An Engineered
Tragedy
Statistical Analysis of Casualties in the
Palestinian - Israeli Conflict

September
2000 - September 2002Don Radlauer

ICT
Associate

Introduction

For the last 23
months, Israel and the Palestinian Arabs have been engaged
in a “low-intensity conflict” generally referred to as the “al-Aqsa
Intifada”.
This conflict has caused over 2,200 deaths so far; and yet, its most
significant
aspect seems to be the struggle for international public opinion rather
than any effort at gaining a conventional military victory. New reports
of death and injury appear almost daily in the world’s news media,
generally
accompanied by the current tally of the total number of people killed
on
each side. Pundits and laymen read these reports and draw conclusions
from
the simplistic statistics they convey.

Before many months
of this conflict had passed, it became apparent to
some observers that the “fatality scorecard” commonly included in
coverage
of the al-Aqsa conflict was painting an oversimplified and deceptive
picture
of a complex reality. A more thorough accounting and analysis of the
conflict’s
incidents and casualties should enable a better understanding of the
true
nature of the conflict. Accordingly, the International Policy Institute
for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) launched the Al-Aqsa Casualties Database
Project
to provide such an accounting. (See Project
Summary for a brief review of the project’s findings.)

A Note on
Terminology

The word “intifada”
is properly translated as “uprising”. The use of
either of these terms implies a judgement as to the nature of the
conflict
– specifically that, like the earlier Intifada of 1987-1991, this
“intifada”
is a spontaneous and authentic expression of “popular rage at Israeli
occupation”.
Some supporters of Israel, realizing the political significance of the
common, often unthinking use of such terms, have attempted to
substitute
other names for the conflict, such as “the Oslo War”. None of these
alternative
names has gained general currency.

As this study aims
to investigate the true nature of the ongoing Israeli/Palestinian
conflict, it seems most appropriate to avoid the use of all such
value-laden
terms. Accordingly, we decided to use the more neutral and general term
“al-Aqsa conflict” to describe the events which began in September
2000.
Even this usage can be criticized, in that it suggests some specific
causal
connection between the conflict and the al-Aqsa Mosque; but it seems to
be a useful compromise.

Another Note:
On Reading Graphs

It has been pointed
out that readers of this study may be misled by
the fact that various graphs are shown with differing scales. According
to this critique, some readers may receive a visual impression that
minimizes
Palestinian fatalities relative to Israeli ones. We have made no
attempt
to mislead the reader in this way. If all graphs in this study were
displayed
using a uniform scale, many of them would be difficult or impossible to
interpret; thus we have chosen a scale for each graph that best conveys
the point made by that graph. Lacking a better solution to the
problems
of visually conveying numeric information, we can only ask that the
reader
A) note the numeric scale indicated next to the vertical axis of each
graph;
and B) remember that when we suggest comparisons be made between two
different
graphs, the intended comparison is generally one of “shape” rather than
“size”. In all cases, the accompanying text should clarify any
ambiguities.

Summary
of Findings

Our research and
analysis shows that the al-Aqsa conflict is different
in many respects from what it is generally believed to be. Among our
findings
are the following:

The al-Aqsa
conflict is not a single, homogenous event. To describe it
glibly as “an uprising against Israeli occupation” grossly
oversimplifies
and distorts our view of the conflict, and obscures much of the
significance
of its history. The conflict has, in fact, gone through four distinct
phases
from its beginning until now. Judging by fatality statistics, only the
first of these phases, which lasted less than three months, strongly
resembled
a true “intifada”. The especially high rate of death among the
Palestinians
during this phase probably created the general public impression of the
entire conflict as an overwhelming slaughter of overmatched
Palestinians.

The usual
fatality count quoted in news articles presents an inaccurate
and distorted picture of the al-Aqsa conflict, exaggerating Israel’s
responsibility
for the death of noncombatant civilians. For example, our database
shows
a total of 603 Israelis killed, compared to 1596 Palestinians, up to 29
August 2002 – numbers in general agreement with media reports (see
Graph
1.1).

But such numbers
hide as much as they reveal: They lump combatants in with
noncombatants, suicide bombers with innocent civilians, and report
Palestinian
“collaborators” murdered by their own compatriots as if they had been
killed
by Israel. Correcting for such distortions, we can arrive at a figure
of
617 Palestinian noncombatants killed by Israel, compared to 471 Israeli
noncombatants killed by Palestinians (see Graph 1.2). While Israelis
account
for 27 percent of the total fatalities as generally reported, they
represent
43 percent of these noncombatant victims. There are a number of valid
ways
of arriving at such corrected figures to compare the extent to which
each
side has been responsible for the killing of noncombatants; they all
show
a much more balanced picture of the conflict than the raw totals do.

Graph 1.2 shows
the gradually increasing number of noncombatant fatalities
each side has suffered at the other's hands, along with the
“noncombatant
gap” – the number by which Israeli killing of Palestinian noncombatants
exceeds Palestinian killing of Israeli noncombatants. It is worth
noting
that this “noncombatant gap” rose quickly in the first few months of
the
conflict, and has remained within a narrow range since then.

While Israeli
fatalities in the al-Aqsa conflict have consisted of 80 percent
noncombatants (and over 80 percent before the substantial IDF
casualties
suffered during the Jenin incursion of April 2002), Palestinian
fatalities
have consisted of more combatants than noncombatants (see Graphs 1.3
and
1.4).

As Graph 1.3 shows, the “combatant gap” – that is, the “excess” of
Palestinian combatants killed by Israel over Israeli combatants killed
by Palestinians – has continued to grow over the life of the conflict.
Contrast this with the “noncombatant gap” in Graph 1.2.

The proportion of
combatants among Palestinians killed has increased
significantly over time, from around 40 percent to its current value of
54 percent. (It is also worth noting that the figure for Palestinian
noncombatants
includes a large number of fatalities for which combatant status could
not be determined – see “Combatants and Noncombatants”, below.)

The proportion of
females among Israeli fatalities was relatively low in
the early months of the conflict, and gradually rose to a level of
around
30 percent; since June 2001, this proportion has remained fairly
stable.
Palestinian fatalities, in contrast, have been consistently and
overwhelmingly
(over 95 percent) male (see Graph 1.5).

