For months, the American people have been signaling their willingness to enter into a nuclear deal with Iran—and their skepticism that the deal will work. In recent days, two new opinion surveys show that these sentiments have persisted as the negotiations with Iran have dragged on.

The Washington Post-ABC News poll finds that 59 percent of Americans continue to support an agreement along the lines now been discussed, while 31 percent opposed it. This total includes majorities of most sub-groups as well as a 47 percent plurality of Republicans. But 59 percent of Americans also doubt that the deal would prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Only 4 percent are “very confident” that the deal would work, while 34 percent express a complete lack of confidence.

The Pew Research Center finds a smaller 49 percent plurality in favor of direct negotiations with Iran on the nuclear issue—62 percent of Democrats, only 36 percent of Republicans, and a country-mirroring 49 percent of Independent. At the same time, fully 63 percent say that the Iranians are “not serious” about addressing our concerns. Only 15 percent of Republicans, 28 percent of Independents, and 39 percent of Democrats express a more optimistic view of Iranian intentions.

Not surprisingly, the Pew results show a link between attitudes toward negotiations and assessment of Iran’s intentions. Two-thirds of those who think Iran is serious favor direct negotiations with the Islamic Republic; half of those who think that Iran is not serious oppose the negotiations.

Notably, 42 percent of Americans who doubt the Iranians’ seriousness nonetheless favor negotiations with them. This is consistent with prior survey research showing that most Americans do not want to use military force against Iran until every alternative to war has been exhausted. Opponents of the current negotiations have not made their case that there is a third alternative—a negotiated deal significantly better than the current talks are likely to produce.

Still, Americans are unwilling to leave the outcome fully in the Obama administration’s hands. Fully 62 percent want Congress to have the final authority for approving any US-Iran nuclear agreement. This super-majority includes not only four out of five Republicans but also two-thirds of Independents and even 42 percent of Democrats.

If the current negotiating deadline fails to produce a framework agreement, Congress is poised to act when it reconvenes after its Easter/Passover break. Tennessee’s Bob Corker, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, is offering a straightforward approach: President Obama should transmit the eventual agreement (if there is one) to Congress, which would have 60 days to act. During that period, the President would be prohibited from relaxing or waiving any existing sanctions. And if Congress passes a joint resolution of disapproval within 60 days, the President would be debarred from doing so, presumably until the legislative branch changes its mind.

The White House has suggested that the President would veto any such bill. Even if he were to make good on this threat, however, it is not clear that he could mobilize enough Democrats to prevent his veto from being overridden. In the end, he could well be forced to accept congressional involvement.

For months, the American people have been signaling their willingness to enter into a nuclear deal with Iran—and their skepticism that the deal will work. In recent days, two new opinion surveys show that these sentiments have persisted as the negotiations with Iran have dragged on.

The Washington Post-ABC News poll finds that 59 percent of Americans continue to support an agreement along the lines now been discussed, while 31 percent opposed it. This total includes majorities of most sub-groups as well as a 47 percent plurality of Republicans. But 59 percent of Americans also doubt that the deal would prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Only 4 percent are “very confident” that the deal would work, while 34 percent express a complete lack of confidence.

The Pew Research Center finds a smaller 49 percent plurality in favor of direct negotiations with Iran on the nuclear issue—62 percent of Democrats, only 36 percent of Republicans, and a country-mirroring 49 percent of Independent. At the same time, fully 63 percent say that the Iranians are “not serious” about addressing our concerns. Only 15 percent of Republicans, 28 percent of Independents, and 39 percent of Democrats express a more optimistic view of Iranian intentions.

Not surprisingly, the Pew results show a link between attitudes toward negotiations and assessment of Iran’s intentions. Two-thirds of those who think Iran is serious favor direct negotiations with the Islamic Republic; half of those who think that Iran is not serious oppose the negotiations.

Notably, 42 percent of Americans who doubt the Iranians’ seriousness nonetheless favor negotiations with them. This is consistent with prior survey research showing that most Americans do not want to use military force against Iran until every alternative to war has been exhausted. Opponents of the current negotiations have not made their case that there is a third alternative—a negotiated deal significantly better than the current talks are likely to produce.

Still, Americans are unwilling to leave the outcome fully in the Obama administration’s hands. Fully 62 percent want Congress to have the final authority for approving any US-Iran nuclear agreement. This super-majority includes not only four out of five Republicans but also two-thirds of Independents and even 42 percent of Democrats.

If the current negotiating deadline fails to produce a framework agreement, Congress is poised to act when it reconvenes after its Easter/Passover break. Tennessee’s Bob Corker, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, is offering a straightforward approach: President Obama should transmit the eventual agreement (if there is one) to Congress, which would have 60 days to act. During that period, the President would be prohibited from relaxing or waiving any existing sanctions. And if Congress passes a joint resolution of disapproval within 60 days, the President would be debarred from doing so, presumably until the legislative branch changes its mind.

The White House has suggested that the President would veto any such bill. Even if he were to make good on this threat, however, it is not clear that he could mobilize enough Democrats to prevent his veto from being overridden. In the end, he could well be forced to accept congressional involvement.

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2015/03/31-iran-p5-nuclear-talks-deal-agreement-deadline?rssid=iran{9B50908D-B9C3-4F47-8EFB-BD33E4EDEF34}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/88003617/0/brookingsrss/topics/iran~A-soft-deadline-for-the-Iranian-nuclear-talks-and-a-moment-of-truth-for-Obamas-diplomacyA soft deadline for the Iranian nuclear talks and a moment of truth for Obama's diplomacy

With a crucial milestone in the Iranian nuclear talks looming, the negotiations between Iran, the United States, and five other world powers have intensified. Unfortunately, however, so have the uncertainties.

The end-of-March target date for achieving a political framework was meant to be a soft deadline — a deliberately low hurdle that both sides would use to reassure their impatient domestic critics that a comprehensive deal was, in fact, achievable. But those same partisan pressures — amplified by escalating regional unrest — conspired to transform this purported 'soft deadline' into a moment of truth for the tortuous process and, by extension, for the Obama administration’s Middle East policy.

This latest deadline, like others in this process, was inevitably aspirational and elastic. Still, any failure to produce parameters for a credible bargain in this latest round of talks would reveal that the differences between the two sides are — for the moment, at least — fundamentally irreconcilable. That would add fuel to the already determined Republican efforts to sabotage the process, jeopardizing Obama’s historic Iran diplomacy, and the interim arrangements that have constrained Iran’s nuclear advances since November 2013.

Iran’s Shell Game

The last-minute suspense contravenes the drumbeat of relatively positively signals for much of the past month. Throughout February and early March, negotiators from both sides were quoted in the press suggesting that the central roadblock to a deal — the divergence in the two sides’ positions on Iran’s enrichment capabilities — had finally been overcome. The breakthrough can be credited to painstaking American efforts to devise a creative (and controversial) formula that would enable Tehran to retain a larger proportion of its centrifuges while also providing the international community with the requisite assurances that any Iranian race toward a bomb could be detected and deterred.

As the latest round of talks got underway, other sticking points remained, including the deal’s provisions for Iranian nuclear research and the timeline for sanctions relief. Still, solving the enrichment conundrum seemed to represent a major step forward in the long-drawn-out process.

But negotiating with Iran rarely follows a straight path, and as the talks on the political framework entered their final days, Tehran appeared to reverse its prior commitment to export the bulk of its low-enriched uranium stockpiles to Russia. On Sunday, Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi was quoted in the Iranian press that “the export of stocks of enriched uranium is not in our program, and we do not intend to send them abroad. ... There is no question of sending the stocks abroad." His statements have since been echoed by other Iranian representatives.

If this reversal sticks, it could wreck the hard-fought blueprint for a deal. The ship-out provision represents a key component of the formula for prolonging Iran’s distance from nuclear weapons capability. More disturbingly, the late-stage shift echoes a persistent Iranian tactic throughout these difficult and protracted talks that should accentuate misgivings about its leadership’s intentions. Each time the two sides appeared to resolve one small element of the enrichment impasse, the Iranian negotiators would promptly reopen another aspect that previously appeared to have been resolved.

An enduring gap exposes insufficient progress

American representatives tried to downplay the significance of Araghchi’s apparent backtracking. And given the investment of both sides in the negotiating process, it is hardly surprising that they will be able to extract an announcement of some kind, if only to justify the extended ministerial presence around the table in Switzerland. But the State Department spokesperson on Monday conceded that “we don’t have agreement with the Iranians on the stockpile issue.” This is a pivotal problem — it is, effectively, the heart of the matter that has been under contention in more than a dozen years of diplomacy to constrain Iran’s nuclear program.

Today’s preliminary deadline was explicitly intended to build confidence in the inevitability of a comprehensive deal — a diplomatic down payment to demonstrate that the balance of the outstanding issues could be resolved. Its currency is not simply words on a page, but rather the evidence of meaningful progress in devising the parameters of a comprehensive bargain. In other words, the specificity of any agreement matters far more than its actual announcement. An ambiguous and incomplete statement by the parties may offer an excuse to break out Champagne in Lausanne, but it is an inherently insufficient outcome.

And it must call into question the fundamental assumptions of the Obama administration’s high-stakes investment in its Iran diplomacy. The administration has doggedly pursued a deal with Iran as the centerpiece of its Middle East strategy. Obama’s outreach is not grounded an illusion of a new alliance or wholesale rapprochement with the Islamic Republic, as some Republicans and many in the region seem to believe.

Instead, the administration’s Iran diplomacy has been guided by two core convictions: first, that there is a rational, mutually-tolerable solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis that can be constructed through meticulous diplomacy and technical creativity. And that this solution would remove one of the most urgent and potentially destabilizing threats to the stability of the region and, importantly, to America’s friends and partners in the Middle East, especially Israel.

This is a perfectly logical hypothesis, and one that is especially appealing to a U.S. president who was elected twice by a profoundly war-weary America. But logical assumptions do not always fare well in the maelstrom that is the Middle East. It is entirely possible that the world’s differences with Tehran over its nuclear ambitions are simply not reconcilable — and that additional time or more innovative technical proposals or more congenial negotiators cannot alter that reality.

And given the developments in the region over the course of this 14-month process, it is equally possible — perhaps even likely — that even if a deal can be achieved, it will not provide a meaningful security payoff for the region. There are simply too many forces at play in the Middle East that will ensure its continuing destabilization: apocalyptic Islamism, sectarian frictions, the horrific Syrian civil war, a peace process without partners, the dysfunction of many Arab states, and a disproportionately young population for whom peace, prosperity, and political voice remain perennially out of reach.

Neither the gaps in the current deal or the holes in the administration’s logic should prompt an end to the diplomatic gambit with Iran. From where I sit, it makes sense to continue trying to fashion a deal. The two sides are closer than they were four months ago and perhaps a breakthrough is really right around the corner. But it would be reassuring to see that the president’s patience is not unlimited, and that he is prepared to contemplate the failure of his cherished Iran initiative.

The stakes for Iran remain as a high as they ever were — and perhaps even higher now that its bid for regional influence is being forcefully contested by an array of Arab states. As I wrote back in July, “In the absence of a resolution, Iran faces more of the same: isolation, deprivation, and billions of dollars sacrificed on the altar of more centrifuges.” While it is hardly the optimal outcome, Washington and the world can well afford to continue deterring Iran’s nuclear program with escalating economic pressure. Can the Islamic Republic really afford an indefinite standoff with the world? More importantly, can the Iranian people?

Authors

]]>
Mon, 30 Mar 2015 22:33:00 -0400Suzanne Maloney
With a crucial milestone in the Iranian nuclear talks looming, the negotiations between Iran, the United States, and five other world powers have intensified. Unfortunately, however, so have the uncertainties.
The end-of-March target date for achieving a political framework was meant to be a soft deadline — a deliberately low hurdle that both sides would use to reassure their impatient domestic critics that a comprehensive deal was, in fact, achievable. But those same partisan pressures — amplified by escalating regional unrest — conspired to transform this purported 'soft deadline' into a moment of truth for the tortuous process and, by extension, for the Obama administration's Middle East policy.
This latest deadline, like others in this process, was inevitably aspirational and elastic. Still, any failure to produce parameters for a credible bargain in this latest round of talks would reveal that the differences between the two sides are — for the moment, at least — fundamentally irreconcilable. That would add fuel to the already determined Republican efforts to sabotage the process, jeopardizing Obama's historic Iran diplomacy, and the interim arrangements that have constrained Iran's nuclear advances since November 2013.
Iran's Shell Game
The last-minute suspense contravenes the drumbeat of relatively positively signals for much of the past month. Throughout February and early March, negotiators from both sides were quoted in the press suggesting that the central roadblock to a deal — the divergence in the two sides' positions on Iran's enrichment capabilities — had finally been overcome. The breakthrough can be credited to painstaking American efforts to devise a creative (and controversial) formula that would enable Tehran to retain a larger proportion of its centrifuges while also providing the international community with the requisite assurances that any Iranian race toward a bomb could be detected and deterred.
As the latest round of talks got underway, other sticking points remained, including the deal's provisions for Iranian nuclear research and the timeline for sanctions relief. Still, solving the enrichment conundrum seemed to represent a major step forward in the long-drawn-out process.
But negotiating with Iran rarely follows a straight path, and as the talks on the political framework entered their final days, Tehran appeared to reverse its prior commitment to export the bulk of its low-enriched uranium stockpiles to Russia. On Sunday, Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi was quoted in the Iranian press that “the export of stocks of enriched uranium is not in our program, and we do not intend to send them abroad. ... There is no question of sending the stocks abroad." His statements have since been echoed by other Iranian representatives.
If this reversal sticks, it could wreck the hard-fought blueprint for a deal. The ship-out provision represents a key component of the formula for prolonging Iran's distance from nuclear weapons capability. More disturbingly, the late-stage shift echoes a persistent Iranian tactic throughout these difficult and protracted talks that should accentuate misgivings about its leadership's intentions. Each time the two sides appeared to resolve one small element of the enrichment impasse, the Iranian negotiators would promptly reopen another aspect that previously appeared to have been resolved.
One of the chief American negotiators has compared the quest for a comprehensive agreement to trying to solve a Rubik's cube, noting that “where one makes progress on one element may mean there's more trade space on another element.” But for Iran, perhaps a more relevant analogy is to a shell game, where sleight of hand and a little showmanship bamboozle the unwitting observer.
An enduring gap exposes insufficient progress
American representatives tried to downplay the significance of ...
With a crucial milestone in the Iranian nuclear talks looming, the negotiations between Iran, the United States, and five other world powers have intensified. Unfortunately, however, so have the uncertainties.
The end-of-March target date for ...

With a crucial milestone in the Iranian nuclear talks looming, the negotiations between Iran, the United States, and five other world powers have intensified. Unfortunately, however, so have the uncertainties.

The end-of-March target date for achieving a political framework was meant to be a soft deadline — a deliberately low hurdle that both sides would use to reassure their impatient domestic critics that a comprehensive deal was, in fact, achievable. But those same partisan pressures — amplified by escalating regional unrest — conspired to transform this purported 'soft deadline' into a moment of truth for the tortuous process and, by extension, for the Obama administration’s Middle East policy.

This latest deadline, like others in this process, was inevitably aspirational and elastic. Still, any failure to produce parameters for a credible bargain in this latest round of talks would reveal that the differences between the two sides are — for the moment, at least — fundamentally irreconcilable. That would add fuel to the already determined Republican efforts to sabotage the process, jeopardizing Obama’s historic Iran diplomacy, and the interim arrangements that have constrained Iran’s nuclear advances since November 2013.

Iran’s Shell Game

The last-minute suspense contravenes the drumbeat of relatively positively signals for much of the past month. Throughout February and early March, negotiators from both sides were quoted in the press suggesting that the central roadblock to a deal — the divergence in the two sides’ positions on Iran’s enrichment capabilities — had finally been overcome. The breakthrough can be credited to painstaking American efforts to devise a creative (and controversial) formula that would enable Tehran to retain a larger proportion of its centrifuges while also providing the international community with the requisite assurances that any Iranian race toward a bomb could be detected and deterred.

As the latest round of talks got underway, other sticking points remained, including the deal’s provisions for Iranian nuclear research and the timeline for sanctions relief. Still, solving the enrichment conundrum seemed to represent a major step forward in the long-drawn-out process.

But negotiating with Iran rarely follows a straight path, and as the talks on the political framework entered their final days, Tehran appeared to reverse its prior commitment to export the bulk of its low-enriched uranium stockpiles to Russia. On Sunday, Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi was quoted in the Iranian press that “the export of stocks of enriched uranium is not in our program, and we do not intend to send them abroad. ... There is no question of sending the stocks abroad." His statements have since been echoed by other Iranian representatives.

If this reversal sticks, it could wreck the hard-fought blueprint for a deal. The ship-out provision represents a key component of the formula for prolonging Iran’s distance from nuclear weapons capability. More disturbingly, the late-stage shift echoes a persistent Iranian tactic throughout these difficult and protracted talks that should accentuate misgivings about its leadership’s intentions. Each time the two sides appeared to resolve one small element of the enrichment impasse, the Iranian negotiators would promptly reopen another aspect that previously appeared to have been resolved.

An enduring gap exposes insufficient progress

American representatives tried to downplay the significance of Araghchi’s apparent backtracking. And given the investment of both sides in the negotiating process, it is hardly surprising that they will be able to extract an announcement of some kind, if only to justify the extended ministerial presence around the table in Switzerland. But the State Department spokesperson on Monday conceded that “we don’t have agreement with the Iranians on the stockpile issue.” This is a pivotal problem — it is, effectively, the heart of the matter that has been under contention in more than a dozen years of diplomacy to constrain Iran’s nuclear program.

Today’s preliminary deadline was explicitly intended to build confidence in the inevitability of a comprehensive deal — a diplomatic down payment to demonstrate that the balance of the outstanding issues could be resolved. Its currency is not simply words on a page, but rather the evidence of meaningful progress in devising the parameters of a comprehensive bargain. In other words, the specificity of any agreement matters far more than its actual announcement. An ambiguous and incomplete statement by the parties may offer an excuse to break out Champagne in Lausanne, but it is an inherently insufficient outcome.

And it must call into question the fundamental assumptions of the Obama administration’s high-stakes investment in its Iran diplomacy. The administration has doggedly pursued a deal with Iran as the centerpiece of its Middle East strategy. Obama’s outreach is not grounded an illusion of a new alliance or wholesale rapprochement with the Islamic Republic, as some Republicans and many in the region seem to believe.

Instead, the administration’s Iran diplomacy has been guided by two core convictions: first, that there is a rational, mutually-tolerable solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis that can be constructed through meticulous diplomacy and technical creativity. And that this solution would remove one of the most urgent and potentially destabilizing threats to the stability of the region and, importantly, to America’s friends and partners in the Middle East, especially Israel.

This is a perfectly logical hypothesis, and one that is especially appealing to a U.S. president who was elected twice by a profoundly war-weary America. But logical assumptions do not always fare well in the maelstrom that is the Middle East. It is entirely possible that the world’s differences with Tehran over its nuclear ambitions are simply not reconcilable — and that additional time or more innovative technical proposals or more congenial negotiators cannot alter that reality.

And given the developments in the region over the course of this 14-month process, it is equally possible — perhaps even likely — that even if a deal can be achieved, it will not provide a meaningful security payoff for the region. There are simply too many forces at play in the Middle East that will ensure its continuing destabilization: apocalyptic Islamism, sectarian frictions, the horrific Syrian civil war, a peace process without partners, the dysfunction of many Arab states, and a disproportionately young population for whom peace, prosperity, and political voice remain perennially out of reach.

Neither the gaps in the current deal or the holes in the administration’s logic should prompt an end to the diplomatic gambit with Iran. From where I sit, it makes sense to continue trying to fashion a deal. The two sides are closer than they were four months ago and perhaps a breakthrough is really right around the corner. But it would be reassuring to see that the president’s patience is not unlimited, and that he is prepared to contemplate the failure of his cherished Iran initiative.

The stakes for Iran remain as a high as they ever were — and perhaps even higher now that its bid for regional influence is being forcefully contested by an array of Arab states. As I wrote back in July, “In the absence of a resolution, Iran faces more of the same: isolation, deprivation, and billions of dollars sacrificed on the altar of more centrifuges.” While it is hardly the optimal outcome, Washington and the world can well afford to continue deterring Iran’s nuclear program with escalating economic pressure. Can the Islamic Republic really afford an indefinite standoff with the world? More importantly, can the Iranian people?

In a record time, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) has been able to successfully build a firm coalition of ten countries participating in the war against the Houthi movement and their ally, ousted Yemeni President Ali Abdulla Saleh. Furthermore, legitimacy— a major requirement for successful international intervention— has been secured through two main regional organizations: the Arab League, and Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC), which expressed their unequivocal support to the Saudi’s “Decisive Operation” in Yemen. In addition, elected Yemeni President Abed Rabbu Mansour Hadi made the request for intervention publicly, which KSA used to legitimize its military intervention in Yemen. While KSA seems to have done their homework to launch this operation, they will need to think carefully how to end it, and that the operation will not turn to further exacerbate instability in Yemen.

