Western Command

The
genesis of was in the crucible of adversity and
forged on the anvil of one of the most momentous and tragic
trans-migrations of human populations into the two new Nations of
India and Pakistan. In June 1947, Punjab Boundary Force was set up
for both West and East Punjab, comprising units of both Indian and
Pakistan Armies. It was disbanded on 15 Sep 1947, with the two
nations assuming responsibility for their respective areas. It was
then that HQ Delhi and East Punjab Command was raised for the defence of Delhi and East Punjab areas with the Command Headquarters
located at Delhi. The Command was popularly known as the DEP Command
and Lieutenant General Dudley Russel, CB, CBE, DSO, MC took over as
the first GOC-in-C.

DEP
Command was given the role of restoring law and order in riot torn
Punjab in the wake of partition. As it entailed constant movement, a
special self contained train comprising coaches of the old Viceregal
Train was placed at the disposal of HQ DEP Command. The mobile
Command Headquarters moved from place to place in Punjab to restore
law and order. The Command accomplished its task with elan and
dedication resulting in the saving of thousands of lives. DEP
Command was redesignated as 'Western Command' on 18 Jan 48 and
Lieutenant General (Later Field Marshal) KM Cariappa, OBE was
appointed as the Army Cdr

Lt Gen
(Later Field Marshal) KM Carriappa, OBE

who took over the Command as GOC-in-C,
Western Command
on 20 January 1948.

The First
Test by Fire

In Aug 1947, Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Standstill Agreement
with Pakistan, but remained undecided on the accession issue.
Apprehending
danger
from Pakistan he deployed his state force (nine infantry battalion,
one horsed cavalry and one mountain battery) rather thinly to defend
over 700 km border from Kathua to Karakoram. Pakistan was in no mood
to allow Maharaja Hari Singh the luxury of delaying accession of the
State to Pakistan In the initial stage, Pakistan irregulars started
nibbling at the far-flung north –western frontiers of the state.

Eventually, in October 1947, a large force of tribals from
Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province, led by retired Pakistan
Army Officers, veterans of the Second World War, simultaneously
intruded into Western Jammu and the Jhelum Valley, with Srinagar as
their objective. This operation was nicknamed ‘Gulmarg’. The Jhelum
Valley force had planned to

Brig Rajinder
Singh, MVC (Posthumous)

capture Srinagar on 26 October 1947,
so that Pak leaders could celebrate ‘Id-ul-Fitr’ in Srinagar. At
this stage, nothing stood between Pakistan and its objective except
a few assorted companies of the J&K State Army under Brigadier
Rajinder Singh, Chief of Staff of state Forces. Brigadier Rajinder
Singh and his men were hopelessly outnumbered on all fronts, but by
bold and determined delaying actions between Uri and Baramulla, they
managed to delay the advance of the Pakistan invaders along the
Jhelum Valley road. Brigadier Rajinder Singh and his force also
succeeded in destroying a vital road bridge at Uri, thus completely
upsetting the timetable of this Pakistan-sponsored tribal force.
Consequently, they could only reach the vicinity of Baramulla by
25th October, instead of the outskirts of
Srinagar.
This delay enabled the Maharaja to carry out negotiations with the
Indian Union for accession and moving Indian Army to save the State.
Brigadier Rajinder Singh was ambushed on the night 26/27 Oct, barely
six hours before the Indian Army landed at Srinagar airport.
Demolition of Uri Bridge was a masterstroke that ultimately saved
Kashmir. For this action Brigadier Rajinder Singh is gratefully
known as 'Saviour of Kashmir' and was awarded Independent India's
first gallantry award, the 'Mahavir Chakra' (posthumously).

The Kashmir war
1947-48

J&K state acceded to India on October
26, 1947. The first Indian Army contingent was flown to Srinagar on
October 27. The Dakota
aircraft carrying this contingent, comprising one company of the 1
Sikh under Lt Col Dewan Ranjit Rai, their Commanding Officer,
touched down on the dusty and unkempt airstrip of Badgam (Srinagar)
at 0830 hours on October 27, 1947. At this stage, no one was sure
about the state of affairs in the valley. The Commanding Officer 1
Sikh had orders to turn back and land at Jammu if the Srinagar
airfield was found occupied by hostile forces. God favoured the
brave. 1Sikh landed safely without any mishap. While the battalion
was being built up to its strength with more air landings, Baramulla
was being ransacked by the tribals. The delay caused by looting and
rape, however, cost the Pakistanis dearly. If the tribal force had
advanced to Srinagar with with speed instead of indulging in loot
and rape, they could have occupied the airfield at Srinagar before
the Indian troops landed there. Immediately after landing , CO 1
Sikh rushed a company forward to join the J&K force on the outskirts
of Baramulla. The so-called 'Lashkar' was however, well armed with
mortars and machine guns and completely outnumbered our troops.
Despite a determined fight put up by the Sikh, they had to withdraw
from Pattan, approximately 11 kms down the Srinagar road. Lt Col Rai
was killed in action, on the outskirts of Baramulla along with a JCO
and 20 Jawans. For his gallant action and exceptional valour, Lt Col
Dewan Ranjit Rai was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra (MVC) posthumously.

The Defence of Badgam
Airstrip

The tribal forces soon contacted the Pattan defences. Finding them
too strong to tackle, a major part of the force bypassed Pattan and
headed for Srinagar. The situation in Srinagar was still fluid,
though by now HQ 161 Infantry Brigade along with 1 Punjab, 1 Kumaon
and two companies of 4 Kumaon had landed at Srinagar.

Commander
161 Infantry Brigade, Brig J C Katoch, was wounded at Pattan and was
replaced by Brig L P (‘Bogey’) Sen, who took over command of the
Brigade on November 2, 1947. Brig Sen, did not have to wait long.
Tribals led by veteran Pakistan officers were now approaching
Srinagar from three different directions, and had infiltrated Badgam
in large numbers with the airstrip as their target.

Information received from Badgam indicated that some tribals
disguised in Kashmiri attire were hiding in a village close to the
airstrip. The tribals
successfully
concealed their identity and our patrols reported no enemy activity
in the vicinity of Badgam. Consequently, all other troops except one
company of 4 Kumaon were pulled out from Badgam, to join the main
force at Srinagar. The tribals struck with full force on the
isolated 4 Kumaon company on the night of November 3, 1947 The
Kumaonis under their company commander, Majar Som Nath Sharma,took
the enemy head-on, although they were hopelessly outnumbered and
outgunned. A horde of wild, howling, tribesmen attacked the
temporary defences repeatedly with mortars and machine guns, but
were held at bay. Finally the attack was repulsed with heavy
casualties. Majar Som Nath Sharma led from the front, unconcerned
about his personal safety. He was seen moving from section to
section, emboldening his men. He even assisted his machine gun team
to mow down the advancing enemy, although one of his hands was in
plaster due to a previous injury. Majar Som Nath Sharma was killed
in this action and was awarded the highest gallantry award for
valour, the Param Vir Chakra (PVC), posthumously, for most
conspicuous bravery and daring act in the face of the enemy.

The Battle of
Shalateng (Srinagar)

6 Rajputana Rifles, 2 Dogra and 37
Field Battery soon arrived in Srinagar to reinforce the garrison.
The tribals were now closing in on the town in great numbers for the
final battle for Srinagar. On November 7, an aerial patrol reported
a large concentration of tribesmen on the outskirts of Srinagar town
at Shalateng village. This force was seen digging, prior to an
assault on the town. Brig L P Sen rightly decided to attack the
enemy before it had time to firm in1 Sikh was deployed on the
Srinagar-Baramulla road to keep an intact front. One company of 4
Kumaon held the firm base, while the remainder of the battalion held
the airfield. 1 Kumaon with a troop of 7 Cavalry were chosen to
attack the main enemy force under command of Colonel Harbaksh Singh.

The action commenced at midday on 07 November 1947. The tribesmen
were pinned down by the assaulting columns which attacked the enemy
from the flanks and rear. Encircled from three direction, the enemy
panicked and ran. Our Air Force now caught them in the open fields,
creating further havoc in their ranks. The Battle of Srinagar was
won by 1700 hours on the same day.

Having
lost the race for Srinagar, Pakistan’s ambition of making a grand
entry into Srinagar failed. At Shalateng, the Pakistan forces met
their Waterloo: hundreds of enemy troops were killed or wounded, and
the remainder headed towards Baramulla with utmost speed, with our
troops close on their heels. On November 8, when 1 (Para) Kumaon
entered Baramulla town, they found only a few enemy stragglers. The
rest of the enemy force had fled towards Uri. Baramulla was now a
ghost city. having been plundered and burnt down earlier by the
Pakistani tribesmen. On receiving news of the unceremonious retreat
of the tribesmen, civilians started returning from the surrounding
hills where they had taken shelter. Nehru himself, riding an
armoured car all the way from Srinagar, visited Baramulla on
November 11. He was welcomed heartily by the entire population when
he entered the town.

