United States v. Collins

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division

September 4, 2019

UNITED STATES OF AMERICAv.JOHN LEE COLLINS

ORDER

James
D. Whittemore, United States District Judge.

BEFORE
THE COURT is Defendant's Motion to Reduce
Sentence Pursuant to the First Step Act (Dkt. 213) and the
United States' Amended Response (Dkt. 217). Upon
consideration, Defendant's motion is DENIED, except that
his term of supervised release on Count One is reduced to 8
years.

The
First Step Act

The
First Step Act authorizes the court to “impose a
reduced sentence as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair
Sentencing Act of 2010 … were in effect at the time
the covered offense was committed.” First Step Act,
Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404(b). Under Section 404(a), a
“ ‘covered offense' means a violation of a
Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which
were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of
2010 ... that was committed before August 3, 2010.”
Defendant stands convicted of distribution of cocaine base
(Count One) and distribution of heroin (Count Two) (Dkt.
104). On May 26, 2000, his sentence was enhanced under 21
U.S.C. § 851(b) and he was sentenced as a career
offender to concurrent 360 month terms, with concurrent 10
(Count One) and 6 (Count Two) year terms of supervised
release (Id.). His sentence was affirmed (Dkt. 123).

Defendant's
conviction on Count One for distribution of cocaine base is a
“covered offense” as defined by Section 404 of
the First Step Act, and he is therefore eligible for a
sentence reduction. But his conviction on Count Two for
distribution of heroin is not a “covered
offense.”[1] The United States acknowledges that
Section 404 of the First Step Act lowered Defendant's
statutory penalty on Count One from 20 years to life to 10
years to life, but notes that the statutory penalty on Count
Two remains the same, up to 30 years. It agrees that the
statutory change on Count One “gives this Court
authority to reduce his sentence . . .”, but opposes a
sentence reduction.[2]

The
United States relies on Probation's assessment, pointing
out that Defendant's guideline range today remains the
same as it was when he was sentenced in 2000.[3] Specifically, it
contends that “[t]he First Step Act modifies
Collins's statutory penalty provision as to Count One,
but it does not modify his amended guidelines range which
remains 360 months to life imprisonment.” (Dkt. 217).
The United States contends that the only change is that
retroactive application of the FSA lowers the statutory
minimum penalty on Count One from 20 to 10 years, and that no
other factor considered by the court at sentencing is
altered. According to the United States: “Nothing
suggests that Collins's 360 months sentence is now
inappropriate because of a reduction in his statutory minimum
penalties, when those penalties did not bear on the sentence
that was imposed.” (Dkt. 216 at p. 6).

Discussion

Essentially,
the United States argues that retroactive application of the
FSA has no impact on Defendant's sentence. I agree.
Applying the FSA retroactively, the minimum penalty on Count
One is lowered, but the minimum penalty had no bearing on his
sentence. Even if the FSA was in effect when his offenses
were committed, his sentence would be the same. Moreover, the
penalty on Count Two is unaffected, and his guideline range
remains the same. Regardless, after considering the factors
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), particularly the seriousness of
the offenses, and the need to promote respect for the law and
deterrence, I find that a sentence reduction is not
warranted, notwithstanding his eligibility.

The
United States is correct that Defendant is not entitled to a
plenary resentencing. Nothing in Section 404(b) of the First
Step Act of 2018 authorizes a full resentencing based on
current law. And while there is no Circuit precedent
addressing whether a defendant seeking a sentence reduction
under the First Step Act is entitled to a full sentencing
hearing, there is precedent limiting the scope of sentence
modification proceedings under § 3582(c)(2), which I
find to be analogous. See United States v. Bravo,
203 F.3d 778, 781 (11th Cir. 2000) (“This Circuit has
been very clear in holding that a sentencing adjustment
undertaken pursuant to Section 3582(c)(2) does not constitute
a de novo resentencing.”). And in the context of a
Section 3582(c)(2) proceeding, “all original sentencing
determinations remain unchanged with the sole exception of
the guideline range that has been amended since the original
sentencing.” Id.[4]

I find
the reasoning in Bravo applicable to a modification
proceeding under § 3582(c)(1)(B) based on the First Step
Act.[5]
Defendant's request for a hearing is accordingly denied.

Conclusion

Section 404(c) of the First Step Act expressly provides that
“[n]othing in this section shall be construed to
require a court to reduce any sentence pursuant to this
section.” Considering the factors in 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a), as well as Defendant's submissions, I find that
a sentence reduction is not warranted, except for a reduction
in the term of supervised release on Count One to 8 years.

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;DONE
...

Our website includes the first part of the main text of the court's opinion.
To read the entire case, you must purchase the decision for download. With purchase,
you also receive any available docket numbers, case citations or footnotes, dissents
and concurrences that accompany the decision.
Docket numbers and/or citations allow you to research a case further or to use a case in a
legal proceeding. Footnotes (if any) include details of the court's decision. If the document contains a simple affirmation or denial without discussion,
there may not be additional text.

Buy This Entire Record For
$7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.