Saturday, 23 May 2015

The Islamic State's spring offensive: al-Sukhna

By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans

Al-Sukhna, a small yet vital town in the middle of the vast Syrian desert, was captured by the fighters of the Islamic State in a swift, unexpected one-day long offensive on the 13th of May 2015. While the fighters of the Free Syrian Army, Jaish al-Islam, Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State (still called ISIS at the time) had already captured the strategically located village back in October 2013, they never succeeded in holding it for long, and al-Sukhna was back under regime-control after just one week.

While the largely Sunni town of al-Sukhna itself isn't home to any important military sites, and military presence had previously only been negligible, the town is located next to the highly important M20 highway, making it a crucial link in the road running all the way from Damascus to Tadmur (Palmyra) and ultimately Deir ez-Zor. This highway is absolutely vital for the Assad regime as it allows for resupplying its troops in Deir ez-Zor, and without control of the road, the regime won't be able to continue its struggle to keep it out of IS's hands, making the fall of the city a very plausible reality.

The town, much like Tadmur, also serves as an important link in the production and distribution of a large portion of Syria's gas supplies. As the Islamic State is now occupying both Tadmur and al-Sukhna, it has easy access to and thus control over the numerous gas fields and pipelines running through the area, denying the Assad-regime much-needed resources.

While the regime quickly recaptured al-Sukhna back in
October 2013, it remains to be seen if the National
Defence Force (NDF) and Suqour al-Sahraa' (Desert Falcons) have the will, manpower, resources and equipment to establish a new line of defence and hold off the Islamic State's advance in Central Syria after the fall of Tadmur, let alone to once again retake the area. The victory at al-Sukhna and Tadmur will likely decide the ultimate fate not only of Central and Eastern Syria, but also might have far-reaching consequences on the regime's grip on Homs and Damascus.

Tadmur (Palmyra) and al-Sukhna are both claimed by the Islamic State
as part of the Wilayat al-Badiya province, but after the Islamic State
withdrew most of its troops from the region in the summer of 2014, their
(at the time still limited) reign in the region largely ended, and Wilayat
al-Badiya was unofficially incorporated in the Wilayat Homs province.

Wilayat
al-Badiya de-facto thus ceased to exist, and the Islamic State ceased
its offensive in the region to focus on other, then more important, frontiers. The months that followed did see a
series of renewed fierce clashes between the fighters of the Islamic
State, the NDF and Suqour al-Sahraa' throughout Central Syria. Heavily
supported by the Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF), the NDF and Suqour
al-Sahraa' managed to push the fighters of the Islamic State away from the outskirts of Syria's most important airbase: T.4, home of the SyAAF's dreaded Su-24M2s.

These
clashes symbolise the situation in Central Syria, where
regime-controlled towns, gasfields and military bases were only defended
by small numbers of NDF and SyAA soldiers, the latter manning the heavy
weaponry attached to the NDF. The fact that it is nigh on impossible to completely
control the vast Syrian desert, combined with the dire lack of soldiers, means the regime is forced to rely on very light mobile units to stop the fighters of the Islamic State before they reach the often ill-defended but strategically important towns and gasfields.

Patrols
conducted by Suqour al-Sahraa' and the SyAAF's SA-342 'Gazelles' were
the regime's first line of defence in Central Syria. Tasked with finding
the Islamic State's convoys travelling through the vast Syrian desert,
reinforcements were called in when such a convoy was spotted. More Suqour al-Sahraa' fighters, fighter-bombers, helicopterswere sent
in to destroy the convoys. This tactic had so far paid off, but should just
one IS convoy make it through undetected, the result can be devastating: al-Sukhna being a case in point.
The
failed offensive on T.4 had somewhat calmed the situation in Central Syria,
meaning the Islamic State's recent offensive caught the regime's
troops in Central Syria completely off-guard. As there were no reinforcements available anywhere close, they simply collapsed under this unexpected pressure. It seems likely that even the fighters of the Islamic State didn't expect to push through the regime's defences in Central Syria so easily. Especially when considering the fact that IS is still publishing media in the area
through the Wilayat Homs outlet, indicating that the Islamic State had not even planned a new administration for Wilayat al-Badiya. Of course, with the recents gains in Central Syria, it will now indubitably reappear as an independent province.

Tasked with the defence of al-Sukha was the NDF, mostly consisting of Alawites from Homs, and a limited number of fighters from Suqour al-Sahraa', further strenghtened by a detachment of handful T-72M1s from the 18th Tank Batallion of the Syrian Arab Army
(SyAA), originally stationed in Tadmur. The various checkpoints littered around the town were manned by the NDF while the higher ground was held by a contingent from Suqour al-Sahraa'. Contrary to what has often been observed during the conflict, the T-72M1s were not used as static pillboxes, but rather utilised as a quick-reaction force deployed in between the defender's positions.

Fire support for the fighters of the Islamic State consisted of three tanks (one T-55, one T-62 and one T-72M1), a number of technicals, one 122mm D-30, various 122mm DIY MRLs, a number of mortars and ATGMs. Most of the heavy weaponry was brought in on tank trailers and unloaded just outside the town before the assault begun. A video covering the assault can be seen here (WARNING: GRAPHIC).

The amount of IS fighters involved in the offensive is not believed to have been higher than a few hundred, and were seperated into two groups, one tasked with storming the checkpoints, while the other group was to provide fire-support for the former. In an effort to help the latter group distinguish the assaulting IS fighters from regime forces, the first group wore blue head bands.

As is nowadays often the case during the Islamic State's offensives, its fighters made clever use of UAVs to scout the positions of the defenders before initiating the assault. These positions were subsequently targeted with tank, artillery, rocket, mortar and heavy-machine gun fire, keeping the regime forces pinned down and unable to return fire. As an unsurprising result of this heavy supressive fire most of the around forty casualties on the side of the Islamic State were suffered as a direct result of the close quarters combat that followed the storming.

The first defensive position that was overrun was that of Suqour al-Sahraa'. The majority of the soldiers stationed here fled to the remaining checkpoints, and in usual disorderly SyAA fashion, left the heavy weaponry looking out over the town intact. Now aimed at their former operators, the captured 107mm MRL and 122mm D-30 were immediately put to use and hit the remaining regime positions shortly thereafter. The situation brings to light once again the shrining problem of incompetence in its ranks that has cost the regime battles on more than one occasion.

The detachment of T-72M1s, now fully aware of the assault, rushed to the remaining regime-held ground to aid in the defence of the checkpoints. Aware of the presence of several tanks, the fighters of the Islamic State set up positions on the high ground overlooking the checkpoints, and subsequently ambushed and destroyed the two T-72M1s present with 9M113 Konkurs and MILAN F2 ATGMs. The impact of the 9M113 was strong enough to cause the main gun of the T-72M1 to fire, while the MILAN hit completely destroyed the other T-72, causing the turret to fly off.

This sight must have demoralised the remaining regime forces to such an extent that they abandoned their positions and ran away on foot. Unfortunately for these fleeing regime forces, the fighters of the Islamic State already took position next to their escape route, resulting in a turkey shoot with many casualties under the defendless regime forces.

In this manner the offensive, lasting not more than a few hours, ended the regime's presence in al-Sukhna. In hindsight, it is obvious that the defenders never had any real, sound plan to keep the town from falling, and were definitely not prepared to fight until the end for it. The fact that al-Sukhna was of very high strategic importance makes this knowledge all the more astounding.

The first effects of the fall of al-Sukhna will indubitably be felt in Deir ez-Zor, where regime forces continue to battle the fighters of the Islamic State for control of the largest city in Eastern Syria. The situation for the NDF, the SyAA and the 104th Airborne Brigade of the Republican Guard, which, despite rumours to the contrary, is still present in Deir ez-Zor, has suddenly turned for the worse now that the vitally important M20 highway has been lost to the Islamic State. Together with a limited airbridge, the road was the regime's only way of resupplying its forces in Deir ez-Zor.

Indeed, as the SyAAF's transport aircraft are unable to transport any kind of heavy weaponry , the regime-forces in Deir ez-Zor now have no means to replace any damaged or destroyed tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, artillery or MRLs, which were previously all brought in via the M20 highway.

Even though the contingent defending al-Sukhna only had access to a limited number of heavy weapons, the capture of the town also proved to be quite profitable in terms of Ghaneema (spoils of war). Although underwelming compared to some of the Islamic State's previous scores, the captured weaponry will certainly aid the Islamic State in any future offensives in Central and Eastern Syria. As is often seen, the amount of weaponry that was available to the defenders far surpassed their needs and capabilities.

