Under 50 miles hurts with Hertz [Hertz hat kein Herz?]

"Bruce Baker" <bruce_baker@qm.sri.com>3 Nov 1992 10:48:24 -0800

Hertz Rent-A-Car has recently implemented an advanced fuel purchase
option. The option permits drivers to pay for gas at the average self service
price in the area of the car rental. The option only benefits those drivers
who use more than a full tank of gas. Otherwise, you must show your gas
receipts upon returning the car, if you claim that you are returning the car
with a full tank.
An interesting quirk of this system is the programming of the portable
check-in palm-top computers used by the attendants who wander along the lanes
where you return your car. If you have driven less than 50 miles, the system
is programmed to automatically charge you $5.00 for gas, even if you have a
receipt showing that you have filled it up. Hmmm... let's see... if the
average distance driven by those who have driven less than 50 miles is about
35 miles, that equates to about one gallon of gas for the $5.00 charge (vs.
about $1.15 at the tank). Are Ross Perot's gas prices already here? To
override the check-out slips provided by the attendants from their palm-tops,
you have to take your receipt into the main check-in area. If you're in a
hurry, chances are you won't. Then Hertz has the full tank of gas *and* your
$5.00. Luckily, my attendant informed me of this quirk. Chalk up another one
for American ingenuity!
Bruce N. Baker, SRI International
[My apologies to Bruce. He sent me this long ago and it slipped through
the crack. It should have preceded the first item in RISKS-14.26. PGN]

When I read this passage, I knew I'd heard a story somewhere like this before.
It turns out the story is in the Nintendo Entertainment System manual!
The Super Nintendo Entertainment System "Consumer Information and Precautions
Booklet", which comes with SNES and NES systems sold in the US (and the UK, to
the best of my knowledge), issues the following warning:
EPILEPSY WARNING: READ BEFORE USING YOUR NES OR SUPER NES
A very small portion of the population may experience
epileptic seizures when viewing certain kinds of flashing
lights or patterns that are commonly present in outr daily
environment. These persons may experience seizures while
watching some kinds of television pictures or playing
certain video games. Players who have not had any previous
seizures may nonetheless have an undetected epileptic
condition. Consult your physician before playing video games
if you have an epileptic condition. Consult your physician
if you experience any of the following symptoms while
playing video games: altered vision, muscle twitching, other
involuntary movements, loss of awareness of your
surroundings, mental confusion, and/or convulsions.
Looks like this British case is another classic version of RTFM!
Rick Russell | TAMU Meteorology | wrr3118@tamsun.tamu.edu

Owners of Commodore 64's might remember a program in the C64 Programming
manual (I think) which changed the color palette for the text, screen and
border as fast as the 64 was capable. There was a warning message to the
effect of "don't run this if you or someone in your family has a history of
epileptic problems".
J. Eric Townsend — jet@nas.nasa.gov — 415.604.4311 (DoD# 0378)

