In the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks, U.S.-Russian relations experienced a resurgence of amiability and cooperation. Russia, long fighting Islamist terrorists in the breakaway republic of Chechnya, became an ally in the American war on terrorism. During the American military campaign in Afghanistan, Moscow shared intelligence information with Washington and gave tacit approval of American access to military airbases within the former Soviet republics of Central Asia. While Moscow and Washington diverged on the question of preemptive military action against Iraq, American-Russian partnership endured.

Since 2004, however, American-Russian relations have steadily declined as Russian foreign policy has become more assertive. After more than seven years of economic growth driven by Russian energy exports and high world oil prices, Moscow seeks to substitute national shame for the "chaos" brought about by the dissolution of the Soviet Union with a restored self-image as a foremost geopolitical power.1 Russia promotes the establishment of a multipolar world order, which would restrain American unilateralism. During President Vladimir Putin's second term in office, Russia has increasingly sought to reassert itself as a world power, reestablishing its traditional sphere of influence over the former Soviet republics.

In early 2006, Russia cut off gas to Ukraine and, by extension, to the rest of Europe, as reprisal for Kiev's pro-Western orientation and policies. In May, Vice President Cheney rebuked Moscow for its use of oil and gas as "tools of intimidation and blackmail."2 Russia has also attempted to reduce American influence in Central Asia, with Moscow attempting to limit U.S. and NATO access to airbases in the region. NATO enlargement has once again reemerged as a divisive issue, as former Soviet states Ukraine and Georgia prepare to join the Atlantic alliance.

Section Questions

What are the major trends in Russian economic performance since the end of the Cold War?

How large are Russian energy exports? How dependent is the Russian economy on such exports?

What is extent of Russian defense spending? How has defense spending changed since the end of the Cold War?

Figure 3: Russian Defense Expenditures, 1992-2005

V. Russia in the Iranian Nuclear Dispute

As part of its effort to reassert itself as a world power, Russia has actively promoted itself as the indispensable mediator in the nuclear proliferation dispute between Iran and the West. Moscow actively pursues productive relations with Iran, a nation located on Russia's periphery. Russian military exports to Tehran are estimated to total $4 billion, including the $900 million sale of 30 TOR M-1 antiaircraft missiles.3 Russia also supplies the nuclear fuel for operation of the Bushehr nuclear power plant, which Russian specialists aided in the construction. Moscow regards these economic transactions as a means of restoring its influence in the Middle East after the collapse of the Soviet Union. At the same time, Russia seeks not to alienate the West and to enhance its role in the world, reemerging as a key player in international diplomacy. While the Kremlin staunchly defends Iran's right to a "peaceful development of nuclear energy" and resists all "non-diplomatic measures of pressure" on Tehran, Moscow has also aimed to find a diplomatic compromise between Iran and the West, including an offer to enrich uranium for Iran on Russian soil to supply Iranian nuclear power reactors and ensure no fuel is diverted to bomb-making. Tehran has thus far rejected the Russian proposal, and Moscow has begun to indicate its frustration and impatience with the Iranian leadership.4

VI. Russian Democracy and Human Rights

During the presidency of Boris Yeltsin, Russia marched slowly, albeit at times tentatively, towards democracy. It was a nation with new-found political freedoms, multiple political parties, contested political elections, freedom of the press, and liberal market reforms. The Yeltsin years, however, are now regarded with the deep national shame for the "chaos" brought about by the dissolution of the Soviet Union, specifically the weakening of the Russian state. Instead, the reforms of the 1990s now regarded as a result a vast plot by those outside of Russia, paid for by the rich oligarchs, and implemented by shortsighted and weak political leaders. In short, the reform politics and economic liberalization of the 1990s were both misguided and detrimental to Russian interests. In response, President Putin has increasingly sought to reassert the power of the state over Russian society. In the broadly held American view, Putin has sharply reversed the democratic reforms of the Yeltsin years, established the preponderance of the executive branch over both the Duma and judiciary, exerted state control and ownership of television and much of the print media, restored the Kremlin's authority over the formerly self-governing provinces, and returned the most successful sectors of the economy to the state. These trends, along with corruption and selectivity in law enforcement, and political pressure on the judiciary, have resulted in the steady deterioration in Russian democracy and human rights.5

The U.S. human rights and democracy strategy towards Russia aims to promote democratic institutions and processes, along with respect for human rights through high level contacts between U.S. and Russian officials. In May and November 2005 meetings with President Putin, President Bush raised a broad range of bilateral issues, including democracy and human rights concerns. In addition to meeting with government officials, the President and Secretary of State met with Russian civic leaders during their visit to Russia in May. In early 2006, the Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor visited Moscow to discuss the NGO law with civil society, Duma, and government leaders.

VII. Suggested Reading List

J. Goldgeier, Power and Purpose: US Foreign Policy towards Russia after the Cold War (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2003).

D. Gorenburg (with H.H. Gaffney), "Great Promise Unfulfilled: How Russia lost its way after independence," PONARS Working Paper No. 26 (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2006). Available at http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/ruseur_wp_026.pdf.