Thursday, 8 August 2013

The End of El Chapo Guzman? Why STRATFOR has got it wrong.

STRATFOR has produced a
report that is now widely circulated and seems to be accepted as authoritative truth in Mexico.
"The Mythical El Chapo" was available to subscribers on STRATFOR's site beginning on AUG 1, 2013. It is also available to others as a "promo" if they are willing to sign
up for STRATFOR's monthly subscription rate ($39.99)

The STRATFOR report argues
that El Chapo is not invincible or
irreplaceable. Personally, I know of no-one who would argue with that
statement. Many of Mexico's previous "Jefe de Jefes" have
fallen by the wayside —remember Miguel Angel Feliz Gallardo and Amado Carrillo
Fuentes? But all of them were replaced, and the Mexican drug business has
continued without them.

The STRATFOR provides
little evidence and this is an opinion piece and a matter of speculation. It relies
on widely circulated reports about "challenges to El Chapo's
authority" and refers to several "battles for plazas". The
report has escalated those incidents to the point where they are presented as
evidence of El Chapo's decline. I am not convinced by the arguments
made in this report.

The Stratfor report makes
three major arguments that are reproduced in the Rio Doce report).

One argument
is that El Chapo is being
seriously challenged by los Mazatlecos.
This is true, but it is also old news. Los
Mazatlecos are a heavily armed group of sicarios headed by "El Chapo" Isidro Meza Flores (a
good English language description of him is available in Borderland
Beat http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2012/07/chapo-isidro-history.html and
several Spanish language reports are in Rio Doce at http://riodoce.mx/noticias/reportaje/la-caza-del-dos-letras
and http://riodoce.mx/noticias/reportaje/regresa-la-mochomera
). This minor "Shorty" has terrorized the north of Sinaloa for
a few years now and has variously operated in the service of the Beltran-Leyvas
as hitmen for hire, as armed allies working with Los Zetas to disrupt trade
routes along both highway 15 and highway 24, and sometimes just acting as local
thugs and bullies following their own agenda of repaying personal grudges and
violence.

STRATFOR has not provided
any evidence that Los Mazatlecos have made inroads beyond those that it
achieved two years ago. And STRATFOR has not provided any evidence that Los Mazatlecos have learned how to function
as a well-oiled organization. All evidence from Sinaloa suggests that Los Mazatlecos are brutal, dangerous,
heavily armed, frightening and bothersome – but there is little evidence that
they are anything more than a band of thugs operating in the long tradition of roving
bandits in the Sierra Madre of the Golden Triangle. They are a definite pain in
the ass for the powerful El Chapo,
but they won't be the group that replaces his powerful organization.

Another argument made in
the STRATFOR report is that the Cartel de
Jalisco Nueva Generacion (CJNG) is the major threat to El Chapo in Jalisco.
The report also suggests that this threat emerged out of a "betrayal"
of a CJNG leader by El Chapo. Again, this is old news and although the CJNG has
created serious organized disruptions in Guadalajara, they were also quick to
"back off" in the face of government displays of power.

As is the case with los Mazatlecos, there is no real
hard-core evidence that they are structurally organized to the point where they
represent a real threat to the "hegemonic" control of Joaquin El
Chapo Guzman Loera's dominion. There's no evidence that the CJNG have the
international reach (Guatemala, Costa Rica, Honduras, Latin America) that has
been carefully maintained by El Chapo (the same argument holds for Los
Mazatlecos). Where's the structure behind the threat of CJNG? Where's the
organization that makes them anything more than a local group of thugs? Where's
the reach beyond Jalisco? Where's the support from other challengers? None of
this is addressed in the STRATFOR report.

The third argument made
by STRATFOR is that it's too early to write off Los Zetas after the capture of
Miguel Angel Treviño Morales. Who hasn't said this? Who would disagree? One
valuable part of this STRATFOR report is its description of how Los Zetas have
organized along different lines (vertical) than the Sinaloa cartel (horizontal).
This part of the article and report is a nice summary and that is undoubtedly
accurate. In fact, STRATFOR's main strength over the past few years has been its
ability "to correctly describe the threat and structure of the Gulf Cartel
and Los Zetas". On the other hand, STRATFOR has always been on shakier
grounds when it describing the strength, power and organization of the Sinaloa
cartel.

