The Athenians also made an expedition against the isle of
Melos with thirty ships of their own, six Chian, and two Lesbian
vessels, sixteen hundred hoplites, three hundred archers, and
twenty mounted archers from Athens, and about fifteen hundred
hoplites from the allies and the islanders.

The Melians are a colony of Sparta that would not submit to
the Athenians like the other islanders, and at first remained
neutral and took no part in the struggle, but afterwards upon the
Athenians using violence and plundering their territory, assumed an
attitude of open hostility.

Cleomedes son of Lycomedes, and Tisias son of Tisimachus, the
generals, encamping in their territory with the above armament,
before doing any harm to their land, sent envoys to negotiate.
These the Melians did not bring before the people, but bade them
state the object of their mission to the magistrates and the few;
upon which the Athenian envoys spoke as follows:

Athenians: “Since the negotiations are not to go on before the
people, in order that we may not be able to speak straight on
without interruption, and deceive the ears of the multitude by
seductive arguments which would pass without refutation (for we
know that this is the meaning of our being brought before the few),
what if you who sit there were to pursue a method more cautious
still! Make no set speech yourselves, but take us up at whatever
you do not like, and settle that before going any farther. And
first tell us if this proposition of ours suits you.”

Melians: “To the fairness of quietly instructing each other as
you propose there is nothing to object; but your military
preparations are too far advanced to agree with what you say, as we
see you are come to be judges in your own cause, and that all we
can reasonably expect from this negotiation is war, if we prove to
have right on our side and refuse to submit, or in the contrary
case, slavery.”

Athenians: “If you have met to reason about presentiments of
the future, or for anything else than to consult for the safety of
your state upon the facts that you see before you, we will cease
talking; otherwise we will go on.”

Melians: “It is natural and excusable for men in our position
to turn more ways than one both in thought and utterance. However,
the question in this conference is, as you say, the safety of our
country; and the discussion, if you please, can proceed in the way
which you propose.”

Athenians: “For ourselves, we shall not trouble you with
specious pretenses—either of how we have a right to our empire
because we overthrew the Mede, or are now attacking you because of
wrong that you have done us—and make a long speech which would not
be believed; and in return we hope that you, instead of thinking to
influence us by saying that you did not join the Spartans, although
their colonists, or that you have done us no wrong, will aim at
what is feasible, holding in view the real sentiments of us both;
since you know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is
only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what
they can and the weak suffer what they must.”

Melians: “As we think, at any rate, it is expedient—we speak
as we are obliged, since you enjoin us to let right alone and talk
only of interest—that you should not destroy what is our common
protection, namely, the privilege of being allowed in danger to
invoke what is fair and right, and even to profit by arguments not
strictly valid if they can be persuasive. And you are as much
interested in this as any, as your fall would be a signal for the
heaviest vengeance and an example for the world to meditate
upon.”

Athenians: “The end of our empire, if end it should, does not
frighten us: a rival empire like Sparta, even if Sparta was our
real antagonist, is not so terrible to the vanquished as subjects
who by themselves attack and overpower their rulers. This,
however, is a risk that we are content to take. We will now proceed
to show you that we have come here in the interest of our empire,
and that we shall say what we are now going to say, for the
preservation of your country; as we would desire to exercise that
empire over you without trouble, and see you preserved for the good
of us both.”

Melians: “And how, pray, could it turn out as good for us to
serve as for you to rule?”

Athenians: “Because you would have the advantage of submitting
before suffering the worst, and we should gain by not destroying
you.”

Melians: “So you would not consent to our being neutral,
friends instead of enemies, but allies of neither side.”

Athenians: “No; for your hostility cannot so much hurt us as
your friendship will be an argument to our subjects of our
weakness, and your enmity of our power.”

Melians: “Is that your subjects’ idea of equity, to put those
who have nothing to do with you in the same category with peoples
that are most of them your own colonists, and some conquered
rebels?”

Athenians: “As far as right goes they think one has as much of
it as the other, and that if any maintain their independence it is
because they are strong, and that if we do not molest them it is
because we are afraid; so that besides extending our empire we
should gain in security by your subjection; the fact that you are
islanders and weaker than others rendering it all the more
important that you should not succeed in thwarting the masters of
the sea.”

Melians: “But do you consider that there is no security in the
policy which we indicate? For here again if you debar us from
talking about justice and invite us to obey your interest, we also
must explain ours, and try to persuade you, if the two happen to
coincide. How can you avoid making enemies of all existing neutrals
who shall look at our case and conclude from it that one day or
another you will attack them? And what is this but to make greater
the enemies that you have already, and to force others to become so
who would otherwise have never thought of it?”

Athenians: “Why, the fact is that mainlanders generally give
us but little alarm; the liberty which they enjoy will long prevent
their taking precautions against us; it is rather islanders like
yourselves, outside our empire, and subjects smarting under the
yoke, who would be the most likely to take a rash step and lead
themselves and us into obvious danger.”

Melians: “Well then, if you risk so much to retain your
empire, and your subjects to get rid of it, it were surely great
baseness and cowardice in us who are still free not to try
everything that can be tried, before submitting to your
yoke.”

Athenians: “Not if you are well advised, the contest not being
an equal one, with honor as the prize and shame as the penalty, but
a question of self-preservation and of not resisting those who are
far stronger than you are.”

Melians: “But we know that the fortune of war is sometimes
more impartial than the disproportion of numbers might lead one to
suppose; to submit is to give ourselves over to despair, while
action still preserves for us a hope that we may stand
erect.”

