Roles and Rationales in the Negotiations of the First Review Conference of the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1973-1975

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Abstract

The post-war period has been characterized by both national
and international efforts to restrict nuclear technology to
peaceful purposes. When the nuclear bombs were dropped over
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, the world entered a
new era in which the survival of humanity can no longer be
assumed. This thesis contributes towards expanding knowledge
of the institutionalization of an international nuclear non-
proliferation norm by examining the first Review Conference of
the NPT. Despite its obvious historical relevance as both the first
conference to review the operation of an arms regulating treaty,
and as the model for the periodic review system, an
unprecedented enforcement mechanism for international law
that is of great current importance, the first Review Conference
of the NPT, has not been subjected to historical research.
The recent availability of the extensive official British records
from the review negotiations has presented the opportunity to
describe the first Review Conference very differently from how it
has been portrayed in biographical accounts. According to the
findings presented in this thesis, the review negotiations were
characterized by a large degree of consultations, cooperation
and compromise, not only within, but also across the
caucuses.The thesis argues that the roles played by Sweden and
the United Kingdom were decisive for the conduct and outcome
of the review negotiations. Two factors presented these two
states with the opportunity to play pivotal roles in bringing about
the conference compromise. Both Sweden and the United
Kingdom had a special incentive to act as mediators in the review
negotiations. However, a precondition for their maneuverability
was the character of the conflict between the superpowers, the
détente.