RING V. ARIZONA[Syllabus]Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639, is irreconcilable with Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466, and is, accordingly, overruled to the extent that it allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty, see 497 U. S., at 647-649. Because Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors operate as "the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense," Apprendi, 530 U. S., at 494, n. 19, the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury.

SATTAZAHN V. PENNSYLVANIA[Syllabus] Neither the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause nor the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause barred Pennsylvania from seeking the death penalty against petitioner on retrial when he was given a life sentence at his first trial.

WEEKS V. ANGELONE[Syllabus]1. Is there any ""compelling"" reason to review the Fourth Circuit's application of this Court's recent decision in Buchannan V. Angelone, 118 S. Ct. 757 (1998), to the facts of petitioner's case, which are substantially indistinguishable from those in Buchanan?"

SHAFER V. SOUTH CAROLINA[Syllabus] The South Carolina Supreme Court incorrectly interpreted Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U. S. 154, when it declared that case inapplicable to South Carolina's current sentencing scheme.

BANKS V. DRETKE[Syllabus]In this Texas capital case, the Fifth Circuit (in an unpublished order) overturned the district court's issuance of habeas corpus relief as to Petitioner Delma Banks' sentence. Banks contends that the Court of Appeals reached this result only by misapplying and misinterpreting well-established 'precedents of this Court regarding, inter alia, prosecutorial misuse of peremptory challenges to exclude African Americans from Banks' petit jury, and trial counsel's ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Banks seeks review by this Court of the following questions: 1. Did the Fifth Circuit commit legal error in rejecting Banks' Brady claim— that the prosecution suppressed material witness impeachment evidence that prejudiced him in the penalty phase of his trial--on the grounds that: (a) the evidence supporting the claim was procedurally defaulted, notwithstanding the fact that, like in Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999), there was no reasonable basis for concluding that counsel for Banks could have discovered the suppressed evidence prior to or during that trial or state post-conviction proceedings; and (b) the suppressed evidence was immaterial to Banks' death sentence, where the panel neglected to consider that the trial prosecutors viewed the evidence to be of utmost importance to showing a capital sentence was appropriate? 2.Did the Fifth Circuit act contrary to Stricland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)and Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000),where it weighed each item of mitigating evidence separately and concluded that no single category would have brought a different result at sentencing without weighing the impact of the evidence collectively? 3. Did the Fifth Circuit act contrary to Harris v. Nelsen, 394 U.S. 286 (1969)and Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993) in holding that Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b) does not apply to habeas proceeding because evidentiary hearings in those proceedings are not similar to civil trials? 4. Did the Fifth Circuit err in refusing to consider Bank's jury discrimination claim--virtually identical to one this Court is consider Bank's jury discrimination claim-- virtually identical to one this Court is considering in Miller-El v. Cockrell (No.01-7662)--based upon its conclusions that: (a) the state court's rejection of that claim rested upon an adequate and independent state ground; and that (b) there was inadequate prejudice to Mr. Bank's interest to excuse his counsel's failing to present, at trail, direct and statistical evidence of the prosecution's consistent policy of using peremptory challenges to keep African Americans off felony juries?

PENRY V. JOHNSON[Syllabus] The jury instructions at Penry's resentencing for capital murder did not comply with the Court's mandate in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302; the admission into evidence of statements from a psychiatric report based on an uncounseled interview with Penry did not run afoul of the Fifth Amendment.

MCKUNE V. LILE[Syllabus] The Tenth Circuit's judgment-that Kansas prison officials' threat to reduce respondent inmate's privilege status and transfer him to maximum security if he refused to participate in a sexual abuse treatment program constituted compelled self-incrimination violative of the Fifth Amendment-is reversed, and the case is remanded.

SCHRIRO V. SUMMERLIN[Syllabus]1) Did the 9th Circuit err by holding that the new rule announced in Ring v. Arizona is substantive, rather than procedural, and therefore exempt from the retroactivity analysis of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)? (2) Did the 9th Circuit err by holding that the new rule announced in Ring applies retroactively to cases on collateral review under Teague's exception for watershed rules of criminal procedure that alter bedrock procedural principles and seriously enhance the accuracy of the proceedings?

