MR. RUBIN: Greetings. Welcome to the State Department briefing
on this Friday. Let me start by announcing that at the direction
of President Clinton, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Thomas Pickering plans to lead a senior-level delegation to Nigeria
within the next two weeks. The purpose of the visit is to share
our concerns about the transition program that's not happening
there, and to discuss steps we think could lead to democratic
civilian government in Nigeria.

The trip underscores the importance we attach to our relationship
with Nigeria and to democracy and reform in Africa. Accompanying
Under Secretary Pickering will be Assistant Secretary Susan Rice,
NSC Senior Director for African Affairs Joe Wilson and Deputy
Commander-in-Chief, European Command, General James Jamerson.

If there are any questions on that or any other subjects, let
me turn the questioning over to George Gedda from The Associated
Press.

QUESTION: I wanted to turn to Pakistan. Do you have any
evaluation of the international response - the NATO allies, with
one or two exceptions, don't seem too enthusiastic about the idea
of sanctions. How do you see it?

MR. RUBIN: First of all, sanctions are not an end in themselves;
sanctions are a tool. Obviously in this case, the sanctions did
not deter the Indians or the Pakistanis from engaging in testing.
So the task of the international community is not sanctions for
sanctions' sake.

Let me say, on the other hand, I think the international community's
response has been very much in line with the President's response
and the Secretary's response; in particular, the North Atlantic
Council, the Permanent Joint Council, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership
Council - that means over 44 nations at meetings yesterday in
Luxembourg -- all made clear their opposition to this test. So
the international community is very united on its views.

What Secretary Albright has been doing in the last two days is
trying to develop a more coordinated international response along
the following lines: She had a series of small meetings with Foreign
Minister Primakov, with Foreign Minister Cook, with Foreign Minister
Vedrine, and she has been on the phone twice with the Chinese
Foreign Minister, as a result of which the statement just passed
the Security Council strongly deploring the Pakistani test. They
also have been discussing, and she hopes to make it possible for
the Permanent Five members of the Security Council to meet in
the coming week at the ministerial level to address this problem.

Clearly the situation in South Asia - the security situation has
deteriorated, and so Secretary Albright has launched a process,
beginning with a ministerial-level meeting that we hope to arrange
as early as next week for discussions on the key issues that make
the risk of conflict greater now in South Asia - that is, conflict
both by miscalculation or intentional. So the purposes of this
meeting and any subsequent meetings - and we would expect there
to be a larger group that would begin to discuss this after that
initial session - the purposes of this initial session would be
to develop a coordinated, common approach to this grave situation.
In particular, to see that there are no more nuclear tests or
escalations in the region; to reaffirm the world's commitment
to the maintenance of the global non-proliferation regime; to
find ways to engage India and Pakistan in a process that will
lead to their signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban; support for
the fissile material cut-off; ensuring that they don't take further
escalatory steps in the ballistic missile area; and finally, to
find ways to de-escalate the underlying tensions, including promoting
dialogue between India and Pakistan both on the current security
situation and on the underlying conflict in Kashmir so that the
underlying dispute that has made it so worrying and so troublesome
that they have both tested nuclear weapons and have gone to war
with each other several times in recent decades can be addressed.

This is the beginning of a long and complicated process. It's
evident, I think, as a result of the meetings that Secretary Albright
has had and the decisions that Pakistan has made that the outside
world's ability to have decisive influence in the area of nuclear
testing was very limited, and that the key driving factors were
the regional dynamic that was created by India's test and many
of the events that preceded that, as well as the enormous political
pressure that Prime Minister Sharif was under.

So despite the limited leverage the outside world has, the concerns
are so deep and the danger is sufficient so that we hope to arrange
this initial meeting next week.

QUESTION: Where will it be and who will be invited?

MR. RUBIN: The meeting would be the permanent members of
the Security Council at the ministerial level. We have not settled
on a venue yet, but this is -- in real-time, it would be the five
foreign ministers from the permanent members of the Security Council.

QUESTION: Have they agreed to come?

MR. RUBIN: As I said, we're hoping to arrange it. We've
received, in a series of discussions, general support for this
idea. Now we're nailing down the venue and timing and agenda.
But the agenda that we would be looking toward would be the kind
of objectives that I just set forth.

QUESTION: China has been criticized in the past for aiding
Pakistan's nuclear program. Without getting into great detail
about that, how do you assess the role of China in the future
in curbing a potential arms race on the sub-continent?

