Parents continued to have disagreements about parenting and parenting time
up through the time of the hearing, as evidenced by, for example, an email exchange in
which mother asked father to see that S completed his homework during his weekend
visit with father, and father's email response: "Shut up! I'm done with you and your
bullshit. Contact me if the boy's [sic] are hurt, otherwize [sic] stuff the rest in your ass!"
During that time, T became more and more reluctant to go to father's house for scheduled
parenting time.

In late 2005, at Bell's request, both parents underwent psychological
evaluations. Although the psychological reports went into detail about each parent's
strengths and weaknesses, they did not indicate that either parent had major psychological
issues that would call into question either's ability to parent.

Shortly thereafter, Dr. Lorah Sebastian performed a psychological
evaluation of T. That evaluation revealed that T had been cutting himself in the previous
year because the pain took his mind off other things. T had also burned his arms in the
fall of 2005. He acknowledged to Sebastian that he had set fires and made bombs when
he was younger, and that, several years earlier, he and a friend had stuck a pencil into a
cat's anus--conduct he described as "amusing."

Sebastian found that T was bright and articulate, but that he had low self-esteem and, without treatment, his antisocial and self-abusive behaviors could escalate.
She diagnosed T with cannabis dependence in early partial remission, as well as an
adjustment disorder with mixed emotional features including anxiety and depression.

Sebastian, as well as Bell, strongly recommended that T receive individual
counseling with a specific counselor and, preferably, that he participate in an adolescent
dialectical behavioral therapy (DBT) program, designed to address the type of behaviors
he had exhibited. Sebastian testified:

"[T is] basically what I would say kind of standing on the edge of a
diving board with no water in the pool. He needs some help with regard to
direction. He's had some issues with drug involvement that, you know,
could recur or could not recur. But he doesn't appear to have any structure
about how to deal with the kinds of issues that he has, and that's what DBT
will teach, given him some--teach him some tools and skills, and then also
give him some treatment for some sort of direction and goal in his life. It's
a very kind of goal-oriented treatment."

The DBT program recommended by Sebastian is available only in Portland. The
counselor whom Sebastian and Bell recommended was not covered by mother's
insurance; consequently, at the time of the hearing, mother was attempting to find a
therapist for T that met with Sebastian's and Bell's approval and was covered by her
insurance.

Bell testified at the hearing that she was extremely concerned about T's
mental health and was not impressed with either parent's ability to get him help. She
indicated that she did not think that either parent had taken his problems very seriously at
first--but also rejected the suggestion that the problems were simply a result of his being
in mother's custody. Bell attributed some of the children's recent problems to their stress
over the custody dispute and their parents' ongoing disputes.

Ultimately, Bell recommended that mother retain custody of the children.
She based that recommendation on mother's status as the primary caretaker, the children's
expressed desires, and the desirability of keeping them in their schools, near their friends,
and in a metropolitan area where services are readily available. Bell observed that a
change to father's custody would involve the children losing their primary parent, a move
to an isolated area, a change of schools, and the loss of their friends. She further
observed that, in her experience, given the children's ages and their desires to remain with
mother, it was unlikely that a change of custody would be successful.

The trial court granted the change of custody. In her oral ruling, the judge
expressed profound concerns about both children's behavioral issues and about T's mental
health in particular. The court described the testimony as disclosing "some of the most
disturbing information that I've heard about kids in a long time, maybe ever" and
repeatedly characterized the circumstances as "traumatic," "frightening," and "drastic":
"The situation is drastic enough that it seems to me a drastic remedy is what needs to be
done at this point."

The trial court further noted that both parents' unwillingness to work
together to meet the children's needs was of great concern. Ultimately, the court
concluded that, because mother had had custody of the children, it was her responsibility
to ensure that the children received the help that they needed--and that she had failed in
that regard. The court emphasized that it was granting the change of custody,
notwithstanding Bell's recommendation and the children's expressed preference, because
of the children's needs "for structure, for treatment, for discipline, for somebody really
paying attention," and admonished father:

"I'm going to take you at your word because you haven't had a
chance yet, and something dramatically different has to happen here or Dr.
Sebastian's predictions will come true."

