A fine WordPress.com site

Category Archives: Uncategorized

Or challenges. One version holds that morality needs to motivate everyone; another that it should not motivate anyone.
—-
Why would a theoretical contract made behind a veil of ignorance be binding”

If the veil of ignorance thing is the correct analysis of ethics, and if moral proposition X can be justified that, way then there is a chain of reasoning that justifies X which means that X is binding on rational agents, in the sense that they should assent to X, for some interpretation of “should”.

Binding is not motivation. Someone who says, “I really should do X, but I can’t be arsed today” is admitting to an obligation, and confessing to a lack of motivation to fulfil it. Akrasia is the gap between obligation and motivation.

Not all motivation is based in immediate reward. People are motivated to accept good rational arguments on the bases of status and identity. Everybody wants to be higher status, for some definition of status, and rational people are often seen as higher status, giving a lot people a certain amount of motivation accept moral claims backed by rational argument.The average person is of course not an ideal rationalist, and many other factors remain in play, not least confirmation bias. Nonetheless, moral persuasion more often takes the form of appeals to objective principles than appeals to personal interest.

So binding and motivation are not the same, which means you common claim that moral proportion are not binding (in principle) just because they are not motivating (to some specific person)

And binding and motivation are not orthogonal or disjoint: a certain moral claim can be motivating because it is binding because it is justifiable because it is true.

But motivating-ness and truth are not theme. You can’t directly refute the claim that some X is an objective moral truth by noting that noone would be motivated to act on it. It would be strange to have a set of moral truths that no one ever acts on. All other things being equal, adding motivation to the set of moral truths would be a nett gain …but all other things aren’t equal. You have to change one thing to change another.

Motivation is psychological, so one way is to use social pressures or whatever to change individual psychology. That is popular, but not, apparently, your approach.

Another way is to hold psychology constant, and change morality. Compromising on truth to achieve motivation is not an unalloyed win.it can still be nett gain.. for instance, if no one is willing to work on the 100% true morality, but willing to work on the 50% true one. But there is no nett gain for the 0% true morality, and that is the problem with ethical egoism. Caligula is extremely well motivated to behave the way he behaves, and that isn’t moral at all. Putting a label reading “this is moral” on de facto behaviour doesn’t change anything in reality, or make anything better.

Caligula is a reductio ad absurdum of the idea that motivating-ness is the only criterion for morality.

There are an endless variety of norms, each of which generates its own set of shoulds, mays and shalt-nots.

Some are opt of ional and/or localized, such as medical ethics or chess rules.The distinguishing feature of moral normativity, of morally-should is that it is binding on all sane adults.

So if there are true moral claims, and you are a sane adult, there are things you morally-should do.

That establishes, conditional in their being any morality, why you should be moral.

The argument that you should not be moral works by collapsing together several different shoulds, several different norms. If you morally-should do something, it might also be against your immediate self interest, so that you selfish-should-not. The argument continues, that, since there is a sense in which you shouldn’t do X…then you should not do X at all.

The analysis in terms of multiple norms, multiple shoulds can be seen to be correct through the existence of moral conflicts and dilemmas.
—

Therefore, an epistemic rationalist will be motivated to accept the truth of well justified moral claims.

Therefore, morality is not incompatible with rationality.

That’s about all I need to answer the challenge.

To answer some further questions:

An epistemic rationalist won’t necessarily act on a moral claim she accepts.They can be akrasic. Altruistic morality requires them to lose utility in some areas, which mayor may not be balanced out others areas. That doesn’t mean they are irrationality losing nett utility every time they act morally.

“Why would a theoretical contract made behind a veil of ignorance be binding”

If the veil of ignorance thing is the correct analysis of ethics, and if moral proposition X can be justified that, way then there is a chain of reasoning that justifies X which means that X is binding on rational agents, in the sense that they should assent to X, for some interpretation of “should”.

Binding is not motivation. Someone who says, “I really should do X, but I can’t be arsed today” is admitting to an obligation, and confessing to a lack of motivation to fulfil it. Akrasia is the gap between obligation and motivation.

