In speaking of dogmas it must be understood that Judaism does not
ascribe to them any saving power. The belief in a dogma or a doctrine
without abiding by its real or supposed consequences (eg. the, belief in
creatio ex nihilo without keeping the Sabbath) is of no value. And
the question about certain doctrines is not whether they possess or do not
possess the desired charm against certain diseases of the soul, but
whether they ought to be considered as characteristics of Judaism or not.

It must again be premised that the subject, which occupied the thoughts
of the greatest and noblest Jewish minds for so many centuries, has been
neglected for a comparatively long time. And this for various reasons.
First, there is Mendelssohn's assertion, or supposed assertion, in his
Jerusalem, that Judaism has no dogmas -- an assertion which has
been accepted by the majority of modern Jewish theologians as the only
dogma Judaism possesses. You can hear it pronounced in scores of Jewish
pulpits; you can read it written in scores of Jewish books. To admit the
possibility that Mendelssohn was in error was hardly permissible,
especially for those with [p. 148] whom he enjoys a certain infallibility.
Nay, even the fact that he himself was not consistent in his theory, and
on another occasion declared that Judaism has dogmas, only that they are
purer and more in harmony with reason than those of other religions; or
even the more important fact that he published a school-book for children,
in which the so-called Thirteen Articles were embodied, only that instead
of the formula "I believe," he substituted "I am convinced," -- even such
patent facts did not produce much effect upon many of our modern
theologians. [n. 1] They were either overlooked or explained away so as to
make them harmonise with the great dogma of dogmalessness. For it is one
of the attributes of infallibility, that the words of its happy possessor
must always be reconcilable even when they appear to the eye of the
unbeliever as gross contradictions.

Another cause of the neglect into which the subject has fallen is that
our century is an historical one. It is not only books that have
their fate, but also whole sciences and literatures. In past times it was
religious speculation that formed the favorite study of scholars, in our
time it is history with its critical foundation on a sound philology. Now
as these two most important branches of Jewish science were so long
neglected -- were perhaps never cultivated in the true meaning of the
word, and as Jewish literature is so vast and Jewish history so
far-reaching and eventful, we cannot wonder that these studies have
absorbed the time and the labour of the greatest and best Jewish writers
in this century.

There is, besides, a certain tendency in historical studies that is
hostile to mere theological speculation. The historian deals with
realities, the theologian with abstrac- [p149] tions. The latter likes to
shape the universe after his system, and tells us how things ought to be,
the former teaches us how they are or have been, and the explanation he
gives for their being so and not otherwise includes in most cases also a
kind of justification for their existence. There is also the odium
theologicum, which has been the cause of so much misfortune that it is
hated by the historian, whilst the superficial, rationalistic way in which
the theologian manages to explain everything which does not suit his
system is most repulsive to the critical spirit.

But it cannot be denied that this neglect has caused much confusion.
Especially is this noticeable in England, which is essentially a
theological country, and where people are but little prone to give up
speculation about things which concern their most sacred interest and
greatest happiness. Thus whilst we are exceedingly poor in all other
branches of Jewish learning, we are comparatively rich in productions of a
theological character. We have a superfluity of essays on such delicate
subjects as eternal punishment, immortality of the soul, the day of
judgment, etc., and many treatises on the definition of Judaism. But
knowing little or nothing of the progress recently made in Jewish
theology, of the many protests against all kinds of infallibility, whether
canonised in this century or in olden times, we in England still maintain
that Judaism has no dogmas as if nothing to the contrary had ever been
said. We seek the foundation of Judaism in political economy, in hygiene,
in everything except religion. Following the fashion of the day to esteem
religion in proportion to its ability to adapt itself to every possible
and impossible metaphysical and social system, we are [p. 150] anxious to
squeeze out of Judaism the last drop of faith and hope, and strive to make
it so flexible that we can turn it in every direction which it is our
pleasure to follow. But alas! the flexibility has progressed so far as to
classify Judaism among the invertebrate species, the lowest order of
living things. It strongly resembles a certain Christian school which
addresses itself to the world in general and claims to satisfy everybody
alike. It claims to be socialism for the adherents of Karl Marx and
Lassalle, worship of man for the followers of Comte and St. Simon; it
carefully avoids the word "God" for the comfort of agnostics and sceptics,
whilst on the other hand it pretends to hold sway over paradise, hell, and
immortality for the edification of believers. In such illusions many of
our theologians delight. For illusions they are; you cannot be everything
if you want to be anything. Moreover, illusions in themselves are bad
enough, but we are menaced with what is still worse. Judaism, divested of
every higher religious motive, is in danger of falling into gross
materialism. For what else is the meaning of such declarations as "Believe
what you like, but conform to this or that mode of life"; what else does
it mean but "We cannot expect you to believe that the things you are
bidden to do are commanded by a higher authority; there is not such a
thing as belief, but you ought to do them for conventionalism or for your
own convenience."

But both these motives -- the good opinion of our neighbours, as well
as our bodily health -- have nothing to do with our nobler and higher
sentiments, and degrade Judaism to a matter of expediency or diplomacy.
Indeed, things have advanced so far that well-meaning, but ill-advised
writers even think to render a service to Judaism [p. 151] by declaring it
to be a kind of enlightened Hedonism, or rather a moderate Epicureanism.

I have no intention of here answering the question, What is Judaism ?
This question is not less perplexing than the problem, What is God's
world? Judaism is also a great Infinite, composed of as many endless
Units, the Jews. And these Unit-Jews have been, and are still, scattered
through all the world, and have passed under an immensity of influences,
good and bad. If so, how can we give an exact definition of the Infinite,
called Judaism?

But if there is anything sure, it is that the highest motives which
worked through the history of Judaism are the strong belief in God and the
unshaken confidence that at last this God, the God of Israel, will be the
God of the whole world; or, in other words, Faith and Hope are the two
most prominent characteristics of Judaism.

In the following pages I shall try to give a short account of the
manner in which these two principles of Judaism found expression, from the
earliest times down to the age of Mendelssohn; that is, to present an
outline of the history of Jewish Dogmas. First, a few observations on the
position of the Bible and the Talmud in relation to our theme.
Insufficient and poor as they may be in proportion to the importance of
these two fundamental documents of Judaism, these remarks may nevertheless
suggest a connecting link between the teachings of Jewish antiquity and
those of Maimonides and his successors.

