> Claiming that anyone can use RF and spoof a message is a poor excuse to
> not be diligent about securing APRS-IS from abuse.
Be diligent, be ultra diligent. But don't think you have secured the
APRS-IS from abuse. What you seem to be arguing is what is currently in
place is not "good enough". The community obviously thinks it is, as do
current governments.
> Head-in-the-sand approaches always backfire in the end, the Internet is
> full of bored teenagers and dranged adults just waiting to annoy someone.
>
It's not head-in-the-sand. It's called reasonable security. The two
characters you bring up, the bored teenager and the deranged adult are
_exactly_ the people you will _not_ be able to stop. If you want to stop
the occasional "hey tom..you're a jerk!" messages. Implement a better
authentication system. But it won't stop the messages that might actually
get an igate operator in trouble. What we have now is "reasonable".
-Tyler