Saturday, March 24, 2007

In 1997, Nong Darol Mahmada became furious with God. Her mother-who had been active in organizing Islamic prayer meetings in her neighborhood in Labuan, Banten, West Java-was struck with an incurable illness that would leave her crippled for life. Nong thought that God had abandoned them. "My mother was a good person and a devoted wife. Why would God let her suffer? When she became ill, everything fell apart." At Nong's father's pesantren religious school, the enrollment dropped from around 500 to 100. "My mother used to take care of everything," Nong says. "No one could replace her. I thought, why doesn't God see that by making my mother sick He was losing so many people who had praised Him?' I was very angry."

Nong's relationship with God has been a passionate affair. As a young woman, she desired only to devote herself to religion. As a middle-school student at her father's pesantren, she dreamed of leaving the school to live alone in a rented room where she could spend more time in solitary praise of God. Nong found her inspiration in Rabi'ah al-Adawiyah, an 8th century woman Sufi from the area that is now Iraq, who was well-known for her concept of divine love. "Rabi'ah didn't marry, she spent all her time performing wirid," says Nong, referring to the practice of reciting the Qur'an to praise God, usually done after completing the five daily prayers or h.

Nong lost interest in school, preferring to spend her time reciting the Qur'an and praying. One night in the middle of her devotions, she got up and left her room. She walked alone through the dark streets until she arrived at the small prayer room (musholla) at the bus terminal. She prayed there alone until dawn. That incident led her teacher to reprimand her, warning that a bus terminal was a dangerous place for a young woman.

This was not Nong's first scolding. She had grown up in a very strict religious environment under her paternal grandmother, since her parents were busy running the religious school. Nong's grandmother believed in a literal adherence to Islamic scripture. It was she who made sure that Nong wore a jilbab, the scarf worn by many of Indonesia's Muslim women to cover the hair, neck and chest. Nong remembers her grandmother warning her, "If you don't wear a jilbab and cover your hair, when you die your hair will burn in the fires of hell." Once she watched her grandmother yank the hair of her older sister, which had been fashionably curled and styled in a ponytail. "Hey, you're going to hell! You'll be burned up!" her grandmother shouted, pulling on her granddaughter's offending coiffure.

It was not until Nong entered university at the Syarif Hidayatullah State Academy for Islamic Sciences (IAIN) in Jakarta that she was introduced to interpretations of Islam that challenged her grand`mother's thinking. Exposed to a new world of books and Qur'anic interpretations, she came across the works of Fatima Mernissi, a Moroccan Muslim feminist.

"Fatima says that the jilbab exists for the political self-interests of men," Nong says. "I became convinced that the command to wear the veil was very political. I saw the revelation of the Qur'anic verse about the veil to have been meant not as a requirement but as an appeal. It was revealed during the time of the Prophet Muhammad, when people harassed Muslim women as a way of attacking the Prophet. But now there is no difference if I wear jilbab or not. It's a warning. The Prophet saw the clothing traditions of the Quraishi women at the time, and he said, 'pull your coverings over your chests.' There was no command to cover your hair. I wear modest clothes that don't attract people's attention-that's my jilbab."

On campus, Nong began to participate in discussions with her new friends, and she felt that her previous understanding of Islam had been backward. "All that I experienced in the pesantren made me restless at university. It seemed that what I had understood to be true wasn't right. How, I asked myself, could I have accepted those kinds of teachings? I felt really out of it."

Like Nong, Ulil Abshar-Abdalla was raised in an orthodox Islamic tradition. His father was the head of a pesantren in Pati, Central Java, and believed that formal schooling was syakkun fil Rab, a symptom of doubt in God. Ulil's father was distressed to see his son reading books written in Latin letters rather than the holy texts written in Arabic. For Ulil's father, true knowledge was contained in these Arabic texts.

But Ulil was drawn to read widely, despite his father's warning that such books would lead him astray. By the time he was of middle-school age, Ulil had read h (Upheaval in Islamic Thinking), the journal of Ahmad Wahib, a young Indonesian Islamic intellectual writing in the 1970s and who died at a young age. Wahib introduced Ulil to the notion of freedom of thought, not yet a popular concept among Indonesian Islamic thinkers. In the introduction to his journal, Wahib wrote, "I believe in God, but God is not a land forbidden to thought. God exists not in order for his existence to be un-thought. God takes shape not in order to hide from the light of critique." Wahib believed that God was living, fresh and flexible: "He does not want to be fixed in place."

Wahib's writings fuelled Ulil's search for new thought. Ulil also found a teacher to offer him encouragement. He says, "Kyai Sahal [Mahfudz] introduced me not only to modern Arab thinkers but also to the thought of Cak Nur [Nurcholish Madjid, a progressive Indonesian Muslim thinker] and Gus Dur [Abdurrahman Wahid, a leader of Nahdlatul Ulama, the largest Muslim organization in Southeast Asia and former president of Indonesia]. It gave me a sense of pride in Islamic thought. He also introduced me to Western philosophy. Many kinds of books were available in his school library back then." (Sahal Mahfudz is now the head of the Majelis Ulama Indonesia, an organization of Indonesian Islamic intellectuals.)

Books, however, were not enough to give Ulil a clear path. He also sought a social environment that could provide an answer to his restless questioning. "I entered the fundamentalist milieu and became a member of their religious community. For two years I was one of them."

