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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000955
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/MAG.
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/8/2019
TAGS: PRELPTERPGOVKISLPHUMLY
SUBJECT: LIBYAN ISLAMIC FIGHTING GROUP REVISES JIHADIST IDEOLOGY
REF: A) Tripoli 359; B) Tripoli 678
TRIPOLI 00000955 001.2 OF 003
CLASSIFIED BY: Joan A. Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, U.S.
Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Six leading members of the Libyan Islamic
Fighting Group (LIFG) imprisoned in Libya recently issued a
417-page document renouncing the use of violence and
establishing a new "code" for jihad. The group includes LIFG's
"founding fathers," individuals with ties to Al Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb's (AQIM) senior leadership, including the elder
brother of Abu Yahya al-Libi, a leading AQIM figure. The
recantation claims to represent a clearer understanding of the
"ethics" of Islamic shari'a law and jihad and specifically
refutes the LIFG's decades-long jihad against Muammar
al-Qadhafi. The document is the result of a two-year initiative
led by Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi through his Qadhafi
International Charity and Development Foundation (QDF), and
supported by Libya's internal and external security services.
As a result of the initiative, more than 200 jihadists
(approximately half of the imprisoned LIGF members) have been
released from prison, with more releases expected soon. The
initiative has been highlighted by local and international media
as a potential model in counter-radicalization and touted by the
Libyan government as a "revolutionary new method to combat
terrorism and the influence of Al Qaeda in the region." While
Libya's terrorist rehabilitation program has drawn skepticism
from some quarters, who view the recantation as coerced and
politically motivated, the work is reportedly being reviewed by
foreign governments and has received praise as a positive GOL
contribution to regional counterterrorism efforts. While the
initiative is significant for Libya's internal politics --
simultaneously shoring up regime stability and Saif al-Islam's
credentials -- its long-term effects as a counter-radicalization
effort remain to be seen. End summary.
SAIF AL-ISLAM AND LIBYAN SECURITY FORCES FACILITATE CODE,
RELEASE OF LIFG
¶2. (SBU) In late September, six leading members of the Libyan
Islamic Fighting Group, being held in the Abu Salim prison,
issued a document outlining a revised interpretation of their
jihadist ideology -- one which renounces violence and claims to
adhere to a more sound Islamic theology than that of Al Qaeda
and other jihadist organizations. The authors represent the
group's historic senior leadership, including Abd al-Hakim
Balhaj (aka, Abu Abd Allah al-Sadiq, Emir of the LIFG), Abu
al-Munder al-Saidi (Jurisprudence Official of the LIFG/most
senior shari'a authority), Abd al-Wahab al-Qayed (the elder
brother of Abu Yahya al-Libi, a leading AQIM figure), Khalid
al-Sharif, Miftah al-Duwdi, and Mustafa Qanaifid. In the
417-page, Arabic-language document, entitled "Revisionist
Studies of the Concepts of Jihad, Verification, and Judgment of
People," the authors point to ignorance and a misinterpretation
of Islamic jurisprudence as the basis for their formerly violent
expression of Islamic jihad. The authors state that "The lack
of religious knowledge, whether it was a result of an absence of
'ulama' (religious scholars) or the neglect of people in
receiving it and attaining it, or due to the absence of its
sources, is the biggest cause of errors and religious
violations." They credit a deep evaluation of their lives'
experiences, coupled with a closer study of shari'a law for
their ideological reform.
¶3. (SBU) The study is characterized as an attempt to recant
former LIFG doctrine and to establish a new "code" for jihad for
the benefit of the modern Muslim community. In the text, the
authors directly challenge Al Qaeda, addressing the recantation
to "anyone who we might have once had organizational or
brotherly ties with." The document gives detailed
interpretations of the "ethics and morals to jihad," which
include the rejection of violence as a means to change political
situations in Muslim majority countries whose leader is a Muslim
and condemns "the killing of women, children, the elderly,
monks/priests, wage earners, messengers, merchants and the
like." It claims that "The reduction of jihad to fighting with
the sword is an error and shortcoming."
