Battle for the Punchbowl: The U. S. 1st Marine Division 1951 Fall Offensive of the Korean War

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have acquired a lot of experience. My recent action, as you know, has been farfrom hasty [in regards to pushing the issue of inadequate CAS with the FAF (FifthAir Force) and EUSAK (Eighth U. S. Army in Korea) and CINCFEC (Commanderin Chief Far East Command)] . . . I know what I am talking about when I say thata great percentage of those casualties could have been saved by adequate andtimely close air support.26The effects of artillery compared to CAS were further obviated by the fact thatthere was usually a pattern to it. "Enemy prisoners indicated that they had been able tomarch into attack positions through artillery fire simply by studying its pattern." Anairstrike was not predictable if done right and quickly, and napalm covered a wideenough area in its blast that no troops could plot any avoidable pattern.27Centralization on the highest level and decentralization at any lower level (downto the battalion) (centralized command of CAS, and coordination was at the battalionlevel with the Marines, as opposed to division or even corps level in the Army, so eventhough command of an air strike was under a single officer of the battalion Tactical AirControl Party, there was decentralization in that units as low as the battalion could makethese decisions instead of only one single operations center for an entire corps or armylike the JOC of the Air Force). This meant that Marine CAS would be provided byMarine "planes under the direct control of the ground commander which could not bediverted to other employment by a higher echelon." In other words, "Over-all control ofaircraft is highly centralized, but control of aircraft employed on close support missionsis decentralized to the maximum extent." So while the TACC (Tactical Air ControlCenter - the highest echelon of tactical air control) would be in control of all tacticalsupport aircraft in general, the ground commander requesting an air strike would be in26 Letter to CG Fleet Marine Force Pacific, Lt. Gen. Lemuel C. Shepherd, from CG 1MarDiv, Maj. Gen.Gerald C. Thomas, undated, page, 3.27 Headquarters, Eighth U. S. Army Korea, "Enemy Tactics," 17.