Last week’s installment examined charges that Senator Youri Latortue, whom the U.S. Embassy described in a secret cable as possibly “the most brazenly corrupt of leading Haitian politicians,” was involved in drug trafficking, kidnapping, and other illegal activities. We continue our portrait of this powerful politician through secret U.S. Embassy cables provided to Haïti Liberté by the media organization WikiLeaks.

Latortue
vs. Alexis

One of Youri Latortue’s
biggest political rivals was then Prime Minister Jacques Edouard
Alexis, who also hails from Gonaïves. A colleague of Latortue
described how “Senator Latortue paid protestors to
demonstrate and cause disruption to the ceremonies”
celebrating Gonaïves’ anniversary, which Alexis attended, wrote
U.S. Ambassador Janet Sanderson in a Nov. 20, 2006 cable. “Senator
Latortue often exploits local gangs for his own purposes in this
way.”

Sanderson commented at the
end of her cable that “Latortue's activities are a cause for concern given his
presidential ambitions for 2011. Prime Minister Alexis has gone
as far as to ask for the USG [U.S. government] to ‘arrest him’,
as has Préval's advisor Bob Manuel.”

The political skirmishing
between Alexis and Latortue continued throughout 2007, with the
U.S. Embassy following it closely. The biggest row came after “Chief
judge for the court of appeals, Hughes St. Pierre, died in
Port-au-Prince on April 24 in a traffic accident,” Sanderson
reported in a May 15, 2007 cable. The judge was presiding over
the La Scierie trial, in which various Aristide government
officials and policemen were accused of carrying out a “massacre”
in St. Marc, a charge which has since been completely
discredited. “St. Pierre, 75 years-old, was getting off a a
‘tap tap’ (a small truck converted for public transport) on the
busy Delmas thoroughfare when another vehicle struck him. St.
Pierre on April 13 had issued a ruling on a motion to dismiss
the charges brought by several La Scierie defendants, declining
to make a final decision and asking the examining magistrate in
the case to re-examine several witnesses.” Two days after
St. Pierre’s death, former Lavalas deputy Amanus Mayette was
released by the replacement judge, which “unleashed a torrent
of criticism and conspiracy theories from [Lavalas Family] FL
opponents,” who argued that “the La Scierie defendants
would go free and not reveal the involvement of President Préval
and other officials in crimes committed under Aristide.”

Sanderson matter-of-factly
commented at the end: “Apart from trying to link the judge's
death to a government conspiracy to absolve the La Scierie
defendants, Youri Latortue and his allies in the Senate appear
to be using this opportunity to derail justice reform
legislation.”

When Alexis met with
Sanderson later that May, he said that Latortue’s “parliamentary
investigation into the death of [St. Pierre] and calls to remove
the justice minister” were simply an “attack [...]
really directed against him, orchestrated by Youri Latortue,”
the ambassador wrote in a May 25, 2007 cable. Alexis “claimed
that Latortue had organized the demonstrators who had thrown
rocks at him during his visit to Gonaïves... to attend St.
Pierre's funeral.” Alexis said how even his “supporters
among the Gonaïves elite” asked to meet him “outside of
Gonaïves, because they did not feel safe holding the meeting in
the city” because “the local police force was corrupt and
controlled by Latortue.” Sanderson concluded, almost
bemusedly, that even the powerful Prime Minister’s “supporters
in his own home town were running somewhat scared.”

Five days later, Sanderson
wrote Washington that “political observers believe that
Senator Youri Latortue is either instigating or encouraging the
disturbances” in the northwestern city because “ongoing
violence in Gonaïves discredits both the government and MINUSTAH,
raising Latortue's profile as a powerful alternative to the
current order.”

