If four Ubiquity air transmitters are located on buildings around London with a line of sight to the Ecuadorian Embassy, from four different directions, the long-range mesh Wi-Fi will be stable and of significant bandwidth to support Assange's operations.

A small selection of localised long-range to short-range WAPs would need to be connected to each other and to the long-range Wi-Fi systems. This is the end-node part of the long-range backhaul network. It takes the long-range network and transmits it at an acceptable frequency for the laptop, which does not have the power to run a 24 GHz Wi-Fi module and space in it for the antenna.

Security issues for the localised Wi-Fi distributors can be fixed by having a very good mesh network.

Eight or more long-range to localised (short range) mesh capable WAPs will allow for a localised mesh, long-range Wi-Fi connectivity and Assange's laptop to hook up to any of them when needed.

The security part comes into frame as the more mesh WAPs installed, the harder it is to jam (RF unicast, multicast or broadcast).

Whatever you (Anonymous and WikiLeaks fans) do, make sure to configure your WAPs by viewing what channels are being used around the embassy. The more channels you use in the 5 GHz millimetre wave spectrum the better.