United States v. Gibson

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Fort Wayne Division

March 19, 2018

UNITED STATES OF AMERICAv.SHON L. GIBSON

OPINION AND ORDER

THERESA L. SPRINGMANN, CHIEF JUDGE

After
events that transpired late in the evening on December 13 and
into the morning of December 14, 2016, the Defendant, Shon
Gibson, was arrested and charged with possessing with intent
to distribute methamphetamine and with being a felon in
possession of a firearm. Although the Drug Enforcement Agency
(DEA) had already been investigating the Defendant for
dealing methamphetamine, agents had not anticipated arresting
the Defendant that evening. The Defendant's interaction
with local police on December 13, as well as information the
Defendant's wife had provided earlier that same day
regarding contraband inside their residence, prompted law
enforcement to obtain a search warrant for the residence. The
Defendant seeks to prevent the Government from introducing
incriminating evidence discovered during the execution of the
search warrant, as well as the information that was provided
as grounds for obtaining the warrant, arguing that none of it
would have been obtained but for an unlawful stop that took
place earlier in the evening of December 13.

BACKGROUND

On
January 17, 2017, the Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss or,
in the Alternative, to Suppress Evidence [ECF No. 20]. The
Defendant requested that the Court “dismiss the
indictment against him or, in the alternative, to suppress
all evidence obtained as a result of the search of
Gibson's home on December 13, 2016, and any subsequent
custodial interrogation.” (Def.'s Mot. 1.) His
first challenge was to the decision of a Wolcottville police
officer to stop the Defendant and his companion as they
walked near a residential area. He argued that the stop was
made in the absence of reasonable suspicion supported by
articulable facts that criminal activity was afoot. Although
no evidence was seized during the stop, and the Defendant was
allowed to leave, the officer subsequently found a glass pipe
commonly used to smoke methamphetamine laying on the ground
underneath the officer's squad car. Seeking to further
investigate the Defendant's possible connection to the
pipe, police conducted a traffic stop of the Defendant in his
vehicle later that night. The Defendant complained that the
stop was made after the Defendant had already pulled his
vehicle onto the curtilage of his property. Therefore, when
officers used a drug detection dog to search his vehicle, it
was in direct violation of Florida v. Jardines, 133
S.Ct. 1409 (2013). The dog signaled to the presence of a
controlled substance inside of the vehicle, [1] and, according to
the Defendant's Motion, the police used this information
and the meth pipe to obtain a search warrant for the
residence.[2]

The
search uncovered several pieces of incriminating evidence,
including drugs, drug paraphernalia, currency, and AK-47
rifles. The Defendant was arrested. On December 16, 2016, a
grand jury returned a two count indictment against him. The
Defendant argues that the evidence seized at his home, and
any contemporaneous and subsequent statements by anyone at
the home, were the direct result of an illegal stop, search,
and arrest.

Upon
referral from this Court, Magistrate Judge Susan L. Collins
held an evidentiary hearing on February 28, 2017. Believing
that the Defendant was challenging the legality of the
initial stop and the traffic stop, including the dog sniff,
the hearing testimony was limited to those events. However,
the parties also acknowledged that, after the traffic stop, a
search warrant had been obtained for the Defendant's
residence. The Government noted that the Defendant had not
challenged the search warrant affidavit, and that probable
cause with regard to the affidavit was not relevant to the
evidentiary hearing because there had been no showing for a
Franks hearing. The parties agreed that the correct
analysis of the affidavit was within its four corners. The
search warrant affidavit was not presented as an exhibit
during the hearing, but it was agreed that it could be
presented as an exhibit with the post-hearing briefing.

In the
Defendant's post-hearing brief [ECF No. 28], he analyzed
the lawfulness of the initial stop under Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and subsequent case law.
Arguing that the stop was illegal under the Fourth Amendment,
the Defendant asserted that “the entirety of the
evidence against [him] must be suppressed.” (Def.'s
Br. 10) Relying on the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine,
he maintained that the initial “illegal stop . . .
provided the sole grounds for the traffic stop, ” and
that this “provided the sole grounds to detain [the
Defendant] for an extended period of time on his own
property, ” which then “gave rise to the series
of events that would culminate in [the Defendant]'s wife
emerging from her own home, allegedly providing the sole
basis for the resulting search warrant.” (Id.)