¶4. (S/NF) The revised LIFG ideology is the result of a two-year
initiative, led by Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi in his capacity as
QDF chairman and brokered on behalf of the Libyan government.
According to press reports and Libyan officials, Saif worked
closely with the UK-based former LIFG leader, Noman Benotman, on
the effort to work on a revised ideology with the LIFG in
exchange for amnesty. QDF's lead negotiator, Salah Abdelsalam
Salah, director of the QDF's Human Rights Committee, (who also
heads Saif al-Islam's al-Ghad Media Group, ref A), said that he
had met with al-Sadiq "4-5" times in 2007, before reconciliation
TRIPOLI 00000955 002.2 OF 003
discussions began in earnest. At that time, al-Sadiq seemed
"ready to reconcile" and had indicated that his cohort shared
his serious desire to break with their violent past.
¶5. (S/NF) Salah detailed the two-year negotiation in a meeting
with Pol/Econ Chief, sharing several handwritten letters from
al-Sadiq to Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, requesting assistance.
After the initial communication, a series of meetings began,
along two tracks: the first involving imprisoned LIFG
leadership conversing with their members; the second involving
LIFG leadership, the QDF, leading Islamic scholars, and prison
officials (from Libya's Internal Security Organization).
Libya's External Security Organization reportedly took on a
supporting role, coordinating a "reconciliation and
rehabilitation" movement among Libyan opposition figures
(including LIFG members and others) living abroad. The meetings
continued over the course of two years, and al-Sadiq wrote
letters to Saif al-Islam throughout that period with updates on
the LIFG position. In a letter dated January 16, 2009, al-Sadiq
informed Saif of the LIFG's intention to draft the recantation
work by August 1, 2009, to announce revisions to its jihadist
ideology and to reconcile with the Libyan regime. On February
23, 2009, al-Sadiq issued a press statement on behalf of the
LIFG leaders in prison, announcing the continuation of a
reconciliation dialogue with the QDF and GOL. Salah refused to
comment on international press reports that Saif faced
challenges from old guard regime officials who reportedly did
not want to pardon the prisoners.
¶6. (S/NF) As reported in ref B, QDF's Executive Director told us
in August that the QDF had facilitated consultations between
LIFG leadership and leading Islamic scholars, such as
Qatar-based Egyptian cleric Yusuf al-Qardawi and Sheikh Ali
Asalabi. In response to an early-2009 letter from al-Sadiq to
Saif requesting by title a list of more than 10 books on Islamic
jurisprudence, the QDF provided reading and reference materials
for the LIFG to study in prison. On August 1, al-Sadiq informed
Saif that the revisionist study was complete and submitted it
for review.
¶7. (S/NF) On August 23, to mark the beginning of Ramadan and the
Libyan leader's 40th anniversary in power, LIFG leadership
issued another press statement, this time apologizing to Muammar
al-Qadhafi for their past acts of violence against him. The
first of two rounds of prison releases took place shortly after
the statement was published, with 91 LIFG prisoners pardoned and
released. A second amnesty was announced in mid-October, with
another 43 LIFG members reportedly being released. According to
Salah, these releases constitute approximately half of the
imprisoned LIFG members, all of whom were imprisoned at Abu
Salim prison. (Saif al-Islam has publicly stated his intention
to demolish the facility, infamous for a 1996 uprising that left
1200 prisoners dead, after the last prisoners have been
released.) Salah reported that another round of amnesties would
take place in the coming weeks, with Saif's ultimate goal being
100-percent prisoner release. In a separate effort, Salah said
that the GOL has released some 62 members of other "jihadist
groups" from Abu Salim prison based on their recantations of
violent jihad.
¶8. (S/NF) According to Salah, the revisionist study represented
the dissolution of the LIFG organization in Libya. Upon
release, each former LIFG member becomes a "regular" citizen and
is allowed to "do what regular Libyans do," including
unrestricted movement and the freedom to travel abroad. Salah
vehemently denied the assertion among some analysts that the
LIFG leaders reconciled due to lucrative incentive packages
offered by the GOL. He claimed that the only benefits given to
former LIFG prisoners upon release were "job training and
employment assistance, financial support for medical care, if
needed, and living expenses until the prisoners are able to find
jobs." Some press reports indicate that as a condition of the
pardon, former militants are required to pledge not to
participate in Libyan politics, although they are able to speak
in mosques. [Comment: Even if they wanted to participate in
politics, how they would do so is unclear, given that political
parties are outlawed in Libya. End comment.]
