I am a Burmese exile taking a near-permanent refuge in New York and Sydney. Here are my essays about Burma and anything else I feel like writing about. And posting the articles I like from selected sites. Bridging Burma to the world this Blog is more of a Politically-Oriented Literary Blog than a Plain News Blog or a Sophisticated Thoughts Blog.

Wednesday, September 30, 2015

Killing For Allah: NU’s 1965 Indonesian Genocide

(The Nahdlatul Ulama or NU is the
largest and most powerful Islamist organization in Indonesia. NU’s functions primarily
are the establishment and running of madrassas for the training of future
generations of ulama, the running of mosques, the scrutiny of textbooks to
ensure their orthodoxy, and the establishment of bodies to promote trade,
industry and agriculture run along Islamic lines in accordance with the strict Sharia
Law. NU in mid 1960s had basically wiped out Indonesian Christians and Buddhists
in notorious 1965 Indonesian Genocide. Nearly two million non-Muslims were
killed and the rest were forcefully converted into Islam.)

'If we remain quiet, we are dead.' These are the words that Munasir Ali
uttered to a tense meeting of the leaders of the Muslim organisation Nahdlatul
Ulama (NU) in Jakarta three days after the 30 September 1965 coup attempt had
been defeated on 1 October by army units under the command of Major-General
Suharto.

NU was a potentially critical actor in
post-coup events. It was the largest Islamic party in Indonesia and the only
major Islamic organisation to be part of Sukarno's Guided Democracy regime.
Moreover, it also had a history of bloody conflict with communists, most
notably in the communist uprising in Madiun in 1948 where hundreds of NU and
PKI members were killed.

More recently, NU and PKI supporters
had clashed violently in the so-called 'unilateral actions' of 1964 and early
1965, during which communist groups had sought to occupy large rural
landholdings owned by well-to-do Muslims. In the period leading up to the coup,
some sections of NU had worked closely with anti-communists in other political
parties and the army to build an informal anti-PKI alliance. If there was to be
a mass response to the coup movement and particularly the PKI, NU was set to
play a prominent role.

Within the NU meeting on 3 October,
opinions were divided. Some central board members wanted the party to proceed
cautiously, arguing that the political situation was too uncertain and that
precipitate action might imperil NU members and the future of the party. They
were especially worried that the PKI and its supporters in the military and the
ruling regime remained powerful and would retaliate fearfully against any
hostile activity.

Others were determined to act
emphatically against the PKI. They were militantly anti-communist and believed
that the failed coup attempt provided a long-awaited opportunity to strike back
at the PKI. They were convinced that communists posed a grave threat not only
to Islam but also to NU and its elite ulama (religious scholars).

When Munasir Ali told the meeting that
inaction equalled death, most those in attendance agreed with him. They decided
on two courses of action which helped to seal the fate of the PKI and its
supporters. Not only would NU publicly identify the PKI as the main coup
plotter and push for its immediate banning, it also would also begin mobilising
its members for a physical campaign against communists.

A new organisation called the NU Security Coordination Body (BKKJNU) was
established the same day, under the chairmanship of Munasir, with the objective
of coordinating the anti-PKI mobilisation. Other NU figures joined with
anti-communist leaders from a variety of religious and political backgrounds to
found KAP-Gestapu, an 'action front' which quickly organised large public
demonstrations against the coup movement and in support of Suharto.

A small group of NU leaders also
succeeded on 5 October in getting military approval for the broadcast on
national radio of the first statement connecting the coup movement to the PKI
and calling for the communist party's prohibition.

The NU central board sent a string of
instructions to branches condemning the PKI and the coup movement and calling
on members to help the authorities to 'root out' and 'eliminate' communism.
Parallels were drawn with the events of 1948 in Madiun, where NU said that
communists had slaughtered Islamic scholars. NU leaders were concerned to avoid
uncontrolled aggression by party members, particularly if this resulted in
conflict with the authorities. But while not explicitly enjoining violence,
such action was clearly implied in these communiqués.

By the second week of October, the
first systematic NU violence towards PKI members had taken place in East Java.
It soon spread to other parts of the island. Local ulama usually played a
pivotal role, organising their followers into squads or directing NU's
paramilitary brigade, Banser, as well as liaising with regional military
officials and the NU Security Coordination Body in Jakarta.

The exact details of NU operations varied from area to area, but the
most common pattern was for NU units to work closely with the army and other
anti-communist groups in drawing up lists of PKI members and supporters, and
then either detain or execute them.

