D.C. Aggarwal
Vs. State Bank of India and Another [2006] Insc 242 (27 April 2006)

B.N.
Srikrishna & Lokeshwar Singh Panta Srikrishna, J.

These
two appeals arise between the same parties and are interconnected. Hence, they
can be disposed of by a common judgment.

The
appellants are the legal representatives of one D.C. Aggarwal, an erstwhile
employee of the respondentState Bank of India, who have brought these appeals claiming:

the benefits of
an extension in service of the said D.C. Aggarwal up to the age of sixty years;
and

the benefits
arising out of notional promotion which ought to have been granted to the said
employee, etc. For the purpose of convenience, the said D.C. Aggarwal shall be
referred to as "the appellant" in the course of our judgment.

Background
to the Promotion Issue The appellant joined the respondent-bank as Probationary
Officer on 15.1.1960. He got repeated promotions during the period 1960-1980,
reaching all the way to Top Executive Grade Scale VI (hereinafter "TEGS
VI") as a Deputy General Manager on 27.7.1980.

On
4.1.1981, the appellant was posted as Deputy General Manager of the
respondent-bank at Chandigarh and was put in charge of the
respondent-bank's branches in the State of Haryana and in the Union Territory of Chandigarh. On 8.7.1981, the appellant's
explanation was called for in respect of some irregularities pertaining to his
work. He gave an explanation, which was not acceptable to the respondent-bank
and on 11.7.1981, he was placed under suspension. The respondent- bank
conducted an inquiry and the investigating officials held an ex- parte inquiry.
The appellant challenged the investigation and the matter ultimately landed up
in this Court. This Court disposed of the matter by a direction that the
Central Vigilance Commission appoint an inquiry officer who would re-open the
inquiry from the stage it was closed. Further directions were given so as to
enable the parties to lead evidence and to ensure that the inquiry was
conducted expeditiously.

The
inquiry was conducted by one A.K. Rastogi, a senior IAS officer, who submitted
his report on 30.5.1985 by which he exonerated the appellant of most of the
major charges; and put on record that most of the charges were fabricated and
were intended to denigrate the conduct of the appellant as a senior and
responsible official of the bank. The report of A.K. Rastogi was considered by
the Central Vigilance Commission, which, however, disagreed with his findings
and found the charges proved against the appellant. It recommended that, at the
very least, the appellant be removed from service. The Disciplinary Authority
of the respondent-bank, through an elaborate order, agreed with the findings of
the Central Vigilance Commission, except with regard to the recommendation on
the quantum of punishment. It found that the recommended punishment of removal
from service, was too harsh and instead imposed the punishment of demotion by
two grades on the appellant.

Consequently,
the appellant was relegated to Middle Management Scale IV, virtually resulting
in the forfeiture of almost more than a decade's service of the appellant. This
order was confirmed by the executive committee of the respondent-bank on
4.11.1987. The appellant joined the demoted post of Secretary, Banking Services
Recruitment Board, Chandigarh, though under protest. Within
twenty-six days, he was transferred to Bhopal. He, however, did not join the post at Bhopal on the ground that it was against the rule for officers of
Middle Management Grade Scale to be transferred out of the circle. After about
six months, the transfer of the appellant was cancelled and he was permitted to
join in the demoted post as Officer on Special Duty, Zonal Office, Chandigarh. A departmental appeal carried by
the appellant against the order of the penalty imposed on him, was dismissed.

During
the aforesaid period, the appellant was not considered for promotion to the
post of General Manager (TEGS VII) on 1.8.1984, 20.2.1986, 8.6.1987, 1.8.1988,
24.4.1989 and 3.2.1992.

Also,
the appellant's case was not considered under the "sealed cover
procedure" pending finalisation of the departmental proceedings. On
17.4.1989, the appellant moved a Civil Writ Petition No.15874/1989 challenging
his order of demotion before the Punjab and Haryana High Court. The learned Single Judge allowed the writ
petition and granted him the relief sought for. A Letters Patent Appeal No.
553/1991 carried by the respondent-bank was dismissed by the Division Bench of
the High Court. The respondent-bank moved this Court by filing Special Leave
Petition No. 10198/1991. This Court dismissed the appeal by holding that the
appellant had been prejudiced in the matter of his defence; it was held:

"The
order is vitiated not because of mechanical exercise of powers or non-supply of
the inquiry report but for relying and acting on material which was not only
irrelevant but could not have been looked into. Purpose of supplying document
is to contest its veracity or give explanation. Effect of non-supply of the
report of Inquiry Officer before imposition of punishment need not be gone into
nor it is necessary to consider validity of sub-rule 5. But non-supply of CVC
recommendation which was prepared behind the back of respondent (appellant
herein) without his participation, and one does not know on what material which
was not only sent to the Disciplinary Authority but was examined and relied,
was certainly violative of procedural safeguard and contrary to fair and just
inquiry." In the result, this Court was of the view that the inquiry
against the appellant had been rightly quashed by the High Court.

