Thursday, 31 October 2013

As the evidence
I’ve previously presented shows: drones rarely kill civilians and they are
quite effective at reducing terrorism. This shouldn’t be surprising: there is a
general
trend for Western military action to cause very little civilian loss and the
latter proposition is only surprising to people who still believe in the idea
of blowback. But two things have made me want to write this post: firstly, the
report from Amnesty and secondly, laying out the evidence on effectiveness far
more thoroughly than I previously had.

Amnesty International

The debate about drones is
fundamentally about effectiveness and civilian causalities –and once those
issues have been handled, the bulk of the debate is over – which is why I think
the latest
report by Amnesty doesn’t change much about that general debate. Glenn
Greenwald stated
that the report shows that the report shows ‘far more civilians than the USG
claims’ have been killed. But thats been pretty much accepted by everyone
outside of the US government. A meta-analysis
showed the civilian casualty rate to be 8-17% (when you took out the lowest
estimate). The main concern is civilian casualties not what the U.S says – and
on that count, they are low. In fact, if you look at the appendix of the Amnesty
report which lists drone strikes, only two (the ones documented below) are said
to have killed civilians only (p.62).

The Amnesty report is not
completely irrelevant as it can, however, raise specific incidents in attempt
to spark a debate about those incidents. This is despite the general debate
being settled. But it is my view that even in this narrower endeavour it fails.
The report draws particular attention to two incidents: the drone strike on October
24 2012 which killed Mamana Bibi and the drone strike on 6 July 2012 which
killed 18 individuals. Amnesty is, to its credit, aware of the limitations of
their conclusions:

Because the US
government refuses to provide even basic information on particular strikes,
including the reasons for carrying them out, Amnesty International is unable to
reach firm conclusions about the context in which the US drone attacks on
Mamana Bibi and on the 18 laborers took place (p.8)

But, as we will see, this doesn’t
go far enough. Mamana Bibi’s grandson told Amnesty that his grandmother was
outside her home ‘gathering okra to cook that evening’ on October 24 2012. It
was then that ‘before her family’s eyes, Mamana Bibi was blown into pieces by
at least two Hellfire missiles’ (p.18-19). Amnesty states the following about
the incident:

Witnesses and
family members, interviewed separately and by different research teams at
different times, all denied that any militants were anywhere near Mamana Bibi
at the time of the attack. Amnesty International’s investigation found no
evidence of military or armed group installations or fighters. (p.22)

It goes without saying that an
innocent civilian’s death is regrettable. There does, however, seem to be more
to the incident than Amnesty describe. The only thing that Amnesty cites that
can be construed as a defence of the action is that a Pakistani source states
there was signal intelligence which placed a Taliban fighter on a nearby road.
Amnesty states that this is not enough to go on because (i) drones would have
had time to see that Mamana Bibi was not a militant and (ii) the nearest roads
were over 930ft away. I’m not sure how persuasive these responses really are
(the first requires an assessment of the evidence and the second doesn’t seem
relevant at all) – but that’s not the main thing thats wrong with their
description.

After the drone strikes, source
after source came out saying that there were militants not only in the area but
were killed in the strike. As noted by the New
America Foundation, different sources told CNN, AFP, Dawn, Associated Press and The News that militants had been killed. I stress that this (and
everything that follows) is not conclusive. There are, however, two main
reasons for siding with the New America Foundation over the Amnesty (and,
unfortunately, the family of the victim). First, is the general trend of drone
strikes and U.S military policy toward civilians. I have already written a
full post on that so will only state the conclusion: U.S policy does not
target civilians and does everything to minimise the loss of civilian life.

Second is a fact that Amnesty
draws attention to. The reliability of witnesses is in doubt particularly on
the question of whether militants are in the area (this response is, for
reasons that will become apparent, extremely pertinent to the next incident).
Amnesty gives the following example of a drone strike on 24 May 2012:

It is virtually impossible for residents to
complain to the authorities about armed groups. For example, four foreign
fighters and four local Taliban were killed instantly in a village in Esso Khel
when a series of drone strikes hit the building they were resting in on the
evening of 24 May 2012. While local residents confirmed details of the
incident, most refused to confirm the presence of these fighters or whether
they had any choice about them residing in their village (p.34)

There are no good reasons for
thinking that the situation changes when Amnesty and their researchers enter
the town, it remains ‘virtually impossible’ for people to share what really
happened. Additionally, we know
that militants were operating in Tappi over the long term, using the area as a
shelter. Again, I stress this only gives good, not conclusive, reasons for
discounting the Amnesty account.

Amnesty’s account of July 6 2012
incident has the same shortfalls. According to Amnesty a ‘group of laborers
from Zowi Sidgi village had gathered at a tent after a long day of work in the
summer heat’ (p.24). Then multiple drones carried out strikes against the
individuals in this tent. After this first strike, individuals gathered to
‘search for survivors.’ A few minutes after this initial strike, more strikes
were carried out and killed, according the Amnesty account, 18 people – going
on to state:

All of the
people who spoke to Amnesty International – each interviewed separately in
detail and at different times and locations to corroborate testimony as
accurately as possible – were adamant that all of those killed in the strikes
were ordinary villagers, not fighters, and that none had engaged in attacks
against US or Pakistani forces. Most of the victims worked as labourers (p.26)

In this incident the two reasons
why we should discount the Amnesty account converge. According to the New York Timesaccount of the incident:

At least 15
people suspected of being Taliban militants were killed by an American drone
strike late Friday in northwestern Pakistan, according to a Pakistani
intelligence official and local
residents.

