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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES

No.
021377

BUCK DOE, PETITIONER v. ELAINE L.
CHAO,SECRETARY OF LABOR

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

[February 24, 2004]

Justice Souter
delivered the opinion of the Court.

The United States is subject to a
cause of action for the benefit of at least some individuals
adversely affected by a federal agencys violation of the
Privacy Act of 1974. The question before us is whether
plaintiffs must prove some actual damages to qualify for a
minimum statutory award of $1,000. We hold that they must.

I

Petitioner Buck Doe filed for benefits
under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 83 Stat. 792, 30 U.S.C. § 901et seq., with the Office of Workers Compensation
Programs, the division of the Department of Labor responsible
for adjudicating it. The application form called for a Social
Security number, which the agency then used to identify the
applicants claim, as on documents like
multicaptioned notices of hearing dates, sent to
groups of claimants, their employers, and the lawyers involved
in their cases. The Government concedes that following this
practice led to disclosing Does Social Security number
beyond the limits set by the Privacy Act. See 5 U.S.C. §
552a(b).

Doe joined with six other black lung
claimants to sue the Department of Labor, alleging repeated
violations of the Act and seeking certification of a class of
all claimants for
Black Lung Benefits since the passage of the Privacy
Act. Pet. for Cert.
6a. Early on, the United States stipulated to an order
prohibiting future publication of applicants Social
Security numbers on multicaptioned hearing notices, and the
parties then filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The
District Court denied class certification and entered judgment
against all individual plaintiffs except Doe, finding that
their submissions had raised no issues of cognizable harm. As
to Doe, the Court accepted his uncontroverted evidence of
distress on learning of the improper disclosure, granted
summary judgment, and awarded $1,000 in statutory damages under
5 U.S.C. §
552a(g)(4).

A divided panel of the Fourth Circuit
affirmed in part but reversed on Does claim, holding the
United States entitled to summary judgment across the board.
306 F.3d 170 (2002). The Circuit treated the $1,000 statutory
minimum as available only to plaintiffs who suffered actual
damages because of the agencys violation, id., at
176179, and then found that Doe had not raised a triable
issue of fact about actual damages, having submitted no
corroboration for his claim of emotional distress, such as
evidence of physical symptoms, medical treatment, loss of
income, or impact on his behavior. In fact, the only
indication of emotional affliction was Does conclusory
allegations that he was torn all to pieces and greatly concerned and worried because of the disclosure of
his Social Security number and its potentially devastating consequences. Id., at
181.

[I]n order to protect the
privacy of individuals identified in information systems
maintained by Federal agencies, it is necessary to
regulate the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of
information by such agencies. Privacy Act of 1974,
§2(a)(5), 88 Stat. 1896. The Act gives agencies detailed
instructions for managing their records and provides for
various sorts of civil relief to individuals aggrieved by
failures on the Governments part to comply with the
requirements.

Subsection (g)(1) recognizes a civil
action for agency misconduct fitting within any of four
categories (the fourth, in issue here, being a catchall), 5 U.S.C. §
552a(g)(1)(A)(D), and then makes separate provision
for the redress of each. The first two categories cover
deficient management of records: subsection (g)(1)(A) provides
for the correction of any inaccurate or otherwise improper
material in a record, and subsection (g)(1)(B) provides a right
of access against any agency refusing to allow an individual to
inspect a record kept on him. In each instance, further
provisions specify such things as the de novo nature of
the suit (as distinct from any form of deferential review),
§§552a(g)(2)(A), (g)(3)(A), and mechanisms for
exercising judicial equity jurisdiction (by in camera
inspection, for example), §552a(g)(3)(A).

