Bayesianism has some faults some of them are the problem of old evidence and the issue of new theories. Are these two problems linked to Quine’s underdetermination? Or are they contrasting it? What is ...

I have just read Confessions of a Confirmed Extensionalist where Quine says:
“Probability? Of events? Restore extensionality (...). Of states of affairs? Treat quotationally, like de dicto. How much ...

Does there exist any secondary literature discussing "Quining Qualia" by Daniel Dennett?
A google search provided nothing relevant. I'm not in university, so I don't have a professor to give a brief ...

Why can’t we eliminate talk of necessity and possible worlds, for talk of analyticity and (non-modal) logical consistency? Has there been any attempt in recent times to do this? I'm not 100% sure, but ...

Kuhn's view as expressed in the passage quoted above depends upon meaning holism—the claim that the meanings of terms are interrelated in such a way that changing the meaning of one term results in ...

The paradox of Bertrand Russell he formulated in 1918, I believe, has undermined the attempt to found mathematics on a strictly logical basis. I remember that an intuitive way of putting the paradox ...

Lately, I have been reading some of Quine's works on modality. I can't help but feel that many of his pronouncements on modality are wrong/misguided, although pinpointing exactly where is goes wrong ...

If we do away with the analytic-synthetic distinction as per Quine, does that mean that mathematics is no more certain than empirical science?
And how does mathematical proof proceed if we don't use ...

Could someone explain to me, in easy language, what the main differences are between Carnap and Quine's views regarding internal / external questions and realism? Quine called Carnap a Platoist, yet I ...

These are fairly straight forward question to which I have found no answers. Years ago, when I was taking a seminar on Quine, the professor explained Quine's philosophy of science. According to Quine, ...

I've listened to two sets of lectures on the philosophy of science that treat Quine's results on underdetermination, the dissolution of the analytic/synthetic distinction, and confirmation holism as ...

Three points are not clear to me about the relations between semantic externalism (Kripke, Putnam) and holism (Quine):
Is there a way according to which externalism and holism can be held together or ...

Would Quine say that Pegasus is not a winged horse? This sounds absurd, unless he means in reality, independent of our stories about Pegasus.
It seems that Quine says everything that has being exists....

Kripke and Quine argue both for 2 different ideas (about which I will write shortly) but their objectives are common - to say something about the nature of sentences. Yet, It seems to me like they don'...

Kant's epistemology: There are facts out there, but we can never access them directly, we can only perceive them the way they are presented to us by our own minds.
Quine: There are facts out there, ...

Quine criticizes analyticity for presupposing another notion, that of synonymy, which for Quine either must be explained in terms of analyticity or synonymy itself.
But what exactly does Quine think ...

Quine's holism is marked by a scientific methodology. Perhaps not all beliefs in Quine's web of belief are accurate, but at its best the web consists of the refined, matured string of beliefs which ...

I was recently reading Russell's chapter on Parmenides in The History of Western Philosophy, and I came across a fun little argument for the absence of change. Essentially, it says that word meaning ...

Quine, like many others before him, thought that the meaning of words depends on the context they are in.
But what compelled Quine to hold that in light of this there is an ambiguity as to what any ...

Quine thought that only that which exists can be referred to, or in other words 'to be is to be the value of a bound variable'.
However, what of his equally famous fictional characters Wyman and McX?...

Gödel and Tarski's works have been especially influential in the pragmatist tradition, but what exactly did their theorems usher in?
What is left of self-reference in the pragmatist tradition?
More ...

I was surprised to learn that Quine is a mathematical realist (See this interview for example). I always assumed that his "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" and specifically his dissolution of the Analytic/...

What is the connection between the criticisms offered by Wittgenstein and Quine of meaning and language? Are both philosophers generally criticizing the same semantic theories with similar arguments, ...

Quine held that the meaning of words was indeterminate. The reasons he holds this view all seem to have in common a certain aspect; the indeterminacy that occurs occurs within what might be called '...

Hume's Fork, which divides knowledge into 'relations of ideas' and 'matters of fact' has had an incredible influence on philosophy ever since its conception (though it is sometimes claimed that others ...

Quine's application of the problem of underdetermination took the thesis to be a problem not only for physics (as Duhem before him), nor even for the particular sciences, but for any and all theories ...

I'm trying to understand this paper. Seems to me like it all stems from a rejection of "meaning"... ie: Quine is saying statements don't mean anything. And this is what leads to the rejection of the ...

In "On What There Is" Quine notes that "there is a gulf between meaning and naming even in the case of a singular term which is genuinely a name of the object". This distinction can be made more clear ...

In response to Quine's rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction, Strawson and Grice appear to reduce Quine's rejection (or skepticism) of synonymy to a rejection of meaning. What is/would be ...

General scientism seems to hold that due to the predictive powers of our scientific methods, such methods are preferred to other methods of knowledge, such as metaphysics (radical scientism claiming ...

I'm looking for a comment I think I remember Quine having made. He's talking about our understanding of proofs. I think he says something along the following lines...
If you understand many different ...