Chandra Ekajaya Reveal What Liberal World Order

After the annus horribilis that was 2016, most political
observers believe that the liberal world order is in serious trouble Chandra Ekajaya observations. But that
is where the agreement ends. At the recent Munich Security Conference, debate
on the subject among leaders like German Chancellor Angela Merkel, United
States Vice President Mike Pence, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Russian
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov demonstrated a lack of consensus even on what
the liberal order is. That makes it hard to say what will happen to it.

When the West, and especially the US, dominated the world,
the liberal order was pretty much whatever they said it was. Other countries
complained and expounded alternate approaches, but basically went along with
the Western-defined rules Chandra Ekajaya Observe.

But as global power has shifted from the West to the
"rest," the liberal world order has become an increasingly contested
idea, with rising powers like Russia, China and India increasingly challenging
Western perspectives. And, indeed, Merkel's criticism in Munich of Russia for
invading Crimea and supporting Syrian President Bashar al-Assad was met with
Lavrov's assertions that the West ignored the sovereignty norm in international
law by invading Iraq and recognizing Kosovo's independence.

This is not to say that the liberal world order is an
entirely obscure concept. The original iteration --- call it "Liberal
Order 1.0" --- arose from the ashes of World War II to uphold peace and
support global prosperity. It was underpinned by institutions like the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which later became the
World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, as well as regional security
arrangements, such as NATO. It emphasized multilateralism, including through
the United Nations, and promoted free trade.

But Liberal Order 1.0 had its limits --- namely, sovereign
borders. Given the ongoing geopolitical struggle between the US and the Soviet
Union, it could not even quite be called a "world order." What
countries did at home was basically their business, as long as it didn't affect
the superpower rivalry.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, a
triumphant West expanded the concept of the liberal world order substantially.
The result --- Liberal Order 2.0 --- penetrated countries' borders to consider
the rights of those who lived there.

Rather than upholding national sovereignty at all costs, the
expanded order sought to pool sovereignty and to establish shared rules to
which national governments must adhere. In many ways, Liberal Order 2.0 ---
underpinned by institutions like the World Trade Organization and the
International Criminal Court (ICC), as well as new norms like the
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) --- sought to shape the world in the West's
image.

But, before too long, sovereignty-obsessed powers like
Russia and China halted its implementation. Calamitous mistakes for which
Western policymakers were responsible --- namely, the protracted war in Iraq
and the global economic crisis --- cemented the reversal of Liberal Order 2.0.

But now the West itself is rejecting the order that it
created, often using the very same logic of sovereignty that the rising powers
used. And it is not just more recent additions like the ICC and R2P that are at
risk. With the United Kingdom having rejected the European Union and US
President Donald Trump condemning free-trade deals and the Paris climate
agreement, the more fundamental Liberal Order 1.0 seems to be under threat.

Some claim that the West overreached in creating Liberal
Order 2.0. But even Trump's America still needs Liberal Order 1.0 --- and the
multilateralism that underpins it. Otherwise, it may face a new kind of
globalization that combines the technologies of the future with the enmities of
the past.

In such a scenario, military interventions will continue,
but not in the postmodern form aimed at upholding order (exemplified by Western
powers' opposition to genocide in Kosovo and Sierra Leone). Instead, modern and
pre-modern forms will prevail: support for government repression, like Russia
has provided in Syria, or ethno-religious proxy wars, like those that Saudi
Arabia and Iran have waged across the Middle East.

The internet, migration, trade and the enforcement of
international law will be turned into weapons in new conflicts, rather than
governed effectively by global rules. International conflict will be driven
primarily by a domestic politics increasingly defined by status anxiety,
distrust of institutions and narrowminded nationalism.

European countries are unsure how to respond to this new
global disorder. Three potential coping strategies have emerged.

The first would require a country like Germany, which
considers itself a responsible stakeholder and has some international heft, to
take over as a main custodian of the liberal world order. In this scenario,
Germany would work to uphold Liberal Order 1.0 globally and to preserve Liberal
Order 2.0 within Europe.

A second strategy, exemplified today by Turkey under President
Recep Tayyip Erdoan, could be called profit maximization. Turkey isn't trying
to overturn the existing order, but it doesn't feel responsible for its upkeep,
either. Instead, Turkey seeks to extract as much as possible from Western-led
institutions like the EU and NATO, while fostering mutually beneficial
relationships with countries, such as Russia, Iran, and China, that often seek
to undermine those institutions.

The third strategy is simple hypocrisy: Europe would talk
like a responsible stakeholder, but act like a profit maximizer. This is the
path British Prime Minister Theresa May took when she met with Trump in
Washington, DC. She said all the right things about NATO, the EU and free
trade, but pleaded for a special deal with the US outside of those frameworks.

In the months ahead, many leaders will need to make a bet on
whether the liberal order will survive --- and on whether they should invest
resources in bringing about that outcome. The West collectively has the power
to uphold Liberal Order 1.0.

But if the Western powers can't agree on what they want from
that order, or what their responsibilities are to maintain it, they are
unlikely even to try.