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1 When the Euro Falls Apart A Sequel By Hal S. Scott Nomura Professor of International Financial Systems, Harvard Law School January 31, 2012 Working Paper Program on International Financial Systems Harvard Law School

2 I. Introduction When my article When the Euro Falls Apart was published in International Finance in 1998, it dealt with a different set of concerns than confront us today. No one foresaw that the creation of the euro would enable some Member States like Greece or Italy to issue excessive and unsustainable debt because the market did not differentiate the riskiness of their debt from that of more disciplined countries like Germany. Analysts assumed that there was a real anti-bailout policy and did not anticipate that the European Central Bank (ECB) would place an equal value on all countries sovereign bonds when used by banks as collateral. I did discuss the possibility that a country might seek to leave the euro to get control over monetary policy or devalue its exchange rate, but did not anticipate that this might be motivated by the desire to reduce its debt burden, the situation faced today. I assumed that euro area Member States would resist withdrawals because they would see this as a step backward in European integration and would therefore not facilitate them. The 1998 article did, however, look at obstacles to withdrawal that still remain today and which are further analyzed in this Sequel: (1) the absence of a legal framework for withdrawal (although the nature of this problem changed with new provisions in the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon); (2) the possibility of bank runs triggered by cross-border movement of funds out of a withdrawing country and whether capital controls could stop this; (3) the difficulty of establishing a new currency, such as a new drachma or lira, alongside a continuing euro; and (4) major legal difficulties in redenominating debt. Again, these problems were analyzed largely with the assumption that remaining euro members would not take action to facilitate withdrawal. 1

3 The Sequel continues to be pessimistic about the viability of non-consensual withdrawals from the euro area. However, today the issue is whether a consensual withdrawal would work that Greece, and perhaps other countries, would withdraw from the euro with the help of their peers. This is decidedly more realistic. What is required for a viable withdrawal is a collaborative approach, in some cases involving legal changes: (1) a rapid treaty amendment permitting withdrawal from the euro area without necessitating withdrawal from the European Union; (2) cooperation in the temporary imposition of capital controls to block cross-border euro flight; (3) establishment of a new currency; (4) entry of withdrawing members into the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) at a pegged exchange rate with unlimited swap lines from the ECB to limit the impact of devaluation losses on European banks and to make credible the strength of the new currency by insuring future discipline in domestic monetary policy (entry into the euro for some like Greece was a way to achieve such discipline, which is still needed); and (5) a European Union, and indeed international, legal framework legitimizing redenomination which otherwise would be subject to broad and disruptive litigation. This framework would be similar to the one constructed when countries redenominated obligations as part of their adoption of the euro. All of these measures would have to be properly sequenced. Any move toward withdrawal would risk severe capital flight, so at the outset of the announcement of a planned withdrawal capital controls would have to be imposed. Once the treaty amendment permitting withdrawal was secured, all of the other measures would be adopted. Capital controls would be lifted once the new exchange rate under the ERM was credibly established. 2

4 As this essay is being written, the possibility of euro withdrawal, unilateral or consensual, is not high. European policymakers generally see this option as off the table. Their opposition is perhaps for the reason I discussed in 1998: that it would be seen as a step backward in European integration. But this is a mistake if the continued insistence on all countries remaining in the euro, with the continued support this entails from the ECB and other Member States, will lead to an unsustainable spiral of debt and demands for support that may ultimately wreck the European Union itself. It may be far better to relieve the pressure by allowing withdrawals and put those withdrawing in the purgatory of the ERM from which they can return some day to euro membership. In my view, euro withdrawal is preferable to the restructuring of continued euro denominated debt. Euro withdrawal allows for currency devaluation that can restore the competitiveness of economies (Mankiw 2004), an improvement that cannot be attained by debt restructuring. Both techniques can decrease debt burden. And the amount of devaluation can, like the debt haircut achieved through restructuring, be limited so as not to impose unacceptable levels of loss on European banks. However, redenomination of debt has distinct advantages over restructuring as a technique to reduce debt burden. Redenomination, within a proper legal framework, avoids the need to negotiate debt reduction levels with creditors and the disruption in payment and trade flows that may be necessitated to shield country assets from exposure to attachments by holdout creditors. Redenomination also places an equal burden on public and private holders of debt whereas public creditors have long insisted (perhaps wrongly) and continue today to insist on super priority in any debt restructuring. Euro withdrawal also relieves the burden of fiscal support from stronger countries and from the ECB necessitated by 3