The fundamentalist outlook inspired Ulil to even greater devotion. Previously he had followed Islam simply as a social tradition; now he grew to see Islam as not just a set of religious rules but as a compass to guide society and state. He remembers thinking at the time, "This is amazing."

But Ulil's perspective changed again after listening to a lecture by a young Islamic intellectual, Imanuddin Abdurrahim, at the Salman Mosque in Bandung. "[Imanuddin] had once been jailed by Suharto's New Order government. I listened to him speak and I read his books, and it was very inspiring. His background was in physics and he had a very logical way of thinking. He said that the law of God is natural law, having an objective quality, and that it does not discriminate between one group or another."

Imanuddin gave an example that stuck in Ulil's mind. "There are two buildings, one a mosque and the other an office," Ulil recounts. "The office installs a lightning rod, but the mosque does not. When a storm comes, the mosque will be hit by lightning, even though it is a place for the worship of God. Because it does not follow the [natural] law of God, it will face the consequences. This means that if Muslims want to progress, they cannot depend only on religious texts that were produced in a certain social and historical context, as if they were God's law, without considering how social laws have developed. Social law is not static. The mistake of the fundamentalists is to see it as static."

Ulil came to see fundamentalism as archaic. He became more deeply convinced of this in the midst of political shifts following the fall of Suharto in 1998. Radical Islamic movements, such as the Islamic Defenders' Front (FPI) and Laskar Jihad, injected religious emotion into political conflicts that had been brewing across the nation during Suharto's thirty-three-year regime-often they advocated violence as a moral response. In areas such as Ambon and Poso in eastern Indonesia, the issues at stake became colored as an inter-religious war. In Javanese cities, vigilante squads of the FPI attacked cafés and discotheques, claiming that they were protecting the public from sin. There were raids and "sweepings" in boarding houses in Central Java, enforcing curfews in the name of preventing immoral acts.

"This fundamentalism comes from a sense of desperation, a feeling of disappointment," says Ulil. "They're disappointed because Muslims once knew a golden age and now they feel degraded. They are experiencing political fragmentation, they are being left behind in science and economics. Looking at American policy in Palestine, they become spectators of injustice. 'Has God left us out?' That's their fundamental question. They feel belittled. Fundamentalism gives them a sense of pride. The real challenge, though, is regain their pride by confronting the roots of the backwardness in certain fields, not to withdraw into a conservative group."

Nong interjects, "Fundamentalist Muslims are unproductive, exclusive and they don't follow the developments of the times. As Ulil says, religion is a living organism that makes us feel enthusiasm. If we feel enthusiasm, then what Nietzsche said, 'religion is already dead,' that couldn't possibly happen."

Hamid Basyaib adds, "These days people just react to situations, which at the level of discourse are dominated by aggressive Islam or uneducated Islam," adds Hamid Basyaib. "These movements aren't terrifying, but they do promote rigidity, backwardness and literalist thinking."

In 1999, Ulil, who graduated from the Institute for Islamic and Arabic Knowledge in Jakarta, met with a number of friends, including Goenawan Mohamad, Luthfi Assyaukanie, Ihsan Ali Fawzi, Nong Darol Mahmada, Ahmad Sahal and Hamid Basyaib, all of whom shared many of Ulil's views and his determination to address Indonesia's growing fundamentalism. Ulil says, "We've seen radical Islam grow militant, systematic and organized, while liberal Islam has been unorganized, weak-seeming, not militant, not resistant and unassertive in giving voice to its perspectives. The Liberal Islamic Network was in fact motivated by the appearance of these radical Islamic movements."

It's January 4, 2001 in Jakarta, and a meeting is underway in a wood-floored study with dark blue walls, the office of Goenawan Mohamad, a columnist for the Indonesian newsmagazine Tempo and one of the founders of the Jakarta-based Institute for the Study of the Flow of Information (ISAI). The space is furnished simply with a table and six black-varnished wooden chairs, and a long wooden bench covered in red pillows. The walls are decorated with paintings and posters from European art exhibitions. An easel stands near the door, holding drafting paper covered with pen strokes. The seven people in the room have been engaged in serious discussion for hours.

Goenawan picks up a phone and calls Dahlan Iskan, the Chief Editor of the Jawa Pos newspaper, to ask him for some space to publish liberal Islamic thought. They have already agreed to appoint Nong Darol Mahmada to work on a funding proposal, while Luthfi Assyaukanie will be in charge of planning and managing a mailing list for discussing liberal Islam on the Internet.

"The Liberal Islamic Network was born in that meeting," says Nong. "All we want is to provide a choice for interpreting Islamic teachings."

"A lot of people don't realize that reading the Qur'an cannot be value-free," Ulil adds.

"In other words, the Qur'an can be read from different perspectives or angles. Each angle has its own validity. Even though each of these angles is valid, that doesn't negate the possibility of mutual critique. Without mutual critique, there's no possibility of us learning from each other."

