HOWARD, J.: Sandra Crawley was
convicted of murder and sentenced to life in prison. She appeals, arguing the
trial court erred by (1) allowing her confession into evidence; (2) denying
her motion for a mistrial; and (3) allowing the State to introduce testimony
regarding her relationship with Eugene Davis. We affirm.

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Eugene Davis was stabbed to death on October 28,
1987. The murder remained unsolved until January 12, 1999. While investigating
Davis's death, the police determined that Crawley and her husband had a relationship
with Davis. Specifically, police learned that Crawley stayed with Davis on several
occasions after her husband assaulted her.

As a result of this information, Officer Denton
transported Crawley from the Spartanburg County Detention Center, where she
was incarcerated on an unrelated charge, to the Sheriff's Department, where
she was questioned regarding her involvement. During the interrogation, Crawley
twice confessed that she participated in Davis's murder.

Crawley was ultimately convicted of murder and
sentenced to life in prison. This appeal follows.

DISCUSSION

A. Admissibility of the Confessions

The first issue presented on appeal is whether
the trial judge erred in admitting Crawley's two statements into evidence. The
trial court held a Jackson v. Denno (1)
hearing and then ruled Crawley was advised of her Miranda
(2) rights, knowingly and intelligently waived those rights, and gave
her statements to the police freely and voluntarily. Crawley argues the trial
court erred in not suppressing her confessions.

The test regarding the admissibility of a confession
is voluntariness. State v. Von Dohlen, 322 S.C. 234, 243, 471 S.E.2d
689, 694 (1996) ("A confession is not admissible unless it was voluntarily made.").
The voluntariness of a confession is determined from an examination of the totality
of the circumstances. Id. at 243, 471 S.E.2d at 694-95. To introduce
the statement made after a defendant has been advised of his rights, the State
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence he voluntarily waived those rights.
State v. Reed, 332 S.C. 35, 42, 503 S.E.2d 747, 750 (1998). "Once a voluntary
waiver of the Miranda rights is made, that waiver continues until the
individual being questioned indicates that he wants to revoke the waiver and
remain silent or circumstances exist which establish that his 'will has been
overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired.'" State
v. Rochester, 301 S.C. 196, 200, 391 S.E.2d 244, 246 (1990) (quoting State
v. Moultrie, 273 S.C. 60, 62, 254 S.E.2d 294, 294-95 (1979)). This Court
will not disturb the trial court's findings of fact regarding the voluntariness
of a statement absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Kennedy, 333 S.C.
426, 429, 510 S.E.2d 714, 715 (1998).

The interrogation lasted approximately seven and
a half hours. During this time, Crawley was given a lie detector test, which
lasted an hour and a half. She also received dinner and restroom breaks. At
11:45 p.m., Crawley gave a statement in which she confessed to participating
in Davis's murder. Approximately an hour later, she gave a more detailed statement
in which she stated, "I did stab [Eugene Davis] along with [my husband]. I don't
remember how many times I stabbed him, but I'm sure it was more than once."

On appeal, Crawley first argues the confessions
were inadmissible because she was not told Davis's murder was the subject of
the inquiry before she waived her right to remain silent. We disagree.

Officer Denton admitted he did not tell Crawley
the subject of the investigation before she arrived at the Sheriff's Department
or before she signed the Miranda waiver. However, we conclude this does
not affect the voluntariness of the confessions. See Colorado v. Spring,
479 U.S. 564, 576 (1987). As the Supreme Court reasoned,

Once Miranda warnings are given, it is difficult
to see how official silence could cause a suspect to misunderstand the nature
of his constitutional right - "his right to refuse to answer any question
which might incriminate him." United States v. Washington, 431 U.S.
181, 188, 97 S.Ct. 1814, 1819, 52 L.Ed.2d 238 (1977). "Indeed, it seems self-evident
that one who is told he is free to refuse to answer questions is in a curious
posture to later complain that his answers were compelled." Ibid. We
have held that a valid waiver does not require that an individual be informed
of all information "useful" in making his decision or all information that
"might . . . affec[t] his decision to confess." Moran v. Burbine, 475
U.S., at 422, 106 S.Ct., at 1141. "[W]e have never read the Constitution to
require that the police supply a suspect with a flow of information to help
him calibrate his self-interest in deciding whether to speak or stand by his
rights." Ibid. . . . [T]he additional information could affect only
the wisdom of a Miranda waiver, not its essentially voluntary and knowing
nature. Accordingly, the failure of the law enforcement officials to inform
[the defendant] of the subject matter of the interrogation could not affect
[the defendant's] decision to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege in a constitutionally
significant manner.

