May 5, 2011 – Links International Journal of Socialist Renewal -- Six
years after Bolivians elected their first Indigenous-led government, their
ongoing struggle for national and social liberation remains a subject of debate
and disagreement among socialists around the world.

Have the Bolivian masses been able to
score significant gains under the government of President Evo Morales, first
elected in December 2005?

Or has the Morales presidency served
to limit popular movements and block the possibility of significant change?

The
second view is argued by Canadian socialist Jeffrey Webber in a new book and a
variety of recent articles, including an interview published March 15 in Bullet.[1]
While Webber says that activists in the global North should defend Bolivia
against “imperialist meddling”, his primary concern is to disabuse First World
socialists of illusions in the country’s government. Despite Morales’s “nominal
inclusion of revolutionary slogans”, his actions involve only “relatively
superficial policy initiatives”, Webber says. (Except as indicated, all
quotations are from the March 15 interview in Bullet.)

Far
from moving towards socialism, Webber says, the Morales government has served
to close off a “possibility of a fundamental, transformative overhaul of social,
economic, and political structures” and to consolidate a “reconstituted
neoliberalism”.

Jeffrey Webber has won international recognition for his writings on the
social struggles in Bolivia, so his analysis deserves respectful consideration.
His argument rests on his view – in my opinion correct – that Bolivia remains
capitalist, and that a socialist transformation is not under way.

But surely that is only part of the story. The reforms that Webber
derides as “superficial” have been violently opposed by the Bolivian oligarchy,
who don’t seem to agree that Morales is strengthening capitalism. The US
embassy in La Paz has participated actively in attempts to overthrow the
government. Internationally, the Bolivian government has joined ALBA, the
progressive alliance founded by Cuba and Venezuela, and has taken other
positive steps, including breaking diplomatic relations with Israel.

In my view, Webber and others who agree with him are measuring the
Bolivian government against an impossible standard, against the ideal program
of a hypothetical mass socialist movement. If we instead consider its real
achievements, the gains it has made against formidable odds, we must conclude
that our priority lies in support of Bolivia’s positive moves towards national
sovereignty, social progress and effective action on global warming.

Cochabamba initiative
for climate justice

Webber
himself praises one recent Bolivian initiative of world import: the Morales
government’s hosting of “a major anti-capitalist gathering in Cochabamba last
year”. This was “a genuine step forward for the construction of international,
eco-socialist networks”, he says.

Let
us add that the conference, with more than 30,000 participants, provided a
model of how social movements can establish an agenda for action by sympathetic
governments. The conference also creatively applied an Indigenous perspective
to the most urgent crisis facing humankind through its call for a “universal
declaration of the rights of Mother Earth”, which has won significant
international support.

Bolivia
led an alliance of global South countries in taking the Cochabamba resolutions
to the world climate change conference in Cancun, Mexico, in December 2010. There,
Bolivia ended up standing alone in flatly rejecting an imperialist-imposed deal
that again failed to act on climate change. The outcome in Cancun was a serious
setback for ecological forces, but Bolivia, undeterred, is helping to spearhead
organising toward the next world climate change conference in Durban, South
Africa, in December 2011.

Imperialist
powers are not accustomed to be defied in this way by a small Third World
country. Why did this historic challenge, the world’s first expression of a
mass anti-capitalist ecological movement, come from Bolivia, a small and desperately
poor country, remote from the world’s power centres, and weighed down with a historically
fragile, dependent and crisis-prone economy?

Agenda for sovereignty

To
explain the Cochabamba initiative, we examine its context: a reversal in US-Bolivian
relations since Morales was elected. Bolivia has long been subjected to
aggressive US intervention, supported by the country’s capitalist elite. Previously,
the US utilised three extended campaigns—the so-called wars against communism,
drugs and terrorism—to keep Bolivian society off balance and to pave the way
for various forms of intervention. After Morales’s election in 2005, Washington
turned to backing separatist forces in Bolivia’s internal conflicts.

