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entitled 'Missile Defense: Opportunity Exists to Strengthen
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Report to Congressional Committees:
April 2012:
Missile Defense:
Opportunity Exists to Strengthen Acquisitions by Reducing Concurrency:
GAO-12-486:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-12-486, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
MDA has spent more than $80 billion since its initiation in 2002 and
plans to spend $44 billion more by 2016 to develop, produce, and field
a complex integrated system of land-, sea-, and space-based sensors,
interceptors, and battle management, known as the BMDS.
Since 2002, National Defense Authorization Acts have mandated that GAO
prepare annual assessments of MDA’s ongoing cost, schedule, testing,
and performance progress. This report assesses that progress in fiscal
year 2011. To do this, GAO examined the accomplishments of the BMDS
elements and supporting efforts and reviewed individual element
responses to GAO data collection instruments. GAO also reviewed
pertinent Department of Defense (DOD) policies and reports, and
interviewed a wide range of DOD, MDA, and BMDS officials.
What GAO Found:
In fiscal year 2011, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) experienced
mixed results in executing its development goals and Ballistic Missile
Defense System (BMDS) tests. For the first time in 5 years, GAO found
that all of the targets used in this year’s tests were delivered and
performed as expected. None of the programs GAO assessed were able to
fully accomplish their asset delivery and capability goals for the
year. Flight test failures, an anomaly, and delays disrupted the
development of several components and models and simulations
challenges remain. Flight test failures forced MDA to suspend or slow
production of three out of four interceptors currently being
manufactured while failure review boards investigated their test
problems.
To meet the presidential 2002 direction to initially rapidly field and
update missile defense capabilities as well as the 2009 announcement
to deploy missile defenses in Europe, MDA has undertaken and continues
to undertake highly concurrent acquisitions. Concurrency is broadly
defined as the overlap between technology development and product
development or between product development and production. While some
concurrency is understandable, committing to product development
before requirements are understood and technologies mature or
committing to production and fielding before development is complete
is a high-risk strategy that often results in performance shortfalls,
unexpected cost increases, schedule delays, and test problems. It can
also create pressure to keep producing to avoid work stoppages. In
contrast, as shown in the notional graphic below, successful programs
that deliver promised capabilities for the estimated cost and schedule
use a disciplined knowledge-based approach.
Figure:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Highly concurrent schedule:
Technology development:
large overlap with:
Product development:
large overlap with:
Production.
Knowledge-based approach:
Technology development:
followed by:
Product development:
followed by:
Production.
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of figure]
High levels of concurrency were present in MDA’s initial efforts and
are present in current efforts, though the agency has begun
emphasizing the need to follow knowledge-based development practices.
During 2011, the Ground-based Midcourse Defense, the Aegis Standard
Missile 3 Block IB, and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
experienced significant ill effects from concurrency. For example, MDA’
s discovery of a design problem in a new variant of the Ground-based
Midcourse Defense program’s interceptors while production was underway
increased costs, may require retrofit of fielded equipment, and
delayed delivery. Flight test cost to confirm its capability has
increased from $236 million to about $1 billion. Because MDA continues
to employ concurrent strategies, it is likely that it will continue to
experience these kinds of acquisition problems.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO makes seven recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to reduce
concurrency and strengthen MDA’s near- and long-term acquisition
prospects. DOD concurred with six recommendations and partially
concurred with one related to reporting on the cause of the Aegis BMD
Standard Missile-3 Block IB test failure before committing to
additional purchases. DOD did not agree to tie additional purchases to
reporting the cause of the failure. DOD’s stated actions were
generally responsive to problems already at hand, but did not
consistently address implications for concurrency in the future, as
discussed more fully in the report.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-486]. For more
information, contact Cristina Chaplain at (202) 512-4841 or
chaplainc@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
Mixed Progress in Development and Delivery Efforts:
Limited Progress in Developing Models and Simulations; Much More
Remains to Be Done:
MDA's Highly Concurrent Acquisition Strategy Magnifies the Effects of
Tests and Other Problems:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: BMDS Models and Simulations Progress:
Appendix IV: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD) with Standard
Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IA and Block IB:
Appendix V: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD) Standard
Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IIA:
Appendix VI: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD) Standard
Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IIB:
Appendix VII: Aegis Ashore:
Appendix VIII: Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD):
Appendix IX: Precision Tracking Space System (PTSS):
Appendix X: Targets and Countermeasures:
Appendix XI: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD):
Appendix XII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Description of MDA's BMDS Elements:
Table 2: European Phased Adaptive Approach Plans and Delivery Time
Frames as of 2009:
Table 3: BMDS Fiscal Year 2011 Selected Accomplishments:
Table 4: Flight Test and Failure Review Cost to Assess CE-II
Capability:
Table 5: Fiscal Year 2011 Acquisition Events by Target Class:
Figures:
Figure 1: Concurrency Compared to the Knowledge-Based Approach:
Figure 2: GMD Concurrent Schedule:
Figure 3: SM-3 Block IB Concurrent Schedule:
Figure 4: THAAD Concurrent Schedule:
Figure 5: SM-3 Block IIB Concurrent Schedule:
Figure 6: Aegis Ashore Concurrent Schedule:
Figure 7: PTSS Concurrent Schedule:
Figure 8: SM-3 Block IB Schedule:
Figure 9: SM-3 Block IIB Schedule:
Figure 10: Aegis Ashore Schedule:
Figure 11: GMD Concurrent Schedule:
Figure 12: PTSS Concurrent Schedule:
Figure 13: THAAD Concurrent Schedule:
Abbreviations:
Aegis BMD: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense:
APL: Applied Physics Laboratory:
APUC: average procurement unit cost:
BAR: BMDS Accountability Report:
BMDS: Ballistic Missile Defense System:
CDR: critical design review:
CE-I: Capability Enhancement-I:
CE-II: Capability Enhancement -II:
DACS: divert and attitude control system:
DOD: Department of Defense:
EKV: exoatmospheric kill vehicle:
eMRBM: Extended Medium-Range Ballistic Missile:
FTG: Flight Test GMD:
FTM: Flight Test Missile of Aegis:
FTTT: HAAD Flight Test:
FTX: Flight Test "Other":
GBI: ground-based Interceptor:
GMD: Ground-based Midcourse Defense:
ICBM: intercontinental ballistic missile:
IMTP: Integrated Master Test Plan:
IRBM: intermediate-range ballistic missile:
LV: launch vehicle:
MDA: Missile Defense Agency:
MRBM: medium-range ballistic missile:
OSF: Objective Simulation Framework:
OTA: Operational Test Agency:
PAA: Phased Adaptive Approach:
PDR: preliminary design review:
PTSS: Precision Tracking Space System:
SM-3: Standard Missile-3:
SPY-1: Army/Navy Water (Shipboard) Radar Surveillance:
STSS: Space Tracking and Surveillance System:
TDACS: throttleable divert and attitude control system:
THAAD: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense:
TSRM: third-stage rocket motor:
VLS: vertical launching system:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
April 20, 2012:
Congressional Committees:
The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has developed and deployed an initial
integrated and layered Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) to
defend the United States, our deployed forces, allies, and friends,
and is continuing development and production of additional
capabilities. Since 2002, MDA has spent more than $80 billion and
plans to spend an additional $44 billion through 2016 to develop a
highly complex system of systems--land-, sea-, and space-based
sensors, interceptors and battle management. To rapidly field missile
defense capabilities, MDA has concurrently developed, produced, and
fielded a variety of systems. While this approach has helped MDA to
rapidly deploy initial capabilities, it also has meant that it has
fielded some assets whose capabilities are uncertain or impaired. In
addition, there has been limited transparency and accountability for
the acquisitions, particularly limited understanding of the costs,
schedules, requirements, and system effectiveness. As the United
States government seeks to address growing fiscal pressures,
investments in new weapon systems, like the BMDS, will face increasing
scrutiny to ensure that they are providing the best value for the
increasingly limited resources available.
Since 2002, National Defense Authorization Acts have mandated that we
prepare annual assessments of MDA's ongoing cost, schedule, testing,
and performance progress.[Footnote 1] To date, we have delivered
assessments of MDA's progress covering fiscal years 2003 through 2010
and are currently mandated to continue delivering assessments through
fiscal year 2016.[Footnote 2] This report provides our assessment of
MDA's progress in fiscal year 2011. Specifically, it highlights (1)
progress and challenges in delivery of assets for key programs, or
elements; (2) progress in developing models and simulations needed to
assess BMDS performance; and (3) challenges related to MDA's use of
highly concurrent acquisition strategies. In terms of costs, we report
on the cost effects MDA experienced or is likely to experience for
individual systems as a result of its past, ongoing, and planned
acquisition practices. We will not be able to assess aggregate cost
reporting until corrective actions we recommended are implemented and
substantial improvements are made to MDA's cost estimates. According
to MDA senior-level officials, the agency has taken several actions in
response to our recommendations. Finally, we will be issuing a
separate report assessing MDA's progress in adopting best practices
for developing project schedules as well as broader progress in
enhancing and enabling Department of Defense (DOD) and congressional
oversight for MDA.
To assess MDA's progress, we examined the accomplishments of eight
BMDS elements and supporting efforts that MDA is currently developing
and fielding: the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD) with
Standard Missile-3 Block IA and Block IB; Aegis Ashore; Aegis BMD
Standard Missile-3 Block IIA, Aegis BMD Standard Missile-3 Block IIB;
Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD); Precision Tracking and Space
System (PTSS); Targets and Countermeasures; and Terminal High Altitude
Area Defense (THAAD).[Footnote 3] We reviewed individual element
responses to GAO data collection instruments, which detailed key
accomplishments for fiscal year 2011. The results of these reviews are
presented in detail in appendixes to this report and are also
integrated as appropriate in our findings related to progress in
delivering assets and capabilities. For more details on our scope and
methodology, see appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from April 2011 to April 2012 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
MDA's BMDS is being designed to counter ballistic missiles of all
ranges--short, medium, intermediate, and intercontinental.[Footnote 4]
Since ballistic missiles have different ranges, speeds, sizes, and
performance characteristics, MDA is developing multiple systems that
when integrated, provide multiple opportunities to destroy ballistic
missiles before they can reach their targets. The system includes
space-based sensors as well as ground-and sea-based radars, ground-and
sea-based interceptor missiles, and a command and control, battle
management, and communications system providing the warfighter with
the necessary communication links to the sensors and interceptor
missiles. A typical engagement scenario to defend against an
intercontinental ballistic missile would occur as follows:
* Infrared sensors aboard early-warning satellites detect the hot
plume of a missile launch and alert the command authority of a
possible attack.
* Upon receiving the cue, land-or sea-based radars are directed to
track the various objects released from the missile and, if so
designed, to identify the warhead from among spent rocket motors,
decoys, and debris.
* When the trajectory of the missile's warhead has been adequately
established, an interceptor--consisting of a kill vehicle mounted atop
a booster--is launched to engage the threat. The interceptor boosts
itself toward a predicted intercept point and releases the kill
vehicle.
* The kill vehicle uses its onboard sensors and divert thrusters to
detect, identify, and steer itself into the warhead. With a combined
closing speed of up to 10 kilometers per second (22,000 miles per
hour), the warhead is destroyed above the atmosphere through a "hit to
kill" collision with the kill vehicle.
* Inside the atmosphere, interceptors kill the ballistic missile using
a range of mechanisms such as direct collision between the interceptor
missile and the inbound ballistic missile or killing it with the
combined effects of a blast fragmentation warhead (heat, pressure, and
grains/shrapnel) in cases where a direct hit does not occur.
Table 1 provides a brief description of eight BMDS elements and
supporting efforts currently under development by MDA.
Table 1: Description of MDA's BMDS Elements:
BMDS element/supporting effort[A]: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense
(Aegis BMD) with Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IA and Block IB;
Description: Aegis BMD is a sea-based missile defense system being
developed in incremental, capability-based blocks to defend against
ballistic missiles of all ranges. Key components include the shipboard
SPY-1 radar, SM-3 missiles, and command and control systems. It also
is used as a forward-deployed sensor for surveillance and tracking of
ballistic missiles. The SM-3 missile has multiple versions in
development or production. The first two variants are referred to as
the SM-3 Block IA and SM-3 Block IB[B].
BMDS element/supporting effort[A]: Aegis Ashore;
Description: Aegis Ashore is a future land-based variant of the ship-
based Aegis BMD. It is expected to track and intercept ballistic
missiles in their midcourse phase of flight using SM-3 interceptor
variants as they become available. Key components include a vertical
launch system and a reconstitutable enclosure that houses the SPY-1
radar and command and control system. DOD plans to deploy the first
Aegis Ashore with SM-3 Block IB in the 2015 time frame as part of the
missile defense of Europe called the European Phased Adaptive Approach
(PAA).
BMDS element/supporting effort[A]: Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IIA;
Description: The SM-3 Block IIA is the third SM-3 variant to be
developed for use with the sea-based and future land-based Aegis
Ballistic BMD. This program began in 2006 as a joint development with
Japan, and it was added to the European PAA when that approach was
announced in 2009. As part of European PAA Phase III, the SM-3 Block
IIA is planned to be fielded with Aegis Weapons System version 5.1 by
the 2018 time frame.
BMDS element/supporting effort[A]: Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IIB;
Description: The SM-3 IIB is the fourth SM-3 variant planned. It is
intended to defend against medium-and intermediate-range ballistic
missiles and provide early intercept capabilities against some
intercontinental ballistic missiles. The SM-3 Block IIB program began
in June 2010 and is planned to be fielded by the 2020 time frame as
part of the European PAA Phase IV. Given its early stage of
development, program management officials stated that the SM-3 Block
IIB is not managed within the Aegis BMD Program Office and has not
been baselined.
BMDS element/supporting effort[A]: Ground-based Midcourse Defense
(GMD);
Description: GMD is a ground-based missile defense system designed to
destroy intermediate and intercontinental ballistic missiles during
the midcourse phase of their flight. Its mission is to protect the
U.S. homeland against ballistic missile attacks from North Korea and
the Middle East. GMD has two ground-based interceptor variants--the
Capability Enhancement I and the Capability Enhancement II. MDA has
emplaced its total planned inventory of 30 interceptors at two missile
field sites--Fort Greely, Alaska and Vandenberg, California.
BMDS element/supporting effort[A]: Precision Tracking and Space System
(PTSS);
Description: PTSS is being developed as an operational component of
the BMDS designed to support intercept of regional medium and
intermediate range ballistic missile threats to U.S. forces and allies
and long-range threats to the United States. PTSS will track large
missile raid sizes after booster burn-out, which could enable earlier
intercepts.
BMDS element/supporting effort[A]: Targets and Countermeasures;
Description: MDA develops and manufactures highly complex targets for
short, medium, intermediate and eventually intercontinental ranges
used in BMDS flight tests to present realistic threat scenarios. The
targets are designed to encompass the full spectrum of threat missile
ranges and capabilities.
BMDS element/supporting effort[A]: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
(THAAD);
Description: THAAD is a ground-based missile defense system designed
to destroy short-and medium-range ballistic missiles during the late-
midcourse and terminal phases of flight. Its mission is to defend
deployed U.S. forces and friendly foreign population centers.
Source: MDA data.
[A] The BMDS also includes other elements and supporting efforts such
as the Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications and
BMDS Sensors efforts, which are not covered in this report.
[B] MDA is currently developing or producing four versions of the SM-3
interceptor--IA, IB, IIA, and IIB. The SM-3 Block IA and SM-3 Block IB
are the earlier variants of the missile. The SM-3 Block IIA and SM-3
Block IIB are planned to provide successively greater range and
velocity to intercept medium to long-range ballistic missiles. The
latter two versions are reported on separately, in appendices V and
VI, respectively.
[End of table]
European Missile Defense Acquisition Approach:
In 2009, DOD altered its approach to European defense, which
originally focused on ground-based interceptors from the GMD element
and a large fixed radar as well as transportable X-Band radars, in
order to provide defenses against long-range threats to the United
States and short-, medium-, and intermediate-range Iranian threats to
Europe. This new approach, referred to as the European Phased Adaptive
Approach (PAA), consists primarily of Aegis BMD sea-based and land-
based systems and interceptors, as well as various sensors to be
deployed over time as the various capabilities are matured.
The European PAA policy announced by the President articulates a
schedule for delivering four phases of capability to defend Europe and
augment current protection of the U.S. homeland in the following time
frames: Phase 1 in 2011, Phase 2 in 2015, Phase 3 in 2018, and Phase 4
in 2020. DOD's schedule for the European PAA comprises multiple
elements and interceptors to provide an increasingly integrated
ballistic missile defense capability. It is projected that each
successive phase will deliver additional capability with respect to
both threat missile range and raid size.
Table 2 outlines the plans and estimated delivery time frames
associated with each European PAA phase.
Table 2: European Phased Adaptive Approach Plans and Delivery Time
Frames as of 2009:
Phase: Phase I;
Plans: Deploy current and proven missile defense systems, including
the sea-based Aegis Weapon System, the SM-3 interceptor (Block IA) and
sensors such as the Army/Navy Transportable Radar Surveillance system
to address regional ballistic missile threats to Europe and deployed
U.S. personnel and their families;
Delivery time frame: 2011.
Phase: Phase II;
Plans: After appropriate testing, deploy a more capable version of the
SM-3 interceptor (Block IB) both at sea on Aegis ships and on land in
the Aegis Ashore, as well as more advanced sensors, to expand the
defended area against short-and medium-range missile threats;
Delivery time frame: 2015.
Phase: Phase III;
Plans: After development and testing are complete, deploy the more
advanced SM-3 Block IIA variant currently under development at sea and
on land to counter short-, medium-, and intermediate-range threats;
Delivery time frame: 2018.
Phase: Phase IV;
Plans: After development and testing are complete, deploy the SM-3
Block IIB at sea and on land to help better cope with medium-and
intermediate-range missiles and the potential future intercontinental
range ballistic missile threat to the United States;
Delivery time frame: 2020.
Sources: President's September 17, 2009, policy announcement and MDA
data.
[End of table]
Mixed Progress in Development and Delivery Efforts:
MDA experienced mixed results in executing its fiscal year 2011
development goals and BMDS tests. For the first time in 5 years, we
are able to report that all of the targets used in fiscal year 2011
test events were delivered as planned and performed as expected.
Moreover, the Aegis BMD program demonstrated the capability to
intercept an intermediate-range target for the first time. Also, the
THAAD program successfully conducted its first operational flight test
in October 2011. However, none of the programs we assessed were able
to fully accomplish their asset delivery and capability goals for the
year. At the same time, several critical test failures as well as a
test anomaly and delays disrupted MDA's flight test plan and the
acquisition strategies of several components. Overall, flight test
failures and an anomaly forced MDA to suspend or slow production of
three out of four interceptors currently being manufactured. The GMD
program, in particular, has been disrupted by two recent failures,
which forced MDA to halt flight testing and restructure its multi-year
flight test program, halt production of the interceptors, and redirect
resources to return-to-flight activities. Production issues forced MDA
to slow production of the THAAD interceptors, the fourth missile being
manufactured.
Table 3 presents a summary of selected MDA goals for fiscal year 2011
that details how well these goals were accomplished. Appendixes IV
through XI further detail MDA's progress in each of the major programs.
Table 3: BMDS Fiscal Year 2011 Selected Accomplishments:
Element: Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IA;
Fully accomplished goals: Flight test FTM-15 demonstrated capability
required for European Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) Phase I. Deployed
first ship in support of European PAA Phase I;
Partially or not accomplished goals: Delivered 6 out of 19 planned
missiles by the end of fiscal year 2011;
delivery of 12 missiles is on hold pending the results of the failure
investigation of the anomaly in FTM-15. Depending on the results,
delivered missiles may have to be retrofitted.
Element: Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IB;
Fully accomplished goals: Delivered first SM-3 Block IB developmental
interceptor and fired it in the first flight test, FTM-16 E2;
Partially or not accomplished goals: The SM-3 Block IB failed to
intercept the target during its first flight test, resulting in a
failure review board investigating the cause of the failure. The
flight test is scheduled to be re-conducted in 2012, delaying the
certification of the Aegis BMD 4.0.1 weapon system.
Element: Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IIA;
Fully accomplished goals: None;
Partially or not accomplished goals: Subsystem preliminary design
review problems led to a program replan that adjusted the preliminary
design review date to fiscal year 2012 and included new subsystem
reviews for several components. The new subsystem reviews were
completed in fiscal year 2011 and early fiscal year 2012.
Element: Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IIB;
Fully accomplished goals: Awarded three concept definition and program
planning contracts in April 2011 and approved to begin technology
development in July 2011;
Partially or not accomplished goals: Demonstration of low-cost divert
and attitude control system components was delayed until the first
quarter of fiscal year 2012.
Element: Aegis Ashore;
Fully accomplished goals: Completed preliminary design review in
August 2011;
Partially or not accomplished goals: A new deckhouse fabrication plan
delayed the award of the deckhouse fabrication contract, procurement
of deckhouse fabrication materials, and the start of construction.
Element: GMD;
Fully accomplished goals: Completed three of the five limited
interceptor upgrades, partially to resolve component issues identified
in developmental testing and manufacturing;
Partially or not accomplished goals: Flight test, FTG-06a, failure in
the first quarter of fiscal year 2011 resulted in interceptor
production suspension pending the completion of an investigation and a
successful nonintercept flight test.
Element: PTSS;
Fully accomplished goals: Completed system requirements and system
design reviews in the second quarter of fiscal year 2011;
Partially or not accomplished goals: Approval to begin technology
development was delayed to the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2012.
Element: Targets;
Fully accomplished goals: Launched all 11 targets as planned;
Partially or not accomplished goals: Delivered 11 out of 14 targets it
had planned.
Element: THAAD;
Fully accomplished goals: Successfully conducted first operational
flight test, FTT-12, in October 2011. Delivered 11 missiles;
Partially or not accomplished goals: Materiel release to Army delayed
to the second quarter of fiscal year 2012. THAAD delayed plans to
deliver first battery to fiscal year 2012 because of production issues
with the interceptor.
Source: GAO analysis of MDA data.
Note: BMDS fiscal year 2011 asset and capability deliveries for
Airborne Infrared; Command, Control, Battle Management, and
Communications; joint U.S.-Israel BMDS; Sea-based X-band radar; and
Space Tracking and Surveillance System elements were not reviewed.