And STRATFOR's
"lesser-understanding" of the Sinaloa cartel is likely the reason
that they were willing to publish a report as speculative as this. All evidence
suggests that the powers that be in Mexico (from los Pinos down) would prefer
to work with the Sinaloa cartel and its leaders. The Sinaloa cartel has a
proven track record and business model, they generate profits, they share with
others (albeit through corruption), and they cause less trouble for the State
and make less noise than Los Zetas, Los Templarios, Los Mazatlecos, or the CJNG. The noise and disruption associated with
those groups (violence, dismembered bodies, blockades, notorious kidnappings)
makes it more difficult for Enrique Peña Nieto to convince the international
community that Mexico is back on track and that Mexico is a country of the
future. Does anyone really think that Enrique Peña Nieto and the economists of
PRI will allow the "cowboy cartels" to replace El Chapo.

Or to put it more succinctly.
Sure, El Chapo may eventually go and he may be replaceable, but the Sinaloa
cartel and its structure are rock-solid and not threatened by Los Mazatlecos or
the CJNG. His replacement is likely to come from within.

Beltran Leyvas: brothers and childhood friends of Joaquin Guzman. Broke with him after the arrest of El Mochomo Beltran Leyva and engaged in a bloody dispute for territory. Relocated to Nuevo Leon in aftermath

Cuerno de chivo: AK-47, the preferred weapon of drug cartels. Some (e.g. Roberto Saviano) have claimed that the AK-47 has been used to kill more people than any other weapon. 90% of arms used in Mexico originate from the United States and arms dealers in Arizona and Texas.

DTO: Drug trafficking organization

El Señor de los Cielos: Amado Carrillo Fuentes, the Lord of the Skies who helped consolidate the Juárez cartel. He died in 1997 undergoing plastic surgery in Mexico City (Polanco).

encobijado: a common way that sicarios dispose of bodies — wrapped in a blanket, rug, or tarpaulin and taped.

Familia (la): 'de Michoacan'. DTO that specializes in synthetic drugs (crystal) and with a religious code. Extremely violent and unpredictable.

FFL: US legal term for federal firearms licensees. Approximately 6700 operate in American Southwest

guachicol: oil product stolen from PEMEX and then sold back to business under duress. A practice common in Tamaulipas

halcon (los): There are two meanings here. In the border area, "halcones" are lookouts and street level informants (falcons) who warn the drug cartels about intrusions from other DTO's, police or army manoeuvers. Halcones are also an elite squad of commandos that have a notorious reputation for violation of civil rights and abuse.

hormiga (el correo de..): an ant run. Big result of lots of little additions and purchases.

Jefe de Jefes: Capo de Capos. The name applied to the most prominent drug chief in Mexico. Most frequently is associated with Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo. Popular corrido of Los Tigres del Norte, although Miguel Felix Gallardo denies that the song is about him.

Levantón (m): Abduction. Term used in northwest Mexico to describe forced seizure of a person. Most of the time, the "levantado" is never seen alive again. Secuestro is the term used more often to describe kidnapping

Linces (los): a unit of sicarios employed by "El Viceroy" Vicente Carrilo-Fuentes and the Juárez cartel. May have evolved from "La Linea". This group is apparently composed of military deserters (like the Zetas) who are well trained, use military ordnance, uniforms and vehicles. The Mexican military argues that this group is responsible for most human right violations in Chihuahua.

linea (la): sicarios in employ of Juarez DTO.

Matapolicia (f): bullets of heavy calibre that can penetrate vests. Police killers — ordnance used when attacking police or members of the military.

Matazetas (los): a name used by a group that has executed members of Los Zetas. It's most likely that the matazetas are members of a rival cartel, but it's possible that they are actually an independent group.

Maña: a local name for cartels in Tamaulipas, most often used to refer to Los Zetas or other sicarios working for Gulf cartel

Mota (f): marijuana.

Narcocorrido: a version of a corrido that deals with a drug theme. Some narcocorridos are commissioned by the drug dealers in order to "sing their praises", but others share much in common with morality plays because they sing about the negative consequences of drug dealing. See the excellent book by Elijah Wald describing narcocorridos.

