http://semprag.org/issue/feedSemantics and Pragmatics2018-09-24T13:13:06-07:00David Beaver & Kai von Finteleditors@semprag.orgOpen Journal Systemshttp://semprag.org/article/view/sp.11.10A formal semantics for situated conversation2018-09-24T13:13:06-07:00Julie Hunterjuliehunter@gmail.comNicholas Asherasher@irit.frAlex Lascaridesalex@inf.ed.ac.ukWhile linguists and philosophers have sought to model the various ways in which the meaning of what we say can depend on the nonlinguistic context, this work has by and large focused on how the nonlinguistic context can be exploited to ground or anchor referential or otherwise context-sensitive expressions. In this paper, we focus on examples in which nonlinguistic events contribute entire discourse units that serve as arguments to coherence relations, without the mediation of context-sensitive expressions. We use both naturally occurring and constructed examples to highlight these interactions and to argue that extant coherence-based accounts of discourse should be extended to model them. We also argue that extending coherence-based accounts in this way is a nontrivial task. It forces us to reassess basic notions of the nonlinguistic context and rhetorical relations as well as models of discourse structure, evolution, and interpretation. Our paper addresses the conceptual and technical revisions that these types of interaction demand. EARLY ACCESS2018-09-24T13:10:55-07:00Copyright (c) 2018 Julie Hunter, Nicholas Asher, Alex Lascarideshttp://semprag.org/article/view/sp.11.9Complex sentential operators refute unrestricted Simplification of Disjunctive Antecedents2018-09-24T13:11:22-07:00Daniel Lassiterdanlassiter@stanford.eduThere is a longstanding debate about the status of the principle Simplification of Disjunctive Antecedents (SDA), according to which a counterfactual with a syntactically disjunctive antecedent [(φ ∨ ψ) &gt; χ] entails a conjunction of counterfactuals [(φ &gt; χ) ∧ (ψ &gt; χ)]. This principle is highly intuitive for most examples that have been considered, but it has also been claimed to be subject to empirical counter-examples. However, there are promising pragmatic explanations for the currently known counter-examples, which have led several authors to argue in recent work that SDA is unrestrictedly valid after all. This short piece introduces new data involving sentential operators that impose both upper and lower bounds on confidence, frequency, etc., such as <i>likely but not certain</i>, <i>there is an exactly n% probability</i>, and <i>usually but not always</i>. These examples show clearly that SDA is not valid <i>tout court</i>. While SDA-supporting interpretations do exist and require an explanation, every theory of counterfactuals also requires an explanation of examples that can only be read in a way that does not support SDA. EARLY ACCESS2018-06-14T11:49:19-07:00Copyright (c) 2018 Daniel Lassiterhttp://semprag.org/article/view/sp.11.8The case of the missing ‘If’: Accessibility relations in Stalnaker’s theory of conditionals2018-09-24T13:11:22-07:00Matthew Mandelkernmatthew.mandelkern@gmail.comA part of Stalnaker (1968)’s influential theory of conditionals has been neglected, namely the role for an accessibility relation between worlds. I argue that the accessibility relation does not play the role intended for it in the theory as stated, and propose a minimal revision which solves the problem, and brings the theory in line with the formulation in Stalnaker &amp; Thomason 1970. EARLY ACCESS2018-06-14T11:45:00-07:00Copyright (c) 2018 Matthew Mandelkernhttp://semprag.org/article/view/sp.11.7Might do better: Flexible relativism and the QUD2018-09-24T13:11:22-07:00Bob Beddorrbeddor@gmail.comAndy Eganandyegan@philosophy.rutgers.eduThe past decade has seen a protracted debate over the semantics of epistemic modals. According to contextualists, epistemic modals quantify over the possibilities compatible with some contextually determined group’s information. Relativists often object that contextualism fails to do justice to the way we assess utterances containing epistemic modals for truth or falsity. However, recent empirical work seems to cast doubt on the relativist’s claim, suggesting that ordinary speakers’ judgments about epistemic modals are more closely in line with contextualism than relativism (Knobe &amp; Yalcin 2014; Khoo 2015). This paper furthers the debate by reporting new empirical research revealing a previously overlooked dimension of speakers’ truth-value judgments concerning epistemic