Based on the readings from a thermal imager, the observation of unusually high power usage at Defendant-Appellant
Danny Lee Kyllo's home, information provided by an informant, and other circumstantial evidence, federal law enforcement officers obtained a warrant to search the premises of
Danny Lee Kyllo ("Kyllo"). The officers executed the warrant
and discovered an indoor marijuana growing operation, weapons, and drug paraphernalia. After being indicted, Kyllo
moved to suppress all the evidence obtained in the search of
his residence. The district court denied his motion. We
vacated that conviction and remanded for further proceedings.
On remand, the district court again denied Kyllo's motion to
suppress. This appeal presents an issue of first impression in
this circuit, namely whether thermal imaging scanning is a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. We
hold that thermal imaging scanning is a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

I. Factual Background

While investigating a suspected marijuana growing and distribution operation, United States Bureau of Land Management Agent William Elliott ("Elliott") discovered information
suggesting Kyllo's involvement. Elliott contacted Oregon
state law enforcement officers who provided him with additional information, including the following: that Kyllo lived
with his wife, Luanne Kyllo ("Luanne"), in one unit of a triplex in Florence, Oregon; that the triplex was occupied by
other persons who were suspects in the investigation; that a
car registered to Kyllo and Luanne at the triplex address was
parked outside the triplex; that Kyllo had allegedly told a
police informant that Luanne and he could supply the informant with marijuana; and that the previous month, Luanne
had been arrested for delivery and possession of a controlled
substance.

Elliott subpoenaed Kyllo's utility records. Using a chart for
estimating average electricity use, Elliott concluded that
Kyllo's electricity use was abnormally high. At Elliott's
request, Staff Sergeant Daniel Haas ("Haas") of the Oregon
National Guard examined Kyllo's home using an Agema
Thermovision 210 thermal imaging device (the "Agema"). A
thermal imager operates by observing and recording the differential heat patterns emanating from various objects within
its view. The results of the measure of these differential heat
patterns are then displayed on a viewfinder on top of the
instrument which indicates the amount of heat emitted by
objects by shading the area around the object a lighter or
darker color. As the Tenth Circuit explained,

[a]ctivities that generate a significant amount of heat
. . . produce a heat "signature" that the imager can
detect. Under optimal conditions -- viewing through
an open window into a darkened room, for example
-- the imager (or one much like it) might well be
able to resolve these heat signatures into somewhat
indistinct images. The utility of the machine depends
therefore not on the inevitable and ubiquitous phenomenon of heat loss but on the presence of distinguishable heat signatures inside the structure.

Haas' search revealed what he considered abnormally high
levels of heat emanating from Kyllo's home. Elliott concluded that this heat signature indicated the presence of high
intensity lights used to grow marijuana indoors. Elliott presented the information he had gathered about Kyllo in an affidavit (the "Affidavit") to a federal magistrate judge for the
United States District Court for the District of Oregon and
requested a search warrant for Kyllo's home. The magistrate
issued the warrant. Elliott searched Kyllo's home. He discovered an indoor marijuana growing operation and seized a
number of items, including marijuana, weapons, and drug paraphernalia.

Kyllo was indicted on one count of the manufacture of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §841(a)(1). After holding a
suppression hearing, the district court denied Kyllo's motion.
Kyllo pled guilty and was sentenced to 63 months in custody.
Kyllo appealed the district court's denial of his motion to suppress the evidence to this Court. In a memorandum disposition, this Court found that, while the portion of the Affidavit
relating to Kyllo's electricity use was false and misleading,
the district court was not clearly erroneous in concluding that
the false statements were not knowingly or recklessly made.
See United States v. Kyllo, 37 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 1994). Thus,
the portion of Elliott's affidavit relating to Kyllo's electricity
use was properly considered by the magistrate judge in determining whether there was probable cause to issue a warrant.

This Court then remanded the case to the district court to
hold an evidentiary hearing on the capabilities of the Agema
and on whether Elliott knowingly or recklessly omitted from
the Affidavit the fact that Kyllo and Luanne were divorced.
"A district court must suppress evidence seized under a warrant when an affiant has knowingly or recklessly included
false information in the affidavit." United States v. Dozier,
844 F.2d 701, 705 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 927
(1988). The district court found that, while Elliott's omission
from the Affidavit of the fact that Kyllo and Luanne were
divorced was misleading, it was not knowingly false or made
in reckless disregard for the truth. See United States v. Kyllo,
No. Cr. 92-51-FR (D.Or. Mar. 15, 1996). We review the district court's finding that these statements were not made with
reckless regard for the truth under the clearly erroneous standard. See Dozier, 844 F.2d at 705.

