Enthroning the Interpreter: Dangerous Trends in Law and Theology - Part II

The previous article (part one) demonstrated that the utilization of
a literal hermeneutic in order to ascertain authorial intent is a key
component of American jurisprudence. This article (part two) will
establish that the employment of this same method of interpretation
is also the cornerstone of proper biblical interpretation. It stands
to reason that if jurists employ literalism in order to discover the
author’s meaning in contracts, testamentary documents,
statutes, or constitutions, interpreters of Scripture should do no
less when seeking to discover what God Himself has declared. Thus,
one notices distinct similarities when comparing traditional maxims
of legal interpretation with basic maxims of biblical interpretation.
Specifically, this article will show that both biblical and legal
interpretation use the identical interpretive approach and underlying
philosophy.

Similar Interpretive Approaches in both Biblical and Legal
Interpretation

Post reformation biblical interpretation employs what is called the
literal, grammatical, historical method of interpretation. Let us
break this phrase down into its component parts. The dictionary
defines literal interpretation as that type of interpretation
which is “based on the actual words in their ordinary
meaning…not going beyond the facts.”1
Thus, literal interpretation encompasses the idea of assigning to
every word the same meaning it would have in its normal usage,
whether employed in speaking, writing, or thinking.2
Cooper’s “Golden Rule of Interpretation”
incorporates such an understanding of literalism:

When the plain sense of Scripture makes common
sense, seek no other sense; therefore, take every word at its
primary, ordinary, usual, literal meaning unless the facts of the
immediate context, studied in light of related passages and axiomatic
and fundamental truths, indicate clearly otherwise.3

Because literalism resists “going beyond the facts,” when
interpreting a given text, literal interpreters resist the temptation
to import foreign ideas from outside the text. A classic example of
going beyond what the text says is the ancient interpretation that
the four rivers in Genesis 2, the Pishon, Havilah, Tigris, and
Euphrates, represent the body, soul, spirit, and mind. Such an idea
is not readily apparent from studying the text in Genesis 2. One must
go outside the text of Genesis 2 and bring into it foreign concepts
in order to arrive at this conclusion.

It should be noted in passing that literal interpretation has been
unfairly criticized on the basis that it adheres to a wooden,
inflexible literalism that fails to allow for types, symbols, figures
of speech, and genre distinctions. Such a straw man argumentation is
easily recognizable by simply reading how those advocating a literal
hermeneutic define the term literal. Charles Ryrie specifically notes
that literalism “…does not preclude or exclude correct
understanding of types, illustrations, apocalypses, and other genres
within the basic framework of literal interpretation.”4
Ryrie further explains that literal interpretation “…might
also be called plain interpretation so that no one receives the
mistaken notion that the literal principle rules out figures of
speech.”5
Ryrie buttresses this point by appealing to the following quote from
E.R. Craven:

The literalist (so called) is not one who
denies that figurative language, that symbols are used in prophecy,
nor does he deny the great spiritual truths are set forth therein;
his position is, simply, that the prophecies are to be normally
interpreted (i.e., according to received laws of language) as any
other utterances are interpreted-that which is manifestly
figurative so regarded.6

The absurdity of the notion that a literal hermeneutic fails to
encompass basic figures of speech is also illustrated by the fact
that the most extensive scholarly treatment of figures of speech
available today7
was completed not just by a dispensational literalist, but by a hyper
dispensationalist! E.W. Bullinger, the creator of this work, was not
only a literalist and a dispensationalist, but a hyper
dispensationalist who believed that the age of the church began after
Acts 28:28. Thomas Ice observes that, “Bullinger’s work
demonstrates that literalists have at least thought about the use of
figures of speech in a detailed and sophisticated way and do not
consider such usage in conflict with literalism.”8

Grammatical interpretation observes the impact that grammar
plays in any given text. Thus, bible interpreters must correctly
analyze the relationship that words, phrases, or sentences have
toward one another. Such an analysis entails the study of lexicology
(meaning of words), morphology (form of words), parts of speech
(function of words), and syntax (relationship of words).9Historical interpretation takes into account historical
context, setting, and circumstances in which the words of Scripture
were written. Milton S. Terry explains:

The interpreter should, therefore, endeavour to
take himself from the present, and to transport himself into the
historical position of his author, look through his eyes, note his
surroundings, feel with his heart, and catch his emotion. Herein we
note the import of the term grammatico-historical
interpretation.10