The two remaining categories deal
with derelictions having consequences beyond the statutory
violations per se. Subsection (g)(1)(C) describes an
agencys failure to maintain an adequate record on an
individual, when the result is a determination
adverse to that person. Subsection (g)(1)(D)
speaks of a violation when someone suffers an adverse
effect from any other failure to hew to the terms of the
Act. Like the inspection and correction infractions, breaches
of the statute with adverse consequences are addressed by
specific terms governing relief:

In any suit brought under the
provisions of subsection (g)(1)(C) or (D) of this section in
which the court determines that the agency acted in a manner
which was intentional or willful, the United States shall be
liable to the individual in an amount equal to the sum
of

(A) actual damages
sustained by the individual as a result of the refusal or
failure, but in no case shall a person entitled to recovery
receive less than the sum of $1,000; and

(B) the costs of the
action together with reason-able attorney fees as
determined by the court. §552a(g)(4).1

III

Doe argues that subsection (g)(4)(A)
entitles any plaintiff adversely affected by an intentional or
willful violation to the $1,000 minimum on proof of nothing
more than a statutory violation: anyone suffering an adverse
consequence of intentional or willful disclosure is entitled to
recovery. The Government claims the minimum guarantee goes
only to victims who prove some actual dam-ages. We think
the Government has the better side of the argument.

To begin with, the Governments
position is supported by a straightforward textual analysis.
When the statute gets to the point of guaranteeing the $1,000
minimum, it not only has confined any eligibility to victims of
adverse effects caused by intentional or willful actions, but
has provided expressly for liability to such victims for
actual damages sustained. It has made specific
provision, in other words, for what a victim within the limited
class may recover. When the very next clause of the sentence
containing the explicit provision guarantees $1,000 to a
person entitled to recovery, the simplest reading
of that phrase looks back to the immediately preceding
provision for recovering actual damages, which is also the
Acts sole provision for recovering anything (as distinct
from equitable relief). With such an obvious referent for
person entitled to recovery in the plaintiff who
sustains actual damages, Does theory is
immediately questionable in ignoring the actual
damages language so directly at hand and instead looking
for a person entitled to recovery in a separate
part of the statute devoid of any mention either of recovery or
of what might be recovered.

Nor is it too strong to say that Doe
does ignore statutory language. When Doe reads the statute to
mean that the United States shall be liable to any adversely
affected subject of an intentional or willful violation,
without more, he treats willful action as the last fact
necessary to make the Government liable, and he is
thus able to describe anyone to whom it is liable as entitled
to the $1,000 guarantee. But this way of reading the statute
simply pays no attention to the fact that the statute does not
speak of liability (and consequent entitlement to recovery) in
a freestanding, unqualified way, but in a limited way, by
reference to enumerated damages.2

Does manner of reading
entitle[ment] to recovery as satisfied by adverse
effect caused by intentional or willful violation is in tension
with more than the text, however. It is at odds with the
traditional understanding that tort recovery requires not only
wrongful act plus causation reaching to the plaintiff, but
proof of some harm for which damages can reasonably be
assessed. See, e.g., W. Keeton, D. Dobbs,
R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of
Torts §30 (5th ed. 1984). Doe, instead, identifies a
person as entitled to recover without any reference to proof of
damages, actual or otherwise. Doe might respond that it makes
sense to speak of a privacy tort victim as entitled to recover
without reference to damages because analogous common law would
not require him to show particular items of injury in order to
receive a dollar recovery. Traditionally, the common law has
provided such victims with a claim for general
damages, which for privacy and defamation torts are presumed
damages: a monetary award calculated without reference to
specific harm.3

Such a rejoinder would not pass
muster under the Privacy Act, however, because a provision of
the Act not previously mentioned indicates beyond serious doubt
that general damages are not authorized for a statutory
violation. An uncodified section of the Act established a
Privacy Protection Study Commission, which was charged, among
its other jobs, to consider whether the Federal
Government should be liable for general damages incurred by an
individual as the result of a willful or intentional violation
of the provisions of sections 552a(g)(1)(C) or (D) of title
5.4
§5(c)(2)(B)(iii), 88 Stat. 1907. Congress left the
question of general damages, that is, for another day. Because
presumed damages are therefore clearly unavailable, we have no
business treating just any adversely affected victim of an
intentional or willful violation as entitled to recovery,
without something more.

