NATIONALISM, ETHNICITY AND DEMOCRACY:
CONTEMPORARY MANIFESTATIONS

Peri Pamir

Introduction

The subject of nationalism is extremely complex, not the least because of
the many different sources and manifestations of the phenomenon. This paper
will deal essentially with certain contemporary forms of nationalism which have
emerged or intensified in Europe and the former Soviet Union during the 1990s.
In order to place this discussion in perspective, a brief background of the
historical experience is provided at the outset as well as a consideration of
some of the basic concepts relating to this phenomenon.

As the ensuing discussion will show, it is almost impossible to come up with
a uniform definition of nationalism. In its historical context, it is an ideological
movement aimed at attaining and maintaining the identity, unity (through social
cohesion) and autonomy (through national self-determination) of a "nation,"
or a peoples united under a "national" banner (Smith, 1991). In other
words, it is the most potent ideology in nation state building and consolidation.
However, as we will seek to illustrate, nationalism, particularly in the contemporary
era, has also been a vehicle for disaffected ethnic or cultural communities
to voice their dissatisfaction with the status quo. The sources of discontent
may be related to a variety of factors such as denial of cultural identity,
political discrimination, repression, or economic deprivation. In these cases,
it is a movement of minority groups which springs up in reaction to the policies
or performance of the central state. At other times, it is a counter-reaction,
either on the part of the political authorities, or of threatened social groups,
in response to the political authorities, and therefore embodies different objectives.
But in most cases, the central state, whether directly or indirectly, plays
a key role in manipulating or being the target of nationalist sentiments.

Hence, in this paper, nationalism has a broad meaning ranging from being the
defining ideology of political movements seeking some form of autonomy or independent
statehood; of groups striving to achieve or to improve their cultural, political,
social and economic rights within a given state; of protest movements on the
part of communities threatened by either state policies or by other social groups;
to the core ideology employed by the state to galvanize public support for its
policies or to reaffirm its legitimacy. The typology offered attempts to distinguish
between these various contemporary manifestations of nationalist sentiment and
discusses their impact on democracy as a means of distinguishing between the
progressive and reactionary forms of nationalism.

Historical and Conceptual Background

The historical paradoxes of nationalism

To understand the contemporary forms of nationalism, it is useful to keep
in mind the paradoxical goals which this ideology has served in the historical
process of nation state building.

Eighteenth and nineteenth century European nationalism was a unifying force
which brought together people of diverse backgrounds at the price of subordinating
their ethnic identities to the larger territorial unit dominated by the secular
state. The background to this evolution went back to the emergence of the secular
state following the decline of the feudal and the rise of the industrial system,
when effective power shifted from the unity of Church and State to that of Nation
and State. Consequently, ethnic loyalties, which sometimes transcended the boundaries
of these states, were seen to be subversive and every attempt was made to suppress
them. The dominant ideology became that of nationalism, which idealized the
secular state and deprecated the maintenance of any linguistic, religious or
other sentiments that might conflict with loyalty to it. Nationalism became
synonymous with patriotism (Richmond, 1988).

A similar trend followed the creation of nation states after the collapse of
the multinational Russian, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires in the aftermath
of World War I. In the Balkans, in particular, nation states were created often
with little or no regard for the rights and aspirations of the substantial ethnic
groups trapped within their borders. The principle of state sovereignty, which
evolved from the legitimization of national self determination made these new
nation states as unsympathetic to demands for self determination from dissatisfied
groups within their jurisdiction as were the Romanov, Habsburg and Ottoman rulers
to the national claims that were advanced against their rule in the 19th century.
(Mayall, 1990, p. 49). Hence, a major source of instability in Eastern Europe
lay in the fact that each "purported nation-state negated the principle
of self determination, even while basing its legitimacy on that principle"
(Deák, 1990).

The aftermath of the decolonization process and the creation of nation states
in Asia, Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific after 1945 followed a similar
pattern. Those states which achieved their independence through the principle
of self determination held the view that a broader definition of the concept
could become counterproductive.1 Consequently,
although during the 20th century, many wars of national liberation were fought
over the alleged denial of the right to national self determination to groups
which felt themselves disenfranchised within the existing state structure, few
succeeded in attaining sovereign statehood (Mayall, 1990, p. 42).

Hence the paradoxical qualities of nationalism in its modern historical expression
reside in the fact that it has served several conflicting purposes. It has acted
as the principal ideology which enabled nations to seek self determination and
political statehood. It also provided the subsequently created states with the
ideological justification for holding "the nation" together. And third,
it has enabled dissatisfied minority or ethnic groups within the nation states
to challenge state authority by questioning its claim to legitimacy which, in
a democratic system, formally rests on the doctrine of self determination and
popular sovereignty. Hence, nationalism, in this sense, has ironically contributed
to the formation, and survival as well as to the dismemberment of nation states.

Conceptual issues

As may be gathered from the above discussion, the phenomenon of nationalism
bears closely upon such political concepts as the right to self determination,
rights of national and ethnic minorities, the concept of a nation, the nation
state, national sovereignty, territorial integrity (unity/ inviolability/indivisibility)
and the unitary state. The relationship between each of these concepts as they
relate to nationalism are discussed below.

