SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I want to talk a little bit about the
situation in Pakistan. I want to try and give you a little bit of
background, a little bit of sort of our thinking at this point in time
about the way ahead. And then I'd be delighted to answer your questions.

We became aware at the beginning of last week that there was emerging
concern within the Pakistani government -- one, there was a concern about
the direction and what would come out of the supreme court in its decision
on President Musharraf's election. But, two, there was also concern
expressed to us by Pakistani authorities about the security situation, and
what some of the actions by the supreme court, the impact it was having on
the security situation.

I tell you this not -- to give you a sense of two things: one, what was
told to us that were the concerns of the Pakistani government; and two,
that we were advised that they will be contemplating some kind of emergency
measure early last week. And we had a very intensive process of
interaction with the Pakistan government. Our Ambassador was involved,
Secretary Rice was involved in conversations with President Musharraf, I
had conversations with my counterpart. As you know, for example, I think
from the press, that Admiral Fallon had a meeting with our Ambassador with
President Musharraf on Thursday.

And we argued in various forums and various conversations that they should
not take this step, particularly not before any supreme court opinion, but
also after, because we felt that Pakistan was -- in moving towards a more
democratic future that the Pakistani people deserved and wanted. And we
were concerned that this would be a step off that path, and a step away
from constitutional, democratic government. And so we argued strongly that
this was the wrong course for the government to take. The government
decided for its own reasons to go forward, notwithstanding our advice.

And you have seen the rest of it in terms of what's been in the press. We
have been in contact with Pakistani authorities today, at the President's
direction. We had some concerns about the address that President Musharraf
gave to the nation, and the fact that that address did not deal with the
issue of and the status of the elections that had been expected and are
expected in January; did not deal with the issue of the President taking
off the uniform, which he said -- has said in the past that he would do.

And our concerns in that respect were enhanced when we saw the statements
that were made yesterday by the Pakistani Prime Minister, when he talked in
a factual context about how the current assembly could be extended, I
think, for up to a year.

And so this morning, in a variety of conversations, we made the point that
-- as we have been saying publicly, that we did not -- we recommended
against this action; we were very disappointed that it was taken, that our
-- we think it is important for the people of Pakistan that the government
get back on a constitutional footing; that the principal vehicle for doing
that was for the elections anticipated in January to go forward; that they
be free and fair elections; that the international community assist
Pakistan in ensuring they be free and fair elections; and that President
Musharraf carry through with the assurances he had given, including the
assurance that he would take the uniform off here.

We also expressed concerns about the extent of the actions taken under the
emergency resolution. We expressed concerns about the large numbers of
people that seem to be round up -- rounded up, in terms of political
opposition, in terms of members of the Human Rights Commission; the actions
that were taken against the press; that we were concerned that this might
become a broader action than what we had understood was contemplated,
recognizing that we were strongly -- that we were -- advised against this
emergency declaration altogether.

This -- that continues -- we've been encouraged by some indications today
from Pakistani officials that they intend to proceed with the elections on
roughly the time frame that has been anticipated. We encourage the -- that
issue and the issue of the uniform and others to be clarified, because we
think that would be a good message to the Pakistani people and to the
international community. And we are hopeful that we will see some
clarification on that in the next several days.

There's been a lot of discussion about the assistance issue, whether the
administration intends to cut off assistance. Secretary Rice said we are
looking -- as you know, there are various forms of assistance that we have
with the Pakistani government, some of them administered by the State
Department, some by Treasury, some by the Department of Defense. We are
looking at all of those to see if there are automatic triggers that are
cut, that have been triggered by the actions taken that would require some
kind of cutoff in assistance, because obviously we want to comply with the
law, and we need to know exactly what these statutes require.

We are in a situation where, as opposed to the late 1990s, when the United
States had very little assistance to Pakistan, had various sanctions on
Pakistan, and had very little influence -- that is a different situation
than it is now. We, as you can tell, we've had long consultations with the
Pakistani government. We regret that we were unable to persuade them not
to do that, not to take the action they had taken. We believe that the
relationship between the United States is a different one than it was in
the late 1990s, and that it is a value not only to the United States but
also to the people of Pakistan and the government of Pakistan.

