Yudron wrote:Some -- such as Van Shaik-- feel that atiyoga may have emerged in India as stage of deity yoga practice.

I don't know about the thesis in the article. The sacred place of Shaivism is Mount Kailash, and Mount Kailash is in Tibet, not India. So it would seem logical to say that Shenrab Miwoche, not Shaivism, was the originator of that form of Dzogchen Atiyoga.

Yudron wrote:Since Nyingma is a term that was invented at the time of the second transmission of the Dharma from India, as a way of distinguishing what Dharma was already there, versus what was being transmitted newly (sarma), you can't separate Dzogchen from Nyingma. That is, unless you are trying to say it was a Bon thing only until then, meaning that the huge Buddhist libraries of Tibetan and Sanskrit texts that Atisha saw when he came to Tibet did not contain atiyoga. Do you really want to go there?

This is not just a Nyingma Dzogchen Atiyoga question. No tantras (either Nyingma or Sarma) were taught by nirmanakaya Shakyamuni and their validity is established by other criteria. Since nirmanakaya Garab Dorje received the teaching beyond cause and effect from the dharmakaya Samantabhadra through sambhogakaya Vajrasattva, Dzogchen Atiyoga as taught in Oddiyana by Garab Dorje is considered a direct teaching of the Buddha.

I fled Him, down the nights and down the days; I fled Him, down the arches of the years; I fled Him, down the labyrinthine ways, Of my own mind; and in the mist of tears, I hid from Him, and under running laughter. Up vistaed hopes I sped; And shot, precipitated, Adown Titanic glooms of chasmèd fears, From those strong Feet that followed, followed after. But with unhurrying chase, And unperturbèd pace, Deliberate speed, majestic instancy, They beat - and a Voice beat - More instant than the Feet - ‘All things betray thee, who betrayest Me.’

Yudron wrote:Unless there is a significant archeological find in the future, we just won't know from a Western historical perspective exactly where Atiyoga came from. ChNNR has his ideas, the Bon have their ideas, and Nyingma religious traditionalists have their ideas.

Since Nyingma is a term that was invented at the time of the second transmission of the Dharma from India, as a way of distinguishing what Dharma was already there, versus what was being transmitted newly (sarma), you can't separate Dzogchen from Nyingma. That is, unless you are trying to say it was a Bon thing only until then, meaning that the huge Buddhist libraries of Tibetan and Sanskrit texts that Atisha saw when he came to Tibet did not contain atiyoga. Do you really want to go there?

In fact, most Dzogchen books were translated from the Oddiyana language into Tibetan, and not from the Sanskrit, though they may or may not have arrived by way of India. Answering these charges, famous scholars like Longchenpa (1308–1363) and Sodogpa Lodrö Gyaltsen (1552–c.1624) demonstrated, in many volumes, that the refutations of Dzogchen are false, and that such arguments are without foundation. This is all on the level of intellectual proof and argument.- Chögyl Namkaï Norbu - Dzogchen Teachings -

But because this is all on the level of intellectual proof and argument, I do not really want to go there ...

Sönam

By understanding everything you perceive from the perspective of the view, you are freed from the constraints of philosophical beliefs.By understanding that any and all mental activity is meditation, you are freed from arbitrary divisions between formal sessions and postmeditation activity.- Longchen Rabjam -

Sönam wrote:As for Mipham's vain efforts to propose an intellectual pov for other Buddhists traditions...Sönam

Sonam, what were you saying here? Certainly you're not criticizing Mipham's understanding of Dzogchen here or his intentions? Also, I've seen you a few times devise some sort of distinction between Dzogchen and "Nyingma Dzogchen"... You do realize that Dzogchen is Dzogchen, and the Dzogchen teachings propagated by authentic masters of the Nyingma school (which is consequently nearly all Dzogchen masters in this world) is no different from what our guru ChNN transmits and teaches, right? ChNN has what I'd propose is a more modern, pragmatic approach to offering Dzogchen to modern, non-Tibetan people than many other masters, but it's not as if he's the only master teaching authentic Dzogchen lol.

All inclusive, YOU are my sunshine, my only sunshine, YOU make me happyyyyyyyyyy lalalalaaaaaaaaa, Titiritititi...okay till here. All traditions' teachings are perfect for the help of all beings, meanwhile Dzogchen masters = nature not leaving its' nature.

Sönam wrote:As for Mipham's vain efforts to propose an intellectual pov for other Buddhists traditions...Sönam

Sonam, what were you saying here? Certainly you're not criticizing Mipham's understanding of Dzogchen here or his intentions? Also, I've seen you a few times devise some sort of distinction between Dzogchen and "Nyingma Dzogchen"... You do realize that Dzogchen is Dzogchen, and the Dzogchen teachings propagated by authentic masters of the Nyingma school (which is consequently nearly all Dzogchen masters in this world) is no different from what our guru ChNN transmits and teaches, right? ChNN has what I'd propose is a more modern, pragmatic approach to offering Dzogchen to modern, non-Tibetan people than many other masters, but it's not as if he's the only master teaching authentic Dzogchen lol.

For shure I'm not criticizing Mipham, just made the assessement that he it was vain to try to realize what he was expecting to do, reconciling other schools intellectual processes with dzogchen.I certainly do not pretend that ChNN is the only dzogchen master, I just notice that dzogchen is beyond time and space, therefore, also if there is, in specific places and times, nyingmapa teachers to expose dzogchen principes, just sticking it to a specific school in a specific time, wether it is nyingma, does not reflect the dzogchen reality ... in that perspective i did answer to Jyoti.

Sönam

By understanding everything you perceive from the perspective of the view, you are freed from the constraints of philosophical beliefs.By understanding that any and all mental activity is meditation, you are freed from arbitrary divisions between formal sessions and postmeditation activity.- Longchen Rabjam -

asunthatneversets wrote:Perhaps some facets of the Nyingma school uphold the concept of conventional truth, but we aren't discussing The Nyingma. There is another board available for that if you'd like to discuss the Nyingma's view of conventional truth.

