3 1 Key findings With the referendum on whether the UK should remain in or leave the European Union (EU) fast approaching, it is important that businesses and individuals should have an informed view on the potential economic implications of alternative outcomes of the vote so that they can plan accordingly. The CBI therefore commissioned PwC to provide a detailed quantitative assessment of the potential economic implications of possible scenarios where the UK voted to leave the EU, as compared to the UK voting to remain in the EU. We have assessed the potential economic impacts of a UK exit from the EU under two possible scenarios, combining a range of favourable and less favourable assumptions: An FTA scenario in which the UK negotiates a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the EU and both this and other aspects of post-exit uncertainty are resolved within five years of the referendum (i.e. by 2021). A WTO scenario' in which negotiations on post-exit arrangements prove more difficult and prolonged, and trade between the UK and the EU defaults to being conducted under World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules. Our model estimates are expressed relative to a counterfactual economic scenario in which the UK remains a member of a reformed EU under the deal secured by the UK Government in February In the counterfactual, the economy continues to grow at a long-run trend rate of 2.3% per annum. We estimate that total UK GDP in 2020 could be between around 3% and 5.5% lower under the FTA and WTO scenarios respectively than if the UK remains in the EU. In both cases, the largest short-term impact on the economy is felt through the additional uncertainty that would result from a UK vote to leave. The negative impact represents a reduction of around billion in UK GDP, at 2015 values. By 2030 this post-exit uncertainty should be resolved, but we estimate that the net longer term impact of other changes related to EU exit could result in total UK GDP in 2030 being between 1.2% and 3.5% lower in our two exit scenarios than if the UK remains in the EU (around billion, at 2015 values). This reflects the potential negative economic impacts of increased barriers to trade and labour mobility after EU exit, offset in part by potential benefits from lower regulatory burdens and fiscal savings from no longer paying net budgetary contributions to the EU. Projected differences in migration across scenarios will also change the size of the UK population and therefore GDP per capita. We estimate average GDP per capita (in real terms) could be between around 0.8% and 2.7% lower in 2030 in our two exit scenarios than if the UK remains in the EU. In the short-term, however, there could be a bigger decline due to uncertainty. We estimate GDP per household could be around 2,100-3,700 lower in 2020 if the UK leaves the EU. Average real UK GDP per capita in 2030 would, however, be around 25% to 28% higher in 2030 than in 2015 in the EU exit scenarios, as compared to an estimated 29% increase with continued EU membership. PwC 3

4 In the short-term, our results suggest that employment levels fall by 1.7% and 2.9% relative to the counterfactual in Over the longer-term, total UK employment (the number of people employed) in 2030 could be between around 350,000 and 600,000 lower in our two exit scenarios relative to remaining in the EU. This equates to a reduction of around 1% to 1.8% in total projected UK employment in 2030 in these two exit scenarios relative to remaining in the EU, in large part due to lower inward migration of workers. In the short-term, unemployment could rise to around 7-8% in the next 3-4 years if the UK left the EU, compared with a rate of 5% if the UK remained in the EU. But the unemployment rate should return to around 5% in 2030 in the exit scenarios as the labour market adjusts. As with any economic modelling exercise, our estimates are subject to many uncertainties. They should therefore only be taken as indicative of the broad direction and order of magnitude of the potential economic impacts of alternative exit scenarios. The report aims to inform the debate from an economic perspective and does not cover the wider political, social and cultural impacts of an exit from the EU that have been discussed in the public debate on EU membership, which are outside the scope of this study. PwC 4

