RE: [Kierkegaardians] Is the immediate aesthete innocent?

JimR, here is the section from CA, Hong, pp 35-38 that you say you find the stuff below. Show me where it is. Show me where E/O is referred to and how it shows

Message 1 of 25
, Jan 1, 2010

JimR, here is the section from CA, Hong, pp 35-38 that you say
you find the stuff below. Show me where it is. Show me where E/O is referred to
and how it shows the equivalency that you argue for. In the passage below K
makes two claims about innocence; that it is ignorance and that it is annulled
by guilt not mediacy. These seem consistent with my claim that innocence is a
state of “resting transparently in the creator”. It is clearly not
necessary to know any-thing about the creator in fact to know would and does
bring on guilt and the annulment of innocence. The Aesthetic stage presumes
guilt and cannot be, until guilt enters the picture and annuls innocence.

Don

§3.

THE CONCEPT OF INNOCENCE

Here,
as everywhere, it is true that if one wants to maintain a dogmatic definition
in our day, one must begin by forgetting what Hegel has discovered in order to
help dogmatics. One gets a queer feeling when at this point one finds in works
on dogmatics,27 which otherwise propose to be somewhat or­thodox, a
reference to Hegel's favored remark28 that the na­ture of the
immediate is to be annulled, as though immediacy and innocence were exactly
identical. Hegel has quite con­sistently volatilized every dogmatic concept
just enough to appeal to a man of reduced existence as a clever expression for
the logical. That the immediate must be annulled, we do not need Hegel to tell
us, nor does he deserve immortal merit for having said it, since it is not even
logically correct, for the immediate is not to be annulled, because it at no
time exists [er til]. The concept of immediacy belongs in logic; the con­cept of
innocence, on the other hand, belongs in ethics. Every concept must be dealt
with by the science to which it belongs, whether the concept belongs to the
science in such a way that it is developed there or is developed by being
presupposed.

It is
indeed unethical to say that innocence must be an­nulled, for even if it were
annulled at the moment this is ut­tered, ethics forbids us to forget that it is
annulled only by guilt. Therefore, if one speaks of innocence as immediacy and
is logically offensive and rude enough to have let this fleeting thing vanish,
or if one is esthetically sensitive about what it was and the fact that it has
vanished, he is merely geistreich (clever] and forgets the point.

Just as
Adam lost innocence by guilt, so every man loses it in the same way. If it was
not by guilt that he lost it, then it was not innocence that he lost; and if he
was not innocent be­fore becoming guilty, he never became guilty.

As for
Adam's innocence, there has been no lack of fantastic
notions, whether these attained symbolic dignity in times when the velvet on
the church pulpit as well as on the origin of the race was less threadbare than
now or whether they floated about more romantically like the suspicious
inventions of fiction. The more fantastically Adam was arrayed, the more
inexplicable became the fact that he could sin and the more appalling became
his sin. As it was, he had once and for all forfeited all the glory, and about
that, whenever it suited them, men became sentimental or witty, melancholy or
frivolous, historically contrite or fantastically cheerful, but the point of it
they did not grasp ethically.

As for
the innocence of subsequent men (i.e., all with the exception of Adam and Eve),
there has been only a faint con­ception. Ethical rigor overlooked the limit of
the ethical and was honest enough to believe that men would not avail them­selves
of the opportunity to slip away from the whole thing when escape was made so
easy. Light-mindedness grasped nothing at all. But innocence is lost only by
guilt. Every man loses innocence essentially in the same way that Adam lost it.
It is not in the interest of ethics to make all men except Adam into concerned
and interested spectators of guiltiness but not participants in guiltiness, nor
is it in the interest of dogmatics to make all men into interested and
sympathetic spectators of the Atonement [Forsoning]but not
participants in the Atone­ment.

That
the time of dogmatics and ethics, as well as one's own time, has often been
wasted by pondering what might have happened had Adam not sinned merely proves
that one brings along an incorrect mood, and consequently an incorrect con­cept.
It would never occur to the innocent person to ask such a question, and when
the guilty asks it, he sins, for in his esthetic curiosity he ignores that he
himself brought guiltiness into the world and that he himself lost innocence by
guilt.

Innocence,
unlike immediacy, is not something that must be annulled, something whose
quality is to be annulled, something that properly does not exist [er
til], but rather, when it is annulled, and as a result of being
annulled, it for the first time comes into existence [bliver
til] as that which it was before being annulled and which now is
annulled. Immediacy is not annulled by mediacy, but when mediacy appears, in,
that same moment it has annulled immediacy.30 The annul­ment of
immediacy is therefore an immanent movement within immediacy, or it is an
immanent movement in the op­posite direction within mediacy, by which mediacy
presup­poses immediacy. Innocence is something that is canceled by a
transcendence, precisely because innocence is something (whereas
the most correct expression for immediacy is that which Hegel uses about pure
being:31 it is nothing). The rea­son is that when innocence is
canceled by transcendence, something entirely different comes out of it,
whereas mediacy IS just immediacy. Innocence is a quality, it is a state that
may very well endure, and therefore the logical haste to have it an­nulled is
meaningless, whereas in logic it should try to hurry a little more,32
for in logic it always comes too late, even when it hurries. Innocence is not a
perfection that one should wish to regain, for as soon as one wishes for it, it
is lost, and then it is a new guilt to waste one's time on wishes. Innocence is
not an imperfection in which one cannot remain, for it is always sufficient
unto itself, and he who has lost it, that is, not in a manner in which it might
have pleased him to have lost it but in the only way in which it can be lost,
that is, by guilt-to him it could never occur to boast of his perfection at the
ex­pense of innocence.

The
narrative in Genesis33 also gives the correct explana­tion of
innocence. Innocence is ignorance. It is by no means the pure being of the
immediate, but it is ignorance. The fact that ignorance when viewed from
without is regarded as something defined in the direction of knowledge is of no
con­cern whatever to ignorance.

Obviously
this view is in no way guilty of any Pelagian­ism. The race has its history,
within which sinfulness con­tinues to have its quantitative determinability,
but innocence is always lost only by the qualitative leap of the individual. It
is no doubt true that this sinfulness, which is the progression of the race,
may express itself as a greater or lesser disposition in the particular
individual who by his act assumes it, but this is a more or less, a
quantitative determination, which does no: constitute the concept of guilt.

Thanks much for the posts, Jim S. You are right, I have completely
forgotten our conversation from May. But your quotations don't seem to
serve the purpose which you claim. I said in a recent post that
Haufniensis's description of the innocent character in CA is equivalent to the
description of the aesthetic personality (immediate pole) in E/O I.

What you quote below makes the following claims:

Jim R (6 May, 8251): I did not at any time say that for JC innocence is
"the state of dreaming desire [which is in] the immediate pole of the
aesthetic stage."

Jim R (28 April, 8195): E/O I identifies innocence as one pole of the aesthetic
sphere – the aesthetic sphere is divided into the immediate and the
reflective pole. The immediate pole of the aesthetic sphere is characterized by
dreaming, seeking, and desiring desire. Dreaming desire is identified with the
state of innocence, an identification reinforced by Haufniensis in CA, as you
can see from this quotation.

