Drawing upon decades of experience, RAND provides research services, systematic analysis, and innovative thinking to a global clientele that includes government agencies, foundations, and private-sector firms.

The Pardee RAND Graduate School (PRGS.edu) is the largest public policy Ph.D. program in the nation and the only program based at an independent public policy research organization—the RAND Corporation.

Purchase

Purchase Print Copy

Research Questions

What is the most plausible hypothesis to explain the nature of the North Korean missile program?

What consequences might these findings have for U.S. and Republic of Korea policy and strategy toward North Korea?

What data would be most valuable for better understanding the nature of the North Korean missile program?

The security community generally believes that North Korea acquired Soviet guided ballistic missiles from Egypt in the 1980s, reverse engineered them, and has indigenously produced and deployed in North Korea perhaps 1,000 ballistic missiles of various types. This report questions this common view and seeks to better characterize the North Korean missile threat. The author compares the available data on the North Korean missile program against five hypotheses about the program's origins, sophistication, and scale, highlighting inconsistencies. The author finds that the most plausible characterization of the North Korean missile program is what he terms the "Bluff" hypothesis: The main purpose of the program is political — to create the impression of a serious missile threat and thereby gain strategic leverage, fortify the North Korean regime's domestic power, and deter other countries, particularly the Republic of Korea and the United States, from military action. The author maintains that the North Korean missile program's operational readiness seems to be secondary, and that therefore the threat posed by it has been exaggerated.

Key Findings

The Common View of the North Korean Missile Program

North Korea is commonly believed to have acquired Soviet guided ballistic missiles from Egypt in the 1980s, reverse engineered them, and deployed as many as 1,000 ballistic missiles of various types.

The possibility that some of these missiles might be armed with nuclear warheads is a serious concern.

North Korea Is Not Behaving Like a Developer and Producer of Large Numbers of Relatively Sophisticated Missile Systems

North Korea has conducted very few missile test launches, but the missiles used in these few launches have shown a high level of reliability.

Launches take place only at politically significant dates and are therefore not dictated by engineering development or training needs.

Soviet Scud missiles and the North Korean Scud missiles that have been observed look exactly the same, up to the smallest details.

North Korea apparently limits its reverse engineering and production capabilities to missiles and a few other defense products. For example, it possesses almost no automotive or aerospace industry.

The North Korean Missile Threat Is Largely a Bluff

North Korea has likely launched Soviet/Russian-made missiles (that are old but proven designs) to maximize the appearance of performance.

North Korea may never have tested missiles from its own production, and any such indigenous missiles cannot have noteworthy reliability or accuracy.

It cannot be ruled out that North Korea has nuclear warhead designs for its missiles, but without actual testing, the reliability of these warheads has to be assumed to be low.

The main purpose of the program seems to be political — to create the impression of a serious missile threat and thereby gain strategic leverage, fortify the North Korean regime's domestic power, and deter other countries, particularly the Republic of Korea and the United States, from military action.

Recommendations

North Korea should be considered to possess no real long-range missile threat, but steps should be taken to defend against a conventional short-range threat.

Concerns about North Korea's missile launches are overblown: Every launch further depletes the limited North Korean arsenals, and North Korea gains no real experience from these events. Since the purpose of the launches seems to be political, the United States and other nations should downplay or even ignore them.

A variety of avenues of investigation should be pursued to gain more information about the North Korean missile program.

The research described in this report was supported by the Stanton Foundation.

This report is part of the RAND Corporation technical report series. RAND technical reports may include research findings on a specific topic that is limited in scope or intended for a narrow audience; present discussions of the methodology employed in research; provide literature reviews, survey instruments, modeling exercises, guidelines for practitioners and research professionals, and supporting documentation; or deliver preliminary findings. All RAND reports undergo rigorous peer review to ensure that they meet high standards for research quality and objectivity.

Permission is given to duplicate this electronic document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit the RAND Permissions page.

The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.

The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest.