It should be
recognized that most relationships between people can be interpreted as forms
of exchange. Exchange is the
purest and most developed kind of interaction, which shapes human life when it
seeks to acquire substance and content. – Simmel[1]

Introduction: Three
Basic Types of Exchange

The contents of social relations and the forms of them are different. With
sheer glances at phenomena, people usually notice only the contents.What are the forms in here? They refer to the
material or social conditions in which contents are created, circulated, or exchanged. For example, Hannah
Arendt, in her critique of Karl Marx, refers to the difference of glaborh and gwork.h[2]According to her distinction, labor
merely engages in reproductions of the things existed, while works produce
something new – attesting human creativity. But, this critique is missing the
essence of Marxfs theory. Not that
he ignored the difference between labor and work and focused on the former, but
essentially the gformh blurs such a distinction. It does not matter whether a production is a work or
a labor, if the
capitalist forms of relations maintain the productions or circulations of its products (services or information) – wage-labor and the
grasp of surplus value by capitalists.
In this sense, itis
important to see which forms of social relations the products go
through – such as free contracts, wage-labor,
aristocratic patronage, feudalistic forced labor, or reciprocal gift exchanges. Marx wrote:

What is a
Negro slave? A man of
the black race. The one
explanation is as good as the other.

A Negro is a
Negro. He only becomes a slave in
certain relations. A
cotton-spinning jenny is a machine for spinning cotton. It becomes capital only in
certain relations. Torn from these
relationships it is no more capital than gold in itself is money or sugar the
price of sugar.[3]

This relational
view certainly influenced Georg Simmelfs distinction between the gcontenth
and gform,h as clear from my quotation at the beginning of this chapter.
I will also interpret economy through the analyses of
various forms of exchanges. In this regard, Karl Polanyi, in his essay
gThe Economy as Instituted Process,h categorizes
three essential types of exchanges.

Empirically, we find the main patterns to be
reciprocity, redistribution, and exchange. Reciprocity denotes movements between correlative points of
symmetrical groupings; redistribution designates appropriational movements
toward a center and out of it again; exchange refers here to vice versa
movements taking place as between ghandsh under a market system.[4]

Kojin Karatani applies this analysis of three
types of exchange for his insightful study of what he calls
gCapitalist-Nation-State.h[5] His contention is that each one of
these categories performs each type of the exchanges. Capitalism derives from the market
exchange, the nation the reciprocal, and the state the
appropriation-redistribution.

As the works of Marcel
Mauss[6]
and other anthropologists have well documented, exchanges within an agrarian community are
reciprocal. In the archaic world, such
gift-like exchanges also characterized the constant and stable relationships among
two or more communities. They
were bound to reciprocate traditionally determined gequivalents.h Here, the
relationship among members are mutual supportive, but the codes of
communitarian reciprocity restrict everyday conducts of each individual.

The second
exchange of appropriation-redistribution was conducted by feudal lords. In fact, feudal lords, with its
military power – violence – enjoyed plundering, yet, in order to continue this appropriation, they had to redistribute some portions of their loot. In this way, they could behave as if
they were the protectors of the people.
This
redistribution was, in a sense, similar to gift-giving. Justification of appropriations came
from this similarity to reciprocity.
They were also aware that such
redistribution in fact would help the increase of productions among
their subjects and lands, thus maximizing the amount they could
appropriate.

The
market exchange was different from these two exchanges. In fact, the people who were excluded
from the above reciprocal communities
started this exchange. Markets
started in realms between communities.
The development of cities and trades was the cause of modern
capitalism.

But
it is crucial to see the role of the absolutist states
that helped the inter-regional market activities (mercantilism). Both absolutist states and merchants
had the same adversaries: feudal lords. Now, the state took over from feudal
lords the role of appropriation-redistribution exchanges. Merchants could
engage in their international trades and the reorganizations of national industries
as the state projects. When
this merge of capitalism and the state was consolidated, in order to repress
revolts from the other type of exchange – reciprocity of agrarian communities –
the states attempted to subject people under its sway. The states
tried to control the people as the subjects united to
the statesf causes – usually invasions
of other lands. The state-led nationalism was
tried. Only
after popular uprisings for human rights (in fact, the gnationfsh rights),however, was nationalism in the modern
sense consolidated. Through the process of these movements, people
idealized the nation as reciprocal.
Such idealization to connect oneself with the imagined reciprocity also
could not occur without linguistic or art movements.

Now, this
gimagined communityh (Benedict Anderson) became the source of mutual
supports. Here, people had
to support each other, and those who were classified as outsiders
were eliminated or discriminated.
In order to reciprocate the unlimited gifts from national lands, they
voluntarily fought against an enemy.
The chief of the state was no longer a man detached from people, but the one chosen
from the members of the nation – usually by election – as the peoplefs
representative.[7]

This was the
consolidation of the nation-state.
This term is a
common word; but actually it should be described as the
capitalist-nation-state – each one of them became the central institution
of the three exchanges. The
trinity of the capitalist-nation-state is almost unbeatable, basically because
all these three are based on the essential exchanges and, together, they could
supplement each otherfs failures (such as unequal distribution of wealth by
capitalism is compensated by the gwelfareh state, or the tax levy of the state
appropriation is veiled by the mutual supporting ideal of the nation). The only other possible way would be to
create an alternative exchange to these three exchanges. That it would be the gassociationh – similar to
reciprocity but combined with the flexibility of market exchanges and the
democratic redistributions of common trust – is the contention of
Karatani. I will substantiate,
supplement and develop his theory.
I will also refer to the related studies of several preceding thinkers
here. The purpose of this chapter
is, therefore, to show that it is difficult to overcome the trinity and the
possible alternative would be associational exchanges.

In this chapter, I will
analyze the modern forms of these three types of exchanges in detail in the
following order: the nation, the state and capitalism. As Karatani has
emphasized, these three represent their distinct types of exchanges; they are,
therefore, disparate. However,
they form the trinity –
collaborations of each other. Hence, the combination between the two, or among three must
be also analyzed. They are
separated, yet connected.

The Nation

Among the three types of exchanges, the
reciprocal exchange stands at the core.
This exchange exists even among group-oriented animals. Its essence is to return the equivalent
of gifts one has received. The
quality and the quantity of this gequivalenth is culturally and traditionally
determined. Within agrarian communities, reciprocal exchangesare
dominant. Such gift exchanges are
compulsory and increasing bonds among members. Here is from Marcel Mauss:

First, it is not individuals but
collectivities that impose obligations of exchange and contract upon each
other. c Moreover, what they
exchange is not solely property and wealth, movable and immovable goods, and
things economically useful. In
particular, such exchanges are acts of politeness: banquets, rituals, military
services, women, children, dances, festivals, and fairs, in which economic
transaction is only one element, and in which the passing on of wealth is only
one feature of a much more general and enduring contract. Finally, these total services and
counter-services are committed to in a somewhat voluntary form by presents and
gifts, although in the final analysis they are strictly compulsory, on pain of
private or public warfare. We
propose to call all this the system of total services.[8]

The gsystem of total serviceshwasindispensable for agrarian communities in order to maintain customs and to
reproduce the same natural environments (plots for subsistence and the inheritance
to children).