The main threat to Srinagar and the Kashmir Valley had been averted,
but the enemy was still lurking in the higher ridges of the
Baramulla gorge. Maj Gen Kulwant Singh, now in command of J&K Forces
at Srinagar, gave the enemy no respite. The remaining tribesmen were
thrown out of the Valley once and for all by November 13, 1947.
Though the battle for Srinagar and the valley was over, the enemy
forces continued to hold the high features around the Uri bowl, and
many fierce battles had to be fought to clear this area.

Crucial battle of
Jammu (1947- 48)

After the enemy was driven out of the Kashmir Valley in early
November 1947, the main effort was diverted towards the Uri-Poonch
link up in the North, Mirpur and Kotli in the South. 161 Infantry
Brigade was given the task to effect the Uri-Poonch link up, across
the Haji Pir Pass at 2,636 meters, while 50 Independent Para Brigade
was ordered to secure Mirpur, Kotli and Jhangar area by November 20,
1947.

By the end of November, the enemy had, however, secured Mirpur and
penetrated deep into the Naushera, Rajouri, Mendhar and Poonch
areas. The battles of Naushera and Poonch tell a tale of grim
determination and bold courage of our troops, who pursued the enemy
relentlessly and eventually, drove him out of these key areas
despite various handicaps. If the enemy had succeeded in holding on
to these areas, he would have threatened the whole of the Jammu
region, and all the routes connecting Srinagar and Jammu.

The Battle of Naushera
Sector

50 Independent Para Brigade was given the task to relieve
pressure
on the State Forces detachment at Kotli. The advance commenced on
November 16, along the Akhnoor- Naushera - Jhangar track. No strong
opposition was encountered en route except for minor road block, but
there was a sharp encounter on the outskirts of Kotli on November
26. The enemy was holding the bridge on River Bains supported by
mortars and machine guns. This opposition was cleared on November
26-27, and the State Forces garrison was reinforced. Mirpur, an
important communication centre south of Kotli, however fell into
enemy hands the same day.

Due to certain political and military
considerations. it was decided to abandon Kotli and take defences in
the Jhangar-Naushera area. Jhangar, which was an important
communication centre and considered a gateway to Naushera, was
Pakistan's prime target. There were several thrusts and counter
thrusts and the Jhangar defences changed hands twice.

Eventually our troops holding Jhangar had to fall back on Naushera
on December 24, 1947. The enemy followed closely and occupied some
important heights around Naushera. The final battle of Naushera was
fought in February 1948. The enemy attacked Naushera in great
strength in in the first week of February, but was repulsed. Brig M
Usman, Commander 50 Para Brigade, took steps to evict the enemy from
the surrounding heights, regardless of the enemy strength around
Naushera. In the battle of Tain Dhar, a height near Naushera, one
company of 1 Rajput Battalion, occupying this position, frustrated
all enemy attempts to capture this ground. In fierce hand-to-hand
fight, the tenacity of Naik Jadunath Singh of 1 Rajput and his
section of nine men who kept the enemy at bay could be seen. In the
process Nk Jadunath Singh was killed and was awarded the Param Vir
Chakra (PVC) in recognition for his outstanding courage and
determination against great odds. Lt KS Rathore, his company
commander, was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra (MVC).

Capture of Jhangar

Lieutenant General Cariappa , who had taken over as Western Army
Commander, brought his Tactical headquarters forward to Jammu to
oversee the conduct of two important operations, the capture of
Jhangar and Poonch.

The
capture of Jhangar was of special significance for 50 Para Brigade
to avenge the setback they had suffered in December 1947. The
operation commenced in the last week of February 1948. 19 Infantry
Brigade advanced along the Northern ridge, while 50 Para brigade
cleared the hills dominating the Naushera-Jhangar road in the south.
Many fierce battles were fought during this twin thrust toward
Jhangar.

