On September 23, 2003, Gary Mullane pled guilty to possession with intent
to distribute marijuana and was sentenced to 100 months' imprisonment by the
United States District Court for the District of Kansas. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a),
(b)(1)(B). Following the denial of his direct appeal, Mr. Mullane, proceeding
pro se, moved the district court to set aside his sentence under 28 U.S.C. §
2255,
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. On September 13, 2006, the district
court issued a detailed memorandum and order granting Mr. Mullane's motion in
part and denying it in part.

On October 2, 2006, prior to the district court's resentencing on the sole
meritorious issue presented in Mr. Mullane's Section 2255 motion,(1) Mr. Mullane
filed a notice of appeal seeking review of that portion of the district court's
memorandum and order denying his Section 2255 motion. In response, the
district court issued an order denying Mr. Mullane a certificate of appealability
("COA") on those claims. See Order, No. 03-10040-02-WEB (D. Kan. Oct. 16,
2006). On November 3, 2006, Mr. Mullane filed a letter with this Court stating
that he was proceeding pro se and was "confused on what . . . to do next"; he
also requested appointment of an appellate attorney to "see if the issues [he] is
appealing have any validity." Subsequently, Mr. Mullane supplemented his
filings in this Court with an application for a COA, seeking to appeal those
ineffective assistance of counsel claims denied by the district court. Our first task
in this case is to assess whether we have jurisdiction to hear
it. Section 2253(c)(1) requires that an appeal of a Section 2255 proceeding be
taken from a final order. Court rules provide that a notice of appeal must be filed
with the district clerk within 30 days after entry of the final amended judgment
and that such notice identify the party taking the appeal, the judgment or order
appealed, and the name of the court to which the appeal is taken. Fed. R. App. P.
3; seealso Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1). Here, Mr. Mullane filed his "notice
of
appeal" with the district court prematurely; that is, after his sentence had been
vacated and prior to the district court's resentencing and entry of the final
amended judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1); see also Andrews v.
United
States, 373 U.S. 334, 340 (1963) (until a defendant is resentenced pursuant to an
order granting a Section 2255 motion, there is no final disposition of the Section
2255 proceeding). However, his November 3, 2006 letter requesting appointment
of counsel to assist him in his appeal was filed within 30 days after entry of the
final amended judgment and meets the requirements of Rule 3 with the exception
that it was filed in this Court and not with the district court.

Where, as here, the defendant is proceeding pro se, the Supreme Court has
instructed that "[c]ourts will liberally construe" the notice requirements and "a
court may nonetheless find that the litigant" complied with the rule although the
"papers are technically at variance with the letter of" the rule. Smith v. Barry,
502 U.S. 244, 246-49 (1992) (quotation omitted). We find that Mr. Mullane's
timely letter requesting appointment of appellate counsel was the "functional
equivalent" of a notice of appeal. See id. at 246-49 (the court held that an
informal brief timely filed with the court of appeals that otherwise met the notice
requirements constituted a notice of appeal); see also Fleming v. Evans, No.
06-6110, __ F.3d __, 2007 WL 970163, at *2 (10th Cir. April 3, 2007) (holding that
although the pro se litigant filed a premature and thus untimely notice of appeal,
his timely combined motion ­ requesting leave to proceed on appeal without
prepayment of costs and a COA ­ was the "functional equivalent" of a notice of
appeal); Fed. R. App. P. 4(d) (providing that a notice of appeal mistakenly filed
in the court of appeals is considered filed in the district court on the date the
clerk of the court of appeals notices it was received).(2)

Turning from our jurisdiction to the substance of Mr. Mullane's COA
application, Congress has instructed that we may review a district court's denial
of a Section 2255 motion only if a judge first issues a COA; in turn, such a
certificate may be properly issued only if the defendant has "made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Under
our rules, the defendant must present the COA issue, in the first instance, to the
district court; in this case, the district court issued an order denying Mr. Mullane
a COA on the claims appealed to us. See Order, No. 03-10040-02-WEB (D. Kan.
Oct. 16, 2006); see also 10th Cir. R. 22.1(C). Based on our independent review
of the record in this case, including Mr. Mullane's Section 2255 motion papers,
we agree that he has not met the threshold set by Congress for the issuance of a
COA and do so for substantially the same reasons outlined in the district court's
September 13, 2006 memorandum and order.

More specifically, in order to succeed on an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, Mr. Mullane must show that his attorney's advocacy fell below an
"objective standard of reasonableness," and that but for counsel's deficient
representation, the result in his case would have been different. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984). To prove counsel's
representation was not objectively reasonable, "'the defendant [has] the burden
of showing that counsel's action or inaction was not based on a valid strategic
choice.'" Bullock v. Carver, 297 F.3d 1036, 1047 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 11.10(c) at 715 (2d ed. 1999)).

