Version
3.0

Defra

Foot
and Mouth Disease

Contingency
Plan

FOREWORD

This Contingency Plan takes forward the Government’s
commitment to implement the recommendations of the Inquiries into the foot and
mouth disease outbreak in 2001.The
Lessons Learned Inquiry stressed the importance of contingency planning, the
need to react with speed and certainty, and the importance of clear and
consistent communication with interested parties.

The
plan sets out the structures and systems that would be immediately implemented
in an outbreak and describes the capability that would enable the speedy
provision of resources to bring into operation the Government’s control
policies.It has been developed
with input from stakeholders and acknowledges the importance of greater
engagement with operational partners, particularly local authorities, both in
developing emergency preparedness and dealing with a disease
outbreak.

Defra published an interim Foot and Mouth Disease
Contingency Plan in March 2002 which codified the immediate lessons learned from
the 2001 outbreak.Following the
publication of the Reports of the Official Inquiries, a revised version was
published on 6 November 2002 at the same time as the Government responded to the
Inquiries’ recommendations.This
Plan replaces that version following consultation, policy development and
further work.

The
purpose of publishing this Plan is to make transparent the way in which FMD
control policies would be implemented in the event of an outbreak.In this sense it is an operational
plan.Future developments in policy
such as those that may result from the Animal Health and Welfare Strategy and
the implementation of new legislation such as the current draft FMD Directive
will be reflected in future revisions as part of a commitment to regular
updating and stakeholder involvement.This Plan is intended only to indicate how Defra and its partners would
implement the agreed policies.It
will be subject to regular review.

The
Plan fits into the framework of the EU approved Contingency Plan and is
augmented by the detailed SVS instructions dealing with operational disease
control and the particular local aspects of the control operation that are
contained in plans maintained by each Animal Health Divisional
Office.

This
Plan will be brought into use not only in the event of an outbreak of foot and
mouth disease, but also to provide the structures, frameworks and systems that
would be necessary for the control of other exotic diseases.They have been developed against the
background of the 2001 foot and mouth disease outbreak and may be modified and
developed during future operations.They are the initial framework for managing an outbreak in a structured
way, but they are not intended to constrain the way the control operation
develops.The Plan provides at
present a clear and public operational plan which would guide Defra and those
with whom it works in dealing with an outbreak of exotic disease and informs the
public and all those who might be affected by the control measures.

The
Plan sets out how the disease would be controlled were there to be an outbreak
tomorrow.It is however, the
Government’s view that there needs to be a fairer balance between farmers and
tax payers in meeting the costs of animal diseases.The view is supported by the Curry
Commission, the Lessons Learned Inquiry into FMD 2001 and the PAC report.A Defra-led working group comprising
stakeholders from the livestock and insurance industries has been exploring
policy options for this.The group
completed the initial phase of this work in 2002.It is likely that a combination of a
levy and voluntary top up insurance could provide a basis for a way forward and
work is continuing with the view of launching a wide ranging consultation
exercise in summer 2003.This will
affect compensation for animals slaughtered in the disease control operation or
under a livestock welfare scheme, and the costs of secondary cleansing and
disinfection.

Since
the last version of the Plan was published it has been considerably
augmented.It now makes reference
to the availability of detailed instructions on procurement and commercial
contracting and on financial management of the outbreak.It explains the provision of a register
of Defra staff available for service in an emergency and how further personnel
would be engaged.It explains how
the new register of independent valuers would be employed and the call up of
monitor valuers.It outlines the
key regional operational stakeholder capabilities and encourages the greater
involvement of Defra, both nationally and locally, with its operational partners
to ensure a better integrated approach to disease control and with all those
affected to provide a better understanding of what the effect disease control
measures would have.

It
includes a new section on the role of the Rural Stress Action Plan Working Group
- encouraging liaison with volunteer and charity organisations who could offer
support.Finally the Plan reflects
the provisions of the Animal Health Act 2002 by reference to emergency
vaccination and the Decision Tree for disease control strategies, the disease
control slaughter protocol for the use of the pre-emptive cull and refers to the
revised biosecurity guidance which is out for consultation.

This
version of the Contingency Plan takes into account comments received,
operational additions to the plan and lessons learned from exercises.It has been the subject of considerable
consultation with stakeholders and reflects as far as possible the comments that
have been made.As a living
document it will always be open for further comment.

7The
latest version of the Contingency Plan will be displayed on the Defra website at
all times with a box for comments allowing ongoing opportunity for
comment.

7Timely
meetings will be held with stakeholders so that views can be included in the
process of the development of the Plan.

7Any
proposals for significant changes of policy affecting the Plan will be subject
to separate consultation exercises.Consultation letters will explain that the end result will form part of
the Plan.To avoid consultation
‘fatigue’ we will not always consult on the whole Plan when only these policy
changes are incorporated.However,
interested parties will be written to in order to let them know of the changes
to the Plan and we will also place a clear message on the Defra
website;

7Regardless
of any separate consultations on particular issues, a full written consultation
on the Plan will take place at least annually.

Operational
Instructions to carry out the requirements of this contingency plan are
contained within the State Veterinary Service Instructions - VIPER (Veterinary Instructions, Procedures and Emergency Routines) Chapter 3.This is available to the public in the
Defra library, Room 320A, Nobel House, 17 Smith Square, London SW1P 3JR and may
be viewed by appointment by telephone: 0207 238 6575 (please allow 24 hours
notice).

A
project to consolidate the existing version into a web based document, capturing
and collating experiences gained during 2001 to provide a consistent response
based on best practices identified during and following the outbreak is under
way.The revised re-presented
chapter should be completed and publicly available on the Defra website in the
summer.

VA

VEXDD

VLA

VO

VRD

VTVS

Vetnet
Tracing Verification System

WAG

Welsh
Assembly Government

WAG ARAD

Welsh
Assembly Government Agriculture and Rural Affairs
Department

SECTION
1 - Background, Structures and
Policies

BACKGROUND

1.1This
document is Defra’s contingency plan framework for foot and mouth disease (FMD)
outbreaks within the structure provided by the existing EU approved contingency
plan. It is a working document subject to regular review and update.

1.3The Plan is
split into sections, which are designed to be removed and used as ‘standalone’
documents giving guidance at differing levels.

1.4This
framework document taken together with the State Veterinary Service operational
instructions (VIPER Chapter 3) and local contingency plans form Defra’s FMD
contingency plans.The State
Veterinary Service operational instructions (VIPER Chapter 3) include detailed
guidance and instruction for staff in local Animal Health Divisional Offices (or
Local Disease Control Centres) and the National Disease Control Centre.Local plans, prepared by AHDOs, include
local procedures and contact lists to allow the implementation of VIPER Chapter
3 instructions and the National Contingency Plan.This ensures a consistent national
approach whilst allowingnecessary
adaptation to local circumstances. This framework contingency plan does not
re-iterate VIPER Chapter 3 and local instructions.This Plan provides a clear view of the
structures, roles and responsibilities required at strategic and tactical levels
in order to support the operations on the ground.

1.5The Plan is
based on established veterinary procedures and also incorporates some of the
control policies that developed during the 2001 outbreak.It codifies the experiences and
operational lessons learnt from that outbreak and reflects the recommendations
made by the Official Inquiries.

OUTLINE OF COMMAND
STRUCTURES

Command and
Control

1.6The
response to a disease alert will be controlled using a Strategic, Tactical and
Operational command structure.

Strategic
Command

1.7Purpose:To provide high
level command and control at all stages of an animal disease outbreak, enabling
a cross departmental response which gives clear strategic direction.Initially Defra Management Board, but
rapid establishment of the Civil Contingencies Committee (CCC and/or CCC(O))
which will include Ministers (both Defra and other Government Departments),
Defra Permanent Secretary, Defra Directors General (including the Chief
Veterinary Officer), Directors of: State Veterinary Service and Defra
Communications Directorate and senior officials from other relevant Government
Departments (as below).

Operational Command

1)To implement contingency plans, working
with stakeholders to ensure effective control of the disease
outbreak.

2)To receive tactical guidance and
implement it in liaison with other local responders and provide regular
feedback.

Local
Disease Control Centres (LDCCs) under Regional Operations Director/Divisional
Veterinary Manager control; to include representatives from relevant agencies,
local authorities, other key stakeholders and operational partners (see Annex
N).

1.11N.B.This Plan covers
operations in England.Annex O sets
out outline details of the contingency plans for Scotland and Wales.Northern Ireland also has a separate
contingency plan, details of which are not outlined in this plan as the island
of Ireland is treated as a separate epidemiological
entity.

OUTLINE OF POLICIES

1.12These policies will be
applied if FMD is confirmed

(Note:
The first case will be confirmed by Laboratory Test)

7A
GB wide national movement ban of susceptible species will be put in place
immediately.

7Export
licences for animals and animal products will be
withdrawn.

7Diseased
and other susceptible animals on infected premises will be culled as soon as
possible, within 24 hours of report.Dangerous contacts will be culled as soon as
possible.

7Emergency
Vaccination will immediately be considered as an option based upon emerging
epidemiological and logistical factors.If emergency vaccination is used it would be on the basis of
vaccinate-to-live wherever possible.

7A
Protection Zone will be imposed with a radius of 3km around the Infected
Premises.Regular veterinary patrol
visits of all premises with susceptible livestock within this area will take
place.

7A
Restricted Infected Area will be declared with a minimum radius of 10km
around infected premises.This will
require increased levels of biosecurity on farms, cleansing and disinfection
(C&D) for vehicles, people and machinery moving on/off farms and movement
controls for animals, animal products, feed and bedding.

7Disposal
by incineration would be implemented immediately with rendering as the next
option and other disposal routes being available as an additional resource
subject to environmental, land use planning and public health
considerations.

7Footpaths
would only be closed on Infected Premises and within the 3km Protection Zone, (A
Veterinary Risk Assessment and Protocol for Rights of Way closure is at Annex
E).

1.13Further action will depend on
the circumstances of a particular outbreak and on scientific and veterinary
advice.The Decision Tree (Annex B)
will be followed in deciding what action to take.

1.14Additional strategies
include:

7culling
of other susceptible livestock exposed to the disease (e.g. premises under virus
plumes, premises contiguous to the infected premises); and

7pre-emptive
or ‘firebreak’ culling of animals not on infected premises, not dangerous
contacts or not necessarily exposed to the disease, in order to prevent the
wider spread of the disease outwith an area.

SECTION
2 - Alert System & States
of Alert

2.1A standard
alert system has been adopted as a basis for planning the response to a disease
outbreak.Alert states of ‘Amber’
(in the case of suspicion of disease) and ‘Red’ (on confirmation of the first
case of disease) will be called.

AMBER - ACTION ON
SUSPICION OF FMD

2.2Any
suspicion of FMD must be reported to the local Animal Health Division Office
(AHDO) of the State Veterinary Service who will take action according to SVS
instructions.In outline this means
that:-

7movement
restrictions will be imposed on the affected premises whilst investigations are
carried out;

7if
initial examination of the suspect animal by an official Veterinary Inspector
cannot rule out the existence of FMD, samples will be taken and sent for
laboratory analysis;

7as
a precautionary measure, movement restrictions will also be imposed on all
livestock holdings within an 8km radius of the affected
premises;

7key
local stakeholders will be notified as soon as
practicable.

2.3Responsibility for providing and communicating information on a
suspect case of disease, including laboratory results, lies with
Veterinary Exotic Diseases Division (VEXD) who use form ND1 to notify key
veterinary and policy personnel in HQ and the regions, including the Chief
Veterinary Officer and the Director of the State Veterinary Service.The Director of the SVS will put the
relevant ROD & DOM on alert.

2.4Out of
Hours notification is the responsibility of the Duty Veterinary Adviser and Duty
Press Officer.

2.5In some
cases where laboratory confirmation is awaited and the veterinary assessment
indicates an unacceptable risk in waiting, the Chief Veterinary Officer may take
the decision to move to red alert before final confirmation is received.In this case all action indicated as
required under ‘Red’ alert will be immediately initiated.

Communications Protocol - Laboratory Test Results on a suspect case

2.6This
protocol governs the distribution and timing of release of information on test
results, both internally and externally.

2.7Information
should be made available as soon as possible.To ensure that communications aspects
can be dealt with as quickly as possible, a discussion, normally by conference
call, should take place with the CVO or his nominated representative leading and
those listed below participating.

CVO

DG OSD

Director SVS

AHWD - Director or Head of Division

LSDG - Director of Head of Division

CD (and GNN)

Private Offices

No. 10

SVS Contingency Planning

DVM

Civil Contingencies Secretariat

News Co-ordination Centre

2.8The
arrangements for convening the conference call will be undertaken by CD (out of
hours the duty press officer will be notified by the Duty Veterinary Advisor in
AHWD).A list of contact names and
numbers for internal principals and their deputies will be maintained by AHWD
and available from the Defra Duty Officer and the SVS Home Duty
Clerk.

2.9The agenda
for the communications teleconference call would comprise (with a report from
bracketed party)

1.Situation Report-
National (CVO nominated representative)

- Local (DVM)

2.Timescale (CVO nominated representative)

3.Risk assessment (CVO nominated representative/DVM)

4.Communications objectives (Director of
Communications)

5.Stakeholder Handling (national and local) (AHWD,
DVM)

6.Agreed lines to take/press notice (Director of
Communications)

7.Time of release and action points (CVO Nominated
representative)

2.10The following then take
responsibility for informing externally at an agreed time:

-DVM: individual farmer (DVM to alert CD/regional GNN as soon as the
individual is told and before informing other external groups);

-DVM: Emergency planning departments of relevant local authorities, local
police force and the Environment Agency;

2.11News Releases are drafted by
AHWD in conjunction with CD and must be sent to all internal principals
(particularly the DVM) before being released externally.

2.12Questions about test results
and timing of their delivery should be addressed to the CVO nominated
contact.

RED - INITIAL
ACTION ON CONFIRMATION OF FMD

2.13If the suspected case is
subsequently confirmed by the CVO as having disease or if the risk assessment
indicates, the alert state will immediately be raised to ‘Red’ and the following
action will take place:-

7the
Head of Animal Movements and Exotic Diseases Division will notify Defra
Ministers and senior officials, other government departments, devolved
administrations and agencies and organisations directly
affected;

7the
DCVO (policy) will inform the European Commission, OIE, and national veterinary
organisations;

7the
Director of the SVS will authorise the establishment of a Local Disease Control
Centre (LDCC) and the National Disease Control Centre.SVS Instructions contain detailed plans
for their establishment and resourcing;

7the
Head of SVS Contingency Planning Division will notify all DVMs and Heads of
Veterinary Services, nominated heads of NDCC cells from within Defra, those who
will be invited to be represented in the NDCC, and nominated RODs and
DOMs;

7the
Head of SVS CP Division will alert the vaccination contractors and put them on
stand-by, subject to further direction from the Strategic Group.As soon as the FMD strain responsible
for the outbreak is identified and it has been confirmed that one of the
available vaccines will afford protection, the Head of AMED Division will
instruct the relevant contractor to formulate vaccine;

7an
Emergency Management Board will be convened as soon as possible and will take a
decision on triggering the Civil Contingencies Committee on the basis of
emerging information about the disease;

7other
Government Departments, the Armed Forces, operational partners and key local
stakeholders such as local authorities will be notified as soon as
possible.

NB.Detail of who should contact whom is set
out at Annex F.

2.14Action to be taken to
establish the NDCC and relevant LDCC and to control the disease is set out in
detail in the SVS instructions and the AHDO contingency
plans.

2.15The following policies will
be applied on confirmation of FMD:

(Note:
The first case will be confirmed by Laboratory Test)

7A
GB wide national movement ban of susceptible species will be put in place
immediately.

7Export
licences for animals and animal products will be
withdrawn.