In essence, the literal, grammatical, historical method of
interpretation is designed to arrive at authorial intent by allowing
the ideas plainly found within the text to speak for themselves. By
way of comparison, the literal, grammatical, historical hermeneutical
method is identical to the contractual hermeneutical method reflected
in the words of Justice Flaherty that was mentioned in part one.
Flaherty noted, “It is well established that the intent of the
parties to a written contract is to be regarded as being embodied in
the writing itself, and when the words are clear and unambiguous the
intent is to be discovered only from the express language from the
agreement…”11
Furthermore, the literal, grammatical, historical method of
interpretation is virtually identical to Joseph Story’s
aforementioned approach to constitutional interpretation. According
to Story:

In construing the Constitution of the United
States, we are in the first instance to consider, what are its nature
and objects, its scope and design, as apparent from the structure of
the instrument, viewed as a whole and also viewed in its component
parts. Where its words are plain, clear and determinate, they require
no interpretation…Where the words admit of two senses, each of
which is conformable to general usage, that sense is to be adopted,
which without departing from the literal import of the words, best
harmonizes with the nature and objects, the scope and design of the
instrument.12

Moreover, Terry’s above described definition of historical
interpretation bears much resemblance to Thomas Jefferson’s
admonition to return to the Constitution’s original intent. The
previous article quoted Jefferson in this regard when he said that we
must:

Carry ourselves back to the time when the
Constitution was adopted, recollect the spirit in the debates, and
instead of trying what meaning may be squeezed out of the text, or
invented against it, conform to the probable one in which it was
passed.13

In sum, maxims of biblical interpretation have much in common with
traditional maxims of legal interpretation. Both approaches have as
their underlying goal the pursuit of authorial intent by first and
foremost observing the ideas plainly presented in the text.

Philosophical Similarities in Legal and Biblical Interpretation

Although there are similarities in approach when comparing maxims of
legal and biblical interpretation, the similarities do not end there.
The philosophy of interpretation is also shared between the two
disciplines. The underlying goal of both legal and biblical
interpretation is to transfer the authority away from the subjective
impulses of the interpreter and instead toward the objective standard
of the author’s meaning.

Why should biblical interpreters employ the literal, grammatical,
historical method of interpretation? J. Dwight Pentecost cites
several dangers when such an approach is not used.14
First and foremost, the authority transfers from the text to the
interpreter. In other words, the basic authority in interpretation
ceases to be the Scriptures, but rather the mind of the interpreter.
Early church father Jerome warns, “that the faultiest style of
teaching is to corrupt the meaning of Scripture, and to drag its
reluctant utterance to our own will, making Scriptural mysteries out
of our own imagination.”15
F.W. Farrar adds, “…once we start with the rule that
whole passages and books of scripture say one thing when they mean
another, the reader is delivered bound hand and foot to the caprice
of the interpreter.”16
Bernard Ramm observes, “The Bible treated allegorically becomes
putty in the hands of the exegete.”17
Thus, scripture becomes held hostage to whatever seems reasonable to
the interpreter when the literal, grammatical, historical
interpretive method is dispensed with.

Second, the Scripture itself is not being interpreted. The issue
becomes not what God has spoken but what the interpreter thinks. In
other words, the text becomes servant to the interpreter rather than
the interpreter being subservient to the text. Terry explains:

…it will be noticed at once that its
habit is to disregard the common signification of words and give wing
to all manner of fanciful speculation. It does not draw out the
legitimate meaning of an author’s language, but foists into it
whatever the whim or fancy of an interpreter may desire.”18

Third, one is left without any means by which the conclusions of the
interpreter may be tested. When the objective standard of language’s
common meaning is dispensed with, one man’s personal
interpretation becomes just as valid as anyone else’s. In such
an environment, there is no way to determine whose interpretation is
correct because there is no longer an objective standard that
personal interpretations can be compared to. Fourth, there is no
mechanism to control the imagination of the interpreter. Ramm notes:

…to state that the principal meaning of
the Bible is a second-sense meaning, and that the principle method of
interpretation is “spiritualizing,” is to open the door
to almost uncontrolled speculation and imagination. For this reason
we have insisted that the control in interpretation is the literal
method.19

Thus, literal interpretation properly constrains the dictates of the
carnal imagination by allowing it to roam only so far. Otherwise,
interpreters (to borrow the language of the great New York jurist,
Chancellor James Kent) would be able to “roam at large in the
trackless fields of their own imaginations.” In sum, the
philosophy behind utilization of the literal, grammatical, historical
method of interpretation is to shift the authority in the
interpretive process away from the subjectivity of the interpreter’s
ever-vacillating imagination and back toward the objectivity of the
static text.

