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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 YAOUNDE 000971
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS PEACE CORPS, USAID
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/2018
TAGS: CMEAIDECONFRKCORMASPGOVPHUMPINRPREL
SUBJECT: RETHINKING OUR APPROACH TO CAMEROON
REF: A. YAOUNDE 724
¶B. YAOUNDE 769
Classified By: Ambassador Janet E. Garvey for reasons 1.4 (d) and (e)
¶1. (C) Summary: Cameroonian President Paul Biya, who
recently celebrated his 27th year in office, has delivered
little in the way of democratization, good governance,
economic reforms, or investments in people - all key USG
goals. The government here values its relationship with the
United States but has not moved substantially in areas that
we care about, with the exception of cooperation on maritime
security. As it heads into a critical pre-election period,
Cameroon has a number of the ingredients of a failing state,
with the potential for conflict that could undermine regional
stability. This calls for an adjustment in our approach,
building on existing tools and Mission Strategic goals but
leaning more on Washington engagement, cooperation with the
French and other allies, and a sharper-edged message. Our
primary goal should be to encourage preparations for a
peaceful transition to a more democratic, better governed
post-Biya period. End summary.
Biya Completes 27 Years
-----------------------
¶2. (C) On November 6, Paul Biya celebrated 27 years as
President of Cameroon; when added to his time as former
President Ahidjo's Prime Minister, Biya has been at the helm
of government for 32 years (since 1977). As detailed ref A,
Cameroon has a number of the elements of a failing state and
Biya had little to trumpet at last week's anniversary. He
marked the occasion with a first-ever letter to the
Cameroonian people in which he extolled Cameroonians to feel
better about themselves but talked only in general terms
about his goals (septel).
¶3. (C) Biya's 27th year in office was not without some
accomplishments. Cameroonian officials frequently argue that
the country's ethnic, linguistic, and regional divisions
require slow movement on many fronts; they highlight
stability and unity as among Biya's biggest achievements.
2009 was a more stable year than riot-torn 2008. Relations
with Nigeria are at a high and Biya is beginning to play a
more statesmanlike role in the Central African region. There
is more security in Bakassi, thanks largely to the Rapid
Intervention Battalion (BIR). Biya urged his Cabinet to
fight inertia and, in a minor Cabinet shuffle in June, he
changed his Prime Minister and ousted his venal Defense
Minister. Since then, the government seems more focused on
moving forward with large infrastructure projects, including
several new roads and the Kribi port. Biya has also
continued with his anti-corruption campaign "Operation
Epervier (Operation Sparrowhawk), arresting a string of
officials on corruption charges.
¶4. (C) On the other hand, Biya enters his 28th year with
diminished legitimacy. His recent letter to the people and
an orchestrated campaign drumbeat from within the ruling
Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (CPDM) party are strong
signals that Biya will run again in the scheduled 2011
presidential election. Biya seems increasingly isolated and
has fended off criticism of the fact that he spends
significant time overseas, including on expensive vacations.
His 2008 decision to pack the new Electoral Commission
(ELECAM) with senior party stalwarts undermined democratic
development and raises a big question mark about the
legitimacy of the upcoming election. Economic forecasts
continue to be gloomy, with GDP growth predictions for 2009
of about 2% (below 3% population growth), although senior
officials hope that a global economic pickup and new
infrastructure investments will spur more buoyant growth by
the third quarter of 2010. The government has made little
progress on governance and its 2009 Millennium Challenge
Corporation scorecard reads about the same as last year -
that is to say, Cameroon fails on 13 of 17 MCC indicators.
The U.S. A Valued Partner
-------------------------
¶5. (C) The United States celebrated 50 years of diplomatic
relations with Cameroon in 2007. Cameroonians admire the
U.S. and the government values its relationship with the
United States, especially our military-military cooperation,
and sees us as a counterbalance to France and China.
President Biya met President Bush at the White House in 2003
and supported us on the Iraq war when Cameroon was a Security
Council member. The GRC greatly appreciates our support for
the Greentree process which led to the handover of the
YAOUNDE 00000971 002 OF 005
Bakassi Peninsula from Nigeria - perhaps Biya's biggest
perceived success in recent years.
¶6. (SBU) Over the past month, the Foreign Ministry has
stepped up overtures to us, seeking a regular bilateral
dialogue and supporting us with an abstention in the
Goldstone Report. The Director for North America at the
Foreign Ministry recently reassured Pol/Econ Chief that "You
are one of our top partners - if you don't know it, you
should." The GRC has repeatedly hinted at a desire for
senior USG visitors (top of their wish list, not
surprisingly, is a POTUS visit).
Active Broad-Gauge Engagement
-----------------------------
¶7. (SBU) Our top Mission Strategic Plan priorities are: to
strengthen democracy and good governance; to foster economic
prosperity and development; to collaborate on security and
international issues; and to invest in people. Within these
goals, our main activities are:
-- Democracy Building: We deploy a wide range of activities
to encourage democratic development, including a broad array
of Public Diplomacy programs. We were the most outspoken
foreign mission in opposing the 2008 constitutional change to
eliminate presidential term limits and the subsequent
creation of ELECAM. The Ambassador and her predecessor have
been at the forefront of diplomats in speaking out against
corruption and electoral fraud. In the past year, we
sponsored a Human Rights Day roundtable and a series of
democracy showcase events, and organized programs to
highlight the 2008 U.S. presidential election. We engage the
government actively on anti-corruption efforts, including
helping identify overseas deposits of ill-gotten money.
-- Economic Advocacy: We regularly engage the government on
investment climate and budget transparency issues. We
actively support U.S. companies and EXIM Bank, OPIC, USDA,
and the US Trade Development Agency, which are all engaged
here. The U.S. is Cameroon's largest foreign investor (in
terms of dollars) and one of its largest trading partners.
Cameroonian exports to the U.S. doubled between 2007 and
2008, to $614 million.
-- Mil-Mil Engagement: One of the strongest components of
our bilateral relationship is our military-military
relationship. This includes various ongoing FMF cases valued
at about $1 million, humanitarian assistance, and
increasingly strong engagement on maritime security,
especially with the Rapid Intervention Battalion (BIR). For
the past year, Cameroon has offered to deploy up to 800
troops for UN/AU peacekeeping mission in Darfur.
-- Investing in People: We have one of the largest and
oldest Peace Corps programs in the world (currently with
about 125 Volunteers), focused on education, health and small
business development. The Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention in Cameroon has been active in countering
HIV/AIDS. Other bilateral assistance totaling about $30
million, in single and multi-year funds, includes the US
Department of Agriculture's Food for Progress programs
(focused on food security), and small funds to support
refugees, democracy and human rights, Self Help projects, and
environmental activities. USAID closed its office in
Cameroon in 1994 (largely a reaction to the stolen 1992
election) but retains about $1.5 million in programming here,
primarily focused on the health sector, and managed out of
its regional office in Accra. Public diplomacy is a major
tool for the mission to promote development assistance and
new partnerships.
What Have We Gotten For It?
---------------------------
¶8. (C) We have had years of polite conversations with the
GRC and attestations of friendship. In return, we have
gotten a certain degree of cooperation on many fronts and a
certain level of reciprocated good will. However, it is
difficult to say we have substantially moved the ball on the
things that matter most to us. Our public statements on
elections, amending the constitution, corruption and ELECAM
gained us popular support but did not visibly impact GRC
decision-making. Biya has done little to open up his
authoritarian regime or smooth the way for a post-Biya
democratic transition. While the media has become freer in
the past decade and there is a high level of religious
freedom, Cameroon has never had a free and fair election, its
democratic institutions (parliament, judiciary, electoral
YAOUNDE 00000971 003 OF 005
commission etc.) are politically controlled from the center,
and opposition and civil society elements have been weakened
and co-opted.
¶9. (SBU) Cameroon does poorly on scorecards from the World
Bank, Freedom House, Transparency International and other
organizations, with rankings steadily slipping. Its economy
is limping along, with little industry, little agricultural
diversification, and little economic vision. Many social
indicators have worsened. Corruption is endemic and
government decision-making is sclerotic. Cameroon has
supported us on some UN and other international issues, but
it tends to abstain on UN votes important to us, with a 22%
voting coincidence with the United States on overall votes
and 0% on important votes in 2008, according to the
Department's "Voting Practices in the United Nations" report.
¶10. (C) As detailed in ref A, Cameroon's drift threatens
its longer term stability and our national interests here -
within Cameroon but also within the region. Cameroon's
Douala port, road connections, oil refinery (which produces
almost all of Cameroon and Chad's refined petroleum), $4.5
billion Chad-Cameroon oil pipeline, abundant agricultural
production, and large economy (the largest GDP in Central
Africa) are critical to the economic health of its neighbors.
As the longest serving leader in the region, Biya has some
influence over neighboring heads of state, although he has
traditionally shied away from regional activism. We have a
regional strategic interest in strengthening Cameroon's
longer term stability - which requires us to adjust our
engagement.
Our Seven-Point Approach
------------------------
¶11. (C) It is time, we believe, to be more direct with Biya
and the GRC. We outline the following seven-point approach:
-- Get Senior Washington Engagement: We believe senior
Washington engagement (preferably Assistant Secretary level
or higher) with Biya and senior GRC officials could be
productive. Such discussions should note our growing
frustration with developments in Cameroon, highlighting the
need to improve governance, ensure greater legitimacy for
ELECAM, hold free and fair elections in 2011, and prepare for
transition to a post-Biya period. We should tell the
government privately that we can only support them as
friendly partners up to a point -- we cannot sacrifice our
support of fundamental U.S. principles in the process. We
will tell them we want to be on the right side of history,
and that increasingly, the current regime appears to be on
the wrong side.
-- Engage with a Sharper Edge: We will seek renewed
opportunities to highlight our Self Help programs, Peace
Corps and other activities, framing them in terms of our
support for the Cameroonian people. We will continue to put
our mil-mil activities in the context of regional security
and the interests of the Cameroonian people. At the same
time, however, in line with senior Washington engagement, we
will stress to the GRC privately and in public forums our
desire to see the current paradigm in Cameroon change. We
will explain to the GRC our internal tripwires, including
tripwires we will develop for responding to political and
security developments, and how the unfolding events of the
next few years could impact our relationship. At the same
time, we should continue to reinforce our message that
Cameroonians need to take more responsibility for their own
future.
