This is a gem of a little book. Many books deal with humanism and
many books focus
on Christianity. This hook converges on both in an elaboration of what it means
to be a human being. The coverage is from an avowed Christian viewpoint.

'Why does Martin write on Christianity and Humanism? Bccassse they
cover the two
main ways of looking at life. Martin hopes that "Christians and
Humanists... take time off from digging their entrenched positions deeper and look about
them."

The book deals with four language systems: molecule-talk, the language of science; me-talk, the language of personal
experience;
us-talk and them-talk, the language of interpersonal relationships;
and God-talk,
the language of theology.

Martin addresses his remarks to the approximately one-third of the population
in England who read, God's gift to publishers. The other two-thirds lose little
sleep over the human predicament. The third who read are largely
students "who
read paperbacks as others read shopping lists, and who are
extraordinarily well-informed
on at least one side of every question." The bookish group is made up of
Christians and Humanists, both of whom claim support from the man in
the street.

Humanists have considerable excuse for their foggy idea about Cod because the
church speaks with so many incongruent voices. Martin's parody on contemporary
Christendom is succinct and right on target. At one end is the group
arguing for
correct cultic behavior (church attendance, especially at Easter and Christmas,
is the absolute minimum). At the other extreme, social involvement is the key
(church going and doctrine is optional). Somewhere in the middle is the group
stressing doctrinal formulations (the vital thing is to say the right words).
Out of this plethora of images the Humanist often perceives God not as Father
but as boss-the Victorian paterfamilias made seven times hotter.

Charles Martin, a graduate of London University,
is the author of several books, including Tangle of the Mind, Introduction to
Ethics, and Christian Origins and History. How Human Can You Get? was originally intended for Britishers, but
its contents are timely for Americans as well. In publishing the book
for Americans, InterVarsity did not Americanize the vocabulary so that words like behaviour,
programme, spoilt, and colourful remain.

Martin raises some weighty questions, throws in a dash of humor and
overall comes
up with some pretty spiffy phrases. The further one reads the better it gets.
The last two chapters are the capstone and the best of the ten.

Here is yet another book on glossolalia. Fifteen
years ago the charismatic revival burst upon the religious scene, resulting in
a steady stream of articles and honks that seems now in crescendo. I
have diligently
followed this literature, but found little change in fifteen years.
Most authors
are theologians with vested interests in maintaining a pro-tongue or antitongue
position. Scientific studies of glossolalia have been slower in
corning forward.
Yet when good scientific studies appear they are seized upon to bolster a pro
or con theological position. This rip-off of scientific data to religious ends
is all too familiar, even in cases where scientists have explicitly cautioned
against the use of their data to sustain ideologies. I am unaware of
a dispassionate
scholarly theological book on glossolalia, that gives due credence to
the available
scientific research, to the historical data, and to the religious functions of
glossolalia qua religion.

This book make an attempt at such dispassionate analysis. The editor offers us
ten chapters on glossolalia from a historical, cultural, religious,
theological,
anthropological, and linguistic point of view. The editor takes a meliorative
position, stating that the religions arguments have been polemical, while what
is needed is an analysis in perspective by those who both agree and
disagree with
the charismatics. Eight authors are theologians, almost all Southern Baptist;
one a Wheaton College anthropologist; one a University of Toronto
linguist. Thus
the author skew is both scholastically and theologically conservative
and non-representative.

The bow toward scholarship is deceptive. The editor has assembled a really fine
annotated bibliography, relatively comprehensive up to about 1971. Yet there is
a singular lack of scholarship by most of the authors. Their work is marred by
generalizations and insipid thinking. Two chapters on church history
by Bunn and
Hinson are cursory. Both ignore the magnum opus in the field:
Enthusiasm by Monsignor
Knox (Oxford, 1955); also omitted in the bibliography. The chapters on theology
and religious interpretations do not systematically review either theological
history nor religious history, offering instead personal opinion and
interpretation.
A chapter on anthropology by Mayers is acceptable, albeit cursory. It largely
paraphrases my Journal ASA review of 1968. Without personal modesty
my own review
is out of date, superceded by the work of anthropologists like Bourginoun,
Gerlach, Hine, Goodman, etc. None of the serious socio-cultural research of the past six
years is accounted for. Likewise the psychological studies of Kildahl, Maloney,
Flog, etc. are not systematically reviewed.

