World War I

On 15 January 1918, a small party 6f Americans arrived at the French village of Villeneuve-les-Vertus, located about ten miles south of Epernay. Ordered from Paris two days before, the little band, led by Major Bert M. Atkinson and composed of Captains Philip J . Roosevelt and John G. Rankin, six sergeants, and a civilian, formed the vanguard of the people and organizations that would, five months later, form the 1st Pursuit Group. Major Atkinson, fresh from meetings with Brigadier General Benjamin D. Foulois, Chief of the Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), and Colonel William Mitchell, Air Commander, Zone of Advance, knew that the American people expected much from the Air Service. He also knew that the air arm could claim no real accomplishments to that point, even though America had been at war for more than nine months. Foulois and Mitchell therefore told Atkinson and his staff "to get started as quickly as possible.

Major Atkinson wasted little time in organizing a staff for the "1st Pursuit Organization and Training Center" established at Villeneuve-les-Vertus on 16 January 1918. He appointed Captain Roosevelt adjutant and Captain Rankin supply officer, and they set to work. Despite their good intentions, the conditions Atkinson, Roosevelt, and Rankin encountered in France complicated their work. The American staff in Paris had assured them that Villeneuve-les-Vertus was a spacious, well-equipped airfield ready to receive the three pursuit squadrons then completing the training course at the advanced training school at Issoudun, where American pilots transitioned from the trainers they flew in the United States to the high performance fighters they would fly at the front. Combat-ready Spads supposedly sat at French factories, awaiting the arrival of the pilots from Issoudun to ferry them to the front. The Americans found, to their chagrin, that the staff in Paris had little grasp of the actual situation at the front.

Villeneuve proved to be a first-rate airfield, but the French 12th Groupe de Combat occupied all its facilities. The squadrons training at Issoudun were far from being ready for combat at the front. As for the Spads, the French suggested that they might be able to supply some in six months or so, but French aviation officers reported that they had few they could spare at the time.

Captain Rankin, the supply officer, sized up the situation. He used some of his funds to purchase a quantity of champagne, and with its help and a little innovative bargaining, he obtained shop space from the French unit at Villeneuve-les-Vertus. By the middle of February, about a month after their arrival, Major Atkinson and his growing Training Center staff had managed to build or borrow a barracks and hangar space for thirty-six aircraft. When Atkinson reported that these limited facilities were available, the American staff in Paris dispatched to the airdrome the squadronsthat would soon make up the 1st Pursuit Group. The 95th Aero Squadron reported on18 February 1918. The 94th Aero Squadron rolled into camp two weeks later, on 4March. Neither squadron possessed any aircraft, but Major Atkinson and CaptainJames E. Miller commander of the 95th, began pursuing some promising leads.

The 94th and 95th Aero Squadrons had trained and travelled together sincetheir organization on 20 August 1917, at Kelly Field, Texas. First Lieutenant J. Bayard H. Smith became the first commander of the 94th, while First LieutenantFred Natcher led the 95th. When the two squadrons boarded a train at Kelly Field onI - 20 September 1917 for the trip to Mineola, New York, they consisted entirely of theenlisted echelon that would form the squadron's ground support element. Arriving atMineola on 5 October, the squadrons reported directly to Aviation Mobilization CampNo. 2. Each unit completed training there in about three weeks and proceeded toHoboken, New Jersey, where, on 27 October 1917, they boarded a ship for the trip toEurope. The two squadrons arrived at Liverpool on 10 November, spent fourteenhours in a rest camp, boarded a steamer at Southampton, and sailed for France on 12November. The 94th and 95th entered camp at LeHavre the next day, but theirtravels were not quite over. On 15 November the 95th moved to the Aviation TrainingCenter at Issoudun. On 18 November the 94th moved to Paris, where it divided intoseven detachments that immediately began advanced maintenance training in theregion's airframe and aero-engine plants. The 94th reassembled in Paris anddeparted for Issoudun on 24 January 1918.

After the 95th's personnel arrived at Issoudun in November, they receivedadvanced training on the same types of aircraft they would operate at the front. The95th thus found itself well along in its training when the 1st Pursuit Organizationand Training Center announced its readiness to receive units in mid-February, and itbecame the first unit to be attached to the center. The 94th made good progress atIssoudun, however, and it reported to Villeneuve not long after the 95th. CaptainMiller remained in command of the 95th when it arrived at Villeneuve; Major John F.Huffer commanded the 94th.

The 1st Pursuit Center controlled a pair of combat units, but neither was readyfor combat. The newly-assigned pilots and maintenance personnel were eager, butthey had little with which to work. Major Atkinson had obtained only a handful ofaircraft from the French, all Nieuport 28s, France's second-line fighter. The Frenchreported that they had no surplus Spads available to equip the Americans, soAtkinson and his staff agreed that the units would see action sooner if the Americansaccepted the more readily available Nieuport. On 26 February they received wordthat thirty-six Nieuports were waiting to be picked up at a factory near Paris. Acontingent of pilots departed within hours, but bad weather delayed their return. Theweather broke on 5 March, allowing fifteen pilots to take off for Villeneuve. Only sixsuccessfully completed the return flight that day. Weather and mechanicaldifficulties forced the others to land along the route. All the Nieuports reachedVilleneuve by 8 March, and Atkinson assigned most of them to the 95th.

Even as the 95th lay claim to the first sizable contingent of aircraft, the 94thmade its bid for fame by launching, on 6 March 1918, the first patrol flown by anall-American squadron in France. At 0815, Major Raoul Lufbery led two young firstlieutenants, Douglas Campbell and Edward V. Rickenbacker, on a two-hour patrolnear Rheims. A German antiaircraft battery challenged the flight, but it encounteredno aerial opposition, a fortunate circumstance, since neither Campbell's norRickenbacker's aircraft carried any armament. The two neophytes believed they hadflown an uneventful patrol. To their surprise, the more experienced Lufbery calmlypointed out that he had spotted no less than ten Spads, four German fighters, and aGerman two-seat observation aircraft during the patrol. He also showedRickenbacker holes in the fabric skin of the younger pilot's aircraft, a reminder oftheir brush with the German battery.

The 95th made its first flights on 8 March 1918. These missions followed thepattern the 94th established during its first sorties. An experienced pilot, frequentlyeither Major Lufbery or someone from the French group, led two or three Americanson a patrol over a quiet sector of the front. The Americans made great sport of theseunarmed patrols, but the French expressed more concern. The initial patrols proveduneventful, but they were not without their risks. The frail Nieuports had severalmechanical and structural faults, and engine trouble in a Nieuport contributed to the1st Pursuit Center's first combat loss.

Captain Miller, commander of the 95th, experienced engine trouble on atraining flight on 8 March 1918. He landed safely at Coincy and returned toVilleneuve by truck. On 10 March he returned to Coincy to pick up his aircraft. On theway back to the Center, Miller stopped to visit some friends at the airfield at Coligny,where he borrowed a Spad and flew a patrol over Rheims in the company of two otherpilots. German fighters attacked the flight; Miller died in the ensuing dogfight. Captain Seth Low assumed command of the 95th, but Major Davenport Johnson, whoflew with Miller on his final flight, replaced Low on 15 March.As training operations continued and the pilots gained proficiency, morale inboth squadrons soared. The A11ies anticipated a German offensive on the WesternFront, and the members of the two squadrons sensed that their real baptism of firewas at hand. With this prospect in mind, the members of the 94th began to discuss thedesign of a unit emblem. The 94th's commander, Major Huffer, suggested that thesquadron use Uncle Sam's stovepipe hat. Lieutenant Paul Walters, squadron medicalofficer, suggested a variation on Huffer's theme. Recalling America's decision to enterWorld War I after a long period of neutrality, he proposed a device that wouldsymbolize Uncle Sam throwing his hat into the ring. His squadron mates liked theidea, and one of the pilots, Lieutenant Paul Wentworth, volunteered to draw up sometentative sketches of the design. The result of Wentworth's work became one of themost widely-recognized unit insignias. The squadron's artists immediately began toapply the Hat-in-the-Ring emblem to the squadron's Nieuports.

Even as they took brushes in hand, events occurred that brought the units ofthe 1st Pursuit Group Organization and Training Center into more active combat.The Germans launched a massive attack against the British lines to the north on 21March 1918. The aircraft of the 94th and 95th sti11 lacked guns, and the staff in Parisreported that the pilots were not proficient enough to face the Germans. Villeneuvewas too close to the front to be occupied by partially-trained units, so the center movedto a quieter sector. Someone in headquarters also realized that most of the pilots hadnot received any formal air-to-air gunnery training. Consequently, on 24 March1918, most of the pilots of the 95th were ordered to the gunnery training school atCazaux, in southwestern France. On 31 March the headquarters of the 1st PursuitOrganization and Training Center moved from Vi11eneuve-les-Vertus to Epiez. The94th, reinforced by the few pilots of the 95th who had already received gunnerytraining, flew to Epiez on 1 April.

The center did not remain at Epiez for long. The field there was little more thana swamp. Aircraft regularly flipped over on landing, and the mud thrown back byflight leaders often broke the propellers of trailing planes during takeoffs. Because ofpilot complaints and damage to the aircraft, the 94th left Epiez for Goncourt airfield near Toul. The 1st Pursuit Center remained at Epiez, without squadrons. When the94th transferred to Toul it was temporarily assigned to the French VIII Army as an"Independent Air Unit."