[End of table]
Highlights of progress and challenges this year include the following:
* Targets: In prior years, we reported that problems with availability
and reliability of targets had caused delays in MDA's test program;
however, in fiscal year 2011, MDA delivered 11 short-or intermediate-
range targets, and all performed successfully. The targets launched
during the year supported tests of several different BMDS elements,
including Aegis BMD, GMD, and Patriot systems without causing major
delays or failures in flight tests.[Footnote 5] Among these successful
flights was FTX-17, the return-to-flight of MDA's short-range air-
launched target in July 2011. This was the target's first launch since
an essential mechanism that releases it from the aircraft failed in a
December 2009 THAAD flight test. After the failure, the agency
identified shortcomings in the contractor's internal processes that
had to be fixed before air-launched targets could be used again in
BMDS flight tests. Nineteen months later, these deficiencies appeared
to be overcome when the target missile was successfully air-launched
in FTX-17. To reduce risk, the flight was not planned as an intercept
mission but as a target of opportunity for several emerging missile
defense technologies including the Space Tracking Surveillance System.
* Aegis BMD: In April 2011, the Aegis BMD program demonstrated
capability for the first time to intercept an intermediate-range
target, used remote tracking data provided by an Army/Navy
Transportable Radar Surveillance - Model-2 radar, and demonstrated
support for European PAA Phase I. While the Aegis BMD program
successfully conducted this test, there was an anomaly in a critical
component of the SM-3 Block IA interceptor. Despite the anomaly, the
interceptor was able to successfully intercept the target. In
September 2011, the Aegis BMD program failed in its first attempted
intercept of its SM-3 Block IB missile. During this test--named FTM-16
Event 2--a problem occurred in the interceptor and it failed to
intercept the target. The Aegis program has had to add an additional
flight test and delay multiple additional flight tests. Program
management officials stated the SM-3 Block IA deliveries were
suspended and the SM-3 Block IB production was slowed while the
failure reviews are conducted.
* THAAD: The THAAD program also had some noteworthy testing
accomplishments in 2011, successfully conducting its first operational
flight test in October 2011.[Footnote 6] This test was a significant
event for the program as it was designed to be representative of the
fielded system with soldiers conducting the engagement. During the
test, the THAAD system engaged and nearly simultaneously intercepted
two short-range ballistic missile targets. However, THAAD also
experienced a delay in its planned flight test schedule for fiscal
year 2011. A flight test originally scheduled for the second quarter
of fiscal year 2011 was delayed until fiscal year 2012 due to the
availability of air-launched targets and then subsequently was
canceled altogether. This cancellation has delayed verification of
THAAD's capability against a medium-range target.
* GMD: As has been the case since 2005, testing failures continue to
affect the GMD program in fiscal year 2011. Specifically, as a result
of the failed flight test in January 2010,[Footnote 7] MDA added a
retest designated as FTG-06a. However, this retest also failed in
December 2010 due to a failure in a key component of the kill vehicle.
The GMD program has added two additional flight tests in order to
demonstrate the Capability Enhancement II (CE-II) interceptor.
However, since fiscal year 2009 MDA has already manufactured and
delivered 12 interceptors, 2 of which have been used in flight tests,
prior to halting further deliveries. The manufacture of components
related to the failure and delivery of interceptors has been halted
while the failure review and resolution actions are ongoing. MDA
conducted a failure review investigation throughout fiscal year 2011
and concluded that the CE-II interceptor design does not work as
intended and therefore required redesign and additional development.
MDA is currently undergoing an extensive effort to overcome the design
problem and return to intercept flight tests.
According to a GMD program official, the program has already conducted
over 50 component and subcomponent tests to develop a fix and verify
the design. MDA also realigned resources from planned 2011 testing
activities to fund the investigation and fund return-to-intercept
activities including redesign efforts. For example, the program
delayed funding the rotation of older fielded interceptors into flight
test assets, delayed funding interceptor manufacturing, and delayed
purchasing ground-based interceptor (GBI) upgrade kits. However, the
agency did continue its efforts to increase reliability of the
interceptors through upgrades and its repair of five interceptors to
help mitigate the effects on the production line. MDA is planning on
upgrading 15 interceptors between fiscal years 2013 to 2017.
Additionally, MDA plans to refurbish five older interceptors between
2014 and 2017 to support flight tests.
* SM-3 Block IIA: MDA recognized that the program's schedule included
elevated acquisition risks and, as such, took actions in fiscal year
2011 to reduce those risks as well as potential future cost growth.
The program planned to hold its system preliminary design review
(PDR)--at which it would demonstrate that the technologies and
resources available for the SM-3 Block IIA would result in a product
that matched its requirements--but subsystem review problems for key
components meant the system review had to be adjusted by 1 year. The
program appropriately added time and money to its program by revising
its schedule to relieve schedule compression between its subsystem and
system-level design reviews and incorporated lessons learned from
other SM-3 variants into its development to further mitigate
production unit costs. The program still expects to meet the 2018 time
frame for European PAA Phase 3.
Limited Progress in Developing Models and Simulations; Much More
Remains to Be Done:
Models and simulations are critical to understanding BMDS
capabilities. The complex nature of the BMDS, with its wide range of
connected elements, requires integrated system-level models and
simulations to assess its performance in a range of system
configurations and engagement conditions. Assessing BMDS performance
through flight tests alone is prohibitively expensive and faces safety
and test range limitations that can best be dealt with through sound,
realistic models and simulations.
Ensuring that the models and simulations are sound and realistic
requires a rigorous process to accomplish two main tasks: (1)
developing individual system models and realistically linking those
models and simulations and (2) gathering data from MDA's ground and
flight tests to feed into the models. MDA attempts to confirm that the
models re-create the actual performance found in BMDS test events.
[Footnote 8] The Operational Test Agency (OTA) independently assesses
how realistic the models are in a formal process called accreditation.
When a model is accredited it means that it can be trusted to produce
high-confidence results for its intended use, and the limitations of
the model are known. The development of reliable MDA models depends
upon the collection of test data upon which to anchor the models.
Because MDA had made very limited progress in identifying and
collecting needed data, MDA's test program was reoriented beginning in
2010 to enable the collection of data to support the development of
BMDS models.
MDA has made some limited progress in developing the individual system
models and linking those models. Originally, MDA's models had been
developed for use only by each element, not for integrated
assessments. MDA is still developing these individual element models,
while at the same time linking the models to show BMDS-level
performance. Since fiscal year 2010, MDA has made progress in creating
a common framework, whereby the various BMDS element-level hardware-in-
the-loop[Footnote 9] models are subjected to a common and consistent
scene and environment during test events. MDA is now using this
framework, known as the Single Stimulation Framework, in assessing
BMDS performance. MDA officials highlight that the framework is being
used to evaluate BMDS performance in increasingly complex and
realistic scenarios, employing greater numbers of BMDS assets.
The process of developing and linking these models is extremely
complex and difficult and will take many years to accomplish. In
August 2009, the U.S. Strategic Command and OTA jointly informed MDA
of 39 system-level limitations in MDA's models and simulations program
that adversely affect their ability to assess BMDS performance.
Resolution of these 39 limitations, OTA maintains, would permit MDA's
models and simulations to provide more realistic representations of
BMDS performance using the full complement of fielded BMDS assets. OTA
officials have noted that since August 2009, MDA has partially or
fully resolved 7 of these issues and identified technical solutions
for 15 more. According to OTA officials, most of the resolved
limitations are issues that are more easily addressed, such as the
installation of improved communications systems and the provision of
separate workstations for simulation controllers. No technical
solutions have yet been identified for the remaining 17 of the 39
issues and OTA officials maintain that they are still awaiting an MDA
timeline for the complete resolution of these remaining limitations.
We reported, in 2009, problems with MDA's model development and the
lack of flight test data. In 2009, MDA undertook a new approach to
test planning to focus the test program on gathering critical test
data needed for modeling and simulation. Since 2009, MDA has bolstered
efforts to collect test data for the BMDS model and simulation
program; however, considerable effort and time are required to address
all known shortfalls. Through its ongoing test data collection
activities, MDA has collected 309 critical variables since 2009;
however, those represent only 15 percent of the total needed. Flight
test failures, anomalies and delays have reduced the amount of real-
world data MDA expected. Additionally, some required data are
difficult to collect, posing challenges even when a flight test is
properly executed. When tests are carried out, considerable post-test
data analysis is required for model development. Under the current
plan, MDA does not foresee complete collection of data on these
critical variables until sometime between 2017 and 2022.
MDA has also made some limited progress in achieving partial
accreditation for some BMDS models--ensuring that they are realistic
and can be trusted and that their limitations are known. MDA models
are accredited for specific functions for which they are to be
employed. Over the past few years, OTA officials have performed
assessments of MDA's models and simulations and have noted that,
amongst the element-level models, those for THAAD and Aegis BMD are
farthest along. While MDA has made some progress toward accreditation
of element models for specific functional areas, MDA has not yet
achieved OTA accreditation in other key areas, such as any of the 18
environmental models. See appendix III for further details on MDA's
modeling and simulation efforts.
MDA's Highly Concurrent Acquisition Strategy Magnifies the Effects of
Tests and Other Problems:
To meet the 2002 presidential direction to initially rapidly field and
update missile defense capabilities as well as the 2009 presidential
announcement to deploy missile defenses in Europe, MDA has undertaken
and continues to undertake highly concurrent acquisitions. For
example, large-scale acquisition efforts were initiated before
critical technologies were fully understood and programs were allowed
to move forward into production without having tests completed to
verify performance. Such practices enabled MDA to quickly ramp up
efforts in order to meet tight presidential deadlines, but they were
high risk and resulted in problems that required extensive retrofits,
redesigns, delays, and cost increases. A program with high levels of
concurrency (1) proceeds into product development before technologies
are mature or appropriate system engineering has been completed or (2)
proceeds into production before a significant amount of independent
testing is conducted to confirm that the product works as intended.
High levels of concurrency were present in MDA's initial efforts and
are present in current efforts.
Recently, the agency has begun emphasizing the need to follow
knowledge-based development practices, which encourage accumulating
more technical knowledge before program commitments are made and
conducting more testing before production is initiated. Developmental
challenges and delays are to be expected in complex acquisitions, such
as those for missile defense. However, when concurrency is built into
acquisition plans, any developmental challenges or delays that do
occur exacerbate the cost, schedule, and performance effects of those
problems, particularly when production lines are disrupted or assets
have already been manufactured and must be retrofitted. In 2009, we
recommended that MDA synchronize the development, manufacturing, and
fielding schedules of BMDS assets with the testing and validation
schedules to ensure that items are not manufactured for fielding
before their performance has been validated through testing. In
response, DOD partially concurred with our recommendation, maintaining
that MDA was pursuing synchronization of development, manufacturing,
and fielding of BMDS assets with its established testing and
validation requirements. However, because MDA continues to employ
concurrent strategies, it is likely that it will continue to
experience these types of acquisition problems.
Highly Concurrent Acquisition Strategies Often Lead to Cost, Schedule,
and Performance Consequences:
Concurrency is broadly defined as the overlap between technology
development and product development or between product development and
production of a system. The stated rationale for concurrency is to
introduce systems in a timelier manner, to fulfill an urgent need, to
avoid technology obsolescence and to maintain an efficient industrial
development and production workforce. While some concurrency is
understandable, committing to product development before requirements
are understood and technologies mature as well as committing to
production and fielding before development is complete is a high-risk
strategy that often results in performance shortfalls, unexpected cost
increases, schedule delays, and test problems.[Footnote 10] At the
very least, a highly concurrent strategy forces decision makers to
make key decisions without adequate information about the weapon's
demonstrated operational effectiveness, reliability, logistic
supportability, and readiness for production. Also, starting
production before critical tests have been successfully completed has
resulted in the purchase of systems that do not perform as intended.
These premature commitments mean that a substantial commitment to
production has been made before the results of testing are available
to decision makers. Accordingly, they create pressure to keep
producing to avoid work stoppages even when problems are discovered in
testing. These premature purchases have affected the operational
readiness of our forces and quite often have led to expensive
modifications.
In contrast, successful programs that deliver promised capabilities
for the estimated cost and schedule follow a systematic and
disciplined knowledge-based approach. This approach recognizes that
development programs require an appropriate balance between schedule
and risk and, in practice, programs can be executed successfully with
some level of concurrency. For example, it is appropriate to order
long-lead production material in advance of the production decision,
with the pre-requisite that developmental testing is substantially
accomplished and the design confirmed to work as intended. We have
found that, in this approach, high levels of product knowledge are
demonstrated at critical points in development.[Footnote 11] This
approach is not unduly concurrent because programs take steps to
gather knowledge that demonstrates that their technologies are mature,
their designs are stable, and their production processes are in
control before transitioning between acquisition phases. This
knowledge helps programs identify risks early and address them before
they become problems. It is a process in which technology development
and product development are treated differently and managed
separately. The process of technology development culminates in
discovery--the gathering of knowledge--and must, by its very nature,
allow room for unexpected results and delays. The process of
developing a product culminates in delivery and therefore gives great
weight to design and production. If a program is falling short in
technology maturity, it is harder to achieve design stability and
almost impossible to achieve production maturity. It is therefore key
to separate technology from product development and product
development from production--in other words, it is key to avoid
concurrency when these transitions are made. The result of a knowledge-
based approach is a product delivered on time, within budget, and with
the promised capabilities.
See figure 1 for depictions of a concurrent schedule and a schedule
that uses a knowledge-based approach.
Figure 1: Concurrency Compared to the Knowledge-Based Approach:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Highly concurrent schedule:
Technology development:
large overlap with:
Product development:
large overlap with:
Production.
Knowledge-based approach:
Technology development:
followed by:
Product development:
followed by:
Production.
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of figure]
In fiscal year 2011, due to flight test failures and a flight test
anomaly, MDA suspended production of two interceptors--one in the GMD
program and one in the Aegis BMD program--and slowed production of a
third--in the Aegis BMD program. In addition, development problems
with a key THAAD component disrupted that program's interceptor
production.
Ground-based Midcourse Defense:
MDA undertook a highly concurrent acquisition strategy to meet the
President's 2002 directive to deploy an initial set of missile defense
capabilities by 2004. To do so, the GMD element concurrently matured
technology, designed the system, tested the design, and produced and
fielded a system. While this approach allowed GMD to rapidly field a
limited defense that consisted of five CE-I interceptors and a fire
control system, the concurrency resulted in unexpected cost increases,
schedule delays, test problems, and performance shortfalls. Since
then, MDA has produced and emplaced all of its planned CE-I
interceptors. To address issues with the CE-I interceptors, MDA has
undertaken an extensive retrofit and refurbishment program.
Prior to MDA fully completing development and demonstrating the
capability of the initial interceptor, MDA committed in 2004 to
another highly concurrent development, production, and fielding
strategy for an enhanced version of the interceptor--CE-II--as shown
in figure 2.[Footnote 12]
Figure 2: GMD Concurrent Schedule:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Product development:
2004 through 2022.
Technology development:
2004 through 2012.
Production:
2004: start date;
2011: Production suspended;
2012: Production resumes;
2017: Production complete:
2022: Flight test completion.
Source: GAO analysis of MDA data.
Note: CE-I development began in 1996--the first interceptor was
delivered in 2004, the first intercept was completed in 2006, delivery
was completed in first quarter of 2009. Testing continues.
[End of figure]
MDA proceeded to concurrently develop, manufacture, and deliver 12 of
these interceptors before halting manufacture of components and
delivery of interceptors in 2011 due to the failure in FTG-06a.
[Footnote 13] Although MDA had not successfully tested this
interceptor, failing in both its attempts, it manufactured and
delivered 12 of these interceptors.
The discovery of the design problem while production is under way has
increased MDA costs, led to a production break, may require retrofit
of fielded equipment, delayed delivery of capability to the war-
fighter, and altered the flight test plan. For example, the flight
testing cost to confirm the CE-II capability has increased from $236
million to about $1 billion.[Footnote 14] In addition, the program
will have to undertake another retrofit program, for the 10 CE-II
interceptors that have already been manufactured.[Footnote 15]
According to a GMD program official, although the full cost is
currently unknown, he expects the cost to retrofit the CE-II
interceptors to be around $18 million each or about $180 million for
all 10. Intended to be ready for operational use in fiscal year 2009,
it will now be at least fiscal year 2013 before the warfighter will
have the information needed to determine whether to declare the
variant operational.
The GMD flight test program has been disrupted by the two back to back
failures. For example, MDA has restructured the planned multiyear
flight test program in order to test the new design prior to an
intercept attempt. MDA currently plans to test the new design in a
nonintercept test in fiscal year 2012.
Because MDA prematurely committed to production before the results of
testing were available, it has had to take steps to mitigate the
resulting production break, such as accelerating retrofits to 5 of the
CE-I interceptors. Program officials have stated that if the test
confirms that the cause of the failure has been resolved, the program
will restart the manufacturing and integration of the CE-II
interceptors. According to MDA, because of the steps taken to develop
and confirm the design change, a restart of the CE-II production line
at that time will be low risk. However, while MDA has established a
rigorous test plan to confirm that the design problem has been
overcome, the confirmation that the design works as intended through
all phases of flight, including the actual intercept, will not occur
until an intercept test--FTG-06b--currently scheduled for the end of
fiscal year 2012 or the beginning of fiscal year 2013.
High levels of concurrency will continue for the GMD program even if
the next two flight tests are successful. GMD will continue its
developmental flight testing until at least 2022, well after
production of the interceptors are scheduled to be completed. MDA is
accepting the risk that these developmental flight tests may discover
issues that require costly design changes and retrofit programs to
resolve. As we previously reported, to date all GMD flight tests have
revealed issues that led to either a hardware or software change to
the ground-based interceptors.[Footnote 16] See appendix VIII for more
details on the GMD program.
Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IB:
The SM-3 Block IB program, the second version of the SM-3 interceptor,
is facing both developmental and production challenges that are
exacerbated by its concurrent schedule, as shown in figure 3. This
interceptor shares many components with the SM-3 Block IA, but the
kinetic warhead is new technology that is being developed. The need to
meet the presidential directive to field the Aegis BMD 4.0.1/SM-3
Block IB by the 2015 time frame for European missile defense is a key
driver for the high levels of concurrency.
Figure 3: SM-3 Block IB Concurrent Schedule:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Product development:
2Q FY 2010 through 4Q FY 2012.
Technology development:
Previous to 2Q FY 2010 through 4Q FY 2012.
Production:
2Q FY 2010: Production development approval;
4Q FY 2012: End of flight test series;
4Q FY 2013: Formal production decision.
Source: GAO analysis of MDA data.
[End of figure]
In response to previous developmental problems and to prevent a
production break, MDA has twice had to purchase additional SM-3 Block
IA interceptors and faces a similar decision in fiscal year 2012.
According to MDA, the additional SM-3 Block IA missiles were purchased
to avoid a production gap as well as to keep suppliers active, and to
meet combatant command SM-3 missile quantity requirements. The
program, according to program management officials, was scheduled to
purchase the last SM-3 Block IA in fiscal year 2010 and transition to
procurement production of the SM-3 Block IB missiles in fiscal year
2011.
MDA began purchasing the SM-3 Block IB in 2009 beyond the numbers
needed for flight testing while a critical maneuvering technology was
immature and prior to a successful flight test. According to the
Director, MDA these missiles support development and operational
testing; prove out manufacturing processes; provide information on
reliability, maintainability and supportability; verify and refine
cost estimates; and ensure that the missile will meet its performance
requirements on a repeatable basis. MDA has determined that 18 of the
25 SM-3 Block IB missiles ordered are to be used for developmental
testing; the remaining 7 interceptors are currently unassigned for
tests and may be available for operational use.[Footnote 17] According
to program management officials, these unassigned rounds represent a
small portion of the total planned purchases.
MDA is also planning to purchase 46 additional SM-3 Block IB missiles
in fiscal year 2012. Meanwhile, testing has yet to validate the
missile's performance, the cause of the test failures is not yet
determined, and remaining tests may not be completed until 2013.
Consequently, purchasing additional interceptors beyond those needed
for development remains premature. The first SM-3 Block IB
developmental flight test failed in September 2011, and an anomaly
occurred in an April 2011 flight test of the SM-3 Block IA. The flight
test failure and the test anomaly occurred in components that are
shared between the SM-3 Block IA and IB. Program officials are still
investigating the reason for these failures. The program was unable to
validate initial SM-3 Block IB capability during the failed September
test, and program officials hope to conduct a series of three
intercept tests in fiscal year 2012 needed to validate SM-3 Block IB
capability. Depending on the timing and content of the failure review
board results, this schedule could change further.
Any SM-3 Block IB missiles ordered in fiscal year 2012 before
mitigations for the anomaly and the failure, if needed, are determined
and before the three flight tests confirm the design works as intended
would be at higher risk of cost growth and schedule delays. In
addition, SM-3 Block IB missiles already manufactured but not
delivered also are at higher risk of requiring a redesign depending on
the results of the failure review. Program management officials stated
MDA has slowed SM-3 Block IB manufacturing until the outcome of the
failure review board is known. It remains unclear whether the
additional 46 missiles will be ordered before the failure reviews are
complete and the interceptor is able to demonstrate that it works as
intended. Recognizing the critical importance of the completing the
planned fiscal year 2012 intercept tests, the operational need for SM-
3 missiles, the relative success of the SM-3 Block IA, as well as the
potential for a production break, the Senate Committee on
Appropriations directed MDA to use the fiscal year 2012 SM-3 Block IB
funds for additional Block IA missiles should the test and acquisition
schedule require any adjustments during fiscal year 2012. However, a
decision to purchase additional SM-3 Block IA missiles in fiscal year
2012 to help avoid a production break may be affected by the SM-3
Block IA failure investigation that has not yet been completed.
Program management officials stated most deliveries of the SM-3 Block
IA have been suspended pending the results of the failure review.
See appendix IV for more details on the Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IB
program.
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense:
MDA awarded a contract to produce THAAD's first two operational
batteries in December 2006 before its design was stable and
developmental testing of all critical components was complete. As a
result, the THAAD program has experienced unexpected cost increases,
schedule delays, test problems, and performance shortfalls. At that
time, MDA's first THAAD battery, consisting of 24 interceptors, 3
launchers, and other associated assets, was to be delivered to the
Army as early as 2009. In response to pressure to accelerate fielding
the capability, THAAD adopted a highly concurrent development,
testing, and production effort that has increased program costs and
delayed fielding of the first THAAD battery until early fiscal year
2012. (See figure 4.)
Figure 4: THAAD Concurrent Schedule:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Technology development:
January 1992: program start;
Through approximately 1998.
Product development:
Approximately 1998 through approximately 2012.
Production:
December 2006: Initial production decision;
2021: End of production.
Source: GAO analysis of MDA data.
