In this property dispute, defendants appeal as of right from the trial court?s judgment
quieting title to a disputed driveway and granting both plaintiff and defendants an easement for
use of the driveway. We affirm.
The property at issue is a concrete driveway that borders defendants? property on the
north and plaintiff?s property on the south. The driveway was installed by Ruppe Concrete,
plaintiff?s predecessor in title, and provides access to both the buildings on plaintiff?s property
and a gravel driveway that leads to defendants? home. Neither party has another driveway that
can be used to access their property. Both parcels of land are bordered on the west by a local
roadway, to which the driveway at issue connects.
Defendants first argue, in essence, that the trial court erred in determining the parties?
credibility. After carefully considering the lower court record, we do not believe there is
anything in that record to indicate that this Court should abandon the traditional deference given
to the factfinder in determining credibility. Mogle v Scriver, 241 Mich App 192, 201; 614
NW2d 696 (2000). The trial court was aware of the differences between the parties? positions
and was free to accept plaintiff?s version of events and reject defendants? version. We decline to
interfere with and cannot find error with the trial court?s determinations regarding issues of
credibility.
Defendants next argue that the trial court should not have granted plaintiff a prescriptive
easement over the concrete driveway. We disagree. Actions to quiet title are equitable in nature
and are reviewed de novo. Beulah Hoagland Appleton Qualified Personal Residence Trust v

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Emmet Co Rd Comm, 236 Mich App 546, 550; 600 NW2d 698 (1999). The trial court?s findings
of fact are reviewed for clear error. Walters v Snyder, 239 Mich App 453, 456; 608 NW2d 97
(2000). A finding is clearly erroneous when ?the reviewing court on the entire record is left with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.? Id.
The trial court actually concluded that both plaintiff and defendants had acquired a
prescriptive easement over the other?s respective properties. A prescriptive easement is
established when a party shows use of another?s property that is open, notorious, adverse, and
continuous for a period of fifteen years. Higgins Lake Property Owners Ass?n v Gerrish Twp,
255 Mich App 83, 118; 662 NW2d 387 (2003). The use of the driveway by both plaintiff and
defendants was clearly open, notorious, and continuous from 1974 to the present, a time period
that is well beyond the requisite fifteen years. Thus, resolution of this issue turns on whether
plaintiff?s use of the driveway was adverse. ?Adverse or hostile use is use inconsistent with the
right of the owner, without permission asked or given, use such as would entitle the owner to a
cause of action against the intruder.? Mumrow v Riddle, 67 Mich App 693, 698; 242 NW2d 489
(1976). ?[P]ermissive use of property, regardless of the length of the use, will not result in an
easement by prescription.? West Michigan Dock and Market Corp v Lakeland Investments, 210
Mich App 505, 511; 534 NW2d 212 (1995).
The record establishes that both parties used the driveway under a claim of right. There
was evidence that Ruppe Concrete had a permissive agreement with defendants? predecessor in
title and defendants for use of the driveway. Specifically, the agreement apparently called for
Ruppe to maintain the driveway in exchange for the right to use it. However, this type of oral
license ?is automatically revoked upon transfer of title by either the licensor or licensee.?
Kitchen v Kitchen, 465 Mich 654, 658-659; 641 NW2d 245 (2002). Although the evidence
showed that plaintiff continued to maintain the driveway when it acquired the property, there
was no evidence presented that this was done as a result of an agreement between plaintiff and
defendants regarding permissive use of the driveway. Therefore, when title transferred to
plaintiff, any agreement about the use of the driveway was revoked, plaintiff?s use of the
driveway was no longer with permission, and plaintiff?s use of the driveway was adverse.
Therefore, the trial court did not err in finding that both parties? use of the property resulted in an
easement by prescription.
However, we agree with defendants that the trial court erred in concluding that plaintiff
established an easement by necessity. Nonetheless, as this was an alternative ground for granting
a right-of-way easement over the driveway, the error was harmless. Gray v Pann, 203 Mich App
461, 464; 513 NW2d 154 (1994) (?The fact that the trial court reached the right result for the
wrong reason is not grounds to reverse on appeal.?).
Defendants also argue that the trial court erred in determining that the parties had
acquiesced to a boundary line running down the middle of the driveway. Again, we disagree.
When pursuing a claim of acquiescence for the statutory period, there is no need for a party to
establish a bona fide controversy over the boundary line. Sackett v Atyeo, 217 Mich App 676,
681; 552 NW2d 536 (1996). The party only needs to show that adjoining property owners
acquiesced to a boundary line for a period of at least fifteen years. Killips v Mannisto, 244 Mich
App 256, 260; 624 NW2d 224 (2001). The testimony at trial showed that, until a survey was
performed in 2002, both parties and their predecessors in title believed that the boundary line
was marked by an iron pin or piece of rebar imbedded in the middle of the driveway. This

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monument was treated as marking the boundary line for well over the statutory period of fifteen
years. We conclude, therefore, that the trial court did not err in determining that the parties had
acquiesced to this line as the boundary line between their properties.
Finally, we decline to address defendants? argument that the trial court erred in not
properly considering safety factors when rendering judgment because this argument was not
presented to the trial court for resolution or sufficiently briefed and supported on appeal. See
Efefia v Credit Technologies, Inc, 245 Mich App 466, 471-472; 628 NW2d 577 (2001).
Affirmed.
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Peter D. O?Connell
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio