The Many Worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, in claiming to circumvent the problem of quantum mechanical wave function collapse, in effect claims to circumvent the problem of split consciousness as well. However, since MW is itself necessarily formulated in terms of two-valued logic, the problem regresses to that of how the "hyperuniverse" associated with MW itself "collapsed" out of the sea of all potential "meta-realities". On this score, MW has little insight to offer on its own behalf. MW thus lacks justificative self-containment and is therefore no basis for a fundamental theory of reality. You can't explain even a single universe by positing the existence of many.

At 11/9/2014 12:09:40 PM, dylancatlow wrote:The Many Worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, in claiming to circumvent the problem of quantum mechanical wave function collapse, in effect claims to circumvent the problem of split consciousness as well. However, since MW is itself necessarily formulated in terms of two-valued logic, the problem regresses to that of how the "hyperuniverse" associated with MW itself "collapsed" out of the sea of all potential "meta-realities". On this score, MW has little insight to offer on its own behalf. MW thus lacks justificative self-containment and is therefore no basis for a fundamental theory of reality. You can't explain even a single universe by positing the existence of many.

There is, to my knowledge, no evidence suggesting that alternative 'hyperuniverses' are possible (I am not arguing that they aren't, just recognising that quantum mechanics itself does not appear to postulate them). Under QM, evolution of a particular 'perceived' world is stochastic, and we have no idea why some are preferentially selected. MW just bites the bullet and accepts that there is no preferential selection except in what we observe. Evolution of the hyperuniverse however, is deterministic and therefore the same argument does not apply (there aren't multiple hyperuniverses to collapse out of).

At 11/9/2014 12:09:40 PM, dylancatlow wrote:The Many Worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, in claiming to circumvent the problem of quantum mechanical wave function collapse, in effect claims to circumvent the problem of split consciousness as well. However, since MW is itself necessarily formulated in terms of two-valued logic, the problem regresses to that of how the "hyperuniverse" associated with MW itself "collapsed" out of the sea of all potential "meta-realities". On this score, MW has little insight to offer on its own behalf. MW thus lacks justificative self-containment and is therefore no basis for a fundamental theory of reality. You can't explain even a single universe by positing the existence of many.

Correct. An explanation with no explanatory power is not an explanation at all.

At 11/9/2014 12:09:40 PM, dylancatlow wrote:The Many Worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, in claiming to circumvent the problem of quantum mechanical wave function collapse, in effect claims to circumvent the problem of split consciousness as well. However, since MW is itself necessarily formulated in terms of two-valued logic, the problem regresses to that of how the "hyperuniverse" associated with MW itself "collapsed" out of the sea of all potential "meta-realities". On this score, MW has little insight to offer on its own behalf. MW thus lacks justificative self-containment and is therefore no basis for a fundamental theory of reality. You can't explain even a single universe by positing the existence of many.

This theory hasn't progressed enough to explain a single universe. It's a consequence of the inflationary big bang and a useful interpretation of quantum mechanics (as it would resolve things like the grandfather paradox), but there's no evidence for it (save gravitational waves, but this is currently being disputed, and even if true, would only be indirect evidence). The main thing atheists tend to use the multiverse theory with is that it would negate the fine-tuning argument (the argument goes that with around 10^120, there should be at least one universe suitable for intelligent life), but no one is claiming (at least I hope not) that the multiverse theory explains the origin of spacetime itself.

I'm becoming less defined as days go by, fading away, and well you might say, I'm losing focus, kinda drifting into the abstract in terms of how I see myself.

At 11/9/2014 12:09:40 PM, dylancatlow wrote:The Many Worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, in claiming to circumvent the problem of quantum mechanical wave function collapse, in effect claims to circumvent the problem of split consciousness as well. However, since MW is itself necessarily formulated in terms of two-valued logic, the problem regresses to that of how the "hyperuniverse" associated with MW itself "collapsed" out of the sea of all potential "meta-realities". On this score, MW has little insight to offer on its own behalf. MW thus lacks justificative self-containment and is therefore no basis for a fundamental theory of reality. You can't explain even a single universe by positing the existence of many.

There is, to my knowledge, no evidence suggesting that alternative 'hyperuniverses' are possible (I am not arguing that they aren't, just recognising that quantum mechanics itself does not appear to postulate them). Under QM, evolution of a particular 'perceived' world is stochastic, and we have no idea why some are preferentially selected. MW just bites the bullet and accepts that there is no preferential selection except in what we observe. Evolution of the hyperuniverse however, is deterministic and therefore the same argument does not apply (there aren't multiple hyperuniverses to collapse out of).

Why would there be any empirical evidence for alternative potential meta-realities. This misses the whole point.

