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Monday, December 28, 2015

I normally do not engage in attempting to
redesign major game systems in games. After all, who wants to read the rantings
of a player about a feature he or she does not like? I usually try to write
posts that interest me, and frankly, I prefer reading bad fan fiction to
articles with ideas that will never reach a game server.

So why change now? In November, the subject
of the month in EVE Online was war decs. With people ranging from The Marmite
Collective's Tora Bushido to MassivelyOP's Brendan Drain speculating on the
future design of the war declaration system. I think most players think the
current system is, to put it nicely, a bit dysfunctional. With CCP planning to
introduce citadels into the game before Fanfest in April 2016, now is an
appropriate time to consider changes to the war declaration system in high
security space.

Before suggesting change, one should have a
rationale for making said change. My reason is simple. When the optimum
solution for a plurality, if not an outright majority, of players when faced
with a war dec is to either disband their player organization, leave their
current corporation, or just not log into the game for seven days, then the
game system is broken. The mark of a poorly designed game feature in an MMORPG
is one that discourages or otherwise hampers social bonding. Industry-wide, the
biggest indicator that a player will stay engaged, or in EVE's case subscribed,
for a long period is having friends to play with. Those social bonds make
leaving a game more difficult.

Some players, especially those who regularly
engage in high sec war decs or suicide ganking, will argue that the biggest
indicator that someone will remain a player is if a player loses a ship in the
first 30 days. Yes, CCP stated that was the case a couple of years ago. Nevertheless,
I would like to know the percentage of players who lost ships, were part of a
corporation, and stayed versus those who did lose ships and were not part of a
corporation and stayed. My belief is that members of strong player
organizations are better equipped to handle ship loss than those in either weak
player organizations or those who never leave their beginning NPC corp. Moreover,
the current war declaration system is an obstacle to the formation of strong
player organizations. A system that discourages people from playing together
tends to do that.

What is my alternative? First, a replacement
system needs to fit into the existing game world. The lore that justifies the
current war dec mechanics centers on corruption. Players can pay CONCORD to look
the other way while their corporations wage war. A question I have always had
is why the empires, and their navies, would just sit back and watch the carnage.
The current system implies that empire officials are also getting a cut of the
action. Why not make the flow of corruption explicit?

I also have a different vision of what a war
dec in high sec actually represents. Strip away all the sci-fi trappings and
the current war dec system is illegal behavior. Criminal activity on an
interstellar scale, but criminal activity all the same. What is wrong with
allowing players to embrace their inner Al Capone? The game should openly allow
players form up gangs and fight over turf where they can sell drugs, profit off
protection rackets, and corrupt government officials.

In the spirit of CONCORD and the empires
losing control, the effective security status of some systems should fluctuate.
I would not change the actual security status of systems, as that number
reflects so much information at a glance. Players instead would change the
nature of the space around them. In such a system, the local inhabitants would
possess an advantage in avoiding the conflict while those just passing through
could find themselves on the wrong end of a laser battery.

So, how would the system work? First, I need
to introduce the system governor. The system governor is the capsuleers' one
stop shopping point to access the entire rotten, corrupt bureaucracy in various
parts of New Eden. He performs all of the dirty tasks behind the scenes so
players do not have to do the administrative work required to bribe or threaten
all the NPCs involved in making a war dec work. The system governor is also a
greedy bastard who is perfectly happy to make a profit off all the chaos a war
dec brings. Hey, if he is going to do all the grunt work, he deserves any ISK
he can skim off the system.

Second, one does not declare war on a
corporation or alliance. One declares war on a system. Wars between
corporations and alliances will occur, because limiting a war dec to a single
system is not only a bit silly, but ripe for abuse.

Before continuing, I need to make a comment
about the numbers used in the rest of the post. I do not have access to the
information that CCP has, so some of the numbers are probably wildly horrible.
Think of them as placeholders for now.

Under my proposed system, declaring war on a
system is relatively easy. All that is required is the party declaring the war
dec to own at least one citadel of any size in the system and to pay a bribe to
the system governor. The bribe increases as the security level increases. The
ethics of system governors in a 0.5 system are a lot more fluid than those governing
0.8 systems. System governors in 0.9 and 1.0 systems are pretty honest and will
not accept bribes, although they will allow players to conduct war activity in
their systems begun with a war dec outside their systems. While relatively
honest, the system governors in 0.9 and 1.0 systems are not incorruptible.

The corp CEO’s or alliance executor’s modified
faction standing with the NPC faction that owns the system also influences the
size of the bribe required. The war deccing corp/alliance not only has to pay
off CONCORD but the local faction navy as well. The modified faction standing
is the average modified faction standing for the past 30 days. If the corp
CEO/alliance executor has not been in the organization for at least 30 days, the
algorithm uses a value of -10 for each day under 30 days the corp CEO/alliance
executor was not in the organization when determining the average modified
faction standings.

