Chapter IVThe Return

For more than two years the high command
of the Southwest Pacific had anticipated
the promised return to the Philippines.
That objective had governed nearly
all of the planning and most of the earlier
invasions. Now the day had arrived. Plans
had been made and troops and cargo were
aboard ships. The fleets of the Pacific Ocean
Areas and the Southwest Pacific Area were
about to join forces in a mighty assault
against the Philippines.

The Convoy Forms

That part of the VII Amphibious Force
which carried the 24th Infantry Division
and the Sixth Army Service Command assembled
at the harbor of Hollandia, Netherlands
New Guinea. In this force were over
470 ships, ranging in size from small rocket-launching
craft to 5,000-man troopships,
loaded and now waiting for the message to
weigh anchor and head for the Far Shore,
as Leyte was designated. They were scheduled
to pick up that part of the force which
was carrying the 1st Cavalry Division from
Manus Island and then rendezvous with the
III Amphibious Force.

At 1600 on Friday, the thirteenth of October,
the word was given and the great
fleet at Hollandia got under way for the target--Leyte--1,300 miles distant.1
Minesweeping
task groups had preceded it on 11
and 12 October.2
By sundown the convoy
was formed and the ships were darkened.
On 14 October the ships of the convoy
crossed the equator without ceremony. General
quarters (battle drill) and abandon ship
drills were held. The part of the force carrying
the 1st Cavalry Division was sighted during
the day. On the following day the two
units joined and the convoy proceeded. On
17 October the convoy made visual contact
with the tractor groups of the III Amphibious
Force. This force had come from Hawaii
with the XXIV Corps to help in the
liberation of Leyte.3

XXIV Corps Afloat

In the early morning hours of 13 September
the headquarters of XXIV Corps at
Schofield Barracks, Oahu, Hawaii, was
awake and active. Breakfast was served at
0330, and all men who had been informed
the day before that they were to embark for
an unknown shore shouldered their barracks
bags and carried them to waiting trucks.
By 0700 the men had been loaded on the
trucks, which took them to the narrow-gauge
Oahu railroad. In flat cars they traveled
some twenty miles to Honolulu Harbor. The

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usual seeming delays followed, but eventually
the hot, tired, and perspiring headquarters
men boarded the George F. Clymer and
were assigned bunks. The Clymer was but
one unit of a large convoy that stretched
toward the horizon in every direction. At
1115 on 15 September the convoy got under
way for a destination believed to be Yap.
As the ships departed, word was received
that the Yap operation had been canceled
and that Leyte was to be their destination.
For the men on board, life fell into the monotonous
routine common to all transports.
Reading, card and dice games, eating, sleeping,
and interminable "bull sessions" helped
to pass the time.

On the 25th of the month the Clymer
anchored at Eniwetok Island, an anchorage
already crowded with hundreds of transports,
warships, and cargo vessels. The men
were allowed to go ashore, where they were
given beer and other refreshments. The
XXIV Corps was notified that it would
leave for Manus, in the Admiralty Islands,
where further orders would be received and
the staging completed. The LST flotilla left
on 26 September and two days later the
transports followed. Maps, terrain studies,
and aerial photographs were distributed
and studied en route.4
At the same time the
XXIV Corps issued a tentative field order
which was distributed to lower unit commanders,
who then held conferences and
issued tentative verbal field orders.5

Early in October the convoy crossed the
equator. On many of the ships ceremonies
were held transforming pollywogs into shellbacks,
with the result that some of the men
preferred standing to sitting for a few days.
On 3 October the convoy arrived at Manus.6
The assault troops of the XXIV Corps were
transferred from AKA's to LST's. The 96th
Division on 9 October issued a final field
order for the Leyte operation. This order
allowed the regimental headquarters less
than forty-eight hours to complete final orders,
plans, and maps, and distribute them
to the headquarters of the assault battalions.7

On 11 October the LST transports carrying
the assault battalions filed out of the
Manus anchorage, and on 14 October the
rest of the convoy again formed and started
on the last stretch of the journey.8
Its progress
was satisfactory, and on 15 October the
President of the United States sent his best
wishes for the success of the operation to
President Sergio Osmeña of the Philippine
Commonwealth, who was at sea with the
expedition.9
When the III Amphibious
Force rendezvoused with the Seventh Fleet,
the largest convoy ever seen in the Pacific
up to that time was formed.10

Composition of the Convoy

Thirty-four months had been spent in
building and preparing these combatant and
amphibious vessels. Practically none of them
were in existence at the time Corregidor was
besieged. Most of the 183 vessels of Task
Force 77 were warships, while Task Forces
78 and 79, the amphibious forces, consisted
mainly of transports, cargo ships, and a wide
variety of landing ships and craft. Fully 518
ocean-going vessels were included in Task
Forces 78 and 79.11

Of the vessels assigned to participate in
the operation, 157 were combatant ships:
6 old battleships, 5 heavy cruisers, 6 light

The convoy did not include the combatant
ships of Admiral Halsey's Third Fleet.
The main striking force of the Third Fleet
was Task Force 38, composed of four powerful
carrier task groups, under Admiral
Mitscher. Each group contained fast carriers,
cruisers, destroyers, and the newest
American battleships.13

After forming, the convoy proceeded
toward the target. At this time a disquieting
report was received from the meteorologists
on board the ships: a typhoon was headed
toward the Leyte Gulf area. Such a disturbance
could be fatal to the expedition. A
severe storm did in fact lash the gulf area
from 14 through 17 October, but it gradually
abated and the morning of A Day, 20
October, was clear. This favorable weather
augured well for a successful landing.

