The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis

Daniel Chandler

Within linguistic theory, two extreme positions concerning the relationship
between language and thought are commonly referred to as 'mould theories’ and
'cloak theories'. Mould theories represent language as 'a mould in terms of which
thought categories are cast' (Bruner et al. 1956, p. 11). Cloak theories represent
the view that 'language is a cloak conforming to the customary categories of
thought of its speakers' (ibid.). The doctrine that language is the 'dress of
thought' was fundamental in Neo-Classical literary theory (Abrams 1953, p.
290), but was rejected by the Romantics (ibid.; Stone 1967, Ch. 5). There is also
a related view (held by behaviourists, for instance) that language and thought are
identical. According to this stance thinking is entirely linguistic: there is no
'non-verbal thought', no 'translation' at all from thought to language. In this sense,
thought is seen as completely determined by language.

The Sapir-Whorf theory, named after the American linguists Edward Sapir
and Benjamin Lee Whorf, is a mould theory of language. Writing in 1929, Sapir
argued in a classic passage that:

Human beings do not live in the objective world alone, nor alone in the world
of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very much at the mercy of
the particular language which has become the medium of expression for their
society. It is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality
essentially without the use of language and that language is merely an
incidental means of solving specific problems of communication or
reflection. The fact of the matter is that the 'real world' is to a large extent
unconsciously built upon the language habits of the group. No two
languages are ever sufficiently similar to be considered as representing the
same social reality. The worlds in which different societies live are distinct
worlds, not merely the same world with different labels attached... We see
and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do because the
language habits of our community predispose certain choices of
interpretation. (Sapir 1958 [1929], p. 69)

This position was extended in the 1930s by his student Whorf, who, in another
widely cited passage, declared that:

We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages. The
categories and types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do not
find there because they stare every observer in the face; on the contrary, the
world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be
organized by our minds - and this means largely by the linguistic systems in
our minds. We cut nature up, organize it into concepts, and ascribe
significances as we do, largely because we are parties to an agreement to
organize it in this way - an agreement that holds throughout our speech
community and is codified in the patterns of our language. The agreement is,
of course, an implicit and unstated one, but its terms are absolutely
obligatory; we cannot talk at all except by subscribing to the organization
and classification of data which the agreement decrees. (Whorf 1940, pp.
213-14; his emphasis)

I will not attempt to untangle the details of the personal standpoints of Sapir and
Whorf on the degree of determinism which they felt was involved, although I
think that the above extracts give a fair idea of what these were. I should note that
Whorf distanced himself from the behaviourist stance that thinking is entirely
linguistic (Whorf 1956, p. 66). In its most extreme version 'the Sapir-Whorf
hypothesis' can be described as consisting of two associated principles. According
to the first, linguistic determinism, our thinking is determined by language.
According to the second, linguistic relativity, people who speak different
languages perceive and think about the world quite differently.

On this basis, the Whorfian perspective is that translation between one
language and another is at the very least, problematic, and sometimes impossible.
Some commentators also apply this to the 'translation' of unverbalized thought
into language. Others suggest that even within a single language any
reformulation of words has implications for meaning, however subtle. George
Steiner (1975) has argued that any act of human communication can be seen as
involving a kind of translation, so the potential scope of Whorfianism is very
broad indeed. Indeed, seeing reading as a kind of translation is a useful reminder
of the reductionism of representing textual reformulation simply as a determinate
'change of meaning', since meaning does not reside in the text, but is generated
by interpretation. According to the Whorfian stance, 'content' is bound up with
linguistic 'form', and the use of the medium contributes to shaping the meaning.
In common usage, we often talk of different verbal formulations 'meaning the
same thing'. But for those of a Whorfian persuasion, such as the literary theorist
Stanley Fish, 'it is impossible to mean the same thing in two (or more) different
ways' (Fish 1980, p. 32). Reformulating something transforms the ways in which
meanings may be made with it, and in this sense, form and content are
inseparable. From this stance words are not merely the 'dress' of thought.