WILLIAMS V. TAYLOR[Syllabus]1. Where both the federal district court judge and state trial court judge who had originally sentenced Petitioner to death concluded that counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial under the test this Court articulated in Strickland v. Washington, did the Fourth Circuit err in denying relief by reformulating the Strickland test so that: a. ineffective assistance of counsel claims may be assessed under the ""windfall"" analysis articulated in Lockhart v. Fretwell even where trial counsel's error was no ""windfall"" ; and b. The petitioner must show that absent counsel's deficient performance in the penalty phase, all twelve jurors would have voted for life imprisonment, even where state law would have mandated a life sentence if only one juror had voted for life imprisonment; and 2. Did the Fourth Circuit err in concluding that, under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1), a state habeas court's decision to deny a federal constitutional claim cannot be ""contrary to "" clearly established Federal law as determined by the Court unless it is in ""square conflict"" with a decision of this Court that is controlling as to law and fact""? 3. Did the Fourth Circuit err in concluding that, under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1), a state habeas court's decision to deny a federal constitutional claim cannot involve ""an unreasonable application of"" clearly established Federal law as determined by the Court unless the state court's decision is predicated on an interpretation or application of relevant precedent that ""reasonable jurists would all agree is unreasonable""?

YARBOROUGH V. ALVARADO[Syllabus](1) Whether, in applying the objective test for a "custody" determination under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), a court must consider the age and experience of a person if he or she is a juvenile? (2) Whether a state court adjudication can be deemed an "objectively unreasonable" application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent, for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), because it declines to "extend" the rule of a Supreme Court precedent to a new context.

WILLIAMS V. TAYLOR[Syllabus]2. Whether 28 U.S.C. sec. 2254 (e) (2), which prohibits a federal habeas court from holding an evidentiary hearing only ""if the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State Court proceedings, ""governs petitioner's claims where throughout state proceedings, the state suppressed the relevant facts, denied petitioner's discovery requests, denied all investigative and expert resources to investigate, develop, and discover claims, and denied an evidentiary hearing."

WOODFORD V. GARCEAU[Syllabus] For purposes of applying the rule in Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U. S. 320, a case does not become "pending" until an actual application for habeas relief is filed in federal court; respondent's application is subject to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 because it was not filed until after AEDPA's effective date.

CAREY V. SAFFOLD[Syllabus] As used in 28 U. S. C. §2244(d)(2), which tolls the limitations period for filing federal habeas petitions while a petition for state collateral relief is "pending," the term "pending" covers the time between a lower state court's decision and the filing of a notice of appeal to a higher state court; that rule applies to California's collateral review system; and the case is remanded for reconsideration of the question whether respondent's state petition was timely filed.

AMERICAN INS. ASSN. V. GARAMENDI[Syllabus]California's Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act (HVIRA) requires California insurers to provide extensive information regarding every insurance policy issued in Nazi dominated Europe between 1920 and 1945 by any insurer with which the California insurer now has a legal relationship. The district court enjoined enforcement of the Act on three constitutional grounds: interference with the federal government's power over foreign affairs, due process, and the Foreign Commerce Clause. Over the objections of the U.S. government and affected foreign governments, and in direct conflict with Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. v. Gallagher, 267 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit reversed and upheld the HVIRA in all respects. 1. Whether the HVIRA, which the U.S. government has called an actual interference with U.S. foreign policy, and which affected foreign governments have protested as inconsistent with international agreements, violates the foreign affairs doctrine of Zschering v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968). 2. Whether the HVIRA, which attempts to regulate insurance transactions that occurred overseas between foreign parties more than half a century ago, exceeds California's legislative jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause. 3. Whether the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. 1011-1015, insulates the HVIRA form review under the Foreign Commerce Clause.

TYLER V. CAIN[Syllabus] The rule in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U. S. 39-that a jury instruction is unconstitutional if there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood it to allow conviction without proof beyond a reasonable doubt-was not "made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court," within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. §2244(b)(2)(A).