And therefore, we, at this point, want to use that influence we have to get
the Pakistani government to do what we think the people of Pakistan want it
to do, which is to get back on a -- into constitutional government, back on
a track for elections, and to go forward in the process that we thought was
on train to move Pakistan in the direction of greater democracy.

We hope that we'll get some clarification on the intentions of the
government in the next few days, and our policy will obviously evolve based
on how the facts move on the next several days, because we have to keep in
mind what the goal is here. Is the goal just to punish this government?
Or is the goal to use our influence -- the fact that they want a good
relationship with this country; that we have, as we say, carrots and
sticks, to use all of those to try and get the Pakistan government to move
to a constitutional -- back to a constitutional path, to get Musharraf to
make good on the promises he's made to step out of uniform, to go forward
with the elections in January. That's the objective of our policy, and
that will be guiding the decisions that the President will make in the days
ahead.

There's no secret that there's going to be concern about this activity on
Capitol Hill. There's concern here in the United States, in the executive
branch, and concerns more broadly. So, obviously, they are questions about
the future of our aid and assistance, but what we're looking for now in the
next several days, sometime in the course of this week, we would hope, is
some clarification on the intentions of the government. And we've made
clear the direction on which we think they ought to proceed.

So that's where we are at this point in time, and I'd be glad to answer
some questions.

Q Did General Musharraf give Secretary Rice any assurances? What did he
tell her that he would do in the near term?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're going to let some of the statements
come out, but I think the statements we've heard in private are consistent
with what you're beginning to hear in public, that they do intend to go
forward with the elections. There was a statement today from the Attorney
General. There was also a statement from the Prime Minister, Prime
Minister Aziz, that clarified, if you will, the statement he made
yesterday. So we're beginning to think this is moving in the right
direction.

Q So you're satisfied with that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What we've said is that we've -- as I
mentioned in my background, we think it will be important for the
government to make authoritative statements as to their intentions --
important for the people of Pakistan, important for the international
community. And we hope they will do that over the days ahead.

Q Would General Musharraf make an acceptable candidate in the January
elections or should he not run?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The January elections are for elections of
parliament and I don't think there's an issue of him standing in those
elections. The January -- the point about January is over the course of
this and next month, the various assemblies at the national level and in
the five principal provinces all go out of business, if you will. And
that's what requires then an election and it would be a nationwide
election. And we think that is the way out of what has become obviously a
constitutional crisis in Pakistan; that the way to get to -- to proceed is
to avoid violence, and we've called for that, for all the political parties
to come together and support a way out of this constitutional crisis by
elections in January. We think that is the best way to proceed.

Q Why is it that there hasn't been direct consultation between President
Bush and President Musharraf? Is that a matter of leaving diplomatic
options open so that the ultimate U.S. diplomat can weigh in later?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think the -- you know, the
President has made clear what message he wants conveyed when Secretary Rice
talks when President Musharraf and when others of us talk to our
counterparts. I don't think there's any lack of clarity here about how we
think is best for the Pakistani people and the future of the Pakistani
nation for this to proceed. It's one of those things when, you know, the
question is strategy, and who does what, when, in order to optimize the
chance of that strategy succeeding. And at this point, I think the
President's judgment is that the messaging has been right and, as I
indicated earlier, we're expecting some important clarifications over this
week, as the President noted in his comments earlier.

Q So there is a diplomatic rationale for the people who have talked to
him --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There is.

Q How do you expect that clarification to come? Is that through
Secretary Rice and --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I think the clarification needs to
come from the Pakistani government to their people. And, obviously, what
the Pakistani people are going to want to look for at some point is, what's
the intention of their President?

Q Can I ask you also -- you've mentioned Capitol Hill and criticisms
there. House Speaker --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I didn't mention criticism. I said
there's obviously concerns, and as you would expect. There's concerns in
the executive branch, there's concern in the Congress, as well there should
be.

Q House Speaker Nancy Pelosi has issued a statement in which she said
that the Bush administration enabled President Musharraf's delusion, she
called it, by ignoring his undemocratic acts and a lack of internal support
in exchange for his assistance and efforts against terrorism. How would
you respond to this idea that the United States has sort of sacrificed one
goal here, democracy, at the -- in order to promote the fight against
terrorists, in order to continue this relationship with --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would say that what we've done in
Pakistan is emblematic of the President's strategy generally, which has
been in the war on terror, in the short run, to fight against the
terrorists; to take the fight to the terrorists; to try and deny them safe
haven; to go after their operatives and leadership, all the things you
know.

