Blair's account, like the intelligence field in general, treats many distinct constructs as if they were practically interchangeable – this is not self-evident. Paradigm integration and rationalization of redundant nomenclature are important for the continued development of understanding. The prior task is to demonstrate where synonymity of constructs across paradigms occurs, and where it fails. We present arguments why this is the case. (Published Online April 5 2006).

We report performance measures for lexical decision, word naming, and progressive demasking for a large sample of monosyllabic, monomorphemic French words (N = 1,482). We compare the tasks and also examine the impact of word length, word frequency, initial phoneme, orthographic and phonological distance to neighbors, age-of-acquisition, and subjective frequency. Our results show that objective word frequency is by far the most important variable to predict reaction times in lexical decision. For word naming, it is the first phoneme. Progressive demasking (...) was more influenced by a semantic variable (word imageability) than lexical decision, but was also affected to a much greater extent by perceptual variables (word length, first phoneme/letters). This may reduce its usefulness as a psycholinguistic word recognition task. (shrink)

Feminist thinkers have long criticized liberal theory’s public/private distinction for perpetuating indifference to injustices within the family. Thinkers such as Susan Okin have extended this criticism in evaluating the theory of political liberalism, suggesting that this theory’s reliance on a public conception of citizenship renders it indifferent to the way in which the internal politics of the family can undermine equality.However, I argue in this article that the feminist concern to ensure equality within the domestic sphere can in fact be (...) incorporated into a reconstructed account of political liberalism. Central to my strong public reconstruction is the principle of publicly justifiable privacy, according to which the public/private distinction itselfmust be formulated with reference to the values of free and equal citizenship. On my account, the public values of citizenship should figure prominently in evaluations of family life. This reformulation of the public/private distinction answers feminist critics who suggest that political liberalism fails to offer a politics of the personal. (shrink)

Beloved author of, among many other books, the bestsellers How to Argue and Win Every Time and The Making of a Country Lawyer , Gerry Spence distills a lifetime of wisdom and observation about how we live, and how we ought to live in Seven Simple Steps to Personal Freedom . Here, in seven chapters, he delivers messages that inspire us first to recognize our servitude-to money, possessions, corporations, the status quo, and our own fears-and then shows us how (...) to begin the self-defining process toward liberation. Seven Simple Steps to Personal Freedom is a powerfully affirming, large-hearted, and life-changing book that asks us all to take the greatest risk for the greatest reward-our own freedom. (shrink)

In order for us to have epistemic justification, Sinnott-Armstrong believes we do not have to be able to rule out all sceptical hypotheses. He suggests that it is sufficient if we have 'modestly justified beliefs', i.e., if our evidence rules out all non-sceptical alternatives. I argue that modest justification is not sufficient for epistemic justification. Either modest justification is independent of our ability to rule out sceptical hypotheses, but is not a kind of epistemic justification, or else modest justification is (...) a kind of epistemic justification, but is not truly independent of our ability to rule out sceptical hypotheses. (shrink)

Anti?substitution intuitions play a central role in discussion of the semantics of propositional attitude ascriptions, and all theorists seem to agree that these intuitions should be explained by either semantic or pragmatic means. Jennifer Saul (2007) has recently argued that it is impossible to explain all our anti?substitution intuitions thus. In particular, she argues that any account of the semantics of propositional attitude ascriptions faces the ?Enlightenment Problem? ? i.e. no such account can explain the fact that we have anti?substitution (...) intuitions about utterances of speakers who are ?unenlightened? as to the fact that certain names are co?referential. In this paper, I suggest an alternative explanation of our intuitions about unenlightened utterances, and in doing so offer an original strategy for explaining truth?conditional intuitions by either semantic or pragmatic means. (shrink)

Humanitarian aid professionals frequently encounter situations in which one is conscious of the morally appropriate action but cannot take it because of institutional obstacles. Dilemmas like this are likely to result in a specific kind of stress reaction at the individual level, labeled as moral stress. In our study, 16 individuals working with international humanitarian aid and rescue operations participated in semistructured interviews, analyzed in accordance with a grounded theory approach. A theoretical model of ethical decision making from a moral (...) stress perspective was developed. The practical implications of the study are discussed. (shrink)

I reply to comments by Gerry Hough, Peter Baumann and Martijn Blaauw on my book Moral Skepticisms. The main issues concern whether modest justifiedness is epistemic and how it is related to extreme justifiedness; how contrastivists can handle crazy contrast classes, indeterminacy and common language; whether Pyrrhonian scepticism leads to paralysis in decision-making or satisfies our desires to evaluate beliefs as justified or not; and how contextualists can respond to my arguments against relevance of contrast classes.

