An accident which occurred on Sunday 29 January 1989 in Merstham Tunnel, in
the Southern Region of British Railways.

At approximately 00.52, the 00.15 'Gatwick Express' passenger train from London, Victoria Station, travelling at a
speed of about 70 milelh, struck some of the components of a new signal bracket structure which were being
conveyed on an engineer’s train. Six passengers were slightly injured but, after hospital examination and treatment for shock, cuts and bruising, all
were discharged the same day. After examination of the line by civil engineer's staff, normal working was resumed at 04.13.

DESCRIPTION
Summary of the accident

1 Components of a signal bracket structure were
being conveyed by an engineer's train from Three
Bridges to Balham in connection with the Waterloo area
resignalling scheme; they were loaded on to a bogie
bolster wagon, designated a 'Salmon'. In the course of
the journey part of the load, consisting of two rolled steel
joists(RSJs),becamedisplacedandoverhungthe
wagon side towards the six-foot space and outside the
loading gauge limits. The RSJs were struck by the
Gatwick Express as the two trains passed each other in
Merstham Tunnel.

The trains involved and damage sustained

2 The 00.15 Victoria to Gatwick Airport passenger
train, identified as 2A18, and known as a Gatwick
Express, was a push-pull unit formed by a Class 7311
electro-diesel locomotive propelling six bogie vehicles of
passenger stock. The formation was:

Leading Driving motor luggage van (DMLV) No 68509

Trailer second handbrake (TSH) No 72643

Trailer first handbrake (TFH) No 72507

Trailer second handbrake (TSH) No 72620

Trailer second (TS) No 72710

Trailer second handbrake (TSH) No 72621

Trailing Electro-diesel locomotive No 73204

Note Electro-diesel locomotives normally draw current
from the third rail supply. They are, however, equipped
with a diesel-generator set which enables them to
operate, albeit at reduced tractive effort, over non-
electrified track or when the third rail supply has been
interrupted for any reason.

3 All exterior damage to the vehicles was on their
right-hand (ie six-foot) sides.

Bodyside panels gashed and holed in four
places above and below the windows.
Internal luggage racks and panelling
damaged. (All the passengers who were injured
were travelling in this vehicle.)

The engineer’s train was the 23.44 Three Bridges to Balham, 7Z15, of Saturday 28th January. It was marshalled as follows.

Leading

Electro-diesel locomotive No. 73118

Converted ferry van (ZSX) No. DB786901

Converted ferry van (ZSX) No. DB787000

Converted ferry van (ZSX) No. DB786974

(These three vehicles acted
as additional brake force)

Brake van (ZXW) No. DS55476

15 ton diesel-electric crane (YOB) No. DRT81338

Crane match wagon (QSB) No. DS70276

'Salmon' bogie bolster
wagon (YMB) No. DB996546

Trailing ‘Bass’ open wagon (ZDA) No. DC110274

The Salmon wagon was loaded with the component parts of a new signal bracket which were secured with webbing straps, while the Bass wagon contained some miscellaneous small items.

5 The last two wagons showed signs of damage from being struck on their right-hand sides.

DB996546 Underframe and floor damaged, also a
toolbox in the centre of the wagon.

Winch point damaged about three-quarters
of the length of the wagon from the leading
end and the third webbing strap was
broken. In the area of this strap, a length of RSJ
was found unsecured and displaced to the
right-hand side, some 30" to the direction of
travel. The load on the rear portion of the wagon
also showed signs of having been struck
and had moved approximately two inches
out of position.

DC110274 Leading door hinge and hinge pin struck
and damaged. A rope-securing cleat on the third door from
the leading end had been driven through
the bottom plank of the door. Rear corner post bent and both bottom
welds fractured. Rear end plate bent and
its door securing pin damaged.

Injuries to people

6 Six passengers in the fifth coach, TSH 72621, were
injured, mainly by fragments of glass from the broken
windows and by luggage thrown from the racks. All were
taken by ambulance to New East Surrey Hospital; none
was detained after receiving treatment.

