Tuesday, February 28, 2017

An open conflict will likely erupt imminently between Turkey and the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the town of Manbij in Northern Syria. Turkey considers the Syrian Kurdish YPG – the main component of the SDF - to be an extension of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is currently waging an insurgency in Southern Turkey. The fight for Manbij will derail the U.S.-backed campaign against ISIS and create opportunities for al Qaeda to expand further in Syria. The U.S. must reduce its dependence upon both Turkey and the Syrian Kurdish YPG.

Turkish President Recep Erdogan has repeatedly stated his intent to expel the Syrian Kurdish YPG – the main component of the SDF – from Manbij to the Euphrates River’s eastern bank.

Turkish President Recep Erdogan reiterated on February 28 that Turkish-backed opposition groups in Operation Euphrates Shield will advance against Manbij in Eastern Aleppo Province after they finish consolidating control over Al-Bab, located twenty five miles to the west. Turkish-backed forces in Operation Euphrates Shield seized Al-Bab in Northern Aleppo Province on February 23 after ISIS withdrew from the city and its environs toward Ar-Raqqa City.

The end of combat operations in Al-Bab frees Erdogan to pursue his strategic aim to roll back the de-facto contiguous autonomous zone controlled by the YPG along the Syrian-Turkish Border.

The U.S. reportedly gave a deadline of February 27 for Turkey to present an alternative operational plan to seize Ar-Raqqa City as part of a wider review of the campaign against ISIS due to U.S. President Donald Trump on the same day.

Turkey proposed inserting opposition forces into Tel Abyad in Northern Ar-Raqqa Province and forming a ‘corridor’ through terrain held by the SDF as part of a its preferred plan for an offensive against Ar-Raqqa City during a meeting between Turkish Chief of the General Staff Gen. Hulusi Akar and U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Joseph Dunford on February 17.

Senior U.S. officials remain unwilling to contemplate proposals to exclude the SDF from operations against Ar-Raqqa City despite high-level lobbying by Turkey. Instead, U.S. Secretary of Defense Gen. James Mattis met with Turkish Defense Minister Fikri Isik on February 15 and offered increased intelligence support for operations against the PKK in Northern Iraq.

Erdogan has already demonstrated his willingness to take actions in Syria that undermine U.S. policy positions and admonitions. Turkey threatened to partner with Russia to conduct joint airstrikes against ISIS in Al-Bab, and then did so after the U.S. ignored its repeated requests for air support.

The U.S. has taken overt actions to deter an attack by Turkey and reaffirm its support for the SDF over the past several weeks given the growing risk of a direct military conflict.

CENTCOM publicized several photos over the past week highlighting the role of the Manbij Military Council (MMC) in the campaign against ISIS in Northern Syria. The MMC is a component of the Syrian Democratic Forces that retains close organizational ties to the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) - the political wing of the YPG.

The U.S. led a field inspection with a delegation from the Turkish Armed Forces in December 2016 to demonstrate that the YPG had withdrawn completely from Manbij. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu later stated that the visit failed to satisfy concerns that the town remains controlled by proxies of the group. Thousands of residents held demonstrations in Manbij on February 13 calling for the release of imprisoned PKK founder Abdullah Ocalan.

Unconfirmed activist reports claim that some of the 500 U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) currently present in Northern Syria may have been deployed to frontlines on the Sajur River near Manbij within the past several days in order to deter further aggression by Turkey.

Turkish leaders met on February 27 and likely made the decision to proceed with operations against Manbij rather than wait on coalition support for an offensive against ISIS in Ar-Raqqa City.

Erdogan called unscheduled meetings with Turkish Defense Minister Fikri Isik and Turkish Chief of the General Staff Gen. Hulusi Akar in Istanbul on February 27.

Turkish Presidential Advisor Ilnur Cevik claimed on February 27 that Turkey plans to end its military operations in Syria after establishing a fifty-mile “buffer zone” in Manbij.

Turkey has continued to deploy additional armored vehicles to Northern Aleppo Province in recent weeks. These reinforcements could be deployed against Manbij as well as the isolated Kurdish Afrin Canton in Western Aleppo Province.

Further escalation between Turkey and the Syrian Kurds would severely jeopardize – and likely halt indefinitely - the campaign against ISIS in Ar-Raqqa City.

The U.S. has relied extensively upon the YPG as the main component of the SDF – the preferred coalition partner on the ground against ISIS in Northern Syria.

Open fighting between Turkey and the SDF would allow ISIS to retain its hold on Ar-Raqqa City and potentially secure new gains across Northern Syria.

The U.S. must exercise all of its sources of leverage over Turkey – including its military presence in Syria as well as bilateral military-to-military assistance, humanitarian support, and economic investment – in order to prevent a Turkish offensive against the SDF.

The U.S. should also consider slowing down or halting further SDF advances in order to avoid fueling a wider conflict between Arabs and Kurds in Northern Syria. The U.S. must not sacrifice long-term stability for a quick victory against ISIS in Ar-Raqqa City.

The U.S. must ultimately build an alternative partner force of Syrian Sunni Arabs that is both willing to fight Salafi-jihadi groups and is independent from the political project of the PYD. The U.S. cannot rely upon the Turkish-backed opposition force due to its inclusion of Salafi-jihadi groups, including Ahrar al-Sham, that serve as a vector for al Qaeda in Syria.

ISIS could be facing difficulty coordinating successful attacks in Iraq as losses in Mosul are forcing it to transform from a governing to guerrilla style terrorist organization. ISIS did not carry out the wave of complex attacks predicted to occur in response to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) launching operations to retake western Mosul on February 19. The deviation from the expectation may be a result of ISIS losing coordination between cells across Iraq as it takes time to regroup or as the ISF puts pressure on lines of communication in northern Iraq. The ISF may also be improving in its ability to preempt or thwart attacks. ISIS launched a major attack against checkpoints near the Syrian-Jordan-Iraqi border from February 22 to 24 and targeted checkpoints in Diyala Province on February 23. However, these attacks alone do not match the intensity of ISIS’s previous responses, in which ISIS either carried out major attacks in generally quiet areas, such as Kirkuk City or Sinjar, or ramped up the frequency or scale of attacks in usual attack zones, such as Baghdad. ISIS may have planned for attacks in Samarra, Karbala, and Abu Ghraib to reach the response threshold, but these attacks were thwarted by the ISF over the course of February 21 to 24. The decline in ISIS’s response is not likely a sign of permanent loss of ability to attack, but rather an indication that ISIS may take time to sufficiently regroup its command and logistical hubs as it deals with losses in Mosul and northern Iraq.