In the second exchange – appropriation and
redistribution – the essence of gift giving is sustained in the form of
redistribution. In return of being
redistributed, people allow central authorities to continue to appropriate
them. It is not only materials or
services authorities redistribute.
They maintain orders among their subjects. In spite of its similarity to the first exchange, the
ability to appropriate and distribute huge gifts bestows the center a special
position. This position enables
them to stand above gift-exchanging communities. They seem to have objectified views, detached from everyday
menaces.

Equivalent value in reciprocal exchanges is
stable, because people have to continue tradition. This consistency maintains the feeling of fairness among all
the community members – even though such uniformity means strict obligations at
the same time. The maniac pursuits
of exchanging equivalents also categorize market exchanges – but this time, the
value equivalent is constantly shifting and determined every time in each
exchange. But at least, in each
exchange, markets can claim the fair reciprocity of equivalents – in this
sense, the third exchange has the basis in gift exchanges. But also the legal power the second
exchange produces is indispensable to secure the market contracts.

In this sense, these three exchanges are not
only disparate, but connected and dependent on each other. In essence, reciprocal exchange
supports two other types by being their basis. But it does not mean that they always collaborate
harmoniously. Because they are different
forms of exchange, the chance of conflict always exists. For example, popular people could revolt
by claiming the reestablishment of the gmoral economyh – reciprocal and gfairh
exchanges. This would happen when
they believed that the institutions based on the exchanges other than
reciprocity had threatened their lives.
The other exchanges tend to overgrow the limit set by traditional reciprocity. The modern era has been full of these
concessions and turnovers. But in
reality, the aspirations for reciprocity usually fail to create gfair exchangesh
as people have hoped. The state
and capitalists often repress peasantsf revolts or revolutionary attempts by
citizens. Then, the failures of the
actualizations force the people to discover instead gimaginedh communities –
the nations. These are,
unfortunately, imagined ones.
Without realizing the gfairh exchange in reality, popular sentiment for
reciprocity will continue to gimagineh and gidealize.h

1.Agrarian Community, Reform and the Commons

The main concern
of Emile Durkheim was the moral and normative unity of society.[9]In his early ages, he envisions
that the modern gorganich solidarity will derive from the functional
interdependence of individuals.
Because of the division of labor, these individuals lost gcommonality,h which was
the central source of the primitive gmechanicalh solidarity. His analysis of this latter essence resulted in his later analysis of
rituals.[10] Rituals provide
communitiesthe experiences of ecstatic and collective submissions to higherand sacred
symbols. These symbols and
memories of rituals galvanize the members for the social cohesion.[11] This is g[a] society whose members are
united by the fact that they think in the same way in regard to the sacred
world and its relations with the profane world, and by the fact that they
translate these common ideals into common practices.h[12]But the fact gthey think in the same wayh is
rigorously an unscientific description – something nobody can prove. They only gimagineh that they think in
the same way or they tell so to interviews. What we have to focus on is that they engage in gcommon
practices.h In other words, it has
to be explained in material forms, or economical terms. Rituals reinstate communal definitions
of reciprocity – traditionally understood equivalents.

Max Weber, in Sociology of Religion, traces the historical development of
religion – from the ancestral cult to a more grationalizedh version. It is, however, wrong to consider that
the history of religion took a linear development in reality. Generally speaking, the reciprocal
exchange creates the form of cult.
Complex ranks of gods and taboos set the stable rules of equivalency for
community members without allowing them to question its order. On the other hand, the rationalized
form of religion guarantees that even if detached from onefs communities, as
long as staying in the same religion, one can trust others. It will also guarantee the universal
mode of civilized manner or conducts – civility. Then, the both forms of religion – the cult and the rational
salvation religion –are tied to the three essential forms of exchange. Cult-like beliefs have remained in the modernity,
as long as reciprocal exchanges stay as the necessity of life. Rationalized religions existed in
antiquity if the appropriation-redistribution exchanges guaranteed
inter-communal trades.

The expansion of
the capitalist economy induced the commercialization of agriculture – especially
in England, landowners carried outenclosure, thus excluding
peasants out of farm lands. Detached from any means of production,
former peasants had to seek for someone who owned the means. The state also
helped the disintegration of agrarian communities through taxation. Needs to pay tax compelled peasants to
seek for sourcesto attain money. Thus, they became wage-laborers. Certainly, this commodification
of labor power was
giving certain freedom to peasants.[13] But it also put workers in a weak
position of a seller – selling their labor power commodities.

These land reforms dissolved agrarian
communities. This process caused,
on the one hand, anxiety among peasants, who had followed grituallyh determined
reciprocal exchanges, but on the other, emancipated them from communitarian
constraints. In this regard, land
reforms were not entirely negative events. This process had, however, dissolved another custom of
agrarian communities – gcommons.h They
were similar to communitarian reciprocity, but the uses of them were more or
less dependent on individual necessities.
They can be categorized as the social trust wealth – the mixture of
reciprocal and gassociationalh exchanges.
Of course, there existed certain limits to such uses to avoid the
over-consumption of natural resources – gthe tragedy of the commons.h[14] Such places were greatly important for
adjusting seasonally or other shifts in peoplefs needs – especially for the
relief of poor people. The major
blow to the people in agrarian communities was the loss of – the privatization
of – these commons, more than the dissolution of communities themselves. Here from Barrington
Moore Jr.fs analysis of land reforms:

c innumerable
peasants lost their rights on the common lands of the villages as the great
landlords absorbed these lands.
This was an age of improvement in agricultural techniques, such as the
increased use of fertilizer, new crops, and crop rotation. New methods could not be applied at all
in fields subject to the rules of common cultivationc[15]

the rights
of common played a large part. For
cottagers and certainly for the landless laborers who had only customary but
not legal usage of the common, the loss of this right or privilege meant
disaster.[16]

cgenerally only the
young, the unmarried, or the village craftsmen were willing to leave home—and
only such individuals were wanted by the new industrial employers. Mature men with families were not as
trainable nor could they as easily tear themselves completely out of the fabric
of rural life. Remaining on the
soil, they had recourse to their glast righth—the right of poor relief.[17]

In the above
quotation, Moore insightfully analyzes the process of dissolution of gcommon
landsh[18]
and how the peasants started to rely on gpoor relief.h Obviously, the modern state took over this role
– redistribution to the poor.
Because of its own interest in maximizing its revenues – appropriation,
however, the state was impossible to eliminate the discontents among the
populace completely. Strong
demands or even revolts from the people were inevitable.

In reciprocal exchanges, it is
gmoralh to follow the codes of communities. Then, the market exchange, which compels the constant shift
of value, would be gimmoral.h The popular
sentiments for reciprocity – mutual support and
dependence – have been backfiring against the robust activities of profit-maximizing
economy.We find a good example in what E.P. Thompson rightly callsthe gmoral
economy.h It is unnatural gthat any man should
profit from the necessities of others... [I]n time of dearth, prices of
enecessitiesf should remain at a customary level, even though there might be
less all aroundh[19]. This is ga consistent traditional view
of social norms and obligations, of the proper economic functions of several
parties within the community, which, taken together, can be said to constitute
the moral economy of the poor.h[20]Because the
fairness is tied to the reciprocating of traditional equivalents, constantly
shifting value judgment appears as unfair.

