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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BUCHAREST 006434
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOVPINSRO
SUBJECT: ROMANIAN PRESIDENT ION ILIESCU -- A
POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY
¶1. CONFIDENTIAL-ENTIRE TEXT.
¶2. SUMMARY: THIS IS THE FIRST OF TWO CABLES FOCUSING
ON ROMANIAN PRESIDENT ION ILIESCU, AND COVERS HIS
POLITICAL HISTORY THROUGH THE 1992 ELECTIONS.
SEPTEL WILL DEAL WITH HIS CURRENT POWERS AND ROLE IN
THE ROMANIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM. ILIESCU, WHO WAS
BORN INTO A COMMUNIST FAMILY IN 1930, ROSE RAPIDLY
IN THE PARTY HIERARCHY UNTIL HE BEGAN TO CRITICIZE
THE EXCESSES OF DICTATOR NICOLAE CEAUSESCU IN THE
EARLY 1970'S. ILIESCU THEN EXPERIENCED A SERIES OF
DEMOTIONS, AND BY 1984 HAD FALLEN TO THE POSITION OF
DIRECTOR OF AN OBSCURE PUBLISHING HOUSE. HOWEVER,
HE HAD BECOME KNOWN AS A PARTY DISSIDENT, AND WITH
THE RISE OF GORBACHEV, ILIESCU BEGAN ADVOCATING AN
OPENING OF ROMANIAN SOCIETY ALONG THE LINES THEN
BEING PURSUED IN MOSCOW. IN THE CHAOS WHICH
FOLLOWED THE SUDDEN FALL OF THE CEAUSESCU REGIME IN
DECEMBER, 1989, THE INTELLECTUALS WHO WERE SEEKING
TO ESTABLISH A NEW POLITICAL ORDER TURNED TO THE
MORE EXPERIENCED ILIESCU FOR LEADERSHIP, AND HE
QUICKLY BECAME THE DOMINANT FIGURE IN THE AD HOC
NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT (NSF) GOVERNMENT.
¶3. GIVEN THE TOTAL LACK OF ORGANIZED OPPOSITION
GROUPS IN ROMANIA PRIOR TO THE REVOLUTION, ILIESCU
HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO KEEP THE OLD BUREAUCRACY IN
OFFICE, BUT THIS DECISION ALIENATED THE
INTELLECTUALS AND THE EMERGING OPPOSITION PARTIES.
ILIESCU AND THE NSF MOVED QUICKLY TO LAY THE
FOUNDATIONS FOR A PLURALISTIC POLITICAL SYSTEM AND
HE WON THE PRESIDENCY HANDILY IN THE MAY, 1990
ELECTIONS -- WHICH, ALTHOUGH SERIOUSLY FLAWED,
REFLECTED THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE -- BUT THE
OPPOSITION PARTIES REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE LEGITIMACY
OF THE GOVERNMENT AND CLAIMED THAT ILIESCU WAS A
"CRYPTO-COMMUNIST." ILIESCU COMPOUNDED HIS PROBLEMS
BY SUMMONING MINERS TO BUCHAREST IN JUNE, 1990, TO
END THE OCCUPATION OF A MAJOR SQUARE BY PROTESTING
STUDENTS. IN SEPTEMBER, 1991, THE MINERS AGAIN CAME
TO BUCHAREST AND FORCED THE RESIGNATION OF PRIME
MINISTER PETRE ROMAN, WITH WHOM ILIESCU HAD EARLIER
SPLIT DUE TO A DISPUTE ON THE PACE OF REFORM AS WELL
AS S CLASH OF AMBITIONS. HOWEVER, ILIESCU THEN
APPOINTED A RESPECTED TECHNOCRAT AS PRIME MINISTER,
WHO, WITH ILIESCU'S BACKING, ORGANIZED THE FREE AND
FAIR ELECTION OF SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1992. ILIESCU
AGAIN WON THE PRESIDENCY BY A WIDE MARGIN, HAVING
CAMPAIGNED ON A PLATFORM OF GRADUAL REFORM AND A
STRONG SOCIAL SAFETY NET TO EASE THE PAIN OF THE
TRANSITION TO THE MARKET.
