he legalisation of same-sex
marriage in the UK and the
recent furore over comments
made about Section 377A, a
law which criminalises sexual
relations between men, points to
an underlying disconnect between
the approaches that parties in
the debate take towards the
legitimacy of using legislation to
regulate personal conduct on the
grounds of its immorality.
One of the fundamental tenets
of political liberalism is that the
moral conduct of the individual
should not be policed by the state,
on the basis that to do so would
be to pass a normative judgment
and hence privilege a certain
conception of the “good” over
others. The motivation behind
this tenet is the accommodation of
diversity in differing conceptions
of what constitutes “good”, and
how the individual may choose
to pursue their ideals, thus
upholding the inviolability of the
principle of personal autonomy. A
desirable effect of upholding this
tenet is the prevention of statesponsored coercion of minority
views.

It therefore comes as no surprise
that pro-LGBT (Lesbian, Gay,
Bisexual and Transgender) rights
supporters have traditionally
appealed to abstract, “morallyneutral” values of autonomy,
equality, tolerance, and privacy
to justify the accordance of civil
rights to LGBT individuals,
particularly in societies in which
the majority hold opinions which
are not conciliatory towards the
LGBT community.
This is a mistake.
It is undeniable that arguments
focusing on “morally-neutral”
values would carry much weight
in countries which are committed
to liberalism, and have these
commitments enshrined in their
constitution. However, As MP
Thio Li-Ann rightly pointed out in
her parliamentary speech in 2007
on the repealing of Section 377A,
Singapore does not refrain from
passing normative judgments
through legislation on the basis
of a particular conception of the
good precisely because the state
has never sought to emulate
wholesale the liberal democracy
of the Western nations. Hence,

within the Singapore context, it
is misguided for pro-LGBT rights
supporters to continue to appeal
to the separation of morality and
the law.

“

SINGAPORE DOES
NOT REFRAIN
FROM PASSING
NORMATIVE JUDGMENTS”

A perfunctory review of debates
over LGBT rights in other
countries reveals a common
pattern in argumentation for both
sides of the camp. More often
than not, the pro-LGBT rights
camp appeals to “morally-neutral”
values of autonomy, equality,
tolerance, and privacy, while the
conservative camp appeals to
moral beliefs which arise out of
their religious beliefs and/or social
conservatism.
Given the almost adamant liberal
avoidance of broaching the issue
of the morality of homosexuality,
it is understandable that one
would come to think that
homosexuality cannot be justified,
or would have a weaker case

to make if it appealed on moral
grounds.
This avoidance may be a conscious
decision of the liberal camp, which
might fear that they would lose
out in the public debate over the
morality of homosexuality—a
fear which is perhaps not entirely
unfounded, as literal readings
of most religious texts and
traditional conservative values
view homosexual conduct as
morally impermissible or at least
severely frowned upon. In spite
of this, I argue that it would be
erroneous for the liberal camp to
cede the moral high ground to the
social conservatives.
Prima facie, there is no obvious
reason why engaging in
consensual, sexual relations with
a member of the same gender
is less moral than engaging in
a heterosexual one. To argue
that the decriminalisation of
homosexuality would be the
catalyst which sets us down
a slippery slope of morality,
and open the moral floodgates
safeguarding us from indisputably
immoral acts like bestiality,
paedophilia and consensual