DUNCAN V. WALKER[Syllabus] A federal habeas petition is not an "application for State post-conviction or other collateral review" within 28 U. S. C. §2244(d)(2)'s meaning, so that provision did not toll the limitation period for filing respondent's second federal habeas petition during the pendency of his first federal habeas petition.

INS V. ST. CYR[Syllabus] Amendments that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 made to the Immigration and Nationality Act did not affect the federal courts' habeas jurisdiction to decide pure questions of law; nor did they affect the availability of discretionary relief from deportation for aliens whose convictions were obtained through plea agreements before the amendments' effective dates.

PLILER V. FORD[Syllabus] (1) Whether the dismissal of a "mixed" habeas corpus petition is improper unless the district court informs the petitioner about the possibility of a stay of the proceeding pending exhaustion of state remedies and advises the petitioner with respect to the statute of limitations in the event of any refiling? (2) Whether a second, untimely habeas petition may relate back to a first habeas petition, where the first habeas petition was dismissed and the first proceeding is no longer proceeding?

EDWARDS V. CARPENTER[Syllabus]Whether a federal habeas court is barred from considering an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim as "" cause"" for the procedural default of another habeas claim when the ineffective-assistance claim is itself procedurally defaulted."

[Syllabus]

ARTUZ V. BENNETT[Syllabus]Is a state court post-conviction application ""properly filed"" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(2), which tolls the one-year statute of limitations for Habeas corpus petitions in the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, if it is filed in a court that does not have the power to hear the merits of the application?"

SLACK V. MCDANIEL[Syllabus]If a person's petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254 is dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies and he subsequently exhaust his state remedies and refiles the 2254 petition, are claims included within that petition that were not included within his initial 2254 filing ""second or successive"" habeas applications?

LOCKYER V. ANDRADE[Syllabus] The Ninth Circuit erred in ruling that the California Court of Appeal's decision affirming Andrade's sentence for a "third strike" conviction is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, this Court's clearly established law within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1).

RING V. ARIZONA[Syllabus]Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639, is irreconcilable with Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466, and is, accordingly, overruled to the extent that it allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty, see 497 U. S., at 647-649. Because Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors operate as "the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense," Apprendi, 530 U. S., at 494, n. 19, the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury.

SHAFER V. SOUTH CAROLINA[Syllabus] The South Carolina Supreme Court incorrectly interpreted Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U. S. 154, when it declared that case inapplicable to South Carolina's current sentencing scheme.

SATTAZAHN V. PENNSYLVANIA[Syllabus] Neither the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause nor the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause barred Pennsylvania from seeking the death penalty against petitioner on retrial when he was given a life sentence at his first trial.

WEEKS V. ANGELONE[Syllabus]1. Is there any ""compelling"" reason to review the Fourth Circuit's application of this Court's recent decision in Buchannan V. Angelone, 118 S. Ct. 757 (1998), to the facts of petitioner's case, which are substantially indistinguishable from those in Buchanan?"

PENRY V. JOHNSON[Syllabus] The jury instructions at Penry's resentencing for capital murder did not comply with the Court's mandate in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302; the admission into evidence of statements from a psychiatric report based on an uncounseled interview with Penry did not run afoul of the Fifth Amendment.

