(1) In this Act, references to deprivation of a person’s liberty have the same meaning as in Article 5(1) of the Human Rights Convention and, accordingly, a person is not deprived of liberty in any of the circumstances described in subsections (2) to (4).

(2) A person is not deprived of liberty in a particular place if the person is free to leave that place permanently.

(3) A person is not deprived of liberty in a particular place if—

(a) the person is not subject to continuous supervision, and

(b) the person is free to leave the place temporarily (even if subject to supervision while outside that place).

(4) A person is not deprived of liberty if—

(a) the arrangements alleged to give rise to the deprivation of liberty are put in place in order to give medical treatment for a physical illness or injury, and

(b) the same (or materially the same) arrangements would be put in place for any person receiving that treatment.

(5) A person is free to leave a particular place for the purposes of subsections (2) and (3) even if the person is unable to leave that place provided that if the person expressed a wish to leave the person would be enabled to do so.”

(2) In section 64(5) of that Act (interpretation) for the words from “same” to the end substitute “meaning given by section 4ZA.””

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My Lords, this Bill will ensure that vulnerable people are afforded protections should they be deprived of their liberty. It will increase access to protections for the 125,000 people who are potentially being deprived of their liberty without an authorisation in place. The Government have, in the other place, made a number of changes which we will consider today.

Amendment 1 was tabled by the Government to provide statutory clarification in relation to the meaning of a deprivation of liberty for the purposes of the Mental Capacity Act. This proposed new clause anchors the meaning of deprivation of liberty to Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights. My predecessor and noble friend Lord O’Shaughnessy committed to bring forward statutory clarification in order to provide clarity to people and professionals. The clause delivers this by setting out non-exhaustive bounds of the concept of deprivation of liberty—that is, circumstances which do not constitute a deprivation of liberty. This is a matter that I have discussed with a number of your Lordships.

It sets out that a person is not deprived of their liberty if they are free permanently or temporarily to leave the place they are in and would not be subject to continuous supervision if they were enabled to leave if they expressed a wish to do so. A person will also not be deprived of liberty if arrangements are put in place to give medical treatment for physical illness or injury and these are the same as would be put in place for anyone receiving this treatment.

These boundaries to the concept of deprivation of liberty are drawn mainly from existing case law decided by our highest courts. We have taken this approach because it allows case law to evolve and helps ensure the definition remains valid as it does so. It is also very difficult for any positive definition to adequately address the range of cases that may be a deprivation of liberty, particularly while retaining the ability to reflect evolving case law. This clause will be accompanied by statutory guidance, which will be scrutinised by both Houses. We are currently working with stakeholders to compile case studies to illustrate when a deprivation of liberty occurs or does not occur under this definition, so that it will be more usable by practitioners and individuals.

Amendment 1B, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, provides an alternative definition of deprivation of liberty. It specifies that a person is deprived of their liberty if they are confined in a space,

“for more than a negligible period of time … have not given valid consent and the arrangements are due to an action of a person or body responsible to the state”.

Concerns about this amendment have been raised with me. It speaks directly to Article 5 of the ECHR, and we all agree on the importance of Article 5 in protecting liberty. It is vital to make sure that this is done right. If Parliament defines that concept, it must be clear how our statutory definition of deprivation of liberty relates to the ECHR definition. Our amendment clearly articulates the relationship between Parliament’s definition and the ECHR’s. Getting this wrong would mean further delays for thousands of people who were previously receiving protections. It does this in new subsection (1) by stating that deprivation of liberty has the Article 5 meaning, “and, accordingly”, that there is no deprivation of liberty in the circumstances in the remaining subsections. Thus it is clearly stated that what is not a deprivation of liberty is the same under the Act as under the convention: there is no difference between the two.

Amendment 1B does not do that. The clause defines a deprivation of liberty only for the purposes of the Act itself. It does not link it to Article 5 of the convention. This would risk Parliament’s concept of deprivation of liberty diverging from the convention. It is not appropriate to have two divergent concepts of deprivation of liberty, one set by Parliament and another set by the ECHR. The difference between the two would risk creating confusion and uncertainty. It would also mean that people who fall outside Parliament’s concept of deprivation of liberty but within the Article 5 definition could not have their circumstances considered within the Mental Capacity Act and would have to take their case to the High Court, causing delays. That would not be acceptable. Too many people are already being failed by the current system because of delays. We cannot create a situation that creates further delay, confusion or uncertainty.

Amendment 1B would create a narrow concept of deprivation of liberty. Proposed new subsections (2) and (3) provide cumulative requirements for a deprivation of liberty. If any one of those requirements is absent, the situation falls outside the Act’s concept of deprivation of liberty. One of the requirements is in subsection (3)(b): that the person is,

“subject to continuous supervision and control”.

On this definition, if a person is subject to a level of supervision or control that is less than continuous, they are outside the Act.

For example, a person may be locked in to their care home, unable to leave, regularly medicated and with little liberty. However, the level of supervision might be less than continuous. For example, they may be given just an hour a day to walk unsupervised in a confined garden. Under Amendment 1B, that person may not be considered to have their liberty deprived and would fall outside the Act’s protective framework. I am sure we all recognise that such a restriction as a deprivation of liberty, but the clause would not afford that person protections. Therefore, under the Government’s more limited draft, a person would not fall under liberty protection safeguards merely because there is some period of the day when their supervision is not “continuous”. Rather, it would be only where this was coupled with the person being free to leave temporarily.

This illustrates clearly the problem with trying to provide a list of matters which, together, constitute a deprivation of liberty, or a positive definition. Noble Lords will know that the concept of deprivation of liberty is both complex and fact-sensitive, and needs to apply across varying situations. Indeed, I know that there was a lot of debate on the subject before I came to this House. If a list of requirements is used, such as with Amendment 1B and its proposed new subsections (2) and (3), the real risk is that the list does not capture what is and is not a deprivation of liberty across the widely varying situations that might arise. This then risks leading to the definition not being compatible with Article 5. That is one of the reasons why we opted against having an exhaustive definition of all deprivations of liberty in all settings. Rather, our clause seeks to put into legislation and clarify key features of the concept of deprivation of liberty while minimising the risk of incompatibility with the convention.

I am further concerned by proposed new subsection (2)(b), through which a person falls outside the scheme if they have “given valid consent”. The meaning of this seems to us unclear. This subsection could plausibly be interpreted as providing that people lacking capacity can consent to their confinement, creating a category of people who consent to their deprivation of liberty but lack capacity to make that decision. If that is what the clause intends, it should say so. If it is not, it is unclear what the clause seeks to achieve. A major concern is that the clause does not define “valid consent”, which could lead to uncertainty in implementation. It is essential that any inclusion of that would have to be very clear about what it means.

We are also concerned that the definition in Amendment 1B is narrower than the Article 5 concept of what is imputable to the state, and would mean that cases relating to people being deprived of liberty by non-state actors would fall outside of the system and, instead, fall to the courts, which of course is something that we are trying to avoid. Subsection (4) of the Government’s new clause is a reference to the Court of Appeal’s decision in the case of Ferreira, with which I am sure noble Lords will be familiar. Amendment 1B contains no equivalent subsection and I am concerned that this of itself could create difficulties. Amendment 1B purports to be an exhaustive definition of when a person is considered to be deprived of their liberty for the purposes of the Mental Capacity Act. Without an exception for the sort of situation covered by the case of Ferreira, it is unclear whether Ferreira would continue to apply. This confusion could result in more LPS applications being required where, under the existing law, or under the Government’s proposed amendment, LPSs would not apply.

This amendment, if passed, could risk us having a longer backlog and, in turn, more delay, uncertainty and confusion, as well as our not having a workable system through this legislation. It would mean that people would have to continue to access safeguards through the courts. In addition, we believe that the clause would diverge from ECHR case law on what constitutes a deprivation of liberty. I am sure that noble Lords take these issues extremely seriously; our discussions have shown that they do.

I understand that the noble Baroness and charities such as Age UK are concerned about ensuring that the meaning of deprivation of liberty is understood by families and carers, as well as by those who work in the sector. I agree that this is important but do not think that it can be done through the Bill alone; that is why we are working with the sector to produce a statutory code. I understand concerns that this single code may not go far enough to help families and carers understand the definition, and I would be happy to consider whether a further code or supporting material aimed at these groups might be beneficial. Case studies will be provided to illustrate when a deprivation of liberty occurs and when the provision of care, support and treatment does not meet that threshold.

