Wednesday, June 12, 2013

Niebuhr's "Children of Light," a Summary and Reflection

You may not know Reinhold
Niebuhr, but you know Reinhold Niebuhr. At least you do if
you've ever read that "man's capacity for justice makes
democracy possible, but man's inclination to injustice makes democracy
necessary," or recited the prayer "God, grant me the serenity to
accept the things I cannot change, the courage to change the things I can, and
the wisdom to know the difference.”

Gary Dorrien, professor at
Union Theological Seminary and Columbia University, has called him "the
most important thinker of the past century concerning the relation of
Christianity to problems of social ethics and politics." Time went
even further, eulogizing him as the "greatest Protestant theologian since
Jonathan Edwards." His career as a pastor, theologian, professor, author,
and social commentator left an indelible imprint on intellectual life in the
20th-century United States.

I was first drawn to
Niebuhr after reading of his rejection of the unbridled idealism of the liberal
social gospel, an ideology which he had enthusiastically espoused in his early
years. Drawing from the writings of St. Augustine and John Calvin, Niebuhr came
to believe in the 1920s that sentimental belief in the goodness and progress of
man did not do justice to the egotistic and selfish nature of man. He applied
his developing theology to political and social issues, helping to create a
political and social perspective that is now known as Christian realism.
Although Niebuhr would certainly not be theologically orthodox by conservative
evangelical standards, his transition away from liberalism placed him, alongside Karl Barth and others, within the
bounds of the Neo-Orthodox movement.

I've always believed that
if you really want to understand a book, you need to write about it in some
form. Take notes, review it, critique it, summarize it. But interact with it in
some way. In an effort to engage with Niebuhr's thought more deeply, I've
decided to take this approach with my second dip into Reinhold Niebuhr's
writing. What follows is basically a rough draft (and decidedly
non-expert) summary of Niebuhr's book. I've incorporated as many direct quotations from Niebuhr as possible, because his words are brilliant, and mine are not.

Niebuhr begins by first
analyzing the tensions inherent in the "collectivism v.
individualism" dichotomy that permeates modern democratic society. He
writes:

It is true that individuals are
usually the initiators of new insights and the proponents of novel methods. Yet
there are collective forces at work in society which are not the conscious
contrivance of individuals...

He then shifts his focus
beyond the typical socialism/capitalism debates. His focus goes beyond those
standard categories:

But there is a more fundamental
error in the social philosophy of democratic civilization than the
individualism of bourgeois democracy and the collectivism of Marxism. It is the
confidence of both bourgeois and proletarian idealists in the possibility of
achieving an easy resolution of the tension and conflict between self-interest
and the general interest.

You can see the
Augustinian/Calvinist influence on Niebuhr's thought here. He is essentially
applying the idea of original sin to Western idealism. The problem with the
various social philosophies, like the problem with mankind, is that they are
corrupted but their adherents do not seem to realize it. Modern
secular political theories all have good intentions. Yet, all of them make the
crucial error of rejecting or ignoring original sin and thus creating a sense
of naive, Utopian certainty. In one of my favorite passages of the book, he
writes:

But it is necessary to point out
that [original sin] makes an important contribution to any adequate social and
political theory the lack of which has robbed bourgeois theory of real wisdom;
for it emphasizes a fact which every page of human history attests. Through it
one may understand that no matter how wide the perspectives which the human
mind may reach, how broad the loyalties which the human imagination may
conceive, how universal the community which human statecraft may organize, or
how pure the aspirations of the saintliest idealists may be, there is no level
of human moral or social achievement in which there is not some corruption of
inordinate self-love.

Those so blinded into
believing their ideology is the ultimate answer to the proper social
organization of society are deemed by Niebuhr as "children of
light." He describes the children of light as those who "believe that
self-interest should be brought under the discipline of a higher law." In
Niebuhr's calculation, Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham AND Karl Marx all qualify as
children of light. In opposition to the children of light are the
"children of darkness" (hey look, there's the book title!), who
"are moral cynics...evil because they know no law beyond the self. They
are wise, though evil, because they understand the power of
self-interest."

In other words, Niebuhr argues that political conflict is not so much about
competing theories (i.e. socialism vs. capitalism) but rather about the abuse
of power by groups who feel no qualms about utilizing whatever theoretical
avenue is available for them to seize, expand, and exploit their power. As
Niebuhr writes, the fate of all of the children of light, from Smith to Marx,
"is to have their creed become the vehicle and instrument of the children
of darkness."