modals. Our results show that these judgments vary systematically with the question under discussion in the conversational context in which the utterance is being assessed. We argue that this ‘QUD effect’ is difficult to explain if contextualism is true, but is readily explained by a suitably flexible form of relativism. EARLY ACCESS2018-06-12T12:19:55-07:00Copyright (c) 2018 Bob Beddor, Andy Eganhttp://semprag.org/article/view/sp.11.5Disentangling two distinct notions of NEG raising2018-09-24T13:11:22-07:00Chris Collinscc116@nyu.eduPaul M Postalpp11@nyu.eduIn this paper we consider two analyses of NEG raising phenomena: a syntactic approach based on raising NEG, as recently advocated in Collins &amp; Postal 2014, and a semantic/pragmatic approach based on the Excluded Middle Assumption; see Bartsch 1973. We show that neither approach alone is sufficient to account for all the relevant phenomena. Although the syntactic approach is needed to explain the distribution of strict NPIs and Horn clauses, the semantic/pragmatic approach is needed to explain certain inferences where syntactic NEG raising is blocked. EARLY ACCESS2018-05-22T14:37:12-07:00Copyright (c) 2018 Chris Collins, Paul M. Postalhttp://semprag.org/article/view/sp.11.6Reconstructing the syntax of focus operators2018-09-24T13:11:22-07:00Liz Smeetsliz.smeets@mail.mcgill.caMichael Wagnerchael.wagner@gmail.comThis paper presents novel evidence that the exclusive operator <i>alleen</i> in Dutch (and <i>nur</i> in German) can directly attach to the focus constituent it associates with, and against an analysis like the one in Jacobs 1983 and Büring &amp; Hartmann 2001 which analyzes all instances of <i>alleen/nur</i> as sentential adverbs that take a single syntactic argument that denotes a proposition. Instead, we argue that <i>alleen/nur</i> takes two syntactic arguments, which combine to denote a proposition. The evidence comes from novel data showing scope reconstruction of [<i>alleen/nur</i> + DP] sequences from the prefield in Dutch (and German), adding to earlier arguments in Reis 2005 and Meyer &amp; Sauerland 2009. EARLY ACCESS2018-05-03T16:00:53-07:00Copyright (c) 2018 Liz Smeets, Michael Wagnerhttp://semprag.org/article/view/sp.11.4Free choice and distribution over disjunction: the case of free choice ability2018-09-24T13:11:22-07:00Rick NouwenR.W.F.Nouwen@uu.nlThis squib discusses the semantics of ability modals in relation to the law of distribution over disjunction and free choice effects. Most current analyses of free choice need distribution over disjunction as a theorem for modals in order to correctly derive free choice inferences. Famously, however, ability modals have been argued to fail to meet distribution over disjunction (Kenny 1976). The squib explores to what extent free choice abilities are dependent on the distribution property. EARLY ACCESS2018-04-18T15:02:26-07:00Copyright (c) 2018 Rick Nouwenhttp://semprag.org/article/view/sp.11.3That’s not quite it: An experimental investigation of (non‑)exhaustivity in clefts2018-09-24T13:11:22-07:00Joseph P. De Veaugh-Geissjoseph.de.veaugh-geiss@uni-potsdam.deSwantje Tönnisswantje.toennis@uni-graz.atEdgar Oneaedgar.onea-gaspar@uni-graz.atMalte Zimmermannmazimmer@uni-potsdam.deWe present a novel empirical study on German directly comparing the exhaustivity inference in <i>es</i>-clefts to exhaustivity inferences in definite pseudoclefts, exclusives, and plain intonational focus constructions. We employ mouse-driven verification/falsification tasks in an incremental information-retrieval paradigm across two experiments in order to assess the strength of exhaustivity in the four sentence types. The results are compatible with a parallel analysis of clefts and definite pseudoclefts, in line with previous claims in the literature (Percus 1997, Büring &amp; Križ 2013). In striking contrast with such proposals, in which the exhaustivity inference is conventionally coded in the cleft-structure in terms of maximality/homogeneity, our study found that the exhaustivity inference is not systematic or robust in <i>es</i>-clefts nor in definite pseudoclefts: Whereas some speakers treat both constructions as exhaustive, others treat both constructions as non-exhaustive. In order to account for this unexpected finding, we argue that the exhaustivity inference in both clefts and definite pseudoclefts — specifically those with the compound definite <i>derjenige</i> — is pragmatically derived from the anaphoric existence presupposition that is common to both