Monday, February 27, 2017

Update: The Syrian regime seized additional towns from ISIS southeast of al-Bab on 27 FEB 2017 after ISIS withdrew. Regime control now abuts US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces and also Turkish-backed opposition forces. ISIS will continue to launch spectacular attacks along this seam at which the interests of local and global anti-ISIS actors compete directly.

Key Takeaway: ISIS launched offensives against the Syrian regime in Deir ez Zour, eastern Homs province, and eastern Damascus province in January 2017, exploiting the regime’s focus on Aleppo and attempting to offset or divert regime operations near al-Bab. Regime forces began to reverse ISIS’s gains in Homs province on February 14. ISIS lost additional territory in Mosul to the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition in early 2017. ISIS also lost al-Bab, Syria to Turkish-backed Operation Euphrates Shield on February 23. ISIS may increasingly infiltrate opposition-held territory in northwest Syria as U.S.-backed, Kurdish-dominated Operation Euphrates Shield threatens its control of Raqqa. ISIS-linked opposition group Liwa al-Aqsa conducted numerous attacks in northern Hama and southern Idlib provinces against opposition groups in early 2017, especially those affiliated with al-Qaeda’s de facto affiliate in Syria, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham. Liwa al-Aqsa subsequently negotiated a withdrawal from villages in northern Hama province, which may remain an attack zone for ISIS. ISIS’s affiliate in southwest Syria, Jaysh Khalid ibn al-Walid, also seized towns in Dera’a province in February, exploiting the focus of local opposition groups on an offensive in Dera’a City. ISW is placing a watch on ISIS in Damascus province and in Jordan, where ISIS may have latent potential to launch attacks in response to further losses in Raqqa and Mosul. A depiction of ISIS sanctuary in Jordan is forthcoming.

Sunday, February 26, 2017

ISIS launched offensives against the Syrian regime in Deir ez Zour, eastern Homs province, and eastern Damascus province in January 2017, exploiting the regime’s focus on Aleppo and attempting to offset or divert regime operations near al-Bab. Regime forces began to reverse ISIS’s gains in Homs province on February 14. ISIS lost additional territory in Mosul to the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition in early 2017. ISIS also lost al-Bab, Syria to Turkish-backed Operation Euphrates Shield on February 23. ISIS may increasingly infiltrate opposition-held territory in northwest Syria as U.S.-backed, Kurdish-dominated Operation Euphrates Shield threatens its control of Raqqa. ISIS-linked opposition group Liwa al-Aqsa conducted numerous attacks in northern Hama and southern Idlib provinces against opposition groups in early 2017, especially those affiliated with al-Qaeda’s de facto affiliate in Syria, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham. Liwa al-Aqsa subsequently negotiated a withdrawal from villages in northern Hama province, which may remain an attack zone for ISIS. ISIS’s affiliate in southwest Syria, Jaysh Khalid ibn al-Walid, also seized towns in Dera’a province in February, exploiting the focus of local opposition groups on an offensive in Dera’a City. ISW is placing a watch on ISIS in Damascus province and in Jordan, where ISIS may have latent potential to launch attacks in response to further losses in Raqqa and Mosul. A depiction of ISIS sanctuary in Jordan is forthcoming.

Friday, February 24, 2017

Key Takeaway: The U.S. cannot drive a wedge between Russia and Iran in the near term. Tehran and Moscow share regional and global interests across the Middle East, North Africa, Caucasus, and Central Asia. Their common interests and overarching objective of expelling the U.S. from the Middle East will likely bind Iran and Russia together into an enduring partnership.

The Trump administration reportedly seeks to drive
a wedge between Russia and Iran in Syria. Officials have suggested that the
U.S. could exploit natural tensions between the two states and persuade Russia
to check
Iran in the Middle East. This notion assumes that cooperation between the two
countries is limited to tactical efforts in Syria and misses the deep strategic
convergence between Moscow and Tehran. Iran and Russia share many fundamental
and enduring common interests and strategic objectives, most notably the
expulsion of the U.S. from the Middle East.

Iran and Russia are historic
rivals and dissimilar regimes. Each poses a unique threat to the existing
international order. Russia aims to reestablish itself as a global superpower
and restore the multipolar world of the Cold War at the expense of the U.S. and
Europe. Iran aims to become a regional hegemon by expelling the U.S. from the Middle
East, undermining Saudi Arabia, and eliminating Israel. These aims do not
diverge over the short to medium term. Iran remains far from its goal of
regional hegemony – a position that would likely draw concern from Moscow.
Russia is also not close to achieving parity with the U.S. and NATO. Russia and
Iran will thus likely continue to partner closely until one or the other comes
within striking distance of its goals – a condition unlikely to emerge in the
foreseeable future.

Strategic Convergence

Syria - Iran and Russia
support the Syrian regime against all its opponents.

Iran needs a
friendly regime in Damascus to provide a secure base from which it can support Lebanese
Hezbollah and conduct
operations against Israel. Russia requires a regime willing and able to guarantee
long-term access to its air
and naval bases on the Mediterranean Sea from which to challenge the U.S.
and NATO. Minor divergences between Iran and Russia in their approach to the
Syrian Civil War reflect the friction normal to any coalition rather than signs
of fragility. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei appears to view the
continued
rule of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad as a matter of personal honor while
Russian President Vladimir Putin does not. Even if Putin agreed to abandon
Assad, however, there is no reason to imagine that the partnership between
Russia and Iran would collapse given their numerous other grounds for
cooperation.

Iraq and Afghanistan –
Iran and Russia seek to expel the U.S. from both Iraq and Afghanistan.