Consequent
to the aforesaid Order, on 7.11.1992, the appellant was transferred to Hyderabad as Deputy General Manager, but he
refused to join there as a matter of protest and remained absent without leave.

Subsequently,
the appellant's posting in Hyderabad was
cancelled and he was posted at Chandigarh
once again and he retired with effect from 10.9.1993 after working as Deputy
General Manager.

However,
when the appellant was still in service, on 28.12.1992, the appellant was given
a fresh showcause notice for an inquiry against him. The appellant challenged
the fresh show cause notice by filing Contempt Petition No.1098/92 before the
High Court in which two Managing Directors of the respondent-bank V. Mahadevan
and P.V. Subba Rao were made respondents. The said respondents challenged the
initiation of the contempt proceedings against them, before this Court, by
Special Leave Petition Nos. 1707-08/1993. Leave was granted therein and Civil
Appeal Nos. 1017- 18/1993 was disposed of by this Court with the following
three directions :

"no fresh
enquiry shall be held against the respondent for the act or commission for
which action was taken against him which resulted in reduction from rank in
1987. Notice dated 28th
December, 1992 shall
stand withdrawn."

"The State
Bank of India shall reconsider the claim of
promotion of the respondent to higher scale in accordance with rules. We do not
express any opinion on the question if interview for higher scale is necessary
and if there was any valid justification for not promoting the respondent whose
record prior to these proceedings is unblemished but if under the policy framed
by the bank and followed in other cases, constitution of a committee and
interview is necessary then the committee be constituted but the Managing
Director, State Bank of India, Central Office, Bombay and Managing Director
(Personnel), State Bank of India, Central Office, Bombay who are appellants in
this Court may not be its members."

"The
committee shall be constituted within three weeks from today which shall decide
if respondent (the appellant herein) was entitled to be promoted to higher
scale" and if the committee decides that the appellant is not suitable for
promotion it shall give reasons therefor.

In view of the abovesaid
conditions, the contempt proceedings against the two Managing Directors of the
respondent-bank were dropped.

Pursuant
to the directions issued by this Court, the General Manager (Operations) Chandigarh
issued a letter dated 26.8.1993 calling upon the appellant to attend an
interview so as to adjudge his suitability for promotion to TEG Scale VII
(General Manager's Post). The appellant appeared before the Interview Committee
on 1.9.1993. The Committee awarded him only 25.7% marks as a result of which he
was informed by a letter dated 8.9.1993 that his claim for promotion was
rejected as he was found unsuitable by the Interview Committee. The appellant
made a representation thereagainst to the Chairman of the respondent-bank. He
also approached this Court by a Contempt Petition No. 324/1993 in Civil Appeal
No. 4017-18/1993 for initiation of contempt proceedings against the
respondent-bank and its officers. This Contempt Petition was withdrawn on
17.9.1993 with liberty to move the High Court for appropriate relief. The
appellant thereupon filed Civil Writ Petition No.15245/1993 before the High
Court by which he impugned the action of the respondent-bank in not granting
him the promotion he sought. He also claimed therein salary from November 1992
to 16.6.1993, which was denied to him on the ground that he had failed to
report to Hyderabad where he had been posted and had
remained absent without leave.

The
appellant's Writ Petition No. 15245/1993 was allowed on the ground that, under
the policy applicable to the appellant's case, an interview by the Departmental
Promotion Committee was not envisaged and that his claim for promotion had to
be decided by an informal interview by the Managing Director and some other officers.
The Single Judge also held that it could not be said that the appellant had
been absenting himself from 8.11.1992 to 16.6.1993 as his posting at Hyderabad was unfair and had been cancelled.
Thus, his claim for salary was allowed. The respondent-bank challenged the
learned Single Judge's judgment by filing Letters Patent Appeal No. 364/1998 in
which the appellant also filed cross-objections.

