Rives (U. S. and Mexico, ii, 172–3) decides roundly against Frémont, and cites for support a letter from the prefect to Larkin demanding the reason for Frémont's movements; but it was perfectly in accord with Mexican methods that such a letter should have been written purely to satisfy the authorities at Mexico.

Gillespie took to Frémont a letter of introduction from Buchanan and letters from Frémont's father-in-law, Senator Benton. The former was entirely non-committal; and the latter, while very likely they contained veiled allusions to conversations in which the desire of the administration to acquire California had been mentioned, must have been like it in that respect, else Gillespie would not have dared to carry them through Mexico.

3. The evidence on this point, including Frémont's positive statements made not long after the event, is conclusive (Polk, Diary, March 21, 1848; Senate Report 75; 30, 1, pp. 13, 32; 132Benton, Feb. 18, 1848; Ho. Report 817; 30, 1, p. 4; 52Larkin to P. Pico, July 5, 1846. Speaking in the Senate, April 10, 1848 (Cong. Globe, 30, 1, p. 604), Benton, though feeling extremely bitter toward Polk and no doubt fully informed by his son-in-law and client regarding all the facts, did not intimate that any instructions inconsistent with the instructions of Larkin were sent to Frémont. Indeed he stated the contrary. See also his Thirty Years View, ii, 689.

4. Frémont stated before a committee of the Senate that he had learned from Bancroft that Polk's plan, in case of war, contemplated the occupation of California; but Frémont wrote to Capt. Montgomery of the Portsmouth, June 16, 1846, that even in the case of war he was not expected to prosecute "active hostilities." In 1886 Bancroft stated that Gillespie was to inform Frémont of the President's intentions.

5. First, many of the settlers had ample reasons to feel alarmed: the illegality of their presence; Castro's sudden and cruel seizure of Americans in 1840; his attack upon Frémont in violation (the Americans believed) of a promise; official notices, issued about May 1, to the effect that the majority of the Americans were liable to be expelled at the convenience of the authorities; Castro's warlike preparations; his talk of moving against the immigrants with armed forces (52Larkin, no. 42, April 17); and reports, more or less authentic and reliable, from various persons regarding what he said or intended. Secondly, the contemporary testimony of Frémont, Gillespie and other Americans-some of it given under oath-that alarm was actually felt is too strong to be rejected (see note 6). Much has been made of Bidwell, a clerk of Sutter's, who tells us that alarm was not felt. But (1) his 123Statement was made thirty years after the events; (2) he admits that he was not on good terms with Frémont, and the Statement aims to show that Frémont invented the story of alarm as an excuse for his conduct; (3) his Statement is in other respects clearly inaccurate; (4) it assumes that he knew the sentiments of all the persons on the Sacramento, yet proves that an important fact may have been known to but few; (5) it shows that at the critical time he was absent in the mountains; (6) it says, "Californians were always talking of expelling Americans" [and therefore were talking of it in April, 1846]; (7) his book mentions that in 1845 an attack upon New Helvetia was so confidently expected that he rode day and night to warn Sutter; (8) he undertakes to disprove positive testimony with negative. The legitimate settlers had no direct occasion to feel alarmed; but, as Bidwell himself points out, they could not have held aloof, had an attempt been made to expel their fellow-countrymen. It would be a mistake to suppose that the Americans who joined Frémont in these operations were actuated solely by patriotism and the idea of self-defence.

7. As Sloat was in personal intercourse with Gillespie about Feb. 20–22, he probably learned from him something more about the intentions of our government.

8. 48Oct. 17, 1845, Bancroft wrote to Sloat, "In the event of actual hostilities between the Mexican Government and our own," you will carry out "the instructions [of June 24] forwarded to you from the Dept. in view of such a contingency." Rives (U. S. and Mexico, ii, 168) draws a sharp distinction between the "actual hostilities" of this order and the "declaration of war" of June 24. But (1) Bancroft said, Oct. 17, "actual hostilities" [not between forces in the field but] between the two governments; and (2) in his last quoted words above he indicated that the two orders contemplated precisely the same [not, as Rives holds, a different] contingency. As, therefore, the order of June 24 was the formal and fundamental one, Sloat had a technical ground for falling back upon it, whereas an officer of broad, clear views, decided character and unselfish loyalty would have acted more promptly, even at a slight personal risk. To do him justice, the reader should recall that many Senators refused to believe that the border hostilities were hostilities between the two governments (p. 182); and also that Sloat was old and not robust, and that he had the case of T. A. C. Jones before his eyes.

9. We find both July 1 and 2 given as the date of his arrival. The log book of his vessel says that she anchored at Monterey July 1, and that Larkin came aboard July 2. As he would have gone aboard as soon as possible, it seems probable that the vessel arrived July 1 at night.

10. Capt. Mervine wrote, July 6, to Capt. Montgomery that Larkin believed Castro, Pico and others would meet the following day to deliberate about declaring independence and hoisting the American flag.