5 countries remaining in the euro. Despite these advantages, Greece the leading candidate for euro area withdrawal as of this writing seems as if it is more likely to pursue restructuring than redenomination. Such a decision would be regrettable, because it would not address the problem of Greek competitiveness. If Greece does pursue restructuring, it cannot also pursue withdrawal, at least in the immediate future the prospect of redenomination losses added to restructuring haircuts is more than European banks can bear. However, establishing a withdrawal framework now makes sense regardless of what path Greece pursues. After all, the true threat to the long-term viability of the euro area does not come from the current debt crisis in Greece, but from the looming crises in Italy and other large Member States. Establishing the withdrawal framework today ensures it will be in place when it is truly needed. In the longer run, measures must be adopted to avoid continued debt crises. While euro withdrawal may be preferable to debt restructuring, neither is desirable. The fundamental flaw of the euro, monetary integration without fiscal integration, must be addressed. The Sequel proposes that all debt of euro area members be issued with crossguarantees but also be subject to euro area approval if the debt exceeds sixty percent of GDP, or what is otherwise thought to be a clearly sustainable level. In a transition period, Member States would be able to issue ten percent more cross-guaranteed debt over their current debt levels, recognizing that in most cases current debt levels are significantly over sixty percent of GDP. This is a more binding approach to debt limitation than yet another toothless Stability and Growth Pact or national debt brakes that can be easily circumvented. Yet it stops short of full fiscal integration because it leaves debt issuance up to sixty percent of GDP, as well as spending and taxation 4

6 decisions, to national discretion (albeit spending and tax policies will be constrained by the debt limit). II. An Orderly Withdrawal From the Euro Area An orderly withdrawal from the euro area requires a series of legal changes by all involved in some cases not just the nations of Europe, but also major economic powers around the world. In this Part, I first describe those changes in detail and then address the question of how they should be sequenced to minimize disruption to the financial system. A. Create a legal basis for withdrawal One of the first issues Greece, Italy, or any other Member State would confront in attempting to withdraw from the euro area is finding a legal basis for exiting a monetary union that the E.U. s underlying constitutional treaties have repeatedly described as irrevocable (Articles 4(2), 118, and 123(4) of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, and Article 140(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union). Neither the Treaty on European Union (TEU) nor the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the two treaties that today create the E.U. s governing legal structure, provide any mechanism for unilateral withdrawal from the euro area. Accordingly, a negotiated withdrawal through treaty amendment is the only realistic possibility. 1. The E.U. treaties do not permit unilateral euro area withdrawal. The only existing treaty mechanism speaking to unilateral withdrawal is Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union. Added by the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, Article 50 is a blunt instrument: it permits a Member State to withdraw from the E.U. completely. 5