[End of figure]
Problems encountered while THAAD was concurrently designing and
producing assets increased costs by $40 million and caused slower
delivery rates of both the first and second THAAD batteries. These
batteries are not projected to be complete before July 2012--16 months
after the original estimate of March 2011. While all assets except the
interceptors were complete in 2010, the first operational interceptor
for the first THAAD battery was not produced until the second quarter
of fiscal year 2011. At the same time, MDA committed to purchasing
more assets by signing a production contract for two additional THAAD
batteries, despite incomplete testing and qualification of a safety
device on the interceptor. During fiscal year 2011, after several
production start-up issues, 11 of the expected 50 operational
interceptors were delivered.[Footnote 18] Consequently, the first
battery of 24 interceptors was not complete and available for fielding
until the first quarter of fiscal year 2012--more than 2 years later
than originally planned. The same issues have delayed the second
battery as well. Although the launchers and other components for the
second battery were completed in 2010, the full 50 interceptors
necessary for both batteries are not expected to be delivered until
July 2012.
Newer Programs Continue High Levels of Concurrency:
MDA has taken steps to incorporate some acquisition best practices in
its newer programs, such as increasing competition and partnering with
laboratories to build prototypes. However, the SM-3 Block IIB, Aegis
Ashore, and the PTSS program acquisition strategies still include high
or elevated levels of concurrency that set the programs up for
increased acquisition risk, including cost growth, schedule delays,
and performance shortfalls.
* SM-3 Block IIB: The program has high levels of concurrency because
it plans to commit to product development prior to holding a PDR, as
depicted in figure 5.
Figure 5: SM-3 Block IIB Concurrent Schedule:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Technology development:
4Q FY 2011: Technology development start;
4Q FY 2013: Product development decision.
March 2015: Preliminary design review.
Product development:
From 4Q FY 2013 and beyond March 2015.
Source: GAO analysis of MDA data.
Note: Given the early stage of the program, which does not yet have a
baselined schedule, we are not able to depict the production plans or
the end of the product development phase for the SM-3 Block IIB.
[End of figure]
The need to meet the 2020 time frame announced by the President to
field the SM-3 Block IIB for European PAA Phase IV is a key driver for
the high levels of concurrency. The program is following some sound
acquisition practices by awarding competitive contracts to multiple
contractors to develop options for missile configurations and mature
key technologies as well as planning to compete the product
development contract. However, while the program is holding a series
of reviews that will provide engineering insight into the SM-3 Block
IIB design, we have previously reported that before starting
development, programs should hold key system engineering events,
culminating in the PDR, to ensure that requirements are defined and
feasible and that the proposed design can meet those requirements
within cost, schedule, and other system constraints.[Footnote 19] In
addition, based on the initial schedule developed by the program and
prior history of SM-3 interceptor development, the SM-3 Block IIB
program will need to commit to building the first flight test vehicle
prior to holding the PDR in order to remain on the planned test
schedule. According to MDA, this approach is a low risk development if
the program is funded at requested levels. The agency stated that the
achievement of an initial operating capability will be based on
technical progress and execution of a "fly before buy" approach.
* Aegis Ashore: The program initiated product development and
established a cost, schedule, and performance baseline early; included
high levels of concurrency in its construction and procurement plan;
and has not aligned its flight testing schedule with construction and
component procurement decisions. The need to meet the 2015 time frame
announced by the President to field the Aegis Ashore for European PAA
Phase II is a key driver for the high levels of concurrency. The high
levels of concurrency are depicted in figure 6.
Figure 6: Aegis Ashore Concurrent Schedule:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Technology development:
September 2009: European PAA announcement;
FY 2010: Start of component procurement.
Product development:
FY 2010 through 4Q FY 2015.
Production:
FY 2010 through beyond 4Q FY 2015.
Source: GAO analysis of MDA data.
[End of figure]
Aegis Ashore began product development and set the acquisition
baseline before completing the PDR. This sequencing increased
technical risks and the possibility of cost growth by committing to
product development with less technical knowledge than recommended by
acquisition best practices and without ensuring that requirements were
defined, feasible, and achievable within cost and schedule constraints.
The program has initiated procurement of components for the
installation and plans to start fabricating two enclosures called
deckhouses--one for operational use at the Romanian Aegis Ashore
installation and one for testing at the Pacific Missile Range
Facility--in fiscal year 2012, but does not plan to conduct the first
intercept test of an integrated Aegis Ashore installation until fiscal
year 2014. Further, the program plans to build the operational
deckhouse first, meaning any design modification identified through
system testing in the test deckhouse or the intercept test will need
to be made on an existing deckhouse and equipment. As we have
previously reported, such modifications on an existing fabrication may
be costly.
According to the Director of MDA, Aegis Ashore is a land adaptation of
the Aegis weapons system sharing identical components. However, we
previously have reported on the modifications to existing Aegis BMD
technology that must be made to operate in a new land
environment.[Footnote 20] In addition, some of the planned components
for Aegis Ashore are being developed for future Aegis weapon system
upgrades and are still undergoing development. Aegis BMD program
management officials stated that the risks of concurrency in the
program schedule are low due to the program's reliance on existing
technology and the ground testing that will be completed prior to the
first intercept test. Nevertheless, the program has a limited ability
to accommodate delays in construction or testing.
* PTSS: MDA approved a new acquisition strategy for PTSS in January
2012 that acknowledges some concurrency, but program officials stated
that they have taken steps to mitigate the acquisitions risks and have
worked to incorporate several aspects of acquisition best practices
into the strategy. MDA plans to develop and acquire the satellites in
three phases. First, a laboratory-led contractor team will build two
lab development satellites. Second, an industry team, selected through
open competition while the laboratory team is still in a development
phase, will develop and produce two engineering and manufacturing
development satellites. The two laboratory-built and the two industry-
built development satellites are planned to be operational. Third,
there will be a follow-on decision for the industry team to produce
additional satellites in a production phase.
While the strategy incorporates several important aspects of sound
acquisition practices, such as competition and short development time
frames, there remains elevated acquisition risks tied to the
concurrency between the lab-and industry-built developmental
satellites, as shown in figure 7.
Figure 7: PTSS Concurrent Schedule:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Technology development:
Prior to and ending 1Q FY 2014.
Laboratory satellite product development:
1Q FY 2014: Product development approval;
4Q FY 2017: Launch;
Beyond 4Q FY 2017: On-orbit checkout and testing complete.
Industry satellite product development:
1Q FY 2014to approximately beyond 4Q 2017;
Production:
Beyond 4Q FY 2017.
Source: GAO analysis of MDA data.
[End of figure]
Because the industry-built developmental satellites will be under
contract and under construction before on-orbit testing of the lab-
built satellites, the strategy may not enable decision makers to fully
benefit from the knowledge about the design to be gained from that on-
orbit testing before making major commitments.
See appendixes for more details on each program.
Conclusions:
MDA has a long history of pursuing highly concurrent acquisitions in
order to meet challenging deadlines set by the administration.
Concurrency can enable rapid acquisition of critical capabilities but
at a high risk, particularly if technologies are not well understood
at the outset of a program, requirements are not firm, and decisions
are made to keep moving a program forward without sufficient knowledge
about issues, such as design, performance, and producibility. In MDA's
case, many of its highly concurrent acquisition programs began with
many critical unknowns. While the developmental problems that have
been discovered in these acquisitions are inherent in complex and
highly technical efforts, the effects were considerably magnified due
to the high levels of concurrency, including questions about the
performance of fielded assets, significant disruptions to production,
and expensive retrofits. While MDA has embraced the value of reducing
unknowns before making key decisions in some of its newer programs,
such as the SM-3 Block IIA, and adopted good practices, such as
awarding competitive contracts to multiple contractors in the SM-3
Block IIB program, it has continued to plan and implement highly
concurrent approaches in others. In fact, today, MDA is still
operating at a fast pace, as production and fielding of assets
remains, in many cases, ahead of the ability to test and validate them.
As we recommended in 2009, these disruptions can only be avoided when
the development, manufacture, and fielding schedules of BMDS assets
are synchronized with the testing and validation schedules to ensure
that items are not approved to be manufactured for fielding before
their performance has been validated through testing. Moreover, as we
have concluded for several years, while concurrency was likely the
only option to meet the tight deadlines MDA has been directed to work
under, having an initial capability in place should now allow the
agency to construct acquisition approaches that are less risky from a
cost, schedule and performance perspective. Near-term steps MDA can
take to reduce cost, schedule, and performance risks include actions
such as demonstrating the second GMD interceptor can work as intended
before resuming production and verifying that the SM-3 Block IB
completes developmental flight tests before committing to additional
production. Longer-term solutions require the Office of the Secretary
of Defense to assess the level of concurrency that currently exists
within MDA programs and where that concurrency can be reduced.
Moreover, while missile defense capabilities play a vital role in the
United States' national security and international relationships,
decisions about deadlines for delivering capabilities need to be
weighed against the costs and risks of highly concurrent approaches.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following seven
actions to reduce concurrency and strengthen MDA's near-and long-term
acquisition prospects. To strengthen MDA's near-term acquisition
prospects, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense:
For the GMD program, direct MDA to:
1) demonstrate that the new CE-II interceptor design works as intended
through a successful intercept flight test in the operational
environment--FTG-06b--prior to making the commitment to restart
integration and production efforts and:
2) take appropriate steps to mitigate the effect of delaying the CE-II
production restart until a successful intercept occurs. Specific
consideration should be given by MDA to accelerating additional needed
CE-I refurbishments.
For the Aegis BMD program, direct MDA to:
3) verify the SM-3 Block IB engagement capability through the planned
three developmental flight tests before committing to additional
production beyond those needed for developmental testing and:
4) report to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and to Congress
the root cause of the SM-3 Block IB developmental flight test failure,
path forward for future development, and the plans to bridge
production from the SM-3 Block IA to the SM-3 Block IB before
committing to additional purchases of the SM-3 Block IB.
For the SM-3 Block IIB program, direct MDA to:
5) ensure that the SM-3 Block IIB requirements are defined and
feasible and that the proposed design can meet those requirements
within cost, schedule, and other system constraints by delaying the
commitment to product development until the program completes a
successful preliminary design review.
To strengthen MDA's longer-term acquisition prospects, we recommend
that the Secretary of Defense:
6) Direct the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to review all MDA acquisitions
for concurrency, and determine whether the proper balance has been
struck between the planned deployment dates and the concurrency risks
taken to achieve those dates.
7) Direct the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to review and report to the
Secretary of Defense the extent to which the capability delivery dates
announced by the President in 2009 are contributing to concurrency in
missile defense acquisitions and recommend schedule adjustments where
significant benefits can be obtained by reducing concurrency.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report. These
comments are reprinted in appendix II. DOD also provided technical
comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
In responding to a draft of this report, DOD concurred with six of our
seven recommendations and commented on actions in process or planned
in response. In some cases, these actions are responsive to immediate
problems, but do not appear to consistently address the implications
for concurrency in the future.
DOD concurred with our recommendation for the GMD program to
demonstrate that the new CE-II interceptor design works as intended
through a successful intercept flight test in the operational
environment--FTG-06b--prior to making the commitment to restart
integration and production efforts. In response to this
recommendation, DOD stated that the program plans to restart the CE-II
manufacturing upon successful completion of the FTG-06b flight test.
This decision will reduce the risk of prematurely restarting CE-II
production.
DOD also concurred with our recommendation for the Aegis BMD program
to verify the SM-3 Block IB engagement capability through the planned
three developmental flight tests before committing to additional
production, stating that the final decision to purchase SM-3 Block IB
missiles with DOD-wide procurement funding will be made after the next
three planned flight tests. We remain concerned that MDA is planning
to purchase 46 additional SM-3 Block IB missiles prematurely using
research, development, test, and evaluation funds in fiscal year 2012
before validating the performance of the missile and before
determining the root cause of test failures--risking disrupting the
supply chain if testing reveals the need to make design changes. We
continue to believe that the program should not purchase any
additional missiles, regardless of the type of funding used to
purchase them, until the SM-3 Block IB's engagement capability has
been verified through the three developmental flight tests currently
planned for the program. We have modified the recommendation to focus
on verifying the capability before committing to additional production
beyond the missiles needed for developmental testing.
DOD concurred with our recommendation to direct the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
to review all MDA acquisitions for concurrency, and determine whether
the proper balance has been struck between the planned deployment
dates and the concurrency risks taken to achieve those dates. In its
response, DOD stated that it will wait until fielding dates are
established to undertake concurrency assessments, and in the interim
it will ensure that knowledge is gained to support capability
deliveries. However, we remain concerned that DOD continues to focus
on gaining key acquisition knowledge much later than needed. DOD's
approach is to understand the extent to which the design works as
intended after committing to production--a high-risk strategy--rather
than before committing to production. The assessment of concurrency
should precede and should inform the setting of fielding dates. If the
department waits until fielding dates are set to assess concurrency in
the BMDS, it will miss the opportunity and accept the performance,
cost, and schedule consequences. Our position is not unique in this
regard. In recent testimony, the Acting Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics confirmed that excessive
concurrency can drive cost growth and result in major schedule
disruptions that produce further inefficiency. Noting that the
acceptable degree of concurrency between development and production
depends on a range of factors, including the risk associated with the
development phase, the urgency of the need, and the likely impact on
cost and schedule of realizing that risk, he stated that the Office of
the Secretary of Defense intends to assess the levels of concurrency
within programs, as our report recommends should be done for missile
defense elements.
DOD also concurred with our recommendation to direct the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
to review and report to Secretary of Defense the extent to which the
presidentially announced capability delivery dates are contributing to
concurrency in missile defense acquisitions and recommend schedule
adjustments where significant benefits can be obtained by reducing
concurrency. DOD stated that the current missile defense program is
structured to develop and field capabilities at the earliest
opportunity while taking into account prudent risk management
practices and executing a thorough test and evaluation program. The
department further noted that when fielding dates are established, the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology
and Logistics will review and report to the Secretary of Defense the
extent to which presidentially announced capability dates may be
contributing to concurrency in missile defense acquisitions and
recommend schedule adjustments if significant benefits can be obtained
by reducing concurrency. Given the amount of concurrency we have found
in our reviews of the BMDS, we believe that significant benefits can
be reaped if concurrency is assessed sooner rather than later.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to report to the
Office of the Secretary of Defense and to Congress the root cause of
the SM-3 Block IB developmental flight test failure, path forward for
future development, and the plans to bridge production from the SM-3
Block IA to the SM-3 Block IB before committing to additional
purchases of the SM-3 Block IB. DOD commented that MDA will report the
root cause of the SM-3 Block IB test failure and the path forward for
future development to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and to
Congress upon completion of the failure review in the third quarter of
fiscal year 2012. However, DOD makes no reference to delaying
additional purchases until the recommended actions are completed,
instead stating that MDA is balancing the need to demonstrate
technical achievement and also ensure that the system is thoroughly
tested before fielding with the need to keep the industrial base and
supply chain healthy to ensure that production transitions as quickly
as possible. We believe that an appropriate balance between schedule
and risk is necessary for development programs. However, our analysis
has shown that MDA undertakes acquisition strategies of accelerated
development and production that have led to disruptions in the supply
chain and have increased costs to develop some BMDS assets. We
maintain our position that MDA should take the recommended actions
before committing to additional purchases of the SM-3 Block IB.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense and
to the Director of MDA. In addition, the report is available at no
charge on the GAO website at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions
to this report are listed in appendix XII.
Signed by:
Cristina Chaplain:
Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
List of Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Chairman:
The Honorable Thad Cochran:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Howard P. McKeon:
Chairman:
The Honorable Adam Smith:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young:
Chairman:
The Honorable Norman D. Dicks:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To assess the Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) cost, schedule, testing
and performance progress, we reviewed the accomplishments of eight
Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) elements that MDA is currently
developing and fielding: the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis
BMD) with Standard Missile-3 Block IA and Block IB; Aegis Ashore;
Aegis BMD Standard Missile-3 Block IIA; Aegis BMD Standard Missile-3
Block IIB; Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD); Precision Tracking
and Space System (PTSS); Targets and Countermeasures; and Terminal
High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD).[Footnote 21] We developed data
collection instruments (DCI) that were completed by the elements'
program offices and reviewed the individual element responses. These
instruments collected detailed information on schedule, cost and
budget, contracts, testing and performance, and noteworthy progress
during the fiscal year. We also examined the cost and resource,
schedule, and test baselines as presented in the BMDS Accountability
Report (BAR),[Footnote 22] Baseline and Program Execution Reviews,
test schedules and reports, and production plans. The results of these
reviews are presented in detail in the element appendixes of this
report and are also integrated as appropriate in our findings. We also
interviewed officials within program offices and within MDA functional
directorates, such as the Directorates for Engineering and Testing. We
discussed the elements' test programs and test results with the BMDS
Operational Test Agency and the Department of Defense's Office of the
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation.
To assess whether MDA elements delivered assets and achieved self-
identified capability goals as planned in fiscal year 2011, we
examined the 2011 BAR, and compared it to the 2010 and 2009 versions,
looking for similarities and differences between the three. We also
reviewed MDA briefings to congressional staffers from March 2011 and
responses to our DCIs, which detailed key accomplishments and asset
deliveries for fiscal year 2011. To assess progress on MDA's
development of models and simulations, we held discussions with
officials at the Missile Defense Integration and Operations Center,
and the Operational Test Agency, and reviewed budget documents and
MDA's directive on modeling and simulation verification, validation,
and accreditation.
Our work was performed at MDA headquarters in Fort Belvoir, Virginia,
and in Dahlgren, Virginia; Alexandria, Virginia; Falls Church,
Virginia; Annapolis, Maryland; Colorado Springs, Colorado; Arlington,
Virginia; and at various program offices and contractor facilities
located in Huntsville, Alabama, and Tucson, Arizona. In Fort Belvoir,
we met with officials from the GMD program office and the Advanced
Technology Directorate who manage the Aegis BMD Standard-Missile 3
Block IIB program. In Dahlgren, we met with officials from the Aegis
BMD program office, the Aegis Ashore program office, and the Aegis
Standard-Missile 3 Block IIA program office. In Alexandria, we met
with the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, and officials from
the Institute for Defense Analysis. In Falls Church, we met with
officials from the PTSS program office. In Arlington, we met with the
Director, Developmental Test and Evaluation, the Missile Defense
Executive Board, officials in the Pentagon Office of Strategic
Warfare, and the Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation group. In
Annapolis, we met with officials from the Defense Spectrum
Organization/Joint Spectrum Center.
In Huntsville, we interviewed officials from the Airborne Infrared
program office; the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense project
office; the Targets and Countermeasures program office; and MDA's
Acquisitions Directorate, Programs and Integration Directorate,
Engineering Directorate, Test Directorate, Cost Directorate, and
Advanced Technologies Directorate. We also met with Boeing officials
in Huntsville to discuss the failure review investigation for the FTG-
06a failure, and their plan to resolve the resulting manufacturing
stop. In addition, we met with officials from the Operation Test
Agency in Huntsville to discuss MDA's performance assessment, as well
as models and simulations.
In Colorado Springs, we met with officials from U.S. Northern Command,
the Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense,
and the Missile Defense Integration and Operations Center. We met with
Raytheon and Defense Contract Management Agency officials in Tucson to
discuss the manufacturing of the exoatmospheric kill vehicle and
schedule issues for GMD, respectively.
We conducted this performance audit from April 2011 to April 2012 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office of The Under Secretary of Defense:
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics:
3000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3000:
April 12, 2012:
Ms. Cristina Chaplain:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
U. S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Chaplain:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft
Report, GAO-12-486, "Missile Defense: Opportunity Exists to Strengthen
Acquisitions by Reducing Concurrency," dated March 12, 2012 (GAO Code
120996).
The DoD concurs with six of the draft report's recommendations and
partially-concurs with one. The rationale for our position is included
in the enclosure. I submitted separately a list of technical and
factual errors for your consideration.
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the draft report. My point
of contact for this effort is Lt Col Peter Jackson, 703-695-7328,
Peter.Jackson@osd.mil.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
David G. Ahern:
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense:
Strategic and Tactical Systems:
Enclosure: As stated.
[End of section]
GAO Draft Report Dated March 12, 2012:
GAO-12-486 (GAO Code 120996):
"Missile Defense: Opportunity Exists To Strengthen Acquisitions By
Reducing Concurrency"
Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: To strengthen the Missile Defense Agency (MDA's)
near-term acquisition prospects for the Ground-based Midcourse Defense
(GMD) program, the GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct
MDA to demonstrate that the new Capability Enhancement-II (CE-II)
interceptor design works as intended through a successful intercept
flight test in the operational environment-Flight Test GMD-06B-prior
to making the commitment to restart integration and production efforts.
DoD Response: Concur. Flight Test GMD-06B is currently scheduled for
2nd Qtr FY13. After successful completion of this test, GMD plans to
restart the CE-II manufacturing line.
Recommendation 2: To strengthen the MDA's near-term acquisition
prospects for the GMD program, the GAO recommends that the Secretary
of Defense direct MDA to take appropriate steps to mitigate the effect
of delaying the CE-II production restart until a successful intercept
occurs. Specific consideration should be given by MDA to accelerating
additional CE-I refurbishments.
DoD Response: Concur. Since CE-II manufacturing was stopped (2nd
quarter FY 2011), GMD completed five CE-I upgrades (three in FY 2011
and two in FY 2012). Current schedule is to complete three more CE-I
upgrades in CY 2012.
Recommendation 3: To strengthen the MDA's near-term acquisition
prospects for the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD) program,
the GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct MDA to verify
the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IB engagement capability through
the planned three developmental flight tests before committing to
additional production.
DoD Response: Concur. The final decision to purchase SM-3 Block IB
missiles with Defense Wide Procurement funding will be made after the
next three planned flight tests. Missiles being manufactured today are
part of the development program. Such action is in accordance with
last year's GAO recommendation (GA0-11-372) to stabilize MDA's Test
Plan to have sufficient spare test assets to absorb test failures and
delays.
Recommendation 4: To strengthen the MDA's near-term acquisition
prospects for the Aegis BMD program, the GAO recommends that the
Secretary of Defense direct MDA to report to OSD and to Congress the
root cause of the SM-3 Block IB developmental flight test failure,
path forward for future development and the plans to bridge production
from the SM-3 Block 1A to the SM-3 1B before committing to additional
purchases of the SB-3 Block 1B.
DoD Response: Partially Concur. The MDA will report root cause of SM-3
Block IB test failure and the path forward for future development to
OSD and Congress upon completion of the failure review in the third
quarter of FY 2012. As a matter of frequent command interface, MDA has
briefed OSD and all Congressional Defense Committees on the initial SM-
3 Block IB failure analysis and path forward, and provided situational
updates. As part of the path forward and plans to fulfill the COCOMs'
demand for more sea-based BMD missiles, the missile buy and deliver
strategy will address plans to bridge production from the SM-3 Block
IA to the SM-3 Block IB that includes a purchase of SM-3 Block IB
missiles in FY 2013. MDA is balancing the need to demonstrate
technical achievement and ensuring the system is thoroughly tested
before fielding with the need to keep the industrial base and supply
chain healthy to ensure production transition as quickly as possible.
