This is how the EPA can avoid another Flint, Mich. water disaster | Editorial

(Editor's Note: The following editorial first appeared in The Washington Post)

In February 2016, Michigan Gov. Rick Snyder, R, testified before the House Oversight Committee and acknowledged what the residents of Flint, Michigan, well knew: The city's water crisis was caused by "a failure of government at all levels. Local, state and federal officials . . . all failed the families of Flint." On Thursday, the Environmental Protection Agency's inspector general released a sharply critical report that arrives at the same conclusion.

As was widely reported at the time, much of the responsibility for the crisis rests with the city and state governments, particularly the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality.

After the city switched its water source from Detroit to the polluted Flint River, officials failed to implement two federal regulations: They did not maintain corrosion control treatment or keep an inventory of lead service lines to identify critical sampling sites.

This allowed corrosive river water to react with the pipes and release lead into the city's drinking supply - and may have left officials without a clear sense of the problem until it was far too late.

But the inspector general's newly released audit describes how the EPA - and specifically its Region 5 office, which oversaw Michigan - also failed to respond effectively and efficiently.

According to the report, the agency "did not establish clear roles and responsibilities, risk assessment procedures, effective communication and proactive oversight tools." Though concerns were brought to EPA staff on numerous occasions, they repeatedly underestimated the urgency and scope of the crisis.

Between May 2014 and January 2016, regional EPA staff received no fewer than 87 citizen complaints about drinking water. In a particularly damning episode, an EPA scientist in Michigan drafted a memo describing the potential of serious health risks. Despite this mounting evidence, the agency took months to intervene.

In response to these failures, the inspector general's office has issued nine recommendations for the EPA.

It calls on the agency to create a risk identification system for state drinking-water programs, track citizen complaints and provide training on the oversight tools available to drinking-water staff.

It also advises the EPA to release a clear escalation policy that outlines when it should intervene in states. These are common-sense suggestions that would help close the oversight and communication gaps highlighted by the report.

But perhaps the report's most important recommendation is for the EPA to update the Lead and Copper Rule, which dictates how communities control lead in drinking water. The rule is almost universally disliked, earning criticism from environmental groups, local governments and the water industry for being complex, outdated and insufficient. Yet the Trump administration has delayed revising it three times.

It is long past time to improve monitoring, clarify standards and strengthen protections for vulnerable communities. If the EPA is serious about averting another Flint, it should take these steps soon.