On a late-April 1994 afternoon last year at
Arlington Cemetery, Air Force Captain Cleon E. Bass and his wife sat near
President Clinton and General Merrill A. McPeak, the former Air Force Chief
of staff, watching a memorial service for their son Cornelius.

Specialist Cornelius A. Bass, a 22-year-old
Army helicopter mechanic, and 25 others had died a few days earlier in
northern Iraq when the two Army helicopters they were aboard were mistakenly
shot down by Air Force fighter jets. Shortly after the service for his
son, Cleon Bass, a communications officer, hung up his Air Force uniform
for good after 19 years, deciding he could not "remain on active duty knowing
the Air Force was responsible for this fatality."

Now, nearly a year after his son's death, Cleon
Bass and several other relatives of the victims not only live with the
constant pain of their losses but believe that the incident is being whitewashed
by the military. In short, they believe that a scapegoat. has been found
in Captain Jim Wang, the lone officer facing criminal charges in the incident.
Although Defense Secretary William J. Perry and an exhaustive Pentagon
investigation concluded the April 14 helicopter shoot down was an "avoidable
tragedy" caused by mistakes made throughout the chain of command, only
Wang is facing a court-martial, which is under way at Tinker Air Force
Base near Oklahoma City.

Others besides Wang should be "held accountable,"
Elleen Thompson, the widow of Army Colonel Jeraid L. Thompson, said in
an interview. Thompson was one of the 26 who died. "To say it's too bad
and then do nothing is ridiculous," she said. "This is not right; people
should be held accountable."

When proceedings against Wang and five others
--a pilot and four crew members aboard Wang's Airborne Warning and Control
System, or AWACS, plane -- began, it looked like several people would face
charges. But over time all charges except those against Wang have evaporated.
At the same time, the Air Force has reprimanded others including senior
commanders in the field and acknowledged that numerous mistakes in judgment
were made. The Black Hawk helicopters that were shot down, the AWACS radar
plane monitoring the skies for friendly and enemy aircraft, and the two
F-15 fighters that brought down the helicopters all were participating
in Operation Provide Comfort, a 4-year-old U.N. effort to keep hostile
Iraqi aircraft away from Kurdish settlements in northern Iraq. The Pentagon's
21-volume investigation detailed mistakes by virtually everyone from the
commander of the operation, Brigadier General Jeffrey Scott Pilkington,
to the pilots who fired the missiles. That Wang alone faces a court-martial
clearly has enraged families of the victims and divided the Air Force,
particularly in two commands: Air Combat Command, which was responsible
for the AWACS plane, and the Air Force command in Europe, which was responsible
for the two F-15s. One senior Air Force of-tidal said angrily, "Our guy
[Wang] is being railroaded, and the pilots' part of it is being swept under
the rug."

One of the two F-15 pilots who shot down the
Black Hawks, Captain Eric Wick-son, was granted immunity from any criminal
charges in exchange for testimony. The other, Lieutenant Colonel Randy
W. May, initially faced 26 counts of negligent homicide, which later were
dropped. Both pilots said they misidentified the helicopters as Iraqi
Hinds, which were considered hostile aircraft in that area. Four officers
aboard the AWACS plane were investigated for not keeping accurate track
of the Army helicopters and stopping the shoot down as they should have.
After investigative hearings in November, Wang, the senior director on
board the AWACS, is being court-martialed. According to the Air Force,
Wang should have seen important symbols on his radar scope warning that
the helicopters were friendly and not Iraqi. Wang, whose court-martial
begins March 13 at Tinker when jury selection begins, could be dismissed
from the Air Force and imprisoned up to nine months if found guilty of
all three dereliction-of-duty charges against him.

"I have a difficult time with the fact that
these same individuals will be flying the same missions," Bass, the father
of the dead Army soldier, said, referring to the two F-15 pilots who fired
the missiles and four other members aboard a nearby AWACS radar plane who
were monitoring the area to prevent such accidents."It's just mind-boggling."

Bass and the family members of other victims
in the friendly fire catastrophe are pressing Congress to hold hearings
to look into how it ended up that only one person will face a court-martial
Danny Piper, a retired Air Force colonel who lost his daughter in the shoot
down, Air Force First Lieutenant Laura Piper, said in a February 22 interview
that the Air Force justice system was flawed by parochialism. He said some
of those responsible have not been held accountable because the Uniform
Code of Military Justice divides the responsibilities for assigning-blame
between two Air Force commands.

