Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted
on the last-mentioned date:

PROCEDURE

1. The case originated in an application (no.
62332/00) against the Kingdom of Sweden lodged with the Court under
Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 7 October 2000 by five
Swedish nationals: (1) Ms Ingrid Segerstedt-Wiberg (born in 1911), (2)
Mr Per Nygren (born in 1948), (3) Mr Staffan Ehnebom (born in 1952),
(4) Mr Bengt Frejd (born in 1948) and (5) Mr Herman Schmid (born in
1939) (“the applicants”).

2. The applicants were represented by Mr D. Töllborg,
Professor of Law, practising as a lawyer in Västra Frölunda. The Swedish
Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr
C.H. Ehrenkrona, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

3. The applicants alleged, in particular, that
the storage in the Security Police files of certain information that
had been released to them constituted unjustified interference with
their right to respect for private life under Article 8 of the Convention.
Under this Article, they further complained of the refusal to advise
them of the full extent to which information concerning them was kept
on the Security Police register. The applicants also relied on Articles
10 and 11. Lastly, they complained under Article 13 that no effective
remedy existed under Swedish law in respect of the above violations.

4. The application was allocated to the Fourth
Section of the Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). Within that
Section, the Chamber that would consider the case (Article 27 § 1 of
the Convention) was constituted as provided in Rule 26 § 1.

5. On 1 November 2004 the Court changed the composition
of its Sections (Rule 25 § 1). This case was assigned to the newly
composed Second Section (Rule 52 § 1).

6. By a decision of 20 September 2005, the Chamber
declared the application partly admissible.

7. The Chamber having decided, after consulting
the parties, that no hearing on the merits was required (Rule 59 §
3 in fine),
the parties replied in writing to each other’s observations.

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

8. The present application was
brought by five applicants, all of whom are Swedish nationals: (1) Ms
Ingrid Segerstedt-Wiberg (born in 1911), (2) Mr Per Nygren (born in 1948),
(3) Mr Staffan Ehnebom (born in 1952), (4) Mr Bengt Frejd (born in 1948)
and (5) Mr Herman Schmid (born in 1939). The first applicant lives in
Gothenburg, the second applicant lives in Kungsbacka and the third and
fourth applicants live in Västra Frölunda, Sweden. The fifth applicant
lives in Copenhagen, Denmark.

A. The first applicant,Ms Ingrid Segerstedt-Wiberg

9. The first applicantis the daughter of a well-known publisher and anti-Nazi activist,
Mr Torgny Segerstedt. From 1958 to 1970 she was a Liberal member of
parliament. During that period she was a member of the Standing Committee
on the Constitution (konstitutionsutskottet). She has also been Chairperson of the
United Nations Association of Sweden. She is a prominent figure in Swedish
political and cultural life.

10. On 22 April 1998, relying
on section 9A of the Police Register Act (lag om polisregister m.m., 1965:94), the first applicant made
a request to the Minister of Justice for access to her Security Police
records. She said that she had become aware of certain material held
by the foreign service of the United States of America from which it
appeared that since the Second World War she and others had been under
continuous surveillance, in particular because of her work for the United
Nations Association of Western Sweden. That information had originated
from Sweden and had apparently been communicated by the United States
to other countries in order to cause her damage and harm her work for
the protection of refugees. She also referred to the spreading of rumours
that she was “unreliable” in respect of the Soviet Union. Those
rumours had started during the 1956 parliamentary elections, but had
not prevented her, a couple of years later, being returned to Parliament
or sitting on its Standing Committee on the Constitution.

By a decision of 17 June 1998,
the Ministry of Justice refused her request. It pointed out that absolute
secrecy applied not only to the content of the police register but also
to whether or not a person was mentioned in it. The government considered
that the reasons relied on by the first applicant, with reference to
section 9A of the Police Register Act, could not constitute special
grounds for derogation from the rule of absolute secrecy.

Appended to the refusal was
a letter signed by the Minister of Justice, pointing out that neither
the first applicant’s previous access to material indicating that
she had been the subject of secret surveillance nor the age of any such
information (40 to 50 years old) could constitute a special reason for
a derogation under section 9A of the Act. The Minister further stated:

“As you may be aware, some time ago
the government submitted a proposal to Parliament as to the manner in
which the Security Police register should be made more accessible to
the public. It may be of interest to you to know that a few weeks ago
Parliament passed the bill, which means that absolute secrecy will be
abolished. The bill provides that the Security Police must make an assessment
of the need for secrecy on a case-by-case basis, which opens up new
possibilities for individuals to see records that are today covered
by absolute secrecy. It is first of all historical material that will
be made accessible.”

11. On 28 April 1999, following
an amendment on 1 April 1999 to Chapter 5, section 1(2), of the Secrecy
Act 1980 (sekretesslagen, 1980:100), the first applicant submitted a
new request to the Security Police to inform her whether or not her
name was on the Security Police register.

On 17 September 1999 the Security
Police decided to grant the first applicant authorisation to view “seventeen
pages from the Security Police records, with the exception of information
about Security Police staff and information concerning the Security
Police’s internal [classifications]”. Beyond that, her request was
rejected, pursuant to Chapter 5, section 1(2), of the Secrecy Act 1980,
on the ground that further “information could not be disclosed without
jeopardising the purpose of measures taken or anticipated or without
harming future operations”.

On 4 October 1999 the first
applicant went to the headquarters of the Security Police in Stockholm
to view the records in question. They concerned three letter bombs which
had been sent in 1990 to Sveriges Radio (the national radio corporation
of Sweden), to her and to another well-known writer (Hagge Geigert)
because of their stand against Nazism and xenophobia and in favour of
the humanitarian treatment of refugees in conformity with international
treaties ratified by Sweden. The Security Police had gathered a number
of police reports, photographs and newspaper cuttings, and had reached
the conclusion that there was nothing to confirm the suspicion that
there was an organisation behind the letter bombs. That was all the
information the first applicant was allowed to view.

12. On 8 October 1999 the first
applicant instituted proceedings before the Administrative Court of
Appeal (kammarrätten) in Stockholm, requesting authorisation to view
the entire file on her and other entries concerning her that had been
made in the register. In a judgment of 11 February 2000, the court rejected
her request. Its reasoning included the following:

“The Administrative Court of Appeal
considers that, beyond what emerges from the documents already released,
it is not clear that information about whether or not [the first applicant]
is on file in the Security Police records regarding such activities
as are referred to in Chapter 5, section 1(2), could be disclosed without
jeopardising the purpose of measures taken or anticipated or without
harming future operations.”

13. On 28 February 2000 the
first applicant appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court (Regeringsrätten). She submitted that the rejection of her
request had left her with the impression of being accused of involvement
in criminal activities. In order to counter these accusations, she requested
permission to see all files concerning her.

On 10 May 2000 the Supreme
Administrative Court refused the first applicant leave to appeal.

14. During the proceedings before
the Strasbourg Court, the Government provided the following additionalinformation.

The first applicant was put
on file for the first time in 1940. The Security Police were interested
in her because of the circles in which she moved and which, during the
war in Europe, were legitimately targeted by the security services.
In accordance with the legislation in force at the relevant time, additional
entries were made in her file until 1976, in part on independent grounds
and in part to supplement records entered previously.

Between 1940 and 1976, information
and documents regarding the first applicant had been collected in the
filing system that existed at the time. While those documents were microfilmed,
no documents concerning her had been microfilmed since 1976. The documents
contained in the file were probably weeded some time before 1999. However,
while backup copies on microfiche had been retained, they were not accessible
in practice, unless marked as having already been “deactivated”.

A new filing system was introduced
in 1980-82. As the first applicant came under a bomb threat in 1990,
a new file on her was opened under the new system. It included a reference
to the previous file under the old system and the microfilm number required
to retrieve the microfiche. The Security Police’s register was also
updated with the new information regarding the first applicant. The
1990 file had also been weeded. It was not destroyed but transferred
to the National Archives.

The first applicant was again
put on file by the Security Police in 2001, because of a new incident
that could have been interpreted as a threat against her.

On 13 December 2002 the Security
Police decided of their own accord to release all stored information
that had been kept about the applicant until 1976, representing fifty-one
pages. No copies of these documents or particulars of their specific
content were submitted to the Court.

B. The second applicant, Mr Per Nygren

15. The second applicantis an established journalist at Göteborgs-Posten, one of the largest daily newspapers in Sweden.
He is the author of a number of articles published by that paper on
Nazism and on the Security Police that attracted wide public attention.

16. On 27 April 1998 the Security
Police rejected a request by the applicant for access to their quarterly
reports on communist and Nazi activities for the years 1969 to 1998,
and for information on which authorities had received those reports.

17. By a letter of 7 June 1999
addressed to the Security Police, the second applicant stated that,
having received one of the quarterly reports from the police in Karlskrona,
he had become aware that the Security Police had been interested in
him; he therefore wished “to read [his] file and all other documents
at [their] disposal where [his] name might occur”. In addition, the
second applicant made a similar request in respect of his recently deceased
father, in accordance with the latter’s wishes.

In a decision of 11 November
1999, the Security Police allowed the applicant’s request in part
by replying that his father did not appear in any files or entries in
the register and rejected the remainder of his request. It stated:

“As from 1 April 1999 the treatment
of personal data by the Security Police of the kind referred to in your
request is governed in the first place by the Police Data Act (1998:622).

