After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties' request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.

Claimant Yuell O. Canida appeals from an order of the magistrate judge(1)
affirming the decision of the Secretary of Health and Human Services, denying
his application for disability insurance and supplemental security income
benefits. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C.
405(g), and we affirm.

At the time of his administrative hearing, claimant, a fifty-two year old
man, alleged disability since April 1, 1989, due to lower back pain. Although
claimant had been deaf in his right ear since birth and had some left ear hearing
loss, he claimed the only reason he could not work was the back pain.
Concluding that claimant could perform his past relevant work as a janitor, the
administrative law judge (ALJ) found claimant not disabled at step four of the
five-step process for determining disability, seeWilliams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d
748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988) (discussing the five steps in detail).

In his request for Appeals Council review, claimant submitted additional
evidence of borderline mental retardation and depression. The Appeals Council
found that neither claimant's contentions of error in the ALJ's decision or the
additional evidence of mental impairment provided a basis for review. The
magistrate judge affirmed the Secretary's decision and claimant appeals.

On appeal, claimant contends that (1) the ALJ erred in finding claimant's
subjective complaints of pain to be incredible; (2) the Appeals Council erred in
evaluating the evidence of claimant's mental impairments; (3) the ALJ's
conclusion that claimant could return to his past relevant work as a janitor was
not supported by substantial evidence; and (4) the ALJ did not adequately
develop the record as to the demands of claimant's past relevant work as he
actually performed it.

We review the Secretary's decision to determine whether it is supported by
substantial evidence and whether the correct legal standards were applied. SeeCastellano v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 26 F.3d 1027, 1028 (10th Cir.
1994). We do not, however, reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for
that of the Secretary. SeeHargis v. Sullivan, 945 F.2d 1482, 1486 (10th Cir.
1991).

We have thoroughly reviewed the parties' briefs and the record on appeal,
and are satisfied that claimant's contentions of error have no merit. The
magistrate judge thoroughly and correctly addressed the issues raised by
claimant. Therefore, we affirm for substantially the reasons stated in the
magistrate judge's Order of December 23, 1996. See Appellant's App., Vol. I at
6-29.

FOOTNOTESClick footnote number to return to corresponding location in the text.

*. Effective March 31, 1995, the functions of
the Secretary of Health and
Human Services in social security cases were transferred to the Commissioner of
Social Security. P.L. No. 103-296. Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c), John J.
Callahan, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, is substituted for Donna E.
Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services, as the defendant in this action.
Although we have substituted the Commissioner for the Secretary in the caption,
in the text we continue to refer to the Secretary because she was the appropriate
party at the time of the underlying decision.

**. This order and judgment is not
binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

1. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
636(c)(1), the parties consented to final
adjudication of this matter by the magistrate judge.