¶4. GIVEN ILIESCU'S POLITICAL HISTORY AND OUR CLOSE
OBSERVATION OF HIM OVER THE PAST FIVE YEARS, WE HAVE
NO DIFFICULTY IN BELIEVING THAT HE IS COMMITTED TO
THE DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEM WHICH HE PLAYED A
LARGE PART IN ESTABLISHING. HOWEVER, ILIESCU IS
CONCERNED ABOUT THE IMPACT OF RAPID MOVEMENT TOWARD
PRIVATIZATION ON ROMANIA'S WORKERS -- NOT
SURPRISINGLY, IN VIEW OF HIS BACKGROUND. HE TOLD
AMBASSADOR MOSES RECENTLY THAT THE 1990 STUDENT
PROTESTORS IN BUCHAREST WERE REALLY PAWNS OF THE
REESTABLISHED HISTORIC PARTIES, WHICH WERE USING
THEM IN AN EFFORT TO RESTORE THE PRE-WWII SOCIAL
ORDER WITH ITS ENORMOUS DISPARITIES OF WEALTH.
WHETHER THERE IS ANY TRUTH TO THIS INTERPRETATION OR
NOT, IT IS INDICATIVE OF ILIESCU'S VIEWS. ON
ECONOMIC MATTERS, HE IS PRO-REFORM BUT WANTS TO
PROTECT THE WORKERS. THIS IS BOTH IDEOLOGICAL AND
REFLECTIVE OF THE FACT THAT HIS POLITICAL BASE AND
THAT OF HIS PARTY (PDSR) LIES WITH THE ROMANIAN
WORKERS EMPLOYED FOR THE LAST FOUR DECADES BY STATE-
OWNED BUSINESSES. AS HE PUT IT IN THE 1992
CAMPAIGN, HIS GOAL IS A "SOCIAL MARKET ECONOMY" --
AN ECONOMY WITH PRIVATE PROPERTY AND FREE
ENTERPRISE, BUT ONE IN WHICH STATE REGULATION IS
USED TO PREVENT THE EXTREME INEQUALITIES AND MASSIVE
POVERTY WHICH CHARACTERIZED THE PRE-WAR ORDER.
SINCE 1992, ILIESCU HAS GIVEN MORE SUPPORT TO
REFORMS, INCLUDING AUSTERITY MEASURES, THAN SUCH
CAMPAIGN RHETORIC WOULD HAVE LED ONE TO EXPECT
(SEPTEL), BUT IN OUR VIEW HE WILL NEVER BE PREPARED
TO GO FURTHER TOWARD AN UNREGULATED MARKET THAN A
TRADITIONAL EUROPEAN SOCIAL DEMOCRAT. END SUMMARY.
-----------------------------------------
¶5. FROM COMMUNIST ORTHODOXY TO DISSIDENCE
-----------------------------------------
ILIESCU CAME FROM A WORKING CLASS COMMUNIST
BACKGROUND AND ROSE RAPIDLY THROUGH THE PARTY RANKS
UNTIL HIS 1971 BREAK WITH CEAUSESCU. ILIESCU'S
FATHER, A RAILWAY WORKER, WAS ONE OF THE FEW ETHNIC
ROMANIAN ACTIVISTS IN THE TINY PRE-WWII ROMANIAN
COMMUNIST PARTY (RCP). ILIESCU HIMSELF JOINED THE
COMMUNIST YOUTH ORGANIZATION IN 1944 AT THE AGE OF
14 AND, AFTER OBTAINING HYDROENGINEERING DEGREES
FROM THE BUCHAREST POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE AND THE
MOSCOW ENERGY INSTITUTE, HELD POSITIONS ON THE YOUTH
ORGANIZATION'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE. IN 1965 HE BECAME
AN ALTERNATE MEMBER OF THE RCP CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND
IN 1967 HE WAS MADE A FULL MEMBER, AS WELL AS BEING
APPOINTED MINISTER OF YOUTH AFFAIRS. IN 1969 HE WAS
NAMED AN ALTERNATE MEMBER OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S
POWERFUL POLITICAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (POLITBURO).
