Re : Common ground for study

... Neither of these statements is unreasonable or untrue, but I think they could be taken as suggesting or presupposing (or leading to) something more

Message 1 of 12
, Aug 1, 2003

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Steve Davies wrote:

> On a related matter being discussed here, I, and I suspect Mike
> Grondin, seem to take people's Christian faith seriously. So, it
> should follow, that if a person will make certain faith statements
> in regard to Jesus that that person will hold views of Jesus that
> will effect his notions of HJ.

Mike Grondin wrote:

> No. 'Z' is a variable. I specifically didn't use 'X' cuz I feared
> it would be mistaken to represent Christianity. Now as to your
> further questions (which I won't quote, since they somewhat
> embodied the misunderstanding): I generally believe that good
> history requires both knowledge of, and "distance" from, subject.
> This "distance" is what I would call 'impartiality'. One needs to
> be close enough to know the subject, but yet far enough away so
> as not to act as a shill for the subject. A balancing act, for sure.
> Now you put church history in the hands of a Eusebius, say, and you
> aren't likely to see any embarassing warts. Put it in the hands of
> someone at the opposite pole and all you see is warts.

Neither of these statements is unreasonable or untrue, but I think they
could be taken as suggesting or presupposing (or leading to) something more
questionable, and that it is that the *only* significant factor predisposing
a scholar's view on the HJ is the presence or absence of his/her faith. I
know neither Steve nor Mike have said this, and it may be that they both
disown is, but there's a danger here that needs pointing out, and that is,
that to an outsider, it can begin to look as if 'impartiality' is being
equated with the particular worldview of secular North American academics.
*Of course* Steve is correct in pointing out that one might reasonably
expect someone's faith stance to impact on their view of the HJ, but this is
only a particular instance of the fact that all historians are
flesh-and-blood human beings with particular viewpoints arising not only
from their religious/metaphysical conditions but also their social location,
economic circumstances, education experience, temperament and a whole host
of other factors. If a South American, African or Asian scholar comes up
with a different perspective on the HJ it might have as much to do with her
coming from a very different environment as to a particular set of
metaphysical/theological convictions (indeed, those very convictions will in
part have been shaped by the differences in life-experience I'm talking
about).

Indeed, I'm even struck by how some of the presuppositions of this debate
look rather different from my British perspective; one senses, for example,
a reaction against a particular kind of religious fundamentalism that simply
isn't an issue on this side of the pond, (that's not to say it doesn't
exist, but it's not seen as anything like the same kind of issue, because
over here it has no obvious political consequences outside beyond purely
ecclesiastical politics). From my (obviously partial) British perspective,
the North American concern over religious vs secular scholarship thus looks
curiously brittle. That is in no way to wish to exclude the contributions of
North American secular scholarship to questions about the HJ, but it is to
be sensitive to anything that starts to look like a claim that this North
American secular academic perspective is somehow to be privileged as *the*
standard of objective neutral impartiality (and again, I emphasize my
recognition that neither Steve nor Mike have claimed this, nor is it to
impugn the logic of many of the arguments they have advanced; I'm simply
pointing to a danger that seems to be lurking under the surface of the
discussion).

[Steve]

> I'm sure neither of us would assert
> that it is necessarily the case that a Christian Scholar could not
> possibly think in a completely secular manner. But we might wonder
> why he would want to concede the truth of the secular view, when in
> fact he holds another view altogether.

There may be a danger in lumping all Christian Scholars together; indeed,
aren't all of us (not least myself) in danger of falling into some kind of
essentialist fallacy here, by reifying 'secular scholarship' and 'Christian
scholarship' as two distinct kinds of substance with particular essences
that can be compared and contrasted, something I've been trying to challenge
here by pointing to other factors that may be just as important in a
scholar's subjectivity. Of course I accept it can be virtually impossible to
conduct discussions without some kind of generalizations, but every now and
again it's worth checking that the presuppositions behind the
generalizations aren't leading anyone astray.

What does 'not thinking in a completely secular manner' entail? Does it mean
that the Christian is committed to a particular take on physics, mathematics
or biology? (Again, the attempts by some North American religious
reactionaries to oust Darwinism in favour of 'Creation Science' may give you
a different take on the last of those from that which would occur most
naturally to me). To be sure, history is not natural science, but is my
religious identity any more a part of subjectivity than, say, my national
identity in considering the viewpoint from which I'm likely to view a whole
raft of historical questions.

