Israel Military Intelligence:
Intelligence During the Six-Day War (1967)

by Doron Geller

There were a number of factors that led to the stunning Israeli victory in June
1967. Years before the war broke out Wolfgang Lotz had penetrated the
highest levels of the Egyptian military and political establishments to obtain
vital information on Egypt's defense and contingency plans. Eli
Cohen had done the same in Syria. There were many more like them, who
remain unknown and anonymous.

In August 1966, too, the Iraqi Air Force pilot, Munir Redfa, flew his
Soviet-made MiG-21 to Israel, a defection that benefited Israel greatly in
terms of its Air Force's ability to train against an aerial adversary.

With the founding of the Palestine
Liberation Organization in 1964, existing tensions only increased with the
rise on cross-border infiltration and Arab terrorist attacks on Israelis. The
capture and hanging of Eli Cohen in
Damascus in 1965 only fuelled the flames. Arab attacks in turn led to Israeli
retaliation, culminating in an Israeli dogfight with Syrian planes over the Golan
Heights on April 7, 1967. Syrian gunners had shelled the settlement of
Tel-Katzir below the Golan Heights shortly beforehand. The Israeli Air Force
sent out IAF planes to take
out Syrian guns, Syrian planes rose up to defend them, and the IAF shot down 6
Syrian planes to no Israeli losses.

Chief of Israeli General Staff Yitzhak
Rabin warned that Israel would not remain passive in the face of
provocation. The Syrians, alarmed by their show of weakness, were nervous
about Israeli conclusions and intentions. Thus the Syrians looked to the
Egyptians to back them up.

Nasser, as the undisputed leader of the Arab world, took up the challenge.
On May 14 and 15 lead units of two Egyptian divisions rolled into the Sinai
Peninsula. He placed the Egyptian Army on full alert.

The move took the Israeli Intelligence Services by surprise. According to
Service estimates, the Arab armies would not be ready for war until 1969-70.
The Egyptians had large numbers of forces tied down in Yemen backing the
anti-Saudi, anti-royalist forces there. In addition, since the conclusion of
the Sinai War of 1956, the Sinai
had been effectively demilitarized. United Nations peacekeeping forces had
been stationed there as an Israeli precondition for the withdrawal of her
forces from the Sinai following the war.

It was true that as early as 1960, following skirmishes on the
Israeli-Syrian border, Egypt had sent large forces into the Sinai with the
intention of "deterring Israel from attacking Syria." But the
Egyptian troop deployments of May 1967 were different. "Unlike 1960, when
the Egyptians had entered secretly so that their eventual withdrawal could be
low-key and honorable, there was no radio silence in this operation, no
secrecy; in fact, the sight of Egyptian tanks in a bright sand camouflage en
route to push the Jews into the sea was covered with great glee by the Arab
media."

Israeli Military Intelligence (Aman) had only a few hours' advance warning
of the Egyptian move into Sinai. Even so Aman was not overly worried. The
Israelis thought that Nasser "would order his army and tanks to withdraw
after a show of force had put Israel in its place." This was despite the
fact that the Soviets were clearly stirring up trouble in the region.
"Perhaps wishing to instigate a conflict in order to humiliate Israel, or
to instill a sense of invincibility in the Arab camp, the Soviets gave the
Egyptians and Syrians false information about nonexistent IDF troop movements and about American intentions.'" On May 13, the Soviets
had told Anwar Sadat, Nasser's deputy
who was on a visit to Moscow, that Israeli troops "were massing and
intended to invade Syria." The Soviet leader had mentioned 11-13 Israeli
brigades massing on the border with Syria, of which Sadat quickly informed
Nasser.

The Soviets probably did not intend war. They thought both Israel and the
Arabs would stop short of the brink, but they were wrong. It seems the Soviets
completely underestimated Israel's ability and willingness to defend her
rights. In a by now rather famous conversation Moshe Sneh (leader of the
Israel Communist Party) had with the Soviet ambassador to Israel, Sneh said:
"'Israel will win the war.' The Soviet ambassador responded: 'Who will
fight? The espresso boys and the pimps of Dizengoff Street?'"

Still, on May 15-16, the Israelis were confident. That changed on May 16,
when Nasser asked UN Secretary-General U Thant to withdraw UN forces from the
Sinai. U Thant quickly complied,
leaving no international forces between Egypt's army in the Sinai and Israel's
borders. In fact, the speed with which U Thant complied with Nasser's request
may have surprised even Nasser. If Nasser's intentions were only to bluff,
then, having gone this far, he could not pull back from the brink for reasons
of face.

By May 19 the Egyptians had deployed six divisions in the Sinai. Israeli
Intelligence chief Meir Amit "proposed that Israel publish abroad aerial
reconnaissance photographs of the massive Egyptian deployment…" with
the idea of justifying Israel's mobilization of her reserves, which had begun
on May 16. However, the Israeli leadership rejected the suggestion.