If we
restrict our view to each side's noncombatants killed
by the opposing side, the gap in the percentage of females among those
killed is even wider: 40 percent of Israeli noncombatants killed by
Palestinians
have been female, compared to 8.4 percent of Palestinian noncombatants
killed by Israel (see Graph 1.6). The latter figure represents a slight
increase from its previous levels, due to the several women and girls
killed
in July's Israeli “targeted killing” in Gaza.

In absolute
terms, many more Israeli females have been killed than Palestinian
females. If we include combatants and fatalities for whom
responsibility
is unclear, 70 Palestinian females have been killed; the corresponding
Israeli figure is 190 (see Graph 1.7).

Restricting ourselves
to cases where clear responsibility can be reliably
assigned for noncombatant deaths, we see that Israel has been
responsible
for killing 52 Palestinian noncombatant females, while Palestinians
have
killed 187 Israeli noncombatant females – more than three times as many
(see Graph 1.8).

A much higher
proportion of Israeli noncombatants killed by Palestinians
have been aged 45 or older than the equivalent proportion among
Palestinian
noncombatants killed by Israel - over 30% of Israeli noncombatants have
been 45 or older, compared with only 10% of Palestinian noncombatants
(see
Graph 1.9).

In absolute terms,
nearly three times as many Israeli noncombatants
aged 45 and over have been killed as Palestinian noncombatants 45 and
over
(see Graph 1.10). Israelis have killed 55 noncombatant “mature”
Palestinians,
while Palestinians have killed 148 “mature” Israeli noncombatants.

The number of
Palestinians killed by actions of their own side – including
suicide bombers, “work accidents”, collaborators, and people killed in
intra-Palestinian fighting – has increased strongly over time. So far,
over 200 Palestinians have died in this way; they represent more than
twelve
percent of the total Palestinians killed (see Graph 1.11). (Note that
this
category does not include Palestinian “suicide shooters” – gunmen who
carry
out attacks with the expectation that they will be killed by Israelis
in
the course of their attacks – or other attackers whose foolhardiness
might
be construed as “suicidal”. Only Palestinians who were killed with no
“help”
from Israel are included.)

The second phase
of the al-Aqsa conflict lasted for nine months; this phase
was characterized by a rough parity in each side’s killing of the other
side’s noncombatants. The third phase saw a higher (and more erratic)
level
of violence than the second phase; even so, noncombatant fatalities in
the third phase were much more balanced between Israelis and
Palestinians
than they were in the first phase. The fourth phase appears to be
characterized
by a lower level of fatalities than has been seen for some time, with
fewer
successful large-scale terrorist attacks. The demographic composition
of
Palestinian noncombatants killed in the fourth phase is quite different
from that of previous phases.

Palestinian
fatalities, including those of noncombatants, have shown extremely
regular age distributions. In combination with the fact that almost all
Palestinians killed in this conflict have been male – and absent any
other
reasonable explanation for such a non-random pattern of fatalities –
this
suggests that large numbers of Palestinian men and teenaged boys made a
choice to confront Israeli forces, even after many of their compatriots
had been killed in such confrontations. The overall pattern of
Palestinian
deaths is completely inconsistent with accusations that most of these
fatalities
resulted from random Israeli attacks on residential areas, mixed-sex
crowds
at roadblocks, or other ordinary civilian gatherings.

Israeli
fatalities do not show such a high regularity in their age or gender
distribution. Population segments like women or older people would not
normally be specifically targeted for their military importance; thus
their
higher relative prevalence among Israeli fatalities is an indication of
the degree to which these deaths were caused by random attacks on a
civilian
population.

Data
Gathering

The greatest care
and effort in carrying out this project has been spent
in gathering and evaluating enough information on each fatal incident
to
enable accurate classification of each claimed fatality. Reliable and
detailed
data on Israeli casualties of the al-Aqsa conflict has been relatively
easy to find, as this information is extensively reported in Israeli
and
foreign newspapers, as well as various official and unofficial
websites.
Palestinian Arab fatalities present much greater difficulty, for
several
reasons:

Arab names are
often long and complex; in many cases different sources
give different casualty names for the same incident, and it is
difficult
to ascertain whether the different names in fact refer to the same
person.

Detailed reports
of Palestinian casualties are generally provided by Palestinian
organizations and individuals; in some cases these reports are
“slanted”
or even fraudulent, due to pressures to paint Israel in as negative a
light
as possible.

The Israel
Defense Forces do not keep a precise record (or at least have
not so far provided such a record to us) of every time, place, and
circumstance
where weapons have been used; thus, certain Palestinian reports of
fatalities
due to Israeli fire cannot be confirmed or refuted. In many cases, we
have
given the Palestinian account of events the benefit of the doubt, even
though the casualties may have resulted from Palestinian actions,
rather
than Israeli actions. In cases where the cause of death as reported by
Palestinian sources is very much open to question, we have assigned a
Low
confidence Level to that particular casualty.

We have made extensive
use of mainstream media outlets, both in Israel
and abroad, for the details of al-Aqsa conflict incidents. Information
on Palestinian casualties has been gathered from Arabic-language
newspapers,
cross-correlated with reports from human-rights organizations in Israel
and the Palestinian Authority. Unfortunately, these sources generally
disagree
on many significant details, including the name, age, and circumstances
of death of victims. It should be noted that, since no Israeli official
body has been keeping records of Israeli actions and their results, the
information reported by the Western media has come almost exclusively
from
Palestinian sources.

Categorization

In order to provide
a better understanding of the nature and significance
of al-Aqsa conflict incidents and casualties, we have classified them
according
to several criteria. This classification system is a reflection of our
desire to improve upon the usual reportage, which – to give an extreme
example – treats the death of a suicide bomber as equivalent to the
death
of one of his victims. A good system of classification, combined with
carefully-gathered
data, provides rich opportunities for analysis.

As the conclusions
reached in this study are strongly influenced by
the categories we have chosen for our analysis, it is important to
understand
these categories in some detail.

Incident
Organization

This
category is used to classify incidents,
such as terror attacks, which can be attributed to a particular
terrorist
organization; it is used as well to identify the groups targeted by
Israeli
“targeted killings”.

