Engels retraces the history of woman ... in The Origin of the
Family, Private Property, and the State, showing that this history depended
essentially on that of techniques. In the Stone Age, when the land belonged in common to
all members of the clan, the rudimentary character of the primitive spade and hoe limited
the possibilities of agriculture, so that woman's strength was adequate for gardening. In
this primitive division of labour, the two sexes constituted in a way two classes, and
there was equality between these classes. While man hunts and fishes, woman remains in the
home; but the tasks of domesticity include productive labour  making pottery,
weaving, gardening  and in consequence woman plays a large part in economic life.
Through the discovery of copper, tin, bronze, and iron, and with the appearance of the
plough, agriculture enlarges its scope, and intensive labour is called for in clearing
woodland and cultivating the fields. Then man has recourse to the labour of other men,
whom he reduces to slavery. Private property appears: master of slaves and of the earth,
man becomes the proprietor also of woman. This was 'the great historical defeat of the
feminine sex'. It is to be explained by the upsetting of the old division of labour which
occurred in consequence of the invention of new tools. 'The same cause which had assured
to woman the prime authority in the house  namely, her restriction to domestic
duties  this same cause now assured the domination there of the man; for woman's
housework henceforth sank into insignificance in comparison with man's productive labour
 the latter as everything, the former a trifling auxiliary.' Then maternal authority
gave place to paternal authority, property being inherited from father to son and no
longer from woman to her clan. Here we see the emergence of the patriarchal family founded
upon private property. In this type of family woman is subjugated. Man in his sovereignty
indulges himself in sexual caprices, among others  he fornicates with slaves or
courtesans or he practises polygamy. Wherever the local customs make reciprocity at all
possible, the wife takes revenge through infidelity  marriage finds its natural
fulfilment in adultery. This is woman's sole defence against the domestic slavery in which
she is bound; and it is this economic oppression that gives rise to the social oppression
to which she is subjected. Equality cannot be re-established until the two sexes enjoy
equal rights in law; but this enfranchisement requires participation in general industry
by the whole female sex. 'Woman can be emancipated only when she can take part on a large
social scale in production and is engaged in domestic work only to an insignificant
degree. And this has become possible only in the big industry of modern times, which not
only admits of female labour on a grand scale but even formally demands it. . .'

Thus the fate of woman and that of socialism are intimately bound up
together, as is shown also in Bebel's great work on woman. 'Woman and the proletariat,' he
says, 'are both downtrodden.' Both are to be set free through the economic development
consequent upon the social upheaval brought about by machinery. The problem of woman is
reduced to the problem of her capacity for labour. Puissant at the time when techniques
were suited to her capabilities, dethroned when she was no longer in a position to exploit
them, woman regains in the modern world her equality with man. It is the resistance of the
ancient capitalistic paternalism that in most countries prevents the concrete realisation
of this equality; it will be realised on the day when this resistance is broken, as is the
fact already in the Soviet Union, according to Soviet propaganda. And when the socialist
society is established throughout the world, there will no longer be men and women, but
only workers on a footing of equality.

Although this chain of thought as outlined by Engels marks an advance
upon those we have been examining, we find it disappointing  the most important
problems are slurred over. The turning-point of all history is the passage from the regime
of community ownership to that of private property, and it is in no wise indicated how
this could have come about. Engels himself declares in The Origin of the Family
that 'at present we know nothing about it'; not only is he ignorant of the historical
details: he does not even suggest any interpretation. Similarly, it is not clear that the
institution of private property must necessarily have involved the enslavement of women.
Historical materialism takes for granted facts that call for explanation: Engels assumes
without discussion the bond of interest which ties man to property; but where does this
interest, the source of social institutions, have its own source? Thus Engels's account
remains superficial, and the truths that he does reveal are seemingly contingent,
incidental. The fact is that we cannot plumb their meaning without going beyond the limits
of historical materialism. It cannot provide solutions for the problems we have raised,
because these concern the whole man and not that abstraction : Homo oeconomicus.