This inference from the terms of the
Commissions mandate is underscored by drafting history
showing that Congress cut out the very language in the bill
that would have authorized any presumed damages.5 The Senate bill
would have authorized an award of actual and general
damages sustained by any person, with that language
followed by the guarantee that in no case shall a person
entitled to recovery receive less than the sum of $1,000.
S. 3418, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., §303(c)(1) (1974).
Although the provision for general damages would have covered
presumed damages, see n. 3, supra, this language
was trimmed from the final statute, subject to any later
revision that might be recommended by the Commission. The
deletion of general damages from the bill is fairly
seen, then, as a deliberate elimination of any possibility of
imputing harm and awarding presumed damages.6 The deletion thus precludes
any hope of a sound interpretation of entitlement to recovery
without reference to actual damages.7

Finally, Does reading is open
to the objection that no purpose is served by conditioning the
guarantee on a persons being entitled to recovery. As
Doe treats the text, Congress could have accomplished its
object simply by providing that the Government would be liable
to the individual for actual damages but in no case
less than the sum of $1,000 plus fees and costs.
Does reading leaves the reference to entitlement to
recovery with no job to do, and it accordingly accomplishes
nothing.8

IV

There are three loose ends.
Does argument suggests it would have been illogical for
Congress to create a cause of action for anyone who suffers an
adverse effect from intentional or willful agency action, then
deny recovery without actual damages. But this objection
assumes that the language in subsection (g)(1)(D) recognizing a
federal civil action on the part of someone
adversely affected was meant, without more, to provide a
complete cause of action, and of course this is not so. A
subsequent provision requires proof of intent or willfulness in
addition to adverse effect, and if the specific state of mind
must be proven additionally, it is equally consistent with
logic to require some actual damages as well. Nor does our
view deprive the language recognizing a civil action by an
adversely affected person of any independent effect, for it may
readily be understood as having a limited but specific
function: the reference in §552a(g)(1)(D) to adverse
effect acts as a term of art identifying a potential
plaintiff who satisfies the injury-in-fact and causation
requirements of Article III standing, and who may consequently
bring a civil action without suffering dismissal for want of
standing to sue. See Director, Office of Workers
Compensation Programs v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry
Dock Co., 514 U.S.
122, 126 (1995) (The phrase person adversely
affected or aggrieved is a term of art used in many
statutes to designate those who have standing to challenge or
appeal an agency decision, within the agency or before the
courts); see also 5 U.S.C. § 702
(providing review of agency action under the Administrative
Procedure Act to individuals who have been adversely
affected or aggrieved). That is, an individual subjected
to an adverse effect has injury enough to open the courthouse
door, but without more has no cause of action for damages under
the Privacy Act.9

Next, Doe also suggests there is
something peculiar in offering some guaranteed damages, as a
form of presumed damages not requiring proof of amount, only to
those plaintiffs who can demonstrate actual damages. But this
approach parallels another remedial scheme that the drafters of
the Privacy Act would probably have known about. At common
law, certain defamation torts were redressed by general damages
but only when a plaintiff first proved some special
harm, i.e., harm of a material and generally
of a pecuniary nature. 3 Restatement of Torts
§575, Comments a and b (1938) (discussing
defamation torts that are not actionable per se);
see also 3 Restatement (Second) of Torts §575, Comments
a and b (1976) (same). Plaintiffs claiming such
torts could recover presumed damages only if they could
demonstrate some actual, quantifiable pecuniary loss. Because
the recovery of presumed damages in these cases was
supplemental to compensation for specific harm, it was hardly
unprecedented for Congress to make a guaranteed minimum
contingent upon some showing of actual damages, thereby
avoiding giveaways to plaintiffs with nothing more than
abstract injuries, Los Angeles v.
Lyons, 461 U.S.
95, 101102 (1983).10

