WASHINGTON, Sept. 22 -- On July 25,President
Saddam Hussein of Iraq summoned the United States Ambassador to Baghdad, April Glaspie, to
his office in the last high-level contact between the two Governments before the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait on Aug. 2. Here are excerpts from a document described by Iraqi
Government officials as a transcript of the meeting, which also included the Iraqi Foreign
Minister, Tariq Aziz. A copy was provided to The New York Times by ABC News, which
translated from the Arabic. The State Department has declined to comment on its accuracy.

SADDAM HUSSEIN: I have summoned you
today to hold comprehensive political discussions with you. This is a message to President
Bush. You know that we did not have relations with the U.S. until 1984 and you know the
circumstances and reasons which caused them to be severed. The decision to establish
relations with the U.S. were taken in 1980 during the two months prior to the war between
us and Iran.

When the war started, and to avoid misinterpretation,
we postponed the establishment of relations hoping that the war would end soon.

But because the war lasted for a long time, and to
emphasize the fact that we are a non-aligned country, it was important to re-establish
relations with the U.S. And we choose to do this in 1984.

It is natural to say that the U.S. is not like
Britain, for example, with the latter's historic relations with Middle Eastern countries,
including Iraq. In addition, there were no relations between Iraq and the U.S. between
1967 and 1984. One can conclude it would be difficult for the U.S. to have a full
understanding of many matters in Iraq. When relations were re-established we hoped for a
better understanding and for better cooperation because we too do not understand the
background of many American decisions. We dealt with each other during the war and we had
dealings on various levels. The most important of those levels were with the foreign
ministers.

U.S.-Iraq Rifts

We had hoped for a better common understanding and a
better chance of cooperation to benefit both our peoples and the rest of the Arab nations.

But these better relations have suffered from various
rifts. The worst of these was in 1986, only two years after establishing relations, with
what was known as Irangate, which happened during the year that Iran occupied the Fao
peninsula.

It was natural then to say that old relations and
complexity of interests could absorb many mistakes. But when interests are limited and
relations are not that old, then there isn't a deep understanding and mistakes could have
a negative effect. Sometimes the effect of an error can be larger than the error itself.

Despite all of that, we accepted the apology, via his
envoy, of the American President regarding Irangate, and we wiped the slate clean. And we
shouldn't unearth the past except when new events remind us that old mistakes were not
just a matter of coincidence.

Our suspicions increased after we liberated the Fao
peninsula. The media began to involve itself in our politics. And our suspicions began to
surface anew, because we began to question whether the U.S. felt uneasy with the outcome
of the war when we liberated our land.

It was clear to us that certain parties in the United
States -- and I don't say the President himself -- but certain parties who had links with
the intelligence community and with the State Department -- and I don't say the Secretary
of State himself -- I say that these parties did not like the fact that we liberated our
land. Some parties began to prepare studies entitles: "Who will succeed Saddam
Hussein?" They began to contact gulf states to make them fear Iraq, to persuade them
not to give Iraq economic aid. And we have evidence of these activities.

Iraqi Policy on Oil

Iraq came out of the war burdened with $40 billion
debts, excluding the aid given by Arab states, some of whom consider that too to be a debt
although they knew -- and you knew too -- that without Iraq they would not have had these
sums and the future of the region would have been entirely different.

We began to face the policy of the drop in the price
of oil. Then we saw the United States, which always talks of democracy but which has no
time for the other point of view. Then the media campaign against Saddam Hussein was
started by the official American media. The United States thought that the situation in
Iraq was like Poland, Romania or Czechoslovakia. We were disturbed by this campaign but we
were not disturbed too much because we had hoped that, in a few months, those who are
decision makers in America would have a chance to find the facts and see whether this
media campaign had had any effect on the lives of Iraqis. We had hoped that soon the
American authorities would make the correct decision regarding their relations with Iraq.
Those with good relations can sometimes afford to disagree.

But when planned and deliberate policy forces the
price of oil down without good commercial reasons, then that means another war against
Iraq. Because military war kills people by bleeding them, and economic war kills their
humanity by depriving them of their chance to have a good standard of living. As you know,
we gave rivers of blood in a war that lasted eight years, but we did not lose our
humanity. Iraqis have a right to live proudly. We do not accept that anyone could injure
Iraqi pride or the Iraqi right to have high standards of living.

Kuwait and the U.A.E. were at the front of this
policy aimed at lowering Iraq's position and depriving its people of higher economic
standards. And you know that our relations with the Emirates and Kuwait had been good. On
top of all that, while we were busy at war, the state of Kuwait began to expand at the
expense of our territory.

