The Congress directed the Defense Department to
conduct a comprehensive Nuclear Posture Review to lay out the direction for American
nuclear forces over the next five to ten years. The Department has completed
that review and prepared the attached report.

Early on, we recognized that the new security
environment demanded that the Department go beyond the Congressional mandate in
developing a strategic posture for the 21st century. President Bush had already
directed the Defense Department to transform America’s military and prepare it
for the new, unpredictable world in which we will be living. The result of his
direction is the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Building on the (QDR) this
Nuclear Posture Review puts in motion a major change in our approach to the
role of nuclear offensive forces in our deterrent strategy and presents the
blueprint for transforming our strategic posture.

This report establishes a New Triad, composed of:

Offensive strike
systems (both nuclear and non-nuclear);

Defenses (both active
and passive); and

A revitalized defense
infrastructure that will provide new capabilities in a timely fashion to
meet emerging threats.

This New Triad is bound together by enhanced command
and control (C2) and intelligence systems.

The establishment of this New Triad can both reduce
our dependence on nuclear weapons and improve our ability to deter attack in
the face of proliferating WMD capabilities in two ways:

The addition of
defenses (along with the prospects for timely adjustments to force
capabilities and enhanced C2 and intelligence systems) means that the U.S.
will no longer be as heavily dependent on offensive strike forces to
enforce deterrence as it was during the Cold War.

The addition of
non-nuclear strike forces--including conventional strike and information
operations--means that the U.S. will be less dependent than it has been in
the past on nuclear forces to provide its offensive deterrent capability.

The combination of new capabilities that make up the
New Triad reduce the risk to the nation as it draws its nuclear forces toward
the goal of 1,700-2,200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads announced
by President Bush on November 13, 2001.

The following is a summary of the highlights in this
report.

First and foremost, the Nuclear Posture Review puts
the Cold War practices related to planning for strategic forces behind us. In
the decade since the collapse of the Soviet Union, planning for the employment
of U.S. nuclear forces has undergone only modest revision, despite the new
relationship between the U.S. and Russia. Few changes had been made to the size
or composition of the strategic nuclear force beyond those required by the
START Treaty. At the same time, plans and funding for sustaining some critical
elements of that force have been inadequate.

As a result of this review, the U.S. will no longer
plan, size or sustain its forces as though Russia presented merely a smaller
version of the threat posed by the former Soviet Union. Following the direction
laid down for U.S. defense planning in the Quadrennial Defense Review, the
Nuclear Posture Review shifts planning for America’s strategic forces from the
threat-based approach of the Cold War to a capabilities-based approach. This
new approach should provide, over the coming decades, a credible deterrent at
the lowest level of nuclear weapons consistent with U.S. and allied security.

Second, we have concluded that a strategic posture
that relies solely on offensive nuclear forces is inappropriate for deterring
the potential adversaries we will face in the 21st century. Terrorists or rogue
states armed with weapons of mass destruction will likely test America’s
security commitments to its allies and friends. In response, we will need a
range of capabilities to assure friend and foe alike of U.S. resolve. A broader
array of capability is needed to dissuade states from undertaking political,
military, or technical courses of action that would threaten U.S. and allied
security. U.S. forces must pose a credible deterrent to potential adversaries
who have access to modern military technology, including NBC weapons and the
means to deliver them over long distances. Finally, U.S. strategic forces need
to provide the President with a range of options to defeat any aggressor.

To meet the nation’s defense goals in the 21st
century, the first leg of the New Triad, the offensive strike leg, will go
beyond the Cold War triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs),
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and long-range nuclear-armed
bombers. ICBMs, SLBMs, bombers and nuclear weapons will, of course, continue to
play a vital role. However, they will be just part of the first leg of the New
Triad, integrated with new non-nuclear strategic capabilities that strengthen
the credibility of our offensive deterrence.

The second leg of the New Triad requires development
and deployment of both active and passive defenses--a recognition that
offensive capabilities alone may not deter aggression in the new security
environment of the 21st century. The events of September 11, 2001 underscore
this reality. Active and passive defenses will not be perfect. However, by denying
or reducing the effectiveness of limited attacks, defenses can discourage
attacks, provide new capabilities for managing crises, and provide insurance
against the failure of traditional deterrence.

The third leg of the New Triad is a responsive defense
infrastructure. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. defense infrastructure
has contracted and our nuclear infrastructure has atrophied. New approaches to
development and procurement of new capabilities are being designed so that it
will not take 20 years or more to field new generations of weapon systems. With
respect to the nuclear infrastructure, it needs to be repaired to increase
confidence in the deployed forces, eliminate unneeded weapons, and mitigate the
risks of technological surprise. Maintaining our ability to respond to large
strategic changes can permit us to reduce our nuclear arsenal and, at the same
time, dissuade adversaries from starting a competition in nuclear armaments.

The effectiveness of this New Triad depends upon
command and control, intelligence, and adaptive planning. “Exquisite”
intelligence on the intentions and capabilities of adversaries can permit
timely adjustments to the force and improve the precision with which it can
strike and defend. The ability to plan the employment of the strike and defense
forces flexibly and rapidly will provide the U.S. with a significant advantage
in managing crises, deterring attack and conducting military operations.

Constructing the New Triad, reducing our deployed
nuclear weapons, and increasing flexibility in our strategic posture has
resource implications. It costs money to retire old weapons systems and create
new capabilities. Restoring the defense infrastructure, developing and
deploying strategic defenses, improving our command and control, intelligence,
planning, and non-nuclear strike capabilities require new defense initiatives
and investments. However, these investments can make the U.S. more secure while
reducing our dependence on nuclear weapons.

The Quadrennial Defense Review established the
foundation for America’s post-Cold War defense strategy. Building on the
Quadrennial Defense Review, the Nuclear Posture Review will transform the Cold
War era offensive nuclear triad into a New Triad designed for the decades to
come.