I assure noble Lords that the government amendment is the result of many months of careful work, in which I know many noble Lords have been involved. We have worked closely with lawyers across government to ensure that this clause reflects existing case law as much as possible, and can provide clarification of the current position while preserving Article 5 rights. The government amendment is clear and precise, which is essential when putting these rights into legislation: that is, turning them into legal rights. It is not something we have done lightly; similarly, changes cannot be made lightly. I understand that the noble Baroness wishes to ensure that the definition can be communicated by people and professionals but, as I outlined a moment ago, it is not appropriate for this to be done through the Bill alone. On this basis, I respectfully ask that the noble Baroness withdraws her amendment and I hope that noble Lords will be content to accept the amendments from the House of Commons. I beg to move.

Amendment to the Motion

Moved by

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My Lords, I take this opportunity to welcome the Minister to her new role. I am very much looking forward to working with her, and thank her for meeting me yesterday.

I was pleased that the Government listened to the concerns that many of us raised when this Bill was on Report, and that they agreed to introduce a statutory definition in the Bill. They subsequently brought forward a new clause in the other place, introducing what some have termed an exclusionary definition of deprivation of liberty.

I believe that there are serious problems with the government definition. My overriding concern is that as it currently stands, the government amendment defines only when a person is not being deprived of their liberty. A definition based on someone not having their liberty restricted does not, in my view, allow for a clear assessment of whether a cared-for person is currently being deprived of their liberty. The whole of the definition is couched in the negative, and splattered with double negatives, which I consider very difficult to understand.

I also have concerns over Clause 1(4) in the government definition, which I believe is unnecessary. When it is in someone’s best interest to receive emergency or routine medical care, there is already a clear consent procedure—even when that patient lacks capacity. As currently worded, it is discriminatory between physical and mental illnesses. I have taken much advice, and I am grateful to people in the sector—charities, lawyers, human rights groups, academics and others—who have offered invaluable expertise in this very complicated issue. I note that some leading academics have described the Government definition as too complicated, unclear and out of step with Article 5 of the ECHR, and therefore likely to lead to costly litigation. I accept that my last two points run contrary to what the Minister has said, but this demonstrates what a highly complex, contested and difficult-to-interpret area this is. Nothing is that clear-cut.

What is needed is a definition which is simple, easy to understand and provides practitioners, and above all, families and cared-for people, with a clear understanding of where they stand. The purpose of any definition is to provide absolute clarity to practitioners. Perhaps more importantly, it should tell cared-for people and their families when they are deprived of their liberties and thus have certain rights which they can call upon. It is, frankly, of little use if people cannot use it to make such a determination, and my conclusion at the moment is that the definition does not serve that purpose.

We need a definition which, as well as being simple and easy to understand, allows guidance and information to be developed for families and practitioners that will allow them to make a real-world determination of whether the care arrangements they are putting in place when their loved ones lack capacity amount to a deprivation of liberty.

The definition that best captured the recommendations from the Cheshire West case of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale is that the person concerned is under continuous supervision and control and is not free to leave. I believe that the wording in Amendment 1B meets these vital tests. My definition of what constitutes a deprivation on liberty is based on the principles outlined in the noble and learned Baroness’s judgment in the Cheshire West case. I believe that it would allow practitioners and family members to clearly test their individual circumstances against that definition.

This is complex and I think many of us have found it difficult to get our head round it, but it is so important that the definition is compliant with Article 5 of the ECHR. The definition that I have put forward meets that test. It may not be perfect but it provides a basis for moving forwards. I beg to move.

My Lords, I commend the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, for the amount of work that she has put into her amendment, along with others of us who have worked on it. I do not want to take a lot of time repeating what she has already said in explaining it. However, I would like to pick up on some criticisms made by the Minister and question them.

The Minister spoke critically about the concept of “valid consent” yet, as far as I have understood, consent must always have three pillars to it: the person must have capacity to make that decision; they must have accurate information on which to make a decision; and it must be made voluntarily and free of coercion. With those three pillars in place for all types of consent, I was slightly confused by the Minister’s suggestion that this could somehow apply if people did not have capacity to provide consent. The other area where I was confused when she spoke relates to the Government’s own amendment, where we have a double negative. Amendment 1 says:

“A person is not deprived of liberty in a particular place if … the person is not subject to continuous supervision”.

However, the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, has turned the two negatives into a positive as while a person would be “subject to continuous supervision”, she has added the very important words “and control”.

A lot of people who are supervised one way or another are free to do what they want, but there is a safety barrier around them. They are not being controlled in the way that they behave; it is simply that to protect them from dangers to which they may be subject, there is a degree of supervision. That is called good care of another citizen, and we all do it all the time in relation to each other if we see someone about to get into a situation which is dangerous, whether or not they have mental capacity. The difference in this situation is that if somebody is deprived of their liberty, something is being taken away from them and controlled by another person. The amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, has captured that difference between a duty-of-care supervision and that control.

I know that there are difficulties in defining a negligible period of time but I note the concept, in the Government’s own amendment, of whether somebody is free to leave a place permanently. How long would we determine “permanently” to be? Is it days, weeks, months or years when, again, it is a concept but is not defined specifically? With those questions, I am concerned that the Government’s criticism of the noble Baroness’s amendment does not stack up equally with the criticisms that have come from many quarters over the Government’s amendment, which is indeed quite difficult to understand, particularly because of the double negatives in it.

I draw the House’s attention to the fact that, if I am correct, the Law Commission’s original report did not include a recommendation of a definition. Perhaps what we see here is that it is incredibly difficult to come up with a definition that applies across the enormous range of circumstances that people who lack capacity may find themselves in. I am concerned that the Government’s amendment is intended, in the words of the Minister, to be able to respond to evolving case law. I suggest that that is a recognition that there will be legal challenges to the Government’s own definition, just as much as to any other, and I am unsure how that will be avoided by anything in the Bill. I will therefore strongly support the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler.

My Lords, I offer my support to my noble friend’s amendment. All of us know—with due respect to the lawyers sitting among us today—that when you have more than a few lawyers, you get more than some factorial of opinions. My noble friend’s amendment was drawn up in consultation with both the care sector and human rights lawyers—hence we have more than one view. We believe that where we are is the right view.

The Minister stated that it was not always possible to use plain English in legislation. That is patently not the case. I point the Minister to the Care Act, another piece of legislation that affects the care of vulnerable adults. It was written from top to toe in plain English.

There is a call for this amendment to be clear. We have already heard today that the double negatives used in the government amendment are not easily understood. It does not read well; it is not comfortable. It needs to be clear, in positive rather than negative language, and able to be understood by a lay person or a carer. This amendment has the backing of the care and health sector bodies, and so we support it.

My Lords, this is a very difficult area. I agree with all the noble Baronesses who have spoken, in so far as they stress the problems of trying to identify what one means by “liberty” in this area, particularly regarding mental health. A number of cases have come before the courts, both in this House when it was sitting in its appellate capacity, and in the UK Supreme Court, where I sat and grappled with this problem myself. I support the government amendment which seems much more consistent with the way the Strasbourg court has interpreted Article 5.

There is a great deal of case law that has been developed over the years as to the meaning of “liberty” in its various contexts. The point that comes out very clearly from a case called HL v the United Kingdom—it went to Strasbourg following a decision in this House in a case called R v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust—is that account has to be taken of a whole range of factors when you look at the word “liberty” for the purposes of the article. The court says that in the end it will always come down to a question of degree and intensity, regarding whether what has been going on really is a deprivation of liberty or merely a restriction. It is trying to devise a dividing line between these factors that one is searching for in looking for a definition.

The court said it decided not to try to define the world “liberty”, because it was so difficult to find a workable definition that would apply to all circumstances. What you tend to find is the approach that the government amendment takes, of saying what does not fall within the article in a given case, and what does. It is a safer way of proceeding, rather than trying to, as the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness does, lay down in clear terms what the “deprivation of liberty” amounts to. The problem is that if one looks at the way in which that amendment is framed, in future cases the courts are going to find it very difficult to see whether Article 5 is consistent with what is in the amendment. Then there is the problem of the court having to declare an incompatibility, which then has to be sorted out by some further amendment.

