Buddhism and Time

The concept of time is a rich subject of discussion that produced countless metaphysical theories in ancient India. Buddhists likewise joined into the discussion and in due time it seems this attracted the criticism of figures like Nāgārjuna and his later students who refuted any possibility of a substantially existent time. Here I want to take a brief look at how time was divided into two
types by Nāgārjuna and expand on the significance of the two concepts. Outside of Buddhism there were of course many alternative heterodox ideas, such as time being a causal
agent responsible for the creation and destruction of phenomena.
Nāgārjuna sought to refute the theories of both his fellow
Buddhists (namely the Sarvāstivāda) and heterodox schools.
Curiously, one refuted heterodox concept of time came to be adopted
into the Kālacakra Tantra, which is what will consider at the end.

According to the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Upadeśa大智度論
(MPU) there are
two types of time.

In
India there are said to be two types of time. The first is called
kāla. The second is
called samaya.

Now, before we examine these two
terms I should say something about the MPU. Said text is attributed
to Nāgārjuna. It was translated into Chinese by Kumārajīva
(344-413) near the end of his life. As Arakawa Shintaro's study
reveals there are fragments of the text in Tangut (I suspect they
would be a translation of the Chinese), but otherwise the complete
text only remains extant in Classical Chinese translation.

There is an ongoing discussion about
whether Nāgārjuna was the true author of it or not, but there is no
unanimous consensus on the matter. Kumārajīva as a translator was
known to add material and edit his translations to make them more
readable, which his contemporaries at the time noted with his edition
of Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā中論
(MMK). Jizang
吉藏
(549–623) in
his commentary on the MMK cites a source which states Kumārajīva
would "cut away redundancy and make up for any deficiencies."1He likely took the same approach with the MPU. This would help
to explain peculiar parts of the text such as mentioning “India”
天竺.
If it was a completely faithful translation of an Indian text,
presumably the Indian author would have been addressing an Indian
audience and hence would have had no need to specify “India”.
Consequently, while it is not a completely faithful translation of
the source text, we cannot confidently deny Nāgārjuna
as the author.2
Here I assume he was the author despite Kumārajīva's
editing.

“a
fixed or right point of time , a space of time , time (in general)”

“the
proper time or season for”

“occasion,
circumstance”

“meal-time”

“time
(as leading to events , the causes of which are imperceptible to the
mind of man), destiny, fate”

“time (as
destroying all things) , death , time of death (often personified and
represented with the attributes of yama, regent of the dead , or even
identified with him: hence kālam- √i or kālaṃ- √kṛ , "
to die " ”

In
Chinese the term is understood as “real time” 實時.
It refers to specific demarcated portions of time, mostly
notably for the purposes of the Vinaya where midday marks the point
of time where a bhikṣu must not eat anything until dawn the
following day (more specifically when the lines on the palm of one's
hand become visible).

The MPU denies that time has any ultimate
existence and goes on to refute the suggestion that it does, much like the MMK. It does
however posit that “real time” in the context of the Vinaya is
real only in the conventional mundane sense (世界中實).
This is in reference to the two truths: ultimate (paramārtha-satya)
and conventional (saṃvṛti-satya). In the former there are
no phenomena to be perceived. The latter is common reality as it is
perceived by ordinary beings and hence we can speak of “real time”
as it relates to common perceptions.

Kāla
is also understood by one heterodox school and the late-period
Kālacakra Tantra as
being the causal genesis of the production and destruction of
phenomena (consider the last dictionary definition above). We will
consider this shortly.

The term samaya refers to the
sense of time specified in sūtras
and śāstras. Sūtras
generally start with ekasminsamaye
(“at one time”). Monier-Williams defines it as “appointed or
proper time, right moment for doing anything ..., opportunity
,occasion ,time , season”. In Chinese it is understood as “false
time” 假時
in
contrast to “real time”. The notion behind ekasminsamaye
is explained as follows in the MPU:

According
to mundane convention there is no fault with there being “one
time”. There is no fault if with paint, clay or wood one makes an
image of a deity, and in recollecting the deity thus pays respects. To
speak of “one time” is also like this. Although there really is
no “one time”, there is no fault in speaking of “one time”
according to mundane conventions.