The enemy was eventually driven from this area and Jhangar was
recaptured. Pakistan brought its regular forces into the fray in May
1948. Jhangar was once again subjected to heavy artillery
bombardment and many determined attacks were launched on Jhangar by
the Pakistan Army. Brig Usman, the hero of Naushera and Jhangar,
however frustrated all enemy attempts to recapture Jhangar. Brig
Usman unfortunately was killed in Jhangar by an enemy 25-pounder
shell. For his inspiring leadership and great courage, Brigadier M
Usman was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra posthumously. 7 Cavalry under
Lt Col Rajinder Singh played a pivotal role in the recapture of
Jhangar for which he was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra.

The
Battle of Poonch

Poonch is a small town situated North-West of Jammu, at the
confluence of Betar Nala and the Poonch River, in a bowl-shaped
valley, surrounded by high hills. In November 1947, the 1st and the
8th Battalions of the J&K State Forces held the town. Well-trained
Pakistani Irregulars had surrounded Poonch in November 1947 and were
subjecting the town to heavy mortar and machine gun fire. On
November 21,1947, 161 Infantry Brigade under Brig L P Sen, set off
from Uri, cleared the Haji Pir Pass and descended towards the town
of Poonch. Their aim was to reinforce the Poonch garrison with one
battalion and clear the Uri-Poonch axis for maintenance.

1 Kumaon, under Lt Col Pritam Singh, MC (Military Cross), a Second
World War veteran, entered Poonch town on November 21, 1947 and the
State Forces located there were put under his command. Lt Col Pritam
Singh who was promoted to Brigadier took immediate initiative to
drive out a few enemy posts directly dominating the town. In January
1948 the enemy made six determined efforts to capture the town, but
each one failed. In February 1948, 3/9 Gorkha Rifles had also landed
and the garrison was now in a position to under take offensive.

The Link Up
to Poonch

Brig
Pritam Singh, MC, in the meanwhile kept on nibbling at the enemy
posts on the surrounding hills. By the middle of June 1948, he had
consolidated his position and kept the enemy at bay. 1 Kumaon had by
now been in action for over six months and urgently needed rest and
recuperation. A plan was made to effect a link-up with the Poonch
garrison from the South with a view to bring in much needed
supplies, rations and ammunition. This was a difficult proposition,
as almost three enemy brigades were now operating in all the key
areas around Poonch and Rajouri. A link up operation named
‘Operation Gulab’ was launched in June 1948 from the South for
relief and resupply. Eventually two
columns,
one each from Rajouri and Surankot, managed to reach the outskirts
of Poonch after some heavy encounters en route. A column under Brig
Pritam Singh also went forward from Poonch to meet the link-up
columns, but they were delayed by a stiff encounter with the enemy
at Potha, a dominating position enroute. By now Mendhar, another
enemy stronghold had been breached and the way to Poonch was
cleared. On arrival of the relief columns there was great jubilation
in Poonch, but as Rajouri and some other key areas were still in
enemy hands, the siege of Poonch was still not over. It was decided
to use 19 Infantry Brigade to clear the axis for good. This was
achieved in September 1948. This operation resulted in the capture
of nearly 5,000 square kms of territory in Rajouri, Mendhar and
Poonch area, and three brigades of the enemy deployed in these areas
were driven out with heavy casualties.

The long siege of Poonch was at last broken. The defence of Poonch
against great odds was another outstanding example of the heroic
effort of our troops and their patriotic fervour in most
unfavourable circumstances.

The Battle of Zojila and Leh

The importance of Zojila lay in the fact that it commanded entry to
Leh. Indus Valley provided a direct all weather approach to Leh and
Kargil from Giligit and Skardu. Once Zojila closed in winter, there
was no direct route available in Srinagar and Leh . After December
1947 , when the enemy had invested Skardu, the Indus Valley route to
Leh lay open, and the capture of Leh would only be a matter of time.
By March 1948 Leh was threatened both from the North and South. The
enemy had occupied Zojila, Dras and Kargil in strength. Between
Kargil and Leh only two state Forces platoons, guarding the bridge
at Khaltse, stood in the way of the enemy.

Leh detachment was ordered to build an airstrip near leh in these
difficult conditions, which they managed to complete by May 1948, as
the Pakistani forces approached Khaltse, the State Forces platoons
demolished the bridge, just at the nick of time to halt the enemy in
its tracks. On June 1, 1948, one company of 2/4 Gorkha Rifles had
been air-transported to Leh from Srinagar; the reinforced Leh
garrison therefore managed to keep the enemy at bay.