There is no dzogchen without the discussing the nyingma's perspective of dzogchen, to posit otherwise is ignorance of the history of dzogchen, or to posit there is a pure form of dzogchen would be a mistake, because we didn't live in the time of Hevajra. The very fact of the requirement of dzogchen for direct transmission instead of preserving the teaching in the authenticity of the original scriptures, make dzogchen impossible to not be contaminated through the passing of the lineage by the opinions of different teachers. The effort of nyingma scholars like Mipham who make the dzogchen teaching stand out in writing among other Tibetan buddhist traditions contribute much to the authenticity of dzogchen as a buddhist teaching in the main stream buddhism throughout the world. However, later effort of some who attempt to isolate dzogchen from main stream buddhism will have negative impact on any such previous effort.

As for the allegations of contamination, that is an unfounded accusation and cannot be proven. Getting into that realm of discussion is merely going to produce a debate predicated on conjectured supposition which will only serve to reify (and reflect) our already established points of view, ergo deviating into historicity seems like an unproductive and trivial route to take (in my opinion). The Nyingma Dzogchen doesn't posit a two-truth dichotomy either. I did however find another quote from Longchenpa which isn't as extreme as his other statement (regarding the conventional) I cited in a prior reply in this thread:

"The two truths are not different like two horns; in the conventionally real phase, when one sees the reflection of the moon in the water, insofar as there is the reflection, this is the conventionally real; insofar as this reflection is not the moon, this is the absolutely real. The fact that both represent one fact insofar as there is the presence of the moon in the water of the well without existing there, is the indivisibility of the two truths. About the intellect that understands it in this way, it is said that it understands the two truths."- Longchenpa (Shing rta chen po)

Dzogchen is dzogchen, just because (as a teaching) it has survived within the systems of the Nyingma or Bön doesn't mean it in itself has been adulterated in any way, shape or form. That would be impossible. Dzogchen is the actualization of the natural state within one's experience, you either experience dzogchen or you don't, talking about dzogchen isn't dzogchen, the texts about dzogchen aren't dzogchen, these things point to it... and if you can recognize it within your own experience, then that is dzogchen.

Jyoti wrote:

asunthatneversets wrote:Dzogchen does not uphold the duality of conventional and ultimate truth but instead sees this distinction as a fallacious projection of conceptualization.

To assert conventional and ultimate truth as a duality is not having understand the meaning of the inseparability of the conventional and ultimate.

It is a subtle duality, but it has it's uses and I understand what you're saying.

asunthatneversets wrote:The Dzogchen treasure text Experiencing The Enlightened Mind Of Samantabhadra states, "In the awakened mind there is no relative or ultimate truth", and this is because Dzogchen is precisely the experience of awakened mind, and not dualistic conceptual elaboration about awakened mind. Though the Great Perfection is considered to be the quintessence and heart of all paths, it does consider all other approaches apart from itself to involve supposition, which is not an authentic apprehension of wisdom.

Thusness has no different with regard to relative or ultimate, knowledge of this nondifferentiation is the 'intellect of nondifferentiation', or the 'intellect of the origin' which is non-analytical in nature, this is what the text referred to as the awakened mind. 'Awakened' correspond to bodhi, whereas mind correspond to the 6th and 7th consciousnesses, these are the sites for the function of the intellect.

'Awakened mind' is just another way of saying prajñā, yeshe, sherab etc...

Jyoti wrote:

asunthatneversets wrote:"The delusory appearances of conventional truth are a great lie.When everything is brought into the condition of gnosis in the vast expanse,The subject and object in flickering awareness, like a child's dance,Are neutralized in the state of awareness transcending intellect."- Longchen Rabjam

'Lie' is sometime translated as deception, appearance is deceptive in the sense that it is the cause of mistaken perception. Again thusness itself has no different in terms of the all (12 entrances).

The delusory appearances of conventional truth are a great lie, means that the seeming persons, places, things etc... that appear to exist as a result of conceptual projection are illusory and therefore, yes, they are potentially deceptive. Unwittingly believing the illusion to be truly authentic is delusion (avidyā). When delusion is recognized to be delusion, then ignorance is neutralized and wisdom remains.

Jyoti wrote:

asunthatneversets wrote:"Like mistakenly seeing a rope as a snake,with these varied appearanceswe perceive them as what they are not,

This is refering to the imaginary nature

This is referring to ignorance (avidyā).

Jyoti wrote:

asunthatneversets wrote:giving rise to the duality of externality and internality,i.e. the material environments and life forms therein.

This is refering to the imaginary nature within the internal and external field of perception, for example, the imaginary self and the imaginary self of others as well as the imaginary object as real substance.

Without reading the full context exist above regarding the rope analogy. This part of the sentence can easily confused as refering purely to the basis of external and internal as imaginary, the term 'externality' refer to external contents rather than merely the 'external' field of perception itself.

It's speaking of precisely the material environments and life forms therein, just as it says. Not the imaginary nature within the material environments and life forms therein. It is certainly referring to the basis of external and internal as imaginary, because that basis is avidyā. You assume the above quote is referring to external contents (rather than the external field) because you assume that perception is inherently endowed with external and internal aspects, when it isn't.

Jyoti wrote:

asunthatneversets wrote:However, upon scrutiny only the rope itself is found - These environments and life forms are primordially empty,

The statement is fine as it refer to the thusness, since in term of thusness, even the dependent arising nature is thusness, and the term emptiness is refering to thusness, not an absolute emptiness in the conventional sense.

The term 'primordially empty' is being attributed to these alleged environments (externality) and life forms (internality), to say that they - since beginningless time - have never had any reality apart from the delusory facade of avidyā, which is no reality at all.

Jyoti wrote:

asunthatneversets wrote:as the ultimate only seems to have such concrete form within the dissimulating process of the conventional.

This is description for mere appearance and conventional truth, thus if the emptiness in previous passage were taken as absolute in the conventional sense, then the word 'seems to have such concrete form' (equavalent to 'mere appearance') and 'conventional' (conventional truth of the dependent arising nature) would have no place.