Self determination, national sovereignty and
international responsibility

The concept of self determination, as articulated in the Charter of the United
Nations (Art.1, para. 2 and Art. 55), and reiterated in the famous "Declaration
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples" (1961),
was principally developed to accommodate the legitimacy of the struggle of the
colonial peoples, and peoples under alien domination, to exercise their right
to sovereign statehood. "It was repeatedly stressed that it was necessary
to avoid any formulation of the principle which might be interpreted as widening
its scope and making it applicable to peoples who already formed part of an
independent state, as the concept was meant to serve to unite peoples on a voluntary
and democratic basis, not to break up existing national entities" (Vajic,
1991). Consequently, the principle of territorial integrity and respect for
existing frontiers (or the preservation of the unitary state) as a major factor
of international stability predominated over the right to self determination
(where this implied the dismemberment of existing states) and secession.

However, advances in the field of democracy and fundamental freedoms over the
last decades, accompanied by the growing consensus that the use of force is
neither desirable nor effective in stifling aspirations for self determination,
have led to situations where conflicts between the concept of self determination
and the unitary state have become increasingly more difficult to resolve. The
experience of the Kurds, the Slovenes, the Croats and the Bosnians has demonstrated
that separatist pressures can no longer be regarded as strictly internal affairs,
especially since the resistance to their struggle has had the effect of invalidating
the fundamental assumption linking territorial inviolability - and, implicitly,
the denial of self determination - to international peace and stability. Consequently,
the human rights performance of a state, including its treatment of its minorities,
is steadily becoming a matter of legitimate international concern. Embodied
in this attitude is the developing consensus, strengthened since the Gulf war
experience, that state sovereignty can no longer provide governments immunity
in cases of violations of human rights, particularly in its repression of its
minorities.

Another related issue is the changed world environment since the end of the
cold war in Europe. Whereas before the cause of ethnic minorities was often
exploited by the superpowers or their allies as a way of obtaining geopolitical
leverage (e.g., US support to the Kurdish rebellion in the 1970s), the removal
of the cold war context, together with the growing intensity of independence
movements, has generated a serious reconsideration of the legal foundations
and ethical implications of a denial of legitimate aspirations for political
and territorial autonomy.

While this may be the case, there is also much confusion as to who has right
to self determination, where the limits of national sovereignty and unity lie,
and whether and when the territorial integrity of nation states should remain
unconditionally unchallenged. What are the main overriding criteria for self
determination and independent statehood? Are there any legal distinctions between
the rights of those minorities which belong to a group which already has a state
(e.g., Albanians in Kosovo, Turks in Cyprus, Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh,
Serbs in Bosnia, Hungarians in Transylvania), and those which do not (e.g.,
the Kurds or the Chechens)? Does the right to self determination include the
right to secession and independent statehood? When should the international
community recognize the rights of a peoples to decide on its own international
status, and when should the territorial unity of the nation state be protected
(as reaffirmed in the Helsinki Final Act)?2

In view of the continuing confusion surrounding such issues, self determination
claims, especially when they lend themselves to violence, are likely to continue
to be based on "the play of geopolitical forces rather than upon the relative
merits of the moral and legal case" (Falk, 1994).

Nations and nation states

It would appear then that the drive for self determination, which has acted
as the principal inspiration for many modern day nationalist movements, challenges
the legitimacy of the state by placing in question its claim to represent the
popular will of the nation. We will now turn to the dynamic between the nation
and the state as a means of understanding the basis for what is broadly known
as ethno-nationalism.

Part of the confusion concerning the nature of the relationship between nation
and state arises from the different (sometimes overlapping) meanings ascribed
to the former concept depending on the particular context, which are briefly
enumerated below:

(1) Nation as synonymous with state.
(2) Nation as encompassing the state plus other political entities, such as
trusts and non-self governing territories, as defined in the UN Charter.
(3) Nation as representing a people (not a population) belonging to the same
ethno-linguistic group, not necessarily inhabiting the same political and territorial
space, but possessing the political will or ambition to form a unitary state
(e.g., the Kurds).
(4) Nation as representing a culturally homogenized population living in an
existing state (e.g., as in the case of the French nation).3
(5) Nation as a community of peoples composed of one or more nationalities and
possessing a defined territory and government (e.g., USA, Switzerland).

Given these definitions, a "nation (or multi-national nation) state"
can connote:

(i) A form of political organization under which a relatively
homogenized people inhabit a sovereign state; or
(ii) A political territory where different minority and majority nations formally
possessing the same rights live together.

The nationalist belief, as expressed by Guiseppe Mazzini in the 19th century,
maintained that every nation (each particular ethno-linguistic group) had the
right to form its own state, and that there should be only one state for each
nation. This claim has been historically impractical since, by current accounting,
there exist practically no ethno-linguistically homogeneous nations.

The territorial distribution of the human race is older
than the idea of ethnic-linguistic nation-states and therefore does not correspond
to it. Development in the modern world economy, because it generates vast population
movements, constantly undermines ethnic-linguistic homogeneity. Multi-ethnicity
and plurilinguality are quite unavoidable, except temporarily by mass exclusion,
forcible assimilation, mass expulsion or genocide - in short, by coercion (Hobsbawm,
1991).

