Beyond the MTCR: Non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear-capable
delivery systems

Restricting Submarines

The headlines of this report presented at the INESAP
Conference "Beyond the NPT: A Nuclear-Weapon Free World", held in Muelhime,
Germany in November, 1994. Published in "Beyond the NPT: A Nuclear Weapon Free World" (INESAP
document prepared on the occasion of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension
Conference in New York. April, 1995); Part 2.3 Beyond the MTCR: Non-proliferation
and disarmament of nuclear-capable delivery systems, pp. 132-133.

Compared to other nuclear capable delivery platforms, submarines can
perform covertly, so that their location can not be monitored continuously.
Due to their stealth, long range (more than 10,000 miles), and capability
to operate being submerged for long time, submarines are able to use their
strategic or tactical nuclear weapons close to the territory of an adversary
and cause surprise attacks, which are hard to prevent.

Deployment of strategic weapons on nuclear submarines is widely recognized
to be the best option to ensure strategic deterrence. Sea based component
is the key element of the US, British and French strategic forces. These
countries have deployed nearly half of their strategic arsenals at sea.
By the year 2003, this list will likely include Russia, which should dismantle
its land based MIRV-ed missiles according to the START 2 Treaty.

During the Cold War, the threat of nuclear attack generally emerged
from nuclear powered submarines. Non-nuclear weapon and threshold states
do not possess such submarines. However, the end of confrontation between
superpowers and increased number of regional conflicts all over the world
allow to insist that modern conventional submarines can play decisive role
in military conflicts as well as other high technology delivery platforms
(ballistic and cruise missiles, aircraft).

The following facts lead to this statement.

First sea based ballistic missiles were deployed on conventional diesel
submarines. A non-nuclear state will unlikely be able to create submarine
launched ballistic missiles in the foreseeable future because of technical
complexity. However, nowadays, some "threshold" states are considering
plans to deploy strategic SLCMs.1
Modern "Tomahawk" type SLCMs, which are aimed at land targets, are compact
enough to fit in standard torpedo tubes of submarines. One can not exclude
a possibility to create nuclear capable "Harpoon" or "Exoset" type missiles
and mines by the "threshold" states. Compact and stealthy conventional
mini-subs represent the best platforms to deliver small saboteur groups
and nuclear devices.

It is worth to mention that littorals and shallow waters, which are
typical for conflict regions (Persian Gulf, Mediterranean, East-China Sea
etc.) represent the ideal environment for a conventional submarine. Submarines
can easily hide in skerries, and even lie on the bottom at shallow depth.
Antisubmarine warfare (ASW) operations are very difficult in shallow waters.

Submerged conventional submarine are more covert compared to nuclear
ones. However they have periodically to surface to charge their batteries.
Therefore, the strategy of ASW operations consists in search of surfaced
or snorkeling diesel submarines, which become detectable at distances of
few dozens of kilometers. Post WWII submarines had to surface once in 24
hours in the average. Diesel submarines of 70-s - 80-s of Type 2092
and "Kilo"3 class can
run submerged up to 72 hours to the distance of up to 400 miles. New generation
of conventional submarines developed in Sweden, Germany, France and Russia,
has got combined propulsion system, which does not need air as an oxidizer.
Therefore, underwater endurance of a submarine can be increased by the
factor of several times. There is a danger of proliferation of conventional
submarines, which will be no more vulnerable than nuclear ones. For example,
Pakistan has already signed a contract with France about purchasing three
"Agosta" class submarines, which can perform almost 2 weeks without surfacing.4

Currently highly developed countries only are capable to deploy an efficient
system of ASW means in restricted areas against conventional diesel submarines.
The Falklands War provides a good example of the kind of danger
that these platforms can pose.5

Several specific measures must be taken in order to prevent the threat
of deploying nuclear weapons on submarines by "threshold" states.

Sales of conventional submarines and submarine deliverable weapons should
be forbidden to the countries which have not signed the NPT Treaty.

Restrictions should be established to access to high technologies which
are critical for production of stealthy, highly capable submarines and
submarine carried weapons. Creation of an international regime, which could
play the similar role as MTCR Treaty is preferable.

It is necessary to create joint naval task groups in the frames of the
UN security forces, which could carry the mission of international control
of operation of diesel submarines at the "hot spots". During a "period
of danger", these joint task groups could monitor diesel submarines of
conflicting countries, trail them and under proper circumstances - prevent
using of their weapons.

1) On November 16, 1994,
REUTER reported with a reference on a publication in Jane's Defence Weekly
magazine, that Israel is considering such an option

2) Submarines of Type 209
were initially produced in Germany. Currently, Navies of 11 countries including
India and Israel operate these submarines.

3) Submarines of "Kilo" class
are produced by Russia. Five other countries including Iran and India purchased
several "Kilo" class submarines.

5) The Argentinean diesel submarine "San Luis" sailed 800 miles from
its base and returned back successfully in spite of the fact that it faced
2 aircraft carriers, 15 escorts, dozens of ASW helicopters as well as nuclear
attack submarines of the Royal Navy (Andres de Lionis, Anti-Submarine
Review in the Third World, Jane's Intelligence Review, April 1,
1994, p.188, v. 4, no. 4.)