There is one jewel of a chapter on sociolinguistics by William J. Samarin from
the University of Toronto. He published a serious longitudinal linguistic study
of glossolalia in 1972: Tongues of Men and Angels (Macmillan), which
is the major
scientific evaluation of glossolalia extant, in my opinion. The short chapter
by Samarin in this book summarizes his major linguistic,
sociological, and theological
observations. It should whet the appetite of the reader to obtain
Samarin's book.

To my mind the major linguistic data on glossolalia are now in, i.e., the work
of Samarin. The psychological data are still sparse, limited primarily by the
biases of population sampling in the reported studies, and the inferences to be
drawn from skewed populations. The sociocultural data, primarily from
Bourginoun
and Gerlach, is fragmentary and not sufficiently explanatory. Classical history of
ecstatic religious experience is well represented by Knox, although
the scattered
historical sources could profitably he drawn together. A current
history of ecstatic
religion is missing. As I observe the scene, glossolalia was but the precursor
of the revival of mystical religion, which is the larger religious
movement beyond
fundamentalistic charismatics. For example, we've seen the Jesus
movement, eastern
mysticism, meditation, group sensitivity encounter, and onward, all
of which represents
a reemphasis on the experiential aspect of religion. This larger perspective,
of which glossolalia is but a part, is missed in this book.

In sum, this book sets out to place glossolalia in perspective. The
goal is noble,
but the effort is marred by trite theology, inadequate scholarship,
and a myopic
perspective.

Reviewed by E. Mansell Pattison, Department of Psychiatry and Human Behavior,
University of California, Irvine

Professor Erling Jnrstad has given us a "reader" relating
to the multi-faceted
phenomenon known as neo-Pentecostalism. He is Chairman of the
Division of History,
Philosophy, and Religion at St. Olaf College, Northfield, Minnesota,
and has written
The Politics of Doomsday and That New-Time Religion: The Jesus
Revival in America.

This handbook draws together much helpful contemporary material from those who
have written on both sides of the Pentecostal question. It naturally
affords the
reader a perspective that is relatively unbiased since several viewpoints are
presented. In fact, Jorstad works on the assumption that neo-Pentecnstalism is
one of the most criticized and defended and yet least understood movements in
contemporary Christianity. The editor intends to expose the reader to various
writings that reflect the several differing attitudes concerning the nature and
significance of the Charismatic revival. He includes writings that
present "accurately,
clearly, and responsibly" the major themes of the movement (p.
6). His selection
of materials is solid and representative of the many viewpoints
within the movement
itself.

The first two chapters consist of excerpts aimed at clarifying for the reader
the history of Pentecostalism and specifically the rise of neo-Pentecostalism
in the United States. The third chapter deals with the various
controversies that
have arisen since the appearance of neoPentecostalism. These initial chapters
are written by Professor Jorstad himself, but beginning with Chapter
Four ("The
Mid-Week Prayer Meeting") the role of Jorstad shifts to that of
editor, and
he exposes the reader to selected and edited readings from various sources both within and outside of neo-Pentecostal writings.

The controversial issue of "speaking in tongues" is dealt
with in Chapter
Seven (pp. 77-99). Here the editor presents selections from Don Basham, Larry
Christenson and Kilian McDonnell. In its broader aspect, the
discussion of spiritual
gifts embraces three chapters of the book (pp. 77-134). Of particular interest
to pastors is the chapter entitled "What the Churches Can
Do" (154-156),
a section in which the editor gives some sound advice to those who are having
to deal with the issues being raised by the Charismatic revival.
These guidelines
are brief and to the point but are of sufficient depth that they can become the
basis for some genuine discussion and positive action.

Agrimson's book is an anthology of articles that deals with the range
of spiritual
gifts and the ways these relate functionally to the body of Christ.
It, too, attempts
to give perspective to the Charismatic movement. The six essays
presented in the
book are written by recognized authorities in this area of study. The
editor contributed
the introduction and the concluding essay. Other contributors are
Dwayne A. Priebe
("Charismatic Gifts and Christian Experience in Paul");
Paul C. Sonnack
("A Historical Perspective on Some Contemporary Religious
Movements");
Johannes A. Schiller ("The Sociology of Charismatic Movements"); John
P. Kildahl ("Six Behavioral Observations about Speaking in Tongues");
Arnold Bittlinger ("Baptized in Water and in Spirit").
Kildahl's article
is taken from a recent book published by Harper & Row (The
Psychology of Speaking
in Tongues, 1972). Bittlinger is noted for his work in the area of Charismatic
renewal, particularly his recent 1)00k entitled Gifts and Ministries (Eerdmans,
1973).

