OilDDW 20121Shift from oil is slow now, but when it occurs, the US will back out of Saudiengagement and regional affairsMiller, assistant professor of international-security studies at the National Defense University. He previously served as director for Afghanistan on the National Security Council staff from 2007–2009, 6-28Paul D. Miller, assistant professor of international-security studies at the National Defense University. He previously served as director for Afghanistan on the National Security Council staff from 2007–2009, 6-28-12, [“The Fading Arab Oil Empire,” National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-fading-arab-oil-empire-7072?page=show] E. LiuThose policies were largely sensible efforts to maintain the security of world energy supplies. However, they make less sense in light of the brewing realities in the world oil market. These developments—the world’s increasing energy efficiencyand the Middle East’s loss of its comparative advantage in oil production—will take time to play out fully. But they have been under way for several decades already. In two decades or so, the global oil market and the Middle East’s geopolitical influence will be dramatically different from what they are today. The Middle Eastwill remain an important player, but it will no longer be able to act as the “central bank of oil,”asthe princes of Saudi Arabia style their kingdom. Moreover, it will forever lose the ability to credibly threaten to wield oil as a weapon. The sword of Damocles that has implicitly hovered over the West since the 1970s will be gone. That means the central goalof U.S.foreign policy in the Middle East willessentially be achieved: no power will be able to threatenthe United States with unacceptable leverage over theAmerican economy. That is because oil itself will be less important, and the world oil market will be more diffuse and diverse. The importance of this development cannot be overstated. It is a tectonic shift in the geopolitical balance of power, a strategically pivotal development only slightly less momentous than the fall of the Soviet Union. It is the slow-motioncollapse of the Middle Eastern oil empire.In turn, the United States can and should begin to adapt its foreign policy to reflect these realities. It can look with more complacency onthe rise and fall of particular regimes across the Middle Eastand North Africa. The Arab Spring, even if it brings to power moderate Islamist governments, is unlikely to threaten American interests. Washington also canplay a less active part in conflicts between states, reverting to a role more like its indirect support for Iraq against Iran and less like its direct involvement in the 1991 and 2003 Iraq wars. Further, it can speak outmore freely against tyrannyand human-rights abuses, especially in Saudi Arabia,one of the most oppressive countries on earth. It can reclaim its position as the advocate of

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