This is stating that the appearance of environments (external world) and life forms (sentient beings endowed with internality) only seem real due to the deceiving nature of the conceptual superstructure amassed by the intellect. The rampant habitual proclivity to presuppose conventional imputation is accurately framing the nature of experience, dissimulates reality and makes it appear as that which it is not, just like misperceiving a rope to be a snake.

Jyoti wrote:

asunthatneversets wrote:The perception of a snake is phenomenologically true in terms of our seeing it as so,but seeing the rope instead is authentically true;

The snake is the imaginary nature, the rope is of the dependent arising nature, thus only the dependent arising nature is true.

Metaphorically, the snake is a figment of the imagination, the rope is the nature of mind (or 'thusness' as you like to say).

Jyoti wrote:

asunthatneversets wrote:analogically, it is like the appearance of a bird on a promontory:The nature of these two truths is thatthis transitory world is merely conventional dissimulation,which the authentic reality has no relationship to - In the expanse of emptinesseverything is free within it's essence."- Garland of Precious Pearls Tantra

The analogy is refering to the truth of the imaginary nature (bird) and the truth of the dependent arising nature (promontory). The 'nature of the two truths' refer to the truth of the dependent arising nature and the truth of the absolute nature. 'Conventional dissimulation' refering to the impermanence of the apparent phenomena contain the truth of dependent origination. 'Authentic reality has no relationship to' refer to the truth of the absolute nature has no relationship to the truth of dependent origination.

The 'nature' of these two-truths, is only referring to the character or makeup of the truths being described. You're seeing the term 'nature' and associating it with the way 'nature' is sometimes used in these texts, but in this instance the term 'nature' is simply signifying the characteristics of these two truths. So the nature of the two-truths is that the delusional appearances of avidyā have no reality whatsoever apart from delusion, they are birthed and sustained by conventional dissimulation and the authentic condition has nothing to do with these delusional appearances, nor is it truly ever effected by them (even the notion of an authentic condition is a conventional dissimulation, though the notion is warranted since it requires distinction from delusion).

Jyoti wrote:In no place did this quote of Longchenpa negate the conventional truth in favour of the ultimate truth, he is just describing the thusness. While the thusness may be describe from the position of the ultimate meaning, it causes more confusion (in the absence of right interpretation) than it does to generate understanding.

This wasn't a quote by Longchen Rabjam, (his quote was the quote above this one). The quote directly above that we were just discussing is from the Garland of Precious Pearls Tantra, which is one of the 17 original dzogchen tantras. The conventional truth wasn't outright negated, but it wasn't reaffirmed either, it was considered comparable to delusion, which it is.

Jyoti wrote:

asunthatneversets wrote:Within this schematic you're speaking of there is no sensory consciousness which exists apart from conceptual imputation.

No, the conceptual imputation is the function of the 7th consciousness. The 6 sensory consciousnesses have no such capacity. The 6 sensory consciousnesses are merely responsible for the gathering of the object of perceptions, they are able to distinguish objects but have no capacity of arising the imaginary nature based upon such object.

Well you're correct in saying that they're unable to distinguish objects, only the intellect (or 7th consciousness as you like to call it) does that. So if the intellect is the party responsible for distinguishing objects, and also responsible for the 'imaginary nature' attributed to these alleged objects... why is it not also responsible for their inception? And why is it not responsible for the notion of sensory consciousness and perception as well? Are there really objects? Objects 'out there' which are gathered by sensory consciousness? Aren't these objects in fact the presence of the senses themselves? Can you truly separate an object from the modalities of tactile and visual sensation? And aren't these senses in fact the presence of consciousness itself? Can you truly separate consciousness from sensation? Sensation from objects? I find that this cannot be done... but I commend your valiant effort to do so. Objects seem to exist because one is ignorant of their true condition, if that condition is known then it is also known that no objects have ever existed (or not existed).

Jyoti wrote:

asunthatneversets wrote:Your notion that "the former 6 sensory consciousnesses are free of conceptual imputation" is a presupposition that is held in place due to a failure to effectively apperceive the authentic condition.

A simple method is to know why this is not a notion but a fact is to know that it take time for conceptual activity to occur after the senses having contact with the object, so the intiatial moment of sense contact is free of conceptual activity, such is the moment where the dependent arising nature of object is established as not depended on conceptual construction. That's why I have suggest you read Mipham's or other buddhist material on valid cognition before asserting what you apparently have no knowledge about.

Yes, it certainly does appear to take a moment for conceptual activity to occur after the senses having contacted an object, and you're right that initial moment of contact is free of conceptual activity... so therefore it's also free of 'objects' and likewise free of the 'senses' is it not? Or perhaps you don't see that your habitual tendency to employ conceptual activity has become a deeply engrained perception that governs your experience. After years and years of this vicious little cycle you have formed (what are now 'subconscious') presuppositions regarding these divisions and conceptual activities. You actually believe that some of these activities are somehow inherent, or left-over when conceptualization has ceased, and you don't question them but instead try to convince others that this is true so you can feel safe and warm in your little bubble of delusion. If you would question these presuppositions, you would find that, "such is the moment where the dependent arising nature of object is established as" COMPLETELY dependent on conceptual construction. You have not taken your investigation of dependent arising all the way to the ground.

Jyoti wrote:

asunthatneversets wrote: You say the 'body' is the absolute (a.k.a. emptiness), I don't see how emptiness can be said to be permanent, since emptiness is not a quality which can be said to retain characteristics such as permanence or impermanence. In what way does this 'body' abide? And in what way is it permanent?

As I said, in buddhism emptiness is another word for the absolute, anything of absolute exists, and such existence is permanent, viz. permanence has to do with existence, and existence with permanence.

In buddhism 'emptiness' is another word for dependent origination, and just as Nāgārjuna points out in his 60 Stanzas: "The supreme knower of reality, said that dependent production is not production."

