Drones can't change war

Among the many issues that Defense Secretary Leon Panetta must ponder in the coming months will likely be whether to recommend shifting U.S. strategy in Afghanistan from counterinsurgency to counterterrorism.

Some critics argue that our current policy of deploying large numbers of ground troops puts more of our men and women at risk for questionable gain and even encourages more Afghans to join the Taliban, fighting against what they claim is an invasion force. Yet the recent gains in clearing out Taliban strongholds and helping to build schools, medical facilities and other civic institutions argue, instead, for staying the course for several more years.

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But other factors are sure to intrude to force a resolution of this strategic dispute.

A growing segment of the American people wants to scale back the Afghanistan war effort, which has drained our Treasury of more than $1 trillion, when added to the costs of Iraq. Moreover, the allies who have joined us are also facing enormous pressure to reduce their defense expenditures in manpower and materiel.

The United States, despite pledges of support from its friends, may soon find that it must bear an even greater burden of the battle under way. Sheer necessity, rather than desire, may become the mother of strategic recalculation.

Actually, something of a shift is evident with our increased reliance on armed drones to target those identified as enemy combatants. The increased use of drones in Afghanistan, Pakistan and elsewhere, however, raises significant issues.

For example:

• Who determines when a drone strike is legitimate, and who decides to “pull the trigger” for a given strike?

• How reliable is the intelligence that the U.S. gathers before a strike is ordered?

• How reliable and secure are the thousands of miles of networks and data links involved in the drones’ command and control with the decision makers and policymakers across the globe?