You may say this is propaganda, but I would direct
you to one document, the Military Patrol Line, which is the borderline endorsed by the
Arab League in 1961 for military patrols not to cross the Iraq-Kuwait border.

But go and look for yourselves. You will see the
Kuwaiti border patrols, the Kuwaiti farms, the Kuwaiti oil installations -- all built as
closely as possible to this line to establish that land as Kuwaiti territory.

Conflicting Interests

Since then, the Kuwaiti Government has been stable
while the Iraqi Government has undergone many changes. Even after 1968 and for 10 years
afterwards, we were too busy with our own problems. First in the north then the 1973 war,
and other problems. Then came the war with Iran which started 10 years ago.

We believe that the United States must understand
that people who live in luxury and economic security can each an understanding with the
United States on what are legitimate joint interests. But the starved and the economically
deprived cannot reach the same understanding.

We do not accept threats from anyone because we do
not threaten anyone. But we say clearly that we hope that the U.S. will not entertain too
many illusions and will seek new friends rather than increase the number of its enemies.

I have read the American statements speaking of
friends in the area. Of course, it is the right of everyone to choose their friends. We
can have no objections. But you know you are not the ones who protected your friends
during the war with Iran. I assure you, had the Iranians overrun the region, the American
troops would not have stopped them, except by the use of nuclear weapons.

I do not belittle you. But I hold this view by
looking at the geography and nature of American society into account. Yours is a society
which cannot accept 10,000 dead in one battle.

You know that Iran agreed to the cease-fire not
because the United States had bombed one of the oil platforms after the liberation of the
Fao. Is this Iraq's reward for its role in securing the stability of the region and for
protecting it from an unknown flood?

Protecting the Oil Flow

So what can it mean when America says it will now
protect its friends? It can only mean prejudice against Iraq. This stance plus maneuvers
and statements which have been made has encouraged the U.A.E. and Kuwait to disregard
Iraqi rights.

I say to you clearly that Iraq's rights, which are
mentioned in the memorandum, we will take one by one. That might not happen now or after a
month or after one year, but we will take it all. We are not the kind of people who will
relinquish their rights. There is no historic right, or legitimacy, or need, for the
U.A.E. and Kuwait to deprive us of our rights. If they are needy, we too are needy.

The United States must have a better understanding of
the situation and declare who it wants to have relations with and who its enemies are. But
it should not make enemies simply because others have different points of view regarding
the Arab-Israeli conflict.

We clearly understand America's statement that it
wants an easy flow of oil. We understanding American staying that it seeks friendship with
the states in the region, and to encourage their joint interests. But we cannot understand
the attempt to encourage some parties to hard Iraq's interests.

The United States wants to secure the flow of oil.
This understandable and known. But it must not deploy methods which the United States says
it disapproves of -- flexing muscles and pressure.

If you use pressure, we will deploy pressure and
force. We know that you can harm us although we do not threaten you. But we too can harm
you. Everyone can cause harm according to their ability and their size. We cannot come all
the way to you in the United States, but individual Arabs may reach you.

War and Friendship

You can come to Iraq with aircraft and missiles but
do not push us to the point where we cease to care. And when we feel that you want to
injure our pride and take away the Iraqis' chance of a high standard of living, then we
will cease to care and death will be the choice for us. Then we would not care if you
fired 100missiles for each missile we fired. Because without pride life would have no
value.

It is not reasonable to ask our people to bleed
rivers of blood for eight years then to tell them, "Now you have to accept aggression
from Kuwait, the U.A.E., or from the U.S. or from Israel."

We do not put all these countries in the same boat.
First, we are hurt and upset that such disagreement is taking place between us and Kuwait
and the U.A.E. The solution must be found within an Arab framework and through direct
bilateral relations. We do not place America among the enemies. We pace it where we want
our friends to be and we try to be friends. But repeated American statements last year
make it apparent that America did not regard us as friends. Well the Americans are free.

When we seek friendship we want pride, liberty and
our right to choose.

We want to deal according to our status as we deal
with the others according to their statuses.

We consider the others' interests while we look after
our own. And we expect the others to consider our interests while they are dealing with
their own. What does it mean when the Zionist war minister is summoned to the United
States now? What do they mean, these fiery statements coming out of Israel during the past
few days and the talk of war being expected now more than at any other time?

* * *

I do not believe that anyone would lose by making
friends with Iraq. In my opinion, the American President has not made mistakes regarding
the Arabs, although his decision to freeze dialogue with the P.L.O. was wrong. But it
appears that this decision was made to appease the Zionist lobby or as a piece of strategy
to cool the Zionist anger, before trying again. I hope that our latter conclusion is the
correct one. But we will carry on saying it was the wrong decision.

