Thursday, July 31, 2014

The Kurdish Peshmerga are in a tense standoff with the
Islamic State across northern Iraq. When the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
collapsed after the fall of Mosul the Peshmerga moved into the disputed
territories that had been abandoned by the police and army. One such place was
Jalawla in Diyala, which locals had complained about for years as being an
insurgent hotbed. The Kurdish forces have tried to clear the area, but they
have been constrained by budget problems.

The Peshmerga have tried to secure Jalawla but have not been able to because of budgetary constraints (NY Times)

The Peshmerga have found it difficult to secure Jalawla,
because they don’t have the money to sustain their efforts. June 12 as the insurgents
swept across northern Iraq and the Iraqi security forces melted away the Kurds
moved into Jalawla, which they had longed claimed as historically part of
Kurdistan. Kurds had been targets of militants there for years. Just before the
fighting started in Mosul for example the Islamic State (IS) launched a
car bomb and suicide bomber against the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
offices in the city killing
20 and wounding 66. Then when the Peshmerga moved in they immediately got
into gunfights with the IS starting on June 13. According to press
reports at least 47 Peshmerga have been killed in Jalawla and another 90
wounded along with several civilians since then. That caused around 200
families to flee the area to escape the violence. July
24 the district director claimed that two areas had been
cleared, but the Kurdish forces could only stay there for a few hours because
they ran out of ammunition. Three days
later it was reported that IS fighters were infiltrating back in. The quick
security operation and then withdrawal from Jalawla was caused by the budgetary
crisis that the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is suffering from. In
January Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki withheld the regions’ share of the
national budget to punish it for its independent oil policy. While the regional
government has received some loans and two months worth of salaries from
Baghdad since then it still does not have enough funds to cover its sizeable
costs. That has impacted the security forces as they must now cover a much larger
territory and expend more money on supplies and equipment. As one Peshmerga
commander told
the Washington Post his unit was only allowed to fire upon insurgents if
they were shot at first because they had to save ammunition. The effect has
been that the Peshmerga are able to hold their current positions, but they are
not be able to carry out any kind of sustained operations past that line, which
is why Jalawla is still so violent.

Both the central and regional government are facing a
growing threat from the insurgency, but their political disputes are keeping
them from cooperating. The two sides should be working together to help secure
the country and take back all the territory that has been lost since June.
Instead, the Kurdish parties and Premier Maliki are still arguing over oil, the
budget, and the prime minister’s attempt at a third term. The result is that the
militants have been able to solidify their hold upon the territory they conquered
and threaten places like Jalawla. This is just the latest sign that the
political elite is more interested in their petty disputes than the welfare of
the country. Not even the de facto division of the country has been able to
overcome these divisions and the people are suffering for it.

SOURCES

AIN,
"2 Peshmerga officers killed, injured northeast Baquba," 7/15/14

-
"3 ISIL elements killed northeastern Baquba," 6/18/14

-
"5 Peshmerga elements killed, injured northeastern Baquba," 7/19/14

-
"7 Peshmerga elements killed, injured northeastern Baquba," 6/29/14

Alsumaria, “The displacement of nearly 200 families from the
neighborhood South Jalawla controlled by “Daash,”” 7/16/14

- “Jalawla announce its purge of the armed groups,” 7/24/14

-
"Prominent sniper of Naqshbandi killed and wounding of three Peshmerga in
clashes northeast of Baquba," 7/13/14

Wednesday, July 30, 2014

Iraq’s politicians have taken some important steps towards
forming a new government. A speaker of parliament and a new president were
elected in July 2014. Now President Fuad Masum must pick a candidate for prime
minister from the largest bloc in parliament, which is the National Alliance (NA)
made up of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law (SOL), the Islamic
Supreme Council of Iraq’s Citizen’s Alliance, Moqtada al-Sadr’s Ahrar bloc, and
Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s National Reform Trend. That’s the last major barrier as
Premier Maliki has refused to step aside despite opposition from within the NA,
his own State of Law, the religious establishment in Najaf, and Iran.

