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May 19, 2019

Finnavations LLC v. Payoneer, Inc. (D. Del. 2019)

In the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware, motions for an exceptional case and attorneys' fees were granted on the basis that the patent owner brought suit with a software patent having claims so "ugly" that they had no chance to survive a challenge under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The case is Finnavations LLC v. Payoneer, Inc. and Finnavations LLC v. Stitch Labs, Inc. Here, Defendant Payoneer Inc. filed a Motion for Exceptional Case and Defendant Stitch Labs, Inc. filed a Motion for Attorneys' Fees after prevailing in the action by invalidating the asserted patent under § 101. The District Court granted each of these motions and offered some strong opinions on the invalidity of the patent. However, it's difficult to see, based on current standards, how the patent claim is as "ugly" as the Court stated.

Background

Plaintiff sued Defendants on March 23, 2018, alleging infringement of U.S. Patent No. 9,569,755 ('755 Patent). Defendants filed Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim based on patent ineligibility of the '755 Patent under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Court granted the motions, and specifically found that the '755 Patent was directed to the patent ineligible abstract idea of bookkeeping and did not contain an inventive concept.

The '755 Patent

The '755 Patent is directed to a "Financial Managment System," and is described as a system designed to facilitate the record keeping associated with online transactions to increase the amount of transaction data relating to an online purchase of goods or services that is retained by a personal financial management system.

Claim 1 recites:

1. A method for transferring payment information to a personal financial management program comprising: invoking a financial assistant operating on a network device upon a determination of a transmission of transaction data to a commercial web server configured to conduct online financial transactions; intercepting, by the financial assistant on the network device, the transaction data in a first data structure comprising a plurality of components of transaction data, the first data structure compatible with conducting an online transaction with the commercial web server; copying, by the financial assistant on the network device, each component of the transaction data into a second data structure compatible with the personal financial management program, wherein the second data structure differs from the first data structure; entering, by the financial assistant on the network device, additional transaction data not included in the transmitted transaction data into the second data structure including at least one of a category and remarks; and transmitting, by the network device, the copied transaction data and the additional transaction data to the personal financial management program.

Analysis

The Patent Act provides that "in exceptional cases [the court] may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party." 35 U.S.C. § 285. Under the statute, there are two basic requirements: (1) that the case is "exceptional," and (2) that the party seeking fees is a "prevailing party."

The Supreme Court defines an "exceptional" case as "simply one that stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength of a party's litigating position (considering both the governing law and the facts of the case) or the unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated." Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1756 (2014).

Here, the Defendants are prevailing parties. Thus, the only issue is whether the cases are exceptional.

The Court had a strong opinion that there was "no question" that the '755 Patent is patent ineligible under the Federal Circuit's current precedent. Even though the Court noted that since Alice, the law of patent eligibility has perhaps become unpredictable and unclear, the Court stated that patents that look like those at issue in Alice are ineligible. The Court issued further strong statements, declaring that "I have rarely been more confident in the patent ineligibility of a set of claims or more confident in the unreasonableness of a Plaintiff's decision to sue on a patent." It seems that the Court easily found this case to be "one that stands out from others" with regard to the substantive weakness of Plaintiff's litigation position.

Even though the Examiner allowed the '755 Patent despite four separate § 101 rejections, the Court still found that the USPTO's decision to grant the patent does not relieve the patent holder from making an independent evaluation of the strength of the patent prior to suing. The Court stated that the "issuance of a patent cannot and should not be a license to sue with abandon." The Court further noted that patent examiners are non-lawyers, and an Examiner's opinion on the legal question of patent eligibility does not relieve a patent attorney from his or her obligation to make an independent assessment based on an evaluation of the relevant law.

The Court issued yet another strong opinion:

I have resolved scores of Section 101 motions and seen a wide array of validity arguments. Usually the quality of an argument falls somewhere between good and mediocre. Infrequently, I have encountered arguments which I would classify as bad. Plaintiff's defense of the validity of the '755 Patent was not just mediocre or bad; it was ugly.

