Neutral monism is a position in metaphysics defended by Mach, James, and Russell in the early twentieth century. It holds that minds and physical objects are essentially two different orderings of the same underlying neutral elements of nature. This paper sets out some of the central concepts, theses and the historical background of ideas that inform this doctrine of elements. The discussion begins with the classic neutral monism of Mach, James, and Russell in the first part of (...) the paper, then considers recent neo-Russellian versions in the second half. The chances for a revival of neutral monism are probably slight; its key ideas and starting points lie far from those in contemporary philosophy of mind. A better route might be through the philosophy of science and a deeper understanding of causation. (shrink)

According to the “Textbook View,” there is an extensional dispute between consequentialists and deontologists, in virtue of the fact that only the latter defend “agent-relative” principles—principles that require an agent to have a special concern with making sure that she does not perform certain types of action. I argue that, contra the Textbook View, there are agent-neutral versions of deontology. I also argue that there need be no extensional disagreement between the deontologist and consequentialist, as characterized by the Textbook (...) View. (shrink)

The increasingly common use of inclusive language (e.g., "he or she") in representing past philosophers' views is often inappropriate. Using Immanuel Kant's work as an example, I compare his use of terms such as "human race" and "human being" with his views on women to show that his use of generic terms does not prove that he includes women. I then discuss three different approaches to this issue, found in recent Kant-literature, and show why each of them is insufficient. I (...) conclude that the tension between gender-neutral and gender-specific views in Kant's work should be made explicit, and I offer several strategies for doing so. (shrink)

In this paper, I criticize David McNaughton and Piers Rawling's formalization of the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction. I argue that their formalization is unable to accommodate an important ethical distinction between two types of conditional obligations. I then suggest a way of revising their formalization so as to fix the problem.

The dispute between Kantians and Humeans over whether practical reason can justify moral reasons for all agents is often characterized as a debate over whether reasons are hypothetical or categorical. Instead, this debate must be understood in terms of the distinction between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons. This paper considers Alan Gewirth’s Reason and Morality as a case study of a Kantian justification of morality focused on deriving categorical reasons from hypothetical reasons. The case study demonstrates first, the possibility of (...) categorical agent-relative reasons, and second, that inattention to this possibility has caused considerable confusion in the debate between Kantians and Humeans. (shrink)

The distinction between the agent-relative and the agent-neutral plays a prominent role in recent attempts to taxonomize normative theories. Its importance extends to most areas in practical philosophy, though. Despite its popularity, the distinction remains difficult to get a good grip on. In part this has to do with the fact that there is no consensus concerning the sort of objects to which we should apply the distinction. Thomas Nagel distinguishes between agent-neutral and agent-relative values, reasons, and principles; (...) Derek Parfit focuses on normative theories (and the aims they provide to agents), David McNaughton and Piers Rawling focus on rules and reasons, Skorupski on predicates, and there are other suggestions too. Some writers suspect that we fundamentally talk about one and the same distinction. This work is about practical reasons for action rather than theoretical reasons for belief. Moreover, focus is on whether reasons do or do not essentially refer to particular agents. A challenge that undermines the dichotomy in this sense is posed. After having rejected different attempts to defend the distinction, it is argued that there is a possible defence that sets out from Jonathan Dancy’s recent distinction between enablers and favourers. (shrink)

The paper begins with a more carefully stated version of ontologically neutral (ON) logic, originally introduced in (Hailperin, 1997). A non-infinitistic semantics which includes a definition of potential infinite validity follows. It is shown, without appeal to the actual infinite, that this notion provides a necessary and sufficient condition for provability in ON logic.

This paper formulates and axiomatizes utility models for denumerable time streams that make no commitment in regard to discounting future outcomes. The models address decision under certainty and decision under risk. Independence assumptions in both contexts lead to additive or multiplicative utilities over time periods that allow unambiguous comparisons of the relative importance of different periods. The models accommodate all patterns of future valuation. This discount-neutral feature is attained by restricting preference comparisons to outcome streams or probability distributions on (...) outcome streams that differ in at most a finite number of periods. (shrink)