My answer to your point, which is clearly a bit different from Brian's, is
that I don't see how religious faith can legitimately decide questions of
historical fact any more than it can decide questions of scientific fact. I
thus see no more inconsistency in adopting a 'secular' methodology for
history than I would for mathematics or physics. The difference with history
is that the notion of 'historical fact' is so much more problematic, and so
much more bound up with the issue of interpretation, which inevitably
involves more than an element of subjective judgement. But since this is so
of *anyone's* interpretation it is illegitimate to assert that the
interpretation of a secular scholar is automatically and ipso facto more
'objective'. This is simply a disguised form of cultural imperialism.

I happen to differ with Brian on the limits on what interpretation can
achieve - I have grave doubts that one can interpret an anomaly into
existence, for example. Besides, as I think Brian also agrees, if one is
doing history one is doing history; in the modern world that implies a
'secular' methodology because history is concerned with the activities of
human beings and explanations in terms of human motivations, human social
and economic structures and so forth. To restrict oneself to a secular
methodology in that sense is to accept that history is the study of the
human, not the divine; which also provides common ground for study with
people who take different religious views.

> I'm sure neither of us would assert
> that it is necessarily the case that a Christian Scholar could not
> possibly think in a completely secular manner. But we might wonder
> why he would want to concede the truth of the secular view, when in
> fact he holds another view altogether.

Unlike everyone else round here I continue to insist on the difference
between miracle and anomaly. Miracle is primarily a theological concept,
since it presupposes the existence of God. An atheist is thus necessarily
committed to belief in the impossibility of miracles. But scholars of all
stamp can agree to the historical study of what other people have considered
to be miracles, and 'miracle' might be used as a shorthand way of referring
to this. Thus, when I'm talking or writing about the HJ and refer to the
possibility of his miracles, what I have in mind is whether he did things
that other people in the first century took to be miracles. It is neither a
necessary nor a sufficient condition of being a miracle in this sense that
an event be a violation of the laws of nature.

For this reason I also use the term 'anomaly' (which is not simply a kind of
weak synonym for 'miracle' as Brian seemed to suppose, but a concept I'm
trying carefully to distinguish from that of miracle). As a rough
definition, an anomaly is an event that would constitute a breach of the
laws of nature. This is intended as a purely naturalistic definition in that
no assumption is made about divine causation or religious significance.
As a slightly less rought definition one might distinguish:

a) A 'soft' anomaly - an event for which the current state of scientific
knowledge appears to have no adequate explanation (e.g. reports of
telepathy, precognition or water-divining).

b) A 'hard' anomaly - an event which would actively defy current scientific
theory (e.g. a gross violation of the Second Law of Thermodynamics).

I grant that my distinction between (a) and (b) is a bit rough and ready,
and that scientfically trained people may be able to point out that examples
that I've put in (a) really belong in (b) [e.g. because telepathic
communication of information would have entropic consequences for the brains
involved].

The first thing to point out is that the possibility of either (a) or (b)
occurring is not logically dependent on the existence of God. If we had good
cause to suppose that events of type (a) and (b) happened, the proper
response would be not to conclude "Ah, here's empirical proof for the
existence of God" but "the universe has turned out to be a bit odder than we
thought; perhaps we should start rethinking some of our scientific
theories". For example, whatever attitude one takes towards the paranormal,
I think it would be simply a logical (and theological) mistake to equate it
with the spiritual.

Moreover, the occurrence of events of type (a) and (b) is a purely empirical
question open (in principle) to purely empirical modes of investigation; one
would simply need to work out what conditions would need to be fulfilled
into order to establish that a report of a type (a) or (b) event was
reliable. It is true that some (maybe many) religiously-minded people may be
more credulous with regard to such events if they possess perceived
religious significance (which they need not). It is equally true that some
(maybe many) thoroughly secularised people may be more credulous towards
them if they perceive them as making life more exciting (one doesn't need to
be a Christian to believe in UFOs, does one?). To me it is also true (as
I've pointed out several times now), that no ancient text could meet the
conditions for establishing even the reasonable probability of a type (b)
event, and probably not a type (a) event either, unless one had become
sufficiently convinced on other grounds that this kind of type (a) event was
well attested by modern observers. But, I emphasize again, the occurrence of
a type (a) or (b) event may be of no religious significance whatsoever, and
should thus not automatically be labelled a 'miracle'. IMHO no atheists need
abandon their atheism simply because anomalies were found to have occurred:
perhaps they were due to advanced alien technology, or perhaps they show
that scientific theory needs to be revised, or perhaps they demonstrate that
we are simply mistaken in supposing that the human mind is able to
comprehend all of physical reality; one could hold any of these positions
while remaining a staunch atheist.