Plaintiff argued that the law is unclear and that it made reasonable arguments in response to Defendants' motions. But the Court disagreed and found that the claims of the '755 Patent are plainly directed at a patent ineligible concept and amount to no more than the underlying idea, and further that "[a]ny reasonable patent attorney with an understanding of Section 101 law could have predicted the outcome."

Thus, the Court found that Plaintiff should not have filed suit, asserting "the clearly patent ineligible claims of the '755 Patent." The Court found that this decision was unreasonable under the law and Plaintiff's behavior should be deterred. Thus, the Court granted Defendant Payoneer's Motion for Exceptional Case and Defendant Stitch Labs' Motion for Attorneys' Fees.

Commentary

At times, I believe I am a reasonable patent attorney with an understanding of § 101 law, and perhaps I could have predicted that the claims of the '755 Patent would face § 101 challenges, BUT, the claims at issue in this case are far from "ugly," and in view of the prosecution history, it would have been reasonable to consider the claims valid on their face.

The District Court made much of the claims looking like those at issue in Alice, which, if true, then of course they should be found invalid under § 101. But the representative claim in Alice, shown below, appears far different, in my opinion, from the claims of the '755 Patent:

(Alice claim) A method of exchanging obligations as between parties, each party holding a credit record and a debit record with an exchange institution, the credit records and debit records for exchange of predetermined obligations, the method comprising the steps of: (a) creating a shadow credit record and a shadow debit record for each stakeholder party to be held independently by a supervisory institution from the exchange institutions; (b) obtaining from each exchange institution a start-of-day balance for each shadow credit record and shadow debit record; (c) for every transaction resulting in an exchange obligation, the supervisory institution adjusting each respective party's shadow credit record or shadow debit record, allowing only these transactions that do not result in the value of the shadow debit record being less than the value of the shadow credit record at any time, each said adjustment taking place in chronological order, and (d) at the end-of-day, the supervisory institution instructing one of the exchange institutions to exchange credits or debits to the credit record and debit record of the respective parties in accordance with the adjustments of the said permitted transactions, the credits and debits being irrevocable, time invariant obligations placed on the exchange institutions.

In particular, the claims of the '755 Patent are grounded in computer technology, and include exchange of data between network components. This is not to say that the claim at issue in this case should survive a § 101 challenge, as the '755 Patent appears to be void of description to support a factual analysis that the invention solves a technical problem with a technical solution. However, the patent owner would appear to be on sufficiently solid ground asserting this patent, as the claims were heavily tested during prosecution, and the USPTO issued the patent after a long examination process. Since the claims at issue in this case differ from Alice in this way, the granting of motions for an exceptional case by the District Court are hard to accept.

Comments

Even though the Examiner allowed the '755 Patent despite four separate § 101 rejections, the Court still found that the USPTO's decision to grant the patent does not relieve the patent holder from making an independent evaluation of the strength of the patent prior to suing. The Court stated that the "issuance of a patent cannot and should not be a license to sue with abandon." The Court further noted that patent examiners are non-lawyers, and an Examiner's opinion on the legal question of patent eligibility does not relieve a patent attorney from his or her obligation to make an independent assessment based on an evaluation of the relevant law.

Someone please remind Judge Andrews that the PERTINENT Rule of Law (regardless of whether or not an examiner is an attorney) is set by Congress at:

"I believe I am a reasonable patent attorney with an understanding of § 101 law... ."

Perhaps this just goes without saying, but you are leagues ahead of me if you really do understand §101 law. I like to think of myself as also being a "reasonable patent attorney," but it has been years since the judicial outworkings of §101 have made any sense to me.

The point expressed by Mr. DeLassus may be more stridently put as the Court (and courts, and the Patent Office up to the point of the new “Off Ramps” protocol) were “in the business” of RE-writing 35 USC 101 by way of Common Law evolution, but in doing so had created such a mish-mash of ping-pong decisions that the state of the law is a veritable Gordian Knot, and what any (all) additional court decisions are doing is merely adding more rope to that knotted ball.