In late 1993, PDC entered into an agreement with
its parent company, PDI, whereby PDI was designated PDC’s exclusive agent for
the purpose of conducting hedging activity. In 1995 and 1996,
pursuant to that agreement, PDI carried out hedging transactions on PDC’s
behalf in order to protect the PDI Group from fluctuations in the spot price of
gold. On or shortly after entering into those transactions, PDI allocated them
to PDC. The total net gains that PDC realized from those transactions were
$6,423,000 in 1995 and $11,440,000 in 1996. At the time, the
Minister of Finance’s own administrative practice excluded financial
transactions from the statutory definition of “hedging” unless those
transactions resulted in the delivery of output from an Ontario mine.
Consistent with this practice, PDC excluded the gains from its computation of
profits under the Ontario Mining Tax Act because no gold had been
delivered pursuant to those transactions. By the time PDC was reassessed
in 2000, the policy had changed. Under the new policy, transactions
constitute hedging so long as they are entered into prior to the delivery of
output and to the extent that the volume of the transactions does not exceed
the productive capacity of the Ontario mine. The Minister thus sought to
include the gains in PDC’s profits for the tax years in question. PDC
unsuccessfully appealed this reassessment before the Superior Court of
Justice. The trial judge found that the transactions at issue fell within the
statutory definition of hedging because there was a nexus or “some link”
between the output of the mines and the financial transactions. A majority of
the Court of Appeal set aside the decision and allowed PDC’s appeal, concluding
that the definition of hedging was restricted to contracts that were settled by
physical delivery of gold from an Ontario mine.

Held: The
appeal should be allowed.

The definition of “hedging” in the Mining Tax Act
extends to transactions that do not result in the physical delivery of output
from an Ontario mine. This interpretation avoids the redundancy that results
between the statutory definitions of “hedging” and “proceeds” of mining
operations. Under the Act, “hedging” is defined in terms of a number of
components, including “the fixing of a price for output of a mine before
delivery by means of a forward sale”. The expression “fix the price” cannot
mean simply setting the price that will be paid upon delivery of the output.
If so, the legislature would not have needed this element in the statutory
definition of “hedging” as the price received upon delivery of the output would
clearly fall within all “consideration that is received . . .
from the output of the mine”, the first component of the definition of
“proceeds”, and within “all consideration received . . . from . . .
future sales or forward sales of the output of the mine”, the third component.
A court should avoid adopting an interpretation that renders any portion of a
statute meaningless or redundant and, in this case, the presumption against
tautology carries considerable weight. [3] [43‑46]

The broader interpretation of “hedging” is consistent
with the context of the statutory definition. In addition to “the fixing of a
price . . . by means of a forward sale”, the definition of
“hedging” refers to “the fixing of a price . . . by means
of . . . a futures contract on a recognized commodity exchange”,
“the purchase or sale forward of a foreign currency related directly to the
proceeds of the output of a mine” and “does not include speculative currency
hedging”. It is significant that futures contracts are seldom settled by
physical delivery. Similarly, a sale or purchase forward of foreign currency
is a separate transaction from the sale of an underlying commodity and would
not itself be settled by physical delivery of the commodity. [47]

In light of the scheme and context of the Mining
Tax Act, the statutory definition of “hedging” must refer to something more
than transactions that are settled by delivery of output. The “some link” test
applied by the trial judge is an appropriate response to the gap left in the
Act by the failure to express more clearly what constitutes the “fixing of a
price” for output of a mine. [49]

The shift in the Minister’s administrative practice is
reflective of the ambiguity that inheres in the statute itself and cannot be
relied upon as an interpretive tool except to support the view that the
statutory definition falls short of being clear, precise and unambiguous.
Although administrative practice can be an “important factor” in case of doubt
about the meaning of legislation, it is not determinative. In a case such as
the present one where a statutory provision admits of more than one possible
meaning, the Minister, having decided that its former interpretation was
incorrect, is not precluded from changing its practice. [40]

1The issue at the core of this appeal concerns the proper interpretation
of “hedging” in s. 1(1) of the Mining Tax Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.15, in
order to determine the scope of the tax base under the Act. Hedging, as it is
commonly understood, refers to transactions that offset financial risk inherent
in other transactions, such as price risk or foreign exchange risk. In the
present case, the Court is called upon to determine whether the definition of
“hedging” in the Mining Tax Act is informed by, or is narrower than, the
commonly understood meaning of the term. Specifically, the Court must decide
whether the statutory definition is restricted to transactions that result in
the physical delivery of the output of an Ontario mine or includes profits
derived from “hedging” programs in respect of mining operations.

2Until 1998, the Minister of Finance’s own administrative practice
excluded financial transactions from the statutory definition of “hedging”
unless those transactions resulted in the delivery of output from an Ontario
mine. In 1995 and 1996, Placer Dome Canada Limited (“PDC”) realized gains of
$6,423,000 and $11,440,000, respectively, from certain financial transactions.
Consistent with the Minister’s administrative practice prevailing at the time,
it excluded those gains from its computation of profits under the Mining Tax
Act because no gold had been delivered pursuant to those transactions. By
the time PDC was reassessed in 2000, the Minister’s policy had changed. Under
the new policy, transactions constitute “hedging” so long as they are entered
into prior to the delivery of output and to the extent that the volume of the
transactions does not exceed the productive capacity of the Ontario mine. This
would mean that certain non-speculative transactions which fix the ultimate
price of mine output would fall within the statutory definition of “hedging”,
even if such transactions did not result in the physical delivery of output.
Thus, the Minister sought to include the gains in PDC’s profits for the tax
years in question. PDC appealed this reassessment. Although PDC was
unsuccessful before Cullity J. of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, a
majority of the Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed PDC’s appeal.