11. Sloat stated later that he acted on his own responsibility in taking possession of California; and in fact the orders of May 13 did not reach their destination until about August 28 (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 229).

12. It has been said (Bancroft, Pacific States, xvii, 250) that Sloat merely pretended to have based his action on Frémont's operations, so as to have a way of escape should he be blamed; but (1) we should not without evidence accuse him of lying, (2) he showed strong feeling when he learned that Frémont had acted without authority (e.g. Baldridge, Days of 1846; Sen. 33; 30, 1, p. 178), and (3) as a rational man he could not fail to be influenced greatly. Bancroft says (ibid., 227) that Sloat learned from Larkin that Frémont's co?peration with the insurgents was not certain; but he admits (ibid., 228–9) that on July 5 a launch from the Portsmouth, then lying at San Francisco, brought proof that Frémont was so doing; and the next day Sloat and Larkin, according to the log book of the Savannah, were busy preparing the proclamation, etc. Royce (California, 158) places against Frémont's testimony (that Sloat said his action had resulted from Frémont's) the fact that Larkin did not so state; but silence is not equal in strength to assertion, and Frémont is supported by Gillespie (Sen. Report 75; 30, 1, p. 32), by Wilson of the Savannah (ibid., 41), by Sloat's private secretary (Baldridge, Days of 1846), by Sloat's anxiety to obtain Frémont's co?peration, and by the resentment that he exhibited on finding that Frémont had acted without authority (Sen. 33; 30, 1, p. 178). See also Benton, Abr. Deb., xvi, 17.

13. August 27, 1846, 12Seymour wrote to the Admiralty: "My principal object has been, for many months, to be at hand to prevent or retard it [the American occupation of California], if I should be directed to take any proceedings for these purposes." It was presumably to wait for orders that he placed himself at San Blas. What led him to sail for Monterey, however, as he did on June 14, was not Sloat's leaving Mazatlán, but news that the Santa Barbara convention was likely to declare for independence (13Seymour to Bankhead, June 13). Had that been done, he would have felt that he had a ground on which to oppose American occupation, though he thought that a large body of reliable colonists would be necessary to establish British ascendancy (12Id., Aug. 27). When he arrived at Monterey he was aware that the United States and Mexico were at war, and this was in his opinion an additional reason for inaction (12Id., Aug. 27); but he wrote to Pico that American occupation should be regarded as merely provisional (12to Pico, July 23). Sir Thomas Johnson, commanding a British sloop-of-war off Mazatlán, showed his sympathies by constantly giving the Mexicans information about our vessels (76Gutiérrez, Apr. 8, 1846, res.).

14. Sloat also guaranteed land titles. This was impracticable. In annexing California he exceeded his authority.

16. Stockton sailed from Norfolk on the Congress in October, 1845. Some mystery has been attached to his sealed orders (Bancroft, Pacific States, xvii, 251); but they were merely to sail via the Sandwich Islands for Monterey, deliver the original of the despatch of October 17 to Larkin, and then join Sloat's squadron. For his character see e.g. Royce, California, 179; 330Taylor to brother, January 19, 1848; 108Appleton to Bancroft, April 27, 1847; Porter, Kearny, 6, 7; Sherman, Home Letters, 108; Quincy, Figures, 230–40.

17. One aim of the proclamation was doubtless to provide a way of escape for the United States and its agents in case there should be no war, but even from this point of view it was ridiculous. Sloat repudiated the reasons for his action that were ascribed to him by Stockton.

18. Castro and the Californians generally did not believe that war had been declared, and of course Larkin's letter to Stearns tended to confirm their opinion. Had it proved correct, Stockton would soon have been making apologies like T. A. C. Jones. This may help to explain Castro's firm attitude. The Life of Stockton attempts to explain his haughty and menacing language as due to Castro's military preponderance and the necessity of intimidating him. Stockton himself said later that, as Castro had no authority from the central government to make terms, it would have been useless to treat with him; but Castro could have laid down his arms, and that was the vital point just then. Stockton's other reasons (Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1041–2) are equally unsatisfactory. Bancroft (Pacific States, xvii, 269) expresses the belief that Stockton did not wish to make terms with Castro and the other officials, but to eliminate them. This is quite possible. Probably temperament and thirst for glory counted. Stockton's pretence (in his reply to Castro) that since the two countries were at war, he could not suspend hostilities until Castro should raise the American flag, was absurd. Truces have often been made during war, and never during peace. This was enough-especially as it came after Larkin's overture-to show Castro he could expect nothing from Stockton.

19. 76Later Castro complained bitterly that after forsaking all for Mexico he had to beg for bread.