Donald H. Rumsfeld

Secretary of Defense

Body of the Report

“Nuclear weapons play a critical role in the defense
capabilities of the United States, its allies and friends. They provide
credible military options to deter a wide range of threats, including WMD and
large-scale conventional military force. These nuclear capabilities possess
unique properties that give the United States options to hold at risk classes
of targets [that are] important to achieve strategic and political objectives.”
(p. 7)

However, “U.S. nuclear forces, alone are unsuited to
most of the contingencies for which the United States prepares. The United
States and allied interests may not require nuclear strikes.” A “new mix” of
nuclear, non-nuclear, and defensive capabilities “is required for the diverse
set of potential adversaries and unexpected threats the United States may
confront in the coming decades.” (p. 7)

“Greater flexibility is needed with respect to
nuclear forces and planning than was the case during the Cold War. The assets most
valued by the spectrum of potential adversaries in the new security environment
may be diverse and, in some cases, U.S. understanding of what an adversary
values may evolve. Consequently, although the number of weapons needed to hold
those assets at risk has declined, U.S. nuclear forces still require the
capability to hold at risk a wide range of target types. This capability is key
to the role of nuclear forces in supporting an effective deterrence strategy
relative to a broad spectrum of potential opponents under a variety of
contingencies. Nuclear attack options that vary in scale, scope, and purpose
will complement other military capabilities. The combination can provide the
range of options needed to pose a credible deterrent to adversaries whose values
and calculations of risk and of gain and loss may be very different from and
more difficult to discern than those of past adversaries.” (p. 7)

“Advances in defensive technologies will allow U.S.
non-nuclear and nuclear capabilities to be coupled with active and passive
defenses to help provide deterrence and protection against attack, preserve
U.S. freedom of action, and strengthen the credibility of U.S. alliance
commitments. “ (p. 7)

“Missile defenses are beginning to emerge as systems
that can have an effect on the strategic and operational calculations of
potential adversaries. They are now capable of providing, active defense
against short- to medium-range threats.” (p. 11)

U.S. military forces themselves, including nuclear
forces will now be used to “dissuade adversaries from undertaking military
programs or operations that could threaten U.S. interests or those of allies
and friends.” (p. 9)

“A modern, responsive nuclear weapons sector of the
infrastructure is indispensable, especially as the size of the operationally
deployed nuclear arsenal is reduced.” (p. 10-11)

“The planning process [for the New Triad] not only
must produce a variety of flexible, pre-planned non-nuclear and nuclear
options, but also incorporate sufficient adaptability to support the timely
construction of additional options in a crisis or unexpected conflict.” (p. 11)

II. “CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE NEW TRIAD TO DEFENSE
POLICY GOALS” (p.12)

(Assure, Dissuade, Deter, Defeat)

“ASSURE” —”U.S.
nuclear forces will continue to provide assurance to security partners,
particularly in the presence of known or suspected threats of nuclear,
biological, or chemical attacks or in the event of surprising military
developments. This assurance can serve to reduce the incentives for friendly
countries to acquire nuclear weapons of their own to deter such threats and
circumstances. Nuclear capabilities also assure the U.S. public that the United
States will not be subject to coercion based on a false perception of U.S.
weakness among potential adversaries. (p. 12)

“Defense of the U.S. homeland and protection of
forward bases increase the ability of the United States to counteract
WMD-backed coercive threats and to use its power projection forces in the
defense of allies and friends.” (p. 13)

“DISSUADE” — “Systems capable of striking a
wide range of targets throughout an adversary’s territory may dissuade a
potential adversary from pursuing threatening capabilities. For example, a
demonstration of the linkage between long-range precision strike weapons and
real-time intelligence systems may dissuade a potential adversary from
investing heavily in mobile ballistic missiles.” (p. 12)

“Defenses can make it more arduous and costly for an
adversary to compete militarily with or wage war against the United States. The
demonstration of a range of technologies and systems for missile defense can
have a dissuasive effect on potential adversaries. The problem of countering
missile defenses, especially defensive systems with multiple layers, presents a
potential adversary with the prospect of a difficult, time-consuming and
expensive undertaking.” (p. 13)

“The capacity of the infrastructure to upgrade
existing weapon systems, surge production of weapons, or develop and field
entirely new systems for the New Triad can discourage other countries from
competing militarily with the United States.” (p. 14)

“DETER” — “[Missile] [D]efense of U.S.
territory and power projection forces, including U.S forces abroad, combined
with the certainty of U.S. ability to strike in response, can bring into better
balance U.S. stakes and risks in a regional confrontation and thus reinforce
the credibility of U. S. guarantees designed to deter attacks on allies and
friends.”

“The [defense R&D and industrial] infrastructure
must provide confidence in the reliability of the nuclear stockpile and the
ability of command and control structures to withstand attack. More broadly,
[it] helps to enhance deterrence of aggression by supporting improved U.S.
capabilities to hold at risk high-value targets in the face of an adversary’s
efforts to conceal, harden, and disperse them.” (p. 14)

“DEFEAT” — “Composed
of both non-nuclear systems and nuclear weapons, the strike element of the New
Triad can provide greater flexibility in the design and conduct of military
campaigns to defeat opponents decisively. Non-nuclear strike capabilities may
be particularly useful to limit collateral damage and conflict escalation.
Nuclear weapons could be employed against targets able to withstand non-nuclear
attack, (for example, deep underground bunkers or bio-weapon facilities).” (p.
12-13)

“Missile defenses could defeat small-scale missile
attacks intended to coerce the United States into abandoning an embattled ally
or friend. Defenses that provided protection for strike capabilities of the New
Triad and for other power projection forces would improve the ability of the
United States and its allies and friends to counterattack an enemy. They may
also provide the President with an option to manage a crisis involving one or
more missile and WMD-armed opponents.” (p. 13)

COMMAND, CONTROL, PLANNING, AND INTELLIGENCE (p.
15)

“As forces are incrementally changed to meet the New
Triad force requirements, command and control (C2) becomes more critical to
ensure the effectiveness of the elements of the residual force structure…
Strike options will require intricate planning, flexibility, and interface with
decision makers throughout the engagement process. Command and control will
become more complex and the supporting systems and platforms will require
augmentation, modernization, and replacement.” (p. 15)

“Accurate and timely targeting information can
increase both the lethality of strike capabilities and the possibilities for
non-nuclear strike capabilities to substitute for nuclear weapons or provide
for the timely positioning of missile defense assets.” (p. 15)

DEFENSE POLICY GOALS AND RELATED NUCLEAR WEAPONS
REQUIREMENTS (p. 15)

“In a fluid security environment, the precise nuclear
force level necessary for the future cannot be predicted with certainty. The
goal of reducing, over the next decade, the U.S. operationally deployed
strategic nuclear force to the range of between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads
provides a degree of flexibility necessary to accommodate changes in the
security environment that could affect U.S. nuclear requirements.” (p. 15)

SIZING THE NUCLEAR F0RCE (p. 16)

“In setting requirements for nuclear strike
capabilities, distinctions can be made among the contingencies for which the
United States must be prepared. Contingencies can be categorized as immediate,
potential or unexpected.”

“Immediate contingencies involve well-recognized
current dangers… Current examples of immediate contingencies include an Iraqi
attack on Israel or its neighbors, a North Korean attack on South Korea, or a
military confrontation over the status of Taiwan.”

“Potential contingencies are plausible, but not
immediate dangers. For example, the emergence of a new, hostile military
coalition against the United States or its allies in which one or more members
possesses WMD and the means of delivery is a potential contingency that could
have major consequences for U.S. defense planning, including plans for nuclear
forces.” (p. 16)

Unexpected contingencies are sudden and unpredicted
security challenges,” like the Cuban Missile Crisis. “Contemporary
illustrations might include a sudden regime change by which an existing nuclear
arsenal comes into the hands of a new, hostile leadership group, or an
opponents surprise unveiling of WMD capabilities.” Ibid.

