Now Dawning: The Next Era of Middle East History

By

Gerald F. Seib

Updated Feb. 1, 2011 12:01 a.m. ET

The last six decades of Middle Eastern history can be neatly divided into three phases: The first began with Gamal Abdel Nasser's 1952 revolution in Egypt, the second with the Arab world's humiliating loss in the 1967 war with Israel and the third with the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran.

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Gamal Abdel Nasser waves to a crowd from a car in Cairo in 1956.
Associated Press

A fourth phase likely started over the weekend in Egypt. But whether the political "reform" movement in Cairo's streets turns out to be a positive or negative turn for the region—and for the U.S.—depends much on Hosni Mubarak, Mohamed ElBaradei and, to a lesser extent, Barack Obama. If history is any guide, it may take months, if not years, to know precisely the outcome.

If the Egyptian drama ends with a peaceful departure of Mr. Mubarak, followed by an actual open election in the heart of the Arab world to pick his successor, the current messiness could just possibly be replaced by a new phase of moderating stability beneficial to American interests. Almost any other outcome figures to usher in an era less friendly to the U.S.

The unrest in Egypt, coming on the heels of a similar story in less-important Tunisia, has this in common with those earlier milestones: Each of them didn't merely affect a nation but altered how the entire region thought of itself. It's no accident that each of these seminal events has centered on Egypt, the Western Arab anchor of the Middle East, or Iran, the eastern Persian anchor of the region.

What happens in those two lands has always had an outsized influence on the entire Middle East, which is why American foreign policy is and remains so fixated on what happens in those two nations.

The Nasser-led revolution was a seminal event not merely because it brought to power a military council to replace a traditional (and discredited) Arab monarchy, but because, once in power, Mr. Nasser advanced the idea of Arab nationalism.

Mr. Nasser was the force behind the 1952 revolution, though it took him nearly four years to consolidate power. Once he did, he advanced himself as the de facto leader of not just Egypt, but of a great, sprawling Arab nation still angry over the creation of the state of Israel. By banding the disparate Arab states together, he argued, a great Arab nation could emerge and take its rightful place alongside the world's superpowers.

The defeat of the armies of Egypt and its Arab partners in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war jolted that mindset. It caused both Arab intellectuals and average citizens to begin to doubt the Nasser vision of Arab nationalism. Indeed, it set off a period of self-examination and recrimination that led people to think Arab nationalism might be bankrupt.

Then, a dozen years later, came the Iranian revolution. Though it took place not in an Arab nation but in the Persian giant next door, it brought to the fore the idea that Islamic rule was a plausible alternative to Arab nationalism. The two ideas were set in competition with each other, and traditional, secular Arab leaders, including Mr. Mubarak, retrenched to preserve their power in the face of this new idea.

Now Egypt offers the prospect of another turn. But will it be a turn to an entirely new path—the creation of secular democratic rule driven by popular demand—or open the door for anti-Western forces to complete the process begun in Iran?

Crucially, the outcome of these seminal moments isn't pre-ordained. They can be steered, by forces both domestic and international.

It is often forgotten now, but the path of Iran's revolution wasn't clear at the outset. Initially, the post-revolutionary government was led by secular leftists. It took months and a national referendum to decide Iran would be an Islamic republic, and longer still to write an Islamic constitution. Ultimately, it wasn't until the impeachment of secular President Abulhassan Banisadr in 1981 that clerical dominance in the Iranian regime became clear.

Which is why the way the Egyptian drama is handled is so important. If Mr. Mubarak decides to lead an orderly transition to an open election; if Mr. ElBaradei can emerge as an effective bridging figure to a secular civilian government; if Mr. Obama can, as leader of Egypt's most important benefactor, prod all parties to such results—well, maybe the new phase is a happy one for Washington.

And if you want to think positive thoughts, consider the prescient words that Mohamed Haykal, a Nasser confidante and renowned chronicler of Egyptian affairs, said in a British newspaper interview more than three years ago: "The effect of mobiles, computers, satellites—there is a generation coming that is outside the traditional controls. Normally, generations re-create themselves. But something else is happening." That something could be positive or negative. We just don't know yet.

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