Houthi fighters and key regional players

Since the beginning of their coup against the central government back in September 2014, the Houthis have been successful in expanding their areas of control and defeating their foes. With almost no military resistance, they started from the northern province of Saada to expand to the capital Sanaa and then southern provinces, where President Hadi enjoys overwhelming support. They controlled main ports on the Red Sea, seized most of Yemeni army’s machinery— including fighter jets— and signed an “economic partnership” agreement with Iran.

However, Houthis miserably failed to play by the rules— alienating most regional players (with the exception of Iran). They rejected KSA’s call for negotiations in Riyadh and the U.N. invitations for peace talks in Doha. Additionally, they ignored all previous Security Council’s statements that called them in name to halt their rebellion and abide by the political transition process in Yemen. Most alarmingly, the Houthis alienated all Yemeni political parties— from Islamists to socialists— except a weird alliance with ousted President Saleh, who they fought against in six wars during the past decade.

Operation Decisive Storm

Given these circumstances, the Saudi intervention in Yemen suggests a number of assumptions. First, coalitions emerging from within the region seem to hold much stronger and yield more tangible outcomes compared to international intervention, even when supported by Security Council resolutions. Regional leadership, like KSA, has found support on the ground with mass protests in the Yemeni provinces of Taiz, Mareb, Aden, Ibb, and Houdiedeh in support of Saudi intervention. That is definitely not the case in the alliance that the United States is leading against the Islamic State (ISIS) in Iraq and Syria. While protesters are carrying the pictures of King Salman in Yemen, the picture of President Obama has nowhere seen in any part of the region.

Furthermore, regional coalition building reveals the limits of Iranian intervention in the Arab countries— or what Iranian leaders call a “control of the four capitals,”— Damascus, Baghdad, Beirut, and Sanaa. Iran will provide unlimited political, diplomatic, and to a certain extent arms support to the Houthis. However, it is unlikely Iran will fight a war on behalf of the Houthis in Yemen. While condemning the Saudi intervention in Yemen, Iran’s Foreign Minister Javad Zarif has already urged for “dialogue and reconciliation” in Yemen. It is obvious that KSA securing the firm support of major regional players like Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan has sent powerful message to how far can Iran go with its support to the Houthis. This actually has led some political analysts in the region to suggest that a similar Turkey-led coalition could have put an end to the four year suffering of the Syrian people and that the solution is in the region, not in an American leadership. It sounds like a bit of an ambitious proposition, as Syria has many other variables, but at minimum a firm regional coalition could have to a certain extent altered the current bleak situation in the country.

Moreover, it seems that a new leadership in KSA has come with a new foreign policy. Since the arrival of King Salman to power, tension within the GCC countries— especially with Qatar— has been considerably reduced. Even countering the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) brand of political Islam has become less of a priority for KSA’s foreign policy. Who could have imagined a couple of years ago that KSA and the Yemeni MB would be in the same camp fighting Saudi’s traditional ally, Saleh? The 2011 GCC initiative was designed to keep Saleh and his party present in Yemeni politics to counter the growing influence of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Al-Islah party.

What's next for Decisive Storm

KSA should not take its successes in building a regional coalition against the Houthis for granted. Removing a party from power is much easier than rebuilding a state and putting— as the nursery rhyme goes— “Humpty Dumpty back together again.” Drawing lessons from U.S. failure in rebuilding states in Iraq and Afghanistan should be very helpful. No Yemeni “de-Baathification” should ever be envisioned. The Houthis, despite their rebellious behavior, remain an authentic party of Yemeni politics and KSA should seriously engage with them for a comprehensive solution in Yemen. It might sounds unacceptable for some, but KSA could also talk to Iran to ensure sustainability of reached solutions. Talking does not necessarily mean accepting the other party’s demands. Obviously, the conditions for negotiations have changed now and Yemeni political parties are no longer expected to negotiate under a Houthi set ceiling in Sanaa. Yemeni parties should negotiate on an equal footing and the Houthis should be allowed to come to negotiate with dignity. They should be partners in rebuilding Yemen not control and exclude others.

KSA should be very careful not to destroy state institutions in the process of removing Houthis from power. Destroying institution will likely lead to protracted instability— and Libya is a clear example of this. Furthermore, KSA should engage with those brigades of Yemeni army loyal to Saleh as some of them could probably pledged allegiance to him in the absence of better alternatives. Probably one of the mistakes that the GCC imitative made in 2011 was to allow Saleh to remain an active player in Yemeni politics. This could be an opportunity for KSA to correct this mistake, and ensure that the time has come for him to retire. As some Yemenis argue, the Houthis are “politically immature” and that Saleh— who described himself as “dancing on the heads of snakes”—has been the brain behind the current turmoil.

Finally, KSA should not take Yemeni welcoming of their intervention for granted. Due to historical reasons, Yemenis in general are sensitive to both external interventions in their own affairs and also to Saudi relations with various players in Yemeni political scene. KSA therefore should reassure Yemenis that their intervention is not going to replace Houthi control with Saudi guardianship.

Authors

]]>
Sat, 28 Mar 2015 00:00:00 -0400Ibrahim Sharqieh
In a record time, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) has been able to successfully build a firm coalition of ten countries participating in the war against the Houthi movement and their ally, ousted Yemeni President Ali Abdulla Saleh. Furthermore, legitimacy— a major requirement for successful international intervention— has been secured through two main regional organizations: the Arab League, and Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC), which expressed their unequivocal support to the Saudi's “Decisive Operation” in Yemen. In addition, elected Yemeni President Abed Rabbu Mansour Hadi made the request for intervention publicly, which KSA used to legitimize its military intervention in Yemen. While KSA seems to have done their homework to launch this operation, they will need to think carefully how to end it, and that the operation will not turn to further exacerbate instability in Yemen.
Houthi fighters and key regional players
Since the beginning of their coup against the central government back in September 2014, the Houthis have been successful in expanding their areas of control and defeating their foes. With almost no military resistance, they started from the northern province of Saada to expand to the capital Sanaa and then southern provinces, where President Hadi enjoys overwhelming support. They controlled main ports on the Red Sea, seized most of Yemeni army's machinery— including fighter jets— and signed an “economic partnership” agreement with Iran.
However, Houthis miserably failed to play by the rules— alienating most regional players (with the exception of Iran). They rejected KSA's call for negotiations in Riyadh and the U.N. invitations for peace talks in Doha. Additionally, they ignored all previous Security Council's statements that called them in name to halt their rebellion and abide by the political transition process in Yemen. Most alarmingly, the Houthis alienated all Yemeni political parties— from Islamists to socialists— except a weird alliance with ousted President Saleh, who they fought against in six wars during the past decade.
Operation Decisive Storm
Given these circumstances, the Saudi intervention in Yemen suggests a number of assumptions. First, coalitions emerging from within the region seem to hold much stronger and yield more tangible outcomes compared to international intervention, even when supported by Security Council resolutions. Regional leadership, like KSA, has found support on the ground with mass protests in the Yemeni provinces of Taiz, Mareb, Aden, Ibb, and Houdiedeh in support of Saudi intervention. That is definitely not the case in the alliance that the United States is leading against the Islamic State (ISIS) in Iraq and Syria. While protesters are carrying the pictures of King Salman in Yemen, the picture of President Obama has nowhere seen in any part of the region.
Furthermore, regional coalition building reveals the limits of Iranian intervention in the Arab countries— or what Iranian leaders call a “control of the four capitals,”— Damascus, Baghdad, Beirut, and Sanaa. Iran will provide unlimited political, diplomatic, and to a certain extent arms support to the Houthis. However, it is unlikely Iran will fight a war on behalf of the Houthis in Yemen. While condemning the Saudi intervention in Yemen, Iran's Foreign Minister Javad Zarif has already urged for “dialogue and reconciliation” in Yemen. It is obvious that KSA securing the firm support of major regional players like Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan has sent powerful message to how far can Iran go with its support to the Houthis. This actually has led some political analysts in the region to suggest that a similar Turkey-led coalition could have put an end to the four year suffering of the Syrian people and that the solution is in the region, not in an American leadership. It sounds ...

In a record time, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) has been able to successfully build a firm coalition of ten countries participating in the war against the Houthi movement and their ally, ousted Yemeni President Ali Abdulla Saleh. Furthermore, legitimacy— a major requirement for successful international intervention— has been secured through two main regional organizations: the Arab League, and Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC), which expressed their unequivocal support to the Saudi’s “Decisive Operation” in Yemen. In addition, elected Yemeni President Abed Rabbu Mansour Hadi made the request for intervention publicly, which KSA used to legitimize its military intervention in Yemen. While KSA seems to have done their homework to launch this operation, they will need to think carefully how to end it, and that the operation will not turn to further exacerbate instability in Yemen.

Houthi fighters and key regional players

Since the beginning of their coup against the central government back in September 2014, the Houthis have been successful in expanding their areas of control and defeating their foes. With almost no military resistance, they started from the northern province of Saada to expand to the capital Sanaa and then southern provinces, where President Hadi enjoys overwhelming support. They controlled main ports on the Red Sea, seized most of Yemeni army’s machinery— including fighter jets— and signed an “economic partnership” agreement with Iran.

However, Houthis miserably failed to play by the rules— alienating most regional players (with the exception of Iran). They rejected KSA’s call for negotiations in Riyadh and the U.N. invitations for peace talks in Doha. Additionally, they ignored all previous Security Council’s statements that called them in name to halt their rebellion and abide by the political transition process in Yemen. Most alarmingly, the Houthis alienated all Yemeni political parties— from Islamists to socialists— except a weird alliance with ousted President Saleh, who they fought against in six wars during the past decade.

Operation Decisive Storm

Given these circumstances, the Saudi intervention in Yemen suggests a number of assumptions. First, coalitions emerging from within the region seem to hold much stronger and yield more tangible outcomes compared to international intervention, even when supported by Security Council resolutions. Regional leadership, like KSA, has found support on the ground with mass protests in the Yemeni provinces of Taiz, Mareb, Aden, Ibb, and Houdiedeh in support of Saudi intervention. That is definitely not the case in the alliance that the United States is leading against the Islamic State (ISIS) in Iraq and Syria. While protesters are carrying the pictures of King Salman in Yemen, the picture of President Obama has nowhere seen in any part of the region.

Furthermore, regional coalition building reveals the limits of Iranian intervention in the Arab countries— or what Iranian leaders call a “control of the four capitals,”— Damascus, Baghdad, Beirut, and Sanaa. Iran will provide unlimited political, diplomatic, and to a certain extent arms support to the Houthis. However, it is unlikely Iran will fight a war on behalf of the Houthis in Yemen. While condemning the Saudi intervention in Yemen, Iran’s Foreign Minister Javad Zarif has already urged for “dialogue and reconciliation” in Yemen. It is obvious that KSA securing the firm support of major regional players like Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan has sent powerful message to how far can Iran go with its support to the Houthis. This actually has led some political analysts in the region to suggest that a similar Turkey-led coalition could have put an end to the four year suffering of the Syrian people and that the solution is in the region, not in an American leadership. It sounds like a bit of an ambitious proposition, as Syria has many other variables, but at minimum a firm regional coalition could have to a certain extent altered the current bleak situation in the country.

Moreover, it seems that a new leadership in KSA has come with a new foreign policy. Since the arrival of King Salman to power, tension within the GCC countries— especially with Qatar— has been considerably reduced. Even countering the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) brand of political Islam has become less of a priority for KSA’s foreign policy. Who could have imagined a couple of years ago that KSA and the Yemeni MB would be in the same camp fighting Saudi’s traditional ally, Saleh? The 2011 GCC initiative was designed to keep Saleh and his party present in Yemeni politics to counter the growing influence of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Al-Islah party.

What's next for Decisive Storm

KSA should not take its successes in building a regional coalition against the Houthis for granted. Removing a party from power is much easier than rebuilding a state and putting— as the nursery rhyme goes— “Humpty Dumpty back together again.” Drawing lessons from U.S. failure in rebuilding states in Iraq and Afghanistan should be very helpful. No Yemeni “de-Baathification” should ever be envisioned. The Houthis, despite their rebellious behavior, remain an authentic party of Yemeni politics and KSA should seriously engage with them for a comprehensive solution in Yemen. It might sounds unacceptable for some, but KSA could also talk to Iran to ensure sustainability of reached solutions. Talking does not necessarily mean accepting the other party’s demands. Obviously, the conditions for negotiations have changed now and Yemeni political parties are no longer expected to negotiate under a Houthi set ceiling in Sanaa. Yemeni parties should negotiate on an equal footing and the Houthis should be allowed to come to negotiate with dignity. They should be partners in rebuilding Yemen not control and exclude others.

KSA should be very careful not to destroy state institutions in the process of removing Houthis from power. Destroying institution will likely lead to protracted instability— and Libya is a clear example of this. Furthermore, KSA should engage with those brigades of Yemeni army loyal to Saleh as some of them could probably pledged allegiance to him in the absence of better alternatives. Probably one of the mistakes that the GCC imitative made in 2011 was to allow Saleh to remain an active player in Yemeni politics. This could be an opportunity for KSA to correct this mistake, and ensure that the time has come for him to retire. As some Yemenis argue, the Houthis are “politically immature” and that Saleh— who described himself as “dancing on the heads of snakes”—has been the brain behind the current turmoil.

Finally, KSA should not take Yemeni welcoming of their intervention for granted. Due to historical reasons, Yemenis in general are sensitive to both external interventions in their own affairs and also to Saudi relations with various players in Yemeni political scene. KSA therefore should reassure Yemenis that their intervention is not going to replace Houthi control with Saudi guardianship.

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2015/03/27-yemen-houthis-gcc-saudia-arabia?rssid=iran{F22B2AE5-74FC-4818-9198-880B7BF1225E}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/87755041/0/brookingsrss/topics/iran~Around-the-halls-The-developing-situation-in-YemenAround the halls: The developing situation in Yemen

In the wake of continuing chaos in Yemen, and the decision of a ten-country coalition—led by Saudi Arabia—to conduct airstrikes against Houthi fighters in Yemen, Brookings experts had a candid dialogue about the developing situation. Below is an edited version of that conversation.

Tamara Cofman Wittes, Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Middle East Policy, Foreign Policy program:
This is an extraordinary step:

A direct attack by Sunni Arab states on an Iranian-backed militia;

The first time the GCC has taken military action outside its own membership; and

The return of Egypt to fighting on Yemeni territory.

By the way, Bruce, didn’t we have a conversation just recently about the prospect of Egypt providing an expeditionary force for the GCC states? It feels momentous for the trajectory of the region. Some questions:

Could this campaign distract Sunni governments, and perhaps the United States, from the fight vs ISIS in Iraq and Jordan?

Will Iran double down on the Houthis?

What will AQAP do?

Bruce Riedel, Senior Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy and Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence and Director, Intelligence Project, Foreign Policy program:
Air strikes will not defeat the Houthis, and they are too late to save Aden. Are the Saudis prepared to put boots on the ground? Is Cairo?

Kenneth Pollack, Senior Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy, Foreign Policy program:
That's the danger! Their boots on the ground won't solve the problem either—it will just bog them down in a Yemeni quagmire.

Bruce Riedel:
What are the implications for a nuclear deal? Can you sign a deal with Tehran while your Sunni allies are at war with Iran's proxy in Yemen? And you are giving their Iraqi Shia allies air support in Tikrit?

Tamara Cofman Wittes:
President Obama last August cited Yemen as a model for the United States’ intended counterterrorism approach in Iraq. Maybe the "Yemen model" has a different meaning now: cede the territory to those most willing to bleed for it.

I really wonder how AQAP plays this. Saudi intervention seems like a golden opportunity for them.

Daniel L. Byman, Senior Fellow and Director of Research, Center for Middle East Policy, Foreign Policy program :
I'll add to this only that I can't figure out what the Islamic State presence is in Yemen. If big, AQAP has a problem in that the Islamic State will push the sectarian button better, so AQAP will have a serious local rival.

Salman Shaikh, Fellow, Director, Brookings Doha Center and Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy, Foreign Policy program:
I've said that the United States has the difficult job, like it or not, to play both referee between Saudi and Iran and ally to its traditional friends in the region. Not easy, I know, but there should have been a much greater effort earlier to push back on Iran's hegemonic ambitions in the region. Saudis and others have been warning for quite some time. Instead, the United States is yet again a "reactive" Middle East power, supporting different (opposing) folks in different places.

I also wonder how secure is Saudi Arabia? Houthis may carry out their threats to attack Saudi. If this carries on, we must keep an eye on dissent within Saudi.

Neither do I rule out Sunnis dissent within Iran's western regions. There have been signs of that recently.

Saudi, I was told, is looking to build a very broad regional coalition to counter Iranian expansionism, which includes Pakistan, Turkey, and Egypt.

I also see that 10 countries have pledged support to the Saudis for Yemen, including Jordan, Sudan, Morocco, in addition to Egypt and Pakistan. The Saudis will have to pay for them all.

The Yemeni conflict is now clearly part of a broader regional conflagration. For that reason there is an urgent need to plug the Syrian volcano. Renewed focus on a Syrian a Syrian political transition can contribute to de-escalating regional tensions.

Suzanne Maloney, Senior Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy, Foreign Policy program:
I take a different position than Salman, both with respect to the characterization of Iranian ambitions and the criticism of the Obama administration. As Bruce Riedel has written, Iran's involvement in Yemen is marginal and opportunistic. They didn't invent the Houthi uprising and their investment has been relatively small scale in comparison to other conflicts. Which is why you have never seen a Qassem Soleimani selfie from Aden or anywhere in the vicinity, and you never will. Tehran's real interests lie elsewhere, in Iraq and Syria. I would imagine they will aim to continue to exploit what is likely to remain a very unsettled situation in Yemen. But that hardly qualifies as hegemonic.

As for the United States, I don't know of an American administration that has been anything other than reactive vis-à-vis Yemen. Unfortunately (especially for Yemenis) I think Yemen will simply never rise to the level of a priority that commands proactive American intercession—except if the threat of AQAP is resurgent, which of course may be an inadvertent outcome of the GCC strikes.

My guess is that the Obama administration sees a net benefit in enabling the Saudis to flex their muscles on an issue which is existential, or close to it, for Riyadh but relatively low-priority for the rest of the world. Heck, Washington may have even encouraged this outcome: let the Gulf vent its spleen about the cozy conversations between Secretary John Kerry and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif in an arena where they cannot do much additional harm to core United States interests in the region. Meanwhile, the nuclear talks will go on—even if the Iranians can't close the deal—and Washington will focus its energies on IS and Iraq, in parallel to Iran's campaign there.

In my view, the real problem is that Saudi interventions across the region—military and financial—are no less forceful than those of Iran, and they are not inherently stabilizing, except perhaps in the short run.

I can't yet puzzle out how this is likely to impact the Iranian nuclear talks. I'm tempted to say not at all; the negotiations are really silo-ed on both sides, and if they can finally get to a credible formula, I think that producing a somewhat general, possibly unwritten "political framework" is not a terribly high hurdle. There would still be plenty of time for this to crash and burn before June 30th. On the other hand, the Iranian leadership sees the nuclear issue as firmly enmeshed within a broader web of United States efforts to undermine the regime, and it seems conceivable that the United States-sanctified Saudi attack on an Iranian client/ally — undertaken at the precise moment that Qods Force commander Qassem Soleimani had to yield the Tikrit battle to United States air strikes would intensify Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamenei's hesitation about accepting a deal that the hard-liners in his security bureaucracy will see as a capitulation to the West.

Shibley Telhami, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy, Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, Foreign Policy program:
One thing though to keep in mind, separate from the big unknown (and potentially disastrous) consequences for Yemen. This is a huge development for Arab politics that will test the bargain that the Saudis sought at the outset of the Arab Uprisings: luring Morocco and Jordan into a support relationship with the GCC: money for security support. That now includes Egypt (and a lot of symbolic Sunni countries such as Sudan, Pakistan, and the Palestinian Authority). There is no doubt the Saudis took the lead on this, that they consolidated the support of GCC (with the exception of Oman) which has propelled them into uncharted leadership territory. Regardless of how it all ends in Yemen, the path will be bloody with a lot of unintended consequences. If ground forces will ultimately be needed from Egypt and Jordan, this could obviously have consequences well beyond Gulf.

The Iranian issue will become more prominent, although I doubt Iran will do any more than provide some backing from the outside in the early stages. But it sets up a tone in the Saudi-Iranian competition that will have impact elsewhere.

The Saudis may also feel that they need to start showing that they are a serious military player; despite investing tens of billions on arms, few people in the region take their power seriously and many wonder what they have done with these resources. They may feel this is an opportunity to register their arrival— but if they are seen to fail, they stand to lose a great deal.

As far as the Egyptian role, it is already generating a heated discussion among Egyptian commentators, for and against, with comparison to Egypt's intervention in the 1960s.

Bruce Riedel:
The Saudis have told me the coalition includes Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Egypt, Sudan, Morocco, Jordan and Pakistan. Notably absent is Oman, which has a border with Yemen.

Aircraft from Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Sudan, Morocco and Jordan are part of the air coalition with RSAF. Absent are Pakistan and Egypt so far.

Saudi sources are adamant they don't need foreign ground troops, they can do the ground war alone; 150,000 Army, SANG and MOI troops available they claim. Of course, they don't want to admit Pakistan turned them down two weeks ago.