After thousands of years of work, the mind-body problem endures as one of the most tantalizing issues in metaphysics. For my purposes I formulate the question as: What is the relation between consciousness and matter? The solution to the mind-body problem that I offer is a version of neutral monism, the view that mental and physical events are both to be derived from some stuff that in itself is neither physical nor mental. This paper specifies the conditions under which (...) consciousness and matter occur, rather than implying that thought and extension must be pervasive or that the difference between the mental and the physical is merely one of perspective or of conventional groupings of events, approaches that fail to do justice to our experience. My thesis is that neither consciousness nor matter is derived from the other, but rather both are constructions out of two relations of a single principle to itself, consciousness occurring within I-You, matter being an abstraction from I-it. An advantage of the proposal of the social character of consciousness is that it explains a feature of our world, the nearly identical extension of consciousness and reportability, which many commentators have noted but none explains. It may be thought that this coextension is logically or metaphysically necessary, but I show that this is false. (shrink)

As some see it, an impasse has been reached on the mind- body problem between mainstream physicalism and mainstream dualism. So lately another view has been gaining popularity, a view that might be called the 'Russellian theory of mind' (RTM) since it is inspired by some ideas once put forth by Bertrand Russell. Most versions of RTM are panpsychist, but there is at least one version that rejects panpsychism and styles itself as physicalism, and neutral monism is also a (...) possibility. In this paper I will attempt to sort out these different versions with a view to determining which, if any, have a chance of breaking the perceived impasse. The unsurprising conclusion will be that there are a lot of challenges ahead for the RTM theorist. The surprising conclusion will be that it's not clear that pan- psychist RTM holds an advantage over the other versions in this regard. (shrink)

In his recent book Slaves of the Passions , Mark Schroeder defends a Humean account of practical reasons ( hypotheticalism ). He argues that it is compatible with 'genuinely agent-neutral reasons'. These are reasons that any agent whatsoever has. According to Schroeder, they may well include moral reasons. Furthermore, he proposes a novel account of a reason's weight, which is supposed to vindicate the claim that agent-neutral reasons ( if they exist), would be weighty irrespective of anyone's desires. (...) If the argument is successful, it could help avoid an error-theory of moral language. I argue that it isn't, and that we should reject a Humean approach to reasons. (shrink)

In this paper I am concerned with an analysis of negative existential sentences that contain proper names only by using negative or neutral free logic. I will compare different versions of neutral free logic with the standard system of negative free logic (Burge, Sainsbury) and aim to defend my version of neutral free logic that I have labeled non-standard neutral free logic.

I argue that there is methodological space for a functional explanation of the nature of law that does not commit the theorist to a view about the value of that function for society, nor whether law is the best means of accomplishing it. A functional explanation will nonetheless provide a conceptual framework for a better understanding of the nature of law. First I examine the proper role for function in a theory of law and then argue for the possibility of (...) a neutral functional theory, addressing issues raised by Leslie Green, Stephen Perry, Michael Moore and John Finnis. (shrink)

I argue, contra Dreier, Blackburn, and others, that there are no morally neutral metaethical positions. Every metaethical position commits you to the denial of some moral statement. So, for example, the metaethical position that there are no moral properties commits you to the denial of the (quite plausible) moral conjunction of 1) it is right to interfere violently when someone is wrongly causing massive suffering and 2) it is wrong to interfere violently when only non-moral properties are at stake. (...) The argument generalizes to all metaethical positions. (shrink)

The agent-relative/agent-neutral distintion is widely and rightly regarded as a philosophically important one. Unfortunately, the distinction is often drawn in different and mutually incompatible ways. The agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction has historically been drawn three main ways: the ‘principle-based distinction’, the ‘reason-statement-based distinction’ and the ‘perspective-based distinction’. Each of these approaches has its own distinctive vices (Sections 1-3). However, a slightly modified version of the historically influential principle-based approach seems to avoid most if not all of these vices (Section 4). (...) The distinction so understood differs from numerous other distinctions with which it might easily be confused (Section 5). Finally, the distinction so drawn is important to normative theorizing for a variety of reasons (Section 6). (shrink)

Is there a justification of concern for one's own integrity that agent-neutral consequentialism cannot explain? In addressing this question, it is important to be clear about what is meant by 'agent-neutral', 'consequentialism', and 'integrity'. Let 'consequentialism' be constituted by the following two theses.

