Essentially, the case revolves around two complaints: that New Jersey’s voting machines do not provide a paper record of ballots cast, and that the type of machine used in New Jersey is vulnerable to hacking.

Let’s establish at the outset that no system is perfect. Remember the days when ballot boxes could be stuffed? Remember the “hanging chads” from punch-card ballots in the 2000 presidential election?

Activists routinely cite only two potentially outcome-changing problems over a decade with New Jersey’s 11,000 electronic machines, both of which occurred in South Jersey. But both turned out to be human error, not computer error, and certainly not hacking: In a 2008 primary, some Democrats got Republican ballots and vice versa, while in 2011 the names of two candidates were inadvertently switched by a Cumberland County election worker.

Theoretically, the experts say, the machines could be hacked, but it would take a “monumental effort” involving criminal access to state office space as well as technical skill.

Nonetheless, the lack of a paper trail offering a receipt of votes cast makes whatever system we use more vulnerable to both hacking “what ifs” and to real, non-malicious errors.

Assistant State Attorney General Donna Kelly told an appellate panel this week that the state hasn’t implemented a 2005 law requiring upgrades because it didn’t have the $19 million to do the job then, and doesn’t have it now. Eight years, and two presidential elections later, crying poor is a poor excuse. The upgrades could have been completed over three or four years with little single-year budget impact.

Even if an entirely new “hacker-proof” system isn’t necessary, there’s a clear need to add a paper trail. The appeals court should compel implementation of the 2005 law to that extent.