Across a variety of projects, we have developed methods for
identifying knowledge structures that capture, in part, a
decision maker's situation understanding and plans.

In these projects, we identified mental models based
on critical incident interviews in which officers described
actual decision making experiences. This occured in several
analytical steps, in which we discovered recurring topics,
labelled them, and analyzed their tendency to occur together.
A mental model is a set of correlated topics, typically
linked by causal relationships. More recent work has
explored automated knowledge acquisition
methods that supplements and confirm these manual methods.

The following is an example of an enemyintent mental
model.

Time Stance

Mental models of time stance are of critical
importance in decision making. A time stance is the relationship
that a decision maker's action has to the decision cycle of
another decision maker. The decision maker can try
to influence the other party's actions in a
favorable way, try to predict the other party's
actions and prepare to act on the prediction, or simply react
to them after they have begun to occur. The other decision
maker may be the enemy or it may be othes in the decision
maker's own organizatiion.

It seems plausible to regard initiative as
increasing from reactive to predictive to proactive time stances.

Mental Models and Initiative

A further analysis sheds more light on initiative. The following
multidimensional space represents an analysis of correlations
among mental models and other variables. Initiative increases
from left to right, as we go from reactive to predictive to
proactive. However, the three time stances from a triangle,
with a time stance at one of its corners. The two dimensions
of the triangle are one way of breaking initiative down into
components: (1) Is knowedge of another decision maker's action
obtained early (proactive and predictive) or
late (reactive) in the other party's decision
cycle? (2) Is knowedge of another decision maker's action
obtained merely by assessment (predictive and
reactive stances) or is it obtained by active influence
(proacative stance)?

Different mental models tend to occur more often in connection
with the three different time stances, hence, are associated
with different degrees of initiative:

The reactive time stance typically involves surprise
and mental models of alternative explanations
of what happended.

The predictive time stance involves models of enemy and
friendly intent, models of reliability
of sources, and models of rate of movement.

The proactive orientation depends on mental models of
the higher-level purpose of the operation.
It also involves mental models of enemy and friendly intent,
but in a different causal relationship: Freindly intent
causally affects enemy intent rather than the other way
around.

Mental Models and Expertise

More experienced officers were significantly more likely
to use mental models of higher-level purpose
and the proactive time stance than less experienced
officers. There was also a tendency for more experienced officers
to use friendly intent mental models, i.e., to be aware of
the plan of one's own organization.

The solid line in the diagram below shows the mental models
used in at least 30% of incidents by more experienced
officers; and the dashed line shows those used 30% of the
time by less experienced officers.

Shared and Non-Shared Mental Models in Teams

Specialization is one method for increasing efficiency. Thus,
different teams within an organization, or different subteams
within a team, may be assigned different task responsibilities
in different locations, and may also receive different training
and equipment. On the other hand, coordination within and
across teams depends on a significant amount of shared knowledge
about the situation and plan. A major problem in teamwork
is, How best to balance efficiency and coordination?

In our analyes of mental models, we found significant correlations
between the use of different kinds of mental models and the
type of unit to which an individual belonged,
as well as a significant core of overlap. The figure below
shows the mental models that occured in 30% or more of the
critical incident interviews for a particular unit type.

As the figure shows, only intelligence officers considered
the sources of evidence and alternative ways
of explaining it. Officers in heavy and light units were concerned
with the conclusions of the analysis (e.g.,
about enemy intent). They seldom reflected on the sources
of an inference. On the other hand, intelligence officers
were alone in not consistently referencing the components
of friendly plans.

Officers in heavy units tended to be proactive
more often than other officers, perhaps reflecting a greater
abiliity to influence the enemy. These officers were likely
to reflect on higher-level purpose, friendly intent, and enemy
intent. By contrast, officers in light units were more likely
to be predictive. These officers focused more
exclusively on enemy intent, largely in order to avoid concentrations
of enemy strength. Finally, specialized units focused more
on friendly intent, reflecting their role in support of plans
constructed by other units.

These results reflect both the advantages and disadvantages
of specialization. Lack of consistent considertaion of friendly
plans or purpose permits intelligence officers officers to
focus on their own job, but it might on occasion cause intelligence
officers to overlook creative opportunities for information
collection. Similarly, lack of awareness of evidence interpretation
issues might lead maneuver officers to put more weight on
predictions of enemy intent than they deserve. By focussing
too narrowly on friendly plans, specialized units may fail
to anticipate changes in those plans to achieve higher-level
purposes in the face of enemy action.

The need to balance specialized efficiency and shared knowleddge
has important implications for team training. A flexible process
of critical thinking is necessary
to decide how deeply to probe into mental models associated
with other tasks, and to determine the right balance in each
particular context.

Critical Thinking about Mental Models

Mental models and critical thinking are inextricably tied
together in decision making. Proficiency is a combination
of knowledge, i.e., well-structured mental models, and the
ability to think critically about knowledge. Even more importanly,
critical thinking is a key element in the acquisition of knowledge.
Mental models are not static, but evolve thorugh repeated
cycles of critical thinking in which problems of uncertainty
are identified and addressed. It is the latter process that
is described in the Recognition
/ Metacognition model.

The critical thinking
training that CTI has developed is designed to convey
both of these key components of proficient decision making.