3I conclude that the definition of “hedging” in the Mining Tax Act
extends to transactions that do not result in the physical delivery of output
from an Ontario mine. This interpretation avoids the redundancy that results,
on PDC’s interpretation, between the statutory definitions of “hedging” and
“proceeds” of mining operations. Moreover, it ensures that resources are taxed
at their “locked in” value or their “realized price”.

II. Background

4PDC is a wholly owned subsidiary of Placer Dome International (“PDI”).
PDI has approximately 50 direct and indirect subsidiaries around the world and,
together with those subsidiaries, is engaged in the international exploration,
production and sale of gold. In 1995 and 1996, PDC, or a predecessor prior to
an amalgamation, operated three mines in Ontario: the Campbell Red Lake
underground mine, the Detour Lake mine and the Dome mine. It also operated the
Sigma gold mine in Quebec and the Endako molybdenum mine in British Columbia,
and owned all the shares of a corporation that operated the Kiena gold mine in
Quebec.

5It is not disputed by the parties that all the gold produced by PDC in
1995 and 1996 was sold to bullion dealers at, or approximately at, the spot
market price and that none of the gold produced was the subject of a forward
sale or a futures contract. At issue in the present case is a series of
transactions entered into by PDI on PDC’s behalf as part of a comprehensive
program designed to manage the risk associated with fluctuations in the spot
price of gold. Those transactions included forward contracts, spot deferred
contracts, fixed interest floating lease rate contracts, put options and call
options. It is common ground that none of these transactions were settled by
physical delivery of gold from any of PDC’s Ontario mines.

6On December 21, 1993, PDC entered into an agency agreement with PDI
whereby PDI was designated PDC’s exclusive agent for the purpose of conducting
hedging activity. In 1995 and 1996, pursuant to that agreement, PDI carried
out hedging transactions on PDC’s behalf in order to protect the PDI Group from
fluctuations in the spot price of gold. Under the terms of the agreement, PDI
took instruction from PDC as to the amounts of precious metals to be hedged,
but was otherwise free to conduct hedging activity on PDC’s behalf at its
discretion. On or shortly after entering into these transactions, PDI
allocated them to PDC. In its internal bookkeeping and financial statements
and in computing its income from gold production for the purpose of claiming a
resource allowance in its corporate tax returns, PDC, in turn, allocated the
transactions among its Canadian mines on the basis of proportionate production
from each mine. The gold that was so allocated was less than the actual
production from the mines. The total net gains that PDC realized from these
transactions were $6,423,000 in 1995 and $11,440,000 in 1996.

III. Legislative Framework and Application of the Law

7The present appeal concerns only a very specific and limited part of the
taxation regime of the mining industry in Canada. Over the years, this
industry has seen the rise and fall of a number of rules and policies designed
to address its particular needs and difficulties. Many of them will be found,
for example, in the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.), more
particularly in provisions about the deductibility of Crown royalties or mining
taxes and, for a long time, about depletion allowances.

8Under s. 3(1) of the Mining Tax Act, mine operators pay tax based
on profit. Profit is defined in s. 3(5) as proceeds less allowable deductions,
and “proceeds” is defined in s. 1(1) as follows:

“proceeds” means the total consideration
that is received or is receivable from another person or persons, in any
currency, whether in cash or non‑cash form, from the output of the mine,
including all by‑products sold, or the amount determined in the
prescribed manner, and all consideration received or receivable from hedging
and future sales or forward sales of the output of the mine, converted at the
date of receipt of the consideration to the equivalent in Canadian funds, if
receivable in funds of another country;

Thus, this definition includes three components: (a) total
consideration from the output of the mine; (b) all consideration from hedging;
and (c) all consideration from future or forward sales of the output of the
mine.

9“Hedging” is defined in s. 1(1) as follows:

“hedging” means the fixing of a
price for output of a mine before delivery by means of a forward sale or a
futures contract on a recognized commodity exchange, or the purchase or sale
forward of a foreign currency related directly to the proceeds of the output of
a mine, but does not include speculative currency hedging except to the extent
that the hedging transaction determines the final price and proceeds for the
output;

10It is well established that in resolving doubt about the meaning of a
tax provision, the administrative practice and interpretation adopted by the
Minister, while not determinative, are important factors to be weighed: see Harel
v. Deputy Minister of Revenue of Quebec, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 851, at p. 859, per
de Grandpré J.; Will-Kare Paving & Contracting Ltd. v. Canada,
[2000] 1 S.C.R. 915, 2000 SCC 36, at para. 66, per Binnie J.
(dissenting, but not on this point). Prior to 1998, the Minister took the
position that a hedging transaction only fell within the statutory definition
if it was settled by physical delivery of the mining operator’s output. In
October 1998, the Minister’s policy changed. Under the new policy,
transactions that did not result in physical delivery would be caught by the
statutory definition so long as they were entered into prior to the delivery of
output and to the extent that the quantities of the commodity hedged did not
exceed the operator’s output for the taxation year in question.

