workers’ compensation has been to remove industrial negligence, in all its forms, from the

concept of the law of tort.” Id. (citations omi tted).

In 1975, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that the rule barring employee lawsuits

against employers for negligence does not extend to intentional injuries. See Bryan v. Utah Int’l,

533 P.2d 892 (Utah 1975). The Court clarified the scope of this exception in 2009 in the case of

Helf v. Chevron:

We therefore hold that the “intent to injure” standard requires a specific mental
state in which the actor knew or expected that injury would be the consequence of
his action. To demonstrate intent, a plaintiff may show that the actor desired the
consequences of his actions, or that the actor believed the consequences were
virtually certain to result. But a plaintiff may not demonstrate intent by showing
merely that some injury was substantially certain to occur at some time. For a
workplace injury to qualify as an intentional injury under the Act, the employer or
supervisor must know or expect that the assigned task will injure the particular
employee that undertakes it. In other words, the employer must know or expect
that a specific employee will be injured doing a specific task. In these situations,
the knowledge and expectation that injury will occur robs an injury of its
accidental character, moving it out of the realm of negligence and into the realm
of intent.

Helf, 203 P.3d at 974. In Helf, an employee of the Chevron refinery was instructed to perform a

neutralization process despite a supervisor’s knowledge that, earlier in the day, the same process

had resulted in the release of a toxic purple cloud. Id. at 966. The Utah Supreme Court held that

Ms. Helf had stated a claim for intentional injury because “her supervisors knew or expected that

re-initiating the neutralization process would result in her injury.” Id. at 974.

Here, Ms. Valdez has also stated a claim for intentional injury. But the question at the