Softening the Target

Early Strikes

Allied aircraft had already visited the
Philippine Archipelago. The first aerial
strikes since 1942 were made in the early
fall of 1944. On 1 September B-24's from
New Guinea bases initiated their first large-scale
air attack against airdromes in the
Davao area, though bad weather prevented
the protective fighter escort from attacking
the target. The airborne defense encountered
was surprisingly light--only three intercepting
fighters opposed the strike. The
bombers dropped 100 tons of bombs, destroying
34 planes on the ground and killing
about 100 men.14
Two American bombers
were shot down and six received minor damages.15
General MacArthur believed that the
Japanese were conserving their air strength
in order to concentrate it against anticipated
Allied landings.16

On 4 September the first aerial reconnaissance
flights were made over Leyte.
During the period 9-14 September, Admiral
Mitscher launched a large-scale, carrier-based
air assault against the Japanese air
defenses in the Philippine Islands in order
to protect the Palau and Morotai landings.
On 9 September aircraft from the carriers
attacked airdromes and installations in the
Mindanao area, destroying 60 aircraft on
the ground and 8 in the air. On 12 September
the attack was directed against the
Visayan Islands. Of an estimated air
strength of 225 aircraft in the sector, 125
were destroyed on the ground and 75 in the
air. During the night of 12 September the
Japanese flew in reinforcements from
Luzon. A Third Fleet strike on 13 September
against the reinforced air strength
destroyed an estimated 135 aircraft on the
ground and 81 in the air. On the 14th, the
Third Fleet planes encountered no enemy
air opposition but destroyed from 10 to 15
aircraft on the ground. The air strength
which the enemy had conserved for an

--42--

anticipated American invasion was thus
decimated. About 500, or approximately 57
percent of the 884 aircraft believed to be in
the Philippines, were rendered nonoperational
or destroyed. This successful knocking
out of the Japanese air strength in the
Philippine Islands was an important factor
in the decision to speed up the landing at
Leyte by two months.

On 21 September Central Pacific carrier-based
aircraft directed their attention to the
Luzon area. In spite of their vigorous defense
of the Luzon airfields, the Japanese lost
an estimated 110 aircraft in the air and 95
on the ground. These included not only
combat aircraft but also reconnaissance,
transport, and training planes. The remaining
air strength in the area was estimated
to be 350 aircraft, of which 10 percent were
in Mindanao, 20 percent in the Visayan
Islands, and 70 percent in Luzon.

At the same time, the carrier-based aircraft
made strong strikes against enemy
shipping in the central and southern Philippines.
It was estimated that from 1 September
to 15 September 105 merchant vessels
were sunk in those waters by carrier planes,
destroyers, cruisers, and submarines. Although
exact information was lacking on the
number of enemy vessels present in the
Visayan and Mindanao areas, it was thought
that 50 percent of the Japanese merchant
marine in those areas was eliminated. A
successful attrition of the Japanese air and
naval strength in the Philippines had been
accomplished.17

The Third Fleet's carriers then started to
neutralize the approaches to the Philippine
Islands. The carrier-based aircraft launched
strikes against enemy aircraft staging areas
in the Ryukyus, of which Okinawa is the
largest and most important. As a result of
attacks on 10 October, they destroyed an
estimated 23 enemy planes in the air and 88
on the ground or in the water. Admiral Halsey
reported that his flyers sank 1 subtender,
1 mine sweeper, 1 destroyer escort, 2 minecraft,
4 midget submarines, 20 cargo ships,
and 45 other craft. In addition, nearly as
many ships, mostly of small size, were damaged.18
On 11 October the flyers struck at
Luzon.

Air and Naval Action in the Formosa Area

The plans of the Third Fleet called for
strong carrier-based strikes against Formosa
on 12 and 13 October. The four task
groups of Task Force 38 were assigned targets
in the southern Formosa, northern
Formosa, central Formosa, and the Takao
areas, respectively. (Takao is a port city on
the southwest coast of Formosa.) After a
fast run on the night of 11-12 October the
carriers of Task Force 38 arrived in position
off Formosa in the early morning. Although
the Japanese were aware of the approach of
the task force, they made no attacks against
it before dawn. As the first fighters started
sweeps over their respective areas, heavy opposition
developed, but it dropped markedly
during the day. From 12 to 14 October the
Japanese lost some 280 aircraft,19
while the
Americans lost 76. As a result of the operation,
the Japanese lost half of their naval
air strength. This loss gave assurance that

--43--

the U.S. forces would have air superiority
over the Leyte area on A Day.20

On the evening of 13 October the American
heavy cruiser Canberra was torpedoed
eighty-five miles off Formosa. Admiral
Halsey kept his forces in the area another
day in order to afford protection to the
Canberra. Attacks, therefore, continued
against enemy aircraft, airfields, and installations.
By this time, Japanese reinforcements
had arrived. On the evening of 14
October an aerial torpedo hit the heavy
cruiser Houston.

