Thursday, July 31, 2014

One of the most odious features of
Soviet times is now making a horrific comeback in Russian-occupied Crimea—“snitching”
or denouncing others to the authorities in the hopes of currying favor with the
latter or of gaining specific benefits such as the apartment of those against
whom the denunciations are directed. As officials clearly intend, Crimean
commentator Andrey Kirillov says, this trend is leading to the atomization of
society and the spread of fear. Thus, the spread of denunciations is making the
population less likely to resist and easier to control (krymr.com, July 23; unian.net, July 24).

According to Kirillov, such
denunciations have become “a mass phenomenon” in Crimea after only a few months
of Russian occupation. A few people may be snitching because they believe that
they have discovered problems and “wish to restore order.” But most of those in Crimea who are taking
this step appear to be driven by a desire to curry favor with the authorities and
win benefits for themselves at the expense of those they denounce.

He suggests that those engaged in such
activities think like “children of the USSR” and assume that because the new
powers that be have so many enemies, they can exploit the situation by turning
them in. If this judgment is correct, it suggests the perception of the
population is that the Russian occupation officials are anything but
legitimate.

Kirillov says that in Crimea since the
beginning of the Russian occupation, “bosses have begun to report on their
subordinates, and subordinates on their bosses, the employees of one office on
those of another,” including among government officials. Businesses hope to
gain contracts, employees hope to oust bosses, and government employees hope to
promote themselves in the eyes of the occupying authorities.

Moreover, he continues, “journalists
are denouncing other journalists who have remained in Crimea, doctors are
denouncing doctors, school directors their staffs,” and so on and on. Recently, he says, “an especially terrible
kind” of denunciation has made an appearance—neighbors denouncing neighbors in
the hopes of obtaining their property.
Fortunately, this form has not yet assumed the proportions of the
others, but there is little reason to think that it will not continue to grow
as long as the occupation lasts.

Unlike in Soviet times, when people knew just where to
deliver denunciations, many in Crimea are struggling to identify the proper
“addressees.” Some send these notorious memos to the top of the occupation
pyramid, which appears to be especially interested in damaging personal data
about Crimeans. But others are turning to the militia, the Federal Security
Service (FSB), and the procuracy as well. The system, like much else, is still
not regularized. But there seems to be little doubt that it will be, Kirillov
says, noting that the occupation authorities have already taken over all the
personal files they can

Tuesday, July 22, 2014

While the
latest events in eastern Ukraine—in particular, the downing of Malaysian
Airlines Flight MH17 by pro-Russia separatist forces—may have proven a step too
far even for Vladimir Putin, for many in Moscow the problem lies not with the
Kremlin’s activity in the conflict but its lack thereof. Infamous right-wing
publicist and member of the Izbornii club (a right-wing think tank associated
with Neo-Nazi ideas) Maxim Kalashnikov and sometime Kremlin ideologist
Alexander Dugin have called on Putin to support the rebels in Ukraine’s eastern
region of Donbas militarily—in other words, with a more overt military intervention
(ru.krymyr.com, July 19). Nor has the pressure come entirely from forces
outside the regime, as even Vladislav Surkov and economic advisor Sergei
Glazyrev have voiced dissatisfaction with the government’s failure to act. Similarly,
Moscow has seen popular rallies and the mobilization of huge stores of
humanitarian aid to beleaguered forces in Ukraine (see EDM,
July 16).

Some of
the most active—not to mention fanatical—fighters in eastern Ukraine are
Russian nationalists with ties to various Russian Neo-Nazi movements, such as
the Movement Against Illegal Immigration (known by its Russian acronym, DPNI). And
equally disappointed with what they believe is the Kremlin’s inaction, the DPNI
recently re-initiated its anti-corruption campaign against Putin and the regime.
For example, one article on the DPNI website posits that the regime is afraid
to initiate a conflict due to the Russian oligarchs’ fear that their “umbilical
cord” to the West—holiday homes on the Cote d’Azur and London boarding schools
for their children—could be cut (DPNI, June 23).

