Redefining romance: China’s dating shows are being used to instil the new national ideology

In China, popular dating shows are being used to promote Xi Jinping’s changing national ideology. Luka Vertessy looks at dating, and politics in Chinese pop culture.

It’s entertainment with the whole package: drama, tension and comedy. Yet China’s top dating shows are beginning to reflect more than just the struggles of modern-day romance. Changes to the format of these shows are instead indicative of a new revolution in national social ideology.

Recent televised dating shows have begun to emanate the influence of ‘Xi Jinping Thought’. The structure of programs, interactions between contestants and the parameters for success resonate with the CCP’s push for a supposed revitalisation of more traditional expectations.

Filial piety, the Confucian tenant of respect for ones elders, in particular has become a central topic in terms of its prominence in modern-day China.

If You Are the One features a single (often male) contestant centred against a 24-person panel. The contestant’s aim is to hopefully woo his panellist of choice. While there is no sure-fire method for success, the show has become infamous for one female panellist’s rationale of “I’d rather cry in a BMW than smile on a bicycle”.

The sentiment of this line can be seen echoed throughout many episodes, where importance is placed upon the suitor’s more individualistic aspects, such as financial worth, occupation, hobbies, as well as personal aesthetics.

A shift in the questions asked has also ensued, with parents often discussing topics ranging from housework to plans for a family. Furthermore, responses aligned with more traditional (Confucian) values appear to garner more positivity from both those on the show and the audience.

There is an almost sequential timing to the establishment of ‘Xi Jinping Thought’ and the overhaul of the nationally, and internationally, successful dating show structure. Given this re-popularisation of filial piety as a core obligation, it is hard to pass off the relationship between the CCP and mainstream popular culture as pure coincidence.

Paired with the CCP’s increasing media curation through both censorship and the promotion of select material, it is clear that pop culture products have become a pipeline for Xi Jinping’s authoritarian social revolution.