England Overview

Note: As usual, this is way too long, and probably boring. But I wanted to be comprehensive, and give more than “The US needs to stop Rooney.” This is meant as a look at the England attack, not necessarily as a preview of June 12th. Finally, though this is quite different, it still stands on the shoulders of what Jonathan Wilson and Zonal Marking have written. Hope you enjoy.

Rooney. Gerrard. Lampard. Ferdinand. The names haven’t changed since England lost their only competitive match at Wembley two years ago, crumpling against Croatia in the rain. The result left them out of Euro 2008, sealing Steve McLaren’s fate in the process. Since then, however, the squad has undergone nothing short of a transformation, due in no small part to Fabio Capello, the celebrated Italian manager making his first foray into the international game.

Beyond repairing the squad’s damaged psyche in the summer of 2008, Capello inherited a side that was fraught with tactical dilemma. First and foremost, he needed to solve the puzzle in midfield, conjuring a solution that would allow for Steven Gerrard and Frank Lampard to co-exist. Second, he needed to fully harness the mercurial talent of Wayne Rooney, a matter that had less to do with Rooney himself than it did with finding an ideal partner up front.

With Capello pondering the issues that had lingered for nearly six years, England could find solace in a relatively mild qualifying group (Croatia and Ukraine being the competition of note, supplemented by Andorra, Belarus and Kazakhstan). To their credit, they left very little to the imagination, dropping points only in Kiev, where an experimental lineup took the pitch against the Ukrainians with qualification having been secured. In a dose of irony fit for a London stage, England announced its re-arrival in European with an annihilation of the same Croatia team—in Zagreb, no less—that had caused so much pain just a year prior.

Tactically, Capello’s great innovation was advertised as sending Gerrard out to the left wing, leaving Lampard back in the center of midfield. The truth, however, is that he simply took the reigns off the Liverpool man. While Gerrard offers an array of talents, positional discipline has never been mistaken for one. It’s not a slight—there are only a handful of players in the world that possess his ability to find dangerous positions across the pitch.

While starting on the left side, Gerrard was given the freedom to roam throughout the final third of the pitch, interchanging mainly with Wayne Rooney in the middle. Lampard took on the role of a deep-lying playmaker, partnering alongside Gareth Barry, who assumed the holding midfield role.

With Gerrard secured on the left side, Capello focused his attention on the front line—specifically, how to get the best out of Wayne Rooney. The fundamental issue was whether to partner Rooney with another forward at the top, or play with a sole striker, allowing Rooney to drop back further towards the midfield. On top of it all, Capello needed to determine who the second forward should be, picking from a lot that included Emile Heskey, Jermaine Defoe and Peter Crouch. With the problem unsolved, Cappello continued to tinker with the lineup and formation throughout the campaign.

Qualifying

With Gerrard missing from the first handful of qualifiers due to injury, England lined up in a 4-4-2 against Andorra and Croatia, only to evolve into a 4-3-3 against Kazakhstan. It was only against Belarus in October that Gerrard, now recovered, made his debut on the left. A temporary modification to a 4-2-3-1 resulted in a stuttering victory over Ukraine at Wembley in April, with Rooney dropping back to play centrally, complemented by Walcott/Lennon to his right and Gerrard to his left.

So it would be for England during the remaining qualifiers and friendlies, with Capello never quite settling on a preferred option. The man who best partnered with Rooney was Heskey, who created space, linked well, and occupied defenders, allowing Rooney and Gerrard to thrive. Yet the big man offers little in the way of scoring, having notched just 7 goals in 58 games for England.

Conversely, Jermaine Defoe and Peter Crouch were far more dangerous in front of goal, but their styles weren’t conducive to playing a complementary, workmanlike role. Further muddying the waters was Heskey’s inability to crack the starting XI in a mediocre Aston Villa side, leading to questions about form and fitness.

By and large, England looked at it’s best in the 4-4-2, with Rooney and Heskey pairing together up top, and games were consistently put out of reach before the hour mark. The formation was also showcased in, arguably, their finest team effort in years, the 5-1 demolition of Croatia at Wembley that assured qualification. The 4-2-3-1, by contrast, produced a stuttering win over Ukraine at Wembley, secured through a John Terry header on 85 minutes, along with wins over group doormats Andorra and Kazakhstan, and the lone loss, away to Ukraine.

Ironically, the team selection changed very little, regardless of the formation. It’s also curious that Rooney’s tendency to drop back to receive the ball often made it appear that England were in a 4-2-3-1 anyways. Yet all the analysis in the world could do little to change the reality that England were simply more fluid with Rooney and Heskey together up top.

