Monday, January 29, 2018

The current “review that is not a
review”, now called Defence Modernisation Programme, is an abomination and an
abject failure. There is no other honest way to describe the current farcical
situation, with a government in denial scrambling for new cuts scarcely two
years into a 5-years strategic plan crafted with the last SDSR, dated November
2015. The handling of the whole “National Security Strategy” is farcical, and
the months spent denying the problem now look like nothing but concentrated
dishonesty. Michael Fallon’s late change of heart is the coronation of the
whole disaster: now that he is no longer in charge he is not just admitting
that there is a serious cash problem, but pontificating on areas where to seek
further “efficiencies”.

We are now officially into a new
review, but the government is still trying to tell us that it is not a purely
financial exercise. They insist on turning “cuts” into “modernisation”.

The effective gravity of the problem
is hard to gauge. The MOD is now saying that they have “line of sight” on about
90% of the efficiency target set by the SDSR 2015 (more than 7.4 billions) and
they also say that the earlier target set by the SDSR 2010 is more or less
achieved. A variety of other initiatives requiring other efficiencies added up
to an official target of some 20 billion. In theory, if the MOD statements are
to be trusted, most of that money has been found, but press reports continue to
suggest that a minimum of 15 and a maximum of 30 billions are missing over the
next ten years timeframe. This is nothing short of astonishing because, in the
worst case, it pretty much means that the MOD is missing a whole financial year
of budget. It is hard to even imagine how this can be, especially since the
Equipment Budget, one of the biggest expenditure voices, is entering into years
in which most of the expenditure is planned but not contractually committed. According
to the Equipment Programme 2016, 48% of the Equipment Budget is not yet tied to
contracts as of financial year 2017/18, which in theory means that there is a
lot that could simply shift to the right or be cancelled before cuts to
existing assets and manpower numbers need to be considered. Of course, a large
proportion of money not yet contractually locked is nonetheless tied to
programmes which the MOD absolutely does not want to drop, but even then there
should be (and there is) a degree of flexibility that is hardly reconciled with
stories of imminent collapse.

Not to mention that all Army
programmes are late on start, so the MOD has been spending less than originally
planned, and all three services are undermanned compared to requirement, which
also should mean personnel costs are lower than expected. Unless the MOD is
completely unable to calculate a budget, it is extremely hard, if not
impossible, to reconcile the MOD’s affirmations on Efficiencies and on the
state of the EP and the financial crisis as reported by the press: either said
crisis is far smaller than the media estimate, or the MOD must be lying about
having found the efficiencies requested. Alternatively, the Treasury has not respected its promise to let the MOD carry forward its underspend and has taken back the money or is trying to take it back now.

For sure the MOD is very distant from
meeting its civilian headcount reduction target; this is known.

The terrifying cut options that Fallon was about to approve, according to the Times. Option 2 would seem to be the most "acceptable", but it still makes for horrifying reading. The new secretary reportedly refused to seriously consider any of these.

Meanwhile, Fallon has written in the
Telegraph to say that efficiencies can still be found by removing “duplication”
in medical services, helicopters and other functions.

While medical services could perhaps
be an area where to look for savings, finding genuine “efficiencies” in
helicopters will be very complicated: there no longer are “duplicate fleets”. Puma
is no duplication of Merlin. Puma is smaller, can quickly deploy via C-17.
Merlin is for shipboard ops and ASW. Chinook has no duplicate. Wildcat neither.
Apache neither. That leaves the Gazelle fleet, still used in a number of
supporting roles at home and in BATUS. Gazelle could be replaced with H-135 or
145 to achieve commonality with the new training fleet, but this is a typical
“spend now to save later” solution. Similarly, the armed forces could perhaps
put under contract a more coherent and logistically common solution for
training support and Brunei (currently done with a handful of Bell 212) and for
Cyprus (4 Griffin helicopters for SAR and training support). But, again, it
would take cash to do so.

Reducing the number of Army Air
Corps bases is also something that is being looked at, long and hard. A
specific strand of Defence Estate review dealing with this topic has been in
the works for months and is (very) late on publishing. There is some appetite for closing down Wattisham, moving
the Apache south to Middle Wallop or Boscombe Down. This might generate
significant savings in the long run, but the upfront cost is massive.
Efficiencies, when they aren’t just cuts under a different name, often require
upfront expenditure, and that makes them hard to pursue when lack of cash
in-year is the problem.

