The Cromer Terrace blog - for independent graduate perspectives on Current Affairs, Cultural Issues and The Arts

Wednesday, 27 June 2012

Putin's Russia:Parallels with Al-Assad

The first part in a new series on Russia,
its internal politics, and its role in International affairs.

The
recent news that a Russian cargo ship, bound for Syria, has turned back after
having its insurance to move through British waters revoked by the government
is troubling. On board the MV Alead reportedly were three Mi-25 Helicopter
Gunships and a new advanced air defence system; the perfect tools to fight a
civil war and to deter any potential interference from the outside world. The
ship, which was flying the flag of the Dutch-Antilles, is now likely re-sail
under the Russian tricolour as a sign of the Putin regime’s determination to
support Al-Assad.

In
such a case, any attempt by the British authorities to prevent the passage of
the ship would be highly prevocational and illegal. Instead the significance of
the matter remains with the actions of the Russians: Putin’s determination to
defy the western world is indicative of his deep paranoia over internal opposition
and of the continuance of his outward-looking KGB Cold-War mentality. Indeed the
recent wave of protests that have accompanied Putin’s re-entrance into the
Kremlin have provoked a difficult situation for the regime. The propping up of
Assad is becoming increasingly reflective of the domestic situation in Russia,
as the Oligarchy resorts to intimidation and oppression of opposition forces,
fearing a movement reflective of the Arab-spring.

Pro-Democracy protests against Putin's rigged re-election to the Kremlin: New laws against protests are indicative of the police state characteristics of Putin's internal and external policies (more on the protests in Part 2)

This
paranoia is compounded by the paranoia of the ruling elite, who see every
attempt to challenge them as part of a wider western-led plot to overthrow
them. Luke Harding, in his book Mafia
State has estimated that up to 77% of the political elite could have FSB
((Russia’s post-Soviet Intelligence agency) and/or KGB backgrounds, including 42% of leaders who are already known to have had. Such a makeup goes some way to explaining the action of a regime that has moved to solidify its position internally through oppression, whilst simultaneously remaining belligerent in its diplomacy toward democracies. It is therefore unsurprising that despite the moral-bankruptcy of his position, Putin continues to block UN resolutions towards Syria, considering the immediate parallels that can be drawn between the protests in Syria and the Arab world in general, and the protests against Putin’s recently rigged return to the Kremlin

Aside
from explanations centred on the backward and autocratic mentality of Russia’s
political elite, and the parallels that can be drawn between Syria’s revolution
and Russia’s own internal opposition (more to come in a future article), the
regime’s actions can be viewed as an attempt to remain a big game player on the
international stage. Fyodor Lukyanov, editor of Russia in Global Affairs has stated “my deep conviction is that
Russia has not cared about its international image for a long time.” This may
be true, to the extent that Russia does not care what the west thinks of it.
But Putin is desperate to revive the strength of his Russian state; which means being taken seriously by both
internal opposition and the West.

The
support of Syria is just one on a list of actions that share inconspicuously
the common theme of highlighting the strength and autonomy of Putin’s regime
from the West. The murder of the KGB defector Alexander Litvineko by FSB agents in London in 2006, which was
likely to have been ordered, or at least endorsed, by Putin, is another such
example. In the aftermath of the assassination, the Putin regime refused to give
up the supposed killer, Andrei Lugovoi, and even endorsed him for political
office. The invasion of Georgia to humiliate the country and its president, Mikheil
Saakashvili in 2008, for their pro-Western stance is also indicative of this.

A posed picture as part of Putin's carefully cultivated 'Strongman' image

The
message of Russia’s actions in Syria is simple: ‘We don’t need the West and we
do as we please.’ But as The Economist has
argued, Russian defiance should not be seen as an insurmountable bar to action:
It did not prove to be in Kosovo in 1999. The UN Security-Council should thus
move to outmanoeuvre Russia, and sideline it from resolutions, particularly if
China’s position softens further. My personal suspicion is that Putin does care
about Russia’s international image, just as he cares so obviously about his
domestic one. Just as he wants to return Russia to great-power status, so too
does he want to project an image of strength. The response therefore, should be
strength from the West against him; to be ignored in the case of Syria would be
a humiliation for Putin both internationally and at home.

Putin’s
legitimacy had been quashed in the wake of the election-rigging scandal and his
oppression against opposition and his support of dictatorial regimes is
reflective of this domestic context. With his regime’s position so
morally-bankrupt, western leaders should not allow him the pleasure of playing
such a major, and disruptive, role in international relations.

Upcoming:

Part
two of this feature will deconstruct Putin’s so called ‘Mafia State’ and assess
how Putin’s ascendancy to power has corresponded with the formation of an
autocratic oligarchy. Part three will question whether, with the centennial
anniversary of the 1917 revolution soon coming into view, popular opposition
forces will have the strength to enact a new revolution.