In light of the evidence presented at the suppression hearing, it was not clearly erroneous for the district court to find
that Elliott's omission from the Affidavit of the fact that Kyllo
and Luanne were divorced was not knowingly false or made
in reckless disregard for the truth. No evidence was presented
at the hearing that either Elliott or the Oregon State law
enforcement officers who supplied him information knew that
Kyllo and Luanne were divorced. Furthermore, there was no
evidence presented showing that their failure to discover and
report the fact of Kyllo's divorce was reckless. Thus, the portion of Elliott's affidavit relating to Kyllo's relationship to
Luanne was properly considered by the magistrate judge in
determining whether there was probable cause to issue a warrant.

After holding the evidentiary hearing, the district court
found that Elliott did not knowingly or recklessly omit information about Kyllo's divorce from the Affidavit. Regarding
the Agema, the district court found that (1) it revealed no
intimate details of Kyllo's home, (2) it did not intrude on the
privacy of persons inside Kyllo's home, (3) it could not penetrate walls or windows or reveal human activities or conversations, and (4) it "recorded only the heat being emitted from
the home." United States v. Kyllo, No. CR 92-51-FR (D.Or.
Mar. 15, 1996). Based on its factual findings, the district court
concluded that the warrantless search of Kyllo's home with
the Agema was permissible and that there was probable cause
to issue the warrant to search Kyllo's home.

On appeal, Kyllo argues that the use of the thermal imaging
scanner to measure the heat emanating from his house was a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and,
therefore, required a warrant to be valid. As a result, Kyllo
argues that the search was unconstitutional, rendering the
search warrant based on the results of Agema's measurements
invalid. Kyllo further argues that the district court erred in
finding that Elliott's omission from the Affidavit of the fact
that Kyllo and Luanne were divorced was not knowingly false
or made in reckless disregard for the truth. Kyllo contends
that neither the findings from the warrantless search with the
Agema nor Elliott's omissions from the Affidavit should have
been considered by the magistrate in determining whether
there was probable cause to issue the search warrant. Thus,
Kyllo argues, the evidence obtained during the search should
be suppressed.

II. Warrantless Search with Thermal Imaging Device

Kyllo first argues that the warrantless use of a thermal
imaging device to scan his home constituted a "search" within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and that the fruits of
this warrantless search must therefore be suppressed. The
validity of a warrantless search is reviewed de novo. See
United States v. Van Pyck, 77 F.3d 285, 190 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 276 (1996). The district court's findings of
fact on the capabilities of the Agema are reviewed for clear
error. See Ornelas v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1663
(1996); United States v. Hernandez, 27 F.3d 1403, 1406 (9th
Cir. 1994).

[1] The Fourth Amendment provides that"[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and other
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated." U.S. Const. amend. IV. We must apply the twoprong test enunciated by the Supreme Court in Katz to determine whether a warrantless search violated a defendant's
legitimate expectation of privacy: the defendant must have a
subjective expectation of privacy, and that expectation must
be one that society is prepared to acknowledge as reasonable.
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211
(1986). We conclude that Kyllo had a subjective expectation
of privacy that activities conducted within his home would be
private. Although the Supreme Court ultimately held that the
search conducted in Ciraolo was constitutional, it first concluded that the defendant, who enclosed his backyard marijuana crop with a double fence, "ha[d] met the test of
manifesting his own subjective intent and desire to maintain
privacy as to his unlawful agricultural pursuits. " Ciraolo, 476
U.S. at 211. Surely a defendant, such as Kyllo, who moves his
agricultural pursuits inside his house has similarly manifested
a subjective expectation of privacy in those activities. See
United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 854 (5th Cir. 1995).