MR. RUBIN: Well, I think the fact the Chinese Foreign Minister
agreed to attend this meeting is a signal that they want to be
as supportive as they can to ensure that the troubling events
in recent weeks in South Asia do not spin out of control. They
were very much in sync with the United States in terms of trying
to convince Pakistan not to test; in terms of their very strong
response to India's initial test, in terms of their decision,
despite their obvious close relationship with Pakistan, to allow
this statement to go through just a few hours ago in New York,
as a result of this conversation Secretary Albright had with the
Chinese Foreign Minister.

That is not to say there are not serious concerns that we've had
in the past about China's cooperation with Pakistan. But I think
we all have to bear in mind the evolution that has occurred in
China's policies, including a commitment that we believe they
are honoring not to assist unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, especially
those in Pakistan and other countries of concern.

So there's no question there were problems in the past. I think
we've spoken to those very clearly. But one can either live in
the past, or one can focus on what's happened in recent years
in terms of their non-proliferation policy and what is evidently
a desire on their part to work with the United States and the
other leading countries. Let me say in that regard that President
Yeltsin and President Clinton had a very important discussion
about the need for cooperation along the lines of this kind of
permanent member meeting in South Asia to deter the sides from
taking further dangerous steps, and to try to see what the major
powers can do collectively through their various diplomatic means
and the different leverage they have on the different parties
to prevent this situation from spinning out of control.

QUESTION: Jamie, Mike McCurry has talked about a strongly-worded
diplomatic cable having been sent to both Islamabad and to New
Delhi. Can you, without obviously going into the exact wording,
characterize some of the concerns expressed in such a cable? And
can you bring us up to date on whether or not Ambassador Simons
is going to be recalled or not and Ambassador Celeste?

MR. RUBIN: Tentatively, it's my understanding the Secretary
has decided not to recall Ambassador Simons, and Ambassador Celeste
will be sent back to the region, to India, very shortly. We obviously
have a lot of discussions that have to take place now in this
situation. We think it's appropriate to have ambassadors in country
to try to work with the governments involved so that the decisions
they take in the coming days and weeks will turn around the troublesome,
dangerous trend that we've seen in recent weeks.

With regard to our specific concerns, again, it would be difficult
to say too much in public; other than to say we are concerned
about the danger of additional action that would escalate the
situation. A very strongly worded message was sent to Pakistan
last night, urging them not to take any additional action that
could further unravel the peace and stability that is currently
in existence there. We are trying to turn around the trend, and
it is a very difficult thing to do from outside when you have
such an emotional national issue as the underlying dispute over
Kashmir, and you have the cycle of action in tests of missiles
and tests of nuclear weapons and counter-tests that are occurring,
and the outside world's views are not as important as the feelings
that exist in those countries.

Nevertheless, we're going to continue to stay in contact with
them, and we hope that as a result of the kind of meeting we're
trying to arrange, that the various permanent members of the Council
can bring to bear some leverage and turn this process around before
it's too late.

QUESTION: A follow up - you mentioned a strongly worded
cable to Pakistan - was one not sent to New Delhi?

MR. RUBIN: It's my understanding there was one to both.

QUESTION: At this meeting of the Permanent Five, can you
give us any insight into what possible items might be on the agenda
- the way in which, at least the United States is thinking - is
there any thought given to a mediation effort between Pakistan
and India?

MR. RUBIN: We've had a longstanding position that we would
be prepared to be helpful if the parties saw that as wise and
wanted us to do that, and that is our view.

I think the important point is that it's a meeting that hasn't
yet taken place. It's a meeting that is in the process of being
arranged, and although I do like to be able to give you real-time
information as much as I can, I'd hope you wouldn't expect us
to be in a position a week in advance of a meeting to tell you
exactly what we're going to do at that meeting before we've even
had it and discussed it with the countries.

Nevertheless, the basic goal is, as I've said, to try to see how
we can encourage the parties to take steps to reduce the possibility
of escalation; to reduce the possibility of conflict in Kashmir;
and to deal with the underlying dispute in Kashmir; and to promote
a bilateral dialogue between them. Hopefully, with the major powers
in the world having taken on this issue in this way, we will be
in a position to urge them successfully to do more to see that
their underlying dispute does not cause the kind of horrifying
conflict that is now imaginable.

QUESTION: Jamie, yesterday Deputy Secretary Talbott said
there were a series of meetings to figure out what exactly to
do. Apart from the proposed P-5 meeting and the decision on the
ambassadors and the strong telegram, is any other concrete action
--

MR. RUBIN: Yes, there are concrete actions that we are
considering.

QUESTION: What are they?

MR. RUBIN: Those are concrete actions that, when we're
prepared to discuss publicly, we will. I just told you three things
that were happening. I know your appetite is large, but I'm doing
the best I can, Jim.

