BONDCUBE: Files for Liquidation Three Months After LunchBROADCASTING SUPPORT: In Administration, 100 Job at RiskF G HAWKES: High Court bans directors of for 10 yearsFIMA CONSULTING: Director Banned For 13 Years For GBP1MM FraudLEHMAN COMMERCIAL: September 1 Proofs of Debt Deadline Set

Moody's has also assigned Counterparty Risk Assessments (CRAssessments) of B1(cr)/Not-Prime(cr), in line with its new bankrating methodology.

Moody's rating action is driven by: (1) the deterioration inCredins Bank's asset quality primarily due to its concentratedexposures to the construction and real estate sector, whichcontinue to perform poorly, and subsequent pressure onprofitability stemming from high provisioning requirements; and(2) modest capitalization available to absorb losses, in thecontext of the low coverage of non-performing loans (NPLs) byloan loss reserves.

The stable outlook takes into the bank's comfortable liquiditybuffers, solid deposit funding structure and high probability ofgovernment support in case of need.

RATINGS RATIONALE

-- REAL ESTATE EXPOSURES PRESSURE ASSET QUALITY AND PROFITABILITY

The main driver for the rating action is Credins Bank's weakeningasset quality metrics owing primarily to its exposures to theconstruction and real estate sector. Moody's notes that althoughthe pace of growth in problematic exposures has eased in 2015,Credins Bank's impaired loans (defined as past due by more than90 days) as a percentage to gross loans ratio grew to 22.9% as atMarch 2015, compared to 21.8% ratio as of end-2014 and 16.5% asof end- 2013.

Moody's notes that Credins Bank remains exposed to a few largecustomers in the construction and real-estate sector, whichcontinue to perform poorly and limit the bank's ability to reducethe stock of non-performing loans (NPLs). The construction andreal estate sector, which accounted for approximately 19% of thebank's gross loans in December 2014, remains under pressuremainly due to supply and demand imbalances leading to cash flowproblems for related corporates. While GDP grew by 1.7% in 2014,construction was the only sector contributing negatively toAlbania's economic growth.

Moody's notes that the high stock of impaired loans is alsoresulting in increased provisioning needs and dampening Credinsbank's profitability. According to audited FYE2014 financialstatements, provisioning expenses accounted for 2.9% of thebank's gross loans, well above the pre-2008 levels of less than0.5%, absorbing 79% of pre-provision profits. Moody's expectsbottom-line profitability to remain under pressure over thecoming quarters as the bank improves the coverage of its impairedloans by booking additional provisions. As of end-March 2015, thecoverage of impaired loans by loan loss reserves was modest at53%, according to unaudited Q1 2015 financial statements of thebank.

-- MODEST CAPITALISATION AVAILABLE TO ABSORB LOSSES

Credins Bank's capital adequacy ratio stood at 15.2% as of end-2014, slightly above the 14% regulatory minimum. While Moody'sunderstands that the bank plans to raise capital in H2 2015,through a rights issue to existing shareholders, it expects thatCredins Bank's loss absorption capacity will remain modest in thecontext of its low provisioning coverage. Moody's estimates thatuncovered NPLs as a percentage of shareholders' equity rose to ahigh 89% as of year-end 2014, from 39% at year-end 2013.

-- SOUND LIQUIDITY BUFFERS AND HIGH LIKELIHOOD OF PUBLIC SUPPORT CONTINUE TO UNDERPIN THE RATINGS

The B2 deposit rating and corresponding stable outlook also takeinto account the bank's comfortable liquidity buffers, soliddeposit funding structure and high probability of governmentsupport in case of need.

Despite the aforementioned negative drivers, Moody's alsorecognizes that the bank's standalone profile continues to besupported by sound liquidity buffers and by its well-diversifiedfunding base, sourced primarily from individuals. Moody's notesthat the bank benefits from a growing deposit franchise -- withdeposits accounting for 85% of total assets as of end-2014 --which also underpin its comfortable liquidity levels, with liquidassets to total asset estimated at around 35% as at end-2014.

Moody's also considers that there is a high likelihood ofgovernment support for Credins Bank's rated deposits, underpinnedby the bank's relative importance to the domestic financialsystem with a 10% market share of deposits. Thus Moody'scontinues to incorporate one notch of government support in thebank's B2 long-term deposit ratings.

-- COUNTERPARTY RISK ASSESSMENT

Moody's has also assigned a CR Assessment of B1(cr)/Not-Prime(cr)to Credins Bank, which, taking into account our Loss GivenFailure framework and the same extent of government supportuplift as applied to deposit ratings, is positioned two notchesabove the bank's Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment (BCA). As aresult, the CR Assessment for Credins Bank is one notch higherthan its deposit ratings, reflecting Moody's view thatauthorities are likely to honor the operating obligations the CRAssessment refers to in order to preserve a bank's criticalfunctions and reduce potential for contagion.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'BB-' long-term corporatecredit rating on HEP and S&P's 'BB-' issue rating on its seniorunsecured debt.

The outlook revision mirrors that on the sovereign rating. Itreflects S&P's view that the Croatian government's ability toprovide support to HEP in a financial stress scenario couldweaken. S&P considers HEP to be a government-related entity(GRE), and believe there is a "high" likelihood that the Croatiangovernment would provide extraordinary support to HEP in theevent of financial distress. According to S&P's GRE criteria, adowngrade of Croatia (BB/Negative/B) would result in a one notchdowngrade of HEP, all else being equal.

S&P bases its ratings on HEP on its stand-alone credit profile(SACP), which S&P continues to assess at 'b+', reflecting S&P'sview of its "fair" business risk profile and "aggressive"financial risk profile. In accordance with S&P's criteria forGREs, S&P's view of a "high" likelihood of extraordinarygovernment support is based on S&P's assessment of HEP's:

-- "Very important" role for the energy sector and the broader economy in Croatia, along with S&P's view that the dividend payouts boost Croatia's state budget. Recently, the Croatian government has also set an obligation for HEP wherein HEP has to provide electricity as a universal and guaranteed service to households in Croatia, and a guaranteed service to the commercial customers;

-- "Strong" link with the Croatian government, which is the sole shareholder and is actively involved in defining HEP's strategy, including payouts and reinvestments. Also, the government has a legal framework that gives it the ability to intervene in the managerial decisions of the company.

S&P's view of HEP's business risk profile as "fair" isconstrained by what S&P sees as high regulatory risk. This stemsfrom unpredictable tariff setting absent a regulatory trackrecord and an established framework. This results in what S&Pviews as HEP's relatively weaker competitive position compared tomany regulated utility peers in Western Europe. S&P believes theCroatian government's track record of adjusting tariffs has beeninconsistent in the past. Nevertheless, S&P believes the newEnergy Act, which has granted full tariff-setting powers toCroatia's independent energy regulator, could reduce the risk ofpolitical interference over the medium term, although theregulator has yet to establish a track record.

S&P views HEP's profitability as below average and relativelyvolatile because of its reliance on hydrological output,fluctuating commodity prices, and the need to procure electricityabroad to meet Croatia's needs. These constraints are somewhatoffset by HEP's de facto monopoly position in Croatia'selectricity market along the value chain. Furthermore, HEP hasan important role as a public provider to tariff customers whohave not exercised their right to switch supplier.

HEP's "aggressive" financial risk profile is based on S&P'sforecasts that it will generate negative discretionary cash flowsafter 2015, following two strong years on the back of veryfavorable hydrological conditions. Despite HEP's large cash flowdeficit constraints, S&P views its credit metrics as stabilizingat adjusted funds from operations (FFO) to debt of more than 30%.S&P uses the standard volatility table because it views HEP'sregulatory framework as relatively unpredictable.

HEP's credit metrics will benefit from declining electricityimport prices and decreasing procurement costs for natural gas,as HEP has renegotiated its gas supply contracts. However,credit metrics are exposed to the uncertainty of the potentialextent of regulatory tariff reduction. S&P also sees the balancesheet weakening if HEP decides to invest in the new thermal powerplant, Plomin. S&P might consolidate the investment if HEP bearsthe economic burden from this investment through power purchaseagreements or any other direct or reputational links.

The negative outlook on HEP reflects that on the sovereign andthe possibility that if S&P was to downgrade Croatia it couldlead S&P to lower the rating on HEP.

Under S&P's criteria for GREs, a downward revision of the stand-alone credit profile (SACP) by one notch is unlikely to affectthe rating on HEP, all else being equal. That said, a one notchlowering of the rating on Croatia would result in a similarrating action on HEP.

S&P would consider revising downward the SACP if HEP's creditmetrics weaken, depending on if and how HEP invests in the largescale thermal power plant, Plomin. S&P could also reassess itsview of the "high" likelihood of extraordinary state support thatS&P currently assumes if there is no evidence of governmentsupport for the project.

Negative pressure on the SACP could build if HEP's liquidityposition deteriorates -- for example, if the negativediscretionary cash flow exceeds our base-case scenario due tomore ambitious investment levels or worse market conditions thanS&P currently anticipates. S&P would also views covenantbreaches as weakening HEP's credit quality, although S&P viewsthese as unlikely at present. Equally, the SACP could come underpressure if the company resumes paying dividends to thegovernment, which S&P do not consider likely in the context ofthe company's large investment needs. The SACP might alsodeteriorate if HEP's business risk profile weakens, say from aloss of retail market share due to competition or delayed orinsufficient tariff increases.