The “serious debate on defence” dream

I remain convinced that the current
handling of Defence policy in the UK is simply indefensible and needs to be
dramatically reformed. British defence plans are largely unaccountable. The
lack of details and the endless contradictions make it impossible to keep track
of the department’s work. The EP document is a manifestation of this extreme
vagueness: the graphics show us, more or less accurately, the consistence of
the budgets for each equipment area but there is next to nothing in terms of
detail about what programmes are included. We get told how much money is
expended, but we only ever get extremely limited detail about what it buys.

The NAO Major Projects report is no
longer produced, so even that source of information is gone, leaving behind
only the Excel spreadsheets that the MOD publishes in July, showing the
expenditure connected to the largest ongoing programmes. Some of the figures
remain undisclosed; smaller but important programmes get no mention at all;
acquisition profiles are not included and the entire spreadsheet only gives a
vision of the financial year that has ended. In other words: in July this year
(assuming there are no delays or changes) we’ll get a picture that will be
current only to September 2017. What little we get to know is always a picture
of a far gone past.

Written Answers are just as vague:
MOD ministers regularly refuse to disclose dates and numbers. The latest
written answers about WCSP and MRV-P, for example, deliberately do not include
any indication of a target date for contract award. The Warrior CSP production
contract; a Challenger 2 LEP candidate downselection; the order for JLTV for
the Multi Role Vehicle Protected Group 1 and a choice between Eagle 6x6 and
Bushmaster for the Group 2 requirement are (were?) all expected this year, but
uncertainty rules supreme. Speaking at RUSI, Carter mentioned that the Army
will have WCSP and CR2 LEP “sometimes in the next five years”. Is he talking of
contract award? Delivery of first vehicle? IOC? FOC? He could have hardly been
any more confusing. There is no way to keep track of the MOD’s actions.

The Defence Committee is powerless
and the Defence chiefs are subject to such limitations when they speak to it
that they are effectively forbidden from voicing any discomfort with government
policy. This effectively means that the hearings are almost completely
pointless.

There have been complaints recently
about leaks to the newspapers being “damaging to morale”, and that is certainly
true. But the sad truth is that leaks are currently the only instrument in the
hands of the MOD to initiate a public debate. Chiefs aren’t allowed to voice
their concerns openly in front of the committee and Parliament doesn’t get a
vote on the defence plan. In France, in the US, and even in Italy Parliament
does get a say and each financial year sees the publication of detailed
documents that show how much money will be allocated to each programme and what
said money will buy. France publishes a list of everything it plans to order in
year, and another of everything it receives.

In the UK there is absolutely
nothing remotely comparable.

It is my opinion that this
absolutely needs to change. It is impossible to have a “serious debate” on
Defence when no information is ever allowed to circulate. The Chief General
Staff ended his much hyped RUSI speech urging experts to debate about defence.
This is a very welcome call to arms, but the debate cannot be restricted to
“give defence more money because Russia is a threat”. The debate cannot be
restricted only to extremely general concepts: how can anyone comment on the
validity of STRIKE, for example, when the Army tells us nothing about the
concept? How do we make a case for “Information Manoeuvre” when we have been
barely told that it will involve “77 Brigade, 1st ISR Brigade and
the two signal brigades” working together. Back in June last year, Fallon spoke
to RUSI and said that Royal Signals and Intelligence Corps would “merge” as
part of the Information Manoeuvre Strategy and that a second EW regiment (who
knows with what kind of capability remit) would be formed. We were never given
a further word about it.

One only needs to compare the
british army SOLDIER magazine with Corps or Army-wide publications in the US or
Australian or French armies. SOLDIER is gossip (no offence intended to those
who produce the magazine, just stating facts), while journals elsewhere include
very interesting discussions about tactics, force structure, proposals, critiques coming from inside the army.

If the armed forces want a proper
debate, they must start it themselves and provide us with some degrees of
information. Security concerns are always and rightfully prominent, but it is
just not credible to say that the British forces can never discuss anything in
the open while other allied armies feel free to share their thinking. Surely
there is something that is both releasable and meaningful. In absence of any relevant information, any debate ends
up being a fantasy fleet exercise. Personally, I find it frustrating enough
that I’ve largely ceased trying, because every discourse ultimately feels
pointless and I’m finding it harder and
harder to take any statement or plan with any degree of confidence. There are
only so many defence reviews that can be torn to bits within a year or two
before all confidence in their worth is lost.

