Information contained on this site is for informational or amusement purposes only. Nothing written is intended to be
legal advice or legal counsel. All original work is protected by applicable copyright laws. Thank you.

Following the dismissal of the Baltimore Terrapins' initial lawsuit
in Philadelphia, the club engaged in some limited settlement
negotiations with the two major leagues over the next several months.
When those efforts ultimately failed, the team then opted to
file a second lawsuit against the American and National Leagues in September 1917,
this time in Washington, D.C. It is not entirely clear why the team
elected to file suit in Washington. Baltimore likely hoped to avoid any
potential prejudice from refiling the case in Philadelphia, and
therefore simply opted for the closest city hosting a major league team
(for service of process reasons).

Because the trial court never issued a formal written opinion in the
case, relatively little has been known about the lower court
proceedings in the Federal Baseball suit. Baltimore's complaint was
divided into two primary sets of allegations, the first dealing with the
major leagues' monopolization of the professional baseball industry
from 1903-1915, and the second contesting the ultimate destruction of
the Federal League in 1915, both of which the team believed constituted
violations of both federal antitrust and state law. In particular,
Baltimore alleged that the American and National Leagues had monopolized
the industry in various ways, not only by securing their claim to
nearly all professional players through the use of the reserve clause
(thereby tying each player to his current team for the entire length of
his career), but also by guaranteeing all major league teams exclusive
control over their geographic territories. This latter aspect of the
team's case has often gone largely overlooked in modern treatments of
the dispute, as courts and scholars have at times believed the case
simply involved monopolization allegations relating to the reserve
clause.

Due to the Washington court's congested docket, the suit would not
be called for trial until March 1919. The parties eventually staged a
fourteen day jury trial, featuring testimony from a variety of baseball
executives (including legendary Philadelphia A's manager Connie Mack) and former
players. Baltimore's newly retained legal counsel was able to present a
much stronger case on the team's behalf than was asserted in the Philadelphia suit,
emphasizing not only the dissolution of the Federal League in 1915, but
also the major leagues' consistent monopolization of the industry for
years prior.

Following the completion of the witness testimony, presiding judge
Wendell Stafford allowed each side to present dueling motions for
directed verdict, with both parties asserting that the undisputed
evidence from the trial warranted a verdict in their favor. These
arguments ultimately turned on the question of jurisdiction, as the
parties disputed whether professional baseball constituted interstate
commerce, and thus was subject to federal antitrust law. Baltimore's
counsel stressed the fact that major league teams were spread across a
number of different states, necessitating the transportation of both
players and equipment across state lines, as proof that the leagues were
engaged in interstate commerce. The team's counsel was so convinced of
the strength of their argument that they opted to voluntarily waive
Baltimore's claims arising under state law, resting its case entirely on
the applicability of federal antitrust law. This decision would prove to be a critical mistake in hindsight.

Conversely, the American and National Leagues' counsel, George
Wharton Pepper, argued that the business of professional baseball did
not constitute commerce under the prevailing judicial definition in
place at the time. In particular, Pepper stressed a series of precedents holding that commerce only involved the production
or sale of tangible goods. Because the major leagues produced no
tangible products themselves, but instead merely sold tickets to ephemeral
exhibitions of baseball (games that were staged entirely in one state,
no less), he did not believe that professional baseball was engaged in interstate commerce. Consequently, Pepper asserted, baseball could not be
regulated under Congress's interstate commerce powers and therefore not subject to federal
antitrust law.

Judge Stafford adopted the plaintiff's view of the law. He ruled
from the bench that the major leagues were engaged in interstate
commerce, and that they had illegally monopolized the industry in
violation of the Sherman Act. Stafford indicated that he was not
entirely convinced that this determination was correct, however, suggesting that
he was ruling in Baltimore's favor in part to avoid the potential need
for a retrial, thereby allowing the already empaneled jury to resolve
the remaining factual issues (namely, whether Baltimore had itself been
harmed by the major league's monopoly, and, if so, what the extent of
its damages were). Had Stafford instead ruled in the major leagues'
favor and dismissed the suit, only to have his decision overturned on
appeal, the parties would then have had to stage a new trial to
determine the remaining factual issues in dispute.

The jury ultimately returned a verdict awarding Baltimore $80,000 in
damages (subsequently trebled to $240,000), much less than the $300,000
in damages the team had sought, but a significant victory nonetheless.
The major leagues, of course, immediately vowed to appeal the decision,
and were confident that their position would ultimately be adopted by a
higher court. Their prediction eventually proved correct.

I have never heard of "The Federal Baseball Trial of 1919", I'm a huge fan too. I guess I don't know much about olden day baseball though, mostly just the classic players from that era. My buddy over at Brownstone Law probably knows about it. He pretty much knows everything about baseball.