This goes to underscore the point
about the reliability of the witnesses that Amnesty interviews. This is not
just a general accusation about the reliability of witnesses but clear
inconsistency. Aside from local residents, as the New America Foundation notes
different sources – including ‘local tribesman’ - told AFP, The Guardian and Dawn that
militants were killed in this attack. To really reinforce the point – and to
give explanation for the second strike - compare these two statements from the
Amnesty account and the New York Times:

Local
residents said that soon after the strike Taliban militants cordoned off the
area around the compound and searched for bodies in the debris (New York Times)

While
residents said the area is not under the direct control of any armed group, it
is not effectively governed by the Pakistani state either. Residents of Zowi
Sidgi said some locals were sympathetic to the Taliban (Amnesty, p.26).

The last factual element of the
report is about the effect of drone strikes on the Pakistani population. Amnesty
quotes an individual stating the following:

“Local tribal
people generally live in fear and stress and feel psychological pressure. They
think they could be the target of a drone attack because wrong information
might be given to drone operators” (p.31)

This is quite strange because I
have only seen one poll asking about the accuracy of drone strikes and the
results do not confirm this at all. A poll carried out by the Aryana Institute for Regional Research and
Advocacy carried out a poll of those
that lived under drone strikes and found the following:

– Do you see
drone attacks bringing about fear and terror in the common people? (Yes 45%, No
55%)

– Do you think
the drones are accurate in their strikes? (Yes 52%, No 48%)

– Do you think
anti-American feelings in the area increased due to drone attacks recently?
(Yes 42%, No 58%)

There is no doubt that if you
poll across Pakistan, the last result
is the opposite. But the quoted results do align with a general trend of other accounts
and academic
papers of people who actually live under the Taliban and other Al Qaeda
affiliated groups (i.e., those who live under drone strikes). The Economistrecently went around the area and found that ‘surprising number of
Pakistanis’ (‘many’) support drone strikes. Hussain Nadim found the similar
results when asking individuals who actually suffer under the Taliban as he
wrote in Foreign Policy:

Although no
official polls have been conducted in Balochistan due to the lack of access in
the area, I conducted an unofficial survey of 1,500 people from Balochistan, of
which only 38% had a negative stance towards the United States.

While these reports should bring
some comfort to people who support the use of drones, they should not be used
as a determining factor in supporting strikes. If the question of efficacy
(handled below) and civilian casualties (handled in these posts and above) is
sorted to put it as diplomatically as I can: we must act in self-defence
regardless and by ‘we’ I do not just mean the West.

Efficacy of drone strikes

There are two separate positions
on drone strikes – the first is that they lead to radicalisation and thus
further militancy and the second is that they reduce violence. For breadth,
both claims will be handled quantitatively and qualitatively – and in proving
the second, the first is further weakened.

The academic literature and
research on drones is fairly conclusive on the first question: drones do not
lead to blowback. In a meta-analysis of the available research (specifically)
on drones, Walsh
(2013) concludes ‘from the existing research is that drone strikes that
result in civilian deaths appear to have little relationship with subsequent
insurgent violence’ (p.45). His own research is consistent with this view. By ‘plotting
the number of civilians killed in drone strikes along with the number of
terrorist attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan,’ Walsh finds that ‘no clear
patterns emerge[s]’ (p.32).

The qualitative element of this
first point has been handled
before and I will not repeat it (needless to say that the poll results
quoted above are further evidence of the positions I have previously outlined:
people do not suddenly become militant when they perceive themselves to be
wronged). But both elements lead to the same conclusion stated by Aaron Y Zelin
in Foreign Policy: ‘there is scant
evidence that drones strikes have been mobilizing AQC to conduct attacks in
response.’

On the question of whether the drone strikes reduce violence, Johnson and Sarbahi find that ‘drone strikes are associated with decreases in both the frequency and the lethality of militant attacks overall and in IED and suicide attacks specifically.’ Walsh own
research finds that (i) pre-2011, the relationship between drones strikes and
terrorist activity is the converse of what is claimed (thereby proving the
first statement to be correct) and (ii) post-2011, drones strikes lead to a
decline in terrorist activity:

[Until early 2011...] the
pattern is one in which increases in
terrorism are followed by more drone strikes. Something similar
characterizes the data for Pakistan through 2010. After this date, though, a spike in drone strikes is closely associated
with a decline in terrorist activity, suggesting that drones may have had
their desired effect.

It’s worth stressing that drones were intensified
in the periods where Walsh finds that they had their deterrent effect. Despite
these two findings Walsh’s meta-analysis of available research (which includes
the aforementioned empirical findings) states that ‘research efforts have not
yet produced a consen­sus on how drones influence insurgent organizations’ and
that ‘between drone strikes and terrorist attacks in Pakistan are quite
variable’ (p.38, 46). This conclusion still supports the first proposition but
not the second.

Why has Walsh concluded, contrary to his own
findings and Johnson and Sarbahi, that it has little positive effect? Because
of a paper by Jaeger and Siddique which finds that drone strikes have different
effects on different organisations in Pakistan – including negative effects. My
view is that less weight should be given to this paper for two reasons –
firstly because as Walsh notes ‘Jaeger and Siddique’s findings on these relationships
are not very robust’ (p.38) and secondly because it is inconsistent with the
wider academic literature. Indeed, when we look at the academic literature
outside of drone use, we see that wiping militants out works.

Instead of just linking to two old posts which show that this
is the case, the study undertaken by Johnson which looks at 90
counter-insurgencies since 1970 finds that

when militant leaders
are captured or killed militant attacks decrease, terrorist campaigns end
sooner, and their outcomes tend to favor the government or third-party country,
not the militants

Bearing in mind that ‘an estimated 3,300 al
Qaeda, Taliban, and other jihadist operatives in Pakistan and Yemen’ have been
killed, the second proposition seems to be a reasonable conclusion on the basis
of all the quantitative evidence.[1] The qualitative evidence is just as clear
and answers the questions as to why violence in FATA is still so frequent. The International Crisis Group in their report on
drones makes the following conclusion:

The main causes for the
spread of militancy in FATA are not drone strikes but domestic factors. These
include the absence of the state and insecurity due to resulting og political,
legal and economic vacuum; and the military's support of, provision of sanctuaries
to, and peace deals with militant groups (p.24)

This really shouldn’t be controversial: not only is it the conclusion of our very own MI5,
rather surprisingly it is the conclusion of The
Guardian. In an editorial they state that

The public discourse in
Pakistan suffers from a false binary that the TTP is a function of the drone
strikes. The challenge it poses the state is more fundamental than that.
Fundamentalism is a product of decades of official complicity, cowardice and
appeasement. Sooner or later, Mr Sharif will be forced to realise that. Until
then, he is merely kicking the can down the road.

It must have been Seamus Milne’s day off. Incidentally,
this is exactly the same as the academic literature on the terrorist campaign
in Yemen. Gregory Johnsen has repeatedly stated drones have
increased Al Qaeda membership in Yemen on the basis of interviews he conducted.
This is wrong not only because of the academic literature of drone strikes and
leader incapacitation and the far larger samples of interviewers who
found the opposite result but because it ignores the real causes of increased
militancy.

Watts and Cillufo (2012) in a brilliant paper note that ‘several phenomena
occurring outside Yemen’s borders have been the primary catalyst for AQAP’s
emergence.’ First, after the Surge took effect in Iraq, foreign fighters
returned home – and for many fighting in Iraq, home was Yemen. Second, Saudi
military operations pushed AQ members from Saudi Arabia to Yemen. Third, the ‘intermittent
military commitment’ of the Yemeni military has helped Al Qaeda. As Peter Bergen notes when the Yemeni
military, in conjunction with the use of drones, conducts military operations
Al Qaeda ‘lost all of these gains within about a year.’ Watts and Cillufo
conclude the ‘logic behind this assertion [i.e., Johnsen’s] appears horribly
backwards.’

Footnotes

[1] One further study which helps
support this conclusion (beyond the vast academic literature in my previous
posts) is this Journal of Conflict Resolutionpaper which finds that ‘(1) when the
leader of a rebel group is captured or killed, wars are 398 percent more likely
to end, (2) conflicts are less likely to end while rebel groups are being led
by their founder.’ The reason that this is not quoted in the main body is that
this study is specifically about leaders but
the logic, it is submitted, is the same. Indeed, even if it weren’t, 51
militant leaders have been knocked out.

This post will be
kind-of-reviewing the two books listed above. I say kind-of-reviewing because
the review of the first book is more of an overview but with a few comments.
The reason for the overview is twofold: first I think the book’s arguments can
and should be used in future debates. Second, it is the approach of the first
book that shows how wrong the second book really is. This is despite the fact
they have no similarities aside from attempting to provide qualitative accounts
of their subject matters (the Russian Revolution in 1991 and the trend of
suicide bombers).

Roads to the Temple

The reason why I own and read
this book is, I hope, obvious: I want to learn lessons from the Russian
experience of bringing down unabashed socialism so that when Ed comes to power,
I know how to act. Just kidding, I’m
not a maniac. The real reason is because Leon Aron wrote one of my favourite
essays. In that essay published in Foreign Policy, Aron persuasively rejected the material explanations for the Fall
of the Soviet Union and stated that it was a ‘intellectual and moral quest’
undertaken by writers, intellectuals and then the population

beginning with
a merciless moral scrutiny of the country's past and present [which] within a
few short years hollowed out the mighty Soviet state, deprived it of
legitimacy, and turned it into a burned-out shell that crumbled in August 1991.

Roads to the Temple is an elaboration of this essay and it doesn’t
disappoint. Aron is now the author of not just one of my favourite essays but one
of my favourite non-fiction books. The book is an attempt to explain the collapse
of the Soviet state as a result of the ideological change that warped the
country in the aftermath of Glasnost policy which, finally, allowed a modicum
of freedom of speech and press.

First, Aron seeks to explain why
the economic and (materially) political factors were not significant in the
downfall. As he points out, ‘no key parameter of economic performance prior to
1985 pointed to a rapidly advancing disaster’; GDP while slowing was still at a
respectable 1.9% throughout the period (p.13). None of this should be taken as endorsing
Soviet economic policy, merely that the material conditions cannot be a
persuasive explanation for what happened and particularly how it happened.[1]

Incidentally, you’ll find the
same record if you look at Arab countries prior to the Arab Spring in 2011. GDP
growth slowed – not least in the aftermath of the 2008 – but their growth
levels were not different from the late 90s and earlier 2000s (see here).
That the economic explanation for the Arab Spring seems wrong is apparent when
you ask the people
themselves: 59% of Egyptians say the main reason for the uprising was freedom
and human rights, only 25% say economic. This is in line with empirical
evidence (which Aron unfortunately doesn’t quote). As Jay Ulfield, a brilliant
forecaster of regime downfalls has said:

Statistical
forecasting of democratic transitions supports the supposition that, far more
than leadership change or a slumping economy, the mobilization of nonviolent
uprisings is what could tip China toward deep political reform

But it is not just the empirical
record that shows that arguments like this are lacking – it is the approach
itself, the ‘structuralist approach.’ As Aron explains structuralists ‘emphasise
[the] state... as collective political actors’ and the causes of social
revolutions are ‘traced back to state’s inability... to effect the necessary
economic, social and political reforms.’ The main point is that these events
are ‘independent of (or ‘exogenous to’) people and people’s ideas.’ This is a
Weberian development on Marx’s historical materialism - the idea that the
‘causal scheme is centred on the ‘forces of production’ (the economic system)’
(p.16-17). The reason this approach fails?

