Monday, November 21, 2016

PLOS CEO steps down as publisher embarks on “third revolution”

On
31st October, PLOS sent out a surprise tweet saying that its CEO
Elizabeth Marincola is leaving the organisation for a new job in Kenya. Perhaps
this is a good time to review the rise of PLOS, put some questions to the
publisher, and consider its future.

PLOS
started out in 2001 as an OA advocacy group. In 2003, however, it reinvented itself as an open access publisher and
began to launch OA journals like PLOS
Biology and PLOS Medicine. Its mission: “to accelerate progress in
science and medicine by leading a transformation in research communication.” Above
all, PLOS’ goal was to see all publicly-funded research made freely available
on the internet.

Like
all insurgent organisations, PLOS has over the years attracted both devoted
fans and staunch critics. The fans (notably advocates for open access) relished
the fact that PLOS had thrown down a gauntlet to legacy subscription publishers,
and helped start the OA revolution. The critics have always insisted that a bunch
of academics (PLOS’ founders) would never be
able to make a fist of a publishing business.

At
first, it seemed the critics might be right. One of the first scholarly publishers
to attempt to build a business on article-processing charges (APCs), PLOS gambled that
pay-to-publish would prove to be a viable business model. The critics demurred
and said that in any case the level that PLOS had set its prices ($1,500) would
prove woefully inadequate. Commenting to Nature
in 2003, cell biologist Ira Mellman of Yale University, and editor of The Journal of Cell Biology, said. “I feel that PLOS’s
estimate is low by four- to sixfold,”

In
2006, PLOS did increase the fees for its top two journals by 66% (to $2,500), and
since then the figure has risen to $2,900. While this is neither a four- or
sixfold increase, we must doubt that these prices would have been enough to
make an organisation with PLOS’ ambitions viable. In 2008 Naturecommented, “An analysis by Nature of the company’s accounts shows
that PLOS still relies heavily on charity funding, and falls far short of its
stated goal of quickly breaking even through its business model of charging
authors a fee to publish in its journals. In the past financial year, ending 30
September 2007, its $6.68-million spending outstripped its revenue of $2.86
million.”

PLOS ONE

But
by then PLOS had pioneered a new – and very different – type of journal.
Launched in December 2006, PLOS ONE was
the world’s first “megajournal”, and is distinctive in two ways. First reviewers
are told that when considering a paper for publication in the journal they
should not consider its novelty, importance, or interest to a particular
community, but only whether it is “technically sound
and worthy of inclusion in the published scientific record.”

Second,
PLOS ONE accepts papers from right
across science, technology, engineering and mathematics, along with some social
sciences.

These
two features meant that the journal was soon flooded with submissions from
authors keen to benefit for its low-bar approach to publishing research.

And
this in turn provided a welcome fillip to PLOS’ coffers. “In its first full
year of operation in 2007, PLOS ONE
published 1,230 articles, which would have generated an estimated $1.54 million
in author fees, around half of PLOS’s total income that year” reported Nature in 2008. “By comparison, the 321 articles
published in PLOS Biology in 2007
brought in less than half this amount.”

Essentially
PLOS ONE had provided the publisher
with what critics tend to sneeringly describe as a “cash cow”.

But
critics had another line of attack up their sleeve: PLOS ONE’s approach to peer review, they said, is serving to lower
the quality of the scientific corpus. Thus where PLOS fans like to describe the
PLOS ONE model as providing “objective
review”, critics deride it as “peer review-lite”, or – in the words of green OA
advocate (and vegan) Stevan Harnad – “a pine-nut in
a poke”.

PLOS ONE has certainly
published controversial papers along the way, including one in 2007 on HIV/AIDS
that led a Geneva-based official in the World Health Organisation’s
HIV-prevention team to comment, “The paper is
total drivel, it should have been picked up in the review process.”

I
discussed this paper and other such controversial papers in a piece I wrote on PLOS ONE in 2011.

