This
matter comes before the Court upon Motion by Plaintiff
Patricia Strulson (“Plaintiff”) to Reconsider the
previous Memorandum Opinion and Order dismissing four of the
five claims she has brought against her former employer,
Chegg, Inc. (“Defendant”). [DN 34.] Defendant has
responded, [DN 36], and Plaintiff has replied. [DN 40.] This
matter is ripe for adjudication. For the following reasons,
Plaintiff's Motion is GRANTED.

I.
Factual Background & Procedural History

The
following factual background is taken from Plaintiff's
Complaint. [DN 1.] Plaintiff was hired by Defendant in 2008
and was later promoted to the position of warehouse manager
in 2009. [Id. at 2.] “In September 2013, a
nodule was found on Plaintiff's lung, which turned out to
be cancerous.” [Id.] In November of the same
year, “Plaintiff went on leave under the Family and
Medical Leave Act (FMLA)…to have surgery for removal
of the cancerous nodule, lymph nodes, and lower lobe of her
lung.” [Id.] Thereafter, Plaintiff “was
unable to stand up, walk, drive, or stay awake for eight
hours. In January Plaintiff began chemotherapy.”
[Id. at 3.] Plaintiff “underwent four sessions
of chemotherapy, twenty-one days apart and had doctor's
appointments every week from November 2013 to May 2014. The
chemotherapy made Plaintiff very sick and caused her to be
stuck in the bed and sleeping most days.”
[Id.] “Throughout the relevant time
period…, Defendant was aware of Plaintiff's
diagnosis, treatment, and condition….”
Plaintiff's Complaint indicates that, while she was out
of the office due to chemotherapy, she stayed in contact with
work personnel and worked at least some of the time.
[Id.]

“Plaintiff
expressed concern to Ms. [Tammy] Dangerfield [an employee in
Defendant's human resources department] about being
terminated from work because she was taking FMLA leave. Ms.
Dangerfield informed Plaintiff that it was very expensive for
the company to have employees with cancer.”
[Id. at 3-4.] Although Plaintiff continued to see
her doctor every week, “[o]n January 20, 2014,
Plaintiff was released to return to work with certain
limitations. Upon her return to work, Plaintiff could no
longer walk around the warehouse due to her surgery, but
instead used a golf cart.” [Id.] After her
return to work, Plaintiff was transferred from her previous
position to the position of “projects manager, ”
although her previous position was not eliminated, and
“was filled by an employee who had less seniority
within the company, but who did not have the same or similar
health issues as Plaintiff.” [Id.]

“On
April 10, 2014, Plaintiff inquired into her available FMLA
time because her oncologist scheduled a CT scan of her lung,
” and “she wanted to be prepared for potentially
having more surgery or other cancer treatment like she did
before. At that time (April 2014), Plaintiff did in fact have
more FMLA time available.” [Id. at 5.]
“On April 17, 2014, Plaintiff's doctor informed her
that the CT scan showed something in her other lung (the
doctor was not sure, at that point, whether it was more
cancer). On April 18, 2014, Plaintiff told her boss, Eric
Williams, that something was found in her other lung.”
[Id.] One day later, on April 19, 2014,
“Defendant terminated Plaintiff from her employment
under the pretext of alleged unethical and unprofessional
behavior.” [Id.] Defendant's stated reason
for terminating Plaintiff's employment at Chegg was that
Plaintiff had hired her husband's grounds-keeping
business to perform certain work on Defendant's premises
“at too high a price and in violation of Chegg's
ethics policies.” [Id. at 6.] Plaintiff states
in her Complaint, though, that “the retention of
Plaintiff's husband's company was implemented through
a bidding process approved by [Defendant's] owner in
2010, Director of Operations in 2011 and 2012, and Vice
President of Operations in 2013….”
[Id.] A second reason given by Defendant for
Plaintiff's termination “was that she allegedly
encouraged Chegg to hire a temporary maintenance worker who
had felony convictions, demonstrating a total disregard for
the best interests of the company and its hiring
processes.” [Id.] Plaintiff states in her
Complaint that the employee in question was well-liked and
that Williams and Dangerfield were both aware of his criminal
history. [Id.]

