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Sunday, 3 December 2017

General John M. "Jack" Keane was the most senior Army officer in the United States on September 11, 2001. Working at the Pentagon, he was ideally placed to respond promptly and effectively to the terrorist attacks that day. And yet he appears to have done alarmingly little while the attacks were underway.

The only action he has recalled taking after learning about the crashes at the World Trade Center was ordering that the Army Operations Center (AOC) at the Pentagon be brought up to full manning. He apparently did not order the activation of the Army's Crisis Action Team (CAT), even though this was designed for dealing with emergencies like the one taking place at the time.

When the Pentagon was hit, more than 50 minutes after the attacks began, Keane initially spent time helping people get out of the building--a task that anyone could have performed--instead of carrying out his duties as head of the Army. He only went to the AOC, a facility that was ideally equipped for dealing with the crisis, when one of his staffers pointed out that he should "leave the recovery to other people" and go and "take command of the Army."

We need to consider why Keane, despite being an experienced military man, apparently performed very poorly in response to the crisis on September 11. Was his inaction due to incompetence or was there a more sinister reason for it? Might he have been confused because he mistook actual events for simulations, as part of a training exercise? Might he even have been to some degree complicit in what happened and so his inaction was intended to help ensure that the military was unable to stop the attacks before the targets were hit?

Keane was one of a number of key officials who surely had essential duties to perform in coordinating the military's response to the 9/11 attacks but failed to get properly involved in responding to the crisis until it was too late to make a difference to the outcome of the attacks. His actions on September 11, though, have so far avoided serious scrutiny. We therefore need to examine what he did, and what he failed to do, while the attacks were underway.

ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF WAS OUT OF THE COUNTRY ON SEPTEMBER 11Jack Keane was vice chief of staff of the U.S. Army--the Army's second-highest-ranking officer--from 1999 to 2003. On September 11, however, General Eric Shinseki, chief of staff of the U.S. Army, was out of the country attending the Pacific Armies Management Seminar, a conference in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. [1] This meant Keane was the highest-ranking Army officer in the U.S. that day and presumably served as the acting chief of staff of the Army while Shinseki was away. [2] He would therefore likely have been responsible for taking charge of the Army's response to the terrorist attacks in New York and at the Pentagon, and his actions would surely have had a significant impact on how effectively the Army performed.

The Army in fact had a unique and important role to play on September 11. As "executive agent" for the Department of Defense, it was responsible for coordinating with the Navy and the Air Force on "proposed action to support civilian authorities during emergencies involving mass casualties," according to the Defense Department's book about the Pentagon attack. [3] It was presumably, therefore, particularly important that Keane acted promptly and effectively in response to the attacks.

KEANE IMMEDIATELY THOUGHT THE FIRST CRASH WAS AN ATTACKKeane was at the Pentagon--the headquarters of the Department of Defense--on the morning of September 11. This was probably an ideal location from which to respond to the 9/11 attacks. And yet descriptions of his actions indicate that his reaction to the crisis was far less adequate than we might reasonably expect.

He was in his office when the attacks began and was promptly alerted to the first crash at the World Trade Center. American Airlines Flight 11 flew into the North Tower at 8:46 a.m. and CNN started reporting the incident at 8:49 a.m. Apparently very shortly after this, a member of his staff ran into the room and said, "Sir, something terrible is going on in New York." She turned on the television and Keane then saw the reports stating that a plane had hit the Trade Center.

Keane has recalled that, unlike many people, he realized right away that the incident was a terrorist attack. Noticing that it was a cloudless day, he thought, "Nobody could ever hit the World Trade Center on a day like that by accident." He also remembered that the Trade Center had been the target of a terrorist attack before, with a bomb going off in the underground parking garage there in February 1993. Therefore, he has commented, "I knew instinctively it had to be a terrorist attack and said as much."

In response to the event, he called General Peter Chiarelli, the Army's director of operations, readiness, and mobilization, who was also at the Pentagon that morning, and ordered him to bring the Army Operations Center up to full manning. [4] The AOC, located in the Pentagon basement, was normally staffed by 35 to 40 men, but during a crisis the number of people working there would be significantly increased. [5]

The AOC was "the Army's command and control center," Chiarelli has commented. [6] And yet, while Chiarelli headed to it after Keane called him, Keane remained in his office at that time. Even after he saw the second hijacked plane--United Airlines Flight 175--crashing into the World Trade Center on television, at 9:03 a.m., he stayed where he was.

OFFICERS DISCUSSED EVACUATING BUILDINGS IN WASHINGTONAt some point after the second attack in New York occurred but before 9:37 a.m., when the Pentagon was hit, Chiarelli called Keane from the AOC. He reported that the Operations Center was fully manned and alerted Keane to a suspicious aircraft that had been noticed flying toward Washington, DC.

He said he was monitoring Federal Aviation Administration communications and, Keane recalled, had learned that "a plane that took off from Washington, DC, had turned around in the vicinity of Ohio and approached DC from the south along I-95 before turning east, short of the city, and then south again." (He was presumably referring to American Airlines Flight 77, the plane that supposedly crashed into the Pentagon.) "We were obviously aware then that there was a plane targeting Washington," Keane has commented.

Keane and Chiarelli started discussing the procedures for evacuating buildings in the capital. But then the Pentagon was hit. Keane felt his office shake violently, even though it was located far from the crash site, and, he recalled, the office "immediately" began to fill with smoke. He alerted Chiarelli to the incident right away. "Pete, that plane [that was approaching Washington] just hit us," he said.

Even then, however, Keane apparently issued no orders or did anything else to help protect America and prevent further attacks. Instead, he recalled, he told Chiarelli "to tell the U.S. Army around the world what happened [at the Pentagon] and that, given the status of the AOC, which was unharmed, we would still maintain command and control of the Army."

KEANE WENT TO HELP AT THE CRASH SITEKeane told his staffers to evacuate at that time. But he stayed inside the Pentagon himself, keeping just his executive officer and his aide with him. However, rather than heading to the AOC, where he could have helped the Army respond to the crisis, he went toward the scene of the attack. "Let's go on down there and see if we can help some of these people," he told his aide and his executive officer.

The three men made it to about 100 yards from the crash site, where they found the smoke becoming thicker. From there, they helped Pentagon employees get out of the building--"making sure they know what to do and where they're going, and that sort of thing," Keane described.

Keane has not said exactly how much time they spent doing this. But after "a while," his executive officer told him the three men needed to go to the AOC, from where Keane could "take charge of the Army." Keane agreed and he then went to the Operations Center with his two colleagues. [7]

Other senior Army leaders also went to the AOC after the Pentagon was hit. [8] The Operations Center became "a focal point for all Pentagon activities," according to Lieutenant Colonel Richard Kotch, an AOC staffer. [9]

Personnel there worked throughout the attacks and their aftermath. [10] They "assured continuity of operations" after the Pentagon was hit, Kotch recalled. [11] They reportedly "spent much of 9/11 manning the phones; opening secure communications channels to the Army chief of staff, the National Command Authority, and the other Pentagon-based operation centers; and assessing the local and international situation for the senior command." [12] Keane stayed in the Operations Center until around 11:00 p.m. that night. [13]

KEANE SHOULD HAVE GONE TO THE OPERATIONS CENTER AFTER THE FIRST CRASHAnalysis of Jack Keane's actions highlights numerous oddities around how the Army vice chief of staff reacted to the 9/11 attacks, which we need to examine. An important question to consider is why Keane remained in his office after he learned of the first crash, even though he would surely have been much better able to organize a response to the crisis in the Army Operations Center.