5 2 Executive summary 2.1 Purpose of this report In February 2016, the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) commissioned PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (PwC) to provide a detailed quantitative assessment of the possible implications for the United Kingdom (UK) economy as a result of leaving the European Union (EU). This report is intended to inform the debate from an economic perspective and to help businesses to prepare for alternative possible outcomes of the UK Referendum on EU membership on 23 rd June We have used a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model 1 to estimate the impacts on the UK economy in two EU exit scenarios relative to an alternative or counterfactual scenario in which UK citizens voted to remain part of the EU. We consider only the possible economic impacts of EU exit, not the wider political, social and cultural impacts that are beyond the scope of this study. We believe this study is distinctive in that it covers a wide range of impacts, uses rigorous economic modelling techniques and provides estimated impacts of more than just total GDP, including the impact on the different expenditure components of GDP, GDP per capita (and per household) and total employment. 2.2 Alternative scenarios We first defined a counterfactual scenario where the UK votes to remain in the EU. This scenario largely represents a continuation of business as usual trends for the UK economy, with trend real GDP growth of around 2.3% per annum over the period to 2030 and the latest official population projections from the ONS. However, we have made some adjustments to capture the impact of the competitiveness reforms agreed by the UK Government with the governments of the other EU Member States in February These adjustments assume a small and gradual reduction in non-tariff barriers for UK-EU trade, and a small reduction in regulatory costs. The outlook for the UK economy outside the EU is more uncertain, particularly in terms of our future trading relationships. We have, therefore, captured this uncertainty by modelling two possible exit scenarios based on the following key assumptions: FTA scenario: The UK exits and negotiates a free trade agreement (FTA) with the EU, based on tarifffree trade in goods (but not services). 2 The UK would have to implement EU standards on goods supplied to the EU, but otherwise would not be bound by the four freedoms 3 of the Single Market. The net inflow of low-skilled migrants from the EU could cease. However, this scenario reflects a case where the Government is able to secure greater flexibility over its immigration policy by relaxing rules for highlyskilled migrants from both EU and non-eu countries. The UK grandfathers all existing FTAs that the EU has with third-party countries after it leaves the EU. It also uses its freedom to pursue its external trade policy by negotiating an FTA with the US. The UK would no longer have to make budgetary contributions to the EU. We have assumed the UK would also gain greater control over regulatory policy, which could result in some regulatory cost savings. However, there could also be some regulatory divergence between the UK and EU over time, leading to an increase in non-tariff barriers. 1 CGE models can be used to assess the economic impact of different government or institutional policies. They are often used by the UK Government to assess the impact of large policy changes (for instance corporation tax/fuel duty changes or the effects of Scottish Devolution). 2 Recent EU FTAs with third countries, e.g. Canada and South Korea, primarily cover goods trade, with limited liberalisation in some services sectors. 3 These are freedom of movement for goods, services, capital and labour within the Single Market area. PwC 5

6 WTO scenario: The UK exits the EU and then trades with the EU on the World Trade Organisation s (WTO) MFN basis, which means that the UK would no longer enjoy tariff-free trade in goods with the EU. The UK would not be bound by the EU four freedoms. The net inflow of low-skilled migrants from the EU could cease. However, unlike the FTA scenario, there is assumed to be no corresponding relaxation in immigration rules for high-skilled migrants from both EU and non-eu countries. The Government would gain greater control over regulatory policy, which could result in some regulatory cost savings. However, there could also be some regulatory divergence between the UK and EU over time, leading to an increase in non-tariff barriers. We also assume that current FTAs between the EU and third-party countries no longer apply to the UK once it exits the EU, and trade with those countries reverts to a WTO MFN basis between 2020 and 2026 until new arrangements are put in place. The UK could use its freedom to pursue its external trade policy by negotiating an FTA with the US, but we assume this takes longer than in the FTA scenario to come into force. The UK would no longer contribute to the EU budget. It should be noted that post-exit trade arrangements with the EU (FTA vs WTO rules) are a key aspect of our modelled scenarios, but there are other assumptions included that are not specific to trade (as discussed in Section 2.3 below) and would not necessarily be related to the trade relationships that would exist following an exit. We have also reviewed other widely discussed possible EU exit scenarios, including the UK becoming a member of the European Economic Area (EEA), with a relationship to the EU broadly similar to that of Norway, or agreeing a series of bilateral deals with the EU in a way broadly similar to Switzerland. We have not modelled these alternative scenarios, however, because they would seem inconsistent with many of the key arguments that have been put forward for voting to leave the EU, notably as regards continued free movement of labour between the UK and the rest of the EU. 2.3 Potential economic impacts of a UK withdrawal from the EU We identified five main potential impacts on the UK economy from a possible UK vote to leave the EU, and subsequent withdrawal from the EU. These are discussed in turn below. 1. Increase in uncertainty In the short-term following a UK vote to leave the EU, there is likely to be significant economic and political uncertainty around the UK s future relationship with other EU countries if the UK voted to leave the EU. This is because it would take at least two years, and perhaps more, before the post-exit relationship between the UK and the EU would be clarified in relation to trade and other matters. This uncertainty would be likely to manifest itself in increased financial market and exchange rate volatility, higher risk premia in credit and equity markets, and possible consequential impacts on business confidence and investment. Some of this could be offset by some positive sentiment around whether the UK would become more prosperous outside of the EU, but this is not considered to be the most likely outcome. Therefore, we would still expect uncertainty to have a negative impact on GDP. 2. Lower levels of trade and investment At present, UK businesses are able to export goods tariff-free to other EU Member States. Similarly, businesses in other EU countries can export goods to the UK tariff-free. The EU is still the largest export market for UK goods and services, although its share of total UK exports has fallen from around 55% in 1999 to around 45% in On the other hand, the UK accounts for around a tenth of EU exports. The UK s total stock of inward FDI has grown steadily over time since accession to the EU, amounting to around 1 trillion in The UK could face an increase in tariffs and/or non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to trade with the EU following exit from the EU, depending on the nature of the post-exit negotiated arrangement with the EU. An increase in trade barriers would be likely to have a knock-on impact on investment and, in particular, foreign direct investment (FDI), as EU market access restrictions may lower the returns to investment in the UK. PwC 6

