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1 Explaining the Deterrence Effect of Human Rights Prosecutions for Transitional Countries Mass human rights violations are among the most pressing international problems facing policy makers today. Many more people were killed by their own governments in the twentieth century than the combat deaths of all the wars combined. 1 The early years of the twenty-first century give no indication that this trend is abating. Yet, while the academic literature on the causes of war is well developed, the literature on causes of human rights violations is still relatively new. Because human rights violations are so prevalent, the discussion of how to prevent or diminish repression has important theoretical and policy implications. Human rights prosecutions have been the major policy innovation of the late twentieth century designed to diminish human rights violations. 2 The justification for such trials has rarely been merely retributive; the purpose has not been only to punish perpetrators, but also to use accountability to deter future violations. 3 This deterrence hypothesis states that increases in the probability of prosecution should diminish repression. But until now, data on human right trials has not existed to be able to test the deterrence hypothesis. In this article, we use our new dataset on domestic and international human rights prosecutions to test the deterrence argument, and to generate new arguments about the causes of and remedies for repression. We also link the argument to a broader debate in international relations about the role of enforcement for compliance with international rules, and provide additional arguments about the mechanisms 1 Rudolph Rummel (1994) estimates that the death toll from governmental mass murder of civilians was more than four times the battle dead for this century's international and civil wars. This estimate was based on data up to 1987, before the major episodes of mass murder in the Balkans and Rwanda in the mid-1990s. 2 Ellen L. Lutz and Caitlin Reiger (2008) document 43 prosecutions of heads of state for human rights crimes between January 1990 and June See Akhaven (2001). President Alfonsin (1996:87) said that the justification for the trials in Argentina was not mainly punishment, but prevention: to avoid that this could happen again. The Deputy Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) said that to deter other people from committing crimes was a principle goal of the court (Interview, Fatou Bensouda, The Hague, November 10, 2008). 1

2 through which prosecutions exercise their deterrence effect. The practical significance of such research is great: if the possibility of prosecutions can diminish repression, such knowledge could inform choices that policymakers are currently making around the world about whether or not to use human rights trials. Since the 1980s, states are increasingly addressing past human rights violations using multiple mechanisms including trials, truth commissions, reparations, vetting, museums and other memory sites, archives, and oral history projects (Bassiouni, 2002, Hayner, 2002, Jelin et al., 2003, Kritz, 1995, McAdams, 1997). This paper focuses on the most important of these mechanisms: prosecuting human rights violations in domestic, foreign, international, and hybrid courts. We address two main research questions: 1) do human rights prosecutions deter future violations of human rights in transitional countries, and if so, 2) what are the mechanisms through which prosecutions lead to improvements in human rights? Because human rights trials are relatively recent phenomena, we still know little about their effects (Thoms et al., 2008:31). Although there is a large and important quantitative literature on the causes of repression, it has not addressed human rights trials. 4 We draw on our new dataset on human rights prosecutions to provide the first full quantitative analysis on the impact of such prosecution on human rights practices. 5 We also contrast the impact of prosecutions with that of truth commissions. This contrast helps us to develop and evaluate theoretical arguments about the mechanisms through which prosecution bring about change. Human rights trials are not only instances of punishment or enforcement, but also high-profile symbolic events that communicate and dramatize norms. It is 4 Poe and Tate (1994), Poe, et. al (1999), Zanger (2000), Davenport and Armstrong II (2004), Anderson, et. al (2002), Apodaca (2001), Bueno de Mesquita et. al (2005), Richards, et. al (2001), and Hafner-Burton (2005). 5 A book manuscript by Leigh Payne, Tricia Olsen, and Andrew Reiter also provides a quantitative analysis of the impact of trials and of other transitional justice mechanisms: Engaging the Past to Safeguard the Future: Transitional Justice in Comparative Perspective. 2