The Ghaneema mainly included small arms and ammunitions, but also a
few technicals, anti-aircraft guns, artillery and multiple rocket
launchers (MRLs).

The fighters of the Islamic State involved in the capture of al-Sukhna later participated in the Tadmur offensive, and if the current upmarch (that has also seen the fall of Tadmur, T.3 pumping station, al-Tanf border post, al-Hail gas field and Iraqi Ramadi in recent days) continues in the same pace, they will indubitably soon be fighting at T.4 airbase.

Thanks for your reply. I feared that might be the case. I think that we (i.e. 'the West') will need a lot of things to go right if we are not to end up with either an 'Islamic' Syria (as opposed to secular) or with a Syria which is permanently divided.

Thanks for this report. Concerning the road to Homs, the Islamic State will have to conquer a lot of military base to reach the city, beginning with T4 (Tiyas) airbase and all surrounding fortifications and military facilities. But this also a strategic area as well because the very last gas field held by the regime are there and are much needed to fuel electric power plants. I think it will be very interesting to see what will be IS both strategy and tactics used to conquer this axis.

I agree with Oryx about Russia. But Iran is different. Iran considers Syria a vital national interest. It cannot allow Syria to fall to IS. If that were to happen, it would destroy Tehran's credibility as a regional power and its claim to leadership over Shiite Muslims. And the existence of an radical Sunni Islamic State (not just a state in name, but in reality) would be a dire threat to the security of Iran. So I am not so sure that, as a last resort, it wouldn't send in a force to carve out and protect a Alawite mini-state, maybe working out an arrangement with Turkey divide the country into regions of influence and to eliminate IS.

Are those DIY grenades using spent 23mm shells in the last picture? I've seen similar in other IS releases from captured SyAA Stocks.

Also I wonder how much IS actually commits against the YPG? Because everytime YPG announces they are winning, they can't be beat, yadda yadda, IS masses a fist, punches YPG out, YPG cries to Assad and US to help them and take months to regain ground even with massive air support from US and Artillery and Tank support from Assad. If Deir Ezzor falls to IS, is Kobane and Serenkanyie even viable defensively? If the US hadn't blown up 80% of Kobane, IS would have had control of it now, they only lifted the siege when SyAA started making big gains in Deir Ezzor to break the partial siege as they needed the troops to contain a potential Regime breakout of Deir Ezzor.

''Are those DIY grenades using spent 23mm shells in the last picture? I've seen similar in other IS releases from captured SyAA Stocks.''

That's right.

''Also I wonder how much IS actually commits against the YPG? Because everytime YPG announces they are winning, they can't be beat, yadda yadda, IS masses a fist, punches YPG out, YPG cries to Assad and US to help them and take months to regain ground even with massive air support from US and Artillery and Tank support from Assad.''

The Islamic State's commitment to the YPG front is more a case of holding the line than initiating offensives. The focus has now been shifted to Central Syria, where technicals, tanks and artillery can still roam freely.

''If Deir Ezzor falls to IS, is Kobane and Serenkanyie even viable defensively? If the US hadn't blown up 80% of Kobane, IS would have had control of it now, they only lifted the siege when SyAA started making big gains in Deir Ezzor to break the partial siege as they needed the troops to contain a potential Regime breakout of Deir Ezzor.''

If Deir ez-Zor falls, the focus will likely shift to either Damascus, Aleppo or Homs, not the YPG-held areas.

But knocking YPG out improves road road connections and brings the Rmelan Oil Fields under their control. Plus moving on Qamishli would finish off Assad's Northern Air Force which does the bulk of air support to YPG because its closer and can fly more sorties and knocking the SyAA Artillry Brigade in the north with its tanks leaves YPG exposed to heavy IS firepower with no means to retaliate and US airstrikes won't be enough.

During the Kobani Fight IS demonstrated repeatably that when it wanted to push an offensive they could and took the border post multiple times and the US had to destroy it multiple times. The lovers forest changed hands multiple times.

Despite YPG claims and SOHR which just took YPG claims at face value, IS official records showed they lost 1,000 dead in Kobane, most due to US Airstrikes which speaks poorly of YPG capabilities who whenever they fight alone get curbstomped so fast it isn't even funny.