In reality, therefore, the definitions are not so clear cut as states are
generally multinational (and hence, rarely homogeneous) and nations are quite
often polyethnic.4 Although the 'political nation'
corresponds to the territorial boundaries of the nation state, an 'ethnic nation'
may spill over several state boundaries (e.g., the Kurds) and therefore, in
that sense, is not synonymous with state.

Nationalism in the Contemporary Era

A number of contemporary developments, one pertaining to the European continent
and the former Soviet Union, the other occurring on a world scale but affecting
Europe closely, provide some basis for our understanding of the resurgence of
nationalism in modern times.

The former concerns the parallel and opposed dynamics in today's Europe between
the forces of integration on the one hand (European Union), and those of political
disintegration and fragmentation (e.g., former Yugoslavia), fuelled by the awakening
of latent ethnic antagonisms, on the other. Expressing itself in the form of
nationalist or self determination movements, notably in the Balkans and in several
republics of the former Soviet Union, these groups have been seeking protection
of minority rights, territorial autonomy or sovereign statehood. It is interesting
to note that both trends have had the effect of challenging state sovereignty,
though the tendency towards fragmentation - or the weakening or collapse of
central political authority - has also delivered a direct blow to the concept
of the territorial integrity of the nation state.

The other development has its origins in the increase in international migration
as a result of global economic and political developments. Over the last decade
or so, Europe has become a main destination for people fleeing economic and
political distress, traditionally from the South but increasingly from Eastern
Europe. This development, in turn, has created fertile ground for the emergence
of xenophobic right-wing groups in Western Europe which are exploiting economic
discontent to justify hostility to "outsiders" perceived as competing
for limited resources. As we will see later, the xenophobic reaction is not
confined to Western Europe, but has come to the fore as a platform of protest
in the economically unstable former socialist societies as well.

Contemporary forms of nationalism: a typology

The phenomenon of modern day nationalism springs from multiple and often overlapping
factors encompassing social, psychological, economic, political and cultural
dimensions. Because of the diversity of the conditions, it is manifested in
many different forms which makes it difficult to draw clear distinctions between
them. Nevertheless, to the extent possible, the following analysis will concentrate
on three broad - and sometimes overlapping - contemporary varieties, namely,
state nationalism, ethno-nationalism and, finally, what we call "protest"
nationalism, encompassing both right-wing nationalist movements in Europe and
the former Soviet Union as well as the phenomenon of religious fundamentalism.
Given the background of the preceding section, which has sought to establish
the relationship between certain key concepts, we will try to show that in each
case nationalism is a reaction to something which is directly or indirectly
related to the policy or the performance of the state.

State nationalism

In a practice widely resorted to by governments, state nationalism embraces
the nation as a whole, thus transcending ethnic distinctions. It is the creation
of mass public sentiment in favor of the state and is used by the latter to
mobilize popular support for its policies (most prominently in wartime) or to
reaffirm its legitimacy.

State nationalism can be expressed in a multitude of ways. Most prominently,
it is an instrument wielded in the process of nation state building where the
state is created and sustained around the concept and the glorification of the
nation (e.g., Croatia). It can also allude to state manipulation of nationalist
ideology to promote unity against external opposition (e.g., Nicaragua under
the Sandinistas, Castro versus the USA, Iraq under Saddam Hussein). Externally,
it can refer to policies aimed at extending the territory of the state into
areas which the state claims as belonging to its nation (e.g., Hitler's claims
to the Sudentenland and Austria, Serbia's current policy in Bosnia). Internally,
one could describe as nationalist actions taken by the state against specific
groups or individuals amounting to a denial of cultural pluralism and justified
on grounds of the anti- or un-national ("unpatriotic") character of
those groups or individuals (e.g., Turkish state and the PKK).5
The latter policy, as seen from the Turkish-Kurdish confrontation, can serve,
in turn, to engender a heightened sense of ethnic identity among the disaffected
group, thereby challenging the state's claim to represent the interests of the
nation as a whole.

Although no common definition of ethnicity exists, it is generally described
as the awareness on the part of a particular community of having a separate
identity on the basis of common history, race, language, religion, culture and
territory. Where that community constitutes a minority, which is often the case,
ethnicity is also used synonymously with minority or identity groups, which
is sometimes also loosely extended to migrant or refugee communities. Most ethnic
groups are oriented towards recognition and expression of their cultural identity
and the protection of their rights as a group to share in the benefits of the
state in which they live. An increasing number, however, are seeking various
forms of political recognition or autonomy. Irrespective of the regions involved,
the complaints appear to be the same: each group feels it is being denied some
of the economic, political, social and cultural rights and opportunities available
to other populations in a given state.7 Where
their aspirations for greater autonomy or social justice have a territorial
basis, the movements concerned may assume a separatist form.

Broadly speaking, therefore, ethnicity becomes a form of nationalism when it
assumes a political (and often territorial) dimension that challenges the status
quo, and, in some cases, the legitimacy and stability of the state in question
by becoming a catalyst for intra- or inter-state conflict. Some would argue
that the most dynamic ingredient of nationalism is ethnicity; indeed, that nationalism
is in essence the political expression of ethnicity.