The AEF air staff decided to transfer the 94th to Gencoult after determiningthat the squadron was ready to enter combat. Toul was an active sector, but theintensity of combat was low. The French used the region as a rest area for unitsrebuilding after an extended campaign and as a place to introduce newly-formed unitsinto combat, and it seemed that the Germans used their side of the line for much thesame purpose. Ground positions in the area were well-defined, with goodcommunication links. French spotters at the front passed information about enemyaerial activity back to control centers and to the airfield, giving the 94th ample time to launch its aircraft.

The squadron's first patrols from Gencoult followed a pattern similar to that ithad established at Villeneuve-les-Vertus. Two or three Americans in unarmedNieuport 28s, led by an experienced French pilot, flew patrols against enemylong-range photographic reconnaissance aircraft. The Air Service staff reported that:"The fact that the American airplanes had no machine guns was due tothe shortage of these guns that prevailed on the Western Front at thetime, but the fact that the area in which they worked was so far back ofthe lines as to make the danger of enemy attack negligible, coupled withthe fact that the morale effect of their presence was in all probabilitysufficient to ensure the retreat of an isolated enemy photographicairplane, rendered this experience a valuable one."

The 94th, still under the operational control of the VIII French Army, movedfrom Epiez to Gencoult on 10 April 1918. At about the same time, the squadron finallyreceived a consignment of machine guns for its aircraft. Mechanics quickly installedand tested the guns, and the pilots of the squadron prepared themselves for the timethey would actually be able to do something about the enemy aircraft they harassedduring their training flights. 16 Two days later, the commander of the Army AirService, French VIII Army, issued orders making the 94th responsible for control ofthe air over a sector of the front from St Mihiel to Pont-a-Mousson. 11 It seems unlikelythat the pilots of the 94th knew of the AEF air staff's judgment that the enemy pursuitunits facing it were "neither aggressive, numerous, nor equipped with the best type ofmachines."

On Sunday 14 April, the pilots of the 94th stood alert as an active combat unitfor the first time. Captain David Peterson led the squadron's first patrol withLieutenants Reed Chambers and Eddie Rickenbacker. Lieutenants DouglasCampbell and Alan Winslow waited on alert at the airfield. Peterson led his flightnorth from Gencoult at about 0600, heading for Pont-a-Mousson. The weather wasbad, and by the time they reached their patrol altitude of 16,000 feet Peterson hadturned back for the field with engine trouble. Rickenbacker took over flight lead, andhe and Chambers made four circuits of a twenty-mile stretch of front betweenPont-a-Mousson and St Mihiel. By the time they turned for home a heavy blanket offog had settled over the area. Rickenbacker entered the clouds and immediately lostsight of Chambers. Rickenbacker descended to about 100 feet before recognizing alandmark that enabled him to turn for Gencoult, where he landed safely. Chambershad not yet returned. At about 0800, as Peterson chided Rickenbacker for flying off indeteriorating weather, the squadron operations officer received word that Frenchspotters could hear German aircraft approaching the airfield. Campbell and Winslowtook off immediately. Minutes after their departure a German Pfalz D-3 fell out of theclouds and crashed near the airfield. An Albatross D-5 followed it seconds later. TheAmerican pilots had no difficulty confirming these kills. Campbell received credit forthe Pfalz, the 94th's first confirmed victory. Winslow was credited with the Albatross.The Americans landed about ten minutes after they scrambled. Both German pilotssurvived, and they reported that they had tried to intercept Rickenbacker's flight butbecame lost in the fog. Chambers eventually joined the festivities that followed.

Bad weather settled in, so the 94th remained on the ground for several days,basking in the glow of its "opening day" successes. Captain James N. Hall andLieutenant Rickenbacker shared a kill on 29 April, the squadron's only other victorythat month. As the 94th gained combat experience at the front, the 1st PursuitOperations and Training Center added additional squadrons behind the lines. Thepilots of the 95th completed their gunnery training at Cazaux and returned to Epiez on22 April. The 27th and the 14 7th Aero Squadrons reported to Major Atkinson'sheadquarters the same day. Both arrived without planes or pilots.

The 27th Aero Squadron was organized as Company K, 3d Provisional AeroSquadron, at Kelly Field, Texas, on 8 May 1917, almost fourteen weeks before the94th and 95th were organized. On 15 June, Company K was redesignated the 21stProvisional Aero Squadron. The Signal Corps then discovered that it had organizedanother 21st Provisional Aero Squadron in California on the same day, so on 23 June1917 the unit at Kelly Field was redesignated the 27th Aero Squadron, with MajorMichael Davis as its first commander. In mid-August the squadron left Texas forToronto, Canada, for advanced training. After about a month in Canada the 27threturned to Camp Hicks, near Fort Worth, Texas. Major Harold E. Hartney, aCanadian native and Royal Flying Corps veteran who had the dubious distinction ofbeing one of Baron Manfred von Richthofen's early victims, became squadroncommander on 2 January 1918. The 27th received orders to move to New York on 11January, but it did not leave Texas for Garden City, New York, until the 23d. Whenthe squadron arrived, medical officers immediately placed it under quarantine forscarlet fever. During this interlude the Army transferred two officers and sixtyenlisted men to other units. Medical authorities lifted the quarantine on 3 February,and the squadron moved onto a troop ship. Squadron personnel lived aboard thetransport until 26 February, when it sailed for Liverpool. The 27th arrived in Englandon 5 March 1918, the same day the 95th received its first Nieuport 28s in Paris and the94th reported to Major Atkinson at Villeneuve. On 23 March the 27th arrived at theAviation Training Center at Issoudun.