BANKS V. DRETKE[Syllabus]In this Texas capital case, the Fifth Circuit (in an unpublished order) overturned the district court's issuance of habeas corpus relief as to Petitioner Delma Banks' sentence. Banks contends that the Court of Appeals reached this result only by misapplying and misinterpreting well-established 'precedents of this Court regarding, inter alia, prosecutorial misuse of peremptory challenges to exclude African Americans from Banks' petit jury, and trial counsel's ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Banks seeks review by this Court of the following questions: 1. Did the Fifth Circuit commit legal error in rejecting Banks' Brady claim— that the prosecution suppressed material witness impeachment evidence that prejudiced him in the penalty phase of his trial--on the grounds that: (a) the evidence supporting the claim was procedurally defaulted, notwithstanding the fact that, like in Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999), there was no reasonable basis for concluding that counsel for Banks could have discovered the suppressed evidence prior to or during that trial or state post-conviction proceedings; and (b) the suppressed evidence was immaterial to Banks' death sentence, where the panel neglected to consider that the trial prosecutors viewed the evidence to be of utmost importance to showing a capital sentence was appropriate? 2.Did the Fifth Circuit act contrary to Stricland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)and Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000),where it weighed each item of mitigating evidence separately and concluded that no single category would have brought a different result at sentencing without weighing the impact of the evidence collectively? 3. Did the Fifth Circuit act contrary to Harris v. Nelsen, 394 U.S. 286 (1969)and Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993) in holding that Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b) does not apply to habeas proceeding because evidentiary hearings in those proceedings are not similar to civil trials? 4. Did the Fifth Circuit err in refusing to consider Bank's jury discrimination claim--virtually identical to one this Court is consider Bank's jury discrimination claim-- virtually identical to one this Court is considering in Miller-El v. Cockrell (No.01-7662)--based upon its conclusions that: (a) the state court's rejection of that claim rested upon an adequate and independent state ground; and that (b) there was inadequate prejudice to Mr. Bank's interest to excuse his counsel's failing to present, at trail, direct and statistical evidence of the prosecution's consistent policy of using peremptory challenges to keep African Americans off felony juries?

WOODFORD V. GARCEAU[Syllabus] For purposes of applying the rule in Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U. S. 320, a case does not become "pending" until an actual application for habeas relief is filed in federal court; respondent's application is subject to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 because it was not filed until after AEDPA's effective date.

WILLIAMS V. TAYLOR[Syllabus]1. Where both the federal district court judge and state trial court judge who had originally sentenced Petitioner to death concluded that counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial under the test this Court articulated in Strickland v. Washington, did the Fourth Circuit err in denying relief by reformulating the Strickland test so that: a. ineffective assistance of counsel claims may be assessed under the ""windfall"" analysis articulated in Lockhart v. Fretwell even where trial counsel's error was no ""windfall"" ; and b. The petitioner must show that absent counsel's deficient performance in the penalty phase, all twelve jurors would have voted for life imprisonment, even where state law would have mandated a life sentence if only one juror had voted for life imprisonment; and 2. Did the Fourth Circuit err in concluding that, under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1), a state habeas court's decision to deny a federal constitutional claim cannot be ""contrary to "" clearly established Federal law as determined by the Court unless it is in ""square conflict"" with a decision of this Court that is controlling as to law and fact""? 3. Did the Fourth Circuit err in concluding that, under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1), a state habeas court's decision to deny a federal constitutional claim cannot involve ""an unreasonable application of"" clearly established Federal law as determined by the Court unless the state court's decision is predicated on an interpretation or application of relevant precedent that ""reasonable jurists would all agree is unreasonable""?

SCHRIRO V. SUMMERLIN[Syllabus]1) Did the 9th Circuit err by holding that the new rule announced in Ring v. Arizona is substantive, rather than procedural, and therefore exempt from the retroactivity analysis of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)? (2) Did the 9th Circuit err by holding that the new rule announced in Ring applies retroactively to cases on collateral review under Teague's exception for watershed rules of criminal procedure that alter bedrock procedural principles and seriously enhance the accuracy of the proceedings?

WILLIAMS V. TAYLOR[Syllabus]2. Whether 28 U.S.C. sec. 2254 (e) (2), which prohibits a federal habeas court from holding an evidentiary hearing only ""if the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State Court proceedings, ""governs petitioner's claims where throughout state proceedings, the state suppressed the relevant facts, denied petitioner's discovery requests, denied all investigative and expert resources to investigate, develop, and discover claims, and denied an evidentiary hearing."

MCKUNE V. LILE[Syllabus] The Tenth Circuit's judgment-that Kansas prison officials' threat to reduce respondent inmate's privilege status and transfer him to maximum security if he refused to participate in a sexual abuse treatment program constituted compelled self-incrimination violative of the Fifth Amendment-is reversed, and the case is remanded.