The Bible itself hardly contains a command bidding us to
believe. We are hardly ordered, e.g., to believe in the
existence of God. I say hardly, but I do not altogether deny the
existence of such a command. It is true that we [p. 152] do not find in
the Scripture such words as: "You are commanded to believe in the
existence of God." Nor is any punishment assigned as awaiting him who
denies it. Notwithstanding these facts, many Jewish authorities -- among
them such important men as Maimonides, R. Judah Hallevi, Nachmanides --
perceive, in the first words of the Ten Commandments, "I am the Lord thy
God," the command to believe in His existence. [n. 2]

Be this as it may, there cannot be the shadow of a doubt that the
Bible, in which every command is dictated by God, and in which all its
heroes are the servants, the friends, or the ambassadors of God, presumes
such a belief in every one to whom those laws are dictated, and these
heroes address themselves. Nay, I think that the word "belief" is not even
adequate. In a world with so many visible facts and invisible causes, as
life and death, growth and decay, light and darkness; in a world where the
sun rises and sets; where the stars appear regularly; where heavy rains
pour down from the sky, often accompanied by such grand phenomena as
thunder and lightning; in a world full of such marvels, but into which no
notion has entered of all our modern true or false explanations -- who but
God is behind all these things? "Have the gates," asks God, "have the
gates of death been open to thee? or hast thou seen the doors of the
shadow of death? . . .Where is the way where light dwelleth? and as for
darkness, where is the place thereof ? . . . Hath the rain a father? or
who hath begotten the drops of dew? . . . Canst thou bind the sweet
influences of Pleiades, or loose the bands of Orion ? . . . Canst thou
send lightnings, that they may go, and say unto thee, Here we are?" (Job
xxxviii.). Of all these wonders, God, [p. 153] was not merely the prima
causa; they were the result of His direct action, without any
intermediary causes. And it is as absurd to say that the ancient world
believed in God, as for a future historian to assert of the nineteenth
century that it believed in the effects of electricity. We see them, and
so antiquity saw God. If there was any danger, it lay not in the denial of
the existence of a God, but in having a wrong belief. Belief in as many
gods as there are manifestations in nature, the investing of them with
false attributes, the misunderstanding of God's relation to men, lead to
immorality. Thus the greater part of the laws and teachings of the Bible
are either directed against polytheism, with all its low ideas of God, or
rather of gods; or they are directed towards regulating God's relation to
men. Man is a servant of God, or His prophet, or even His friend. But this
relationship man obtains only by his conduct. Nay, all man's actions are
carefully regulated by God, and connected with His holiness. The 19th
chapter of Leviticus, which is considered by the Rabbis as the portion of
the Law in which the most important articles of the Torah are embodied, is
headed, "Ye shall be holy, for I the Lord your own God am holy." And each
law therein occurring, even those which concern our relations to each
other, is not founded on utilitarian reasons, but is ordained because the
opposite of it is an offence to the holiness of God, and profanes His
creatures, whom He desired to be as holy as He is. [n. 3]

Thus the whole structure of the Bible is built upon the visible fact of
the existence of a God, and upon the belief in the relation of God to men,
especially to Israel. In spite of all that has been said to the contrary,
the Bible does lay stress upon belief, where belief is required. The [p.
154] unbelievers are rebuked again and again. "For all this they sinned
still, and believed not for His wondrous work," complains Asaph (Ps.
lxxviii. 32). And belief is praised in such exalted words as, "Thus saith
the Lord, I remember thee, the kindness of thy youth, the love of thine
espousals, when thou wentest after me in the wilderness, in a land that
was not sown" (Jer.ii. 2). The Bible, especially the books of the
prophets, consists, in great part, of promises for the future, which the
Rabbis justly termed the "Consolations." [n. 4] For our purpose, it is of
no great consequence to examine what future the prophets had in view,
whether an immediate future or one more remote, at the end of days. At any
rate, they inculcated hope and confidence that God would bring to pass a
better time. I think that even the most advanced Bible critic -- provided
he is not guided by some modern Aryan reasons -- must perceive in such
passages as, "The Lord shall reign for ever and ever," "The Lord shall
rejoice n his works," and many others, a hope for more than the
establishment of the "national Deity among his votaries in Palestine."

We have now to pass over an interval of many centuries, the length of
which depends upon the views held is to the date of the close of the
canon, and examine what the Rabbis, the representatives of the prophets,
thought on this subject. Not that the views of the author of the
Wisdom of Solomon, of Philo and Aristobulus, and many others of the
Judaeo-Alexandrian school would be uninteresting for us. But somehow their
influence on Judaism was only a passing one, and their doctrines never
became authoritative in the Synagogue. We must here confine ourselves to
those who, even by the [p. 155] testimony of their bitterest enemies,
occupied the seat of Moses.

The successors of the prophets had to deal with new circumstances, and
accordingly their teachings were adapted to the wants of their times. As
the result of manifold foreign influences, the visible fact of the
existence of God as manifested in the Bible had been somewhat obscured.
Prophecy ceased, and the Holy Spirit which inspired a few chosen ones took
its place. Afterwards this influence was reduced to the hearing of a Voice
from Heaven, which was audible to still fewer. On the other hand the
Rabbis had this advantage that they were not called upon to fight against
idolatry as their predecessors the prophets had been. The evil inclination
to worship idols was, as the Talmud expresses it allegorically, killed by
the Men of the Great Synagogue, or, as we should put it, it was suppressed
by the sufferings of the captivity in Babylon. This change of
circumstances is marked by the following fact: -- Whilst the prophets
mostly considered idolatry as the cause of all sin, the Rabbis show a
strong tendency to ascribe sin to a defect in, or a want of, belief on the
part of the sinner. They teach that Adam would not have sinned unless he
had first denied the "Root of all" (or the main principle), namely, the
belief in the Omnipresence of God. Of Cain they say that before murdering
his brother he declared: "There is no judgment, there is no judge, there
is no world to come, and there is no reward for the just, and no
punishment for the wicked." [n. 5]

