Those
who argue that Y2K is "no big deal" base
their arguments on a
vast array of contradictions, logic gaps and self-deluding
definitions.
These contradictions, while not always obvious at first, are
easy to
spot when you know what you're looking for. For example, consider
the
contradictions in the belief systems of individuals I call "Y2K
Deniers."

In my numerous
discussions with individuals following
this belief system, I've found
they share two common traits: first, they
are anti-doomsday believers,
meaning they automatically discount any prediction
of "bad
times." Second, they display unwavering belief in the
"authorities." Those authorities might be scientists,
politicians,
company leaders, reporters on CNN and so on. But Deniers
entirely miss
the fact that these beliefs are contradictory. This
contradiction can be
easily demonstrated in the following way.

Suppose I told a Y2K Denier that some
non-mainstream
inventors had created a solid-state technology device
that produces "free"
energy. The Y2K Denier will usually
snort something similar to, "Right.
If there was anything to that,
today's scientists would already know it."
In this way, the Y2K
Denier essentially claims that today's scientists
embody the apex of
energy science. Mankind will apparently never rise above
the burning of
fossil fuels.

I reply, "So
you're saying that when we run out
of fossil fuels in about forty
years, civilization will collapse due to
lack of energy?" The Y2K
Denier, now invoking his "no-doomsday"
beliefs, will crack
back, "No, dummy. Of course they'll come up with
something else
before then!"

Such
contradictions are common with Y2K Deniers. Take
the missed-deadline
contradiction, for example. In early 1998, Y2K Deniers
agreed with the
White House that everybody would be 100% Y2K-compliant
by, at the
latest, December 31, 1998. That would leave "a full year
for
testing."

If you were to
ask a Y2K Denier, in 1998, about this
testing period, he would usually
reply, "Yes, the full year for testing
ensures that we have plenty
of time to get everything right. This full
year guarantees we'll have
no Y2K problems."

But when
the deadline was universally missed - and when
the March, June and
September 1999 deadlines were subsequently missed -
the Deniers changed
their explanation. "A full year of testing isn't
necessary at
all," they now say. "All we need is a full month."

Other contradictions abound. For example,
the original
explanation that "Companies are spending hundreds of
millions of dollars
on Y2K remediation; therefore, it will be
fixed" soon gave way to
the reality that companies had grossly
underestimated the costs of their
Y2K repairs. Thus, the Y2K dollar
appropriations, by themselves, were indications
that the organizations
in question did not really have an understanding
of the magnitude of
these projects.

Here's another
contradiction held by Y2K Deniers: "Companies
will fix Y2K because
it is in their interests to do so." This logic
attempts to equate
intentions with results. But then those same Deniers
claim that small
organizations are the only ones that will fail to reach
full
compliance. I wonder: why is it that, according to Y2K Deniers, this
apparent law of the universe called "desired intentions always lead
to desired results" only applies to Fortune 500 firms and not to sole
proprietorships? This is as absurd as saying gravity only affects rich
people. If it's a natural law of the universe, it should be - by
definition
- universal.

As
it turns out, there is no such universal law. This
explanation by Y2K
Deniers is merely another convenient contradiction designed
to explain
away their faulty belief system and deflect blame from large
companies
and organizations.

Here's yet
another contradiction: if large organizations
are the only ones who
will be compliant, why are they the primary stockpilers
of backup
supplies?

The pharmaceutical
industry, for example, is admittedly
stockpiling large quantities of
drugs while simultaneously urging the public
not to. Electric utility
companies are stockpiling mountains of fuel (coal)
while telling the
public not to. And police departments around the country
are buying up
record numbers of shotguns while telling the public they
won't need
guns for Y2K. In every case, it's the same contradiction: "We
need
this stuff for Y2K, but you don't."

Bank regulators play the contradiction game, too.
Federal
regulators say 98 percent of U.S. banks are "Y2K
ready" but won't
identify the 2 percent that aren't. That's like
saying, "Everybody
is ready but anybody might not be." It's
like playing Russian Roulette
with your deposits.

Just the term "Y2K ready" is a
contradiction,
by the way. The phrase - which implies a state of full
compliance - actually
means the systems are not fully compliant.
"Y2K ready" means
an organization believes it is able to
handle the inevitable failures that
will occur. "Y2K ready"
means having some kind of contingency
plan that theoretically will
allow the organization to continue conducting
business. "Y2K
ready" really means "we are not fully compliant
with the Year
2000." Otherwise, they would use the phrase "Y2K
compliant."

Y2K publicity
efforts are filled with inherent contradictions.
Take the North
American Electric Reliability Council's "Y2K drills,"
for
example. These drills were heralded as some kind of
"industry-wide"
test of the Y2K compliance of electric
utilities. That was the public explanation,
and that's what the press
reported. But upon closer inspection, it turns
out the drill didn't
test electrical generation or distribution in any
form whatsoever! In
fact, this drill tested nothing but the backup communications
systems
of electric utilities. In some facilities, this was nothing more
complex than a couple of guys chatting on walkie talkies. They say,
"Can
you hear me?" "Yes, I can hear you!"
"Good, tell NERC
we're Y2K ready!"

Perhaps the greatest contradictions appearwhen we
examine
the differences between companies' public relations statements
and their
federally filed SEC reports. For a real-world example of
this, let's look
at Texaco. On its corporate web site, Texaco says,
"When people at
Texaco discuss the rollover to the Year 2000, the
message is always the
same: at Texaco, it's going to be business as
usual."

But Texaco's SEC
statements paint a very different picture.
In Texaco's most recent SEC
filing, we learn that "Y2K failures, if
not corrected on a timely
basis or otherwise mitigated by our contingency
plans, could have a
material adverse effect on our results of operations,
liquidity and
overall financial condition. Factors that could affect our
ability to
be Year 2000 compliant by the end of 1999 include: the failure
of our
customers, suppliers, governmental entities and others to achieve
compliance and the inaccuracy of certifications received from them; our
inability to identify and remediate every possible problem; and a shortage
of necessary programmers, hardware and software."

This text, of course, doesn't appear
anywhere in the
more publicly available Texaco Year 2000 Disclosure.
Texaco isn't alone
in this strategy, however. It's the same story
throughout corporate America:
the public statements explain that Y2K is
no big deal while the federally
mandated SEC disclosures point out that
Y2K could, in fact, bankrupt the
company. So which statement should we
believe?

(A rare exception to
this is NIKE, which states, right
on its web site, news that most
companies wouldn't dare publish: "A
substantial majority of our
significant suppliers and customers have not
responded to our surveys,
have not provided assurance of their Year 2000
readiness, or have not
responded with sufficient detail for us to determine
their Year 2000
readiness.")

The White
House, of course, encourages this Y2K contradiction
game by
complimenting contingency plans of businesses while ridiculing
the
contingency plans of individuals. Through some twisted invocation of
selective logic that has yet to be questioned by a single journalist in
the popular press, the White House congratulates businesses, industry and
government departments for stockpiling supplies while insisting that
individuals
who pursue the same Y2K risk-reduction strategy are wackos
and extremists.

What's good for
the People, it appears, is no longer
good for the country. And by all
means, unless you want to be called an
"extremist," be sure
that you take absolutely no action whatsoever
to prepare for
Y2K.

On January 20, 1961,
President Kennedy challenged Americans
to "Ask not what your
country can do for you, but ask what you can
do for your
country."

Thirty-eight
years later, Clinton's politically correct
Y2K version sounds like
this: "Ask not what Y2K will do to you, but
ask what you ought not
to do for your country."