Winning in Afghanistan means telling home truths

The battle in Afghanistan is one that must not be lost. It is a fight to stop the country becoming a base for international terrorism, to show that democracy can be built in one of the most inhospitable countries in the world, to sustain the battered credibility of the entire international community. Victory, however, will not be easy and will require much clever diplomacy, military will, deft handling of Afghan politics and, above all, a far greater commitment than the West has so far shown.

Over the past few weeks, it has become evident that Nato has a real war on its hands. An alliance of Taliban militants, tribal militias, drug traffickers and bandits are fighting hard in Afghanistan's long ungoverned southern provinces. They man roadblocks, control territory, administer summary justice, intimidate villagers and are well-financed from the export of opium poppies.

Six British soldiers have now died in the last month in Helmand's Sangin Valley, where British troops are taking a lead role. They are well-briefed and well-trained but 3,330 soldiers are covering a region four times the size of Wales. Reinforcements are imperative.

Afghanistan is not Iraq. Westerners were welcomed into the country five years ago and the international coalition still has much support. In many parts of the country, significant improvements, especially in women's education, are evident. The north and west are by and large stable. Afghanistan's terrible economic and political isolation has ended. But the pace of reconstruction has been painfully slow. For many, grinding poverty remains a daily reality; a government that cannot guarantee order and justice or offer the prospect of better life will lose its popular base. President Hamid Karzai is under intense and growing pressure; disillusion is growing.

The war currently being fought in the south was avoidable. As in Iraq, a hard job has been made much harder. America and Europe left the southern provinces to stew for four years, hoping that the difficulties there would somehow just go away. And though the money pledged to reconstruction sounds considerable, one recent study found that international aid to Afghanistan equals £30 per person, as compared with £400 in Bosnia and £130 in Iraq.

Yet success is possible. It will need much more money, much more political attention, many more troops than anyone has previously admitted. Having a coalition that is truly international - not just composed of Americans and Europeans - will help. So, too, will addressing regional issues that currently destabilise Afghanistan. However, enough men on the ground backed by sufficient aid and an effective diplomatic effort, can achieve much. The Afghans do not want the Taliban back. They just want security and a measure of prosperity and dignity.

But the West's political leaders must be explicit about what is at stake and what is needed. They must win popular support at home. This will be particularly vital if the effort needs to be sustained, maybe over decades. Yet, only recently, the Americans halved their aid budget and cut troop deployment. It hardly indicates long-term serious intent.

In Britain, senior politicians must explain the situation truthfully and clearly, along with their projected solution. The Prime Minister made a start last week. And on Friday, Defence Secretary Des Browne spoke not just of the danger to British troops, but also of the desperate need. Both men will need to make such arguments repeatedly and to back them with action. Losing in Afghanistan would cost all of us very dear.