"The wonder of it! This marvelous, astounding event/reality (Dharma):From that which involves no origination, everything originates;and in that very origination, there is no origination!The wonder of it!In it's very enduring, there is no enduring!The wonder of it!In it's very cessation, there is no cessation!"- Guhyagarbha Tantra

Jyoti wrote:Conversely the dependent arising nature has to do with the false/deceptive appearance, such false/deceptive appearance is impermanent and permanent, it is impermanence because appearance changes, it is permanent because of its capacity for ceaseless/permanent arising due to conditions. The body abides permanently in nirvana (ceasing/non-arising aspect).

I can agree with the former half of this (regarding the dependent arising nature), although I'm not sure if I'd derive permanence from it's ceaselessness. Also, since the phenomena in question are merely deceptive appearances they can only appear to be simultaneously impermanent/permanent, they (being empty) cannot truly posses such traits.

Jyoti wrote:

asunthatneversets wrote:So in a cryptic way, you're stating that the intellect and emptiness are inseparable?

Emptiness is the thusness, the reason of thusness is the intellect, so thusness (emptiness) is not separated from the intellect.

According to Yogācāra of course.

Jyoti wrote:

asunthatneversets wrote:From the text that Sönam was kind enough to share, it seems that relying on Mipham for an accurate account of the dzogchen view in some of his writings may prove to be problematic...

So you rather believe in the opinion Jean-Luc Achard, someone who has no known authority in the dzogchen nor having produce any philosophical commentary on dzogchen, than in the wisdom of Mipham's philosophical thesis?

He has no known authority according to you perhaps. If Mipham did deviate from the traditional view in an attempt to create some form of coalescence between Dzogchen and Mādhyamaka then he's (by default) introducing exegetical tenets which serve to obfuscate Dzogchen. Mainly the two-fold division of the "ultimate" into "non-deluded subject and non-delusory object", this is an incorrigible notion in the eyes of ati-yoga. Therefore to associate concepts such as these with the teachings of dzogchen, is to contaminate those teachings.

Jyoti wrote:

asunthatneversets wrote:Yes vidyā is the knowledge of the natural state (or 'thusness', as you choose to define it, though that term isn't employed in dzogchen), and the natural state has no division. Dependent arising is the way in which apparent phenomena seemingly exist, and there is no division of subject and object within dependent origination since the subject/object dichotomy is itself a rather bold example of dependent origination.

Conventional appearances always have two-fold divisions, as it is inherent division of consciousness itself, thus this inherent distinction allow one to know instinctively what is external and internal. What is external also have reality not share on the internal, such reality as the consciousnesses (mind stream) of other beings which may only be perceive by the external senses (including divine sight of the gods), whereas the internal senses can only perceive the mind stream of one's own. This is due to the fact that the internal division is of the 8th consciousness, the rest of the sensory consciousnesses are based on the external division. The 8th consciousness is also considered as the body of other consciousnesses, the other consciousnesses act as the means, thus all of the 7 consciousnesses are permanent and impermanent (the dynamic and creativity of the means).

Again, Dzogchen does not uphold that an inherent division exists. Dzogchen also doesn't create a distinction between one consciousness and other consciousnesses nor does it ultimately give credence to the notion of other beings (being that it considers the duality of sentient and non-sentient to be delusory, and therefore does not purport such notions).

Jyoti wrote:The fact that conventional appearances is conventional, there is no need to try to eliminate the characteristics of the two-division by shear negation, since mere appearances still continue to appeared in two-fold division regardless of the conceptual construction that attempt to modify it. As conventional truth is conventional truth, ultimate truth is ultimate truth, attempting to convert the appearance of conventional truth to match the description of the ultimate truth is all proliferation.

The two-fold division is itself a product of conceptual construction. Mere appearances only appear to establish themselves in such a (two-fold) manner due to conforming with the initial imputed designation of two-fold division.

Jyoti wrote:

asunthatneversets wrote:I believe the issue here is again the issue of the two-truths. According to the two-truths, yes, relatively there is division, though within that apparent division, no actual division is ever created. Ultimately there is no division, and within dzogchen not even the division of relative and ultimate is established, so any division posited to exist relatively is given no credence at all.

Again what is not establish as two divisions is only when speaking of the thusness. If dzogchen strayed to the ultimate truth to the exclusion of relative truth, then it strayed from the middle path, when it talks of attaining nirvana, liberation from samsara or of suffering, then it disqualified itself as a teaching of definitive meaning and consequently downgrade itself to the view of the 2 yanas.

Dzogchen doesn't stray into ultimate truth or relative truth, neither of these notions can contain it.

Jyoti wrote:

asunthatneversets wrote:A thought is none other than thought, a notion is a thought which is seemingly directed towards (or is about) something. In it's most basic state, yes, a notion is none other than thought, but if we're going to say that then why not say that about everything? The point was to address the notion of a 'notion', in a relative sense.

Even in a relative sense, a thought itself is neutral to the position of good or bad, rather it is the content of the thought that determined whether such a thought is good or bad. Otherwise, thought would have an essence that determine it as good, and an essence that determine is as bad, etc. Since there is no such individual essence, thought itself attached to the content (matter and reason) of dhamadhatu, and according to such content, determine itself as good or bad thought.

It's actually another thought which determines whether a prior thought is good or bad, and that whole process is dependent on thought (memory) itself and is therefore completely illusory.

Jyoti wrote:

asunthatneversets wrote:I didn't say it existed inherently, I was pointing out that, that which is dependently arisen is not inherent, and since everything is dependently arisen, nothing exists inherently.

Only the imaginary nature can be said to be not inherently exist as it is artificial constructed by mind, but those of dependently arisen nature is inherent aspect of existence. The term 'nothing exists inherently' is a gross generalisation which is only true in the ultimate sense in contrast to thusness but not in the relative sence, since mere appearance and dependent origination still continue to arise without ceasing and these are not based on imagination.

Dependently arisen phenomena are not inherent aspects of experience.

"The imputed, the dependent,And the consummate - they haveOnly one nature of their own, emptiness;Their identities are constructed upon the mind."