Not all motivation is based in immediate reward. People are motivated to accept good rational arguments on the bases of status and identity. Everybody wants to be higher status, for some definition of status, and rational people are often seen as higher status, giving a lot people a certain amount of motivation accept moral claims backed by rational argument.The average person is of course not an ideal rationalist, and many other factors remain in play, not least confirmation bias. Nonetheless, moral persuasion more often takes the form of appeals to objective principles than appeals to personal interest.

So binding and motivation are not the same, which means you common claim that moral proportion are not binding (in principle) just because they are not motivating (to some specific person)

And binding and motivation are not orthogonal or disjoint: a certain moral claim can be motivating because it is binding because it is justifiable because it is true.

But motivating-ness and truth are not theme. You can’t directly refute the claim that some X is an objective moral truth by noting that noone would be motivated to act on it. It would be strange to have a set of moral truths that no one ever acts on. All other things being equal, adding motivation to the set of moral truths would be a nett gain …but all other things aren’t equal. You have to change one thing to change another.

Motivation is psychological, so one way is to use social pressures or whatever to change individual psychology. That is popular, but not, apparently, your approach.

Another way is to hold psychology constant, and change morality. Compromising on truth to achieve motivation is not an unalloyed win.it can still be nett gain.. for instance, if no one is willing to work on the 100% true morality, but willing to work on the 50% true one. But there is no nett gain for the 0% true morality, and that is the problem with ethical egoism. Caligula is extremely well motivated to behave the way he behaves, and that isn’t moral at all. Putting a label reading “this is moral” on de facto behaviour doesn’t change anything in reality, or make anything better.

Caligula is a reductio ad absurdum of the idea that motivating-ness is the only

1. It is hard to see how moral facts supervene on natural facts, because why would one atom bumping into another matter morally?

2. It is easy to see how moral facts supervene on facts about experience and intention. In any universe that has pain, deliberately causing pain is surely wrong

1 and 2 can only be true if 3 is true:

3. It is hard to see how facts about experience and intention supervene on favys about physics.

…which we ready knew. The relation between experience, qualia, and physics is the or a hard problem. We now can see that it’s hardness contributes to the hardness of understanding moral realism.

In fact we can make this three level structure mathematically precise: thecworlf of fact is the value free world. The world of aesthetics is the world of valuation of subjects, ie relations between entities with preferences and entities without. The world of ethics is reactions between two or more entities with preferences.

Abstract: Scientifically minded types often conclude that morality is subjective. However, moral subjectivism is not proven by the failure of moral objectivism, and has drastic flaws of its own, Whereas there are unappreciated advantages to moral objectvism and realism.

Glossary

Metaethics

Relativism

Realism

Prima Facie Case for Moral Objectvism

At first glance, morality looks as though it should work objectively. The mere fact that we praise and condemn people’s moral behaviour indicates that we think a common set of rules is applicable to us and them. Moreover, morality needs to provide the foundations of law: the rewards and punishments handed out to people are objective: someone is either in jail or not; they cannot be in jail from some perspectives and not others. Another problems is thst if ethics were relative at the subjective level anyone could get off the hook by devising a system of personal morality in which whatever they felt like doing was permissible. It would be hard to see the difference between such a state of affairs and having no morality at all. The subtler sort of subjectivist (or relativist) tries to ameliorate this problem by claiming that moral principles re defined at the societal level, but similar problems recur — a society (such as the Thuggees or Assassins) could declare that murder is Ok with them. These considerations are of course an appeal to how morality seems to work as a ‘language game’ and as such do not put ethics on a firm foundation — the language game could be groundless. I will argue that it is not, but first the other side of the argument needs to be put.

The Arguments against Realism

Argument From Descriptive Relativism

It is indisuptable that morality varies in practice across communities. But the contention of ethical objectivism is not that everyone actually does hold to a single objective sysem of ethics; it is only that ethical questions can be resolved objectively in principle. The existence of an objective solution to any kind of problem is always compatible with the existence of people who, for whatever reason, do not subscribe. The roundness of the Earth is no less an objective fact for the existence of believers in the Flat Earth theory.(It is odd that the single most popular argument for ethical subjectivism has so little logical force).