Leh still had no satisfactory logistic support system as the route
to Srinagar was blocked with the enemy in occupation of Zojila, Dras
and Kargil. Gen Thimayya decided to clear Zojila, Dras and Kargil.
77(Para) Brigade of Chindits and Burma fame, commanded by Brig KL
Atal, was given the task of capturing Zojila in September 1948. This
brigade comprised 3 JAT, 1/5 Gorkhas, 5 Maratha Light Infantry, a
platoon of engineers, a platoon of machine gunners and a few
ancillary units. 1 Patiala, which was located at Baltal after
clearing the Sonamarg valley, was put under command of the Brigade
for this mission.

77
(Para) Brigade first went into action on September 3, but was unable
to complete the mission due to difficult terrain and snow conditions
on all the heights surrounding Zojila. So strong was the enemy
position, that the battalion attacking Zojila frontally could make
no headway, despite adequate artillery support and strafing of enemy
positions by Tempest aircraft. Another attempt on September 13 also
failed. Instead of bashing their heads against this strong enemy
position on the Pass, Gen Thimayya now came up with a truly
ingenious and bold plan. He decided to use light armour to dislodge
the enemy from Zojila, and then make a dash for Drass and Kargil.
Nowhere in the world had tanks ever operated at such heights. Within
a period of one month, the Engineers (Madras Sappers) built a track,
which could be used by Stuart tanks from Baltal base up to the Pass.
The plan, however, involved the move of a squadron located at
Akhnoor across the Pir Panjal Range. The road from Jammu to Srinagar
was a mere dusty track in 1947/48, with weak wooden bridges over
fast-flowing streams and rivers. Engineer assistance was required at
each crossing, which had to be affected by night. To keep this move
secret, tank turrets were removed and transported by vehicles. While
heavily camouflaged turretless armoured vehicles moved from one
harbour to another under the cover of darkness. The tanks had to be
winched across many bridges. After nearly a month, the Stuarts
arrived in the vicinity of Srinagar. A curfew was imposed in the
town so that the direction of movement of the tanks could be kept a
secret. To move a squadron of tanks 400 kms over such difficult
terrain was a great achievement for the Stuart squadron and the
Engineers. The first heavy snowfall of the season generally takes
place of Zojila after mid October. This is exactly what happened on
D Day, October 20, 1948, and 'OP BISON' had to be postponed. A less
determined commander than Gen Thimayya would have given up, as
heavier snow were expected thereafter. Gen Thimayya, in another bold
decision, declared November 1 as the next D Day, regardless of the
weather conditions. Full credit must be given to the CO of 7
Cavalry, Lt Col Rajinder Singh 'Sparrow' who did not hesitate for a
moment to accept this seemingly impossible mission. During the
assault, tanks were closely followed by determined infantry soldiers
with bared bayonets. Gen Thimayya travelled in the leading tank, up
the treacherous gradients to the white hell of Zojila. It should be
noted that Gen Thimayya always led from the front, often at great
personal risk. Any hesitation to tackle Zojila at this juncture
would have resulted in the loss of Leh and Laddakh.

On November 1, 1948 at 1440 hours. tanks reached the Ghumri basin,
negotiating the steep and slippery gradients while heavy snow fell
around them. The tank column followed by 1/5 (Royal) Gorkhas
continued across the Pass, while 1 Patiala and 4 Rajput charged and
drove out the enemy from their strongholds. The appearance of tanks
came as a bolt from the blue for the enemy. Surprised and highly
demoralized, heavily punished by artillery fire, and blinded by
snow, the enemy ran for their lives. Thimayya, who was on the spot
as usual, gave orders to the Brigade Commander to press on to Machoi,
a few kms ahead. 1 Patiala reached Machoi the same night. The
surprised enemy once again ran for their lives, leaving a howitzer
behind.

A
great victory had been won, and the troops, justly proud, celebrated
it with gusto. To assault the enemy position with tanks, at minus 20
degree temperature with blowing blizzards, without any snow clothing
or equipment, had never before been achieved anywhere else in the
world. The commanders and the men of 7 Cavalry and the infantry
units displayed outstanding courage and great determination to
achieve this distinction. The success was exploited further, and 4
Rajput captured Matyan, 18 kms ahead of Zojila, on November 4.
However, the advance was now held up by a very strong enemy position
on dominating grounds. Once again tanks were moved up to dislodge
the enemy. By November 15-16, Drass, considered to be the
second-coldest inhabited place in the world, was captured.

