June 2012

I recently saw the trailer for Ben Affleck’s upcoming film Argo, set during the Iranian Hostage Crisis of 1979-81. It follows an unorthodox exfiltration attempt by the CIA of six American hostages who managed to hide from Iranian authorities and take shelter with the Canadian ambassador to Iran.

As I watched strategically integrated clips of angry Iranian mobs harassing a bus carrying Americans and the Revolutionary Guard marching in the streets with guns, I couldn’t help but wonder how much the public perception of Iran played into the timing of the film’s release. That is to say—does the fact that many politicians and media outlets have recently been vilifying Iran guarantee higher public interest and, in turn, profit for the movie-makers?

Now for all I know the film may have a message that somehow paints the Iranian people in a pacifistic light, emphasizing the distinction between the people and the government. But regardless, it appears that advertent or not, these filmmakers are fueling the vilification of a country by means of trailers that look like news clips.

That is to say, vilifying the Iranian people through reminding the public of a crisis that took place thirty years ago seems like a morally questionable act at a time when relations between Iranians and Americans are at an extremely dangerous place.

The proposal of denying or altering historical reality to protect people from skewed opinions or perceptions is a way this article might be misinterpreted, but I assure you this is not my intention—I’m merely attempting to weigh the moral obligation of filmmakers (or any artist for that matter) in playing off of the popular perception of “other” people. It seems filmmakers sometimes forget that though these perceptions may help their work be successful, it also has the cyclical effect of feeding into that perception and, in a sense, confirming it.

So while I do not have a prescription for how long someone should wait to remind people of atrocities that question the character of a group or country, I think it’s important to keep in mind that filmmakers are not necessarily more educated on current events than the average American, and that their work being played very loudly on a large screen in front of a lot of people gives them artificial authority in terms of broader things like politics and current events.

While it may be argued that the movie’s timing is appropriate since it is, in theory, only vilifying the Iranian government which, now more than ever is disconnected from its own people, this argument assumes prior knowledge of this disconnect. The reality of the American public’s knowledge on Iran, let alone the silenced tensions between the government and the people, is that it is simply lacking.

A CNN Gallup poll from February of this year showed 71 percent of Americans think that Iran currently possess a nuclear bomb, and another poll shows roughly 25 percent want to take action to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities.

The sentiment reflected by these numbers is one that does not mesh with an understanding of the complex state of Iranian politics, nor the history surrounding Iranian resources.

For most of Iran’s recent history, great powers have forced themselves into the country, calling themselves “business partners,” but functionally acting as bullies. Specifically, beginning in the early nineteenth century the Great Game took place, during which Great Britain and Russia were in competition with one another for control over Central Asia. During this period the two countries fought over the resources of the Iranian Plateau and took over the Persian Empire’s most lucrative industries, including that of oil. This continued into the twentieth century and the Iranian people suffered mass inflation and starvation.

For Iran, nuclear energy means independence at last, looking toward France as a model, a country that gets over 75 percent of its electricity from nuclear power. Petroleum exports are the main source of economic surplus for the Iranian government, and abandoning the development of its nuclear power projects means risking using up all oil for potential exports domestically. No oil exports means no economic surplus for the government, a huge incentive to maintain nuclear development.

Furthermore, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khameini reiterated afatwah (a religious ruling by an authority on Islam) in April of this year that deemed nuclear weapons haram (forbidden in Islam) on the basis that they necessarily kill innocent civilians. He explicitly forbade the production, stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons, meaning his pursuing nuclear weapons would entirely undermine his own religious authority—which is, of course, the basis for his claim to political authority.

Logically, signs thus do not necessarily point to Iranian desire to create a nuclear weapon to strike the United States. Actually, it seems almost vain to assume such motive. Iran is acting rationally in its own best interest on the nuclear question, and until the International Atomic Energy Agency reports say something more than the informal equivalent of “hey, it could happen!” the risks involved in a strike on Iran cannot conceivably be outweighed by much of anything.

Though Argo features the rise of what is technically the same government that maintains power in Iran today, it also perpetuates the idea of this government as a resolute one, which emboldens it in the minds of watchers and makes it seem much more threatening.

But the reality of the current dynamics at play in Iran is one of great complexity that involves cleavages within the government itself. And if people continue to assume the Iranian government exists as one cohesive, strong entity, they are missing an extremely important element of Iranian state of affairs that could, almost ironically, be the key to taking down the unpopular, abusive regime.

At a time when waging war on this country is currently being seriously discussed by many unenlightened politicians, it is unquestionably risky to increase vilification of Iran in the minds of American moviegoers. They are, after all, citizens with voting power.

Cheney’s one percent doctrine, the idea that war against Iraq was justified by even a “one percent risk” of their possessing Weapons of Mass Destruction, played off of the fears of a public that did not know anything about their new so-called enemy, which is a testament to the fact that bad things happen when the public doesn’t know any better and looks to assumed authorities for wisdom. Thousands have been killed in a war that should never have taken place, as it was justified by fabricated facts and flawed logic.

