Our predecessor committee, the Science and Technology
Committee, recommended the relocation of the Government Chief
Scientific Adviser's office to the Cabinet Office.[242]
We asked Professor Beddington if reporting to both the Prime Minister
as the Government Chief Scientific Adviser as well as the Secretary
of State of DIUS caused problems or tensions in terms of the departmental
responsibilities. He replied:

There is a potential tension but I do not think there
is one in actual fact. Essentially, we use DIUS as our landlord.
We have a floor within DIUS. The salaries and rations and so on
are managed by the DIUS organisation, but my reporting line is
completely clear; it is to the Prime Minister and Cabinet and
at a personal level to the Cabinet Secretary. We have to have
a clear degree of autonomy from DIUS; I have to have the ability
to challenge the science that DIUS is actually doing. That autonomy
is preserved by the current arrangements. Of course I talk to
the Secretary of State and Lord Drayson [Minister of State for
Science and Innovation ] on a regular basis but my reporting
responsibilities are quite clear.[243]

We can appreciate that a significant part of Professor
Beddington's work may require contact with bodies such as research
councils for which DIUS has responsibility. But equally significant
amounts concern other departmentsfor example, he told us
that following up the Foresight report on obesity required working
closely with the Department of Health.[244]
As he also pointed out, DIUS acted as a "landlord",
a function that does not, in our view, have to carried out by
DIUS. We
conclude that, while the links between the Government Chief Scientific
Adviser and DIUS are useful, they are not such to lead us to revise
the Science and Technology Committee's recommendation that the
Government Chief Scientific Adviser should be based in the Cabinet
Office.

He added that he would be setting out the "aims
of GO-Science, how we intend to operate, and that will be published
[ ] before the end of the year.[246]
The report had not been published by the time we completed our
deliberations.

We asked Professor Beddington about his profile in
the media and whether it had been as high as that of his predecessor
and whether or not that was a good thing. He considered that if

you are going to have an impact, you have to have
an impact at a number of levels. Some things require a fairly
high media profile. In one of the areas, particularly highlighting
the issues of food security and the related issues to food security
of energy security, water security and so on and the link with
climate change, I think I have been relatively high profile. [ ]
In other areas I think it is more effective to discuss with the
appropriate members of governmentappropriate Ministers
or with Permanent Secretaries or scientific colleagues. I would
expect in the future that issues will arise where I will seek
to have a substantial media profile.[247]

When he gave us evidence previously, on 12 December
2007, Professor Beddington explained his role as ensuring that:

the Government gets the best possible scientific
advice, that where there is uncertainty, that is characterised,
where there is risk, that is characterised, but I see my job as
really trying to ensure that, when a new policy is made, it is
based on the best possible scientific advice that is available
at the time. Now, at some stages, there may well be contradictions
between scientific advice and other policy imperatives, and that
is taken as understood, but I think my central role is to do that
and that is what I will try to do.[248]

With this description of his role in mind, when he
gave evidence in November 2008, we asked Professor Beddington
about two matters: the Government's decision to reclassify cannabis;
and the scientific evidence supporting homeopathic treatments.

Reclassification of cannabis

On the reclassification of cannabis from a Category
C to Category B drug, Professor Beddington said that "science
can provide advice [ ] but scientific evidence is just one
part of the decision process. One should look at scientific evidence;
one should assess it; and then you should also look at other factors,
economic and social, in making that decision."[249]
As he had not looked at the matter in detail at the time he followed-up
with a written memorandum in which he said:

In reaching a decision on the classification of cannabis,
I am satisfied that Ministers sought and considered sound scientific
advice. The Government consulted the Advisory Council on the Misuse
of Drugs (ACMD) which provides independent scientific advice on
the harm to society and individuals posed by specific substances.
In May the Council recognised that the most worrying individual
harms are the effects on mental health, but recognised that evidence
on this issue is confused. It found clearer evidence about the
social harms (such as impaired driving skills) associated with
cannabis, but little real evidence that cannabis is a significant
cause of acquisitive crime or of anti-social behaviour. The majority
of Council members, having weighed up the evidence available,
took the view that cannabis should remain a Class C drug because
its harmfulness more closely equates with other Class C drugs
than with drugs in the Class B category. However, a minority were
concerned about the effects of cannabis on the mental health of
users and supported reclassification to Class B.