The safer and most useful route is to anchor the amendment to Article 5, as subsection (1) of the government amendment does; and then, for the guidance of those who have to deal with these difficult issues, set out some clearly defined areas where they are not at risk of it being said that they are in conflict with the article. I do not find the provisions set out in the subsections that follow difficult to understand.

I thank the noble and learned Lord for allowing me to ask a question about the comments of the Joint Committee on Human Rights and its grave reservations about the formulation which the Government are putting forward.

I am not surprised; we are all grappling with a difficult area. Based on my own experience, and my reading of the Strasbourg decisions, the Government’s approach is the safer one to adopt. Before the noble Baroness stopped me, I was trying to say that there are situations where the use of a double negative is a perfectly intelligible way of proceeding, so that criticism does not seem particularly strong. I suggest that we follow the Government’s approach for the reasons I have given, especially because of the way it anchors the proposed section to Article 5 itself. We are always going to come back to the Strasbourg court and the way it interprets the article. We do not have the final word on this, I am afraid, because of the way the convention is framed, the way we have subscribed to it and the way we apply the decisions of the Strasbourg court.

My Lords, this is a challenging and complex Bill and this topic is possibly the most complex of all. Before considering the merits of the two approaches, it is worth reflecting on the fact that a huge amount of work has gone into the development of the government amendment and that in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler. I signal our gratitude to that work, and to the contribution of many people who grappled with a difficult and challenging area, as the noble and learned Lord pointed out. I am certain that all those people had the right intentions.

Speaking from the Back Benches, having shepherded the Bill on an interesting rollercoaster ride through this House while I was a Minister, there are two questions which I have to satisfy myself on. The first, and less important in a sense, is whether this fulfils the promise which I made the House that the Government would bring forward a definition. The second—much more important—one is whether the Government have provided an operable definition that will be useful in reality, which is, after all, what we want. My noble friend the Minister gave a robust exposition of the merits of the Government’s amendment. It is certainly the product of a huge amount of work, some of it when I was in the department, and offers clarity and precision. It also offers a way through on the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay. There has been a great deal of disagreement on what the right, positive definition ought to look like, so going for a negative one—I think it was described as an exclusionist definition—offers a way through.

The noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, made an important point about the complexity of language and whether this is intelligible. We need to draw a distinction between who will be using the Act and who will be using the statutory guidance that will flow from it. The Act will mainly be the subject of scrutiny by lawyers and others who are able to cope with double negatives and such things, in a way that I cannot. More importantly, these will be—and are being—distilled into case studies of how this would operate in practice. That is what will be practically useful for cared-for people, their carers and those who are supporting them. Perhaps when my noble friend responds to this debate she will say a little more about how the statutory guidance which will bring this to life will be scrutinised.

The key question is whether the definition that the Government have provided will be usable in the courts and compatible with the ECHR. I believe that it is but, more importantly for this House, the opinion of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, is that it performs that function. On that basis, I am happy to support the approach taken by the Government, not only because it satisfies the commitment I made to this House but, more importantly, because it provides an operable definition that will be useful to those who have to grapple with it every day.

My Lords, I will be brief. I too had concerns about this definition when the original legislation went through pre-legislative scrutiny—it seems an eternity ago now. It does not seem to be any easier for my noble friend to put this in the Bill. But there are some concerns. I declare my interests as a vice-president of the National Autistic Society, which has written to me, along with other similar charities, to say that it has concerns, not so much on the substance but on the clarity.

As my noble friend has just pointed out, there are two areas here. One is the clarity of the legal definition which lawyers will need, and that is important. But also, as the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, has said—I assume this will be in the guidance and consultations that my noble friend is now undertaking—it needs to be in clear English for practitioners, relatives and people deprived of their liberty. If anybody asks in the future what Parliament’s intention was at the time—a question which I understand is sometimes asked in courts of law and to which we perhaps pay scant attention when we are legislating—I hope that on both counts, in terms of the legal definition and the guidance for others who are not lawyers, my noble friend will make sure in those documents that Parliament’s intention in defining deprivation of liberty is clear.

My Lords, this area of the definition of liberty is, and always has been, extremely difficult. The Strasbourg court has wrestled with it. It is absolutely vital from the legal point of view—I understand the distinction that has been made and I will mention that again—that this definition should be in accord with the convention; otherwise, we will have trouble maintaining this in the face of challenge. It is difficult to say that the Government’s definition is not in accordance with the convention. It seems clear that it is so. Therefore, all the decisions taken here and in Strasbourg in respect of it are available to help in the formulation of guidance.

If a different definition is taken which does not expressly subscribe to the convention, there is certainly room to try to squash definitions or applications which are in line with this definition as amended by the noble Baroness. It is perfectly open to use the legal definition in the main, in accordance with the convention, and then to help people as best we can to understand what it is all about by giving guidance, which is not authoritative in the same way as judicial decisions. There is quite a lot of scope for trying to do that with guidance which will be in accordance with what the practitioners have asked for. I should say that I am an honorary vice-president of the Carers Trust, but that does not affect what I have to say about it. I can see the need to help people in the actual work they have to do; this is a legal definition, and not all legal definitions are absolutely self-apparent to people who are not lawyers. But the guidance provided for can help in that respect, and there is a serious risk that, if we do not do something of that kind, the result will be litigation which could affect the viability of this clause in the future.

My Lords, it is a matter of great regret that we have reached this point in the Bill and are still debating the definition of deprivation of liberty. We should have been able to resolve this over the last six months, and we should not be having this discussion. We should have agreed it. The reason we have not agreed it, to put one point of criticism, is stated in the letter from the Joint Committee on Human Rights:

“It is regrettable that there was no time for adequate consultation on the proposed definition”.

I think that is exactly right.

We are where we are, and what we have is a disagreement between our very eminent lawyers—the noble and learned Lords, Lord Hope and Lord Mackay—and those of us who have been looking at and considering the Bill since July last year.

The Government have not given enough weight to the letter that the Minister received from the Joint Committee on Human Rights and the issues it raised about the definition that the Government have put in the Bill. If these issues are taken seriously, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, has said, there will be challenges. If it is true that this definition will result in differential treatment between physical and mental conditions, that will be challenged. That is an obvious one that will be challenged, because our laws on equality between physical and mental conditions are quite clear.

We on these Benches will be supporting the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, in her amendment. It provides a definition for practitioners and families of the cared-for person; it takes account of Clause 5; it allows for guidance and information for practitioners to make a real-world determination; it is positive; and it best captures the comments of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, in the Cheshire West case that the person concerned,

“was under continuous supervision and control and was not free to leave”.

We do not yet have a satisfactory definition in the Bill. One reason we will be supporting this amendment is that we would like the Government to have another go. We would like to see them take seriously the Joint Committee on Human Rights, for the safety of this Bill, so we will support the amendment.

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My Lords, I thank all those who have contributed to this debate on the first group of amendments. As your Lordships have so thoughtfully said, we are wrestling with this definition because, as my noble and learned friend Lord McKay put it so eloquently, this is a very challenging task indeed.

In my opening speech, I explained the Government’s amendment and the reasons for our opposition to the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, so I will try to answer a couple of questions that have been raised. The first came from the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, who asked why the amendment introducing the definition was tabled in the first place, given that it was such a difficult task and the Law Commission did not recommend that definition. There were calls for a definition from the JCHR, noble Lords and many stakeholders. It was an attempt to meet those calls, and we have done our best to collaborate and respond. She also raised the issue of valid consent and the three pillars. All references in the Bill to the deprivation of liberty only apply to people who lack capacity, and the amendment implies that people who lack capacity can give consent. That would not be correct in law but that is the way it could be read, so it needs to be clarified before it could be accepted.

I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, for his comments. In his broad experience, the Government’s definition is in line with the reading of Strasbourg’s decisions so far. As he rightly understands, our intention is to anchor the definition in Article 5 and Cheshire West and to allow for evolving case law so that those who are awaiting decisions do not have to go back to court again and again. The purpose of this definition in the primary legislation is exactly as my noble friend Lord O’Shaughnessy put it: it is for the use of lawyers, whereas we are determined to bring forward robust and clear statutory guidance for stakeholders and those who will be affected by the definitions, so that they can be assured that they understand exactly the effect of this definition. On that basis, I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, feels able to withdraw her amendment.

