After bypassing, and not penalizing (due to the creativity involved), the insidiously subtle, if not subversive, pandering, I took a closer look at the approach. ILO had a very strong strategic approach to this debate, capitalizing on their strengths and minimizing their weaknesses.

The debate question - at least for me- was a nonstarter. ILP had this in the bag. ILO was in said bag. ILP forgot to take the blowtorch away from ILO before they put them in the bag. This is primarily what burned them. Let me explain:

Xunxian, started out well building a foundation, covering the basics, and entertaining the classical approach to this question only to have Pavlovian stumble in like a drunken pirate, completely disregarding all that Xunxian had presented. What didn't make Pavlovian's approach a complete disaster was the forceful caveat counter, priming for things to come. Primarily, Pavlovian simply strips Morality down to the 'will' and if pushed, he might consider the will to power, but no further. All the other ILO members proceed to build a strong case for this 'hearts and minds' approach.

Carleas managed to poke a hole into Pavlovian's presentation but didn't really get enough support from the closing ILP team members. Tab seemed to entertain misdirection through paring opposites, while Smears meandered after a great opening. This was simply fodder for ILO's case.

Again, this was a hard fought battle between both teams and we thank you for your participation. I would like to thank Pavlovian for conducting these series, hopefully there's more to come.

W.C.

'Loneliness does not come from having no people about one, but from being unable to communicate the things that seem important to oneself, or from holding certain views which others find inadmissible.'C. G. Jung

'I began the revolution with eighty-two men. If I had to do it again, I could do it with ten or fifteen and absolute faith. It does not matter how small you are if you have faith and plan of action.'Fidel Castro

I agree, but earlier I said that want is not the only Motivator. It is the Motivator of want, or any other Motivator, that makes a person take an action. In other words, we want to do everything that we do, we have to want to do it. It is the Motivators that make us want to take an action, so in that sense, everything is want.

Even if it worked, I don't think this extra "want" step adds anything to understanding our behavior. In fact, I think it takes away from it. There is a serious sense in which we don't want to do many actions that we perform, but we do them anyway in order to achieve things we want in the future or avoid other things we don't want. And I certainly don't experience this struggle as you have described it, and I don't think you do either. There are multiple motivators at play, and the motivator that we have been calling "want" can be strongly opposed to an action but be overrided by a value. I find it extremely silly to say in such circumstances that we wanted to perform that action, when the motivational want was a "not want". The description freely equivocated.

Further, you fail to give any serious causal or behavioral power to this second step "want" to begin with, so it cannot hope to help explain our behavior. It's this irrelevant add on, an afterthought, or an "oh yeah". It's supposed to be like this psychological rationalization, yet it is oddly applied to cases even when we not only don't recognize a want, but recognize a distinct and powerful "not want". If you expect me to put a "want" on every action anyone performs ever, contrary to their first person experience of that action, you better make a powerful argument for it and it better add some sort of explanatory coherence to that persons behavior. The fact is that it does neither. Also, if you expect to make a morality out of it, it has to effect behavior in some way, and this second step "want" clearly does not.

Let me, for a moment, hold all of that in abeyance so I can ask if even if I assume it makes sense, does it work. There are two immediate reasons why it doesn't, two cases that it cannot account for.

1. Involuntary or unconscious action

2. I am at home and I want to go out tonight, but I want to go out with a girl I met. She told me earlier in the day that she would call me. She is honest, so I am justified in believing I am going out with her tonight, I fully intend to go out with her tonight, and I want to go out with her tonight. I fall asleep waiting for her to call, she never calls, and I wake up the next morning having not gone out the night in question.

Now initially the point of attack seems to be the fact that I wanted to go out with her but never did. But the actual point to be made lays in analysis of why I stayed home. What is immediately appearant is that this is not a classic case of willed inaction, as when I stay home and do nothing because that's what I intend and want to do. It cannot be said that I wanted to do nothing that night, because that clearly wasn't what I wanted, and because I was at no point ever motivated to stay home all night to begin with. Yet, assuming your theory is true, I am forced to say either than I wanted to stay home or that I acted immorally. Niether of these answers is acceptable.

Let preachers have their heaven, give the employers hell, and take the world for the workers

Sittlichkeit wrote:Even if it worked, I don't think this extra "want" step adds anything to understanding our behavior. In fact, I think it takes away from it. There is a serious sense in which we don't want to do many actions that we perform, but we do them anyway in order to achieve things we want in the future or avoid other things we don't want. And I certainly don't experience this struggle as you have described it, and I don't think you do either. There are multiple motivators at play, and the motivator that we have been calling "want" can be strongly opposed to an action but be overrided by a value. I find it extremely silly to say in such circumstances that we wanted to perform that action, when the motivational want was a "not want". The description freely equivocated.