The importance of what is 'lost in translation' varies, of course. The issue is
usually considered most important in literary writing. It is illuminating to note
how one poet felt about the translation of his poems from the original Spanish into
other European languages (Whorf himself did not in fact regard European
languages as significantly different from each other). Pablo Neruda noted that the
best translations of his own poems were Italian (because of its similarities to
Spanish), but that English and French 'do not correspond to Spanish - neither in
vocalization, or in the placement, or the colour, or the weight of words.' He
continued: 'It is not a question of interpretative equivalence: no, the sense can be
right, but this correctness of translation, of meaning, can be the destruction of a
poem. In many of the translations into French - I don't say in all of them - my
poetry escapes, nothing remains; one cannot protest because it says the same
thing that one has written. But it is obvious that if I had been a French poet, I
would not have said what I did in that poem, because the value of the words is so
different. I would have written something else' (Plimpton 1981, p. 63). With more
'pragmatic' or less 'expressive' writing, meanings are typically regarded as less
dependent on the particular form of words used. In most pragmatic contexts,
paraphrases or translations tend to be treated as less fundamentally problematic.
However, even in such contexts, particular words or phrases which have an
important function in the original language may be acknowledged to present
special problems in translation. Even outside the humanities, academic texts
concerned with the social sciences are a case in point.

The Whorfian perspective is in strong contrast to the extreme universalism
of those who adopt the cloak theory. The Neo-Classical idea of language as
simply the dress of thought is based on the assumption that the same thought can
be expressed in a variety of ways. Universalists argue that we can say whatever
we want to say in any language, and that whatever we say in one language can
always be translated into another. This is the basis for the most common
refutation of Whorfianism. 'The fact is,' insists the philosopher Karl Popper, 'that
even totally different languages are not untranslatable' (Popper 1970, p. 56). The
evasive use here of 'not untranslatable' is ironic. Most universalists do
acknowledge that translation may on occasions involve a certain amount of
circumlocution.

Individuals who regard writing as fundamental to their sense of personal and
professional identity may experience their written style as inseparable from this
identity, and insofar as writers are 'attached to their words', they may favour a
Whorfian perspective. And it would be hardly surprising if individual stances
towards Whorfianism were not influenced by allegiances to Romanticism or
Classicism, or towards either the arts or the sciences. As I have pointed out, in the
context of the written word, the 'untranslatability' claim is generally regarded as
strongest in the arts and weakest in the case of formal scientific papers (although
rhetorical studies have increasingly blurred any clear distinctions). And within the
literary domain, 'untranslatability' was favoured by Romantic literary theorists,
for whom the connotative, emotional or personal meanings of words were crucial
(see Stone 1967, pp. 126-7, 132, 145).

Whilst few linguists would accept the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis in its 'strong',
extreme or deterministic form, many now accept a 'weak', more moderate, or
limited Whorfianism, namely that the ways in which we see the world may be
influenced by the kind of language we use. Moderate Whorfianism differs from
extreme Whorfianism in these ways:

the emphasis is on the potential for thinking to be 'influenced' rather than
unavoidably 'determined' by language;

it is a two-way process, so that 'the kind of language we use' is also
influenced by 'the way we see the world';

any influence is ascribed not to 'Language' as such or to one language
compared with another, but to the use within a language of one variety
rather than another (typically a sociolect - the language used primarily by
members of a particular social group);

emphasis is given to the social context of language use rather than to purely
linguistic considerations, such as the social pressure in particular contexts to
use language in one way rather than another.

Of course, some polemicists still favour the notion of language as a strait-jacket
or prison, but there is a broad academic consensus favouring moderate
Whorfianism. Any linguistic influence is now generally considered to be related
not primarily to the formal systemic structures of a language (langue to use de
Saussure's term) but to cultural conventions and individual styles of use (or
parole). Meaning does not reside in a text but arises in
its interpretation, and interpretation is shaped by sociocultural contexts.
Conventions regarding what are considered appropriate uses of language in
particular social contexts exist both in 'everyday' uses of language and in
specialist usage. In academia, there are general conventions as well as particular
ones in each disciplinary and methodological context. In every subculture, the
dominant conventions regarding appropriate usage tend to exert a conservative
influence on the framing of phenomena. From the media theory perspective, the
sociolects of sub-cultures and the idiolects of individuals represent a subtly
selective view of the world: tending to support certain kinds of observations and
interpretations and to restrict others. And this transformative power goes largely
unnoticed, retreating to transparency.

Marshall McLuhan argued in books such as The Gutenberg Galaxy (1962)
and Understanding Media (1964) that the use of new media was the prime cause
of fundamental changes in society and the human psyche. The technological
determinism of his stance can be seen as an application of extreme Whorfianism
to the nature of media in general. Similarly, the extreme universalism of the cloak
theorists has its media counterpart in the myth of technological neutrality
(Winner 1977; Bowers 1988). My own approach involves exploring the
applicability of moderate Whorfianism to the use of media.

References

Abrams, M. H. (1953): The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical
Tradition. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Bowers, C. A. (1988): The Cultural Dimensions of Educational Computing:
Understanding the Non-Neutrality of Technology. New York: Teachers College Press