New Iraqi President Masum is waiting for the National Alliance to name its candidate for premier. Will it be Maliki, another figure from State of Law or a politician from another list within the coalition? (Al Arabiya)

In mid-July a new speaker of parliament and president of
Iraq were elected. On July
15, Salim Jabouri of Mutahidun was elected the new speaker, with Haidar
Abadi of State of Law his first deputy and Aram Sheikh Mohammed of the Change
List his second deputy. It took two rounds of balloting to select Abadi as he
was challenged by Ahmed Chalabi who was elected to parliament as part of the
Citizen’s Alliance. Chalabi did not actually desire the position, but wanted to
make a point that Maliki could be stopped from being elected to a third term by
his opponents. Then after some internal
divisions within the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) were overcome Fuad
Masum was elected the new president of Iraq on July 24. This was a break
from former elections when the speaker, president and premier were all part of
a package deal worked out by the winning lists. That was impossible this year
since Maliki insisted that he be the candidate for prime minister, while his
critics within the NA could not agree upon an alternative. What did hold was
the ethnosectarian quota system with a Sunni becoming speaker and a Kurd being
president. Likewise the premiership will remain with the Shiite parties.

Maliki is trying to wait out his opponents like he did in
2010, but there is more writing on the wall each week that he will not be able
to hold onto power. Moqtada al-Sadr’s Ahrar bloc and the Supreme Council’s
Citizen’s Alliance ran against the prime minister and have continued to demand
that his State of Law replace
him. Both
Ahrar and Citizen’s said they had their own candidates such as former vice
president Adel Abdul Mahdi, Ahmed Chalabi, and ex-Finance Minister Bayan Jabr,
and that State of Law had alternatives like Maliki adviser Tariq Najm, Deputy
Premier Hussein Shahristani and Transportation Minister Hadi Ameri, but could
not move forward as long as Maliki demanded to remain in office showing the
divisions within the National Alliance. The Najaf clergy has become more and
more vocal against the prime minister. July
16 Sheikh Ali Najafi the spokesman for his father Ayatollah Bashir
al-Najafi said that a new government needed to be formed quickly without Maliki
to solve the on going crisis in the country. July
25 during Friday prayers Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani released a
statement that Iraq’s leaders should not “cling” to power obviously referring
to Maliki. Third, Iran has apparently come out against the premier’s third term.
According
to the Associate Press, the head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Quds
Force General Qasim Suleimani talked with Maliki about stepping down, but he
refused. Last splits have arisen within State of Law as well. After Sistani’s
remarks the prime minister’s own Dawa
Party said that it would follow the Ayatollah’s guidance. July 28 ISCI’s Buratha News
reported that the Badr Organization left State of Law because of Maliki’s
obstinacy. SOL
has responded to all of these attacks by claiming that since it won the
most seats it therefore has the right to pick the next premier. Maliki even
went to the courts trying to get them to declare State of Law not the National
Alliance as the largest bloc in parliament and thus giving it the sole right to
name the premiership, but he was turned
down. In 2010 the victorious parties took ten months to put together a new
ruling coalition. Maliki dragged out the process and brought the courts,
Tehran, and Washington eventually to his side. The Supreme Court for example
ruled that the party that was able to put together the largest alliance after
the election not the one that won the most votes had the right to name the
candidate for premier. This has now come back to haunt Maliki as it makes his
claim that the SOL’s victory in the polls gives him the right to stay in office
invalid. Instead it is up to the divided NA to make that decision. His
opponents within the coalition now have the backing of Najaf and Tehran if the
AP story is correct. The latter was instrumental in ensuring Maliki a 2nd
term after the last elections, but the Iranians may now seem him as a source of
instability and want him out. Finally State of Law has lost its internal
cohesion. The report about Badr leaving SOL may not be true, but there is
definitely dissension within its ranks. The Iraqi elite is still not following
the timetable laid out in the law to form a new government, but it is making slow
progress as the election of Jabouri and Masum show. That means the final step
of naming a candidate for prime minister may occur sooner rather than later as
Maliki’s support is being worn down.

