Universal Declaration of Human rights states that “all are equal before the law, and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law".

Article 14 of the Indian Constitution declares that “The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.”

But...

Indian laws against domestic violence blatantly deny protection to men against any form of domestic abuse, and every year, over 56,000 married men commit suicide due to verbal, emotional, economic and physical abuse and legal harassment.

Mothers and sisters of husband not women?

Indian laws against domestic violence are touted as tools for women's protection and empowerment.

But...

in the last four years alone, over 1,23,497 women have been arrested under IPC Section 498A alone, without evidence or investigation, not for committing any crime under law, but only because they were related to a man.

The verdict is in…

Indian taxpayers have spent lakhs to implement draconian policies around the country. And the verdict is clear – these policies:

Thursday, September 24, 2009

If there was an award for a minister for saying all the right things, it should be given to Mr Veerappa Moily, the law minister. Here is a chronology of events and his sayings since he became law minister in new UPA government after elections in May 09.

Note: if at any point you get tired of reading about the news stories of Mr Moily, just jump to the end of the post.

Here is news of Mr Moily being sworn in as cabinet minister (May 22, 2009):

May 30, 2009 - CHICKABALLAPUR: Union Law Minister M. Veerappa Moily on Friday said the Centre would come out with comprehensive anti-terrorism laws in accordance with the recommendations of the Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC), headed by him. Mr. Moily, who assumed office as the Law Minister ... (May 30, 2009):

Jun 3, 2009 - The long-pending controversial women's reservation bill is on "top" of Government's agenda to be made into "reality", Law Minister M Veerappa Moily said on Wednesday. "As far as our party and government is concerned we would like to ensure that it comes early. (Jun 3, 2009):

NEW DELHI: The ministry of law and justice is open to judicial reforms and opening up Indian legal services to foreign law firms, minister for law and justice Dr Veerappa Moily said on the sidelines of an event held in New Delhi recently. (Jun 8, 2009):

Law Minister Veerappa Moily looks set to push for a “mechanism” to provide for “punishment” to judges who are proved guilty of corruption — the existing provision for their impeachment only leads to their removal from the post. He also wants some “regulations” to define contempt of... (Jun 15, 2009):

The Centre will soon bring in legislation to tackle issues related to accountability and corruption in the judiciary, including provision for punishment, Union Law Minister M. Veerappa Moily said on Sunday (Jun 29, 2009):

NEW DELHI: Union law minister Veerappa Moily on Tuesday said he would look into the allegation made by a Madras High Court Judge that a Union minister had tried to influence him to grant anticipatory bail to a doctor and his son in a forged mark sheets case filed by CBI (Jun 30, 2009):

Union Minister of Law and Justice, Veerappa Moily, on Monday said that more than 2.6 crore cases were pending in the subordinate courts and over 39 lakh cases were pending in high courts across the country (Jul 13, 2009):

JAIPUR: The Union law ministry will soon approach the state to mark out the most litigant departments. It has tried to initiate the process for listing the departments facing maximum legal confrontations at the Central level. This was announced by Union law minister Veerappa Moily (Jul 18, 2009):

Expressing an identical view, law minister Veerappa Moily had said that the judges could not be equated with politicians and bureaucrats when it came to declaration of assets. "There should be some in-built mechanism in the proposed legislation to protect them from frivolous litigation: (Jul 24, 2009):

Forced by the Opposition to shelve the judges' assets Bill, Union Minster for Law and Justice M Veerappa Moily has ruled out fresh deliberations with the Chief Justice of India on the issue (Aug 9, 2009):

Union Law Minister M Veerappa Moily on Wednesday virtually backed Chief Justice of India KG Balakrishnan on the issue of assets declaration by judges and said if judges were voluntarily disclosing their assets and wanting to become heroes, it is their wish.(Aug 26, 2009):

New Delhi, Aug 27 (PTI) With Supreme Court judges deciding to make public their assets, Law Minister M Veerappa Moily today welcomed the move and said it is for the judges to decide how it should be done (Sep 8, 2009):