What is unique is that there is soteriological function to samaya.
According to the MPU, samaya
is used instead of kāla
in order to eliminate views. The former is nebulous and does not make
specific reference to a definite span of time. The latter is
definitive and more importantly associated with heterodox philosophy. Here the
paradigm from the Prajñāpāramitā literature is evident. The
interpretation here posits that the Buddha's aim was to have beings
eliminate attachment to views and this would include reified notions
of time, hence the wide use of samaya
in sūtras
and few examples of
kāla as the MPU
suggests is a result of the Buddha's express intent. In other
words, indefinite time is used for the edification of beings –
more importantly, it is out of the concern that beings will generate wrong views on the matter of time. This is a key concern of the MPU and MMK. It is in direct
response to heterodox assertions that time is permanent and the
causal genesis of all phenomena. The MPU cites two different
arguments suggesting a true existence of time:

Some say, “The cause for all agreeable and disagreeable things in
heaven and earth is time. As the verses of the Time Scripture
state:

Time comes and beings mature,

Time arrives and
they hasten,

Time can awaken
people,

For this reason
time is the cause.

The world is
like a chariot wheel,

Passing of time
is akin to the wheel turning,

People are also like
the chariot wheel,

Some rise and
some descend.”

Some also say,
“Although all agreeable and disagreeable things in heaven and earth
are not produced by time, time is a static cause and truly existent.
The phenomenon of time is subtle and thus cannot be seen and cannot
be [directly] known. We can know that time exists because of the
result of flowers and fruits. The past year and the present year,
distant and close, slow and fast – seeing these characteristics we
can know that time exists although we do not see time. Why? It is
because in seeing the result we know that there is a cause. Thus the
phenomenon of time exists. The phenomenon of time is indestructible
and thus permanent.”

Question – Which of the externalists teach that all things are
produced by time and that this is called nirvāṇa?

Answer – The seventeenth externalist proponent of time dispersal
teaches as follows. “Time matures all elements. Time creates all
things. Time disperses all things. For this reason in my theory we
say that if shot with a hundred arrows you would not die if time had not arrived. When time arrives, you would die immediately if touched by a small blade of grass. Time produces all things. Time matures all
things. Time destroys all things. Time cannot be passed over.” For
this reason the proponent of time teaches that time constantly produces
all things. It is called the cause for nirvāṇa.

Zhanran 湛然
(711-782) also affirms the aforementioned verses in the MPU
as being heterodox and moreover the soteriological function of these
two types of time as follows.

Thus the externalist conceives of time as real. In verse they state,
“Time comes and beings mature. Time goes3
and they hasten. Time can awaken people. For this reason time is the
cause.” Thus there is a need to refute error and teach samaya.
Hence now in the text here real time reveals the inner production of virtue
[i.e., the Buddhist Vinaya] while false time refutes externalists
while severing away evil.

We
need to bear in mind it was not only heterodox schools which reified
time. Jizang also goes on to explain how the Buddhist
Dārṣṭāntika (associated with the Sautrāntika) and Sarvāstivāda
proponents likewise reified time in their respective theories as a substantive entity, which
he notes the MMK sets out to “greatly disrupt” and refute. In his
extensive commentary on the MMK he explains as follows.

In respect to
time, there are two externalist proponents. One states that the
essence of time is permanent. Myriad phenomena just produce the cause
for awareness [i.e., the cause for awareness of time as stated in MPU
quote above; jñāpaka-hetu?]. It does not produce phenomena,
hence it is not the generative cause. Another states that there is particular essence to time. It is an impermanent phenomenon. The
“killing cause” is produced for myriad manifestations [phenomena].
Thus the verse states, “Time comes and beings mature. Time goes
and they hasten. Time can awaken people. For this reason time is the
cause.”

In
Buddhadharma there are also two proponents.

The
first are the Dārṣṭāntika which state that there is a separate
essence to time. It is neither material (rupa)
nor mental. The essence is permanent, but the phenomena are
impermanent. Phenomena are only active in time, like when a person
goes from one room to another, or when an object is transferred from
one vessel to another. The Vibhāṣā states, “In order to refute
this theory it is explained that phenomena are time. As phenomena are
impermanent their time is impermanent.” This recognizes time as a
conventional appellation [prajñapti]
resulting from phenomena. There is no separate form of time apart
from phenomena. While the three periods of time have no distinct
essence, the phenomena within time itself are definitely not
non-existent.

