Flash Gordon Left Me The Keys

The TEST OF ALL MOTHERS

Monday, May 19, 2003

INTRO: The chief investigator of the U-S space shuttle Columbia disaster has criticized shuttle managers for underestimating the danger posed by possible left wing damage while it was still in flight. As David McAlary reports, the investigating panel and members of Congress are urging changes in the shuttle bureaucracy.

The investigators are looking into the possibility that pieces of hard insulating foam that broke away from the shuttle's external fuel tank during launch cracked the wing and caused Columbia's disintegration in the stress of re-entry.

Admiral Gehman says shuttle managers missed obvious signals when they rejected requests by NASA engineers for U-S satellite images to try to learn whether the foam had damaged the wing. NASA had a prior agreement with the government's satellite imaging agency to obtain such photographs whenever it needed them, but chose not to take advantage of it in this case.

/// GEHMAN ACT 1 ///

The system didn't work, and I wouldn't blame that on any one person. We were a little disappointed in what some of the senior people knew and understood about how you get these images and what the images can do for you.

/// END ACT ///

Admiral Gehman blames the failure to pay heed to engineers' worries to the fact that they are not independent from shuttle managers.

NASA administrator Sean O'Keefe told the Senate hearing that the rejection of satellite photographs is infuriating in hindsight. But he recalled that shuttle managers at the time did not consider the foam strike a risk to Columbia's safety.

/// O'KEEFE ACT ///

It was a judgement call. It was clearly the wrong judgement. We know now there are a variety of signals that could have told us what we should have been observing and what we could have corrected.

/// END ACT ///

Shuttle managers said after the disaster that nothing could have been done to repair Columbia in orbit even if satellite imagery had revealed wing damage. But Admiral Gehman told the senators he rejects that notion. He says his investigation panel heard from engineers and former astronauts who suggested maneuvers, including spacewalks and a visit by another shuttle. The admiral points out that his board and NASA have begun a joint inquiry into possible steps that might have been taken to repair Columbia in flight.

/// GEHMAN ACT 2 ///

Even if we had a fix that had only a 10 percent chance of succeeding, of course we would have done something, absolutely. Thus far, this review hasn't found any magic formula, but has found several steps that could have been done to mitigate this. We may find more.

/// END ACT ///

Admiral Gehman says a large portion of his panel's final report on the Columbia disaster will include recommendations for solving NASA's management problems.

(This column by Frederick D. Gregory, deputy administrator of the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, was first published May
16 in USA Today. The column is in the public domain. No republication
restrictions.)

(begin byliner)

NASA's Committed to Safety
By Frederick D. Gregory

I was part of the first space-shuttle-astronaut class and spent two
and a half years helping to prepare Columbia for its maiden voyage. I
would fly three shuttle missions, two as commander.

On Jan. 28, 1986, I was sitting in Mission Control at NASA's Johnson
Space Center in Houston as the lead CAPCOM -- the person in charge of
communicating with the astronauts -- when I saw the space shuttle
Challenger explode. Like all Americans, I was stunned and saddened.

I would become part of a NASA that recommitted itself to safe flight.
We would institute the recommendations of the Rogers Commission, the
presidential commission that investigated the loss of Challenger, and
then some.

Sadly, after 17 years of safe flight, we would see another brave crew
lost.

After the loss of Challenger, NASA began face-to-face flight-readiness
reviews that had one simple ground rule: Prove that the shuttle is
ready and safe to fly. From then on, if any shuttle-program official
had the slightest qualm about a safety or technical issue, we would
not launch. Last year, we prudently delayed five shuttle flights on
eight separate occasions because of safety concerns that ranged from
the discovery of tiny cracks in propellant fuel liners to poor weather
at an alternative landing site.

NASA also began putting astronauts such as Dick Truly, Bob Crippen,
Bill Readdy and me in senior management positions because of our
flight experience and breadth of knowledge -- but also because of the
depths to which we care about the safety of the shuttle crews. For us,
safety is not a concept. It's personal.

After Challenger, I initiated an independently run safety-reporting
system, which enables anyone at NASA to raise anonymously any safety
concerns directly with upper management.

We already have begun to make the shuttles safer by working on the two
initial recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board,
as well as on some issues that we've identified on our own. For
example, we are addressing the obvious problem of foam loss from the
external tank, regardless of whether it's found to be a factor in the
Columbia accident.

We repeatedly have said that we await the board's complete findings,
and we stand ready to learn from them.

But we also intend to do what the Columbia families have asked of us
-- and what the legacy of the Apollo 1, Challenger and Columbia crews
demand. We will find the problem, fix it and return to flying safely
once again.

(Frederick D. Gregory is deputy administrator of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration.)

(end byliner)

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Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)