The defeat in the Second World War ironically brought another
round of industrialization to Japan. New research fields and
technology originating in the United States were introduced.
During the war the Second Faculty of Engineering was established
at the University of Tokyo, but after the war the Faculty was
reorganized into several research institutes for science and
technology. Kyoto University also expanded its own Faculty of
Engineering. The number of professors has Increased, from 63 in
1949 to 165 thirty years later in 1979. The number of students of
engineering has expanded from 1,640 in 1957 to 5,500, and now the
Faculty can boast that one out of every three students at the
university is majoring in engineering. Besides these famous
universities, the national universities have now expanded in
number from 19 before the war to 93 at the present.
Unfortunately, the new local universities have Insufficient funds
and personnel to promote the study of social science even if they
have both a Faculty of Letters and a Faculty of Science.

The significant change In the realm of the humanities is the
alleviation of governmental control and interference and the
disappearance of taboos affecting research projects. The number
of chairs in humanities has not conspicuously increased but each
scholar enjoys spiritual freedom, relieved from the burden of
censorship. One new development in the research field of
humanities has been the establishment of new Institutes for
economics and business management. Quantity analysis developed by
the US has been adopted in these new institutes. This shows a
sign of westernization even in the study of the humanities.

In spite of the great change after the war, an unchangeable
factor worth mentioning here is the leadership that the
centralized government has shown. Throughout the American
occupation, the US tried to Introduce the idea of
decentralization into the Japanese administration, but It met
direct or Indirect resistance from the bureaucracy. It also
failed to decentralize education, the police system, and the
financial system. The evolution of science and technology in
postwar Japan was carried out under the guidance of the central
government authorities such as the Ministry of Education and the
Science and Technology Agency.

It Is well known that the leading developments in scientific
technology after the war have been In the fields of automation,
electronics, atomic energy, and synthetic chemistry, all of which
were developed In the US. The sophisticated technology which
needs elaborate equipment and a mass-production system can only
be developed by the power of huge industrial conglomerates. The
rapid growth of the economy in Japan has depended on the
development of these huge industries. Therefore, the three
decades after the war could be called "the Age of Science
and Technology" In the history of Japan.

But one important factor is that science and technology, which
have long been through" to represent the most brilliant
achievements in the world, have suddenly proved to be
incompatible with human beings and their societies. It became
clear to us at the end of the 1960s that the development of
science and technology could kill us all. Poisoning from
agricultural chemicals and medical drugs, air pollution from the
petroleum industry, water pollution from synthesized fertilizers,
traffic accidents, and atomic plant radiation leaks, all these
are damaging our society, although they are the by-products of
modern industry, of science and technology.

In the space of a few years, our sense of values has reversed
itself. Science and technology suddenly lost their shining status
and their impact was regarded as suspect, though people stir
clung to the benefits they were providing. It is interesting to
see how people began to feel a strong need for decentralization
and local autonomy as the negative view of science and technology
began to prevail among the general public and as criticism and
opposition increased against the centralized policies of the
government. In Japan, many historians and economists, together
with some of the progressive activists in local community
movements, developed new research groups to study the possibility
of establishing "regional communities." Besides these
specialist groups, popular voices were raised and gained general
support for local autonomy, local cultural activities, and the
conservation of the environment.

In spring 1979, the local elections for governors and mayors
were held in fifteen prefectures and hundreds of cities and towns
around Japan. At this time, all the political parties and the
mass media advocated the slogan: "Here comes The Age of
Local Communities." What did this vague slogan mean? The
result of the election at least showed that all the former
governors of large prefectures such as Tokyo and Osaka who had
stood for a progressive opposition party were replaced by veteran
administrators in charge of local problems in the central
government. For citizens, "The Age of Local
Communities" simply means that a local governor who has a
strong connection with the central government will be able to
draw out more from the central funds for his local community.

Therefore, the regionalism implied in the slogan "The Age
of Local Communities" is not sufficient to satisfy the real
needs of the regional community. It will not bring a radical
change in the relation between the central government and
regional communities, nor will it foreshadow the coming of a new
age. It will guarantee neither the autonomy of the local
community nor its inherent creativity. After a hundred years of
centralization, the identity and independence of the local
community suffer from severe damage in Japan. Therefore, people
should claim more ostentatiously their right to a "regional
community". Otherwise, "The Age of Local
Communities" will end up as nothing but another deceptive
slogan.

Nevertheless, it is noticeable that the government, economic
circles, and even the mass media are at the moment continually
paying lip service to the issues of the "regional
community." Prime Minister Ohira conceived a plan of
building a number of local cities with populations of 300,000 in
many places throughout Japan. He called it the "Garden-City
Concept." Also, the Agency for Land Development advocated
the building up of ''Regions of Permanent Residence". The
Agency for Local Institutions has another plan to transfer the
administration of traffic and welfare to the local governments in
the cause of decentralization. There are many more examples of
local community projects advanced as joint ventures of a regional
government and groups of local businessmen.

