The
plaintiff, a state prisoner in the South Carolina Department
of Corrections (“SCDC”), who is proceeding
pro se, brought this action seeking relief pursuant
to Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983. Pursuant to
the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section
636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.),
this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial
matters in cases filed under Section 1983 and submit findings
and recommendations to the district court.

PROCEDURAL
HISTORY

In his
complaint filed October 13, 2016, the plaintiff alleges that
the defendant Ms. Williams, a corrections officer at
SCDC's Lee Correctional Institution, closed a cell door
flap on his hand and then failed to take him to the medical
unit for his resulting injuries (doc. 1, comp. p. 4-5). The
plaintiff thereafter filed an amended complaint, restating
his medical allegations and specifically claiming an Eighth
Amendment violation of excessive force and state law claims
of assault and battery (doc. 39, am. comp. ¶¶ 7-8).
On June 30, 2017, Officer Williams filed an answer raising
various defenses, including the affirmative defense of the
plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies
(doc. 40). On July 24, 2017, Officer Williams filed an
amended motion for summary judgment (doc. 41). On July 25,
2017, pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309
(4th Cir. 1975), the plaintiff was advised of the summary
judgment procedure and the possible consequences if he failed
to respond adequately (doc. 42). The plaintiff timely filed a
response in opposition to summary judgment (doc. 45). On
August 22, 2017, the undersigned ordered Officer Williams to
provide additional information in reply to matters raised by
the plaintiff in his response. Specifically, Officer Williams
was directed to (1) respond to the plaintiff's claim that
no incident report was prepared following the incident, and,
if an incident report was prepared, provide a copy of it; (2)
respond to the plaintiff's claim that he did not receive
a response to the grievance form he submitted on January 27,
2016 (the form submitted bears no signature by the plaintiff
showing he received the response (doc. 41-1 at 5)); and (3)
respond to the plaintiff's claim that he is unfamiliar
with the grievance process and provide any relevant documents
(doc. 48). Officer Williams filed a reply to the order on
August 29, 2017, (1) providing the requested incident report;
(2) explaining why the plaintiff's signature did not
appear on the grievance response; and (3) providing affidavit
testimony that all admitted inmates are instructed on the
SCDC grievance system (doc. 50).

FACTS
PRESENTED

The
plaintiff is a state inmate formerly housed in the Special
Management Unit at Lee Correctional Institution, where the
incident at issue occurred. He describes himself as
illiterate and classified as mentally ill (doc. 39-1, pl.
aff. ¶¶ 3-4). In his amended complaint, he alleges
that on December 22, 2015, Officer Williams came to his cell
to collect his food tray. As he passed the tray to her
through a flap in the cell door, she allegedly slammed the
flap against his hand and wrist. When he screamed, she
slammed it down again, causing bleeding and extreme pain.
After he dislodged his arm, he claims that Officer Williams
failed to notify the medical staff on his behalf, but that
his mental health counselor was nearby and did so (doc. 39,
am. comp. ¶¶ 4-7). He further alleges that shortly
thereafter, he made several requests to the prison staff
seeking assistance with filling out a grievance form, but
when no assistance was provided, he completed a Step 1
grievance form and submitted it “as best as I
understood how to do it” (doc. 39-1, pl. aff. ¶
8). He claims that he “was not notified by anyone at
the prison that my Step 1 grievance had been sent back to me
with instructions to list a requested action. The
institutional Inmate Grievance Coordinator Ms. Johnson did
not ever contact me about this defect in my grievance, or
else I would have corrected the error” (id.
¶ 9).

Officer
Williams denies that she intentionally closed the door flap
on the plaintiff's arm, but was instead trying to secure
the flap when the plaintiff stuck his arm out. She gave him
several directives to pull his arm back, and as he did, she
closed the flap, catching his arm. Contrary to the
plaintiff's contention that he was not charged in the
incident, Officer Williams prepared an incident report
against him for refusing to obey orders and evading a
security device (doc. 50-1, Williams aff. ¶¶ 4-6;
doc. 50-2).