Admiral Halsey decided to capitalize on
the damage inflicted on the two cruisers.
He ordered two task groups, which included
the battleships, to retire eastward out of
sight; he sent another of the task groups to
conduct intermittent air raids against northern
Luzon; and he assigned the remaining
task group to protect the crippled Canberra
and Houston. Halsey instructed this last
task group to send out messages in the clear
begging piteously for assistance. He hoped
that by this ruse, which he called the "Lure
of the Streamlined Bait," the Japanese fleet
would be led to believe that this task group
was all that remained of the task force and
would therefore sweep down for the kill.
The two task groups which had retired eastward
would then appear and engage the
enemy. The Japanese swallowed the bait
and dispatched destroyers and cruisers toward
the "crippled" American force. Unfortunately,
their search planes uncovered
the two task forces off Formosa, and the
Japanese surface ships hastily withdrew.

The enemy pilots made such greatly exaggerated
claims of success that Imperial
General Headquarters decided to order out
the 2d Diversion Attack Force against the
Americans. The flying units of Carrier Divisions
3 and 4 were transferred to the 2d Air
Fleet. These air units proceeded to Formosa
on the 12th of October. Carrier Divisions 3
and 4, however, remained in the Inland Sea
until they sortied forth for the Battle of
Leyte Gulf.21
The exaggerated claims of the
Japanese air force were accepted jubilantly
on the home islands. The people felt that
the American Navy had indeed been given a
death blow, and the Finance Ministry distributed
"celebration sake" to all households
in the country to commemorate the event.
The Tokyo radio made the unfounded claim
that "a total of 57 enemy warships including
19 aircraft carriers and four battleships
were sunk or heavily damaged by the Japanese
forces . . . the enemy task forces lost
the majority of their strength and were put
to rout. . . ."22
It also predicted that the
Allied losses would delay the invasion of the
Philippine Islands by two months.23

Admiral Halsey's reaction was to report
that "all 3d Fleet Ships reported by radio
Tokyo as sunk have now been salvaged and
are retiring towards the enemy."24

The convoy, as it steamed toward Leyte,
received the news of the United States success
with considerable satisfaction. At this
time, however, Admiral Halsey announced
that the Third Fleet was being deployed for
action, since he was expecting the Japanese
to rise to his bait. Consequently the Third
Fleet, except for the current strike at Luzon,
could not furnish any more carrier support
for the operation.25
The Third Fleet task

--44--

group which went to the Luzon area successfully
struck at enemy airfields and shipping.
From 17 to 19 October it destroyed
an estimated ninety-nine enemy aircraft on
the ground and ninety-five in the air.26

Realignment of Air Support

On the heels of Admiral Halsey's announcement
that no assistance in connection
with the Leyte landings could be expected
from the Third Fleet, Far East Air Forces
stated that the Fifth Air Force would support
the Leyte operation as a "priority mission."27
At the same time the Seventh Fleet
requested intensive reconnaissance of San
Bernardino and Surigao Straits in the Leyte
area. This mission was assigned to the Fifth
Air Force, which was also charged with
neutralizing the Visayan airfields. The
Thirteenth Air Force was to expedite the
basing on Morotai of heavy bombers which
could be called forward in support when
requested by the Fifth Air Force. From 18
to 19 October the carrier aircraft of the
Seventh Fleet protected the convoy and
struck at small vessels and airfields in northern
Mindanao as well as defense and communications
installations and airfields on
Leyte.28

Although the missions Admiral Halsey
had assigned his carriers apparently prevented
any aircraft of the Third Fleet from
participating in direct support of the landings,
Halsey nevertheless ordered one of the
task groups to strike at the Leyte, Samar,
Cebu, and Negros areas on 18-19 October
and to provide direct air support for the
Leyte operation on 20 October.29
Moreover,
by 18 October news was received that
the Japanese had discovered the ruse and
withdrawn their warships from the Formosa
area, thus leaving Admiral Halsey's forces
free to protect the operation by covering San
Bernardino and Surigao Straits.30

The carrier force of the Seventh Fleet was
to bear the brunt of the tactical air support.
By the afternoon and night of 17 October
the weather had cleared, and flying conditions
were perfect as the carriers moved into
their operation areas the following morning.
The force was divided into three units: one
unit operated in the southern part of Leyte
Gulf to protect the landings at Panaon
Strait; another operated near the entrance
to the gulf in order to support the landings
of the Southern Attack Force at Dulag; and
the last operated southeast of Samar Island
to support the landings of the Northern Attack
Force at Tacloban.