7Diseased
and other susceptible animals on infected premises will be culled as soon as
possible, within 24 hours of report.Dangerous contacts will be culled as soon as
possible.

7Emergency
Vaccination will immediately be considered as an option based upon emerging
epidemiological and logistical factors.If emergency vaccination is used it would be on the basis of
vaccinate-to-live wherever possible.

7A
Protection Zone will be imposed with a radius of 3km around the Infected
Premises.Regular veterinary patrol
visits of all premises with susceptible livestock within this area will take
place.

7A
Restricted Infected Area will be declared with a minimum radius of 10km
around infected premises.This will
require increased levels of biosecurity on farms, cleansing and disinfection
(C&D) for vehicles, people and machinery moving on/off farms and movement
controls for animals, animal products, feed and bedding.

7Disposal
by incineration would be implemented immediately with rendering as the next
option and other disposal routes being available as an additional resource
subject to environmental, land use planning and public health
considerations.

7Footpaths
would only be closed on Infected Premises and within the 3km Protection Zone, (A
Veterinary Risk Assessment and Protocol for Rights of Way closure is at Annex
E).

2.16Further action will depend on
the circumstances of a particular outbreak and on scientific and veterinary
advice.The Decision Tree (Annex B)
will be followed in deciding what action to take.The Animal Health Act 1981, as amended
by the Animal Health Act 2002, lays
a duty on the Secretary of State to consider vaccination as a means of
preventing the spread of the disease.Wherever possible this would be on the basis of emergency
vaccinate-to-live.Consultation
with interested parties is currently underway, in the context of negotiations on
the EU FMD Directive, to address technical, commercial and communications issues
around emergency vaccination.The
reasons for a decision not to vaccinate would be explained before further
measures were introduced.

2.17Additional strategies
include:

7culling
of other susceptible livestock exposed to the disease (e.g. premises under virus
plumes, premises contiguous to the infected premises); and

7pre-emptive
or ‘firebreak’ culling of animals not on infected premises, not dangerous
contacts or not necessarily exposed to the disease, in order to prevent the
wider spread of the disease outwith an area.

2.18The “Decision Tree” for
disease control strategies against FMD sets out the factors the Government will
take into account in deciding which strategy to adopt in order to control and
eradicate the disease.The Decision
Tree is at Annex B.

2.19There is also a Disease
Control (Slaughter) Protocol for use in the event of a pre-emptive cull as at
Annex C.

This
protocol sets out the requirements that must be followed if a pre-emptive cull
is to be undertaken.

Further Action

2.20Once FMD is confirmed the
main elements of this plan are brought into action.

Section
3 sets out the resources that would be deployed;

Section
4 describes the key operations that have a central input;

Section
5 sets out the main elements of the Communications Plan;

Section
6 describes the strategic organisations and structures;

Section
7 the tactical organisation; and

Section
8 the operational plan.

These last two are augmented by the SVS instructions and
the local office contingency plans.

SECTION
3 -
Resources

INVOLVEMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES

3.1Immediately
a case of FMD is confirmed, the Director General Operations and Service Delivery
will contact the MOD Home and Special Forces Secretariat in order to notify them
of the outbreak so that, if necessary, aid can be sought with the minimum
delay.If it were decided that it
was necessary to seek aid from the armed forces, aid would be provided under the
‘Military Aid to the Civil Authorities’ (MACA) arrangements, subject to other
Armed Forces commitments.The Armed
Forces may provide assistance with logistic capability and it may be appropriate
to deploy at both tactical (Tactical command) and operational (Operational
command) levels.

3.2Contact
details for MOD Home and Special Forces Secretariat can be found at Annex
F.

3.3The Armed
Forces will have their own command and control structure with overall
co-ordination of their effort being controlled by Armed Forces HQ Land.It is not appropriate for regional staff
to approach Army Brigade headquarters directly.All requests for initial assistance must
be passed through NDCC.

3.4Brigade
Commanders will take direction (but not commands) from RODs/DVMs and will need
to be given clear aims and objectives.The local military commander will decide how best to use their troops
based on these aims and the directions received.Military Liaison Officers should be
posted to LDCCs to take on a local strategic co-ordination
function.

HUMAN RESOURCES

Veterinary Personnel

Identification of UK government veterinary personnel

3.5On
authority from the Director SVS individual veterinary staff will be alerted with
immediate effect and deployed as instructed by Divisional Veterinary
Managers.(SVS instructions and
local office contingency plans expand on these arrangements).In addition, vets from the following
sources will be contacted by VRD with a view to securing additional
assistance:

7Retired
veterinary staff

7Veterinary
staff from Defra agencies and other government
departments.

Identification of non-government veterinary personnel

3.6The great
majority of private vets who worked for Defra during the FMD epidemic of 2001
did so as Temporary Veterinary Inspectors (TVIs).The Department has temporarily stopped
appointing TVIs pending the introduction of a new flexible employment
contract.In the interim,
practising private vets in Great Britain would be engaged as Local Veterinary
Inspectors (LVIs) to increase the numbers of LVIs that are already engaged.These arrangements are likely to be
refined following the current Review of LVIs.Other private veterinary surgeons in GB
and abroad would be engaged as casual veterinary staff.

Identification of overseas government veterinary personnel

3.7If overseas
government veterinary resource is deemed necessary following risk assessment and
epidemiological advice, the Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO) will send a formal
request to the International Animal Health Emergency Reserve countries.The CVO will also send a formal request
to EU Member States if necessary.Induction briefing for incoming veterinary surgeons will be arranged at
London HQ through the Veterinary Resource Division.Training will be provided at Local
DCCs.

3.8Members of
the Senior Civil Service will be appointed for three years as contingency
Regional Operations Directors (RODs) to take up post in the event of an outbreak
and lead the LDCCs.They will be
allocated to one of the three SVS regions in England.SVS Contingency Planning Division will
maintain a list of RODs (Annex G).

3.9When an
Amber alert is declared the Director of the SVS will alert the Head of
Veterinary Service for that SVS Region to be on immediate standby to take up
post as ROD.The contingency ROD
for that region will also be alerted to replace the HVS as soon as possible to
lead the LDCC so that the HVS can be transferred to strengthen veterinary
management at HQ.

3.10Grade 6s (or Grade 7s on
temporary promotion) will be appointed for three years as contingency Divisional
Operations Managers to take up posts in the event of an outbreak and work beside
DVMs to manage the administrative (non-veterinary) part of the operation.Like RODs, they will be allocated to one
of the three SVS regions in England.Upon confirmation of a case, a DOM for the relevant region will be
alerted by SVS CPD to take up post as soon as possible.SVS CPD will maintain a list of DOMs
annexed to this plan (Annex G).Similar arrangements are being set up in Scotland and
Wales.

3.11During their period of
appointment, the contingency RODs and DOMs will spend 5 days a year training,
developing effective links with AHDOs, DVMs and key regional stakeholders and
taking part in contingency planning exercises.

Key Administrative, Field & Technical Personnel

3.12The National Disease Control
Centre (NDCC) and Local Disease Control Centres (LDCCs) will require access to
middle managers who are able to take up key positions immediately on
confirmation of disease.Key posts
have been identified in the NDCC & LDCCs, together with job descriptions and
Day 1 tasks.

3.13The Director SVS, through HR
Services Division, will maintain a list of Defra staff who have the required
skills and experience to take up key positions in the NDCC.These individuals will be called upon as
soon as disease is confirmed and are expected to take up post as soon as
possible (within 24 hours of request).

3.14Staff in an AHDO in which an
LDCC is being set up, and in the SVS more widely, will be the first to be called
upon if FMD is confirmed.They will
be expected to take up post as soon as possible while further staff resources
are called in.

3.15Key administrative personnel
will be expected to take part in contingency testing exercises.This should be written into their job
descriptions and work objectives.

General field, technical and administrative personnel

3.16The NDCC and LDCCs will
require immediate access to general field and administrative staff to support
key personnel and veterinary colleagues in the eradication of
disease.

3.17The Director General of
Operations and Service Delivery will seek Management Board authority to require
the release of staff from Defra and Defra Agencies to work on emergency sites.
The Management Board will provide clear direction to Divisions, Agencies and
work groups, in order that non-essential staff can volunteer their services and
be released quickly.First call
will be on those staff on the Defra Emergency Volunteers
Register.

3.18Human Resources Services
Division will co-ordinate action on the redeployment of administrative staff
from the Emergency Volunteers Register, and other staff, to the NDCC and to
LDCCs.The NDCC Personnel Cell will
maintain an overview of numbers, provide terms of appointment for administrative
staff in the regions, liaise with DWP and act as a central point, in close
liaison with the SVS Personnel Unit at Worcester, for HR issues both in London
and the Regions.

3.19The SVS Personnel Unit will
advise on Human Resource services for LDCCs and will provide one or more HR
trained personnel to assist in setting up local HR teams.They will also maintain quality control
and provide policy guidance to local managers and HR teams on HR issues.They will also be responsible for
liaising with the LDCC personnel points, monitoring national field-based
resources and co-ordinating national veterinary recruitment
exercises.

3.20Additional support staff may
need to be drafted in from other government departments.Use of the protocols set out in a
central Memorandum of Understanding on Mutual Aid and the Redeployment of Human
Resources will be triggered if necessary, and the Director General Operations
and Service Delivery, through the Permanent Secretary, will contact the Civil
Contingencies Secretariat to request assistance with additional staffing.Concurrently, Regional Operations
Directors will liaise with Government Office Directors to seek additional
assistance in locating further staff.

3.21Having first sought clearance
from the Director General Operations and Service Delivery [or Director SVS],
RODs may contact Regional Directors ofPluscentreplus (Department for Work and Pensions) in order to recruit
staff directly on short-term contracts.In this instance, guidance on contractual arrangements should be sought
from the personnel cell in the NDCC and the personnel expertise that may be
available in the LDCC.The
Operational Support Secretariat of Jobcentre Plus (Department of Work and
Pensions) may assist in brokering these arrangements and will be invited to send
a representative to the NDCC.(See
Annex F - Contact List for details).

3.22Additional technical staff
from the following sources will also be considered:

7Retired
SVS technical staff

7Veterinary
students from veterinary colleges

7Agricultural
students

DEFRA LEGAL SERVICES

3.23Legal Services Directorate
General must be instructed at the start of an outbreak.It is important to have an established
system for the handling of claims for matters such as compensation for
slaughtered animals and unintentional damage to premises.

3.24A Legal Liaison Unit will be
immediately established in the NDCC to co-ordinate actions and evidence
gathering between LSDG and the NDCC and the LDCCs.Additionally, a Legal Liaison Officer
will be posted in each LDCC.Administrative staff will fill both the NDCC Legal Liaison Unit and the
Legal Liaison Officers posts.LSDG
will provide lawyers to the NDCC on a rota basis.

3.25LSDG hold all templates for
Orders and must be approached immediately a Declaratory Order is
required.

VACCINATION TEAMS

Vets and team members responsible for vaccination

3.26Upon confirmation of disease,
ADAS, the current contractor responsible for emergency vaccination will be
notified by the Head of SVS CP Division to set its plans in action to establish
the required numbers of vets and team members within the agreed
time.

Lay Vaccinators

3.27To ensure that emergency
vaccination could be implemented without delay in any future outbreak, Defra is
currently making arrangements, subject to public consultation, for the use of
lay vaccinators to be permitted by orders made under the Veterinary Surgeons Act
1966 and the Medicines Act 1968.

INVOLVEMENT OF STAKEHOLDERS AND OPERATIONAL PARTNERS

3.28High level involvement of
other government departments, executive agencies and stakeholders is defined in
Section 6 - the Strategic Level section of this plan.This will be confirmed by the Civil
Contingencies Committee (Officials) and may change as necessary.The Head of SVS Contingency Planning
Division will ensure that representatives of other government departments,
operational partners and those affected by the disease and measures taken to
control it are invited to form part of the NDCC.

3.29DVMs will engage with local stakeholders as part of their routine
emergency-preparedness arrangements and, where possible, include them in the
planning and implementation of regular local exercises.DVMs must establish strong links with
their local Police Force strategic (Gold) command as this is recognised by all
key local agencies as the co-ordination point for emergency response.It is also essential that DVMs have
established regular contact with their Local Authority Emergency Planning
Officers, Trading Standards Officers, Environment Agency Emergency Planners, the
Government Office Emergencies Team and the Health Protection Agency.All these agencies must know and
understand the FMD contingency plans (including relevant sections of SVS
instructions and local office contingency plans) and the DVM must have
established their capabilities, roles and responsibilities in the event of an
outbreak.It is also important that
all those that would be affected an outbreak including representatives of the
farming industry, rural businesses, local community groups and those concerned
with promoting tourism are engaged and involved, as appropriate in
exercises.

3.30The regular animal health
stakeholder meetings will be upgraded in the event of an outbreak under the
chairmanship of the Animal Health Minister [or as necessary by the Chief
Veterinary Officer or the Director Animal Health deputising for him] and meet
more frequently.Representatives of
key stakeholder organisations from outside the agriculture and the food sectors
will be invited to attend in order to embrace wider countryside interests.The possibility of having separate
sub-groups to look at particular issues in greater depth (e.g. trade,
countryside access, tourism, etc.) will be kept under review, according to the
scale of the outbreak.

TRAINING AND EXERCISES

Veterinary training

3.31All new veterinary entrants
to the SVS attend a one-day course on exotic viral diseases at the Institute for
Animal Health, Pirbright, in addition to general and specific training related
to all their work areas.This
includes training in notifiable disease procedures.Selected individuals also attend
specific post-graduate training, e.g. in epidemiology.Courses are held, as required, to ensure
adequate numbers of trained people across the country.

Private Sector Veterinary Training

3.32The current review of Local Veterinary Inspectors (LVIs) referred to at
paragraph 3.6 is considering the enhanced training of LVIs both in everyday and
emergency situations.

AHDO training in key emergency procedures

3.33DVMs will identify individual
Animal Health Divisional Office (AHDO) staff to undertake key emergency roles in
line with the job roles outlined in SVS instructions.They will ensure these staff are fully
trained and equipped to undertake their respective roles and that their
‘everyday’ objectives include reference to the key responsibilities
required.

Induction training

3.34Managers must ensure that new
staff recruited into LDCCs or the NDCC during an outbreak receive induction
training covering at least their roles and health and safety procedures.The Director SVS and DVMs will ensure
their permanent staff are familiar with this contingency plan, the relevant
local office contingency plans, SVS instructions, and business process
maps.

3.35For key personnel, this will
centre on the job descriptions within this plan.Desk instructions for key posts will be
available in AHDOs.For other
individuals recruited to support an LDCC, a brief outline job description must
be drafted.Managers must take time
to describe the jobholder’s duties, offer support and review the job role
regularly.Managers should consider
establishing a ‘buddying’ system, whereby new recruits work alongside existing
jobholders to learn their job.

3.36ADAS will train vets and team
members recruited to carry out vaccination in on-farm procedure and bio-security
procedures.Additionally,
specialised training in vaccination, tagging and data recording will be
provided.All external contractors
will be provided with, and will make themselves familiar with, Biosecurity
Protocols.All local recruits to
vaccination teams must meet, and sign that they comply with, specified criteria
including no contact with susceptible livestock for 3 days prior to starting the
programme, during the programme and for 3 days after
completion.

Media Training

3.37DVMs/RODs/HsVS should already
have received appropriate media training, in order to deal effectively with the
intense media interest surrounding an outbreak.If not, a short two day course,
organised by Communications Directorate in conjunction with an outside training
company, uses broadcast journalists and a film crew to enable participants to
deliver professional standard broadcast interviews.

Contingency Planning Exercises

3.38This plan and the detailed
instructions and local plans will be regularly tested at both local and national
levels through simulation exercises using the key personnel identified.Stakeholders will be involved in these
exercises.It is intended that all
stakeholders should be aware of Defra’s emergency procedures and be fully
involved in their on-going development.

