Tucker Carlson Grills Former Mexican Official Who Plots to Sabotage U.S. Court System With Thousands of Deportation Cases

By Humberto Fontova, Townhall

“Yes I want to use the U.S. judicial system—the immigration courts in particular– to jam, to backlog it so perhaps President Trump will change his mind and stop this ridiculous policy– this unpleasant and hostile policy– of deporting people…” (Jorge Castañeda to Tucker Carlson, Fox News, 2/14/17.)

In other words, this “unpleasant and hostile policy” consists of Trump’s fulfillment of his campaign promises and his pledge to uphold the U.S. Constitution when he was sworn in on Jan. 20.

The Mexican government itself has pledged $50 million in legal defense funds towards this jamming of U.S. courts as planned and promoted by Jorge Castañeda, who was introduced by Tucker Carlson as “Mexico’s former Foreign Minister, also a NYU professor and Board member of Human Rights Watch.”

Democrats and the mainstream media would have us gag and shudder at such fulfillments of the U.S. Constitution—because they offend the sensibilities of a former Mexican Communist Party member and spy for Cuba’s terror-sponsoring Stalinist regime.

“Whoops! What was that?” some readers ask.

Yes, amigos, I’m afraid that — either due to politeness or ignorance –Tucker Carlson scrimped on his guest Jorge Castañeda’s curriculum vitae. (We’ll flesh it out in a second.)

But firstly, from 2000-2003 Jorge Castañeda served as Mexico’s Foreign Minister. On March 2nd, 2002, 21 desperate Cuban refugee wannabes crammed into Mexico’s embassy in Havana hoping to emigrate from Castro’s Cuba to Mexico. (In prosperous, European immigrant-swamped pre-Castro Cuba, by the way, the family and friends of any Cuban seeking to immigrate to Mexico would have promptly recommended him to a psychiatrist.)

At any rate, promptly upon notice of this violation of Mexican sovereignty by immigrant wannabes, Jorge Castañeda —a man apparently scandalized by U.S. judicial procedures, especially as regards to illegal immigrants—ordered Castro’s Stalinist police to enter the embassy and drag the desperate Cubans out.

Now let’s expand a bit on Jorge Castaneda’s “credentials.” I hold here in my hands a document detailing how this very Jorge Castañeda was recruited by Cuba’s KGB-trained secret police as a spy, where he served loyally for almost five years.

Although Cuban dictator Fidel Castro died on Nov. 25, 2016, the influence of the intelligence services that he created lives on. Castro, who ruled Cuba with an iron fist for five decades, created a spy apparatus whose outsized impact has extended far from the shores of the Caribbean country.

Cuba did not have a professional foreign intelligence service before Castro seized power in 1959. Under Soviet auspices, it created one in 1961. Initially called the Direccion General de Inteligencia (DGI), and later renamed the Direccion de Inteligencia (DI), Cuba’s most important intelligence agency began training its officers in Moscow in 1962. KGB tutelage proved of enormous value, both to the Castro regime and to the USSR.

The DGI quickly developed into an elite service. Brian Latell, a former CIA analyst, noted in his 2012 book Castro’s Secrets, “Many retired CIA officials stand in awe of how Cuba, a small island nation, could have built up such exceptional clandestine capabilities and run so many successful operations against American targets.” In Latell’s opinion, “Cuban intelligence…ran circles around both” the CIA and the FBI.

William Rosenau and Ralph Espach, both senior analysts at the Virginia-based think tank, the Center for Naval Analyses, concurred with Latell’s conclusion. Writing in The National Interest, both offered the judgment: “Cuban intelligence services are widely regarded as among the best in the world—a significant accomplishment, given the country’s meager financial and technological resources (“Cuba’s Spies Still Punch Above Their Weight,” Sept. 29, 2013).”

The basis for this claim seems sound.

Cuban intelligence successfully penetrated U.S. national security agencies both during the Cold War and in the years since. Following his 1987 defection to the U.S., Florentino Aspillaga Lombard, a top official in Castro’s intelligence agencies, exposed dozens of Cuban double agents who had infiltrated various segments of American society, from the government to non-profit organizations. Many of the spies had been living in the U.S. for years.

In retaliation, Castro ordered at least two-failed assassination attempts on Aspillaga—both of them, Latell pointed out, involving people the former Cuban spy knew.

Another of the DI’s successful plants, Ana Belen Montes, spied on behalf of Cuba for sixteen years. Montes, an analyst with the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), was sentenced to a 25-year prison term in October 2002.