Niebuhr (who was certainly
left-leaning in his lifetime) thus brings both the left and the right in for
reckoning. The economic right, which typically lauds the brilliance of Adam
Smith's capitalism because it supposedly figured out a way to channel
self-interest into a vehicle for the promotion of the greater good, is
misguided and naive. For, despite the fact that Smith's theory contained what
Niebuhr called a "secularized version of providence...[in which] a
man who is guided by self-interest is also 'led by an invisible hand to promote
an end which is not his intention,'" Smith's idealism was ripe for
exploitation. Niebuhr writes:

A dogma which was intended to
guarantee the economic freedom of the individual became the “ideology” of vast
corporate structures of a later period of capitalism, used by them, and still
used, to prevent a proper political control of their power. His vision of
international harmony was transmuted into the sorry realities of an
international capitalism which recognized neither moral scruples nor political
restraints in expanding its power over the world. His vision of a democratic
harmony of society, founded upon the free play of economic forces, was refuted
by the tragic realities of the class conflicts in western society. Individual
and collective egotism usually employed the political philosophy of this creed,
but always defied the moral idealism which informed it.

Sitting alongside Smith's
capitalism among the children of light was utilitarianism, which Niebuhr
absolutely disdained, calling it the "most naive form of the democratic
faith." Together, Bentham and Smith paved the way for corrupt influences
to seize on their ideas:

Utilitarianism's
conception of the wise egotist, who in his prudence manages to serve interests
wider than his own, supported exactly the same kind of political philosophy as
Adam Smith's conception of the harmless egotist, who did not even have to be wise,
since the providential laws of nature held his egotism in check. So Jeremy
Bentham's influence was added to that of Adam Smith in support of a
laissez-faire political philosophy; and this philosophy encouraged an
unrestrained expression of human greed at the precise moment in history when an
advancing industrialism required more, rather than less, moral and political
restraint upon economic forces.

Marxism did not escape
damning criticism from Niebuhr, either. In one of the many classic lines for
the book, Niebuhr writes, "Marxism expects men to be as tame and social on
the other side of the revolution as Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham thought them
to be tame and prudential on this side of the revolution." Furthermore,
Marxism miscalculated the extent of man's selfishness, "for men may fight
as desperately for power and glory as for bread." Niebuhr continues:

The Marxist theory fails to
anticipate the inevitable rise of an oligarchy in a new society, partly because
it has Utopian ideas of idyllic relations in such a society, which obviate the
necessity of the use of any form of coercive power; and partly because it
identifies economic power too absolutely with the power of private ownership.

And again:

Marxist theory has no protection
against the excessive power of those who manipulate a socialized economic
process or who combine the control of both the economic and the political
process.

After all his
deconstruction, one might wonder if Niebuhr has anything constructive to say.
How then, shall we live? (Or at least what political ideology should we hold?) If all the typical ideological camps are corrupted, then what ideas does
Niebuhr promote? Niebuhr's answer is that the democratic process must play
itself out in light of changing situations. Democracy, Niebuhr says, is "a
method of finding proximate solutions for insoluble problems." Perils
abound from "too little and too much equilibrium of economic power, or
from too much or too little social control of it" and thus, answers to
those questions "must be considered in the light of each new situation and
technical development...[and] continually solved within the framework of the
democratic process."

Understanding the perils
of both collectivist and individualist creeds, we must find the right balance
for our time, understanding that where we land on the spectrum may not be the
proper place for future generations. You can see quite clearly why Niebuhr
would make for a terrible politician. Instead of simplifying political rhetoric
into "bad guys" and "good guys," Niebuhr suggests a
complicated and (probably impossible) process of comprehending our time and
situation with enough precision to be able to fine-tune the balance, every generation, on our
politico-economic machine. "Since freedom and community are partially
contradictory and partially complementary values in human life," Niebuhr
says, "there is no perfect solution for the relation of the two values to
each other. This means that the debate on how much or how little the economic
process should be brought under political control is a never-ending
one." How's that for a campaign slogan?

Niebuhr also spends time
in the book discussing the importance of the Christian faith to the political
realities of the West. It is here, I think, that present-day conservatives might
be most drawn to Niebuhr's thought (if, that is, they were just cherry-picking
Niebuhr's ideas to select only the ones they already agree with). In a
statement that one could imagine any number of current conservative religious
activists saying, Niebuhr writes:

The most effective opponents of
tyrannical government are today, as they have been in the past, men who can
say, “We must obey God rather than man.” Their resolution is possible because
they have a vantage point from which they can discount the pretensions of
demonic Caesars and from which they can defy malignant power as embodied in a
given government.

Furthermore, Niebuhr
claims that religious ideas are

the ultimate sources of the moral
standards from which political principles are derived. In any case both the
foundation and the pinnacle of any cultural structure are religious; for any
scheme of values is finally determined by the ultimate answer which is given to
the ultimate question about the meaning of life...

Indeed, the religious idea
of finding life's "ultimate answers" is incredibly important, because
different ideas about the ultimate meaning of life "produce conflicting
answers on all proximate issues of moral order and political
organization."