An upward revision of HEP's SACP would depend on a continued,sustainable improvement in the company's liquidity profile to alevel that S&P considers "adequate" under its criteria. S&Pwould take a positive view of:

The CreditWatch placement reflects S&P's view that IGSS'liquidity could have weakened in the past few months. S&Punderstands that the company used a meaningful portion ofavailable liquidity sources to service its debt maturities in thesecond quarter of 2015 and its capital structure could haveshifted toward shorter-term financing.

S&P understands that the company is currently negotiating torefinance its short-term maturities. If successful, this couldallow the company to restore its liquidity to "adequate" asdefined in S&P's criteria. That said, S&P do not expect IGSS tobe unable to secure the rollover of its short-term bank lines;rather, S&P sees a risk of a significant shift toward short-termfinancing in its capital structure, which might not becommensurate with the current ratings.

S&P also believes that EBITDA and cash flow generation in thefirst half of 2015 might have been weaker than S&P's previousexpectations, thereby leading to increased leverage and creatingmore pressure on liquidity. Although S&P generally thinks thatthe operating environment for Russian oilfield services companiesis better than for its global peers, as Russian oil companieshave not meaningfully lowered their capital spending, there isstill significant pressure on operating profits. S&P believesthat challenging industry conditions are set to continue in themedium term, which could further weaken IGSS' leverage andliquidity.

S&P assess the company's business risk profile as "weak." S&Pbases its assessment on the company's fairly small size, itsparticipation in the highly cyclical, competitive, and nicheseismic industry, and its reliance on the exploration spending ofoil and gas companies, which S&P sees limiting its pricing power.On the upside, international players have a relatively limitedpresence in Russia. IGSS has leading positions in this smallmarket, with more advanced technologies than local competitors,thanks to support from its minority shareholder, Schlumberger.

S&P continues to view GEOTECH Seismic Services as a coresubsidiary of IGSS under S&P's criteria. S&P considers that itis an integral part of IGSS' business, generating a large chunkof total EBITDA. S&P therefore continues to equalize its globalscale rating on the subsidiary with that on IGSS.

The CreditWatch placement reflects the lack of visibility withregard to IGSS' liquidity with a potential shift toward short-term financing, which might not be commensurate with the currentrating. S&P aims to resolve the CreditWatch in the next threemonths.

S&P could lower the global scale rating by one notch if thecompany does not improve the duration of its debt by raisinglonger-term financing. Equally, S&P could lower the rating if itsees a risk of debt to EBITDA rising higher than 5x on asustainable basis and FFO to debt falling below 10%.

S&P could affirm the global scale rating at 'B' if the companymanages to improve its liquidity by securing long-term financing.To support a 'B' rating, S&P would also expect leverage to remainat below 5x.

Ship & Bunker relates that the law firm said the decisionhighlights that "protection under national insolvency law may besought for the very purpose of overriding contractual rights andobligations."

The OW entity was said to have been in the money at the time ofits bankruptcy and has commenced numerous actions against itscounterparties in Denmark, including SwissMarine, according toShip & Bunker.

However by the time the Danish Proceedings had been brought,SwissMarine had already commenced proceedings in England fordeclaratory relief against OW, declaring that it had no liabilityto OW under the 2002 ISDA Master Agreement, which was governed byEnglish law, Ship & Bunker relates.

The report says SwissMarine argued that the anti-suit injunctionwas necessary because OW's Danish proceedings were in breach ofthe exclusive jurisdiction agreement under the ISDA Agreement.

However, the judge ruled that the ISDA wording could not havebeen intended by either party to amount to an abandonment of theprotection of their national insolvency regimes, the reportnotes.

Indeed, much clearer wording would be need to have that effect,they said, and ultimately OW was entitled to bring proceedings ina non-exclusive jurisdiction, Ship & Bunker relays.

"This decision highlights that in the event of insolvency of oneof the parties, the insolvent estate may nevertheless seek torely on its own national insolvency rules and bring proceedingsbefore its own courts, regardless of the contractual positionbetween the parties," the report quotes Reed Smith as saying.

"Protection under national insolvency law may be sought for thevery purpose of overriding contractual rights and obligations.Whilst the English Courts may be prepared to grant declarationsof non-liability in such circumstances and may refuse torecognise a foreign insolvency judgment, anti-suit injunctionsare unlikely to be available to put an end to the proceedingsbrought for relief under a party's national insolvency rules.

"Indeed, the English court stated in this case that, while aDanish insolvency judgment would not be recognised in England, itmay be recognised elsewhere, and the judge appeared to acceptthat this was a legitimate purpose of OW's pursuit."

Earlier this month, it was reported that legal disputes resultingfrom the fallout from last year's OW Bunker bankruptcy could helpclarify U.S. law as to whether it is the bunker broker or thephysical supplier who has the maritime lien, Ship & Bunker adds.

In addition, S&P lowered its long-term issue rating on IKKS'EUR33 million super senior revolving credit facility (RCF), whichhas been downsized from EUR40 million as part of the transaction,to 'B+' from 'BB-'. The recovery rating on the RCF remains at'2', reflecting S&P's expectation of substantial (70%-90%)recovery, in the higher half of the range, in the event of apayment default.

S&P also lowered its long-term issue rating on IKKS' EUR320million senior secured notes to 'B' from 'B+'. The recoveryrating on these notes remains at '4', reflecting S&P'sexpectation of average (30%-50%) recovery, in the higher half ofthe range, in the event of a payment default.

The downgrade follows IKKS' announcement, earlier this month,that it has been acquired by private-equity firm LBO France, andreflects the increase in the company's Standard & Poor's adjustedleverage, post transaction. The acquisition has been financedwith a combination of equity, a vendor loan, and shareholderinstruments, issued by the acquiring Holding IKKS Invest, whichsits above HoldIKKS -- the bond issuer -- in the corporatestructure. S&P notes that the EUR320 million senior secured notesdue 2021 will remain in place. S&P calculates its Standard &Poor's-adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio at around 6.3x in 2015(including the EUR40 million vendor loan and the EUR94 millionconvertible bonds granted by the shareholders that S&P considersas debt under its criteria), compared with S&P's expectation of5.4x before the transaction. Consequently, S&P no longer viewsIKKS' financial risk profile in the stronger end of its "highlyleveraged" category.

The rating action also encompasses S&P's view of the ownershipand control of the company by a financial sponsor, LBO France.In S&P's view, in the absence of amortizing debt in the capitalstructure, and given the investment strategy of the mainshareholder, IKKS' deleveraging potential from the closing of thetransaction will depend on its ability to increase EBITDA and onits financial policy under its new owner.

S&P acknowledges that the amount of debt requiring cash interestpayments will likely be unchanged after the transaction, giventhe cash-preserving characteristics of the vendor loan andshareholder instruments. This supports positive free operatingcash flow (FOCF) generation and a funds from operations (FFO)-to-cash interest coverage ratio in the 3.0x-3.5x range, under S&P'sbase case scenario for the next 12 months. S&P estimates thatIKKS should be able to generate at least EUR10 million in FOCF in2015 and 2016.

S&P continues to assess IKKS' business risk profile as "fair,"although at the low end of this category. S&P's assessmentprimarily incorporates its view of the retailer's exposure to theapparel industry -- which S&P assess as cyclical and competitive,with limited barriers to entry -- and to fashion risk. Itfurther reflects the company's relatively limited size andgeographic exposure to France, where it generates about 80% ofits revenues. Additionally, S&P sees some execution risks inIKKS' international expansion strategy, although S&P understandsthat part of this expansion will be in countries where IKKS isalready present.

These weaknesses are partially offset by IKKS' diversification interms of distribution channels, brands, and target customers.S&P understands that the company's positioning in premium urbancasual wear somewhat reduces fashion risk. The company's retailstrategy is partially based on an "affiliate" business model.S&P views this favorably as it reduces operating leverage bytransferring some fixed costs, such as staff and rent, topartners. The company's business risk profile is also supportedby its profitability, which S&P continues to assess as "aboveaverage" under its criteria.

In S&P's base case, it assumes:

-- French real GDP growth of 1.3% in 2015 and 1.6% in 2016, compared with 0.2% in 2014, and a recovery in private consumption on the back of improved purchasing power, due to low inflation and reduced tax pressure.

-- Low double-digit revenue growth in 2015 and 2016, primarily on new store openings. Stable reported EBITDA margin at about 20% over S&P's 2015-2017 forecast period, because S&P anticipates that the positive scale effect will be offset by higher marketing and communication expenses.

-- Capital expenditures (capex) in the EUR20 million-EUR25 million range.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measuresfor IKKS:

-- Adjusted debt to EBITDA of about 6.3x in 2015, declining to about 5.9x in 2016. Adjusted FFO to debt in the 5%-10% range in 2015 and 2016. FFO cash interest coverage in the 3.0x-3.5x range in 2015 and 2016.

-- Reported FOCF of about EUR10 million in 2015 and 2016.

The stable rating outlook reflects S&P's expectation that IKKS'future earnings growth, fueled by positive trading and thesuccessful execution of the company's store network expansionunder its new owner, should enable the company to moderatelyreduce leverage post transaction. S&P also anticipates that IKKSwill likely report an adjusted FFO cash interest coverage ratioin the 3.0x-3.5x range and generate positive FOCF in 2015 and2016.