It is clear that ethnic divisions have existed since time immemorial. Conflicts
or tensions have been present (even when apparently latent) and grievances nursed
for generations. What concerns us here are the factors which have given rise
to contemporary ethno-nationalism, some of which are enumerated below.

At the national level, the resurgence of ethno-nationalism can be sought in
the failure or inability of the modern nation state to serve the national community
and to meet the needs of its minority populations in terms of an equitable distribution
of resources and opportunities. Economic deprivation and disparity, as witnessed
in numerous cases, has often acted as a powerful catalyst igniting the flame
of nationalist revolt and in crystallizing a sense of ethnic identity. Not only
does the denial of cultural and political rights and the lack of active power-sharing
for minority groups through constitutional arrangements fail to close the poverty
gap, but this failure combines, in some cases, with frustration over the slow
development of democratic forms of government - a combination that helps to
explain some of the political bases for ethnic resurgence. Furthermore, the
tendency of the modern nation state to resort to political discrimination, repressive
action (e.g., Serb policy towards Kosovo Albanians), or military confrontation
(e.g., Turkey and the PKK) to quell the identity demands of its minority populations
is another major factor which has exacerbated ethnic tensions. Such actions
invariably result in strengthening aspirations for separate ethno-national identity.

A related consequence of state policies also resulting in ethno-nationalism
happens when migrant communities fleeing ethnic, political and economic victimization
settle in the more industrialized societies and create new hybrid cultural identities
distinct from the society in which they have settled. The growing hostility
to their presence (frequently expressed through racist rejection) is leading
these groups to declare their specificity and to rally around different forms
of cultural or political expression. Though most Muslims in Western Europe (numbering
over 8 million) say they want to integrate, it can be argued that it is the
enmity and coldness of the native European populations which push them to assert
their identity through religious and cultural differences.

In Central and Eastern Europe, on the other hand, the principal stimulus for
ethnic revival springs from the multinational and multiethnic composition of
most of the societies in the region.8 Large
and small minorities living in one country have often felt a greater affinity
for their fellow countrymen across the border mostly because of perceived political
or cultural inequalities or outright discrimination they experience at home.
Such reactions have invariably sprung from or led to repressive government policies,
thereby periodically creating serious tensions between the states or communities
concerned. In addition, almost all the countries harbor revisionist claims against
one another. However, although such tensions have occasionally strained inter-state
relations since World War II, they have never jeopardized national and regional
stability to the extent witnessed since the collapse of the socialist state
system, the war in Bosnia being its most tragic illustration.

The situation in the former Soviet Union is analogous, demonstrated most dramatically
by the liberation struggle of the Chechen people and the inter-ethnic conflicts
within the Transcausian republics. Several reasons are ascribed to this development,
some of which are outlined below.

The "deep freeze" effect: namely, that the totalitarian regimes were
not successful in quelling ethnic passions; they were merely kept frozen only
to resurface when authoritarian structures which imposed an artificial homogeneity
disintegrated.9 In fact, some would even argue
that the historical tendency in the Balkans has inclined more towards ethnic
differentiation than towards integration (Liebich, 1991, p. 60).

Others claim that it is the disintegration of central power and not the strength
of national feeling that has forced certain republics, such as Khazakstan and
Macedonia which did not previously dream of separation, to assert their independence
as a means of self-preservation (Hobsbawm, 1991). Or, stated differently, nationalism,
in this case, becomes a means of filling the political void left by the rapid
breakdown of central political authority, or of retrospectively celebrating
new-found statehood. A related argument is that nationalism is a reaction to
communist ideology's denial of national identity based on its promotion of the
all-embracing concept of 'homo-Sovieticus' which sought to foster the illusion
of homogeneity.10 In other words, it is an identity
response to the vacuum left after the collapse of communist rule.

The seeming inability of the nation state to satisfy the demands of ethno-cultural
minorities and the lack of an accepted international premise for the recognition
of self determination (as in the case of Chechenya) no doubt constitute additional
reasons for the eruption of ethnic tensions in the region.

Protest nationalism

Not unlike ethno-nationalism, the phenomenon of what we call protest nationalism
can broadly be explained as a response to perceived social, political, cultural
or economic insecurity brought about or subsequently exploited, directly or
indirectly, by state policy.

1. Right-wing nationalism in Western Europe

According to conventional wisdom, wealth, individual freedoms and political
maturity should have inoculated Europe against xenophobic and parochial forms
of nationalism and ushered in a heightened sense of tolerance and acceptance
of the "other." On the other side of the coin, modernization theory
assumed that the experience of industrialization and urbanization would gradually
reduce ethnic differences and ultimately assimilate all minority groups (principally
through the educational and occupational systems) into a single homogeneous
culture defined by the boundaries of the nation state.