In the first passage I am saying that -Climacus- does not identify innocence
with dreaming desire.

In the second passage I say that -Haufniensis- does identify innocence with
dreaming desire.

These are two separate, mutually exclusive claims. They are not
contradictory. I have also been saying all along that different
pseudonyms can disagree with one another. I'm still not sure that I can
support my claims about Haufniensis, innocence, and dreaming desire from the
text of CUP. I haven't tried.

I have yet to see Don produce any quotations at all to support his claims about
innocence.

Jim R

James Rovira

That s the section that I referred to off the top of my head, yes, Don. It s part of the context. Nowhere does it say that the innocent personality rests

Message 2 of 25
, Jan 1, 2010

That's the section that I referred to off the top of my head, yes, Don. It's part of the context. Nowhere does it say that the innocent personality "rests transparently in the Creator," though. Haufniensis does assert that Adam and Eve have some knowledge (of the prohibition, specifically, which means knowledge of the God who issued it, and knowledge that they ought not to go against the prohibition). What they are ignorant of are the consequences of violating the prohibition -- death, and the new persons they would become should they eat the fruit. They are able to change everything. That is a dizzying freedom.

Now, the rest of the context that I was thinking of can be found on pp. 42-3 of Reidar Thomte's translation (supervised by the Hongs, the one from 1980. The Hongs, to my knowledge, never translated CA. Lowrie did Concept of Dread). The context is Haufniensis's description of the anxiety of innocence -- anxiety as the presupposition of original sin. Look closely at the last paragraph of p. 43:

<<That anxiety makes its appearance is the pivot upon which everything turns. Man is the synthesis of the psychical and the physical; however, a synthesis is unthinkable if the two are not united in a third. This third is spirit. In innocence, man is not merely animal, for if he were at any moment in his life merely animal, he would never become man. So spirit is present, but as immediate, as dreaming.>>

Now on this page of CA there is a footnote by Haufniensis making reference to E/O 1. It makes reference to "melancholy." A discussion of melancholy takes place in "A"'s description of "dreaming desire" on pp. 75-78 of E/O I, particularly the paragraphs starting at the bottom of p. 75 and going on to the top of p. 77. The second paragraph on p. 77 describes how desire and its object are not differentiated in this immediate pole of the aesthetic sphere, and claims that before desire is aware of itself as desire, it experiences "anxiety" (middle of p. 76 E/O 1).

The "enormous nothing of ignorance" on p. 44 of CA is described in the paragraph that begins at the bottom of p. 76 and goes to the top of p. 77 of E/O 1. Since desire is ignorant of itself as desire, it "lacks an object." It is not aware that it lacks an object, of course, because it is not aware that it is desire that has an object. The reference to the horn of Thor is a reference to the Eddas, where Thor was given a task (by Loki disguised as a giant) to drink a horn to the bottom. He did not know that the other end of the horn was resting in the ocean, but he still managed to drain it down half way. The author of E/O I stresses on p. 77 not that the ocean is infinite so cannot be drunk, but stresses instead Thor's ignorance -- just as Thor was ignorant that the horn was connected to the ocean, so could not attempt to drink the ocean, the one in dreaming desire is ignorant of the object of his desire, because he is ignorant of desire.

You could compare the discussion of the demonic on pp. 90-1 of E/O 1 with Hauf's discussion of the demonic in CA. There's a clear debt on Haufniensis's part to E/O 1 and 2, which he acknowledges in a footnote on p. 43. He derived his model for innocence in part from E/O 1's discussion of the immediate-erotic stages, specifically the stage of dreaming desire. He borrowed ideas and language, then developed his own thought from there.

I don't know that other pseudonyms like Climacus might not have taken the development in yet another direction.

JimR, here is the section from CA, Hong, pp 35-38 that you say
you find the stuff below. Show me where it is. Show me where E/O is referred to
and how it shows the equivalency that you argue for. In the passage below K
makes two claims about innocence; that it is ignorance and that it is annulled
by guilt not mediacy. These seem consistent with my claim that innocence is a
state of “resting transparently in the creator”. It is clearly not
necessary to know any-thing about the creator in fact to know would and does
bring on guilt and the annulment of innocence. The Aesthetic stage presumes
guilt and cannot be, until guilt enters the picture and annuls innocence.

Don Anderson

JimR, talk about people getting stupid. Pp 42-3 is not about innocence. It is about anxiety and its consequences which is at the confinium between innocence

Message 3 of 25
, Jan 1, 2010

JimR, talk about people getting stupid. Pp 42-3 is not about
innocence. It is about anxiety and its consequences which is at the confinium between
innocence and the aesthetic stage. It is the process of going beyond innocence
(its annulment and aftermath). You either do not understand CA or you are not
making your arguments in good faith.

Yes it is true that the section on innocence does not use the
term “resting transparently etc. But Anti-Climacus does and I am
suggesting that any half-educated person can see that the state of innocence at
the beginning is the same. It is the state we begin in as newborns and it is
the state that we are meant to reach when we are fully human beings.

Let me summarize that My description of “resting
transparently” is trusting and depending on rather than knowing.
Ignorance in the sense of not being able to control the events by knowing
before acting is consistent with that. I don’t need to know if I trust
God, he knows.

That's the section that I referred to off the
top of my head, yes, Don. It's part of the context. Nowhere
does it say that the innocent personality "rests transparently in the
Creator," though. Haufniensis does assert that Adam and Eve have
some knowledge (of the prohibition, specifically, which means knowledge of the
God who issued it, and knowledge that they ought not to go against the
prohibition). What they are ignorant of are the consequences of violating
the prohibition -- death, and the new persons they would become should they eat
the fruit. They are able to change everything. That is a dizzying
freedom.

Now, the rest of the context that I was thinking of can be found on pp. 42-3 of
Reidar Thomte's translation (supervised by the Hongs, the one from 1980.
The Hongs, to my knowledge, never translated CA. Lowrie did Concept of
Dread). The context is Haufniensis's description of the anxiety of
innocence -- anxiety as the presupposition of original sin. Look closely
at the last paragraph of p. 43:

<<That anxiety makes its appearance is the pivot upon which everything
turns. Man is the synthesis of the psychical and the physical; however, a
synthesis is unthinkable if the two are not united in a third. This third
is spirit. In innocence, man is not merely animal, for if he were at any
moment in his life merely animal, he would never become man. So spirit is
present, but as immediate, as dreaming.>>

Now on this page of CA there is a footnote by Haufniensis making reference to
E/O 1. It makes reference to "melancholy." A discussion
of melancholy takes place in "A"'s description of "dreaming
desire" on pp. 75-78 of E/O I, particularly the paragraphs starting at the
bottom of p. 75 and going on to the top of p. 77. The second paragraph on
p. 77 describes how desire and its object are not differentiated in this
immediate pole of the aesthetic sphere, and claims that before desire is aware
of itself as desire, it experiences "anxiety" (middle of p. 76 E/O
1).