I thus think it important to distinguish establishing the occurrence of a
miracle from establishing that of an anomaly. The latter is not - even when
the purported miracle would also constitute an anomaly. Thus, even if it
were possible to establish by critical historical argument that Jesus really
had walked on water, turned water into wine, and fed five thousand people
with five bread rolls, this argument would only establish the occurrence of
certain anomalies, not miracles; to judge that these events were miracles
would be to move to a different plain of discourse altogether (though it
would, of course, be perfectly possible for the historian qua historian to
judge that these anomalies were *perceived* as miracles at the time).

[Steve]

> Or is this what leads to the idea that while faith requires a commitment

to the

> possibility of miracles secular scholarly work reveals that we cannot

claim that

> a paricular miracle ever happened.

As I hope I've now made clear I think that this perhaps needs to be
rephrased in terms of miracle and/or anomaly to be able to answer the point.
Secular scholarship cannot discuss 'miracle' (except as a term denoting the
beliefs of the historical subjects being studied) since 'miracle' is simply
not an historical category. Whether secular scholarship can admit the
different concept of 'anomaly' is a different matter, since as I've tried to
define it, it's a purely secular, imminent, naturalistic, this-worldly
concept. My own view is that (a) I don't think there's a valid metaphysical
argument, even on purely naturalistic premises, that can validly rule out
the possibility of anomaly a prior (this is simply a recognition of the
force of Hume's argument about causation and induction); (b) nevertheless,
the exclusion of anomaly is a necessary presupposition of natural science
(perhaps this goes back to Kant's answer to Hume); (c) it may be, therefore,
that the exclusion of anomaly is necessary as a kind of synthetic a priori
presupposition of historical study as well (but here I'm not so sure, since
it also seems to me that, faced with sufficient evidence, one would be
forced to admit that an anomaly had occurred).

So the best answer I can give Steve right now, having reinterpreted his
point in my terms is:

(a) One (whether a religious or a secular 'one') should perhaps be open to
the possibility of anomaly as part of a general policy of being open to what
the evidence demands; the reverse would be to hold that "I shall not believe
in an anomaly no matter what the evidence", and I'm not sure than can be
sustained.

(b) Nevertheless, in practice it is right to treat all reports of anomaly
with deep suspicion and scepticism, since the admission of an anomaly would
threaten to undermine a synthetic a priori principle one generally relied
upon. In practice, then, one will wish to set a very high standard of
evidence before the possibility of anomaly can be entertained, which means
that few, if any, putative anomalies will meet the test.

I've tried to formulate (a) and (b) in ways that can form common ground
between secular and believing scholars, but I'm well aware they may only
seem compelling from the point of view of my own intellectual development,
so they (along with anything else I've said) can only have the status of a
proposal.

But to complete my response to Steve's point, the believing scholar may well
be open to the possibility of miracle, but this is a judgement of a
different order that should IMHO be decoupled from judgements about the
anomalous nature of an event (though one would not call it a 'miracle'
unless it were at least strikingly surprising, but no one will deny that
strikingly surprising events may occur). Here, I think, is where I differ
from Brian. Note also that on this proposal, the believing scholar's
openness to miracle need not translate into giving an unduly favourable
judgement on a purported anomaly, which is the strictly historical question.
To assert that something is a miracle is to make a judgement on its
religious/theological significance, which is not the business of a historian
in her/his capacity as historian. To require that something be an anomaly
before accepting it as a miracle may, IHMO, be a theological mistake, but
that is a completely separate issue, and one on which not all Christians
will agree.

[Steve]

> Would this be like saying that while one is committed to the view
> that Jesus is Christ and God, that being Christ and God had no
> knowable effect whatsoever on his life? I don't think that this is
> coherent. But I do think that somne people seem to think it is.

