The war in Iraq

An elusive peace

WITH the war in Iraq still raging, officially or not, a reader might be forgiven for casting a suspicious eye on the plethora of books that have already appeared on the subject. It can be some time before perspective and objectivity are possible: Michael Herr's seminal “Dispatches”, for example, was not published until three years after the end of the Vietnam war. So it is a pleasant surprise to find that good books on this war exist already.

Williamson Murray and Robert Scales, both American military academics, have produced a superlative record of the invasion—part history, part critique and part doctrinal template for the future. Technical and operational aspects are explained clearly without losing the depth required to make this a serious study.

“The Iraq War” draws on the lessons of past American adventures, from the limitations of technology demonstrated in Vietnam, to the successful use of “special forces” in Afghanistan. There is criticism for past American failings, such as the botched efforts to restore order in Panama after the 1989 invasion and the timidity of military and political leaders in dealing with the savagery in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. But such admissions add credibility to the authors' debate on the Iraq conflict.

They offer a potted history of the rise of the Baath party, but most of their focus is on the mechanics of the military invasion and its operational successes and failures. The coalition's military victory over at times solid resistance by the regime is attributed to the use of “overmatching power”, speed and flexibility. British forces receive praise for their ability to operate effectively with limited resources and for obtaining critical intelligence from special forces, Iraqi agents and other sources. The responsibility for Iraqi defeat is heaped entirely on the Baath leadership, for having a military machine designed more for internal suppression than for repelling invaders.

ReutersStill learning

The conclusion is that, although the war is far from over, henceforth the Iraqis “will be influenced less by demonstrations of fighting strength than by the emotional security that comes from safe streets, employment, electricity and fresh water.” If the daily needs of Iraqis are not met, “political and military defeats will come later, and at greater cost.”

Anne Garrels, an American radio reporter, provides fascinating observations on the Iraqi population in “Naked in Baghdad”. She tours Baghdad before the invasion, frequently eluding her minders, to document conversations with Iraqis. An elderly barber who once trimmed the beard of King Faisal tells of oil wealth before Iraq's war with Iran. A murderer let out under Saddam's sweeping amnesty wonders aloud why he is released when political prisoners are not. A doctor complains of the lack of medicines, the fault of both the government and sanctions. Corruption is endemic: by the time the war begins Ms Garrels is paying $1,000 for a $38 visa. Intelligence agents wander through the Al-Rashid hotel while Uday Hussein's bored Russian prostitutes dance in the garden.

While she loathes the regime and its apparatchiks, Ms Garrels admits to ambivalent feelings about the invasion. Her uncertainty is shared by many in Baghdad, who fear occupation will result in civil war and the partition of Iraq. There is widespread criticism for the reluctance of American forces to establish order. A marine officer tells Ms Garrels, “We're not policemen”; an army soldier puts it more bluntly, “I'm a trigger puller.” Iraqis are incensed that the oil ministry is rapidly secured while looters are allowed to ransack the national museum.

Ultimately, “The Iraq War” and “Naked in Baghdad” reach the same conclusion: that for all its might in war the United States has a great deal to learn about peace. If America squanders this opportunity to create a democracy in the Middle East and allows the formation of yet another hostile Islamic state, it will have virtually no one but itself to blame.