The "enormous nothing of ignorance" on p. 44 of CA is described in
the paragraph that begins at the bottom of p. 76 and goes to the top of p. 77
of E/O 1. Since desire is ignorant of itself as desire, it "lacks an
object." It is not aware that it lacks an object, of course, because
it is not aware that it is desire that has an object. The reference to
the horn of Thor is a reference to the Eddas, where Thor was given a task (by
Loki disguised as a giant) to drink a horn to the bottom. He did not know
that the other end of the horn was resting in the ocean, but he still managed
to drain it down half way. The author of E/O I stresses on p. 77 not that
the ocean is infinite so cannot be drunk, but stresses instead Thor's ignorance
-- just as Thor was ignorant that the horn was connected to the ocean, so could
not attempt to drink the ocean, the one in dreaming desire is ignorant of the
object of his desire, because he is ignorant of desire.

You could compare the discussion of the demonic on pp. 90-1 of E/O 1 with
Hauf's discussion of the demonic in CA. There's a clear debt on
Haufniensis's part to E/O 1 and 2, which he acknowledges in a footnote on p.
43. He derived his model for innocence in part from E/O 1's discussion of
the immediate-erotic stages, specifically the stage of dreaming desire.
He borrowed ideas and language, then developed his own thought from there.

I don't know that other pseudonyms like Climacus might not have taken the
development in yet another direction.

JimR, here is
the section from CA, Hong, pp 35-38 that you say you find the stuff below. Show
me where it is. Show me where E/O is referred to and how it shows the
equivalency that you argue for. In the passage below K makes two claims about
innocence; that it is ignorance and that it is annulled by guilt not mediacy.
These seem consistent with my claim that innocence is a state of “resting
transparently in the creator”. It is clearly not necessary to know
any-thing about the creator in fact to know would and does bring on guilt and
the annulment of innocence. The Aesthetic stage presumes guilt and cannot be,
until guilt enters the picture and annuls innocence.

James Rovira

Don -- So, it doesn t matter that Haufniensis actually uses the word innocence at the bottom of p. 42, and that since he s describing anxiety as the

Message 4 of 25
, Jan 1, 2010

Don --

So, it doesn't matter that Haufniensis actually uses the word "innocence" at the bottom of p. 42, and that since he's describing anxiety as the -presupposition- for original sin, he must be describing it before -sin takes place-? "Original sin," Haufniensis makes clear, is nothing but the first sin. He rejects all other positions in the first three pages of his book.

Very sorry I didn't take the time to retype the entire passage. I thought you'd be able to read it for yourself.

Why don't you quote A/C and then explain to me how he is describing a state of innocence? If you're referring to the opening pages of SUD, nowhere does A/C use the word "innocence" and, in fact, he is most concerned with despair. "Resting transparently" is what you move to -after- despair, so you're a long way from innocence indeed.

You start your reading of K by assuming he's like you, rather than pay careful attention to his actual words. Thus, you assume a subject that's not mentioned and ignore subjects that are. When either H or A/C is talking about innocence, they actually use the word "innocence." When they are not...amazingly...they do not.

Jim R

James Rovira

Just to make clear, Don: This sentence from the bottom of p. 43 of CA: Actually uses the

Message 5 of 25
, Jan 1, 2010

Just to make clear, Don: This sentence from the bottom of p. 43 of CA:

<<This third is spirit. In innocence, man is not merely animal...>>

Actually uses the word "innocence" but is not, in fact, about innocence. That is what you think, right? And the entire context -- even though the word "innocence" appears on the bottom of p. 42 and then again at the bottom of page 43 -- it's not about innocence either, right?

Jim R

Don Anderson

JimR, it would appear that you do not know what the term confinium means. It means the border between two stages; I can t see how innocence can be anything

Message 6 of 25
, Jan 1, 2010

JimR, it would appear that you do not know what the term “confinium
means. It means the border between two stages; I can’t see how innocence
can be anything less than a stage considering the CA discussion and I am not
alone among scholars. It is the border between innocence and guilt. It is true
that anxiety is raised in innocence which I have not denied. But anxiety is not
sin or sinfulness. Neither is anxiety necessarily a bad thing. CA makes clear
in the last chapter of CA that anxiety is “saving.” What is
being said in the context we are discussing is that it is also the “condition”
for grasping at finitude although condition is an inadequate word but will have
to do.It is not the “condition” that is sin It is the grasping
which is sin. So what we have here is becoming. Innocence is not static. It is
a movement from transparency to anxiety and finally a leap that changes
everything. I have been talking about the early stages of innocence. But the
important thing is that anxiety does not annul innocence, guilt does. Anxiety
may well be the beginning of the end of ignorance but it is not the end and it
may be the beginning of the process toward guilt but it is not guilt.

Your statement about Anti-Climacus is nonsense. It shows you did
not read what I said. Let me restate it in hope that you will read it here. I
never said that Anti-Climacus talked about innocence nor did I say that CA says
anything about “resting transparently.” I simply said that I saw a
similarity in what A-Climacus was describing and how CA describes innocence
especially when one also remembers that J Climacus at the end of CUP describes the
same phenomenon as a break with understanding which could be compared to
ignorance in one sense. I suppose it’s a minor point, so use your own
terms but I do hope you are able to keep innocence and sin separated and in
their proper spheres.

As to your final paragraph, I could well say the same about you
and assert that you are wrong because the problem is exaclly what you are
always telling me, you didn’t take the time to read carefully what I
said. But of course you are far too busy for that.

So, it doesn't matter that Haufniensis actually uses the word
"innocence" at the bottom of p. 42, and that since he's describing
anxiety as the -presupposition- for original sin, he must be describing it
before -sin takes place-? "Original sin," Haufniensis makes
clear, is nothing but the first sin. He rejects all other positions in
the first three pages of his book.

Very sorry I didn't take the time to retype the entire passage. I thought
you'd be able to read it for yourself.

Why don't you quote A/C and then explain to me how he is describing a state of
innocence? If you're referring to the opening pages of SUD, nowhere does
A/C use the word "innocence" and, in fact, he is most concerned with
despair. "Resting transparently" is what you move to -after-
despair, so you're a long way from innocence indeed.

You start your reading of K by assuming he's like you, rather than pay careful
attention to his actual words. Thus, you assume a subject that's not
mentioned and ignore subjects that are. When either H or A/C is talking
about innocence, they actually use the word "innocence." When
they are not...amazingly...they do not.

Jim R

Don Anderson

JimR, No this is not what I think. I think I have made it clear in my last post. I m actually kind of confused what your point is unless you think anxiety is

Message 7 of 25
, Jan 1, 2010

JimR, No this is not what I think. I think I have made it
clear in my last post. I’m actually kind of confused what your point is
unless you think anxiety is sin or the next thing to it or something of the
sort.

Just to make clear, Don: This sentence from the bottom of p. 43 of CA:

<<This third is spirit. In innocence, man is not merely
animal...>>

Actually uses the word "innocence" but is not, in fact, about
innocence. That is what you think, right? And the entire context --
even though the word "innocence" appears on the bottom of p. 42 and
then again at the bottom of page 43 -- it's not about innocence either, right?

