It has been urged in different shapes that a constitution of
the kind proposed by the Convention, cannot operate
without the aid of a military force to execute its laws. This
however, like most other things that have been alledged
on that side, rests on mere general assertion; unsupported
by any precise or intelligible designation of the reasons
upon which it is founded. As far as I have been able to
divine the latent meaning of the objectors, it seems to originate
in a pre-supposition that the people will be disinclined
to the exercise of foederal authority in any matter
of an internal nature. Waving any exception that might be
taken to the inaccuracy or inexplicitness of the distinction
between internal and external, let us enquire what ground
there is to presuppose that disinclination in the people?
Unless we presume, at the same time, that the powers of
the General Government will be worse administered than
those of the State governments, there seems to be no room
for the presumption of ill-will, disaffection or opposition
in the people. I believe it may be laid down as a general
rule, that their confidence in and obedience to a government,
will commonly be proportioned to the goodness or
badness of its administration. It must be admitted that
there are exceptions to this rule; but these exceptions depend
so entirely on accidental causes, that they cannot be
considered as having any relation to the intrinsic merits or
demerits of a constitution. These can only be judged of by
general principles and maxims.

Various reasons have been suggested in the course of
these papers, to induce a probability that the General Government
will be better administered than the particular
governments: The principal of which reasons are that the
extension of the spheres of election will present a greater
option, or latitude of choice to the people, that through
the medium of the State Legislatures, which are select
bodies of men, and who are to appoint the members of
the national Senate,--there is reason to expect that this
branch will generally be composed with peculiar care and
judgment: That these circumstances promise greater
knowledge and more extensive information in the national [Volume 1, Page 272]
councils: And that they will be less apt to be tainted by the
spirit of faction, and more out of the reach of those occasional
ill humors or temporary prejudices and propensities,
which in smaller societies frequently contaminate the
public councils, beget injustice and oppression of a part of
the community, and engender schemes, which though
they gratify a momentary inclination or desire, terminate
in general distress, dissatisfaction and disgust. Several additional
reasons of considerable force, to fortify that probability,
will occur when we come to survey with a more
critic[al] eye, the interior structure of the edifice, which we
are invited to erect. It will be sufficient here to remark,
that until satisfactory reasons can be assigned to justify an
opinion, that the foederal government is likely to be administered
in such a manner as to render it odious or contemptible
to the people, there can be no reasonable foundation
for the supposition, that the laws of the Union will
meet with any greater obstruction from them, or will stand
in need of any other methods to enforce their execution,
than the laws of the particular members.

The hope of impunity is a strong incitement to sedition--the
dread of punishment--a proportionately strong
discouragement to it. Will not the government of the
Union, which, if possessed of a due degree of power, can
call to its aid the collective resources of the whole confederacy,
be more likely to repress the former sentiment, and
to inspire the latter, than that of a single State, which can
only command the resources within itself? A turbulent faction
in a State may easily suppose itself able to contend
with the friends to the government in that State; but it can
hardly be so infatuated as to imagine itself a match for the
combined efforts of the Union. If this reflection be just,
there is less danger of resistance from irregular combinations
of individuals, to the authority of the confederacy,
than to that of a single member.

I will in this place hazard an observation which will not
be the less just, because to some it may appear new; which
is, that the more the operations of the national authority
are intermingled in the ordinary exercise of government;
the more the citizens are accustomed to meet with it in the
common occurrences of their political life; the more it is
familiarised to their sight and to their feelings; the further
it enters into those objects which touch the most sensible
cords, and put in motion the most active springs of the
human heart; the greater will be the probability that it will
conciliate the respect and attachment of the community.
Man is very much a creature of habit. A thing that rarely
strikes his senses will generally have but little influence
upon his mind. A government continually at a distance
and out of sight, can hardly be expected to interest the
sensations of the people. The inference is, that the authority
of the Union, and the affections of the citizens towards
it, will be strengthened rather than weakened by its extension
to what are called matters of internal concern; and
will have less occasion to recur to force in proportion to
the familiarity and comprehensiveness of its agency. The
more it circulates through those channels and currents, in
which the passions of mankind naturally flow, the less will
it require the aid of the violent and perilous expedients of
compulsion.

One thing at all events, must be evident, that a government
like the one proposed, would bid much fairer to
avoid the necessity of using force, than that species of
league contended for by most of its opponents; the authority
of which should only operate upon the States in
their political or collective capacities. It has been shewn,
that in such a confederacy, there can be no sanction for
the laws but force; that frequent delinquencies in the
members, are the natural offspring of the very frame of
the government; and that as often as these happen they
can only be redressed, if at all, by war and violence.

The plan reported by the Convention, by extending the
authority of the foederal head to the individual citizens of
the several States, will enable the government to employ
the ordinary magistracy of each in the execution of its
laws. It is easy to perceive that this will tend to destroy, in
the common apprehension, all distinction between the
sources from which they might proceed; and will give the
Foederal Government the same advantage for securing a
due obedience to its authority, which is enjoyed by the
government of each State; in addition to the influence on
public opinion, which will result from the important consideration
of its having power to call to its assistance and
support the resources of the whole Union. It merits particular
attention in this place, that the laws of the confederacy,
as to the enumerated and legitimate objects of its jurisdiction,
will become the SUPREME LAW of the land; to the
observance of which, all officers legislative, executive and
judicial in each State, will be bound by the sanctity of an
oath. Thus the Legislatures, Courts and Magistrates of the
respective members will be incorporated into the operations
of the national government, as far as its just and constitutional
authority extends; and will be rendered auxiliary to
the enforcement of its laws. Any man, who will pursue by
his own reflections the consequences of this situation, will
perceive that there is good ground to calculate upon a regular
and peaceable execution of the laws of the Union; if
its powers are administered with a common share of prudence.
If we will arbitrarily suppose the contrary, we may
deduce any inferences we please from the supposition; for
it is certainly possible, by an injudicious exercise of the authorities
of the best government, that ever was or ever can
be instituted, to provoke and precipitate the people into
the wildest excesses. But though the adversaries of the
proposed constitution should presume that the national
rulers would be insensible to the motives of public good,
or to the obligations of duty; I would still ask them, how
the interests of ambition, or the views of encroachment,
can be promoted by such a conduct?