Military interventions in Turkey

Some analysts have suggested that among national institutions, only the armed forces retain the public trust and respect. Since the end of single-party rule in 1950, they have intervened directly three times in the country's politics. In each instance, civilian control was restored after a transition period during which purported problems were addressed, justice meted out, new constitutions adopted, and economic growth accomplished.

The 1960 coup occurred against a backdrop of escalating tension between
the government and opposition that threatened to erupt into civil war.
First elected in 1950, Menderes built on the
liberalization measures that followed Atatürk’s
death in 1938, including a relaxation of laws that restricted the role
of minorities and Islam. Confronted with strong
Kemalist opposition, the government repeatedly passed legislation designed
to restrict freedom of the press to print material "designed to damage
the political or financial prestige of the state" or "belittling persons
holding official positions". By 1959, growing hostilities between
government and opposition supporters fuelled by a polarization of public opinion led
to violent clashes. In April 1960, a series of large-scale student demonstrations
paralyzed university campuses and led to bloody confrontations with police
forces. The imposition of martial law in Istanbul
and Ankara on 1st of May and the confinement of
demonstrators in detention camps failed to restore civil order.

Although public unrest had been growing over the previous year, the
trigger for the coup appears to have been the 1st of May decision to use
the armed forces in an effort to regain control of the situation. While
some senior officers supported the government, Istanbul's
martial law commander announced that his troops were authorized to fire
on "even the smallest public assembly" - others were not united behind
this policy. One week after the declaration of martial law, the commander
of land forces, General Gürsel, was placed on a compulsory leave of absence.
In his farewell message, Gürsel urged his troops to steel themselves against
the “greedy political atmosphere now blowing through the country." Such
sentiments were clearly shared by others as well. Former President and
Atatürk's
colleague, Ismet Inönü, warned that "an oppressive
regime can never be sure of the army".

In a 27 May broadcast, Cemal Gürsel rejected dictatorship and announced that
the government had been overthrown to help establish an honest and just
democratic order and to give over the administration of the state into
the hands of the nation. In a press conference on 28 May, Gürsel emphasized
that the "purpose and the aim of the coup is to bring the country with
all speed to a fair, clean and solid democracy... I want to transfer power
and the administration of the nation to the free choice of the people".
That same day, the military-dominated cabinet issued a policy statement
promising respect for human rights and the abolition of all laws contrary
to the Kemalist tradition. The military dominated the political scene until
October 1965. During that time, a series of conservative coalition
government led by former PresidentInönü held office. When
free elections were once again permitted, Süleyman
Demirel led his Justice Party (Adalet Parti - AP) to victory. Demirel
remained in office until the Turkish military forced his resignation in
March 1971.

The 1971 Imposition of "Guided Democracy"

On 12 March 1971, the Demirelgovernment was
forced to resign after the commanders of the armed forces delivered an
ultimatum to the President. Demanding a new government, Turkey's
military leaders asserted the urgent need for a "strong and capable
government"
that could redress the "anarchical situation" in the country. A refusal
to accept this demand, they warned, would result in the armed forces taking
over the administration of the country.

The decision by the military high command to impose its will on the
government followed three years of political violence and growing economic
problems. As early as 1968, demonstrations had become so disorderly that
Demirel
warned “enemies of the state" that the government would not "allow the
destroyers of the legitimate order to strangle democracy in the streets".
In the following three years, both left- and right-wing violence paralyzed
Turkish politics and coincided with the deterioration of the
economy. Although
the government pursued policies that fostered an annual growth rate of
nearly 7%, a serious balance of payments deficit had nonetheless
emerged. Devaluation of the national currency took place in August 1970,
but efforts to redress the economic fall were undermined by chronic inflation
(78 percent from 1963 to 1968). Violent demonstrations by leftist forces
and trade unions opposed to the government's economic program began in
June 1970 and led to the imposition of martial law in
Istanbul.

The use of the armed forces to support an unpopular
government was resisted
by senior commanders. In July 1970, the air force commanders General Muhsin
Batur, sent a memorandum to President Sunay advocating a program of socio-
economic reforms and warning of the consequences if the
government was
unable to maintain public order. In late November 1970, Batur submitted
a second memorandum that called for greater powers for the National Security
Council and the convening of a constituent assembly. One month later, chief
of the General Staff, General Memduh Tagmac, used his New Year's address
to issue a strong warning to "all who may try to destroy the national integrity
of the republican regime and Atatürk's reforms".
"The armed forces," he stated, "whose mission is to protect the country
against any danger from without or within, will smash any action directed
against the country." Tagmac added that the drift to civil war could still
be stopped "by the responsible constitutional bodies".

