Extracts from a declaration made to the OSPAAAL General
Secretariat in December 1968

1. Synthesis of the situation

The main characteristic of the present phase of our
liberation struggle is the progressive reversal of the relative
positions of the two forces. While the Portuguese colonialist
forces are falling back more and more on the defensive, our
patriotic forces are developing the offensive both against the
fortified enemy camps still remaining in the liberated areas
and against the colonial troops in the other regions. While our
action is increasingly assuming the character of a mobile
partisan war and we are reinforcing the capacity of
co-ordination of our activities on the different fronts, the
enemy's actions are becoming infrequent, being mainly
restricted to acts of reprisal, terrorism and plunder, with
increasingly frequent aerial bombing and machine-gunning.
Meanwhile, having succeeded in consolidating the areas
liberated and controlled by our armed forces under the auspices
of the Party's governing bodies, we are making fruitful efforts
there towards improving the production of foodstuffs, education
and health facilities-developing the new bases of our
political, economic, administrative, judicial, social and
cultural life.

Apart from in the Cabo Verde and Bissagos Islands, and in
the main urban areas (Bissao, Bafata and Gabo-Sara), where our
action is still restricted to a purely political level, the
enemy is having to face the initiatives of our armed forces on
every side.

Also, having succeeded in constantly frustrating the
political manoeuvres of the Portuguese colonialists, aimed at
creating divisions within the patriotic forces and mystifying
national and international opinion, our armed and political
actions have put a halt to the collaborationist activities of
certain traditional chiefs who were traitors to the nation,
thus neutralising the harmful effects of their attitude on
certain sections of the population.

In the contested or partially liberated areas, we are
constantly broadening the fronts of our struggle and, in the
flame of patriotism fanned by the fire of our weapons, nursing
the future of freedom, peace and progress for which we are
fighting.

The Portuguese information services themselves have had to
admit, through the voice of Radio Bissao, that "the

bandits no longer want to stay in the bush; they are moving
into the villages and drawing closer to the urban centres."
This reality is proudly expressed in one of our people's
patriotic songs, which runs: "Lala kêmà:
kàu di sukundi kâ tê" (The great humid plain
has caught fire: they [the colonialists] have nowhere to
hide).

2. Situation of the armed struggle

The colonialist forces now number about 25 thousand
men (army, navy and air force, police and special armed corps),
with the reinforcements newly arrived from Lisbon, especially
since last May, to counterbalance the intensification of our
action and to replace the heavy losses suffered during the
course of this year. For a small underdeveloped country such as
ours (15,500 square miles, 800,000 inhabitants, of whom only
about 100,000 are capable of usefully assisting our action
against the enemy) an army of 25,000 well-equipped men, with
the most modern material resources, assumes astronomic
proportions, comparable only to those of the disaster which
they are doomed to face in our country. And this in spite of
huge expenditure on material of all sorts, and particularly
American B26 bombers and German jet fighters (Fiat 91).

Portuguese actions, the frequency of which has dropped
significantly in recent months, are characterised mainly
by:

a) aerial bombing and intensive machine-gunning of
the villages in the liberated areas and of places believed to
conceal our bases;

b) a few vain attempts to land troops and set up
camps in our liberated areas (particularly in the South of the
country) with massive air support;

c) increasingly rare incursions into certain
liberated areas close to the fortified camps, with the aim of
terrorising the population, ruining the villages and destroying
our crops and cattle;

d) desperate attempts to bring supplies into certain
fortified camps by river and by air, rarely by land;

e) a few larger-scale operations in contested
areas.

The bombing and machine-gunning of villages and of our
positions by their planes is the main action at present carried
out by the enemy, this being in certain areas, and for long
periods, the only manifestation of their presence. Several
villages have been destroyed in recent months, notably in the
North and Central-South of the country. This is understandable
if one bears in mind the weakness of our means of anti-aircraft
defence and our forces' lack of experience in this field. The
civil defence measures which we have nevertheless taken have
successfully prevented extensive loss of life among our
peoples, frustrating the genocidal intentions of the Portuguese
colonialists.

