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The Present Status of Social Psychology

Floyd Henry Allport
School of Citizenship and Public Affairs
Syracuse University

IN VIEW of the difficulty of defining the science of general psychology, it
would seem rash to attempt the definition of the newer and less clearly
delimited branch known as "social psychology". Just as modern psychologists,
through the behavior movement, combine strictly psychological data with
physiological, in like manner social psychologists seem at present to straddle
the line between psychology and the social sciences, having an especially firm
foothold in sociology and ethnology. There is thus room for the play of "vested
scientific interests" in exploiting this new field; and misunderstandings may
arise among sincere students approaching the subject from the background of
their special disciplines.[1]
The
disunity is increased by the fact that psychology and sociology do not belong by
common consent even to the same "family" of sciences; the former being
considered a "natural" science, and the latter, through a distinction vital to
some writers, designated as a "social" science. This difference leads to basic
disagreements as to the nature or the elements or units of social psychology,
the methods of measurement, the principles of explanation, and the laws
eventually derived.

We do not imply that such disagreement is undesirable. On the contrary, it is
highly stimulating. Neither is it wise to attempt a meticulous definition of any
science, except for purposes of cooperation and division of labor among
different investigators. In such definitions, moreover, it is the inclusive,
rather than the logical and narrow aspect, which should be stressed. In the
writing of textbooks and treatises, however, most writers (including the
present: one) are inclined to start from a rather rigid definition of their own,
and to exclude differing viewpoints which for the moment might be confusing to
the student. Hence the need arises for in occasional bird's-eye view from which
we may try to see the advances made along different lines of attack and bring
them into some intelligible relationship. A brief outline of the current
movements to which the name "social psychology" might be given

(373) will be here attempted. We shall not present any formal definition of
the science from these standpoints, but merely characterize the type of
approach.

1. The "Social Forces" School. The first approach, though mainly of
historic interest, is still followed by certain sociologists. This is the view
that all social phenomena can be regarded as manifestations of some homogeneous
force or forces. The imitation theory, developed principally by Tarde [2] and
Ross, [3] is an illustration which is too well known to require discussion. A
number of writers have taken certain alleged "instincts" as forces universally
operative in society; for example, fear, hate, gregariousness, suggestibility,
and parental love. We are not here referring to the instinct school of social
psychologists who trace the basis of social facts in the specific instinctive
behavior of individuals. We mean rattler those sociologists who abstract the
categories of instinct from specific individuals and consider them upon the
generalized plane of a "social force".

2. Social Mind Theories. Exponents of a second viewpoint maintain that
mental phenomena must be studied in their social context or organization. The
facts of social life cannot be sufficiently formulated by reference to separate
individuals, but require the hypothesis of some hind of superindividual,
psycho-logical structure. Certain theories of nationality belong to this type.
The range of these theories in respect to the nature of the social mind which
they postulate is great, extending from organismic and "cell-consciousness"
theories, such as those of Spencer[4]
and
Espinas [5]
respectively, through
neurological and pathological analogies, illustrated by the writings of
Munsterberg [6]
and Rivers, [7]
to the "mental structure" theories of the group mind, represented by
McDougall.[8]
The postulated collective
mind also differs widely in scale of worth according to different writers.
LeBon's [9]
view is that of a "mob mind",
of a low order, unorganized, and made up of impulses and emotions. McDougall's
notion, at the other extreme, is that of the superior mental organization
resulting from the relationships within stabilized groups such as nations. Some
writers belonging to this group deny the existence of an actual

(374) overindividual mind separate from the minds of the individuals;
but they maintain that the larger view of mental organization is necessary in
order to understand the social occurrences which we can observe only as the
behavior of individuals. The minds of individuals are to be understood only as
exhibiting in some degree the mind of the group.

3. The Social Laws Approach. Without accepting the reality of a
collective mind, in any sense, it is still possible to study social phenomena
from the standpoint of purely social structures and changes. Although the group
is not endowed with a mind, it is nevertheless real. This is the
viewpoint which is perhaps most characteristic of sociologists. Examples of
writers of this class are Ellwood [10]
and B. Warren Brown. [11]
Their
contribution has been the elaboration of descriptive laws of the dynamics of
society. We may mention Brown's [11]
"laws of social groups", such for example as those dealing with the relation
between the structure, homogeneity, and "dynamic' of groups. Similar instances
are Znaniecki's [12] laws of "stabilization", "mobilization",
"Inhibition", and the like, through which the movement or stabilizing of society
are described as following inevitably certain psychological conditions, such is
shifts of values in relation to the existing order. The individual and social
aspects, however, are not clearly separated in Znaniecki's formulations.
Kroeber's [13]
theory of the
super-organic as the field for social psychology is based upon the
possibility of discovering laws lying wholly upon the social plane.

4. The Cultural Approach (Social Products and Social Structures).
Impetus has recently been given to social science by the work of the cultural
anthropologists. Here, again, the point of view is abstract; that is, culture
products are considered not so much in relation to human behavior as themselves
constituting the field of psychological and social investigation. Existing
culture is also described as exerting a causal effect upon thought and action of
individuals. This view is similar to the "social laws approach” except that
instead of the group itself there is substituted the product of group activity,
or culture. Ogburn [14]
has shown that
culture may be regarded as a detached phenomenon, progressing by laws of its own
(laws, to be sure, of a descriptive

(375) rather than an explanatory type), and interacting in significant ways
with human nature. Judd [15]
describes
the basic elements of our culture pattern, such as the number system, language,
time measurement, and measures of precision, under the title of “institutions".
His recent work expresses the need of studying these basic patterns as a
necessary supplement to laboratory psychology ; for without them the traditional
individual psychology is quite inadequate for an understanding of modern man.
Among a number of writers in the same vein, we may mention Bentley [16] who
calls attention to the "precipitates of organization' (including both material
and non-material aspects of culture) as a separate category of reality for
scientific study.

5. Innate Individual Causation (the Individual as the Cause of Society).
This group of scholars approaches the problem from the standpoint of the native
endowment of human individuals. Leaving the sociological and anthropological
viewpoints, we here descend to the strictly psychological, and even biological,
level. One here ignores the part played by the accumulation of culture just as
one ignores the "laws" of the sociologist. In human instincts and emotions
untouched by society are to be found the sources of all social organization and
change. As is well known, the outstanding exponent of this approach is
McDougall. [17] He has had numerous followers among the social
scientists, for example, Tead,[18]
Veblen,[19]
Groves,[20]
and Eldridge,[21]
as well as certain
sociologists who have since changed their views. This approach is at the pole
opposite from the cultural and the social laws' points of view.

6. Socialization Theories (Society as the Cause of the Individual).
With the sixth group of theories we reverse the view just preceding and return
to the fold of the anthropologist and sociologist. By carrying the cultural
approach to its logical conclusion, we come to the view that the individual is
not so much the cause as the effect of the social order in which he lives.
Champions of this thesis have made sharp attacks upon the instinct theory. They
have maintained that native reactions are almost never to be seen in the adult
individual, his conduct being determined by the

(376) social objects, stimulations from social behavior, and the traditions
of the culture in which he lives. Bernard [22]
has made a comprehensive attack upon the instinct theory, while Dewey
[23]
has stressed the role of social
factors in the formation of habit systems in individuals. Such interpretations
closely ally their exponents with the behavior psychologists; for the
influence of traditions and the culture pattern upon the individual can be
conceived only through the process of education (that is, habit formation in the
younger generations). Although the importance of the societal pattern is
definitely established by showing how, completely it absorbs, metaphorically the
life of the individual, yet from the standpoint of complete explanation this
view must fall back upon the psychology of individual learning. Other exponents
of the socialization theory are Baldwin,[24]
Mead,[25]
and Cooley.[26]
An extremist in cultural causation is Wilson D. Wallis.[27]
Both he and Kantor [28]
would insist that
physiological processes fail to explain the acquisition of culture. The cause of
an individual's acquiring a language lies, for example, not so much in his
neuromuscular speech mechanism as in the particular pattern of sounds comprising
the language. Otherwise how can we account for the fact that one person acquires
English, and another Hebrew, or Chinese?

7. The Behavior Approach (the Broader View of Individual Causation).
Swinging back, finally, to the more strictly psychological approach, we may
describe briefly the movement which represents a systematic development of the
behavioristic point of view in the social field. This viewpoint, like that of
"innate individual causation", regards the study of the individual as the data
proper to social psychology. The survey of factors in individual behavior is,
however, distinctly broader than the field of native human tendencies. Probably
most behaviorists accept the modern criticism of instincts and subscribe, with
the cultural sociologists and anthropologists, to the large importance of the
social environ-

(377) -ment. Instead, however, of attributing causation to the social
environment by itself, they work out the details of socialization or
aculturation in terms of the universal acquisition of habits, that is, the
habits common to the entire race or group. Since all habit formation rests in
part upon the original instinctive and emotional responses of human beings
(though such responses are far simpler than the instinct theorists maintain),
the behavioristic approach may be said to include the viewpoint of individual
causation referred to above as number 5. This school, therefore, makes possible
a coordination of the two preceding viewpoints, sacrificing, of course, the
extreme aspects of each.

