Can Babies Unlock the Origins of Morality? Not So Fast.

Recent Psychological studies suggest that babieshave an innate moral sense. On October 18th, CBS aired “The Baby Lab” ( it’s worth the 13 minutes for anyone interested in the Origins of Morality)where they interviewed Psychologists Paul Bloom and Karen Wynn. Both claim that their studies are telling of the “the origins of morality“. This suggests that someone’s environment might not be playing the role that many have thought that it has. So much for the tabula rasa that Rousseau and Locke suggested if Bloom and Wynn are correct. Bloom says, “there is a universal moral core that all humans share. The seeds of our understanding of justice, our understanding of right and wrong, are part of our biological nature.” The purpose of this post will be to call their conclusion into question.

I do not think that the studies by Bloom and Wynn are suggesting that nature plays a larger role in our behavior.

Why think that particular moral judgments are “built-in” as Bloom has suggested? Isn’t it possible that the babies partaking the studies have been disposed to dislike things that seem to end play time? If you watch the video you’ll see some of the studies that Bloom and Wynn are drawing from to base their conclusion. I think their conclusion is far too quick and fast. In what follows I will suggest another interpretation of what we are seeing in the studies that Bloom and Wynn take to b e telling of some sort of built-in morality. As if the babies genes are programmed to like or dislike certain moral/immoral behavior. The video discusses babies and older children, for the sake of making this post brief I’d like to focus on the conclusions drawn by the studies involving babies.

One study puts 3 puppets in front of a baby. One of the puppets (middle puppet) struggles to open up the box which has toys in it. The puppy puppet on the right (wearing yellow) comes over to help open up the box while the puppet on the left (wearing blue) sits back and watches. The study then goes on to give a variation of the scene just witnessed by the 5 month old baby. This time the puppet (puppy wearing blue) on the left comes over while the middle puppet (tiger) struggles to open the box filled with toys. The puppet on the left (wearing blue) slams the box shut, quite abruptly, instead of helping as in the case when the puppet helped (puppy wearing yellow). This is done to prime the baby into thinking that the puppet in blue is mean.

The first case is trying to show nice behavior or “moral behavior” (helping out) while the latter is supposed to show mean behavior (slamming the box shut and not helping). After watching both scenes the baby is asked to make a choice between the two puppets. The “good” or the “bad” puppet? Nearly 3/4 of the babies chose the “good” puppet in the first case. This suggests, according to Wynn and Bloom, that they have a preference for the puppet that exhibits morally good behavior.

In a second study a baby is again shown two different scenes each aiming to depict moral and immoral actions. The first scenario shows the baby 3 puppets playing with a ball. One of the puppets (a bunny) takes the ball and runs away with it. This is supposed to suggest that the bunny is stealing the ball. The second scene, as in the first study, shows a puppet struggling to open a box. The difference in this study is that the bunny puppet who stole in the previous scene is the puppet struggling to open up the box. When asked to choose which puppet they want they decide much differently than they originally did. In the second study 81% of the babies selected the puppet who slammed the box shut in the first study (the puppy wearing blue). From this change in attitude toward which puppy they selected, Bloom and Wynn suggest that the baby is selecting the blue puppy because they think the ball thief (the bunny) is deserving of punishment. Since they were previously primed to see the puppet wearing blue as mean. Bloom and Wynn claim that this is telling that babies are born with an innate sense of justice. What else could account for the difference in selection? I would like offer some alternative interpretations of the data drawn from these studies. These alternatives do not posit the existence of any innate sense of morality that Bloom and Wynn would have us believe.

My Take: In the first study they conclude that babies have a preference for moral behavior. This is so because they select the puppet that offers help to the struggling puppet trying to get the toy. I agree, it seems that over 75% of babies selecting the “good” puppet might indicate a trend toward a preference to morally good behavior. However, it does not follow that such a selection is innate, or “built-in”. This last move is doubtful. These babies have already had 5 months of experiences. They like it when mom or dad help them get things they like so it is plausible to think that they are seeing similar behavior in the puppets which is leading to their preference of the morally “good” puppy. The description I just gave does not insist on a built-in moral code and instead bases the preference of the baby to select the morally good puppet on their previous pleasant or similar experiences. This interpretation seems to directly conflict with the conclusion drawn by Bloom and Wynn.

In the second study they claim that the baby is selecting the puppet with the blue shirt because it deems that the bunny is in need of punishment. This is a stretch. Why couldn’t it suggest that they chose the puppet on the basis of that puppet ending the struggle of the puppet that could not open the box? Since the puppet that was selected in both cases was the puppet that ended the struggle of the Further, even if we grant that the baby chose the puppet in blue for reasons of justice it doesn’t follow that such a sense of justice is innate. As I responded in the first case this could have been learned, and, we have reason to believe that my interpretation is plausible. Since babies do not have the capacity to think outside the box it is likely that they emulate the preferences suggested by what they have already witnessed during their short existence.