‘North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya are among
the countries that could be involved in immediate, potential, or unexpected
contingencies. All have longstanding hostility toward the United States and its
security partners; North Korea and Iraq in particular have been chronic
military concerns. All sponsor or harbor terrorists, and all have active WMD
and missile programs.” Ibid

“Due to the combination of China’s still developing
strategic objectives and its ongoing modernization of its nuclear and non
nuclear forces, China is a country that could be involved in an immediate or
potential contingency.” (p. 16-17)

“Russia maintains the most formidable nuclear forces,
aside from the United States, and substantial, if less impressive, conventional
capabilities. There now are, however, no ideological sources of conflict with
Moscow, as there were during the Cold War. The United States seeks a more
cooperative relationship with Russia and a move away from the balance-of-terror
policy framework, which by definition is an expression of mutual distrust and
hostility. As a. result, a [nuclear strike] contingency involving Russia, while
plausible, is not expected.” (p. 17)

(U) “Adjusting U.S. immediate nuclear force
requirements in recognition of the changed relationship with Russia is a
critical step away from the Cold War policy of mutual vulnerability and toward
more cooperative relations.” (p. 17)

(S) “Russia’s nuclear forces and programs,
nevertheless, remain a concern. Russia faces many strategic problems around its
periphery and its future course cannot be charted with certainty. U.S. planning
must take this into account. In the event that U.S. relations with Russia
significantly worsen in the future, the U.S. may need to revise its nuclear
force levels and posture.” (p. 17)

OPERATIONALLY DEPLOYED AND RESPONSIVE NUCLEAR
FORCES

“The operationally deployed forces are sized to
provide the capabilities required to meet the U.S. defense goals in the context
of immediate, and unexpected contingencies. That is, a sufficient number of
forces must be available on short notice to counter known threats while
preserving a small, additional margin in the event of a surprise development.
The 1700-2200 warheads the United States is scheduled to deploy in 2012 would
constitute the operationally deployed force.” (p. 17)

“The responsive force is intended to provide a
capability to augment the operationally deployed force to meet potential
contingencies … The responsive force … retains the option for leadership to
increase the number of operationally delayed forces in proportion to the
severity of an evolving crisis. A responsive force need not be available in a
matter of days, but in weeks, months, or even years. For example, additional
bombs could be brought out of the non-deployed stockpile in days or weeks. By
contrast, adding additional weapons to the ICBM force could take as long as a
year for a squadron in a wing. The responsive force [also] provides a reserve
from which replacements can be provided for operationally deployed weapons that
evidence reliability problems.”

US NUCLEAR FORCE SIZE

“Based on current projections, an operationally
deployed force of 1700-2200 strategic nuclear warheads by 2012 ...will support
U.S. deterrence policy to hold at risk what opponents value, including their
instruments of political control and military power, and to deny opponents
their war aims. The types of targets to be held at risk for deterrence purposes
include leadership and military capabilities, particularly WMD, military
command facilities and other centers of control and infrastructure that support
military forces.”

“A conceptual path toward an operationally deployed
force of 1,700-2,200 warheads in 2012 ... eliminates Peacekeeper ICBMs, removes
4 Trident SSBNs from strategic service, and downloads weapons from Trident
SLBMs, Minuteman III ICBMs; and B-52H and B-2 bombers. This will result in
3,800 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads by 2007 (SLBM warheads
for SSBNs in overhaul will not be counted as operationally deployed because
those submarines are unavailable for alert patrols).” (p. 19)

“Subsequent reductions below the 3,800 operationally
deployed warheads can be achieved through a variety of methods. The precise
method will be determined in the course of periodic reviews the Department will
conduct beginning in 2003. The Secretary of Defense will direct that these
reviews be undertaken with the participation of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the Commander in Chief of U.S. Strategic Forces Command, and
the NNSA Administrator.” (p. 19)

III. CREATING THE NEW TRIAD

“To meet the demands of the New Triad, an overhaul of
existing capabilities is needed. This includes improving the tools used to
build and execute strike plans so that the national leadership can adapt
pre-planned options, or construct new options, during highly dynamic crisis
situations.” (p. 23)

“In addition, the technology base and production
readiness infrastructures of both DoD and NNSA must be modernized so that the
United States will be able to adjust to rapidly changing situations
....adjustments may be needed to match capabilities of the remaining nuclear
forces to new missions... a need may arise to modify, upgrade, or replace
portions of the extant nuclear force or develop concepts for follow-on nuclear
weapons better suited is the nation’s needs. It is unlikely that a reduced
version of the Cold War nuclear arsenal will be precisely the nuclear force
that the United States will require in 2012 and beyond.” (p. 23)

·Mobile and Relocatable Targets. DoD
proposed to develop a systems-level approach, applied across the Services, for
holding at risk critical mobile targets.

·Defeating Hard and Deeply-Buried Targets.
DoD would implement a program to improve significantly the means to locate,
identify, characterize, and target adversarial hard and deeply buried targets.

·Long Range Strike. DoD will pursue a
systems level approach to defeat critical fixed and mobile targets at varying
ranges, in all terrain and weather conditions, and in denied areas.

·Guided Missile Submarines (SSGNs). DoD
has proposed to fund the conversion of four SSBNs, withdrawn from the strategic
nuclear service, to SSGN configuration.

·Precision Strike. Effort to increase the
number of targets than can be attacked on a single mission. Elements include a “Multifunction
Information Distribution System” to provide “a jam-resistant, secure, digital
network for exchange of critical information for strike capabilities,” a “Joint
Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile,” A “Small Diameter Bomb,” and the “Unmanned
Combat Air Vehicle.”

·New Strike System. “DoD will begin in
FY03 to explore concepts for a new strike system that might arm the converted
SSGNs. Desired capabilities for this new strike weapon include timely arrival
on target, precision, and the ability to be retargeted rapidly.” (p. 24-25)

Ballistic Missile Defense

“The President has stated that the mission for
missile defense is to protect all 50 states, our deployed forces, and our
friends and allies against ballistic missile attacks. The Department has
rerganized its ballistic missile defense program. The program is pursuing
missile defense based an the following guidance:

·Missile defense is most effective if it is
layered; that is, able to intercept ballistic missiles of any range in all
phases of their flight.

·The United States seeks effective defenses
against attacks by small numbers of longer range missiles as well as defenses
against attacks by larger numbers of short- and medium-range missiles.