Argument from Universality

Another objection is that an objective system of ethics must be accepted by everybody, irrespective of their motivations, and must therefore be based in self-interest. Again, this gets the nature of objectivity wrong. The fact that some people cannot see does not make any visual evidence less objective, the fact that some people refuse to employ logic does not make logical argument any less objective. All claims to objectivity make the background assumption are claims to a truth that will be unserstood by, and compeeling to, individuals of a certain level of rationality.

Argument from Unsavoury Motivations

Some people insist that anyone who is promoting ethical objectivism and opposing relativism must be doing so in order to illegitamately promote their own ethical system as absolute. While this is problably pragmatically true in many cases, particularly where political and religious rhetoric is involved, it has no real logical force, because the contention of ethical objectivism is only that ethical questions are objectively resolvable in principle — it does not entail a claim that the speaker or anyone else is actually in possession of them. This marks the first of our analogues with science, since the in-principle objectivity of science coincides with the fact that current scientific thinking is almost certainly not final or absolute. ethical objectivism is thus a middle road between subjectivism/relativism on the one hand, and various absolutisms (such as religious fundamentalism) on the other.

Argument the Realism Requires Non-Physical Entities

This is the objection on that moral facts need to correspond to some kind of immaterial or non-physical ‘queer fact’ or ‘moral object’ which cannot be found.

Argument that Realism Requires an Ultimate Authority

Euthyphro: the say-so of an Ultimate Subject still isn’t Objective!

Argument from the Lack of an Object-Level Ethics

Physicalism does not require a final phsyical theory.

Argument from Circular Evaluation

Moral values do not need to be evaluated against other moral values, they can be evaluated against the values of rationality.

Argument from the Subjectivity of Value

I think there is a difference between it being objectively true that, in certain circumstances, the values of rational agents converge, and it being objectively true that those values are moral. A rational agent can do really “bad” things if the beliefs and intrinsic values on which it is acting are “bad”. Why else would anyone be scared of AI?

I don’t require their values to converge, I require them to accept the truths of certain claims. This happens in real life. People say “I don’t like X, but I respect your right to do it”. The first part says X is a disvalue, the second is an override coming from rationality.

Only rational agents, not all mindful agents, will have what it takes to derive objective moral truths. They don’t need to converge on all their values to converge on all their moral truths, because ratioanity can tell you that a moral claim is true even if it is not in your (other) interests. Individuals can value rationality, and that valuation can override other valuations.

Only rational agents, not all mindful agents, will have what it takes to derive objective moral truths. The further claim that agents will be motivated to do derive moral truths., and to act on them, requires a further criterion. Morality is about regulating behaviour in a society, So only *social* rational agents will have motivation to update. Again, they do not have to converge on values beyond the shared value of sociality.

It’s uncontrovesial that rational agents need to update, and that AIs need to self-modify. The claim that values are in either case insulated from updates is the extraordinary one. The Cipper theory tells you that you could build something like that if you were crazy enough. Since Clippers are contrived, nothing can be inferred from them about typical agents. People are messy, and can accidentally update their values when trying to do something else, For instance, LukeProg updated to “atheist” after studying Christian apologetics for the opposite reason.

Argument from Variation in Conditions.

It is unlikely that different societies would have identical ethics under different circumstances. Unlike the preceding arguments, this is a real issue.

Argument from unintuitiveness

Work you kill kittens if it was objectively the right thing to do? How could you know it was objectively right without knowing why. This objection presupposes the Tablet or Divine Command theory, where a moral truth is presented as a fait accompli. It doesn’t apply to versions of realism where rational agents are supposed to be able to arrive at and converge on moral truths by their own efforts. 8f you figure out a moral truth, you will have reason to believe it, those reasons being exactly the steps that brought you to the realisation.

Moral Objectivism based on Facts and Reason

Advantages and Disadvantages of Consequentialism

Advantages and Disadvantages of Deontology

Deontology, unlike Utilitarianism can explain why moral claims are compelling, why one should be moral. Are rational grounds sufficient to tell us what we should do, rather than what we shouldn’t? Maxims and rules.