11There is no dispute that at the time PDC filed its mining tax returns
for the years in question, it did so in conformity with the administrative
practice prevailing at the time. However, by the time that PDC’s returns were
reassessed in 2000, the policy had changed. While PDC emphasizes that its
returns were consistent with the Minister’s own practice at the time they were
filed and argues that the former policy is entitled to substantial weight in
interpreting the Mining Tax Act, the Minister submits that it is not
estopped from changing its practice having decided that its original
interpretation was incorrect.

12The Minister argues that PDC’s interpretation and, indeed, its own
interpretation under the former administrative practice, result in a
substantial redundancy between the statutory definitions of “hedging” and
“proceeds”. In the Minister’s view, “hedging” encompasses transactions that do
not culminate in delivery of output so long as there is a sufficient nexus
between the output of the mine and the hedging contract.

13PDC responds that the definition of “hedging” in the Mining TaxAct
is limited to transactions that result in the physical delivery of the output
of an Ontario mine. Any redundancy in the Mining Tax Act, it submits,
cannot displace the clear words of that provision.

IV. Judicial History

A. Superior Court of Justice (2002), 61 O.R. (3d) 628

14Cullity J. dismissed PDC’s appeal from the confirmation of the
assessments by the Minister. He relied in part on the principles outlined in Echo
Bay Mines Ltd. v. Canada, [1992] 3 F.C. 707 (T.D.), about the general
purpose, characteristics and methods of hedging and held that those principles
should inform the meaning of the definition of “hedging” in the Mining Tax
Act. In his view, the terms of the statutory definition make it clear that
there must be a nexus, or “some link”, between the output of a mine and the
financial transaction, but restricting that definition to transactions that
culminate in the delivery of the output of the mine would introduce a
significant redundancy into the Act. Specifically, if hedging “by means of a
forward sale” were restricted to sales that are settled by delivery of output,
then that part of the statutory definition would be deprived of any meaning
that is not already covered by the inclusion in the definition of “proceeds” of
the “total consideration . . . from the output of the mine”.

15The trial judge stated that whether or not there is a sufficient link
between a hedging transaction and output is a question of fact. In light of a
number of factors, including: (a) the underlying purpose of the transactions;
(b) the existence and terms of the agency agreement between PDI and PDC; (c)
the allocation of the transactions to PDC pursuant to that agreement; and (d)
PDC’s treatment of the gains and losses for the purpose of its internal
accounting and corporate tax returns, Cullity J. concluded that the
transactions were related to the output of PDC’s mines. He observed that any
other conclusion would not have been reasonable or realistic in the
circumstances.

B. Court of Appealfor Ontario (2004), 190 O.A.C. 157

16Writing for the majority, Armstrong J.A. allowed PDC’s appeal. In his
view, the definition of “hedging” in the Mining Tax Act was clear,
unambiguous and precise, and was restricted to contracts that were settled by
physical delivery of gold from an Ontario mine. Applying this interpretation,
two findings of fact made by the trial judge were determinative: (a) all gold
produced by PDC’s Ontario mines was sold to bullion dealers at approximately
the spot market price; and (b) none of the gold was the subject of a forward
sales contract. In light of those facts, Armstrong J.A. found it impossible to
conclude that the transactions could be said to fix the price for output of the
Ontario mines. The principles articulated in Echo Bay Mines were
inapplicable as that case involved the interpretation of a different statute,
one in which no statutory definition for hedging was provided. Moreover, in
applying expert evidence adduced in Echo Bay Mines to fill a perceived
deficiency in the record before him, Armstrong J.A. considered that Cullity J.
had run afoul of the rule against judicial innovation articulated by this Court
in Ludco Enterprises Ltd. v. Canada, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 1082, 2001 SCC 62,
at para. 38.

17Armstrong J.A. concluded that there was no fatal redundancy in the Act
because there could be future sales or forward sales contracts relating to the
output of the mine that are not caught by the definition of “hedging” in the
Act, “either because they do not take place on a recognized commodity exchange
or for some other reason” (para. 40). In the alternative, he held that any
such redundancy could not displace the plain meaning of the provisions at issue.
He was reinforced in his conclusion by the observation that, while
consideration is inherently a gross concept, gains and losses from hedging
transactions are necessarily computed as net values. Including a net amount
within the computation of consideration would distort fundamental concepts of
accounting. He also opined that the Minister’s administrative practice was
entitled to be given some weight based on the principles articulated in Harel
and Will-Kare Paving. He noted that the burden for proving that the
Mining Tax Act imposes a tax on net gains from the transactions rests
with the Minister, relying on Gonthier J.’s statement in Québec (Communauté
urbaine) v. Corp. Notre-Dame de Bon-Secours, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 3, for that
purpose. If mistaken in the view that the statutory definition of “hedging”
was unambiguous, Armstrong J.A. would have resolved any reasonable doubt in
favour of the taxpayer in accordance with the residual presumption.

18Gillese J.A. would have dismissed PDC’s appeal. In her view, the
statutory definition is ambiguous in that it admits of two reasonable
interpretations. The “narrow” interpretation, which was reflected in the
Minister’s former administrative practice, restricts “hedging” to contracts,
the subject matter of which is the output of a mine. The “broad”
interpretation, reflected in the Minister’s new administrative practice (and
the Minister’s position in the present case), encompasses contracts which have
as their subject matter something other than the output of a mine, but which
can nevertheless be said to fix the price for the output of a mine. In her
view, the narrow interpretation results in a serious redundancy between the
second and third elements of the statutory definition of “proceeds”, that is,
“hedging” and “forward sales of the output of the mine”, respectively. She
concluded that the broad interpretation is preferable and that the statutory
definition refers to contracts with a subject matter other than the output of a
mine so long as those contracts are: (a) formed prior to delivery of output;
(b) on a recognized commodity exchange; and (c) the means by which the price
for the output of an Ontario mine is fixed.

