[…]
The pilot got two weather briefings and was advised of deteriorating IFR weather in the destination area. When he filed an IFR flight plan, he told the briefer that he did not have his charts; the briefer looked up the airway designations and fixed for the pilot. Near the destination approach control told the pilot the airport was below approach minimums and that three other aircraft had made missed approaches without seeing the ground. The controller then suggested nearby airports that were above approach minimums as alternatives. The pilot said that his car was parked at the airport and he wanted to make the approach(!). Radar data disclosed that the aircraft flew the approach segments at least 1.000 feet higher than the charted altitudes and at speeds between 155 to 180 knots. The aircraft overflew the missed approach point and the airport, then crossed the adjacent US/Mexico border before ATC could instruct the pilot to make an immediate missed approach. The pilot responded on the radio “I guess I don’t know where I am”. Radar data then showed the aircraft climbing and descending rapidly as it reversed course, then descended to 300 feet above the ground as it neared the western airport boundary. The pilot transmitted that he thought he had the airport in sight. Four second later, the aircraft impacted the departure end of the runway. Ground witnesses observed the aircraft in cloud bases, and they noted that it narrowly missed a building; it then turned sharply toward the runway before descending steeply to ground impact.
The NTSB’s official finding of the probable cause was: “The pilot’s lack of situational awareness, his failure to fly the approach as charted, and his failure to maintain aircraft control, while attempting an abrupt turn toward the airport, which led to an inadvertent stall/spin. The pilot’s lack of recent experience was a related factor”. The pilot’s logbook did not show that he had met instrument currency requirements.
There were some differences between this accident report and the simulator scenario, but they did have this in common: When pilots flew the approach poorly, poor decisions followed. This was, in part, because the pilot did not acquire all available information and this limited his awareness. The pilot in this accident report was given information about cloud bases and alternate airports but chose not to consider these factors. The pilot repeatedly made poor situational assessments.

[…]
In this context, research has been conducted with a group of general-aviation pilots. In one project, pilots flew an IFR flight in a flight training device (simulator). At one point in the flight, the pilots flew a localizer-only instrument approach. The pilot did not know it at first, but the clouds bases were lower than the minimum descent altitude (MDA) for the approach. Most of the pilots correctly flew down to the MDA and discovered that they were still in clouds. No runway ever was sighted, so when they arrived at the missed approach point, they properly executed a missed approach. When these pilots were then asked, “What are your intentions?” most asked for vectors to another approach at another airport. They reasoned that the ceiling was too low at the first airport and so another attempt there was a waste of time. But several other pilots did not fly the approach correctly. Some managed the approach so poorly that they never got all the way down to the MDA before reaching the missed approach point. Because they di not get down to MDA, they did not know that the clouds were lower than the MDA. When these pilots executed a missed approach and were asked, “What are your intentions?” most of these pilots asked for vectors back around to shoot the same approach a second time. They reasoned that if they had made it all the way down to MDA, then they would have seen the runway and could have landed-when in reality, the clouds were too low and a second attempt at the same approach was a waste of time. So the poorly flown approach robbed them of valuable information, made them less aware of the true situation, and adversely influenced their next decision. There was one more factor that the pilots were also dealing with during this localizer-only approach. During that portion of the simulator session, the alternator had failed and the airplane was using battery power only. The pilots who knew a second attempt was going to be a waste of time quickly diverted and landed safely using a nearby ILS approach. But the pilots who were unaware of the total situation and asked for a second attempt back to the same airport using the same localizer-only approach soon used up all their battery power before making a final decision to divert. A lack of situational awareness was fatal in the scenario. Fortunately, this experiment was done in the safety of the simulator and everybody walked away unhurt. But the interdependence between pilot flying skills, situational awareness, and pilot decision making was never more clear.
An incident in 1996 –NTSB LAX97FA049– took place that was very similar to this scenario. A private pilot flying in instrument conditions, was killed while attempting to land at san Diego’s Brown Field.
(to be continued)