This almost sounds like you're coming from a logical positivist standpoint -
a statement is only meaningful if it susceptible to empirical verification
conceived in terms of natural science. That may not be your view, of course,
but it's certainly a view a religious believer will not share (although I
hardly think one need be a religious believer to dispute it). Of course it
depends what you mean by 'knowable effect'. Does that mean an effect that we
can know now through the process of critical historical reconstruction? If
so, then I must simply disagree with your notion of coherence. Or does it
mean the rather different view that if it were possible to reconstruct an HJ
violently at odds with Christian belief, the Christian doctrine of the
Incarnation would be undermined? If you mean the latter then I'd agree with
you, though I might have different views on what constituted being
'violently at odds' (e.g. I would consider it 'violently at odds' with the
Christian doctrine of the Incarnation for Jesus to have been a petty thief,
murderer, rapist and bandit, but not at all at odds for him not to have
turned water into wine; indeed, it may be the relative powerlessness of
Jesus that's the most theologically significant thing about the incarnation,
but of course that leads off into a totally different discussion).

I don't know whether I've actually managed to clarify anything in this long
attempt to suggest that finding a common ground shouldn't be that
problematic. I'll just finish with a final question: from my eccentric
British perspective it seems to me that this angst about a possible parting
of the ways between secular and religious NT scholarship is a particularly
North American concern; is this the case, and, if so, does that tell us
anything? It's not that such issues don't arise here, it's that the frontier
doesn't run along that particular divide and doesn't seem to exercise people
so much in quite the same way (the divide, if it can be so described, is
more between liberal Christians and secular humanists on the one hand, and
religious conservatives on the other, but even then I'd say it wasn't so
sharply demarcated, and in the main we can mostly agree to disagree and
carry on working together).

... {Snip detailed explanation of the difference Eric means when, and why, he uses anomaly instead of miracle to describe specific event as described in

Message 2 of 12
, Aug 1, 2003

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--- In crosstalk2@yahoogroups.com, "Eric Eve" <eric.eve@h...> wrote:
{Snip detailed explanation of the difference Eric means when, and
why, he uses "anomaly" instead of "miracle" to describe specific
event as described in history}

Thank you for this Eric, I now have a much better understanding of
where you are coming from on this question, and find myself in
general agreement with much of what you said. Perhaps the
word "miracle" carries too much baggage to be used in historical
critical discussions, and should be replaced by something else like
anomaly, especially as acceptance of the latter does not necessitate
acceptance of the existence of the supernatural, and can remain well
within the realm of scientific and historical inquiry.

(One thinks of all the shocking new scientific discoveries that keep
popping up now and then, forcing science to significantly modify its
theories and explanations for how the universe actually works, to see
how anomalies change our perception of the world on a regular basis).

Peace,

Brian Trafford
Calgary, AB, Canada

Eric Eve

... Great! I m glad I ve at last succeeded in making myself clear to somebody. ... Yes, though I think the anomalies that force change in scientific theory

Message 3 of 12
, Aug 1, 2003

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Brian Trafford wrote:

> Thank you for this Eric, I now have a much better understanding of
> where you are coming from on this question, and find myself in
> general agreement with much of what you said. Perhaps the
> word "miracle" carries too much baggage to be used in historical
> critical discussions, and should be replaced by something else like
> anomaly, especially as acceptance of the latter does not necessitate
> acceptance of the existence of the supernatural, and can remain well
> within the realm of scientific and historical inquiry.

Great! I'm glad I've at last succeeded in making myself clear to somebody.

> (One thinks of all the shocking new scientific discoveries that keep
> popping up now and then, forcing science to significantly modify its
> theories and explanations for how the universe actually works, to see
> how anomalies change our perception of the world on a regular basis).

Yes, though I think the anomalies that force change in scientific theory
tend to take the form of general contradictions in the current model rather
than specific events, don't they? (E.g. on the classical model of the atom,
an electon orbiting a nucleus ought to radiate electromagnetic energy, so
according to the law of conservation of energy the orbit ought rapidly to
decay causing the electron to fall into the nucleus, meaning atoms on the
classical model ought not to exist - oops, let's rethink this - ah, quantum
mechanics!). But you raise an important general point, that it is really
only meaningful to talk about anomaly in relation to a particular set of
theories (which are in principle always revisable). That's why I think one
should be wary of definitions of anomaly (let alone miracle) that use an
expression such as 'violations of the laws of nature', unless one makes it
very clear in what sense the term 'laws of nature' is being employed. To
rule out an anomaly because it conflicts with current scientific
understanding risks supposing that scientific understanding is now complete;
to define anomaly relative not to current understanding but to the laws of
nature 'as they really are' raises the double problem (a) that unless we
know the laws of nature 'as they really are' we cannot identify an anomaly;
and (b) that if we're not careful the statement 'anomalies cannot happen'
collapses into the tautology 'what is impossible is impossible'.

