This discipline case involving respondent attorney William D. Paul
arises out of a petition and supplementary petition for disciplinary
action filed by the Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional
Responsibility (“OLPR”). A referee appointed by our court heard
evidence for and against the petition and supplementary petition,
concluded Paul engaged in misconduct, and recommended that Paul be
indefinitely suspended from the practice of law for a minimum of six
months. Paul disputes the referee’s finding that he improperly
notarized an affidavit. We indefinitely suspend Paul from the
practice of law for a minimum of four months.

Respondent attorney William D. Paul was admitted to practice law in
Minnesota in 1985. Over the last 20 years, he has received five
admonitions, one public reprimand, and has been placed on supervised
probation twice. His prior misconduct includes instructing
investigators working for him to directly contact a represented party
and then ratifying the misconduct by attempting to use the admissions
gained in that communication; failing to handle a matter with
adequate diligence and promptness; failing to communicate with
clients; failing to pay a valid, law-related judgment entered against
him; failing to promptly return a file to a client; engaging in a
pattern of improperly depositing fee and cost advances in his
business account; failing to safeguard client funds; failing to
cooperate with a disciplinary investigation; failing to provide an
accounting of his attorney fees upon request of a client; and
conditioning a refund of attorney fees upon a client agreeing not to
file a professional responsibility complaint.

In 2009, the Director of the OLPR filed a petition for disciplinary
action against Paul. The Director alleged that Paul had committed
numerous violations of the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct
and one violation of the Rules on Lawyers Professional
Responsibility. We appointed a referee to make findings of fact and
conclusions of law and to recommend appropriate discipline. After
conducting an evidentiary hearing in July 2010, the referee filed
with our court findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a
recommendation for discipline. The referee concluded that Paul
violated Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 3.2 and 8.1(b) and Rule 25 of the
Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility (RLPR). Based on his
findings and conclusions, the referee recommended that Paul be
suspended from the practice of law for 30 days and placed on
supervised probation for 2 years.

On August 19, 2010, before the briefing order was issued, the
Director filed a supplementary petition for disciplinary action,
alleging additional misconduct. We appointed the same referee to
make findings of fact and conclusions of law and to recommend
appropriate discipline, with respect to the allegations of the
supplementary petition. After conducting an evidentiary hearing on
the supplementary petition in January 2011, the referee filed with
our court on March 22, 2011, findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and a recommendation for discipline. The referee concluded that Paul
violated Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.1, 1.3, 3.4(c), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d)
during his representation in three client matters and failed to
cooperate with the Director’s investigations of those client
matters, in violation of Rule 25, RLPR. Based on his findings and
conclusions, the referee recommended that Paul be indefinitely
suspended from the practice of law for a minimum of six months. Paul
ordered a transcript within 10 days of the date when the referee
filed his findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation
for discipline.

The following recitation of facts is based upon the portions of the
referee’s findings of fact that set forth the undisputed evidence.

The P.Q. Matter

Paul admitted the factual accuracy of the allegations in
count I of the Director’s petition regarding the P.Q. matter. The
referee incorporated the allegations in count I of the petition by
reference, and the recitation of facts here regarding the P.Q. matter
reflects Paul’s admissions.

In September 2008, P.Q. retained Paul to appeal a conciliation court
judgment against P.Q. Paul served and filed a notice of appeal with
the court of appeals but failed to file the statement of the case
required by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 133.03. The clerk of appellate
courts directed Paul to file two copies of a statement of the case
within 10 days. He did not do so within 10 days. Eventually, and
only after a court of appeals order to do so and threatening
sanctions, Paul filed a statement of the case.

In the statement of the case, Paul stated that a full transcript was
necessary for the appeal. Despite an order of the court of appeals
directing Paul to order a transcript, Paul failed to serve and file a
completed certificate as to transcript. Consequently, the court of
appeals dismissed the appeal.

The J.F. Matter

J.F. retained Paul to represent him in a child support matter
scheduled for hearing on February 24, 2010. J.F. planned to attend
the hearing, but Paul told him not to attend.