(Reference: Director's testimony to Senate Appropriations
Defense Subcommittee on May 25, 2011.)
Recommendation 5: To strengthen the MDA's near-term acquisition
prospects for the SM-3 Block IIB program, the GAO recommends that the
Secretary of Defense direct MDA to ensure that the SM-3 Block IIB
requirements are defined and feasible and that the proposed design can
meet those requirements within cost, schedule, and other system
constraints by delaying the commitment to product development until
the program completes a successful preliminary design review.
DoD Response: Concur. The Aegis BMD program office is planning for the
SM-3 Block IIB Product Development acquisition. The Agency currently
plans to competitively select one contractor to complete design of the
interceptor through a disciplined series of Preliminary
Design Reviews at the interceptor and interceptor subsystem level that
will confirm the IIB is ready for Product Development.
Recommendation 6: To strengthen the MDA's longer term acquisition
prospects, the GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the
Office of Acquisition Technology and Logistics to review all MDA
acquisitions for concurrency, and determine whether the proper balance
has been struck between the planned deployment dates and the
concurrency risks taken to achieve those dates.
DoD Response: Concur. The Deputy Secretary of Defense signed a
memorandum in June 2011 that provided guidance to the Missile Defense
Agency (MDA) and the Military Departments (MilDeps) for management and
funding responsibilities for the Ballistic Missile Defense System
(BMDS) elements as they progress through their life cycles. The memo
also provided a process for the MDA and MilDeps to establish fielding
dates for the BMDS elements. The MDA and the MilDeps are working to
establish fielding dates for the BMDS elements. When the fielding
dates are established, concurrency assessments will be possible. In
the interim, the Missile Defense Agency, working closely with the
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) and the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense, Developmental Test and Evaluation
(DASD (DT&E)) are working to ensure: alignment of BMDS T&E events and
capability delivery; element readiness for system-level T&E; and
updates to the BMDS Integrated Master Test Plan. When a full rate
production decision is required, DOT&E will provide an assessment of
operational effectiveness, suitability, and survivability in
accordance with Title 10, United States Code.
Recommendation 7: To strengthen the MDA's longer term acquisition
prospects, the GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the
Office of Acquisition Technology and Logistics to review and report to
Secretary of Defense the extent to which the Presidentially directed
capability delivery dates are contributing to concurrency in missile
defense acquisitions and recommend schedule adjustments where
significant benefits can be obtained by reducing concurrency.
DoD Response: Concur. The current program is structured to develop and
field capabilities at the earliest opportunity while taking into
account prudent risk management practices and executing a thorough
test and evaluation program. MDA is working closely with the DOT&E and
DASD (DT&E) to ensure: alignment of BMDS T&E events and capability
delivery; element readiness for system-level T&E; and updates to the
BMDS Integrated Master Test Plan. When a full rate production decision
is required, DOT&E will provide an assessment of operational
effectiveness, suitability, and survivability in accordance with Title
10, United States Code. When fielding dates are established per the
response to recommendation 6, the Office of Acquisition Technology and
Logistics will review and report to Secretary of Defense the extent to
which the Presidentially directed capability delivery dates may be
contributing to concurrency in missile defense acquisitions and
recommend schedule adjustments if significant benefits can be obtained
by reducing concurrency.
[End of section]
Appendix III: BMDS Models and Simulations Progress:
Fiscal year 2011 events:
* The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) carried out a highly complex
integrated digital simulated assessment involving six Ballistic
Missile Defense System (BMDS) elements;
* MDA awarded a major contract to build a unified models and
simulations architecture for the BMDS.
Overview:
* MDA has made progress in creating a strategic framework for
developing its models and simulations;
* Model and simulation development is challenging, and much remains to
be done;
* Test delays and an anomaly have limited progress in gathering needed
data;
* Limited progress made in accrediting element models.
Models and simulations are critical to understanding how capable the
Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) is and how well it can
function. The complex nature of the BMDS, with its wide range of
connected elements, requires integrated system-level models and
simulations to assess its performance. Assessing BMDS performance
through flight tests alone cannot be done, for it is prohibitively
expensive and faces safety and test range limitations that can best be
dealt with through sound, realistic models and simulations.
Ensuring models and simulations that are sound and realistic requires
a rigorous process to accomplish two main tasks--(1) developing
individual element models and realistically linking those models and
simulations and (2) gathering data from the Missile Defense Agency's
(MDA) ground and flight tests to feed into the models. The BMDS
Operational Test Agency (OTA), an independent multi-service
organization, then assesses how realistic the BMDS models are in order
to accredit the models for use in simulating various levels of system
performance.[Footnote 23] When a model is accredited it means that it
can be reliably trusted to produce high-confidence results for its
intended use and the limitations of the model are known. Since
developing reliable MDA models depends upon the collection of test
data upon which to anchor them, MDA's test program[Footnote 24] plays
a crucial role in model development and BMDS performance assessments.
MDA's models and simulations development effort is making progress in
developing top-level planning documents, but two are not yet final.
Two MDA planning documents, the Integrated Master Assessment Plan and
the Integrated Models and Simulations Master Plan, are being developed
to better focus and link the testing and assessment efforts. According
to OTA officials, the Integrated Master Assessment Plan is based on
sound methodology, which should improve MDA's models and simulations
program, in part by elevating BMDS evaluation and assessment
requirements as the key driver of test design. OTA officials noted
that the Integrated Models and Simulations Master Plan should also
lead to a greater emphasis on model development needs in driving the
design of MDA's test events.
The task of developing and linking the element-level models and
simulations together into an integrated BMDS model is extremely
complex and difficult and will take years to accomplish. Last year, we
reported that the overall performance of the BMDS could not be
assessed because MDA models and simulations had not matured
sufficiently and may not be fully mature until 2017. Since that time,
there has been limited progress in resolving model issues that would
provide more realistic representations of BMDS performance.
In August 2009, U.S. Strategic Command and OTA jointly informed MDA of
39 system-level limitations in MDA's models and simulations program
that adversely affect their ability to assess BMDS performance.
Resolving these limitations, OTA maintains, would permit MDA's models
and simulations to provide more realistic representations of BMDS
performance using the full complement of fielded BMDS assets. MDA
officials have noted that since August 2009, MDA has fully resolved or
is in the process of resolving 7 of these issues and has identified
technical solutions for 15 more. According to OTA officials, most of
the limitations resolved are issues that are more easily addressed,
such as installing improved communications systems and providing
separate workstations for simulation controllers. No technical
solutions have yet been identified for the remaining 17 issues, and
OTA officials maintain that they are still awaiting an MDA timeline
for the complete resolution of these remaining limitations. Among the
remainder are some critical model deficiency issues, which result in
modeled performance that does not reflect realistic operation and
conditions. For instance, models for certain radars have artificial
limitations constraining data processing, so that a simulation
involving high debris levels would effectively shut down the model.
Another model limitation is the need for accurate interceptor modeling
for all BMDS weapon systems in system-level assessments, the absence
of which prevents a determination of engagement success in such
simulations.[Footnote 25]
MDA has made some progress in developing a single, integrated model
and simulation approach for the BMDS. Originally, MDA's models were
developed for use by each element and not for integrated assessments.
Since fiscal year 2010, MDA has made progress in creating a common
framework, whereby the various BMDS element-level hardware-in-the-loop
(HWIL)[Footnote 26] models are subjected to a common and consistent
scene and environment during test events. MDA is now using this
framework, known as the Single Stimulation Framework, in assessing
BMDS performance, and MDA officials maintain that progress achieved in
developing it has facilitated MDA's efforts to resolve some of the 39
limitations. MDA officials further highlight that the framework is
being used to evaluate BMDS performance in increasingly complex and
realistic scenarios, employing greater numbers of BMDS assets.
MDA officials have also claimed some success in creating and
integrating a purely digital model and simulation framework for the
BMDS. In fiscal year 2011, MDA officials stated that they have
achieved some measure of success in using the digital model in a key
assessment of six key BMDS elements. According to MDA officials, in
this assessment, the simulation tool was more successful than the
previous major digital simulation event, which was carried out in
2009. MDA officials have noted a downward trend in simulation trouble
or incident reports for both the Single Stimulation Framework and the
digital model.
MDA plans to integrate these two efforts into a single Objective
Simulation Framework (OSF). OSF is planned as an end-to-end
representation of the BMDS in support of testing, training, exercises,
and system development. OSF is scheduled to go online in the second
quarter of fiscal year 2014, with the current digital simulation
architecture phased out by fiscal year 2016. According to OTA
officials, the common BMDS-level test framework that OSF is intended
to provide has multiple advantages, such as the provision of a single
tool with which to conduct data verification cross-checks.
Additionally, this tool could serve to fill gaps that currently exist
in the hardware-based models.
MDA's difficulty in executing the test plan has limited the progress
of modeling and simulations. The agency has refocused the design of
its test program on collection of test data to strengthen the
development of the models. As we reported in 2010, MDA revised its
testing approach in response to GAO and Department of Defense concerns
and began to base test scenarios on identified modeling and simulation
data needs. In order to collect data required to fill certain model
data gaps, MDA had increased planned testing in certain areas, such as
ground testing. However, according to OTA officials, MDA has had
difficulty conducting its test plan, since actual test events are not
always carried out in accordance with the schedule. We have also
reported consistent problems in conducting tests over the past few
years. Test schedule disruptions delay not only the MDA test schedule,
but also the models and simulations' efforts that depend on the test
data.
Despite MDA's increased efforts to collect test data for the BMDS
model and simulation program, it will take considerable effort and
time to fill all knowledge gaps. MDA has succeeded in collecting some
309 critical variables since 2009; but, by the end of fiscal year
2011, those represented only 15 percent of the required total
identified by MDA. Under the current plan, MDA does not foresee
complete collection of these data until sometime between 2017 and 2022.
Limited test data is a significant challenge MDA faces in developing
accredited models. Flight test failures, an anomaly, and delays in
fiscal year 2011 have reduced the amount of data MDA expected to have
available to support the anchoring of its models and simulations. MDA
officials also maintain that some required data are difficult to
collect and are challenging to obtain even when a flight test is
properly executed. When tests are carried out, considerable post-test
data analysis is required for model development, MDA officials
maintain. However, MDA officials indicated that MDA must often limit
the scope of its analysis to discrete model development objectives.
Because of the challenges in carrying out the full range of testing
required to collect the anchoring data to develop models, MDA is
concurrently exploring alternative methods for model development, such
as greater use of subject matter experts. According to OTA officials,
the subject matter experts focus MDA's efforts toward scenario factors
that are most important for actual and likely BMDS operation, thereby
reducing the amount of testing data required.
MDA has also made some limited progress in achieving partial
accreditation for some BMDS models. MDA models may be partially
accredited for some, but not all, intended functions due to
limitations in the models or gaps in the data. Over the past few
years, BMDS OTA officials have assessed MDA's models and simulations
in an effort to fully understand the performance of the current BMDS
configuration, and have noted that among the element-level BMDS
models, those for Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD) are farthest along
developmentally. In an April 2011 accreditation report, independent
assessors from the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory
found improvements in five of six functional areas for a key THAAD
modeling tool, noting that available data permitted accreditation for
three areas. The report also noted progress with two key Aegis BMD
models, each of which was assessed for limited accreditation in two of
four BMDS target negation areas. MDA officials have also noted
significant progress in the development of a key model for the
Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications element of the
BMDS. MDA has made some progress toward accreditation of BMDS element
models for specific functional areas, but MDA officials acknowledged
that the agency has not yet achieved OTA accreditation in other key
areas, such as any of the 18 environmental models.
While MDA has progressed in its use of simulated BMDS assessments,
there are risks inherent in collecting information from unaccredited
sources. Currently, both of the BMDS modeling and simulation
frameworks rely on currently unaccredited models, despite the
improvements that MDA has noted in the results of such assessments.
OTA officials expressed lowered confidence in the data collected from
such simulated assessments. The reliance on unaccredited models could
result in poorly crafted tactics, techniques, and procedures and in
the production and fielding of a system that is not able to actually
counter real-world threats. As the BMDS matures and the number of
fielded assets increases, modeling and simulation capabilities and
laboratory representations of BMDS assets must keep pace to maintain
operational realism.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD) with Standard
Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IA and Block IB:
Fiscal year 2011 events:
* In September 2011, the SM-3 Block IB failed during its first
developmental flight test;
* The planned 2011 SM-3 Block IB production decision was delayed to
fiscal year 2013;
* In April 2011, the SM-3 Block IA successfully intercepted an
intermediate-range missile. During the test, the missile experienced
an anomaly. The anomaly occurred in a component also used in the SM-3
IB;
* Deliveries of both the SM-3 Block IA and the SM-3 Block IB are on
hold until separate failure review boards are completed;
* The program supported the deployment of the first ship for the
European Phased Adaptive Approach Phase I.
Overview:
* Aegis BMD achieved some significant accomplishments in fiscal year
2011;
* SM-3 Block IB's concurrent schedule overlaps development and
production;
* Failure in SM-3 Block IB's first flight test led to cost growth and
schedule delays;
* The production transition to the SM-3 Block IB from the SM-3 Block
IA has been repeatedly disrupted;
* SM-3 Block IA production and deliveries are on hold while the April
2011 flight test anomaly is being investigated.
Aegis BMD with the SM-3 Blocks IA and IB is a ship-based missile
defense system designed to intercept short-to intermediate-range
ballistic missiles during the midcourse phase of their flight. Key
components include the Aegis Weapons System, shipboard SPY-1 radar,
battle management and command and control systems, and SM-3 missiles.
Missile Defense Agency (MDA) continues to develop Aegis BMD in spirals
for the weapon system and successive capability-based variants of the
SM-3 interceptor to improve defense against increased threat missile
range, type, and raid size. The SM-3 missile has multiple versions in
development or production: the SM-3 Blocks IA, IB, IIA, and IIB. The
currently deployed system is Aegis BMD 3.6.1 with SM-3 Block IA, which
is designed to hit short-to medium-range threat missiles. This system
is included in Phase I of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA).
The next generation version is Aegis BMD 4.0.1 with SM-3 Block IB,
which has greater capabilities. The SM-3 Block IB uses many of the
same components as the SM-3 Block IA, but features an improved two-
color target seeker capability for increased onboard discrimination,
an advanced signal processor for engagement coordination, an improved
throttleable divert and attitude control system (TDACS) for adjusting
its course, and increased range and raid capabilities. The SM-3 Block
IB with Aegis BMD 4.0.1 is planned to be deployed as part of European
PAA Phase II in the 2015 time frame. The SM-3 Blocks IIA and IIB
interceptors are discussed in appendixes V and VI.
Aegis BMD made several significant accomplishments in fiscal year
2011. The Aegis BMD 4.0.1/SM-3 Block IB program successfully conducted
simulated flight test FTM-16 E1 in March 2011, delivered the SM-3
Block IB pathfinder round to hold FTM-16 E2, and gained sufficient
data in FTM-16 E2 in September 2011 to support certification of the
Aegis BMD 4.0.1 weapon system, planned in the second quarter of fiscal
year 2012.
As for the Block IA interceptor, DOD fielded the Aegis BMD 3.6.1/SM-3
Block IA-equipped ship, U.S.S. Monterey, for Phase I of the European
PAA in April 2011, meeting the 2011 time frame for deployment. During
the fiscal year, MDA also installed one Aegis BMD 3.6.1 weapon system
on a ship. In addition, the Aegis BMD program conducted a successful
flight test of the Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IA, referred to as FTM-15,
despite experiencing an anomaly during the test. The Aegis BMD SM-3
Block IA was also used in a Japanese flight test--JFTM-4--in which two
U.S. Aegis BMD ships cooperated to detect, track, and conduct a
simulated intercept engagement against the same target.
Overall, the Aegis BMD 3.6.1/SM-3 Block IA program has had eight out
of nine successful flight tests. In addition, Japanese Aegis BMD has
conducted three out of four successful intercepts using SM-3 Block IA
interceptors.[Footnote 27] The Aegis BMD 3.6.1 weapon system was the
first MDA element to be assessed as operationally effective and
suitable for combat by independent test officials, with limitations.
Problems with concurrency are affecting the production of SM-3 Block
IB interceptors and delaying the phaseout of the SM-3 Block IA
production. The acquisition plan for the SM-3 Block IB interceptor
includes high levels of concurrency--buying weapon systems before they
demonstrate, through testing, that they perform as required--between
development and production. Specifically, the program purchased
interceptors before confirming that the design works as intended by
completing developmental tests and prior to ensuring that a key
subcomponent has overcome prior developmental problems. The need to
field the Aegis BMD 4.0.1/SM-3 Block IB by the 2015 time frame for
European PAA Phase II announced by the President is a key driver for
the high levels of concurrency. According to MDA, the program is
purchasing interceptors for a variety of reasons, including in support
of developmental and operational testing, proving the manufacturing
process, and ensuring the missile will meet its performance
requirements on a repeatable basis. See figure 8 for a depiction of
the SM-3 Block IB's concurrent schedule.
Figure 8: SM-3 Block IB Schedule:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Technology development:
Prior to 2Q FY 2010 through 4Q FY 2012.
Product development:
2Q FY 2010 through 4Q FY 2012.
Production:
2Q FY 2010 through beyond 4Q FY 2013.
2Q FY 2010: Product development approval;
4Q FY 2012: End of flight test series.
4Q FY 2013: Formal production decision.
Source: GAO analysis of MDA data.
[End of figure]
The SM-3 Block IB's acquisition plan includes high levels of
concurrency. We reported in February 2010 that planned interceptor
production would precede knowledge of interceptor performance, and
recommended that MDA delay a decision to produce interceptors to
follow successful completion of developmental testing, a flight test,
and manufacturing readiness review.[Footnote 28] In March 2010, we
reported that the Aegis BMD program is putting the SM-3 Block IB at
risk for cost growth and schedule delays by planning to begin
manufacturing in 2010 before its critical technologies have been
demonstrated in a realistic environment.[Footnote 29] We also reported
in December 2010 that the SM-3 Block IB test schedule was not
synchronized with planned production and financial commitments.
[Footnote 30] Finally, in March 2011, we reported that the schedule
had become even more compressed due to the redesign and
requalification of a missile component, and in response, MDA deferred
key program milestones so that it would have better informed
production decisions.[Footnote 31]
The program began production of SM-3 IB interceptors before resolving
development issues with the TDACS, a key interceptor component that
maneuvers the kill vehicle during the later stages of flight. The
TDACS failed qualification testing in early 2010 and required a
redesigned propellant moisture protection system. In order to hold the
first SM-3 Block IB developmental flight test, FTM-16 Event 2, in
September 2011 as scheduled, MDA only partially completed TDACS
qualification testing and the version used in the failed flight test
was not identical with the approved production design. The TDACS is
expected to complete qualification testing in 2012; however, any
additional issues discovered during qualification testing or
developmental flight testing may require additional redesigns.
The commitment to produce SM-3 Block IB interceptors beyond those
needed for developmental testing was made before the program had a
sufficient level of knowledge about the missile's technology maturity
and performance. MDA has determined that 18 of the 25 SM-3 Block IB
missiles ordered are to be used for developmental testing. The
remaining 7 interceptors are currently unassigned for tests and may be
available for operational use.[Footnote 32]
According to MDA, these interceptors will be used to support
developmental and operational testing; to prove out the manufacturing
processes; to provide information about reliability, maintainability,
and supportability; to verify and refine cost estimates; and to ensure
that the missile meets performance requirements. MDA officials
acknowledged that missiles not consumed by testing could be used
operationally. Program management officials stated that the unassigned
missiles represent a very small portion of the total number of
interceptors they plan to purchase, representing less than 5 percent
of the total 472 interceptors that the program plans to purchase
through fiscal year 2020. MDA decided that the risk was low given that
many of the SM-3 Block IB critical technologies were based on critical
technologies that were tested and used successfully by the SM-3 Block
IA.
MDA is also planning to purchase 46 additional SM-3 Block IB missiles
in fiscal year 2012. However, there are two failure investigations
ongoing that affect SM-3 Block IB production that could delay three
planned developmental flight tests that need to occur to validate SM-3
Block IB capability. It therefore remains unclear whether the
additional 46 missiles will be ordered before the failure reviews are
complete and the interceptor is able to demonstrate that it works as
intended through these flight tests.
The program's highly concurrent schedule is shaped primarily by the
need to achieve initial capability for the fielding of Phase II of the
European PAA by the 2015 time frame announced by the President. In
addition, the program must be ready to participate in the second BMDS
operational test in 2015. Program officials report that they are on
track to achieve these time frames. However, until development is
complete, any additional issues could lead to additional cost growth
or schedule delays.
Failure in SM-3 Block IB’s First Flight Test Led to Cost Growth and
Schedule Delays:
The SM-3 Block IB failed its first developmental flight test, FTM-16
E2, leading to cost growth and schedule delays compounded by the
disruption to ongoing production, the full extent of which has yet to
be determined. During the flight test, the SM-3 Block IB experienced
an unexpected energetic event in the third-stage rocket motor and
failed to intercept a short-range ballistic missile target. Following
the flight test, the program convened a failure review board to
determine the root cause of the failure, modified the missile
production contract, restructured the flight test program, and delayed
key production decisions. While the failure review board is still
investigating the flight test, MDA slowed production of SM-3 Block IB
interceptors. The program had planned to deliver an additional three
SM-3 Block IB missiles for flight testing in fiscal year 2011.
However, the delivery of the remaining three has been delayed until
spring 2012.
Program officials estimate that the flight test failure--including the
failure investigation, design modifications, testing, and
requalification for return to flight--may cost approximately $187
million in fiscal year 2012. In addition, because officials are still
investigating the cause of the flight test failure and how many
already-produced missiles may have to be retrofitted, they do not yet
know how much the retrofits, if required, will cost. At this point,
the program does not have an approved plan to avoid an SM-3 production
gap.
The flight test failure also had several other consequences. The SM-3
Block IB manufacturing readiness review has been delayed from the
second quarter of fiscal year 2011 to the third quarter of fiscal year
2012, and the procurement production decision for additional SM-3
Block IB missiles was moved from fourth quarter of fiscal year 2011 to
the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2013. The failed flight test will be
re-conducted in mid-2012, which may delay additional developmental
flight testing.