And Pakistan has been an ally in that. At the same time as you've heard
the President say a thousand times, true stability over the long-term
requires democracy and freedom, and letting people have a say in their own
future; and that the Freedom Agenda is, over the long-term, the antidote to
the ideology of the terrorists.

So it has been a policy where we have supported the Pakistani government as
they go after the terrorists, while at the same time making clear and
encouraging the Pakistani government to respond to their people in moving
towards more democracy and freedom.

And the point is that they were moving in that direction. You had seen
Benazir Bhutto come back into the political process. We were looking for
elections in January. That's all a good thing as Pakistan moves towards
greater democracy and freedom, and indeed if you listen to some of the
statements President Musharraf has made, he viewed that as a legacy that he
could bring to the people of Pakistan. And that's why it's so unfortunate
the decision that has been made to step -- seemingly, to step away from
that by an action outside the constitution. And that's why our objective
and our policy is to get them back on the track to more democracy and
freedom. So I would say, with all due respect, it misunderstands the
policy that we've pursued with some success.

Q In the run-up to the declaration on Saturday, in the bilateral
conversations, how clearly did we -- the government, our government -- make
to the regime that the aid assistance would be reviewed, if this action
were taken?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We said very clearly. We were very clear
on our policy, and one of the things we also said clearly is we would of
course have to review, because, you know, the Pakistan government remembers
the periods in the 1990s and the sanctions that they were in. And one of
the things that has -- questions they have had is whether the United States
was prepared to stand with Pakistan and the government and the Pakistani
people through ups and downs, or whether at the moment something happened,
where they did something that we didn't like, whether we would cut off the
aid, because that's what -- that's how they -- I think unfairly -- but
that's how they read the 1990s.

So this issue about the aid and assistance has a real resonance to them and
that's why it's a card that has to be played fairly carefully. Look, on
our judgment, President Musharraf, you know -- who is the leader of his
country -- but in our judgment, he's made a mistake. And the question is
what do you do when someone makes a mistake that is a close ally? You
know, do you cut him off, hit him with sanctions, walk out the door? Or do
you try and see if you can work with them to get them back on track? And
the President's guidance to us is see if we can work with them to get back
on track.

Why? One, because Pakistan is very important in terms of the war on
terror; that is true. But secondly, Pakistan is also very important to us
as part of the Freedom Agenda, because we think there is a chance, and we
think Pakistan was in the direction of greater freedom and democracy, which
is good for the Pakistanis and good for the region as a whole. And we
don't want to throw that over; we don't want to give up on this
proposition. We think there is a lot at stake for us and for the Pakistani
people, and that's why we're going to try and work along the lines I
described.

Did I -- did you -- I want to get to everybody once before I get through
every second time. Did I talk to you?

Q I do. This is the first time.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Michael.

Q Do you have an assessment, does the government have an assessment of
Musharraf's hold on power right now? Is this a situation like Marcos, you
know, in the '80s where basically the people have turned against him and it
was just a matter of time, to which he's gone? Do you guys have a feeling
about that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You know, one of the things about these
situations is you don't really know till it happens. They're -- we are
concerned about it; we get reports obviously from all the various sectors
that you would expect. But I think, you know, you don't really know. And
what you need to do is have a set of principles and have a set of policies
that advance our interests, and then work with a strategy to try and
achieve them. And that's what we're trying to do.

Q Still, given everything that's happened, do you regret having backed
Musharraf all these years? And is this a set-back for the Freedom Agenda,
all that's happened?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We don't know, because we don't know how
this story comes out. We're on the fourth day of this crisis. We don't
know. And as you say -- as you have heard, we have a strategy and a set of
objectives that would keep Pakistan, we hope, as an ally in the war on
terror, because it's not a favor they do for us; it is, remember, a --
terrorists have killed many Pakistanis. And so this is something where we
have had a partnership in the war on terror. We think, given the location
of Pakistan and some of the things that are happening in Pakistan, it is
important to both Pakistan and the United States to retain that
partnership. But we also think it's important for Pakistan to move on the
democratic track. And we are still committed to that. I think it's too
soon to say. We're in the opening days of this crisis.