More
recently, stories have begun to emerge suggesting that the way PLOS ONE recruits its reviewers leaves a
lot to be desired. See, for instance this; and I have
documented my own experience here.

However,
the truth is that problems like these are by no means restricted to PLOS ONE. They are now endemic to
scholarly publishing, and it is widely acknowledged that scholarly
communication is in the grip of a deep and wide-ranging quality and
reproducibility crisis.

That
said, pay-to-publish open access certainly appears to have exacerbated these
problems (including giving rise to “predatory
publishers”). Some now also appear to be questioning whether OA is the
right answer to the problems scholarly communication faces.

Be
that as it may, PLOS ONE allowed the
publisher to devote resources to advocating for open access and, importantly,
to continue innovating. In 2009 PLOS pioneered Article-Level Metrics (ALM), and to speed up
and make more efficient the publication process it set about developing its own
submission system Aperta (currently only
available for PLOS Biology).

And
in 2014 PLOS introduced a data policy that requires
authors to provide supporting data with their papers (with the aim of improving
quality and reproducibility). It now also encourages researchers to post their
research to preprint servers, on the principle I assume that this too
could improve quality. Authors can also now have their preprints automatically
submitted to PLOS via services like bioRxiv.

Eating PLOS’ lunch

But
innovation requires a constant flow of surplus cash, and the problem PLOS faces
is that it is dependent on a cash cow that others want to eat. So we have seen legacy
publishers developing their own megajournls, including BMJ, IEEE, Sage, Elsevier and Nature.

To
put it another way, legacy publishers are now eating PLOS’ lunch.

The
consequences of this became evident in 2014. In a post on The Scholarly Kitchen blog that year, Phil Davis reported that PLOS ONE’s publication output had fallen
25% since its peak in 2013, and it did not appear to be recovering.

Consequently,
Davis predicted, PLOS’ revenues can be expected to decline, and at a time when
its expenses are growing. “For 2013, the publisher reported that gross
revenue grew by 31% to $50.8 million (up from $38.8 million in 2012). At
the same time, PLOS’s expenses grew by 35% to $37 million (up from $27.4
million).”

Since
then the situation appears to have deteriorated. In its 2015 financial overview PLOS reports that
for the year ending December 31st 2015, it generated total revenues of $42.9
million, compared to total revenues of $45.6 million for the year ending
December 31st 2014. Total expenses in 2015 were $42.8 million compared to $40.7
million in 2014.

In
the Q&A below PLOS says that PLOS ONE
published 28,000 articles in 2015. I don’t know what the figures for this year
will be, but recently Stephen Pinfield, professor of information services
management at the University of Sheffield, reported
that in September PLOS ONE was
overtaken by Nature’sScientific Reports, which published 1,940 research
articles in that month, compared with PLOS
ONE’s 1,756. The figures for August were 1,691 and 1,735, respectively.

Looking
to the future, Pinfield sees two possible scenarios. In one scenario, he suggests, the megajournal
could “sink without trace”. Alternatively, he says, megajournals could find a
long-term niche for themselves as cash cows whose raison d’être is to subsidise a publisher’s selective journals. Clearly,
in being able to bask in the sun of high-value brands like Nature and Elsevier, megajournals operated by legacy publishers might
be expected to have a long-term advantage over PLOS ONE.

In
short, the financial challenges facing PLOS have not gone away. And it faces
the added challenge of seeing its authors starting to complain about its prices.
In addition, there is a growing pushback against the
pay-to-publish model of gold OA (see here,
and some of the comments here for instance). Against
this background, developing a viable strategy can be no easy task for PLOS.

Perhaps
it is no surprise, therefore, that we have seen signs of internal conflict. In 2013,
for instance, both the CEO and CFO at PLOS disappeared, practically overnight.

And
the (brief, and tight-lipped) announcement the publisher made
left the scholarly publishing community both surprised and perplexed. The only
hint as to what had happened, reported Kent Anderson,
were rumours that there had been a disagreement within the publisher, with the
CEO and CFO arguing vigorously that PLOS should either become for-profit, or
spin off a for-profit, and the board roundly rejecting the idea.

