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Thursday, May 15, 2014

Ideally, geopolitical concepts such
as “Eurasia” should consider the
divergence that exists between the interests of the state and the interests of the people.Both
from the point of view of
Europe and Russia, “Eurasia”
represents a geopoliticalinterest of
a higher
order.
As can be expected, the
people's interest
in the realisation
of “Eurasia,”
both for a Russian citizen
and for
a European citizen,
is therefore
doubtful at best. The
people has
an interest in the lower
order activities of the
state that concern the defence
and the security
of the nation. Abstract
geopolitical concepts like “Eurasia” mean almost nothing to the
common man.

Indeed,
it is difficult to understand how the
average Russian citizen might be
more secure if Russia
establishesthe Eurasian
Economic Union with other
nations. The
basic security of Russian citizens is still far from guaranteed
today; the Russian state therefore oughtto deal withother more important
internal priorities - the
real interests of the Russian people.

It is also difficult to understand how the
average European citizen might be
safer and more secure if the
EU somehow managed to
integrateeconomically and politically
with Russia. And
it is highly dubious, to
say the least,whether
the peoples
of Europe would have
much to gain by bringing
Ukraine into the European
economic and political sphere. On the contrary, before potentially bearing fruits, any rapprochement with Ukraine would have substantial costs for Europe, which hitherto have been born by Russia.

The
publics of all nations
should
therefore make efforts to inform themselves
about their “nation's”
geopolitical plans, and ask themselves whetherthe
realisation of the state's geopoliticalinterests
can
be
advantageous to
them.
In
the case of “Eurasia,”the
peopleshould
at least request
fromtheir
elected
representatives,
the
answer to the
followingquestions:
Will
the
realisation
of
this geopolitical interest make the public safer?
If
yes, then in what way? If yes, then whatpublic
resources would
be
spent in order to do so?[1]

Unfortunately,both
these questions
and their answers are usually absent from public debate.
Clearly,
this would
not be the case in
any reasonably
democratic
political
system, where the interests of the state are interests of the people.

Thursday, May 1, 2014

The
question of the realisation of “Eurasia” requires an analysis of
the order of priority of
this geopolitical interest. From this point of view,
“Eurasia”is
an ambitious goal for both Europe and Russia; it is a
geopolitical interest of a
high order, far
from the basic interest of national defenceand security.

However,
“Eurasia” is
a more
important geopolitical
interest to
realise for Russia
than for
Europe. Russia
considers, naturally,
that one of its fundamental geopolitical interests is to exercise
some form of control of
what it calls its “nearer
abroad.”[1]Europe's motivation
for realising
its own versionof “Eurasia”
does not have as high priority, for
a number of reasons, one being the existence of security
agreements with the USA. It
is not surprising, therefore, that Russia's
realisation of its view
of“Eurasia”
is in
a far more advancedstatecompared to
the European one, which is
at the moment only
anidea.
Europe has not yet fully managed to
bring Ukraine into its fold, whereas the
customs union between
Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan is now
called the Eurasian
Economic Union, and Russia
has successfully
convinced Armenia,
Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan to
join as members in 2015.[2]In other words, Russia
is in the process of adding
economic integration to a military integration that has largely taken
place already between these
countries.

Some
of the types
of coercive
methods that
are available for the realisation of geopolitical interestsare
used in the case of “Eurasia”. Being
the more powerful nation, Russia
is
naturally using
many suchmeans
in order to incite,
orforce,other
nations into its sphere of influence. This has been the case with
Armenia, and
other nations that
will adhere to theEurasian
Economic Union which
Russia
will
lead.
Europe
has also been trying to use some of these coercive
foreign
policy tools in order to get Russia to show more interest in an
integration with Europe.[3]
This has
been evident
not only in the
EU's
hitherto
inconclusive
approach
towards
Ukraine, but also in
its interaction with Russia,
such
as the latest sanctions show.[4]The
European Union considers,
rightly, that the biggest obstacle to the realisation of its
concept of “Eurasia,” is the Russian government. But
coercive methods are
far
more
useful
and effective
when
stronger nations
use them on decidedly
weaker ones.
Therefore,
while
Russia
can use coercive methods to realise its view of “Eurasia,” Europe
can only
realise
its own
version of
“Eurasia”
by consensual means.

There
are two conditions for consensual realisation of geopolitical
interests; firstly, the “Eurasian” interests should be
complementary between Europe and Russia. This is certainly not the
case, since the two parties do not even define “Eurasia” in the
same way. In fact, the European and Russian definitions of “Eurasia”
cannot both be realised at the same time. Further, Europe and Russia
are currently opposed in several important geopolitical areas, the
most important of which being the struggle for the control of
Ukraine.[5] This is not the kind of environment in which the European
definition of “Eurasia” can be realised. The Russian view of
“Eurasia,” on the other hand, has more probability of success
since it does not depend on Europe (with the exception of Ukraine,
which will remain problematic for Russia in the future).

