EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Tropical Storm Alberto originated in Senegal on June 18, 1994,
as a tropical wave. The system became Tropical Depression One
on June 30 at approximately 0600 Universal Coordinated Time (UTC).
On July 2 at about 0000 UTC, the depression strengthened in the
Gulf of Mexico near the Yucatan Peninsula to become Tropical Storm
Alberto. When the center made landfall near Destin, Florida, at
1500 UTC on July 3, Alberto was at its peak intensity, 993 millibars
and 55-knot winds. Winds then quickly subsided, and Alberto's
central pressure rose rapidly.

After landfall, the motion of the storm slowed and precipitation
increased. The storm moved slowly through Alabama into Georgia,
stalling just south of Atlanta. Over the next few days it reversed
its course and then looped back on its previous course before
ultimately dissipating. During that period it dumped copious amounts
of rain across the area. Amounts as high as 21.1 inches in 24
hours were observed at Americus, Georgia. The Weather Surveillance
Radar-1988 Doppler (WSR-88D) provided the forecasters with a very
good representation of the areal extent of the precipitation although
it underestimated precipitation amounts somewhat. This rainfall
produced record and near-record flooding along the Flint, Ocmulgee,
Chattahoochee, Choctawhatchee, and Apalachicola Rivers. Overall,
flash flooding and flooding caused by the rainfall from Alberto
took 33 lives, destroyed thousands of homes (including some entire
communities), forced approximately 50,000 people to be evacuated,
and caused property damage (including lost crops) estimated as
high as $750 million.

Based on the current technologies available to the
National Weather Service (NWS) offices in the area affected
by Alberto, the offices in general performed their forecast and
warning functions in an exemplary manner. The NWS received high
praise for its products and services from all affected parties
(emergency managers, the media, and the general public). Throughout
Georgia, Alabama, and Florida, the disaster survey team found
a remarkably universal degree of high regard.

The lack of negative comments may be attributed in part to the
fact that external perceptions and expectations of NWS's present
and future capabilities were quite limited relative to what the
NWS believes it can and should be able to do as a result of the
modernization now underway. Initial uncertainties regarding Alberto's
landfall, the failure to predict that the storm would stall over
Georgia instead of moving to the northeast, the Bainbridge forecast
discrepancy, and the relatively short lead-time of some flash
flood warnings are all examples of where users of NWS forecasts
and products should, in the future, be able to expect a more accurate
and timely service.

Many of the deaths in this event can be attributed to individual
lack of judgment: refusal to evacuate despite the request of emergency
managers and other authorities, attempts to either drive around
barricades or on inundated roads, and other actions obviously
inappropriate in the face of the hazard. Approximately two-thirds
of the deaths were related to vehicular incidents. They also represent
a small fraction (less than 0.1 percent) of the total number of
people evacuated. Nevertheless, the high loss of life is troubling
and clearly leaves room for improvement. A few people were seemingly
unaware of the impacts of their weather-related decisions. Some
complacency was evident early in the event. A factor which may
have contributed to this complacency is the fact that recent floods
in the Southeast have not been nearly as severe as this one. Therefore,
most residents did not have previous experience in dealing with
such a dangerous flood event.

Although general external impressions of NWS performance were
favorable, the disaster survey team's closer examination revealed
a number of causes for concern and opportunities for improvement
(a summary of all the findings and recommendations of the disaster
survey team is located in Appendix A):

- Perhaps as much as any single factor, the inability of NWS centralized
model guidance to predict the reversal of the storm motion and
precipitation amounts significantly limits the utility of NWS
products and services. The NWS should work with the Office
of Atmospheric Research and other Federal agencies, as well as
the academic research community, to improve such predictions.

- The forecast for the Flint River at Bainbridge received
considerable media and public attention when the river crested
well below the forecasted level. The forecast at Bainbridge
needs to be investigated and appropriate changes made to the
forecast scheme.

- There is some indication that a number of problems occurred
during the event that were related to the public's perception
of the interfaces between responsibilities. Examples of these
interfaces include the following: between the
National Hurricane Center and National Meteorological Center's
Meteorological Operations Division as the storm made landfall;
between Weather Service Forecast Offices; between Weather Service
Forecast Offices and Weather Service Offices; between Weather
Service Forecast Offices and the River Forecast Center; and
between the NWS and the media, emergency managers, and the general
public. Interfaces are inevitable. Modernization in the
NWS will cause a shift in a number of them. The NWS should develop
an inventory of particularly important interfaces and ensure
that the treatment of these receive special attention and priority.

- Transition to the modernized NWS and its associated staffing
configurations pose special challenges. Throughout the affected
region, offices had to deal with added stress in their handling
of the event by conflicts between scheduled training and urgent
operations, by recent introduction of the new technologies (particularly
the WSR-88D), and by vacancies. The NWS should reexamine
its approach to staffing and training during the transition
with an eye to the special vulnerabilities represented by extreme
events and make necessary adjustments. In addition, the NWS
should continue working with management at the Department of
Commerce, the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) , and the
Office of Management and Budget , and with the Congress,
to ensure that this is the last such wrenching modernization
the NWS undertakes. In the future, modernization must be a continuing
process, not a disruptive event.

- Preparedness is a special issue. As warnings and forecasts
of particular events improve, opportunities for saving lives
and property will depend increasingly on preparedness. In the
modernized NWS, it will be challenging for a smaller number
of offices to work with communities and other affected parties
spread over large geographical areas to build the needed relationships
and coordination on an ongoing basis. The NWS should identify
resources for improving the capabilities of Weather Service
Forecast Offices and future Weather Forecast Offices to build
community preparedness with special focus on taking advantage
of the "information highway."

- New demands on NOAA for information are created by increasing
and changing societal vulnerability to weather, growing awareness
of this vulnerability, and technological advances, especially
in computing and communications. NOAA should continue to
shift emphasis from particular events to ongoing processes of
preparedness. It should create national capabilities that parallel
the Federal Emergency Management
Agency's capabilities for special emergency response and
disaster relief operations. NOAA should also give more emphasis
to the development of all-hazard telecommunications capability
for NOAA Weather Radio.