·Missile defense systems, like all military
systems, can be less than 100-percent effective and still make a significant
contribution to security by enhancing deterrence and saving lives if deterrence
fails.” (p. 25)

“Other than the PAC-3, the
United States has not yet chosen systems for deployment; that decision will
depend on the evolution of both technology and the threat. The Department is
exploring a wide range of alternative approaches. There are two dimensions to
the missile defense program: near-term emergency capabilities; and improved
variants of these capabilities leading to more robust, operational systems.
Several near-term and mid-term options (2003-2008) that could provide an
emergency missile defense capability are under consideration, including:

·A single Airborne Laser for boost-phase
intercepts may be available for limited operations against ballistic missiles
of all ranges;

·A rudimentary ground-based midcourse system,
consisting of a small number of interceptors taken from the test program and an
upgraded Cobra Dane radar in Alaska, could be available against longer-range
threats to the United States; and

·A sea-based Aegis system could be available to
provide rudimentary midcourse capability against short to medium-range threats.”
(p. 26)

“Based on the technical
progress of these systems, the United States could deploy operational
capabilities beginning in the 2006-2008 period including:

·2-3 Airborne Laser aircraft

·Additional ground-based midcourse sites

·4 sea-based midcourse ships

·terminal systems, able to defend against shorter
range threats: PAC-3, which began deployment in 2001, and THAAD, which could be
available by 2008.” (p. 26)

“DOD will develop the low-orbit constellation of
SBIRS-Low satellites to support missile defense. This system will provide
capabilities to track enemy ballistic missiles and to assist in the
discrimination of reentry vehicles and other objects in flight.” (p. 28)

Command and Control Intelligence

[the Secretary of Defense] “established a Federal
Advisory Committee (FAC) to conduct an independent, end-to-end review of all
activities involved in maintaining the highest standards of nuclear weapons
safety, security, control, and reliability.” This “End-to-End Review”
was conducted concurrently with the NPR but was not completed before the NPR
deadline. While the review is not yet final, the FAC presented an “urgent
preliminary finding to the Secretary subsequent to the events of September 11
identifying the need to expand the current nuclear command and control (C2)
architecture to a true national command and control conferencing system.” (p.
26)

“The attacks of September 11 dramatically highlighted
the requirement for secure, wideband communications between fixed and mobile
command centers and national decision makers. The Department is developing a
secure wideband communications architecture and procedures … The Department
will initiate a satellite communications system in FY03, the Advanced
Wideband System (AWS), that incorporates interoperable laser communications
and will be designed to meet the needs of the defense and intelligence
community for wideband tactical, protected tactical (replaces Advanced EHF
satellites) broadcast, and relay communications with a planned system first
launch during FY09. The Department supports the effort to implement a secure,
wideband capability on all strategic C2 platforms. Wideband complements, but
does not replace, the requirement for assured, survivable, and enduring nuclear
C2.” (p. 27)

The “2001 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act
for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States”
provided immediate upgrades to aircraft for national leadership, and the
Department has programmed funding for additional wideband upgrades including
the E-4 National Airborne Operations Center aircraft.

“Three Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF)
spacecraft are planned for an initial operating capability of FY08 that will
provide nuclear-survivable (e.g. against high altitude electromagnetic pulse),
anti-jam, low and medium data rate communications to strategic and tactical
users.”

“The Department will initiate in FY03 an Extremely
High Frequency (EHF) communications satellites program primarily for national
and strategic users requiring nuclear protected communications in the
mid-latitude and polar regions with a planned first launch during FY09.
Survivable, jam-resistant, secure voice conferencing among principal nuclear C2
decision makers remains essential to facilitate discussions of tactical warning
and assessment, response options, and force management.” (p. 27)

“To provide continuous and persistent intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance of critical regions, the Department proposes
to develop in its FY03-07 FYDP a “system of systems that consists of space,
airborne, surface, and subsurface capabilities. Sensors for this system will
include a mix of phenomenology, allow for agile and flexible response, and
operate across the electro-magnetic spectrum.” (p. 28)

“New concepts for persistent surveillance - from air-
and space-based platforms - including hyper-spectral imaging, are proposed in
the FY03 budget. (ibid).

“Intelligence for Information Operations (IO).
Information Operations targeting, weaponeering, and execution requires
intelligence collection of finer granularity and depth than is currently
available. The intelligence community lacks adequate data on most adversary
computer local area networks and other command and control systems.
Additionally, there is limited analytical capability to exploit these networks
using IO tools. Investments must continue in order to upgrade and, populate the
Modernized Integrated Database to enable effective IO targeting, weaponeering,
and combat assessment essential to the New Triad.”

Adaptive Planning (p. 29)

“The current nuclear planning system, including
target identification, weapons system assignment, and the nuclear command and
control system requirements, is optimized to support large, deliberately
planned nuclear strikes. In the future, as the nation moves beyond the concept
of a large, Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) and moves toward more
flexibility, adaptive planning will play a much larger role.”

“Deliberate planning creates executable war plans,
prepared in advance, for anticipated contingencies. Adaptive planning is used
to generate war plans quickly in time critical-situations. Deliberate planning
provides the foundation for adaptive planning by identifying individual
weapon/target combinations that could be executed in crises.”

“For contingencies for which no adaptive planning has
been done, fully adaptive planning will be required. The desire to shorten the
time between identifying a target and having an option available will place
significant stress on the nuclear planning process as it currently exists.
Presently 12-48 hours is required to develop a plan to attack a single new
target, depending on the weapon system to be employed. A more flexible planning
system is needed to address the requirements of adaptive planning.”

“To make the Strategic Warfare Planning System
(SWPS) more responsive to adaptive planning scenarios, a comprehensive SWPS
Transformation Study has been initiated and is being conducted by U.S.
Strategic Command. Results will be available in late spring 2002. To meet the
requirements of adaptive planning, an upgrade of the existing nuclear C2
architecture is needed.

DOD Infrastructure Issues

“DOD has identified shortfalls in current
infrastructure sustainment programs far nuclear platforms. These include the
following: solid rocket motor design, development and testing; technology for
current and future strategic systems; improved surveillance and assessment
capabilities; command and control platforms and systems; and design, development,
and production of radiation-hardened parts.” (p. 30)

“In support of this effort, the Defense Science
Board Task Force on System Technology for the Future US Strategic Posture
is considering strategies for enhancing the ability of the U.S. technology base
to deal with or hedge against uncertainties in the nature and timing of
potential strategic threats, the capability of the technology and industrial
base to respond in a timely manner, and the adequacy and responsiveness of
science and technology programs related to possible future strategic
capabilities. In addition, the U.S. Strategic Command Advisory Group on
Strategic Platforms is addressing weapon system viability and nuclear force
readiness.” (p. 30)

The Current U.S. Nuclear Warhead Infrastructure

“Underinvestment in the infrastructure - in
particular the production complex - has increased the risks that if substantial
problems in the stockpile are discovered, future options to refurbish or
replace existing designs will be limited. For example, although an interim pit
production capability will be established later in this decade, no current
capability exists to build and certify plutonium pits, certain secondary
components, or complete warheads.” (p. 30)

“The need is clear for a revitalized nuclear weapons
complex that will: ...be able, if directed, to design, develop, manufacture,
and certify new warheads in response to new national requirements; and maintain
readiness to resume underground nuclear testing if required.” (p. 30)

Stockpile Maintenance

“DOD and NNSA are in the preliminary stages of
determining the requirements for nuclear warheads for the New Triad. As the New
Triad is developed and fielded, DoD and NNSA will have to reassess how the
warheads in the stockpile are characterized. At present, the warhead stockpile
is divided into two categories: active and inactive:

·Active stock pile warheads are maintained in a
ready-for-use configuration with tritium and other limited life components
installed. They incorporate the latest warhead modifications. The active
stockpile includes all deployed warheads, warheads for the responsive force,
and logistics spares for each warhead type.

