Monday, June 16, 2014

Iran And Its Shiite Militias Mobilize In Iraq Interview With Phillip Smyth

After the collapse of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in
northern and central Iraq the press started reporting that militias were
mobilizing in Baghdad and other areas, and that the Iranian Revolutionary
Guards (IRGC) Quds Force was sending in several hundred of its members to aid
the Iraqi government. The fact is militias had been shifting their fighters
from Syria and carrying out mass recruiting drives in Iraq since the beginning
of the year far preceding the current security crisis. To help explain the situation
is Phillip Smyth from the University of Maryland’s Institute for Advanced
Computer Studies’ Lab for Computational Cultural Dynamics. He also writes
Hizballah Cavalcade for Jihadology.

Funeral procession for Badr fighter killed in Samarra June 2014 showing the redeployment of Shiite militias from Syria to Iraq (via Phillip Smyth)

1. When did the Shiite
militias first start moving back from Syria to Iraq?

This was a process that actually started around the same
time that Nouri al-Maliki started his offensive in Anbar around Christmas time
[December 2013]. The first real evidence that they were back in Iraq started in
January with Asaib Ahl Al-Haq and Badr Organization deployments throughout the
country.

2. In your article “Iranian Proxies Step Up Their Role in
Iraq”
for the Washington Institute for Near East Policy you wrote that the militias
are forming popular committees and recruiting in Iraq. Can you talk about how
they are recruiting people and any idea on how many people have joined?

Numbers are really hard to come by. If you just look at
mainstream articles you can see that there are people lining up out the door.
The thing is with the Iranian backed proxy groups that are in Iraq, they
started recruiting long before Nouri al-Maliki and even the Sadrists really
started any real efforts. That started in earnest around March or April 2014.

What they’ve done with the popular committees, and Badr has
them, Asaib Ahl Al-Haq has them, others have them, is that they have separate
recruitment centers in different cities from Baghdad to throughout the south.
People just go in, state their name, they need to provide enough evidence that
they are not an infiltrator, and that’s it. That’s how they’ve generally been
organizing it.

Images of members of ISCI in SWAT and militias and Ammar Hakim after they said they would support the Defense Ministry against the insurgents (Buratha News)

ISCI head Hakim has been seen on TV and on social media in fatigues and firing an AK-47 showing his support for the military during the current security crisis

3. You’ve mentioned
the well known militias but lately Ammar al-Hakim of the Islamic Supreme
Council of Iraq and Moqtada al-Sadr have issued statements about helping out
the Defense Ministry and protecting the shrines, so are the larger more
mainstream groups getting involved as well?

Those two have problems with Maliki and with the Iranian
backed groups. Sadr is no fan of Asaib Ahl al-Haq. He just did a couple trips
to Iran. Some people read that to mean that Moqtada is aligned with the
Iranians, but after Syria I really don’t think so. The Iranians and their proxy
groups have been trying to portray Sadr as being with them, and everything that
they are promoting. He’s has been very vocal in saying that these are “foreign entities.”
I even saw a fatwa that came out about one of the militia groups where he said
that these are foreigners. There is a definite split there. That doesn’t mean
they’re not talking. It doesn’t mean they don’t see the same problem, and
that’s ISIS. A common example is that the United States did ally with Joseph
Stalin to crush Adolf Hitler. If you think about it along those lines there are
major shrines and major areas [that are threatened by ISIS]. They [Sadr and
Hakim] would have to save face by at least doing new recruitment.

There’s been a progression on how this has been going. The
Iranian backed groups started their recruitment first. Then Nouri al-Maliki
announced one. The weird thing was there was a period right in between the
Iranian backed groups’ announcement and Maliki’s announcements where Sadr came
out and established new companies or brigades that were devoted to shrine
defense. Now with the general recruitment [by the government going on] after
Ayatollah Sistani’s announcement it means the momentum is there, and Hakim and
Sadr can say they will do this, and they have to. This is not just a cynical
power play. There is the existential threat of ISIS, and there’s no denying it.
There’s the existential threat of the Naqshbandi coming back, the Baathists and
other groups. They can’t really sit back and allow it.

Ali Reza Moshajari of the IRGC might have died in Iraq in June 2014 showing their presence on the ground in the country (Hizballah Cavalcade)

4. There have been
recent reports that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) sent in some forces
to Iraq. Have you seen anything about Lebanese Hezbollah doing the same?

Yes, but you have to know where to look. It’s not just
something that’s floating out there. They know how to pitch it to comrades that
are more accepting of Lebanese Hezbollah being on the ground there [in Iraq].
It’s only been pushed in a few different places. This is not something they
really want out in the public. Of course Lebanese Hezbollah has Unit 3800,
which was quite active during the early years of the Iraq War. It wouldn’t
surprise me one bit if after over a year of fighting alongside, and being
advisers and commanders for numerous Iraqi Shiite units in Syria that Lebanese
Hezbollah in addition to the IRGC are on the ground assisting with a lot of
these different processes. It’s basic logic that they would. The only problem
is that when you’re dealing with groups that operate covertly I can’t say that
I’ve seen Lebanese Hezbollah on the ground in Najaf and I know that they’re
there with Iraqis, because they haven’t put that up. But I don’t think there
isn’t some kind of deployment going on.