Yet, as recent European history has shown, xenophobic nationalism, embodying
characteristics of neo-fascist ideology, can also emerge among groups within
so-called advanced societies. These reactions have tended to flourish within
a more general context of socio-economic decline and political change. The ensuing
insecurities have found their principal target in the settled or newly arriving
immigrant communities. As many analysts have pointed out, at a time of economic
stress, all 'foreign' elements and new arrivals are bound to be resented - even
ethnic Germans from ex-GDR wishing to settle in Germany. "The Germans have
been gripped by fear," reported Der Spiegel in 1992. "Fear of strangers,
fear for their jobs, fear of inflation and recession, fear also of the unavoidable
impression that the island of prosperity on which they live can no longer be
preserved."11

These phenomena explain in part the popular appeal of right-wing parties and
groups in Western Europe12 which seek to defend
so-called national and cultural identity and norms on the basis of reactionary,
authoritarian and racist slogans advocating for the most part the severe restriction
of immigration and asylum policies. The phenomenon or, as some put it, the traumatism,
of immigration has been used as a convenient target for public discontent and
has become a politically important and sensitive issue.

Some also explain the popular successes of these groups or parties in terms
of the reaction to the political disorientation arising from the rapid collapse
of the communist menace and the accompanying psychological need to transfer
the "enemy" image to new sources of threat. As has traditionally been
the case in history, most notably with the Jews, in times of economic crisis
and social instability, ethno-nationalistic sentiments offer groups an opportunity
to put the blame on others outside their own community.

A further attraction of these right-wing parties appears to lie in their promise
to eliminate corruption, misery and unemployment and their ability to exploit
people's aspiration for a better life. Sadly, they speak for those Europeans
who have lost faith in more moderate or mainstream political parties,13
who are disoriented by post-communist upheavals and who fear interlopers from
other countries and other cultures.14

The real threat of these parties is not that they will take over power in Europe.
Their pernicious impact lies in the fact that they are forcing the center-right
parties to shift further to the right, threatening, in some cases, to undermine
the very foundations of democracy. In France, for instance, the ruling conservatives
have stolen the far-right's thunder by tightening French citizenship laws and
officially calling for "zero immigration," leading to the observation
that the moderate right is simply trying to "outflank the National Front
by being even tougher on immigrants" (The Economist, 27 April 1996, p.
33). The German government has similarly restricted the country's asylum policies,
a step that can hardly be unrelated to mounting xenophobic sentiment expressed
not only by fringe groups, but also by far-right parties. In Britain, asylum
and immigration policies have been tightened to a point where state policies
are considered by some to seriously breach liberal values and to "betoken
a dangerous defensiveness" (The Economist, 4 May 1996, p. 16).

2. Right-wing nationalism in the former Soviet
block

The phenomenon of right-wing resurgence is not confined to Western Europe.
Extremist groups and parties have also sprung up in the former Soviet block.
About 80 ultra-nationalist groups are said to be currently active in the Russian
Federation. One of the most prominent social manifestations of this trend is
Pamyat, the xenophobic chauvinist Slavic movement founded in 1986 which extols
Russia's imperial past, advocates submission to the authority of the Russian
Orthodox church and whips up discontent and support by targeting ethnic minorities
as scapegoats for Russia's troubles. A more prominent manifestation of right-wing
populism in Russia is the misleadingly named Liberal Democratic Party. Led by
the now well-known Vladimir Zhirinovsky, it is said to get its support from
the most alienated segments of society, such as blue collar workers hit hard
by food shortages and inflation, army officers bitter about the country's fall
from superpower status and its seemingly inescapable dependence on the West
for economic revival, and young voters disappointed with the Yeltsin experiment.
Some of Zhirinovsky's supporters have since defected to the Communist Party,
whose leader, also a fervent nationalist, claims that great power status is
an intrinsic part of Russia's national identity and that a "voluntary"
restoration of the old Soviet block is "a historical necessity" (The
Economist, 16 March 1996, p. 33). However, it is also sobering to observe that
the far right's real hard core views Zhirinovsky with contempt. One example
is the Russian National Unity led by Alexander Barkashov who is building a neo-fascist
movement whose declared objective is to "fight ... against the internal
and external enemies of ... the Russian nation"; a paranoia that appears
to be shared by all national patriots (The Economist, 28 January 1996, p. 21).

Nor need one look to extreme far-right groups to find evidence of manipulation
of nationalist sentiment. Neither Boris Yeltsin, who has led a merciless and
ineffective war since 1994 against the determined resistance of the Chechen
people, nor General Alexander Lebed, his new security advisor, have been shy
about exploiting nationalist feelings to attract popular support.

Several reasons are advanced to explain the resurgence of right-wing nationalism
in the former Soviet block. At first, one could imagine it being a means of
filling the ideological void left by the collapse of the communist system. More
importantly, however, the feeling of gloom upon which it feeds has its roots
in the rapid dismantling of the old centralized political system and the attempt
to achieve a quick transition to a market economy. This is taking the shape
of destructive inflation, mass unemployment, shortages of goods, declining living
standards, growing disparities in income, and increased crime and Mafia activity.
New market-induced inequalities are replacing the old. Predictably, non-Slavs
living in Russia (notably, the Chechens, Azeris, people from Central Asia and
the Jews) are being targeted. Moreover, the concept of social justice, deeply
engraved in people's minds in all state socialist countries, is making adjustment
to the economic crisis even more dramatic. Consequently, right-wing populism
is also seen as a reaction to the climate of insecurity triggered by the accelerated
transition to new political and economic systems.

