Predator Drones: The Best Worst Option?

U.S. intelligence officials have called the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) or drones, “their most effective weapon against Al Qaeda.” This belief seems to be manifested in the increased frequency of drone attacks in the border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Although the Bush administration authorized only a handful of such strikes in 2007, the Wall Street Journal reports there were more than 30 attacks in 2008. So far in 2009, attacks are up 30 percent from last year, with Newsblogging noting there have been 27 drone attacks, “of which only two occurred before Obama took office.”

Obama’s administration officials have claimed that drone strikes in Pakistan have killed nine of the 20 top Al Qaeda officials. Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemannechoed in an article last month, “It is possible to say with some certainty that since the summer of 2008, U.S. drones have killed dozens of lower-ranking militants and at least ten mid-and upper-level leaders within Al Qaeda and the Taliban.” Despite these successes, U.S. drone strikes have been widely criticized for their high civilian death toll. The U.S. has been tight-lipped on these numbers, refusing to disclose “how many civilians have been killed in the strikes,” but an article in The News this past April published figures provided by Pakistani officials, “indicating that 687 civilians have been killed along with 14 Al Qaeda leaders in some 60 drone strikes since January 2008 – just over 50 civilians killed for every Al Qaeda leader.”

Last week, Daniel Byman from Brookings was more cautious in his assessment when he noted, “Sourcing on civilian deaths is weak and the numbers are often exaggerated.” However, he added, “more than 600 civilians are likely to have died from the attacks. That number suggests that for every militant killed, 10 or so civilians also died.” Amir Mir, a Pakistan terrorism expert, put the total number of deaths caused by drone strikes since 2006 at 700, a number similar to Bergen and Tiedemann’s estimates, “although he asserts that the vast majority of casualties have been civilians, something that is, in fact, impossible to establish definitively.”

In Pakistan, these civilian deaths have sparked outrage among the population, leading many analysts to question whether the costs of drone strikes outweigh their benefits. David Kilcullen, author of The Accidental Guerilla and an influential counterinsurgency advisor to Gen. David Petraeus between 2006 to 2008, believes these attacks do more harm than good because of the “backlash they create.” In the Small Wars Journal earlier this year he wrote, “Unilateral strikes against targets inside Pakistan, whatever other purpose they might serve, have an unarguably and entirely negative effect on Pakistani stability…They increase the number and radicalism of Pakistanis who support extremism and thus undermine the key strategic problem of building a willing and capable partner in Pakistan.” In a NY Times op-ed written with Andrew McDonald Exum, Kilcullen further asserted, “…Every one of these dead noncombatants [from U.S. drone attacks] represents an alienated family, a new desire for revenge, and more recruits for a militant movement that has grown exponentially even as drone strikes have increased.”

Drone strikes have also impacted overarching anti-U.S. sentiment in Pakistan. A recent poll conducted by World Public Opinion from May 17 – May 28, 2009 found that 82% of Pakistanis view predator strikes as “unjustified,” (interestingly, though, the Aryana Institute for Regional Research and Advocacy found that more than half the people it polled in FATA said the drone strikes are accurate and are damaging the militant organizations. Fewer than half said that anti-American sentiment in the area had increased due to the drone attacks).

If the strategic costs outweigh the tactical benefits, why does the United States continue to champion such a policy? Upon studying numerous articles and resources, the answer seems to be: because it is their best worst option. According to an article in last week’s Wall Street Journal, “Unlike fighter jets or cruise missiles, Predators can loiter over their targets for more than 20 hours, take photos in which men, women and children can be clearly distinguished (burqas can be visible from 20,000 feet) and deliver laser-guided munitions with low explosive yields. This minimizes the risks of the ‘collateral damage’ that often comes from 500-pound bombs.”

In Pakistan and Afghanistan, where the U.S. operates the MQ-1 Predator and their more sophisticated successor MQ-9 Reaper drones, the most impressive thing, noted the Atlantic, is that they fly slow. The news piece elaborated, “That’s right, in counterinsurgency operations, where the goal is to hunt and kill individuals or small groups of fighters—rather than to attack mass infantry formations—the slower a plane flies, the better.”