This same rationale also exists in the domain of legal
interpretation. For the same reasons described above, when
interpreting a contract, courts first of all observe the plain
meaning of the contract language. Because courts understand that
parties have a right to enter into contractual terms of their own
choosing, courts understand that they are not in the business of
rewriting contracts in a way that is contrary to the expressed wishes
of the parties. Therefore, courts allow the authority in the
interpretive process to reside in the contract language rather than
in their own opinions regarding what the contract should or should
not say. As previously mentioned in part one, Justice Flaherty
succinctly summarized the philosophy behind literal interpretation in
contract law:

…the rationale for interpreting
contractual terms in accord with the plain meaning of language
expressed is multifarious, resting in part upon what is viewed as the
appropriate role of the courts in the interpretive process: This
court long ago emphasized that the parties have the right to make
their own contract, and it is not the function of the court to
re-write it, or to give it a construction in conflict with…the
accepted and plain meaning of the language used…In addition to
the justifications focusing upon the appropriate role of the courts
in the interpretive process, the plain meaning approach to
construction has been supported as generally best serving the
ascertainment of the contracting parties mutual intent…In
determining what the parties determined by their contract, the law
must look to what they clearly expressed. Courts in interpreting a
contract do not assume that its language was chosen carelessly.
Neither can it be assumed that the parties were ignorant of the
meaning of the language that they employed…20

Similarly, because courts desire to honor the wishes of the testator,
they also allow authority to rest in the testamentary document itself
by utilizing a literal approach when interpreting such documents.
Moreover, because the judiciary traditionally has not desired to
transform itself into a super legislature, it has attempted to follow
the plain language of statutes whenever possible when interpreting
legislation. In addition, because jurists have traditionally not
desired to amend the Constitution from the bench, they have typically
followed the plain language of the Constitution’s drafters thus
allowing authority to abide in the constitutional text rather in
their own ideological predilections. Traditional principles of
constitutional interpretation recognize that the maxim of following
the plain language of the text is indeed the best insulation against
an overly ideological judiciary. If jurists approached these
documents any other way, they would not be interpreting. Rather, they
would be amending and rewriting them.

Lawyers Advocating Literalism throughout Church History

As indicated in the preceding discussion, appropriate biblical
interpretation, as capsulated in the works of hermeneutical
authorities such as Ramm, Pentecost, Terry, and Farrar, is nearly
identical to the principles of legal interpretation in both approach
and philosophy. However, this similarity will come as no surprise to
students of church history. Some of the greatest contributions to the
church’s understanding of the importance literal interpretation
have come from those who were either lawyers or former students of
the law. Great advances in hermeneutical method came about when these
Christian jurists applied their legal training to the study of the
Scriptures. Their efforts resulted in trusted interpretive methods
later codified and summarized by recent hermeneutical authorities.

For example, reformers Martin Luther and John Calvin, both students
of the law in their formative educational years,21
played integral roles in rescuing the church from the Alexandrian
allegorical method of interpretation that was introduced in the
second century and grew to dominate the church throughout the middle
ages. Luther denounced the allegorical approach to Scripture in
strong words. He said: “Allegories are empty speculations and
as it were the scum of Holy Scripture.” “Origen’s
allegories are not worth so much dirt.” “To allegorize is
to juggle the Scripture.” “Allegorizing may degenerate
into a mere monkey game.” “Allegories are awkward,
absurd, inventive, obsolete, loose rags."22
Luther also wrote that the Scriptures “are to be retained in
their simplest meaning ever possible, and to be understood in their
grammatical and literal sense unless the context plainly forbids”
(Luther’s Works, 6:509).23

Calvin similarly rejected allegorical interpretations. He called them
“frivolous games” and accused Origen and other
allegorists of “torturing scripture, in every possible sense,
from the true sense.”24
Calvin wrote in the preface of his commentary on Romans “it is
the first business of an interpreter to let the author say what he
does say, instead of attributing to him what we think he ought to
say.”25

Both reformers rejected the use of church tradition as a guide for
spiritual truth and instead advocated returning to scripture alone or
“sola scriptura” as the source of Christian belief
and practice. To put this into legal terms, Luther and Calvin
rejected the case law approach as a guide to Scripture.26
The case law method places more emphasis on studying what legal
authorities have said about a given legal source than on studying the
legal source itself. The case law method and its relationship to
constitutional law will be dealt with in part three. In addition,
both reformers recognized the value of knowledge of biblical Hebrew
and Greek due to the fact that a return to scripture inevitably
required knowledge of the original languages of Scripture.