As England close in on June 12th, Capello has yet to settle the issue definitively. Does he send Heskey out, knowing that Rooney is at his best with the rugged target man by his side? Or does he call on Crouch or Defoe, who play very different roles, but at least offer the viable scoring threat that Heskey lacks. It seems likely that the lumbering Heskey will get the call against the United States, with Crouch and Defoe the likely options off the bench if goals are needed.

Key Factors & Flow of Play

For all the talk about Capello’s dilemmas, however, England ran ram shod through the competition in qualifying, putting in 34 goals in ten games—tops in Europe (compared to the 24 goals in 12 games during the Euro 2008 qualifying round). The newfound offensive fluidity hinges on three main factors:

Rooney – His ability to find the back of the net is perhaps surpassed by his indomitable spirit and determination to simply outwork everyone else on the pitch. Like Gerrard, he seems to pop up everywhere, usually at the precisely the right moment. Perhaps the greatest testament to his to his importance is the simple fact that Emile Heskey found his way to South Africa. Though flexible, he tends to drift between the left touchline and the center of the pitch, and feasted throughout qualifying on balls played in from the right side.

The Gerrard/Lampard Axis – While neither is in their preferred position, Capello has at least found roles for both that from which they can be individually effective, certainly to a far greater extent than when they were paired together at the heart of midfield. That partnership appeared to leave them unsure of assignments, with their mutual strengths more often stifling than complementing one another. While the underrated Lampard lurks in a deeper lying position, Gerrard serves as the quarterback, starting from his spot out wide before moving in to link with Rooney.

The Flanks – If you’re searching for an unlikely hero for England come Saturday, look no further then Glen Johnson. Johnson and Ashley Cole, the left back, have terrorized opposing defenses from the wings. Far more than simply moving past the centerline, they attack the 18-yard box, often appearing in the spots you’d expect to see the wide midfielders. It’s often Johnson who has one of the final touches on the ball before an England goal, and with he and Aaron Lennon combining on the right wing, Carlos Bocanegra will have his hands full.

If specific questions regarding the frontline remain, the English offense has by and large settled on a defined shape and motion. As opposed to years past, when the attack was forced up the middle to accompany Gerrard and Lampard (going out wide only to find David Beckham), the offense now moves through Gerrard on the left, who typically receives the ball tucked just inside of the left touchline.

From here, Gerrard is presented with three main options. With the aforementioned Cole marauding forward from his position in defense, Gerrard can play the overlap, leaving Cole to charge towards the right back before playing a ball in (causing, as Jonathan Wilson notes, England to be left with an asymmetrical shape). Towards the middle of the pitch, Gerrard can link with Rooney, who tends to drop quite deep at the beginning of possession. His final option is to switch the field to either Johnson or Lennon on the right side.

When the ball is played to Cole, Gerrard will stay on the left side, drifting to the corner of the 18-yard box. Played to Rooney, and Gerrard will look for space centrally. If it’s Lennon or Johnson that he picks out, he’ll start to lurk towards the net, inevitably arriving at the back post, with Rooney in the middle and Heskey off ensuring he simply doesn’t get in the way.

Once the offense has moved to the right side, the action truly begins. It’s not just the ability of Cole and Johnson to be involved in the offensive build-up that makes them dangerous—it’s that they have the confidence, skill, and encouragement to attack in the final third. It’s rare to see either whip a ball into the box from the far touchline. Instead, they look to take the ball to the edge of the box and pick out one of Rooney, Gerrard, or Lampard coming from deep. Time and time again, the play unfolds in this manner, and the result is a tremendous amount of pressure on the fullbacks and wing defenders.

Let’s look at the match versus Croatia at Wembley. In the first image, Gerrard receives the ball on the left side. Ashley Cole, in the red circle, immediately takes off down the sideline, presenting Gerrard with his first option. Instead, he crosses over to Johnson.

The second image is of a similar play minutes later. Rooney has tracked back to link up, with Heskey wandering wide. Gerrard again sends it wide to Lennon. You can see Rooney and Heskey immediately starting their runs into the box, with Gerrard to shortly follow in the third frame. Lennon picks out Gerrard at the far post, and its 2-0 England after 14 minutes.

The next image, taken from the destruction of Andorra, shows England perfectly lined up for a Johnson cross into the box. Once again, the play came from Gerrard on the left, through Lennon. Rooney makes his run, Johnson puts in a perfect ball, and Rooney puts in his second.

The constant switching from side to side often leaves the middle of the pitch exposed, where Lampard and Barry can move from the back and put themselves in dangerous spots just outside the box. The last image is what the England offense, early on in possession, will look like against the (likely) American defense. I’ve taken a few liberties with Edu and Holden in the lineup, but the names don’t much matter.