But again, it is important to see the
difference between conservative demands for returning to idealized reciprocity
and the sense of fairness contained in the commons. Even though people repeatedly fail the attempts to recover
commons, the necessity of social trust wealth is universal. The popular cry for the fairness in
economy – the moral economy – arises from the indispensability of the
commons. The problem is that,
because of their similarities, people often mix up reciprocities with the
associational commons. This is the
reason why modern attempts for fair exchanges end up in the rituals of
idealized commonality – the nation.
This idealist concept does not have concrete units. It is merely an gimagined community.h Even though the nation is an idealized
reciprocity, it does restrain the conducts of the people significantly –
sometimes people are even gwilling to die for the nation.h One of the reasons is that in an
imagined community, people feel that they are receiving unidirectional
gifts. The form of reciprocity is
the never-ending repetition of the same amounts of gifts:

This form is idealized and the concrete connection
of gift-exchange becomes missing.
Now, the people stay at the position before giving back the reciprocal
gift:

xX – yY – xX - - - - yY

This divided line (- - -) indicates that this
gift-return is idealized and never realized. The people at this position of returning feel the endless
aspiration to give back the gift – obligation to contribute to the idealized gcommunity.h

There is another
reason why the strong restraints of the nation work. The process of gimaginingh or gidealizingh itself involves
people in attaching themselves to the nation. I will call this process the gsocial anesthetizationh and
analyze it in the next section.

2. Commons Idealized – Reciprocity and the Social Aesthetization

In the long course of
modernization, feudal or aristocratic ideals – human sentimentsor passions for
heroic acts – had shifted to those for economic interests, as Albert Hirshman
analyzed.[21] Economic interests compelledpeople to
gdisinteresth in
religious or customary judgment of value – reciprocal exchanges of traditional
equivalents. Use value of
commodities is usefulness for each individual purchaser. Value judgments of equivalents are only
temporary now.

But this
detachment, on reverse, became the potential for the idealization –gbracketingh the economic
interests again and pursuing gdisinterestedh exchanges – art.

From
Romanticism on, artists have aimed at the autonomy of art (art for
artfs sake)– the detachment from religious, courtly or bourgeois patrons. As Pierre
Bourdieu points out, this movement went parallel with the development of markets for art
works.[22] In this sense, romanticistsf autonomy was dependent
on the development of capitalism. Because art markets provided the income, they
could proclaim the autonomy. Before
making simple critiques of commercialization of art, we have to keep in mind
these roles of markets for the independence of artists.

At any rate, the
concept of autonomous art itself was
the critique against the development of the
capitalist economy. In fact,
similar to the Romantic art, the modern concept of gcultureh had
emerged only after capitalism compelled the detachment of individuals from reciprocal
or feudal human relationships (such as agrarian communities,
religious communities or court societies). Through gcultureh
people imagined that they could establish reciprocal
or associational exchanges
against the capitalist market. For
example, against the global power of the US economy and Soviet
communism, Nazis emphasized the solidarity of German ethnicities.[23] They tried to embed global economy
within the control of the national culture and the state
power. Fascism was a degenerated
form of the anti-globalization movement. Its peculiarly strong
concerns for morality and aesthetics were natural outcomes of their essential
character – the idealized recovery of the moral economy.

Walter
Benjaminfs essay eWorks of Art in the Age of Mechanic Reproductionf points out
the liquidation of aura that was attached to the goriginalh artworks by ggeniuses.h[24]The development of reproductive techniques had
decreased the
importance of originals or gauthenticity.h The reproduction undermined authorfs
originality. In other words,
gaurah was the outcome of a certain social setting.

But, the mechanic reproduction was not the phenomenon
that started neither in Benjaminfs era nor with photographs. Print mechanism Gutenberg devised
(around 1450) was the beginning of reproductive techniques. In fact, reproductions did not gliquidateh
the aura, but transformed it into another gidealizationh or gimagination.h For example, when Luther translated and
published the Bible in a German dialect (1522), people suddenly started to view
this dialect as something sacred – aura.
This gidealizedh aura was influential for this dialect to become the gnationalh
language.[25] Here is Peter
Bürgerfs critique on Benjamin:

For Benjamin, art with an aura and individual reception (absorption in
the object) go hand in hand. But
this characterization applies only to autonomous art, certainly not to the sacral
art of the Middle Ages (the reception of the sculpture on medieval cathedrals
and the mystery plays was collective).
Benjaminfs construction of history omits the emancipation of art from
the sacral, which was the work of the bourgeoisie. One of the reasons for this omission may be that with the lfart
pour lfart movement and aestheticism, something like a resacralization (or
reritualization) of art did in fact occur.h[26]

But again, Bürgerfs gconstruction of historyh here
misses the gresacralizationh that happened before the emergence of the
romanticism. The existence of
potential new readers, for example, compelled Luther to gresacralizeh a dialect
of a local community by making the God speak through it. What happened in Romanticism was to
treat gthish sacralization as self-evident – something always existed since the
beginning of the history. New
readers – merchants – welcomed Lutherfs religious reform, which meant the
negation of Catholic rituals – stable reciprocity – and instead recommended the
individual reading of the Bible. Its
interpretation is inevitably temporary shifting. This gresacralizationh was different in character from the
former feudal or cult gaurah – local religious communities. Kojin Karatani, referring to the
Kantian concept of the sublime, explains its difference from cult or greligious
aweh:

the sublime is gself-alienationh in the act of discovering an
infinity of reason in the object that is contradictory to the self. It goes without saying that the sublime
is not a manifestation of religious awe.
An object that overpowers a human – lightning in the night sky, for
instance – is deemed sublime only insofar as its cause is scientifically
evident and the spectator is protected from its brutal force. If not, the lighting remains an object
of religious awe or supernatural attributes, like a divine message. For this reason the sublime as an
aesthetic judgment is connected, like the flip side of a coin, to the
epistemology of modern science.[27]

But, according
to Karatani, the philosophy of Kant ignores the material form of the capitalist
economy. It was crucial to have
the extension of the monetary form of exchange for the concept of art to emerge. This form negated collective rituals and enabled the
privatization of value judgment.

At this point, it is imperative to consider a
realm that Kant did not scrutinize, a place where all differences are
unconditionally bracketed: the monetary economy. This is where manifold use values and the practical labor
that produces them are reduced to exchange value, or, in Marxfs terms, gsocial
and abstract labor.h c In other words, in the world of the commodity economy we
find an attitude totally indifferent to the difference among things -- their
use value -- and only concerned with one thing: interest.

c For the romantics, then, Kantian disinterestedness functioned mainly
to bracket economic interest, a practice that was manifest as gart for artfs
sake.h More crucial in this
context is that Kantian bracketing or, namely, purification of all domains is
inseparable from the capitalist economy that nullifies differences of all
domains. c Hence, ever since art came to be art it has been irrevocably
connected to commodification like the flip side of a coin. Disinterestedness as an aesthetic stance
is made possible in the supremacy of economic interest, therefore, it is
impossible to escape the latter by bracketing it.[28]

In the same manner,
the money form that gbracketsh the ethical and aesthetic differences was also
influential for the development of modern science. Here from Schumpeter:

c capitalism develops rationality and adds a new
edge to it in two interconnected ways.