Disagreement about the properattitude toward disability proliferates. Yetlittle attention has been paid to an importantmeta-question, namely, whether ``disability'' isan essentially contested concept. If so, recentdebates between bioethicists and the disabilitymovement leadership cannot be resolved. Inthis essay I identify some of the presumptionsthat make their encounters so contentious. Much more must happen, I argue, for anydiscussions about disability policy andpolitics to be productive. Progress depends onconstructing a neutral conception ofdisability, one that neither devaluesdisability nor implies that persons withdisabilities are inadequate. (...) So, first, I clearaway the conceptual underbrush that makes usthink our idea of disability must bevalue-laden. Second, I sketch someconstituents of, and constraints upon, aneutral notion of disability. (shrink)

The neutral and nearly neutral theories of molecular evolution are sometimes characterized as theories about drift alone, where drift is described solely as an outcome, rather than a process. We argue, however, that both selection and drift, as causal processes, are integral parts of both theories. However, the nearly neutral theory explicitly recognizes alleles and/or molecular substitutions that, while engaging in weakly selected causal processes, exhibit outcomes thought to be characteristic of random drift. A narrow focus on (...) outcomes obscures the significant role of weakly selected causal processes in the nearly neutral theory. (shrink)

MacDonald and Kreitman (1991) propose a test of the neutral mutationrandom drift (NM-RD) hypothesis, the central claim of the neutral theory of molecular evolution. The test involves generating predictions from the NM-RD hypothesis about patterns of molecular substitutions. Alternative selection hypotheses predict that the data will deviate from the predictions of the NM-RD hypothesis in specifiable ways. To conduct the test Mac- Donald and Kreitman examine the evolutionary dynamics of the alcohol dehydrogenase (Adh) gene in three species of (...) Drosophila. The test compares the number of DNA sequence changes between species and within species. The number of DNA differences is an indicator of the evolutionary rate of the Adh gene. Based on the test they conclude that there is strong evidence for adaptive protein evolution at particular sites in the gene. Understanding the test requires some basic knowledge about molecular terms and the predictions of neutral theory. The two important terms are fixed differences and polymorphisms. These are determined by comparing DNA sequences made up of thousands of individual nucleotide sites. A site that is unchanged within a species but different from a related species counts as a fixed difference. These are mutations that occur in some common ancestor of the lineage such that all descendants inherit the change. A site that differs within a species counts as a polymorphism. Determining the number of fixed differences and polymorphisms requires placing 1 each individual gene sequence onto a phylogenetic tree. A coalescent tree charts the ancestral relationships for a set of individual gene sequences. Sequences sampled from within a species form a within-species tree. The common ancestors of each within-species tree form a between-species tree. A detected difference counts as a polymorphism or a fixed difference depending on where it occurs in the phylogenetic tree (cf. Table 1). The test uses the numbers of polymorphisms and fixed differences as indicators of evolutionary rates.. (shrink)

Bare plurals (dogs) behave in ways that quantified plurals (some dogs) do not. For instance, while the sentence John owns dogs implies that John owns more than one dog, its negation John does not own dogs does not mean “John does not own more than one dog”, but rather “John does not own a dog”. A second puzzling behavior is known as the dependent plural reading; when in the scope of another plural, the ‘more than one’ meaning of the plural (...) is not distributed over, but the existential force of the plural is. For example, My friends attend good schools requires that each of my friends attend one good school, not more, while at the same time being inappropriate if all my friends attend the same school. This paper shows that both these phenomena, and others, arise from the same cause. Namely, the plural noun itself does not assert ‘more than one’, but rather the plural denotes a predicate that is number neutral (unspecified for cardinality). The ‘more than one’ meaning arises as an scalar implicature, relying on the scalar relationship between the bare plural and its singular alternative, and calculated in a sub-sentential domain; namely, before existential closure of the event variable. Finally, implications of this analysis will be discussed for the analysis of the quantified noun phrases that interact with bare plurals, such as indefinite numeral DPs (three boys), and singular universals (every boy). (shrink)

: This paper offers a distinctive interpretation of Hegel's Doppelsatz from the Preface to the Philosophy of Right: 'What is rational is actual; and what is actual is rational'. This has usually been interpreted either conservatively (as claiming that everything that is, is right or good) or progressively (that if the world were actual, it would be right or good, but that there is a distinction that can be drawn between existence and actuality). My aim in this paper is to (...) argue against both interpretations, so that the position I offer is neutral between the two. My claim is that when Hegel identifies what is actual with what is rational in the Doppelsatz, his intention is not to offer a normative assessment of what is actual; rather, it is to suggest that genuine philosophy must be committed to reason in its methods of inquiry, if it is to properly undertake an investigation into the "spiritual universe" as well as the "natural" one. The Doppelsatz is thus a defence of philosophical rationalism, rather than a normative claim about "was ist wirklich". (shrink)

Some maintain that voluntariness is a value-neutral concept. On that view, someone acts involuntarily if subject to a controlling influence or has no acceptable alternatives. I argue that a value-neutral conception of voluntariness cannot explain when and why consent is invalid and that we need a moralized account of voluntariness. On that view, most concerns about the voluntariness of consent to participate in research are not well founded.