How much ISK is required to bribe a system
governor? That is a play balance question I'd leave to the developers, but
considering the war deccing corp/alliance must also put at least a 700 million
ISK citadel at risk (and possibly 1 billion including fittings), I would put
the size of the bribe in the 20-50 million ISK range.

I have described how to declare war on a
system. How does one declare war on a specific corporation or alliance? If a
corp or alliance has an active war declaration running in a system, then any
other corporation or alliance can declare war on that corp/alliance by
declaring its own war in the system. If two corporations or alliances are
already at war in a system, declaring a war on a system also is a declaration
of war against both player entities. Therefore, in addition to the system
warfare mechanics, the existing war dec mechanics apply throughout the rest of
New Eden.

A war dec can end in one of two ways. First,
a war dec can end when a party no longer owns a citadel in the system. The
second is that at the end of seven days the war deccing party can inform the
system governor that the war dec is ending. I have two caveats to these rules.
The first is that a corp/alliance cannot end a war dec on a system if the
corp/alliance has a citadel in a reinforced state in the system. If a
corp/alliance wants to end the war dec and has a citadel in a reinforced state,
the corp/alliance can inform the system governor and the war dec will end at
the first downtime when no citadels the corporation or alliance owns are in a
reinforced state.

What are the effects of a war declaration on
a system? First, all pilots are set to suspect status unless the system
governor receives a suitable bribe, but more on that later. Second, members of
a war deccing corp/alliance may attack any player owned structure not protected
by the system governor in the system. Members of non-war deccing corp/alliances
may not attack player-owned structures. Those unwilling to risk a structure do
not get the benefits of attacking the structures of those who do. Finally, the
system governor imposes special taxes in the system in order to raise the funds
required to "fight" the capsuleer gangs and "restore
order."

At this point, some readers are probably
shaking their heads in disbelief. Am I really proposing the introduction of
free-for-all PvP into high security space? Not really. A truly FFA system would
allow everyone to shoot everyone else with little to no penalty imposed by the
game for doing so. Null security space
is an example of such a zone in EVE. Under this system, players would have the
option of opting out of a system war dec.

How would the opt-out system work? To receive
CONCORD and faction navy protection in the system, a corporation or alliance
would need to pay a suitable bribe to the system governor. The proposed bribe
schedule for player corporations and alliances is:

Immunity
for ships (except mining-class ships) - 100,000 ISK.

Immunity
for mining ships - 100,000 ISK. Requires the purchase of general war
declaration ship immunity.

Immunity
for custom offices - 2 million ISK for each one in system.

Immunity
for medium citadels - 2 million ISK for each one in system.

Immunity
for large citadels - 5 million ISK for each one in system.

Immunity
for extra-large citadels - 10 million ISK for each one in system.

To opt out of the war dec in the system, a
corp/alliance at a minimum must pay for ship and infrastructure immunity. For
example, a 100-member corp that owns five customs offices and a medium citadel
in a system would need to pay the system governor a 22 million ISK bribe for 30
days protection in the system.

This fee covers everything except for
specialized mining ships (exhumers, mining barges, expedition frigates and
mining frigates). The system governor is a bit greedy, and wants to skim some
of the profits from mining operations in his system. Since miners can refine
and sell their ore outside the system, he demands a bribe to actually mine in
the system itself. Therefore, a corp or alliance has to pay for a mining permit
for each of its members in order to receive CONCORD protection for mining
ships. In the example above, the 100-member corp would need to pay an
additional 10 million ISK for a 30-day mining permit, bringing the total bribe
the system governor receives up to 32 million ISK.

A player in an NPC corp would pay a different
rate. The bribe schedule is:

Immunity
for ships (except mining-class ships) - 1 million ISK.

Immunity
for mining ships (aka the mining permit) - 1 million ISK. Requires the purchase
of general war declaration immunity

System governors do not consider a player with
an NPC as particularly dangerous so the system governor feels confident about
squeezing that capsuleer for more ISK.

The bribe to the system governor does have
some limitations. The bribe only restores the high quality CONCORD protection
that capsuleers have grown to love over the years. The bribe does not improve
upon it. In other words, becoming a victim of a suicide gank is still a
possibility in high sec, even if a player, corp, or alliance purchases a mining
permit.

In addition, bribing a system governor for
protection does not override the effects of a war declaration started in
another system. For example, The Marmite Collective and the Fedo Liberation
Front both dropped medium citadels in the system of Lanngisi in Metropolis,
resulting in a war dec between the two alliances. The Fedo Liberation Front could
then bribe the system governor of Hek to ignore a system war dec in that
system, but The Marmite Collective could still attack Fedo Liberation Front
ship's without any interference from CONCORD.

