The European Union and Relationships
Within Ireland,
by Jeson Ingraham

The following is the first draft of an article contributed by Jeson Ingraham who, at the time of writing, was a temporary intern student at INCORE (INitiative on Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity). The text is based on an essay
written by the author during a course of study on the BA in Peace
and Conflict Studies degree at the University of Ulster at Magee.
The views expressed
in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of the members of
the CAIN Project. The CAIN Project would welcome other material which meets
our guidelines for contributions.

The European Union and Relationships
Within Ireland

by Jeson Ingraham

Introduction

The European Union (EU) has undergone
a number of profound changes in the past two decades and further
changes in the nature of the EU are set to occur. The proposed
expansion of the number of member states, the introduction of
a single currency in 1999, and the pooling of sovereignty will
have far-reaching implications for all the member states. Europe
has also directly and indirectly influenced the search for a political
settlement in Northern Ireland.

For centuries the conflict in Ireland
has been viewed in a narrow context. The conflict was seen mainly
in terms of the relationship between Ireland and England. England's
military conquest of Ireland was to be followed by a political
and economic dominance that for many years denied Ireland an independent
voice in Europe. The geographic and political obscurity of Ireland
is exemplified in the statement that it was an "island behind
an island" (O'Conner, March 9, 1998).

However, the supranational EU has had,
and will have, a considerable impact on the economic, social,
and political life of people in both Northern Ireland and the
Republic of Ireland. The addition of the European context to
Northern Ireland's political problems has the scope for further
positive impact. Nevertheless, there remains the possibility
that disagreement on Europe's role in Northern Ireland's affairs
might reinforce divisions and tensions which exist between both
communities. Ultimately, the extent to which Europe has, and
will have, an impact on North / South relations will indicate
whether or not the EU will be able to encourage a positive political
settlement in Northern Ireland. To answer this question properly
it is necessary to examine: developments in North / South relations
since Ireland's and the UK's entry into the then European Economic
Community (EEC) in 1973; unionist and nationalist reactions to
the EU's involvement in Northern Ireland's affairs; and finally
the role the EU is likely to take in the future.

The European Union's Impact on Anglo-Irish
and North-South Relations

Historically, Ireland has been overly
dependent on Britain economically, and the Irish government realised
that entry into the EEC could significantly reduce that dependence.
Despite this realisation, in 1963 Ireland withdrew its application
to join the EEC mainly because Britain had decided to withdraw
its own application (O'Conner, February 9, 1998). This event
highlighted both Ireland's dependence on Britain and the reality
that this economic dependence would only be reduced after both
countries had joined the EEC. In the meantime, the Irish government
prepared itself for EEC membership. Both countries finally joined
in 1973.

Remarkably, Ireland had drastically
reduced its reliance on trade with Britain. In a period of fifty
years, the percentage of Irish exports to Britain declined from
98 per cent in 1922, to 58 per cent in 1973. The most rapid reduction
occurred between 1958 and 1973, when it dropped from 80 per cent
to 58 per cent (O'Conner, February 9, 1998). These were not the
only events which helped show that Ireland was shedding its "inferior"
status in relation to Britain. In 1979, Ireland joined the European
Monetary System (EMS) even though Britain did not. In this decision,
the Irish government expressed confidence that the EMS would be
strong enough for the Irish Pound to end its subservient fiscal
relation to the British pound (Sharp, February 23, 1998).

As Ireland looked to Europe changes
were not only economic but political and psychological as well.
In his book, Ireland and the Irish, John Ardagh commented,
the EU has "enabled the old unequal face-to-face relationship
with Britain to change into a new, more relaxed partnership, within
a wider club where both are equal members; and this has eased
the old Irish complex about the English" (Ardagh, 1994; 328).
In the case of Northern Ireland, this new attitude allowed the
British and Irish governments to forge ahead and seek agreement
in documents such as the Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985),
the Downing Street Declaration (1993), the New Framework
for Agreement (1995), and The Agreement (1998).

Unfortunately, there is a fine line
between Anglo-Irish relations and North-South relations. Although
the majority population in Northern Ireland refer to themselves
as British, developments between the unionist controlled government
of Northern Ireland (1922 to 1972) and the Republic were minute
in comparison to the huge forward steps made between the Irish
and British governments following the imposition of 'Direct Rule'
in 1972.