In
support of her motion for summary judgment, and in response
to the court's order for additional information, Officer
Williams presents the affidavit and supplemental affidavit of
Sherman L. Anderson, who is employed with the SCDC's
Office of General Counsel - Chief Inmate Grievance Branch
(docs. 41-2, 50-3). Mr. Anderson describes a three step
process through which an inmate must attempt to resolve his
grievance within SCDC (doc. 41-2, Anderson aff. ¶ 4) and
states that all inmates are instructed on how to use
SCDC's Inmate Grievance System upon initial entry as an
inmate (doc. 50-3, Anderson supp. aff. ¶ 6). He states
that while this three step process allows inmates to have
their concerns addressed internally at least three times, the
plaintiff failed to follow this procedure (doc. 41-2,
Anderson aff. ¶ 3). Mr. Anderson points out that the
plaintiff submitted a Step 1 grievance reciting the incident,
but that he failed to request that any action be taken
(id.; doc. 50-4). The grievance form was then
returned to the plaintiff with an explanation that it was
incomplete since no action was requested. The plaintiff was
also provided with instructions on how to complete and submit
a new grievance. A review of the returned grievance form
shows that it does not contain the plaintiff's signature
as having been received back in response (doc. 50-4, pp.
4-5). However, Mr. Anderson states that the form was in fact
returned to the plaintiff as evidenced by the dated signature
of L. Johnson, the Inmate Grievance Coordinator. He explains
that “when a grievance is returned unprocessed to an
inmate wherein they did not appropriately complete the
grievance form, it is not required that an inmate sign for
receiving the grievance response” (doc. 50-3, Anderson
supp. aff. ¶ 4). While the plaintiff states in an
earlier affidavit that he never received the returned form
(doc. 39-1, pl. aff. ¶ 9), he later states in his
response in opposition to summary judgment that he “did
not send a new grievance [because] I cannot read good”
(doc. 45, ¶ 1).

APPLICABLE
LAW AND ANALYSIS

Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56 states, as to a party who has
moved for summary judgment: “The court shall grant
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). As to
the first of these determinations, a fact is deemed
“material” if proof of its existence or
nonexistence would affect the disposition of the case under
the applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of material fact is
“genuine” if the evidence offered is such that a
reasonable jury might return a verdict for the non-movant.
Id. at 257. In determining whether a genuine issue
has been raised, the court must construe all inferences and
ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving
party. United States v. Diebold, Inc.,369 U.S. 654,
655 (1962).

The
party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden
of demonstrating to the district court that there is no
genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett,477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Once the movant has
made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to
survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the
allegations averred in his pleadings; rather, he must
demonstrate that specific, material facts exist that give
rise to a genuine issue. Id. at 324. Under this
standard, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in
support of the plaintiff's position is insufficient to
withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477
U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory allegations or denials,
without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of
the summary judgment motion. Id. at 248. “Only
disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit
under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of
summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or
unnecessary will not be counted.” Id.

In her
motion for summary judgment, Officer Williams argues that the
plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies
prior to commencing this action. This court agrees. The
Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L.
No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(a) (1996)), mandates, among other things, that
prisoners exhaust their administrative remedies prior to
filing civil actions concerning prison conditions under
Section 1983 or any other federal law. See Jones v.
Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007) (“There is no
question that exhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA and that
unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court”).
“[T]he PLRA's exhaustion requirement is mandatory,
” Anderson v. XYZ Corr. Health Servs., Inc.,
407 F.3d 674, 677 (4th Cir. 2005), and “applies to all
inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general
circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege
excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v.
Nussle,534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Although PLRA
exhaustion is not jurisdictional, failure to exhaust is an
affirmative defense that can be pleaded by the defendants.
Jones, 549 U.S. at 216; Anderson, 407 F.3d
at 681. “[U]nexhausted claims cannot be brought in
court.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 211.
“Requiring exhaustion allows prison officials an
opportunity to resolve disputes concerning the exercise of
their responsibilities before being haled into court.”
Id. at 204. It also has the “potential to
reduce the number of inmate suits, and also to improve the
quality of suits that are filed by producing a useful
administrative record.” Id.

The
PLRA requires “proper exhaustion” of available
administrative remedies prior to filing suit. Woodford v.
Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-94 (2006). As the Supreme Court
noted, “[a]ggrieved parties may prefer not to exhaust
administrative remedies for a variety of reasons, ”
whether it be concerns about efficiency or “bad
faith.” Id. at 89-90. This is especially true
in a prison context. Id. at 90 n.1. Nevertheless,
“[p]roper exhaustion demands compliance with an
agency's deadlines and other critical procedural rules
because no adjudicative system can function effectively
without imposing some orderly structure on the course of its
proceedings.” Id. at 90-91.

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;On
January 27, 2016, the plaintiff filed a Step 1 grievance,
stating: &ldquo;the 12/22/15 between 3:30 or 4:00 p.m. Sgt.
Williams close my arm in the flap it take the staff 6:15 p.m.
to take me to medical because mental health Ms. Fox told the
staff call medical&rdquo; (doc. 50-4). However, the plaintiff
failed to fill out the next section of the form that asks for
the &ldquo;action requested&rdquo; to be taken as a result of
the incident. In a response section entitled
&ldquo;Warden&#39;s Decision and Reason, &rdquo; the typed
response states that &ldquo;. . . this grievance is being
returned to you due to the fact you failed to complete the
grievance form in its entirety. You have not listed an action
requested. This information is needed in order to process
your grievance appropriately. If you wish to submit a new
grievance on this issue, it must be received no later than
02/09/16 . . . .&rdquo; (id.). Under the typed entry
is the signature of L. Johnson, Lee Correctional's Inmate
Grievance Coordinator, dated 2/2/16, indicating that the form
was returned to the plaintiff (doc. 50-3, ...

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