What effect have these changes had on the present situation of
science and technology? It is well known that the introduction of
huge industrial units in the American style brought about the
economic development of post-war Japan. But it is also well known
that the elaborate conglomerates cannot evolve any further,
partly because of the lack of new markets and partly because of
environmental pollution and inevitable accidents, but chiefly
because of the shortage of resources and the new energy crisis.
The technology needed at this moment is not that of the huge
industrial conglomerates on a national scale and the know-how to
operate them, but the development of "intermediate
technology!' or "small decentralized technology" which
actually meets the needs of the local community and is under the
control of the members of the community. There is also a need to
reevaluate the techniques for manufacture and livelihood which
have been fostered and handed down in traditional communities.
From these points of view, a radical change in the philosophy of
science has been under way for the relocation of the regions of
human life along the water supply routes and the reorientation of
human society as an ecological entity. As for the energy crisis,
an "Autonomic Energy Plan" will be recommended to each
regional community to replace the current energy-consuming
technology and way of life.

I am afraid, however, that an extreme
"anti-technology" posture could easily lead to a total
denial of the value of science and technology, as could the
simple slogan "'Return to Nature" after the fashion of
J. J. Rousseau. Japan has been so deeply committed to science and
technology that it is inconceivable that she should ever give up
her large-scale research projects for science and technology, or
cast away her elaborate industrial investments.

'What we can hope for in Japan's future is not a vainglorious
centralized government, but a productive administrative system
which honors the initiative and identity of local or regional
communities; not a huge conglomerate for science and technology,
but a small-scale flexible system of technology; not devotion
only to an analytical and rational science, but encouragement of
wide varieties of study in the humanities and social sciences. I
think that present-day Japan is already at such an advanced stage
of culture and civilization.

The contemporary world has at its disposal, generally
speaking, sufficient human and material resources; so for the
time being the question of the insufficiency of resources is not
raised. But the fact is that those resources are not evenly
distributed within the international community, and for that
reason some states abound with resources while others do not have
a sufficient or sufficiently diversified share of resources
(e.g., the mono-cultural type of economy). However, the
fundamental cause of the existing differences is the unequal
distribution of scientific and technological knowledge in the
world, enabling a limited number of countries to make rational
use of their natural wealth. The rest of the states, not having
the necessary knowledge and experience, are forced to purchase it
in order to exploit their natural wealth and engage their human
and material potentials.

A large number of the developing countries are in a situation
of having to import almost the whole technological basis of their
national economies, relying little on their own capacities.
Consequently, their dependence on foreign technology is enlarging
and intensifying because of the general development trends of the
developing countries. That relation can be illustrated by the
fact that all developing countries contribute only 7 per cent to
the world industrial production. This is due to the world set-up
which puts many of these countries in the position of satisfying
basic needs for industrial goods by importing them in exchange
for raw materials.

The scientific and technological dependence of the developing
countries can also be demonstrated in another example. Of the
400,000 inventions applied annually, developing countries take
part in 1 per cent (the USA, the USSR, the Federal Republic of
Germany, and Japan participate in 73 per cent). This should not
be surprising, considering that only 2 per cent of total
expenditures for research and development in the world is spent
in developing countries.

Today's expenditures for scientific research in developing
countries are 0.7 per cent of the GNP on the average, versus
1.3-3 per cent in the industrial world.

When we observe the differences in development between various
countries as far as per capita income is concerned, noting the
rate of industrial expansion and other economic indications, we
actually only scratch the surface of the basic economic and
industrial set-up. The very essence of these relations correlates
with the gap between the invention activities and possibilities
of one group of countries in applying new forms of technological
knowledge and the slow pace of the other group in tarring part in
the process. For the latter group of countries, importing
technology is the imperative of economic survival. The transfer
of technology, considered as a complementary exchange of
available technological knowledge, represents by itself no danger
for a national economy. Today's reality of that transfer,
however, is overwhelmingly based on pure export from developed
countries, lacking any kind of exchange of human knowledge.

The dependence of national economies on the import of
technology can be a step in bridging the gap in invention
activities - as it was, for example, in the case of Japan -
provided such a transfer becomes organically implanted in
domestic industrial production and stimulates local creative
potential. This results in cutting technological imports down to
the import only of more sophisticated technology which
complements domestic technology and helps achieve further and
more significant domestic technological improvements.

The expectations of such progress are not fulfilled in many
countries, however. In spite of their best efforts, natural
resources, cheap labour, and the existing economic structure
remain their sole factors of economic development.