·Inactive stockpile warheads do not have limited
life components installed, and may not have the latest warhead modifications.
These warheads serve a number of purposes ranging from reliability replacements
that act as a hedge against the discovery of a problem with a large number of
active warheads, to the more predictable replacement of warheads consumed by quality
assurance and reliability testing. This hedge is required because the United
States will not have, for a decade or more, the capacity to produce certain new
components for warheads. The time it would take to deploy warheads in the
inactive stockpile depends on the delivery system, and availability of tritium
gas and other limited-life components. These warheads or their components could
also be used to provide new capabilities. This time would range from weeks in
the case of bombers, to years in the case of ICBMs.” (p. 31-32)

“There are almost 8,000 warheads in the active
stockpile today. As the initial nuclear warhead reductions are implemented,
some warheads will be transferred from the active to the inactive stockpile.
For example, the removal from strategic service of the 4 SSBNs will result in
the transfer of over 700 W76 warheads to the inactive stockpile. By 2012
approximately 3,000 warheads, now in the active stockpile, are planned to be
transferred to the inactive stockpile or retired.” (p. 32)

“Some of the W87 Peacekeeper warheads will be
redeployed on Minuteman ICBMs under the Safety Enhanced Reentry Vehicle (SERV)
program Each W87 warhead will displace one W62, or three W78 warheads currently
deployed on Minuteman. To provide warhead diversity in the force, some
SERV-modified Minuteman missiles would carry the W78 warhead. A number of W78
and W87 warheads will be retained as reliability replacements and surveillance
assets to support the responsive force. In addition, the W62 will be retired by
the end of Fiscal Year 2009. (p. 32)

“The active stockpiles also includes the nonstrategic
nuclear weapons.”

“The United States will retain an inactive stockpile
of nuclear weapons. The size of that stockpile is yet to be determined. It will
be driven by the capacity of the nuclear weapon complex to refurbish and
dismantle weapons. For example, today the complex can process - either
refurbish or dismantle - roughly 350 weapons per year. If the NNSA’s proposed
plan is funded, that number should increase to roughly 600 per year.” (p. 32)

“A major challenge for nuclear weapons programs over
the next two decades will be to refurbish, and thereby extend the life of, at
least seven types of nuclear warheads” [a table lists these as B61 -3, 4, 10;
B61-7, 11; W76; W78; W80-0, 1; B83-0; B83-1; W87; and W88.]

Restoring Production Infrastructure

“Warhead Assembly and Disassembly:...Plans are
underway to expand the capacity and capability of the Pantex Plant to meet the
planned workload for dismantlement and remanufacturing of existing weapons.”
(p. 33)

“Uranium Operations: At least seven to eight
years of effort will be required to restore the capability to produce a
complete nuclear weapon secondary at the Y-12 Plant in Tennessee. Qualified
processes for some material and manufacturing steps are not currently in place.
Plans are underway to expand the capacity and capability of the Y-12 Plant to
meet the planned workload for replacing warhead secondaries, and other uranium
components.” (p. 33)

“Plutonium Operations: One glaring shortfall
is the inability to fabricate and certify weapon primaries, or so-called “pits”.
Work is underway to establish an interim capability at Los Alamos National
Laboratory late in this decade to meet current demand created by destructive surveillance
testing on the W88 warhead. For the long term a new modern production facility
will be needed to deal with the large-scale replacement of components and new
production.” (p. 33)

“Other Component and Material Production:...
Tritium production, halted since 1988, is programmed to resume in FY03 with
first deliveries to the stockpile scheduled for FY06. Additionally, warhead
refurbishment plans require modern facilities at Y-12’s Special Materials
Complex for manufacturing unique materials.” (p. 14)

NNSA Initiatives for Nuclear Weapons Programs

“As a result of the NPR, NNSA will undertake several
initiatives...

Advanced Concepts Initiative:...There are several nuclear weapon options that might provide
important advantages for enhancing the nation’s deterrence posture: possible
modifications to existing weapons to provide additional yield flexibility in
the stockpile; improved earth penetrating weapons (EPWs) to counter the
increased use by potential adversaries of hardened and deeply buried facilities;
and warheads that reduce collateral damage. (p. 34-35)

“To further assess these and other nuclear weapons
options in connection with meeting new or emerging military requirements, the
NNSA will reestablish advanced warhead concepts teams at each of the national
laboratories and at headquarters in Washington. This will provide unique
opportunities to train our next generation of weapon designers and engineers.
DoD and NNSA will also jointly review potential programs to provide nuclear
capabilities, and identify opportunities for further study, including
assessments of whether nuclear testing would be required to field such
warheads.” (p. 35)

“The [Feb. 2001 Foster] Panel recommendation that
DOE/NNSA assess the feasibility and cost of reducing the time [to resume
testing] to ‘well below the Congressionally-mandated one year’ (sense of the
Congress as expressed in the 1996 Resolution of Ratification for the START II
Treaty) was addressed as part of the NPR.” (p. 35)

“Test Readiness is maintained principally by the
participation of nuclear test program personnel in an active program of
stockpile stewardship experiments carried out underground at the Nevada Test
Site (NTS). There are two concerns about the current test readiness program.”

“First, ... the current 2-3 year test readiness
posture will not be sustainable as more and more experienced test personnel
retire. Not all of the techniques and processes required to carry out
underground nuclear tests - including nuclear diagnostic instrumentation,
containment, design and emplacement of diagnostic equipment in a vertical
shaft, drillback and radiochemical analysis are exercised with the subcritical
experimentation work carried out a the NTS. As experienced personnel retire, it
will become more difficult to train new people in these techniques, further
degrading test readiness. This argues for an approach in which all key
capabilities required to conduct underground nuclear tests are identified and
exercised on projects making use of a variety of nuclear testing related
skills.” (p. 35-36)

“Second, the 2-3 year posture may be too long to
address any serious defect that might be discovered in the future.”

