When I assumed command of the Pacific Fleet on 31 December 1941, our submarines
were already operating against the enemy, the only units of the fleet that could come to
grips with the Japanese for months to come. It was to the Submarine Force that I looked to
carry the load.... It is to the everlasting honor and glory of our submarine personnel
that they never failed us in our days of great peril.

 Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz

The exploits of our World War II Submarine Force are a
source of legend, pride, and legacy. Two previous issues of UNDERSEA WARFARE have
recounted the heroic exploits of Medal of Honor skippers Commander Dick OKane of USS
Tang and Commander Eugene "Lucky" Fluckey of USS Barb. Our World War II
Submarine Force produced five other Medal of Honor winners and scores of Navy Cross and
Silver Star winners  real heroes who laid their lives on the line to preserve our
nation in those "days of great peril." Admiral Nimitzs submariners did
carry the load when no one else could do it. Our World War II submarine crews, with only
two percent of the Navys sailors, were responsible for 55 percent of the
enemys maritime losses.

More recently, many of
the somewhat "saltier" (read older) sailors among us, who served in post-World
War II diesel boats and in the nuclear-powered attack and ballistic missile submarines of
the 60s, 70s, and 80s, can recall with pride the singular role we played in bringing the
Cold War to a successful conclusion. Lately, that role is becoming better known to the
public, as weve seen the submarine story featured on 60 Minutes, Nova, The Discovery
Channel, in numerous books, and on the Internet.

Submarines Today Stressed And
Strained
Many short-sighted, optimistic, armchair political-military observers predicted an era of
peace, tranquility, and a "New World Order" with the fall of the Berlin Wall.
Incredibly, some still cling to this misty-eyed hope. They were, and are, wrong.
Todays world, as you submariners who are out there in it know, is new  but
its not very orderly. You see it  and feel it  in the length and tempo
of submarine deployments, in the frequent "on-the-fly" retaskings you receive,
and in the increased operational demands on you for submarine intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (ISR) missions. Submarines today are working as hard or harder than
they were at any time during the Cold War.1

Fleet requirements for submarines on the front lines have
not gone down. In fact, theyve gone up, and they continue to increase. As our SSN
force has been cut nearly in half since 1989, the volume of ISR mission tasking undertaken
by submarines has doubled, due to the increased national need for information uniquely
obtainable by submarines in many new trouble spots around the globe. With 58 SSNs today,
and still falling toward 50, were already stretched thin by our efforts to meet all
the demands. As I said earlier, you submariners who are doing it, know it. Our national
leaders are fighting over you, to get enough submarine mission time to meet their needs,
and our Fleet Commanders-in-Chief have repeatedly stated needs for a force level of more
than 70 SSNs to carry out their heavy, multi-mission tasking. They know that our stealth,
endurance, agility, and firepower make SSNs crucial assets in an unstable world, today and
for the future. You respond rapidly to any crisis anywhere in the world, giving our
national leadership great flexibility. You do what no other platform can do  while
on station and forward deployed continuously for months  you can operate either
covertly when required, or overtly if desired.

There are numerous real-world examples of submarines
executing crucial missions during the past decade. Most are highly classified, but a few
have been selectively made public knowledge, like the important and responsive role of our
SSNs in helping face down the crisis in the Taiwan Straits in March 1996, as well as some
of the various Tomahawk strikes our SSNs have launched. And the pace is still going up,
not down. We continue to be called into action in the Persian Gulf, the Adriatic, the
South China Sea, and other regional hot spots, every day of the year  and without
question, the SSN represents our own premier ASW capability.

Although we currently have an advantage in ASW 
causing some, dangerously, to assume away a future threat  we cannot afford to
become complacent and lose our edge. Also, as those of you who have done it understand
well, the very skills you develop in practicing ASW are put to frequent use in executing
many of the other missions you alone can do so well.

SSNs bring powerful advantages to our national leaders and
our military commanders. But theyre beginning to feel the pinch as our numbers drop,
and theyre faced with gapping some of those SSN missions. A 1998 Defense Science
Board task force looked hard at our national security needs for submarines today and
tomorrow and at how (and even whether) submarines should play in the force structure
needed as the next century unfolds. That study on the "Submarine of the Future"
concluded:

Submarines are a key and enduring element of the
current and future naval forces  a "crown jewel" in Americas arsenal
... we need more, not fewer SSNs.