19In addressing the subsidiary arguments, Gillese J.A. concluded that the
Minister was not estopped from changing his administrative practice and, if
anything, the change in administrative practice supported the view that the
statutory definition is ambiguous. She noted that hedging is necessarily a net
concept and that, as a result, “consideration from hedging” has to be a net
concept in the circumstances. On the question of whether options could
properly be considered forward sales contracts, she noted that the characterization
by the trial judge of the transactions is a mixed question of law and fact and,
as such, is entitled to some deference.

V. Analysis

A. The Issue

20As I have noted, the central issue in this case concerns the computation
of profits for the purpose of the Mining Tax Act. Specifically, the
issue is whether the statutory definition of “hedging” encompasses financial
transactions that are not settled by physical delivery of the output of an
Ontario mine. I will first address the principles of statutory interpretation
applicable to taxation statutes. Next, I will briefly review the nature and
mechanisms of hedging, as that term is used under generally accepted accounting
principles (“GAAP”). Finally, I will turn to an analysis of the statutory
provision at issue in this appeal.

B. Interpretation of Tax Statutes

(1) General Principles

21In Stubart Investments Ltd. v. The Queen, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 536,
this Court rejected the strict approach to the construction of taxation
statutes and held that the modern approach applies to taxation statutes no less
than it does to other statutes. That is, “the words of an Act are to be read in
their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously
with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of
Parliament” (p. 578): see 65302 British Columbia Ltd. v. Canada, [1999]
3 S.C.R. 804, at para. 50. However, because of the degree of precision and
detail characteristic of many tax provisions, a greater emphasis has often been
placed on textual interpretation where taxation statutes are concerned: Canada
Trustco Mortgage Co. v. Canada, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 601, 2005 SCC 54, at para.
11. Taxpayers are entitled to rely on the clear meaning of taxation provisions
in structuring their affairs. Where the words of a statute are precise and
unequivocal, those words will play a dominant role in the interpretive process.

22On the other hand, where the words of a statute give rise to more than
one reasonable interpretation, the ordinary meaning of words will play a lesser
role, and greater recourse to the context and purpose of the Act may be
necessary: Canada Trustco, at para. 10. Moreover, as McLachlin C.J.
noted at para. 47, “[e]ven where the meaning of particular provisions may not
appear to be ambiguous at first glance, statutory context and purpose may
reveal or resolve latent ambiguities.” The Chief Justice went on to explain
that in order to resolve explicit and latent ambiguities in taxation
legislation, “the courts must undertake a unified textual, contextual and
purposive approach to statutory interpretation”.

23The interpretive approach is thus informed by the level of precision and
clarity with which a taxing provision is drafted. Where such a provision
admits of no ambiguity in its meaning or in its application to the facts, it
must simply be applied. Reference to the purpose of the provision “cannot be
used to create an unexpressed exception to clear language”: see P. W. Hogg, J.
E. Magee and J. Li, Principles of Canadian Income Tax Law (5th ed.
2005), at p. 569; Shell Canada Ltd. v. Canada, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 622.
Where, as in this case, the provision admits of more than one reasonable
interpretation, greater emphasis must be placed on the context, scheme and
purpose of the Act. Thus, legislative purpose may not be used to supplant
clear statutory language, but to arrive at the most plausible interpretation of
an ambiguous statutory provision.

24Although there is a residual presumption in favour of the taxpayer, it
is residual only and applies in the exceptional case where application of the
ordinary principles of interpretation does not resolve the issue: Notre-Dame
de Bon-Secours, at p. 19. Any doubt about the meaning of a taxation
statute must be reasonable, and no recourse to the presumption lies unless the
usual rules of interpretation have been applied, to no avail, in an attempt to
discern the meaning of the provision at issue. In my view, the residual
presumption does not assist PDC in the present case because the ambiguity in
the Mining Tax Act can be resolved through the application of the
ordinary principles of statutory interpretation. I will say more on this
below.

(2) The Burden of Proof

25The parties disagree on who bears the burden of proof in this case. The
burden of proof under the Mining Tax Act is set out in s. 8(7). That
section referentially incorporates s. 80(18) of the Corporations Tax Act,
R.S.O. 1990, c. C.40, which provides that

[a]n assessment, subject to being varied or vacated on
an objection or appeal and subject to a reassessment, shall be deemed to be
valid and binding despite any error, defect or omission therein or in any
proceeding under this Act relating thereto.

Thus, the taxpayer bears the burden of establishing that the factual
findings upon which the Minister based the assessment are wrong. This is the
same burden that applies under the Income Tax Act, s. 152(8): see V.
Krishna, The Fundamentals of Canadian Income Tax (8th ed. 2004), at p.
35; Johnston v. M.N.R., [1948] S.C.R. 486.

26PDC and the majority of the Court of Appeal, cite Notre-Dame de
Bon-Secours for the proposition that the party claiming the benefit of a
legislative provision has the burden of showing that he or she is entitled to
rely on it. Specifically, at p. 15, Gonthier J. held:

The burden of proof thus rests with the tax department
in the case of a provision imposing a tax obligation and with the taxpayer in
the case of a provision creating a tax exemption.