The role of CPT invariance and consequences for bipartite entanglement of neutral (K) mesons are discussed. A relaxation of CPT leads to a modification of the entanglement which is known as the ω effect. The relaxation of assumptions required to prove the CPT theorem are examined within the context of models of space-time foam. It is shown that the evasion of the EPR type entanglement implied by CPT (which is connected with spin statistics) is rather elusive. Relaxation of locality (...) (through non-commutative geometry) or the introduction of an environment do not by themselves lead to a destruction of the entanglement. One model of the environment, which is based on non-critical strings and D-particle capture and recoil, leads to a specific momentum dependent stochastic contribution to the space-time metric and consequent change in the neutral meson bipartite entanglement. Although the class of models producing the omega effect is non-empty, the lack of an omega effect is demonstrated for a wide class of models based on thermal like baths which are often considered as generic models appropriate for the study of space-time foam. (shrink)

A relation between physical consequences of the so-called Ehrenfest’s Paradox and the radial electric field E r (r) in the classical quasi-neutral tokamak plasma is shown. Basic author’s approach to the relativistic nature of the tokamak E r (r) has been described in Romannikov (J. Exp. Theor. Phys. 108:340–348, 2009). The experiment which can resolve the Ehrenfest’s Paradox is presented.

Is it possible to do a good thing, or to make the world a better place? Some argue that it is not possible, because perspective-neutral value does not exist. Some argue that ‘good’ does not play the right grammatical role; or that all good things are good ‘in a way’; or that goodness is inherently perspective-dependent. I argue that the logical and semantic properties of ‘good’ are what we should expect of an evaluative predicate; that the many ways of (...) being good don't threaten the thesis that some ways are perspective-independent; and that there are clear examples of perspective-independent goodness. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that, according to a particular physicalist conception of information, information is both alethically neutral or non-alethic, and is intrinsically semantic. The conception of information presented is physicalist and reductionist, and is contrary to most current pluralist and non-reductionist philosophical opinion about the nature of information. The ontology assumed for this conception of information is based upon physicalist non-eliminative ontic structural realism. However, the argument of primary interest is that information so construed is intrinsically semantic (...) on a reductionist and non-alethic basis where semantic content is constituted by indication along causal pathways. Similar arguments have been presented by philosophers with respect to representation. I suggest the conception of information that I present is correct by the lights of the best applied mathematical and scientific theories of information. If so, there is no need for any separate theory of semantic information. Thus I present a theory of intrinsically semantic information which also constitutes an informational theory of truth where truth reduces to information. In the last section I discuss weakly and strongly semantic information, and reject them in favour of alethically neutral intrinsically semantic information. (shrink)

Abstract Two conflicting visions of technology nevertheless agree that scientists and engineers bear little moral responsibility for their inventions. According to one vision, technology is largely autonomous,? that is, self?determinative operating according to its own blind laws independently of human will. According to the other, technology is fully controllable, but control rests solely with ?end?users? as technology is, in itself, value?neutral. After a brief characterization of the domain of technology, each vision of technology is criticized in turn. Despite the (...) many penetrating insights offered by the best exemplar of the first approach? Jacques Ellul?it is shown that his approach rests on unacceptable metaphysical and epis?temological assumptions: because it seemingly explains so much, it explains nothing; and it anthropomorphizes technology. Champions of the value neutrality thesis fail to sustain their argument because they overlook the ways in which various technologies embody the values of particular persons, institutions, or classes. Undermining these two prominent visions of technology opens the way for afresh consideration of the moral responsibilities of the creators and users of technology. (shrink)

Ecological communities around the world are under threat while a consensus theory of community structure remains elusive. In the last decade ecologists have struggled with two seemingly opposing theories: niche-based theory that explains diversity with species’ differences and the neutral theory of biodiversity that claims that much of the diversity we observe can be explained without explicitly invoking species’ differences. Although ecologists are increasingly attempting to reconcile these two theories, there is still much resistance against the neutral theory (...) of biodiversity. Here we argue that the dispute between the two theories is a classic example of the dichotomy between philosophical perspectives, realism and instrumentalism. Realism is associated with specific, small-scale and detailed explanations, whereas instrumentalism is linked to general, large-scale, but less precise accounts. Recognizing this will help ecologists get both niche-based and neutral theories in perspective as useful tools for understanding biodiversity patterns. (shrink)