Attempts to land troops in our liberated areas with the aim
of creating bridgeheads there have ended in failure. Except in
very rare cases (using helicopter-borne troops) when the enemy
has been able to destroy crops and cattle. their terrorist
operations have generally ended in considerable losses for them
in lives and material. Getting supplies to the fortified camps
which are completely cut off by us is one of the major problems
facing the enemy. With the support of aircraft which bomb and
strafe the river banks, the enemy does still manage to supply
certain camps by river.

In the contested areas, joint operations (called 'mopping-up
operations') are generally just a waste of energy, as our
forces take advantage of these opportunities to wreak havoc on
the men and equipment of the enemy forces in ambushes and
surprise attacks. This is proved by the fact that in spite of
the numerous operations of this type carried out in the regions
of Canchungo, S. Domingos and Bafata, we have made considerable
progress there, liberating new areas and controlling certain
roads.

The adoption of the technique of strategic hamlets has not
produced the expected results. Created mainly in areas under
the influence of certain traditional chiefs, particularly in
Gabu, these hamlets have been subjected to violent attacks by
our troops and several of them have been destroyed. The
populations, more realistic than the chiefs, are now fleeing
from the hamlets, preferring to take refuge in neighbouring
countries, or moving into the liberated areas or the urban
centres. In addition, information from colonialist sources
indicates that the morale of the Portuguese troops is getting
progressively lower. Conflicts inside the barracks and the
fortified camps are becoming more frequent. After the attempted
armed rebellion within the air force in April 1965, which led
to the arrest of over 100 military, including a senior officer
sentenced to 28 years in prison, several other conflicts,
generally severely repressed, have taken place in the course of
the past year.

More than 7,000 young men, drafted into the army and
destined mainly for our country, have been able to desert and
hide in the countryside, or get abroad, especially to
France.

Our own actions have been characterised mainly by the
following activities:

a) attacks on barracks and fortified camps, particularly on
those remaining in our liberated areas. These attacks have been
made with mortars, artillery and bazookas. In the case of the
weaker camps they have been followed by assaults using light
weapons:

b) increasing the isolation of enemy positions by using
heavy weapons against river transports, and by installing
antiaircraft weapons; destruction of the strategic hamlets;

c) ambushes and surprise attacks against enemy forces moving
in contested or partially liberated areas; control of the main
roads in these areas;

d) raids against the barracks in the areas that have not yet
been liberated, aimed at increasing the insecurity of the enemy
forces and of the individuals supporting them;

The increasing use of aircraft and helicopters reflects the
difficulties experienced by the colonial authorities in
supplying their troops. In fact, given the impossibility of
using almost all passable roads, including those in contested
areas, and faced with the intensification of our action against
river transports, the enemy is forced to use air transport to
keep the troops supplied. Although we have sunk or seriously
damaged several boats on the Farim, Cumbidjà and Geba
rivers, our action in this field, as in the field of
anti-aircraft defence (3 planes shot down and several others
damaged) still shows serious deficiencies, particularly in
cases where the river transports are escorted by aircraft.

Increasing the isolation of the enemy forces, which also
demands the urgent development of effective anti-aircraft
measures, is proving to be an indispensable measure for
accelerating the total defeat of these forces. This isolation
leads to physical and moral degeneration among the troops, and
facilitates our actions against the fortified camps.

It is in ambushes and surprise attacks carried out mainly in
the contested areas that we are inflicting the heaviest loss of
life and destruction of equipment on the enemy forces. In fact,
as the colonialist troops venture only very rarely into our
liberated areas, it is elsewhere that we are really able to
fully develop our military action, in the field of guerilla
warfare. We can now state firmly that any attempt by the enemy
to reoccupy the liberated areas will end in defeat, or will
cost them an even higher price, in lives and equipment, than
they paid at the time of the invasion of the island of Como in
1964.

We have made progress in co-ordinating the actions of our
armed forces within each sector, and we are trying to
effectively co-ordinate our forces on the regional and national
level.