3. Religious fundamentalism

The sources of dogmatic fundamentalism, whether of the nationalist or of the
religious variety, appear to spring from the same psychological roots, the principal
component of which is probably the question of identity. In this case, religious
faith is used as a means to assert or reaffirm a separate identity, which is
why we consider it to be a manifestation of nationalism.

There is no doubt that the crisis of identity in the Third World, provoked
by its struggle for self preservation and survival in a world dominated by hegemonic
political and economic structures controlled by the industrialized powers, is
the most critical factor contributing to a return to traditional religious values.
It is also a way of helping people cope with the pace of rapid change and modernity.
In addition, both nationalist and religious fundamentalisms derive their support
from popular grassroots sentiments such as insecurity and disorientation, poverty
and social unrest, political and economic exclusion, and the sentiment of injustice.
Thus, religious fundamentalism - most prominently, of the Islamic variety -
also tends to arise from the disarray people feel in the face of what appears
to be a society without future. In addition to being a unifying force, a main
attraction thus seems to reside in its ability to provide people with a sense
of purpose and a guide for the soul in an unjust, unfriendly and oppressive
world.

Similarly, the revival of orthodoxy and other forms of religious worship in
the former Soviet Union as well as in parts of Central and Eastern Europe, with
which some neo-nationalist movements have closely aligned themselves, is said
to be a means of countering the disappointment and despair which came at the
heels of the initial euphoria of liberation and feeling of political and national
renaissance. In addition to being a reaction to the spiritual vacuum which prevailed
under 70 years of atheist rule, the use of the Church is also considered to
be a means employed by the state to promote national identity (e.g., Serbia),
or to reinforce claims to a separate identity (e.g., Poland).

Among expatriate communities in Western Europe threatened by exclusion, hostility,
xenophobia and racism, religion is used as a means of protecting and preserving
national and cultural identity.

In Islamic societies, where religious values have traditionally provided the
foundation for social and political life, it is not surprising to see religion
being used as an alternative to Western-influenced state policy which is perceived
as having failed to cope with dire socioeconomic and political problems. The
former is mainly due to the uncontrolled exodus from rural to urban centers
and the ensuing socioeconomic hardship confronted by these groups. No less important
is the accompanying culture shock which rural migrants receive when they are
faced with the "decadence" of city life which is generally attributed
to Western influence. Political instability, on the other hand, is induced by
undemocratic forms of government, open political conflict or confrontation,
or by outright military occupation. The growing popularity of such groups as
Hamas (in Gaza), Hezbollah (in southern Lebanon), the FIS (in Algeria), and
the religious party (Refah) in secular Turkey which draws much of its support
from the Kurdish community, bears witness to the observation that religious
groups draw their support from prevailing political, economic and cultural threat
and insecurity. Religious values and a return to traditionalism are thus used
as a means of expressing public protest, and of generating some element of hope
among the threatened and disillusioned.

Nationalism and Democracy

It would appear, at first sight, that the correlation between these two processes
are sometimes of a causal nature. That is to say that in some cases, nationalism
is the manifestation of democratic pluralism taken to its extreme in the negative
sense, by leading to intolerance and exclusivity. Conversely, in other cases,
nationalism is the expression of social opposition to the lack of, or insufficient
forms of, democracy. Looking at the recent experience of the former socialist
countries, however, one is tempted to speculate that it is more the rapid and
radical transition from totalitarian to democratic rule, rather than the switch
to democracy itself, which has unleashed the forces of nationalism. One may
then conclude that nationalism can spawn or stifle democracy, depending on whether
it takes a fundamentally progressive or reactionary form.15

A nuanced comparison can also be made about the relationship between the two
processes in Western Europe, where an advanced state of democracy has also provided
the context within which extremist nationalist forces have been able to express
themselves. The manifestation of ultra right-wing sentiments in Western Europe
could, in turn, have the effect of undermining democratic principles in the
long run by forcing mainstream parties to pander more to populist policies.

More serious perhaps, is the situation in the former Soviet block. Where there
are economic grievances and undeveloped democratic institutions, as in the case
of most of the former socialist countries, processes of democratization and
pluralism can initially fuel populist, chauvinist, nationalist, parochial and
ethno-centric trends.16 Indeed, in societies
just emerging from totalitarian rule, processes of democratization can act as
a vehicle for the flourishing of nationalism or separatism - or the free expression
of particularisms - because they encourage ethnic self-consciousness which,
in turn, threatens to overwhelm democracy by encouraging conflict and violence.
Paradoxically, therefore, pluralistic revolutions can in certain circumstances
(in this case, as a counter-effect to totalitarianism) reignite explosive national
conflicts and fuel anti-pluralist tendencies.

