German Intelligence and the CIA supported

Al Qaeda sponsored Terrorists in Yugoslavia

Both the CIA and German intelligence (BND) supported the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), a terrorist organization with links to Al Qaeda.

This report by the German TV ZDF Network, reviewed by Mira Beham, is revealing in many regards.

First the report corroborates earlier analysis on the role of the BND and the CIA in supporting the KLA, several years prior as well as in the wake of the 1999 bombing of Yugoslavia.

Second, it further documents and confirms the KLA's links to Al Qaeda and the role of the latter in the Kosovo conflict:

"What German journalists and their Dutch colleagues at VPRO Radio Television investigated has a long tradition. Since the beginning of the 1990s the BND has maintained contacts with the
KLA, which was then considered to be a terrorist organization. Although we have to admit that the KLA has stronger ties with the CIA than the BND. Commander Hoxha had ties with the CIA, the BND and with the Austrian
military intelligence service which has devoted great attention to this region and has very good connections with the KLA."

Despite its links to organized crime and Al Qaeda, the KLA rebel army had been skillfully heralded by the Western media in the months preceding the 1999 NATO bombings as broadly representative of
the interests of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. Its leader Hashim Thaci had been "designated" (by US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright) as chief negotiator at the Rambouillet peace talks.

The fact of the matter is that the Atlantic Alliance had been supporting a terrorist organization. The KLA was not supporting the rights of ethnic Albanians. Quite the opposite.

The activities of this terrorist organization on the ground, in Kosovo, provided NATO and the US with the pretext to intervene on humanitarian grounds, claiming that the Serb authorities had
committed human rights violations against ethnic Albanians, when in fact the NATO sponsored KLA was involved in terrorist acts on behalf of NATO, which triggered a response from the Serb police and military.

"Just War"

Broadly speaking, the bombing of Yugoslavia had the support of Western public opinion, on humanitarian grounds.

NATO's mandate was broadly accepted. The geopolitics behind the war were never brought out. The militarisation of the Balkans and the setting up a US military presence was not an issue.

No coherent antiwar movement was launched in relation to Yugoslavia, despite the fact that the invasion of Kosovo was in violation of international law.

A disinformation campaign had been launched. Several leftist intellectuals and civil society activists claimed that this was a "just war".

The KLA, despite its shady connections was also supported by several sectors of the progressive left, which had described the KLA as a "Liberation Movement".

In retrospect, the antiwar movement developed belatedly in relation to the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

NGOs and trade union organizations broadly endorsed the just war interpretation, both in relation to Yugoslavia (1999) and Afghanistan (2001), without understanding how in both cases, the US had
fabricated a pretext, based on a phony humanitarian mandate.

The interrelationship between the wars in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq were misunderstood. The pretext for invading Kosovo had been fabricated, yet public opinion was led to believe that NATO had come the rescue of ethnic Albanians. In the words of Richard Falk:

The Kosovo War was a just war because it was undertaken to avoid a likely instance of “ethnic cleansing” undertaken by the Serb leadership of former Yugoslavia, and it
succeeded in giving the people of Kosovo an opportunity for a peaceful and democratic future. It was a just war despite being illegally undertaken without authorization by the United Nations, and despite being waged in a
manner that unduly caused Kosovar and Serbian civilian casualties, while minimizing the risk of death or injury on the NATO side.

The Afghanistan War was again controversial in relation to the just war tradition. It seems to qualify as an instance of defensive necessity in view of the high risks of harm
associated with the heavy al Qaeda presence in the country, and its demonstrated capacity and will after September 11 to inflict severe harm on the United States in the future. Again, as with Kosovo, the means used and
the ends raised serious doubts about the just means and just ends of the war. The American failure to assume the risks of ground warfare in order to carry out the mission of destroying the al Qaeda presence, as well as
the failure to convert the battlefield outcomes into a durable peace, raise doubts about the overall justice of the war.

The reference in the report to Macedonia is crucial to an understanding of 9/11 and the war on terrorism, because it confirms that US military advisers had integrated a terrorist paramilitary
organization linked to Al Qaeda, barely a few weeks before 9/11.