Medical Records on smart cards

John Gray <phyjwdg@vaxb.hw.ac.uk>Mon, 11 Jan 93 14:09 BST

Over the holidays, in the "Aberdeen Press and Journal" and its evening
equivalent, the "Evening Express", was a description of a trial scheme for
holding patients medical records on cards:
... The 750,000 pound patient data-card system is one of the first of its
type in Europe, according to one of its pioneering developers, Dr James
Beattie. Around 8000 hi-tech cards, the size of a credit card, will be
distributed to patients registered with the Inverurie Health Centre. NHS
Chief Executive in Scotland, Don Cruickshank, said if it proves successful,
the system could become the basis for an all-Scotland one. He said: 'This
project has the potential to greatly improve the communication of individual
medical histories and to which the individual patients will themselves have
access'. Special machines which can read the coded cards will be installed
at various points in the North-east.
[The article then states that the machines will be installed in the health
centre, another doctor's surgery, three outpatients clinics in Aberdeen (for
diabetes, asthma and hypertension) and "chemists shops in Inverurie and
Kintore"]
... When a patient has treatment from a clinic, their card will note what
has happened and course of action taken which will be available to their own
doctor much more quickly than at present ", he [Dr Beattie] said. Dr
Beattie hopes cards will be distributed in about a years time. The pilot
project will run until 1996, when it will be evaluated by health chiefs.
[What intrigued me first was the level of security: the Evening Express of the
same day was more explicit on some technical details:]
Plastic cards which can hold more than 1,000 pages of information on NHS
patients... To maintain confidentiality, the cards can be read only by
special machines. A portable version will be used by GPs on home visits. Mr
Cruickshank said patients will also have access to their own medical
records, using number similar to those used for bank cash cards.
[It also mentions that half the population will remain as a control group for
the study.]
Brief note for those not in the UK: The NHS (National Health Service) is an arm
of the government which is responsible for the vast majority of medical
services in the UK. Thus, perhaps 90+% of the population would be involved if
the scheme were implemented nationwide. I'm not going to dwell on why I think
this is of interest to Risks, but I'll mention two points:
1) If an entire medical record is stored on card, it will contain a great deal
of very confidential information (about as much so as it gets) and a lot of
very important information: how secure is a chemist's shop for such a system?
Also, such a system on its own would be very vulnerable to card failure.
2) Because the cards are read electronically, there is a risk/benefit in terms
of doing computerised card searches remotely (although the article doesn't say
the machines will be networked, I can imagine that happening eventually.
[I didn't know there were any 750,000 pound patients!
Wow. That is really heavy. Somewhat like the
seven foot patrolmen I read about last week. PGN]

DoJ Has NOT "Authorized" Keystroke Monitoring

Date: Fri, 11 Dec 92 16:14:11 EST
>From: dds (Dennis D. Steinauer)
To: privacy@cv.vortex.com
Subject: DoJ Has NOT "Authorized" Keystroke Monitoring
The Subject line on the recent [PRIVACY] reposting by David Banisar of the 7
Dec 92 advisory from CERT/CC is highly misleading and inappropriate. As with
some newspapers, it is important that people read more than just the
headlines.
The Department of Justice hasn't "authorized" anything. Rather, they are
advising system administrators that certain activities, namely the monitoring
or recording of user-to-computer session transmissions (hence "keystroke
monitoring") MAY be found illegal in certain circumstances and that notice
should be given to users.
The CERT advisory was extracted from a letter to the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) from DoJ. Justice asked NIST in its role of
providing computer security guidance to Government to circulate the letter and
provide appropriate guidance. We have made the letter available, without
comment, through several government and other channels (including CERT, I4,
etc.).
The letter is intended to advise system administrators of an ambiguity in
U.S. law that makes it unclear whether session monitoring, often conducted
by system administrators who suspect unauthorized activity, is basically the
same as an unauthorized telephone wiretap. I repeat, the law is *unclear*
-- and the fact that one can argue either way on the issue does not clarify
the law as currently written. DoJ advises, therefore, that if system
administrators are conducting session monitoring or anticipate the need for
such monitoring, they should ensure that all system users be notified that
such monitoring may be undertaken.
The DoJ advice, therefore, is not "authorizing" anything — even implicitly.
They have simply observed the types of activities that diligent system
managers often undertake (a la Cliff Stoll in "The Cuckoo's Egg") in an
attempt to protect their systems from unauthorized users, and they have
rendered some prudent legal advice.
Clearly, there are lots of issues here — technical and otherwise — that
will need to be discussed and sorted out. Indeed, changes in
agency/organizational policies and even the law are probably needed.
However, none of this changes the fact that system administrators need now
to be aware of the potential impact of their activities, and the DoJ advice
attempts to do this.
We (NIST) are developing additional guidance for system administrators to
assist them in implementing the DoJ recommendations. I expect that others
will be doing likewise. We also hope to encourage discussion of the related
technical and other issues. In the meantime, system administrators are well
advised to read the basic DoJ advice and examine their systems and agency
policies to determine if, where, and how notices should be provided to users.
We welcome comments and suggestions, particularly regarding approaches that
various organizations take in dealing with this issue.
Dennis D. Steinauer, National Institute of Standards and Technology
A-216 Technology, Gaithersburg, MD 20899 USA 1-301-975-3359 FAX 1-301-948-0279
DSteinauer@nist.gov (e-mail) NIST Security BBS: 301-948-5717 (cs-bbs.nist.gov)

