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Recently, Dan Szymborski of Fangraphs wrote an article handicapping the MVP award race in both leagues. His piece used his predictive modeling to determine the odds of each player winning the award. Each league appears to be a very tight race with plenty of season left for someone to pull away; however, with much more discussion surrounding the awards races since the Trade Deadline has passed, I thought it would be an interesting topic to dive into. While this article will only look at the NL field, a second piece will analyze the hotly contested AL MVP race as well.

The list of NL MVP candidates with their odds of winning according to Szymborski is shown below:

I will not discuss every player on the above list because they are not all viable candidates or particularly interesting; nevertheless, this is a packed list. While Szymborski’s projections make it appear as though Nolan Arenado is the clear favorite, there is plenty of time for that to change and plenty of contenders to change that. I will cover the case of the 5 players I find most interesting and expect to be prominent in the discussion come the end of the season and I will discuss them in the order they appear in Szymborski’s projections.

Nolan Arenado, Colorado Rockies

Pros:

While on August 8th Arenado captured over 30% of the odds to win the NL MVP, he did not lead the league in a single Triple Crown category. While I am not a huge proponent of using batting average, RBI and Home Runs to evaluate hitters, they are significant statistics in the minds of many MVP voters. Despite not leading the league in many major statistics, Arenado has posted strong numbers across the board, both offensively and defensively, including a league leading .410 wOBA and his typically elite defense.

Cons:

What will hold Arenado back most is likely his home/road splits, especially since he calls Coors Field home. While his 125 wRC+ on the road pegs him as 25% above average as a hitter on the road, it is a far cry from his 164 wRC+ at Coors. This will likely weigh heavily on the minds of many voters as the field of candidates is very crowded.

Matt Carpenter, St. Louis Cardinals

Pros:

Carpenter’s resurgence since an uncharacteristically poor performance early in the season that saw him hit .140 through May 15th has been well documented. Despite his immense struggles early, he currently leads the league in home runs and the Cardinals are now squarely in contention, which improves his chances of receiving MVP votes for his performance. To further boost his case, Carpenter currently leads the NL in WAR and wRC+ and has led all of baseball in wRC+ since May 16th.

Cons:

Carpenter will likely be held back by his low RBI total and the reputation that he is a below-average defender, who has played 1st base too often to receive much positive contribution for his defense. While I would not go as far as to argue Carpenter is the superior defender to Arenado, he has posted 5 DRS more than Arenado this season in a smaller time, which goes to show that the difference may not be as big as we think.

Freddie Freeman, Atlanta Braves

Pros:

Freeman’s candidacy will likely benefit from the surprise success of his team, as few predicted the Braves to be in 1st place in the middle of August. Regardless of the success of his club, Freeman has put together an MVP-caliber season. His .320/.400/.536 slash line is incredibly impressive and good for the second-best wRC+ in the NL this season.

Cons:

Despite playing well defensively, Freeman will likely be brought down by the fact he is strictly a first baseman. He will also be hurt because his home run totals are behind those of the other top hitters as is his RBI total.

Javier Baez, Chicago Cubs

Pros:

Baez may be the most polarizing candidate of the bunch, as he does not stand out in any one area of the game, but does very well in each and does it with flair. Baez leads the league in RBI, so I guess he does stand out in one category, but I am not particularly keen on evaluating hitters on their RBI production, but some voters do place special emphasis on the stat. Being on the best team in the NL will certainly boost his case, as will playing strong defense at multiple infield positions.

Cons:

He’ll be held back by his low OBP and a wRC+ that does not rank on par with the other candidates. His case may also be dampened by the fact he sits nearly a full win behind Carpenter in WAR for the NL lead in position player WAR, which does not support the argument that the sum of his parts is greater than the production of other NL players.

Max Scherzer, Washington Nationals

Pros:

Can a pitcher win the MVP and not the Cy Young? I highly doubt it, but Max Scherzer certainly deserves to be in this discussion. He leads the NL in WAR and has been doing it both as a pitcher and as a hitter. While deGrom leads the NL in pitching WAR, Scherzer has accrued 0.8 WAR as hitter with a wRC+ of 75, which is 5th among pitchers with at least 10 PAs. And of course, as a pitcher, Scherzer leads the NL in innings pitched and K/9, while he is second in ERA to the aforementioned deGrom.

Cons:

The obvious challenge Scherzer must overcome is the bias against pitchers in the MVP race, especially pitchers on a non-playoff team. It is also highly unlikely many voters even look at Scherzer’s hitting stats, so his candidacy is likely based purely on his pitching metrics, which likely won’t be enough to propel him to an MVP award.

My Pick:

If the season ended today, I would cast my vote for Max Scherzer, which is certainly a unique position, especially since he wouldn’t be my pick for the NL Cy Young award. I may just be picking him in hopes of seeing a pitcher win the MVP and not the Cy Young; however it is much more likely that Scherzer brings home the Cy Young and not the MVP. Clearly, I am not worried about voting for a pitcher for MVP and most of that is due to a lack of another standout candidate at the moment and the performance on both sides of the ball by Scherzer.

My Prediction:

While I would vote for Scherzer, many others would not have him at the top of their ballot, especially when he may not even be the best pitcher in his own league. My prediction is that Matt Carpenter will be the one to win the NL MVP award. Carpenter continues to improve his case with the longest active on-base streak in the game at 32 games and the NL lead in home runs and wRC+. While his defensive reputation could lessen his appeal to some voters, he has been the best hitter in the league by a large margin and the defensive metrics this season do not support the narrative that he is a below-average defender. As the Cardinals continue to force their way back into the playoff picture, Carpenter’s case continues to strengthen.

On May 21st, Jeff Sullivan of Fangraphs wrote about the unusual case of Jordan Hicks. Hicks is a 21-year-old rookie relief pitcher for the St. Louis Cardinals, who made the incredible jump from High-A ball in 2017 to the MLB following Spring Training. Working exclusively out of the bullpen for the Cardinals, Hicks has led MLB pitchers in fastball velocity, surpassing Aroldis Chapman as MLB’s premier fastball pitcher.