“Given the certainty of surprise in the future and
the broad spectrum of threats, the United States also must have the capability
to understand the technological implications of nuclear weapon concepts and
countermeasures tested by other states, to ensure that U.S. weapons and
delivery platforms (including advanced conventional strike systems) perform
effectively. If necessary, this will enable the United States to initiate
research into whether it needs to develop an entirely new capability - one that
it not a modification of an existing weapon - in time to address the threat.”
(p. 36)

“To address these concerns... NNSA proposes over the
next three years to enhance test readiness by: augmenting key personnel and
increasing their operational proficiency; beginning the mentoring of the next
generation of testing personnel; conducting additional field experiments including
additional subcritical experiments and test related exercises of appropriate
fidelity; replacing key underground-test-unique components (e.g. Field Test
Neutron Generators); modernizing certain test diagnostic capabilities; and
decreasing the time required to show regulatory and safety compliance. DoD and
NNSA will work to refine test scenarios and evaluate cost/benefit tradeoffs in
order to determine, implement, and sustain the optimum test readiness time chat
best supports the New Triad.” (p. 36)

Meeting Warhead Production Commitments to DoD
. ...A key capability that must be recovered is manufacture of plutonium pits.
In addition to our efforts to establish a limited production capability at Los
Alamos, NNSA will accelerate preliminary design work on a modern pit
manufacturing facility so that new production capacity can be brought on line
when it is needed.” (p. 36)

People with Critical Skills

The DoD and NNSA will jointly support opportunities
that provide end-to-end demonstration of integrated capabilities involved with
warhead design, development, manufacturing, and warhead/weapon integration. A
key objective is to exercise critical skills for adapting warheads to DoD
weapon delivery systems; ...NNSA will include the following as goals for the new
Advanced Concepts Initiative:

·Transfer of warhead design knowledge from the
current generation of designers to the next generation

[Concerning ICBMs] “The focus of the Department’s
efforts are to extend the life of the MM III weapons system until 2020 while
beginning the requirements process for the next-generation ICBM”

A comprehensive set of sustainment programs are
planned or underway:

·Guidance Replacement Program (GRP)

·Propulsion Replacement Program (PRP)

·Propulsion System Rocket Engine (PSRE) life
extension program (“replaces aging components in the post-boost vehicle”)

·Rapid Execution and Combat Targeting (REACT)
service life extension program

·Environmental Control System (ECS)

·Safety Enhanced Reentry Vehicle (SERV) program.

“The SERV program reconfigures the MM III ICBM to
carry the Mk21 reentry vehicle which is currently deployed on Peacekeeper
missiles.” (p. 41)

“Peacekeeper deactivation will occur over a 36-month
period [beginning in FY03] with missiles remaining on alert and fully mission
capable throughout the deactivation period. ...The Department analyzed the role
of the Peacekeeper against projected threats in the post-Cold War environment
and judged that its retirement would not have an adverse effect on the
sufficiency of U.S. nuclear forces. DoD plans to retain the booster stages for
potential future uses such as space launch or target vehicles.” (p. 41)

“Follow on ICBM: The Air Force Systems
Command (AFSPC) led the Ballistic Missile Requirements (BMR) Study (1998 to
2000) which documented a number of needs beyond the current baseline ICBM
mission, such as extended range, trajectory shaping, strategic relocatable
targets, and hardened deeply buried targets, that the next generation ICBM
could address. The Land Based Strategic Nuclear Deterrence Mission Needs
Statement (MNS) drew from the analysis done in the BMR study in documenting
the need for ICBMs beyond 2020. To expand on the MNS and address alternatives
for the follow on ICBM, AFSPC plans to conduct an analysis of alternatives in
FY04 and FY05 with an IOC by 2018. This work will ensure the requirements
generation process and the acquisition process remain on track for the future
ICBM force.” (p. 41)

“Trident SSBN: . ..The Administration
intends to convert four SSBNs from the current force of 18 submarines to carry
special operations forces as well as conventional cruise missiles. Achieving
this force structure also requires converting four of the eight Trident I (C-4)
SSBNs to carry the Trident D-5 missile. The Navy has extended the Trident hull
life to 44 years. This in turn will require the DoD to extend the service life
of the D-5 SWS [Strategic Weapons System] as well. The first of the 14 Trident
SSBNs remaining in service will he retired in 2029.” (p. 42)

“Trident II SLBM: ... DoD will fund the
D-5 Life Extension Program, which continues production of D-5 missiles, and
upgrades the guidance and missile electronics systems on existing missiles. The
continued production of additional D-5 missiles is needed in order to prevent a
shortage of missiles in the next decade.” (p. 42)

“Follow-on SSBN: ... DoD assumes the
continued requirement for a sea-based strategic nuclear force. Therefore, the
timeframe when the next generation SSBN will need to be deployed is about 2029
when the first of the remaining operational Trident SSBNs is planned to be
retired. The Navy is currently studying two options for future follow-on SSBNs:
(1) a variant of Virginia-class nuclear attack submarines (SSN); and (2) a
dedicated SSBN (either a new design or a derivative of the Trident SSBN) ... If
the decision is made to develop a new dedicated SSBN, a program would have to
be initiated around 2016 to ensure that a new platform is available in 2029.”
(p. 42)

“Follow-on SLBM. A new SLBM would be
needed in about 2029 to match the schedule for a follow-on SSBN. The Navy has
begun studies to examine range-payload requirements and missile size, but no
specific plans for a follow-on SLBM at this point other than extending the
service life of the Trident D-5.” (p. 42)

“Common Missile. The Department of
Defense doe not plan to pursue a common ICBM/SLBM ballistic missile at this
time. However, the Air Force and Navy are currently cooperating in research and
development on common technologies related to current and future ballistic
missiles - the Guidance Applications Prograrn (GAP), Reentry Systems
Applications Program (RSAP), Propulsion Applications Program (PAP), and
Technology for the Sustainment of Strategic Systems (TSSS) programs.” (p.
42-43)

Heavy Bombers/Air Launched Cruise Missiles (p. 43)

Strategic Bombers. The Air Force plans
to keep the current B-2 and B-52 fleet operational far another 35-40 years. An
aggressive sustainment and modernization effort for both platforms is required
to support this plan. In particular, upgrades to communications, avionics,
processors, radar systems, displays, and navigation equipment are essential to
keep the fleet affordable and operationally relevant throughout this period.

“Assured, worldwide, survivable two way connectivity
between the National Command Authorities and the strategic bomber force is a
fundamental element of strategic command and control. B-52s and B-2s must
transition to Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite communications
in order to ensure continued Connectivity with National Command elements.”

“Situational Awareness (SA) and electronic
countermeasures (ECM) remain the highest priority B-52 upgrades. The inability
to adapt to and counter threats, the high failure rate of SA and ECM equipment
components, parts obsolescence, and a vanishing vendor base severely limit the
B-52’s ability to operate in a combat environment. To that end, the Electronic
Countermeasure Improvement, Situational Awareness Defense Improvement, and
Low-Mid Band Jammer replacement programs are essential to ensuring the B-52
remains a viable combat asset beyond 2006.”