Russia
and Iran both seek to eliminate the U.S. military presence in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Tehran aims to prevent Iraq from becoming a hostile base of attack,
remembering the existential struggle of the Iran-Iraq War against former Iraqi
President Saddam Hussein. Tehran uses political
parties and militias to pressure
the weak government of Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi, periodically threatening
to replace him with a pro-Iranian leader who might order the U.S. out of Iraq. Meanwhile,
Russian outreach in Iraq has been opportunistic. Russia formed a joint
intelligence-sharing cell with Iran, Iraq, and Syria and stands ready to further
increase
its involvement with support from political
actors aligned with Iran in Baghdad. Iran and Russia both also desire a
stable buffer state in Afghanistan that excludes the U.S. and NATO. Both countries
prefer to work with the same set of allies on the ground within the Northern
Alliance as well as the Afghan
Taliban.

Turkey - Iran and
Russia desire to peel Turkey away from the U.S. and NATO.

Iran and Russia
both seek to pull Turkey out of the orbit of the U.S. and NATO while ending Ankara’s
support to opposition groups in Syria. Both countries also oppose Turkish
President Recep Erdogan’s Neo-Ottoman
strategic vision to reassert Turkish economic, cultural, and military
dominance over the Middle East. Russia and Iran also have major economic
interests in Turkey as a transit
route for natural gas pipelines and a buyer
of energy resources. Moscow and Tehran have coopted Turkey into diplomaticinitiatives
to end the Syrian Civil War that exclude the U.S. Both countries jointly took
advantage of tensions
between the U.S. and Turkey over coalition support for the Syrian Kurdish YPG,
which Turkey considers to be an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).
Erdogan has expressed a willingness to pursue membership in the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization, the rival to NATO led by Russia and China.

Egypt – Iran and Russia
aim to accelerate Egypt’s drift away from the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.

Russia and Iran encourage
Egypt’s movement away from the U.S. and Gulf States. Russia likely seeks new
military basing on the Mediterranean Sea and Red Sea in Egypt that would
give it control over the Suez Canal. Iran needs new points of access to support
its illicit networks throughout Africa after losing itspartners in Sudan
and Eritrea. Both countries likely view Cairo as an acceptable
counterweight to Saudi Arabia for leadership of Sunni Arabs in the Middle
East. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has voted
for Russian initiatives on Syria at the UN Security Council and reportedly sent a limited number of troops
to Syria on behalf of the Russia and Iran.

Caucasus – Russia and
Iran back Armenia against Azerbaijan and Turkey.

Russia maintains
a strong alliance with Armenia that spans centuries. Moscow has sold billions
of dollars’ worth of weapons
to Yerevan over the past two decades and has permanent military bases in
Yerevan and Gyumri. Iran supports Armenia as a counterweight
to Azerbaijan. Tehran fears that Baku could support a secessionist movement within
its own domestic Azeri population and accuses Azerbaijan of providing Israel with
a base
for intelligence-gathering and military training.

Global Stage– Russia
and Iran seek to weaken and divide the EU and NATO.

Russia and Iran diverge on only a
few key points. Russia does not seek to usurp the regional and religious influence
of Saudi Arabia or destroy the state of Israel. Iran’s quest for regional
hegemony also likely poses a problem for Moscow, which would prefer a regional
balance among Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt as well as positive
relations with Israel. Putin has done nothing to protest or contain Iranian efforts
against Israel, however, even in the numerous instances when weapons Russia
gave to Syria were reportedly transferred
to Lebanese Hezbollah. Russia seems willing to accept increased tensions with
Saudi Arabia and Israel in exchange for its partnership with Iran.

Russia and Iran also diverge on their stance towards the Kurds. Iran fears
separatism among Kurds in Northern Iran amidst an increase in low-level
domestic attacks over the past year. Russia by contrast views the Kurds as a
source
of leverage against regional and international powers including the U.S., Turkey,
Iran, and Iraq. Moscow has nevertheless offered no meaningful support for an
independent Kurdistan – the one item that might fully draw the Kurds into the
orbit of Russia. Iran and Russia seem quite capable of managing these differences
to sustain their pursuit of common goals.

Conclusion

There is nothing unnatural, artificial, or inherently temporary about
the coalition between Russia and Iran. Their relationship rests on a deep foundation
of common strategic objectives and interests. The two countries are building a
military coalition that can operate across the region – including a potential anti-access,
area-denial zone stretching from the Mediterranean Sea to the Persian Gulf. Meaningful
divisions between Moscow and Tehran will only materialize under extreme conditions
when either or both are on the verge of victory or collapse, forcing the other to
make hard choices about its long-term regional interests. The foreseeable
future offers little prospect of any such development. The inflation of minor disagreements
in Syria into opportunities to split Russia from Iran misses the depth of this alignment
and opens the U.S. up to strategic surprise by a rising coalition that is
already rewriting the rules of the game in the Middle East.

Key Takeaway: The Syrian Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have seized
the majority of ISIS-held territory in the eastern countryside of ar-Raqqah and
is positioned to complete the isolation of the city in coming months. The
U.S.’s main partners in Syria, the SDF and Turkey, are competing to lead the
next phase of operations to seize ar-Raqqah City and thereby solidify their
influence over post-ISIS governance. The SDF are currently the U.S. partner
force best positioned to seize the city and have begun establishing governance
structures comprised of local allied Arab leaders. Turkey’s alternative
proposals for a Turkish-approved force to seize ar-Raqqah City risk an armed
conflict with the SDF or pro-regime forces as well as the empowerment of
Salafi-Jihadi group Ahrar al-Sham. The U.S. must work with its allies to both
prevent an armed conflict between Turkey and the SDF that would detract from
current anti-ISIS operations and while simultaneously setting conditions to
ensure a representative governance structure for post-ISIS ar-Raqqah City.

The Syrian Kurdish-led
Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have seized the majority of ISIS-held territory
in the eastern countryside of ar-Raqqah in ongoing efforts to isolate the city.
The SDFlaunched the third phase of Operation Euphrates Wrath on February 4 with the stated objective ofseizing the eastern countryside of ar-Raqqah City. The SDF attacked south
towards ar-Raqqah City along two axes from SDF-held territory east of the town
of Ayn Issa, reportedly seizing 98 villages and hamlets northeast of ar-Raqqah City by February
12. The SDF connected these two axes on February 11 and was approximately 5 km northeast of ar-Raqqah City as of February 17. The SDF subsequently announced the second stage of phase three on February 17 and launched two axes of attack in a pincer movement to seize the Raqqa-Hasakah highway and
encircle ISIS-held territory in Northern Deir ez Zour Province. The SDF
simultaneously advanced south from newly seized territory on the Raqqah-Hasakah
highway and seized the village of Judaydat Khabour on February 21, thereby weakening ISIS’s ability to resupply
ar-Raqqah City. The SDF are now positioned to complete the isolation of
ar-Raqqah City and subsequently transition to the next phase of seizing the
city.

