Photo Essay of Soviet Harassment of U.S. Search and
Rescue/Salvage Ships

Soviet Coastal Patrol Boat - under command of KGB General Romanenko

... I've always wondered what really happened because I was on
board USS Badger FF1071 for the "search and rescue/salvage" operation...a few
things clicked like the TOTAL absence of debris. I never saw one thing floating
except for other ships...I wonder if we were even looking in the right spot...

USNS Conserver operations met with interference from the Gavril
Sarychev. The USS Sterrett met with interference from the Pegus.

23 September

The near collision of the USS Callaghan and the Gavril Sarychev.

27 September

The Kashin class destroyer no. 660 interfered with the flight of a
U.S. Navy helicopter. Radar lock-ons of U.S. Navy ships by the
Kara class cruiser Petropavlovsk and the Kashin class destroyer
Odarennyy.

26 October

Soviet combatants crisscrossed in front of the USS Tower and the
Conserver.
(Cold War at Sea, David F. Winkler, U.S. Naval Institute Press, June
2000, pg. 47)

Soviet Kara cruiser Petropavlovsk

27 September - The Kashin class destroyer no. 660 interfered with the flight of
a U.S. Navy helicopter. Radar lock-ons of U.S. Navy ships by the Kara class
guided missile cruiser Petropavlovsk and the Kashin class destroyer Odarennyy.
An Act of War. Official U.S. Navy photo by PH2 Paul Soutar (Released)

Search area

Rear Admiral Walter T. Piotti

Admiral Piotti would describe the provocative, obstructive and dangerous
activities of the Soviets as follows (from the U.S. 6th Fleet Task Force 71
After Action Report):

…maneuvers which prevented ships towing search sensors from making good
their programmed search track, maneuvers with significant potential for
cutting/fouling umbilicals of towed sensors or the deep drone and extremely
close approaches to moored Japanese charter ships which their masters
believed risked collision or damage to their moors (which in several cases
did occur). It appeared at the time and remains so in retrospect, that the
Soviets deliberately harassed and sought to intimidate the masters of the
Japanese charter ships.

…close escorts [by U.S. combatants] including interposition in risk of
collision situations was not sufficient to prevent the intimidation of the
First Master of Maru NR 3, who twice slipped his moor rather than remain in
what he considered a vulnerable position.

The 1991 Republican Staff Study of the Committee on Foreign Relations would
add to and amplify Commander Piotti’s list.

Moreover, the Soviet Navy and auxiliary vessels committed many serious
violations of the 1972 Incident at Sea Agreement… such as attempted ramming
of several U.S. and allied ships, presenting false flag and fake light
signals, locking on the radar guidance of their weapons… sending an armed
boarding party to threaten to board a Japanese auxiliary vessel chartered by
the U.S. They engaged in a naval live-firing exercise northwest of Moneron
Island, and sent Backfire bombers armed with air-to-surface nuclear-armed
missiles to threaten the U.S. Navy search task force… move(d) U.S. sonar
markers… manipulated the U.S. Navy search efforts into searching for decoy “pingers”
on the sea bottom in very deep, international waters.

Piotti would conclude:

Had TF [task force] 71 been permitted to search without restriction
imposed by (Soviet) claimed territorial waters, the aircraft stood a good
chance of having been found.

And here is the Soviet's own recording (from KGB head V. Chebrikov and
Defence Minister D. Ustinov to Premier of Soviet Union Y. Andropov) of their
deception of the U.S. fleet and the world, confirming that while they were
pretending to search and while they were harrassing the U.S. fleet, they already
knew where KAL 007 was, had already boarded her, and had secured for themselves
the sought after "Black Box":

Simulated search efforts in the Sea of Japan are being performed by our
vessels at present in order to disinform the US and Japan. These activities
will be discontinued in accordance with a specific plan...

...Therefore, if the flight recorders shall be transferred to the western
countries their objective data can equally be used by the USSR and the
western countries in proving the opposite view points on the nature of the
flight of the South Korean airplane. In such circumstances a new phase in
anti-Soviet hysteria cannot be excluded.

In connection with all mentioned above it seems highly preferable not to
transfer the flight recorders to the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) or any third party willing to decipher their contents.
The fact that the recorders are in possession of the USSR shall be kept
secret...

As far as we are aware neither the US nor Japan has any information on
the flight recorders. We have made necessary efforts in order to prevent any
disclosure of the information in future.

Looking to your approval.

D.Ustinov, V.Chebrikov

____ December 1983

From Top Secret Memos disclosed in 1992 by Boris Yeltsin and published in
Izvestia, #228, Oct. 16, 1992.