In another place we read that the commission of a sin in secret is an
impertinent attempt by the doer to oust God from the world. But if
unbelief is considered as [p. 156] the root of all evil, we may expect
that the reverse of it, a perfect faith, would be praised in the most
exalted, terms. So we read: Faith is so great that the man who possesses
it may hope to become a worthy vessel of the Holy Spirit, or, as we should
express it, that he may hope to obtain by this power the highest degree of
communion with his Maker. The Patriarch Abraham, notwithstanding all his
other virtues, only became "the possessor of both worlds" by the merit of
his strong faith. Nay, even the fulfilment of a single law when
accompanied by true faith is, according to the Rabbis, sufficient to bring
man nigh to God. And the future redemption is also conditional on the
degree of faith shown by Israel. [n. 6]

It has often been asked what the Rabbis would have thought of a man who
fulfils every commandment of the Torah, but does not believe that this
Torah was given by God, or that there exists a God at all. It is indeed
very difficult to answer this question with any degree of certainty. In
the time of the Rabbis people were still too simple for such a diplomatic
religion, and conformity in the modern sense was quite an unknown thing.
But from the foregoing remarks it would seem that the Rabbis could not
conceive such a monstrosity as atheistic orthodoxy. For, as we have seen,
the Rabbis thought that unbelief must needs end in sin, for faith is the
origin of all good. Accordingly, in the case just supposed they would have
either suspected the man's orthodoxy, or would have denied that his views
were really what he professed them to be.

Still more important than the above cited Agadic passages is one which
we are about to quote from the tractate Sanhedrin. This tractate deals
with the constitution of the supreme law-court, the examination of the
witnesses, the functions of the judges, and the different punishment to be
inflicted on the transgressors of the law. After having enumerated various
kinds of capital punishment, the Mishnah adds the following words:

"These are (the men) who are excluded from the life to come:
He who says there is no resurrection from death; he who says there is no
Torah given from heaven, and the Epikurus. [n. 7]

This passage was considered by the Rabbis of the Middle Ages, as well as
by modern scholars, the locus classicus for the dogma question.
There are many passages in the Rabbinic literature which exclude man from
the world to come for this or that sin. But these are more or less of an
Agadic (legendary) character, and thus lend themselves to exaggeration and
hyperbolic language. They cannot, therefore, be considered as serious
legal dicta, or as the general opinion of the Rabbis.

The Mishnah in Sanhedrin, however, has, if only by its position in a
legal tractate, a certain Halachic (obligatory) character. And the fact
that so early an authority as R. Akiba made additions to it guarantees its
high antiquity. The first two sentences of this Mishnah are clear enough.
In modern language, and positively speaking, they would represent articles
of belief in Resurrection and Revelation. Great difficulty is found in
defining what was meant by the word Epicurus. The authorities of
the Middle Ages, to whom I shall again have to refer, explain the Epikurus
to be a man who denies the belief in reward and punishment; others
identify him with one who denies the belief in Providence; while others
again consider the Epikurus to be one who denies Tradition. But the paral-
[p. 158] lel passages in which it occurs incline one rather to think that
this word cannot be defined by one kind of heresy. It implies rather a
frivolous treatment of the words of Scripture or of Tradition. In the case
of the latter (Tradition) it is certainly not honest difference of opinion
that is condemned; for the Rabbis themselves differed very often from each
other, and even Mediaeval authorities, did not feel any compunction about
explaining Scripture in variance with the Rabbinic interpretation, and
sometimes they even went so far as to declare that the view of this or
that great authority was only to be considered as an isolated opinion not
deserving particular attention. What they did blame was, as already said,
scoffing and impiety. We may thus safely assert that reverence for the
teachers of Israel formed the third essential principle of Judaism. [n. 8]

I have still to remark that there occur in the Talmud such passages as
"the Jew, even if he has sinned, is still a Jew," or "He who denies
idolatry is called a Jew." These and similar passages have been used to
prove that Judaism was not a positive religion, but only involved the
negation of idolatry. But it has been overlooked that the statements
quoted have more a legal than a theological character. The Jew belonged to
his nationality even after having committed the greatest sin, just as the
Englishman does not cease to be an Englishman -- in regard to treason and
the like -- by having committed a heinous crime. But he has certainly
acted in a very un-English way, and having outraged the feelings of the
whole nation will have to suffer for his misconduct. The Rabbis in a
similar manner did not maintain that he who gave up the belief in
Revelation and Resurrection, and treated irreverently the teach- [p. 159]
ers of Israel, severed his connection with the Jewish nation, but that,
for his crime, he was going to suffer the heaviest punishment. He was to
be excluded from the world to come.

Still, important as is the passage quoted from Sanhedrin, it would be
erroneous to think that it exhausted the creed of the Rabbis. The liturgy
and innumerable passages in the Midrashim show that they ardently clung to
the belief in the advent of the Messiah. All their hope was turned to the
future redemption and the final establishment of the Kingdom of Heaven on
earth. Judaism, stripped of this belief, would have been for them devoid
of meaning. The belief in reward and punishment is also repeated again and
again in the old Rabbinic literature. A more emphatic declaration of the
belief in Providence than is conveyed by the following passages is hardly
conceivable. "Everything is foreseen, and free will is given. And the
world is judged by grace." Or, "the born are to die, and the dead to
revive, and the living to be judged. For to know and to notify, and that
it may be known that He (God) is the Framer and He the Creator, and He the
Discerner, and He the judge, and He the Witness," etc. [n. 9]

But it must not be forgotten that it was not the habit of the Rabbis to
lay down, either for conduct or for doctrine, rules which were commonly
known. When they urged the three points stated above there must have been
some historical reason for it. Probably these principles were controverted
by some heretics. Indeed, the whole tone of the passage cited from
Sanhedrin is a protest against certain unbelievers who are threatened with
punishment. Other beliefs, not less essential, but less disputed, remain
[p. 160] unmentioned, because there was no necessity to assert them.

It was not till a much later time, when the Jews came into closer
contact with new philosophical schools, and also new creeds which were
more liable than heathenism was to be confused with Judaism, that this
necessity was felt. And thus we are led at once to the period when the
Jews became acquainted with the teachings of the Mohammedan schools. The
Caraites came very early into contact with non-Jewish systems. And so we
find that they were also the first to formulate Jewish dogmas in a fixed
number, and in a systematic order. It is also possible that their
separation from the Tradition, and their early division into little sects
among themselves, compelled them to take this step, in order to avoid
further sectarianism.