Despite these warnings, the government seemed unable or unwilling to
restore order, and the first three months of 1971 were characterized by
a series of murders, bombings of government buildings, and reports of a
planned leftist insurrection. However, the trigger for the military's ultimatum
appears to have been the kidnapping of four American servicemen on 4 March
and the violent clashes between students and police. On 12 March, Tagmac
and the three service commanders handed a memorandum to the
President which
declared that "Parliament and the
Government, through
their sustained policies, views and actions, have driven our country into
anarchy, fratricidal strife, and social and economic unrest; made the public
lose all hope of reaching a level of contemporary civilization, a goal
set by Atatürk; failed to realize the reforms
stipulated by the [1961] Constitution; and placed the future of the Turkish
republic in grave danger". It concluded by asserting that a "strong and
credible government" was needed to "neutralize the current anarchical situation"
and restore the state. After Demirel's resignation,
the President publicly thanked the High Command, declaring that it had
acted responsibly and he urged all Turks to support
the new government.

Instead of imposing direct rule in 1971, the military leaders saw their
role as one of guiding the Turkish democratic process. Formed after consultations
with the leaders of the major political parties,
the new coalition cabinet governed with the support (and sufferance) of
the armed forces. Suppressing violence, it implemented a sweeping set of
socio-economic reforms similar to those urged
by General Batur in his November 1970 memorandum. Furthermore, it introduced
legislation to restrict those forces on both the left and right wings of
the political spectrum that had advocated policies opposed to the spirit
of Kemalism.

The 1980 Coup d’Etat

On 12 September 1980, the newly elected
government of Demirel
was overthrown. Five days later, Chief of Staff General Kenan Evren declared
that the military was responding to domestic political anarchy. He reinforced
this message by laying out the new regime's program, which included civil
order, national unity, and a secular state
based on social justice and human rights. Planned months in advance, the
coup was welcomed by most Turks as an answer to
the preceding years of economic and political stagnation. The delay in
overthrowing the government seemed to reinforce the claims of the
Turkish
military that they were sincere in their desire to prevent civil war and
preserve the Kemalist republic.

This coup was a response to an unstable political situation that the
elected government seemed powerless to remedy. Extremists on both sides
of the political spectrum resorted to murder and other forms of violence.
Prior to the coup, political leaders, rather than attempting to repress
this antidemocratic behavior, reacted selectively: Demirel
tended to excuse rightist violence, while Ecevit
viewed leftist attacks as legitimate reactions to social injustice. Moreover,
the economy, which had been expected to improve beginning in 1979, failed
to do so. Instead, that year, inflation reached 117.4 percent, unemployment
increased from 20 to 25 percent, and industrial production fell by almost
3 percent. The deteriorating economic situation meant that Ankara
had to re-negotiate agreements with the Organization of Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and was required to introduce measures
including liberalization of foreign investment laws.

More immediate to the coup was the legislative incapacity of the Turkish
parliament. Between January and August, the legislative process was
derailed by an increasingly bitter dispute between Demirel's
ruling conservative Justice party (AP) and the more left-wing Republican
People's party (CHP) led by Bülent
Ecevit. Furthermore, concern was growing about the radical demands
by both the Islamic fundamentalist National Salvation
party led by Necmettin Erbakan and
the extreme right-wing National Action party (MHP)
of former General Alparslan Türkes. The perception that political squabbling
was taking precedence over the national interest was reflected in parliament's
inability after more than 100 ballots to elect a new President of the Republic after Fahri Korutürk's term was ended in April.
Frustration levels among Turkey's political
leaders led to a number of intrigues to replace the Demirelgovernment.

The armed forces were also affected by these developments. Martial law,
imposed in December 1978 in thirteen of Turkey's
sixty-seven provinces (nowadays eighty-one), was extended a year later to nineteen
provinces, and by September 1980 was in effect in twenty. While targets
for extremist violence were generally police officials, judges, and prominent politicians, in the six months prior to the coup, members of the
armed
forces also became subject to a number of attacks. By early September 1980
it was estimated that approximately 25 percent of the 475,000-man
army
was involved in maintaining civil order, a role not welcomed by the High
Command.