She continued: “While
Youri Latortue may have become something of a combination
boogeyman and pat answer for government officials seeking to
explain their failure to improve conditions in Gonaïves, a
broad spectrum of contacts with knowledge of the situation
almost unanimously believe that Latortue orchestrates an
anti-government/anti-MINUSTAH campaign and manipulates the local
gangs to his own political ends. Specifically, they charge that
Latortue encourages lawlessness in Gonaïves to discredit the
government and to bolster his case for the re-establishment of
Haiti's army, while strengthening his own power base in the
region.”

Latortue’s Charm
Offensive

The U.S. Embassy was
starting to be alarmed at the trouble Latortue was creating – in
a Jun. 20, 2007 cable, for example, Chargé d’Affaires Thomas
Tighe remarked that Youri was “suspected of supporting, if
not participating, in criminal activity.” But perhaps
Latortue had some spies of his own in the Embassy who gave him a
heads-up about Washington’s growing concern, because he
requested a meeting with the Embassy and got it on Jun. 18,
2007.

In a Jun. 27 cable entitled
“YOURI LATORTUE REACHES OUT,” Sanderson describes how the
Senator “expressed his desire to have better relations with
the embassy and expand the reach of his political party”
and “explained that he supported forming an army.” She
noted that “Latortue's profile as a leading opponent of the
government and future presidential candidate has risen sharply
in recent months, even though informed Haitians widely assume
that he was involved in drug trafficking and is still directly
linked to criminal activity in his home base in the Artibonite.”
Alas, she concluded, “Latortue's influence makes it
increasingly difficult for post [the Embassy] to shun him
completely, but we will maintain our policy of keeping him at
arms length.”

Latortue told the Embassy
political officer with whom he met that “his goal was to
transform his organization [LAAA] from a regional to a national
party.”

“Latortue stated that
the international community plays a big role in Haitian affairs
and that he must reach out to it if he is to be a successful,
national political leader,” Sanderson reported. “He
claimed to have had good relations with the US Embassy in the
past, but that the relationship soured beginning in 2004.
Unprompted, Latortue acknowledged that some people believe he is
a drug trafficker. He retorted that these were unsubstantiated
claims by his and his 'uncle's' political
enemies.”

Latortue’s sucking up to
the Embassy appeared to have been rather transparent. “He
closed his remarks on his political ambitions by avowing that he
has always been, and will continue to be, a friend of the United
States” Sanderson wrote. “He said that he receives from
Cuba and Venezuela offers to visit, but always declines because
these countries ‘do not represent his way of thinking.’ He also
claimed to have counseled other government officials and
parliamentarians that accepting these offers would appear to be
playing off the United States and Venezuela/Cuba against each
other.”

Youri also said he favors “an
obligatory one year service for 18-20 year olds” in a new
Haitian “public security force” that “should number
between 1,000-2,000.” (Haiti has tens of thousands of young
men in that age group.)

Although Sanderson flagged
“Latortue's blatant political ambition,” she concluded “in
Haiti's see-no-evil -hear-no-evil political culture, many
Haitians naturally assume that Latortue will play an
increasingly important role in politics as he consolidates his
power, and view him as a serious presidential contender, even as
he becomes the poster-boy for political corruption in Haiti.”

The Embassy kept collecting
many reports from many quarters about Youri’s devilry. For
example, one “civil society representative” (whose name
is removed for his safety) “believed that Gonaïves suffered
from insecurity 'that was a form of opposition to the GoH'
caused by politically ambitious persons, 'some of whom should be
behind bars, but are seeking office. You know who I am talking
about.'” He said that “because of his long established
ties with the gangs, Latortue is part of a strong minority able
to disrupt events that support Prime Minister Alexis, as seen
when demonstrators threw rocks at Alexis during Judge Hugues St.
Pierre's funeral” and “claimed to know definitely that
Latortue is stockpiling arms.”

Youri Wins... for Now

Latortue’s chance to bring
down Alexis’ government came in early 2008, when protest and
eventually food riots began to sweep Haiti over the high cost of
living.