But the kicker for Kobane, while the US was so focused on bombing it, it missed the force that took Sukhna and Palmyra training in Mosul in broad daylight.

Plus if IS can defeat YPG in the north, it can secure Highway 2 and 47 in Iraq leading to Mosul.cementing its control and logistics/economic corridors to put yet more men in the field and support them further abroad.

Other wise they havve to garrison a broader front instead of a shorter one if they could clear Kobane and Serekanyie and have Semalka as a border, and Mosul Lake frees up large amounts of troops and gains them valuable oil and agricultural fields.

Assad's Northern 'Air Force' consists of nothing more than a few Mi-8/17s doing supply runs to Qamishli, hardly an Air Force. The US-led coalition doesn't interfere between regime-forces and fighters of the Islamic State, so it's not like they missed any fighters, they simply never intended to hit them.

I'm as good as sure that the Islamic State's push will be towards regime-held territory, not towards YPG-held territory. Yet the Islamic State's action have suprised us before, so only time will tell.

You're underestimating YPG. Without Coalition air support, I have no doubt they will lose Kobane canton but there is no chance that they will be losing Jazira canton anytime soon especially since they managed to clear Yaroubiyah and Jazaa without any Coalition bombing.

Also, SAA (or more properly NDF) in Qamishli and Hasakah were the ones dependent on YPG and not the other way around given that they only managed to take villages when piggybacking YPG's major front-wide offensives (like when they expanded southwards from Qamishli during YPG Tal Hamis op and when they capture Tal Baroud during YPG Abdulaziz op)

Yaroubiyah and Jazaa changed hands multiple times and only thanks to SyAA artillery support as reported by the KCK, the other Kurdish Group active. Whenever IS really pushes an offensive, YPG gets rolled over. I have also seen video evidence of YPG using human wave assaults and throwing children into the fight as actual line combatants as opposed to propaganda purposes like IS does then sends them back.

Kobane was only cleared when FSA sent substantial forces to assist against an IS force that lost every available hiding spot to fight from due to the coalition dropping four bombs for every building in the city.

The recent Hasakah Offensive was heavily dependent on SyAA artillery support, Sutoro and Arab Tribal Fighter support as YPG lacked the numbers to launch the offensive themselves after spending months in grinding attrition battles before quietly admitting they couldn't win.

Already an IS counter-attack has retaken Gire Ebubekir, Qarajah, and Tall Tawkal which two days ago had been cleared.

IS hasn't taken the area yet largely because they don't have many troops in the area, having them fighting on more critical fronts. That it takes months for YPG to clear them from areas, and IS has been slowly cementing its hold on the Khabour Valley tells us more about the quality of YPG and SyAA units than IS who only have 2,000 fighters present in that area at any given time.

As can be seen, once IS appeared as an independent actor, it pretty much has been downhill for YPG. It lacks the manpower resources and it is not as organized as IS to run an efficient military organization across vast operational distances, nor does it have an efficient engineering corps like IS does that is constantly building infrastructure and repairing it.

Plus the economy has boomed in areas under IS control. Satellite photos show traffic jams in IS areas which means gasoline is plentiful despite coalition bombing. IS also has consistent power for its factories unlike YPG areas. With its takeover of Palmyra District, IS has even more energy, and the Syrian Phosphate mines to add to its Iraqi Phosphate mine and the Al-Qaim Phosphate Processing Factory to refine it.

This in turn means people are emigrating to IS held territory because there are jobs and services and no inflation.

This becomes more embarrassing when you consider YPG has 83 billion dollars to tap, IS is estimated to have 2 billion at a conservative estimate and claims an 8 billion dollar budget for this year.

So no YPG can't win, it is simply too corrupt and disorganized to maintain a consistent steady stream of replacements and support them in the field. This is what the underlying trends show.

The battles we hear about are just icing, the real success is in the cake mixture, and YPG's mixture is bad, while IS is good and getting better as they learn and grow their organization.

Once IS resolves more critical fights they will throw the numbers they need at the YPG Cantons which are already ground down in an attritional struggle they can't win and finish the job.

That would depend of the Islamic State's commitment to such an offensive. Finishing the regime's presence in Deir ez-Zor would make more sense out of a military perspective, and that's probably what they're aiming at first.

What surprise me is some of the possible reasons of the results of this ongoing offensive.I was very surprised when it was announced the 104th Airborne Brigade was going the be pulled back to Ghouta for an offensive, it seemed absurd because still it was making slow but active advances on their front.