Two main subdivisions of the broader behavioristic approach may be
recognized, which represent supplementary fields of data rather than diverging
standpoints. The first is perhaps best illustrated by Giddings" [29] theory of "pluralistic behavior" (that, is, the similarities of
behavior among individuals in social aggregates). One may include here either or
both the two following types of similarities: (1) the original
likenesses, due for example, to being members of the same species or to common
selective action of physical environment upon resident and immigrant population,
traits which might be assumed universally to exist in the given region before
social contacts of any kind have produced effects upon the individuals; or (2)
derived similarities, perhaps based upon those just mentioned, but developed
mainly through the responses of the individuals to one another.[30]

While in either case it is simply the fact of uniformity of response in a
given area which interests us, if we consider the origin of the latter type of
similarity, we are led directly to the second
subdivision of the behavior approach. This subdivision deals with the
stimulation of one individual by another and the response of the individual to
such stimulation. . It has to do also, not with uniformities, but with
differences, and especially-with those differences of behavior which
may be said to he complementary in a given social situation. An example of
complementary behavior would be the response of a child to a command of a
parent, or the response of a parent to the request of a child.

Though not. so clearly separable in practice as in theory, these two
subdivisions of the behavior approach include between them

(378) a possible orientation of the entire field of social science. The first
classification includes some writers who are in strong sympathy with the
cultural viewpoint, since cultures may be psychologically defined as patterns of
like behavior. The group in question are interested, however, in the pattern as
behavior rather than as abstract culture. After Giddings, perhaps the clearest
of theories belonging to this school are the universal "institutionalized
reactions" of Kantor,[31]
and the
"coentropes" of Smith and Guthrie.[32]
Attempts at classification and measurement of like behavior in actual aggregates
have been made by Rice,[33]
Willey,[34]
Allport and Hartman.[35]
The second
interest of the behavioristic group, namely, that of social stimulation and the
response of one individual to another, is illustrated by Allport's [36]
definition of "social behavior". It comprises the study not only of behavior in
face-to-face relationships, e.g., the family and other "primary" groups, but
also the response to contributory stimulation received by the individual in the
crowd or co-working group. Some other writers who have formulated the problems
of social psychology in this way are Hunter, [37]
Gault,[38]
Smith and Guthrie,[32]
Williams [39]
(bordering somewhat upon
the group approach) and to some extent Bogardus,[40]
and Dunlap.[41]
Miss Follett's [42]
contributions also arise from the observed effects of
inter-individual behavior, though her approach is more telic than analytic, and
her results are cast in a somewhat philosophical mode. From one standpoint
Bernard's [43]
new work may be classified
with this group since he is mainly interested in the formation of the
individual's personality through "social pressures or stimulus patterns". His
treatment, in certain respects, however, allies him with the socialization

(379) school (number 6 above) rather than with the behavior psychologists.
This qualification refers especially to his tendency to emphasize the social
pattern of the stimulus as a cause rather that the actual behavior process of
stimulation and response between specific individuals.

This outline of seven major viewpoints in social psychology is not
comprehensive. It will serve merely to indicate the diversity of viewpoints from
which the phenomena may be conceived. In the face of such diversity, one should
not attempt a formulation of social psychology with any claim to universal
acceptance. 'Flip writer believes, however, that futile controversies may lie
avoided by recognizing that, after all, these various approaches really deal
with the same natural phenomena. Whether we call such phenomena group
relationships, cultures, or pluralistic; and interacting behavior, we are really
talking about the same thing as well from different points of view. While
working in one of the separate fields each investigator has his own terminology
for real facts which another student would also see but would interpret
differently. The mutual recognition of such a common denominator may help to
avoid misunderstanding. It will also render the exponents of the several
approaches more conscious of the limitations of their respective methods,
thereby paving the way for cooperative investigation.