¶6. DESPITE HIS ORTHODOX COMMUNIST BACKGROUND AND
RAPID RISE IN THE PARTY HIERARCHY, ILIESCU BEGAN TO
CRITICIZE CEAUSESCU'S GROWING CULT OF PERSONALITY,
NEPOTISM, AND EXTREME ECONOMIC CENTRALIZATION
POLICIES. AS A RESULT, AND PROBABLY ALSO BECAUSE HE
WAS VIEWED IN SOME QUARTERS AS A POSSIBLE EVENTUAL
SUCCESSOR TO CEAUSESCU, HE WAS DISMISSED FROM THE
YOUTH MINISTRY IN 1971 AND DEMOTED TO THE POSITION
OF SECRETARY OF THE TIMIS COUNTY RCP. IN 1974,
ILIESCU OBTAINED THE MORE IMPORTANT POSITION OF
FIRST SECRETARY OF THE IASI COUNTY RCP, BUT HIS
OUTSPOKENNESS AND LOCAL POPULARITY AGAIN LED TO
DEMOTION IN 1978, THIS TIME TO THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF
THE WATER RESOURCES COUNCIL. HE ALSO LOST HIS
POLITICAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE POSITION THAT YEAR.
NEVERTHELESS, ILIESCU CONTINUED TO TAKE A CRITICAL
STANCE TOWARD THE CEAUSESCU REGIME, AND IN 1984 HE
LOST BOTH HIS RCP CENTRAL COMMITTEE SEAT AND EVEN
HIS WATER RESOURCES COUNCIL POSITION. FROM 1984 TO
THE DECEMBER 1989 REVOLUTION, ILIESCU SERVED IN
OBSCURITY AS THE DIRECTOR OF A TECHNICAL PUBLISHING
HOUSE, BUT DURING THIS PERIOD HE BEGAN ADVOCATING AN
OPENING OF ROMANIAN SOCIETY ALONG THE LINES BEING
PURSUED BY GORBACHEV IN THE THEN USSR.
--------------------------------------------
¶7. ILIESCU STEPS INTO THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY
LEADERSHIP VACUUM
--------------------------------------------
DESPITE HIS YEARS IN THE POLITICAL WILDERNESS,
ILIESCU WAS WELL-KNOWN AND POPULAR AMONG POLITICALLY
ATTUNED ROMANIANS ON THE EVE OF THE 1989 REVOLUTION.
SINCE THERE WERE NO DISSIDENT GROUPS IN ROMANIA
READY AND WAITING TO TAKE POWER FOLLOWING THE SUDDEN
FALL OF CEAUSESCU, THE ISSUE OF WHO WOULD NOW RUN
THE COUNTRY FELL BY DEFAULT INTO THE HANDS OF THOSE
CITIZENS OF BUCHAREST -- PRIMARILY INTELLECTUALS --
WHO HAD GATHERED SPONTANEOUSLY AT VARIOUS SITES TO
DISCUSS THE CHAOTIC SITUATION CREATED BY THE
COLLAPSE OF THE DICTATORSHIP. MANY OF THEM TURNED
TO THE POLITICALLY MORE EXPERIENCED ILIESCU FOR
LEADERSHIP BECAUSE HE HAD ANTI-CEAUSESCU CREDENTIALS
AND SEEMED TO UNDERSTAND HOW ORDER COULD BE RESTORED
QUICKLY. ILIESCU ALMOST IMMEDIATELY EMERGED AS THE
DOMINANT FIGURE IN THE AD HOC NATIONAL SALVATION
FRONT (NSF) GOVERNMENT.