However, despite their emphasis upon literally interpreting some
aspects of Scripture, Luther and Calvin did not go far enough in
applying a literal hermeneutic to all areas of divine truth.
Regarding Luther, Roy B. Zuck observes:

Though Luther vehemently opposed the
allegorizing of scripture, he too occasionally allegorized. For
instance he stated that Noah’s Ark is an allegory of the
church. For Luther, Bible interpretation is to be centered in Christ.
Rather than allegorizing the Old Testament, he saw Christ frequently
in the Old Testament, often beyond what is legitimately provided for
in proper interpretation.27

Because the reformers were primarily concerned with soteriological
issues, they failed to apply the same literal interpretation that
they used to interpret soteriology to the areas of ecclesiology and
eschatology.

Such a selective and inconsistent application of a literal
hermeneutic was not rectified until the budding of the dispensational
movement centuries later. What makes dispensationalism unique as a
theological system is not merely its emphasis upon a literal
hermeneutic, but its willingness to consistently apply this literal
hermeneutic to the totality of biblical revelation. Thus, Ryrie
includes consistent literal interpretation in his sine qua non
of dispensational theology when he says, “the distinction
between Israel and the church is born out of a system of hermeneutics
that is usually called literal interpretation.”28

By insisting on the application of a literal hermeneutic to all of
Scripture, dispensationalism, in essence, completed the hermeneutical
revolution begun by the reformers. Dispensationalists took the
literal hermeneutic applied by the reformers in the area of
soteriology and applied it to all areas of theology, including
eschatology and ecclesiology. Just as Calvin and Luther, the two men
most credited for introducing a literal hermeneutic to soteriological
issues in the reformation era, were trained in the law, many of the
leaders of the dispensational movement were heavily influenced by
their legal training and thinking. For example, John Nelson Darby,
the man mostly credited with rediscovering the scriptural doctrine of
the pretribulation rapture, planned to enter the field of law after
graduating from Trinity College in Dublin. He was called to the Irish
Chancery Bar in 1822. However, after a spiritual struggle that led to
his conversion he opted to give up the law in order to become a
priest in the Church of England.29

Another key dispensational thinker was Sir Robert Anderson. Though
more recent work may shed new light on Anderson’s prophetic
calculations,30
his work The Coming Prince is considered a classic in the area
of biblical chronology because of its detailed explanation of the
literal fulfillment of Daniel’s prophecy of the seventy weeks.
Anderson, like Darby, was also heavily influenced by the legal
profession. After receiving his law degree from Trinity College,
Dublin in 1863, he became a member of the Irish bar and worked
drawing up legal briefs on a traveling circuit. He served as chief of
the criminal investigative department of the Scotland Yard. After
retiring with distinction, he used his investigative training and
ability to think logically to study the Scriptures.31

Cyrus Ingerson Scofield was yet another influential dispensationalist
who also happened to be a lawyer. Following the Civil War he studied
law and received his law degree. He then entered politics in Kansas.
President Grant later appointed him to the office of District
Attorney. Scofield’s best-remembered contributions include his
influence as a Bible teacher as well as The Scofield Reference
Bible, which advocated a pretribulation rapture, a literal return
of the Jews to the homeland, premillennialism, and
dispensationalism.32
In sum, given the contributions that legal minds have made throughout
church history concerning the significance of literal interpretation,
it is no wonder that the maxims of proper biblical interpretation, as
summarized by hermeneutical authorities such as Ramm, Pentecost,
Terry, and Farrar, bear such a close resemblance to traditional
maxims of legal interpretation.

Conclusion

Just as employing a literal method of interpretation in order to
ascertain authorial intent is central in the field of law, the exact
same maxim of interpretation is also crucial toward proper biblical
interpretation. Not only is this interpretive approach the same in
both fields, but the philosophy behind the approach is also the same
in both. The rationale for a literal hermeneutic in both legal and
biblical interpretation is to transfer authority away from the
subjective impulses of the interpreter and toward the objective
standard of the text.

These first two articles demonstrate the significance of literalism
to proper legal interpretation (part one) and proper biblical
interpretation (part two). Now that this foundation has been laid,
the next two articles will expose gradual erosion of these principles
in modern legal interpretation (part three) and in contemporary
evangelical biblical interpretation (part four).