Drawing upon decades of experience, RAND provides research services, systematic analysis, and innovative thinking to a global clientele that includes government agencies, foundations, and private-sector firms.

The Pardee RAND Graduate School (PRGS.edu) is the largest public policy Ph.D. program in the nation and the only program based at an independent public policy research organization—the RAND Corporation.

Bin Laden's Group Will Survive Him

Every television station and newspaper declares Osama bin Laden to be America's
"Public Enemy Number One." The United States is demanding the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan to surrender bin Laden or face dire consequences. And the Pentagon
is exploring a range of military options and may, as it did in 1998, try to kill
him with a cruise missile strike.

Bin Laden's death or imprisonment would be necessary, but not sufficient, to eradicate
the terrorist network he created. His personal charisma and wealth were essential
to forming the organization he leads, Al-Qaida (Arabic for "the Base"), and bringing
radicals around the world together. Unfortunately, the group he spawned and the
network he has woven are now strong and robust.

Like a successful businessman, he has created institutions that can survive him.
As a result, the struggle against this threat will not end when bin Laden is dead
or in prison. Rather, the United States must both remove bin Laden and uproot
the broader network he has created.

At times, striking down a leader is enough to end a threat. The threat from Iraq
would greatly abate with the death of Saddam Hussein. Much of Baghdad's aggressive
and brutal policies are linked to his grandiose ambitions and aggressive practices,
and it is probable that a successor would be less bellicose and more cautious.
Moreover, in contrast to bin Laden, Saddam has not created structures of power
that appear likely to last if he dies.

To be clear, bin Laden's removal is a key element of any campaign against the
vast terrorist network he has spawned. The magnitude of his crimes demand that
he personally pay a price. Moreover, his removal probably would impair the operations
of Al-Qaida. Any successor to bin Laden might prove less inspiring, reducing the
fervor of his movement. Leadership rivalries are common in terrorist groups, and
his passing would almost certainly lead to at least squabbles and perhaps even
a bloodbath among his followers.

Bin Laden, however, has other accomplishments that will live on after him. His
greatest skill may be his organizational ability.

Al-Qaida often bungled its early operations, such as the 1993 attempt to bomb
the World Trade Center. But over time, it grew more lethal. The organization now
uses a sophisticated cell structure to ensure operational security. Its operatives
are patient, willing to deploy many years in advance of a strike. They distribute
training manuals to help groups and individuals, and they employ a range of fronts
to raise funds throughout the Muslim and Western world.

Perhaps even more important, bin Laden has brought together like-minded radical
groups, creating synergies among them. Al-Qaida cooperates with radicals in Algeria,
Egypt, Yemen, Kashmir, Chechnya, Pakistan, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and dozens
of other countries. Al-Qaida helps arm, organize and train these groups in their
struggles against their respective governments, while they in turn give it a global
reach that enables Al-Qaida operatives to acquire official documents, use safe
houses or otherwise pass from country to country.

In addition, bin Laden has helped transform groups that were once essentially
local in outlook to share his anti-U.S. and international focus.

The Egyptian Islamic Jihad, for example, focused its operations against the Egyptian
government in the early 1990s. Today, it shares bin Laden's broader pan-Islamic
and anti-American agenda. With bin Laden's encouragement, the Jihad's leaders
have also mended fences with their former rivals, the Islamic Group, to join in
a common fight against the United States and the West.

Because of his success in creating a semi-autonomous terrorist network that spans
the globe, meeting the challenge bin Laden poses will require striking at his
network simultaneously - not just in Afghanistan, but in all the countries in
which it operates. If we attack it piecemeal, we risk having operatives simply
flee from one locale to another, where they will rebuild and resume their activities.

Similarly, killing bin Laden without destroying the rest of the network will only
create a martyr, inspiring his minions to lash out at us.

As the Bush administration has properly stressed, even such a simultaneous strike
may not wipe out every piece of the network. But it would do tremendous damage,
destroying the ability of the terrorists to work together, eliminating key assets
and driving the remainder underground. In the short term, this will make it difficult
for them to stage new terrorist attacks - at least of the scope and sophistication
of those that occurred Sept. 11. In the long-term, it will make them more vulnerable
to arrests, extraditions and direct attacks and discourage new recruits from joining
the movement.

Such a simultaneous assault, however, depends as much on intelligence and diplomacy
as it does on military operations.

Stopping Al-Qaida in Afghanistan will probably require a military solution. However,
there are dozens of other countries - in the Middle East, Europe, Africa, Asia
and North America - in which Al-Qaida and its allies operate. The United States
will need to persuade those countries, or coerce them, to help eradicate the Al-Qaida
presence on their soil.

The United States also will have to make a full-court intelligence press, both
in terms of intelligence gathering and covert action, to go after Al-Qaida personnel
and assets around the world. Even countries that have not suffered an attack by
Al-Qaida must recognize that bin Laden's network poses a threat to their security
and that, in any event, a refusal to cooperate will greatly harm their relations
with Washington. Military strikes will at times have to take a back seat to these
joint intelligence operations with allies.

Finally, the United States must recognize that such a war will take years to succeed.
Even if initial efforts are successful and destroy much of the global network
in one fell swoop, the survivors will go underground and wait for opportunities
to rebuild the network and strike back. The endemic poverty of the region, disruptive
social change, and local frustrations with the autocratic political systems of
the Arab world generate large numbers of disaffected young Arabs who will still
join the Al-Qaida network.

There will still be individual attacks, and Americans may still die. Yet we can
reduce the pace and scale of attacks on the United States as terrorists are hounded
in every allied country while military strikes in the few areas of the globe where
friendly governments cannot reach. This is inevitable, and the only solution is
to be prepared to keep the pressure on for years.

This battle will not end with a victory parade. Nevertheless, the United States
and its allies can win the war on terrorism. The victory will not be by a formal
surrender of Al-Qaida members and their associates but by a growing silence and
lack of violence.
Daniel L. Byman, former CIA Persian Gulf political analyst, is research director
for RAND Corporation's Center for Middle East Policy.
Kenneth M. Pollack, former CIA Persian Gulf military analyst, is a senior fellow
in the National Security Studies Program at the Council on Foreign Relations

The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest.