This refers to an inspection conducted on July 29 through August 27,
1996, at the River Bend Station (RBS) reactor facility. This special inspection
included a review of the failure to perform or to properly complete surveillance
testing on several safety-related components. The results of the inspection
were discussed with your staff on September 6, 1996, and the subject inspection
report was issued on September 10, 1996. The cover letter to the inspection
report noted that the apparent violations identified in the report were
being considered for escalated enforcement but that it was not necessary
to conduct a predecisional enforcement conference in order for the NRC
to make an enforcement decision. As such, we gave you the opportunity
to either request a predecisional enforcement conference or respond to
the apparent violations in writing. You did not request a conference but,
instead, responded to the apparent violations by letter dated October
10, 1996.

Based on the information developed during the inspection and the information
that you provided in your October 10 response, the NRC has determined
that violations of NRC requirements occurred. These violations are cited
in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice) and the circumstances surrounding
them are described in detail in the subject inspection report. The violations
involve the failure to perform surveillance testing in accordance with
the requirements specified in the Technical Specifications. The six violations
involve the failure to perform or adequately perform surveillance testing
on the following equipment: (1) the Division I battery, (2) the Division
III battery, (3) the drywell airlock, (4) the drywell combination equipment
hatch/personnel door, (5) the prefilters for the standby gas treatment,
control room fresh air, and fuel building ventilation systems, and (6)
a primary containment penetration isolation valve.

As noted in your October 10 letter, prior to the identification of these
violations, RBS identified surveillance program weaknesses, and a corrective
action plan and improvement initiatives were underway. In July 1996, after
issues were identified related to the Division I station service battery
performance discharge data, RBS initiated a Significant Event Response
Team (SERT) and developed corrective actions based on the SERT's findings.
When your staff reviewed other surveillance activities for similar problems,
RBS found the remainder of the surveillance discrepancies.

Your October 10 letter stated that you believe there is adequate justification
for imposition of one Severity Level IV violation based on several factors
regarding the circumstances of the violations (e.g., self-identified,
comprehensive corrective actions, lack of actual safety significance,
and others). While we generally agree with the circumstances as you characterized,
they do not provide a basis for NRC to conclude that the circumstances
amounted to Severity Level IV violations. The NRC's concern is that these
issues collectively represent a breakdown in your surveillance testing
program and, as such, represent a significant regulatory concern. Therefore,
these violations are classified in the aggregate in accordance with the
"General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions"
(Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600, as a Severity Level III problem.

In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the
amount of $50,000 is considered for a Severity Level III problem. Because
your facility has not been the subject of escalated enforcement actions
within the last 2 years, the NRC considered whether credit was warranted
for Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment
process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Based on the various
corrective actions taken by RBS staff, the NRC determined that corrective
action credit is warranted. RBS took prompt corrective actions for each
of the violations, including procedure revisions, discussions with personnel
regarding personal accountability, enhanced training, and an additional
staff engineer to provide oversight of the surveillance testing program.
In addition, corrective action credit was warranted because of the comprehensive
nature of the corrective actions addressing the programmatic issues. Specific
corrective actions to address the program concerns included followup by
Quality Assurance, additional training on technical specification bases,
departmental "all-hands" meetings, comparison of the RBS program
with other sites, surveillance program self-assessment, evaluations of
procedure verification and validation, and focusing additional management
observations on the performance of surveillance tests.

Therefore, to encourage prompt identification and comprehensive correction
of violations, and in recognition of the absence of previous escalated
enforcement action, I have been authorized not to propose a civil penalty
in this case. However, significant violations in the future could result
in a civil penalty.

The NRC has also concluded that information regarding the reasons for
the violations, the corrective actions taken and planned to correct the
violations and prevent recurrence, and the date when full compliance will
be achieved is already adequately addressed on the docket in the subject
NRC inspection report, LER 96-014-00 dated August 9, 1996, and your October
10 response. Therefore, you are not required to respond to this letter
unless the description therein does not accurately reflect your corrective
actions or your position. In that case, or if you choose to provide additional
information, you should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed
Notice.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice,"
a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your October 10 response will
be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

During an NRC inspection conducted on July 29 through August 27, 1996,
violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the
"General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions,"
NUREG-1600, the violations are listed below:

Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.0.1 states, in part,
that Surveillance Requirements shall be met during the MODES or other
specified conditions in the Applicability for individual Limiting Conditions
for Operation, unless otherwise stated in the Surveillance Requirement.