On May 20 Israeli Intelligence learned that Nasser had recalled three
Egyptian brigades from Yemen. This was ominous. The same day Egyptian forces
took over Sharm El-Sheik, at the southern tip of the Sinai Peninsula. At
midnight on May 22 Nasser announced the closure of the Straits of Tiran, at
the entrance of the Gulf of Aqaba, thus closing off Israel's only shipping
route through the Red Sea. This was a clear causus belli, which had
been understood since 1956 - Israel's shipping routes through the Red Sea
would not be impeded.

Military Intelligence Chief Aharon Yariv attended the Cabinet meeting the
following morning in Tel-Aviv, with Prime Minister Levi
Eshkol present. He announced: "'The post-Suez period is over…It is
not merely a question of freedom of navigation. If Israel does not respond to
the closure of the Straits, there will be no value to its credibility or to
the IDF's deterrent power, because the Arab states will interpret Israel's
weakness as an excellent opportunity to assail her security and her very
existence.'" He called for immediate military action, as did Air Force
chief (and Israel's current president) Ezer
Weizmann.

Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin was more
reserved but on May 23 he agreed with Yariv's and Weizmann's assessment that
Israel should take the initiative and make the first strike. But Prime
Minister Levi Eshkol preferred to
continue with the diplomatic route, hoping that Western powers would solve the
issue.

On May 30 King Hussein of Jordan
made a surprise visit to Nasser in Cairo. While there had been a lot of
animosity between Nasser and Hussein in the past, they made up and signed a
mutual defense pact. Jordan was brought "into a joint military command
with Egypt." An Egyptian general was put in command of Arab forces on the
Jordanian front.

While Soviet warnings may have preempted the crisis and U Thant's decision
to withdraw UN forces upon Nasser's request deepened it, the joint
Egyptian-Jordanian military pact made war almost inevitable.

On June 2 the Israeli Cabinet decided in principle on war. The military
realized the dangers of waiting any longer: more Egyptian troops would arrive
from Yemen, and the Soviet Union would continue with its supply of weapons to
Egypt. Moreover, it was understood that the United States and Washington would
do nothing to break Nasser's blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba.

More than that, Military Intelligence was also aware of the weakness of
Egyptian preparations and morale. Yariv asserted that "the Egyptians were
still busy pushing units across the canal and were doing so in such haste that
some of their troops had been left without food and water for two days
running." Some of them arrived at the front in traditional Arab peasant
dress, "as there had not been time to issue them with uniforms."

Mossad Chief Meir Amit returned from consultations in Washington and was
convinced that the Americans supported an Israeli first strike. On June 4 the
Cabinet decided on war, and on the morning of June 5, the Israeli attack
began.

Egyptian pilots woke up to the sounds of their planes exploding on the
ground that morning. The Israeli Air Force destroyed 304 out of 419 Egyptian
aircraft on the ground, 53 out of 112 Syrian planes, and Jordan's entire 28
plane Air Force. The IAF even struck at Iraq's western most airbase at
Habbaniya, destroying ten planes on the ground.

Israel's main attack on the Egyptian airbase came in two waves. IAF planes
flew over the Mediterranean and then east to attack Egypt's Sinai bases. At
12:15 p.m. Israel attacked the Syrian and Jordanian Air Forces, putting them
mostly out of action. With the Arab Air Forces out of the way, Israel rolled
into the Sinai, Jerusalem and the West Bank and took them over completely
within three days. On the sixth day of the war Israel took the Golan Heights,
putting the northern Galilee out of the range of Syrian guns, as well.

Israel's tremendous military success came not only as a result of the high
level of training, expertise and courage of her pilots and soldiers, but also
as a result of accurate intelligence. As Samuel Katz writes; "It is safe
to assume that in no time in the history of modern warfare has a nation been
equipped with such an intimate portrait of the enemy's disposition,
deployment, abilities and inabilities as was the IDF…on the morning of June
5, 1967." King Hussein of Jordan later said; "'Their pilots knew
exactly what to expect…their pilots had a complete catalogue of the most
minute details of each of the thirty-two Arab air bases, what objectives to
strike, where, when and how. We had nothing like that.'" Israel's
Intelligence had been so attentive that they knew the exact timing of Egyptian
patrols and their air routes. Air Force commander Motti Hod told Chief of
Staff Yitzhak Rabin on June 4: "'For the past two weeks, we have been
keeping a watch on the precise movements of the Egyptian air force…at first
light they take off on patrol, staying up for an hour. Then they return to
base and go off for breakfast. Between seven and eight, everything is dead,
and 7:45 in the morning is the ideal time for us.'" That was the exact
time that the Israeli Air Force struck.

The groundwork for the successful penetration of the Egyptian and Syrian
militaries was laid by Wolfgang Lotz and Eli Cohen, but many other spies, both
Israelis and Arabs - and sometimes European or American non-Jews - also worked
on behalf of Israel. Ali al-Alfi, the masseur to both Nasser and his successor
Anwar el-Sadat, may have spied on behalf of Israel. He was accused by the
Egyptians of doing so and was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment in 1979.

