Tuesday, 5 November 2013

The Fall of Yaroubiya to the YPG In Context

A guest post by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi and Fadel al-Kifa’ee.

Introduction: Solidifying
Stalemate

The small
town of Yaroubiya in north-east Syria (Hasakah governorate) on
the border with Iraq recently came to media attention in light of the
takeover of the locality by the YPG- a Kurdish militia affiliated
with the Democratic Union Party (PYD). This resulted in the expulsion
of the al-Qa’ida affiliate Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham
(ISIS), among other fighters

To be sure, in the grand scheme
of things in the conflict between the YPG and rival rebel factions,
the takeover of Yaroubiya does not represent a decisive turning point
but a further step towards the most likely overall outcome: namely,
consolidation of existing positions.

Generally, since the
outbreak of wider conflict following the YPG’s expulsion of ISIS
from Ras al-Ayn in July, the YPG has retained its strongholds in
Hasakah governorate- where Kurds form a continuum of populated
territory in much of the area- and expanded its control to an
increasing degree.

In the case of Ras al-Ayn, Jabhat al-Nusra
(JN), ISIS and Ahrar ash-Sham have repeatedly failed to advance
beyond the outskirts since July, and have at best only launched
mortar strikes on the town center.

In contrast, in Aleppo and
Raqqa governorates, where Kurds form pockets of population, the YPG
has suffered serious losses, such as expulsion in August from the
town of Tel Abyaḍ in northern Raqqa on the
border with Turkey.

The Situation in Yaroubiya

The
case of Yaroubiya stands out for its wider analytical implications.
Just before the YPG takeover, the town was under the control of
ISIS/JN and two other groups: Ansar al-Khilafa and Liwa al-Tawhid wa
al-Jihad.

Some comment is needed here on the JN-ISIS
relationship in these eastern borderlands: it would appear that the
boundaries between the two remain unclear.

Thus, consider the photographic evidence below. The town of
Yaroubiya features JN graffiti that has not been erased, but from the
same period of the YPG offensive on the town photos of captured
vehicles with the ISIS banner were released. Certainly for the YPG
the two names and banners are interchangeable. This is similarly the
case with reports from jihadi sources on the Yaroubiya area.

Perhaps the lack of clear boundaries between ISIS and JN in
these border areas is not so surprising, where mujahideen both Syrian
and foreign will naturally tie the struggles of eastern Syria and the
Sunni protestors and insurgents in Anbar and Ninawa governorates in
Iraq to one unified cause.

Figure 1: Entry to the market in
Yaroubiya, featuring JN graffiti on the wall to the right (cf. this
video at around 1:30 minutes in).

Figure 2: Vehicle captured by the
YPG featuring the ISIS banner. Photo released on 24 October.

Figure 3: A graphic put out by a YPG
fighter equating JN and ISIS- seen as one entity- with the gates of
Hell.

According to a pro-ISIS source in
Hasakah interviewed for this piece, Ansar al-Khilafa and Liwa
al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad are aligned with ISIS/JN, but Liwa al-Tawhid wa
al-Jihad was a very small battalion in Yaroubiya. The town was also
home to a rebel group drawn from local Arab Shammar tribesmen: Liwa
Ahrar al-Jazira (LAJ). The battalion was expelled
from Yaroubiya in mid-October on ISIS/JN allegations of
corruption. The price of flour for distribution to local inhabitants
was then lowered to consolidate control over the town.

Figure 4: Photo of an Ansar
al-Khilafa fighter at the Yaroubiya border gate on October 26. The
town fell into YPG hands towards the end of the day. It should be
pointed out that multiple groups in Syria use the name Ansar
al-Khilafa. This group in Yaroubiya- extending into the Qamishli
area- is distinct from Ansar
al-Khilafa in Aleppo governorate affiliated with Hizb-ut-Tahrir.

Figure 5: Liwa al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad
fighters in Yaroubiya on October 26, showing that they had not been
driven out just yet.

Key to the narrative put out by jihadi
supporters over the fall of Yaroubiya is the notion of ‘betrayal’
in the sense of collaboration between the local tribesmen, the Iraqi
army under the Maliki government, and the Assad regime.

Figure 6: Photo distributed by LAJ,
among others, allegedly showing Iraqi army vehicles in Yaroubiya.
However, they do not actually belong to the Iraqi army, but the YPG.

In contrast, ISIS/JN, Ansar al-Khilafa
and Liwa al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad are on the outskirts trying to regain
control, aided by the Salafist battalion Ahrar
ash-Sham’s firing mortar rounds at the YPG, accused by Ahrar
ash-Sham of being “agents” of Iran, Assad and Israel.

