Syria and Lebanon

This is the former blogging site for Next Century Foundation articles on Syria. We have migrated to a new website and blogging platform, and can now be found at:
https://nextcenturyfoundation.wordpress.com/category/syria/

Thursday, March 19, 2015

Ambassador Hambley argues that the American led coalition has no real strategy with regard to dealing with the Isis insurgency. While some view ISIS as a medieval organisation, its ability to entice foreign thrill-seeking fighters through the employment of New Media strategies propels them into the 21st century:

Wednesday, March 18, 2015

The policies of
the US and the coalition in the Syrian civil war have been met with disdain by
Syrian opposition leader, Khaled Khoja. In a speech in France last
week, he described US plans to arm Syrian rebels over the next three years as a
“joke” and claimed that coalition support for Syrian rebels is flimsy in
comparison to the backing that President Assad has from his Russian and Iranian
allies.

Khoja does have
a point; the West has repeatedly voiced its support for moderate Syrian rebels but
has also repeatedly failed to live up to its promise to make any serious
impact. The coalitions’ contribution pales in comparison to the financial
strength ISIS enjoy, reportedly generating US$2million
in revenue per day, according to the International Business Times. Whilst Khoja
claims Assad’s forces are being significantly aided with men and aircraft from
Iran. As the coalition’s involvement focuses on the destruction of ISIS, Assad is also effectively being indirectly aided in
the conflict.

US Secretary of State, John Kerry stated that
“we will have to negotiate in the end”, enforcing the view that Assad’s
position has strengthened. The issue is: now that his position has strengthened
and he no longer appears close to defeat, the negotiation and the solution is
likely to have to involve him. This puts negotiators in a difficult position of
trying to re-build a new government that involves Assad. ISIS has indirectly
sealed the fate of Assad and Syria.
Despite this, the opposition are unwilling to budge on their stance and are not
keen on negotiating with Assad.

Clearly the
defeat of ISIS has become the focus of coalition forces but more pressure needs
to be exerted on Assad and Russia
if any solution between other forces is ever to be reached. The rise of ISIS in
Syria
was a symptom of the civil war, and a power vacuum in some areas has allowed
them to creep in and commandeer power and control. If there is any hope of a
resolution, the roots of the conflict need to be addressed. His response, on
Syrian television, to comments made by Kerry was telling: “Any talk on the
future of the Syrian President is for the Syrian people and all the
declarations from the outside do not concern us”. He is in a strong enough
position at this point to dismiss the vague olive branch that Kerry has
extended.

Despite Khoja’s
best efforts at raising support, there is little left of the Free Syrian Army
who seemed to have faded into obscurity. The money and success of more extreme
groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS has
led to thousands leaving the Free Syrian Army to join them. The lack of notable
coalition backing can be blamed for this however it is still not too late to
act.

Without the
financial and military backing needed for success, the lure of ISIS becomes greater. Likewise, success of Assad’s forces
makes joining any moderate rebel groups less appealing. There is no end in
sight to the conflict as it stands but with over 200,000 dead and millions left
homeless, we cannot simply assume that there can be no solution. Stefan de Mistura who obsessively pursued the Aleppo ceasefire has
suffered a huge setback after the rebels rejected the UN brokered plan. Backing
for rebels must be increased. Pressure on Assad is an important part of the
battle against ISIS in Syria; if his position is weakened, he is more likely to
enter into some form of negotiation - although the chances of that will be slim
- thus allowing for a more focused effort against ISIS. A significant show of
strength from any rebel faction could exert this pressure.

Friday, February 20, 2015

Well talk about the leopard changing his spots. Interesting I guess. What do you make of this complete about face by the former US Ambassador? Is he a moral coward or a realist?

Robert Ford

Once a top booster, ex-U.S. envoy no longer backs arming Syrian rebels

In recent weeks, Ford, the former U.S. ambassador to Syria who made
news when he left government service a year ago with an angry critique of Obama
administration policy, has dropped his call to provide weapons to the rebels.
Instead, he’s become increasingly critical of them as disjointed and
untrustworthy because they collaborate with jihadists.

Thursday, February 12, 2015

Syrian Refugee Crisis – Challenges to Humanitarianism

The following report
is from Ms Eva M. Doerr, Junior Research Fellow at the Next Century Foundation:

I have recently returned from a journey to the Syrian border
in an effort to assess the humanitarian situation and requirements of Syrian
refugees in Turkey as well as arrange and manage cross-border distribution of aid
into Syria.