First it exalts the
monetary unit – not itself a creation of capitalism – into a unit of
account. That is to say, capitalist
practice turns the unit of money into a tool of rational cost-profit
calculations, of which the towering monuments is double-entry bookkeeping. Without going into this, we will notice
that, primarily a product of the evolution of economic rationality, the
cost-profit calculus in turn reacts upon that rationality; by crystallizing and
defining numerically, it powerfully propels the logic of enterprise.[29]

Schumpeter
analyzes how the extension of monetary units and capitalism
generated the rational thought – citing examples from mathematico-experimental
science to modern hospitals.[30]Of course, the process was not
unidirectional. The development of
scientific epistemology decreased the social anxiety for natural
disasters. In this sense, neither
the state protection nor the rituals to ease rages of gods (religious awe)
seemed necessary. At the same
time, however, science analyzed the system of natural futility. New knowledge, then, compelled the
people to focus on the quality of lands and the health of young people. Scientific answers to increase human
futility were, first, education. The
entire nation now had the equal chance of education. Second, the morality of people would increase the docility
of workers. The need of rest,
recreation was also discovered as essential. National holidays were obliged. People now discovered new rituals – national activities.[31]

The states certainly supported these
trends. But without the popular
cry for the idealized reciprocities, it is hard to understand the strong
attachments to such cultures. Benedict Anderson states the difference:

But it is doubtful whether either social
change or transformed consciousnesses, in themselves, do much to explain the attachment that peoples feel for the
inventions of their imaginations—or, to revive a question raised at the
beginning of this text—why people are ready to die for these inventions.[32]

Nationalism was the inversion of the popular
calls. Because actual reciprocity
or commons no longer existed, people tried to aesthetize and ritualize their
imagined worlds. Benedict Anderson argues that the nation as the gimagined communityh emerged from what he terms print capitalism. Multiple
publications of the same copy provided the common
language of a nation, which previously had various spoken languages.

These fellow-readers, to whom they were
connected through print, formed, in their secular, particular, visible
invisibility, the embryo of the nationally imagined community.

Second, print-capitalism gave a new fixity to
language, which in the long run helped to build that image of antiquity so
central to the subjective idea of the nation. As Febvre and Martin remind us, the printed book kept a
permanent form, capable of virtually infinite reproduction, temporally and
spatially. c

Third, print-capitalism created
languages-of-power of a kind different from the older administrative
vernaculars. Certain dialects
inevitably were ecloserf to each print-language and dominated their final forms.[33]

The daily
publication of newspaper united the readers to the common concerns of the
nation.[34]

But in fact, such
gnational cultureh was something
invented when one tried to criticize
capitalism. And these
efforts to solve the problem of capitalism – inequality of wealth and the severe
cycle of recessions –often ended up within the trinity of the capitalist-nation-state. Nationalism is the gaesthetizedh
or gidealizedh form of reciprocity.
Its basis was in the gresacralizationh – such as the individual
readership of the Bible. This gbracketingh
of collective rituals – traditional value judgment – was the source of gimagination.h The act of bracketing, without gde-bracketingh
constantly, induces people to idealize continuously the world created by gbracketingh
– the nation. This idealization
certainly could develop to the level of self-alienation – the sublime to die
for onefs inventions. But this
idealization is difficult to discard, because its essence resides in the human
need for exchanging gfairh equivalents.
For example, the disappearance of religion in the modern world seemed
inevitable. But, religion, or more
accurately speaking, a cult is the essential form of reciprocal exchanges. For this reason, religions have strong
reasons to continue or to recover repeatedly. The problem is that both nationalism and modern religions
are gidealizedh forms. They will
not essentially bring back the lost fairness – associational commons.

The
State

Orthodox Marxists since Engels have understood the state as the
part of superstructure based on the capitalist economy. They have
counted the Base-Superstructure theory as one of the biggest contributions of
Marx to the world. Peculiarly,
however, Marx states such an idea explicitly only once in the gPreface to the
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy.h In fact, the Base Superstructure theory – or the theory of
historical materialism and the labor theory of value (exploitation) – was the
idea existed before Marx – in the works of left Riccardians or German
historical economists. Marxfs
works cannot be categorized into these simplistic approaches; they are, as
represented by the 18th
Blumaire or Capital, highly
complex and detailed studies of the society and economy.

With the Base-Superstructure
theory at hand, orthodox Marxists often assigned the state only an auxiliary role – the use
of violence to maintain the social order to help
the domination of bourgeois.[35]But as I have
emphasized, the state and the nation have their own distinct rules of exchange.

Because of its
possession of violence, the state can appropriate from others – both inside its
territory and outside. Here lies
the statefs interest: maximizing the revenue of appropriation. This is different, however much look
similar, from capitalistsf motive of maximizing profits – the result of gfairh
exchanges within markets.[36]As I have explained before, the state redistributes parts of its revenues to justify the plundering. In fact, this
redistribution by way of social welfares, the maintenance
of social infrastructures or the protection from outside enemies often result
in the increase of social products, thus expanding the amount the state can
appropriate. This is the core of the seemingly
peculiar exchange of the Statefs appropriation with its redistribution: the exchange between the state and its subjects.

Appropriation

According
to a World Bank report, in 1999, 24.7 percent of gross domestic
products of the world went to governmentfs revenue.[37] What was the historical origin of this
statefs revenue?

Charles Tilly
provocatively compares the state with an organized crime:

If protection rackets represent organized crime at its smoothest,
then war making and state making – quintessential protection rackets with the
advantage of legitimacy – qualify as our largest examples of organized
crime. Without branding all
generals and statesmen as murderers or thieves, I want to urge the value of
that analogy. At least for the European
experience of the past few centuries, a portrait of war makers and state makers
as coercive and self-seeking entrepreneurs bears a far greater resemblance to
the facts than do its chief alternatives: the idea of a social contract, the
idea of an open market in which operators of armies and states offer services
to willing consumers, the idea of a society whose shared norms and expectations
call forth a certain kind of government.[38]

It
is almost self-apparent that the possessor of strong military means could
plunder from others. Feudal lords
were able to extract rents from peasants because of such power.[39] From todayfs viewpoint, such a violent
appropriation seems
morally unjustifiable. But for
aristocratic ideals, violent appropriation was the symbol of a heroic
activity. Here is from Simmel:

First, the general acceptance and approval of
robbery, as the subjective and normatively unregulated seizure of what is
immediately desired. Long after
the time of Homer, piracy continued to be regarded, in the backward
agricultural areas of Greece, as legitimate business, and some primitive people
consider violent robbery more noble than honest payment. This is also understandable; for in
exchanging and paying one is subordinated to an objective norm, and the strong
and autonomous personality has to efface himself, which is disagreeable. This also accounts for the disdain of
trade by self-willed aristocratic individuals. On the other hand, exchange favours peaceful relations
between men because they then accept a supra-personal and normative regulation.[40]