The
Government's Response Brief [ECF No. 35] defended the
initial stop of the Defendant, which also included a pat down
for weapons, as being supported by reasonable suspicion. With
respect to the traffic stop, the Government argued that it
was supported by probable cause that the Defendant committed
a traffic violation. Thus, regardless of whether it was
problematic to investigate the abandoned methamphetamine
pipe, the stop was justified. The Government further noted
that the edge of the driveway, where the Defendant stopped
his vehicle, was not within the curtilage of the home.
Regarding the Defendant's argument that the scope and
duration of the traffic stop exceeded permissible bounds for
a routine traffic stop, and that this purported violation
caused the Defendant's wife to exit the house and provide
information for the search warrant, the Government noted that
it was a new argument. The Government submitted that Mrs.
Gibson's voluntary statements were sufficiently
attenuated as to dissipate the taint of any illegality that
may have existed. The Government noted that the Defendant had
not addressed attentuation, but simply assumed that
“but for” causation was sufficient to suppress
evidence. Because the Defendant had not mentioned the scope
and duration of the traffic stop, or argued that it led to
the Defendant's wife providing information for the search
warrant, the Government requested a supplementary hearing to
present additional evidence.

The
Defendant's Reply Brief [ECF No. 36] took issue with the
Government's portrayal of the level of suspicion that
existed before the initial stop. The Defendant continued to
maintain that all evidence obtained on the night of December
13, 2016, therefore, was unlawfully obtained. He alleged that
the purported traffic violation was made up after the fact,
as evidence by the fact that the officer did not mention it
to the Defendant as the basis for the stop. The Defendant did
not agree that a supplemental hearing was necessary, and
argued that the Court could determine that attenuation did
not apply based on the existing record.

The
Magistrate Judge acknowledged the parties' arguments
regarding a supplemental hearing, and found that the
Defendant's original motion did not sufficiently raise
the issue of the scope and duration of the traffic stop.
Neither had it adequately pointed to Mrs. Gibson's
pre-search statements as problematic. Rather, the
Defendant's discussion of the traffic stop had focused on
the officers' warrantless use of a drug detection dog to
search his vehicle while it was on the curtilage of his
residential property. The Defendant had argued that the
search warrant for his home was obtained on the basis of the
drug dog's search. Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge
conducted a second evidentiary hearing on September 14, 2017.

Two DEA
task force agents testified at the hearing. The agents
testified that they had been receiving information from Mrs.
Gibson on a weekly basis since October 31, 2016. They also
testified that Mrs. Gibson had met with them on December 13,
told them about methamphetamine inside the house, and showed
them pictures on her phone. When the traffic stop occurred
later that same day, Mrs. Gibson called one of the agents
about ten minutes into the traffic stop upset because the
agents had told her they were not going to arrest the
Defendant that night, or in a manner that would reveal her
cooperation. The agents came to the scene to talk to Mrs.
Gibson, assuring her that the traffic stop was not initiated
by their investigation. The investigating agents then
discarded their previous plan for how the investigation would
proceed, and law enforcement relied on the same information
Mrs. Gibson had provided to the agents earlier in the day to
apply for a search warrant.

The
Defendant submitted his Brief Following the Continued Motion
to Suppress Hearing [ECF No. 42] to address the testimony of
the two DEA task force agents. The Defendant questioned why,
if it was the Government's position that Mrs.
Gibson's statements were admissible regardless of any
prior illegal search or seizure, the Government had
“called two witnesses at the initial hearing, and
forced all parties to brief matters that it now claims are
completely irrelevant.” (Def.'s Br. 5.) The
Defendant further alleged that the testimony from the
supplemental hearing was incompatible with the testimony from
the initial hearing, particularly the testimony involving the
traffic stop. The Defendant asked the Court to view the
Government's justification as “an acknowledgement
[sic] that the various stops and arrests of [the Defendant]
were illegal, followed by a desperate,
evidentiarly-unsupported attempt to salvage the evidence
obtained as a result.” (Id. 6-7.)