That said, I suspect most working scientists would have some perception of
what types of anomaly could not be fitted into any conceivable revision of
the scientific theory that would not make the entire edifice of natural
science come crashing down around our ears. This is partly due, I think, to
the way that scientific understanding increasingly comes to form an
interlocking series of theories that form a fairly tight fit; I have some
recollection from my reading of popular science that there are very few ways
that quantum mechanics can be formulated without mathematical
inconsistencies: thus it is either right, or completely wrong: it can't
simply be tweaked to fit new data. Moreover, I think this sense of what kind
of revisions to natural science can be accommodated without bringing the
whole structure crashing down (which neither relativity nor quantum
mechanics have done, for example) would lead one to be fairly confident in
classifying certain events as hard anomalies that are likely to remain hard
anomalies under any feasible upheavals in modern science (part of the reason
for the distinction between hard and soft anomalies is to allow for the
possibility that the soft sort may simply find themselves accommodated under
a new scientific paradigm). Thus, it is probably safe to assume that no
feasible revolution in scientific understanding is going to make it any less
of an anomaly to walk on water or feed five thousand people with five bread
rolls. Even allowing that our scientific understanding is corrigible, it
thus seems a sound epistemological principle to suggest that we can't allow
the possibility of anomalies of this sort without sawing off the branch of
rational judgement on which we're trying to sit. Even if it should turn out
from the perspective of the science of the future that we were wrong in our
judgements of what could feasibly be incorporated into scientific theory, it
remains the best we can do in the present.

This is not to rule out the possibility that the universe may be a weirder
place than we often like to imagine, but here two opposite considerations
seem to me to come into play:

(1) On the one hand, commitment to a particular scientific view, or a
particular rationalist perspective, could well rule out evidence of strange
phenomena that do not fit the current paradigm; it is very easy for us
simply to filter out what does not fit into our worldview;

(2) On the other hand, the human love of the wondrous, the bizarre, and the
spectacular, the human propensity for both credulity and fraud, suggest that
one would be wise to treat anecdotal evidence of the weird and wonderful
with caution, if not downright scepticism (gosh, I think I'm starting to
sound like Hume here!).

Thus the human capacity for self-deception cuts both ways. My own
temperamental inclination in practice is to lean towards the scepticism
suggested by (2), but I think it possible that some cases may yet turn out
to fall under (1), though I would not expect anything in the hard anomaly
category to do so. This thus leaves some scope for individual judgement on
the plausibility of strange things narrated in ancient texts, while also
providing the critic with a point at which s/he can say "Here I draw the
line; beyond here I shall not admit that a literal intepretation of the text
can be sustained as a report of an actual historical event; as a hard
anomaly it must be ruled out." Of course another question, the answer to
which does not strike me as totally obvious, is how far Mark, say, intended
his reports of hard anomalies to be taken literally (it seems to me that
Mark 4-8 works pretty hard to get the reader to see a symbolic meaning
behind the sea and feeding miracles, but that does not exclude the
possibility that Mark could have viewed them as actual events as well - but
that will have to be a topic for another essay when I get round to writing
it).

Best wishes,

Eric

Mike Grondin

Eric- Thanks for putting me in Steve s company. Although I don t know him personally, we ve had a long history of correspondence relative to the Gospel of

Message 4 of 12
, Aug 2, 2003

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Eric-

Thanks for putting me in Steve's company. Although I don't know
him personally, we've had a long history of correspondence relative
to the Gospel of Thomas, and I find that our intuitions tend to
coincide - probably because he's a top-notch logical analyst, in
addition to everything else (scholar, humorist, provocateur?)

I also love the way you Brits (other than Tom Wright) typically
analyze problems. (I actually have some English blood myself - on
my mother-nee-Tyler's side - which probably explains it.)

Alas, not enough time at the present to adequately respond to even
one of the interesting comments in your note. What I would like to
ask, however, if you don't mind, is that you address yourself
specifically to an issue which lies at the beginning of this series
of threads, and even long before that. You refer to:

> ... this (your) long attempt to suggest that finding a common
> ground shouldn't be that problematic.