“Tough choices”

As cuts draw nearer, the usual
rhetoric about tough choices and sacred cows resurfaces. From my somewhat
privileged observation point outside of the UK I can say that:

1) The
UK is extremely “good” at making tough choices when it comes to cutting
defence. They are often extremely tough and they have dramatic and long-lasting
effects. They tend to only make some kind of sense from a short-term
perspective, however. Few other countries are able to demolish entire
capabilities and spit in the face of years of efforts and investment as the UK
does, and arguably none in the whole world ends up doing it so frequently.

2) The
sacred cows rhetoric is too often used in the context of inter-service rivalry
rather than in a rational assessment of capability. “Amphibious capability” and
“airborne capability” are not sacred cows. The fetish for a disproportionate
number of tiny infantry battalions is.

Ahead of this new review several
commentators are calling for tough choices matching the severity of those
contained in the infamous 1981 review chaired by John Nott. The Guardian in
particular seems to have jumped on this train of thought advocating, for the
most part in extremely vague and weak ways, for a UK
that “focuses on Europe” and that “cannot afford to rule the waves
anymore”.

There was some outrage when the new
secretary of state for defence listed his priorities for defence and put
developing a global strike capability based on the new aircraft carriers right
behind Continuous At Sea Deterrence and ahead of the “capability to defend
Europe”. I found that quite ridiculous, first of all because I'm not sure the
order in which he told them has any real meaning. Also, they are concepts so
vaguely defined that they can mean pretty much anything and its contrary, save
for CASD which is (or should be, at least) unambiguous. The very fact that
amphibious capability and LPDs are very much in danger of being cut means that
"global carrier strike" means little. The two components are closely
connected and removing one damages the whole irreparably.

Moreover, "Defence of
Europe" can take several different directions.

There is a dangerous narrative doing
the rounds about the navy being responsible for the Budget problem and for the
army’s woes. The carriers are regularly described as the problem, regardless of
how patently and demonstrably false this affirmation is.

First of all, before examining the
strategic implications, let’s take note of this fact: the carriers by now are
paid for. Soon enough the second ship will be delivered, and the 6 billions are
gone at this point. If you want a programme costing over six billions and with most
of the expenditure yet to take place you have to look at the voice “Armoured
Cavalry 2025 - Ajax”.

The 6 billions for the carriers have
been expended between 2008 and today, and there never was a year in which they
were the biggest voice of expenditure in the budget. The acquisition of the 48
F-35B planned will cost some 9.1 billion spread on the financial years 2001 to
2026. Simple math confirms that no, the carriers did not break the budget, even
if the ships cost and the F-35 costs are summed together. Note that the F-35
would still be there regardless of the carriers, as the RAF would have wanted
it all the same to replace its older attack aircraft.

The carriers have contributed to
forcing the Navy to accept a number of cuts to its escorts, that is definite,
but the simple truth is that a navy of sole escorts is very different from a
navy complete of carriers. The carriers fundamentally shape the role and
capability of the Royal Navy. Having a few frigates more would not have the
same effect.

It is also false that the Army is
not getting money because of the Navy and of the F-35. The Land Equipment
budget for 2016 – 2026 is 19.1 billion, versus 19 for Ships and 18 for Combat
Air. It is true that the Air Force also gets money under “Air Support” and
“Helicopters” budget, but that is valid for the Army as well (Apache and
Wildcat for the Army Air Corps). Arguably, the Army is the primary user for
many of the air support platforms as well (C-130, A400, C-17, Voyager). When it
is said that the army is suffering the consequences of inflated Navy and Air
Force programmes, fundamentally a lie is uttered.

The real elephant in the room is
clearly the nuclear deterrent, which enormously inflates the “Submarines”
budget, but as long as CASD remains the primary national defence tool there is
little that can be done about its cost. The Navy has little to no actual
control on it, and said control will become even more loose as the Top Budget
Areas are restructured and divided up
differently. Effective from 1 april 2016 the MOD has established the Director General Nuclear Organisation. The effect of this further division of responsibility should become visible in the soon to be published Equipment Programme document (which details the financial year 16/17). DG Nuclear is a Front Line Command (FLC) equivalent post. Since April 2013 the equipment budget management has been delegated to the FLCs: RN, Army, RAF, Joint Forces Command, Strategic Programmes Directorate and now DG Nuclear.

Strategic considerations; Europe and the unpleasant truth

The UK cannot and should not
"defend Europe" from Russia. It can contribute to the defence of Europe, and the difference between the
two affirmations is enormous.