This article argues that secularism is not neutral. Secularization is a process, the secular state is a structure, whereas secularism is a political philosophy. Secularism takes two main forms: first, a “benevolent” secularism that endeavours to treat all religious and nonreligious belief systems even-handedly, and, second, a “hostile” kind that privileges unbelief and excludes religion from the public sphere. I analyze the European Court of Human Rights decision in Lautsi v Italy, which illustrates these types. The article concludes that (...) secularism as a political philosophy cannot be neutral, and the secular state is not neutral in its effects, standpoint, governing assumptions or treatment of religious truth claims. (shrink)

If payoffs are tickets for binary lotteries, which involve only two money prizes, then rationality requires expected value maximization in tickets. This payoff scheme was increasingly used to induce risk neutrality in experiments. The experiment presented here involved lottery choice and evaluation tasks. One subject group was paid in binary lottery tickets, another directly in money. Significantly greater deviations from risk neutral behavior are observed with binary lottery payoffs. This discrepancy increases when subjects have easy access to the alternatives' (...) expected values and mean absolute deviations. Behavioral regularities are observed at least as often as with direct money payoffs. (shrink)

It has become increasingly popular to argue that legal positivism is actually a normative theory, and that it cannot be purely descriptive and morally neutral as H.L.A. Hart has suggested. This article purports to disprove this line of thought. It argues that legal positivism is best understood as a descriptive, morally neutral, theory about the nature of law. The article distinguishes between five possible views about the relations between normative claims and legal positivism, arguing that some of them (...) are not at odds with Hart’s thesis about the nature of jurisprudence, while the others are wrong, both as expositions of legal positivism or as critiques of it. Legal positivism does not necessarily purport to justify any aspect of its subject matter, nor is it committed to any particular moral or political evaluations. (shrink)

Public bioethics focuses on deliberating about, recommending, or establishing social policies or practices concerning health care and biotechnology. A brace of premises underlies much of the work of public bioethics. First, there is the view that, if one approaches reality and human life as if both were without ultimate significance, one will find that one shares a common public bioethics. That is, if one abstains not only from any religious concerns, but even from philosophical reflections on the circumstance that life (...) might have ultimate meaning, one will be able to articulate a common neutral moral perspective that all persons can share and that can be the basis of a common public bioethics. The second premise is that the controversies in bioethics arise from the presence of religious belief, especially Christian belief, which supports a set of moral commitments that generate controversies that make the framing of public policy difficult. The view is that there is significant disagreement among persons who hold religious positions, particularly Christians, and that in public bioethics we should strive to eliminate these controversies by relying on a neutral moral framework. This paper documents and challenges these premises. It demonstrates that Christian bioethics finds itself already embedded in the field of secular moral controversy before it adds the perspectives it brings. (shrink)

In this article we present a conceptual overview of relevant interpretations of what state neutrality may imply; we suggest a distinction between inclusive neutrality and exclusive neutrality. This distinction provides a useful framework for understanding the several positions as presented by the parties in the Lautsi case. We conclude by suggesting a solution of the Lautsi case that might provide a more viable solution.

Spherically symmetric entities filled with matter and induced by the 5D bulk may be built in the empty 4D space-time. The substance of the entity, the latter regarded as a fundamental particle, is characterized by the prematter equation of state P=−ρ. The particle is covered in a Schwarzschild-like envelope and from the outside it is characterized by mass and radius. One can regard these entities as neutral fundamental particles being constituents of quarks and leptons. The presented classical models are (...) developed in the framework of a Weyl–Dirac version of Wesson’s Induced Matter Theory. (shrink)

