Asian Security Blog: What the Japan Tsunami Tells Us about International Politics

[Here's a guest post from Robert E. Kelly, Associate Professor at Busan National University. Robert blogs at the very fine Asian Security Blog. The post, written shortly after the quake, contains a few dated facts but Bob's points still stand.]

Aerial view of Minato, Japan, one week after the March 11th earthquake. U.S. Navy photo.

For as awful as natural disasters are, they also act as lightning flashes to illuminate the hidden landscape of states’ weaknesses and capabilities. As ‘acts of god,’ natural disasters represent a uniquely blameless test of state seriousness and capacity (and of genuine international solidarity). Unlike man-made catastrophes such as 9/11 or Srebrenica, this cannot be blame on foreign machinations, ignored/manipulated for political calculations, or otherwise geopolitically spun. Not even Koreans, who are arguably the people most alienated from the Japanese on the planet, are ‘happy’ about this or calling it retribution or anything like that.

So this earthquake was a major test of the response capacity of the Japanese state (and of the functioning of global governance on things like nuclear-oversight or disaster-relief assistance), and we can honestly say that Japan has performed remarkably well. The quake was an staggering 9.0 on a 10 point scale (the Richter scale), and news reports are calling this the worst quake in Japan’s history. Yet the death-toll is still under 5000. Despite the sadness of these deaths, we should recognize how astonishingly low that is and credit that directly to the seriousness and functionality of the Japanese state. Events like this cast into extreme clarity: the difference between the ‘First World’ and the rest; why, for all the talk about the ‘second world rising,’ places like South Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and even China, have a such long way to go, and why they export, not import, people; and just how badly governed so much of the world really is, and how that dysfunction borders on criminal negligence when really serious disaster strikes. Remember how many people died in far less powerful events in Pakistan or Haiti recently.This is not meant to be OECD triumphalism, but yet another wake-up call regarding the atrocious government of far too many places. Japan should make Haitian and Pakistani elites hang their heads in shame.

Here are a few applaudable illustrations of truly serious, responsible government:

1. Japan called International Atomic Energy Agency immediately after the earthquake about its nuclear reactors. It has cooperated properly and publicly with IAEA. It has noted the problems in the media, while responding properly with cautions where necessary. This is what real governments, who actual govern rather than tyrannize, pilfer, or exploit, do. Imagine how Iran or NK, or maybe even China and India, – all hyper-nationalist, corrupt governments with super-secret nuclear programs – would have responded. They would have told no one until the questions became unbearable. Conspiracy theories about outside intervention would have been floated. IAEA regulations would have been openly rejected as a pretext for western espionage, etc. The consequence would be a re-run of the post-Chernobyl hysteria, because no one knew the details or trusted the source. By contrast, Japan did its duty, and the world trusts them. Well done.

2 Japanese emergency responders got out there quickly. Within a few hours, bulldozers were already on scene. Just like the rapid New Zealand response a few weeks ago, this was a good demonstration of what political science calls state capacity. The Japanese state is not faux-structure on paperthat really exists to serve some megalomaniac ‘president-for-life’ like Gadhafi. It is highly modern, efficient, rational, focused entity that can fairly rapidly process information, redirect resources, and otherwise flexibly respond to shocks. Given the 9.0 Richter measure, I am amazed how rapidly and coherently Japan is responding. Had this happened in Cambodia or Mozambique, the entire state might have collapsed. Even the Americans really blew it on the far-less-catastrophic Hurricane Katrina. Again, well done.

3. The Japanese trained a lot for this and are a disciplined, serious, but not therefore terrorized, population. What most strikes me about the videos coming out of this is just how calm everyone seems. The CNN reporters in the first few hours seemed almost desperate to find scenes of hysteria – one guy saying on a cell-vid, ‘the building is going to collapse!’, got re-played again and again. By contrast, look at the American response to 2003 power outage in northeast; people treated it like the apocalypse. Or far worse, look at how the NK state has ‘disciplined’ its people to “arduously march” through its recurrent famines, or how the USSR militarized its entire population and economy to fight WWIII. If the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in the US actually did its job, this is how Americans would respond to terror alerts, instead of neuroses about duck tape and safe rooms. Japan has just shown the US how intelligent grown-ups respond to real threats. We could only dream that DHS was so professional.