7 3. Reduction in migration in to the UK Free movement of labour is one of the four fundamental freedoms of the EU, allowing EU nationals to move between and reside freely in other Member States. The inflow of EU nationals into the UK has more than doubled since the 2004 EU enlargement 4 and individuals born in other EU Member States now account for around 6% of people in employment in the UK. Following the UK s exit from the EU, restrictions could be placed on immigration to the UK from the EU (and vice versa), in particular on the inflow of lower skilled labour. 4. Reduction in regulation If the UK left the EU, it would no longer be bound by regulations originating from the EU which could create some scope for deregulation and a potential reduction in regulatory costs. Regulation is usually intended to address market failures, such as monopoly power, externalities or to provide public goods. The potential savings from reducing regulatory costs could, however, be relatively limited once the foregone benefits of regulations are taken into account. In addition, the UK may have limited scope to change those regulations that have been largely driven by global initiatives following the UK s exit from the EU. 5. Reduction in fiscal contributions All EU Member States are required to make a financial contribution to the EU budget. From 2010 to 2015, the UK s average annual gross contribution to the EU amounted to around 16.8 billion. However, the UK also receives a rebate and funding from the EU in the form of farming subsidies and funding from rural and regional development programmes and other EU initiatives. This means that the UK s average annual net contribution to the EU budget over these same years is estimated to be around 8.8 billion, or around 0.5% of GDP. If the UK leaves the EU, the UK would no longer be required to make budgetary contributions (unless these were part of a negotiated bilateral deal, though this is not a feature of the scenarios we have modelled). It would, however, also cease to receive funding from the EU (e.g. in relation to the Common Agricultural Policy and research and development). 2.4 Estimated economic impacts in alternative EU exit scenarios Based on our modelling of the five types of impact discussed above, we estimate that the level of real (i.e. adjusted for inflation) UK GDP in 2030 could be around 1.2% lower in the FTA exit scenario than in the counterfactual (i.e. without an EU exit) and around 3.5% lower in the WTO exit scenario. After adjusting for population changes in the different scenarios, we estimate that average real GDP per capita could be between 0.8 and 2.7% lower in 2030 in the two scenarios. We looked at the impacts over the period to 2030 as this is a time horizon over which the short-term uncertainty relating to post-exit arrangements should have largely dissipated and the UK economy would have had time to adapt to a new relationship with EU countries. As set out in Table 2.1, these longer term impacts on real GDP are driven primarily by trade and migration effects. Limitations on free access to the EU Single Market, and the resulting tightening in trade terms with the EU, would be expected to reduce exports and GDP. The migration impacts could lead to a lower number of working individuals in the UK, which would have a negative impact on GDP, although the effect on GDP per capita would be smaller as shown in the final row of Table 2.1 The estimated impacts vary over time as illustrated in Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2. There is a significant shortterm impact of around 3% to 5.5% of GDP by 2020 due in large part to the effect of uncertainty, and then a longer term impact of between around 1.2% and 3.5% on GDP in 2030 once the initial impact of uncertainty has faded away enlargement countries were Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. PwC 7

9 We discuss below our estimates for each of the different types of potential economic impact: Uncertainty: A vote to leave the EU would create economic and political uncertainty that could last for several years while the UK Government negotiates the terms of its exit from the EU as well as new trade arrangements with non-eu countries. This uncertainty is modelled through increased risk premia on the cost of capital that are estimated to have the largest economic impact in the short-term, with UK GDP around 2-2.5% lower in 2020 in the two scenarios due to uncertainty. However, by 2030, this impact should have almost entirely reduced as we assume the terms of the UK s post-exit relationship with the EU and other countries would by then have been agreed and had time to bed down. Trade: Under the WTO scenario our model estimates suggest that UK GDP could be more than 2% lower than in the counterfactual in 2030 due to the combined trade impact, but this would reduce to around 0.5% of GDP in the FTA scenario. Migration: The introduction of tighter restrictions on migration is estimated to reduce UK GDP by around 1-1.6% of GDP in the two scenarios due to reduced labour supply. This will particularly impact sectors which are heavily dependent on low-skilled migrant workers at present, such as agriculture, food and accommodation services. Regulatory and fiscal impacts: The potential post-exit benefits of reducing regulatory costs are estimated to be relatively small in macroeconomic terms at around 0.3% of GDP in 2030 in the two scenarios. This effect reflects cost savings for businesses, particularly in sectors that are relatively labourand energy-intensive. These impacts are small due to leakages from the domestic economy (i.e. some of the benefits of lower regulatory costs flow outside the UK), as well as due to adjustment costs in response to regulatory changes. This has the effect of reducing some of the benefits from regulatory cost savings. There are also some benefits to GDP from lower EU contributions, but these are also relatively modest once the knock-on impacts of these changes in fiscal flows are taken into account through our model. In both exit scenarios, the largest effect on GDP comes through investment, particularly in the short-term due to the assumed heightened degree of uncertainty following a vote to leave the EU. Under the FTA scenario, investment falls by over 16% by 2020, while under the WTO scenario, investment falls by over 25% by 2020 relative to the counterfactual. It is also important, however, to recognise that the total size of the UK economy in 2030, and average income levels per capita, would be considerably larger than today. Specifically, our model estimates suggest that: Total real UK GDP could be around 36-39% higher in 2030 than in 2015 in the two exit scenarios, as compared to a cumulative GDP rise of around 41% in our counterfactual scenario where the UK remains in the EU. Average real GDP per capita in 2030 could be around 25-28% higher than in 2015 in the two exit scenarios, as compared to around 29% if the UK remains in the EU. Estimated impacts on employment levels The reduction in economic output and activity associated with a potential UK exit from the EU results in a negative impact on demand and investment, which leads to a reduction in employment. In the short-term, our results suggest that employment levels fall by between 1.7% and 2.9% in the two scenarios relative to the counterfactual in 2020, but this effect gradually reduces in the long-term. Our model estimates suggest that total employment in 2030 could be between 350,000 and 600,000 lower relative to the counterfactual case in the FTA and WTO exit scenarios respectively. A significant proportion of these impacts are accounted for by the reduction in labour supply due to the reduction in migration inflows, but others reflect the effects of increased trade barriers on economic activity more generally. Limitations and uncertainties relating to our approach and model estimates The report aims to inform the debate from an economic perspective and does not cover the wider political, social and cultural impacts of an exit from the EU that have been discussed in the public debate on EU membership, which are outside the scope of this study. PwC 9

