These are regularly described
in the Nikaayas as 'theories' (di.t.thi) which the
Buddha has 'set aside' (.thapita) and 'rejected'
(patikkhita) . The Buddha gives a number of
different explanations about why he does not
elucidate these questions. Several of these are
decidedly pragmatic in character, however
with the Fire Parable, we encounter
an explanation as to why the Buddha
does not answer these questions.

A Samana--- or
wandering ascetic, later to be defined in the time of the Zen schools by the Japanese word hsing-chiao (traveling on foot) --- by the name of Vaccha is puzzled by
the fact that the Buddha has denied, in turn, each of
these four alternatives --- 1) that the Enlightened one is
reborn after death; 2) that he is not reborn; 3) that he is
both reborn and not reborn; 4) and that he is neither
reborn nor not reborn. Thus he asks these questions
again, but this time the Buddha replies, "To say that
he is reborn does not fit the case.... To say that he
is not reborn does not fit the case," and so forth.
At this point, Vaccha confesses that he is totally at
a loss about what to think. The Buddha then proposes
this simile: Suppose a fire which had been burning
before you were to go out. If someone were to ask in
which direction the fire had gone, north, south,
east, or west, what would you reply? "The question
would not fit the case." answers Vaccha. What we have
here is something akin to a category mistake.

The Buddha is suggesting that similar
considerations apply to the case of the Arahat after
death. While the framework of ancient Indian thought
allows us to ask of any deceased individual whether
he or she is to be reborn, the question is
meaningless with respect to the Arhat. Vaccha was
confused by the Buddha's rejection of each of the
four logically possible alternatives; it would seem
that by necessity one of these must be true. Once we
see, however, that such predicates as 'reborn' simply
do not apply to the Arhat and that the deceased arhat
is subsumed under a different category, the seeming
oddity of the position vanishes. (source)

Discussion of the unanswerables and the famous
"silence of the Buddha" on such things as the existence or non-existence of God to the question of the Arhat above, has been a popular topic in modern scholarship,
and four main theories have been proposed to explain his refusal
to provide answers. The four are presented again briefly below. Nagarjuna's
treatment of the unanswerables does not seem to fit neatly any of the four and discussed following:

First, it has been said that the Buddha was silent because he was interested
only in practical matters. The speculative metaphysics were, simply, less
important than living the proper life, and thus were set aside.

Second, another interpretation is that the Buddha frankly did not know the answers,
and was preeminently an agnostic. This was the initial suspicion of the
monk in the above parable.

Third, an opposite interpretation of agnosticism is that the Buddha did
know the answers, but was incapable of explaining them. This interpretation
is partially supported by the number of times the Buddha emphasized the
subtlety and abstruseness of the doctrine. Following his enlightenment
he seriously considered not even attempting to teach his new- found truths,
only because he despaired of anyone understanding.

"The Enlightenment won by me is deep, difficult to see, difficult
to understand," the Buddha thought on the night of his awakening. "...For
human beings this would be a matter difficult to see... If I were to teach
[it] and others were not to understand me, that would be a weariness to
me, that would be a vexation to me."
However, to say that the difficulty of teaching motivated the Buddha's
reticence to speak is not to do him justice. Surely such an Enlightened
being would be able to wield language to make it do his bidding. Further,
it is stated clearly in the discourses that the Buddha did have the ability
to tailor his use of language to fit his audiences.

Fourth, is an approach that says the problem lies in the mental processes
which give rise to such questions. What is important is, not an answer
or the lack of an answer to these questions, but rather completely removing
oneself from such a sphere of ratiocination by the appeasement of
thoughts.

The Buddha divided all questions into four classes:

Those that deserve a categorical (straight yes or no) answer.

Those that deserve an analytical answer, defining and qualifying the terms of the question.

Those that deserve a counter-question, putting the ball back in the questioner's court.

Those that deserve to be put aside.

The last class of question consists of those that don't lead to the end of suffering and stress. The first duty of a teacher, when asked a question, is to figure out which class the question belongs to, and then to respond in the appropriate way. You don't, for example, say yes or no to a question that should be put aside. If you are the person asking the question and you get an answer, you should then determine how far the answer should be interpreted. The Buddha said that there are two types of people who misrepresent him:

Those who draw inferences from statements that shouldn't have inferences drawn from them.

(For a more complete discussion of this, see Gadjin M. Nagao,
"The Silence of the Buddha and its Madhyamic Interpretation," in Nagao
1991, 35-50)

The above might or might not be correct, and they might not even be compatatible or incompatible,
but neither are they Nagarjuna's Direct Approach. Nagarjuna, simply, says
that the answers to these questions are wrong. There may be theoretical
reasons for rejecting the unanswerable questions, and there certainly are
pragmatic reasons for not becoming entangled in such speculation. However,
Nagarjuna's primary reason for rejecting them in his final section is none
of these. He simply rejects them because they do
not hold up to logical scrutiny.

Nagarjuna opens with a discussion of views
about eternalism. All views of the survival of the self
are based on the belief that the self existed in the past and/or that the
self will exist in the future. However, it would not be appropriate to
say that the self existed in the past, for this would require that the
self who existed in the past is identical with the self who exists now,
in the present. This has already been refuted in section eleven. However,
the Buddha also said that it is incorrect to say that the self is
not eternal. If the Buddha had denied
continuity of existence, then, as discussed above, morality would be undercut,
for "the fruit of action performed by one will be experienced by another."

Further,
a self that existed in the present but not in the past would be uncaused,
which would be an erroneous conclusion. Since neither of the above alternatives
is appropriate, it would certainly not be appropriate to combine them and
say that one both existed and did not exist in the past. Further, since
there are no other alternatives besides existence or not existence, and
since a middle ground between the two would be unintelligible, it is not
appropriate to say that one neither existed nor did not exist in the past.
Views regarding a future existence are to be treated
in the same way. That which leads to the asking of the above unanswerable
questions is the tendency to seek for some "thing," some real entity which
can be characterized in terms of existence or non- existence. But, "if
it is thought that there is nothing eternal, what is it that will be non-eternal,
both eternal and non-eternal, and also what is separated from these two
[i.e. 'neither']?"

While we are on the subject there are four what the Buddha called "unconjecturables that are not to
conjectured about" that may be of some interest. Please go to:

Fundamentally, our experience as experienced is not different from the Zen master's. Where we differ is that we place a fog, a particular kind of conceptual overlay onto that experience and then make an emotional investment in that overlay, taking it to be "real" in and of itself.