Q Any regrets on the fact -- the President has been pretty up-front
about backing Musharraf in the face of some criticism.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think part of it is, he has been
the government of Pakistan. We have provided that government support
rhetorically and financially in the war on terror because it had been in
our interest to do so. We don't regret that at all. Secondly, we have
been pushing President Musharraf to move in the direction -- it's not by
accident that he has given his assurance that he would take off the
uniform. It's not by accident he had a set of elections set for January.
It is not by accident that Benazir Bhutto has returned to the political
scene.

So this has been an effort we have had to do both tracks of our policy,
both allied with countries who can help in the war on terror, and also try
and encourage democracy and freedom.

Q I just want to make sure I'm clear on the aid issue. The President,
in his public remarks, said we want to continue to work with Musharraf to
fight terrorists and extremists, which would indicate the funding would
continue in counterterrorism efforts. But are you saying that the entire
aid package is under review, including military aid?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What I said was, all of these statutes,
these aid programs come in different statutory provisions, and all of them
have various conditions. So the first thing you have to do is inventory
your assistance, and ask the question, is the legislation written in such a
way that there is some triggers that would require some action affecting
the aid and assistance. That's what we are doing. That's in the process
of what we are doing.

Q But we shouldn't interpret the President's remarks as saying that
military aid will continue when he says we want to continue to work with
them to fight terrorists?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We clearly want to continue them -- to
work with them to fight terror. And so what I said is really two parts:
One, we need to find out exactly what the statutes require. Secondly, we
need to get a sense of where this government is going over the next several
days, what is the way ahead. And third, depending on what that way ahead
seems to be, what course they set for themselves, and whether they pursue
it, we will know when and how to use the various instruments of influence
that we have.

But as I said to you earlier, this issue of assistance is a very neuralgic
one with the Pakistanis, given the history. And what we think we ought to
be doing is using our various forms of influence at this point in time to
help a friend, who we think has done something ill-advised, to try and get
back on a course which we think is what the Pakistani people want, and
result in greater freedom and democracy in that country.

Q Is the next several days a deadline or a time frame of any sort? How
will you know when the story is over?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we don't -- we won't know the story
is over in some sense until whether we see these elections in January and
what comes out of that process, and whether we see a return to the
constitutional order. What we would hope, and what we think the Pakistanis
need to see, and the international community wants to see, is some
clarification in the days ahead about what are the intentions of this
government. As I said in my opening comments, we got some conflicting
signals.

Those are beginning to sort out. You're seeing some of it publicly; we're
getting some indications privately. We think it's important for that
process to clarify and that the Pakistani government come out very clearly
on what they see as the way ahead, which as I said, ought to be a return to
constitutional order, elections, President Musharraf makes good on the
pledges he's made about the uniform and the like. So we're looking for
their intentions to be clarified.

Q Regardless of how Musharraf chose to address it, does the
administration believe there is a state of emergency in Pakistan?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The government has declared one and they
have adopted an order that appears to be sort of a provisional
constitutional order. That's what the document says. That is what they
have declared under Pakistani law.

Q You talked at the outset about the pending court decision, and you
mentioned the security situation. I wonder if you'd elaborate a little bit
on the security situation. There are published reports now of Indian
intelligence saying that the Pakistani military is demoralized,
hemorrhaging troops due to desertions and surrenders to the extremists in
Waziristan. Does the United States share those assessments?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As you know from press reports, they have
had a tough time in the tribal areas in north and south Waziristan. They
have lost a lot of troops. As you may remember press stories, a couple
hundred were taken -- Pakistani soldiers were taken hostage. It's a tough
situation up there. There has, of course, also been reports of violence
inside the country. So they have had these concerns, and we obviously are
concerned very much about what happens in the tribal areas, both from the
threat they pose to stability in Pakistan, both to the possibility that
there are people there who are training and plotting against the United
States, and because of the instability that that creates in terms of
Afghanistan.

Q So how did you get from that to a state of emergency? How do you get
from military setbacks, problems in the tribal areas to setting aside the
constitutional order?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We don't, as you know. And that's why we
recommended against it. What I was trying to give you a sense at the
beginning is what we were told by the Pakistani government were their
concerns. And as you know, we recommended against it.

