"Hilmar Kaiser refers to an anti-Armenian “genocide” but to anti-Greek and anti-Nestorian/Syrian “demographic policies,” as if the mass killings of Greeks and Assyrians had been either unplanned or part of ordinary demographic planning. Hilmar Kaiser, “Genocide at the Twilight of the Ottoman Empire,” in The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies, ed. Donald Bloxham and A. Dirk Moses (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 365–384."

jeudi 2 juin 2016

Mikhail Remizov: "Armenia distances greatly from Russia in the field of the historical memory policy’’
May 30 - 8:30 pm By Vestnik KavkazaThe last weekend Armenia's senior management participated in an opening of the monument to Garegin Nzhdeh in Yerevan, one of the fascist executioners, whose separatist forces during World War II killed the Soviet citizens in Crimea, and who was convicted for 25 years in prison by the Soviet authorities. This is not the first step of Armenia in this direction. The Nzhdeh subway station and Nzhdeh Square already exist in the capital of Armenia. The president of the National Strategy Institute, Mikhail Remizov, told to Vestnik Kavkaza about the consequences of a glorification of the Nazi war criminal for the Russian-Armenian relations.

-How far can Russia today rely on Armenia as an ally, while the official Yerevan is creating the national heroes of the Nazi criminals?

- Armenia has several positions in the field of the historical memory policy, for which it is substantially distances itself from Russia, its official history and its vision of its own history. Yerevan has several cherished national grievances. One of them is related to the role of the young Soviet republic in the loss of a substantial part of the territory of Armenia. The whole tradition of the Armenian nationalism that emerged in the early 20th century during the period of the collapse of the Russian Empire is not too loyal and sympathetic to the Russian historical project.

But this does not mean that the big politics will move in a line with the historical squabbles, simply because Armenia has a very limited freedom of the geopolitical and geo-economic maneuver. Now after the military aggravation in Karabakh a level of irritation of Moscow's position is very high in the Armenian society. This irritation, in my opinion, is unjust and ill-founded, because Russia has made serious diplomatic efforts to ensure that the conflict is swelled, and that a military solution to the Karabakh conflict would not become the main and inevitable solution. A preservation of the status quo in any way is more profitable for the Armenian side than for Azerbaijan.

With regard to the sale of weapons to Azerbaijan, this question does not play any role from a practical point of view, because everything that is purchased in Russia, may be purchased in other countries. And no restrictions in respect of the arms sales to Azerbaijan will be established and accepted by the international community. A supply on this market exceeds a demand. Therefore, it is also an insult rather than a political sense to link the military strengthening of Azerbaijan with Moscow’s position.

So now, of course, there is a very negative background for the relations between the countries. And such decisions in the field of the historical memory policy, of course, heat this problem further.

- In your opinion, what would be Moscow’s reaction to this demarche of Yerevan?

- It seems to me that Moscow must have the most pragmatic approach to the alliance on the former Soviet Union’s space, must not have any illusions about the brotherhood of the former Soviet republics. In this sense, a logic of the national egoism in the historical memory policy is just instructive for us. We should not wait, we should not believe in the category of friendship in the politics. It is necessary to be the most pragmatic to that perimeter of the alliance that we have there.

- What are the reasons for such Yerevan’s act, given the fact that the Nzhdeh monument was opened by the President of Armenia, except for the internal national interests?

- I think that the Armenian leadership is under pressure on the part of the public opinion in connection with the policy towards Moscow. There was an entry to the Eurasian Economic Union. From the point of view of the opposition-minded public, Yerevan does not actively defend its interests towards Moscow. It is a symbolic compensation, focused on the domestic audience. But this does not mean that the move will not be noticed outside. There are enough alarm bells for Moscow that allow to draw conclusions about the nature of this strategic partnership.

The unremembered German-Ottoman Zionism
TAL BUENOS
Published May 16, 2016 Since
World War I, Zionism's very essence was shaped according to
Anglo-American designs, though this is not thoroughly recognized. The
original concept which was enabled by German-Ottoman cooperation was
distorted and is now no longer remembered

Most scholars
of Zionism say that not one, but multiple Zionisms, paved the way for
the movement toward the creation of the State of Israel. Since the late
19th century, there were different, and at times competing, forms of
cultural, labor and religious Zionism.

However, the
common study of political Zionism has not engaged in a purely
power-based approach to understand the sequence of relevant events
before and after World War I. There has been no meticulous effort to
explain how the powerless Jews became empowered, and by whom, to what
end.

Instead, in Israeli schools it is mainly taught
that self-propelled Zionist leaders found ways to persuade powerful
world leaders as they finagled a state. The efforts of Zionist lobbyists
are shown as independent, without recognition that the implications of
the Zionist agenda would go to serve the interests of the powers who
gave them voice.

According to this, the following
simple truth of power relations is unacknowledged: The path of political
Zionism was dictated by the great powers that dominated the region. In
other words, the attitude of political Zionists and the small nation
that they led was always molded by the interests of the great powers,
whose extension they were.

Zero attention has been
given to a great-power distinction between two Zionisms: German-Ottoman
Zionism, as opposed to Anglo-American Zionism. Since World War I,
Zionism's very essence has been shaped according to Anglo-American
designs, though this is not thoroughly recognized. The original concept ,
which was enabled by German-Ottoman cooperation, became distorted and
is now not remembered.

Despite popular claims about
American neutrality until April 6, 1917, World War I tells a story of a
tremendous power struggle between the U.S. and Germany that started
years before the war. While establishing dominance in their own
continent, Americans sought to continue the British tradition of
maintaining a balance of power in Europe. Germany presented the only formidable threat to American hegemony worldwide.

The advent of steam and steel allowed the Americans to build transcontinental railroads and unite the country. Germans
were set to do the same from Berlin to Baghdad. Modernity coincided
with the German rise in power to facilitate an unprecedented
connectedness between Europe, Asia and Africa. The Anglo-Saxon United
States of America was at risk of being overshadowed by a German-led
United States of Europe, Asia and Africa.

The
Germans were looking to oversee a federal government that would expand
their sphere of influence. Just as the Anglo-Saxons in America had their
western frontier, the Germans in Europe had their eastern frontier.
Unlike the brutal civilizing process that was imposed on the tribal
Native Americans known as "Indians," the civilizing process that was
envisioned by the Germans for the nomadic Arabs, through Ottoman
enabling, was to be gentler. In this civilizing project, the Jews had a
role to play under German direction. For instance, the modern city of
Beersheba was built by the Ottomans under German supervision in 1900, to
allow for a railway station to be operated and protected there, and to
gradually familiarize the Bedouins with city life.

In
this context, Theodor Herzl's Der Judenstaat (1896) is seen as the
articulation of a pragmatic ambition to join efforts with the Ottomans
and introduce a German-styled state. Even though the modern Zionist movement was first manifested by Russian Jews, who suffered from persecutions and
developed a yearning for a cultural and physical Hebrew existence,
Herzl's work reflects the first political harnessing of modern Zionism
by a great power. The idea of a Jewish nation was supposed to inspire
Jews to move, but once they arrived at their destination, they were not
expected to obsess over Jewish nationalism; rather Herzl expressed an
expectation that they would toil to create an optimal state as part of
the civilizing process. His state-centrism was unmistakable.

The
idea was to create a state, not to claim land. Tasked with cultivating
desert and swamp land, the Jews were primarily asked to construct –
houses, roads, bridges, and means of communication – rather than a
label. They were to come as Jews to be a positive European influence,
not to convert European power into Jewish ideology. In Herzl's vision,
the state's flag was not to borrow symbols from Jewish tradition such as
the Star of David, but show seven golden stars to mark the state's
regulation of a seven-hour workday.GERMAN-OTTOMAN ZIONISM

German-Ottoman
Zionism was dedicated to laying infrastructure for advanced
institutions of government. The state's mission was to maximize the use
of resources and modernize the surroundings. Herzl dismissed
"theocratic tendencies" and rejected Hebrew in favor of a language that
would prove "to be of greatest utility for general intercourse" toward
state efficiency. In his writings, anti-Semitism was the trigger that
would mobilize Jews in order to civilize areas – in the Middle East, but
South America was also a possibility – where other Europeans did not
wish to go, in conditions that did not appeal to other Europeans.

