Articles Posted inBirth Injury

The Bronx appellant in this case is appealing by permission an order that denied his motion to vacate a finding of liability made by a medical malpractice panel. There are five main issues to consider on this appeal.

First, the court must consider whether an order that denies a motion to vacate a medical malpractice panel’s finding is appealable in this court.

Second, if the doctor member of the medical malpractice panel must be a specialist that practices in the same field of medicine as the defendant doctor who the malpractice is claimed.

This appeal involves new legislation that concerns medical malpractice actions. The issue before the Supreme Court Appellate Division is whether or not the plaintiff’s failure to timely file a notice of the medical malpractice action was properly excused by the Supreme Court.

Case Facts

In March of 1986, the Queens plaintiff individually and as the administrator of her deceased infant’s estate started this action to recover damages for her daughter’s death as well as the conscious pain and suffering predicated by the Staten Island defendant physician’s alleged medical malpractice that resulted in the death of the infant.

This is an action to recover damages for fraud. The New York City plaintiffs are appealing an order made by the Supreme Court of Suffolk County that granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against them.

Case Background

The plaintiffs in this case are an infant and his father. In 1987, the plaintiffs settled a medical malpractice action against an insured of the respondent in this case. The settlement included an annuity that would provide payments to the infant plaintiff in the sum of $3000 per month for life. The respondent estimated the present value of the entire settlement package to be $940,180.

This is a claim for medical malpractice against the state city health and hospitals corporation brought by a mother, individually and on behalf of her son. The infant was born at one Nassau hospital and allege that the infant sustained meconium aspiration syndrome and hypertonia as a result of the hospital’s mismanagement of the labor and delivery. Though the infant was transferred to another hospital and stayed for almost two weeks, he was then transferred back with the previous hospital where he received continuous treatment. It is also alleged that the infant suffers from brain injury and severe developmental delays.

At the beginning, the court had lack of authority to grant the leave to file a late notice of claim as to the mother’s individual claims because her application is made more than one year and ninety days from the accrual of the incident. As to the infant’s claims, based on the dates of the alleged malpractice, a notice of claim should have been served on the hospital corporations but the infant is the beneficiary of an infancy toll.

Further, entries in the medical records reveal that the infant was developing normally at the time of discharge and there is no indication of a long term injury. In the supporting affidavit, the mother admits to being aware of the conclusion by noting that at the age of three months her son had met all developmental milestones. A neurology visit note also supports the said conclusion. The mother also stated that about 17 months after her delivery, her son had once again met all milestones. The Suffolk mother stated that she did not learn of her son’s alleged delays until some point and that it was not until more findings led her to believe that her son’s injury was in fact related to his birthing process. It is evident that the mother could not have been aware of any damages attributable to the delivery within 90 days of the date of accrual, or a reasonable time thereafter, as there was no indication that the infant experiences any alleged delays. Consequently, the subject medical records alone do not support that the mother, by its acts or omissions, inflicted injuries to the infant and that the mother should have been aware of same within the applicable 90 days, or a reasonable time thereafter.

Petitioner minor child, represented by his parents is permanently and substantially brain damaged as a result of alleged medical malpracticeon the part of respondent physician and respondent medical center, as well as other medical providers. The petitioner parents filed suit in circuit court against their obstetrician, respondent, his professional association, respondent Hospital, and numerous other defendants. A Florida Medical Malpractice Lawyer said that, the trial court abated the circuit court proceedings for a determination by the Division of Administrative Hearings as to whether the infant’s injuries qualified for coverage under the NICA Plan. In the petition for determination of NICA coverage, petitioners alleged that long after the post-delivery period had ended, the minor child’s medical providers committed numerous errors, including administering too much IV fluid and failing to test for serum electrolyte derangements until numerous days after the delivery. As required by statute, NICA was served with the petition in the administrative proceedings. NICA intervened and took the position that he did not suffer a “birth-related neurological injury” within the scope of section 766.302(2).