Operational command of the coalition is in the hands of the Minister of Defense Prince Muhammad bin Salman, 34, the King’s son. He toured the Saudi border provinces over the weekend to prepare the operation.

Among the many odd aspects of this story is the Saudi announcement. Has any country ever announced it is going to war using as its spokesman an ambassador stationed in a foreign country thousands of miles away? Why not the King, Crown Prince or Foreign Minister speaking in Riyadh to the Saudi people? So far they have not spoken.

The Omani absence is also driven by the Sultan’s health question. Although he returned to Muscat on Monday after months in Germany, he has yet to speak to the Omani people. Reports that his health is fully restored and he is cured of cancer are probably wishful thinking.

Pakistan’s absence is also notable. Officially the Pakistani government is “considering” the Saudi appeal for assistance. Like Oman Pakistan shares a border with Iran and is more cautious about how far to jump on the Saudi bandwagon.

Authors

]]>
Fri, 27 Mar 2015 11:45:00 -0400Daniel L. Byman, Kenneth M. Pollack, Bruce Riedel, Salman Shaikh, Suzanne Maloney, Shibley Telhami, et al.
In the wake of continuing chaos in Yemen, and the decision of a ten-country coalition—led by Saudi Arabia—to conduct airstrikes against Houthi fighters in Yemen, Brookings experts had a candid dialogue about the developing situation. Below is an edited version of that conversation.
Tamara Cofman Wittes, Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Middle East Policy, Foreign Policy program:
This is an extraordinary step:
- A direct attack by Sunni Arab states on an Iranian-backed militia; - The first time the GCC has taken military action outside its own membership; and - The return of Egypt to fighting on Yemeni territory.
By the way, Bruce, didn't we have a conversation just recently about the prospect of Egypt providing an expeditionary force for the GCC states? It feels momentous for the trajectory of the region. Some questions:
- Could this campaign distract Sunni governments, and perhaps the United States, from the fight vs ISIS in Iraq and Jordan? - Will Iran double down on the Houthis? - What will AQAP do?
Bruce Riedel, Senior Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy and Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence and Director, Intelligence Project, Foreign Policy program:
Air strikes will not defeat the Houthis, and they are too late to save Aden. Are the Saudis prepared to put boots on the ground? Is Cairo?
Kenneth Pollack, Senior Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy, Foreign Policy program:
That's the danger! Their boots on the ground won't solve the problem either—it will just bog them down in a Yemeni quagmire.
Bruce Riedel:
What are the implications for a nuclear deal? Can you sign a deal with Tehran while your Sunni allies are at war with Iran's proxy in Yemen? And you are giving their Iraqi Shia allies air support in Tikrit?
Tamara Cofman Wittes:
President Obama last August cited Yemen as a model for the United States' intended counterterrorism approach in Iraq. Maybe the "Yemen model" has a different meaning now: cede the territory to those most willing to bleed for it.
I really wonder how AQAP plays this. Saudi intervention seems like a golden opportunity for them.
Daniel L. Byman, Senior Fellow and Director of Research, Center for Middle East Policy, Foreign Policy program :
I'll add to this only that I can't figure out what the Islamic State presence is in Yemen. If big, AQAP has a problem in that the Islamic State will push the sectarian button better, so AQAP will have a serious local rival.
Salman Shaikh, Fellow, Director, Brookings Doha Center and Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy, Foreign Policy program:
I've said that the United States has the difficult job, like it or not, to play both referee between Saudi and Iran and ally to its traditional friends in the region. Not easy, I know, but there should have been a much greater effort earlier to push back on Iran's hegemonic ambitions in the region. Saudis and others have been warning for quite some time. Instead, the United States is yet again a "reactive" Middle East power, supporting different (opposing) folks in different places.
I also wonder how secure is Saudi Arabia? Houthis may carry out their threats to attack Saudi. If this carries on, we must keep an eye on dissent within Saudi.
Neither do I rule out Sunnis dissent within Iran's western regions. There have been signs of that recently.
Saudi, I was told, is looking to build a very broad regional coalition to counter Iranian expansionism, which includes Pakistan, Turkey, and Egypt.
I also see that 10 countries have pledged support to the Saudis for Yemen, including Jordan, Sudan, Morocco, in addition to Egypt and Pakistan. The Saudis will have to pay for them all.
The Yemeni conflict is now clearly part of a broader regional conflagration. For that reason there is an urgent need to plug the Syrian volcano. Renewed focus on a Syrian a Syrian political transition can contribute ... In the wake of continuing chaos in Yemen, and the decision of a ten-country coalition—led by Saudi Arabia—to conduct airstrikes against Houthi fighters in Yemen, Brookings experts had a candid dialogue about the developing situation.

In the wake of continuing chaos in Yemen, and the decision of a ten-country coalition—led by Saudi Arabia—to conduct airstrikes against Houthi fighters in Yemen, Brookings experts had a candid dialogue about the developing situation. Below is an edited version of that conversation.

Tamara Cofman Wittes, Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Middle East Policy, Foreign Policy program:
This is an extraordinary step:

A direct attack by Sunni Arab states on an Iranian-backed militia;

The first time the GCC has taken military action outside its own membership; and

The return of Egypt to fighting on Yemeni territory.

By the way, Bruce, didn’t we have a conversation just recently about the prospect of Egypt providing an expeditionary force for the GCC states? It feels momentous for the trajectory of the region. Some questions:

Could this campaign distract Sunni governments, and perhaps the United States, from the fight vs ISIS in Iraq and Jordan?

Will Iran double down on the Houthis?

What will AQAP do?

Bruce Riedel, Senior Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy and Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence and Director, Intelligence Project, Foreign Policy program:
Air strikes will not defeat the Houthis, and they are too late to save Aden. Are the Saudis prepared to put boots on the ground? Is Cairo?

Kenneth Pollack, Senior Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy, Foreign Policy program:
That's the danger! Their boots on the ground won't solve the problem either—it will just bog them down in a Yemeni quagmire.

Bruce Riedel:
What are the implications for a nuclear deal? Can you sign a deal with Tehran while your Sunni allies are at war with Iran's proxy in Yemen? And you are giving their Iraqi Shia allies air support in Tikrit?

Tamara Cofman Wittes:
President Obama last August cited Yemen as a model for the United States’ intended counterterrorism approach in Iraq. Maybe the "Yemen model" has a different meaning now: cede the territory to those most willing to bleed for it.

I really wonder how AQAP plays this. Saudi intervention seems like a golden opportunity for them.

Daniel L. Byman, Senior Fellow and Director of Research, Center for Middle East Policy, Foreign Policy program :
I'll add to this only that I can't figure out what the Islamic State presence is in Yemen. If big, AQAP has a problem in that the Islamic State will push the sectarian button better, so AQAP will have a serious local rival.

Salman Shaikh, Fellow, Director, Brookings Doha Center and Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy, Foreign Policy program:
I've said that the United States has the difficult job, like it or not, to play both referee between Saudi and Iran and ally to its traditional friends in the region. Not easy, I know, but there should have been a much greater effort earlier to push back on Iran's hegemonic ambitions in the region. Saudis and others have been warning for quite some time. Instead, the United States is yet again a "reactive" Middle East power, supporting different (opposing) folks in different places.

I also wonder how secure is Saudi Arabia? Houthis may carry out their threats to attack Saudi. If this carries on, we must keep an eye on dissent within Saudi.

Neither do I rule out Sunnis dissent within Iran's western regions. There have been signs of that recently.

Saudi, I was told, is looking to build a very broad regional coalition to counter Iranian expansionism, which includes Pakistan, Turkey, and Egypt.

I also see that 10 countries have pledged support to the Saudis for Yemen, including Jordan, Sudan, Morocco, in addition to Egypt and Pakistan. The Saudis will have to pay for them all.

The Yemeni conflict is now clearly part of a broader regional conflagration. For that reason there is an urgent need to plug the Syrian volcano. Renewed focus on a Syrian a Syrian political transition can contribute to de-escalating regional tensions.

Suzanne Maloney, Senior Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy, Foreign Policy program:
I take a different position than Salman, both with respect to the characterization of Iranian ambitions and the criticism of the Obama administration. As Bruce Riedel has written, Iran's involvement in Yemen is marginal and opportunistic. They didn't invent the Houthi uprising and their investment has been relatively small scale in comparison to other conflicts. Which is why you have never seen a Qassem Soleimani selfie from Aden or anywhere in the vicinity, and you never will. Tehran's real interests lie elsewhere, in Iraq and Syria. I would imagine they will aim to continue to exploit what is likely to remain a very unsettled situation in Yemen. But that hardly qualifies as hegemonic.

As for the United States, I don't know of an American administration that has been anything other than reactive vis-à-vis Yemen. Unfortunately (especially for Yemenis) I think Yemen will simply never rise to the level of a priority that commands proactive American intercession—except if the threat of AQAP is resurgent, which of course may be an inadvertent outcome of the GCC strikes.

My guess is that the Obama administration sees a net benefit in enabling the Saudis to flex their muscles on an issue which is existential, or close to it, for Riyadh but relatively low-priority for the rest of the world. Heck, Washington may have even encouraged this outcome: let the Gulf vent its spleen about the cozy conversations between Secretary John Kerry and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif in an arena where they cannot do much additional harm to core United States interests in the region. Meanwhile, the nuclear talks will go on—even if the Iranians can't close the deal—and Washington will focus its energies on IS and Iraq, in parallel to Iran's campaign there.

In my view, the real problem is that Saudi interventions across the region—military and financial—are no less forceful than those of Iran, and they are not inherently stabilizing, except perhaps in the short run.

I can't yet puzzle out how this is likely to impact the Iranian nuclear talks. I'm tempted to say not at all; the negotiations are really silo-ed on both sides, and if they can finally get to a credible formula, I think that producing a somewhat general, possibly unwritten "political framework" is not a terribly high hurdle. There would still be plenty of time for this to crash and burn before June 30th. On the other hand, the Iranian leadership sees the nuclear issue as firmly enmeshed within a broader web of United States efforts to undermine the regime, and it seems conceivable that the United States-sanctified Saudi attack on an Iranian client/ally — undertaken at the precise moment that Qods Force commander Qassem Soleimani had to yield the Tikrit battle to United States air strikes would intensify Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamenei's hesitation about accepting a deal that the hard-liners in his security bureaucracy will see as a capitulation to the West.

Shibley Telhami, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy, Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, Foreign Policy program:
One thing though to keep in mind, separate from the big unknown (and potentially disastrous) consequences for Yemen. This is a huge development for Arab politics that will test the bargain that the Saudis sought at the outset of the Arab Uprisings: luring Morocco and Jordan into a support relationship with the GCC: money for security support. That now includes Egypt (and a lot of symbolic Sunni countries such as Sudan, Pakistan, and the Palestinian Authority). There is no doubt the Saudis took the lead on this, that they consolidated the support of GCC (with the exception of Oman) which has propelled them into uncharted leadership territory. Regardless of how it all ends in Yemen, the path will be bloody with a lot of unintended consequences. If ground forces will ultimately be needed from Egypt and Jordan, this could obviously have consequences well beyond Gulf.

The Iranian issue will become more prominent, although I doubt Iran will do any more than provide some backing from the outside in the early stages. But it sets up a tone in the Saudi-Iranian competition that will have impact elsewhere.

The Saudis may also feel that they need to start showing that they are a serious military player; despite investing tens of billions on arms, few people in the region take their power seriously and many wonder what they have done with these resources. They may feel this is an opportunity to register their arrival— but if they are seen to fail, they stand to lose a great deal.

As far as the Egyptian role, it is already generating a heated discussion among Egyptian commentators, for and against, with comparison to Egypt's intervention in the 1960s.

Bruce Riedel:
The Saudis have told me the coalition includes Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Egypt, Sudan, Morocco, Jordan and Pakistan. Notably absent is Oman, which has a border with Yemen.

Aircraft from Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Sudan, Morocco and Jordan are part of the air coalition with RSAF. Absent are Pakistan and Egypt so far.

Saudi sources are adamant they don't need foreign ground troops, they can do the ground war alone; 150,000 Army, SANG and MOI troops available they claim. Of course, they don't want to admit Pakistan turned them down two weeks ago.

Operational command of the coalition is in the hands of the Minister of Defense Prince Muhammad bin Salman, 34, the King’s son. He toured the Saudi border provinces over the weekend to prepare the operation.

Among the many odd aspects of this story is the Saudi announcement. Has any country ever announced it is going to war using as its spokesman an ambassador stationed in a foreign country thousands of miles away? Why not the King, Crown Prince or Foreign Minister speaking in Riyadh to the Saudi people? So far they have not spoken.

The Omani absence is also driven by the Sultan’s health question. Although he returned to Muscat on Monday after months in Germany, he has yet to speak to the Omani people. Reports that his health is fully restored and he is cured of cancer are probably wishful thinking.

Pakistan’s absence is also notable. Officially the Pakistani government is “considering” the Saudi appeal for assistance. Like Oman Pakistan shares a border with Iran and is more cautious about how far to jump on the Saudi bandwagon.

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2015/03/26-pollack-iraq-tikrit-airstrikes-isis?rssid=iran{816FC78E-BDE2-45A2-A5F7-A1EFBF265D7B}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/87705549/0/brookingsrss/topics/iran~Why-US-airstrikes-in-Tikrit-are-good-for-the-US-and-IraqWhy U.S. airstrikes in Tikrit are good for the U.S. and Iraq

The start of American air operations against Da'ish forces in Tikrit has generated a lot of concerns that this is another foolish move by which the United States is empowering Iran and its allied Shi'ite militias in Iraq.

In this one case, however, the exact opposite is true.

What is critical to understand about the Tikrit offensive is that it was meant to discredit the United States. Two weeks ago, an extremely high-ranking Iraqi official—a senior cabinet minister—told me that the operation was presented by Abu Mahdi al-Mohandis, Iran's most important cat's paw in Iraq, to the Iraqi government six days before the start of the operation. At the time, he indicated that the various Shi'ite militias were going to launch the offensive against Tikrit with Iranian support, and he asked if the Iraqi government was interested in participating. He also made it clear that he and his compatriots did not want the United States to participate.

In other words, the Shi'ite militias and their Iranian backers devised this operation on their own; they intended to carry it out regardless of what the Iraqi government did and simply gave Baghdad the option of participating—but only at the price of excluding the Americans. It was an operation designed to demonstrate that the Shi'ite militias (and the forces at the disposal of the Shi'a-dominated government more broadly) were fully capable of liberating even core Sunni cities without the United States. It was intended to demonstrate that Iraq needs Iranian help, while American help was of secondary importance at best.

This seems to be why the offensive caught the United States by surprise—the Iraqi government did not know about it until the last minute and they were forced to keep the Americans in the dark or be shut out of the operation altogether. This was too dangerous for Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, who could not afford to have the Shi'ite militias and Iran liberate Tikrit from Da'ish WITHOUT Iraqi Security Force (ISF) participation. Doing so would have demonstrated that he is not fully in control of Iraq or the military campaign to liberate Iraq. Given his own problems with Iran and its Iraqi allies, that was something he just could not afford, and so he agreed to participate, rushed some ISF units north to take part in the offensive, and gave a send-off speech to the troops—all to try to take ownership of an operation conceived by the Shi'ite militias and Iran.

The great danger in all of this is that if the operation was a success, it would reinforce the narrative that Iran was Iraq's only real ally and the United States was both diffident and not terribly important. It would have further increased Iran's already extensive influence in Iraq and further diminished America's already damaged reputation. And early on, when the offensive seemed to be succeeding, this was exactly what Iraqis were saying. Indeed, the Shi'ite militias distributed all kinds of sophisticated media materials showing them feeding liberated Sunni children to demonstrate that they were welcomed by the Sunni populace and thus did not need the Americans even to reach out to the Sunnis.

Now, the sudden stalemate and the request for American airstrikes has given the United States the chance to reverse that narrative: to convince Iraqis that the Shi'ite militias cannot do it all on their own—or only with Iranian help—and that Iraq needs the United States because the United States has unique capabilities critical to Iraq's future security. It is also important for Prime Minister Abadi in giving him some room to maneuver and not reducing him to subservience to Iran and its allies among the Shi'ite militia leadership. What's more, if Tikrit is now liberated, Iraqis will all say that the Iranians failed, but the Americans succeeded.

Nothing could be more useful in starting to restore American influence. Indeed, that is precisely why the Shi'ite militias closest to Iran—Asaib ahl al-Haq, Khataib Hizballah, the Peace Brigades, and possibly the Badr Organization—all have either announced that they won't participate in the fight anymore or are considering withdrawing. They do not want to see the United States succeed where the Iranians alone failed, and they know that their own role could be crucial to the fighting. So rather than do what is best for Iraq, they are doing what is best for themselves and for Iran, even at the expense of what is best for Iraq.

And that is a golden opportunity for the United States.

Authors

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Thu, 26 Mar 2015 16:00:00 -0400Kenneth M. Pollack
The start of American air operations against Da'ish forces in Tikrit has generated a lot of concerns that this is another foolish move by which the United States is empowering Iran and its allied Shi'ite militias in Iraq.
In this one case, however, the exact opposite is true.
What is critical to understand about the Tikrit offensive is that it was meant to discredit the United States. Two weeks ago, an extremely high-ranking Iraqi official—a senior cabinet minister—told me that the operation was presented by Abu Mahdi al-Mohandis, Iran's most important cat's paw in Iraq, to the Iraqi government six days before the start of the operation. At the time, he indicated that the various Shi'ite militias were going to launch the offensive against Tikrit with Iranian support, and he asked if the Iraqi government was interested in participating. He also made it clear that he and his compatriots did not want the United States to participate.
In other words, the Shi'ite militias and their Iranian backers devised this operation on their own; they intended to carry it out regardless of what the Iraqi government did and simply gave Baghdad the option of participating—but only at the price of excluding the Americans. It was an operation designed to demonstrate that the Shi'ite militias (and the forces at the disposal of the Shi'a-dominated government more broadly) were fully capable of liberating even core Sunni cities without the United States. It was intended to demonstrate that Iraq needs Iranian help, while American help was of secondary importance at best.
This seems to be why the offensive caught the United States by surprise—the Iraqi government did not know about it until the last minute and they were forced to keep the Americans in the dark or be shut out of the operation altogether. This was too dangerous for Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, who could not afford to have the Shi'ite militias and Iran liberate Tikrit from Da'ish WITHOUT Iraqi Security Force (ISF) participation. Doing so would have demonstrated that he is not fully in control of Iraq or the military campaign to liberate Iraq. Given his own problems with Iran and its Iraqi allies, that was something he just could not afford, and so he agreed to participate, rushed some ISF units north to take part in the offensive, and gave a send-off speech to the troops—all to try to take ownership of an operation conceived by the Shi'ite militias and Iran.
The great danger in all of this is that if the operation was a success, it would reinforce the narrative that Iran was Iraq's only real ally and the United States was both diffident and not terribly important. It would have further increased Iran's already extensive influence in Iraq and further diminished America's already damaged reputation. And early on, when the offensive seemed to be succeeding, this was exactly what Iraqis were saying. Indeed, the Shi'ite militias distributed all kinds of sophisticated media materials showing them feeding liberated Sunni children to demonstrate that they were welcomed by the Sunni populace and thus did not need the Americans even to reach out to the Sunnis.
Now, the sudden stalemate and the request for American airstrikes has given the United States the chance to reverse that narrative: to convince Iraqis that the Shi'ite militias cannot do it all on their own—or only with Iranian help—and that Iraq needs the United States because the United States has unique capabilities critical to Iraq's future security. It is also important for Prime Minister Abadi in giving him some room to maneuver and not reducing him to subservience to Iran and its allies among the Shi'ite militia leadership. What's more, if Tikrit is now liberated, Iraqis will all say that the Iranians failed, but the Americans succeeded.
Nothing could be more useful in starting to restore American influence. Indeed, that is precisely why the Shi'ite militias closest ...
The start of American air operations against Da'ish forces in Tikrit has generated a lot of concerns that this is another foolish move by which the United States is empowering Iran and its allied Shi'ite militias in Iraq.

The start of American air operations against Da'ish forces in Tikrit has generated a lot of concerns that this is another foolish move by which the United States is empowering Iran and its allied Shi'ite militias in Iraq.

In this one case, however, the exact opposite is true.

What is critical to understand about the Tikrit offensive is that it was meant to discredit the United States. Two weeks ago, an extremely high-ranking Iraqi official—a senior cabinet minister—told me that the operation was presented by Abu Mahdi al-Mohandis, Iran's most important cat's paw in Iraq, to the Iraqi government six days before the start of the operation. At the time, he indicated that the various Shi'ite militias were going to launch the offensive against Tikrit with Iranian support, and he asked if the Iraqi government was interested in participating. He also made it clear that he and his compatriots did not want the United States to participate.

In other words, the Shi'ite militias and their Iranian backers devised this operation on their own; they intended to carry it out regardless of what the Iraqi government did and simply gave Baghdad the option of participating—but only at the price of excluding the Americans. It was an operation designed to demonstrate that the Shi'ite militias (and the forces at the disposal of the Shi'a-dominated government more broadly) were fully capable of liberating even core Sunni cities without the United States. It was intended to demonstrate that Iraq needs Iranian help, while American help was of secondary importance at best.