During 18 and 19 October, aircraft from
the carriers struck at enemy airfields on
Cebu, Negros, and Panay Islands. There
was very little enemy activity from the Japanese
airfields in the Leyte area, since they
were still sodden from the recent storms. In
the two days' strikes, the Seventh Fleet aircraft
destroyed an estimated thirty-six
enemy planes and damaged twenty-eight
more.31

Japanese Plan of Defense

The air blows on the Philippines served
as a warning that the Americans were ready
to return to the Islands--an event long expected

--45--

by the Japanese. By the end of June
1944, the Japanese military situation had
considerably worsened. The outer circle of
Japan's perimeter had been pierced and the
impetus of the American drive showed no
signs of slackening. (Map 2)

The Allied nations had hit the Japanese
from east and west and seriously interfered
with their seaborne commerce. Japan was
in grave danger of being separated from her
stolen southern area--the source of her raw
materials. Units within this area were also
being forcibly isolated from each other. The
fall of Saipan had brought about a "most
serious crisis." Premier Tojo was removed
and Kuniaki Koiso formed a new cabinet.32

In the summer of 1944 Imperial General
Headquarters had started to strengthen the
Philippines, the Ryukyus, the Kurile Islands,
and Japan itself--the "first line of sea defense."
If the Allies landed forces in any
of these areas, the Japanese would concentrate
their land, air, and sea forces and
attempt to repel the landing force. These
operations were known as the SHÕ (Victory)
Operations. Defense of the Philippines
was SHÕ I.33

The Japanese strategy was simple. Japan
wished to remain in the war, and to do so
she must at all costs keep open the lines of
communication to the sources of her raw
materials in the Netherlands Indies.

In the first part of August 1944, the headquarters
of the 14th Area Army, which was
to be charged with the defense of the Philippine
Archipelago, was organized under the
command of the Southern Army, while the
35th Army, which was to defend the Visayan
Islands, was established under the command
of the 14th Area Army.34

The Philippine Islands were under the
jurisdiction of the Southern Army, whose
command organization was extremely complex.
(Chart 3) The supreme commander
was Field Marshal Count Hisaichi Terauchi.
There were four area armies in the
Southern Army: the 2d Area Army occupied
Netherlands New Guinea, thence west
to Timor; the 7th Area Army was at Singapore;
the Burma Area Army was at Rangoon;
and the 14th Area Army, commanded
by Lt. Gen. Shigenori Kuroda, was in
the Philippines with its headquarters at
Manila. The Southern Army also had two
air armies and three garrison armies: the
3d Air Army in Singapore; the 4th Air
Army, consisting of two air divisions in the
Philippines and one air division in western
New Guinea; and a garrison army stationed
in Thailand, another in French Indochina,
and a third in Borneo. The commander of
the 14th Area Army maintained a staff liaison
with the 4th Air Army but otherwise had
no control over it.

The 1st Air Fleet, under the command of
the Southwest Area Fleet, was stationed in
the Philippines, with headquarters at Manila.
Admiral Soemu Toyoda, commander
in chief of the Combined Fleet with headquarters
at Tokyo, controlled the entire
naval forces, including the Southwest Area
Fleet.35

--46--

Map 2
Situation in the Pacific
Mid-October 1944

--47--

Chart 3
Japanese Army Organization of Major Units for the Leyte Operation

--48--

Plans for the 14th Area Army

The Japanese during the summer of 1944
anticipated that the United States forces
would return to the Philippine Islands, but
when and where were two questions for
which not even Tokyo Rose, the Japanese
radio propagandist, had the answers. Consequently,
the Japanese wished to keep their
troops sufficiently mobile that reinforcements
might be rushed to the point of contact.
The original plan called for the main
defensive effort of the ground forces to be
made on Luzon, since there were too few
Japanese troops in the archipelago to defend
all of the Philippines. The Japanese Navy
and Air Forces, however, were to carry out
"decisive" actions in the central and southern
Philippines.36

To General Kuroda fell the task of making
and executing plans for the defense of
the Philippines by the 14th Area Army.
General Kuroda was essentially a realist.
Restated in June 1947 that in October 1944
he had told Maj. Gen. Seizo Arisue, Chief
of Army Intelligence, Imperial General
Headquarters, that "it would be best for
Japan to negotiate an immediate peace before
the Americans could destroy our nation
by air power."37
Kuroda thought that all
available land forces should be concentrated
in the Luzon area in order to counterattack
any American landing within the
Luzon perimeter. However, because of their
predominant aerial strength, the Americans
in their next attempt could unless they
made "some terrible mistake . . . land in
force and once ashore, could take the Philippines."38
General Kuroda's plan was never
considered. Imperial General Headquarters'
plan for the defense of the Philippines called
for the employment of ten divisions and five
brigades: five divisions and two brigades in
Luzon, four divisions and two brigades in
the southern Philippines, and one division
and one brigade in China and Formosa.
The two units last mentioned would be
rushed to the Philippines as soon as the
American landing became imminent.39
When the Americans landed, all of these
units, acting in concert, were to participate
in fighting a decisive battle against the
American troops. This plan was never carried
out in its entirety.

The Japanese occupation troops of the
Philippine Islands had grown soft and had
"no particular will to fight." In the spring
of 1944, there were only minor units available
to set up an organized defense.