In a final effort to save his claim,
Doe points to a pair of statutes with remedial provisions that
are worded similarly to §552a(g)(4). See Tax Reform Act
of 1976, §1201(i)(2)(A), 90 Stat. 16651666, 26 U.S.C. §
6110(j)(2)(A); §1202(e)(1), 90 Stat. 1687, 26 U.S.C. §
7217(c) (1976 ed., Supp. V) (repealed 1982); Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986, §201, 100 Stat. 1866,
18 U.S.C. §
2707(c). He contends that legislative history of these
subsequent enactments shows that Congress sometimes used
language similar to 5
U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4) with the object of authorizing
true liquidated damages remedies. See, e.g.,
S. Rep. No. 94938, p. 348 (1976) (discussing
§1202(e)(1) of the Tax Reform Act); S. Rep. No.
99541, p. 43 (1986) (discussing §201 of the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act). There are two problems
with this argument. First, as to §1201(i)(2)(A) of the
Tax Reform Act, the text is too far different from the language
of the Privacy Act to serve as any sound basis for analogy; it
does not include the critical limiting phrase entitled to
recovery. But even as to §1202(e)(1) of the Tax
Reform Act and §201 of the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act, the trouble with Does position is its
reliance on the legislative histories of completely separate
statutes passed well after the Privacy Act. Those of us who
look to legislative history have been wary about expecting to
find reliable interpretive help outside the record of the
statute being construed, and we have said repeatedly that
subsequent legislative
history will rarely override a reasonable interpretation of a
statute that can be gleaned from its language and legislative
history prior to its enactment, Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook Cty.
v. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 170,
n. 5 (2001) (quoting Consumer Product Safety
Commn v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 118,
n. 13 (1980)).11

V

The entitle[ment] to
recovery necessary to qualify for the $1,000 minimum is
not shown merely by an intentional or willful violation of the
Act producing some adverse effect. The statute guarantees
$1,000 only to plaintiffs who have suffered some actual
damages.12
The judgment of the Fourth Circuit is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

Notes

1. The Privacy Act says nothing about
standards of proof governing equitable relief that may be open
to victims of adverse determinations or effects, although it
may be that this inattention is explained by the general
provisions for equitable relief within the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), 5
U.S.C. § 706. Indeed, the District Court relied on
the APA in determining that it had jurisdiction to enforce the
stipulated order prohibiting the Department of Labor from using
Social Security numbers in multiparty captions. Doe v.
Herman, Civ. Action No. 970043B (DC Va.,
Mar. 18, 1998), pp. 911.

2. Indeed, if adverse effect of
intentional or willful violation were alone enough to make a
person entitled to recovery, then Congress could have
conditioned the entire subsection (g)(4)(A) as applying only to
a person entitled to recovery. That, of course, is
not what Congress wrote. As we mentioned before, Congress used
the entitled-to-recovery phrase only to describe those entitled
to the $1,000 guarantee, and it spoke of entitlement and
guarantee only after referring to an individuals actual
damages, indicating that actual damages is a
further touchstone of the entitlement.

3. 3 Restatement of Torts §621,
Comment a (1938) (It is not necessary for the
plaintiff [who is seeking general damages in an action for
defamation] to prove any specific harm to his reputation or any
other loss caused thereby); 4 id., §867,
Comment d (1939) (noting that damages are available for
privacy torts in the same way in which general damages
are given for defamation, without proof of
pecuniary loss [or] physical harm); see also 3
Restatement (Second) of Torts §621, Comment a
(1976).

4. The Commission ultimately recommended
that the Act should permit the recovery of special and
general damages but in no case should a person entitled
to recovery receive less than the sum of $1,000 or more than
the sum of $10,000 for general damages in excess of the dollar
amount of any special damages. Personal Privacy in an
Information Society: The Report of the Privacy Protection Study
Commission 531 (July 1977).