The decision not to proceed against the F-15
pilots was made by Major General Eugene D. Santarelli, commander of the
17th Air Force, based at Sembach Air Base in Germany. The decision to proceed
against one of the five AWACS crew members was made by Lieutenant General
Stephen B. Croker, commander of the 8th Air Force, based at Barksdale Air
Force Base near Bossjer City, Louisiana.

"Piecemealing the responsibility to different
commanders put out the mind-set that 'My guy didn't cause this whole thing,
so I'm not going to hang him,'" Piper said. "A congressional hearing would
put one single focus on the case." Piper and Bass said they don't want
jail sentences for everyone involved in the case. But they believe that
everyone directly involved should not be allowed to continue to fly fighters,
monitor radar scopes and command military operations. "They should not
be given a second chance to make life-and-death decisions," Bass said.
'Somewhat confused'

Indeed, some Air Force officials in the Air
Combat Combat, which command the AWACS planes, were dumbfounded when the
U.S. Air Forces in Europe gave one F-15 pilot immunity and dropped all
criminal charges against the other. "Those of us over here [in the United
States] are somewhat confused over how things over in Europe transpired,"
one colonel in Air Combat Command said. Not all believe the 28-year-old
Wang is a scapegoat, however. Some of those close to the case say he should
have seen on his radar scope that friendly helicopters were in the area.
The accident investigation report released by the Pentagon in July said
symbols showing the Black Hawks' location were "clearly visible, along
with intermittent radar returns, on the AWACS radar scopes" only a few
minutes before the accident. "To not act on that information, that's negligence,"
said one Air Force official familiar with the derision to bring criminal
charges against Wang. "That's not mistaking an identity, which can happen
to anybody," he added. "That's negligence." Wang was an experienced AWACS
crew member, having flown almost 2,400 hours in the plane.

But his record is spotty: He had received several
"unsatisfactory" ratings from instructors throughout his career, and two
years before the accident he was reprimanded for falling asleep while crew
members under his supervision were controlling fighters, according to the
accident report. But at other times, his record revealed him to be "well
above Air Force requirements." Wang said he was not derelict and that he
has been turned into a scapegoat for a flawed operation. "The entire [AWACS]
crew, including myself, acted in accordance with our training and the information
we were provided," Wang said the day the decision was made to bring him
before a court-martial. In a February 20 interview, Wang denied he saw
symbols on his scope indicating friendly helicopters were in the area.

"A green H [the symbol indicating a friendly
helicopter] would be a large indicator to me as an experienced crew member
that there might be something wrong," he said. He blamed out-of-touch commanders
who allowed Army helicopters to fly routinely without using proper identification
procedures and who did not make sure AWACS and F-15 crews knew the whereabouts
of Army helicopters. Four senior commanders of the operation refused to
testify at an October investigative hearing, but Wang's claims of serious
command problems in Operation Provide Comfort seemed to be supported by
evidence that has pried up over the months since the accident. Regardless
of the outcome of the Wang case, the decision to prosecute only him has
sparked debate throughout the Air Force, as evidenced by letters and commentaries
appearing in Air Force Times over the months. One colonel said responsibility
for the accident should not fall upon "one captain who didn't shoot anything,"
and that doing so leaves the appearance that Wang indeed is a scapegoat.
Even Air Force Secretary Sheila E. Widnall took the highly unusual step
of asking Defense Secretary William J. Perry in December whether the court-martial
against Wang should be halted. In a February 14 statement that may be used
as testimony in Wang's court-martial, Widnall said that Perry's "initial
reaction was to allow the due process procedures in place to run their
course." Widnall added she did not express an opinion to Perry on whether
charges against Wang should be dropped at that meeting with Perry. "I still
have not made up my mind," Widnall said in her testimony, which was signed
by defense and prosecuting attorneys on February 14.