Whether the “defend Europe” priority
truly needs to be a major force structure driver is actually debatable. If we
seriously expect major, non-geographically limited russian action, arguably we
should not be contemplating cuts at all.

If the Russian threat is
geographically limited, presumably to the Baltic countries, the UK cannot
afford to have its defence policy dragged too much towards an overland posture
by something it might still not be able to prevent and that, sorry if it sounds
cynical, is of little actual impact to the UK. We need to ask what is the
actual danger to the UK from Russia's actions in Ukraine and, potentially, the
Baltics? Cynical as it sounds, UK committment must be commensurate to threat
and returns. What is the UK's substantial committment to the Baltics buying?
What would an even greater focus gain?

The direct impact on the UK from Russian actions in either area is
actually minimal. Obviously, the one enormous difference is that the Baltic
countries are part of NATO, so an aggression against them would trigger Article
5 and require NATO action. If NATO failed to react appropriately, the
credibility of Article 5 would be shattered forever. This indirect impact is the real concern, as it would put the whole of
NATO, and all the defence assumptions it underpins, into question.

The collapse of Article 5 is to be
avoided by preventing the start of hostilities. I think that, if we are
realistic, we will all admit that if Russia ever attacked for real, rushing
into war would be very, very complicated. Would the NATO countries be willing and able to declare war on Russia
over the Baltics? Especially if Russia managed to make the invasion start off
as a “local uprising” as in Crimea and Ukraine? I very much struggle to imagine
much enthusiasm in the public opinion, including a UK in which an alarmingly
large share of the population seem to share Corbyn’s feeling that even the
Falklands and Gibraltar should be given up. If they have so little care for
fellow Britons, do we expect them to support a far more dangerous war in the Baltics?
We are “lucky” that Georgia and Ukraine are not part of NATO. And we cannot be
surprised that Russia attacked them before they could join. As much as US and
NATO protested and deprecated Russia’s actions and regardless of how good and
deep the relations with either country are, nobody was willing to enter an
actual war for them. Within Europe there are those who think the EU is
responsible for the Ukraine disaster because it “intruded into Russia’s
backyard”. There was and is political opposition even to the economic sanctions
against Russia, with some parties valuing trade with Russia more than Ukraine.
As Italian, unfortunately, I know this all too well, as we have had some loud
voices speaking exactly in these terms. If push came to shove there would be
some serious thinking about how to react to a Baltic scenario as well. Realism
hurts, but is desperately necessary.

The NATO forward presence in the
Baltics is intended to prevent such a scenario by hopefully making it
impossible for Russia to build up an “uprising scenario” or any other form of
modern maskirovka while also putting
NATO troops directly on the frontline. Any invasion would put British,
American, German, French and other troops immediately at risk, and public
opinion in the respective countries would find it much harder not to react. In
the most brutal and direct terms possible: if the Russians advance, NATO soldiers
will die and that will provide motivation for the fight to continue. And in turn,
this awareness discourages Russia from trying in the first place.

It is a game of deterrence, and I
hope no one believes that the forward-deployed battlegroups, with their handful
of mix and match armored vehicles from multiple countries, could actually defend the Baltics through combat. They
are nowhere near large and capable enough to do that. Their presence is meant
to dissuade Russia from opening fire in the first place, not to provide effective defence against a serious attack. They are there to ensure that others would come after them.

Should NATO’s forward presence be
reinforced? Should a much greater permanent presence of troops be a priority? No.
An excessively cumbersome NATO presence would risk alienating local support in
the long run, while worsening relations with Russia even further. It would also
be difficult, if not impossible, to accumulate enough forces to make the
Baltics “unassailable”. Russia is advantaged by geography and by good internal
communications that would allow it to rapidly concentrate overwhelming force in
the area, while the small Baltics states physically do not have territory to give up to gain time.

“Defending Europe” does not require
the UK switching its focus back to continental warfare. It would be extremely
unwise to do so. Skewering any further the whole UK's defence posture towards a
new British Army of the Rhine, or even of Poland or of the Baltics would be
nothing short of stupid.