21. In a proclamation of October 1 Flores charged that the Americans were dictating "arbitrary and despotic laws" and crushing the people with exactions intended to ruin them. His aim was announced as the expulsion of the Americans. All Mexicans and Californians 15–60 years old, not joining the insurgents, were declared to be traitors and under penalty of death. All Americans acting directly or indirectly against the insurgents were to lose their property and be sent into Mexico as prisoners. It cannot be denied that many Californians, especially in the north, had been deprived of their property-particularly horses and saddles-by Frémont's men in the name of the United States, and that many had suffered personal abuse (Sen. 33; 30, 1; pp. 97, etc.; Ho. Report, 817; 30, 1; Sen. Report 75; 30, 1; Colton, Three Years, 155). Colton estimated that in all 1200 Californians were in arms at one time.

22. Flores charged that Gillespie violated the terms and Gillespie denied this vigorously. Gillespie seems to have interpreted the terms, which were loosely drawn, with a view to the advantage of his side, and Flores to have judged largely, if not entirely, from what he supposed to be Gillespie's intentions. We have not sufficient data to say more. A misunderstanding was very natural, and possibly Gillespie, since he was dealing with perjured men, thought it right to take every advantage he could. Flores sent parties to San Diego and Santa Barbara, and captured those places. Capt. Merritt of the California Battalion, commanding at the former place, took refuge on a whale-ship. Lieut. Talbot, commanding at Santa Barbara, refused to surrender, and with his eight or ten men made an extremely brave escape through the mountains.

23. At this point Mervine's log book was extremely bitter with reference to Stockton, whom it described as vain, selfish, cowardly, false and ignorant of naval life and duties. The Captain was doubtless smarting under his repulse, due (he asserted) to Stockton's selfishness in retaining all his field pieces. Stockton explained his going to San Diego by saying that San Pedro was not a good base, and there was force in this view; but it was much nearer to Los Angeles, and certainly he should have decided whether it was a good base before attempting to use it as such. San Diego had been recovered by Merritt and others (Proceeds. U. S. Naval Instit., 1888, p. 544). Lieut. Minor of the navy now commanded there.

Including servants and quartermaster's men, Kearny probably had at least 150; but precisely how many took part in the fighting one cannot say-perhaps not more than 80. Some of the men had to guard the baggage and manage the howitzers, and probably others did not reach the front in time. The howitzers were tied up with rawhide; when made ready they could not fire at first because the two parties were mixed in a hand-to-hand struggle; and when they were preparing to do so later, one was carried away by frightened mules and captured by the enemy. Botello, who talked with Pico after the fight, says that Pico was afraid forces from San Diego would attack him, should he continue to operate against Kearny, and also that Pico's horses were now too much exhausted to be serviceable. 207Griffin thought the Californians drew off to make sure of keeping the howitzer. It seems clear that Pico did not retire from fear of Kearny-unless possibly from fear of his guns. Dec. 7 Kearny advanced a short distance, drove some Californians from a rocky hill near San Bernardo, and occupied it. In the night of Dec. 10–11 Lieut. Gray and about 215 men from San Diego reinforced him. Lieut. Beale of the navy and the scout Christopher ("Kit") Carson made their way past the enemy with remarkable courage and endurance, to inform Stockton of Kearny's desperate situation, and arrived just as Gray was setting out.

25. The troops were all on foot except Gillespie's men. Stockton had two 9-pounders and four smaller pieces.

26. Only six shells were captured with the howitzer at San Pascual, and owing to its construction the gun could use no other ammunition. Flores reported that he had also a 6-pounder, a 3-pounder, and a 2-pounder (76Mar. 31).

28. Frémont's methods were unscrupulous. He promised the men large pay, and took horses, saddles, etc., where he could get them (Sen. Report 75; 30, 1, particularly Wilson, p. 42). Probably he intended to pacify the owners later by paying liberally. Apparently one must accept the explanation of his policy proposed in the text, or ascribe to him a tenderness not suggested by his choice of a profession and his conduct in June, or accuse him-as did many at the time-of a cowardice that would explain, after all, only a part of the facts.

29. It is particularly singular that Frémont did not use the Savannah to communicate with Stockton.

30. The reports of Flores show that Frémont's approach embarrassed the insurgents. Frémont now had six guns. January 10 Kearny wrote a note to Frémont stating that the Americans were entering Los Angeles.

31. For later events see chap. xxxi. Disturbances, resulting partly from the insurrection in the south and partly from depredations committed by Americans, occurred in the north. Monterey was threatened, and some fighting occurred near San Francisco Bay; but those who had taken up arms to protect their property gladly laid them down (about the time Stockton entered Los Angeles) when satisfied there would be no more plundering, and the treaty of Cahuenga quieted those still acting in sympathy with Flores. (See particularly Colton, Three Years, 73–6, 86, 152, 155, 158, 170; Bancroft, Pacific States, xvii, 378–383; 10Aram, statement; 4Amador, memorias, 175; Aldrich, Marine Corps, 95.) During these troubles Larkin was made a prisoner, and but for the fear of reprisals might have suffered severely for what the Californians regarded as double-dealing. Just before leaving California Flores released him. (See particularly 52Larkin, no. 63, January 14, 1847; Bryant, What I Saw, 361; 263Mervine to Frémont, Nov. 21.)

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