My Lords, I listened very carefully to the arguments put forward on this difficult and complex issue. Of course, I listened particularly carefully to the arguments of the noble and learned Lords, Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Mackay of Clashfern. I am not a lawyer, as will become abundantly clear. I have looked to put this in a very simple way.

The issue goes back to the point made by my noble friend Lady Jolly. In my strong view, there is a need for plain English in statutes so that the citizens of this country who are subject to them understand what they say. I think it was the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, who said that it is not always apparent to non-lawyers what some of these more complex passages mean. I agree; he is absolutely right. Perhaps it is overly simplistic of me but, frankly, I make no apology for that. It is Parliament’s role to define the legal principles in a Bill as simply as possible and the courts’ role to interpret them. I do not understand from any of the arguments I heard why the definition must be framed in such a convoluted way, in the negative with lots of double negatives. I just do not get it, despite listening carefully to the debate. I continue to believe that my definition meets those tests; it is important that whatever definition is in the Bill does so. I do not think that the Government’s definition does so. I wish to test the opinion of the House.

My Lords, I will speak also to Commons Amendments 5 to 14, 16 to 23, 26 to 41, 42, and 47 to 50. Throughout the legislative process the Government have worked, constructively I hope, with Peers, MPs and stakeholders across the sector, and as a result we have made a number of changes to strengthen the protections provided to the person in the new liberty protection safeguards system.

Amendments 3 and 40 to 42 specify that a pre-authorisation review must be completed by an approved mental capacity professional if the arrangements are for the cared-for person to receive their care or treatment mainly in an independent hospital, and clarify that other cases can be referred to an AMCP by the responsible body, provided that the AMCP accepts the referral. Noble Lords flagged that cases other than those where a person objects should be able to be considered by an approved mental capacity professional, and the Government agreed to clarify that in the Bill.

We also recognise that those residing in independent hospitals are often particularly vulnerable and in many cases have mental health needs and that it is appropriate in these cases for an AMCP to complete the pre-authorisation review, regardless of whether or not the person has raised an objection. The AMCP will provide an additional level of scrutiny for those who need it. They will meet the person, complete any relevant consultation and review assessments to decide whether the authorisation conditions are met.

I understand that the intention of Amendment 41A, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, is to require as far as practicable that an AMCP in an independent hospital case is independent from any person responsible for the act or decision regarding the arrangements. She is of course right to try to ensure independence in the system. The amendment has taken some of the wording from Section 35 of the Mental Capacity Act but this has caused some issues in the read-across.

The Government have taken the concerns about those in independent hospitals seriously. That is why we have required an AMCP to complete the pre-authorisation review in independent hospital cases, and why we have changed the Bill so that independent hospitals cannot be responsible bodies. In ensuring that the AMCP will act independently, I can confirm that they will be appointed by the local authority or local health board and that the independent hospital will be in no way involved in this decision.

We will make regulations on which professionals can fulfil this new role and specify there the qualities and qualifications necessary. The code of practice will provide guidance to responsible bodies regarding the appointment of AMCPs, and we will use this to outline that an AMCP should be independent of those carrying out the arrangements. It should also be noted that AMCPs will be held to account through their professional bodies, and they will be held to high professional standards. This sits alongside the other safeguards provided by the Bill, including advocacy, information and the ability for others to raise objections on the person’s behalf. I hope that with this reassurance the noble Baroness will not move her amendment.

Amendments 28, 35 and 39 are technical amendments which build on important amendments made by this House. The Government amended the Bill here to specify that those with a prescribed connection to a care home cannot complete the assessments needed for an authorisation or the pre-authorisation review, ensuring that there is no conflict of interest. These amendments clarify that the “prescribed connection” will be set out in regulations. It is vital that this Bill does not put care home managers in a position where they have to make a decision about whether or not a person lacks capacity or whether or not the proposed arrangements are valid because there is a conflict of interest. We are satisfied that the amendments made in this place and in the other place address this.

Amendments 8 to 23 remove the role of independent hospitals as responsible bodies, thereby removing any potential conflict of interest. When arrangements take place mainly in an independent hospital, the responsible body will be the local authority in England and the local health board in Wales. This approach broadly replicates the situation under the current DoLS. In England we want to make sure the new system is aligned with the general thrust of policy to support people in the community and reduce reliance on in-patient care, especially for autistic people and those with a learning disability. Having greater oversight by a local authority supports this.

Amendments 26, 27, 29 to 34, 36 and 37 are designed to ensure that the person who completes the assessments and determinations required for a liberty protection safeguards authorisation has the appropriate experience and knowledge to complete those assessments and determinations. The amendments give the Government the power to set out in regulations who can complete assessments and determinations. Our intention is that assessments will be completed by skilled professionals such as doctors, nurses and social workers. These amendments clarify that for medical and capacity assessments, the determination of whether or not the authorisation condition is met can be completed by someone who did not complete the assessments. This is important, as it allows valid assessments which have been completed previously to be used for the liberty protection safeguards authorisation. For example, a previous diagnosis of dementia from a psychiatrist’s mental health assessment could be used for the purposes of a medical assessment, where it is reasonable to do so. This helps to reduce unnecessary duplication in the system, which we know has proved to be a problem until now.

Amendments 45 to 50 allow objections to be raised on behalf of the person by those engaged in caring for them or with an interest in their welfare, and for a review under paragraph 35 to be triggered. The noble Baronesses, Lady Finlay and Lady Barker, flagged that it was important that there was an ability to whistleblow, and the Government amended the Bill here to clarify that objections can be raised on behalf of the person at the pre-authorisation review stage of the process. Our amendment clarifies the ability to whistleblow after the arrangements have been authorised. The amendments also clarify that where concerns have been raised and a review triggered, the case can also be referred to an approved mental capacity professional.

These amendments strengthen the protections provided by the liberty protection safeguards. I hope that noble Lords will be content to accept these changes made by the House of Commons, and I beg to move.

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My Lords, I shall speak briefly to Amendment 41A, but first I congratulate the Minister on moving such an enormous group with such coherence. She deserves at least a drink of water, if not a cup of tea. I tabled this small and modest amendment for the sake of completeness. During the passage of the Bill, the noble Lord, Lord O’Shaughnessy, gave us undertakings and assured us that issues to do with independent hospitals would be addressed in the Commons. I congratulate the Government on the fact that indeed they have been. In November, the noble Lord said:

“The Government believe that independent hospitals would benefit from AMCP involvement, and therefore our intention is to bring forward an amendment, or amendments, as required, in the Commons to deal with this issue and make sure that there is such a role for the AMCP in all deprivation of liberty cases”.—[Official Report, 21/11/18; col. 279.]

In some ways the Minister has already partly addressed my concern, which is about the fact that in many independent hospitals most of the patients will be there because of the local authority or the CCG. So the clarification that I am seeking is on whether independence is truly protected when an AMCP is appointed under those circumstances. This amendment seeks to clarify that. The Minister has gone some way towards clarifying that, but I think I need to press her a little on whether that is the case. I declare an interest as a member of a CCG that commissions many of these services. When we are looking at commissioning an independent hospital, should we be the body that also takes the decision about the appointment of an AMCP?

I shall speak very briefly. I welcome very much Amendments 13 and 22 in particular in relation to independent hospitals. In Committee, a number of us raised that issue and were very concerned that independent hospitals, which are often hundreds of miles away from a person’s home, could act as the responsible body and make crucial decisions where perhaps they have a commercial interest in keeping that person on their premises.

With the permission of the current Minister, I will applaud the noble Lord, Lord O’Shaughnessy, because I feel I know that he played a key role in making sure that these amendments found their way into the Bill. The stipulation that the local authority shall be the responsible body is important. Although I understand what the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, is saying, it seems to be a huge step forward to take the responsible body away from the independent hospital. I would like to feel that local authorities—the professionals dealing with the assessment of such cases—would have a real interest in making sure that those people returned home, if at all possible, as soon as possible. That is what all this should be about.