Q What is your ideal time line from here on out? I mean, you mentioned
the transition from a state of emergency into a situation with free and
fair elections. How -- what's the transition point there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Politics doesn't work really on a sort of
timetable. And what I think -- what we've talked about is, we think in the
days ahead there needs to be some clarification of intentions, and we think
the key thing is these elections, which they're looking to in mid-January.
Again, there's no fixed date, there's some very -- it's a complicated
process to fix the election date, specific date, but we think, and we've
made very clear, that they ought to go forward in that time frame, which is
sometime around January.

Q Just to clarify, you knew about this at the beginning of the week.
Did the President at any point call -- that is before the declaration of
emergency? And related to that, do you feel -- how do you feel that you
can have some influence on what happens next when you seem to have had very
little influence on persuading him not to take this step?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Can't say very little influence, but
didn't work. You know, we don't -- we are the United States of America;
we're very powerful, we have a lot of influence, but we don't dictate. And
they made a different calculation. Other countries have made different
calculations that we have made. We think this one was a mistake and we are
trying to get them back on to a path.

We have some advantages in trying to persuade them to get back on a path --
one, because they do think of us as a strong ally, an ally they want to
keep and maintain. Obviously we have a complicated relationship of
cooperation in the war on terror and financial assistance. And those
things give weight to your opinions. That doesn't mean you're always going
to prevail. And we want to use that weight to try and get them back on a
constitutional track.

Q Did the President make any call last week? Was there any call before
this?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He did not. He did not.

Q A year ago when President Musharraf came here, President Bush said
that he trusted him. Now he's not --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And I would say to you, on the President
question, none of us recommended that he call President Musharraf. As I
say, we had a way forward that we thought was the best way to pursue our
interests, and none of us recommended that he call President Musharraf. I
think that was the right decision.

Ann.

Q When Musharraf came here last year, President Bush said that he
trusted him. If Musharraf does now take off the uniform, as you all keep
saying, how does that make a substantive difference? Who takes over the
military? Do you have any sense of trust in that individual? And do you
have any reason to believe that things would change if Musharraf takes off
the uniform?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Look, this is a story that we're in the
opening chapters of. And we don't know how it's going to work out. We
don't know what is going to be the attitude of a new parliament elected in
January.

Q What do you want, then, to happen if he removes his uniform and --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What we want is a set of principles, and
we want to go back to a constitutional order. We want to go back to
democratic and free elections. We want to have the political process
within Pakistan commit to move forward on a democratic track. That's what
we want.

Now, how that's going to work out, in terms of who has what positions, I
think it is too soon to say. We just really don't know. We're going to
have to see how this plays out.

For the moment, President Musharraf seems to have been elected by the past
parliament. That is a constitutional way of proceeding. We're obviously
now in a situation where we have a, if you will, a suspension of the
constitutional order. We need to get back on track. And then they're
going to have to -- the various parties are going to have to work out a
political situation for a way forward for Pakistan. And it's going to take
weeks to do.

Q The President a few minutes ago said that they tried to kill Musharraf
three times. Was that a misstatement? Because I thought that he -- that
published reports had said that assassination attempts, there were only two
of them.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We can check that for you. My
recollection is with the President, that it was three. But we will try and
get that for you and provide it to you.

The fact is, probably one is more than you'd like. (Laughter.)

Q What's your assessment as to the timing of this declaration of
emergency, assuming, that is, you don't accept the Pakistan government's
explanation that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I didn't say we didn't accept it. I
simply gave you --

Q I assume you --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I gave you what they said to us, and I
gave you the advice that we gave them.

Q What's your reading as to why it's happened now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think there was -- I can tell you what
they say to us. They were concerned about the activities of the supreme
court, which they thought was really acting beyond its mandate. And they
indicated concern about stability in the country going forward. That's
what they said.

Q The supreme court was going to, they were assuming, ask him to remove
his uniform, which is what you're asking him to do.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I don't think that's what the -- there
were a number of alternatives that the supreme court had in front of it.
One was simply to disqualify him from being President altogether and strip
him of his presidency.

Q -- clearly hasn't removed his uniform.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. There was the uniform issue, but
there was also, as you know, a constitutional provision that would require
someone to be out of government for two years before they can run for
President.