DELHI: Barely 24 hours after CJI KG Balakrishnan asserted that sanctions to prosecute babus were not always forthcoming, Union minister for law and justice Veerappa Moily on Sunday said prior sanction should not be needed to prosecute a public servant in a corruption case (Sep 14, 2009):

Now do you see a pattern in his utterances. He simply seems to echo what seems to be the popular or majority opinion at the time. For example, watch out for his utterances on following issues and just check how many of these have been done:

3. Gay laws and Section 377 of IPC. He is careful and sensitive on his utterances here. See the number of gays may be small so there is no vote bank, but can a law minister be seen to be going against liberal opinion (read Western masters' opinion) ? But at the same time he does not dare to offend the real vote bank, so he will not openly support the Delhi HC judgment but cover his words carefully.

4. Assets declaration by judges. See the flip-flops on this continuously: first he sides with CJI Balakrishnan in saying 'judges can choose to be heroes" if they want to, indirectly sniping at Justice DV Shylendra Kumar who had dared to disclose his assets going against CJI and coterie of judges against assets declaration. A few days later, when CJI and coterie decide to give in after seeing writing on the wall, he again says that is the right thing to do! His government tables bill in parliament on assets declaration which says something to the effect that judges will have to declare their assets but only to other judges and no one else! Good that it gets thrown out the same day due to all round opposition.

5. About pending cases and speeding up of trials in courts: His utterances here seem to be clockwork giving the suspicion it is being reminded to him through a software reminder program. Every few days there will be a statement about pending court cases, having three shifts in courts, judicial reforms, recruitment of judges, cases solves in 3 years, in 1 year and what not. How much of that is actually going to happen is anybody guess. Still guessing? are you kidding... people who are achievement-oriented let their work speak for themselves. Talk is cheap!

Taking note of allegations of acquisition of "huge assets" made against Karnataka High Court Chief Justice P D Dinakaran, Chief Justice of India KG Balakrishnan reportedly sought an explanation from the judge who denied the charges.

The meeting that took place last week in New Delhi came against the backdrop of five legal luminaries writing to the CJI about complaints from several lawyers based in Chennai against Dinakaran.

The leading advocates including F S Nariman, Shanti Bhushan, Ashok Desai and Ram Jethmalani suggested that the CJI should reconsider the decision to elevate the judge to the Supreme Court.

Dinakaran and four others have been recommended by the Supreme Court Collegium to the Government for being appointed as judges of the apex court.

Highly-placed sources said during the meeting at the CJI's residence and attended by some Supreme Court judges, Dinakaran's attention was drawn to the letter sent by the lawyers under the auspices of the Forum for Judicial Accountability levelling charges of land grabbing and other "irregularities" against the judge.

Dinakaran is understood to have denied the charges before returning to Bangalore.

The Bar Council of India (BCI) had on Monday voiced reservation over Dinakaran being appointed to the apex court.

Sunday, September 6, 2009

SC Judgment under article 142 of constitution on divorce granted to husband due to irretrivable breakdown of marriage, and basically the fact that wife withdrew consent on mutual divorce agreement AFTER she had got the property from husband as per agreement.

--------------------------------------------------------SUPREME COURT OF IND IA RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

CIVIL APPEAL NO 5952 OF 2009 (Arising out of SLP (C ) No.14361 of 2007

ANIL KUMAR JAIN Petitioner (s)

VERSUS

MAYA JAIN Respondent (s)

Date : 01/09/2009 This Petition was called on for judgment today.

For Appellant (s) Mr.Shankar Divate, Adv.

For Respondent(s) Mrs. K. Sharda,Adv.

Hon'ble Mr. Justice Altamas Kabir pronounced the

Judgment of the Bench comprising His Lordship, and

Hon'ble Mr. Justice Cyriac Joseph.

Leave granted.

The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed

judgment which is placed on the file.

