In this case, Superior argues that there was insufficient proof of actual
possession that was open and notorious. We address each of those elements in turn.

We begin with actual possession. Superior argues that there is no clear and
convincing evidence of actual possession of the disputed parcel, only occasional hiking
and hunting for rattlesnakes. That, Superior argues, is insufficient to warrant transferring
title of the property on a theory of adverse possession. The Zambrottos argue that
Superior stipulated that they or the Dunkins have been in possession of the disputed
parcel since 1928.

We find no such stipulation in the record. During the trial, counsel for the
Zambrottos discussed the admission of the Dunkin and Zambrotto deeds into the record.
Counsel for Superior commented with respect to those deeds that "[t]here is no dispute on
the Zambrottos owning the property so we'll stipulate to save some time that they own the
property that they claim to own." Thus, Superior did not stipulate that the Zambrottos
own the disputed parcel. It stipulated only that they own the parcel of land described in
the deed from the Dunkins. We turn, then, to the evidence in the record as to the use of
the disputed property.

The requirement of actual use is satisfied if the Zambrottos establish their
"use of the land that would be made by an owner of the same type of land, taking into
account the uses for which the land is suited." Allison v. Shepherd, 285 Or 447, 452, 591
P2d 735 (1979). In this case, the property is rural, mostly forested property. There is
evidence that the Dunkins and Zambrottos occasionally hiked in the disputed area and
hunted for rattlesnakes. There is also evidence that the area had been logged. But there is
no evidence as to who did the logging. There is evidence that the Dunkins and
Zambrottos occasionally repaired the fence that ran along part of the southern boundary
of the disputed parcel. We conclude that there is evidence of actual use, not much use, to
be sure, but actual use nonetheless. As we have noted, the requirement of "actual" use is
a qualitative one, determined by reference to the type of use that would be made by an
owner of the land. Given the nature of the land, we conclude that hiking, rattlesnake
hunting, and the like constitute actual use.

The question then becomes whether the use was open and notorious. To
qualify as "open and notorious," the Zambrottos' use of the disputed area must have been
"'of such a character as to afford the [owner] the means of knowing it, and of the claim.'"
Hoffman, 329 Or at 560 (quoting Hicklin v. McClear, 18 Or 126, 138, 22 P 1057 (1889)).
Occasional use of rural property may suffice, "but only if it is significant enough to put an
owner on notice that his or her title is being challenged." Hoffman, 329 Or at 560; see
also Rayburn, 153 Or App at 81 ("the acts of the person claiming title as an adverse
possessor 'must be so open and exclusive as to leave no inquiry as to his intention, so
notorious that the owner may be presumed to have knowledge that the occupancy is
adverse'") (quoting Reeves et al v. Porta, 173 Or 147, 155, 144 P2d 493 (1944)).

The Zambrottos contend that their use was sufficient to qualify as "open
and notorious." In particular, they rely on evidence of logging in the disputed area, the
existence of the blaze line marking the southern boundary of the area, evidence of the
Dunkins and their occasional hikes and rattlesnake hunts in the area, and evidence that
they regularly repaired the fence along part of the southern edge of the area.

As we have noted, however, although some logging occurred in the
disputed area, there is no evidence as to who did it, certainly no evidence that the Dunkins
or the Zambrottos did. Likewise, there is evidence of a blaze line, but none as to who put
it there. Indeed, the record shows that the Zambrottos did not know of the existence or
purpose of the blaze line until the initiation of this litigation. The Dunkins and the
Zambrottos did occasionally use the disputed area for hiking and rattlesnake hunting, but
the nature and frequency of those activities hardly were sufficient to put Superior or its
predecessors on notice that their title was being challenged. Finally, as to the fence
repair, the evidence likewise is insufficient. There is no evidence as to who constructed
the fence. Originally it may have been constructed to prevent livestock from wandering
between the properties, but there is no evidence as to the nature or frequency of any
livestock grazing by the Dunkins or the Zambrottos. See Nooteboom v. Bulson

, 153 Or
App 361, 366, 956 P2d 1042, rev den 327 Or 431 (1998) (extent to which fence was
needed to contain livestock relevant to assigning significance for adverse possession
claim). Moreover, the fence extended to only a relatively small portion of the southern
boundary of the disputed area. We conclude that, given the nature of the property and the
scant evidence of its use, the occasional maintenance of a partial fence was insufficient to
put Superior and its predecessors on notice that the Dunkins and the Zambrottos were
mounting a title challenge.

We therefore conclude that, on de novo review, the evidence in the record is
insufficient to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, all of the elements of either a
statutory or a common-law adverse possession claim.

Reversed and remanded with instructions to enter judgment quieting title in
defendant.