Internally, Air Force officials have considered
taking the rare step of publicizing the normally private. reprimands that
have been handed out to commanders of the operation. "I think it would
be very demoralizing to the troops to not know that any punishment was
levied upon any commanders," said one officer familiar with the internal
Air Force discussions. But at the moment, the only visible sign that action
is being taken is the court-martial of Captain Jim Wang. Here is the U.S.
chain of command that was in place on April 14, the day that two Army Black
Hawk helicopters mistakenly were shot down by two Air Force F-15 Eagles.
The chain of command was established for all activities relating to Operation
Provide Comfort, the mission aimed at protecting the Kurdish population
in northern Iraq. Many played a role in the tragedy. Captain Jim Wang may
be the only individual to face court-martial in the shoot down over Iraq,
but plenty of people might have prevented the incident by doing their jobs
better, according to court testimony, documents and an Air Force Times
investigation over the past several months.

Also at issue is whether the incident could
have been avoided by better leadership at a high level. That is a question
the Air Force hierarchy has been asking itself for months, and the answer
appears to be yes. The April 14 shoot down came as two Army Black Hawks
were on a mission through a no-fly zone over Iraq that had been set up
to protect Kurdish refugees in northern Iraq from Saddam Hussein. The operation,
set up in April 1991, was called Provide Comfort. In the months before
the April shoot down, it was becoming clear that Provide Comfort's senior
leadership, including those at the U.S. European Command in Germany, were
aware of the possibility of just such a horrible accident. There were many
reasons for that concern, but a lack of coordination between the Army and
the Air Force was a big part of the problem. For example, Army helicopter
pilots regularly operated without using proper identification and radio
frequencies, according to testimony from Air Force officials at hearings
at Tinker Air Force Base near Oklahoma City last year. Also, the Air Force
commanders in the region, despite having the authority to coordinate operations
and force Army officials to comply with regulations, failed to do so, according
to the testimony and other reports on the incident. In fact, there is much
doubt as to whether commanders knew the extent of their authority or the
specifics of the regulations. Air Force planes in conjunction with British,
French and Turkish aircraft in the months before the shoot down were responsible
for ensuring that no Iraqi aircraft entered the no-fly zone north of the
36th parallel. It was the Army's job, using its helicopters, to help rebuild
Kurdish cities destroyed by Saddam Hussein's forces. But since the start
of the operation in April 1991 the two services by all accounts had grown
apart to the point that many Air Force commanders no longer viewed Army
aircraft as part of Provide Comfort, according to sources. In the months
before the shoot down, poor coordination between the Army and Air Force
resulted in numerous instances in which Army helicopters were 'targeted
but not fired upon by friendly Air Force fighters.

On one occasion an Army helicopter pilot took
evasive action out of fear be was about to be shot down by Air Force Fighters.
The lack of coordination was severe enough that Brigadier General Jeffery
S. Pilkington, the operation's commander, and others on his staff in the
months before the accident complained to European Command officials in
Stuttgart-Vaihingen, Germany, about the management of Army flight operations.
But European Command officials, some of them Army officers, appear to have
rebuffed Air Force commanders, and the helicopters continued to operate
with their customary autonomy, officials said. Operation Provide Comfort's
Army officials, including Coloneel Jerald L. Thompson, the commander of
the Military Coordination Center at Zahku, Iraq, and the Army helicopters,
also could not or would not get their helicopters to comply with regulations.
Thompson was among the 26 killed in the shoot down. The reason for the
noncompliance? The personnel and supply missions the helicopters flew were
deemed important enough to afford the Army greater flexibility in its operations
than the Air Force wanted. Playing a major role in the lack of communication
between the Army and Air Force was Air Force Colonel James R. O'Brien,
according to Colonel William S. Colwell, a military judge who investigated
dereliction of duty charges against five officers who served aboard an
E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System plane on the day of the
shoot down. O'Brien, the director for plans and policy for Provide Comfort,
was responsible for the coordination of all the operation's aircraft, including
helicopters. He also was in charge of the Joint Operations Center in the
region, whose job it was to communicate helicopter flight information to
fighter and AWACS crews.