Situational Awareness (SA) is a moving target. If you have it one moment, you may lose it in the next moment. You may have it one moment and in the next moment you may lose it without knowing that you lost it. Maintaining situational awareness is a constant, never-ending effort. The aircraft is in constant motion, thereafter the situation that is presented to the pilot is also ever changing. To have any hope of keeping up, the pilot must learn to anticipate changes and formulate contingency plans. Even when flying on a beautiful VFR day, the pilot must become the receiver and processor of a large amount of incoming data. In flight, all the pilot’s senses are feeding information to the brain. The eyes scan the instruments and the horizon, the ears listen to the rhythm of the engine and ATC callouts, and even the “seat of the pants” detects every air current and eddy. The pilot must become “tuned in”. In addition to simply concentrating on the surroundings, the pilot must also be suspicious, savvy, and calculating. The pilot must bring in all this outside data and then make sense of it. The pilot must look for clues of an impending problem. Aware pilots anticipate trouble and conduct preemptive strikes on problems. Unaware pilots only learn of a problem’s existence as it is unfolding and when it is too late for remedial action.
Aware pilots are proactive decision makers. In fact, the state of awareness and assertive decision making depend on each other. They are like binary stars in orbit around each other. Decision that pilots make tend to reveal additional information. This new information is then used to enhance awareness. Then with greater awareness, better decisions are possible. It is a positive cycle.
Pilot decision making is not static. When a decision is made and the outcome of the decision has no effect on any future decision, it is called static decision. But when we fly we know that the outcome of just about every decision will change the available option and influence the next decision. It is like coming to a fork in the road. If you select the right fork, you will, by your decision, eliminate any of the challenges that you would have faced if you had selected the left fork. In an airplane, once a course of action has been selected you probably will be unable to stop, back up to the fork in the road again, and select the other fork. In an airplane the decisions we make are dynamic. Decisions line up one after another in chains. There is not just one fork in the road, but succession of forks, each one changing the option and producing different outcomes. Knowing the best fork to take depends on the pilot’s ability to make a good situational assessment. This assessment depends on the pilot’s ability to project or forecast the result of the decision. The ability to project and forecast is more often referred to as “staying ahead of the airplane” by flight instructors.
(to be continued)

[…] Experts do very little talking during the flight except to air traffic controllers. They very often talk themselves, however. These internal conversations can be characterized as reminders and questions to themselves:
“I’ve got set up in number 2 ..”
“I’m ready to make the turn outside the marker beacon ..”
“I’m at 9000-1000 feet to go until level off ..”
“Can I get a DME reading off of (..) VOR from here? ..”
These are not addressed to the controllers but rather are audible thoughts. When the experts pilots do address controllers, they often have suggestions for the them. On the surface this might seem somewhat backward. Most of the time you think of controllers telling the pilos what to do, but experts never wait for a controller to come up with a plan. They are ahead of the controller:
“Can I get a 320 heading now? ..”
“I can accept a tight turn-on to the localizer ..”
“Confirm you want a left turn; my chart indicates a right turn on the missed procedure .. ”
“How much longer will you need me on this heading? ..”
These pilot suggestions are usually made professionally but forcefully. The fact that pilot knows enough about the situation to be making suggestions to the controllers is evidence of his or her awareness.
Experts are aware of what is taking place around them. They are never caught off guard. They do not miss any important clues or information coming from inside or outside the airplane. They take on each challenge and work it through to a logical conclusion. When-ever a solution is not immediately found to a problem, an alternative is decided upon. Expert pilots are expert troubleshooters. They know their airplane’s systems and can diagnose problems.

There really is a big gap between experts and novices. The challenge for every flight instructor is to figure out ways to help pilots act more like experts, even though they have low flight time and little experience. It would seem logical that if we want to act like experts, we should just do what they do!

[…] Here is a short list of some preparations that expert pilots make:

– Experts set a VOR radio to an outbound course before arriving at the station.
– Ask for an updated wind report when turning on the final approach course or on short final when landing.
– Experts tune in a backup navigation frequency on the second radio.
– Before flying into an air traffic control sector, experts observe the communication radio frequency on the second communications radio. When the times comes to switch to the new frequency, it only take the flip of a switch and the workload at that point is reduced.
– When faced with instrument approach weather decisions, expert ask for weather reports from many surrounding airports before arriving at a final decision.
– Under a heavy workload circumstance will solicit information from the controller asking them the length of the runway or the frequency of the tower, rather than attempting to look this information up in a directory or a chart book.
– Experts, when faced with unknown circumstances, make backup plans. If the pilot face an instrument approach with weather at or near the minimums, expert make plans in advance for the possibility of a missed approach or a circle to land or even a tailwind landing.
– Experts use all their resources, which includes nonpilot passengers, asking them to look for other air traffic, hold chart books, flip pages, and any other task that would be helpful during high workload events.
– Experts use backup radios to listen to prerecorded weather broadcasts.
– Anticipate stations passages so that they can start and end timed segments of the flight properly.
– Expert pilots make and take the time to listen to the Morse code identifying broadcast of navigation radios.
– Experts update altimeter settings as the flight progresses and continually monitor motor parameters.
– When they are unable to land due to low clouds at one airport, ask the controller if other airplanes have recently landed on an instrument approach at a nearby airport. The logic is that if other pilot are landing, it would be possible for them to land as well.
– Expert pilot ask for additional information from other pilots who have flown the course ahead of them.
– Expert pilots do not hesitate to discuss problems that arise with air traffic controllers.
– When airplane malfunctions occur, expert pilots take appropriate internal action and advise controllers on their situation and what impact the malfunction has on the remainder of the flight.(to be continued)