The other matter I will raise briefly is that of people in domestic settings, where deprivation of liberty is at stake. At our recent meeting with the Bill team we were assured that such cases would be dealt with under this new piece of legislation in the course of the normal care planning process, rather than requiring a reference to the Court of Protection. When an elderly person is caring for a demented husband or wife, the last thing they need is some bureaucratic requirement. This seemed very important, and I was delighted when the Bill team gave us an assurance that this, too, was being dealt with.

There is nothing in the Commons amendments on this, but I wonder whether the Minister could give the House an assurance that it will indeed be the case that people in domestic settings will be dealt with within the local authority planning process, and will not require a reference to the Court of Protection.

My Lords, I apologise—I should have declared my interest as chair of the National Mental Capacity Forum at the beginning of the previous debate. Like others, I thank the noble Lord, Lord O’Shaughnessy, for having made sure that the Bill is now in much better shape than it was when it came to us.

I am very grateful to the Minister for confirming that the whistleblowing amendments are there, and in fact are, if I have understood correctly, stronger than when they left this House. I have a couple of questions for her, though. One relates to the group of people who can become approved mental-capacity professionals. I was concerned that she did not include speech and language therapists in her list. People who have communication difficulties can be extremely difficult to assess. Those with a brain injury affecting the speech area can be very difficult indeed to assess because they may also have frontal-lobe disorders, as the noble Baroness herself well understands.

I know that the regulations will be brought forward, and I hope that the Minister will be able to consider additional training—not part of general undergraduate training but additional, postgraduate training for speech and language therapists to be able to develop a full set of competencies and undergo the same training as other people. I think that, without it, we will end up with duplication of assessments and duplication of costs.

My other question relates to portability. I hope that the Minister can confirm that the portability concept, which was so welcomed in the liberty protection safeguards, remains and will be applicable so that people can move between different settings without needing a reassessment. Obviously, emergency medical treatment can arise at any time with anybody, and that is covered separately for someone who lacks capacity and must be treated: that would come under a best-interest decision-taking process anyway.

My last query relates to the determination conditions and the assessment. I have a slight concern on reading the amendments that the assessments seem to be separated from the determination. If I heard the Minister correctly, she said that the care-home managers would not be making either the assessments or the determinations. We had a lot of concern over care-home managers and conflicts of role in previous debates, and I would be grateful if she would confirm that this is my correct understanding, and that we have not had a way whereby the care-home manager can undertake the assessment, and then somebody else, based on that assessment, will make a determination, because the validity of the assessment will determine the validity of the later determination.

Those are my queries in relation to this, and the determination and assessment question relates in particular to Amendments 28 to 38, to which the Minister has already spoken.

My Lords, I will make three quick points. One is to thank the Minister for the way in which she set out the ways in which the Government listened to the debates at an earlier stage in this House. We had deep misgivings about the lack of attention that we have been able to pay to independent hospitals. I am very glad that the reassurance that they will no longer be the responsible bodies has been given by the Government in another place.

Anybody who has followed our deliberations in great detail, as some people have, will know that we have had to spend an awful lot of time during the passage of this legislation focusing on care-home managers and the inappropriate responsibilities that they were given in the initial draft of the Bill. I am not entirely convinced that in relation to independent hospitals or local authorities we have entirely separated responsibility for assessment, responsibility for determination of what constitutes a care package and deprivation of liberty, and responsibility for the financing of those care packages. If the Bill had started off in a better shape, perhaps we would have been able to spend much more time on that, as we should have done. Therefore, it is important that at this stage we take on board the points made in Amendment 41A tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, and make sure that we have not left a conflict of interest anywhere in the Bill.

My Lords, I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Meacher, Lady Finlay and Lady Thornton, for their kind words. However, the credit for the improvements in this group, outlined by my noble friend the Minister, should go to this House. As everyone involved in the Bill will remember, we had some interesting, challenging and sometimes not quite bad tempered but difficult debates as we attempted to get this right. It is only because in the end noble Lords took a constructive approach to working together that we were able to make these changes. It is a credit to the process and to the people involved in it that we have been able to solve so many of these problems, whether they be on whistleblowing, independent hospitals or other issues.

I will reflect quickly on the intention behind the amendment regarding independence, as set out by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton. In a sense, avoiding conflict of interest has been at the heart of the changes that everyone has wanted to see made to the Bill, and, as I understand it from what she has said, that is her intention here. My belief is that that is dealt with in this case by making the responsible body, which has responsibility for appointing the AMCP, the local authority or the health board in Wales—or, more specifically, not making it the independent hospital. That then puts it on a level playing field with care homes, which was obviously the subject of huge discussion during our debates. This is where I seek reassurance from the Minister.

If we are satisfied that the changes we have made on the care home front to make sure that the responsible body is the only person who can appoint an AMCP also make sure that there is not a conflict between the AMCP and their role in commissioning, given that local authorities often, although not always, commission social care places and in a sense have that contracting relationship between the local authority and a care home, and given that we are trying to put the independent hospital on a similar footing, and if we are also satisfied, which I think we are—or we were during the passage of the Bill and subject to the amendments that have been brought forward—that there is the appropriate independence and that there are appropriate mechanisms for avoiding conflicts of interest for care homes and the appointment of AMCPs, by deduction it ought to follow that they will be in place because of the Government’s amendments on independent hospitals, and even more so because every single independent hospital case will be referred to an AMCP.

If it is true, as I believe it to be as a consequence of the government amendments, that the commissioning relationships are essentially the same and that the responsibility to appoint an AMCP will essentially be the same for the local authority, whether it is vis-à-vis a care home place or a place in an independent hospital, I hope that it will be possible for my noble friend to reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, that what she is asking for is already the case and therefore that her amendment is not necessary. However much I applaud the intention behind it, as I said, I think that it would repeat what is already the case. With that reassurance to noble Lords, I hope that we will be able to move on on this issue.

I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate, which has reflected the genuinely constructive way in which this section of the Bill has already been improved. I join the chorus of thanks to my noble friend Lord O’Shaughnessy and the Minister, Caroline Dinenage, for the extensive work that they have done on the Bill so far. I will not speak for too long, as I have already outlined the Government’s position on these amendments. However, I would like to answer a few of the questions.

The noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, asked whether liberty protection safeguards would be extended to people in domestic settings rather than them going to the Court of Protection. I am happy to confirm that liberty protection safeguards will apply to community settings, including domestic settings. I think that people and their families and carers will welcome this, as the court process is slow, costly and very intimidating for many. The Bill will achieve greater protections for people than the current deprivation of liberty system.

The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, raised some important questions, particularly about speech and language therapists. As she points out, they will play a very important role in the new system. They will definitely be involved in consultation. The regulations that will come forward will determine their exact role in implementation, whether as AMCPs or in another specific role.

The noble Baroness also asked about portability. An authorisation can apply to different settings so that it can travel with a person but cannot be varied to apply to completely new settings once it has been made, as this would undermine Article 5. I hope that this clarifies that point.

The noble Baroness also asked whether or not care managers can determine care assessments. Care homes are explicitly prevented from completing care assessments. I think I made this point, but I re-emphasise it. This comes back to the points made by the noble Baronesses, Lady Thornton and Lady Barker. As I outlined at the outset, AMCPs are independent of the responsible body and accountable to their professional bodies. I repeat that the Government have amended the Bill here specifically to ensure that those with the proscribed connection to care homes cannot complete assessments needed for authorisation or pre-authorisation review, to ensure that there is no conflict in the process. These amendments clarify that the proscribed connection will be set out in regulations. Because there is a conflict of interest, we will ensure that care managers are not put in the position of having to decide whether or not a person lacks capacity or the proposed arrangements are valid. I hope that this reassures noble Lords and that the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, will not press her amendment. I beg to move.

4: Schedule 1, page 7, line 6, leave out from “Wales,” to end of line 10 and insert “the person registered, or required to be registered, under Chapter 2 of Part 1 of the Regulation and Inspection of Social Care (Wales) Act 2016 (anaw 2) in respect of the provision of a care home service, in the care home;”

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Amendment 4 aligns the definition of “care home manager” in Wales with that in England. As currently drafted, the Bill defines the care home manager in Wales as the registered manager. This amendment changes it so that it is instead linked to the registered service provider.