Although he possessed elite velocity, he struggled to strike batters out at the MLB level. In fact, as of May 21st, Hicks had walked more batters than he had struck out through his first 22 Big League innings. His -7.4 K-BB% was second-worst in the MLB ahead of only his teammate, Greg Holland. Among pitchers with at least 20 innings pitched, his K% was second-lowest in the league, at 9.5%.

Despite his lack of whiffs, Hicks boasted a 2.05 ERA; however, the outlook on his performance was not as appealing, as his peripherals included a 4.87 FIP and an unsightly 6.05 xFIP. While it was tempting to argue Hicks’s impressive velo and sinker movement were generating enough weak contact to make up for the lack of strikeouts and high walk rate, he ranked in just the 16th percentile in terms of xwOBA against, which determines what a pitcher’s wOBA against should be based on the quality of contact against. This did not support the belief that he is an elite contact-manager; instead, it suggested he had been very lucky to that point in the season.

Towards the end of his article, Sullivan wrote that Hicks’s luck would run out, unless he improves. It appears that Hicks has accepted Sullivan’s challenge and has not only begun striking batters out at an elite pace, he has also vastly improved his walk rate, which is a statistic that has plagued him all the way back to his Minor League days.

Since Sullivan published his article, Hicks has been baseball’s best reliever and leads MLB relievers in FIP and ranks second in K-BB% after increasing his K% by nearly 31% and still managing to cut his BB% to less than half of its previous rate. His recent increase in strikeouts is due in large part to the success of his slider. Hicks’s slider generated swings and misses just 5.45% of the time in April; however, that number increased to 22.5% in May and sits at over 50% in June. While it is possible these improvements are merely luck in a small sample, Hicks has made tangible adjustments to the pitch, as he as sharpened the pitch by increasing its velo and shortening its break. The harder and shorter slider has baffled hitters thus far and is likely to continue to do so. His improved slider has allowed him to command the strike zone better and given him a genuine put-away pitch.

In addition to improving his strikeout and walk numbers, Hicks has also vastly improved his xwOBA against, which now ranks in the top half of the league for the entire season. His contact-management skills may be best exemplified in his ability to miss barrels, as he has been barreled just once, which trails only Adam Cimber among pitchers with at least 80 batted ball occurrences.

All of his improvements should be taken with a grain of salt, as they have occurred for just 13 innings. However, his season statistics are trending in the right direction and carry much stronger peripherals through his full 35 innings than they did through his first 22 innings. He now boasts a respectable 19.7% strikeout rate that is on the rise and has maintained his ERA at 2.06, while dropping his FIP to 14% better than league average from 24% worse than league average through his first 22 innings.

While Sullivan found Hicks interesting because of his lack of strikeouts in spite of leading the league in velo, Hicks is now interesting for his quick and remarkable adjustment at the game’s highest level. It will be important to see how the league adjusts to Hicks’s newfound ability to command the strike zone and miss bats with his slider.

The St. Louis Cardinals are in the midst of a very underwhelming offseason. This statement is not really controversial. The Cardinals reportedly entered this offseason with more financial might than they have had in any previous offseason, thanks to their new television contract. Despite their increased wealth, the Cardinals have failed to improve their roster for 2016. They have whiffed in their attempts to add star players David Price and Jason Heyward and have lost significant pieces from their 100-win ball club of 2015. Beyond losing Heyward, the Cardinals will compete in 2016 without John Lackey and Lance Lynn, two of their top starters a year ago. Even with these significant losses, the Cardinals’ acquisitions have been underwhelming, with Jedd Gyorko, Brayan Pena and Jonathon Broxton constituting all of the Major League talent the club has added this offseason. Their lack of impact acquisitions isn’t from a lack of trying, as their offer to David Price was the second richest he received and their offer to Heyward exceeded $200 Million. Regardless, they signed neither of these players and are now potentially heading into the 2016 season with a significantly less talented roster, so how can they salvage their offseason?

For many people, the next logical move after missing on the top free agents is to move to the next tier of the market and maybe spread the money around to multiple players. This especially appears like an ideal next step for the Cardinals because this year’s class of free agents is very deep. However, this Cardinals roster does not have many holes to fill, just right field or first base and a starting pitcher position remain open for upgrades. The top position player free agents remaining don’t fit these needs for a right fielder or first baseman. The remaining outfielders all profile as left fielders, which hinders the Cardinals ability to add them because Matt Holliday has that position locked down for at least one more season. Chris Davis certainly seems like an ideal match for the Cardinals because he can take over first base and bring 40-homer power to a lineup starving for home runs. However, Davis has already turned down a 7-year contract worth upwards of $150 Million. This commitment isn’t beyond the Cardinals’ means, but they are known for being very prudent with their money and as Dave Cameron of Fangraphs pointed out, Chris Davis is likely to be a very poor investment due to how his one-dimensional skill set typically ages.

The market for starting pitchers, on the other hand, may be a better match with what the Cardinals are seeking, but it lacks any real impact arms. While solid mid-rotation arms like Mike Leake, Wei-Yin Chen and Scott Kazmir are still available, the Cardinals may not feel compelled to spend around $15 million per year on an extended contract for a marginal upgrade over their current options for a 5th starter.

The Cardinals’ next option beyond the free agent market is to turn to the trade market. The Cardinals are reportedly discussing a deal with the Tampa Bay Rays for a starting pitcher, likely Jake Odorizzi. They could also engage the Indians on a trade for one of their young hurlers: Carlos Carrasco, Danny Salazar or Trevor Bauer. However, the increased price of pitching on the free agent market has driven up the cost of talent necessary to acquire a cost-controlled starter, like the ones above. The Indians are willing to trade from their rotation, but only if the return includes young, MLB ready position players. With the Cardinals looking to augment their offense as well, this trade scenario doesn’t matchup too well. Likewise, a trade for a quality outfielder, such as one of the Rockies’ starters Carlos Gonzalez, Corey Dickerson or Charlie Blackmon, will likely cost a young, MLB ready pitcher. Even if the Cardinals could find a trade partner that was seeking prospects, their system lacks elite prospects, barring Alex Reyes, who is near untouchable in trades. The Redbirds’ system does have plenty of depth, which leaves the door open for a trade, just not a very impactful one.