Keane recognized immediately that an attack was underway when he learned that a plane had hit the World Trade Center. "I sensed it instinctively what had happened, that this was a terrorist act," he recalled. [14] He should presumably, therefore, have realized that he needed to respond quickly and effectively, in case more attacks were imminent--as indeed turned out to be the case.

And since the Army was the Department of Defense's "executive agent" for providing support to civilian authorities during disasters involving mass casualties--like the one that had just occurred in New York--he should presumably have gone immediately to the most suitable location for organizing Army assistance in response to the crash.

The AOC seems to have been the logical place for Keane to have gone to, where he could have most effectively carried out his duties as acting Army chief of staff. It was "the place that people will migrate" to during an emergency, according to General Clyde Vaughn, the Army's deputy director of operations, readiness, and mobilization. Keane would presumably, therefore, have been surrounded by colleagues there, who could have helped him respond to the attacks. [15]

The facility was equipped with state-of-the-art communications equipment and television sets for monitoring news coverage. It also had four giant screens on the wall on which personnel were "monitoring all the activities that took place that day," Keane described. And there was a "watch team" there that monitored the world constantly.

Keane surely needed to closely follow what was happening after he learned of the first crash, so he could immediately deal with the crisis and promptly respond to any additional emergencies if they arose. In the AOC, he would have had the resources necessary to do this. But, by staying in his office, he limited his capabilities.

Furthermore, there was an "emergency action console" in the AOC that was "equipped with a sophisticated communications system that [allowed] the watch team instantaneous connections at the touch of a computer button to the White House, secretary of defense's office, and Army commands around the world," according to the Washington Post. [16] Soldiers magazine reported that the watch team could direct "hundreds of communications daily to the FBI, the State Department, the White House command center, local law enforcement agencies, and others." The watch team was therefore "the central point of contact during emergencies." [17]

With such invaluable resources available at the facility, Keane would have been ideally positioned in the AOC to communicate with other senior officials and help them organize a response to the terrorist attacks. And yet, even when the Pentagon was hit, more than 50 minutes after the first attack took place, he did not initially go there.

KEANE WAS ADVISED TO GO TO THE OPERATIONS CENTER TO 'TAKE CHARGE OF THE ARMY'Instead, at that time, he headed toward the crash site, intending to assist people there. Along with his executive officer and his aide, he then spent time making sure that people were able to get out of the Pentagon.

This course of action was inexplicable. There would have been plenty of people at the Pentagon who could have helped personnel find their way out of the building and so it was unnecessary for a top official like Keane to get involved with the task. But as the most senior Army officer in the country that day, Keane was irreplaceable and there were presumably specific duties he was required to carry out. While he was busy helping people evacuate, he would have been unable to carry out these duties.

Keane's executive officer recognized the problem. At some point, he told Keane: "Look, you've got to take charge of the Army, so let's get to the Operations Center. We'll leave the recovery to other people." Strangely, Keane appears to have recognized the inappropriateness of his own response to the Pentagon attack. Referring to his executive officer's advice, he commented, "Of course, I knew immediately that he was right and [so] we joined my staff in the AOC." [18]

Once he reached the Operations Center, Keane provided "leadership and guidance" to the personnel there, according to a report published by the Army. [19] But surely he should have provided leadership and guidance from the outset, by going to the AOC immediately after he learned of the first crash.

KEANE WAS APPARENTLY UNCONCERNED FOR HIS OWN SAFETYKeane's decision to stay in his office after he heard about the first crash and determined immediately that it was a terrorist attack is also puzzling because Keane should surely have realized that, if America was under attack, the Pentagon was a likely target.

Indeed, numerous individuals who were at the Pentagon that morning have recalled being concerned that their building might be attacked. For example, after they learned about the first crash at the World Trade Center, Captain William Toti, special assistant to the vice chief of naval operations, and his colleagues started discussing whether there could be more attacks and, if there were, what the targets would be. Toti concluded, "The only building that makes sense is the Pentagon" and, "If [the terrorists] hit any place, they are going to hit this building." [20]

Similarly, after he saw the second crash on television, Peter Chiarelli told a colleague, "If there are other aircraft up there that have been hijacked or if there are other aircraft getting ready to do this, this building [i.e. the Pentagon] has got to be a target." [21]

Keane should surely have assumed from the outset that the Pentagon might be attacked. He should therefore have made his own safety a priority, so he would still be able to carry out his duties if it was hit.

And yet, by staying in a vulnerable and exposed area of the Pentagon, he failed to do this. His office was on the third floor of the building's outer ring. [22] If terrorists attacked that area of the Pentagon, perhaps by crashing an aircraft into it or detonating a truck bomb outside of it, Keane could have been seriously injured or killed. He should have realized that he would be much safer in the AOC, which was on the lowest level of the Pentagon, inside a bunker reinforced by steel and concrete, 60 feet below the parking lot. [23]

Keane stayed in his office after he saw the second plane crashing into the World Trade Center on television, even though it became clear then that the crisis involved more than an attack on just a single target. The possibility of the Pentagon being hit--and the need to go to a safer location--should have seemed increasingly great to him at that point.

Keane's decision to stay in his office until after the Pentagon attack occurred is particularly astonishing considering that when Chiarelli called, before the Pentagon was hit, he told Keane a suspicious aircraft had been noticed flying toward Washington. Keane even seems to have thought at the time that this aircraft might be heading toward the Pentagon. He recalled that he and Chiarelli were "concluding it's heading for a building someplace in Washington," and he asked Chiarelli: "What's the plan to evacuate this building [i.e. the Pentagon]? Why isn't it being evacuated?"

And yet he did not hurry out of his office, in case the approaching aircraft crashed into the part of the building he was in. Instead, he remained on the phone and was still talking with Chiarelli when the Pentagon was struck. "Right during that conversation, the plane hit the building; it was quite amazing," he has commented. [24]

It is remarkable too that, in light of the possibility of the Pentagon being attacked, Keane made no attempt to send his staff to somewhere more secure. Surely, just as he should have ensured his own safety, he should have taken action to ensure the safety of his staffers. And yet he did nothing before the Pentagon was hit.

After the Pentagon attack occurred, almost all Army personnel at the Pentagon evacuated the building. [25] Only at that time did Keane order his staffers, "Call your homes right now and make sure everybody knows you're alright, and then I want you to all to leave the building immediately." [26] By then, however, it was too late. If the area of the Pentagon in which they worked had been hit, members of Keane's staff could have been killed or seriously injured.

KEANE APPARENTLY FAILED TO ACTIVATE THE CRISIS ACTION TEAMAn aspect of Jack Keane's behavior on September 11 that may be particularly significant was Keane's apparent failure to activate the Army's Crisis Action Team at the Pentagon.

The CAT, according to author Robert Rossow, was "an organization of subject matter experts from throughout the Army" who would be "called to the AOC to man their battle stations when the CAT is activated." [27] It had "a dedicated 'hot' desk with classified and unclassified computers, and secure telephones for 24 separate Army staff sections," according to Soldiers magazine. [28]

Keane, as the most senior Army officer in the U.S., should presumably have arranged for it to be activated as soon as possible on the morning of September 11, so the team could promptly respond to the attacks. He could perhaps have ordered Peter Chiarelli--who oversaw operations in the AOC--to activate it when he called him after he learned of the first crash. And yet the only action he took at that time, according to his own recollections, was to order Chiarelli to bring the AOC up to full manning.