The Brigade resumed its advance on November 17-18 with Kargil as its
main objective. Kargil looked accessible now, and all enemy
positions on the way were eliminated by the night of November 22-23.
A company of 5 Gorkhas took a long detour, crossed a feature more
than 4,000 meters high, and contacted the Kargil defences at dawn.
Another company of this battalion crossed the Shingo River to deal a
blow to the enemy from another direction. Later in the day, a column
from Leh affected the link-up at Kargil. Kargil was finally cleared
of enemy, and the direct link from Leh to Srinagar was restored.

In 1962, Western Command was charged
with the defence of the Ladakh plateau. At heights of 3000 to 4000
metres, with inadequate resources, Western Command and its gallant
troops faced a numerically superior adversary in near arctic
conditions, giving as good as it got.

Operations in Ladakh

The Sino-India conflict in 1962 was triggered by a dispute over
Aksai Chin. Chushul Sector, only 15 miles from the border as crow
flies and with an all weather landing strip was critical to the
defence of Ladakh. Chushul was the solitary Indian position east of
the Ladakh range. and was an important target for the Chinese. It
lay on the road to Leh. A narrow sandy valley at an altitude of 4337
meters, it was bounded to the north by the clear blue waters of the
Pangong Tso (lake), the east and west by 5700 meter ranges and the
Chushul airfield to the south. There is an opening in the eastern
side known as the Spanggur gap, which led to Rudok a 100 kms to the
east. As part of the forward policy, a number of posts were
established around Chushul by the J&K militia. As tensions with the
Chinese mounted, Western Command requested a division of troops (4
Brigades) for an effective defence of Leh. Instead by September 1962
only one Brigade with two battalions were deployed. These units were
strung in pickets and could at the most only serve as trip wires to
any Chinese advance.

Defence of Chushul

The
Sirijap valley, North of the Pangong Tse in Ladakh, was considered
vital for the defence of Chushul airfield. Number of outposts were
established there to thwart any enemy encroachment in the area. One
of these outposts named Sirijap-1 was held by a platoon under the
command of Major Dhan Singh Thapa. At 0600 hours on 21 October 1962,
the Chinese opened a barrage of artillery and mortar fire over
Sirijap-1 post. The shelling continued till 0830 hours and the whole
area was set ablaze. Some shells fell on the command post and
damaged the wireless set, which put the post of communication. The
Chinese then attacked the outpost in overwhelming numbers. Major
Thapa and his men repulsed the attack, inflicting heavy casualties
on the enemy. But the Chinese were not dismayed by the defeat. They
mounted another attack in greater number after shelling the area
with artillery and mortar fire.

Major Thapa again rose to the occasion and repulsed the attack,
inflicting heavy losses on the enemy. He encouraged his men to be
prepared for a third assault, which came after a short while indeed.
The third Chinese attack was, however, more powerful and intense.
The enemy now came with tanks in support of the infantry. The
platoon post was now in a much-depleted strength owing to the
casualties suffered in earlier attacks. But the post held out till
the ammunition lasted. When the Chinese finally overran it, Major
Thapa jumped out of his trench and killed many intruders in
hand-to-hand fighting. He was eventually overpowered. His cool
courage, conspicuous fighting qualities and leadership were in the
highest tradition of the Army. Major Thapa was believed to have been
killed in this engagement, and the original citation given reflects
this. He was later discovered to have been taken prisoner by Chinese
soldiers and after his release from the POW camp, he resumed his
military career. For his gallant act, Major Dhan Singh Thapa was
honoured with the highest wartime gallantry medal, Param Vir Chakra.