In 1966 three Southern Baptist Seminary professors attempted to put glossalalia
"in the round" by presenting perspectival essays on the phenomenon
in terms of its biblical, historical and psychological dimensions
(see Frank Stagg,
et al, Glossalalia: Tongue Speaking in Biblical, Historical, and Psychological
Perspective, Abingdon, 1967). Presently Agrimson, who is President of
the Southeastern
Minnesota District of the American Lutheran Church, has enlarged the focus to
include a variety of additional approaches being made to the
Charismatic revival.
His writers offer the biblical, historical, sociological,
psychological, experiential
and pastoral dimensions of the subject. This enlargement of scope is itself a
witness to the increasing interest in the phenomenon associated with
the Charismatic
movement, and various new ways being suggested for studying it.
Increasingly, as more and more Christians are becoming caught up in charismatic
renewal, numerous books are appearing that treat the subject from the vantage
point of widely differing disciplines. Such an approach gives a fresh
perspective
and will go a long way toward bringing genuine understanding.

The subtitle of this book indicates that it is a comparative study of science
and religion, but the focus of the comparison is primarily on the
roles of paradigms
and models in science and religion. In this study Barbonr emphasizes
three themes.
The first is that language has a diversity of functions. Scientific discourse
has usually been pointed to as the norm for all other forms of
discourse because
of its objectivity, but, Barbour
argues, "every type of language has its own logic appropriate to
its specific
purposes." Whereas some have taken this theme off in the
direction of conceptual
relativism and Wittgensteinian fideism1 Barbour holds that religious language
has cognitive functions and that there is no "sharp contrast between the
objectivity of science and the subjectivity of religion."2
Although religious
language has some distinctive functions unparalleled by scientific discourse,
the contrasts with science are ones of degree and not of kind. This
claim is explored
in the second and third themes of the book: the role of models and the role of
paradigms in religion and science. An examination of these three themes serves
to support the position of critical realism that Barbour advocates in
both religion
and science.
Critical Realism

Briefly, critical realism with respect to models holds that models are neither
literal pictures of reality (naive realism) nor are they mere
dispensable psychological
aids that have no crucial role in theory making or scientific
discovery. The critical
realist takes models seriously but not literally. With respect to paradigms the
attitude of the critical realist is a mediating one between naive objectivism
and conceptual relativism. Critical realism rejects the textbook view
of the growth
of science and accepts most of the major theses of Kuhn put forward in his The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions3 but with important qualifications.

Those who are familiar with Barbour's earlier work Issues in Science
and Religion4
will expect a work that is both synoptic with respect to the problems
he discusses
and synthetic with respect to the conclusions that he offers. If this work is
approached with those expectations, one will not be disappointed. In
several ways
this book is an amplification of some of the issues raised by himself in Issues
and others in two collections of essays edited by Barbour,5 The main thrust of
Myths, Models and Paradigms is the exposition of critical realism via
the comparisons
of the roles that models and paradigms play in science and religion.
Surrounding
this discussion are a constellation of related issues which include discussions
on the distinctions between metaphor and symbol; the use of analogy
in metaphor,
myth and parable; the cognitive function of myths; a critique of
Bultmann's demythologizing;
the adequacy of Ian Ramsey's "disclosure models" and John
Hick's version
of "seeing as" - "experiencing as" and Barbour's
own suggestion
of viewing the theory ladenness of experience as "interpreting as."
Some of the other specific issues will be commented on after a
further elaboration
of Barbour's critical realism.

When Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions first appeared in 1962, it caused a stir especially among followers
of Karl Popper, because it was believed that Kuhn's account of
scientific revolutions
was too subjective, irrational and led to conceptual relativism. While Popper
and his followers had argued that falsification was decisive in overthrowing a
theory, Kuhn maintained that falsifications are never viewed as such
unless other
conditions obtained-i.e., there was a crisis and an alternative
theory that handled
the anomalies of the present theory was on the horizon. The criteria
for assessment
of the paradigm are dependent on or relative to the paradigm; thus,
any two paradigms
are incommensurable. Imre Lakatos, a follower of Popper, rather
critically summed
up the results of Kuhn's analysis as follows:

For Kuhn scientific change - from one paradigm to another is a
mystical conversion
which is not and cannot be governed by rules of reason and which falls totally
within the realm of the (social) psychology of discovery. Scientific change is
a kind of religious change.6
There are no rational standards for their comparison. Each paradigm
contains its
own standards. The crisis sweeps away not only the old theories and rules hot
also the standards which made us respect them. The new paradigm
brings a totally
new rationality. There are no superparadigmatic standards. The change is a hand
wagon effect. Thus in Kuhn's view scientific revolution is irrational, a matter
of mob psychology.7

In response to criticisms like these, Kuhn has modified and clarified many of
his views. Barbour's own position of critical realism is a synthesis
of the best
insights of both Kuhn and his critics. Barbour's position has three prominent
modifications of Kuhn's view. First, although Kuhn and Barbour are in agreement
that all data are theory-laden, Barbour disagrees that rival theories
are incommensurable
because of it. Barbour believes that there is "a common core of overlap in
observation languages" which allows for a common ground for
interparadigmatic
discussion. This concession would account for the fact that there is a residue
of some observation statements and laws which survive scientific
revolutions and
are incorporated within the new "research programme". This would also
tend to account for the textbook version of science which sees science as one
uninterrupted line of progress and continual accretions of knowledge. Second,
Kuhn has been criticized for his views about the relevance of falsification to
the refutation of theories and paradigm shifts, and Barbour agrees
with this criticism
to the extent that he allows that observation does exert some control over the
falsification of theories. The control that observation exercises over theories
(falsification risk) is inversely proportional to the
comprehensiveness, generality
or scope of a theory. Third, Kuhn held that there are no rules for
choosing among
research programmes, and Barbnur agrees with this but suggests that there are
criteria for assessment which are not applied in any rigorous way or reducible
to formal rules.

The criteria that Barbour offers for the rational assessment are apparently to
be paradigm independent, but he offers no argument for this.8 The
criteria (simplicity,
internal consistency and systematic interrelatedness, extensibility
or fruitfulness,
and comprehensiveness) are also the familiar ones.9

Barbour's critical realism as applied to models is
much indebted to Mary Hesse10 in his discussion of their status and function in science. As mentioned above,
the critical realist takes models seriously but not literally. Barbour argues
that the instrumentalist account of the role of models fails to account for the
tenacity and commitment that the scientist shows and has for his
models, theories
and research programmes. Barbour agrees with Kuhn over against
Lakatns that scientists
make ontological and not just methodological commitments in these
areas. But this
commitment is not to exclude it or make it immune from criticism. Both of these
aspects, ontological commitment and critical reservation are concisely put in
this quote from Leonard Nash:

We must not then take a theoretic model [an imaginative mental construct that
attempts to represent symbolically an unknown process] too literally; indeed we
may err by taking the model too literally. But, as we would realize
the full heuristic
power inherent in it, we must take the model very seriously . . . .
If our models
are to lead us to ask, and seek answers for, new questions about the world, we
must regard them as something more than 'logical super-floities',
'illicit attempts
at explanation', 'convenient fictions', or the like. The lesson of scientific
history is unmistakable. To the hypothetical entities sketched by our theories
we must venture at least provisional grants of ontologie status.
Major discoveries
are made when invisible atoms, electrons, nuclei, viruses, vitamins, hormones,
and genes are regarded as existing.11