The economic component becomes a critical factor in the success of the transition
process. The destructive impact of the economic crisis in some countries of
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union is said to be undermining stable
democratization by unleashing disintegrative energies and by providing implicit
support for anti-reformist forces (Nakarada, 1991). In a situation where a major
incentive for rejecting communism came from its inability to provide the economic
prosperity enjoyed in the West, and where people long accustomed to the notion
of social welfare see their lives made worse by the new freedoms, the nationalist
backlash will continue to grow. If the former Soviet Union's experiment with
democracy collapses with economic ruin, it is quite possible that right-wing
populists will be there promising a return to order and stability in exchange
for political freedoms.

In fact, studies of transition from authoritarianism to democracy in Latin
America and Southern Europe suggest that "a rapid decomposition of state
power, especially when aggravated by serious economic decline, is hardly conducive
for the establishment of viable democratic regimes." This claim seems to
be born out by the current situation in Eastern and Central Europe, where "the
rapid disintegration of party-states [has] produced a power vacuum which has
been hastily permeated by highly fragmented political forces... prone to radicalization
not only around political and economic issues, but also around ethnic and religious
cleavages." Hence, some argue that "the tasks facing new democratically
elected governments are so drastic that some form of coercive policies may be
necessary in order to accomplish a fundamental restructuring of political and
economic systems" (Ekiert, 1991, pp. 288 & 312).

Another inherent danger contained in the transition to a democratic system,
particularly in heterogeneous societies, concerns the rights of minorities.
While democracy is based on majority rule, it also implies respect for the rights
and interests of minority groups. It is the lack of sufficient constitutional
guarantees for minority rights, combined with discrepancies in economic conditions
between different regions and ethnic groups, which has been one of the principal
causes of inter-ethnic tensions within and between states. While an advanced
democratic system may eventually achieve some form of social, economic and political
equilibrium between majority and minority ethnic interests, this may be extremely
difficult to attain at the early stages of democratic institution-building.
In such a situation, political freedoms might actually be used on the part of
the majority as a pretext to vent ethnic or cultural prejudice - and hence,
to curtail the freedom of minority groups, a development which may eventually
provoke a counter-nationalist backlash - rather than to institutionalize political
and cultural pluralism.

In fact, aspects of such a development can be witnessed in certain republics
of the former Soviet Union where the transition to democratic rule has paradoxically
been accompanied by a drive to create "ethnically pure" states. Proposals
to grant citizenship on the basis of ethnic criteria have been advanced in Georgia
as well as in the relatively more advanced Baltic republics.17 In witnessing
such developments, one cannot help recalling Hannah Arendt's observation, made
in The Origins of Totalitarianism, that the road to ethnic purification was
one that lead directly toward totalitarianism. However, a more optimistic rejoinder
might attribute such tendencies to the counter-effects of totalitarianism and
to the undeveloped state of democratic institutions. It might argue that young
democracies take a while to be nurtured; that they cannot simply be ordained.

Conclusion

As will be clear from the preceding analysis, nationalism has assumed a multitude
of forms, both historically and in the contemporary era, most of which are generally
related, directly or indirectly, to the policy or performance of the central
state. At the outset of this paper it was argued that nationalism had historically
served three paradoxical purposes by contributing to the formation, survival
as well as the dismemberment of nation states. In the context of the typologies
created, one could argue that state nationalism constitutes a celebration of
sovereign statehood; ethno-nationalism, a challenge to the legitimacy (and sometimes,
integrity) of the state; and protest nationalism, a critique of state policy
or, going one step further, a response to the crisis of the nation state.

Although one obvious conclusion that can be drawn is that the nation state
has clearly failed in its claim to represent the popular will, it does not necessarily
follow that it has also expended its purpose as an effective or desirable form
of political organization. One fundamental impediment to transcending this claim
is the prevailing and ever-strong aspiration of most self determination movements
to seek the nation state paradigm as the final embodiment of their political
goals. Hence, the issue appears to be more one of how boundaries should be drawn,
rather than that of questioning the basic legitimacy or desirability of sovereign
political statehood within a defined territory. Given the historical discrepancy
between the political development of different peoples, a more realistic approach
for the medium-term may be to advocate measures which seek to narrow the growing
disparity between the rights of (all members of) society and the obligations
of the central state. It is also conceded that given the rise in nationalist
sentiment in recent years, the question of the recognition of ethnic and minority
rights will eventually have to be treated beyond the nation state paradigm.

Notes

1 Indeed, given that an ethnic redrawing of the African political
map would give birth to over 300 new states, the OAU adopted, on the eve of
its creation in 1963, the binding principle of Uri Possidetis, namely, implicit
respect for existing boundaries, in a separate resolution from its Charter.
Consequently, members of the OAU have been largely faithful to the policy of
not granting assistance to secessionist movements in Black Africa, a prominent
illustration being their refrain from providing support to the Biafran movement
during the Nigerian civil war.

