Last week, while most Western policy makers were busy telling
themselves that the election of Petro Poroshenko to the presidency in
Ukraine meant that the crisis in Ukraine was winding down, another
corner of the former Soviet Union descended into a period of brief, but
potentially significant, political turmoil.

Demonstrators took to the streets in Abkhazia, a breakaway region
of Georgia, demanding the resignation of de facto President Alexander
Ankvab, who they accused of failing to tackle corruption and economic
problems, among other things. Within days, Ankvab resigned and
parliamentary speaker Valery Bganba was appointed as an interim
president. Presidential elections are scheduled for late August.

At first glance, this seems like a minor event. The resignation of
a non-president of a non-state in a small and poor region of the
Caucasus is not the kind of thing that generally grabs headlines, and it
probably shouldn't. The broader context, however, suggests that we
should pay a bit more attention to these events, particularly as the
West is increasingly concerned about Russian aggression.

Abkhazia has been the site of unresolved conflict since the end of
the Soviet period. While most of the world sees it as part of Georgia,
the Abkhaz people see it as an independent state. In practice, Abkhazia
is essentially a Russian colony.

Abkhazia relies on Russia for its security and economic survival,
so support for Russia is reasonably widespread. While these events may
not have had anything to do with Abkhazia's orientation towards
Russia, Abkhazia -- like southern and eastern Ukraine -- is a place
where instability is good for Russia and bad for pro-Western governments
in Tbilisi or Kiev.

Georgia is scheduled to sign an association agreement with the
European Union in a few weeks. We know from recent events in Ukraine
that Russia is capable of doing a lot to undermine the European
aspirations of neighboring former Soviet Republics. In this context,
Ankvab's resignation, regardless of why it happened, looks somewhat
different and potentially more significant.

The new leadership of Abkhazia may create more trouble with Georgia
through skirmishes or tensions across the non-border between the two
polities, or by harassing the remaining ethnic Georgians in Abkhazia.
Perhaps Russia will encourage Abkhazia's new leaders to do this in
exchange for support in the August elections, or perhaps Abkhaz
politicians will turn to a harder-line Georgia policy to win support in
the upcoming election.

Either way, this could create problems for Georgia at a critical
time: The signing of the association agreement in late June will be
followed by a NATO summit in the fall that is of great import to
Tbilisi.

It is too early to tell whether Ankvab's ouster is part of a
Russian attempt to create problems for Georgia, but it is nonetheless a
reminder of the breadth of ways Moscow can foil the plans of post-Soviet
countries seeking integration into NATO and the EU.

Russia's reasons for opposing NATO expansion are clear, but
the hard and soft power at the country's disposal are easy to
overlook. Six months ago, Moscow offered then-Ukrainian-President Viktor
Yushchenko a substantial counteroffer so that he would reject the EU
association agreement offer. Six years ago, Russia invaded Georgia, not
least because NATO pledged that Georgia would eventually become a
member.

Given this recent history, the possibility that Russia played a
role in the change of leadership in Abkhazia should not be overlooked.

Russia's enormous influence in Abkhazia is exacerbated by the
West's policy of ignoring internal politics in Abkhazia. As the
crisis unfolded, Western policy makers and journalists struggled to get
information about the causes of the demonstrations, Russia's role
in those demonstrations, and the political leanings of the new leaders.

At a moment of instability and potential change in Abkhazia, the
West had no way to influence outcomes and almost no relationships with
important actors in the political or civic life of Abkhazia. The lack of
Western influence -- or of any alternative to Russia --may not seem
important, but because a Moscow-backed Abkhaz leadership can always
cause problems for Georgia, it probably is.

Lincoln Mitchell was Chief of Party for the National Democratic
Institute (NDI) in Georgia from 2002-2004, and is currently an associate
at the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute for War and Peace Studies at
Columbia University.