Many heads of jihad hard targets to hit

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The structure of Jemaah Islamiah is its best defence against the authorities, writes Zachary Abuza.

Jemaah Islamiah has struck again with alacrity, its third major attack in Indonesia since October 2002. The terrorist attack last Thursday at the Australian embassy in Jakarta has clear implications for both Australian and regional security and reminds us that JI remains an intractable threat despite more than 300 arrests in the past two years.

For Australia, it is clear that it has become a target in its own right, not simply because of its alliance with the US. Australia has been mentioned by name twice in al-Qaeda statements, for its role in East Timor and its position in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Australian Federal Police's very public roles in the Bali and Marriott investigations and its establishment of a joint counter-terrorism centre in Semarang, which we now have learnt was targeted by JI, have put Australians in JI's sights. While Australia has good border security and JI has no capabilities at present to target Australia proper, Australian interests in the region remain vulnerable.

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For the region, terrorism remains the most immediate security threat. The 300 arrests included much of JI's leadership, but it has remained resilient, able to recruit and tap new leaders. Regional and Western security services seemed confident about the intelligence garnered from detainees and agents who had started to infiltrate JI's ranks. While important, it is not going to stop JI, which is not a hierarchical organisation. Individual cells are highly compartmentalised and dispersed.

JI was confident enough in its ability to strike this time at a hard target: a well-guarded embassy rather than an indefensible hotel, nightclub or shopping centre.

The main suspects, Azahari Husin, Noordin Mohammed Top and Dulmatin, are adept bomb builders and they clearly have a vast network to protect them. There are two things about Azahari that are important to note. First, he has an enormous ego, and is very narcissistic. There is some credible evidence that he witnessed the Marriott bombing. Second, he is a teacher. He takes pride in conveying knowledge. While it may have been difficult to teach many people in the past few years, I guarantee he was conducting classes. The federal police found his cookbooks in a safe house in Solo. They were simply written so people with only a simple Koranic education could understand them. Whether he made this bomb himself, his "fingerprints" are all over it.

Some analysts have suggested JI is riddled with factionalism, that there is a definitive rift between "internationalists" linked to Hambali who want to target Western interests and those who support a Darul Islam-based sectarian conflict. Does last week's bombing suggest the internationalists have the upper hand? Is there indeed a real factional rift that will cause JI to break up? Or are multiple policies being implemented because command and control has been so degraded in the past two years? There was an upsurge in communal violence in Central Sulawesi, as well as southern Thailand, in the first half of the year; diminished only by robust Government responses. The point is, the policies are not mutually exclusive and do not prove the organisation is factionalised.

Indeed, Hambali - a senior member of al-Qaeda - was a leading advocate of sectarian violence as a means to recruit and indoctrinate a new generation of jihadis willing to fight in defence of their religion. If you carefully read JI documents such as the General Guidebook for the Struggle of Jemaah Islamiah, which was written in large part by Mukhlas, the leader of the cell that perpetrated the attacks in Bali, JI has laid out a 30-year strategy to establish an Islamic state. They use the language of guerilla war and attrition. They are in this for the long haul.

Recent reports suggest a second cell of suicide bombers is poised to attack again. History would suggest this is unlikely. After the Bangkok meeting in January 2002, in which Hambali gave the order to target venues in which Westerners would be the primary victims, it took nine months to plan and execute the attack, 10 months to execute the bombing of the Marriott and 12 months to launch this attack. Although press reports last December suggested JI was about to unleash a wave of attacks in Jakarta, they did not materialise. What this suggests is there is a natural timetable for attacks: the amount of time it takes them to procure the chemicals, explosives and equipment; find and indoctrinate willing martyrs; and reconnoitre suitable targets. All this made more difficult as they are coping with arrests and police dragnets.

There have been questions regarding the timing of the attack, whether it was meant to influence the Indonesian or Australian elections. Some analysts suggest JI is not sophisticated enough to do this and argue it has not done so in the past. But that belies two important points: they read the internet and were no doubt impressed with the degree to which the Spanish cell that perpetrated the Madrid attacks in March was able to influence the electorate. Second, there has not been an election in either Indonesia or Australia since 2002 which they could attempt to influence. Their choice of target and timing is always well thought out.

The attack proved JI remains potent, able to recruit a new generation of bombers at the same rate of their attrition. JI training continues in Moro Islamic Liberation Front camps in Mindanao, while JI and the Abu Sayyaf appear to have stepped up co-operation. This must force the regional security services from their complacency and redouble co-operation among nations. There was a lot of regional co-operation after the Bali bombings. It started from low levels, but once Indonesia - the most intransigent - knew it needed help, there was a flurry of co-operation. But recently such co-operation has slowed; with success and no overt sign of renewed activity grew complacency, a sense that the back of JI had been broken, and the security services lapsed into traditional secretiveness.

JI is a much more resilient organisation than it has been given credit for, and our counter-terrorism strategy based on "decapitation" - the arrest of key leaders - is not going to eliminate them.