These days, Islamic liberal thinkers take inspiration from many sources, including the work of Charles Kurzman, whose book Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook differentiates between those Islamic revival movements which reject modernity and claim to be searching for the pure Islam practiced in the time of the Prophet Muhammad, and liberal Islam, which supports a division between state and religion in its search for a route to modernity. Ulil explains, however, that even within the liberal Islamic community there are varying opinions about secularism. Some argue that an attempt to separate politics and religion is impossible in today's world, or even that it is an old-fashioned notion belonging to another era when secularism seemed much simpler. In today's modern society, religion carries with it a cultural identity, and despite attempts to marginalize it, it returns in much more complex forms.

"This makes it difficult to find the point at which liberal Islam diverges from literal Islam-that's our term for the fundamentalist movements. On some matters our positions meet-about pornography, for example, because pornography does damage ideals about the family, and our religion places a great emphasis on the family. Just like the Christian conservative George Bush, their rhetoric is filled with references to family values," Ulil says.

However, as Kurzman explains, a respect for the rights of women and non-Muslims, freedom of thought, anti-theocracy and support for democracy provide liberal Islam with a wide space in which to move.

Indonesia's Liberal Islamic Network spreads their viewpoints not only by publishing newspaper articles and hosting mailing list debates, but also by sponsoring radio talk shows and Friday bulletins, and they have plans to launch their own magazine. Funds for their operations come from The Asia Foundation and The Freedom Institute, a nonprofit organization headed by the Indonesian pro-democracy figure Rizal Mallarangeng. The Liberal Islamic Network has found that of all these channels for publicizing their thought, it is syndicated media that has been the most effective to date.Ulil says, "People's reactions to the articles we published in the Jawa Pos were amazing. I didn't realize it until I visited local communities, especially in East Java and Eastern Indonesia."

Not everyone, however, has had a positive reaction to the Liberal Islamic Network. The most heated response came after Ulil published an article in the Kompas newspaper entitled "Freshening Up Islamic Understanding" (Menyegarkan Kembali Pemahaman Islam)on November 18, 2002.

At seven o'clock in the evening, several weeks after the article appeared and two days before the Muslim holiday of Idul Fitri, Nong received a call on her cell phone from Hamid Basyaib. Hamid was in Jakarta, but Nong had already returned to her parents' home for the holidays.

"Nong, Ulil has had a death fatwa issued against him. Look at Detikcom [a news website]. I've been trying to call Ulil but I can't get through. His cell phone isn't ringing. Ulil has to hear this. You let him know, okay, Nong? Try to call him."

"Okay, I'll contact him later," Nong replied easily.

After talking to Hamid, Nong opened her laptop and logged onto the Detikcom website. Sure enough, she found a news item saying that a group of religious scholars called the Forum Ulama Umat Indonesia (FUUI) in Bandung, West Java had issued a fatwa calling for Ulil's death. Trying not to panic, Nong interrupted her father, who was busy watching television. "Father, a death fatwa has been issued against Ulil. Did you have anything to do with it?" Nong's father replied that he had known about the plans for the group of religious scholars to meet, but that he didn't know anything about a fatwa concerning Ulil. Her father assured her that the fatwa wasn't really serious.

Meanwhile, Ulil was in a car driving through Central Java on the road home for the holidays with his wife and child when his cell phone rang with a message: "What about those religious teachers in Bandung? How should it be followed up in Bandung?" Ulil did not understand the message.

"What I imagined at the time was that it wouldn't be the FUUI who would execute Ulil, but that it would be taken up by radicals on the street and they would kill him," Nong remembers.

Ulil stood accused of insulting the Muslim community and spreading enmity and hatred through society by way of his writings. But Athian Ali Muhamad Dai, head of the FUUI, denied that his organization had issued such a fatwa against Ulil. "We never issued a death fatwa especially about Ulil in our press release. We only called upon the state apparatus to dissolve that network, then we noted that whoever insulted Islam could reasonably expect the death penalty." Athian stated that he had already turned over Ulil's case to the police, complaining that what Ulil wrote in his article was an evil act against religion. Athian says he had reported Ulil to the police based on complaints from the Muslim community in Bandung. "Around 700 people complained. We distributed a questionnaire for this purpose-this was also what the police wanted, proof of how much influence this act had on society. Some people who were so fed up that they wanted to see Ulil hang."

For his own part, Athian considered Ulil's thinking dangerous for, he argued, it positioned the human mind above God. "It's a perfect example of insulting Islam," he said. "Ulil dares to say there is no law of God, there is only the law of man. He calls the Islamic punishment of stoning to death and other matters things that 'not meaningful'." Athian claimed that he would not forbid Ulil from having an alternative interpretation of Islam as long as he did not spread his ideas by writing in the mass media. "If Ulil wants to scream and shout in his room or with his own group, that's not a problem. If Ulil wants to say he has no religion at all, that's not a problem. But don't say those things while claiming to be a Muslim."

Fauzan Al-Ashari from the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia-a fundamentalist organization that counts among its members Abu Bakar Baasyir, the man accused of complicity in several terrorist bomb blasts in Indonesia-said that he disagreed with the plan to issue a fatwa against Ulil. "I heard about that," he said, "but the fatwa doesn't exist. It's just a speculative thing." Fauzan said he was, however, among those who supported the FUUI in its attempts to have the police investigate Ulil. He suggested that the way out of the debate was to muhabalah-to leave the decision in God's hands.

"For example," explained Fauzan over the telephone, "we ask for a sign from Allah within three days, that one of us should be struck by lightning and that's how we'll know which of us is wrong."

