Mcgruder v. State

Supreme Court of Georgia

May 7, 2018

MCGRUDERv.THE STATE.

Grant,
Justice.

Rajonte
McGruder was convicted of malice murder in the death of
Kenneth Quarterman, Jr., aggravated assault against Lewis
Brown III, and other crimes in connection with a drive-by
shooting on June 16, 2013. On appeal, McGruder argues that
the evidence admitted at trial was legally insufficient to
support his convictions. We find that the evidence was
sufficient to authorize the jury to find beyond a reasonable
doubt that McGruder was guilty of the crimes of which he was
convicted, and therefore affirm.[1]

I.

Viewed
in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the evidence
presented at trial showed that late in the evening on June
15, 2013, McGruder and several other men associated with a
street gang known as "MFG" assembled in a field
near Club Apollo in Louisville, Georgia. There was a block
party outside the club and the area was crowded with people.
McGruder, Damien Simpkins, Dalonte Tarver, Octavius Hickson,
and Jason Williams gathered in a circle to plot an attack on
a group McGruder called the "Wrens Boys, " which
included Michael Reaves, Brown, and Quarterman. There was a
history of conflict between MFG and the Wrens Boys. That
night, McGruder understood that they were after Reaves in
particular, because Reaves had been "talking trash"
to the girlfriend of another MFG member.

Tarver
and Hickson said, "We gonna get those n*****s tonight,
" and McGruder knew they were talking about the Wrens
Boys. Tarver asked McGruder where his "colors"
were, and then told McGruder he was going to have to drive.
Tarver told Simpkins, who had a pistol in his waistband, that
Simpkins was going to have to "do it, " and pointed
toward several of the Wrens Boys who were coming out of the
club. McGruder, Simpkins, and another individual got into a
black Dodge Charger, with McGruder driving and Simpkins
sitting in the driver's side rear seat. McGruder drove
the Charger around the block and stopped in front of the
Wrens Boys, and Simpkins fired several shots at the group.
[2]
Quarterman was shot in the head and later died. Brown was
shot in the face and the hand, but survived. Someone returned
fire and a bullet struck the driver's window of the
Charger, scaring McGruder. He sped away and drove several
miles to a nearby town, where they left the Charger. Simpkins
called someone McGruder did not know to come pick them up.

McGruder
was arrested five days after the shooting, based on
interviews with eyewitnesses to the shooting who identified
McGruder as the driver of the Charger. Initially, McGruder
said that he had been at the block party near Club Apollo but
had gone home before the shooting. Eventually, however,
McGruder admitted to driving the Charger as instructed by
Tarver.

II.

In his
sole enumeration of error, McGruder argues that the evidence
summarized above was insufficient to support his convictions
under the standard set out in Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307 (99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560) (1979). We
disagree.

When
evaluating a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we
view all of the evidence admitted at trial in the light most
favorable to the prosecution and ask whether any rational
trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of the crimes of which he was convicted. See
id. at 319. This evaluation "essentially addresses
whether the government's case was so lacking that it
should not have even been submitted to the jury."
Musacchio v. United States, U.S., (136 S.Ct. 709,
715, 193 L.Ed.2d 639) (2016) (citation and punctuation
omitted). Our limited review leaves to the jury the
resolution of conflicts in the evidence, the weight of the
evidence, the credibility of witnesses, and reasonable
inferences to be made "from basic facts to ultimate
facts." Id.; see Walker v. State, 296
Ga. 161, 163 (766 S.E.2d 28) (2014).