Both Northern Ireland and the Republic
of Ireland have benefited economically from membership of the
EU. For the purpose of determining EU spending, Northern Ireland
"is defined as an Objective One region, despite being ranked
as number 45 of the poorest regions in Europe" (Lyderson
and Skar, 1993; p3). However, the benefit accruing from Northern
Ireland's objective one-status must be seen in the context of
funding received from Britain. From 1989 to 1993, the EU contributed
£600 million "to Northern Ireland from the Structural
Funds through a series of programmes directed particularly towards
economic revitalisation and development " (Bell, 1993; p28).
Of this money, £106 million went towards improving transportation
infrastructure, £87 million "towards strengthening and
diversifying the region's industrial base," and £70
million were "allocated towards development in tourism and
agricultural sectors" (Bell, 1993; p28). Despite the fact
Northern Ireland has been a EU economic priority, the £600
million Northern Ireland has received over four years seems small
in comparison to the £2.4 billion "grant-in-aid"
money they receive each year from the UK (Bell, 1993; p28).

The Republic of Ireland was also given
Objective One status which allowed it to apply for a range of
funding from the EU. However, as the Republic was dealing directly
with the EU, whereas Northern Ireland's case was being presented
indirectly through Westminster, the Republic of Ireland was more
successful in terms of the total amount of funding received on
a per capita basis. The largest difference in funding resulted
in differences due to income form the Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP). However, even in the case of structural funding the Republic
of Ireland was still able to secure a higher level of funding
per capita; see Table 1. Still, only 6.4 per cent of Ireland's
Gross Domestic Profit (GDP) is coming from EU funding (Sharp,
March 23, 1998). Both Northern Ireland and Ireland have received
substantial funding from the EU, but the impact of EU funding
should not be overestimated because it represents only a small
proportion of both states' GDP. Furthermore, the EU's generous
funding will not continue, as the proposed enlargement will bring
five more countries, all of which are economically poorer than
all current EU members, into the existing 15 member union.

Since funding will inevitably decrease,
the status of North / South relations in a European context faces
some uncertainty. Commenting on the "chiefly economic"
benefits of EU membership, Peter Bell of the Northern Ireland
Office concluded it was doubtful the EU "could play a significant
political role in the Province for the time being" (Bell,
1993; p32). Although economic benefits will decrease in the future,
European integrationists believe it will be EU structures which
help transform relationships between Northern Ireland and the
Republic of Ireland.

The trading relationships between European
members have changed radically since the introduction of the single
European market in 1992. The act significantly reduced the relevance
of political borders by implementing free trade. This act is
sure to increase trade between the Republic and Northern Ireland,
a relationship which has been historically dismal. While the
Republic has been reducing its proportion of trade with Britain
in the last forty years Northern Ireland remained, until recently,
heavily dependent on trade with other parts of the UK. "Estimated
figures for 1990 are that some £6,000 million worth of goods
manufactured in Northern Ireland some £4,000 million were
exported, but of these some £2,000 million went to Great
Britain and only about £400 million to the Republic; almost
double that amount, some £750 million, was exported from
the Republic to Northern Ireland (Boyle and Hadden, 1994; p141).
Kevin Boyle and Tom Hadden note that with the development of
the single European market, "this picture is changing rapidly.
There is now an increasing flow of goods and of capital across
the border" (Boyle and Hadden, 1994; p141).

In the future, further economic co-operation
across the border is likely as, "considerable efforts are
being made by the business community both to promote and develop
these cross-border trading and organisational links and also make
it clear that they are entirely independent and without any political
or constitutional implications" (Boyle and Hadden, 1994;
pp141-142). David Donoghue, then a member of Ireland's Department
of Foreign affairs, recognised the necessity of increased trading:
"As the search for markets becomes more intense, businessmen
in both parts of Ireland will realise that they simply cannot
afford to ignore a market on their doorstep" (Donoghue, 1993;
p20). It will clearly be in the interests of both economies to
increase trade between the two regions and, in the long-term,
to establish a more mutually beneficial economic relationship.

The ending of economic custom controls
between Northern Ireland and the Republic also had the effect
of removing one particular physical manifestation of the border.
The removal of customs posts and custom officers from the 'approved'
border crossings changed the way people, north and south, viewed
and thought of the border.

Potential economic changes have increased
discussion on the possibility that all-Ireland economic developments
will also lead to all-Ireland political developments. Europe
finds its most enthusiastic supporters in Ireland, North and South.
This is due to a multiplicity of reasons, but certainly those
who identify themselves as Irish see that the diminishing importance
of the economic border may indeed have unifying political implications.
The governing party of the Irish Republic Fianna Fáil
submitted a statement to the Forum for Peace and Reconciliation
suggesting that,

The setting up of democratically mandated
North-South institutions with executive powers is essential, both
for practical reasons to serve common interests between North
and South against the backdrop of the European Single Market,
and for reasons of identity as a reflection of the Irish dimension.
(Reynolds, 1995; p9-10)

David Donoghue predicted that, "with
more and more co-operation between North and South in the European
framework, and with steady progress which is being made towards
the European Union, the relevance of the border in a political
sense will also, in time, be diminished" (Donoghue, 1993;
p21). Popular Irish politician Garret FitzGerald wrote in 1972
that membership in the European Community would "likely be
uniformly directed towards that path to a united Ireland"
(Arthur, 1993; p56). Perhaps politicians learned over time to
avoid such blunt comments which were, and still are, of much concern
to unionists.

The pro-European stance of all the major
political parties in the Republic, and the Social Democratic and
Labour Party (SDLP) in Northern Ireland, has more to do with economic
concerns than with nationalist aspirations. Unionists however
were suspect of the motivies of John Hume and the SDLP because
Hume was, and is, the most prominent pro-European member of the
European Parliament. Yet, in the past, supporters of Sinn Féin
(SF) have argued that the pro-European stance of the SDLP would
lead them to "abandon the goal of a united Ireland"
(Guelke, 1993; p79). The argument that the Irish pro-European
status is a Trojan Horse to a united Ireland can also be diluted
by those who say Europe will lead to a politics of accommodation
in which both communities will find a common European identity.
This perspective is held by Richard Kearney, then Professor of
Philosophy at University College Dublin, in his book Postnationalist
Ireland. Kearney claims that in a new Europe borders will
cease to be important, and that, "Such a focus could help
modernise nationalist politics on the island in the process, away
from the traditional emphasis on border change and territorial
unity towards a stress on the unity of peoples, of 'hearts and
minds'" (Kearney, 1997; 87).

Kearney is not without critics. Jan
Erik Grindheim, then Professor of Comparative Politics University
of Bergen, contrasts Kearney's Euro-idealism stating,

If the Europe of the Regions shall succeed,
a new European citizenship will have to be created. However,
I do not believe this will happen on any broad base in Europe,
nor do I think it will have any positive influence on the conflict
in Northern Ireland. It is not possible to replace the British
and Irish identities with a native or genuine identity [i.e. a
unity of peoples hearts and minds], and a European identity will
be hard to develop (Grindheim, 1993; p85).

In this statement, Grindheim highlights
the most fundamental reason for Unionist scepticism of the EU,
which is the issue of identity. There is a portion of the population
which believes their British identity is threatened by the evolution
of cross-border institutions. Despite the Irish desire to build
North and South structures, the extreme section of the unionist
population wishes to cut off ties to the Republic. In 1993, William
Lafferty wrote,

It is widely acknowledged that the principal
goal of the loyalists in the talks that have been conducted off
and on for the past several years is to weaken the little influence
that the Dublin government now has through the Anglo-Irish Agreement
(Lafferty, 1993; p52).

The Downing Street Declaration,
the New Framework for Agreement, and the current all-party
talks which led to Good Friday's Agreement have greatly
increased Ireland's involvement in Northern Ireland's affairs,
and assuredly will provoke more loyalist resentment to their involvement.

In 1985, following the signing of the
Anglo-Irish Agreement between Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher
and Taoiseach Garret FitzGerald of the British and Irish governments,
the Rev. Ian Paisley opened his morning church service in Belfast
praying, "Very solemnly right now we hand Mrs Thatcher over
to the devil that she might not learn to blaspheme" (Cooke,
1996; p1). It is unfair to align all unionists with the views
of Ian Paisley. His Free Presbyterian denomination is attended
by only a minority of people in a society with large numbers of
church attendees. But, it must be recognised that he is the leader
of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the third largest party
in Northern Ireland, and his theology of separation receives a
great deal of support when converted into a distinct political
philosophy. While in Church, Paisley asserted that the EU "challenged
the distinctive Christian moral standards of Northern Ireland,"
(Arthur, 1993; p59) in the political sphere he claimed, "the
whole aim of the community is to seek to weaken and eventually
destroy [Northern Ireland's] links with the rest of the United
Kingdom" (Arthur, 1993; p62).