HEALTH AND SAFETY AND STAFF WELFARE

3.39The Defra Departmental Health
and Safety Unit (DHSU) and VRD Safety Team are the key safety professionals who
must be involved in all aspects of operational planning.They will ensure that all LDCCs have a
named safety professional to provide
competent advice at all stages of operations; as far as is operationally
possible this individual will be located in the LDCC and it is expected that
provision will be made for this.DVMs and RODs must ensure that the
competent safety person is included as part of their management
team.

3.40The Departmental Health and
Safety Manager will operate as part of the Operations Cell in the NDCC,
providing health and safety advice at the strategic level.

3.41All staff should be made
aware of Defra’s Welfare Service which can provide support and guidance in
individual cases of stress of hardship.

3.42A strategic health and safety
plan in support of these arrangements has been produced by Defra and is detailed
in Annex L of this document.All
relevant personnel must follow these arrangements.

3.43As part of the management of
the vaccination operation ADAS (as the current contractor) will establish a
Health and Safety Team.This will
consist of a Manager and 2 other trained H&S consultants.This team will produce risk assessments
for pre-vaccination visits by vets, for farm vaccinators, on handling facilities
and maintain the necessary documentation to accompany this.ADAS will comply with best practice and
all relevant provisions, whether statutory or otherwise, relating to health and
safety at work.

ACCOMMODATION

Access to accommodation, IT and telephony infrastructure

3.44DVMs will identify and
regularly review the availability of potential LDCC sites in liaison with BEM
Division.BEMD has in place
Facilities Management Contracts covering all of England and Wales through which
temporary and other accommodation can be provided.DVMs should also maintain details of
suppliers and contractors of temporary accommodation.

3.45Additionally, a range of
suitable sites are currently being investigated for use as vaccination
centres.In doing so, consideration
will be given to the following factors:

7good
road access to the target area(s) and to any satellite centres - where possible,
within the target area;

7suitable
area for plunge disinfection of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and
subsequent drying;

7suitable
area for vaccination team dispatch.

3.46Modular office accommodation
will also be made available, depending in circumstances, on a call off basis for
use as vaccination centres if required.It is envisaged that each vaccination centre will be accompanied by
smaller satellite centres that will exist on a smaller
scale.

3.47The National Disease Control
Centre will be in London.A room in
Defra’s building at 1A Page Street is equipped with the necessary facilities
needed to establish the control centre immediately an outbreak is
confirmed.However, it is realised
that in the event of a rapid escalation of an outbreak it would be necessary to
have access to more space.In this
event, BEMD could relocate the NDCC to the 7th and 8th
floors as they have the requisite infrastructure in place.BEMD will therefore be kept fully
informed of the likely escalation of the disease in order that they can enact
plans for the relocation of staff and the provision of adequate desking,
telephony, etc.

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & DATA SYSTEMS

3.48The provision of IT hardware
and corporate software (Defra EDEN) is the responsibility of Information
Technology Directorate (ITD).Additional hardware and software can be quickly supplied through
arrangements with Defra’s IT partners.ITD also has detailed plans to ensure IT resilience and Business
Continuity.

Disease Control System (DCS)

3.49The FMD Disease Control
System (DCS) is the key Management Information System to be used in the event of
an outbreak in the near future.It
provides the system for recording all actions taken to control the disease in
relation to each premises affected and for providing reports on the progress of
the disease and its management.DVMs will ensure that all their AHDO staff are familiar with the
functionality of DCS, requesting additional staff training from SVS IT Branch as
appropriate.

3.50Preventative contingency
measures for system failure of FMD DCS are in place at the national level.These include the use of a cluster
server which enables mirroring between two web servers and databases.This will ensure that should one fail,
the second will take over.In
addition, the back up routine that is in place means that the risk of data loss
in cases of total failure is minimal.

3.51A system for the tracing of
animals - VTVS, updated and enhanced during the 2001 outbreak of foot and mouth
disease to take account of vehicle and personnel movements, is used for tracings
required on a day to day basis.A
project to review further tracings work has been initiated, with a view to
encompassing both endemic and exotic diseases.

3.52An improved Exotic Disease
Control System (ExDCS), that will enable the task of dealing with any serious
animal disease outbreak to be undertaken as efficiently as possible and which
will support procedures to assist the veterinary surveillance team in proactive
measures, is being developed.

3.53The goal of the ExDCS project
is to create a system to collect, collate and validate animal disease data.The system will facilitate the process
of exotic notifiable disease management and control, provide reliable management
information to users at all levels and inform Government policy on animal health
and welfare.The system is being
designed to deal with more than one concurrent disease.

3.54The ExDCS project aims to
interface with other Defra projects currently under development ensuring
reliable and non-duplication of data.

Financial System

3.55A project team is developing
a generic financial system which will ensure that financial information is
collected in the most efficient manner to meet accountancy requirements and the
requirements of auditors.This
system will be operational during ‘peacetime’, therefore ensuring staff
familiarity, with the facility to ramp-up during an emergency.An interim facility will be in place by
summer 2003 and in the event of an outbreak could be brought into use before
then with the new system being developed thereafter.

3.56The new system will be part
of the Defra Corporate Finance System and will be installed in all AHDOs to be
used in peace time for normal business.

PROCUREMENT

General - Procurement and Commercial Contracting Contingency Plan

3.57Detailed instructions and
guidance on procurement and commercial contracting covering the acquisition of
goods, works and services; and the role of the Procurement and Contracts
Division (PCD) can be found in the PCD Contingency Plan which is available for
internal use.

3.58PCD are responsible for
ensuring that robust, value for money contracts are let and mobilised for goods,
services and works requirements including their contract management and forensic
examination.

3.59The PCD contingency plan
provides contact details for all nominated PCD personnel.The Head of SVS Contingency Planning
Division will notify the Director of Purchasing and Supply if alert state AMBER
is declared so that the appropriate resources can be placed on standby.Sources of supply for these procurement
personnel have been identified by PCD and these resources can be called upon in
the event of a notifiable disease outbreak or other emergency
situation.

3.60The PCD contingency plan sets
out the procurement resources that will be mobilised at tactical level to form
Procurement Emergency Response Teams (PERT) under the direction of Defra’s
Director of Purchasing and Supply or his/her nominated representatives.PCD will provide a procurement cell in
the NDCC within 8 hours.

3.61PCD will ensure that best
practice guidance is available to AHDOs and LDCCs covering the requirements from
the period from confirmation of the outbreak until the PERT team arrives,
including the triggering of contingency contracts; authorisation and use of
emergency purchase orders and procurement cards; and contract management and
letting.

3.62Within 72 hours PCD will
provide a PERT team in an LDCC to manage the procurement and commercial
activities for that office.The
PERT unit will include a Commercial/Procurement Manager, Contracts Manager,
Purchasing Manager, Quantity/Claims Surveyor, Field Store Manager and Field
Manager.Forensic accountants will
be engaged prior to receipt and approval of supplier/contractor
invoices.

3.63All contracts and commercial
arrangements put in place after declaration of an emergency situation will be
let in accordance with delegated authorities determined by Defra’s Director of
Finance in consultation with Defra’s Director of Purchasing and
Supply.

3.64PCD and AHDOs will put in
place national/regional/local contingency contracts and supply contingency
arrangements to meet all foreseeable requirements of an emergency.These suppliers will be vetted and
subjected to regular review and appraisal by PCD to ensure their validity in the
event of an outbreak.

3.65These contracts and
arrangements will be comprehensive in coverage of all the relevant supply chains
and include slaughter and disposal, shepherds and gatherers and ancillary
equipment; carcass pick-up; preliminary C&D including detoxification and
mobile detoxification units; slurry treatment, management and disposal; lagoon
and environmental protection measures; electrical works and technical services
associated with discrete supply chains; e.g. dairy engineers.A list of call-off contracts and
contingency supply arrangements is available for internal
use.

3.66Supplementary lists of
preferred and vetted suppliers for use in an emergency situation are available
for internal use.These suppliers
are a back-up to the contingency contracts already in place and are likely to be
engaged where a notifiable disease cannot be confined either in number of
outbreaks or geographically.The
PERT team will be responsible for putting robust contracts in place with these
suppliers should the extent of the outbreak require additional
supply.

3.67For each AHDO a list of
transport companies is provided indicating the number and type of vehicles that
the companies have available for immediate use together with the companies’
ability to scale up supply within defined timescales.

3.68Details of contracts placed
and preferred vetted suppliers available to AHDOs is on the PCD webpage for
internal use.DVMs should liaise
closely with PCD to ensure timely, scaleable and appropriate supply arrangements
in the event of a notifiable disease outbreak.PCD emergency contacts and their details
are available for internal use.

FINANCIAL CONTROL

NDCC Head of FMD Finance

3.69NDCC Head of FMD Finance will
be appointed by the Defra Finance Director immediately following confirmation of
disease to be responsible for establishing the FMD Finance Team in the NDCC and
for the provision of a Finance Manager to each LDCC.They are also responsible for issuing
guidance, in accordance with departmental policy, on accounting policies,
financial databases, audit trails, desk instructions and checklists on financial
controls including:

7Roles
and responsibilities of Finance Managers (LDCC and NDCC) - and reporting
responsibilities which are set out in SVS instructions;

7Authorisation
levels for payments, delegations, management checking, write-off, over payment
procedures in accordance with the department’s Finance Manual and Government
Accounting;

7Policy
on the retention of records;

7Chart
of accounts, cost centre codes and objective codes;

7Fraud
guidelines in accordance with the department’s policy including the process of
dealing with allegations of fraud;

7Budgeting,
estimates and the monitoring of expenditure;

7Liaison
with the National Audit Office (NAO), European Union (EU) and internal
auditors;

Finance Managers, LDCCs

3.70LDCC Finance Managers are
responsible for managing all financial activity in the LDCC and for providing
financial advice to the Regional Operations Director (ROD) and Divisional
Operations Manager (DOM) including:

7Authorising
certified contractor invoices for payment;

7Ensuring
suitable records are maintained relating to all financial
transactions;

7Initial
Scrutiny of Compensation Claims for slaughter and for items seized and
destroyed.

Role of Finance Officers

3.71NDCC Head of FMD Finance will ensure close communication between FMD
Finance, Accounting Services Division, Defra Finance Director and HM
Treasury.There will be regular
meetings of all appropriate members of FMD Finance, ASD and Procurement and
Contracts Division (PCD).These
meetings are the forum to raise issues (e.g.- Overpayments, VAT) which require
financial policy and procedural advice.

3.72On confirmation of an
outbreak, Head of FMD Finance will submit a request for funding to HM Treasury
via Financial Management & Information Division (FMID) and the Finance
Director.Both Finance Director and
HM Treasury will be provided with a financial report on actual expenditure
incurred on a regular basis.

3.73During an outbreak, there
will be initial meetings with the National Audit Office, EU Auditors and Defra
auditors to:

a)inform them of the role and responsibilities of the teams involved in the
eradication process;

b)explain the approach to tackle the emergency
situation.

3.74FMD Finance is responsible for providing regular reports to the auditors
on actual expenditure incurred during the outbreak and for responding to audit
reports as appropriate, submitting EU claims for reimbursement of costs (in
accordance with the EU Regulations) and communicating with EU auditors as and
when required.

EQUIPMENT AND
STORES

National minimum stocking
levels

3.75Minimum contingency stocks,
designed to cope with the stores requirements of 100 Veterinary Inspectors, will
be held at VLA Weybridge.Under the
terms of the Service Level Agreement, these items can be provided where required
within defined time limits.

Divisional minimum stocking
levels

3.76Each AHDO is required to hold
or have immediate access to sufficient equipment to deal with up to 10 disease
outbreaks in the first 48 hours, including provision for equipping up to 20
additional Veterinary Inspectors.Stock levels are managed by designated local staff, who have day to day
responsibility for monitoring availability and serviceability of stores.They will be responsible for using the
generic stock control database, once it has been rolled
out.

Stores to supply vaccination
teams

3.77Stores of equipment to supply
vaccination teams and vaccination centres are maintained equally between two
sites.At present, there is enough
equipment to supply 50 vaccination teams (each consisting of a 1 vaccinator, 1
ear tag reader/tagger and 1 ear tag recorder) - the initial number of teams
required to be provided by ADAS under the terms of the present contract with
provision for this number to be ramped up depending on circumstances.Call-off contracts are in place to
obtain additional equipment (e.g. additional vaccine guns and needles).This equipment will be subject to
quality control checks in accordance with a quality management protocol by
stores managers.

3.78Call off contracts for mobile
cattle/sheep/pig handling facilities are currently being put in
place.

3.79Upon the establishment of
vaccination centre(s) Defra will arrange, through its contract with a transport
firm, for sufficient equipment to be dispatched to the vaccination centre for
use by ADAS by the fourth day after the first case has been
confirmed.

SECTION
4 - Key
Operations

EMERGENCY VACCINATION

Introduction

4.1There are
various drivers which will contribute towards the decision on whether to adopt
an emergency vaccination strategy against FMD, and if so whether the animals
should subsequently be killed or not.The Government’s preferred approach is that emergency vaccination should
be on the basis of ‘vaccinate to live’ wherever possible.The full range of options and the
factors which the Government will take into consideration in the event of a
future outbreak are contained in full in the Decision Tree.This covers the consideration to be
given to rare breeds and zoo animals.

Current operational arrangements

4.2During the
2001 Foot and Mouth disease outbreak ADAS were commissioned to develop a
programme for the emergency vaccination of cattle in parts of Cumbria and
Devon.ADAS has since been retained
to provide operational support for emergency FMD vaccination (vets and
vaccination teams working under State Veterinary Service direction) until such
time as Defra is able to let a formal contract to cover this operation -
probably in early Autumn 2003.The
following arrangements therefore provide an interim framework for
implementation, which can be amended to form a specific implementation plan
dependent on each set of circumstances as necessary.

Timing

4.3The present
arrangements provide for a 9 day lead in time, although arrangements are in hand
for this to be reduced to a 5 day lead in.As emergency vaccination is to be considered as an option from the start
of any future FMD outbreak, ADAS will be placed on standby by the Head of SVS
Contingency Planning Division as soon as disease is confirmed, at which time
they will recruit, train and locate teams to be ready to commence
vaccination.Within this time
period, the particular strain of the FMD virus would need to be identified (up
to two days) and the vaccine would need to be formulated (four days) ready for
dispatch to the vaccination centres.

4.4Veterinary
advice to Ministers will be based on epidemiological evidence and it is unlikely
to be immediately available.It is
probable that the time necessary for veterinary assessment of epidemiological
data, the use of the Decision Tree and the development of advice on the
strategic deployment of vaccination means that it is unlikely that vaccination
will start five days after the first outbreak.

Operational Process

4.5This is set
out in full at Annex D.

ANIMAL WELFARE

4.6Consideration will be given to setting up, at earliest opportunity, an
animal welfare forum, chaired by a Minister, with representatives of the RSPCA,
Compassion in World Farming and the Humane Slaughter Association.This would enable points of specific
welfare concern to be brought readily and quickly to Ministers’ attention and
Ministers to explain the implications for welfare of their disease control
policies.

4.7Provisions
for ensuring the welfare of animals on-farm, at markets or in transit (at the
time of movement controls being imposed) are detailed in SVS Instructions
Chapters 31-34.Slaughter or
killing must be carried out in accordance with the Welfare of Animals
(Slaughter or Killing) Regulations 1995 (Inset 31 refers).Provisions for emergency slaughter on
farm for poor welfare are detailed in SVS Instructions, Chapter 32.G.Procedures for slaughter/killing for
disease control purposes are detailed in SVS Instructions Chapter 3 Section
L.