Nouri
al-Maliki was the resounding winner in the 2014 elections, but that does not
assure him staying in power. Ibrahim Jaafari became premier in 2005 not because
his Dawa party won the most votes, but because it was part of the largest bloc
the United Iraqi Alliance. Maliki was named prime minister in 2006, because the
U.S. and others had lost confidence in Jaafari with the escalating civil war.
Again, his Dawa was not the largest party, but he was chosen within the United
Alliance as a compromise candidate. In 2010 the Iraqi National Movement won the
most seats, but thanks to the Supreme Court ruling Maliki was able to put
together the largest coalition after the voting and win a 2nd term. Coming out victorious in 2014
was therefore an important step for Maliki, but not the final word. Immediately
after the election it looked like he had the momentum, but then the insurgent
summer offensive came and most of northern Iraq fell, and the prime minister’s
star began to fall as more and more groups from Najaf to Iran added their
voices calling for him to step down. This whole process still has minutes left
on the clock, but they are counting down for Maliki.

Tuesday, July 29, 2014

While several small oil fields have fallen under the control
of the Islamic State in northern Iraq the vast majority of the country’s
reserves reside in the south and have been unaffected. In fact, new
infrastructure recently opened that expanded the capacity for southern exports.
That doesn’t mean output can’t continue to fluctuate like it always has. In
June 2014 exports were down from May due to technical issues and an accident.

Problems with docking tankers were the main reason why June
exports decreased. Last month Iraq exported 2.423
million barrels a day compared to 2.582 million barrels in May. All of this
output went through the southern Basra pipeline. There were troubles with
docking tankers at the Basra and Khor Amaya oil terminals along with a tanker
hitting a mooring point that temporarily took it off line. This was the third
lowest output of the year after March’s 2.396 million and January’s 2.228.

Iraq Oil Exports And Profits 2011-2013

Month

Avg.

Exports

(Mil/

Bar/

Day)

Avg. Price Per Barrel

Revenue (Bill)

Jan. 11

2.16

$90.78

$6.082

Feb.

2.20

$98.44

$6.064

Mar.

2.15

$107.13

$7.167

Apr.

2.14

$114.26

$7.342

May

2.22

$108

$7.47

Jun.

2.27

$105.17

$7.173

Jul.

2.16

$108.79

$7.311

Aug.

2.18

$104.91

$7.124

Sep.

2.10

$104.89

$6.619

Oct.

2.08

$104.04

$6.742

Nov.

2.13

$106.59

$6.833

Dec.

2.14

$106.18

$7.061

2011 Avg.

2.16

$105.00

$6.913

Jan. 12

2.10

$109.08

$7.123

Feb.

2.01

$112.92

$6.595

Mar.

2.31

$117.99

$8.472

Apr.

2.50

$116.79

$8.795

May

2.45

$103.03

$8

Jun.

2.40

$90.09

$6.453

Jul.

2.51

$97.14

$7.577

Aug.

2.56

$106.22

$8.445

Sep.

2.59

$107.59

$8.371

Oct.

2.62

$105.51

$8.578

Nov.

2.62

$104.32

$8.200

Dec.

2.34

$103.72

$7.551

2012

Avg.

2.41

$106.20

$7.846

Jan. 13

2.35

$104.92

$7.672

Feb.

2.53

$107.66

$7.644

Mar.

2.41

$103.76

$7.772

Apr.

2.62

$98.70

$7.764

May

2.48

$97.23

$7.477

Jun.

2.32

$97.40

$6.799

Jul.

2.32

$101.00

$7.272

Aug.

2.57

$104.45

$8.356

Sep.

2.07

$104.87

$6.511

Oct.

2.25

$102.57

$7.160

Nov.

2.381

$102.57

$7.324

Dec.

