Rob Cuthbert Professor of Higher Education Management University of the West of England - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Is there a crisis of trust in universities? CIHE/SRHE Consultation Trust, Accountability and the World to Come St George’s House, Windsor Castle, 22-23 April 2010. Rob Cuthbert Professor of Higher Education Management University of the West of England rob.cuthbert@uwe.ac.uk

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“We set detailed performance targets for public bodies, but are complacent about the perverse incentives they create. We try to micro-manage complex institutions from the centre, and wonder why we get over-complex and inadequate rather than good and effective governance. We try to judge quality by performance indicators rather than by seeking independent and informed evaluation. We aspire to complete transparency in public life, but neglect the more fundamental goal of limiting deception.”

O’Neill (2002:viii)

Trust, accountability … but are complacent about the perverse incentives they create. We try to micro-manage complex institutions from the centre, and wonder why we get over-complex and inadequate rather than good and effective governance. We try to judge quality by performance indicators rather than by seeking independent and informed evaluation. We aspire to complete transparency in public life, but neglect the more fundamental goal of limiting deception.”

Trust and accountability

Audit and self-regulation

Getting the balance right depends on:

Better mutual understanding

Better connections between policy and practice

Better communication

… and the world to come but are complacent about the perverse incentives they create. We try to micro-manage complex institutions from the centre, and wonder why we get over-complex and inadequate rather than good and effective governance. We try to judge quality by performance indicators rather than by seeking independent and informed evaluation. We aspire to complete transparency in public life, but neglect the more fundamental goal of limiting deception.”

The nature of trust

Trust in public bodies

HE and the state

How does HE change?

The opportunity we have now

Diagnosis rather than prescription

The nature of trust but are complacent about the perverse incentives they create. We try to micro-manage complex institutions from the centre, and wonder why we get over-complex and inadequate rather than good and effective governance. We try to judge quality by performance indicators rather than by seeking independent and informed evaluation. We aspire to complete transparency in public life, but neglect the more fundamental goal of limiting deception.”

The nature of trust but are complacent about the perverse incentives they create. We try to micro-manage complex institutions from the centre, and wonder why we get over-complex and inadequate rather than good and effective governance. We try to judge quality by performance indicators rather than by seeking independent and informed evaluation. We aspire to complete transparency in public life, but neglect the more fundamental goal of limiting deception.”

Charitable: trust

Professional: trust me, I’m a doctor

Social: trussst in me …

Domestic: can I trust you to …

Financial: too trusting?

A two-edged concept

The nature of trust but are complacent about the perverse incentives they create. We try to micro-manage complex institutions from the centre, and wonder why we get over-complex and inadequate rather than good and effective governance. We try to judge quality by performance indicators rather than by seeking independent and informed evaluation. We aspire to complete transparency in public life, but neglect the more fundamental goal of limiting deception.”

Social and technological changes systematically dismantle trust, which needs to be reconstructed (Misztal)

Confidence –v- trust (Luhmann)

Vicious circle of anxiety and suspicion

Reputation is the key to trust (Dasgupta)

The nature of trust but are complacent about the perverse incentives they create. We try to micro-manage complex institutions from the centre, and wonder why we get over-complex and inadequate rather than good and effective governance. We try to judge quality by performance indicators rather than by seeking independent and informed evaluation. We aspire to complete transparency in public life, but neglect the more fundamental goal of limiting deception.”

“ ... trust (or symmetrically, distrust) is a particular level of the subjective probability with which an agent assesses that another agent or group of agents will perform a particular action, both before he can monitor such action (or independently of his capacity ever to be able to monitor it) and in a context in which it affects his own action.” (Gambetta:216, emphasis in original).

Trust in public bodies but are complacent about the perverse incentives they create. We try to micro-manage complex institutions from the centre, and wonder why we get over-complex and inadequate rather than good and effective governance. We try to judge quality by performance indicators rather than by seeking independent and informed evaluation. We aspire to complete transparency in public life, but neglect the more fundamental goal of limiting deception.”