7 Article 50 anticipates a process for negotiated withdrawal, with the Council representing the E.U. in drafting an agreement that must be approved by the European Parliament. Despite the goal of negotiation, however, Article 50 clearly allows for unilateral action. Specifically, the right to withdraw is linked to a Member State s own constitutional requirements rather than any steps taken by the E.U. If the European Council fails to act on a Member State s notification of intent to withdraw, withdrawal becomes effective automatically after a two-year waiting period. Thus if Greece or Italy decided to leave the E.U., apparently abandoning the euro in the process, they would not need the consent of any other Member States. However, there is no treaty authority for a unilateral decision to abandon just the euro. Some commentators have suggested that this silence in the treaties could mean that withdrawal from the euro area, regardless of a Member State s right to withdraw unilaterally from the E.U., must always be negotiated through treaty amendment (Athanassiou 2009). Other commentators have questioned whether the greater power includes the lesser, such that Article 50 s creation of a unilateral right to complete E.U. withdrawal necessarily creates a unilateral right to euro area-only withdrawal (Smits 2005; Athanassiou 2009). Despite such speculation, the consensus view is that to the extent Article 50 allows euro area withdrawal at all, such withdrawal is possible only in conjunction with complete E.U. withdrawal. The reason is that participation in the E.U. s Economic and Monetary Union, including adoption of the euro, is a fundamental part of the E.U. acquis communautaire, or underlying legal order binding on all Member States. Other than the United Kingdom, which negotiated an opt-out as part of the Maastricht Treaty, and Denmark, which negotiated a special post-maastricht opt-out through the 6

8 Edinburgh Agreement, all Member States are obligated to adopt the euro. Although Sweden has avoided joining the euro area by declining to satisfy the necessary prerequisites, all other non-euro area Member States are in the process of doing so. Accordingly, to read a distinct right to unilateral euro area-only withdrawal into Article 50 would fundamentally conflict with the premise of the E.U. treaties. This premise has been described since the 1950s as an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe. As commentators almost universally recognize, the legal process of European integration is a one-way ratchet in which commitments, once made, cannot be undone. Put simply, a Member State likely could unilaterally leave the euro area pursuant to Article 50 only if it also were willing to sacrifice its E.U. membership entirely. Even if it were willing to do so, the withdrawing Member State likely would still face a potentially protracted legal battle over claims that it was obligated to negotiate separately the terms of its withdrawal from the euro area. 2. Public international law does not support euro area withdrawal. The apparent impossibility of unilateral euro area withdrawal under the E.U. treaties has prompted some commentators to turn to public international law as perhaps providing a distinct legal mechanism for unilateral withdrawal. Any reliance on public international law is unconvincing on two levels, however. First, given the E.U. s unique legal structure, the ability of a Member State such as Greece or Italy to invoke any sources of international law other than the treaties themselves is sharply limited when E.U. interests are at stake. As the European Court of Justice (ECJ) explained in the landmark case Van Gend en Loos v. Administratie der Belastingen, what are now known as the E.U. treaties created a new legal order of 7

9 international law, for the benefit of which the States have limited their sovereign rights. The ECJ later made explicit in Costa v. ENEL that the transfer by the States from their domestic legal system to the Community legal system of the rights and obligations arising under the Treaty carries with it a permanent limitation of their sovereign rights, against which a subsequent unilateral act incompatible with the concept of the Community cannot prevail. In short, a claim that international law can provide rights not contemplated by E.U. law is at best highly contestable and would be subject to a serious legal challenge. The result would be significant economic and political consequences across Europe for the withdrawing Member State. Second, and just as problematic, even if Greece, Italy, or another Member State could invoke public international law to modify its E.U. obligations, that law would be unavailing in the case of euro area withdrawal. Contra some commentators (Dor 2011), the refusal of some Member States to ratify the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties has no effect on the possible invocation of the public international law rules that govern treaties, because the vast majority of the Convention s provisions simply codify customary international law that binds all states. Specifically, public international law, as codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, recognizes a right to treaty withdrawal in only a handful of circumstances. First, withdrawal may be permitted if the parties intended to allow withdrawal or if a treaty implies such a right (Article 56). Second, withdrawal may be permitted if performance is impossible (Article 61) or there has been a fundamental change in circumstances (Article 62). Withdrawal also may be permitted in a handful of circumstances not relevant to the current debate over the euro area, such as fraud or coercion. 8