(Kusum Syal) (Juginder Kaur) Sr.P.A. Court Master

(Signed Reportable judgment is placed on the file.) IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

rites. On account of differences between them, they took adecision to obtain a decree of mutual divorce, which resulted

in the filing of a joint petition for divorce under Section

13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, (hereinafter referred

to as `the Act') on 4th September, 2004, in the District Court

at Chhindwara. The same was registered as Civil Suit No.167-

A of 2004. As required under the provisions of Section 13-B

of the aforesaid Act, the learned Second Additional District

Judge, Chhindwara, fixed the date for consideration of the

petition after six months so as to give the parties time to

reconsider their decision. On 7th March, 2005, after the

expiry of six months, the learned Second Additional District

Judge, Chhindwara, took up the matter in the presence of both

the parties who were present in the Court. While the

appellant husband reiterated his earlier stand that a decree

of mutual divorce should be passed on account of the fact

that it was not possible for the parties to live together, on

behalf of the respondent wife it was submitted that despite

serious differences which had arisen between them, she did

not want the marriage ties to be dissolved. On account of

withdrawal of consent by the respondent wife, the learned

Judge dismissed the joint petition under Section 13-B of the

Act.

4. Aggrieved by the order dated 17th March, 2005, passed by

the learned Second Additional District Judge, Chhindwara, theappellant filed an appeal under Section 28 of the Act in the

High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur on 4th April, 2005,

and the same was registered as First Appeal no.323 of 2005.

Even before the High Court, on 12th March, 2007, the

respondent wife expressed her desire to live separately from

the appellant, but she did not want that a decree of

dissolution of marriage be passed. In that view of the

matter, by his order dated 21st March, 2007, the learned

Single Judge dismissed the First Appeal. While dismissing

the appeal, the learned Single Judge took note of the

decision of this Court in similar circumstances in the case

of Ashok Hurra v. Rupa Bipin Zaveri [1997 (4) SCC 226],

wherein this Court granted a decree of mutual divorce by

exercising its extra-ordinary powers under Article 142 of the

Constitution of India.It was indicated that the High Court

did not have such powers and Section 13-B required that the

consent of the spouses on the basis of which the petition

under Section 13-B was presented, had to continue till a

decree of divorce was passed by mutual consent. On that

basis, the learned Single Judge of the High Court, while

dismissing the appeal, observed that the appellant would be

free to file a petition of divorce in accordance with law,

which would be decided on its own merits by keeping in mind

the special fact that the parties were living separately for

about five years and the respondent wife was adamant aboutliving apart from her husband.

5. It is against the said order passed by the High Court

rejecting the appellant's prayer for grant of mutual divorce

that the present appeal has been filed.

6. Appearing on behalf of the appellant husband, Mr. Rohit

Arya, learned Senior Advocate, contended that prior to the

filing of the petition for mutual divorce, the parties had

entered into a settlement which had been fully acted upon by

the appellant and that under the said agreement valuable

property rights had been transferred to the respondent wife,

which she was and is still enjoying. Mr. Arya submitted that

apart from the above, the attitude of the respondent wife in

openly declaring that she had no intention to remain with the

appellant, was sufficient to indicate that the marriage had

broken down irretrievably and in similar circumstances this

Court had invoked its extra-ordinary powers under Article 142

of the Constitution to grant a decree of divorce under

Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, even though one of

the parties had withdrawn consent before the passing of the

final decree. Reference was made to the decision in Ashok

Hurra's case(supra), which also involved a petition under

Section 13-B of the Act.7. However, the facts of the said case were a little

different from those in the instant case. In the said case,

after six months from the date of filing of the petition

under Section 13-B, an application was filed by the husband

alone for a decree of divorce on the petition under Section

13-B of the Act. Not only did the wife not join in the said

application, she made a separate application for withdrawal

of consent given by her for mutual divorce after the expiry

of 18 months from the date of presentation of the divorce

petition. At this juncture, reference may be made to the

provisions of Section 13-B of the above Act and the same is

extracted hereinbelow :-

"13B. Divorce by mutual consent. Â­ (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act a petition for dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce may be presented to the district Court by both the parties to a marriage together, whether such marriage was solemnized before or after the commencement of the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976, on the ground that they have been living separately for a period of one year or more, that they have not been able to live together and that they have mutually agreed that the marriage should be dissolved.