2 By way of a partial response, jurists point out that not all groups
have the automatic right to self-determination. In fact, under existing international
law, minorities do not have the right to statehood or autonomy unless the state
in question voluntarily grants it (e.g., as in the case of the Czech and Slovak
Republics) or is forced to cede them such rights (e.g., Eritrea). Only "nations"
and "peoples" do (e.g., as in the case of the Croats and the Slovenes,
as defined by the former Yugoslavian constitution). Hence, according to this
interpretation, Albanians in Kosovo do not have the same rights as the Croats
and Slovenes because they constitute a "minority" according to the
constitution of the new Yugoslavia, even if they form a majority in the region
of Kosovo itself. The case of the Kurds is also tricky and analogous to that
of the Serbs in ex-Yugoslavia and the Russians in the former Soviet Union spread
over several different state boundaries. A military solution to gathering an
ethnic peoples within a single state by parcelling out existing states, whether
through a policy of "ethnic cleansing" or aggressive conquest, is
not, as the Serbian case has shown, a viable option.

5 See Breuilly, 1982, p. 10. Other examples include anti-Semitism
of the Third Reich, and the policies of the US government (e.g., Committee on
un-American Activities) during the McCarthy era of the 1950s.

6 For an excellent theoretical analysis of this subject, see Lawson,
1992.

7 According to some estimates, 25% of the global population are
minorities experiencing serious deprivation in relation to fellow citizens of
a given state. While a greater percentage are in Third World countries, Western
Europe has 21 such minority groups spread over 13 countries, constituting 7.8%
of the total population, and North America has 8 minority groups in 4 countries,
comprising 15.8% of its population (Boulding, 1990).

8 To get just an inkling of the inter-ethnic composition of the
Balkan states, one need only consider the presence of Hungarians in Transylvania
(Romania) and in Vojvodina (Serbia); the Romanian-speaking Moldavians in Moldovo
(or Bessarabia, historically contested by Romania); the Albanians in Kosovo,
Macedonia and Greece; the Greeks in northern Epirus (Albania); the Serbs in
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina; the Macedonians in Greece and Bulgaria; the
Turks in Bulgaria. (For a detailed exposition of the distribution of ethnicities
in Central and Eastern Europe, see Liebich, 1991, pp. 56-61).

9 A related explanation argues that the communist state never allowed
the development of a civil society; it oppressed ethnic, national and religious
beliefs, permitting only class identification. The explosion came when communist
leaders attempted to manipulate these beliefs, playing one nationality against
the other, in order to stay in power as long as they could (Drakulic, 1992).

10 As Vaclev Havel (1993) explains, "This vast shroud of uniformity,
stifling all national, intellectual, spiritual, social, cultural, and religious
variety covered over any differences and created the monstrous illusion that
we were all the same."

11 Cited in Newsweek "Europe's New Right," 27 April 1992,
p. 9. In Vienna, the Austrian Freedom Party, which employs strong anti-immigrant
rhetoric, won 23% of the municipal elections in 1991, and 22.6% of the vote
in October 1994. The far-right Italian Social Movement (MSI), which won 13.5%
of the general election in March 1994, then became part of the ruling coalition
(International Herald Tribune, 27 November 1992; The Economist, October 15,
1994, pp. 41-42). The prevailing public alarm is in turn reinforced by the poor
living conditions and increased crime rate of some immigrant communities (e.g.,
Albanians in Italy), which act as unpleasant reminders of the social ills generally
associated with developing societies.

12 In Germany, France, Italy, Austria, and Belgium, the far-right
parties scored advances in the early 1990s, although support for these parties
has since waned in some countries.

13 As the political platforms of Social Democrats and moderate conservatives
in Europe have slowly converged so as to become virtually indistinguishable,
the extreme right has also benefitted as the primary recipient of protest votes.
The smaller parties are also loosing votes to the far right. Many of Mr. Pen's
latest supporters are said to be working class defectors from the Communist
Party, who fear that their blue-collar jobs are jeopardized by immigrants willing
to accept lower wages to work in France. In the 1994 municipal elections, the
Front won more than a quarter of the votes in 20 big towns of over 30,000 inhabitants,
and outright control of three towns (The Economist, 27 April 1996, p. 33).

14 For the range of discontent these parties exploit, see Newsweek,
24 April 1992, p. 10.

15 An example of progressive nationalism is that which developed
in the East European countries during the time of Soviet domination, when "nationalism
became the common denominator of East European resistance to communism"
(Ekiert, 1991, p. 290). The nationalism of Serbian leader Milosevic, on the
other hand, is qualified as reactionary because it is used as an instrument
of exclusion, destruction and oppression.

16 As in Yugoslavia, for instance, where the fall of communism did
not usher in a democratic order. Instead, it gave way to populist ethno-nationalism.

17 Among the most restrictive is Latvia, seeking to protect its
52% majority ethnic Latvian population on the basis of birth rights and linguistic
competence. Similar suggestions have also been advanced in Lithuania, where
nationalists refuse naturalization to those settled in the country after 1940
(Neier, 1991). In the Estonian elections of June 1992, only those of Estonian
origin were allowed to vote.

References

Boulding, Elise. 1990. "Ethnicity and New Constitutive
Orders: An Approach to Peace in the Twenty-First Century." Chapter 2 in
Hisakazu Usu and Takeo Vihida, Eds., From Chaos to Order, Vol. I: Crisis and
Reneaissance of the World Society. Tokyo: Yuskindo Publishers.

Breuilly, John. 1982. Nationalism and the State. New York:
St. Martin's Press.