10 The first set of these circumstances clearly does not apply to euro area treaty commitments, given the irrevocable nature of economic and monetary union and the understanding that assuming E.U. obligations is a one-way ratchet. Plainly none of the Member States intended to allow or imply a unilateral right to withdraw from the euro area. As for the second set of these circumstances, they are interpreted so narrowly that they can rarely, if ever, apply in practice. The impossibility of performance doctrine typically involves tangible objects that are indispensable to the fulfillment of treaty obligations. A nation s obligations under a riparian rights treaty may be impossible to meet if a river dries out, for example. Furthermore, the doctrine cannot be invoked by parties to a treaty that have themselves created the impossibility at issue. To the extent that Greece, Italy, or another Member State has difficulty fulfilling its monetary union obligations, that difficulty is almost certainly the result of its own fiscal policies. The change in circumstances doctrine is even more narrowly interpreted. It applies only if the circumstances that have since changed were an essential basis for a party s consent to the relevant treaty and only if the new circumstance radically transform the extent of treaty obligations. A state wishing to withdraw from the euro area could point to no changed circumstances simply its own miscalculation about the benefits of monetary union. In short, even if public international law could be invoked within the E.U. legal order a highly doubtful prospect it would not support a unilateral right to withdraw from the euro area. 3. A treaty amendment is the clearest path to euro area withdrawal. In short, the clearest legal path to euro area exit is a negotiated amendment to the treaties. The recent intergovernmental agreement by which euro area Member States 9

11 agreed to impose new fiscal discipline rules without going through the E.U. s treaty amendment process might raise the tempting prospect that a similar agreement would be sufficient to permit euro area withdrawal. However, the differences between that agreement, which is essentially a new fiscal treaty, and withdrawal are striking. Whereas the proposed treaty will add additional duties for a subset of Member States, euro area withdrawal would fundamentally alter the terms of a Member State s participation in the E.U. itself. Intergovernmental agreements can be employed only to govern matters outside an area of E.U. competence provided for in the E.U. treaties. For example, a subset of E.U. Member States recently adopted the so-called Prüm Convention, which governs border and law enforcement issues not addressed by the existing treaties. As the Convention itself makes clear, it applies only insofar as it is compatible with E.U. law, and in case of a conflict, E.U. law always takes primacy (Article 47). The draft text of the new fiscal treaty includes a similar provision (Article 2(2).) Because the operation of the euro area is a core E.U. competence, and because withdrawal clearly conflicts with the E.U. treaties, an intergovernmental agreement is impossible. Thus treaty amendment is unavoidable. While the Treaty of Lisbon introduced a simplified revision procedure to make amendment easier, given the broad treaty changes required, this procedure almost certainly would not apply (Zbíral 2010). Moreover, even the simplified approach does not avoid the main obstacle to any change unanimity among the Member States, which must then approve the amendment in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements (Article 48(6) TEU). However, if Member States reached consensus on the need for an amendment, its adoption could occur rapidly; a plausible 10

12 timeline is two to four months. The new fiscal treaty, for example, is set to take effect by March 2012, despite having been proposed only in December Commentators correctly note that any amendment is difficult, and the potential for an extended amendment period during which capital controls, as described below, would remain in effect is an admitted (although unavoidable) weakness of any withdrawal plan. Nonetheless, the difficulty of a euro withdrawal amendment should not be overstated. Such an amendment is a realistic possibility, particularly if it came as part of a broader grand bargain setting the terms by which such a withdrawal would take place (described in more detail below). An amendment substantially altering the terms of a country s membership in the E.U. would not even be unprecedented. In 1984, before Article 50 s adoption required it to do so, the E.U. s predecessor, the European Economic Community, negotiated the Greenland Treaty, which permitted Greenland to leave the EEC the following year and assume the status of an overseas territory. B. Implement capital controls As soon as treaty amendment became a realistic possibility, perhaps the most pressing problem a Member State withdrawing from the euro area would face is the prospect of capital flight. For example, following the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian monetary union in 1919, citizens feared converting their existing crowns to replacement local currencies, which might lose value quickly. Thus, residents of Austria and the future Yugoslavia moved their money to Hungary, where it could be redeemed for the stronger new Hungarian crown. The Czechoslovakian monetary union breakup in 1993 saw a similar dynamic. When it became clear following the 1992 election that the country would divide in two, residents of the future Slovakia began moving their money 11