(2) On the motion of both the parties made not earlier than six months after the date of the presentation of the petition referred to in sub- section (1) and not later than eighteen months after the said date, if the petition is not withdrawn in the meantime, the court shall, on being satisfied, after hearing the parties and after making such inquiry as it thinks fit, that a marriage has been solemnized and that the averments in the petition are true, pass a decree of divorce declaring the marriage to be dissolved with effect from the date of the decree."

As will be clear from the above, sub-Section (1) of

Section 13-B is the enabling Section for presenting a

petition for dissolution of a marriage by a decree of divorce

by mutual consent. One of the grounds provided is that the

parties have been living separately for a period of one year

or more and that they have not been able to live together,

which is also the factual reality in the instant case. Sub-

Section (2) of Section 13-B, however, provides the procedural

steps that are required to be taken once the petition for

mutual divorce has been filed and six months have expired

from the date of presentation of the petition before the

Court. The language is very specific in that it intends that

on a motion of both the parties made not earlier than six

months after the date of presentation of the petition

referred to in sub-Section (1) and not later than 18 months

after the said date, if the petition is not withdrawn in the

meantime, the Court shall, on being satisfied, after hearing

the parties and after making such inquiry as it thinks fit,

pass a decree of divorce declaring the marriage to be

dissolved with effect from the date of the decree.

8. The question whether the consent of both the partiesgiven at the time of presentation of the petition for mutual

divorce under Section 13-B of the Act must continue till the

decree is finally passed, has been the subject matter of

several decisions of this Court. The issue was raised in the

case of Smt. Sureshta Devi vs. Om Prakash [(1991) 2 SCC 25],

wherein this Court held that the consent given by the parties

to the filing of a petition for mutual divorce had to subsist

till a decree was passed on the petition and that in the

event, either of the parties withdrew the consent before

passing of the final decree, the petition under Section 13-B

of the Hindu Marriage Act would not survive and would have to

be dismissed.

9. Subsequently, however, in Ashok Hurra's case (supra),

doubts were expressed by this Court with regard to certain

observations made in Sureshta Devi's case (supra) and it was

felt that the same might require re-consideration in an

appropriate case. Basing its decision on the doctrine of

irretrievable break-down of marriage, the Hon'ble Judges were

of the view that no useful purpose would be served in

prolonging the agony of the parties to a marriage which had

broken down irretrievably and that the curtain had to be rung

down at some stage. It was further observed that the court

had to take a total and broad view of the ground realities of

the situation while dealing with adjustment of humanrelationships. Their Lordships placed reliance on the

decision of this Court in Chandrakala Menon (Mrs.) & Anr. vs.

Vipin Menon (Capt.) & Anr. [(1993) 2 SCC 6], in arriving at

such a conclusion. In the said case, although, indisputably

consent for the petition under Section 13-B of the Act was

withdrawn within a week from the date of the filing of the

joint petition, the Court, in exercise of its powers under

Article 142 of the Constitution, granted a decree of divorce

by mutual consent under Section 13-B of the Act and dissolved

the marriage between the parties in order to meet the ends of

justice, subject to certain conditions. It was also made

clear that the decree would take effect only upon

satisfaction of the conditions indicated therein.

10. The decision in Ashok Hurra's case (supra) to invoke the

power under Article 142 of the Constitution was, thereafter,

followed in several cases based upon the doctrine of

irretrievable break-down of marriage.

11. In keeping with the trend of thought which found

expression in Ashok Hurra's case (supra) another question

arose before this Court in the case of Sandhya M. Khandelwal

vs. Manoj K. Khandelwal [(1998) 8 SCC 369], which had come up

before this Court by way of a transfer petition seeking

transfer of a matrimonial suit. During the pendency of thetransfer petition before this Court, the parties settled

their disputes, and, although, the petition involved a

proceeding under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955,

keeping in mind the settlement arrived at between the parties

and also the interest of the parties, this Court granted a

decree of divorce by treating the pending application as one

under Section 13-B of the said Act.