We might illustrate this common basis by reference to some actual social
phenomenon, for example, a war. It is probable drat the exponents of all views
above described will agree as to what a war is; the differences will lie in
interpretation of the origin, causes, and significance of the phenomenon. In
such interpretation each of the approaches gives, by itself, a coherent and
largely tenable formulation of the facts. Each also presents certain unique
truths differing, of course, in practical applicability, but all contributing to
our understanding of the total, situation. let us review briefly some of the
possibilities of each view.

(1) The older social forces idea, while it does not carry us into details of
causation, is useful for an initial, rough formulation of the problem. It calls
attention to the figurative sweep of warlike impulses through the nation,
a phenomenon to be studied more closely through the other approaches.

(2) The group mind conception has a similar value. It does not present a
final analysis, but serves as a method for calling attention to a vital phase of
war as a social situation. It is important to note that there exists, at least
in the individual's con-

(380) -sciousness, the experienced reality o f the nation. Professor
Pillsbury ascribes to the nation reality of a contingent and mental sort; that
is the nation is real in the sense that an ideal in the mind of an individual is
real. And this very ideal of the nation is, in terms of the individual's
experience, a reality to be upheld and defended by force of arms and to the
point of extreme self-sacrifice. One must understand the notion held by the
German people of their state and their national kultur, or one will miss
an important part of the picture. Nationalism and public opinion cannot be
discussed without reference at least to the pluralistic hypothesis of the
social mind.

(3) The third viewpoint, comprising the social laws and group structures of
the sociologists, is also a consistent and (especially if combined with the
behavioristic approach) illuminating contribution. The problem o[ war may be
profitably investigated as a matter of increase or shifting of population,
economic competition between groups, resistance of groups to subordination,
or struggles for group sovereignty. Such formulations do not tell the
whole story, but they outline a field of mass data without which the exponent of
individual behavior would be at a complete loss in localizing or weighing the
relative value of his various explanatory hypotheses.

(4) The fourth, or cultural, approach, is equally significant. The hearing of
scientific inventions upon the development of efficiency in warfare is
universally acknowledged. The existence of a large armament and military
establishment is said to be in itself one of the formidable causes of war. The
rapid development of the destructive material culture of warfare is one of the
most imperative of reasons for attempts to abolish war as a method of settling
conflicts. Not only the objective phases of the culture (armaments), but also
the popular acceptance of war as a hind of institution, the use of military
organization, tactics, strategy, and international rules,-these are all
important aspects of the causation of war. Disarmament conferences attack the
material aspects of the problem; while international treaties, courts of
international arbitration, the World Court idea, and the League of Nations seek
to establish new forms of culture relevant to behavior upon group-wide
provocations for hostility.

(5) Viewing the problem from the standpoint of innate individual causation,
war may be treated as dependent upon crude innate responses, such as (a) the
struggle reaction (so-called "instinct of pugnacity") evoked by thwarting
of food-getting or sex

(381) activity, (b) the innate tendency to seek physical protection in
danger, and (e) the violent
reinforcing emotions which are a part of these innate responses. Such
reactions may be aroused directly by acts of invasion, pillage, piracy, and the
like, by members of a neighboring nation; or they may be aroused indirectly, or
in advance, by the words of propagandists as conditioning stimuli. But in
either case it may truly be said that without such fundamental activities in
human individuals war would not exist. Stated in other words, the abolition of
mass situations which would serve either as original or conditioning stimuli for
these innate responses, were such a thing possible, would mean the elimination
of war.

(6) Those who attach greatest weight to the social environment would, in
turn, assert that wars are precipitated in accordance with custom and
tradition., and the ethics of groups reflected in international
mores. Military operations are not parts of instinctive behavior, but are
socially established ways of carrying on conflicts. Within the national
area social influences have so far modified original human nature that physical
combat ("instinct of pugnacity") is the rare exception rather than the rule.
Laws and customs have been substituted for innate responses. Accordingly, it is
the absence of such mores of peaceful and ;judicial settlement between
nations that keeps the conduct of international disputes upon the instinctive
and emotional plane. The solution of the problem lies in the substitution of
socialized habits for innate responses.

(7) To this the behavior psychologists would readily assent; but they would
inquire into the details of the process by which socialized habits are
developed, not upon a tabula rasa, but as learned modifications of
earlier and simpler forms of innate (reflex) activity. A distinction therefore
is not drawn between socialization (society) and individual nature; but
attention is called to the concrete interactions of the individuals who
constitute society, stimuli and responses through which the members or the
younger generations acquire socialized habits.