If nothing else, this piece is intended to remind people that every country has a dark past and, often, even a dark present, but that there are also competing perspectives and complicating factors at play that are often neglected out of ignorance or convenience. Though there is surely not malicious intent on the part of the Argo creators, they may be inadvertently helping to shift public opinion in such a way that creates undesirable outcomes.

After all, the fact is that the goal of movie makers is to make money, and sometimes reality doesn’t sell.

Gabrielle Cherney is a senior at Indiana University Bloomington studying Near Eastern Language & Culture and Political Science. She is a founding member of the IU Debate Team and pursuing Language and Area Certification in Iranian Studies.

Does American Film’s Portrayal of Iran Shape Public Perception? was last modified: June 28th, 2012 by thegeneration

Egypt’s economy is suffering and a large part of the problem can be attributed to the huge amount of money spent on subsidies.

By Laila Elimam

Egypt’s subsidies have long been a monstrous burden on its social spending, but they are also a central element of the livelihoods of the Egyptian people.

In 1977, when subsidy cuts were announced in line with attempts to liberalize the economy under former President Sadat, the infamous “bread riots” ensued, resulting in violent clashes between the people and police in Cairo and Alexandria. The uproar caused the Government to revoke the decision, although the cuts were mainly on what had been classified as luxury goods. Since then, the event would resonate with future Egyptian policymakers, preventing any major action to be taken on the reduction of subsidies. Although under Sadat, state subsidies had reached an unprecedented 14% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) spending, today, the figure is also high and stands at about 10% of Egypt’s annual GDP. Attempts at reforming and eventually, phasing out, subsidies have been seen as essential for years, but real action has been put off for fear of provoking instability.

While many of Egypt’s subsidies go towards basic food stuffs, such as bread (Egypt is the largest importer of wheat in the world), oil, and sugar, a larger portion – 6% – goes towards fuel every year. During the past five years, the Government introduced a plan for reforming the subsidy system, with specific emphasis on fuel subsidies. But progress was quickly trumped in 2007 – 2008 as a response to the global increase in food and energy prices and the economic crisis.

Today, Egypt’s economy is struggling – an economy that grew from 2004 to 2010 at a rate of 5%–7% annually is expected to barely reach 2% this year. The Government, meanwhile, has reiterated its commitment to maintaining a free market economy and has made reforms in the legal and banking sectors to encourage domestic and international investors as well as to reassure Western partners, but investors have continued to flee due to the political uncertainty. At the same time, few aid promises made by the G8 countries at the 2011 Summit have been fulfilled and internal bickering has also put a $3.2 billion IMF loan into jeopardy. Egypt’s national reserves – $36 billion in February 2011– are at an all-time low of $15.4 billion.

On June 4, the Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 – 2013 budget completed by the Government was submitted to the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) for approval. Based on the budget, the Egyptian Government must acquire $22.5 billion to satisfy its projected spending demands, much of which will continue to fulfill social spending. The budget includes a 27% cut in spending on fuel subsidies. In the past, fuel subsidies have mostly benefited those who need it the least, including middle and upper class citizens as well as energy-rich industries. Dr. Monal Abdel-Baki, Assistant Professor of Economics at the American University in Cairo, has commented that the cuts are “way overdue. Already, measures have been taken to remove energy subsidies for a large number of factories, specifically those that are export-oriented and that result in pollution and externalities.”

But more needs to be done. Since the uprising, fuel shortages have occurred several times and have been attributed to a range of reasons from rising global prices to panicked hoarding. In either case, the shortages have hit bread bakeries the hardest, which has in turn impacted subsidized bread supplies.

A desperate reform of financial planning and spending is crucial to Egypt’s transition. Particularly important is the revival of the subsidy restructuring scheme. At the May 2012 IMF-World Bank Spring Meetings, experts asserted that subsidy reform in developing countries is “inevitable.” Egypt needs to look to its counterparts for similar experiences and lessons learnt and must focus on achieving reform through the least painful means possible. This requires effective planning and engagement of citizens through awareness on the reasons for potential increases in fuel prices. At the same time, the Government must also prepare through consolidation of the social safety net and better targeting of subsidies to minimize waste and inefficiency. The planned cut in fuel subsidies in the FY 2012-2013 budget, if approved by the military, is a good first step, although it is already being labeled as “ambitious” by some, according to Egypt Independent newspaper.

The political sensitivity that has traditionally characterized subsidy cuts in Egypt must end. On June 16 and 17, Egyptians voted in a tense presidential run-off between Ahmed Shafik, former President Mubarak’s last Prime Minister and Muslim Brotherhood candidate, Mohamed Morsy. But in the midst of the political tension and conflicting claims from the two candidates, Egyptians must divert their attention to the country’s economic future. Regardless of the winning candidate, Egypt’s new leadership may not have a choice but to concede to painful adjustment policies because of the continuous financial challenges the country is facing and the simple fact that the Government may no longer be able to afford such large social spending.

Figures acquired from Foreign Policy Magazine, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Egypt Independent.

Laila Elimam is an incoming MPP student at the UCLA Luskin School of Public Affairs. She grew up in the Bay Area, California and studied and worked in Cairo for eight years. She is a co-editor with The Generation.

Egypt’s Subsidy Burden was last modified: June 22nd, 2012 by thegeneration