Paul’s paralegal testified that Paul asked her to get a
continuance of the hearing the day before it was scheduled. She
stated that Paul instructed her to get a continuance because Paul was
not sure he “would be there on time, or able to be there at all.”
Paul was involved in a 3-day trial that was to break the same day as
the child support hearing, in order to allow Paul to attend two oral
arguments before the court of appeals that morning. The paralegal
called the Assistant St. Louis County Attorney assigned to the child
support matter, who had no objection to the requested continuance.
The paralegal also left a voice message on the magistrate’s phone,
stating that there was an agreement to a continuance. The paralegal
also called the court administrator, who said she would deliver a
note to the magistrate. Based on these efforts, the paralegal
assumed that a continuance had been granted and communicated this to
Paul. At Paul’s direction, she called J.F. and left a message
telling him he did not need to attend the hearing. Significantly,
Paul never contacted the child support recipient to secure her
consent to the continuance.

The continuance was not granted, and the hearing occurred as
scheduled. The February 24, 2010, order provided, among other
things, that J.F. pay $426 per month (ultimately increased to $465
per month in a subsequent order) in child support. In the order, the
child support magistrate noted that, although counsel “did not
object to a continuance,” “the decision whether or not to
continue” a hearing “would have to be made by the magistrate.”
The order also noted:

The magistrate was not informed of any request to continue the
February 24, 2010 hearing prior to that hearing and, had he been
contacted, would have provided his standard response that no
continuance would be granted, at that late stage, absent the consent
of both the County and the other party to the proceeding.

The Obligee appeared at the February 24, 2010 hearing, after
driving 4-1/2 hours, one way, to get there, and, when asked,
informed the magistrate she had not been contacted by [J.F.] or
anyone else acting on his behalf about a continuance of that hearing.

[J.F.] has had notice of the February 24, 2010 [sic] since service of
the motion to modify child support, by first class mail, on January
22, 2010, or for over one month. Any request to continue that
hearing, on less than one day’s notice, without even contacting the
Obligee, would be denied, as unreasonable and without good cause and,
consequently, the hearing proceeded, as scheduled.

The D.K. Matter

The recitation of facts for the D.K. matter reflects not only the
referee’s findings of fact but the record as well.

Paul sought to intervene in a family court proceeding in order to
obtain visitation rights for his clients with the clients’
grandchildren. After a CHIPS petition was filed against the
biological parents of the minor children, the children were
adjudicated in need of protection or services in July 2007. Pursuant
to an agreement with the biological parents, permanent legal and
physical custody of the minor children was transferred to H.M. and
K.M. in April 2008, subject to reasonable parenting time for the
biological parents and visitation for extended family members at the
discretion of H.M. and K.M. The matter was then transferred to the
family court.

In September 2008, Paul filed a motion to intervene for visitation
and to modify custody on behalf of the grandparents. In violation of
court rules, the motion did not state a date for the hearing and was
not accompanied by an affidavit of service. The district court
directed staff to advise Paul to serve and file a petition for
custody. But Paul did not do so.

In January 2009, the biological mother of the children filed a motion
for parenting-time assistance. On the day of the hearing, March 4,
2009, Paul filed an amended motion to intervene for visitation and to
modify custody. Paul appeared at the parenting-time assistance
hearing and asked the court to hear the amended motion for
intervention. But Paul had not properly served the amended motion,
and the other parties were not prepared to respond to the motion.
During the hearing, the court again advised Paul that a petition for
custody and the creation of a new file would be the proper way to
proceed with his clients’ request for relief. The court
specifically told Paul that once a petition for custody was filed,
consolidation or joinder would occur. On March 16, 2009, opposing
counsel sent a letter to Paul stating that the amended motion had “no
basis in the law.” Opposing counsel also stated that his client
would seek sanctions under Minn. R. Civ. P. 11 if the motion was not
voluntarily dismissed.

In its order denying the grandparents’ motion to intervene, the
district court noted, “[I]ntervention would be proper if the matter
had not been previously adjudicated. It is clear that the motion is
not timely.” The court ordered Paul to pay $1,500 within 30 days
to opposing counsel for attorney’s fees incurred in responding to
the amended motion for intervention. Although Paul eventually paid
the $1,500 sanction to opposing counsel, the payment was untimely.

The R.V. Matter

The Director alleged that Paul directed his client, R.V., in
connection with a probate matter, to pre-sign signature pages and
then directed a notary public to improperly notarize one of these
pre-signed signature pages. In his answer, Paul stated:

In order to make it convenient for [R.V.], i.e. [R.V.] would not have
to come back from the Twin Cities to sign an affidavit signature
page, it was discussed and agreed that [R.V.] would pre-sign
affidavit pages which would then be attached to his affidavit after
it was transcribed.

The signature lines were strategically placed (high on the page, in
the middle of the page, and at the bottom of the page) so that
wherever the affidavit ended, one of the signature pages could be
used to disguise the fact that the signature was in place before the
affidavit was prepared.

Failure To Cooperate

The Director alleged that Paul failed to cooperate with the
Director’s investigation of several complaints against Paul. On
August 11, 2008, the Director mailed to Paul a notice of
investigation of M.F.’s complaint. The notice requested Paul to
provide his complete written response within 14 days of the notice.
On September 30, 2008, the Director mailed Paul a notice of
investigation of J.D.’s complaint, which also requested Paul to
provide his written response within 14 days. On October 28, 2008,
the Director mailed a notice of investigation of M.B.’s complaint,
which requested Paul to provide his written response within 14 days.

In the first half of November 2008, the district ethics committee
(DEC) investigator for the J.D. matter and Paul exchanged several
phone messages, and on November 13, 2008, the investigator and Paul
spoke on the telephone. Paul stated that he would send a response to
the J.D. complaint but did not timely respond. On December 1, 2, and
3, 2008, the DEC investigator for the J.D. matter called Paul and
left messages, but Paul did not return the calls or respond to the
J.D. complaint.

On December 9, 2008, the DEC investigator for the M.B. matter called
Paul requesting his response. Paul replied that the matter was in
arbitration. The DEC investigator advised Paul that he must respond,
but Paul did not do so. On December 22, 2008, the investigator again
called Paul, requesting Paul’s response. On December 23, 2008,
Paul finally provided his response to the M.B. matter.

On January 16, 2009, the Director advised Paul that his office would
be handling the M.F., J.D., M.B., and R.N. matters. On January 20,
2009, the Director requested complete responses to the M.F. and J.D.
matters. Paul requested additional time to respond on February 12,
2009, and eventually provided responses on February 17, 2009.

On May 17, 2010, the Director mailed to Paul’s attorney a notice of
investigation of J.F.’s complaint, which required a written
response and certain documents within 14 days. Paul sent the
requested documents to the OLPR on June 16, 2010. On June 21, 2010,
the Director wrote to Paul’s attorney requesting Paul’s written
response. Paul’s attorney told the Director by telephone on July
29, 2010, that Paul was working on his written response, which was
eventually provided.

On July 1, 2010, the Director mailed to Paul a notice of
investigation of A.B.’s complaint, which required a written
response and the entire client file within 14 days. On July 26,
2010, Paul provided a response to the Director and enclosed a copy of
the case file. In a letter dated August 6, 2010, Paul made an
additional response to the Director regarding the A.B. complaint. In
his testimony, Paul admitted that not all of his letters met the time
limits set forth by the Director.

Referee’s Conclusions of Law

The referee concluded that Paul failed to timely file the
required statement of the case and certificate as to transcript
during his representation of P.Q., in violation of Minn. R. Prof.
Conduct 3.2.1
The referee further concluded that Paul’s “late, ineffectual
attempt to obtain a continuance of the hearing” and his “failure
to appear at the hearing and his office’s instruction to [J.F.] not
to appear at the hearing” violated Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.1 and
1.3.2
The referee also concluded that Paul’s failure to properly serve
his motion and amended motion and his failure to respond to the
instruction from the district court in the D.K. visitation matter
violated Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 3.4(c) and 8.4(d),3
and Paul’s “procurement of and participation in” an improper
notarization in the R.V. matter violated Minn. R. Prof. Conduct
8.4(c).4
Finally, the referee concluded that Paul’s failure to cooperate
promptly with the Director’s investigations violated Minn. R. Prof.
Conduct 8.1(b), and Rule 25, RLPR.5
The referee recommended that Paul be indefinitely suspended from the
practice of law for a minimum of 6 months.

I.

Paul argues that (1) his due process rights were violated when he
was not permitted to have a panel hearing; (2) his failure to attend
the child support hearing in the J.F. matter is not a violation of
Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.1, requiring competence, or Minn. R. Prof.
Conduct 1.3, requiring diligence; (3) the Director failed to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that Paul’s failure to properly file
a petition for custody in the D.K. visitation matter violated Minn.
R. Prof. Conduct 3.4(c), prohibiting knowing disobedience of a
tribunal, and Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(d), regarding conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice; (4) the Director failed
to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Paul procured and
participated in an improper notarization in violation of Minn. R.
Prof. Conduct 8.4(c); and (5) the Director failed to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that Paul failed to cooperate in the A.B.
investigation, in violation of Rule 25, RLPR.

A.

We first address Paul’s argument that his due process rights were
violated when he was not permitted to have a panel hearing on the
allegations set forth in the Director’s supplementary petition for
discipline. Paul states that a panel proceeding is “sort of [his]
right to a jury trial” and that “[a]n attorney, who is the
subject of a disciplinary action, should always have the right to
have the matter heard by a panel.” He claims that the only
exception to this general rule is found in Rule 10(d), RLPR,6
and that none of the allegations in this case can be considered
“serious matters.”

Paul’s argument finds no support in the rules governing
disciplinary proceedings. A lawyer subject to a disciplinary action
may submit a request for a panel hearing but is not entitled to a
hearing as a matter of right. Under Rule 9(a), RLPR, within 14 days
after being notified of the charges, the lawyer “may submit a
request that the Panel conduct a hearing,” and under Rule 9(a)(2),
RLPR, the Panel “may hear oral argument or conduct a
hearing,” but there is no language requiring the Panel to hold a
hearing. (emphasis added). Furthermore, Paul ignores Rule 10(e),
RLPR, which provides:

Additional Charges. If a petition under Rule 12 is pending
before this Court, the Director must present the matter to the Panel
Chair, or if the matter was not heard by a Panel or the Panel Chair
is unavailable, to the Board Chair or Vice-Chair, for approval before
amending the petition to include additional charges based upon
conduct committed before or after the petition was filed.

After the hearing on the original petition and while this matter
remained pending before this court, the Director prepared a
supplementary petition, which was presented and approved as required
by Rule 10(e) before it was filed and served. Therefore, the referee
properly considered the supplementary petition.

B.

We next address Paul’s challenges to the referee’s findings of
fact and conclusions of law. “At a disciplinary hearing, the
Director bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence
that a lawyer violated the Rules of Professional Conduct.” In
re Varriano, 755 N.W.2d 282, 288 (Minn. 2008) (citations
omitted). Because Paul ordered a transcript of the hearing before
the referee, the referee’s findings and conclusions are not
conclusive, although we give great deference to the referee’s
findings and conclusions and will uphold them if they have
evidentiary support in the record and are not clearly erroneous.
Rule 14(e), RLPR; Varriano, 755 N.W.2d at 288 (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Paul challenges several of the referee’s conclusions of law. We
conclude that the referee committed clear error in concluding that
Paul procured and participated in an improper notarization, in
violation of Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(c), but conclude that all
other findings of fact and conclusions of law are not clearly
erroneous.

The J.F. Matter

Paul first challenges the referee’s conclusion that his
failure to attend the child support hearing on behalf of J.F.
violated Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.1 and 1.3. Paul argues that his
failure to attend the child support hearing was not an ethical
violation because his failure to attend was due to a
miscommunication, rather than neglect or inadvertence. He testified
that his paralegal led him to reasonably believe that a continuance
had been granted, and that after she told him, he directed her to
call J.F., instructing him not to attend. Paul also argues that his
failure to attend the scheduled child support hearing did not
prejudice J.F. because J.F. did not have to pay more child support
than his income required. Paul testified that after the hearing, he
prepared a child support guidelines worksheet that established J.F.’s
monthly net child support obligation as $465, which was more than the
$426 per month J.F. was ordered to pay in the district court’s
February 24 order.

But even if J.F. suffered no financial loss as a result of Paul’s
failure to attend the child support hearing, Paul does not address
the referee’s findings and conclusions. The referee noted that
Paul did not explain why he waited until the day before the February
24 hearing to attempt to obtain the continuance. The referee further
noted that the 3-day trial and the arguments in the court of appeals
are not matters that arise suddenly and create a last-minute crisis,
so Paul was aware of these competing obligations long before the
scheduled hearing date. Finally, the referee found that Paul should
have known that a continuance must be agreed to by all parties and
that his failure to contact an opposing party was an unreasonable
omission capable of causing great prejudice to an opposing party.
The referee’s conclusion that Paul’s conduct in the J.F. matter
violated Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.1, requiring competence, and Minn.
R. Prof. Conduct 1.3, requiring diligence, is not clearly erroneous.

The D.K. Matter

Paul next argues that the Director failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that Paul’s failure to respond to the advice
from opposing counsel or to follow the instructions of the district
court to properly file a petition for custody violated Minn. R. Prof.
Conduct 3.4(c), prohibiting knowing disobedience of a tribunal, and
Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(d), regarding conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice. Paul argues that seeking to intervene in
an existing family court file was not an ethical violation because
Minn. R. Civ. P. 24.02 permits an applicant to move for permissive
intervention. Minn. R. Civ. P. 24.02 provides:

Upon timely application, anyone may be permitted to intervene in an
action when an applicant’s claim or defense and the main action
have a common question of law or fact. . . . In exercising its
discretion, the court shall consider whether the intervention will
unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the
original parties.

Paul argues that he was improperly sanctioned for his motion to
intervene because the two files were ultimately joined together,
which was the relief sought by his clients. He also claims that his
clients were benefited as a result of his behavior because their
claims were assigned to a different judge.

Under Minn. R. Civ. P. 24.03, a person seeking to intervene must
serve and file (1) a notice of intervention, which is automatically
effective after 30 days if no one objects, and (2) a pleading
“setting forth the nature and extent of every claim or defense as
to which intervention is sought and the reasons for the claim of
entitlement to intervention.” In other words, a person can
intervene only if he or she has some interest in the proceeding (in
either one of the claims or one of the defenses) then before the
court. The grandparents might have been able to intervene for the
purpose of seeking custody before permanent custody was awarded to
H.M. and K.M. But at the point that Paul filed the amended motion to
intervene for visitation and to modify custody in March,7
the only issue before the district court was the biological mother’s
request for parenting-time assistance, and nothing in Paul’s motion
indicated that the grandparents had an interest in the mother’s
parenting-time assistance. In the memorandum attached to its March
25, 2009 order, the district court noted, “[I]ntervention would be
proper if the matter had not been previously adjudicated. It is
clear that the motion is not timely.”

Paul fails to address his violations of procedural rules. The
referee concluded that Paul failed to properly file and serve his
motion and amended motion to intervene for visitation and to modify
custody: he never served the original motion, failed to file the
amended motion far enough in advance of the hearing, and failed to
serve the amended motion on all parties. These procedural violations
were prejudicial to the administration of justice because they
delayed the hearing on the mother’s request for parenting time.

Paul
also challenges the referee’s conclusion that he procured and
participated in an improper notarization in violation of Minn. R.
Prof. Conduct 8.4(c). In his supplementary petition for disciplinary
action, the Director alleges: “[Paul] prepared the affidavit and
thereafter attached one of the pre-signed signature pages to the
affidavit. At [Paul’s] direction, the signature was notarized by a
notary who did not witness R.V.’s signature.” We conclude,
however, that the Director did not prove this allegation by clear and
convincing evidence. Although Paul admitted that he directed R.V. to
pre-sign signature pages, Paul testified R.V. signed the affidavit
filed with the probate court in Paul’s presence, and Paul then
notarized the affidavit. There is nothing in the record contrary to
Paul’s testimony. Therefore, the referee’s conclusion that Paul
violated Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(c), is clearly erroneous.

The A.B. Matter

Paul challenges the referee’s conclusion that he failed to
cooperate in the A.B. investigation, in violation of Rule 25, RLPR.
Paul argues that because he eventually responded to the requests by
the Director and the rules do not contain a time limit, he did not
fail to cooperate. We have found that failure to timely respond to
requests for information during a disciplinary investigation
constitutes a failure to cooperate and a violation of Rule 25, RLPR.
In re Ulanowski, 800 N.W.2d 785, 800 (Minn. 2011); In re
Grigsby, 764 N.W.2d 54, 62 (Minn. 2009). Although Paul’s
failure to cooperate in the A.B. investigation is clearly less
serious than his failure to cooperate in, for example, the M.B.
matter, the referee did not clearly err when he concluded that Paul
failed to cooperate in the A.B. investigation.