Kedai Tempo, an open-air Jakarta cafe, feels relaxed this March 24th afternoon. It is near the Jaringan Islam Liberal offices, and Nong and her friends like to meet here, drinking coffee or bottled tea, enjoying the breeze that wafts in from the open sides of the café. But Nong Darol Mahmada's cell phone rings often and she looks tired. She's organizing a campaign against the U.S. war on Iraq, a campaign involving the Liberal Islamic Network and a number of well-known Indonesian performers, including Iwan Fals, Franky Sahilatua and Trie Utami.

"When the Bali bombings occurred," Nong says, "I thought the fundamentalist groups would fade, because people would see that they were wrong. But now the Iraq war becomes a new justification for the fundamentalist attitude toward America or the West. Everything we've been working for-democracy, freedom of thought-all seems in vain."

She turns to Ulil. "What are we going to do now?"

"Well, you know, we'll just continue with our agenda," he answers, already on his feet.

**Linda Christanty is a journalist and writer. Reference : Latitudes, July 2003

In this essay, I reflect on how moderate Muslims in Indonesia came to terms, in late 2002, with George W. Bush’s zealous preparations to attack Iraq. The topic is quite important, as Indonesia is well known to have the world’s largest Muslim population, and the majority of Indonesia’s Muslims are moderate and tolerant in their religious views. At the time, there were “pro” and “contra” views of the planned attack. The fundamentalist camp saw it as ammunition – proof that the United States of America was indeed the Great Satan. The fundamentalists could not differentiate between U.S. citizenship and U.S. government policy. Consequently, they pursued U.S. citizens on the streets in what are known locally as “sweepings,” although no major or violent incident ensued.

Meanwhile, the moderate Muslim camp saw the U.S. plan as having the potential to destroy the image and future of Islam, which it had worked extremely hard to develop as part of a mature civil society. For some time, Muslim organizations like Nahdhatul Ulama (NU, the nation’s largest), Muhamadiyah (the second largest), and my own Liberal Islam Network (Jaringan Islam Liberal, JIL) have launched numerous and various activities to create an Islamic community that is tolerant, moderate, pluralist, and emancipative. These are activities that have received American support through USAID. In bringing the danger posed by U.S. war plans to the attention of the Indonesian public, Muhamadiyah leader Dr. Syafi’I Maarif carefully focused his harsh criticism on Bush administration policy.

In early October 2002, in my capacity as JIL representative, I contacted friends representing “moderate” Islamic organizations. These included elements from the NU – Lakpesdam, Muslimat, Fatayat, and others; from Muhammadiyah – Pemuda Muhamadiyah (its youth wing), Mahasiswa Muhamadiyah (students), Aisyiyah (women), and others; and campus-based groups such as those from the State Islamic University (Universitas Islam Negeri) and Paramadina Mulya Universitas in Jakarta. I felt the need to survey their attitudes towards the planned attack on Iraq, and to my surprise, they all expressed the same opinion, rejecting this U.S. policy. JIL itself, long before these inquiries were made, had condemned and rejected the planned attack through interviews on our weekly radio talk shows and articles published on our website and syndicated media.

However, JIL’s serious objections conveyed through media were deemed insufficient. A more tangible action was needed so that all parties would see this condemnation in concrete form. We finally decided upon October 8 as the date to express our objections through a mass demonstration at the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta. At that time, not one organization or institution had demonstrated at the Embassy against the planned attack. If we may so claim, “moderate” Islamic organizations pioneered these demonstrations.

Many were were surprised, never expecting such an action plan from us. The U.S. Embassy called me the day before the action. There was concern that the planned demonstration would provide justification for violent acts by fundamentalist groups that had long despised the United States. I replied that the demonstration would prove positive for the moderate Muslim community, because the insane U.S. plan had to be rejected outright, and that this matter had no connection whatsoever to the actions of fundamentalist groups. Indeed, if the moderate Muslim camp remained quiet and did not react to the planned attack, its lack of action would boomerang and set a bad precedent in the ongoing development of Islam in Indonesia. Further, our demonstration aimed to underline to fundamentalist groups that the planned attack was the policy of the Bush administration, which should not be equated with the American people, most of whom rejected this policy of their own government. We chose to see the planned attack on Iraq in terms of humanitarian concerns, as such an attack would represent a threat to world peace and cause unnecessary civilian deaths.

Fundamentalist groups were also surprised about our planned demonstration. They primarily believed that no such action could issue from and be coordinated by JIL. Their reason: JIL and its like-minded friends were considered very pro-American because we agree with and campaign for what they call the “western ideas” of tolerance, pluralism, and democracy; and furthermore the U.S. government had funded some of our activities. Naturally, we viewed this as a feeble argument. Just because JIL, the NU, and Muhamadiyah had received funds from the United States did not mean we could shut our eyes to the arbitrary policy of its government. What we rejected and despised was the policy of the Bush administration to attack Iraq, not Americans per se. Accordingly, we condemned the “sweeping” actions launched against U.S. citizens by fundamentalist organizations at the time.

The Basis of our Rejection

For us, all the statements and official documents issued by the U.S. government about the planned attack on Iraq were illogical and full of contradictions, displayed a pervasive hatred and a lust for war, and failed to make any connection to the September 11 tragedy, “Al Qaida,” or even the “war on terror.”