Moreover, it also confirms that US paratroopers were sent in to save the Al Qaeda sponsored fighters and their US military advisers.

"Samedin Xhezairi, also known as Commander Hoxha, joined the Kosovo Liberation Army when armed conflict in Kosovo began, fighting in three operation zones. He was a fighter in Chechnya,
trained in Afghanistan and acted as the commander of the Mujahideen 112th Brigade operating in the summer of 2001 in the region of Tetovo [Macedonia]. In August of the same year 80 members of the 3/502 battalion of U.S.
paratroopers evacuated him from Aracinovo [Macedonia], together with his Albanian extremists and 17 instructors of the U.S. private military company MPRI which was training the Albanian paramilitary formations."

In other words, the US military was collaborating with Al Qaeda, which according to the Bush administration was involved in the attacks on the WTC and the Pentagon.

Yet, the US military was working hand in glove with "enemy number one" barely a few weeks before 9/11, and we are led to believe that the Bush administration is committed to waging
a battle against Al Qaeda.

Michel Chossudovsky, 15 February 2005

NIN, Belgrade, Serbia, Serbia-Montenegro November 25, 2004

WHEN INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS FAN FLAMES

German ZDF television presents serious accusations against German intelligence (BND) in relation to the March "pogroms" directed against the Serb population in Kosovo.

by Mira Beham

In two segments of more than four minutes each broadcast on November 18 and 20 as major news during the main news program, ZDF reporters documented the following: that the German intelligence
service (BND - Bundesnachrichtendienst) knew three weeks prior to March 17 that organized attacks on Serbs throughout Kosovo and Metohija were being prepared; that the BND knew this because it was tapping the
conversations of one of the organizers of the pogrom; that this man's name is Samedin Xhezairi, also known as Commander Hoxha; and that Xhezairi, for his part, was a BND spy but also an intermediary between Albanian
extremists and al-Q'aida. The reporters cited transcripts of conversations from the intelligence services as well as confidential NATO documents, and the dilemmas they opened, directly and indirectly, were why BND did
not relay the information to the German government, and through it to the commander of the German Kfor contingent in Prizren and Holger Kammerhof, then commander in chief of NATO troops in Kosovo? Could the violence have
been prevented if key political and military structures in Berlin and Kosovo and Metohija had received timely information from the German intelligence officers? And finally - with what kind of suspicious characters is
the BND cooperating?

The quick reaction of the German government confirmed that the information obtained by the ZDF was "hot". The very next day after the broadcast of the first part, government spokesperson
Bela Anda sharply denied at a press conference ZDF claims that the BND but not the German troops in the field knew that Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija were preparing violence against the Serbs. Anda emphasized that the
BND and the German Army had been in "an agreement regarding the assessment of the situation" but refused to comment on cooperation between the BND and the extremist Xhezairi.

The German and Austrian media accepted the ZDF news and the government reaction. The Austrian paper "Kurier", for example, placed the headline of "Al-Q'aida fanned the violence in
Kosovo" above its report. Although things are indeed serious they are not quite as simple as the headline suggests.

NIN's journalist accompanied the ZDF journalists during their investigations in this region and also learned additional information. Thanks to the exclusive information at our disposal we can put
together pieces of a jigsaw puzzle still far from complete but clear enough to be able to recognize the contours of a somber scenario.

The protagonist of this story is Samedin Xhezairi, also known as Commander Hoxha, an Austrian citizen, originally from Albania, who today lives in Prizren [in Kosovo]. Last week we presented
general information about him. To that we shall add that Xhezairi lived in Austria and joined the Kosovo Liberation Army when armed conflict in Kosovo began, fighting in three operation zones. He was a fighter n
Chechnya, trained in Afghanistan and acted as the commander of the Mujahideen 112th Brigade operating in the summer of 2001 in the region of Tetovo [Macedonia]. In August of the same year 80 members of the 3/502
battalion of U.S. paratroopers evacuated him from Aracinovo [Macedonia], together with his Albanian extremists and 17 instructors of the U.S. private military company MPRI which was training the Albanian paramilitary
formations.