Analogies between Natural and Moral Law

Natural laws do not correspond in a simplistic one-to-one way with any empirically detectable object, yet empiricism is relevant to both supporting and disconfirming natural laws. With this in mind, we should not rush to reject the objective reality of moral laws on the basis that there is no ‘queer’ object for them to stand in one-to-one correspondence with.

There is, therefore, a semi-detached relationship between natural laws and facts — laws are not facts but are not unrelated to facts — facts confirm and disconfirm them. There is also a famous dichotomy between fact and value (where ‘value’ covers ethics, morality etc). You cannot, we are told, derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’. This is the fact/value problem.

But, as Hume’s argument reminds us, you cannot derive a law from an isolated observation. Call this the fact/law problem. Now, if the morality is essentially a matter or ethical rules or laws, might not the fact/value problem and the law/value problem be at least partly the same ?

(Note that there seems to be a middle ground here; the English “should” can indicate lawfulness without implying either ineveitability, like a natural law, or morality. eg you “should” move the bishop diagonally in chess — but that does not mean you will, or that it is unethical to do so. It is just against the rules of chess).

Sceptics about ethical objectivism will complain that they cannot be exactly the same because moral rules like “Thou shalt not kill” contain an ‘ought’, an irreducibly ethical element. Let’s look at what sceptics about natural laws say: their complaint is that a law is not a mere collection of facts. A law cannot be directly derived from a single observation, but it is not constituted by a collection of observations, a mere historical record, either. A historical record is a mere description; it tells you what has happened, but a law tells us what will and must happen. A description gives no basis for expectation — the territory does not have to correspond to the map — yet we expect laws to be followed, if we believe in them at all.

I do not propose to answer this challenge in its own terms — that is I do not propose to show that a collection of mere facts does provide all by itself the required lawfulness. On my analysis, all individual laws depend on a general assumption — a meta-law or ur-law — that the future will follow the same general pattern as the past. The sceptic will object that this has been assumed without proof. My reply is that each individual law is tested on its own merits. Since at least some laws are thus shown to be correct a-posteriori, the lack of a-priori proof of the meta-law is not significant.

My further contention is that there is a different meta-law that needs to be posited for ethical rules. Just as someone who is engaged in the business of understanding the natural world needs a basic commitment to the idea that nature has regularities, so someone needs a basic commitment to moral behaviour in order to be convinced by ethical arguments. Ethical arguments do not and cannot be expected to convince psychopaths, any more than mathematical arguments can be expected to convice the innumerate. Whilst it is essentially correct that an evaluative conclusion cannot be drawn directly from a factual premiss, such a conclusion can be drawn with the aid of a bridging prinicple, (which is of course just our meta-law) e.g

I do not want to be murdered

I should do as I would be done by

I should not murder.

(2) is an example of a meta-law (or bridging principle or moral maxim), As ethical objectivism is a work-in-progress there are many variants, and a considerable literature discussing which is the correct one.

Advantages and Disadvantages of Consequentialism

It can supply positive goals, and provide motivation. When applied to judgements of individual actions, it leads to injustice.

Deontology and Consequentialism Reconciled.

They’re about different things.

Disadvantages of Relativism

Arbitrariness, lack of fulfillment of functional role.

Disadvantages of Realism

Ethical universalism is unikely. It is unlikely that different societies would have identical ethics under different circumstances. However, a compromise position can allow object-level ethics to vary non-arbitrarily. Strong realism is wrong, but it is not obvioulsy wronger than strong relativism. Utilitarianism does this automatically, but is disadvantageous at explaining where Ethical Compulsion comes from.

My ideas about sexual conduct are in line with my instincts. A highly religious person’s ideas about sexual conduct are in line with the instincts that society drilled into them. If I converted that person into sex-positivism, they would shed the societal conditioning and their morality and feelings would change. Who is not in alignment with their instincts?

The convertee. In my expererience, people are generally converted by arguments…reasoning…system 2. So when people are converted, they go from Instinct to Reason. But perhaps you know of some process by which subjective feelings are transferred directly, without the involvement of system 2.