The seeds of our understanding of right and wrong are part of our biological nature. Sure, but only insofar as our biological nature provides us with the capacity to reason. Any claims beyond that seem to be a stretch. We are not computers, our behavior does not come programmed into our genes. Our behavior seems to be the result of genetic factors that affect our capacity to reason and the experiences that we go through in our lifetimes. The studies do not seem to provide ample evidence for or even suggest that we are innately one way or the other.

Admittedly, reading the details of the study as presented here gets a bit hard to follow. I suggest watching the short (13-minute video) before weighing in. As far as I can tell, the nature vs. nurture debate is here to stay.

This is why we don’t draw anything but tentative conclusions from single studies open to peer review. The media tends to think it’s the original studies that formulate conclusions. This is exactly wrong. The right question to ask of any study is: “What does the peer review say?” This is what you have deal with for your criticism to be considered relevant: has your criticism been taken into account?

Another indicator worth paying attention to is the preponderance of evidence. Do infants demonstrate moral awareness? Why is this evidence from human infants almost identical to what other mammals demonstrate (preference of attention given to those who demonstrate fairness and reciprocity)? What’s the connection? Why do moral considerations of fairness and reciprocity show a significant preference across all anthropomorphic boundaries (like gender, race, geography, religion, age, language, social status, and ethnicity)?

Morality is often couched in terms of being a present or gift or obligation from some kind of supernatural agency of Oogity Boogity. Any time an issue is slapped with a label of morality, the religious tend to line to impose their faith-based ‘expertise’ on it, much to the detriment of us all. And the excuse is that morality comes from believing in some god’s authority to dictate what is and is not moral behaviour according to some Stone Age social blueprint. It is important to determine if moral behaviour has roots elsewhere… such as in our biology. Lo and behold, we have a rather compelling case to make that our behaviour really is fully informed by our biology modified by our interactions with our environment. It is not Good News! to those who assume their religious belief is the ongoing source for moral pronouncements that affect public policy and the pursuit of knowledge.

But what is very important is to understand that, clearly from such studies, moral awareness precedes religious belief… so we can step around this ever-ready impediment of faith-based belief reliably used to block us from gaining knowledge about the reality we share.

Checking out a peer-review is not a necessary action for my criticism to be relevant. Before “peer-reviewed” journals existed criticism was alive and well. And, these criticisms led to scientific progress. So, I am not so sure that my criticism needs to be addressed in peer-review for it to be salient. It’s quite possible that they may have over-looked a key feature of the data interpretation that a keen-eyed outside researcher not in their peer circle could notice. Noticing problematic conclusions that are not supported by the evidence would be relevant to any study. Also, what counts as “peer-review”. I am a PhD student doing work on the nature of moral judgments. Is this short blog post not a form of peer-review in itself? Need I have a particular sort education or degree in order to review someone’s work? I think not. As long as the researcher is cognizant of important aspects of the study under investigation that should suffice to weigh in and give critical comments.

With regards to morality and the supernatural: I don’t worry much about morality getting couched in God or the supernatural. In Philosophy, those arguments do not fly and are not taken very seriously. Morality can be grounded in many other ways other than biology and the supernatural. Any intro to Ethics course will teach you that (This is not a criticism pointed at you, just speaking generally). I do have one point that I would like to bring out and what may be motivating my skepticism regarding biological based ethics since you brought it up.

Science can only tell us the way things are and not the way things ought to be (If you’re interested in this google the ‘is-ought’ distinction. Sure, the way things are should inform us with regards to how we should go about thinking about what we ought to do. It is good to understand the world we live in before we make decisions about what we ought to do in it, however, there is no basis to think that science can give us answers to morally charged questions. Science can only serve to inform us about the natural facts, it does not delineate what we ought to do in light of those facts. Regardless of what Sam Harris would have many believe. Science cannot tell us how to live. Plain and simple.

Now, Bloom and Wynn are not suggesting that it is, they are simply suggesting that we are born with some innate moral code. This code is what it is. My worry is that people will come along and try to justify morally abhorrent behavior by grounding their claims in the fact that “hey, I was born that way”. If it is true (that we are born with some sort of innate moral sense) and the facts suggest that it is then great, we’ll appeal to the is/ought distinction and put the science in its rightful place (which is not in ethics). Further, and most important, it is not clear to me that the facts do suggest we are born with an innate moral sense for the reasons I mentioned in the post.