¶8. COMMENT: OTHER INTERPRETATIONS OF THE 1989
REVOLUTION HAVE IT THAT ILIESCU AND LIKE-MINDED
PARTY DISSIDENTS HAD EITHER BEEN PLOTTING A COUP AND
USED THE REVOLUTION AS A COVER TO STAGE IT, OR
STEPPED IN AND "STOLE" THE REVOLUTION AS IT WAS
OCCURRING. WE FIND THE FIRST INTERPRETATION TOO
PARANOID TO BE ACCEPTABLE WITHOUT OVERWHELMING
PROOF. AS FOR THE SECOND, SINCE THE REVOLUTION WAS
NOT LED BY AN ESTABLISHED ANTI-COMMUNIST GROUP SUCH
AS SOLIDARITY, BUT BROKE OUT SPONTANEOUSLY, WHO IS
ILIESCU SUPPOSED TO HAVE STOLEN IT FROM? END
COMMENT.
----------------
¶9. TWO BAD YEARS
----------------
DUE TO THE LACK OF ORGANIZED ANTI-COMMUNIST
OPPOSITION FORCES PRIOR TO THE REVOLUTION, ILIESCU
HAD NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO KEEP THE OLD POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC BUREAUCRACY IN OFFICE, EXCEPT AT THE VERY
HIGHEST LEVELS. HOWEVER, GIVEN HIS OWN BACKGROUND,
HE PROBABLY FELT NO DESIRE TO PURGE THOSE OFFICIALS
WHO WERE READY AND ABLE TO ADJUST TO A NEW POLITICAL
SYSTEM. (NOTE: A POINT OF VIEW MORE ACCEPTABLE NOW
THAT FORMER COMMUNISTS HOLD POWER THROUGHOUT MUCH OF
THE REGION. END NOTE.) MANY OF THE INTELLECTUALS
WHO HAD INITIALLY SUPPORTED ILIESCU TURNED AGAINST
HIM BECAUSE OF HIS FAILURE TO PURGE THE BUREAUCRACY
AND HIS LATER DECISION TO TURN THE NSF INTO A PARTY
-- ONE WHICH THE BUREAUCRATS HE HAD RETAINED IN
OFFICE NATURALLY SUPPORTED. GIVEN ILIESCU'S OWN
COMMUNIST PAST, IT WAS EASY FOR THE INTELLECTUALS
AND THE EMERGING OPPOSITION PARTIES TO DISPUTE THE
VERY LEGITIMACY OF THE PROVISIONAL NSF GOVERNMENT --
A TACTIC WHOSE CONTINUED USE STILL EMBITTERS
ROMANIAN POLITICS TODAY.
¶10. ILIESCU AND THE NSF QUICKLY MOVED TO ESTABLISH
CIVIL LIBERTIES AND A PLURALISTIC POLITICAL SYSTEM.
HOWEVER, THE MAY 1990 ELECTIONS, IN WHICH ILIESCU
WAS ELECTED PRESIDENT WITH 85& OF THE VOTE, WERE
SERIOUSLY FLAWED. THE NSF HAD CONSIDERABLE
ADVANTAGES IN TERMS OF CONTROL OF AND/OR ACCESS TO
THE MEDIA, FUNDS, AND OTHER RESOURCES BASIC TO AN
ELECTION CAMPAIGN. WORSE, NSF SUPPORTERS
INTIMIDATED AND HARASSED OPPOSITION CANDIDATES IN
THE RURAL AREAS. ALTHOUGH ILIESCU AND THE NSF WOULD
HAVE WON IN ANY CASE, THE NATURE OF THE CAMPAIGN
ALLOWED THE OPPOSITION TO CHALLENGE THE VALIDITY OF
THE RESULTS, AND THEY CONTINUED TO ASSERT THAT THE
GOVERNMENT WAS ILLEGITIMATE AND ILIESCU A "CRYPTO-
COMMUNIST."
