Thai Troubles: Combating Terror or Creating Insurgency?

Thai Troubles: Combating Terror or Creating Insurgency?

Three bombs
exploded across southern Thailand on April 3, 2005, the latest
attacks in a 15-month-old terrorist campaign that has claimed
almost 700 lives. But Thai authorities still do not know who is
behind the growing insurgency, what their motivation is, or even if
all the terrorism is due to Islamic radicals. No one claims
responsibility for the almost weekly attacks, and there is no
published evidence that the attackers originate from outside
Thailand. One thing appears certain, however: the current Thai
counter-insurgency strategy is a complete failure.

Thai authorities
and most terrorism experts suspect Islamic insurgents because the
southern Thailand provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat are
home to most of Thailand's three million strong Muslim minority.
Also, terrorists linked to Al Qaeda or Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) are
known to have traveled through southern Thailand, and Southeast
Asia's Al Qaeda mastermind, Hambali, was captured there in August
2003. The presence of JI in Thailand and the documented regional
cooperation among Southeast Asia's terrorist groups[1] are indicators that
contact with international groups is possible or even likely. But
despite the large number of insurgents captured and documents
seized, there is still no published link between the insurgency and
international terrorism.

Even if there were
no international terrorist network, Thai Muslims would have plenty
of reasons to be angry with the government in Bangkok. Their
principle complaint is a powerful sense of injustice. Thai Muslims
have been second-class citizens in their own country for centuries.
The symptoms are poverty, lack of development money when compared
to other parts of the country, limited access to government jobs,
and few education opportunities. Furthermore, Thailand's security
forces are unaccountable and act more like an occupation army than
a national security force. There are few Muslims in the military or
police, and hardly any soldiers or police speak the local Malay
dialect. Extra-judicial killings and disappearances of Thai Muslims
are endemic.

The lack of
accountability of Thai security forces is best illustrated in two
examples:

In April 2004,
108 Muslim Thai youths, armed only with machetes, were killed while
attacking heavily armed Thai police and army security posts.
Security forces shot thirty-two of the youths at point-blank range
after they fled the scene and took refuge in a mosque. Those
rioters were shot despite explicit orders from the Thai Deputy
Prime Minister in charge of security not to use force at the
mosque. No police or army officers were ever charged with crimes
related to the massacre.

In October 2004,
78 Thai Muslim demonstrators died while in police custody. Most of
the demonstrators suffocated in trucks during transport to the
police station. The others had broken necks. At the time, Prime
Minister Thaksin blamed the deaths on the fact that it was the
Muslim holy month of Ramadan and the protesters were weak from
fasting. There was an investigation, and three senior military
officials were transferred. Again, no Thai security force personnel
were ever charged with crimes related to the negligent deaths of
the demonstrators.

There is also the
possibility that the recent attacks are not all related to a Muslim
insurgency. From the beginning of the insurgency, it was apparent
that many other elements were active in southern Thailand that
might account for some of the violence, such as criminal gangs,
corrupt officials, and perhaps corrupt security forces as well. For
example, Muslim separatists were blamed for a raid on an armory
that supposedly netted them 380 M-16 rifles. But the raid on the
armory has the look of an inside job. Armories are heavily
constructed buildings, and there was no sign of forced entry.
Following the armory raid, the Muslim youths attacking the
fortified police and army units in April 2004 were armed mostly
with machetes, and none of the stolen rifles have ever turned up in
the hands of Thai Muslims.

Prime Minister
Thaksin's tactics are being condemned at home and abroad. In the
February 2005 national elections, Thaksin's party won a landslide
victory everywhere except southern Thailand, where it did not win a
single seat. At the end of that month, the U.S. State Department's
2004 Human Rights Report criticized Thailand's security forces for
excessive use of force and impunity from prosecution. Even
Thailand's neighbors are joining in the condemnation. Chairman
Achmad Muzadi, from Indonesia's largest and moderate Muslim group,
Nahdlatul Ulama, visited southern Thailand and told Thai government
officials that they hoped that Thailand's insurgent problem did not
become "an international one."

Muzadi's statement
encapsulates the problem for American policymakers. The United
States cannot stand by while heavy-handed Thai security forces
create an international terrorist problem where there was not one
before. The United States has a deep and sophisticated
military-to-military relationship with Thailand's security forces,
and it is time to use that leverage to bring more discipline to the
Thai military. Pentagon officials must closely review this
relationship and convince Thailand to emphasize human rights and
the rule of law. Furthermore, when Pentagon officials meet with
their Thai counterparts, the excessive force issue must not be
ignored or glossed over but underscored as a serious national
security problem for both countries. Members of Congress should
emphasize the issue with their counterparts in Parliament, and the
Bush Administration should stress human rights to Prime Minister
Thaksin.

The April 3 bomb
attacks are especially troubling because the timing of the attacks
was evidently coordinated and they took place outside the
traditional territory of Thai Muslims. Those characteristics
demonstrate the growing sophistication and outward focus of the
insurgency. The United States must act to help instill discipline
in Thai security forces before international terrorists become
entrenched in southern Thailand.

Dana R. Dillon is
Senior Policy Analyst in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage
Foundation.