This seems to be why the offensive caught the United States by surprise—the Iraqi government did not know about it until the last minute and they were forced to keep the Americans in the dark or be shut out of the operation altogether. This was too dangerous for Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, who could not afford to have the Shi'ite militias and Iran liberate Tikrit from Da'ish WITHOUT Iraqi Security Force (ISF) participation. Doing so would have demonstrated that he is not fully in control of Iraq or the military campaign to liberate Iraq. Given his own problems with Iran and its Iraqi allies, that was something he just could not afford, and so he agreed to participate, rushed some ISF units north to take part in the offensive, and gave a send-off speech to the troops—all to try to take ownership of an operation conceived by the Shi'ite militias and Iran.

The great danger in all of this is that if the operation was a success, it would reinforce the narrative that Iran was Iraq's only real ally and the United States was both diffident and not terribly important. It would have further increased Iran's already extensive influence in Iraq and further diminished America's already damaged reputation. And early on, when the offensive seemed to be succeeding, this was exactly what Iraqis were saying. Indeed, the Shi'ite militias distributed all kinds of sophisticated media materials showing them feeding liberated Sunni children to demonstrate that they were welcomed by the Sunni populace and thus did not need the Americans even to reach out to the Sunnis.

Now, the sudden stalemate and the request for American airstrikes has given the United States the chance to reverse that narrative: to convince Iraqis that the Shi'ite militias cannot do it all on their own—or only with Iranian help—and that Iraq needs the United States because the United States has unique capabilities critical to Iraq's future security. It is also important for Prime Minister Abadi in giving him some room to maneuver and not reducing him to subservience to Iran and its allies among the Shi'ite militia leadership. What's more, if Tikrit is now liberated, Iraqis will all say that the Iranians failed, but the Americans succeeded.

Nothing could be more useful in starting to restore American influence. Indeed, that is precisely why the Shi'ite militias closest to Iran—Asaib ahl al-Haq, Khataib Hizballah, the Peace Brigades, and possibly the Badr Organization—all have either announced that they won't participate in the fight anymore or are considering withdrawing. They do not want to see the United States succeed where the Iranians alone failed, and they know that their own role could be crucial to the fighting. So rather than do what is best for Iraq, they are doing what is best for themselves and for Iran, even at the expense of what is best for Iraq.

And that is a golden opportunity for the United States.

Authors

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http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/fixgov/posts/2015/03/24-bipartisan-letter-obama-iran-politics-galston?rssid=iran{F2DF37E4-CC6F-4866-BF20-BA95A419F729}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/87599055/0/brookingsrss/topics/iran~The-politics-of-the-bipartisan-letter-to-President-Obama-on-the-Iran-negotiationsThe politics of the bipartisan letter to President Obama on the Iran negotiations

On March 20, a bipartisan group of House members dispatched a cautionary letter to President Obama about the content of the emerging nuclear deal with Iran. These representatives wrote, they explained, to underscore the “grave and urgent issues that have arisen in these negotiations.”

Their letter made three key points. First, any acceptable final agreement “must constrain Iran’s nuclear infrastructure so that Iran has no pathway to a bomb, and that agreement must be long-lasting.” Second, Iran’s record of clandestine activity, lack of cooperation with international inspectors, and outright intransigence “prevents any trust” in the Islamic Republic. “Given Iran’s decades of deception,” the signatories insisted, “negotiators must obtain maximum commitments to transparency.” And finally, despite the understandable focus on the Iranian nuclear threat, it is critical that we also consider “Iran’s destabilizing role in the region.”

Although the tone of the letter was respectful and cooperative, it represented a clear warning shot across the administration’s bow. Congress has the right to evaluate any agreement, the letter stated, to “determine its long-term impact on the United States and our allies,” Unless the terms of a proposed final agreement definitively foreclose any Iranian pathway to a bomb, Congress will not be able to consider permanent sanctions relief.

The letter was signed by 367 members, more than 80 percent of the body, and far more than the two thirds needed to override a presidential veto. Only 7 Republicans refrained from signing on, and one of them, Aaron Schock, has since announced his resignation.

Although two thirds of House Democrats also signed, 59 did not, and the composition of the hold-outs is intriguing. Although Minority Whip Steny Hoyer affixed his signature to the letter, Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi did not. Most of her leadership team followed suit, including Assistant Leader Jim Clyburn, Caucus Chair Xavier Becerra, and Steering and Policy Committee co-chairs Rosa DeLauro and Donna Edwards. Led by co-chairs Raul Grijalva and Keith Ellison, substantial numbers of the Congressional Progressive Caucus also refrained from participating.

Chris Van Hollen, who is running for the Democratic senatorial nomination to replace Maryland’s retiring Barbara Mikulski, did sign the letter, setting up a contrast with Edwards, who is also running. This is the foreign policy face of a broader contest between self-styled progressives and more traditional liberals and moderates to define the future of the Democratic Party. This competition has already shaped mayoral races in New York and Chicago, and progressives would like to see a similar dynamic in the 2016 presidential primary. If a strong progressive candidate does not emerge to challenge Hillary Clinton, Maryland could be ground zero for the intra-party foreign policy debate.

The author wishes to acknowledge the rapid and meticulous research of Alexander Snowdon, without whose prodigious efforts this piece could not have been written.

On March 20, a bipartisan group of House members dispatched a cautionary letter to President Obama about the content of the emerging nuclear deal with Iran. These representatives wrote, they explained, to underscore the “grave and urgent issues that have arisen in these negotiations.”

Their letter made three key points. First, any acceptable final agreement “must constrain Iran’s nuclear infrastructure so that Iran has no pathway to a bomb, and that agreement must be long-lasting.” Second, Iran’s record of clandestine activity, lack of cooperation with international inspectors, and outright intransigence “prevents any trust” in the Islamic Republic. “Given Iran’s decades of deception,” the signatories insisted, “negotiators must obtain maximum commitments to transparency.” And finally, despite the understandable focus on the Iranian nuclear threat, it is critical that we also consider “Iran’s destabilizing role in the region.”

Although the tone of the letter was respectful and cooperative, it represented a clear warning shot across the administration’s bow. Congress has the right to evaluate any agreement, the letter stated, to “determine its long-term impact on the United States and our allies,” Unless the terms of a proposed final agreement definitively foreclose any Iranian pathway to a bomb, Congress will not be able to consider permanent sanctions relief.

The letter was signed by 367 members, more than 80 percent of the body, and far more than the two thirds needed to override a presidential veto. Only 7 Republicans refrained from signing on, and one of them, Aaron Schock, has since announced his resignation.

Although two thirds of House Democrats also signed, 59 did not, and the composition of the hold-outs is intriguing. Although Minority Whip Steny Hoyer affixed his signature to the letter, Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi did not. Most of her leadership team followed suit, including Assistant Leader Jim Clyburn, Caucus Chair Xavier Becerra, and Steering and Policy Committee co-chairs Rosa DeLauro and Donna Edwards. Led by co-chairs Raul Grijalva and Keith Ellison, substantial numbers of the Congressional Progressive Caucus also refrained from participating.

Chris Van Hollen, who is running for the Democratic senatorial nomination to replace Maryland’s retiring Barbara Mikulski, did sign the letter, setting up a contrast with Edwards, who is also running. This is the foreign policy face of a broader contest between self-styled progressives and more traditional liberals and moderates to define the future of the Democratic Party. This competition has already shaped mayoral races in New York and Chicago, and progressives would like to see a similar dynamic in the 2016 presidential primary. If a strong progressive candidate does not emerge to challenge Hillary Clinton, Maryland could be ground zero for the intra-party foreign policy debate.

The author wishes to acknowledge the rapid and meticulous research of Alexander Snowdon, without whose prodigious efforts this piece could not have been written.

Nuclear Negotiations

On March 19, in an editorial in reformist Shargh entitled, “A welcomed historic agreement,” political commentator Sadegh Zibakalam wrote, “47 Senators, Netanyahu, radical republicans, and some regional countries that were hopeful of a continuation of the nuclear confrontation between Iran and the West, have now become worried; because they know that this agreement might be able to begin a new chapter [of relations] between Iran and the West.”

On March 19, an editorial in hard-line Vatan-e Emrooz criticized Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammed Javad Zarif, calling his backing of a final nuclear agreement to be endorsed under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter as “dangerous.” The editorial’s headline read, “The ruse of Chapter VII.”

On March 17, Mehr News reported that during the inauguration ceremony of Phase 12 of the South Pars natural gas field, Oil Minister Bijan Zangeneh said, “The opening of South Pars Phase 12 is a message to the P5+1 that even with sanctions, Iran can’t be stopped [from advancing].”

On March 18, hard-line Mashregh News published an open letter written by MP Hamid Resaei, which called on President Rouhani to address fellow MP Ali Motahari’s public statements regarding his recent physical assault in Shiraz. In the letter, Resaei called Motahari’s behavior after the attack, “wicked and unlawful.”

Authors

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Fri, 20 Mar 2015 11:29:00 -0400Hanif Zarrabi-Kashani
Nuclear NegotiationsOn March 19, in an editorial in reformist Shargh entitled, “A welcomed historic agreement,” political commentator Sadegh Zibakalam wrote, “47 Senators, Netanyahu, radical republicans, and some regional countries that were hopeful of a continuation of the nuclear confrontation between Iran and the West, have now become worried; because they know that this agreement might be able to begin a new chapter [of relations] between Iran and the West.”
On March 19, an editorial in hard-line Vatan-e Emrooz criticized Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammed Javad Zarif, calling his backing of a final nuclear agreement to be endorsed under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter as “dangerous.” The editorial's headline read, “The ruse of Chapter VII.”
On March 19, ISNA quoted Abbas Ali Mansouri Arani, a member of the parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, as saying, “The nuclear negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 have enabled us to defend our ideas and as a result, perceptions about Iran have changed to the point in which they have accepted Iran's framework.”
On March 19, hard-line Vatan-e Emrooz reported that Alaeddin Boroujerdi, the chairman of parliament's Foreign Policy and National Security commission, announced that Iran's Supreme Nuclear Committee “has resumed its meetings.”
On March 19, ISNA quoted Esmail Kowsari, a member of the parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, as saying, “The Americans will undoubtedly negotiate in a way to prevent the collapse of the Zionist regime, because they fear the collapse of this illegitimate regime.”
On March 18, Fars News reported that Deputy Speaker Mohammed Reza Bahonar reacted to the possibility of a potential nuclear agreement being endorsed under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, saying, “Parliament will intervene if necessary but at the moment we are not worried about this.”
On March 18, Khabar Online quoted Ali Shamkhani, secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council as saying, “If the P5+1 abandons their policy of threats and pressure, an agreement can be achieved.”
On March 17, a hard-line Javan Online headline read, “10 percent of key differences: A technical agreement is in reach, a political understanding is uncertain.”
On March 17, ISNA reported that according to Reza Nazar Ahari, Iran's ambassador to Japan, “If a nuclear agreement is reached, Japan is ready to develop multi-lateral relations with Iran.”
On March 17, hard-line Javan Online ran a front page headline that read, “The United States isn't ready for a written agreement [in Lausanne].”
Economy and Energy
On March 18, Mehr News quoted President Hassan Rouhani as saying, “In this current year (ending March 20) non-oil exports totaled $50 billion.”
On March 18, ISNA reported that Mohammad Nahavandian, President Rouhani's chief of staff said, “Job creation is the administration's top priority in the coming New Year.”
On March 17, Khabar Online reported that according to Iran's Central Bank, about 60 percent of the country's bank loans are administered in Tehran province, while Iran's 30 other provinces make up the remaining 40 percent. On March 17, Fars News quoted President Rouhani as saying, “Inflation has dropped 20 percent in less than a year (11 months).”
On March 17, Mehr News reported that during the inauguration ceremony of Phase 12 of the South Pars natural gas field, Oil Minister Bijan Zangeneh said, “The opening of South Pars Phase 12 is a message to the P5+1 that even with sanctions, Iran can't be stopped [from advancing].”
Politics On March 19, reformist Shargh ran a front page headline that read, “During the last [Rouhani] cabinet meeting [of the year]: 1394 (2015-2016) will be ... Nuclear NegotiationsOn March 19, in an editorial in reformist Shargh entitled, “A welcomed historic agreement,” political commentator Sadegh Zibakalam wrote, “47 Senators, Netanyahu, radical republicans, and some regional countries ...

Nuclear Negotiations

On March 19, in an editorial in reformist Shargh entitled, “A welcomed historic agreement,” political commentator Sadegh Zibakalam wrote, “47 Senators, Netanyahu, radical republicans, and some regional countries that were hopeful of a continuation of the nuclear confrontation between Iran and the West, have now become worried; because they know that this agreement might be able to begin a new chapter [of relations] between Iran and the West.”

On March 19, an editorial in hard-line Vatan-e Emrooz criticized Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammed Javad Zarif, calling his backing of a final nuclear agreement to be endorsed under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter as “dangerous.” The editorial’s headline read, “The ruse of Chapter VII.”

On March 17, Mehr News reported that during the inauguration ceremony of Phase 12 of the South Pars natural gas field, Oil Minister Bijan Zangeneh said, “The opening of South Pars Phase 12 is a message to the P5+1 that even with sanctions, Iran can’t be stopped [from advancing].”

On March 18, hard-line Mashregh News published an open letter written by MP Hamid Resaei, which called on President Rouhani to address fellow MP Ali Motahari’s public statements regarding his recent physical assault in Shiraz. In the letter, Resaei called Motahari’s behavior after the attack, “wicked and unlawful.”

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2015/03/13-brookings-mena-posts-roundup?rssid=iran{C1CBF783-06B6-4581-B2C1-616513499BF6}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/86945096/0/brookingsrss/topics/iran~In-case-you-missed-it-More-from-Brookings-on-the-Middle-East-just-in-time-for-the-weekendIn case you missed it: More from Brookings on the Middle East, just in time for the weekendWith so many pieces published each week at Brookings, we wanted to take a moment and highlight some of what’s been happening around our halls in recent days on issues related to the Middle East.

Finally, Israelis head to the polls next week. We trust you’ve been reading the excellent coverage by Natan Sachs, fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, and Lauren Mellinger, senior research assistant, in our Israeli Elections Series, but hope you’ll take a few minutes to listen to Sachs on Lawfare’s podcast, discussing Benjamin Netanyahu’s speech to Congress last week in Washington.

Authors

Stephanie Dahle

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Fri, 13 Mar 2015 11:26:00 -0400Stephanie Dahle
With so many pieces published each week at Brookings, we wanted to take a moment and highlight some of what's been happening around our halls in recent days on issues related to the Middle East.
In honor of International Women's Day, the Education + Development blog at Brookings published two thought-provoking pieces by Maysa Jalbout, a nonresident fellow at the Center for Universal Education in the Global Economy and Development program at Brookings. The first piece examines the breakdown of boys and girls' attendance in primary and secondary schools in the Middle East and North Africa region, and Jalbout argues that the “current efforts fall short for far too many girls and young women.” In the second blog post, Jahout looks at the rates of employment for educated women in the MENA region, and writes that, “much greater efforts and cooperation between the private sector and government are needed to replicate and scale up initiatives that tap the potential of working women.”
An interesting round-robin debate erupted on our sister blog, Order from Chaos, about U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. Ambassador Martin Indyk, who has served as director of the Foreign Policy program and was just named Brookings Executive Vice President, outlined the choices the United States faces in the Middle East, and made the case for doubling down on our relationships with our longstanding regional allies. Michael E. O'Hanlon, director of Research for the Foreign Policy Program, followed by advocating the incorporation of American values into U.S. policy toward the region. Tamara Cofman Wittes, director of the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, also published a counter-argument to Indyk, making the case that the only logical U.S. approach in the Middle East is a hedging strategy. In the spirit of friendly debate, Indyk responded to both of their pieces here.
Bruce Riedel, director of the Intelligence Project at Brookings, wrote an informative piece in Al Monitor about how Saudi Arabia is quietly preparing for a nuclear agreement with Iran.
The U.S. Relations with the Islamic World Project just released two fascinating papers on the Islamic State (ISIS). The paper— by Nonresident Senior Fellow J.M. Berger and Jonathon Morgan, a senior developer at Ushahidi— examines the population of ISIS supporters on Twitter, and he also wrote a blog post for Order from Chaos explaining the highlights from his findings. Berger's paper was launched on Wednesday alongside an analysis paper by Cole Bunzel, a ph.d. candidate at Princeton University, From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State, which argues that eliminating ISIS leaders such as Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi would significantly weaken the group. Click here to watch the launch event for these papers.
Finally, Israelis head to the polls next week. We trust you've been reading the excellent coverage by Natan Sachs, fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, and Lauren Mellinger, senior research assistant, in our Israeli Elections Series, but hope you'll take a few minutes to listen to Sachs on Lawfare's podcast, discussing Benjamin Netanyahu's speech to Congress last week in Washington.
Authors
- Stephanie Dahle
With so many pieces published each week at Brookings, we wanted to take a moment and highlight some of what's been happening around our halls in recent days on issues related to the Middle East.
In honor of International Women's Day, the ... With so many pieces published each week at Brookings, we wanted to take a moment and highlight some of what’s been happening around our halls in recent days on issues related to the Middle East.

Finally, Israelis head to the polls next week. We trust you’ve been reading the excellent coverage by Natan Sachs, fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, and Lauren Mellinger, senior research assistant, in our Israeli Elections Series, but hope you’ll take a few minutes to listen to Sachs on Lawfare’s podcast, discussing Benjamin Netanyahu’s speech to Congress last week in Washington.

The letter to Iran's leaders signed by 47 Republican senators

On March 12, hard-line Vatan-e Emrooz ran a headline that read, “Unlike [Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad] Zarif’s reaction, the political director of the presidential office [Hamid Aboutalebi] says that the senators are correct; we can’t count on Obama.”

On March 11, ISNA quoted MP Ismail Kowsari saying, “This letter disproves the claim that the United States is a super power that runs the world, [because] there is so much uncertainty in their decision making.”

Nuclear Negotiations

During Friday prayers in Tehran, ISNA quoted interim prayer leader Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami as saying, “Considering the American’s mischief and the resilience of the people of Iran, whatever the outcome of the negotiations are, Iran will be the victorious nation.”

On March 10, reformist Shargh quoted the head of Iran’s Expediency Council, Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani, as saying, “At this critical moment, it’s not necessary that I chair [the Assembly of Experts], it's sufficient that I’m a member. As an member, you can speak up and give your opinion, and if I want to, I can have an impact.”

On March 10, Entekhab published a statement written by MP Ali Motahari, which described in detail how he was physically assaulted in Shiraz. In the statement, Motahari claimed that around 30-40 assailants used “rocks and bricks” during the attack, and that they were “trying to kill” him.

On March 9, reformist Etemaad interviewed Ali Tayyebnia, minister of economic affairs and finance. According to Tayyebnia, senior officials at the World Bank and the IMF personally have told him, “[Iran] has performed an economic miracle” in controlling the inflation rate.

Authors

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Fri, 13 Mar 2015 12:57:00 -0400Hanif Zarrabi-Kashani
The letter to Iran's leaders signed by 47 Republican senators
On March 12, hard-line Vatan-e Emrooz ran a headline that read, “Unlike [Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad] Zarif's reaction, the political director of the presidential office [Hamid Aboutalebi] says that the senators are correct; we can't count on Obama.”
On March 11, ISNA quoted MP Ismail Kowsari saying, “This letter disproves the claim that the United States is a super power that runs the world, [because] there is so much uncertainty in their decision making.”
On March 11, ISNA reported that MP Mohammed Salehi Jokar said, “In the international system, when a government makes a commitment, someone can't just cancel it. The recent letter by the American senators represents a lack of faith.”
On March 11, hard-line Raja News quoted Iran's former nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili as saying, “Distrust of the United States has increased dramatically.”
On March 10, hard-line Vatan-e Emrooz ran a headline that read, “Any agreement will only last until Obama's second term.”
On March 10, hard-line Javan Online ran a headline that read, “Global distrust of the U.S. increases with the senators' letter.”
On March 10, hard-line Javan Online ran an editorial headline that read, “Democrats attack the nuclear letter [written by the] 47 Republicans: America vs. America.”
Nuclear Negotiations
During Friday prayers in Tehran, ISNA quoted interim prayer leader Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami as saying, “Considering the American's mischief and the resilience of the people of Iran, whatever the outcome of the negotiations are, Iran will be the victorious nation.”
On March 10, hard-line Kayhan ran a headline that read, “Western experts admit: The breakdown of negotiations will cause the sanctions boat to drown.”
On March 10, ISNA quoted nuclear negotiating team member Davoud Mohammad Nia saying, “Under no circumstances will the duration of a deal be longer than ten years.”
On March 8, hard-line Kayhan ran a headline that read, “Although Obama bluffs about walking away from the negotiations: John Kerry [says] Obama insists on reaching an agreement with Iran.”
Domestic Politics
On March 11, hard-line Raja News ran a headline that read, “Politicizing the Assembly of Experts leadership was Hashemi Rafsanjani's mistake.”
On March 11, Donya-e Eqtesad published the final voting results of both rounds for this week's Assembly of Experts chairmanship election.
On March 10, Digarban reported that Assembly of Experts member, Ayatollah Abbas Kaebi said, “Hashemi [Rafsanjani's] failure in being elected as chair has disappointed our enemies.”
On March 11, Arman Daily ran a headline that read, “Why did Hashemi [Rafsanjani] come forward [as a candidate to chair the Assembly of Experts]?” According to reformist Hussein Marashi, “What happened on Tuesday isn't incomprehensible. Hashemi's decisions have always been based on protecting the structures of the country.”
On March 10, reformist Shargh quoted the head of Iran's Expediency Council, Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani, as saying, “At this critical moment, it's not necessary that I chair [the Assembly of Experts], it's sufficient that I'm a member. As an member, you can speak up and give your opinion, and if I want to, I can have an impact.”
On March 8, hard-line Kayhan ran a headline that read, “Footprint of dirty money leads to the reformist camp.”
On March 10, Entekhab published a statement written by MP Ali Motahari, which described in detail how he was physically assaulted in Shiraz. In the statement, Motahari claimed that around 30-40 assailants used “rocks and bricks” during the attack, and that they were “trying to kill” him.
Economy On March 12, Khabar Online reported that the Tehran Stock ... The letter to Iran's leaders signed by 47 Republican senators
On March 12, hard-line Vatan-e Emrooz ran a headline that read, “Unlike [Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad] Zarif's reaction, the political director of the presidential office ...