Jim R

James Rovira

Don -- You made an indirect, incomplete, and unclear claim about SUD and resting transparently in your previous post, which you used to link whatever it is

Message 8 of 25
, Jan 1, 2010

Don --

You made an indirect, incomplete, and unclear claim about SUD and "resting transparently" in your previous post, which you used to link whatever it is you were thinking about to innocence.

Here is what you said:

<<Yes it is true that the section on innocence does not use the
term “resting transparently etc. But Anti-Climacus does and I am
suggesting that any half-educated person can see that the state of innocence at
the beginning is the same.>>

Because you did not fully explain yourself, I had to guess. This post is a bit clearer, but you're still not quoting SUD, nor are you explaining from a quotation what exactly it is that you mean.

Nothing that you say below seems to me to be a response to anything I've said, except that some undefined something is a border between stages. You say, "It is the border between innocence and guilt." What is the border between innocence and guilt? There's no referent for the "it" in your sentence. Do you mean "anxiety" is the border between innocence and guilt?

I agree with most of what you say directly about anxiety below.

This issue at hand is: does Haufniensis identify innocence as he describes it with the immediate erotic stage (dreaming desire) described in E/O 1? I quoted Haufniensis, explained the quotation in context, demonstrated how he included a footnote within his own text to E/O 1, and then demonstrated how that reference was directly to E/O 1's discussion of dreaming desire in the section titled "The Immediate Erotic Stages" through its discussion of melancholy. I quoted a section of CA that was clearly about innocence, since it actually used the word "innocence" and is describing anxiety in a prelapsarian state.

You respond with a string of claims unsupported by any quotation.

You need to make at least the same effort I have to explain your own ideas: quote the texts, and then show me the connections between the texts. Then explain directly from the texts I've quoted how my reading of them is incorrect.

JimR, it would appear that you do not know what the term “confinium
means. It means the border between two stages; I can’t see how innocence
can be anything less than a stage considering the CA discussion and I am not
alone among scholars. It is the border between innocence and guilt. It is true
that anxiety is raised in innocence which I have not denied. But anxiety is not
sin or sinfulness. Neither is anxiety necessarily a bad thing. CA makes clear
in the last chapter of CA that anxiety is “saving.” What is
being said in the context we are discussing is that it is also the “condition”
for grasping at finitude although condition is an inadequate word but will have
to do.It is not the “condition” that is sin It is the grasping
which is sin. So what we have here is becoming. Innocence is not static. It is
a movement from transparency to anxiety and finally a leap that changes
everything. I have been talking about the early stages of innocence. But the
important thing is that anxiety does not annul innocence, guilt does. Anxiety
may well be the beginning of the end of ignorance but it is not the end and it
may be the beginning of the process toward guilt but it is not guilt.

Your statement about Anti-Climacus is nonsense. It shows you did
not read what I said. Let me restate it in hope that you will read it here. I
never said that Anti-Climacus talked about innocence nor did I say that CA says
anything about “resting transparently.” I simply said that I saw a
similarity in what A-Climacus was describing and how CA describes innocence
especially when one also remembers that J Climacus at the end of CUP describes the
same phenomenon as a break with understanding which could be compared to
ignorance in one sense. I suppose it’s a minor point, so use your own
terms but I do hope you are able to keep innocence and sin separated and in
their proper spheres.

As to your final paragraph, I could well say the same about you
and assert that you are wrong because the problem is exaclly what you are
always telling me, you didn’t take the time to read carefully what I
said. But of course you are far too busy for that.

Don

Don --

So, it doesn't matter that Haufniensis actually uses the word
"innocence" at the bottom of p. 42, and that since he's describing
anxiety as the -presupposition- for original sin, he must be describing it
before -sin takes place-? "Original sin," Haufniensis makes
clear, is nothing but the first sin. He rejects all other positions in
the first three pages of his book.

Very sorry I didn't take the time to retype the entire passage. I thought
you'd be able to read it for yourself.

Why don't you quote A/C and then explain to me how he is describing a state of
innocence? If you're referring to the opening pages of SUD, nowhere does
A/C use the word "innocence" and, in fact, he is most concerned with
despair. "Resting transparently" is what you move to -after-
despair, so you're a long way from innocence indeed.

You start your reading of K by assuming he's like you, rather than pay careful
attention to his actual words. Thus, you assume a subject that's not
mentioned and ignore subjects that are. When either H or A/C is talking
about innocence, they actually use the word "innocence." When
they are not...amazingly...they do not.

Jim R

Don Anderson

JimR, I think I see your point a little better. It is I guess that anxiety is about innocence as it takes place in the period of innocence. Your other

Message 9 of 25
, Jan 1, 2010

JimR, I think I see your point a little better. It is I guess
that anxiety is about innocence as it takes place in the period of innocence.
Your other assertion is that if he uses the word innocence twice in that section
it must be all about innocence. The news is it is about Anxiety, Innocence
comes up because anxiety comes forth at the end of anxiety. The references that
mention innocence are about anxiety primarily.

It is also important to note that the description of innocence
that I was attempting to elucidate is innocence in its earlier stage, think a
newborn baby, where anxiety has not raised its head but it still applies as far
as I can see to innocence until guilt annuls it.

Just to make clear, Don: This sentence from the bottom of p. 43 of CA:

<<This third is spirit. In innocence, man is not merely
animal...>>

Actually uses the word "innocence" but is not, in fact, about
innocence. That is what you think, right? And the entire context --
even though the word "innocence" appears on the bottom of p. 42 and
then again at the bottom of page 43 -- it's not about innocence either, right?

Jim R

James Rovira

Yes, Don, I think we re both talking about the same thing -- innocence in its earlier stage. Innocence in its earlier stage is what I identify with dreaming

Message 10 of 25
, Jan 2, 2010

Yes, Don, I think we're both talking about the same thing -- innocence in its earlier stage. Innocence in its earlier stage is what I identify with dreaming desire. I think the state of dreaming desire does describe the infant, but can also describe persons who are older too. K is not so much interested in a simple developmental model, in which we grow through natural stages like plants in sunshine -- something like what Freud or Maslow came up with. I think he is primarily concerned with existential development, which requires decisions of some kind.

Anyway, we may be reading CA with a different emphasis. I see Haufniensis posing a rather traditional theological problem:

How can Adam and Eve have sinned unless God created them defectively?

The point is that Adam and Eve have to be capable of sin while still being created without moral, mental, spiritual, or physical defect at the same time, otherwise God is responsible for sin, a possibility which Haufniensis rejects without too much consideration. He simply says that it is ethically unacceptable. The "middle term" between sin and innocence is "anxiety" in Haufniensis's argument. Anxiety is the result of an innocent/ignorant personality consciously being given freedom by being made "to be able."