The U.S.’s main partners
in Syria, the SDF and Turkey, are competing to lead operations to seize
ar-Raqqah City and solidify their influence over post-ISIS governance. The SDF
are currently advancing towards the city with increased U.S. material support, and have requested heavy weapons and additional armored vehicles to counter ISIS’s
strength in urban combat. The SDF and affiliated political parties have also
begun solidifying relationships and alliances with local Arab tribal leaders in order to create a governance structure of SDF-friendly local notables similar to the structure
established by the SDF in Manbij City. Turkey, meanwhile, has demanded that the U.S. end its support for the SDF and proposed two alternative plans for a Turkish approved force to seize
ar-Raqqah City. Turkey’s plans, however, will likely not beas effective in
combating ISIS in ar-Raqqah City as a U.S.-supported SDF assault on the city
and will fail to achieve U.S. strategic objectives for Syria. The first plan to
advance along a 12-mile wide corridor from the town of Tal Abyad to ar-Raqqah
City would bisect SDF-held territory east of the Euphrates. The SDF will not
concede to this plan without major U.S. guarantees or Turkish concessions, and
may launch counter-attacks if Turkey proceeds unilaterally. Turkey’s second
proposal is an offensive from the recently seized town of al Bab, which would require Turkish troops to advance approximately 100
miles and seize at least two heavily fortified ISIS-held towns before reaching
ar-Raqqah City. This second proposal violates areported agreement between Turkey and Russia preventing Turkish troops from
advancing south of al Bab, and pro-regime forces have already begun advancing east towards Lake Assad in an effort to prevent Turkish-backed
opposition groups from seizing vast territory.

Turkish-backed
opposition groups acceptable to the U.S. likely [DS1] cannot seize ar-Raqqah
City without additional support from prominent Salafi-Jihadist group Ahrar al
Sham. Turkey used Ahrar al Sham during the offensive on al Bab to seize
territory when other Turkish backed opposition groups proved unable to
effectively combat ISIS in and around the urban terrain. Turkey will likely
utilize Ahrar al Sham in a leading role in a Turkish offensive on ar-Raqqah City.
Ahrar al Sham’s seizure of the city would likely allow the group to dictate the
composition of ar-Raqqah City’s governance structure, effectively trading
control of ar-Raqqah from one Salafi-Jihadist group to another. A governance
structure established by Ahrar al Sham is antithetical to U.S. strategic
interests in Syria.

A U.S. failure to
prevent conflict between its Kurdish- and Turkish-led partner forces in Syria
could jeopardize the anti-ISIS mission in Syria. A Turkish attack on Manbij City or an attempt to bisect Kurdish territory could
instigate a wider armed conflict that would distract both major U.S.-partner
ground forces from the anti-ISIS fight in ar-Raqqah City. The U.S. must also
set conditions to prevent the resurgence of Salafi-Jihadism after the seizure
of ar-Raqqah City by ensuring that the city is governed by representatives of
its population rather than another Salafi-Jihadist group or a Kurdish puppet.

Update: The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) recaptured the Mosul Airport and Ghazlani military base on February 24 from where they advanced into neighborhoods in western Mosul. Units from the Federal Police and Emergency Response Division (ERD) completed the two-day operation to recapture the airport before moving into adjacent neighborhoods in western Mosul. The Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) crossed the Tigris River, likely around Yarmjah in eastern Mosul, on February 22 and conducted a two-day operation on February 23 and 24 to clear the Ghazlani military base before likewise moving into nearby neighborhoods. The ISF will continue to use the airport and military base as a springboard and logistical and command hub for operations into western Mosul. Meanwhile, the 9th Iraqi Army Armored Division supported by a Hawza militia continued efforts around Mount Atshan on February 22 and 23 before moving into an outermost neighborhood in Mosul on February 24.

Opposition
groups backed by Turkey in Operation Euphrates Shield seized full
control over Al-Bab in Northern Aleppo Province as well as
two neighboring towns, ending more than three months of heavy clashes.The
fall of Al-Bab will enable Turkish President Recep Erdogan to pursue his next
stated strategic priorities in Northern Syria – including an offensive to expel
the Syrian Kurdish YPG from Manbij in Eastern Aleppo Province. Turkish
Defense Minister Fikri Isik warned that Turkey will “reevaluate”
military operations against the town if the U.S. does not ensure
the imminent withdrawal of the Syrian Kurdish YPG from Manbij.
Meanwhile, UN Special Envoy to Syria Staffan de Mistura opened
the Geneva IV Talks between regime and opposition delegations with
the goal of reaching a political solution to the Syrian Civil War. The
negotiations nonetheless appear primed to fail amidst deteriorating conditions
on the ground - including an increasingly unstable nationwide ceasefire and a
continued consolidation of power by Al-Qaeda in Syria.

These graphics mark the latest installment of our Syria SITREP Map made possible through a partnership between the Institute for the Study of War andSyria Direct. The graphic depicts significant recent developments in the Syrian Civil War. The control of terrain represented on the graphic is accurate as of February 16, 2017.

Wednesday, February 22, 2017

Key Takeaway:ISIS Wilayat Khorasan may be
developing a regional powerbase in northwestern Afghanistan. Former Taliban militants
operating in the name of ISIS executed international aid workers and held
others captive in a prison in Jowzjan Province in February 2017, a step change
in ISIS’s operations in Afghanistan. ISIS may increasingly use this hub to regenerate
manpower as it suffers losses elsewhere, threatening US and NATO interests in
multiple regions across Afghanistan. Malign external actors like Russia and
Iran could also use ISIS’s expansion in the region to validate their support of
Taliban militants and undermine the U.S. and NATO.

