Leaked CIA report says targeted killing programs could backfire

Drone strikes and other targeted counterinsurgency programs aimed at capturing or killing “high-value targets” belonging to militant groups could be effective if coupled with larger strategic goals, the CIA believes, but they could also backfire.

That’s the conclusion the agency came to back in 2009, when it
completed a review of the positive and negative consequences of
targeted assassinations on counterinsurgency efforts. Published
online by WikiLeaks on Thursday, the document – dubbed “Making
High-Value Targeting Operations an Effective Counterinsurgency
Tool” – details operations and outcomes in countries such as
Afghanistan, Iraq, Colombia, Northern Ireland, and more.

These types of high-value targeting (HVT) operations were said to
involve taking aim at individuals whose death, or
“removal,” as the CIA termed it, “disproportionately
degrade[s] an insurgent group’s effectiveness.”

While HVT efforts were found to have worked in some cases – the
simple fact that they were ongoing significantly reduced Osama
bin Laden’s ability to lead Al-Qaeda, the report found – they
were not as effective in others. For example, the Taliban was
able to keep replenishing leadership positions and keep its
structure intact despite “sustained” targeted operations
begun in 2001.

Notably, the review’s release online comes as the Pentagon
announced that American airstrikes in Iraq have killed three
senior Islamic State military leaders. The United States and its
coalition partners are trying to beat back the extremist group in
Iraq and Syria, where it has made significant gains over the past
year.

“It is disruptive to their planning and command and
control,” Gen. Martin Dempsey said. “These are
high-value targets, senior leadership.”

In the leaked analysis, the CIA said the positive effects of HVT
efforts include “eroding insurgent effectiveness,”
disrupting strategies and support to the point that the central
government gains an advantage, reducing morale and insurgent
will, and “fragmenting or splitting the insurgent
group.”

The CIA pointed out that in the case of Osama bin Laden, HVT
operations forced the Al-Qaeda leader into hiding and minimized
his use of technology. This “affected his ability to command
his organization” by making it difficult to meet with other
members in person and direct them.

Also detailed is what the CIA called a “pruning
approach,”which involves killing select individuals based on
their importance to a group’s functionality rather than simply
taking aim at senior leadership. In Iraq, the CIA found that
“removing individuals who are important to the organization’s
core functions—such as those running its car-bombing networks—has
had a more demonstrable effect” when it came to reducing the
effectiveness of Al-Qaeda groups.

This approach could also be used to “protect incompetent
leaders or restore them to positions of authority” by
killing more effective subordinates.

On the other hand, HVT operations could backfire if they led to
local populations sympathizing with insurgents or caused
governments to overlook other elements of its strategy. Targeted
strikes could also radicalize remaining leadership, potentially
opening the group to more extreme members and worldviews.
Additionally, even failed or successful attempts could
“enhance an insurgent leader’s lore” or have negative
effects if civilians are killed.

When not paired with competent and influential governments, HVT
operations were found to be lacking, particularly in the case of
the Taliban, the report found. Despite ongoing operations in
Afghanistan, corruption in the government and its lack of
influence in much of the country caused many problems for
counterinsurgency efforts.

Combined with the ability of Taliban leaders to hide in the
mountains of neighboring Pakistan, there were little gains to be
had for the Afghan government, NATO, and the US.

“The Taliban has a high overall ability to replace lost
leaders, a centralized but flexible command and control overlaid
with egalitarian Pashtun structures, and good succession planning
and bench strength, especially at the middle levels,” the
report said.

The review, finalized as President Barack Obama weighed sending
more troops to Afghanistan in 2009, emphasized that HVT
operations are most effective when paired with a broader
counterinsurgency strategy. During the Iraq War, for example, the
report stated that targeted strikes did not noticeably slow the
momentum of insurgents and Al-Qaeda offshoots until Sunni tribes
turned against militants and their base of support crumbled.