Tag Archives: G.L.c. 93A

Where (1) a plaintiff brought suit to recover personal injury protection payments and damages for the defendant insurer's alleged violations of G.L.c. 93A and (2) the judge awarded the plaintiff treble G.L.c. 93A damages as a sanction for the defendant's discovery violation in its late disclosure of an investigative report, the sanction must be vacated on due process grounds.

Where a judge held a defendant attorney liable under G.L.c. 93A, that finding was proper based on evidence that the attorney charged a fee to a plaintiff client whose sole objective — obtaining a residency status — was unambiguously foreclosed by law.

Where a defendant lender and codefendant mortgage brokerage have moved for summary judgment with respect to a complaint brought by plaintiff borrowers, the motion should be denied as to counts alleging G.L.c. 93A violations and civil conspiracy.

Where a plaintiff charges that a number of defendants violated G.L.c. 93A, I find that he has made proper service on defendant Louis Bertucci but not on defendants Signature Group Holdings, Inc., Dorchester Real Estate, Union Capital Business Mortgage Trust or EB Real Estate Group, Inc.

Where the defendant University of Massachusetts has moved for summary judgment on a G.L.c. 93A claim asserted by the plaintiffs in a patent dispute, the defendant does not qualify as a person under the statute and thus the summary judgment motion must be allowed.

Where a dispute has arisen over the termination of a power purchase agreement, the facts led this court to conclude that the defendant should be held liable for violating G.L.c. 93A but that the plaintiff’s other claims must fail.

Where a plaintiff has charged a defendant with violating G.L.c. 93A in connection with filings at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, the complaint must be dismissed on grounds of federal preemption and a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Where a defendant has moved for removal of a default judgment entered against him in a suit arising out of a disputed lease, I find that the motion must be denied because the defendant has not demonstrated excusable neglect or any other ground for relief from the default judgment.

Where a plaintiff tenant slipped and fell on an icy walkway in front of her apartment and brought a number of claims against the defendant housing authority, I find that the plaintiff’s breach of the implied warranty of habitability claim should be allowed to go forward but that her G.L.c. 176D and 93A claims should be dismissed.