Explaining Computation Without Semantics: Keeping it Simple

Abstract

This paper deals with the question: how is computation best individuated?

1.

The semantic view of computation: computation is best individuated by its semantic properties.

2.

The causal view of computation: computation is best individuated by its causal properties.

3.

The functional view of computation: computation is best individuated by its functional properties.

Some scientific theories explain the capacities of brains by appealing to computations that they supposedly perform. The reason for that is usually that computation is individuated semantically. I criticize the reasons in support of this view and its presupposition of representation and semantics. Furthermore, I argue that the only justified appeal to a representational individuation of computation might be that it is partly individuated by implicitintrinsic representations.

Keywords

In the context of this paper, ‘individuated’ may be interpreted as ‘distinguished’. Thus, the main question can be rephrased to read: how is computation best distinguished from non-computational phenomena? I do not explicitly discuss the criteria for distinguishing computation from non-computation in this paper (see for example, Fresco 2008).

Notes

Acknowledgements

Thanks to Axel Cleeremans, David Rosenthal, Gualtiero Piccinini, Joseph Agassi and Oron Shagrir for useful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. An earlier version of this text was presented at the 2007 AAP (NZ) conference in Auckland, NZ. I am especially grateful to Phillip Staines for his helpful comments and ongoing support.