Considered and decided
by Kalitowski, Presiding Judge, Parker, Judge,*
and Foley, Judge.*

U
N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

KALITOWSKI, Judge

Appellant Gerald Allen Tait challenges the district
court’s award of attorney fees to respondent Judith Ann Tait, arguing that
respondent failed to comply with documentation requirements of Minn. R. Gen.
Pract. 119.02, and that the record does not support an award of attorney fees
under Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1 (2000). Appellant also contends that the court’s entry of a judgment for
maintenance arrears is so excessive that it is oppressive. We affirm.

D E C I S I O N

I.

An
award of attorney fees “rests almost entirely within the discretion of the
trial court and will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion.” Crosby v. Crosby, 587 N.W.2d 292, 298
(Minn. App. 1998) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Feb. 18,
1999); see also Katz v. Katz, 408 N.W.2d 835, 840 (Minn. 1987) (stating
award of attorney fees is within discretion of district court).

Appellant
contends that the district court abused its discretion by awarding respondent
attorney fees incurred in bringing her motion to find appellant in
contempt. We disagree.

The district court found that
respondent was entitled to attorney fees under Minn. Stat. § 588.02 (2000)
stating that appellant “shall pay to [respondent] the sum of $1,000.00 as and
for attorney’s fees for the prosecution of the present contempt.”

But Minn. Stat. § 588.02 states:

Every
court and judicial officer may punish a contempt by fine or imprisonment, or
both. In addition, when the contempt
involves the willful disobedience of an order of the court requiring the
payment of money for the support or maintenance of a minor child, the
court may require the payment of the costs and a reasonable attorney’s fee,
incurred in the prosecution of the contempt, to be paid by the guilty party.

(Emphasis
added.) Thus, this statute does not
allow the district court to award attorney fees when the contempt involves the
willful disobedience of a court order for spousal maintenance, as is the case
here.

Although the district court erred by
ordering appellant to pay respondent’s attorney fees under Minn. Stat. §
588.02, the record still supports the award of attorney fees in this
matter. Respondent asked the district
court for attorney fees “as may be just and equitable.” A district court shall award attorney fees,
costs, and disbursements if it finds

(1) that the fees are necessary for the good-faith assertion of
the party’s rights in the proceeding and will not contribute unnecessarily to
the length and expense of the proceeding;

(2) that the party from whom fees, costs, and disbursements are
sought has the means to pay them; and

(3) that the party to whom fees, costs, and disbursements are
awarded does not have the means to pay them.

Minn.
Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1 (2000).
Although the district court did not make specific findings under this
statute,

a lack of specific findings on
the statutory factors for a need-based fee award under Minn. Stat. § 518.14,
subd. 1, is not fatal to an award where review of the order reasonably implies
that the district court considered the relevant factors and where the district
court was familiar with the history of the case and had access to the parties’
financial records.

Here,
the district court’s findings regarding the previous litigation and appellant’s
ability to meet his maintenance arrearages demonstrates the court’s familiarity
with the history of the case. Moreover,
the fact that the district court found appellant in contempt, indicates that
respondent asserted her rights in good faith.
And the fact that the court found appellant had the ability to meet his
maintenance arrearages indicates that appellant has the means to pay for
respondent’s attorney fees. Finally,
there is evidence in the record, including respondent’s need for spousal
maintenance, that establishes her need for assistance in asserting her
rights. Thus, we cannot say the
district court abused its discretion by awarding respondent attorney fees in
this matter.

Appellant contends that even if a
fee award is justified, respondent failed to file the proper records to
demonstrate the amount of the award. We
disagree. Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 119.02
states:

The motion [for fees] shall be
accompanied by an affidavit of any attorney of record which establishes the
following:

1. A
description of each item of work performed, the date upon which it was
performed, the amount of time spent on each item of work, the identity of the
lawyer or legal assistant performing the work, and the hourly rate sought for
the work performed;

2. The
normal hourly rate for each person for whom compensation is sought * * *

4. That
the affiant has reviewed the work in progress or original time records, the
work was actually performed for the benefit of the client and was necessary for
the proper representation of the client, and that charges for any unnecessary
or duplicative work has been eliminated from the application or motion.

In Gully v. Gully the supreme
court recognized that rule 119

is
not intended to limit the court’s discretion, but is intended to encourage
streamlined handling of fee applications and to facilitate filing of
appropriate support to permit consideration of this issue.

Gully v. Gully, 599 N.W.2d
814, 826 (Minn. 1999) (quotation omitted).
Further, the Gully court held that it was not an abuse of discretion for
the district court to waive the rule 119 requirements where the district court
is familiar with the case and has access to the parties’ financial
records. Id.

In this case, respondent submitted a
motion that stated:

I have incurred eight hours of
attorney time in the preparation of this motion and anticipate another four
hours through the hearing of this motion on May 14, 2001.

I have been in the general practice
of law for the last fifteen years and have a standard hourly billing rate fee
for these matters of $175.00 per hour.
I would anticipate fees associated with this motion of no less than
$2,100.00.

Because of the
district court’s familiarity with the case, the attorney’s efforts, and the
financial situation of the parties, we conclude the district court did not
abuse its discretion by awarding respondent attorney fees.

Appellant contends that the district court’s
award for maintenance arrears was based on “figures so irrational and
oppressive that it must be reversed and refigured[.]” We disagree. Appellant
cites no authority to support this argument.
Instead, appellant simply points out that he has little money and that
his maintenance payments leave him with only $107.41 each month to live on. But appellant never appealed the spousal
maintenance awards that led to his arrearages.
And because appellant rests on mere assertion and presents no evidence
or argument supporting his position, we need not address it. See Schoepke v. Alexander Smith &
Sons Carpet Co., 290 Minn. 518, 519-20, 187 N.W.2d 133, 135 (1971) (stating
“[a]n assignment of error based on mere assertion and not supported by
any argument or authorities in appellant’s brief is waived and will not be
considered on appeal unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection”
(citations omitted)).