Considered and decided by Willis, Presiding Judge, Huspeni, Judge, and Forsberg, Judge.

S Y L L A B U S

Minn. Stat. § 260.181, subd. 3(d) (Supp. 1997), which requires a court, if determining the
disposition of a juvenile and so requested by the juvenile's birth parent, to put the juvenile in a foster
home with the same or a similar religious background as that of the child's birth parent, is not
violated by placing the child of a parent whose religion holds homosexual conduct to be a sin in a
foster home run by homosexuals if the record shows that the religious background of the foster
caregiver was not important to the parent, that the entity making the placement was aware of the
available placement options, and that the placement was the best possible placement under the
circumstances.

O P I N I O N

FORSBERG, Judge

Appellant-mother Eve Schuld belongs to a religious denomination that holds homosexuality to be a
sin and appeals the juvenile court's order placing her son in a foster home where the foster
caregivers are homosexuals. She claims the placement violates Minn. Stat. § 260.181, subd. 3(d)
(Supp. 1997), which requires courts to place children in foster homes with a religious background
the same as, or similar to, that of the parent, if the parent so requests. Because this record shows
that mother was not concerned about the religious background of those running the foster home in
which her child was placed, that she understood the available placement options, and that the
placement was the best placement possible under the circumstances, we affirm.

FACTS

Mother's son was born in 1982, adjudicated CHIPS in 1991 and, with limited exceptions, has
been in out-of-home placements since that time. In 1995, as a result of his conduct while in an
out-of-home placement, son was adjudicated delinquent on charges of criminal sexual conduct and
assault. Son has an IQ of 90, struggles significantly in the area of verbal and written skills, and has
been diagnosed with mixed bipolar, obsessive/compulsive, and paraphilia disorders. He also
engages in self-injurious behaviors, generally refuses to comply with treatment requirements, and
has a parent-child relationship problem. Son is oppositional and defiant and has been discontinued
from, or refused by, several institutional placements.

In August 1997, son was moved from an out-of-home placement to an intensive treatment foster
home. This placement was made in light of son's probation. One of the persons involved in the
placement decision was son's probation officer. Two homosexual men run the foster home. Mother
is a member of the Assemblies of God Church. The church holds that homosexual conduct is a sin,
people should not associate with those who are sinning, and parents have a duty to raise their
children in their religious faith. Mother objected to son's placement, claiming it violated Minn. Stat.
§ 260.181, subd. 3(d) (Supp. 1997), under which, at the request of a child's birth parent, the
juvenile court shall place children in foster homes with the same or a similar religious background
as that of the child's birth parent(s). After a hearing, the juvenile court rejected mother's claims.
Mother appeals.

If the child's birth parent or parents express a preference for placing the child in a
foster or adoptive home of the same or a similar religious background to that of the
birth parent or parents, the court shall order placement of the child with an
individual who meets the birth parent's religious preference.

Mother is a member of the Assemblies of God Church and that church believes homosexual
conduct is a sin. In rejecting mother's alleged religion-based challenge to the placement, the juvenile
court stated:

The entire argument becomes moot, however, because [mother] testified that she
would not disagree with her son being placed with foster parents who do not
practice or foster the practice of the Assemblies of God and would allow [son] to
be placed in a foster home where the foster parents practice a religion other than
her own. [Mother] is not concerned with [the custodian's] religious preference, but
only with their affectional preference.

The record supports this aspect of the juvenile court's analysis. Mother testified both that she would
not object to her son being in a placement that did not encourage son's participation in the
Assemblies of God religion and that the sticking point with son's placement was the homosexual
relationship of son's foster custodians.

Also, here, because of son's numerous special needs and his history of committing sexual abuse, the
difficulty in finding any type of placement for son is extreme. The placement problem, however, is
further aggravated because mother, the experts, and the lay witnesses all agree a foster home,
rather than a residential placement, was required for son because son needs more structure and
supervision than is available in a residential placement.

When making the placement decision, in addition to considering placements in Minnesota,
placements in Indiana, Nebraska, and West Virginia were considered. The possible out-of-state
placements either refused to take son because of his special needs and history of committing sexual
abuse or were unable to provide son with the services he requires. In Minnesota, the foster
placement agency consulted by the county indicated there was only one available placement for a
child with needs as extensive as son's needs. In addressing the propriety of putting son in that foster
placement, the experts agreed the placement was in son's best interests. See Minn. Stat.
§ 260.011, subd. 2(a) (1996) (paramount consideration in child protection proceedings is best
interests of child). The child protection specialist also testified that, while she was aware of mother's
religious background and what mother stated to be her custodial preference, that preference could
not be realized here because of the limited number of foster homes willing to take children who
have a history of committing sexual abuse and who need the extent of services son needs, as well
as the limited number of foster homes that have care givers with the training to handle a child with
needs like son's needs. To the extent mother claims the county did not contact more than one
placement agency in making its decision, we note one of the foster care providers testified to a
familiarity with possible alternative placement agencies and indicated the vast majority of them
would not take son or would not be able to provide son the services he needs. Also, mother's
exhibit listing alternatives shows many were residential placements or for adults, or both. This
record shows familiarity with relevant placement options and shows that the juvenile court made the
best placement possible under these awkward circumstances. We therefore conclude that this
juvenile court's placement of this child with these homosexual custodians was not an abuse of the
juvenile court's broad discretion.

Because of our ruling, we need not address other arguments for affirmance made by son and the
county. Also, while mother argues son's placement violates her right to free exercise of religion
under the state and federal constitutions, because these issues were not addressed by the juvenile
court, we do not address them. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988)
(appellate court addresses only claims presented to and decided by district court); see In re
Welfare of D.D.G., 558 N.W.2d 481, 485 (Minn. 1997) (noting gravity of termination
proceedings insufficient reason to abridge established rules of appellate argument).

D E C I S I O N

Because mother admitted religion was not the basis for her objection to the foster placement of her
son and, where given the extreme difficulty in placing the son, the county made the best placement
possible under the circumstances, the juvenile court did not abuse its wide discretion in rejecting
mother's religion-based challenge to the placement.

Affirmed.

Footnotes

[1] Mother and the county make arguments based on the 1996 statute. The statute, however, was
amended, effective May 7, 1997. 1997 Minn. Laws ch 86, §§ 12, 14. Because the juvenile court
issued its order in December 1997, we address the 1997 statute.