In the absence of factors other than the scientific
advice it would have been appropriate for the Home Secretary to
take the view that cannabis should remain in class C. However,
scientific advice is not the only factor that Ministers take into
account when reaching decisions. In this case, I understand the
Home Secretary also considered evidence on wider issues including
public perceptions and the needs and consequences for policing
priorities. These are issues which the Advisory Council made clear
it was not able legally to take into account in advising on the
classification of substances.

The Government accepted the other 20 of the 21 recommendations
made by the ACMD in relation to cannabis, including those on research
to improve the evidence base available for policy making and treatment.

More generally, I recognise that there is a relatively
limited evidence base to inform policies on drugs and associated
issues such as mental health. The recent Foresight report on Mental
Capital and Wellbeing and the report by the Academy of Medical
Sciences on Brain Science, Addiction and Drugs provide some helpful
suggestions on how to address this. I shall take a close interest
in how they are taken forward.[250]

Homeopathic treatments

We asked Professor Beddington, in November 2008,
whether he considered that the National Health Service should
spend money on homeopathic treatments.[251]
He replied:

It depends on the extent of the placebo effect[ ]
It is not just in terms of homeopathy, but, I suppose, less conventional
medicines. There does seem to be some evidence that they are effective.
In terms of homeopathy [ ] I see no evidence beyond the placebo
effect that it works. [ ] I can make that point to government
and say that there is no evidence that homeopathy works. The decision
on whether you wish to fund homeopathy as part of the National
Health Service has other factors which are beyond science.[252]

I think this is more policy than science[ ]
I am quite firm with this. I see no scientific evidence that homeopathy
has an effect beyond the placebo effect. The question that [ ]
is a reasonable one, but I think it is possibly better posed to
the Department of Health rather than me.[253]

We found Professor Beddington's statements equivocal
compared to those of this predecessor, Professor Sir David King,
who stated in evidence to us in December 2007:

The issue of homeopathic medicine leaves me completely
puzzled. How can you have homeopathic medicines labelled by a
department which is driven by science? There is not one jot of
evidence supporting the notion that homeopathic medicines are
of any assistance whatsoever; therefore, I would say they are
a risk to the population because people may take them expecting
that they are dealing with a serious problem.[254]

After the evidence session in November 2008, we asked
Professor Beddington for a note on the statements that the Department
of Health (DH) had made on the adequacy of scientific evidence
to support homeopathic products and the extent to which evidence
based on such products had informed policy-making at DH. We set
out the contents of the note[255]
Professor Beddington supplied at some length:

The evidence base [for the provision of homeopathic
treatments by the National Health Service] is sorely lacking,
but this is [an] area where wider factors than science may be
relevant. For example, there is considerable public interest in
complementary therapies and it is estimated that in any year 11%
of the adult population visit a complementary therapist for one
of six named therapies including: acupuncture, osteopathy, chiropractice,
herbal medicine, hypnotherapy and homeopathy.

Homeopathy has been funded by the NHS since its inception
60 years ago. It is used by patients for a wide range of acute
and chronic physical and emotional illnesses, and to provide palliative
care where a condition is beyond the scope of the body's normal
self-repair mechanisms. Until very recently, there were five NHS
hospitals specialising in homeopathic treatments, although one
has recently closed.

In my evidence, I said that I knew of no scientific
evidence that homeopathy has an effect, beyond the placebo effect.
I have since learned of some qualitative evidence that suggests
that homeopathy may be effective in treating certain conditions,
such as asthma,[256]rhinitis and hayfever.[257]There is also evidence of effectiveness in the treatment
of influenza.[258]
However, the scientific basis of homeopathy remains highly questionable.