[…]
The third task layer involves situation awareness management. One example of the expert at work is dialing in an additional navigation radio frequency on a second radio, even though this second radio is not required for the flight procedures at hand. Experts use it anyway to more clearly determine their position. With this knowledge the experts are aware of their relative position throughout the procedure and are able to call on this knowledge. At times they will turn with a tighter radius to make a smooth course intercept. The only way the expert could have known that a tighter radius was called for was having knowledge of the relative position. With the course intercept made smoothly, the approach procedure begins under control and no time is wasted passing through the course and attempting to reintercept from the other side. Expert are constantly and predictably completing these extra third-level task. The result is that the procedure appears effortless and everything is under control.
One commonality that all experts have is the ability to physically fly the airplane without using up all their mental energy. These pilots are able to hold altitude and heading when that is required and still plan ahead. When the physical workload increases, such as a turn or descent, a descending turn, or a course intercept, they are capable of keeping pace both with the physical task of manipulating the airplane controls and also with the mental tasks. They do not miss radio calls. They are assertive and clear with radio transmission. They do not miss altitude changes. They reduced speed when they should. “They are in command”.
Experts never seem to “get behind the airplane” but this is no accident. They are always planning ahead. They are always doing something that although it is not actually mandatory at the time will pay off soon there after.(to be continued)
Nel terzo livello entra in gioco quella che possiamo definire come “coscienza situazionale manageriale”. Un esempio di un pilota esperto è la capacità di inserire le corrette frequenze radio sulla seconda radio anche se questa non è prevista dalla procedura. I piloti esperti la usano comunque, così da determinare al meglio la loro posizione, e sfruttare questa loro conoscenza aumentando la loro coscienza situazionale. Al momento giusto stringeranno la virata per intercettare gradualmente il localizzatore, ma per far questo è necessario conoscere la propria posizione. La procedura di avvicinamento sarà così condotta in maniera più fluida con maggior controllo e nessun tempo sarà sprecato nel doverla intercettare nuovamente perché sfuggita sul lato opposto. I piloti esperti sono costantemente impegnati ad eseguire queste azioni del terzo livello. Il risultato sarà che la procedura sembrerà essere eseguita senza nessuno sforzo o indecisione, costantemente sotto controllo.
Una caratteristica che accomuna tutti i piloti più esperti è la capacità di controllare l’aereo senza dover usare tutte le loro energie mentali. Questi piloti sono capaci di mantenere la prua e l’altitudine pianificando in anticipo le azioni future. Quando il carico di lavoro aumenta, come iniziare una discesa, una virata, o intercettare una radiale, essi sono capaci di non perdere il ritmo mantenendo il controllo dell’aereo e non perdendo di vista l’obiettivo. Non perdono le chiamate radio, sono chiari nelle comunicazioni, non si distraggono se viene loro richiesto un cambio di altitudine, riducono la velocità se gli viene richiesto. “Essi sono ai comandi”.
Non sembrano mai essere in ritardo rispetto alla conduzione dell’aereo e questo non è casuale, essi pianificano sempre in anticipo, non hanno tempi morti, sono sempre occupati in qualcosa che prima o poi risulterà loro utile.

What is the difference between an expert pilot and a novice pilot? The difference is simple: experience and the ability to make decisions (Decision Making). Experience and DM go together, but it is not clear which comes first. Pilots who have had the benefit of many flight hours may have seen situations during those flight hours that help them make decisions. In other words, their experience guides their decisions. Or it may be that pilots who can make good decisions in the first place remain on the job longer and live longer. They have the longevity that allows them to gain the experience. It probably is a combination of the two. If there really is an observable and measurable difference between expert pilot performance and novice pilot performance, can there also be teaching strategies developed that would help novices act more like experts? If such a strategy were developed, it would have to start with a definition of just what expert pilot behavior is. So what do expert pilots do that is different and worth copying?

CHARACTERISTICS OF EXPERT PERFORMANCE

Experienced pilots are able to prepare and anticipate far more than the novice pilots.
Experts can fly with ease, never coming near a mental saturation point. This leaves them with the mental capacity available to think ahead and plan for upcoming events. Experts never seem to be in a hurry, yet they are always doing something. They never let a free moment go without planning something or doing something that will help them out later. Experts pilots do all the extra and little things that make the job easier.
In any flight procedure there are several task layers. there are task that absolutely have to be done if the flight procedure is even possible. An example of this would be turning in a navigation radio to frequency that is used for an instrument approach. Without that frequency the pilot cannot know where to go, so tuning that frequency is an absolute necessity. Then there are task on a slightly higher level that, although not absolutely required, make the procedure run smoothly. An example is prereading the missed-approach instructions so that when the time comes for the missed-approach procedure to be executed, experts calmly add power and begin the procedure without immediate reference to any chart. Nonexpert pilots rarely are that prepared at the missed-approach point. They often fumble around looking for the proper chart while the airplane is somewhat out of control(to be continued)