-- Develop Political Tripwires: As noted above, we plan to
map out a series of political and security tripwires to guide
our more sharply focused engagement over the coming few
years. Key markers will be whether ELECAM becomes a more
credible electoral institution by mid-2010; whether the GRC
publishes its 2005 census; whether the human rights and media
freedom situations change significantly; whether there is
progress in fighting corruption (including implementation of
Article 66 of the constitution which requires government
officials to disclose their personal assets); whether the
security forces are deployed to suppress dissent; whether the
President creates a Senate, as required by the constitution;
and - looking down the road - whether the 2011 election is
free and fair.
-- Work More Closely with Allies: The "8 6" group of
like-minded Ambassadors is a useful forum for coordination on
the ground. The outgoing European Union Ambassador this week
YAOUNDE 00000971 004 OF 005
publicly blasted Cameroon for its poor record on democracy
and governance. We have sensed, however, a greater
reluctance on the part of some partners like the British and
Dutch - who have been outspoken and activist in the past - to
hold Cameroon to a high standard of governance and speak out
about problems. We will work to mobilize a more united
multinational approach to Cameroon. Per ref B, France has
considerable influence with the Biya regime but has been
reluctant to criticize the regime. We would encourage an
effort in Washington and Paris to convince France to
cooperate with us more closely on anti-corruption and
democracy promotion in a country like Cameroon, where
France's long term interests may be jeopardized by the
animosity generated by closely aligning with a regime like
Biya's.
-- Strengthen our Assistance Tools: Our assistance efforts
are piecemeal and have little visibility. Post has put
together an assistance matrix to better track the various
pots of USG funding here but our ability to leverage these
into influence is hampered by a systemic lack of coordination
and staffing. A Foreign Ministry contact recently complained
to Pol/Econ Chief "you never ask us what we want, you just
offer us things." He has a point. Our overall assistance
engagement process- from DOD, USDA, USAID, Peace Corps, Fish
and Wildlife Service, and others - insufficiently consults
post and the GRC on priorities and design. From post's
vantage point, the MSP and F processes have not brought about
this discipline, limiting our ability to use our resources,
even in countries like Cameroon where the funding levels are
modest. Part of the problem is staffing. We manage a large
USDA program with no USDA staff. DAO manages sizable
humanitarian assistance without adequate staff to track it.
We have not seen the USAID regional model work well,
especially since there is no USAID Central Africa.
-- Innovate On Other Tools: Post has used the 212 (f) visa
ineligibility as a powerful way to impact efforts to combat
corruption. We would welcome other visa tools - such as
ineligibilities for electoral fraud and Internet scammers -
to reinforce our core interests. We would also like to see
new ideas on supporting AGOA. Cameroon is a major economy
with some sophisticated exporters eager to take more
advantage of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).
Yet we seem to have the same discussions every year with the
GRC and private sector about the country's inability to
effectively take advantage of AGOA. We hope to establish a
USAID-supported AGOA Resource Center in Cameroon and will
look for ways this Center can engage creatively to boost
AGOA. In other areas where we support and engage the GRC -
such as health, agriculture, and security - we should focus
our efforts on good governance. So much of progress in these
areas depends on the governance component. We also see scope
to get more demanding on GRC responsiveness to USG training
opportunities. The USG offers free security training under
ILEA and a range of military offerings, free US Patent and
Trademark training, free training trips to strengthen
fisheries and anti-corruption efforts, and other training
options that support mutual goals. Yet we have great
difficulty getting the GRC to provide the required clearances
and names. We plan to demarche the government at senior
levels about this difficulty in getting cooperation for
training and then start denying training options that become
too difficult to implement.
-- Add a Political Officer: For the past two MSPs, post has
requested the return of a political officer position. This
position remains key to our ability to effectively implement
the above goals. An additional political officer would help
our Pol/Econ section strengthen assistance coordination,
engage more actively with allies, boost Public Diplomacy and
interventions focused on democracy and good governance,
better engage civil society and political parties, and
increase reporting during the run-up to elections and an
eventual post-Biya period.
Comment
-------
¶12. (C) We have a limited ability to impact developments in
Cameroon. Biya is set in his ways after almost three decades
as president. He and his entourage are polite listeners but
are fundamentally conservative and preservationist.
Nonetheless, the approach outlined above is, in our view, our
best road map for impacting the critical next few years for
Cameroon. Biya will listen to us more if Washington engages
(through phone calls, meetings, visits etc.) at a senior
level, especially if in tandem with France. He wants
international legitimacy, especially from our two countries.
YAOUNDE 00000971 005 OF 005
A more bold and at times confrontational style could
undermine GRC good will to some degree. However,
Cameroonians have become used to our forward leaning, at
times outspoken, diplomacy and will adjust to a tougher
approach on some issues which, if carefully managed, will
better serve our interests here.
GARVEY