A Lawyer said that, in a narrow category of cases in which a “birth-related neurological injury” occurs, parents’ common law rights to sue on behalf of their children for medical malpractice are eliminated and replaced by an administrative remedy that provides limited compensation on a no-fault basis. “Birth-related neurological injury” is defined by statute as “injury to the brain caused by oxygen deprivation occurring in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate post-delivery period in a hospital, which renders the infant permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired.” § 766.302(2), Fla. Stat. (2001).

A Lawyer said that, the First District held that the petitioners were limited to the administrative remedy provided by the NICA Plan, reversing the decision of the administrative law judge (ALJ), who found that the minor child did not suffer a “birth-related neurological injury” as defined by the NICA Plan.

This is a medical malpractice case where it is alleged that the plaintiff suffered from injuries as a result of the still birth of her infant as a result of prenatal malpractice and negligence of the defendants.

The plaintiff sought prenatal care from the defendants starting in July of 2001 through November of 2001 for her pregnancy. The result was a still birth on the fourteenth of December. The plaintiff states that she was exposed to DES which increased her risk of having an incompetent cervix and that the defendants should have performed a cerclage procedure in order to tighten her cervix to prevent a still birth or miscarriage.

This case is being heard in the Special Term of the Supreme Court of Queens County. NYC in the state of New York. The question before the court is whether the mother of a still born child who alleges that she was caused to endure excruciating pain and unnecessary injury and delay by reason of malpractice of the defendants is able to recover for the alleged emotional and psychic harm that resulted from the still born birth.

Case Discussion

The question before the court is interesting as the defendants of the case have motions for summary judgment to dismiss the complaint against them for failure to state a cause of action that is cognizable under the laws of the state of New York.

This case is being heard in the Supreme Court of Nassau County. The plaintiffs of the case are seeking to recover damages for medical malpractice. The plaintiffs allege that as a result of the negligence of the defendants the infant plaintiff suffered from fetal complications including oxygen deprivation that caused brain damage and resulting complications.

Case background

The infant plaintiff was born on the 29th of April, 2004. By December of 2004 he was diagnosed with cerebral palsy, left – sided hemiparesis, motor deficit, delayed speech, and cognitive deficits. The defendant in the case is the obstetrician of the mother. He treated the mother at his office and at the hospital.

In this case the plaintiffs are seeking to recover damages for medical malpractice. The plaintiffs allege that the defendants cared for the plaintiff while she was pregnant and that one of the twins died in utero as a result this care.

Case Background

The plaintiffs of the case are seeking to recover damages for alleged malpractice by the defendants. The plaintiffs allege that the defendants cared for the plaintiff while she was pregnant and that one of her twins died in utero as a result of this care. The plaintiff states that she sustained personal injuries, emotional distress, and pecuniary loss.

Appellant Hospital appeals an order issued by an administrative law judge [“ALJ”] finding that claimant was not subject to compensation under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan [“the plan”], because she was not permanently and substantially “mentally impaired” within the meaning of the plan. Appellants contend that, based on certain undisputed facts, she was permanently and substantially mentally impaired as a matter of law.

The minor child was born at Florida Hospital in Altamonte Springs, Florida, on November 28, 1997. She was deprived of oxygen during birth and sustained serious birth injuries. An expert said that, her parents filed an action for medical malpractice in Seminole County circuit court against the appellant Hospital, as well as the two physicians who provided obstetrical services to the child’s mother, and Mid-Florida OB/GYN Specialists, Inc. Both obstetricians were “participating physicians” under the plan and the hospital was a participating hospital, but the parents did not file or pursue a claim for benefits under the plan.

An Injury Lawyer said that, the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association [“NICA”] intervened in the circuit court action, claiming that the child’s birth injuries were subject to the plan. The circuit court abated the action and required the parents to file a petition with the Division of Administrative Hearings to resolve whether the child was covered by the plan. The NICA statute defines “birth-related neurological injury” to mean an injury which, among other things, renders the infant both “permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired.” The parents’ position was that the child did not meet the criteria for coverage under the plan because, although she had suffered significant physical impairments, she had not sustained a permanent and substantial mental impairment.