Background
to the Extension Issue During the pendency of the litigation between the
appellant and the respondent-bank, the appellant was granted extension in
service from 10.3.1991 to 9.9.1993 i.e. upto the age of fifty-eight years by a
letter dated 9.9.1993. He was also informed that the Review Committee had not
recommended further extension of his service in terms of Rule 15 of the State
Bank of India Service Rules; as a result of which, the appellant would retire
on attaining the age of superannuation with effect from 10.9.1993. The
appellant preferred an appeal before the Chairman of the respondent-bank, which
was turned down. Thereafter, he filed Civil Writ Petition No.12062 of 1993,
which was also dismissed by the Division Bench on 5.10.1993. He then carried
Special Leave Petition 17752/1993 to this Court. Leave was granted therein and
the resultant Civil Appeal No. 1609/1994 was allowed on 11.3.1994. This Court
disposed of the appeal by the following operative order:

"In
the result, this appeal succeeds and is allowed. The orders passed by the High
Court, the Appellate Authority and the Review Committee are quashed. The
respondents are directed to constitute a fresh committee of the personnel
mentioned in the rule itself. In case the appellant had made any allegation
against any of those Deputy Managing Directors, then the committee shall
comprise of Deputy Managing Directors, other than those who are mentioned in
the rules. The earlier Deputy Managing Directors who were the members of the
committee shall not be members of the new committee. The recommendations of the
committee shall be placed before the competent authority who shall be different
and higher in rank then (sic-than) the members who shall constitute the
committee.

Such
committee shall be constituted within two weeks from today and the decision by
the competent authority shall be taken within two weeks thereafter." The
respondent-bank filed I.A. No. 3/1994 for clarification of the aforesaid order
on the ground that the Chairman and Managing Director is the Appellate
Authority and as a consequence, he could not deal with the Committee to consider
the case for extension of the appellant. It was pointed out that the appellant
had made serious allegations against several senior officers, as a result of
which, they could not be nominated as members of the Review Committee.
Accordingly, in pursuance of the time bound directions of this Court, the
Executive Body of the respondent-bank decided on 27.5.1994 to formally
constitute a three-member committee comprising S. Doreswamy,
Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Central Bank of India as its Chairman/Competent
Authority, and the two other members were R. Vishwanathan, Deputy Managing
Director (Commercial Banking) and G. Kathuria, Deputy Manager Director
(Treasury and Investments Management). The three-member Review Committee would
consider and decide the claim of the appellant for extension of his term in
accordance with the rules. It was also made clear in the order of this Court
that it was not open to the parties to challenge the constitution of the
Committee in any further proceedings. It was also directed that, the Committee
be constituted within two weeks and thereafter the Competent Authority take a
decision within two weeks.

R. Vishwanathan
and G. Kathuria held two meetings on 6.6.1994 and 9.6.1994 and on 16.6.1994
recommended to the Chairman/Competent Authority that it was not in the interest
of the respondent-bank to extend the services of the appellant beyond the age
of fifty-eight years. The Chairman accepted the recommendation on the very same
day. All the three members of the Committee met on 16.6.1994, and recorded the
minutes of the proceedings making a recommendation against granting an
extension of service to the appellant. The appellant once again challenged this
by way of Contempt Petition No. 4/1995 which was dismissed as withdrawn with
liberty to impugn it by appropriate proceedings.

The
appellant filed Civil Writ Petition No. 5567/1995 challenging the decision of
the respondent-bank not to grant an extension to him. The learned Single Judge
was of the view that the Committee was biased against the appellant on account
of his history of previous litigation; that other officers who were not as
competent as the appellant had been granted extensions up to the age of sixty
years and thus, there was discrimination against the appellant. Consequently,
the learned Single Judge interfered and set aside the recommendation and held
that the action of the Review Committee and the Competent Authority was
arbitrary. Thus, the writ petition was allowed and the relevant orders were
quashed. The respondent- bank challenged the said judgment of the learned
Single Judge in Letters Patent Appeal No.81/1999 in which the cross-objections
were also filed by the appellant.

The
Division Bench of the High Court by its impugned judgment dated 9.3.1999
referred commonly to the Letter Patent Appeals in the Promotion and Extension
matters. It allowed both the appeals and set aside the judgments of the learned
Single Judge by holding that the action of the respondent-bank was not liable
to be interfered with on any ground. Hence this appeal.

