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The perceived paradox might just be an illusion. Most likely, Xi might encourage North Korea to join the nuclear club, since The US president has asked for Xi's help to solve this problem. By asking the nuclear club to welcome North Korea instead of resisting, Xi can enlist the help of North Korean leader to strengthen the perceived deterrence potential of nuclear weapons, if there is any. Xi can raise to prominence globally as a statesman of caliber and might end up orchestrating the future of not just China but the entire humanity.

Minxin Pei might be placing too much emphasis on the role and purpose of the CPP today. As he notes, Xi could retain the normally supreme party position as Secretary General, but he chose instead to maintain his grip on the governance position of President. Indeed, there are few who believe that the CPP has any serious role in China today other than as an organization to maintain oligarchy, by limiting access to governance positions. China is functioning as a "mixed economy" with a centralized political structure. One might call it capitalism with a Chinese face.

Xi seems to be pursuing an uber nationalistic, Han based Juche characterized by a imperialist foreign policy that he hopes, like the Third Reich, will reign for centuries. I know that schoolteachers who visit Taiwan can be threatened if they are suspected of being influenced during their travels outside the new paradigm of Xi.

Too much power concentrated in so few people might not be the wisest option specially for the well being of those few...Are the persons in charge of agglomerates (countries, companies, foundations...) competent?Theresa May - current PM of UK - seems to do not know the meaning of article 50th of Lisbon Treaty.José Socrates - former PM of Portugal - seems to do not know the difference between VAT and withhold tax.Donald Trump - current President of US - seems to do not know the consequences of Anthropocene.Michel Temer - current President of Brazil - seems to do not know the consequences of inequality....Xi - current President of CCP - seems to do know the consequences of... ☺

There is an important confusion here: "Economically, the private sector accounts for more than 60% of China’s output, and the CPC has become practically irrelevant in the daily lives of ordinary Chinese."1. If the private sector is the 60%, this means that the public sector is the 40%. This is not a small quantity, and by no means irrelevant.2. The party has a direct participation in most private enterprises: in every company there are some party cadres that participate in decisions like hiring, promotions, etc. So maybe they don't direct the company, but their influence is great.

Minxin Pei is convinced that Xi Jinping - sooner or later - will find out that "his ability to shape Chinese society may turn out to be far more limited than he, his allies, and most outside observers expect." The 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) ended this week and Xi has been formally elevated to the same status as Mao Zedong, becoming the most powerful leader since the founder of the People's Republic of China. Since Xi's name and thought have been enshrined in the country's constitution, and there is no clear successor in sight, the CPC has unanimously set up its leader for an extended stay in power - with no constraints on tenure. The 64-year-old is starting his second term and will - unlike his predecessors - serve a third term in 2022 and remain in office till 2027, or beyond. His newly appointed loyalist, Li Zhanshu will help him amend the constitution that removes "the party’s unofficial retirement age of 68". Xi has abandoned the system of collective leadership that the CCP under Deng Xiaoping imposed after the death of Mao. The party was scarred by the cruelty and famine that one man had prompted through disastrous policies, notably the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Under Deng, the CPC started to institutionalise leadership succession in the 1980s, overseeing a peaceful and orderly transition of power between incoming and outgoing leaders. As a result, Xi’s two predecessors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, ruled through consensus - as the “first among equals” at the top of the Politburo Standing Committee - and were limited to two terms.A new era is dawning under Xi, who has the ambitions to tighten party control over society and make his country a superpower on the world stage. His political philosophy is directly opposed to that of the West, rejecting democracy and free speech, and harbouring a desire to challenge America's preeminent role in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. Xi, who has sought to portray himself as a strong and stable leader since Trump's election, also painted China as a responsible global power that was committed to tackling shared dangers such as climate change. From now on, any challenge to Xi will be seen as a threat to the party rule, and "Xi Jinping Thought on socialism with Chinese characteristics for the New Era" may one day outdo Mao's "Little Red Book", as his ideas will soon become compulsory learning for Chinese ¬students from primary school to university. Xi warned that corruption remained the greatest threat to the party’s survival despite a five-year crackdown, that critics see as a pretext to purge political enemies. His "trusted loyalist, Zhao Leji, will take over from the 69-year-old Wang Qishan as the chief of the anti-corruption agency – a crucial position, responsible for keeping the CPC in check." The party must be more disciplined and more responsive to people’s needs. Yet its leadership must not be questioned. The author predicts Xi's loyalists to "reiterate their allegiance, while those on the fence are likely to hop on the Xi bandwagon. As for Xi’s rivals, they must be thoroughly demoralized." Even though this scenario offers no hint that democratic reform is on the horizon or that the party is considering loosening its grip on power, Xi spoke of building a "moderately prosperous society". The paradox is that, people become more assertive the wealthier they become. They may no longer let the party be in control of every aspect of their life, including the economy, the Internet, politics, culture and religion. The author points out that although the party's "internal power dynamics haven’t change much in the last few decades, Chinese society has moved far beyond the Maoist or even the Dengist era. Few Chinese, including members of the party, genuinely believe in any official doctrine. Economically, the private sector accounts for more than 60% of China’s output, and the CPC has become practically irrelevant in the daily lives of ordinary Chinese."Indeed, much had changed since 1949 and now Xi sees himself as the third leader to transform China. The first epoch under Mao, a helmsman helped steer the ship through revolutionary waters and find safe haven; then came Deng Xiaoping, the reformer who masterminded China’s economic development and helped it prosper. Deng’s influence on the course of Chinese history was hugely significant. But he wielded his power less explicitly - often behind the scenes. Hence his “Theory on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” was not formally incorporated into the party constitution until after his death. It remains to be seen what Xi's “Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation” will bring. There is no guarantee that Xi's "now-formidable power that will enable him to impose his vision of hardline authoritarian rule, underpinned by Chinese nationalism, in the coming years" will last.

I think Xi faces greater risks regarding the stability of China as the population becomes restive under deteriorating environment conditions such as air quality, water quality, food scandals and the seemingly epidemic corruption issues. Reliance upon fomenting nationalistic responses to external events can only carry the day for so long before that response focuses on internal issues. Health issues such as one-third of the population not being treated for high blood pressure and a declining population will place additional pressures that the nationalistic fervour will not assuage.