From Eastern Roman Revanche to Byzantium under Siege I: Justinian I (527-565)

From Eastern Roman Revanche to Byzantium under Siege I: Justinian I (527-565)

A first question regards the disturbances at the beginning
of his rule. Were the Nika Riots extremely serious? On the one
hand, he could very well have lost his rule in an urban revolt
and coup. On the other hand, it was put down as soon as the Emperor
displayed resoluteness, and he was not faced with similar outbursts
during the rest of his reign. It seems that this incident captures
the volatility and degree of urban politicization in Constantinople
and other cities of those years, setting it off from Western Europe
which did not possess the degree of political sophistication, urban
development, or popular involvement. It also demonstrates the
intermittent confluence of interests between claimants and disaffected
urban factions, and the peril of excessive Imperial fiscal extractiveness.
It should not be construed as revealing systemic weakness in the emerging
Byzantine body politic, but rather the political vitality of its
subjects.

We have considered elsewhere Justinian's
western campaigns and their effects.
Here it is necessary to examine his motives. It is tempting to
think that after the Nika disturbances, he needed a foreign distraction
that would both prove his martial vigor and unite the people in
an outward direction. Though this may have impacted upon his timing,
Justinian seems too purposeful and reasoning an individual to launch
so momentous an operation just as a national distraction to save
his throne. At the same time, it is unlikely that he planned to
attack North Africa, Italy, and even Spain from the start. As
regards the latter, only a Visigothic revolt in the early 550s
allowed him the opportunity to grab the southern coast. In general
terms, though, Justinian's program was indeed restorative, yet perhaps
not entirely planned from the start. Reforms were initially internal.
Codifying the laws and restoring the fiscal basis of the state
were natural starting places. After subduing internal opposition,
he then went on to rid the bureaucracy of the corruption that had
set in since Zeno began selling administrative offices. Only then,
and not without the proper political circumstances in Vandal North
Africa, did he contemplate foreign involvement. Its rapid success
facilitated the jump to Italy, which was also undertaken only when
situation on the ground seemed to assure success.

Beyond this though, one could argue that an Eastern Roman attempt
at reconquest of the West was predetermined. Emperors in Constantinople
had never regarded Italy as totally out of their sphere of concern.
Further, though granting temporary legitimacy to Odovacar or Theodoric
the Ostrogoth, these had not been earnest acknowledgements of a
new order. Odovacar had not been appointed to his position, but
had presented Constantinople with a fait accompli.
Likewise, Zeno sent Theodoric west not because he thought it was
the best new ordering of the Empire, but because he was urgently
trying to relieve his state of Ostrogothic pressure. Thus no Eastern
Roman leader viewed the situation in the West as legitimate or
permanent, and anyone of them who had the capacity would try to
reverse it, returning to a unified Roman Empire. Anastasia had
moved in this direction, sending flotillas to Italy, but the ecclesiastical
schism of the time had undercut his prospects. This was no longer
an issue for Justinian.

Many of Justinian's leading advisers opposed the expeditions
to the West, claiming that challenges in the North and East would
not permit it. In this, there is some merit. Justinian would
simply not accept that which was probably quite true--the Empire
could not fight a two-front war, and the proof emerged after 540.
Indeed, by devoting all his resources to the West, Justinian invited
Eastern disaster. Still, what we can determine of Justinian's
design was not too far-fetched. Targeting the North African littoral,
the southern Spanish coast, the Adriatic, and peninsular Italy,
he only appears to have been trying to restore the coastal core
of ancient Mediterranean society. This was the most thoroughly
Romanized area, as well as the most revenue-producing. Success
would have strengthened his state tremendously indeed.

We have seen how the thoroughly destructive nature of
roman-Gothic warfare in Italy brought the region to the brink of
the Dark Ages, the descent into which was facilitated by Lombard
arrival. The Justinian era exhibits similar dynamics for the East.
The plague ushered in a characteristic of Byzantium to the end
of the millennium--a severe constriction of human and material
resources in comparison to Antiquity. It also caused a fatigue
whereby each crisis the state faced appeared to be a life-or-death
matter. The Avar-Slav invasions fit into this context. These
invasion-migrations are quite important, being the third sustained
wave of Barbarian infiltration into Mediterranean lands. The Gothic,
Vandal, and other Germanic invaders of the 370-420 period had moved
through Eastern Roman lands as fast as possible, plundering some,
yet settling almost none, and not wrecking the culture or ecology.
The second wave, comprising Huns and subject peoples, had been
violent, pillaging expeditions in the Danube region, which extorted
great amounts of gold from the imperial treasury. Huns as well,
however, were a temporary disaster. The Avars and Slavs were different.
Not only did they raid and exact tribute, but they stayed in Byzantine lands,
particularly the Slavs, who were egged on buy the post-570 Avar
state on the Danube. This would cause peasant flight, as well as
full-scale urban decline in the Balkans and even Thrace. What was
needed to preserve Justinian's accomplishments, therefore, were
talented emperors and good fortune in dealing with the Barbarians.
Neither would materialize.