06KIEV3185, UKRAINE: POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNIFIL FACE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KIEV 003185
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR PM, IO, EUR/UMB
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/16/2016
TAGS: MARRMOPSPRELLEUP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNIFIL FACE
TIMELINE AND AUTHORIZATION OBSTACLES
REF: STATE 134133
Classified By: Charge a.i., reason 1.4 (b,d)
¶1. (C) Summary. The Government of Ukraine (GOU) is actively
considering what contribution Ukraine might offer to the
expanded UNIFIL mission and has conducted consultations in
New York with UN Assistant Secretary General for Peacekeeping
Operations Annabi but faces an August 17 deadline from UN PKO
to provide an answer, deputy Foreign Minister Yuri Kostenko
told Charge August 16. GOU initial thinking has focused on
transport and logistical components. However, because of the
current August vacation break and a multi-step process for
authorizing and initiating any military unit deployment
overseas, including Presidential and parliamentary approval
and the need for unit preparation and training, it is
unlikely such an immediate decision will be forthcoming in
the next 24 hours to meet UN PKO's timeline.
¶2. (C) Comment: The Ukrainian MFA is more forward leaning in
attempting to make a serious offer to the UN solicitation
than several other key GOU components. The legacy of the UN
having curtailed Ukraine's UNIFIL contingent in 2005 and
canceled a planned Ukrainian deployment to the Golan Heights
mission after an audit found evidence of corruption by
several Ukrainian contingent commanders sent to UNIFIL in
2004, combined with what some in the GOU feel was UN SYG Kofi
Annan's rude treatment of President Yushchenko when
Yushchenko raised the issue in late 2005, may color Ukrainian
consideration of the force request; we do not know whether it
might affect UN PKO consideration of any Ukrainian offer to
return to UNIFIL. We have urged the GOU to consider taking
advantage of this opportunity to rejoin UNIFIL, put the
bitterness of the 2005 experience behind them, and move
forward. End Summary and Comment.
A Ukrainian contribution to UNIFIL?
-----------------------------------
¶3. (SBU) Charge delivered ref A's request for contributions
to the enhanced UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to
deputy Foreign Minister Yuri Kostenko and Ambassador-at-large
for the Middle East Oleksiy Rybak August 16, following a
series of previous discussions starting July 28 by EUR DAS
Kramer, Ambassador, and Charge with Foreign Minister
Tarasyuk, Acting Foreign Minister Maysmekul, Deputy FM
Veselovsky, Defense Minister Hrytsenko, and Acting Defense
Minister Polyakov.
¶4. (SBU) DFM Kostenko said that the GOU felt that it was very
important for Ukraine to be involved in the international
effort to stabilize the situation in Lebanon; the MFA had
issued a statement immediately after UN Security Council
Resolution 1701 passed supporting the resolution and the
expanded UNIFIL mission. The Ukrainian DCM at their UN
mission in New York had discussed force needs with UN ASG
Hedi Annabi August 15; the real challenge was that UN PKO
demanded a firm answer from Ukraine by August 17 at the
latest, combined with a readiness to commit to a field
deployment in the next 10-15 days.
¶5. (SBU) Acting FM Khandohiy and acting Defense Minister
Polyakov had discussed theoretical Ukrainian contributions
early August 16, said Kostenko. These included: an airmobile
battalion with rotary wing (helicopter) capability;
engineers; military police; and logistical support. There
were two significant problems, however: deployment
preparation time--the MoD said that the General Staff would
need two-three months to prepare units for deployment; and
the authorization process for deployments.
Authorizing deployments not simple, especially in August
--------------------------------------------- -----------
¶6. (C) DFM Kostenko expressed some frustration that some GOU
colleagues in the MOD and Presidential Secretariat had been
slow to react to the MFA's active press on the issue of a
potential UNIFIL contribution, which FM Tarasyuk initiated
the week of July 31 in the wake of EUR DAS Kramer's July 28
visit to Kyiv. On the one hand, the GOU would like to
participate and resume operations in Lebanon. On the other,
Ukrainian bureaucratic realities work against a quick
response in August: the Rada is out of session until
September 5; President Yushchenko is in Crimea on his annual
vacation; and the military has its prep time cycle built
around solicitation for volunteers to deploy.
¶7. (SBU) Ukraine's constitutionally-mandated decision and
KIEV 00003185 002 OF 002
authorization processes for an overseas military deployment
has four stages, most recently described by Defense Minister
Hrytsenko on an August 15 TV program about NATO aired by
Channel 5. The General Staff, MOD, and MFA first coordinate
details of a possible deployment; the National Security and
Defense Council in executive session (chaired by the
President) then would meet to discuss and approve the plan;
the President then must sign an
authorizing decree (ukaz);
and finally the Rada (parliament) must pass an authorizing
resolution.
¶8. (C) The MFA has brainstormed on possible workarounds. DFM
Veselovsky told DAS Kramer July 28 that personnel
deployments, as opposed to full unit deployments, did not
need a Rada authorizing resolution, only a Presidential
decree (note: this is the mechanism under which up to 50
Ukrainian staff officers currently work in Iraq), and a
personnel deployment should be possible within a month.
Kostenko asked whether the UNIFIL mandate under UNSCR 1701
had changed from UNIFIL's previous mandate; if the mandates
were close enough, unit deployments might be possible under
the previous Rada resolution. Kostenko noted to Charge that
the UN PKO tight deadline and the Ukrainian military
pre-deployment prep time appeared ultimately incompatible.
Bitter taste from UN action in 2005 lingers
-------------------------------------------
¶9. (C) Several conversations with Acting Defense Minister
Leonid Polyakov between August 10 and 15 revealed lingering
resentment of the way the UN curtailed the Ukrainian UNIFIL
deployment in 2005 and canceled the expected Ukrainian
deployment to the mission on the Golan Heights after a
mid-2005 audit uncovered evidence of corruption
(skimming/reselling fuel allotments) on the part of three
Ukrainian force commanders deployed to UNIFIL in 2004, prior
to the Orange Revolution. From the Ukrainian perspective,
the audit--which they feel was triggered by a tip-off by
someone working for the Russians intending to cause
embarrassment to President Yushchenko and Ukraine in the
aftermath of the Orange Revolution--uncovered roughly $10,000
in inappropriate actions over three months, but not enough
evidence for Ukrainian authorities to pursue prosecution.
¶10. (C) Notwithstanding Yushchenko and Defense Minister
Hrytsenko's pledges to attack corruption--Hrytsenko was the
most active minister in the new "orange" government which
came into office in 2005, sacking several dozen generals and
civilian ministry officials involved in corruption--Polyakov
claimed that UN SYG Annan had rudely dismissed Yushchenko's
personal plea in late 2005 to allow at least the Golan
Heights mission to go forward, suggesting Yushchenko fight
corruption in Ukraine rather than worrying about deployments.
Polyakov suggested that this negative experience continued
to color the General Staff's attitude to rejoining UNIFIL and
might affect the attitude of Yushchenko and the Presidential
Secretariat. He personally favored an increased Ukrainian
SIPDIS
deployment to Kosovo which could allow a country with troops
deployed there to reallocate to UNIFIL, but he said he would
work with the MFA to explore possibilities vis-a-vis UNIFIL.
¶11. (U) Visit Embassy Kiev's classified website at:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Gwaltney

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