High profile cases: MPs’ expenses

Election debate: public spending = ‘waste’

A once familiar narrative: private good, public bad. But:

More high profile cases: Worldcom, Enron

The world financial crisis

Trust in public bodies but are complacent about the perverse incentives they create. We try to micro-manage complex institutions from the centre, and wonder why we get over-complex and inadequate rather than good and effective governance. We try to judge quality by performance indicators rather than by seeking independent and informed evaluation. We aspire to complete transparency in public life, but neglect the more fundamental goal of limiting deception.”

A seeming irony: the public sector must pay for private excesses

But what is public, what is private? (Watson).

BAe, VT, Mouchel

U of Buckingham, BPP, Carter & Carter

Trust in public bodies but are complacent about the perverse incentives they create. We try to micro-manage complex institutions from the centre, and wonder why we get over-complex and inadequate rather than good and effective governance. We try to judge quality by performance indicators rather than by seeking independent and informed evaluation. We aspire to complete transparency in public life, but neglect the more fundamental goal of limiting deception.”

Changing the narrative:

Not private or public, but:

Market or political/hierarchical choice? (Vickers)

Selective or comprehensive concerns?

Making a profit, or making a difference?

Trust in public bodies but are complacent about the perverse incentives they create. We try to micro-manage complex institutions from the centre, and wonder why we get over-complex and inadequate rather than good and effective governance. We try to judge quality by performance indicators rather than by seeking independent and informed evaluation. We aspire to complete transparency in public life, but neglect the more fundamental goal of limiting deception.”

The primacy of values and beliefs

Communication, and how mass media can distort perceptions and beliefs

Prejudice: public and private

Capitalism is comparatively scrupulous (Weber)

Trust in public bodies but are complacent about the perverse incentives they create. We try to micro-manage complex institutions from the centre, and wonder why we get over-complex and inadequate rather than good and effective governance. We try to judge quality by performance indicators rather than by seeking independent and informed evaluation. We aspire to complete transparency in public life, but neglect the more fundamental goal of limiting deception.”

New public management and the ‘perverse social defence’; the negative outcomes of managerialism and Performance Management

Virtual reality and the ‘auditable surface’

“… the further removed the observer (ie managers, policymakers, politicians) is from the reality of the frontline the more they are likely to be taken in by the illusion they themselves have been instrumental in creating.” (Hoggett)

There is nothing a manager wants done which cannot be undone by educated subordinates

Higher education and the state but are complacent about the perverse incentives they create. We try to micro-manage complex institutions from the centre, and wonder why we get over-complex and inadequate rather than good and effective governance. We try to judge quality by performance indicators rather than by seeking independent and informed evaluation. We aspire to complete transparency in public life, but neglect the more fundamental goal of limiting deception.”

New public management: insightful analysis, but in HE, mostly a literature of whingeing

Academic capitalism: insights, but more whingeing (Bok)

League tables: condemnation and collusion; failures of managerial imagination

Breaking through the ‘auditable surface’: new communication, re-education not appeasement

How does HE change? but are complacent about the perverse incentives they create. We try to micro-manage complex institutions from the centre, and wonder why we get over-complex and inadequate rather than good and effective governance. We try to judge quality by performance indicators rather than by seeking independent and informed evaluation. We aspire to complete transparency in public life, but neglect the more fundamental goal of limiting deception.”

Elite (3%) to mass to universal (40-50%)

<15 universities to >150 universities

Unit costs down 80-90%

Funding from secret to transparent

Modularisation, credit, e-learning

Diversifying: staff and students

The idea of the university: global context

How does HE change? but are complacent about the perverse incentives they create. We try to micro-manage complex institutions from the centre, and wonder why we get over-complex and inadequate rather than good and effective governance. We try to judge quality by performance indicators rather than by seeking independent and informed evaluation. We aspire to complete transparency in public life, but neglect the more fundamental goal of limiting deception.”