DUNCAN V. WALKER[Syllabus] A federal habeas petition is not an "application for State post-conviction or other collateral review" within 28 U. S. C. §2244(d)(2)'s meaning, so that provision did not toll the limitation period for filing respondent's second federal habeas petition during the pendency of his first federal habeas petition.

YARBOROUGH V. ALVARADO[Syllabus](1) Whether, in applying the objective test for a "custody" determination under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), a court must consider the age and experience of a person if he or she is a juvenile? (2) Whether a state court adjudication can be deemed an "objectively unreasonable" application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent, for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), because it declines to "extend" the rule of a Supreme Court precedent to a new context.

EDWARDS V. CARPENTER[Syllabus]Whether a federal habeas court is barred from considering an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim as "" cause"" for the procedural default of another habeas claim when the ineffective-assistance claim is itself procedurally defaulted."

LOCKYER V. ANDRADE[Syllabus] The Ninth Circuit erred in ruling that the California Court of Appeal's decision affirming Andrade's sentence for a "third strike" conviction is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, this Court's clearly established law within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1).

CAREY V. SAFFOLD[Syllabus] As used in 28 U. S. C. §2244(d)(2), which tolls the limitations period for filing federal habeas petitions while a petition for state collateral relief is "pending," the term "pending" covers the time between a lower state court's decision and the filing of a notice of appeal to a higher state court; that rule applies to California's collateral review system; and the case is remanded for reconsideration of the question whether respondent's state petition was timely filed.

TYLER V. CAIN[Syllabus] The rule in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U. S. 39-that a jury instruction is unconstitutional if there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood it to allow conviction without proof beyond a reasonable doubt-was not "made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court," within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. §2244(b)(2)(A).

INS V. ST. CYR[Syllabus] Amendments that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 made to the Immigration and Nationality Act did not affect the federal courts' habeas jurisdiction to decide pure questions of law; nor did they affect the availability of discretionary relief from deportation for aliens whose convictions were obtained through plea agreements before the amendments' effective dates.

PLILER V. FORD[Syllabus] (1) Whether the dismissal of a "mixed" habeas corpus petition is improper unless the district court informs the petitioner about the possibility of a stay of the proceeding pending exhaustion of state remedies and advises the petitioner with respect to the statute of limitations in the event of any refiling? (2) Whether a second, untimely habeas petition may relate back to a first habeas petition, where the first habeas petition was dismissed and the first proceeding is no longer proceeding?

[Syllabus]

SLACK V. MCDANIEL[Syllabus]If a person's petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254 is dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies and he subsequently exhaust his state remedies and refiles the 2254 petition, are claims included within that petition that were not included within his initial 2254 filing ""second or successive"" habeas applications?

AMERICAN INS. ASSN. V. GARAMENDI[Syllabus]California's Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act (HVIRA) requires California insurers to provide extensive information regarding every insurance policy issued in Nazi dominated Europe between 1920 and 1945 by any insurer with which the California insurer now has a legal relationship. The district court enjoined enforcement of the Act on three constitutional grounds: interference with the federal government's power over foreign affairs, due process, and the Foreign Commerce Clause. Over the objections of the U.S. government and affected foreign governments, and in direct conflict with Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. v. Gallagher, 267 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit reversed and upheld the HVIRA in all respects. 1. Whether the HVIRA, which the U.S. government has called an actual interference with U.S. foreign policy, and which affected foreign governments have protested as inconsistent with international agreements, violates the foreign affairs doctrine of Zschering v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968). 2. Whether the HVIRA, which attempts to regulate insurance transactions that occurred overseas between foreign parties more than half a century ago, exceeds California's legislative jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause. 3. Whether the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. 1011-1015, insulates the HVIRA form review under the Foreign Commerce Clause.

ARTUZ V. BENNETT[Syllabus]Is a state court post-conviction application ""properly filed"" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(2), which tolls the one-year statute of limitations for Habeas corpus petitions in the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, if it is filed in a court that does not have the power to hear the merits of the application?"