Moodle File Disclosure Vulnerability
Systems Affected Moodle series <1.6.9+, <1.7.7+, <1.8.9, <1.9.5
Severity Critical
Probability of being vulnerable Rather Low
Vendor http://moodle.org/
Filed Bug #MDL-18552
Author Christian J. Eibl
Date 20090327
I. BACKGROUND
Moodle is an open source (webbased) learning management system with
users all over the world in educational institutes, schools, or
companies. See vendor homepage for details.
II. DESCRIPTION
An input filter for TeX formulas can be exploited to disclose files
readable by the web server. This includes the moodle configuration
file with all authentication data and server locations for directly
connecting to backend database.
TeX filter by default is off and in case of being activated mostly no
complete LaTeX environment on a server system will be available.
III. DETECTION OF VULNERABILITY
Since Moodle 1.6 a complete LaTeX environment is preferred over the
shipped mimetex program for rendering TeX formulas to images that can
be included in HTML pages.
In any text input area, e.g., forum, type something like "$$ \jobname
$$" (without quotes). If the result looks like
- "$$ \jobname $$": TeX filter not activated
- "[jobname ?]": TeX filter activated, but mimetex used
- "a91dbb..." (hash): TeX filter active and LaTeX used (vuln.)
Since LaTeX per se is very powerful for file inclusion and even
writes, the vulnerability depends on LaTeX environment and its
configuration.
IV. EXPLOIT PoC
If LaTeX is not configured to restrict file inclusion (default!), then
absolute paths and relative ones can be used. As proof of concept
enter:
"$$ \input{/etc/passwd} $$"
In case the system is vulnerable, this will read the /etc/passwd file
and will render the contents to an image included in the text. Hence,
content is disclosed.
Rendering takes place in temporary folder by default which should not
be in the scope of the web server. Otherwise even arbitrary code could
be injected to compromise the whole web environment.
By using relative paths with background knowledge of Moodle's path
organization, it is easy to disclose the configuration file with
sensitive data.
V. WORKAROUND
Several alternatives:
1) deactivate TeX filter, if not needed
2) use more restrictive mimetex program for rendering
3) change LaTeX configuration (set "openin_any=p" for paranoid!)
... or upgrade to latest development version where patch should be
applied by now.
VI. TIMELINE
20090312 Bug discovered
20090313 Vendor contact / Bug filed (MDL-18552)
20090314 Response and confirmation by vendor
20090315 First patch proposed
20090327 Bug marked resolved and patch in tree