Mother notes that the "change of circumstances" inquiry is not merely
whether any change of circumstances has occurred--but, instead, whether a change has
occurred "that relates to the capability of one or both parents to care for the child." State
ex rel Johnson v. Bail, 325 Or 392, 398, 938 P2d 209 (1997) (emphasis added). In
particular, mother posits, where the allegation is that a parent is not providing adequate
care and supervision, "these events must be of such a nature or number that reflect a
course of conduct or pattern of inadequate care which has had or threatens to have a
discernable adverse effect upon the child." Collins and Collins, 183 Or App 354, 358, 51
P3d 691 (2002) (quoting Niedert and Niedert, 28 Or App 309, 314, 559 P2d 515, rev den,
277 Or 237 (1977)). Mother asserts that the record demonstrates that she neither caused
the children's problems nor failed to address them as they arose--and, thus, that father
failed to show the requisite change in circumstances.

Father responds that he adequately demonstrated, and the trial court
properly found, that mother is incapable of appropriately parenting the children, which
constitutes a change of circumstance. In that regard, he specifically asserts that mother,
as the custodial parent, failed in her responsibility to provide adequate structure,
discipline, therapy, and medical intervention for the children.

We reject at the outset the idea that anything in the record indicates that
mother's own lifestyle or circumstances have altered in any way that is significant. That
is, the record does not reflect that mother has decreased the amount of supervision she
provides the children, that she has altered their living arrangements in any way that is
detrimental to the children, or that she has experienced significant mental, physical, or
emotional problems that have affected her ability to parent. See, e.g., May and May, 136
Or App 481, 484, 901 P2d 938 (1995) (mother's extreme intoxication, leaving five-year-old child unattended in home, failing to provide child with clean clothes, regular meals
and baths, and requiring child to live in squalid and unsanitary conditions constituted a
course of conduct or pattern of inadequate care justifying change of custody). Rather,
father's emphasis is on two other considerations, viz., that, as the trial court determined,
mother "has not apparently been able to handle parenting these kids with the difficulties
that they present, and there has been an absolute inability to work with the kids' father to
help the kids."

As the trial court understood, a custodial parent's unreasonable failure to
communicate with a noncustodial parent about substantial matters pertaining to the
children can constitute a material change of circumstances. "A component of the capacity
of a custodial parent to take care of a child properly is the promotion by the custodial
parent of a healthy relationship between the children and the noncustodial parent. Thus,
depending on the facts of a particular case, anger, hostility, and interference with a
noncustodial parent's parenting time may constitute a substantial change of circumstances
for purposes of a change of custody." Garrett, 210 Or App at 673.

Here, however, the lack of communication was hardly unilateral--and,
indeed, was not primarily attributable to mother. On de novo review, the record reflects
the unfortunate fact that neither parent was communicating important information about
the children to the other parent in a satisfactory manner. For example, mother did not
learn about the incidents of T's animal abuse that father witnessed until shortly before the
hearing, nor was she aware of S's "Dear Santa" letter until that time. Moreover, she
learned from another parent--and not from father--that father had caught T smoking
marijuana. Conversely, mother did not reveal directly to father what she had learned
about T's "huffing"; nor did she disclose to father before the hearing that she had arranged
for S to see a counselor.

The record also reveals that parents squabbled almost incessantly about the
details of parenting time. However, on this record, it appears that father's communication
and behavior in that respect were at least marginally worse than mother's behavior. For
example, there is evidence that father on several occasions did not pick up or drop off the
children at the arranged times and failed to inform mother of his change of plans. On one
of those occasions, the younger child was left unsupervised for some time because mother
was not at home when father dropped him off.

Mother testified that, when she tried to talk to father, "he hangs up on me.
He's belligerent to me. He's mean to me. He laughs at me. And he says, 'I don't want to
hear it.'" Father acknowledged at the hearing that he had a problem with speaking with
mother on the phone and had, consequently, instructed her that she needed to
communicate with him by e-mail. However, as noted above, see ___ Or App at ___ (slip
op at 5), even father's e-mail communication was, at least on occasion, hostile, bullying,
and crude. By the time of the hearing, mother had concluded that "it was safer to
communicate through the attorneys."

The circumstances here are notably distinguishable from those in Garrett,
where the trial court changed custody from the father to the mother, and we affirmed.
There, as here, communication between the parents had broken down "and conflicts arose
over parenting schedules, transportation of the children, trade-off times, child support,
medical costs, and other issues." 210 Or App at 672. In that case, the father, the custodial
parent, was "verbally abusive when they talked on the phone or exchanged the children."
Id. Moreover, the father screamed at and threatened the mother on the phone, engaged in
a physical altercation during which the police were called, and exhibited hostility to police
officers in the children's presence. Id. at 672-73. In that case, we concluded that "the
escalation of father's anger in his dealings with mother constitutes a substantial change of
circumstances that warrants a determination about whether the best interests of the
children require a change of custody of the daughter." Id. at 674.