Moreover, the plan contravened the United Nations Charter, whose Preamble pledges nations to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” and which was established to “take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace” (Article 1 section 1).

We believe that the reasons put forth in the official document outlining the “preemptive attack” (the “Bush Doctrine”) violate international law. The UN Charter prohibits unilateral cross-border military actions without the justification of self defense, yet there was not a single reason for the U.S. government to need to defend itself against Iraq. UN Security Council Resolution 678 also prohibits any country from invading another without that body’s consent.

Finally, this attack would be undertaken after Iraq had endured more than ten years of economic sanctions that caused suffering to millions of Iraqi civilians, particularly women and children, because the sanctions had destroyed access to clean water. Such economic sanctions themselves stand in direct contradiction to the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Convention of 1977, which prohibits the use of economic blockades against civilians as a method of war. Economic sanctions are perhaps responsible for more deaths in Iraq than the murders committed throughout history with the use of what are known as weapons of mass destruction (John and Karl Muller, Foreign Affairs, May/June 1999).

The Weakness of Bush’s Position

The reason the U.S. government gave for the attack was that the Iraqi regime was developing weapons of mass destruction – chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons – that threatened international security. This reason was proffered repeatedly, although, in fact, these weapons were in evidence only in the past, during the Iran-Iraq war, when their development received the full support of the United States government itself in the form of raw materials, storage facilities, and technical expertise. These facts have been underlined by agencies of the United Nations, international NGOs, and even sources within the U.S. Congress.

Now the so-called weapons of mass destruction claimed to be in Iraq’s possession have failed to surface. Indeed, even if Iraq had possessed such weapons, the United States would have had no right to attack, just as Iraq has no right to attack the U.S., despite the latter’s possession of weapons of mass destruction in far larger number and scale.

In our view, this war was perpetrated for no other reason than to fulfill American hegemonic and imperialistic ambitions, and this is clearly indicated by the “Bush Doctrine.” The war was waged to make all other nations vassals to the American Empire, parties to an eventual Pax Americana. Considered from the perspective of “threat,” it is the U.S. ambition to become a global empire that represents the true “clear and present danger” to peace, welfare, and humanity on earth.

With our demonstration, we took the following stance:

1. We opposed the planned devastation of the Iraqi state and people – we opposed it in the highest and most steadfast terms. This in no way implies that we supported the dictatorship of then-president Saddam Hussein in all its manifestations, which had for almost a quarter century caused great suffering to the vast majority of Iraq’s people.

2. We appealed to U.S. and world leaders to heed a very clear lesson from history – that war leads only to disaster and misery; that it would serve no purpose but to increase suffering in the world in this time of heightening tension. War causes deep wounds in our civilization because it not only causes suffering for the victims, but also betrays the spirituality and humanity of the perpetrators.

I am convinced that war, in the sense of one country attacking another, will surely never produce a clear winner and that the combatants will reap only failure – failure as human beings and the failure of cultural backwardness. War is not the way to ring in the twenty-first century. After the experience of the previous twenty, this century should be devoted to perfecting the humanity of all people; it should bring us greater consciousness that we are all bound together in one great humanity; and it should demonstrate the logic of cooperation, not confrontation, between the inhabitants of our earth.

Such are my reflections, subjective though they may be, on the U.S. attack on Iraq. As one member of one organization working toward a better future for the millions of Indonesia’s Muslims, I hope to see no further attacks by one country on another in the name of world peace or the democratization of the other.

What is Liberal Islam Network’s (JIL) interest in publishing a book on hijâb (recognized as jilbab in Indonesia)? Actually this question is a personal one because the answer must necessarily be subjective. I’m very conscious of the fact that my thoughts on this issue are derived from my personal experience.

I remember that when I was a child my grandmother was very strict about wearing a veil though then it was merely a piece of cloth for covering the head. She was a pious Muslim up to her death (âllâhummâghfirlâhâ). To her, the hair of an adult (baligh) woman should not be exposed since it is aurat (part of the body which may not be visible). If anyone breaks this rule, her hair would be burnt in hell. Surely, the idea of burning in hell haunts me and worse still as a statement coming from someone I adore. Hence, when I grew up and became an adult, I faithfully wore the veil due to the fear of the consequences for not wearing it.

Nevertheless, my decision to wear the veil did not stop my criticism and my search for the answer to the question of why it is that a woman’s head and hair happen to be aurat and thus have to be covered. Why is it that women are deemed aurat so that they must be covered while a man’s aurat is limited only from the knee up to his navel? That curiosity triggered me to study more about the veil.

Apparently, the matter is not as simple as I had been led to believe. It is not merely about definitions of aurat and burning in hell. It is far more complicated than that. For example, in every case of the implementation of Islamic sharia, the first step is to always make women wear veils. Similarly, for example, in several regions in our country, the first consequence of implementing Islamic sharia in the region would be the obligation upon women to wear veils. Thus the regulation of wearing the veil is singled out as it is the most physical evidence or indicator of the success of the implementation of Islamic sharia law. It is almost as if wearing the veil is synonymous with Islam itself. The question is this: Is it true that wearing the veil is an essential aspect of Islamic sharia?