The
Government, in its Supplemental Response Brief [ECF No. 46],
argued that both stops were lawful and that, even if the
second stop lasted too long, the statements of the
Defendant's wife were voluntarily made and were not
derived from the traffic stop outside her residence. The
Government countered the Defendant's argument about the
initial hearing and briefs by noting that the Government
still maintained that both stops were lawful throughout, and
that the methamphetamine pipe is incriminating evidence that
it intends to use against the Defendant. Beyond that, the
Government asserted that the officers were justified in
keeping the Defendant from entering his residence while they
obtained a search warrant. The Government's brief also
emphasized that live witness testimony was less susceptible
to exclusion as fruit of the poisonous tree than other types
of evidence.

In his
final brief [ECF No. 47], the Defendant called the
Government's reference to live witness testimony a
“strawman” because Mrs. Gibson did not testify at
either evidentiary hearing. He submitted that Mrs.
Gibson's prior cooperation, which the Government pointed
to in support of the voluntariness of her statements, is not
relevant to the determination of probable cause because it is
not in the four corners of the search warrant
affidavit.[3] Finally, the Defendant reiterated that the
testimony of different witnesses regarding the traffic stop
was not compatible. He argued:

The Government essentially asks this Court to pick from one
of two mutually antagonistic scenarios, both of which were
advanced by the Government depending on which hearing
transcript one reads. In the first, Gibson is a known drug
dealer whose arrest is the natural consequence of his
wife's long cooperation with law enforcement. In the
other, the Government knows almost nothing about Gibson's
history, and the search of his home and subsequent arrest
come only after Gibson is illegally detained twice, and after
he continues to be detained after two searches of his vehicle
fail to uncover any contraband. Because Gibson takes the
Government at its initial presentation, he asks this Court to
grant his Motion to Suppress, to dismiss the indictment
against him, and for all other just and proper relief in the
premises.

(Def.'s Supp'l Reply 4.)

On
January 29, 2018, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and
Recommendation [ECF No. 48], recommending that the Court deny
the Defendant's Motion to Suppress. The Magistrate Judge
concluded that the initial encounter between Officer Brandon
Garrison and the Defendant on the public roadway was
consensual, and only turned into a seizure when Officer
Garrison handcuffed the Defendant. Further, this seizure was
supported by reasonable suspicion. The Magistrate Judge
concluded that even if a Fourth Amendment violation occurred,
the only incriminating evidence that was found-the meth pipe
under the squad car after the Defendant was permitted to go
on his way-was admissible under the plain view doctrine. The
Report and Recommendation then turned to the traffic stop,
finding that it was supported by probable cause that the
Defendant had committed a traffic violation, and that
officers were justified in investigating the discovery of the
meth pipe. The Magistrate Judge recognized that two distinct
chains of evidence existed, but found that the collective
knowledge doctrine allowed officers to rely on both the
events of the evening and the DEA's ongoing drug
investigation to extend the duration of the traffic stop. The
Magistrate Judge thus concluded that the duration and scope
of the stop was reasonable, and that Mrs. Gibson's
statement were also admissible. What is more, Mrs.
Gibson's statements were sufficiently attenuated from any
Fourth Amendment violation so that exclusion of her
statements would not be warranted or appropriate.

On
February 6, 2018, the Defendant filed his Objection to
Magistrate's Report and Recommendation [ECF No. 49],
objecting to several of the Report's conclusions. First,
the Defendant objects to the Magistrate Judge's
conclusion that the Defendant's initial encounter with
Officer Garrison began as a consensual one. He also objects
to the conclusion that reasonable suspicion supported the
seizure that occurred when the Defendant was placed in
handcuffs later in the stop. He disagrees with the Magistrate
Judge's conclusion that the use of handcuffs was
reasonable. Finally, the Defendant maintains that the plain
view doctrine does not apply. Based on these objections, all
of which concern the initial encounter with police on
December 13, 2016, the Defendant submits that his motion ...

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