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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MADRID 000741
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2015
TAGS: PRELCUCOSPVZ
SUBJECT: MFA READOUT OF CUBA/VENEZUELA DISCUSSIONS IN
WASHINGTON
REF: A. A) STATE 29323
¶B. B) MADRID 703
Classified By: Political Counselor Kathy Fitzpatrick; reasons 1.4 (B) a
nd (D).
¶1. (U) This is an action message. Please see request for
guidance on Venezuela in paras 4 and 15.
¶2. (C) Summary. MFA Director General for Latin America
Javier Sandomingo requested a meeting with polcouns on
February 24 to discuss his recent meetings at the Department
and the NSC, which he said had gone very well. Sandomingo
said he believed Spain shared a "common vision" with the USG
on our broad objectives in Cuba despite our tactical
differences and that there was an opportunity for coordinated
efforts to improve human rights conditions. He assured
polcouns that EU missions in Havana would soon put into
effect a "structured dialogue" with the opposition to
demonstrate continued EU support for democracy activists. He
said the MFA would also instruct the Spanish Embassy in
Havana to increase its own contact with dissidents. Polcouns
welcomed the news on the beginning of a structured outreach
to the dissidents since this was supposed to be a key element
in the easing of the EU's restrictive measures. Regarding
assertions of a "common vision," however, polcouns noted that
there was still considerable doubt in Washington regarding
the EU's recent overtures to Castro, which we believe
strengthen Castro at the expense of the opposition and will
be used by Castro to undermine USG-EU unity in favor of
democratic reforms. Sandomingo confirmed that Cuban Foreign
Minister Perez Roque will visit Madrid March 14-15.
¶3. (C) On Venezuela, Sandomingo said Spain hopes to use its
influence with Chavez to halt the erosion of democratic
rights in Venezuela, end Chavez' regional adventurism, and
ease Colombian-Venezuelan tensions. Spain's view, he said,
was that Chavez should not be isolated as long as there is a
chance he can be turned back from his current course. He
said there has been no final decision on the composition of
the Spanish weapons sale to Venezuela, nor on whether
Zapatero will travel to Venezuela in late March. Polcouns
said the weapons sale and the Zapatero visit to Caracas were
not consistent with Spain's stated objectives in Venezuela,
since they would only embolden Chavez' negative tendencies
and play into Chavez' hands as he will exploit any perceived
split in our policies. Sandomingo admitted that he was not
optimistic that Chavez could be deviated from his path, but
said Spain was determined to try. Polcouns again noted that
it was difficult to understand how Spain's gestures, rather
than a common policy of pressure to reform, would influence
Chavez. Sandomingo (protect) admitted that the 2004 decision
not to sell tanks to Colombia had been made in response to
appeals to halt the sale by unnamed NGOs that had aided
Zapatero's electoral campaign. He urged WHA A/S Noriega to
visit Madrid at the earliest opportunity to discuss possible
areas of U.S.-Spain cooperation in Latin America.
¶4. (C) This meeting and previous discussions with
Sandomingo's subordinates reveal considerable unease within
the MFA regarding weapons sales to Venezuela. If we want to
influence Spain's decision, we should do so as soon as
possible. Press reports indicate Zapatero's trip to Caracas
is scheduled for March 28-30 and the GOS will surely make a
decision on the final weapons package prior to that visit.
We may not be able to prevent a sale, but we should at least
highlight the contradiction of selling large quantities of
weapons to Chavez at the same time that Spain claims to be
trying to ease Colombian-Venezuelan tensions. On Cuba, the
MFA may be feeling defensive, but we have little confidence
that Zapatero feels pressure to demonstrate Spain/EU
commitment to the democratic opposition. The proof will come
in the nature of the EU's engagement with dissidents in the
coming months. Action request: Post requests Department
guidance on the issue of the Spanish weapons sales to
Venezuela. End Summary.