According to Chapter 5, section 1(2),
of the Secrecy Act (1980:100), secrecy applies to information relating
to undercover activities under section 3 of the Police Data Act or that
otherwise falls within the Security Police’s remit in preventing or
revealing crimes committed against the security of the Realm or in preventing
terrorism, if it is not clear that the information may be imparted without
jeopardising the purpose of the decision or measures planned or without
harm to future activities. The implied starting-point is that secrecy
applies as the main rule irrespective of whether the information, for
example, appears in a file or emanates from a preliminary investigation
or undercover activities.

In the preparatory work for the relevant
provision of the Secrecy Act (prop. 1997/98:97,p. 68), it is stated that even information about whether a
person is mentioned in a secret intelligence register should be classified
in accordance with Chapter 5, section 1, of the Secrecy Act. It is further
stated that in view of the nature of undercover activities only in special
circumstances can there be a question of disclosing information. If
there are no such circumstances, the government assume in accordance
with the preparatory work that even the information that a person is
not registered is classified as secret under the Act.

In the present case the Security Police
consider that ... the fact that your father was born in 1920 and has
recently passed away satisfies the kind of conditions in which information
can be disclosed that a person is not registered.

In so far as your request concerns yourself,
it is rejected for the reasons given in the preparatory work and the
relevant provisions of the Secrecy Act.”

According to the applicant,
the above reasons given for the rejection of the request made for access
to his own records were identical to those given in all other rejection
cases.

18. In their pleadings to the
Court, the Government stated that at the time of the Security Police’s
decision on 11 November 1999 it had not been possible to find the file
owing to the fact that the second applicant had not been the subject
of a personal record in connection with the report in issue.

19. On 25 November 1999 the
second applicant appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal in Stockholm,
requesting authorisation to view his file and all other entries made
on him by the Security Police. He relied on certain written evidence
to the effect that he had been mentioned in the records of the Security
Police, notably on the cover page and page 7 of a secret report dating
back to the third quarter of 1967 and emanating from Section (byrå) A of the Security Police, that had been released by
the Karlskrona police shortly beforehand. The report was entitled “Presentation
on communist and Nazi activities in Sweden from July to September 1967”.
Page 7 contained the following statement:

“On 18-20 September a meeting was
held within the DUV [Demokratisk Ungdoms Världsfederation – World Federation
of Democratic Youth] in Warsaw. A youngster, probably [identifiable
as] Mr Per Rune Nygren from Örebro, participated as a representative
for the VUF [Världsungdomsfestivalen – World Youth Festival].”

The second applicant requested,
in particular, access to the quarterly reports for the years 1969-98
and information regarding the authorities to which those reports had
been communicated. He stressed that since he had never been convicted,
charged or notified of any suspicion of crime and had never taken part
in any illegal, subversive or terrorist activity, refusing him full
access to the files could not be justified. The wishes of the Security
Police to maintain secrecy about their work should have been balanced
against his interest in clarifying the extent of the violation that
he had suffered, not only through their collection of information about
him but also through their disclosure of such information.

20. In accordance with standard
procedure, the appeal was brought to the attention of the Security Police,
who then decided, on 20 December 1999, to release the same two pages
of the 1967 report referred to above, while maintaining their refusal
regarding the remainder of the second applicant’s initial request.
The reasons given were largely the same as in the first decision, with
the following addition:

“In the Security Police archives there
are a number of documents which contain information both about different
subject matter and individuals. The fact that such documents exist in
the Security Police’s archives does not mean that all information
in the documents is registered and therefore searchable. Information
which is not registered can only be retrieved if details have been submitted
about the document in which the information is contained. Since you
provided us with such details, it was possible for us to find the document
you asked for in your request.”

After receipt of the above
decision, the second applicant had a telephone conversation with Ms
Therese Mattsson, an officer of the Security Police (who had signed
the decision of 27 April 1998). According to the applicant, she explained
that, when dealing with requests such as his, only documents that were
searchable by computer would be verified, which was the reason why the
initial request had been rejected in its entirety and access had been
granted to the two pages of the 1967 report.

21. In his appeal to the Administrative
Court of Appeal, the applicant pointed out that from the above telephone
conversation it emerged, firstly, that since 1969 several hundred thousand
personal files in the Security Police’s register had been destroyed.
Secondly, information about persons whose files had been erased could
still be found in the Security Police’s archives but could not be
searched under names or personal identity numbers. Thirdly, the so-called
destruction lists, comprising several hundred thousand names, was all
that remained of the erased files. The second applicant complained that
the Security Police had failed to search those lists (assuming that
the files no longer existed).

On 14 February 2000 the Administrative
Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal in its entirety, giving essentially
the same reasons as the Security Police, with the following further
considerations:

“In connection with the introduction
of [section 3 of the Police Data Act], the government stated that even
the information that a person is not registered by the Security Police
is such that it should be possible to keep it secret under the said
provision (prop. 1997/98:97, p. 68). According to the government bill,
the reason is the following. A person who is engaged in criminal activity
may have a strong interest in knowing whether the police have information
about him or her. In such a case it could be highly prejudicial to the
investigation for the person concerned to be informed whether or not
he or she is of interest to the police. It is therefore important for
a decision on a request for information from the register not to have
to give information on whether the person appears in the register or
not. The nature of secret intelligence is such that there can only be
disclosure of information in special cases.

The Administrative Court of Appeal finds
that it is not clear that information, beyond that which emerges from
the disclosed documents, about whether [the second applicant] has been
the subject of any secret police activity falling under Chapter 5, section
1(2), of the Secrecy Act can be disclosed without jeopardising the purpose
of measures taken or anticipated or without harming future operations.”

22. On 25 July 2000 the Supreme Administrative
Court refused the second applicant leave to appeal.

C. The third applicant, Mr Staffan Ehnebom

23. The third applicant has
been a member of the KPML(r)(Kommu-nistiska Partiet Marxist-Leninisterna – Marxist-Leninist
(revolutionaries) Party, established in 1970)since 1978. He is an engineer, and since 1976 has been employed
by the Ericsson Group.

24. On 10 April 1999, after
the absolute secrecy requirement applying to information held in the
records of the Security Police had been lifted on 1 April 1999, the third
applicant submitted a request to the Security Police to see all files
that might exist on him. By a decision dated 17 November 1999, the Security
Police granted him access to thirty pages, two of which could only be
read on the Security Police’s premises and could not be copied by
technical means. Copies of the twenty-eight remaining pages were sent
to his home. Twenty-five of these consisted of the decision by the Parliamentary
Ombudsperson concerning the above-mentioned matter and the three remaining
pages were copies of press articles, two dealing with the applicant
and a third, not mentioning him, consisting of a notice from the paper Proletären about a forthcoming 1993 KPML(r) party congress.
Thus, all of the said twenty-five pages contained publicly available,
not classified, material. The two pages which the third applicant was
permitted to see on the Security Police’s premises consisted of two
security checks concerning him dating from 1980. These were copies of
forms used by the FMV (the Försvarets Materialverk, an authority responsible for procuring
equipment for the Swedish Army, and with whom the Ericsson Group worked)
to request a personnel check (now known as a register check) concerning
the third applicant. The registered information contained the following
text in full:

“In September 1979 it was revealed
that [the third applicant] was/is a member of the Frölunda cell of
the KPML(r) in Gothenburg. At this time he was in contact with leading
members of the KPML(r) regarding a party meeting in the Frölunda town
square.”

25. The third applicant submitted
that the above information about his membership of theKPML(r) was the real reason for the FMV’s demand that he
be removed from his post, although every authority involved would deny
this. He pointed out that the KPML(r) was a registered and lawful political
party that took part in elections.

26. On 24 November 1999 the
third applicant appealed against the decision of the Security Police
to the Administrative Court of Appeal, maintaining his request to see
all the material that the Security Police might have on him. He disputed, inter alia, that the material released to him revealed that
he constituted a security risk. In a judgment of 14 February 2000, the
Administrative Court of Appeal rejected his request, giving the same
type of reasons as in the cases of the first and second applicants.

27. On 13 April 2000 the Supreme
Administrative Court refused the third applicant leave to appeal.

D. The fourth applicant, Mr Bengt Frejd

28. The fourth applicant has
been a member of the KPML(r) since 1972, and the Chairman of Proletären FF, a sports club which has about 900 members, since
1974. He is renowned within sporting circles in Sweden and has actively
worked with children and young people in sport, both nationally and
internationally, to foster international solidarity and facilitate social
integration through sport.

29. On 23 January 1999 the fourth
applicant requested access to information about him contained in the
Security Police register, which he suspected had been entered because
of his political opinions. On 4 February 1999 the Security Police rejected
his request under the rules on absolute secrecy.

30. The fourth applicant renewed
his request after the abolition of the rule on 1 April 1999. On 8 February
2000 the Security Police granted the fourth applicant permission to
see parts of his file.

This comprised, firstly, fifty-seven
pages of paper cuttings and various information concerning him and other
athletes and sports leaders, their participation in conferences, meetings
and tournaments, and about sport and the promotion of social integration
through sport, particularly involving international exchanges and solidarity
in cooperation with the African National Congress in South Africa. There
was information about a much publicised sports project in 1995, where
representatives of several sports such as basketball, football and handball
had left Sweden for South Africa with the aim of helping young people
in black townships. A number of people from within the Swedish sports
movement whom the fourth applicant had met, many of whom had no connection
with any political organisations, had been mentioned in his file. These
included, for example, a prominent sports leader, Mr Stefan Albrechtson,
who had himself been subjected to Security Police surveillance.

The file further included a
number of items dealing with sports organisations and events, such as
an appeal (in the file from as late as 1993) from all the sports clubs
in Gothenburg demanding lower fees for the use of sports fields, a document
with the names of some one hundred people, including that of the fourth
applicant, and in some instances their telephone numbers. A list of
the participants at a spring meeting of the Gothenburg Handball League
could also be found.

