Is the world a better place if saints live better then sinners? That question guides Stephen Kershnar's theoretically sophisticated exploration of desert. The author begins with a simple premise -- that human well-being is desirable -- yet denies that it is good in itself. To the contrary, our well being is intrinsically valuable only insofar as we merit it. We do not, however, earn such desert through right actions, which themselves issue from virtuous motives such as beneficence. Even virtuous attitudes, moreover, as he maintains in his "building block theory of virtue," are not intrinsically valuable. While they may improve our characters, Kershnar argues: "[J]ones being virtuous does not make the world an intrinsically better or worse place. Rather, the conjunction of Jones being virtuous and Jones' life going well...makes the world an intrinsically better place as compared to his not existing" (Kashmer:99). Indeed, he proposes a "geometry of desert" which graphically represents how our well being is properly proportioned to the quality of our characters, or, as he describes it, "the relation between how well an individual's life goes and how this affects the intrinsic value of the world" (Kershnar:30).

Kershnar's argument is concise, cogent and logically developed, but hinges on a series of questionable "intuitions." We might grant, for example, that the world is a better place when people get what they deserve. But one striking corollary of his account is that given a choice between two worlds, one in which all well-being is perfectly proportioned to what agents' deserve, and another with a higher over-all quantity of well-being, some or much of which is unearned, we ought to prefer the former. Yet how, exactly, is the former a better world?

Indeed, the "goodness of the world" itself is left largely undefined. Kershnar's account does not, after all, assert a metaphysical fact -- that well being and desert are in fact proportioned. His position maintains instead that the world is, or would be, a better place when -- or if -- well being is proportioned to desert. His account does not, however, specify how -- or even if -- we should aim to bring about that increase in intrinsic value. His view would imply, for example, that we ought to refuse undeserved well-being, in order to increase the world's total goodness. Yet what is so great about intrinsic value that we should prefer less well being in order to make the world a better place, and to what end do we ultimately contribute thereby?

If desert is entirely an individual matter, as Kershnar insists, then the total goodness of the world would seem morally indifferent to me. If I refuse unmerited well being, I may increase the world's total goodness, but would still leave others' well-being unaffected. Conversely, if I enjoy unmerited well-being, I alike leave others' fortunes untouched. The world may be a better or worse place, that is, in some nebulous sense, but neither I nor any one else will be measurably better or worse off in terms of well being. So why sacrifice even unearned well-being to such a diffuse end? Kershnar acknowledges this challenge, noting from the outset that the goodness of the world is a "primitive" notion, indefinable in more basic terms. To that extent, his account can offer no further reason for why the world's goodness should morally concern us, except that it should.

Yet that point is both the strength and the weakness of his project. Kershnar sets out a logically developed argument. Grant his premises, that is, share his intuitions about what makes the world intrinsically valuable, and his conclusions follow with deductive rigor. But whether those intuitions reflect metaphysical or normative facts is a separate and immensely involved question.

Despite the book's deceptively simple thesis, and its brevity, the author's argument presumes close familiarity with the sprawling, intricate vocabulary of contemporary meta-ethics. It also requires extensive attention to the current academic literature in analytic ethics, and would prove a demanding read even for a very narrow readership of professional philosophers. Kershnar's work is well laid out and supported and researched and engages interesting questions. But it is not at all suited to a general readership, and it is recommended instead primarily for professional philosophers and other academic researchers interested in foundational questions in contemporary meta-ethics.

Welcome to Metapsychology.
We feature over 8100 in-depth reviews of a wide range of books and DVDs written by our reviewers from many backgrounds and
perspectives.
We update our front page weekly and add more than twenty new reviews each month. Our editor is Christian Perring, PhD. To contact him, use one of the forms available here.

Metapsychology Online reviewers normally receive gratis review copies of the items they review. Metapsychology Online receives a commission from Amazon.com for purchases through this site, which helps us send
review copies to reviewers. Please support us by making your Amazon.com purchases through our Amazon links. We thank
you for your support!