Incident
Type

This
category provides a broad description of
the type of incident that occurred; examples include “Terror Attack”,
“Roadblock
Confrontation”, and so on.

Attack
Type

This
is a more specific category, identifying
the particular form of violence which led to injury or loss of life.
Examples
include “Car Bomb”, “Suicide Bomb”, and “Lynching”.

Incident
Target

The
Incident Target represents the immediate
goal of an attack, as opposed to any broader political aims. Examples
include
“Civilian”, “Vehicle”, “Hotel”, and “Militant”.

Incident
Confidence Level

This
category reflects our considered opinion
as to the reliability of a report. Confidence Level as applied to
incidents
represents the degree of certitude that the incident itself took place;
applied to individual casualties, it represents the level of certainty
that a particular individual was injured or killed in the incident. It
is possible that an incident itself may have a high Confidence Level
while
some of the casualties attributed to the incident have a lower
Confidence
Level. This is the case where the incident itself was well attested,
but
some of the reports of casualties attributed to the incident were less
reliable.

Confidence
levels are as follows:

Extremely
Low

Low

Questionable

High

Extremely
High

Side
Responsible for Incident

This
category assigns responsibility for initiating
an incident – for example, “Israel,” “Palestinians,” “Probably Israel,”
“Probably Palestinians,” or “Unclear.” In the case of a terrorist
attack
on Israeli civilians by Palestinians, the Side Responsible is
listed
as “Palestinians”. The same is true of “work accidents.” In the case of
a targeted killing of a Palestinian militant carried out by Israel, the
Side
Responsible is listed as “Israel.” In the majority of
incidents—Roadblock
Confrontations, Violent Clashes, etc—the Side Responsible is
listed
as “Unclear.”

Note that Side
Responsible in this study refers to physical
responsibility only, and does not indicate a moral judgement.

Side
Responsible for Casualty

In
the majority of incidents, assigning responsibility
for an incident to one side or another is insufficient for purposes of
analysis. An incident may be initiated by Palestinians—for instance, an
armed attack by Hamas militants on an Israeli bus—but end with the
militants
being killed by Israelis. In such a case, the Side Responsible for
Incident
would be “Palestinians”, while the Side Responsible for Casualty
would be “Israel” in the case of each militant, and “Palestinians” in
the
case of each Israeli casualty. There are also cases in which
Palestinians
killed Palestinians and Israelis killed Israelis.

As with Side
Responsible for Incident, Side Responsible for
Casualty represents only the physical responsibility for
causing
death or injury, and expresses no judgement as to the appropriateness
of
that action.

Combatant
Level

This
is one of our most significant ways of
classifying casualties, and represents the degree to which someone
killed
or injured during the course of the al-Aqsa conflict can be considered
an “innocent victim”. Our decisions in defining the Combatant Level
categories
and assigning casualties to these categories are made with reference to
ICT’s published definition of terrorism, explained in Boaz Ganor’s
article,
“Terrorism: No Prohibition Without Definition”.

Non-Combatant

A
non-combatant is an innocent bystander – a person whose death or
injury has no justification other than nationality or ethnicity.

Health
Related

A “health
related” fatality is someone who died from a cause only
indirectly related to violence – for example, due to a heart attack
following
an incident, tear-gas inhalation, or a roadblock delay that prevented
an
ilperson from receiving medical treatment in a timely manner.

Probable
Combatant

A “probable
combatant” is someone killed at a location and at a time
during which an armed confrontation was going on, who appears most
likely
– but not certain – to have been an active participant in the fighting.
For example, in many cases where an incident has resulted in a large
number
of Palestinian casualties, the only information available is that an
individual
was killed when Israeli soldiers returned fire in response to shots
fired
from a particular location. While it is possible that the person killed
had not been active in the fighting and just happened to be in the
vicinity
of people who were, it is reasonable to assume that the number of such
coincidental deaths is not particularly high. Where the accounts of an
incident appear to support such a coincidence, the individual casualty
has been given the benefit of the doubt, and assigned a non-combatant
status.

The status of
“probable combatant” has also been assigned to people
who knowingly took some action which would lead to increased danger,
such
as entering an area in which fighting was going on or which security
officials
had declared off-limits.

Uniformed
Non-Combatant

A “uniformed
non-combatant” is a non-civilian, but is not actively
involved in the conflict. This category can include civil police as
well
as soldiers in uniform but not at their post.

Violent
Protester

A “violent
protester” may be a civilian, but has chosen to take an
active and violent part in the conflict – such as rioting or vigilante
activity.

Protestor
Unknown

A “protestor
unknown” is anyone who was killed during a protest, for
whom information as to violent behavior is unavailable.

Full
Combatant

A “full
combatant” is a soldier on active duty, an active member of
a terrorist group, or a civilian independently choosing to perpetrate
an
armed attack on the opposing side. In general, rock-throwers are not
considered
to be combatants; an exception to this generalization would be, for
example,
someone dropping large rocks from a bridge onto fast-moving traffic. A
rioter throwing "Molotov cocktails", grenades, or the like can be
considered
a full combatant.

Mere
possession of a weapon does not imply combatant status. A civilian
driving with a weapon in his/her car, or a pedestrian with a holstered
pistol, is normally considered a noncombatant. However, a civilian who
encounters a terror attack in progress and draws his/her weapon in an
attempt
to stop or prevent the attack is a combatant once the weapon is
out of its holster.

Suspected
Collaborator

This is a
special category for Palestinian or Israeli Arabs targeted
by militants who suspect them of aiding Israel.

Unknown

In a large
number of cases, the information at hand has been insufficient
to decide the circumstances of death for a given Palestinian casualty.
As the project continues and additional information is accumulated, we
believe that the number of “unknowns” will steadily decrease. When we divide
fatalities into the broader categories of “Combatant” and
“Noncombatant”, only “Full Combatants”, “Probable Combatants”, and
“Violent
Protestors” are counted as combatants. All others, including
“Unknowns”,
are considered to be noncombatants.

Casualty
Confidence Level

This
category reflects our considered opinion
as to the reliability of a report of an individual death. A Confidence
Level is applied to individual casualties as well as to incidents
because
we found that in many cases an incident itself was well attested, but
some
of the reports of casualties attributed to the incident were less
reliable.