So it was a whole series of challenges, and I can't give you the detail on
them, but the most serious of which would have denied him the presidency.

David.

Q You've spent a good part of the past few years trying to convince
President Musharraf at various moments to be more aggressive against both
al Qaeda and the Taliban. If he spends the next year consumed in whatever
political upheaval is going on there, even if they do get back on track
with the elections, to your mind, is this likely to reduce their commitment
to dealing with al Qaeda and more specifically with the Taliban, who they
feel a little bit less threatened by than al Qaeda?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We'll have to see. In the short run
between now and the election in January, assuming that goes forward, it's
obviously going to be a very chaotic time and there are going to be people
have a lot of -- lot of things that they are watching. And we obviously
have concerns about that in terms of what may be going on in the tribal
areas. And we will be addressing those concerns with the appropriate
agencies in the Pakistani government.

I'm encouraged by some of the things that Benazir Bhutto has said about the
importance to Pakistan to fight terror and her view that more aggressive
efforts need to be made and that that is part of her program, not as a
favor to us but as part of her program for the Pakistani people. And we
would hope that one of the things in this process that they're going into
as people could come together on, is the proposition that they need to be
more aggressive in the war on terror for the purposes of the long-term
stability of Pakistan.

Q If I could just follow that. If you come to the conclusion that they
are not or they are not capable of doing it while they're trying to sort
themselves through this, does that change your calculation about how you
would operate from the Afghan side of the border with U.S. forces or
special forces, who so far you have, at least publicly, kept out of those
territories?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There are a lot of factors that enter into
a judgment about how we would fight the war on terror.

Anything else?

Q The aid review that you're talking about --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We going around for second rounds.
Anybody not had a first round? Alright, we're going to do these three for
the second round and then we're going to quit. Okay?

Q The aid review that you're talking about, is that limited to money
governed by automatic trade triggers, or are you looking at things, levers
that you could push yourself? Or is it just --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What I said as a first point: We've got
to inventory all the laws under which various kinds of assistance are
provided to the Pakistani government. And then on that inventory it says,
do any of them have provisions that are triggered by the events that we've
seen? If so, what are they, and what's the fall out? Are they waivable?
Are they not waivable? When do they cut in? We've got to do an inventory
and get a sense of what the territory is before we know where we might go
in terms of the consequences of that review.

And that's going to depend heavily on what we hear, obviously, from the
Pakistani government in terms of their intentions, this week, and that is
not a threat in any way. It is simply a statement of fact that we are
going to have to take a look at those various pieces of legislation to see
what they require by their terms. And secondly, we are hopeful that the
Pakistani government will clarify their intentions here in the days ahead.

Q You mentioned in response to Ann's question that it was too early to
tell who comes next if Musharraf takes off the uniform, as the
administration hopes. The most likely guy is General Kiani, I understand.
Can you tell me, do you have -- does the administration have a view on him?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think the Pakistanis have made
clear that if Musharraf takes off the uniform, which again doesn't affect
his holding the presidency but does mean he's no longer chief of staff of
the army, I think the current vice chief of staff is General Kiani, and I
think a number of people expect that he would step into that position.
He's someone that we've worked with a lot because of his former position as
head of the security services.

Michael, last question.

Q Can I just get in a question about Turkey? Did the Prime Minister ask
President Bush for anything specific in terms of concrete actions that he
wanted either the United States or the Iraqi government to take? And did
the President offer anything concrete beyond the strong words of support
that he gave when he came out and met the press afterwards?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There was a discussion between the two of
them, just as there had been in various levels of our governments as we
interact on this, both with the United States, Turkey, the Iraqi
government, and the Kurdish regional government. We've spent the last week
or so looking at concrete steps that might be taken that would help the
situation. We had some ideas. The Turks have had some ideas. The Iraqis
have had some idea. The Kurds have had some ideas. And one of the things
for the structures the two leaders talked about is to provide a framework
for deciding which of those things ought to be made to go forward. I'm not
at this point going to go into any of that publicly, but it was -- the
answer to your question is yes, some specific things were discussed.

Q And do you feel about the crisis has passed? Do you think that with
this visit, the chances of Turkey staging a military operation on their own
in the next week or two has passed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We've just had this conversation. There
will be some follow-up conversations. I think that that process needs to
run before we know where we are.