Chiarelli, in contrast, appears to have recognized right away the importance of activating the CAT, since he activated it of his own accord, apparently shortly after Keane called him. (Curiously, he made no mention of having any phone calls with Keane when he was interviewed by a military historian about his experiences on September 11, so the exact sequence of events is difficult to determine.)

Chiarelli, according to his own recollections, started watching the coverage of the first crash at the World Trade Center at around 9:00 a.m. on September 11 on the television in his office, where he had been preparing to go to a meeting. Although he has said it was "unclear" to him at that point whether the crash was "a terrorist action," he realized that the incident was "a really serious situation." He therefore called Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Stramara--his chief of operations, who was responsible for the CAT--into his office.

After Stramara entered, Chiarelli said to him, "We need to look at standing up a CAT because I believe we've got ourselves a possibility of a mass casualty [incident]." He told Stramara, "It's time to activate the CAT" and instructed him, "Get it set up." [29] Chiarelli explained, in a phone call later that morning, that he had activated the CAT "to respond to the contingency in New York if requested by state and local officials," because he had "anticipated that the World Trade Center disaster would require enormous rescue, firefighting, and recovery efforts." [30]

KEANE HAD INCREASED POWERS IN THE HOURS AFTER THE ATTACKSKeane, evidence suggests, failed to take any significant action in response to the 9/11 attacks while they were taking place. However, as a result of certain anomalous circumstances, he had a lot of power in the crucial hours after the attacks.

The chief of staff of the U.S. Army in 2001 was Eric Shinseki. However, as previously noted, Shinseki was in Malaysia on September 11, for a conference of the chiefs of staff of Pacific nation armies. [31] He was promptly alerted to the news that a plane had crashed into the World Trade Center and, when he then saw the second crash live on television, realized it was a terrorist attack. But since he was on the other side of the world to where the attacks occurred, he was only able to participate in the military's response to the crisis over the phone.

Most of the senior U.S. Army delegation in Malaysia prepared to head immediately back to America. However, on top of the long time it would take to fly to the United States, their journey was delayed because U.S. airspace was closed in response to the attacks. [32] Shinseki appears to have therefore only arrived in Washington, where he could resume his duties as Army chief of staff, on the night of September 12. [33] While he was away, Keane, as his second in charge, would presumably have carried out these duties.

Another key official whose circumstances led to Keane having increased power in the hours following the attacks was Thomas White. As secretary of the Army, White was the top civilian leader for the U.S. Army, and was responsible for the effective and efficient functioning of the Army. [34] He was also the "top executive agent in the Pentagon hierarchy," the "coordinator of continuity for the Pentagon," and the "middleman for military support to civil authorities," according to military expert and author William Arkin. [35] However, due to an apparent mishap, he was away from Washington for several hours on September 11.

White was at the Army Navy Country Club in Arlington, Virginia, where he had been scheduled to give a speech, when the Pentagon was hit and so, like Keane, he only arrived at the Army Operations Center sometime after the Pentagon attack took place. [36] Like Keane, he then provided "leadership and guidance" to the personnel in the AOC. [37]

However, after he spent some time in the Operations Center, he was ordered to go to Raven Rock, a secure complex of buildings outside Washington. [38] He objected to being sent away from the Pentagon. But the officer in charge of the relocation and continuity of operations plan had explained to Peter Chiarelli--the man who told White he had to go: "[White] has no choice at this time. This has been directed and he must immediately proceed to leave here." When Chiarelli asked the officer if he was certain of this, he replied, "Yes, I'm sure."

And yet the decision to send White to Raven Rock turned out to be a mistake. "We found out that it wasn't required for him to leave at that particular point in time, because the level of evacuation did not reach his level," Chiarelli explained. The person who said White had to leave "had misspoke over the phone," Chiarelli added. White was consequently allowed to return to the Pentagon about four hours after he left it. [39] But while he was away, Arkin noted, Keane was "in charge of the Army (and of decisions relating to military support to civil authorities)." [40]

OTHER KEY OFFICIALS FAILED TO CARRY OUT THEIR DUTIESWhile Keane's apparent lack of response to the 9/11 attacks may seem alarming, the Army vice chief of staff was in fact one of several key officials responsible for running the U.S. military whose actions meant they were unable to carry out their duties while the attacks were taking place.

These officials included Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who, after learning about the crashes at the World Trade Center, insisted on continuing with a routine intelligence briefing. Then, after the Pentagon was hit, instead of helping the military respond to the crisis, he initially went to the crash site, simply to inspect the damage and help carry a stretcher. [41]

Meanwhile, General Montague Winfield should have been on duty as the deputy director for operations in charge of the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon on the morning of September 11. However, he remained in a routine "personnel meeting," which apparently commenced before the attacks began, until sometime after the Pentagon was hit. While he was in the meeting, a colleague had to carry out his duties. [42]

And General Ralph Eberhart, the commander of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), decided to drive from his office at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, to the NORAD operations center in Cheyenne Mountain in the middle of the attacks, even though he knew there were "dead spots" in which he would be out of phone coverage for five to 10 minutes at a time during the journey. Consequently, he was out of communication with other officials for about 45 minutes at this critical time, while he traveled between the two locations. [43]

KEANE ISSUED FEW ORDERS DURING THE ATTACKSSince Jack Keane, as the most senior Army officer in the country, was such a key figure in the U.S. military on September 11, it is alarming to find, upon close scrutiny, that his behavior while the terrorist attacks took place that day appears so suspicious. He seems to have done remarkably little to protect his country at a time when he should surely have assumed that his prompt action might help make the difference between further attacks succeeding or being stopped.

Important questions therefore need to be addressed. We need to know, for example, what exactly Keane's responsibilities were on September 11. What actions should Keane have taken in response to the attacks? And, in light of his responsibilities, what exactly did he do and what duties did he fail to carry out?

We need to know what orders Keane issued while the attacks were underway. The only ones we know of, based on his recollections, were that the Army Operations Center be brought up to full manning and, after the Pentagon was hit, that his immediate staff should evacuate the building. Were these the only orders he gave?

More specifically, why did Keane apparently fail to order Peter Chiarelli to activate the Crisis Action Team and instead just tell him to bring the AOC--where the members of the CAT would assemble in an emergency--up to full manning? As acting chief of staff of the Army, activating the CAT may have been one of his responsibilities that day. And yet it appears that, after Keane called him following the first crash, Chiarelli arranged to have the CAT activated on his own initiative, rather than based on an order from his superior.

Eric Shinseki--the actual Army chief of staff in September 2001--has indicated that he understood the importance of activating the CAT. Even though he was out of the country when the attacks occurred, after he saw the second crash on television, he recalled, he "gave instructions for the Army staff to stand up the Crisis Action Team." [44] If Shinseki recognized the need to promptly activate the CAT, why was Keane apparently unable to do so?

KEANE'S ACTIONS AFTER THE SECOND CRASH ARE UNKNOWNAnother issue to address regards the lack of available information about Keane's actions in the half-hour or so after the second crash at the World Trade Center occurred.

Keane has described calling Chiarelli after he learned of the first crash and then seeing the second crash on television. That crash took place at 9:03 a.m., almost 35 minutes before the Pentagon was attacked. The next thing Keane has described doing is talking to Chiarelli again, when the officer called to let him know the AOC was fully manned and a suspicious aircraft had been noticed flying toward Washington. That call, though, appears to have begun shortly before the Pentagon was hit, since the two men were still talking to each other when the Pentagon attack occurred.

Keane's recollections, therefore, appear to leave about half an hour unaccounted for. What, then, did Keane do during this critical period, immediately after the second attack took place?