2.341

$102.89

$7.470

2013 Avg.

2.386

$102.33

$7.435

Jan. 14

2.228

$102.37

$6.454

Feb

2.799

$102.05

$7.159

Mar

2.396

$101.03

$7.429

Apr

2.509

$100.69

$7.582

May

2.582

$100.69

$8.077

June

2.423

$102.61

$7.47

Oil
Exports Through Basra 2012-2013
January 2012 1.711 mil/bar/day

February
1.639 mil/bar/day

March 1.917
mil/bar/day

April 2.115
mil/bar/day

May 2.086
mil/bar/day

June 2.085
mil/bar/day

July 2.216
mil/bar/day

August
2.252 mil/bar/day

September
2.178 mil/bar/day

October
2.172 mil/bar/day

November
2.122 mil/bar/day

December
2.022 mil/bar/day

2012 Avg. 2.042 mil/bar/day

January
2013 2.093 mil/bar/day

February
2.196 mil/bar/day

March 2.1
mil/bar/day

April 2.31
mil/bar/day

May 2.19
mil/bar/day

June 2.13
mil/bar/day

July 2.32
mil/bar/day

August 2.30
mil/bar/day

September
1.90 mil/bar/day

October
2.06 mil/bar/day

November
2.281 mil/bar/day

December
2.081 mil/bar/day

2013 Avg. 2.16 mil/bar/day

January
2014 2.036 mil/bar/day

February
2.507 mil/bar/day

March 2.370
mil/bar/day

April 2.509
mil/bar/day

May 2.582
mil/bar/day

June 2.423
mil/bar/day

Oil Exports Through Kirkuk 2012-2013

January 2012
393,500 bar/day

February
375,800 bar/day

March
400,000 bar/day

April
393,300 bar/day

May 364,500
bar/day

June
316,600 bar/day

July
300,000 bar/day

August
312,900 bar/day

September
420,000 bar/day

October
451,600 bar/day

November
426,600 bar/day

December
325,800 bar/day

2012 Avg. 373,300 bar/day

January
2013 264,500 bar/day

February
339,200 bar/day

March
316,100 bar/day

April
306,600 bar/day

May 283,800
bar/day

June
193,300 bar/day

July
180,600 bar/day

August
270,900 bar/day

September
250,000 bar/day

October
193,000 bar/day

November
309,00 bar/day

December
260,000 bar/day

2013 Avg. 264,200 bar/day

January
2014 192,000 bar/day

February
292,000 bar/day

March
25,806 bar/day

April 0
bar/day

May 0
bar/day

June 0 bar/day

At the same time capacity at the southern ports just
expanded. At the beginning of June a third single mooring point
opened. That went along with a new metering
platform that started working in May. The mooring points can’t
all operate at the same time right now, but it does mean that there can be
uninterrupted loading of tankers while repair and other work is being done,
which has cut exports in the past. A fourth platform is scheduled to come on
line by the end of the year. With the current added capacity Oil Minister Abdul
Karim Luaibi announced in mid-July that production was around 3.15
million barrels and exports were over 2.6 million. The opening of the new
mooring points come just as Rumaila, West Qurna 1 and 2, Zubayr, Halfaya, and
Badra fields are expected to increase their output. This added production and
capacity would help make up for the loss of the Kirkuk pipeline, which was
knocked out of commission in March by an insurgent attack, and now mostly lies
in militant hands.

Ironically the summer insurgent offensive has raised oil
prices. In June Iraqi crude sold for $102.61
per barrel, up from $100 per barrel in April and May. June was the highest
price since December 2013’s $102.89. Iraq earned $7.47 billion in June as a
result. That was down from May’s $8.077 billion however, because oil exports
dropped. The continued fighting in Iraq and other unrest in the Middle East
will likely keep crude prices up.

The Oil Ministry is hoping that its exports will rebound in
July. Early figures show that’s already happening. That doesn’t mean technical
problems wont continue to occur in the future leading exports to fluctuate
again. It can only be hoped that overall exports grow over the long run and oil
prices stay at $100 per barrel or more since Baghdad needs as much money as it
can get right now to pay for its on going security and refugee crisis.

Iraq History Timeline

About Me

Musings On Iraq was started in 2008 to explain the political, economic, security and cultural situation in Iraq via original articles and interviews. I have written for the Jamestown Foundation, Tom Ricks’ Best Defense at Foreign Policy and the Daily Beast, and was responsible for a chapter in the book Volatile Landscape: Iraq And Its Insurgent Movements. My work has been published in Iraq via NRT, AK News, Al-Mada, Sotaliraq, All Iraq News, and Ur News all in Iraq. I was interviewed on BBC Radio 5, Radio Sputnik, CCTV and TRT World News TV, and have appeared in CNN, the Christian Science Monitor, The National, Columbia Journalism Review, Mother Jones, PBS’ Frontline, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Institute for the Study of War, Radio Free Iraq, Rudaw, and others. I have also been cited in Iraq From war To A New Authoritarianism by Toby Dodge, Imagining the Nation Nationalism, Sectarianism and Socio-Political Conflict in Iraq by Harith al-Qarawee, ISIS Inside the Army of Terror by Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassahn, The Rise of the Islamic State by Patrick Cocburn, and others. If you wish to contact me personally my email is: motown67@aol.com