10 Within this economic approach, all economic model estimates are subject to uncertainties and this is particularly true when assessing such a complex and unprecedented possible event as the UK leaving the EU. Our estimates should, therefore, only be taken as indicative of the broad direction and magnitude of the potential economic impacts of alternative UK exit scenarios. Also, we have only modelled two possible exit scenarios: many other variants would be possible in practice as regards, for example, post-exit trade arrangements, immigration regimes and regulatory regimes outside the EU. Our FTA scenario also assumes fairly ambitious achievements, including significant changes in migration policy in order to attract inflows of high-skilled workers to the UK. The assumption that the UK would be able to accelerate negotiations with the US (potentially on the back of existing TTIP negotiations) in time for an FTA to be implemented in 2021 is similarly ambitious. In contrast, the WTO scenario reflects a relatively unfavourable outcome from a labour supply perspective where the UK does not allow any increase in high-skilled migration. However, we also note that the regulatory savings modelled in this scenario could be relatively optimistic as it may not be politically or socially desirable to ease or repeal all of the social, employment and environmental and climate change regulations as assumed in our modelling. Our modelling also assumes no significant changes in the global macroeconomic outlook that would affect the UK economy in a materially different way depending on whether the UK remains in or leaves the EU. As is widely acknowledged, there are currently some material risks to the global economy, such as a more marked slowdown in the Chinese economy and escalating problems in commodity-exporting economies, which could affect the UK s future growth prospects in a significant way. But, in general, these would apply whether the UK remains within or chooses to leave the EU. 5 Our study also does not cover potential structural changes to the economy, or any potential political knock-on impacts of the UK voting to leave the EU. This could include the possibility of a second referendum on Scottish independence after a vote to leave the EU in the UK that was not matched in Scotland, or reactions from other EU Member State governments or the governments of countries outside the EU, beyond what we have explicitly modelled in terms of future trade arrangements or cost of capital risk premia related to post-exit uncertainty. These limitations on the scope of the study should be borne in mind when interpreting the results. 5 For example, by the OBR in their Economic and Fiscal Outlook report, March 2016, as well as in recent economic analyses by the IMF, the OECD and leading central banks. PwC 10

11 3 Overview of our approach In this section, we outline the approach we have used to derive our results and the timeline we have assumed in our modelling. 3.1 Our analytical approach We focused on three steps in our analytical approach: 1. Identification of possible EU exit scenarios: We identified a set of exit scenarios to be modelled, based on our assessment of the alternative options that have been discussed in the public debate on the possible outcomes of the EU referendum, as well as a counterfactual scenario for the case where the UK votes to remain a member of the EU. These scenarios are set out in more detail in Section Analysis of the impacts on the UK economy: To inform our analysis, we conducted a comprehensive review and critical assessment of the existing evidence. Based on this, we identified various ways through which a potential UK exit from the EU could result in economic impacts. Our analysis also seeks to address the evidence gaps identified in existing studies, in particular by considering the economic impacts of changes to migration and the regulatory environment following a potential UK exit from the EU. Figure 3.1 provides an overview of the potential impacts of an EU exit. Figure 3.1: Potential impacts of an EU exit Initial impacts Impact on markets Impact on economy Uncertainty Product Output and productivity Trade Migration Labour Employment Regulations Fiscal Capital Public finances Source: PwC analysis 3. Modelling of the impacts using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model: We modelled the impact of UK exit from the EU by changing various policy or macroeconomic levers that are available in the model to simulate the economic impacts of a UK exit from the EU. The model inputs are informed by our review of existing quantitative evidence for each of the channels through which a UK exit from the EU could impact the UK economy. The results of this modelling are set out in Section 5 of the report, while Annexes B to F provide further detail on each potential policy impact. PwC 11