The
violent appropriation favored by aristocratic individuals was repressed when
kings attempted to monopolize its revenues. The development of the money economy and credit
system increased the transferability of wealth across lands,
which induced the emergence of central tax-appropriation machine –
the state. It is also
important to notice that the global sea voyages and the absolutist states (and
the Protestant) emerged at around the same time – the sixteenth century. Overseas
territorial and economic expansion led by European powers also increased the
revenue they could appropriate.[41]Kings
tried to persuade or coerced their subjects and feudal lords to admit that
kingsf concerns were also the gstateh
affairs. Here emerged the
absolutist regimes. Josef
Schumpeter describes the development of such gtax
statesh:

Taxes not only helped to create the state. They helped to form it. The tax system was the organ, the development of
which entailed the other organs.
Tax bill in hand, the state penetrated the private economies and won
increasing domination over them.
The tax brings money and calculating spirit into corners in which they
do not dwell as yet, and thus becomes a formative factor in the very organism
which has developed it.[42]

Schumpeter also states an important suggestion that the separation of
gprivateh and gpublich was the consequence of such tax statesf efforts to maximize revenues. What was determined
taxable was assigned the term public. In contrast,
aristocrats, merchants or bourgeois attempted to maximize the sphere of family
or domestic domain, which was defined as private. Privacy in this sense was not related
to human rights and so on, but was their attempts to escape from
taxations. g[T]he individual
economy of each family had become the center of its existence; and that thereby
a private sphere was created which was now to be confronted by the public
sphere as a distinguishable element.h[43] On the other hand, giving up
certain amounts of income for taxation guaranteed the freedom of economic
activities, detached from feudal subjugation. gThis is, therefore, the right to
buy oneself out of a personal obligation by means of money.h[44]The
essential element of capitalism – the private property – was, therefore, the outcome of the concession with
the State.

Theda Skocpol reinstated the
statefs own functions and interests.[45] gState
organizations necessarily compete to some extent with the dominant class(es) in
appropriating resources from the economy and society.h[46]She also
claims that the statefs core interests are to compete with other states and
maintain internal order. And such
interests could sometimes interfere with capitalists:

The state normally performs two basic sets of
tasks: it maintains order, and it competes with other actual or potential
states. c Although both the state
and the dominant class(es) share a broad interest in keeping the subordinate
classes in place in society and at work in the existing economy, the statefs
own fundamental interest in maintaining sheer physical order and political
peace may lead it – especially in periods of crisis – to enforce concessions to
subordinate-class demands. These
concessions may be the expense of the interests of the dominant class, but not
contrary to the statefs own interests in controlling the population and collecting
taxes and military recruits.[47]

Here Skocpol tries hard to argue with Marxist understanding of the
state as the tool of a dominant class.
The state can be the tool of a
dominant class, but also does have
its own subjective motive of action.
She maintains that the competition for overseas domination was not
original to the interests of capitalists.
Merchants rather prefer a peaceful stabilization of international
geopolitics, in which they can engage in commerce.

The international states
system as a transnational structure of military competition was not originally
created by capitalism. Throughout
modern world history, it represents an analytically autonomous level of
transnational reality – interdependent
in its structure and dynamics with world capitalism, but not reducible to it.[48]

I agree with Skocpol in this account;
another question is, however, why such a monopoly of violence by the state can
gain the support of the capitalists or the nation. The
statefs gprivateh interests have to be
recognized as the gcommon exigency.h In fact, there is
a gcommon exigency.h The
appropriation-redistribution exchange exist all around the world. It is not only because gviolenth
appropriation is by nature prevalent, but also the opposite pole – redistribution
– is a universal necessity. Many
social infrastructures are impossible to build or run solely by
private-interest companies. Without
short-term gains in mind, social institutions must engage in gpublich
enterprises. States legitimize tax
collection by exploiting this universal need of the social trust – commons
(even though the typical bureaucratic inefficiency would soon prove to show
itself).

Some would
argue that the free use of the statefs violence is no longer possible. In many ways, todayfs states have legal
restrictions on their conducts; such as the legislative board restricts
executive agencies by issuing laws.
Since such parliament members are elected by peoplefs votes, the laws are
understood to represent the will of the people. In his Transcritique,
however, Karatani remarks that the wills of individuals are so various and
unstable that in fact they can be hardly grepresented.h Besides, state bureaucrats usually
draft laws rather than legislators.
This is an old Hegelfs contention that the representative system or
election is rather the mechanism to let the citizens to believe that they
choose the laws that actually bureaucrats have inscribed. I quote from his Philosophy of Right:

 314

The
purpose of the Estates as an institution is not to be an inherent sine qua
non of maximum efficiency in the consideration and dispatch of state
business, since in fact it is only an added efficiency that they can supply.
Their distinctive purpose is that in their pooled political knowledge, deliberations,
and decisions, the moment of formal freedom shall come into its right in
respect of those members of civil society who are without any share in the
executive. Consequently, it is knowledge of public business above all which is
extended by the publicity of Estates debates.

 315

The opening of this opportunity to know has a more
universal aspect because by this means public opinion first reaches thoughts
that are true and attains insight into the situation and concept of the state
and its affairs, and so first acquires ability to estimate these more
rationally. By this means also, it becomes acquainted with and learns to
respect the work, abilities, virtues, and dexterity of ministers and officials.[49]

The core of the state
mechanism is the executive agency – bureaucracy – and the monopoly of violence –
army and police. Of course,
inspections by jurisprudential or legislative democracy exist. But there is a limit with these
institutions; because it is gonly an added efficiency that they can supply.h Only the democratization of the
bureaucratic system itself can change the issue of the
appropriation-redistribution exchange.

Again, the
appropriation-redistribution exchange is prevalent; because, as of violent
appropriation, social redistribution of wealth is also a general
necessity. Even if the violent
appropriation were abolished from the world, the redistribution would remain
indispensable. In the next, I will
examine this social trust wealth in detail.

The
Collaboration of the State with Capitalism and the Nation

Capitalism
cannot totalize its power to whole societies. Capitalism requires labor power and raw products, but it
cannot directly produce them. For
maintaining such fields, capitalism needs other institutions. Similarly, even a fervent nationalism
cannot maintain its own land fairly without capitalistic economic developments and the strong
state military. The state is the
same: gIn any case, the state has
its definite limits. These are, of
course, not conceptually definable limits of its field of social action, but
limits to its fiscal potential.h[50] These three institutions – the state,
capitalism and the nation -- have to rely on each other.

1. Colonization

As
Skocpol has indicated, statesf interests of world domination can interfere with
capitalistfs interests.
Nevertheless, to expand markets, merchants cannot help but welcoming military supports from the state. Historically,
this appeared as mercantilism – the collaboration of the absolute state and
merchant capitalists.

Before
the appearance of the
absolute states, there was no mercantilism, but
merchant activities, limited to cities or towns. When absolutist monarchy emerged,previous
antagonistic relation between feudal lords and merchants – as is shown by the city
fortifications – had shifted.[51] Internally,
mercantilist states created gnational marketsh and eliminated guilds or other
traditional trading customs. It
set the national boarder to accumulate the wealth created in the world economy within.