Gonthier J.’s statement in Notre-Damede Bon-Secours was
obiter dicta, made in the context of explaining the traditional rule
that tax legislation must be strictly construed. His point was simply that the
residual presumption in favour of the taxpayer, which follows from the strict
construction rule, was distinct from the concept of burden of proof. The
burden of proof was not at issue in the case before him, and Gonthier J.’s
comment was made in passing, without reference to the leading case law
establishing the burden of proof in tax cases. The fundamental rules on the
allocation of evidentiary burden in this matter remain valid. I cannot accept
that, with this statement, he intended to overrule an established body of
jurisprudence. The taxpayer bears the burden of displacing the Minister’s
factual assumptions, but the concept of burden of proof is not applicable to the
interpretation of a statute, which is necessarily a question of law: Johnston.

27Before moving on from this point, I wish to address the similar
observation made in the context of explaining the analytical approach to the
general anti-avoidance rule (“GAAR”) in Canada Trustco,at paras.
64-65. In that case, the Court noted that, as a practical matter, the taxpayer
was not required to disprove that he or she had violated the object, spirit or
purpose of the provision. Rather, the Minister, who is in a better position
than the taxpayer to make submissions as to the legislative intent behind
particular taxation provisions, was obliged to identify the purpose of the
provisions and to show how that purpose would be frustrated or defeated by the
taxpayer’s arrangements.

28The statement in Canada Trustco is distinguishable in that it
applies in cases where the taxpayer has complied with the letter of the law,
and where the Minister seeks to rely on GAAR to nevertheless disallow the
taxpayer’s claim on the basis that it is inconsistent with the object and
spirit of the provision in question. It would be both impractical and unduly
onerous to require a taxpayer whose transaction falls within the four corners
of a tax provision to also disprove that he or she has violated the object,
spirit or purpose of the provision. The same line of reasoning does not apply
in the present case where the meaning of the provision is ambiguous. In a case
such as the present one, the meaning of the relevant provision is a question of
law, and there is no onus on either party in respect of it — the duty to
ascertain the correct interpretation lies with the court.

C. Hedging

29In order to give some context to the discussion of the statutory
definition of “hedging”, I will begin with a brief overview of hedging, as it
is commonly understood under GAAP. The transactions at issue in the present
case are financial derivatives. Generally speaking, financial derivatives are
contracts whose value is based on the value of an underlying asset, reference
rate, or index. As Professors Grottenthaler and Henderson explain, there are
essentially two reasons for entering into such a contract — to speculate on the
movement of the underlying asset, reference rate or index, or to hedge exposure
to a particular financial risk such as the risk posed by volatility in the
prices of commodities: see M. E. Grottenthaler and P. J. Henderson, The Law
of Financial Derivatives in Canada (loose-leaf), at p. 1-8. This
distinction between speculation and hedging is an important one. A transaction
is a hedge where the party to it genuinely has assets or liabilities exposed to
market fluctuations, while speculation is “the degree to which a hedger engages
in derivatives transactions with a notional value in excess of its actual risk
exposure”: see B. W. Kraus, “The Use and Regulation of Derivative Financial
Products in Canada” (1999), 9 W.R.L.S.I. 31, at p. 38. Because the gold
that was allocated to the transactions at issue in the present case did not
exceed the actual production from the respective mines, the transactions were
not speculative in the ordinary sense of the term.

30The two basic types of derivative transactions are forward contracts and
options: see Grottenthaler and Henderson, at pp. 1-4 et seq. A forward
contract is a contract that obligates one party to buy, and another party to
sell, a specified amount of a particular asset at a specified price, on a given
date in the future. The obligation contained in a forward contract is
two-sided in that both parties are obligated to perform the contract. By
contrast, an option which grants the purchaser upon payment of a premium the
right, but not the obligation, to purchase (“call option”) or sell (“put
option”) an asset on a specified date is a one-sided obligation. Nevertheless,
they both function as hedging tools.

31Derivative transactions may be settled in a number of different ways:
physical delivery of the underlying asset, cash settlement or offsetting
contract. Most derivative contracts, however, are not settled by physical
delivery. The most important point about settlement is that, at least for the
purposes of GAAP, the way in which a derivative contract functions as a “hedge”
is unaffected by the method by which the contract is settled.

32An example may be useful at this stage to better illustrate how hedging
transactions work and to identify the distinction between hedging and
speculation. Assume that on January 1, 2006, the price of gold is $200/oz.
Company A is a gold producer and wishes to hedge its exposure to fluctuating
gold prices. On January 21, A enters into a forward sale contract for 100 oz.
of gold at $200/oz. If the price of gold falls, the value of the hedging
contract increases. Conversely, if the price of gold increases, the
value of the contract decreases. It is this characteristic that separates a
hedge from a purely speculative transaction. The producer who faces genuine
exposure to price fluctuations effectively trades some of the opportunity for
gains that would accompany increasing gold prices for security against
decreasing gold prices. This relationship is most visible where derivative
transactions are cash settled (as they most commonly are). If, on July 31, the
price of gold has fallen to $100/oz., the contract may be cash settled by a
payment of the difference between the strike price ($20,000) and the spot
market price at the time of settlement ($10,000). Thus, the counterparty to
the forward sale contract would issue a cheque to A for $10,000. The greater
the margin by which the price of gold decreases, the greater the profit on the
hedging contract.