12. The views expressed in Ashok Hurra's case (supra) were

echoed in Anita Sabharwal vs. Anil Sabharwal [(1997) 1 SCC

490] and in the case of Kiran vs. Sharad Dutt [(2000) 10 SCC

243]. In the former case decree for mutual divorce was

granted without waiting for the statutory period of six

months. In the latter case, after living separately for many

years and after 11 years of litigation involving proceedings

under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the parties

filed a joint application before this Court for amending the

divorce petition. Treating the said divorce petition as one

under Section 13-B of the Act, this Court, by invoking its

powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, granted a

decree of mutual divorce at the SLP stage.

13. Without referring to the decisions rendered by this

Court in Ashok Hurra's case (supra) and in Kiran's case

(supra), a three Judge Bench of this Court in the case ofAnjana Kishore vs. Puneet Kishore [(2002) 10 SCC 194], while

hearing a transfer petition, invoked its jurisdiction under

Article 142 of the Constitution, and directed the parties to

file a joint petition before the Family Court at Bandra,

Mumbai, under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955,

for grant of a decree of divorce by mutual consent, along

with a copy of the terms of compromise arrived at between

the parties. This Court also directed that on such

application being made, the Family Court could dispense with

the need of waiting for six months as required by Sub-Section

(2) of Section 13-B of the Act and pass final orders on the

petition within such time as it deemed fit. This Court

directed the Presiding Judge to take appropriate steps

looking to the facts and circumstances of the case emerging

from the pleadings of the parties and to do complete justice

in the case.

14. Again in the case of Swati Verma (Smt.) vs. Rajan Verma

& Ors. [(2004) 1 SCC 123], which was a transfer petition, the

doctrine of irretrievable break-down of marriage was invoked.

Pursuant to a compromise arrived at between the parties and

leave granted by this Court, an application was filed under

Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act read with Article 142

of the Constitution and having regard to the aforesaid

doctrine, this Court, in exercise of its powers vested underArticle 142 of the Constitution, allowed the application for

divorce by mutual consent filed in the said proceedings, in

order to give a quietus to all litigation pending between the

parties. The same procedure was adopted by this Court in the

case of Jimmy Sudarshan Purohit vs. Sudarshan Sharad Purohit

[(2005) 13 SCC 410], where upon a settlement arrived at

between the parties, a joint petition was filed under Section

13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act and the same was allowed in

exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution.

15. The various decisions referred to above were considered

in some detail in the case of Sanghamitra Ghosh vs. Kajal

Kumar Ghosh [(2007) 2 SCC 220], and the view taken in the

various cases was reiterated based on the doctrine of

irretrievable break-down of marriage.

16. Although, the decision rendered in Sureshta Devi (supra)

was referred to in the decision rendered in Ashok Hurra's

case (supra) and it was observed therein that the said

decision possibly required reconsideration in an appropriate

case, none of the other cases has dealt with the question

which arose in Sureshta Devi's case (supra), namely, whether

in a proceeding under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act,

consent of the parties was required to subsist till a final

decree was passed on the petition. In all the subsequentcases, the Supreme Court invoked its extraordinary powers

under Article 142 of the Constitution of India in order to do

complete justice to the parties when faced with a situation

where the marriage-ties had completely broken and there was

no possibility whatsoever of the spouses coming together

again. In such a situation, this Court felt that it would be

a travesty of justice to continue with the marriage ties. It

may, however, be indicated that in some of the High Courts,

which do not possess the powers vested in the Supreme Court

under Article 142 of the Constitution, this question had

arisen and it was held in most of the cases that despite the

fact that the marriage had broken down irretrievably, the

same was not a ground for granting a decree of divorce either

under Section 13 or Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act,

1955.