According to confidential NATO information from 2002 prepared by the German intelligence services BND and ZNBw (Zentrum für Nachrichtenwesen der Bundeswehr), Xhezairi has been tasked with forming
a branch of Allah's Army - Hezbollah, and his telephone number has been found in confiscated documents from identified members of al-Q'aida. Samedin Xhezairi is an active member of the KLA Veterans' Association, which is
collecting money for "humanitarian aid" through a German bank. The Albanians consider him to be a charismatic "holy man" and count him among the most eminent Albanian leaders.

The same NATO information presented to KFOR Headquarters on May 17, 2002 indicates that his involvement with Islamist elements in Kosovo is far reaching. At the center of local Islamist structures
in Prizren is Hoxha Mazlumi who is active in the Jeni Mahala ("New settlement") mosque. Through his closest associates, including Xhezairi, Mazlumi has established an organization with his own paramilitary
units, intelligence service and logistical, financial and propaganda network. Through his people Mazlumi has ties to the [the UN sponsored] Kosovo Protection Corps, the Kosovo Police Service, UNMIK [UN Mission in Kosovo]
and al-Q'aida.

The NATO documents state that the potential intentions and capabilities of Mazlumi's organization are "quick mobilization of the masses for demonstrations, fanning of aggressive stance among
the non-Islamist population toward Kfor, development of an Islamist dam [sic] in Prizren, initiation of unrest to demonstrate the failure of the international community, taking advantage of the fact that Kosovska
Mitrovica in the center of Kfor's attention, while the south of Kosovo is under less observation by international forces..."

Breaking news -BND admission

At the printing deadline for this issue of NIN we have learned that BND chief August Hanning has admitted that the ZDF documents also in NIN's possession are authentic.

Thus, it was known for at least two years that in Prizren a cell of extremist Islamists was being born right under the eyes of German Kfor. It is not surprising that the temperature in that city
jumped when ZDF journalists arrived and began to ask awkward questions of both the German troops and the Islamist extremists. At the same time, it is interesting that the Germans were less talkative than their temporary
neighbors. They stuck firmly to the official version of events: no one knew anything about the preparation of the March pogroms; German Kfor, like all members of international forces throughout Kosovo, were caught by
surprise by the violence, and consequently unable to react adequately. When confronted with evidence that the BND was informed about the preparations by Albanian terrorists, the German soldiers categorically rejected
every possibility of being privy to the information themselves.

Unlike them, Samedin Xhezairi was not particularly reluctant to admit some things to the German reporters even though his nervousness was apparent. He warned his collocutors no less than four
times that they must show the report they were preparing to the BND before broadcasting it. According to him, the BND had to put its stamp of approval on reporters' discoveries. Apparently, Xhezairi understood this to be
an obligation on his part toward his former employers. Commander Hoxha did not deny working for the BND as a spy but he depicted this as some form of entertainment. He did not deny having taken part in the recorded
conversations regarding the preparation of the violence nor did he reject the fact that organized structures exist: "We are former fighters; we know each other just like U.S. veterans. As long as people are alive,
these structures exist."

He also explained the use of coded conversations to the German reporters: "You agree beforehand that, for example, the word 'health' means 'liquidate him' and then you just say 'health' and
the people tapping your conversation don't know what it means." In fact, the conversations Xhezairi took part in at the end of February and beginning of March were not very well coded, and any listener with an
average education level could understand them, let alone intelligence service experts. It was said, for example, that "in two or three weeks the party will begin" and that "in Prizren everything is
prepared for a hot party"; then it was asked whether the collocutor "can guarantee it will be a blast in Urosevac?". Some of Xhezairi's collocutors also complained that they still had not organized enough
buses to transport the activists. According to transcripts in the possession of ZDF journalists, Samedin Xhezairi commanded the March operations in Prizren and Urosevac, and probably in Orahovac, too. The BND knew, but
they were not alone.