¶11. ILIESCU THEN COMPOUNDED HIS PROBLEMS BY MAKING
THE WORST MISTAKE OF HIS POST-REVOLUTION CAREER --
CALLING MINERS INTO BUCHAREST IN JUNE, 1990, TO
BREAK UP A MONTHS LONG OCCUPATION OF A CENTRAL
SQUARE BY STUDENT PROTESTORS. (NOTE: ILIESCU HAS
CLAIMED, NOT VERY CONVINCINGLY, THAT HE DID NOT CALL
IN THE MINERS AND THAT THEIR ARRIVAL IN BUCHAREST
RESULTED FROM THEIR OWN PATRIOTIC INITIATIVE. END
NOTE.) THE MINERS NOT ONLY USED VIOLENCE AGAINST
THE STUDENTS, BUT ATTACKED THE OFFICES OF OPPOSITION
PARTIES AS WELL. ILIESCU'S IMAGE ABROAD SANK STILL
FURTHER WHEN HE SPLIT WITH HIS NSF PRIME MINISTER,
PETRE ROMAN, ON THE GROUND THAT ROMAN WAS MOVING TOO
QUICKLY ON ECONOMIC REFORM, BUT ALSO DUE TO CLASHING
AMBITIONS AND SHARPLY CONTRASTING PERSONAL STYLES.
AFTER SEVERAL MONTHS OF DISSENSION WITHIN THE NSF,
THE MINERS CAME TO BUCHAREST AGAIN IN SEPTEMBER OF
1991 TO DEMAND ROMAN'S OUSTER. THIS TIME, HOWEVER,
IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THEY HAD BEEN SUMMONED OR
HAD COME OF THEIR OWN VOLITION DUE TO A DROP IN
THEIR REAL INCOME WHICH THEY ATTRIBUTED TO ROMAN'S
POLICIES. WHATEVER THEIR ORIGINAL PURPOSE, ON
ARRIVAL IN THE CAPITAL SOME OF THE MINERS BEGAN
CALLING FOR ILIESCU'S DEPARTURE AS WELL AS ROMAN'S,
AND MARCHED ON HIS OFFICE AT COTROCENI PALACE.
ILIESCU RESPONDED BY OBTAINING ROMAN'S RESIGNATION,
WHICH DEFUSED THE SITUATION AND ENABLED HIM TO GET
THE MINERS TO LEAVE BUCHAREST PEACEFULLY. SHORTLY
THEREAFTER THE NSF BROKE UP, AND ROMAN AND THE YOUNG
TECHNOCRATS WHO SUPPORTED HIM FORMED THEIR OWN PARTY
WHILE THE BUREAUCRATS REMAINED WITH ILIESCU.
¶12. COMMENT: ILIESCU HAS TOLD US THAT THE STUDENTS
PROTESTS OF SPRING 1990 WERE INSPIRED BY THE NEWLY
REESTABLISHED HISTORICAL PARTIES -- THE NATIONAL
PEASANT PARTY (PNTCD) AND THE NATIONAL LIBERAL PARTY
(PNL). THESE PARTIES, HE ARGUED, WERE ATTEMPTING TO
USE THE STUDENTS TO "STEAL" THE 1989 REVOLUTION FOR
THEIR OWN PURPOSES: REVERSAL OF THE TREND TOWARD
EGALITARIANISM WHICH CAME WITH POST-WWII COMMUNIST
RULE AND THE RESTORATION OF THE PRE-WWII SOCIAL
ORDER, AN ORDER MARKED IN ILIESCU'S VIEW (AND IN
FACT) BY ENORMOUS DISPARITIES OF WEALTH AND MASSIVE
POVERTY. ALTHOUGH MORE PRO-REFORM THAN MANY OTHER
OFFICIALS OF THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING PM
VACAROIU, ILIESCU FAVORS A PARTIAL GRATIS
DISTRIBUTION OF OWNERSHIP IN PRIVATIZED ENTERPRISES
TO THE ROMANIAN PEOPLE, AS EVIDENCED BY THE RECENTLY
ENACTED MASS PRIVATIZATION LAW WHICH PROVIDES THAT