The Sarvāstivāda school although
has four great proponents. They establish that the three periods of
time are different. …

Here we are informed about externalist and Śrāvakayāna schools which see time as being substantial and truly existent. This is problematic for the Madhyamaka project, in India and elsewhere, which sought to refute any possibility of anything at all having substantial existence (svabhava). Again, time is permitted to have a conventional function and existence, though any postulate beyond this will be rejected.

In this tantric
system, the term "wheel of time" (kāla-cakra)
designates the dynamic and nondual nature of a single reality that
manifests primarily in two ways—the conventional (saṃvṛti)
and the ultimate (paramārtha).
The conventional reality itself appears in two ways—the individual
(adhyātma)
and the individual's environment (bāhya),
the macrocosmic and microcosmic aspects of that single reality. With
regard to the external aspect of conventional reality, the term
"wheel of time" refers to the passage of days, month, and
years in the cycle of time. The Vimalaprabhā
defines time (kāla)
as a circle of twelve solar mansions or zodiacs (rāśi-cakra).
The unit day-and-night (aho-rātra)
is also called "time."

With regard to the
individual, the "wheel of time" denotes a circulation of
prāṇas
within the wheel of the nāḍīs
in the body. In view of the close interrelatedness of these two
aspects of conventional reality, the "wheel of time" also
designates a circulation (cakra) of twenty-one thousand and
six hundred pairs of inhalations and exhalations, which takes place
in the course of a day-and-night called "time."

Even though the
cosmos ultimately neither arises nor ceases, conventionally, the
entire cosmos, with its three worlds, is said to arise and cease due
to the power of time. More specifically, this is said to occur due to
the union of the time of origination and the time of destruction. It
is stated in the Ādibuddhatantra:

Time brings forth
phenomena, and time always destroys phenomena, for time is the

Bhagavān,
vajrī, who has the nature of a day and a night.

In accordance with
the classification of the mind, a day is the sun, uterine blood,

and vulva; a night
is the moon, semen, and male sexual organ. Their union is Kālacakra, the supreme bliss
(mahā-sukha).

This
indeed sounds like the heterodox theory cited in the MPU. The
difference between the aforementioned externalist theory of kāla
and the Kālacakra
Tantra is perhaps that whereas
the former sees causal time as being ultimately real and substantial,
the latter only sees causal time as conventionally real, much like
how Nāgārjuna in the MPU above posits that kāla
functions only as conventionally real. The bhikṣus might not eat
after midday, and hence kāla
serves an expedient function. Likewise it seems in the Kālacakra
literature the aspect of causal time being the creator and destroyer
of phenomena is merely a means to an end, and not a view to cling to.
Vesna Wallace explains the ultimate aspect of the Kālacakra
as follows:

With regard to the ultimate reality, the "wheel of time"
indicates the nonduality of two facets of a single reality—namely,
wisdom (prajñā),
or emptiness (śūnyatā), and method (upāya),
or compassion (karuṇā).
The word "time" refers to the gnosis of imperishable bliss
(akṣara-sukha-jñāna),
which is a method consisting of compassion; and the word "wheel"
designates wisdom consisting of emptiness. Their unity is the Buddha
Kalacakra.4

Kālacakra Maṇḍala

This degree of syncretism is
remarkable, though not unusual for Kālacakra
literature. As John
Newman in his article (see here) “Islam in the Kālacakra Tantra”
explains the“Kālacakra
tantra syncretism is unusually obvious and is even self-conscious -
the tantra makes little effort to disguise its borrowings from the
Śaiva, Vaiṣṇava, and Jaina traditions. The basic structure of
the Kālacakra system is
itself non-Buddhist: the Kālacakra
uses the ancient idea of the homology of the macrocosm and the
microcosm as the foundation of its soteriology.”5

Much like how Nāgārjuna granted a practical function to kāla, the Kālacakra literature as a form of expedient means employs what was a heterodox vision of time as well as other non-Buddhist ideas into its soteriological framework, the whole intent of which is to enable rapid liberation from saṃsāra. In other words, time is put to good use for the purposes of liberation.

There could be much more said about the concept of time, especially in respect to how it was conceived in the Śrāvakayāna schools. We might discuss that in a later post.