EVENTS LEADING TO THE ACCIDENT

7 The signal structures for the Waterloo area
resignalling scheme (WARS) were fabricated at the
British Railways area civil engineer's steelwork shop at
Brighton and taken, in sections, by rail to the sites at
which they were to be erected. The structure involved in
the accident was one of several which had been made
over a period of some months; all the sections being
transported on Salmon wagons. Because of their
heights above rail level, each load was designated as an
exceptional load requiring examination by an inspector
specifically qualified to do so.

8 Steelwork Shop Supervisor K Cresswell told me
that he was responsible for the fabrication and despatch
of steelwork from the area civil engineer's steelwork
shop at Brighton. He said that in the twelve months prior
to the accident he had despatched the components for eight or nine structures for WARS on Salmon wagons.
The steelwork involved in the accident had been loaded
on the morning of Friday 20 January by his chargehand,
a crane with driver and two fitters.

9 Mr Cresswell described the way in which the
various parts of the signal bracket were positioned on
the wagon. The stanchion was loaded on the leading
end and secured with four webbing straps while two
straps secured the cantilever arm on the trailing end.
The smaller components, which included the RSJs and
steel gratings which were to form the walkway on the
cantilever, were placed between the larger sections. On
assembly, the RSJs would form inclined struts
supporting the cantilever. He said that the wagon was
provided with a six-inch high timber edgmg and the
walkway gratings were contained within the shallow well
formed by it. The RSJ struts were stacked on top of the
gratings and were above the level of the timber edging;
a single webbing strap was passed over the struts to
secure both them and the gratings underneath them.

Mr Cresswell added that the gratings, which were a
proprietary product, arrived at Brighton after the wagon
had been loaded with the rest of the components. He
had, therefore, to remove the struts, load the gratings
and then replace the struts on top of them before they
could be secured in position.

10 Having satisfied himself that the load was secure, Mr
Cresswell telephoned the control point at Brighton Station
to request that it be examined by an "Exceptional Loads"
Inspector. When, on the following Wednesday, Area
Movements lnspector Robb arrived to carry out his
examination, Mr Cresswell assisted him in measuring the
load although, he said, he was not usually involved in
such inspections; his responsibility ended when he had
seen a wagon loaded and secured. He told me that of
similar loads previously despatched, three included RSJ
struts and all had been accepted as adequately loaded
and secured. He admitted that he had not received any
formal training in dealing with exceptional loads but said
that he had gained his knowledge by experience over a
period. He considered that every load that he dealt with
was an exceptional load and said that all of them were
examined by a member of the "Traffic Department".

11 Area Movements lnspector S C Robb told me that he
had been advised on the Tuesday that there was a load to
be examined in the engineering depot at Brighton. He
attended to it on the following day, satisfying himself that it
was within the limits prescribed and that the load was
secure. His evidence generally confirmed Mr Cresswell's
description of the load but he said that, in addition to the
side timbers, a piece of wood had been placed across the
wagon and that one end of the small items, including the
struts, were resting upon it and were not lying flat on the
floor of the wagon; this portion of the load had been
secured with one webbing strap only. The lower end of

the walkway gratings and the RSJ struts were firmly held
against one of the wagon's bolsters and the webbing strap
had been pulled tight to hold them down on to the cross
timber that had been added.

12 Mr Robb said that he had added further timber
dunnage (packing) to wedge the load and make it more
secure but he had not fixed these timbers down to the
wagon floor. He considered that the load was stable and
incapable of moving, being satisfied that it was within
loading gauge limits and adequately secured, he signed
the wagon labels, advised the steelworks supervisor
accordingly and arranged for it to be marshalled into its
train.