In summary, we conclude that the referee committed clear error in
concluding that Paul procured and participated in an improper
notarization, in violation of Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(c). We
conclude that the referee’s conclusions that Paul’s misconduct
violated Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.1, 1.3, 3.2, 3.4(c), 8.1(b), and
8.4(d), and Rule 25, RLPR, on the other hand, were not clearly
erroneous.

II.

We now turn to the appropriate discipline. The purpose of
professional discipline is not to punish the lawyer, but rather “to
protect the public, to protect the judicial system, and to deter
future misconduct by the disciplined attorney as well as by other
attorneys.” In re Karlsen, 778 N.W.2d 307, 311 (Minn. 2010)
(citations omitted). We place great weight on a referee’s
recommended discipline but retain responsibility for determining the
appropriate sanction. Grigsby, 764 N.W.2d at 62 (citing In
re Nelson, 733 N.W.2d 458, 463 (Minn. 2007)). “In determining
the appropriate sanction, we consider several factors: (1) the nature
of the misconduct; (2) the cumulative weight of the disciplinary
violations; (3) the harm to the public; and (4) the harm to the legal
profession.” Id. (citation omitted). We impose sanctions
“on a case-by-case basis, considering the specific acts of
misconduct and any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, while
looking to similar cases for guidance.” In re Brooks, 696
N.W.2d 84, 88 (Minn. 2005) (citation omitted).

The referee recommended that Paul be indefinitely suspended from the
practice of law for a minimum of 6 months. We conclude, however,
that indefinite suspension for a minimum of 4 months is the
appropriate sanction.

Nature and Cumulative Weight of the Misconduct

Paul’s misconduct is substantial and varied. The referee
concluded that Paul failed to make reasonable efforts to expedite
litigation; failed to provide competent representation; failed to act
with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client;
failed to obey court rules; engaged in conduct that is prejudicial to
the administration of justice; failed to attend a hearing and
improperly told his client not to appear; and failed to cooperate
with disciplinary investigations.

We have held that failure to cooperate with a disciplinary
investigation warrants discipline, including suspension. In re
Engel, 538 N.W.2d 906, 906-07 (Minn. 1995) (suspending
indefinitely an attorney who failed to cooperate with disciplinary
investigations); In re Neill, 486 N.W.2d 150, 151 (Minn. 1992)
(holding that failure to cooperate, without more, warrants
suspension).

We have also held that repeated neglect of client matters warrants
severe discipline. In re Merlin, 572 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn.
1998) (“Indefinite suspension is typical in cases involving
continued or repeated neglect of client matters without evidence of
mitigating circumstances.”) (citation omitted); In re Flanery,
431 N.W.2d 115, 118 (Minn. 1988) (recognizing that, in cases of
neglect of more than one client’s matters, we have typically
ordered either indefinite suspension or disbarment) (citation
omitted).

Moreover, Paul has engaged in multiple acts of misconduct, which
typically warrant more severe sanctions. “[T]he cumulative weight
and severity of multiple disciplinary rule violations may compel
severe discipline even when a single act standing alone would not
have warranted such discipline.” In re Oberhauser, 679
N.W.2d 153, 160 (Minn. 2004) (citation omitted). “[M]ultiple acts
of misconduct, including past disciplinary history, warrant a more
severe sanction.” Ulanowski, 800 N.W.2d at 801 (citations
omitted); see In re Lee, 764 N.W.2d 19, 19 (Minn. 2009)
(imposing indefinite suspension for neglect of client matters,
failure to communicate with clients, failure to account to clients,
failure to protect client interests upon withdrawal from
representation, failure to cooperate with the Director’s
investigation, and engaging in conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice); In re Levenstein, 438 N.W.2d 665,
668-69 (Minn. 1989) (imposing an indefinite suspension for repeated
instances of neglect of client matters, the continued practice of law
while on suspended status, failure to respond to client requests to
turn over information, and noncooperation during the disciplinary
investigation). We conclude that Paul’s misconduct merits the
imposition of a serious sanction.