NIN also received confirmation of this from German intelligence service expert Erich Schmidt-Eenboom who told us: "Until March 4 - two weeks before the pogroms - Commander Hoxha was a BND spy
paid 500 euros per month, probably more because of his connections with al-Q'aida than because of Kosovo. On March 4 he was deactivated after the BND learned from partner services - probably the Austrian military
intelligence service - that they were tapping his conversations. The BND advised him of this fact." According to some sources, after this discovery Xhezairi fled to Bosnia, returning immediately prior to March 17 to
Prizren. It is not known whether someone temporarily removed him or if he left for personal reasons. What is known, and what Erich Schmidt-Eenboom confirmed for NIN, is the fact that Xhezairi was working for at least one
other intelligence service, the CIA. That is why U.S. paratroopers evacuated him in 2001 from Aracinovo.

Some German media and politicians these days are not even questioning the reliability of the ZDF reports according to which the BND was aware of the criminal activities of its collaborator
Xhezairi. For example, the spokesperson of the Greens on defense matters, Winfried Nachtwei, stated that the ZDF investigations are based on "fairly solid and certain indications". And former coordinator of the
German secret services in the government Bernd Schmidbauer said that the ZDF information regarding the suspect role of the BND "must be taken very seriously" and requires a thorough investigation into lack of
communication between the BND and the German Army.

The statements of Nachtwei and Schmidbauer follow a scandal after the March events in Kosovo in which German defense minister Peter Struck and his army were implicated. Struck and the German
contingent in Kosovo found themselves in the limelight after media reports revealed that at the time of the attack by Albanian terrorists there had been chaos among the German troops and that the burned body of a Serb
man had been found in Prizren even though Struck later claimed that there were no casualties in the German area of responsibility. The latest revelations regarding the role of the BND correspond with this stunning
picture of disorganization on the part of German military and security structures. If the BND had the information and failed to forward it to the government and army, that means there is no help for anyone dependent on
the protection by state institutions. That is the approximate image of the intelligence service and the army among the German public at present.

However, Erich Schmidt-Eenboom categorically rejects this interpretation and tells NIN that the German government spokesperson was telling the truth in his denial of the ZDF report: "The BND
certainly informed the Chancellor's cabinet. It is inconceivable that the BND failed to do so under the present political conditions and good cooperation with the German government. The statement of spokesperson Anda is
correct - the BND and the German Army had a 'mutually agreed picture of the situation'. That means that the German contingent in Prizren and its commander colonel Hinkelmann consciously failed to respond to the attacks,
that they allowed everything to happen in order to avoid coming into direct contact with the Albanians. Because the consequence of having done so would have been Albanian violence against the German Army, and that would
have ruined the good image of the peacekeeping mission. The irony of the whole story is that the German government and the KLA have a common final goal: an independent state of Kosovo without territorial concessions to
the Serbs. The only difference is that Berlin also needs to be careful with respect to the timeline as far as allies who still oppose this goal are concerned, as is the case with France."

Schmidt-Eenboom also reminds of the history of cooperation between the BND and the KLA: "What German journalists and their Dutch colleagues at VPRO Radio Television investigated has a long
tradition. Since the beginning of the 1990s the BND has maintained contacts with the KLA, which was then considered to be a terrorist organization. Although we have to admit that the KLA has stronger ties with the CIA
than the BND. Commander Hoxha had ties with the CIA, the BND and with the Austrian military intelligence service which has devoted great attention to this region and has very good connections with the KLA."

Such facts, of course, are not mentioned in the media and among the general public in Germany because life is not easy for those who reveal such information. After the ZDF reports were broadcast
the BND launched a campaign against one of the authors, journalist Franz Josef Hutsch and began to spread stories in Berlin that his revelations are based on false information from Serbian intelligence services, and that
he is pro-Serb because he was a defense witness in the Milosevic trial and after that gave an interview to NIN. As far as the German public is concerned, being pro-Serb is pretty much as bad as being, for example, a
member of al-Q'aida.

However, the editors of ZDF strongly support Hutsch, as Hans-Ulrich Gack, one of the co-authors of the controversial broadcasts, tells NIN. There is even more compromising material for the BND and
the German government, and now everyone is waiting for the further unfolding of events.