Importantly, the outlook incorporates S&P's expectations that newownership will not result in significant changes or disruption inIKKS' management team, strategy, financial policy, or ability toexpand operations.

S&P could lower the ratings if IKKS' operating performancesignificantly deviated from our expectations. This might leadS&P to revise its assessment of the company's business riskprofile downward to "weak," which could raise the credit ratiorequirements for staying at the same rating level. S&P couldalso consider a downgrade if IKKS failed to generate FOCF or ifS&P saw marked weakening in the company's liquidity. An adjustedFFO cash interest coverage ratio decreasing toward 1.5x couldalso put pressure on the ratings.

S&P considers a positive rating action as unlikely in the comingquarters, given IKKS' highly leveraged capital structure. S&Pcould raise the ratings on IKKS if it projected that its adjusteddebt to EBITDA would decrease toward 5x and if S&P perceived thatthe risk of releveraging is low, based on the company's financialpolicy and S&P's view of LBO France's financial risk appetite. Apositive rating action would also hinge on S&P's anticipation ofsustainably positive like-for-like revenue growth, EBITDA marginthat is at least stable or widening, and sizable FOCF generation.

Tetu editor-in-chief Yannick Barbe said the four-monthobservation period allowing potential buyers to step in, grantedJune 1, had been shortened "due to the lack of seriouscandidates", WWD relates.

Mr. Barbe, as cited by WWD, said layoff procedures for the 10employees of the general interest gay magazine, including 5editorial positions, are to commence.

Mr. Barbe blames the closure on what he perceives as anunderestimation of the gay market's potential in France, wheresame-sex marriages have been legal since 2013, WWD discloses. Hesaid another factor is the extreme difficulty for an independentpublication to attract advertisers, WWD notes.

Jean-Jacques Augier, a businessman who was French PresidentFranáois Hollande's campaign treasurer in 2012, bought loss-making Tetu from Pierre Berge in 2013, WWD recounts.

According to WWD, the magazine is estimated to have reduced itsannual losses to around EUR1.1 million in 2014, or US$1.5 millionat average exchange, and was expected to post losses of aroundEUR600,000, or US$652,026 at current exchange, in 2015.

Insolvency administrator has just decided to apply for revocationof admission for trading on Prime Standard of Frankfurt StockExchange, Reuters relates.

The report says admission of shares for trading on RegulatedMarket (General Standard) should remain unaffected.

Joyou AG on May 21, 2015, filed an application for the opening ofinsolvency proceedings with the competent local court(Amtsgericht) of Hamburg following the existing over-indebtednessof the Company. "Due to the necessity to completely write down,the Company's participation in Hong Kong Zhongyu SanitaryTechnology Limited as well as existing guarantee obligations ofthe Company in the aggregate amount of US$300 million withrespect to the credit facility in the amount of US$300 milliongranted by creditors to Joyou Hong Kong, the Company is over-indebted," Joyou said.

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GREECE: MPs Back Third Bailout Program to Clear Way for Talks-------------------------------------------------------------Helena Smith and Graeme Wearden at The Guardian report thatGreece's prime minister easily won a crucial vote on a thirdbailout program for the debt-stricken nation early on July 23,hours after the European Central Bank infused cash-starved Greekbanks with further emergency liquidity.

According to The Guardian, a total of 230 MPs backed the economicreforms program demanded by Greece's creditors, while 63 votedagainst the plan at the late-night vote.

Alexis Tsipras again faced down rebels within his own party whooppose a third bailout, The Guardian relays. Thirty-six SyrizaMPs either voted no or abstained, three fewer than at a similarvote last week, The Guardian discloses.

The vote clears the way for Greece to begin formal talks with itslenders on a three-year package of loans that could be worthEUR86 billion, The Guardian notes.

Before the vote, Mr. Tsipras had urged MPs to support thebailout, which will save Greece from bankruptcy and preserve itsplace in the eurozone, The Guardian relays.

Mr. Tsipras told MPs, "We made difficult choices and now we mustall adapt to the new situation," repeating that he did not agreewith many of the reforms but would do his best to implement them,The Guardian relates.

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BALLYRIDER LIMITED: Court Removes Accountant as Liquidator----------------------------------------------------------Limerick Post reports that Anthony J. Fitzpatrick of Fitzpatrick& Co, Clonmoney House, Newenham Street, Limerick, who wasappointed as a liquidator of a failed business has been removedfrom his position by a High Court judge in the first ruling ofits kind from an Irish court.

Mr. Fitzpatrick, a Limerick accountant, was removed by JusticeRoderick Murphy from his position where he was charged with thewind up of Ballyrider Limited, according to Limerick Post.

The report notes that the High Court petition was brought by theoffice of the Revenue Commissioners after they said they lostconfidence in the manner which Mr. Fitzpatrick was carrying outhis duties.

The report relates that Justice Murphy found that the liquidationhad not been conducted in an efficient and cost effective mannerand that the evidence suggested the Limerick accountant has aflawed understanding of the role and duties of a liquidator.

The report notes that Mr. Fitzpatrick was appointed voluntaryliquidator to the business, which included the ownership of theHazel Hotel in Monasterevin in County Kildare, on November 19,2010.

Ballyrider Limited was set up on Monday August 17, 1987, in Co.Kildare.

The company's current directors John Kelly and Margaret Kellyhave been the directors of two other Irish companies betweenthem; both of which are now closed. Ballyrider Limited has twoshareholders, the report discloses.

Following the hearing at the High Court, Justice Murphy foundthat given the evidence of the petition put forward, the concernsof Revenue were both genuine and warranted, the report relays.

Issues surrounding costs of the liquidation and costs incurredwere highlighted to have exposed the liquidation fund and thatMr. Fitzpatrick could not therefore remain in place as liquidatorto the failed firm, the report notes.

In his ruling, Justice Murphy said that he was aware the effectthe removal would have on Mr. Fitzpatrick's professional positionbut that such damage flowed directly from his ownineffectiveness, the report adds.

Duchess V CLO B.V., issued in December 2005, is a collateralizedloan obligation (CLO) backed by a portfolio of mostly high-yieldsenior secured European loans managed by Babson CapitalManagement (UK) Limited. The transaction's reinvestment periodended in February 2011.

RATINGS RATIONALE

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes arethe result of the substantial deleveraging since last ratingaction in November 2014 which was based on September 2014 data.

Class A-1 and Class B notes have paid down in aggregate byapproximately EUR 57.9 million since the last rating action, as aresult of which over-collateralization (OC) ratios of all classesof rated notes have increased significantly. As per the trusteereport dated May 2015, Class B, Class C, and Class D OC ratiosare reported at 4562.8%, 258.2%, and 128.7% compared to September2014 levels of 233.5%, 156.2% and 115.5%, respectively.

The ratings of the Combination Notes address the repayment of theRated Balance on or before the legal final maturity. For Class O,the 'Rated Balance' is equal at any time to the principal amountof the Combination Note on the Issue Date increased by the ratedcoupon of 0.25% per annum, accrued on the Rated Balance on thepreceding payment date minus the aggregate of all payments madefrom the issue date to such date, either through interest orprincipal payments. The Rated Balance may not necessarilycorrespond to the outstanding notional amount reported by thetrustee.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weightedaverage recovery rate, are based on its published methodology andcould differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its basecase, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having aperforming par of EUR66.73 million and GBP15.18 million,defaulted par of EUR1.66 million, a weighted average defaultprobability of 29.4% (consistent with a WARF of 4550 over aweighted average life of 3.57 years), a weighted average recoveryrate upon default of 48.46% for a Aaa liability target rating, adiversity score of 13 and a weighted average spread of 3.78%.Assets denominated in GBP are hedged by a GBP/EUR macro swapwhich has been modelled in Moody's analysis.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of thecollateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life ofthe collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate onfuture defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assetsin the collateral pool. For a Aaa liability target rating,Moody's assumed a recovery of 50% of the 95.6% of the portfolioexposed to first-lien senior secured corporate assets upondefault and of 15% of the remaining non-first-lien loan corporateassets upon default. In each case, historical and marketperformance and a collateral manager's latitude to tradecollateral are also relevant factors. Moody's incorporates thesedefault and recovery characteristics of the collateral pool intoits cash flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as afunction of the target rating of each CLO liability it isanalyzing.

Moody's notes that shortly after this analysis was completed, theJune 2015 trustee report has been issued. There is no materialchange in key portfolio metrics such as WARF, diversity score,and weighted average spread as well as OC ratios for Classes B, Cand D from their May 2015 levels.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's GlobalApproach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published inFebruary 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conductedsensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,for which it assumed a lower weighted average recovery rate forthe portfolio. Moody's ran a model in which it reduced theweighted average recovery rate by 5%; the model generated outputsthat were unchanged for Classes B and C, and within one notch ofthe base-case results for Class D.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomicuncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on thenote, in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in thegeneral economy. CLO notes' performance may also be impactedeither positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investmentstrategy and behavior and 2) divergence in the legalinterpretation of CDO documentation by different transactionalparties because of embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:

-- Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty inthis transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlyingportfolio, which can vary significantly depending on marketconditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.Amortization could accelerate as a consequence of high loanprepayment levels or collateral sales by the collateral manageror be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extendrestructurings. Fast amortization would usually benefit theratings of the notes beginning with the notes having the highestprepayment priority.