4.8Animal
Movement Licensing Unit hold suitable licence templates for the movement of
animals and instructions for their issue and use if movement restrictions are
imposed.Animal Welfare Policy
Division holds copies of advice to stock-keepers to assist them in maintaining
welfare if movement restrictions are imposed.

4.9The needs
of animals and their welfare will be given early consideration in the event of a
disease outbreak or emergency.

4.10Where possible animals should
be kept alive and healthy where they are.This is first of all the responsibility of the farmer, but there may be a
need for Government assistance possibly in the form of a fodder scheme and/or
licensed movement scheme.Any
animal welfare disposal scheme would be an option of very last resort as it is
clearly undesirable to slaughter animals unless absolutely necessary.The Government would not offer
compensation for animals slaughtered under such a scheme, but would provide free
collection and disposal.The Head
of Livestock Strategy Division in consultation with the Heads of Animal Welfare
Policy Division and Animal Welfare Veterinary Division will examine the options
for such schemes and looking at plans for implementing
them.

VALUATION

4.11Since 2001 a new list of
valuers has been approved to undertake livestock valuations on behalf of
Defra.This list is maintained by
the SVS and reviewed annually.Each
valuer has been sent instructions for carrying out valuations.In the event of an outbreak of FMD, a
letter will be sent to all these valuers notifying them of the outbreak and
enclosing the latest version of Defra’s instructions for carrying out
valuations.

4.12LDCCs would contact individual valuers on the list as necessary to deal
with each premises where compulsory slaughter is to take place.No other valuers will be used.

4.13In the event of an animal
disease outbreak, Animal Movements and Exotic Disease Division will call upon
the services of the four Monitor Valuers who have been appointed (these
appointments will be reviewed regularly, at least every 3 years).Initially the Monitor Valuers will
attend Defra offices in London to advise on further instructions and guidance to
issue to valuers (reflecting species affected, area etc.) to try to ensure
uniformity in valuations and fairness to both livestock owners and
taxpayers.Depending on the extent
of the outbreak the Monitor Valuers could be situated in London or in/near
LDCCs.

4.14A review of all the animal
disease compensation arrangements is being undertaken with a view to
rationalisation and simplification.Part of this process will be to look at the case for compulsory standard
valuations.This would remove the
need for individual valuation in many or most cases.Such a system would help speed up the
slaughtering process and would ensure a greater degree of uniformity in animal
valuation.

RESTRICTED INFECTED AREAS

4.15A Restricted Infected Area
(RIA) will be declared with a minimum radius of 10km around infected
premises.This will require
increased levels of biosecurity on farms, C&D for vehicles, people and
machinery moving on/off farms and movement controls for animals, animal
products, feed and bedding.Guidance on establishing a RIA, location of cleansing and disinfection
sites, etc. is being developed with EA and local authority input for inclusion
in SVS instructions.

BIOSECURITY GUIDANCE

4.16Anyone coming into contact
with livestock or their waste runs the risk of spreading animal diseases.Biosecurity is the prevention of disease
causing agents entering or leaving a livestock premises.It involves a number of measures and
protocols designed to prevent potential disease causing agents being spread from
one premises to another.

4.17Revised Biosecurity guidance
which reflects the provisions of the Animal Health Act 2002 is currently out for
consultation and can be found on the Defra website at:

Disposal Hierarchy

4.19This is a change from the
Department of Health guidelines (published 24/04/2001) which set out an agreed
disposal hierarchy as follows:-

1.Rendering

2.Commercial incineration (not air curtain
incinerators)

3.Licensed commercial landfill

4.Pyre burning

5.Mass burial at Defra-owned sites and On-farm burial

This
is because of policy developments and increasing environmental
constraints.

4.20Decisions on disposal options
will take into account assessments of risks from TSEs and latest SEAC
guidance.

4.21A number of strategies, such
as emergency vaccination, are now in place which could reduce the numbers of
animals to be disposed of in any future outbreak and this should mean that these
three disposal routes would be sufficient.Although mass pyres will not be used in the future, the use of
alternative methods of disposal routes such as on-farm pyres and on-farm or mass
burial cannot be completely ruled out if demand exceeds the capacity of the
preferred options of incineration/rendering and licensed commercial
landfill.Any decisions to utilise
these disposal routes will be taken in consultation with key stakeholders and
appropriate environmental and public health assessments will be made at each
disposal location.

4.22Defra recognises that there
are a number of factors that may impact on the disposal hierarchy in the
future.These include the
implementation of possible new environmental or waste management legislation and
changes to capacity and accessibility of the disposal outlets.The hierarchy will be regularly
reviewed, in consultation with relevant stakeholders, to take account of these
issues.New technologies and
facilities will also be reviewed on a regular basis.

Incineration

4.23Agreement in principle has
been obtained with nine animal incinerator operators in England, Scotland and
Wales, to dispose of FMD carcasses.Contractual arrangements are being completed.

4.24Incineration capacity is
limited and will only be able to deal with small isolated outbreaks for the
first few days of a new outbreak or disease recrudescence.

4.25As soon as a decision to
slaughter has been taken, or where slaughter is likely, the DVM or LDCC
Disposals Manager must telephone:-

7The
disposal team in SVS Contingency Planning Division (which will become part of
the NDCC);

7The
Rural Payments Agency (RPA) who, in consultation with the disposal team, will
allocate the disposal outlet taking account of location, number and type of
stock and spare capacity at each plant - see contacts
below;

7The
national transport co-ordinator (If the call-off agreement for transport is to
be used - see transport section below) who can, in the interim, manage the
transport required (available at 24 hours notice).

4.26The recipient DVM (for the
disposal site) must be informed before the transport leaves the
IP.

-Transport must not
leave the slaughter site until it has been fully cleansed and disinfected.All areas must therefore continue to
have access to detox units.

-In the event of
problems, a member of the Disposals team should be contacted - see contact
details below.

-Any queries related to
biosecurity at disposal sites can be dealt with by Vet Ops based in the NDCC who
will consult Veterinary Policy teams within HQ in consultation with the
DVM.

-The sending DVM must
ensure that vehicles are properly cleansed and disinfected and that the haulage
contractors and accompanying personnel follow strict biosecurity
procedures.All vehicles used must
be sealed and leak-proof and accompanied by an escort.

4.27DVMs will liaise with the
relevant local authorities and EA (or SEPA) to agree access arrangements and
monitoring requirements.

Rendering

4.28A call-off agreement with a
major rendering company has been agreed to ensure a minimum lead-in time should
there be an outbreak of disease.Additional capacity will be arranged in the event of a major outbreak,
using the RPA as brokers.Total
weekly capacity in the order of 15,000 tonnes per week could be made
available.Transport will be
provided separately through regional contractors with hauliers, renderers and
the knacker industry.

4.29DVMs will ensure they are
aware which rendering facilities are available to them in the event of an animal
disease outbreak.The recipient DVM
(for the disposal site) must be informed before the transport leaves the
IP.

4.30The arrangements and
requirements in 4.19 and 4.20 above regarding liaison, communication,
biosecurity and transport must also be followed.

Licensed Commercial Landfill sites

4.31EU Animal By-Products
regulation may preclude this option in 2003 and beyond, or limit the number of
suitable landfill sites, although Defra is currently discussing a number of
derogations with the European Commission.The disposal team are discussing, in consultation with the EA, SEPA, ESA
and local authorities, structured agreements and national operational protocols
for the use of licensed landfill sites.The Secretary of State may seek powers of direction for the use of
commercial landfill sites in the event of an emergency.Waste Management Division is responsible
for drafting the necessary statutory instruments.

4.32DVMs will ensure they are
aware which licensed landfill facilities are available to them during an animal
disease outbreak and liaise with EA (or SEPA) and local authorities to discuss
access arrangements and monitoring requirements.

On-Farm Burial

4.33If incineration and rendering
capacity has been exhausted it may be necessary to consider on-farm burial.In this event Defra will consult with EA
(or SEPA) to ensure that no burial is undertaken until an appropriate risk
assessment has been completed and that any burial is undertaken in accordance
with the relevant EU and national regulations so as to minimise the risk of
environmental and public health impact.

Pyre Burning

4.34Pyre burning would not
normally be considered and only in exceptional circumstances.If it is decided that pyre burning has
to be utilised on a limited basis, Defra will follow the guidelines developed by
the Department of Health in 2001 together with the SVS instructions.In preparing for pyre burning, Defra
will consult with local authorities, the Health Protection Agency and EA (or
SEPA), to ensure environmental and public health impacts are
minimised.

Transport

4.35In consultation with the
disposal team, the local DVM and disposal manager will decide whether to use
local transport contract arrangements or to utilise the transport call-off
agreement in place with 2 national haulage companies.The duty officer will deal with requests
for transport.On confirmation of
an outbreak, a national transport logistics manager, supported by a regional
transport manager(s), will be appointed and will take over responsibility for
transport logistics and tasking from the local DVM.

SEROLOGY

Serology capacity - Surveillance

4.36Serological surveillance may
be carried out for a number of reasons, such as epidemiology, but its main use
is likely to be as part of the surveillance of protection and surveillance zones
following an outbreak, prior to declaring them free from disease.Serology surveillance in support of
lifting restrictions should not commence until at least 21 days following
preliminary cleansing and disinfection of an infected
premises.

4.37Defra has an agreement with
the Veterinary Laboratories Agency (VLA) that they will provide serological
testing capacity for FMD on a contingency basis of 120,000 samples per week at
three laboratories.The first
laboratory would be ready to start testing within 3 weeks with an initial
capacity of 7,000 tests, 20,000 tests in the second week and reaching full
capacity of 40,000 in the third week.The second laboratory would be operational within 6 weeks and a third
laboratory within 8 weeks with the same capacity build up.Full capacity of 120,000 tests per week
would be reached by the 10th week.

4.38The Institute for Animal
Health (IAH) Pirbright provides the diagnostic testing service for FMD.It also carries out additional tests
(i.e. VNT) on positive or inconclusive serology samples submitted by
VLA.

4.39Personnel required to
undertake blood sampling will be recruited and trained under the co-ordination
of the Veterinary Resource Division.Personnel could be drawn from veterinary/agricultural students and from
local Job Centres.

Transport of samples

4.40DVMs will ensure they have
access to the best means of transporting blood samples during an animal disease
outbreak as set out in SVS operational instructions.

RURAL STRESS ACTION PLAN
WORKING GROUP

4.41The Department recognises
that any future outbreak may result in significant social, economic and personal
emotional impact.These issues will
be addressed through consultation with the Rural Stress Action Plan Working
Group to ensure that:

7Contingency
Plans are drawn up to include the ‘human dimension’ of an
outbreak;

7Provide
for appropriate feedback and consultation during an outbreak to address issues
that arise;

7The
issues of de-briefing and aftercare, relevant both to the individuals affected
and to the staff involved in measures taken to control an outbreak are
addressed.

4.42Contacts will be made via the RSAP Working Group with support
organisations at a local level and issues such as referral procedures,
confidentiality and debriefing for staff addressed.

4.44This partnership, or
combinations of the membership, is reproduced at the regional and local level to
address the needs of the rural community including supporting those in
distress.County bases support
“groups” are facilitated by RSIN and FCN, whose organisations and volunteer
members provide information, signposting and, in some cases, telephone
helplines.The groups draw on the
expertise of the wider partnerships that the network fosters, and there are
various “entry points” for enquiries and assistance.

4.45Farming Help is the banner
under which RSIN, RABI, FCN and Samaritans promote confidential help for all in
the farming community, and contact with any of these via the national telephone
numbers will offer callers a wide range of guidance, assistance and
support.

4.46Farmers and others in the
rural community are increasingly aware of the support network, and some Defra
staff (RDS, BCMS, Government Offices and RPAs) have been drawn into RDS’s Rural
Support Operational Guidance, part of which is designed to increase awareness of
the role of national and local rural support networks.

CLEANSING AND DISINFECTION OF AFFECTED PREMISES

4.47Government funding of
secondary cleansing and disinfection will be subject to review and separate
consultation as part of the consideration of the future funding of disease
control measures.Primary cleansing
and disinfection will remain the responsibility of Defra, and will be charged to
Defra.

4.48Detailed guidance on the
procedures for cleansing and disinfecting affected premises is available at SVS
Instructions Chapter 3, Section N.The EA or SEPA must be consulted before any disposal of disinfectant or
seized material is considered.All
disposals will be subject to a prior risk assessment and will be undertaken in
accordance with EU and national regulations and guidance.

RODENT CONTROL

4.49Rodent Control will be
carried out on infected premises, on behalf of Defra, until the disease risk
from rodents has been minimised (e.g. carcasses and potentially infected feed
have been removed during the Cleansing and Disinfection procedures).This control will be by the National
Wildlife Management Team (NWMT) and will be co-ordinated nationally with staff
operating within, and reporting to, the Biosecurity Unit of the LDCCs.Thereafter responsibility for rodent
control will revert to the owner or occupier of the infected
place.

SECTION
5 - Key
Operations

MANAGEMENT INFORMATION AND DISEASE CONTROL INFORMATION

5.1DVMs will
ensure that appropriate staff are familiar with the Management Information
reports of the Disease Control System (DCS).This will ensure the accurate and timely
collation of statistical information for circulation to the NDCC and within the
LDCC itself.

5.2RODs are
required to submit daily situation reports (Sitreps) to the NDCC Operations cell
that will then circulate them to colleagues as appropriate and draw on them for
the daily NDCC Report.These are
required by 1800 hours.The sitrep
format can be found at Annex K.The
NDCC will collate information from the RODs, from DCS and other appropriate
sources to produce a daily evening report on the disease and its management and
control, for Ministers, the Civil Contingencies Committee and senior
officials.

5.3It is
essential that the collection and processing of data within the NDCC and LDCC
spheres of command is done without delay.The supply of accurate management information to the tactical and
strategic command levels is of critical importance.All personnel involved with the
collection, collation and processing of this information should be made aware of
this and understand its importance.

5.4Case
Officers must be deployed to ensure that the data required by the strategic and
tactical levels is captured on-farm as soon as is practicable.The outline requirements for this are as
follows:

-Animals slaughtered;

-Performance against 24 hour slaughter target (if farm is
IP);

-Animals disposed;

-Disposal route;

-Cleansing and Disinfection - when primary C&D
complete.

COMMUNICATIONS

Media - also Annex
H

5.5News
releases will be co-ordinated through Communications Directorate.Defra Press Office will take all
national media inquiries, organise press briefings and interviews with
Ministers, vets and officials.If a
central governmental response is initiated, the NCC will take the lead, working
closely with Defra and other departments with a shared interest e.g. Environment
Agency and Department of Culture, Media and Sport.The Government News Network will do
likewise in the regions.

5.6DVMs/RODs
will work with their local Government News Network (GNN) representative to
ensure that accurate and timely briefings are given to the media and
stakeholders.

Website

5.7Defra’s FMD
website is a key source of information in the event of an outbreak of
disease.Outline pages are being
prepared in advance so that an information site can be established as soon as
possible in an outbreak.This is
the responsibility of the Head of Animal Movements and Exotic Disease Policy
Division working in co-operation with the Head of News Media in Communications
Directorate.

5.8The site
will include:

7A
full list of Infected Premises (IPs) updated daily.This will not include Dangerous Contact
premises (DCs) or premises slaughtered on suspicion of disease (SOS) for data
protection reasons.

7Links
to relevant websites (e.g. other Government departments and Agencies, Meat and
Livestock Commission, English Nature, National Farmers Union, Open Britain and
Local Authorities).

Helplines

5.9The Defra
General Helpline 08459 335577 will be prepared for intense public interest, by
providing additional staff resources, establishing supplementary helplines and
providing adequate briefing.Plans
to escalate capacity are covered in Annex H.