Confidence
levels are as follows:

Extremely
Low

Low

Questionable

High

Extremely
High

All the casualty
statistics mentioned, along with the associated charts
and graphs in this report, are based upon casualty reports with a
confidence
level of High or Extremely High. Unless specically indicated,
Questionable,
Low-confidence, and Extremely Low-confidence casualty reports have been
filtered out.

Age

Where
known, the age of the casualty is entered
into the database. There are a number of casualties, particularly on
the
Palestinian side, where the age is unknown, or uncertain.

Gender

The
gender of casualties has turned out to be
central to our analysis, as discussed below.

Nationality
and Secondary Nationality

The
casualty’s nationality is obviously at the
heart of any comparison of casualties between the two sides. In some
cases,
the casualty had dual citizenship. For this reason, we’ve included a
field
for Secondary Nationality.

Residence

This
category was added in order to serve as
a basis for a geographical analysis of both casualties and incidents.

Casualty Type

Casualty
Type describes whether the casualty
was killed or injured, and if the latter, the extent of the injury. The
Casualty Types are: Injured
Lightly

Injured
Moderately

Injured
Seriously

Injured
Unclear

Killed

For this first
phase of the project only fatalities have been entered into
the database.

Organizational
Affiliation

This
category describes the casualty’s membership
in an existing non-governmental organization. This is particularly
useful
in the case of Palestinian combatant fatalities, who were largely
active
members of known terrorist groups, rather than individuals acting on
their
own.

A note on
“Combatants” and “Civilians”

Media reports
frequently discuss the fatalities of the al-Aqsa conflict
in terms of the number of “civilian fatalities” on each side. We have
deliberately
avoided this usage. In any conflict between a country with
conventionally-organized
military and police forces and an opposing force mostly composed of
non-uniformed
“irregulars”, the uniformed forces cannot avoid killing a
disproportionate
number of “civilians” – since even their most deadly opponents are
usually
not members of an official military, and in many cases have perfectly
respectable
“day jobs”.

In the current
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the distinction between
Palestinian “civilians” and members of the plethora of official
Palestinian
Authority security forces is even harder to make, since many
Palestinian
policemen (and members of the other P.A. uniformed forces) combine
their
official service with membership in one or more unofficial groups such
as Hamas or the various arms of Fatah. When Palestinians in this
situation
have killed Israeli noncombatants, they have generally done so in their
“civilian” capacity.

At first glance, it
should be easier to determine which Israeli fatalities
are “civilians”. However, even here the distinction between “civilians”
and members of official security forces paints a somewhat distorted
picture.
A substantial number of Israeli fatalities, especially those killed
inside
“Israel proper”, have been members of the civil police, or noncombatant
members of the Israel Defense Forces – such as office workers and
mechanics.

As a result of all
these factors, dividing this conflict's fatalities
into “civilians” and “non-civilians” over-emphasizes the “civilian”
status
of many of the Palestinian victims, and to a degree distorts the
significance
of Israeli fatalities as well. At best, such categorization paints an
inaccurate
picture of the conflict; and in some instances, those who use these
categories
are clearly being disingenuous. (As an extreme example, one report in a
Saudi newspaper contrasted some 1,400 Palestinian “civilians” killed
with
about 530 Israeli “soldiers and settlers”.)

For this reason, we
chose to classify those killed by their actual combatant
status, according to the criteria laid out in the “Combatant Level”
section
above. While this method requires a degree of judgement in categorizing
those killed, it offers some hope of making sense of an assymmetrical
conflict;
whereas the alternative system, while easier to apply, cannot provide
meaningful
results.

Results
and Trends

1. General
Trends in Overall Fatalities

The first impression
conveyed by the standard “Intifada body count”
report is that people on both sides of the conflict have been getting
killed
at a more or less steady pace, with Palestinian fatalities outnumbering
Israeli fatalities by a factor of almost three to one. A glance at
Graphs
2.1 and 2.2 quickly dispels this illusion.

These graphs display
all Israeli and Palestinian fatalities month-by-month,
with no categorization or qualification. They show that Israeli
casualties
have varied widely from one month to the next, but have shown a general
upward trend. (This trend is somewhat masked by the especially high
death
toll of March 2002, which “flattens” the rest of the graph.)
Palestinian
fatalities, on the other hand, were very high for the first few months
of the conflict, then remained at a lower level – although still
generally
above the level of Israeli casualties. They increased again starting in
September 2001 – possibly as a result of new, more aggressive Israeli
counter-terrorism
tactics adopted after the September 11 terror attacks on the United
States.
Large numbers of Palestinians were killed in March and April 2002, in
the
course of Israel’s “Operation Protective Shield” incursions into
Palestinian-Authority-ruled
cities; this operation was a response to a rash of major Palestinian
terror
attacks.

In order to show
these trends more clearly, it is helpful to correct
(or “normalize”) for the fact that the al-Aqsa conflict began on 27
September
2000* – so that the first “month” shown on our graphs is in
fact only four days long. By multiplying by 30/4, we can correctly
display
a value corresponding to the rate at which people were being killed
during
these first four days. Graphs 2.3 and 2.4 show this correction, as well
as trend-lines to clarify the changes in the rates of death.

* Note that we consider
the beginning of the “al-Aqsa
Intifada” to have been on 27 September 2000, the date of the first
Palestinian
attack on Israelis carried out by official Palestinian Authority
personnel.

While the monthly
number of Israeli fatalities is rather chaotic, there
has clearly been an upward trend in the fatalities during both “good”
and
“bad” months (that is, higher peaks and higher troughs in the graph),
especially
since December 2000 – January 2001. Palestinian fatalities, on the
other
hand, trended downward from a very high beginning, then picked up
somewhat
from September 2001 onwards – although they did not approach the levels
of the first months of the conflict until March 2002.

Graph 2.5 compares
these overall trends in fatalities suffered by the
two sides. While it is evident that the overall level of Israeli
fatalities
has been consistently lower than that of Palestinian fatalities, the
gap
between the trend-lines lessened over the first few months of the
al-Aqsa
conflict and then remained roughly steady until September 2001. Since
then,
the gap between fatalities incurred by the two sides has been
fluctuating
erratically.