So all the time that H. is talking about anxiety in the earlier chapters of CA, he is describing how an innocent personality can experience anxiety -- it's about how the innocent person is still innocent, not created defectively, but can experience anxiety (so we also agree that anxiety isn't sin, even anxiety about sin isn't sin). His discussion is primarily psychological, not spiritual.

The later chapters of CA describe anxiety after we have sinned and is taken up with a long discussion of the demonic.

The transition between innocence and sin is a mystery to psychology as far as H is concerned, is in the realm of dogmatics, so he does not discuss it. He describes psychology immediately before the leap into sin, which is characterized by anxiety, and then after the leap into sin.

That's the framework for my reading of CA. He has to take some time to describe the innocent person's psychology to explain how this person can experience anxiety and why. He draws from E/O I to develop this description of the innocent person's psychology -- the part where the author of E/O 1 is describing dreaming desire -- and credits his debt in a footnote on p. 43.

JimR, I think I see your point a little better. It is I guess
that anxiety is about innocence as it takes place in the period of innocence.
Your other assertion is that if he uses the word innocence twice in that section
it must be all about innocence. The news is it is about Anxiety, Innocence
comes up because anxiety comes forth at the end of anxiety. The references that
mention innocence are about anxiety primarily.

It is also important to note that the description of innocence
that I was attempting to elucidate is innocence in its earlier stage, think a
newborn baby, where anxiety has not raised its head but it still applies as far
as I can see to innocence until guilt annuls it.

Just to make clear, Don: This sentence from the bottom of p. 43 of CA:

<<This third is spirit. In innocence, man is not merely
animal...>>

Actually uses the word "innocence" but is not, in fact, about
innocence. That is what you think, right? And the entire context --
even though the word "innocence" appears on the bottom of p. 42 and
then again at the bottom of page 43 -- it's not about innocence either, right?

Jim R

-- James RoviraTiffin University

amir

Hi there I think having a look at the story of Adam and Eve from Islamic/Quranic perspective may be helpful. Amir (new in K.) ________________________________

Message 11 of 25
, Jan 2, 2010

Hi thereI think having a look at the story of Adam and Eve from Islamic/Quranic perspective may be helpful.Amir (new in K.)

Yes, Don, I think we're both talking about the same thing -- innocence in its earlier stage. Innocence in its earlier stage is what I identify with dreaming desire. I think the state of dreaming desire does describe the infant, but can also describe persons who are older too. K is not so much interested in a simple developmental model, in which we grow through natural stages like plants in sunshine -- something like what Freud or Maslow came up with. I think he is primarily concerned with existential development, which requires decisions of some kind.

Anyway, we may be reading CA with a different emphasis. I see Haufniensis posing a rather traditional theological problem:

How can Adam and Eve have sinned unless God created them defectively?

The point is that Adam and Eve have to be capable of sin while still being created without moral, mental, spiritual, or physical defect at the same time, otherwise God is responsible for sin, a possibility which Haufniensis rejects without too much consideration. He simply says that it is ethically unacceptable. The "middle term" between sin and innocence is "anxiety" in Haufniensis's argument. Anxiety is the result of an innocent/ignorant personality consciously being given freedom by being made "to be able."

So all the time that H. is talking about anxiety in the earlier chapters of CA, he is describing how an innocent personality can experience anxiety -- it's about how the innocent person is still innocent, not created defectively, but can experience anxiety (so we also agree that anxiety isn't sin, even anxiety about sin isn't sin). His discussion is primarily psychological, not spiritual.

The later chapters of CA describe anxiety after we have sinned and is taken up with a long discussion of the demonic.

The transition between innocence and sin is a mystery to psychology as far as H is concerned, is in the realm of dogmatics, so he does not discuss it. He describes psychology immediately before the leap into sin, which is characterized by anxiety, and then after the leap into sin.

That's the framework for my reading of CA. He has to take some time to describe the innocent person's psychology to explain how this person can experience anxiety and why. He draws from E/O I to develop this description of the innocent person's psychology -- the part where the author of E/O 1 is describing dreaming desire -- and credits his debt in a footnote on p. 43.

JimR, I think I see your point a little better. It is I guess
that anxiety is about innocence as it takes place in the period of innocence.
Your other assertion is that if he uses the word innocence twice in that section
it must be all about innocence. The news is it is about Anxiety, Innocence
comes up because anxiety comes forth at the end of anxiety. The references that
mention innocence are about anxiety primarily.

It is also important to note that the description of innocence
that I was attempting to elucidate is innocence in its earlier stage, think a
newborn baby, where anxiety has not raised its head but it still applies as far
as I can see to innocence until guilt annuls it.

Just to make clear, Don: This sentence from the bottom of p. 43 of CA:

<<This third is spirit. In innocence, man is not merely
animal...>>

Actually uses the word "innocence" but is not, in fact, about
innocence. That is what you think, right? And the entire context --
even though the word "innocence" appears on the bottom of p. 42 and
then again at the bottom of page 43 -- it's not about innocence either, right?

Jim R

-- James RoviraTiffin University

Don Anderson

Dear Amir, Thanks and welcome. I would like to hear your Islamic/Quranic perspective! Don From: kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com

Message 12 of 25
, Jan 2, 2010

Dear Amir, Thanks and welcome. I would like to hear your Islamic/Quranic
perspective!

Yes, Don, I think we're both talking about the same thing -- innocence in
its earlier stage. Innocence in its earlier stage is what I identify with
dreaming desire. I think the state of dreaming desire does describe the
infant, but can also describe persons who are older too. K is not so much
interested in a simple developmental model, in which we grow through natural
stages like plants in sunshine -- something like what Freud or Maslow came up
with. I think he is primarily concerned with existential development,
which requires decisions of some kind.

Anyway, we may be reading CA with a different emphasis.
I see Haufniensis posing a rather traditional theological problem:

How can Adam and Eve have sinned unless God created them
defectively?

The point is that Adam and Eve have to be capable of sin
while still being created without moral, mental, spiritual, or physical defect
at the same time, otherwise God is responsible for sin, a possibility which
Haufniensis rejects without too much consideration. He simply says that
it is ethically unacceptable. The "middle term" between sin and
innocence is "anxiety" in Haufniensis's argument. Anxiety is
the result of an innocent/ignorant personality consciously being given freedom
by being made "to be able."

So all the time that H. is talking about anxiety in the
earlier chapters of CA, he is describing how an innocent personality can
experience anxiety -- it's about how the innocent person is still innocent, not
created defectively, but can experience anxiety (so we also agree that anxiety
isn't sin, even anxiety about sin isn't sin). His discussion is primarily
psychological, not spiritual.

The later chapters of CA describe anxiety after we have
sinned and is taken up with a long discussion of the demonic.

The transition between innocence and sin is a mystery to
psychology as far as H is concerned, is in the realm of dogmatics, so he does
not discuss it. He describes psychology immediately before the leap into
sin, which is characterized by anxiety, and then after the leap into sin.

That's the framework for my reading of CA. He has to
take some time to describe the innocent person's psychology to explain how this
person can experience anxiety and why. He draws from E/O I to develop
this description of the innocent person's psychology -- the part where the
author of E/O 1 is describing dreaming desire -- and credits his debt in a footnote
on p. 43.