The Transition to the SM-3 Block IB from the SM-3 Block IA Has Been
Repeatedly Disrupted:
Aegis BMD's transition to the SM-3 Block IB has been repeatedly
disrupted because the transition was risky given the technology
maturity of components developed for the SM-3 Block IB and the
program's concurrent schedule. Originally, MDA planned that production
of SM-3 Block IA interceptors would end in fiscal year 2009 as
production of SM-3 Block IB interceptors began. However, due to
developmental issues with the SM-3 Block IB, MDA twice had to extend
SM-3 Block IA production--in 2010 and 2011--to cover emerging
production gaps with the SM-3 Block IB. To date, MDA has contracted
for 41 more SM-3 Block IA missiles than originally planned in order to
bridge the production gaps. Now, following the September 2011 flight
test failure, MDA is facing another production gap. It is extending
production once again--it purchased 23 SM-3 Block IA missiles in
fiscal year 2011 and is considering whether to purchase additional SM-
3 Block IA missiles in fiscal year 2012.
In addition, the program has twice had to adjust the procurement of SM-
3 Block IB missiles. Instead of purchasing 24 SM-3 Block IB missiles
as planned in 2010, it purchased 18 SM-3 Block IA missiles and it did
not procure 8 SM-3 Block IB missiles in 2011 as planned. To free up
funding needed to improve TDACS operational suitability, MDA reduced
the planned SM-3 Block IB missiles from 34 to 25 in fiscal year 2011.
Thus far, the program has purchased 41 fewer missiles than previously
planned. Due to the FTM-16 E2 developmental flight test failure,
delivery of these SM-3 Block IB missiles is now being slowed until the
failure review board completes its investigation and any possible
retrofits are made. Despite the test failure and delivery hold, MDA is
considering purchasing 46 SM-3 Block IB interceptors in fiscal year
2012 and 29 SM-3 Block IB interceptors in fiscal year 2013.
Recognizing the critical importance of the completing the planned
fiscal year 2012 intercept tests, the operational need for SM-3
missiles, the relative success of the SM-3 Block IA, as well as the
potential for a production break, the Senate Committee on
Appropriations directed MDA to use the fiscal year 2012 SM-3 Block IB
funds for additional Block IA missiles should the test and acquisition
schedule require any adjustments during fiscal year 2012.
SM-3 Block IA Deliveries Are on Hold While the April 2011 Flight Test
Anomaly Is Being Investigated:
As a result of an anomaly in the latest SM-3 Block IA flight test--FTM-
15 in April 2011--MDA halted acceptance of SM-3 Block IA deliveries.
During the April 2011 flight test, MDA demonstrated the Aegis BMD
3.6.1 weapon system's ability to launch the SM-3 Block IA interceptor
using data from a remote sensor against a separating intermediate-
range ballistic missile target and the capability of the interceptor
to engage threat missiles in the range expected for Phase I of the
European PAA. However, although the SM-3 Block IA interceptor
intercepted the target, it experienced an anomaly. The anomaly
occurred in a component also used in the SM-3 Block IB.
At the time of our review, the program had not completed its
investigation into the cause of the anomaly or decided how it will
address the issue. The program convened a failure review board, which
has not yet completed its investigation of the root cause of the
anomaly. Twelve assembled SM-3 Block IA missiles are not being
accepted for delivery and are being held at the production factory
until the investigation of the anomaly is complete and any possible
refurbishments are made. This represents about 10 percent of the
population of SM-3 Block IA missiles. Program management officials
report that thus far seven missiles will need to be refurbished.
Because the failure review board has not yet completed its
investigation, an unknown quantity of additional SM-3 Block IA
missiles may need to be refurbished due to the anomaly. At the time of
our review, the program did not have an approved plan for how it will
refurbish the affected missiles. Despite these issues, MDA purchased
23 SM-3 Block IA missiles in September 2011 and is considering whether
to purchase additional missiles in 2012 to avoid production gaps and
to keep SM-3 suppliers active.
[End of section]
Appendix V: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD) Standard
Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IIA:
Fiscal year 2011 events:
* The program discovered problems with four key components during
subsystem preliminary design reviews (PDR) and held reviews to resolve
the issues with two components in fiscal year 2011;
* The program was restructured in response to subsystem PDR problems,
adjusting planned flight tests;
* Preliminary testing of some U.S. and Japanese components began.
Overview:
* The SM-3 Block IIA program began in 2006 as a cooperative
development with Japan. It is required to be fielded by 2018 as part
of the European Phased Adaptive Approach Phase III;
* Design review problems in fiscal year 2011 led to a program
restructure and likely increased current costs;
* Program actions in fiscal year 2011 reduced acquisition risk and
potential future cost growth;
* Despite positive changes in program schedule, technology development
concerns remain.
Background and Overview:
The SM-3 Block IIA is the third SM-3 version to be developed for use
with the sea-based and future land-based Aegis BMD. This interceptor
is planned to have increased velocity and range compared to earlier SM-
3s due to a larger 21-inch diameter, more sensitive seeker technology,
and an advanced kinetic warhead.[Footnote 33] Most of the SM-3 Block
IIA components will differ from the versions used in the SM-3 Block
IB, so technology has to be developed for the majority of the SM-3 IIA
components. The SM-3 Block IIA is expected to defend against short-,
medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles.
Initiated in 2006 as a cooperative development program with Japan, the
SM-3 Block IIA program was added to the European Phased Adaptive
Approach (PAA) in 2009. As part of European PAA Phase III, the SM-3
Block IIA is planned to be fielded with Aegis Weapons System 5.1 by
the 2018 time frame and is expected to provide engage on remote
capability, in which data from off-board sensors is used to engage a
target, and expand the range available to intercept a ballistic
missile. The program is managing both the development of the SM-3
Block IIA and its integration with Aegis Weapons System 5.1, which
also is still under development. In this appendix, we evaluate only
the SM-3 Block IIA.
Design Review Problems in Fiscal Year 2011 Led to a Program
Restructuring and Likely Increased Current Costs:
The program planned to hold its system preliminary design review
(PDR)--at which it would demonstrate that the technologies and
resources available for the SM-3 Block IIA would result in a product
that matched its requirements--but problems with the reviews of key
components meant the system review had to be adjusted by 1 year. To
prepare for the system review, the program held 60 subsystem reviews,
for its components to ensure that they were feasible given the
technology and resources available. Two components--divert and
attitude control system (DACS) and DACS propellant--failed their
subsystem reviews and two components--nosecone and third stage rocket
motor (TSRM)--had their reviews suspended, indicating that the
technological capability of these critical components and SM-3 Block
IIA requirements were mismatched. The program took steps to resolve
each of the four subsystem review problems, including restructuring
the program to reduce future acquisition risk.
The DACS, used to adjust the course of the kinetic warhead, failed its
subsystem review because it was not meeting weight and divert
acceleration requirements, which the program resolved by reviewing and
rebalancing subsystem requirements. The system-level DACS requirements
did not change. The DACS propellant that failed the subsystem review
was susceptible to a moisture problem, and the program selected a
different propellant.[Footnote 34] The nosecone, which encloses the
kinetic warhead, was overweight and could become more so, and the
mitigation plan for the weight issue was insufficient. To resolve
these issues, the program evaluated weight reduction opportunities and
risks. The TSRM, used to lift the missile out of the atmosphere and
direct the kinetic warhead to the target, was also not meeting weight
requirements, and one of its components, the attitude control system,
was not meeting thrust accuracy and alignment requirements. To resolve
this issue, the program rebalanced subsystem requirements, but did not
change system-level TSRM requirements.[Footnote 35]
The subsystem review issues also required program schedule changes,
which included the following:
* Adjusting the system PDR from January 2011 to March 2012.
* Splitting in two the critical design review (CDR), at which the
program will determine that the product's design matches the SM-3
Block IIA requirements and cost, schedule, and reliability goals. This
led to schedule adjustments of 13 and 19 months, respectively, for
each of the CDRs.
* Adjusting the interceptor flight test schedule. The program
previously planned to hold its first intercept tests in fiscal years
2014 and 2015 as part of the co-development with Japan, but with the
schedule adjustment, it will now have these tests in calendar year
2016.The United States and Japan finalized the development program
restructuring on September 30, 2011. Despite this adjustment, the
interceptor remains aligned with European PAA Phase III in the 2018
time frame.
Aegis BMD program management officials stated that the subsystem PDR
problems and subsequent program restructure may increase current
program costs, but they are not certain how much because the
completion contract, which will run through fiscal year 2017, was
still being negotiated as of December 2011.
Program Actions in Fiscal Year 2011 Reduced Acquisition Risk and
Potential Future Cost Growth:
The SM-3 Block IIA program took actions in 2011 that could reduce
acquisition risk and mitigate future cost growth. Its previous
schedule was compressed, which raised acquisition risk. For example,
there was limited recovery time to investigate and resolve potential
problems between program reviews as well as flight tests. The new
schedule, made final in September 2011, relieves some compression
concerns and adjusts to the subsystem review issues by adding time
between the subsystem reviews and the system review to ensure that the
technology issues are resolved. We have previously reported that
reconciling gaps between requirements and resources before product
development begins makes it more likely that a program will meet cost,
scheduling, and performance targets, and programs that commit to
product development with less technical knowledge and without ensuring
that requirements are defined, feasible, and achievable within cost,
schedule, and other system constraints face increased technical risks
and possibility of cost growth.[Footnote 36] The new SM-3 Block IIA
schedule allows the program to have more knowledge before committing
to product development in the second quarter of fiscal year 2014, a
strategy that may reduce future cost growth and development risks. The
new schedule also adds flexibility in the test schedule by adding an
option for a third controlled test vehicle flight if needed. If the
first two test vehicles prove to be successful and a third is not
needed, this test can be converted into the first intercept test of
the SM-3 Block IIA.
In addition to the schedule change, in fiscal year 2011 the program
identified some steps to avoid the difficulties that affected SM-3
Block IB component production. For example, it found that using proven
materials, standardizing inspections with vendors, and ensuring that
designs included reasonable tolerances were practices to follow based
on lessons learned from the SM-3 Block IB experience.
Finally, the SM-3 Block IIA program identified alternatives to one
advanced seeker component that it had identified, based on the
experience of the SM-3 Block IB, as potentially increasing production
unit costs by 5 percent. Program management officials stated that they
identified a viable alternative for this component and worked with the
SM-3 Block IIB program to further develop manufacturing improvements
for this technology.
Despite Positive Changes in Overall Program Schedule, Technology
Development Concerns Remain:
The program still faces significant technology development challenges.
While the SM-3 Block IIA is a variant of the SM-3 missile, the
majority of its components will change from their SM-3 Block IB
configuration. The program must develop these components, some of
which have consistently been technologically challenging for SM-3
development. In addition, two technology maturity challenges have
emerged. Two critical technologies, the second and third stage rocket
motors, experienced problems during testing that may require redesign
and a potential CDR rescheduling. The program was investigating the
problems and potential effects at the end of fiscal year 2011. In
addition, following the subsystem review failure and selection of an
alternate propellant, analysis of the DACS propellant performance
showed that there may be a shortfall in divert performance for some
missions. As of the end of fiscal year 2011, the program was still
determining the extent of this issue.
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD) Standard
Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IIB:
Fiscal year 2011 events:
* The program entered the technology development phase and awarded
initial contracts for concept definition and technology risk reduction;
* Inclusion of additional technology development efforts to support
European Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) Phase IV led to realignment of
the resource plan;
* The program continued development of technologies that may
contribute to SM-3 interceptor variants;
* The program prepared for transfer of SM-3 Block IIB development to
Aegis BMD program office in 2013.
Overview:
* SM-3 Block IIB program began in June 2010 and is planned to be
fielded by the 2020 time frame as part of European PAA Phase IV;
* The program awarded three concept definition and program planning
contracts to develop schedule and design options;
* The current program plan includes high levels of concurrency and
acquisition risk.; Full program acquisition costs have not been
developed given the early stage of the program;
* The benefits of early intercept capability are unclear and the lack
of analysis of alternatives may result in warfighter needs not being
met within resource constraints.
Background and Overview:
The SM-3 Block IIB is a planned interceptor for the Aegis BMD program
that is intended to contribute to U.S. homeland defense by providing
early intercept capabilities against some intercontinental ballistic
missiles and regional defense against medium-and intermediate-range
ballistic missiles. This interceptor has been described by the Missile
Defense Agency (MDA) as critical to the Ballistic Missile Defense
System (BMDS) and developing solutions to future BMDS capability
shortfalls. The SM-3 Block IIB program began in June 2010 and entered
the technology development phase in July 2011. Given its early stage
of development, the SM-3 Block IIB does not have cost, schedule or
performance baselines and is not managed within the Aegis BMD program
office. Instead, this program has a tentative schedule and is being
managed within MDA's Advanced Technology office until a planned 2013
transition to the Aegis BMD program office. The SM-3 Block IIB is
planned to be fielded by the 2020 time frame as part of the European
Phased Adaptive Approach Phase IV.
The program received a significant funding reduction in the fiscal
year 2012 budget and, as of January 2012, was determining how to
adjust its tentative schedule and future program plans. The program's
fiscal year 2012 budget request was reduced by $110 million to $13
million.
Program Awarded Initial Contracts to Develop Schedule, Design Options,
and Crosscutting Technology:
The SM-3 Block IIB program is following a two-pronged development
strategy. First, program officials have awarded competitive contracts
to generate options for missile configurations and development plans.
Second, in a separate effort, they are using multiple contractors to
reduce risks by developing technologies that may be used in the SM-3
Block IIB and other SM-3 variants. The program awarded three concept
definition and program planning contracts to define and assess viable
missile configurations, conduct trade studies, and define a
development plan. The contractors will develop alternative missile
concepts, technologies and schedule for interceptor development beyond
2013. According to the program, the purpose of this competition is to
minimize cost, schedule, and technical risks. There will be another
competition to select one contractor for the product development phase
in 2013. We have reported previously that competition among
contractors can result in increased technological innovation that
leads to better and more reliable products.[Footnote 37]
The program is using technology risk reduction contracts to develop
technologies that may cut across versions of the SM-3, such as the
focal plane array,[Footnote 38] and to invest in materials or
technology that will increase missile velocity and containment of
threat missiles. For example, this effort produced a major technical
first when a contractor working on focal plane array issues changed
the process for creating a component of the focal plane array in a way
that may reduce the number of defects in the production of that
component.
Current Program Plan Includes High Levels of Concurrency and
Acquisition Risk:
Program management officials have issued a tentative schedule beyond
the technology development phase, but this plan, if implemented,
includes high levels of concurrency and acquisition risk. We have
previously reported the following:
* Concurrency leads to major problems being discovered in production,
when it is either too late or very costly to correct them.[Footnote 39]
* Before starting product development, programs should hold key
engineering reviews, culminating in the preliminary design review
(PDR), to ensure that the proposed design can meet defined, feasible
requirements within cost, schedule, and other system constraints.
[Footnote 40]
* Committing to production and fielding before development is complete
is a high-risk strategy that often results in unexpected cost
increases, schedule delays, test problems, and performance shortfalls.
[Footnote 41]
Successful defense programs ensure that their acquisitions begin with
realistic plans and baselines before the start of their
development.[Footnote 42] According to the tentative SM-3 Block IIB
schedule, the product development decision will occur before the March
2015 PDR. As a result, MDA is planning to commit to developing a
product with less technical knowledge than our prior work has shown is
needed and without fully ensuring that requirements are defined,
feasible, and achievable within cost, schedule, and other system
constraints. This sequencing increases both technical risks and the
possibility of cost growth.[Footnote 43] In addition, the program will
not have a stable design when it must commit to building flight test
vehicles. According to acquisition best practices, a design is
considered stable when the technologies are mature and the critical
design review (CDR) confirms that at least 90 percent of the drawings
are releasable for manufacturing. Based on the experience of other SM-
3 interceptors, the program must commit to produce flight test
interceptors 2 years before the March 2016 first flight. However, this
timeline means the commitment to a flight test vehicle would occur a
year before the SM-3 Block IIB PDR has confirmed that the design is
feasible and more than a year and a half before CDR has confirmed that
the design is stable. See figure 9 for a depiction of the tentative SM-
3 Block IIB schedule.
Figure 9: SM-3 Block IIB Schedule:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Technology development:
4Q FY 2011: Technology development decision.
Product development:
4Q FY 2013: Product development decision.
March 2015: Preliminary design review.
Source: GAO analysis of MDA data.
Note: Given the early stage of the program, we are not able to depict
the production plans or the end of the product development phase for
the SM-3 Block IIB.
[End of figure]
Program management officials stated that they have taken steps in the
tentative schedule that reduce acquisition risk. According to SM-3
Block IIB program information, the tentative schedule is based on the
experience of programs with similar magnitude and complexity, and the
concept definition and program planning contractors will develop
detailed product development schedules that will help refine the
program schedule. Further, activities during the technology
development phase, such as evaluating the performance of multiple
contractor concepts, simulations conducted by the contractors, and
affordability assessments, are designed to reduce risk in SM-3 Block
IIB development. In addition, while the program plans to hold its
production development decision prior to the PDR, it will hold a
series of reviews with the concept definition contractors to receive
engineering insight into each contractor's plans. Program management
officials told us they also plan to hold a government-only system
requirements review prior to the initiating the product development
contract competition. This review is planned to confirm that SM-3
Block IIB has specific technical requirements that the developer can
use to establish a product baseline as well as conduct a risk and
technology readiness assessment.
Another key step for successful programs is ensuring that only mature
technologies are brought into product development. MDA has identified
technologies that are important for SM-3 variants and is investing in
these technologies, particularly the less mature technologies, to
facilitate SM-3 Block IIB development. However, as of October 2011,
the program had not named specific critical technologies for the SM-3
Block IIB. Program officials stated that they do not plan to do so
until the product development decision. The concept definition
contractors are required to identify technology investments to
increase the maturity of the technologies by demonstrating them in a
relevant environment by the end of fiscal year 2013, which coincides
with the product development decision. MDA, however, does not require
that a program mature technologies to this level by this decision.
Without knowing the specific critical technologies, it is not possible
to identify the risk of including them in the product development
phase. As we have previously reported, including immature technologies
in product development can lead to delays and contribute to cost
increases.[Footnote 44]
Full Program Acquisition Costs Not Developed Given Early Stage of the
Program:
While the program has proposed that $1.673 billion in research and
development funding is needed from fiscal years 2012 to 2016, a full
program acquisition cost has not yet been developed. Given the early
stage of the program, and that key decisions about requirements and
the missile configuration have not been made, a full acquisition cost
estimate is not currently feasible. According to MDA, the program
plans to complete a detailed cost estimate prior to entering product
development.
A cost estimate cannot be developed until key acquisition decisions
are made. Program management officials stated that warfighter and
system requirements for the SM-3 Block IIB have not been set, and
discussions about the delivery schedule beyond the initial capability
are ongoing. Further, whether the propellant will be liquid or solid,
the SM-3 Block IIB's diameter, and whether modifications must be made
to a vertical launch system are not yet known given the early stage of
the program. In addition, as there is not yet a final schedule, the
currently proposed funding is not informed by a complete post-product
development decision schedule. Program management officials note that
these key decisions are being informed by activities occurring during
the technology development phase, such as trade studies involving the
propulsion and missile diameter, and they are updating current cost
estimates as they receive information from contractors as well as
working on developing detailed cost estimates.
Benefits of Early Intercept Capability Are Unclear and the Lack of
Analysis of Alternatives May Result in Warfighter Needs Not Being Met
within Resource Constraints:
MDA determined that a key goal for the SM-3 Block IIB is to provide an
early intercept capability. However, a recent Defense Science Board
study suggested that other capabilities are more important than early
intercept. The study concluded that early intercept capability is not
useful for regional missile defense. Further, while early intercept
with shoot-look-shoot capability could be part of a cost-effective
defense of the U.S. homeland if a sufficiently fast missile was
available, the size of the battlespace and not early intercept
capability is the key driver of cost-effectiveness.[Footnote 45] In
addition, it is unclear if early intercept is possible for defense of
the U.S. homeland due to the velocity required for an early intercept
of an intercontinental ballistic missile aimed at the United States
and the state of current missile technology. Finally, the value of a
shoot-look-shoot capability relies on a robust ability to determine if
the first missile was successful, often called kill assessment, but
this ability has not been established.[Footnote 46] In response, MDA
stated that the Defense Science Board study had used a limited
definition of early intercept and ignored significant benefits of the
strategy that stem from decreasing the time available to the adversary
to deploy countermeasures. Such benefits include providing a longer
viewing time of deployment maneuvers for forward-based sensors,
reducing the flight time of the interceptor, and increasing the
complexity to the attacker of deploying countermeasures.
The program office did not conduct a formal analysis of alternatives
to compare the operational effectiveness, cost, and risks of a number
of alternative potential solutions to address valid needs and
shortfalls in operational capability prior to embarking on the
technology development phase. The program did assess some missile
concepts for early intercept capability in a review that was not a
formal analysis of alternatives. The program currently plans to
conduct engineering and trade studies--including cost trades--that
will be completed in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2012 and review
additional alternative concepts as part of the concept definition
process. While MDA programs are not required to conduct an analysis of
alternatives, we have previously reported that it is key to planning
and establishing a sound business case. Specifically, an analysis of
alternatives provides a foundation for developing and refining the
operational requirements for a weapons system program and provides
insight into the technical feasibility and costs of alternatives.
Further, without a full exploration of alternatives, the program may
not achieve an optimal concept that satisfies the warfighter's needs
within available resource constraints.[Footnote 47] Without this sound
basis for program initiation, the SM-3 Block IIB is at risk for cost
and schedule growth as well as not meeting the warfighter's needs with
the resources available.
[End of section]
Appendix VII: Aegis Ashore:
Fiscal year 2011 events:
* Initiated manufacturing of Aegis Ashore test site at Pacific Missile
Range Facility in preparation for testing in fiscal year 2014;
* Successfully completed system design review and preliminary design
review;
* Signed agreement with Romania to host Aegis Ashore site as part of
European Phased Adaptive Approach Phase II;
* Restructured acquisition strategy for deckhouse twice.
Overview:
* Concurrent development and production schedule increase potential
for cost growth and schedule delays;
* Various Aegis Ashore components require modification for a land-
based configuration and development uncertainties remain;
* Unstable Aegis Ashore program content, affecting both the resource
baseline and cost estimates, reduces transparency and impedes
oversight and accountability.
Background and Overview:
Aegis Ashore is the Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) planned land-based
version of the ship-based Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD),
which will track and intercept ballistic missiles in their midcourse
phase of flight using Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptors. Key
components include a vertical launching system (VLS) with SM-3
missiles and a reconstitutable enclosure, referred to as a deckhouse,
that contains the SPY-1 radar and command and control system. Aegis
Ashore will share many components with the sea-based Aegis BMD and
will use next generation versions of the Aegis weapons systems--Aegis
4.0.1 and Aegis 5.0--that are still under development. In accordance
with the September 2009 European Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA)
announcement, the Department of Defense (DOD) plans to deploy the
first Aegis Ashore installation with the SM-3 Block IB in the 2015
time frame and the second installation in the 2018 time frame.