We also need to consider why Keane was apparently so unconcerned for his safety and for the safety of his staff after he learned of the first crash, considering that he immediately realized the incident was a terrorist attack. Surely, as previously mentioned, if the U.S. was under attack, the Pentagon--as a prominent symbol of American power--should have been considered a likely target. And, located on the third floor of the outer ring, Keane's office was presumably in one of the most exposed and vulnerable areas of the building.

And yet Keane made no attempt to leave there and go to somewhere safer--such as the AOC--until after the Pentagon was attacked. And he only ordered his immediate staff to evacuate after the building was hit. [45]

We need to know if there was a particular person who was responsible for Keane's safety. If there was, who was this individual? Surely, such a person should have made sure that Keane was promptly taken from his office to somewhere more secure in response to the attacks on the World Trade Center. Why, then, did they fail to do so?

DID KEANE HELP PLAN THE ATTACKS?What was the reason for Jack Keane's inaction while the 9/11 attacks were underway, when Keane should have been going out of his way to help the military respond to the crisis? Was Keane's poor performance simply due to incompetence or is there a more disturbing explanation for it?

For example, might Keane have been confused because he thought information he received about the attacks was simulated, as part of a training exercise? Chiarelli has recalled that, on September 11, the Army was preparing an exercise for the CAT, which would be based around the scenario of a plane crashing into the World Trade Center. Although this exercise was scheduled to take place in the week after 9/11, it was a "no-notice exercise," which means its participants were not told beforehand exactly when it would occur. [46] Army personnel, including Keane, might therefore have mistakenly thought the exercise was taking place on September 11 when they learned a plane had crashed into the World Trade Center that day.

Another possibility, which, though unsettling, needs to be considered is that Keane was in some way complicit in planning and carrying out the attacks. His failure to take effective action on the morning of September 11 might plausibly have been because he intended to help ensure that the attacks succeeded and the military was unable to intervene before the targets were hit. If this was the case, it would mean a group other than al-Qaeda was behind 9/11. Instead, the attacks might have been perpetrated by rogue individuals in the U.S. military and other government agencies.

If Keane was involved in planning the attacks, he would presumably have known which part of the Pentagon would be hit and he would therefore have known that, along with his colleagues, he would be safe in his office on the morning of September 11. If he had such foreknowledge, this fact could explain why he was apparently so unconcerned for his own safety before the Pentagon attack took place.

Keane was an important and powerful figure on September 11. And yet little has been revealed about what he did when the 9/11 attacks occurred and his behavior that day has avoided serious examination. He is therefore one of a number of senior military and government officials whose responses to the attacks ought to be the subject of particular scrutiny in a new investigation of 9/11.

Thursday, 25 May 2017

Donald Rumsfeld, the U.S. secretary of defense, proceeded as normal with his daily intelligence briefing at the Pentagon on the morning of September 11, 2001, despite learning that a second aircraft had hit the World Trade Center and America was clearly under attack. Even when the Pentagon was attacked, over 30 minutes later, he still did nothing to assist the military's response to the crisis and instead hurried outside to the crash site, simply to inspect the damage and help carry a stretcher. By the time that he became involved in defending his country, the terrorist attacks were over.

Rumsfeld, as secretary of defense, had important responsibilities that day. And yet he repeatedly ignored the appeals of colleagues when they tried to get him involved with the military's response to the attacks. Remarkably, he rejected the advice of two aides to abandon his usual activities because, he told them, if he did so, "the terrorists have won."

Some government and military officials, as well as journalists, have criticized Rumsfeld for effectively deserting his post at such a critical time, when he should have been focused on preventing possible further attacks. These commentators have made clear how unusual and unacceptable his actions were.

In light of what is known about the defense secretary's actions on September 11, we need to consider whether Rumsfeld's behavior while the 9/11 attacks were taking place was simply due to negligence and recklessness or the result of something more disturbing. Might Rumsfeld perhaps have known in advance what was going to happen on September 11?

If he had foreknowledge of 9/11, he would presumably have known he could get away with abandoning his responsibilities as secretary of defense while America was under attack. And if he knew what the targets would be, he would have known that the area of the building where his office was located would not be hit when the Pentagon was attacked, which meant it was safe for him to continue with his intelligence briefing. He would also have known there would be no second attack on the Pentagon and so he could safely go to the crash site after the building was hit.

Official investigations have failed to thoroughly probe Rumsfeld's actions on September 11 and the media have never inquired why the secretary of defense acted so inappropriately in response to the terrorist attacks. It is important, therefore, that we now closely examine what Rumsfeld did that day.

RUMSFELD THOUGHT THE FIRST CRASH WAS A 'TRAGIC ACCIDENT'Donald Rumsfeld was hosting a breakfast meeting in his private dining room at the Pentagon, attended by several members of Congress, when the first hijacked plane--American Airlines Flight 11--crashed into the World Trade Center, at 8:46 a.m. on September 11. [1]

He learned of the crash shortly after it occurred when Larry Di Rita, his special assistant, sent him a note telling him what had happened. [2] Vice Admiral Edmund Giambastiani, his senior military assistant, received the note and passed the message on to him while he was in the meeting. He assumed the incident was a "tragic accident," he has recalled, and took no action in response to the news. His meeting apparently therefore continued until 9:00 a.m., when it was scheduled to end. [3]

He then went to his office for his intelligence briefing. [4] Giambastiani turned on the television and he then started watching the coverage of the burning World Trade Center. [5]

RUMSFELD WENT AHEAD WITH HIS INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING, DESPITE KNOWING AMERICA WAS UNDER ATTACKRumsfeld received a daily intelligence briefing, similar to the one provided to the president each morning. [6] The briefing on September 11 was scheduled to run from 9:00 a.m. to 9:30 a.m. and was going to be delivered by DeNeige ("Denny") Watson, an analyst with the CIA. [7]

Watson learned of the first crash at the World Trade Center when she arrived at the Pentagon that morning and saw people watching the coverage of it on television. She learned of the second crash, and presumably realized that America was under attack, before she went in to brief Rumsfeld, seeing the incident live on television, at 9:03 a.m., in the anteroom of Rumsfeld's office. She immediately called the operations center at CIA headquarters and asked what people there knew about what was going on. She was told there were 50 airborne planes still unaccounted for.

In light of what was happening, Watson apparently expected Rumsfeld to cancel his schedule so he could focus on responding to the crisis. As she was about to go into his office, she "declined to even open her briefcase to pull out the PDB [President's Daily Brief], figuring it had been overtaken by events," author David Priess described. The secretary of defense, though, was determined to go ahead with the briefing.

Inside Rumsfeld's office, Watson relayed what she had been told by the CIA's operations center. And yet, while this information surely indicated that more attacks might be imminent, Rumsfeld just nodded his head and started flipping through the copy of the PDB she had brought with her. [8]

RUMSFELD WAS DETERMINED TO STICK TO HIS SCHEDULEAround this time, while he was receiving the briefing, Rumsfeld was told about the second crash by Edmund Giambastiani. "Someone came in and said that another plane had hit a different tower of the World Trade Center," Rumsfeld recalled. [9] "I went in and informed the secretary [of the second crash]," Giambastiani said. [10] At that point, "it became clear that it was more than an accident," Rumsfeld commented. [11] "We knew there was a problem here," Giambastiani stated. [12] All the same, Rumsfeld continued with the briefing as if nothing unusual had happened.

Minutes after Watson entered the office, two of Rumsfeld's aides came in: Victoria Clarke, Rumsfeld's spokeswoman, and Larry Di Rita.