NYT: Piloting drones from trailers

From a U.S. standpoint, the use of drones are not only cheaper than conventional planes, they also keep pilots and American soldiers “out of harm’s way,” particularly since most UAVs are manned from thousands of miles away. The Air Force’s Predator missions, for instance, are operated by pilots sitting in trailers at Nellis Air Force base outside Las Vegas, Nevada. In the aforementioned 2006 Atlantic piece, “Hunting the Taliban in Las Vegas,” Robert Kaplan described the inside of one of these trailers,

Like sub drivers, Pred pilots fly blind, using only the visual depiction of their location on a map and math—numerical readouts indicating latitude, longitude, height, wind speeds, ground elevation, nearby planes, and so forth. The camera in the rotating ball focuses only on the object under surveillance. The crew’s situational awareness is restricted to the enemy on the ground. Much of the time during a stakeout, the Pred flies a preprogrammed hexagon, racetrack, bow tie, or some other circular-type holding pattern. Each trailer holds a two-person crew: a pilot and a “sensor,” who operates the ball. Both face half a dozen computer screens, including map displays and close-up shots of the object under surveillance.

Today, MQ-9 Reapers are slowly replacing the Predators, which are a newer model and more heavily armed. And, in a sign of growing U.S. support for these drones, the military is spending significant more money on this technology, from $880 million in 2007 to $2 billion a year. Several sources note that the strikes have disrupted Al Qaeda’s operations, and Dennis Blair, the Director of National Intelligence, testified to Congress in February that “replacing the loss of key leaders since 2008 in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas has proved difficult for Al Qaeda.” Someone speaking from a U.S. national security standpoint would also point out that bombs in the air are a better and more viable option than boots on the ground.

From a Pakistani perspective, none of these explanations are likely to improve perceptions of the United States. In fact, much of this reasoning comes off as callous and clinical when placed in context with the tremendous amount of civilian casualties, (the WSJ’s line: “drones have made war-fighting more humane,” further emphasizes this point). However, recent developments indicate that a compromise has been reached between Washington and Islamabad. According to McClatchy news service, recent drone strikes targeting key Pakistani militant leaders “indicate the two governments are coordinating closely.” In the new offensive in South Waziristan, “Pakistani forces have been preparing the battleground by sending in combat aircraft to pound suspected militant hideouts and defenses. The U.S. drones, which contain highly sophisticated technology for homing in on individuals, seem to be augmenting the attack.” Analyst Hasan Askari-Rizvi told the news agency, “The frequency (of the drone strikes) has been increased in order to support Pakistan’s military operations in South Waziristan…These operations help Pakistan contain Beitullah Mehsud.”

Ultimately, the question remains: Even with this reported coordination between U.S. and Pakistan, are drone attacks ever acceptable? What if they killed Mehsud or his top operatives? As Byman noted, “The real answer to halting Al Qaeda’s activity in Pakistan will be the long-term support of Pakistan’s counterinsurgency efforts,” not the short-term advocacy of Predator or Reaper drones.

I think there is a long term versus short term question here. I think we can accept as true that drone attacks are keeping al-Qaeda on the defensive, which is a net positive. (The question about international legal violations are moot, since the attacks are being carried out with Pakistan’s assent). But the long-term strategic downside is that civilian casualties lead to greater support for militancy and increase the instability within Pakistan.

Here, the issue becomes one of implementation and timing.
As the number of potential targets decreases, and the harder those targets become, the likelihood of civilian casualties increases, causing the long-term strategic challenges above. Thus, the use of drones over time should become more restrictive. By gradually decreasing the drone attacks and saving them for the clearest/best shot, civilian deaths can be minimized. Additionally, this should be supplemented with a proper counter-insurgency strategy. But in the long term, Pakistan needs to do a lot in FATA, including incorporating it into NWFP, and repealing the FCR and the Political Parties Act.

I actually think the most interesting statistic was the Aryana poll which found that fewer than half the people polled in FATA said anti-American sentiment increased due to drone attacks) – contrast that with Pakistanis polled in the rest of the country (the WPO poll was conducted in Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan and the NWFP but not in FATA), who said across the board that drone strikes were unjustified. Granted, polls should be taken with a grain of salt, but an interesting discrepancy nonetheless.

tough questions. there was some talk previously of drone attacks being “jointly operated” between us and pakistani military officials.

its pretty clear that the pakistani political-military establishment has agreed to the drone attacks. to sweeten the pot, the US recently started using the drone attacks against baitul mesud. i also think that the US privately has agreed to eventually negotiate with afghan taliban that are allied with pakistan. i also think that the US has privately agreed to push india onto a kashmir settlement.

so overall, i think that the US and Pakistan are now operating according to the same playbook.

Yeah, the whole U.S.-India-Pakistan dynamic is an interesting one, and definitely merits a post this week, esp. in regard to the back channel talks that have been occurring between Ind-Pakistan on Kashmir. In fact, prior to the Mumbai attacks, reports say the two countries were pretty close in reaching a solution to Kashmir. Have to do more research on that, but that’s what the talk has been.

Very well-done piece. While I disagree with the final assessment, the ratio of civilian deaths to militant deaths is disconcerting.