In addition to the above material,
on 28 February 1999 the fourth applicant was granted access to two pages
from his file, provided that they were read on the Security Police’s
premises and not reproduced by technical means. The pages contained
the following information:

“1 January 1973. F. is a member of
the KPML(r) and has been working actively for six months. He is responsible
for propaganda in the Högsbo-Järnbrott group of the KPML(r), 4 March
1975. According to an article in Göteborgs Tidningen of 4 March 1975, F. is the Chairman of Proletären
FF, 9 June 1977. According to an article in Stadsdelsnytt/Väster, F. is one of the leaders of the youth
section of Proletären FF, 6 September 1979. F. is number 19 on the KPML(r)
ballot for the municipal elections in the fourth constituency of Gothenburg.
Not elected.”

31. On 1 March 2000 the fourth
applicant appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal against the
decision of the Security Police, requesting to see his file in its entirety
and all other records that might have been entered concerning him. He
disputed the Security Police’s right to store the information that
had already been released to him, and stressed that none of it justified
considering him a security risk.

On 12 May 2000 the Administrative
Court of Appeal rejected the fourth applicant’s appeal, basically
on the same grounds as those stated in the judgments pertaining to the
first, second and third applicants.

32. On 29 August 2000 the Supreme
Administrative Court refused the fourth applicant leave to appeal.

E. The fifth applicant, Mr Herman Schmid

33. The fifth applicant was
a member of the European Parliament from 1999 to 2004, belonging to
the GUE/NGL Group and sitting for the Swedish Left Party (Vänsterpartiet).

34. On 9 December 1997 the fifth
applicant filed a request with the Ministry of Defence to have access
to the data files and all entries about him that may have been made
in the Security Police registers. On 20 January 1998 the Ministry of
Defence informed him that the request had been transmitted to the Defence
Authority (Försvarsmakten) for decision. On the same date the fifth applicant
was informed of another government decision to lift secrecy regarding
certain information contained in an attachment B to a report entitled
“The Military Intelligence Service, Part 2” (Den militära underrättelsetjänsten. Del 2). In this research
document, which had previously been released to two journalists, it
was stated:

“One document ... contains the information
that among the teachers listed in the Malmö ABF [Arbetarnas Bildningsförbund – Workers’ Association of
Education] study programme for the autumn of 1968 are sociologists Schmid
and Karin Adamek. It was stated that both of them had previously been
reported in different contexts.”

On 19 March 1998 the National
Police Authority sent a duplicate letter to the fifth applicant and
an unknown number of others, announcing that their requests for access
to registered information had been rejected.

35. On 29 October 1999 the Security
Police took a new decision, granting the fifth applicant access to “eight
pages from the Security Police archives with the exception of information
regarding Security Police staff and ... internal classifications”,
on the condition that the documents be consulted on the Security Police’s
premises and not copied by technical means. As far as all other information
was concerned, the initial rejection of his request remained, with the
following standard reasoning:

“All information about whether or
not you are reported in other security cases filed by the Security Police
is subject to secrecy according to Chapter 5, section 1(2), of the Secrecy
Act. Thus, such information cannot be released without jeopardising
the purpose of actions taken or planned, or without detriment to future
activity.”

On the above-mentioned date
the fifth applicant went to the police headquarters in Malmö in order
to have access to the eight pages in question. While under surveillance,
he read out loud the text on each page and tape-recorded himself, for
later transcription. According to a transcript provided by the applicant,
the entries bore various dates between 18 January 1963 and 21 October
1975.

The above-mentioned entries
concerned mostly political matters such as participation in a campaign
for nuclear disarmament and general peace-movement activities, including
public demonstrations and activities related to membership of the Social
Democratic Student Association. According to one entry dated 12 May
1969, the fifth applicant had extreme left-wing leanings and had stated
that during demonstrations one should proceed with guerrilla tactics
in small groups and if necessary use violence in order to stage the
demonstration and achieve its goals. There were also some notes about
job applications he had made for university posts and a report he had
given to the Norwegian police with his comments in connection with the
murder of a Moroccan citizen, Mr Bouchiki, in Lillehammer on 21 July
1973. Finally, the documents contained entries on the opening of a boarding
school for adults (folkhögskola) in 1984 in which the fifth applicant had played
a major role.

The fifth applicant, for his
part, challenged the allegation that he had advocated violence, saying
that it was totally against his principles and emphasising that since
1960 he had been active in the peace movement in Skåne and was a well-known
pacifist who had been imprisoned three times on account of his conscientious
objection to military service.

36. On 29 November 1999 the
applicant appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal against the
Security Police’s refusal to give him access to all the information
about him registered in their archives. He disputed their right to store
the information to which he had had access. The appeal was dismissed
by a judgment of 15 May 2000 on the same grounds as those given to the
other applicants in the present case.

37. On 27 June 2000 the Supreme
Administrative Court refused the fifth applicant leave to appeal.

F. Particulars of the KPML(r) party programme

38. Clause 1 of the KPML(r)
party programme states that the party is a revolutionary workers’
party whose goal is the complete transformation of existing society.
Clause 4 affirms that the power of the bourgeoisie in society is protected
by the State and rests ultimately on its organs of violence, such as
the police, armed forces, courts and jails, supplemented to some extent
by private security companies. Clause 22 provides that the socialist
transformation of society has to take place contrary to the laws and
regulations of bourgeois society, and that for a transitional period
a revolutionary dictatorship of the working class will be established.
Clause 23 states that the forms of the socialist revolution are determined
by the prevailing concrete conditions but that the bourgeoisie will
use any means available to prevent the establishment of real people’s
power, and the revolutionary forces must therefore prepare themselves
for an armed struggle. According to Clause 28, socialist democracy does
not make any distinction between economic and political power, or between
judicial and executive power, but subjects all social functions to the
influence of the working people.

II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE

39. Domestic provisions of relevance
to the present case are found in a number of instruments. Certain constitutional
provisions regarding freedom of opinion, expression and association
found in the Instrument of Government (regeringsformen) provide the starting-point. This is also the
case with regard to the principle of free access to official documents
enshrined in the Freedom of the Press Ordinance (tryckfrihetsförordningen) and the restrictions on that freedom
imposed by the Secrecy Act (sekretesslagen, 1980:100). The Security Police’s handling
of personal information is regulated by the Police Data Act (polisdatalagen, 1998:622, which came into force on 1 April
1999), the Police Data Ordinance (polisdataförordningen, 1999:81, which also came into force
on 1 April 1999), the Personal Data Act (personuppgiftslagen, 1998:204) and the Personal Data Ordinance
(personuppgiftsförordningen, 1998:1191).

A. Constitutional guarantees

40. Chapter 2, section 1(1),
of the Instrument of Government (“the Constitution”) guarantees
the freedom to form opinions, the right to express them and the right
to join others in the expression of such opinions. The freedoms and
rights referred to in Chapter 2, section 1(1), may be restricted by
law to the extent provided for in sections 13 to 16. Restrictions may
only be imposed to achieve a purpose which is acceptable in a democratic
society. A restriction may never exceed what is necessary having regard
to its purpose, nor may it be so onerous as to constitute a threat to
the free expression of opinion, which is one of the foundations of democracy.
No restriction may be imposed solely on grounds of political, religious,
cultural or other such opinions (Chapter 2, section 12).

41. According to Chapter 2,
section 13, freedom of expression may be restricted, for instance, “having
regard to the security of the Realm”. However, the second paragraph
of the latter provision states that “[i]n judging what restraints
may be imposed by virtue of the preceding paragraph, particular regard
shall be had to the importance of the widest possible freedom of expression
and freedom of information in political, religious, professional, scientific
and cultural matters”. The term “security of the Realm” covers
both external and internal security.

42. With regard to freedom of
association, fewer limitations are provided for. It follows from Chapter
2, section 14, that it may be restricted “only in respect of organisations
whose activities are of a military or quasi-military nature, or which
involve the persecution of a population group of a particular race,
skin colour or ethnic origin”.

43. Chapter 2, section 3, provides
that no entry regarding a citizen in a public register may be based,
without his or her consent, exclusively on that person’s political
opinion. The prohibition is absolute.

44. Under Chapter 2, section
2, of the Freedom of the Press Ordinance, everyone is entitled to have
access to official documents unless, within defined areas, such access
is limited by law.

B. Security intelligence

45. The Security Police form
part of the National Police Board (Rikspolisstyrelsen). The Security Police are engaged in four
major fields of activity. Three of them – the upholding of the Constitution,
counter-espionage and counterterrorism – fall under the common heading
of security intelligence. The fourth area concerns security protection.

1. Legal basis for registration

46. The legal basis for the
register kept by the Security Police before 1999 has been described
in Leander v. Sweden (26 March 1987, §§ 19-22, Series A no.
116). For the period thereafter the matter is governed by the 1999 Police
Data Act and Police Data Ordinance. The Police Data Act is a lex specialis in relation to the 1998 Personal Data Act. The
Security Police’s own rules of procedure (arbetsordning), which are not public in their entirety, contain
more detailed rules on the registration and use of personal information.

“Personal information may not be processed
merely on the ground of what is known about the person’s race or ethnic
origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical conviction, membership
of a trade union, health or sexual orientation.

If personal information is processed
on another ground, the information may be completed with such particulars
as are mentioned in the first paragraph if it is strictly necessary
for the purposes of the processing.”