If a
revolutionary process is represented by a line on which letters from... a to d
mark the stages of the revolution from first stirrings to triumph, the
structuralist approach may be very helpful in uncovering what happened in the c-to-d
stretch [but not...] what happens between a and c...

There were
plenty of structural reasons whythe
Soviet Union should have collapsed
but these fail to explain fully how it happened. In explaining the Soviet
collapse we have no choice but to stray outside the universe of the ‘objective’
factors and take into consideration the enormous and subversive influence of
ideas (p.17-18).

It is Aron’s approach that makes
this book great. The structuralist idea has permeated public discourse. It
exists in the idea that crime or terrorism is caused by poverty or foreign
policy, that the choices of individuals are
of little relevance. It is clear from my posts that I have an issue with structuralism
(see my post on the
riots and every single one of my posts on terrorism). The reason English
law has given is because it ignores the role of an individual’s ‘free, informed
and deliberate action’ and the authorship of that act (a view I adhere
to). Aron says much the same: ‘it is
‘ideas and actors’ rather than structures... that are the primary engines of
revolution.’ As Issiah Berlin has stated

these great
movements began with ideas in people’s heads... We cannot confine our attention
to impersonal forces, natural and man-made, which act upon us (p.18-9).

It is these ideas that ‘provide
alternatives to the current view’ and explain how ‘pre-revolutionary situations
become revolutionary crises’ (p.20). Freedom of speech allowed ‘every
institution – political economic and social – to be subjected to trial by truth
and conscience’ (p.51). It is following this process of self-discovery and
criticism that surveys showed ‘solid majorities favour some key features of
liberal capitalism’ (p.32-3).

Aron then engages in a
comprehensive social history of the change of ideas. So comprehensive is Aron’s
study – it is based on ‘8,000 pages of Russian originals: newspapers, magazines
and books’ (p.4) – that it is better described as a rigorous qualitative study.
Prior to Glasnost, it was not just the concealment of the truth but the ‘hourly
construction and maintenance of a parallel, brilliant reality’ (p.64). The
first element of the qualitative study, then, is justifiably targeted the Russian
people, ‘relearning Soviet history became a national pastime’ (p.72).

Aron spends three chapters on the deconstruction of
the myths of the Soviet Union – each page of these chapters tries to move away
from the monotonous history that everyone knows to fascinating details that
were being published in newly liberated Soviet papers. Each Soviet construction
crumbles: the myth of outstanding
healthcare (‘the number of scalpels made in the country was 62% of the amount
needed’ (p.119)); the myth that the U.S paled USSR poverty levels (‘131 million
people, or 46% of Soviet citizens were [earning around $200 per month]’ (p.127));
the myth of technological development (‘India was said to have more paved roads’
(p.136)); the myth of worker efficiency (the Soviet worker ‘had to labor 10-15
times [longer] for eggs, 18-25 times for bananas and oranges’ (p.137)).

In the third part of the book,
the question of who is to blame for this state of affairs is handled. For
Russian intellectuals and the people the blame lay with Stalin and Marxist-Leninist ideology. Stalin’s death
didn’t affect his legacy which was found ‘in the economic, political and
ideological and moral threads that riddled the society’ (p.200). The ‘cause of
communism’ justified everything for Stalin (p.219) – and here ‘everything’
included the consequences described above. This ideological framework had two
fundamental consequences: ‘de-individualisation’ and the complete control of
the economy.

‘De-individualisation’ or the
‘nationalisation of conscience’ was a process by which the people lost their
rights to define their own interests, autonomy and rights to liberty. One cause
of this illiberal process was directly related to an orthodox interpretation of
Marxist thought:

His [the
Soviet man’s] “petty bourgeois” insistence on a better life now and for himself was an impediment to history’s glorious future for all. [It was based on] the coming of the
kingdom of peace and justice (p.212-3).[2]

The Soviet economy – based on
centralisation and nationalisation of the means of production – was also a
cause of the deepening misery of the people. It was both a cause of the
de-individualisation and a consequence. The political act of
de-individualisation can only be completed by taking away of people’s private
property and the scope to take control of their own lives – which inevitably
leads to nationalisation of property (p.206-7). But, similarly, the economic
control (which led to de-individualisation) was a ‘fundamental principle’ of
the ideology (p.202).

The solution, realised by the populous
and printed in newspapers, was a liberal democracy: ‘the individual was not to
be the means of the party-state’s aims but a key objective himself’ and they
were the rightful ‘subject[s] of the national economy’ (p.272-3). And this was
translated into the political sphere: Yeltsin called for the regime to be
dismantled. The Communist Party, of course, stood in the way but by now, the
legitimacy of liberal democracy had made their position untenable:

The revolution
culminated in August 1991 in the rallies and strikes throughout Russia in
support of Gorbachev and Yeltsin against the communist coup.[3]

Despite a couple of minor
gripes[4], this is, without question, one of the best non-fiction books I have
read. Aside from my point above about the Arab Spring, I have only one more
comment to make. Last year Chris Dillow and the late Norman Geras were debating
about free speech. Norm echoing John Stuart Mill stated

It is a
commonplace of political liberalism that discussion and debate are good; we
learn through considering different points of view, including those to which we
are opposed.

Discussion and
debate lead not so much to learning as the mere exchange of prejudice. Free
speech gives us not a rational pursuit of truth but rather the mindless and
often dishonest venting... Mill's defence of free speech seems to have been a
rationalist Victorian optimism which isn't supported by the evidence.

And, as if by magic, the New York Timeshad a summary of the evidence of what happened when people were
exposed to opposing views in that same week:

You might
expect that people’s views would soften and that divisions between groups would
get smaller. That is not what usually happens. On the contrary, people’s
original beliefs tend to harden and the original divisions typically get
bigger. Balanced presentations can fuel unbalanced views.