The number of their dogmas amounts to ten. According to Judah Hadasi
(150), who would appear to have derived them from his predecessors, their
dogmas include the following articles:

Creatio ex nihilo;

The existence of a Creator, God;

This God is an absolute unity as well as incorporeal;

Moses and the other prophets were sent by God;

God has given to us the Torah, which is true and complete in every
respect, not wanting the addition of the so-called Oral Law;

The Torah must be studied by every Jew in the original (Hebrew)
language;

The Holy Temple was a place elected by God for His manifestation;

Resurrection of the dead;

Punishment and reward after death;

The Coming of the Messiah, the son of David.

How far the predecessors of Hadasi were influenced by a certain Joseph
Albashir (about 950), of whom there exists a manuscript work, "Rudiments
of Faith," I am unable to [p. 161] say. The little we know of him reveals
more of his intimacy with Arabic thoughts than of his importance for his
sect in particular and for Judaism in general. After Hadasi I shall
mention here Elijah Bashazi, a Caraite writer of the end of the fifteenth
century. This author, who was much influenced by Maimonides, omits the
second and the seventh articles. In order to make up the ten he numbers
the belief in the eternity of God as an article, and divides the fourth
article into two. In the fifth article Bashazi does not emphasize so
strongly the completeness of the Torah as Hadasi, and omits the portion
which is directed against Tradition. It is interesting to see the
distinction which Bashazi draws between the Pentateuch and the Prophets.
While he thinks that the five books of Moses can never be altered, he
regards the words of the Prophets as only relating to their
contemporaries, and thus subject to changes. As I do not want to
anticipate Maimonides' system, I must refrain from giving here the
articles laid down by Solomon Troki in the beginning of the eighteenth
century. For the articles of Maimonides are copied by this writer with a
few slight alterations so as to dress them in a Caraite garb.

I must dismiss the Caraites with these few remarks, my object being
chiefly to discuss the dogmas of the Synagogue from which they had
separated themselves. Besides, as in everything Caraitic, there is no
further development of the question. As Bashazi laid them down, they are
still taught by the Caraites of to-day. I return to the Rabbanites. [n.10]

As is well known, Maimonides (1130-1205), was the first Rabbanite who
formulated the dogmas of the Synagogue. But there are indications of
earlier attempts. R. Saadiah [p. 162] Gaon's (892-942) work, Creeds and
Opinions, shows such traces. He says in his preface, "My heart
sickens to see that the belief of my co-religionists is impure and that
their theological views are confused." The subjects he treats in this
book, such as

creation,

unity of God,

resurrection of the dead,

the future redemption of Israel,

reward and punishment,

and other kindred theological subjects might thus, perhaps, be considered
as the essentials of the creed that the Gaon desired to present in a pure
and rational form. R. Hannaneel, of Kairowan, [n. 11] in the first half of
the eleventh century, says in one of his commentaries that to deserve
eternal life one must believe in four things:

in God,

in the prophets,

in a future world where the just will be rewarded,

and in the advent of the Redeemer.

From R. Judah Hallevi's Cusari, written in the beginning of the
twelfth century, we might argue that the belief in the election of Israel
by God was the cardinal dogma of the author. [n. 12] Abraham Ibn Daud, a
contemporary of Maimonides, in his book The High Belief, [n. 13]
speaks of rudiments, among which, besides such metaphysical
principles as unity, rational conception of God's attributes, etc., the
belief in the immutability of the Law, etc., is included. Still, all these
works are intended to furnish evidence from philosophy or history for the
truth of religion rather than to give a definition of this truth. The
latter task was undertaken by Maimonides.

I refer to the thirteen articles embodied in his first work, The
Commentary to the Mishnah. They are appended to the Mishnah in
Sanhedrin, with which I dealt above. But though they do not form an
independent treatise, Maimonides remarks must not be considered as merely
incidental. [p. 163] That Maimonides was quite conscious of the importance
of this exposition can be gathered from the concluding words addressed to
the reader:

"Know these (words) and repeat them many times, and think
them over in the proper way. God knows that thou wouldst be deceiving
thyself if thou thinkest thou hast understood them by having read them
once or even ten times. Be not, therefore, hasty in perusing them. I have
not composed them with out deep study and earnest reflection."

The result of this deep study was that the following Thirteen Articles
constitute the creed of Judaism. They are: --

The belief in the existence of a Creator;

The belief in His Unity;

The belief in His Incorporeality;

The belief in His Eternity;

The belief that all worship and adoration are due to Him alone;

The belief in Prophecy;

The belief that Moses was the greatest of all Prophets, both
before and
after him;

The belief that the Torah was revealed to Moses on Mount Sinai;

The belief in the Immutability of this revealed Torah;

The belief that God knows the actions of men;

The belief in Reward and Punishment;

The belief in the coming of the Messiah;

The belief in the Resurrection of the dead.

The impulse given by the great philosopher and still ,greater Jew was
eagerly followed by succeeding generations, and Judaism thus came into
possession of a dogmatic literature such as it never knew before
Maimonides. Maimonides is the centre of this literature, and I shall
accordingly speak in the remainder of this essay of Maimonists and
Anti-Maimonists. These terms really apply to the great controversy that
raged round Maimonides Guide of [p. 164] the Perplexed, but
I shall, chiefly for brevity's sake, employ them in these pages in a
restricted sense to refer to the dispute concerning the Thirteen Articles.

Among the Maimonists we may probably include the great majority of
Jews, who accepted the Thirteen Articles without further question.
Maimonides must indeed have filled up a great gap in Jewish theology, a
gap, moreover, the existence of which was very generally perceived. A
century had hardly elapsed before the Thirteen Articles had become a theme
for the poets of the Synagogue. And almost every country where Jews lived
can show a poem or a prayer founded on these Articles. R. Jacob Molin
(1420) of Germany speaks of metrical and rhymed songs in the German
language, the burden of which was the Thirteen Articles, and which were
read by the common people with great devotion. The numerous commentaries
and homilies written on the same topic would form a small library in
themselves. [n. 14] But on the other hand it must not be denied that the
Anti-Maimonists, that is to say those Jewish writers who did not agree
with the creed formulated by Maimonides, or agreed only in part with him,
form also a very strong and respectable minority. They deserve our
attention the more as it is their works which brought life into the
subject and deepened it. It is not by a perpetual Amen to every utterance
of a great authority that truth or literature gains anything.