QA for improvement or justification? Can we do both? If so QA must:

make a difference for students; be owned by HEIs; be relevant to HE’s purposes; promote diversity; be cyclical not sporadic; address standards; be done by peers, at subject or program level; contain international comparative measures; be reported in terms easily understood by a lay audience (Massaro)

How does HE change? but are complacent about the perverse incentives they create. We try to micro-manage complex institutions from the centre, and wonder why we get over-complex and inadequate rather than good and effective governance. We try to judge quality by performance indicators rather than by seeking independent and informed evaluation. We aspire to complete transparency in public life, but neglect the more fundamental goal of limiting deception.”

The case of the RAE

Seems to meet many of Massaro’s criteria

Improvement and justification?

Attacked, but then defended, why?

Problem with its uses as much as its methods

The devil we know

Self-regulation and peer review

How does HE change? but are complacent about the perverse incentives they create. We try to micro-manage complex institutions from the centre, and wonder why we get over-complex and inadequate rather than good and effective governance. We try to judge quality by performance indicators rather than by seeking independent and informed evaluation. We aspire to complete transparency in public life, but neglect the more fundamental goal of limiting deception.”

QA and the RAE: not seeing the wood for the trees

We need to see academic practice as a whole, not as R and T, separately funded

The true meaning of ‘brand’ is the integrity of academic practice in corporate strategy

The integrity of the HE sector

The opportunity we have now but are complacent about the perverse incentives they create. We try to micro-manage complex institutions from the centre, and wonder why we get over-complex and inadequate rather than good and effective governance. We try to judge quality by performance indicators rather than by seeking independent and informed evaluation. We aspire to complete transparency in public life, but neglect the more fundamental goal of limiting deception.”

Let’s not waste a good crisis

HE has been trying too hard to be accountable, and not hard enough to be trustworthy

Less spending should mean less control, not more (anti Mandelson)

A trust dividend – really reducing the bureaucratic burden

The opportunity we have now but are complacent about the perverse incentives they create. We try to micro-manage complex institutions from the centre, and wonder why we get over-complex and inadequate rather than good and effective governance. We try to judge quality by performance indicators rather than by seeking independent and informed evaluation. We aspire to complete transparency in public life, but neglect the more fundamental goal of limiting deception.”

To change the narrative/discourse:

Distrust in/ignorance of modern higher education

a lack of understanding of ‘science’ (boffins)

academics deliberately obscure things (dons)

English anti-intellectualism

HE isn’t ‘worth it’ anymore, it’s not what it was

wider access means lower standards

Changing the discourse but are complacent about the perverse incentives they create. We try to micro-manage complex institutions from the centre, and wonder why we get over-complex and inadequate rather than good and effective governance. We try to judge quality by performance indicators rather than by seeking independent and informed evaluation. We aspire to complete transparency in public life, but neglect the more fundamental goal of limiting deception.”

Too many graduates, ‘non-graduate’ jobs

Too many people fail

UK plc is slipping; education is partly to blame

New universities better off as polytechnics

Vocational education is OK … for other people’s children (Wolf)

Academics don’t know when they’re well off

Tests for a new narrative but are complacent about the perverse incentives they create. We try to micro-manage complex institutions from the centre, and wonder why we get over-complex and inadequate rather than good and effective governance. We try to judge quality by performance indicators rather than by seeking independent and informed evaluation. We aspire to complete transparency in public life, but neglect the more fundamental goal of limiting deception.”

Meet the global challenges of

Mission definition

Funding structures and arrangements

Student engagement

Transparency and accountability

Ability to partner

(Freedman)

So HE must: but are complacent about the perverse incentives they create. We try to micro-manage complex institutions from the centre, and wonder why we get over-complex and inadequate rather than good and effective governance. We try to judge quality by performance indicators rather than by seeking independent and informed evaluation. We aspire to complete transparency in public life, but neglect the more fundamental goal of limiting deception.”