But case in point: Steve and others (including myself) have
virtually no doubt that the gospels contain a significant amount
of authorial invention. Brian, on the other hand, has argued long
and hard (if I understand him aright) that there's no reason to
suppose that the authors didn't believe everything they wrote to
be literally true. (And if so, of course, there couldn't be any
significant amount of authorial invention.) We've had extended
discussions on this before and gotten nowhere. Where do you think
common ground might be found on this particular issue?

Thanks,
Mike G.

Eric Eve

... Well, I suppose this depends on what we mean by common ground here; I take it to mean a sufficient common basis to allow conversation/debate to be

Message 5 of 12
, Aug 2, 2003

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Mike Grondin asks:

> But case in point: Steve and others (including myself) have
> virtually no doubt that the gospels contain a significant amount
> of authorial invention. Brian, on the other hand, has argued long
> and hard (if I understand him aright) that there's no reason to
> suppose that the authors didn't believe everything they wrote to
> be literally true. (And if so, of course, there couldn't be any
> significant amount of authorial invention.) We've had extended
> discussions on this before and gotten nowhere. Where do you think
> common ground might be found on this particular issue?

Well, I suppose this depends on what we mean by 'common ground' here; I take
it to mean a sufficient common basis to allow conversation/debate to be
meaningful. I assume that neither Steve nor yourself operate with the belief
of a 'significant amount of authorial invention' as some kind of a prior
dogmatic belief, but rather as a consequence of your study of the Gospels;
IOW it would be something that you would in principle be prepared to give
reasons for, not merely to assert. If Brian has "argued long and hard...
that that there's no reason to suppose that the authors didn't believe
everything they wrote to be literally true"* then he presumably also
recognizes the need to argue for his position. Thus, a first condition for
common ground in this situation, recognizing that the burden of proof lies
on whoever wants to make an assertion, could in principle be met. A further
condition would be that both sides sufficiently agree on what constitutes
the proper grounds and methods of arguments (otherwise they'll simply be
talking past each other), but one would hope that should be possible among
scholars.

'Common ground' surely does not mean that all parties have to agree in their
conclusions, or else either no one would ever be allowed to dissent from the
'official view', or we'd have to split into 100 different scholarly groups
with own particular blends of conclusions; I'm quite sure neither of these
is what you have in mind!

(*BTW, is it necessarily so of an ancient author, perhaps one believing
himself to be writing under the influence of the Holy Spirit, that 'he made
x up' and 'he believed x to be literally true' are absolutely incompatible
statements? I don't want to push the point since I'm personally less than
convinced that 'literal truth' was the primary concern of the Evangelists in
everything they wrote, it's just that it occurred to me when I was quoting
your phrase).

... No, of course not. But if one gets a feeling that the conclusions of the other party are presuppositions instead of conclusions, and that they re not

Message 6 of 12
, Aug 2, 2003

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--- Eric Eve wrote:

> 'Common ground' surely does not mean that all parties have to
> agree in their conclusions, or else either no one would ever be
> allowed to dissent from the 'official view', or we'd have to split
> into 100 different scholarly groups with own particular blends of
> conclusions; I'm quite sure neither of these is what you have in
> mind!

No, of course not. But if one gets a feeling that the conclusions
of the other party are presuppositions instead of conclusions, and
that they're not really open to serious question, then what you
call 'common ground' turns into quicksand. I would put it in terms
of the conditions for scholarly discourse, and I would think that
one such condition - a necessary one - is what's called "good
faith". What this demands, IMO, is that all parties be prepared to
provide rational and evidentiary support for their positions - or
at least admit that belief X is not open to question for them. I
guess it's an issue of trust. Without a sense that the other party
is acting in good faith, one perceives reasons as rationalizations,
and the possibility of fruitful discourse quickly disappears.

> (*BTW, is it necessarily so of an ancient author, perhaps one
> believing himself to be writing under the influence of the Holy
> Spirit, that 'he made x up' and 'he believed x to be literally
> true' are absolutely incompatible statements? I don't want to
> push the point since I'm personally less than convinced that
> 'literal truth' was the primary concern of the Evangelists in
> everything they wrote...