1. facilitating investigations undertaken
in order to prevent and uncover crimes against national security;

2. facilitating investigations undertaken
in order to combat terrorist offences under section 2 of the Act; or

3. providing a basis for security checks
under the Security Protection Act [säkerhetsskyddslagen, 1996:627]. The Security Police are responsible
[personuppgiftsansvarig] for the processing of personal data
in the register.”

1. The person concerned by the information
is suspected of having engaged in or of intending to engage in criminal
activity that entails a threat to national security or a terrorist offence;

2. The person concerned has undergone
a security check under the Security Protection Act; or

3. Considering the purpose for which
the register is kept, there are other special reasons therefor.

The register shall indicate the grounds
for data entry. The government may lay down further regulations on the
type of data that may be entered (Act 2003:157).”

The scope of the expression
“special reasons” in sub-paragraph 3 of section 33 of the Police
Data Act is commented on in the preparatory work in respect of that
legislation (Government Bill 1997/98:97, pp. 153-54 and pp. 177-78),
where the following points are made in particular. In order to enable
the Security Police to perform the tasks assigned to them by the relevant
legislation, it could in certain cases be deemed necessary to register
persons also for reasons other than those laid down in sub-paragraphs
1 and 2 of section 33: for instance, persons who are connected with
other persons registered under sub-paragraphs 1 and 2 of section 33;
persons who could be the targets of threats; and persons who could be
the object of recruitment attempts by foreign intelligence services.
In order for the Security Police to be able to prevent and uncover crimes
against national security, it was necessary to survey and identify potential
threats and recruitment attempts. It should also be possible for the
Security Police to identify links between persons who move to Sweden
after participating in oppositional activities in their home countries.
Moreover, it should be possible for the Security Police to register
information about persons who have been smuggled into Sweden on assignment
from foreign non-democratic regimes with the task of collecting information
concerning fellow countrymen. There was a need to update information
concerning such informers continuously. Also, information concerning
contacts with foreign missions in Sweden was relevant in this context.

The Government stated that
the fact that an individual’s name had been included in the register
did not necessarily mean that he or she was suspected of an offence
or other incriminating activities. Other than the examples already mentioned
above from the preparatory work, the Government gave the following illustrations:

– he or she is in contact
with someone suspected of a crime;

– he or she is in contact
with personnel from a foreign mission;

– he or she has attracted
the attention of a foreign intelligence service or is used by such a
service;

– he or she is active in a
circle that has attracted the attention of a foreign intelligence service;

– he or she is used by an
organisation whose activities are the subject of an investigation regarding
threats to security;

– he or she is the referee
of a foreign citizen seeking a visa;

– he or she has contacted
the Security Police and provided information;

– he or she is contacted by
the Security Police.

The Government stated that
information in respect of the person in question may be needed in order
to determine the interests of an entity
(State, organisational or individual) constituting a threat to Swedish
security, and the extent and development of that threat.

50. Section 34 of the Police
Data Act provides:

“The Security Police register may
only contain:

– information for identification;

– information on the grounds for registration;
and

– references to the files where information
concerning the registered person can be found.”

51. Under section 3 of the Personal
Data Act, the treatment of personal information includes every operation
or series of operations carried out with respect to personal information,
whether automatic or manual. Examples of such treatment are the gathering,
entry, collation, storage, processing, use, release and destruction
of personal information. Personal information is defined by the same
provision as all kinds of information that relate directly or indirectly
to a physical, living person. The Personal Data Act applies to the processing
of personal information that is wholly or partially automated. It also
applies to all other processing of personal data if the information
is or is intended to be part of a structured collection of personal
information that can be accessed by means of a search or compilation
according to certain criteria (section 5).

2. Registration and filing

52. Documents that contain information
are collected in files. Depending on its content, a document may, when
necessary, either be placed in a file on a certain individual – a
personal file (personakt) – or in a so-called thematic file (sakakt). It may also be added to both kinds of files.

53. A thematic registration
is done, and a thematic file opened, whenever there is a need to collect
and compile documents systematically. The documents may concern a matter
or a subject that the Security Police have a duty to supervise or cover,
or on which the Security Police need to have access to relevant information
for any other reason. A thematic file may be started in order to collect
documents that concern the relations between States and organisations.
It may also be started in order to collect a certain type of document,
for instance a series of reports. It should be observed that thematic
registration as such does not mean that names are entered into the Security
Police’s register, even though names may be found in the documents
of a thematic file. Thus, a search for a person who has been mentioned
in a thematic file cannot be done unless, for independent reasons, that
person has also been registered in a personal file. Moreover, the name
of a person who has been registered personally may occur in a thematic
file but may still not show up in a search for the name in the latter
file if, for instance, the name in the thematic file lacks relevance
for the Security Police.

3. Correction and destruction of registered
information

54. The Data Inspection Board
(Datainspektionen) monitors compliance with the Personal Data
Act (unlike the Records Board which supervises the Security Police’s
compliance with the Police Data Act). The Data Inspection Board is empowered
to deal with individual complaints and, if it finds that personal information
is not processed in accordance with the Personal Data Act, it is required
to call attention to the fact and request that the situation be corrected.
If the situation remains unchanged, the Board has the power to prohibit,
on pain of a fine (vite), the person responsible for the register from continuing
to process the information in any other way than by storing it (section
45 of the Personal Data Act).

55. The Data Inspection Board
may request a county administrative court to order the erasure of personal
information that has been processed in an unlawful manner (section 47
of the Act).

4. Removal of registered information

56. Registered information in
respect of an individual suspected of committing or of being liable
to commit criminal activities that threaten national security or a terrorist
offence, shall as a rule be removed no later than ten years after the
last entry of information concerning that person was made (section 35
of the Police Data Act). The same applies to information that has been
included in the register for other special reasons connected with the
purpose of the register. The information may be kept for a longer period
if justified by particular reasons. More detailed rules concerning the
removal of information are to be found in the regulations and decisions
issued by the National Archives (Riksarkivet) and in the Security Police’s own rules of procedure.
All documents removed by the Security Police are transferred to the
National Archives.

C. Access to official documents

57. The limitations on access
in this particular field before 1 April 1999 have been described in
detail in Leander (cited above, §§ 41-43). With regard to access to
information kept by the Security Police, absolute secrecy was thus the
principal rule prior to 1 April 1999. The only exceptions made were
for the benefit of researchers. From 1 July 1996 it was also possible
to allow exemptions (dispens) if the government held the view that there were extraordinary
reasons for an exemption to be made from the main rule of absolute secrecy.

58. The absolute secrecy of
files kept exclusively by the Security Police was abolished by an amendment
to Chapter 5, section 1(2), of the Secrecy Act, made at the same time
as the Police Data Act came into force on 1 April 1999. According to
the amended provision, information concerning the Security Police’s
intelligence activities referred to in section 3 of the Police Data Act,
or that otherwise concerns the Security Police’s activities for the
prevention and investigation of crimes against national security, or
to prevent terrorism, was to be kept secret. However, if it was evident
that the information could be revealed without detriment to the aim
of measures that had already been decided upon or that were anticipated,
or without harm to future activities, the information should be disclosed.
When submitting the relevant bill to Parliament, the government stressed
that the nature of the intelligence service was such that information
could only be disclosed in special cases. They presumed that in other
cases the fact that a person was not registered would also remain secret
(Government Bill 1997/98:97, p. 68).

A fourth subsection was added
to section 1 of Chapter 5 on 1 March 2003, under which a person may
upon request be informed of whether or not he or she can be found in
the Security Police’s files as a consequence of registration in accordance
with the Personnel Security Check Ordinance that was in force until
1 July 1996 or corresponding older regulations. However, the government
was still of the view that there were in principle no reasons for the
Security Police to reveal whether or not there was any information concerning
an individual in their files and registers:

“The Government acknowledge that it
may appear unsatisfactory not to be given a clear answer from the Security
Police as to whether an individual is registered in their files or not.
There are, however, valid reasons for the Security Police not to disclose
in certain cases whether a person appears in Security Police records.
This point of view was also taken in the preparatory work on the Police
Data Act (Government Bill 1997/98:97, p. 68), where it was stated that
a person linked to criminal activities may have a strong interest in
knowing whether the police have any information regarding him or her.
In such a case, it could be very damaging for an investigation if it
were revealed to the person in question either that he or she was of
interest to the police or that he or she was not. It is therefore essential
that the information whether a person appears [in the files] or not
may be kept secret.” (Government Bill 2001/02:191, pp. 90-91)

59. The Security Police apply
the Secrecy Act directly. There are thus no internal regulations that
deal with the issue of access to official documents since that would
be in breach of the Secrecy Act. Under Chapter 5, section 1(2), of the
Secrecy Act, there is a presumption of secrecy, meaning that whenever
it is uncertain whether the disclosure of information in an official
document is harmful or not, such information shall not be disclosed.

60. A request for access to
official documents kept by the Security Police gives rise to a search
to ascertain whether or not the person in question appears in the files.
If there is no information, the person who has made the request is not
informed thereof and the request is rejected. A few exceptions have
been made from this practice in cases where the person concerned has
died and the request has been made by his or her children (as in the
second applicant’s case). However, if information is found, the Security
Police make an assessment of whether or not all or part of it can be
disclosed. It is not indicated whether the disclosed information is
all that exists in the files.

61. The Government have stated
that it was standard practice for the Administrative Court of Appeal
to go to the Security Police and take part of their files – if any
– in every case that had been brought to it. The three judges examined
all the documents and made an assessment of every document that had
not been released to the appellant. If the appellant did not appear
in the register and files of the Security Police, the court obtained
part of a computer print-out showing that the appellant did not appear
in the documents kept by the Security Police.