“Senator Youri
Latortue immediately pronounced that the ‘government in power
has failed,’ and that the people's ‘patience has limits,’”
wrote Sanderson in a Feb. 15, 2008 cable. In sharp contrast to
his posture at the U.S. Embassy only eight months earlier,
Latortue “accused the government of pursuing ‘neo-liberal’
policies responding to the demands of ‘international financial
institutions’ rather than to the needs of the Haitian people.”

Sanderson concluded that “ten
percent inflation and sixty percent joblessness have no
short-term cures. The cost of living is an issue tailor-made for
demagoguery and browbeating the government, which Senator
Latortue is spearheading for now.”

On Apr. 12, 2008, the
Haitian Senate ousted Alexis, and it was largely thanks to
you-know-who. “Senator Youri Latortue,... who ultimately
helped engineer the downfall of PM Alexis, accurately predicted
to the Canadian Ambassador Alexis' fall before it happened,”
Sanderson wrote in her Apr. 24, 2008 cable. “It was Senator
Latortue who called for the Senate to vote on Alexis' fate in
the April 12 Senate interpellation.”

Ironically, in meetings
with the U.S. Embassy three months later, Latortue “put the
blame

for the April food riots
on Fanmi Lavalas elements” saying that they were “organizing
the violence.” Sanderson reports in a Jul. 17 cable.
(Ironically, during the food riots, the Lavalas Family had a
large rally in Cité Soleil seeking to calm the population.)

At that same meeting,
Latortue outlined his security program as “1) expanding
Haitian National Police (HNP) coverage of the country... 2)
creating a coordinated national intelligence institution; and 3)
establishing an army or a gendarmerie.”

As usual, Sanderson
concluded with the usual shrug: “With a shady and possibly
criminal past, Latortue is an unavoidable presence in the
Senate... Embassy nevertheless remains conscious of Latortue's
shady past (which may well continue into the present) and of his
possible drug associations. While Latortue is the most
articulate and media-savvy of Senators, his messages to foreign
diplomatic interlocutors are carefully tailored around his
political agenda. Embassy will continue to maintain discreet,
working level contact with Latortue in the interest of gathering
information.”

The New Latortue/Martelly
Alliance

The Embassy cables in 2009
continue to track Latortue’s political challenge to the Préval
camp but also international leeriness of him. For example, a
Jan. 23 cable explains that Michaëlle Jean, then Canada’s
Governor General, on a tour of Haiti “skipped the port city
of Gonaïves to avoid having to meet Artibonite Senator Youri
Latortue who is widely believed to be associated with drug
trafficking and thus unable to get a Canadian visa.”

Also the Haitian President
began to tell the Embassy that he was worried about Latortue’s
rise, according to a May 12, 2009 cable. “These were Préval's
first remarks to the Embassy that he views Artibonite Senator
Youri Latortue -- whose Presidential ambitions are thinly veiled
-- as a political threat,” it reads.

Ironically, neo-Duvalierists
like Youri Latortue and Michel Martelly, with backing from
Washington, did end up knocking Préval’s candidate, Jude
Célestin, out of the March 2011 Presidential run-off. They now
are trying to ram through their pet project of restoring the
Army, but as Rouzier’s rejection shows, Haiti, politically, is “tè
glisse,” or slippery ground.

Meanwhile, Youri Latortue
continues to carry on his business, secure with his
parliamentary immunity and his “je sèch,” approach,
Kreyòl for bald-face lying. For example on Jun. 14, 2011, he
held a book signing for his new title “My Fight in the
Parliament,” a self-serving account of his years as Senator.
In it, he denounces the Aristide and Préval governments’ failure
to carry out judicial reform, the very same reform he worked so
hard to block as Chairman of the Senate’s Justice committee, the
U.S. Embassy cables show.

In the new book, he also
describes how he worked hard in the Parliament to “give the
institution another image.”

Best of all, as he signed his new book, Youri Latortue was also
signing one of his other titles: “The Problem of Drugs.”