[2] In cases involving the use of thermal imagers, other circuits have framed the inquiry in the first prong of Katz
differently. Those circuits have analogized the excess heat
measured by a thermal imager to the excess trash left on the
curb, and have asked whether the defendant has manifested a
subjective expectation of privacy in the "waste heat" emanating from their homes. Those courts have held, citing
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1998), that such
defendants have failed to manifest a subjective expectation of
privacy in the excess heat. See United States v. Robinson, 62
F.3d 1325, 1328-29 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. Myers,
46 F.3d 668, 669-70 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Pinson,
24 F.3d 1056, 1058 (8th Cir. 1994). We respectfully reject the
"heat waste" analogy. The purpose and utility of the thermal
imager is to reveal the heat signatures of various objects and
activities occurring inside a structure. "The pertinent inquiry
is not, therefore, whether the Defendants retain an expectation
of privacy in the `waste heat' radiated from their home but, rather, whether they possess an expectation of privacy in the
heat signatures of the activities, intimate or otherwise, that
they pursue within their home." United States v. Cusumano,
67 F.3d 1497, 1502 (10th Cir. 1995), vacated on other
grounds, 83 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 1996); see also Katz, 389
U.S. at 353 (holding the defendant had exhibited a subjective
expectation of privacy although he had not taken every precaution against electronic eavesdropping); Ishmael 48 F.3d at
854-55 (holding warrantless search with thermal imager constitutional but rejecting the "waste heat" analogy).

We now must address whether Kyllo's subjective expectation of privacy regarding the heat signatures of the activities
within his home is one that society is prepared to acknowledge as reasonable. As the Supreme Court has stated,"[a]t the
risk of belaboring the obvious, . . . [the individual's expectation in the privacy of a residence] is plainly one that society
is prepared to recognize as reasonable." United States v. Karo,
468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984). The Supreme Court has repeatedly
emphasized that "[a]t the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home
and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion."
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).
Because of the respect for the sanctity of the home,"the
Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to
the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may
not reasonably be crossed without a warrant." Payton v. New
York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980). Therefore, warrantless
searches and seizures in the home are "presumptively
unreasonable." Id.

Other circuits that have considered the warrantless use of
thermal imagers have held that because of the technical inadequacies of the thermal imager used in their respective cases,
the scan of defendants' homes did not reveal enough intimate
details to raise constitutional concerns, all citing Dow
Chemical v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986). See
Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1328 (11th Cir. 1995); Ishmael, 48 F.3d
at 854 (5th Cir. 1995); Myers, 46 F.3d at 669-70 (7th Cir.
1995); Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1059 (8th Cir. 1994); contra
Cusumano, 67 F.3d at 1504 (10th Cir. 1995). We too are concerned about the nature of the information that the thermal
imager used to scan Kyllo's home is able to reveal. As we
stated on remand,

[the Katz] inquiry cannot be conducted in the
abstract. We must have some gauge of the intrusiveness of the thermal imaging device, which depends
on the quality and the degree of detail of information
that it can glean. For example, our analysis will be
affected by whether, on the one extreme, this device
can detect sexual activity in the bedroom, as Kyllo's
expert suggests, or, at the other extreme, whether it
can only detect hot spots where heat is escaping
from a structure.

United States v. Kyllo, 37 F.3d 526, 530-31 (9th Cir. 1994).

In the evidentiary hearing conducted on remand, Kyllo
presented considerable evidence to the district court about the
capabilities of near-end thermal imagers such as the Agema
Thermovision 210. Carlos Ghigliotty presented a videotape he
had created for the district court which clearly demonstrated
the ability of the Agema and other near short wave infrared
cameras to see through glass. Mr. Ghigliotty is president of
Infrared Technologies, a company that does testing of the limitations and capabilities of infrared cameras and tests ways
infrared cameras can be applied in the field, and has been
involved in thermal imaging and infrared technology for fourteen years. The videotape demonstrated that an Agema camera used in the dark to scan a car with tinted, closed windows
clearly showed a person waving inside the car. The videotape
also depicted the image displayed on the Agema which
revealed a man standing inside a glass door of a house, and
showed details such as his movements to open the door, and
his hand waving. Mr. Ghigliotty testified that this was a common capability among near-end thermal imagers such as the
Agema.

Bill Martin, the director of sales for Flir Systems Incorporated which manufactures infrared imaging equipment, testified for the government. Mr. Martin had previously worked
for the Agema company, and the company had provided Mr.
Martin extensive training in infrared technology, including
specific training on the Agema Thermovision 210. (T-2, 24).
Mr. Martin admitted that if a window was open and it was
dark in the room, any thermal imager could detect activity
through the opening. (T-2, 100). He furthermore stated that
the imager could "see" people behind curtains if they were
very close to the window, and could reveal people embracing
if the window was open and it was dark out. Mr. Martin also
testified that thermal imagers have physiology applications, as
they can detect subsurface problems in the human body.