Philosophers of language traditionally take it that anti-substitution intuitions teach us about the content of belief reports. Jennifer Saul [1997, 2002 (with David Braun), 2007] challenges this lesson. Here I offer a response to Saul’s challenge. In the first two sections of the article, I present a common sense justification for drawing conclusions about content from anti-substitution intuitions. Then, in Sect. 3, I outline Saul’s challenge—what she calls ‘the Enlightenment Problem’. Finally, in Sect. 4, I argue that Saul’s challenge does (...) not undermine the common sense justification presented in Sects. 1 and 2. I avoid the challenge by arguing that anti-substitution intuitions are not directly sensitive to the content of the sentences that produce them, but rather to the possibility that one could have distinct ways of thinking about an object. (shrink)

Discussion is frequently observed in democratic politics, but change in view is rarely observed. Call this the unchanging minds hypothesis. I assume that a given belief or desire is not isolated, but, rather, is located in a network structure of attitudes, such that persuasion sufficient to change an attitude in isolation is not sufficient to change the attitude as supported by its network. The network structure of attitudes explains why the unchanging minds hypothesis seems to be true, and why it (...) is false: due to the network, the effects of deliberative persuasion are typically latent, indirect, delayed, or disguised. Finally, I connect up the coherence account of attitudes to several topics in recent political and democratic theory. Key Words: deliberation  democracy  persuasion  change in view  coherence. (shrink)

This paper applies recent work on scripts and stories developed as tools of evidential reasoning in artificial intelligence to model the use of argument from analogy as a rhetorical device of persuasion. The example studied is Gerry Spence’s closing argument in the case of Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corporation, said to be the most persuasive closing argument ever used in an American trial. It is shown using this example how argument from analogy is based on a similarity premise where similarity (...) between two cases is modeled using the device of a story scheme from the hybrid theory of legal evidential reasoning (Bex in Arguments, stories and criminal evidence: a formal hybrid theory. Springer, Dordrecht 2011). It is shown how the rhetorical strategy of Spence’s argumentation in the closing argument interweaves argument from analogy with explanation through three levels. (shrink)

Jean Baudrillard loved cinema and was fascinated by the collusions which occur between it and life. He also believed that technologies of virtualization and the pursuit of realism were deeply harmful to the quality of the cinematic image. Precisely at the time when cinema was subject to these forces he pointed out that it is coming to play a far more important role in the collective understanding of history than are the best scholarly histories. Because of the focus he took (...) concerning cinema his work will remain important to discussions of the intersections between film and philosophy well into the future. (shrink)

Realist philosophies of science posit a dialectical relation between theoretical, explanatory knowledge and practical, including taxonomic knowledge. This paper examines the dialectic between the theory of descent and empirical, Linnaean taxonomy which is based on a logic of traditional classes. It considers the arguments of David Hull to the effect that many of the practical problems of empirical classification can be resolved by means of an ontology based upon the theory of descent in which species taxa are regarded as individuals (...) rather than as classes or natural kinds.Contra Hull, it is argued that this view is, at best, only partially consistent with taxonomic practice and that it cannot sustain experimental practice which presupposes that species taxa be regarded as natural kinds. An outline is given of a possible alternative dialectic between a field theory of morphogenesis and a rational systematics involving a logic of relations. (shrink)

The concept of wildness not only plays a role in philosophical debates, but also in popular culture. Wild nature is often seen as a place outside the cultural sphere where one can still encounter instances of transcendence. Some writers and moviemakers contest the dominant romanticized view of wild nature by telling stories that somehow show a different harsher face of nature. In encounters with the wild and unruly, humans can sometimes experience the misfit between their well-ordered, human-centered, self-created world view (...) and the otherness of nature, and in doing so face, what Plumwood calls, “the view from the outside.” Three films—Gerry, Into the Wild, and Grizzly Man—deal with contemporary encounters with wildness. What these works have in common is the central theme of modern humans who are fascinated by wild nature and seek experiences unknown to those limited to the overly cultivated life (psyche) of modern society. Another connecting theme, however, is that any idealization of wildness is in itself deeply problematic. All three films have fatal endings, which in turn fascinates the contemporary viewers. These films show, first, that wildness is conceived as a moral counterforce against the overly civilized world; and, second, that fascination with this wildness has itself become thoroughly reflexive, and. (shrink)

Somatosensory processing for action guidance can be dissociated from perception and memory processing. The dorsal system has a global bias and the ventral system has a local processing bias. Autistics illustrate the point, showing a bias for part over wholes. Lateralized differences have also been noted in these modalities. The multi-modal dysfunction observed may suggest more an issue of interhemispheric communication.

Shylock's famous speech is music to the ears of modern liberals: Hath not a Jew eyes, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions? Fed with the same food, hurt with the same weapons, subject to the same diseases, heated by the same means, warmed and cooled by the same winter and summer, as a Christian is? If you pick us, do we not bleed? If you tickle us do we not laugh? If you poison us do we not die?

Artificial neural networks have weaknesses as models of cognition. A conventional neural network has limitations of computational power. The localist representation is at least equal to its competition. We contend that locally connected neural networks are perfectly capable of storing and retrieving the individual features, but the process of reconstruction must be otherwise explained. We support the localist position but propose a “hybrid” model that can begin to explain cognition in anatomically plausible terms.