Amendment 15 is a technical amendment that will help ensure that the liberty protection safeguard system works well in Wales. There is no statutory definition of NHS continuing healthcare that applies in Wales, so this amendment clarifies that local health boards will act as responsible bodies if arrangements are mainly carried out through the provision of an equivalent to NHS continuing healthcare as defined in English legislation. I thank Welsh Government officials for working with us on these two amendments. It is vital that the new system works for Wales. We have been in close dialogue with the Welsh Government throughout this process to ensure that this is the case.

Amendments 51 to 54 relate to the interaction with the Mental Health Act. They provide that the liberty protection safeguards cannot be used to recall a person subject to the Mental Health Act, who is residing outside of a hospital, back to hospital. We have also clarified the drafting of the Bill so that arrangements can be authorised if the person is not subject to mental health requirements. This is in order to close down any possibility that the Bill is read as applying only to those with mental health requirements.

Amendments 55 and 56 amend Section 36 of the Mental Capacity Act to ensure that regulations about the functions of independent mental capacity advocates can make provision for advocates appointed under the LPS to support an appropriate person. The reason for this is that the “appropriate person” is a new role, and it is important that the regulations under Section 36 can address that. Amendments 55 and 56 also clarify that an IMCA need not be appointed under the MCA to represent and support a person in respect of accommodation in a hospital, a care home or long-stay residential accommodation if an IMCA has been appointed in respect of the same accommodation under the LPS scheme. They also make consequential amendments reflecting the change from the deprivation of liberty safeguards to the liberty protection safeguards.

Amendments 43, 44 and 46 relate to authorisations that need to vary in order to stop them ceasing because of small changes that need to be made. They require that a review must take place, where practicable or appropriate, before an authorisation is varied. These amendments also clarify that a responsible body can change during the course of an authorisation to stop authorisations automatically ceasing where there is a change of responsible body; for example, a care home resident may become eligible for NHS continuing care, and then the responsible body may change even though their location and care regime does not.

I hope that noble Lords will accept these changes made by the House of Commons. I beg to move.

“(2) If an independent hospital is situated in the areas of two or more Local Health Boards, it is to be regarded for the purposes of sub-paragraph (1)(ab) as situated in whichever of the areas the greater (or greatest) part of the hospital is situated.”

21: Schedule 1, page 8, line 42, leave out from beginning to end of line 10 on page 9

22: Schedule 1, page 9, line 18, at end insert—

“8A (1) In paragraph 6(1)(aa), “responsible local authority”, in relation to a cared-for person aged 18 or over, means—

(a) if there is an Education, Health and Care plan for the cared-for person, the local authority responsible for maintaining that plan;

(b) if paragraph (a) does not apply and the cared-for person has needs for care and support which are being met under Part 1 of the Care Act 2014, the local authority meeting those needs;

(c) in any other case, the local authority determined in accordance with sub-paragraph (4).

(2) If more than one local authority is meeting the needs of a cared-for person for care and support under Part 1 of the Care Act 2014 the responsible local authority is the local authority for the area in which the cared-for person is ordinarily resident for the purposes of that Part of that Act.

(3) In paragraph 6(1)(aa), “responsible local authority”, in relation to a cared-for person aged 16 or 17, means—

(a) if there is an Education, Health and Care plan for the cared-for person, the local authority responsible for maintaining that plan;

(b) if paragraph (a) does not apply and the cared-for person is being provided with accommodation under section 20 of the Children Act 1989, the local authority providing that accommodation;

(c) if neither paragraph (a) nor paragraph (b) applies and the cared- for person is subject to a care order under section 31 of the Children Act 1989 or an interim care order under section 38 of that Act, and a local authority in England is responsible under the order for the care of the cared-for person, that local authority;

(d) if none of paragraphs (a) to (c) applies, the local authority determined in accordance with sub-paragraph (4).

(4) In the cases mentioned in sub-paragraphs (1)(c) and (3)(d), the “responsible local authority” is the local authority for the area in which the independent hospital mentioned in paragraph 6(1)(aa) is situated.

(5) If an independent hospital is situated in the areas of two or more local authorities, it is to be regarded for the purposes of sub-paragraph (4) as situated in whichever of the areas the greater (or greatest) part of the hospital is situated.”

23: Schedule 1, page 10, leave out lines 43 to 45

Motion on Amendments 5 to 23 agreed.

Motion on Amendment 24

Moved by

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“12A(1) The following must publish information about authorisation of arrangements under this Schedule—

(a) the hospital manager of each NHS hospital; (b) each clinical commissioning group;

(c) each Local Health Board;

(d) each local authority.

(2) The information must include information on the following matters in particular—

(a) the effect of an authorisation;

(b) the process for authorising arrangements, including making or carrying out—

(i) assessments and determinations required under paragraphs 18 and 19;

(ii) consultation under paragraph 20;

(iii) a pre-authorisation review (see paragraphs 21 to 23);

(c) the circumstances in which an independent mental capacity advocate should be appointed under paragraph 39 or 40;

(d) the role of a person within paragraph 39(5) (an “appropriate person”) in relation to a cared-for person and the effect of there being an appropriate person;

(e) the circumstances in which a pre-authorisation review is to be carried out by an Approved Mental Capacity Professional under paragraph 21;

(f) the right to make an application to the court to exercise its jurisdiction under section 21ZA;

(g) reviews under paragraph 35, including— (i) when a review will be carried out; (ii) the rights to request a review;

(iii) the circumstances in which a referral may or will be made to an Approved Mental Capacity Professional.

(3) The information must be accessible to, and appropriate to the needs of, cared-for persons and appropriate persons.

12B (1) Where arrangements are proposed, the responsible body must as soon as practicable take such steps as are practicable to ensure that—

(a) the cared-for person, and

(b) any appropriate person in relation to the cared-for person, understands the matters mentioned in sub-paragraph (3).

(2) If, subsequently, at any time while the arrangements are being proposed the responsible body becomes satisfied under paragraph 39(5) that a person is an appropriate person in relation to the cared-for person, the responsible body must, as soon as practicable, take such steps as are practicable to ensure that the appropriate person understands the matters mentioned in sub-paragraph (3).

(3) Those matters are—

(a) the nature of the arrangements, and

(b) the matters mentioned in paragraph 12A(2) as they apply in relation to the cared-for person’s case.

(4) If it is not appropriate to take steps to ensure that the cared-for person or any appropriate person understands a particular matter then, to that extent, the duties in sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) do not apply.

(5) In this paragraph “appropriate person”, in relation to a cared-for person, means a person within paragraph 39(5).”

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My Lords, It is vital that those who are deprived of their liberty are provided with the information necessary for them to be able to exercise their rights. Although there is a duty to provide information in Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights, noble Lords have rightly flagged that the Bill should be explicit about this duty, and amended the Bill to this effect.

The Government listened to noble Lords and agreed that the Bill should be explicit on this matter. However, the amendment tabled in this place was not clear about when information should be provided; we felt that this drafting could cause some confusion for practitioners, so we tabled alternative amendments. Amendment 24 clarifies that, as soon as practicable after arrangements are proposed, the responsible body must take such steps as are practicable to ensure that the person understands the key steps and safeguards in the authorisation process. This is particularly important to ensure that people are aware of their options to challenge the authorisation. Importantly, there is also a duty to provide the same information to any appropriate person who is providing representation and support to the person. This is important in ensuring that family members and those close to the person are also provided with the necessary information to enable them to effectively provide representation and support to the person.

The duty on the responsible body is to take steps as soon as practicable to provide the person with the information. This means that this should be done as soon as possible after the responsible body is aware that arrangements are proposed. The responsible body will need to identify an appropriate person or appoint an IMCA at the earliest possible stage to provide support and representation for the person; the same principle applies for the duty to provide information. Information should be provided in the early stages of the process so that the person can make an informed decision regarding the support they receive through the process, and is able to exercise their rights. The code will provide details about how this will work in practice. We have already established a working group on the code of practice, which includes stakeholders from across the sector, ensuring that information is provided at the earliest possible point to form a part of these discussions.