Imperial General Headquarters and the
Southern Army thought that because of the
many islands in the archipelago emphasis
should be placed on air power. Air attacks
could destroy the American forces before
they arrived at the landing areas or at least
before they could make appreciable gains.
The way could then be opened to turn a
defense into an offensive.40
General Kuroda
threw cold water on this plan by bluntly
stating:

That concept is good, but you cannot fight
with concept alone. Words alone will not sink
American ships and that becomes clear when
you compare our airplanes with theirs. That
is why the major battles have been occurring
on land. We can say that the power of our
air force is negligible at this time. No matter

--49--

how much the Fourteenth Army devotes their
efforts toward air power, in actuality, should
there be a decisive fight, they must fight on
land. The preparation and conduct of an
operation, and the responsibilities thereof cannot
be conducted by airplanes and air units.
The land army should initiate its own preparations.
For example, for what purpose were
the group of air bases constructed at Davao
and Tacloban? Even though they are built,
they aren't used. It amounts to construction
for the use of the enemy.41

During the month of August, the Japanese
devoted their main efforts toward
strengthening the air force. After the first of
September more emphasis was placed on
building up the ground troops while the air
preparations continued to some extent. The
Southern Army in late August ordered about
one half of a division to Sarangani and one
division to Davao against the wishes of the
14th Area Army. This meant a reshuffling
of the troops that had been moving and repairing
defenses since the first part of August.
"The order was carried out begrudgingly."42

Lt. Gen. Sosaku Suzuki, the commander
of the 35th Army, thinking that the American
Army would land on 1 October, said:
"Contrary to what has been announced by
General Headquarters our air force cannot
be prepared and equipped in time, nor can
the Combined Fleet be depended upon. The
situation grows worse and for this reason
the land force preparations must be hastened.
Yet, in spite of that, we must not discourage
the air forces and should do as much
as possible to prepare aggressive aerial
opposition."43

In the middle of September, Imperial
General Headquarters decided to replace
General Kuroda with General Tomoyuki
Yamashita. Not only did General Kuroda
have a concept of the Philippine operations
that differed from that of his superiors, but
he was charged with neglecting his duty as
field army commander.44
Lt. Col. Seiichi
Yoshie of the Personnel Bureau of the War
Ministry, who had been sent to the Philippines
to investigate personnel matters in the
Southern Army, said of the incident:

Stories reached the War Ministry that Lt.
Gen. Kuroda was devoting more time to his
golf, reading and personal matters than to the
execution of his official duties. It appeared
that his control over staff officers and troops
was not sufficiently strong and that there was
a good deal of unfavorable criticism of his
conduct among the troops. There were also
indications that discipline was becoming very
lax.

On 4 September 1944, I left Tokyo under
orders . . . to investigate. As a result I obtained
many statements substantiating the unfavorable
stories in regard to Lt. Gen. Kuroda.
The recommendations of all the staff was
that Lt. Gen. Kuroda be relieved as soon as
possible, and be replaced by Gen. Yamashita
. . . who was a superb tactician and excellent
leader.45

General Yamashita, who was in Manchuria,
received notification of his appointment
on 23 September, and on the 9th of
October he assumed command of the 14th
Area Army.46
On his arrival in the Philippines,
he found conditions were "unsatisfactory."
Of the eleven members of the old
staff only five were left and the new staff

--50--

GEN. TOMOYUKI YAMASHITA

LT. GEN. SOSAKU SUZUKI

officers were unfamiliar with conditions in
the Philippine Islands.47
The state of affairs
was well exemplified by a remark of his new
chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Akira Muto, who arrived
in the Philippines on 20 October from
Sumatra, where he had been in command
of the 2d Imperial Guards Division.48
Upon
being told that the Americans had landed
on Leyte, Muto is said to have replied,
"Very interesting, but where is Leyte?"49

Maj. Gen. Toshio Nishimura, one of
three assistants to Yamashita, states that the
planning for the Leyte campaign was "very
bad." The supply situation, however, was
favorable. Since Manila was the main depot
not only for the Philippines but also for
other places in the south such as Borneo and
Singapore, a sufficient amount of everything
needed was at hand.50

There were two tactical concepts of defense
of the islands in July and August 1944.
One was termed the policy of "annihilation
at the beachhead" and the other the policy
of "resistance in depth." The respective
merits of the two concepts were bitterly debated
by their partisans. The proponents of
resistance in depth thought that the beach
defenses, which had been constructed with
a great deal of labor, were useless, since it
was believed they could not withstand naval
bombardment. On the other hand, the
friends of annihilation at the beachhead felt
that semipermanent beach fortifications
could withstand bombardment. Imperial

--51--

General Headquarters, after studying the
battle lessons of the Pacific Campaign and
the actual effect of naval bombardment, decided
to adopt the resistance in depth tactics
and instructed the entire army forces to
comply. Consequently, the various group
commanders abandoned their beach defenses
with regret and began to build strong
fortifications in selected areas of the
interior.51

The control of the Visayan Islands and
Mindanao was vested in the 35th Army,
which was the equivalent of an American
army corps. General Suzuki, its commander,
compromised between the two concepts of
defense. At a meeting of the 35th Army unit
commanders in the middle of August 1944,
he stated that although the main battle was
to be fought away from the beaches some
troops should remain to resist the American
landings and "therefore part of the troops
must suffer premature losses."52

The 16th, 102d, 30th, and the 100th Divisions,
which were in Leyte, Panay, and
Mindanao, were placed under the 35th
Army, whose headquarters was at Cebu.53

The Suzu Plan

On 17 August General Suzuki issued the
Suzu orders for the defense of the Visayan
Islands and Mindanao by the 35th Army.
The 100th Division was to protect the Davao
area on Mindanao while the 16th Division
would defend Leyte. Most of the 30th Division
and two infantry battalions were
made mobile units which could be rushed to
annihilate the American force wherever it
landed. However, if the Americans landed
simultaneously on Davao and Leyte, the
main force of the 30th Division was to be
sent to Davao and the other mobile units
would go to Leyte.