Id. at 576-577. Therefore, Crawley's ignorance
regarding the subject of the questioning does not make her confessions inadmissible.

Crawley next contends the police knew she was addicted
to crack cocaine, pain pills, nerve pills, Xanax, Valium, and alcohol and used
all of these substances on a daily basis. She testified she was suffering from
withdrawal symptoms at the time she confessed to the murder because she had
been in jail for three days and had not had access to the drugs. She claims
her withdrawal affected her adversely, so as to render her confessions unknowing
and involuntary.

However, Officer Wood testified he had known Crawley
in his capacity as a police officer for seventeen years. According to Officer
Wood, he was aware of Crawley's addiction, but Crawley did not act any different
on the day of the interrogation than she did any other day. He testified she
understood what was occurring, and he disputed her assertions that she asked
to be left alone or that she cried during the interrogation.

We find this evidence supports the trial judge's
conclusion that Crawley's statements were knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
given, despite any withdrawal from alcohol and drugs. Therefore, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in admitting Crawley's statements. Kennedy,
333 S.C. at 429, 510 S.E.2d at 715; see alsoBright v. State,
455 S.E.2d 37 (Ga. 1995) (finding that even if the defendant had been exhibiting
symptoms of drug withdrawal, that fact alone does not render the statement involuntary).

B. Mistrial

Crawley next argues the trial court abused its
discretion by refusing to declare a mistrial when a witness testified Crawley
called Davis "from the jailhouse." Crawley argues this testimony placed her
character in issue to her prejudice. We disagree.

The decision to grant or deny a motion for a mistrial
is within the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not be overturned
on appeal absent an abuse of discretion amounting to an error of law. State
v. Council, 335 S.C. 1, 515 S.E.2d 508 (1999). Although this decision is
vested in the sound discretion of the trial court, the power of the court to
declare a mistrial should be used with the greatest caution and for plain and
obvious causes. State v. Johnson, 334 S.C. 78, 512 S.E.2d 795 (1999).

During his testimony, Paul David Hensley testified
he was a friend of Davis and he had also known Crawley and her family for a
long time. Hensley stated he talked to Crawley on Davis's phone when she called
prior to the murder. When the State inquired as to who initiated this phone
call, Hensley replied, "I think she called him from the jailhouse, as far as
I can remember." Crawley objected and moved for a mistrial. The trial judge
denied the motion, but instructed the witnesses not to mention a jail.

We conclude the trial judge did not abuse his discretion
in denying the motion for a mistrial. Hensley's statement was vague and provided
no particulars regarding Crawley's connection, if any, to the "jailhouse." It
was not apparent from this casual remark whether Crawley herself was incarcerated
or was visiting someone else at the jail. SeeCouncil, 335 S.C.
at 1, 515 S.E.2d at 508 (ruling the trial judge did not abuse his discretion
in denying a mistrial after witness improperly alluded to SLED fingerprint database
containing the defendant's prior fingerprint card because it was questionable
whether jury even understood the implication of a prior criminal record from
the witness's statement, and therefore, there was no prejudice).

C. Hearsay Testimony

Crawley next argues the trial judge erred by allowing
testimony from the Davis's daughter, Teresa Davis Gilliam, that Davis told her
he was dating Crawley and Crawley was going to come stay with him. Crawley argues
this testimony was hearsay and highly prejudicial, requiring reversal. We disagree.

Any error in the admission of this testimony was
clearly harmless because Crawley admitted her close relationship to Davis in
her statement to police and Officer Wood testified without objection that Crawley
stayed with Davis for two to three day periods, using his residence as a "safe
house" when her husband beat her. Thus, we find no reversible error because
the statement was merely cumulative. SeeState v. Griffin, 339
S.C. 74, 77-78, 528 S.E.2d 668, 670 (2000) ("There is no reversible error in
the admission of evidence that is cumulative to other evidence properly admitted.").