Falsification

Of the specific issues surrounding Barbour's comparative study one of the most
interesting is the issue of falsification in science and theology. In a section
titled "on the falsification of beliefs",12 Barbour neatly summarizes
the old debate concerning Flew's challenge to specify the conditions for falsification
as a condition for meaningful assertions.13 One response to this
challenge along
Wittgensteinian lines is to point out the diversity of functions that language
has and that all criteria are relative to the language game in which
they occur.
Religious language has its own logic appropriate to its specific purposes. This
is the response of Wittgensteinian fideism and Barbour rejects it on the same
grounds that he rejects conceptual relativism with regard to paradigms.
A more interesting response is to question Flew's challenge itself.
This is Barbour's
strategy. Barbonr, however, confuses two issues here. Flew's challenge embodies
a thesis about meaning an assertion, to be meaningful, must be
specifiably falsifiable.
That this thesis is untenable is shown by the work of Wittgenstein and Austin.
But even if religious assertion are shown to be meaningful because
they are part
of a language game that is played, it would still leave open their
cognitive status.
Karl Popper never intended his falsification thesis as a thesis about meaning
but he did think that it provided a line of demarcation between
science and nonscience.14
It is this issue that Barbour must, and in fact does, address if he
is to maintain
that the difference between religion and science is one of degree and
not kind.

The first part of Barbour's attack is to point out
that, "The demand for the specification of falsifying
conditions seems unreasonable, since it cannot be met by scientific theories,
especially those of great generality.15 A theory that is faced
with a falsifying
instance may modify some auxiliary hypothesis, make an ad hoc adjustment in the
theory or simply set the falsification instance aside as an anomaly.
"Crucial
experiments" are dubbed as such by history and are hardly ever recognized as such when they occur. But a real problem arises when it
is realized
that the crucial part of science, first order principles, are unfalsifiable. In
this case it is not so much not being able to specify what will
falsify them because
it is difficult to see, but rather because nothing is allowed to count against
them. John F. Miller holds the position that there is a logical
similarity between
religion and science because they both have unfalsifiable first principles.

As in religion with its first order non-falsifiable statements,
nothing is allotted
to count against these important first-order scientific principles which have
been discussed (causality, determinism, the principle of rectilinear
propagation
of light, the law of the conservation of energy). Therefore, religion
and science
are logically similar in this respect: both have within their
conceptual frameworks
or world-views non-verifiable principles of first order status which
are principles
in accordance with which inferences are drawn and evidence is adduced.16

Barbour objects to Miller's thesis on two grounds however. The first
is that Barbour
believes that, "A prolonged accumulation of anomalies or ad hoc amendments
would, I believe, bring about reformulations of the principle itself
or qualifications
of its universality".17 He notes that Miller bases his case for
quantum determinism
largely on the writings of Planck, but this now represents a minority
view among
scientists and philosophers. Thus, not all physicists assume that determinism
must hold in the atomic domain. The second reason for objecting to
Miller's position
is that Miller, along with many others who have written on the
subject, have assumed
that falsifiability and unfalsifiability are mutually exclusive
categories, when
in fact a theory's resistence to falsification is proportional to its
generality.
Thus, on Barbour's analysis it is no longer necessary to see religion
and science
as either contrasting or logically similar but on a spectrum. And a further consequence
of Barbour's
view is that it completely obliterates Popper's line of demarcation.

Barbour's views on falsification then amount to this: the
specification of possible
instances of falsification is an unreasonable demand because it cannot be met.
In theories of high generality there is no piece of evidence which
"decisively
counts against" such theories, but they do "count against" it.
Like straws on a camel's back they accumulate to an extent that if
another promising
beast of burden should come along, it will be noticed that either the camel's
back is broken or is breaking. Barbour believes that this is the ease in both
religion and science. Nothing in them is immune from falsification but we may
not be able to specify that future straw which will break the camel's back.

Barbour's views are interesting and important but one wishes that he would have
addressed some other alternatives in addition to those discussed.
Are, for instance,
some of the key interpretive terms, concepts and principles
unfalsifiable because
they are definitional and not empirical? Or, on Alastair MeKinnon's view,18 does
science contain assertations which are both necessary and eontentful?
Isn't causality
really the bedrock interpretive principle which Miller claims it is? Might it
not be the case that there are certain beliefs that a scientist cannot abandon
without at the same time giving up science? As McKinnon suggests, might not the
belief that there is order in the world be such a belief which constitutes the
activity of a scientist? These are questions which Barbour does not raise but one wishes he had.

Complementary Models

Of particular interest is Barbour's discussion of complementary
models in physics
and theology. The use of complementary models in theology might seem to invite
all manner of uncritical acceptance and justification of otherwise
untenable dichotomies
in theology but, from his analysis of complementary models in physics, Barbour
suggests rules governing their use which would prohibit it. It is pointed out
that the use of complementary models does not a priori preclude searching for
a unitary model and it can be used only in situations where the models refer to
the same entity and are of the same logical type. This stipulation
has an important
consequence in that it prevents us from viewing science and religion
as complementary,
since they are not of the same logical type. Science and religion,
Barbour maintains,
are attempts at interpreting different aspects of reality and serve different
functions.