In the Cabo Verde Islands our Party, which has consolidated
its bases and made major progress in mobilising the popular
masses, has decided to move on to armed action as soon as
possible, in order to answer the criminal violence of the
colonialist agents. Despite the difficulties inherent in this,
we must develop the struggle by every possible means in this
part of our territory, and we will do so.

The situation on the level of the armed struggle is
therefore generally favourable. The enemy is on the defensive,
and we hold the initiative on all fronts. We must not lose
sight of the fact, however, that the enemy, economically much
stronger than us, has considerable human resources and
efficient material means available with which to continue the
war against us. They are still firmly established in certain
urban areas, particularly in the main towns, and can still
count on the money, arms, aircraft and other equipment which
their allies are supplying.

3. The political situation

The political conditions in our country before the beginning
of our struggle-nationwide oppression, absence of even the most
elementary freedoms, police and military repression

-determined our actions, forcing us to start the armed
liberation struggle. Now it is the latter-as the expression of
our determination to free ourselves from the colonial yoke, and
thus of our fundamental political choice-which is determining
the enemy's political behaviour.

Swept out for good from our liberated areas, which cover
more than half our national territory (about 60%) and in which
50% of our people live, Portuguese 'sovereignty' is now
limited to the urban areas. In fact Portuguese political
domination, which generally took the form of more or less
forced collection of taxes of every sort, has ceased to be
possible even in the contested or partially liberated areas. In
general the inhabitants of these areas refuse to pay taxes. The
colonial authorities have to tolerate this refusal, fearing
that the use of force would produce a mass exodus of the
inhabitants towards the liberated areas or neighbouring
countries. Even in the urban centres, including the main towns,
effective political control has become practically impossible,
in the face of the growing influx of refugees from the combat
zones and of the pressure maintained on these centres by our
armed forces.

Having counted on the treachery of certain traditional
chiefs who had promised the loyalty of the populations under
their control, the Portuguese authorities now have to recognise
their failure on this level, and have even stripped of their
rank or arrested some of these chiefs. Progressively abandoned
by the populations which they had controlled, the traditional
chiefs who have betrayed their nation are today the object of
suspicion from the colonial authorities and cannot hide their
fear and their doubts when faced with the progress of our
struggle.

The political manoeuvres of the Portuguese colonialists
aimed at demobilising patriots and deceiving African and world
opinion by promulgating false administrative 'reforms' and
hinting at so-called internal autonomy, distant and undefined,
have also met with failure.

A large part of the sector of the African petty bourgeoisie
which had placed itself at the service of the colonialists, now
has to face an agonising situation, prey to a double fear- that
of the colonialist-fascist repression, and that of the justice
of the patriotic forces. Some of these petty-bourgeois elements
have been moved, or have asked to be moved (to Angola,
Mozambique or Portugal), others have been arrested, and the
majority hope to be able to go on deceiving the colonial
authorities and managing to convince us of their nationalist
feelings.

The dominant factor in the political sphere is the backlash
of police repression, which is now striking not only patriots
but also people who were considered favourable to the colonial
regime. The President of our Party, Rafael Barbosa (Zaim Lopez)
who was living under house arrest, has again been secretly
moved to Bissao prison. The patriots Fernando Fortes, Quintino
Nosolini and others, who had already suffered three years'
imprisonment, have been imprisoned again. The concentration
camp on the island of Galinhas is being filled with patriots
suspected of being members or sympathisers of our Party. About
80 patriots, among them some Party cadres, are still being
detained in inhuman conditions in the infamous concentration
camp of Tarrafal (Cabo Verde Islands). In addition certain
people in the service of Portuguese colonialism have been
arrested, and others, including Duarte Vieira and Godofredo de
Souza, have died under interrogation. The lawyer Augusto Silva
and the important businessman Severino de Pina, General
Secretary of the Municipality of Bissao, have been arrested and
transferred to the prison of Caxias, near Lisbon. These recent
events demonstrate the confusion of the colonial authorities,
under the local direction of 'governor' Arnaldo Schultz,
trained by the Nazis and formerly Salazar's Minister of the
Interior.