On the other side, no more than a dozen countries or a hundred
multinational companies possess and control the key technology.
The export and import of technology neglects the real needs of
developing countries, leaving them at the mercy of big monopolies
that dominate the market. We see old colonial powers as
technology exporters who have adapted to the present situation by
perpetuating the dependence of the former colonies in a
relatively hidden manner. The methods are different, and are
correlated with the participant in transfer, the kind of
technology, and so on. The most common method is by neglecting to
establish a satisfactory relation between the imported technology
and the traditional culture in a broader sense. Otherwise the
monopoly of transferred technology would be at stake. Technology
remains the most subtle means of control and domination of many
societies by the owners of the technology. Instead of
contributing to the resolution of the vital problems of the third
world, technology becomes a power which acts against the basic
interests of Third World peoples.

The technology imported into developing countries is often too
advanced and automated for the geophysical characteristics of the
country, the demands of the market, and the limited output of
production. Contrary to some assertions, the main danger for
developing countries is not in the ability of the supplier of
technology to transform the technology into capital but in the
use of technology in a monopolistic manner - by excluding the
acquiring country from exploiting the technological knowledge -
and in the abuse of the monopolistic position.

The owners of technology, furthermore, carry out the exclusive
distribution of technology in the world through the glorification
of private ownership and the transformation of historical
advantages into their own. In this context, the present position
of the developing countries is compared to the situation when
today's developed countries were underdeveloped themselves before
they managed to overcome that situation and became developed.
Such a comparison involves neo-colonialistic implications,
because in the times spoken about, today's developed countries
were surrounded by countries which were even less developed.

The developing countries are integrated into the world system
dominated by the economically developed countries, which, having
inherited advantages, provided for themselves the best position
in the world interest-economies and converted it into their
permanent monopoly. The highly developed technology of the
industrial countries is based on two hundred years of industrial
tradition, supported by the advancement of appropriate
infrastructure. The developing countries have neither the
tradition of technological development nor the appropriate
infrastructure, so their position is considerably more
unfavorable than the one today's developed countries had one or
two centuries ago.

The developing countries, after achieving national
independence, have to conform to the existing economic relations
in the world (until the new economic order becomes universally
accepted) and to the "international division of labour,'' as
it is generously named by western economists, that exists at the
time. The developing countries are compelled to be incorporated
into contemporary macro-technology - the macro-organization of
the production forces - which is dominated by technical elements.
Macro-technology is founded on normalization, unification,
efficiency, and stability; it has grown out of the capitalist
system, and its bearers want to impose it upon all mankind. In
the developing countries, centres for the development of
macrotechnology are rare and without significant influence on the
aggregate development of macro-technology in the world.

Another danger for the developing countries is the transfer of
technology performed in the mode of today. The unequal
technological and economic position of the contract parties
enables the suppliers of technology to have the decisive control
in determining conditions for the transfer of technology. Not
only is the type of technology determined by the owners
(technology that has not been adequately tested, for instance, so
that the receiver has the role of testing polygon, or that is
sufficiently amortized or already out of date), but the
accompanying elements of so-called "tied purchase" are
also decided upon by the owners, in order to enlarge their profit
and make the position of the receiver even more subordinate,
under the pretext of an efficient transfer of technology.

As the competition in the market of technology is imperfect,
the price is decided upon by the owner, having in mind the
economic position of the receiver. in most cases, the resources
at the disposal of the receiver are limited, so the owner of
technology is simultaneously in the position of giving a loan,
and that makes the position of the receiver even worse. An
enterprise from a developing country, needing foreign technology
and not having enough financial resources and information about
the available technology in the world, and being restrained by
given social and economic conditions (the stage of development of
the production forces, infrastructure, the profile of personnel),
links itself to the first owner of technology who is willing to
make it available to that enterprise by granting a loan. The
terms of the transfer of technology are out of the primary
concern, as well as the effect of the application of technology
on the receiving country. In other words, the transfer of
technology performed under restrictive conditions imposed by the
developed countries is partly made possible by the developing
countries themselves. The lack of interest or wrongly directed
interest of the international community also plays a part in this
situation.

The legal protection of technological knowledge and skill,
i.e., the law of industrial property, is an accomplishment of the
contemporary national and international legal systems, as the
object of protection gained its significance only in the
circumstances of a relatively developed industrial production.

Industrial property rights were values of accessory nature
till the Second World War in the majority of industrial
underdeveloped countries. Domestic industry was almost
non-existent in many countries in Africa and Asia, while
industrialists and merchants from developed countries enjoyed a
monopolistic position in the domestic market. On that account,
there was no need for the registration of patents and trademarks
and, accordingly, no need for domestic law on industrial
property. The attainment of national independence, the beginning
of the development of national industry, and the pressure exerted
by the owners of technology from developed countries that they be
granted exclusive rights influenced the adoption of the first
national regulations on industrial property.