Central Co-ordination

5.10The Emergency Management
Board meeting chaired by Defra’s Permanent Secretary on Day 1 will consider the
need to engage CCC.A
representative from the Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat should
attend this meeting to advise on Government-wide co-ordination.If CCC is engaged, it will need to
consider whether to activate a central multi-disciplinary Communications Team to
co-ordinate between Government departments and agencies.This will depend on an assessment of the
scale and possible course of the outbreak and the extent of involvement of other
Departments.

5.11The CCS, in conjunction with
OD Sec, will provide, within COBR, a suite of rooms capable of housing a 24/7
operation.Units would include a
Crisis Management Unit, a Joint Assessments Cell (SAC) and a Government Liaison
Team (GLT) which would include representatives from the main departments
involved.CCS would provide the
secretariat for CCC and CCC(O) meetings.The NCC, located at 10 Great George Street could provide daily rolling
media briefs, take all media calls and centralise all press office
functions.It could also contain
web and internal communications specialists and would maintain a constant
electronic link with the Defra briefing and knowledge network
units.

PUBLICITY AND DISEASE AWARENESS

Notifiable Disease Awareness programmes

5.12Headquarters and DVMs,
working with Communications Directorate, are involved in awareness programmes:
lectures/demonstrations to veterinary schools, veterinary practices and
agricultural colleges; direct mailing to livestock producers and articles in the
veterinary and farming press as appropriate; and frequent contact through
testing, inspection and advisory visits to livestock producers and those working
in ancillary industries including markets, slaughter houses and livestock
transport.

SECTION
6 - Strategic Level
Plan

BACKGROUND AND SCOPE

6.1Defra is
lead Department for the control of Foot and Mouth Disease outbreaks.This section relates to the
strategic level structures and functions necessary for effective command,
control and communications in the event of a disease
outbreak.

6.2The
Strategic Plan defines the necessary structures, roles and responsibilities for
those involved in the strategic level decision-making
process.

6.3The
decision-making processes at strategic level will be focussed entirely on
defining, reviewing and refining strategies for disease control, communications,
disposal, relief and recovery.(See
below for Defra Management Board and Civil Contingencies Committee).The Strategic Group will direct the
Tactical Group and will receive feedback on operational issues from stakeholders
and from the operational command in order to inform further strategic
decisions.

6.4In the event of a confirmed outbreak of
disease, Defra’s Management Board will meet as soon as possible (as detailed
below) to ensure a rapid and appropriate response.The Management Board will confirm the
need to establish the Civil Contingencies Committee.This will be triggered by the Permanent
Secretary contacting the Head of Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies
Secretariat.

6.5Whilst
Defra will retain overall responsibility as lead department, if required the
Civil Contingencies Committee(s) [CCC and CCC(O)] will adopt the strategic
command and control and the assessment of the wider impact of the developing
outbreak.It is responsible for
reviewing and developing cross-departmental strategies, and in particular
accounting for issues affecting the wider UK economy.

6.6The Science
Advisory Group (SAG) exists to ratify, challenge and guide the development of
the control strategies that are implemented by Defra and its agents. It will also need to consider whether
SAPER should be involved.The
mechanisms for activating SAPER require the departmental Permanent Secretary or
Chief Scientific Adviser to write to the Security and Intelligence Co-ordinator,
or, in his absence the Head of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat, copied to
the Government’s Chief Scientific Adviser.

6.7Stakeholders’ issues and concerns will be raised at separate meetings
including the Rural Affairs Forums of the Government Offices in the Regions, and
the issues will be tabled at CCC(O) by Defra
representatives.

6.8Tactical issues will be addressed at the daily Emergency Direction
Group and by the National Disease Control Centre.

6.9Operational decisions are devolved, in the main, to the Local
Disease Control Centre lead by the Regional Operations
Director.

Strategic
Aims and Objectives

Aim: In the event of a confirmed case of FMD

To
establish rapidly a command structure which enables a cross-departmental
response and which gives clear strategic direction to the control
effort.

7Provides
strategy for direction of communications, within Defra, across wider Government
and externally to the public.

7Members
of Defra Management Board are the principal advisors to Defra Secretary of
State, Number 10 and the Civil Contingencies Committee.

7Defra
Management Board must ensure Defra’s business continuity arrangements, in
particular the impact on departmental business as a result of the reallocation
of staff to the control effort.

7Defra
Management Board must set and review departmental business priorities and give
guidance on the reallocation of resources.This must be clearly communicated to managers and staff in the
Department.

7The
Defra Management Board is responsible for ensuring the financial integrity of
the control and recovery operations by establishing proper procurement, finance
and audit procedures, in liaison with HM Treasury and the National Audit
Office.

Defra Emergency Management
Board

Purpose

The
strategic decision-making body in Defra

Meets

Meets
as soon as possible after initial confirmation of disease and then
as necessary in Room 613, 9 Millbank, London

Activation
criteria

As
soon as possible after initial confirmation of disease the Chief
Veterinary Officer (or his representative) will notify the Permanent
Secretary and agree the establishment and timing of the Emergency
Management Board and to consider the establishment of the Civil
Contingencies Committee.Thereafter the CVO will notify Management Board members as soon as
practically possible (as per the Communications protocol of this
plan).

Likely
Scenarios:
(Although limited information is likely to be available, should consider likely
scenarios and their impact on the issues highlighted below, challenge
assumptions, horizon scan for future risks likely to affect current
strategies)

Issues:

Outline
of Risks:

Are
there adequate resources?

E.g.Vets

Administrators

Case Officers

Bleeders

DGs
to consider release of (i) key personnel as identified in contingency
arrangements, (ii) other personnel as requested

As
soon as possible after initial confirmation of disease the Chief
Veterinary Officer (or his representative) will notify the Permanent
Secretary and agree the establishment and timing of an emergency
Management Board meeting.Thereafter the Director of Communications will notify the relevant
senior officials (listed below) as soon as practically possible and agree
their attendance at the Communications Meeting (as per the communications
protocol of the contingency plan).

Civil Contingencies Committee
(Officials)CCC(O)

The
forum for reviewing strategies in a wider Government context and for
dealing with operational strategy issues that affect other Government
Departments

Meets

09.00
as necessary in COBR or 10 Great George Street

Activation
criteria

As
soon as possible after initial confirmation of disease the Chief
Veterinary Officer (or his representative) will notify the Permanent
Secretary.The Permanent
Secretary’s office will notify other Departments’ Permanent Secretaries by
e-mail.This will be followed
by [GICS] briefing provided to OGDs via Defra Communications Directorate

-
Consider and develop policies and operational policies where wider
government commitment is required.Receives CCC(O) position on strategic issues for consideration of
wider implications and for refinement if necessary; in particular
strategies for relief and recovery

Defra Science Advisory
Group

To
provide independent science advice to the Animal Disease Policy Group and
the Civil Contingencies Committee; and to challenge strategic
assumptions

Meets

As
necessary (and initially after the first Defra Emergency Management
Board) in Room 806 Nobel House, 17, Smith Square, London

Activation
criteria

As
soon as the CSA is informed of confirmation of the disease he will alert
Science Advisory Group members.

Timing:
Science Advisory Group will meet after the first Defra Emergency
Management Board.Time: to be
agreed

Reports
to

Civil
Contingencies Committee & Defra Emergency Management Board

Core

Membership

Defra
Chief Scientific Adviser (Chair), Members of the Science Advisory Council
Animal Disease Sub-Group augmented by experts from their emergency
stand-by list (including EU experts who may be accessed through protected
internet link).

-
Advises the Civil Contingencies Committee on the science relating to
disease control, carcass disposal and farm restoration and its
implications, in order that the Committee can develop appropriate
strategies

As
soon as possible after initial confirmation of disease the Chief
Veterinary Officer (or his representative) will notify the Permanent
Secretary.Thereafter the CVO
will notify Emergency Management Board members (including the Directors of
Veterinary Policy and Animal Health and Welfare) as soon as practically
possible (as per the Communications protocol of this contingency
plan).This will trigger the
Director Veterinary Policy to alert other Animal Disease Policy Group
members.

Timing:Animal Disease Policy Group will
meet after the first Defra Emergency Management Board.Time: to be agreed

As
soon as possible after initial confirmation of disease the Chief
Veterinary Officer (or his representative) will notify the Permanent
Secretary.Thereafter the CVO
will notify Emergency Management Board members (including the Director
General LURA) as soon as practically possible (as per the Communications
protocol of this contingency plan).This will trigger the Director General LURA to alert Rural Issues
Group members and confirm communication networks with Regional Affairs
Forums through the Government Offices in the Regions.

Timing:Rural Issues Group will meet
after the first Defra Emergency Management Board.Time: to be agreed

DG Operations & Service Delivery

7Ensure
that notification of a confirmed outbreak is cascaded down to Heads of Division
level within the Directorate General without delay and that those HODs
with key roles to play (e.g. Heads of Professions) understand their roles and
the need for a rapid reaction to support the control
effort.

7Responsible
for making recommendation to Defra Permanent Secretary on the establishment of
the Civil Contingencies Committee.

7Establish
strategic delivery priorities.

7Engage
other Directors General and Other Government Departments (particular
responsibility for engaging Civil contingencies Secretariat and Armed Forces
support), issues likely to be: Augmentation of Defra staff from OGD pool and
elsewhere, calling in the Armed Forces (in liaison with MOD Home & Special
Forces Secretariat - see contact list at Annex F).

7Ensure
Local Authority engagement through Local Government Association and
LACORS.

Chief Veterinary Officer

7Responsible
for confirmation of disease in first case.

7Head
of State Veterinary Profession - increased liaison with RCVS and
BVA.

7Establish
and Chair Animal Disease Policy Group (N.B. this is separate from Science
Advisory Group) to devise/refine disease control policies, horizon scan and
inform development of strategies at Civil Contingencies Committee
(09.00).

7Ensure
that notification of a confirmed outbreak is cascaded down to key staff as
outlined in the Tactical Section of this plan, and also to Heads of Division
level within the Directorate General without delay and that those HODs
with key roles to play understand the need for a rapid reaction to support the
control effort.

7Attend
morning NDCC Birdtable (07.30) (optional).

7Attend
daily Tactical/Communications Meeting (08.00 - 08.30).

7Attend
Civil Contingencies Committee (O) (09.00).

7Brief
media (11.30).

7Attend
Defra Emergency Management Board (15.00 as necessary).

7Attend
Stakeholders Group (once per week) or
send deputy.

7Appoint
deputies.

DEFRA Chief Scientist

7Establish
and Chair Science Advisory Group to inform and challenge development of
strategies at Civil Contingencies Committee (N.B. this is separate from Animal
Disease Policy Group).

7Horizon
scan for strategic issues.

7Ensure
that notification of a confirmed outbreak is cascaded down to Heads of Division
level within the Directorate General without delay and that those HODs
with key roles to play understand the need for a rapid reaction to support the
control effort.

7Attend
morning NDCC Birdtable (07.30).

7Attend
Civil Contingencies Committee (O) (09.00).

7Brief
media (11.00).

7Attend
Defra Emergency Management Board (15.00 as necessary).

7Attend
Stakeholder Group (once per week) or send
deputy.

7Appoint
deputies.

Director Legal Service A/DG Legal Services

7Ensure
that notification of a confirmed outbreak is cascaded down to Heads of Division
level within the Directorate General without delay and that those HODs
with key roles to play understand the need for a rapid reaction to support the
control effort.

7Ensure
that there are sufficient legal staff to meet emerging
needs.

7Ensure
that there is a lawyer posted (on a rota basis) to the National Disease Control
Centre at its inception.

DG Land Use and Rural Affairs

7Ensure
that notification of a confirmed outbreak is cascaded down to Heads of Division
level within the Directorate General without delay and that those HODs
with key roles to play understand the need for a rapid reaction to support the
control effort.

7Ensure
that the Countryside Agency is briefed and invited to attend Civil Contingencies
Committee [and Emergency Management Board] and provide a representative within
the National Disease Control Centre.

7Horizon
scan for strategic issues.

7Establish
and Chair Rural Issues Group (see description above) to horizon scan and develop
policies to inform development of strategies at Civil Contingencies Committee
and Defra Emergency Management Board.

7Review
procedures for information gathering from rural stakeholders with the aim to
ensure close stakeholder liaison and adequate feedback to Civil Contingencies
Committee and Defra Emergency Management Board.

7Attend
morning NDCC Birdtable (07.30).

7Attend
Civil Contingencies Committee when required (09.00).

7Attend
regular stakeholder meeting.

7Attend
Defra Emergency Management Board (15.00 as necessary).

7Appoint
deputies.

Other DGs

7Ensure
that notification of a confined outbreak is cascaded down to Heads of Division
level within the Directorate General without delay and that those HODs
with key roles to play (e.g. Heads of Professions) understand the need for a
rapid reaction to support the control effort.

7Attend
Defra Emergency Management Board (15.00 as necessary).

7Appoint
deputies.

7N.B.
Attendance at 07.30 NDCC Birdtable is recommended for
briefing.

Director
SVS - Tactical
Commander

7Director
of Disease Operations.

7Establish
and lead the National Disease Control Centre (NDCC):

-appoint deputies (see
Joint Deputy Directors of NDCC

-notify NDCC Heads of
Teams

-ensure that contingency
arrangements are enacted

7Direct
the RODs and LDCC in controlling and eradicating the
disease.

7Attend
NDCC Birdtables (especially 07.30 for briefing).

7Attend
daily Tactical/Communications meeting (08.00 - 08.30).

7Attend
and brief daily Defra Emergency Direction Group (10.15).

7Ensure
that clear instructions are produced from Emergency Direction Group for
dissemination to NDCC and LDCC(s).

SECTION
7 - Tactical Level
Plan

BACKGROUND AND SCOPE

7.1Defra is
lead Department for the control of Exotic Animal Disease outbreaks.This section of the Plan defines the
tactical structures and functions necessary for effective control,
operations and communication in the event of a disease outbreak.The Tactical Group receive direction
from the Strategic Group and instruct field operations.They are also the conduit for feedback
from the operations on the ground back to the Strategic Group.

7.2The
Tactical Level centres around the National Disease Control Centre (NDCC) (See
Annex I), which includes representatives from other government departments,
devolved administrations, agencies, other operational partners and key
stakeholders.Policy divisions from
the Animal Health and Welfare Directorate have key roles to play here and close
liaison is essential.

Objective

7.3To focus on
co-ordination, identifying operational problems and issues and taking
authoritative decisions to resolve them; creating a ‘relevantly advised
network’, dissemination of policies, strategies, decisions and other
information; provision of data to and from the Strategic Level and of ensuring
the accuracy and integrity of data; the provision of direct access to senior
State Veterinary Service (SVS) management and policy makers for the Operational
Level.

7.4Strategic issues should be
addressed at the Defra FMD Strategy Board, the Government FMD Co-ordination
Committee, the Daily Emergency Direction Group and their associated
groups.

7.5Tactical issues should only be
addressed at the Defra Daily Exercise Direction Group, Daily Communications
Meeting and National Disease Control Centre (Birdtable
Meetings).

7.6Operational decisions are
devolved (in the main) to the Local Disease Control Centre under the overall
control of the Regional Operations Director.

ACTIVATION

Authority

7.7The
following Defra Officers have the authority to activate the
NDCC:

1)Director of State Veterinary Service

2)Director General Operations and Service Delivery

3)Permanent Secretary

Process

7.8Action to
be taken to contact personnel and so establish the NDCC is set out at Section
2.13.The Map of Initial Defra
actions explains what would happen at this time.

NDCC TEAM TASKS

Disease Reporting Team

7.9The Disease
Reporting Team (DRT) authorise slaughter and act as a central co-ordination
point to collate, refine and present up-to-date information on disease
reports.They provide an accurate
picture of the disease outbreak situation by establishing and managing a team of
Telephone Report Veterinarians and other teams within DRT.On day one of the activation of the
NDCC, the maximum number of team positions is 15.