3 thus difficult to separate these normative and performative aspects of prosecution from its material punishment and enforcement effects. Truth commissions, which are official government bodies temporarily set up to investigate past histories of human rights violations (Hayner, 2002), also communicate norms but they do not involve any material punishment. Truth commission reports rarely give names of perpetrators, and even when they do, such naming does not lead to a material sanction. If human rights change occurs only by imposing material costs on specific individuals, we would not expect truth commissions to lead to any change. By comparing the impact of prosecution with that of truth commissions, we are able to gain an understanding of whether human rights change occurs only through enforcement involving material costs, or through some combination of material and social pressures. Many scholars and practitioners argue that human rights trials are both legally and ethically desirable and practically useful in deterring future violations (Méndez, 1997, Roht- Arriaza, 1995). Mendeloff (2004:358), however, finds many claims about the positive effects of trials but relatively little solid evidence to support those claims. Others believe that prosecution will not deter future violations and that in some circumstance they will lead to an increase in repression (Snyder and Vinjamuri, 2003). In the 1980s and 1990s, scholars of democratization also generally concluded that trials for past abuses would undermine new democracies, and not have a deterrent effect (Huntington, 1991). We consider a variety of these different hypotheses from these literatures as well as from the more specialized literature on transitional justice. Consistent with the deterrence hypothesis, we find that transitional countries with human rights prosecutions are less repressive than countries without prosecutions. Our study also shows that countries with more cumulative prosecutions are less repressive than countries with fewer prosecutions. In addition, countries with more neighbors with prosecutions are less repressive, 3

4 which may suggest that individuals learn from the experiences in other countries to create a deterrence impact across borders. We also find that truth commissions are associated with improvements in human rights practices. Thus, we argue that both normative pressures and material punishment are at work in deterrence, and the combination of the two, as in the case of prosecution combined with truth commissions, is more effective than either pure punishment or pure normative pressure. In the first three sections, we give a brief background on the emergence of human rights trials, review and discuss the various arguments in the transitional justice, compliance, and deterrence literatures that link human rights trials with human rights violations, and present the hypotheses to be tested. In the fourth section, we explain our dependent and independent variables and discuss our sample, which is defined as transitional states. In the next section, the statistical evidence relating trials to human rights protection is examined. Various models were used to check the robustness of the relationship, especially given the concerns about endogeneity. We conclude with a summary and suggestions for the future research. Compliance, Deterrence, Trials and Truth Commissions The area of human rights has experienced a dramatic increase in legalization in the post WWII period. 6 In 1945, the human rights issue area was not highly legalized at the international level. By 2000, many detailed treaties involving diverse human rights had been widely ratified and had entered into effect, but these treaties had weak enforcement mechanisms. Human rights were a highly legalized issue area but there were few tools or sanctions to enforce the law. Where accountability existed, it tended to be reputational accountability depending upon moral 6 By legalization, we follow Abbott, et. al (2000) in referring to a particular form of institutionalization characterized by obligation, precision, and delegation. 4

5 stigmatization of state violators. 7 In the few cases where stronger enforcement mechanisms existed, especially the regional human rights courts in Europe and the Americas, the focus was on state legal accountability. That is, regional human rights courts, like the European Court of Human Rights, find that states (not individuals) are in violation of their obligations and require them to provide some kind of remedy, usually in the way of changed policy. The international human rights regime is still mainly characterized by state accountability with weak enforcement. But for a small set of core human rights and war crimes, states and international institutions are increasingly using individual criminal accountability. 8 Specific state officials are prosecuted and if found guilty, they go to prison. This change has emerged gradually over the last twenty years in international and domestic judicial processes. It reflects not only an increase in the legalization of international human rights, but a specific form of legalization one focused on individual accountability. This trend has been described by Lutz and Sikkink (2001) as the justice cascade, and by Sriram (2003) as a revolution in accountability. This new form of legalization is not for the whole range of human rights, but for a core set of human right violations (torture, summary execution, disappearances and political imprisonment), genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. 9 The new focus on individual criminal accountability is reflected in the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), in the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 7 We use Grant and Keohane s (2005) definition of accountability that implies that some actors have the right to hold other actors to a set of standards, then judge whether they have fulfilled their responsibility and to impose sanctions if they determine these responsibilities have not been met. Reputational accountability is one of the seven forms of accountability they discuss. 8 The legal literature uses the term individual criminal responsibility for core international crimes subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC. See Damgaard (2008). Ratner and Abrams (2001) also use the term individual accountability for human rights abuses to refer to the broader phenomena of holding individual state officials responsibility for human rights violations. We use the term individual criminal accountability both to signal that we are interested in the broader phenomena and to clarify that our data base does not include civil claims. 9 Thus, the legalization discussed here enforces many of the non-derogable rights in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Genocide Convention, the Convention against Torture (CAT), those parts of the Geneva Conventions prohibiting war crimes, and the Rome Statute of the ICC. 5