The damage caused by Montes was extensive. Scott Carmichael, the U.S. counterintelligence officer who helped bring Montes down, stated in his 2007 book True Believer that, among other actions, Montes divulged the existence of a secret U.S. Army base in El Salvador, resulting in an attack by Castro-friendly forces and the death of an American Green Beret. Additionally, Montes revealed U.S. assets in Cuba and, in the opinion of former U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton, may have offered significant contributions to a 1998 intelligence report that minimized the danger Cuba poses to the U.S.

1997-1998: Director, European and North American Division — Ministry of Foreign Investment and Economic Cooperation (cover assignment)

1992-1997: Economic Counselor in charge of economic and trade affairs at the Cuban Embassy in Brazil (cover assignment)

1982 – 1992: Specialist on Cooperation in the Division of Economic International Institutions of the State Committee for Economic Cooperation in Havana (cover assignment)

1981: Project Manager with the ECIMETAL Enterprise (cover assignment)

@1981 – Present day: Entered Cuba’s primary foreign intelligence service, the Directorate General of Intelligence (DGI) as an officer in the Q-2 Department, which conducted operations against Cuban exiles. Following a 1989 restructuring, the DGI was renamed the Directorate of Intelligence (DI).

1980: Graduated from the University of Havana with a degree in Economics

Born in Havana, Cuba, on 10/14/56, Malmierca Díaz is married to Grisell Guadalupe Castano-Rey and has two children. His languages include Spanish, English, French & Portuguese.

Editor’s Note: A “cover assignment” is the purported occupation or purpose of an intelligence officer or agent and is intended to explain one’s duties or presence in an area.

This week, Cuba’s Minister of Foreign Trade and Investment, Rodrigo Malmierca Diaz, is visiting Washington, D.C., where he will discuss business with Obama Administration officials and be fêted by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.

Let’s be clear: Malmierca is not “the Cuban people.”

This trip is not about doing business with “the Cuban people” or any of the discredited rhetoric of the Obama Administration and its new Chamber friends, led by former U.S. Secretary of Commerce Carlos Gutierrez.

During this trip, Malmierca will distribute the Cuban dictatorship’s glossy 168-page book of 246 business “opportunities” with Castro’s state monopolies, which are run by its military and intelligence services.

But it’s also about recruiting “useful idiots” (“poleznye idioty”).

You see — Malmierca is not simply Cuba’s Minister of Foreign Trade and Investment (MINCEX, Spanish acronym).

Rodrigo Malmierca Diaz is the son of Isidoro Malmierca Peoli, a historic Castro confidant and founder of Cuba’s counterintelligence and state security services. In the 1980s, Rodrigo himself entered Cuba’s intelligence services (known as “DGI“) as an officer in the Q-2 Department, which was tasked with “recruitment” and other operations against Cuban exiles. As a DGI officer, Rodrigo would serve under “diplomatic cover” at Castro’s Embassies in Brazil, Belgium and the Cuban Mission to the United Nations in New York. Then, in 2009, he was named Minister of Foreign Trade and Investment.

Rodrigo Malmierca is not the first senior MINCEX official to visit the United States.

In 1995 (that’s right 1995), Cuba’s Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade, Ismael Sene Alegret, traveled throughout the Midwest as part of a month-long Cuban “trade delegation” in the United States. (Click here to see how familiar this article reads). His goal was to “recruit” allies in the agri-business community.

Like Malmierca, Sene Alegret was a senior DGI officer.

Sene Alegret officially served in Cuba’s DGI from 1967-1997. (That’s right, he was still a DGI officer while serving at MINCEX). He was a senior Cuban intelligence official in Eastern Europe — with close KGB ties — where he headed missions in the former Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

Get ready for another round of “Let’s go do business in Cuba” enthusiasm on Friday. That’s when Secretary of State John Kerry is scheduled to raise the Stars and Stripes for the ceremonial opening of the U.S. Embassy in Havana.

Before you go rushing into a business venture on the island that was the communist outpost in the Cold War, you might want to have a talk with Ross Thompson at Classified Worldwide Consulting, which has an office in West Palm Beach. Thompson, the firm’s managing director, has a few caveats to share.

In particular, Thompson cautions that Cuba’s foreign investment and business laws present six key challenges that Americans need to think through ahead of time. They are:

The Cuban government will own a majority stake in the company. A 49-51 percent split is common, but Havana has required a larger share in some sectors.

Your local workforce will be selected by the Cuban government. This selection may not be based on skill or merit but by seniority or cronyism.