Half-tracked STRIKE brigades, even
if their vehicles were stored in Germany, where the army intends to maintain
its Controlled Humidity Storage facility, would not change the equation. Even
assuming they could truly drive all the way to the Baltics along European
roads, they still wouldn’t shift the balance. I'd rather invest further in the ability to move heavy armour by road and train. The British Army's fleet of Heavy Equipment Transporters is a precious asset, but with just 89 transporters and 3 recovery vehicles there are obvious limits to what can be moved around. British HETs have been transporting allied armoured vehicles and loads as well. Notably, some 30 HETs have been loaned to the US Army as the american HET does not comply with european regulations.

The supporters of the mythical
“tough decision”, however, seem to advocate for a repeat of the retreat from
East of Suez to preserve the army and focus on the European theatre. Supposedly
this is not just the wise choice but also the cheap one.

The actual harsh truth is that it is
neither wise nor cheap.

The British Army is not in good
shape. It is very small; it is short of supports; it is incredibly weak in
terms of air defence and most of its brigades are not deployable but are mere
bags containing a variable number of small, light role, non-mechanized infantry
battalions plus three small cavalry regiments mounted on Jackal. The British
Army is nowhere near ready for an actual fight with Russia and, size-wise especially, it will never truly be. The Guardian can happily subscribe to the
Russia-produced story that what the heavily mechanized, artillery rich Russian
army is very afraid
of the tiny light role infantry battalions on foot that make up most of the
british army, but I hope that most people can recognize deliberate trolling for
what it is.

Fortunately, the British Army does
not need to take on Russian forces on its own.

Obsolescence of major equipment,
weakness in Fires, ground based air defence in need of rebuilding and a dog’s
breakfast mix of countless small vehicle fleets procured under UOR all add up
to a gigantic capability gap that it would take many billions to close. The 19
billion ten-year equipment budget would merely begin to improve the outlook,
even assuming everything (finally) worked out. And keep in mind that it is,
de-facto, not known exactly what is included in those 19 billions, what is
partially included and what is left for later. Even before new programmes begin
to appear (new artillery, land precision strike, long range rockets for GMLRS,
air and missile defence, new ground based sensors, a Desert Hawk III
replacement etcetera) we don’t know when WCSP will deliver, or when CR2 LEP
will go ahead and whether it will be enough to make Challenger 2 competitive
again.

The UK is not equipped to be a
continental power. The British Army in many ways compares horribly poorly to
Poland’s army. And this is, to a degree, normal. It is not the UK’s task to be
a continental power and the guardian of East Europe. It should continue to
contribute, certainly, but trying to buy influence in Europe with the land
forces the UK has is, if not impossible, a job that will take many years and
many more billion pounds than the UK can expend.

Cutting back capabilities such as
the (existing and paid for) amphibious force with its shipping; or the
carriers; or the F-35 purchase, would merely mean turning billions of pounds
and years of efforts and investment into nothing but waste. New weaknesses will
be created where there are not, for little to no effective gain at all.

What the UK has always added to
Europe's military capability and to the “European side of NATO” is the
willingness and ability to intervene far from home. An Europe-centric garrison,
even if it was to revolve around a new "british army of the
Baltic" would not be in the UK nor EU's interest if it came at the expense
of other capabilities.

The UK was never primarily defined
in Europe by its MBTs apart perhaps when Chieftain's 120mm appeared in a 105mm
NATO. BAOR was of course a valued contribution, and there was a period in which
it made sense to focus on it and GIUK gap above all else, but those times are
over.

Today’s unique
UK strengths include strategic air mobility; air breathing ISTAR which is
second only to the US’s; the Royal Fleet Auxiliary which has more capability on
its own than the support vessels of the other major European navies put
together; SSNs and their expert and excellently trained crews; Tomahawk which
only has a European paragon in France’s Scalp Navale; amphibious capability
which in Europe few players have; a vast Chinook fleet; Apache; and combat
engineering. P-8 Poseidon and Carrier Strike will soon enough be part of this
list. In good part, the strength’s of today’s UK have come out of the never
realized review of 1998, but this does not make them any less relevant. Whether
by design or by incident, many of those capabilities remain unique in Europe or
make up a huge percentage of Europe’s entire potential capability in the
sector.

It would be absurd to throw away
existing strengths to try and become a continental power on the cheap. Also
because, quite simply, the budget would never suffice anyway.

Years ago, before starting this
blog; before Russia invaded Georgia, I was a commentator on blogs owned by
others. More than once I warned that the Cold War had never ended from a
russian prospective but only from a western one. Back then, any remark of this
kind was invariably met with the typical 90s and early 00s story that Soviet
equipment was never good anyway and Russia would never be a threat again.