Here, in contrast, the amount of hostility exhibited by both parents has
remained unfortunately consistent for years. Further, in this case, it is father, the
noncustodial parent, who has exhibited the greater degree of hostility. Indeed, and
consistently, Bell reported that the children had been exposed to more negative comments
about mother in father's home than vice versa. In sum, although it is clear that the parents'
ongoing hostility to each other continues to injure their children, this is not a situation in
which mother's interactions (or lack thereof) with father are so extreme as to represent a
change of circumstance in her ability to parent.

The trial court's other overarching concern was that mother "has not
apparently been able to handle parenting these kids with the difficulties that they present."
The trial court indicated that mother, as the custodial parent, was the one whose
responsibility it was to get help for the children, and that she had failed to do so. See ___
Or App ___ (slip op at 7). On de novo review, we again disagree.

We begin with S. The record reflects that S has had academic--and, to a
lesser extent, behavioral--issues at school. But the record also shows that mother was
aware of the situation and had been in contact with the school to address those issues.
The record further shows that mother helps S with his homework and has encouraged
father to do so as well--albeit apparently unsuccessfully. Finally, after mother learned of
S's "Dear Santa" letter, she promptly arranged for him to see a counselor. The trial court
chided mother for arranging that counseling without consulting father, but, on review, we
conclude that mother's decision to handle communication with father through her attorney
at that point, two weeks before the hearing, was not unreasonable.

Bell also indicated that both parents underestimated, or downplayed, T's
problems to some extent--but she further believed that, by the time of the hearing, both
had a better understanding of his problems. We do not view mother's failure to
understand the extent of T's problems as "reflect[ing] a course of conduct or pattern of
inadequate care which has had or threatens to have a discernable adverse effect upon the
child." Collins, 183 Or App at 358. The record indicates that a number of T's most
troubling behaviors occurred when he was with father--such as the incidents of animal
abuse that father witnessed and the marijuana incident--and that much of T's self-mutilation behavior occurred when he was with father as well. In light of the fact that
father did not share that information with mother, her ignorance of the extent of the
problems does not demonstrate inadequate care on her part.

In sum, this is not a case that involves "inadequate care," as that term is
commonly used. That is, the record shows that mother takes the children to school, has
adjusted her work schedule so that she can supervise the children after school, provides
them dinner, helps them with homework, checks with their friends' parents regularly,
communicates with their schools, and has arranged therapy for them. Despite receiving
such care and supervision, T has behavioral and mental health problems, and S has
academic problems and, to a lesser extent, some behavioral issues as well. Despite
receiving such supervision, the children, particularly T, have engaged in seriously
concerning behaviors--and done so, at least in part, on mother's "watch."

It is, indeed, tempting, when faced with adolescents whose lives are--or
may soon be--spiraling, to reach for a "drastic" remedy. But, putting aside whether there
is any reasonable prospect that the children would, in fact, fare better with father, we are
unpersuaded that mother's efforts to monitor and address the children's needs and
problems have been so deficient as to constitute the requisite change of circumstances.
There are, we appreciate, circumstances in which, notwithstanding a custodial parent's
best and most careful and loving efforts, an adolescent child will engage and persist in
profoundly disturbing, even self-destructive, behaviors. Ultimately, however, it is not the
child's conduct--but, instead, the custodial parent's effort--that determines whether the
parent has engaged in a "course of conduct or pattern of inadequate care." Collins, 183
Or App at 358.

Here, the record does not establish that mother's response to the children's
circumstances was so deficient as to represent a "course of conduct or pattern of
inadequate care." Id. Consequently, father failed to show the requisite change of
circumstances relating to mother's "capability * * * to care for the child[ren]." Bail, 325
Or at 398.

Reversed.

1. S had historically been a C student, and that did not change significantly.

4. Bell further indicated that, although that therapist had done a drug assessment of
T, Bell did not believe that he was qualified to do so. The record, however, contains no
information as to that therapist's credentials or, in fact, any information about the results of his
drug assessment of T.