Promotion
Matter The learned counsel for the appellant elaborately pointed out the
history of the litigation between the parties commencing from the first showcause
notice given to the appellant and the final order made against him. Counsel
also highlighted the fact that all the disciplinary orders had been set aside
by this Court from time to time. His contention was that, this had resulted in
an institutional bias against the appellant. Counsel suggested that all the top
officers of the respondent-bank were biased against the appellant and were
unanimously against him.

The
second contention of the learned counsel is that the appellant was a brilliant
officer who, between the period 1960 to 1981, had succeeded to the top echelons
of the respondent-bank by dint of his merit. It was only thereafter that, the
top officers deliberately spoiled his good record by giving him showcause
notices on frivolous grounds, which were ultimately quashed by this Court. He
submitted that the appellant had already reached TEGS VI and the case of the
appellant for TEGS VII had to be considered on four different dates: 1.8.1984,
20.2.1986, 8.6.1987, 1.8.1988 and thereafter on 24.4.1989 and 3.2.1992. It is
contended that, during the period the appellant was under suspension, the
respondent-bank was bound to consider his case under the "sealed cover
procedure", which the respondent-bank had failed to do. Thus, the
legitimate claim of the appellant was defeated on account of the bias against
him, as well as, for not following the procedure prescribed.

Taking
the second point first, it appears to us that the contention is misconceived.
The learned counsel contends (and the learned Single Judge agreed with this)
that the respondent-bank had erred by retrospectively applying the procedure
prescribed in the policy document dated 11.3.1989, for promotions to be
considered between 1.8.1984 to 1.8.1988. We are satisfied that this was a
mistake on the part of the learned Single Judge for he failed to take notice of
a document which was placed on record. This document was dated 23.2.1984, and
modified an earlier promotion policy enunciated in the year 1982. There is no
dispute that such a document existed and that it was placed on record before
the learned Single Judge.

There
is also no dispute that such a policy governed the case of the appellant. With
this in mind, the Division Bench has correctly analysed the facts and pointed
out that for the first four dates on which the appellant's promotion had to be
considered i.e. on 1.8.1984, 20.2.1984, 8.6.1987 and 1.8.1988, the assessment
had to be made under the terms of the policy dated 23.2.1984. While learned
Single Judge was under the impression that the case of the appellant for
promotion was governed by the policy of 1982, the Division Bench rightly points
out that by this time the modified policy of 1984 had already come into force.
By the Government of India Circular dated 28.9.1983, guidelines were issued to
add to Regulation 17 of the Officers Service Recruitments the following:

"All
promotions to Senior Management Grade, Scale V and Top Executive Grade, Scale
VI and VII will be made by a Committee of Directors consisting of the Managing
Director, the Government Director and the Reserve Bank of India Director on the
basis of the evaluation of the past performance and the assessment of the
potential of the eligible officers by the said Committee." The memorandum
titled "Executive Selection System", prepared for the Central Board
of the respondent-bank dated 21.2.1984 in respect of the promotion system inter
alia for TEGS VI, TEGS VII, TEG Special Scale, noted (vide paragraph 2):

"The
system is essentially merit based, seniority being given due weightage for the
purpose of reckoning eligibility (among officers of equal merit or suitability,
seniority would count).

While
performance on a given job is assessed in terms of the identified key
responsibility areas, potential to shoulder the responsibilities in the higher
management cadres assumes importance" For assessing these factors, the
memorandum prescribed (vide paragraph 2(iv)) "a supplementary process of
structured interview for promotion to Senior Management Grade Scale V and Top
Executive Grade Scale VI." The interviews were to be held by a Committee
consisting of the Managing Director and any one or more of the other members of
the Central Management Committee "with a view to assessing the officer's
potential".

More
importantly, the memorandum noted (vide paragraph 2(v)):

"The
eligible officials are assessed separately on the basis of their

past performance
and

potential for
handling higher assignments. An officer who is unable to get a minimum score of
60% (or equivalent rating) either in the appraisal of his performance or in the
interview, is not considered for promotion. Giving equal weightage to the two
processes, the merit list is prepared by adding the ratings/scores in respect
of both the aspects and officers equivalent to the number of vacancies are
recommended to the Executive Committee of the Central Board for promotions
strictly according to their positions in the merit list." The above
memorandum was placed before the Central Board of the respondent-bank and was
considered by it during its meeting on 23.2.1984.