I briefly mentioned the feature before, but
players do not have to declare war in order to engage in PvP in a system under
a war declaration. Like Han Solo in Star Wars, players do not have to wait for
the war deccer to shoot first. These alliances, corporations, and individuals fall
under the category of "Honorable Third Parties." Honorable third
parties may shoot at any suspect or criminally flagged pilot in the system
without CONCORD intervention. However, shooting at the structures of any
corp/alliance the capsuleer is not at war with will result in CONCORD
intervention.

If honorable third parties exist, does that
mean dishonorable third parties also exist? Absolutely! Honor, however, has a
different meaning in the proposed system. By paying the system governor a bribe
to opt out of PvP, capsuleers are promising to not engage in activity that
would result in the player becoming criminally flagged or otherwise violate the
rules of the war declaration system. Dishonor the agreement and the system
governor becomes angry. Did I mention that the system governor works
hand-in-glove with the local CONCORD and faction navy commanders?

Let me reiterate that the proposed system
still allows the practice of suicide ganking. Pilots in corps or alliances that
are either engaged in war deccing the system or acting as an honorable third
party face no greater sanctions from CONCORD than they do under the current
game mechanics. Those who act dishonorably by opting out of PvP and then engage
in suicide ganking incur the following penalties:

An immediate, temporary debuff of -10 to a
capsuleer's security standing. The debuff lasts for 24 hours.

If the debuff lowers the capsuleer's security
standings below -10, the faction navies will attempt to pod the player
throughout high security space.

If 25% of the members of a corporation or
alliance have the debuff, then all opt out bribes become null and void. The
system governors become distrustful of the corp/alliance and no system governor
will accept an opt-out bribe for 48 hours.

If the player is in an NPC corporation, then
upon receiving the debuff, all of the player's opt out bribes become null and
void and system governors will not accept any opt out bribes from the capsuleer
for 48 hours.

Now, at this point I expect some people are upset
with the proposal. Why give carebears a get out of a PvP card? Why make suicide
ganking harder? Yes, I know that suicide ganking is harder under this proposal.
Not so much because the NPCs are more effective than because other players can
more easily interfere with gankers.

The answers to those questions like with the
type of environmental change I want to see in high sec. Bringing turf wars in
the style of Al Capone in Prohibition-era Chicago involves attempting to bring
some of the nuances as well. For example, Capone lived in the town of Cicero, a
suburb of Chicago. Burglars and thieves soon learned not to conduct their trade
in Capone's hometown. Let us just say that Capone's justice was a bit harsher
than the government's. I wish to give the successful gang the ability to
control more of the activity in a system than the current mechanics allow.

The second reason involves the New Eden
economy. I would like the system to serve as an ISK sink. I believe that a
successful war dec should result in rewards that CCP does not magically
generate out of thin air. That means the rewards must come from other players. Under
this proposal, the more PvE activity that occurs in a system, the bigger the
payout for the successful war deccer.

So far, I only described the payment of
bribes to the system governor. To paraphrase the philosophy of a recent Chicago
mayor, system governors, at least the greedy ones, never let a good crisis go
to waste. Therefore, in addition to collecting bribes from capsuleers, they
also institute "emergency" taxes and fees in order to provide the
extra funds needed to "protect" their systems from the Empyreans.
That so much of that money winds up lining the pockets of system governors and
their associates is just a normal part of business in New Eden.

As a reminder, I do not have access to the
economic data that CCP holds, so the numbers I am about to quote are just
placeholder amounts. As a first proposal, the presence of a war dec on a system
would impose an additional NPC tax on the following activities:

1%
tax on all bounties collected in the system.

1%
tax on all mission rewards collected from agents in the system.

.5%
tax on all market transactions within the system.

.5%
tax on all manufacturing/invention activity fees (reprocessing, copying, etc)
conducted in the system. This fee would include activity on player-owned
citadels.

Players could reduce the amount of the above
additional "emergency" taxes they pay through training a new skill. In
addition, the amount of taxes paid would depend on the standings a player has
with the local NPC faction. Capsuleers with friends in high places would get a
discount on the taxes paid. Why? A corrupt system governor cannot afford to let
the central authorities look too closely into how he governs the system. Giving
breaks to well-connected capsuleers keeps not only keeps the complaints down to
a minimum, but the oversight of the governor as well. I will leave determining the
amount of the tax breaks well trained and well-connected players receive up to
the professional developers.