In late August, Suzuki received orders to
dispose his troops as follows: a reinforced
division in the Davao area, three battalions
in the Sarangani Bay area, three battalions
in the vicinity of Zamboanga, two battalions
in the Jolo Islands, a "strong unit" in the
vicinity of Surigao, and one division in the
Leyte Gulf area. The 55th Independent
Mixed Brigade was to be assigned to the
35th Army. Units of the 16th Division
which were in Luzon were sent to the 16th
Division on Leyte. These elements, which
consisted of one engineer company, an independent
transportation unit, and a medical
unit, were placed under the commander
of the 33d Infantry Regiment.54

Lt. Gen. Shiro Makino, commanding the
16th Division, which was the major force
on Leyte, had directed his efforts since April
1944 toward the construction of defensive
positions on the island. The first line of defense,
which was on the east coast in the
Dulag area, was practically completed by
the middle of October. The third defensive
line was in the middle of Leyte Valley in
the vicinity of Dagami. The second line of
defense was between the two others, while
the bulk of supplies was assembled in the
central mountain range at Jaro.

The distribution of the other troops at the
time of the American landings was as follows:
one battalion of the 9th Infantry
Regiment in the Catmon Hill and Tanauan
district, and the main strength of the 33d
Infantry Regiment in the Palo and Tacloban
area. The larger part of the 33d Infantry
Regiment, which was less adequately trained

--52--

than the other regiments, had arrived on
Leyte in mid-September from Luzon. Its
officers were unfamiliar with the terrain
and did not fortify their positions.55

On 17 October General Makino, having
heard that American warships had approached
Leyte Gulf, alerted the 16th Division
for the impending battle and ordered
all units to "shatter the enemy landing attempts."56
On 18 October the 14th Area
Army received a report from the 16th Division
which indicated that the latter was not
certain the vessels sighted off Leyte were an
enemy attacking force. They might be ships
seeking safety from the storms, or vessels
damaged in the naval battle off Formosa.
Consequently, 14th Area Army was not sure
that an attack was imminent at Leyte.57

Plans for the 4th Air Army

The principal assignment of the 4th Air
Army was to attack American transports
and interdict American shipping and, if
given the opportunity, to attack the American
combatant vessels. The 4th Air Army
was also to give aerial support to the movement
of reinforcements.58

In October the 4th Air Army issued a plan
for anticipated operations. In co-operation
with the Army and the Navy, the 4th Air
Army would attempt to destroy the American
forces when they struck the Philippines.
The Army air force in concert with
the naval air units would try to destroy
carrier-based planes and air bases. In operations
against the American fleet, the Army
and Navy air units were to have "a unified
and tactful commitment." If the naval air
units could not co-operate the Army air force
was to venture a surprise attack with a few
planes. Dusk, night, and dawn attacks were
to be made against Allied air bases and all
means exerted to foil Allied attempts to
establish advance bases in the Philippines.
The main strength of the fighter units was
to move into the central and southern Philippines
in order to destroy the principal American
landing force. The mission of the Japanese
4th Air Army, operating from Mindanao,
Celebes, and northern Borneo, would
be restricted to checking the current attempts
on the part of the Americans to establish
bases on Halmahera and western
New Guinea and the destruction of the
planes there. For this purpose the Japanese
air force would use bases in the southern
Philippines.

When the American convoy was sighted
moving toward the Philippines, the heavy
bombers were to deploy to the central and
southern Philippines and make preparations
for an immediate attack on the convoy after
it had arrived in the harbor. The fighter
units were to attack Allied aircraft and, if
the circumstances were propitious, were also
to attack the convoy. If the Americans
should attempt simultaneous landings at various
points, the Japanese Army air forces
would "try to annihilate the landing parties
one by one,"59
acting in concert with the
Japanese Navy.

Capt. Toshikazu Ohmae, the chief of staff
to the commander in chief of the Japanese
Third Fleet, was highly critical of the liaison

--53--

between the Army and Navy air forces.
"The Army and Navy always quarreled
with each other. In theory they were supposed
to cooperate and on the higher levels
it would work, but personalities were the
trouble."60

Japanese Navy Plans

On 21 July 1944 Admiral Toyoda received
a directive which laid down the basic
policies for subsequent "urgent operations."
A great deal of the contracting empire was
abandoned. The Southwest Area, which
embraced the region from Manila to Singapore,
was ordered to "maintain security of
resources areas, hold vital sectors for their
defense, and place emphasis on protection
for fleet anchorages." Thus the Japanese
planned to restrict battle "to the homeland
and to the island chain which protected the
last links" of the empire with the south. The
forces in the Japanese home islands, the
Ryukyu chain, Formosa, and the Philippine
Islands were told to take "all measures
to expedite the establishment of conditions
to cope with decisive battle. In event of
enemy attack, summon all strength which
can be concentrated and hold vital sectors,
in general intercepting and destroying the
enemy within the operational sphere of
planes of our base air force."61

The success of Admiral Halsey's carrier
strikes against Formosa had considerably
weakened the strength of Japanese carrier-based
planes, and less than one half of the
Army planes remained. The necessity of
sending reinforcements to Formosa also
weakened considerably the Japanese aerial
defense of the Philippines. The enemy became
almost completely dependent upon
the remaining land-based planes.62
Within
their capabilities the Japanese had made
their plans and readied their forces, as the
American convoy steamed towards Leyte
to do battle.