//CUBA//
¶5. (C) Sandomingo said he had had excellent meetings on both
Cuba and Venezuela with A/S Noriega and with NSC Senior
Director for Latin America Tom Shannon. On Cuba, Sandomingo
expressed his conviction that there that the USG and GOS
shared "the same vision" for Cuba's future, to include a
peaceful transition to democracy that would include a role
for the opposition. He said Spain and the USG are also of a
similar mind on the need to improve political conditions in
Cuba even while Castro remained in power. Sandomingo said
that differences would obviously remain on the question of
how to achieve these objectives, including Spain's negative
view of the U.S. embargo and rejection of Helms Burton, but
said he was certain that there was ample room for bilateral
cooperation on Cuba beyond these differences.
¶6. (C) Sandomingo said he understood from his meetings in
Washington that the USG wanted to see clear evidence that the
new EU approach on Cuba did not imply diminished support for
pro-democracy activists. He said that EU heads of mission in
Havana were to meet on February 24 to "determine concrete
modalities for putting into effect the EU's structured
dialogue with the opposition." He promised to share a copy
of the report on the Havana COM meeting with the Embassy and
said he expected the initial meeting to be primarily
"symbolic." EU missions in Havana would invite 20-25
dissident leaders to a luncheon or reception for discussions,
with minimal objectives on substance. Though it would be a
closed meeting, the EU participants would release a press
statement at the end to draw public attention to the event.
(NOTE: Sandomingo later said that the EU was trying to avoid
too much publicity in order to prevent an immediate
confrontation with the Cuban government over the issue. END
NOTE.) Future meetings would be in the form of working
sessions and would probably involve fewer dissidents at a
time, given the differences among the various groups. Apart
from participating in broader EU contacts with the
opposition, Sandomingo said the Spanish Embassy in Havana
would be issued "specific instructions" to engage activists
on a bilateral basis. He said the Spanish Embassy had always
been in the forefront in supporting the opposition in Havana,
recalling his own experience in Cuba as the Spanish charge
d'affaires in the mid 1990s.
¶7. (C) Polcouns welcomed Sandomingo's readout and information
on the EU's next steps in Cuba, but cautioned that there were
still grave doubts in Washington regarding the EU's course
and actions thus far. The USG has seen months of overtures
to Castro, but little to substantiate Spain's commitment to
balance the easing of the EU's restrictive measures with
greater outreach to the opposition. In our view, the visit
of PSOE President Chaves to meet with Castro and (briefly)
with the opposition had been a failure and a gift to the
Castro regime. Moreover, we'd seen the news that Cuban
Foreign Minister Felipe Perez Roque would soon visit Madrid,
giving Castro another chance to claim victory over the EU's
previous tough stance on Cuba. Sandomingo said that the USG
would soon see concrete EU measures to ramp up contact with
dissidents and insisted that Spain and the EU are not "giving
Castro any gifts" in the new relationship. He confirmed that
Perez Roque would be in Madrid March 14-15 and said that
immediately after that visit he and Cuba desk officer Pablo
Gomez de Olea would travel to Miami for meetings with Cuban
exile groups.
//VENEZUELA//
¶8. (C) Sandomingo called Venezuela "a much more complex"
issue than Cuba, though again he said that the USG and Spain
shared a similar outlook. "The only difference is that Spain
believes that Chavez is on his way to becoming another
Castro, while the USG believes he already is another Castro.
We don't believe that now is the time to isolate Venezuela,
since that would only push Chavez in a negative direction."
Sandomingo outlined Spain's top three priorities in Venezuela:
¶A. Help preserve the freedoms that still exist, including
freedom of the press and independent political parties. He
acknowledged that these and other centers of independent
thought were under continuing assault by the Chavez
government.
¶B. Convince Chavez not to involve himself in foreign
adventures in the region.
¶C. Prevent conflict between Colombia and Venezuela.
¶9. (C) Sandomingo said that while the USG had many levers of
influence over Venezuela and could apply painful pressure if
necessary, Spain had far more limited options. He said Spain
had gained Chavez' confidence and was now analyzing how to
use that influence in support of the objectives described
above. Spain's policies towards Venezuela were also
conditioned by the fact that Chavez was, "for the moment," a
legally elected leader and therefore a legitimate
interlocutor.