The best way to salvage this offseason may not involve significant forays into the free agent market or even the trade market, instead the Cardinals could use their increased financial might to extend some of their budding young stars. Locking in a few of their top young players may not improve their 2016 roster, but they may be able to contend without significant upgrades, as they are coming off a 100-win campaign and still project as 5th best team in the NL. While Heyward pointed to the Cardinals’ aging core as a primary reason for leaving, the Cardinals still boast an impressive collection of talented young players, and as I mentioned earlier they have a deep farm system. If the Cardinals can lock up a few of their key youngsters, namely Michael Wacha, Carlos Martinez and Trevor Rosenthal, they can give themselves some cost-certainty moving forward and potentially lower their future costs. This will free them up to be aggressive in free agency again in an offseason or two. Extensions carry plenty of risk, especially when they involve pitchers and pitchers that have injuries in their recent past. The benefits of these extensions can outweigh the potential costs, especially since salaries for pitchers on the open market are growing much faster than those of position players. By guaranteeing the money ahead of free agency, the club can limit the overall cost of signing the player and certainly lower the amount of money due to the player in the future by paying more money up front, which makes perfect sense for the Cardinals because they have plenty of money to spend now.

So, what might the extensions for Rosenthal, Wacha and Martinez look like?

Rosenthal: 4 years, $38 Million + 1 club option for $13 Million

Rosenthal’s best comp is Craig Kimbrel’s extension from 2014. Kimbrel’s deal awards him $42 Million over 4 years with a club option valued at $13 Million. Rosenthal may not be as dominant as Kimbrel was when he signed, but he has the same amount of service time and has racked up plenty of saves to get a major payday through the arbitration process. Shutdown relievers are en vogue right now, so the cost to acquire control of two of his free agent years will be costly. However, relievers are also known to be quite volatile, so Rosenthal should be interested in locking in a significant guarantee, while he is both healthy and effective.

Wacha: 5 years, $37.5 Million + 1 club option for $15 Million

Wacha has just over 2 years of service, which means he is still one year away from arbitration and 4 years from free agency. His best comps include Yovani Gallardo, Jon Lester and Ricky Romero. Each of these starters signed for right around $30 Million over 5 years. While each pitcher had similar, if not slightly better, track records than Wacha, their extensions are a bit outdated as the price for starting pitchers has skyrocketed recently, so Wacha’s extension will have to adjust for this. What will likely keep Wacha’s extension below $40 Million is his distance from free agency, previous injury to his throwing arm and the fact that arbitration is slow to correct itself. The last point means that while free agent pitchers are receiving more money, pitchers going to arbitration have not seen as substantial increases in salary. Wacha’s rare shoulder injury in 2014 will likely motivate him to sacrifice two years of free agency in exchange for guaranteed money. The Cardinals will certainly consider Wacha’s health when discussing an extension, but it is important they lock Wacha in before he reaches free agency and sees his salary climb even further.

Martinez: 5 years, $35 Million + 1 club option for $15

Martinez has the same service time as Wacha, but a different case in his extension negotiations because he has only one full season as a starter under his belt. He may lack the same experience in the rotation as Wacha, but his one season in the rotation bested any of Wacha’s single seasons. Martinez is also considered to have a higher ceiling compared to Wacha, so his extension will have to consider the likelihood that his performance continues to top that of Wacha. Similarly, to Wacha, Martinez recently had a shoulder injury that prematurely ended his season, which may motivate him to give up to free agent years in order to gain financial security now.

Extending these budding stars may not improve the 2016 club, but it will prepare them to further improve the roster in the coming years by providing them cost-certainty. The 2016 roster likely doesn’t need a major addition to begin with; adding Heyward or Price would have been beneficial, but not essential. As always, the Cardinals have someone within the organization ready to step up. They should still look to augment this roster, but with more modest additions. If they can convince Mark Buehrle to play one last year before retirement, they can add to their rotation and give themselves more pitching depth in case any of their starters go down with injuries. If they are willing to spend more money, Scott Kazmir seems like a good fit if they can get him on a 3-year deal with an Average Annual Value under $15 Million. On the offensive side, they can sign Steve Pearce to a cheap 2-year deal to platoon with Matt Adams at first base and maybe Pearce will rediscover the magic he had in 2014. The Cardinals may not be able to sign each of these players to an extension because not every player is interested in giving away free agent years and not every player is worthy of a risky extension. However, putting their extra money towards locking in their young core and putting less of it into the free agent market is a better move than spending significant money on players that are not great fits for their club. The Cardinals dealt with arguably the worst injuries of any club last year and were still able to reach the 100-win plateau, so I don’t think it’s accurate to assume they have to force additions on their roster in order to succeed in 2016. While Heyward feels the club’s core is nearing the end of its run, the Cardinals have anther core ready to establish itself, just as they always do. They should use this offseason to begin ensuring their core of tomorrow will stay together for a long time to come.

Early this past offseason, the St. Louis Cardinals and Atlanta Braves agreed to a blockbuster trade that sent Shelby Miller and prospect Tyrell Jenkins to the Braves in exchange for Jason Heyward and Jordan Walden. As with many big trades, this one has been continuously analyzed to determine who is the “winner” of the trade. However, this article will not perpetuate this trend because it seems pretty clear that the Braves will receive the most value from this trade, not because Heyward hasn’t become the offensive threat many hoped for, but because Shelby Miller has transformed himself as a pitcher and come back strong from a weak sophomore campaign. Instead, this post will look at whether the Cardinals made the right decision to trade Shelby Miller over Carlos Martinez, who was the Braves’ preferred choice in the trade. Both pitchers are enjoying breakout seasons, but which one has the brighter future?

Name

IP

K/9

BB/9

HR/9

GB%

HR/FB

ERA

FIP

xFIP

WAR

Martinez

107.1

9.48

3.61

0.84

56.0%

14.7%

2.52

3.46

3.13

1.5

Miller

113.2

7.52

2.77

0.48

50.2%

5.9%

2.38

3.09

3.64

2.3

The above graph displays each pitcher’s numbers so far in 2015.

The Case For Shelby Miller

I did not have much faith in Miller coming into the 2015 season. He was coming off a down 2014, in which he struggled to generate swings and misses and battled control issues all year. He was still young, however, just 24-years-old, so he still had time to develop into a more complete pitcher, rather than the thrower he seemed to be in 2014. I did not see anything close to Miller’s remarkable turnaround coming; he has become a completely different pitcher. During his time in St. Louis, Miller was a fly-ball pitcher with swing-and-miss stuff, but he struggled to consistently generate the whiffs expected with such great stuff. In half a season with Atlanta, Miller has moved into the league’s top-25 in GB%, after ranking in the bottom-20 last season. He has done this while also improving both his strikeout and walk rates. Here is a graph of Miller’s 2014 statistics compared with his numbers this season.

Year

IP

K/9

BB/9

HR/9

GB%

HR/FB

ERA

FIP

xFIP

WAR

2014

183

6.25

3.59

1.08

39.9%

9.9%

3.74

4.54

4.47

.5

2015

113.2

7.52

2.77

0.48

50.2%

5.9%

2.38

3.09

3.64

2.3

Is Miller’s turnaround legitimate or has his success this season been a fluke? While Miller is not likely to sustain an ERA in the low-2s moving forward, his groundball and strikeout numbers seem genuine. That is because these statistical improvements have been accompanied by adjustments in Miller’s repertoire, as he has adopted both a sinker and a cutter that have changed his results. When Miller was with the Cardinals, he featured a fourseam fastball that reached the mid-90s and a curveball that showed flashes of plus, but lacked consistency. This year, however, Miller has used his sinker more frequently than his straight fastball and has implemented his cutter 20% of time, compared to just 6% previously. These two pitches have both contributed to Miller’s new groundball tendencies and have even improved his fourseam fastball, which now generates more swinging strikes than last season.

The best predictors for a pitcher’s future success are strikeouts, walks and home runs and Miller has developed an excellent approach for controlling these three outcomes. He has improved his command and refined his repertoire to increase his groundball rate while also generating more swings and misses.

While Shelby Miller has controlled the three most important outcomes for a pitcher very well, Carlos Martinez has mastered just one of the three. Martinez is among the NL leaders in strikeouts, but he has struggled to limit walks and homeruns, which could catch up to him moving forward. Miller’s ability to control those outcomes better than Martinez is what gives him a brighter outlook.

The Case For Carlos Martinez

While Miller’s transformation is very impressive and noteworthy, it does not match what Martinez has consistently produced. He has maintained a strong strikeout rate throughout his career and even seen it increase each season. He has coupled his healthy strikeout numbers with impressive groundball rates, with each season’s GB% topping Miller’s career best groundball rate.

Name

IP

K/9

BB/9

HR/9

GB%

HR/FB

ERA

FIP

xFIP

WAR

Martinez

225

8.84

3.52

0.60

53.5%

9.3%

3.44

3.30

3.38

3.1

Miller

483.2

7.57

3.14

0.89

41.9%

9.0%

3.11

3.81

3.98

5.7

Above is the career numbers for both Martinez and Miller.

Miller has the career advantage in ERA, but Martinez trumps Miller in his peripheral statistics, such as FIP and xFIP, which are both better predictors of future performance because they only consider strikeouts, walks and home runs. However, looking at Miller’s career numbers isn’t entirely fair after we concluded his adjustments this year are likely to last. Looking strictly at this season, Martinez again bests Miller in xFIP, but not FIP. This is because Martinez has been plagued by an abnormally high HR/FB, which does not correlate well year-to-year, so he can expect to see that figure regress. Martinez’s advantage in xFIP is noteworthy because it corrects for the random variation of a pitcher’s HR/FB rate and is better at analyzing a pitcher’s true talent level.

The other positive for Martinez is his age and experience, as he is one year younger and also has one more year of team control, which means he will not reach free agency for another year after Miller. Even if you believe that Miller has a slight talent advantage, Martinez’s extra year of control makes him a more valuable player for now and the future. In just his first season as a full-time starting pitcher, Martinez compares very favorably with Miller, who is already in his 3rd season as a starter. While Miller’s improvements this season put each of them on the same level, Martinez is making adjustments of his own that will elevate him beyond their current level. In an effort to eliminate his platoon splits against left-handed batters, Martinez has increased his usage of his changeup, which he rarely featured out of the bullpen, but has now become an excellent pitch for him against lefties.

Martinez has been a very raw talent ever since his initial promotion to the Majors, but has shown tremendous improvements in his first season as a starter. Not only has Martinez’s pitch selection improved, but his composure and mentality on the mound have also come a long way from his days as a reliever. Martinez appears to have really blossomed under the mentorship of catcher Yadier Molina and carries himself with the confidence of a rising star. His improved demeanor on the mound is certainly a positive, but it is his improved pitch selection and consistent success through his time in the Majors that make him the more valuable of the two pitchers moving forward.

Conclusion

The argument can certainly be made that either of these two young pitchers is more valuable, and either starter you choose will bring enormous value. I favor Carlos Martinez to Shelby Miller because I believe his strikeout numbers and ability to miss bats will last long into his career. He has also consistently generated groundballs at a rate among the league leaders. With his propensity to generate groundballs, Martinez is more likely to avoid being plagued by home runs. Miller has certainly shown better control than Martinez, but Martinez looks better at generating strikeouts and limiting home runs, which will lessen the impact of his higher walk rate. Another factor in Martinez’s favor is his extra year of team control, which lessens his cost to his club and gives him more value, with all else equal. Miller’s improvements have been quick and impressive and I do believe they will last, but Martinez still has more value moving forward.

