Burundi: Rising Threats to Democracy, Peace

Editor's Note

The UN Security Council voted unanimously last week to renew the
mandate for the UN peacebuilding mission in Burundi until the end
of the year, despite the position of the country's ruling party
that the mission is no longer needed. The decision was phrased
in diplomatic language. But it was a clear signal
that the international body shares the concerns of Burundi civil
society and political opposition voices about rising
authoritarianism and political mistrust, as the ruling party
attempts to consolidate its position before elections in 2015.

Since the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in 2000, the
result of mediation headed first by Julius Nyerere and then by
Nelson Mandela, Burundi has enjoyed relative stability compared to
earlier periods. But the process of peacebuilding has been far from
smooth, marked by political strife and episodic violence, most
recently by youth groups associated with political parties. The
last elections in 2010 were boycotted by major opposition parties
(http://tinyurl.com/omz9yt5). Over the past year, despite the
return of some opposition figures from exile, political space has
been further restricted by ruling party efforts to alter the
constitution to secure a third term for President Pierre
Nkurunziza.

This AfricaFocus Bulletin contains a short report on the UN
Security Council decision to renew the mandate of the UN mission in
Burundi, a press release from the International Federation for
Human Rights (FIDH), and a background blog article on "The 2015
elections in Burundi: towards authoritarianism or democratic
consolidation?"

Thanks to Jean Claude Nkundwa for providing leads to most of these
sources on his Facebook page. See his own short commentary from
October 2013 at http://tinyurl.com/lzlvgmb

Security Council extends UN mission in Burundi until December 2014

13 February 2014 - The Security Council today renewed until the end
of the year the United Nations mission helping Burundi recover from
decades of ethnic war, despite the Central African country's
request to end it earlier, as it moves towards crucial elections
amid political violence and intra-party tensions.

In a unanimous resolution the 15-member body welcomed the continued
progress that Burundi, a centrepiece of UN peacebuilding efforts to
ensure that countries once ravaged by war do not relapse into
bloodshed, has made towards stability, but it endorsed SecretaryGeneral
Ban Ki-moon's recommendation not to wrap up the UN Office
in Burundi (BNUB) by mid-2014 as the Government requested.

Instead, it extended the mission until 31 December to continue its
peacebuilding work in a small country where hundreds of thousands
of people have perished in largely inter-ethnic fighting between
Hutus and Tutsis that erupted even before it gained independence
from Belgium in 1962.

The Council did however note the Government's request for a UN
electoral observer mission before, during and after the 2015
elections in Burundi and requested the Secretary-General "to
establish such a mission to follow and report on the electoral
process in Burundi immediately at the end of BNUB's mandate."

BNUB was set up in 2006 following a ceasefire between the
Government and the last remaining rebel force to support peace
consolidation, democratic governance, disarmament and reform of the
security sector. It replaced the UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB), a
peacekeeping mission which at its peak had nearly 6,000 military
personnel.

Now its replacement by the regular UN country team, a collection of
UN agencies concerned principally with development and humanitarian
issues that exists in most nations around the world, as requested
by the Government, will not occur until 1 January, 2015.

Burundi is often cited as a success story in UN efforts to
consolidate peace in countries that have been ravaged by conflict
and was the first, along with Sierra Leone, to be put on the agenda
of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) when it was set up in
2006, to prevent post-conflict nations from relapsing into
bloodshed.

But in his latest report to the Council, Mr. Ban stressed that
President Pierre Nkurunziza's request that BNUB be drawn down
within six months as of 15 February, so that Burundi can take
fuller ownership of its political process, "poses a difficult
dilemma, given the continuing need for a United Nations political
presence whose functions cannot be entirely covered by the United
Nations country team."

Recommending a full year's extension, he noted Burundi's
"substantial progress, overcoming formidable challenges since the
end of the civil war," but warned that such gains are far from
irreversible as the country prepares for presidential elections in
2015 - "a litmus test" for long-term stability.

A UN strategic assessment conducted from September to December
found that the political scene remains deeply polarized, with the
Government using its dominance in Parliament to enact laws
infringing on political and civil rights, contributing to a
shrinking of political space, while the opposition threatens to
take steps to confront the Government.

In its resolution today the Council asked Mr. Ban to prepare BNUB's
transition and the transfer of appropriate responsibilities to the
country team by 31 December, and urged it and its component
agencies to scale up their activities and programming during the
transition.

It called on the Government to foster inclusive elections in 2015
by improving dialogue between all national actors and ensuring
space for all political parties, including from the extraparliamentary
opposition, safeguard human rights, and prevent
abuses, particularly reported extrajudicial killings, mistreatment
of detainees and torture, restrictions on civil liberties, and
harassment, intimidation and violence committed by youth groups.