33In Echo Bay Mines, the Trial Division of the Federal Court
considered the principles of hedging under GAAP. In that case, the taxpayer
was a silver producer that had entered into forward sales contracts in order to
protect itself against the risk of declining silver prices. When the price of
silver fell, the taxpayer realized gains on those contracts by closing them out
or rolling them over. None of the contracts resulted in the delivery of any
silver. Nevertheless, the taxpayer treated those gains as “resource profits” on
the basis that they were income from the production of minerals in Canada.
Doing so enabled the taxpayer to take advantage of the resource allowance, as
provided for in s. 20(1)(v.l) of the Income Tax Actand s.
1204(1) of the Income Tax Regulations. MacKay J. accepted that

under generally accepted accounting principles, a
producer’s gain or loss from its execution of forward sales contracts may be
considered a “hedge” and therefore matched against the production of the goods
produced, if four conditions are met. . . .

1. The item to be hedged
exposes the enterprise to price (or interest rate) risk.

2. The futures contract
reduces that exposure and is designated as a hedge.

3. The significant
characteristics and expected terms of the anticipated transactions are
identified.

4. It is probable that the
anticipated transaction will occur. [pp. 715-16]

He concluded at p. 733 that the price received for the silver
produced was the sum of receipts from delivery of actual production and from
the settlement of forward sales contracts.

34The decision in Echo BayMines illustrates the way in which
financial transactions, though they may not be settled by physical delivery of
the output of an Ontario mine, may nevertheless be said to “fix the price” for
that output. I agree with the following endorsement of the decision in Echo
Bay Mines:

This conclusion is clearly a
sensible one. If the transactions had been physically settled then the gain or
loss on the transactions would have been the actual revenue or loss from the
sale of the silver and would have been on income account. Treating the gain or
loss on the forward contracts having the same economic result in any different
way would have created an unjustified artificial distinction.

(Grottenthaler and Henderson, at pp. 11-8 and 11-9)

From the perspective of what constitutes hedging under GAAP, the
distinction between cash-settled and delivery-settled contracts is arbitrary.

35Although I am mindful that Echo BayMines concerned a
different statute, one in which “hedging” is not a defined term, I conclude
that the general principles articulated in that case have some relevance here.
The central issue in Echo BayMines was whether gains and losses
from hedging were sufficiently linked to the underlying transactions, namely
the production and sale of silver, to constitute “resource profits” within the
meaning of the Regulations under the Income Tax Act. In essence, the
court in Echo BayMines was grappling with the same question that
is raised in the present case: Can synthetic derivative transactions be said
to “fix the price” for the underlying commodity even where those transactions
do not result in the delivery of the underlying commodity?

D. The Inclusion of Hedging Profits

36The parties agree that the transactions at issue in the present case
constitute “hedging” in the ordinary sense of the term. However,
notwithstanding that it is common in the industry vernacular to speak of
“realized price” as the aggregate of proceeds from spot sales and gains and
losses from hedging, PDC argued before this Court that the price for the output
of an Ontario mine could only be “fixed”, for the purpose of the Mining Tax
Act, by a transaction that culminated in the physical delivery of that
output. I turn, then, to a consideration of the meaning of the statutory
definition of “hedging”.

37The definition of “hedging” first appeared in 1975 in the Regulation to
the Mining Tax Act, 1972, S.O. 1972, c. 140: O. Reg. 126/75, s. 1(f).
At that time, profit was calculated under s. 3(3) of the Act using: (a) the
amount of gross receipts from the output of the mine during the taxation year;
(b) where the output was not sold but was treated by or for the producer of the
mine, the amount of the actual market value of the output at the pit’s mouth;
or (c) where there was no means for determining the actual value at the pit’s
mouth in (b), the amount at which the mine assessor appraised the output. The
method by which the assessor was to appraise output under (c) was set out in s.
4(1) of the Regulation. It was only in this last context that the definition
of “hedging” came into play. In 1987, the definition of “hedging” was
introduced into the Act itself and incorporated into the definition of
“proceeds”: Mining Tax Amendment Act, 1987, S.O. 1987, c. 11, ss.
1(4)(cb) and 1(7)(j).

38PDC raised several arguments, based on the statutory and constitutional
limits on the power of the Lieutenant Governor in Council at the time, about
the meaning of “hedging” when it was first introduced in the Regulation.
Specifically, PDC argues that no power had been vested in the Lieutenant
Governor in Council to make regulations imposing a new tax or expanding the
existing tax base, and that any such attempt would have been contrary to s. 53
of the Constitution Act, 1867, which requires that bills imposing any
tax originate in the House of Commons. Both of these arguments depend for
their validity on the proposition that the 1975 Regulation created a new tax or
expanded the tax base. I am not satisfied that the 1975 Regulation can be so
construed — it did not alter the primary definition of “gross receipts” in the
Act, but merely clarified the method by which a subsidiary, discretionary
amount was to be assessed. This does not, in my view, constitute a change of
the radical nature that PDC suggests.