The letter to Iran's leaders signed by 47 Republican senators

On March 12, hard-line Vatan-e Emrooz ran a headline that read, “Unlike [Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad] Zarif’s reaction, the political director of the presidential office [Hamid Aboutalebi] says that the senators are correct; we can’t count on Obama.”

On March 11, ISNA quoted MP Ismail Kowsari saying, “This letter disproves the claim that the United States is a super power that runs the world, [because] there is so much uncertainty in their decision making.”

Nuclear Negotiations

During Friday prayers in Tehran, ISNA quoted interim prayer leader Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami as saying, “Considering the American’s mischief and the resilience of the people of Iran, whatever the outcome of the negotiations are, Iran will be the victorious nation.”

On March 10, reformist Shargh quoted the head of Iran’s Expediency Council, Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani, as saying, “At this critical moment, it’s not necessary that I chair [the Assembly of Experts], it's sufficient that I’m a member. As an member, you can speak up and give your opinion, and if I want to, I can have an impact.”

On March 10, Entekhab published a statement written by MP Ali Motahari, which described in detail how he was physically assaulted in Shiraz. In the statement, Motahari claimed that around 30-40 assailants used “rocks and bricks” during the attack, and that they were “trying to kill” him.

On March 9, reformist Etemaad interviewed Ali Tayyebnia, minister of economic affairs and finance. According to Tayyebnia, senior officials at the World Bank and the IMF personally have told him, “[Iran] has performed an economic miracle” in controlling the inflation rate.

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2015/03/12-iran-response-senators-cotton-letter-nuclear?rssid=iran{FD8D8F56-5E16-4157-843C-D0EBB3AC4DAA}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/86906983/0/brookingsrss/topics/iran~Imagining-an-Iranian-response-to-the-GOP-senators-letter-on-the-nuclear-negotiationsImagining an Iranian response to the GOP senators' letter on the nuclear negotiations

Thank you so much for your letter of March 5. Because of the long enmity between our countries, we do indeed have very little insight into your very complex and opaque system of oligarchic rule. To be fair to our confusion, the unique mixture of archaic constitutional rules, unwritten customs, and unelected power centers make America’s bizarre system of governance difficult to understand for even the most careful observer. We appreciate your effort to so carefully explain it to us in language that we can understand and to warn us against its tendency to betrayal.

In this vein, your letter confirmed our long-held suspicion that the real power in America lies in more fundamentalist religious institutions that are not under the control of those with whom we are told we must negotiate. Indeed, the very notion of a legislative body in which members regularly stay for decades helps us to understand how the essentially pro-Iranian sentiment of the American people has been so long and so systematically thwarted. This system of competitive power centers also helps explain why America can at once claim to be seeking a negotiated solution with us and yet, at the same time, use covert and forceful means to oppose our efforts to bring stability and protect minorities in Syria, Lebanon, and Bahrain, among others.

This has all been most helpful. But while we appreciate your warnings, as a peace-loving nation that follows the more conventional rules of international relations, we will continue to negotiate in good faith in due recognition of your country’s status as a sovereign nation. We see now that internal divisions in Washington means there are two clocks against which our negotiation is timed, one counting down toward an agreement with us; one counting toward an unprovoked attack on our homeland. For our part, we can only hope that the first clock moves faster.

Of course, we will honor any agreement reached, but in heeding your warning, we will maintain constant vigilance to verify that America does the same. We take this stance not in a naïve belief in the faithfulness of American diplomacy, against which your letter so eloquently warned us. Rather, we do so in the hope that we can give some succor to the moderates and dissenters within your population and contribute, perhaps, in some small way to the stirrings of a democratic — hopefully Islamic — revolution in your country, which might rid the American people and the world of such avowedly perfidious diplomatic tactics.

With our sincerest regards and our fondest hope that your liberation is at hand,

Thank you so much for your letter of March 5. Because of the long enmity between our countries, we do indeed have very little insight into your very complex and opaque system of oligarchic rule. To be fair to our confusion, the unique mixture of archaic constitutional rules, unwritten customs, and unelected power centers make America’s bizarre system of governance difficult to understand for even the most careful observer. We appreciate your effort to so carefully explain it to us in language that we can understand and to warn us against its tendency to betrayal.

In this vein, your letter confirmed our long-held suspicion that the real power in America lies in more fundamentalist religious institutions that are not under the control of those with whom we are told we must negotiate. Indeed, the very notion of a legislative body in which members regularly stay for decades helps us to understand how the essentially pro-Iranian sentiment of the American people has been so long and so systematically thwarted. This system of competitive power centers also helps explain why America can at once claim to be seeking a negotiated solution with us and yet, at the same time, use covert and forceful means to oppose our efforts to bring stability and protect minorities in Syria, Lebanon, and Bahrain, among others.

This has all been most helpful. But while we appreciate your warnings, as a peace-loving nation that follows the more conventional rules of international relations, we will continue to negotiate in good faith in due recognition of your country’s status as a sovereign nation. We see now that internal divisions in Washington means there are two clocks against which our negotiation is timed, one counting down toward an agreement with us; one counting toward an unprovoked attack on our homeland. For our part, we can only hope that the first clock moves faster.

Of course, we will honor any agreement reached, but in heeding your warning, we will maintain constant vigilance to verify that America does the same. We take this stance not in a naïve belief in the faithfulness of American diplomacy, against which your letter so eloquently warned us. Rather, we do so in the hope that we can give some succor to the moderates and dissenters within your population and contribute, perhaps, in some small way to the stirrings of a democratic — hopefully Islamic — revolution in your country, which might rid the American people and the world of such avowedly perfidious diplomatic tactics.

With our sincerest regards and our fondest hope that your liberation is at hand,

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/events/2015/03/11-upcoming-israel-elections?rssid=iran{DF6C2390-CE55-4C7A-83DB-35185A2E1870}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/86790283/0/brookingsrss/topics/iran~Israel%e2%80%99s-upcoming-elections-What-to-watch-what-to-expectIsrael’s upcoming elections: What to watch, what to expect

Event Information

Israelis go to the polls on March 17 to elect the 20th Knesset, and with it, a new government. The Israeli electorate is divided over national security, economics, and the public role of religion, and as many as 10 parties are expected to win seats in the next Knesset. The elections also come at a pivotal moment in Israel's foreign relations: nuclear negotiations with Iran are approaching a decisive moment, Israeli-Palestinian relations are tense, and the Netanyahu and Obama administrations are squabbling. How important are these elections? What might the results mean for Israel's future, U.S.-Israeli relations, and Israel's foreign policy?

On March 11, the Center for Middle East Policy convened a panel of Brookings experts to preview Israel’s coming elections and their broader significance.

Audio

Transcript

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Wed, 11 Mar 2015 14:00:00 -0400http://7515766d70db9af98b83-7a8dffca7ab41e0acde077bdb93c9343.r43.cf1.rackcdn.com/150311_IsraeliElections_64K_itunes.mp3
Event Information
March 11, 2015
2:00 PM - 3:30 PM EDT
Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036 Register for the Event
Israelis go to the polls on March 17 to elect the 20th Knesset, and with it, a new government. The Israeli electorate is divided over national security, economics, and the public role of religion, and as many as 10 parties are expected to win seats in the next Knesset. The elections also come at a pivotal moment in Israel's foreign relations: nuclear negotiations with Iran are approaching a decisive moment, Israeli-Palestinian relations are tense, and the Netanyahu and Obama administrations are squabbling. How important are these elections? What might the results mean for Israel's future, U.S.-Israeli relations, and Israel's foreign policy?
On March 11, the Center for Middle East Policy convened a panel of Brookings experts to preview Israel's coming elections and their broader significance.
Join the conversation on Twitter using #IsraelElections
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- Israel’s upcoming elections: What to watch, what to expect
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- Israel’s upcoming elections: What to watch, what to expect
Transcript
- Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)
Event Materials
- natan_sachs_israeli_elections_slides- 20150311_israel_elections_transcript
Event Information
March 11, 2015
2:00 PM - 3:30 PM EDT
Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036 Register for the Event

Event Information

Israelis go to the polls on March 17 to elect the 20th Knesset, and with it, a new government. The Israeli electorate is divided over national security, economics, and the public role of religion, and as many as 10 parties are expected to win seats in the next Knesset. The elections also come at a pivotal moment in Israel's foreign relations: nuclear negotiations with Iran are approaching a decisive moment, Israeli-Palestinian relations are tense, and the Netanyahu and Obama administrations are squabbling. How important are these elections? What might the results mean for Israel's future, U.S.-Israeli relations, and Israel's foreign policy?

On March 11, the Center for Middle East Policy convened a panel of Brookings experts to preview Israel’s coming elections and their broader significance.

Audio

Transcript

Event Materials

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2015/03/10-congress-letter-iran-nuclear-deal?rssid=iran{618ED787-9F1E-47E8-BA92-A9E7F03ECE98}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/86751046/0/brookingsrss/topics/iran~Letters-to-the-ayatollah-the-sequel-The-Republican-letter-to-Irans-leaders-reflects-strategy-as-well-as-spiteLetters to the ayatollah, the sequel: The Republican letter to Iran's leaders reflects strategy as well as spite

In a new low for bipartisan consensus on U.S. foreign policy, 47 Republican senators have issued an “open letter” addressed to the Iranian leadership that is intended to sabotage prospects for a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran by cultivating doubt about the credibility and reliability of the American president. Although the letter has drawn wide reproach as a partisan tactic and a dangerous precedent, it might just accomplish what it was intended to do — reinforce the paranoia of the Iranian regime and scuttle long-awaited progress toward a negotiated resolution of the Iranian nuclear impasse.

The letter asserts the primacy of Congress — and, by extension, the Republicans — in determining the longevity of any nuclear agreement between Iran, the United States, and the five other world powers involved in the negotiations. “Anything not approved by Congress is a mere executive agreement,” the letter stresses, adding that “(t)he next president could invoke such an executive agreement with the stroke of a pen and future Congresses could modify the terms of an agreement at any time.” Just in case the message wasn’t clear, the letter emphasized that Obama would be out of office in a matter of months while “many of us [the 47 signatories] will remain in office well beyond then — perhaps decades.”

Criticism of the senators' letter to Tehran

The release of the letter provoked sharp criticism from the administration and well beyond. Obama accused the Republicans of aligning themselves with Iranian hard-liners against diplomacy and in favor of war; Vice President Joe Biden described the letter as “beneath the dignity of an institution I revere” and “highly misleading signal to friend and foe alike that that our Commander-in-Chief cannot deliver on America’s commitments-a message that is as false as it is dangerous.”

I want to agree, but unfortunately I’ve long since lost most of my optimism about Iran. Instead, I tend to believe the opposite dynamic is more likely: by exacerbating Tehran’s pre-existing skepticism about the durability of President Obama’s promises, the letter could spook the Iranian leadership. This in turn could prompt Tehran to demand a higher price for any concessions, to try to stack the deal with as much early sanctions relief as possible, and to begin making its own arrangements for an early expiration date on any commitments.

And that, of course, is precisely the point. My Twitter feed is filled with derision and chortles about a presumptive Republican misstep and the acumen of its organizer, Sen. Cotton. Senator Harry Reid (D-NV) accused Cotton and his cohort of attempting to undermine the president “purely out of spite.” Unfortunately, it’s worse than spite or stupidity; it’s a strategy, and it just might work.

Now the Republicans in the Senate, in an echo of statements made by each of the leading contenders for the GOP nomination for the 2016 ballot, have put it in writing: the Obama administration can make no binding promises and its domestic rivals will spare no effort to nullify any sanctions relief or other concessions made to Tehran in the course of a nuclear bargain. How do you think that will play with Iran's skeptical supreme leader?

The feedback loop between Cotton’s letter and Khamenei’s innate mistrust is brilliantly calculated. As Cotton said earlier this year, “The end of these negotiations isn't an unintended consequence of congressional action. It is very much an intended consequence.” In December, he promised that Congress would “put an end to these negotiations,” adding that “I think the adults in Congress need to step in early in the new year. And those are people in both parties."

Dan Drezner is right about path dependence in U.S. foreign policy; whatever the candidates may say today, even the most ambitious Republican president will find it difficult to simply walk away from a deal if it has been successfully implemented by both sides. As Dan points out, opinion polling suggests Americans favor a deal, and certainly prefer a negotiated resolution to another military conflict in the Middle East. Irrespective of campaign rhetoric, a new president will inevitably find it difficult “to sabotage an agreement that tamped down a major stressor in the region.”

Former Obama administration official Ilan Goldenberg explains the logistical complications of a mid-course switch, noting that “[b]y the time any president goes to Congress for final removal of the sanctions, an agreement will be so far along in implementation and the whole world will be so committed to the process that it will be very hard for any Congress to sabotage it.” And if you have any doubt about how the next president might approach Iran, just look at the track record; the history of U.S. policy toward Iran is marked by fierce campaign criticism and almost absolute uniformity in policies. (On that note, Obama can thank the second-term Bush administration for his own Iran strategy.)

Of course, the expectation of continuity is another reason for the urgency that prompted this seemingly reckless letter. The Republicans on the Hill recognize the potential resilience of a comprehensive accord, and they appreciate that it would be far easier, and far more advantageous in terms of their own public positioning, for Congress to sabotage negotiations than it would be to upend a done deal. The failure of talks can always be depicted as a predictable outcome to an uncertain engagement with a long-time adversary, whereas Congressional intervention after the fact will invoke the Colin Powell Pottery Barn rule: you break it, you own it. And despite the rhetoric, no one on the Hill really wants to own the unpalatable array of U.S. policy options that will be left in the absence of negotiations.

The Republicans’ gambit comes with some risk. The immediate reaction doesn’t appear to have boosted the Congress’ battered reputation, either at home or abroad. For their part, the Iranians are reveling in what appears to be another counterproductive family feud between the two U.S. political parties. Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif revived his mostly dormant Twitter account to parody Cotton’s patronizing tone, and it seems unlikely that the Republicans can salvage an advantage in the war for public perceptions over this latest wrinkle in the diplomacy.

Like the invitation to Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu to speak to the Congress, the ‘open letter’ may actually impede their effort to consolidate a veto-proof majority in favor of new avenues of pressuring Tehran, either through new sanctions or a push to assert Congressional oversight over any deal. But the prospect of maintaining sufficient Democratic support for either proposition was always a bit suspect.

Ultimately, the loss of the good opinion of a few Democrats is a small price to pay if the letter hits its real target. The most reliable opponent of a nuclear deal resides in Tehran, and it is entirely possible that the Republican letter has reinforced his aversion to compromise. Washington’s pundits may jeer, but I worry that Senator Cotton & co. may yet have the last laugh.

Authors

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Tue, 10 Mar 2015 09:13:00 -0400Suzanne Maloney
In a new low for bipartisan consensus on U.S. foreign policy, 47 Republican senators have issued an “open letter” addressed to the Iranian leadership that is intended to sabotage prospects for a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran by cultivating doubt about the credibility and reliability of the American president. Although the letter has drawn wide reproach as a partisan tactic and a dangerous precedent, it might just accomplish what it was intended to do — reinforce the paranoia of the Iranian regime and scuttle long-awaited progress toward a negotiated resolution of the Iranian nuclear impasse.
The letter asserts the primacy of Congress — and, by extension, the Republicans — in determining the longevity of any nuclear agreement between Iran, the United States, and the five other world powers involved in the negotiations. “Anything not approved by Congress is a mere executive agreement,” the letter stresses, adding that “(t)he next president could invoke such an executive agreement with the stroke of a pen and future Congresses could modify the terms of an agreement at any time.” Just in case the message wasn't clear, the letter emphasized that Obama would be out of office in a matter of months while “many of us [the 47 signatories] will remain in office well beyond then — perhaps decades.”
The letter was organized by freshman senator Tom Cotton (R-AR), a rising GOP star who only weeks ago sneered that Obama's own letters to Iranian leaders reminded him of “a lovestruck teenager.”
Criticism of the senators' letter to Tehran
The release of the letter provoked sharp criticism from the administration and well beyond. Obama accused the Republicans of aligning themselves with Iranian hard-liners against diplomacy and in favor of war; Vice President Joe Biden described the letter as “beneath the dignity of an institution I revere” and “highly misleading signal to friend and foe alike that that our Commander-in-Chief cannot deliver on America's commitments-a message that is as false as it is dangerous.”
The letter has also prompted howls of outrage and mockery on social media and among pundits, particularly after Harvard Law professor Jack Goldsmith, writing on the Brookings-affiliated blog Lawfare, pointed out the rather awkward inaccuracies in its characterization of the Constitutional prerogatives of the Congress with respect to treaty ratification. (See also Goldsmith's follow-up post for additional nuance and interpretation.)
Brookings non-resident senior fellow Dan Drezner, international relations professor and Washington Post blogger, envisages an optimistic scenario — that the letter's warning about the limited duration of President Obama's tenure might actually boomerang in the administration's favor, by persuading Tehran to get on board as quickly as possible with a deal.
I want to agree, but unfortunately I've long since lost most of my optimism about Iran. Instead, I tend to believe the opposite dynamic is more likely: by exacerbating Tehran's pre-existing skepticism about the durability of President Obama's promises, the letter could spook the Iranian leadership. This in turn could prompt Tehran to demand a higher price for any concessions, to try to stack the deal with as much early sanctions relief as possible, and to begin making its own arrangements for an early expiration date on any commitments.
And that, of course, is precisely the point. My Twitter feed is filled with derision and chortles about a presumptive Republican misstep and the acumen of its organizer, Sen. Cotton. Senator Harry Reid (D-NV) accused Cotton and his cohort of attempting to undermine the president “purely out of spite.” Unfortunately, it's worse than spite or stupidity; it's a strategy, and it just might work.
Spectacular misstep or savvy strategy?
Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali ...
In a new low for bipartisan consensus on U.S. foreign policy, 47 Republican senators have issued an “open letter” addressed to the Iranian leadership that is intended to sabotage prospects for a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran by ...

In a new low for bipartisan consensus on U.S. foreign policy, 47 Republican senators have issued an “open letter” addressed to the Iranian leadership that is intended to sabotage prospects for a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran by cultivating doubt about the credibility and reliability of the American president. Although the letter has drawn wide reproach as a partisan tactic and a dangerous precedent, it might just accomplish what it was intended to do — reinforce the paranoia of the Iranian regime and scuttle long-awaited progress toward a negotiated resolution of the Iranian nuclear impasse.

The letter asserts the primacy of Congress — and, by extension, the Republicans — in determining the longevity of any nuclear agreement between Iran, the United States, and the five other world powers involved in the negotiations. “Anything not approved by Congress is a mere executive agreement,” the letter stresses, adding that “(t)he next president could invoke such an executive agreement with the stroke of a pen and future Congresses could modify the terms of an agreement at any time.” Just in case the message wasn’t clear, the letter emphasized that Obama would be out of office in a matter of months while “many of us [the 47 signatories] will remain in office well beyond then — perhaps decades.”

Criticism of the senators' letter to Tehran

The release of the letter provoked sharp criticism from the administration and well beyond. Obama accused the Republicans of aligning themselves with Iranian hard-liners against diplomacy and in favor of war; Vice President Joe Biden described the letter as “beneath the dignity of an institution I revere” and “highly misleading signal to friend and foe alike that that our Commander-in-Chief cannot deliver on America’s commitments-a message that is as false as it is dangerous.”

I want to agree, but unfortunately I’ve long since lost most of my optimism about Iran. Instead, I tend to believe the opposite dynamic is more likely: by exacerbating Tehran’s pre-existing skepticism about the durability of President Obama’s promises, the letter could spook the Iranian leadership. This in turn could prompt Tehran to demand a higher price for any concessions, to try to stack the deal with as much early sanctions relief as possible, and to begin making its own arrangements for an early expiration date on any commitments.