More on the Orange Book

<kmeyer@aero.org>Mon, 14 Dec 92 09:38:46 PST

In response to an article I wrote, W. Murray (WHMurray@DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL)
cautions against applying the orange book in situations for which it was never
intended. While the orange book is not an appropriate criteria for many
environments, it is currently the ONLY criteria regularly used in the United
States to assess the security features of operating systems--and as such,
there is a lot that can be learned from it, even in non-military environments.
It is an unfortunate fact that many vendors of commercial operating systems
either do not know or do not care about security--the result being that most
of us do not have much in the way of security in the computer systems we use
every day. If we insist on keeping the bugs of DOS and UNIX for backward
compatibility into eternity, we will never have secure systems.
Kraig R. Meyer, Trusted Computer Systems Dept,
The Aerospace Corp, El Segundo, CA kmeyer@aero.org

Slipstreamed Software Changes, the Titanic, and my Pontiacs

Re: Version numbers (Marchant-Shapiro, RISKS-14.26)
> ... "Version 6.37a." "Yes, but WHICH version 6.37a...?"
Actually this is nothing new. My other hobby is automobiles and we regularly
get into arguments as to whether certain options were available, both sides
citing references as "proof".
A recent case concerned the Pontiac GTO "Judge" in 1970 - for years there had
been a rumour of a 455 option that year but all available sales literature
showed only a 400 engine. Recently a brochure turned up dated November that
looked exactly (same cover artwork and everything as the September issue which
is very common). but which did mention a 455 engine option. Turns out that 17
cars were built.
Shortly after the Titanic incident, the White Star Line refitted the Olympic
with an extensive increase in the double hull coverage also fitted to the
third ship in the series (the ill-fated Britannic which incidentally sunk
much faster than its sibling), along with a number of other "safety" features.
The ones I liked the best were the giant cranes used with rotary lifeboat
launchers. Originally billed as being able to launch all boats from either
side of the ship, there was one minor difficulty - some of the smokestacks
would have had to be jettisoned first. Minor problem.
This was also apparently "slipstreamed", at least I never saw a mention of
"Triple Screw Steamship Revision A" - but then what can you expect from
a company that would add a fourth stack for pure sales appeal (well maybe
the cigars in the lounge did need that much ventilation...).
The fact is that manufacturers have been quietly fixing products at least
since the introduction of mass production and it is always a stressful time
for the engineers when the easy changes of development are replaced by the
rigorous requirements of configuration control. Sometimes even management
is not told about such "fixes", occasionally with disastrous results (it is
very easy to remove the motor mounts in one of my cars so that the engine can
be raised allowing the spark plugs to be changed. Seems that the power steering
was in the way of an air conditioner duct so it was moved just a wee bit 8*).

Public Service for Cornell Hackers

<dclawson@clipr.colorado.edu>Wed, 13 Jan 93 09:56:50 -0700

"Public Service for Hackers" by John Marcham
_Cornell_Alumni_News_ magazine
Two former [Cornell] students will develop a computer program to make it easier
for a quadriplegic man in Tennessee to use a computer he owns, as part of their
punishment for launching a computer virus that damaged programs and caused hard
drive crashes last February.
David Blumenthal '96 and Mark A. Pilgrim '94 were sentenced by a Tompkins
County Court judge to pay restitution to users whose computers were jammed by
the men's virus, at and near Stanford University and in Japan, and to perform
ten hours of community service per week for a year.
A computer buff who knew the quadriplegic and heard of the Cornell virus case
wrote the judge in Ithaca, and asked if the students' public service could be
worked off developing a less expensive and cumbersome program for the disabled
man, who uses a mouthstick and outdated software to operate his McIntosh
computer.
The judge and the former students agreed to the proposal: the students start
work in November. A third former student, found guilty of a lesser infraction,
was asked by not required to do public service, and declined.

