Building Better Beings

A Theory of Moral Responsibility

Manuel Vargas

An original and revisionist account of moral responsibility, by a leading expert in the field

Defends our ordinary, common-sense convictions about free will and agency

Draws on recent debates in social psychology, and illuminates the relationship between moral philosophy and legal practice

Building Better Beings

A Theory of Moral Responsibility

Manuel Vargas

Description

Building Better Beings presents a new theory of moral responsibility. Beginning with a discussion of ordinary convictions about responsibility and free will and their implications for a philosophical theory, Manuel Vargas argues that no theory can do justice to all the things we want from a theory of free will and moral responsibility. He goes on to show how we can nevertheless justify our responsibility practices and provide a normatively and naturalistically adequate account of responsible agency, blame, and desert. Three ideas are central to Vargas' account: the agency cultivation model, circumstantialism about powers, and revisionism about responsibility and free will. On Vargas' account, responsibility norms and practices are justified by their effects. In particular, the agency cultivation model holds that responsibility practices help mold us into creatures that respond to moral considerations. Moreover, the abilities that matter for responsibility and free will are not metaphysically prior features of agents in isolation from social contexts. Instead, they are functions of both agents and their normatively structured contexts. This is the idea of circumstantialism about the powers required for responsibility. Third, Vargas argues that an adequate theory of responsibility will be revisionist, or at odds with important strands of ordinary convictions about free will and moral responsibility. Building Better Beings provides a compelling and state-of-the-art defense of moral responsibility in the face of growing philosophical and scientific skepticism about free will and moral responsibility.

Building Better Beings

A Theory of Moral Responsibility

Manuel Vargas

Table of Contents

PART I. Building Blocks 1: Folk Convictions 2: Doubts About Libertarianism 3: Nihilism and Revisionism 4: Building a Better TheoryPART II. A Theory of Moral Responsibility 5: The Primacy of Reasons 6: Justifying the Practice 7: Responsible Agency 8: Blame and Desert 9: History and Manipulation 10: Some ConclusionsAppendix: Activity and Origination

Building Better Beings

A Theory of Moral Responsibility

Manuel Vargas

Author Information

Manuel Vargas, University of San Francisco

Manuel Vargas is Professor of Philosophy and Law at the University of San Francisco. His principal areas of research include moral psychology, philosophy of action, philosophy of law and Latin American philosophy. He received his joint-PhD in Philosophy and Humanities from Stanford University. He is the co-author of Four Views on Free Will (Blackwell, 2007) with John Fischer, Robert Kane, and Derk Pereboom, and co-editor of Rational and Social Agency: On Themes in the Philosophy of Michael Bratman (OUP, forthcoming) with Gideon Yaffe.

Building Better Beings

A Theory of Moral Responsibility

Manuel Vargas

Reviews and Awards

Winner of the 2015 APA Book Prize

"[W]ill appeal to both thos with interest in moral responsibility literature and to others with broader interests in moral concepts and conceptual revision ... Interested philosophers should pick up the book" - Zac Cogley, Social Theory and Practice

"extraordinarily rich . . . Vargas has achieved something that is quite rare: he has given us an entirely new way to approach an ancient and, yes, seemingly intractable problem." - Tamler Sommers, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

"Vargas sets out and defends a subtle and powerful view, according to which holding one another morally responsible is justified by the effects of our practices on cultivating moral agency." - Neil Levy, Philosophical Quarterly