And that, of course, is precisely the point. My Twitter feed is filled with derision and chortles about a presumptive Republican misstep and the acumen of its organizer, Sen. Cotton. Senator Harry Reid (D-NV) accused Cotton and his cohort of attempting to undermine the president “purely out of spite.” Unfortunately, it’s worse than spite or stupidity; it’s a strategy, and it just might work.

Now the Republicans in the Senate, in an echo of statements made by each of the leading contenders for the GOP nomination for the 2016 ballot, have put it in writing: the Obama administration can make no binding promises and its domestic rivals will spare no effort to nullify any sanctions relief or other concessions made to Tehran in the course of a nuclear bargain. How do you think that will play with Iran's skeptical supreme leader?

The feedback loop between Cotton’s letter and Khamenei’s innate mistrust is brilliantly calculated. As Cotton said earlier this year, “The end of these negotiations isn't an unintended consequence of congressional action. It is very much an intended consequence.” In December, he promised that Congress would “put an end to these negotiations,” adding that “I think the adults in Congress need to step in early in the new year. And those are people in both parties."

Dan Drezner is right about path dependence in U.S. foreign policy; whatever the candidates may say today, even the most ambitious Republican president will find it difficult to simply walk away from a deal if it has been successfully implemented by both sides. As Dan points out, opinion polling suggests Americans favor a deal, and certainly prefer a negotiated resolution to another military conflict in the Middle East. Irrespective of campaign rhetoric, a new president will inevitably find it difficult “to sabotage an agreement that tamped down a major stressor in the region.”

Former Obama administration official Ilan Goldenberg explains the logistical complications of a mid-course switch, noting that “[b]y the time any president goes to Congress for final removal of the sanctions, an agreement will be so far along in implementation and the whole world will be so committed to the process that it will be very hard for any Congress to sabotage it.” And if you have any doubt about how the next president might approach Iran, just look at the track record; the history of U.S. policy toward Iran is marked by fierce campaign criticism and almost absolute uniformity in policies. (On that note, Obama can thank the second-term Bush administration for his own Iran strategy.)

Of course, the expectation of continuity is another reason for the urgency that prompted this seemingly reckless letter. The Republicans on the Hill recognize the potential resilience of a comprehensive accord, and they appreciate that it would be far easier, and far more advantageous in terms of their own public positioning, for Congress to sabotage negotiations than it would be to upend a done deal. The failure of talks can always be depicted as a predictable outcome to an uncertain engagement with a long-time adversary, whereas Congressional intervention after the fact will invoke the Colin Powell Pottery Barn rule: you break it, you own it. And despite the rhetoric, no one on the Hill really wants to own the unpalatable array of U.S. policy options that will be left in the absence of negotiations.

The Republicans’ gambit comes with some risk. The immediate reaction doesn’t appear to have boosted the Congress’ battered reputation, either at home or abroad. For their part, the Iranians are reveling in what appears to be another counterproductive family feud between the two U.S. political parties. Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif revived his mostly dormant Twitter account to parody Cotton’s patronizing tone, and it seems unlikely that the Republicans can salvage an advantage in the war for public perceptions over this latest wrinkle in the diplomacy.

Like the invitation to Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu to speak to the Congress, the ‘open letter’ may actually impede their effort to consolidate a veto-proof majority in favor of new avenues of pressuring Tehran, either through new sanctions or a push to assert Congressional oversight over any deal. But the prospect of maintaining sufficient Democratic support for either proposition was always a bit suspect.

Ultimately, the loss of the good opinion of a few Democrats is a small price to pay if the letter hits its real target. The most reliable opponent of a nuclear deal resides in Tehran, and it is entirely possible that the Republican letter has reinforced his aversion to compromise. Washington’s pundits may jeer, but I worry that Senator Cotton & co. may yet have the last laugh.

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2015/03/08-israel-iran-nuclear-netanyahu?rssid=iran{44A62481-7A81-41CF-8255-30E9DF6917D7}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/86629139/0/brookingsrss/topics/iran~False-flag-the-bogus-uproar-over-Irans-nuclear-sunsetFalse flag: the bogus uproar over Iran's nuclear sunsetSince the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) was reached in November 2013, critics have focused on a variety of its alleged deficiencies. But, perhaps no element of the JPOA has received as much scorn as its last line: “Following successful implementation of the final step of the comprehensive solution for its full duration, the Iranian nuclear programme will be treated in the same manner as that of any non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT.”

Prime Minister Netanyahu, in his barn-burning speech to a Joint Session of Congress on March 3, named this “sunset provision” as one of the reasons that the comprehensive solution still being negotiated is a “a very bad deal.” He noted that the notional concept of a decade of restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program was “a blink of an eye in the life of a nation... [and] a blink of an eye in the life of our children.” He argued that, taken in combination with insufficient restrictions for that 10 year period, the deal under consideration would “pave Iran’s path to the bomb.” Instead, he argued the United States should insist the restrictions remain in place until Iran has stopped “its aggression against its neighbors in the Middle East”; stopped “supporting terrorism around the world;” and stopped “threatening to annihilate my country, Israel.”

Netanyahu’s speech builds on a long line of commentary that has decried the theory of a sunset provision as dangerous and naive. Some have even argued that the idea of a “sunset provision” is reason enough to end talks and redouble U.S. sanctions efforts until a “zero enrichment” option becomes achievable.

Given the level of criticism, one might think the sunset provision the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, coordinated by the European Union) agreed to with Iran was unprecedented. Alas, you'd be mistaken. Indeed, sunset provisions are a common feature of international arms control and even Congressional legislation. In fact, even in the case of Iran's nuclear program, the idea of establishing a sunset period for restrictions isn’t new, having first emerged as an element of U.S. policy under President Bush in 2006.

For years, Iran has made it clear that any future nuclear restrictions it agrees to will have to be limited and time-bound. Although the issue of a sunset provision has become a cause celebre, the real issue is that there is considerable misunderstanding of what a realistic deal would require the international community to accept and how a sunset provision could be structured.

Sunsets are common practice

Commentators skewering the administration over this provision know full well that “sunset clauses” are quite common in international diplomacy and even in sensible Congressional legislation. This is not surprising because it is difficult to conceive of a voluntary arrangement reached in which one country gives up, in perpetuity, its ability to engage in an activity. Thus, sunset clauses have been a common trait of U.S diplomacy especially arms control agreements.

For example, the Treaty between the United States and Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions of 2002 (also known as the Moscow Treaty) contained an explicit, 10 year sunset provision in Article IV, permitting continued extensions but not requiring them. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and its successor, New START, contained similar provisions. The first START was set to expire after 15 years (and, in fact, did) and New START is expected to expire in 2020, unless it is extended. Both treaties also contain withdrawal provisions.

Even the NPT itself is not as cast iron as some may believe: the original treaty was set to expire after 25 years and was only extended indefinitely in 1995, after much debate on its effectiveness, fairness, and overall role. Each of these treaties also contained withdrawal clauses of varying time lengths, permitting the participants to exercise a national sovereign right to escape from their commitments as they may deem necessary (though, in the case of the NPT, parties are required to notify the UN Security Council of their withdrawals in recognition of the significance of such a step). It’s worth nothing that all four of these treaties— three of which involve nuclear weapons pointing at the United States— have been ratified by the U.S. Congress.

Other critics have argued that Iran is getting a better deal than even some U.S. partners. This argument goes that Iran, by virtue of its longstanding violations of its international obligation, ought to be held to a higher standard than, for example, the United Arab Emirates, which agreed to refrain from enrichment in concluding its Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (123 Agreement) with the United States in 2009. But, here too, the UAE’s commitment was limited to 30 years, at which point the UAE would be permitted to engage in any nuclear activity that it desires, regardless of its present obligations, if it chose to walk away from the 123 Agreement with the United States. Further, the UAE requested— and received— confirmation that its obligations under the 123 Agreement, including this voluntary commitment, could be reviewed at its request at any time and that the Agreement itself could be terminated. There would be costs, certainly, to the U.S.-UAE relationship and material costs because the United States would retain rights to reclaim nuclear material and technology transferred under the 123 Agreement. However, the UAE’s agreement was to refrain from enrichment for a period of time, not forever.

Congress, too, has seen fit to impose sunsets on a variety of U.S. laws, including those dealing with U.S. national security. The PATRIOT Act, for example, has a variety of provisions that were extended in 2011 but expire in 2015 unless further action is taken by Congress. One of the sharpest critics of a sunset provision in the Iran deal—the Washington Post Editorial Board— featured an article in 2012 that extolled the virtues of sunset provisions and lamented Congressional efforts to “hit the snooze button” to extend laws that might otherwise be appropriate to retire. Even in the case of Iran, sunset provisions have been used in legislation: the Iran Sanctions Act, for example, was supposed to expire multiple times since its first passage in 1996 as the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. It is currently set to expire in December 2016.

The Case of Iran

As noted above, the heretical idea of an Iran nuclear sunset did not start with the Obama administration in 2013. The United States has long understood that a nuclear deal Iran agrees to would only place temporary restriction on its nuclear program. Indeed, the JPOA’s very language is drawn from the Bush-era P5+1 package of May 2008, which stated: “China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union High Representative state their readiness: ...to treat Iran’s nuclear programme in the same manner as that of any Non-nuclear Weapon State Party to the NPT once international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme is restored.”

The first P5+1 offer to Iran in June 2006 contained similar language, referring to a future review of the “moratorium” Iran was to undertake with its enrichment and reprocessing activities. The P5+1 said: “The long-term agreement would, with regard to common efforts to build international confidence, include a clause for review of the agreement in all its aspects, to follow: [1] confirmation by the IAEA that all outstanding issues and concerns reported by the IAEA, including those activities which could have a military nuclear dimension, have been resolved; and [2] confirmation that there are no undeclared nuclear activities or materials in Iran and that international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's civil nuclear programme has been restored.” This was further reflected in UNSCR 1737, which mandated a suspension of Iran’s enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water-related activities, but also noted that upon Iran’s compliance with its UNSC obligations and resolution of all concerns with Iran’s nuclear program, the sanctions on Iran’s nuclear program would be terminated.

How would a sunset provision work

Having established that sunset provisions are common enough in international diplomacy and that the United States bought into the concept of one to cover the Iranian nuclear program as early as 2006, the real issue becomes whether the sunset concept being negotiated now is adequate protection against a future Iranian move to acquire nuclear weapons.

It is possible to discern a few of the administration’s concepts for the sunset of a nuclear deal with Iran from public comments, thereby respecting the sanctity of the negotiating room.

1.It would only come after a long period of nuclear restrictions and intrusive inspections. These restrictions would hold Iran at least a year away from being able to produce enough weapons-grade nuclear material for one bomb and the inspections would ensure that the United States, or its partners, could use that entire length of time to respond to a breakout attempt.

2. Iran would agree to fully implement its IAEA Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol, which in combination provide inspectors with access to all declared nuclear facilities as well as any suspected undeclared facilities. Iran would have the obligation to cooperate with the IAEA in this way in perpetuity, meaning that even after the sunset period expires there will be far more intrusive inspections of Iran’s nuclear program than there were before the JPOA was signed. This is a crucial issue and one many of the critics of a nuclear deal with Iran seem confused about. For example, a recent op-ed in the Washington Post claimed that after the sunset period is over, there will “no legal limits on Iran's nuclear ambitions.” This is factually inaccurate.

3. During the period of the agreement, Iran would permit even more intrusive inspections than what these agreements with the IAEA would normally allow (and, if press reports are accurate, intrusive inspections could continue for a period after physical restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program end). Of course, it is also notable that the United States continues to seek a strengthened international nonproliferation system— including through IAEA inspections— and that Iran would be expected to fulfill the normal requirements of any IAEA-inspected country, whatever those may be, at the time a deal formally concludes.

Iran would be treated like any other NPT state party in compliance with its international obligations after the term of the agreement formally ends. Nowhere has the United States agreed that Iran would be immunized forever more from international scrutiny after a deal eventually ends. Should Iran attempt to move to nuclear weapons after that time, it would be acting in contravention of its NPT obligations. Among other things, this would permit the United States and its partners to respond with a range of options, up to and including the use of military force. A sunset would therefore cut both ways for Iran, creating a possibility for Iran to test the fences again in pursuit of a nuclear option, but only with the potential for future costs and risks that any Iranian leader would have to respect.

So what’s the real problem

The previous examples all demonstrate that “sunsetting” is not a problem, either conceptually or specifically with Iran, and that it is an appropriate, standard, and reasonable way to address a long-term national security issue.

Most people currently taking issue with the sunset clause are really just opposed to any deal with Iran. Prime Minister Netanyahu’s comments this week were instructive in this regard. His address to Congress suggested that a sunset is not a problem in and of itself but rather that it becomes one because of the nature of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its foreign policy. As such, he argued that the United States should use negotiations to secure Iranian commitments that are antithetical to the broader Iranian foreign policy approach. Repugnant as many aspects of Iranian foreign policy are, this is still no guide to a negotiation with representatives of the Iranian government. By demanding that these issues be resolved in negotiations, Netanyahu is— in effect —arguing that, unless Iran promises regime change in the future, there can be no deal.

With this in mind, the issue of the duration of the restrictions and their scope ironically become less important. Indeed, Prime Minister Netanyahu’s observation that a decade is not enough time for a generational change in Iran is probably accurate. As the administration has repeatedly stressed, the key question is not when we can trust Iran, but when we can verify that it is not doing what it should not be doing. This is something that can be measured, assessed, and reported by international inspectors...but only if they are permitted to implement the deal now being negotiated.

Conclusion

As a long-time antagonist of the Iranian nuclear program, it is not easy to contemplate a future in which Iran’s nuclear program is free from constraints beyond those of any other NPT state party. Iran’s history of obfuscation and willful defiance of its international nuclear obligations for 30 years are difficult to get past, especially when considering Iran’s many other activities that are antithetical to U.S. interests and a common sense of decency.

However, the simple reality is that Iran will not accept a deal in which it is a second-class NPT citizen forever and insisting upon it would spell the end of the negotiating process. The sunset provision that the negotiators have in mind would address U.S. national security requirements as well as protect the interests of our allies and partners. We should not jeopardize a sufficient solution for an unachievable ideal one.

Authors

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Sun, 08 Mar 2015 08:00:00 -0400Richard Nephew
Since the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) was reached in November 2013, critics have focused on a variety of its alleged deficiencies. But, perhaps no element of the JPOA has received as much scorn as its last line: “Following successful implementation of the final step of the comprehensive solution for its full duration, the Iranian nuclear programme will be treated in the same manner as that of any non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT.”
Prime Minister Netanyahu, in his barn-burning speech to a Joint Session of Congress on March 3, named this “sunset provision” as one of the reasons that the comprehensive solution still being negotiated is a “a very bad deal.” He noted that the notional concept of a decade of restrictions on Iran's nuclear program was “a blink of an eye in the life of a nation... [and] a blink of an eye in the life of our children.” He argued that, taken in combination with insufficient restrictions for that 10 year period, the deal under consideration would “pave Iran's path to the bomb.” Instead, he argued the United States should insist the restrictions remain in place until Iran has stopped “its aggression against its neighbors in the Middle East”; stopped “supporting terrorism around the world;” and stopped “threatening to annihilate my country, Israel.”
Netanyahu's speech builds on a long line of commentary that has decried the theory of a sunset provision as dangerous and naive. Some have even argued that the idea of a “sunset provision” is reason enough to end talks and redouble U.S. sanctions efforts until a “zero enrichment” option becomes achievable.
Given the level of criticism, one might think the sunset provision the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, coordinated by the European Union) agreed to with Iran was unprecedented. Alas, you'd be mistaken. Indeed, sunset provisions are a common feature of international arms control and even Congressional legislation. In fact, even in the case of Iran's nuclear program, the idea of establishing a sunset period for restrictions isn't new, having first emerged as an element of U.S. policy under President Bush in 2006.
For years, Iran has made it clear that any future nuclear restrictions it agrees to will have to be limited and time-bound. Although the issue of a sunset provision has become a cause celebre, the real issue is that there is considerable misunderstanding of what a realistic deal would require the international community to accept and how a sunset provision could be structured.
Sunsets are common practice
Commentators skewering the administration over this provision know full well that “sunset clauses” are quite common in international diplomacy and even in sensible Congressional legislation. This is not surprising because it is difficult to conceive of a voluntary arrangement reached in which one country gives up, in perpetuity, its ability to engage in an activity. Thus, sunset clauses have been a common trait of U.S diplomacy especially arms control agreements.
For example, the Treaty between the United States and Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions of 2002 (also known as the Moscow Treaty) contained an explicit, 10 year sunset provision in Article IV, permitting continued extensions but not requiring them. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and its successor, New START, contained similar provisions. The first START was set to expire after 15 years (and, in fact, did) and New START is expected to expire in 2020, unless it is extended. Both treaties also contain withdrawal provisions.
Even the NPT itself is not as cast iron as some may believe: the original treaty was set to expire after 25 years and was only extended indefinitely in 1995, after much debate on its effectiveness, fairness, and overall role. Each ... Since the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) was reached in November 2013, critics have focused on a variety of its alleged deficiencies. But, perhaps no element of the JPOA has received as much scorn as its last line: “Following successful ... Since the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) was reached in November 2013, critics have focused on a variety of its alleged deficiencies. But, perhaps no element of the JPOA has received as much scorn as its last line: “Following successful implementation of the final step of the comprehensive solution for its full duration, the Iranian nuclear programme will be treated in the same manner as that of any non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT.”

Prime Minister Netanyahu, in his barn-burning speech to a Joint Session of Congress on March 3, named this “sunset provision” as one of the reasons that the comprehensive solution still being negotiated is a “a very bad deal.” He noted that the notional concept of a decade of restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program was “a blink of an eye in the life of a nation... [and] a blink of an eye in the life of our children.” He argued that, taken in combination with insufficient restrictions for that 10 year period, the deal under consideration would “pave Iran’s path to the bomb.” Instead, he argued the United States should insist the restrictions remain in place until Iran has stopped “its aggression against its neighbors in the Middle East”; stopped “supporting terrorism around the world;” and stopped “threatening to annihilate my country, Israel.”

Netanyahu’s speech builds on a long line of commentary that has decried the theory of a sunset provision as dangerous and naive. Some have even argued that the idea of a “sunset provision” is reason enough to end talks and redouble U.S. sanctions efforts until a “zero enrichment” option becomes achievable.

Given the level of criticism, one might think the sunset provision the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, coordinated by the European Union) agreed to with Iran was unprecedented. Alas, you'd be mistaken. Indeed, sunset provisions are a common feature of international arms control and even Congressional legislation. In fact, even in the case of Iran's nuclear program, the idea of establishing a sunset period for restrictions isn’t new, having first emerged as an element of U.S. policy under President Bush in 2006.

For years, Iran has made it clear that any future nuclear restrictions it agrees to will have to be limited and time-bound. Although the issue of a sunset provision has become a cause celebre, the real issue is that there is considerable misunderstanding of what a realistic deal would require the international community to accept and how a sunset provision could be structured.

Sunsets are common practice

Commentators skewering the administration over this provision know full well that “sunset clauses” are quite common in international diplomacy and even in sensible Congressional legislation. This is not surprising because it is difficult to conceive of a voluntary arrangement reached in which one country gives up, in perpetuity, its ability to engage in an activity. Thus, sunset clauses have been a common trait of U.S diplomacy especially arms control agreements.

For example, the Treaty between the United States and Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions of 2002 (also known as the Moscow Treaty) contained an explicit, 10 year sunset provision in Article IV, permitting continued extensions but not requiring them. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and its successor, New START, contained similar provisions. The first START was set to expire after 15 years (and, in fact, did) and New START is expected to expire in 2020, unless it is extended. Both treaties also contain withdrawal provisions.

Even the NPT itself is not as cast iron as some may believe: the original treaty was set to expire after 25 years and was only extended indefinitely in 1995, after much debate on its effectiveness, fairness, and overall role. Each of these treaties also contained withdrawal clauses of varying time lengths, permitting the participants to exercise a national sovereign right to escape from their commitments as they may deem necessary (though, in the case of the NPT, parties are required to notify the UN Security Council of their withdrawals in recognition of the significance of such a step). It’s worth nothing that all four of these treaties— three of which involve nuclear weapons pointing at the United States— have been ratified by the U.S. Congress.

Other critics have argued that Iran is getting a better deal than even some U.S. partners. This argument goes that Iran, by virtue of its longstanding violations of its international obligation, ought to be held to a higher standard than, for example, the United Arab Emirates, which agreed to refrain from enrichment in concluding its Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (123 Agreement) with the United States in 2009. But, here too, the UAE’s commitment was limited to 30 years, at which point the UAE would be permitted to engage in any nuclear activity that it desires, regardless of its present obligations, if it chose to walk away from the 123 Agreement with the United States. Further, the UAE requested— and received— confirmation that its obligations under the 123 Agreement, including this voluntary commitment, could be reviewed at its request at any time and that the Agreement itself could be terminated. There would be costs, certainly, to the U.S.-UAE relationship and material costs because the United States would retain rights to reclaim nuclear material and technology transferred under the 123 Agreement. However, the UAE’s agreement was to refrain from enrichment for a period of time, not forever.