-- Around 19.6% of the collateral pool consists of debtobligations whose credit quality Moody's has assessed by usingcredit estimates. As part of its base case, Moody's has stressedlarge concentrations of single obligors bearing a credit estimateas described in "Updated Approach to the Usage of CreditEstimates in Rated Transactions," published in October 2009 andavailable athttp://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBC_120461

-- Recoveries on defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations intrustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes havedefaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-collateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries andthe manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaultedassets can also result in additional uncertainty. Moody'sanalysed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the marketprice or the recovery rate to account for potential volatility inmarket prices. Recoveries higher than Moody's expectations wouldhave a positive impact on the notes' ratings.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitlymodelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee'sconsiderations. These qualitative factors include the structuralprotections in the transaction, its recent performance given themarket environment, the legal environment, specific documentationfeatures, the collateral manager's track record and the potentialfor selection bias in the portfolio.

S&P's recovery ratings on unsecured debt issued by corporateentities that S&P rates 'BB-' or higher are generally capped at'3' to account for the risk that their recovery prospects are ata greater risk of being impaired by the issuance of additionalpriority or pari passu debt prior to default. S&P had previouslynot applied this cap to the EUR250 million senior unsecured notesgiven its valuation of GDTE, the amount of value available to theunsecured notes, and the entity's status as a joint venturewhich, in S&P's opinion, provided a measure of ring-fencing withregard to debt incurrence (as evidenced by the fact that theequity was not pledged), thereby affording a '2' recovery ratingto the notes. While S&P's valuation of GDTE has not declined,the company's June announcement that its joint-venture agreementwith Sumitomo Rubber Industries Ltd. would end (making GDTE awholly owned subsidiary of The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. whenthe dissolution is effective) and its decision to upsize GDTE'ssenior secured revolving credit facility effective May 2015(increased from EUR400 million to EUR550 million), thereforereducing the value available to the senior unsecured notes in theevent of a simulated default, have led S&P to apply the cap.GDTE's EUR250 million senior unsecured notes are guaranteed byGoodyear and its subsidiaries that guarantee Goodyear's notes.The guarantee lapses if the Goodyear notes are rated investmentgrade. S&P views these notes as structurally senior to the U.S.senior unsecured notes since they benefit from the aforementionedguarantees.

KOMPANIA WEGLOWA: Three Companies to Contribute to Bailout----------------------------------------------------------Agnieszka Barteczko and Adrian Krajewski at Reuters report thatPoland has persuaded at least three major companies to contributeto a bailout of troubled coal miner Kompania Weglowa, despitesome executives' misgivings about the commercial logic of gettinginvolved.

According to Reuters, sources with knowledge of the matter saidafter weeks of talks with more than a dozen firms it hoped wouldtake part in the rescue, government officials have receivedproposals from three: copper miner KGHM, utility PGE andchemicals producer Grupa Azoty.

The government, facing a tough re-election battle in October,cannot afford to let Kompania Weglowa go bankrupt because itdepends on votes from mining regions, but it is also barred byEuropean Union rules from giving state aid, Reuters notes.

The three companies preparing to take part in the rescue arestate-controlled, but a significant part of their equity is heldby private shareholders who want the firms to return profits anddividends, Reuters states.

KW, which is the EU's No.1 coal miner, and JSW, the bloc'sbiggest coking coal producer, are both facing insolvency, anoutcome which would anger politically-influential mining unionsin an election year, Reuters says.

To avoid that, Poland's treasury ministry has forged a specialfund whose function is in part to help the troubled state-runminers, Reuters discloses. It will have PLN6 billion (US$1.59billion) worth of assets, Reuters relays.

State bank BGK and its investment vehicle PIR are to investPLN1.5 billion in the fund by the end of August, Reutersdiscloses. The rest is supposed to come from major Polishcompanies, either in the form of cash or non-cash assets, Reutersnotes.

According to Reuters, sources close to companies in talks withthe government said PGE tentatively offered a combination of cashand its telecom arm Exatel as its contribution to the fund.

The sources, as cited by Reuters, said KGHM, Europe's No. 2copper producer, would offer spa resorts in Poland which arecontrolled by KGHM's investment fund for non-core assets. Azotywas also to offer assets, Reuters states.

The sources said that the negotiations were still underway andthat proposals from the companies could change, Reuters relays.

===============P O R T U G A L===============

GAMMA SOCIEDADE: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to B-(sf)--------------------------------------------------------------Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered and removed fromCreditWatch negative its credit rating on the class A notes GAMMASociedade de Titularizacao de Creditos, S.A.'s Atlantes MortgageNo. 2. At the same time, S&P has lowered its ratings on theclass B and C notes.

On Feb. 18, 2015, S&P placed on CreditWatch negative its ratingon the class A notes for counterparty reasons.

On June 9, 2015, S&P took various rating actions on certain U.K.and German commercial banks following the introduction of well-formed bank resolution frameworks in these countries, the ongoingregulatory impetus to have systemic banks hold sizeable buffersof bail-in capital that the authorities could use to recapitalizethem, and the associated reduced prospects for extraordinarygovernment support. S&P's rating actions included the loweringof its long-term issuer credit rating (ICR) on The Royal Bank ofScotland PLC (RBS), counterparty for Atlantes Mortgages No. 2.

This transaction features an amortizing reserve fund, whichcurrently represents 7.47% of the outstanding balance of thenotes.

Severe delinquencies of more than 90 days at 1.76% are on averagehigher for this transaction than our Portuguese RMBS index.Delinquencies of more than 90 days have decreased to 1.76% from1.95% since S&P's Dec. 22, 2014 review.

Defaults are defined as mortgage loans in arrears for more than12 months in this transaction. Cumulative defaults, at 3.39%,are also higher than in other Portuguese RMBS transactions thatS&P rates. Prepayment levels remain low and the transaction isunlikely to pay down significantly in the near term, in S&P'sopinion.

After applying S&P's RMBS criteria to this transaction, itscredit analysis results show an increase in the weighted-averageforeclosure frequency (WAFF) and an increase in the weighted-average loss severity (WALS) for each rating level.

The increase in the WAFF is mainly due to the geographicconcentration and the use of the original loan-to-value (OLTV)ratio in the default calculations. S&P applies a penalty of1.25x on 72.20% of the pool as province concentration in Algarve,Minho-Lima, Baixo Vouga, Grande Porto, Grande Lisboa, and PinhalInterior Norte exceeds the limit set by the RMBS criteria. Theweighted-average OLTV ratio is relatively high, with 64.04% ofthe outstanding pool balance having an OLTV ratio of above 70%.This means that, in line with S&P's RMBS criteria, most of thepool is penalized, as the weighted-average OLTV ratio is abovethe 73% threshold. At the same time, seasoning partially offsetsthe negative effect of geographic concentration and the weighted-average OLTV ratio. This is because S&P's updated criteria givegreater credit to well-seasoned pools. The transaction has aweighted-average seasoning of 105.85 months, which means thatmost of the loans will have a 0.5x adjustment.

The increase in the WALS is mainly due to the application ofS&P's revised market value decline assumptions and the indexingof its valuations under its RMBS criteria. The overall effect isan increase in the required credit coverage for each ratinglevel.

Following the application of S&P's RMBS criteria and consideringits criteria for rating single-jurisdiction securitizations abovethe sovereign foreign currency rating (RAS criteria), S&P hasdetermined that its assigned rating on each class of notes inthis transaction should be the lower of (i) the rating as cappedby S&P's RAS criteria and (ii) the rating that the class of notescan attain under S&P's RMBS criteria.

Under S&P's RAS criteria, it applied a hypothetical sovereigndefault stress test to determine whether a tranche has sufficientcredit and structural support to withstand a sovereign defaultand so repay timely interest and principal by legal finalmaturity.

The class A notes can support the stresses that S&P applies at a'A+' rating level. S&P's RAS criteria designate the country risksensitivity for RMBS as "moderate". Under S&P's RAS criteria,this transaction's notes can therefore be rated four notchesabove the sovereign rating, if they have sufficient creditenhancement to pass a minimum of a "severe" stress. However, asnot all of the conditions in paragraph 44 of the RAS criteria aremet, S&P cannot assign any additional notches of uplift (apart ofthe four notches uplift mentioned above) to the ratings in thistransaction.

Consequently, S&P can assign a rating on the class A notes up toa maximum of four notches above the sovereign rating. At thesame time, the remedy actions outlined in the swap documents werenot taken in November 2013 when S&P lowered its long-term ICR onthe swap provider, RBS, to 'BBB+'.

Consequently, under S&P's current counterparty criteria, thisbreach of the agreement caps the maximum potential rating on theclass A notes at 'BBB+ (sf)', S&P's long-term ICR on thecounterparty. S&P has therefore lowered to 'BBB+ (sf)' andremoved from CreditWatch negative its rating on the class Anotes.

The class B notes cannot support the stresses that S&P applies ata rating level higher than that on the sovereign. Consequently,S&P can assign a rating to the class B notes up to the sovereignrating. S&P has therefore lowered to 'BB (sf)' from 'BBB- (sf)'its rating on the class B notes.

S&P's analysis indicates that the available credit enhancementfor the class C notes is no longer sufficient to support itscurrently assigned rating. Consequently, S&P has lowered to 'B-(sf)' from 'BB (sf)' its rating on the class C notes.