Like Justin, I tend to think that criticizing popular media’s takes on academic & experimental research is an important duty for academics and non-academics alike, and analyzing/criticizing the method an argument the media uses to justify their conclusions doesn’t necessarily require the critic to refer specifically to the data in peer-reviewed research. Argument analysis doesn’t require any reference outside of the argument being analyzed.

The tendency, as tildeb points out, is for the popular media to sieze on the story of a provocative conclusion from a limited (read: underdetermined) data set. As I see it, their acting on this tendency presents places where we have an intellectual (and moral?) duty to pull them up short.

Popular media, of course, is story-driven rather than fact-driven… they often follow what I think was Mark Twain’s suggestion – never to let the facts get in the way of a good story.

“Science can only tell us the way things are and not the way things ought to be”

Why should we seek to impose such a restriction? If you look at science as a method for understanding the world, why would we be incapable of applying this tool to ways of living? I can certainly understand why doing so might be deeply distasteful (disastrous, perhaps, if applied by someone with few scruples), but I don’t see how this constitutes an inability to do so, especially if we’ve already got another goal in mind. Since societies collectively have the goal to maintain themselves, doesn’t it follow that science can be used to answer “ought” questions regarding that maintenance at the very least?

Hi– not affiliated with Wynn or Bloom, but I’m a longtime fan of Wynn’s work. I think she has a genius way of using infants to inform the world. I think you misunderstand her work, and the general point of the field. I’d first like to address your second point about why her conclusions are non sequiturs.

You apparently missed that part of the video. This isn’t the same baby as in the previous studies, so your point about “preceding information” is not true. Scene 1: The bunny runs away with the ball. Scene 2: Bunny tries to open the box. Needs help. Yellow-Shirt Dog sits and does nothing; Blue-Shirt Dog slams the lid shut so that bunny can’t open the box. Babies prefer Blue-Shirt dog to Yellow-Shirt dog. This flies in the face of the previous scenario, where the helpful one is selected at roughly the same rate (81%) over the one who is hindering (slams the box shut).

In fact, if you read Bloom’s NY Times Opinion article, he goes on to say that they find that there is a hierarchical effect: helper > neutral > hinderer. The importance of this hierarchy is shown by the scenario that you referenced. They preferred the hinderer ONLY because they had previous information about the bunny. It is precisely important that the previous information about the bunny informed their decision about who was the better dog. This is why they are saying it was a moral decision. In this situation, hinderer > neutral > helper. They did other experiments not mentioned in the video that show this as well.

Regarding the idea of it being innate; I’m not sure what you want them to study? The morals of a fetus? A baby that can’t see beyond 6 inches from their face? She’s using babies that can’t talk; can’t walk; can’t even understand conservation of mass; conservation of water; and other physical principles. As previous psychologists proclaimed, the baby is the “perfect idiot,” i.e., they cannot respond to formal teaching. That doesn’t mean they can’t learn, however. This is where the science is becoming interesting though; the baby/young child is unteachable, and yet they can learn so much without formal instruction. What an idea!

Language takes years to develop because of its complexities and the lack of fine motor skills (mouth and tongue) at a young age. What makes you think that an infant has so much exposure to morality, that it would be such a perfect (and consistent) judge at 3-months to a year of age, particularly as these babies come from different households and cultures? Additionally, how can you then explain Bloom’s research that older children do not respond the same way; in fact they are more generous. Bloom and Wynn are saying that the older children are responding to culture; not the babies.

I believe Bloom and Wynn are careful in explaining the idea of “morality,” and I don’t think they are saying they’ve “discovered” innate morality. They are simply showing that we aren’t teaching as much as we think we are. This is consistent with Wynn’s finding with mathematical principles; we were born with the ability to add; it doesn’t mean we were born knowing how to add 34 and 23.

The burden, sir, is on you to explain why we wouldn’t be wired this way. Developing fields of neural plasticity is showing that we are designed to learn and perform certain functions (like acquire language). Do you know a society in which murders and rapists are exalted? There isn’t a lot of “nurturing” involved to determine that those people are not “good” for society. But what if a generous philanthropist rapes someone? How do we determine how “good” or “evil” someone is? That’s where morality is interesting. Those are the kinds of questions that we aren’t necessarily born knowing how to answer, and those are the ones where cultures differ.

Thank you, Ashley. Your contribution in clarification is important and helps explain the meaning when I wrote Lo and behold, we have a rather compelling case to make that our behaviour really is fully informed by our biology modified by our interactions with our environment. And it is from behaviour that we apply where on the spectrum falls our definitions of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ we term as morality. That is why intention is such an important feature to actions, whereas in so much theology, it is actions alone that are deemed right and wrong.