"In order to achieve things in the future or avoid other things we don't want." Like I said in my initial Debate post, not wanting to do something or wanting for something not to happen is still a want. That's all a matter of whether you are wanting to express it in the positive or the negative, but any want can be expressed in the positive or negative.

With relation to achieving things in the future, that means that we want for certain things to be achieved in the future. Pointing this out only furthers the point that I was trying to make, the only way that it furthers your point is if you are somehow suggesting that a Motivator can only be satisfied by immediate action. That's not true, though, for instance if someone wants to pay off their house and they owe $40,000 on the mortgage but do not have $40,000 at the time, but continue to make payments of $1,000/month they are still acting to satisfy the want of owning the house.

To clarify, the want itself is to commit a certain action, whereas a Motivator can be a value, want, need or anything else that you can think of. Just because a Value is a greater Motivator than a want does not mean that we do not want to take action to satisfy the value, otherwise we would not take it.

Simply stated, the person in this example WANTS to satisfy their values prior to their wants.

Further, you fail to give any serious causal or behavioral power to this second step "want" to begin with, so it cannot hope to help explain our behavior. It's this irrelevant add on, an afterthought, or an "oh yeah". It's supposed to be like this psychological rationalization, yet it is oddly applied to cases even when we not only don't recognize a want, but recognize a distinct and powerful "not want". If you expect me to put a "want" on every action anyone performs ever, contrary to their first person experience of that action, you better make a powerful argument for it and it better add some sort of explanatory coherence to that persons behavior. The fact is that it does neither. Also, if you expect to make a morality out of it, it has to effect behavior in some way, and this second step "want" clearly does not.

Are you trying to insinuate that satisfying our Motivators (or even having Motivators to begin with) does not affect our behaviour?

Once again, a not want is actually a want just expressed in the negative.

The first person experience of the action is that the person commits the action, unless there are no alternatives whatsoever but for the person to commit the action, then the person wanted to commit the action.

1. Involuntary or unconscious action

First off, define this or give examples. I'm not trying to be a smartass, but Judging from our conversation thus far I imagine that we define these two terms differently, and I want to argue from the perspective of your definition.

Because if we go with mine, I'm just going to say that nothing that we do is truly involuntary or unconscious, it is just that we are not consciously aware of the part of our brain that consciously performs the action. Do you think our hearts beat involuntarily or unconsciously? I don't, it's far too complicated of a process to take place unconsciously.

2. I am at home and I want to go out tonight, but I want to go out with a girl I met. She told me earlier in the day that she would call me. She is honest, so I am justified in believing I am going out with her tonight, I fully intend to go out with her tonight, and I want to go out with her tonight. I fall asleep waiting for her to call, she never calls, and I wake up the next morning having not gone out the night in question.

Now initially the point of attack seems to be the fact that I wanted to go out with her but never did. But the actual point to be made lays in analysis of why I stayed home. What is immediately appearant is that this is not a classic case of willed inaction, as when I stay home and do nothing because that's what I intend and want to do. It cannot be said that I wanted to do nothing that night, because that clearly wasn't what I wanted, and because I was at no point ever motivated to stay home all night to begin with. Yet, assuming your theory is true, I am forced to say either than I wanted to stay home or that I acted immorally. Niether of these answers is acceptable.

You wanted to go out with the girl, but in order for that to happen the girl had to call. She never called and you fell asleep waiting for her to call. Due to the fact that you wanted to receive her call and chose to wait for her call at home, you effectively wanted to stay at home.

In other words, because she never called you were never in a position to satisfy the Motivator of going out with her, it's like flying of your own power, you may want to do it, but it is not an option. The Motivator you were satisfying is waiting for the call, which (within the confines of your example) you either chose to do at home or had to do at home.

"Love is the gravity of the Soul" - Abstract -/-/1988 - 3/11/2013 R.I.P

Actually, now that all of the Judging and everything is said and done, I will reveal the argument Team ILO was most afraid of that I was surprised to see not come out:

Severely mentally handicapped people.

Obviously, some people are mentally handicapped to the extreme that they may not, "Want," anything in a certain sense of the word and are unable to recognize their needs, let alone fulfill them. The only argument that Team ILO could have countered with is that they do it to whatever extent that they can, but "Whatever extent that they can," coming into play pretty much means it fails to qualify as a Universal.

Anyway, I'm kind of glad that didn't come out, we pretty much knew before I had even posted that us having any chance in the Debate whatsoever depended on that not being brought up. However, with the terms of the Debate, that brought us from no chance to a slim chance, so at least it was an improvement!