6 and Rwanda (ICTR) and in the foreign universal jurisdiction cases like that against former Chilean President Augusto Pinochet (Bassiouni, 1996, Macedo, 2004, Roht-Arriaza, 2005). But the change has not been limited to these high-profile international tribunals and foreign cases. It is a more profound shift that also includes changes in domestic institutions. The great bulk of enforcement of core human rights norms now occurs in domestic courts using a combination of national criminal law, international criminal law, and international human rights law. Even when they primarily use domestic criminal law, human rights prosecutions differ from ordinary criminal trials because they involve state officials, who historically had immunity from prosecution (Ratner and Abrams, 2001). Our research focuses on prosecuting human rights violations in domestic, foreign, international, and hybrid courts. By prosecuting human rights violations, we refer to processes including indictments, arrests, extraditions, detention, as well as trials for violations of core human rights by state officials. Prosecuting human rights violations can be seen as a form of enforcement because it imposes costs and sanctions on state officials and carries the possibility of punishment. Even when trials do not result in convictions and incarceration, they can impose substantial costs on individuals, including the financial costs of litigation, the lost income during preventive detention, and importantly for elites, a loss of prestige and legitimacy. We include prosecutions that impose costs on the accused even when they do not result in convictions because we believe that such costs are relevant to explain deterrence. So, for example, the prosecutions of Augusto Pinochet in the United Kingdom and in Chile did not result in a conviction. Although Pinochet was never convicted of human right crimes, most would agree that his detention and trial was very costly to him. Likewise, Slobodan Milosevic died before he faced conviction by the ICTY, and yet his indictment, extradition to Hague, and 6

7 detention and trial there was all very costly to him. Many believe such arrests and trials send shock waves into the homes of other leaders, and thus may deter future human rights violations, a hypothesis we test here (Goldstone, 2000:136). Does Prosecuting Human Rights Deter Future Violations? International relations and legal scholars have long been concerned with the conditions under which governments comply with their commitments (Raustiala and Slaughter, 2002). What leads states to bring their behavior into greater conformity with international law? Many legal scholars believe that norms themselves induce a sense of obligation in states to comply (Chayes and Chayes, 1993, Koh, 1997). A more common hypothesis in the international relations compliance literature is a rationalist one that argues that an increase in enforcement should lead to an increase in cooperation (Downs et al., 1996). Because prosecuting human rights violations can be conceptualized as a form of enforcement that imposes new costs on state officials, an exploration of whether such prosecutions lead states and government officials to comply more with human rights law can help illuminate these larger debates over compliance and enforcement. The debate over human rights trials is also related to an important literature on deterrence in domestic legal systems (Andenaes, 1974, Blumstein et al., 1978, Matsueda et al., 2006, McCarthy, 2002, Nagin, 1998). This literature is similar to the compliance literature in that it is concerned with the degree to which sanctions and enforcement influence compliance with laws, but the deterrence literature has focused almost exclusively on how domestic prosecution and punishment inhibit individual criminal activity in the country where the prosecution occurs. It is relevant to our study because these also involve imposing domestic sanctions on individuals with 7

8 the aim of preventing future violations. In this literature, deterrence is defined as "the inhibiting effect of sanctions on the criminal activity of people other than the sanctioned offender (Blumstein, et al., 1978). After the ICTY indicted Milosevic for crimes in Bosnia, he went on to commit further violations in Kosovo. Some said this was a failure of deterrence. But as the definition above makes clear deterrence theory does not anticipate that sanctioned offenders who have already committed human rights violations will be deterred from committing further violations. Rather, it is concerned with how sanctions affect future behavior of other actors. Individuals who have already committed crimes can be incapacitated or preempted from committing future crimes by incarceration, but they are not the subjects of deterrence (Blumstein, et al., 1978). Reviews of the deterrence literature from domestic legal systems now conclude that there is much firmer evidence for a substantial deterrent effect than there was two decades ago (Nagin, 1998). Of particular relevance to our study is the finding that beliefs about the likelihood or probability of arrest and punishment have more deterrent effects than increases in the severity of punishment (Becker, 1968, Bueno de Mesquita, 1995, McCarthy, 2002, Nagin, 1998). In other words, research on domestic crimes rates has not shown that more severe punishment, such as the death penalty, deters crime, but it does indicate that increases in the likelihood of sanctions is associated with deterrence. What has changed dramatically in the realm of international human rights is exactly this likelihood of individual sanctions of state officials. Prior to the 1970s, there was an almost zero likelihood that heads of state and state officials would be held accountable for past violations The Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, and other WWII successor trials were the important exceptions to this rule, but they were also exceptions that proved the rule. Only leaders who ordered such crimes and then were unconditionally defeated could indeed be held individually responsible for their crimes by the victors or by domestic or foreign courts. 8