The 147th Aero Squadron arrived at Issoudun the next day. Organized on 11November 1917 at Kelly Field under First Lieutenant John D. Morey, it completed itstraining and left New York for Liverpool on 5 March 1918. The squadron arrived on 18March, proceeded to LeHavre on the 24th, and arrived at Issoudun late the same day.The 27th and the 14 7th trained together there for about a month. They reported to the1st Pursuit Organization and Training Center on 22 April.

The AEF transferred the 95th Aero Squadron from the training center at Epiezto the 94th's airfield at Gencoult on 4 May, the same day it directed the 1st PursuitOrganization and Training Center to move from Villeneuve to Gencoult. As of thatdate the center controlled three squadrons, the 27th, the 95th, and the 14 7th. The 27thand 14 7th were training at Epiez. The 95th found itself strung out on the road betweenEpiez and Gencoult. The 94th, still serving as an independent air unit with the FrenchVIII Army, flew daily patrols from Gencoult.

The 1st Pursuit Group was organized at Gencoult, France, on 5 May 1918 underMajor Bert M. Atkinson. Officers from the 1st Pursuit Organization and TrainingCenter, which appears to have been dissolved at this point, filled most of the groupstaff positions. Headquarters, AEF assigned the 94th (relieved from its temporaryassignment to the French VIII Army) and the 95th Aero Squadrons to the 1st PursuitGroup on the same day. The 1st Pursuit Group was, as its name suggests, the nation'sfirst group-level fighter organization, but it was not the AEF's first flying group. Thathonor went to the 1st Corps Observation Group, organized in early April. The 27th andthe 147th Aero Squadrons joined the group on 30 May.

The group suffered a devastating loss two weeks later. On 19 May Major RaoulLufbery, part of the group staff but flying with the 94th, took off to intercept a Germanintruder. He attacked the two-seater, but the German gunner hit Lufbery's Nieuportin the gas tank. The aircraft burst into flames. Lufbery rode the blazing machine downto about 3,000 feet, where he apparently jumped out of the aircraft. He wore noparachute; French villagers who witnessed his fall reported that he struck a fence,staggered briefly to his feet, then fell over dead. Lufbery had received credit forseventeen kills at the time of his death, although he may have scored at least thatmany more that were never confirmed.

Lufbery's death stunned the group. He had helped to train many of the pilots,and they respected his courage and ability. The 94th and the 95th turned out in forcefor his funeral the next day. Lieutenant Kenneth P. Culbert of the 95th described theceremony:

"As we marched to the grave, the sun was just sinking behind themountain that rises so abruptly in front of Toul; the sky was a faultlessblue and the air heavy with the scent of blossoms. An American and aFrench General led the procession, followed by a band which played thefuneral march and "Nearer My God to Thee" so beautifully that I couldhardly keep my eyes dry. There followed the officers of his squadron andmy own, and after us, a group of Frenchmen, famous in the stories of thiswar, American officers of high rank, and two American companies ofInfantry, separated by a French company. We passed before crowds ofAmerican nurses in their clean white uniforms and a throng of patientsand French civilians. He was given a full military burial, with thesalutes of the firing squad and the repetition of taps, one answering theother from the west .... Truly France and America had assembled to paythe last tribute to one of their bravest soldiers. My only prayer is thatsomehow, by some means, I may do as much for my country before I too gowest-ifin that direction I am to travel."

Lieutenant Culbert died in battle -"he went west" -the next day.

As the pilots of the 1st Pursuit Group helped lay Major Lufbery to rest, themembers of the 27th Aero Squadron prepared themselves for their own initiation intocombat. As part of this process, the pilots of the 27th met to consider a squadroninsignia. They discussed several possibilities before Lieutenant Malcolm Gunnsuggested a design he noticed in New York that struck his fancy. The Anheuser-Buschbrewerv used (and continues to use) an eagle for its corporate logo. Gunn suggestedthat the 27th adopt a variation of this design, an eagle with outspread wings andtalons diving on its prey. A Corporal Blumberg drew a sample design on 18 May, andthe other members of the squadron decided it would make an ideal insignia. Thesquadron continues to use a variation of this design, although a falcon replaced theeagle in 1924.