2. Refining
the Trends – Responsibility and Combatant Status

So far we have
looked only at overall fatality figures, without regard
to any difference between one fatality and another. There are several
ways
in which we can refine our view. One obvious approach is to classify
fatalities
by which side caused them, rather than by the nationality of the
deceased.
By counting the people killed by the actions of each side rather than
simply
those who died on each side, we now classify suicide bombers and people
killed while preparing explosives (“work accidents”) as part of their
own
side’s tally of deaths, rather than as apparent victims of the other
side.
(Killings of foreign nationals are also included in this
classification;
almost all of these have been foreigners working in Israel who were
killed
by Palestinian terrorist attacks.) Graph 2.6 shows the trends in deaths
caused by each side, ignoring cases in which responsibility for death
was
unclear.

While the general
appearance of this graph is similar to what we have
seen before, it is significant that when we make these adjustments, the
figures for fatalities caused by each side were actually quite similar,
on average, for all but a few months after January 2001. (Note that, as
mentioned above, selecting fatalities by the side “responsible” for
them
does not imply that the responsible side is at fault; “responsible” in
this context refers only to physical rather than moral responsibility.)

Our view can be
refined still further (in the sense of selecting those
deaths which are “politically significant”) by ignoring the deaths of
combatants.
This eliminates from consideration those killed who were actively
involved
in the fighting, and thus legitimate targets for attack: soldiers at
their
posts, active members of terrorist groups, suicide bombers, and so on.
Those remaining – even though many of them, such as stone-throwing
protestors,
may have knowingly put themselves in harm’s way – are considered
“noncombatants”.
(Note that for our purposes, “Violent Protestors”, “Probable
Combatants”,
and “Full Combatants” are treated as combatants; all other
classifications,
including “Unknowns”, are considered noncombatants.)

Noncombatant status
is significant in several ways:

Attacks by
non-governmental groups on noncombatants are categorized as
terrorism, as opposed to attacks on combatants, which are categorized
as
guerilla warfare – a more legitimate form of “resistance to occupation”.

Large numbers of
noncombatant fatalities inflicted by Israeli forces are
a possible sign of problems in field tactics, as noncombatants are not
normally considered to present an immediate danger to soldiers on duty.
(One of the few precepts accepted by both Israelis and Arabs, along
with
outside observers of the conflict, is that Israel has a moral
responsibility
not to kill Palestinian noncombatants.)

Noncombatant
deaths are normally considered more deserving of sympathy,
and thus have a special significance in a conflict being fought as much
in the news media as on the ground.

In short, combatants on
both sides are generally accepted as legitimate
military targets, of less political significance; while there is a
moral
onus attached to the killing of noncombatants.

Graph 2.7 shows the
trends in noncombatant deaths inflicted by each
side on "non-nationals" – i.e. citizens of the opposing side and
third-country
citizens. This graph shows the same general trends as Graph 2.6,
although
(as Palestinian combatant fatalities are no longer included) the
vertical
scale is somewhat lower. Also, this graph shows even more clearly the
trend
for a rough parity between the two sides after December 2000.

3. Identifying
Phases of the Conflict

Graphs 2.5, 2.6, and
2.7 suggest that the al-Aqsa conflict, up to late
July 2002, can be divided into four phases:

An initial phase
characterized by very high Palestinian fatalities and
relatively low Israeli fatalities;

A second phase of
near-parity between the two sides (when we adjust for
either combatant status or responsibility);

A third phase in
which fatalities on both sides fluctuated rather wildly.

A fourth phase,
begun in late June 2002, in which the overall level of
killing on both sides appears to be declining somewhat. It is still too
early to be absolutely certain that this is a genuinely new phase of
the
conflict, rather than merely another of the several relatively quiet
periods
that punctuated Phase 3; but after two months, the fourth phase does
seem
to have established its own identity.

A closer look at our
casualty data enabled a more precise selection of
starting and ending points for each phase – although any such exact
dates
are inevitably somewhat arbitrary.

The first phase of
the al-Aqsa conflict began on 27 September 2000,
and ended in late December 2000. At that time Palestinian fatalities
tapered
off sharply, and remained generally lower until the next September.
December
21, 2000 has been chosen as the last day of this first phase. As a
first
approximation, we can label this phase of the conflict the “real or
apparent
popular uprising” phase (leaving room for uncertainty as to whether
this
“uprising” was genuinely spontaneous, or was manufactured by
Palestinian
leaders), as most of the fatalities appear to have occurred as the
result
of Palestinian mass demonstrations or riots, and the Israeli response
to
them. (A more detailed breakdown of these fatalities by Incident Type
remains
to be done.)

The second phase
began on 22 December 2000, and lasted until September
2001. It was characterized by rough parity between the two sides when
fatalities
are measured either by responsibility or by noncombatant status. It
also
featured a general rising trend in Israeli fatalities, as well as in
deaths
to both sides caused by Palestinians. A final date of 11 September 2001
has been chosen for this period, because changes in Israeli policy and
tactics resulting from that day’s terror attacks on the United States
appear
to have ushered in the next phase.

The third phase of
the al-Aqsa conflict began on 12 September 2001 –
again, a date chosen somewhat arbitrarily, as the first day “post
9/11”.
This phase began with a significant increase in Palestinian fatalities,
in contrast to the preceding period of rough parity between the two
sides
in noncombatant fatalities suffered and fatalities caused. Over the
course
of this phase, fatalities on both sides fluctuated dramatically from
month
to month, with Palestinian and Israeli trends rather closely
correlated.
The nine months of this phase saw attempts to impose cease-fires, which
sometimes resulted in brief periods of relative quiet; visits to the
region
by foreign “peace envoys”, which often resulted in flare-ups of
violence;
and Israeli incursions into Palestinian Authority-controlled territory,
which caused temporary reductions in successful terrorist attacks but
achieved
no long-term results.

The fourth phase of
the conflict began with Israel's longer-term re-occupation
of major Palestinian towns in the West Bank, around 21 June 2002. Two
months
into this phase, it appears that the Israeli presence in and around
Palestinian
towns is reducing the level of success in carrying out terror attacks
against
Israelis, if not the Palestinians' motivation to do so.