The B-52 also requires a highly reliable and accurate
navigation system to conduct worldwide tasking and nuclear weapons deliveries.
The Inertial Navigation system (INS) represents the heart of the B-52
navigation suite but is reaching the end of service life and is increasingly
cost-prohibitive to support. The Avionics Mid-Life Improvement program
addresses this issue by replacing the INS and other obsolete B-52 avionics
components required for precision navigation and weapons delivery.”

Several upgrades are currently underway on the B-2.
These upgrades include AHFM (Alternate High Frequency Material) which improves
the ability to maintain the low observable materials of the aircraft:
UHF/SATCOM upgrade; JASSM upgrade; Mk-82 Smart Bomb Rack Assembly upgrade; and
Link-16 upgrade.

“Air-Launched Weapons Systems. The Air
Force recently determined that its current force of cruise missiles can be
sustained until 2030.” (p. 43)

“Follow-on Strategic Bombers” Based on
current estimates, “a new bomber will need to be operational by approximately
2040. A need for additional or improved bomber capabilities could, however,
move the ‘need date’ closer to the present... The Air Force recently funded a
science and technology effort for the Long-Range Strike Aerospace Platform-X to
further explore options.” (p. 43-44)

“Follow-on Air Launched Weapon Systems.
There are no plans at this time for a follow-on nuclear ALCM... However,
conventional cruise missile programs (such as the Extended Range Cruise
Missile) are planned that could support an accelerated timetable if necessary,
but would have to be modified to carry nuclear warheads.”

Dual-Capable Aircraft, DoD is
considering options and their associated costs to either extend the life of the
dual capable F-16C/Ds and F-15Es or make a block upgrade to the Joint Strike
Fighter (JSF) aircraft... The Operational Requirements Document for the JSF
requires that initial design permit nuclear capability to be incorporated at a
later date (after IOC, currently scheduled for 2012) at an affordable price.”

“Dual-capable aircraft and nuclear weapons in
support of NATO. DoD will not seek any change to the current posture in
FY02 but will review both issues to assess whether any modifications to the
current posture are appropriate to adapt to the changing threat environment. A
plan is already underway to conduct a NATO review of U.S. and allied dual
capable aircraft in Europe and to present recommendations to Ministers in
summer of 2002. Dual capable aircraft and deployed weapons are important to the
continued viability of NATO’s nuclear deterrent strategy and any changes need
to be discussed within the alliance.” (p. 44)

Tankers The current fleet of KC-135s
will be operational for the next 35-40 years. The aging fleet will begin a long
phased retirement starting in 2013 and continuing until approximately 2040. The
Air Force anticipates constant upgrades to avionics, displays, and navigation
equipment over the coming years. However, the current KC-135 fleet is not
equipped with a survivable communications capability, limiting its
effectiveness in a stressed environment. The Air Force is evaluating a
follow-on tanker in conjunction with a follow-on common airframe air1ift and
special missions platform. The service is also considering the lease or
purchase of 100 off-the-shelf 767 tankers as an interim measure prior to the
need to produce the KC-X replacement platform. In developing altematives,
consideration needs to be given to the possibility that aircraft will operate
in a nuclear, biological and chemical weapons environment.” (p. 44-45)

“Nuclear Warhead Sustainment... The
active stockpile quantities will be sufficient to arm the operationally
deployed and responsive nuclear force, and provide sufficient logistics spares.
The inactive stockpile will consist of warhead types in the active stockpile
plus the W84 and B83 Mod 0, which have no active stockpile counterparts. The
W62 warhead will be retired in FY09.” (p. 45)

“The NNSA his initiated a program to energize design
work on advanced concepts at the three design laboratories. This initiative
will be focused on evolving DoD requirements.” (p. 46)

“New capabilities must be developed to defeat
emerging threats such as hard and deeply buried targets (HDBT), to find and
attack mobile and relocatable targets, to defeat chemical or biological agents,
and to improve accuracy and limit collateral damage. Development of these
capabilities, to include extensive research and timely fielding of new systems
to address these challenges, are imperative to make the New Triad a reality.”

Defeating Hard and Deeply Buried Targets

“More than 70 countries now use underground
Facilities (UGFs) for military purposes. In June 1998, the Defense Science
Board Task force on Underground Facilities that there are over 10,000 UGFs
worldwide. Approximately 1,100 UGFS were known or suspected strategic (WMD,
ballistic missile basing, leadership or top echelon command and control) sites.
Updated estimates form DIA reveal this number has now grown to over 1,400. A
majority of the strategic facilities are deep underground facilities. These
facilities are generally the most difficult to defeat because of the depth of
the facility and the uncertainty of the exact location. At present the United
States lacks adequate means to deal with these strategic facilities. A detailed
report on this issue was provided to the Congress recently (Report to
Congress on the Defeat of Hard and Deeply Buried Targets, July 2001). (p.
46)

“To deny the enemy sanctuary in HDBTs requires timely
identification and characterization of potential targets, realistic defeat
alternatives, and accurate assessment of damage done by the attack. Achieving
the desired level of capability requires the integration of Service and
National systems into a robust, highly responsive system of systems capable of
addressing the threat. Improved command and control and intelligence in support
of the New Triad will be a key enabler to address this capability shortfall.”
(p. 47)

“In general, current conventional weapons can only ‘deny’
or ‘disrupt’ the functioning of HDBTs and require highly accurate intelligence
and precise weapon delivery - a degree of accuracy and precision frequently
missing under actual combat conditions, Similarly, current conventional weapons
are not effective for the long term physical destruction of deep, underground
facilities. (p. 47)

“The United States currently has a very limited
ground penetration capability with its only earth penetrating nuclear weapon,
the B61 Mod 11 gravity bomb. This single-yield, non-precision weapon cannot
survive penetration into many types of terrain in which hardened underground
facilities are located. Given these limitations, the targeting of a number of
hardened, underground facilities is limited to an attack against surface
features, which does not does not provide a high probability of defeat of these
important targets.” (p. 47)

“With a more effective earth penetrator, many buried
targets could be attacked using a weapon with a much lower yield than would be
required with a surface burst weapon. This lower yield would achieve the same
damage while producing less fallout (by a factor of ten to twenty) than would
the much larger yield surface burst. For defeat of very deep or larger
underground facilities, penetrating weapons with large yields would be needed
to collapse the facility.” (p. 47)

“To defeat HDBT it is necessary to improve
significantly U.S. means to locate, identify, characterize, and target HDBTs.
This objective also requires deliberate pre-planned and practiced missions and
the development and procurement of several types of conventional earth
penetrating munitions. A number of Special Operations Forces and information
capabilities will need to be developed to support this goal. Investment and
organization will yield a new level of capability for the stated objectives by
2007, with new technologies deployed by 2012. One effort to improve the U.S.
capability against HBDTs is a joint DoD/DOE phase 6.2/6.2A Study to be started
in Apri1 2002. This effort will identify whether an existing warhead in a 5,000
pound class penetrator would provide significantly enhanced earth penetration
capabilities compared to the B61 Mod 11.” (p. 47)

Mobile and Relocatable Targets

“One of the greatest challenges today is accounting
for the location uncertainty of mobile and relocatable targets... To respond to
this challenge, collection systems and techniques that defeat adversary
relocation capabilities must be developed. Sensors must also be capable of
defeating camouflage and concealment efforts and detecting and exploiting new
command and control systems.”