17. In the ultimate analysis the aforesaid discussion throws

up two propositions. The first proposition is that although

irretrievable break-down of marriage is not one of the

grounds indicated whether under Sections 13 or 13-B of the

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, for grant of divorce, the said

doctrine can be applied to a proceeding under either of the

said two provisions only where the proceedings are before the

Supreme Court. In exercise of its extraordinary powers under

Article 142 of the Constitution the Supreme Court can grantrelief to the parties without even waiting for the statutory

period of six months stipulated in Section 13-B of the

aforesaid Act. This doctrine of irretrievable break-down of

marriage is not available even to the High Courts which do

not have powers similar to those exercised by the Supreme

Court under Article 142 of the Constitution. Neither the

civil courts nor even the High Courts can, therefore, pass

orders before the periods prescribed under the relevant

provisions of the Act or on grounds not provided for in

Section 13 and 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

18. The second proposition is that although the Supreme

Court can, in exercise of its extraordinary powers under

Article 142 of the Constitution, convert a proceeding under

Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, into one under

Section 13-B and pass a decree for mutual divorce, without

waiting for the statutory period of six months, none of the

other Courts can exercise such powers. The other Courts are

not competent to pass a decree for mutual divorce if one of

the consenting parties withdraws his/her consent before the

decree is passed. Under the existing laws, the consent given

by the parties at the time of filing of the joint petition

for divorce by mutual consent has to subsist till the second

stage when the petition comes up for orders and a decree for

divorce is finally passed and it is only the Supreme Court,

which, in exercise of its extraordinary powers under Article142 of the Constitution, can pass orders to do complete

justice to the parties.

19. The various decisions referred to above merely indicate

that the Supreme Court can in special circumstances pass

appropriate orders to do justice to the parties in a given

fact situation by invoking its powers under Article 142 of

the Constitution, but in normal circumstances the provisions

of the statute have to be given effect to. The law as

explained in Smt. Sureshta Devi's case (supra) still holds

good, though with certain variations as far as the Supreme

Court is concerned and that too in the light of Article 142

of the Constitution.

20. In the instant case, the respondent wife has made it

very clear that she will not live with the petitioner, but,

on the other hand, she is also not agreeable to a mutual

divorce. In ordinary circumstances, the petitioner's remedy

would lie in filing a separate petition before the Family

Court under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, on

the grounds available, but in the present case there are

certain admitted facts which attract the provisions of

Section 13-B thereof. One of the grounds available under

Section 13-B is that the couple have been living separately

for one year or more and that they have not been able to live

together, which is, in fact, the case as far as the partiesto these proceedings are concerned. In this case, the parties

are living separately for more than seven years. As part of

the agreement between the parties the appellant had

transferred valuable property rights in favour of the

respondent and it was after registration of such transfer of

property that she withdrew her consent for divorce. She

still continues to enjoy the property and insists on living

separately from the husband.

21. While, therefore, following the decision in Smt.

Sureshta Devi's case we are of the view that this is a fit

case where we may exercise the powers vested in us under

Article 142 of the Constitution. The stand of the respondent

wife that she wants to live separately from her husband but

is not agreeable to a mutual divorce is not acceptable, since

living separately is one of the grounds for grant of a mutual

divorce and admittedly the parties are living separately for

more than seven years.

22. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. The impugned judgment

and order of the High Court is set aside and the petition for

grant of mutual divorce under Section 13-B of the Hindu

Marriage Act, 1955, is accepted. There will be a decree of

divorce on the basis of the joint petition filed by the

parties before the Second Additional District Judge,Chhindwara, under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act,

Additional Sessions Judge Nivedita Anil Sharma acquitted Sunil of the charge of rape under Section 376 and molestion under Section 354 of the IPC, finding no evidence against him.

The court said those who file false cases should not be spared as they abuse the process of law and waste the time of courts and the police machinery.

"Such type of litigants who without any justified reason drag the matter for several years or file false cases/FIRs should not be pardoned as it has not only caused unnecessary harrassment to the accused but also caused wastage of the time of the police," the court said, adding they also undermined the authority of law.

Also it was done on request of public procecutor:

The court ordered their trial for perjury on a plea made by Public Prosecutor Vinod Kumar Sharma who submitted that non-prosecution of complainants would set a bad example in society.