Graph 2.8 displays
the overall rates of noncombatant deaths inflicted
on each side by the other. It is very clear that since the end of Phase
1 of the conflict, Israeli and Palestinian noncombatant death rates
have
been almost identical.

More work remains to
be done in order to match the trends of fatalities
with corresponding developments on the political scene. However, one
can
already point to several significant points: for example, a dip in
Israeli
fatalities in July 2001 (as a result of international pressure on the
Palestinians
after the June 2001 Dolphinarium attack); and sharp dips in both
Palestinian
and Israeli casualties in January 2002. The latter decrease in
casualties
corresponds to Yasser Arafat’s “cease-fire calls” to his own side on 16
December 2001.

Further sections
will explore other aspects of the phases of the al-Aqsa
conflict in more detail.

4. Combatants
and Noncombatants

As noted above, the
classification of victims into combatants and noncombatants
is important in evaluating both their tactical and political
significance.
It is worthwhile to examine this classification in more detail.

Note that a
substantial portion – almost 55 per cent – of Palestinian
fatalities are either Full Combatants, Probable Combatants, or Violent
Protestors. Of the remaining fatalities, a substantial slice are
classified
as “Unknown”, meaning that their Combatant Level has not yet been
determined.
Ongoing review of existing reports, as well as addition data to be
gathered,
will, we hope, reduce the number of Unknowns.

Graph 2.10 shows the
equivalent distribution for Israeli fatalities.
The most obvious feature of this graph is the overwhelming
preponderance
of noncombatants over combatants. According to our practice of
classifying
only Full Combatants, Probable Combatants, and Violent Protestors as
combatants,
about one in five Israeli fatalities have been combatants. Even were we
to include such categories as civil police and soldiers aboard civilian
buses (i.e. Uniformed Noncombatants) among combatants, some 70 per cent
of Israelis killed have been noncombatants.

The apparent reason
for the lopsided distribution of Israeli fatalities
is that Israeli combatants are members of a well-trained and equipped
modern
army – and more specifically, one that goes to unusual lengths to
minimize
its casualties. This has two implications: first, that Palestinians
will
generally prefer to attack civilian targets, or alternatively members
of
the military who are not on active duty; and second, that most
Palestinian
attacks on Israeli military patrols or outposts are unlikely to cause
extensive
Israeli fatalities.

Graph 2.11 shows
trends in the balance of Palestinian fatalities between
combatants and noncombatants, month by month. Note that Phase 1 and the
first month of Phase 3 are both characterized by surges in noncombatant
deaths, while most other periods show either parity between combatants
and noncombatants, or else a preponderance of combatant deaths.

The strong upward
trend in Palestinian fatalities due to Palestinian
actions suggests several possible explanations: increased suicide
bombings,
occasional clashes brought on by efforts by Palestinian Authority
security
forces to exert its authority over the various Islamist groups, and a
general
breakdown in law and order in Palestinian areas. The large “spike” in
Palestinian
noncombatants killed by Palestinians in April 2002 appears to represent
the large number of “collaborators” killed in the aftermath to Israel’s
“Defensive Shield” operation.

The preponderance of
noncombatant over combatant casualties is immediately
obvious. The irregular but generally increasing trend in Israeli
noncombatant
fatalities is also apparent, along with the gradual increase in Israeli
combatant fatalities since the beginning of 2002, leading up to the
substantial
losses suffered during Operation Protective Shield. (Note also December
2001, which included several major Palestinian terrorist attacks
perpetrated
during American envoy Anthony Zinni’s visit to the area.) As we saw
above,
the extremely high number of Israeli noncombatants killed in March 2002
"flattens" the rest of the graph, making the overall increasing trend
appear
less significant than it otherwise would.

Finally, Graph 2.14
analyzes the relationship between each month's Palestinian
combatant and noncombatant fatalities over time. (Compare this to Graph
1.4, which shows the cumulative trend rather than each month's ratio
individually.)

The pronounced
increase over time in the percentage of combatants among
Palestinian fatalities appears to result from a combination of several
possible factors:

an increase in
the number of Palestinian combatants killed due to the actions
of their own side, or killed by Israeli actions;

possible changes
in the behavior of Palestinian protestors, resulting in
fewer and/or less violent demonstrations.

At the same time, note
that the major incursions of Israeli forces into
Palestinian Authority-controlled areas in September 2001 and
March-April
2002, as well as Israel's July 2002 “targeted killing” in Gaza,
resulted
in significant “dips” in the monthly ratio of combatants killed. Graph
1.4 shows that these “dips” represented a pause in a long-term trend,
rather
than any reversal of that trend.

5. Gender War

The issue of gender
has not been widely discussed in relation to the
al-Aqsa conflict. Investigation of the sexual composition of fatalities
on both sides of the al-Aqsa conflict reveals some striking facts.

Graph 2.15 shows
Israeli fatalities month by month, with male victims
separated from female victims. While there is an overall preponderance
of male Israelis killed (slightly over two thirds of the victims were
male),
the pattern is not consistent – there were some months when females
outnumbered
males among the victims – or extreme. As will be seen below in the
section
dealing with Age Distribution, the “excess” of males is not consistent
across ages; fatalities among young people and the elderly are evenly
balanced
between the sexes.

Graph 2.16,
displaying the equivalent data for Palestinians, shows a
dramatically different picture. Palestinian fatalities in this conflict
have been consistently and overwhelmingly male. In total, Palestinian
women
account for fewer than five percent of all Palestinians killed.

To eliminate any
possible distortion caused by including combatants
– almost all of them male, on both sides of the conflict – in our
picture,
we can generate similar graphs illustrating the proportion of males and
females among the noncombatants on each side who were killed by the
other
side. Graphs 2.17 and 2.18 show that even when we restrict ourselves to
the noncombatant victims of the conflict, almost all the Palestinians
killed
have been male.

Graph 2.19 reveals a
related fact that has received scant media attention:
If we look only at females killed, Israeli fatalities have far
outnumbered
Palestinian fatalities. This graph includes only each side's
noncombatant
females killed by the opposite side; but even if we include Palestinian
combatant females and others whose death is not reliably attributable
to
Israeli actions, the ratio of Israeli females killed to Palestinian
females
killed is 2.7 to 1. (Using the more stringent criteria of noncombatants
killed by the opposite side, the ratio is 3.6 to one.)

