, time
participates in the destiny of created beings. We are simultaneously
essentially rooted in and existentially separated from the divine
ground beyond both. This separation has occurred in finite beings through
the polarity of freedom and destiny. To talk about ‘time’ before creation is
to point to God’s time, which precedes time as we know it and thereby cannot
really be called ‘time’. To talk about “creation in time” is to point
to the movement from God’s ‘time’ to our time, or essentially unified
time to existentially split/disrupted time. The better way to answer the
question of creation and time is to speak of “creation with time”,
because “time is the form of finitude” in both the “creative ground of the
divine life” and in “creaturely existence”. [258] All of the ontological
categories of finitude are in the creative ground of the divine life and in
the existential experience of “actualized freedom, in the fulfilment and the
self-estrangement of creaturely being”. However, the presence of the
categories in the creative ground of the God can only be asserted
symbolically, while the categories in our existence are asserted literally.

Definitions:

Time:
“Time is the form of finitude in the creative ground of the divine life
as well as in creaturely existence.” [257]

Questions:

Why
does Tillich say that the presupposition of the question as to what
happened before creation is absurd?

Why is
it important to note that God is not subjected to the conditions of
existence, which include time?

What
does it mean to say that humanity experiences time in the separation of
essence and existence? In other words, how has this separation occurred?

[258] The
argument that “the fulfilment of creation is the actualization of finite
freedom” is continued in this section and applied to humanity as “the
creature” within which finite freedom is actualized. Because the human being
is the only being within which finite freedom is completely present,
humanity is the telos of creation. The “image of God” is the biblical
phrase for the creatureliness of humanity. This phrase has undergone many
interpretations, complicated by translation of the terms imago and
similitude. These terms led to “ontological dualism” (i.e.
differentiation of the natural equipment from the divine gift in Adam) by
Irenaeus, which were rejected by Protestantism, which interpreted these
terms as indication that humanity had power to commune with God; the power
which was lost in the fall. Roman Catholicism holds that humanity did
not lose this power; rather it was simply weakened. The central point around
which these arguments turn, however, is on the interpretation of grace
within these camps. [259] Because ontological supranaturalism is untenable,
the Catholic doctrine is here rejected and the Protestant accepted. Within
Protestantism, however, there are two problems: first, the “exact meaning of
‘image of God’; second, “the nature of man’s created goodness”. The first
problem is answered by distinguishing between image of God from
relation to God. Humanity is in God’s image because humans have reason,
which is “the structure of freedom”, because the human is the only creature
within which the ontological elements are complete and united, and because
humanity’s “logos is analogous to the divine logos”. The
second problem is answered by discussing the original state of Adam as
“dreaming innocence”, which was lost at the fall. “The goodness of man’s
created nature is that he is given the possibility and necessity of
actualizing himself and of becoming independent by his self-actualization,
in spite of the estrangement unavoidable connected with it.” Because the
actualization of Adam’s freedom was the turning point, the fall, one cannot
speak of his “actual state” prior to this. To be in an “actual state” is to
be actualized. Prior to the actualization which was the fall, Adam could not
have been in an actual state. [260] Because humanity is the only
creature in whom the ontological elements are complete, all other creatures
are called “subhuman”. Because the human is the only creature who feels the
threat of nonbeing, it has less natural perfection than the others, which
are on a different ontological level than the human. Though there are
subhuman creatures, there are not superhuman creatures. The human and
subhuman creatures participate in one another, because in the human “all
levels of reality are present. [261] This is shown mythologically and
symbolically, culminating in the truth theology should learn from “modern
naturalism”: “what happens in the microcosm happens by mutual participation
in the macrocosmos, for being itself is one.”