Operations (Non-Veterinary)

7.10Aim - To co-ordinate and manage the non-veterinary aspects of the
control, eradication and recovery operation by co-ordinating the work of the
Operations Teams.Overall
responsibility for operations, disposals, statistics and management information
and cleansing and disinfection will lie with the Operations Team as well as
responsibility for ensuring liaison between operations and veterinary, animal
health and welfare, environment, rural policy, Briefing Unit, Corporate
Services, legal, stakeholders and operational partners represented in the
Operations Team.Representation of
the Operations Team at Defra Emergency Direction Group meetings.The team also manages the Birdtable
meetings and co-ordinates the information from the 1800 daily situation
report.On day one of the
activation of the NDCC, the maximum number of team positions is 12.

Veterinary Operations

7.11Aim - To co-ordinate and
manage the veterinary aspects of the control, eradication and recovery operation
by liaison with the Animal Health and Welfare Directorate and direction of the
Divisional Veterinary Managers (DVMs).On day one of the activation of the NDCC, the maximum number of team
positions is 6.

Communications and Briefing

7.12The Communications and
Briefing Team aim to gather information on the disease outbreak, on the policies
employed to control it and the control operation, from a number of sources
including the Management Information Cell in the NDCC.It aims to provide accurate and timely
media briefing and points to make for Ministers, senior officials, helplines and
all staff dealing directly with the public.The team will liaise with the GNN and
communications teams in LDCCs to ensure that briefing can be deployed
effectively.They will ensure that
all Defra staff are kept aware of developments in controlling the disease.On day one of the activation of the
NDCC, the maximum number of team positions is 4.

FMD Personnel

7.13The FMD Personnel Team aim to
manage and co-ordinate the provision of veterinary, specialist and
administrative resources to the NDCC and the field by liaising with Defra
divisions, Defra Agencies, Government Offices, Cabinet Office Civil
Contingencies Secretariat, the Employment Service (Jobcentre Plus) Operational
Support Secretariat and other Government Departments to secure emergency staff,
including veterinary staff resource.There will also be liaison with RCVS/BVA, FCO and worldwide CVOs over
transfer of staff.Establishment of
contract terms and conditions for staff and contracted personnel as well as
provision of training, Health and Safety procedures for staff and contractors
and support and advice to Personnel Teams based in the LDCCs.On day one of the activation of the
NDCC, the maximum number of team positions is 3.

FMD Finance

7.14The FMD Finance Team aim to
establish, co-ordinate and manage the framework of financial controls and the
resulting expenditure.Setting
delegations for payments and authorisation levels throughout the National
Disease Control Centre (NDCC) and Local Disease Control Centre(s) (LDCC) in
consultation with the Director SVS and Defra’s Director of Finance, ensuring
LDCCs are trained in the use of financial management systems.To be done by:

-Resource Accounting - Ensuring that an appropriate accounting system in
place to meet the Departments Resource Accounting
requirements.

-Establishing a chart of accounts.

Audit

7.15Liaison with the National
Audit Office (NAO), European Union (EU) and Defra Internal
Audit.

Estimates and
Expenditure

7.16Maintaining an adequate cost
forecasting and reporting system to meet the requirements of senior management,
Financial Planning and Resources Directorate (FPRD) and HM
Treasury.

Costing Systems

7.17Establishing a system of
regular reports on the expenditure by expense and
activity.

Inquiries

7.18Providing briefing responses to PQs, Ministerial Correspondence.

Payments

7.19Authorisation of payments for
contractors and other expenses including costs from Other Government Departments
(OGDs).

Compensation

7.20Establish a payments system
for animals slaughtered with a full database validated and reconciled to the
Disease Control System (DCS).Maintaining an audit trail of documentation to meet the European Union
(EU), National Audit Office (NAO) and Defra audit
requirements.

Arbitration
-

Establish
and maintain a unit to receive appeals against valuations.

Establish
and maintain a database of cases.

Helpline
for Arbitration queries.

Business Continuity

7.21Maintain a strategic plan for
Business Continuity in FMD Finance and in the Finance Units in the
LDCCs.

Arrange
periodic visits to LDCCs to confirm financial controls are in operation as
expected.

Vaccination Operations

7.22The Vaccination Operations
Team aim to co-ordinate and manage the emergency vaccination exercise and
provide the link between the NDCC and the commercial contractors responsible for
the supply of vaccination teams and supervisory veterinary surgeons.This is done by ensuring that commercial
resource and supplies are sufficient to meet the needs of the disease outbreak,
ensuring that vaccine and supplies reach the designated vaccination centres
promptly and are replenished as required, by providing advice and guidance to
the commercial contractor and advice and guidance on vaccination capability and
operational arrangements to NDCC, Animal Health & Welfare/Veterinary Policy
and LDCC staff.And by providing
briefing on vaccination issues and drafting instructions to the field.On day one of the activation of the
NDCC, the maximum number of team positions is 2.

STAKEHOLDERS

7.23Stakeholders and operational
partners within the NDCC are likely to include representatives from the
following organisations:

Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO)

Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS)

Countryside Agency (CA)

Department for Transport (DFT)/Freight Transport Association
(FTA)

Department for Work and Pensions (DWP)/Jobcentre
Plus

Environment Agency (EA)

Local Authorities Co-ordinators of Regulatory Services
(LACORS)

Local Government Association (LGA)

Military Liaison Officer

National Farmers Union (NFU)

Regional Co-ordination Unit (Cabinet Office) (RCU)

Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
(RSPCA)

Representatives
from other organisations will be invited if necessary.

CO-ORDINATION

7.24The National Disease Control
Centre falls under the responsibility of the Director of SVS.In order for the NDCC to operate
effectively, co-ordination from other parts of Defra and its agencies is
essential; Directorates will loan staff and equipment for the eradication
effort.The teams that will be
formed are as follows:

Geographical
Information System-Reporting to Director SVS via

(GIS)
staff and equipment.Head of Disease Reporting Team.

Epidemiology
Team and equipment-Reporting to Director SVS via

Head of Disease Reporting Team.

7.25Director SVS will be
responsible for the maintenance and upkeep of all equipment and for the
availability of all loaned staff for the duration of the loan period (i.e. the
duration of the outbreak).

7.26Certain sectors of the NDCC
will not fall under the management of the Director SVS.These sections will remain under the
management of their home divisions, but will form part of the NDCC to facilitate
a joined up disease eradication effort.The teams that fall into this category are:

CORPORATE COMMUNICATIONS

7.27Communications Directorate
are responsible for updating the external website, internal website and the
Knowledge Network.Before
communicating with the media, stakeholders, operational partners and other
external bodies, please refer to the Knowledge Network and Operational
Communications Team.

MEETINGS

7.28The meeting schedule for the
NDCC is:

Birdtable,
at 07.30, 12.00 and 19.00 daily, to be held in the NDCC, to provide daily,
short, outcome-focussed briefing and co-ordination by identifying operational
problems and issues, problems and progress against them, tasking individuals to
resolve them and creating the ‘relevantly-informed network’.This should be attended by a
representative from each team’s subject area within the NDCC and policy
representatives from Animal Health and Welfare and Livestock
Strategy.

Daily
Emergency Direction Group,
at 10.15 - 10.45 to be held initially in Room LG20, 1A Page Street, London.To define the major issues arising from
the outbreak and provide tactical direction to the NDCC. For more detail see the
Defra Daily Emergency Direction Group Table.

Title

Defra Daily Emergency Direction
Group

Purpose

A
daily forum for defining the major issues arising from the outbreak and
providing tactical direction to the NDCC

As
soon as possible after initial confirmation of disease the Chief
Veterinary Officer (or his representative) will notify the Permanent
Secretary and agree the establishment and timing of the Emergency
Management Board. The CVO will also notify the Director SVS, who will in
turn notify Emergency Direction Group members as soon as practically
possible. Timing: 10.15 [after CCC(O)]

N.B.
This is NOT the forum for discussion of strategic issues
– these should be discussed at CCC/CCC(O)

Output

-
Report of major issues and key decisions on the tactical application of
strategies (owned by Director SVS) – sent to NDCC Heads of Cells, all
Directors General, Director Communications,

-
Requests for additional briefing,

Secretariat

Director
General - Operations & Service Delivery office

ADMINISTRATION

Location

7.29The National Disease Control
Centre will initially be set up in room LG09 in Page Street.On request from Head of FMD Operations,
Building and Estate Management Division will invoke their contingency
arrangements to clear staff from the seventh and eight floors of Page Street to
allow the establishment of the NDCC.

Telecommunications

7.30The Telecommunications
Section are responsible for telephone lines, telephone handsets and headsets in
the NDCC.Their contact details can
be obtained from the Corporate Directory or the BEMD Website.

Information Technology Support

7.31Responsibility for the supply
and maintenance of IT equipment (computers, printers etc) lays with Information
Technology Support Unit (ITSU).Their contact details can be obtained from the Corporate Directory or the
BEMD website.

Catering

7.32Arrangements for catering should be made through the Page Street canteen
on the Lower Ground Floor.

Document Management

7.33Documents should be managed
in line with the policies set out in the Records Management Website.

Security

7.34For all London-based non-Defra staff, temporary building passes will be
provided by the front reception desk security staff at Page Street.Proximity Type Photographic Security
Passes are obtained and managed by Security Branch, contact details for both can
be found on the Page Street website.

Travel/Accommodation

7.35Hotel, flight, train or hire
car bookings can be made through Defra contracted companies.Hotels can be booked direct or be booked
through one of our Nominated Hotel Booking Agents.Agent details are available on Defra
on-line.

7.36Flights can be booked via
Omega World Travel, however tickets will not be issued until the appropriate FT1
(Overseas Air Form) or UKAT 1 (UK Air Travel Form) has been received by
Omega.Where possible forms should
be sent to Omega by transit addressed to Omega World Travel c/o Post Room, Nobel
House.Omega will collect these
twice a day at 10.30am and 2.30pm.Exceptionally, forms can be faxed to Omega where urgent tickets are
required.This should then be
followed with the hard copy to Omega.Further details and contact numbers are available on Defra on-line.

7.37Train tickets (including for
Eurostar) can also be booked via Omega World Travel.Tickets can ONLY be ordered on receipt
of the relevant UKRT 1 (UK rail form) or FT 1 (EUS) (Eurostar form).Further details and contact numbers are
available on Defra on-line.

7.38Car hire (for the UK and
overseas) can be booked by telephone and should be directed through the Travel
Liaison Unit.Likewise for London
taxi bookings.Details are
available on Defra on-line.

7.39If there are still queries on
any of the above, they should be directed to Travel Liaison
Unit.

SECTION
8 - Operational Level
Plan

BACKGROUND AND SCOPE

8.1Defra is
lead Department for the control of Exotic Animal Disease outbreaks.The Operational-Level Plan forms a
Section of the Defra Foot and Mouth Disease Contingency Plan and relates to the
operational level structures and functions necessary for effective
control, operations and communication in the event of a disease outbreak.The role of the operational command is
to implement contingency plans, working with stakeholders to ensure effective
control of the disease outbreak and to receive tactical guidance and implement
it, and to provide regular feedback to inform strategic
decisions.

8.2The
Operational Level centres around the Local Disease Control Centre(s) (LDCC),
which may include representatives from other government departments, devolved
administrations, agencies, other operational partners and
stakeholders.

OBJECTIVES

7Manage
and co-ordinate the local components of a national response to control and
eradicate the notifiable disease outbreak; to allow a return to disease-free
status;

7Provide
data to the Tactical Level ensuring the accuracy and
integrity.

8.3The key
aims for administrative and field staff are to work to support veterinary
and technical staff in the eradication of disease, establish effective
communication with key stakeholders and the rural community and ensure value for
money.

8.4Strategic issues should be
addressed at the Defra FMD Strategy Board, the Government FMD Co-ordination
Committee, the Daily Emergency Direction Group and their associated
groups.

8.5Tactical issues should only be
addressed at the Defra Daily Exercise Direction Group, Daily Communications
Meeting and National Disease Control Centre (Birdtable
Meetings).

8.6Operational decisions are
devolved (in the main) to the Local Disease Control Centre under the overall
control of the Regional Operations Director.

ACTIVATION

Authority

8.7The
following Defra Officers can initiate the establishment of the
LDCC:

1)Divisional Veterinary Manager (DVM)

2)Head of Veterinary Service (HVS)

3)Director SVS

PROCESS

8.8SVS Instructions cover the implementation of
control measures and guidance on the establishment of a
LDCC.

8.9Once FMD is
confirmed, the Director of the SVS will authorise the establishment of an LDCC
and confirm this with the DVM and HVS.

8.10Each AHDO maintains a list of
local organisation details for personnel (including other government
departments, the devolved administrations, stakeholders and operational
partners) that must be contacted upon confirmation of disease.The DVM is responsible for
notification.

8.11The DVM/HVS will contact the
Heads of LDCC Teams.This will
trigger the release of further personnel for the LDCC.The LDCC will develop as the necessary
control measures are implemented.

INVOLVEMENT OF STAKEHOLDERS AND OPERATIONAL PARTNERS

8.12DVMs will engage with local stakeholders as
part of their routine emergency-preparedness arrangements and where possible
include them in the planning and implementation of regular local
exercises.It is important that
LVIs should be fully engaged in developing these arrangements.DVMs must establish strong links with
their local Police Force strategic (Gold) command as this is recognised by all
key local agencies as the co-ordination point for emergency response.It is also essential that DVMs have
established regular contact with their Local Authority Emergency Planning
Officers, Trading Standards Officers, Environment Agency Emergency Planners, the
Government Office Emergencies Team and the Health Protection Agency.All these agencies must know and
understand the FMD contingency plans (including relevant sections of SVS
Instructions and local office contingency plans) and the DVM must have
established their capabilities, roles and responsibilities in the event of an
outbreak.

8.13An outline of local
stakeholder capabilities is at Annex N.

8.14In an outbreak , RODs and
DVMs will engage fully with operational partners and all those affected by the
disease and its management and control including farmers’ organisations, rural
businesses and local community organisations.

ADMINISTRATION

Location

8.15The Local Disease Control
Centre will initially be set up in the relevant AHDO (as outlined in the local
contingency plan).Building and
Estate Management Division will invoke their contingency arrangements to allow
the establishment of the LDCC in more permanent
accommodation.

Facilities

8.16The Facilities Team are
responsible for:

7telephone
lines, telephone handsets and headsets in the LDCC;

7supply
and maintenance of IT equipment (computers, printers
etc.).

Document Management

8.17Documents should be managed in line with the policies set out in the
Records Management Website (on Defra on-line).

Security

8.18Security Branch are available
to advise on security generally.Contact details can be found on the Page Street
website.

Travel/Accommodation

8.19Hotel, flight, train or hire
car bookings can all be made through Defra contracted
companies.

Hotels
can be booked direct or be booked through one of our Nominated Hotel Booking
Agents.Agent details are available
on Defra on-line.

7Flights
can be booked via Omega World Travel, however tickets will not be issued until
the appropriate FT1 (Overseas Air Form) or UKAT1 (UK Air Travel Form) has been
received by Omega.Where possible
forms should be sent to Omega by transit addressed to Omega World Travel c/o
Post Room, Nobel House.Omega will
collect these twice a day at 10.30am and 2.30pm.Exceptionally, forms can be faxed to
Omega where urgent tickets are required.This should then be followed with the hard copy to Omega.Further details and contact numbers are
available on Defra on-line.

7Train
tickets (including for Eurostar) can also be booked via Omega World Travel.Tickets can ONLY be ordered on receipt
of the relevant UKRT1 (UK rail form) or FT1 (EUS) (Eurostar form).Further details and contact numbers are
available on Defra on-line.