13 Mr Robb told me that he had completed a three-day
exceptional loads course during the previous year and
that he had attended earlier courses. The most recent
course was purely theoretical and had dealt with the
principles of loading; he had gained a mark of 98% in the
test held at the end of the course. He commented that he
would have liked the course to have been longer and to
have had a practical element included.

14 Depot Supervisor P Dunn, one of the supervisors
from Three Bridges Depot, told me that the bogie wagon
carrying the steelwork had been taken to Three Bridges
from Brighton on the Friday prior to the accident to be
marshalled in the engineer’s train that was to deliver it to the site of work. He had seen it in the yard and had
checked the webbing straps holding the load to ensure
that they were secure. One or two needed tightening
slightly but, he said, this was a common occurrence
after a loaded wagon had been moved. He said that,
although the load was secure, he noticed that the timber
beneath the walkway gratings was bending slightly. This
was a piece of 2" by 2" wood which was resting on the
longitudinal side timbers of the wagon but Mr Dunn did
not consider that it was adequate so he reinforced it with
a piece of 3" by 2" timber; this he wedged in by hand
alongside the original. Neither of the timbers was
fastened to the wagon but were held in place by the
weight of the components lying on them and by the
tension in the single strap securing that part of the load.
Mr Dunn confirmed Mr Robb's description of the manner
in which the gratings were laid on the wagon; they were
on the floor with one end only supported on the timber
dunnage.

15 Trackman G Talley was detailed as the Acting
Guard of train 7215, the 23.44 Three Bridges to Balham
into which Salmon wagon D8996546 was marshalled.
He said that his first task on reaching his train was to
examine the vehicles to ensure that the handbrakes
were released, the couplings tight and that none of the
vehicles had been labelled by the carriage and wagon
examiners as unfit to run. He also checked the security
of the loads by pulling on the webbing straps to satisfy
himself that they were adequately tight. His evidence
regarding the load on wagon D8996546 confirmed that
of Mr Robb and Mr Dunn. Mr Talley then carried out a
brake test, lit the train's tail lamp and instructed his
driver that he could move the train to the exit signal from
the yard.

16 Mr Talley spoke on the telephone to the signalman
in Three Bridges Signal Box to obtain information about
the route that his train was to take and then advised his
driver accordingly before taking up his travelling position
in the rear cab of the locomotive. He said that it was the
normal practice for the guard to ride there in order that
he could observe the load during transit. On this
particular train, however, a number of box vans had
been marshalled next to the locomotive and the only
way that he could see along the length of his train was
to lean out of the side window of the cab. He told me
that he was unaware of anything untoward with his
charge until the train was stopped by signals in
Coulsdon Station and he was advised of the accident.
He added that the train had ridden normally and he had
no recollection of it having been jolted at any time during
the journey from Three Bridges.

17 Driver D Davis was at the controls of electro-diesel
locomotive No 73118 hauling train 7215 from Three
Bridges. He told me that the maximum permitted speed
of his train was 45 milelh, it being limited by the
engineer’s crane that was in its formation, but that he had not exceeded 40 mile/lh at any stage of the journey.
He confirmed Mr Talley's statement that the journey had
been free of untoward occurrences and could not add
anything further.

18 At the controls of the 00.15 Victoria to Gatwick
passenger train, 2A18, was Driver P Rood. He was in the
driving cab of DMLV No 68509 and told me that he had
left Victoria a few minutes late and stopped, as booked,
at Clapham Junction, Selhurst, East Croydon and Purley
Stations. The journey was perfectly normal until, as he
passed a train travelling towards London on the adjacent
Up line in Merstham Tunnel, there was "a loud bang" and
he saw the reflection of an electric arc being drawn from
the conductor rail; at that time, he said, he believed his
speed was between 70 and 75 milelh. He realised that
something had struck the front of his train and
immediately applied the brake; he also started the diesel
engine to ensure that he could retain electrical power.
When his train’s speed had been reduced to about 20 milelh and it was evident that it had not been derailed,
he decided to proceed in order to clear the tunnel before
stopping to examine the train and to inform the
signalman of the occurrence, using a signal post
telephone.