The development
of industrial capital – the development of machinery – drove further
colonization. Machinery required
huge amounts of cheap raw materials and also inexpensive labor powers. Also generally, once
the product and process innovations of a certain product had developed to a certain
level, capitals could no longer gain enough surplus value from its technological
development.[52] Then, the capitalist-state reinforced
military attempts for colonization in order to grasp
cheap labor. In order to maintain
the supply of cheap labor, the state closely regulated the international
currency rate. Globalization
has been always inherent in capitalism.[53]

Not only colonizing outside the country, but
also protecting inside from foreign economic powers is the task the state
performs.Relatively
weaker industries have sought governmental protections. Wallerstein points out:

the fact that capital has never allowed its
aspirations to be determined by national boundaries in a capitalist
world-economy, and that the creation of gnationalh barriers – generically,
mercantilism – has historically been a defensive mechanism of capitalists
located in states which are one level below the high point of strength in the
system. c In the process a large number of countries create national economic
barriers whose consequences often last beyond their initial objectives. At this later point in the process the
very same capitalists who pressed their national governments to impose the
restrictions now find these restrictions constraining. This is not an ginternationalizationh
of gnationalh capital.[54]

Hence, on the one hand, import-restrictions of competitive electricity products, and on the other, forcing free entrance to the Third World markets through WTO, can both become
the policy of one state.

2. Internal
Order

The
collaboration between the state and capitalism is not limited to external
coercions. Especially in the
peacetime, both prefer to maintain inner political and social order in a softly
manner. There arise many methods
of preserving the order. One of
the most obvious schemes is the police
force. As the famous Max Weberfs
definition indicates, the state is the sole proprietor of violence.[55]

The
establishment of the legal system is another
important role of the state. As
Benjamin made famous in his gCritique of Violence,h[56]
legality is in essence never substantiated without violence. Capacity to gpunishh is the basis of
jurisprudential institutions. In
the state legal system, three original sources of rules are intermingled – the
order from the state, contract rules for the capitalist
economy, and traditional customs.[57] Each of these three sources is based on
the necessity to run the three types of exchange. In modernity, these three sources of legality (or morality) are
accumulated into the state.[58]

States are also
involved with the maintenance of market functions and order. Shanahan and Tuma indicate the relation
of banks with the state:

Long
before the emergence of modern central banking and the regulation of financial
institutions, banks and governments were interdependent. Governments turned to bankers for loans
while also providing the bankers with crucial forms of protection -- including,
most importantly, help in collecting defaulted loans.[59]

Today, bank notes are generally used as paper
money. Governments could not issue
such gtrusth money, because their needs to collect state bonds – debt – for
flexibly adjusting their finances would undermined the very gtrusth of the
state notes. But, at the same time,
the guarantees given by the state to collect tax by the central bank notes and
to return its bonds by them are essential for the gtrusth of the bank
notes. The collaboration of the
state and capitalism is such a complex and co-dependent one.

The market system, when left by itself, constantly creates problems:
most notably, unfair distribution of wealth and anarchic cycles of
recessions. There occurs the need
of state regulations. In order to increase
effective demands, governments should incite investments by
lowering interest rates, and simultaneously in some cases, must provide public
investments actively.[60]

One of the
crucial works of the state was the establishment of private property
rights. Here Fred Block notes, gIn any complex society,
one of the statefs inescapable tasks is to establish a regime of property
rights. In constructing such a
regime, a Lockean conception of private property in which the individualfs
ownership rights are absolute is neither possible nor desirable.h[61]As Karatani
emphasizes in his Transcritique, the modern style of private ownership was actually given by
absolutist states on the condition that owners pay tax to the latter. In this sense, the private ownership is
actually the state-guaranteed ownership.
On this account, the abolition of private ownership is not to establish
state ownership, as Marxists originally thought, because they are in essence originating from
the same source: the state power to order. In contrast to gprivate,h toward the
end of Capital vol.1, Marx indicates
the possibility of gindividualhproperty:

The capitalist mode of appropriation, which springs from
the capitalist mode of production, produces capitalist private property. This is the first negation of
individual private property, as founded on the labour of its proprietor. But
capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a natural process, its
own negation. This is the negation
of the negation. It does not
re-establish private property, but it does indeed establish individual property
on the basis of the achievements of the capitalist era: namely co-operation and
the possession in common of the land and the means of production produced by
labour itself.[62]

Here, Marx is indicating that
gindividual propertyh is the developed form of capitalism. In the third volume of Capital,
he hints at the potential created bythe gsocialh possession through stock markets or banks.[63] This social possession cannot
retrograde into the monopoly of property – the state ownership. The gsocialh possession is something
both gindividualh and gin commonh at the same time. It is clear that he juxtaposes the bothin this
paragraph. There is a customary
interpretation of this passage, such as consumer goods to individuals on the
one hand and the means of production to the state on the other. But this is simply similar to the
justification of the statefs taxation – gpublich taxable gprivateh not – as I have explained through Schumpeterfs
findings.
This will not create any new type of social or individual property
system. Marx, in his Capital, repeatedly claims that the credit system will help bring
out such a new property system, but it cannot create it solely by itself. I will come
back this topic at the section of the alternative economy.

3. Public Goods

The other
crucial purpose of the statefs redistribution is the formation of the social
infrastructure,whose nature is different from private commodities or goods. Private economies can hardly provide it, due to its relatively small potentials for gaining surplus value (because of
its relative immobility, long construction time, and the public necessity to lower the fee to use
it).
Earlier, Adam Smith mentioned it: gerecting and maintaining those public
institutions and public works, which, though they may be in the highest degree
advantageous to a great society, are, however, of such a nature, that the
profit could never repay the expense to any individual or small number of
individuals.h[64] From a social viewpoint, social
infrastructure plays a highly important role to create local
environments.

Kenfichi
Miyamoto (1967) applies Marxfs analysis to his study of social
goods.[65] This is the premise and basis of the
department I (the means of production) and the department II (consumer goods) – he, therefore, calls it the
department 0.
Furthermore, the department 0 is also, like departments I and II,
divided into a department 0i (social goods used mainly for social or private production,
which is the source of the accumulation of capital) and 0ii (social goods for
social or private consumption).

Process of Capital

@

Social

@

Private

Production

Department 0i

Department I

Consumption

Department 0ii

Department II

For example, the
former 0i includes industrial complexes, roads, ports, airports, railways,
telecommunication, irrigation, power plants, military facilities, etc. The department 0ii includes public
utilities, commuting trains, parks, nurseries, hospitals, educational
institutions, cultural or entertaining facilities, etc. To be sure, both departments share many
infrastructures such as roads; however, their formation can be leaned toward
either one of the two (often to the production side, for example, a better
transportation system in industrial or office areas than in residential areas).

In order to
explain the statefs involvement with the construction of public goods, some
scholars point out popular pressures, such as political protest (social
demonstrations, protests, boycotts, strikes),[66]educational needs,[67]or social
democratic force (labor unions, leftist parties, voting power of workers).[68] However, these explanations cannot
explain the development of what Miyamoto calls social goods for production
(the department 0i).