4. Japan didn’t blame this on God’s unhappiness about abortion, gays, or modern decadence; Mossad, the United States, China, Korea, etc, ad nauseaum. Again, try to imagine how NK would have responded: a US-SK-Jpn plot to control the earth’s crust!; or the Taliban: it’s Allah’s punishment for not beating our women harder; or Fox News: Jesus’ response to gays in the military. Don’t believe me? Jerry Falwell blamed US homosexuals for 9/11, or read this about how Israeli intelligence is responsible for shark attacks in Egypt – because, you know, Spielberg is a Jew and directed Jaws... Despite huge destruction, Japan’s response to the massive event has been serious, normal, and measured. Hear, hear.

5. Japan prepared for this by listening to scientists and experts and not just blowing the money on pork for reelection, or just conveniently forgetting about legislative hearings that demonstrated real threats. America is once again an instructive counter-example (*sigh*, wouldn’t it be nice if we could get this stuff right?). Post-Katrina, we all found out how much the New Orleans and Louisiana had been warned. Mayor Nagin was a balloon head with absolutely no idea what to do, despite governing a coastal city eight feet below sea-level (!) with known exposure to hurricanes - which is obviously why he got re-elected – wth!?, but then W got re-elected post-Iraq… Anyway, then came heckuva-job-Brownie. Or how about the audits of DHS which show that homeland security money still follows legislative pork not appraised terror threats? This sort of stuff should tell you why the far less powerful Katrina Hurricane lead to the travesty at the Superdome, while Japan is pushing through with minimal panic. Serious people from a focused government spent big money on empirically demonstrated problems. I guess we forgot that in the war on terror.

Japan just showed how serious, professional, responsible, secular government can construct a real, responsive state apparatus that can help citizens in even very extreme circumstances and genuinely resolves serious collective action and public goods problems. Superb. Truly remarkable. In the midst of this tragedy, we should be in awe of the world-class response. This is a real ‘all-hazard’ response. The world – and especially DHS! – should take note.

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A contributor and editor at the blog War Is Boring, Kyle Mizokami started Japan Security Watch in 2010 to further understand Japan's defenses and security policy.
Kyle Mizokami has 530 post(s) on Japan Security Watch

3 comments

As nice as it is to hear people praise Japan's reaction to the quake I'm not sure that Kelly is placing things in the proper context. The idea of using the disaster response capability of Japan, a country that possesses the world's third largest economy and is regularly under threat from major earthquakes and tsunami, to criticize impoverished states such as Cambodia, Mozambique and Haiti is ludicrous. Not only do each of these have nowhere near the funds of a first-world nation, but what they do have is generally desperately needed for areas that are incredibly underfunded, and an arguably higher priority than disaster relief, such as basic healthcare and education. The reason why these states are so poor is a whole different issue but considering the lingering effects of colonialism and the ongoing policies of the World Bank and IMF it seems disingenuous for any Western academic, especially one who lists these institutions as areas of specialization, to criticize the response-capability of states that remain impoverished and wracked by internal tensions largely as a result of western foreign policy.

Certainly, many such states have highly corrupt governments and once again much of this is inline with the use by Western states of just such corrupt and brutal puppet regimes. Yet, while the leaderships of impoverished states are simply labeled as inherently inept or deceitful, he goes further with states that might be considered US foes. The leaders of such countries are instead written off as paranoid and insane. While an opportunity to throw in an entirely unrelated and unwarranted dig at Libya is understandable for any champion of current US foreign policy, apparently even the leaders of China would be unable to respond in an intelligent, humane and diplomatic way to a major humanitarian disaster in their nation. This is the same country which, despite recent waves of anti-Japanese nationalism, responded to the tsunami with widespread admiration for the Japanese character and which was among the first countries to dispatch search and rescue teams to the stricken area.