The Anti-Maimonists can be divided into two classes. The one class
categorically denies that Judaism has dogmas. I shall have occasion to
touch on this view when I come to speak of Abarbanel. Here I pass at once
to the second class of Anti-Maimonists. This consists of those who agree
with Maimonides as to the existence of dogmas [p. 165] in Judaism, but who
differ from him as to what these dogmas are, or who give a different
enumeration of them.

As the first of these Anti-Maimonists we may regard Nachmanides, who,
in his famous Sermon in the Presence of the King, speaks of three
fundamental principles:

Creation (that is, non-eternity of matter),

Omniscience of God, and

Providence.

Next comes R. Abba Mari ben Moses, of Montpellier. He wrote at the
beginning of the fourteenth century, and is famous in Jewish history for
his zeal against the study of philosophy. We possess a small pamphlet by
him dealing with our subject, and it forms a kind of prologue to his
collection of controversial letters against the rationalists of his time.
[n. 15] He lays down three articles as the fundamental teachings of
Religion:

Metaphysical: The existence of God, including His Unity and
Incorporeality;

Mosaic: Creatio ex nihilo by God -- a consequence of this
principle is the belief that God is capable of altering the laws of nature
at His pleasure;

Ethical: Special Providence -- i.e., God knows all our actions
in all their details.

Abba Mari does not mention Maimonides' Thirteen Articles. But it would be
false to conclude that he rejected the belief in the coming of the
Messiah, or any other article of Maimonides. The whole tone and tendency
of this pamphlet is polemical, and it is therefore probable that he only
urged those points which were either doubted or explained in an unorthodox
way by the sceptics of his time.

Another scholar, of Provence, who wrote but twenty years later than
Abba Mari -- R. David ben Samuel d'Estella (1320) -- speaks of the seven
pillars of religion. They are:

Revelation,

Providence,

Reward and Punishment, [p. 166]

the Coming of the Messiah,

Resurrection of the Dead,

Creatio ex nihilo, and

Free Will. [n. 16]

Of authors living, in other countries, I have to mention here R.
Shemariah, of Crete, who flourished at about the same time as R. David
d'Estella, and is known from his efforts to reconcile the Caraites with
the Rabbanites. This author wrote a book for the purpose of furnishing
Jewish students with evidence for what he considered the five fundamental
teachings of Judaism, viz.:

The Existence of God;

The Incorporeality of God;

His Absolute Unity;

That God created heaven and earth;

That God created the world after His will 5106 years ago -- 5106 (1346
A.C.), being the year in which Shemariah wrote these words. [n. 17]

In Portugal, at about the same time, we find R. David ben Yom-Tob Bilia
adding to the articles of Maimonides thirteen of his own, which he calls
the "Fundamentals of the Thinking Man." Five of these articles relate to
the functions of the human soul, that, according to him, emanated from
God, and to the way in which this divine soul receives its punishment and
reward. The other eight articles are as follows:

The belief in the existence of spiritual beings -- angels;

Creatio ex nihilo;

The belief in the existence of another world, and that this other
world is only a spiritual one;

The Torah is above philosophy;

The Torah has an outward (literal) meaning and an inward (allegorical)
meaning;

The text of the Torah is not subject to any emendation;

The reward of a good action is the good work itself, and the doer must
not expect any other reward;

It is only by the "commands relating to the heart," for instance, the
belief in one eternal God, the loving and fearing Him, and [p. 167] not
through good actions, that man attains the highest degree of perfection.
[n. 18]

Perhaps it would be suitable to mention here another contemporaneous
writer, who also enumerates twenty-six articles. The name of this writer
is unknown, and his articles are only gathered from quotations by later
authors. It would seem from these quotations that the articles of this
unknown author consisted mostly of statements emphasising the belief in
the attributes of God: as, His Eternity, His Wisdom and Omnipotence, and
the like. [n.19]

More important for our subject are the productions of the fifteenth
century, especially those of Spanish authors. The fifteen articles of R.
Lipman Muhlhausen, in the preface to his well-known Book of Victory
[n. 20] (1410), differ but slightly from those of Maimonides. In
accordance with the anti-Christian tendency of his polemical book, he lays
more stress on the two articles of Unity and Incorporeality, and makes of
them four. We can therefore dismiss him with this short remark, and pass
at once to the Spanish Rabbis.

The first of these is R. Chasdai Ibn Crescas, who composed his famous
treatise, The Light of God, about 1405. Chasdai's book is well
known for its attacks on Aristotle, and also for its influence on Spinoza.
But Chasdai deals also with Maimonides' Thirteen Articles, to which he was
very strongly opposed. Already in his preface he attacks Maimonides for
speaking, in his Book of the Commandments, of the belief in the
existence of God as an "affirmative precept." Chasdai thinks it absurd;
for every commandment must be dictated by some authority, but on whose
authority can we dictate the acceptance of this authority? His general
objection to the Thirteen Articles [p. 168] is that Maimonides confounded
dogmas or fundamental beliefs of Judaism, without which Judaism is
inconceivable, with beliefs or doctrines which Judaism inculcates, but the
denial of which, though involving a strong heresy, does not make Judaism
impossible. He maintains that if Maimonides meant only to count
fundamental teachings, there are not more than seven; but that if he
intended also to include doctrines, he ought to have enumerated sixteen.
As beliefs of the first class -- namely, fundamental beliefs -- he
considers the following articles:

God's knowledge of our actions;

Providence;

God's omnipotence -- even to act against the laws of nature;

Prophecy;

Free will;

The aim of the Torah is to make man long after the closest communion
with God.

The belief in the existence of God, Chasdai thinks, is an axiom with which
every religion must begin, and he is therefore uncertain whether to
include it as a dogma or not. As to the doctrines which every Jew is bound
to believe, but without which Judaism is not impossible, Chasdai divides
them into two sections:
(a)

Creatio ex nihilo;

Immortality of the soul;

Reward and Punishment;

Resurrection of the dead;

Immutability of the Torah;

Superiority of the prophecy of Moses;

That the High Priest received from God the instructions sought for,
when he put his questions through the medium of the Urim and Thummim;

The coming of the Messiah.