Tripwire: The Jowzjan Provincial Governor claimed
ISIS-linked militants killed six International Committee for the Red Cross
(ICRC) workers on February 8 in Qush
Tepah District. Militants are holding two more ICRC workers captive
in an ISISprison in Qush Tepah District, Jowzjan Province
according to a local news source. This report comes one month after local
officials and elders separately claimed that ISIS members destroyed homes in DarzabDistrict,
Jowzjan Province and forced up to 60 families to leave their homes in Sayad
District, Sar-e Pul Province in December 2016. Another report emerged on
February 8 that the son of the slain
leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which pledged to ISIS
in August 2015, is leading efforts to resettle up to 650 foreign Pakistani and
Uzbek militants and their families in Jowzjan, Sar-e Pul, and Faryab Provinces.
ISW is issuing a warning based on these reports that ISIS may be developing a
regional power base in northwestern Afghanistan. Neither ISIS Wilayat Khorasan
nor ISIS’s central media has claimed the aforementioned events.

Pattern: The execution of international aid
workers is a step change for ISIS in Afghanistan.The establishment of
a prison and population displacement are new developments for ISIS in northwest
Afghanistan, but typical of ISIS generally. ISIS militants previously used resettlement efforts
to increase presence in Kunar inMarch 2016, and also established multiple prisons in
their strongholds in Nangarhar Province. Reporting of ISIS-linked activity in northwestern
Afghanistan accelerated in February 2017 compared to previous trends, but early
indicators corroborate the presence of ISIS-linked fighters in this zone. Local
security officials first claimed ISIS
was recruiting and raising “black flags” in Jowzjan and Sar-e Pul Provinces in
January 2015. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which historically
operates in northern Afghanistan and the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area,
pledged to ISIS in August 2015. ISIS militants reportedly clashed with security
forces in Qush
Tepah District, Jowzjan province in July 2016. Another report in August
2016 alluded to a local ISIS
commander in Jowzjan. ISIS militants clashed again with security forces in Darzab
District, Jowzjan Province in October 2016. ISIS-linked groups also killed a
local prayer leader in for assaulting minors in Darzab
District in October 2016.

Timing: ISIS
may be exploiting a gap in security by Dostum’s Junbish Militia in northwestern
Afghanistan.ISIS’s expansion in the region comes as First Vice President Abdul Rashid
Dostum, who maintains significant influence in the North through his Junbish
Militia, remains confined to his home
surrounded by his militia in Kabul City following a scandal involving the
alleged assault of former Jowzjan Provincial Governor Ahmad Eschi in November
2016 by his bodyguards. The lack of reported Junbish militia action to combat
ISIS-linked militants in Northern Afghanistan may represent the absence of
Junbish militias. Alternatively, Dostum may be sanctioning the expansion of
ISIS in the region in order to demonstrate his significance to Afghan security
in an attempt to relieve the political pressure to prosecute him for the
alleged assault. Meanwhile, the ANSF is currently undergoing a U.S.-led force
regeneration process during their 2016-2017 winter campaign. The Afghan
National Unity Government has historically relied on a joint force of ANSF
units and Junbish militiamen to provide security in northwestern Afghanistan.
The lessened presence of Dostum’s militia while the ANSF rests and refits units
may be granting ISIS-linked militants increased freedom of movement in the
region.

Assessment: The prison in Qush Tepah District, Jowzjan province is the first indicator of social control by ISIS in Afghanistan outside of its strongholds in eastern Afghanistan. The prison is run by former
Taliban shadow governor Qari Hekmat, who reportedly joined ISIS
in mid-2016 a few months after he was expelled from the Taliban
due to his excessive brutality. Qari Hekmat is one of several ISIS-linked
groups operating in the area, including Abdul Rahman Yuldash, the son
of the slain leader of the IMU, who has also been implicated by local sources
in recent reporting. The Jowzjan Provincial
Governor claimed on February 8 that five ISIS
factions with up to 200 fighters are present in Qush Tepah District alone. The successful recruitment of former-Taliban
and IMU militants in Jowzjan, Sar-e Pul, and Faryab Provinces will allow ISIS
to regenerate manpower and absorb losses incurred in its strongholds in eastern
Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. ISIS seeks to take advantage of the vast
ungoverned and remote spaces in Afghanistan to establish camps where it can recruit,
train, and deploy local and foreign fighters. ISIS Wilayat Khorasan has trained
recruits from India, planned successful attacks in Kabul, and deployed
expeditionary recruiters to remote provinces from its strongholds in Nangarhar
and Zabul according to local sources. ISIS will likely use its growing presence
and influence in the northwestern provinces to establish an additional regional
base in which it can implement social control and expand ISIS’s Caliphate as it
loses territory in core terrain.

Implications: The expansion of ISIS’s
Caliphate in Afghanistan would grant ISIS an additional logistical hub to
receive and train foreign fighters as it becomes more difficult for foreign
fighters to join ISIS in Iraq and Syria.ISIS Wilayat Khorasan is likely strengthening its ties with IMU
militants in order to expand its regional network and coopt local groups and
fighters. Russia may use the expansion of ISIS in northwestern Afghanistan,
which borders former Soviet satellite states Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and
Tajikistan, to continue undermining the U.S. and NATO by supporting Taliban militants
and claiming that Taliban militants are fighting ISIS rather than the U.S. The
expansion of ISIS outside of its bases in eastern Afghanistan will also strain
the ongoing U.S. counterterrorism mission as it will have to shift resources to
remote northwestern provinces. This shift may allow ISIS in Nangarhar to
reconstitute sanctuaries lost to joint U.S.-ANSF operations in 2016. Any
remaining Junbish militias under Dostum’s control in the area would further
complicate U.S. response if Dostum faces backlash from his alleged assault against
Eschi and orders his militias not to cooperate with the U.S. as a result. Both
ISIS and Russia stand to benefit from the expansion of ISIS into the northwest
at the expense of the U.S.

