WASHINGTON TALK: DIPLOMACY BY A LEGISLATOR

WASHINGTON TALK: DIPLOMACY BY A LEGISLATOR; The Latin Peace Plan According to Wright

By WAYNE KING

Published: August 11, 1987

WASHINGTON, Aug. 10—
The sudden appearance of an accord under which five Central American countries are to try to bring peace to the strife-ridden region seemed to burst from nowhere. But according to Jim Wright, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Latin-sponsored peace plan was in considerable part the product of efforts he quietly started months ago that were brought to fruition by intense negotiations over the last 10 days.

Involved in the negotiations at various stages were leaders from Nicaragua and other Central American nations; Secretary of State George P. Shultz; the White House chief of staff, Howard H. Baker Jr.; the national security adviser, Frank C. Carlucci, and some top Democratic leaders who cautioned Mr. Wright to move with extreme caution lest he become a pawn of President Reagan.

In the end, the Texas Democrat agreed to back a plan put forth by the White House last week, he said in an interview, because Mr. Reagan himself convinced him of his sincerity in trying to seek a peaceful resolution to the wars that have wracked Nicaragua and El Salvadaor.

The Reagan-Wright plan, which was supported by some key Democrats and attacked by others, was superseded by a peace initiative originally put forward last winter by President Oscar Arias Sanchez of Costa Rica and agreed to by Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras in Guatemala last Friday.

But Mr. Wright argues that it was the Reagan-Wright plan that spurred the five Central American Presidents to take matters into their own hands and approve the peace plan that originated in their own region. A Skittish Blessing

The Reagan-Wright plan had managed to secure the skittish blessing of key Democrats through closed-door lobbying and cajoling by Mr. Wright, but it prompted intense skepticism from some Democrats and fears that Mr. Wright had let himself be used by the Administration.

Not so, said Mr. Wright. In an interview today before leaving on vacation, he described in some detail the complex negotiations that led ultimately to a call from Central America in the wee hours of Aug. 7 telling him that the Latin leaders had approved a framework for an end to the fighting in Nicaragua and the possibility of democratic reform by the Marxist government there.

Mr. Wright said he had decided to abandon his role as partisan Democratic leader so as to act as a kind of diplomat in a bold peace effort - a politically risky course, he acknowledged. Mr. Wright said that he had been importuning the White House since January to start peace negotiations with Nicaragua, but that nothing had come of it.

''The spark that set the fire,'' he said, was a visit to his home two weeks ago by Tom Loeffler, a fellow Texan who had himself served eight years in the House, as a chief deputy whip for the Republicans.

Although of sharply divergent political loyalties, Mr. Wright and Mr. Loeffler are close friends. Mr. Wright describes his former House colleague as ''a decent man who has never once lied to me or in any way misled me; when we were on opposite sides of the aisle, we developed a trust.''

By Mr. Wright's account, Mr. Loeffler came by his house, bringing along a pizza, and informed him he had been hired as a consultant by the Reagan Administration to promote continued United States aid to the insurgents in Nicaragua.

''But,'' Mr. Wright recalled, ''he also said, 'I'm really here to talk to you about something that I think is a hell of a lot more important.' ''

With that, Mr. Wright said, Mr. Loeffler told him that Mr. Reagan was prepared to undertake a peace initiative in Central America.

''It seemed to me,'' Mr. Wright said, ''that here was a moment in time in which a temporary opportunity existed, one of those tides that you try to catch at its fullest and ride to a conclusion.''

Mr. Wright, who has had an interest in Central American affairs for much of his three decades in the House and has visited the region many times, said the disclosure of the President's willingness to pursue negotiations came at a propitious time.

''I knew there would be a meeting of the Presidents Aug. 6 and 7 in Guatemala City,'' he said. ''I had already sounded out some of them and gained the impression that they would probably have an inconclusive meeting, just waiting to see what the United States would do.''

If the Central American leaders failed to act, Mr. Wright said, it would lead to ''a lot of bloodletting on the House floor'' over continued aid to the Nicaraguan contras.

''In the course of that, U.S. policy would be emasculated,'' he said.

Mr. Wright said he decided to support the President's initative, but with a caveat: ''I said to Tom Loeffler, 'Tommy, if the President is earnestly sincere and is willing to give this top priority and is willing to wage peace, then I'll do everything in my power to advance the process.' ''

''But I said, 'Tommy, let me tell you pal, if the President is just going to go through the motions, with the idea of being rejected and using that as a justifiction to ask for more money to continue the war, count me out.' '' Mr. Loeffler, in an interview with The Dallas Morning News, was quoted as saying that a major reason for the overture from the White House to Mr. Wright to support a peace plan was a fear that Congressional approval of continued contra aid was unlikely.

''After looking at the votes and listening to a whole host of people, Democrats and Republicans, it was obvious that the likelihood would be a defeat,'' he said.

He said Administration officials made it clear that they were interested in pursuing a diplomatic inititative.

Mr. Loeffler said he had talked to Mr. Wright to sound him out on his support because of personal friendship and mutual respect. ''Sincerity has always been our common bond,'' he said.

Mr. Wright said he was convinced of the President's sincerity after meeting with Mr. Shultz, Mr. Carlucci, Mr. Baker and, finally, the President himself.

He said he then met with the House Republican leader, Robert H. Michel of Illinois, and the two sat down with Ambassador Carlos Tunnermann of Nicaragua and gained an assurance that the Nicaraguans would be responsive to a peace effort and some reform in exchange for a cutoff of military assistance to the insurgents.

Mr. Wright said he next met with some Democratic leaders from the House, Tony Coelho of California, David E. Bonior of Michigan and Thomas S. Foley of Washington, and eventually with other Democratic leaders, to persuade them to go along with the plan. 'A Potential for Injury'

''We had two or three talks,'' he said, ''and they saw a potential for injury, that our colleagues could interpret the move as a foolish sellout to the Administration.''

But Mr. Wright said most Democrats eventually accepted the initiative.

The matter became moot, he added, when, in a call from Guatemala City on Thursday, he was asked by Guido Fernandez, the Costa Rican Ambassador to the United States, if the Latin chiefs of state could use the Reagan-Wright plan essentially as a component of the peace proposal offered last February by President Arias.

''I said, 'Absolutely, if anyone deserves to have his name attached to a peace plan, it is Oscar Arias.' ''

Mr. Wright said he had promptly agreed to the request because he wanted to help make the peace plan a Central American initiative, in as much as any plan regarded as the sole work of the United States would have little chance of success among Central Americans sensitive to charges of United States meddling in their affairs.

He said that purpose was confirmed for him in a second telephone call from Guatemala City on Friday.

''So I got this call at 4:30 in the morning the day it was announced,'' Mr. Wright recalled, ''and Guido Fernandez said, 'The Presidents have agreed on a plan, and they will sign it today. President Arias wanted you to know that had it not been for the stimulus provided by your initiative there, he is not sure there would have been sufficient prodding and impetus to get all five to agree.' ''