Mr Bhushan is not into sensation mongering. Here are his conclusions based on corruption of SC judges based on events:

Not in my own perception, but I think for the public there were two watershed events – the Chief Justice Sabharwal case (where there was an allegation that Chief Justice YS Sabharwal’s orders to demolish commercial outlets in Delhi directly benefited his sons, who were partners with some mall developers) and the Ghaziabad Provident Fund scam.

Here he talks about other judges: I can’t prove this, though we had evidence against Punchi, Anand and Sabharwal on the basis of which we sought their impeachment.

Here is talks about possibility of seeming unholy nexus where CJI does not allow prosecution for another judge:For example, the complaint against Justice Bhalla was that he had purchased land worth Rs 4 crore at Rs 4 lakh — approximately — from land mafia in Noida. This was based on a report from the DM and SSP of Noida. This land mafia had several cases pending in courts subordinate to Justice Bhalla. Another complaint was that in the Reliance Power matter, though his son was the lawyer for Reliance Power, Justice Bhalla constituted a special bench while he was the presiding judge in Lucknow. He sat in the house of one the judges at 11pm at night to hear their case and pass an injunction in their favour. We asked Chief Justice Sabharwal to initiate proceedings against Bhalla, but he refused.

Here is another case:Similarly, Justice Vijender Jain decided the case of a person whose granddaughter had been married out of his own house. He was a close friend but he still heard and decided the case in this person’s favour. The point is, in these cases though very specific complaints were made to the then Chief Justice of India (CJI), he didn’t do anything to activate the in-house procedure. All these judges have gone on to become chief justices. Bhalla is still chief justice of Rajasthan; Virendra Jain became chief justice of Punjab and Haryana.

On Karnataka judges with women, and Ghaziabad PF case:That’s what happened in Karnataka. There was a complaint against several judges visiting a motel and misbehaving with women. When the police officer came, the judges threatened him and said no FIR could be filed against them because they were judges. This happened in the Ghaziabad Provident Fund case as well. The investigation isstumped because the CJI hasn’t given permission. We have to get rid of this injunction.

Here is another case of clear case of conflict of interest where judge should have recused himself but he did not:There is Justice Kapadia who decided on the Niyamgiri mining lease case in Orissa. He said Vedanta can’t be given the lease because it’s been blacklisted by the Norwegian government; but its subsidiary company Sterlite can get the lease because it is a publicly listed company. Justice Kapadia said it’s publicly listed because he had shares in it and yet he passed an order in favour of Sterlite! There is a law against judges hearing cases where there is a conflict of interest, but they just bypass it and you can’t complain because that would be contempt.

Wednesday, September 2, 2009

There is another news favouring progress towards more judicial accountability. I will add Justice S Ravindra Bhatt to the list of progressive judges who favour moving with the times and also taking steps to restore public's trust in judiciary.

In an important judgment, the Delhi High Court on Wednesday upheld the Chief Information Commission's order stating that the Chief

Justice of India's office is a public authority and is under the purview of the Right To Information Act.

Justice S Ravindra Bhatt said that a person can seek information about declaration of assets by SC judges. This comes under the Act.

"The CJI is a public authority under the Right to Information Act and the CJI holds the information pertaining to assets declaration in his capacity as Chief Justice. That office is a public authority under the Act and is covered by its provisions," Justice S Ravindra Bhatt said.

"Declaration of assets by Supreme Court judges is an information under Section 2 (f) of the RTI Act. The information pertaining to declaration given to the CJI and the contents of such declaration are information and subject to the provisions of the RTI Act," Bhat said.

Judges are accountable but they are also subjective to some constraints, Bhat said adding: "The dignity of the judges adds value to the democracy. Judges are under public attack and revealing of assets and other information may increase the reputation of the judges."

"Chief Public Information Officer of the Supreme Court shall release the information about the declaration of the assets to the petitioner within four weeks of time," he said.

The judge also said judges should declare their assets.

...snipped...snipped

Solicitor General GE Vahanvati contended before Justice Bhatt that disclosure of information on personal assets by judges will affect the independence of the judicial system.