12 3.2 Our CGE modelling approach Introduction to the CGE model The analytical tool used in this report is a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model of the UK economy (see Annex A for further details). CGE models are often used to assess the impact of different government or institutional policies, or to investigate the effects of significant economic events. They are used widely by international institutions such as the World Bank, IMF and OECD as well as the UK Government. A CGE model combines economic data and a complex system of equations in order to capture the interactions of the three main elements in an economy households, businesses and the government (See Figure 3.2 for more detail). Each element is defined and linked through labour market or capital market flows, household consumption, intermediate product demand, taxes or government transfers. Our model features the supply chain interactions of different industries in the economy based on the 2014 Supply and Use Tables for the UK compiled by the Office for National Statistics (ONS). The model also enables us to account explicitly for the impact of trade relationships, which is important as it is likely that trade flows could change significantly following a UK exit from the EU. Our CGE model allows us to project the impact of a UK exit from the EU on a range of different macroeconomic variables, including GDP (and GDP per capita), employment, household consumption, exports, imports and investment. The model that we use is broadly consistent with the approaches used by HM Treasury (HMT) and HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) to model the impact of large policy changes. The relationships within the CGE model are calibrated based on actual historical economic data. Figure 3.2: Economic interactions in the CGE model Transfers Subsidies Government Taxes Taxes Household Labour and investment Companies (local and multi-national) Companies purchase goods and services from one another Companies (local and multi-national) Goods and services, and wage income Companies determine the level of production by maximising profit Source: PwC 3.3 Timelines for modelling economic impacts The timelines involved if the UK were to exit the EU are highly uncertain as there is no precedent for a country leaving the EU under current Treaty arrangements 6. However, we have outlined an indicative timeline in Figure 3.2 below based on available public information. We assume that: In the event of a vote to leave in the June 2016 referendum, the UK Government would notify the European Council of its intention to exit the EU, as set out in the provisions of Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, and a withdrawal agreement would start to be negotiated between the EU and the UK. 6 Greenland did leave the European Economic Community in 1985, but the circumstances were very different from those facing the UK in the event of a possible exit from the EU in 2016, so this does not provide a useful comparator. PwC 12

13 The agreement would then be approved by the Council, acting by qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament. The EU treaties would then cease to apply from the date of the agreement, or failing that, within two years of the initial notice. However, this could go on for a longer period if there is unanimous agreement amongst the remaining 27 Member States to extend the negotiation period. There is considerable uncertainty around how long the formal exit process would last. For example, the UK Government has suggested that negotiating trade agreements can take up to ten years or more so a two-year period could be relatively optimistic. 7 Figure 3.3: Timeline for possible exit negotiations June 2016 UK holds referendum on EU membership 2016 The UK gives two years notice to leave the EU under Article UK negotiates the terms of its exit with the EU 2019 onwards The UK and EU continue to work towards the UK s formal exit 2020 onwards The UK is no longer a member of the EU Source: PwC analysis Based on this indicative timetable, we have assumed that the transitional period while an exit is negotiated would run from mid-2016 until the end of 2019, culminating in a formal exit in A shorter or longer period is possible, but we need to make a concrete assumption for modelling purposes and this seems reasonable based on the available information. We have considered two main time periods within our analysis: A short-term transition period between 2016 and the end of 2019, during which an exit agreement is negotiated between the UK and the EU. The UK is likely to experience political and economic uncertainty over this period as to the outcome of the exit negotiations. We simulate the impacts of uncertainty using a change in the credit risk premium, which feeds into the CGE model as a cost of capital impact that applies to both debt and equity. A longer-term period between 2020 and 2030 where we examine the long-term impacts of alternative EU exit scenarios. We expect that, during this period, the impact of uncertainty would fade away as greater clarity emerges over the status of the UK s post-exit economic and trading relationships with the EU and other trading partners. The EU treaties would cease to apply formally to the EU from this point onwards, which is when changes to the UK s relationship with the EU (e.g. change in tariffs and NTBs, changes to migration, regulations and fiscal contributions) would take effect. 7 Cabinet Office (2016b). PwC 13

