There is no backup EVA capability in the event the need for a contingency EVA arises.

Supporting Evidence: The event on EVA 23 created a crisis within the ISS Program as it meant that
there was no US contingency EVA capability in the event that a critical EVA had to be performed to
ensure the safety of the crew or vehicle. Flight Rule B1-3 C. dictates that when a function normally
provided by one partner’s segment is unavailable, the function shall be performed by another partner’s
segment when possible. Given the inherently uncertain environmental and usage conditions faced by this
legacy system and the risks of relying upon it solely and indefinitely, one or more dissimilar backup
options should exist as with other essential vehicle systems.
In the past such a capability existed. Russian EVA training suits (known as Orlan) were available and
used in the JSC NBL and cross training of basic US task skills was performed by crew in Orlan suits. The
Joint Airlock was designed with the intent that either suit could be used in that airlock. The Joint Airlock
is in service on the ISS today, however, its use by Orlans has never been validated.
Recommendation R-26: For critical external tasks, the ISS Program should provide at least one
viable and proven dissimilar backup EVA capability (known candidates include dexterous
robotics or Russian EVA)
O-15 Lessons learned databases and corporate knowledge information exist, but are not always
easily accessible, often incomplete and are not being fully utilized.
Supporting Evidence: From interviews and review of existing EVA historical databases, the MIB
learned that the loss of suit expertise that started in the early to mid-1990s continues and is uniform across
multiple EVA organizations. Some of the loss is traceable to routine personnel retirements, but other
losses were driven by decisions that declared the suit design to be sufficiently mature for ISS purposes.
Upgrades and improvements have been relatively few compared to the efforts of the 1980s and early 90s.
The depth and breadth of the work force has diminished as development and significant improvements
gave way to sustaining engineering for obsolescence and failure support. Space Shuttle retirement, ISS
completion and cancellation of the Constellation program further eroded EVA support since a number of
key personnel were sustained by directly or indirectly supporting multiple programs. Just within MOD’s
EVA ranks, civil servant and contractor head counts dropped from 54 to 38 after the completion of the
Shuttle program and ISS assembly. Those remaining are stretched thin to cover routine training and
multiple mission control shifts with little margin for contingency affairs without burnout. Such attrition
over the years has depleted those that remember or have direct experience with this suit’s legacy, its hard
earned lessons, inherent limitations or subtle messages suggesting renewed attention. These adverse labor
conditions are not unique to EVA and exist across other areas of human spaceflight.
Attempts to counteract this loss of expertise via knowledge capture and lessons learned exist, but are
limited by lack of resources and time. It is admirable that EVA mission control skills are bolstered by
innovative tactics such as staff mentoring and participation in non-EVA handovers (for currency with the
latest flight control processes and personnel) and on-the-job training (OJT) roles during this era’s more
limited spacewalks. Unfortunately, departure of contractor and civil servant experts occurs faster than
information is collected and passed on. Those that remain have less time to explore history in meaningful
ways because their labor is almost fully dedicated with preparation for present and future EVAs.
Compared to the Shuttle and ISS assembly eras, hands-on hardware experience opportunities are much
reduced with fewer crewmembers flying, fewer ground training/test events and even fewer on-orbit
sorties. There is a trend toward very few vacuum chamber runs (8 ft., 11 ft., ETA, SSATA), no thermal