6. Age
Distributions

Yet another area
that has received inadequate attention is the age distribution
of victims of the al-Aqsa conflict. Again, analysis of the data yields
some surprises.

Graph 2.20 shows the
age distribution of Palestinian female noncombatants
killed by Israel. Note that this graph displays no strong trend – the
distribution
of deaths across age categories appears essentially random.

This graph is
included mainly to provide a contrast to those that follow.

Graph 2.21, on the
other hand, showing Palestinian noncombatant fatalities
of both sexes (which, as we’ve seen before, consist almost entirely of
males), displays a highly non-random age distribution.

The median age for
Palestinian victims is roughly 23; some 37% of them
were under twenty years old, and 72% under thirty. The most striking
features
of the graph, however, are the dramatically high number of teenage
noncombatants
killed, and the almost perfect “textbook” skewed distribution.

Graph 2.22 shows the
age distribution of Palestinian combatant fatalities.
Again, this graph shows a highly non-random distribution – but with
significant
differences from Graph 2.21. Palestinian combatant deaths are even more
concentrated in a small age-range than Palestinian noncombatant deaths
are, and combatants on average were somewhat older than noncombatants.

Teenagers are much
less prevalent among Palestinian combatant fatalities
than among noncombatants; only around 18% of all Palestinian combatants
killed were under twenty years old. (This reflects, to a minor degree,
the fact that as a matter of principle we have classified essentially
all
Palestinians under the age of 13 as non-combatants.) The median age for
Palestinian combatants is about 24 years. On the other hand, around 80%
of the Palestinian combatants killed were under thirty – a slightly
higher
percentage of under-age-thirty deaths than among Palestinian
noncombatants.

The distribution of
Palestinian fatalities across age and gender demonstrates
a simple but important fact: Palestinians killed in the al-Aqsa
conflict
have been overwhelmingly male, and for the most part teenaged or in
their
twenties. (Note, though, that the number of children killed under the
age
of ten is very low – under five percent of noncombatants.) This is
highly
significant, as it is very different from the results one would expect
from random Israeli fire into inhabited neighborhoods, or other forms
of
indiscriminate killing of which Israel has been accused.

These graphs suggest
that even the noncombatants among the Palestinians
killed in this conflict were not, for the most part, passive victims of
Israeli aggression. It appears that there was a strong element of
self-selection
among those who would eventually be killed – in short, teenagers and
young
men decided, or were encouraged, to confront Israeli forces and, all
too
often, “achieve martyrdom”. In this context, it is unsurprising that
this
element of self-selection – showing up as a more “focused” distribution
– is even stronger for Palestinian combatants.

Graph 2.23 and 2.24
provide separate age breakdowns for males and females,
for Israeli noncombatants killed by Palestinians, and Palestinian
noncombatants
killed by Israel. The Israeli fatalities, both male and female, display
patterns consistent with a population subject to terror attack – an
essentially
random distribution, with a slight prevalence of males among ages when
adults are more likely to be “out and about”. (It is interesting to
note
that female deaths are roughly equal to male deaths for ages below 20
and
above 59; the lower number of female deaths between the ages of 20 and
59 presumably reflects more time spent indoors.)

The Palestinian
pattern is very different. Palestinian female noncombatants
(as more easily seen in Graph 2.20, above) show a fairly random age
distribution;
but Palestinian male noncombatants display an age distribution
completely
unlike that of any of the other noncombatant groups. It is apparent
from
these graphs that the Israeli killing of Palestinian noncombatant males
is a very different phenomenon from the killing of other noncombatants
in this conflict.

Graph 2.25 shows
another interesting aspect of the age distribution
of Palestinian fatalities. Here noncombatant Palestinians killed by
Israel
have been divided up according to the al-Aqsa conflict phases described
above.

In order to make
accurate comparisons among phases of different lengths,
the data has been “normalized” into deaths per 30-day month. When the
data
is graphed in this way, several things become apparent:

Each phase of the
conflict shows a distinct difference in the overall rate
at which noncombatants were killed. This is most obvious in the case of
Phase 1, during which many noncombatants were killed over a relatively
short time-span. Phase 2 shows a dramatic 75% reduction in the rate at
which Palestinian noncombatants were killed. Phase 3 displays a rate of
noncombatant death more than twice that of Phase 2, but still
substantially
less than that of Phase 1. (Note that this graph somewhat understates
Phase
3 deaths, as we don't yet know the ages of some 63 of the Palestinian
noncombatants
killed by Israel during this phase – 20% of the total for this phase.
Compare
with Graph 2.8, which includes noncombatants whose age is unknown.) The
overall rate of death of Palestinian noncombatants has declined
somewhat
in Phase 4.

While Phase 2 saw
a major reduction in the rate of noncombatant death,
the age distribution of noncombatant fatalities was similar to that
during
Phase 1. This implies that a substantial proportion of the
noncombatants
killed in Phase 2 were probably killed in circumstances similar to
those
in Phase 1 – that is, with the same self-selection process among
potential
victims.

Phase 3 displays
a significantly different pattern. While Phase 1 noncombatant
deaths show a strong peak in the teenage years (with a median age at
death
of around 18-19), Phase 3 noncombatants killed were, on average,
significantly
older. The greatest number of deaths occurred between the ages of 20
and
29, and the median age of death was around 25.

The pattern of
noncombatant Palestinian fatalities in Phase 4 appears much
more random than the pattern for earlier phases. For the first time, a
large proportion of those killed have been babies and young children.
Most
of this increase in death among the very young can be attributed to a
single
incident: Israel's July 2002 “targeted killing” in Gaza.

The above observations
imply that Phase 2 differed from Phase 1 (at least
in terms of the death of Palestinian noncombatants) primarily in
intensity.
Phase 3, on the other hand, saw a significant difference in the ages at
which noncombatants were killed – implying that these deaths were due
to
tactical changes on one or both sides of the conflict. One significant
factor in this change may be Israel’s series of incursions into
Palestinian
Authority territory during Phase 3. Phase 4 shows yet another
significantly
different pattern – implying that “intifada-type” incidents account for
a lower proportion of the noncombatant deaths in this phase.

