Four reasons why Israel probably won't attack Iran

Back in April, I offered a few thoughts on Iran, suggesting that war was far from imminent and we should all calm down a bit. Since then, formal diplomacy between Iran and the world’s six leading powers has fallen apart since the failure of the Moscow talks in June. Meanwhile, Israel’s political leadership is, once again, threatening a preventive strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities.

So was I wrong? Well, I’m going to stick my neck out and argue that my conclusions from April are still valid. War is not around the corner and it might not happen at all. I claim no great insight and I could be proven wrong tomorrow if Israel were attack targets across Iran. But here’s why I think the case against panic remains conclusive:

1. War with Iran would be bad for Israel. The Iranian people would probably respond to outside attack by rallying behind their leaders and strengthening a deeply unpopular regime. Iran would hit back through Hizbollah in Lebanon and by trying to close the Strait of Hormuz, with serious civilian casualties in Israel and incalculable consequences for the global economy. In Syria, Bashar al-Assad would have the opportunity to pose alongside Iran as a dual victim of a Zionist plot against the Muslim world. It might be just the boost that Assad needs. And the best the Israeli air force could achieve would be to delay – not derail – Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Israel’s pilots would impose nothing more than a relatively short interval before Iran achieves nuclear weapons capability anyway. In fact, a war could have the opposite effect to the one desired. Iran’s leaders want the ability to build a Bomb, but they have not yet decided whether to actually go ahead and become a nuclear-armed state. If Israel attacks, they would be compelled to take a decision – and we can all guess what it would be.

2. Israel’s military and security leadership understands all of the above. Sundry ex-Mossad chiefs have publicly argued that hitting Iran would be a bad idea. General Benny Gantz, the current chief of staff and Israel’s most senior soldier, has given a sober and measured assessment of Iran’s intentions. He thinks that Iranian leaders are “very rational people” who, in the final analysis, will not go ahead and build a Bomb – assuming they aren’t attacked, of course. Israel’s decision-makers cannot ignore these arguments, even supposing their air force has the ability to inflict more than temporary damage on Iran’s nuclear facilities, which seems unlikely.

3. The outlines of a deal between Iran and America are emerging. I don’t mean a formal agreement, still less a “Nixon goes to China” diplomatic breakthrough. I’m not suggesting that the Obama administration is about to announce that secret diplomacy with Iran has solved the problem. I mean that both sides might quietly decide they can live with the status quo. In other words, Iran comes close to the ability to build a nuclear weapon, but its leaders refrain from going the final mile and actually manufacturing a Bomb. America, for its part, lives with an Iran on the threshold of nuclear capability, provided that Tehran holds back and opts not to become a nuclear-armed state. Iran and America might feel their way towards an implicit arrangement along these lines.

4. That could be the least worst option for the West. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran, is 73 and sick. No-one knows what’s wrong with him (pancreatic cancer, say some, prostrate cancer, say others). It doesn’t matter: the point is that he could disappear from the scene at any moment. Meanwhile, President Ahamdinejad is a lame duck who will go at the end of his term in June. So it’s perfectly possible that Iran will have a new leadership in a year or two – and that could create an opening. Until then, preserving the status quo is the least unappealing option.

To sum up, I think the real objective of American and Western policy is to keep Iran exactly where it is – ie, some way short of the ability to build a nuclear weapon – until the inevitable moment of political change arrives in Tehran. Hence the emphasis on direct sabotage of the nuclear programme. It’s all about slowing down the nuclear clock and obstructing all Iran’s efforts until the current leadership disappears of its own accord. That is an entirely sensible objective.

If Iran were to embark on a sudden sprint to a nuclear weapon – something that would require the expulsion of United Nations inspectors and formal withdrawal from the non-proliferation treaty – then every calculation would change. If Iran radically alters the status quo, military action might become the least awful option. But for Israel to throw all the pieces in the air by going to war in the next few months would be the height of folly. I don’t believe it will happen.