Department

First Advisor

Keywords

Abstract

This research project examines the intervening role of party system institutionalization in determining the effect of electoral rules on the behavior of political parties. Highly institutionalized systems differ across multiple dimensions--supply stability, volatility of results, and rootedness of parties--from fluid systems. Party behavior can be depicted rationally as a response to both institutional incentives and the historical and sociological context of a nation's party system. Electoral incentives promoting certain types of party behavior can be negated by party system mechanics that deter those behaviors. The research uses a medium-N structured, focused comparison of elections from Australia, Fiji, and Papua New Guinea held under preference voting rules, a majority formula that rewards parties for cooperating formally prior to elections. Preference voting is assumed to offer a middle ground between the problems of concentration inherent to single member district plurality systems and the problems of coordination necessitated by multi-member district list PR models. Despite similar incentives, the cases differ in the type and number of pre-electoral alliances. Using party system institutionalization as an intervening variable, the thesis constructs a heuristic model to assess whether cooperation is likely in preference voting systems.

Recommended Citation

Barrow, Lee T., "Alliances and Preferences: Party System Institutionalization's Potentially Intervening Role on Pre-election Cooperation in Australia, Fiji, and Papua New Guinea" (2013). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 56.
https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd/56