2015 IL App (5th) 120401

10 Supreme Court Cases Posted 12-1-16

1. Criminal Law: Appellate court reversed,
circuit court affirmed: Defendant could not complain that
his 2-1401 petition could not be dismissed for his
purported failure to serve applicable State's Attorney;
only party to whom service is owed can complain about
improper service. Garman, J.

On March 25, 2012, defendant Jerrell Matthews mailed a
petition for relief from judgment via the prison mail
system at Menard Correctional Center to the clerk of the
Cook County circuit court and the Cook County State’s
Attorney’s office. On May 24, 2012, the circuit
court dismissed the petition sua sponte as untimely. The
appellate court concluded that the dismissal was premature
because the State was never properly served. The judgment
of the circuit court was vacated, and the cause remanded.
The State appealed to this court. Appellate Court
reversed.

2. Public Bonds: Appellate and circuit
courts affirmed: Private citizens had no standing to file
suit seeking a claim on public bonds, in which it was
alleged that county treasurer conspired with others to
charge inflated interest rates as to taxpayer delinquent
properties. Kiilbride, J.

The issue in this appeal is whether plaintiffs, as private
citizens, are proper claimants on a statutorily mandated,
public official bond issued by RLI Insurance Company
(RLI), as surety, to the Madison County Treasurer and
Collector under section 3-10003 of the Counties Code
(55 ILCS 5/3-10003 (West 2014)) and section 19-40 of the
Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/19-40 (West 2014)). The
circuit court of Madison County granted RLI’s motion to
dismiss a portion of plaintiffs’ class action
complaint involving plaintiffs’ claim against RLI,
pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure
(Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2014)). The circuit court
determined that plaintiffs were not proper parties to seek
redress directly against the public official bond,
and the appellate court affirmed (2015 IL App (5th)
140473-U). We agree and hold that plaintiffs, as private
citizens, are precluded from making claims on the
statutorily mandated, public official bond at issue in
this case. We therefore affirm the judgments of the
appellate court and the circuit court of Madison County
dismissing plaintiffs’ claim against RLI.

3. Criminal Law: Mandamus awarded: In case
where defendant was found guilty of two separate acts of
sexual penetration committed against a single victim while
armed with a firearm, trial court erred in refusing to
apply 15-year firearm enhancement to both counts.
Karmeier, C.J.

The petitioner, Anita Alvarez, State’s Attorney of Cook
County, seeks a writ of mandamus (see Ill. Const. 1970,
art. VI, § 4(a)) to compel respondent, the Honorable
Vincent Gaughan, judge of the circuit court of Cook
County, to sentence defendant, Steven Castleberry,
with a mandatory 15-year firearm enhancement imposed on
each of his two convictions for aggravated criminal sexual
assault. See 720 ILCS 5/12-14(a)(8), (d)(1) (West 2008)
(providing, in subsection (d)(1), that “15 years shall
be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the
court” for aggravated criminal sexual assault when the
defendant committed the offense of criminal sexual assault
while “armed with a firearm,” as specified in subsection
(a)(8), thus rendering the criminal sexual assault
“aggravated”).1 For the following reasons, we reject
arguments interposed against issuance and award the writ.

4. Public School Teachers: Appellate and
circuit courts affirmed; school board decision reversed:
In case where tenured teacher was given "notice of
warning" regarding future practices after numerous late
attendance and missed days stemming from care of elderly
parent, school board's decision to discharge teacher based
on teacher's failure to submit lesson plans and for
tardiness was against the manifest weight of the evidence,
where tardiness was expressly excused by school principal
and where tardiness was minimal at best, and discharge was
manifestly erroneous. Thomas. J.

Plaintiff, Lynne Beggs, a tenured teacher, was dismissed
for cause from her employment by defendant, the Board of
Education of Murphysboro Community Unit School District
No. 186 (the Board). Plaintiff subsequently requested a
hearing before a mutually selected hearing officer
under section 24-12 of the Illinois School Code. Following
a four-day hearing, the hearing officer issued findings of
fact and recommended that plaintiff be reinstated to her
position with back pay and benefits because the
Board failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that she had violated a notice of remedial warning or that
she had engaged in irremediable conduct that constituted
grounds for dismissal. Thereafter, the Board, in a written
order, dismissed plaintiff notwithstanding the
findings of fact and recommendation of the hearing
officer. Plaintiff filed a complaint in the circuit court
of Jackson County seeking administrative review of her
dismissal. The circuit court reversed the Board’s decision
and ordered plaintiff reinstated with back pay and
benefits. The appellate court affirmed. 2015 IL App (5th)
150018. We allowed the Board’s petition for leave to
appeal.

5. Inspector General/County Ordinance:
Circuit court and appellate court affirmed: County
assessor was obligated to cooperate with county inspector
general in connection with issuance of subpoenas, as
county ordinance establishing inspector general office and
requiring county officials to cooperate with inspector
general was constitutional. Freeman, J.

A Cook County ordinance obligates county officers to
cooperate with investigations conducted by the Office of
the Independent Inspector General (Inspector General) and
to comply with subpoenas issued by the Inspector General.
At issue in this appeal is whether that ordinance is
constitutional as applied to Joseph Berrios, in his
official capacity as the assessor of Cook County (the
Assessor). The circuit court of Cook County determined
that the ordinance is constitutional as applied to the
Assessor and entered summary judgment granting declaratory
and other relief in favor of the Inspector General. The
appellate court affirmed. 2015 IL App (1st) 142857. For
the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the
appellate court.