The excitement that accompanies long-term free agent contracts (8-10 years in length) is followed almost immediately by immense scrutiny. These lengthy deals that buyout at least eight years of free agency are associated with significant risk, and it is usually assumed that the player will provide very little value in the last few years of the contract. Despite the high chance that the team will have a devastating amount of money allocated to an unproductive player, we are seeing more and more players signed to these long contracts. While I have mentioned that I consider these long-term free agent contracts to last a minimum of 8 years, they do not need to be signed on the free agent market. Rather, these deals can be extensions signed prior to free agency, but they must buyout at least 8 years of the player’s free agency. This would not include a player like Freddie Freeman, who signed an 8-year contract after 3 seasons in the Big Leagues, which means his contract only buys out 5 years of free agency. I make this distinction because these early career extensions are usually less money and also a different type of risk, as you pay for less of a known quantity.

What is making teams increasingly willing to pay tens of millions of dollars a year for more than 8 years of free agency? For starters, the clubs must guarantee something in the neighborhood of 8 years to secure a superstar talent in free agency these days. With the amount of money in the game continuing to grow, it reasons that clubs expect this growth to continue and make their payments in the last few years of the deal less substantial in regards to their total payroll. Beyond why these deals are becoming more common, we need to know how completed contracts turned out and the current outlook for ongoing contracts. This is important because it does not appear these long-term deals are going away, actually, we are likely to see more in the very near future with players like Jason Heyward and Ian Desmond set to hit the open market following the 2015 season.

Teams looking for one major addition to push them over the top for the next few seasons are more likely to justify a deal like this as a way to win in the short term, while not entirely ruining their future. After all, the player should provide at least 5-6 years of value before they are not a key contributor for the club, and in some cases even more. This gives the team enough time to develop young talent to arrive just as the star becomes extremely overpaid, so they can remain competitive. However, this is rarely what happens, as teams choose to kick the can further down the road and remain in win-now mode, which is not a bad strategy when you win, but what about when you lose?

The Angels can attest that it puts incredible strain on the farm system without improving the Major League roster enough to reach the Postseason. While they finally made it to the Playoffs in 2014 with the best record in baseball, they accomplished this feat two years after they planned. Despite significant free agent expenditures for Albert Pujols (2012) and Josh Hamilton (2013), the Angels did not make it beyond the regular season until 2014. Baseball Prospectus ranked the Angels’ farm system as the weakest of all clubs for the second straight season heading into 2014. Sacrificing draft picks for star free agents and trading top prospects for Major League improvements failed to help the Angels’ efforts in 2012 and 2013, although it helped them for 2014, they have paid a steep price. Where Pujols should have been the star to anchor the Angels roster, he led to the need for more additions, further delaying the rebuilding of their farm system. This is not to say anything negative about the Angels, more to point out that these deals do not guarantee the club’s success, nor does it guarantee the player will remain a star even in the early years of the deal. The Angels are not the only team that has signed a player to a long-term contract and not immediately experienced success, but each team with such a contract was in win-now mode or nearing such a phase.

Another driving force behind these deals is the record amount of money flowing into the game. While many people would like to believe baseball’s popularity is fading, that just is not true. Revenues have been growing for some time, and in 2014, Major League Baseball saw a 13% increase giving them over $9 Billion in revenue for 2014. MLB’s new television deal with ESPN has led to each MLB team receiving over $25 Million per year, which is a $15 Million increase. This is money that MLB gives to every MLB team, but many teams are now receiving much more money from their own local television deals. This influx of cash has led to more spending in free agency, as teams have more money to spend now and also greater security moving forward. With teams like the Angels taking in over $150 Million per year from these deals, it is no surprise clubs are willing to guarantee long-term deals in order to land a superstar for the remainder of his prime. This is especially the case since inflation will likely make the payments in the later years of the deal less significant than they currently seem. Inflation will not make these deals bargains, but it certainly mitigates some of the risk associated with these types of deals, especially if the club expects increased revenue moving forward.

Successful: Among these 7 contracts, three can be considered clear successes for the team. These three are Derek Jeter’s 10-year, $189 Million pact, Scott Rolen’s 8-year, $90 Million contract and Alex Rodriguez’s 10-year, $252 Million deal. During the 9 years that Jeter would have been a free agent without his deal, he accumulated 46.2 fWAR, which comes out to $3.8M/Win. While this shows his deal was certainly successful when considered in its entirety, Jeter also never faded, always being a worthwhile investment. Scott Rolen’s 8-year deal proved to be even more valuable for the team, as his 35.3 WAR over the course of the contract, coming out to $2.5M/Win. Similar to Jeter, Rolen was a valuable player throughout the life of his deal. Finally, Alex Rodriguez’s first 10-year contract was also a very valuable signing for the team. While he opted out after only 7 years, we can still see how he performed in the three years following his opt out. If he had played the entirety of his deal, Rodriguez would have been worth $3.6M/Win and he also never faded during this time.

Even: Of the 7 concluded contracts, Manny Ramirez’s 8-year, $160 Million deal and Todd Helton’s 9-year, $141.5 Million deal were relatively fair for both the player and team. Both contracts ended with the player averaging $4.8M/Win, which is just about what a win was worth in 2008, according to Dave Cameron. Ramirez’s value faded slightly towards the end of his deal, as his defense deteriorated, but he did finish strong in 2008. Helton also lost some value, as he was about replacement level in 2 of his last 4 seasons, but did rebound each time, so he was not a complete waste of resources at any point.

Unsuccessful: The final two concluded deals have not been so team-friendly. Alfonso Soriano’s 8-year, $136 Million contract and Ken Griffey Jr.’s 9-year, $116.5 Million contract never lived up to the hype associated with such long-term deals. Soriano accumulated 19.6 WAR over the course of the deal, worth $6.9M/WAR, and was eventually released during his final season, as he struggled mightily to a 64 wRC+ through his first 67 games in 2014. Ken Griffey Jr.’s deal is about the worst-case scenario for how these deals can play out. Over the life of his contract, Griffey Jr. accumulated just 9.7 WAR, meaning each win cost more than $12 Million. However, even though his WAR was not impressive, he still carried a 118 wRC+, which may not merit such a significant deal, but he did provide offensive value throughout his deal.

