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Abstract

Introduces a bargaining model to explore the process by which ethnic groups are mobilized & then demobilized, such that the extremity of their demands shifts over time. Two arguments are presented: (1) A group's structural characteristics (including its size & compactness) define the upper limits of goals that groups are capable of pursuing against the center. (2) The extremity of these claims is a joint function of (A) the group's expected political or economic benefits of exercising its 'exit option' (the independent variable) & (B) the bargaining power & activities of a group's lobby state or organization (the intervening variable). Discussion focuses on how & why an ethnic group's demands can shift from extreme goals, such as broad territorial autonomy, to very moderate goals, such as affirmative action policies, & vice versa. How international organizations may intervene to ameliorate the intensity of ethnic conflict is considered in conclusion.