In
pursuance of the memorandum, the Central Board resolved that a Departmental
Promotion Committee act as the Recommending Authority for promotions to Senior
Management Grade Scale V and above. Thus, it is clear that the appellant's case
for promotion between 1.8.1984 to 1.8.1988 had to be considered in the light of
the promotion policy of 1982, as modified by the policy of 1984. Hence, the
Division Bench was right in its view that there was no question of the policy
of 1989 being applied retrospectively in the case of the appellant. We agree
with the view of the Division Bench in this regard.

The
Interview Committee noted that the appellant had been under suspension from
21.7.1981 to 12.11.1987 and his service upto 21.7.1981 only had to be taken
into consideration for appraisal of the past performance of the appellant in
the same manner as had been done for other eligible officers. Considering the
case of the appellant on each of the relevant dates, the Committee found that
although the appellant had obtained 60% marks for "performance appraisal",
his performance at the interview was very poor as he had obtained only 25.7%
marks. Thus, on each of the relevant dates, the Committee was of the view that
his case could not be considered for promotion to TEGS VII. The High Court
rightly points out that, whatever might have been the assessment of the
appellant on the basis of an informal interview conducted under the promotion
policy prior to 1982, he was now required to undergo a structured and formal
interview before a Committee which would adjudge him on the basis of indicia as
prescribed in the 1984 policy. We can hardly find fault with the Committee for
its decision in rejecting the claim of the appellant for promotion to TEGS VII,
which undoubtedly, is a grade at the highest level requiring extreme responsibility
on the part of the officer concerned.

Taking
the first argument of the learned counsel for the appellant, that the
appellant's case was rejected because of institutional bias, we are of the view
that this is nothing but resurrection of an issue which had been finally laid
to rest by this Court. Having examined the matter between the parties, this
Court had said by its order that the appellant's acts should be considered by a
Committee which did not include any of the officers who had been made respondents
in the previous litigations. The general argument of institutional bias or that
of senior officers being biased against him, does not cut ice with us. Having
noted the questions that were asked of him, and the manner in which the
appellant replied to them, it appears to us that there was no doubt that the
appellant (who had been adjudged to be excitable by the Interview Committee,
the learned Single Judge, the Division Bench and even this Court) had either
displayed ignorance of the requisite knowledge to answer the questions or was
taking up an obstructive attitude in order to scuttle the interview, which
according to him could not have been held. The Division Bench was being
charitable in assuming that the appellant had sufficient knowledge but
deliberately obstructed the interview. We cannot say that the assessment made
by the Division Bench is in anyway erroneous or does not arise from the facts
placed before it. The Division Bench of the High Court came to the conclusion
that the appellant had never intended to submit to the interview but wanted to
filibuster and ultimately to scuttle it, although he was aware of the
consequences of his actions.

We
agree with the impugned judgment of the High Court that no fault could be found
with the Interview Committee when they assessed the performance of the
appellant to be poor. We have seen the record and the three questions that the
Committee put to the appellant. Answers to those three questions would have
demonstrated the depth of knowledge the appellant had in his professional
field. The answers given by him to the questions asked, suggest that either he
was incapable of answering them or that he was deliberately filibustering the
interview. In either event, he did not deserve to be selected by the Interview
Committee. No fault can be found with the decision of the Interview Committee
or with the decision of the respondent-bank that the appellant was not fit for
promotion to TEGS VII.

Extension
Matter As a result of the order made by this Court in Civil Appeal No.1609/1994
dated 11.3.1994, together with the order made on 13.5.1994 in I.A. No. 3/1994,
the respondent-bank requisitioned the services of S. Doreswamy,
Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Central Bank of India to act as the
Chairman/Competent Authority of a three-member committee to make
recommendations as to whether the appellant's services were to be extended till
the age of sixty years. As we have already pointed out, the other two members
of the committee were R. Vishwanathan, Deputy Managing Director (Commercial
Banking) and G. Kathuria, Deputy Manager Director (Treasury and Investments
Management). In the course of the hearing, the parties accepted the names of
the above-mentioned officers without demur or protest. The two members of the
Committee i.e. R. Vishwanathan and G. Kathuria, considered the entire service
record of the appellant and recommended that it was not in the
respondent-bank's interest to give an extension in service to the appellant.
The Chairman of the Committee/Competent Authority also concurred with this
recommendation.