The answer is certainly lengthy and not a black or white one. Even though the veil is merely a part of a woman’s outfit, this concept has a long history. The word Jilbab is derived from the word jalaba meaning to gather and to carry. In the period of the prophet Muhammad SAW the Jilbab was an outfit covering the whole of an adult woman’s body. In contrast, the head covering outfit in Indonesia was initially recognized as a veil, but by the ‘eighties the word jilbab became more popular.

Jilbab in the sense of being merely a head cover is acknowledged only in Indonesia. In several Muslim countries it is a full body cover. The jilbab-like costume known variously as the chador in Iran, the pardeh in India and Pakistan, the milayat in Libya, the abaya in Irak, the charshaf in Turki, and lastly, the hijâb in a number of Arab-African countries like Egypt, Sudan and Yemen.

Actually the concept of hijâb is not exclusive to Islam. For instance in the Old Testament, the Jews Holy Book, the hijâb was referred to as tif’eret. Similarly in the Bible, the Holy Book of the Christians, the terms of zammah, re’alah, zaif and mitpahat all refer to the veil. Even according to Eipstein, as quoted by Nasa-ruddin Umar in his article contained in Journal of Ulumul Quran, the concept of hijâb (in the sense of a head cover) predated the samawi (sky revealed) religions (Jew and Christian). According to Mr Nasar, this sort of wear became established in the Code of Bilalama (3.000 SM) and continued in the Code of Hammurabi (2.000 SM) and the Code of Asyiria (1.500 SM). The regulation of wearing the veil was practiced in several ancient cities like Mesopotamia, Babilonia, and Asyiria. (Kompas, 25/11/02)

The tradition of wearing the veil was an aspect of family law amongst the Assyrians. This law stipulated that wives, daughters and widows should wear the veil whenever they go out into public space. In analyzing this concept further, when Adam and Eve were evicted from the garden of Eden, covering their genitals was the first thing they had to do (aurat) (QS. Thaha/20: 121). In this regard, the Jewish literature mentions that the use of hijâb began with the original sin: the sin of eve tempting her husband, Adam, to eat the forbidden fruit. The consequence is that Eve and her clan (women) were cursed not only to wear the hijâb but also to menstruate and to be restricted by menstrual regulations. The difference between the concept of hijâb in the Jewish and Christian traditions and in Islam, is that hijâb has no relation at all with original sin or with menstruation. In the Islamic concept, hijâb and menstruation have their own contexts. The accentuation of the Hijâb is much more closely related to ethic and aesthetic issues.The hijâb institutionalization in Islam is based on two verses of Qur’an QS. Al-Ahzab/ 33: 59 dan QS. An-Nur/24: 31. These verses affirm the regulations in regard to dress for Muslim woman. In surah An-Nur, the word khumur is a plural form of khimar, meaning veil. While the word juyub is the plural form of jaib, means ash-shadru (chest). Hence the sentence and to draw their veils over their bosoms, is a reaction to the dressing traditions of the women of Arab Jahiliya. In the era of ignorance, the Jahiliya period, women used to go out in public with naked breasts and would reveal their necks in order to show off their adornments as illustrated by Al-Allamah Ibnu. For instance, Imam Zarkasyi wrote that in this period the women wore dresses that revealed their necks and chests as well as other parts of their bodies. They also drew their veils backwards while leaving the front parts wide open. Consequently, they were commanded to draw their veils forward in order to cover their chest.” Moreover, dress codes even incited the war between the unbelievers (kafir) of Mecca with the Muslims at the battle of Uhud

The tradition is political, discriminative and elitist-natured. Surah Al Ahzab contains the verse about hijâb revealed after the battle of Khandaq (5 Hijriyah), while surah An-Nur was revealed long after that. They are political because the verses are revealed in order to answer the attack by the munafik (unbelievers who pretend to be Muslims, hypocrites), in this case Abdullah bin Ubay and friends. This attack of munafik “used” the Muslim women by slandering the wives of prophet, especially Aisha. The event is known as al-ifk.* In that period, this event was so important so that it was affirmed in five separate verses: QS. An-Nur/23: 11-16. The problems this has created for Muslim women are incessant though the verses were intended to protect Muslim woman from acts of disrespect. Allah has decreed that the reason for wearing jilbab is so that women maybe recognized and not annoyed and so that the free can be distinguished from slaves.

Thus the laws can be understood to be both elitist and discriminative, since this verse distinguishes between free and slave Muslim woman. Here the ambiguity of Islamic law regarding slavery can be observed. On the one hand Islam is opposed to slavery yet on the other hand, it still supports the distinction of dress for different classes. In my opinion, to avoid ambiguous interpretation, the interpretation should stress the ethical issue of the verse, and not be read merely as a code about the regulation of dress. There should be no difference between a free woman and a slave, good manners and modesty should apply equally to both.