9 In principle, citizens could have used domestic criminal law to hold their past leaders legally accountable, but doctrines granting immunity to state officials from prosecution and the continuing power of these leaders prevented such accountability. Our data indicate that in the 1980s and 1990s the observable likelihood of sanctions for past violations has increased from almost zero to some positive number in many countries. Indeed the international realm may provide some kind of natural experiment for deterrence theory, since a major change in this key variable, the likelihood of sanction, has occurred in a relatively short period of time. A contrary argument comes from the literature that suggests that more enforcement of human rights norms and law can be counterproductive and actually lead to more violations of the law. Jack Goldsmith and Stephen D. Krasner (2003: 51) contend that a universal jurisdiction prosecution may cause more harm than the original crime it purports to address. They argue that states that reject amnesty and insist on criminal prosecution can prolong conflict, resulting in more deaths. Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri (2003) also argue that human rights trials themselves can increase the likelihood of future atrocities, exacerbate conflict, and undermine efforts to create democracy. These arguments suggest that more enforcement or the wrong kind of enforcement can lead to less compliance with international and domestic law. In particular, they suggest that during civil wars, insurgents will not sign peace agreements if they fear they will be held accountable for past abuses and the prolonged war can seriously exacerbate human rights violations. Until now, this debate has been carried on through the use of qualitative comparative case studies and counterfactual arguments. This has been necessary because there was no data on human rights trials. Our new data, however, allows us to test quantitatively for the first time two hypotheses about human rights prosecutions and deterrence. 9

10 Hypothesis 1: Countries that have held domestic human rights prosecutions or whose officials have been the object of foreign or international prosecutions will see greater improvements in human rights practices than those countries that have not held or been the object of human rights prosecutions. Hypothesis 2: Under situations of civil conflict and war, human rights prosecutions will exacerbate human rights violations. Through Which Mechanisms Do Human Rights Prosecutions affect Repression? Once we establish if human rights prosecutions are associated with improvements in human rights, we need to ask about the mechanisms through which these improvements occur. One key literature on mechanisms is the rational choice literature on the causes of repression. This literature argues that state officials choose repression because the benefits gained from repression exceed the costs (Poe, 2004). From this point of view, the expected benefits of repression may include the political gains for repressing political opponents, and the financial gains of expropriating their wealth and property. Prosecutions lead to sanctions of various sorts (arrest, incarceration, loss of income or prestige) that may increase the perceived costs of repression. For this approach, the main mechanism through which prosecutions lead to improvements in human rights practices is by increasing the costs of repression for state officials at the same time as the benefits of repression remain constant. Although this literature does not exclude social costs, the focus has been on the material costs and benefits. The alternative to the rational choice models are norm models that say that sometimes deterrence or compliance occurs for normative or managerial reasons even in the absence of 10

11 strong enforcement (Chayes and Chayes, 1993). Since issues of state and individual reputation, esteem, and legitimacy are at stake in human rights debates, the processes of the mobilization of shame through advocacy networks and international organizations could lead to behavioral change without stronger enforcement (Risse et al., 1999). In this approach, trials and truth commission are also a part of a process of socialization through which the norms of domestic and international society are communicated and reinforced, not only to state officials, but also to broader publics. Deterrence research suggests that deterrence is more effective for individuals who have a higher stakes in society or in conventionality (McCarthy, 2002, Nagin, 1998) which would include current and future state officials. Norm models stress that state officials also care about the social costs imposed by trials, and are attentive to the general norms of society and the role of institutions, including judicial institutions in communicating those norms. But we should be clear that the norms literature does not say that stronger enforcement is counterproductive for compliance, just that strong enforcement may not be necessary in all circumstances and that behavioral change is possible in the absence of enforcement mechanisms. Many legal scholars and political science norms theorists who write on human rights believe that human rights change is usually the result of both normative and coercive factors, such as aid cut-offs or other sanctions (Akhaven, 2001:13, Cardenas, 2007, Risse, et al., 1999, Weissbrodt and Bartolomei, 1991). Thus, they would tend to agree that the greater enforcement of human rights norms through prosecutions will complement and enhance the processes of naming and shaming that have long been a staple of the human rights movement. Nevertheless, it may be useful for analytical purposes to try to separate out the punishment costs of prosecutions that are mainly of concern to the rational choice literature, and the socialization processes that have been stressed in the norms literature. Such an effort would help us 11