Although Army helicopter crews rarely filed
complete flight plans and often changed the ones they did submit, O'Brien,
in testimony after the accident, seemed to be unclear about what to do
with the information. Like other commanders, he had the mistaken impression
that helicopters were not part of the operation, so they were not coordinated
like other aircraft, according to the Colwell report. How were the AWACS
crews to find out about helicopters flights? O' Brien assumed that the
Army helicopters would call the AWACS and pass along any vital information
as the helicopters crossed the Turkish-Iraqi border on their way into northern
Iraq. But the AWACS crew members later said they needed more information.
And on April 14, the lack of communication became painfully evident. The
AWACS crew had no knowledge of the helicopters until the copters from Zahku
said they were heading for lrbil. Whether more contact would have prevented
the catastrophe will never be known. O'Brien's office also was responsible
for coordinating the flight operations of British, French and Turkish air
units participating in Provide Comfort. Allied aircraft operate from Incirlik
Air Base near Adana, Turkey.

But Army helicopters operate from Diyarbakir,
Turkey, about 300 miles to the northeast of Incirlik and about 150 miles
from Zahku. That separation between Air Force and Army commanders made
O'Brien' s office vital to maintaining sound communications between the
helicopters, and the AWACS and fighter aircraft intended to protect them.

On one occasion, O'Brien's office knew of a
Russian civilian cargo plane that was to fly over northern Iraq on its
way home from Baghdad, Iraq, but the information never was passed along
to the fighters patrolling the area. Unaware that the flight had been approved,
fighters spotted the plane on their radar and intercepted it. After making
a visual identification the plane was allowed to proceed. Fighter pilots
told investigators after the shoot down that they often complained to Air
Force Colonel Douglas J. Richardson that they were not informed of flights
cleared by O'Brien's office. Richardson then was Combined Forces Air Component
Director of Operations, who was responsible for the daily operations of
the 50 Air Force aircraft flying from Incirlik. At the bottom of the command
structure were the fighter and AWACS crews who often were without a clear
picture of other aircraft they would encounter. April 14 was no exception.
Although Pilkington himself had approved the helicopter mission that day,
the word never reached the AWACS or the fighter crews that such a mission
was taking place. Aboard the two Black Hawks were 26 Americans and foreigners.
Despite apparent mismanagement on many levels, Provide Comfort's commanders
appear to have weathered their mistakes. None was charged with wrongdoing
and none is expected to be court-martialed, officials said.

Although Army General George A. Joulwan, commander
of the European Command, removed Pilkington from 'his Provide Comfort command
in June. Pilkington retained command of the 86th Airlift Wing at Ram-stein
Air Base, Germany. Beyond losing that job, Pilkington's career has not
been affected, and he is on the fast track, according to sources. O'Brien
now is serving as a planning and programs officer on the Air Force Issues
Team at the Pentagon. He will soon become the team's roles-and-missions
officer. Two other officers, who played a lesser-role in the tragedy, also
appear to have gone on with their careers. Brigadier General Curtis H.
Emery, [I. then a colonel in charge of all of the operation's American
aircraft and the commander of the 39th Wing at Incirlik, now
is the assistant deputy for theater missile defense operations with the
the Defense Department's Ballistic Missile Defense Organization at the
Pentagon.

Richardson now is the deputy chief of staff
for plans and programs for the Air Force element for the Supreme Headquarters
Allied Powers Europe at Vicenza, Italy. And of the two pilots and five
AWACS crew members directly involved in the incident. only Wang is being
court-martialed.
WASHINGTON After two air force fighter pilots down two
Army helicopters iraq April 14, killing 26 people, Defense Department officials
promised strong action would be taken to identify and, if warranted, punish
those responsible. But only Capt. Jim Wang is facing a court-martial. Wang,
28, is an E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System senior director
with the 963rd Airborne Air Control Squadron at Tinker Air Force Base near
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.

Five others charged were disciplined but never
faced a court-martial. In addition, sources said that an un-specified number
of other senior officers also have been disciplined, but it is unclear
who they are or how they were punished. Here is what happened to those
who faced criminal charges in the incident: Wang's court martial began
on began on Feb. and sentenced, Wang could lose his rank, privileges and
benefits, and could spend up to nine months in jail.