Even after the events in Georgia the
situation did not change. It took Ukraine to truly generate a reaction.

Now I see a real risk that the UK
will go from one extreme to the other. Russia must not become an hysteria that
bends the UK’s defences and foreign policy entirely out of shape.

Russia's threat, while absolutely
significant, does not require nor suggest the UK should be throwing away every
bit of effort expended since at least 1998 to become a country engaged globally
in a globalized world in favor of garrisoning an hostile Europe seeking gains
from Brexit.

The UK has chosen to leave the
European Union. It will not leave Europe, for obvious reasons. But Global
Britain needs to be a concept which is actively pursued, not an empty slogan.
With the capabilities it possesses, the UK is better positioned to be an
expeditionary player than a garrison entrenched in East Europe. This does not
make the UK’s forces any less valuable to NATO or the EU. If the UK sacrifices
its expeditionary capabilities to revert to an “European garrison” ala review
of 1981, France’s military weight within the EU will massively increase as they
will be the only major player with worldwide reach. There is no guarantee that
the UK would even be able to conserve its current “rank” (let alone improve it)
if it cut back on expeditionary capabilities to keep the army at 82k personnel.
Sending a squadron of open-topped Jackals in the frozen north-east Europe so
the crews can get frostbite is hardly going to impress anyone. I say this with
the utmost respect for the crews out there riding Jackals and Coyotes, let me
make this clear. I just can’t take the idea seriously, though.

Remainers should not be under the
illusion that cutting back on the navy in favor of the army will gain the UK
any advantage in Brexit negotiations. The government, moreover, should not be
under the impression that they can cut defence at will and still expect Europe
to be awed by the british armed forces and overtly attach to them a great
value. General Camporini had tough comments to offer about the UK’s armed
forces and their role in Europe pre and post Brexit and he is unlikely to be
the only one thinking in those terms. In fact, the the last thing the UK should
do is to offer even further unilateral promises and reassurances and
commitments before securing any kind of return. Unilaterally and
unconditionally committing to “manning trenches” in the East Europa is the
perfect way to enable the EU to snub the british armed forces value and still
get them to pay the cost of defending the union.

Ultimately, in this day and age, the
UK cannot and should not pretend that the world begins at Gibraltar and ends near Kaliningrad. The UK spent a good twenty years rebuilding its forces to an
expeditionary model and is now on the verge of having the second most powerful
naval task force in the world.

The “tough choice” it needs to make
is arguably to stop salami-slicing capability from all three services and
accept that its efforts have to be prioritized on some sectors rather than
others. The strengths are at sea and in the air? Build on them. They are paid
for. They are valuable.

Middle East commitments build security,
buy the UK a market (including for its defence industry) and play into Europe’s
security no less than a battlegroup in the Baltic. The “defence of Europe” does
not encompass only the continent: it stretches out to Africa and Middle East.

The UK also needs to continue its
return East of Suez, not because it can more realistically take on China than it can on Russia, but because it needs to be seen as a player in the Indian Ocean
and beyond. France and even Italy, which is basing its new defence strategy on
the concept of “enlarged Mediterranean” and on the acquisition of expeditionary
capabilities such as AEW and new, larger ships, have understood that they need
to buy relevance beyond Suez. The UK’s powerful naval group and its air force
cannot defeat China, obviously, but are more than valuable enough to contribute
to build security and can buy the UK influence in the area.

The UK’s natural role in Europe is
as guardian of the GIUK gap and ASW expert. The new NATO command for
the Atlantic should see the UK in very first line for obvious reasons of
geography, direct interest (nobody else has as much to lose from a potential
Russian break out into the Atlantic as the UK), expertise and equipment (P-8
incoming, Merlin, SSNs, Type 23 and, in the future, Type 26). The Type 31
frigate is the odd one out: the ship would be much more useful if it was ASW
capable. “GP frigates”, as I’ve said more than once, are a terribly poor
investment as far as I’m concerned.

The Arctic?

MOD officials recently went on
record saying that the next fight will be in the frozen north, but does the UK
have any sort of strategy, or even clear ambitions in the arctic?

China has now published a
programmatic document outlining its approach to the Arctic, including the
stated intention of beginning to exploit the natural resources to be found in
the area, as well as the new navigable routes that are increasingly becoming
viable with the retreat of the ice.

The Arctic Shipping Routes, if they became truly viable, would significantly shorten the travel times to China, Korea and Japan, reducing shipping costs. The UK is in a good position to benefit from such a development.