The main characteristics of our political action are the
work of consolidating our national organisation and adapting
its structure and its leadership to the new demands of the
struggle. In the liberated areas we have strengthened the
leadership organisation of the Party (inter-regional committee)
by permanently establishing two members of the Political Bureau
in each inter-region. The sector committees are developing
their action among the population and a large number of village
committees (section committees) have been created or renewed.
The Party is making efforts to guarantee the normal and
effective functioning of the base organisations, in the
framework of a wide democracy under centralised leadership. In
the contested or partially liberated areas political work is
carried out mainly by the armed forces.

In the urban centres, in spite of the police and military
repression, our militants are continuing to develop their
underground work and maintain contact with the leadership. Our
organisation has been consolidated in Bissao, Bolama and
Bafata, the main towns.

The higher Party organs are functioning normally and are
dedicating themselves to the improvement of political work at
all levels and to solving the various problems posed by the
rapid development of our struggle. There have been four
conferences of cadres this year, two for each inter-region. The
work of these conferences, which have concentrated on the
problems of organisation of the struggle and development of the
liberated areas (production, security, education and health),
has constituted a basis for elaborating general and specific
directives for leaders at all levels. These conferences of
cadres also gave attention to the study of the deficiencies and
mistakes committed in our political and armed actions. Measures
have been taken to progressively eliminate deficiencies and
rule out mistakes.

4. Economic situation

For some time now we have been able to eliminate the system
of colonialist exploitation of our people in most of the
national territory. This year we struck a severe blow against
the remains of the economy of exploitation in the Eastern
(Gabu-Bafata) and Western (Canchungo-S. Domingos) regions.

Most wholesale and retail businesses in the secondary urban
centres have had to close down, as the merchants and employees
have fled from these centres to the capital. To get some idea
of the catastrophic situation of the colonial economy, it is
enough to recall that the Companhia Uniao Fabril (CUF), the
main commercial enterprise in Guinea, has been in deficit for
almost three years, and has had to draw on its reserves to
survive. In addition the colonial authorities, in a country
which produces more rice than is needed for local consumption,
have had to import large quantities of this cereal (10,000 tons
from Brazil alone) to feed the troops and the urban
populations.

Other economic activities have been practically paralysed.
Apart from works of a military nature, public works and
building are non-existent.

In the liberated areas we are continuing to give every
attention to economic development, particularly with regard to
increasing the production of crops. New areas of land were
planted with rice and other crops during the last rainy season.
Other products (leather, rubber from the forests, crocodile and
other animal skins, and coconuts) have been shipped and sold
abroad, although only in small quantities.

We are also trying to develop artisan work and small local
industries. Because of technical difficulties (lack of means of
transport and spare parts) we have had to postpone the
reopening of the sawmills previously belonging to settlers in
the forest of Dio. We are currently examining the possibility
of starting up in the North a small rudimentary factory to
produce ordinary soap, using palm oil.

To supply the basic needs of the population, two new
people's stores have been created in the North of the country
and in the Boe region. However we are facing grave difficulties
in this, through lack of merchandise, in spite of the help
given by friendly countries. Supplying the basic necessities of
the inhabitants of the liberated areas is proving to be a major
factor in the consolidation of these areas, giving
encouragement in the struggle and demoralising the enemy.

The colonialists are making efforts to compete with our
people's stores by greatly reducing the prices of goods in the
areas which have not yet been liberated. We must successfully
counter this competition. Every effort and sacrifice made with
this aim will have favourable repercussions on the evolution of
the struggle.

5. Social and cultural situation

In order to counter the success of our struggle, the enemy
has made efforts to improve certain social conditions,
particularly in the urban centres, and even has extensive
propaganda, mainly on the radio, aimed at convincing the
population that it should repudiate our Party, claiming that
life will be a 'bed of roses' if the 'Portuguese presence' is
maintained in our country.

The flooding of thousands of people towards the main towns
has created serious problems of overpopulation there, with
effects on food supplies and on common crime. Unemployment is
constantly growing. The hospitals and even the schools are
occupied by troops, because of the lack of military
installations. In Bissao, where the population has trebled in
the last two years, theft, prostitution and general moral
degeneracy are rife. Even within the ranks of the colonial
troops increased medical facilities have not succeeded in
improving the situation, with a large proportion of the
military suffering from malaria or intestinal illnesses.