Harm to the Public and the Legal Profession

Paul neglected multiple matters, failed to obey court rules,
and failed to cooperate with disciplinary investigations. Neglect of
client matters “generally undermines public confidence in the legal
profession, which harms the public, the legal profession and the
justice system.” In re Letourneau, 792 N.W.2d 444, 453
(Minn. 2011) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Failure to obey court rules and procedures is harmful to the justice
system because it “needlessly increase[s] the burden on a heavily
loaded and underfunded court system.” Id. at 453.
Furthermore, we have stated that failure to cooperate with a
disciplinary investigation harms the legal system because it
undermines “the integrity of the lawyer disciplinary system.” In
re Gomsrud, 618 N.W.2d 803, 805 (Minn. 2000).

Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

The referee found that Paul’s disciplinary history was a
substantial aggravating factor.8See In re Mayrand, 723 N.W.2d 261, 269 (Minn. 2006). We
expect a previously-disciplined lawyer to demonstrate “a renewed
commitment to comprehensive ethical and professional behavior.” In
re Simonson, 420 N.W.2d 903, 906 (Minn. 1988) (citation omitted).
We have generally imposed “more severe sanctions when the current
misconduct is similar to misconduct for which the attorney has
already been disciplined.” Letourneau, 792 N.W.2d at 452
(citing In re Moore, 692 N.W.2d 446, 450 (Minn. 2005))
(internal quotation marks omitted). In In re Coleman, we
indefinitely suspended an attorney for a minimum of 6 months because
he engaged in multiple acts of misconduct and had an extensive
disciplinary history of similar misconduct. 793 N.W.2d 296, 309
(Minn. 2011). Paul has violated multiple rules and has an extensive
disciplinary history. Paul violated Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.1, 1.3,
3.2, 3.4(c), 8.1(b), and 8.4(d), and Rule 25, RLPR, and over the past
20 years, Paul has received five admonitions, one public reprimand,
and was placed on supervised probation twice. Moreover, Paul has
been disciplined previously for neglect of client matters and failure
to cooperate with a disciplinary investigation, which is similar to
some of his current misconduct.

The referee concluded that Paul’s new violations and his response
to them “demonstrate a continuing and heightened lack of insight, a
lack of an appropriate legal and moral compass,” and an “ability
to rationalize any failure of his duty to his client as somehow
benefiting the client.” The referee also noted that “the failure
of prior supervisory and rehabilitative efforts” and Paul’s
“inability to understand the goals and needs of his clients”
require “discipline of a more severe nature.” We agree with the
referee’s findings.

Accordingly, we order that:

1. Respondent William D. Paul be indefinitely suspended from the
practice of law, effective 14 days after the filing of this order,
and that he be ineligible to petition for reinstatement for a minimum
of 4 months from the effective date of suspension.

3
Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 3.4(c), provides that a lawyer shall not
“knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal.”
Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(d), states that professional misconduct
includes engaging in “conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice.”

4
Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(c), states that professional misconduct
includes engaging in conduct “involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit,
or misrepresentation.”

It shall be the duty of any lawyer who is the subject of an
investigation or proceeding under these Rules to cooperate with the
District Committee, the Director, or the Director’s staff, the
Board, or a Panel, by complying with reasonable requests, including
requests to:

(1) Furnish designated papers, documents or tangible objects;

(2) Furnish in writing a full and complete explanation covering the
matter under consideration.

Other Serious Matters In matters in which there are an
attorney’s admissions, civil findings, or apparently clear and
convincing documentary evidence of an offense of a type for which
the Court has suspended or disbarred lawyers in the past, such as
misappropriation of funds, repeated non-filing of personal income
tax returns, flagrant non-cooperation including failure to submit an
answer or failure to attend a pre-hearing meeting as required by
Rule 9, fraud and the like, the Director may either submit the
matter to a Panel or upon a motion made with notice to the attorney
and approved by the Panel Chair, file the petition under Rule 12.

7
Paul did not file a notice of motion with his September 2008 motion
to intervene for visitation and to modify custody and did not
properly serve this motion, so the district court was not called
upon to act on the motion in September 2008.

8
The referee found lack of harm to P.Q. as a mitigating factor of
Paul’s conduct.