So far, the proposed rules only describe how the
game would take ISK from players. How can players funnel some of that
potentially huge pool of ISK into their wallets? A corp of alliance receives
50% of all bribes and emergency taxes in a system in which it is the only
entity with an active war dec in the system. The rationale is simple. As long
as capsuleers are fighting each other in the system, then the system governor
can play the player organizations against each other and keep all the
corruption to himself. Once one organization comes out on top, however, the
system governor decides that discretion is the better part of valor and gives
the winning corp/alliance a piece of the action. Is that enough of an incentive
to fight a high sec war?

How would the disbursement of the rewards
take place? In order to avoid flooding wallet logs, a corp or alliance would
receive a deposit from the system governor once a day. The corp/alliance would
receive a prorated amount of the bribes paid to the system governor. So, to
continue an example used previously, The Marmite Collective defeats Fedo
Liberation Front and is the only alliance with an active war dec in Lanngisi. Let
us say that players have 600 million ISK in active bribes on file with the
system governor. Marmite would then collect 10 million ISK (Total bribe ISK
divided by 30 days, times 50%) for its share of the bribes that day.

Not a lot by itself, but Lanngisi is also a
relatively busy missioning system not only due to the presence of a level 4
Sisters of EVE security agent but its location in the Minmatar COSMOS system of
Ani. How much more would Marmite receive in emergency NPC taxes? For the sake
of simplicity, let us assume that 5 billion ISK in missioning and ratting
activity occurs in the system on a given day. That amount would result in The
Marmite Collective receiving an additional 50 million ISK, or 60 million ISK
for the day.

Is 60 million ISK a day in payouts worth the
war dec? If a corp/alliance can hold onto the system, that means the corporation
or alliance is risking, if using a medium citadel to declare the war dec on the
system, between 700 million and 1 billion ISK in order to make 1.8 billion ISK
in a month. Is that enough for someone to issue a war declaration? On the other
hand, is the amount required higher and would high sec war deccers instead
confine their activity to systems like the nearby trade hub of Hek?

Finally, if the empires are really losing
control, they should lose control over more than just the security in systems.
Since Al Capone influenced the ideas in this post, this proposal also addresses
one final point in the lore: booster prohibition. I have a high degree of
confidence that residents of high security space, especially the min/maxers,
would love to get their hands on some high performance boosters. However,
booster prohibition makes transporting the goods from major trade hubs
problematic. In my opinion, the solution is to encourage local production.

In the proposed system, members of
corporations and alliances engaged in an active war dec in the system can openly
manufacture, transport, and sell illegal boosters. In addition, a member of an
alliance or corp can transport illegal boosters between two adjacent systems
without fear of interference from NPCs as long as the corp/alliance has an
active war dec in both systems. Everyone may transport illegal boosters within
the system as long as at least one war declaration on the system is active.

Let us go back to the example of Lanngisi.
The Marmite Collective is no longer receiving its share of the corruption
payments due to the Fedo Liberation Front putting up another medium citadel and
declaring war on the system again. Does that mean that Marmite is not making
any ISK from the war? If The Marmite Collective is not morally opposed to the
sale and use of boosters, the ISK can flow into the alliance wallet. Sisters of
EVE loyalty points are valuable so many mission runners are looking for that
extra edge to increase profits. Since Marmite has a citadel in the system
anyway, a couple of members look to make a little extra money by making
boosters. They purchase the materials in Hek two jumps away and produce the
boosters in Lanngisi.

Once produced, the pilots transport the
boosters to the Sisters of EVE station, where the mission runners then purchase
and use the boosters. Not only do mission runners buy the boosters, but also so
do the honorable third parties that show up in the system to PvP. Potentially,
Marmite could make more from illegal booster sales than all the other
corruption involving the system governor combined. Of course, the Fedo
Liberation Front is also making and selling boosters, giving Marmite an
additional incentive to defeat the FLF.

I realize that the system as proposed in this
blog post is just a high-level document with many holes that enterprising
players could exploit. Conceptually, though, I think the system accomplishes
goals that will make EVE Online a better game. They are:

A
system that enhances the lore storyline of the empires (and CONCORD) losing
control.

A
way for players to opt out of high sec wars while still making it possible for
them to wander into a bad neighborhood.

A
way for players in small corporations to protect citadels they own in high sec
without having to constantly tear them down.

Introduce
mechanics that give defenders a better chance of thwarting suicide gankers that
could lead to more PvP in high sec.

A
system that acts as an ISK sink.

I also realize that few will wade through
this 4,000 word, 7-page wall of text. Certainly, no one from CCP once they
realize the post does not contain any botter or RMT tears. So why spend the
time to write it? Sometimes when criticizing a system, the question comes back
asking, "Well, then what would you do?" Perhaps everyone will hate my
ideas, but I am now on record on what I wish to see in the game.