Oh, no, I don't see how there can be any doubt that the primary
concern of the Evangelists wasn't that. But now you bring up an
interesting point that probably bears further discussion. Suppose
I believe that the HS is revealing to me an event or event-detail
hitherto unknown - say, the words that Jesus was supposed to have
written in the sand. Firstly, it seems that I can't fail to know
that it's *new*. Secondly, however, it seems that I *can* fail to
know that *I* invented it - since I'm fooling myself into believing
that I'm the recipient of supernatual information at that point.
Nor would I even think of supposing that those forces might be evil
forces, or that a good spirit might seek to implant untruths in me
in order to "advance the faith". So, yes, it does seem that I can
fool myself into believing that what is in fact my own creation
corresponds to something that really happened. I don't think that's
the way the Evangelists operated, however, nor does it seem likely
that leaving it open whether or not the Evangelists believed their
story innovations to have really happened would satisfy someone who
wanted to claim that there wasn't any significant degree of
authorial invention at all.

Regards,
Mike Grondin
Mt. Clemens, MI

leon santiago

Gordon Raynal wrote:

Message 7 of 12
, Aug 8, 2003

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Gordon Raynal wrote:

<<*** . . . wonder storie(s) . . . . primarily been
defended and attacked on the basis of "did it actually
happen?" as the basis for searching out truths/ "the
point(s)" of such stories.) How strange and how
fundamentally sad. I dare say if folks were to pick
up the Odyssey they don't start dissing Homer for his
imagination and don't start searching out questions of
truth on the basis of asking questions about whether
the wonder filled stories he tells are rooted in
"facts". Likewise when reading Shakespeare ("Do
ghosts really exist and can they talk?" from Hamlet,
for example).... and on to watching this summer's
"blockbuster movies." (I didn't hear anyone come out
of the theatre from watching "Terminator 3" going
"What a deceitful movie 'cause there really can't be
liquid robotic computers who can turn their appendages
into different killer machines at whim!"). ***>>

Yes, Gordon . . . but then, no one ever told me that I
was going to spend eternity in an agonizing place if I
didn't believe that those liquid robotic computers
were real. Or that such belief was the ONLY way to
obtain salvation from such a fate. Your analogy seems
inappropriate at best and mocking at worst. I agree
with you that the true value of these stories
transcends their historicity, and that they belong
among the great mythological traditions of the world
as such.

Jonah and the great fish, Moses climbing up Sinai,
great stories conveying timeless and meaningful
messages, yes . . .

But the fact is that the Christianity that we have
inherited is a religion founded on the belief in
certain historical events that were reported to have
occurred at a certain place and time. Moreover, these
things were claimed to have occurred once and ONLY
once in history. As historical events, are they not
subject to our examination by current historical
methods? I don't think you should dismiss this as
folly. It must be done, precisely so that we can view
the stories in their proper mythological context once
the gloss of veneration has been bracketed.

Who was it that said that extraordinary claims require
extraordinary evidence? Was it Schweitzer? (pardon the
paraphrase).

My first question is, has anyone attempted to catalogue and cross- reference the Jesuine sayings that seem to cohere with other sayings as well as those

Message 8 of 12
, Aug 8, 2003

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My first question is, has anyone attempted to catalogue and cross-
reference the Jesuine sayings that seem to "cohere with" other
sayings as well as those Jesuine sayings that seem to be "in
tension with" other sayings (or actions) in the gospels?

Anticipating a negative answer, my second question is, what sort
of resources could I turn to in building such a cross-referenced
database? (Besides a Bible and a super memory!)

My vaguely conceived goal is something like Crossan's appendix,
but with the emphasis on the criterion of coherence rather than the
criterion of multiple attestation, and then to try to do something
with the data.

best,
Peter Kirby

Bob Schacht

... Peter, I suppose you ll have to start out by defining what cohere with and be in tension with mean. If you don t, you ll get a stew of such diverse

>My first question is, has anyone attempted to catalogue and cross-
>reference the Jesuine sayings that seem to "cohere with" other
>sayings as well as those Jesuine sayings that seem to be "in
>tension with" other sayings (or actions) in the gospels?
>
>Anticipating a negative answer, my second question is, what sort
>of resources could I turn to in building such a cross-referenced
>database? (Besides a Bible and a super memory!)
>
>My vaguely conceived goal is something like Crossan's appendix,
>but with the emphasis on the criterion of coherence rather than the
>criterion of multiple attestation, and then to try to do something
>with the data.
>
>best,
>Peter Kirby

Peter,
I suppose you'll have to start out by defining what "cohere with" and "be
in tension with" mean.
If you don't, you'll get a stew of such diverse composition that no one can
agree on what it means.
If you do: Others will argue with whatever definition you come up with, but
at least we'll know what you are looking for.