However, as you noted, this may be the “best worst option.” As long as militants continue to hide in civilian populations, civilian casualties will rise. While I’m not, by any means, condoning the civilian deaths, I don’t think that you can let militants effectively evade any and all targeting mechanisms.

I also tend to believe that the effectiveness is best gauged by those in the FATA region – an interesting point you raised in the piece. The US military is in between a rock and a hard place, and this may currently be the best option that allows the military to target terrorists while simultaneously respecting, as best as possible, Pakistani sovereignty.

However, the most interesting aspect of the piece may be the response of the Pakistani government to the strikes. Public reaction by the government must simultaneously recognize the necessity and benefit of the drone strikes from both a US and Pakistani military perspective and respect the indignation of the Pakistani populace.

There seems to be a very large disconnect between what the government is voicing to the people and what they are doing privately with the U.S. It’s not that I don’t understand why they’re trying to save face in front of the people, by condemning all drone strikes and calling it an infringement of Pakistani sovereignty. However such statements are undermined when intel reports about secret bases in Balochistan are leaked or when articles surface about close U.S. military and Pakistani cooperation. I am realist, so I’d rather the two militaries collaborate on a policy, so maybe the government needs to be more transparent?

While I condemn the drone attacks, I realize that the problem exists because Pak Gov’t allowed this problem to escalate to this magnitude. Ofcourse this allows AQ to achieve the public sympathy, exactly what they hoped to do. Perhaps the intelligence bureaus need to double/triple check their sources before using the drones to level out houses/building and worse, civilians. If this continues, the end result would be a complete leveling of all structures and useless death of thousands. Education could be a way to achieve the goal, singling out AQ and their likes. We are after all, living in a sane and advanced world. Using our heads, rather than blind attacks might be the way to go.

Maybe the US could conduct an awareness campaign. A lot of fury at the drone attacks come from the fact that a lot of Pakistanis think that it’s an invasion of our airspace, rather than a joint operation to target militants.

I think US policy fails on those fronts in many ways i.e. by failing to inform the local population about their agenda and just going covert and hoping the repercussions don’t have a fallout.

I don’t think it’s the U.S.’s job to conduct an awareness campaign though – it should be the Pakistani government’s initiative. Plus, don’t you think that any effort by the US to conduct an “awareness” campaign will be viewed with suspicion? Much better to come from a more “neutral” party, I think anyway.

Great post, CHUP, and the ensuing dialogue seems to reveal both ideas on improving the current drone policy and serious questions on its overall effectiveness. Drone attacks are a reality like you mentioned, but could be much more of a joint military tactic versus a current crutch of a US strategy. US Forces frustration continues to grow as Pakistan evolves into a sanctuary of sorts for AQ. Drones give these forces an ability to reach key targets without tanks or troops on the ground. I believe part of the recent rise in drone attacks represents the growing frustration of US forces trying to engage an enemy that hides and organizes itself in northern Pakistan.

It seems like there is room to improve on the current drone approval process. One post mentioned a “triple check” and I think the political cost and impact on the AFPAK counter insurgency strategy of the administration would be other key measures for this approval process. The ratio you quote or close to it would violate the current COIN strategy and recent “population centric” approach, resulting in many current attacks should not be approved. Drones will continue to be counter productive until that correlation with civilians and enemy is much lower if not negative and supports the strategy mentioned.

The other point from several posts is the lack of coordination between such attacks and other efforts. This is the context that matters most and not easily understood without more information. If attacks are directly linked to supporting Pakistani military efforts or to allow development efforts a chance, than this tactic may be justified within an overall plan or strategy. I think people are rightly outraged when an attack seems to be a single action not linked to anything else, much less no public briefing detailing the attack. I agree that local awareness should come from local outlets of trusted news, but US forces could still publish details for local news to use via press releases or other updates. Access to information surrounding these attacks contributes to the frustration and discontent.

I wonder though – is there a sense of accountability for the civilians killed? I have a problem with even the term “collateral damage” because it dehumanizes what’s at stake here, particularly given that COIN strategies are meant to be population-centric, but if drone strikes are supposed to be U.S. “worst best option” how can they ensure, aside from coordinating with the Pakistani military, that they minimize the civilian death toll? I wonder if recruits operating these drones from their trailers are even reprimanded for the “mistakes” they make.

I don’t think there is enough accountability for civilians lost. The drone operators are definitely not reprimanded for carrying out an approved attack. Commanders in the approval chain would be the only ones. We ran into a similar problems with cruise missile approval process when Commanders and politicians might disagree on collateral damage risk. Hopefully, Pakistani commanders can start taking more ownership of approving such attacks and help explain the rationale at a local level. Oh yeah, and start decreasing this option as quickly as possible.