The UK needs to think about what it
wants to get in the Arctic and how it might get it. What is the position of the
UK on the exploitation of the untapped natural resources to be found in the
frozen north? There are well known concerns about the preservation of the
natural environment, but does the UK think said concerns should entirely prevent future
exploitation? China clearly expects to tap into those natural resources and so
does Russia, which has been working for years on turning its arctic coast into
a massive military base and defensive bastion. Obviously they are not doing
that to protect polar bears from hunters. What is the UK's position on the matter?

The UK has no direct way to directly
claim territory in the Arctic, and whatever it wants to obtain from the frozen
north must reflect this. Clearly any UK access to the area and its resources depends
on cooperation with allies which have a legitimate claim to arctic territory. Norway,
which is a historic and natural partner, including for GIUK gap defense, is an
obvious candidate.

Bilateral agreements and common strategies and goals are needed.

China’s plan for a “polar silk road”
is potentially enormously significant for the UK’s economy. The arctic
routes to Asia are much shorter, and quicker, cheaper navigations could, in
the future, encourage a massive growth in traffic. The UK is excellently
positioned to benefit from such a development .

Russia, advantaged by geography, is
already putting up a true Anti Access Area Denial bubble extending over much of
the Arctic, to ensure it starts from a dominant position.

The UK needs to engage with its
allies, beginning with Norway and Canada, to shape a common policy for the
Arctic, to ensure that it can benefit from future developments in the area and
avoid strategic shocks.

Where does that leave the Army?

The UK should continue to aim for
Division-sized effects, because that is the ambition level appropriate for a
regional power with worldwide reach. It should be well within the UK’s
possibilities. The Division should be the ambition, but not at all costs. If it
can’t be done because the government is not prepared to fund defence in line
with ambitions, then strong brigades must be the alternative.

The Army should not try at all costs
to be a continental power that can take on Russia. What the UK needs from its
army is a capable land element that can deploy effectively within a larger
allied force and complement other tools of british policy and power projection.
It is more important to field a flexible, capable force, than a larger but
obsolescent force tormented by the current plethora of capability gaps and
vulnerabilities.

Like in the Air and Sea domains, the
UK should strive to field an enablers-rich land force that can act as leader and
take aboard the contributions of other countries.

In order to modernize, the Army needs
to become a lot more rational in its approaches. In twenty years of constant
rethinks, cancellations, delays and mistakes it has gone around in circles,
returning to the starting point again and again, losing something along the way
with each lap. With the exception of Royal Engineers vehicles, the British
Army’s last “combat” vehicle purchase that didn’t happen through UOR was the
Panther. And after purchasing it, it tried to use it as a patrol vehicle, which
was not what it had been procured for, and ended up hating it.

Then, only partially excused by the
urgency imposed by ongoing combat operations, it only ever managed to procure
vehicles through UORs. Now it has a multitude of small fleets requiring
multiple different logistic lines.

Its main acquisition programmes have
literally gone in circles: again Boxer (or at least a heavy 8x8) is on the list
of wishes, as it was in the 90s (in the Boxer case we are literally talking of
the same vehicle). The Warrior capability sustainment programme is years late.
Challenger 2 CSP, eventually downgraded to a simpler Life Extension Programme, has
long been in the same limbo. Artillery modernization programmes are more or
less motionless by as much as a decade plus.

Still, the Army continues to start
more programmes than it can manage and fund. In the SDSR 2010 the focus was put
on modernizing the armoured brigades: a noble target that was the one bit of
common sense in the whole of Army 2020. WCSP finally began; the huge Ajax
contract was signed in September 2014.

In November 2015 the priorities were
turned on their heads and wheels returned to the front of the queue, with MIV
being the new must-have. Results so far: WCSP downsized by two battalions; one
armoured brigade to be converted to Strike; ABSV removed from the programme in
2016; CR2 numbers slashed once more. 3 years later, WCSP production contract is
still not coming, the FV432 replacement remains a question mark, CR2 LEP does
not truly satisfy anyone and marches to an unknown timeframes and Ajax is being
tentatively squeezed into a new role for which many, beginning with me, do not
think it is adequate.

Is it too much to ask the Army to at
least focus on one thing at once? Can it start one modernization process and,
just this once, bring it to conclusion? The armoured brigades were the focus.
Serious money was assigned to the projects needed to modernize them. Bring the
job to conclusion.