ALL CITIZENS WILL RECEIVE OWNERSHIP CERTIFICATES OF
EQUAL VALUE TO EXCHANGE FOR STOCK IN THE ENTERPRISES
TO BE TO BE PRIVATIZED. ILIESCU IS ALSO ANXIOUS TO
AVERT, TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, THE MASSIVE
UNEMPLOYMENT WHICH COULD FOLLOW FROM PRIVATIZATION
AND ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING. IT IS ILIESCU'S OWN
LABOR CONSTITUENCY -- WHICH ENJOYED JOB SECURITY, IF
LITTLE ELSE, DURING THE COMMUNIST REGIME -- WHICH
WOULD BE MOST NEGATIVELY EFFECTED, AND HE IS
NATURALLY RELUCTANT TO RISK ALIENATING IT BY TAKING
THE LEAD IN FORCING RADICAL RESTRUCTURING. ILIESCU
MAY HAVE ANTICIPATED THAT THE HISTORICAL PARTIES --
WHOSE CONSTITUENCIES HAVE THE MOST TO GAIN FROM
PRIVATIZATION -- WOULD TAKE THE LEAD IN PERSUADING
ROMANIANS TO ACCEPT THE TEMPORARY PAIN WHICH
RESTRUCTURING ENTAILS; BUT UNFORTUNATELY THEY HAVE
NOT EVEN SUPPORTED THE GOR'S OWN MOVES IN THE
DIRECTION OF REFORM, PREFERRING TO CRITICIZE THEM
FOR THE SAKE OF POLITICAL ADVANTAGE. NEVERTHELESS,
ILIESCU HIMSELF IS UNWILLING TO PUSH FOR RAPID
RESTRUCTURING IF THE PRICE IS UNEMPLOYMENT FOR THE
MANY AND MASSIVE AGGREGATIONS OF WEALTH FOR A FEW.
¶13. COMMENT CONTINUED: AS ILIESCU PUT IT DURING THE
1992 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN -- AND HE HAS NOT
DEVIATED SINCE -- HIS GOAL IS "A SOCIAL MARKET
ECONOMY," NOT "SAVAGE CAPITALISM." IN OTHER WORDS,
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND FREE ENTERPRISE ARE FINE SO
LONG AS STATE REGULATION PREVENTS THE CREATION OF
ENORMOUS INCOME AND CLASS DISPARITIES. THUS, WHILE
ILIESCU FULLY SUPPORTED THE POST-REVOLUTION SALE OF
STATE-OWNED APARTMENTS TO THEIR TENANTS AT BARGAIN
PRICES -- A MOVE WHICH CREATED HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS
OF HOME OWNERS AT A STROKE -- HE HAS JUST AS
VEHEMENTLY OPPOSED THE PHYSICAL RETURN OF
NATIONALIZED DWELLINGS TO THEIR FORMER OWNERS, WHOM
HE PROBABLY CONSIDERS, BUT HAS NOT PUBLICLY
DESCRIBED, AS PRE-WAR "ARISTOCRATS". ILIESCU'S
VETOES OF ATTEMPTS BY EX-KING MICHAEL TO TRAVEL TO
ROMANIA UNTIL HE FORMALLY RENOUNCES THE THRONE AND
PLEDGES NOT TO USE A VISIT TO INCITE PRO-MONARCHIST
DEMONSTRATIONS HAVE ALSO NO DOUBT BEEN INSPIRED IN
LARGE MEASURE BY HIS AVERSION TO THE POLITICAL AND
SOCIAL ORDER OF PRE-WAR ROMANIA. IN ANY CASE,
HOWEVER, THERE IS LITTLE POPULAR SUPPORT FOR
RESTORING THE MONARCHY (NO MORE THAN 20& HAVE EVER
FAVORED IT, ACCORDING TO PUBLIC OPINION POLLS) AND
EVEN THE PNTCD IS NOW DOWNPLAYING ITS TRADITIONAL
MONARCHISM. END COMMENT.
