Abstract

We study a Downsian model of elections in which two candidates who are primarily office-motivated have policy-relevant private information. A conventional intuition is that electoral competition bene�ts voters by inducing candidates to choose (constrained-)efficient platforms. A countering perspective is that inefficiencies obtain because candidates distort their platforms toward the voters' prior beliefs, i.e. they pander. We �nd that both intuitions are incorrect for familiar classes of information structures. In our model, office-motivated candidates have an incentive to exaggerate their private information, i.e. to anti-pander. While platforms can stillreveal information, equilibrium voter welfare is limited. Our main result is that voter welfare in the Downsian game cannot be any higher than under \dictatorship" by a single non-ideological politician; furthermore, if both candidates have a positive probability of winning in the Downsian game, voter welfare is strictly lower. Normatively, we also show that pandering would improve efficiency; while this is incompatible with office-motivated candidates, it would be an equilibrium were candidates benevolent.