At 11/9/2014 12:09:40 PM, dylancatlow wrote:The Many Worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, in claiming to circumvent the problem of quantum mechanical wave function collapse, in effect claims to circumvent the problem of split consciousness as well. However, since MW is itself necessarily formulated in terms of two-valued logic, the problem regresses to that of how the "hyperuniverse" associated with MW itself "collapsed" out of the sea of all potential "meta-realities". On this score, MW has little insight to offer on its own behalf. MW thus lacks justificative self-containment and is therefore no basis for a fundamental theory of reality. You can't explain even a single universe by positing the existence of many.

There is, to my knowledge, no evidence suggesting that alternative 'hyperuniverses' are possible (I am not arguing that they aren't, just recognising that quantum mechanics itself does not appear to postulate them). Under QM, evolution of a particular 'perceived' world is stochastic, and we have no idea why some are preferentially selected. MW just bites the bullet and accepts that there is no preferential selection except in what we observe. Evolution of the hyperuniverse however, is deterministic and therefore the same argument does not apply (there aren't multiple hyperuniverses to collapse out of).

Why would there be any empirical evidence for alternative potential meta-realities. This misses the whole point.

I never said the evidence was required to be empirical, it could be in the form of a plausible argument suggesting this to be the case on metaphysical grounds. I would appreciate though if you engaged with the rest of my response, as the point you have used to dismiss is supportive but not essential to the argument I was trying to make.

To put it in the form of a question, where does the MW interpretation imply the existence of 'meta-realities' for it to collapse out of (and the argument from analogy to the way that the actual world collapses out of the many worlds does not apply for the reasons I mentioned above).

If it does not, what reason do you have to suggest that it's failure to address this fact invalidates the theory?

I presume your answer is that it is thus not 'justificatively self contained' to which I respond with the following.

I interpret justificatively self contained to mean that the theory supports itself. Someone adopting the theory, has a justifiable reason to accept the theory. This may be a strong implication, or some weaker probabilistic argument.

If I am someone who has not adopted this theory, and indeed have not adopted any other theory supporting this one, I still have no reason to accept it.

So I ask the follow up question, on what grounds do you propose that the self justification criterion is a useful one for selecting theories for adoption?

At 11/9/2014 12:09:40 PM, dylancatlow wrote:The Many Worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, in claiming to circumvent the problem of quantum mechanical wave function collapse, in effect claims to circumvent the problem of split consciousness as well. However, since MW is itself necessarily formulated in terms of two-valued logic, the problem regresses to that of how the "hyperuniverse" associated with MW itself "collapsed" out of the sea of all potential "meta-realities". On this score, MW has little insight to offer on its own behalf. MW thus lacks justificative self-containment and is therefore no basis for a fundamental theory of reality. You can't explain even a single universe by positing the existence of many.

There is, to my knowledge, no evidence suggesting that alternative 'hyperuniverses' are possible (I am not arguing that they aren't, just recognising that quantum mechanics itself does not appear to postulate them). Under QM, evolution of a particular 'perceived' world is stochastic, and we have no idea why some are preferentially selected. MW just bites the bullet and accepts that there is no preferential selection except in what we observe. Evolution of the hyperuniverse however, is deterministic and therefore the same argument does not apply (there aren't multiple hyperuniverses to collapse out of).

Why would there be any empirical evidence for alternative potential meta-realities. This misses the whole point.

To put it in the form of a question, where does the MW interpretation imply the existence of 'meta-realities' for it to collapse out of (and the argument from analogy to the way that the actual world collapses out of the many worlds does not apply for the reasons I mentioned above).

I never said that the MW interpretation implies the existence of other meta-realities. My question was simply: out of all the ways that reality could have been, how was the actual reality decided. I.e., how was the multiverse selected for over a non-multiverse. Since multiverse theory fails to answer this question, it isn't an explanation.

Suppose there are many 'ways' the world could have been. Each of these 'ways' has associated with it a theory describing the 'way'. If the theory associated with a 'way' is true, then the actual world is that 'way'. If the theory describing a particular 'way' also predicts the statement 'this way is the actual way' or equivalently 'this theory is true' then it constrains the universe only if the way is already true.

You have in effect A->A which, as much as it's a useful tautology at times, doesn't really help prove A unless you already happen to know that A is the case.

Since multiverse theory fails to answer this question, it isn't an explanation.

Perhaps if you provide an example theory that does answer this question I can better understand why this is a useful criterion?

A follow up or perhaps supporting question, what is special about MW that means it must provide this explanation? Newtonian physics does not have to explain why Newton's laws were selected. I understand that MW is slightly more philosophically motivated, but your self-justification criterion is a very strong one to impose.