The 27th (under Major Harold Hartney) and the 14 7th (under Major GeoffreyBonnell) reported to Gencoult on 31 May. On the same day Lieutenant DouglasCampbell of the 94th became the nation's first "ace" when he shot down a GermanRumpler observation plane over American lines near the village of Menial-La-Tours.The 94th took over the task of introducing the 27th to the intricacies of aerial combat,and pilots from the 94th led pilots of the 27th on their first patrols on 2 June. The 27thscored its first kill on 13 June, when four pilots combined to down an Albatross. By theend of June, as the 1st Pursuit Group prepared to move to a more active front, thegroup's four squadrons had accumulated twenty-seven confirmed kills, althoughpilots claimed to have shot down a total of fifty-eight enemy aircraft.

Group headquarters warned its units to be prepared to move on short notice inearly June, when allied intelligence advised that a German offensive was imminent.On 26 June the group dispatched an advance party from the 27th to set up shop atTonquin airfield, a site about 150 miles west of Toul and some twenty-five milessouthwest of Chateau-Thierry. The 1st Pursuit Group headquarters transferred toTonquin on 29 June, the same day the group's fifty-four Nieuport 28s made the flightwithout incident. The group mustered all its organizations the next day, and the foursquadrons each made patrols over the area to familiarize the pilots with the terrain.Combat operations began on 1July.

The move to Tonquin marked the end of the 1st Pursuit Group's formativeperiod and the beginning of four months of almost continuous front line service. Byabout 1 July the group's four squadrons were competent, combat-ready organizations.Since April they had accounted for twenty-seven kills (seventeen credited to the 94th,six to the 95th, and four to the 27th) in the quiet Toul sector. The squadrons learned tofly and fight together, and the group staff gained valuable experience controllingoperations. The move to the Marne front exriosed the members ofthe 1st Pursuit Groupto a more demanding combat environment.The United States had so little combat aviation experience that most of the 1stPursuit Group's actions during this period established precedents. The move fromToul to Tonquin, for example, was one of the Air Service's first large-scale tacticalrelocations in the face of the enemy. The AEF air staff considered the move to be sosuccessful and so carefully executed that the official history suggested that it "mightalmost be considered a model."Atkinson organized the group into three echelons. The first formed an advanceparty, dispatched by ground transportation, that "comprised sufficient personnel fromeach squadron to care for the arriving airplanes, to install the necessary telephonicliaison and to arrange for billeting the enlisted and commissioned personnel.

Theflying squadrons comprised the second echelon, while the third consisted of themaintenance and support personnel who launched the aircraft and brought remainingequipment to the new operating location. Atkinson devised a simple and efficientmobility procedure that was deemed a noteworthy innovation at the time.

The 1st Pursuit Group's operations on the Marne front marked the beginning ofa period during which the Army Air Service began to develop operational and tacticalprocedures. When the group moved to the Marne front, it joined with the 1st CorpsObservation Group and some French units to comprise the 1st Air Brigade, underColonel Mitchell. Allied intelligence had detected a massive German buildup alongthe front and predicted a drive on Paris. To provide air cover for the upcomingoffensive, the Germans deployed forty-six of their seventy-eight fighter squadrons,including Hermann Goering's Jagdeschwader I, the famed Richthofen Flying Circus.The quality and numbers of the opposition, along with the demanding requirements ofthe group's missions, forced the 1st Pursuit Group to adopt new tactics.

Colonel Mitchell assigned the 1st Pursuit Group three missions. The foursquadrons worked to allow American observation aircraft to operate freely, to preventenemy observation aircraft from completing their missions, and "to cause such othercasualties and inflict such other material damage on the enemy as may be possible." The tactics adopted to protect American observation aircraft subsequently causedunnecessary losses, but the most immediate problem the group faced came from thenumerically superior, aggressive, and experienced German squadrons. LieutenantHarold Buckley of the 95th described the situation:

"... the halcyon days were over. No longer could we hunt in pairs deep inthe enemy lines, delighted if the patrol produced a single enemy plane tochase. Gone were the days when we could dive into the fray with only aglance at our rear. There was trouble ahead. The action we craved was athand; we could sense it in the air like an approaching storm .... The skyaround us was filled with Fokkers; instead of a lone two-seater or two, wecounted the enemy in droves of twelve, eighteen, and twenty."

The two-to-six plane formations of the Gencoult days gave way tosquadron-strength patrols, twelve-to-sixteen plane formations divided into threeflights. The lead flight attacked first, protected by the other two, which supported thefirst if the situation warranted. In practice, the flights frequently fought separatebattles; the first attacked its target, usually enemy observation aircraft, while theother flights battled to keep escorting fighters off the backs of the lead section.