------------------------
¶14. THE TURN OF THE TIDE
------------------------
FOLLOWING THE FALL OF THE ROMAN GOVERNMENT, ILIESCU
IMMEDIATELY TOOK THE FIRST IN A SERIES OF STEPS
WHICH REESTABLISHED HIS CREDENTIALS AS A POLITICAL
DEMOCRAT AND AN ADVOCATE, HOWEVER CAUTIOUS, OF
ECONOMIC REFORM. HE APPOINTED TEODOR STOLOJAN, A
WELL-RESPECTED ECONOMIST WITHOUT PARTY AFFILIATION,
AS PRIME MINISTER. STOLOJAN, WITH ILIESCU'S
SUPPORT, DEFINED HIS PRIMARY TASK AS ORGANIZING FREE
AND FAIR LOCAL AND NATIONAL ELECTIONS WITHIN A YEAR,
AFTER WHICH HE WOULD RESIGN. DURING THE RUN-UP TO
THE FALL 1992 ELECTIONS, ILIESCU AND HIS PARTY --
SHORTLY TO BE RENAMED THE PARTY OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY
(PDSR) -- CAMPAIGNED ON A PLATFORM OF GRADUAL
ECONOMIC REFORM AND A STRONG SOCIAL SAFETY NET TO
MINIMIZE THE PAIN OF THE TRANSITION TO THE MARKET.
THE PDSR WON 27& OF THE VOTE IN THE ELECTIONS --
WHICH ALL INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS CONSIDERED FAIR
AND FREE -- WHICH GAVE IT A PLURALITY. ILIESCU DID
FAR BETTER THAN HIS PARTY. RUNNING AGAINST FIVE
OTHER CANDIDATES, HE WON 47& OF THE VOTE IN THE
FIRST ROUND OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. IN THE
SECOND ROUND, RUNNING ONLY AGAINST THE STRONGEST
OPPOSITION CANDIDATE, ILIESCU TOOK 61& OF THE VOTE.
¶15. COMMENT: MOST ANALYSTS HERE ATTRIBUTE ILIESCU'S
1992 VICTORY TO HIS COMBINATION OF DIGNITY, WHICH
ROMANIANS EXPECT OF A PRESIDENT, AND A "COMMON MAN"
APPROACH -- ONE OF ILIESCU'S MOST EFFECTIVE CAMPAIGN
SLOGANS WAS "FROM US, FOR US." IN OUR VIEW, ILIESCU
DOES CONSIDER HIMSELF TO BE, IF NOT A COMMON MAN,
THEN AT LEAST THE COMMON MAN'S DEFENDER. THIS
ATTITUDE IS A NATURAL OUTGROWTH OF HIS COMMITMENT TO
EGALITARIANISM AND HATRED OF THE PRE-WAR SOCIAL
ORDER, AND HAS BEEN REFLECTED NOT ONLY IN HIS
POSITION ON SUCH ISSUES AS NATIONALIZED HOUSING, BUT
IN HIS REPEATED -- BUT UNHEEDED -- DEMANDS THAT THE
MP'S OF HIS OWN PARTY EITHER RESIGN FROM LUCRATIVE
ECONOMIC POSITIONS ON THE BOARDS OF STATE
ENTERPRISES OR LEAVE PARLIAMENT, AS WELL AS IN HIS
DENUNCIATIONS OF CORRUPTION IN GENERAL. IT IS
SIGNIFICANT THAT ILIESCU IS ONE OF THE FEW POLITICAL
LEADERS HERE WHO HAS NOT BEEN SUBJECTED TO CONSTANT
-- AND IN MANY CASES, WELL-GROUNDED -- ACCUSATIONS
OF CORRUPTION. IN FACT, SOME OPPOSITION LEADERS
CRITICIZED ILIESCU'S STATED DESIRE TO "DIE A POOR
MAN" NOT ON GROUNDS OF HYPOCRISY, BUT OF
"STUPIDITY."