The numbers that were coming out like 130 IRGC in Iraq were
interesting. I don’t know where this number came from, but again I think that
the problem is people are not viewing this in context. They’re not viewing the
current history and its decade long background. They say IRGC is just now in
Iraq. IRGC has been in Iraq for decades. They had the Badr Brigade since the
Iran-Iraq War. In the Badr Organization people have duel membership in IRGC.
The same thing with people in Asaib Ahl al-Haq, it’s an IRGC controlled group.
The big change is how this has become public. If you’re reading it in the Times
of London or the Wall Street Journal where it’s been published it looks like
this is a new big push, but people should have just expected this.

The really interesting thing is Washington’s response to
this, which is they don’t like Iran’s presence, but there’s nothing they can
really do about it. I think a lot is being lost there. You’re seeing very
clearly that Maliki’s rump state is coming under IRGC guidance. Don’t let me
downplay the fact that the masses of Shia in Iraq are not Iranian agents. That’s
something I always hear. But in a lot of powerful places IRGC is controlling
certain things. Just remember the entire recruitment program in Iraq for Syria,
who ran that? Who ran all the militia groups? It was IRGC, it was Lebanese
Hezbollah, it was their proxies in Iraq. They were recruiting normal Shia
because they had created a narrative to do that. Now in Iraq the situation is a
little different. They don’t have to do narrative building, because they have
ISIS attacking stuff and blowing things up all the time. It’s easier for Iran
to make their position coalesce around the official Iraqi government line and
around more popular pushes to go fight. We’re kind of at a point where even if
Sadr said he had disagreements with the Iranians he’s not going to say to them
that he doesn’t want their guns, no he doesn’t want their help. It’s the theater
of the absurd on that one. The levels of control are advancing within what’s
left of the Iraqi state. I don’t think anyone can really deny that. It’s clear.
When you see Badr members of parliament like Qasim al-Araji putting up pictures
of him with General Qasim Suleimani about a week ago. Then he has another
picture of himself in combat fatigues holding an AK there’s no clearer message.
Iran has a long-term game plan and I don’t think enough people respect it. It’s
not that they’re just focused upon ISIS, but they have long-term goals. What
are those long-term goals? For Iraq as with the region, it is to kick the
United States out one way or another. Simultaneously they spread their
ideology, military umbrella, and take control. This crisis is a great opportunity
to further those larger goals and even with the acceptance of the U.S. while
doing it because there is a shared foe.

Immediately after that meeting MP Araji posted this photo of himself in fatigues with an AK-47 (via Phillip Smyth)

5. Can you finish
with Diyala province? It seems like Diyala is really important. Militias have
been deployed there. It’s right on the border with Iran. Transportation
Minister Hadi Ameri of the Badr Organization just got put in charge of security
there. What’s going on?

Diyala has been a very interesting place. CNN actually
reported that IRGC was fighting in Diyala. Now Diyala is right next to Iran,
and beyond that it has been a nice recruiting center for Shia fighters heading
for Syria. Not only is Badr controlling security there now, but Kataib
Hezbollah has deployed there along with its popular defense brigades. I think
when you see that level of Iranian proxy involvement there has to be some level
of IRGC on the ground, particularly when it’s a border area. I think Diyala is
another area to watch.

In terms of narrative development Samara in Salahaddin is
the place to watch, because the shrines are there. That was one of the initial
things that was pushed, particularly on line, the legitimate defense of the
shrines and then there’s the defense of the homeland. These are the two
different themes that have been promoted.

Militiamen handing out pictures of Ayatollah Khomeini in Baghdad June 2014 showing where their loyalties lie (via Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi)

SOURCES

Chulov, Martin, “Iraq faces the
abyss after its military melts away,” Guardian, 6/13/14

3 comments:

Anonymous
said...

Really it is more than welcome your article since when the international media talk about extremist Islamist usually forget to mention the Iranian proxies in Iraq such as Asai’b Ahl al-Haq and Hezbollah brigades. They are responsible for the killings of Americans in Iraq and Lebanon and they are behind the killings before and again today of many Iraqis Sunni and Shia from Basrah to Anbar and Baghdad. Iraqi Shies killed because they worked with International charities (before and now), with Iraqi government –before), with Women and Human Rights or International companies. Above all they terribly hate Iraqi women with knowledge working independently. ISIS is asking the women to remain indoors and the same are asking Asai’b Ahl al-Haq and Hezbollah, the different is that the Iranian proxies have the blessing of Maliki and Obama administration has decided to forget who were the masterminds of the killing of scores of American before.How do you think will affect the Sunni point of view –within Diyala- of Maliki and ISF as sectarian about the decision taken for the Iraqi Supreme Court regarding the 3 elected Sunni representatives in Diyala?Ayad Allawy should have been in Baghdad since 2 days ago. Do you have any news about the coordination and steps taken among the secular and Sunni blocks with the US embassy , Maliki coalition, Sadder, Hakim and Barzani aiming to get new government in place?

Last thing I heard Allawi was in London attacking Maliki. The Supreme Court just ratified the election results so now there is a timeline the parties have to follow to create a new government. Given the security crisis however the parties may ignore those deadlines and put off putting together a new ruling coalition.

I am in agreement with Anonymous above. The shiite militias are no less extreme than ISIS, and carry just as much blood, extortion and control campaigns in areas which they are/were with influence too. Like ISIS, they pretend to be protectors of their respective populations. The only difference is they are politically empowered so they need not to carry out insurgency operations against the government to achieve their agendas. Of course mainstream media is incapable of seeing things other than in black and white.

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About Me

Musings On Iraq was started in 2008 to explain the politics, economics, security, culture and history of Iraq via original articles and interviews. If you wish to contact me personally my email is: motown67@aol.com