39In any event, whatever the precise effect of the 1975 Regulation, which
need not be decided in this case, it is clear that the decision to incorporate
the definition of “hedging” into the Act itself in 1987 signified a change in
the statutory framework for the computation of profit. Hedging gains were no
longer included in income only where it was otherwise impossible to ascertain
the market value of the output of a mine before processing. The Act now
includes them in every case as an integral component of the statutory
definition of “proceeds”. No constitutional or other impediment in 1987
prevented the enactment of such a provision, with respect to either of the
proposed definitions. Since the definitions of “hedging” and “proceeds” remain
unchanged in the present Act, the task at hand is to set out the precise nature
and scope of the 1987 amendments. Although both parties rely on Hansard
evidence related to the movement of the hedging provision from the Regulation
to the Act, I find that evidence to be ambiguous and of little assistance in
this case. Accordingly, any analysis of the 1987 amendments must be grounded
in an examination of the scheme and context of the revised Act.

40At the outset, I note that I do not find the arguments based on the
Minister’s administrative practice to be helpful in the present case. The fact
is that there are two administrative practices — one corresponding to each of
the proposed interpretations. The shift in the Minister’s practice is reflective
of the ambiguity that inheres in the statute itself and cannot be relied upon
as an interpretive tool except to support the view that the statutory
definition falls short of being clear, precise and unambiguous. Although
administrative practice can be an “important factor” in case of doubt about the
meaning of legislation, it is not determinative: Nowegijick v. The Queen,
[1983] 1 S.C.R. 29, at p. 37. In a case such as the present one where a
statutory provision admits of more than one possible meaning, the Minister,
having decided that its former interpretation was incorrect, is not precluded
from changing its practice.

41PDC argues that the Minister’s change in administrative practice is
arbitrary and unfair, noting that in the same month the Minister argued for the
application of the new administrative policy before Cullity J. in the present
case, and for the application of the former administrative policy in Inco
Ltd. v. Ontario (Minister of Finance), [2002] O.J. No. 3150 (QL) (S.C.J.).
Inco had incurred substantial losses on its hedging activities in its taxation
years 1988 to 1990 and sought to deduct those losses based on the decision in Echo
Bay Mines. The critical distinction between the present case and Inco,
however, is that the statutory limitation period for reassessment in Inco
expired while the old administrative policy was still in place. Whenever the
Minister changes its administrative practice, it is inevitable that different
taxpayers will have been taxed differently under the same provision depending
on whether they were assessed prior to, or after, the change in policy. The
line between taxpayers who fall on either side of the administrative policy
must be drawn somewhere, and doing so on the basis of whether a taxpayer’s taxation
year is open or closed under the statute is a principled and practical
approach.

42As I noted above, “proceeds” is defined in s. 1(1) of the Mining Tax
Act in terms of three components: (a) consideration received from the
output of a mine; (b) consideration from hedging; and (c) consideration from
future sales or forward sales of the output of the mine.

43“Hedging” is also defined in terms of a number of elements. Although
only one of those elements is at issue in the present appeal, it is worth
parsing the full definition in order to better appreciate the context and
scheme within which the disputed phrase is placed. Specifically, “hedging”
means:

(a) the fixing of a price for output of a mine before
delivery by means of

(i) a forward sale or

(ii) a futures contract on a recognized commodity
exchange;

(b) the purchase or sale forward of a foreign currency
related directly to the proceeds of the output of a mine; and

(c) speculative currency hedging, to the extent that the
hedging transaction determines the final price and proceeds for the output.

Only “the fixing of a price for output of a mine before delivery by
means of a forward sale” is at issue in the present appeal. I note at this
stage that my parsing of the definition of “hedging” differs from both the
majority and dissenting reasons of the Court of Appeal. Both Armstrong and
Gillese JJ.A. suggested that forward sales and futures contracts, as the terms
are used in the definition of “hedging”, must take place on a recognized
commodity exchange. However, such a view does not accord with the ordinary
usage of these terms. Forward sales are by definition “over-the-counter”
products, while futures contracts are by definition exchange-traded. Indeed,
futures contracts are simply an exchange-traded form of forward sales
contracts: C. W. Smithson, “A Building Block Approach to Financial Engineering:
An Introduction to Forwards, Futures, Swaps and Options” (1997), 1017 PLI/Corp
9. The significance of this point is that “forward sales” within the meaning
of the definition of “hedging” cannot be distinguished from “forward sales” in
the third element of the definition of “proceeds” on the basis that the former
take place on a recognized commodity exchange while the latter do not. I will
say more on this point below.

44The difficulty that arises in coming to a plausible interpretation of
this provision is that the Act does not specify what it means to “fix the
price” for output of a mine by means of a forward sale. At first blush, it
might seem that fixing a price is simply setting the price that will be paid
upon delivery of the output. Indeed, this is the interpretation advocated for
by PDC (the narrow interpretation). If that were so, however, the legislature
would not have needed this element in the statutory definition of “hedging” as
the price received upon delivery of the output would clearly fall within “[all]
consideration that is received . . . from the output of the mine”, the first
component of the definition of “proceeds”, and within “all consideration
received . . . from . . . future sales or forward sales of the output of the
mine”, the third component.

45Under the presumption against tautology, “[e]very word in a statute is
presumed to make sense and to have a specific role to play in advancing the
legislative purpose”: see R. Sullivan, Driedger on the Construction of
Statutes (3rd ed. 1994), at p. 159. To the extent that it is possible to
do so, courts should avoid adopting interpretations that render any portion of
a statute meaningless or redundant: Hill v. William Hill (Park Lane) Ld.,
[1949] A.C. 530 (H.L.), at p. 546, per Viscount Simon.