Anwar Ephraim was a Military Intelligence agent who was believed to be
"responsible for organizing a massive and, if reports of the celebration
are correct, frenzied party for the pilots of (an air force base) just outside
of Alexandria. The party was thrown on June 4, "less than twelve hours
before the preemptive Israeli blitz…" They drank and ate and watched
belly dancers until the "wee hours of the morning", and a little
before Israeli pilots prepared for takeoff, Ephraim left Egypt on an
international flight. Another Israeli became a close personal friend of an
Egyptian belly dancer, who was presumed to have been privy to many state
secrets.

An Egyptian officer provided much valuable information to the Israeli Army
in the days leading up to the Israeli preemptive strike of June 5. Nor was
Israeli Intelligence restricted to the Egyptian or even the Syrian Military.
They had accurate knowledge of Jordanian politcal and military installations
too. "After the war Samir ar-Rifai (an assistant to King Hussein), told
Western reporters that a lone IAF Super Mystere had attacked King Hussein's
office in the Royal Palace in Amman on the afternoon of 5 June. The Israeli
plane 'machine-gunned the king's office at point-blank range with a precision
and knowledge of its target that was stupefying,' ar-Rifai said.

The Israelis had also invented or made good use of existing electronic
gadgets to decipher enemy movements or intentions, as well as to listen in on
conversations.

The best-known example of Israel's technical ability and advantage during
the 1967 War was the capturing of a conversation between Nasser and King
Hussein of Jordan on the second day of the war, June 6. At the time most of
Nasser's Air Force had been wiped out, but he didn't tell that to King
Hussein. Nevertheless, things were not going well for either of them, as can
be understood from the conversation:

"Nasser: How are you? The brother (Nasser referring to Hussein) wants
to know if the fighting is going on all along the front…Do you know that the
US is participating alongside Israel in the war? Should we announce
this?…Should we say that the US and Britain (are participating) or only the
US? (Nasser later did broadcast that the Americans had taken part in the
initial, decisive air assault, in order to explain away the defeat.)

Hussein: The US and England.

Nasser: Does Britain have aircraft carriers?

Hussein: (Unclear)

Nasser: Good. King Hussein will make an announcement and I will make an
announcement… we will make sure that the Syrians (also) make an announcement
that American and British aircraft are using their aircraft carriers against
us…(Meanwhile), our aircraft have been attacking Israel's airfields since
this morning."

This conversation was carried out over the public telephone system and was
tapped "by two veteran Aman (Military Intelligence) officers using Second
World War vintage equipment." Their commanding officer told them
"'It's worth millions. Make four copies.'"

Aman Chief Aharon Yariv opposed the publication of the conversation,
fearing that it would reveal the extent of Israel's eavesdropping capabilities
and thus encourage the Arabs to upgrade their systems. But he was overruled by
Defense Minister Moshe Dayan and Prime Minister Levi
Eshkol, who believed it would have great political effect; the
conversation would show that the Arab leaders would shamelessly lie for their
own ends (and to make it appear as if Israel was incapable of such military
action on her own), as well as to drive a wedge between Nasser and Hussein.
The message made it clear that despite the fact that Nasser was aware of the
heavy losses he had suffered at that point, he neglected to inform his ally
Hussein.

The publication of the conversation indeed did lead "the Arabs to
considerably upgrade their communications security, rendering Aman's
electronic eavesdropping much more difficult. One senior intelligence officer
said later that the publication cost Israel 60 per cent of its Sigint (Signal
Interception) capability in the Arab states.'" On the other hand, the
Arabs no longer knew if what they said was being heard or not.

At 2 p.m. on June 6, Military Intelligence made a very important
interception in terms of ground operations "of Nasser's general order to
his forces in Sinai to fall back to the Suez Canal, following the major
breakthroughs by Israeli divisions led by General Israel Tal (on the northern
Sinai axis) and General Ariel Sharon (southern axis) early that day. This enabled the IDF General Staff to decide
on opening an offensive against Syria in the southern Golan Heights three days
later."

The Israeli breaking of the Egyptian military code enabled them to confuse
the Egyptian army and air force with false orders. Israeli officers
"ordered an Egyptian MiG pilot to release his bombs over the sea instead
of carrying out an attack on Israeli positions." When the pilot
questioned the veracity of the order, the Israeli Intelligence officer gave
the pilot details on his wife and family." The pilot indeed dropped his
bombs over the Mediterranean and parachuted to safety.

Another major incident occurred when an Israeli Intelligence agent
impersonated an Egyptian officer and instructed a lost battalion in the Sinai
away from Israeli lines. After the ceasefire was declared the Aman officer
guided the Egyptian unit towards a POW camp, where the Egyptian tanks and
soldiers were taken under Israeli control.

Israeli Intelligence also confused the Egyptian Army about its real
intentions regarding invasion routes. These broadcasts worked so well that
major Egyptian units waited for advancing Israeli tank units that never came -
they had simply bypassed the Egyptians and made their way all the way to the
Suez Canal.

Many other measures of Israeli Intelligence ingenuity never came to light.
But Intelligence played a major part in the winning of the war. In the years
to come, with greatly expanded borders acquired as a result of the 1967 War,
Israeli Intelligence at all levels would grow in importance and sophistication
as she struggled to deal with the new challenges, many of them unforeseen
before the great victory of 1967.