Clarke had been in her office at the Pentagon when she learned of the first crash from seeing the coverage of it on television. She'd called Di Rita to discuss the incident and, as the two were talking, they saw United Airlines Flight 175--the second hijacked plane--crashing into the World Trade Center live on their TVs. Realizing this was "clearly a terrorist attack of some kind," Clarke headed to Di Rita's office, down the hallway from Rumsfeld's office.

On the way, she made some notes about what needed to be done in response to the crisis, such as contacting the president, the vice president, and the director of the CIA. She and Di Rita then went together to Rumsfeld's office to discuss "the kinds of things [Rumsfeld] needed to do in response to this," Clarke recalled. [13] Upon entering the office, they told Rumsfeld what they knew about the terrorist attacks and that the crisis management process was starting up. [14]

Clarke and Di Rita wanted Rumsfeld to cancel his schedule, presumably so he could focus on responding to the attacks. "Sir, I think your entire schedule is going to be different today," Di Rita said. [15] But Rumsfeld refused to change his plans. [16]

He told them to go to the Pentagon's Executive Support Center (ESC), which was well equipped to deal with crisis, and said he would join them later. At that time, he "wanted to make a few phone calls," Clarke recalled. The two aides therefore left the office and headed to the ESC. [17] Rumsfeld, meanwhile, went back to skimming through the PDB. [18]

RUMSFELD WENT TO THE CRASH SITE AFTER THE PENTAGON WAS HITThe secretary of defense was still in his office with Watson at 9:37 a.m., when the Pentagon was attacked, and felt the building shake from the impact. "I knew that only something truly massive could have made hundreds of thousands of tons of concrete shudder," he recalled.

The attack on the Pentagon surely emphasized why he needed to get involved with responding to the crisis right away, as the extent of the emergency and the capability of the attackers became increasingly apparent. And yet he still did nothing to help the military react to the crisis. Instead, he rushed outside to the scene of the attack. [19] "I wanted to see what had happened; I wanted to see if people needed help," he has commented. [20]

Rumsfeld went to the site accompanied by Officers Aubrey Davis and Gilbert Oldach of the Defense Protective Service--the Pentagon's police force; Joseph Wassel, his communications officer; plus Rick Kisling and Kevin Brown, the director and deputy director of security for his office. [21]

Davis and Oldach had headed to Rumsfeld's office after Flight 175 hit the World Trade Center with the intention of moving the secretary of defense to a better-protected location. They'd encountered Rumsfeld outside his office just after the Pentagon was hit.

Rumsfeld hurried toward the scene of the attack based on information Davis was receiving over his radio. Davis called on Oldach to join him as he accompanied the secretary of defense to the crash site and motioned to Kisling, Wassel, and Brown, who were in the personnel security office, to do the same. Davis protested that Rumsfeld should head back, but the secretary of defense ignored his objections.

Rumsfeld and his entourage reached the crash site "by 9:40 at the latest," according to Davis. "It was not more than two or three minutes [after the building was hit] before we were actually on site," Davis said. [22]

COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER DETERMINED THAT RUMSFELD SHOULD RETURN TO THE PENTAGONUpon reaching the scene of the attack, Rumsfeld inspected the area and helped carry a survivor on a stretcher to where they could get medical attention. [23] But after he had been at the site for some time, Wassel decided it was unnecessary for the secretary of defense to be there and told him, "I really need to get you on the phone with the president." Rumsfeld asked, "Where do we go?" Wassel apparently said they should return to the Pentagon. He recalled that he determined that "the hit seemed to be localized and we should have good communications inside the building." [24]

"At some moment, I decided I should be in [the Pentagon] figuring out what to do, because your brain begins to connect things," Rumsfeld has said. [25] He therefore announced, "Let's go" and led his group back inside.

Rumsfeld returned to the building at around 9:56 a.m. to 10:00 a.m., according to Davis. Accompanied by Davis, Wassel, Oldach, Brown, and Kisling, he initially went to his office and talked briefly with President George W. Bush on the phone. [26]

At around 10:10 a.m. to 10:15 a.m., he went to the ESC where a number of his colleagues had assembled. Those in the center included Stephen Cambone, a special assistant to Rumsfeld; William Haynes, the general counsel of the Department of Defense; Victoria Clarke; Larry Di Rita; and Edmund Giambastiani. [27]

In the well-equipped facility, Rumsfeld was finally in a location suitable for responding to the crisis. He was able to participate in the White House video teleconference while he was there. [28] But by the time he reached the ESC, the last of the four planes that were hijacked that morning--United Airlines Flight 93--had already crashed, reportedly going down in a field in Pennsylvania at 10:03 a.m., and so the attacks were over.

Rumsfeld then went to the Pentagon's National Military Command Center (NMCC), entering it at around 10:30 a.m. His "primary concern" once there was ensuring that the fighter pilots who had taken off to defend America's airspace "had a clear understanding of their rules of engagement," he told the 9/11 Commission. [29] He rapidly went to work on developing "some rules of engagement for what our military aircraft might do in the event another aircraft appeared to be heading into a large civilian structure or population," he said. [30]

In the NMCC, which was particularly well-equipped for dealing with the crisis, Rumsfeld was able to participate in the air threat conference call, which had been set up in response to the attacks. [31] But by the time he reached the center, it was too late for his actions to make a difference to the outcome of the attacks.

RUMSFELD THOUGHT THERE MIGHT BE ADDITIONAL ATTACKSDonald Rumsfeld's failure to get involved with the military's response to the crisis until the terrorist attacks were over could have had serious consequences. However, according to retired Lieutenant Colonel Robert Darling, who was working for the White House Military Office on September 11, even if Rumsfeld had gone to the NMCC immediately after the second hijacked plane hit the World Trade Center, there is "no indication" that this action "would have changed the devastating outcome [of the attacks] for the better." [32]

Rumsfeld, though, ought to have been unaware of this at the time and should surely have assumed that he needed to get involved with responding to the crisis as quickly as possible. If 9/11 was a surprise, as has been officially claimed, no one would have known how many attacks were planned. Terrorists may have intended to hit numerous additional targets beyond the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Indeed, Victoria Clarke recalled, "Everybody was fixated for the first few hours on what could be next." [33]

Rumsfeld himself said he believed that additional attacks were possible. When asked, "Did you have a concern that the U.S. was about to be hit again in those early moments, those early hours?" he replied: "Sure. There's no question about it." Considering that three planes had crashed into buildings and other suspicious aircraft were still in the air, he explained, "you can't help but be very attentive to the possibility of another attack." [34]

If more attacks had been planned, Rumsfeld's failure to promptly get involved with the military's response to the crisis could have cost many lives. An unnamed senior White House official who was in the White House Situation Room that morning, trying to coordinate a response to the attacks, has angrily criticized Rumsfeld in this regard. "How long does it take for something bad to happen?" the official asked. "No one knew what was happening," they pointed out. "What if this had been the opening shot of a coordinated attack by a hostile power?" [35]

RUMSFELD WAS OUT OF COMMUNICATION WHILE HE VISITED THE CRASH SITEA number of accounts have indicated that, regardless of its impact on the outcome of the attacks, Rumsfeld's decision to visit the scene of the Pentagon attack had a detrimental effect on the military's ability to respond to the crisis. It meant, for example, that in the 20 minutes between when Rumsfeld left his office and when he returned to the building, people who urgently needed to talk to him were unable to do so.

Aubrey Davis kept receiving frantic calls over his radio while he was with Rumsfeld at the crash site, saying: "Where's the secretary? Where's the secretary?" But he was unable to answer the inquiries. "I kept saying, 'We've got him,' but the system was overloaded," he recalled, "so I couldn't get through and they went on asking." [36] In that 20-minute period, Rumsfeld was "completely out of touch," journalist and author Andrew Cockburn concluded.