Definitions:

The
Telos of Creation: “The fulfilment of creation is the actualization
of finite freedom … man is the telos of creation. In other beings
there are preformations of freedom … but the power of transcending the
chain of stimulus and response by deliberation and decision is absent.
No other being has a complete self and a complete world; no other being
is aware of finitude on the basis of an awareness of potential
infinity.” [258]

Justitia Originalis:
“Man in his pure nature is not only the image of God; he has also the
power of communion with god and therefore righteousness toward other
creatures and himself (justitia originalis).” [258]

Rational: “Rational can be defined as technical reason in the sense of
arguing and calculating.” [259]

Subhuman: “Man is the creature in which the ontological elements are
complete. They are incomplete in all creatures, which (for this very
reason) are called ‘subhuman.’ This does not imply less perfection than
in the case of the human. On the contrary, man as the essentially
threatened creature cannot compare with the natural perfection of the
subhuman creatures.” [260]

Questions:

What
is the fulfillment of creation, and how does this relate to humanity?

Why is
the Catholic interpretation of “image of God” rejected?

How
does Tillich distinguish the “image of God” from the “relation to God”?

What
reasons does Tillich give for the assertion of the meaning “image of
God”, applies to reason? Do you agree? Why?

Why
could Adam not have had an “actual state” before the fall?

How
does humanity and the rest of the world participate in one another?

Changes in
German:

[260]+7: all
[+other] creatures

[260]+15: has
[-to be +been] given

[260]+19:
(Paul should be Peter; German preserves the mistake)

[260]-10:
[-They underlie…the Christian Era.]

[260]-6:
[-They appear…same substance and power.]8 (note that footnote 8 is
preserved in the German)

[261] The
actualization of human freedom occurs within “the whole of reality”. This
actualization involves the resistance both of nonbeing and the ground of
being which we depend on. Yet ironically, humanity cannot actualize freedom
without its dependence on “its creative ground”, and cannot resist nonbeing
but by the power of being-itself. The traditional doctrine of the
preservation of the world involved “the relation of God to the creature in
its actualized freedom”, through which deism has entered into the
theological tradition. [262] In attempts to speak of God’s preservation
of the world, the untenable notion of deism (including consistent and
theistic deism) has surfaced. A better interpretation of God’s preservation
of the world explains preservation as God’s “continuous creativity”. This
description defeats deism. Further, distinguishing originating from
sustaining creativity; culminating in a faith that God’s sustaining
creativity “is the faith in the continuity of the structure of reality as
the basis for being and acting.” [262-263] Worldviews have fluctuated from
negating to emphasizing the significance of God’s sustaining creativity.
[263] The concepts of immanence and transcendence have been replaced by the
incorrect phrase “as well as”, which point to a spatial God both in
and above the world. Because God is “neither I another nor in the
same space as the world”, the non-spatial articulation of God as “immanent
in the world as its permanent creative ground and transcendent to the world
through freedom”, is a better answer to the question of God’s preservation
of the world. God does not ‘preserve’ the world. Rather, God creatively
sustains the world.

Definitions:

Consistent deism: God does not interfere with creation after its
beginning. [262]

Theistic deism: God interferes with creation only occasionally through
miracles and revelation. [262]

Consistent theism: God acts in a “continual interrelationship”. [262]

Preservation: the continuous creativity of God. [262]

Deus Sive Natura:
“A phrase which indicates that the name ‘God’ does not add anything to
what is already involved in the name ‘nature.’” [262]

Questions:

What
is the irony in the asserting that the human actualization of freedom
“includes structural independence … the possibility of resisting the
return to the ground of being”?

Why is
the phrase “as well as”, which replaced the concepts of immanence and
transcendence, problematic?

How
does Tillich offer a better answer to the question of God’s preservation
of the world?

[263] The
question of the purpose of creation is so ambiguous that it is not worthy of
developing. The concept is shown to be ambiguous in the following way: from
the perspective of creation, it “has no purpose beyond itself”, the
creature, creation is its way to actualize itself, the creator, “the
exercise of his creativity”. [264] In Calvinist theology God does not need
creation to give him glory. In Lutheran theology, God’s purpose for creation
is to have a loving relationship with “his creatures”. Yet the world here
also, can offer nothing to God. The “telos of creativity” is a better
notion than that of a “purpose of creation”. With the telos of creativity,
traditionally called ‘providence’, God directs creation towards the inner
aim of “fulfilling in actuality what is beyond potentiality and actuality in
the divine life.”