This
reflects the general tendency whereby organized rebel battalions-
whether under the FSA-banner or Islamist coalitions-will not side
with the YPG against ISIS. The rule of thumb here is partly rooted in
the widespread perception of the PYD as a regime agent, though a more
accurate characterization is that the PYD is determined to hold on to
Kurdish areas at least and to this end is willing to cooperate or
fight with regime forces and rebels depending on the circumstances at
a local level.

In any case, tribal locals and other civilians-
even of Arab ethnicity- differ from the organized rebel battalions in
that they may prefer the YPG as the lesser of two evils, such that
the YPG has now organized an “Arab
Citizens’ Battalions” military unit.

Perhaps more
important is the question of the Iraqi government role. It is
certainly true that the Iraqi army reinforced their own side of the
border, but there is no evidence of active Iraqi military aid to the
YPG. Nor is there evidence for Assad forces’ assistance to the YPG
in this case, despite the clear pleasure shown by pro-Assad
channel Sama TV at the YPG takeover.

Figure 7: Screenshot from a video
currently being circulated in jihadi social media purporting to show
an Iraqi army Humvee on the Iraqi side of the border across from
Yaroubiya.

Rather, the Iraqi
aim was to stop the ISIS fighters in particular from slipping into
Ninawa province, where, as a report from Baghdad’s
newspaper al-Aalem has shown, ISIS fighters have frequently
retreated in the face of rout at the hands of the YPG and/or regime
forces as a launching pad to head back into Syria. Mosul in
particular- where
ISIS has an extensive financial network- serves as an apt base
for recuperation. Of course, the YPG will also have an interest in
preventing ISIS fighters from having border crossings whereby they
can retreat into Iraq to launch new incursions into their territory
in Syria.

Yaroubiya and Kurdish
Rivalries

Unsurprisingly, this coinciding of interests
on the part of the YPG and Iraqi government has won praise for
Baghdad from some Syrian Kurdish figures. For example, Shelal Kedo- a
member of the Syrian Kurdish Council- told Iraqi outlet al-Sumaria
News that the takeover of Yaroubiya marked a turning point for
the better in relations between Syrian Kurds and Iraq.

At the
same time, a member of the West Kurdistan
Council (NB West Kurdistan- Syrian Kurdistan) denied active Iraqi
assistance in the takeover of Yaroubiya. In any event, the positive
outlook on the alignment of interests between Baghdad and the YPG
contrasts notably with the tensions between the PYD and the Iraqi
Kurdistan Regional Government under Massoud Barzani, whose ties
with Turkey are viewed with strong dislike by the PYD. The PYD
sees
Ankara as supporting jihadis against Syrian Kurds. Some YPG
commanders have also voiced disaffection at a perceived lack of
support from Arbil for the fight against the jihadis.

Far from
bringing about Kurdish political unity in the face of a perceived
common threat, therefore, the Yaroubiya affair may actually help
solidify divisions among Kurds and hinder the long-term prospects of
an oft-touted merger of Syrian and Iraqi Kurdistan.

Indeed,
it is apparent that in its conflict with other rebel groups, the YPG
has been able to bolster the PYD’s image as protector of Syrian
Kurds, to the detriment of rival Kurdish factions.

Recently
the YPG released a statement accusing several factions of committing
aggression on YPG territory. Besides usual suspects such as ISIS,
Ahrar ash-Sham and Liwa al-Tawhid (all of whom were part of a joint
statement in August calling for the purging of the ‘PKK’-
interchangeable with YPG here- from the Manbij-Hasakah highway), the
YPG also singled out
the Kurdish Islamic Front and the Salah ad-Din Kurdish brigade.

On the political level, affiliates of
the Kurdish National Council (KNC), which rivals the PYD, are hurt by
association with the opposition-in-exile
coalition, which after the takeover of Yaroubiya released a
statement condemning the YPG for expelling the ‘FSA’ from the
town (even as there were no FSA groups in the town by the time of the
YPG takeover) with supposed Iraqi military assistance. Such
detachment from reality can do the KNC no good to win Syrian Kurdish
support.

In short, the Yaroubiya affair reflects a hardening
of divisions, not only in territory between the YPG and other rebels,
but also among the Kurdish political factions of Syria and Iraq. The
events should further illustrate that the role of political ideology
in the Syrian conflict cannot be down-played as analysis cannot be
reduced to single paradigms of ethnicity or who simply has more money
and arms.

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi is a student at
Brasenose College, Oxford University, and a Shillman-Ginsburg Fellow
at the Middle East Forum. Fadel al-Kifa’ee is an Iraqi political
analyst. Follow on Twitter @ajaltamimi
and @fadelalkifaee