Rezang La

During the 1962 Indo-China conflict, 13 Kumaon was deployed in
Chushul sector. The ‘C’ Company of the battalion led by Major
Shaitan Singh held a crucial position at Rezang La, at a height of
5000 metres. The expected Chinese attack on Rezang La came on
November 18th in the morning. In the dim light of the morning, the
Chinese were seen advancing through nullahs to attack the Indian
company. The Indian troops fell on their
prepared position to face
the enemy offensive and opened up on the advancing enemy with
rifles, light machine guns, grenades and mortars. The nullahs were
littered with dead bodies. The survivors took position behind
boulders and the dead bodies. The enemy was not, however,
discouraged. They subjected Indian positions to intense artillery
and mortar fire. Soon about 350 Chinese troops commenced advance
through the nullahs, but were
repulsed by the determined Indian troops. Unsuccessful in frontal
attack, the enemy, approximately 400 strong, then attacked from the
rear of the company position. They simultaneously opened intense
medium machine gun fire. This attack was contained at the barbed
wire fencing of the post. The enemy again resorted to heavy artillery and mortar shelling and launched an assault by 120 Chinese troops from the rear. Two Indian platoons were encircled and fought
bravely to the last man and last round.

Major Shaitan Singh, the Coy Commander, displayed exemplary
leadership and courage in the battle of Rezang La. He led his troops
most admirably and unmindful of his personal safety moved from one
platoon post to another and encouraged his men to fight during which
he was seriously wounded. In this action, 114 Kumaonis out of a
total of 123 were killed. The Chinese suffered many more casualties.

In January 1963 a shepherd wandered on to Rezang La. It was as it
the last moment of battle had turned into a tableau. The freezing
cold had frozen the dead in their battle positions and the snow had
laid a shroud over the battlefield. The Indian party which recovered
the dead, recorded the scene for posterity with cine and still
cameras. This tableau told their countrymen what actually happened
that Sunday morning. Every man had died a hero. Major Shaitan Singh
was conferred the Param Vir Chakra. Eight more received the Vir
Chakra while four others the Sena Medal. The 13 Kumaon received the
battle honour ‘Rezang La’ that it wears so proudly.

“You rarely come across such example in the annals of world military
history when braving such heavy odds, the men fought till the last
bullet and the last man. Certainly the Battle of Rezang La is such a
shining example.”

Rezang La Memorial

‘HOW CAN A MAN DIE BETTER THAN FACING FEARFUL ODDS FOR THE ASHES OF
HIS FATHERS AND THE TEMPLES OF HIS GODS’- To the sacred memory of
the Heroes of Rezang La 114 Martyrs of 13 Kumaon who fought to the
Last Man Last Round, Against Hordes of Chinese on 18 November 1962.

In 1965 Pakistan made a deliberate plan to seize Jammu & Kashmir by
use of force. The plan envisaged a combination of guerrilla and
conventional tactics. Massive armed infiltration into the Kashmir
Valley and parts of Jammu was planned to overthrow the State
Government with the help of local collaborators. In Jammu, an
offensive by regular forces was also planned with a view to cut off
the lines of communication to the Valley, and to seize maximum
territory in the Akhnoor-Jammu region.

The
first rounds of the war were, however, fired by Pakistan in the Rann
of Kutch in Gujarat. This was meant to test the newly-acquired tanks
and guns supplied by USA, and draw the Indian Armed Forces away from
the main theatre of operations in the North. Pleased with their
effort, the Pakistanis agreed to a ceasefire in July 1965. This
action was meant to lull the Indians into a false sense of security
before the commencement of armed infiltration into J&K in August
1965. The plan of invasion was ready in May 1965. The operation,
code-named ‘Gibraltar’ was already in an advanced stage of planning
and preparation by the time ceasefire was declared in Kutch.

Ten well-trained armed groups named after various famous commanders
of Islamic history and folklore were to infiltrate into nominated
areas to seize the government machinery with the help of local
collaborators. The group at Srinagar was to place a puppet regime in
position, which would declare independence and ask for assistance
and recognition from various countries.

The grandiose plans of infiltration and declaration of independence
at Srinagar were foiled by the people of Kashmir, who, instead of
collaborating with the invaders, reported to the Army and civil
authorities. Indian action was swift. Bases of infiltration were
attacked and isolated by the Army. The armed infiltrators were
hunted down with the help of local people and were soon on the run
in complete disarray.

Counter-infiltration operations were necessary to destroy the
forward bases of Pakistan’s’ infiltrating groups. This involved
capture of a number of dominating features in the Pakistan held
territory including those in the Tithwal sector on the Kishanganga
River.

Capture of Haji Pir

A brilliantly conceived and gallantly led ground assault by
infantry, saw Western Command wrest the crucial Haji Pir pass, a
constant thorn in our defences, from Pakistan. The operation was
completed on 29 August 1965 by an Infantry Brigade with four
battalions.