[264]
“Providence is a paradoxical concept” because faith in divine providence is
held “in spite of” ‘the darkness of fate and the meaninglessness of
existence.” This concept has been manifest in different ways: in Plato, as
the overcoming of dark fate through “the good” (ultimate power of being and
knowledge); in the late ancient world through a reign of terror, and in
Christianity fate and fear were defeated by Christ. Subsequently
Christianity transformed the concept of fate from providence to “a rational
principle at the expense of its paradoxical character”. [265] This
transformation has occurred in three forms: the teleological, which holds
that all things serve God’s purpose as human happiness; the harmonistic,
which argues that behind the “egoistic concerns” of people, there is a law
of harmony moving; and the dialectical, wherein the self-realization of God
is the explanation of history. [266] The modern era is characterized by a
dark view of fate, from which individuals respond by seeking individual
fulfillment; returning to the “same struggle in which originally the
Christian victory was won.”

Definitions:

The
Teleological Way: All things are constructed so that they serve the
purpose of God’s action, which is human happiness [265]

The
Harmonistic Way: The law of harmony always works towards overcoming the
egoistic intentions of humans. The ‘universe bends towards justice’
[265]

[266] With
respect to providence, God is usually ambiguously understood either as
‘foreseeing” or ‘fore-ordering’, implying God as an “omniscient spectator”
or a “planner who has ordered everything that will happen”. The former leads
to creatures either making their own world as God watches, or creatures as
“cogs in a universal mechanism”, with God “as the only active agent”. Both
views are problematic. God is rather a director who constantly creates
through human freedom, directing everything towards its fulfillment;
regardless of situation or circumstance. [266-267] This view of ‘providence’
includes all existential conditions, though God does not interfere, God
creates. [267] Providence is “the divine condition” always present in finite
conditions. Providence is neither miraculous nor divine activity, it is
“inner directedness”. Through faith in providence, the believer
asserts that nothing can frustrate the fulfillment of his ultimate destiny.
A prayer is not made with the expectation that God will change situation or
events, but with the hope that God will direct the situation towards
fulfillment. In a true prayer, the individual surrenders a part of himself
to God, and expresses faith in God’s directing activity.

Definitions:

Pro-videre:
fore-seeing and fore-ordering [266]

Providence: Providence is a quality of every constellation of
conditions, a quality which ‘drives’ or ‘lures’ toward fulfilment.
Providence is the ‘divine condition’ which is present in every group of
finite conditions and in the totality of finite conditions.” [267]

Questions:

What
is Tillich’s articulation of a proper meaning of providence? Do you
think it is an improvement upon the classical doctrine of providence?

[267]
Providence and special providence are distinguished; the former referring to
individual and historical time, the latter is meant to assure an individual
person that God through the “divine factor” keeps the possibility for
fulfilment open. [268] Providence and special providence were not
distinguished in the ancient understanding. Human fate was believed to be
beyond a person's control, thus special providence had a liberating effect;
which appears in philosophical movements such as Stoicism. In Christianity,
providence assumes a personal relationship to God, including personal
protection and guidance. Faith in this kind of providence encourages hope
and confidence, but has a double edged character. It can become problematic
when a person assumes that God’s providence will change his or her
circumstances. In fact the inverse is true. Providence gives a person
courage to bear any circumstances without the circumstances changing.
Providence allows for transcendence. Historical providence on the other
hand, has been embraced by Christianity from its root in Old Testament
Judaic thought. Like special providence, historical providence can become
dangerous when faith is invested in expectations of certain historical
events, ends, or processes. Again, providence allows for transcendence of
history, not the alteration of history.

Definitions:

Special Providence: “The certainty that under any circumstances, under
any set of conditions, the divine “factor” is active and that therefore
the road to . . . ultimate fulfillment is open.” [267]

Individual Providence: Providence as it is felt and understood by the
individual. [268]

Historical Providence: The understanding of the eternal creativity of
God as experienced in and through history, without allowing the outcome
of specific historical events to determine one's faith. [268]

Questions:

What
is the difference between individual and historical providence?