D. Review bodies

1. The Records Board

62. The Records Board (Registernämnden) was established in 1996 and replaced the
National Police Board (described in paragraphs 19 to 34 of the above-mentioned Leander judgment). It is entrusted with the task of determining
whether information kept by the Security Police may be disclosed in
security checks, to monitor the Security Police’s registration and
storage of information and their compliance with the Police Data Act,
in particular section 5 (see section 1 of the Ordinance prescribing
instructions for the Records Board – förordningen med instruktion för Registernämnden, 1996:730).
In order to carry out its supervisory function, the Board is entitled
to have access to information held by the Security Police (section 11).
It presents an annual report to the government on its activities (section
6). The report is made public.

Under sections 2 and 13 of
the Ordinance prescribing instructions for the Records Board, the Board
consists of a maximum of eight members, including a chairperson and
a vice-chairperson, all appointed by the government for a fixed term.
The chairperson and the vice-chairperson have to be or to have been
permanent judges. The remaining members include parliamentarians. The
Records Board’s independence is guaranteed by, inter alia, Chapter 11, section 7, of the Constitution, from
which it follows that neither Parliament nor the government nor any
other public authority may interfere with the manner in which the Board
deals with a particular case.

2. The Data Inspection Board

63. Under section 1 of the Ordinance
prescribing instructions for the Data Inspection Board (1998:1192),
the Board’s main task is to protect individuals from violations of
their personal integrity through the processing of personal data. The
Board is competent to receive complaints from individuals. Its independence
is guaranteed, inter alia, by Chapter 11, section 7, of the Constitution.

64. In
order to carry out its monitoring function, the Data Inspection Board
is entitled to have access to the personal data that is being processed,
to receive relevant additional information and documentation pertaining
to the processing of personal data and to the safety measures in respect
of the processing and, moreover, to have access to the premises where
the processing takes place (section 43 of the Personal Data Act).

The
Board’s powers in relation to the correction and erasure of registered
data are summarised in paragraphs 55 and 56 above.

65. A
personal data representative (personuppgiftsombud) has been appointed within the Security
Police with the function of ensuring independently that the personal
data controller processes personal data in a lawful and correct manner
and in accordance with good practice, and of pointing out any shortcomings.
If the representative has reason to suspect that the controller has
contravened the provisions on the processing of personal data, and if
the situation is not rectified as soon as is practicable after being
pointed out, the representative shall notify the Data Inspection Board
(section 38(1) and (2) of the Personal Data Act).

3. Other review bodies

66. The Security Police, the
Records Board and the Data Inspection Board and their activities come
under the supervision of the Parliamentary Ombudspersons and the Chancellor
of Justice. Their functions and powers are described in Leander (cited above, §§ 36-39).

67. Unlike the Parliamentary
Ombudspersons, the Chancellor of Justice may award compensation in response
to a claim from an individual that a public authority has taken a wrongful
decision or omitted to take a decision. This power of the Chancellor
of Justice is laid down in the Ordinance concerning the administration
of claims for damages against the State (förordningen om handläggning av skadeståndsanspråk mot staten,
1995:1301). The Chancellor may examine claims under several provisions
of the Tort Liability Act (skadeståndslagen, 1972:207), notably Chapter 3, section 2,
pursuant to which the State shall be liable to pay compensation for
financial loss caused by a wrongful act or omission in connection with
the exercise of public authority. Compensation for non-pecuniary damage
may be awarded in connection with the infliction of personal injury
or the commission of certain crimes, such as defamation (Chapter 5,
section 1, and Chapter 1, section 3).

A decision by the Chancellor
of Justice to reject a claim for damages in full or in part may not
be appealed against. The individual may, however, institute civil proceedings
against the State before a district court, with the possibility of appealing
to a higher court. In the alternative, such proceedings may be instituted
immediately without any previous decision by the Chancellor. Before
the courts, the State is represented by the Chancellor.

68. Under section 48 of the
Personal Data Act, a person responsible for a register shall pay compensation
to a data subject for any damage or injury to personal integrity caused
by the processing of personal data in breach of the Act.

THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8
OF THE CONVENTION

69. The relevant parts of Article 8 of the Convention
read as follows:

“1. Everyone has the right to respect
for his private ... life ...

2. There shall be no interference by
a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is
in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society
in the interests of national security ... [or] for the prevention of
disorder or crime ...”

A. Storage of the information that had been
released to the applicants

70. Under Article 8 of the Convention, the applicants
complained that the storage in the Security Police files of the information
that had been released to them constituted unjustified interference
with their right to respect for private life.

1. Applicability of Article 8

71. The Government questioned whether the information
released to the applicants could be said to fall within the scope of
the notion of private life for the purposes of Article 8 § 1. They
stressed that the information that had been released to the first applicant
did not concern her own activities but the activities of other persons,
namely those responsible for the letter bombs that had been sent to
her and others. The information kept on the other applicants that was
subsequently released to them appeared to a large extent to have emanated
from open sources, such as observations made in connection with their
public activities (the second applicant’s participation in a meeting
abroad and the fifth applicant’s participation in a demonstration
in Stockholm). In addition, the bulk of the information was already
in the public domain since it consisted of newspaper articles (the third,
fourth and fifth applicants), radio programmes (the fifth applicant)
or of decisions by public authorities (decision by the Parliamentary
Ombudspersons with regard to the third applicant).None of them had alleged that the released information was
false or incorrect.

72. The Court, having regard to the scope of the
notion of “private life” as interpreted in its case-law (see, in
particular, Amann v. Switzerland [GC], no. 27798/95, § 65, ECHR 2000-II,
and Rotaru
v. Romania [GC], no. 28341/95, § 43, ECHR 2000-V), finds that
the information about the applicants that was stored on the Security
Police register and was released to them clearly constituted data pertaining
to their “private life”. Indeed, this embraces even those parts
of the information that were public, since the information had been
systematically collected and stored in files held by the authorities.
Accordingly, Article 8 § 1 of the Convention is applicable to the impugned
storage of the information in question.

2. Compliance with Article 8

(a) Whether there was interference

73. The Court further considers, and this has
not been disputed, that it follows from its established case-law that
the storage of the information in issue amounted to interference with
the applicants’ right to respect for private life as secured by Article
8 § 1 of the Convention (see Leander, cited above, § 48; Kopp v. Switzerland, 25 March 1998, § 53, Reportsof Judgments and Decisions 1998-II; Amann, cited above, §§ 69 and 80; and Rotaru, cited above, § 46).

(b) Justification for the interference

(i) Whether the interference was in accordance
with the law

74. The applicants did not deny that the contested
storage of information had a legal basis in domestic law. However, they
maintained that the relevant law lacked the requisite quality flowing
from the autonomous meaning of the expression “in accordance with
the law”. In particular, they submitted that the terms of the relevant
national provisions were not formulated with sufficient precision to
enable them to foresee – even with the assistance of legal advice
– the consequences of their own conduct. The ground of “special
reasons” in sub-paragraph 3 of section 33 of the Police Data Act was
excessively broad and could be applied to almost anybody. This had been
amply illustrated by the instances of gathering and storage of information
that had been released to them.

75. The Government submitted that not only did
the impugned interference have a basis in domestic law but the law was
also sufficiently accessible and foreseeable to meet the quality requirement
under the Court’s case-law.

76. The Court reiterates its settled case-law,
according to which the expression “in accordance with the law” not
only requires the impugned measure to have some basis in domestic law,
but also refers to the quality of the law in question, requiring that
it should be accessible to the person concerned and foreseeable as to
its effects (see, among other authorities, Rotaru, cited above, § 52). The law must be compatible with
the rule of law, which means that it must provide a measure of legal
protection against arbitrary interference by public authorities with
the rights safeguarded by paragraph 1 of Article 8. Especially where,
as here, a power of the executive is exercised in secret, the risks
of arbitrariness are evident. Since the implementation in practice of
measures of secret surveillance is not open to scrutiny by the individuals
concerned or the public at large, it would be contrary to the rule of
law for the legal discretion granted to the executive to be expressed
in terms of an unfettered power. Consequently, the law must indicate
the scope of any such discretion conferred on the competent authorities
and the manner of its exercise with sufficient clarity, having regard
to the legitimate aim of the measure in question, to give the individual
adequate protection against arbitrary interference (see Malone v. the United Kingdom, 2 August 1984, §§ 67-68, Series
A no. 82, reiterated in Amann, cited above, § 56, and in Rotaru, cited above, § 55).

77. In this regard, the Court notes from the outset
that the legal basis in Swedish law of the collection and storage of
information on the secret police register, and the quality of that law
prior to the amendments which came into force on 1 April 1999, were
the subject of the Court’s scrutiny in the above-cited Leander judgment (§§ 19-22). It concluded that such measures
had a legal basis in national law and that the law in question was sufficiently
accessible and foreseeable to satisfy the quality requirements flowing
from the autonomous interpretation of the expression “in accordance
with the law” (ibid., §§ 52-57). In the present instance, the parties
have centred their pleadings on the situation after 1 April 1999. The
Court will therefore not deal of its own motion with the period before
that date and will limit its examination to the subsequent period.

78. In the first place, the Court is satisfied
that the storage of the information in issue had a legal basis in sections
5, 32 and 33 of the 1998 Police Data Act.