In the end I think we should focus mostly on the basic of manpowers: what Assad has there? And what he could pour in the fight? Very little I think... if he removes units from Aleppo or Hama's frontline, there would be surelly a rebel offensive there to take some advantages.

IS is already fighting on the north-east of of Suwayda and there Assad could rely on the druze (that are a likely target of the IS massacres, due their enthic and religion).

An option could be a surprsing shift of alliances or at least a truce between rebel forces and Assad between Al-Nabek/Yabroud and the Sayqual and Dumayr airports: in that area of the east of the province, there has already been some truces.

Hopefully Assad and local rebels could strenght a local truce to try to stop together IS and prevent an offensive against Damascus?

Also I am wondering about the current Qualamoun operations: Assad's and Hezbollah media are praising it. The offensive has clearly more propaganda value than military matters: it's true they're regaining ground, but they're not likely destroying all the Nusra/islamist manpower, just pushing it back in Lebanon (forcing them to fight with the local IS forces).

Still maybe, if they complete this offensive, cleaning such fron, they could divert troops to Homs.

The main problem I think it's time: Assad and Hezbollah's force make very slow advances, while IS rely on speed.

Sending tanks into the fray without infantry. How many times have we seen the futility of these moves? "Send in the tanks!" as if they were some sort of salvation. News outlets are calling the recent takeover of Idlib a tank massacre! And that took place only last week. Still commanders on the ground haven't grasped the tank's limitations. "Send in the tanks!" Ouch. I just wonder if I would have forgotten all these lessons if I was pinned down, and facing ISIS's onslaught.

What's also surprising is the extent to which ISIS units plan their their attacks, and how well they execute these plans. You would think that they were the ones with an army established in the 1920s as opposed to five or six years ago. At the risk of sounding like an "IS/nusra/fsa snackbar salafist faggot", one cannot but appreciate this apparent professionalism.

Thank you Mr. As an Islamic State supporter i cannot fathom how the sensible people in darul kufr can ignore the brilliance and competency of our State. We are fighting in 5 different fronts in both Iraq and Syria, against the YPG, PKK, Peshabmerga, western mercernaries, Shia militias, FSA, Syrian Army, Iraqi Army, Iranian armed forces, US and British special ops teams and Shia militias AND being bombed by over 50 coaltition airforces 24/7. Call me what u want but these guys have balls. More than any other player in this conflict. Their resilience is shown in their actions. They fight till death and never retreat. We saw what happened in kobane. The worlds greatest superpower took 5 months to drive out the Mujahideen from a town the same size as central park. Daulatul Islam Baqiyah! Allahuakbar

It's not worth responding to the boasting from the IS supporter, but there is a good point to be found in his comment. IS is fighting on multiple fronts. By it's own admission, it has taken 1000 dead at Kobane, and that suggests several thousand wounded. That's just Kobane - one corner of Syria. That's not counting the rebel offensives against IS, ground combat with the SAA, airstrikes in Iraq from the coalition, Iran and the Iraqi air force, combat with the ISF and Shiite militias, etc. How can IS sustain losses at this rate? The highest estimate for IS forces I have seen is 30,000. The Kurds proposed a much larger number, but no one takes that seriously. Assuming 30,000, they might be incurring 10% casualties per month. So where is their manpower shortage? Even if they could smuggle in enough foreign fighters and drum up local Sunni recruits to replace their losses, most of these men would be raw recruits and quality would degrade. At this point, we should be seeing either quantitative or qualitative degradation of IS forces, but I am not seeing it.

"How can you defeat an enemy who looks into the barrel of your gun and sees paradise?" - Russian General during Chechen War

"I bring with me men who desire death as ardently as you desire life" - Khalid bin Walid, Commander of Muslims during Khilafah Rashida

The secret to their success is their total disregard for their own safety, the almost divine courage and determination to either achieve victory or martyrdom. We will never stop. This is Khilafah ala minhaj in Nubuwa.Thousands have come here from all walks of life from all the corners of this earth to build this State, with their blood and sacrifice. We will not give it up so easily Wallah. Your president Bush himself said that once the Khilafah is established it will be impossible to turn the tide against it. Guess he was right. You will never win in sha Allah.