Concurrent Development and Production Schedule Increase Potential for
Cost Growth and Schedule Delays:
Given the commitment to field Aegis Ashore by the 2015 time frame, the
program's schedule contains a high level of concurrency--buying weapon
systems before they demonstrate, through testing, that they perform as
required--between development and production. The program began
product development early, included high levels of concurrency in its
construction and procurement plan, and has not aligned its testing
schedule with component procurement and construction. As we have
reported previously, an acquisition strategy for accelerated fielding,
such as that of Aegis Ashore, will likely accept higher risk primarily
through concurrent development and production.[Footnote 48] Under such
a strategy, major problems are more likely to be discovered in
production, when it is either too late or very costly to correct them.
The program began product development and established the Aegis Ashore
cost, schedule, and performance baseline in June 2010, which was 14
months before completing its preliminary design review. This
concurrent sequencing can increase technical risks and the possibility
of cost growth by committing to product development with less
technical knowledge than needed by acquisition best practices and
without ensuring that requirements are defined, feasible, and
achievable within cost and schedule constraints. In addition, the
program has a concurrent schedule for constructing deckhouses and
procuring Aegis Ashore components. Since committing to product
development and establishing the product development baseline, the
acquisition strategy for deckhouse construction has been revised
twice. The current plan, called the dual deckhouse plan, is to
construct two deckhouses--first, an operational deckhouse planned for
installation in Romania and a second for developmental testing in
Hawaii. The test deckhouse will begin construction a quarter later
than the operational deckhouse and will be installed for testing at
the Pacific Missile Range Facility in Hawaii. Aegis BMD program
management officials stated that a third deckhouse, for the Aegis
Ashore installation in Poland, will be constructed at a later date to
be set based on funding availability. The program also has initiated
procurement of equipment, such as the VLS and SPY-1 radar that are
needed for the Aegis Ashore installations.
This plan means that knowledge gained from testing the Hawaiian
installation cannot be used to guide the construction of the Romanian
deckhouse or procurement of components for operational use. Any design
changes that arise from testing in Hawaii will have to occur on a
complete deckhouse and on already procured components intended for
operational use. As we have previously reported, rework on an existing
fabrication is costly. Aegis Ashore is currently scheduled to
participate in four flight tests, three of which are intercepts, with
the first intercept flight test scheduled for the second half of
fiscal year 2014, at which point two of the three deckhouses will be
completed and Aegis Ashore site construction and interceptor
production will be well under way. The final flight test is planned
for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2015. See figure 10 for a
depiction of Aegis Ashore's concurrent schedule.
Figure 10: Aegis Ashore Schedule:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Technology development:
September 2009 through about FY 2013.
Product development:
FY 2010 through 4Q FY 2015.
Production:
Late 2009 through beyond 4Q FY 2015.
September 2009: European PAA announcement;
FY 2010: Start of component procurement;
4Q FY 2015: End of flight test series.
Source: GAO analysis of MDA data.
[End of figure]
However, Aegis BMD program management officials state that Aegis
Ashore has taken steps to lower the acquisition risks. First, the
officials note that the program is using components already in use
aboard Aegis BMD ships, reducing the technical risk of the program.
The Director of MDA has stated that the sea-based system and Aegis
Ashore will share identical components. According to program
documentation, the dual deckhouse plan reduces risk and creates
fabrication and construction efficiencies. Aegis BMD program
management officials noted that the dual deckhouse plan has
significant advantages over prior plans, all of which had the
operational deckhouse built before the test deckhouse. For example,
they noted that prior Aegis Ashore deckhouse construction plans
required testing a different deckhouse design in Hawaii than the one
that would be used at the operational sites. Constructing two
deckhouses concurrently provides for greater efficiency in purchasing
material and equipment and allows for one contractor to build both
deckhouses. The Director of MDA stated that the deckhouse construction
methodology is the most cost effective and efficient under the
program's time constraints. In addition, the program expects to be
able to modify the operational deckhouse prior to its installation in
Romania if flight tests reveal that a modification is needed. The
program management officials also stated that the dual deckhouse plan
provides more time for testing the equipment that goes in the
deckhouse. Aegis BMD program management officials stated that this
plan allows them to test the electrical system in the Romanian
deckhouse and to complete these tests more than 1 year earlier than
previously scheduled. Finally, they noted that constructing two
deckhouses also facilitates testing, including conducting Aegis Light
Off events that consist of preflight test verification of the
integration of Aegis Ashore components.
Aegis BMD program management officials told us that the schedule does
contain more risk before the first controlled test vehicle flight
test, which is the first time all of the Aegis Ashore components will
be integrated, and less risk between that test and the fielding in
Romania. They stated that they decided to increase the risk at the
start of the schedule in order to meet the presidentially announced
date of 2015 for the first Aegis Ashore installation.
While Aegis BMD program management officials are confident that the
risks of a concurrent schedule are low given the nature of the Aegis
Ashore program, the short time frame for integrating and fielding
Aegis Ashore could magnify the effects of any problems that may arise.
Program documentation states that there is limited to no margin in the
schedule to deal with possible delays in fabrication or system
testing, and as this effort is the first time a land-based deckhouse
has been constructed, there is no prior experience on which to draw to
alleviate any schedule delays.
Various Aegis Ashore Components Require Modification for a Land-Based
Configuration, and Development Uncertainties Remain:
While Aegis Ashore will use components already developed and used
operationally in the sea-based Aegis BMD, key components--the VLS and
radar--will be modified for use on land. In addition, the multimission
signal processor, a key component for both the sea-based and land-
based system that processes radar inputs from ballistic and cruise
missile targets, is still under development and behind schedule. The
first time all of the Aegis Ashore components are expected to be
integrated and flight tested will be in fiscal year 2014. Given the
concurrent schedule for the program, any difficulties with the
modified components or partly developed components may affect the
overall schedule, potentially leading to cost growth or an
installation not meeting expectations because a needed modification
was discovered too late.
The Aegis Ashore installations will include a VLS currently used on
Aegis BMD ships, but it is planned to be located at a greater distance
from the deckhouse. The communications system between the deckhouse
and the VLS will require modification because of this increased
distance. In addition, the VLS is planned to be surrounded by an
environmental enclosure at Aegis Ashore installations. Aegis BMD
program management officials stated that this enclosure will include
the heating and cooling system and provide power to the launcher.
Testing of this modification is planned for fiscal year 2014.
Aegis Ashore's SPY-1 radar likely will face challenges related to the
radio-frequency spectrum, which is used to provide an array of
wireless communications services, such as mobile voice and data
services, radio and television broadcasting, radar, and satellite-
based services. The radar might need to be modified if the performance
of wireless devices in Romania is degraded by the SPY-1. Furthermore,
Romania's future use of the radio-frequency spectrum is unknown but
could allow more domestic wireless communications services to operate
in or near the radar's operating frequency. Consequently, the Aegis
Ashore site may need modifications to resolve this potential issue, or
alternatively, Romanian wireless broadband devices may need to be
modified. An initial analysis of radio-frequency spectrum use in
Romania by the Defense Spectrum Organization, DOD's organization that
provides information and assistance on radio frequency analysis,
planning, and support, recommended to MDA that additional study of
Romanian radio-frequency spectrum use occur. Aegis BMD management
officials told us that they recognize the risks associated with
operating the SPY-1 radar on land and that MDA plans additional study
in fiscal year 2012 to better understand Romanian spectrum use and the
potential effect of the SPY-1 radar on land, including study of
existing land-based SPY-1 radars. There may be modifications to the
SPY-1 radar to mitigate this potential issue, but the officials told
us they do not currently know what modifications could be required to
mitigate any frequency issues because of this need for further study.
Depending on spectrum policy and usage in the host nation, this issue
may be a long-term challenge over the life of the Aegis Ashore
installations regardless of where they are fielded.
In addition, urban clutter--which could affect the ability to acquire,
maintain track, and perform imaging on long-range targets--could
affect the SPY-1 radar. Program documentation states that both the
Romanian and Polish Aegis Ashore sites have clutter from urban
structures and wind farms. Urban clutter may require modifications of
the radar, such as software modifications, or may require additional
testing or affect operations of the Aegis Ashore installation.
In addition to the aforementioned VLS and radar issues, developmental
uncertainties also exist for the multimission signal processor. We
have previously reported that it is behind schedule, with a
significant percentage of its software increments still needing to be
integrated.[Footnote 49] This component of Aegis Ashore was unable to
demonstrate planned functionality for a radar test event in December
2010, and the Defense Contract Management Agency has identified the
multimission signal processor schedule as high risk.
As we have reported previously, Aegis Ashore is dependent upon next
generation versions of Aegis systems--Aegis 4.0.1 and Aegis 5.0--as
well as the SM-3 Block IB interceptor, all of which are still under
development.[Footnote 50]
Unstable Aegis Ashore Program Content, Affecting Both the Resource
Baseline and Cost Estimates, Reduces Transparency and Impedes
Oversight and Accountability:
Aegis Ashore's requirements, acquisition strategy and overall program
content were not stable when the resource baseline--the expected
investment in the development and delivery of a product--was
established, and subsequent program changes obscure the assessment of
program progress. MDA's acquisition directive states that baselines
are used to assess programs and program maturity. We have previously
reported that baselines provide the best basis for transparency over
actual program performance, giving decision makers key information
about program progress and cost.[Footnote 51] Baseline variances give
management information about where corrective action may be needed to
bring the program back on track. Variation from the baseline can
provide valuable insight into program risk and its causes and can
empower management to make decisions about how to best handle risks.
However, this transparency is limited if the initial baseline is not
sound or if the reporting of progress against the baseline obscures
actual program cost or performance.
Aegis Ashore's resource baseline, established at the developmental
baseline review on June 22, 2010, was initially $813 million. The
initial resource baseline established the resources needed to develop
and build two Aegis Ashore systems--one test and one operational--and
deploy them in the 2015 time frame. In the June 25, 2010 BMDS
Accountability Report (BAR) submitted to Congress 3 days after the
review, MDA reported a revised resource baseline of $966 million, an
increase of $153 million or 19 percent. According to information
provided by the program, the reason for the increase was a refinement
of the program requirements and a review of resource estimates
provided earlier in fiscal year 2010.
Beyond this resource baseline adjustment, the anticipated cost of the
program has grown as program plans have developed. By February 2012,
program management officials provided information that the program was
reporting a cost growth of $622 million over the 2010 baseline for a
total cost estimate of $1.6 billion.[Footnote 52] Aegis BMD management
officials provided information attributing the cost growth to changes
in the deckhouse fabrication plans, an increase in the cost of the
Aegis Weapons system, and a refinement of equipment needs. In
addition, the program has adjusted the calculations for the average
procurement unit cost (APUC), or the ratio of procurement costs to the
number of operational units, across the life of the program. At the
developmental baseline review in June 2010, the APUC was based on the
test installation in Hawaii. By June 2011, the program included two
installations--for Romania and Poland--in the APUC. However, at the
end of fiscal year 2011, the program changed the quantity to one Aegis
Ashore installation. Information provided by the program office states
that the increase to two installations occurred due to the addition of
all European PAA phases to the program during the year and that the
fiscal year 2012 BAR will include only one installation to be
consistent with the 2011 BAR. The current estimate for the APUC also
has changed. The baseline for the average procurement cost is $272
million for each Aegis Ashore system. Program management officials
reported that by February 2012, the estimate for the APUC was $380
million, a 40 percent increase over the baseline unit cost.
[End of section]
Appendix VIII: Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD):
Fiscal year 2011 events:
* In December 2010, the program failed to successfully intercept a
target during a retest of the unsuccessful January 2010 intercept
attempt. The tests were designed to verify the capability of the
enhanced version of the kill vehicle called the Capability Enhancement
II (CE-II EKV);
* Due to the failed intercept test, the Director, MDA halted final
integration of the remaining CE-II EKVs;
* At the request of the U.S. Northern Command, delivered a second fire
control system to Fort Greely Alaska so that testing can occur while
the system is also operational;
* GMD participated in a BMDS ground test during which operational
personnel executed tactics, techniques and procedures for the defense
of the United States.
Overview:
* GMD has not been able to verify the capability of the CE-II
interceptor;
* MDA's cost to demonstrate the CE-II through flight testing has grown
significantly;
* MDA has pursued a highly concurrent acquisition strategy for the GMD
program that allowed for rapid fielding, but with increased risks;
* Consequences of MDA's highly concurrent acquisition strategy include
schedule delays, cost growth and reduced understanding of system
performance.
Background and Overview:
The GMD element enables combatant commanders from the U.S. Space and
Missile Defense Command[Footnote 53] to defend the United States
against a limited attack from intermediate-and intercontinental-range
ballistic missiles from nations such as North Korea and the Middle
East during the midcourse phase of flight. GMD consists of a ground-
based interceptor (GBI)--a booster with an exoatmospheric kill vehicle
(EKV) on top--and a fire control system that receives target
information from Ballistic Missile Defense System sensors in order to
formulate a battle plan. The GMD program has emplaced two EKV
versions. The first, fielded since 2004, is known as the Capability
Enhancement I (CE-I)[Footnote 54] and the second, the current version
in production, is called the Capability Enhancement II (CE-II). GMD
has fielded its entire planned inventory of 30 GBIs.[Footnote 55]
According to the Director, Missile Defense Agency (MDA), GMD is
expected to remain in service until at least 2032.
In fiscal year 2011, MDA continued to provide U.S. Northern Command a
capability to defend the nation against a limited ballistic missile
attack and delivered a second fire control system to Fort Greely,
Alaska, to provide flexibility to operate while also testing the
system.
GMD Has Not Been Able to Verify the Capability of the CE-II EKV
Interceptor:
MDA has not successfully demonstrated the ability of the CE-II to
intercept a target. The first two attempts failed--the first in
January 2010 due to a quality control issue and the second in December
2010 due to a design issue.[Footnote 56] During this second attempted
test, MDA launched an intermediate-range target with a simulated
reentry vehicle and associated objects. A forward-based radar provided
acquisition and track data to the GMD system. In addition, the Sea-
based X-band radar provided discrimination data to the GMD system. The
GMD interceptor was launched from a silo at Vandenberg Air Force Base,
flew as expected to its designated point, and deployed the CE-II EKV,
which reached the target and identified the most lethal object but
failed to intercept it.
After this failure, the Director, MDA, testified that the agency's top
priority was to confirm the root cause, fix it, and successfully
repeat the previous flight test.[Footnote 57] Accordingly, MDA
undertook an extensive and rigorous effort to determine the root cause
of the failure and develop design solutions to resolve the failure.
The investigation concluded the following: (1) ground testing cannot
replicate the environment in which the kill vehicle operates and (2)
the CE-II EKV, specifically the inertial measurement unit, requires
redesign and additional development, which MDA has undertaken. For
example, according to a GMD program official, the program has
conducted over 50 component and subcomponent failure investigation and
resolution tests. Additionally, the program has developed new testing
techniques and special instrumentation to provide additional data in
future flight tests.
MDA realigned resources from planned 2011 activities to fund the
investigation and fund return-to-intercept activities including
redesign efforts. For example, the program delayed funding the
rotation of older fielded interceptors into flight test assets,
delayed funding interceptor manufacturing, and delayed purchasing GBI
upgrade kits. However, the agency did continue its efforts to increase
reliability of the interceptors through upgrades and repair of five
interceptors although the refurbishments conducted to date do not fix
all known issues or provide a guarantee of reliability.
MDA’s Cost to Demonstrate the CE-II Initial Capability through Flight
Testing Has Grown Significantly:
The cost to confirm the CE-II capability through flight testing has
increased from $236 million to about $1 billion dollars due to the
flight test failures as noted in table 4. In addition to the costs of
the actual flight tests, the total cost for determining the root cause
and developing the design changes has not been fully developed.
Table 4: Flight Test and Failure Review Cost to Assess CE-II
Capability[A]:
Activity: FTG-06;
Cost: $236 million.
Activity: FTG-06a;
Cost: $240 million.
Activity: CTV-01 Costs as of February 2012;
Cost: $141 million.
Activity: FTG-06b Costs as of February 2012;
Cost: $269 million.
Activity: Failure review costs as of February 2012;
Cost: $91 million.
Activity: Total;
Cost: $976 million.
Source: MDA.
[A] Flight test costs include the target, mission planning, range
support, and post-test analysis.
[End of table]
While the cost incurred by MDA to verify the CE-II variant through
flight testing, as noted above, is about $1 billion, it does not
reflect the costs already expended during development of the
interceptor and target. For example, the cost of the flight test
excludes nonrecurring development costs, such as the development costs
for the interceptor or target and its support as well as those for
systems engineering and test and evaluation, among others. Often these
are costs that were incurred many years before the flight test was
conducted. MDA has not separately reported the nonrecurring
development costs for the CE-II interceptor, but instead reports the
program acquisition unit costs (which are the development, production,
deployment, and military construction costs divided by the total
number of operationally configured units) for the combined CE-I and CE-
II interceptor effort. For these interceptors, the program acquisition
unit costs are reported to be $421 million as of February 2011 and are
likely increasing to address the flight test failure. MDA reports the
nonrecurring costs for the targets used in these flight test as $141
million each. Consequently, including nonrecurring development costs
for both the CE-II and the targets would substantially increase the
costs for each flight test and the overall costs outlined in table 4.
MDA Has Pursued a Highly Concurrent Acquisition Strategy for GMD That
Allowed for Rapid Fielding, but with Increased Risks:
To meet a 2002 presidential directive to deploy an initial missile
defense capability by 2004, MDA concurrently matured technology,
designed the element, tested the design and produced and fielded an
initial capability. A 2008 MDA briefing acknowledged that fielding
while still in the development and test phase led to very risky
decisions regarding schedule, product quality, and program cost. For
example, the EKV team focused on technical aspects of design instead
of also ensuring that the design could be produced, which led to a
lack of production control and near continuous engineering changes.
While this approach did lead to the rapid fielding of a limited
defense, it also resulted in schedule delays, unexpected cost
increases, a refurbishment program, and a reduced knowledge of system
reliability necessary for program sustainment, as well as variations
between delivered CE-I EKVs. (See figure 11.)
Figure 11: GMD Concurrent Schedule:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Product development:
2004 through 2022.
Technology development:
2004 through 2012.
Production:
2004: start date;
2011: Production suspended;
2012: Production resumes;
2017: Production complete:
2022: Flight test completion.
Source: GAO analysis of MDA data.
[End of figure]
MDA emplaced its first GBI in 2004, although it had little of the
data, such as interceptor reliability, that it would normally have had
before fielding a system. Accordingly, the Director, MDA, testified on
March 2011 that GMD put interceptors "that are more akin to prototypes
than production representative missiles in the field." Additionally,
interceptors were emplaced in silos before successfully conducting a
flight test of this configuration.
In 2004, MDA committed to another highly concurrent development,
production, and fielding strategy for the new CE-II interceptor,
approving the production before completing development of the prior
version or flight testing the new components.[Footnote 58] MDA
proceeded to concurrently develop, manufacture, and deliver 12 of
these interceptors even though MDA has not yet successfully tested
this new version.
Consequences of MDA’s Highly Concurrent Acquisition Strategy Include
Schedule Delays, Cost Growth, and Reduced Understanding of System
Performance:
MDA's concurrent approach to developing and fielding assets has
disrupted its acquisition efforts, resulted in cost growth and
expensive retrofits, and reduced the planned knowledge of the system's
capabilities and limitations. In response to the failure of FTG-06a in
December 2010, MDA restructured its fiscal year 2011 manufacturing
plan by halting deliveries of remaining CE-II EKVs until the
completion of the failure review and a nonintercept attempt in fiscal
year 2012.[Footnote 59]
To help mitigate the affect of the production halt, the GMD program
planned to perform five limited upgrades to previously manufactured CE-
I interceptors. According to contractor officials, in order to keep
the production line viable, they were directed to complete five
limited interceptor upgrades; however, the program was only able to
complete three and expects to complete the other two in fiscal year
2012. As we previously reported, in 2007 MDA began a refurbishment and
retrofit program of the CE-I interceptors to replace questionable
parts identified in developmental testing and manufacturing.[Footnote
60] This program was to develop an overall plan to address known
hardware upgrades and service life limitations, issues discovered
since the interceptors were emplaced. However, MDA has yet to complete
all planned refurbishments of CE-I EKVs, and program officials
discovered additional problems during early refurbishments causing MDA
to expand this effort. Consequently, refurbishments are planned to
continue for many more years and the cost to refurbish each CE-I
interceptor could range from $14 million to $24 million.
Additionally, MDA will have to undertake a major retrofit program for
the CE-II EKVs that have already been manufactured and delivered in
addition to the retrofit program for the CE-I GBIs that is already
underway. According to GMD program management officials, the final
cost for this effort has not been determined, but they expect the
effort to cost about $18 million per EKV, resulting in an additional
cost of about $180 million for 10 interceptors.[Footnote 61]
The agency has also had to restructure its flight test program, adding
two tests that were not previously planned before the failure. To
verify the new design of the kill vehicle, MDA inserted a nonintercept
test scheduled for the third quarter of fiscal year 2012. This test is
designed to exercise as many CE-II EKV functions as possible that have
not been demonstrated in either FTG-06 or FTG-06a. Performing the
nonintercept mission, using an upgraded inertial measurement unit,
provides the benefit of scripting the test in order to best stress the
EKV design and to fully demonstrate the resolution of the failure in
FTG-06a. MDA officials have stated that if the test confirms that the
cause of the failure has been resolved, the program will restart the
manufacturing and integration of the CE-II EKVs.
However, successfully completing an intercept that demonstrates the
full functionality of the kill vehicle is necessary to validate that
the new design works as intended. MDA added a new intercept flight
test (FTG-06b) in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2012, however due
to further developmental challenges with the EKV, it has been delayed
until at least the second quarter fiscal year 2013 to demonstrate CE-
II intercept capability and achieve the unmet objectives of the two
previous tests (FTG-06 and FTG-06a).[Footnote 62] As a result,
confirmation that the design works as intended will take place more
than 9 years after the decision to begin production and more than 4
years after the first planned test.[Footnote 63]
Lastly, MDA's continued inability to conduct the GMD developmental
flight testing has resulted in less knowledge of the fielded systems
capabilities and limitations than planned. For example, GMD has been
only able to successfully conduct two intercept tests since 2006--the
last successful intercept being conducted December 2008.[Footnote 64]
Additionally, GMD has yet to conduct a salvo test. As we reported in
our last assessment, GMD canceled its planned 2011 salvo test due to
the failure in the January 2010 flight test and scheduled a salvo test
for fiscal year 2015. Consequently, neither the CE-I nor CE-II variant
capability is fully understood and according to the Director,
Operational Test and Evaluation's fiscal year 2010 assessment, the
continuing evolution of the interceptor design has resulted in
multiple interceptor configurations among the fielded interceptors and
test assets. These configuration differences complicate assessment of
operational capability.