The need of capitalism influences the development of social goods for productions (department 0i) more than the other (0ii). The state hurries the construction of
the department 0i in order to modernize industries quickly, while keeping the
development of living environments lower.

4. Financial and human revenues.

As clear from
the above observations, capitalism usually benefits from its collaboration
with the state. National citizens
can also gain as the consequence of the development of social goods or
services for public consumptions.
Then, what is the advantage for the state? It is obviously the maximization of their tax revenues as
the result of effective redistribution.
The state cannot sustain without proper amounts of tax revenues.[69] g[T]he state, as a condition of its
power, must organize its economic bases and encourage economic growth as an
ongoing source of revenue.h[70]

It
is not only money that the state receives from the capitalism and the
nation. Human and other material
resources (including arms, trans-communication systems and so on) are
indispensable for the state organization.
Capitalism supplies and develops various
goods with new technology. The continuing supply from the
nation to police, army and other task forces guarantees the monopoly
of violence, while various technical jobs require a complex bureaucracy
system. In order to receive loyal
citizens (subjects), the state distributes or intervenes into education.

Yet,
in order to discourage wills of citizens to participate in politics from
going further, the state quickly establishes
representative parliaments.
Because citizens gvoteh representatives, people feel that they are
actually participating in politics.
However, this is an illusion, because represented politicians actually
do not directly represent the people who vote, but represent some powerful
voice-makers and groups of bureaucrats.
As Kojin Karatani points out,[71]
since secret votes – indispensable for liberal democracy – hide who has actually
voted who, politicians are detached from
citizens, yet preserve the claim that they were elected and therefore represent
the people. As the
previous quotation from Hegel suggests,
parliament is a complex system to legitimate the actions
and decisions of the gomnipresenth
bureaucracy. The core of the state
is not the parliament, but the bureaucracy, army and the
absolute leader in the case of crisis.

This systematic limitation of citizensf
participations into politics through representation led the people like
Proudhon to anarchism. But his
idea differs from other gillusoryh anarchists. He has recommended the federalism based on autonomous local
governments.[72] In this sense, we can see the
similarity with the idea of liberalists, such as Alex de Tocqueville. I will not delve into this point, but
such an gassociationalh decision-making system would be the only alternative to
the state.

[9]Durkheim, Emile, ([1893], 1933), The Division of Labor in
Society, translated by George Simpson, New York: Free Press.This focus derived
from Comte, who was disturbed by the diversification of morality in
the modern world (Comte, Auguste, ([1838 etc,] 1974), The Essential Comte,
edited by Stanislaw Andreski, New York, Barns and Noble Books.).
The separation between
culture as tradition and as modern civilization guided the classical sociologistsf comprehension
of culture. This tendency
was also prevalent in German tradition as the work of Tönnis shows. (Tönnies, Ferdinand, ([1887], 1957), Community & Society (Gemeinschaft
und Gesellschaft), New York, Harper & Row.)

[12] 59:
Durkheim, Emile, ibid. Later
Durkheimians develop the analysis of the symbolic gritualsh of the modern
society, which function as the consensual symbols of cultural integration.
For example, Victor Turner analyzes the process in which high status
or position is recognized by the society in order to sustain its human
bond, what he terms communitas (Turner, Victor, (1969), The
Ritual Process: Structure and Antistructure, New York, Aodine de
Gruyte). For Talcott Parsons, culture is a system to maintain
the social order by controlling the norm or value (Parsons, Talcott, (1951) The
Social System,
Glencoe, IL: Free Press.).

[13]Instead of Marx, I quote Simmel: gIn view of the harshness and coerced nature of labour, it seems as
if the wage labourer is nothing but a disguised slavec Certainly
the worker is tied to his job almost as the peasant to his lot, but
the frequency with which employers change in a money economy and the
frequent possibility of choosing and changing them that is made possible
by the form of money wages provide an altogether new freedom within
the framework of his dependency.h 299-300: Simmel, Georg,
([1907] 1978), The Philosophy of Money (Philosophie des Geldes),
translated by Tom Bottomore and David Frisby, Boston; Routledge &
Kegan Paul.

[14] Hardin, Garrett, (1968), gThe Tragedy of the Commons,h Science
162, 1243. This theory is criticized by e.g. Ostrom, Elinor, (1990),
Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective
Action, Cambridge, England, and New York: Cambridge University Press.

[15] 21: Moore, Barrington, JR., Social Origins of Dictatorship
and Democracy / Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World,
Boston: Beacon Press, 1966.

[18] Marx explains this dissolution of commons in the following
manner: gCommunal property – which is entirely distinct from the
state property we have just been considering – was an old Teutonic
institution which lived on under the cover of feudalism. We have
seen how its forcible usurpation, generally accompanied by the turning
of arable into pasture land, begins at the end of the fifteenth century
and extends into the sixteenth. But at that time the process was
carried on by means of individual acts of violence against which legislation,
for a hundred and fifty years, fought in vain. The advance made
by the eighteenth century shows itself in this, that the law itself
now becomes the instrument by which the peoplefs land is stolen, although
the big farmers made use of their little independent methods as well.
The Parliamentary form of the robbery is that of eBill for Inclusure
of Commonsf, in other words decrees by which the landowners grant themselves
the peoplefs land as private property, decrees of expropriation of the
people.h 885: Marx, Karl, Capital, vol. I, Chapter 27 gThe
Expropriation of the Agricultural Population from the Landh, Penguin
Books.

[19] 132: Thompson, E.P., (1971), gThe Moral Economy of the English Crowd in
the Eighteenth Centuryh, in Past and Present, 50.

[23] Heidegger: gThis Europe, in its ruinous blindness forever
on the point of cutting its own throat, lies today in a great pincers,
squeezed between Russia on one side and America on the other.
From a metaphysical point of view, Russia and America are the same;
the same dreary technological frenzy, the same unrestricted organization
of the average man. At a time when the farthermost corner of
the globe has been conquered by technology and opened to economic
exploitationch (37: Heidegger, Martin ([1935], 1959), An Introduction
to Metaphysics, translated by Ralph Manheim, New Haven, Yale University
Press.) Of course, what led Germany (or Italy and Japan) to fascism
was their lack of colonies. England and USA had then already
conquered vast amounts of lands. They did not have to be expansionist
nor xenophobic like the
others, but rather
had to protect what they had already earned.
This is why they could boast gliberalism.h World War II had
ended after such
countries vanquished
the militarist countries. But, as clear even from todayfs world,
by escaping historical
lessons by winning the world wars, England
and USA have kept their characters of being
belligerent and imperialist. Being internally liberal
does not contradict with the fact that the same country can be an
imperialist externally.

[24] Benjamin, Walter, ([1936],
1969), gThe Work
of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproductionh in Hannah Arendt ed.,
Illuminations, New York, Schocken.

[31]As
Benedict Anderson analyzed, museum was also influential in creating
the imagined community called the nation. Within this institution,
archeological or classical works were classified as the national heritage:
gIn this light, archaeological restorations—soon followed by
state-sponsored printed editions of traditional literary texts—can
be seen as a sort of conservative educational program, which also
served as a pretext for resisting the pressure of the progressives.h Museum exhibit the stable collection of national heritages.
(181: Anderson, Benedict, (1983, Revised 1991), Imagined Communities
/ Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, London:
Verso.)