(b)Doctrines which are expressed by certain religious ceremonies,
and on belief in which these ceremonies are conditioned:

The belief in the efficacy of prayer as well as in the power of the
benediction of the priests to convey to us the blessing of God;

God is merciful to the penitent;

Certain days in the year -- for instance, [p. 169] the Day of
Atonement -- are especially qualified to bring us near to God, if we keep
them in the way we are commanded.

That Chasdai is a little arbitrary in the choice of his "doctrines," I
need hardly say. Indeed, Chasdai's importance for the dogma-question
consists more in his critical suggestions than in his positive results. He
was, as we have seen, the first to make the distinction between
fundamental teachings which form the basis of Judaism, and those other
simple Jewish doctrines without which Judaism is not impossible. Very
daring is his remark, when proving that Reward and Punishment, Immortality
of the soul, and Resurrection of the dead must not be considered as the
basis of Judaism, since the highest ideal of religion is to serve God
without any hope of reward. Even more daring are his words concerning the
Immutability of the Law. He says: "Some have argued that, since God is
perfection, so must also His law be perfect, and thus unsusceptible of
improvement." But he does not think this argument conclusive, though the
fact in itself (the Immutability of the Law) is true. For one might answer
that this perfection of the Torah could only be in accordance with the
intelligence of those for whom it was meant; but as soon as the recipients
of the Torah have advanced to a higher state of perfection, the Torah must
also be altered to suit their advanced intelligence. A pupil of Chasdai
illustrates the words of his master by a medical parallel. The physician
has to adapt his medicaments to the various stages through which his
patient has to pass. That he changes his prescription does not, however,
imply that his medical knowledge is imperfect, or that his earlier
remedies were ignorantly chosen; the varying condition of the invalid was
the cause of the variation [p. 170] in the doctor's treatment. Similarly,
were not the Immutability of the Torah a "doctrine," one might maintain
that the perfection of the Torah would not be inconsistent with the
assumption that it was susceptible of modification, in accordance with our
changing and progressive circumstances. But all these arguments are purely
of a theoretic character; for, practically, every Jew, according to
Chasdai, has to accept all these beliefs) whether he terms them
fundamental teachings or only Jewish doctrines. [n. 21]

Some years later, though he finished his work in the same year as
Chasdai, R. Simeon Duran (1366-1444,) a younger contemporary of the
former, made his researches on dogmas. His studies on this subject form a
kind of introduction to his commentary on Job, which he finished in the
year I405. Duran is not so strongly opposed to the Thirteen Articles as
Chasdai, or as another "thinker of our people," who thought them an
arbitrary imitation of the thirteen attributes of God. Duran tries to
justify Maimonides; but nevertheless he agrees with "earlier authorities,"
who formulated the Jewish creed in Three Articles -- The Existence of God,
Revelation, and Reward and Punishment -- under which Duran thinks the
Thirteen Articles of Maimonides may be easily classed. Most interesting
are his remarks concerning the validity of dogmas. He tells us that only
those are to be considered as heretics who abide by their own opinions,
though they know that they are contradictory to the views of the Torah.
Those who accept the fundamental teachings of Judaism, but are led by
their deep studies and earnest reflection to differ in details from the
opinions current among their co-religionists, and explain certain passages
[p. 171] in the Scripture in their own way, must by no means be considered
as heretics. We must, therefore, Duran proceeds to say, not blame such men
as Maimonides, who gave an allegorical interpretation to certain passages
in the Bible about miracles, or R. Levi ben Gershom, who followed certain
un-Jewish views in relation to the belief in Creatio ex nihilo.
Only the views are condemnable, not those who cherish them. God forbid,
says Duran, that such a thing should happen in Israel as to condemn honest
inquirers on account of their differing opinions. It would be interesting
to know of how many divines as tolerant as this persecuted Jew the
fifteenth century can boast. [n. 21]

We can now pass to a more popular but less original writer on our
theme. I refer to R. Joseph Albo, the author of the Roots, [n. 23]
who was the pupil of Chasdai, a younger contemporary of Duran, and wrote
at a much later period than these authors. Graetz has justly denied him
much originality. The chief merit of Albo consists in popularising other
people's thoughts, though he does not always take care to mention their
names. And the student who is a little familiar with the contents of the
Roots will easily find that Albo has taken his best ideas either
from Chasdai or from Duran. As it is of little consequence to us whether
an article of faith is called "stem," or "root," or "branch," there is
scarcely anything fresh left to quote in the name of Albo. The late Dr.
Low, of Szegedin, was indeed right, when he answered an adversary who
challenged him -- "Who would dare to declare me a heretic as long as I
confess the Three Articles laid down by Albo?" with the words "Albo
himself." For, after all the subtle distinctions Albo makes between [p.
172] different classes of dogmas, he declares that every one who denies
even the immutability of the Law or the coming of the Messiah, which are,
according to him, articles of minor importance, is a heretic who will be
excluded from the world to come. But there is one point in his book which
is worth noticing. It was suggested to him by Maimonides, indeed; still
Albo has the merit of having emphasised it as it deserves. Among the
articles which he calls "branches" Albo counts the belief that the
perfection of man, which leads to eternal life, can be obtained by the
fulfilling of one commandment. But this command must, as Maimonides
points out, be done without any worldly regard, and only for the love of
God. When one considers how many platitudes are repeated year by year by
certain theologians on the subject of Jewish legalism, we cannot lay
enough stress on this article of Albo, and we ought to make it better
known than it has hitherto been. [n. 24]

Though I cannot enter here into the enumeration of the Maimonists, I
must not leave unmentioned the name of R. Nissim ben Moses of Marseilles,
the first great Maimonist, who flourished about the end of the thirteenth
century, and was considered as one of the most enlightened thinkers of his
age. [n. 25] Another great Maimonist deserving special attention is R.
Abraham ben Shem-Tob Bibago, who may perhaps be regarded as the most
prominent among those who undertook to defend Maimonides against the
attacks of Chasdai and others. Bibago wrote The Path of Belief
[n.26] in the second half of the fifteenth century, and was, as Dr.
Steinschneider aptly describes him, a Denkglaubiger. But, above
all, he was a believing Jew. When he was once asked, at the table of King
[p. 173] John II., of Aragon, by a Christian scholar, "Are you the Jewish
philosopher?" he answered, "I am a Jew who believes in the Law given to us
by our teacher Moses, though I have studied philosophy." Bibago was such a
devoted admirer of Maimonides that he could not tolerate any opposition to
him. He speaks in one passage of the prudent people of his time who, in
desiring to be looked upon as orthodox by the great mob, calumniated the
Teacher (Maimonides), and depreciated his merits. Bibago's book is very
interesting, especially in its controversial parts; but in respect to
dogmas he is, as already said, a Maimonist, and does not contribute any
new point on our subject.