It would seem clear, for example, that the very concept of personal
possession can be comprehensible only with reference to the original condition of the
existent. For it to appear, there must have been at first an inclination in the subject to
think of himself as basically individual, to assert the autonomy and separateness of his
existence. We can see that this affirmation would have remained subjective, inward,
without validity as long as the individual lacked the practical means for carrying it out
objectively. Without adequate tools, he did not sense at first any power over the world,
he felt lost in nature and in the group, passive, threatened, the plaything of obscure
forces; he dared to think of himself only as identified with the clan: the totem, mana,
the earth e group realities. The discovery of bronze enabled man, in the experience of
hard and productive labour, to discover himself as creator; dominating nature, he was no
longer afraid of it, and in the faceof obstacles overcome he found courage to see himself
as an autonomous active force, to achieve self-fulfilment as an individual.' [Gaston
Bachelard in La Terre et les rÍveries de fa volontť makes among others a
suggestive study of the blacksmith. He shows how man, through the hammer and the anvil,
asserts himself and his individuality. 'The blacksmith's instant is an instant at once
well marked off and magnified. It promotes the worker to the mastery of time, through the
forcefulness of an instant' (P. 142); and farther on: 'The man at the forge accepts the
challenge of the universe arrayed against him.']

But this accomplishment would never have been attained had not man
originally willed it so; the lesson of work is not inscribed upon a passive subject: the
subject shapes and masters himself in shaping and mastering the land.

On the other hand, the affirmation of the subject's individuality is
not enough to explain property: each conscious individual through challenge, struggle, and
single combat can endeavour to raise himself to sovereignty. For the challenge to have
taken the form of potlatch or ceremonial exchange of gifts  that is, of an
economic rivalry  and from this point on for first the chief and then the members of
the clan to have laid claim to private property, required that there should be in man
another original tendency. As we have seen in the preceding chapter, the existent succeeds
in finding himself only in estrangement, in alienation; he seeks through the world to find
himself in some shape, other than himself, which he makes his own. The clan encounters its
own alienated existence in the totem, the mana, the terrain it occupies; and when the
individual becomes distinguished from the community, he requires a personal incarnation.
The mana becomes individualised in the chief, then in each individual; and at the same
time each person tries to appropriate a piece of land, implements, crops. Man finds
himself in these goods which are his because he has previously lost himself in them; and
it is therefore understandable that he places upon them a value no less fundamental than
upon his very life. Thus it is that man's interest in his property becomes an intelligible
relation. But we see that this cannot be explained through the tool alone: we must grasp
in its entirety the attitude of man wielding the tool, an attitude that implies an
ontological substructure, a foundation in the nature of his being.

On the same grounds it is impossible to deduce the oppression of woman
from the institution of private property. Here again the inadequacy of Engels's point of
view is obvious. He saw dearly that woman's muscular weakness became a real point of
inferiority only in its relation to the bronze and iron tool; but he did not see that the
limitations of her capacity for labour constituted in themselves a concrete disadvantage
only in a certain perspective. It is because man is a being of transcendence and ambition
that he projects new urgencies through every new tool: when he had invented bronze
implements, he was no longer content with gardens  he wanted to clear and cultivate
vast fields. And it was not from the bronze itself that this desire welled up. Woman's
incapacity brought about her ruin because man regarded her in the perspective of his
project for enrichment and expansion. And this project is still not enough to explain why
she was oppressed; for the division of labour between die sexes could have meant a
friendly association. If the original relation between a man and his fellows was
exclusively a relation of friendship, we could not account for any type of enslavement;
but no, this phenomenon is a result of the imperialism of the human consciousness, seeking
always to exercise its sovereignty in objective fashion. If the human consciousness had
not included the original category of the Other and an original aspiration to dominate the
Other, the invention of the bronze tool could not have caused the oppression of woman.

No more does Engels account for the peculiar nature of this oppression.
He tried to reduce the antagonism of the sexes to class conflict, but he was half-hearted
in the attempt; the thesis is simply untenable. It is true that division of labour
according to sex and the consequent oppression bring to mind in some ways the division of
society by classes, but it is impossible to confuse the two. For one thing, there is no
biological basis for the separation of classes. Again, the slave in his toil is conscious
of himself as opposed to his master; and the proletariat has always put its condition to
the test in revolt, thereby going back to essentials and constituting a threat to its
exploiters. And what it has aimed at is its own disappearance as a class. I have pointed
out in the Introduction how different woman's situation is, particularly on account of the
community of life and interests which entails her solidarity with man, and also because he
finds in her an accomplice; no desire for revolution dwells within her, nor any thought of
her own disappearance as a sex  all she asks is that certain sequels of sexual
differentiation be abolished.