Above I referred to Roads to the Temple as a qualitative
study – and I did so deliberately. This book supports the idea that free speech
matters – it changed the views and then the actions of the Russian people. The
studies that Chris cites are evidence of what seem to be short term
confirmation bias. When confronted with the truth consistently, with good
evidence and outside of short term lab conditions where results don’t matter,
Norm and Mill are right. Recent human development – the constantmoralprogress,
declining warandcrime, the rise
of liberalism and the decline
of religion
- is a testament to their correctness. Rest in peace, Norm.

Myth of Martyrdom

This was a disappointing book. Lankford
is arguing against the prevailing view in the academic literature on the
psychology of suicide terrorists. These are not normal terrorists but specifically
the three percent who kill themselves as
well as others (p.12). As Lankford explains:

[Experts] made
the logical leap that in terms of their psychology, suicide terrorists were
essentially just like ordinary people. “Sure, the 9/11 highjackers had extreme
political and religious beliefs,” the experts admitted. But were they unstable?
No. Were they suicidal? No (p.4)

Lankford believes that the
“experts got it wrong” (p.2). And on his main thesis, he is right that the
experts overstated that view. Robert Pape for example claims that in his study
into suicide terrorists he ‘found no documented mental illness, such as
depression, psychosis or past suicide attempts’ (p.29). Lankford notes the
absurdity of such a position:

How likely is
it that you could walk into a room with 462 people anywhere on the globe and
not a single depressed person would be present? [The odds are] 1 in
19,574,665,823... Either Pape has unintentionally discovered that suicide
bombing is the most remarkable cure for... mental illness or something is
seriously wrong with his so-called “comprehensive and reliable research.”
(p.30)

Lankford draws on a study carried
out by Ariel Merari whose research looked at 12 regular terrorists (that is
non-suicide bombers) and 15 suicide bombers who were stopped. The results show
that Pape is wrong: 53.3% of would-be suicide bombers had depressive tendencies
compared with 8.3% in regular terrorists; 20% of them had post traumatic stress
disorder compared to 0%; 13.3% previous suicide attempts compared to 0%.

Clearly, despite Merari’s small
sample, this is enough to disprove Pape’s idea that there are no documented
cases of past suicide attempts or instances of depression. But Lankford goes
beyond this and suggests that it is part of the explanation for terrorism. Lankford is clearly aware of the study
carried out by Bryan
and Araj (2012) (he quotes it on p.50) – and yet does not take their
criticisms seriously. Here is what they say in their response to Merari:

Merari finds
that one of four respondents who tried to activate their explosive device
displayed suicidal tendencies in interviews, compared to five of eleven
respondents who did not try to activate their explosive device. [But taking
into account the margin of error] there is no statistically significant
difference between the two categories of respondents in terms of their
likelihood of displaying suicidal tendencies (p.435).

This severely weakens an attempt
at ‘explaining’ terrorism using mental illness. Moreover, as Lankford rightly
notes, even if we take Merari’s findings at face value, it is still only half
of suicide terrorists that have depressive tendencies.[5] Lankford’s mistake is
ignoring the role of ideas in these individuals. Clearly mental illness does
not cause terrorism (not even Lankford makes this claim) and clearly it is not
a necessary component in suicide terrorism (as Merari’s research shows). Indeed,
it doesn’t even seem to follow trends of suicide terrorism (the author notes
that there has been a 300% increase in suicide terrorism between 2001 and 2010
on p.20 – but there is likely no tangible difference in (i) incidence of mental
illness compared with other countries and (ii) change over time in the Middle
East itself, ignoring the issue of home-grown terrorists – see here).

Rather, the main cause is the
acceptance of the idea that terrorism is an acceptable form of conduct and is
essential to fight that forms a necessary and sufficient explanation (see here
for evidence and elaboration). Indeed, Lankford is right note it is a
misconception to say that ‘suicidal people are crazy and irrational’ – as he notes,
‘there is a broad spectrum of people who struggle with suicidal urges and
mental health problems... [some] have no grasp of rationality, but many [do]’
(p.31). But he doesn’t seem to realise that this means that the suicide-terrorist
population, then, is able to have individuals committed to the cause who happen
to be suicidal – and hence in terms of explaining their actions or culpability,
there is no difference. And this fits in with the statistics: 5% of the general
population are depressed and roughly half of the 3% of terrorists who attempt
to blow themselves up are depressed.

If we ignored this ideological
element, these individuals could kill themselves in their rooms but they choose
not to – why? Lankford claims that the answer lies in the cultural stigma of
suicide:

When a
community strongly condemns conventional suicide as a certain path to hell, it
virtually disappears as potential escape route. And when a significant
percentage of people believe that suicide terrorism is justified, a new door
opens for desperate individuals (p.153)

I have argued against this idea
before: as the research
on attitudes to suicide terrorism shows, there
is no significant difference between communities around the world. Israeli
Jews are 1% more likely to approve compared with Palestinians – and way above
both groups are Mormon Americans. Lankford’s argument does not fit with the
empirical record (presented above and in these twoposts) and inevitably requires him to
rely on cultural views in one respect (on suicide) but ignore it in another (on
suicide terrorism).