Car hire (for the UK and overseas) can be booked by
telephone and should be directed through the Travel Liaison Unit.Likewise for London taxi bookings.Details are available on Defra on-line.

8.20If there are still queries on
any of the above, they should be directed to Travel Liaison
Unit.

ANNEX
A

VETERINARY GUIDANCE FOR
INITIAL ACTION

ON SUSPECT CASES

LEVEL
OF SUSPICION

IMMEDIATE
ACTION

Level
0
– disease not suspected following veterinary inquiry.

All
restrictions on premises lifted, no further
action.

Level 1 –
lesions and clinical disease not typical – but disease cannot be ruled out
entirely on clinical grounds.

Suspect
animal(s) left alive and observed.Samples taken for laboratory diagnosis.Form A premises restrictionsenforced.Form C area restrictions
imposed.

Level
2- lesions and clinical disease
suggestive of FMD but not entirely convincing.

Level 3-
veterinary staff on farm and at HQ believe from investigation on clinical
grounds that disease exists.

All
susceptible livestock on the premises slaughtered on suspicion.Samples submitted for laboratory
diagnosis.Form A
premises restrictions enforced.Form C area restrictions imposed.

Level
4- as at level 3 plus disease
already confirmed in the country or substantial evidence that disease may
have entered the country for example disease in imported animals
originating from a region with confirmed FMD

Disease
confirmed on clinical grounds only without awaiting laboratory results.
Samples submitted for laboratory diagnosis.Form A premises restrictions
enforced.Form C area
restrictions imposed. All susceptible livestock on the premises
slaughtered.Dangerous
contacts traced and slaughtered depending on veterinary assessment.Restricted Infected Area Order
imposed.

ANNEX
B

DECISION TREE FOR DISEASE
CONTROL STRATEGIES AGAINST FMD

DISEASE CONTROL
STRATEGIES:FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE
(FMD DECISION TREE)

Introduction

1.This paper outlines the measures that may be taken to slaughter or
vaccinate animals in the event of an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD).
It sets out the factors the Government will take into account in deciding which
strategy to adopt in order to control and eradicate the disease in the future.

2.The EU Council Directive on FMD, 85/511 as amended, requires slaughter of
all susceptible animals on infected premises, and provides for culling of
susceptible animals on epidemiologically linked holdings (known as dangerous
contacts). This reflects the EU's policy of adopting "FMD free without
vaccination" status for all Member States, and is provided for in Defra's FMD
Contingency plan.The EU Commission
has brought forward revisions to the FMD Directive.This is being discussed with
stakeholders as negotiations on it proceed.

3.Beyond this basic strategy, which will apply in all cases, there are a
range of additional options and strategies potentially available depending on
the circumstances of a particular outbreak and on the scientific and veterinary
advice. Section 14B of the Animal Health Act 1981 (as amended) requires the
Secretary of State to consider what is the most appropriate means of preventing
the spread of disease, in particular the use of vaccination.The Commission's proposal for a new FMD
Directive also promotes consideration of emergency vaccination.The range of options includes:
-

7culling
of other livestock exposed to the disease (e.g. premises under virus plumes,
contiguous premises); and,

7emergency
vaccination (either to live or to kill; within an area or in a ring around an
area);

7pre-emptive
or ‘firebreak’ culling of animals which are not on infected premises nor are
dangerous contacts nor are necessarily exposed to the disease, in order to
prevent the wider spread of the disease outwith an area.

4.Since each disease outbreak is different and each has to be tackled at
speed and – inevitably – with imperfect information it is not possible to
prescribe in detail which strategy will be followed in advance of knowing the
circumstances of a particular outbreak.This calls for a flexible approach, which recognises that different
approaches may be needed in different geographical areas or to deal with
different species.Nevertheless,
there is clear advantage in reaching a view on the likely options for response
in advance.Accordingly, this paper
and the enclosed “decision tree” seeks to set out:

7The
factors that would be taken into account in deciding whether to use emergency
vaccination and if so whether to vaccinate to live or
kill.

7The
factors that would be taken into account in deciding slaughter
policy.

5.The Government’s objective in tackling any fresh outbreaks of FMD will be
to eradicate the disease as quickly as possible and to maintain the UK’s
disease-free status.In doing so,
the Government will seek to select a control strategy
which:

7causes
the least possible disruption to the food, farming and tourism industries, to
visitors to the countryside, and to rural communities and the wider
economy;

7minimises
the number of animals which need to be slaughtered, either to control the
disease or on welfare grounds, and which keeps animal welfare problems to a
minimum;

7minimises
damage to the environment and protects public health;

7minimises
the burden on taxpayers and the public at large.

VACCINATION
POLICY

6.In responding to the FMD Inquiries the Government has made clear that
where measures additional to the culling of infected animals and dangerous
contacts are needed, emergency vaccination will be considered as part of the
control strategy.The Government
also accepts that if emergency vaccination is used it should be on the basis of
vaccinate-to-live wherever possible.

7.EU legislation allows for the use of emergency vaccination in
circumstances where an outbreak of FMD threatens to become extensive in the
Member State concerned.The
proposed new FMD Directive, when adopted, would allow an emergency vaccination
strategy to be more fully effective.

8.The decision to introduce emergency vaccination is normally taken by the
European Commission in consultation with Member States in the Standing Committee
on the Food Chain and Animal Health, although Member States can vaccinate and
then seek the EU’s agreement later.Two types of vaccination strategy are envisaged:

(i)"Protective Vaccination"(Vaccination to live)

(ii)"Suppressive Vaccination"(Vaccination to kill)

9.The Inquiries investigated in detail the issues involved in employing
emergency vaccination. Between them they highlighted a range of significant
questions that would need to be addressed, particularly as regards vaccination
to live, but concluded that once these were resolved, the option of emergency
vaccination to live should be the preferred approach. The Government is
committed to tackling these issues in consultation with all interested parties
so that it is in a position to trigger an emergency vaccination campaign should
the need arise.As part of this
process it is essential to have stakeholder support and the Government has
engaged in dialogue with a wide range of stakeholders in order to achieve, so
far as possible, a shared understanding in advance of an outbreak of the factors
which influence the choice of control options.The Decision Tree is intended to assist
this process.

Protective
Vaccination (Vaccination to live)

10.This
strategy would be considered:-

7where
veterinary and scientific advice is that an outbreak could not be contained by
stamping out of Infected Premises and Dangerous Contacts alone;

7where
a defined category of animals could be identified for protection, either in
geographical or species terms; this could include pet or sanctuary animals
within a vaccination zone;

7to
protect, where appropriate, zoo animals and rare breeds collections as
recommended by the Royal Society.

11.More
generally, this option is likely to carry advantages where the population
density of susceptible animals is high; where pigs are the main species
involved; where there is a high risk of airborne spread; where the origin of the
outbreak is unknown; where incidence is rising rapidly, and where the
distribution of outbreaks is widespread.

Suppressive
Vaccination (Vaccinate to kill)

12.This
strategy could be considered where the number of animals to be culled is likely
to exceed the available disposal capacity.In those instances, animals in defined areas would be vaccinated first
and slaughtered only as disposal capacity became available.It could also be used where there is an
urgent need to reduce the amount of virus circulating in an area and reduce the
risk of spread beyond that area.

STAMPING OUT
POLICY

13.EU
Directive 85/511 lays down the minimum measures Member States must take against
FMD.The Directive requires
slaughter of all susceptible animals on infected premises, and provides for
culling of susceptible animals on epidemiologically linked holdings, as well as
culling of susceptible animals on holdings where FMD is suspected.

14.UK
legislation allows for slaughter of:

7Animals affected or suspected of being affected with FMD.

7Animals
which are believed to have been exposed to FMD infection.

7Animals
to prevent the spread of FMD e.g. a 'firebreak' cull.

Animals affected
or suspected of being affected

15.When the
State Veterinary Service (SVS) is made aware of suspicion of foot and mouth
disease in animals they will arrange for a veterinary investigation to be
undertaken.

16.The
decision to slaughter will be based either on the results of laboratory tests
carried out on samples arising from animals suspected of being affected with
disease, or on clinical evidence of disease.In an area considered to be free of
disease, except in exceptional circumstances, it is likely that disease will be
confirmed on laboratory results.However, once disease has become established in an area it is likely that
cases will be confirmed on clinical grounds alone in order to ensure animals are
slaughtered quickly.

Animals
which are believed to have been exposed to infection

17.Animals may
be slaughtered if they are believed to have been exposed to infection.In these cases, animals will be subject
to a veterinary inquiry to determine if, in the opinion of the Veterinary
Inspector, they have been exposed.In making this judgement the Veterinary Inspector may take account of
national information from experts that animals in certain areas have been
exposed.

18.Animals
that are believed to have been exposed to infection are known as Dangerous
Contacts.This can include animals
on contiguous premises.As virus
can be excreted by such animals prior to the development of obvious and
identifiable clinical signs, it is important that they are culled as soon as
possible to stop virus production and hence spread of disease.A decision to slaughter will be taken by
the veterinary inspector based on information gathered during the inquiry (e.g.
geographical, epidemiological) and account will be taken of levels of
biosecurity.The action that we
take will depend on a risk assessment.Where it is believed that the likelihood is that exposed animals are at a
high risk of becoming diseased they will be slaughtered.Where that risk is lower and there are
the resources to observe the animals, they will be restricted and observed.So our action depends not only on the
degree of risk but our ability to mitigate the risk by having available the
necessary resources to observe animals regularly and our ability to detect early
disease in exposed animals and take immediate action should disease occur.

19.Animals can
be exposed to infection by many routes.The following list is not exhaustive and the relative importance of each
will depend on a number of factors:

a.Direct contact with infected animals

b.Airborne Spread

c.Movement of a live animal

d.Movement of a person

e.Movement of vehicles

f.Movement of equipment or other materials

g.Movement of animal products

h.Movement of feedstuffs or bedding

i.Movement by wildlife or non-susceptible vector

More
details of relevant factors for each are given in Annex A.

To
prevent the spread of disease

20.A third
type of slaughter policy is “to prevent the spread of disease”, e.g. to create a
‘firebreak’.Such a cull might be
required in order to protect areas of high livestock density, either as an
addition to emergency vaccination or, in some cases, instead of it.The species and geographical area of the
cull would have to be carefully assessed.Use of this power is described by a Disease Control (Slaughter) Protocol
as required by the Animal Health Act 1981 as amended.The Protocol identifies the criteria to
be considered and procedures to be followed should it be considered necessary to
call on this power.

21.The
Government is committed to using the new slaughter powers only where this is
justified by the level of risk of the disease spreading and on the basis of
sound veterinary, epidemiological and scientific advice.Vaccination would have been considered
first and if not used the reasons would be published.

22.Any
decision to use these wider powers of slaughter would be taken in the light of
an overall assessment of the risks, costs and benefits in a given situation.
This could include not only risks of transmission but also social and economic
risks that would arise if effective and timely action were not taken.The Government would justify its
decision to use the slaughter powers, explaining the veterinary, epidemiological
and other relevant factors that had been taken into account.

FMD
decision tree - FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED

Each
decision on the tree is taken on the basis of a number of factors.The decision matrix has been based on a
USDA paper but has been adapted to take account of the fact that any disease
control strategy in the UK must take account of the relevant EU and domestic
legal framework.

In
using the decision tree, the following factors should be taken into account at
each decision point.Modelling –
economic & epidemiological – will be used to assist in identifying trigger
points. The Government accepted the recommendation of the UK Lessons Learned
Inquiry to undertake a cost-benefit analysis of different FMD control
strategies.This will be undertaken
in 2003.The results from this
would help inform decisions concerning disease control strategies in a future
outbreak.

All
outbreak and mitigation factors need to be considered at this point in deciding
whether stamping out alone will eradicate the disease.However at the start of an outbreak
information on many of these factors will be incomplete and this may not be
available until well into the outbreak.Decisions may need to be revisited
as more information becomes available.

Outbreak
factors

7Time
from introduction of infection to detection
(epidemiology);

7Contact
rate:type of farms; direct and
indirect movement and distance of movement; efficacy of movement
controls;

7Host
or species affected – the species affected and species at risk (manifestation of
clinical signs leading to early recognition): domestic livestock only – whether
disease is in pigs, cattle or sheep; game farms/zoos – how effective would
isolation methods be; wildlife.

7Status
of outbreak – estimation of the extent of the geographical distribution of FMD
and duration of epidemic: number of affected herds; number of foci of infection;
rate of spread.Use of
epidemiological models.

7Human
resources: emergency response system i.e. are there sufficiently trained staff
for stamping out and to maintain movement controls; what are the epidemic
projections?Defra’s Contingency
Plan identifies the resources needed to deal with an outbreak of FMD.

7Socio-political
factors: The current FMD EU Directive 85/511 (and the proposed FMD directive
which is currently being negotiated) requires slaughter of all susceptible
animals on Infected Premises and provides for culling of susceptible animals on
epidemiologically linked holdings (known as Dangerous Contacts); public opinion;
industry acceptance; other affected sectors e.g. tourism.

7Vaccine
strain availability – Is there a vaccine available?The UK has its own stocks of 8 different
FMD antigen strains held, on its behalf, by a commercial supplier.In addition, the EU Vaccine Bank holds a
range of antigens for emergency use.The UK is also a member of the International Vaccine Bank to which it has
drawing rights of 500,000 doses for each of the 7 strains of FMD antigen kept by
them.

7Number
of vaccine doses available – Doses available vary depending on the strains.(Defra is keeping the availability of
strains and quantities under review).

7Emergency
vaccination strategy i.e. ring or firebreak vaccination – the strategy would
depend on factors such as the virulence of the strain, number of foci of
infection, density and species of livestock in likely vaccination zone,
etc.The Government accepted in its
Response to the UK Inquires into FMD that it should draw up arrangements for a
process of prior registration of zoos and rare breeds for possible emergency
vaccination in a future outbreak.

7Vaccination
logistics – this will be covered by the SVS operational field instructions.To comply with the UK Marketing
Authorisation for FMD vaccines, a second dose would be required 3-4 weeks after
the first dose. However, the need for a second inoculation or a booster will
depend on the length of time that active disease is present.Where the policy is
vaccinate-to-slaughter a 1-dose strategy is more likely to be used.(In an emergency, Article 8 of Directive
2001/82 /EC would provisionally allow the use of FMD vaccines which do not have
UK Marketing Authorisations (MAs) in the absence of a suitable medicinal product
and after informing the Commission of the detailed conditions of use.)

7Laboratory
capacity/ability to distinguish vaccinates from infected – Laboratory capacity
exists to undertake testing.However, there are currently no internationally recognised standards for
NSP testing.There are a variety of
NSP tests at differing levels of validation.The Government accepts that the
validation of NSP (non-structural protein) tests is a key area.There are currently a number of research
projects in the UK, Europe and America and many of the European groups are
partners in a European Union Concerted Action project on FMD diagnosis.The main limiting factor for the
validation of such tests is the availability of suitable panels of sera,
especially from vaccinated and then challenged animals.Defra is supporting research into this
area.In addition, the Government
also accepts that there is a need to develop accepted strategies for
surveillance after vaccination.This is something that the OIE has under consideration.

7Time
– Whether there would be enough time for vaccination to be completed before
spread of infection would depend on the epidemiological projections during the
outbreak. Need for modelling
input.

3.Human resources to be
considered:

7Emergency
response system – need to have sufficient numbers of vaccinators available.The revised Viper Chapter 3A will deal
with recruitment and training of vaccinators.Current arrangements provide for 50
fully trained vaccination teams (each consisting of 1 vaccinator, 1 ear tag
reader and 1 recorder) to be made available, with provision to increase this
number of teams within 4/5 days of notification to meet an increased demand for
additional resources.There are
also human resource implications in carrying out NSP testing of all vaccinated
herds/flocks.