I cant say it any better than that. Fifty SSNs just
arent enough to do all the things youre needed for today, and 50 surely
wont be enough to do all the jobs tomorrow. Our submarines are hard-pressed and
using every bit of their multi-mission flexibility and endurance, stretching to meet the
Nations needs with an under-sized force.

The submarines's broad range
of capabilities can be employed "covertly when requireed, or overtly if desired"

Submarines Tomorrow  The
Imperative of Innovation
The future, smaller SSN force levels that follow from budget-driven decisions will
constrain deployment options and limit the quantity of deployed days, but will demand the
highest quality, technologically overwhelming submarines we can field. Admirals
Giambastiani, Konetzni, Fages, and I owe it to you to make sure of this outcome. The
accelerating pace of technology will increasingly provide our potential adversaries broad
access to more sophisticated and capable military systems and weaponry. Regional powers
will have greater capabilities to engage in area denial  using satellite
surveillance and targeting, missiles, mines, and short-range, limited-capability diesel
submarines, for example, to deny U.S. forces and our allies access to project presence and
power in regions of importance to international stability (the Persian Gulf, Taiwan
Straits, and Korean Peninsula, to name a few). SSNs, with their inherent stealth, are
recognized as significantly capable platforms that are less vulnerable to those
instruments of area denial. The continued capabilities of our submariners to succeed
tomorrow will depend on the vision and ability of the Submarine Force to rapidly
incorporate technological innovation, in order to maintain our margin in a fast-paced
technological environment and to optimize the warfighting capabilities of the submarine
platform.

There are two types of innovation that are the linchpins of
Submarine Force success  tactical innovation and technical innovation. OKane
and Fluckey were standouts in wartime, because they were tactical innovators. Once the
lines were over and the ship was underway, they had what they had. So they never stopped
looking for a better way to solve the problem or conduct the approach and attack 
and they were their own harshest critics. Today as well, our best COs are innovators
 the thoughtful risk-takers from whom we should all be learning.

Although it is undeniable that the face of warfare has
changed in the 20th century, it is also important to reflect on another aspect of history,
which has driven submarines and submariners to evolve, changing in step with advancements
in warfare. Three major submarine wars have taken place in this century: two U-boat
campaigns in the Atlantic, 1914-1918 and 1939-1945; and our own Pacific Submarine
Forces campaign, 1941-1945. The Cold War can count here too, in many respects. For
submarines  as with other weapons  war itself has truly been the engine of
innovation. And thus, history records that these conflicts were instrumental in leveraging
the inherent characteristics of submarines for innovative roles well beyond those for
which they were originally conceived.

That is why innovation is a central theme of this UNDERSEA
WARFARE issue  were laying the groundwork today to ensure we will have the
ability to effectively incorporate technological improvements into our submarines as we
proceed into the next century.

This is not a new resolution for submariners. Looking back,
the repeated willingness and ability to embrace technological innovation and put it to
full use have been a hallmark of the Submarine Force. Some of our advances, like the
transition to nuclear propulsion, the deployment of submarine-launched ballistic missile
systems, and the more recent addition of land-attack cruise missiles, have resulted in
revolutionary changes in submarine employment and national defense doctrine. Other changes
have been more evolutionary  less dramatic, but nonetheless vitally important to the
continued advancement of our Submarine Forces capabilities. The considerable
improvements in our 688-class submarines, from USS Los Angeles through USS Cheyenne, are
good examples of the incremental incorporation of technology to maintain our edge.

Admiral Skip Bowman
Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion

Admiral Frank L.
Skip Bowman was born and grew up in Chattanooga, Tennessee. He holds a
Bachelors degree from Duke University and two masters degrees, in Nuclear
Engineering and Naval Architecture/Marine Engineering, from the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology. In addition to several sea tours in both ballistic missile and fast attack
submarines, Admiral Bowman commanded USS City of Corpus Christi (SSN-705) and USS Holland
(AS-32). His ships earned a total of five Battle Efficiency Es during his
command tours.