GMD's acquisition strategy will continue its high levels of
concurrency. Developmental flight testing will continue through 2022,
well after the currently planned completion of production. In
following this concurrent acquisition strategy, the Department of
Defense is accepting the risk that these later flight tests may
discover issues that require costly design changes and retrofit
programs to resolve.
[End of section]
Appendix IX: Precision Tracking Space System (PTSS):
Fiscal year 2011 events:
* PTSS was initiated in the second quarter of fiscal year 2011;
* Johns Hopkins University's Applied Physics Laboratory, under
contract with the Missile Defense Agency, awarded subcontracts to
industry partners, to bring them into the development process;
* The PTSS program completed its System Requirements Review in March
2011.
Overview:
* PTSS is just beginning the early acquisition phases;
* PTSS revised its acquisition strategy in January 2012, includes some
acquisition best practices, but also elevated levels of concurrency;
* Projected size and cost of the entire PTSS constellation is unknown;
* While many technologies are well developed, technology maturation of
key components still needed;
* PTSS concept development benefits from STSS testing.
Background and Overview:
The Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) PTSS is being developed as a space-
based infrared sensor system to provide persistent overhead tracking
of ballistic missiles after boost and through the midcourse phase of
flight. Being a space-based sensor system, PTSS is not constrained by
geographical considerations that affect the placement of ground-, air-
and sea-based radar systems. While the number of PTSS satellites to
make up the constellation has not yet been determined, the system is
expected to expand the Ballistic Missile Defense System's (BMDS)
ability to track ballistic missiles in the post-boost phase and plans
to fill coverage gaps existing within the current BMDS radar
configuration. According to PTSS officials, the constellation will
provide coverage of some 70 percent of the earth's surface with a
minimum of six satellites. Furthermore, the enhanced coverage planned
for PTSS would help increase the size of the missile raids that the
BMDS can track and respond to. The PTSS program plans to launch its
first two development satellites in the fourth quarter of fiscal year
2017 and to increase the constellation to nine satellites by 2022.
The PTSS program plans to create a satellite constellation that can
accommodate subsequent configuration adjustments. The program intends
to create a flexible on-orbit and ground architecture that could
accommodate such changes as an increase to the constellation size or
changes to the communications infrastructure. This flexibility would
permit the system to evolve in response to changes in the threat
environment.
PTSS Is Just Beginning the Early Acquisition Phases:
The PTSS program officially began as a new program in the second
quarter of fiscal year 2011. Johns Hopkins University's Applied
Physics Laboratory (APL) is the lead system developer for PTSS. In
this capacity, APL advises the PTSS program office on systems
engineering and integration issues, while leading the other
laboratories involved in the development effort. In early 2011, APL
awarded six integrated system engineering team subcontracts to
industry partners to provide manufacturing and producibility
recommendations for the development of the PTSS initial article
satellites: Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin, Ball
Aerospace, Orbital Science, and Boeing. MDA's decision to involve the
laboratories in initial development work is an action that we have
previously recommended for other space acquisition programs.
During the course of 2011, the PTSS program made several schedule
changes, in part due to budgetary issues. PTSS was scheduled to begin
the Technology Development Phase in the fourth quarter of fiscal year
2011, but delayed it until the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2012. One
of the key early analytical knowledge points, the establishment of
mass raid engagement time windows, was also delayed from the fourth
quarter of fiscal year 2011 to the first quarter of fiscal year 2012.
Finally, the planned launch date for the first two initial satellites
was delayed from the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2015 and is now
planned for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2017. The PTSS program
also delayed the projected launch dates of production satellites for
the PTSS constellation.
PTSS Revised Its Acquisition Strategy in February 2012; It Includes
Some Acquisition Best Practices but Also Elevated Levels of
Concurrency:
According to the acquisition strategy report signed in January 2012,
MDA plans to develop and acquire the satellites in three phases.
First, the APL-led laboratory team will produce two lab-built
development satellites. Second, an industry team, selected through
open competition while the APL-led laboratory team is still in a
development phase, will develop and produce two industry-built
engineering and manufacturing development satellites. Third, there
will be a follow-on decision for the industry team to produce
additional satellites in a production phase. (See figure 12.)
Figure 12: PTSS Concurrent Schedule:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Technology development:
Prior to and ending 1Q FY 2014.
Laboratory satellite product development:
1Q FY 2014: Product development approval;
4Q FY 2017: Launch;
Beyond 4Q FY 2017: On-orbit checkout and testing complete.
Industry satellite product development:
1Q FY 2014 to approximately beyond 4Q 2017;
Production:
Beyond 4Q FY 2017.
Source: GAO analysis of MDA data.
[End of figure]
The strategy acknowledges some concurrency but maintains that there
are benefits to this approach. Under the plan, the industry team will
be approved for production of long-lead items for the two development
satellites, while the laboratory team is still working to complete the
first two development satellites. The program intends that by engaging
industry concurrently at this development stage, industry can
influence the selection of parts and subsystems in a manner that will
minimize the need for system design changes between the two laboratory
development satellites and the two initial industry satellites. The
program intends to conduct on-orbit checkout and testing of the two
laboratory-produced development satellites prior to the decision to
complete the assembly of the two industry-built development satellites.
According to MDA, the approach aligns with several aspects of GAO's
acquisition best practices. The program will establish firm
requirements before committing to production, it will ensure full and
open competition, the development cycle will be less than 5 years, it
has a simple payload design and can deploy larger numbers in the
constellation and it is deferring advanced capabilities until a second
spiral thereby limiting the technological development challenge for
the initial satellites.
According to program management officials, they have taken steps
intended to mitigate cost, schedule, and performance risks. PTSS is
being designed strictly for BMDS use, so the satellite payload is
geared toward the BMDS missile tracking mission, with the objective of
keeping the design as simple and stable as possible. Additionally, the
acquisition strategy stipulates that PTSS will not duplicate functions
found elsewhere in the BMDS, but instead will remain focused on the
specific function for which it is being designed. The program aims to
shorten its development schedule through the use of proven
technologies with high technology readiness levels. According to PTSS
program management officials, the use of currently available
technologies helps to keep the PTSS design cost-effective. In
addition, according to those officials, the government intends to
acquire unlimited data rights, government purpose data rights, or both
for the duration of the program, so that the government is not locked
in with any particular contractor.
Because the PTSS acquisition strategy was only recently developed, we
had limited time to assess the strategy for this review. We intend to
review this new strategy next year. Building developmental and
engineering and manufacturing development satellites is a positive
step. However, the strategy may enable decision makers to fully
benefit from the knowledge to be gained and the risk reduction
opportunity afforded through on-orbit testing of the lab-built
satellites before committing to the industry-built developmental
satellites. The industry-built development satellites will be under
contract and under construction before on-orbit testing of the first
two lab-built satellites can confirm that the design works as intended.
Projected Size and Cost of the Entire PTSS Constellation Are Unknown:
Currently, the PTSS program office has not determined how many
satellites will make up the PTSS constellation, though the program is
progressing with a flexible approach toward the number of satellites
in the constellation. The size of a full PTSS constellation would
depend on factors that have yet to be determined, most specifically,
the size of missile raid that the system would be expected to track.
In fiscal year 2011, the program conducted physics-based analysis to
demonstrate the system's performance within the BMDS in handling a
range of raid scenarios. The satellites for the PTSS constellation are
expected to have a 5-year design life, though officials stated that
they expect the operational life will exceed the 5 years. Relative to
other military space programs, the PTSS satellite is intended to be a
low-cost unit, which can be readily replaced as on-orbit units degrade
over time. However, the full cost of development has not yet been
determined, and it is currently unclear how many satellites will need
to be replaced annually, as this will be determined by such factors as
design life and the total number on orbit. The cost to launch a
satellite into orbit can be very expensive, sometime exceeding $100
million or more. Because the full size of the constellation has also
not yet been determined, the PTSS program is unable to estimate the
anticipated full costs of the acquisition and operation of the system.
While Many Technologies Are Well Developed, Technology Maturation of
Key Components Is Still Needed:
In leveraging proven technologies with high technology readiness, many
of the system's technologies are in relatively high states of maturity
for a program in this early stage of development. The program office
has identified two PTSS critical technologies: the optical payload and
the communications payload. Many of the underlying components for the
optical and communications payloads have been demonstrated in an
environment relevant to the conditions under which they will be
employed in the PTSS satellites. However, certain key components of
these critical technologies require further development to reach
maturity, and until these key components mature, they reduce the
overall technological maturity of the payloads. Program management
officials stated that they plan to have both critical technologies in
functional form by the time of the preliminary design review, which is
scheduled for the end of fiscal year 2013.
The high radiation environment in which the PTSS satellites will
operate creates technical challenges for the development effort. The
PTSS program has instituted risk reduction measures to address
radiation risks pertinent to two technologies. For risk issues
pertaining to the focal plane array, the PTSS's risk mitigation
efforts are on schedule, with two contracts having been awarded to
explore manufacturing processes to address radiation hardness
requirements for the satellites' anticipated on-orbit environment.
Radiation mitigation efforts are also required for the satellite's
star tracker, a component of the system's guidance and control
subsystem. The PTSS program plans to award contracts to several
vendors in 2012 to evaluate options to address this concern.
PTSS Concept Development Benefits from STSS Testing:
The PTSS development effort is benefiting from MDA's two operational
Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) satellites, which were
launched into orbit in 2009. BMDS test events involving STSS have been
useful in providing key information to the PTSS program. According to
PTSS officials, the success of STSS in the FTM-15 flight test
conducted in 2011 served as a "proof of principle" for PTSS, as the
event demonstrated multiple aspects of the PTSS concept of operations,
such as the ability to provide data from which interceptor missiles
could be remotely launched and directed toward a missile threat. The
FTM-12 flight test in late 2011 repeated the positive results noted in
FTM-15, with tracking sensors locking onto targets and successfully
providing direction for the fired interceptors. The STSS tests are
assisting the PTSS program office as it develops the system's concept
of operations.
[End of section]
Appendix X: Targets and Countermeasures:
Fiscal year 2011 events:
* Eleven targets were delivered and successfully launched;
* Successful "return-to-flight" of short range air-launched target;
* Intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) target contract signed
in March 2011;
* Undefinitized contract action for eight reentry vehicles issued;
* Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) target contract
solicitation canceled February 16, 2011.
Overview:
* Targets were not a source of testing problems in 2011;
* Availability of targets increasing risk for first Ballistic Missile
Defense System operational flight test and affecting other planned
tests;
* Missile Defense Agency slowly building inventory of targets and
implementing backup strategy;
* Significant decisions consolidate new work with the prime contractor.
Background and Overview:
The Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) Targets and Countermeasures program
designs, develops, produces and procures missiles serving as targets
for testing missile defense systems. The targets program involves
multiple acquisitions covering the full spectrum of threat missile
capabilities (separating and nonseparating reentry vehicles, varying
radar cross sections, countermeasures, etc.) and ranges.[Footnote 65]
Some target types have been used by MDA's test program for years while
others have been recently or are now being developed and can represent
more complex threats.
As MDA's test program has matured, its Targets and Countermeasures
program has worked toward developing, in parallel, more complex
targets that can more closely represent modern-day threats. Since the
program was initiated in 2001, it has done this using several
different acquisition strategies--the third was issued in 2011.
Initially, MDA used many contractors to design and build the targets,
but in 2003, it chose a single prime contractor, Lockheed Martin to
lead the acquisition. Shortly after, MDA decided to pursue what it
called the Flexible Target Family approach to acquiring targets, which
used common components and shared inventory and promised reduced cycle
time, cost savings, and increased capability. At that time, MDA began
work on the 72-inch diameter launch vehicle (LV)-2 target and the 52-
inch diameter targets. When this approach proved more costly and less
timely than expected, MDA suspended the 52-inch effort, focusing on
the LV-2. Responding to congressional concern[Footnote 66] about these
problems and our 2008 recommendations, MDA revised its acquisition
approach in 2009, seeking to increase competition by returning to a
multiple contract strategy with four separate target classes and a
potential of four prime contractors. MDA completed the intermediate-
range target contract award, which reduced target costs. However, as
proposals for the new medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) contract
were submitted, the program determined that costs associated with this
approach were higher than anticipated. Solicitations for the medium-
range and the intercontinental classes of targets were then canceled,
and MDA began the process of revising its acquisition strategy for the
third time.
Targets Were Not a Source of Testing Problems in Fiscal Year 2011:
In the past, we have reported that availability and reliability of
targets caused delays in MDA's testing of Ballistic Missile Defense
System (BMDS) elements. However, in fiscal year 2011, MDA delivered 11
targets, all of which were successfully launched and did not
negatively affect the test program. The targets launched during the
year supported tests of several different BMDS elements, including
Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD), Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense,
and Patriot systems.[Footnote 67]
All targets that were delivered or launched within the fiscal year
were either short-or intermediate-range targets and performed as
expected. Most notably, in July 2011 MDA successfully accomplished the
return-to-flight of MDA's short-range air-launched target. This was
the target's first launch since an essential mechanism that releases
it from the aircraft failed in a December 2009 Terminal High Altitude
Area Defense (THAAD) flight test. After the failure, the agency
identified shortcomings in the contractor's internal processes that
had to be fixed before air-launched targets could be used again in
BMDS flight tests. Nineteen months later, these deficiencies were
satisfactorily addressed when the target missile was successfully
extracted from the rear of the C-17 aircraft in FTX-17. To reduce
risk, the flight was not planned as an intercept mission but as a
target of opportunity for several emerging missile defense
technologies, including Space Tracking Surveillance System.
Availability of Targets Increasing Risk for First BMDS Operational
Flight Test and Affecting Other Planned Tests:
According to MDA and Director, Operational Test & Evaluation test
officials, the availability of targets has affected planned future
flight tests. MDA has scheduled the first two extended medium-range
ballistic missiles (eMRBM) to launch in a crucial operational flight
test (FTO-01) by the end of 2012, which is the first system-level test
of the BMDS. On a tight schedule to meet this deadline, MDA is
accepting higher risk that target issues could affect this test by
launching the first two of the new targets in this operational test,
rather than conducting a risk reduction flight first. Risk reduction
flight tests are conducted the first time a system is tested in order
to confirm that it works before adding other test objectives. The lack
of such a test was one factor that delayed a previous GMD flight test
(FTG-06) in 2010. While the target, the LV-2, was successfully flown
in that flight test, aspects of its performance were not properly
understood and lack of modeling data prior to the test contributed to
significant delays in the test program.
In addition, the next air-launched target test was scheduled to use
the new medium-range extended air launched target in 2012, but the
flight test--FTT-13--was canceled because of budgetary concerns and
test efficiency. As a result, the first flight test using this target
is not planned until the third quarter of fiscal year 2014, though it
may be available for use as early as the fourth quarter of fiscal year
2012. Since the short-range air-launched target was successfully
launched in July 2011, MDA now plans to continue acquisition of the
one short-range and the two extended air-launched targets that are
currently under contract through fiscal year 2014.
MDA Slowly Building Inventory of Targets and Implementing Backup
Strategy:
As development and production processes mature, the targets program is
slowly developing an inventory of targets for use in BMDS testing. In
previous years, failures of target missiles have caused major
disruptions to MDA's flight test program, in part because no spare
targets were available to retest once the cause of any failure was
determined. In response, MDA has slowly begun working toward
developing an inventory of both backup and spare missiles to support
the test plan. The targets program currently has a limited backup
strategy in place. In the event of a target failure, backup missiles
assigned to a future mission could be taken from inventory and used
for an earlier test and be replaced by newer missiles.
Significant Decisions Cancel or Defer Competition and Consolidate New
Work with the Prime Contractor:
The Targets and Countermeasures program made several key decisions in
fiscal year 2011 that will shape future target acquisition. Two key
contracts were definitized in 2011; the eMRBM contract in October
2011, and an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) target
contract in March 2011. MDA realigned funding planned for the medium-
range competition, which was canceled in 2010, to manufacture
additional IRBM targets. MDA canceled the planned intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) competition because the new test plan delays
the need for the first ICBM target by several years. Finally, MDA
issued an undefinitized contract action to the prime contractor for
reentry vehicles. One overall consequence of these decisions has been
a consolidation of work with the prime contractor. (See table 5.)
Table 5: Fiscal Year 2011 Acquisition Events by Target Class:
Target class: Short-range ballistic missile targets;
Fiscal year 2011 acquisition events:
* Air-launched target return-to-flight in July 2011;
* Undefinitized contract action[A] issued for acquisition of one
foreign military target.
Target class: MRBM targets;
Fiscal year 2011 acquisition events:
* eMRBM production contract definitized in October 2011 for five
targets;
* Undefinitized contract action issued in July 2011 for seven
specialized MRBM targets;
* Extended-range air-launched target qualification process resumed.
Target class: IRBM targets;
Fiscal year 2011 acquisition events:
* IRBM contract awarded in March 2011 for eight targets.
Target class: ICBM targets;
Fiscal year 2011 acquisition events:
* Specialized ICBM contract solicitation canceled in February 2011--
acquisition delayed to align with first ICBM test in 2020.
Target class: Reentry vehicle;
Fiscal year 2011 acquisition events:
* Undefinitized contract action for eight common reentry vehicles
issued to prime contractor.
Source: GAO Analysis of MDA data.
[A] To meet urgent needs, DOD can issue undefinitized contract
actions, which authorize contractors to begin work before reaching a
final agreement on contract terms. Undefinitized contract action means
any contract action for which the contract terms, specifications, or
price are not agreed upon before performance is begun under the
action. Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 217.7401(d).
[End of table]
An agreement on price was reached for the production of five eMRBM
targets in September 2011. MDA began developing the eMRBM for
operational use in 2003 as part of the Flexible Target Family when it
was referred to as the 52-inch target. Though development and
production had been on hold since 2008 because of continuing cost and
schedule problems, MDA resumed acquisition of eMRBMs through the
existing prime contractor due to a target failure. The production
contract was definitized in October 2011 after being undefinitized for
about 540 days.[Footnote 68] The Defense Federal Acquisition
Regulation states that undefinitized contract actions shall provide
for definitization by the earlier of either, 180 days after issuance
of the action or the date on which more than 50 percent of the not-to-
exceed price has been obligated. The 180-day threshold may be extended
but may not exceed the date that is 180 days after the contractor
submits a qualifying proposal. MDA program officials stated that
because MDA continued to change the requirements on the undefinitized
contract action, the contractor did not submit a qualifying proposal
until March 2011. MDA definitized the contract approximately 194 days
after receiving the proposal. During the 18-month delay, while the
contract was being negotiated and requirements continued to change,
the contractor spent over $82 million,[Footnote 69] the quantity of
targets under contract increased, and some capability was deferred to
later years. The final negotiated price at completion was $321
million, $175 million less than the previously expected price ceiling.
MDA contracting officials acknowledged that undefinitized contract
actions can lead to undefined costs, but believe they are a good tool
to use to meet urgent requirements.
MDA initiated three new undefinitized target contract actions in
fiscal year 2011.
* First, an action for seven "T3" medium-range ballistic missile
targets was initiated in July 2011. A requirement for this target type
was accelerated in the test plan to the first quarter of fiscal year
2014. T3s are unique targets designed for more specialized maneuvers
in their respective ranges.
* Second, an action for a foreign military asset target to meet a
fourth quarter of fiscal year 2012 requirement.
* Third, an action for eight common reentry vehicles, which will
replace earlier ones.
* MDA set up a common components project office to manage the
acquisition strategy for the reentry vehicles, which are intended for
flight tests in mid-2014. They have the potential to fly on any target
launch vehicle, but the program is still developing more specific
acquisition plans.
In 2011, MDA began implementing its third acquisition strategy for
targets by acquiring common reentry vehicles from a single source, a
significant change in the acquisition strategy for the program office.
Reentry vehicles for targets were previously acquired separately, were
more specifically tailored to the target launch vehicle, and were
procured from more than one contractor. The single-source strategy
implemented with the 2011 undefinitized contract action is intended to
maximize commonality and could reduce costs through purchasing larger
numbers. Through 2013, the single source will be the targets prime
contractor. MDA plans to decide in the second quarter of fiscal year
2012 whether to issue a competitive solicitation for a new provider.
[End of section]
Appendix XI: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD):
Fiscal year 2011 events:
* The first production interceptor was delivered in March 2011;
* Eleven of 50 THAAD operational interceptors were delivered in fiscal
year 2011;
* The production decision was made and the contract was issued for
additional THAAD batteries;
* Qualification problems with the ignition safety system and
production start-up issues caused interceptor production rates to be
slower than planned;
* Two Missile Defense Agency knowledge points, once planned for fiscal
year 2011, have not yet been achieved due to target availability
issues.
Overview:
* Army and Department of Defense test organizations successfully
conducted the first THAAD operational flight test;
* THAAD's highly concurrent acquisition strategy led to delayed
delivery of THAAD batteries;
* Requirements and design were not stable before THAAD interceptor
production began;
* THAAD interceptor production issues delay deliveries and increase
program costs;
* THAAD achieved conditional materiel release to the Army in 2012;
full materiel release date not yet known; Ongoing concurrency
increases acquisition risks until developmental testing is complete.
Background and Overview:
THAAD is a rapidly deployable ground-based system designed to defend
against short-and medium-range ballistic missile attacks during their
late midcourse and terminal stages. A THAAD battery consists of
interceptor missiles, six launchers, a radar, a fire control and
communications system, and other support equipment. The program is
producing batteries for initial operational use for conditional
materiel release to the Army. For this to occur, the Army must certify
that the batteries are safe, suitable, and logistically supported. The
date for full materiel release has not yet been determined because the
program is still conducting flight tests to prove out the system, and
production rates have been slower than planned.
Army and Department of Defense Test Organizations Successfully
Conducted the First THAAD Operational Flight Test:
THAAD successfully conducted its first operational flight test in
October 2011, a major accomplishment because this was its first
operational test with the Army and Department of Defense test and
evaluation organizations fully engaged to ensure that the execution
and test results were representative of the fielded system. During the
test, the THAAD system engaged and nearly simultaneously intercepted
two short-range, threat-representative, ballistic missile targets. The
test demonstrated the ability to perform in the full battle sequence,
from planning through live operations, under operationally realistic
conditions (within the constraints of test range safety). The U.S.