Similarly,
the National News Service, endorsed by a group calling itself “Russian Sector” (a
play on the Ukrainian far right group “Right Sector”), posted an article
decrying the involvement of modern-day “Chekists”—meaning the Russian Federal Security
Service (FSB)—in the Ukraine conflict and throughout recent Russian history,
including in the 1999 apartment bombings in Moscow that served as a casus belli
for the second Chechen War. The article goes on to claim that “it is easy to
comprehend that the chief commander of the DNR [Donetsk People’s Republic] is
an FSB colonel, and the head of the DNR is an FSB general specializing in
‘delicate operations’” (rusnsn.info, July 14). The National News Service piece was authored by
Vladimir Potkin, who also goes by the Internet name ‘Basmanov’ and is the younger
brother of Alexander Potkin (a.k.a. Belov)—both men are leaders of the DPNI. Assuming
the article represents the general viewpoint of Russian neo-Nazis on the
conflict in Ukraine, their disenchantment with a hesitant Kremlin that has so
far failed to unite the “Russian world” bodes ill for stability in Ukraine and
in the post-Soviet space more generally.

Overall,
it should not be surprising that the Putin regime’s perceived reluctance to
pursue the nationalist cause has inspired such a renewal of criticism. Some
analysts have argued that Putin’s opportunistic annexation of Crimea was an
attempt to rebuild the popularity of a regime weakened by the 2011–2012 anti-corruption
street protests, in which many Russian far right groups took part. In order to
fortify itself, the regime incited nationalist fervor; and it now may be
dangerous to try and contain these passions. If the regime wishes to harness
the nationalist juggernaut, it may have to ride the train further than it had
originally intended.

Wednesday, July 16, 2014

Despite having been independent for
more than 20 years, the countries of Central Asia still have not agreed on
precisely where their borders are. At present, disputes between Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan, on the one hand, and between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, on the
other, are heating up, with negotiations not going anywhere fast. In both cases,
and especially in the first, the dispute about where the exact line should pass
involves a fight over just which maps from the tsarist and Soviet pasts should
be accepted.

In the case of the
Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan dispute, the two sides, despite having held meetings
every ten days on this issue for some years, cannot even agree on how much of
their shared 1,378-kilometer-long border has been agreed to. Bishkek says that
the two sides have agreed on 1,003 km, while Tashkent insists that the two
governments have agreed on the delimitation of only 701 km (kyrtag.kg, July 14).

The situation concerning the
Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan border is even more complicated. Kyrgyzstan’s officials
say that the Tajiks are claiming 135,000 hectares of what Bishkek says are
Kyrgyzstani lands, although the Kyrgyz Republic’s diplomats acknowledge that
these Tajikistani claims so far have been made only “orally” and “not
officially.” Nonetheless, this conflict is likely to intensify because the lands
involved are in the heavily populated Ferghana Valley and not in unpopulated regions
that the two sides have found it easier to reach agreement on (kyrtag.kg, July 14).

But underlying this dispute, which has
already led to border clashes between the forces of the two countries over the
last several years, are fights about which historical map should be considered
the most authoritative. Tajikistanis consider the most authoritative maps to be
the Soviet ones prepared between 1924 and 1939, as part of the territorial
delimitation of the entire region and often based on tsarist military maps. The
Kyrgyzstanis, in contrast, insist that the maps that should be examined to
settle the dispute are those of the Soviet volumes on administrative divisions
from 1958-1959 and 1989, as confirmed by the Supreme Soviet of the Kyrgyz Soviet
Socialist Republic (SSR) in the latter year (centrasia.ru, July 16).

The first Soviet maps of these republics
were prepared in 1924, at the end of the territorial delimitation of the
region. These maps reflected Soviet needs and were largely based on the maps
prepared by the tsarist military in 1896, which described the region in terms
of natural features like mountains, rivers and the like. The 1924 Soviet map
was modified in succeeding years as Moscow redrew the borders at the request of
one or another of the governments in the region. This complex history is described by V.N. Fedchina in her
classic study, “How the Map of Central Asia was Created” (in Russian, Moscow:
Nauka, several editions).

On the basis of this history, Maksim Vedeneyev of the
“Tsentr Asiya” news service says the Tajikistanis are in the right in their
claims against Kyrgyzstan. But not surprisingly, current politics may lead to
another outcome or no solution at all—at least anytime soon (centrasia.ru,
July 16).

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