As Israel's war on the Gaza Strip continues amid Hamas rocket fire into Israel—a conflict that has, this time around, cost the lives of at least 560 (largely civilian) Palestinians and 27 Israelis—and swells into the present ground invasion, it bears mentioning that the current conflict between Israel and Hamas is deeply personal—for the leaders on each side.

Before Benjamin Netanyahu tried to cripple Hamas, he, in fact, attempted to assassinate its leader. But in botching the operation, the Mossad created bitter enmity between the two men at the center of the conflict.

The year was 1997; the place was Amman, Jordan. Israel had identified the little-known Hamas operative Khalid Mishal, then 41, as a likely future leader of the movement.

When Netanyahu, then in his first term as prime minister, called for a list of Hamas targets to avenge a series of suicide bombings in Jerusalem, he is said to have personally placed the bull’s-eye on Mishal, overruling intelligence advice that a more high-profile Hamas operative should be taken out.

The plan was absurdly complicated. Instead of the clean snatch or sniper shot at which the Mossad excelled, it called for an Israeli agent to sidle past Mishal as he arrived for work at his Amman office. That agent was to create a kerfuffle by popping a pre-shaken can of soda while an accomplice would amble past in the opposite direction, using a special device to deposit a slow-acting killer drug in the distracted Mishal’s ear.

The idea was that Mishal would go about the rest of his day and would respond to a feeling of tiredness by taking a nap—from which he would never awake. The drug was a powerful derivative of the surgical painkiller fentanyl, which the Israelis expected would dissipate so quickly in Mishal’s body that there would be no trace of it by the time a postmortem was done.

The plot succeeded as spectacularly as it failed. The poison was in Mishal’s ear, but his two bodyguards witnessed the attack and one of them gave chase, capturing the two Mossad men after all three engaged in bloody hand-to-hand combat.

Their capture forced Netanyahu to fess up to a furious King Hussein of Jordan.

The monarch had gone out on a limb, signing a peace treaty with Israel against the wishes of his people; and he was exceptionally irritated by Netanyahu’s behavior as prime minister. Now the Israeli leader’s resort to cloak-and-dagger games in the streets of the Jordanian capital had presented him with the exquisite pleasure, for an Arab leader dealing with his Israeli counterpart, of having two Israeli prisoners to barter for an outcome that would humiliate Israel.

The poison did its job—within hours Mishal was at death’s door. Warning that if Mishal died, the Mossad duo would be hanged, the king called in the big guns—then U.S. president Bill Clinton and his Middle East team. Hussein’s two demands were extraordinary: he required the Israelis to cough up a vial of the antidote to the poison, the only means of saving Mishal’s life; he insisted that Netanyahu order the immediate release, from Israeli prisons, of a number of Palestinian prisoners, including the ailing Sheik Ahmed Yassin, the wheelchair-confined founder and spiritual leader of Hamas who was one of Israel’s most notable Palestinians in their custody.

The big names in the Clinton White House were involved—Sandy Berger, Dennis Ross, and Bruce Riedel. But in researching a book on the crisis and its impact on the Hamas leadership, I was told that this was one of those rare occasions when none of the president’s men would support Netanyahu—he was told there could be no face-saving, he would have to deliver on both of King Hussein’s demands.

Mishal was saved—with literally only hours to spare—and, within Hamas, he was anointed as “the man who wouldn’t die.” He became the leader of the organization, after Israel assassinated Yassin in 2004 (and his successor, Abdel Rantisi, a month later), always based outside the occupied territories, but the first in the movement to take control of all wings—political and military, inside and outside.

Publicly, Israeli officials were required to condemn Mishal as a terrorist, and few in Washington would speak up for him.

But in confidential interviews some gave more considered assessments – “an authentic nationalist hero,” from a former Israeli military intelligence chief; will have ‘an essential role’ in the Middle East crisis, from a then Clinton aide. And this from a senior Israeli official: “He wants to be like us, like the Zionists in historic Palestine. As a homeless people they succeeded in carving out a new state that today is home to more than 40 per cent of the Jews in the world. Mishal wants to bring [Palestinians] all together in their historic home.” The closest these two have been since Netanyahu’s agents fumbled, was when both attended the 1999 funeral of Jordan’s King Hussein. Again the venue was Amman—and this time Jordan’s General Intelligence Department was diplomatically scrupulous in keeping a distance between the would-be killer Netanyahu and his target, Mishal.

But the two men actually talk, even if never face-to-face, mind you. Yet acting through intermediaries they have negotiated a series of truces. And in every crisis, including the war now unfolding in Gaza, the last rites are read for Mishal’s movement.

This certainly is a low point for the movement. In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, Hamas was being duchessed by then Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi and by the Qatari leadership. When I met Mishal in Doha, in February 2013, Hamas was confident that its new regional sponsors would see Mishal appointed leader of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, a stepping-stone to succeeding Mahmoud Abbas as leader of the Palestinian nation.

That’s not likely to happen any time soon. Israel and the new military leadership in Egypt are squeezing Hamas. And this conflict has the same asymmetrical dynamic of all that came before it—a high-tech regional superpower against an Islamist militia, that can launch thousands of rockets and even a drone aircraft, but which causes more psychological than physical or human damage.

Given that the movement has emerged bloodied but unbowed from its serial military encounters with Israel, it might be prudent to reserve judgment on claims in Israel that Hamas will be finished off this time, once and for all.