Doctrinal difficulties compounded the tactical problems created by the need tofly and fight in large formations. The group fared well when it flew offensive patrolsagainst German observation aircraft, but it suffered heavy casualties when it flewclose escort missions in support of the 1st Corps Observation Group. While the escortmissions proved to be great morale boosters to the crews ofthe observation aircraft, thepursuit pilots were less enthusiastic. The observation aircraft were slower than thefighters and they attracted clouds of German fighters. Directed to fly in a protectiveformation around perhaps one or two observation aircraft, the escorts yielded theinitiative to the Germans. "Denied the possibility of utilizing their maneuverability,speed or guns, they were easy prey. "

After suffering heavy observation and fighter losses, the American fliersadopted more successful tactics: the observation aircraft flew in larger formations,forcing attacking Germans to face the concentrated gunfire of their defensivearmament. Escort support took the form of squadron-strength fighter sweeps flownahead of and around the observation formations. This gave the fighters the initiative,since they could now attack as the Germans climbed toward the observationformation. Epic air battles involving several squadrons on each side sometimesdeveloped.

To further complicate the group's difficulties, a conversion from Nieuport 28s toSpad XIIIs began as the Marne campaign opened. The conversion took most of themonth of July. The Nieuports were fragile aircraft, prone to shed fabric from theirwings during violent maneuvers. Still, the 27th and the 14 7th preferred those "littlefellows that responded more to the pilot's thought than to his touch" to what MajorHartney ofthe 27th called "those damned Spad machines. "41 The 94th and the 95th, onthe other hand, had experienced more difficulty with Nieuports coming apart inmid-air and were delighted to get the Spads. The Spad was a sturdier and morepowerful aircraft, but its Hispano-Suiza engine was more complex and more difficultto keep in tune than the Nieuport's Gnome rotary. The pilot transition andmaintenance training process disrupted operations and effectively grounded eachsquadron in turn for several days, but the group flew what was available from day today.

The Chateau Thierry (or Aisne-Marne) campaign comprised two phases thatlasted from 15 July to about 6 August 1918. The long-awaited German offensiveformed phase one, from 15 July through the 18th. The Germans gained some ground,but the well-prepared Allied armies blunted the German drive. The Allies launched acounteroffensive that lasted from 18 July through early August. The 1st PursuitGroup saw continuous action throughout the campaign, with the 27th and the 95thperforming especially well. Pilots frequently flew three or four two-hour sorties eachday, often in the face of heavy opposition. The group flew observation escort,counter-observation and ground attack missions, with an occasional reconnaissancesortie added to the flying schedule. Losses were heavy: in July the group destroyedtwenty-nine German aircraft, but lost twenty-three.

Despite the difficulties encountered throughout the entire operation, the pilotsof the 1st Pursuit Group "maintained their aggressive spirit, and attacked and foughtsuccessfully superior numbers of enemy planes."44 The Air Service gave the grouphigh marks for its operations:"While it is true that several of our balloons were burned; that our groundtroops were repeatedly harassed by machine gun fire; and that our corpsair service suffered more severe losses than they anticipated, it is alsotrue that the 1st Pursuit Group carried the fighting into enemy territory;that our corps air service, despite its losses, was always able to do itswork, even the work of deep photography, and that enemy attempts atphotography and visual reconnaissance were seriously interferedwith."

The group operated out of Tonquin and later Saints (occupied on 8 July) untilabout 20 August, supporting operations on the Chateau Thierry/Marne front andbringing its new Spads into service. During the last ten days of August, the groupwitnessed a number of changes as it prepared for its next campaign. On 21 AugustMajor Hartney, commander of the 27th Aero Squadron, replaced Major Atkinson ascommander of the 1st Pursuit Group. First Lieutenant Alfred A. Grant replaced MajorHartney as commanding officer of the 27th. Major Atkinson assumed command of the1st Pursuit Wing, 1st Army, AEF. The wing included the 2nd and 3rd Pursuit Groupsand the Day Bombardment Group.

Between about 22 August and 1 September, the group moved from Saints toRembercourt, some twenty miles west of the town of St Mihiel on the Verdun/St Mihielfront. This move became part of the buildup for the American drive to eliminate the StMihiel salient, and the group made the trip under the utmost secrecy. As thesquadrons arrived at Rembercourt, they dispersed themselves around the field andcamouflaged their aircraft and other equipment. The group kept its deploymenthidden while it attemnted to mask the American buildup along its front from Germanobservation aircraft.​The attack began on 12 September; American forces eliminated the Germanpositions in about four days. During the campaign the 1st Pursuit Group covered thefront from Chatillion-sous-les-Cotes to St Mihiel, flying observation escort andanti-observation sorties. Extremely bad weather during the first three days of theoffensive forced American aircraft to low levels, where they attacked Germanobservation balloons and harassed troops on the ground. The attack caught theGermans in the midst of evacuating the salient, and American aircraft took a heavytoll of the retreating enemy. The weather improved on the 14th, but German airopposition centered on the southern flank of the salient covered by the 1st PursuitWing. As a result, the 1st Pursuit Group concentrated on ground attack throughoutthe campaign. Although ground operations ended on the 16th, air operationscontinued for another week to ten days.