In
what way has the history of Christianity changed the understanding and
faith in Providence?

[269] The
difficulties involved in existential finitude give rise to the question of
theodicy, the answer of which is given in a paradoxical faith in providence.
The physical pain (i.e. finitude and the threat of nonbeing) is a necessary
result of the creativity of the divine. Because God cannot create anything
that is contrary to himself, though God does create that which has become
finite. This only partially answers the question of theodicy. [270] To fully
answer the question, we must be aware of the existential nature of all
theological questions: theological questions are relevant only for those
asking them. To answer a universal theological question, we must determine
where our life intersects other lives. That intersection is found in our
mutual participation in the ground of being. This then means that all
questions have both a universal and personal implication. This understanding
of individuality and participation is the answer to the question of theodicy
in that all beings participate in the ground of being so there can be no
division between the fulfilled and the unfulfilled in human life. Because
they participate in the ground of being, all must be fulfilled. God
participates in and transcends finitude, as the divine creativity, which
makes paradoxical providence possible. Therefore the answer to the question
of theodicy is faith in God who is the ground of being. Because God is
creativity, universal participation in the ground of being denies the
exclusion of any being, thus no being is excluded from fulfillment.

Definitions:

Theodicy: The question of the justification for evil and pain in the
world if God is just and good why some beings are seemingly “excluded
from any kind of fulfilment.” [269]

Patripassianism: “The doctrine that God the Father has suffered in
Christ.” [270]

Questions:

What
problem does the idea of Patripassianism present if God is the ground of
being?

[271] God as
the ground of being and all relations of being is not a being. Thus God does
not relate to beings as a being. To speak of a relation to God is to speak
symbolically in the same way that we speak of God as a living God. Symbols,
because of their inadequacy in reaching the ground of being, must be both
affirmed and denied in their use. This true when we speak of relation
to God. A relation assumes that God can become an object in the human
subject-object or self-world sense of relation, but God is always a subject.
God is in a way unapproachable, which means that God as inapproachable is
nuanced in the term ‘holy’. In a relation with God, the ego embraces the
ground of all relations, and embraces itself. [272] It is ultimately
insulting to speak of God as a ‘partner’, or an object in relation to our
subjectivity. The terms “majesty” and “glory” are symbols for God's
transcendence found in the Old Testament and Calvinism. To take these
symbols too far is to forget that all qualities of the divine life are
qualified by God's holiness. Yet humanity participates, through the ground
of being, in holiness. And when humanity praises God's as holy, humanity
participates in holiness.

Definitions:

Holy:
A word denoting the unapproachability of God, “the impossibility of
having a relation with [God] in the proper sense of the word” [271].

[273] The
symbol of omnipotence separates Christianity from all religions that posit
gods with being, rather than the ground of being itself. Only a God that is
not a being can be humanity’s ultimate concern. Omnipotence is the symbol
which answers the first question of finitude. The symbol of omnipotence does
not connote a personal god that acts arbitrarily. This would make God a
finite being among other beings, even if he were the most powerful, and he
could not be of ultimate concern. God transcends actuality and potentiality,
as well as time and space. The expression of omnipotence within the
ontological structure of being (i.e. the categories), and the subject-object
structure as a whole are eternity, omnipresence, and omniscience
respectively.