If STRIKE is unaffordable; if MIV
cannot be procured at the moment, then it should be shelved. In the meanwhile
perhaps the Army can explain what it wants to do, for real, and we can have
that “serious debate” about it. Because as of now STRIKE
seems just a solution in search of a problem.

Through stubbornness of its own and
political meddling the army has also never properly restructured its regiments
and when faced with cuts to the budget has ended up disproportionately damaging
the supporting elements, so much that now it is heading for just 4 “complete”
brigades out of 11. 16 Air Assault is a two-battlegroups force; two armoured
and two strike brigades will be the only other units for which there will be
Signals, Artillery, Engineer and Logistic units. And even then, the armoured
brigades will miss an important piece: a cavalry formation for reconnaissance
and screening.

The army needs to modernize and
re-balance its structure even more than it needs to modernize its equipment.

Real elephant in the room for me
remains 1st Division and its load of "fake brigades" without CS and
CSS. As useful as it still can be in a variety of roles (infantry is never
useless), in its current form it cannot possibly be considered a wise and
rational use of manpower and resources.

Rationalizing structures and
inventory also brings efficiencies. Some big, some small, some neutral. CBRN
mission, currently split between FALCON Sqn RTR and 27 Sqn RAF Regiment after
the complete disaster that was the disbandment of the Joint CBRN regiment in
the SDSR 2010 needs sorting out with a new joint solution.

Medical services across the three
services and field hospitals should be reconsidered in a joint way: most of the
field hospitals are reserve ones and jointery is already noticeable, so there
probably aren’t big savings to be found, but with how much everything else has
sized down there still seems to be a disproportion. The field hospitals do a
sterling job, but if I was the one looking for efficiencies I would want to
look into the medical services. On this one, I side with Fallon.

DFID might want to make greater use
of them, and should help pay for them to help pull defence out of trouble.

I also suggest looking into a
unified, single Police service. Again, jointery is already well developed in
the police domain already but it still seems absurd to me that there is a RAF
Police, Royal Navy Police, RMP, MOD Police. Again, probably small savings to be
found, but then again RFA Largs Bay was sold to Australia to save a paltry 12
million per year and Albion could be lost to save 20 million or so per year,
regardless of the completely disproportionate consequences. Any small saving
that can be obtained in less damaging ways is a saving that must be harvested
first.

A big "spend-to-save"
measure could be pursued in the Army if the large JLTV purchase was made in one
go rather than parcelled over uncountable years. The FMS request calls for over
2700 vehicles but the expectation is that the army would initially order 750 at
best. I’d recommend going with the big order from the start instead, with the
aim of replacing Panther and Husky right away, as well as replacing
out-of-the-wire unprotected Land Rovers as currently planned. I’d also withdraw
from service the RWMIK, replacing them with Jackals which would cease to play
“cavalry” in favor of working as fire support and mobility platforms in the
infantry, until they can be replaced as well.

JLTV assessment is ongoing, as are track trials for MRV-P Group 2 with Eagle and Bushmaster

The fragmented multitude of fleets the army has to support. MRV-P must bring about a massive inventory rationalisation if it has to be a success.

Instead of suggesting improbable and
unwise mergers of PARAs and Marines the MOD could take note of the fact that
they possess a precious C-17 fleet plus Puma, plus 50 Apache plus the largest Chinook
fleet outside of the US. Seriously, if the British Army doesn’t invest on its
air assault force while having all these paid-for resources, who else should?

What if STRIKE, at least initially,
was delivered, accepting the limitations of the case, of course, with a
combination of Mastiff-mounted infantry plus Marines, with the capability to go
in from the sea, and of Mastiff-mounted infantry and PARAs on Chinooks and
aircraft? Mastiff has defects and limitations, but is it really so
indispensable to replace it with MIV? I think there are far more pressing
urgencies. And instead of pushing the rhetoric of the “sacred cows” for Marines
and PARAs, I think every effort should be made to beef up both 16 AA and 3 Cdo
to expand their capabilities.

The really radical thing to do in
this review is squeezing the maximum value out of what is already available. If
you can’t afford to be a hero in every sector, do at least try to be one where
you can.

Lest we forget

About me

Gabriele Molinelli, journalist and blogger. Developed a huge passion for everything military at a very young age, due to Spitfires, Lancasters and Mosquitos. Myopia frustrated my chances to pursue a career in the military, so journalism felt like the best way to stay close to the military and talk of it.