What is still more serious, woman cannot in good faith be regarded
simply as a worker; for her reproductive function is as important as her productive
capacity, no less in the social economy than in the individual life. In some periods,
indeed, it is more useful to produce offspring than to plough the soil. Engels slighted
the problem, simply remarking that the socialist community would abolish the family 
certainly an abstract solution. We know how often and how radically Soviet Russia has had
to change its policy on the family according to the varying relation between the immediate
needs of production and those of re-population. But for that matter, to do away with the
family is not necessarily to emancipate woman. Such examples as Sparta and the Nazi regime
prove that she can be none the less oppressed by the males, for all her direct attachment
to the State.

A truly socialist ethics, concerned to uphold justice without
suppressing liberty and to impose duties upon individuals without abolishing
individuality, will find most embarrassing the problems posed by the condition of woman.
It is impossible simply to equate gestation with a task, a piece of work, or with a
service, such as military service. Woman's life is more seriously broken in upon by a
demand for children than by regulation of the citizen's employment no state has ever
ventured to establish obligatory copulation. In the sexual act and in maternity not only
time and strength but also essential values are involved for woman. Rationalist
materialism tries in vain to disregard this dramatic aspect of sexuality; for it is
impossible to bring the sexual instinct under a code of regulations. Indeed, as Freud
said, it is not sure that it does not bear within itself a denial of its own satisfaction.
What is certain is that it does not permit of integration with the social, because there
is in eroticism a revolt of the instant against time, of the individual against the
universal. In proposing to direct and exploit it, there is risk of killing it, for it is
impossible to deal at will with living spontaneity as one deals at will with inert matter;
and no more can it be obtained by force, as a privilege may be.

There is no way of directly compelling woman to bring forth: all that
can be done is to put her in a situation where maternity is for her the sole outcome
 the law or the mores enjoin marriage, birth control and abortion are prohibited,
divorce is forbidden. These ancient patriarchal restraints are just what Soviet Russia has
brought back today; Russia has revived the paternalistic concepts of marriage. And in
doing so, she has been induced to ask woman once more to make of herself an erotic object:
in a recent pronouncement female Soviet citizens were requested to pay careful attention
to their garb, to use make-up, to employ the arts of coquetry in holding their husbands
and fanning the flame of desire. As this case shows clearly, it is impossible to regard
woman simply as a productive force: she is for man a sexual partner, a reproducer, an
erotic object  an Other through whom he seeks himself. In vain have the totalitarian
or authoritative regimes with one accord prohibited psychoanalysis and declared that
individual, personal drama is out of order for citizens loyally integrated with the
community; the erotic experience remains one in which generality is always regained by an
individuality. And for a democratic socialism in which classes are abolished but not
individuals, the question of individual destiny would keep all its importance  and
hence sexual differentiation would keep all its importance. The sexual relation that joins
woman to man is not the same as that which he bears to her; and the bond that unites her
to the child is sui generis, unique. She was not created by the bronze tool alone;
and the machine tool alone will not abolish her. To claim for her every right, every
chance to be an all-round human being does not mean that we should be blind to her
peculiar situation. And in order to comprehend we must look beyond the historical
materialism that an and woman no more than economic units.

So it is that we reject for the same reasons both the sexual monism of
Freud and the economic monism of Engels. A psychoanalyst will interpret the claims of
woman as phenomena of the 'masculine protest'; for the Marxist, on the contrary, her
sexuality only expresses her economic situation in more or less complex, roundabout
fashion. But the categories of 'clitorid' and 'vaginal', like the categories of 'bourgeois
or proletarian', are equally inadequate to encompass a concrete woman. Underlying all
individual drama, as it underlies the economic history of mankind, there is an
existentialist foundation that alone enables us to understand in its unity that particular
form of being which we call a human life. The virtue of Freudianism derives from the fact
that the existent is a body: what he experiences as a body confronted by other bodies
expresses his existential situation concretely. Similarly, what is true in the Marxian
thesis is that the ontological aspirations  the projects for becoming  of the
existent take concrete form according to the material possibilities offered, especially
those opened up by technological advances. But unless they are integrated into the
totality of human reality, sexuality and technology alone can explain nothing. That is why
in Freud the prohibitions of the super-ego and the drives of the ego appear to be
contingent, and why in Engels's account of the history of the family the most important
developments seem to arise according to the caprices of mysterious fortune. In our attempt
to discover woman we shall not reject certain contributions of biology, of psychoanalysis,
and of historical materialism; but we shall hold that the body, the sexual life, and the
resources of technology exist concretely for man only in so far as he grasps them in the
total perspective of his existence. The value of muscular strength, of the phallus, of the
tool can be defined only in a world of values; it is determined by the basic project
through which the existent seeks transcendence.