Definitions:

Omnipotence: The symbol of God's power in “resisiting and conquering
nonbeing”. [272]

[274] Eternity
is an expression implying God as the ground of being, and is a better
articulation of God than the traditional ‘omni-’ or all-temporality
indicated by examples such as ‘omnipotence’ or ‘omnipresence’. Eternity
alludes to the “power” which embraces all time; and time is a significant
part of finitude. God as eternal means that God is that which stands against
and transcends the temporal even as God participates in it. The eternal is
composed of past, present and future equally and simultaneously, but it is
the transcendent unity of the three aspects of temporality- without their
loss of their distinctive modes of existence. Eternity is in this way not
timelessness, but neither is it endlessness of time. [275] If time were
endlessness, God would be less than divine, because he would be subjected to
endless temporal moments. This would mean that God could not be the ground
of being, or eternity itself. These assertions about timelessness and the
endlessness of time beg the question, about the existence of the modes of
time. First, the analogy of eternity found in human life will be used. This
is the remembrance of past, combined with expectation of the future, within
the present. The center of this analogy is a present that does not cease to
move between past and future, but which is also ever present. The future
must be open to God, God must know and anticipate it, or God would be less
than God. [276] The same goes for eternity's relation to the past. Eternity
is not dependent upon the past. The past, like the future, is changeable
rather than static, thus containing potentiality. Eternity stands as the
basis for the courage that negates the anxiety of the future and the past.
Eternal life is found through participation in the eternal ground of being.

Definitions:

Eternity: “Is neither timelessness nor the endlessness of time . . . It
means the power of embracing all periods of time.” [274]

[276] “God’s
relation to space, as his relation to time, must be interpreted in
qualitative terms.” [277] God is neither in nor outside of space and time.
Theology needs to focus on the symbolic, rather than the literal application
of phrases such as ‘God is in heaven’. This does not mean that God is
spatially and temporally present in heaven. This means that God’s “Life is
qualitatively different from creaturely existence.” God “transcends” and
“participates” in the spatial-temporality under which categorical structure
we live, “But God is not subject to it; he transcends it and participates in
it.” The ascription of God relating to time but not to space is also
problematic; it stems from a poor ontology which locates vitality and
personality in God. This is a problematic ontology because vitality and
personality are applicable only to a person who has a “bodily basis.” [278]
When we realize that God transcends the spatial-temporal designation, we
have existential relief. Because God is beyond this distinction, we can find
relief from our anxiety and experience the courage which allows us to
overcome our fears in this life. When we find this relief in God, we enter
into the supra spatial-temporal sanctuary, which is God.

Definitions:

Omnipresence: The notion of God as “An extension of the divine substance
throughout all spaces…can be interpreted to mean that God is present
‘personally’ in a circumscribed place (in heaven above but also
simultaneously present with his power every place (in the earth
beneath). [277]

The
Sacramental Presence of God: The “Actual manifestation of [God’s]
omnipresence”. The existential relation to God that we can have, where
the anxiety of our lack of a self space is overcome with a courage to
“accept the insecurities and anxieties of spatial existence.” God
transcends the sacred-secular distinction. [278]

Questions:

Why is
it important that God should be understood as transcending space and
time?

How is
this important distinction helpful to our lives? Do you agree that this
understanding of God relieves human anxiety? Why?

[278]
Omniscience is a symbol that expresses the way in which God is Spirit.
Divine omnipotence and omnipresence have a spiritual character, which is
expressed in the symbol of omniscience. The first task for theology is to
provide good interpretation of the term ‘omniscience’. [278-279] God is not
contained within the subject-object structure of reality. God transcends the
structure of finitude, for God is Spirit. God is ‘present’ in the finitude
of humanity only in a symbolic and spiritual way. Thus when theology speaks
of God’s omniscience, it should avoid anthropomorphic assertions about God.
[279] Because ‘in’ God the rational and the abysmal are unified, humanity
enjoys an existential peace. Because darkness and “hiddenness” are in God as
Spirit, they are not in humanity. Thus when we have faith in the divine
omniscience, our anxiety is relieved. Further, because duality is unified in
God, there is no “split of being which makes things strange and unrelated to
each other”. In other words, God is the One for the many. Because God is the
Logos, we can participate in the discovery of truth by faith in “the symbol
of the divine omniscience”, which is God.