Amendment 24 also introduces a general duty to publish information about the authorisation, including: the process; the circumstances in which an IMCA should be appointed; the role of the appropriate person; and the right to challenge an authorisation in court. This ensures that anyone who has an interest in the welfare of the person is subject to liberty protection safeguards authorisation, has access to the important information about a person’s rights, and is able to raise objections on behalf of the person.

Amendment 25 requires that the responsible body remind the cared-for person and any appropriate person of this information after the authorisation is granted. The information that needs to be provided to the person, and to any appropriate persons, includes details of the authorisation process, access to representation and support from an appropriate person or an IMCA, the right to request a review, and circumstances in which an AMCP will consider a case, which includes objections and the right to challenge authorisations in court.

On the matter of challenging authorisations in court, the responsible body under Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights has a duty to ensure that relevant cases are referred to the Court of Protection. I know that there has been a particular concern about ensuring that in very rare cases where it is not in the person’s best interests to receive support and representation, those people are enabled to challenge in the Court of Protection if they want to. In these cases, the responsible body will need to ensure that the cases are referred to the court. If it fails in this duty, it can be challenged in court.

I understand that Amendment 25A, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins, seeks to require responsible bodies to keep a record of the decision and justification for not immediately giving a copy of the authorisation record, and if an authorisation record is not given within 72 hours, there must be a review into whether the lack of information is appropriate. I understand her desire to ensure that information about an authorisation record is provided promptly. However, we think that the drafting of the amendment would cause some issues; for example, it is not clear who is responsible for the duty to record or carry out a review. I am certainly willing to reflect on how best we can ensure that information is shared promptly, but I hope that I can reassure the noble Baroness that we will generally expect the information to be provided earlier than this, and we will set out reasonable timescales for the responsible body in the statutory code of practice. I hope that, with this reassurance, she will decide not to press her amendment.

The House has made clear its view that the Bill should be explicit about the duty to provide information. The Government have listened: these amendments outline clearly the duty to provide information at the earliest possible stage; to require, as far as possible, that the person understands the information they are being given; and to take action on it if necessary. I hope that noble Lords will accept these changes made by the House of Commons, and on that basis, I beg to move.

Is my noble friend able to define what the Government describe as “as soon as practicable”, which she said was going into the code of practice? Linked to that, how will it be defined for those people who will need the support of speech and language therapists, of an approved mental capacity professional or of an IMCA? It seems that we will need information to be provided at a very early stage, so that it can be considered and then decided whether there is a need for additional support. Can she give us some indication of how she is going to deal with that in the code of practice?

My Lords, I welcome the Minister to her new role, and look forward very much to working with her. I also acknowledge that the Government have gone a very long way in responding to previous amendments in the name of Lady Hollis and myself with regard to the supply of information to the cared-for person and other relevant bodies.

I turn briefly to my Amendment 25A. While I fully appreciate that it is not always practicable for the responsible body to ensure that a copy of the authorisation record is given to the cared-for person and other bodies immediately after authorisation, as outlined, Commons Amendment 25 is not at all specific about the time limits. I believe this means that busy clinical staff may not always feel it necessary to chase up this issue and make time swiftly to explain issues to the cared-for person or the appropriate person. This needs to be done quickly enough in terms of ongoing deprivation of liberty safeguard orders for appeals or challenges to the authorisation to be made, if individuals so require.

Amendment 25A in my name is therefore designed to ensure that records are kept at the commencement of the deprivation of liberty safeguarding order, outlining the reasons why information cannot be given at that time. These records may be brief but should be clear. For example, they could be as brief as saying that the cared-for person is confused and upset, and that to discuss deprivation of liberty safeguarding at this time is not considered to be in the best interests of the person concerned. As a mental health nurse of 40 years’ standing, I can certainly see such situations arising. I am not contending that everything should be done immediately.

The second part of my amendment is designed to ensure that a time limit is applied to reviewing why the authorisation record has not been given to those specified in sub-paragraph (1)within 72 hours, if this has not occurred, and a review of whether the lack of sharing the information was appropriate at the time of the initial deprivation. I am concerned that while “practicable” is understood in law, in very busy situations things can be kicked down the road. My amendment is designed to ensure that even in busy and sometimes very difficult clinical circumstances, the cared-for person’s right to information regarding authorisation arrangements is reviewed shortly after commencement. I suggest that a time limit for review—not necessarily 72 hours—is consistent with human rights legislation and would be good practice.

If the Government are not able to consider putting some kind of time limit within the main body of the Bill then, having pointed out that I am certainly not wedded to 72 hours, I feel that I will need to seek the opinion of the House. The backlog in the current system indicates what could happen under the Bill if we do not have some kind of clear time limit for information.

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My Lords, I shall speak briefly and I apologise to the House: I should have declared my interest at the beginning of this stage as a chair of an organisation caring for over 2,000 adults with learning disability or autism, or both. In Committee the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, tabled an amendment on the provision of information for cared-for people, carers, family members and IMCAs. She is not in her place today but the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins of Tavistock, has produced a really elegant amendment and I shall support it.

On Report, I also explained why it is not sufficient to have this commitment in the code of practice. I shall not repeat that argument in detail now but it drew upon a Supreme Court ruling of earlier this year. The MCA code of practice not only misstated the legal situation but could not establish a duty where none had existed. If there is a need for a hard-edged duty or right, that needs to be put into legislation and not the code. We must have provisions in the Bill to provide the person with information about their situation and rights, along with clear statutory entitlements to copies of the relevant documentation for those supporting and representing them.

My Lords, the rights to information are another good example of the positive change that this House made in the passage of the Bill. I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins, and Baroness Hollis, for making that argument so persuasively. I am very grateful to my noble friend the Minister and my right honourable friend the Minister of State, Caroline Dinenage, for responding.

I completely understand the desire to create—if I can borrow a bit of terminology—a backstop for why these sorts of cases ought to be considered. It is very easy to see how in practice when perhaps a small institution is caring for people with complex needs, the definition of “practicable” could stretch over time because of urgent or important responsibilities. There is a risk that, without some kind of backstop or time limit, this is too vague. However, I have a big problem with having an arbitrary time limit. I know that the noble Baroness is not attached to any particular time, but any time is by definition arbitrary.

My concern is that if this is in primary legislation it could lead to rushed or poor record keeping if it is not, for example, possible to conclude the review, assemble all the relevant pieces of information and provide that in a readable form—bearing in mind that is not going to be just straight English language for everybody—to the appropriate person, the IMCA, and so on. We should particularly bear in mind that an appropriate person could be somebody appointed by the cared-for person who resides in another country. So there are complexities at the edge of these kinds of cases that mean that if an arbitrary limit—which any limit would be—is set out in primary legislation, it could mean that as institutions bump up against it, they just rush to get the job done rather than making sure that they take care to do the highest-quality piece of work. That is my fear, although maybe other noble Lords do not share it.

I take the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, made about whether or not—in her view, not—the guidance is the place to do it. It seems to me that it is the right place to do it, because we had not defined “practicable” and “appropriate” before. We can now derive some examples of what that would and ought to look like in normal cases, but also in edge cases. I have listened very carefully to the argument—as noble Lords know, my attitude throughout has been to listen and make sure that we can improve this Bill. However, I have concerns about putting an arbitrary limit in, for the reasons that I have set out. I hope my noble friend, as she has been asked to do by my noble friend Lady Browning, will be able to explain things to us in a bit more detail—and give us a flavour of how the statutory guidance would provide that kind of detail—to provide reassurance to noble Lords that this is not just a boundless commitment that does not have some teeth.

My Lords, the amendment on this very important matter in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins, is fully supported on these Benches. The Minister knows the strength of feeling of support in the House to ensure that the cared-for person, or their carer, relative, friend or other person advocating on their behalf, is fully informed about their rights at the start of the LPS authorisation process. The amendment, carried by a substantial majority, was very clear on this issue. That information should be provided up front to families as a matter of course—information not only about the process, but importantly, their rights to advocacy and to challenge—in an accessible format that they can understand.

The provision in Amendment 25 of a statutory duty for information to be provided “as soon as practicable” does not ensure that this essential up-front requirement for information is met. One of the excellent briefings on this matter from Mencap states:

“Families’ carers have consistently fed back to us that the lack of information up-front meant that they didn’t know what was happening, that it was a process done to them and their loved one, and that set in motion misunderstandings, mistrust and instances of an appeal which could have been avoided had information been provided and explained at the beginning”.