The German public, for example, still does not know what NIN reported last week: that terrorist structures in Kosovo are being systematically armed by state-of-the-art G-22 sniper rifles, which
are arriving in the southern Serbian province in large quantities. Taking into account the fact that Commander Hoxha stated in his interview for German television that he can immediately mobilize 30,000 fighters, and
that "it is no longer necessary to wait for the spring for a new attack; all we need is a spark" the German public may suddenly find itself confronted by new-old questions without clear answers: Who will be to
blame if the Albanian terrorists carry out yet another, perhaps final ethnic cleansing in Kosovo? Can Kfor protect the Serbs from new violence, and is it even in their interest to do so? Are Islamist fundamentalist cells
being born in Kosovo under the eyes of the peacekeeping forces? Could they even become a threat to Europe? Are Western intelligence sources participating, actively or passively, in this process and thus creating a new
army of "Taliban" who will one day turn against them? And so on and so on...

There are so many questions and the answers are wrapped in a veil of silence or consciously obscured. It appears that both the Serbian public and Serbian politicians are reluctant to face
important facts. We have not heard any official statements following the news from Germany while "The National television of European Serbia", for example, reported on the whole issue as if Kosovo and Metohija
were some province in the Congo, not one whose fate is still, at least rhetorically, tied in with Serbia's state interests. It would appear that these matters are of interest only to "the dark forces of the
past" whose days are numbered.

Translated by KDN

Albanian rebel veterans reportedly organized March riots Kosovo

Radio B92 text web site, Belgrade, in English 1418 GMT 20 Nov 04

Text of report in English by Belgrade-based Radio B92 text web site on 20 November

Vienna, 20 November 2004

The March protests that turned into acts of violence against Kosovo Serbs were planned a long time before they occurred, according to Samedin Dzezairi Xhesairi , an Austrian citizen who worked for
the BND, the German Intelligence Agency.

Dzezairi said that prior to the riots he had constantly been warning officials that "the situation in Kosovo could take a turn for the radical, and all that was needed was one spark to ignite
the explosion".

According to Dzezairi, who has been linked to working with the American CIA as well, an organization of veterans and former members of the Kosovo Liberation Army KLA, UCK in Albanian were
responsible for planning the March riots. This same organization organized the demonstrations against UNMIK UN Mission in Kosovo prior to the riots.

Although Dzezairi does not deny that the March riots in Kosovo were meticulously planned out, he firmly denied reports from German newspapers that claim that the KLA is linked to the Al-Qa'idah.

November 19, 2004

GERMAN GOVERNMENT REJECTS ALLEGATIONS ON KOSOVO INFORMATION

"Government: BND did not withhold any Kosovo information"

DDP News Agency, Berlin, in German 1116 GMT 19 Nov 04

Berlin: The Federal Government has rejected allegations by a ZDF television report that the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) had information about planned assaults weeks before the Kosovo
(March) riots. Government Spokesman Bela Anda said in Berlin on Friday (19 November) that the report about the BND having intentionally kept back or withheld security-relevant information is "completely
unfounded." The BND and the Bundeswehr (German Federal Armed Forces) had "a common, coordinated picture of the situation" of the March riots, he said. Anda declined to respond to accusations to the effect
that the BND had an informer in the Kosovar circles that were responsible for the March riots. Referring to eavesdropping protocols of several intelligence services, ZDF television reported that a certain Samedin
Xhesairi (nom de guerre Hoxha) had prepared the acts of violence in southern Kosovo as early as at the end of February. Several sources had confirmed that Hoxha was a paid informer of the German intelligence service, it
was reported.

In the official version that has been presented to date both NATO and the German Kfor (NATO-led international Kosovo Force) had been surprised by the ethnic clashes in the Serbian province
inhabited by Albanians. In the riots, 19 people were killed and more than 1,000 injured. Moreover, Serbian Orthodox institutions and churches were the target of attacks and were burned down in the German area of
responsibility in southern Kosovo.

Although it has been relatively quiet in Kosovo since the unrest of 17 and 18 March, people fear that the conflict might flare up again. Xhesairi told ZDF: "A spark is enough to trigger off
such riots at any time. Together with former UCK (Kosovo Liberation Army) forces, we are in a position to mobilize 30,000 guerilla fighters."