Narcofosa: narco cemetery; body disposal place, usually clandestine and used for a period of time. Have been found in at least 8 Mexican states.

Narcomanta (f): a banner or a poster placed in a prominent location with a message. Most frequently, the messages seem to originate with the drug organizations, but the message may also be aimed at the drug trafficking organizations.

Ni-Ni (alt: ninis): ni estudia ni trabaja — not studying or working, approximately 7 million young Mexicans who also represent a pool of disposable labour for narcos. See http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2010/01/12/index.php

Operation Coronado: The code term for the DEA/FBI/ICE coordinated arrest of La Famila de Michoacana members on Oct. 24 2009

Pelones (los): sicarios that were originally assembled by the Beltran Leyva brothers for the Sinaloa Federation

Perico (m): cocaine. A parrot. Nickname based on the idea that it "goes up the nose".

pez gordo (m.): big fish, big boss

PGR: La Procuraduria General de la Republica. The institutional agency of the Mexican Attorney General (

pista (f): the 'game'. Literally, 'the track' as in racing. Refers to the business at hand.

Plaza (f): Territory, turf. Can also refer to the product being moved or in dispute.

PROCAMPO: Federal program to provide financial support for farmers and ejiditarios. Recent revelations indicate that it has been a cash-cow for agribusiness and PRI party members. Little of the original program (to provide irrigation etc.) has benefitted the poorest farmers.

Project Gunrunner: US DOJ and ATF plan to disrupt illegal flow of guns from US into Mexico.

rematar: literally "to re-kill". the prefix re is used to indicate "once again" when it precedes a verb. rematar is used when a means of execution is especially brutal, and also used to mean "slaughter", "finish off"

Sicario (m): the word used to describe an "assasin" or hitman for the cartels. The word has roots back to Roman times. Sicarios are sometimes young and "throw-away" bodies recruited by the cartels, but can also be well-trained military deserters or police (e.g. Los Zetas).

Google Translate

Short Reading List: Cartels and Violence

Astorga, Luis. 1999. "Drug Trafficking in Mexico: A First Assessment." in Management of Social Transformations: MOST Discussion Paper 36: UNESCO-MOST.

—. 2002. "The Field of Drug Trafficking in Mexico." Pp. 54—75 in Globalization, Drugs and Criminalization: Final Research Report on Brazil, China, India and Mexico, edited by UNESCO — MOST: UNESCO.

—. 2002. "The Social Construction of the Identify of the Trafficker." Pp. 52-72 in Globalization, Drugs and Criminalization: Final Research Report on Brazil, China, India and Mexico, edited by UNESCO — MOST: UNESCO.

Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Peace Corps Narcotics and Terrorism. 1997. "The drug cartels and narco-violence : the threat to the United States : hearing before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps, Narcotics, and Terrorism of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate,." Pp. iii, 77 p., edited by United States. Congress. Senate. Caucus on International Narcotics Control. Washington: U.S. G.P.O. : For sale by the U.S. G.P.O., Supt. of Docs., Congressional Sales Office.

Edberg, Mark Cameron. 2004. El narcotraficante : narcocorridos and the construction of a cultural persona on the U.S.-Mexico border. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Wald, Elijah. 2001. Narcocorrido : a journey into the music of drugs, guns, and guerrillas. New York, NY: Rayo.

Images from Culiacan

Download?

Some comments are available on SCRIBD.

Los Jardines de Humaya

There's a popular expression in Sinaloa — "Mejor vivir 10 años como un güey que vivir 40 años como un büey". It's better to live 10 years as a good old boy than 40 years as a donkey.
Death comes early to those who enter the narcotraffic business, and they celebrate by building elaborate crypts for their remains. Architects and skilled artisans have been employed to build some of the most modern funereal designs seen anywhere in the world. How else will the world know you were a big shot?
The link http://www.scribd.com/doc/15690361/Narco-Campo-Santo-Los-Jardines-del-Humaya-Culiacan opens a SCRIBD pdf file which is a slide show of images from the Cemetery of the Narcos in Culiacan.
It is a large file with little comment.
Also recommended is a view of Culiacan written by Magali Tercero and published in Letras Libres - "Culiacán, el lugar equivocado" por Magali TerceroLETRASLIBRES.COM