In this paper I suggest that the Humean male and Humean female of Hume’s Treatise would have different mental lives due to a great extent to what Hume takes to be the socio-culture in place. Specifically, I show that the Humean male would be incapable but the Humean female would be capable of forming a Humean sex-neutral general idea of man. The Humean male’s inability is not innate but the result of the trauma he experiences when discovering sexuality, reproduction (...) and realizing how insecure a claim of paternity is. The Humean female not having such a traumatic experience is not impaired in the same way. Insofar as she is impaired, it is because in the very same socio-culture she cannot exercise her ability because it would endanger the socio-culture she is expected to partake in. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Ethics: A Radical-constructivist Approach” by Andreas Quale. Upshot: Andreas Quale in his article defends radical constructivism (RC) from the accusation of being guilty of being ethically neutral. His defence is based on a distinction between clearly communicable cognitive knowledge and less easily communicable value-laden non-cognitive knowledge. The position taken in this commentary is that RC is a process and provides a way of understanding values. To condemn RC for ethical neutrality is to confuse (...) process and product. (shrink)

Previous emotion-regulation research has shown that the late positive potential (LPP) is sensitive to the down-regulation of emotion; however, whether LPP is also sensitive to the up-regulation of emotion remains unclear. The present study examined the description-based reappraisal effects on the up-regulation of positive emotions induced by erotic and neutral images in a Chinese population. Self-reported ratings and event-related potential (ERP) were recorded when subjects viewed pleasant and neutral images, which were shown after either a neutral or (...) positive description. Self-reported results showed that images following positive descriptions were rated as more pleasant compared to images following neutral descriptions. ERP results revealed that the P2, P3, and slow wave (SW) components were larger for erotic pictures than for neutral pictures, while the positive description condition yielded attenuated erotic image-induced P2, P3 and SW and increased SW induced by neutral images. The results demonstrated that description-based reappraisal, as a method of reappraisal, significantly modulates the emotional experience and ERP responses to erotic and neutral images. (shrink)

Previous emotion-regulation research has shown that the late positive potential (LPP) is sensitive to the down-regulation of emotion; however, whether LPP is also sensitive to the up-regulation of emotion remains unclear. The present study examined the description-based reappraisal effects on the up-regulation of positive emotions induced by erotic and neutral images in a Chinese population. Self-reported ratings and event-related potential (ERP) were recorded when subjects viewed pleasant and neutral images, which were shown after either a neutral or (...) positive description. Self-reported results showed that images following positive descriptions were rated as more pleasant compared to images following neutral descriptions. ERP results revealed that the P2, P3, and slow wave (SW) components were larger for erotic pictures than for neutral pictures, while the positive description condition yielded attenuated erotic image-induced P2, P3 and SW and increased SW induced by neutral images. The results demonstrated that description-based reappraisal, as a method of reappraisal, significantly modulates the emotional experience and ERP responses to erotic and neutral images. (shrink)

In our previous studies we have shown that seeing another person “live” with a direct vs. averted gaze results in greater relative left-sided frontal asymmetry in the electroencephalography (EEG), associated with approach motivation, and in enhanced skin conductance responses indicating autonomic arousal. In our studies, however, the stimulus persons had a neutral expression. In real-life social interaction, eye contact is often associated with a smile, which is another signal of the sender’s approach-related motivation. A smile could therefore enhance the (...) affective-motivational responses to eye contact. In the present study, we investigated whether the facial expression (neutral vs. smile) would modulate the frontal EEG asymmetry and autonomic arousal to seeing a direct vs. an averted gaze in faces presented “live” through a liquid crystal shutter. The results showed that the skin conductance responses were greater for the direct than the averted gaze and that the effect of gaze direction was more pronounced for a smiling than a neutral face. However, the frontal EEG asymmetry results revealed a more complex pattern. Participants whose responses to seeing the other person were overall indicative of leftward frontal activity (indicative of approach) showed greater relative left-sided asymmetry for the direct vs. averted gaze, whereas participants whose responses were overall indicative of rightward frontal activity (indicative of avoidance) showed greater relative right-sided asymmetry to direct vs. averted gaze. The other person’s facial expression did not have an effect on the frontal EEG asymmetry. These findings may reflect that another’s direct gaze, as compared to their smile, has a more dominant role in regulating perceivers’ approach motivation. (shrink)

This article examines the permissibility of teaching evolution in the public schools of a religiously diverse society. Science is committed to methodological naturalism, which is a limited epistemological position that is silent on issues of religious importance. The article argues that it is possible to teach evolution under the assumptions of methodological naturalism without violating the principle, of secular rationale or the neutrality principle which apply to religion in a pluralistic democracy. However, neither creationism nor Intelligent Design qualify for inclusion (...) in a science curriculum. The article ends with a discussion of philosophical and pedagogical approaches that an instructor should employ when teaching evolutionary theory. (shrink)