Securing the Channel Approaches

Landings of the 6th Ranger Infantry Battalion

The forward part of the convoy, which
was carrying the 6th Ranger Infantry Battalion,
commanded by Lt. Col. Henry A.
Mucci, had experienced stormy weather
since leaving Hollandia, but by dawn of the
17th the storm had slackened, though the
ocean was still choppy. The transports carrying
the reinforced 6th Ranger Battalion,
preceded by three mine sweepers, entered
Leyte Gulf.63

The USS Crosby, carrying Company D,
arrived on schedule off Suluan Island, the
outermost of the islands guarding Leyte
Gulf. For twenty minutes the cruiser Denver
shelled the island. Under lowering skies
and in a driving rain which rendered impossible
the anticipated air support,64
Company
D, under 1st Lt. Leslie M. Gray, disembarked
from the transport and headed
for the island in landing craft. The mission
of the unit was to secure mine charts which
were believed to be located in a lighthouse

--54--

on the island. At 0805 the boats touched
shore.

The landing was unopposed. The men
immediately filed south 500 yards on a trail
along the coast and then headed east toward
the lighthouse. On the way, four buildings,
one of which contained a Japanese radio,
were found and set ablaze. The company
then continued along the trail. Suddenly
the enemy fired from a concealed position,
killing one man and wounding another.
When Company D went into attack formation,
the enemy force disappeared into the
heavy jungle bordering the trail. The march
was resumed and the company reached its
objective without further incident. The
lighthouse, which had been damaged by
naval bombardment, and adjoining buildings
were deserted.65

In searching the documents found in the
lighthouse, the company failed to turn up
the hoped-for enemy mine charts.66
It returned
to the beachhead area and, finding
that the landing boats had been hopelessly
battered and broken up by the surf, formed
a perimeter for the night.

As Company D was moving along the
coast of Suluan Island, naval fire blasted
away at the extreme northwest coast of
Dinagat Island. At 0900 the first assault
waves of the 6th Rangers, minus Companies
D and B, started for the beach. Although
coral reefs approximately one hundred yards
offshore grounded the boats so that the men
had to wade the remainder of the distance,
the companies were all ashore by 1230. No
Japanese were on the island and the troops
accomplished their mission, the erection of
a navigation light at Desolation Point to
guide the movement of the main portion of
the convoy.

Company B of the 6th Rangers was to
have landed on Homonhon Island at the
same time landings were made on Suluan
and Dinagat. Its mission, too, was the emplacement
of a navigation light, but bad
weather and choppy seas kept the troops
confined to the ship throughout the 17th.67
On the morning of the 18th, the ship's address
system clanged out general quarters.
The men went below, put on their gear, and
checked their weapons. At 0900 the troops
were told to prepare to disembark. They
bolted up the ladders and spilled out over
the deck to the davits.68
The boats were
lowered and the first wave started for the
beach. At the same time the guns from the
destroyer and frigate which had escorted
the transport concentrated fire against the
shore line for twelve minutes. Three minutes
later, the boats grounded on a coral
reef forty yards from the beach, and the
men waded the remaining distance to shore.
They encountered no resistance and at 1038
the company commander, Capt. Arthur D.
Simons, notified the battalion commander,
"Beachhead secured, supplies ashore. No
resistance. No casualties."69
The company
set up a channel light.

By 18 October, steady white lights were
beaming from Dinagat and Homonhon
Islands to guide the convoy in to Leyte
Island. The one on Dinagat had a visibility
of twelve miles and that on Homonhon a
visibility of ten.70

--55--

PATROL OF COMPANY F, 6TH RANGERS, at Desolation Point (above), and investigating
a native village on Dinagat Island (below).

--56--

Mine Sweeping

The mine-sweeping plans contemplated
that the mine-sweeping group would arrive
on 17 October simultaneously with the
troops that were to storm Suluan, Dinagat,
and Homonhon Islands. On 11 October the
slow-moving mine sweepers lifted anchor at
Manus and departed for the objective area.
They rendezvoused near the Palaus with
the Dinagat force, which had left Hollandia
on 12 October. On 15 October they were
joined by the carriers and the beach demolition
and bombardment and fire support
groups which had sortied from Manus on 12
October. On 14 October information was
received from guerrilla sources that there
were no underwater obstacles off the beaches
between Abuyog and Tacloban. Although
the northern Surigao Strait was mined, it
was considered doubtful whether the same
condition existed at the southern entrances
of Leyte Gulf.71
The mine-sweeping groups
that had left Hollandia on 11 October arrived
in Leyte Gulf during the storm of the
evening of 16 October. Some of the mine
sweepers had been delayed by the storm
but were able to arrive in time to begin
sweeping the channels.72