Mencap’s concern is that the “as soon as practicable” provision could mean a system working on the timescales of the responsible body, rather than of the individual body and the families. That is our concern, too.

Amendment 25A addresses these concerns and ensures that the loophole in the Government’s amendment is addressed by requiring a record of the decision and justification to be kept where it has not been practicable to provide that up-front information about the decision to commence authorising arrangements under subsection (1). It also provides a necessary timeframe. We have heard that the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins, is not wedded to 72 hours, but it is important to have a timeframe within which, if a copy of the authorisation record has not been provided, there must be a review of whether the lack of information provision was appropriate. The requirement would provide the necessary safeguard for the cared-for person, and the hard- pressed staff, by facilitating routine record keeping and accountability for the decisions made. The noble Baroness pointed out some very explicit examples of the type of record that needs to be kept; it would not be onerous.

We are in a strange position, which we are slowly getting used to, of having the ex-Minister reassuring the House from the Government Benches that everything he promised has been delivered—before the Minister speaks. Amendment 25A highlights a significant loophole that needs to be addressed and I hope that the Government will accept it. We accept that the Government’s intention is to provide the information needed, and as soon as possible, but the amendment is necessary to reassure that “as soon as practicable” is not as open-ended as it can so often turn out to be.

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their contributions to the debate on this group. The provision of information in an appropriate and timely way goes to the heart of the Bill, in its intent to empower the cared-for person. The contributors today demonstrated how significant they have been in the process of improving the Bill.

I will respond first to my noble friend Lady Browning, and her question about clarifying what “as soon as practicable” means. This term is also used in the DoLS legislation. As we have outlined, we intend to clarify this in the code of practice with a range of examples that will make it perfectly clear exactly what it means, for practitioners and the cared-for person. We expect that this will be in the earliest stages of the process, so that the person has the information to enable them to exercise their rights, as the noble Baroness, Lady Wheeler, said,

“as a matter of course”.

This is exactly what would be expected. In order to ensure that this code of practice is workable and effective and, as my noble friend Lord O’Shaughnessy rightly put it, “has teeth”, it is being developed with strong input from stakeholders and practitioners. That is why we are confident that it will not be just a document but a usable and effective piece of statutory guidance.

We are not able to accept the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness for the reasons which she accepted, in some way, in her contribution. We have concerns about the specification of 72 hours and other aspects, but I understand her desire to ensure that information about the authorisation record is provided promptly. This is our intention as well. We have heard the will of both Houses on this and have tried to reflect that in our amendments, and I am certainly willing to consider how best to do that. We think that it is best done in the code of practice, which will be statutory and will have teeth, for the reasons that I outlined. I hope that, with these reassurances, the noble Baroness will feel bound to press her amendment. I beg to move.

25: Schedule 1, page 11, line 19, leave out from beginning to end of line 7 on page 12 and insert— “13 (1) As soon as practicable after authorising arrangements, the responsible body must ensure that a copy of the authorisation record is given to—

(a) the cared-for person,

(b) any independent mental capacity advocate appointed under paragraph 39 to represent and support the cared-for person,

(c) any person within paragraph 39(5) in respect of the cared-for person (the “appropriate person”), and

(d) any independent mental capacity advocate appointed under paragraph 40 to support the appropriate person.

(2) As soon as practicable after authorising arrangements, the responsible body must take such steps as are practicable and appropriate, having regard to the steps taken under paragraph 12B and the length of time since they were taken, to ensure that the cared-for person and any appropriate person understands the matters mentioned in paragraph 12A(2)(a), (c), (d), (f), and (g) as they apply in relation to the cared-for person’s case.”

Amendment 25A (as an amendment to Commons Amendment 25)

Moved by

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32: Schedule 1, page 14, line 34, leave out “made on an assessment” and insert “by a person, who meets requirements prescribed by regulations made by the appropriate authority, made on an assessment by that person”

33: Schedule 1, page 14, leave out lines 40 to 46

34: Schedule 1, page 15, line 2, leave out from “16,” to “by” in line 3 on page 15 and insert “a determination may not be made”

35: Schedule 1, page 15, line 4, leave out “prescribed connection” and insert “connection, of a kind prescribed by regulations,”

“(2A) In making arrangements under sub-paragraph (2)(c), the appropriate authority must have regard to the principle that a person to whom a proposed act or decision relates should, so far as practicable, be represented and supported by a person who is independent of any person who will be responsible for the act or decision.”

Amendment 41A (to Amendment 41) not moved.

Motion on Amendment 41 agreed.

Motion on Amendments 42 to 56

Moved by

The edit just sent has not been saved. The following error was returned:

43: Schedule 1, page 17, line 5, after “being” insert “, and the responsible body for the time being,”

44: Schedule 1, page 19 leave out line 43 and insert—

“(a) on a variation under paragraph 34;”

45: Schedule 1, page 20, line 5, after “(4)” insert “or (5A)”

46: Schedule 1, page 20, line 8, at end insert—

“(3A) A review under sub-paragraph (3)(a) must be carried out before the authorisation is varied or, if that is not practicable or appropriate, as soon as practicable afterwards.”

47: Schedule 1, page 20, line 16, leave out from “paragraph” to end of line 17 and insert “21—

(i) was not by an Approved Mental Capacity Professional, or

(ii) was by an Approved Mental Capacity Professional solely because paragraph 21(2)(c) or (d) applied.”

48: Schedule 1, page 20, line 24, at end insert—

“(5A) This sub-paragraph applies where sub-paragraph (4) does not apply and—

(a) the arrangements provide for the cared-for person to reside in, or to receive care or treatment at, a specified place,

(b) a relevant person informs the reviewer or (if the reviewer is not the responsible body) the responsible body that they believe that the cared-for person does not wish to reside in, or to receive care or treatment at, that place, and

(c) the relevant person makes a reasonable request to the person informed under paragraph (b) for a review to be carried out.

(5B) In sub-paragraph (5A) “relevant person” means a person engaged in caring for the cared-for person or a person interested in the cared-for person’s welfare.”

49: Schedule 1, page 20, line 30, at end insert—

“(7A) On any review where sub-paragraph (5A) applies, the reviewer or (if the reviewer is not the responsible body) the responsible body may refer the authorisation to an Approved Mental Capacity Professional and, if the Approved Mental Capacity Professional accepts the referral, the Approved Mental Capacity Professional must determine whether the authorisation conditions are met.”

“(g) anything which has the same effect as something within any of paragraphs (a) to (f), under another England and Wales enactment.”

54: Schedule 1, p 27, line 16, at end insert—

“(1A) And, for the purposes of this Schedule, arrangements which relate to a person are “not in accordance with mental health requirements” if the person is subject to mental health requirements and the arrangements are not in accordance with them.”

(2) In subsection (2)(a) leave out “(“P”) so that P” and insert “or support so that that person”.

(3) In subsection (2)(c) leave out “P’s wishes and feelings” and insert “the wishes and feelings of the person the advocate has been instructed to represent (“P”)”.

(4) After subsection (2)(d) insert—

“(da) in the case of an advocate instructed to support an appropriate person where paragraph 40 of Schedule AA1 applies, supporting that person to ascertain—

(i) what the wishes and feelings of the cared-for person who that appropriate person represents and supports would be likely to be and the beliefs and values that would be likely to influence the cared-for person;

(ii) what alternative courses of action are available in relation to the cared-for person who that appropriate person represents and supports;”.

(2) In subsection (2)(a) leave out “(“P”) so that P” and insert “or support so that that person”.

(3) In subsection (2)(c) leave out “P’s wishes and feelings” and insert “the wishes and feelings of the person the advocate has been instructed to represent (“P”)”.

(4) After subsection (2)(d) insert—

“(da) in the case of an advocate instructed to support an appropriate person where paragraph 40 of Schedule AA1 applies, supporting that person to ascertain—

(i) what the wishes and feelings of the cared-for person who that appropriate person represents and supports would be likely to be and the beliefs and values that would be likely to influence the cared-for person;

(ii) what alternative courses of action are available in relation to the cared-for person who that appropriate person represents and supports;”.