The situation was surely made worse because Rumsfeld failed to tell his command staff where he was going when he headed toward the crash site. [37] "He came out [of his office] and he didn't even talk to his staff," Joseph Wassel recalled. "His staff only found out where he was after the fact," Wassel said. [38]

Rumsfeld's colleagues therefore didn't know where the secretary of defense was at this critical time. Davis heard people over his radio saying, "Doctor Cambone wants to know where the secretary is; Admiral Giambastiani wants to know where the secretary is." [39] Several times in the half-hour after the Pentagon was attacked, Victoria Clarke heard people in the ESC asking where Rumsfeld was. [40] And for 30 minutes, personnel in the NMCC "couldn't find him," Brigadier General Montague Winfield said. [41]

Furthermore, because he went to the crash site, Rumsfeld was unable to join the Pentagon's air threat conference call when it commenced, at 9:37 a.m. Captain Charles Leidig, who ran the air threat conference, requested that the secretary of defense be brought into the conversation at the start of the call, but minutes later it was reported that Rumsfeld was nowhere to be found. [42] This meant that "the chain of command was broken," Cockburn concluded. [43] Rumsfeld only joined the conference call over 50 minutes after it began, once he arrived at the NMCC. [44]

THE ESC AND THE NMCC WERE EQUIPPED TO DEAL WITH THE ATTACKSAnalysis of Donald Rumsfeld's behavior at the time of the 9/11 attacks gives rise to many concerns. Rumsfeld appears to have acted in a way that was inconsistent with his responsibilities as secretary of defense and inappropriate in light of the crisis that needed his urgent attention.

He should surely have left his office right away after he learned a second plane had hit the World Trade Center and it became clear that America was under attack. To begin with, had he done so, he could have immediately gone to either the Executive Support Center or the National Military Command Center, where he would have been in a good position to respond to the attacks while they were still taking place.

The ESC and the NMCC, unlike Rumsfeld's office, were equipped to deal with a crisis like what happened that day. Additionally, numerous key officials responded to the terrorist attacks from these facilities. In either of them, therefore, Rumsfeld could have conferred with these officials about what to do in response to the attacks.

The ESC was a communications hub with a video teleconference facility, located on the third floor of the D ring--the second-outermost ring of the Pentagon. [45] It consisted of conference rooms that were secure against electronic eavesdropping. [46] People there had "instant access to satellite images and intelligence sources peering into every corner of the globe," Victoria Clarke described. [47] And "because it had so many communications in it," Joseph Wassel said, it could serve as a command center. [48]

Clarke called the ESC "the Pentagon's war room" and said it was "the place where the building's top leadership goes to coordinate military operations during national emergencies." [49] In it, therefore, Rumsfeld would have been well placed to respond to the attacks.

The NMCC, located in the Joint Staff area of the Pentagon, was a two-story complex of rooms that, Rumsfeld described, were "outfitted with televisions, computer terminals, and screens tracking military activities around the world." [50] It was equipped with numerous communications systems, including multiple screens for video conferences, and was staffed 24 hours a day by up to 200 employees. [51]

General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on September 11, called it "a switchboard connecting the Pentagon, the civilian government, and the combatant commanders." [52] CNN called it the U.S. military's "worldwide nerve center." [53]

The NMCC had a key role to play during an event like what happened on September 11. It was "the operational center for any and every crisis, from nuclear war to hijacked airliners," Andrew Cockburn wrote. [54] "The job of the NMCC in such an emergency" as occurred on September 11, according to the 9/11 Commission Report, was "to gather the relevant parties and establish the chain of command between the National Command Authority--the president and the secretary of defense--and those who need to carry out their orders." [55]

The NMCC would presumably have been an ideal location for the secretary of defense to go to immediately when he learned that America was under attack. Indeed, after he finally entered it at around 10:30 a.m. on September 11, the communications network there "enabled him to keep in touch with key government officials and military commanders," according to the Department of Defense's book about the Pentagon attack. [56] Rumsfeld said he gained "situational awareness" of what was happening after he arrived at the center. [57]

Robert Darling, who spent much of September 11 responding to the crisis from the White House, wrote that he believed that "Rumsfeld's appointed place of duty" while the attacks were taking place "was at the helm in the NMCC." If the secretary of defense had gone to the NMCC earlier than he did, Darling wondered: "Could he have made a difference? What information would he have learned? What orders might he have given? Could there have been a better outcome?" [58]

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAD SPECIFIC RESPONSIBILITIES DURING A CRISISRumsfeld should also have canceled his schedule and left his office after he learned of the second attack because, as secretary of defense, he had a unique role to play during a crisis like what occurred on September 11. He therefore needed to get involved with the military's response to the attacks as quickly as possible in order to carry out his duties.

To begin with, he was part of the National Command Authority (NCA). The NCA consists of the president and the secretary of defense. [59] Directions for military operations originate from the NCA and, by law, no one else in the chain of command is permitted to authorize the execution of military action. [60] "No offensive, lethal military action will ever be taken by any component of the U.S. military without the direct consent of the president or the secretary of defense," Darling wrote. [61]

Cockburn called the NCA "the ultimate source of military orders, uniquely empowered, among other things, to order the use of nuclear weapons." In times of war, he wrote, the secretary of defense "was effectively the president's partner, the direct link to the fighting forces, and all orders had to go through him." [62]

As part of the NCA, Rumsfeld surely had a crucial role to play on September 11. But, Darling pointed out, "In the worst attack on American soil since Pearl Harbor, taking nearly 3,000 American lives, destroying billions of dollars' worth of property, sending Americans running in fear through our country's streets, and nearly crippling the world's largest financial system, no official National Command Authority response came until after the attacks had ended." [63]

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAD A KEY ROLE IN THE RESPONSE TO HIJACKINGSRumsfeld's prompt involvement with the military's efforts to respond to the crisis was also surely important because the secretary of defense had a unique role to play when an aircraft hijacking occurred. The key role of the secretary of defense had been laid out in military instructions dating back as far as 1997, if not earlier. [64] The defense secretary was usually required to give his approval before the military could take action in response to a hijacking, according to the most recent of these instructions prior to 9/11.

The NMCC was the "focal point" within the Department of Defense for providing assistance in response to hijackings in U.S. airspace, the instruction stated. And upon being notified of a hijacking, the NMCC was, "with the exception of immediate responses," required "to forward requests for [Department of Defense] assistance to the secretary of defense for approval." [65]

Major General Larry Arnold, commander of the Continental United States NORAD Region on September 11, confirmed the crucial role of the secretary of defense when he described the procedure for responding to hijackings. "The FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] contacts the National Military Command Center whenever there is a problem," he said. "They, in turn, go to NORAD [the North American Aerospace Defense Command] to see if assets are available. Then the secretary of defense grants approval to intercept a hijacked airplane." [66]

Of course, the military should presumably have scrambled fighter jets in response to the four hijackings on September 11 even without Rumsfeld's approval simply due to factors such as the hijacked planes losing contact with air traffic control or deviating from their flight plans. The secretary of defense's permission was apparently unnecessary for responding to these kinds of emergencies. [67] All the same, in light of the defense secretary's unique responsibilities when a hijacking occurred, Rumsfeld should surely have become involved in the military's response to the crisis as soon as possible on September 11.