19 Mr Rood told me that, having obtained an
assurance from the signalman that the Up line had been
blocked, he went back to examine his train. He found
that the leading end shoe fuse-box of the DMLV was
missing and that the fuses were hanging on their leads;
the trailing end fuse-box was damaged but intact. The
third, fourth and fifth vehicles had suffered minor damage
only but the sixth, TSH 72621, had a number of windows
broken and its bodyside was extensively holed. The rest
of the train and the propelling locomotive appeared
unmarked.

20 He boarded TSH 72621 to check on the well-being
of the passengers; one woman had sustained cuts
around her ankles and another had something in her
eye. Mr Rood met up with his guard, Conductor
Bergmeier and an off-duty driver, Mr R Wadey, in the
coach and , between them, helped passengers into other
coaches. Mr Wadey then assisted Mr Rood in securing
the damaged shoe fuses before the train went forward to
Redhill Station where it was met by an ambulance and a
number of police officers.

21 While at Redhill Station, a passenger awaiting a
train engaged Mr Rood in conversation and remarked
that a goods train had passed through the station "with
something loose sticking out the side". Later, when
shunting his train at Redhill before returning to Stewarts
Lane Depot, Mr Rood noticed that the route indicator
associated with a ground shunting signal (position light
type) between the Down and Up lines had been
dislodged and was lying on its back; this he reported to
the signalman.

22 Conductor M Bergmeier, the guard of the 00.15
Victoria to Gatwick train, confirmed Mr Rood's
evidence, adding that there had been eight
passengers in the most severely damaged vehicle,
TSH 72627. He said that he was riding in the leading
vehicle when he heard the sound of a crash and saw a
bright flash. He checked the first two vehicles in the
train and, finding nothing untoward, made his way
forward to the driver's cab, by which time the train was
drawing up to a signal outside of :he tunnel.

23 Signalman J A Baker was on duty in Three
Bridges Power Signal Box operating the panel
controlling the area between Salfords and Horley. He
told me that he was made aware of the accident at
00.55 when Mr Rood called him from a signal post
telephone located immediately to the south of
Merstham Tunnel advising him that his train had struck
something from a passing engineer's train and asking
for the adjacent Up line to be blocked. Mr Baker did so
and also advised his colleague, who was operating the
Purley section of the control panel, of the incident; his
colleague then took steps to stop the engineer's train
and instruct its crew to carry out an examination of it.
Mr Baker said that the train crew reported back that
they had lost a girder that was part of their load. He
also told me that some time later he was advised that
a theatre-type route indicator associated with a ground
position light signal on the Down line at Redhill had
been damaged.

24 Area Movements lnspector D S Morgan was
advised of the accident at approximately 01. l5. He
told me that he went to Redhill Station and made
arrangements to examine Merstham Tunnel. He
walked through the tunnel accompanied by a man
from the Civil Engineering Department and, about half-
way through, they found small pieces of aluminium
and broken glass; they also noted damage to some
signalling equipment mounted in the four-foot way.
About 25 m further towards the London end of the
tunnel they found a metal girder lying across the rails
of the Down line; its ends were bent and some of its
paint coating had been chipped off.

25 Mr T Knight, Regional Trains Inspector, showed
me the broken webbing strap which had been used to
secure the walkway gratings and the RSJ struts to the
wagon, and explained that the strap had a breaking
load of five tonnes. He explained that the broken ends
of the strap showed signs of progressive failure with
the inner strands being stretched before final fracture.
This, he considered, indicated that the struts had
slipped down over the side of the wagon and had then
been struck by the passing train and had cartwheeled.
He was supported in this view by Rolling Stock
lnspector Strzetuszewski who had also examined the
two trains.