5. On this point, we do not understand
Justice Ginsburgs dissent to take issue with our
conclusion that Congress explicitly rejected the proposal to
make presumed damages available for Privacy Act violations.
Instead, Justice Ginsburg appears to argue only that Congress
would have wanted nonpecuniary harm to qualify as actual
damages under subsection (g)(4)(A). Post, at 8,
n. 4 (plaintiff may recover for emotional distress
 that he proves to have been actually suffered
by him  (quoting 3 Restatement (Second) of
Torts, supra, at 402, Comment b)). That issue,
however, is not before us today. See n. 12, infra.

6. While theoretically there could also
have been a third category, that of nominal
damages, it is implausible that Congress intended tacitly
to recognize a nominal damages remedy after eliminating the
explicit reference to general damages.

8. Justice Ginsburg responds that our
reading is subject to a similar criticism: Congress more
rationally [c]ould have written: actual damages
but in no case shall a person who proves such damages [in any
amount] receive less than $1,000. 
Post, at 34. Congresss use of the
entitlement phrase actually contained in the statute, however,
is explained by drafting history. The first bill passed by the
Senate authorized recovery of both actual and general damages.
See infra, at 78. At that point, when discussing
eligibility for the $1,000 guarantee, it was reasonable to
refer to plaintiffs with either sort of damages by the general
term a person entitled to recovery. When
subsequent amendment limited recovery to actual damages by
eliminating the general, no one apparently thought to delete
the inclusive reference to entitlement. But this failure to
remove the old language did not affect its reference to
actual damages, the term remaining from the
original pair, actual and general.

9. Nor are we convinced by the analysis
mentioned in the dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals,
that any plaintiff who can demonstrate that he was adversely
affected by intentional or willful agency action is entitled to
costs and reasonable attorneys fees under
§552a(g)(4)(B), and is for that reason a person
entitled to recovery under subsection (g)(4)(A). See 306
F.3d 170, 188189 (CA4 2002). Instead of treating damages
as a recovery entitling a plaintiff to costs and fees, see,
e.g., 42
U.S.C. § 1988(b) (allowing a reasonable
attorneys fee to a prevailing party
under many federal civil rights statutes); Alyeska Pipeline
Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240,
247258 (1975) (discussing history of American
courts power to award fees and costs to prevailing
plaintiffs), this analysis would treat costs and fees as the
recovery entitling a plaintiff to minimum damages; it would get
the cart before the horse.

10. We also reject the related suggestion
that the category of cases with actual damages not exceeding
$1,000 is so small as to render the minimum award meaningless
under our reading. It is easy enough to imagine pecuniary
expenses that might turn out to be reasonable in particular
cases but fall well short of $1,000: fees associated with
running a credit report, for example, or the charge for a
Valium prescription. Since we do not address the definition of
actual damages today, see n. 12, infra, this
challenge is too speculative to overcome our interpretation of
the statutes plain language and history.

11. In support of Does position,
Justice Ginsburgs dissent also cites another item of
extratextual material, an interpretation of the Privacy Act
that was published by the Office of Management and Budget in
1975 as a guideline for federal agencies seeking to comply with
the Act. Post, at 67. The dissent does not claim
that any deference is due this interpretation, however, and we
do not find its unelaborated conclusion persuasive.

12. The Courts of Appeals are divided on
the precise definition of actual damages. Compare
Fitzpatrick v. IRS, 665 F.2d 327, 331 (CA11 1982)
(actual damages are restricted to pecuniary loss), with
Johnson v. Department of Treasury, 700 F.2d 971,
972974 (CA5 1983) (actual damages can cover adequately
demonstrated mental anxiety even without any out-of-pocket
loss). That issue is not before us, however, since the
petition for certiorari did not raise it for our review. We
assume without deciding that the Fourth Circuit was correct to
hold that Does complaints in this case did not rise to
the level of alleging actual damages. We do not suggest that
out-of-pocket expenses are necessary for recovery of the $1,000
minimum; only that they suffice to qualify under any view of
actual damages.