Army Test and Evaluation Command and the Ballistic Missile Defense
System (BMDS) Operational Test Agency will review data collected from
this event to make an operational assessment of the THAAD system. In
addition, the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, will also
independently evaluate the operational effectiveness of the system.
The assessment of this event will support upcoming production and
fielding decisions.
THAAD’s Highly Concurrent Acquisition Strategy Led to Delayed Delivery
of THAAD Batteries:
The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) awarded a contract for THAAD's first
two operational batteries in December 2006, before its design was
mature and developmental testing of all critical components was
complete. At that time, MDA's first THAAD battery, consisting of 24
interceptors, 3 launchers, and other associated assets, was to be
delivered to the Army as early as 2009. While some assets were
delivered by this time, the interceptors were delayed because of
issues with components that had not passed all required testing. In
response to pressure to accelerate fielding the capability, THAAD
adopted a highly concurrent development, testing, and production
effort, as shown in figure 13, that has increased program costs and
delayed fielding of the first THAAD battery until early fiscal year
2012.
Figure 13: THAAD Concurrent Schedule:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Technology development:
January 1992: program start;
Through approximately 1998.
Product development:
Approximately 1998 through approximately 2012.
Production:
December 2006: Initial production decision;
2021: End of production.
Source: GAO analysis of MDA data.
[End of figure]
Problems encountered while THAAD was concurrently designing and
producing assets caused slower delivery rates of both the first and
second THAAD batteries, which are not currently projected to be
complete before July 2012--16 months after the original estimate of
March 2011. While all assets, except the interceptors, were complete
in 2010, the first production interceptor for the first THAAD battery
was not produced until the second quarter of fiscal year 2011. In the
same quarter, MDA committed to purchasing additional assets by signing
a production contract for two additional THAAD batteries, despite
incomplete testing of a safety device on the interceptor. During
fiscal year 2011, after several production start-up issues, 11 of the
expected 50 operational interceptors were delivered.[Footnote 70]
Consequently, the first battery of 24 interceptors was not complete
and available for fielding until the first quarter of fiscal year
2012--more than 2 years later than originally planned. The same issues
have delayed the second battery as well. Although the launchers and
other components for the second battery 2 were completed in 2010, the
full 50 interceptors necessary for both batteries are not expected to
be delivered until July 2012.
Requirements and Design Were Not Stable before THAAD Interceptor
Production Began:
A production contract was signed in 2006 before the requirements or
design for a required safety device called an optical block was
complete. Housed in the flight sequencing assembly, an optical block
is an ignition safety device designed to prevent inadvertent launches
of the missile. The program experienced design and qualification
issues with this component until testing was complete in the fourth
quarter of fiscal year 2011. Incorporating an optical block device
into the THAAD interceptor has been a primary driver of design,
qualification, and production delays for the program since as early as
2003, shortly after the Army issued a standard requirement for this
type of safety device on munitions ignition systems. The original
THAAD design did not have an optical block device, and MDA did not
modify the development contract to include this requirement until
2006. Program management officials explained that the military
standard is primarily written for smaller, more typical, munitions'
fuses, not systems as technically complex as THAAD.
According to program management officials, THAAD has worked with the
Army to tailor requirements and associated testing required of the
optical block device during the past few years. The part failed
initial qualification testing in early fiscal year 2010 and was not
fully qualified until that September. Also, in May 2010, the Army
added requirements to test the flight sequencing assembly during
exposure to electrical stress and other environments, such as extreme
temperature, shock, humidity, and vibration. Testing failures led
THAAD to make minor design changes and extensive manufacturing process
changes, which required requalification of the optical block and
delayed production of the interceptors. Environmental testing was
complete in March 2011, but the stress test was not completed until
September 2011--after the first interceptor was produced.
As recently as fiscal year 2011, the program was considering further
design changes to the optical block to make it more producible;
however, the program estimated that the cost to make the needed design
changes would be $150 million, an investment that could not be easily
recouped in production savings in the near future. Program mangers
decided not to make those changes because of improved flight
sequencing assembly and optical block manufacturing performance, and
program funding constraints. The current design was also successfully
demonstrated in the recent flight test and in the other testing in
support of conditional materiel release. Therefore, the program
determined that the benefits of continuing the redesign no longer
justified the cost.
THAAD Interceptor Production Issues Delay Deliveries and Increase
Program Costs:
Production issues have collectively delayed interceptor delivery by 18
months and are projected to cost the program almost $40 million. While
issues with the flight sequencing assembly have been the most costly,
three production start-up issues emerged in fiscal year 2011 that also
caused delays. First, the program encountered problems with the
availability of a solution containing nitrogen needed for production.
Program management officials explained that since all of the liquid
could not be extracted out of a newly designed bottle, due to
unanticipated design changes in the delivery mechanism, more had to be
ordered before production could continue, which caused the delay.
Another production delay of over a month took place because of debris
found in a transistor on the interceptor. Program management officials
explained that a root cause analysis determined that the part had not
undergone proper testing, which would have detected such debris. The
transistors had to be replaced with properly tested parts. A third
delay occurred because ragged, raised edges were discovered inside
several of the fuel tanks. According to program management officials,
in the unlikely event that a small metal edge broke off during
pressurization of the fuel tank, it could cause an interceptor
failure. They said that after conducting a risk analysis, the program
decided to remove the rough edges on future procurements, but not on
the first 50 interceptors, since the possibility of such risk was low.
The interceptor's flight sequencing assembly is currently being
produced at or above the expected rate of about four per month. Due to
start-up issues, which are common to new production lines, interceptor
production rates have fluctuated, ranging anywhere from 0 to 5 in
recent months. Also, some recent production rates could be
artificially high as delays with some components have allowed others
more time than usual to stockpile for future production. These
stockpiles are projected to help with production through the second
battery. The program needs to achieve a steady production rate in
order to deliver the second THAAD battery by July 2012. After this
date, the contractor is scheduled to return to a rate of 3
interceptors per month.
THAAD Achieved Conditional Materiel Release in 2012; Full Materiel
Release Date Not Yet Known:
THAAD achieved conditional materiel release to the Army in February
2012, though at one time, it had been expected as early as September
2010. It was delayed over a year due to ongoing safety issues with the
interceptor and, most recently, to incorporate data from the October
2011 operational flight test. Conditional materiel release is an
interim step to the Army's full materiel release decision. For
example, for conditional materiel release, the Army Ignition System
Safety Review Board requires that three flight sequencing assembly
units complete a series of tests to evaluate the interceptor in
various electrical and other stressing environments. By the end of
fiscal year 2011, all these tests had been successfully completed.
While THAAD has performed all test events required for conditional
materiel release, including its most recent flight test (FTT-12),
analysis of data is ongoing and the Army is still refining its
requirements for full materiel release. Program management officials
expect the gap in knowledge between conditional materiel release and
full materiel release to be defined in second quarter of fiscal year
2012 as well. At that time, they explained, the Army will have
developed a list of the remaining conditions that the program must
address in order to receive full materiel release.
One of the conditions that must be met to achieve full materiel
release of THAAD to the Army is the incorporation of the required
Thermally Initiated Venting System, a safety feature of the
interceptor that prevents the boost motor from becoming propulsive or
throwing debris beyond a set distance in the event that the canister
holding the interceptor heats up to a certain temperature. Development
and testing of this system has been done concurrently with production
of fielded interceptors. Even if the latest design and near-term
testing is successful, the system will be approved too late to be
incorporated in the first 50 interceptors. Although the system is not
required for conditional materiel release, the program expects it to
be required for full materiel release, unless the Army grants a
waiver. Since the last two developmental tests of this safety feature
have failed, THAAD is at risk of not complying with the requirement.
The next test is scheduled for the second quarter of fiscal year 2012.
According to program management officials, if it fails, the program
will be forced to seek a waiver for the current design and accept the
risk of not having the design on the interceptors. Program management
officials explained that the requirement for a Thermally Initiated
Venting System is primarily written for smaller-scale systems, not for
a system as large as THAAD. Although officials said they are working
to comply with the requirement, the technology may not be available to
make it work. At best, the program could not incorporate the safety
system into the interceptor until production of the third battery. The
Army has approved fielding the first 48 interceptors configured
without the safety system based on available testing and it has chosen
to accept the associated risk.
Ongoing Concurrency Increases Acquisition Risks until Developmental
Testing Is Complete:
While MDA is committed to producing four THAAD batteries, more flight
tests are needed to achieve two remaining MDA developmental knowledge
points set for the program. Both are tied to flight tests that were,
at one time, planned for fiscal year 2011 but were delayed into later
fiscal years. MDA's knowledge points identify information required to
make key decisions throughout the program and are typically defined
early in the acquisition phase to manage program risks. Although
success of the first operational test increases confidence in THAAD,
we have reported that good acquisition outcomes require high levels of
knowledge before significant decisions are made. The building of
knowledge consists of information that should be gathered at critical
points over the course of a program before committing to production.
To achieve the first remaining MDA knowledge point, THAAD must conduct
an integrated flight test against a medium-range ballistic missile
target. This test was originally scheduled for the second quarter of
fiscal year 2011, but after an air-launched target failure in December
2009 and subsequent target availability issues, the agency moved the
test to the third quarter of fiscal year 2012. Later in fiscal year
2011, the test was canceled altogether because of budgetary concerns
and test efficiency. The agency now plans to test the objective in the
first BMDS operational test (FTO-01) in late fiscal year 2012. This
test is not only planned as the first against a medium-range target
for THAAD, but it will also be the first flight of the newly developed
extended medium-range ballistic missile target. Assuming several new
"firsts" during this high-level operational test poses significant
additional risk for the agency and for achieving the knowledge point.
The second knowledge point is to demonstrate THAAD's Army Navy/
Transportable Radar Surveillance -Model-2 radar advanced
discrimination in terminal mode. This knowledge point was delayed from
the first quarter of fiscal year 2010 into the fourth quarter of
fiscal year 2011 because of the same 2009 target issue. However, this
knowledge point was not accomplished in 2011 either. Additional
changes to the flight test plan in 2011 moved this objective to a
flight test scheduled for the third quarter of fiscal year 2013. As
THAAD continues to gather data from these developmental flight tests,
the program continues to concurrently produce interceptors, launchers,
and associated equipment for operational use. As a result, the program
is at risk for discovering new information that could lead to costly
design changes and a need to retrofit missiles either already in the
production process or in inventory.
[End of section]
Appendix XII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Cristina Chaplain, (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, David B. Best, Assistant
Director; Letisha J. Antone; Ivy Hübler; LaTonya Miller; Jonathan A.
Mulcare; Kenneth E. Patton; John H. Pendleton; Karen Richey; Ann
Rivlin; Luis E. Rodriguez; Steven Stern; Robert Swierczek; Hai V.
Tran; and Alyssa Weir made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-107, § 232(g) (2001); Ronald W. Reagan National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-375, § 233
(2004); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub.
L. No. 109-163, § 232; John Warner National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 224 (2006); and National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, §
225. See also National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012,
Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 232 (2011).
[2] GAO, Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Transparency and
Accountability, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-372]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24, 2011); Defense Acquisitions: Missile
Defense Transition Provides Opportunity to Strengthen Acquisition
Approach, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-311]
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 25, 2010); Defense Acquisitions: Production
and Fielding of Missile Defense Components Continue with Less Testing
and Validation Than Planned, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-338] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 13,
2009); Defense Acquisitions: Progress Made in Fielding Missile
Defense, but Program Is Short of Meeting Goals, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-448] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14,
2008); Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Acquisition Strategy
Generates Results but Delivers Less at a Higher Cost, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-387] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15,
2007); Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Agency Fields Initial
Capability but Falls Short of Original Goals, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-327] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15,
2006); Defense Acquisitions: Status of Ballistic Missile Defense
Program in 2004, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-243]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2005); and Missile Defense: Actions Are
Needed to Enhance Testing and Accountability, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-409] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 23,
2004).
[3] The BMDS also includes other elements and supporting efforts such
as the Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications and
BMDS Sensors which are not covered in this report. For this report, we
selected and focused our efforts on eight of the BMDS elements based
on Congressional interest, known acquisition challenges and successes,
and the current status of these efforts.
[4] Ballistic missiles are classified by range: short-range ballistic
missiles have a range of less than 1,000 kilometers (621 miles);
medium-range ballistic missiles have a range from 1,000 to 3,000
kilometers (621 to1,864 miles); intermediate-range ballistic missiles
have a range from 3,000 to 5,500 kilometers (1,864 to 3,418 miles);
and intercontinental ballistic missiles have a range greater than
5,500 kilometers (3,418 miles).
[5] This report does not contain an assessment of the Patriot Advanced
Capability-3 because its initial development is complete and it has
been transferred to the Army for production, operation, and
sustainment.
[6] An operational flight test is designed to test the components by
having the warfighter utilize them in an operational environment.
[7] This test--FTG-06--was planned as the first test of GMD's enhanced
version of the kill vehicle called the Capability Enhancement II.
[8] This process is called anchoring.
[9] With hardware-in-the-loop models, simulations are conducted with
actual mission components/hardware in a laboratory environment, and
the physical environment/conditions are simulated, under the control
of computer equipment.
[10] GAO, Best Practices: Capturing Design and Manufacturing Knowledge
Early Improves Acquisition Outcomes, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-701] (Washington, D.C.: July 15,
2002), and Defense Acquisitions: Production and Fielding of Missile
Defense Components Continue with Less Testing and Validation Than
Planned, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-338]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 13, 2009).
[11] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon
Programs, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-391]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2006).
[12] An interceptor is composed of two main components: the booster
and an exoatmospheric kill vehicle. The CE-II upgrade was intended to
update certain components, some of which were becoming obsolete.
However, updating those components changed the performance of the
interceptor and remains a substantial developmental challenge.
[13] MDA officials stated that the agency is allowing the contractor
to continue work on those components of the EKV that would not be
factors in the FTG-06a flight test failure in order to keep the
production line moving.
[14] These costs include the target, mission planning, range support,
and post-test analysis.
[15] Since fiscal year 2009 MDA has manufactured and delivered 12
interceptors, 2 of which have been used in flight tests.
[16] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-372].
[17] Six of the 18 missiles will not be needed for developmental tests
until fiscal year 2015 or later. SM-3 Block IB missiles are used for
developmental tests of the SM-3 Block IB and Aegis Weapons System
4.0.1 program and are planned for use in developmental tests for Aegis
Ashore and Aegis Weapons System 5.0.
[18] Twelve total interceptors were delivered by the end of fiscal
year 2011, but the first, produced in fiscal year 2010, was used in a
flight test.
[19] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapons
Programs, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-233SP]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2011).
[20] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-372].
[21] The BMDS also includes other elements and supporting efforts such
as the Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications and
BMDS Sensors which are not covered in this report. For this report, we
selected and focused our efforts on eight of the BMDS elements based
on Congressional interest, known acquisition challenges and successes,
and the current status of these efforts.
[22] MDA issued an updated test baseline in March 2012, but we did not
include it as part of this review because we received it at the end of
our audit and did not have time to assess it. Our next assessment will
include this updated test baseline.
[23] As per MDA's Integrated Master Test Plan, or IMTP, OTA's
accreditation recommendation, when signed by the Accreditation
Authority (the Commanding General of the Army Test and Evaluation
Center, the lead service test agency for the BMDS), is the official
certification that models and simulations' products are acceptable for
their intended use. While OTA is responsible for carrying out
accreditation for this certification process, MDA also carries out
internal model accreditation assessments.
[24] As laid out in MDA's IMTP.
[25] MDA does, however, employ modeling tools external to the system-
level simulations, in order to model interceptor performance and
thereby assess end-game performance and probability of success.
[26] With HWIL models, closed loop simulations are conducted with
actual mission components/hardware in a laboratory environment, and
the physical environment/conditions are simulated, under the control
of computer equipment.
[27] Japanese flight tests help MDA officials understand performance,
but because they are not U.S. assets, they are not considered
developmental flight tests from a programmatic perspective.
[28] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-311].
[29] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon
Programs, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-388SP]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2010).
[30] GAO, Missile Defense: European Phased Adaptive Approach
Acquisitions Face Synchronization, Transparency, and Accountability
Challenges, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-179R]
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 21, 2010).
[31] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-372].
[32] Six of the 18 missiles will not be needed for developmental tests
until fiscal year 2015 or later. SM-3 Block IB missiles are used for
developmental tests of the SM-3 Block IB and Aegis Weapons System
4.0.1 program and are planned for use in developmental tests for Aegis
Ashore and Aegis Weapons System 5.0. MDA originally planned to
purchase 34 SM-3 Block IB interceptors; however, to address
developmental issues with the TDACS in the SM-3 Block IB, in 2011, MDA
reduced the planned quantity on order to 25 SM-3 Block IB
interceptors. One interceptor was used in FTM-16 E2, leaving 24
interceptors.
[33] A kinetic warhead is a "hit-to-kill" warhead that collides with a
ballistic missile's warhead to destroy it.
[34] The SM-3 Block IB propellant was affected by the moisture issue,
which was caused by a component shared with the initial SM-3 Block IIA
propellant.
[35] The reviews to close out the nosecone and TSRM subsystem PDRs
failures occurred in fiscal year 2011. The closeout review for the
DACS and DACS propellant occurred early in fiscal year 2012.
[36] GAO, Best Practices: Using a Knowledge-Based Approach to Improve
Weapon Acquisition, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-386SP] (Washington, D.C.: January
2004), and Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapons
Programs, GAO-11-233SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2011).
[37] GAO, Joint Strike Fighter: Assessment of DOD's Funding Projection
for the F136 Alternate Engine, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-1020R] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15,
2010).
[38] The focal plane array is a component of the seeker.
[39] GAO, High-Risk Series: Defense Weapons Systems Acquisition,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/HR-93-7] (Washington,
D.C.: December 1992).
[40] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapons
Programs, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-233SP]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2011).
[41] GAO, Best Practices: Capturing Design and Manufacturing Knowledge
Early Improves Acquisition Outcomes, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-701] (Washington, D.C.: July 15,
2002).
[42] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Transition Provides
Opportunity to Strengthen Acquisition Approach, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-311] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 25,
2010).
[43] Given the funding reduction in fiscal year 2012, the program
plans to delay the product development decision by several months but
was still determining in January 2012 what other modifications to the
tentative schedule would take place. We reviewed the tentative
schedule issued prior to the funding reduction.
[44] GAO, Best Practices: Better Management of Technology Development
Can Improve Weapon System Outcomes, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-99-162] (Washington, D.C.: July
30, 1999).
[45] Shoot-look-shoot, also known as shoot-assess-shoot, means firing
one interceptor, observing the results of the initial shot, and then
launching the subsequent missile(s).
[46] The Aegis BMD weapons system includes an integrated kill
assessment system. We did not evaluate the capabilities of this system.
[47] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Many Analyses of Alternatives Have Not
Provided a Robust Assessment of Weapon System Options, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-665] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 24,
2009).
[48] GAO, High-Risk Series: Defense Weapons System Acquisition,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/HR-93-7] (Washington,
D.C.: December 1992).
[49] GAO, Arleigh Burke Destroyers: Additional Analysis and Oversight
Required to Support the Navy's Future Surface Combatant Plans,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-113] (Washington, D.C.:
Jan. 24, 2012).
[50] GAO 11-372.
[51] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Acquisition Strategy
Generates Results but Delivers Less at a Higher Cost, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-387] (Washington D.C.: Mar. 15,
2007).
[52] According to information provided by the program, the $1.6
billion includes costs for development, military construction,
operations and support and disposal. It excludes Navy military
construction, manning and fleet operations costs as well as costs for
MDA's command, control, battle management, and communications system.
It also does not include any procurement funding.
[53] This command is the Army service component to U.S. Strategic
Command.
[54] The original EKV's delivered were called Test Bed kill vehicles,
however, they have since been renamed Capability Enhancement I.
[55] In 2009, the Secretary of Defense reduced the number of planned
emplaced GBIs from 44 to 30, reducing the number of GBIs needed. The
reduced inventory includes 30 operational interceptors and an
additional 22 for testing and spares.
[56] The failure review investigation concluded that FTG-06 failed due
to a quality control escape where a lockwire was not inserted during
the EKV manufacturing process. The contractor has altered its
processes now to ensure that all steps are properly followed.
[57] According to GMD and contractor officials, they understood that
they could not replicate the failure during ground testing and have
since developed new technology to measure the frequencies that they
might experience in space. Although the frequency ranges are not fully
compatible, they are making progress.
[58] The CE-II EKV was not originally a reliability upgrade or a
performance upgrade program. Its initial priority was replacing
obsolete components. However, updating certain components is expected
to result in increased performance.
[59] A GMD program official stated that the agency is allowing the
contractor to continue work on those components of the EKV that would
not be factors in the FTG-06a flight test failure in order to keep the
production line moving.
[60] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-338] and
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-311].
[61] Although the program has delivered 12 EKVs, 2 have already been
expended during flight testing.
[62] This schedule to return to flight may also be at risk because a
key component redesigned due to the earlier failure has experienced
more problems in production.
[63] As we reported in 2009, MDA had originally planned to assess CE-
II capability in fiscal year 2008. However, early ground test failures
in the inertial measurement unit caused delivery delays and resulted
in a redesign of the component. Consequently, the program had to delay
the test. See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-338].
[64] GMD conducted FTG-03a in September 2007 and FTG-05 in December
2008.
[65] Ballistic missiles are classified by range: short-range ballistic
missiles have a range of less than 1,000 kilometers (621 miles);
medium-range ballistic missiles have a range from 1,000 to 3,000
kilometers (621 to1,864 miles); intermediate-range ballistic missiles
have a range from 3,000 to 5,500 kilometers (1,864 to 3,418 miles);
and intercontinental ballistic missiles have a range greater than
5,500 kilometers (3,418 miles).
[66] H.R Rep No. 110-477 at 824 (2007) (Conf. Rep.) (accompanying the
National Defense Authorization Act of 2008. Pub. L. No. 110-181).
[67] This report does not contain an assessment of the Patriot
Advanced Capability-3, which has been transferred to the Army for
production, operation, and sustainment.
[68] Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations 217.7404-3 If a
contractor submits a qualifying proposal before the 50 percent
threshold has been reached, then the limitation on obligations may be
increased to no more than 75 percent.
[69] The extended use of undefinitized contract actions has previously
been identified by GAO and others as risky for the government.
Because, under undefinitized contract actions, contracting officers
normally reimburse contractors for all reasonable, allocable, and
allowable costs they incur before definitization, contractors bear
less risk and have little incentive to control costs during this
period.
[70] Twelve total interceptors were delivered by the end of fiscal
year 2011, but the first, produced in fiscal year 2010, was used in a
flight test.
[End of section]
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