"The conventional is taught to be emptiness;The emptiness itself is the conventional;One does not occur without the other..."- Nāgārjuna (Bodhicittavivaraṇa)

Jyoti wrote:

asunthatneversets wrote:You actually were making sense up until you brought up the body and means again. I'm not sure what you're suggesting the basis of the similarity between the two is, they certainly don't share the same basis. The basis in yogācāra is mind (or consciousness) as you choose to see it, while the basis in dzogchen is awakened wisdom.

The basis in yogacara refered to the body (consciousness), whereas awakened wisdom, primordial wisdom, self-existing gnosis or whatever, in dzogchen these all refer to the body (consciousness), thus it is not different in meaning to the yogacara. Yogacara will not rely on the body, neither is dzogchen, as dzogchen rely on the means which is vidya, but it seems some dzogchenpa only know the body and miss the crucial point of the means.

Jyoti

Only in Yogācāra does awakened wisdom refer to consciousness, awakened wisdom in dzogchen has nothing to do with consciousness. Thus the meanings are worlds apart.

*This discussion is growing exponentially with every reply and is getting to be almost unmanageable, I suggest we either consolidate some sections or condense it to a few key points of interest before continuing.

asunthatneversets wrote:From the text that Sönam was kind enough to share, it seems that relying on Mipham for an accurate account of the dzogchen view in some of his writings may prove to be problematic...

So you rather believe in the opinion Jean-Luc Achard, someone who has no known authority in the dzogchen nor having produce any philosophical commentary on dzogchen, than in the wisdom of Mipham's philosophical thesis?

He has no known authority according to you perhaps. If Mipham did deviate from the traditional view in an attempt to create some form of coalescence between Dzogchen and Mādhyamaka then he's (by default) introducing exegetical tenets which serve to obfuscate Dzogchen. Mainly the two-fold division of the "ultimate" into "non-deluded subject and non-delusory object", this is an incorrigible notion in the eyes of ati-yoga. Therefore to associate concepts such as these with the teachings of dzogchen, is to contaminate those teachings.

*This discussion is growing exponentially with every reply and is getting to be almost unmanageable, I suggest we either consolidate some sections or condense it to a few key points of interest before continuing.

It looks like both of you are actually rehashing Mipham's reasoning. Mipham was asked to write the Lion's Roar Asserting Extrinsic Emptiness by Kongtrul Lodro Thaye, even though he had refuted the idea of extrinsic emptiness in his response to the first question in Beacon of Certainty, so at the start of the Lion's Roar he writes,

"Thus, the statement "not empty from its own side" must by all means be understood... in terms of the position of the two truths being mutually exclusive, where one is the negation of the other (gcig la gcig dkag). It must never be understood according to the manner of positing the two truths as different isolates of the same essence (ngo bo gcig dang Idog pa tha dad)."

...but if you are familiar with Mipham, he surpasses the idea of the two truths being mutually exclusive in favour of the latter view, just as your quotations of Longchenpa also unify that view. So by the end of the Lion's Roar, Mipham writes,

"Thus, if one analyzes well with conventional valid cognition, One can realize with a discriminating mind whether Permanence, impermanence, emptiness, non-emptiness,Reality, unreality, existence, and non-existence are extremes."

but

"For the gnosis that analyzes the final ultimateThere are no elaborations of existence, non-existence, and so forth...

Although all dharmas are empty of essence,The element of luminosity, the bodies, and gnosisAre spontaneously present, like the sun and its rays."

The Lion's Roar contrasts these two positions, a point on the path where the two truths are taken as mutually exclusive equivalents versus the ultimate view where they are truly unified, and although Mipham's own position is the latter, this text is written from the point of view of the former.

we cannot get rid of God because we still believe in grammar - Nietzsche

I think the key point is that we all have our frame of reference, and that our "understanding" comes through this frame (whether of direct experience or intellectual paradigms). This knocks down to, in the immediate crunch of what do we do (with) NOW, the fact remains that we all have to work out our spiritual path with diligence.

Again, the two-truth itself is not dichotomy. Because there is only one body within the two-truth. The body is the ultimate truth, whereas the means of this body manifest as conventional truth. Conventional truth is none other than the dependent arising nature, the dependent arising nature is none other than object of the 7 consciousnesses.

just because (as a teaching) it has survived within the systems of the Nyingma or Bön doesn't mean it in itself has been adulterated in any way, shape or form. That would be impossible.

The teaching has been adulterated, partly due to translation to Tibetan, and it will get worse when translated into other languages, and partly due to incorporating into the gradual vehicles, as the definitive meaning contradict the provisional meaning. That's why we need capable scholars like Mipham who can make commentaries that has a significance with respect to main stream buddhism. That's also the reason why it need to be compared against scriptures of definitive meaning especially from the chinese tripitaka as well as yogacara of chinese buddhism. It may choose to be isolated from the rest of buddhism, and being subject to further corruption due to the work of human nature, where the means to rectify will be completely absence. Or it can choose to be part of the main stream buddhism, able to criticize others, as well as being criticized if something goes wrong. The later approach is recommended, being able withstand criticism through the intellectual writings will help the teaching to stay on the right track, as well as helping others who have wrong in their tradition and teaching. If one is on the right track, there should be no fear being able to defend what is right, and opposed to what is wrong.

Dzogchen is the actualization of the natural state within one's experience, you either experience dzogchen or you don't, talking about dzogchen isn't dzogchen, the texts about dzogchen aren't dzogchen, these things point to it... and if you can recognize it within your own experience, then that is dzogchen.

Since everything is consciousness (nature state or experience), saying about the actualization of consciousness is not making sense. This is one example of what would be corrupting the teaching when relying on specific words as ultimate rather than relying on the meaning.

'Awakened mind' is just another way of saying prajñā, yeshe, sherab etc...