The Syrian civil war is entering its fifth year, the humanitarian
situation is atrocious and it seems there is little hope for the imminent
resolution of this conflict – which has seen levels of truly extraordinary
violence. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) over ten million people are in need of assistance
with 7.6 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Syria and at least
3.2 million who have already fled the country. These figures are inevitably
arbitrary. The NCF believes the number of IDPs to be higher and refugee
numbers, particularly in Lebanon, are possibly severely underestimated by the
UN. According to the latest UN figures for registered refugees Turkey hosts 1.6
million Syrian refugees, Lebanon 1.1 million, Jordan 600,000, Iraq 200,000. We
reiterate, these are registered refugees only. The pressure placed on these host
countries’ economies has left them at breaking point. The civilian population
bears the brunt of the burden.

Humanitarian actors, whose efforts should at least be guided
by the four principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence, face
an array of challenges when attempting to alleviate the suffering of civilians
in the midst of ongoing conflict and violence. Along the Syrian-Turkish border,
there are 100 IDP camps housing 160,000 people and since the beginning of the
conflict both international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and local
organisations have been involved in managing the provision of aid through cross-border
operations from Turkey.

Those affected by the conflict in Syria face the burden of
border closures by some of Syria’s neighbour countries, who are struggling to
absorb the immense flow of people into their often already fragile economic,
social and political systems as well as restrictions of people’s movement in
besieged areas of Syria. It is estimated that currently around 220,000 people
are affected by restriction of movement policies, and there is growing evidence
that these have become a military tactic of belligerents in the conflict and
militia groups who use the social pressure of the growing humanitarian crisis for
personal gain.

For humanitarian organisations operating in and around
Syria, one of the most pervasive challenges is lack of access. Strict visa
regulations and the high-risk of travel in Syria make it extremely difficult for
INGOs to operate, demonstrated by extensive media coverage of the active
targeting and kidnapping of humanitarian workers. According to UN OCHA, 298
security incidents involving aid workers were recorded between January 2013 and
August 2014 across the wider MENA region. However and perhaps contrary to the perception
fostered by media sources, it is local staff that face the highest risk. Given
the security threat, INGOs are required to work through local implementing
partners, which pose obstacles to both needs assessments prior to, as well as
monitoring activities during and after, the provision of aid.

A further and perhaps more striking constraint to
humanitarian efforts are the advances of ISIS and the group’s control of huge
swaths of land in both Syria and Iraq as large governmental and
non-governmental donors impose undue restrictions on these areas. In accordance
with the global anti-terror campaign, no aid flows into governorates controlled
by the group amid the looming suspicion of funding ‘anti-Western’ militias. Despite growing donor reluctance and fatigue,
ISIS expansion has brought humanitarian actors into
direct conflict with armed opposition groups as in Deir-ez-Zor. Not only has
fighting blocked access to the governorate, but it has prompted both sides to block
humanitarian access (ISIS halts humanitarian access to opposition-controlled regions,
whilst these opposition groups block humanitarian assistance to those in areas
governed by ISIS).

The
Turkish government is another actor that places further restrictions on aid
flows from its territory into areas in Syria that are controlled by the
Syrian Government – Assad is a longstanding political rival of Erdoğan – and
the Kurds. Turkish-Kurdish relations have remained tense because the Kurdish
party, the PKK, continues to struggle to build a Kurdish nation, partly on
Turkish soil.

Given these numerous political obstacles, the
number of governorates in which humanitarian agencies can operate and
distribute equipment has now shrunk considerably. It is remarkable that part of
the area considered accessible and ‘easy’ to operate in is currently under the
jurisdiction of al-Nusra Front, which remains on top of the US list of terror
organisations. Doing business with al-Nusra would have been a lot less acceptable
before ISIS came to prominence and seemingly altered the scale of ‘good’ and
‘bad’.

The Syrian conflict is a prime example that demonstrates the
changing nature of conflict from interstate to intrastate war, which has led to
increased challenges for humanitarian actors not to act in breach of
humanitarian protection principles. In the case of Syria, non-governmental
organisations face multiple restrictions both through donor countries and other
territories that function as operations bases. In the context of nation states
and national sovereignty, the capacity of humanitarianism is often reduced to a
minimum and the space in which INGOs can operate whilst sticking by their
principles is marginal. As lines between civilians and combatants increasingly
blur, it becomes difficult to legitimise aid allocations
and guarantee that equipment and currency does not merely end up in the pockets
of militants, but aids those in need of protection.