79. Secondly, as to the question regarding the
quality of the law, the Court notes that, as is made clear by the terms
of section 33 of the Police Data Act, “[t]he Security Police’s register
may contain personal information only” (emphasis added) on any of the grounds set out in sub-paragraphs
1, 2 or 3. The Court considers that an issue may arise, but only in
relation to the apparent broadness of the ground in sub-paragraph 3
of section 33: “Considering the purpose for which the register is
kept, there are other special reasons therefor” (see paragraph 49
above). The Government stated that a person may be registered without
his or her being incriminated in any way. Here the preparatory work
gives some specific and clear examples: in particular, a person who
is connected with another person who has been registered, a person who
may be the target of a threat and a person who may be the object of
recruitment by a foreign intelligence service (ibid.). The Government
have also given examples of wider categories, for instance “a person
in contact with someone suspected of a crime” (ibid.). It is clear
that the Security Police enjoys a certain discretion in assessing who
and what information should be registered and also if there are “special
reasons” other than those mentioned in sub-paragraphs 1 and 2 of section
33 (a person suspected of a crime threatening national security or a
terrorist offence, or undergoing a security check).

However, the discretion afforded to the Security
Police in determining what constitutes “special reasons” under sub-paragraph
3 of section 33 is not unfettered. Under the Swedish Constitution, no
entry regarding a citizen may be made in a public register exclusively
on the basis of that person’s political opinion without his or her
consent. A general prohibition of registration on the basis of political
opinion is further set out in section 5 of the Police Data Act. The
purpose of the register must be borne in mind where registration is
made for “special reasons” under sub-paragraph 3 of section 33.
Under section 32 of the Police Data Act, the purpose of storing information
on the Security Police register must be to facilitate investigations
undertaken to prevent and uncover crimes against national security or
to combat terrorism. Further limitations follow from section 34 governing
the manner of recording data in the Security Police register.

Against this background, the Court finds that
the scope of the discretion conferred on the competent authorities and
the manner of its exercise was indicated with sufficient clarity, having
regard to the legitimate aim of the measure in question, to give the
individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference.

80. Accordingly, the interference with the respective
applicants’ private lives was “in accordance with the law”, within
the meaning of Article 8.

(ii) Aim and necessity of the interference

81. The applicants stressed the absence of any
concrete actions recorded by the Security Police that substantiated
the alleged risk that any of them might be connected with terrorism,
espionage or any other relevant crime.

82. The Government maintained that the interference
pursued one or more legitimate aims: the prevention of crime, in so
far as the first applicant’s own safety was concerned by the bomb
threats, and the interests of national security with regard to all the
applicants. In each case the interference was moreover “necessary”
for the achievement of the legitimate aim or aims pursued.

83. The Government submitted that they were at
a loss to understand the reason why the first applicant should claim
at all that the Security Police’s registration and filing of information
concerning threats against her were not in her best interests but, on
the contrary, entailed a violation of her rights under the Convention.
The information that had been released to the other four applicants
was highly varied in nature. Most of it appeared to have been found
in the public domain, such as the media. The Government were unaware
of the origins of each and every piece of information, and therefore
could not comment on that particular aspect. They noted, however, that
from today’s perspective the information seemed either fairly old
or quite harmless and that the interference was proportionate to the
legitimate aim pursued, namely the protection of national security.

84. As to the second applicant, given the Cold
War context at the time, it could not be deemed unreasonable for the
Security Police to have kept themselves informed about a meeting in
1967 of left-wing sympathisers in Poland in which he may have taken
part. He had not been the subject of personal data registration and
the information about him had been carefully phrased (with the use of
the word “probably”).

85. The third and fourth applicants had since
the 1970s been members of the KPML(r), a political party which advocated
the use of violence in order to bring about a change in the existing
social order. One of the Security Police’s duties was to uphold the
Constitution, namely, by preventing and uncovering threats against the
nation’s internal security. It was evident that persons who were members
of political parties like the KPML(r) would attract the attention of
the Security Police.

86. The case of the fifth applicant should also
be seen against the background of the Cold War, and he too seemed to
have advocated violence as a means of bringing about changes in society.
According to one of the entries in the records released to him, he was
said to have stated that violence could be resorted to in order to stage
demonstrations and to achieve their goals.

(iii) The Court’s assessment

87. The Court accepts that the storage of the
information in question pursued legitimate aims, namely the prevention
of disorder or crime, in the case of the first applicant, and the protection
of national security, in that of the remainder of the applicants.

88. While the Court recognises that intelligence
services may legitimately exist in a democratic society, it reiterates
that powers of secret surveillance of citizens are tolerable under the
Convention only in so far as strictly necessary for safeguarding the
democratic institutions (see Klass and Others v. Germany, 6 September 1978, § 42, Series
A no. 28, and Rotaru, cited above, § 47). Such interference must be supported
by relevant and sufficient reasons and must be proportionate to the
legitimate aim or aims pursued. In this connection, the Court considers
that the national authorities enjoy a margin of appreciation, the scope
of which will depend not only on the nature of the legitimate aim pursued
but also on the particular nature of the interference involved. In the
instant case, the interest of the respondent State in protecting its
national security and combating terrorism must be balanced against the
seriousness of the interference with the respective applicants’ right
to respect for private life. Here again the Court will limit its examination
to the period from 1999 onwards.

89. In so far as the first applicant is concerned,
the Court finds no reason to doubt that the reasons for keeping on record
the information relating to bomb threats in 1990 against her and certain
other personalities were relevant and sufficient as regards the aim
of preventing disorder or crime. The measure was at least in part motivated
by the interest in protecting her security; there can be no question
of any disproportionate interference with her right to respect for private
life thus being entailed. The Court has received no particulars about
the precise contents of the documents released to the applicant on 13
December 2002 and will not therefore examine that matter.

90. However, as to the information released to
the second applicant (namely, his participation in a political meeting
in Warsaw in 1967), the Court, bearing in mind the nature and age of
the information, does not find that its continued storage is supported
by reasons which are relevant and sufficient as regards the protection
of national security.

Similarly, the storage of the information released
to the fifth applicant could for the most part hardly be deemed to correspond
to any actual relevant national security interests for the respondent
State. The continued storage of the information to the effect that he,
in 1969, had allegedly advocated violent resistance to police control
during demonstrations was supported by reasons that, although relevant,
could not be deemed sufficient thirty years later.

Therefore, the Court finds that the continued
storage of the information released to the second and fifth applicants
entailed a disproportionate interference with their right to respect
for private life.

91. The information released to the third and
fourth applicants raises more complex issues in that it related to their
membership of the KPML(r), a political party which, the Government stressed,
advocated the use of violence and breaches of the law in order to bring
about a change in the existing social order. In support of their argument,
the Government submitted a copy of the KPML(r) party programme, as adopted
on 2-4 January 1993, and referred in particular to its Clauses 4, 22,
23 and 28 (see paragraph 38 above).

The Court observes that the relevant clauses
of the KPML(r) party programme rather boldly advocate establishing the
domination of one social class over another by disregarding existing
laws and regulations. However, the programme contains no statements
amounting to an immediate and unequivocal call for the use of violence
as a means of achieving political ends. Clause 23, for instance, which
contains the most explicit statements on the matter, is more nuanced
in this respect and does not propose violence as either a primary or
an inevitable means in all circumstances. Nonetheless, it affirms the
principle of armed opposition.

However, the Court reiterates that “the constitution
and programme of a political party cannot be taken into account as the
sole criterion for determining its objectives and intentions; the contents
of the programme must be compared with the actions of the party’s
leaders and the positions they defend” (see, mutatis mutandis, Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey [GC],
nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98, § 101, ECHR 2003-II; United Communist
Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, 30 January 1998, § 46, Reports
1998-I; Socialist
Party and Others v. Turkey, 25 May 1998, § 50, Reports 1998-III; and Freedom and Democracy Party (ÖZDEP) v. Turkey [GC], no. 23885/94,
§ 45, ECHR 1999-VIII). This approach, which the Court has adopted in
assessing the necessity under Article 11 § 2 of the Convention of the
dissolution of a political party, is also pertinent for assessing the
necessity in the interests of national security under Article 8 § 2
of collecting and storing information on a secret police register about
the leaders and members of a political party.

In this case, the KPML(r) party programme was
the only evidence relied on by the Government. Beyond that, they did
not point to any specific circumstance indicating that the impugned
programme clauses were reflected in actions or statements by the party’s
leaders or members and constituted an actual or even potential threat
to national security when the information was released in 1999, almost
thirty years after the party had come into existence. Therefore, the
reasons for the continued storage of the information about the third
and fourth applicants, although relevant, may not be considered sufficient
for the purposes of the necessity test to be applied under Article 8
§ 2 of the Convention. Thus, the continued storage of the information
released to the respective applicants in 1999 amounted to a disproportionate
interference with their right to respect for private life.

92. In sum, the Court concludes that the continued
storage of the information that had been released was necessary with
respect to the first applicant, but not for any of the remaining applicants.
Accordingly, the Court finds that there has been no violation of Article
8 of the Convention with regard to the first applicant, but that there
has been a violation of this provision with regard to each of the other
applicants.

B. The refusals to advise the applicants of
the full extent to which information was kept about them on the Security
Police register

1. The parties’ submissions

(a) The applicants

93. The applicants further submitted that the
respective refusals to grant full access to all information kept about
them on the Security Police register amounted to unjustified interference
with their right to respect for private life under Article 8 of the
Convention.

94. In the applicants’ view, the interference
was not “in accordance with the law” as the relevant national law
failed to fulfil the requirements as to quality under the Convention.
It had not been foreseeable what kind of information might be stored
or what considerations governed the decisions by the Security Police
or the courts on each applicant’s request for access to information
kept on file about them.

95. Nor was the interference “necessary in a
democratic society”. The applicants pointed to the absence of any
specific information recorded by the Security Police that could substantiate
any assumption of a risk that the applicants might be connected with
terrorism, espionage or other relevant criminal activities. Moreover,
the lack of access to declassified data kept mainly for purely historical
or political reasons could not be viewed as strictly necessary.