In this case, Mr. Mullane first contends that his counsel's advocacy at
sentencing before the district court amounted to ineffective assistance. But a
review of the record shows that Mr. Mullane's counsel implored the district court
to grant Mr. Mullane a sentence reduction under USSG § 3B1.2 because, he
argued, Mr. Mullane's role in the offense "was that of a mule" ­ that is, he only
drove a truck containing drugs, he did not exercise control over the drugs, and he
did not know where the drugs originated or to whom they were to be delivered.
See Memorandum and Order, No. 03-10040-02-WEB (D. Kan. Sept. 13, 2006)
(the "Memorandum and Order") at 9. Counsel also made a colorable analogy to
Mr. Mullane's role as that of "an unskilled deliveryman at a construction site."
Seeid. While ultimately unsuccessful in his attempt to persuade the
district court
to exercise its discretion to impose a lower sentence, we see nothing in any of
this to suggest that counsel did anything other than a credible job.

Mr. Mullane also argues that counsel was ineffective by failing to raise this
same mitigation argument (which he contends was ineffectively presented in the
trial court) on direct appeal. But counsel need not raise on appeal every
nonfrivolous claim; rather, competent counsel do (and should) "select from
among them in order to maximize the likelihood of success on appeal." Cargle v.
Mullin, 317 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th Cir. 2003). Furthermore, "if the omitted issue
has merit but is not so compelling, the case for deficient performance is more
complicated, requiring an assessment of the issue relative to the rest of the
appeal, and deferential consideration must be given to any professional judgment
involved in its omission." Id. On direct appeal in this case, counsel focused his
efforts on the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress. See
United States v. Mullane, 123 Fed. Appx. 877 (10th Cir. Feb. 3, 2005) (unpub.).
Although defendant's mitigation theory, premised on his being nothing more than
a drug mule, is not foreclosed by our decisions, neither was it an obviously
compelling basis for appeal. This Court is constrained to review a district court's
factual findings about a defendant's role under the clear error standard. See
United States v. Onheiber, 173 F.3d 1254, 1258 (10th Cir. 1999). In sentencing
Mr. Mullane, the district court in this case specifically found that "[t]he facts of
the offense suggest the defendant likely had ample knowledge of the plan and
that he played an essential role, together with his co-defendant, in the distribution
of the drugs," Memorandum and Order at 10-11; while perhaps not an
insurmountable task, given our narrow standard of review, it would have been
quite a row to hoe for counsel to show a specific finding along these lines to be
clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we cannot say counsel's decision not to pursue
this issue to be anything other than a good faith, and reasonable, tactical
judgment.

Lastly, we find meritless Mr. Mullane's separate argument that a jury must
find facts relating to a prior conviction when they are used to enhance a
sentence.(3) This argument is foreclosed by
our (repeated) holdings that "the
Constitution does not require the government to charge or prove to a jury either
the existence of prior convictions or certain facts related to those convictions."
United States v. Corchado, 427 F.3d 815, 820 (10th Cir. 2005); see also United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005) ("Any fact (other than a prior
conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum
authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be
admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt."
(emphasis added)).

For the foregoing reasons, we deny Mr. Mullane's application for a COA
and dismiss his appeal.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT

Neil M. Gorsuch Circuit Judge

FOOTNOTESClick footnote number to return to corresponding location in the text.

1. The district court subsequently amended the
judgment and reduced Mr.
Mullane's sentence to 92 months on October 26, 2006.

2. Because we find that, by his
November 3, 2006 letter, Mr. Mullane
effectively submitted a timely notice of appeal, we find it unnecessary to
determine whether Rule 4(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
would have rendered timely his premature, October 2, 2006, notice of appeal. In
accordance with Rule 4(d), the clerk of this Court is directed to send the
November 3, 2006 notice of appeal to the district court for filing.

3. Mr. Mullane received two additional
criminal history points under USSG
§ 4A1.1(d) (2003), for being on probation at the time he committed the instant
offense. In Mr. Mullane's Application for Certificate of Appealability, he asserts
that his presentence investigation report ("PSI") states "it has no records of" the
underlying probationary offense and because of this, the points were improperly
attributed to him. We find Mr. Mullane's assertion without merit; the PSI clearly
explains that a warrant "remains active and outstanding" relating to a burglary he
committed in Florida in 1994 and that Mr. Mullane was on probation "at the time
he committed the instant offense." PSI ¶ 56. Because we find Mr. Mullane's
argument unsupported by the record and, in the absence of any denial of the
occurrence of the burglary offense itself, we are constrained to conclude that the
criminal history points were properly added.