The record also contains a brochure published by the
Agema company describing the capabilities of an Agema
Thermovision 210: "Sensitive to temperature differences as
small as 0.9 F, the Thermovision 210 can detect and delineate
objects or persons in complete darkness, or under natural
cover, as far away as 1500 feet. Operations can be conducted
in any level of ambient light and at air temperatures from 14
to 131 F. Even at that distance . . . the rugged 210 can easily
distinguish between a domestic animal and a human being."

[3] We conclude that the details unveiled by a thermal
imager are sufficiently "intimate" to give rise to a Fourth
Amendment violation. Although the Tenth Circuit's opinion
in Cusumano was later vacated on rehearing en banc on other
grounds, we agree with its initial conclusion that

[o]ur fellow circuits have, we think, misapprehended
the most pernicious of the device's capabilities. The
machine intrudes upon the privacy of the home not
because it records white spots on a dark background
but rather because the interpretation of that data
allows the government to monitor those domestic
activities that generate a significant amount of heat.
Thus, while the imager cannot reproduce images or
sounds, it nonetheless strips the sanctuary of the
home of one vital dimension of its security: `the
right to be let alone' from the arbitrary and discretionary monitoring of our actions by government
officials.

United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1504 (10th Cir.
1995), vacated on other grounds, 83 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir.
1996). It is not disputed whether the Agema 210 could reveal
details such as intimate activities in a bedroom. According to
the manufacturer, the imager used in this case is sensitive to
temperature differences as small as 0.9 F. As the court noted
in Cusumano, it would not be difficult to determine the origin
of two commingled objects emitting heat in a bedroom at
night. Id. at 1504. Even assuming that the Agema, apparently
a relatively unsophisticated thermal imager, is unable to
reveal such intimate details, technology improves at a rapid
pace, and much more powerful and sophisticated thermal
imagers are being developed which are increasingly able to
reveal the intimacies that we have heretofore trusted take
place in private absent a valid search warrant legitimizing
their observation.

[4] Furthermore, even if a thermal imager does not reveal
details such as sexual activity in a bedroom, with a basic
understanding of the layout of a home, a thermal imager could
identify a variety of daily activities conducted in homes
across America: use of showers and bathtubs, ovens, washers
and dryers, and any other household appliance that emits heat.
See United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1519 (W.D.
Wis. 1994) (stating that a thermal imager had detected the
presence of a dehumidifier in use in a closet). Even the routine and trivial activities conducted in our homes are sufficiently "intimate" as to give rise to Fourth Amendment
violation if observed by law enforcement without a warrant.
Compare Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987) ("It
matters not that the search uncovered nothing of any great
personal value to respondent . . . . A search is a search, even
if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a
turntable.") and United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984)
(holding that revelation of a single detail about the interior of
the home, whether or not the beeper placed in can of ether
was still inside the home, was sufficient to violate the Fourth
Amendment) with Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 452 (1989)
(plurality decision) (visual surveillance of interior of greenhouse revealed "no intimate details connected with the use of
the home") (dicta) and Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 237-39
(surveillance by camera revealing outlines of commercial
buildings did not disclose intimate details of the home). We
therefore conclude that the use of a thermal imager to observe
heat emitted from various objects within the home infringes
upon an expectation of privacy that society clearly deems reasonable.

[5] Because scanning with a thermal imager without a warrant violates the Fourth Amendment, the Agema readings
should not have been considered by the magistrate judge.
However, the district court did not consider whether the information provided to the magistrate was sufficient to sustain a
search warrant without the addition of the readings from the
thermal imager. Therefore, we remand for the district court to
make that determination. On remand, the district court should
be cognizant of the Court's holdings that the portions of
Elliott's affidavit relating to Kyllo's electricity use and his
relationship to Luanne were properly considered by the magistrate judge in determining whether there was probable cause
to issue a warrant.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

HAWKINS, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

My colleagues have made the best case imaginable for the
proposition that the use of a thermal imaging device constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
I am not persuaded.

A search, whether of a home, a car, or a body, is, at bottom,
an intrusion; a non-consensual invasion of protected space.
Whatever its Star Wars capabilities, the thermal imaging
device employed here intruded into nothing. Rather, it measured the heat emanating from and on the outside of a house.
Nor did law enforcement randomly choose its choice of targets: the agents employing the device were alerted to Kyllo's
house because of its extraordinary use of electricity, a use
consistent with indoor marijuana cultivation.

I would follow the lead of our sister circuits and hold that
the use of thermal imaging technology does not constitute a
search under contemporary Fourth Amendment standards.