In this connection, the applicants argued that
the relevant law did not offer adequate safeguards against abuse. They
stressed that the Records Board, a body established in 1996, had failed
to review their files following their request for access. The Board
had no power to order the destruction of files or the suppression or
rectification of information therein. Nor was it empowered to award
compensation. The Data Inspection Board had never carried out a substantial
review of the files kept by the Security Police. The Parliamentary Ombudsperson
could not grant the applicants access to their files and was not empowered
to correct false or irrelevant information therein. The Chancellor of
Justice was the government’s representative and was therefore not
independent.

(b) The Government

96. The Government acknowledged that, at some
point in time, the Swedish Security Police had kept some information
about the applicants but, referring to their above-mentioned arguments,
questioned whether the applicants had shown that there was at least
a reasonable likelihood that the Security Police retained personal information
about them and that there had consequently been interference with their
private life.

97. However, were the Court to conclude that there
was interference with the applicants’ rights under Article 8 § 1
in this context, the Government submitted that it was justified under
Article 8 § 2: it was “in accordance with the law”, pursued a legitimate
aim and was “necessary in a democratic society” in order to achieve
that aim.

98. As to the issue of necessity, the Government
argued that under Swedish law there were adequate safeguards against
abuse.

(i) The discretion afforded to the Security Police
was subject to limitations set out in the more general Personal Data
Act, which dealt with the processing of personal information wherever
it took place, and the more specific Police Data Act, which in positive
terms obliged the Security Police to keep a register, specified its
aims and laid down the conditions under which personal information could
be included in it.

(ii) Both the Constitution and the Police Data
Act expressly provided that certain sensitive information could only
be registered in exceptional circumstances, that is to say when it was
“strictly necessary”. Under no circumstances could a person be registered
by the Security Police simply because of his or her political views
or affiliations.

(iii) The Data Inspection Board was an important
safeguard, considering its mandate with respect to the overall treatment
of personal information. It was empowered to take various measures to
protect personal integrity, such as prohibiting all processing of personal
data (other than merely storing it) pending the rectification of illegalities.
It could also institute judicial proceedings in order to have registered
information erased.

(iv) The Records Board, another important safeguard,
had two functions. It monitored the Security Police’s filing and storage
of information and their compliance with the Police Data Act. It also
determined whether information held by the Security Police could be
disclosed in security checks.

(v) The Parliamentary Ombudspersons supervised
the application of laws and other regulations not only by the Security
Police themselves but also by the bodies monitoring them (the Data Inspection
Board and the Records Board). The Ombudspersons were empowered to carry
out inspections and other investigations, institute criminal proceedings
against public officials and report officials for disciplinary action.
It was to be recalled that the third applicant’s trade union had in
fact lodged a complaint with the Parliamentary Ombudspersons, arguing
that there had been a breach of the Personnel Security Check Ordinance
in connection with the security check carried out with regard to the
third applicant, and that the Ombudspersons had voiced some criticism
about the manner in which the matter had been handled.

(vi) The Chancellor of Justice had a role similar
to that of the Parliamentary Ombudspersons, was competent to report
public servants for disciplinary action, to institute criminal proceedings
against them and to award compensation.

In addition, damages could be claimed under the
Tort Liability Act in direct judicial proceedings. The Personal Data
Act moreover contained a separate ground for damages that was of relevance
in the context of the present case.

The Government argued that, in view of the absence
of any evidence or indication that the system was not functioning as
required by domestic law, the framework of safeguards achieved a compromise
between the requirements of protecting a democratic society and the
rights of the individual which was compatible with the provisions of
the Convention.

2. The Court’s assessment

99. The Court, bearing in mind its assessment
in paragraphs 72 and 73 above, finds it established that the impugned
refusal to advise the applicants of the full extent to which information
was being kept about them on the Security Police register amounted to
interference with their right to respect for private life.

100. The refusal had a legal basis in domestic
law, namely Chapter 5, section 1(2), of the Secrecy Act. As to the quality
of the law, the Court refers to its findings in paragraphs 79 and 80
above, as well as paragraphs 57 to 61, describing the conditions of a
person’s access to information about him or her on the Security Police
register. The Court finds no reason to doubt that the interference was
“in accordance with the law” within the meaning of Article 8 §
2.

101. Moreover, the refusal pursued one or more
legitimate aims – reference is made to paragraph 87 above.

102. The Court notes that, according to the Convention
case-law, a refusal of full access to a national secret police register
is necessary where the State may legitimately fear that the provision
of such information may jeopardise the efficacy of a secret surveillance
system designed to protect national security and to combat terrorism
(see Klass
and Others, cited above, § 58, and Leander, cited above, § 66). In this case the national administrative
and judicial authorities involved all held that full access would jeopardise
the purpose of the system. The Court does not find any ground on which
it could arrive at a different conclusion.

103. Moreover, having regard to the Convention
case-law (see Klass and Others, cited above, § 50; Leander, cited above, § 60; Esbester v. the United Kingdom, no. 18601/91, Commission decision
of 2 April 1993, unreported; and Christie v. the United Kingdom, no. 21482/93, Commission decision
of 27 June 1994, Decisions and Reports 78-A) and referring to its findings
regarding the quality of the law (see paragraphs 79 and 80 above) and
the various guarantees that existed under national law (see paragraphs
52 to 68), the Court finds it established that the applicable safeguards
met the requirements of Article 8 § 2.

104. In the light of the foregoing, the Court
finds that the respondent State, having regard to the wide margin of
appreciation available to it, was entitled to consider that the interests
of national security and the fight against terrorism prevailed over
the interests of the applicants in being advised of the full extent
to which information was kept about them on the Security Police register.

Accordingly, the Court finds that there has been
no violation of Article 8 of the Convention under this head.

II. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLES
10 AND 11 OF THE CONVENTION

105. The applicants complained that, in so far
as the storage of secret information was used as a means of surveillance
of political dissidents, as was particularly noticeable with regard
to the first and fourth applicants, it entailed a violation of their
rights under Article 10 of the Convention. The relevant parts of that
Article provide:

“1. Everyone has the right to freedom
of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and
to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by
public authority and regardless of frontiers. ...

2. The exercise of these freedoms, since
it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed
by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of
national security ... [or] for the prevention of disorder or crime ...”

They further complained that, for each of them,
membership of a political party had been a central factor in the decision
to file secret information on them. This state of affairs constituted
an unjustified interference with their rights under Article 11, the
relevant parts of which provide:

“1. Everyone has the right to freedom
of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including
the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his
interests.

2. No restrictions shall be placed on
the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law
and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security or ... for the prevention of disorder or crime ...”

106. The Government argued that no separate issues
arose under either Article 10 or Article 11 in the circumstances of
the present case in so far as the first, second, fourth and fifth applicants
were concerned. They had not been the subject of personnel security
checks. The information on them held by the Security Police was apparently
never consulted by third parties. In fact, it seemed only to have been
released to the applicants themselves following their own requests for
access. Furthermore, their suspicions that the Security Police were
holding information on them – suspicions that were confirmed when
information was indeed released to them – appeared not to have had
any impact on their opportunities to exercise their rights under either
Article 10 or Article 11. They had at all times been free to hold and
express their political or other opinions. It was not supported by the
facts of the present case that their opportunities to enjoy freedom
of association had in any way been impaired. Therefore, the Government
maintained that there had been no interference with their rights under
Articles 10 and 11 and requested the Court to declare their complaints
under these provisions inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded.

107. The Court, for its part, considers that the
applicants’ complaints under Articles 10 and 11, as submitted, relate
essentially to the adverse effects on their political freedoms caused
by the storage of information on them in the Security Police register.
However, the applicants have not adduced specific information enabling
it to assess how such registration in the concrete circumstances could
have hindered the exercise of their rights under Articles 10 and 11.
Nevertheless, the Court considers that the storage of personal data
related to political opinion, affiliations and activities that is deemed
unjustified for the purposes of Article 8 § 2 ipso facto constitutes an unjustified interference with the
rights protected by Articles 10 and 11. Having regard to its findings
above under Article 8 of the Convention with regard to the storage of
information, the Court finds that there has been no violation of these
provisions with regard to the first applicant, but that there have been
violations of Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention with regard to the
other applicants.

III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE
13 OF THE CONVENTION

108. The applicants further complained that no
effective remedy existed under Swedish law with respect to the above
violations, contrary to Article 13 of the Convention, which provides:

“Everyone whose rights and freedoms
as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective
remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation
has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”

A. The parties’ submissions

1. The applicants

109. Apart from arguing that the relevant Swedish
law on data registration was vague and that the safeguards against improper
data entry were inadequate, the applicants submitted, in particular,
that Swedish law did not provide for a judicial remedy enabling aggrieved
parties to have the files destroyed.

110. The applicants further alleged that the standardised
reasoning the national courts gave when rejecting their request for
full access to their respective files had been arbitrary and even stigmatising.

The first applicant claimed that the Administrative
Court of Appeal did not look into the Security Police’s files on her
before adopting its judgment.

111. The applicants maintained that during its
thirty years of existence the Data Inspection Board had never performed
a substantial review of the files of the Security Police. While the
Records Board had been a success, it had not been involved in any of
the instances in issue under the Convention. The Parliamentary Ombudsperson
was not empowered to decide on whether the applicants should be granted
a right of access to their files or to correct irrelevant or false information
on them. The Chancellor of Justice was not independent of the executive.