S&P also considers credit stability in its analysis. To reflectmoderate stress conditions, S&P adjusted its WAFF assumptions byassuming additional arrears of 8% for one-year and three-yearhorizons. This did not result in S&P's rating deterioratingbelow the maximum projected deterioration that it would associatewith each relevant rating level, as outlined in S&P's creditstability criteria.

In S&P's opinion, the outlook for the Portuguese residentialmortgage and real estate market is not benign and S&P hastherefore increased its expected 'B' foreclosure frequencyassumption to 3.33% from 2.00%, when S&P applies its RMBScriteria, to reflect this view. S&P bases these assumptions onits expectation of modest economic growth, continuing highunemployment, and sluggish house price appreciation for theremainder of 2015 and 2016.

On the back of the weak macroeconomic conditions, S&P don'texpect the performance of the transactions in its Portuguese RMBSindex to significantly improve in 2015.

S&P expects severe arrears in the portfolio to remain at theircurrent levels, as there are a number of downside risks. Theseinclude weak economic growth and high unemployment. On thepositive side, S&P expects interest rates to remain low.

The final rating is contingent upon the receipt of finaldocuments and legal opinions conforming to the informationalready received.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

The subordinated notes are notched down one level from IbercajaBanco's Viability Rating (VR) of 'bb+' for loss severity becauseof lower recovery expectations relative to senior unsecured debt.These securities are subordinated to all senior unsecuredcreditors.

PESCADOS JUAN: In Liquidation But Remains Unsold------------------------------------------------Alicia Villegas at Undercurrent News reports that Spanishprocessor and distributor Pescados Juan Fernandez, which begunits liquidation on May 25, has not been sold yet.

The La Coruna-based company distributing fish and shellfishentered liquidation about four months after it filed forbankruptcy, according to Undercurrent News.

Administrator Diego Comendador Alonso declined to make furthercomments to Undercurrent, as he said the company is in the middleof judicial bankruptcy proceedings.

The seafood firm became a casualty of Spain's economic crisis, LaVoz de Galicia reported, and it stopped its activity at the endof last year, the report notes.

In 2012, it posted a loss of EUR310,000 and a EUR12.6 millionturnover, 12% down over the previous year, according toAlimarket, the report relays.

In 2010, the company sold a 36.29% stake in the Spanish cannerMar de Couso, headquartered in Ribeira, and owned by Fernandez'brother Juan Luis, as the two brothers decided to go theirseparate ways, the report recalls.

RMBS SANTANDER 3: Moody's Cuts Rating on Series B Notes to Caa1---------------------------------------------------------------Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of FTA RMBSSantander 3's classes A and C notes, and downgraded the ratingsof the class B notes. These rating actions follow Moody's reviewof the recent structural changes to FTA RMBS Santander 3 andconcluded that these amendments have both neutral and negativeimpact on the ratings, depending on the ranking of the notes:

The structural amendments relates to a reduction of the size ofthe reserve fund from 15.0% of the initial amount of classes Aand B notes at closing to 5.0% of the outstanding amount of theclasses A and B notes. The reserve fund was funded by theissuance of the class C notes. Consequently, Class C willamortize to EUR313.6million equal to 5% of the new outstandingamount of classes A and B.

The size of the class A will decrease to EUR4,704.8 million whichwill represent 75% of the classes A and B notes. The amortizationon the class A will be on an extraordinary payment date, asdescribed in the amendment. Simultaneously, there will be anincrease in the size of the class B to EUR1,568 million whichwill represent 25% of the classes A and B notes. Class A willbenefit from sufficient credit enhancement to maintain the ratingof the notes. However, Class B is negatively impacted because itwill be protected by a lower reserve fund.

In reaching this conclusion, Moody's has taken into considerationthe characteristics of the mortgage pool, the current level ofcredit enhancement and the level of credit enhancement that willbe present in the transaction after the amendments have takenplace, together with the amount of liquidity within thetransaction given by the new reserve fund level. However, Moody'sopinion addresses only the credit impact associated with theproposed amendment, and Moody's is not expressing any opinion asto whether the amendment has, or could have, other non-creditrelated effects that may have a detrimental impact on theinterests of note holders and/or counterparties.

The key collateral assumptions have not been updated as part ofthis restructuring. The performance of the underlying assetportfolio remains in line with Moody's assumptions.

Moody's rating analysis also took into consideration the exposureto key transaction counterparties, including the roles ofservicer and account bank provided by Banco Santander S.A.(Spain) (A3(cr)/P-2(cr)).

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities provide a quantitative/model-indicated calculation of the number of rating notches that aMoody's structured finance security may vary if certain inputparameters used in the initial rating process differed.

The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged and is notintended to measure how the rating of the security might migrateover time, but rather how the initial rating of the securitymight have differed if key rating input parameters were varied.Parameter Sensitivities for the typical EMEA RMBS transaction arecalculated by stressing key variable inputs in Moody's primaryrating model.

At the time the deal was restructured, the model output indicatedthat the Series A notes would have achieved an A2 if the expectedloss was as high as 16.8% and the MILAN CE was 33.0% and allother factors were constant.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody'sApproach To Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework published inJanuary 2015. Please see the Credit Policy page on www.moodys.comfor a copy of this methodology.

The analysis undertaken by Moody's at the initial assignment of arating for an RMBS security may focus on aspects that become lessrelevant or typically remain unchanged during the surveillancestage. Please see Moody's Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILANFramework for further information on Moody's analysis at theinitial rating assignment and the on-going surveillance in RMBS.

Moody's will continue monitoring the ratings. Any change in theratings will be publicly disseminated by Moody's throughappropriate media.

The rating addresses the expected loss posed to investors by thelegal final maturity of the notes. In Moody's opinion, thestructure allows for timely payment of interest with respect ofthe class A notes and ultimate payment of principal by the legalfinal maturity. Moody's ratings only address the credit riskassociated with the transaction. Other non-credit risks have notbeen addressed, but may have a significant effect on yield toinvestors.

TRANSACTION FEATURES

The transaction is a securitization of Spanish prime mortgageloans originated by Banco Santander S.A. (Spain) (A3/P-2 CRA) andBanco Espanol de Credito, S.A. (Banesto) to obligors located inSpain. The portfolio consists of high Loan To Value ("HLTV")mortgage loans secured by residential properties including a highpercentage of renegotiated loans (20%).

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Factors or circumstances that could lead to an upgrade of theratings include (1) further reduction in sovereign risk, (2)performance of the underlying collateral that is better thanMoody's expected, (3) deleveraging of the capital structure and(4) improvements in the credit quality of the transactioncounterparties.

Factors or circumstances that could lead to a downgrade of theratings include (1) an increase in sovereign risk, (2)performance of the underlying collateral that is worse thanMoody's expects, (3) deterioration in the notes' available creditenhancement and (4) deterioration in the credit quality of thetransaction counterparties.

BONDCUBE: Files for Liquidation Three Months After Lunch--------------------------------------------------------John Detrixhe at Bloomberg News reports that a startup fixed-income platform called Bondcube has filed for liquidation justthree months after its launch, a sign that entrepreneurs arefinding it difficult to ease bond trading.

The London-based company was 30% owned by Deutsche Boerse AG,which provided two rounds of investment, Bloomberg discloses. Itwent live for fixed-income trading in the U.S. and Europe inApril, Bloomberg recounts.

"Although Bondcube succeeded to launch its platform, over recentmonths sufficient business prospects failed to materialize and asa result the long-term financial viability of the businessdeteriorated," Bloomberg quotes Deutsche Boerse as saying in astatement. "In these circumstances, the shareholders decided notto provide further funding to Bondcube."

BROADCASTING SUPPORT: In Administration, 100 Job at Risk--------------------------------------------------------Manchester Evening News reports that more than 100 people are setto lose their jobs after Broadcasting Support Services, a callcenter, went into administration.

Broadcasting Support Services (BSS), based in Portland Street inManchester city center, is set to close on August 14 witheveryone employed by the company facing redundancy, according toManchester Evening News.

The report notes that the not-for-profit organization manageshelplines for a number of charities and services including mentalhealth charity Mind, Action Fraud and the Eczema Helpline for theNational Skin Condition Charity.

A staff member, who wishes to remain anonymous, saidadministrators ReSolve Partners announced they were being maderedundant last Friday, July 17, the report relates.

The report discloses that the staff member said: "Last Friday,more or less out of the blue, the administrators came in and saidthere are only two weeks to salvage the company. The atmospherewas just sadness basically with sporadic outbursts of anger."

Hundreds of workers were employed to manage the helplines andanswer the calls while a number of workers were employed tomaintain BSS websites, the report relays.

The company also has offices in Edinburgh and Glasgow, which arealso understood to have been closed down, the report notes.

The report discloses that workers are now planning legal actionand are trying to get a Protective Award.

BSS had an office inside Westminster House on Portland StreetThe award is a sum of money from the government equating to eightweeks pay for the lack of redundancy notice given, the reportrelays.

BSS Manchester appears to currently not be open for business andphone calls to the reception are diverted to a recorded message,the report notes.

The report notes that the message said: "BSS have gone intoadministration as of July 17, 2015. ReSolve Partners Limited havebeen appointed as administrators. The affairs, business andproperty of the company are being managed by the administrators."

F G HAWKES: High Court bans directors of for 10 years-----------------------------------------------------Frederick Geraint Hawkes and his mother Janis Hawkes, thedirectors of F G Hawkes (Western) Limited (FGH), have beendisqualified for 10 years for causing the company to submitannual financial accounts which they knew contained falseinformation and submitting false VAT returns to HM Revenue &Customs (HMRC).

