Scoring on the Sacrifice Fly

“The better the gambler, the worse the man“. – Publius Syrus, Latin writer from the first century B.C.

Two weeks ago I took a look at how often runners score from third base on fly balls caught by outfielders. What I found was that:

Runners are sent around 80% of the time when the ball is caught by a corner outfielder and almost 90% of the time when caught by the center fielder

In these opportunities runners score a whopping 96% of the time overall with just a 2% variance when there is one out (95%) versus when there are none (97%)

It makes almost no difference whether there is zero or one out when the ball is hit since third base coaches hold the runner just 2% more often with nobody out than with one

I concluded that article by taking a look at who caught those fly balls in order to see if it told us anything about the quality or reputation of that arm. What I found was that those outfielders with reportedly better arms tend to be more intimidating, resulting in fewer chances taken by opposing third base coaches.

Well, since I showed data for fielders, it’s only right (and because inquiring minds wanted to know) that I do the same for the base runners. However, this time I expanded the data set to include the six-year period of 2000-2005; the previous article’s data set only spanned the previous three years.

Know When to Hold ‘Em

First let’s take a look at those runners who were held least often when perched on third base in a sacrifice fly opportunity.

This list includes all those players with 10 or more opportunities who were sent every time the ball was hit to center. What you should notice is that individual players, even over a six-year stretch, don’t get that many opportunities. That means that small sample size caveats apply. You’ll also note that the list contains both players like Jimmy Rollins, Kenny Lofton and Brian Roberts who are generally considered fast and some who are of average speed like Albert Pujols, Cliff Floyd and Scott Rolen. This probably indicates that this list is for the most part determined by opportunity than actual base running skill.

The following list shows those who were sent every time when the ball was hit to one of the corner outfield positions.

In the second table, and to a smaller extent in the first, we begin to see that those runners who have a bit of trouble getting down the line are likely not being sent home as often. Carlos Delgado, for example, earned the distinction of being the worst base runner in the past six years according to my base running framework as mentioned in The Hardball Times Baseball Annual 2006.

Know When to Run

But probably more interesting are leaders and trailers in success percentage—that is, the percentage of times they scored when sent. Those players with more than 15 opportunities in center and 20 at the corners who were never caught include:

The first list here is interesting because it is really a mixed bag with Jay Payton and Fred McGriff together. Presumably the reason for this is more related to the bad fortune of these players in running when the outfielder makes a perfect throw. The second list, however, is filled with notoriously slow runners.

Incidentally Melvin Mora led the majors by getting nabbed five times at the plate (four times from a corner outfielder and once from a center fielder) during the six-year period.

The Dealin’s Done

So what, if anything, do all these lists tell us? Because of the small sample sizes it’s not wise to try and draw too many conclusions. But with that said, we might infer the following:

Faster runners are not given the go-ahead to try and score any more often than average runners. In other words, third base coaches see little additional risk in sending runners who are of average speed. This makes sense given the high success rate.

Third base coaches don’t appear to take running speed into consideration when the ball is hit to center field, possibly because the throw is longer, allowing even a slow runner to score without much additional risk.

However, coaches do hold runners much more often who have below-average speed when the ball is caught by a corner outfielder.

While fast runners score at a high rate no matter where the ball is hit, slow runners (even with fewer opportunities) are the ones being nabbed when the ball is in the hands of a corner outfielder.

When the ball is hit to center, the results are more random, indicating that runners caught in those situations are probably unlucky

To finish let me reiterate one of the points I made in the previous article with a different twist. The very high success rates on sacrifice flies are an indication that coaches probaby don’t send runners as often as they should. I mentioned in the previous article that this might be chalked up to the human propensity to be risk averse. However, in thinking it over I believe there may also be a more subtle reason as well.

What if bang-bang plays at the plate on sacrifice fly opportunities are relatively rare? Instead, what if most opportunities result in the runner being safe by a mile or getting nailed by 10 feet? If that were the case, and I believe you can make an argument that it is despite only having anecdotal evidence, then those failures would be better remembered and carry an increased weight in the minds of the fans, the media, the manager and maybe even the third base coach himself. The end result is a coach who is not much of a gambler.