It is China though which seems to identify the real strength of Japan's response. Kelly credits it to listening to experts and scientists, yet many of the key problems at Fukushima seem to have stemmed from listening too closely to the advice of neoliberal 'experts' during the 1990's. Among the Chinese people, on the other hand, many have written that their country must aspire to reach Japan's level of social cooperation and consideration. Of course, Japan's social character is something that has taken generations, at a minimum to build, and has had dark elements in its development, whether the strident imperialism of the Meiji rescript on education or the enforced group-think of the Kempeitai war years. The idea that the US department of Homeland Security could ever foster a similar character in the US populace lacks any understanding of just how different both cultures really are.

Ultimately, it seems as though Kelly is an advocate of what Klein called 'disaster capitalism', the opportunity afforded by major natural disaster to globalist neoliberals, wherein they can use the period of shock and chaos in the aftermath to reconstruct the nations infrastructure in a pattern more acceptable to the experts and scientists of institutions such as the IMF and World Bank. If so, his praise of Japan is to be taken with a pinch of salt and should be regarded simply as an encouragement for increased intervention in the domestic affairs of other states under the aegis of disaster prevention.

His understanding of Japan's capacity for rational analysis of its national security concerns can be ascertained by his statement that Japanese politicians will listen to experts rather than "blowing money on pork for reelections" or ignoring "real threats". The idea that Japan does not have its own hard core of financially corrupt politicos is as risible as the view that the country is fully prepared for all possible real threats. While the response to the tsunami was well rehearsed and executed there are many other threats looming in the none-too-distant future, including energy shortfalls, littoral territorial disputes and manpower shortages, that Japan is not nearly as fully prepared to deal with.

Rather than listening to shallow and specious praise, Japan’s security experts should be more focused on considering whether the country is capable of responding to 9.0 magnitude events that might occur in other areas of security concern.

Thank you for reading and for the vigorous response. Here are a few responses:

1. Regarding my credentials on international organizations, I did study IO as a subsection of my graduate work in international relations. I wrote my dissertation about the IMF and World Bank and their interaction with NGOs who often share the Naomi Klein critique of the institutions. I did interview work with dozens of NGO and Bank/Fund staff in the process. So I feel reasonably qualified to speak on the issue. Here is the dissertation; here, here, here, and here are some blog-posts on the IMF. While I am somewhat sympathetic to 'neoliberalism,' I hardly think of myself as some sort of IMF hack. Certainly the IMF doesn't think so; I have spoken there a few times and gotten sustained criticism.

2. I am not sure how much of this is actually connected to IMF/WB neoliberal policy though. Disaster relief is not traditionally an area of either institution, especially the IMF. The Bank and Fund are a lot more interested in market efficiencies, inflation, exchange rates, infrastructure, etc. I suppose there is an oblique link between these things and disaster response, but one might therefore connect 'neoliberalism' to almost any social ill (or good). I would like to see the in-depth process tracing that ties IMF/WB decisions directly disaster relief strategies. The UNDP works more on this issue, I believe. Klein's work is the only book I know to offer such a critique. I don't know anything more academic and less polemical though in the robust political science and economics literature on the institutions. It’s also worth noting that Klein doesn’t talk about the IMF and WB that much in the book; she is more concerned with neoliberalism as ideology, Wall Street, and Washington. The IMF and WB are more pawns of more powerful actors in her critique than independent actors. If so, they can’t be blamed that much. This does not mean you are incorrect, only that causal relationship strikes me as pretty loose, and there is little extant theory that I know of – beyond Klein who is a little too driven by an agenda to be too credible for me.