14 4 Alternative scenarios Summary We first defined a counterfactual scenario where the UK remains in the EU. This scenario is assumed to be largely a continuation of business as usual trends for the UK economy. However, we have made some specific adjustments to capture the competitiveness reforms agreed by the UK Government with the governments of the other EU Member States in February These adjustments assume a small and gradual reduction in non-tariff barriers in UK-EU trade, and a small reduction in regulatory costs. The outlook for the UK economy outside the EU is more uncertain, particularly in terms of our future trading relationships. We have, therefore, captured this uncertainty by modelling two possible exit scenarios combining a range of favourable and less favourable assumptions, as follows: FTA scenario: the UK exits and negotiates an FTA with the EU, based on tariff-free trade in goods (but not services). 8 The UK would have to implement EU standards on goods supplied to the EU, but otherwise would not be bound by the four freedoms 9 of the Single Market. The net inflow of low-skilled migrants from the EU could cease. However, this scenario reflects a case where the Government is able to secure greater flexibility over its immigration policy by relaxing rules for high-skilled migrants from both EU and non-eu countries. The UK grandfathers all existing FTAs that the EU has with third-party countries after it leaves the EU. It also uses its freedom to pursue its external trade policy by negotiating an FTA with the US. The UK would no longer have to make budgetary contributions to the EU. We have assumed the UK would also gain greater control over regulatory policy, which could result in some regulatory cost savings. However, there could also be some regulatory divergence between the UK and EU over time, leading to an increase in non-tariff barriers. WTO scenario: the UK exits the EU and then trades with the EU on the WTO s MFN basis, which means that the UK would no longer enjoy tariff-free trade in goods with the EU. The UK would not be bound by the EU four freedoms. The net inflow of low-skilled migrants from the EU could cease. However, unlike the FTA scenario, there is assumed to be no corresponding relaxation in immigration rules for high-skilled migrants from both EU and non-eu countries. The Government would gain greater control over regulatory policy, which could result in some regulatory cost savings. However, there could also be some regulatory divergence between the UK and EU over time, leading to an increase in non-tariff barriers. We also assume that current FTAs between the EU and third-party countries no longer apply to the UK once it exits the EU, and trade with those countries reverts to a WTO MFN basis between 2020 and 2026 until new arrangements are put in place. The UK could use its freedom to pursue its external trade policy by negotiating an FTA with the US, but we assume this takes longer than in the FTA scenario to come into force. The UK would no longer contribute to the EU budget. We also considered other possible EU exit scenarios for the UK based on the EEA/Norwegian, or Swiss models, but we did not model these because key features of these options, particularly continued free movement of labour did not seem consistent with the main arguments used to justify a vote for the UK to leave the EU. 8 Recent EU FTAs with third countries, e.g. Canada and South Korea, primarily cover goods trade, with limited liberalisation in some services sectors. 9 These are freedom of movement for goods, services, capital and labour within the Single Market area. PwC 14

15 In this section, we: Define the counterfactual scenario in which the UK remains a member of the EU, which we use as a comparator for the EU exit scenarios in the modelling we have undertaken; and Describe the scenarios we have considered in our modelling in more detail. 4.1 Counterfactual scenario Our analysis estimates the economic impact of the UK s potential exit from the EU by comparing it to the outcome that would arise if the UK remained part of the EU (i.e. the counterfactual). This scenario is assumed to be largely a continuation of business as usual trends for the UK economy. There are likely to be longer-term impacts of the reformed EU deal that was agreed by the UK Government with other EU Member States at the European Council meeting on the 18 th and 19 th February, but it is difficult to reflect the long-term benefits of all aspects of the deal within the modelling, particularly in the areas of economic governance, sovereignty and welfare and free movement. However, we have made some specific adjustments to capture the competitiveness reforms. These adjustments assume a small and gradual reduction in non-tariff barriers in UK-EU trade, and a small reduction in regulatory costs. Our counterfactual scenario uses the following real GDP growth projections that are based on our latest UK Economic Outlook report in the short-term and our World in 2050 model beyond These projections are also broadly in line with historical average UK GDP growth rates since We have also set out our assumptions regarding employment levels (i.e. the number of people employed) under the counterfactual case in Table 4.1. Table 4.1: Trend GDP and employment assumptions under the counterfactual scenario Year GDP growth p.a.* Employment (millions) % % % % 34.5 Source: PwC assumptions *2020, 2025 and 2030 figures are 5-year averages ending in these years. 4.2 Potential exit options for the UK There is considerable uncertainty around what the UK s relationship with the EU might look like if the outcome of the referendum is a vote to leave. In this section, we set out four alternative options which have been put forward that the UK could pursue in the event of a leave vote. These are summarised in Table UK-EU free trade agreement (FTA). 2. A WTO scenario. 3. Membership of the European Economic Area (EEA). 4. Bespoke bilateral deals Swiss option. 10 PwC UK Economic Outlook (March 2016) and PwC (2015) The World in As discussed above, we have not explicitly factored in changes in the growth rate as a result of the reformed EU deal within our counterfactual scenario as these are difficult to determine at this stage. However, we note that there could be some growth impacts that could arise from the deal over the longer-term. PwC 15