As at Chateau Thierry, combat filled the 1st Pursuit Group's days. The pilotsagain flew many sorties each day, frequently landing only to take on more fuel andammunition. The pace of action took its toll on both planes and pilots; as the groundcampaign drew to a close, Hartney ordered the group to reduce its operations to givemechanics time to make permanent repairs on the Spads, many of which werebeginning to look like flying sieves from ground fire. The pilots were as worn out as theaircraft: on 16 September, Lieutenant John Jeffers of the 94th fell asleep whilereturning from a patrol. His Spad continued its flight on course, losing altitude slowly.Jeffers woke up in time to level out and crash on a hill not far from the airfield. Heescaped injury.

Another short lull followed, as the American army redeployed for theMeuse-Argonne offensive. The 1st Pursuit Group rested and received replacements forthe aircraft and pilots lost during the campaign. One noteworthy change of commandoccurred during this interval: on 25 September, Lieutenant Rickenbacker replacedMajor Kenneth Marr as commanding officer ofthe 94th Aero Squadron.

Rickenbacker took command of a squadron "which seemingly had never livedup to its early promise."When he checked on the status of the squadron's kills, hefound that the "presumptuous young 27th had suddenly taken a spurt, thanks to theirbrilliant Luke, and now led the Hat-in-the-Ring Squadron by six victories!"Rickenbacker immediately convened his pilots and announced that "no otherAmerican squadron at the front would ever again be permitted to approach our marginof supremacy." Within a week, the 94th had overtaken the 27th and neverrelinquished the lead.

After his talk with the pilots, Rickenbacker next approached the squadron'smechanics who, he reported, "felt the disgrace of being second more keenly than did wepilots."Not surprisingly, Rickenbacker later noted that from that time on thesquadron's aircraft were always in top mechanical condition. Lieutenant Rickenbacker resolved to lead by example. A squadron commanderhad administrative responsibilities, but they interested him less than the real matterat hand. He passed these duties to subordinates. To avoid the red-tape business at the aerodrome - the making out ofreports, ordering materials and seeing that they came in on time,looking after details of the mess, the hangars and the comfort of theenlisted men - all this work must be placed under competent men, if Iexpect to stay in the air and lead patrols. Accordingly I gave thisimportant matter my attention early next morning. And the success ofmy appointments was such that from that day on I never spent more thanthirty minutes a day upon the ground business connected with 94'soperation.

At about this time - late September 1918 - the 1st Pursuit Group reached itsoperational peak. All four squadrons were experienced, and staff officers at all levelshad served through at least two major campaigns. As of the end of September, afterabout six months of combat, the ~oup was credited with one hundred kills, achieved ata cost of fifty-seven casualties. 5 Major Hartney, the group commander, "found in theother squadrons the same ultra-fine quality of officers and men of which I had been soproud in the 27th, courageous, well-trained, decent, loyal and intelligent."Duringthe last seven weeks of the war the 1st Pursuit Group scored an additional 102 kills at acost of fifteen of its pilots.

The United States Army launched its final offensive of the war on 26September, when the American First Army began the Meuse-Argonne offensive. Theterrain favored the defenders, and the Germans had organized a formidable defensivesystem. By this time the AEF staff had come to appreciate "the morale effect ofaviation,"... and it was felt that the necessity of supremacy of the air was neededmore by American arms in these operations than perhaps ever before, toproduce the greatest results. It needed the morale supremacy, so easilyenhanced by a predominance of ground troops, of low-flying airplanes tocarry Americans over the awful terrain of the Meuse under tryingweather conditions.

The 1st Army air staff assigned the 1st Pursuit Group the task of providing thatlow-level support during the offensive. The staff ordered the group to clear the front ofenemy observation balloons and low-flying aircraft. The 1st Pursuit Wing, especiallythe 2nd and 3rd Pursuit Groups, provided top-cover for the 1st Pursuit Group. It alsoprovided escort for American bombers and observation aircraft. The staff knew thatthe decision to commit roughly one-third of the fighter force to tactical air supportmight jeopardize air superiority, but they believed that it was "more important thatenemy aviation, including balloons and airplanes, low and full in sight of theadvancing troops, should be destroyed at all costs."

Committed to low-altitude defense suppression and air support operations, the1st Pursuit Group reverted to the small formations and stalking tactics thatcharacterized its earlier service on the Toul front. The group flew most of its missionsduring the last seven weeks of the war at low altitude, attacking enemy observationaircraft and heavily-defended observation balloons, although pilots showed noreluctance to take on enemy fighters that slipped past the group's top cover.Perhaps no one was any better at this dangerous work than Lieutenant FrankLuke of the 27th. Luke specialized in attacking enemy balloons, a risky process sincethe balloons floated on tethers at known altitudes and enjoyed the protection ofaircraft and mobile flak batteries. Luke attacked these balloons fearlessly. His onlyclose friend in the 27th, Lieutenant Joseph Wehner, often flew top cover while Lukewent after a balloon. Neither attracted any particular attention until the start of theMeuse-Argonne campaign!f when their work against the German balloons broughtthem both fame and death.