¶9. (SBU) Saif al-Islam's involvement in the reconciliation
effort has received widespread local and international media
attention -- state-run print media has published excerpts of the
text and praised Saif for his work, and CNN recently broadcast a
feature report on the efforts. The CNN report praises the
initiative, describing Saif's motivation as not only ending the
TRIPOLI 00000955 003.2 OF 003
violent movement against the regime but also combating Al
Qaeda's "growing influence in the region." CNN further claimed
that, "In essence the new code for jihad is exactly what the
West has been waiting for: a credible challenge from within
jihadist ranks to Al Qaeda's ideology." International
think-tanks such as the Quilliam Foundation and Jihadica have
analyzed the efforts and the LIFG document, with the latter
calling it a "very sweeping repudiation not just of Salafi
jihadism but of all forms of revolutionary Islamism in general."
¶10. (C) Some observers believe the Libyan counter-radicalization
experiment could be used as a model across the region and state
that it differs from similar efforts, such as those in Saudi
Arabia, Yemen, and Egypt in its methods and target audience.
The September 17 edition of the US-based "Terrorism Monitor"
credited the initiative's success to the "full institutional
participation of the LIFG and its leadership," in the reform
project. By contrast, the Saudi Arabian and Yemeni models, for
example, relied on "the conversion of militant individuals who
may remain drawn (willingly or otherwise) to their former
organizations." In Egypt, the work of the Egyptian Islamic
Jihad, while renouncing violence, maintained a fairly extreme
ideology, propounded primarily by a single leader of the
organization.
¶11. (S/NF) The Libyan government proudly explained the efforts
to reconcile with LIFG members during a September 6 meeting with
NEA A/S Feltman. During the meeting, Director of Military
Intelligence and Muammar al-Qadhafi confidante, Abdullah
al-Sanussi, described the effort as a "revolutionary new method
to combat terrorism and the influence of Al Qaeda in the
region," and presented a pre-published copy of the recantation
study. UK diplomats have told us that the Libyans have also
given them a copy of the work, which they are translating in
full and analyzing as a possible model for
counter-radicalization efforts. Other diplomats have praised
the program as a positive GOL contribution to regional
counterterrorism efforts.
¶12. (S/NF) Amidst the positive international attention currently
focused on Saif al-Islam's LIFG counter-radicalization program,
some observers have expressed skepticism to emboffs about the
project. One Western diplomat confided his personal view that
the efforts were purely political and that even the Islamic
scholars involved in the effort, such as Yusuf al-Qardawi, had
political agendas. A number of private Libyan citizens agreed
with the opinions expressed on some foreign-based blogs, that
Libya's security organizations forced the LIFG leaders to write
the recantation and that some LIFG members -- imprisoned in Abu
Salim prison for decades -- were simply motivated by the
prospect of pardon and the hope of reuniting with their
families.
COMMENT
¶13. (S/NF) While local and international opinions are still
being formulated on the initiative, the LIFG's renouncement of
violent jihad and extremist ideology, and the document's direct
challenge to Al Qaeda, represents a significant achievement for
Saif al-Islam in particular and the Libyan government as a
whole. The primary motivation for Muammar al-Qadhafi's backing
of the initiative was undoubtedly regime security, and for Saif
al-Islam, it may also have been political, designed to shore up
his credentials both at home and abroad. We suspect that the
Libyan Government may well have contributed significant
resources in the form of "financial assistance" to help ensure
that the newly released fighters maintain their end of the
bargain. The GOL's immediate payoff on this investment is
significant: the elimination of one of Qadhafi's most staunch
opposition groups and a high-profile public relations coup in
Libya's ongoing quest to position itself as a leader in the
Islamic world. However, the long-term effects of the
initiative, particularly with respect to the ideology of jihad
and global counter-radicalization efforts, remains to be seen.
POLASCHIK