16 Table 4.2: Possible scenarios for the UK leaving the EU Access to single market Influence over EU regulations Application of EU regulations and directives Contribution to EU budget Independent immigration policy Independent trade policy Source: PwC analysis UK-EU Free trade agreement (FTA) Medium - UK would retain free trade in goods with the EU, but nontariff barriers such as divergence in standards and regulations could emerge WTO Low EEA membership (similar to Norway) High EEA countries have access to the Single Market No No Some no voting rights but limited formal engagement. Some autonomy in other areas The UK would have to comply with EU regulations around the goods covered by the FTA Technically no, but product exports to the EU would still need to meet EU product standards. Yes, including social and labour law (Working Time Directive) Bespoke bilateral deals (similar to Switzerland) Medium the Swiss agreements cover trade in goods but not in services. No Technically no, but required in practice if domiciling in other territories (e.g. Swiss banks operating out of UK) No No Yes, but smaller Yes, but smaller Yes Yes No all four freedoms retained Yes UK may negotiate FTAs with other countries Yes UK may negotiate FTAs with other countries in financial services and other services Yes UK may negotiate free trade agreements (FTA) with other countries Some autonomy, but Switzerland cannot restrict EU immigration Yes UK may negotiate FTAs with other countries More details around each of these scenarios are provided below. This is not an exhaustive list, and many subvariants are possible within these four broad options, but it covers the main spectrum of options discussed in the EU membership debate thus far. We begin by discussing the two variants we have modelled (FTA and WTO) and then consider the other two options and explain why we chose not to include these in our quantitative modelling exercise. UK-EU free trade agreement The UK could aim to negotiate a free trade agreement (FTA) with the EU upon exit. Across the world, FTAs vary greatly, both in terms of their coverage and ambition. An FTA would allow the UK to trade with the EU with reduced tariffs on goods. However, there would still be non-tariff barriers on both goods and services to a greater degree than if the UK had remained in the EU Single Market. If the UK entered into a FTA with the EU, the UK would have to implement EU standards on goods supplied to the EU, but would otherwise have greater freedom in implementing its own regulatory policy. Historical FTAs with the EU (e.g. the EU-Canada CETA and EU-South Korea FTA) usually mainly cover goods but can include limited liberalisation in some services sectors. PwC 16

17 We assume that the UK would not be bound by the four freedoms of the Single Market in this scenario (other than in relation to required standards for free trade in goods). Similarly, the UK would not be bound by EU policies such as the Common Agricultural Policy and Common Fisheries Policy. Trade agreements often take years to negotiate and implement. For example, the EU FTA with South Korea took four years to conclude, and the EU s negotiations with Canada concluded in 2014 after seven years of talks, although the agreement has not yet come in to force. The EU also currently holds trade agreements with 53 countries. If the UK left the EU, it may not remain party to these and may have to renegotiate agreements with these third-party countries. A WTO scenario Another potential exit scenario is that the UK would revert to conducting trade with the EU under the rules of the World Trade Organisation. This means that exporters would be subject to the EU s common external tariffs for WTO members on a MFN basis for trade in goods. Moreover, the UK is likely to face non-tariff barriers in the cross-border provision of services, including financial services. It would no longer be bound by the four freedoms and would no longer have to make fiscal contributions to the EU. The UK would also have complete control over its external trade policy and would be able to pursue its own trade deals with other economies. Leaving the EU under this scenario would see the UK lose access to the Single Market. Tariffs on UK s goods exports to the EU would increase from zero to MFN rates, while imports from the EU would become more expensive should the UK impose tariffs on goods imports from the EU. Membership of the European Economic Area (EEA) This option would see the UK leave the EU but become a member of the EEA, which consists of the 28 EU Member States and three non-eu Member States - Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland. Under this scenario, the UK would largely retain access to the Single Market and would, therefore, maintain most of its economic and trading relations with the EU. For example, Norway has extensive, but not full, access to the Single Market. 12 The UK would also remain bound by the four freedoms of the Single Market (i.e. freedom of movement of goods, services, labour and capital) and would continue to make contributions to the EU budget (estimated to be 91% of the current levels of the UK s contribution). 13 Furthermore, the UK would have to continue to implement EU legislation that relates to the areas of the Single Market that the UK still has access to. EEA Member States have the right to participate in expert groups and committees in the early stages of a legislative proposal, however, they cannot vote on legislation in the European Council or European Parliament. The UK would, therefore, lose formal access to the EU decision making process under this scenario. However, the UK would no longer be bound by the Common Agricultural and Fisheries Policies and could, therefore, determine its own approach to these policy areas. Additionally, the UK would no longer be required to conform with the rest of the EU in other policy areas, such as regional policy or judicial co-operation. Bespoke bilateral deals Swiss option Switzerland engages with the EU through a series of bespoke bilateral deals that cover trade in goods but not in services. In order to maintain access and alignment with the Single Market, Switzerland has adopted legislation in parallel to the EU and adjusted some domestic legislation to meet EU requirements. Striking a similar deal to Switzerland would mean that the UK would continue to have tariff-free access to the EU goods market. However, in order to gain this access, the UK would need to ensure that it aligns domestic legislation with that of the EU and adopts some of the rules governing the Single Market. 14 The UK would have little to no influence in the composition or evolution of these rules. The Swiss option would also mean that the 12 Norway is outside the Common Agriculture Policy and Common Fisheries Policy which means that it does not trade freely in these sectors. The EU also applies its rules of origin to trade with Norway. This means that if a Norwegian firm exports goods which contain a high proportion of content produced by non-eu countries to the EU, tariffs are applied by the EU countries. 13 These estimates from the Centre for European Reform assume that UK contributions would be made at the same proportion of GDP as current Norwegian contributions. Source: Centre for European Reform (June 2014). 14 A study by the University of Kent for the City of London estimates that around 40% of Swiss legislation is derived from EU rules. See University of Kent Centre for Swiss Politics (2013). PwC 17

