Attorney General Charles
M. Condon, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant
Deputy Attorney General Robert E. Bogan, all of Columbia; and Solicitor
David P. Schwacke, of N. Charleston, for respondent.

JUSTICE MOORE: We granted a writ of certiorari to review the
Court of Appeals' decision affirming petitioner's convictions for kidnapping and
assault and battery with intent to kill. (1) We
affirm as modified herein.

FACTS

At trial, Debra Brown (Victim) testified
she was acquainted with petitioner and saw him on the night of February 14,
1996, at a bar she frequented. He offered her a ride home after she had had
several drinks. On the way, Victim waited in the car while petitioner made a
stop at a friend's house. When he returned to the car, he had drugs with him
and was angry about being cheated.

Victim became frightened and tried
to get out of the car but petitioner restrained her. He drove to a wooded area
where he pulled her out of the car. He raped her on the ground then forced her
back into the car and drove to a partially boarded-up trailer owned by his mother.
There he beat Victim repeatedly about the face, head, and back with a tire iron,
forced her to smoke crack after trying to make her swallow it, and raped her
again.

Finally, at about 6:00 a.m. the following
morning, petitioner agreed to let Victim leave with the threat that he would
kill her and her children if she told anyone. He dropped her off near her home.
Victim walked to her sister's house and from there was taken by ambulance to
the hospital where she was treated for facial fractures and severe bruising.

Petitioner admitted having sex with
Victim but claimed it was consensual. He testified they agreed to exchange sex
for drugs and left the bar together for that purpose. At the trailer, they smoked
crack and had sex. When Victim indicated she did not want to have sex with him
again, petitioner cut off the drugs. Victim became angry and attacked petitioner
with a piece of board. Petitioner defended himself.

The trial judge charged self-defense.
Petitioner requested an additional charge that the State must disprove self-defense.
The trial judge refused the charge and petitioner appealed.
(2) The Court of Appeals affirmed with one judge dissenting.

ISSUE

Did the trial judge err in refusing
to instruct the jury that the State has the burden of disproving self-defense?

DISCUSSION

Petitioner contends under State v.
Wiggins, 330 S.C. 538, 500 S.E.2d 489 (1998), he was entitled to a charge that
the State had the burden of disproving self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.

Wiggins addressed whether the defendant
was entitled to a directed verdict because the State failed to negate self-defense.
We noted that self-defense is no longer an affirmative defense in our State
and that "current law requires the State to disprove self-defense, once raised
by the defendant, beyond a reasonable doubt." 330 S.C. at 544, 500 S.E.2d at
492. (3) The Court of Appeals' majority found
Wiggins was not controlling in the context of a jury charge. We disagree.

In State v. Davis, 282 S.C. 45, 317
S.E.2d 452 (1984), we issued a model self-defense charge that removed the burden
from the defendant to prove self-defense. Instead, trial courts were to charge:

If you have a reasonable doubt
of the defendant's guilt after considering all the evidence including the
evidence of self-defense, then you must find him not guilty. On the other
hand, if you have no reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt after considering
all the evidence including the evidence of self-defense, then you must find
him guilty.

In Wiggins, we specified for the
first time, though not in the context of a jury charge, that the State has the
burden of disproving self-defense. Wiggins is dispositive of the issue here.
See State v. Kimbrell, 294 S.C. 51, 362 S.E.2d 630 (1987) (error to
refuse charge that was correct statement of law). When self-defense is properly
submitted to the jury, the defendant is entitled to a charge, if requested,
that the State has the burden of disproving self-defense by proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. (4) Because petitioner was tried before
the filing of our opinion in Wiggins, however, we hold the trial judge did not
err in refusing the charge in this case. The decision of the Court of Appeals
is

2. Petitioner
also argued on appeal to the Court of Appeals that the trial judge's self-defense
charge was confusing. We agree with the Court of Appeals that this argument
is procedurally barred. See State v. Patterson, 324 S.C. 5, 482 S.E.2d
760 (1997) (argument not raised below not preserved for review).

3. Wiggins cites
State v. Fuller, 297 S.C. 440, 442, 377 S.E.2d 328, 330 (1989), in which we
quoted the trial judge's charge including the following language: "[A]bsence
of self-defense must be proven by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt."
In Fuller, however, this aspect of the charge was never addressed.