In the field of education the situation is also very bad, in
spite of the measures hastily taken by the colonial authorities
to increase the number of official schools (from 11 to
25) and to give grants for study in Portugal. Almost all
the elementary schools of the Catholic missions ceased to
function years ago, when the majority of the African teachers
joined our ranks. The few schools established in the
Un-liberated areas have not even started functioning for lack
of teachers, and a large proportion of the pupils have
preferred to come to the nearby liberated areas and attend our
schools instead. Secondary education (1 high school and I
technical school in Bissao) uses teachers without any
professional qualifications, notably the wives of officers in
the colonial army and other people without any university
education.

It would be naive to pretend that the progress achieved in
our liberated areas has brought about a radical change in the
social situation of the inhabitants. Our people, who have to
face a colonial war whose genocidal intentions spare nobody,
still live under difficult conditions. Entire populations have
seen their villages destroyed and have had to take refuge in
the bush. But everybody has enough to eat, nobody is subject to
exploitation, and the standard of living is progressively
rising. Demonstrating a political consciousness which is
heightened every day, the people live and work in harmony,
united in standing up to the evils of the war imposed on us.
Apart from a few rare cases of lack of discipline, generally
motivated by personal interests or understandable
misconceptions, the people proudly follow the Party's
directives. Four hospitals are now functioning in the interior
of the country (2 in the South, 1 in the North and 1 in Boe),
with a total of about 200 beds, and the permanent attendance of
doctors helped by sufficient nurses and having the equipment
necessary for surgical operations. Also dozens of dispensaries
established in the various sectors give daily assistance to the
combatants and to the people. The hospital at Boe has now been
improved and has departments of general medicine, surgery,
orthopaedics, radiology, anaesthesia and analysis. In the past
year 80 nurses have been trained (30 inside the country and 50
in Europe), and 30 more are being trained at the moment. We are
soon going to set up a new rural hospital, exclusively for
orthopaedics.

Bearing in mind that we started from nothing, and that the
Portuguese colonialists had only three hospitals and a few
dispensaries in the whole country, the importance of the
results already obtained, with the help of certain friendly
countries and organisations, is obvious.

Progress made in the field of education has far surpassed
what we thought possible in our conditions. 127 primary schools
are now functioning in the liberated areas, attended in
1965/1966 by 13,500 pupils aged 7 to 15. Considering that at
the start of our struggle there were in the whole country only
56 primary and elementary schools (11 official and 45 mission
schools) with a maximum total of 2,000 pupils, it is easy to
understand the enthusiasm of our children and people for the
Party's success in this field.

As in other fields, progress in the field of education has
brought with it new demands, and here too we are facing
difficulties at present. Particular difficulties are those of
publishing books in Portuguese for the various classes, of
providing educational materials and clothing for the pupils,
and of maintaining the pilot school and a few others set up
near the frontiers. But the several thousand adults who have
already learned to read and write, as well as the young people
from the primary schools, are now discovering a new world
before them; they understand the reasons for our struggle and
our Party's aims better, and make no secret of their enthusiasm
and renewed confidence in the future.

7. Our struggle in the international context

Our enemy, the Portuguese colonial government, has suffered
shameful defeats on an international level this year. It has
been excluded from various international organisations,
including certain specialised UN agencies, and has been
severely criticised and condemned within other
organisations.

Although we greatly appreciate the efforts made by the
United Nations and the moral and political value of its
resolutions, we have no illusions about their practical
effects. In fact we are convinced that given the contradictions
which dominate the internal life of that international
organisation and its proven inability to resolve the conflicts
between colonial peoples and the dominating powers, the United
Nations has done everything it can against Portuguese
colonialism.

