See
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/03/politics/03archives.html?ei=5094&
en=b9932bb452d6188e&hp=&ex=1141448400&partner=homepage&pagewanted=print
or
http://shrinkster.com/clq
Excerpt:
"After complaints from historians, the National Archives directed
intelligence agencies on Thursday to stop removing previously declassified historical
documents from public access and urged them to return to the shelves as quickly
as possible many of the records they had already pulled.
Allen Weinstein, the nation's chief archivist, announced what he called a
"moratorium" on reclassification of documents until an audit can be completed to
determine which records should be secret."
MAARJA'S COMMENTS: This sounds like a sound move on the part of Dr.
Weinstein. NARA is lucky that it has a unit such as the Information Security
Oversight Office (ISOO) within it to turn to, and that it is headed by someone with
Bill Leonard's reputation.
I did notice that Scott Shane reported that "Mr. Weinstein, who became
archivist of the United States a year ago, said he knew 'precious little' about the
seven-year-old reclassification program before it was disclosed in The New
York Times on Feb. 21."
Agency heads have a lot to juggle and I daresay other matters, such as
electronic records issues or the Nixon Library flap, took up much of Dr. Weinstein's
time during his first year. I don't know enough about Dr. Weinstein to know
how approachable he is, the little I've heard, just from a couple of people,
suggests that some NARA employees at the working level have found him easy to
talk to.
There have been a few earlier news stories pointing to potential problems
with NARA, e.g., George Lardner's May 19, 2002 article
available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2001/05/wp051901.html
and
http://www.slate.com/id/2114963/
Minutes posted publicly on the Internet from a 2001 meeting of a State
Department history advisory committee also reflected strong concern about
reclassification.
My view is that as with anything any public or private sector organization
does, institutional credibility often relies on good internal controls and
proper procedures being in place. The more internal controls, oversight and yes,
opportunities for an agency's employees to express concern up their reporting
chain or to a unit such as ISOO, the better.
As with the question of Presidential families, these records access
situations involve people at every point of their life cycle. Are their
vulnerabilities as a result? Of course! Under E.O. 12958, as amended, information is not
supposed to be classified simply to shield embarrassing actions.
Classification and declassification requires a very careful balance.
Here's a hypothetical. If there was a complete lack of internal controls
over the process, how many of you, handed the ability to stamp something secret,
would choose to try improperly to shield forever work-related documents
involving you that should be unclassified under the E.O. but might reflect
embarrassing actions? The more controls and the more rigor in the process, the less
likely that such mistakes will occur. Remember what ISOO Director Bill Leonard
said in his excellent speech in 2004, available at
http://www.archives.gov/isoo/speeches-and-articles/ncms-2004.html
Of course, security classified information always should be protected until
it is declassified properly.
Maarja
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