3. It is incorrect that IMF and WB foist a strict one-size-fits-all model on developing borrowers. In fact, that is one of the great myths about the Bank and Fund that the academic literature has refuted rather clearly I believe. I would recommend work by Randall Stone. Fund policy advice is not a strict strait-jacket, other than being broadly capitalist I suppose. The World Bank especially has moved significantly into softer social lending (for schools, healthcare, water, etc) for a while now. Finally, it is worth noting in their defense, that no one forces states to go to IMF or Bank. Ultimately state elites choose to go, usually for reasons of their own making – they ran their economies into a ditch. States can and have chosen to go their own way – as East Asian states have since the East Asian financial crisis.

4. It does not strike me as unfair to suggest that many other states with super-secret nuclear programs would have reacted very differently than Japan. In fact, where those programs are militarized, and in non-democracies, I imagine it would be the first instinct of closed oligarchic elites, as the USSR showed after Chernobyl. But I agree that this is counterfactual.

5. I am of course aware that corruption, especially in the construction industry, in Japan is a huge issue. Agreed. But it is also very clear from the response itself just how well Japan did nonetheless prepare through the fog and waste of traditional interest group politics. Vastly more people died in lesser quakes in many other places. Haiti and Pakistan are the most obvious recent examples. Both are vastly more corrupt places, as measured by Transparency International, and this has real costs. The Pakistani military, eg, might spend less on weapons aimed at India and more on needed internal services. This seems like a pretty obvious trade-off that can't be blamed on the IMF, Bank, or the West, which do in fact encourage changed spending priorities. Neocolonialism or the hangover of post-colonialism might be a general structural cause; agreed. But that does not relieve Haitian and Pakistani elites from nonetheless acting on fairly prosaic things like building codes. Lest this be misunderstood as western triumphalism, a critique I tried hard to abjure, I also included the poor US response to Katrina. It became very clear after Katrina that mayors of New Orleans and governors of Louisiana of both parties over many years had been notified by all sorts of experts that N.O. was hugely vulnerable. Yet the Superdome still happened. That too was shameful.

4. The other issues listed for Japan's preparedness, "energy shortfalls, littoral territorial disputes and manpower shortages," are indeed issues for Japan's future. Japan may or may not be preparing well, but these are also obliquely connected my argument about disaster response I think. They are also long-term issues that boil up slowly, allowing politicians much time to flim-flam and obfuscate. Consider the world’s policy to global warming. Sure, Japan's politicians shuck costs to the future as well as any political class. But ‘acts of god’ can be genuinely catastrophic, and clearly Japan's elites learned from past catastrophes and created a good system that worked pretty well last month. Compare this to the huge sums of money that went into DHS after 9/11 yet showed little real preparedness when another mass-casualty event struck a major US city – Katrina 2005. That response showed multiple failures and huge social panic which I didn't see in Japan recently. Hence my praise.

My thanks for your response and my apologies if my criticism was overly aggressive, I may be a little touchy about the number of groups who have recently begun to use the disaster as a political card to advance their personal agenda. While I do stand by my points, I sincerely appreciate your willingness to contest the issues in a reasoned manner.

The one further comment I would make is that in the case of Katrina, the US government did in fact make a major investment in the response that was directly related to 9/11. Unfortunately, this response was limited to the specific security threat that 9/11 had brought to prominence and involved swamping New Orleans with military personnel and Blackwater paramilitary units in an effort to justify the huge amount of funding they had diverted toward one very narrow area of threat.

Like 9/11 and Katrina, the Tsunami is an example that major disasters, both man-made and natural, cannot be predicted and that focusing on only a narrow area, especially after the event, can lead to significant frailties in other areas of preparedness. I agree with you that other countries should certainly emulate Japan's response to recent events but it is a lesson that other elements of the Japanese government and civilian bureaucracy might also apply to their own bailiwicks. While a decisive action over control of territory may or may not "boil up slowly" (something I would disagree with), there are more than enough other potential dangers, from pandemics and terrorism to the recently evidenced failure to properly chaperone media hyperbole and exaggeration of threats, that can strike without warning and deal just as much damage in quite different ways.