Graphs 2.26A and
2.26B show total Israeli noncombatant fatalities for
each phase of the al-Aqsa conflict. (Two separate graphs are shown here
for readability; combining them as was done to create Graph 2.24
resulted
in a graph that was colorful but extremely difficult to interpret.)

Four facts are
immediately apparent:

Phase 1 shows
almost all casualties (the sole exception is one person aged
between 60 and 64) between 15 and 44 years old. The fact that almost
all
Phase 1 Israeli deaths took place within these ages – a very different
pattern than is seen for later phases of the conflict – suggests that
the
incidents resulting in these fatalities were different from those that
came later. (This should be clarified by future analysis of fatalities
by Incident Type.)

Phases 2 and 3
show that Israeli teenagers were killed more than any other
age bracket. This high number of teenaged fatalities may be the result
of suicide bombings, many of which targeted groups of young people.
Again,
it is hoped that analysis by Incident Type will clarify this issue.

Phases 2 and 3
show a considerable number of fatalities among people aged
40 and over. The general pattern of death among Israeli noncombatants
appears
to be much more random than what was seen for Palestinian
noncombatants.
This suggests that selection of victims by their own side,
which
appears to account for the age distribution of Palestinian fatalities,
is not a factor in Israeli noncombatant fatalities. Once more, this is
an area for further investigation.

The rate of
Israeli fatalities increased from phase to phase, until the
re-occupation of Palestinian cities at the beginning of Phase 4. The
age
distribution of Israeli fatalities has become broader over time as well.

One frequently-used
measure of the extent to which noncombatant fatalities
represent “genuinely innocent victims” is the proportion of young males
among them. A very high proportion of young males is taken to indicate
that many of the fatalities likely resulted from confrontations that
the
victims could have avoided. Graph 2.27 shows that for the first three
phases
of the conflict, the proportion of Palestinian noncombatants killed by
Israel who fit into this category was significantly higher than the
proportion
among Israelis – especially so during Phase 1, when 85% of the
Palestinian
noncombatants killed by Israel were males aged between 12 and 29. Since
the beginning of the conflict, 63% of all Palestinian noncombatants
killed
by Israeli forces have been in this category; this compares with 26% of
all Israeli noncombatants killed by Palestinians.

As noted above,
Phase 4 appears to be less “intifada-like” than any
previous phase of the conflict.

Graph 2.28 displays all
Israeli fatalities by age, with combatants separated
from noncombatants.

In addition to
showing once more that the vast majority of Israelis
killed have been noncombatants, this graph contrasts the very orderly
distribution
of Israeli combatant deaths – expected for a uniformed army with
reserve
service generally continuing until the mid-40’s – with a much broader
distribution
of noncombatant fatalities. (Note that the small number of Israeli
combatants
appearing in the “15-19 Years” category represents young conscripts,
normally
recruited at the age of 18. In fact, no Israeli 18-year-old combatants
have been killed in the conflict so far; the youngest killed have been
19 years old.)

Graph 2.29, the
equivalent graph for Palestinian fatalities, shows a
completely different picture. Palestinian combatant fatalities, like
those
on the Israeli side, are concentrated in a narrow age range – although
this concentration is slightly less pronounced. (This is unsurprising,
given that Palestinian combatants are mostly members of unofficial
terrorist/guerilla
organizations.) Palestinian noncombatant fatalities, however, show an
age
distribution completely unlike that on the Israeli side. Instead of a
“sloppy”
distribution over a broad range of ages, Palestinian noncombatant
fatalities
are heavily concentrated among teenagers and young adults.

Graph 2.30 focuses
specifically on noncombatants on both sides in their
aged 45 and older.

While overall
Palestinian deaths outnumber Israeli deaths by almost
three to one, Israeli “mature noncombatant” deaths are more than double
the equivalent Palestinian fatalities. (If we omit Palestinian
noncombatants,
such as “collaborators”, killed by Palestinians, the ratio is 2.7 to1.)

Graph 2.31 shows a
detailed breakdown of Israeli and Palestinian young
noncombatants killed by the opposite side, by age and gender. These
fatalities
display a rather strange pattern. Among both Palestinians and Israelis,
the number of young children (under the age of 10-11 years old) is
comparatively
small (although more young Israeli children were killed as a proportion
of total fatalities). The number of Palestinian children killed begins
to increase at about 10 years of age, and jumps up dramatically between
the ages of 12 and 13. However, the increase consists entirely of boys
– the number of Palestinian girls killed shows no age-trend, and is
very
low for all ages.

Young Israelis
killed by Palestinians show a different profile: Both
boys and girls show an increase starting at age 14 (perhaps a year
earlier
for boys), and just as many teenaged girls were killed as teenaged
boys.

What is significant
in all these comparisons is, again, the contrast
between the randomness of the pattern of Israeli fatalities and the
more
non-random distribution of Palestinian deaths. The random distribution
is typical of terrorist attacks, which, though sometimes carried out in
places frequented by young people, e.g. the Dolphinarium disco attack,
may equally target restaurants or buses which are used by a wide
spectrum
of the population. Some of the most frequent targets of Palestinian
terror
attacks, such as open-air markets and public buses, are used
disproportionately
by the most vulnerable segments of society: women, the elderly, and the
poor.

The fact that
Palestinian deaths caused by Israeli actions do not, as
a rule, follow the same pattern would seem to undermine claims that
Israel
deliberately targets Palestinian civilians.

NEW! We
now also offer an up-to-date Israeli/Palestinian
Conflict Statistics page with the latest totals from our database, as
well
as a full database query function for viewing "Intifada" incidents and
casualty data. You can access all these features through ICT's
Arab-Israeli Conflict Page.

Published: June 24,
2002Updated: September 29,
2002
Source: International
Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorismhttp://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=439

This page was produced by Joseph
E. KatzMiddle Eastern Political
and Religious
History Analyst Brooklyn, New York E-mail
to a friend

Source:
Statistics appearing
in Haaretz Newspaper, IDF Website, Palestinian Information Service
Website,
and other public sources.