You are appeasing the usurper in so many ways --
economically, politically and militarily as well as in the media. When will the time come
when, for every three appeasements to the usurper, you praise the Arabs just once?

APRIL GLASPIE: I thank you, Mr. President, and
it is a great pleasure for a diplomat to meet and talk directly with the President. I
clearly understand your message. We studied history at school That taught us to say
freedom or death. I think you know well that we as a people have our experience with the
colonialists.

Mr. President, you mentioned many things during this
meeting which I cannot comment on on behalf of my Government. But with your permission, I
will comment on two points. You spoke of friendship and I believe it was clear from the
letters sent by our President to you on the occasion of your National Day that he
emphasizes --

HUSSEIN: He was kind and his expressions met
with our regard and respect.

Directive on Relations

GLASPIE: As you know, he directed the United
States Administration to reject the suggestion of implementing trade sanctions.

HUSSEIN: There is nothing left for us to buy
from America. Only wheat. Because every time we want to buy something, they say it is
forbidden. I am afraid that one day you will say, "You are going to make gunpowder
out of wheat."

GLASPIE: I have a direct instruction
from the President to seek better relations with Iraq.

HUSSEIN: But how? We too have this desire. But
matters are running contrary to this desire.

GLASPIE: This is less likely to happen the
more we talk. For example, you mentioned the issue of the article published by the
American Information Agency and that was sad. And a formal apology was presented.

HUSSEIN: Your stance is generous. We are
Arabs. It is enough for us that someone says, "I am sorry. I made a mistake."
Then we carry on. But the media campaign continued. And it is full of stories. If the
stories were true, no one would get upset. But we understand from its continuation that
there is a determination.

GLASPIE: I saw the Diane Sawyer program on
ABC. And what happened in that program was cheap and unjust. And this is a real picture of
what happens in the American media -- even to American politicians themselves. These are
the methods the Western media employs. I am pleased that you add your voice to the
diplomats who stand up to the media. Because your appearance in the media, even for five
minutes, would help us to make the American people understand Iraq. This would increase
mutual understanding. If they American President had control of the media, his job would
be much easier.

Mr. President, not only do I want to say that
President Bush wanted better and deeper relations with Iraq, but he also wants an Iraqi
contribution to peace and prosperity in the Middle East. President Bush is an intelligent
man. He is not going to declare an economic war against Iraq.

You are right. It is true what you say that we do not
want higher prices for oil. But I would ask you to examine the possibility of not charging
too high a price for oil.

HUSSEIN: We do not want too high prices
for oil. And I remind you that in 1974 I gave Tariq Aziz the idea for an article he wrote
which criticized the policy of keeping oil prices high. It was the first Arab article
which expressed this view.

Shifting Price of Oil

TARIQ AZIZ: Our policy in OPEC opposes sudden
jumps in oil prices.

HUSSEIN:Twenty-five dollars a barrel is not a high price.

GLASPIE: We have many Americans who
would like to see the price go above $25 because they come from oil-producing states.

HUSSEIN: The price at one stage had dropped to
$12 a barrel and a reduction in the modest Iraqi budget of $6 billion to $7 billion is a
disaster.

GLASPIE: I think I understand this. I have
lived here for years. I admire your extraordinary efforts to rebuild your country. I know
you need funds. We understand that and our opinion is that you should have the opportunity
to rebuild your country. But we have
no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait.

I was in the American Embassy in Kuwait
during the late 60's. The instruction we had during this period was that we should express
no opinion on this issue and that the issue is not associated with America. James Baker
has directed our official spokesmen to emphasize this instruction. We hope you can solve
this problem using any suitable methods via Klibi or via President Mubarak. All that we
hope is that these issues are solved quickly. With regard to all of this, can I ask you to see how the issue appears
to us?

My assessment after 25 years' service in this area is
that your objective must have strong backing from your Arab brothers. I now speak of oil
But you, Mr. President, have fought through a horrific and painful war. Frankly, we can
see only that you have deployed massive troops in the south. Normally that would not be
any of our business. But when this happens in the context of what you said on your
national day, then when we read the details in the two letters of the Foreign Minister,
then when we see the Iraqi point of view that the measures taken by the U.A.E. and Kuwait
is, in the final analysis, parallel to military aggression against Iraq, then it would be
reasonable for me to be concerned. And for this reason, I received an instruction to ask you, in the spirit of friendship
-- not in the spirit of confrontation -- regarding your intentions.

I simply describe the position of my Government. And
I do not mean that the situation is a simple situation. But our concern is a simple one.