The disqualifications follow an investigation by the InsolvencyService and prevent Mr. and Mrs. Hawkes from becoming directly orindirectly involved in the promotion, formation or management ofa company for 10 years from July 22, 2015.

The company was incorporated on March 2, 1987, and traded asimporters of plywood and sheet materials; latterly it also tradedin the rental of holiday villas. Its trading name was RKLPlywood. It ceased trading on Oct. 3, 2011, and was placed intoadministration on the same date.

The Insolvency Service's investigation found that Mr. and Mrs.Hawkes signed FGH's annual accounts for the period ended July 31,2009, and the year ended July 31, 2010, on April 30, 2010, andApril 28, 2011, respectively, knowing that they contained falseinformation.

The investigation also found that Mr. and Mrs. Hawkes caused FGHto submit false VAT returns to HMRC for the quarters endingbetween April 2010 and April 2011 leading to an under declarationof VAT owed of at least GBP1,518,539.

The Court also ordered Mr. and Mrs. Hawkes to pay costs ofGBP16,750 by July 29, 2015.

Commenting on the disqualification, Sue MacLeod, ChiefInvestigator at The Insolvency Service, said:

"The signing of documents knowing they contain misleadinginformation which may be relied upon by third parties, andsubmitting false VAT returns is serious misconduct, which theInsolvency Service will investigate with a view to removing youfrom the market place."

F G Hawkes (Western) Limited was incorporated on March 2, 1987,and traded from Forest Products Terminal, Lockhead, Kings Dock,in Swansea, SA1 1QR as Importers of plywood and sheet materialsand also in the rental of holiday villas. The Company went intoadministration on Oct. 3, 2011, with an estimated deficiency ofGBP26,705,170.

FIMA CONSULTING: Director Banned For 13 Years For GBP1MM Fraud--------------------------------------------------------------Fiaz Razzak Malik, a director of Fima Consulting Ltd, a wholesalemobile phone business based in Slough has been disqualified as adirector by the High Court for 13 years for participating incontrived transactions with a view to gaining VAT refunds of overGBP1 million.

Mr. Malik's disqualification from July 1, 2015 means that hecannot promote, manage, or be a director of a limited companyuntil June 30, 2028.

This disqualification follows investigation by the OfficialReceiver at the Public Interest Unit, a specialist team of theInsolvency Service, whose involvement commenced with the windingup of the company, for unpaid VAT owed to HMRC.

The Official Receiver's investigation uncovered that FimaConsulting Ltd participated in a form of VAT fraud known asMissing Trader Intra Community fraud (MTIC) and that Mr. Malik(36) was a director of the company at the time it engaged inthese activities.

MTIC is commonly known as "Carousel" fraud, as large consignmentsof electrical or other small item size high value goods areinvoiced rapidly and repeatedly around trading chains, speeded upby movement on paper, with actual movement of goods only takingplace as they enter or exit the UK.

Such fraud indicators included the rapid succession of same daytrades without deliveries within the UK of goods sitting at ashared freight forwarder, the common use of the same offshorebank, and entering into payment arrangements involving thirdparties who were neither suppliers nor customers. All tradersbanked with the First Curacao International Bank, which was shutdown by the Netherlands Antilles authorities in September 2006 inorder to prevent money laundering.

Commenting on this case Paul Titherington, Official Receiver inthe Public Interest Unit, said:

"This type of VAT fraud is very serious and a high priority forHMRC and the Insolvency Service. MTIC fraud has been a greatstrain on the public purse and has cost the tax payer manybillions of pounds in fraudulent VAT claims. The InsolvencyService is committed to making directors account for theiractions."

Fima Consulting Ltd was incorporated on Oct. 8, 2003, as OfficeDesigns Ltd but changed its name to Parts Trading Ltd onAug. 13, 2004, and then to its current name on Aug. 18, 2004. Itstrading address was at Flat 5 Stroma Court, Lincoln Way, inSlough, Berkshire SL1 5RQ.

The petition to wind up the company was presented by HM Revenue &Customs in respect of unpaid VAT of GBP646,768. The winding uporder against Fima Consulting Ltd was made on Jan. 28, 2013.

On June 10, 2015, in the High Court of Justice, Registrar Briggsordered that Mr. Fiaz Razzak Malik be disqualified for a periodof 13 years. The period of disqualification will commence onJuly 1, 2015.

Proofs of debt may be lodged at any point up to (and including)September 1, 2015, the last date for proving claims, however,creditors are requested to lodge their proofs of debt at theearliest possible opportunity.

Persons so proving are required, if so requested, to provide suchfurther details or produce such documents or other evidence asmay appear to the Joint Administrators to be necessary.

The Joint Administrators will not be obliged to deal with proofslodged after the last date for proving but they may do so if theythink fit.

The Joint Administrators intend to make such distribution withinthe period of two months from the last date for proving claims.

For further information, contact details, and proof of debtforms, please visit http://is.gd/elC7Vi

Please complete and return a proof of debt form, togetherwith relevant supporting documents to PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP,7 More London Riverside, London SE1 2RT marked for the attentionof Jennifer Hills. Alternatively, you can email a completedproof of debt form to lehman.affiliates@uk.pwc.com

Rule 2.95(2)(c) of the Insolvency Rules 1986 requires the JointAdministrators to state in this notice the value of theprescribed part of LCMC's net property which is required to bemade available for the satisfaction of LCMC's unsecured debtspursuant to section 176A of the Insolvency Act 1986. There areno floating charges over the assets of LCMC and accordingly,there shall be no prescribed part. All of LCMC's net propertywill be available for the satisfaction of LCMC's unsecured debts.

About Lehman Brothers

Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. -- http://www.lehman.com/-- was the fourth largest investment bank in the United States. Formore than 150 years, Lehman Brothers has been a leader in theglobal financial markets by serving the financial needs ofcorporations, governmental units, institutional clients andindividuals worldwide.

On Sept. 19, 2008, the Honorable Gerard E. Lynch of the U.S.District Court for the Southern District of New York, entered anorder commencing liquidation of Lehman Brothers, Inc., pursuantto the provisions of the Securities Investor Protection Act (CaseNo. 08-CIV-8119 (GEL)). James W. Giddens was appointed astrustee for the SIPA liquidation of the business of LBI.

The Bankruptcy Court approved Barclays Bank Plc's purchase ofLehman Brothers' North American investment banking and capitalmarkets operations and supporting infrastructure for US$1.75billion. Nomura Holdings Inc., the largest brokerage house inJapan, purchased LBHI's operations in Europe for US$2 plus theretention of most of employees. Nomura also bought Lehman'soperations in the Asia Pacific for US$225 million.

Lehman emerged from bankruptcy protection on March 6, 2012, morethan three years after it filed the largest bankruptcy in U.S.history. The Chapter 11 plan for the Lehman companies other thanthe broker was confirmed in December 2011.

As of Oct. 2, 2014, Lehman's total distributions to unsecuredcreditors have amounted to $92.0 billion. As of Sept. 30, 2014,the brokerage trustee has substantially completed customer claimsdistributions, distributing more than $106 billion to 111,000customers.

Proofs of debt may be lodged at any point up to (and including)August 14, 2015, the last date for proving claims, however,creditors are requested to lodge their proofs of debt at theearliest possible opportunity.

Persons so proving are required, if so requested, to provide suchfurther details or produce such documents or other evidence asmay appear to the Joint Administrators to be necessary.

The Joint Administrators will not be obliged to deal with proofslodged after the last date for proving but they may do so if theythink fit.

The Joint Administrators intend to make such distribution withinthe period of two months from the last date for proving claims.

For further information, contact details, and proof of debtforms, please visit http://is.gd/UzPOOa

Please complete and return a proof of debt form, togetherwith relevant supporting documents to PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP,7 More London Riverside, London SE1 2RT marked for the attentionof Claire Taylor. Alternatively, you can email a completed proofof debt form to lehman.affiliates@uk.pwc.com

Rule 2.95(2)(c) of the Insolvency Rules 1986 requires the JointAdministrators to state in this notice the value of theprescribed part of LBL&F's net property which is required to bemade available for the satisfaction of LBL&F's unsecured debtspursuant to section 176A of the Insolvency Act 1986. There areno floating charges over the assets of LBL&F and accordingly,there shall be no prescribed part. All of LBL&F's net propertywill be available for the satisfaction of LBL&F's unsecureddebts.

About Lehman Brothers

Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. -- http://www.lehman.com/-- was the fourth largest investment bank in the United States. Formore than 150 years, Lehman Brothers has been a leader in theglobal financial markets by serving the financial needs ofcorporations, governmental units, institutional clients andindividuals worldwide.

On Sept. 19, 2008, the Honorable Gerard E. Lynch of the U.S.District Court for the Southern District of New York, entered anorder commencing liquidation of Lehman Brothers, Inc., pursuantto the provisions of the Securities Investor Protection Act (CaseNo. 08-CIV-8119 (GEL)). James W. Giddens was appointed astrustee for the SIPA liquidation of the business of LBI.

The Bankruptcy Court approved Barclays Bank Plc's purchase ofLehman Brothers' North American investment banking and capitalmarkets operations and supporting infrastructure for US$1.75billion. Nomura Holdings Inc., the largest brokerage house inJapan, purchased LBHI's operations in Europe for US$2 plus theretention of most of employees. Nomura also bought Lehman'soperations in the Asia Pacific for US$225 million.