2. The Government

112. The Government disputed that the applicants
had an arguable claim for the purposes of Article 13 and contended that
this provision was therefore not applicable. In any event, the requirements
of this provision had been complied with.

113. In so far as the applicants could be deemed
to have arguable claims when it came to the correction and erasure of
information held by the Security Police, the Government referred to
the available remedies. The applicants could have complained – but
had failed to do so – to the Data Inspection Board in order to seek
appropriate measures.

114. The Government further disputed the first
applicant’s contention that the administrative courts had failed to
look into the Security Police’s files. It was evident from the case
file of the Administrative Court of Appeal that the court had visited
the premises of the Security Police on 3 February 2000 in order to obtain
some of the documents.

115. In so far as the applicants had also complained
of a lack of opportunity to seek compensation for any grievances resulting
from the storage of information on them by the Security Police, they
had had the opportunity to (1) lodge complaints with the Chancellor
of Justice, (2) institute judicial proceedings under the Tort Liability
Act, or (3) claim – also within the framework of judicial proceedings
– damages under the Personal Data Act. None of the applicants appeared
to have made use of any of those remedies.

B. The Court’s assessment

116. The Court sees no reason to doubt that the
applicants’ complaints under Article 8 of the Convention about the
storage of information and refusal to advise them of the full extent
to which information on them was being kept may, in accordance with
its consistent case-law (see, for example, Rotaru, cited above, § 67), be regarded as “arguable”
grievances attracting the application of Article 13. They were therefore
entitled to an effective domestic remedy within the meaning of this
provision.

117. Article 13 guarantees the availability at
national level of a remedy to enforce the substance of the Convention
rights and freedoms in whatever form they might happen to be secured
in the domestic legal order. It therefore requires the provision of
a domestic remedy allowing the “competent national authority” both
to deal with the substance of the relevant Convention complaint and
to grant appropriate relief, although Contracting States are afforded
some discretion as to the manner in which they conform to their obligation
under this provision. The remedy must be “effective” in practice
as well as in law (ibid., § 67).

The “authority” referred to in Article 13
may not necessarily in all instances be a judicial authority in the
strict sense. Nevertheless, the powers and procedural guarantees an
authority possesses are relevant in determining whether the remedy is
effective. Furthermore, where secret surveillance is concerned, objective
supervisory machinery may be sufficient as long as the measures remain
secret. It is only once the measures have been divulged that legal remedies
must become available to the individual (ibid., § 69).

118. Turning to the present case, the Court observes
that the Parliamentary Ombudsperson and the Chancellor of Justice have
competence to receive individual complaints and have a duty to investigate
them in order to ensure that the relevant laws have been properly applied.
By tradition, their opinions command great respect in Swedish society
and are usually followed. However, in the above-cited Leander judgment (§ 82), the Court found that the main weakness
in the control afforded by these officials is that, apart from their
competence to institute criminal proceedings and disciplinary proceedings,
they lack the power to render a legally binding decision. In addition,
they exercise general supervision and do not have specific responsibility
for inquiries into secret surveillance or into the entry and storage
of information on the Security Police register. As it transpires from
the aforementioned judgment, the Court found neither remedy, when considered
on its own, to be effective within the meaning of Article 13 of the
Convention (ibid., § 84).

119. In the meantime, a number of steps have been
taken to improve the remedies, notably enabling the Chancellor of Justice
to award compensation, with the possibility of judicial appeal against
the dismissal of a compensation claim, and the establishment of the
Records Board, replacing the former National Police Board. The Government
further referred to the Data Inspection Board.

Moreover, it should be noted that, with the abolition
of the absolute secrecy rule under former Chapter 5, section 1(2), of
the Secrecy Act (when it is deemed evident that information could be
revealed without harming the purposes of the register), a decision by
the Security Police whether to advise a person of information kept about
him or her on their register may form the subject of an appeal to the
county administrative court and the Supreme Administrative Court. In
practice, the former will go and consult the Security Police register
and appraise for itself the contents of files before determining an
appeal against a refusal by the Security Police to provide such information.
For the reasons set out below, it is not necessary here to resolve the
disagreement between the first applicant and the Government as to the
scope of the Administrative Court of Appeal’s review in her case.

In the circumstances, the Court finds no cause
for criticising the similarities in the reasoning of the Administrative
Court of Appeal in the applicants’ cases.

120. However, the Court notes that the Records
Board, the body specifically empowered to monitor on a day-to-day basis
the Security Police’s entry and storage of information and compliance
with the Police Data Act, has no competence to order the destruction
of files or the erasure or rectification of information kept in the
files.

It appears that wider powers in this respect
are vested in the Data Inspection Board, which may examine complaints
by individuals. Where it finds that data is being processed unlawfully,
it can order the processor, on pain of a fine, to stop processing the
information other than for storage. The Board is not itself empowered
to order the erasure of unlawfully stored information, but can make
an application for such a measure to the county administrative court.
However, no information has been furnished to shed light on the effectiveness
of the Data Inspection Board in practice. It has therefore not been
shown that this remedy is effective.

121. What is more, in so far as the applicants
complained about the compatibility with Articles 8, 10 and 11 of the
storage on the register of the information that had been released to
them, they had no direct access to any legal remedy as regards the erasure
of the information in question. In the view of the Court, these shortcomings
are not consistent with the requirements of effectiveness in Article
13 (see Rotaru,
cited above, § 71, and Klass and Others, cited above, § 71) and are not offset by
any possibilities for the applicants to seek compensation (see paragraphs
67 and 68 above).

122. In the light of the above, the Court does
not find that the applicable remedies, whether considered on their own
or in the aggregate, can be said to satisfy the requirements of Article
13 of the Convention.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that there has
been a violation of this provision.

IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF
THE CONVENTION

123. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has
been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if
the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A. Damage

124. The applicants each sought 400,000 Swedish
kronor
(SEK) (approximately 42,970 euros (EUR)), exclusive of value-added tax (VAT), in
compensation for non-pecuniary damage, arguing that they should be awarded
the same level of compensation as was offered to Mr Leander following
the revelations as to what information had been kept about him on the
secret police register and subsequent to the delivery of the Court’s
judgment in his case.

125. The Government stressed that the offer to
Mr Leander had been made on an ex gratia basis under a special agreement reached on 25 November
1997 between him and them. In their view, the grant of compensation
to Mr Leander could not serve as a model for any award to be made in
this case. The Government submitted that the applicants had not substantiated
their claim and had not shown any causal link between the alleged violation
of the Convention and any non-pecuniary damage. In any event, the injury
which may have been sustained by the applicants was not of such a serious
nature as to justify a pecuniary award in this case. In the Government’s
view, the finding of a violation would in itself constitute sufficient
just satisfaction.

126. The Court agrees with the Government
that the settlement they reached with Mr Leander cannot serve as a model
for an award in the present case. However, the Court considers that
each of the applicants must have suffered anxiety and distress as a
result of the violation or violations of the Convention found in his
or her case that cannot be compensated solely by the Court’s findings.
Accordingly, having regard to the nature of the violations and the particular
circumstances pertaining to each applicant, the Court awards under this
head EUR 3,000 to the first applicant, EUR 7,000 each to the second
and fifth applicants and EUR 5,000 each to the third and fourth applicants.

B. Costs and expenses

127. The applicants sought, firstly, the reimbursement
of their legal costs and expenses, in an amount totalling SEK 289,000
(approximately EUR 31,000), in respect of their lawyer’s work on the
case (115 hours and 35 minutes, at SEK 2,500 per hour).

Secondly, the applicants’ lawyer sought certain
sums in reimbursement of the cost of his work in connection with a “first
session” with the third applicant and a number of other persons.

128. The Government maintained that costs and
expenses relating to other cases were not relevant and should not be
taken into account in any award to be made in this case. As to the amount
claimed with respect to the present case, the Government did not question
the number of hours indicated but considered the hourly rate charged
to be excessive. SEK 1,286 (inclusive of VAT) was the hourly rate currently
applied under the Swedish legal aid system. In view of the special character
of the case, the Government could accept a higher rate, not exceeding
SEK 1,800. Accordingly, should the Court find a violation, they would
be prepared to pay a total of SEK 208,000 in respect of legal costs
(approximately EUR 22,000).

129. The Court will consider the above claims
in the light of the criteria laid down in its case-law, namely whether
the costs and expenses were actually and necessarily incurred in order
to prevent or obtain redress for the matter found to constitute a violation
of the Convention and are reasonable as to quantum.

Accordingly, the Court dismisses the applicants’
second costs claim. As to the first claim, the Court is not convinced
that the hourly rate and the number of hours were justified. Deciding
on an equitable basis, it awards the applicants, jointly, EUR 20,000
under this head.

C. Default interest

130. The Court considers it appropriate that the
default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the
European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

1. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention
in respect of the second, third, fourth and fifth applicants, but not
of the first applicant;

2. Holds that there has been a violation of Articles 10 and 11
of the Convention in respect of the second, third, fourth and fifth
applicants, but not of the first applicant;

3. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the
Convention in respect of each of the applicants;

4. Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay,
within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final
in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following
amounts:

(i) in respect of non-pecuniary damage,
EUR 3,000 (three thousand euros) to the first applicant; EUR 7,000 (seven
thousand euros) each to the second and fifth applicants; and EUR 5,000
(five thousand euros) each to the third and fourth applicants;

(ii) EUR 20,000 (twenty thousand euros)
to the applicants jointly in respect of costs and expenses;

(iii) any tax that may be chargeable on
the above amounts;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned
three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the
above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European
Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

5. Dismisses the remainder of the applicants’ claim for just
satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing
on 6 June 2006, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.