The Government was also urged to ensure freedom of press,
expression, association and assembly in the run up to the
elections, and fight impunity by ensuring impartial investigations
and reinforcing the protection of victims, witnesses and their
families.

Burundi: UPRONA leaves the government, Democracy in danger

FIDH and ITEKA (Ligue Burundaise des Droits de l'Homme) are
concerned about the dangerous political and security climate in
Burundi and the increased restrictions placed on the democratic
space in the country.

One year away from general elections, in order to ensure the
maintenance of a transparent, credible and secure process, our
organizations call on the Burundian authorities to fulfill their
obligation to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms.

"The political and institutional crisis in our country is partly a
result of the hardening positions of the Burundian political
parties. As we approach the general elections of 2015, the
increased tensions between the various political groups, in
addition to increasingly important security challenges and
increased restrictions on fundamental freedoms, are not likely to
create the conditions for a credible and secure electoral process.
The politicians in power must choose the path of conciliation and
transparent and inclusive dialogue to prevent our country from
plunging back into the darkness of our past," said Joseph
Ndayizeye, President of ITEKA.

Political tensions over the last several months in Burundi took a
major turn with the recent resignation of the three government
ministers from the UPRONA party. These resignations were in protest
against the dismissal of Mr. Charles Nditije, president of UPRONA,
by the Minister of the Interior, and the removal of the First VicePresident,
Mr. Bernard Busoka (who is also a member of UPRONA), by
the President of the Republic. As one of only two opposition
parties to not have boycotted the 2010 general election, UPRONA had
four representatives in the government (three ministers and a first
Vice-President) and is today the second best represented party in
the National Assembly. Rifts appeared between UPRONA and the ruling
CNDD-FDD party, particularly when it came to debates on issues
related to constitutional reform or the revision of the law on the
National Commission for Lands and other Goods (CNTB).

These tensions grew in a context of stalled dialogue between the
party in power and other political opposition parties. Despite most
of the opposition leaders returning from exile and the adoption of
a "roadmap to hold inclusive, free, fair and transparent elections
in 2015," political tensions remain. The absence of a concrete
consultation process on the reform of the Constitution - which some
fear is only intended to allow Pierre Nkurunziza to seek a third
presidential term - is likely to jeopardize the implementation of
the provisions of the roadmap.

Similarly, concerns remain about the deteriorating security
environment, in particular regarding acts of violence committed
with total impunity by the young Imbonerakure, who are close to the
presidential party. Their acts of violence, which have taken place
in several provinces and are sometimes perpetrated with the
complicity of state security forces, mostly target people perceived
as being close to the opposition. These attacks have taken various
forms: physical assaults, acts of intimidation, illegal collection
of taxes, and disruption of political meetings. The violent clashes
that occurred on 6 October 2013 between the young Imbonerakure and
youth supporters of the MSD opposition party illustrate these
tensions.

This alarming political and security climate is accompanied by a
further reduction of the democratic space in Burundi. On 4 June
2013, a new law restricting the freedom of journalists by limiting
the subjects they are allowed to cover and the protection granted
to their sources is a recent example of the crackdown by the
authorities. Similarly, the draft Law on Associations is a source
of concern because as it stands it allocates significant powers to
the Minister of the Interior. These include more stringent measures
for obtaining official status and making it possible for the
authorities to disband associations. In addition, the 28 January
2014 removal of the President of the Bar Association of Bujumbura,
Mr. Isidore Rufyikiri, due to his stance against the draft
constitutional reform and against the lack of independence of
judges and magistrates, confirms the trend that Burundian
authorities want to muzzle all dissenting voices.

According to Dismas Kitenge, Vice President of FIDH, "the Burundian
authorities seem determined to silence any form of oppostion, and
in a pre-electoral context, this gives rise to serious concerns. It
is important to put Burundi back on the path towards rule of law.
This requires an appropriate response to rapidly address the
climate of distrust, insecurity and restrictions currently facing
this country."

FIDH and ITEKA remind the Burundian authorities that under the
provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, they are
obliged to ensure full rights and fundamental freedoms, to fight
against acts of violence, and to ensure that perpetrators of
violence are prosecuted before competent courts, while ensuring the
independence and impartiality of the justice system.

As the Security Council of the United Nations (UN) is scheduled to
soon decide on the renewal of the mandate of the UN Office in
Burundi (BNUB), FIDH and ITEKA call on the members of the UN
Security Council to ensure the continuation of a strong UN presence
in Burundi. Our organizations also call on the Burundian
authorities to agree to the request by the UN Secretary-General for
a renewal of BNUB's mandate, as it is clear that ahead of a
contentious electoral process, the presence of BNUB will help to
ease tensions and prevent the risk of violence.