Definitions:

Omniscience: “The symbol of omniscience expresses the spiritual
character of the divine omnipotence and omnipresence. It is related to
the subject-object structure of reality and points to the divine
participation in and transcendence over this structure.” [278] “The
logical (thought not always conscious) foundation of the belief in the
openness of reality to human knowledge.” [278,279]

Questions:

Why is
it important to realize that God is not to be subsumed “under the
subject-object scheme”?

[279] Love
should not be defined by its emotional side, because the emotional side of
love is only a consequence of its ontological side. God is love. God is
being-itself. Therefore, being-itself is love; and its actuality is life.
Love is an ontological characteristic. [280] Love unifies the tension
between the individualization and desire for participation which humanity
experiences. To say that God is love is to speak symbolically. God as love
expresses a love (agape) that seeks to reach out to a person, and fulfill
the persons longing. God as love symbolizes universality, and the unity of
God and humanity. God is agape love. [281] “God works toward the fulfillment
of every creature and toward the bringing-together into the unity of his
life all who are separated and disrupted.” The love of humanity toward God
is not the same as the love of God towards humanity. God’s love is not
self-seeking, where humanity’s love is. Humanity’s love is eros love. [282]
Because God is the One for the Many, God love’s that which is estranged from
God’s self. This is the proper articulation of Augustine’s notion of God
loving God’s self (the “trinitarian personae”). The forms of humanity’s love
can be evil (when it is selfish, self debasing or self hating).

Definitions:

Love:
Love is ontological. God is love; love is being-itself, and is
actualized in life; the unity of individualization and participation
[279].

Agape:
Divine love; the love of one person to another, and the love of one
person to God; a selfless love which “seeks the fulfillment of the
longing of” another being. Agape unites the lover with the beloved (God
with humanity), does not show partiality, suffers, forgives and accepts.
[280]

Caritas: the Latin translation of the term Agape; comes from the English
word Charity. [280]

Libido:
“The movement of the needy toward that which fulfils the need” [280].

Philia:
“The movement of the equal toward union with the equal” [280].

Eros:
“The movement of that which is lower in power and meaning to that which
is higher.” [280]

Eschaton: “The ultimate fulfillment in which [God] is ‘all in all’.
[281]

Summum
Bonum: A Latin term, which refers to the highest good. [281]

Question:

Why is
it important to maintain a distinction between the emotional
interpretation, and the ontological interpretation, of divine love?

[282] God as
divine love also displays divine justice. God does not take away the freedom
of the subject (i.e. the person), or superimpose God’s self on the
existential state of the person. The divine love unifies the person with
God, without destroying the freedom of the independent self entering into
the love relation from each side. [283-284] Divine love involves divine
justice. This means that the divine love honors the freedom of a person, and
accomplishes the fulfillment of a person- resulting in reunion for both.
[283] However, in addition to luring and affirming, justice “also resists
and condemns.” Divine love is related to- not in conflict with- divine
power. This relation is exemplified in divine justice. Divine power is
being-itself. When a person violates “the structure of justice”, that person
“violates love itself.” The result of this violation is judgment and
condemnation. “Condemnation is not the negation of love but the negation of
the negation of love.” This is the way in which nonbeing is not permitted to
overcome being. This is the way in which God maintains the structures of
being and the structures of justice. Love can accomplish these things
because of its ontological character. The creature that rejects divine love
will undergo self-destruction: this is the way in which theology should use
the symbol of ‘God’s wrath’. [284] The eschatological connotation of God’s
judgment is not of a temporal duration. In God there is a union of
temporality and eternity. Therefore, one who rejects God ultimately rejects
being, therefore losing the possibility of continuing as a being- thus
moving from being to non-being. This is so because one can only have being
if one is related to the ground of all being.

Definitions:

Justice: “Justice is that side of divine love which affirms the
independent right of object and subject within the love relation.” [282]

Symbiotic love: The kind of love which entails “chaotic self surrender
or chaotic self-imposition…(Eric Fromm)”. This is often the character of
romantic love. [282]

Divine
Wrath: The result of resisting divine love, which is condemnation,
judgment, and self-destruction. [283-284] The awareness of this
self-destructive nature of evil. [284]

Condemnation: The result of resisting divine love, which is nonbeing.
[284]

Justification: The expression of love and justice unified in God; the
union of the structures of justice with “The divine act in which love
conquers the immanent consequences of the violation of justice.
[284-285]

Grace:
“The divine love in relation to the unjust sinner is grace.” [285]

Questions:

The
estrangement of a person from God is the person’s resistance of God’s
love. Why does this resistance result in non-being and self-destruction?