Indicators: Increased reports of ISIS conducting
executions and establishing courts or prisons in the northwestern provinces
would indicate ISIS is solidifying social control in the region. Reports that
the group is suddenly flush with cash or is able to procure explosive materials
may indicate a transfer of capabilities from either ISIS in core terrain, ISIS
militants in eastern Afghanistan, or both. Any recognition of these ISIS-linked
groups in official ISIS media, either coming from core or with official ISIS
Wilayat Khorasan branding, would indicate ISIS is consolidating ties with these
groups and attempting to expand the Caliphate in northwestern Afghanistan. The
continued successful recruiting of former-Taliban militants would increase the
likelihood that ISIS will establish a regional stronghold as it coopts is main
competitors in the area. If Dostum’s militia remains disengaged, it could
further deteriorate security in the northwestern provinces and allow ISIS to
make significant gains in the region. These gains may prompt Russia to take
action against ISIS in the northwest, which would severely undermine and
complicate the U.S. and NATO missions.

Tuesday, February 21, 2017

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) launched operations to retake western Mosul on February 19. The ISF has not yet begun operations inside western Mosul city, focusing instead on isolating ISIS in Mosul by cutting off exits routes west of the city and setting conditions to breach the city limits through the southern airport.

The ISF launched operations on February 19 to recapture western Mosul after a three week operational reset following the recapture of eastern Mosul on January 24. The ISF has not yet entered western Mosul, and is continuing shaping operations south and southwest of the city. Units from the Federal Police and the Emergency Response Division (ERD) consolidated control over villages south of Mosul on February 19 and 20. The units reached the outskirts of the Ghazlani military base and Mosul airport on February 20 and began artillery strikes on February 21 on the airport and base in preparation to storm. Meanwhile, the 9th Iraqi Army Armored Division alongside a Hawza militia from the Popular Mobilization, Firqat al-Abbas al-Qitaliya (FAQ), began to close off western escape routes out of the city. The division will likely continue the current trajectory to isolate Mosul by heading north towards the Tigris River. The desert operations are also more suitable to the armored division, which would have trouble navigating western Mosul’s narrow streets. The units may ultimately enter the city, but moving from the outside in rather than the inside out.

Humanitarian conditions inside the city remain a concern as operations advance. The 16th Iraqi Army Division alongside police and local tribal fighters assumed control of security in eastern Mosul. The area has already suffered a series of suicide attacks over the past few weeks, suggesting that areas were insufficiently cleared or that ISIS already re-infiltrated the city. The UN announced on February 15 that it would temporarily pause humanitarian aid to the eastern half of Mosul because of the attacks. Meanwhile, the UN has also announced that food, fuel, and supplies are unable to reach western Mosul, distressing the humanitarian crisis for an estimated 750,000 civilians. The ongoing military operations are compounding these issues by further closing off possible access points for aid into the city. The ISF will need to prioritize efforts to secure the distribution of aid in both eastern and western Mosul and provide evacuation routes from western Mosul as the expected months-long operation will increase the severity of the humanitarian crisis.

Thursday, February 16, 2017

Baghdad witnessed serious breaches of security from February 11 to 16 due to both escalating protest movements and ISIS attacks. A large Sadrist-led protest, demanding electoral reforms, tried to move from Tahrir Square into the Green Zone on February 11, but security forces repelled the protesters with force, resulting in casualties. Soon after the protesters withdrew, unidentified attackers launched three rockets at the Green Zone from eastern Baghdad, resulting in no casualties. The Sadrist-affiliated militia denied responsibility for the rockets, however the attack may have been the act of Iranian proxy militias which have carried out rocket attacks against U.S. infrastructure before. ISIS, meanwhile, continued carrying out spectacular attacks in the capital, including a bombing on February 16 that killed upwards of fifty people, the deadliest of 2017 so far. Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi called an emergency meeting on February 16 in order to issue procedures to ensure security.

The increased intensity of the Sadrist demonstrations could escalate ongoing intra-Shi’a competition in Baghdad and southern Iraq. Sadrist Trend leader Muqtada al-Sadr retains the momentum to continue mass protests, busing in and mobilizing thousands on February 11, then again on February 14, and calling for another protest on February 17. Sadr had similar momentum in early 2016, when protests spread from Baghdad to the southern provinces. Sadrist protesters are historically undisciplined, however, and in 2016 they attacked political offices in southern Iraq, including Dawa Party and other pro-Iran party headquarters. Similar attacks now as political parties gear up for both provincial and national elections could inflame a greater intra-Shi’a conflict in the southern provinces. Basra will likely be a significant flash point as there have already been attacks related to election violence in the past month. Baghdad will need to move quickly to quell Sadr’s protests before they instigate a greater conflict between armed political groups in the capital and southern provinces.

Turkish
President Recep Erdogan reiterated that the “ultimate goal” ofTurkeyin
Operation Euphrates Shield is the establishment of a five-thousand square
kilometer ‘safe zone’ that includesAl-Bab,Manbij, andAr-Raqqa CityinNorthern Syria during a speech on
February 12.Erdogan
stated that the proposed “terrorist-free zone” would require the implementation
of a no-fly zone, noting that he had discussed the issue with both theU.S. andRussia. The
statement came after pro-regime forces supported by Russia and Lebanese
Hezbollah effectively completed the encirclement of ISIS in Al-Bab in line with
a predetermined agreement between Russia and Turkey. Meanwhile, preparations
continued for the next round of Geneva Talks on the Syrian Civil War scheduled
to begin on February 23. The High Negotiations Committee (HNC) approved a watered-down
delegation to the talks that replaced several key armed opposition
representatives with civilian members of the exiled political opposition as
well as delegates from domestic opposition factions backed by Russia that lack
legitimacy on the ground. The potential for successful talks also remains muted
amidst continued calls by armed opposition groups for the full implementation
of a nationwide ceasefire, humanitarian access, and prisoner releases agreed
upon at the Astana Talks on January 23 – 24.

These graphics mark the latest installment of our Syria SITREP Map made possible through a partnership between the Institute for the Study of War andSyria Direct. The graphic depicts significant recent developments in the Syrian Civil War. The control of terrain represented on the graphic is accurate as of February 16, 2017.

Monday, February 13, 2017

Key Takeaway:Recent Russian maneuvering in Ukraine poses a growing risk to U.S. interests as Vladimir Putin presses to capitalize on his intervention. Russia may have assessed that it does not require a full-fledged separatist insurgency in eastern Ukraine anymore, as it sees a political opportunity to force Kyiv into accepting and legitimizing the occupied territories of Donbas on Russia's terms. Putin continues setting conditions to advance his political objective of creating a pliable, pro-Russian, anti-Western Ukraine, and to shape how the West should respond to Russian aggression in Eastern Europe. The U.S. must recognize Putin’s game and seize the initiative, including by boosting support for a sovereign Ukraine, rather than let the Kremlin transform the region toward its own destabilizing ends.