Congress, too, has seen fit to impose sunsets on a variety of U.S. laws, including those dealing with U.S. national security. The PATRIOT Act, for example, has a variety of provisions that were extended in 2011 but expire in 2015 unless further action is taken by Congress. One of the sharpest critics of a sunset provision in the Iran deal—the Washington Post Editorial Board— featured an article in 2012 that extolled the virtues of sunset provisions and lamented Congressional efforts to “hit the snooze button” to extend laws that might otherwise be appropriate to retire. Even in the case of Iran, sunset provisions have been used in legislation: the Iran Sanctions Act, for example, was supposed to expire multiple times since its first passage in 1996 as the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. It is currently set to expire in December 2016.

The Case of Iran

As noted above, the heretical idea of an Iran nuclear sunset did not start with the Obama administration in 2013. The United States has long understood that a nuclear deal Iran agrees to would only place temporary restriction on its nuclear program. Indeed, the JPOA’s very language is drawn from the Bush-era P5+1 package of May 2008, which stated: “China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union High Representative state their readiness: ...to treat Iran’s nuclear programme in the same manner as that of any Non-nuclear Weapon State Party to the NPT once international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme is restored.”

The first P5+1 offer to Iran in June 2006 contained similar language, referring to a future review of the “moratorium” Iran was to undertake with its enrichment and reprocessing activities. The P5+1 said: “The long-term agreement would, with regard to common efforts to build international confidence, include a clause for review of the agreement in all its aspects, to follow: [1] confirmation by the IAEA that all outstanding issues and concerns reported by the IAEA, including those activities which could have a military nuclear dimension, have been resolved; and [2] confirmation that there are no undeclared nuclear activities or materials in Iran and that international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's civil nuclear programme has been restored.” This was further reflected in UNSCR 1737, which mandated a suspension of Iran’s enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water-related activities, but also noted that upon Iran’s compliance with its UNSC obligations and resolution of all concerns with Iran’s nuclear program, the sanctions on Iran’s nuclear program would be terminated.

How would a sunset provision work

Having established that sunset provisions are common enough in international diplomacy and that the United States bought into the concept of one to cover the Iranian nuclear program as early as 2006, the real issue becomes whether the sunset concept being negotiated now is adequate protection against a future Iranian move to acquire nuclear weapons.

It is possible to discern a few of the administration’s concepts for the sunset of a nuclear deal with Iran from public comments, thereby respecting the sanctity of the negotiating room.

1.It would only come after a long period of nuclear restrictions and intrusive inspections. These restrictions would hold Iran at least a year away from being able to produce enough weapons-grade nuclear material for one bomb and the inspections would ensure that the United States, or its partners, could use that entire length of time to respond to a breakout attempt.

2. Iran would agree to fully implement its IAEA Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol, which in combination provide inspectors with access to all declared nuclear facilities as well as any suspected undeclared facilities. Iran would have the obligation to cooperate with the IAEA in this way in perpetuity, meaning that even after the sunset period expires there will be far more intrusive inspections of Iran’s nuclear program than there were before the JPOA was signed. This is a crucial issue and one many of the critics of a nuclear deal with Iran seem confused about. For example, a recent op-ed in the Washington Post claimed that after the sunset period is over, there will “no legal limits on Iran's nuclear ambitions.” This is factually inaccurate.

3. During the period of the agreement, Iran would permit even more intrusive inspections than what these agreements with the IAEA would normally allow (and, if press reports are accurate, intrusive inspections could continue for a period after physical restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program end). Of course, it is also notable that the United States continues to seek a strengthened international nonproliferation system— including through IAEA inspections— and that Iran would be expected to fulfill the normal requirements of any IAEA-inspected country, whatever those may be, at the time a deal formally concludes.

Iran would be treated like any other NPT state party in compliance with its international obligations after the term of the agreement formally ends. Nowhere has the United States agreed that Iran would be immunized forever more from international scrutiny after a deal eventually ends. Should Iran attempt to move to nuclear weapons after that time, it would be acting in contravention of its NPT obligations. Among other things, this would permit the United States and its partners to respond with a range of options, up to and including the use of military force. A sunset would therefore cut both ways for Iran, creating a possibility for Iran to test the fences again in pursuit of a nuclear option, but only with the potential for future costs and risks that any Iranian leader would have to respect.

So what’s the real problem

The previous examples all demonstrate that “sunsetting” is not a problem, either conceptually or specifically with Iran, and that it is an appropriate, standard, and reasonable way to address a long-term national security issue.

Most people currently taking issue with the sunset clause are really just opposed to any deal with Iran. Prime Minister Netanyahu’s comments this week were instructive in this regard. His address to Congress suggested that a sunset is not a problem in and of itself but rather that it becomes one because of the nature of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its foreign policy. As such, he argued that the United States should use negotiations to secure Iranian commitments that are antithetical to the broader Iranian foreign policy approach. Repugnant as many aspects of Iranian foreign policy are, this is still no guide to a negotiation with representatives of the Iranian government. By demanding that these issues be resolved in negotiations, Netanyahu is— in effect —arguing that, unless Iran promises regime change in the future, there can be no deal.

With this in mind, the issue of the duration of the restrictions and their scope ironically become less important. Indeed, Prime Minister Netanyahu’s observation that a decade is not enough time for a generational change in Iran is probably accurate. As the administration has repeatedly stressed, the key question is not when we can trust Iran, but when we can verify that it is not doing what it should not be doing. This is something that can be measured, assessed, and reported by international inspectors...but only if they are permitted to implement the deal now being negotiated.

Conclusion

As a long-time antagonist of the Iranian nuclear program, it is not easy to contemplate a future in which Iran’s nuclear program is free from constraints beyond those of any other NPT state party. Iran’s history of obfuscation and willful defiance of its international nuclear obligations for 30 years are difficult to get past, especially when considering Iran’s many other activities that are antithetical to U.S. interests and a common sense of decency.

However, the simple reality is that Iran will not accept a deal in which it is a second-class NPT citizen forever and insisting upon it would spell the end of the negotiating process. The sunset provision that the negotiators have in mind would address U.S. national security requirements as well as protect the interests of our allies and partners. We should not jeopardize a sufficient solution for an unachievable ideal one.

Israeli reaction to Netanyahu’s speech to Congress

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s address to Congress last Tuesday drew mixed response from Israeli politicians and journalists that primarily broke down along partisan lines. Several members of the security establishmentissued particularly vocal critiques, including Meir Dagan, former chief of the Mossad. At a campaign event shortly after Netanyahu’s speech, Labor’s chairman Isaac (“Bougie”) Herzog told a crowd of supporters that “The painful truth is that after the applause, Netanyahu was left alone. Israel was left isolated. And the negotiations with Iran will continue without Israeli participation.”

Others, including Naftali Bennett, chairman of the Jewish Home Party and the only party leader to travel to Washington with Netanyahu last week, praised the speech, saying that he “gives his full backing to the prime minister,” and that the opposition acted “totally irresponsibly” in response to the speech. Previously Bennett urged Israeli leaders to put politics aside and present a united front in Washington for the prime minister’s address.

Prime Minister Netanyahu responded to the criticism of his speech—from both the Obama administration and from Israelis—asserting that he did offer a viable alternative to terms of the nuclear deal he believes is being negotiated in Geneva.

Coalition rumor mill

Last Sunday, Yesh Atid Chairman Yair Lapid announced that his party will not join any government that intends to repeal the Haredi draft law, stating that “It is a holy principle that all citizens of the country have the same rights. We will not allow this equality of the burden to be overthrown or shot down.” On Monday Lapid, in a blow to Herzog and the Zionist Union, backtracked on an earlier promise, and announced that Yesh Atid was no longer committed to recommending that the leader of the largest faction form the next government.

Raja Zaatry, spokesman for the Joint Arab List, ruled out joining a left-wing government led by Herzog. In an interview with the Jerusalem Post Monday, Zaatry said that the Joint List “cannot be a part of a government that still occupies our people,” adding that the party would work with Herzog to block Netanyahu from forming the next government.

At a Tel Aviv rally on Tuesday, Shas chairman Aryeh Deri endorsed Netanyahu. Speaking to a 10,000-strong crowd of supporters, Deri proclaimed “We are with you Benjamin Netanyahu. . . We want you as prime minister, but we want you as Bibi-Begin not Bibi-Lapid.”

On Wednesday, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas endorsed the Joint Arab List, stating that “This is not interference [in domestic Israeli politics] . . . it is our right as members of the same nation to [endorse] them.”

On Thursday, Haaretz reported that Moshe Kahlon, founder and chairman of Kulanu, rejected an offer from Yair Lapid for a post-election alliance between the two parties.

In an interview with Army Radio on Wednesday, Defense Minister Moshe (Bogie) Ya’alon said the Likud had not ruled out forming a coalition with the Zionist Union, but stated that the party would not agree to a prime ministerial rotation. In response, Jewish Home Chairman Naftali Bennett warned “Likud wants to establish a government with Buji and Tzipi, and not with [the] Jewish home.” On Thursday, Likud clarified its position, maintaining that there would be no unity government and that, “Prime Minister [Benjamin] Netanyahu will turn to his natural partners, led by Jewish Home, to establish a national government . . .” Earlier in the week, in an interview with the Haredi Radio Kol Hai, Netanyahu announced his intention to bring the Haredi parties into the next coalition, and pledged to change the Haredi draft law in the next government.

Socioeconomic issues take center stage

Following the release of the State Comptroller’s report on Israel’s housing crisis, last Sunday several hundred activists returned to Rothschild Boulevard in Tel Aviv, with protest tents. In an effort to revive protests that swept Israel during the summer of 2011, the organizers said this latest protest was intended to keep the election focused on economic issues.

Yesh Atid and Shas both unveiled economic platforms last week, proposing a series of sweeping reforms. Shas’s platform called for significant changes to the income tax policy, as well as raising the minimum wage. Yesh Atid’s platform introduced an anti-poverty plan that called for increasing the salaries of soldiers performing mandatory service. Last month, the party released a separate platform to address Israel’s housing crisis.

Last Tuesday evening, Israeli television broadcastthe first round of campaign commercials. Many focused on socioeconomic issues. In an appeal to secular Israelis, the Haredi party United Torah Judaism released an ad focusing on the Israeli health care system that included women, a first for the party’s commercials. Kulanu released a new campaign video on Tuesday, criticizing Likud for abandoning Israel’s working class and portraying Moshe Kahlon as advancing former Prime Minister Menachem Begin’s legacy of social welfare reform.

Foreign policy

Yesterday, around 40,000 gathered in Tel Aviv in an anti-Netanyahu rally demanding a change in leadership. Former Mossad chief Meir Dagan, a long-time critic of the prime minister, was the keynote speaker, and levied harsh criticism against Netanyahu for his management of the Iranian nuclear threat, the U.S.-Israel relationship, and of last summer’s war with Hamas.

On Friday, a document was leaked claiming that Netanyahu has offered significant concessions to the Palestinians in August 2013. Bennett warned that “The masquerade is over. The next disengagement is already here, and is being led by Likud and by Tzipi Livni,” According to Bennett, “the 2015 elections have become a referendum on forming a Palestine in the ’67 borders,” and that “Without a large Bayit Yehudi [in the next government] this disaster will happen. There will be no one to stop it.”

In an Associated Press interview, Yair Lapid emphasized that Israel’s economy and its diplomatic standing are inextricably linked. He advocated improving the Israeli economy by pursuing a peace agreement with the Palestinians that is part of a broader deal with the Arab world.

On Wednesday, around 3,000 Jewish and Arab women from across Israel gathered in Jerusalem in a protest organized by the grassroots organization Women Wage Peace. The group formed a chain around the Knesset called on Israel’s leaders to make peace negotiations a priority in the next government.

Other campaign news

In a Jerusalem Post interview with the Jerusalem Post, Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman spoke of his desire to change Israel’s electoral system, “I think it’s the problem of our country…Every two years since we established the State of Israel, we have a new government. It’s really a crazy situation. It’s impossible to handle all the challenges if you change your government every two years.”

A group of Ultra-Orthodox activists protested right-wing activist Baruch Marzel’s merger with Eli Yishai’s Yachad Party, warning of the spread of “Kahanist ideology within the ultra-orthodox community,” and further increase tensions between Israeli Arabs and Jews.

Avigdor Lieberman’s Yisrael Beiteinu Party is facing a lawsuit over an election ad. The ad wrongly depicted Mohammed Abed, an Arab-Israeli lawyer, as a perpetrator in the 2002 terrorist attack at the Park Hotel in Netanya, that left 30 people killed and dozens injured. Last week Abed filed a police report against Lieberman, and a civil suit against the party.

Authors

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Sun, 08 Mar 2015 20:12:00 -0400Lauren Mellinger
Israeli reaction to Netanyahu's speech to Congress
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's address to Congress last Tuesday drew mixed response from Israeli politicians and journalists that primarily broke down along partisan lines. Several members of the security establishment issued particularly vocal critiques, including Meir Dagan, former chief of the Mossad. At a campaign event shortly after Netanyahu's speech, Labor's chairman Isaac (“Bougie”) Herzog told a crowd of supporters that “The painful truth is that after the applause, Netanyahu was left alone. Israel was left isolated. And the negotiations with Iran will continue without Israeli participation.”
Others, including Naftali Bennett, chairman of the Jewish Home Party and the only party leader to travel to Washington with Netanyahu last week, praised the speech, saying that he “gives his full backing to the prime minister,” and that the opposition acted “totally irresponsibly” in response to the speech. Previously Bennett urged Israeli leaders to put politics aside and present a united front in Washington for the prime minister's address.
Prime Minister Netanyahu responded to the criticism of his speech—from both the Obama administration and from Israelis—asserting that he did offer a viable alternative to terms of the nuclear deal he believes is being negotiated in Geneva.
The latest polls indicate the speech did not provide major gains to Likud. According to the polls, Likud and the Zionist Union remain in a tight race, with Netanyahu faring slightly better.
Coalition rumor mill
Last Sunday, Yesh Atid Chairman Yair Lapid announced that his party will not join any government that intends to repeal the Haredi draft law, stating that “It is a holy principle that all citizens of the country have the same rights. We will not allow this equality of the burden to be overthrown or shot down.” On Monday Lapid, in a blow to Herzog and the Zionist Union, backtracked on an earlier promise, and announced that Yesh Atid was no longer committed to recommending that the leader of the largest faction form the next government.
Raja Zaatry, spokesman for the Joint Arab List, ruled out joining a left-wing government led by Herzog. In an interview with the Jerusalem Post Monday, Zaatry said that the Joint List “cannot be a part of a government that still occupies our people,” adding that the party would work with Herzog to block Netanyahu from forming the next government.
At a Tel Aviv rally on Tuesday, Shas chairman Aryeh Deri endorsed Netanyahu. Speaking to a 10,000-strong crowd of supporters, Deri proclaimed “We are with you Benjamin Netanyahu. . . We want you as prime minister, but we want you as Bibi-Begin not Bibi-Lapid.”
On Wednesday, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas endorsed the Joint Arab List, stating that “This is not interference [in domestic Israeli politics] . . . it is our right as members of the same nation to [endorse] them.”
On Thursday, Haaretz reported that Moshe Kahlon, founder and chairman of Kulanu, rejected an offer from Yair Lapid for a post-election alliance between the two parties.
In an interview with Army Radio on Wednesday, Defense Minister Moshe (Bogie) Ya'alon said the Likud had not ruled out forming a coalition with the Zionist Union, but stated that the party would not agree to a prime ministerial rotation. In response, Jewish Home Chairman Naftali Bennett warned “Likud wants to establish a government with Buji and Tzipi, and not with [the] Jewish home.” On Thursday, Likud clarified its position, maintaining that there would be no unity government and that, “Prime Minister [Benjamin] Netanyahu will turn to his natural partners, led by Jewish Home, to establish a national government . . .” Earlier in the week, in an interview with the Haredi Radio Kol Hai, Netanyahu announced his ...
Israeli reaction to Netanyahu's speech to Congress
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's address to Congress last Tuesday drew mixed response from Israeli politicians and journalists that primarily broke down along partisan lines.

Israeli reaction to Netanyahu’s speech to Congress

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s address to Congress last Tuesday drew mixed response from Israeli politicians and journalists that primarily broke down along partisan lines. Several members of the security establishmentissued particularly vocal critiques, including Meir Dagan, former chief of the Mossad. At a campaign event shortly after Netanyahu’s speech, Labor’s chairman Isaac (“Bougie”) Herzog told a crowd of supporters that “The painful truth is that after the applause, Netanyahu was left alone. Israel was left isolated. And the negotiations with Iran will continue without Israeli participation.”

Others, including Naftali Bennett, chairman of the Jewish Home Party and the only party leader to travel to Washington with Netanyahu last week, praised the speech, saying that he “gives his full backing to the prime minister,” and that the opposition acted “totally irresponsibly” in response to the speech. Previously Bennett urged Israeli leaders to put politics aside and present a united front in Washington for the prime minister’s address.

Prime Minister Netanyahu responded to the criticism of his speech—from both the Obama administration and from Israelis—asserting that he did offer a viable alternative to terms of the nuclear deal he believes is being negotiated in Geneva.

Coalition rumor mill

Last Sunday, Yesh Atid Chairman Yair Lapid announced that his party will not join any government that intends to repeal the Haredi draft law, stating that “It is a holy principle that all citizens of the country have the same rights. We will not allow this equality of the burden to be overthrown or shot down.” On Monday Lapid, in a blow to Herzog and the Zionist Union, backtracked on an earlier promise, and announced that Yesh Atid was no longer committed to recommending that the leader of the largest faction form the next government.

Raja Zaatry, spokesman for the Joint Arab List, ruled out joining a left-wing government led by Herzog. In an interview with the Jerusalem Post Monday, Zaatry said that the Joint List “cannot be a part of a government that still occupies our people,” adding that the party would work with Herzog to block Netanyahu from forming the next government.

At a Tel Aviv rally on Tuesday, Shas chairman Aryeh Deri endorsed Netanyahu. Speaking to a 10,000-strong crowd of supporters, Deri proclaimed “We are with you Benjamin Netanyahu. . . We want you as prime minister, but we want you as Bibi-Begin not Bibi-Lapid.”

On Wednesday, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas endorsed the Joint Arab List, stating that “This is not interference [in domestic Israeli politics] . . . it is our right as members of the same nation to [endorse] them.”

On Thursday, Haaretz reported that Moshe Kahlon, founder and chairman of Kulanu, rejected an offer from Yair Lapid for a post-election alliance between the two parties.

In an interview with Army Radio on Wednesday, Defense Minister Moshe (Bogie) Ya’alon said the Likud had not ruled out forming a coalition with the Zionist Union, but stated that the party would not agree to a prime ministerial rotation. In response, Jewish Home Chairman Naftali Bennett warned “Likud wants to establish a government with Buji and Tzipi, and not with [the] Jewish home.” On Thursday, Likud clarified its position, maintaining that there would be no unity government and that, “Prime Minister [Benjamin] Netanyahu will turn to his natural partners, led by Jewish Home, to establish a national government . . .” Earlier in the week, in an interview with the Haredi Radio Kol Hai, Netanyahu announced his intention to bring the Haredi parties into the next coalition, and pledged to change the Haredi draft law in the next government.

Socioeconomic issues take center stage

Following the release of the State Comptroller’s report on Israel’s housing crisis, last Sunday several hundred activists returned to Rothschild Boulevard in Tel Aviv, with protest tents. In an effort to revive protests that swept Israel during the summer of 2011, the organizers said this latest protest was intended to keep the election focused on economic issues.

Yesh Atid and Shas both unveiled economic platforms last week, proposing a series of sweeping reforms. Shas’s platform called for significant changes to the income tax policy, as well as raising the minimum wage. Yesh Atid’s platform introduced an anti-poverty plan that called for increasing the salaries of soldiers performing mandatory service. Last month, the party released a separate platform to address Israel’s housing crisis.

Last Tuesday evening, Israeli television broadcastthe first round of campaign commercials. Many focused on socioeconomic issues. In an appeal to secular Israelis, the Haredi party United Torah Judaism released an ad focusing on the Israeli health care system that included women, a first for the party’s commercials. Kulanu released a new campaign video on Tuesday, criticizing Likud for abandoning Israel’s working class and portraying Moshe Kahlon as advancing former Prime Minister Menachem Begin’s legacy of social welfare reform.

Foreign policy

Yesterday, around 40,000 gathered in Tel Aviv in an anti-Netanyahu rally demanding a change in leadership. Former Mossad chief Meir Dagan, a long-time critic of the prime minister, was the keynote speaker, and levied harsh criticism against Netanyahu for his management of the Iranian nuclear threat, the U.S.-Israel relationship, and of last summer’s war with Hamas.

On Friday, a document was leaked claiming that Netanyahu has offered significant concessions to the Palestinians in August 2013. Bennett warned that “The masquerade is over. The next disengagement is already here, and is being led by Likud and by Tzipi Livni,” According to Bennett, “the 2015 elections have become a referendum on forming a Palestine in the ’67 borders,” and that “Without a large Bayit Yehudi [in the next government] this disaster will happen. There will be no one to stop it.”