Prajna is not subject to awakening (bodhi), it belong to the category of the body, which is existence, permanent, non-arising, uncreated, etc. Bodhi belongs to the category of the means, which is existence and non-existence, permanent and impermanent, non-arising and arising, uncreated and created, etc. As is the association of mind with 'awakened', mind as stated previously belongs to the category of the means.

The delusory appearances of conventional truth are a great lie, means that the seeming persons, places, things etc... that appear to exist as a result of conceptual projection are illusory

These (persons, places, things etc.) are not the result of conceptual projection. If you rendered persons as conceptual projection for example, you basically rendered the person's body is not due to the dependent arising nature, and you also rendered the person's consciousness as non-existence. Then you suffered the consequence of having to rationalize your own consciousness as a singular reality, viz. the alaya-vijnana in others are false.

Unwittingly believing the illusion to be truly authentic is delusion (avidyā). When delusion is recognized to be delusion, then ignorance is neutralized and wisdom remains.

In the absence of illusion (imaginary nature), one merely remained authentic with the dependent arising nature (consciousness), this is not any different than one who practice the formless and cessation meditation, since in both cases, one absorped into what remains, i.e. consciousness itself (absolute nature). Then how come the arahat and the worldly meditators who attained this is said to be not the awakening (bodhi) of buddhahood? The answer is the intellect is absence.

This is referring to ignorance (avidyā).

One can visualize deity (mental image) and perceive what is not, as long as one view the deity with the intellect, it is not consider a view of delusion. Therefore, delusion has nothing to do with vision, whether of imagery or of dependent arising nature, but has to do with the absence of the intellect.

It is certainly referring to the basis of external and internal as imaginary, because that basis is avidyā.

External and internal are also of vision, as stated above avidyā is not determine by the vision. Avidya as it literally translated as the absence of knowledge, even in the absence of external and internal vision through force of conceptual construction or in formless meditative condition, if the knowledge is absence, these formless/nondual conditions or states are not free of avidyā.

This is stating that the appearance of environments (external world) and life forms (sentient beings endowed with internality) only seem real due to the deceiving nature of the conceptual superstructure amassed by the intellect.

You don't called it 'intellect' in the absence of knowledge, the right word is 'delusion'. On the other hand, in the presence of intellect, what seem 'real' (deceptive) is considered the dependent arising nature, and what seems unreal (non-deceptive mental image) is considered imaginary nature, there is no confusion between the two and the latter is not considered as the conventional truth. Again what seems real and unreal, has nothing to do with the knowledge of the ultimate meaning that constitutes the ultimate truth.

The rampant habitual proclivity to presuppose conventional imputation is accurately framing the nature of experience, dissimulates reality and makes it appear as that which it is not, just like misperceiving a rope to be a snake.

Like the visualization of deity, it is of imaginery nature (fake), but there is no binding if the intellect is present, viz. even affliction is bodhi in the presence of the intellect. But identify what is imaginery nature is to separate it from the dependent arising nature, because it is due to the truth of dependent arising nature, that true bodhicitta can arise, to negate it in favour of the formless ultimate truth therefore strayed from the point of mahayana, thus the middle path.

Metaphorically, the snake is a figment of the imagination, the rope is the nature of mind (or 'thusness' as you like to say).

The imaginery nature is also thusness, as everything is mere consciousness, the body of consciousness is the thusness. But thusness does not negate the imaginary nature, as there is no requirement since the negation is not the cause of thusness. Similarly thusness has no requirement to negate the dependent arising nature, and consequently the conventional truth, since the negation is not the cause of thusness. Hence, there are the three natures, but only two inherently exist, whereas the other imaginery exists.

So the nature of the two-truths is that the delusional appearances of avidyā have no reality whatsoever apart from delusion, they are birthed and sustained by conventional dissimulation and the authentic condition has nothing to do with these delusional appearances, nor is it truly ever effected by them (even the notion of an authentic condition is a conventional dissimulation, though the notion is warranted since it requires distinction from delusion).

Imaginary nature exist even in the state of vidya, for example in deity meditation while holding the view (vidya), and in the case of buddha, is expressed as the state of sambogakaya. Basically the buddha has no fear with regards to the three natures, as these are none other than the trikaya.

The conventional truth wasn't outright negated, but it wasn't reaffirmed either, it was considered comparable to delusion, which it is.

You compare the knowledge of the conventional truth as delusion, but conventional truth is none other than the truth of the dependent arising nature, it is the potency (means) of the body (nirvana) that manifest as the nirmanakaya.

So if the intellect is the party responsible for distinguishing objects, and also responsible for the 'imaginary nature' attributed to these alleged objects... why is it not also responsible for their inception? And why is it not responsible for the notion of sensory consciousness and perception as well?

This is due to the six sensory consciousnesses are the support of the desire realm (corresponds to nirmanakaya), in their absence, the 7th consciousness can indeed function on its own, and in that case, it manifests the form realm (both internal and external). This corresponds to the sambogakaya.

Are there really objects? Objects 'out there' which are gathered by sensory consciousness? Aren't these objects in fact the presence of the senses themselves? Can you truly separate an object from the modalities of tactile and visual sensation? And aren't these senses in fact the presence of consciousness itself? Can you truly separate consciousness from sensation? Sensation from objects?

Mere appearance of object both exist and non-exist, it exists as mere appearance with dependent arising nature, it non-exists as permanent appearance with essence of such characteristics. Knowledge of what exist and non-exist in term of mere appearance is the conventional truth. All objects are mere perceptions (consciousness). Sensation is also perception (consciousness). Thus everything is consciousness and consciousness is none other than thusness. Knowledge of the conventional object in term of the body of consciousness is the ultimate truth. Thus the two truths exist, being different, yet inseparate from within the same conventional object.

Objects seem to exist because one is ignorant of their true condition, if that condition is known then it is also known that no objects have ever existed (or not existed).