Aside from the aforementioned
empirical research and failings, Lankford has to contend with a further point.
If suicide terrorists are stopped from committing plain suicide in their rooms
because of the religious sanctions, we would expect them to have high
religiosity. But they do not. Faiza Patel in Rethinking Radicalisation notes that ‘the religiosity-terrorism
connection is simply not borne out by empirical research’ (p.10) – and an there
is an indirect connection according to Lankford.[6] That Lankford is wrong is
shown in another way. In his chapter on the psychology of the 9/11 terrorists
he says the following:

Other members
of Atta’s group acknowledged their sexual desires, flirted with women on the
street [in Las Vegas] and even boasted of sexual conquests... sometimes it is
those who appear to be most repressed on inhibited who are actually most likely
to engage in risky sexual behaviours (p.78)

Lankford posits that culture
presents a closed door for people who want to kill themselves – and the only
way they can is through terrorism and so ‘a new door opens for desperate
individuals’ – and yet, the culture against promiscuity doesn’t stop terrorists
from having premarital sex. This makes yet another thing that Lankford has to
ignore to sustain his argument. As these criticisms build, it is unsurprising
why the view of the ‘experts’ which Lankford derides stands in stark contrast
to his view.

Still, Lankford is extremely consistent
in his view so much so that he applies his reasoning to Oprah Winfrey. But this
wrong-headed consistency goes to show how much Lankford is ignoring ideas. Oprah’s
destiny – nor a terrorists -was not
decided by her own views, deliberations and actions. Lankford states that she
attempted suicide after finding out that she was pregnant (out of wedlock) and
wanted to avoid her father’s disapproval. He goes on to say:

Oprah Winfrey
is not a suicide bomber... But if a teenage Oprah had been in the wrong place
at the wrong time, she may have snuck out of her house, filmed a martyrdom
video, cursed the infidels, strapped explosives to her chest and blown herself
up (p.51)

At times Lankford seems to
contradict himself or is not clear enough to understand. He (rightly) rejects
the ‘foreign policy’ causes terrorism viewpoint (p.160). But he does believe
there is a link because of the (i) psychological effects of war which increase
suicidal people and (ii) the influx of weapons. If my criticism of his view
above is convincing then we can clearly reject even this indirect argument
about foreign policy – however the reason I raise the point is for two reasons.
Firstly, inexplicably, he goes on to state to ‘these types of conflict will
likely boost social approval of suicide terrorism against nearby enemies’
(p.161). This is an empirically false statement (see, in
particular, the reduction in support for terrorism following Operation Cast
Lead).

Secondly is a non-empirical
point. Lankford’s prose throughout the book is barbed against his opponents –
and even more than that, he believes their work brings happiness to terrorists:

You’re a
terrorist leader. In front of you sits stacks of newspapers from around the
world. You can’t believe your good fortune... You couldn’t have hired a better
publicist. [The world’s leading academic scholars] say that suicide terrorists
are psychologically normal and their attacks are caused by West’s military occupation
of your lands... And you laugh. (p.38-9)

It is as though Paul Krugman
wrote a book about suicide terrorism. But the point I’m making is this:
Lankford’s views on foreign policy – both as an indirect cause and then his
empirically false statement about support – is exactly the kind of thing that makes terrorists ‘laugh.’ Lankford
should not be so barbed if he is then going to say the same thing. At times the
author makes other ill judgments and extrapolates on the basis of facts where
he really shouldn’t. He says ‘powerful evidence that suicide terrorists’ are
not psychologically normal can come from ‘Zuheir’ (a single individual) on page
48.In an attempt to show that a
terrorist was suicidal, he cites her statement that ‘she [the terrorist] should
have died in [her dead brother’s] place’ (p.56).He even starts whole paragraphs of
speculation knowing what he is doing (p.79).

Finally, the book is extremely
badly written and filled with self-aggrandisement – it not only as though Paul
Krugman wrote the book but also Nick Hornby. Here are a few of the stellar
statements that are representative of the books cringe-worthy writing style:

Answers are
sexy and true enlightenment can be orgasmic (p.148)

As Michael
Jackson explained in his critically acclaimed song “Man in the Mirror”
sometimes the best you can help others is to “take a look at yourself, and then
make a change” (p.154)

I wrote
that “the best scenario might be if [Bin Laden] is killed by soldiers in a
surprise attack...” Looking back, these words now appear prophetic. If Bin
Laden wanted to see what was coming... maybe he should have read my book
(p.152).

Saturday, 5 October 2013

One of my earliest posts argued
against those who claimed that the U.S was offered Bin Laden on a plate in
September 2001. This idea wasn’t particularly popular - it was restricted to
elements of the “anti-imperialist left”. The argument handled below is somewhat
more pervasive – you may even hear it in a pub. It is the idea that the U.S (and more broadly,
Western) military does not care about civilians when operating in war zones.
This, it is claimed amounts to what is in effect a policy of targeting civilians
either through wilful actions or gross negligence.

To deal with some admin: I want
to make clear that I am really only talking about U.S actions in the last
decade or so. This is for brevity not necessarily because I want to avoid the
issue of pre-9/11 actions. The end-notes are elaborations, the sources are
contained with the text itself.

Kahl (2007) in International Security gives us a
framework for evaluating whether the norm of not killing civilians is being
violated:

[The] three
types of measures... used here to assess the degree of U.S. military compliance
with the norm of non-combatant immunity [are] (1) levels of civilian casualties
(an indirect measure); (2) conduct during military operations; and (3)
responses to instances of noncompliance (p.10)

Numbers

The first is a relatively easy
argument to make and I have made it several times: in Afghanistan, coalition
forces are responsible for less than 14%
of civilians deaths so far in 2013 (a consistent
trend). In Iraq, Kahl estimates that coalition forces were responsible for
roughly 10% for the period 2003-2006 (p.11-2). A more recent study by King’s
College London for the period 2003-2008 found coalition forces responsible
for 12% of civilian casualties [1]. In relation to drone strikes, a
meta-analysis of several estimates found that, if you take out the lowest estimate, the civilian toll is between
8% and 17%. If the world’s most powerful
militaries had a wilful policy of killing civilians, they are failing
miserably. But the argument that the policy exists by way of negligence may
still be correct which is where we use conduct and responses to instances of
non-compliance.