But
Bolivia shook off these aggressive intrusions and now has taken the initiative,
rallying international forces against US sabotage of climate justice.[2]

Webber
tips his hat to this reality, noting that “the Morales government has also
developed a relatively more independent foreign policy”. This aspect of its
record is worth closer attention, however, especially given Canada’s oppressive
involvement in the region.

In
December 2005, Morales concluded his first speech as elected president by
repeating a slogan of the coca-farmers’ union, “Causachun coca, wañuchun yanquis” (“Long live coca, death to the
Yankees”). Defence of the coca leaf, significant in Indigenous culture, against
the depredations of US drug-war contingents was symbolic of a new course to affirm
Indigenous and national dignity. In the following months:

Bolivia
broke with the previous practice of allowing US ambassadors to influence appointments
to senior government posts.

Bolivia
refused to grant legal immunity to US soldiers operating in the country;
in response, the US cancelled 96% of its support to the Bolivian army.

Bolivia
broke with US drug-war policies and protected coca cultivation in family
farms.

When
Washington caused visa problems for Bolivian government leaders seeking to
visit the US, Bolivia slapped a compulsory visa requirement on all US
visitors.

Bolivia
cancelled the practice by which the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank had a say in the country’s financial policies, and ended its
dependency on loans from these agencies.[3]

The
last of these steps was part of a package of measures designed to free
Bolivia’s finances from vulnerability to great-power economic pressure.

But
Bolivia’s most effective challenge of North American tutelage lay in promoting
steps toward regional integration, free of US and Canadian intervention.

Webber
mentions Bolivia’s “closer ties to Venezuela, Ecuador, and Cuba”: in fact,
these ties took shape in ALBA (the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our
America), a plan for alternative economic relationships on the basis of
solidarity, not the capitalist market, and simultaneously a political bloc
coordinating member countries’ resistance to US-led imperialism.

The
campaign against US intervention led, in 2008, to the expulsion of the US
ambassador. In the Obama administration’s third year, it has yet to negotiate
terms for its ambassador’s return to La Paz.

The
main barrier to resuming normal diplomatic relations is Bolivia’s strong
objections to subversive activities of US agencies within the country. Indeed, the
Morales government has just expelled the Environmental and Economic Development
program of USAID, a US government agency that has engaged in protracted efforts
to undermine the government.

Bolivia’s
campaign to free itself from US tutelage and assert national sovereignty is an
outstanding achievement, which was spearheaded by the Morales government.

Defeating a rightist insurgency

When
elected, the Morales government had “substantial room for manoeuvre”, Webber
tells us. “The US was overextended in Iraq and Afghanistan” and the “domestic
right had been politically destroyed”. Instead of taking advantage of this
opening, he says, the Morales government’s policies, despite “superficial
policy initiatives … that run against orthodox neoliberalism”, remain
“pre-eminently concerned with the restoration of profitability and the subordination
of the working class”.

This
picture is hard to square with the reality of social polarisation during the
regime’s first years. Far from showing gratitude for Morales’ supposed efforts
to restore capitalist profitability, major sectors of Bolivia’s capitalist
class launched an violent rebellion, purportedly for regional autonomy but
primarily designed to shatter the government’s authority in the country’s richest
areas.

The
rightist revolt was triggered by the government’s initiative for a new
constitution that would refound Bolivia as a “plurinational” republic, and by the
fear that Indigenous peasants would use their enhanced status and authority insist
on return of lands stolen by white, mestizo and foreign elites.

It
is true, as Webber says, that the reform of the hydrocarbon industry, which
vastly increased government royalties, fell short of full nationalisation.
Also, agrarian reform measures have been less radical, so far, than those that
followed Bolivia’s 1952 revolution. Nonetheless, surely it is clear that the present
Bolivian government’s reform measures—the assertion of national sovereignty vis-à-vis
the US empire; the new constitution; the agrarian reform, with all its
limitations; rights and dignity for Indigenous peoples; increased royalties
from resource extraction; etc.—were regarded as crucially important by both the
rightist oligarchy and popular movements.

The
manner in which this confrontation was overcome is instructive. The right-wing
insurgency took the form of a political movement mobilising in the streets and
seeking to impose its will through violence—the characteristic method of
fascism. For a time, much of the eastern region where the rightists were strong
was close to a no-go area for government leaders and their supporters.
Washington threw its support strongly behind the anti-government forces.