Bob

kirby@earthlink.net

... I think that the meaning is the kind of stuff the same person is likely to say and the kind of stuff the same person is unlikely to say, assuming that

Message 10 of 12
, Aug 8, 2003

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On 8 Aug 2003, at 14:25, Bob Schacht wrote:

> At 12:40 PM 8/8/2003 -0800, kirby@... wrote:
> >My first question is, has anyone attempted to catalogue and cross-
> >reference the Jesuine sayings that seem to "cohere with" other
> >sayings as well as those Jesuine sayings that seem to be "in
> >tension with" other sayings (or actions) in the gospels?
> >
> >Anticipating a negative answer, my second question is, what sort
> >of resources could I turn to in building such a cross-referenced
> >database? (Besides a Bible and a super memory!)
> >
> >My vaguely conceived goal is something like Crossan's appendix,
> >but with the emphasis on the criterion of coherence rather than the
> >criterion of multiple attestation, and then to try to do something
> >with the data.
> >
> >best,
> >Peter Kirby
>
> Peter,
> I suppose you'll have to start out by defining what "cohere with" and "be
> in tension with" mean.
> If you don't, you'll get a stew of such diverse composition that no one can
> agree on what it means.
> If you do: Others will argue with whatever definition you come up with, but
> at least we'll know what you are looking for.

I think that the meaning is "the kind of stuff the same person is
likely to say" and "the kind of stuff the same person is unlikely to
say," assuming that the person is consistent.

What I am thinking about is a sliding scale, something like from 1
to 5, with 5 being two verses saying virtually the same thing -- for
example, 1 Cor 7:10-11 and Mark 10:11-12 -- and with 1 being two
verses that are practically in contradiction -- for example, the
medieval Gospel of Barnabas having J say "I am not the Messiah"
and John 17:3 having J refer to himself as "Jesus Messiah," the
one sent by God (I hope I've picked clear and relatively
uncontroversial verses). Then a value of 4 would apply to two
verses that, for example, both indicate a feasting/non-fasting
lifestyle, while a value of 2 would apply to two verses that can be
harmonized but not without effort (famously, the kingdom is here
now, or the kingdom is yet to come). The value of 3 would be
reserved for two verses that have no conceptual relation.

Structurally, one would have a table with all items corresponding to
all items, with a lot of 3's but with other values to show the
coherencies and tensions perceived in the materials. Another way
to look at it would be as an annotated translation with footnotes to
all the other verses that are in the relationship of 1, 2, 4, or 5.

I hope that this helps to clarify the kind of database that I would
like to build, perhaps with help. I could use references to books
that do part of the work or would otherwise help.

> Who was it that said that extraordinary claims require
> extraordinary evidence? Was it Schweitzer? (pardon the
> paraphrase).
>

Guy Townsend responds:

Actually, it was Carl Sagan.

Guy Townsend

Rich Griese

Dear Peter, the way I would approach it is to create a database of the texts you are speaking with. Anyone with database experience could help you. If you then

Message 12 of 12
, Aug 13, 2003

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Dear Peter,

the way I would approach it is to create a database of the texts you
are speaking with. Anyone with database experience could help you.

If you then learn SQL you can search and sort things until the cows
come home.

AND the ability to assign attributes to any data element is very useful.

What would be my recommendation. But I think it sounds like a great
project. I had tried to enthuse Dr Robert Price of the Jesus Seminar of
this a few years ago in San Jose at a convention a few years ago.

I'm sure people have done such a thing. It would amaze me if there were
not groups out there.

On Friday, August 8, 2003, at 01:40 PM, kirby@... wrote:
> My first question is, has anyone attempted to catalogue and cross-
> reference the Jesuine sayings that seem to "cohere with" other
> sayings as well as those Jesuine sayings that seem to be "in
> tension with" other sayings (or actions) in the gospels?
>
> Anticipating a negative answer, my second question is, what sort
> of resources could I turn to in building such a cross-referenced
> database? (Besides a Bible and a super memory!)
>
> My vaguely conceived goal is something like Crossan's appendix,
> but with the emphasis on the criterion of coherence rather than the
> criterion of multiple attestation, and then to try to do something
> with the data.
>
> best,
> Peter Kirby
>

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