18 freedom of movement of people would continue to apply. Additionally, the UK would contribute to the EU Budget, though this would be a smaller amount than it would pay under the EEA membership scenario. 15 One feature of this option is that the UK would be able to pursue its own external trade agenda i.e. trade outside of the EU, unrestricted by the need to conduct trade policy as part of the wider EU. The Swiss currently have an agreement for free trade in goods but have been unable to reach a free trade in services agreement. 16 This could mean restrictions on UK exports in services, including financial services which make up a large part of the UK economy. The relationship between the EU and Switzerland has evolved over decades with complex bilateral agreements now in place. Agreeing a similar set of deals could take a long time - it took around ten years for Switzerland and the EU to put in place the agreements that currently exist between them. 4.3 Our modelled scenarios In our study, we have modelled the potential economic impacts of a UK exit from the EU under two possible scenarios combining a range of favourable and less favourable assumptions: FTA scenario: The UK exits and negotiates an FTA with the EU, based on tariff-free trade in goods (but not services). 17 The UK would have to implement EU standards on goods supplied to the EU, but otherwise would not be bound by the four freedoms 18 of the Single Market. The net inflow of low-skilled migrants from the EU could cease. However, this scenario reflects a case where the Government is able to secure greater flexibility over its immigration policy by relaxing rules for highly-skilled migrants from both EU and non-eu countries. The UK grandfathers all existing FTAs that the EU has with third-party countries after it leaves the EU. It also uses its freedom to pursue its external trade policy by negotiating an FTA with the US. The UK would no longer have to make budgetary contributions to the EU. We have assumed the UK would also gain greater control over regulatory policy, which could result in some regulatory cost savings. However, there could also be some regulatory divergence between the UK and EU over time, leading to an increase in non-tariff barriers. WTO scenario: The UK exits the EU and then trades with the EU on the WTO s MFN basis, which means that the UK would no longer enjoy tariff-free trade in goods with the EU. The UK would not be bound by the EU four freedoms. The net inflow of low-skilled migrants from the EU could cease. However, unlike the FTA scenario, there is assumed to be no corresponding relaxation in immigration rules for high-skilled migrants from both EU and non-eu countries. The Government would gain greater control over regulatory policy, which could result in some regulatory cost savings. However, there could also be some regulatory divergence between the UK and EU over time, leading to an increase in non-tariff barriers. We also assume that current FTAs between the EU and third-party countries no longer apply to the UK once it exits the EU, and trade with those countries reverts to a WTO MFN basis between 2020 and 2026 until new arrangements are put in place. The UK could use its freedom to pursue its external trade policy by negotiating an FTA with the US, but we assume this takes longer than in the FTA scenario to come into force. The UK would no longer contribute to the EU budget. It should be noted that post-exit trade arrangements with the EU (FTA vs WTO rules) are a key aspect of our modelled scenarios, but there are other assumptions included that are not specific to trade and would not necessarily be related to the trade relationships that would exist following an exit. Both scenarios represent a substantial change in terms of both economic and political arrangements with the EU, albeit to different degrees. An FTA would see the UK maintain a level of economic integration with the 15 The Centre for European Reform estimates that if the UK were to contribute on the same basis as Switzerland, it would mean paying 45% of the current contribution. Source: Centre for European Reform (2014). 16 Some commentators suggest that this is partly due to Swiss reservations over EU banking regulations. See University of Kent Centre for Swiss Politics (2013). 17 Recent EU FTAs with third countries, e.g. Canada and South Korea, primarily cover goods trade, with limited liberalisation in some services sectors. 18 These are freedom of movement for goods, services, capital and labour within the Single Market area. PwC 18

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