Now let us look at how the ongoing contracts look moving forward. However, with the recent increase in popularity of these deals, many of them are far too early in the contract to make any meaningful conclusions. With that in mind, I will not classify 8 of these ongoing deals because they have not gone beyond two seasons, which is not enough time to gauge the deal’s progress. That leaves us with 6 deals that we can draw some conclusions from:

Successful: Only one of these 6 contracts can be considered a clear success. Tulowitzki’s 10-year, $157.8 Million deal from 2011 through 2020 bought out two non-free agent seasons of 2011 and 2012, so for this exercise, it is an 8-year, $144.1 Million deal beginning in 2013. While Tulowitzki has been hindered by injuries in the two seasons of this deal, he has still accumulated an amazing 10.5 WAR and he still looks to be in his prime. His deal expires around age 36, which means Tulowitzki should be a good bet to finish out this deal while still providing value in the final years. Even if he fades heavily at the end of the deal, he should make the overall investment worthwhile, as he only needs to be worth about 10 more WAR over the final 6 years of his extension in order to be worth about $7M/Win, which is right around market value.

Unsuccessful: I would deem the remaining five deals as unsuccessful or at least certainly looking like they will be by the time they expire. Unfortunately, Alex Rodriguez’s second 10-year deal did not go as smoothly as the first. Forgetting about his off-field issues, Rodriguez has still struggled to live up to his $275 Million contract, providing only one season of a WAR above 4, and only 4 seasons as an above average player. Albert Pujols’s 10-year, $240 Million deal may be even worse, as he has never resembled even the worst form he displayed as a Cardinal. This deal will be very ugly by the end of it. Prince Fielder’s 9-year, $214 Million contract has also gone poorly through its first 3 seasons and is likely to remain a rather poor contract, as he was always expected to age poorly, but now his early performance has not provided the value expected to make that worthwhile. Not quite as poor a deal as those above, but Mark Teixeira’s 8-year, $180 Million deal is not looking very good, as he has collapsed after 4 seasons that were about what you would expect from him. However, he no longer shows signs of the player he once was and the final two years of this deal are likely to be as ugly as the two preceding years, when he combined for 0.6 WAR. The final long-term deal that has not worked out so well for the signing team is Joe Mauer’s 8-year, $184 Million contract. He has the best chance of these 5 players to make his deal at least a fair deal, but his shift from catcher to first base will make that quite the challenge. Mauer’s hit tool is not as impressive at a position that is flush with offensive threats, especially since he does not provide the power typical of a first baseman. With 4 years left on his deal, Mauer should be able to maintain his above-average hitting ability, so he will still provide value, but just not as much as was expected when he signed the deal as a catcher.

It is apparent that these long-term deals carry substantial risk and usually result in a winner and loser, but we already knew that. What these deals do show, however, is that it is not a guarantee that these deals always end poorly for the signing club. If the team is on the right spot on the win curve when they sign the player, then it is likely to make the struggles at the end more bearable, but only if he performs well early in the deal. One thing we can draw from this is that the best deals were those that ended around age 36, but those deals that lasted beyond age 38 were ill advised. Clearly this has to do with players fading less at age 36 than 38, but more importantly those deals expiring before age 38 also bought out better early years from the players. This is because the players are still likely in their primes at the beginning of the contract; however, if the deal extends beyond age 38, the player is likely leaving their prime at the time the contract begins.

With this in mind, I would not suggest signing any players to long-term contracts if they enter free agency at or after age 31. This is partly due to the fact that such a deal would then run into the dangerous age of 39 or later, but also because these players are typically exiting their prime, so they will not provide the value in the early part of the deal to justify paying heavily for little to no production at the end of the contract. These deals can only work if the player plays like a star early on in the deal, as is expected, so it is imperative that the team signs him when he is still in his prime. Another significant criteria for a deal is that the team is prepared to win during the early years of the deal, otherwise, such a deal can hinder a rebuild and actually be a waste of resources, even if the player is productive. We have seen this with Troy Tulowitzki’s deal, while it has been worthwhile by his performance, the club has not been competitive for some time and may now be willing to trade him, despite the immense value his deal has. If these criteria are met, then such a long-term contract is a sensible investment, as the benefits outweigh the risks. However, in order to have a winning team in the future, even with so much money going to a somewhat unproductive player, the club must build its farm system during the early and middle years of the deal in order to have cost-controlled talent on the field, since they may have limited funds.

The New Year cannot come soon enough for some players, who want nothing more than to turn the page on a disappointing 2014 campaign. With the new year just two days away and Opening Day less than 100 days away, it is appropriate that we look at the five players most primed to rebound from a down 2014 season. This list includes three veterans, who failed to reach their career norms last season and two youngsters that have yet to truly establish themselves in the Big Leagues. Each of these players has a very promising 2015 season ahead, which will make 2014 the exception, not the new normal.

Chris Davis

After two strong seasons from 2012-2013, Davis endured a very difficult 2014 season. After slashing .278/.350/.571 (Avg/Obp/Slg) from 2012-2013, Davis collapsed to a .196/.300/.404 slash line. On the field 2014 was tough enough, but Davis was also hit with a 25-game suspension with 17 games left in the season for using Amphetamines. Davis had been cleared to use Adderall in previous seasons, but not for 2014. However, this suspension is completely behind him and he has actually been cleared to use Adderall in 2015, so there is no concern over a longer suspension. While his K% is alarmingly high, that comes with the territory of being an elite power hitter and many of his other peripheral statistics point to a rebound in 2015. Davis’s BB% actually increased to a career high, which bodes well for his on-base abilities moving forward, but it also suggests that pitchers still feared Davis as a hitter. In fact, his .196 batting average was likely greatly influenced by a career low Batting Average on Balls In Play (BABIP) of .242. His career mark for BABIP is .320, so once that normalizes, Davis will soar above the Mendoza line and more resemble his 2012-2013 self. While Davis will not match his 2013 power numbers, he is likely to surpass his 2012 campaign, where he hit 33 home runs. Even in his down 2014, his ISO (Slugging Percentage – Batting Average) was not far off his 2012 ISO, which shows his power did not go anywhere.