Tripwire: Russian leader Vladimir Putin sees an opportunity to ‘cash in’ his military gains to get closer to his objective of reinstating a client regime in Ukraine.

Russia has recently shown little interest in preserving the combat effectiveness of its proxy forces. First, Russia has allowed a continuous purge of the separatist leadership. In the past two weeks alone, there have been three deaths of high-profile separatist leaders, including Mikhail “Givi” Tolstykh, a senior commander, notorious for his brutality against Ukrainian forces. Second, Russia allowed the separatists to suffer major losses in the most recent Avdiivka escalation. The Ukrainian Army was able to easily repel separatist attacks and force the dispersed, low-quality separatists from their positions. These defeats followed months of setbacks for separatist forces in the Svitlodarsk Arc, where Ukrainian forces had counter-attacked, driven separatist forces from their positions, and thereby threatened their supply lines. Ukrainian armed forces also killed or wounded several high profile separatist commanders, a previously rare occurrence. Russia chose not to provide the backing the separatists would have required to make major gains. This suggests that Russia was not primarily focused on separatist battlefield victories.

Having the most heinous separatist leaders out of the picture gives Russia additional framing leverage vis-à-vis Kyiv in the peace negotiations in Minsk. Their absence may weaken Kyiv's argument that Ukraine cannot consider direct negotiations or any form of legitimization of the occupied territories while the war criminals, who tortured and killed Ukrainian soldiers, are in power. It might also make it easier for Russia to sell legitimization of its proxies to the international community if the separatists are perceived as 'beheaded' and weakened.

Additionally, various political actors inside and outside Ukraine have changed their rhetoric about what is possible in the context of Donbas peace deal. Yevhen Marchuk, Ukraine’s representative in the Minsk talks group, said in a Feb. 6 interview that Ukraine is approaching a “painful stage” in the peace talks, during which it will have to compromise. German Ambassador to Ukraine Ernst Reichel stated that elections in the non-government controlled areas in eastern Ukraine are possible while there are still Russian forces in the area. Meanwhile, Russia has intensified its various false narratives[i] about Ukraine in the West.

Timing: Uncertainly about the new U.S. administration's policy vis-à-vis Russia has opened two cracks for the Kremlin to exploit.

First, some European countries are delaying taking strong stands as they await the new U.S. administration's first move. The pause gives Russia time to exploit any divergences and shape a new narrative about the potential peace deal with Ukraine.

Second, the fear among some decision-makers in Kyiv that the U.S. will 'abandon' Ukraine and leave them dealing one on one with Putin allows the Kremlin to coerce them into a deal. There have been informal reports that such a back door deal is already in the making.

Lastly, Russia needs to make a decision about the cost-benefit of further investment in the separatist forces, which have continued to degrade in capability and have shown signs of little improvement over three years, while the Armed Forces of Ukraine have grown increasingly effective.

Most dangerous course of action:

Russia gets its preferred deal. It forces Ukraine into accepting local elections in the occupied territories that will bring representatives of these separatist territories into the Ukrainian parliament. Russia might also push for the creation of transitional local authorities in these regions and amnesty for the insurgents.

Russia manages to conceal its true intentions and frames these events as major concessions in the eyes of Europe and the U.S.

Such arrangement places a permanent 'Trojan horse' inside Ukraine—an institutionalized political lever in the form of semi-autonomous regions and, potentially, their representation in the legislature. Russia would have gotten a 'foot in the door' and will expand on it until it reinstitutes its client regime. Moreover, the deal would be considered a betrayal by a large part of the Ukrainian population and might lead to violent internal confrontations and, if taken to an extreme, full political destabilization.

Most likely course of action: A major push back from many decision-makers in Kyiv and the Ukrainian population will prevent Russia from getting its preferred arrangement at this time. Many top government officials in Ukraine reaffirmed that elections held in the non-government controlled areas of eastern Ukraine are inadmissible and impossible.

However, if unimpeded by the West, Russia is still likely to get a deal that includes some form of legitimization for the occupied territories. It is also likely to get European sanctions related to Donbas lifted. Russia still will have managed to get 'a foot in the door' and will continue expanding on it until it reinstitutes its client regime.

Russia is likely to continue advancing its proxy war in eastern Ukraine in the event that a strong alignment between Kyiv and the West prevents Russia from gaining increased legitimacy for its proxies or global pressure forces Russia to halt its military ambitions in Ukraine.

Significance for U.S. policy:

Such a deal would get Russia closer to its objective of restricting Ukraine's movement toward the West. It would increase the risk of having a non-U.S. friendly government in Kyiv in the future.

Such a deal would also mean that Russia will have achieved most of its objectives in Ukraine without paying a serious long-term price.

Removal of the European sanctions related to Donbas would ease Russia’s access the debt market and allow the Kremlin to finance continued military expansion and challenge other strategic U.S. positions around the world.

It is critical that the U.S. understands exactly what kind of gains Russia is making in Ukraine and what ‘concessions’ Russia claims, but is not making, as the U.S. considers its strategic options.

Recommendation: A core element of U.S. policy needs to be a focus on strengthening a partner in Kyiv that can resist Putin’s pressure campaigns. The U.S. must in this instance prevent any non-transparent back door deal between the Kremlin and one or more factions of powerbrokers in Kyiv. The U.S. should also develop a more effective effort to strengthen Kyiv using its full range of tools, including political, military, and economic assistance. The U.S. should simultaneously avoid premature concessions, such as weakening the sanction regime on Russia or ruling out options for increasing economic pressure. The U.S. administration should seize the moment to send a strong signal to Ukraine, Europe, and Vladimir Putin. It has an opportunity to do so this week with Defense Secretary James Mattis scheduled to attend a NATO Defense Ministerial Conference and the Munich Security Conference.