For these reasons I will speak of science and religion as alternative languages
using alternative models, and restrict the term complementary to models of the
same logical type within a given langnage.19

Despite these restrictions Barbour does see complementary models in use that do
meet these criteria. In particular, Barbour discusses Tillich's use of personal
and impersonal symbols in talking about God. Barbour also notes that
unlike complementary
models in science there is no unifying mathematical formalism that
allows at least
probabilistic prediction of particular observations in theology. In science the
inconsistency is at the level of models, not at the level of the
theory. In theology,
however, a conceptual unity is provided by theological and doctrinal schemes,
in a manner similar to the functioning of mathematical formulae.
"But their
relation to experience is more ambiguous, and no one would claim for them any
kind of predictive power on even a probabilistic basis".20

Process Theology

Barhour has a too brief discussion of the Christian paradigm and
different models
for the relationship between God and the world that should be of
interest to theologians
and philosophers of religion. Barbour's own persuasion is a variation
of process
theology which is indebted to Whitehead, Hartshorne and Cobb but is
not identical
with any of them. These modelsmonarchical, deistic, dialogie, agent and social
or processare assessed according to the above mentioned criteria for adequacy
and the process model is found to be the most adequate. Barbour mentions one of
the recent critiques of process theology by H. P. Owen. The objection
that Barhour
singles out is that a finite God is unworthy of worship and only a
necessary being
is the proper object of worship. Barbour's reply is that it is Cod's love and
not his omnipotence that inspires and justifies reverence and worship. But this
objection is one of the least substantial of three that Owen makes
and one would
have hoped that Barbour would have addressed the others also .21

Model of Divine Action

One aspect of Barbour's book that is, I think, extremely significant is the application of the insights of philosophy of action
to the action of God in nature. It is claimed in recent philosophical
psychology
that not all bodily movements are human actions; muscle spasms and
other involuntary
movements are exempt. Bodily movements can he adequately explained in terms and
categories of physiology, but human actions must refer to intentions.
A collection
of bodily movements cannot be specified as an action without a
conative intention
or purpose and context that interprets the movements. Thus, there are "two
ways of talking about a single set of events"22 that are not incompatible
but rather two languages, one being interpretive of the first. This analysis of
human action when applied analogically to God's action in nature,
results in seeing
the scientific analysis of physical nature on par with the
physiological analysis
of bodily movements, with Divine intentions providing the
interpretations of significant
events in human and cosmic history. Just as not all bodily movements are human
actions, not all events need be expressions of divine purpose, nor would they
exhaustively express God any more than the personality of an agent is
fully expressed
in any sequence of events. Using this model of God's activity, it can be seen
that God does not need gaps in nature in order to act, and the causal
explanation
is as compatible with God's activity as a physiological explanation
is compatible
with an intentional explanation of human action.

This model of Divine action has limited application in that it does not account
for all those actions sometimes ascribed to God. Miracles that contravene the
usual regularities cannot be accommodated on this model unless, as it may turn
out, these apparent contraventions are really exemplifications of the
operations
of some as yet unknown mechanism. In short, this model can account
only for what
can be accounted for in a causal language. Another feature of this model that
a classical theist might find objectionable is that God's relation to the world
is modeled on a person's relation to one's body and it fits well with
a panentheistic
model of God, John Compton who so ably presents this model in an article called
"Science and God's Action in Nature"23 presents it in
conjunction with
a process model of God, but this feature of the model is a neutral analogy and
does not mandate a process interpretation.