Whatever
the cause of the rupture, it was the deafening silence over what had happened
that most stunned commentators. For a publisher committed to openness, suggested
publishing consultant Joseph Esposito, this was a real surprise.

Behind the innovation curve?

So,
what changed with the new CEO Elizabeth Marincola? A month later she toldNature that PLOS saw the future of
science publishing not in branded, highly selective titles but a world in which
article metrics and community judgements help the cream of research to rise to
the top. “The packaging of a journal will become less and less important,” she
said.

We
might be forgiven for suggesting that that was the premise of PLOS ONE, so what had changed? Central
to the Marincola strategy, it seems, is was what PLOS calls its “third revolution”. This is focused
on enabling the immediate posting of research, open evaluation and community
review. Again, this is not all new – community review, for instance, was
implicit in the PLOS vison from day one.

Moreover,
how much additional revenue this third revolution can generate remains
uncertain. If nothing else, it will surely need to make up for the fall in revenue
that PLOS has been experiencing.

But
the real fear must be that PLOS is falling behind the innovation cycle, a point made to Nature by board member, and PLOS co-founder,
Michael Eisen in 2013. Citing F1000 Research, Eisen said, “They
are doing lots of things that PLOS should have done five years ago. PLOS has
created the landscape that has enabled others to flourish, which is great. The
question is, how can it continue to be innovative?”

It
might seem significant that Eisen made this point three years ago, and yet the
third revolution that Marincola has been spearheading has yet to be
implemented. Might there still be internal disagreement about the best way
forward?

One
reason for suspecting there may be is that on 31st October I (apparently
along with an unknown number of others) received an email from what appeared to
be a PLOS address (info@plos.org). The message was headed “PLOS CEO to leave”
and contained a short, simple statement: “the ship is sinking”.

Assuming
the PLOS account had been hacked in some way, I tweeted an image
of the email,
and invited PLOS to comment. To my surprise, PLOS replied (with a tweet that
was subsequently deleted on the grounds that it included a typo) by confirming
that Marincola is indeed leaving.

Disaffection?

Since
only PLOS employees had been told of Marincola’s impending departure (at a meeting held one week earlier),
I found it hard not to conclude that the message signalled continuing internal disagreement
within the publisher, or at least disaffection amongst staff. Below PLOS insists
that this is “categorically not the case”. Either way, that the world heard of
Marincola’s departure like this seems odd indeed.

Subsequently
David Knutson, Public Relations
Manager at PLOS, agreed to answer a list of questions I emailed to him, which I
publish below.

Eisen
is surely right to argue that PLOS has fallen behind the innovation curve. After
all, F1000 is now busy licensing
its publishing platform to funders like Wellcome in a way that would seem
to pose an existential threat to journals like those PLOS publishes, including PLOS ONE. Or might it be that PLOS has plans
to license Aperta in a similar way?

What
seems certain is that if PLOS continues to face falling revenues it will struggle
to get back up on the innovation curve without access to external cash. That is
why in my final question I ask Knutson if he envisages the publisher being sold
to a large for-profit publisher which, we could note, is what both Mendeley and SSRN felt compelled to
do.

Of
course, the latter two companies were conceived as for-profit organisation,
whereas PLOS is non-profit. But PLOS competitor Frontiers was also initially non-profit, until it reinvented
itself as a for-profit. As Frontiers CEO Kamila Markram explained to me earlier
this year: “We realised early on that we would need more funds to make the
vision sustainable and it would not be possible to secure these funds through
purely philanthropic means – a long-term solution was needed. In 2008, we
formed Frontiers Media SA, a commercial entity, to secure investments.”