Lehman emerged from bankruptcy protection on March 6, 2012, morethan three years after it filed the largest bankruptcy in U.S.history. The Chapter 11 plan for the Lehman companies other thanthe broker was confirmed in December 2011.

As of Oct. 2, 2014, Lehman's total distributions to unsecuredcreditors have amounted to $92.0 billion. As of Sept. 30, 2014,the brokerage trustee has substantially completed customer claimsdistributions, distributing more than $106 billion to 111,000customers.

MILLWALL FOOTBALL CLUB: Chairman Writes Off Interest on Debt------------------------------------------------------------millwallfc.co.uk reports that John Berylson has agreed to writeoff GBP8.4 million of accrued interest owed by the MillwallFootball Club to his company, Chestnut Hill Ventures. Inaddition, he has agreed not to charge any further interest at thepresent time, according to millwallfc.co.uk.

Separately, cash funding of the ongoing losses is being made byissue of B shares (equity, not debt) and GBP12.375 million of Bshares were issued during the year to June 30, 2015 covering thelast two years, the report notes.

The report discloses that the chairman said: "I have agreed tofund the club on an ongoing basis by way of shares and am asfully committed as ever. Obviously League 1 means less revenuebut, having funded the Academy for some time, it is encouragingto see so many good young players coming through which will bevital going forward."

The report relays that fan on the Board, Peter Garston, added: "Iam glad the board has agreed to make this information availableto fans. This is the latest financing of a number that havetaken place in recent years and it once again shows the board'sfinancial commitment and input to Millwall Football Club.

"It also banishes any worries expressed by some fans. I wouldlike to thank John Berylson and the board for their continuedunwavering support," the report adds.

The rating takes into account the credit quality of theunderlying mortgage loan pool, from which Moody's determined theMILAN Credit Enhancement and the portfolio expected loss, as wellas the transaction structure and legal considerations. Theexpected portfolio loss of 2% and the MILAN required creditenhancement of 13% serve as input parameters for Moody's cashflow model and tranching model, which is based on a probabilisticlognormal distribution.

Portfolio expected loss of 2%: this is marginally higher thanother buy to let pools in the UK and is based on Moody'sassessment of the lifetime loss expectation taking into account:(i) the originators' historical performance, (ii) the currentmacroeconomic environment in the UK, (iii) the collateralperformance to date along with an average seasoning of 2.2 years;and (iv) benchmarking with similar UK Buy to Let transactions.

MILAN CE of 13%: this is higher than other UK buy to lettransactions due to (i) the originators' historical performanceand (ii) the weighted average LTV of 72.44%.

At closing the mortgage pool balance will consist of GBP 224million of loans. The Reserve fund will be funded to 2.9% of theinitial mortgage pool balance. The Reserve fund will not beamortized. Moreover, the class A and B notes benefit fromprincipal to pay interest.

Operational Risk Analysis: Charter Court Financial ServicesLimited ("CCFS", not rated) will be acting as servicer. In orderto mitigate the operational risk, there will be a back-upservicer facilitator and Elavon Financial Services Limited,acting through its UK Branch, will be acting as an independentcash manager from close. To ensure continuity of payments overthe transaction's lifetime the transaction documents incorporateestimation language whereby the cash manager can use the threemost recent servicer reports to determine the cash allocation incase no servicer report is available.

Interest Rate Risk Analysis: The transaction will benefit from aninterest rate swap provided by Credit Suisse International (A1/P-1). Under the swap agreements during the term of the life of thefixed rate loans the issuer will pay a fixed swap rate of 1.1%and receive three month sterling Libor from the swapcounterparty.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody'sApproach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published inJanuary 2015.

The analysis undertaken by Moody's at the initial assignment of arating for an RMBS security may focus on aspects that become lessrelevant or typically remain unchanged during the surveillancestage. Please see Moody's Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILANFramework for further information on Moody's analysis at theinitial rating assignment and the on-going surveillance in RMBS.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Significantly different loss assumptions compared with ourexpectations at close due to either a change in economicconditions from our central scenario forecast or idiosyncraticperformance factors would lead to rating actions. For instance,should economic conditions be worse than forecast, the higherdefaults and loss severities resulting from a greaterunemployment, worsening household affordability and a weakerhousing market could result in downgrade of the ratings.Deleveraging of the capital structure or conversely adeterioration in the notes available credit enhancement couldresult in an upgrade or a downgrade of the rating, respectively.

Stress Scenarios:

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If the portfolio expected losswas increased from 2% to 4% of current balance, and the MILAN CEwas increased from 13% to 18.2%, the model output indicates thatthe Class A notes would still achieve Aaa(sf) assuming that allother factors remained equal. Moody's Parameter Sensitivitiesquantify the potential rating impact on a structured financesecurity from changing certain input parameters used in theinitial rating. The analysis assumes that the deal has not agedand is not intended to measure how the rating of the securitymight change over time, but instead what the initial rating ofthe security might have been under different key rating inputs.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities provide a quantitative/model-indicated calculation of the number of rating notches that aMoody's structured finance security may vary if certain inputparameters used in the initial rating process differed.

The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged and is notintended to measure how the rating of the security might migrateover time, but rather how the initial rating of the securitymight have differed if key rating input parameters were varied.Parameter Sensitivities for the typical EMEA RMBS transaction arecalculated by stressing key variable inputs in Moody's primaryrating model.

SHIELD HOLDCO: S&P Raises CCR to 'BB-', Then Withdraws Rating-------------------------------------------------------------Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its long-term corporatecredit rating on security software company Shield Holdco Ltd.(Sophos) to 'BB-' from 'B+'. S&P also removed the rating fromCreditWatch with positive implications, where it had been placedon June 9, 2015.

S&P subsequently withdrew the rating at the company's request.The outlook was stable at the time of the withdrawal.

The rating was withdrawn after the company redeemed its ratedsenior secured loans.

Before withdrawing the corporate credit rating, S&P raised it inresponse to Sophos' recent listing on the London Stock Exchange.As part of the listing, Sophos successfully raised net proceedsof $100 million, which were used to reduce its debt. Inconjunction with the IPO, the company launched full refinancingof its debt facilities. Combined with the debt reduction, thisprocess caused its cash interest payments to fall by more than50%. In addition, before the IPO, the group converted itspreferred equity certificates into equity.

Following all these transactions, and assuming that Sophoscontinues to see more than 10% billing growth, S&P forecasts thatits Standard & Poor's gross adjusted leverage will decline toabout 4x in the financial year (FY) ending March 2016, andfurther decline in FY2017. S&P also anticipates that Sophos willmeaningfully strengthen its cash flow ratios, such that, forexample, its free operating cash flow (FOCF)-to-debt ratio willrise to about 20% in FY2017. Apax Partners' stake in Sophos hasdeclined to about 40% and S&P expects that it will sell off moreof its stake over the short term. Additionally, Sophos now has apublic dividend policy of 20% of its free cash flows. S&P is,therefore, revising upward its assessment of the company'sfinancial risk profile to "significant."

S&P's assessment of Sophos' business risk profile remainsconstrained by the highly competitive and fragmented informationtechnology security market, in which it competes with far largerand better capitalized players that could invest or acquiresuperior research and development capabilities. There are alsono meaningful switching costs for its customers, limiteddiversity, high operating leverage, and meaningful reputationalrisks.

S&P assess Sophos' business risk profile at the higher end of the"weak" category because its business model is largely based onrecurring revenues and because security applications are criticalto its corporate customers, which enables it to achieve very highcustomer retention.

S&P's base-case operating scenario for Sophos assumes:

-- Continued billing growth of about 18% from unified threat management products and growth of about 5% from endpoint products such as antivirus and firewalls in FY2016.

-- An increase in adjusted EBITDA margins of about 1%-2%, chiefly due to lower exceptional costs. Capital expenditure (capex) declining to about 2% of billings.

-- Annual dividends of 20% of the company's free cash flow.

Based on these S&P arrives at these credit measures:

-- Debt to EBITDA of about 4x in FY2016, or about 3.2x on a cash EBITDA basis. -- Free operating cash flow to debt of about 18%-20%. -- EBITDA cash interest coverage of more than 6x (excluding one-off transaction related costs), signifying cash EBITDA coverage of about 7.5x.

At the time of the withdrawal, the stable outlook reflected S&P'santicipation that Sophos' billings would continue to groworganically over the next 12 months, supporting maintenance ofadjusted debt to EBITDA well below 4x.

SKELWITH: Enters Liquidation Casting Doubt Over 2,500 New Homes---------------------------------------------------------------harrogate-news.co.uk reports that York developer Skelwith hassaid that they have entered provisional liquidation.

The developer had plans to deliver up 2,500 new homes on the sitenear to Knaresborough, at the previous Flaxby golf course, aswell as a hotel, as part of a revised masterplan for the site,according to harrogate-news.co.uk.

The report notes that Skelwith has already invested heavily ininfrastructure, completing earlier this year a new GBP4 millionroundabout for the site.

Howver, the Skelwith group is in a legal battle with localfarmers, the Armstrong family, developers, the Ward family andtheir related companies over the site, the report relays.

In 2008, a 280 acre area of land was sold from the Armstrongs toSkelwith for GBP7 million, the report discloses.