FOOTNOTES

1These two terms, "conceptual relativism" and "Wittgcnsteinian
fideism" are not used by Harbour but they characterize the view
that he wishes
to avoid. Conceptual relativism holds that reality, truth and meaning
are dependent
upon the conceptual scheme in which they occur. Wittgensteinian fideism is the
application of this view to religious language.2Ian C. Barbour, Myths, Models and Paradigms: A Comparative Study in Science and Religion (New York: Harper & Row,
1974), p. 5.3Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed.,
Phoenix Books
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1970).4Ian G. Harbour, Issues in Science and Religion (Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
1966; Harper Torch Books, New York: Harper & Row, 1971).5Ian G Barbour, ed., Science and Religion: New Perspectives on the Dialogue (New York: Harper & Row, 1968);
Ian C, Barbour, ed. Earth Might Be Fair: Reflections on
Ethics, Religion and Ecology (Englewood Cliffs, N,J,: Prentice-Hall, 1972).6lmre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific
Research Programmes", Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 93.7 ibid., p. 178.8Barbour in Issues mentions Ferre in connection with the following
criteria. Ferre's
argument deals with criteria for judging the adequacy of metaphysical systems.
The criteria developed out of an analysis of their function 'to unify
and "make
sense" out of ranges of ideas otherwise unrelated draw meaning
out of "blooming,
buzzing confusion"' Frederick Ferre, Language, Logic and God
(New York: Haprer
& Row, 1961; Harper Torchbooks, 1969), p. 162.9Barhour, Myths, p. 143. Cf. Barbour, Issues, pp. 144-148, 252-255; Ferre,
Language,
pp. 160-165; and Basil Mitchell, The Justification of Religious
Belief (New York:
Macmillan, 1963),10Mary B. Hesse, Models and Analogies in Science (London: Sheed and Ward Ltd.,
1963; Notre Dame, Ind.; Notre Dame University Press, 1966); and Mary B. Hesse
"Models and Analogies in Science" vol. 5, Paul Edwards,
ed., Encyclopedia
of Philosophy, pp. 355-356.11Leonard Nash, The Nature of Natural Science (Boston: Little, Brown and Co.,
1963), p. 251. Quoted in Barbour, Myths, Models and Paradigms, p. 38.12Barbour, Myths, pp. 126-137.
l3Anthony Flew, "Theology and Falsification" in Anthony
Flew and Alastair MacIntyre, eds., New Essays in Philosophical Theology (London: SCM Press, 1955;
New York: Macmillan, 1964), pp. 96-99.14See Bryan Magee, Karl Popper (New York: Viking Press, 1973), p. 43.l5Barbour, Myths, p. 129,16John F. Miller III, "Science and Religion: Their Logical
Similiarity",
Religious Studies 5 (October, 1969), p. 64. Quoted in Barbour, Myths,
p. 131.17Barhnor, Ibid., p. 132.185ee Alastair McKinnon, Falsification and Belief, (The Hague:
Moulton & Co.,
1970).19Barhoor, Myths, p. 78.20Ibid., p. 91.
25The claimed advantage of the process model of God over the
classical model is that it more adequately accounts for the
relation between the infinite and the finite. It is, however, just this claim
that Owen disputes. The reason for this is that "In all its
forms, it [process
theology] involves selfcontradiction. The same being cannot be both
absolute and
relative, both changeless and changing, both eternal and temporal" II. P.
Owen, Concepts of Deity (New York: Herder and Herder, 1971), p. 88.
Owen discusses
and rejects various attempts to show that this is only paradox and
not contradiction
and rejects them. It is Harbour's suggestion that ehristnlogical
models are complementary
models and that it is the christologieal model that is one of the sources for
the process model. In short, a suggested reply to Owen might be that
the process
model is not contradictory but uses complementary models in the same way that
models are used in explaining the human and divine natures of Christ.
This reply,
however, must be spelled out and Harbour does not do it here.

The third objection is especially important in light of the emphasis
that Harbour
places on human experience as the data which religious beliefs can be
tested against.
(Of course, experience is not uninterpreted but neither is it
completely malleable.
The relation of experience to the falsification of religious beliefs stands in
the same relation as observation does to the falsification of
comprehensive theoretical
models: experience and observation can count against a position but
not decisively
unless this negative evidence accumulates and a rival model or belief
with promise
is in sight.) One of the most significant items of human experience
is the feeling
of absolute dependence 'which Sehleiermacher and Otto rightly took to
be differentiating
marks of the religious consciousness" (Owen, Concepts, p. 89).
The argument
is that the only justifiable object of such an experience is an
infinite God without
qualification. A finite God would not make sense of this
experience.22Barhour, Myths, p. 159,23John Compton, "Science and God's Action in Nature, in
Harbour", Earth,
pp. 33-47.