The reasons for Euro-scepticism among
unionists should not be over simplified. Although the most excessive
objections to the EU are to be found in the DUP and various Loyalist
organisations, the largest party, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP)
also has its share of EU doubters. This section of unionism is
usually composed of those "who believe that the European
dimension is either irrelevant or is being used to further traditional
nationalist aims" (Guelke, 1993; p84). It is usually this
portion of the population which feels they have been poorly represented
by their leaders at Westminster and that they have not seen the
benefits of EU membership. Although both the North and the South
have received Objective One status, "one of the major priorities
[of EU spending] is to support areas of particular social and
economic need, and these are disproportionately inhabited by Catholics"
(Darby, 1993; p44). In the future it is possible that those
who have been politically sceptical of the EU will pragmatically
support economic developments by beneficial cross-border institutions.

It is the general support of the nationalist
community for the EU and the sometimes extreme scepticism on the
part of the unionist community which creates the possibility that
EU involvement in Northern Ireland affairs will only make divisions
deeper. Jan Erik Grindheim expanded this thought by writing,

we cannot be certain that the introduction
of the European dimension, together with the question of self-determination
and constitutional nationalism in Northern Ireland, will reduce
the conflict between the two communities. Quite the contrary,
it might reinforce the old cleavages (Grindheim, 1993; p84).

Grindheim makes a crucial point in observing
that extremists on both sides will not discriminate in their dislike
of those who seek to bring change contrary to their political
objectives. Pro-Europeans will, for example, surely feel pressure
from extreme elements within loyalism if they attempt to pursue
a political agenda which reflects issues regarding self-determination
and constitutional nationalism.

Conclusion

There are many uncertainties in trying
to predict the future impact of the EU on relationships between
the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. At least for the
short-term, it does not appear that the EU will do anything more
than affect the economic relationship between the two parts of
Ireland. In their book Northern Ireland: The Choice,
Kevin Boyle and Tom Hadden conclude that:

the European Union is unlikely in the
immediate future to become an active participant in the creation
of new constitutional structures for a place like Northern Ireland.
It may be better to think of it as a framework within which the
almost exclusive financial dependence of Northern Ireland on the
British Exchequer may gradually be diminished, and more generally
as a model for interstate co-operation on an open-ended basis
without any clear constitutional objective in view (Boyle and
Hadden, 1994; 148).

There appears to be enough pragmatic
support for the EU to increase cross-border communication between
the North and the South. The controversy arises in debating whether
or not economical accommodation will be a stepping stone to political
accommodation.

If current trends continue, the Catholic
population of Northern Ireland is expected to exceed that of Protestants
within the next thirty years. With a recognition from the British
and Irish governments in a New Framework for Agreement that the people of Northern Ireland have the right to self-determination,
it makes a united Ireland a possibility in the distant future.
Perhaps it will be in this area that the European Union has its
most prominent political impact. If the EU integration continues,
then borders will become less relevant, and in the words of Richard
Kearny, the nation state will be "leaking power both upwards
and downwards to the regional level" (Kearney, 1997; p78).
The loss of relevance of the border would not only transform
the relationship of the North and the South, but would also create
a new and positive bond between Britain and Ireland. Yet, this
prospect for future co-operation might never escape the shadows
of the Loyalist and Republican battle over their irreconcilable
objectives. If the troubles continue, the power of Europe to
assist a settlement in Northern Ireland will be stifled. Therefore,
it will require creativity and openness on the part of both communities
to seek political change in a European context.

Footnotes

1. It should be noted that more recently
Sinn Féin has become more open to the idea of European
involvement in a Northern Ireland political settlement.

Bibliography

Ardagh, John, Ireland and the Irish
(London, Penguin Books, 1994)

Arthur, Paul, Northern Ireland: A
Crucial Test for a Europe of Peaceful Regions? (Norway, Norwegian
Institute of International Affairs, 1993)

Bell, Peter, Northern Ireland: A
Crucial Test for a Europe of Peaceful Regions? (Norway, Norwegian
Institute of International Affairs, 1993)