Cuban managers will be appointed to mirror your handpicked managers, especially if your senior leadership includes Cuban exiles. The Cuban managers will ultimately control many decisions, or influence them, when dealing with your majority partner, the Cuban government.

Everything in Cuba is heavily influenced by Cuba’s intelligence service, the DGI. You must be very careful to guard your own corporate proprietary information. [Emphasis added]

Vendors you may work with may be fronts, or “cutouts,” for other foreign intelligence services such as those from China, Russia, Iran or North Korea. The capture and exchange of corporate confidential information is a lucrative business, so guard your files. [Emphasis added]

Former Dirección General De Inteligencia(DGI) officer Enrique García Diaz reports that prior to the 1979 re-establishment of diplomatic ties, Cuban intelligence maintained three positions in Quito. DGI officer Boris Castillo Barroso held a position in the Latin America Energy Organization (OLADE), while Luis Enrique Benites Montero“Enrique” and Javier Buduen Martinez“Miguel Angel” served undercover with the Centro Internacional de Estudios Superiores de Comunicación para América Latina (CIESPAL).

When official ties between the two nations warmed, the Cuban Embassy was allowed to re-open on August 24, 1979. Thereafter, Castillo established the DGI Centro within the safety of Havana’s diplomatic facility. He would later be assisted by Commercial Attaché and fellow DGI officerRoberto Oliva, whom the CIA took note of in December 1981.

Oliva is a likely match for Roberto Oliva Ibarra, a Cuban official assigned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MINREX) who served as a representative to the United Nation’s Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) during the latter half of the 1970s.

García Diaz said another spy assigned to the very small Embassy was Prensa Latina Correspondent and Departamento America (DA) asset Oscar Perdomo Marin, first posted to Ecuador in June 1974. Perdomo’s DA affiliation meant he worked targets and responsibilities outside the control of the DGI Centro. The Venezuelan asset was a friend of legendary Cuban spymaster Manuel Piñeiro Losada. During the early 1980s, Perdomo’s boss in Havana was the DA’s South America Section Chief,Jose Miguel Guerra Diaz, who also personally directed DA operations in Ecuador.

Relations between Quito and Havana were downgraded to a Chargé d’affaires in April 1981. A Chargé is the lowest rank of diplomatic representative recognized under international law. José Francisco Ross Paz arrived that July as the Chargé, only to be identified by the Washington Times as a DA officer on August 25, 1983.

The second DGI Centro Chief in Ecuador was Hermes Cachon Gacita noted García Diaz. He reportedly arrived in Quito in 1983 for a three year posting using a non-traditional cover assignment. Roughly concurrent with the change in Centro Chiefs was the return of Javier Buduen Martinez,this time as Commercial Attaché. Other newcomers included Buduen’s wife “Elvirita” and Luis Enrique Benites Montero, who took Castillo’s former position in OLADE.

Ambassadorial-level relations were re-established on January 24, 1984 and DGI Officer Carlos Rafael Zamora Rodriguezwas immediately assigned as ambassador. He was accompanied by his spy-wife, Maura Juan Perez. Shortly thereafter, Guerra Diaz, the former DA Section Chief for South America, arrived in Ecuador as the new First Secretary. Two years later, the DGI Centro welcomed Nelson Quesada(Carlos Alfonso) and Ricardo Cruz Fernandez(Max).

Ambassador Zamora and his wife remained in Ecuador until 1989. Public records show by the year 2000, he was Havana’s Ambassador to Panama and several years later became the regime’s Ambassador to Brazil, a position he held until 2013.

Former Dirección General De Inteligencia(DGI) officer Enrique García Diaz reports Alexis Frutos was selected for the DGI during his final year of high school. He then moved to Havana in 1976 to start his spy career. He married an Afro-Cuban woman who gave birth to two daughters during the 1980s. She was not a DGI official at that time.

According to the CIA Directory of Cuban officials, Sarrafserved as a Prensa Latina (PRELA) representative at the Cuban Embassy in the late 1970s. García Diaz and the CIA both noted Frutos Weeden’s assignment to Mexico City as the Commercial Attaché in the early-mid 1980s.

García Diaz said as of his 1989 defection, the DGI Centro in Mexico had 15 officers and had deeply penetrated the Mexican government, every major political party and all key societal sectors. He believes the (now) Directorate of Intelligence (DI) remains deeply rooted throughout the nation to this day.

Alexis Frutos is currently the Political Counselor at the Cuba Embassy in Venezuela, where García Diaz suspects he serves as the DI Centro Chief.