BBC Translation Services

Copyright BBC and DDP, 2004

November 24, 2004

FORMER KOSOVO LIBERATION ARMY MEMBER DENIES AL-QAEDA INTELLIGENCE LINKS

Excerpt from report on interview with Samidin Xhezairi by Blerim Xhemajli and Zija Miftari: "Hoxha says he admires butterflies, birds, wants to make cartoons",

published by Kosovo Albanian newspaper Koha Ditore on 22 November 2004

Prizren, 21 November 2004: The German media have called him (Samidin Xhezairi, alias Hoxha) an informer of the German (Federal) Intelligence Service ( BND) , as well as a person linked to Al-Qa'idah
and the CIA. In the meantime, he says that he is working on the production of the first cartoon in the Albanian language, as well as on filming the first Albanian-language natural science documentary on birds and
butterflies.

There are also some assertions that he has fought in Chechnya, has trained in Afghanistan, and was a commander of a unit of mujahidin who operated in the region of Tetove (Tetovo) in summer 2001.

According to a confidential NATO report from 2002 quoted by the media, Xhezairi's task is to erect a branch of "God's Army" (Hezbollah) in Kosova (Kosovo), while his telephone number was
also found among the confiscated documents of identified members of Al-Qa'idah.

In a conversation with Koha Ditore, Samidin Xhezairi, known for his participation in the two wars in Kosova and Macedonia, where he was nicknamed Hoxha, denies having connections with intelligence
services and with the world's number one terrorist organization. He more or less denies everything that has been said about him over the past few days and earlier. "It is not true that I am an informer of the German
Intelligence Service. I believe this answer is enough," he said, when asked whether it is true that he has links with this service.

Xhezairi has been accused of organizing the (March) riots in Prizren, Ferizaj (Urosevac) and elsewhere in Kosova. Meanwhile, based on a protocol of a taped conversation by the German Intelligence
Service, which was never made public but was mentioned by German ZDF television, he told his partners in Ferizaj over the telephone to prepare for a hot party.

According to contradictory German journalist Hutsch, three weeks before the March riots Xhezairi called on his partners in the Ferizaj area to "stir up the atmosphere". A few days later,
Hoxha concluded that everything was ready for a "hot party". However, while Hutsch refers to surveillance protocols, ZDF did not publish any facsimiles of those protocols. In the meantime, Xhezairi denies
having connections with organizing the March riots, while he calls the conversation listened to by the German Intelligence Service a misunderstanding.

"Heute Journal quoted the following words heard when listening to my telephone: 'We need a bus.' Unfortunately this statement was sufficient for the intelligence services to say that the
March events were organized. They forgot that on 17 March the hospital in Mitrovice (Kosovska Mitrovica) requested from Kosovars aid in terms of doctors, nurses and medicines. I was asked if there was a possibility to
organize aid for the clinical centre. My answer was that, the moment you need aid, Prizren is able to help you with doctors, nurses and medicines," he said. He added: "This is just to illustrate what the
intelligence services of foreign states in Kosova are using."

Furthermore, he denies having been questioned or his house having been searched by the police following the accusations that he is the organizer of these riots, although he is aware that his
entire family and friends are being kept under surveillance.

Xhezairi states under constant surveillance since 1999

"From 1999 to date they have tried to follow me, to bug my telephone, and to follow my vehicle, my co-fighters, my friends and my family. They can investigate for another 1,000 years, but
they will not find what they suspect, because there is nothing to be found," he said.

Also denying having had connections with Al-Qa'idah, Hoxha is convinced that not only him, but no other Albanian has connections with it. "In Arabic, Al-Qa'idah is an understandable term. The
Albanians have an identity and consciousness far from the states that speak this language. We also have our interests that we have to protect, and these are Euro-Balkan interests, where, regardless of whether or not we
like it, we are obliged to be in contact with European states because of our geographic position.

