Army leaders visit Civil War battle site at Cold Harbor to learn lessons for future

March 08, 2010|By By Hugh Lessig | 247-7821

The war drags on as political pressure mounts back home. Troops are stretched thin. A decisive, end-it-all victory isn't happening.

This isn't the latest news from Afghanistan. The year is 1864 and the scene is up the road near Richmond.

And therein lies a possible parallel.

Today, Army leaders who fight wars with night-vision goggles and aerial drones will find out what they can learn from the ghosts of the Civil War.

They will tour the battlefield at Cold Harbor, a brutal and chilling conflict, and review subsequent maneuvers that brought Union and Confederate forces to Petersburg.

The tour sets the stage for a conference in Williamsburg on Wednesday and Thursday.

The Training and Doctrine Command Senior Leaders Conference will bring together representatives of the various Army schools — TRADOC is headquartered at Fort Monroe in Hampton.

The conference will include discussion of the Army Capstone Concept, a guiding document on how to think about future conflicts in today's uncertain and complex world.

But some lessons of war transcend time, said William Glenn Robertson. He directs the Combat Studies Institute at the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center in Fort Leavenworth, Kan., and will lead the tour.

"What it takes to advance — that hasn't changed whether you're a Roman legion soldier or a soldier fighting in Afghanistan," said Robertson, a Suffolk native. "You're motivating people to do something they normally wouldn't do."

Whether the year is 1864 or 2010, breakdowns in communication can be disastrous. And it never helps when top generals have a dysfunctional working relationship.

All that was in play during the campaign that included Cold Harbor.

"These are two weary armies in the midst of a long war and you can draw modern parallels," Robertson said.

Robertson is a Civil War scholar. With this year's conference at Kingsmill — and knowing the rich history of his home state — the Cold Harbor-Petersburg connection seemed fitting.

Consider what happened.

The Civil War was in its third year in June 1864 when Confederates under Gen. Robert E. Lee went up against Northern troops under Gen. George Meade.

Well, technically.

Although Meade commanded his soldiers, traveling with him was his superior, Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, and it was Grant who wanted to press the attack. Meade had bested Lee at Gettysburg in 1863 and he didn't care for Grant looking over his shoulder.

The Northern troops were exhausted and morale was low. In digging trenches at Cold Harbor, they came across skeletal remains from the Battle of Gaines' Mill in 1862. On the home front, President Abraham Lincoln was set to be nominated for re-election in a matter of days and wanted a victory.

Cold Harbor turned out to be a nightmare for the North. Thousands of Yankee troops were killed or wounded in a hopeless assault against Confederate positions.

But after a period of rest, Grant came up with another plan. He disengaged his Army from Lee — no small feat — and crossed the James River with eye toward taking Petersburg to the south.

The plan worked beautifully. Federal troops gathered resources to bridge the James, formed a rear guard and established a blocking position for the trip to the river.

The lesson?

"In the midst of a big war, there are a lot of casualties, people are exhausted and they recognize the political implications of failure," Robertson said. "They are under pressure and there is a disaster. Then they rest and they learn."

But the lesson doesn't end here.

Once the federal troops crossed the James, "they forgot why they came, because they don't take Petersburg," Robertson said.

Grant essentially "sub-contracts" out the Petersburg attack, led by the sickly Gen. William F. "Baldy" Smith, who was suffering from dysentery and blazing headaches. He was hesitant to attack Petersburg on June 15. When he finally moved, it was too late. The federal troops did not take the city.

"What could have been done on the 15th was impossible on the 18th," Robertson said.

So the Union learned, and then they stopped learning.

"Learning is continuous," he said. "People just don't do what you want them to do. Things degrade even though the plan is wonderful. You can't ever let up."

So who was at fault here? Blame Grant for not being hands-on, or blame Smith who was either too sick or too cautious.

A few Army brass might weigh on that subject today.

"We use staff rides to illuminate our problems in a non-threatening way — where you're talking about dead generals, not live ones," Robertson said.