By Chayanika Saxena

Trump’s New Afghan Policy: Too Early for India to Celebrate

The Indian foreign policy establishment is acutely
aware of the implications that instability in Afghanistan can create for India’s
security and for the stability of the larger South Asian region. Having been at
the receiving
end of terrorism whose bases, ostensibly, were installed
in volatile spaces in Afghanistan, India is utterly sympathetic to the cause of
establishing a democratic regime in this war-torn nation in the hope of finding
a credible ideological partner in it.

As a result, ever since the ouster of the Taliban in
2001, India has supported international and regional efforts geared at bringing
political stability and economic prosperity to Afghanistan. Indian bilateral
efforts have taken many shapes, ranging from
capacity-building programs to infrastructure-related projects. These efforts have
further displayed its genuine intent to make Afghanistan a sound post-conflict
country.

However, even as India’s instructive
democratic and economic success has many lessons to
offer for the reinvention of the Afghan polity and economy, its international
partners have paid little heed to it. In fact, for the longest time since the
post-Bonn negotiations in 2001, India has been given a marginal
role to play relative to the position it has enjoyed in
the changing regional and global dynamics. Part of the reason for this
deliberate neglect stems from the geo-political tensions germane to South Asia.

Making a Pakistan a “frontline state” in the US’ War on
Terror, the latter was sensitive to the suspicion, and possible retaliation,
that India’s greater involvement in Afghanistan would create within the
Pakistani establishment. The other part of the reason for India’s limited role
as a security guarantor in Afghanistan emerged from its own reluctance to put
boots on ground in the apprehension that doing so might expose it to closer and
immediate tactical retaliation from the non-state actors harbored across the
Line of Control.

Some of the results of this part-forced and
part-self-enforced distance from the Afghan peace process have been: neglect of
India’s opposition to the distinction between the good and bad Taliban; India’s
absence from major regional initiatives; and even the downgrading of India’s
significance in the now-renounced five-circle policy of Afghanistan’s current
President Ashraf Ghani.

Consequently, Indian
assistance to Afghanistan has centered around four domains — humanitarian
assistance, mega infrastructure projects, small and community-based development
project and education and capacity development — all of which are meant
to bolster the rule of law and effective governance in Afghanistan. In total,
India has spent USD 2
billion in Afghanistan so far and committed USD 1 billion at the Brussels summit last year. Frequent educational and human resource
exchanges; dedicated air freight corridor; influx for medical purposes; and not
to forget, people-to-people interaction through cultural mediums like film and
television, have further deepened cooperation between India and Afghanistan.

Following the drawdown of international forces in
2014, Afghanistan was almost left to fend for itself even as political
stability and cohesion remained far away and the economy experienced withdrawal
symptoms. The absence of definitive international support meant that
Afghanistan had to look for ways to establish a semblance of order on its own,
and which it attempted to do so through what proved to be a misguided attempt
called the Quadrilateral
Cooperation Group.

Visibly upset with the neglect under the new Afghan
regime, India, nevertheless, on its part enabled the government to meet its two
basic responsibilities — governance and service delivery — by delivering two
major infrastructure projects, Parliament (Kabul) and Salma Dam (Herat). India’s cooperation with Afghanistan continued to take shape along the
lines of what was envisaged under the “Strategic
Partnership Agreement” of 2011.

As efforts unraveled, the dithering Pakistani support
to Afghan peace initiatives once again made Afghanistan look to India for
greater moral (and even military) support. Reciprocal high-level visits in 2016
became a regular feature, and economic, cultural, and political assistance to
Afghanistan continued without halt, including the very recently completed Qasr-e-Story that is to serve as
the new address of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan.

Having been
marginalized on Afghanistan in the past and with a self-proclaimed “economic
nationalist” in power, India could be asked to cough up more, which is bound to
generate reactions across the border.

Where the change of guard in Afghanistan created its
own set of repercussions; that which happened in the US became a cause of
global shock. The largely unpredicted rise of Donald Trump left many wondering
about the shape American foreign policy would assume. Afghanistan too was left
wondering about its fate especially as Trump, during his election campaign,
argued for the complete and final withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan.

However, Miles’ law — where one stands depends on
where one sits — prevailed and today
we have US staying put in Afghanistan with more troops (private or officially
not known) on their way there. Saying no to deadlines and maintaining an
element of suspense on the operational template of his Afghan strategy, the
revised mandate of Trump’s Afghan policy is to “kill
terrorists” and not “nation-building
again.” There is hardly anything new in the strategy; some
of its contours match those put in place by Obama.

The lack of a defined “win” and the temporal
imagination of the “end” in his claim “in the end,
we will win” has unnerved many, including people in
Afghanistan who are anticipating more (possibly unending) war in the days to
come. But let us not forget that the businessman in Trump would not let losses
accrue forever. In fact, in calling upon the Afghan government to perform or
see America leave could be read as American intent to look for an eventual “politically
honorable exit” whose responsibility can then be
placed on the ill-performing political class of Afghanistan.

Trump’s aversion to free-riding or drawing “blank checks”
brings us to his opinion of another actor — India. Seeking more “economic
assistance” from India in Afghanistan, Trump did appear to signal who the “good
guy” is in the South Asian region. This, obviously, became more apparent as he
proceeded to enlist India’s help after tightening the (rhetorical) screws on
Pakistan. However, apart from the vindication of its claims about the role of
Pakistan in not creating an atmosphere conducive for peace, India was
effectively brought into an unsavory quid
pro quo equation.

By asking India to contribute more to Afghanistan not
for the sake of contribution, but because it trades in billions with the US
(and makes money out of it), proved to be a major dampener. After all, India’s
contribution to Afghanistan is the largest in South Asia and fifth largest in
the whole world. As I have said elsewhere, to ask India to contribute more
because it makes more could be seen as the levelling of the free-riding
allegation against it.

Welcoming Trump’s strategy on Afghanistan, largely
because of his shrill attack on Pakistan, India is, however, cautious about
what to expect in the days to come. Once bitten, twice shy, as they say. Having been marginalized on Afghanistan in the past and
with a self-proclaimed “economic nationalist” in power, India could be asked to
cough up more, which is bound to generate reactions across the border. Also, given the supportive statements that have come from China and Russia for
Pakistan, India’s apparent tilt towards the US will become more evident if it
answers the American call for greater assistance.

To top that, the US’ careful choice of spheres for
seeking India’s greater cooperation, skirting the military and security domains,
is demonstrative of American awareness of Pakistani sensitivities which it
still gives an upper hand to.

Overall, in the absence of a well spelled-out policy,
there is indeed much to look forward to in the days to come. For India, which
has shown cautious pragmatism on matters concerning Afghanistan so far, it
would make more sense to not get carried away by the American rhetorical
posturing against Pakistan and jump into what might become difficult to manage.

About The Author

Chayanika Saxena is a President Graduate Scholar and a PhD candidate at the Department of Geography, National University of Singapore. Her doctoral thesis looks at the interaction between spaces and political subjectivities of Afghan diaspora in the cities of Delhi, Kolkata and parts of Kashmir. She can be reached at: chayanika.saxena11@gmail.com