On 18 September, Luke and Wehner were attacking a balloon line whenWehner noticed seven Fokkers stalking Luke's Spad. Wehner threw himself at theGermans, disrupting their attack and alerting Luke. The odds were too great,however, and Wehner was killed. Luke tore into the Germans, and in about tenminutes destroyed three balloons and two of the Fokkers. Luke was never noted for hiscaution, but he showed a tendency to take even peater risks after Wehner's death.Hartney grounded him for a time, but to no avail. On Sunday, 29 September, Luke took off alone to take on enemy balloons alongthe front. At 1905 he destroyed one near Dun-sur-Meuse. Another fell shortlythereafter at Buiere Farm. He then shot down two pursuing Fokkers before claiming athird balloon near Milly at 1912. Badly wounded and flying a damaged plane, Lukestrafed a German unit he found in Murvaux. He then made a forced landing near thetown. He drew his pistol and fired on the German troops sent to capture him. Luke diedin the ensuing gun battle. He was later awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor forhis actions on this mission.

The 1st Pursuit Group continued to fly low-level missions until the end of thewar. On 7 October, the 185th Night Pursuit Squadron, led by Lieutenant Seth Low,was assigned to the Group. The 185th was organized at Kelly Field on 11 November1917 and trained as a night fighter unit after arriving in France. Its prey were thegiant German bombers that made nightly forays into Allied territory, and its tacticswere simple: after receiving word that the Germans were in the vicinity, a pilot tookoff, climbed for altitude, and shut off his engine to listen for the intruders. When a pilotfelt he was too low he restarted his engine, climbed, cut the engine again, and resumedhis aural search. The squadron achieved no confirmed kills during the month it was atthe frontbut Major Hartney may have shot down a German bomber using thismethod.

The 1st Pursuit Group achieved remarkable success during the last six weeks of the war. In October the group's five squadrons destroyed fifty-six of the enemy at a costof thirteen American planes. The 94th set the pace with twenty-eight kills. Novemberwas an even more remarkable month. During the first ten days of the month the fourday-squadrons destroyed forty-five enemy aircraft or balloons without a loss. The94th, which claimed America's first World War I kill, also received credit for the lastaerial victory, a Fokker destroyed by Major Maxwell Kirby on 10 November. TheArmistice took effect the next day.

The 1st Pursuit Group ended the war with 202 confirmed kills. Rickenbackerwas America's "Ace-of-Aces" with twenty-six kills, twenty-two aircraft and fourballoons. Luke scored eighteen kills, four aircraft and fourteen balloons, whileLufbery received credit for seventeen kills, all aircraft. By squadron, the 94th receivedcredit for sixty-seven and a half kills; the 27th, fifty-six; the 95th, forty-seven and ahalf; and the 14 7th, thirty-one. The squadrons achieved these totals at a cost ofseventy-two American casualties, killed, wounded or captured. The 27th losttwenty-two; the 95th, nineteen; the 94th, eighteen; the 14 7th, ten; and the 185th,three. The four day-squadrons of the 1st Pursuit Group accounted for approximately38 percent of the Army Air Service's 526 confirmed victories in World War I.

On 17 November orders from the American staff in Paris relieved the 94th AeroSquadron from its assignment to the 1st Pursuit Group, assigned it to the 5th PursuitGroup, Third Army, and directed it to prepare to accompany elements of the AmericanArmy across the Rhine. The squadron departed Rembercourt on 25 November andoccupied the former German airfield at Moors four days later. On 7 Decemberadvanced parties of the group's remaining squadrons departed Rembercourt forColombey-les-Belles, where the 1st Pursuit Group disbanded on 24 December 1918.The 95th returned to the United States on 1 March 1919 and demobilized at GardenCity, New York, on 18 March. The 27th and the 147th arrived at Hoboken the nextday. The 27th ended the war as it began it, in quarantine in New York, this time withthe 147th. The two squadrons demobilized in April. The 94th ended its service with theThird Army on 9 April 1919 and arrived at Hoboken on 31 May. It demobilized at NewYork on 1 June. Even as the World War I squadrons completed their demobilization,however, the War Department began organizing a new 1st Pursuit Group at SelfridgeField, Michigan.

Major Bert M. Atkinson, first commander of the 1st Pursuit Group (5 May 1918 -21 August 1918)

Lieutenant Colonel Harold E. HartneyCommander of the 27th Aero Squadron and second commander of the 1st Pursuit Group