In the Muslim world, many books have been written about hijâb which mention that it is a good Muslim woman’s clothing which separates woman and limits contact between women and men who are not family. The verses do not deliver explicit orders rather they provide expectations about woman’s modesty and the regulations applied to the prophet’s wives. Fatima Mernissi in Women in Islam, has written that in the beginning of Islam the Prophet did not set up a dichotomy between the his own private space and his wives’ with that of other Muslims’. QS. Al-Ahzab/33:53 affirms that there was originally no dichotomy between public and private space.The institutionalization of the veil and the separation of woman from public space crystallized when the Muslim world came into contact with Hellens and Persians in cities. In these contexts, the veil which was formerly used as an occasional costume became institutionalized and women became obligated to wear it. Moreover, the codification of the standard books like hadits, tafseer, fikh, history, including the codification of standard writing (rasm) and reading (qira’at) of Alqur’an, were influenced by Hellenism and Persian culture. For example, the Israiliyat (transmitted from Israel) history is included in the book of Tafseer al-Thabary and it subsequently became the reference of the ulemas in codifying the tafseer.

According to Ruth Rodded in her book Kembang Peradaban, the debate has centered upon the meaning and practical implementation of the verses of hijâb. Her opinion is based on what consists the proper definition regarding certain words (including the terms hijâb), their contexts and whether the regulation set for the prophet’s wives should become norms for every Muslim woman. Nevertheless as it has been argued by Harun Nasution, “the view that says that hijâb is an obligation, could be answered yes to. And those who say it is not an obligation, could be answered yes to as well. But the clear regulation boundary regarding hijâb is not mentioned in the Qur’an and the hadits mutawatir.” (Islam Rasional, p.332).

In short then, this book takes the view that wearing the jilbab is not an obligation. Even Al Asymawy has proclaimed that the hadits taken as the reference regarding jilbab or hijâb obligation is a hadits ahad (transmitted by single person) which cannot be perceived as having a legal foundation. If jilbab was obligatory for women, the impact would certainly be substantial. As he quoted: “the statement that woman’s hair is aurat, is because it is their crown. It follows that her face, which is her throne, is also aurat. Then her voice which is her authority becomes aurat and her body which is her kingdom aurat. Eventually, the entire female being is considered aurat.” The implication is ultimately that woman cannot do anything as Allah’s creature because she is all-aurat.

We are used to reading books or booklets regarding the obligation of wearing jilbab in the verses of Qur’an and Hadits as well as in experiencing threats made to women who do not want to wear it. For us, this book, bluntly and frankly, explains that wearing the jilbab is not an obligation. Even the tradition of wearing the jilbab amongst the sahabat (prophet’s companions) and amongst their followers is more of a cultural obligation than a religious one.I wish this pocket book could be a positive contribution for everyone who does or does not wear jilbab. I am not entirely for or against wearing the jilbab as long as wearing it is due to someone’s consciousness that it is an option and one potential mode of expression of self-searching for a Muslim woman. When used without coercion it is a legitimate dress code.

-- Utan Kayu, 17th April 2003

* The event of al-ifk occurred when Aisha was left out of the group in a battlefield because she was looking for her lost necklace. When she reached the camp, nobody was there anymore. The entire troop had left the location. During the time when Aisha was alone in the camp, Safwan ibn Mu’attal al-Sulami arrived with his camel and carried her to Medina. This incident became widely known and was utilized by the munafik (hypocrites) coordinated by Abdullah bin Ubay such that the Prophet formed a special team to investigate the case.

Fatima Mernissi was born in 1940 in Fez, Morocco. She grew up in a harem along with her mother, grandmothers and other sisters. It was a harem guarded strictly by a janitor so that the women could not escape from it. The harem was well-maintained and served by a maid servant. Her grandmother, Yasmina, is one of nine wives but the same fate did not fall upon her mother. Her father took only one wife and did not choose polygamy since the nationalists rejected polygamy. Even so, her mother was illiterate because she spent all of her time inside the harem.

When she was born, Moroccan nationalists successfully decolonized the country from French rule. As she related,”.... if I was born two years earlier, I would not have obtained an education. I was born at the right time.” The nationalists who fought against France promised to create a new Morocco with equality for everyone. Women and men had equal access to education. The nationalists also sought to abolish the practice of polygamy.

Fatima was lucky that despite of her life in a harem, she got the opportunity to acquire a higher education. In her book The Harem Within, Mernissi tells us about her childhood in a harem in Fez but it’s only part of the book as her childhood was not as wonderful as depicted in the book. For example, although she illustrates life in the harem appealingly, she does not ignore the oppression for those inside. She explained how women in the harems looked up to the sky and dreamt about simple things like walking freely on the street, or how they might peep at the outside world through key holes.

To Mernissi, westerners always visualize harems as castles. She distinguishes between the high class harem (imperial) and the ordinary harem (domestic). The westerners imagination is about the high class harems of rich and powerful men with hundreds of female slaves guarded strictly by a kasim. This sort of harem ceased to exist in World War I when the Ottoman Empire was destroyed and those practices were forbidden by the new Western rulers. Mernissi lived in an ordinary harem of the kind which still exists in the Gulf countries.

Since she was a little girl, Mernissi was involved in the national upheaval of thought and raised wild questions for instance on the limits imposed between boys and girls. The little Mernissi asked, if there is an approved boundary between boys and girls, why is it only girls who are covered and limited. She only posed such questions to her grandma Yasmina who could not reply since it was too dangerous for her.

At that time she also had an ambivalent relation with religion, due to the difference and tension between the perspective of Alqur’an she perceived in the school of Alqur’an and what was taught by her grandma. She was taught strictly in the school where she should memorize Alqur’an everyday. She was constantly berated, yelled at and beaten whenever she made a mistake. Thus she viewed religion as something to be afraid of.