The
recommendations thus made by the Committee were accepted by the management of
the respondent-bank.

The
appellant could not have challenged the constitution of the Committee as this
Court had specifically precluded any such attempt. The learned counsel before
us contended that there was an institutional bias that affected the decision of
the three-member Committee, which was not objective in its assessment. We find
this difficult to accept. That there was bad blood between the appellant and
some top officers of the bank is an admitted fact. It was precisely because of
this that this Court took the trouble of formulating a Committee headed by an
outsider as its Chairman, so that a decision could be taken objectively as to
the suitability of the appellant to be granted the extension he sought. The
Committee went into the entire service record and after scanning through the
Annual Confidential Reports of the appellant, took a decision, which we think
was fair and objective, that no extension as sought for, could be granted.

The
learned counsel for the appellant further contended that the decision of the
Committee was influenced by a report made by the General Manager, Chandigarh Circle and that the Committee did not
independently look into the facts of this case. This is an argument that cannot
be countenanced. It is difficult to believe that the two top-most officers of
the respondent-bank, who were accepted without demur or protest as members of
the Committee, and a person of the rank of Chairman-cum-Managing Director of an
unconcerned bank and who had no interest in the matter whatsoever, would all
conspire together so that the appellant was denied an extension.

The
argument for the learned counsel for the appellant proceeded on a
misapprehension of the manner in which extension of service is to be granted.
In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur and others v. Jag Mohan Lal (hereinafter
"Jag Mohan Lal") this Court had occasion to point out that a rule
under which extension of service can be granted beyond the normal age of
retirement, does not invest a legal right in the employee to be granted such an
extension. The very same regulation as in this case was interpreted in Jag
Mohan Lal (supra) and it was pointed out therein that the sole purpose of
giving extension of service is to promote the interest of the bank and not to
confer any benefit or favour on retiring officers. It was pointed out that it
was not a conferment of a benefit or privilege on officers. Merely because the
officer has put in the requisite number of years of service, that does not earn
him/her that benefit or privilege. This Court observed:

"The
Bank, however, is required to consider the case of individual officers with due
regard to

continued
utility;

good health; and

integrity beyond
reproach of the officer. If the officer lacks one or the other, the Bank is not
bound to give him extension of service. In this case, the Bank has shown to the
High Court that the case of the respondent was considered and he did not fit in
the said guidelines. The High Court does not sit in an appeal against that
decision. The High Court under Article 226 cannot review that decision."
If the bank considers that the continuance of services of an officer is desirable
in the interest of the bank, it may allow him to continue beyond the age of
superannuation. If the bank considers that the service of the officer is not
required beyond the age of superannuation, that is the end of the matter.

Further,
non-extension of service is no reflection on the calibre of the officer and it
carries no stigma.

It
appears to us that these principles were not kept in mind by the learned Single
Judge when he interfered with the discretion of the respondent-bank not to
grant an extension to the appellant. The Division Bench has, however, rightly
applied the legal principle stated in Jag Mohan Lal (supra) and found that
there was no such right vested in the appellant to demand an extension beyond
the age of fifty-eight years. Further, in the facts and circumstances of the
case, the Division Bench found that the extension had been refused for good
reasons and was not liable to be interfered within its writ jurisdiction. We
agree with this reasoning of the High Court.

Relief
Prayed For There is another issue that precludes any relief being granted to
the appellant. As a matter of fact, the appellant retired from service on
9.9.1993 and died in 2005. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that
even though the appellant had died, his legal heirs could be granted the
monetary benefits on the footing that the appellant was entitled to get
extension of service by two years and was also entitled to promotion to TEGS
VII. In our view, both these contentions are unsustainable. Even if the
appellant were to succeed in his appeal, the most favourable order for him
could have been a direction to the respondent-bank to reconsider his case for
promotion to TEGS VII as also to reconsider extension of his service beyond the
age of fifty-eight years. Thus, even with such a direction, it would not have
been possible for us to say that the respondent-bank was bound to grant either
of the appellant's claims. Thus, there is no question of monetary relief being
granted to the legal heirs of the appellant. Further discussion on this aspect
becomes unnecessary since we are not satisfied that the appellant was entitled
to any relief.

In the
result, we find no substance in both the appeals. The impugned judgment of the
High Court is unexceptionable. Consequently, the appeals before us are hereby
dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to
costs.