Ashore, Admiral Bowman has
been assigned to the staff of Submarine Squadron FIFTEEN, in Guam. He served three tours
at the Bureau of Naval Personnel, most recently as the Chief of Naval Personnel from July
1994 to September 1996. Additionally, he served two tours on the Joint Staff and was the
SSN-21 Attack Submarine Program Coordinator on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations.
He has been Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion since September 1996.

His more notable personal
awards include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, the Distinguished Service Medal,
and the Legion of Merit (with three gold stars)

As I look to the 21st century challenges facing us, I see
five key areas of innovation which well need to work on, in order for submarines to
continue to evolve and maintain the capabilities needed to carry out the broad and
significant roles we are being called upon to perform. In simplest terms, we need to do
more to:

Get connected,

Get payload,

Get modular,

Get electric, and meanwhile 

Remain affordable!

Getting Connected
Our success here will provide the National Command Authority better opportunities to
leverage the Submarine Force for access to the littoral environment. Our attack submarines
must incorporate new technologies to monitor, report, and respond in real time to the
tactical situation, both in shallow-water areas and on the beach  focusing on those
complementary capabilities not well-suited to other (e.g., space-based) assets.

In one sense, this means getting better connected to
receive and process input from the outside world, using new high-fidelity on-board and
off-board sensors. Examples of this include high-resolution sonar systems, mast-mounted
electro-optics, more comprehensive electronic support measures (ESM), and novel miniature
sensors, such as those that could provide information on nuclear, chemical, or biological
agents. It also means better exploiting our use of  and access to  new
earth-observing satellites and manned and unmanned tactical reconnaissance platforms,
including Unmanned Aerial and Undersea Vehicles (UAVs and UUVs).

Additionally, it means that we must develop information
systems capable of assembling all this information on board and converting it into
knowledge for use in tactical operations; and then  breaking our historic
"radio silence" a little more often  sharing this large volume,
"spectacular, multi-sensor take" with battlegroup, theater, and national-level
decision-makers, who require it to plan and act on a timely basis. In turn, those external
commands and agencies must process and turn around selected portions of their own broader
knowledge  of direct and timely importance to our submarines  to better
enhance our own tactical picture in real time.

Affordable Deterrence.
TRIDENT submarines.

Even while getting better connected and breaking radio
silence when it is warranted, maintaining our inherent stealth will remain central to our
submarines unique value as warfighting platforms as the next century unfolds.
Frankly, its what gives us a prime seat at the table. Innovative concepts are under
development to enhance electromagnetic and acoustical information exchange, while
remaining stealthy. These include smaller, more efficient mast-mounted antennas,
long-range acoustic modems, and towed communications buoys, to permit higher data rates
and broader bandwidths at speed and depth. Todays funded modernization programs will
field many of these new sensors and information exchange systems. Purposeful research and
development initiatives are also necessary here, as the pace and complexity of
technological innovations continue to accelerate.

While stealth continues to be our inherent virtue, let me
suggest that we can do more to help the CNO with his peacetime forward presence
requirements than we are. There are times when making our presence known would  and
will  make sense: Covert when required, overt if desired. Planting the seeds of
doubt in a mischief-makers mind ("Where did he go? Whats he up to? How
many are there?") has some obvious advantages. This is not technological innovation,
but another example of tactical innovation. In fact, we used this technique effectively
during the blockade of Haiphong during the Vietnam War. In addition to aerial mining of
the harbor, a few of our submarines made their presence known overtly, then
"disappeared." Using their speed, they approached all the ships moving toward
the port, and word quickly spread about the dozen or so submarines surrounding Haiphong.
The merchant traffic abruptly stopped  mission accomplished.

Early in a conflict, forward deployed submarines will
likely be operated closer to potential adversaries than our sister forces. For this
reason, we are becoming ever more valuable participants in the planning, sensor, and
engagement networks upon which future command, control, and coordination of the
sea-air-land battle will depend. Weve got to get better connected  with each
other, with the Battlegroup, with the Joint Commander, and with the National Authorities.

Flexible firepower. The
flexibility of US submarines allows for rapid
response to contingencies around the globe in a wide variety of roles.
Here, USS Oklahoma City (SSN-723) transits the Suez Canal
with a Carrier Battlegroup.