Key Takeaway: The U.S.-led coalition’s fight against ISIS in Syria is in jeopardy as Turkey threatens an offensive against the U.S.’s primary partner force on the ground, the Syrian Democratic Forces. Turkey has stated its intent to shift its focus from ISIS to the Syrian Kurds after the seizure of the ISIS-held town of al Bab in Northern Aleppo Province, which ISW forecasts is likely in the coming weeks. If the U.S. fails to protect its partner force, the Syrian Kurdish-led de facto government of Northern Syria may pursue closer cooperation with Russia, which could hinder the U.S.’s ability to influence the outcome of the Syrian Civil War and continue its operations in the country. Conflict between the U.S.’s allies in Northern Syria will also relieve pressure on ISIS in Raqqa Province and thereby allow ISIS to seize territory from the Syrian regime or reinforce its core terrain in Iraq.

Turkey’s threat
to launch an offensive against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) after the
impending seizure of al Bab endangers the U.S.-led coalition’s fight against ISIS
in Syria. Turkish Armed
Forces (TSK) and Turkish-backed opposition groups entered the ISIS-held town of al Bab in Northern Aleppo Province on
February 9 following a two and a half month offensive on the town. Pro-regime forces severed ISIS’s last remaining ground line of communication south of al
Bab on February 6, and ISW forecasts that the city will likely fall in the coming
weeks. Turkish
President Recep Erdogan stated on January 27 that the Turkish Armed Forces and Turkish-backed
opposition groups will not advancefurther
south following the seizure of al Bab, but rather will launchanoffensiveagainst the SDF in Manbij City to
push the SDF east of the Euphrates. The U.S. is relying on the SDF as the only U.S.-led coalition partner force currently
capable of isolating ISIS’s de-facto capital in Syria – ar-Raqqah City. A Turkish
offensive that both distracts and weakens the U.S.’s partner force in Syria
will diminish the U.S.’s ability to combat ISIS in Syria.

Turkish officials have consistentlyannouncedtheir hostility towards the dominant group in the political alliance behind
the SDF, the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), due to its links to
the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a U.S.-designated terrorist organization. Turkey
launched Operation Euphrates Shield, currently a TSK and Turkish-backed
opposition offensive against ISIS in Northern Aleppo Province, in large part to prevent the formation of a contiguous zone of
control along the Syrian-Turkish border de facto governed by the PYD. In
addition, TSK and Turkish-backed forces recently increased attacks against the SDF in Northern Aleppo Province, indicating that
Turkey is preparing to escalate its currently low-scale conflict with the SDF. Turkey
is also using arrests of alleged ‘PYD militants’ in Turkish-held Northern Aleppo
Province and Turkey to reinforce Turkey’s designation of the PYD as a terrorist
organization and legitimize their potential offensive.

Turkish President Recep Erdogan is likely timing
its assault on the SDF in Northern Aleppo Province in conjunction with preparations
to hold a referendumon a constitutional amendment package that
would increase his executive powers. A Turkish offensive on the SDF will demonstrate
Erdogan’s commitment to Turkey’s ongoing anti-PKK campaign, which is likely to increase
popular support for the proposed constitutional amendments. Turkish officials
likely also see U.S. President Donald Trump’s reported rejection of previous plans to increase support for the SDF as well as his recent
phone conversation with Erdogan as indicators that the new administration is
open to sacrificing support for the SDF in exchange for a closer partnership with
Turkey in Syria.

A Turkish offensive to drive the SDF east
could divert Turkish and SDF resources from combatting ISIS for months. The
U.S. will likely attempt to hedge this effect by offering Turkey a leading role
in operations to seize ar-Raqqah City. A Turkish offensive would require SDF
approval to traverse Kurdish-held terrain, however, otherwise Turkish forces would
have to advance approximately 100 miles through ISIS-held territory before
attacking ar-Raqqah City. The PYD is opposed to allowing Turkey to establish a governing
structure in ar-Raqqah City that is hostile to its goal of establishing a
federal system in post-war Syria. The PYD is currently creating local governance structures for the city and the surrounding
region with the support of local Arab tribal leaders in order to demonstrate the viability
of its proposed governance structure and establish allied control over the
region. Moreover, the extended Turkish assault on the ISIS-held town of al Bab demonstrates that
Turkish-backed opposition forces are not independently combat capable of
seizing ISIS-held urban terrain. A successful Turkish assault on ar-Raqqah City
would require an increased commitment of TSK troops or the use of prominent Salafi-jihadi group Ahrar al Sham in addition to the
full support of the U.S.-led coalition. Most dangerously, a halt to the SDF’s
operations against ISIS could allow the group to retake territory in Northern
Syria, divert forces to its assault on pro-regime held Deir ez-Zour City, or send
reinforcements to defend Mosul City in Iraq.

The PYD may turn to Russia as an alternate
patron if the U.S. fails to prevent an offensive against the SDF or attempt to
allow Turkey a greater role in the ar-Raqqah offensive. Russia has attempted to
reconcile the PYD with its rival Syrian Kurdish political parties in the
Kurdish National Council and the Syrian regime in the past. Russia is also hosting a pan-Kurdistan meeting in Moscow on February 15 to reportedly
discuss ways to foster Kurdish unity and PYD requirements for a post-war Syrian
constitution. The PYD has already allowed Russian military police to patrol its controlled districts within
Aleppo City and currently shares territory with pro-regime forces in Northern
Aleppo Province west of the town of al Bab. The regime also reportedly delivered twenty-five tons of ammunition to the SDF
on October 13 before the SDF launched operations against ISIS in ar-Raqqah City.
Russian mediated reconciliation between the regime and the PYD would be a major
political coup against U.S. influence in Syria, effectively pushing the U.S.
further out into the fringes of being able to affect both the Syrian Civil War
and the fight against ISIS in Syria.

Turkey may indicate an upcoming offensive
by deploying further TSK reinforcements to the towns of Jarablus and Azaz in Northern
Aleppo Province. An escalation in clashes between Turkish-backed opposition
groups and the SDF in Northern Aleppo Province will also indicate that Turkey
is shifting the focus of its operations in Syria from ISIS to the SDF. Syrian
Kurds could show signs of drifting to Russia’s sphere of influence by accepting
Russia’s offered concessions in a potential post-war Syrian constitution or taking increasingly
frequent meetings with Russian officials.