Jay Bruce

Jay Bruce’s 2014 season was painful to watch, especially because it came seemingly out of nowhere. Beyond being painful to watch, it was also painful to play, as Bruce battled nagging knee issues throughout the season that contributed to his reduced production. However, there is no reason to believe this is how Bruce will perform moving forward, even if the knee injuries are not entirely to blame for his struggles. Throughout his 6-year career before 2014, Bruce had been one of the most consistent players in the league, averaging over 2.7 fWAR per season. During his disastrous 2014, Bruce’s Ground Ball% soared, while his Fly Ball% sank to a career low. This does not indicate a healthy power hitter, but rather someone who does not have their legs underneath them and must instead do their damage using their upper body. The Steamer projection system calls for Bruce to post a 1.4 WAR, which would be a 2.5 win improvement. However, I think Steamer is being too conservative in its projection because Bruce should be fully recovered from knee surgery before the 2015 season, which will allow him to return to his previous norms. I would project Bruce to post a season closer to 2011, when he played about average defense and slugged 32 home runs, en route to a .349 wOBA and a 3.0 fWAR.

Evan Longoria

Longoria probably does not fit with the rest of the players on this list because he actually turned in an above average campaign by most players’ standards, but not his own. His 3.4 fWAR would have been a career low, if not for his injury-shortened 2012 season. Despite this being the first unimpressive season in Longoria’s extraordinary career, many fans are concerned about his decline beginning well before his $100 Million extension starts in 2017. Longoria’s 2015 season will quell any concerns about his new extension, at least the first few years of the deal. The 29-year-old third baseman averaged over 6 wins per season for his first 6 Big League seasons, and is unlikely beginning his decline, in what should be the middle of his prime. Instead, Longo suffered from a poor batted ball profile in 2014, which should readjust to his norms and an unusually average season on defense. Longoria saw a slight uptick in his GB%, but more significantly his FB% dropped 4% and saw a 4% increase in Infield Fly Balls (IFFB). Both of these shifts suggest that his timing was off, which is a poor excuse for an entire season; however this is not something that persisted the entire season, as his FB% increased by 10% in the second half and his IFFB% decreased by nearly 4%. He will likely enter this season with his normal timing, which will help him reach his career offensive norms. Longoria also posted the lowest HR/FB rate of his career, which will not repeat itself, as that usually remains near a player’s career norms, so he should expect at least a 5% increase, which will significantly help his power output. On the defensive end, I do not put much weight in one season of fielding statistics, so I do not have any concern over his defense, since he grades out as a gold glove defender by any metric for his career. With improved timing and a normalized HR/FB rate, Longoria will put to rest any mentions of his decline.

Danny Salazar

Salazar differs from the players above, as he has yet to truly establish himself at the Major League level. He dominated during his 50 innings of work in 2013, striking out 11.25 batters per 9 innings. However, in his first chance at a full season, Salazar struggled mightily to match expectations. He finished 2014 with a 4.25 ERA across 110 innings, but his 3.52 FIP suggests he was better than his ERA indicates. But there are plenty of more reasons for optimism heading into 2015 and the Indians should expect a more similar performance to his 50-inning sample in 2013. Salazar is not going to strike out 11 batters per 9 innings again, but he does not need to. 2014 was a season of two halves for Salazar, as he cut his FIP from 4.71 in the first half to 2.83 in the second half, which fit with his ERA dropping more than 2 runs from the first half. The second half version of Salazar most closely resembles the real Danny Salazar, as in the first half he was plagued by an inflated BABIP of .369 and an enormous HR/FB rate of 14.8%. Once these things that are not entirely under his control normalized, Salazar thrived, which is what I expect him to continue in 2015. He should be able to carry over his impressive K/BB ratio of 2014 and he is unlikely to have a BABIP north .340 again, which will help keep his ERA closer to his FIP.

Carlos Martinez

Carlos Martinez is very similar to Salazar, in that he has yet to match expectations at the Big League level, but this will be his first opportunity at being a full-time starter. Even in his time stuck in purgatory between starting and relieving, Martinez’s talent has shined, but the results have not always matched what people have seen. In his 117 2/3 Major League innings, the righty has carried a 4.28 ERA, but a 3.15 FIP, which points to better results ahead, once his surface statistics match his peripherals. While Carlos Martinez has been hurt by an inflated BABIP of .336 for his career, but based on pitchers with a similar profile, that is not likely to persist. The 13 pitchers in 2014 with at least 8 K/9 and at least a 50% Ground ball rate average a BABIP of .293, which suggests that Martinez is likely to see improved batted ball results. One thing he can control is home runs and Martinez has been fantastic at stifling home runs, allowing just .38 HR/9 through his career, which bodes well for future success, especially since he can strike guys out. Martinez will need to limit his walks better, but even when he walked over 3.5 batters per 9 last year, he carried an FIP of 3.18, so if he is more lucky with balls in play, it should not be an issue. I think Martinez should excel in his first opportunity as a full-time starter, but I wouldn’t expect him to reach the 200-inning threshold, as he will need to build up his workload, but also because his high number of walks will drive up his pitch counts.

I expect Longoria to turn in the best season of the players on the list, which isn’t surprising as he is the only established star and the one coming off the best season. Jay Bruce is my pick for the largest improvement, because I believe his performance was heavily influenced by his knee injury, which should be behind him. Of the pitchers, I’d expect Martinez to turn in the best season because I believe in his incredible talent, but also because his profile of high strikeouts and groundballs bodes well for success.