Be willing to change

Broaden vision to include schools/HEI axis

Understand/improve student engagement

Commit to change, be seen to change

Improve assessment and accountability

Involve staff and students, study what works best

Trust, accountability and the world to come. Let’s scrap: but are complacent about the perverse incentives they create. We try to micro-manage complex institutions from the centre, and wonder why we get over-complex and inadequate rather than good and effective governance. We try to judge quality by performance indicators rather than by seeking independent and informed evaluation. We aspire to complete transparency in public life, but neglect the more fundamental goal of limiting deception.”

The myth of choice

Targets, specifications, inspections

Deliverology

Obsession with ‘sharing back office services’

The Audit Commission

The centralised regime that oversees the public sector (Middleton, Seddon)

Trust, accountability and the HE world to come but are complacent about the perverse incentives they create. We try to micro-manage complex institutions from the centre, and wonder why we get over-complex and inadequate rather than good and effective governance. We try to judge quality by performance indicators rather than by seeking independent and informed evaluation. We aspire to complete transparency in public life, but neglect the more fundamental goal of limiting deception.”

Avoid obsession with elite universities

Make HE policy less institution-focused

End CUC-style KPI management

Scrap programme specifications

More trouble-shooting, less audit

‘Skills’ and ‘Quality’ not fit for purpose

Changing the narrative but are complacent about the perverse incentives they create. We try to micro-manage complex institutions from the centre, and wonder why we get over-complex and inadequate rather than good and effective governance. We try to judge quality by performance indicators rather than by seeking independent and informed evaluation. We aspire to complete transparency in public life, but neglect the more fundamental goal of limiting deception.”

Main Street not Wall Street?

“The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits.” (Friedman)

Mortgage meltdown: immoral but not illegal (Hirsch and Morris)

Making markets more moral: can HE catch a wave of change?

Changing the HE narrative but are complacent about the perverse incentives they create. We try to micro-manage complex institutions from the centre, and wonder why we get over-complex and inadequate rather than good and effective governance. We try to judge quality by performance indicators rather than by seeking independent and informed evaluation. We aspire to complete transparency in public life, but neglect the more fundamental goal of limiting deception.”

Changing the narrative but are complacent about the perverse incentives they create. We try to micro-manage complex institutions from the centre, and wonder why we get over-complex and inadequate rather than good and effective governance. We try to judge quality by performance indicators rather than by seeking independent and informed evaluation. We aspire to complete transparency in public life, but neglect the more fundamental goal of limiting deception.”

Authenticity: “Universities are about habits of truth” (Blackburn) but Heidegger! Humility, the provisionality of knowledge.

Integrity and diversity of the HE sector; comprehensive not selective concern; make a difference for and to society

Trust, accountability and the world to come but are complacent about the perverse incentives they create. We try to micro-manage complex institutions from the centre, and wonder why we get over-complex and inadequate rather than good and effective governance. We try to judge quality by performance indicators rather than by seeking independent and informed evaluation. We aspire to complete transparency in public life, but neglect the more fundamental goal of limiting deception.”

A trust dividend for a virtuous circle:

more trust, leading to

better accountability, leading to

better higher education performance, leading to

more trust

References but are complacent about the perverse incentives they create. We try to micro-manage complex institutions from the centre, and wonder why we get over-complex and inadequate rather than good and effective governance. We try to judge quality by performance indicators rather than by seeking independent and informed evaluation. We aspire to complete transparency in public life, but neglect the more fundamental goal of limiting deception.”

Ackoff R and HJ Addison, with considered responses by S Bibb (2006) A little book of f-laws: 13 common sins of management Axminster: Triarchy Press

Cuthbert R (2010) ‘Failing the challenge of institutional evaluation: how and why managerialism flourishes’ in Saunders M, P Trowler and V Bamber (eds) (2010)Evaluative practices in HE: an international view Maidenhead: McGraw-Hill Society for Research into Higher Education and Open University Press