RUMSFELD PUT HIMSELF IN DANGER BY STAYING IN HIS OFFICEAnother reason why Rumsfeld should have left his office after he learned about the second crash at the World Trade Center is that, since by then it was clear that America was under attack and the Pentagon was a potential target, he should have been concerned for his own safety. Indeed, some officials who were in the Pentagon that day--including Stephen Cambone, Edmund Giambastiani, and William Haynes--have recalled wondering if the Pentagon would be attacked after they learned of the crashes at the World Trade Center. [68]

And yet Rumsfeld stayed in his office, simply for the sake of receiving a routine intelligence briefing, even though the office was in a vulnerable area of the Pentagon, on the third floor of its outer ring. He surely should have thought that he might be seriously injured or killed if terrorists attacked that part of the building by crashing an aircraft into it or by some other means, such as detonating a truck bomb outside of it.

Some of Rumsfeld's colleagues certainly seem to have believed he might be unsafe in his office. These include Cambone and Giambastiani. Following the second attack on the World Trade Center, Cambone went to Giambastiani's office and told Giambastiani they needed to get Rumsfeld out of the building. When Giambastiani asked why, Cambone mentioned the planes that had flown into the World Trade Center and said that "there was no telling what would happen next." The two men discussed "what the evacuation plan should be for the secretary," according to Giambastiani. [69]

Aubrey Davis and Gilbert Oldach also thought Rumsfeld might be in danger in his office. Davis recalled that after he saw Flight 175 crashing into the World Trade Center on television, at 9:03 a.m., he and his colleagues "looked at each other and knew that this was warning us to prepare to get Secretary Rumsfeld out of the building, and what measure we would utilize to transport Secretary Rumsfeld to a safe location." [70] Davis and Oldach then headed to Rumsfeld's office because they intended to take the secretary of defense to somewhere that was "better protected" than the office, according to Andrew Cockburn. They planned to take him "to some bunker somewhere." [71]

Their boss, John Jester, chief of the Defense Protective Service, seems to have shared their concern. At some point before they set off to take the secretary of defense to a safer location, he came into the room and said to them, "Let's get prepared to get Secretary Rumsfeld out of here." [72]

And Denny Watson appears to have recognized that Rumsfeld's office was in a vulnerable area of the Pentagon. After the building shook when it was attacked, Rumsfeld peered out of the window to look for signs of what had happened. Concerned at his action, Watson said, "Sir, everything in my training says you need to be back, away from those windows." [73]

Even if he was determined to stay in the Pentagon, Rumsfeld would surely have been safer if he had gone to the ESC or the NMCC after he learned about the second crash at the World Trade Center, rather than remaining in his office at that time. The ESC was "a secure facility" and had "a secure door with a screening process," William Haynes described. [74] And the NMCC was in an area that was presumably much less likely to be damaged than Rumsfeld's office was if the building was attacked. It was in "a very secure location," CNN reported, in the basement of the Pentagon. [75]

Although Rumsfeld did eventually leave his office, after the Pentagon was attacked, he then put himself in an even more vulnerable position by going to the crash site. He should surely have considered it possible that there would be additional attacks at the Pentagon, just like there had been a second attack at the World Trade Center. And if another attack occurred there, he would presumably have been most at risk of being killed or seriously injured outside the building, where there were no walls to protect him.

Those who accompanied him to the scene of the attack certainly seem to have thought so. While he was at the crash site, they "were really preaching [to him] that it is really dangerous," Oldach recalled. [76]

RUMSFELD'S VISIT TO THE CRASH SITE WAS BRIEF AND UNNECESSARYGoing to the scene of the attack, as well as putting the secretary of defense potentially in danger, was a pointless exercise. Although about 20 minutes passed between when Rumsfeld left his office to visit the crash site and when he returned to the building, the attack occurred on the opposite side of the Pentagon to his office. [77] Taking into account the time it would have taken to walk to and from the site, Rumsfeld could only have been at the crash scene for a few minutes. [78] This was presumably too little time for him to achieve anything meaningful while there.

Visiting the crash site--where all he did was inspect the area and help carry a stretcher--also meant Rumsfeld was unable to attend to the tasks he was responsible for at that time. Whereas any Pentagon employee could have gone to the site and reported back to Rumsfeld what they saw, and there were trained medical personnel whose job it was to assist the wounded, Rumsfeld was irreplaceable as the secretary of defense. "He was the secretary of defense; the country was under attack; he actually had a job to do," Andrew Cockburn commented. [79]

Rumsfeld offered a weak explanation for why he abandoned his responsibilities and went to the crash site, saying, "It was a funny thing for me to do, I suppose, and unusual, but I just felt I had to see what it was and what had happened, because no one knew." [80] Some of his colleagues, though, seem to have thought his actions were inappropriate. These include Stephen Cambone, who commented that Rumsfeld only stayed at the crash site for a short time because "his job was inside, not outside the building." [81]

And Joseph Wassell urged Rumsfeld to go back into the Pentagon because he recognized the unnecessity of the secretary of defense being at the scene of the attack. He recalled that after Rumsfeld and his entourage had been at the site for some time, he "decided that there was probably already a mechanism in place to take care of this recovery effort."

He therefore said to Rumsfeld, "Mr. Secretary, I know Doc Baxter [Colonel John Baxter, commander of the Air Force Flight Medicine Clinic] and I know that there is a mechanism." "This was going to be taken care of by the professionals," he has commented. He told Rumsfeld, "I really need to get you on the phone with the president." Rumsfeld agreed with his evaluation and subsequently headed back into the Pentagon. [82]

RUMSFELD IGNORED ATTEMPTS TO GET HIM INVOLVED WITH THE RESPONSE TO THE ATTACKSThe failure of Donald Rumsfeld to help deal with the crisis after the second crash at the World Trade Center occurred is particularly alarming considering that some of his colleagues apparently tried to get him involved with the military's response to the attacks at that time, but he rejected their advice. This indicates that he made a conscious decision to do nothing.

For example, when she entered his office to give him his intelligence briefing, Denny Watson told Rumsfeld: "Sir, you just need to cancel this [briefing]. You've got more important things to do." But he replied: "No, no. We're going to do this."

And when Victoria Clarke and Larry Di Rita came in and tried to get Rumsfeld to cancel his schedule, he refused to do so. They advised him to cancel his appointments for the rest of the day, presumably so he could focus on responding to the attacks. But, astonishingly, he told them: "No! If I cancel my day, the terrorists have won."

Even when Clarke and Di Rita pulled out a copy of his agenda, took him through it point by point, and showed him why each appointment could be canceled, Rumsfeld remained unmoved. His only response was to turn to the television on his desk and look at the coverage of the attacks in New York. After Clarke and Di Rita left the office, he just returned to skimming through the President's Daily Brief. [83]

Rumsfeld still failed to do anything meaningful when he returned to the building following his visit to the scene of the Pentagon attack. Although he talked on the phone with President Bush shortly after 10:00 a.m., the call apparently did little, if anything, to help deal with the attacks. According to a 9/11 Commission staff statement, "No one can recall any content [of the call] beyond a general request to alert forces." Rumsfeld and Bush "did not discuss the use of force against hijacked airliners," the statement added. [84] Rumsfeld's only recollection of the call in his memoir was of telling the president what he knew about the extent of the damage to the Pentagon. [85]

Then, after entering the ESC at around 10:10 a.m. to 10:15 a.m., rather than inquiring about the attacks or immediately issuing some orders, Rumsfeld "pulled out a yellow legal pad, took his seat at the head of a conference table, and wrote down three categories by which his thinking would be organized the rest of the day," according to Victoria Clarke. He wrote down "what we needed to do immediately, what would have to be underway quickly, and what the military response would be." [86]

Although the secretary of defense became more involved in the military's response to the attacks after he entered the NMCC, at around 10:30 a.m., his attempt at developing "rules of engagement" for the fighter pilots who were defending America's airspace was "an irrelevant exercise," according to Andrew Cockburn, since he did not complete and issue the rules until 1:00 p.m., "hours after the last hijacker had died." [87]

RUMSFELD CONTRIBUTED TO 'THE DYSFUNCTIONAL REACTION TO THE ATTACKS'Donald Rumsfeld has been criticized by a number of officials and journalists for his blatant failure to help the military respond to the terrorist attacks on September 11 until it was too late to make a difference. These criticisms highlight the contrast between what Rumsfeld, as secretary of defense, should have done and what he actually did.