Much of the killing by NU squads took
place on riverbanks or in fields, with victims usually being killed in a quick
and orderly fashion using bladed weapons. Tens of thousands of PKI members and
'sympathisers' met their deaths at the hands of NU killing squads and anecdotal
information suggests that NU units were probably responsible for more
executions than any other civilian group.

Explaining the killings

When those involved in NU's killing
squads are asked why they executed communists, the most frequent reply is that
their motivation was religious. Many refer to the role that senior ulama played
in persuading them that killing communists was justified. Many ulama described
communists as kafir harbi, or war-like infidels - the most dangerous category
of unbelievers according to classical jurisprudence - and informed their
students and followers that it was an obligation to physically oppose such
enemies until they either relent or are dead.

Other ulama referred to communists as bughat, or rebels who oppose a
government that is properly constituted according to Islamic law. These
religious explanations convinced many NU members of the rightness of
exterminating PKI activists. One killing squad member told me: 'I didn't worry
about being involved in the [killing] units after I heard my religious teacher
say killing communists would protect Islam. I never had trouble sleeping
because of what I was doing, because I knew it was right.'

When the direct interests of NU ulama
elite were at risk, the organisation was capable of mobilising with belligerent
fervour. Ulama were also mindful of the threat that the PKI posed to their
material interests. The unilateral actions had targeted lands owned by ulama
families or their religious boarding schools (Madarassas), as well as the
properties of NU benefactors in rural areas of Java.

NU leaders must have viewed with alarm
the risk of communist attacks upon their privileged socio-economic position,
much of which was connected to control of land and access to capital. And when
the direct interests of NU ulama elite were at risk, the organisation was
capable of mobilising with belligerent fervour.

Ulama used Islamic boarding schools and
public sermons to vilify communists. References to communist treachery at
Madiun became increasingly common from 1964, as did mention of recent clashes
between NU and PKI supporters, some of which resulted in severe injuries or
death to NU members.

The overall effect was to create an
impression in the mind of the NU community that the PKI represented a lethal
threat. Moreover, this threat had been historically recurring; the PKI had
quickly recovered from its defeat at Madiun and become Indonesia's largest
political party by the late 1950s. The ulama argued that NU should now use the
failed coup to help destroy communism permanently.

NU ulama did not only sanction the killings - they were also often
directly involved in organising and training the Banser units and ad hoc
killing squads. When attending training sessions, they would give special
guidance and prayers for members, as well as dispensing amulets or talismans to
ensure the safety of those involved in killings.

Former Banser members from this period
recount how they regarded themselves as a privileged group, closer to the
religous elite than other NU members and better able to receive their blessings
- something that is important in traditionalist Muslim communities, where ulama
are seen as being able to channel God's grace, and close proximity to them is
likely to bring spiritual and material reward.

Another crucial factor in explaining
the depth of NU's involvement in the violence was the role of the army. Many of
the more stridently anti-communist NU leaders, such as Munasir, Subchan ZE and
Yusuf Hasyim, were themselves ex-army officers and they had retained close
links to the military.

As tensions with the PKI rose from the
early 1960s, they began strengthening relations with like-minded officers in
the army, using these links to exchange information on communist activities, to
gain access to training and funding of NU members and to obtain army protection
should the PKI act aggressively towards NU.

Some NU leaders later claimed that
their organisation's participation in the killings was due to pressure from the
army. Most evidence, however, suggests that NU's elite were keen to move
unequivocally against the PKI but were wary of a military backlash. Within
hours of the collapse of the coup attempt on the evening of 1 October, NU
leaders had begun meeting with their army counterparts to coordinate responses.

They were given 'evidence' of PKI
leadership of the coup and quietly encouraged to begin preparations for
anti-PKI action. Once it was clear to NU leaders that the army was supporting
reprisals against communists, then NU responded quickly.

Ex-army officer Munasir was a case in
point. Close to former Armed Forces' commander General AH Nasution and having
also served as secretary-general of the Veterans' League, Munasir met with
Nasution on 3 October and was told that the PKI had 'masterminded' the coup. He
then asked for, and was given, Nasution's approval for NU to prepare to
confront the PKI.

The NU killing squads did not cease their grisly work until about March
1966. Even then, many local units seemed reluctant to halt the executions and
only desisted when pressured to do so by the central NU leadership and regional
military commands. It is clear, then, that while many scholars have emphasised
the role of the military in unleashing NU's killing squads, much of the
anti-PKI animus was generated from within NU itself and that the organisation
need little encouragement in its attempts to destroy the communist party.

(Dr Greg Fealy (Greg.Fealy@anu.edu.au)
is a senior lecturer and fellow in Indonesian politics at the Australian
National University.)