The 2015 elections in Burundi: towards authoritarianism or
democratic consolidation?

In this blog, Benjamin Chemouni looks at the prospects for
Burundi's 2015 election, and the future of the post-conflict
settlement. Benjamin is a PhD candidate in the Department of
International Development, at the London School of Economics and
Political Science (LSE). His research explores the variation of
state effectiveness between Rwanda and Burundi.

The 2015 local, parliamentary and presidential elections will be
crucial in determining whether the country is on the path of
democracy or authoritarian consolidation. After the end of the
civil war in 2005 and the victory of the rebel group CNDD-FDD
(National Council for the Defence of Democracy and the Forces for
the Defence of Democracy), democracy and stability seemed closer
than ever before. Since the end of the war, two elections have
been deemed relatively free and fair, although far from perfect.
Burundi's new constitution also contains the formulae for a
meticulous consociational division of power, which allows a
minimum of ethnic, gender and political pluralism. Such arithmetic
is at the heart of the successful transition. Constitutionally,
the government and the national assembly must now be 40% Tutsi,
and 60% Hutu and must include 30% women. Any political party
receiving more than 5% of votes is entitled to a ministerial post.
The two vice-presidents must be from different ethnic groups and
political parties. Ethnic quotas are also used in the composition
of the senate, the army, and local governments. Such a system has
been a crucial security guarantee in the post-war order for the
Tutsi minority, which had dominated the state institutions since
independence through the party UPRONA (Union for National
Progress).

Worrying trends

This heritage is, however, increasingly under the attack of the
ruling party, the CNDD-FDD, as explained previously on this blog.
Their hold on power was facilitated by the opposition's boycott of
the 2010 elections. Since 2010, the ruling party has increased its
efforts to close political space across the country. A law passed
in June severely restricts media freedom. In addition, the ruling
party has not been afraid to imprison journalists or kill members
of the opposition.

The most worrying development, however, is the government's recent
attempt to revise the country's constitution. This is especially
alarming for two key reasons. Firstly, revisions would eliminate
restrictions on the number of terms an individual can serve as
president, conveniently allowing the incumbent President, Pierre
Nkurunziza, to go beyond the current two term limit (1). Secondly,
revisions would directly challenge the consociational power-sharing
system agreed on at Arusha. Under the current draft revision of the
constitution, a political party would need 5%, instead of the
current 2%, to be represented at the national assembly. The two
vice-presidents would also be replaced with a single, weaker vicepresident.
This is worrying as a powerful first vice-president,
ethnically different from the President, serves as a guarantee for
the Tutsi minority that they will retain influence in the
executive. Finally, laws would be passed if a majority of 50% and 1
vote were reached, whereas today, in order to foster consensus, 2/3
of the vote is needed. These changes would thus promote a
majoritarian democracy over the current consociational democracy.
This evolution is dangerous in the context of the long deeply
divided Burundian society.

At present, it is unclear whether the constitutional revisions will
be adopted. On one hand, the ruling party is determined to cement
its power and allow its "champion", the current President, to run
again since no other figure has emerged in the party and Pierre
Nkurunziza's populist talents are of great use. The weight of the
CNDD-FDD in both the national assembly and the senate would,
technically, make such a change relatively easy. On the other hand,
civil society, the opposition, and even the powerful Catholic
Church are united in their opposition to the proposed changes,
which means that the CNDD-FDD are alone in trying to promote the
revision. Even the UPRONA, party not in the opposition, has
announced its attachment to the current constitution, which
apparently cost the president of UPRONA as well as the First VicePresident
of the Republic (UPRONA as well) their respective seats.

2015: any real chance to challenge the ruling party?

The opposition is currently in bad shape, and further weakened by
the constraints it faces from the ruling party. Most opposition
parties have joined together to form the ADC Ikibiri (Alliance of
Democrats for Change), born during the 2010 elections. However
there are manifold problems with this alliance. The first question
is whether the ADC Ikibiri can accommodate the multiple, powerful
egos and unite behind a single candidate for the 2015 election. A
second question is whether they can create a political platform
that speaks to the concerns of the vast majority of the population,
such as the increases in the cost of living. Thus far, it has
largely been preoccupied by demands for fostering political
dialogue and preparing for the 2015 elections. Therefore, the
alliance appears as a coalition of urban intellectuals, whose
discourse is directed toward civil society and the international
community rather than voters.