constructions. EARLY ACCESS <a href="http://static.semprag.org/sp.11.3s.zip">Supplementary materials</a>2018-04-18T13:44:48-07:00Copyright (c) 2018 Joseph P. De Veaugh-Geiss, Swantje Tönnis, Edgar Onea, Malte Zimmermannhttp://semprag.org/article/view/sp.11.2Counterfactual de se2018-09-24T13:11:22-07:00Hazel Pearsonh.pearson@qmul.ac.ukThis paper addresses a long-standing debate concerning the derivation of de se construals. One camp holds that there is a dedicated mechanism of ‘de se binding’, which results in a de se pronoun being interpreted as a variable ranging over the doxastic alternatives of the attitude holder (e.g. Chierchia 1990). Another treats de se as a special case of de re under the acquaintance relation of identity (e.g. Lewis 1979, Reinhart 1990). This debate is premised on the assumption that the two different routes to de se result in identical truth conditions. I argue that this assumption is incorrect for a class of cases that can be delineated in a principled fashion — counterfactual attitude reports involving counter-identity, such as <i>Ivanka imagined that she was Melania and she was giving an interview</i>. The argument builds on Ninan 2008, who noticed that de re construal works differently with counterfactual attitudes, and that this has consequences for de se interpretation in this type of sentence. I spell out these consequences more precisely, drawing on a novel, crosslinguistically robust generalization about unambiguously de se expressions such as PRO (the ‘De Se Generalization’). I argue that a treatment of such expressions that appeals to de se-as-de re cannot account for the De Se Generalization in a principled way, and hence that a dedicated mechanism of de se binding must be included among the expressive resources of the grammar. EARLY ACCESS2018-02-15T13:26:23-08:00Copyright (c) 2018 Hazel Pearsonhttp://semprag.org/article/view/sp.11.1Symmetric predicates and the semantics of reciprocal alternations2018-09-24T13:11:22-07:00Yoad Wintery.winter@uu.nlReciprocal alternations appear with binary predicates that also have a collective unary form. Many of these binary predicates are <i>symmetric</i>: if A <i>dated</i> B then B <i>dated</i> A. Most symmetric predicates in English show a simple kind of reciprocity: <i>A and B dated</i> means “A dated B”, or equivalently “B dated A”. Similar observations hold for nouns and adjectives like <i>cousin</i> and <i>identical</i>. Non-symmetric predicates like <i>hug</i>, <i>fight</i> and <i>kiss</i> also show reciprocity, but of a more complex kind. For instance, the meaning of <i>A and B hugged</i> differs substantially from “A hugged B and/or B hugged A”. Addressing a wide range of reciprocal predicates, we observe that “plain” reciprocity only appears with symmetric predicates, while other types of reciprocity only appear with non-symmetric predicates. This <i>Reciprocity-Symmetry Generalization</i> motivates a lexical operator that derives symmetric predicates from collective meanings. By contrast, reciprocity with non-symmetric predicates is analyzed using “soft” preferences of predicate concepts. Developing work by Dowty and Rappaport-Hovav &amp; Levin, we introduce a formal semantic notion of <i>protopredicates</i>, which mediates between lexical meanings and concepts. This mechanism explains symmetry and reciprocity as two semantic aspects of one type system at the lexical-conceptual interface. EARLY ACCESS2018-02-09T11:29:51-08:00Copyright (c) 2018 Yoad Winterhttp://semprag.org/article/view/sp.10.20The lexical pragmatics of count-mass polysemy2018-04-07T11:09:58-07:00Ingrid L. Falkumi.l.falkum@ifikk.uio.noThis paper investigates a subtype of systematic polysemy which in English (and several other languages) appears to rest on the distinction between count and mass uses of nouns (e.g., shoot a <i>rabbit</i>/eat <i>rabbit</i>/wear <i>rabbit</i>). Computational semantic approaches have traditionally analysed such sense alternations as being generated by an inventory of specialised lexical inference rules. The paper puts the central arguments for such a rule-based analysis under scrutiny, and presents evidence that the linguistic component provided by count-mass syntax leaves a more underspecified semantic output than is usually acknowledged by rule-based theories. The paper develops and argues for the positive view that count-mass polysemy is better given a lexical pragmatic analysis, which provides a more flexible and unified account. Treating count-mass syntax as a procedural constraint on NP