Lieutenant Colonel Randy W. May, 42, an F-15C
Eagle pilot who shot down one of the two UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters,
was charged with two counts of criminal dereliction of duty and 26 counts
of negligent homicide. After an Article 32 hearing, a military version
of a civilian grand jury and pretrial hearing, all charges against May
were dropped by Major General Eugene D. Santarelli, commander of the 17th
Air Force at Sembach Air Base. Germany. May is the former commander of
the 53rd Fighter Squadron at Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany. Maj. Douglas
"Boots" L. Martin, 38, who served aboard the AWACS plane as a liaison between
the crew and ground commanders, was charged with three counts of dereliction
of duty. After an Article 32 hearing all' charges against him were dropped
by Lieutenant General Stephen B. Croker, commander of the 8th Air Force
at Barksdale Air Force Base near Bossier City, Louisiana.

At the time of the shoot down, Martin was assigned
to the Air Combat Command's Air Operations Squadron at Langley Air Force
Base near Hampton, Va. Major Lawrence M. Tracey, 39, the AWACS mission
crew commander with the 963rd, was charged with four counts of criminal
dereliction of duty. After an Article 32 hearing all charges against him
were dropped by Croker. Tracey, who was planning to retire before the incident
happened, is expected to leave the service in July.

First Lieutenenat Joseph M. Halcli, age unavailable,
the AWACS en route controller with the 963rd. was charged with four counts
of criminal dereliction of duty. The Article 32 judge recommended that
Halcli receive Article 15 nonjudicial punishment. Officials would not comment
on whether Croker has decided to accept or reject the judge's recommendation.
Second Lieutenant Rickey L Wilson, 29, the AWACS tactical area of responsibility
controller with the 963rd, was charged with four counts of criminal dereliction
of duty, but after an Article 32 hearing he was cleared of all charges
by Croker. He is now training to become an air surveillance officer.
THE VICTIMS

Twenty-six people were killed on April 14 when
two Air Fore fighter pilots shot down two Army helicopters over northern
Iraq. The victims were: Air Force Second Lieutenant Laura A. Piper, an
intelligence analyst specializing in Iraqi air force command and control
matters with the 7454th Tactical Intelligence Squadron at Ramstein Air
Base, Germany. She was posthumously promoted to first lieutenant. Army
Staff Sergeant Paul N. Barclay, a communications
noncommissioned officer and Green Beret with the 10th Special Forces Group
(Airborne) based at Fort Devens, Massachusetts. Army Specialist Cornelius
A. Bass, a UH-60 Black Hawk crew chief with the 6th Battalion, 159th Aviation
Regiment, Giebelstadt, Germany. Army Specialist Jeffery C. Colbert, a UH-60
crew chief with the 159th. Army Private First Class Mark A. Ellner, a UH-60
crew chief with the 159th. He was posthumously promoted to specialist.
Army Warrant Officer 1 John W. Garrett Jr., a UH-60 pilot with the 159th.
He served for 10 years in the Air Force before joining the Army to fly.
Army Chief Warrant Officer 2 Michael A. Hall, a UH-60 pilot with the 159th.
Army Sergeant 1st Class Benjamin T. Hodge,
an intelligence specialist and translator with the 519th Military Intelligence
Battalion at Fort Bragg, North Carolins. Army Captain Patrick M. McKenna,
a UH-60 pilot with the 159th. Army Warrant Officer 1 Erik S. Mounsey, a
UH-60 pilot with the 159th. Army Colonel Richard A. Mulhem, who was to
have become the new commander of the Military Coordination Center in Zakhu,
Iraq. Army Specialist Michael S. Robinson, a UH-60 crew chief and member
of the 82nd Airborne Division based at Fort Bragg. He was posthumously
promoted to sergeant. Army Staff Sergeant Ricky L. Robinson, a medic with
the 10th. Army Colonel Jerald L. Thompson, commander
of the Military Coordination Center in Zakhu. Barbara L. Schell, the operation's
U.S. Department of State political adviser. Major Harry C. Shapland, a
British security officer. Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan C. Swann, the operation's
senior British representative. Lt. Col. Guy Demetz, the operation's senior
French representative. Col. Hikmet Alp, the Turkish co-commander of the
Military Coordination Center in Zakhu. 1st Lt. Ceyhun Civas, a Turkish
liaison officer. 1st Lt. M. Barlas Gultepe, a Turkish liaison officer.
Abdulsatur Arab, a Kurdish bodyguard. Ghandi Hussein, a Kurdish bodyguard.
Bader Mikho, a Kurdish bodyguard. Salid Said, a Kurdish interpreter.