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Thursday, 18 August 2016

Dr. R. Evan Ellis: The Post-Conflict and the Transformation of Colombia’s Armed Forces

From July 11 to 15, 2015, I had the opportunity to participate in a seminar in Bogota,
Colombia, on the topic of transnational organized crime that brought together security
sector professionals from 10 countries across Latin America and the Caribbean, co-
sponsored by U.S. Army South and the Colombian military. The activity occurred on the
heels of the June 23rd announcement by the Colombian Government that a final
agreement was in sight with the country’s largest terrorist organization, the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), just days after leaders of the 1st and 7th fronts of the
FARC announced that they would not participate in the deal.
Similar to my prior visit to Colombia in March, I found my Colombian colleagues less
than excited about the agreement, instead, they were focused on the array of challenges
likely to follow. As we discussed their preparations for the post-agreement security
environment, I recognized that there was a synergy between those preparations and the
long-term efforts of the Colombian military to transform the institution to maximize both
their ability to meet near-term challenges, as well as their relevance to the future needs of
the nation.
A few subtle, but important, indicators of the way in which the Colombian Armed
Forces are preparing for the future are the changes in the terminology that they use to
discuss the array of threats to the nation, and highlighting how they see their own role in
those struggles. Terrorist groups directly challenging the government, like the National
Liberation Army (ELN) and the FARC (until the peace accord is signed), are now referred
to as the “Persistent Armed System” (SAP).

The groups once called “criminal bands” (BACRIM) are now separated into two
groups: Armed Organized Groups (GAO) and Armed Delinquent Organizations (DAO).
The categorization is supported by two new directives from Colombia’s Ministry of
Defense, numbers 15 and 16, regarding the circumstances under which the military can
legitimately use force against armed groups consistent with international law. Colombia
has identified three criminal organizations that fall into these categories: the Gulf Clan
(formerly known as the Úsuga, and prior to that, the Urabeños), the Pelusos, and the
Puntilleros (a group descended from the ERPAC). Consistent with the new designation, in
November 2015, the Colombian Air Force bombarded an encampment of the Gulf Clan.
The new directives also establish a legally defensible framework in which other groups
who are currently considered mere delinquent organizations could be designated “Armed
Organized Groups” in the future.
The Armed Forces are arguably at the forefront among all Colombians in the hopes
that the coming agreement with the FARC brings “peace” to the country, yet it is clear
that they also take their responsibility to defend the nation very seriously, preparing to do
their part in the next phase of the conflict which is likely to come.As suggested in the preceding paragraphs, the coming agreement with the FARC
represents a transitional moment for the Colombian Armed Forces that will bring both
change and continuity to its roles, missions, and the way that it supports the nation. In
recognition of these changes (although not exclusively driven by the agreement with the
FARC), the Colombian Armed Forces have also engaged in a long-term process of
institutional transformation. At the level of the Colombian Army, that process is
supported by a dedicated Transformation Command (COTEF), working to ensure that the
institution will have the organization, doctrine, and capabilities most relevant for the
missions it may be called upon to perform in the future.
As an analyst who spent the early years of my own career supporting U.S. military
transformation efforts, I was struck by the parallels between the challenges faced by the
United States and Colombia as they implemented their transformation programs. The
similarities of these undertakings drew my attention toward the potential for the two
nations to work more closely together, and to learn from each other in this area.
For the United States, like Colombia, transformation is driven by both the
opportunities, and the imperatives of a changing world.
On one hand, the evolution of technologies in an evolving and increasingly
interconnected world make new forms of warfare possible, as well as new military
capabilities that might be exploited by the United States, friends, and adversaries, and
through the development of innovative new combinations of technologies, forms oforganization, and ways of operating. As in all periods of human history, pursuing such
possibilities is not a matter of “ugly militarism,” but the responsibility of any government
and its armed forces to protect its people, given that those same factors are also changing
the threat environment and creating new possibilities for state and non-state adversaries
against which the government must be prepared.

Yet, making decisions about which of the numerous possibilities to concentrate on,
those that would be most appropriate against the equally vast array of emerging threats,
has always been a human and a bureaucratic endeavor as much as a scientific one.
In this context, forward thinking U.S. defense organizations, such as the Office of the
Secretary of Defense for Net Assessment under Andrew Marshall and, later, the Office of
Force Transformation under Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, helped to advance thinking and
prepare a generation of officers to transform their military institutions.
While transformation has always been, in part, about recognizing and exploiting
opportunities, the United States was also “pushed” into transformation by changing
global and budgetary realities. The end of the Cold War, the associated downsizing of the
U.S. military, and an emerging new array of non-state challenges made transformation a
necessity to maintain the necessary capabilities to defend the nation in a changing world
in the context of a shrinking force.
Despite large bureaucracies of competent professionals and contractors, a
sophisticated methodology for capability-based planning (supported by intimidatingly
complex PowerPoint graphics), and transformation “roadmaps” developed by each of the
services, truth be told, the end goals of transformation continuously shifted.
While participating in DoD transformation efforts from 1994 until after the second
Gulf War, including an array of wargames, studies, programs, and roadmaps, I concluded
that transformation efforts have been adapted to emerging real-world challenges more
often than they have anticipated them.The uncertain post-agreement environment that the Colombian military faces is not
unlike that faced by the United States at the end of the Cold War. I am confident that the
very innovative, intelligent, and professional men and women of the Colombian Armed
Forces will work arduously to develop new and enhanced capabilities while adjusting
their organizations, doctrine, and training to be as relevant and effective as possible in the
evolving threat environment of the Andean region, the Pacific Ocean, the Caribbean Sea,
and Central America.