Getting Payload
Both for controlling littoral waters and for impacting events ashore, submarines will
require more warfighting payload. I use the term "payload" in the broadest sense
here, to mean more than just "things that go boom." Sometimes we find ourselves
at the table, only to be confronted with the "so what?" question. We can make
more of a difference. I am including other forms of payload, such as off-board vehicles
and distributed sensors. This need for increased payload means seeking more volume and
more efficient use of that volume, for things such as off-board vehicles, reduction or
elimination of payload propellant and  farther off in the future  for
deployment of directed energy weapons and countermeasures.

The Defense Science Board study I cited earlier recommended
overthrowing what has been described as the "tyranny of the 21-inch torpedo
tube," by employing systems having a more flexible interface with the undersea
environment. By removing the size and configuration restrictions imposed by torpedo tube
deployment schemes, we will enable submarines to handle more payload and more different
types of payloads. Admiral Fages recently signed an agreement with Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to study new attack submarine design concepts, with
emphasis on innovative attack submarine payload options and the structural means to
accommodate them. Even for our present submarine designs, we will need to explore how
vertical launch system (VLS) tubes can be adapted to handle a variety of land-attack (or
anti-air  or even anti-missile) weapons, and how existing torpedo tubes can be best
used to deploy UUVs, or eventually, miniaturized and podded UAVs, in addition to their
more traditional payloads of missiles, mines, and torpedoes.

The miniaturization of conventional sensors and the
creation of wholly new types, such as nuclear, biological, and chemical detectors, suggest
new possibilities for comprehensive submarine-based covert surveillance and monitoring of
the littoral battlespace. For example, a network of drifting or subsurface buoys deployed
from sub-launched UUVs, along with corresponding air/land sensors carried or dropped by
sub-launched UAVs, could be continuously monitored in real time by satellite or submarine
telemetry packages.

In the near term, we are also studying potential payload
options which could be made available by converting a limited number of excess Trident
ballistic missile submarines to SSGNs  large, conventionally-armed attack boats. The
available volume of these large submarines with significant remaining service lifetimes
could be applied to accommodate a variety of new payload concepts, unhinged from the
"tyranny of the torpedo tube." They include  but are not limited to 
providing capacity for deploying over 100 offensive precision-strike weapons and offering
greatly enhanced capacities and capabilities for the transportation and delivery of
Special Operating Forces (SOF).

This innovative look at cost-effective, alternative
applications for a small number of Tridents does not affect our continuing national
reliance on Trident SSBNs as our reliable, survivable, and premier strategic deterrent
well into the next century  an era which is, unfortunately, likely to feature
further proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Our Trident submarines deploy 54
percent of this Nations strategic warheads, using only 34 percent of the strategic
budget and less than 1.5 percent of the Navys personnel. All this, rolled into a
patrolling platform whose whereabouts remain completely unknown to those who would
contemplate unleashing terror upon our Nations interests, make our Tridents an
irreplaceable element of our national security posture for the foreseeable future.

Getting Modular
Modular construction is the most cost-effective and operationally supportable means of
providing for technology insertion into our new submarines. Significant modularity is
already embodied in the design and construction of the new Virginia (SSN-774)-class attack
submarine. This design will facilitate planned technology insertion over the life of the
class. In designing follow-on submarines, these modular concepts will be carried to their
logical conclusion, to yield maximum flexibility in operation, economy in procurement and
construction, and improvement in our modernization rate.

With modular construction, we will also be able to deploy
significant payload variations in our submarines using a single basic design. The modular
architectural approach implements a basic, standardized structural "shell" that
contains the nuclear propulsion plant and ship control functions, along with fundamental
self-defense capabilities. Variable payloads can then be configured as
"plug-and-fight" modules that would mate with the basic hull form, using
standardized electrical and mechanical interfaces. This approach is similar to that used
in configuring the Space Shuttle, where interchangeable payload modules are swapped in and
out to best support the specific mission needs of each flight. These SSNs with optimized
special payloads must preserve the submarines core advantages of stealth, mobility,
and endurance and retain their important multi-mission capability. But the added
flexibility to substantially enhance a chosen mission area  or set of mission areas
 would offer a significant advantage over what Ive called our traditional
"Noahs Ark" submarine design concept, in which "small numbers of
everything" are carried aboard each submarine all the time, potentially to accomplish
any conceivable submarine mission.