JimR, I think I
see your point a little better. It is I guess that anxiety is about innocence
as it takes place in the period of innocence. Your other assertion is that if
he uses the word innocence twice in that section it must be all about
innocence. The news is it is about Anxiety, Innocence comes up because anxiety
comes forth at the end of anxiety. The references that mention innocence are
about anxiety primarily.

It is also
important to note that the description of innocence that I was attempting to
elucidate is innocence in its earlier stage, think a newborn baby, where
anxiety has not raised its head but it still applies as far as I can see to
innocence until guilt annuls it.

Just to make clear, Don: This sentence from
the bottom of p. 43 of CA:

<<This third is spirit. In innocence, man is not merely
animal...>>

Actually uses the word "innocence" but is not, in fact, about
innocence. That is what you think, right? And the entire context --
even though the word "innocence" appears on the bottom of p. 42 and
then again at the bottom of page 43 -- it's not about innocence either, right?

Jim R

--
James Rovira
Tiffin University

James Rovira

One thing I definitely agree with Don about, Amir. Please do elaborate, and welcome to the group. Jim R

Message 13 of 25
, Jan 2, 2010

One thing I definitely agree with Don about, Amir. Please do elaborate, and welcome to the group.

Yes, Don, I think we're both talking about the same thing -- innocence in
its earlier stage. Innocence in its earlier stage is what I identify with
dreaming desire. I think the state of dreaming desire does describe the
infant, but can also describe persons who are older too. K is not so much
interested in a simple developmental model, in which we grow through natural
stages like plants in sunshine -- something like what Freud or Maslow came up
with. I think he is primarily concerned with existential development,
which requires decisions of some kind.

Anyway, we may be reading CA with a different emphasis.
I see Haufniensis posing a rather traditional theological problem:

How can Adam and Eve have sinned unless God created them
defectively?

The point is that Adam and Eve have to be capable of sin
while still being created without moral, mental, spiritual, or physical defect
at the same time, otherwise God is responsible for sin, a possibility which
Haufniensis rejects without too much consideration. He simply says that
it is ethically unacceptable. The "middle term" between sin and
innocence is "anxiety" in Haufniensis' s argument. Anxiety is
the result of an innocent/ignorant personality consciously being given freedom
by being made "to be able."

So all the time that H. is talking about anxiety in the
earlier chapters of CA, he is describing how an innocent personality can
experience anxiety -- it's about how the innocent person is still innocent, not
created defectively, but can experience anxiety (so we also agree that anxiety
isn't sin, even anxiety about sin isn't sin). His discussion is primarily
psychological, not spiritual.

The later chapters of CA describe anxiety after we have
sinned and is taken up with a long discussion of the demonic.

The transition between innocence and sin is a mystery to
psychology as far as H is concerned, is in the realm of dogmatics, so he does
not discuss it. He describes psychology immediately before the leap into
sin, which is characterized by anxiety, and then after the leap into sin.

That's the framework for my reading of CA. He has to
take some time to describe the innocent person's psychology to explain how this
person can experience anxiety and why. He draws from E/O I to develop
this description of the innocent person's psychology -- the part where the
author of E/O 1 is describing dreaming desire -- and credits his debt in a footnote
on p. 43.

JimR, I think I
see your point a little better. It is I guess that anxiety is about innocence
as it takes place in the period of innocence. Your other assertion is that if
he uses the word innocence twice in that section it must be all about
innocence. The news is it is about Anxiety, Innocence comes up because anxiety
comes forth at the end of anxiety. The references that mention innocence are
about anxiety primarily.

It is also
important to note that the description of innocence that I was attempting to
elucidate is innocence in its earlier stage, think a newborn baby, where
anxiety has not raised its head but it still applies as far as I can see to
innocence until guilt annuls it.

Just to make clear, Don: This sentence from
the bottom of p. 43 of CA:

<<This third is spirit. In innocence, man is not merely
animal...>>

Actually uses the word "innocence" but is not, in fact, about
innocence. That is what you think, right? And the entire context --
even though the word "innocence" appears on the bottom of p. 42 and
then again at the bottom of page 43 -- it's not about innocence either, right?

Jim R

--
James Rovira
Tiffin University

Don Anderson

JimR, I think I need to work on this issue for a day or two or whatever before I reply. In the meantime answer the following. What are you saying about how the

Message 15 of 25
, Jan 2, 2010

JimR, I think I need to work on this issue for a day or two or
whatever before I reply. In the meantime answer the following. What are you
saying about how the stage of innocence and the aesthetic stage. I am saying
that the stages are separate and it is my understanding that you are saying
that they are the same or perhaps you are saying they overlap. Please restate
your position on this point.

Yes, Don, I think we're both talking about the same thing -- innocence in
its earlier stage. Innocence in its earlier stage is what I identify with
dreaming desire. I think the state of dreaming desire does describe the
infant, but can also describe persons who are older too. K is not so much
interested in a simple developmental model, in which we grow through natural
stages like plants in sunshine -- something like what Freud or Maslow came up
with. I think he is primarily concerned with existential development,
which requires decisions of some kind.

Anyway, we may be reading CA with a different emphasis.
I see Haufniensis posing a rather traditional theological problem:

How can Adam and Eve have sinned unless God created them
defectively?

The point is that Adam and Eve have to be capable of sin
while still being created without moral, mental, spiritual, or physical defect
at the same time, otherwise God is responsible for sin, a possibility which
Haufniensis rejects without too much consideration. He simply says that
it is ethically unacceptable. The "middle term" between sin and
innocence is "anxiety" in Haufniensis's argument. Anxiety is
the result of an innocent/ignorant personality consciously being given freedom
by being made "to be able."

So all the time that H. is talking about anxiety in the
earlier chapters of CA, he is describing how an innocent personality can
experience anxiety -- it's about how the innocent person is still innocent, not
created defectively, but can experience anxiety (so we also agree that anxiety
isn't sin, even anxiety about sin isn't sin). His discussion is primarily
psychological, not spiritual.

The later chapters of CA describe anxiety after we have
sinned and is taken up with a long discussion of the demonic.

The transition between innocence and sin is a mystery to
psychology as far as H is concerned, is in the realm of dogmatics, so he does
not discuss it. He describes psychology immediately before the leap into
sin, which is characterized by anxiety, and then after the leap into sin.

That's the framework for my reading of CA. He has to
take some time to describe the innocent person's psychology to explain how this
person can experience anxiety and why. He draws from E/O I to develop
this description of the innocent person's psychology -- the part where the
author of E/O 1 is describing dreaming desire -- and credits his debt in a
footnote on p. 43.

JimR, I think I
see your point a little better. It is I guess that anxiety is about innocence
as it takes place in the period of innocence. Your other assertion is that if
he uses the word innocence twice in that section it must be all about
innocence. The news is it is about Anxiety, Innocence comes up because anxiety
comes forth at the end of anxiety. The references that mention innocence are
about anxiety primarily.

