152 ,.' . L.r.. .4 " J': , . · 4.... . (I , :' PçN(j Tk · '\ j N$ ! \ :: 8 Y)óllK lf ' : @CM i-liN :: L.<tVi ! . 1.11(t; B A ó""t:NTA Ht-ND Lo1iON @ Pi1..1.0WS *17<5 ! < .. ,.,' 9\j1(' 1 }\! 'It it.. \ \., ' . '< :..: ,, ' ,, ,.. . '. " " .r!/' . .00 .". of (:-" ,< .. ' .... . . . :' o .' · . \ " 'w- :c-L.. W4 i . (( '! .....' " ., ....r.. ,; i . " .. ^.... . , " . . '. .... . / '.:. . . ':' j 'I .JI . , . " .. øø Lavish indeed-but eminently prac- tical. Balm Argenta, very likely the world's finest hand lotion, now comes to you in tiny foil pillows in a hand- somely decorated dispensing carton. There are 12 matchbook-size packets, each holding 8 individual applications, 96 pillows in all. Can't break or spill, loves travel. Tuck a packet in your purse or pocket. Carry the secret of soft, lovely hands wherever you go. A wonderful gift for bndge prizes, going aways, Harriet Beecher Stowe's b I rt h day, 0 r just to be nice. Jb / ? I L W AT SMART STORES .,i EVERYWHERE ....'-: . .. ..:: .' .t ..' .t. tt ... ,t , '... ,.' "'1 " '" , f.. .. " .t 10' :::. :: " " ".. "'. t' " If'.' ... .,.. . ..". . t' . tt't ,.... .. get it), but now things have changed. " 1 A . " P am not an merlcan puppet, re- mier Nguyen Cao K y said during his recent trip to Australia and New Zea- land. Moreover, it appears that the Vietnamese are beginning to express definite feelings of their own about when and how to negotiate with the enemy. During his trip, Ky said he was ready to SIt down and talk with Ho Chi Minh-somethIng he would probably not have said a few months ago-and though he and other high officials have stated over and over again in public that they will not negotiate directly with the Vietcong through their political representatives in the National Liberation Front, there have lately been quiet acknowledgments of the Front's existence and there seems to be at least the beginning of a willingness to include Front representatives among the parties at the con- ference table. Some Ameri- can observers here feel that these ac- knowledgments simply reflect a wish on the part of most of the top-ranking South Vietnamese to go along with the Americans in a search for peace. Others feel that it indicates a sharp change in the attitude of the South Vietnamese leaders-especially Ky, who would un- doubtedly relish sitting down and nego- tiating with the renowned Ho Chi Minh, a man more than twice his age. There is a growing assumption among the Vietnamese with whom I have talked recently that sooner or later there will be talks wIth representatives of the Front-perhaps initially on the questIon of exchanging prisoners-and that eventually, as part of a policy of national reconciliation, some Front members may even be included in the Saigon government. The possibility that the Vietnamese might negotiate a settle- ment entirely among themselves, leav- ing the Americans out, has begun to strike some South Vietnamese as one that might appeal to President Johnson, not to mention Senator Fulbright. Of the South Vietnamese who have adopt- ed this view, some-not including offi- cials in the government-are saving privately that, as a prelude to peace talks, a halt should be called to the hombing of the North, and perhaps the intensity uf the bombing In the South should be reduced, but these same in- dividuals warn that the United States must be patient, and they emphatically do not advocate the withdrawal of American troops. This, they say, is something that, along with the problem of what should be done with the very ." . substantial bases that the Americans have built in this country, should be the subject of careful negotiation. In argu- ing that the bombing of the North should cease, these people claim that it has essentially failed to accomplish its objectives and that it has been responsi- ble for driving the North Vietnamese closer to the Chinese Communists while at the same time driving the National Liberation Front closer to the North Vietnamese. Those who advance these arguments are not at all naïve about the long-term aims of the Front; in fact, in the past some of them were in favor of a much stronger United States role here, a role that migh t even have included a full and frank occupation of the country until it could be made ready, within a stated number of years, to make a real success of independence. Now, however, the best thing 'tI\ that the United States can do, they feel, is maintain its ground operations and assist the Viet- namese in their pacification and revolu- tionary-development campaigns, on the theory that a mobile and expanding operation of this sort (not in any way to be confused with the so-called "en- clave" theory of simply holding on to a few strategic areas) could do much to create an effective alternative to the Vietcong. y . ' :; . . . . W HATEVER it is that the various straws in the wind noticed here recently may be indicating) It seems clear that Ky and some of his fellow- officers are making a calculated effort to respond to the nationwide sense of fatigue and yearning for peace, espe- cially at a time when political develop- ments in Vietnam make it far more necessary than It used to be for national leaders to pay attention to what the people want. One thing the people want, even more urgently than peace and certainly more urgently than pol- itics, is cheaper rice and more of it. The price of rice, which has been rising steadily, has gone up fifty per cent in the last two months, and the grain is in extremely short supply at any price. Last year, South Vietnam, which used to export rice, had to import about three hundred and fifty thousand tons of it from the United States and close to a hundred thousand tons from Thai- land-a result of the devastation and dislocation of war. Tens of thousands of peasants who once grew rice have been forced to flee to the cities, and th us have become consumers instead of producers. And more and more of the