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Friday, 6 November 2015

Time to Return to Riga Realism

Riga, Latvia. 6 November. It is
time to get back to Riga realism. The flight from Texas to Riga via Atlanta and
Amsterdam is not just long and laden with jet lag, it is also a journey from superpower
to little power, from absolute security to insecurity. Here, close to Russia’s
border, one can smell the hard political realism that close proximity to paranoid
power engenders. There is little room for wishful thinking here in Riga.

Tomorrow I will speak at the
outstanding Riga Conference organised by the Latvian Transatlantic Treaty
Organisation. The subject I have been asked to address is fighting New Generation Warfare. My core point
will be more succinct; whatever tag one puts on aggression it is meaningless if
understanding of said aggression is not matched by active defence against it. Too
often in Europe we confuse understanding with engagement, confuse talking with
action. That is why we repeatedly put new labels on old wine and call them ‘action
plans’, or hold endless summits and declare a problem solved, because it was agreed
by summit. Worse, ‘understanding’ has
become a kind of alibi for inaction; a leitmotif for the wishful thinking that
makes Europeans punch far beneath their weight on the world stage and will
likely continue to do so.

Riga realism is different to
ordinary political realism. It is realism forged in the furnace of white hot
history. Here threat is not mere distant distractions from a busy day. Rather it
hangs in the air like an autumn mist, thin enough to permit activity but never
quite lifting because it is so close. Ironically, one can see reality more
clearly through this mist than anywhere else in denial Europe.

Riga realism must also be reinjected
into all the crises that Europe faces. The migrant crisis, the euro crisis, and
above all the Russia crisis (the crisis in Ukraine is a crisis for Ukrainians.
but it is first and foremost a Russia crisis) all exhibit the same old weakness;
a hope for the better that by inaction only makes matters worse.

The migrant crisis has revealed
ruthlessly the inability of Europe’s liberal leaders to deal with a crisis that
is both humanitarian and by sheer scale threatens to destabilise European
societies. Paralysed by inaction European leaders do what they do so often in
Europe. They simply try to mask the extent from Europe’s people of the influx
and the damage such inflows are already doing to societal cohesion in Europe…and
hope for the best.

The euro crisis was also caused
by hope-for-the-best, wishful thinking politics. Always a political project the
euro was grounded in idealism rather than realism. The cost to the European
taxpayer of this political folly and the self-incubating crisis the euro begat
now runs into many billions.

However, it is the Russia crisis
that has revealed the extent of Europe’s retreat from hard, political realism. Russia
first sought to be a co-hegemon in the post-Cold War world, ruling the planet
together with the United States. When
that failed Russia sought “zones of privileged interest” in states around its borders.
When such ‘rights’ were denied by states that simply sought the right to make
free sovereign choices the Putin regime turned nasty.

One can argue at length as to who
is responsible for the break-up of the NATO-Russia ‘strategic partnership’, and
the West must perhaps bear a part of the blame for Russia’s estrangement. However,
we are where we are and whilst I believe it remains vital we continue talking
to Russia, Russia must want to talk to us. The bottom strategic line is this;
until Russia is ready and willing to enter into a real dialogue then we in the
West must return to Riga realism – and negotiate from strength.

The Russia crisis is being
exacerbated by European leaders who after all that has happened (and is
happening) simply refuse to face hard facts. Indeed, the culture of worst case
planning has not only been abandoned by EU and NATO leaders but actively discouraged
for fear it could appear provocative. Who
is the aggressor here? These people hope against hope that negotiating with
Russia from a position of weakness will somehow demonstrate good faith to a
Moscow regime steeped in political cynicism is doomed to fail. It is not Russia-bashing to plan to prevent this
Russia from bashing others. It is called forward deterrence.

Riga realism would also see a
return to the principles of sound statecraft. Riga realism would see NATO
nations increase their defence spending to 2% GDP immediately, rather than the
ludicrous “within a decade” agreed at the 2014 NATO Wales Summit. Above all,
Riga Realism would see an enormous ‘stop sign’ erected by NATO forces at Russia’s
border with the Baltic States, as one conference speaker suggested. Equally, Riga
realism would also seek to keep dialogue open with the Russians, but dialogue
from strength. Critically, Riga realism would see NATO nations re-establish the
culture of worst-case collective planning on the anvil of which the Alliance
was forged back in 1949, and which has been abandoned in favour of wishful
thinking politics.

It is time for Europeans to return to Riga
realism before wishful thinking turns today’s drama into tomorrow’s tragedy.

About Me

Julian Lindley-French is Senior Fellow of the Institute of Statecraft, Director of Europa Analytica & Distinguished Visiting Research Fellow, National Defense University, Washington DC. An internationally-recognised strategic analyst, advisor and author he was formerly Eisenhower Professor of Defence Strategy at the Netherlands Defence Academy,and Special Professor of Strategic Studies at the University of Leiden. He is a Fellow of Respublica in London, and a member of the Strategic Advisory Group of the Atlantic Council of the United States in Washington.
Latest books: The Oxford Handbook on War 2014 (Paperback) (2014; 709 pages). (Oxford: Oxford University Press) & "Little Britain? Twenty-First Strategy for a Middling European Power". (www.amazon.com)
The Friendly-Clinch Health Warning: The views contained herein are entirely my own and do not necessarily reflect those of any institution.