46Although the presumption is rebuttable where it can be shown that the
words do serve a function, or that the words were added for greater certainty,
I do not think that either of those arguments can succeed in the present case.
Here, a definition was introduced into the Mining Tax Act for a term
that appears only once in the Act, outside its definitional section. Moreover,
the value of a forward sale contract that is settled by delivery of output is
for all intents and purposes just the price received for the output. There is
no doubt that this amount would be caught by the definition of proceeds, and
there would have been no need for the legislature to include this element in a
statutory definition of “hedging”. In the circumstances, the presumption
against tautology carries considerable weight.

47It follows that “the fixing of a price for output of a mine” cannot be
restricted to transactions that are settled by delivery of output. This is, in
my opinion, consistent with the context of the statutory definition. In
addition to “the fixing of a price . . . by means of a forward sale”, the
definition of “hedging” refers to “the fixing of a price . . . by means of . .
. a futures contract on a recognized commodity exchange”, “the purchase or sale
forward of a foreign currency related directly to the proceeds of the output of
a mine”, and “does not include speculative currency hedging”. It is
significant that futures contracts are seldom settled by physical delivery.
Similarly, a sale or purchase forward of foreign currency is a separate
transaction from the sale of an underlying commodity and would not itself be
settled by physical delivery of the commodity. In short, the other elements in
the statutory definition of “hedging” are consistent with the broader
interpretation.

48PDC relies on the fact that the Minister successfully applied the
“hedging” provision of the Mining Tax Act to impose and collect tax from
mining companies under the former administrative policy as evidence that the
narrow interpretation of “hedging” does not introduce redundancy into the Mining
Tax Act. This argument is unpersuasive. Redundancy does not necessarily
prevent the consistent or successful application of a statutory provision.
Rather, an interpretation that gives rise to a redundancy simply fails to give
full effect to all of the elements in the statutory provision.

49In my view, in light of the scheme and context of the Mining Tax Act,
the statutory definition of “hedging” must refer to something more than
transactions that are settled by delivery of output. The “some link” test
applied by Cullity J. is an appropriate response to the gap left in the Mining
Tax Act by the failure to express more clearly what constitutes the “fixing
of a price” for output of a mine. Moreover, the “some link” test accords with
general accounting practices. It is certain that well-accepted business and
accounting principles are not rules of law. They should not be used to
displace rules of law, as legislatures are not bound by them and may modify
them as they see fit for tax purposes. They must therefore play a subsidiary
role to clear rules of law. However, this Court has readily acknowledged that
“it would be unwise for the law to eschew the valuable guidance offered by well‑established
business principles” where statutory definitions are absent or incomplete: see
Canderel Ltd. v. Canada, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 147, at para. 35.

50Before this Court, PDC argued that the interpretation urged by the
Minister would introduce intolerable uncertainty into the Mining Tax Act.
Without a bright line for distinguishing hedging transactions for the purpose
of the Mining Tax Act, such as a delivery requirement, taxpayers would
be unable to effectively predict their tax situations and to order their
affairs intelligently. This argument is not compelling. The fact that the
taxpayer can and does, presumably on a principled basis, determine whether
hedging profits relate directly to the output of a mine, for the purpose of
claiming the resource allowance under the Income Tax Act and the Ontario
Corporations Tax Act belies PDC’s predictability argument. I note, in this
vein, that PDC used the same financial information that it submitted with its
tax return under the Mining Tax Act to claim that its hedging gains
qualified as “resource profits” so as to entitle it to the resource allowance
under the Corporations Tax Act.

51The statutory provisions at issue in this case are far from flawless.
Although the broad interpretation that I have adopted substantially resolves
the redundancy problem, it gives rise to some unexpected consequences of its
own. That being said, I do not find that any of these consequences is serious
enough to outweigh the substantial redundancy that results on the narrow
interpretation of “hedging”. Although, as PDC has pointed out, “consideration”
is generally a gross concept, in the context of the definition of “proceeds”,
“all consideration from hedging” must necessarily refer to a net concept. Any
distortion to the ordinary commercial use of “consideration” is inherent in the
Mining Tax Act itself. Similarly, although forward sales and options
are distinguished from one another in terms of the particular way in which each
is used to hedge price risk, both are used in much the same way to “fix the
price” for output. PDC’s argument about the serious distortion implicit in
treating options as a subset of forward sales is belied by the PDC’s own Annual
Reports for the tax years in question. Those reports provide that “[t]he
Corporation employs forward sales contracts including spot deferred
contracts and options to hedge prices for anticipated gold sales” (emphasis
added).

52The Mining Tax Act defines “hedging” as the fixing of a price for
the output of a mine before delivery by means of, inter alia, a forward
sale. Options, as Cullity J. noted, are simply contingent forward sales, and
they fix the price for output in much the same way that forward contracts do.
To attach substantially different tax consequences, within the context of a
provision that taxes “proceeds from hedging” to two forms of transactions that
serve the same function as hedging tools would be an absurd result that
the legislature could not have intended. Thus, I am unable to conclude that
any of the subsidiary arguments raised by PDC outweigh the substantial
redundancy that results from its proposed interpretation.

VI. Disposition

53For these reasons, I would allow the appeal with costs throughout.

Appeal allowed with costs.

Solicitor for the appellant: Attorney
General of Ontario, Toronto.

Solicitors for the respondent: Osler,
Hoskin & Harcourt, Toronto.

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