A. Surveillance Requirement 3.8.4.8 requires the licensee to
verify that battery capacity is ³ 80% of the manufacturer's rating
when subjected to a performance discharge test. The FREQUENCY of this
test is 60 months AND 18 months, when the battery shows degradation or
has reached 85% of expected life.

Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to perform Surveillance
Requirement 3.8.4.8 within the 18-month required frequency, the appropriate
frequency since the battery had shown degradation. (01013)

B. Surveillance Requirement 3.8.4.7 requires the licensee to verify
that battery capacity is adequate to supply, and maintain in OPERABLE
status, the required emergency loads for the design duty cycle when
subjected to a battery service test. The FREQUENCY of this test is 18
months.

Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to perform Surveillance
Requirement 3.8.4.7 within the 18-month required frequency. (01023)

C. Surveillance Requirement 3.6.5.2.5 requires the licensee to verify,
from an initial pressure of 75 psig, that the drywell air lock seal
pneumatic system pressure does not decay at a rate equivalent to >
0.67 psig for a period of 24 hours. The FREQUENCY of this test is 18
months.

Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to perform Surveillance
Requirement 3.6.5.2.5 because a satisfactory test of the drywell air
lock seal system was not performed within the required 18-month frequency.
(01033)

D. Surveillance Requirement 3.6.5.1.2 requires the licensee to verify,
from an initial pressure of 75 psig, that the personnel door inflatable
seal pneumatic system pressure does not decay at a rate equivalent to
³ 0.67 psig for a period of 24 hours. The FREQUENCY of this test
is 18 months.

Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to perform Surveillance
Requirement 3.6.5.1.2 because a satisfactory test of the personnel door
inflatable seal pneumatic system was not performed within the required
18-month frequency. (01043)

The Ventilation Filter Testing Program, Section 5.5.7.d of the Technical
Specification requires the licensee to demonstrate for each of the ESF
[engineered safeguards features] systems that the pressure drop across
the prefilters is less than the value specified below.

Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to perform Surveillance
Requirements 3.7.2.2, 3.6.4.3.2, and 3.6.4.6.2 because testing of the
system prefilters was not performed. (01053)

F. Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.1.1 requires the licensee to perform
required leakage rate testing in accordance with the Primary Containment
Leakage Rate Testing Program. The FREQUENCY of this test is in accordance
with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

The Primary Containment Leakage Rate Program, as provided in Procedure
ADM-0050, Revision 4, states, in part, that if the leakage for Valve
1SWP-MOV503A is less than 1200 scfm for two consecutive tests, then
the valve can be tested every 5 years vice every 2 years.

Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to perform Surveillance
Requirement 3.6.1.1.1 because the as-found leakage for Valve 1SWP-MOV503A
was not measured during the last test performance and the licensee incorrectly
assumed that the valve had passed the leakage criteria, and as a result,
the test at the 2 year interval was not performed. (01063)

The NRC has concluded that information regarding the reasons for the
violations, the corrective actions taken and planned to correct the violations
and prevent recurrence and the date when full compliance will be achieved
is already adequately addressed on the docket in NRC Inspection Report
50-458/96-26, LER 96-014-00 dated August 9, 1996, and Entergy's October
10, 1996, "Response to Apparent Violations." However, Entergy
Operations, Inc. (Licensee), is required to submit a written statement
or explanation pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201 if the description therein does
not accurately reflect its corrective actions or its position. In that
case, or if the Licensee chooses to respond, clearly mark the response
as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation," and send it to the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington,
D.C. 20555 with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region IV, 611 Ryan
Plaza Drive, Suite 400, Arlington, Texas 76011, and a copy to the NRC
Resident Inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice,
within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation
(Notice).