Plaintiff
had previously filed a complaint against Defendant in 2014.
[See Compl. 3:14-cv-545.] This complaint
“alleged violations of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act,
Kentucky Equal Opportunities Act, unlawful interference under
the Family Medical Leave Act, retaliatory discharge under the
Family Medical Leave Act, and unlawful interference under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act.” [DN 19.] This
complaint was dismissed by United States District Judge David
Hale without prejudice. Therein, Judge Hale noted that he
“declined to conclude that her allegations were fatally
defective.” [Id.] In November 2015, Plaintiff
filed the instant Complaint, asserting the same five claims
listed above. [See DN 1.]

Before
this case was transferred to this Court, four of
Plaintiff's five claims were dismissed for a failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted in a
Memorandum Opinion and Order dated June 1, 2016. [DN 19.]
This decision will be discussed more fully in the
“Discussion” section below. On November 1, 2016,
in the interests of judicial economy and to equalize the
docket, this case was transferred to this Court, [DN 26], and
on September 29, 2017, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion,
asking this Court to reconsider the previous ruling
dismissing four of her five claims. [DN 34.]

II.
Legal Standards

A.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a
plaintiff's complaint include “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.” “Rule 12(b)(6) provides that a
complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.” Bloch v. Ribar,
156 F.3d 673, 677 (6th Cir. 1998). Importantly, “[w]hen
considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the district court must
accept all of the allegations in the complaint as true, and
construe the complaint liberally in favor of the
plaintiff.” Lawrence v. Chancery Court of
Tennessee, 188 F.3d 687, 691 (6th Cir. 1999). Thus,
“unless it can be established beyond a doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim
which would entitle him to relief, ” the motion should
be denied. Achterhof v. Selvaggio, 886 F.2d 826, 831
(6th Cir. 1989). “However, the Court need not accept as
true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual
inferences.” Blakely v. United States, 276
F.3d 853, 863 (6th Cir. 2002). A “complaint must
contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting
all the material elements to sustain a recovery under some
viable legal theory.” Andrews v. Ohio, 104
F.3d 803, 806 (6th Cir. 1997).

Even
though a “complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a
plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his
entitlement to relief requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). This means that the
plaintiff's “[f]actual allegations must be enough
to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the
assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true
(even if doubtful in fact).” Id. The concept
of “plausibility” denotes that a complaint should
contain sufficient facts “to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570.
The element of plausibility is met “when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009). But where the court is unable to
“infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,
the complaint has alleged-but has not show[n]-that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 1950
(internal quotation marks omitted).

B.
Reconsideration Standard

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&ldquo;District
courts have authority both under common law and Rule 54(b) to
reconsider interlocutory orders and to reopen any part of a
case before entry of final judgment.&rdquo; Rodriguez v.
Tennessee Laborers Health & Welfare Fund, 89 F.
App&#39;x 949, 959 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Leelaneu
Wine Cellars, Ltd. v. Black & Red, Inc., 118 F.
App&#39;x 942, 946 (6th Cir. 2004) (explaining that
&ldquo;[a]s long as a district court has jurisdiction over
the case, then it possesses the inherent procedural power to
reconsider, rescind, or modify an interlocutory order for
cause seen by it to be sufficient.&rdquo;). Indeed, pursuant
to Rule 54(b), &ldquo;any order or other decision, however
designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the
rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not
end the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be
revised at any time before the entry of a judgment
adjudicating all the claims and all the parties&#39; rights
and liabilities.&rdquo; (emphasis added). As the Sixth
Circuit instructed in Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro
Gov&#39;t v. Hotels.com, L.P., 590 F.3d 381, 389 (6th
...

Our website includes the first part of the main text of the court's opinion.
To read the entire case, you must purchase the decision for download. With purchase,
you also receive any available docket numbers, case citations or footnotes, dissents
and concurrences that accompany the decision.
Docket numbers and/or citations allow you to research a case further or to use a case in a
legal proceeding. Footnotes (if any) include details of the court's decision. If the document contains a simple affirmation or denial without discussion,
there may not be additional text.

Buy This Entire Record For
$7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.