“To locate successfully and maintain track on mobile
targets until a weapon can be planned and executed, several enhancements need
to be made to the current collection capability. Today’s satellite
constellation is not optimized for the current and developing mobile target
challenge. Planned improvements to this constellation would provide the
capability to rapidly and accurately locate and track mobile targets from the
time they deploy from garrison until they return. Sensors with rapid revisit or
dwell capability over deployment areas combined with automated exploitation
sides are required to provide this capability.” (p. 47-48)

Defeat of Chemical and Biological Agents

DoD and DOE efforts are underway to counter the
asymmetric use of chemical and biological weapons (referred to as agent
defeat). Agent Defeat Weapon (ADW) concepts are being evaluated to deny
access to, immobilize, neutralize, or destroy chemical or biological weapons.
Overcoming uncertainties in intelligence regarding agent production and storage
locations as well as physical geometries of known facilities and contents
appear to be the largest challenges. A variety of ADW concepts are currently
under study, including thermal, chemical, or radiological neutralization of
chemical/biological materials in production or storage facilities, as well as
several types of kinetic penetrators to immobilize or deny use of those
materials.” (p. 48)

Improved Accuracy for Effectiveness and Reduced
Collateral Damage

“Desired capabilities for nuclear weapons systems in
flexible, adaptable strike plans include options for variable and reduced
yields, high accuracy, and timely employment. These capabilities would help
deter enemy use of WMD or limit collateral damage, should the United States have
to defeat enemy WMD capabilities.” (p. 48)

Nuclear Force Modernization

“The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has
initiated a Strategic Deterrent Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment
to characterize the requirements for nuclear weapon systems in the 2020
timeframe. The assessment is to be complete in early FY03.” (p. 48)

“DoD, in coordination with the NNSA, will evaluate
nuclear weapon options to increase weapon system effectiveness and flexibility
and to limit collateral damage. Capability improvements are likely to be needed
to correct the limitations of the existing nuclear forces.” (p. 49)

V. NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS AND IMPLEMENTATIONS FOR ARMS
CONTROL

Initial Reductions

“When these reductions [i.e. retire 50 Peacekeepers,
remove 4 Trident SSBNs, and convert B-1’s to solely conventional role] are
complete in FY06, the number of U.S. operationally deployed strategic warheads
will be reduced by about 1,300 warheads accountable under the START I Treaty
(based on attribution rules at the time these decisions were made). The four
Trident submarines that will be removed from service will remain accountable
under the START I Treaty.” (p. 51)

“The Department analyzed the role of the Peacekeeper
against projected threats in the post Cold War environment and judged that its
retirement would not have an adverse effect on the sufficiency of U.S. nuclear
forces... Funding has been programmed, beginning in FY03, to retire these
weapons in a phased approach to coincide with the Trident D-5 transition to the
Pacific fleet and to retain and maintain the silos for future options. These
silos, and the four Trident submarines converted to SSGNs, will remain
accountable under the START I Treaty.”

“Additional strategic nuclear reduction will be
achieved by lowering the number of warheads assigned to the operationally
deployed force. By the end of FY07, U.S. operationally deployed strategic
nuclear warheads should total no more than 3,800. The drawdown of the
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads will preserve force structure
in that, aside from the Peacekeeper ICBM and the four Trident SSBNs, no
additional strategic delivery platforms are scheduled to be eliminated from
strategic service. These reductions are to be completed between FY03 and FY07,
and will result in approximately a 40% reduction in number of operationally
deployed strategic nuclear warheads from the present.”

Longer Term Reductions

“With regard to additional reductions beyond FY07,
the United States plans to decrease the number of warheads on its ballistic
missile force by “downloading.” Regarding bombers, reductions will be made by
lowering the number of operationally deployed weapons, i.e. those available for
loading at operational bomber bases.”

“Warheads that will count as operationally deployed
are: for ballistic missiles, the actual number of nuclear weapons loaded on the
ICBMs or SLBMs; for bombers, those nuclear weapons located in weapon storage
areas at bomber bases (except for a small number of spares).”

START II Treaty

“...the Russian resolution of ratification, adopted
in 2000, contains unacceptable provision contrary to the new strategic
framework and establishment of the New Triad.”

De-Alerting

“U.S. forces are not on “hair trigger” alert and
rigorous safeguards exist to ensure the highest levels of nuclear weapons
safety, security, reliability, and command and control. Multiple, stringent
procedural and technical safeguards are in place to guard against U.S.
accidental and unauthorized launch.”

“The New Triad addresses concerns about the
accidental or unauthorized launch of certain foreign forces. For example, it
provides missile defenses to protect the United States, it allies, and friends
against limited or unauthorized launches. It also will provide a spectrum of
defensive and non-nuclear response options to an accidental or unauthorized
launch, allowing the United States to tailor an appropriate response to the
specific event and to limit the danger of escalation.”

“The elimination of the Peacekeeper ICBM will be
phased to correspond with the introduction of the Trident II (D-5) missile in
the Pacific. As they are eliminated, those Peacekeeper missiles remaining
during the elimination process will be kept on alert to provide a necessary
contribution to the U.S. portfolio of capabilities.” (p. 54)

“Following the initial phase of U.S. nuclear
reductions, subsequent reductions will be achieved by downloading warheads from
missiles and bombers. Force structure will be retained as the basis for
reconstructing the responsive force. Delivery systems will not be retired
following initial reductions and downloaded warheads will be retained as needed
for the responsive force.” (p. 54)

The Comprehensive Test Ban

“The United States has not conducted nuclear tests
since 1992 and supports the continued observance of the testing moratorium.
While the United States is making every effort to maintain the stockpile
without additional nuclear testing, this may not be possible for the indefinite
future. Some problems in the stockpile due to aging and manufacturing defects
have already been identified. Increasingly, objective judgments about
capability in a non-testing environment will become far more difficult. Each
year the DoD and DOE will reassess the need to resume nuclear testing and will
make recommendations to the President. Nuclear nations have a responsibility to
assure the safety and reliability of their own nuclear weapons.” (p. 55)

Transparency

“The START I Treaty includes provisions that provide
a useful baseline of transparency for offensive strategic forces. Any
additional transparency that may be useful to provide added confidence and
predictability would be in the form of separate political commitments.”