Complementary or alternative medicine (CAM) consultations
tend to be more thorough and detailed than conventional medical
consultations, focussing on the whole of the patient's life rather
than their physical health alone. Such factors may well contribute
to high levels of patient satisfaction with CAM treatments where
they occur.

There is also the placebo effect. Studies have shown
that patient expectations concerning a treatment, the patient's
experience of the treatment and their attitude towards the healthcare
provider can all affect the impact of a treatment. Despite a lack
of understanding of the exact mechanisms through which the placebo
effect may operate, research clearly shows that the effect exists
and can have a significant impact on health. If a homeopathic
treatment makes people feel better, whether that be through treatment
specific effects or the placebo effect, then it could be considered
as being worthwhile.

The GO-Science Review of the Department of Health
did consider the evidence base for the efficacy of homeopathic
medicines. It was the subject of a peer review by the independent
Steering Panel, carried out to inform and test the broad recommendations
in the main report. The study concluded that the scientific basis
for homeopathy remained highly questionable and recommended the
key components of a programme of research to develop a stronger
evidence base. Paragraph 3.16 of Annex 1 to the Review states-

"Homeopathic medicine was part of the NHS, so
the scientific evidence for its effectiveness was clearly important.
While the reviews of the published evidence were useful, the scientific
basis of homeopathy remained highly questionable. A programme
for a stronger evidence base would necessitate agreement between
practitioners, patients and researchers on what should be evaluated,
and on relevant endpoints. Flagship trials should be run in the
most promising areas, chosen on plausibility, and patient demand.
These should be well planned, including pre-defined agreement
on what constitutes a minimally important clinical effect, and
adequate resource, so that the results were clear-cut. Innovative
methods may be needed, for example, if there was a waiting list,
then randomisation is as fair a way as any of deciding who gets
treatment. The difficulties in setting up such a programme robustly
cannot be underestimated. The Health Technology Assessment Programme
provided a framework that should be as applicable to research
on homeopathy as to any other therapy."

This supports the findings of the House of Lords
Select Committee on Science and Technology Enquiry on complementary
and alternative medicine in 2000, which recommended that money
should be ring-fenced to develop the infrastructure for research
into the effectiveness of homeopathy.

On the issue of DH statements on homeopathy and the
evidence base supporting its use. I understand the Government
does not maintain a position on any complementary or alternative
treatment. Decisions on what type of treatments to commission
and fund are the responsibility of the National Health Service
with front line service providers judging the best treatment for
an individual's circumstances, taking into account factors such
as safety, clinical and cost effectiveness and the availability
of suitably qualified / regulated practitioners.

We assume that professor Beddington was not referring
to the annual report 2008 on the Science and Innovation Investment
Framework which was published in December 2008[264]and that there will be a separate report on the activities
of the Government Office for Science published shortly. We
agree with the Government Chief Scientific Adviser that it would
not be appropriate for the Government Office for Science annual
report to be included within the DIUS Departmental Report.
We welcome that the Government Office for Science is producing
a report on its activities. We recommend that Government Office
for Science report annually on science across government.

Professor Beddington said that the time the reviews
took was "ludicrous".[266]
He had taken part in the Review of the Department for Environment,
Food and Rural Affairs and "it seemed to be going on forever."[267]
We note that the review of DEFRA was carried out between January
2005 to July 2006.[268]
He explained that soon after taking up his post he had

commissioned a review of reviews in co-operation
with the Heads of Analysis Group and [had] commissioned a consultant
[ ] to come forward with recommendations on what was good
and what was bad about the previous practice and to make recommendations
about the future. The answer is that he has come forward with
proposals which the Heads of Analysis Group have accepted and
which I accept, too. The new reviews will be significantly shorter,
maximum three months; they will be conducted in a completely different
way from other reviews. They will be jointly owned by the Permanent
Secretary of the department concerned and myself, and they will
be driven at a very high level. There will be an immediate going
in to look and see what are the key issue and if some things worry
us, then we would start to look at those in more detail. [ ]
The pattern of reviews which we would then plan to start early
in 2009 should mean that we will be able to get a lot more done;
we will be using consultants to help us and we will be using a
much higher level of professional input into these reviews.[269]

We welcome the Government Chief
Scientific Adviser's proposals to speed up and streamline the
Science Review Programme.