¶10. (C) Polcouns replied that the USG could not understand
Spain's proposed weapons sale (ref B) and President
Zapatero's plans to visit Caracas in March in the context of
the objectives discussed by Sandomingo. Chavez would only be
emboldened by his belief that Spain, and therefore the EU,
somehow endorsed his undemocratic actions or was at the very
least prepared to ignore his autocratic tendencies. The USG
did not seek to isolate Chavez, but we were deeply concerned
that Chavez was steering Venezuela and the region towards a
serious crisis. We also believed that a common voice
pressuring for reform would have more influence on Chavez
than Spain's gestures.
¶11. (C) Sandomingo said that neither the weapons sale nor
President Zapatero's plans to visit Venezuela had been
finalized. He described the proposed weapons package for
Venezuela as the subject of a vigorous internal debate, with
the guiding principle a determination not to provide
materials that could be transfered by Chavez to subversive
groups or militias. Sandomingo became flustered when pressed
for details on the types of vessels being considered for sale
to Venezuela and for clarity on how the final decision would
be made, making clear that final decisions would be made at a
high political level. He noted that the commercial value of
the deal (over USD 700 million and potentially up to USD 1
billion) would be critical in light of the importance such a
sale would have for Spain's cash-strapped Izar Shipyards.
¶12. (C) Sandomingo said no final decision had been made
regarding Zapatero's possible visit to Caracas. He said that
if Zapatero does go to see Chavez, he will also go to
Colombia to demonstrate that Spain is not siding with Chavez.
Also, while in Venezuela Zapatero would make it a point to
have several meetings with the political opposition. When
polcouns questioned how Spain would get it's message across
under Chavez' headlines on the visit, Sandomingo expressed
confidence that Spain would be able to publicize its sessions
with the opposition.
Sandomingo emphasized that Spain was keeping Colombia
informed on the weapons deal and that the Colombians had
given their approval. Polcouns expressed concern that Chavez
would nevertheless turn the Zapatero visit into a propaganda
coup. Interestingly, Sandomingo (protect) raised Zapatero's
2004 decision not to follow through on former president
Aznar's sale of tanks to Colombia, admitting that unspecified
Spanish NGOs had persuaded Zapatero to withdraw the offer.
He said Zapatero's advisers had felt indebted to these NGOs,
which had helped get him elected, and had bent to their
demands.
¶13. (U) Sandomingo asked that we reiterate his invitation
made in Washington for A/S Noriega to visit Spain. He said
A/S Noriega would be assured good high-level meetings and
that it would help both sides identify potential areas for
cooperation.
//COMMENT//
¶14. (C) For the past several months, we have used every
opportunity to signal the USG's concerns with respect to
Madrid's overtures to Chavez. This meeting with Sandomingo
and previous discussions with his subordinates reveal
considerable unease within the MFA regarding weapons sales to
Venezuela. If we want to influence Spain's decision, we
should do so as soon as possible. Press reports indicate
Zapatero's trip to Caracas is scheduled for March 28-30 and
the GOS will surely make a decision on the final weapons
package prior to that visit. We may not be able to prevent a
sale, but we should at least highlight the contradiction of
selling large quantities of weapons to Chavez at the same
time that Spain claims to be trying to ease
Colombian-Venezuelan tensions. On Cuba, the MFA may be
feeling defensive, but we have little confidence that
Zapatero feels pressure to demonstrate Spain/EU commitment to
the democratic opposition. The proof will come in the nature
of the EU's engagement with dissidents in the coming months.
//ACTION REQUEST//
¶15. (C) Recent events supersede the points we have used in
previous discussions with the GOS on Venzuela, therefore post
requests Department guidance on the issue of Spanish weapons
sales to Caracas. We would like to convey to the GOS a clear
USG message regarding our concerns on the sale so that they
can factor in our response during the course of their
internal deliberations.
MANZANARES