A
capitalist government’s standard response, faced with such a challenge, is to
call in the police and army and impose its authority by force. If successful,
such action in Bolivia would have left the army as arbiter of the situation;
more likely, it would have led to civil war and foreign intervention.

It
is thus striking that the Morales government relied not on the army but on the
strength of social movements that had elected it to office. And far from
resisting the government’s supposed measures to subjugate them, the country’s
working people mobilised again and again to defend government initiatives
against forcible right-wing obstruction. Fascist-type violence and provocation
was thwarted through counter-mobilisation, followed up by democratic
consultations in which Morales obtained the backing of almost two-thirds of the
voters. The neo-fascist thugs were isolated and marginalised. This historic
achievement by Bolivia’s working people stands as a model of how to respond to fascist-type
movements.

Why defend the
Morales regime?

Speaking
of Bolivia today, Webber states that “the popular sectors are rightly concerned
with defending the Morales regime against any imperialist meddling and
right-wing efforts at destabilization when they emerge”.

This
is a welcome statement. Still, if Morales truly represents “reconstituted
neoliberalism”, why should he be defended?

Certainly
it is true that the Bolivian state remains capitalist, and the government
functions within the framework of deeply entrenched capitalist culture and
social relations. It rules through a capitalist state apparatus that is ill adapted
to implement progressive reforms. It is often at odds with popular struggles—particularly
now that gains against the rightists and Washington have opened more scope for such
movements. Capitalist state bureaucrats have attempted to infiltrate the Movement
Towards Socialism (MAS), and turn it to their own ends.

But
it is equally true that, through the victories of the MAS, popular movements
have taken positions of authority within the government and successfully used this
leverage to drive forward a popular agenda on many issues that the Bolivian
people feel are deeply important.

In
Bolivia today, Webber notes, “a situation persists in which there is no
organized, alternative socio-political force to the left of the ruling party”.
Surely this fact suggests that, despite all strains, the tie between social
movements in Bolivia and the Morales government has not been broken.

A revolutionary opportunity?

Webber
regrets the “failure of the 2003 and 2005 mass mobilizations to translate into
an overthrow of the existing capitalist state and the construction of a
popular, sovereign, self-governing power of the Indigenous proletarian peasant
majority from below”. He attributes this negative outcome to “the impact of the
absence of a revolutionary party”.

Certainly,
the presence of a broad, effective revolutionary organisation would have
strengthened the people’s movement and influenced the outcome. Yet it is
striking that not only was a revolutionary party absent (a not uncommon situation
in our world), but that no significant group on the left posed a viable
alternative to MAS’s electoral project. How can this be? Was there something
wrong with the Bolivian popular movements—with the human material, perhaps, or
with their traditions? Or were there factors that made an all-out drive to overthrow
the capitalist state less attractive than Webber implies?

The
type of overturn that Webber describes—which I would call a socialist
revolution—has not occurred since Cuba’s revolution of 1959-62. Indeed, some Marxists
argue that there has been no successful socialist revolution anywhere since
1917. This decades-long delay cannot be put down to inadequacies of
revolutionary will or organisation. It points to the existence of deep-rooted
cultural, social and economic barriers to implementing a socialist agenda,
which cannot be overcome quickly or in a small, isolated sector of the world.

Moreover,
we must recall the overriding lesson of the great Russian anti-capitalist
uprising of 1917-18: to survive and flourish, the revolutionary alternative had
to be extended internationally. That was true not just “ultimately”, as Webber
states, but immediately. The failure of revolution outside Russia had a swift,
devastating impact on the new workers’ state that was keenly felt by 1919.
Fortunately, Soviet Russia, which covered a sixth of the world’s surface,
possessed a range of raw materials and diversified industries sufficient to
enable it to withstand several years of capitalist blockade and armed assault.
Bolivia, by contrast, has an economy that is totally dependent on imports and
exports, and does not have even an ocean port, let alone the backing of a
powerful sponsor, such as that enjoyed by Cuba during and for many years after its
anti-capitalist revolution.