Operation Riddle

The Indian troops crossed the International Border on 06 September
1965 as an inevitable consequence of Pakistani actions. An Indian
Corps was launched to capture bridges on the Ichhogil canal at
Dograi, Jallo and Barki.

Patton Nagar

In
a splendid parry, Western Command formations and units totally
wrecked an audacious Pakistani plan seeking to cut of XI Corps at
the Beas bottleneck, decimating the much vaunted Pakistan 1 Armoured
Division equipped with spanking new American Patton M 48 tanks. So
much so, that the sleepy hamlet of Bikhiwind became famous as
‘Patton Nagar’, a graveyard of well-nigh two regiments worth of
Patton tanks.

Battle
at Phillora

The
biggest tank battle of the 1965 lndo-Pak War took place at Phillora
in the Sialkot sector. During the southern thrust of the Indian Army
on the Kaloi-Phillora axis the 17 Horse commanded by Lt. Col A B
Tarapore advanced on the right flank. On 11 September 1965, the
regiment was assigned the task of delivering the main armoured
thrust for capturing Phillora. It decided upon launching a surprise
attack on Phillora from the rear. To achieve the surprise, when the
regiment was thrusting forward between Phillora and Chawinda, it was
suddenly counter-attacked by the enemy’s heavy armour from Wazirali.

Lt. Col. A B Tarapore defied the enemy’s charge, held his ground and
gallantly attacked Phillora with one of his squadrons supported by
an Infantry battalion. Though
under
continuous enemy tank and artillery fire, he remained unperturbed
throughout this action. When wounded, he refused to be evacuated. On
14 September 1965, he led his regiment to capture Wazirali.
Unmindful of his injury, he again led his regiment and captured
Jassoran and Butur- Dograndi on 16 September 1965. In this battle
his own tank was hit several times. But despite the odds, he
maintained his pivots at both these places and thereby helped the
supporting infantry to attack Chawinda from the rear. Inspired by
his leadership, the regiment fiercely attacked the enemy armour and
destroyed approximately sixty enemy tanks, suffering only nine tank
casualties. However, Lt. Colonel A B Tarapore tank was in flames and
he died a hero’s death. The valour displayed by him in this action,
lasting 6 days, was in keeping with the highest traditions of the
Indian Army. Lieutenant Colonel Ardeshir Burzarji Tarapore was
awarded with the highest war-time gallantry medal, Param Vir Chakra,
posthumously.

With
the clouds of conflict darkening over East Pakistan in
November/December 1971, Western Command was on a watching brief all
along its Western border with Pakistan. Finally, after Pakistan
launched pre-emptive air strikes on its airfields, Western Command
launched operations in the Shakargarh and Dera Baba Nanak areas.

During the operations the Indian troops made tremendous progress and
by 15 December 1971, had control of all the points overlooking the
Shakargarh-Zafarwal road. The big test was the crossing of the
Basantar river, which was heavily mined by Pakistan. The Pakistanis
also had more than four independent armoured brigades worth of
armour to throw at the Indians, which was far more than what the
attackers had. The most formidable task was the river crossing.

The
Infantry and Engineers literally had to run through a wall of fire
to establish crossing points across the river. The bridgehead was
secured but the enemy subjected it to concentrated artillery fire
and aerial bombing. The Indian units pressed on regardless and by 15
December had established a bridgehead.

The Pakistanis tried to destroy the bridgehead by launching a series
of counter-attacks headed by tanks of Pakistan’s 8 Independent
Armoured Brigade. Indian tanks were rushed on to stop the Pakistanis
from breaking through. Two Indian tank regiments held the Pakistanis
with the help of Infantry battalions. The fighting here was easily
the most desperate in the war with the Pakistan losing as many as 46
tanks in less than a day of fighting. It was here that Maj Hoshiar
Singh and Second Lieutenant Arun Kheterpal were awarded the Param
Vir Chakra for their conspicuous acts of gallantry.

Had the war dragged for even a week more,
things
would certainly have been very different. That is why the Pakistani
high command despite having lost all its strategic objectives
readily agreed to a cease-fire. The Indian Army in the West proved
that the Regimental Colours its men carried were still a matter of
honour. The stories of 1971 war ensured that those traditions would
be carried on by many generations of fighting men in the years to
come. Most of all, Indian troops had learnt that after all was said
and done, honour in battle meant standing one’s ground and
fighting-even to the last man or tank if necessary.