13 to the future Czech Republic, which was seen as having better prospects for economic growth and a stronger currency. (The breakup of the Soviet monetary union in roughly the same time period is of limited instructive value; although the situation paralleled a possible euro breakup in that only some countries abandoned the ruble, that currency s hyperinflation meant that those abandoning it had little need for capital controls since the remaining ruble was a weaker currency than the newly established ones.) 1. Capital controls are necessary but the E.U. treaties present a possibly significant legal impediment. The lesson is clear: if a Member State such as Greece were to announce that it was abandoning the euro, Greek businesses and citizens alike would begin moving money to euro-denominated accounts elsewhere in the E.U. or foreign-denominated accounts abroad lest the value of their Greek accounts be severely diminished when they were redenominated in new drachma. Only once Greeks were convinced that the new drachma was a stable currency, no longer subject to speculative attacks likely to cause further major devaluation (as described more fully below in the discussion of the Exchange Rate Mechanism), would they be confident about keeping their money in new drachma. Until that time, the country would have to adopt capital controls to ensure existing accounts were not rapidly drained. Such controls were of at least some value in limiting the effects of cross-border capital flight following the collapse of the Austro- Hungarian and Czechoslovakian monetary unions. Austria, for example, froze 50 percent of bank deposits. It also declared that existing currency was no longer legal tender within the territory and that only crowns that had been physically stamped with the national emblem were valid. Czechoslovakia was even more aggressive; as the Czech Republic 12

14 and Slovakia divided, they limited capital flight by restricting the withdrawal of hard currency, stopping account transfers, and closing their common border. Problematically, however, virtually any attempt to stop money from moving elsewhere in the E.U. risks violating the principle of free movement of capital, which is considered one of the foundational four freedoms of the E.U. This principle is enshrined in the E.U. treaties as Article 63 TFEU, which sets out a sweeping prohibition against restrictions on the movement of capital between Member States and between Member States and third countries (that is, those not in the E.U.). Various safety valves exist that allow a Member State to derogate from this provision. Article 65(1)(b) TFEU, for example, provides that the guarantee of free capital movement exists without prejudice to the right to take measures which are justified on grounds of public policy or public security. Article 347 TFEU explicitly contemplates a Member State taking internal actions that may be incompatible with the E.U. integrated market in the case of serious internal disturbances affecting the maintenance of law and order. Nonetheless, ECJ jurisprudence makes clear that the protections of Article 63 are to be read broadly and the exceptions are to be read narrowly. Accordingly, although a withdrawing Member State could attempt to invoke one of these safety valves, it would face an uncertain prospect for success. However, given that any successful withdrawal from the euro area likely will occur through treaty amendment, perhaps the most straightforward approach would simply be the inclusion of an Article 63 temporary derogation clause that could be invoked by a Member State availing itself of the newly adopted euro area withdrawal procedures. Such a clause might build on the existing Article 66 TFEU, which creates a process by which the E.U. 13