In the early dawn of 17 October the mine
sweepers began their work on the channel
approaches to Suluan Island.73
By 0630 they
had accomplished their task and then began
to sweep the waters of the landing areas in
Leyte Gulf until the storm forced them to
suspend operations. At 1259 they resumed
sweeping with great difficulty. Until A Day,
intensive area and tactical mine sweeping
continued. The sweepers started at dawn
each day and worked continuously until
nightfall. By 19 October it was known that
the Japanese had heavily mined the approaches
to Leyte Gulf but that there were
no mines within the gulf itself. The northern
part of the main channel into the gulf,
however, was not considered safe.74
By the
same date sweeping had been completed in
the southern half, 186 mines having been
destroyed. At about 0135 on 19 October,
the destroyer supporting the mine-sweeping
units which were in the gulf struck a floating
mine and while maneuvering away from
the area struck another. The ship was disabled
and retired from action. By A Day, a
total of 227 mines had been destroyed and
a passage approximately six miles wide had
been cleared just north of Dinagat Island.
All ships were therefore directed to enter
Leyte Gulf through that portion of the
strait.75

As the mine sweepers came close to the
land, boats containing Filipinos moved out
to welcome the advance party of liberators.
The reception they met was not enthusiastic.
Admiral Oldendorf, the commanding officer
of the bombardment and fire support
group, "suspected that some might have
come seeking information so detained them
aboard their respective ships. . . . Directed
no further patriots be taken aboard ship."76

Underwater Demolition Teams

The naval plans for the amphibious phase
of the operation contemplated the use of
seven underwater demolition teams--three
to cover the northern coast beaches and

--57--

four to cover the southern beaches. The
teams, starting A minus 2 (18 October),
were to locate underwater obstructions and
detonate mines. On 18 and 19 October the
underwater demolition teams made a reconnaissance
of the landing areas, accompanied
by destroyers which bombarded the
shores. The two days' reconnaissance disclosed
no underwater obstacles or mines in
the vicinity of the proposed landing beaches.

The Convoy Enters Leyte Gulf

By the evening of 19 October the preliminary
operations were almost completed.
The beaches had been surveyed and found
suitable for landing; mines had been cleared
from most of the main approach channel;
and the entrances to Leyte Gulf had been
secured.77

All ships were to be prepared to attach
paravanes (mine-cable cutting devices) on
signal at any time after noon on 19 October.78
Since the mine sweepers had not sufficiently
cleared the gulf, paravanes were
attached preparatory to entering it. The
mine sweepers were to have escorted the
convoy into the area, but since they would
not be ready for about two hours, the entry
was ordered to be made without them. The
convoy hugged the Dinagat shore line so
closely that the distance from the center of
the formation to the shore was only 3,800
yards.79
Some of the ships did not see the
signal light which had been placed on
Dinagat Island by the 6th Rangers and were
delayed on that account.

The convoy advanced without incident
toward the target area. On the 18th Admiral
Kinkaid radioed General MacArthur that
the operations were going well, though the
storm had somewhat delayed matters, and
the General was made "welcome to our
city."80
MacArthur in reply said that he was
"glad indeed to be in your domicile and
under your flag. It gives me not only confidence
but a sense of inspiration," and, probably
thinking of the many arduous months
of planning and amphibious operations, he
added, "As Ripley says believe it or not we
are almost there."81

As the convoy came ever closer to the
target, the atmosphere aboard the vessels
became more and more tense. By 1800 on
19 October most of the vessels had arrived
outside the gulf. The Far Shore was now
near and could be seen vaguely in the distance.
On board one of the vessels Protestant
and Catholic evening prayers were broadcast
over the address system. Some of the
men felt that it gave them a lift, but many
felt that they were being administered the
last rites of their church.82

All vessels arrived on schedule. Because
the mine barrier in the entrance had not
been completely cleared, the ships entered
the gulf somewhat to the south of the center
of the entrance, avoiding the main channel
and keeping close to the northern point of
Dinagat Island. Fears that strong ebb tides
might impede progress of the slower vessels
through the entrance proved groundless.
Paravanes were retained until arrival in the
transport areas, but no mines were encountered.83

--58--

Naval plans called for bombardment of
the enemy-held shores on A minus 2 (18
October), but because the water areas had
not been completely swept for mines by
that time, ships could not reach the bombardment
area. On A minus 1, bombardment
was chiefly for the purpose of providing
effective support and coverage for the
underwater demolition teams. However,
many of the defenses and installations of the
enemy on or near the landing beaches, including
buildings and supply dumps, were
neutralized or destroyed.

By the afternoon of 19 October, when it
had become apparent to the Japanese that
the Americans had returned to the Philippine
Islands, General Suzuki put his defense
plan into effect. He ordered the 16th Division
to annihilate the American force,
and, failing that, to interfere as much as possible
with the use of Leyte airfields by the
American Army. The mobile units, including
two battalions from the 30th Division,
were to speed to Leyte as fast as possible.
Finally, the headquarters of the 35th Army
was to move to Ormoc on the west coast of
Leyte on the 23d or 24th of October.84

Through the night of 19-20 October,
destroyers near the shore continued to shell
the Japanese forces on land. The American
forces were safely within Leyte Gulf--A
Day had arrived.