He "contributed materially to the whole dysfunctional reaction to the attacks," Cockburn said, explaining: "He was in the wrong place. ... He didn't do his duty and concerned himself with irrelevant matters." [88] He "essentially was a bystander that morning, with little or no input in the crisis," journalist James Ridgeway noted. [89]

Robert Darling expressed his concerns about Rumsfeld's actions, asking: "Why did Secretary Rumsfeld abandon his post that day by not responding to the National Military Command Center the moment the attack on our country was realized? Why didn't he attempt to contact the president sooner? Why was the National Command Authority so ineffective?" [90]

RUMSFELD'S DECISION TO GO TO THE CRASH SITE WAS 'UNBELIEVABLY SHOCKING'Rumsfeld has faced particular criticism for his decision to visit the crash site immediately after the Pentagon was hit. "The country was under attack and yet the secretary of defense disappears for 20 minutes," Cockburn remarked. "He abandons his wider responsibilities to go look at the fire." [91]

"In the time that Rumsfeld had taken to go outside, he was out of the national command loop, out of touch with other high-level government officials who were trying frantically to figure out the nation's response," veteran Washington Post reporter Bradley Graham noted. He consequently "played no part in the urgent initial efforts to determine whether any additional air threats remained or in the decision to authorize military pilots to shoot down any menacing aircraft that refused to divert," Graham added. [92]

John Jester complained that since Rumsfeld was "in the National Command Authority," he "should not have gone to the scene" of the attack. "One of my officers tried to stop him and he just brushed him off," Jester said, adding, "I told his staff that he should not have done that." [93]

Darling criticized Rumsfeld's decision to leave the building and go to the crash site, saying: "His absence was unbelievably shocking. He should have been at his post in the national command structure organizing the defense of the country and instead he was outside helping the wounded." [94]

An unnamed senior White House official had particularly harsh words for Rumsfeld. He angrily commented: "What was Rumsfeld doing on 9/11? He deserted his post. He disappeared. The country was under attack. Where was the guy who controls America's defense? Out of touch!" The official said it was "outrageous" for Rumsfeld "to abandon [his] responsibilities and go off and do what you don't need to be doing, grandstanding." [95]

Rumsfeld, however, claimed his decision to visit the crash site was of little consequence. When asked if he thought his absence from the NMCC during the first minutes after the attack on the Pentagon had a detrimental effect, he replied: "I don't think so--who knows? My deputy was here. The chain of command was complete." [96]

DID RUMSFELD HAVE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF 9/11?Donald Rumsfeld should surely have assumed, when he learned about the crashes at the World Trade Center on September 11, that his actions might make a difference to the outcome of the crisis and have got involved with the response to it as quickly as possible. Why, then, did he continue with a routine intelligence briefing and make a pointless visit to the scene of the Pentagon attack when his job was to protect his country? His actions effectively meant that for the entire time America was under attack, the nation was without a secretary of defense.

Furthermore, why was Rumsfeld apparently unconcerned for his own safety at the time of the attacks? If 9/11 was unforeseen, as has been officially claimed, he should surely have thought the Pentagon was a potential target after he learned what had happened at the World Trade Center.

Why, then, did he apparently place himself in danger by remaining in his office, on the outer ring of the building, at that time rather than going to somewhere less vulnerable? And why did he leave the relative safety of the building to visit the crash site after the Pentagon was hit, even though it was possible that the Pentagon would be attacked again?

It seems difficult to attribute Rumsfeld's actions to incompetence. Rumsfeld had been secretary of defense for eight months under President Bush when 9/11 occurred and previously served as defense secretary for 14 months during the presidency of Gerald Ford in the 1970s. [97] He should surely therefore have acquired a good understanding of his responsibilities in this important post and known what his duties were on September 11.

A possible, albeit sinister, explanation for Rumsfeld's actions while the 9/11 attacks were taking place is that Rumsfeld had foreknowledge of what was going to happen on September 11. If this was the case, he presumably would have known he could get away with taking no action in response to the attacks until it was too late to make a difference. And if he knew in advance what the targets of the attacks were going to be, he would have known he would be safe in his office while he received his intelligence briefing and at the scene of the attack after the Pentagon was hit.

VISITING THE CRASH SITE WAS 'VERY ASTUTE, POLITICALLY'If Rumsfeld knew in advance what would happen on September 11, this could mean his decision to hurry to the scene of the Pentagon attack, where he was caught on video helping to carry a stretcher, may not have been spontaneous but could instead have been made beforehand, as a cynical way to exploit the catastrophe to improve his public image.

The decision to go to the crash site, while making it impossible for colleagues to communicate with him and apparently placing him in danger at the time, certainly benefited Rumsfeld later on. One Pentagon official said he thought the decision was "very astute, politically." Andrew Cockburn commented that Rumsfeld's "dash to the crash site could inspire loyalty and support" among the Pentagon workforce. [98]

Some people regarded Rumsfeld's "instinctive response" to the Pentagon attack as "a gutsy move that showed a basic humanity," according to Bradley Graham. Rumsfeld's "involvement, however brief, in the rescue efforts was a selfless act that won him a measure of appreciation and respect," Graham wrote. [99]

The defense secretary's actions, according to Cockburn, meant, "On a day when the president was intermittently visible, only Rumsfeld, along with New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani, gave the country an image of decisive, courageous leadership." The few minutes he spent at the crash site "made Rumsfeld famous, changed him from a half-forgotten 20th-century political figure to America's 21st-century warlord." [100]

If Rumsfeld decided before September 11 that he would go to the scene of the attack immediately after the Pentagon was hit, this might explain why he was dressed ready to go to the crash site when the attack occurred. Normally, according to Cockburn, when he was in his office, Rumsfeld "would take off his suit jacket and put on a sort of like a vest, because he found it chilly in the office." And yet just 15 to 20 seconds after there was a loud "boom" when the Pentagon was hit, he was seen by Aubrey Davis walking out of his door, "looking composed and wearing the jacket he normally discarded while in his office." It appeared as if, in the space of under 20 seconds, Rumsfeld "had time to change his clothes, put on his going-outside jacket, [and] come out," Cockburn commented. [101]

If Rumsfeld indeed knew in advance what was going to happen on September 11, the question arises of how this came about. Did he know someone who had learned about the 9/11 attacks before they occurred or was involved in planning them and this person told him what was going to happen? Might Rumsfeld himself have been involved with planning the attacks, which would be falsely blamed on Islamic terrorists?

While these are serious and unsettling possibilities to suggest, they need to be investigated. As has been pointed out, Rumsfeld "deserted his post" while America was under attack. His decision to visit the crash site immediately after the Pentagon was hit instead of helping to defend his country was "unbelievably shocking." We therefore need to find out exactly why he neglected his duties at such a critical time, on what was surely the most important day of his professional life.