It
is perfectly possible, of course, that PLOS may be readying some innovative new
solutions behind the scenes. Below Knutson says that “innovations that PLOS is
developing within its publishing program and technology initiatives continue to
attract attention from across the industry, attracting new communities and
business partners that provide additional financial opportunities that co-exist
with the on-going sustainability of our journals.”

Might
we see, for instance, an announcement that the US National Institutes of Health
(NIH) plans to use Aperta to publish papers
from the research it funds in the manner that Wellcome is doing with the F1000
platform?

But
for me what is most disappointing in the PLOS story is that an organisation that
boasts about its commitment to openness is so unwilling to be open about its
own operations.

Perhaps
this is an indication of how beleaguered PLOS feels. After all, there is no
shortage of critics who would still like to see PLOS fail, or have to call in a
commercial white knight. While I can appreciate that, I am conscious that PLOS’
business is built on public money. As such its overly secretive nature seems
unfortunate. It would also be unfortunate, of course, if PLOS were to slip
further behind the innovation curve due to internal conflict, or loss of
direction.

Q&A with PLOS’ David Knutson

RP: On 31st
October, I received an email that used the info@plos.org address. This was headed “PLOS CEO to
leave” and contained the simple statement, “the ship is sinking”. What do you
know about the origin of the email, who sent it, and why it was sent to me?

DK: PLOS investigated
the info@plos.org and found that it
was a forged message from an IP address registered in Amsterdam. It points to
emkei.cz, which is a Czech registered domain and is a free, anonymous, mail
tool and therefore a dead end. We don’t know who sent, to whom it was sent or
why.

RP: It turns out that
the email was fake but the information in it (that PLOS CEO Elizabeth Marincola
is leaving the organisation) was correct. PLOS had at the time made no public
statement about the impending departure, which suggests to me that there is within
PLOS a whistle-blower, or someone who wants to hurt and/or embarrass the
organisation. This in turn suggests that there is some discontent or unresolved
conflict within PLOS. What is the source of that conflict and what is PLOS
doing to try and address the matter?

DK: PLOS has no idea
why someone would send an anonymous and erroneous message of this
sort. The reason that no explanation was given is that the
organization that she is joining cannot announce her appointment until after it
holds its previously-scheduled Board meeting in December. It has nothing to do
with, “a whistle-blower, or someone who wants to hurt and/or embarrass the
organisation [or] that there is some discontent or unresolved conflict within
PLOS.” This is entirely fabrication and is categorically not the case.

RP: Where is
Elizabeth Marincola going, when, and why?

DK: Elizabeth will be
moving to Nairobi, Kenya, where she has accepted the position of Senior Advisor
for Science Communication and Advocacy for an organization that will soon
announce this appointment. This next move is an exciting one for
Elizabeth personally and professionally, and while we will miss her and her
many contributions to PLOS as both a Board member and CEO we wish her well in
her new adventure. She will continue with PLOS through the end of this calendar
year.

Third revolution

RP: What achievements
and successes would you say PLOS has had under Marincola’s leadership, what
disappointments have there been, and what new direction do you think the board
will want the next CEO (when appointed) to take PLOS?

DK: Under Elizabeth's
leadership, PLOS has achieved many important milestones. These include the
launch of Aperta, the introduction of Advanced Online Publication, development
of a plan to introduce the “third revolution of PLOS” through immediate
communication of research findings and transparent review, and many advances in
our publishing services and editorial practices. Of equal or even more
importance, during Elizabeth’s tenure as CEO, PLOS has attracted and retained
an outstanding team at every level, which ensures that we are positioned to
continue pushing the boundaries of research communication going forward.

RP: Will Elizabeth
Marincola be leaving any unfinished business behind her?

DK: Every CEO leaves
behind some unfinished business. In the case of PLOS, while the organization
has developed plans and is fully committed to providing immediate posting of
research, open evaluation and community review, this ambitious vision is yet to
be implemented. The Board has appointed a search committee and is fully
confident that it will find a CEO who has the experience to lead us effectively
and passionately as we drive toward fulfilling our Vision. In the
meantime, Richard Hewitt, currently CFO, will serve as Interim CEO, effective
January 1, 2017.