McGruder's
first challenge is to his murder conviction. He argues that
no evidence showed that he knew or should have known that
Simpkins would shoot at the Wrens Boys, or that he fired a
gun himself. That contention is incorrect. The jury could
infer from the evidence admitted at trial that McGruder was
aware of the pistol that was visible at Simpkins's
waistline and knew that Simpkins was going to use the gun to
shoot at the Wrens Boys. And while McGruder may not have
personally fired the gun in the shooting, a person who
intentionally assists in the commission of a crime may be
convicted as a party to the crime. See OCGA § 16-2-20;
Calloway v. State, Ga., (810 S.E.2d 105) (2018).
"While mere presence at the scene of a crime is not
sufficient evidence to convict one of being a party to a
crime, criminal intent may be inferred from presence,
companionship, and conduct before, during and after the
offense." Sapp v. State, 300 Ga. 768, 769 (798
S.E.2d 226) (2017) (citation omitted). Here, evidence
presented at trial-including McGruder's own statement to
police-showed that McGruder heard Tarver and Hickson say that
they were going to "get" the Wrens Boys, and that
he knew it was serious. He knew about the ongoing conflict
with the Wrens Boys, and that Reaves was a particular target
that night. McGruder agreed to drive the car while Simpkins,
who he knew had been told to "do it, " rode in the
back seat armed with a pistol. McGruder drove the car around
the block and stopped directly in front of the Wrens Boys. He
then drove the shooter away from the scene and left the
vehicle to be picked up by others. When questioned about the
shooting, he initially lied to police about his presence and
participation. From this evidence, a rational jury could
easily find beyond a reasonable doubt that McGruder
participated in a conspiracy to murder Reaves and
intentionally aided in the implementation of that plan by
driving the vehicle in a drive-by shooting that resulted in
Quarterman's death and Brown's injuries. See
White v. State, 298 Ga. 416, 417-418 (782 S.E.2d
280) (2016) (evidence of defendant's participation as the
driver in a drive-by shooting was sufficient to support his
convictions as a party to the crimes of murder and unlawful
possession of a firearm).

McGruder
also challenges his conviction for violation of Georgia's
Street Gang Act, arguing that although the evidence may have
shown that he liked to "play gangster, " there was
no real evidence that he was associated with a criminal
street gang. Again, we disagree.

To
prove that McGruder violated the Street Gang Act as alleged
in the indictment, the State was required to show the
existence of a "criminal street gang, " defined in
OCGA § 16-15-3 (2) as "any organization,
association, or group of three or more persons associated in
fact, whether formal or informal, which engages in criminal
gang activity"; McGruder's association with the
gang; that McGruder committed one of the offenses identified
in OCGA § 16-15-3 (1), which includes any crime
involving violence; and that the crime was intended to
further the interests of the gang. See OCGA § 16-15-3;
OCGA § 16-15-4 (a); Anthony v. State, Ga.
(S.E.2d) (2018 WL 1143929 at *2) (March 5, 2018);
Rodriguez v. State, 284 Ga. 803, 806-807 (671 S.E.2d
497) (2009). Here, each of these requirements was met at
trial.

First,
the State presented evidence showing that
"MFG"[3] is a local street gang that is affiliated
with a national gang called the Gangsta Disciples. The
State's gang expert testified that the Gangsta Disciples,
in turn, are a national gang that is part of a gang alliance
known as Folk Nation, and that their colors are black or dark
blue; that they use certain symbols, including the
six-pointed star; and that gang associates "identify to
the right" by, for example, tilting their hat or belt to
the right, rolling their pant leg up on the right, or leaving
their shoelaces untied on the right. The expert also
testified that a group can be identified as a gang by the
gang-related colors, letters, symbols, and numbers in its
members' tattoos, clothing, or jewelry; Tarver, Hickson,
Ivey Elam and another member of MFG had tattoos with the
letters "MFG" along with other letters, numbers,
and symbols that the expert identified as gang-related. The
expert further testified that it is common for gangs to call
themselves rap groups; McGruder and Elam both told police
that MFG was a rap group. See OCGA § 16-15-3 (2)
(existence of a gang "may be established by evidence of
a common name or common identifying signs, symbols, tattoos,
graffiti, or attire or other distinguishing
characteristics").

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The
evidence further showed that, before the drive-by shooting
was carried out, Tarver, Hickson, McGruder, and Simpkins
"engaged in criminal gang activity" when they
gathered to plan the attack and Tarver gave instructions to
McGruder and Simpkins. See OCGA &sect; 16-15-3 (1)
("&#39;Criminal gang activity&#39; means the commission,
attempted commission, conspiracy to commit, or solicitation,
coercion, or intimidation of another person to commit"
any enumerated crime, including a crime involving violence or
the use of weapons); Hayes v. State, 298 Ga. 339,
341-342 (781 S.E.2d 777) (2016) (evidence of gang
members' conspiracy to commit the underlying crimes was
...

Our website includes the first part of the main text of the court's opinion.
To read the entire case, you must purchase the decision for download. With purchase,
you also receive any available docket numbers, case citations or footnotes, dissents
and concurrences that accompany the decision.
Docket numbers and/or citations allow you to research a case further or to use a case in a
legal proceeding. Footnotes (if any) include details of the court's decision. If the document contains a simple affirmation or denial without discussion,
there may not be additional text.

Buy This Entire Record For
$7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.