Professor Christopher D. Kolenda is President & CEO of Kolenda Strategic Leadership LLC, a Senior Military Fellow at King's College London. Advisor & Strategist on Afghanistan, Pakistan to Undersecretary of Defense for Policy.

​Five current unpleasant realities: 1. The Islamic State is a pro-to Sunni Arab state controlling massive territory. 2. Currently, a proto-Kurdish State currently exits. 3. Neither Assad, nor Iraqi (Shia dominated) is going to win battle for legitimacy. 4. Both regimes are Shia dominated & 5. Assad's regime cannot be defeated as long at it receives Russian/Iranian assistance.

Professor Kolenda's policy is to reverse these trends while providing longterm regional security.

"Terrorist Financing in Pakistan"Daily Times Pakistanhttp://www.dailytimes.com.pk/opinion/14-Jul-2015/nap-and-terrorism-financing​Questions 1. How best to strengthen an emerging civil society?2. Is Imran Khan handled by the security establishment?3. How best to characterize civil-military relations.4. How does Pakistan build an independent judiciary.5. The Army contributed to contemporary dysfunctional political economy, how is it resolved.6. Why does Hafiz Saeed remain free?7. Do military tribunals help Sharif's government.8. How does Pakistan handle sectarian issues.9. The emerging threat between ISIS & Pashtun militancy is growing, how is it resolved.10. Geopolitically, Pakistan is a petroleum corridor, does this help or hurt its political leadership.​11. What is preventing normalized relations with New Delhi.

Amazon Conservative Internationalismhttp://amzn.com/0691159319​Questions: Previous Presidential administrations never had our technological advance, how can the maintenance of Empire teach the State Department about armed diplomacy.

State is run like an unelected monolithic fiefdom demanding fealty, what framework should be applied to reform State & how would immediate future Presidents manage disabling bureaucratic conflict during the application of Statecraft.

How do 24 hour networks and the culture war impact Diplomacy.

How best do we characterize the entrenched institutional dysfunction of numerous Cabinet level agencies prior to the Iraqi Surge that fatally weakened US threat deterrent. Why does this happen?

Can State handle a culture war with Islam? What role does Presidential Statecraft have in engaging State so that IT functions.

How does the R.M.A. (revolution in military affairs) hurt traditional diplomacy in the maintenance of alliances. (How much of this can be identified with 'Blue Water vs. Continental Strategy'.)

Pakistan's Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif resides in his third term after arriving from exile in Saudi Arabia. The nation is besieged from internal political problems of governance related to foreign exchange reserves, monetary regimes and failed infrastructure evidenced in this summers deadly heat wave accompanied by inflation, commodity spikes, inefficient electrical grids and deteriorating bi-laterial relations with long standing allies.

Mahin Siddiqui's analysis reveals an emerging threat to Pakistan coming from the movement of the Islamic State east toward Kabul. Given its myriad social, ethnic and religious plurality, Pakistan is the next logical step for the Islamic State.

Siddiqui's policy resolution is sophisticated, yet grounded in realism: Pakistan's political leadership should seek to reintegrate Pakistan into regional markets to secure a favorable growth strategy, effectively confronting the Islamic State with a strong national Pakistani identity with functioning markets, new capital, and growth, allocating policy flexibility to an emerging threat environment.

Pakistan's security environment is rapidly changing, numerous ideological, ethnic and confessional conflicts are emerging that can rapidly destabilize, even isolate Pakistan's traditional threat assessment framework. The Prime Ministers inability to influence or contribute to King Salaman portends to embody a 'perfect storm' for Islamabad.

Q1. What concrete resources can Army leadership field to preserve its regional interests in a rapidly changing environment.

Q2. The I.M.F. assessment of Pakistan's weak and faltering political economy mired in intransigent reform contributes to Pakistan's social, political instability. Is the Army ready to permit civilian supremacy & reform, whose strength can contribute to State resources helping leadership address growing subnational, regional conflicts that could envelop Islamabad.

Q3. What policy can Islamabad field to counter a rapidly militant column of indigenous Shia favorable to Teheran.

Q4. A new patron in Beijing portends that Pakistan seeks to prevent isolation, what role does Beijing play for Islamabad's security interests.

The paradox of Russian Civilization begs for clarity & resolution: Russian foreign policy has historically been informed by its geographic vastness, however, contemporary technological developments eliminate the dominant role geography, effectively elevating the nature of the political regime to primacy.

Wikistrat's Senior South Asian Policy Analyst, Former Directorate of Naval Operations New Delhi on scale & character of India's rescue operations for numerous Nationals moving west from Yemeni capital of Sanaa under heavy bombardment from Riyadh.

Q8: Historically, the 'Core' of Pakistan's commitment to Islamist proxies through ISI is Army dominance of ethnic Pashtun/Punjabi ethos of militancy. Can this be reconciled with Jinnah's vision of a Republic? Can this ethos of intransigence be reconciled to modernity?

Q9: What can the U.S. do to assist Pakistan's trajectory toward civilian supremacy?

Questions & Time Minute 1-4: Q1. Cold War is over and Pakistan's continuing conflict with India has NOT paid any dividends. An archaic cultural militancy underwriting the supremacy of the Army must be replaced to fortify Jinnah's vision of a Republic. How does the Army & ISI succeed in this initiative?

Minute 7-12: Q3. What conditions wold strengthen an independent judiciary?Minute 9:40: Q4. What concrete role does India play in a newly emerging Pakistani Republic?Minute 12:20: Q5. Army leadership has demonstrated total ignorance, absolutely no competency in running a political economy. What has it learned?

Minute 30: Q9. If Pashtun/Punjabi intransigence is to be confronted; if the culture fortifying terrorism is to be eliminated, then new ideas must be introduced into Pakistan's political culture. What ideas resonate among Pakistan's political class?