In 2010, consent was giving to build a hotel on the site andSkelwith secured a number of investors for the hotel, the reportrelays.

The report notes that the Armstrongs are looking to sell the landto the Ward family to recover what they say is unpaid money tothem and that the land has been undervalued. Skelwith haveblocked this sale at the High Courts, the report relays.

The Armstongs and Wards are continuing to seek a Court order toallow the sale of the land to go ahead, the report adds.

SKELWITH LEISURE: Raithwaite Estate Future Hangs in Doubt---------------------------------------------------------The Scarborough News reports that the future of the luxuryRaithwaite Estate at Sandsend hangs in doubt after the firmbehind the development went into administration.

KPMG said it was "assessing the financial situation" of theEstate which is owned by Skelwith Leisure (Raithwaite) Limited --a subsidiary of The Skelwith Group, according to The ScarboroughNews.

The report notes that a new buyer is now being sought for thedevelopment which includes the hotel, holiday cottages and TheKeep annexe over 100 acres.

In the meantime, a spokeperson for KPMG said: "Our initialpriority is to ensure that the business trades as normal, withclients being unaffected and their commitments being honoured,while we assess its financial situation and consider our nextsteps," the report relates.

Earlier this week, Skelwith Leisure, another subsidiary of theSkelwith Group, went into provisional liquidation blaming costsof a legal dispute over the ownership of the land at Flaxby GolfCourse, the report notes.

Prior to the Raithwaite announcement, a Skelwith spokesperson hadsaid: "Because of the pressure and resources taken up with thelitigation on the Flaxby Golf course site, one Skelwith company,Skelwith Leisure, has gone into provisional liquidation. We areworking with the liquidator to resolve outstanding issues. Thecurrent legal dispute and planning process will continue. Thisdoes not affect other Skelwith companies and projects and westill own various sites that we will continue to operate anddevelop as planned," the report discloses.

The company will do battle with the farming family, theArmstrongs, who sold the land in 2008 at the High Court afterthey became angry with the changes to the masterplan, and a lackof building work to date, the report notes.

A spokesperson for the Skelwith Group insisted both the HighCourt hearing and the planning application for a new town,complete with 2,213 homes shops, primary school, restaurants anda doctors’ surgery, will go ahead, the report adds.

WARLORD PRODUCTIONS: Goes Into Liquidation------------------------------------------Andrew Penman at Mirror News reports that film production companyWarlord Productions Ltd, which raised GBP6 million from thepublic to invest in a new version of Shakespeare's Henry V, hasnow been put into compulsory liquidation in the High Court.

The Insolvency Service said that GBP3 million of the money raisedwent into the pockets of sales reps and the rest has disappeared,according to Mirror News.

"This company appeared to be a film production company in nameonly as it seemed to do little or no filming or producing," saidDavid Hill, Chief Investigator at the Insolvency Service, thereport notes.

The report relates that Michael Caine and Ray Winstone werebilled as due to star in Henry 5 -- as the producers called it --but their agents told me that they have nothing to do with theproject.

Investors said promises of generous returns tempted them to pumptheir savings into other film projects including a biblical epiccalled Mary Mother of Christ and an animated film called GummyBear, the report relates. Now they are desperately worried thatthese films will never see the light of day, the report notes.

The report discloses that a web of firms behind these projectsinclude Stealth Media Group Ltd, now in liquidation, and SpiceFactory UK Ltd, which faced being put into compulsory liquidationlast month until that action was suspended.

Michael Cowan was a director of those firms as well as WarlordProductions, though he claims to have been a director on paperonly, the report relays. The 50-year-old was also the 100%shareholder of Warlord, but maybe that was on paper only too, thereport discloses.

The report relays that Mr. Cowan said that the strings werereally pulled by former associate Steven Wilkinson, who says he'san independent film producer.

The report notes that Det. Con Duncan Lloyd said: "We areinvestigating an allegation of fraud involving the running of anumber of companies linked to the film production industry.

"The investigation is at a very early stage and we would urge anyinvestors who have any concerns about how their money has beenspent to contact us," the report quoted Mr. Lloyd as saying.

Hospitals, Health and People is an interesting and very readableaccount of the career of a hospital administrator and physicianfrom the 1930's through the 1980's, the formative years oftoday's health care system. Although much has changed inhospital administration and health care since the book was firstpublished in 1987, Dr. Snoke's discussion of the evolution ofthe modern hospital provides a unique and very valuableperspective for readers who wish to better understand the forcesat work in our current health care system.

The first half of Hospitals, Health and People is devoted to thefunctional parts of the hospital system, as observed by Dr.Snoke between the late 1930's through 1969, when he served firstas assistant director of the Strong Memorial Hospital inRochester, New York, and then as the director of the Grace-NewHaven Hospital in Connecticut. In these first chapters, Dr.Snoke examines the evolution and institutionalization of anumber of aspects of the hospital system, including thefinancial and community responsibilities of the hospitaladministrator, education and training in hospitaladministration, the role of the governing board of a hospital,the dynamics between the hospital administrator and the medicalstaff, and the unique role of the teaching hospital.

The importance of Hospitals, Health and People for today'sreaders is due in large part to the author's pivotal role increating the modern-day hospital. Dr. Snoke and others insimilar positions played a large part in advocating or forcingchange in our hospital system, particularly in recognizing theimportance of the nursing profession and the contributions ofnon-physician professionals, such as psychologists, hearing andspeech specialists, and social workers, to the overall care ofthe patient. Throughout the first chapters, there are also manyobservations on the factors that are contributing to today'scost of care. Malpractice is just one example. According toDr. Snoke, "malpractice premiums were negligible in the 1950'sand 1960's. In 1970, Yale-New Haven's annual malpracticepremiums had mounted to about $150,000." By the time of thefirst publication of the book, the hospital's premiums werecosting about $10 million a year.

In the second half of Hospitals, Health and People, Dr. Snokeaddresses the national health care system as we've come to knowit, including insurance and cost containment; the role of thegovernment in health care; health care for the elderly; homehealth care; and the changing role of ethics in health care. Itis particularly interesting to note the role that Senator WilburMills from Arkansas played in the allocation of costs ofhospital-based specialty components under Part B rather thanPart A of the Medicare bill. Dr. Snoke comments: "This wasconsidered a great victory by the hospital-based specialists. Iwas disappointed because I knew it would cause confusion inworking relationships between hospitals and specialists andamong patients covered by Medicare. I was also concerned aboutpotential cost increases. My fears were realized. Not onlyhave health costs increased in certain areas more thananticipated, but confusion is rampant among the elderly patientsand their families, as well as in hospital business offices andamong physicians' secretaries." This aspect of Medicare causedsuch confusion that Congress amended Medicare in 1967 to providethat the professional components of radiological andpathological in-hospital services be reimbursed as if they werehospital services under Part A rather than part of the copaymentprovisions of Part B.

At the start of his book, Dr. Snoke refers to a small statue,Discharged Cured, which was given to him in the late 1940's by afellow physician, Dr. Jack Masur. Dr. Snoke explains thesignificance the statue held for him throughout his professionalcareer by quoting from an article by Dr. Masur: "The wholequestion of the responsibility of the physician, of thehospital, of the health agency, brings vividly to mind a smallstatue which I saw a great many years ago.it is a patheticlittle figure of a man, coat collar turned up and shouldershunched against the chill winds, clutching his belongings in apaper bag-shaking, tremulous, discouraged. He's clearly unfitfor work-no employer would dare to take a chance on hiring him.You know that he will need much more help before he can face theworld with shoulders back and confidence in himself. Thestatuette epitomizes the task of medical rehabilitation: tobridge the gap between the sick and a job."

It is clear that Dr. Snoke devoted his life to exactly thatpurpose. Although there is much to criticize in our currenthealthcare system, the wellness concept that we expect andaccept today as part of our medical care was almost nonexistentwhen Dr. Snoke began his career in the 1930's. Throughout his50 years in hospital administration, Dr. Snoke frequently had tofocus on the big picture and the bottom line. He never forgotthe importance of Discharged Cured, however, and his bookprovides us with a great appreciation of how compassionateadministrators such as Dr. Snoke have contributed to the stateof patient care today.

Albert Waldo Snoke was director of the Grace-New Haven Hospitalin New Haven, Connecticut from 1946 until 1969. In New Haven,Dr. Snoke also taught hospital administration at Yale Universityand oversaw the development of the Yale-New Haven Hospital,serving as its executive director from 1965-1968. From 1969-1973, Dr. Snoke worked in Illinois as coordinator of healthservices in the Office of the Governor and later as actingexecutive director of the Illinois Comprehensive State HealthPlanning Agency. Dr. Snoke died in April 1988.

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Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative pricesfor bond issues that reportedly trade well below par. Prices areobtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources duringthe prior week we think are reliable. Those sources may not,however, be complete or accurate. The Monday Bond Pricing tableis compiled on the Friday prior to publication. Prices reportedare not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices for actualtrades are probably different. Our objective is to shareinformation, not make markets in publicly traded securities.Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy orsell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entityaffiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies withinsolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 pershare in public markets. At first glance, this list may looklike the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sellshort. Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported athistorical cost net of depreciation may understate the true valueof a firm's assets. A company may establish reserves on itsbalance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize. Theprices at which equity securities trade in public market aredetermined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a bookof interest to troubled company professionals. All titles areavailable at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com. Go tohttp://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.

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