In an Associated Press interview, Yair Lapid emphasized that Israel’s economy and its diplomatic standing are inextricably linked. He advocated improving the Israeli economy by pursuing a peace agreement with the Palestinians that is part of a broader deal with the Arab world.

On Wednesday, around 3,000 Jewish and Arab women from across Israel gathered in Jerusalem in a protest organized by the grassroots organization Women Wage Peace. The group formed a chain around the Knesset called on Israel’s leaders to make peace negotiations a priority in the next government.

Other campaign news

In a Jerusalem Post interview with the Jerusalem Post, Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman spoke of his desire to change Israel’s electoral system, “I think it’s the problem of our country…Every two years since we established the State of Israel, we have a new government. It’s really a crazy situation. It’s impossible to handle all the challenges if you change your government every two years.”

A group of Ultra-Orthodox activists protested right-wing activist Baruch Marzel’s merger with Eli Yishai’s Yachad Party, warning of the spread of “Kahanist ideology within the ultra-orthodox community,” and further increase tensions between Israeli Arabs and Jews.

Avigdor Lieberman’s Yisrael Beiteinu Party is facing a lawsuit over an election ad. The ad wrongly depicted Mohammed Abed, an Arab-Israeli lawyer, as a perpetrator in the 2002 terrorist attack at the Park Hotel in Netanya, that left 30 people killed and dozens injured. Last week Abed filed a police report against Lieberman, and a civil suit against the party.

Many of the arguments Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made in his speech to Congress on Tuesday probably resonated with his American listeners, including the argument that allowing Iran to keep a uranium enrichment capacity poses dangers. As we found in a survey we conducted Feb. 19 to 25, Americans care about many of the considerations that he has been raising. But, even putting aside the partisan nature of Netanyahu’s speech, it is still unlikely that the substance of what he said will move the majority of Americans to oppose making a deal with Iran that would allow it to have a limited uranium enrichment program.

The survey — fielded by GfK among a nationally representative panel of 710 Americans, with a 4 point margin of error — showed that large majorities of respondents found arguments convincing both for and against making a deal, including the kind of arguments made by Netanyahu. But in the end, 61 percent of participants broke in favor of making a deal allowing limited enrichment, provided that there are intrusive inspections, rather than ramping up sanctions in an effort to get Iran to give up all enrichment.

Netanyahu argued forcefully that Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon would pose an extreme threat. But our survey shows that the question for Americans is not whether there is a threat but how best to respond to it. The argument he made, that more sanctions will lead to a better deal, did prove at least somewhat convincing to many, but in the end they did not think that was the way to go. And his argument that raising higher the requirements for getting a deal — requiring a general improvement in Iranian behavior as well as stopping enrichment — is unlikely to make a lot of headway as Americans do not appear to have a lot of confidence that more sanctions will even stop Iran from enriching.

If the debate about a deal with Iran gets a higher profile in the next weeks, advocates for and against a deal will see heads nodding and get the impression that they are making major headway with their audiences. The U.S. public can see that arguments on both sides of the issue have merit, but, when asked, they do make a clear decision — even in the face of tough challenges.

In the survey we presented respondents with a briefing on the debate surrounding the negotiations with Iran. We also asked them to evaluate a series of 12 strongly stated arguments for and against making a deal and for and against ramping up sanctions. These arguments were fully vetted with congressional staffers from the Democratic and Republican parties and advocates for both positions.

Large majorities, as much as two-thirds of respondents, found all of the arguments at least somewhat convincing. Overall neither position appeared dominant.

When participants were asked whether they could tolerate each option, majorities said they could tolerate either making a deal or ramping up sanctions, though the option of making a deal was tolerable to a larger majority, and the majority grew after evaluating the arguments.

But most significantly, when asked for their final recommendation, making a deal based on limited enrichment was favored not only by 61 percent overall, but also 61 percent of Republicans, 54 percent of Evangelicals, and a plurality (46 to 41 percent) of strong Tea Party sympathizers. Among those who watch Fox News daily, views were divided, with support for the deal rising to 55 percent among those who watch Fox News only two to three times a week. Frequent viewers of Christian broadcasting networks were the exception: They favored more sanctions by 58 percent.

While the survey was taken just before Netanyahu’s speech, it had been widely reported that Netanyahu has opposed a deal. His opposition does not appear to have had an effect on survey respondents. The percentage of participants supporting a deal in this survey was exactly the same (61 percent) as it was when the Program for Public Consultation (PPC) ran the same set of questions in June 2014. Respondents’ attitudes toward the speech may have also dulled any possible effect: 51 percent of all respondents in the current survey thought that it was inappropriate for Netanyahu to speak to Congress without a diplomatic invitation.

The bottom line is that Americans are deeply ambivalent about making a deal. They find convincing the arguments that making a deal is the best option because bombing would just lead Iran to rebuild underground, invading is not a real option, intrusive inspections will give us the ability to know what is going on in time if Iran tries to break out, and Americans would never let another country tell us we have no right to a nuclear energy program.

But they also find persuasive the arguments that the United States should not let Iran defy the U.N. Security Council’s demand that they stop enriching, that limited enrichment will give Iran the ability to refine their enrichment capacities thus positioning them for a breakout and that if the United States dismantles the international sanctions against Iran now it will very difficult to reestablish them if Iran starts cheating.

Arguments in favor of ramping up sanctions to pressure Iran to give up all enrichment are also found convincing by majorities, including the arguments that the sanctions are clearly working as evidenced by Iran’s desire for a deal; that Iranians’ readiness to accept the pain they have endured with sanctions is proof that their real goal is getting nuclear weapons; and that the United States needs to keep the momentum of the sanctions going.

On the other hand, majorities also find convincing the arguments that sanctions have clearly not worked to get Iran to give up enrichment while they have worked to get Iran to accept limits; that the only way to ramp up sanctions is to punish other countries who trade with Iran and this will make these countries angry at the United States; and that if the United States does not follow through when Iran is ready to make a deal we will likely lose the support of our partners, thus undermining the whole sanction regime anyhow.

If the Obama administration does make a deal with Iran in time for the March 24 deadline, Americans are going to be bombarded by all of these arguments as Congress and the pundits jump into the fray, as well as outside voices like Netanyahu’s.

But despite finding all of these arguments persuasive, our research suggests that Americans will not be immobilized by their ambivalence from coming to a conclusion, or simply divide along party lines.

At this point it appears more likely that Americans will come down in favor of a deal. But the fact that Americans are responsive to a wide array of considerations suggests that they will scrutinize the final terms of the deal and be responsive to even subtle considerations. The details will matter. Still, it’s unlikely that there will be trumping arguments one way or the other, including by the leader of a country that is important to many Americans.

Steven Kull is director of the Program for Public Consultation and senior research scholar at the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland. Shibley Telhami is the Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland and a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.

Authors

]]>
Fri, 06 Mar 2015 00:00:00 -0500Steven Kull and Shibley Telhami
Many of the arguments Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made in his speech to Congress on Tuesday probably resonated with his American listeners, including the argument that allowing Iran to keep a uranium enrichment capacity poses dangers. As we found in a survey we conducted Feb. 19 to 25, Americans care about many of the considerations that he has been raising. But, even putting aside the partisan nature of Netanyahu's speech, it is still unlikely that the substance of what he said will move the majority of Americans to oppose making a deal with Iran that would allow it to have a limited uranium enrichment program.
The survey — fielded by GfK among a nationally representative panel of 710 Americans, with a 4 point margin of error — showed that large majorities of respondents found arguments convincing both for and against making a deal, including the kind of arguments made by Netanyahu. But in the end, 61 percent of participants broke in favor of making a deal allowing limited enrichment, provided that there are intrusive inspections, rather than ramping up sanctions in an effort to get Iran to give up all enrichment.
Netanyahu argued forcefully that Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon would pose an extreme threat. But our survey shows that the question for Americans is not whether there is a threat but how best to respond to it. The argument he made, that more sanctions will lead to a better deal, did prove at least somewhat convincing to many, but in the end they did not think that was the way to go. And his argument that raising higher the requirements for getting a deal — requiring a general improvement in Iranian behavior as well as stopping enrichment — is unlikely to make a lot of headway as Americans do not appear to have a lot of confidence that more sanctions will even stop Iran from enriching.
If the debate about a deal with Iran gets a higher profile in the next weeks, advocates for and against a deal will see heads nodding and get the impression that they are making major headway with their audiences. The U.S. public can see that arguments on both sides of the issue have merit, but, when asked, they do make a clear decision — even in the face of tough challenges.
In the survey we presented respondents with a briefing on the debate surrounding the negotiations with Iran. We also asked them to evaluate a series of 12 strongly stated arguments for and against making a deal and for and against ramping up sanctions. These arguments were fully vetted with congressional staffers from the Democratic and Republican parties and advocates for both positions.
Large majorities, as much as two-thirds of respondents, found all of the arguments at least somewhat convincing. Overall neither position appeared dominant.
When participants were asked whether they could tolerate each option, majorities said they could tolerate either making a deal or ramping up sanctions, though the option of making a deal was tolerable to a larger majority, and the majority grew after evaluating the arguments.
But most significantly, when asked for their final recommendation, making a deal based on limited enrichment was favored not only by 61 percent overall, but also 61 percent of Republicans, 54 percent of Evangelicals, and a plurality (46 to 41 percent) of strong Tea Party sympathizers. Among those who watch Fox News daily, views were divided, with support for the deal rising to 55 percent among those who watch Fox News only two to three times a week. Frequent viewers of Christian broadcasting networks were the exception: They favored more sanctions by 58 percent.
Click to see image: Final Recommendation on Iran's Nuclear Program
While the survey was taken just before Netanyahu's speech, it had been widely reported that Netanyahu has opposed a deal. His opposition does not appear to have had an effect on survey respondents. The percentage of participants supporting a deal in this survey ...
Many of the arguments Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made in his speech to Congress on Tuesday probably resonated with his American listeners, including the argument that allowing Iran to keep a uranium enrichment capacity poses dangers.

Many of the arguments Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made in his speech to Congress on Tuesday probably resonated with his American listeners, including the argument that allowing Iran to keep a uranium enrichment capacity poses dangers. As we found in a survey we conducted Feb. 19 to 25, Americans care about many of the considerations that he has been raising. But, even putting aside the partisan nature of Netanyahu’s speech, it is still unlikely that the substance of what he said will move the majority of Americans to oppose making a deal with Iran that would allow it to have a limited uranium enrichment program.

The survey — fielded by GfK among a nationally representative panel of 710 Americans, with a 4 point margin of error — showed that large majorities of respondents found arguments convincing both for and against making a deal, including the kind of arguments made by Netanyahu. But in the end, 61 percent of participants broke in favor of making a deal allowing limited enrichment, provided that there are intrusive inspections, rather than ramping up sanctions in an effort to get Iran to give up all enrichment.

Netanyahu argued forcefully that Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon would pose an extreme threat. But our survey shows that the question for Americans is not whether there is a threat but how best to respond to it. The argument he made, that more sanctions will lead to a better deal, did prove at least somewhat convincing to many, but in the end they did not think that was the way to go. And his argument that raising higher the requirements for getting a deal — requiring a general improvement in Iranian behavior as well as stopping enrichment — is unlikely to make a lot of headway as Americans do not appear to have a lot of confidence that more sanctions will even stop Iran from enriching.

If the debate about a deal with Iran gets a higher profile in the next weeks, advocates for and against a deal will see heads nodding and get the impression that they are making major headway with their audiences. The U.S. public can see that arguments on both sides of the issue have merit, but, when asked, they do make a clear decision — even in the face of tough challenges.

In the survey we presented respondents with a briefing on the debate surrounding the negotiations with Iran. We also asked them to evaluate a series of 12 strongly stated arguments for and against making a deal and for and against ramping up sanctions. These arguments were fully vetted with congressional staffers from the Democratic and Republican parties and advocates for both positions.

Large majorities, as much as two-thirds of respondents, found all of the arguments at least somewhat convincing. Overall neither position appeared dominant.

When participants were asked whether they could tolerate each option, majorities said they could tolerate either making a deal or ramping up sanctions, though the option of making a deal was tolerable to a larger majority, and the majority grew after evaluating the arguments.

But most significantly, when asked for their final recommendation, making a deal based on limited enrichment was favored not only by 61 percent overall, but also 61 percent of Republicans, 54 percent of Evangelicals, and a plurality (46 to 41 percent) of strong Tea Party sympathizers. Among those who watch Fox News daily, views were divided, with support for the deal rising to 55 percent among those who watch Fox News only two to three times a week. Frequent viewers of Christian broadcasting networks were the exception: They favored more sanctions by 58 percent.

While the survey was taken just before Netanyahu’s speech, it had been widely reported that Netanyahu has opposed a deal. His opposition does not appear to have had an effect on survey respondents. The percentage of participants supporting a deal in this survey was exactly the same (61 percent) as it was when the Program for Public Consultation (PPC) ran the same set of questions in June 2014. Respondents’ attitudes toward the speech may have also dulled any possible effect: 51 percent of all respondents in the current survey thought that it was inappropriate for Netanyahu to speak to Congress without a diplomatic invitation.

The bottom line is that Americans are deeply ambivalent about making a deal. They find convincing the arguments that making a deal is the best option because bombing would just lead Iran to rebuild underground, invading is not a real option, intrusive inspections will give us the ability to know what is going on in time if Iran tries to break out, and Americans would never let another country tell us we have no right to a nuclear energy program.

But they also find persuasive the arguments that the United States should not let Iran defy the U.N. Security Council’s demand that they stop enriching, that limited enrichment will give Iran the ability to refine their enrichment capacities thus positioning them for a breakout and that if the United States dismantles the international sanctions against Iran now it will very difficult to reestablish them if Iran starts cheating.

Arguments in favor of ramping up sanctions to pressure Iran to give up all enrichment are also found convincing by majorities, including the arguments that the sanctions are clearly working as evidenced by Iran’s desire for a deal; that Iranians’ readiness to accept the pain they have endured with sanctions is proof that their real goal is getting nuclear weapons; and that the United States needs to keep the momentum of the sanctions going.

On the other hand, majorities also find convincing the arguments that sanctions have clearly not worked to get Iran to give up enrichment while they have worked to get Iran to accept limits; that the only way to ramp up sanctions is to punish other countries who trade with Iran and this will make these countries angry at the United States; and that if the United States does not follow through when Iran is ready to make a deal we will likely lose the support of our partners, thus undermining the whole sanction regime anyhow.

If the Obama administration does make a deal with Iran in time for the March 24 deadline, Americans are going to be bombarded by all of these arguments as Congress and the pundits jump into the fray, as well as outside voices like Netanyahu’s.

But despite finding all of these arguments persuasive, our research suggests that Americans will not be immobilized by their ambivalence from coming to a conclusion, or simply divide along party lines.

At this point it appears more likely that Americans will come down in favor of a deal. But the fact that Americans are responsive to a wide array of considerations suggests that they will scrutinize the final terms of the deal and be responsive to even subtle considerations. The details will matter. Still, it’s unlikely that there will be trumping arguments one way or the other, including by the leader of a country that is important to many Americans.

Steven Kull is director of the Program for Public Consultation and senior research scholar at the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland. Shibley Telhami is the Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland and a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.

Netanyahu’s speech to Congress

Fars News quoted Speaker Ali Larijani as saying during a parliamentary session on March 4, “The words of the puppet Zionist regime’s prime minister are similar to a female prostitute who enters a city with her skirt pulled over her head, and when she is asked why she has entered the city in the manner, she says because not one virtuous man can be found in this city.”

On March 3, hard-line Javan Online ran a headline that read, “Zionist supporters in Congress listen to Netanyahu's repeated fantasies: Netanyahu once again makes himself the world’s fool.”

Nuclear Negotiations

Fars News reported that during Friday prayers in Tehran today, prayer leader Ayatollah Emani Kashani said, “We say that if Iran and the P5 countries reach an agreement, both sides will win, and it will truly be a win-win. But if a nuclear deal isn’t reached and it’s a win-lose situation, it will mean that Iran won and the P5+1 lost because Iran will have proven to the world [that Iran] is reasonable.”

On March 3, Fars News interviewed former ambassador to France Hamid Reza Asif. According to Asif, President Hassan Rouhani’s brother Hussein Fereydoon, who attended the last two rounds of talks, “attends in order to relay messages between the negotiating team and the president.” Asif also said that “sanctions have only affected about 20-25 percent of Iran’s economy.”

Authors

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Fri, 06 Mar 2015 12:54:00 -0500Hanif Zarrabi-Kashani
Netanyahu's speech to Congress
Fars News quoted Speaker Ali Larijani as saying during a parliamentary session on March 4, “The words of the puppet Zionist regime's prime minister are similar to a female prostitute who enters a city with her skirt pulled over her head, and when she is asked why she has entered the city in the manner, she says because not one virtuous man can be found in this city.”
On March 4, ISNA reported that President Hassan Rouhani called Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's speech at Congress “laughable and ridiculous.”
On March 4, Donya-e Eqtesad ran a headline that read, “Anti-Israeli wave in American society.”
On March 4, hard-line Vatan-e Emrooz ran a headline on its front page that read, “During his speech to Congress yesterday, Israel's Prime Minister admitted that Israel and the West have no choice but to accept a nuclear deal with Iran.”
On March 4, Fars News quoted Mojtaba Shakeri, a conservative member of the Tehran City Council, as saying, “This jeweler's game that is being played between the United States and the Zionist regime doesn't trick us.”
On March 4, Fars News reported that MP Qassem Jafari said, “We shouldn't be fooled by this fake dispute between the United States and Israel.”
On March 3, hard-line Javan Online ran a headline that read, “Zionist supporters in Congress listen to Netanyahu's repeated fantasies: Netanyahu once again makes himself the world's fool.”
Nuclear Negotiations
Fars News reported that during Friday prayers in Tehran today, prayer leader Ayatollah Emani Kashani said, “We say that if Iran and the P5 countries reach an agreement, both sides will win, and it will truly be a win-win. But if a nuclear deal isn't reached and it's a win-lose situation, it will mean that Iran won and the P5+1 lost because Iran will have proven to the world [that Iran] is reasonable.”
On March 4, ISNA reported that IAEA officials will travel to Tehran on March 8 to meet with members of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization in order to discuss technical details.
On March 3, an editorial in hard-line Raja News criticized former president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani for comparing Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with Iranian critics who oppose a nuclear agreement.
On March 3, Fars News interviewed former ambassador to France Hamid Reza Asif. According to Asif, President Hassan Rouhani's brother Hussein Fereydoon, who attended the last two rounds of talks, “attends in order to relay messages between the negotiating team and the president.” Asif also said that “sanctions have only affected about 20-25 percent of Iran's economy.”
On March 2, ISNA quoted Ali Akbar Nateq-Nouri, head of the supreme leader's inspection office of the, as saying, “The nuclear negotiations with the West began during the previous [Ahmadinejad] administration, and at the moment the supreme leader is completely leading the process.”
Economy and Energy
Tasnim News reported that before Friday prayers in Tehran today, Rouhani administration spokesman Mohammad Baqer Nobakht spoke to the congregation and said, “Not a single rial forecasted in [next year's] budget is dependent on the P5+1 [nuclear] negotiations.”
During a press conference on March 4, ISNA reported that Rouhani administration spokesman Mohammad Baqer Nobakht commented on next year's budget, saying, “We are prepared for any type of reduction or change in oil revenues.”
On March 3, Khabar Online reported that Ali Tayyebnia, economic and finance minister said, “We will continue to reduce the inflation rate until it reaches single digits.
On March 3, ISNA reported that according to Iran's Statistical Center, the number of construction permits in Tehran have dropped by 33 percent compared to the same period last year.
Politics
On March 2, Donya-e Eqtesad ran a ...
Netanyahu's speech to Congress
Fars News quoted Speaker Ali Larijani as saying during a parliamentary session on March 4, “The words of the puppet Zionist regime's prime minister are similar to a female prostitute who enters a city with ...

Netanyahu’s speech to Congress

Fars News quoted Speaker Ali Larijani as saying during a parliamentary session on March 4, “The words of the puppet Zionist regime’s prime minister are similar to a female prostitute who enters a city with her skirt pulled over her head, and when she is asked why she has entered the city in the manner, she says because not one virtuous man can be found in this city.”

On March 3, hard-line Javan Online ran a headline that read, “Zionist supporters in Congress listen to Netanyahu's repeated fantasies: Netanyahu once again makes himself the world’s fool.”

Nuclear Negotiations

Fars News reported that during Friday prayers in Tehran today, prayer leader Ayatollah Emani Kashani said, “We say that if Iran and the P5 countries reach an agreement, both sides will win, and it will truly be a win-win. But if a nuclear deal isn’t reached and it’s a win-lose situation, it will mean that Iran won and the P5+1 lost because Iran will have proven to the world [that Iran] is reasonable.”

On March 3, Fars News interviewed former ambassador to France Hamid Reza Asif. According to Asif, President Hassan Rouhani’s brother Hussein Fereydoon, who attended the last two rounds of talks, “attends in order to relay messages between the negotiating team and the president.” Asif also said that “sanctions have only affected about 20-25 percent of Iran’s economy.”