U.S Sanctions against the Sudan began in 1997 under the pretext of it supporting groups that Washington calls radical

At the time, Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir placed the country in a camp whose political decisions were logical and came to be known as the Resistance axis because of its regional priorities, such as its support of resistance in Palestine and its animosity towards the Zionist regime.

However, along with increasing political pressure and foreign interference, as well as new conditions arising in the region with the Arab spring, Khartoum’s views would change. Sudan’s president was faced with a legitimacy crisis on the one hand, and on the other with the Darfour separatist crisis which was also accelerating. This internal separatist movement was also supported by foreign powers and Tel Aviv, and had thus gained international legitimacy.

Giving in to America’s demands was Al-Bashir’s decision, contrary to what the Sudanese people wanted. The only reason the decision was made was so that he would be able to spare himself international accusations and internal crises, His decision to join the Saudi camp was the result of his choosing to secure his own power.

The Saudi war on Yemen which began with operation “Decisive Storm” was a political opportunity for Sudan to resolve some of its internal crises and drive away foreign pressure by joining the Saudi coalition, which did in fact happen. Omar al-Bashir, by joining the Saudi coalition, was able to drive away the accusations that Riyadh itself had made of him being a war criminal, and thereby have it forego the sanctions.

It can be said that from that point onward, a new era of Sudanese attitude politics came to be. The independent Sudan that supported Palestine was now a follower of Saudi Arabia that was to follow Riyadh’s footsteps in all of its regional and international policies. However, what later unfolded made it clear that Sudan, much like other Arab countries was wrong in its reading of regional changes, just like all the other countries that believes that Syria was going to fall when the war first began, Khartoum also thought that Decisive Storm was to be a limited operation that would only last a few months, and would end with Saudi Arabia’s victory in war, wherein Sudan would have many spoils to reap.

As the war in Yemen dragged on, and the Saudis came to be in trouble, Sudan felt that it should calmly distance itself from the coalition, without paying the price. It is without a doubt that this very idea was the reason behind the lifting of the sanctions as an incentive by the Americans to keep Sudan as part of the coalition.

Although it’s been said that the Americans, as a precondition for lifting the sanctions, wanted Sudan to completely resolve its internal problems, such as the fighting in certain areas such as Darfour, along with Sudan’s support in combating terrorism and increasing the inflow of humanitarian aid to the country, in reality neither placing Sudan’s sanctions nor lifting them had anything to do with America’s humanitarian beliefs and Sudan’s internal crisis. The reason is that the Darfour crisis was engendered by the U.S and Tel Aviv, as part of Clinton’s Constructive Chaos theory.

As for those who congratulated Sudan on the lifting of its sanctions, they were mistaken, and must know that the lifting of Sudanese sanctions had nothing to do with Sudan’s trampling of popular demands or internal resistance, but rather a reward for joining the Saudi coalition in killing Yemeni children, and because it distanced itself from the Palestinian cause and began to normalize relations with the Zionist regime; this is but a temporary reward that has no guarantees for the future.