It seems silly to think that on a star-studded lineup, it’s Glen Johnson and Aaron Lennon that could provide the difference. And yet, they just may. I’ve included a few more diagrams of the typical English attack, since the screen images from games can be difficult to see.

7 Responses

Well written and very perceptive. It’s long been the case that Gerrard and Rooney were our two genuinely world class talents and the beauty of Gerrard in the (nominally) left sided role is that it seems to get the best out of both of them. A lot of people over here say simply bring in someone like wright phillips or joe cole on the left and push Gerrard up into an out and out attacking role just behind Roonaldo – we have seen glimpses of how well that could work from his relationship with Torres at Liverpool, where he’s effectively played up front. But I agree that we always seem to have gotten the best from Rooney alongside Heskey, which is the only reason for that cretin’s selection – the likes of Darren Bent with 20 plus league goals this season have good reason to be bitter about it. For me the great shame is that Dean Ashton was forced to retire this season – a forward much like Heskey except he was capable of scoring goals, he would have been the perfect foil. As I metioned before, the fitness of Barry is key. Without him, I fear we will see Gerrard back in a more traditional central midfield role alongisde Lampard, and that has simply never worked.
And I agree about Johnson, a great performer for us recently, and of course little Lennon who if he is on song could be a revelation in this world cup. We have some incredibly dangerous players, whether they perform as a cohesive unit is, as always, another matter. Not since Euro 96 has an England team played to its potential in a major tournament. They just choke under the weight of a deranged public’s fevered expectations.

there is a lot of good insight here and the assessment of england’s probable tactics is perhaps worryingly accurate. there are two things about england that concern me ahead of the tournament: firstly the fact that capello has the aura of early-era sven goran eriksson and second that glen johnson has no idea how to defend.
capello has convinced everyone he is a great tactical genius and master motivator on the basis of a couple of impressive qualifying matches against teams on the wane – just as sven did. i have little confidence in his capacity to outsmart a well-drilled, relaxed in possession side like france, netherlands, spain, brazil, argentina…
glen johnson has no positional awareness and cannot tackle. yes he is a dynamic runner going forward but that leaves england exposed. watch how often dempsey will be able to run at the england box on saturday. added to that, ledley king will play as the right-sided partner of two centre-halves. at tottenham he sits on the left of the pairing – this could lead to one or two moments with johnson exposed and king a yard or two off his mark. if the us are savvy they will have someone else drifting from central areas into the massive hole left behind johnson. i back this game to end in a probably low-scoring draw. i hope i am wrong… good post though

I guess the natural response for a Yank is: “so what does a successful American counter-attack look like?” We’re obviously not going to be taking England out of their offense much, but if the breaks go well at our end of the pitch, we should at least have the opportunity to do our thing in short spaces of possession.

Your analysis and diagrams show an obvious asymmetry that results from the England build-up: as a result of aggressive FB play, one side of England is hedged in closer to the center, leaving one of the backs “over” committed in the event of a counter.

Now I assume that if there is a LB that can recover in this instance, it’s Cole (less so Johnson), but that aside – my guess is that we’ll be looking to dash the ball up the wing where there is the most space. Additionally, we won’t be seeing Gareth Barry dropping back into defense – I don’t know how a 100% SWP compares with a 75% Barry but it’s a break either way.

In the alternative, assuming that the athletic Cole and Johnson do recover well…enter the central role of Donovan in a 4-2-3-1? He could put tremendous pressure up the middle, where England will be relying on two players (Wright-Phillips and Carragher) that they did not plan on ideally using a week ago.

How does the US counter-punch here? Is there a detailed plan and/or should there be one?

J, SWP won’t be involved, and certainly not in the centre. If anything he will be brought on as an impact sub on the left wing. King looks set to start rather than Carragher, who is primarily in the squad as cover for Glen Johnson. Strong as Donovan is in the air, I can’t see your forward getting much joy in the air from Terry and King. As indicated by the usurer the best counter attacking bet for the US will be to make use of the man who is for me your classiest attacking threat, Dempsey, and have him exploiting the space left by Johnson’s attacking forays.

Joe–how does it feel to put the words “Shaun Wright-Phillips” and “Impact sub” in the same sentence? You certainly know the English better than I, but I don’t reckon we see much of SWP. If Lennon is struggling, I think we see Joe Cole on the right (or Milner, with Cole moving to the left, or really, anyone except SWP).

Ha. I’m no fan of the Wright family in general. It’s hard to know who’s second choice after Lennon, because until a week ago we all assumed it would be Walcott. But SWP is widely believed to have been the last name on the squad list, just edging walcott at the death, and yeah I don’t think he’ll get much action unless a game badly needs an injection of pace. Joe Cole added much needed dynamism when he came on against Japan and if he’s not starting on the left I agree he would seem most likely to replace an ineffective Lennon.