It is also
important to note that the description of innocence that I was attempting to
elucidate is innocence in its earlier stage, think a newborn baby, where
anxiety has not raised its head but it still applies as far as I can see to
innocence until guilt annuls it.

Just to make clear, Don: This sentence from
the bottom of p. 43 of CA:

<<This third is spirit. In innocence, man is not merely
animal...>>

Actually uses the word "innocence" but is not, in fact, about
innocence. That is what you think, right? And the entire context --
even though the word "innocence" appears on the bottom of p. 42 and
then again at the bottom of page 43 -- it's not about innocence either, right?

Jim R

--
James Rovira
Tiffin University

James Rovira

Very simply, Don, my position: Haufniensis identifies innocence, which he identifies as a state, with the state of dreaming desire as described in E/O I. It

Message 16 of 25
, Jan 2, 2010

Very simply, Don, my position:

Haufniensis identifies innocence, which he identifies as a "state," with the state of dreaming desire as described in E/O I. It could be that it's not a complete identification on his part, but I would say that the state of dreaming desire is certainly his starting point for his thinking about innocence, that and the book of Genesis. The state of dreaming desire is one of the "immediate erotic stages," so is part of the aesthetic stage of existence, the immediate pole.

I believe the author of E/O 1 lays out the aesthetic sphere of existence as following:

JimR, I think I need to work on this issue for a day or two or
whatever before I reply. In the meantime answer the following. What are you
saying about how the stage of innocence and the aesthetic stage. I am saying
that the stages are separate and it is my understanding that you are saying
that they are the same or perhaps you are saying they overlap. Please restate
your position on this point.

Don

Don Anderson

Amir, thanks for these links. I’ll need some time to digest them. Don From: kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com [mailto:kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com] On

Yes, Don, I think we're both talking about the same thing -- innocence in
its earlier stage. Innocence in its earlier stage is what I identify with
dreaming desire. I think the state of dreaming desire does describe the
infant, but can also describe persons who are older too. K is not so much
interested in a simple developmental model, in which we grow through natural
stages like plants in sunshine -- something like what Freud or Maslow came up
with. I think he is primarily concerned with existential development,
which requires decisions of some kind.

Anyway,
we may be reading CA with a different emphasis. I see Haufniensis posing
a rather traditional theological problem:

How
can Adam and Eve have sinned unless God created them defectively?

The
point is that Adam and Eve have to be capable of sin while still being created
without moral, mental, spiritual, or physical defect at the same time,
otherwise God is responsible for sin, a possibility which Haufniensis rejects
without too much consideration. He simply says that it is ethically
unacceptable. The "middle term" between sin and innocence is
"anxiety" in Haufniensis' s argument. Anxiety is the result of
an innocent/ignorant personality consciously being given freedom by being made
"to be able."

So
all the time that H. is talking about anxiety in the earlier chapters of CA, he
is describing how an innocent personality can experience anxiety -- it's about
how the innocent person is still innocent, not created defectively, but can
experience anxiety (so we also agree that anxiety isn't sin, even anxiety about
sin isn't sin). His discussion is primarily psychological, not spiritual.

The
later chapters of CA describe anxiety after we have sinned and is taken up with
a long discussion of the demonic.

The
transition between innocence and sin is a mystery to psychology as far as H is
concerned, is in the realm of dogmatics, so he does not discuss it. He
describes psychology immediately before the leap into sin, which is
characterized by anxiety, and then after the leap into sin.

That's
the framework for my reading of CA. He has to take some time to describe
the innocent person's psychology to explain how this person can experience
anxiety and why. He draws from E/O I to develop this description of the
innocent person's psychology -- the part where the author of E/O 1 is
describing dreaming desire -- and credits his debt in a footnote on p. 43.

JimR, I think I see your point a little
better. It is I guess that anxiety is about innocence as it takes place in the
period of innocence. Your other assertion is that if he uses the word innocence
twice in that section it must be all about innocence. The news is it is about
Anxiety, Innocence comes up because anxiety comes forth at the end of anxiety.
The references that mention innocence are about anxiety primarily.

It is also important to note that the
description of innocence that I was attempting to elucidate is innocence in its
earlier stage, think a newborn baby, where anxiety has not raised its head but
it still applies as far as I can see to innocence until guilt annuls it.

Just to make clear, Don: This sentence from the bottom of p. 43 of CA:

<<This third is spirit. In innocence, man is not merely
animal...>>

Actually uses the word "innocence" but is not, in fact, about
innocence. That is what you think, right? And the entire context --
even though the word "innocence" appears on the bottom of p. 42 and
then again at the bottom of page 43 -- it's not about innocence either, right?

Jim R

--
James Rovira
Tiffin University

Don Anderson

JimR, are you or are you not taking a stand? Is or is not innocence a part of the aesthetic sphere? You seem to be equivocating in your reply below. More

Message 18 of 25
, Jan 2, 2010

JimR, are you or are you not taking a stand? Is or is not
innocence a part of the aesthetic sphere? You seem to be equivocating in your
reply below.

Haufniensis identifies innocence, which he identifies as a "state,"
with the state of dreaming desire as described in E/O I. It could be that
it's not a complete identification on his part, but I would say that the state
of dreaming desire is certainly his starting point for his thinking about
innocence, that and the book of Genesis. The state of dreaming
desire is one of the "immediate erotic stages," so is part of the
aesthetic stage of existence, the immediate pole.

I believe the author of E/O 1 lays out the aesthetic sphere of existence as
following:

JimR, I think I
need to work on this issue for a day or two or whatever before I reply. In the
meantime answer the following. What are you saying about how the stage of
innocence and the aesthetic stage. I am saying that the stages are separate and
it is my understanding that you are saying that they are the same or perhaps
you are saying they overlap. Please restate your position on this point.

Don

James Rovira

Don, I m sorry, but I can t get any clearer than this: When I don t write in

Message 19 of 25
, Jan 2, 2010

Don, I'm sorry, but I can't get any clearer than this:

<<...is part of the
aesthetic stage of existence, the immediate pole. >>

When I don't write in soundbites you claim I'm equivocating. When I do, you complain that I'm being superficial.

Read more slowly and think a bit before responding. What I wrote was clear enough.

Haufniensis identifies innocence, which he identifies as a "state,"
with the state of dreaming desire as described in E/O I. It could be that
it's not a complete identification on his part, but I would say that the state
of dreaming desire is certainly his starting point for his thinking about
innocence, that and the book of Genesis. The state of dreaming
desire is one of the "immediate erotic stages," so is part of the
aesthetic stage of existence, the immediate pole.

I believe the author of E/O 1 lays out the aesthetic sphere of existence as
following:

JimR, so am I correct to say that either you do not think that persons in the aesthetic sphere are not guilty or that sin has not yet entered by the

Message 20 of 25
, Jan 3, 2010

JimR, so am I correct to say that either you do not think that persons
in the aesthetic sphere are not guilty or that sin has not yet entered by the
qualitative leap (see p. 47) Perhaps you are saying that your so-called
immediate poll of the aesthetic sphere is prior to sin and guilt. I am asking
you where you draw this line. Where does the qualitative leap where sin enters
take place? Is it before or after the immediate pole where innocence resides or
is found. This is not clear to me. If I were to guess I would have to say,
based on my present understanding of your view from our discussion that it does
not occur until in the midst of the aesthetic stage. Please correct any misunderstanding
I have of your position.