Killing me with kindness — have a (M)Herz?

Bear Giles <bear@eagle.fsl.noaa.gov>Wed, 13 Jan 93 21:13:49 GMT

After nearly two _months_ at the integrator to repair a bad motherboard, I
finally got my computer back last night (tip 'o the hat to UPS for leaving it
outside of my apartment in near-zero (Fahrenheit) weather)... and it still has
frequent parity errors. In fact, the problem is worse now than two months
ago!
A curious fact has come up: I ordered a 20 MHz system, and have an invoice
stating they shipped a 20 MHz system, but apparently they actually shipped 25
MHz systems. The manager I talked to claimed he was doing me a "favor" by
shipping a better system — and doesn't seem to understand my statement that I
would have refused a 25 MHz system out of concern for unreliability.
(When I purchased my system a year ago 16 MHz 386-SXs were standard and 20 MHz
systems were just starting to get carried. A 25 MHz would have been
first-generation and hence rather unreliable, as my extensive down-time
demonstrates).
Bear Giles bear@fsl.noaa.gov

revoke license where i.birthdate=dwi.birthdate and name like "%...%"

Jim Roberts <roberts@stsci.edu>Wed, 13 Jan 93 09:51:50 EST

The RISK of having your licence revoked is greater than merely that of having
the same name and birthdate as another person, as discussed in RISKS 14.26 by
Bruce Hayden - you need only a *similar* name and birthdate in common.
Yesterday I received in the mail from the state of Maryland, in which I live,
a notice that my driver's licence is revoked based on a DWI arrest by a person
with a similar name in 1985. On all official documents, including driver's
licenses, I use my full name William James Roberts. The miscreant with the
same birthdate and named James Roberts resided in Florida, a state I have
never visited, and was arrested in Tennessee. To have my license reinstated,
I must *prove* to the hearing *board* that I am not the DWI James Roberts,
something I suspect it will not be easy to do.
If one has a real DWI he gets a day in *court*, but if one has merely
a computer generated DWI he has no such right.
The notice indicated that James Roberts had no sex (sigh), weighed 0 pounds,
was 0 ft 0 in in height, and had blank eyes. So the folks who programmed the
database join use the fact that the information you are required to have on
your driver's license is not useful when they want to roll up the numbers on
license revocations. I suspect that if I were Barbara James Roberts (sex:F),
I would have gotten the same notice. In that case it might be easier to
fight. But what if I were a woman with an ambiguous middle name, say Barbara
Kelly Roberts and the revokee were just Kelly Roberts, really a male but to
Maryland an M or F? Then I would again be in difficulties.
The next step in the widening scope of the database joins may be just to use
your birthdate and the Soundex code of your last name. That should
considerably improve the numbers achieved by the "responsible" bureaucrats in
their hunt for more revocations.
Jim Roberts roberts@stsci.edu 6559::roberts