Athenians: “Hope, danger’s comforter, may be indulged in by
those who have abundant resources, if not without loss, at all
events without ruin; but its nature is to be extravagant, and those
who go so far as to stake their all upon the venture see it in its
true colors only when they are ruined; but so long as the discovery
would enable them to guard against it, it is never found wanting.
Let not this be the case with you, who are weak and hang on a
single turn of the scale; nor be like the vulgar, who, abandoning
such security as human means may still afford, when visible hopes
fail them in extremity, turn to the invisible, to prophecies and
oracles, and other such inventions that delude men with hopes to
their destruction.”

Melians: “You may be sure that we are as well aware as you of
the difficulty of contending against your power and fortune, unless
the terms be equal. But we trust that the gods may grant us fortune
as good as yours, since we are just men fighting against unjust,
and that what we want in power will be made up by the alliance of
the Spartans, who are bound, if only for very shame, to come to the
aid of their kindred. Our confidence, therefore, after all is not
so utterly irrational.”

Athenians: “When you speak of the favor of the gods, we may as
fairly hope for that as yourselves; neither our pretensions nor our
conduct being in any way contrary to what men believe of the gods,
or practice among themselves. [2] Of the gods we believe, and of
men we know, that by a necessary law of their nature they rule
wherever they can. And it is not as if we were the first to make
this law, or to act upon it when made: we found it existing before
us, and shall leave it to exist forever after us; all we do is to
make use of it, knowing that you and everybody else, having the
same power as we have, would do the same as we do. [3] Thus, as far
as the gods are concerned, we have no fear and no reason to fear
that we shall be at a disadvantage. But when we come to your notion
about the Spartans, which leads you to believe that shame will make
them help you, here we bless your simplicity but do not envy your
folly. [4] The Spartans, when their own interests or their
country’s laws are in question, are the worthiest men alive; of
their conduct toward others much might be said, but no clearer idea
of it could be given than by shortly saying that of all the men we
know they are most conspicuous in considering what is agreeable
honorable, and what is expedient just. Such a way of thinking does
not promise much for the safety which you now unreasonably count
upon.”

Melians: “But it is for this very reason that we now trust to
their respect for expediency to prevent them from betraying the
Melians, their colonists, and thereby losing the confidence of
their friends in Hellas and helping their enemies.”

Athenians: “Then you do not adopt the view that expediency
goes with security, while justice and honor cannot be followed
without danger; and danger the Spartans generally court as little
as possible.” Melians: “But we believe that they would be more
likely to face even danger for our sake, and with more confidence
than for others, as our nearness to the Peloponnesus makes it
easier for them to act; and our common blood insures our
fidelity.”

Athenians: “Yes, but what an intending ally trusts to is not
the goodwill of those who ask his aid, but a decided superiority of
power for action; and the Spartans look to this even more than
others. At least, such is their distrust of their home resources
that it is only with numerous allies that they attack a neighbor;
now is it likely that while we are masters of the sea they will
cross over to an island?”

Melians: “But they would have others to send. The Cretan sea
is a wide one, and it is more difficult for those who command it to
intercept others, than for those who wish to elude them to do so
safely. [2] And should the Spartans miscarry in this, they would
fall upon your land, and upon those left of your allies whom
Brasidas did not reach; and instead of places which are not yours,
you will have to fight for your own country and your own
confederacy.”

Athenians: “Some diversion of the kind you speak of you may
one day experience, only to learn, as others have done, that the
Athenians never once yet withdrew from a siege for fear of any. [2]
But we are struck by the fact, that after saying you would consult
for the safety of your country, in all this discussion you have
mentioned nothing which men might trust in and think to be saved
by. Your strongest arguments depend upon hope and the future, and
your actual resources are too scanty, as compared with those
arrayed against you, for you to come out victorious. [3] You will
therefore show great blindness of judgment, unless, after allowing
us to retire, you can find some counsel more prudent than this. You
will surely not be caught by that idea of disgrace, which in
dangers that are disgraceful, and at the same time too plain to be
mistaken, proves so fatal to mankind; since in too many cases the
very men that have their eyes perfectly open to what they are
rushing into, let the thing called disgrace, by the mere influence
of a seductive name, lead them on to a point at which they become
so enslaved by the phrase as in fact to fall willfully into
hopeless disaster, and incur disgrace more disgraceful as the
companion of error, than when it comes as the result of misfortune.
[4] This, if you are well advised, you will guard against; and you
will not think it dishonorable to submit to the greatest city in
Hellas, when it makes you the moderate offer of becoming its
tributary ally, without ceasing to enjoy the country that belongs
to you; nor when you have the choice given you between war and
security, will you be so blinded as to choose the worse. And it is
certain that those who do not yield to their equals, who keep terms
with their superiors, and are moderate toward their inferiors, on
the whole succeed best. [5] Think over the matter, therefore, after
our withdrawal, and reflect once and again that it is for your
country that you are consulting, that you have not more than one,
and that upon this one deliberation depends its prosperity or
ruin.”

The Athenians now withdrew from the conference; and the
Melians, left to themselves, came to a decision corresponding to
what they had maintained in the discussion, and answered, [2] “Our
resolution, Athenians, is the same as it was at first. We will not
in a moment deprive of freedom a city that has been inhabited these
seven hundred years; but we put our trust in the fortune by which
the gods have preserved it until now, and in the help of men, that
is, of the Spartans; and so we will try and save ourselves. [3]
Meanwhile we invite you to allow us to be friends to you and foes
to neither party, and to retire from our country after making such
a treaty as shall seem fit to us both.”

Such was the answer of the Melians. The Athenians now
departing from the conference said, “Well, you alone, as it seems
to us, judging from these resolutions, regard what is future as
more certain than what is before your eyes, and what is out of
sight, in your eagerness, as already coming to pass; and as you
have staked most on, and trusted most in, the Spartans, your
fortune, and your hopes, so will you be most completely
deceived.”