To return to the Anti-Maimonists of the second half of the fifteenth
century. As such may be considered R. Isaac Aramah, who speaks of three
foundations of religion:

Creatio ex nihilo,

Revelation (?),

and the belief in a world to come. [n. 27]

Next to be mentioned is R. Joseph Jabez, who also accepts only three
articles:

Creatio ex nihilo,

Individual Providence, and

the Unity of God. [n. 22]

Under these three heads he tries to classify the Thirteen Articles of
Maimonides.

The last Spanish writer on our subject is R. Isaac Abarbanel. His
treatise on the subject is known under the title Top of Amanah [n.
29] and was finished in the year 1495. The greatest part of this treatise
forms a defence of Maimonides, many points in which are taken from Bibago.
But, in spite of this fact, Abarbanel must not be considered a Maimonist.
It is only a feeling of piety towards Maimonides, or perhaps rather a
fondness for argument, that made him defend Maimonides against Chasdai and
others. His own view is that it is a mistake [p. 174] to formulate dogmas
of Judaism, since every word in the Torah has to be considered as a dogma
for itself. It was only, says Abarbanel, by following the example of
non-Jewish scholars that Maimonides and others were induced to lay down
dogmas. The non-Jewish philosophers are in the habit of accepting in every
science certain indisputable axioms from which they deduce the
propositions which are less evident. The Jewish philosophers in a similar
way sought for first principles in religion from which the whole of the
Torah ought to be considered as a deduction. But, thinks Abarbanel, the
Torah as a revealed code is under no necessity of deducing things from
each other, for all the commandments came from the same divine authority,
and, therefore, are alike evident, and have the same certainty. On this
and similar grounds Abarbanel refused to acccept dogmatic articles for
Judaism, and he this became the head of the school that forms a class by
itself among the anti- Maimonists to which many of the great Cabbalists
belong. But it is idle talk to cite this school in aid of the modern
theory that Judaism has no dogmas. As we have seen, it was rather an
embarras de riches that prevented Abarbanel from accepting the
Thirteen Articles of Maimonides. To him and to the Cabbalists the Torah
consists of at least 613 Articles.

Abarbanel wrote his book with which we have just dealt, at Naples. And
it is Italy to which, after the expulsion of the Jews from Spain, we have
to look chiefly for religious speculation. But the philosophers of Italy
are still less independent of Maimonides than their predecessor in Spain.
Thus we find that R. David Messer Leon, R. David Vital, and others were
Maimonists.

[p. 175] Even the otherwise refined and original thinker, R. Elijah
Delmedigo (who died about the end of the fifteenth century) becomes almost
impolite when he speaks of the adversaries of Maimonides in respect to
dogmas. "It was only," he says, "the would-be philosopher that dared to
question the articles of Maimonides. Our people have always the bad habit
of thinking themselves competent to attack the greatest authorities as
soon as they have got some knowledge of the subject. Genuine thinkers,
however, attach very little importance to their objections." [n. 30]

Indeed, it seems as if the energetic protests of Delmedigo scared away
the Anti-Maimonists for more than a century. Even in the following
seventeenth century we have to notice only two Anti-Maimonists. The one is
R. Tobijah, the Priest (1652), who was of Polish descent, studied in
Italy, and lived as a medical man in France. He seems to refuse to accept
the belief in the Immutability of the Torah, and in the coming of the
Messiah, as fundamental teachings of Judaism. [n. 31] The other, at the
end of the seventeenth century (1695), is R. Abraham Chayim Viterbo, of
Italy. He accepts only six articles:

Existence of God;

Unity;

Incorporeality;

That God was revealed to Moses on Mount Sinai, and that the prophecy
of Moses is true;

Revelation (including the historical parts of the Torah);

Reward and Punishment.

As to the other articles of Maimonides, Viterbo, in opposition to other
half-hearted Anti-Maimonists, declares that the man who denies them is not
to be considered as a heretic ; though he ought to believe them. [n. 32]

I have now arrived at the limit I set to myself at the beginning of
this essay. For, between the times of [p. 176] Viterbo and those of
Mendelssohn, there is hardly to be found any serious opposition to
Maimonides worth noticing here. Still I must mention the name of R. Saul
Berlin (died 1794); there is much in his opinions on dogmas which will
help us the better to understand the Thirteen Articles of Maimonides. As
the reader has seen, I have refrained so far from reproducing here the
apologies which were made by many Maimonists in behalf of the Thirteen
Articles. For, after all their elaborate pleas, none of them was able to
clear Maimonides of the charge of having confounded dogmas or fundamental
teachings with doctrines. It is also true that the Fifth Article -- that
prayer and worship must only be offered to God -- cannot be considered
even as a doctrine, but as a simple precept. And there are other
difficulties which all the distinctions of the Maimonists will never be
able to solve. The only possible justification is, I think, that suggested
by a remark of R. Saul. This author, who was himself -- like his friend
and older contemporary Mendelssohn -- a strong Anti-Maimonist, among other
remarks, maintains that dogmas must never be laid down but with regard to
the necessities of the time. [n. 33]

Now R. Saul certainly did not doubt that Judaism is based on eternal
truths which can in no way be shaken by new modes of thinking or changed
circumstances. What he meant was that there are in every age certain
beliefs which ought to be asserted more emphatically than others, without
regard to their theological or rather logical importance. It is by this
maxim that we shall be able to explain the articles of Maimonides. He
asserted them, because they were necessary for his time.

[p. 177]We know, for instance, from a letter of his son and from other
contemporaries, that it was just at his time that the belief in the
incorporeality of God was, in the opinion of Maimonides, a little relaxed.
Maimonides, who thought such low notions of the Deity dangerous to
Judaism, therefore laid down an article against them. He tells us in his
Guide that it was far from him to condemn any one who was not able
to demonstrate the Incorporeality of God, but he stigmatised as a heretic
one who refused to believe it. This position might be paralleled by that
of a modern astronomer who, while considering it unreasonable to expect a
mathematical demonstration of the movements of the earth from an ordinary
unscientific man, would yet regard the person who refused to believe in
such movements as an ignorant faddist.