The social order is not to be regarded as a substitution for original
nature, imposed by "society" upon the individual, but as a modification
of original nature produced by contacts with certain, other persons and
with culture objects in the individual's immediate environment. The behaviorist
therefore agrees with the "social-causationists" in saying that the behavior
characteristic of mankind in human societies presents a picture far
different from innate activities, a picture resembling not primitive instinc-

(382) -tive and emotional response, but the standards and cultural pattern of
the social group. lie would perhaps disagree in his insistence upon
analyzing this cultural pattern into the behavior of specific individuals, and
showing in detail how this change in the picture has been produced by
progressive modifications of the instinctive and emotional behavior itself
during; the plastic period of the individual's life. He would therefore assign a
partial determining value to these innate factors, and recognize the direction
and limitations which their operation places upon the process of socialization.

The behavior approach, then, would view the war situation as group-wide
responses to a widespread stimulus or combination of stimuli. In such responses
innate biological drives, acquired habits, and social attitudes would be
intermingled. The problem would center largely in the determination of (1)
the character and image of the stimulus situation necessary to evoke war or
prevent that is, whether the war was due to thwarting (instinctive struggle), to
propaganda as a conditioning stimulus, to patriotic appeals, and the like-and
(2) the pluralistic distribution and
energy (or intensity) of the response among the individuals of the
nation. The part played by crowd excitement, suggestive stimulations, and
coercion through alleged "public opinion", would also form a part of the
behavioristic investigation of war.

The behavior view would also be closely integrated with two of the other
general viewpoints previously discussed. It deals, on the one hand, with the
elementary facts of human behavior which explain on a deeper level the operation
of social laws, such as population pressure, competition for world
markets, and the like. Economic laws may be reduced to the pluralistic aspect of
individual behavior. Secondly, the cultural basis of war may in a sense
be resolved into the behavior habits of individuals in the use of the "tools" of
warfare, the habits of militaristic thinking (implicit behavior), and the
habitual attitudes of support toward symbols of "the nation", the "state", and
all the "institutions of society" playing a part in martial organization. In
this latter field, especially, the psychology of the culture pattern and social
institutions, the present writer feels that there is the possibility of a
valuable contribution from the student of human behavior.

From the preceding survey the writer believes it fair to say, without
intending invidious comparisons, that the broader behavioristic and individual
approach to social psychology offers a special advantage in synthesizing
valuable contributions from a number of divergent fields.

(383)

If, from the foregoing account, we may come to any single conclusion about
the field of social psychology, it would seem to he the following: The error
which may beset students seeking an orientation in the science would come not
from the mere acceptance of any one of the viewpoints described, hut rather from
its acceptance to the exclusion of the other approaches, or from the
over-emphasis of some one position. While it is acknowledged that individuality
of hypothesis is often a part of scientific drive and inspiration, there comes
to both student and investigator a time and a need for surveying the field as a
whole, recognizing the limitations of one's own approach, and attaining a better
synthesis and balance.

Turning more definitely to the problem of research in social psychology, the
preceding discussion seems to carry certain practical implications. We shall
state these briefly in conclusion. First, it is necessary in any social
phenomenon to study the entire situation. For this end frequent discussions are
desirable among investigators dealing with the same specific problem from
different standpoints and with the techniques of the different human sciences.
Secondly, viewing the problem as a whole, an introductory theoretical analysis
is desirable, showing the various types of units which may he isolated or
subjected to experimental control. Such an analysis should he carried out, not
as an intellectual end in itself, but in order to discover at each step the
possibility of developing experimental and observational procedures. Thirdly,
the most highly perfected systems of social philosophy have usually been based
upon a single type of approach, similar perhaps to those we have described.
Social scientists who have developed such systems should be quid: to recognize
their limitations; for in the actual data of science only the most elementary
systematization is at present possible. No matter how coherent and
intellectually satisfying any system of social interpretation may he, it is of
value for future discovery only insofar as it stimulates research and directs it
into fruitful channels. Fourthly, attention and effort, should be focussed upon
the careful isolation of the units projected by theoretical analysis, and upon
devising methods for measuring these units under varied determinable or
controlled conditions. In so far as concrete discriminations or units and
technique of measurement are accomplished, the controversial discrepancies
between the various approaches will probably fall away. Having served a purpose
in the orientation of research, these varying formulations will no longer stand
in the way of acquiring a knowledge of social phenomena sufficiently- exact for
purposes of prediction and control.

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