By IS own reports, they suffered little over 24,000 dead from April 2014 to April 2015. Half died fighting ISF, 2,600 died fighting Assad, 4,000 died fighting YPG on all fronts, the remaining is divided amongst all the other groups. Some of these are double entries where US strikes occurred.

They also claim to have recruited 125,000 soldiers and 15,000 soldiers defected.

This is just for Iraq and Syria.

Their foes on the other hand are unable to grow their Armies or scratch build their economies to support their war effort.

As for IS claims to be following the Quran:

They are. Everything they do is backed by the Quran and Hadiths.Don't believe me, read them.

As for their military strategy:

Study Muhammad's and the Rashidun's Army's tactics and strategies and update them for modern technology and you have the IS military in a nutshell.

Mubarizun are largely replaced by the Itishadi in SVBIEDs whose job it is to break the morale of the enemy by hitting the HQs allowing a general advance. The other part is the "Spec Ops" Cells that target poorly defended Sahwat Leaders by a variety of methods and perform Sniper Operations.

Spearmen are the riflemen whose job it is to protect the RPGs and ATGMs who are the Archers.Their trucks allow them to perform karr wa farr at high speeds over vast operational distances with radios that Ibn Khalid barely managed with horse and bird messagers in the run up to conquering Syria.

The Mobile Guard has replaced the horses with AFVs.and Trucks.

Compare the IS conquests to the Rashidun Conquests and similarities start rising fast.

1. 15,000 defected to them from other groups the largest proportion being JAN, sorry I wasn't clear from the latest yearly report IS released.

2. I often see Khalid bin Walid written as Ibn Khalid in Western Sources so much I use it by default even though I should know better. A bad habit I'm trying to break. Forgive me.

What is clear though is like the Rashidun, IS has had its share of tactical setbacks, but consistently maintains its core territories and grabs ever more strategic ground while denying it to their enemies. Which is why IS is saying screw it and blowing Baiji Refinery to hell, they have other refineries, not as big as Baiji but sufficient for their needs.

Lets see winter of 2013/2014 IS contracted 90% when Rebels turned on them and the fought to the death in Raqqah. Winter of 2014/2015 they contracted only 25%.

1. Where has IS laid out all these statistics? Is there a website or some other source?

2. If IS has confirmed 24,000 KIA, what about wounded? If they incurred a WIA;KIA ratio of 4:1, that's 120,000 combined casualties, close to 100% of their claimed force size. Even if we drop the ratio to 3:1 and even if we generously assume that medical care in IS territory is so good that half the WIA were able to return to duty, that would still remove from the battlefield 60,000 fighters out of 125,000 claimed fighters. Thus, in May 2015, we would expect to see either 1) a much smaller IS force overall or 2) an IS force that has maintained its size through new recruitment, but which now has raw, untrained recruits comprising approximately 50% of the force. Thus, using the IS statistics you cited, we should be seeing some degradation in quantity or quality or both.

Would it be possible to fit those to ground launchers and shoot them at Syrian Radar Stations? With more rumors from Raqqah is being silently slaughtered of IS flying the few operational aircraft it has despite US and SyAAF surveillance, I wonder if they could work around the fire control system to ground launch them at Syrian Radars, thus really blinding Assad's eyes in the Sky. Or are they better off rigging them for dumb fire, fire them off in the hopes of hitting something and just to be done with them so they don't have to guard them?

Unlikely as this air launched weapon was designed for MiG-25BM and then, other platforms that IS do not have.Taqba AB just host MiG-21 and a few L-39, both unable to fired this weapon.Then, you need a special pod (Fantasmagoria) to make this system fully functional. At least, I hope that the only reason for the SAA to let this missiles intact (an endless matter of surprise/irritation/interrogation...), is the fact that this harware is inoperational for long (end of service life).Now maybe they will be used as IED (oflr derivative) or DIY Free Rocket Over Ground, with questionable efficency...

I avoid discussions with folk like you because of your warped one track minds. I mean seriously, you're quoting a Russian? The Chechens put up a good fight, but at the end of the day, they bowed down to Putin, whether you like to admit so or not. I am talking history, so don't bring up what you believe will happen in the future. History. As for today, Chechnya is ruled from Moscow. So you might want to attribute that quote to someone else. Maybe an "Iraqi General" or a "Syrian General" or just "some General from some country," for your sake.