15 can adopt safeguard measures for six months if movements of capital to or from non- E.U. countries cause, or threaten to cause, serious difficulties for the operation of economic and monetary union. If withdrawal were to occur before the necessary treaty framework was established in which case capital controls would be imposed while the amendment process took place the derogation clause would have to retroactively absolve violations of Article 63 specifically linked to a Member State s withdrawal from the euro area. 2. A withdrawing Member State must declare a brief bank holiday combined with a longer period of restrictions on transfers abroad. Assuming a withdrawing Member State could resolve the legal impediments to capital controls, effective controls would entail multiple measures: most likely a brief bank holiday shutting down the domestic banking system, combined with a longer period of restrictions on financial transfers abroad. The experience of other countries in using these techniques is worth examining. For example, during the Great Depression, dollars in some regions of the United States came to be seen as more valuable than dollars in other regions of the country. The problem began when the Federal Reserve districts of Chicago and Cleveland experienced a disproportionate share of the nation s bank failures more than half, when weighted by deposits. These collapses began to spark bank runs in those districts, as depositors attempted to move their money to New York-based banks (or even their own homes), which were seen as more secure. The new administration of President Franklin Roosevelt responded with a two-week bank holiday, after which banks reopened with de facto full deposit insurance. The holiday effectively ended the banking crisis by preventing citizens from exacerbating problems while the government acted. Of course, 14

16 deposit insurance would not stop capital flight in the case of a Member State s withdrawal from the euro area (where the risk is devaluation not bank failure), so the instructive value of the U.S. is quite limited. More relevant is the different approach Argentina adopted during the financial crisis that occurred in when it took its peso off a fixed exchange rate with the dollar. Rather than adopt a full bank holiday, it imposed a US$1,000 monthly limit on withdrawals and converted all checking and savings accounts above a certain balance (US$10,000 and US$3,000, respectively) into certificates of deposit that were then frozen. In addition, the country imposed a host of restrictions on foreign exchange, investment, and stock purchases abroad. This plan, known as the corralito (little corral), effectively stymied most efforts to move currency out of the country and remained in effect for a year. If a Member State such as Greece were to withdraw from the euro area, it might first declare a bank holiday (or a partial holiday sharply limiting cash withdrawals and prohibiting foreign transfers) for a short period while it dealt with creating a new physical currency within its territory. It then could lift the holiday while retaining a prohibition on foreign transfers for a more extended period. The bank holiday would allow Greece to prepare a new currency to replace the existing physical euros within its territory. This would occur in several steps. First, the Greek government would declare that until it began circulation of new drachma coins and banknotes, only euros stamped with the new drachma emblem were legal tender within Greece and that transporting euros out of or into the country was prohibited. Simultaneously, the government would declare that all circulating currency must be 15

17 brought to government-run locations for stamping within a short fixed period of time, say two weeks, or it would lose its status as legal tender. The government also would simultaneously order banks to stamp their existing stores of currencies. By the time banks reopened, few unstamped euros would be circulating within Greece. Second, when sufficient new drachma had been produced, the government would mandate a transition period, perhaps a month, during which stamped euros would circulate alongside new drachma, for which they could be freely exchanged at any bank. At the end of the transition, stamped euros would cease to be legal tender, but citizens could continue to exchange them for new drachma over an extended period. (For example, although the original drachma ceased to be legal tender in Greece on February 28, 2002, the Bank of Greece and Greek tax authorities continued to exchange euros for drachma until March 1, 2004.) In addition to the bank holiday, a withdrawing Member State such as Greece would have to take steps to limit transfers of money abroad. The capital controls not only would have to be comprehensive, but also would have to include exemptions for foreign direct investment, various portfolio investments, and current international transactions (Ariyoshi et al. 2000). These restrictions would go into effect simultaneously with the bank holiday but would remain in effect for some time afterwards until citizens could be confident that the new drachma would hold its value against the euro and other foreign currencies. In addition to prohibiting physical transport of euros out of Greece, the restrictions would require limits to electronic transfers. While mandating that the new drachma be used as legal tender would require Greeks to hold some amount of new 16