"Love is the gravity of the Soul" - Abstract -/-/1988 - 3/11/2013 R.I.P

I thought it was a very interesting debate. Personally I felt that ILP did more to prove their case and impose their definition upon the debate, but I did feel the unorthodox tactics of the ILO team got them a bit out of their comfort zone. Congrats to ILP on a hard fought round and congrats to ILO on the victory.

If your abilities are merely mediocre, modesty is mere honesty; but if you possess great talents, it is hypocrisy- Schopenhauer

Not that you lied to me, but that I no longer believe you, has shaken me- Nietzsche

Yeah, ILO did astoundingly well given their task. I think everyone involved in the debate would reject a universal morality outside of the debate, so it is greatly to their credit that ILO mustered any case at all, let alone one so interesting and engaging, if ultimately unconvincing

I meant that to be my closing argument because I feel we are going in circles and there isn't much left to be said, but out of town and bored, so giddy-up.

That's all a matter of whether you are wanting to express it in the positive or the negative, but any want can be expressed in the positive or negative.

I agree, but that wasn't really the point. The point is that I can recognize myself as very distinctly not wanting to B, but end up performing B anyway. I can identify with wanting "not B" before I perform B, as I perform B, and after I perform B. I can, in accordance with normal human behavior, ask myself why in the hell I'm doing it, given how miserable it makes me, and identify the motivator as habit, value, attitude, or consistency. Yet, according to you, all motivators have this sort of second step "want" that has no efficacy, and as best I can tell isn't much more than a psychological rationalization. The problem,, as I tried to point out in my last post, is two fold. First, if someone told me I actually wanted to perform B, I would look at them like they are crazy, and tell them I was motivated by other things. Second, and closely related, is the fact that there is an equivocation involved in which this second step "want" is something different than the motivator want. I can't help but wonder what the point of this second step "want" is. It has no causal power because it is the result of motivators, I don't identify with it, and it is sufficiently ambiguous that one could interpret it as almost anything. It leads to reduced explanatory coherence and adds nothing to understanding our behavior. Yet I continue to bother to argue against it.

The best I can tell is that "you do what you want" means something completely different from what you're saying, and while I have no problem disabusing myself of the intricacies of your position, when I see that platitude I instantly identify with it because it's a catch all that includes many ideas, one of which is, you are motivated to perform actions you are motivated to perform. Something that my theory holds as true, but explores in a way that is more restrictive than simply "you do what you want".

This has become manifest in your explanation of the many examples that have come up in discussion. While they are plausible in a general way, they ultimately fail to explain the behavior involved in the narrative and miss critical nuances. For example, in response to the last scenario I gave, you wrote:

You wanted to go out with the girl, but in order for that to happen the girl had to call. She never called and you fell asleep waiting for her to call. Due to the fact that you wanted to receive her call and chose to wait for her call at home, you effectively wanted to stay at home.

In other words, because she never called you were never in a position to satisfy the Motivator of going out with her, it's like flying of your own power, you may want to do it, but it is not an option. The Motivator you were satisfying is waiting for the call, which (within the confines of your example) you either chose to do at home or had to do at home.

Now, it is immediatebly plausible because I did infact stay at home, which would suggest that I was motivated to do so and wanted to do so, but at no point in the scenario did I ever intend to stay at home But, without going into why this means I cannot possibly have been motivated to stay at home which entails, for you, that I couldn't have wanted to stay at home, something fishy emerges. You are trying to have it both ways. In that same post you go on about how future plans mean you're motivated by future wants and motivators don't have to be satisfied by immediate action.)

This should lead you to analyze my example as me trying to satisfy the motivator of going out with the girl, as you did in the mortgage example. Infact, had I gone out with the girl, this would have been how you analyzed it. I could not immediately go out with her(pay 40,000 mortgage), so I waited by the phone in order to go out with her(pay monthly). Which means that you are obliged to say that my wants changed based on weather she called or not despite the fact that I am identical in both scenarios.

The proper way to analyze it is to say that when I fell asleep and stayed home i intended to go out and wanted to go out but failed to satisfy both, and when I go out the same is true only I satisfied them. What is clear is that at no point did I want to stay home all night. Yet, since you add on this second step want you cannot put caveats onto our behavior, and end up saying, quite ridiculously, that that I wanted to stay home when I did, and wanted to go out when I did, despite the fact that I was identical in both scenarios at the point in which I fell asleep or received the phone call. It is an over simplification that leads to absurdity and fails to account for intentional complexity.