The
second condition, which must
also be fulfilled in order to realise
“Eurasia” by consensual
agreement,
requires that there is no third party with the capability and
interest
in thwarting these
efforts.
Here
is another strong
reason
why
“Eurasia” cannot be realised by
Europe:
the
interest
of
the United States is in conflict
with these “Eurasian”
interests.
Though
the USA and Europe are close allies, the
USA
opposes the European view of
“Eurasia” and
cannot
allow
it to happen. For
the US, as Brzezinski
wrote,
“it
is imperative that no
Eurasian
challenger emerges capable of dominating Eurasia and thus of also
challenging America.”[6]Currently,
Washington easily realises this interest, given
the political
influencethey
have over
Europe.[7]The
US uses its system of military allegiance (NATO) in order to both
dominate Europe and contain Russian geopolitical expansion.[8]Regarding
the
Russian “Eurasia,” though
the US
may
not be
able to
prevent
it
from becoming reality, the
US is also
more
tolerantto
it. The
United
States is
not much
concerned about Russia's
realisation
of
this
interest,
since
it
understands
that Russia
will
never
be a
challengerfor
global hegemony unless
it
has integrated
with a major economy.[9]This
is the reason the US is carefully monitoring the current
rapprochement
that is taking place between Russia and China.[10]
In
many ways, the strategic and economic synergies
between
Russia and China are
greater in
the
long term
than the
ones between
Russia and Europe.[11]

It
is
clear, therefore, that the realisation of a geopolitical interest
like “Eurasia” greatly depends on the national perspective. This post
and the previous one have shown that a geopolitical interest and the
ways to realise this interest require radically different approaches.
The third and final
post on this topic of “Eurasia” will concern the necessary distinction
between state and people. In other words, the question that must be
asked is to what respect do the people really have an “interest”
in “Eurasia”?

[3]
See for instance,
“The EU has accused Russia
of implementing protectionist measures in contravention of the WTO
rules. The European Commission, meanwhile, is expected to shortly
unveil a number of anti-trust charges against Russian state-owned
energy company Gazprom.”
See article, EU-Russia talks downgraded amid tensions over Ukraine,
The Irish Times, January 28, 2014.

[5]
See for instance the following analysis:
“The EU Agreement [for Ukraine] excludes simultaneous membership in
a Russian-led customs union and would thus cut off Ukraine from its
main trading partner, with which Ukraine’s industry and transport
routes are closely connected. The abolition of customs duties on
European goods would also mean bankruptcy for many Ukrainian
industries.The
terms of the agreement, which include the introduction of EU rules
for labor market deregulation, the privatization of state enterprises
and a reduction in the public debt, would have a social impact
similar to the EU austerity programs imposed on Greece, Romania and
other countries. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is already
denying Ukraine a much-needed credit because the government refuses
to hike the price of gas by 40 percent—a move that would inevitably
result in the death of many unemployed people and pensioners unable
to pay their heating bills.The
Association Agreement would turn the country into an extended
workbench for German and European companies, which could produce at
lower wage rates than those in China. At the same time, the country’s
natural resources, its vast and fertile landmass, and its domestic
market of 46 million inhabitants make Ukraine a mouthwatering
prospect for German and European businesses.The
agreement would also strengthen the EU’s hand against Russia. A
customs union or Eurasian Union comprising Russia and the Ukraine
would have had a significantly stronger position in trade
negotiations with the EU than an isolated Russia.Germany,
the EU and the US are pursuing not only economic, but also
geopolitical, objectives in Ukraine. Given Russia’s loss of
influence in Eastern Europe since the dissolution of the Soviet
Union, the incorporation of Ukraine into the EU would push Russia off
to the edge of Europe.” from
“The Struggle for
Ukraine”, from World Socialist Web Site, Dec 6, 2013.
(www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/06/pers-d06.html?view=mobilearticle)

[6]
Z.
Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard (Basic
Books), p. xiv. This
is the same view that George Friedman has:
“The United States doesn’t need to win wars. It needs to simply
disrupt things so the other side can’t build up sufficient strength
to challenge it.” The Next 100 Years, p58. (Doubleday). Source:
www.fd.unl.pt/docentes_docs/ma/amg_MA_11180.pdf

[7]
It
is well known that though the US
and
Europe have different geopolitical interests, the US is the stronger
party and often uses Europe
as a proxy for its dealings in “Eurasia.” European
governments
and institutions are so
dominated politically and militarily by the United States, that those
European
leaders who
support this concept of “Eurasia” cannot be fully sincere,
whether they realise this or not. A real possibility for European
version of “Eurasia”
can only come if and when Europe manages
to completely
get
rid of this
US dominance
which has existed since the end of WWII.
However,
as
long as European companies have significant commercial interests in
the US, this is not likely to happen. And
this certainly cannot happen with the NATO policy as it is today.

[11]
Russia is turning its attention to the East, and in
particular to China (the Law changing the Russian time zones is one
example, bringing Moscow 4 hours from both London and Beijing). China
has a strong need for the Russian natural resources lying in relative
proximity. The trade between the two countries is expected to soon
reach $100Bln per year. From 2012 to 2013, China's FDI into Russia
was multiplied by 6. Further, China has now declared a certain
preference for the Russian rouble, and recently Russia and China have
declared that they have a “strategic relationship”. A new deal concerning gas delivery over 30 years has just been signed. See following
sources:rt.com/business/rosneft-china-sinopec-oil-537/