Personnel and logistics justify defense spending

I am writing in response to your very shallow Friday editorial, ''Defense Cuts.''

The budgetary facts and figures quoted are informative, but basically irrelevant, isolated from the reason the United States must spend much more than our allies and potential adversaries on national defense. There are many sound personnel, logistical and strategic considerations from a military and foreign policy standpoint. From these, I would like to address two inter-related issues: to support American foreign policy through power projection to trouble spots around the globe, and the interior lines of communication enjoyed by our potential adversaries.

From a military perspective, the United States is still the preeminent superpower. The reason it requires such substantial land, sea and air forces is not internal security or to protect national sovereignty from invasion, but power projection to protect allies and to deter military adventures from a varied number of potentially hostile states: Russia, China, North Korea and Iran, among others. To do so, we must project our power far from our shores, using substantial, multi-billion-dollar airlift and sealift capabilities coupled with strong naval strike and strategic air assets, in concert with land bases in foreign nations. These forces must be constantly maintained, replaced and updated to remain credible threats.

No other nation, including Russia and China, has such a vast and costly airlift or amphibious capability. They don't need them. Their assets are much more modest, for to carry out their military designs they have short, internal lines of communication to reach into Europe, the Middle East or across Asia. North Korean forces are within 75 miles of the South Korean capital; Iran is centrally located to threaten Israel or the Gulf States and, with cheap tactical cruise and ballistic missiles, can close the Strait of Hormuz. NATO has a small airlift capability and uses it in Iraq and Afghanistan, but its primary focus is on Europe. To threaten and deter the United States, Russian, Chinese and potential Iranian and North Korean strategic nuclear missile forces are relatively inexpensive but are an effective means until we field a credible missile defense, a necessary but technically challenging and very expensive, multi-billion-dollar undertaking.

To implement American foreign policy takes manpower; the all-volunteer force is expensive. Conscription is a thing of the past here, although still a major manpower source in Russia, China, North Korea and Iran, who field cheaper, numerically large but not as well-trained armed forces.

We either allocate the necessary funds, or change our foreign policy, weaken our military and risk more violence and aggression from even second-rate powers by making less credible our fearsome capability to deter or, when necessary, intervene in areas of potential conflict.