referents, it is argued that a single, relevance-guided lexical pragmatic mechanism can cover the same ground as lexical rules, as well as those cases in which rule-based accounts need to appeal to pragmatics. EARLY ACCESS2017-12-21T11:21:43-08:00Copyright (c) 2017 Ingrid L. Falkumhttp://semprag.org/article/view/sp.10.18The Limit Assumption2018-04-07T11:09:57-07:00Stefan Kaufmannstefan.kaufmann@uconn.eduIn the literature on modality and conditionals, the Limit Assumption is routinely invoked to ensure that a simple definition of necessity (truth at all minimal worlds) can safely be substituted for a more complicated one (cf. Lewis’s and Kratzer’s definitions involving multiple layers of quantification). The Limit Assumption itself was formulated by David Lewis in 1973 and 1981, and while its plausibility has at times been debated on philosophical grounds, its content is rarely questioned. I show that there is in fact no single “correct” Limit Assumption: which one is right depends on structural properties of the model and the intended notion of necessity. The version that is most widely appealed to in the linguistic literature turns out to be incorrect for its intended purpose. The source of the confusion can be traced back to Lewis himself. EARLY ACCESS2017-12-20T12:31:54-08:00Copyright (c) 2017 Stefan Kaufmannhttp://semprag.org/article/view/sp.10.17Analyzing imperfective games2018-09-02T21:30:19-07:00Igor Yanovichigor.yanovich@gmail.comDeo 2015 is the first study applying mathematically explicit evolutionary analysis to a specific semantic-change phenomenon, namely the progressive-imperfective diachronic cycle. However, Deo’s actual results do not match completely the empirical observations about that cycle. Linguistic communities passing through the cycle often employ, in the synchrony, a single common type of progressive-imperfective grammar. In Deo’s modeling results, however, two of the grammars never get shared by nearly all the population, including the grammar with the obligatory use of progressive marking in semantically progressive contexts, as in Present-Day English. This paper improves on that wrong prediction. The crucial modeling decision enabling the improvement is switching from the assumption of infinite speaker population to the more realistic, but harder to analyze finite population setting. The finite-population version of Deo’s model derives stages where at many time points, all or almost all speakers share the same grammar. Interestingly, two different a priori reasonable types of trajectories with that feature emerge, depending on the parameter settings. These two trajectory types constitute novel empirical predictions regarding the shape of the cycle generated by (the proposed extension of) Deo’s model. EARLY ACCESS <a href="https://doi.org/10.3765/sp.10.17s">Supplementary materials (SM 1 and SM 2)</a>2017-12-20T12:25:06-08:00Copyright (c) 2017 Igor Yanovichhttp://semprag.org/article/view/sp.10.16Or what?2018-09-02T21:35:27-07:00María Biezmamaria.biezma@uni-konstanz.deKyle Rawlinskgr@jhu.eduThis paper develops an argument that discourse considerations are crucial in the semantics of questions by looking at the case of English “or what” questions. We argue that “what” in these questions is a discourse pronoun anaphoric with the ‘Question Under Discussion’, and show that this account explains the range of variation in how “or what” questions are interpreted in context, compared to other question types. This accounts for the fact that OWQs can be used as plain information seeking questions, as rhetorical questions, and also as questions that express insistence about receiving an immediate answer. Along the way we present empirical arguments that “or what” questions do not involve sluicing, though they can best be compared to the phenomenon of antecedent-less ‘pseudo-sluicing’. EARLY ACCESS2017-12-20T10:31:56-08:00Copyright (c) 2017 Maria Biezma, Kyle Rawlinshttp://semprag.org/article/view/sp.10.15The scope of nominal quantifiers in comparative clauses2018-04-07T11:09:58-07:00Rick NouwenR.W.F.Nouwen@uu.nlJakub Dotlačilj.dotlacil@gmail.comWe identify a new scope puzzle for quantifiers in comparative clauses. In particular, we argue that nominal quantifiers take scope at a higher level in the degree clause than previously assumed. On the assumption that quantifier scope is clause-bounded, this entails that there must be more structure in the clause than standardly assumed. EARLY ACCESS2017-12-20T10:19:20-08:00Copyright (c) 2017 Rick Nouwen, Jakub Dotlacil