Anbar 'Turnaround' Undercuts War Rationale

by Gareth Porter

In hailing what he has called an "almost
breathtaking" turnaround in Anbar Province that has weakened al-Qaeda as
a triumph for his new military strategy in Iraq, Gen. David Petraeus has put
a favorable spin on a development which actually challenges the central rationale
for continued US military occupation of Iraq.

The dramatic change in Anbar, in which Sunnis have replaced US forces and
largely Shi'ite troops in providing security against al-Qaeda, is likely to
be a primary theme in Petraeus's report on the surge next month. It has also
become the favorite theme of war supporters, from right-wing columnist Charles
Krauthammer to the duo of Michael O'Hanlon and Kenneth Pollack.

But the new situation in Anbar cannot be attributed to US military operations
or presence in the province. After five years of unsuccessful US military
operations in Anbar, the US military's agreements with Sunni tribal leaders
in Anbar represents an acknowledgment that it was dependent on the very Sunni
insurgents it once considered the enemy in Iraq to reduce al-Qaeda influence
in the province.

In an interview with ABC News May 30, Petraeus admitted that the Sunnis "can
figure out who al-Qaeda is a heck of a lot better then we can."

The apparent success of Petraeus's shift from relying on US military force
to relying on Sunni troops to take care of al-Qaeda could be used as an argument
against continuation of the US military presence in Anbar.

Recognition that there is a far more effective alternative to US military
operations to reduce al-Qaeda's influence would be a major blow to George W.
Bush's argument against a timetable for withdrawal of US troops, which has
relied increasingly on the threat of an al-Qaeda haven in Iraq.

It would also contradict the rationale for the Democratic Party leadership's
inclusion in troop withdrawal legislation of a major exception for US troops
fighting terrorism in Iraq  a reference to al-Qaeda in Anbar Province.

In several press interviews in recent months, Petraeus has described the new
security arrangements as the result of Sunni tribal leaders' change of heart.
In a Jun. 8 CNN interview, he said that, in just a few months, "[T]tribes
that turned a blind eye to what al-Qaeda was doing in that province are now
opposing al-Qaeda very vigorously."

But the background of the agreements reached in Anbar indicates that it was
the Bush administration that was forced to adjust its policy. Several major
Sunni armed groups, most of which are Arab nationalist in their ideological
orientation, began to quarrel with the foreign-dominated al-Qaeda organization
in Iraq as early as 2005. By early 2006 they were at war with al-Qaeda across
much of Anbar province.

The leaders of the anti-al-Qaeda Sunni armed groups have made repeated proposals
to the United States for cooperation against al-Qaeda as well as Shi'ite militia
groups. In December 2005, a representative of the Sunni insurgents in Anbar
asked the top US commander in Iraq, Gen. George Casey, to let former Iraqi
soldiers from the area replace US forces in providing security for the city
of Ramadi, according to a report in the London Sunday Times.

But Casey refused, on the ground that that would allow Sunni insurgents to
take over the city. A Times of London story in September 2006 reported
that Sunni leaders in Anbar were complaining that US military operations were
strengthening al-Qaeda by disarming local Sunni forces. The Sunni leaders were
pleading for the US military to arm Sunnis in the province, according to the
story.

The reason the US military refused to allow Sunnis to control security in
their own provinces is that earlier in the war Sunni troops and police collaborated
with the Sunni insurgents. In April 2004, when Sunni insurgents went on the
offensive in the Sunni heartland, the number of Sunni "Civil Defense Corps"
troops in the three Sunni provinces fell by 82 percent from 5,600 to about 1,000,
according to a GAO report, because whole units deserted to the insurgents.

So it was Petraeus and the US command, not the Sunni leadership, who have
had a change of heart.

Under the arrangements negotiated with Sunni tribal leaders, Sunni troops have
been given de facto authority over local security, without any official status,
meaning that they are unofficially approved Sunni militias. The same arrangements
have now been extended to other Sunni provinces and to Sunni neighborhoods in
Baghdad.

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates denied Sunday that the United States is
providing arms to the Sunni militias, but confirmed that it is providing training
and financial support.

US officials have said the Sunni recruits for these militias are carefully
vetted, and that they must sign a statement pledging support for the government.
But a Jul. 27 report in the Washington Post revealed how the process
of vetting Sunni recruits actually works in Baghdad.

The US commander in Baghdad's Rasheed district, Col. Ricky D. Gibbs, met
with "half a dozen influential Sunni leaders" to discuss the formation
of "neighborhood protection groups," according to the story, and was
handed a list of 250 names of Sunni residents willing to serve on the force.

Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch, commander of the Third Infantry Division, assured reporters
in June that no support would be given to any Sunni group that had attacked
US forces. But the US command has too little intelligence on the Sunni insurgents
to know whether Sunni guerrillas have entered the program. Sunni insurgents
who remain determined to expel US forces from Iraq in the future are certainly
participating in US-sponsored Sunni militias.

McClatchy's Leila Fadel reported Jun. 7 that members of the anti-US Islamic
Army of Iraq are collaborating with US troops in the Sunni neighborhood of Amariyah
in Baghdad to expel al-Qaeda. The Sunni insurgents do not acknowledge their
insurgent affiliation to the US forces, who have turned to them because, as
the US company commander explained, finding al-Qaeda attackers was "like
fighting ghosts."

But Amariyah Abu Bilal, the Islamic Army cell leader, told Fadel he remains
committed to expelling the "occupation" once al-Qaeda has been defeated.

Fadel and Nancy A. Youssef reported for McClatchy Newspapers Jun. 17 that some
military officers see the new policy as a dangerous reversal of the previous
US policy of refusing to allow those with ties to the insurgency to gain access
to local security organs.

Opponents of the program argue, according to Youssef and Fadel, that supporting
Sunni militias "reinforces the idea that US-trained Iraqi forces cannot
control their country," according to the opponents. The McClatchy reporters
interviewed six different US officers who had served in Iraq. All "shook
their heads when asked about the idea of arming the Sunnis" and expressed
distrust of Sunnis, whom they had been fighting only months earlier.

Only last December, the Bush administration was aghast at the idea that Saudi
Arabia would actually provide money and arms to Sunni militias in Iraq if the
United States withdrew, leaving a Shi'ite force that would threaten the Sunni
community, as King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia warned US Vice President Dick
Cheney on a visit to Riyadh.