Note that the mere killing of
civilians is not sufficient to warrant moral condemnation. As will be obvious
from the second and third sections below, while the loss of life is regrettable,
it often comes about because of militant activities (operating in civilian
areas, not wearing uniforms) and the fog of war which can lead to errors. Even
these errors should not be morally blameworthy – soldiers must act according to
the best evidence and it is simply a fact of war that acting reasonably and making
reasonable assessments can lead to the death of civilians (see particularly
section three, sub-section one). In essence, these are R v
Pagget situations.

Why are the casualties so low?
Partly because of improvements in technology which mean that we can avoid
civilian casualties. Our weapons are becoming more and more sophisticated which
allows for precision. The overwhelming majority of munitions used in Iraq and
Afghanistan are precision guided (p.21). But this is not the main reason. There
has been a radical change in the internalisation of the rules of engagement:

Military
culture is institutionalized, routinized, and reproduced in several ways,
including education and training, career incentives, doctrine and war plans,
budgetary priorities, procurement programs, and even force structures (p.38)

Military conduct

One of the ways we see this
military culture of protecting civilians is through their conduct (other
examples of post-operation matters which indicate that this culture exists will
be handled in the third section). In the run up to the Iraq War, Kahl points
out that

every
potential target was vetted by judge advocates for compliance with the Law of
War before it got on the list, and then vetted again after the list was
complete. Certain operations directed against Saddam Hussein’s regime were
deemed off limits if they targeted civilians or risked producing
disproportionate damage to civilians and civilian infrastructure. Early in the
planning process, the Pentagon drew up “no-strike” lists that included schools,
mosques, sensitive cultural sites, hospitals, water treatment facilities, power
plants, and other elements of the civilian infrastructure (p.16)

These efforts have even been
noted by Human Rights Watch. In their report on the
invasion stage of the Iraq War concluded that ‘U.S.-led Coalition forces took
precautions to spare civilians and, for the most part, made efforts to uphold
their legal obligations’ (p.5) The HRW report goes on to list worries in the
targeting of dual-use buildings, particularly media buildings but that remains
their main conclusion (p.54).

Even after the invasion stage,
U.S military policy attempts to mitigate against civilian casualties. Kahl
notes that before targeting, there is a standard ‘collateral damage estimation
method’ (CDEM) which involves assessing the target’s military use, alternatives
in terms of weaponry and attack, the number of civilians in the area that are
likely to be killed and then authorisation from senior personnel. During air
phase of combat in Iraq, each target ‘had been vetted by dedicated intelligence
officers and reviewed three or four times by judge advocates for potential Law
of War violations’ (p.18).

Authorisation is required for
operations which lead to ‘high collateral damage.’ Where this was the case, the
military took steps to avoid civilian casualties – for example through carrying
out operations at times civilian numbers were low. And, unsurprisingly, it
worked: both a ‘study by Human Rights Watch and a RAND study commissioned by
the U.S. Air Force suggest that there were not significant numbers of civilian
casualties from preplanned strikes’ (p.18). This same policy is reflected in
U.S rules of engagement and unplanned operations: everything from surveillance
drones going ahead to identify civilians to the policy of warning shots. General
McChrystal enhanced these rules in Afghanistan. As the Los Angeles Timesreported, 'commanders could not fire on buildings or other sites where
they had reason to think civilians might be present unless their own forces
were in imminent danger of being overrun.’

Further indirect evidence is
provided by the fact that the military does not use artillery systems in urban
centres. As ‘artillery systems have a large radius of destruction’ firing them
would lead to a higher loss of civilian life - which is why it is avoided
(p.20). Kahl goes through countless ‘mitigation techniques’ – this covers minor
things like avoiding operations during the day, different attack angles to
avoid civilian areas, giving pre-warning to civilians etc. etc.

It might be said that all of this
is propaganda, some chump academics got fooled into printing the faux
procedures and studies into compliance. This would be an error as it’s simply
too farfetched to suggest so: we see these procedures play out not just in the
numbers, correspondent accounts, rules of engagement, weaponry use and peer
reviewed studies – but from accounts where they are simply mentioned as an
after-thought. Here are a few of my
favourite examples:

1.President Obama was presented with several plans
for knocking Bin Laden off when his hideout was discovered. One of the plans
included using ‘a pair of B-2 bombers to drop “a few dozen 2,000-pound bombs”
on the compound.’ As Spencer Ackerman (who has recently deservedly moved to The Guardian) noted
‘the plan was called off, for [inter alia] fear of civilian casualties’

2.In 2007, the U.S thought it had located Bin
Laden. The New York Timesreported that ‘The military set into motion one of the largest
strike missions of its kind, with long-range bombers, attack helicopters,
artillery and commandos.’ The strike was called off, not only because of doubts
about intelligence but because of ‘concerns about civilian casualties from the
bombs.’

3.This one isn’t from the U.S military but it’s
still a favourite of mine because it shows that Seamus Milne is brazen with his
sources. Milne, in an attempt to malign the British military linked to a
database of UK drone usage in order to show how they “deliver
death and destruction in Afghanistan”. That database actually showed constantsuspension of military operations where even a single civilian life was in danger.

Given the data, procedures,
studies, weaponry use etc., is it likely that these accounts are false? Before
moving on to the final section, I want to discount one prominent example.
‘Collateral Murder’ was perhaps one Wikileaks’ first big exposes – and it is
claimed to support the meme that I am arguing against - except it supports what
I’m saying. Here is what Julian Assange said
when confronted with the fact that there were men with AK47s and RPGs in the
group on the Colbert Report:

Colbert: What were these men doing in the streets carrying rifles and rocket
propelled grenades?

