Negotiation vital in Afghanistan

As the Obama administration prepares to release its third strategy review of the war in Afghanistan, discussion of U.S. policy focuses on three conflicts. First, the actual military campaign against Afghan and Pakistani insurgents. Second, the political jockeying among Afghan President Hamid Karzai, his countrymen and international groups attempting to get a handle on massive corruption and poor governance. And third, the Washington shadowboxing between factions supporting “double down” or “out now.”

Ironically, and sadly, the core of this consensus elevates and intensifies the diplomatic and political work that Richard Holbrooke, who died suddenly on Monday, was toiling at, with so little visible reward, until the last moments of his life. Without this, the debate over time-lines that fills so much political and media space lacks meaning.

Here are eight points of broad agreement about what should drive the U.S. mission in Afghanistan:

1. Negotiation is key. An inclusive political agreement is essential to a responsible drawdown — whenever it happens. Gen. David Petraeus, the U.S. commander in Afghanistan, and probably the most high-profile defender of a longer-term military presence, has emphasized this point. CNAS—the policy group with deep ties to Petraeus and his counterinsurgency strategy—reiterated it. As do all the others. War is fought on two tracks: the military and the political. Some may label any negotiation surrender and insist that we must keep fighting to negotiate from a position of strength. But that is politics talking.

2. Regional engagement is crucial. The extensive shuttling by Holbrooke and his team has not translated into high-level talk about how Afghanistan’s neighbors can be drawn into helping maintain long-term stability.

3. Political progress and military drawdown are linked — and lack of the former should precipitate a faster, not slower, drawdown. Debates over time-lines miss a broader consensus: The counterinsurgency strategy, which requires large numbers of troops, should be switched to a counterterrorism strategy, which needs far fewer. The Council on Foreign Relations writes, “The president has said that the United States will continue its present military surge until July 2011. If there is confidence that the current strategy is working, then that should enable the United States to steadily draw down its forces starting in July… If not, however, a more significant drawdown to a narrower military mission would be warranted.” CAP and the Afghanistan Study Group both seek a faster drawdown; CNAS would take it slower.