Iraq’s Biological Weapons and Israel

(September 30, 2004)

Excerpts from the Iraq Survey Group Report (Duelfer
Report):

Saddam
himself exercised control over Iraq'sBW arsenal, and he was
prepared to use it against U.S. and allied forces in the event of war.
At a meeting in early January 1991, he identified the targets for the
BW weapons. Israel was to be first
and all Israeli cities were targets, but he ordered that strikes concentrate
on Tel Aviv. U.S. forces were to be targets if they attacked with unconventional
forces. He also identified Riyadh and Jeddah as targets. In a transcript
of discussions held at the time, Saddam ordered the use of the more
persistent (presumably anthrax) BW agents: "we want the long term,
the many years kind."

Iraq's BW infrastructure emerged from that conflict
(1991 Gulf War) damaged,
but not destroyed, and in the wake of the war the regime tried to preserve
what it could of its BW program. Aiming to leave open the option of
restarting BW activities once UN inspections were over and sanctions
were lifted, Baghdad attempted to remove all possible signatures of
its past offensive activities. Simultaneously, Iraq undertook a significant
denial and deception effort intended to conceal from the UN the true
nature, scope, and ultimate objectives of the program. By 1995, these
efforts had failed, and Iraq admitted its offensive program, leading
in 1996 to the destruction, at Saddam's orders and under UN supervision,
of most of Iraq's BW physical infrastructure.

Saddam continued to see the utility of WMD. He explained
that he purposely gave an ambiguous impression about possession as a
deterrent to Iran. He gave explicit direction to maintain the intellectual
capabilities. As UN sanctions eroded there was a concomitant expansion
of activities that could support full WMD reactivation. He directed
that ballistic missile work continue that would support long-range missile
development. Virtually no senior Iraqi believed that Saddam had forsaken
WMD forever. Evidence suggests that, as resources became available and
the constraints of sanctions decayed, there was a direct expansion of
activity that would have the effect of supporting future WMD reconstitution.

Dr. Bilal told ISG, "Al Hakam was kept as potential
for the BW program in the future." He described that they decided
they must do everything to preserve it and stated that the entire bioinsecticide
and SCP effort at Al Hakam was a "100% cover story" created
by 'Amir Rashid. Dr. Rihab also stated that the intent to produce the
SCP and bioinsecticide at Al Hakam was "to cover the equipment."
ISG judges that in the wake of Desert Storm and destruction of much
of the BW effort, Iraq's strategic objective was to give the appearance
of cooperating with UNSCOM while preserving the intellectual capital
amassed in prior years on BW.