Shaky precedents: With all eyes on Iraq and Afghanistan, other state-building efforts remain unstable

As our attention stays firmly focused on state-building efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, many Americans are unaware that events in the Balkans, where the United States and Europe remain heavily engaged in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina, are reaching critical junctures.

In the recently published "Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq," American state-building specialists cited Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina as successful precedents for state-building efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet, 12 and eight years after the suspension of their respective conflicts, these Balkan cases remain fragile societies bound together by heavy doses of international aid and administration.

Furthermore, ongoing wrangling over the constitutional and territorial makeup of Bosnia-Herzegovina and an impasse ahead of a Monday deadline for the resolution of Kosovo's "future status" raise the alarming prospect of renewed instability in the Balkans.

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the U.S.-brokered 1995 Dayton Accords ostensibly sought to establish the bases for peace within a unified, democratic state. Behind a convoluted set of governing institutions lay the hope that Bosnia-Herzegovina might overcome the secessionist violence of the 1990s and evolve into a multi-ethnic federation where Serbs, Bosniaks and Croatians would have a proportionate share in their governance. A rotating triple presidency was created alongside a legislature directly elected from a combined Bosniak-Croat Federation and indirectly elected by an assembly in the vaguely defined autonomous territory of Republika Srpska.

Presiding over the entire governing apparatus, the international community's Office of the High Representative was established to resolve and/or override disputes that arose in the course of Bosnia-Herzegovina's social, political and economic reintegration.

Twelve years on, myriad problems remain. Institutional safeguards to promote multiethnic consensus yield persistent deadlock, and the OHR resolves most major tasks by decree. Efforts to reform the police forces in the different state entities were delayed for more than two years, and the government only recently agreed to "unblock" the reform efforts. In early 2007, optimistic predictions about the elimination of the OHR and transfer of powers to Bosnia-Herzegovina governing institutions failed to come to fruition.

While formally an autonomous province within the Republic of Serbia, Kosovo became a de facto international protectorate with the cessation of hostilities among the Kosovo Liberation Army, Serbia and NATO in the summer of 1999. Once again, the international community's intent was to remake Kosovo as a multiethnic community either within or outside of Serbia.

In response to increasing agitation among the Albanian population, the international community established Dec. 10, 2007, as the final deadline to determine Kosovo's future status. However, talks deadlocked soon after as Serbs offered broad autonomy within the Republic of Serbia, and the vast majority of Kosovar political elites insisted on nothing short of complete independence.

Rifts became evident within the international community as well. The U.S. and Europe agreed to back a "supervised" independence for the region, while Russia balked at the independence option and is currently pushing for an extension of the Monday deadline or to resolve the dispute in the U.N. Security Council where Russia could employ its veto. Kosovo's Albanian political elite has repeatedly threatened to declare independence unilaterally if an acceptable resolution (independence) is not achieved by the deadline.

If Kosovo unilaterally declares independence, the region risks major destabilization. Statements by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in July strongly suggested the United States would recognize a unilateral declaration of independence. Serbia's ruling coalition remains united on the stance that Kosovo should remain a constituent part of Serbia.

Two important points arise from this overview of recent developments in the Balkans. First, given the level of continuing American engagement, instability in the region will have direct and immediate implications for the already-overstretched U.S. military and foreign policy establishment. Second, it raises additional questions about the prospects for stabilization in Iraq and Afghanistan. With the Balkan state-building "successes" of the 1990s still on shaky ground, what are the prospects for our more recent projects?

Andrew Konitzer is an associate professor of political science at Samford University.