[35]Yet
Marxians have often focused their strategy on the grasp of
state power. Did they not conclude that
the change of only a portion of superstructure would not change a
society formed by the gbaseh?

[36]I
will analyze later why gfairh exchanges will produce surplus or gunfairh
distributions of income.

[38] 169: Tilly, Charles, (1985), gWar Making and State Making as Organized
Crimeh 169-191 in Bringing the State Back In, edited by Peter
B. Evans, Dietrich Bureschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.

[39] Dobb, Maurice, (1946), Studies in the Development of
Capitalism, London : Routledge & Kegan Paul.

[43] 106: Schumpeter, ibid. Also page 103-4: gAltogether,
there is nothing which could not be a ggeneralh or gpublich
affair, once the state exists; and nothing which must fall
within the gpublich or gstateh sphere in the sense that we could not
otherwise speak of a state.As long as the state does
not exist as a separate and real power, the distinction of public
and private law has simply no meaning. The statement that during
the middle ages public law was shot through with aspects of private
law or that there existed only private law is as illegitimate a projection
of our mode of thought into the past as is the opposite assertion.
The concept of the state is inapplicable to the circumstances then
exiting, but not in the sense that what we see today within the sphere
of the state was absent and that only the private sphere remained;
instead, the organizational forms of that time combined both what
we nowadays call the public and the private sphere in one essentially
different unity.h

[45] Skocpol, Theda, (1985), gBringing the State Back In: Strategies
of Analysis in Current Researchh, pp. 3-43 in Bringing the State
Back In, edited by Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Bureschemeyer, and
Theda Skocpol, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[46] 30: Skocpol, Theda, (1979), States and Social Revolutions
/ A Comparative Analysis of France, Russian & China, New York:
Cambridge University Press.

[51] Polanyi, Karl, (1944), The Great Transformation: The Political
and Economic Origins of Our Time, New York: Rinehart. Schmoller,
Gustav, ([1884] 1896), The Mercantile System and Its Historical
Significance, New York: Macmillan and Co.

[52]The
cycle of commodities is: the introduction of a new product, steep development, saturated market,
valorization of commodity types, factory exports, speculative investments,
bubble, falling rate of profits, depression, international conflicts, the introduction of a new product, and so on.

[53] From page 15 of Arendt, Hannah, (1951), The Origins of Totalitarianism,
New York:Meridian Books. gthe rise of imperialism at the end
of the nineteenth century when capitalist business in the form of
expansion could no longer be carried out without active political
help and intervention by the state.h

[54] 87-8: Wallerstein, Immanuel, ([1974] 2000), gThe Rise and Future
Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis,h
in 71-105: The Essential Wallerstein, New York: The New Press.

[55] Weber, Max, (1958), Politics as Vocation, in, Gerth and
Mills ed., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, New York, Oxford
University Press. This remark originally
came from Lenin.

[57]To
secure the political rule or the concentration of power, the state
orders to its subjects. The second one derived from merchantfs
market activities. Economic contracts between agents must be
also secured by the state legal system. Human rights for bourgeois
are the rights to be compensated if such contracts are broken.
In essence, there is no other way to solve human rights violations
but compensation, which can be enforced ultimately only by the statefs
authority. The third origin of rules is the
traditional custom within communities. The infringement of this
custom can be resulted in exclusion, ostracism. These customs
will influence the judgment of cases or interpretation of laws.

[58]The
people who would interfere with the interests of capitalist-nation-state
tend to be excluded from this glegality.h Such people include
foreign immigrants, foreigners, Palestinians in Israel or Kurdish
in Turkey, even though they contribute to the states in terms of tax
revenues. The inclusion of them does
not match with the interests of any institutions – capitalists,
the nation, or the state.

[60]It
was the detachment from laissez-faire economics. This
idea is often attributed to the idea of John Maynard Keynes, especially
in Britain or the United States, where classical economics or liberalism
had strong traditions. In other less developed countries —
the state capitalist countries — such as Germany or Japan, without
knowing Keynes, they had already executed such a policy; because they
were in need of the state-led concentration of capital for steep economic
development. (75: Karatani, Kojin, (2000),
NAM no Genri, Ota Shuppan, Tokyo.)

[61] 700: Block, Fred, (1994), gThe Role of the State in the Economyh,
691-710. in Smelser,
Neil J. and Richard Swedberg eds., The Handbook of Economic Sociology,
Princeton: Princeton University Press. Also see Campbell, John,
and Leon Lindberg (1990), gProperty Rights and the Organization of
Economic Activity by the State.h in American Sociological Review,
55: 634-47.So-called
institutional economics and sociology of economy are producing numerous
numbers of works concerning the role of the state on the maintenance
of markets: social planning (Cowell, Frank A., (1987), gRedistribution
of Income and Wealthh, pp. 109-11, in The New Palgrave Dictionary:
A Dictionary of Economic Theory and Doctrine, vol. 4, edited by
John Eatwell, Murray Milgate, and Peter Newman, New York: Macmillan.),
social security policies (OfConnor, James, (1973), The Fiscal Crisis
of the State, New York: St. Martinfs Press. ; Offe, Claus, (1984),
Disorganized Capitalism, Translated by John Keane, Cambridge:
MIT Press.), or the maintenance of moral order and trust (Shapiro,
Susan, (1984), Wayward Capitalists / Target of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, New Haven: Yale University Press. Shapiro,
Susan, (1987), gThe Social Control of Impersonal Trust,h in American
Journal of Sociology, 93: 623-58.).

[65] Kenfichi Miyamoto, (1967 ), Shakai Shihon Ron (On
Social Capital), Tokyo: Yuhikaku. Originally, Miyamoto was
concerned with public nuisances or pollution that occurred during
the 1950s to 1960s steep economic growth in Japan. John Roemer
termed such pollution or unhealthful products as gpublic badsh as
contrasting to public goods (Roemer,
John, (1992), gCan There Be Socialism after Communism?h Politics
and Society, 20: 261-76.); this is the direct translation of Japanese word ko-gai, which
became famous because of one of Miyamotofs books
(Miyamoto, Kenfichi, Mitsuru Shoji, (1964),
Osorubeki Kogai, Tokyo: Iwanami-Shinsyo.). The fact that such a word had invented
earlier indicates the catastrophic level of public pollution in Japan.

[67]Collins, Randall, (1979), The Credential Society:
A Historical Sociology of Education and Stratification, New York:
Academic Press. Larson, Magali Sarfatti, (1977), The Rise
of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis, Berkeley: University
of California Press.

[68] Castle, F.G., (1985), Working Class
and Welfare: Reflections on the Political Development of the Welfare
State in Australia and New Zealand, 1890-1980, London: Allen and
Unwin. Esping-Anderson, Gösta, (1985), Politics against
Markets: The Social Democratic Road to Power, Princeton: Princeton
University Press. Korpi, Walter, (1989), gPower, Politics, and
State Autonomy in the Development of Social Citizenship: Social Rights
during Sickness in Eighteen OECD Countries since 1930h, American
Sociological Review, 54: 309-28.