Moreover, as journalist Mehmet Ali Birand notes, it would have been
impossible to expect them "to remain immune to the divisions and stirrings
which had rent asunder the fabric of civil society". By early 1980, senior
officers were becoming increasingly alarmed that the country's political
polarization had begun to "seep into" the armed forces. Younger officers
and NCOs were especially vulnerable to the right- and left-wing ideological
exchanges. According to Birand, many of the new NCOs were former student
political activists who had enlisted to escape death threats. Once in uniform,
they proceeded to propagandize their views within the ranks and among the
junior officers.

While the coup was a response to a number of issues, as early as 1975,
many officers had become convinced of the un-workability of the existing
Constitution. It was not until December 1979, however, that Turkey's
senior military leaders began to organize themselves to take political
action. They decided to adopt a similar approach to that employed in 1970.
On 27 December 1979, the High Command sent a letter to the
President urging
the country's leaders to "seek solutions and take measures jointly within
an Ataturkist national perspective and within
the current parliamentary democratic regime". On 1 January 1980, a letter
from General Evren was released to the public urging the formation of a
broadly-based coalition government and parliament's
speedy passage of anti-terrorist measures. A week later, Evren published
a list of over sixty political demands that the armed forces felt were
necessary - demands that Demirel accepted but
was subsequently unable to legislate because of the continuing partisan.

Throughout the ensuing nine months, a sense of crisis took hold of Turkey's
political system, although the trigger for the coup appears to have been
the fear of left-wing and Islamic extremism. Negotiations between Ecevit
and Erbakan raised the fear of an
anti-Western, pro-Moslemgovernment. On 6 September, Erbakan
attended a public rally of Islamic fundamentalists
at which he called for the restoration of the Shariah. The next day, Ecevit
gave a speech to a trade union gathering in which he urged the members
to take violent action if they felt injustice existed. The
government seemed
powerless to respond to these provocations. On 7 September, Evren and the
four service commanders decided that they would overthrow the civilian
government on 1 September.

The Turkish military perceived their role as custodians of national
legitimacy, restoring public order while preparing the country for a transition
to a functioning democratic system. With little resistance, the
armed forces
took administrative control of the state through a five-member National
Security Council (NSC) and appointed a civilian cabinet. Martial law was
extended to all sixty-seven of Turkey's provinces.
In an effort to clean-up Turkish politics, the military also ensured that
those they regarded as accessories to the problems leading to the coup
were no longer able to influence events: a 1981 decree by the NSC prohibited
persons, such as Demirel and Ecevit,
from participation in politics. The transition to civilian rule began when
a new Constitution was accepted by a public referendum in 1982. The end
of military rule came on 6 November 1983, when a general election yielded
a victory for the Motherland party, with
Turgut Özal becoming prime minister.

The 2016 Coup Tentative

On 15th of July 2016 a coup d'etat attempt in Turkey was launched by a small group of Turkish military servicemen. The coup attempt, which is beleived to be executed by some officers loyal to Fethullah Gulen movement, has started with the armored tanks being deployed at the suspension bridges in Istanbul and with surrounding of key Army Force command posts in Ankara as well as General Chief of Staff quarters. Some generals and other high rank officers led the coup by arresting the Commanders first after 22:00 hours. Few fighther jets, some helicopters and some tanks and army personnel were deployed in these two major cities of Turkey but the coup attemp was in a very limited area and conducted by few soldiers. Some of the key targets such as Armed Forces headquarters, main police headquarters, and the Parliament were attacked and bombed, killing numbers of servicemen and civillians. After the first shock, the Government and the President responded by sending the Police forces and also calling the public to go on the streets to react the ongoing coup. After several fights until dusk, some with heavy casualties from both sides, the coup attemp was stopped and the Government regained the control of the air bases and army barracks, the remaining soldiers have surrendered except few of them, the Commanders were rescued. In one night over 300 people were killed and around 1,500 injured during the fights.

Immediately the next day investigations have started and arrests were made and are still ongoing. Along with over 7 thousand soldiers including 166 generals, almost another 2,500 judges and over 9 thousand policemen are detained for helping or being a member of Gulen movement, who is accused by the Government for orchestrating the coup attempt. Over 135 thousand government employees almost from every civil department and teachers have been purged and are under investigations that are feared to be linked to Gulenist movement, tens of thousands of their passports are canceled to avoid them going abroad, several hundreds of Gulen's educational institutions, schools and universities, banking and financial institutions funding their organization, and their hospitals have been shut down. Until June 2018, over 50 thousand people are jailed out of almost 200 thousand investigated. The State of Emergency was declared by the President on 20th July 2016 for a period of 3 months, then extended since then until today in 3-months terms.