name+birthdate=no driver's license

Andrew Koenig <ark@europa.att.com>Wed, 13 Jan 93 10:45:55 EST

A common mistake (and sometimes, I suspect, a deliberate decision) in system
design is to assume that things that are purportedly the same in theory are
actually the same in practice. Thus, for example, politicians who want to
prohibit people from using illegal drugs think it is equivalent to punish
people who fail drug tests, forgetting that there are sometimes false
positives, fraudulently altered results, and so on.
So it is with the driving story. Someone else turns up who appears enough
like you, at least superficially, and suddenly it's up to you to prove
innocence.
Here's another example. This was told to me second hand, so I won't
swear it's true, but it's plausible enough and the lesson is there anyway.
New Jersey, like many (all?) other states, has a mechanism for revoking
driver's licenses for various reasons. Moreover, they have laws mandating
stiff penalties for people caught driving with a revoked license. But
how does one tell if a license has been revoked? New Jersey's answer
is to have a list of revoked licenses; their law specifically prohibits
driving while one's name is on the revoked list.
I know a guy who says his name was placed on the revoked list due to a
clerical error. He had not done anything wrong, and had never been informed
that his name was on the list. He found out about it when he was stopped for
speeding; of course he was immediately charged with driving while on the
revoked list.
At the hearing, the state readily admitted that his name had been placed
there in error. However, they argued that that was irrelevant: the law
prohibits driving while one's name is on the list and that's just what he
had done. The judge had no option but to find him guilty.

"The change (as I understand it) is that the leading 1 digit
should be used ONLY when dialing outside the area code, ...
No, the change is that a leading 1 will always be followed by an area code.
The old practice of dialing 1-nnn-nnnn to make a long distance call within
one's area code is being abolished. This will separate the area code and
exchange number spaces, which at present are distinguished by the second digit
(0 or 1 for area code, other for exchange). This is vital because North
America has run out of area codes.
In Oregon, we will convert to this scheme in July, and we will still use a
leading 1 when making toll calls within the area code, but we will have to
punch the area code as well. This preserves the characteristic that "a
leading 1 means you're paying money," considered desirable.
Andrew Klossner andrew@frip.wv.tek.com uunet!tektronix!frip.WV.TEK!andrew

Upcoming Telephone Number problems

<kmeyer@aero.org>Wed, 13 Jan 93 14:21:05 PST

You will probably both get dozens of messages about this...anyway:
In Risks 14.26, Rob Horn stated that the North American dialing scheme
is changing; but in fact, it started changing (at least) 5 or 6 years ago
and the dialing scheme is no longer consistent around the country.
In the old days, area codes were 3 digits of the pattern x0x or x1x;
prefixes (the first 3 digits of a "local" number) could not be either
of these patterns. Toll calls within your area code were dialed as
1 + number; toll calls outside of your area code were dialed as 1 + area
code + number.
When area codes started running out of prefixes, the dialing
instructions started changing. I know of three different dialing
schemes currently being used in the U.S.:
(1) The original scheme, described in the paragraph above,
(2) The scheme used in Southern California, in which you do not dial
"1" to call a number in your area code (even if it is a toll call)
(3) The scheme used in the Detroit area, in which you dial 1 + 313
to place a toll call within your area code.
When they start using area codes that don't conform to the x0x or x1x format,
any regions still using dialing scheme (1) will have to switch to either
scheme (2) or scheme (3).
Kraig R. Meyer

What's worse is that some areas (like California) have chosen to go strictly
with "+1 means area code", while other areas (such as Oregon and Washington)
have retained the "+1 means long distance" meaning as well. This gets
confusing for computer autodialers, as well as humans.
This means that in-area-code-but-long-distance numbers are dialed differently
in the two plans:
Local, in-area-code: both=xxx-xxxx
Local, out-area-code: Oregon=n/a, California=1 yyy xxx-xxxx
Long distance, in-area-code: Oregon=1 yyy xxx-xxxx, California: xxx-xxxx
Long distance, out-area-code: both=1 yyy xxx-xxxx
(Oregon doesn't have any local calls that are in a differing area code.)
Blech. Your PUC at work. :-)
[Further comments from D King, king@ukulele.reasoning.com.]

Upcoming Telephone Number problems

What's happened in 313 is exactly the opposite — we now have to dial
1-313-xxx-yyyy for calls WITHIN the area code, instead of just dialing
1-xxx-yyyy. This allows them to use the x[01]x prefixes as new exchanges
(postpones the need to split the area code by a few years). I hadn't thought
of it before, but of course, when this is done everywhere, then it will be
possible to use (almost) any 3 digit area code, too.