However, laws on industrial property that were and are still
being enacted in economically underdeveloped countries are not
adapted to the real stage of development of the production forces
but, in most cases, have simply been taken over from the former
colonial powers. The developing countries, fascinated by their
systematization and legal concepts, adopt them without serious
consideration because of the lack of domestic experts. In this
process they fail to take into consideration that the laws they
are taking as a model have been constructed in such a way as to
protect the interests of the exporters of capital and technology
and/or are designed for a society with a much more developed base
and superstructure than exists in the country which is adopting
them.

In this manner the phenomenon of law becoming an object of
transfer from developed to developing countries originated. It is
a phenomenon because the legal order is, in fact, the framework
for the transfer of technology, legalizing it on the national and
international levels. Thus we have the situation of developed
countries exporting not only industrial equipment, knowledge, and
capital but also legal rules enabling the exploitation of the
imported equipment, knowledge, and capital in the recipient,
developing country in a manner that suits their owner. In the
developing countries we come across legal rules representing a
more or less unsuccessful combination of the customary national
law and the law received from an industrial power, usually the
former colonial power.

A former colonial power has continuing economic influence in a
developing country, and it tries to preserve such a situation as
long as possible because it is in its interest, i.e., in the
interest of its citizens who are transferring technology into the
developing country under the protection of the industrial
property law. In this way, the development of peculiarities in
the law of new states is impeded, and positive ideas on the
unification of the law on industrial property are compromised
because of the neo-colonialistic ambitions of some developed
countries. The national law on industrial property, instead of
encouraging domestic innovative activities and having a positive
effect on the flow of foreign technology (under conditions
favourable to the national economy), works against domestic
industry in favour of foreign technology owners from the
developed countries.

The existing system of international protection of industrial
property is based on the principles proclaimed in the Paris
Convention at the end of the last century. Accordingly, the
system is based on the principle of formal equality of the member
countries (and the same conditions are imposed upon unequal
members). The granting of legal protection to foreign citizens
and adopting the principle of national treatment were important
democratic achievements in the domain of law and international
relations in general. Although this system has its undeniable
historical significance and is a contribution to the legal theory
and practice of the nineteenth century, it should be pointed out
that, even at the time of its establishment, it did not suit the
interests of underdeveloped countries. But at those times in the
underdeveloped countries that were already sovereign states, the
internal balance of power favoured the infiltration of foreign
influence and consequently of foreign law too; so those countries
acceded to international conventions, irrespective of the real
character of such conventions, and it was taken to be a
progressive attitude on the part of domestic governments.
Domestic legal rules contributed to such a climate too. As has
already been mentioned, they represented - more or less - the
reception of foreign law. However, at the time of the adoption of
the Paris Convention the majority of the contemporary developing
countries were colonies, and the question of their accession to
the convention was solved by the application of the
"colonial clause.)' So the system of international
protection of industrial property was created by the industrially
developed countries, and it served as a tool for the
institutionalization of existing monopolistic and colonial
positions.

Later, in the circumstances of a developed international
market, modern industrial production, and the raising of
conscience of the most advanced countries in the world, the
implementation of the international system of industrial
protection revealed the extent of its outdatedness. However, it
was and still is difficult to oppose the apologetic claims of an
equitable treatment of all the parties to the Paris Convention
and its other principles as well, since it is backed up by the
most developed countries in the world. On the other hand, it took
almost a whole century to make the majority of the parties to the
Paris Convention aware of the extent to which the international
law of industrial protection is relevant to the transfer of
technology, and consequently to national economic development. A
large number of the developing countries acceded to the Paris.

Convention automatically, the same way they did to other
international conventions, in the ecstasy of the attainment of
national independence and without an estimation of the impact of
those international conventions on their national needs.

It can be stated that both national and international law, in
the present conditions, are components of the
institutionalization of the existing relations based on factual
inequality in the international community and that they serve as
the means for new forms of neo-colonialistic exploitation. This
is quite understandable when we consider the very nature of law
and legal order, which are always the proponents of the
institutionalization of the existing relations in a society,
created by the more powerful minority; it is unlikely that they
could serve as instruments for changing relations to the
disadvantage of those who still occupy stronger positions in the
international community.

The developed countries do not base their superiority on their
size or the allocation of resources but on the technological and
industrial advantages they have achieved and on their more
developed social structure. Accordingly, it is in their interest
to cement existing relations, and the international protection of
industrial property is a really convenient instrument to this
end.