As with the United States, I am equally confident that the Colombian military will have
to make its case domestically, regarding why, in a post-FARC environment, it should not
be downsized. If its budget is indeed cut, which is likely but not advisable, like the United
States, it will be forced to innovate to perform the new array of missions required of it
with fewer personnel and resources.
Since institutional change is both costly and disruptive, Colombia like the United
States, will also struggle with how to develop the required new capabilities, while
continuing to meet existing obligations, without breaking the nation’s proven and vitally
important military institutions.
Some of the outlines of Colombia’s transformation efforts are already apparent. As
noted previously, its Armed Forces seek to support the implementation of the
forthcoming demobilization and disarmament agreements with the FARC while
preparing to fight the evolving set of challenges to come. Colombia also hopes to share its
successful experience against the FARC and ELN through education and training
activities with its Latin American and Caribbean neighbors, thereby helping to “export
security” to the region.
While it is not clear that Colombia will require a smaller military than it has today, it
will arguably require a force with a very different structure. The Colombian Army, for
example, has developed brigades specialized in kidnap response and it is developing a
new brigade specialized to combat illegal mining. Beyond such initiatives, the future
Colombian military will also likely require fewer forces optimized for combat in the
nation’s remote mountainous and jungle regions, and they will need to be better equipped
for the complex challenge of operations against criminal groups embedded in civilian
populations, similar to an expanded version of its urban combat companies. It will also
likely rely more on civil affairs capabilities, such as its innovative and successful
“integrated action” brigades, which contribute to integrated, multi-ministry efforts to
develop the country while strengthening the government’s strategically critical ties to the
population.
As suggested by the parallels between the United States and Colombian transformation
challenges, there are many possibilities for the United States to leverage its own
experience with force transformation to support Colombia’s efforts. Doing so represents
an opportunity for both countries to take their longstanding partnership in a new
direction while also challenging both to engage with each other across institutions
different than those of the past.

Traditionally, U.S. support to Colombia’s Armed Forces has occurred through
Department of Defense (DoD) organizations such as the 7th Group of U.S. Special
Operations Command, or the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation
(WHINSEC). Both primarily provide training to enhance traditional military capabilities.
However, working together on transformation ideally will involve a dialogue between
Colombia’s military and key officials in the Department of Defense, the Joint staff, and
service staff organizations that traditionally have only limited contact with U.S. partner
nations in Latin America. Examples at the Army level include: the Army’s Training and
Doctrine Command (TRADOC); the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC), which
leads in developing future Army concepts; the Army Center of Excellence, which captures
innovative ideas from the field and brings them through ARCIC; the Army G-3/5/7
organization, which is the entry point for the development of new requirements
associated with items such as doctrine, structure, and material and equipment; and the
G-8 force development office (DAPR-FDJ), which works to align new Army requirements
with the Joint force through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). The
Colombian and U.S. militaries could also usefully engage on transformation through their
respective strategic-level war colleges, insofar as that the U.S. Army War College teaches
and conducts research on future warfare and Army force planning issues. Such a
preliminary tie already exists between the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies
Institute and its Colombian counterpart, the Center for Regional Strategic Security
Studies (CREES).
Beyond DoD, a wealth of institutional memory regarding U.S. force transformation
efforts resides in the private sector where retired military officers and other experts have
contributed to both the innovative thinking and institutional tasks that drove the U.S.
force transformation efforts of the 1990s and 2000s.
There are many insights that such interactions can offer both sides, including the U.S.
experience with respect to future force-oriented wargaming, requirements, and
acquisition methodologies, as well as planning for the institutional changes necessary to
support transformation, such as those in training, education, doctrine, military personnel
systems, logistics, and maintenance, among others. It is not only important for the United
States to share its successes, but also, to provide the lessons learned from mistakes and
the pitfalls that should be avoided.
Reciprocally, as the United States prepares for a new generation of engagement
involving military operations against dispersed and decentralized enemies in complex
sociopolitical environments throughout the world, the Colombian experience in
rebuilding connectivity between its Armed Forces, the government, and its people, has a
great deal of instructive value for the United States.

Such ties have the potential to do much good, not only in advancing the processes of
institutional innovation for both Armies, but also in moving the longstanding and close
U.S.-Colombia relationship toward mutually beneficial new terrain.
My conversations with my Colombian counterparts in Bogota assured me that
knowledgeable and forward-thinking professionals are indeed planning for the range of
challenges that may accompany the signing of an agreement with the FARC and the
challenges that Colombia will face in the more distant future. The United States has both
an interest and obligation to ensure that Colombia succeeds in that journey. Strategically,
Colombia’s success as a well-institutionalized, pro-Western nation contributes strongly to
stability and democratic governance in the region. Equally important, the rest of the
region and the world will be watching to see how the United States stands by a partner
that has invested its faith in the United States in its time of need.

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The views expressed in this Strategic Insights piece are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the
Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

This article is cleared for public release;
distribution is unlimited.

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Reprinted with
permission of the Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, U.S. Army
War College.”