12 understand better the mechanisms through which prosecutions affect human rights practices. The dilemma with prosecutions is that they are simultaneously highly symbolic normative events and a key form of material sanctions. It is difficult to isolate the material costs of prosecutions from their social effects as expressions of social disapproval. Informal social sanctions may follow from the formal sanctions of trials, and can have important effects in political arenas where reputation is essential. By comparing the impact of truth commissions and human rights prosecutions, however, we may be able to separate out a more purely normative mechanism from one that imposes both material and social costs. Because truth commissions do not result in any material punishment of individuals, if only material costs matter, truth commissions are unlikely to have any independent effect on human rights practices. If, however, both social and material costs are important, we would expect to see that truth commissions have an impact on human rights practices. Finally, we test an additional hypothesis extrapolated from the deterrence literature. Studies show that countries can learn from the policies of other countries (Haas, 1992, Weyland, 2005). Given the high-profile nature on many human rights prosecutions, human rights prosecutions might have a deterrence impact beyond the confines of the single country in which they are held, or to which they refer. For example, we might anticipate that prosecutions like that of Pinochet would have an impact beyond Chile. We will refer to these possible phenomena as deterrence across borders and will examine it by exploring the impact that prosecutions have on human rights practices in neighboring countries. While we cannot be certain of the mechanisms through which deterrence across borders works, we posit that it involves both a fear of punishment and a normative socialization process. If a neighboring country holds human 12

13 rights trials, it does not objectively increase the possibility of material punishment in the home country but it may increase the fear of anticipated costs on perpetrators across the border. But it also communicates regional or international norms and expectations about behavior. This discussion leads to the following two additional hypotheses. Support for these hypotheses in turn suggests that deterrence involves normative mechanisms as well as the material costs of punishment. Hypothesis 3: The use of a truth commissions will also be associated with improvements in human rights practices. Hypothesis 4: Human rights prosecutions will have a positive impact on the improvement of human rights protection in neighboring countries. Research Design To test these hypotheses, we use our new data on domestic and international human rights prosecutions in transitional countries between 1980 and We test our hypotheses with transitional countries for two reasons. First, we exclude fully authoritarian countries because generally they do not hold free and fair trials, nor do they have an independent judiciary. Thus we could not be confident that genuine trials of state officials for human rights violations can be held there. In the absence of an independent judiciary, for example, what might appear on the surface to be a human rights trial might instead be a show trial or a political trial through which the authoritarian leader punishes his opponents. Second, the theoretical literature directs our attention to the possible effects of prosecutions in transitional societies. The entire transitional justice literature is premised on the notion that transitional societies are in processes of instability 13

14 and flux in which choices made about accountability could have an enduring impact (Kritz, 1995, McAdams, 1997, Minow, 1998). These arguments, however, have not received adequate testing. Important new work by Simmons (2009:14) also demonstrates that human rights law has had more impact in a subset of transitional societies, where institutions are more fluid, than in fully authoritarian or fully democratic countries. Simmons, however, does not examine the impact of human rights prosecutions. There is no corresponding theoretical literature that posits that human rights prosecutions will have an important impact on the already high level of human rights protections in democratic societies. In stable democracies, Simmons shows, human rights law is often redundant and has less of an impact. Our dataset uses the country year as its unit of analysis. We used a variety of time-series cross-sectional models, including models that allow us to address a reciprocal relationship. We include all states which have experienced a transition since Countries with three types of transition were considered: democratic transition, transition from civil war, and transition by state creation. We determined our sample using the Polity IV dataset and found 100 transitional countries. 11 (Appendix 1) The Dependent Variable Repression We explore the impact that human rights prosecutions and truth commissions have on a core set of human rights violations torture, summary execution, disappearances and political 11 The regime transition variable (Regtrans), which was derived from the yearly changing values of the Polity score, was used. We began with all 192 countries and excluded 32 countries with population less than 500,000. We went through three steps to determine our sample. First, the Regtrans is a 6-point scale regime change variable, which +3 means a major democratic transition, +2, a minor democratic transition, and so forth until -2, an adverse regime transition. States with +3 and +2 scores between 1974 and 2004 were examined and we found 68 countries with democratic transition. Second, state failure is coded as -77 and states were categorized to have experienced a transition from civil war if that country has exited from the state failure period by a regime change ( 0 or 1 ), interruption ( -66 ), or transition ( -88 ) and found 16 countries. Third, state creation was recorded as state creation ( 99 ) or state transformation ( 97 ) and we found 28 countries. We found 12 counties with multiple types of transition and all transitions in a chronological order were included. 14

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