HUSSEIN: We do not ask people not to be
concerned when peace is at issue. This is a noble human feeling which we all feel. It is
natural for you as a superpower to be concerned. But what we ask is not to express your
concern in a way that would make an aggressor believe that he is getting support for his
aggression.

We want to find a just solution which will give us
our rights but not deprive others of their rights. But at the same time, we want the
others to know that our patience is running out regarding their action, which is harming
even the milk our children drink, and the pensions of the widow who lost her husband
during the war, and the pensions of the orphans who lost their parents.

As a country, we have the right to prosper. We lost
so many opportunities, and the others should value the Iraqi role in their protection.
Even this Iraqi [the President points to their interpreter] feels bitter like all other
Iraqis. We are not aggressors but we do not accept aggression either. We sent them envoys
and handwritten letters. We tried everything. We asked the Servant of the Two Shrines --
King Fahd -- to hold a four-member summit, but he suggested a meeting between the Oil
Ministers. We agreed. And as you know, the meeting took place in Jidda. They reached an
agreement which did not express what we wanted, but we agreed.

Only two days after the meeting, the Kuwaiti Oil
Minister made a statement that contradicted the agreement. We also discussed the issue
during the Baghdad summit. I told the Arab Kings and Presidents that some brothers are
fighting an economic war against us. And that not all wars use weapons and we regard this
kind of war as a military action against us. Because if the capability of our army is
lowered then, if Iran renewed the war, it could achieve goals which it could not achieve
before. And if we lowered the standard of our defenses, then this could encourage Israel
to attack us. I said that before the Arab Kings and Presidents. Only I did not mention
Kuwait and U.A.E. by name, because they were my guests.

Before this, I had sent them envoys reminding them
that our war had included their defense. Therefore the aid they gave us should not be
regarded as a debt. We did not more than the United States would have done against someone
who attacked its interests.

I talked about the same thing with a number of other
Arab states. I explained the situation t brother King Fahd a few times, by sending envoys
and on the telephone. I talked with brother King Hussein and with Sheik Zaid after the
conclusion of the summit. I walked with the Sheik to the plane when he was leaving Mosul.
He told me, "Just wait until I get home." But after he had reached his
destination, the statements that came from there were very bad -- not from him, but from
his Minister of Oil.

And after the Jidda agreement, we received some
intelligence that they were talking of sticking to the agreement for two months only. Then
they would change their policy. Now tell us, if the American President found himself in
this situation, what would he do? I said it was very difficult for me to talk about these
issues in public. But we must tell the Iraqi people who face economic difficulties who was
responsible for that.

Talks with Mubarak

GLASPIE: I spent four beautiful years in
Egypt.

HUSSEIN: The Egyptian people are kind and good
and ancient. The oil people are supposed to help the Egyptian people, but they are mean
beyond belief. It is painful to admit it, but some of them are disliked by Arabs because
of their greed.

GLASPIE: Mr. President, it would be helpful if
you could give us an assessment of the effort made by your Arab brothers and whether they
have achieved anything.

HUSSEIN: On this subject, we agreed with
President Mubarak that the Prime Minister of Kuwait would meet with the deputy chairman of
the Revolution Command Council in Saudi Arabia, because the Saudis initiated contact with
us, aided by President Mubarak's efforts. He just telephoned me a short while ago to say
the Kuwaitis have agreed to that suggestion.

GLASPIE: Congratulations.

HUSSEIN: A protocol meeting will be held in
Saudi Arabia. Then the meeting will be transferred to Baghdad for deeper discussion
directly between Kuwait and Iraq. We hope we will reach some result. We hope that the
long-term view and the real interests will overcome Kuwaiti greed.

GLASPIE: May I ask you when you expect Sheik
Saad to come to Baghdad?

HUSSEIN: I suppose it would be on Saturday or
Monday at the latest. I told brother Mubarak that the agreement should be in Baghdad
Saturday or Sunday. You know that brother Mubarak's visits have always been a good omen.

GLASPIE: This is good news. Congratulations.

HUSSEIN: Brother President Mubarak told me
they were scared. They said troops were only 20 kilometers north of the Arab League line.
I said to him that regardless of what is there, whether they are police, border guards or
army, and regardless of how many are there, and what they are doing, assure the Kuwaitis
and give them our word that we are not going to do anything until we meet with them. When
we meet and when we see that there is hope, then nothing will happen. But if we are unable
to find a solution, then it will be natural that Iraq will not accept death, even though
wisdom is above everything else. There you have good news.

AZIZ: This is a journalistic exclusive.

GLASPIE: I am planning to go to the United
States next Monday. I hope I will meet with President Bush in Washington next week. I
thought to postpone my trip because of the difficulties we are facing. But now I will fly
on Monday.