As stated above, conventional truth has its object exists in the mode of mere appearance and dependent arising, whereas the knowledge of the ultimate truth of object does not cause mere appearance to cease to appear, nor for dependent origination to cease while in the presence of condition, this is the reason that both truths exist without one capable of negating the other. The ultimate truth only negate the essence exists for the characteristics of appearance to be permanent, whereas conventional truth negate the ultimate truth possessing the characteristics of dependent origination, thus none of them capable of negating the truth that established each of them distinctively.

you're right that initial moment of contact is free of conceptual activity... so therefore it's also free of 'objects' and likewise free of the 'senses' is it not?

There is existence of space and time that can clearly distinguished the existence of subject and object distinctions. In term of space and time, it is best by observing a supersonic aircraft, when one see the aircraft with the eye consciousness, one cannot hear with the ear consciousness the sound of the aircraft approaching, until a moment later, the reason is that the existence of space and time between the subject (consciousness) and object (consciousness) is the cause of the delay of the arriving of the sound. The differences of object (light) and the object (sound) point to a causality factor which is the dependent arising nature, the differences also point to the dependent arising nature has two division of internal and external field of experience.

Or perhaps you don't see that your habitual tendency to employ conceptual activity has become a deeply engrained perception that governs your experience. After years and years of this vicious little cycle you have formed (what are now 'subconscious') presuppositions regarding these divisions and conceptual activities. You actually believe that some of these activities are somehow inherent, or left-over when conceptualization has ceased, and you don't question them but instead try to convince others that this is true so you can feel safe and warm in your little bubble of delusion. If you would question these presuppositions, you would find that, "such is the moment where the dependent arising nature of object is established as" COMPLETELY dependent on conceptual construction. You have not taken your investigation of dependent arising all the way to the ground.

Our relative dimension of existence that correspond to nirmanakaya, possessses dependent arising nature, time and space relativity, all these are not base on conceptual construction. Whereas the blissful dimension of existence that correspond to the sambogakaya, is all about subject and object images that are pure, objects here can be imaginary and mind-only, but in the presence of intellect, there is no binding, and due to permanence in appearances as opposed to the dependent-arising appearances, there is bliss. Thus, even by leaving dependent arising nature and engaged in conceptual construction in the presence of intellect does not bind. This is what the tantra of generation/transformation all about, what is generated is the internal and external appearance, the means of transformation is the mind (imaginary construction).

In buddhism 'emptiness' is another word for dependent origination, and just as Nāgārjuna points out in his 60 Stanzas: "The supreme knower of reality, said that dependent production is not production."

"The wonder of it! This marvelous, astounding event/reality (Dharma):From that which involves no origination, everything originates;and in that very origination, there is no origination!The wonder of it!In it's very enduring, there is no enduring!The wonder of it!In it's very cessation, there is no cessation!"- Guhyagarbha Tantra

This is not contradictory, in the mahayana, the dependent origination is the means to communicate the dharma of permanence which is about the absolute - buddha nature. Whenever there is cessation and no cessation, or enduring and no enduring coming in pairs, it is pointing to the means, by pointing to the means, the means point to the body which has only non-cessation and enduring. Since only by the existence of the truth of non-cessation and enduring as a basis, can there be the truth in the manifestation of cessation and no cessation, or enduring and no enduring.

I can agree with the former half of this (regarding the dependent arising nature), although I'm not sure if I'd derive permanence from it's ceaselessness. Also, since the phenomena in question are merely deceptive appearances they can only appear to be simultaneously impermanent/permanent, they (being empty) cannot truly posses such traits.

Phenomena or appearance is manifestation, it is not the basis or body. Only the manifestation can have the characteristic of arising and ceasing, or permanent and impermanent coming in pairs. The basis or body has to be permanent, and non-arising in order to maintain such dynamic and creative occurrences.

If Mipham did deviate from the traditional view in an attempt to create some form of coalescence between Dzogchen and Mādhyamaka

Dzogchen is actually the greater Mādhyamaka (refer to 'Self-liberation by Nakedly Awareness' by Padmasambhava). Padmasambhava is also the one who continously maintained the two truths in his dzogchen discourses to Yeshe Thogyal. So Mipham is certainly not the first to maintain the two truths and Madhyamaka in dzogchen. So by corruption it referred specifically the recent effort to dismiss the two truths and Madhyamaka (including the common mahayana) in dzogchen. Bear in mind that without these two, your tradition will be no different from the 2 yanas which also realises the same emptiness.

Mainly the two-fold division of the "ultimate" into "non-deluded subject and non-delusory object", this is an incorrigible notion in the eyes of ati-yoga. Therefore to associate concepts such as these with the teachings of dzogchen, is to contaminate those teachings.

However, to think that the mere identification of internal and external is a concept, and such concept contaminate the teaching, then such a person already have a concept as to what to accept and reject, irrespective of the underlying truth and reason. Then such a concept is not in concordance with the way things are. The same with the means and body, without knowing the different, one misses the key point of practice as well as in analysis. For instant, thought is of the external and of the means, whereas original wisdom is of the internal and of the body, by knowing the site of the internal, by remaining in that, the nature is seen, this is the equavalent of direct introduction of the original face. Similarly, by knowing the external means, the internal state can be reflected externally as an object like a reflection is exactly the same as the original, an analogy of using mirror, to be generated at anytime once becoming familiar, and utilize as the reason for the function of the non-analytical intellect.

The intellect being connected to the bodhi, the integration of the intellect with the exernal basis (7 consciousnesses), is the function of perfuming the seeds of bodhi, which directly lead to the progress in the bhumi. Whereas the body itself, by absorbing into that, a function is lost, like a boat being driven by the torrent, being passive it become one with the torrent. The body beyond progress and degeneration, will remain the same whether one pretend to be with it or not, thus one does not intentionally trying to become the body, nor bother with it, but one rely only on the reflected reason that is the capacity of intellect. But without knowing the difference of internal and external, the knowledge of means and body, even to progress and bhumi in the bodhi would be absence, such a person only know the body, the wisdom, without knowing the means, a progress can't be made.

Again, Dzogchen does not uphold that an inherent division exists. Dzogchen also doesn't create a distinction between one consciousness and other consciousnesses nor does it ultimately give credence to the notion of other beings (being that it considers the duality of sentient and non-sentient to be delusory, and therefore does not purport such notions).