A truly modular design would permit unprecedented
flexibility for operational commanders to tailor their fleets. They would be able to use
their current and projected mission requirements to determine the optimum mix of
specialized submarines (with volume-dominating, special-purpose payloads) versus other,
more broadly configured multi-mission submarines  without incurring the operational
inefficiencies and high costs of building and maintaining a number of less flexible,
specialized submarines built from the keel up.

Getting Electric

There is a powerful agent, responsive, quick, and easy
to use, pliable enough to meet all our needs on board. It does everything. It supplies
light and heat for the ship and is the very soul of our mechanical equipment. That agent
is electricity.

These prophetic words were spoken by one of the
worlds most legendary submarine skippers  Captain Nemo, in Jules Vernes
fictional 20,000 Leagues Under the Sea. Today our Navys ships  particularly,
our nuclear-powered warships with their "unlimited" reservoirs of stored energy
 stand at the threshold of access to remarkable capabilities that Jules Verne could
barely have imagined. There are significant operational advancements which could be made
possible by emerging technologies, but they require harnessing very large quantities of
electrical power. To realize this potential for a step improvement in capabilities, we
must pursue the development of modern all-electric ships, incorporating electric drive
technology. This initiative stands to yield significant growth potential to advance
warfighting technologies.

Just how would electric drive and an "all-electric
ship" give us new abilities to do all of this? Well, take a walk into your submarine
engine room. Today, on the order of 75-80 percent of the useful power of a submarine
reactor is solely dedicated to propulsion; it is either used for speed, or it is not used
 but in any event, it is not available to apply to other uses. Obviously then, only
20-25 percent of the reactors useful power can be used for other purposes. With
electric drive, 100 percent of the power generated would be placed on an electrical bus,
from which the skipper would be free to allocate energy wherever, whenever, and however he
needs to, in order to meet requirements dictated by the tactical situation. Examples of
future uses which would be made possible by this type of increased flexibility in
distributing the ships generated energy include:

Recharging high-endurance, reusable mobile payloads, such as
a number of long-range UUVs, and charging UAVs just prior to use.

Discharging high energy countermeasures against
close-aboard, high-speed torpedoes, from which evasion may not be a viable option.

Employing regenerative directed energy weapons, which would
exploit the stored energy of the reactor (rather than depending on the limited quantity of
propellant in the small number of weapons for which stowage volume can be made available).

The Navys future fossil-fueled surface ships might
benefit from this technology as well, even without a nuclear reactor to provide a large
power source, because the same type of flexibility in the allocation of available energy
would be realized, along with tremendous naval architectural flexibility and substantial
cost savings in fuel efficiency and manning reductions. In short, most of our Navys
ships might be substantially enhanced by "getting electric."

Submarines stand to gain a crucial additional advantage by
using electric drive  the next big step in improved acoustic stealth. As quiet as
our submarines already are, we will require further advances here, to keep pace with the
proliferation of rapidly advancing acoustic sensor and processor technologies. We have
already achieved most of the acoustic quieting that is physically available using current,
mechanical drive technology. To do better, we need to change the overall approach to
delivering propulsion and on-board power generation.

Maturing technologies  such as high power
semiconductors, permanent magnet motors, and magnetic bearings  can be exploited in
the near term, to provide the necessary high- torque, power-dense, quiet on-board
machinery we will need. Emerging technologies  including high temperature
superconductivity and direct energy conversion  offer promising future possibilities
of proceeding even farther down this road, achieving very low-loss energy transport and
storage, along with the prospect of a simpler propulsion plant, with few moving parts and
no steam in the engine room.

Heroes:
Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow. Our World War II heroes set the standard of excellence that enabled victory in the Cold Warand sustains the force today. Riding the technological revolution into the
21st Century,submariners will continue to play a central role in our nations combat
forces. Clockwise from top left: USS Barb (SS-220) sailors with WWII battle flag; USS Columbus (SSN-762) underway; Battlestations aboard the USS Tucson (SSN-770); and artists rendition of the coming USS Virginia (SSN-774)

Remaining Affordable
Those who claim there is no competition in shipbuilding today are missing another
post-Cold War reality. We are, in fact, in a pitched competition for limited resources,
vying with other areas important to our Nations interests  education,
transportation, comerce, and social securiy, to name a few. To field a Submarine Force
with the number of SSNs we need to do the job, those SSNs must be affordable. The hard
budget decisions constraining us to 50 today, even when more are needed, are sufficient
evidence of this  and Im determined to do better here.