"As for Al-Qa'idah, as long as there is confusion among Muslims and others about its origins, then how can someone who is Albanian be linked to an organization that does not have a registered
address? Today I will tell my people that Al-Qa'idah has no business here. If they are people who work well, let them work, but they know very well how and where they work and exist. This is the information that the
Albanians lack. Not even before 1998, or now in 2004, have political and military leaders or anyone else had contacts with it," he said convincingly.

He justifies his conviction that no Albanian has links with this organization with a broad explanation. "It is because the Albanians have become more aware. The Albanians have realized who
favours their issues and which are the decision-making circles. We expect the UN to accept Kosova's statehood; therefore, what kind of a decision-making factor is Al-Qa'idah? All those who have worked for national
issues, even before the 1960s, knew that the solution to the problem of Kosova is in the West," he said.

Services have their goals

Very calmly, he also answers new accusations that he is a CIA informer. "This is the most recent information that can be seen in newspapers. Various services that act in Kosova have their own
working methods. There is nothing easier than to blame someone else before you blame yourself. The author, who most probably is an expert of an intelligence service, says that the possibility of Hoxha cooperating with
the BND exists, but Hoxha's essential cooperation is with the CIA. You can also read this in the German media, and it has been republished in a Kosovar medium. This is an opinion of the author, who, in an agreement with
his country's leaders, has his own plans that do not interest Albanians at all. It is their problem to explain what the CIA, the BND or anyone else does. I cannot know what their plans are, so I will let them do their
job. Most probably the affair has an ending. Maybe the CIA will come out with its explanations and maybe not. This is their problem," Hoxha said.

According to him, the media and the intelligences services of Serbia and Macedonia are the main sources of information that the international intelligence services use in his case.

I study butterflies, birds because I can stay in mountains for long time

The 41-year-old from the Tusuz neighbourhood of Prizren said that he finished secondary medical school in Prizren, followed by the high school of electronics in Mitrovice, namely in Zvecan in
1988. Forced to leave the county, he sheltered in Austria, where he studied electronics, specifically programming in Visual C plus plus, in addition to psychology. "If Mitrovice and Vienna are in Arabia, then the
answer is 'yes', I finished my studies in Arab states," he said, answering many accusations of the Macedonian and Serbian media, which, according to him, said that he had finished his studies in Arab countries.

(Passage omitted: Xhezairi says he has given up warring for computer work, photography and making nature films)

Ready for a long conversation, he mentioned the major presence of intelligence services, out of which, according to him, there are 22 powerful ones in Kosova.

"Various intelligence services, out of which there are at least 22 main services in Kosova, carry out intelligence services in the interests of their states and other states. The worst thing
about these services is that their first information comes from Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia, which have territorial interests in this country. The second phase that follows after the services that the Serbian
agencies provide (we know with what facts they cover the territory of Kosova) is when the foreign services start investigations in the field. But this does not lead them to the truth," he said.

"If we look at the Kfor (Kosovo Force) presence and the number of states that participate in it, as well as the presence of states within UNMIK (UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo)
that are not Kfor members, then the result comes to 22. The result is even larger, but we limit the number to 22, which is mainly related to military circles and several more important states within UNMIK. This number is
not final, but it is the number of main ones. There are many other, smaller services," he said, answering the question of how he knows that there are 22 intelligence services in Kosova.

Asserting that the March riots were spontaneous, he believes that such riots could happen any time, because, according to him, the raw nerves of Albanians are being hit. "A few days ago we
saw the protests of the mothers of missing persons. Incorrect behaviour towards demonstrators who want nothing more than the body parts of their most loved ones could cause riots, because it is known that unemployment
also influences people to watch more television, especially the news. Each stab in the heart, such as, for instance, the drowning of the children on 16 March, could cause an escalation of the situation. Hence we can say
that we are informed that another March could happen in Kosova, but nobody knows when. We cannot know when it will be provoked," he said, adding that those who are interested in destabilizing Kosova will provoke
riots.

"The possibility is not ruled out that various anti-Albanian circles will next year organize the drowning of children and violent searches in Kosova with possible victims, aiming at provoking
the people of Kosova in order to postpone resolving the issue of the final status of Kosova. We must not fall into the trap of provocations. We have to have our eyes open," he concluded.

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