Herzl
did not shy away from identifying the Kaiser and the Sultan as the
ultimate sponsors, though their position as beneficiaries remained
under-pronounced. According to Herzl, this "model state" was to be
"an experiment for the good of humanity" and would enact "protection and
equality before the law" for all dwellers in a spirit of toleration. As
long as the territory was under Ottoman control, the Sultan appreciated
the prospects of an improved Ottoman economy, and the Kaiser had no
reservations about the involvement of Jews from rival powers. Herzl
clarified that the state would be neutral, and from a German perspective
it was advantageous to halt the flow of Jews westward to the U.S. by
opening up avenues for Jews to migrate eastward. In confirmation of his
Germanic outlook from Vienna, Herzl even passed criticism on the
American style of occupying land in their "newly opened territory," for
being violent.

Seeing that the healthy
modernization of Ottoman-ruled areas meant an increase in German power,
the Anglo-American imperial union was highly motivated to counter the
trend. Thus, the insidious effect of Christian nationalisms within the
Ottoman Empire is almost self-explanatory. Through control of
education and the press, American missionaries instilled national
identities in the Bulgarians who were to govern in European Turkey, and
in the Armenians who were to govern in Asiatic Turkey. British
politicians such as William Gladstone and James Bryce collaborated by
publicly raising narratives of intra-Ottoman turmoil, such as the
Bulgarian agitation and the Armenian question. In the Armenian case, a
once peaceful ethno-religious group named Haik changed drastically into a
group that functioned as a great-power pawn, and was called Armenian
because of the name's political appeal in Anglo-American culture. The
Anglo-American exploitation of Armenians to disrupt the German-Ottoman
plans for progress led to disastrous results in World War I.

ANGLO-AMERICAN ZIONISM

For
the Jews in Palestine, the Anglo-American triumph in World War I
indicated that Zionism would turn into something completely different
from Herzl's German-Ottoman initiative, whose unique qualities would be
forgotten. Prior to World War I, the initial reaction in the U.S. to the
German-Ottoman fostering of Zionism was to disseminate anti-Zionist
information through the American Jewish Committee. The war presented
opportunities for Anglo-American power to draw up the new fate and faces
of Zionism.

The Balfour Declaration officially started
the Anglo-American endeavor to nationalize the Jewish experience in
Palestine, and called attention to the leadership of Chaim Weizmann who
was credited for the supposed solicitation of the declaration. Weizmann,
who was based in Britain, had been known as Herzl's main opposition,
and later became Israel's first president.

Between
World War I and Israel's statehood, Zionist organizations such as the
Jewish Social Democratic Labor Party (Poale Zion) and the HeHalutz youth
movement in the U.S., and the British-empowered Labor branch in
Palestine and later the mandated Jewish Agency, along with promotions on
the pages of The New York Times, all placed David Ben-Gurion in a
position of leadership that made him appear as the natural prime
minister of the new state in 1948. Ben-Gurion, along with Yitzhak
Ben-Zvi who later became Israel's second president, arrived in Palestine
from the U.S. during World War I to lead the Jewish Legion to fight
against the Turks on behalf of the British.

THE JEWISH STATE VS. THE STATE OF JEWS

The
same American Zionist organizations that became instrumental in voicing
the new Zionist identity are the ones who published Herzl's work under
the significantly mistranslated title of The Jewish State. What Herzl –
in German – intended to be "The State of Jews" in the sense that it was
to be an exemplary state built by the Jews for all the people in the
land, was altered and covered-up by the English book-title, which
suggests an insistence on the state itself having a Jewish character and
destiny. This misrepresentation of Herzl's work signaled the
abandonment of his thinking, and the dawning of the divided and ruled
existence for Israelis and Palestinians, who are defined by their two
irreconcilable national identities. As Israel celebrates its 68th year
of independence amidst sorrow and uncertainty, even so-called "New
Historians," such as Benny Morris, use a language that further
entrenches the notion of helpless Israeli-Palestinian division when
ruling out options for conflict resolution. A fresh take would look past
the dominant bi-national terminology and remember Herzl's focus on the
commitment to the quality of the state as an apparatus for better
living.

Herzl's name and image have been
incorporated into the general Zionist narrative in Israel, but his
precise philosophy has been mostly decontextualized and reduced to the
slogan "if you will it, it is no dream." Hope lies in recalling what
"it" he had in mind.