7Movement
controls are a recognised part of any UK control strategy.Specific restrictions will apply on
movement of vaccinated animals and products from vaccinated animals within the
vaccination zone as laid down by EU.There will be welfare considerations in establishing a vaccination
zone.Need sufficient staff to
monitor movement controls.

7Epidemic
projections – different for each outbreak.

4.Socio-political factors to be
considered:

7Stakeholders
– there needs to be a communications plan that should be communicated to
stakeholders in advance.Need
active engagement with stakeholders especially on FSA advice on safety and to
clarify any labelling and export issues.

7Available
legislation – Powers to vaccinate against FMD are available.The AHA 2002 provides enhanced
powers of entry for emergency vaccination of susceptible animals.Any decision to carry out emergency
vaccination would have to be agreed by the EU.Parallel OIE rules need also to be
considered.

7Industry
opinion – Stakeholders to be kept involved in developments connected with the
issue of vaccination i.e. FMD Directive, changes to the OIE Code, implications
for the resumption of trade.Stakeholder involvement (should be all-inclusive) and agreement would be
important in any decision to vaccinate.

5.Economic considerations to be
considered:

7Cost
of vaccination – as part of its contingency planning, against a future outbreak
of FMD, the UK has purchased a range of antigens.Additional costs would be those of
formulating the vaccine from the antigen, or of acquiring vaccine if the strain
was not one held.The cost of
vaccination equipment, training and employing staff as part of a vaccination
campaign also needs to be costed into the equation.

7Value
of exports – the extended period in which exports would be restricted would need
to be weighed against the benefit to wider rural economy and tourism from
killing and disposing of fewer animals.

7Regionalisation
– would be required under the proposed FMD Directive where the outbreak
threatens to become extensive or if emergency vaccination is used.The proposed Directive sets out the
controls that would apply within a regionalised zone.

Decision
Box 3:is the exit strategy
“vaccinate to live”?

6.Physical resources to be
considered:

7Slaughter
capacity – vaccinate to live is likely to reduce pressure on slaughter capacity
whereas as vaccinate to slaughter might lead to higher numbers for slaughter
than a stamping out policy (the Dutch experience).Capacity would need to be able to cope
with slaughter of vaccinates and slaughter of infected livestock in a
vaccinate-to-slaughter scenario.

7Disposal
capacity – The higher numbers generated by a vaccinate to slaughter policy may
result in disposal becoming a limiting factor.A vaccinate to live policy would help
alleviate disposal problems.

7Controls
on products from vaccinated animals - Under EU rules, products from vaccinates
would need to be kept separate from non-vaccinates.This may raise practical problems for
the processing industry.The
proposed FMD Directive sets out the post vaccination controls that would be
required following emergency vaccination.Stakeholders are currently being
consulted on the proposed controls and the possible costs.

7Time
– If a vaccinate to slaughter policy was followed it would be more
cost-effective to cull after the first inoculation.See Box 2 criteria on physical
resources.

7Identification:individual identification of vaccinated
livestock is required under the proposed FMD Directive so that either one can
ensure that all vaccinates are killed or products from vaccinates are correctly
treated.Currently very difficult
for anything other than cattle.Call-offcontracts
are being put in place to purchase ear tags to identify vaccinated animals.

7.Human resources to be
considered:

7Emergency
response system – Current and future arrangements for delivery of a vaccination
programme take account of the need to implement a vaccinate to live strategy
which, by implication, may require 2 or more doses to be administered.For a vaccinate to slaughter policy, we
would need to consider whether we had the necessary staff ie. slaughtermen.

7Epidemic
projections.As
above.

8.Socio-political factors to be
considered:

7Available
legislation – The AHA allows for emergency vaccination as does EC 85/511.The AHA allows for the slaughter of
vaccinates and for payment of compensation for vaccinated animals which are
compulsorily slaughtered.The proposed FMD Directive
explicitly provides for the option of suppressive vaccination ie. vaccination to
kill, as well as protective vaccination ie. vaccination to live.The Government has made clear its
preference for protective vaccination.

7Public
opinion – Public are likely to support a vaccinate to live policy and this would
be in line with Follett and Anderson Inquiry recommendations.Labelling for vaccinated products is an
issue that needs to be resolved through discussion with stakeholders.

7Industry
acceptance –possible pressure from trade, and other Member States, to slaughter
vaccinates to regain FMD free status.Need to engage industry stakeholders.

9.Economic considerations to be
considered:

7Cost
of vaccinate to slaughter – include the costs of vaccination (Box 4) plus the
cost of slaughter and disposal of all vaccinates.

7FMD
free status – this can be regained 3 months earlier where suppressive
vaccination is used.However, there
are other economic considerations that will need to be taken into account in a
full cost benefit analysis (see earlier decision boxes).

At
decision box 4:are there
additional culling strategies that are appropriateto the circumstances?

In
some circumstances culling additional to DCs and IPs may be the optimal solution
based on a risk assessment.This
cullingcould take a number of
forms – contiguous premises (where these are judged to have been exposed to
infection) or preventive culling where scientific and veterinary advice is that
this will prevent further spread of disease outwith the area.In choosing between these and other
additional forms of culling a number of factors will need to be taken into
account:

10.Socio-political factors to be
considered:

7Available
legislation – The Animal Health Act 1981 (as amended) provides the necessary
powers including the power to slaughter pre-emptively in order to stop the
spread of the disease.The AHA
places a duty on the Secretary of State to consider emergency vaccination before
using the pre-emptive slaughter powers.

7value
of exports & other economic costs particularly in the wider countryside and
for tourism.There are extra costs
involved in additional culling.

7Regionalisation
– this is provided for by the proposed FMD Directive.

At
decision box 5:are resources
available for additional culling strategies?

A
limiting factor is whether adequate resources exist to accommodate the
anticipated number of additional livestock in addition to those slaughtered
under stamping out.

12.Physical resources to be
considered:

7slaughter
capacity – does the capacity exist to slaughter animals both under the stamping
out policy and additional culling;

7transportation
capacity – does the transport capacity exist to remove animals from farm for
disposal under an additional culling scenario;

7disposal
capacity - does the capacity exist to dispose of animals under the stamping out
policy and additional culling in environmentally acceptable ways;

7time
ie are there sufficient resources to accommodate additional culling before such
livestock develop FMD; identification of all premises included in an additional
cull.

13.Human resources to be
considered:

7emergency
response system ie are there sufficiently trained staff to carry out an
additional culling policy without adversely impacting on other key control
policies i.e. enforcing movement controls, etc;

7what
are the epidemic projections – epidemiological modelling of high risk
groups.

Annex
A

Some
of the routes by which animals can be exposed to infection

a.Direct contact with infected
animals

1.Infection is rapidly and efficiently passed from an infected animal to an
uninfected, susceptible animal by direct contact between the animals.When establishing if animals have been
exposed to infection following direct contact with an infected live animal, the
following factors will be taken into account:

2.Virus can be exhaled by an infected animal.The virus may be carried on air currents
to susceptible, uninfected stock.The greatest risk of infection will be to stock on premises that are
close to an IP though under certain circumstances more distant premises,
possibly some distance away, may also be considered to have been exposed by such
a route.(This is different to the
culling to prevent the spread of disease that is covered in paragraph 25).When establishing if animals have been
exposed to infection following airborne spread of virus the following factors
will be taken into account:

i.Species of infected animals.

ii.Species of uninfected, susceptible animals.

iii.Pathogenicity and virulence of the viral strain.

iv.Prevailing wind direction during the period when animals on the IP are
considered to have been excreting virus in exhaled air.

v.Distance between the infected and uninfected
animals.

vi.Environmental conditions that could contribute to virus survival, e.g.
temperature and humidity.

vii.Likelihood
of release of airborne virus, e.g. nature of housing or measures to control air
outlets from housed livestock.

viii.Likelihood of
exposure to the airborne virus. e.g. nature of housing or measures to control
air supply to livestock.

c.Movement of a live animal

3.Before disease is suspected and subsequently confirmed on a premises it
is possible that an animal could, quite legitimately, have moved off that
premises.Although disease had not
been suspected, it is possible that disease was present when that animal moved
off the premises.If that animal
was itself infected it could infect other susceptible livestock at any time
after leaving the premises.

4.When establishing if animals have been exposed to infection following the
movement of a live animal, the following factors will be taken into
account:

5.A person moving from a premises where infection was present could
transmit infective material on their skin, hair, clothes or footwear.When establishing if animals have been
exposed to infection following the movement of a person, the following factors
will be taken into account:

i.Likelihood that the person could have taken infection from the
IP.

ii.Nature of biosecurity measures on leaving the IP and before any contact
with susceptible uninfected animals.

iii.Likelihood the person could have introduced infection to susceptible
uninfected animals.

e.Movement of
vehicles

6.Vehicles could carry infection from a premises where infection was
present to other premises where susceptible livestock are present.Such vehicles could
include:

7.The infective material could be carried anywhere on or in the
vehicle.When establishing if
animals have been exposed to infection following a vehicle movement, the
following factors will be taken into account:

i.The nature of the contact with infected animals or materials from
infected animals.

ii.Whether there was any cleansing and disinfection of the vehicle after
contact with infected animals or materials and before contact with uninfected
susceptible livestock.

iii.Whether the conditions during the journey would have rendered the virus
non-viable.

iv.The
nature of the contact with susceptible uninfected animals.

f.Movement of equipment or other
materials

8.Equipment or other materials used on a premises where infection was
present could carry infective material to susceptible, uninfected animals.Such equipment could range widely, from
large feed mixers to thermometers.In establishing if animals have been exposed to infection following
movement of equipment the following factors will be taken into
account:

i.The nature of the contact between the item and infected
animals.

ii.The nature of the contact between the item and susceptible, uninfected
animals.

iii.Whether there was any cleansing and disinfection of the
item.

g.Movement of animal
products

9.Products from infected animals could contain viable virus that could
infect susceptible, uninfected animals.Such products include milk, slurry, manure, meat, carcases (see also
scavenging at (j) below).When
establishing if animals have been exposed to infection following any movement of
animal products the following factors will be taken into
account:

i.Likelihood that the product contains viable virus.

ii.Effectiveness of any treatment undertaken before it leaves the IP or
before it comes into contact with uninfected susceptible
animals.

iii.Interval between removal of product and contact with the susceptible,
uninfected animals.

h.Movement of feedstuffs or
bedding

10.Products
from infected animals could contaminate forages, feedstuffs and bedding
materials with viable virus that could infect susceptible, uninfected
animals.Such products include hay,
silage, straw, materials used to contain or transport such products.In establishing if animals have been
exposed to infection following movement of these products the following factors
will be taken into account:

i.Likelihood that the product contains viable virus.

ii.Effectiveness of any treatment undertaken before it leaves the IP or
comes into contact with uninfected susceptible animals.

iii.Interval between removal of product and contact with the susceptible,
uninfected animals.

j.Movement by wildlife or
non-susceptible vector

11.This is
when a species of animal that is not susceptible to infection carries infective
material from an IP either inadvertently or during scavenging. It is difficult
to prevent this though good husbandry should reduce the levels of vermin that
are attracted to a premises.Once
the animals are slaughtered, and if there is likely to be any delay in disposal,
then measures, e.g. rodent control, covering and spraying carcases, etc will be
taken by the SVS to minimise this risk.

ANNEX
C

DISEASE CONTROL (SLAUGHTER)
PROTOCOL

Introduction

1.The
Lessons Learned Inquiry on the 2001 Foot-and-Mouth Disease outbreak recommended
that provision should be made for the possible application of pre-emptive
culling policies, if justified by well-informed veterinary and scientific
advice, and judged to be appropriate to the circumstances.Such powers for pre-emptive (or
preventive or "firebreak") culling of animals not exposed to FMD infection are
included in the Animal Health Act 2002.It adds to the armoury the Government has to fight FMD by getting ahead
of the disease and stopping it spreading.

2.Section 32B of the Animal Health Act 1981, as amended by the Animal
Health Act 2002, requires the Secretary of State to have a disease control
(slaughter) protocol for the use of the new slaughter power in the Act (Schedule
3, paragraph 3(c)) to prevent the spread of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD).This would be a pre-emptive or
“firebreak” cull.

3.This power cannot be used unless the protocol has been published and
vaccination has first been considered to prevent the spread of disease (Section
14 of the Animal Health Act 1981 as amended).The reasons for not using vaccination
would be published.The factors to
be considered in deciding on the measures to be used to tackle an outbreak of
FMD are set out in a separate document - FMD Disease Control Strategies,referred to as the FMD Decision
Tree.The purpose of this disease
control (slaughter) protocol is to identify criteria to be considered and
procedures to be followed should it be considered necessary to call on this new
slaughter power.

Purpose
for which the power would be used

4.This power would be used only where this is justified by the
circumstances of the possibility of disease spreading and on the basis of sound
veterinary, epidemiological and scientific advice.Emergency vaccination would have been
considered first and if not used the reasons would be published.

The
principal factors to be taken into account

5.A major factor will be to get ahead of the disease.It could apply in particular to protect
areas of dense livestock population.The cull would include those animals which, should they become affected,
would present a significant risk to the farming and livestock community more
generally by contributing to onward spread.It is in such circumstances that
effective preventative action may be necessary to safeguard the wider public
interest. Species, geographical area and, if appropriate, type of farming would
be relevant.Any decision to use
the wider powers of slaughter would be taken in the light of an overall
assessment of the risks, costs and benefits in a given situation.This could include not only risks of
transmission but also social and economic risks that would arise if effective
and timely action were not taken.

The
procedure to be followed in reaching a decision

6.Such a decision could not be made until the use of emergency vaccination
had been considered and, if not used, the reasons
published.

7.The steps to be taken would then comprise:

(a)the
identification of a group of animals that are likely to contribute to spread of
disease, based on epidemiological modelling, veterinary advice and local
factors;

(b)the determination of which species are involved;

(c)consideration of exemptions on the basis of husbandry or other criteria,
for example, rare breeds or genetic value;

(d)the determination of the geographical area
involved;

(e)the
determination of the rules for inclusion or exclusion of animals at the boundary
of that area;

(f)analysis of risks, costs and benefits;

(g)the
publication of an outline of the reasons why such a cull is
needed.

The
procedure by which animals on a premises will be deemed to be included in a
slaughter

8.Premises believed to contain animals to be slaughtered to prevent the
spread of disease would be identified.A Veterinary Inspector would visit and ascertain if animals meet the
criteria and are to be slaughtered.

9.The Veterinary Inspector would be required to explain the reasons to the
owner and give him an opportunity to provide evidence if he believed the animals
should be exempted.To ensure the
reason for slaughter is clear to the owner a slaughter notice would be
issued.The slaughter notice would
state the powers under which slaughter is required and the reason why the
owner's stock is included (with reference to the criteria for slaughter to
prevent the spread of disease).

The
means by which a particular decision to slaughter can be
reviewed

10.Both as
part of the slaughter notice and during explanations the owner must be made
aware that they can ask the DVM to review the decision that their stock meet the
criteria for the cull and be advised how and by when this can be
done.

11.The DVM, or
a suitable alternative, must be available to hear such reviews.The following action would be
taken:

They
will consider the views of the owner as to why they believe the decision is
wrong.

They
must ensure that the veterinary inspector has carried out a full and fair
inquiry to establish if the animals meet the appropriate
criteria.

ANNEX
D

EMERGENCY VACCINATION ARRANGEMENTS

1.Accommodation

The
current agreement with ADAS starts the process with the establishment of a
suitable vaccination centre (a range of suitable sites are currently being
investigated by Defra).In
identifying vaccination centres consideration will be given to the following
factors:

7good
road access to the target area(s) and to any satellite centres - where possible,
within the target area;