Dzogchen does distinguish the means and the body, example is the use of mirror's reflection to symbolize the means (vidya) of the primordial state (body). Then there is the use of deity or symbol for visualization to generate the primordial state (object), and then rely on the mental impression which is the reflected image of the original object, this mental impression is on the side of means and can be generated after becoming familiar, and so can be brought into function of the intellect.If you read Longchenpa's work, he does make commentary regarding the individual 8 consciousnesses. It is really impossible for a mahayana doctrine, especially for one claiming to be the summit of all vehicles not being equipped with such basic knowledge of buddhism It is commonly accepted knowledge that the higher vehicle cover the knowledge of the lower, but not the lower the higher. In this case, it is expected that dzogchen cover the basis of buddhism, regardless of what others say due to their motive of isolating dzogchen from the common mahayana.Dzogchen share the same view with the common mahayana regarding the existence of beings with their own individual mind stream, regardless of the notion of Samantabadra as unique, as Samantabadra is only regarding the individual's consciousness. Example is dzogchen accept the destruction of the world at the end of the great kalpa, where beings only left with their alaya-vijnana, with all other consciousnesses annihilated, this is clearly showing dzogchen accept individual possessing separate mind-streams (not just illusion). The notion of there being no separate mind-streams, hence no separate alaya-vijnana in beings is not acceptable in buddhism or dzogchen is due to the requirement of maintaining individual seeds of karma, if beings has no separate alaya-vijnana, then each of them has no persistent within dependent-origination.

The two-fold division is itself a product of conceptual construction. Mere appearances only appear to establish themselves in such a (two-fold) manner due to conforming with the initial imputed designation of two-fold division.

Unless you are saying the 8 consciousnesses are product of conceptual construction, they are not. Otherwise the four wisdoms and trikaya would be conceptual construction as well.

Dzogchen doesn't stray into ultimate truth or relative truth, neither of these notions can contain it.

There is no buddhist teaching outside the two truths, as these are termed the truth, they are not of notion, nor can notion establish either of them.

It's actually another thought which determines whether a prior thought is good or bad, and that whole process is dependent on thought (memory) itself and is therefore completely illusory.

Of course the previous is only a brief description, fuller meaning is whether the content of thought is determine by the intellect or delusion. For the former, what is beneficial for self and others is considered good, what is otherwise is considered bad. For the latter, all determination of what is good or bad would be non-definitive, and of individual opinion only.

Only in Yogācāra does awakened wisdom refer to consciousness, awakened wisdom in dzogchen has nothing to do with consciousness. Thus the meanings are worlds apart.

Nothing is outside consciousness, positing an element outside consciousnesses is no longer a teaching of buddhism, some dzogchenpa even proposes an alaya separate from consciousness, there cannot be such alaya, thus there is only alaya-vijnana but no such thing as alaya. Sometime we use simplified term like body or basis to refer to the ground consciousness, in that case, alaya sometime used, but it does not imply there is such element as a body, basis or alaya without the consciousness.

Jyoti wrote:That's why we need capable scholars like Mipham who can make commentaries that has a significance with respect to main stream buddhism.

...it seems strange reading this because everything else you've written seems to contradict Mipham, who asserts that external objects are projections of a perceiving mind which is not truly established. Equally with the Padmasambhava text you quoted,

"As for this sparkling awareness, which is called "mind,"Even though one says that it exists, it does not actually exist."

we cannot get rid of God because we still believe in grammar - Nietzsche

Nothing outside consciousness? This is the Yogachara view right? You put yourself in a box and say that it's empty. But you still believe in consciousness and it's moments. You still think that consciousness is something. You look rather than see. Using the idea that all experience is within the container called consciousness you are always looking. There is a kind of neurosis here because you think that your looking will get you somewhere when in fact it doesn't. Seeing is much better. You relax. You don't look. You understand that nothing can be found or established. It's not a problem that things exist outside of mind. Dualism isn't a big deal. It's actually quite ok. You accept that there are others and that they are different. You don't need to assimilate them into your consciousness. They don't have to be your projection only.So Jhoti what is it that you want? What do you want to happen? Do you have a goal in mind? I asked you this before but you didn't answer.

The Blessed One said:

"What is the All? Simply the eye & forms, ear & sounds, nose & aromas, tongue & flavors, body & tactile sensations, intellect & ideas. This, monks, is called the All. Anyone who would say, 'Repudiating this All, I will describe another,' if questioned on what exactly might be the grounds for his statement, would be unable to explain, and furthermore, would be put to grief. Why? Because it lies beyond range." Sabba Sutta.

futerko wrote:...it seems strange reading this because everything else you've written seems to contradict Mipham, who asserts that external objects are projections of a perceiving mind which is not truly established.

There is no contradiction, external objects are not establish on their own side as essence/body, that's why it is termed mere appearance and dependent arising nature.

"As for this sparkling awareness, which is called "mind,"Even though one says that it exists, it does not actually exist."

This is another way of saying something both exist and non-exist, so this refer to the 6th and 7th consciousness which are on the side of means. However, if something refer as primordial, self-existing, then it refered to the body which exists absolutely.

futerko wrote:...it seems strange reading this because everything else you've written seems to contradict Mipham, who asserts that external objects are projections of a perceiving mind which is not truly established.

There is no contradiction, external objects are not establish on their own side as essence/body, that's why it is termed mere appearance and dependent arising nature.

"As for this sparkling awareness, which is called "mind,"Even though one says that it exists, it does not actually exist."

This is another way of saying something both exist and non-exist, so this refer to the 6th and 7th consciousness which are on the side of means. However, if something refer as primordial, self-existing, then it refered to the body which exists absolutely.

Jyoti

Mind is not truly established. That is what my sentence says. That is where your presentation differs from Mipham's and from the text of Self Liberation through Seeing with Naked Awareness.

we cannot get rid of God because we still believe in grammar - Nietzsche