The
greatest barrier to a socialist overturn in Bolivia is not the Morales
leadership but the absence of workers’ governments in economically advanced
countries that could provide effective support.

The
Morales government’s focus on developing ties with other progressive or
semi-progressive regimes—and even (to Webber’s dismay) with other governments
in conflict with imperialism, such as Iran—represents intelligent revolutionary
strategy. The ALBA alliance is an attempt to widen the options for poor,
dependent countries, a project that, if it flourishes, will create more
favourable conditions for anti-capitalist revolution.

As
we know from experience in Canada, working people do not normally attempt to
overthrow the capitalist state if the road to reform appears to be open.
Revolution and the struggle for reform are not counterposed, but are rather part
of a single process. A struggle for reforms can both strengthen workers’
combative power and demonstrate the limits of what can be achieved in
capitalism. Certainly, in Bolivia, events have shown that the path to reform
did indeed lie open. The Morales government did not overthrow capitalism and
does not appear likely to do so, but its period in office has been marked by tangible
advances for working people and, also, has demonstrated limits of reform under
the present capitalist state.

Metropolitan activists' 'first priority': solidarity

In
terms of sheer drama and as a demonstration of the power and creativity of
working people, struggles in Bolivia over the last decade call for close
attention. Many writers on the left have studied this experience and expressed their
opinions on where Bolivian workers acted wisely and where they took a wrong
step. This process is natural and positive, and Webber has contributed to it significantly.

However,
we must bear in mind that in the Bolivian drama we are not just analysts and
critics, we are also actors. Bolivia’s struggle for democracy and sovereignty has
been actively opposed by the Canadian government and its allies. Imperialist
intervention in Latin America is under way right now—to restrict national
sovereignty, shore up reactionary regimes, overthrow defiant governments and
crush popular movements. It is an urgent threat that has Bolivia in its gun-sights.

In
another article, Webber has written, “From
my perspective, the first priority of activists in the Global North should
indeed be to oppose imperialist meddling anywhere. This means, concretely,
opposition under any circumstances to imperialist-backed destabilization
campaigns against Morales. But the political situation is too complicated to
end our discussion at that stage. Our first allegiance ought to be with the
exploited and oppressed themselves, rather than any leaders or governments who
purport to speak in their name.”[4]

Agreed,
our “first allegiance” should be to the masses, but Webber’s counterposition of
the masses and the MAS leadership fails to acknowledge their close relationship.

Moreover,
Webber’s use of the term “imperialist meddling” radically understates the
systemic nature of imperialist domination or the devastating violence of its intervention
in countries like Haiti, Honduras or Colombia. Imperialist domination is not
expressed merely in “destabilization campaigns”―it permeates and defines every
aspect of Bolivia’s social, economic and political reality.

In
this situation, the “first priority of activists” in Canada is not criticism of
the process in Bolivia, but solidarity—which must be expressed above all in
opposition to Canadian government policies. In that spirit, all of us,
including those who share Webber’s dim view of the Morales government, need to contribute
to the broad movement of solidarity with the people of Bolivia and with other
peoples victimised by imperialist domination.

Comments

I think it is a mistake, which the Left keeps repeating, of counterposing criticism and solidarity and as a result sacrificing theoretical understanding. We have to develop a dialectical unity between what is critical...
consciousness and action.

Similarly, the solidarity movement in support of the Nicaraguan Revolution refused to criticize the FSLN.
The failure to criticize is a failure to educate....the result is a solidarity movement which tags after a "leader"
and even becomes "groupies" for their perfect Revolution. Of course, no Revolution is perfect but we can help
the Revolution through criticism and constructive debate. Ortega, the "leader" of the FSLN, is now in an alliance
with the right wing in Nicaragua. ... to create illusions is to ultimately disilllusion.

In 1953 (when I very young) I attended a meeting in NYC hailing the 1952 Bolivian Revolution led by Paz Estennsoro.
Within a few years, he betrayed the Revolution he had led. The class forces in every revolution lead leaders to betray
when there is no revolutionary party to present an alternative to a policy of compromise with imperialism which every leadership must face.