The Portuguese government is isolated internationally (as is
proved by the voting at the UN), but this isolation covers only
the political and moral field. In the basic fields of
economics, finance and arms, which determine and condition the
real political and moral behaviour of states, the Portuguese
government is able to count more than ever on the effective aid
of the NATO allies and others. Anyone familiar with the
relations between Portugal and its allies, namely the USA,
Federal Germany and other Western powers, can see that this
assistance (economic, financial and in war material) is
constantly increasing, in the most diverse forms, overt and
convert. By skilfully playing on the contingencies of the cold
war, in particular on the strategic importance of its own
geographical position and that of the Azores islands, by
granting military bases to the USA and Federal Germany, by
flying high the false banner of the defence of Western and
Christian civilisation in Africa. and by further subjecting the
natural resources of the colonies and the Portuguese economy
itself to the big financial monopolies, the Portuguese
government has managed to guarantee for as long as necessary
the assistance which it receives from the Western powers and
from its racist allies in Southern Africa.

It is our duty to stress the international character of the
Portuguese colonial war against Africa and the important. and
even decisive role played by the USA and Federal Germany in
pursuing this war. If the Portuguese government is still
holding out on the three fronts of the war which it is fighting
in Africa, it is because it can count on the overt or covert
support of the USA, freely use NATO weapons, buy B26 aircraft
for the genocide of our people (including from 'private
parties'), and obtain whenever it wishes money. jet aircraft
and weapons of every sort from Federal Germany where,
furthermore, certain war-wounded from the Portuguese colonial
army are hospitalised and treated.

It is our armed liberation struggle which will eliminate
Portuguese colonialism in Africa, and at the same time put an
end to the anti-African complicity of Portugal's allies. This
struggle also offers us the advantage, among others, of getting
to know in a real way who are the friends and who are the
enemies of our people.

Various successes obtained by our delegations at
international conferences, the showing of films made in our
country, both in Africa (Conakry and Dakar) and in Europe, the
growing support which our organisation is finding among the
anti-colonialist forces-all these mark considerable progress in
our action on an international level during the past year. We
also presented to the UN, at the session of the Committee on
Decolonialisation held in Algiers in June, some unusual
evidence of our situation- that of journalists and film-makers
who have visited our country, supported by ample film and
photographic documentation. However, we must continue to use
every possible means of improving our action on the
international level.

8. Perspectives for the struggle

The central perspective for our struggle is the development
and intensification of our fight on its three fundamental
levels: political action, armed action, and national
reconstruction. In order to do this, we must above all:

a) constantly improve and develop political work among the
popular masses and the armed forces, and preserve at all costs
our national unity;

b) further strengthen organisation, discipline and democracy
within our Party, continually adapt it to the evolution of the
struggle, correct mistakes and demand from leaders and
militants rigorous application of the principles guiding our
actions;

c) improve the organisation of the armed forces, intensify
our action on all fronts and develop the co-ordination of our
military activities;

d) increase the isolation of the enemy forces, subject them
to decisive blows and destroy the remnants of tranquillity
which they still enjoy in certain urban centres;

e) defend our liberated areas against the enemy's terrorist
attacks, guarantee for our people the tranquillity which is
indispensable for productive work;

f) study and find the best solutions to the economic,
administrative, social and cultural problems of the liberated
areas, increase industrial production, however rudimentary, and
continually improve health and education facilities;

g) accelerate the training of cadres;

h) fight and eliminate tendencies towards opportunism,
parasitism, arrivism and deviation of our action from the
general line laid down by our Party, at the service of our
people;

i) strengthen and develop our relations with the peoples,
states and organisations of Africa, and tighten the fraternal
links which join us with the neighbouring countries and with
the peoples of the other Portuguese colonies;

j) strengthen our relations of sincere collaboration with
the anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist forces, for useful
cooperation in the common struggle against colonialism,
imperialism and racism.

Within the framework of an armed liberation struggle,
whatever the stage of its evolution, no organisation would be
so imprudent as to fix in advance a date for independence. We
are however convinced that we have covered most of the long
road to freedom and gone through the most difficult stages.
This much depends essentially on us, on the efforts and
sacrifices which we are prepared to make, in the framework of a
multiform and necessarily rational action, which takes into
account our own experience and that of others. The
continuation, the definitive success and the length of our
fight must however depend, to a certain extent, on the concrete
solidarity which Africa and all the anti-colonialist forces
will be able to give to our people.