In a recently published essay, a US biosecurity panel justifies its recommendations to redact the methods sections of two papers set for publication. But their reasoning doesn’t satisfy some scientists.

In an essay published in the January 31 issues of both Science and Nature,
a federal biosecurity board explained its rationale for requesting the
redaction of the methodological sections of two papers late last year. After
weighing pros and cons of full disclosure, the board members "found the
potential risk of public harm to be of unusually high magnitude."

Last November, the US government asked its National Science Advisory Board for
Biosecurity (NSABB) to take a look at two papers set for publication in Science
and Nature. The papers described how researchers funded by the
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases mutated the H5N1 avian
flu virus to become more easily transmissible between ferrets. The issue was
would broad dissemination of the full reports aid terrorists in developing
the virus as a weapon to attack human populations.

Just before Christmas, the board unanimously recommended that portions of each
paper be redacted, setting off a passionate debate among scientists. It
suggested that general conclusions highlighting the novel outcomes be made
public, but that methodological details that would allow others to replicate
the experiments not be published.

The NSABB action marks the first time any report on biological research has
been censored in the name of national security. "Once you have
precedent, you will do it again and again," Columbia University
microbiology professor Vincent R. Racaniello said. "My view is that all
research should be published; otherwise science will not go forward."

In the recent essays explaining their recommendations, the board pointed out
that such a precedent was already set by the 1975 voluntary agreement to
delay further research on recombinant DNA until safety guidelines were
established. In addition, it suggested that such a "self-imposed
moratorium on the broad communication of the results of experiments that
show greatly enhanced virulence or transmissibility of potentially dangerous
microbes" might be a wise move now.

In response, both teams that produced the papers under consideration—that of
Yoshihiro Kawaoka at the University of Wisconsin and of Ronald Fouhier of
Erasmus Medical Center—have suspended their research for 60 days. But
Kawaoka argued that a longer halt would be "irresponsible" because "H5N1
viruses circulating in nature already pose a threat."

In a post-9/11 world, censorship might be unavoidable. "I don't think we
can get away from some kind of regulation," said Racaniello.

Nonetheless, Racaniello believes that the two avian flu papers are not good
test cases to set standards for redaction in cases of dual-use research. "The
data is so very vague that they should pick something else," he said.
Specifically, he notes that there is no evidence that infection patterns in
humans would parallel those in ferrets or data on the lethality of the virus
in humans.

NSABB chairman Paul S. Keim of Northern Arizona University acknowledges that
ferrets are not the perfect proxies for humans, but finds that argument
unpersuasive. "To gamble that this model is wrong on this issue is very
dangerous," he maintained in his own discussion of the decision. "Why
would we risk a global pandemic saying that our best model is wrong?"