26 Mr Knight explained some details of the three-day
safe loading courses attended by those whose duties
involved the approval of unusual loads. They were
introduced following an accident in Linslade Tunnel,
London Midland Region, in 1981, in which a section of
prefabricated track became displaced from a load. Each
course, he said, had its principles based upon the section
of British Railways working manual for train staff which
deals with the loading of all types of wagon and is known
as the 'Green Pages'. He explained that the working
manual is a guide in respect of unusual loads and that the
most important aspect of the course is for trainees to
learn to recognise the ways of ensuring that loads can be
conveyed safely. The courses were very intensive and
totally theoretical; up to 1987, practical work was included
but it was felt that too much time was wasted by taking
the trainees away from the classroom and travelling to
yards in which suitable loads could be found. A video
presentation had been substituted and was considered to
be more appropriate to the type of instruction given.

27 Regarding the loading of the Salmon wagon involved
in the accident, Mr Knight said that he was satisfied that it was correctly loaded although he did consider the load
to be inadequately secured. He felt that the timber
dunnage on which one end of the gratings was resting
was probably there for convenience during slinging; he
considered that there should have been two pieces of
timber, one under either end of the bundle so that it lay
flat and not raised at one end. He was also of the
opinion that two straps should have been used to
secure such a load. He added that if an inspector was
unsure of the security or size of a load because of its
unusual nature or if there was a need for reassurance
he, Mr Knight, was always available to provide advice
and assistance.

CONCLUSIONS

28 The RSJ struts became displaced from the load
being conveyed on Salmon wagon D5996546
marshalled in the 23.44 Three Bridges to Balham
engineer's train in the course of its journey. One of
these hung over the side of the wagon and struck and
damaged a ground position light signal at Redhill. I conclude that, as a result, the strut was dragged along at the side of the wagon until, as the 00.15
Victoria to Redhill train passed the engineer's train in
Merstham Tunnel, the strut struck and damaged the
leading vehicle and then cartwheeled alongside,
damaging other vehicles in the passenger train.

29 1 also conclude that the load was inadequately
secured, relying upon the wedging action of timber
dunnage, not firmly affixed to the floor of the wagon, and
a single webbing strap only for stability. It is probable
that the vibration of the wagon during its journey caused
the struts to slide sideways and over the side of the
wagon.

30 Nevertheless, it is evident that all concerned with
the loading, securing and inspection of the wagon and
its load were of the opinion that they had carried out
their duties to the best of their abilities. I conclude,
however, that the training given to British Railways' staff
in respect of unusual loads needs to be further reviewed
in the light of this accident.

RECOMMENDATIONS

31 Large structures such as gantries and brackets
intended to support signals are unusual loads for which
no fully comprehensive loading instructions exist.
Nevertheless, those charged with the responsibility of
checking such loads must be entirely familiar with the
principles regarding loading, the positioning of dunnage and securing. British Railways must ensure that these
matters are fully addressed in both theoretical and
practical elements of their training courses for loaders
and load inspectors. I further recommend that the
duration of each course be extended so that more
thorough instruction, particularly in respect of practical
experience, can be provided.

32 1 am pleased to report that British Railways have
subsequently reviewed their loading instructions. Now
they state that smaller items, such as the struts and
gratings which have figured largely in this report,
should, wherever practicable, be loaded in vans or in
high-sided wagons.

33 A matter for comment, although not contributing to
the accident, is the travelling position of the engineer's
train guard, Trackman Talley. While I accept that it is
normal practice on freight trains for the guard to ride in
the rear cab of the locomotive, Mr Talley was unable to
observe the load during transit except by leaning out of
the cab window. To lean out of a moving train,
particularly looking backwards, is a dangerous and
foolhardy practice and, in any event, the train included
a brake vehicle in which Mr Talley should have ridden.
I recommend, therefore, that if it is necessary to
marshal vans as additional brake force in trains
conveying loads which must be observed during transit,
a separate brake van is provided and the guard
instructed to ride in it.