On the other hand, the little Mernissi perceived the beauty of religion through her grandmother Yasmina, who lead her towards the poetic side of religion. Her grandma frequently told the story about her hajj and enthusiastically told Mernissi about Mecca and Medina. She constantly talked about Medina and ignored the other cities like Arafah and Mina. This influenced Mernissi so much that she became obsessed with Medina.

Mernissi nursed this attitude for many years. To her, Alqur’an depends on our perspective and on our perception toward it. These holy verses could be the gate to escape from or instead be an obstacle. To her Alqur’an can lead us towards dream or instead damage our fortitude.

Meanwhile, Mernissi’s mother always taught her how to behave and carry herself as a woman: “you should learn how to shout and protest just as you learnt how to walk and talk.” For example, she told her the story of how woman should behave wisely and prudently. She often told her the story of A Thousand and One Arabian Nights. It’s about a Sultan who was very fond of tales. Once, Sultan Nebuchadnezzar found his wife engaged having sex with his guard. He was furious and killed them both. He hated women afterward and it led him to the bad habit of marrying woman one night and then killing her the next day. It constantly happened and led to the death of many women. This habit was finally stopped by a girl named Scheherazade who magnetized him through her stories so that the Sultan always delayed his plan to kill her.

The mother regularly recounted such wisdom. Nevertheless, we should highlight how the little girl asked: “How can we learn how to tell stories that please the King?” The mother, as if she was talking to herself, said that it is the life long task of a woman. Mernissi admitted that it was her mother and grandma who supported her in getting a higher education so that she could be independent.

***

When Mernissi became a teenager, she started having religious lessons. She found it heart breaking:

“….. Some Hadits (prophetic tradition) originated from Kitab Bukhari which are told by the teachers hurt me. They state that the Prophet said: “Dog, donkey and woman would annul anyone’s prayer whenever they pass ahead them, break off between the praying man and kiblah.” I was shocked to hear that sort of Hadits and never repeat it with the hopes that silent would wipe away this Hadits out of my mind. I asked, “How come the Prophet said that sort of Hadits which hurt me so much... how could the beloved Muhammad hurt a little girl who is in her growth, attempt to make him as pillars of her romantic dreams.” (Woman in Islam, p. 82)

Mernissi experienced an upheaval in her thinking. Yet despite the merits of the nationalists who allowed women to get an education, Mernissi admitted that many ideas of Arabic nationalism are still to be accomplished. Polygamy is not yet forbidden, women cannot achieve equal status and democracy has not yet become established in the Arab world.

Currently, Mernissi has obtained her master in politics from Mohammed V University in Rabat, Morocco, and a PhD from Brandeis University in America in 1973. Her dissertation, Beyond the Veil, become a text book and a key reference in the west about women and Islam.

And at the moment, she works as a lecturer of Sociology at Mohammed V Rabat University where she graduated. She is well-known as a Muslim feminist in North Africa and is a prominent activist in the Islamic world.

Thought and works

I notice that Mernissi’s works stem from her individual experiences which triggered her to conduct historical research about things which have disturbed her religious comprehension. For example, in her work The Veil and Male Elite which she revised later as Women and Islam: A Historical and Theological Enquir, her investigation of the sacred texts of Alqur’an and Hadits is based on her individual experience, as for instance the case of the misogynist Hadits which equate a females position to that of dogs and donkeys.

Mernissi’s heartbreak deepened when she heard about Hadits regarding female leadership. Her motivation to investigate such Hadits seriously was instigated by the Hadits spoken by a trader in the market who negated female leadership. Surprised by her questions, the trader quoted the Hadit that “there is no salvation within society led by females.” To her, this indicates that the Hadits are embedded within the Muslim community and that therefore female leadership is still debatable despite the case of Benazir Buttho who became the prime minister of Pakistan and despite the fact that Alqur’an discusses the leadership of Queen Bilqis.

She is also concerned with another matter: hijab. The topic of hijab has dominated her intellectual career. The Hujab, which is a instrument of limitation, segregation and isolation which is used to keep women out of the public space. To her Hijab means segregation and is used as a medium of asserting heirarchy between the rulers and the people.

She communicates her understanding through interpretations of Alqur’an and Hadits and through historical research and sociological analyses. Her goal is to deliver an alternative interpretation through her books The Forgotten Queen in Islam and Islam and Democracy. In these works she attempts to show that the defects within Arab governments are not inherent in religious teachings, but that they are due to the manipulation of the religious teaching by rulers for their own interests. Nevertheless, Mernissi defends Arab countries when they are maligned by the western press (see Islam and democracy p. 26).

In most of her works, she attempts to illustrate that religious teachings can be easily manipulated and for that reason she believes that the oppression of woman is not part of the real teaching of Islam. That’s why she is careful not to oppose sacred tradition. Most of her articles regarding woman express these notions. We can see this, for example, in her book Rebellion's Women and Islamic Memory, (London & New Jersey: Zed Books, 1996).

In conclusion, her articles are rich in sociological analyses. In the works mentioned above and in her published dissertation, Beyond the Veil, she writes specifically about her research on Moroccan woman and about the sexual limits placed on woman. Nevertheless, her intellectual struggle and experience can be seen as representative of Muslim matters in general.