[216] Selection of a contractor to
build the lander and to supervise integration of the lander and
orbiter and integration of the spacecraft and launch vehicle
paralleled in time the selection of the scientific experiments. On
28 February 1969. Langley Research Center issued a request for
proposals on the design and fabrication of the lander and project
integration. In addition to the 20 firms directly solicited for
this procurement, 12 others requested and were sent copies of the
proposal package. Technical and managerial proposals were
submitted to NASA by the Boeing Company, McDonnell Douglas
Corporation, and Martin Marietta Corporation. All three companies
had conducted studies earlier for Jim Martin's Titan Mars 1973
team. In the process, they had developed an enthusiasm for and an
expertise in the design of Mars landers.

In April the Source Evaluation Board began
with an appraisal of the written proposals and visited the
production facilities of each of the three potential builders,
where members of the board spoke at length with company
representatives. As Administrator Thomas O. Paine noted in his
report on the contractor selection process, the board furnished
written questions to each firm before its visit. The companies
were advised that the questions covered deficiencies and omissions
as well as proposal ambiguities and that they were being given an
opportunity to support, clarify, correct, or make revisions. After
the visits, the board made its final rankings in May 1969.

Martin Marietta received the highest
overall final rating; its cost proposal was between those of the
other two bidders. The Denver-based division's technical proposal
was well organized, according to the judges on the board; its
strong points were "outstanding mission analysis and plans for
maximum science return, the communications system, the terminal
descent radar analysis, a common deorbit and descent engine, and
landing gear design." Weak points included "the power system
design and uncertain subsonic stability of the aerodynamic
configuration." NASA specialists believed these to be "readily
correctable" problems, and Martin Marietta suggested that the
inflatable-balloon decelerator (ballute) and parachute
combination, which had been proposed for slowing and stabilizing
the lander once it was separated from its aeroshell, be replaced
by a more conventional parachute.

Boeing received the second highest overall
ranking and offered the lowest cost. Boeing's proposal contained
"a well-conceived mechanical design, a redundant and flexible
communications system, and an excellent plan for launch and flight
operations." Proposal weaknesses centered on a method suggested
for dealing with the scientific instruments and the investigators,
the power system design, and deorbit propulsion. The latter two
areas would require "major proposal revisions." according to the
source board. Boeing had planned to join forces with General
Electric and Hughes Aircraft Company-GE as the subcontractor for
entry, power, data handling, [217] and attitude control systems;
Hughes as the subcontractor for terminal landing subsystems,
terminal guidance and control, terminal propulsion, and landing
gear. While the combination of these three companies offered much
"specialized experience" and while the Boeing-GE-Hughes team plan
was well organized, NASA officials thought there were "potential
management and operational problems" in this arrangement.
28

McDonnell Douglas, with the highest cost
estimate, was ranked third. Technical weaknesses outweighed the
strengths of its proposal. And the potential strength of its
management team was outweighed by its decentralized facilities,
which were not as well suited for Viking as those at Martin
Marietta or Boeing.

Following the Source Evaluation Board
presentations, Paine met with a few key NASA employees to obtain
their views on the board's findings. Administrator Paine,
Associate Administrator Homer E. Newell, and NASA General Counsel
Paul G. Dembling subsequently met and agreed to award the contract
to Martin Marietta. 29 Paine explained that his choice for the lander
contractor was influenced by the fact that the firm had
"applicable company experience, technical capability and the most
outstanding facilities. . . .which are specially tailored to
Viking requirements." Martin Marietta's participation in early
Voyager activities and its decision to maintain a team effort with
more than 100 persons during the 1967-1969 period had "established
a strong and highly motivated" group from the top management down
through the working personnel. 30

On 29 May 1969, Paine announced that NASA
planned to award a cost-plus incentive-fee/award-fee contract for
$280 million. 31 The lander system as proposed by the contractor was
technically evaluated by the engineers at Langley to identify
changes that should be made before the formal contract
negotiations between NASA and Martin Marietta began. These
alterations were documented in a "shopping list" of 18 items over
which Langley and the new contractor negotiated. With the changes,
the contract figure totaled $299.1 million in the contract
approved by Paine 20 October. Martin Marietta's fee was targeted
at $14.52 million, but the incentive provision permitted the
company to earn more money if the contract was concluded at less
than the projected cost of $299.1 million and it penalized the
company for any cost overruns. For every dollar above the target,
Martin Marietta would lose 15 cents from the fee, while any cost
savings would bring an additional reward of 15 cents per dollar.
32

The statement of work that accompanied the
contract for "Viking lander system and project integration" was
kept as general as practical so that the number of changes in the
contract would be kept to a minimum. Other large NASA projects
like Gemini and Apollo had produced thousands of contract
modifications. David B. Ahearn in the Langley Procurement Division
would ensure that the work was done properly, but with a minimum
of paperwork. During the life of the contract, the number of
alterations made in that document numbered about 300.
33

[Whole page 218] The Viking lander
design went through a number of versions in 1968 and1969. Above
one of the four-legged configurations presented at the Viking
science instrument team's meeting 10-20 February 1968 was to be
powered by radioisotope generator and battery. One not shown
arrayed solar cells on the lander's flat top to provide power.
Although RTGs posed heat problems, the Viking Project Office
preferred them. Below, the three-legged September 1969 design
added a second camera for stereophotography amd moved the
meteorology instrument to the high-gain antenna mast.

[219] Very early in the contract, a
major modification, made necessary by the two-year launch-date
slip, was negotiated between NASA and Martin Marietta. On 13
January 1970 following the administrator's unexpected announcement
of the change in plans for Viking, the Langley Research Center
Contracting Office notified the contractors to stop all work
authorized under the contract. That week, meetings at JPL, Martin
Marietta, and Langley began reprogramming for the new game plan.
Martin Marietta studied two possible alternatives for a 1975
launch (table 40). 34

By mid-February, the Viking Project Office
authorized Martin Marietta to proceed with the first option and
lifted the stop-work order. Through the end of fiscal 1971 (30
June), only $87.427 million would be made available for the
project, so Martin Marietta would not be able to hire as many
persons as planned. Nor would it be able to increase employment
levels as rapidly as it had hoped under the 1973 schedule. JPL
also had to make changes in its manpower projections. Although
Martin Marietta would employs smaller total number during the life
of the lander contract, those who did work on Viking would be
employed for a longer time. As a consequence, the total cost of
the lander grew by another $44 million (see also graphs in
appendix
C.) 35

The immediately apparent increase caused
by the shift from a 1973 to a 1975 launch was $141 million. While
other factors would drive Viking costs.....

Table 41

Viking Cost Increases Because
of Launch Delay (in millions, as of June 1970)

Component

Viking 1973

Viking 1975

(as of June 1970)

Lander

$313

$360

Orbiter

202

257

Other

94

133

Total

$609

$750

[220].....even higher, the economics of
delaying the project two years to meet the political pressures on
the fiscal 1971 budget were expensive for NASA and American
taxpayers.