In typical Niebuhrian
fashion, he then turns his guns towards both the secularist and the
religionist. Secularism, Niebuhr says, "represents a form of scepticism
which is conscious of the relativity of all human perspectives. In this form it
stands on the abyss of moral nihilism and threatens the whole of life with a
sense of meaningless-ness...it creates a spiritual vacuum into which demonic
religions easily rush." [Niebuhr equates demonic religions especially with
the Nazis throughout the book]

Lest religionists
(or "moral idealists") claim Niebuhr as their champion, Niebuhr laments that "the fanaticism of the various religions...frequently
made no other solution [than secularism] in the modern democratic state
possible." In other words, even though religion (and for Niebuhr, especially Christianity) provides the surest foundation for a well-ordered political
society, one must be religious in the correct way. As Niebuhr
writes:

Democratic life requires a spirit
of tolerant cooperation between individuals and groups which can be achieved by
neither moral cynics, who know no law beyond their own interest, nor by moral
idealists, who acknowledge such a law but are unconscious of the corruption
which insinuates itself into the statement of it by even the most disinterested
idealists.

The correct way to be
religious in a democratic society, then, is one in which

each religion, or each version of
a single faith, seek to proclaim its highest insights while yet preserving an
humble and contrite recognition of the fact that all actual expressions of
religious faith are subject to historical contingency and relativity. Such a
recognition creates a spirit of tolerance and makes any religious or cultural
movement hesitant to claim official validity for its form of religion or to
demand an official monopoly for its cult.

This type of religious
toleration envisioned by Niebuhr straddles the line between the relativism of
the moral cynics and the sincerely-held belief of the moral idealists. Niebuhr
explains that his conception of religious toleration

requires that religious
convictions be sincerely and devoutly held while yet the sinful and finite
corruptions of these convictions be humbly acknowledged; and the actual fruits
of other faiths be generously estimated. Whenever the religious groups of a
community are incapable of such humility and charity the national community
will be forced to save its unity through either secularism or authoritarianism.

And how can one gain what
Niebuhr considers a higher order of religious commitment? It springs, Niebuhr
writes, "only from the depth of a religion which confronts the individual
with a more ultimate majesty and purity than all human majesties and values,
and persuades him to confess: 'Why callest thou me good? there is none good but
one, that is, God.'” In other words, a well-functioning democratic society
requires religious humility from its citizens.

It is here that I think
Niebuhr may have placed himself in the camp of the "children of
light." When faced with the two errors of moral cynics and moral
idealists, he posits a third way - moral realism - that may itself be too naive
to actually work in democratic society, or may itself be utilized by the
"children of darkness" for less-than-admirable purposes.

Of course, Niebuhr does
differentiate himself from moral idealists in that he does not propose an
ultimate solution to the world's problems. He does not claim to offer some sort
of Utopian system. But even Niebuhr's
conception of a society in which economic options are carefully considered and
religious beliefs are held with humility must also be corrupted in some way, if his theory of original sin is correct.
And one might also wonder if Niebuhr's nuanced understanding of religious
toleration - one which lauds the principles of the Christian faith - still
ultimately undermines Christian claims to ultimate truth. His word to
religionists is indeed a wise one, and one need only to look at the sin in religion's social and political past to see why deep humility is needed. Yet,
his proposal could also rather easily be used as a vehicle of the moral
cynics and relativists to undermine belief in a higher law and ultimate truth.

Regardless, Niebuhr's
brilliant thought and his careful deconstruction of the false myths which
permeate American political society are well worth considering. In a polarized
political climate in which both sides seem to make unbounded claims of certainty
in their ideas and also partake in unbridled demonization of the other side, a
realization and reflection of the sin and corruption inherent in all our
political ideas would be especially helpful to us today.

Interestingly, Niebuhr
closes this book, a book in which he has denounced moral idealism, with a wonderful expression of his Christian hope that God will
ultimately purify even our corrupt aspirations. There is no better way to close
than with Niebuhr's own words:

The Christian faith finds the
final clue to the meaning of life and history in the Christ whose goodness is
at once the virtue which man ought, but does not, achieve in history, and the
revelation of a divine mercy which understands and resolves the perpetual
contradictions in which history is involved, even on the highest reaches of
human achievements. From the standpoint of such a faith it is possible to deal
with the ultimate social problem of human history: the creation of community in
world dimensions. The insistence of the Christian faith that the love of Christ
is the final norm of human existence must express itself socially in
unwillingness to stop short of the whole human community in expressing our
sense of moral responsibility for the life and welfare of others. The
understanding of the Christian faith that the highest achievements of human
life are infected with sinful corruption will help men to be prepared for new
corruptions on the level of world community which drive simpler idealists to
despair. The hope of Christian faith that the divine power which bears history
can complete what even the highest human striving must leave incomplete, and
can purify the corruptions which appear in even the purest human aspirations,
is an indispensable prerequisite for diligent fulfillment of our historic
tasks.