Haufniensis identifies innocence, which he identifies as a "state,"
with the state of dreaming desire as described in E/O I. It could be that
it's not a complete identification on his part, but I would say that the state
of dreaming desire is certainly his starting point for his thinking about
innocence, that and the book of Genesis. The state of dreaming
desire is one of the "immediate erotic stages," so is part of the
aesthetic stage of existence, the immediate pole.

I believe the author of E/O 1 lays out the aesthetic sphere of existence as
following:

First thing to understand, Don -- it s not my position : it s my reading of Kierkegaard s texts. I am not representing my own theology when I describe K. I

Message 21 of 25
, Jan 3, 2010

First thing to understand, Don -- it's not my "position": it's my reading of Kierkegaard's texts. I am not representing my own theology when I describe K. I disagree with K on several points. I am attempting to write descriptively.

Why do you say "so called immediate pole" when the title of the section from which I quoted is "the immediate-erotic stages"? Have you picked up a copy of E/O 1 yet and read the sections I referenced? There's no point in my going on with my own descriptions if we aren't reading the same text.

However, I will try to answer your questions about sin and guilt. There are two ways to understand sin and guilt in Kierkegaard's writings -- subjectively, as they are understood by the person, and objectively, as they are attributed to the person by God. K is of course primarily concerned with our subjective understanding of sin and guilt.

From God's point of view in K's writing, so far as I can tell, there's no difference between sin and guilt. Both words equally describe the same objective and subjective state of the individual in sin. I think Haufniensis works from this point of view, but I think that Climacus does not.

From the point of view of the person, so far as I can tell from K's works, and perhaps as explained by Climacus, sin does not really exist as sin until the leap into RB. Guilt exists prior to that leap, of course, but it is not really understood as sin by the individual until the leap into RB.

Now...when does guilt enter consciousness, according to K's works? I'm not sure. It may exist in the reflective-aesthetic. It certainly exists immediately prior to the leap into the ethical sphere and in the ethical sphere. I would say there is no qualitative change until the leap into the ethical sphere.

Back to my little map of the aesthetic sphere from E/O 1 -- slightly modified to make it clearer:

I would say guilt does not exist, so far as Haufniensis is concerned, in the state of desiring desire, which he identifies with innocence. Sin enters the individual's life by the first sin, for that matter, so the person does not experience either guilt or sin, really and individually, until after s/he has transgressed that first command.

Now I don't believe that Haufniensis identifies innocence with the -entire- aesthetic sphere. Just the state of dreaming desire within the aesthetic sphere. Some sense of guilt may come in anywhere along the way, but the aesthete who wrote E/O 1 isn't too concerned about guilt.

JimR, so am I correct to say that either you do not think that persons
in the aesthetic sphere are not guilty or that sin has not yet entered by the
qualitative leap (see p. 47) Perhaps you are saying that your so-called
immediate poll of the aesthetic sphere is prior to sin and guilt. I am asking
you where you draw this line. Where does the qualitative leap where sin enters
take place? Is it before or after the immediate pole where innocence resides or
is found. This is not clear to me. If I were to guess I would have to say,
based on my present understanding of your view from our discussion that it does
not occur until in the midst of the aesthetic stage. Please correct any misunderstanding
I have of your position.

Don

Don Anderson

JimR, we are so far apart in our interpretations of K s texts that it just is not worth it to attempt any serious discussion. Have a nice day. Don From:

Message 22 of 25
, Jan 3, 2010

JimR, we are so far apart in our interpretations of K’s texts
that it just is not worth it to attempt any serious discussion. Have a nice
day.

First thing to understand, Don -- it's not my
"position": it's my reading of Kierkegaard's texts. I am not
representing my own theology when I describe K. I disagree with K on
several points. I am attempting to write descriptively.

Why do you say "so called immediate pole" when the title of the
section from which I quoted is "the immediate-erotic stages"?
Have you picked up a copy of E/O 1 yet and read the sections I referenced?
There's no point in my going on with my own descriptions if we aren't reading
the same text.

However, I will try to answer your questions about sin and guilt. There
are two ways to understand sin and guilt in Kierkegaard's writings -- subjectively,
as they are understood by the person, and objectively, as they are attributed
to the person by God. K is of course primarily concerned with our
subjective understanding of sin and guilt.

From God's point of view in K's writing, so far as I can tell, there's no
difference between sin and guilt. Both words equally describe the same
objective and subjective state of the individual in sin. I think
Haufniensis works from this point of view, but I think that Climacus does not.

From the point of view of the person, so far as I can tell from K's works, and
perhaps as explained by Climacus, sin does not really exist as sin until the
leap into RB. Guilt exists prior to that leap, of course, but it is not
really understood as sin by the individual until the leap into RB.

Now...when does guilt enter consciousness, according to K's works? I'm
not sure. It may exist in the reflective-aesthetic. It certainly
exists immediately prior to the leap into the ethical sphere and in the ethical
sphere. I would say there is no qualitative change until the leap into
the ethical sphere.

Back to my little map of the aesthetic sphere from E/O 1 -- slightly modified
to make it clearer:

I would say guilt does not exist, so far as Haufniensis is concerned, in the
state of desiring desire, which he identifies with innocence. Sin enters
the individual's life by the first sin, for that matter, so the person does not
experience either guilt or sin, really and individually, until after s/he has
transgressed that first command.

Now I don't believe that Haufniensis identifies innocence with the -entire-
aesthetic sphere. Just the state of dreaming desire within the aesthetic
sphere. Some sense of guilt may come in anywhere along the way, but the
aesthete who wrote E/O 1 isn't too concerned about guilt.

JimR, so am I
correct to say that either you do not think that persons in the aesthetic
sphere are not guilty or that sin has not yet entered by the qualitative leap
(see p. 47) Perhaps you are saying that your so-called immediate poll of the
aesthetic sphere is prior to sin and guilt. I am asking you where you draw this
line. Where does the qualitative leap where sin enters take place? Is it before
or after the immediate pole where innocence resides or is found. This is not
clear to me. If I were to guess I would have to say, based on my present
understanding of your view from our discussion that it does not occur until in
the midst of the aesthetic stage. Please correct any misunderstanding I have of
your position.

Don

Don Anderson

David J Kangas, Kierkegaard s Instant: On Beginnings Indiana University Press, 2007. The title pretty well says it all. Kangas makes a close reading of

The title pretty well says it
all. Kangas makes a close reading of several of K’s early pseudonymous texts
including CI, E/O, F&T, and CA. He reads them from the point of view of K’s
philosophy of existence. He explicates K’s similarity to and difference
from the German Idealists and his reliance upon the mystical apophatic tradition
which was very influential on the idealists especially Schelling and the Danish
romantics.