Assange: ...The permission to
engage was given before the word RPG was ever used.

This is misleading for several reasons. First, in the first few minutes of the
video, several men are identified as having AK47s and “weapons” (at 00:27). It was then that permission to engage was
sought – and only then. Second, there are good reasons for thinking that the
reference to “weapons” was a reference to RPGs. U.S military personnel ask over
the radio who requested permission to engage and Hotel Crazyhorse One Eight responded:

I just also
wanted to make sure you knew that we had a guy with an RPG cropping round the
corner getting ready to fire on your location. That's why we ah, requested
permission to engage (15:28).

There had been a fire-fight in
the area (something Assange tries to downplay by calling it a “small-arms
skirmish”) – why wouldn’t you request permission to engage with these
combatants? Civilians were killed but as collateral damage, they were not
targeted and it does not show – in any sense – “murder”. It is a video of
military personnel following procedures and engaging combatants. How
wide-spread is this commitment to not killing civilians? The evidence above
indicates that it’s extremely widespread but there is one further which, when
taken with all of the information so far given, confirms the argument I’m
making:

4 percent of
soldiers and 7 percent of Marines reported unnecessarily hitting or kicking a
non-combatant, and 5 percent of soldiers and 7 percent of Marines reported a
willingness to ignore ROE to accomplish a mission (Kahl, p.33)

These figures are too high but
they at least go to show that the procedures outlined above are internalised by
more than 93% of military personnel. And sure, it’s a survey of the soldiers -
that comes with all the disadvantages of polls you learned in your sociology
class. But again, given all this
information, isn’t it likely that the gist of what it conveys is true?

Responses to norm violations

This is a good point to point out
what I am categorically not saying: I am not saying that the U.S always adheres
to the procedures given above. The U.S military falls short of them – while the
US military is reluctant to use artillery in residential areas, it has used
them (they are still directed at military targets but just placed in
residential areas). Human Rights Watch makes an arguable – but still convincing
- case that the use of other weapons would be more proportionate (see p.91-2 for a
criticism of British military). Members of the military have engaged in
interpreting merely suspicious activity as hostile – Kahl notes that the use of
a phone has led to engagement (p.25).

But two points should be
emphasised. Firstly, not meeting the standards admits that that the standard,
the policy is not wanton murder. Indeed, many of these cases can be justified
on the basis of the ‘fog of war.’ Second, the response of authorities showed is vital. The responses – listed by
Kahl - are varied: that particular problem with artillery was rectified through
technological advancements; after a HRW report into the use of checkpoints,
procedures were quickly changes (p.27); the restrictions of the rules of
engagement (listed above).

(i) Investigations;
where there is a civilian death or other ‘escalation of force’ (I think in a
non-planned attack) there will usually
be an AR 15-6 Investigation. The American Civil Liberties Union has obtained
many of these
AR 15-6 investigations through freedom of information requests. There are
far too many to go through each one of them – but the overwhelming majority
show proper practices were employed: many involve civilians ignoring warnings; activity
that a reasonable person would think makes them a combatant. Don’t take my word
for it – read through a random sample of the summaries given by the ACLU.

The reason I’m not going to go
through them in detail (aside from the sheer volume which only covers 2004-6) is
because the simple fact these investigations exist is sufficiently indicative
of the aforementioned military culture. To repeat: given the low numbers, all
the military conduct listed above, the attitudes of military personnel – doesn’t
the fact these investigations exist say something? It is too time-consuming and
inconsistent with all of the evidence to suggest this is merely lip service.

(ii) Prosecutions: This has proven to be an area the U.S is lacking and
the one that poses a challenge to my view. There have, of course, been several prominent
examples
of prosecutions – but as the Washington Postnotes

[In the period
between 2003-6 in Iraq] only 39 service members were formally accused in
connection with the deaths of 20 Iraqis from 2003 to early this year.
Twenty-six of the 39 troops were initially charged with murder, negligent
homicide or manslaughter; 12 of them ultimately served prison time for any
offense (noted in Kahl, p.35).

Some of this can be partly
explained by the simple standards we expect in prosecutions: beyond reasonable
doubt and regular problems with prosecuting individuals. A good comparison to make that would mitigate the shock of these figures would be rape statistics in Western countries. But then there are specific problems in the military context. As the New York Timesnotes, ‘collecting
physical evidence and finding witnesses can be difficult because the killings
often occur in unstable and dangerous areas, and the cases often come to light
only after time has passed.’ In Iraq and Afghanistan, the practices of quick
burial mean that autopsies cannot be carried out which places
further burdens on prosecuting individuals. Witnesses will often refuse
to give testimonies if it involves travelling (despite financial assistance
with travelling).

But this cannot be a full explanation. The
aforementioned Washington Post article
contains a quote from Major serving in the military which isn’t picked up by
Kahl: “I think there were many other engagements that should have been
[criminally] investigated, definitely.” It should be emphasised that this is
problem is not limited to killing civilians but goes to the core of any
prosecution in the military [2]. Both Kahl’s paper and the WaPo’s report were
published pre-2007, it is not clear how much the situation has changed since
then. For the UK’s position see [3].

Conclusion

The idea
that the U.S military is killing civilians left, right and centre is wrong. The
idea that the U.S. military does not have sufficient regard to the protection
of civilians is wrong. The only conclusion that comes from the fact that the
numbers are low, the studies, the whole host of measures taken, that the rules
of engagement are drummed in, that they spend an inordinate amount of time
investigating these events is that the U.S does have sufficient regard to
civilians. There are improvements that should be made – not least with
prosecutions – but even without them, the argument still stands. Anti-imperialists
will try to point to individual examples whilst ignoring the trend outlined
above – and it is that trend which tells what U.S policy really is.