Ways to Maneuver on North Korea

July 13, 2017

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President Trump is learning the complexity of contending with North Korea’s commitment to becoming a nuclear power.CreditCreditAl Drago for The New York Times

To the Editor:

“The Way Forward on North Korea” (editorial, July 5) points out that to call on China to rein in North Korea is a Big Ask. But that does not mean that China would refuse to respond if the United States offered more than appreciation and vague trade deals in exchange.

The Big Ask calls for a Big Give. China has a great interest in gaining assurances that if the North Korean regime collapses and the two Koreas are uniﬁed, the United States will not move its troops to the border with China.

This is a no-cost or low-cost “give” for Washington because once the North Korean nuclear program folds or the regime collapses, the United States would have little reason to move its troops north.

Similarly, the United States could promise to remove the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense missile defense system, which it is installing in South Korea. We do not need this system if the North Korean nuclear program is ended.

In addition, the United States might agree to stop the almost daily reconnaissance ﬂights up and down China’s coast lines, which Beijing ﬁnds very troubling and are of little strategic value.

Providing China with strong incentives to curb North Korea is a not a substitute for direct talks, which you favor. On the contrary, it will make them more likely to succeed.

AMITAI ETZIONI, WASHINGTON

The writer, a professor of international relations at George Washington University, is the author of “Avoiding War With China.”

David C. Kang claims that nuclear weapons are great for deterrence and that deterrence works both ways. But we should not bank on their sufficing, on their own, to prevent war. We have much to learn from confidence-building measures adopted during the Cold War to diminish risks of nuclear annihilation from needless provocation and accidental war.

In 1986, 35 governments, including those of NATO and Warsaw Pact members, meeting in Stockholm, pledged to observe a set of such measures that included announcing military exercises and troop movements in Europe ahead of time and accepting mandatory on-site inspection.

It took years to negotiate this agreement; it is urgent to undertake similar negotiations to reduce the current risks of nuclear conflagration.

SISSELA BOK, CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

The writer, a philosopher and ethicist, is the author of “A Strategy for Peace: Human Values and the Threat of War.”

To counter the threat posed by North Korean weapons and forces, including nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles, the United States already has in place the military strategy of nuclear deterrence through the threat of nuclear retaliation.

This deterrence strategy has been effective in protecting the United States and our allies against nuclear-armed potential aggressors far more powerful than North Korea — the Soviet Union/Russia and China. Moreover, North Korean leaders have been deterred from invading South Korea since the armistice of July 1953.

JEFFREY S. MILSTEIN, BURKE, VA.

The writer served for more than 20 years as a strategic and policy analyst and planner in the Defense and State Departments, and was an assistant professor of political science and international relations at Yale.