With all of the exciting moves that have already happened this offseason, it is time to turn some attention to the coming season. Even with major stars left on the Free Agent market, such as Max Scherzer and James Shields, we can take a look at some players that do have a home. The following list includes 4 players coming off career best seasons and one coming off yet another very strong season. While each of these players is coming off a strong season, they are all due for significant regression from last year. While it is unlikely that these players would repeat their career best numbers, all of these players are going to see a large drop in production in 2015. However, it does not seem that every Major League team agrees, as three of these players have been traded this offseason, and another landed a 4-year, $68 million contract.

Alfredo Simon

The first player on this list is in for the toughest season ahead. Alfredo Simon enjoyed a very successful season in terms of traditional metrics, as he completed his first Major League season as a full-time starting pitcher. Simon was traded from the Cincinnati Reds to the Detroit Tigers in return for a young Major League shortstop and a 2013 1st round draft choice. The 33-year-old had a 15-10 record with the Reds supported by a 3.44 ERA, however, his peripherals tell a different story. Simon only had a 5.82 K/9, which contributed to his less than appealing FIP of 4.33. His strong ERA likely was not a mirage, but more a result of playing in front of the best defensive team in baseball, as the Reds ranked 1st in Defensive Runs Saved (DRS) with 67 last year. Unfortunately, Simon will now pitch in front of the 28th ranked defense of the Tigers, who totaled negative-67 DRS. The righty will also be moving to the American League, which will be another challenge for him, as he struggled during his 4-year stint with the Orioles before 2012. While he enjoyed a breakout campaign in 2014, Simon will likely finish this season with much worse numbers, as he will be pitching in front of a significantly lesser defense and in a much tougher league.

Mat Latos

The second player on this list is another Former Cincinnati Reds pitcher, who was just traded. Now a member of the Marlins, Latos contributed another successful season for the Reds in 2014, as he posted a 3.25 ERA over 102 1/3 innings while he battled numerous injuries. However, those injuries are a major cause for concern moving forward, especially because they had such a powerful impact on his velocity. His velocity also did not improve after he returned from his injuries, suggesting this could be a lasting result. Latos lost over 2 mph off his fastball from 2013, and while his ERA remained strong, his strikeout rate dropped to a career worst 6.51 K/9. His groundball rate also dropped nearly 8% from 2013, which is not a positive sign for a pitcher who struggles to strike batters out. Just like Simon, Latos is going to a worse defensive team, as the Marlins ranked 18th in DRS last season, which could hurt Latos quite a bit, especially if his strikeout rate remains below his career norms of around 8 K/9. Despite his consistent performance in the past, Latos will likely turn in a very disappointing season in 2015.

Dee Gordon

Dee Gordon broke out in a pretty big way for the Dodgers in 2014, as he posted a 3.1 fWAR while slashing .289/.326/.378 (Avg/Obp/Slg). However, prior to 2014, Gordon had a negative-0.9 fWAR. His entire game is predicated around his speed, as he is not a strong defender and has no power to speak of. 2014 was Gordon’s first season with an above average wRC+ and he still only reached 101, which is just 1% better than league average. However, what makes 2014 seem like an aberration rather than Gordon’s new normal, is that it was powered entire by his .346 BABIP. It is easy to believe that his speed is the reason for his inflated BABIP, but in his two previous seasons Gordon posted BABIPs of .281 and .292 respectively. Gordon’s already low walk rate also got even lower last year, which will be a more significant issue when his BABIP normalizes and needs other ways to reach base and utilize his only real weapon, his speed. If the Marlins are expecting a repeat performance from Gordon, (which they likely are because they gave up their top prospect in Andrew Heaney) then they are going to be very disappointed.

Victor Martinez

Unlike the above players, Martinez has not changed teams this offseason, thanks to the Tigers resigning him with a hefty $68 Million to play the next 4 years with them. What was so shocking about Martinez’s career season was that it came when he was 35 years old. He has always been a productive hitter, but in 2014, the DH turned into a real force in the middle of the lineup. In the past, he was more of an OBP machine with extra-base power, but he never reached 30 homers and hadn’t reached 20 since 2010. Martinez’s power made an appearance in 2014, however, as he mashed a career-high 32 homers, while improving in just about every other offensive statistic. More than just his age, it is unrealistic to expect Martinez’s newfound power to carry over into 2015, as he was helped by a career-best 16% HR/FB rate, which was more than his last two seasons combined. Martinez will still be a productive hitter in 2015, but he will not be the homerun threat he was in 2014, which makes him more of the average DH he was in 2011 when he accumulated 2.5 WAR.

Steve Pearce

The 31-year-old Pearce was one of the great stories of 2014, as he enjoyed an unexpected breakout from being nothing more than a bench player for the earlier parts of his career. And unlike most of the other players on this list, Pearce has not changed teams or landed a new big contract. Pearce posted a 4.9 fWAR after accumulating just 0.2 fWAR over his first 5 Major League seasons. Throughout his Minor League career, Pearce always posted strong On-Base numbers and has had strong walk rates in his Major League career, as well. However, his power in the Minor Leagues never translated to the Majors until 2014, when he slugged .556 and reached 21 homers in just over 100 games. However, Pearce’s power spike was largely aided by a HR/FB rate of 17.5%, which is more than his two previous seasons combined. He is not likely to regress too far from that rate, however, as he has made some mechanical adjustments that made him a much more impactful hitter against fastballs. After such an impressive breakout campaign, the league is likely to adjust to Pearce’s approach, which mainly involved mashing fastballs, especially those up in the zone. Pearce could be the next Jose Bautista, but it is more likely that this is an outlier season and he is now likely to turn in just league average or slightly better seasons. Once the league adjusts and his HR/FB rate normalizes, he will not be as much of a threat in the box, but he is still likely to remain productive at reaching base.

Mat Latos is likely in for the most significant drop from his expected performance, but he should still be able to be a league average starter, if healthy. Alfredo Simon will likely be the least productive of any of the players on the list, especially since he had less than inspiring peripherals in a more pitcher-friendly league. Of the above players, Steve Pearce is the most likely to match or come close to his 2014 performance.