18 drachma, such local payments would be a small part of total assets of wealthy individuals and corporations. Thus, restrictions on cross-border transfers would be essential. Greece would have to lead the way in establishing those measures unless an amendment to resolve the E.U. treaty impediments to capital controls also granted the E.U. new powers to enact such controls. Under current law, the E.U. does not have authority to freeze financial assets except in certain, very limited circumstances. Under Article 75 TFEU, the E.U. can adopt a framework for administrative measures with regard to capital movements and payments, such as the freezing of funds, but only to combat terrorism and related activities. Article 215 TFEU allows interruption or reduction, in part or completely, of economic and financial relations, but only with non- E.U. countries or groups that are subject to E.U. sanctions. Clearly, neither provision of the treaties contemplates intra-e.u. capital controls. As for the ECB and European System of Central Banks (ESCB), although their operation of the TARGET2 payment system makes them a natural choice to assist in implementing capital controls, they also lack clear authority to act. The ECSB is charged with promoting the smooth operation of payment systems (Article 127(2) TFEU) and the ECB may issue regulations on a host of matters, including measures that ensure efficient and sound clearing and payment systems (Article 132(1) TFEU, Article 22 ECB Statute). A payment system freeze on transfers into or out of a Member State, however, presumably would be considered an internal market issue, and authority over such matters falls to the Member States, the Council, and the European Parliament. The ECB s TARGET2 guidelines do contain authority to suspend payment-system access following certain events, but withdrawal from the euro area is not among them. 17

19 Nonetheless, a withdrawing Member State such as Greece would be able to rely on its own domestic authority to act. For example, amid the financial crisis in Iceland, in late 2008 the United Kingdom issued the Landsbanki Freezing Order, which froze the U.K. accounts of Icelandic banks and public bodies, including the government of Iceland, to prevent money from being transferred to Iceland. (The U.K. was motivated by fears that the money would be directed to Icelandic depositors in Iceland s banks at the expense of British depositors.) The U.K. invoked provisions of its own Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 that allowed the Treasury to freeze funds in order to prevent action to the detriment of UK s economy or part of it. Although the U.K. s initiative was directed at several named entities rather than an entire nation of depositors seeking to transfer money from their own accounts, in principle the same steps could be taken on a broader basis. This action on the part of the withdrawing Member State could be supported by coordinated action in other Member States. Although the E.U. may lack the authority to impose capital controls itself, nothing would prevent its members from imposing such controls as part of a negotiated withdrawal process. C. Reestablish an independent national central bank Once a Member State successfully negotiated its withdrawal from the euro area, it would immediately face the task of establishing an independent national central bank (NCB). Because NCBs continue to exist within the Eurosystem and share a host of responsibilities with the ECB, this task is far less daunting than the establishment of an entirely new NCB would be. Nonetheless, a withdrawing Member State would face a host of practical considerations that would have to be confronted quickly. 18

20 1. A withdrawing Member State must issue its own currency. If Italy or Greece were to exit the euro area, the most tangible change in the lives of most of its citizens would be the appearance of the new lira or new drachma. New bills and coins would be more than a highly visible symbol of exit from the euro area, however their production would be among the first responsibilities of a withdrawing Member State s NCB. Under the Eurosystem, each member of the euro area shares responsibility for currency production. Accordingly, euro area Member States have a substantial capability to produce currency, typically on a very large scale. The Banca d Italia, for example, put nearly 10 billion euro coins into circulation in the five years following the currency s introduction, and it operates a massive banknote printing works in Via Tuscolana. Obviously some production downtime would occur as the withdrawing Member State prepared new coin dies and banknote plates, but this would be a comparatively minor delay. Some commentators have suggested that production of a new currency would not be immediately necessary and that euro banknotes and coins could be used instead of a new currency for an extended transition period. This argument rests on the unique national identifying marks on banknotes and coins. Per a European Commission recommendation, all euro coins are supposed to bear the name of the minting Member State. While various Member States, including Greece, do not follow this recommendation, their coins are nonetheless identifiable by the designs of their obverse faces. The Greek 1 coin, for example, depicts the 4 drachma coin of ancient Athens. As for euro banknotes, they are distinguishable by their serial numbers. The serial number of a Greek banknote always begins with the letter Y, for example. But euro coins and 19

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