6. Juvenile Court/Parental Rights:
Appellate court affirmed, circuit court reversed: In case
where custodial father was determined to be an unfit
parent, but mother was deemed fit, trial court erred in
placing children with DCFS, as statutory scheme provided
that children were to be placed with a fit parent,
regardless of the trial court's belief that the child's
best interest might be wserved by being placed elsewhere.
Freeman, J.

At the close of a dispositional hearing on a juvenile
petition based on neglect, the circuit court of Peoria
County found that respondent, Heather M., was a fit parent
to her children, J.M. and M.M. However, the court awarded
temporary custody and guardianship to the Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS). The appellate court
(2015 IL App (3d) 130856) reversed the judgment of the
trial court and remanded to allow that court to enter
specific findings consistent with section 2-27(1) of the
Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-27(1)
(West 2012)). This court allowed the State’s petition for
leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Jan. 1, 2015).
For the following reasons, we now affirm the judgment of
the appellate court and remand the cause to the trial
court for further proceedings.

7. Negligence/Snow & Ice Removal:
Appellate court affirmed, circuit court reversed: Snow and
Ice Removal Act provides immunity from liability from
claims relating to negligent removal of snow and ice, but
does not provide immunity from icy sidewalks which result
from negligent maintenance of the property, which itself
leads to alleged dangerous conditions. Theis, J.

The question presented in this appeal involves the scope
of the immunity provided under the Snow and Ice Removal
Act (Act) (745 ILCS 75/0.01 et seq. (West 2010)).
Plaintiff, Pamela Murphy-Hylton, slipped while walking on
the sidewalk outside her condominium, sustaining
personal injuries. She brought a negligence action in the
circuit court of Cook County against defendants, Lieberman
Management Services, Inc. (Lieberman), and Klein Creek
Condominium (Klein Creek), alleging that a defective
condition and negligent maintenance of the premises
created an unnatural accumulation of ice, which caused her
fall. The trial court granted defendants’ motion for
summary judgment, finding that the Act provided immunity
to defendants. The appellate court reversed and
remanded, ruling that the immunity under the Act did not
bar plaintiff’s cause of action. 2015 IL App (1st) 142804,
¶¶ 41, 47. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the
appellate court.

8. Electrical Utilities: Certified question
answered: In answering question certified by United States
Court of Appeals in connection with federal lawsuit by
Illinois resident against alternative retail electric
supplier, state supreme court ruled that Illinois Commerce
Commission did not have exclusive jurisdiction to resolve
"reparation" claim by plaintiff tha supplier charged too
much for electricity. Karmeier, C.J.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
has certified for instruction from this court the
following question of Illinois law: Does the Illinois
Commerce Commission have exclusive jurisdiction over a
reparation claim, as defined in Sheffler v.
Commonwealth Edison Co., 2011 IL 110166, brought by a
residential consumer against an alternative retail
electric supplier, as defined by section 16-102 of the
Electric Service Customer Choice and Rate Relief Law of
1997 (220 ILCS 5/16-102 (West 2014))? Zahn v. North
American Power & Gas, LLC, 815 F.3d 1082, 1095 (7th
Cir. 2016). We accepted the Seventh Circuit’s invitation
to consider this question pursuant to Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 20 (eff. Aug. 1, 1992).1 For the reasons
that follow, we answer the question in the negative. Under
Illinois law, the Illinois Commerce Commission does not
have exclusive original jurisdiction over such claims. The
claims may be pursued through the courts.

Petitioner, James W. Glasgow, State’s Attorney of Will
County, seeks mandamus pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 381 against respondent, the Honorable David M.
Carlson, judge of the circuit court of Will County.
Petitioner asks this court to compel respondent to
(1) vacate its January 6, 2016, sentencing order, (2)
classify as a Class 2 felony Mitchell Harper’s third
violation of Illinois’s driving while under the influence
(DUI) statute of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS
5/11-501 et seq. (West 2014)), and (3) resentence
defendant as a Class X offender pursuant to section
5-4.5-95(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS
5/5-4.5-95(b) (West 2014)). For the following reasons, we
award mandamus.

10. Criminal Law: Mandamus denied: Trial
court properly concluded that recent legislative changes
to age of "automatic transfer" juveniles in criminal cases
from 15-17 to 16-17, arguably effective on January 1,
2016, were to be given retroactive effect to cases pending
against automatic transfer defendants who were 15 years of
age when their offenses were allegedly committed, and such
cases were to be transferred to Juvenile Court for
discretionary transfer hearings. Thomas, J.

Petitioner, Anita Alvarez, State’s Attorney of Cook
County, seeks a writ of mandamus or prohibition against
respondent, the Honorable Carol M. Howard, judge of the
circuit court of Cook County. See Ill. Const. 1970, art.
VI, § 4(a). Following a statutory amendment that
raised the automatic transfer age for juveniles,
defendant, Luis Montano, moved to send his pending
criminal case to juvenile court for a discretionary
transfer hearing. Respondent granted the motion. The State
now seeks a writ of mandamus or prohibition directing
respondent to rescind her order. We hold that respondent’s
order was in conformance with the law, and we therefore
decline to award the State a writ of mandamus or
prohibition.