Love
does not end because being does not end. This is so because God is
being-itself, and God is love. If one’s rejection of God is rejection of
being-itself, is the traditional notion of ‘hell’ to be understood as a
continued temporal existence for the person under condemnation? Why or
why not?

[285] Because
of God’s grace, God initiates a relation between Gods self and humanity. God
allows beings to be. God, in God’s grace, gives unique participation to
every being, accepts and fulfils every being, and makes this possible by
mediating on behalf of every being. Double predestination is untenable,
because it contradicts the being-itself and the love-itself, which is God.
The notion of predestination is a fallacious consequence, because it
excludes “existential participation”. All theological consequences should be
grounded in existential participation. [286] By predestination, God unifies
the polarity of freedom and destiny. Predestination should be interpreted as
symbolism, as should all articulation alluding to the relation between God
and the creature. From the perspective of humanity, predestination implies
causality and determination. This is problematic. Predestination should be
understood as pointing towards the existential experience that is fulfilled
in God. “Predestination is the highest affirmation of the divine love, not
its negation.” Human existence has no higher answer than the divine love.
This is answer is epitomized by the incarnation- it is the Christological
answer. Jesus appearing as the Christ is the existential answer of the
divine love.

Definitions:

Grace
(gratia, charis): The relation between God and humanity is in no way
contingent upon humanity, it is initiated by God. This is grace. There
are three forms of grace: Creating Grace, which offers the possibility
of unique and individual participation in being-itself to all other
beings. “The second form of grace [Saving Grace] is paradoxical; it
gives fulfillment to that which is separated from the source of
fulfillment, and it accepts that which is unacceptable.” The third form
of grace (Providential Grace) mediates between the first and second
forms, resulting in unity. [285]

Gratia
Praeveniens: The classical term for Providential Grace. This is the
grace of God which prepares humanity for the possibility of accepting
Saving Grace, via history. [285]

[286] The two
primary symbols used in the articulation of a person-to-person relationship
to God are “God as Lord and God as Father”. [287] These two “symbol spheres”
are coterminous and inseparable. The Lord is the Father and the Father is
the Lord. Theology has not understood the importance of holding the two
symbols together; theology has erred by emphasizing one over the other. God
as Lord implies the holy power of God. The symbol of “Lord” emphasizes the
transcendence of God, expresses the divine will (Logos of being), and
implies the fulfillment of every creature (the telos of creation). If God
were only Lord and not Father, God would be seen as a despotic ruler, and
obedience to God would swallow the possibility for love of God. Humanity
would lose autonomy, and God would save people by destroying their freedom.
This is why God must be understood as Lord and as Father. Lord implies the
distance between God and humanity. Father implies the union. [288] God is
not simply a “friendly-father” who would suspend justice and judgment. Guilt
and justice are necessary in order for humanity to see the need for
forgiveness. God as Lord necessitates these. God as Father becomes an object
of humanity’s ultimate concern. The symbols of God as Lord and as Father
express a transcendent (infinite) reality, and reach into the existential
world of human finitude. [289] God is Lord and Father, but God is also
being-itself, and Son and Brother in the existence of humanity.

Definitions:

God as
Lord: A symbol of God’s holy power. [287]

God as
Father: A symbol expressing the relation of humanity to God who is holy
love. [287]

The
Ego-Thou relation: the relation of the ego of a being (“I”) to the thou
of being-itself (God). [289]

Questions:

Should
God be understood as a despotic ruler? Why or why not?

It is
important to keep Lord and Father together as symbols of God. What are
some of the consequences when one is emphasized over the other?