QUESTION: For example, let me ask a specific thing that
has been proposed by some experts around town. Has the United
States followed through to set up a hotline between India and
Pakistan, for example?

MR. RUBIN: We're well aware of the value of better communication
to avoid the risk of unintended conflict. But at this point, we're
a day into this process, and we are pursuing what we think are
the best initial steps and talking publicly about what we think
are the best initial steps. They are to get the permanent members
of the Security Council together to try to bring to bear their
leverage for the agenda that I laid out.

Obviously, the concern about unintended escalation, as the countries
increase their military capabilities, is one of the problems.
If we have anything further to say on tools to do that, we will
do so.

QUESTION: Beyond the cable you mentioned, are there any
other direct discussions between the US Government and either
India or Pakistan going on now or planned for the weekend to discuss
in any way the terms of a stand-down from the current situation
-- any other contacts?

MR. RUBIN: I'm not aware of any particular steps that are
being considered at this point, other than returning Ambassador
Celeste, which I think is an important step, and making clear
through our embassy our views. The President had, as you know,
five separate phone calls with Prime Minister Sharif over the
recent weeks. If there are additional telephone contacts that
we have and choose to report, I'll be happy to do that for you.

We are aware that a delegation from Pakistan is expected here
today. We expect them to have meetings in the coming weeks with
senior American officials as well as members of Congress. That
delegation, however, is led by the chairman of their foreign relations
committee, but it would be a channel for some discussion. Any
additional communication that we have, we will report as appropriate.

QUESTION: Are they coming here today or New York today?

MR. RUBIN: I believe they're arriving in the United States
today. I don't think there are any meetings scheduled here in
the Department today. I think the meetings would begin next week.

QUESTION: You said, just in answer to Jim's question a
few minutes ago, that we're a day into this process. But India
tested over two-and-a-half weeks ago. Was any thought given to
convening the Permanent Five after the Indian test, to possibly
head off Pakistan?

MR. RUBIN: You mean you're asking me, did we consider an
idea that we didn't implement?

QUESTION: Yes.

MR. RUBIN: We consider a lot of ideas.

QUESTION: No, I'm asking, why did you wait - (inaudible)
--

MR. RUBIN: Right. The implication in your question is that
the outside world was capable of stopping Pakistan from testing;
and I think we've spoken to this quite clearly. We believe that
the immense political pressure that the Prime Minister of Pakistan
was under and the regional dynamic that was created by India's
test and events that preceded that made it excruciatingly difficult
for the Pakistani Prime Minister to do anything but what he did.

The President of the United States spoke to him five times in
a series of lengthy phone calls; and we believe that we did what
we can. And we hope that as the American people and those who
comment on American foreign policy examine this issue, they bear
in mind the fact that the United States is not in a position to
control every event that occurs in the world. There will be bad
things that happen in this world that we have not been able to
stop, regardless of what we do. We have considered a lot of steps.
As you know, Deputy Secretary Talbott went to see the Pakistanis.
A number of ideas were put forward between the United States and
Pakistan through the President's phone calls with the Prime Minister.
But at the end of the day, it was the political pressures and
the regional dynamic that were too overwhelming.

Now, that event having occurred, it seems appropriate for us to
try a different way to bring to bear pressure on both parties,
not just on one -- which is obviously what the time now is ripe
for. That is why we've decided to pursue this particular meeting
as a first step in the process.

QUESTION: Kosovo?

MR. RUBIN: Everyone finished with India-Pakistan?

QUESTION: No. The Japanese Government is afraid - they
believe that the North Koreans have supplied Pakistan with up
to 12 of the Rodong II missiles. And they are afraid that this,
perhaps, is going to lead to Pakistan sharing some nuclear technology
or weapons technology with the North Koreans. What is the United
States' concern on that?

MR. RUBIN: Like Japan, we are concerned about the possibility
that nuclear technology could be shared with any country in the
world. We have sanctioned companies with regard to sales between
North Korea and Pakistan; we're well aware of that. But we are
not aware of any plan on the part of Pakistan to share their nuclear
technology with North Korea.

Moreover, North Korea is under a very elaborate agreement, pursuant
to the 1994 Nuclear Framework Agreement, that froze their nuclear
weapons program and that we believe is being honored by North
Korea. Is there always an inherent risk that nuclear weapons capabilities
can be sold? Absolutely; that's one of the reasons we thought
it was so important to stop North Korea's program. It's one of
the reasons we're trying to prevent Pakistan's and India's program
from growing. It's one of the reasons we've spent enormous sums
of money and political and diplomatic leverage on trying to prevent
material that may have existed in the former Soviet Union to become
available for sale. But do we have any specific information about
a specific sale? No.