Another handicap of the coalition is that it does not include what
is maybe the most serious contender to the CNDD-FDD: the FNL
(National Liberation Front). The second most important rebel group
after the CNDD-FDD during the war, the FNL retains popularity in
rural areas. However, the FNL is still divided between its current
president, and its historic leader, the charismatic Agathon Rwasa,
who hid for 3 years for fear of arrest by the government until his
return in 2013. The party also suffers from an ideological void:
the FNL is the heir of the Palipehutu (Party for the Liberation of
the Hutu People), founded in 1980, which has long been the main
Hutu political party and whose political demands were based on
ethnic lines. In the current situation where power is held by a
Hutu-dominated party, such ideological positioning is less
relevant. However, whilst the party rarely resorts to ethnicity
today, it has not articulated a new ideological discourse.

In addition to their internal difficulties, the opposition suffers
from the CNDD-FDD strategy of restricting access to rural areas.
This is achieved by constant intimidation of the members of
opposition parties, creating hurdles at a local authority level for
those seeking to organise political rallies, and so forth. At the
national level, the ruling party also try to thwart any potential
serious challenge. A vivid illustration is the recent attempt to
discredit one of big names of the coalition, former ex-Vice
President and member of the FRODEBU (The Front for Democracy in
Burundi), Frederic Bamvuginyumvira. Reputed to be incorruptible, he
was imprisoned as a result of what seems an unsubtle set-up by the
authorities.

In contrast, the populist strategies of the current president, and
the CNDD-FDD's persistent efforts to penetrate deeper into the
countryside have been a success. Maybe less visibly, the CNDD-FDD
has also become a huge patronage machine. Access to most state jobs
in Burundi now hinges upon membership to the party. But this is
often not sufficient: to demonstrate political loyalty, money
usually has to exchange hands. For example, to become a teacher,
the candidate often has to pay several months of salary upfront to
the party. The goal is twofold for the CNDD-FDD: put loyal people
into all positions in the state and generate income.

The best scenario for 2015

In this context, the transfer of power, although not impossible, is
very unlikely. Some even fear that a defeat might lead the CNDD-FDD
to take up arms again. Whether or not this is realistic, it
certainly incentivises the population to keep voting for the CNDDFDD,
and the party in the countryside distils this fear.

The best - or least bad - scenario might be a victory for the CNDDFDD,
by a small margin. This scenario is possible because the
legitimacy of the CNDD-FDD, although still prominent in rural
areas, has started to erode. The population particularly resents
the deplorable economic situation of the country, especially
against the backdrop of rampant corruption. The growth of GDP per
capita since the end of the war is almost nil, and inflation is
galloping, averaging 18% in 2012 (source: World Bank).

A limited victory would allow the opposition to put a check on the
CNDD-FDD's predatory tactics and their efforts to monopolize power.
This situation might also undermine the party's current
cohesiveness based increasingly on institutionalised corruption and
clientelism. It would give a voice to the significantly important,
but silent, category of party members exasperated by the rampant
corruption and by the evolution of the CNDD-FDD into a party-state,
precisely what they fought against at the time Burundi was ruled by
the Tutsi-dominated UPRONA. Finally, by allowing increasing
political plurality in the institutions, a limited victory for the
CNDD-FDD would revitalize the consociational model elaborated in
Arusha and currently under attack.

This scenario of limited victory for the ruling party requires two
crucial conditions. Firstly, the opposition must not only stay
united but also endeavour to reach the rural population, both
ideologically and physically. Secondly, the ruling party must not
be allowed to rig the elections. The role of the international
community will be crucial in deterring fraud given its leverage on
the government as provider of international aid, which Burundi
desperately needs. Given its soft stance on the various scandals
and authoritarian manoeuvres in Burundi to date, such support
cannot be taken for granted.

(1): There is some confusion when it comes to Nkurunziza: as he was
first elected president by the parliament in 2005, and not by
direct popular suffrage, in accordance with the transitional
arrangements, it has been argued that his first term should not be
included in the current term limit. Such argument, if legally
sound, remains far-fetched as it contradicts the Arusha agreement
that clearly stipulates in article 7 that no one can be president
more than twice.

AfricaFocus Bulletin is an independent electronic publication
providing reposted commentary and analysis on African issues, with
a particular focus on U.S. and international policies. AfricaFocus
Bulletin is edited by William Minter.

AfricaFocus Bulletin can be reached at africafocus@igc.org. Please
write to this address to subscribe or unsubscribe to the bulletin,
or to suggest material for inclusion. For more information about
reposted material, please contact directly the original source
mentioned. For a full archive and other resources, see
http://www.africafocus.org