Workshop organized by the Innovation and Regulation in Digital Services Chair, Paris, 16 March 2011

The workshop was devoted to integrate the economic analysis of network industries with accounting, law and economics.

The first panel explored the role of accounting structures in innovation corporate processes. Y. Biondi and P. Giannoccolo presented a heuristic model based upon complementarities, coopetition and intangibles to analyze these processes, with implications for antitrust regulation, costing and pricing. G. Marzo further clarified this role by exploring accounting notions and methods concerned with intangible resources related to knowledge and innovation from the perspective of several theories of the firm, including the firm as an entity. In this context, A. Arlandis and S. Ciriani analyzed the telecommunications industry by functional layers, with specific attention to operating margins, and investments in R&D and innovation, by geographical location and allocation between Europe, Asia, and USA.

The second panel approached industrial dynamics of coordination and innovation from the viewpoints of the regulator and the judge, through an institutional comparative analysis between France and USA. F. Marty compared antitrust decisions in these countries by analyzing cases of dominant position abuse and margin squeeze. Th. Kirat compared judicial decisions concerned with litigations on costing and pricing in public procurement cases.

The third panel discussed recent trends in telecommunications industry. F. Lirzin and S. Reiche elaborated three scenarios for internet (integration and segregation of corporate networks; market organization of them; free and open access), and their implications for social and economic regulations. R. Lilia and D. Flacher analyzed tariff complexity in telecommunications offers and its implications for consumer welfare and competitive analysis, through an empirical application to Tunisian case.

The fourth and last panel approached innovative investment processes in network industries. Ch. Müller developed a comparative international analysis of notions, methods and practices of incentive tariff-making of these processes in energy sector, with specific attention to the German case. M. Feizi presented a simultaneous (à la Nash) and sequential (à la Stackelberg) game-theoretical model of the game between regulating Authority and regulated firm on tariff-making and updating over time.