RP: I cannot
help but think we have been here before. When in 2013 Elizabeth Marincola took over as CEO her appointment
came in the wake of the sudden and unexplained departure of the previous CEO
and the CFO – as reported on The
Scholarly Kitchen blog here and here. The rumour was
that they had departed following a row within PLOS over its non-profit status:
the CEO/CFO wanted to turn it into a for-profit organisation but the board
disagreed. Does Elizabeth Marincola’s departure come in the wake of a similar
disagreement, only perhaps this time the other way round. I see, for instance,
that there was an announcement on 25th
October that a private equity person has been added to the board.

DK: There is nothing
similar in these circumstances. First, Marincola’s departure is entirely
voluntary on her part and reflects only a personal opportunity to live in an
exciting part of the world, and her professional desire to bring her experience
to Africa, despite having to leave PLOS to do so. Therefore, PLOS
rejects the premise of the question.

As
for the Board of Directors, it is both customary and in accordance with sound
governance practices to recruit expertise from diverse sectors to ensure broad
input into organizational direction. PLOS is very fortunate to have attracted
volunteer members from the Academy as well as from the private sector.

Let’s be open about open access?

RP:
You say that Marincola’s departure was different because it was voluntary. That
presumably means that the former CEO and CFO were fired, but you don’t say why.
Was the rumour about a disagreement over PLOS’ non-profit status correct, or
was there some other reason for their precipitate departure? And why was PLOS
so tight-lipped about it at the time? Does not a commitment to open access by a
publisher also imply a commitment to explaining its internal operations to
outsiders? As Joseph Esposito put it at the time,
“Let’s be open about open access”?

DK: PLOS does not
discuss personnel matters.

RP: How is PLOS
currently doing financially, and in terms of growth, and what are the
expectations going forward?

DK: PLOS continues to
see a comparable volume of submissions from the previous year, but our
published article rate is down. Simply put, PLOS is rejecting more papers.
Another factor is the natural maturation of PLOS ONE. PLOS never
expected PLOS ONE’s submission volume to keep increasing year over year.
It remains one of the largest journals in the world with more than 28,000
articles published in 2015 alone.

PLOS’
commitment to operating a high quality and rigorous stable of peer reviewed
journals remains unchanged and the innovations that PLOS is developing within
its publishing program and technology initiatives continue to attract attention
from across the industry, attracting new communities and business partners that
provide additional financial opportunities that co-exist with the on-going
sustainability of our journals.

RP:
You say that PLOS’ published article rate is down. Does that mean that revenues
will be down when PLOS next reports its financials, or will the additional
financial opportunities you refer to make up for lost APC revenue? What are the
additional financial opportunities? And what implications do these changes to
its revenues have for the organisation?

DK: PLOS will not
address its additional financial opportunities. However, you will find a link
to our financial update here.

RP: Can we expect at
some point to see PLOS sold to one of the large for-profit companies like
Elsevier or Springer Nature? If the board does not feel that would be a good
outcome, has it considered inserting some kind of poison pill into its Articles
of Incorporation (or a similar document) to prevent it from ever happening?

Your narrative includes a lot of guessing, but it is clear they are running PLoS journals in a way that is much more corporate than journals at Nature or Elsevier. Since when does a non-profit OA publisher need a PR stiff to answer simple questions?

I know you would find more openness from several for-profit journal teams and ALL other OA publishers. They might as well sell. It would raise the level of accountability and transparency.

On transparency and accountability: It is true that there are obligations on for-profit public companies to be open and transparent about their finances. And because they will always try to avoid any negative impact on their share price they may be more responsive when they have bad news to weather.

With regard to ALL other OA publishers being more open. I would invite people to read pages 6-9 of the introduction I wrote for the interview with F1000’s Vitek Tracz here.

Finally, I would say that I haven’t found Elsevier to be very responsive to my emails recently!