"If we introduce transparency to an extent which would disturb the working of the judges, then it would affect the independence of the judicial system," Vahanvati had said.

Solicitor General GE Vahanvati is giving lame arguments working for a lame government which introduces a lame bill on assets declaration in parliament, and withdraws it in a lame manner when faced with all round opposition. lame lame lame...

This is what happens to innocent, honest but poor people in India's justice system. If a poor person falls down even by mistake of another or state, the state keeps him under its boots simply because he is poor.

Malegoan resident Bapu Mali was in jail for five years as an undertrial battling rape and murder charges. Even after the trial court acquitted him, Mali spent five more years in prison as he didn't pay the bail amount when his case went into appeal.

"This is a sorry state of affairs," a division bench of Justice Bilal Nazki and Justice A R Joshi said, while upholding the trial court order acquitting Mali. "Not only the prosecuting agency but also the courts are involved (for Mali languishing in jail). This is a reflection on our own system which needs to be corrected."

The court, in its order, also framed guidelines for the trial courts in such cases and said that the sessions judge who didn't comply with the rules will be liable for departmental inquiry and even contempt of court. "A person who is acquitted should not remain in jail even for an (extra) day," said the judges.

The last para is really about accountability of judiciary to the people. What will the judge pay for by this kind of mistake in terms of career prospects? The state pays the 1 lakh compenstation from taxpayer money so the judge does not bother about that. In effect without having accountability of judiciary it has become an 'accomplice' to the corruptions in executive branch of the state. Read here on what the Chief Justice of India has said in an official conference on incompetence (and clear corruption) of some in judiciary.

Tuesday, September 1, 2009

RESTATEMENT OF VALUES OF JUDICIAL LIFE(AS ADOPTED BY FULL BENCH OF SUPREME COURT ON 7TH MAY 1997)1. Justice must not merely be done but it must also be seen to be done.The behaviour and conduct of members of the higher judiciary must reaffirm the people's faith in the impartiality of the judiciary. Accordingly any act of the judge of the Supreme Court or a High Court, whether in official or personal capacity, which erodes the credibility of this perception has to be avoided.

2. A judge should not contest the election to any office of a club, society or other association; further he shall not hold such elective office except in a society or association connected with the law.

3. Close association with individual members of the Bar, particularly those who practice in the same court, shall be eschewed.

4. A judge shall not permit any member of his immediate family, such as spouse, son, daughter, son-in-law or daughter-in-law or any other close relative, if a member of the Bar, to appear before him or even be associated in any manner with a cause to be dealt with by him.

5. No member of his family, who is a member of the Bar, shall bepermitted to use the residence in which the Judge actually resides or other facilities for processional work.

6. A Judge should practise a degree of aloofness consistent with thedignity of his office.

7. A Judge shall not hear and decide a matter in which a member of hisfamily, a close relation or a friend is concerned.

8. A Judge shall not enter into public debate or express his views in public on political matters that are pending or are likely to arise for judicial determination.

9. A Judge is expected to let his judgments speak for themselves. Heshall not give interview to the media.

10. A Judge shall not accept gifts or hospitality except from his family, close relations and friends.

11. A Judge shall not hear and decide a matter in a company in which he holds shares is concerned unless he has disclosed his interest and no objection to his hearing and deciding the matter is raised.

12. A Judge shall not speculate in shares, stocks or the like.

13. A Judge shall not engage directly or indirectly in trade or business,either by himself or in association with any other person. (Publication of a legal treatise or any activity in the nature of a hobby shall not be construed as a trade or business).

14. A Judge should not ask for, accept contributions or otherwise actively associate himself with the raising of any fund for any purpose.

15. A Judge should not seek any financial benefit in the form of aperquisite or privilege attached to his office unless it is clearly available. Any doubt in this behalf must be got resolved and clarified through the Chief Justice.

16. Every Judge must at all times be conscious that he is under the public gauze and there should be no act or omission by him which is unbecoming of the high office he occupies and the public esteem in which that office is held