There has been criticism of the manner in which the
Government has interpreted the principle. It has allowed the Government
to have its cake and eat it: to let the Research Councils take
criticism for difficult decisions, while the Government can exercise
direction on spending decisions. In our report on the Science
Budget Allocations published on 23 April 2008 we had "reservations
about the influence Government appears to have on the use of the
budget and the extent to which the Haldane Principle has been
upheld".[271]We concluded that large "parts of the budget are tied
to cross-council programmes that largely follow a Government agenda"
and that, while it was acceptable for the Government to set priorities
for UK research, it was not "for it to micromanage individual
Research Council budgets".[272]
We recommended that the Government "make clear its role in
regional science policy and how this fits with the Haldane Principle".[273]
It also seemed to us to be a "breach of the Haldane Principle
that the Government should direct a Research Council to switch
funding from postgraduate awards to programme funding merely on
the basis of it being out of step with other research councils,
or indeed for any other reason".[274]
In its response Government rejected our points and drew attention
to Mr Denham's speech of 29 April.[275]

In view of this exchange we returned to the Haldane
principle, when the Secretary of State gave evidence on 29 October.
We pointed out that the Government set up three new major institutes
for researchthe Office for Strategic Co-ordination of Health
Research (OSCHR), the Technology Strategy Board (TSB) and the
Energy Technologies Institutewhich would set the direction
on spending decisions. At the same time it appeared that the Government
outlined six themes where research money should be dedicated[276]
and there had been a significant shift of research money in the
Research Councils from responsive mode to programme research as
a result of that.

In response, the Secretary of State referred back
to his speech to the Royal Academy of Engineering when he has
been "happy to restate the core principles of the Haldane
Principle, but I pointed out three areas where I think inevitably
in the modern world ministers will have a greater degree of engagement.

The first was in major projects; so, for example,
the Camden Medical Research Centre would not happen if you just
said to the [Medical Research Council] it is up to you to make
it happen or not. You had to have engagement with ministers across
government.

The second area is that I think it is legitimate
for ministers to say, "Look, there are some very, very big
questions in our society that we need research to help us answer:
for example, climate change; the implications of an aging society
and the other cross-cutting areas." I think that is one of
those areas where, provided ministers are open about it and upfront
about it, that is a reasonable contribution for us to make.

The third thing I think we were right to do [ ]
was that if you have an overall responsibility for science policy
there are times when you will need to raise questions and initiate
things. So, for example, [ ] my decision to get the Wakeham
Inquiry underway, which was taken before there had been any public
criticism of the [Science and Technology Facilities Council] at
all, it was just me looking at what they were proposing and saying,
"This is going to raise lots of questions about the state
of physics." So it was not for me to step in and say, "You
cannot do this, STFC" it was my job to say, "This is
going to kick off a debate about the state of physics," and
we then found the mechanism for Bill to come in and do his report.
[ ]

So Haldane, I think we are respecting, but I am being
very honest that in practical government terms in those areas
of big projects of strategic priorities we have an input to make.[277]

We
do not propose in this Report to reopen the debate about science
budget allocations and we put on record that we do not necessarily
share the Secretary of State's definition of the Haldane principle.
We accept, however, that it is entirely reasonable for the Secretary
of State to raise, and to suggest refinement, to the application
of the Haldane principle 90 years after it was formulated. We
hope that there is a debate on the application of the Haldane
principle to scientific research in the 21st century and we expect
that this is an issue we will return to in our inquiry "Putting
science and engineering at the heart of government policy".