Last week CAAF declared an end to “multiplicity for sentencing” in its opinion in United States v. Campbell, No. 11-0403/AF, 71 M.J. 19 (C.A.A.F. Mar. 1, 2012) (CAAFlog case page) (link to slip op.). But, it created a new construct: “unreasonable multiplication of charges as applied to sentence.”

The case involves an Air Force Captain serving as an emergency room nurse manager who stole Vicodin and Percocet on approximately 28 occasions. The three charged specifications of violations of Articles 107, 112a, and 121, UCMJ, each on divers occasions, were the subject of trial-stage litigation for multiplicity and unreasonable multiplication of charges, and were merged for sentencing purposes by the military judge. The Appellant was sentenced to a dismissal.

Chief Judge Baker wrote for a near-unanimous court (Judge Stucky concurring in the result), beginning with a discussion of the terms “multiplicity,” “multiplicity for sentencing,” and “unreasonable multiplication of charges.” The rule of multiplicity is long-recognized as a protection against double jeopardy, while the concept of unreasonable multiplication of charges (“UMC”) is designed to protect an accused from “the potential for overreaching in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.” Slip op. at 10. Trial-stage motions for relief from either multiplicity or UMC generally seek dismissal of some charges, or “merger” at sentencing to reduce the total maximum punishment (creating, in effect, concurrent sentences).

While the opinion does not answer the paradox of how trial counsel – who incessantly whine that they have no prosecutorial discretion – could possibly overreach in the exercise thereof, it does resolve the riddle of how a charge could be multiplicious for sentencing (justifying merger) but not multiplicious for findings (justifying dismissal). “As a matter of logic and law, if an offense is multiplicious for sentencing it must necessarily be multiplicious for findings as well.” Slip op. at 10 (and vice versa: “multiplicious for findings is necessarily multiplicious for sentencing.” Slip op. at 11).

However, as quickly as the court makes things simpler, it again makes them complex, deciding that “the concept of unreasonable multiplication of charges may apply differently to findings than to sentencing. For example, the charging scheme may not implicate the Quiroz factors in the same way that the sentencing exposure does.” Slip op. at 11. Thus, a new rules rises from the ashes of the old. “[A]t trial three concepts may arise: multiplicity for double jeopardy purposes; unreasonable multiplication of charges as applied to findings and, unreasonable multiplication of charges as applied to sentence.” Slip op. at 13 (punctuation in original). UMC for sentencing replaces multiplicity for sentencing; a potentially less-confusing rule, but oddly punctuated (which will probably inspire a new line of creative-writing litigation from defense counsel).

Finally, the court affirms the trial military judge’s decision not to dismiss offenses in this case as the thefts of medication “may have each represented a singular act, but each implicated multiple and significant criminal law interests, none necessarily dependent on the others.” Slip op. at 14. Additionally, it affirms the decision to merge for sentencing, “see[ing] how the three specifications in this case might have exaggerated Appellant’s criminal and punitive exposure in light of the fact that, from Appellant’s perspective, he had committed one act implicating three separate criminal purposes.” Slip op. at 16.

Concurring in the judgement, Judge Stucky “cannot join the majority in perpetuating the mess that constitutes our multiplicity and unreasonable multiplication of charges jurisprudence.” Diss. op. at 1. Decrying both the establishment of the doctrine of UMC in Quiroz, and the new “UMC for sentencing” regime, he calls for a single rule of multiplicity based on double-jeopardy principles that leaves prosecutorial overreaching and excessive sentences for the CCAs to address as they exercise their “power to determine whether a sentence is appropriate as a matter of fact.” Diss. op. at 4 (citing United States v. Baier, 60 M.J. 382, 384 (CAAF, 2005)).

I leave it to others to explain why Judge Stucky’s common-sense approach is unworkable under the UCMJ.

Tuesday’s oral argument at CAAF in United States v. Campbell, No. 11-0403/AF, addressed the following issue:

I. Whether the military judge erred, after finding all three charges arose out of the same transaction and were part of the same impulse, by merging them for sentencing rather than dismissing them.

The appellant, an emergency room nurse manager, obtained Vicodin and Percocet by false pretenses on approximately 28 occasions, obtaining the drugs from a medication dispensing machine in the ER pharmacy. He was charged with a total of three specifications of violations of Article 107, 112a, and 121, UCMJ, each on divers occasions, based on his false assertions about doctors orders, his theft of the medication from the government, and his corresponding unlawful possession thereof. He was sentenced to a dismissal.

We noted CAAF’s grant of review last Thursday in United States v. Campbell, __ M.J. __, No. 11-0403/AF (C.A.A.F. June 2, 2011): “WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ERRED, AFTER FINDING ALL THREE CHARGES AROSE OUT OF THE SAME TRANSACTION AND WERE PART OF THE SAME IMPULSE, BY MERGING THEM FOR SENTENCING RATHER THAN DISMISSING THEM.” We’ve uploaded AFCCA’s unpublished decision in the case here.

On Thursday, CAAF added another trailer to the Fosler Trailer Park. United States v. Ballan, __ M.J. __, No. 11-0413/NA (C.A.A.F. June 2, 2011). CAAF also granted a non-Fosler issue in the same case:

ALTHOUGH THE CRIME OF INDECENT ACTS WITH A CHILD TO WHICH APPELLANT PLEADED GUILTY WAS NOT A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF THE CHARGED CRIME OF RAPE OF A CHILD AND THUS HAD NOT BEEN FORMALLY REFERRED TO TRIAL BY COURT-MARTIAL BY THE CONVENING AUTHORITY, WHETHER APPELLANT WAIVED SUCH IRREGULARITY BY PLEADING GUILTY UNDER A PRETRIAL AGREEMENT TO INDECENT ACTS WITH A CHILD IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 134, WHERE NEITHER THE PRETRIAL AGREEMENT NOR APPELLANT’S PLEA AT ARRAIGNMENT EXPRESSLY SET FORTH EITHER POTENTIAL TERMINAL ELEMENT FOR AN ARTICLE 134 CLAUSE 1 OR 2 SPECIFICATION, BUT BOTH ELEMENTS WERE DISCUSSED AND ADMITTED DURING THE PROVIDENCE INQUIRY.

Also on Thursday, CAAF granted review of this issue: “WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ERRED, AFTER FINDING ALL THREE CHARGES AROSE OUT OF THE SAME TRANSACTION AND WERE PART OF THE SAME IMPULSE, BY MERGING THEM FOR SENTENCING RATHER THAN DISMISSING THEM.” United States v. Campbell, __ M.J. __, No. 11-0403/AF (C.A.A.F. June 2, 2011). AFCCA’s website appears to be unavailable at the moment. I should be able to obtain a copy of AFCCA’s opinion in Campbell on Monday and post it then.

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