¶16. COMMENT CONTINUED: HOWEVER, ILIESCU IS NOW
CAUGHT IN A POLITICAL VICE BETWEEN HIS PRO-REFORM,
PRO-WESTERN POLICIES AND HIS POLITICAL BASE, WHICH
IS FIRMLY GROUNDED IN A CONSTITUENCY THAT FEARS
RAPID CHANGE, BEING THE LEAST ABLE TO COPE WITH A
FREE MARKET AND FULL LABOR MOBILITY. CONTROLLING
INFLATION AND RAISING REAL WAGES, EVEN MINIMALLY,
HAVE HELPED, BUT IN THE LONG-RUN HIS PRO-REFORM
POLICIES WILL UNDERMINE HIM AND HIS PARTY IN
ROMANIA. ILIESCU WILL CONTINUE TO BE PORTRAYED BY
THE OPPOSITION AS A CRYPTO-COMMUNIST MASQUERADING IN
WESTERN GARB. BUT WHILE THE LEADERSHIP OF THE
HISTORIC PARTIES (PEASANT AND LIBERAL) TALK REFORM,
THEY VOTED AGAINST THE IMF AGREEMENT AND THE MASS
PRIVATIZATION LAW TO DENY THE GOVERNMENT THE
LEGITIMACY THAT THEIR CONCURRENCE WOULD HAVE
BROUGHT. ILIESCU IS ATTEMPTING TO SURVIVE ON THE
HORNS OF THIS DILEMMA BY PROTECTING THE WORKER AT
THE SAME TIME THAT ROMANIA PRIVATIZES, PRIMARILY BY
MEANS OF MANAGEMENT-EMPLOYEE BUY-OUTS (MEBO'S),
WHICH CONTINUE TO BE PERMITTED UNDER THE MASS
PRIVATIZATION LAW, COMBINED WITH THE DISTRIBUTION OF
OWNERSHIP CERTIFICATES TO THE PUBLIC. THIS POLICY
MAY HAVE SHORT-TERM POLITICAL BENEFITS BUT LONG-TERM
NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS FOR A COUNTRY THAT WILL SOON
HAVE MORE THAN 3000 FORMER STATE-OWNED BUSINESSES
OWNED AND OPERATED BY MANAGEMENT -- AND/OR MILLIONS
OF NEW SMALL SHAREHOLDERS -- AND PRESENT EMPLOYEES,
WITH CONFLICTING SHORT AND LONG-TERM INTERESTS.
¶17. COMMENT CONTINUED: ILIESCU'S "COMMON MAN"
ORIENTATION IS ALSO REFLECTED IN HIS PRIVATE LIFE.
HE AND HIS WIFE ELENA, WHO HAS AN ENGINEERING
DEGREE, ARE CHILDLESS AND LIVE MODESTLY IN AN
APARTMENT BUILDING WHICH CONTAINS FOUR OTHER UNITS.
THEY NEVER APPEAR ON THE BUCHAREST NIGHT LIFE
CIRCUIT AND ELENA IS VERY RARELY SEEN IN PUBLIC AT
ALL, NOR DOES SHE ACCOMPANY HER HUSBAND ON HIS
OFFICIAL TRIPS ABROAD. ILIESCU HAS LEARNED TO SPEAK
ENGLISH QUITE WELL SINCE THE 1989 REVOLUTION, AND
ALSO SPEAKS RUSSIAN, FRENCH, AND SOME SPANISH.
ELENA ILIESCU DOES NOT SPEAK ENGLISH. HOWEVER, SHE
IS REPORTED TO HAVE INTELLECTUAL INTERESTS AND TO BE
A READER OF AMERICAN FICTION. ILIESCU, WHO
RECOVERED RAPIDLY FROM GALL BLADDER SURGERY LAST
SUMMER, APPEARS TO BE IN GOOD HEALTH. HIS WIFE,
HOWEVER, REPORTEDLY HAS A SERIOUS MEDICAL PROBLEM --
PERHAPS CANCER. END COMMENT.
EINIK