Let preachers have their heaven, give the employers hell, and take the world for the workers

I agree, but that wasn't really the point. The point is that I can recognize myself as very distinctly not wanting to B, but end up performing B anyway. I can identify with wanting "not B" before I perform B, as I perform B, and after I perform B. I can, in accordance with normal human behavior, ask myself why in the hell I'm doing it, given how miserable it makes me, and identify the motivator as habit, value, attitude, or consistency. Yet, according to you, all motivators have this sort of second step "want" that has no efficacy, and as best I can tell isn't much more than a psychological rationalization. The problem,, as I tried to point out in my last post, is two fold. First, if someone told me I actually wanted to perform B, I would look at them like they are crazy, and tell them I was motivated by other things. Second, and closely related, is the fact that there is an equivocation involved in which this second step "want" is something different than the motivator want. I can't help but wonder what the point of this second step "want" is. It has no causal power because it is the result of motivators, I don't identify with it, and it is sufficiently ambiguous that one could interpret it as almost anything. It leads to reduced explanatory coherence and adds nothing to understanding our behavior. Yet I continue to bother to argue against it.

The second step want is not always different than the Motivator want. If there is only one action necessary to satisfy the Motivator, then the second step want and the Motivator want are in fact the same thing. However, if multiple actions are necessary to satisfy the Motivator, then there are multiple second step wants involved. In other words, all the second step wants are parts of the whole, which is the Motivator.

In the course of satisfying the Motivator, you may have to undertake individual actions that when taken by themselves, you would otherwise not do or want to do. However, since these actions are necessary to satisfy the Motivator, you actually want to do what you don't want to do because if you don't, the Motivator will not be satisfied.

That's pretty much where that is, you want the effect but do not want to have to undergo the cause to make the effect happen.

The best I can tell is that "you do what you want" means something completely different from what you're saying, and while I have no problem disabusing myself of the intricacies of your position, when I see that platitude I instantly identify with it because it's a catch all that includes many ideas, one of which is, you are motivated to perform actions you are motivated to perform. Something that my theory holds as true, but explores in a way that is more restrictive than simply "you do what you want".

This has become manifest in your explanation of the many examples that have come up in discussion. While they are plausible in a general way, they ultimately fail to explain the behavior involved in the narrative and miss critical nuances. For example, in response to the last scenario I gave, you wrote:

You wanted to go out with the girl, but in order for that to happen the girl had to call. She never called and you fell asleep waiting for her to call. Due to the fact that you wanted to receive her call and chose to wait for her call at home, you effectively wanted to stay at home.

In other words, because she never called you were never in a position to satisfy the Motivator of going out with her, it's like flying of your own power, you may want to do it, but it is not an option. The Motivator you were satisfying is waiting for the call, which (within the confines of your example) you either chose to do at home or had to do at home.

Now, it is immediatebly plausible because I did infact stay at home, which would suggest that I was motivated to do so and wanted to do so, but at no point in the scenario did I ever intend to stay at home But, without going into why this means I cannot possibly have been motivated to stay at home which entails, for you, that I couldn't have wanted to stay at home, something fishy emerges. You are trying to have it both ways. In that same post you go on about how future plans mean you're motivated by future wants and motivators don't have to be satisfied by immediate action.)

This should lead you to analyze my example as me trying to satisfy the motivator of going out with the girl, as you did in the mortgage example. Infact, had I gone out with the girl, this would have been how you analyzed it. I could not immediately go out with her(pay 40,000 mortgage), so I waited by the phone in order to go out with her(pay monthly). Which means that you are obliged to say that my wants changed based on weather she called or not despite the fact that I am identical in both scenarios.

You didn't want to stay at home, but you did to try to go out with the girl. I understand your point here that because you ended up staying at home, but did not actually want to at all, the Universal Morality is unsatisfied. The point here is, you did not act in opposition to what you wanted to do by staying home because you expected for the girl to call you. You stayed home waiting for the call from the girl which is acting in accordance with your want to go out with her, but you did not forsee staying at home.

That's why the Universal Morality is that we will act in accordance with our wants (waiting for the call at home) and not that we will necessarily achieve all of our wants. (going out with the girl) This example only amounts to something that you wanted not to happening occuring due to factors out of your control. (The girl not calling)

The proper way to analyze it is to say that when I fell asleep and stayed home i intended to go out and wanted to go out but failed to satisfy both, and when I go out the same is true only I satisfied them. What is clear is that at no point did I want to stay home all night. Yet, since you add on this second step want you cannot put caveats onto our behavior, and end up saying, quite ridiculously, that that I wanted to stay home when I did, and wanted to go out when I did, despite the fact that I was identical in both scenarios at the point in which I fell asleep or received the phone call. It is an over simplification that leads to absurdity and fails to account for intentional complexity.

You never wanted to stay home, you wanted to be at home to receive her phone call. She did not call you, but that is out of your control.

"Love is the gravity of the Soul" - Abstract -/-/1988 - 3/11/2013 R.I.P