We have made, and continue to achieve, substantial cost
reductions in the Virginia-class submarine  in areas such as a life-of-the-ship
reactor core; a simpler plant design that reduces pumps, valves, and piping by over 40
percent; reduced numbers of watch stations; disciplined incorporation of commercial
off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment; and a fully computerized design-then-build process of
construction.

Methods to reduce the costs of upgrading and maintaining
systems in existing submarine classes are also well underway. An example of this is the
Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion (ARCI) "state-of-the-shelf" upgrade for sonar
systems, first evaluated in USS Augusta (SSN-710) in 1997 and scheduled for full
installation in the fleet by 2005.

We are committed to continuing this cost-limiting approach
into the future. Modularity in both power systems and payloads, for example, will be a key
factor in containing the cost of submarine construction and subsequent upgrades, as well
as permitting a much shorter cycle time for implementing new design concepts. In a
low-build-rate environment, this is the most feasible and cost-effective way to field new
capabilities quickly to respond to new threats.

But our partners in industry need to do more. They should,
and must, understand what is core, and what is process or culture  then challenge
any part of the process and culture where we are not maximizing efficiency. For my part, I
need to find industrial partners willing to do this and bid a fond adieu to the others.

Conclusion
Since our birth a century ago, the Submarine Force has grown in capability, effectiveness,
and value to our Nation on the strength of the sheer guts of our people and continuous
 and often daring  innovation in technology, as well as in strategy and
tactics. In recent decades, with the impetus of the Cold War, the pace of innovation has
accelerated sharply for us, as nuclear propulsion, submarine-launched missiles, digital
acoustic signal processing, towed arrays, and countless other technical achievements
reached the Fleet. As our next century approaches, the Submarine Force will need to
maintain this momentum of inventiveness, in rising to meet the challenges of this
"New World Order" with which we are already engaged. With expanded payload
capabilities, improved connectivity, increased platform versatility made possible through
modularity, and the full electrification of our submarines, we will continue to be a
significant and lethal force, and a crucial element in our nations arsenal.

I began this article reflecting on our heroes from World
War II. I dont think thats being nostalgic or wistfully recalling faded glory.
I recount the stories of those heroes repeatedly, because they set our standards. They
developed the culture of our Submarine Force  they led the way. In the crucible of
an extended world war, numerous technologies emerged at a blinding rate, and those new
technologies demanded new tactics to employ them. Our World War II submariners took the
products of new technologies (the sonars, the radars, the improved torpedo exploders, and
more), put them into their boats  with welding rods, baling wire, and white line
 and then they figured out how to best employ their gadgets, sharing what they
learned with one another and telling their leadership what more they needed to do their
job. Using every bit of technology and innovation available  and a whole lot of
courage  they regained lost territory, developed a lead, and finally prevailed.
Anything less would not have been enough. And our submariners of the 60s, 70s, and 80s
continued this legacy. The public is just beginning to understand their enormous
contributions during those crucial years of nuclear gridlock with the Soviet Union. Study
after study after study has concluded that our country will continue to rely on its
submariners far into the 21st century.

Thats where you who are operating our submarines come
in. We have a lot of people working on developing and incorporating new technologies as
they become available  to ensure the highest quality in the face of diminishing
quantity. Its up to you to take them to sea, though, and figure out how to use them
to our best advantage  and to share them with one another, and tell our Submarine
Force leadership what works, what doesnt work, and what you need most in the very
integrated and Joint world today.

Theres a long, uninterrupted linkage between our
submarines of World War II, our Cold War submarines, our submarines today, and the
submarines well operate into the next century. When our Nation needs the Submarine
Force, nothing else will do:

It was to the Submarine Force that I looked to carry
the load.... It is to the everlasting honor and glory of our submarine personnel that they
never failed us....

We have always answered the bell, just as we are in all
parts of the world today. These are busy and exciting times for our submarines and our
submariners. Were doing the important and irreplaceable job our Nation needs us to
do today, and were putting in place the means to maintain our value to our
Nations arsenal into the next century.