Again, Maimonides undoubtedly knew that there may be found in the
Talmud -- that bottomless sea with its innumerable undercurrents --
passages that are not quite in harmony with his articles; for instance,
the well-known dictum of R. Hillel, who said, there is no Messiah for
Israel -- a passage which has already been quoted ad nauseam by
every opponent of Maimonides from the earliest times down to the year of
grace 1896. Maimonides was well aware of the existence of this and similar
passages. But, being deeply convinced of the necessity of the belief in a
future redemption of Israel -- in opposition to other creeds which claim
this redemption exclusively for their own adherents -- Maimonides simply
ignored the saying of R. Hillel, as an isolated opinion which contradicts
all the consciousness and traditions of the Jew as expressed in thousands
of other passages, and [p. 178] especially in the liturgy. Most
interesting is Maimonides' view about such isolated opinions in a letter
to the wise men of Marseilles. He deals there with the question of free
will and other theological subjects. After having stated his own view he
goes on to say:

"I know that it is possible to find in the Talmud or in
the Midrash this or that saying in contradiction to the views you have
heard from me. But you must not be troubled by them. One must not refuse
to accept a doctrine, the truth of which has been proved, on account of
its being in opposition to some isolated opinion held by this or that
great authority. Is it not possible that he overlooked some important
considerations when he uttered this strange opinion ? It is also possible
that his words must not be taken literally, and have to be explained in an
allegorical way. We can also think that his words were only to be applied
with regard to certain circumstances of his time, but never intended as
permanent truths. . . . No man must surrender his private judgment. The
eyes are not directed backwards but forwards."

In another place Maimonides calls the suppression of one's own opinions
for the reason of their being irreconcilable with the isolated views of
some great authority -- a moral suicide.

By such motives Maimonides was guided when he left certain views
hazarded in the Rabbinic literature unheeded, and followed what we may
perhaps call the religious instinct, trusting to his own conscience. We
may again be certain that Maimonides was clear-headed enough to see that
the words of the Torah: "And there arose no prophet since in Israel like
unto Moses" (Deut. xxxiv. 10), were as little intended to imply a
doctrine as the passage relating to the king Josiah, "And like unto [p.
179] him was there no king before him that turned to the Lord with all his
heart . . . neither after him arose there any like him" (2 Kings xxiii.
25). And none would think of declaring the man a heretic who should
believe another king to be as pious as Josiah. But living among followers
of the "imitating creeds" (as he calls Christianity and Mohammedism), who
claimed that their religion had superseded the law of Moses, Maimonides,
consciously or unconsciously, felt himself compelled to assert the
superiority of the prophecy of Moses. And so we may guess that every
article of Maimonides which seems to offer difficulties to us contains an
assertion of some relaxed belief, or a protest against the pretensions of
other creeds, though we are not always able to discover the exact
necessity for them. On the other hand, Maimonides did not assert the
belief in free will, for which he argued so earnestly in his Guide.
The common "man," with his simple unspeculative mind, for whom these
Thirteen Articles were intended, "never dreamed that the will was not
free," and there was no necessity of impressing on his mind things which
he had never doubted. [n. 34]

So much about Maimonides. As to the Anti-Maimonists, it could hardly
escape the reader that in some of the quoted systems the difference from
the view of Maimonides is only a logical one, not a theological. Of some
authors again, especially those of the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries, it is not at all certain whether they intended to oppose
Maimonides. Others again, as for instance R. Abba Mari, R. Lipman, and R.
Joseph Jabez, acted on the same principle as Maimonides, urging only those
teachings of Judaism which they thought endangered. One could now, indeed,
animated by the praiseworthy exam- [p. 180] ples given to us by
Maimonides, also propose some articles of faith which are suggested to us
by the necessities of our own time. One might, for instance, insert the
article, "I believe that Judaism is, in the first instance, a divine
religion, not a mere complex of racial peculiarities and tribal
customs." One might again propose an article to the effect that Judaism is
a proselytising religion, having the mission to bring about God's kingdom
on earth, and to include in that kingdom all mankind. One might also
submit for consideration whether, it would not be advisable to urge a
little more the principle that religion means chiefly a
Weltanschauung and worship of God by means of holiness both in
thought and in action. One would even not object to accept the article
laid down by R. Saul, that we have to look upon ourselves as sinners.
Morbid as such a belief may be, it would, if properly impressed on our
mind, have perhaps the wholesome effect of cooling down a little our self
importance and our mutual admiration that makes all progress among us
almost impossible.

But it was not my purpose to ventilate here the question whether
Maimonides' articles are sufficient for us, or whether we ought not to add
new ones to them. Nor do I attempt to decide what system we ought to
prefer for recitation in the Synagogue -- that of Maimonides or that of
Chasdai, or of any other writer. I do not think that such a recital is of
much use. My object in this sketch has been rather to make the reader
think about Judaism, by proving that it regulates not only our actions,
but also our thoughts. We usually urge that in Judaism religion means
life; but we forget that a life without guiding principles and thoughts is
a Life not worth living. At [p. 181] least it was so considered by the
greatest Jewish thinkers, and hence their efforts to formulate the creed
of Judaism, so that men should not only be able to do the right thing, but
also to think the right thing. Whether they succeeded in their attempts
towards formulating the creed of Judaism or not will always remain a
question. This concerns the logician more than the theologian. But surely
Maimonides and his successors did succeed in having a religion depending
directly on God, with the most ideal and lofty aspirations for the future;
whilst the Judaism of a great part of our modern theologians reminds one
very much of the words with which the author of Marius the
Epicurean characterises the Roman religion in the days of her decline:
a religion which had been always something to be done rather than
something to be thought, or believed, or loved.

Political economy, hygiene, statistics, are very fine things. But no
sane man would for them make those sacrifices which Judaism requires from
us. It is only for God's sake, to fulfil His commands and to accomplish
His purpose, that religion becomes worth living and dying for. And this
can only be possible with a religion which possesses dogmas.

It is true that every great religion is "a concentration of many ideas
and ideals," which make this religion able to adapt itself to various
modes of thinking and living. But there must always be a point round which
all these ideas concentrate themselves. This centre is Dogma.