NOTE: This introduction
to Clausewitz's On War is from F.N.
Maude's 1908 edition of the long-obsolete J.J. Graham translation published
in London in 1873. The 1976/84 Howard/Paret
version is the standard translation today.

VOLUME I : INTRODUCTION [to Clausewitz's ON WAR]

[Remember that this is an introduction written
in 1908 by British Army (ret.) COL F.N. (Frederick Natusch) Maude, R.E.
(1854-1933), NOT by Clausewitz. Maude was for many years the book review
editor for the Journal of the Royal United Service Institution. He seems
to have been a bit eccentric: He was the inventor of a smoke-eating machine
and a proponent of a "science of organization" called "andrology."
His Who's Who entry reads "Recreations: nil." Maude was associated with
the mystic Aleister Crowley, who introduced the young J.F.C. Fuller to
him around 1906 to 1908. Maude's garrulous and argumentative books were
critical of just about everyone. A fervent admirer of the German military
system, he saw Germany as England's deadliest natural enemy. A relentless
reformer, he was critical of the British army but harsh on the "half-baked"
ideas of most other military reformers. An energetic proponent of
the study of Clausewitz, Maude pointedly rejected key portions of On
War (notably its argument on the power of the defense). In his reformist
views, however, he seems to have been a fairly typical British Clausewitzian.

Maude first discovered On War in 1872,
but he later admitted that it had taken him a long time to fully appreciate
the work. He saw its essence in its analysis of the dynamics of war,
particularly chance and "friction": "The whole result of his system is
finally concentrated in Clausewitz's well-known phrase, `In war everything
is simple, but to secure this simplicity is difficult.'" Despite
his admiration for On War, Maude always insisted that its author
had never understood Napoleon, which may reflect a lack of appreciation
of Clausewitz's actual relationship to the French emperor. Nonetheless,
when Maude urged young Fuller to study Napoleon, he also recommended Clausewitz.

Maude edited J.J. Graham's
by-then scarce 1873 translation of On War
and reissued it in 1908. Beyond enlarging the type and breaking the work
into three volumes, Maude's contributions were few, but they exercised
a great influence on the way the book was perceived by a new generation
of readers: He added a series of footnotes pointing out technological and
organizational changes since Clausewitz's day and discussing Moltke's role.
He also added this short introduction, hostile to Germany but immensely
respectful of Clausewitz, that presents the book in a social Darwinist
light. The later image of Clausewitz as a believer in war for its social
benefits derives largely from Maude's footnotes, which is no doubt why
it was retained in Anatol Rapoport's hostile abridgement in the 1968 Penguin
edition. The Graham/Maude edition would long be the standard English
version of On War. It would be reprinted in 1911, 1918, 1940, 1962,
and 1966 and provide the basis for most subsequent condensations and abridgments.]

THE Germans interpret their new national colours--black, red,
and white-by the saying, "Durch Nacht und Blut zur licht." ("Through night
and blood to light"), and no work yet written conveys to the thinker a
clearer conception of all that the red streak in their flag stands for
than this deep and philosophical analysis of "War" by Clausewitz.

It reveals "War," stripped of all accessories, as the exercise of force
for the attainment of a political object, unrestrained by any law save
that of expediency, and thus gives the key to the interpretation of German
political aims, past, present, and future, which is unconditionally necessary
for every student of the modern conditions of Europe. Step by step, every
event since Waterloo follows with logical consistency from the teachings
of Napoleon, formulated for the first time, some twenty years afterwards,
by this remarkable thinker.

What Darwin accomplished for Biology generally Clausewitz did for the
Life-History of Nations nearly half a century before him, for both have
proved the existence of the same law in each case, viz., "The survival
of the fittest"--the "fittest," as Huxley long since pointed out, not being
necessarily synonymous with the ethically "best." Neither of these thinkers
was concerned with the ethics of the struggle which each studied so exhaustively,
but to both men the phase or condition presented itself neither as moral
nor immoral, any more than are famine, disease, or other natural phenomena,
but as emanating from a force inherent in all living organisms which can
only be mastered by understanding its nature. It is in that spirit that,
one after the other, all the Nations of the Continent, taught by such drastic
lessons as Koniggrätz and Sedan, have accepted the lesson, with the
result that to-day Europe is an armed camp, and peace is maintained
by the equilibrium of forces, and will continue just as long as this equilibrium
exists, and no longer.

Whether this state of equilibrium is in itself a good or desirable thing
may be open to argument. I have discussed it at length in my "War and the
World's Life"; but I venture to suggest that to no one would a renewal
of the era of warfare be a change for the better, as far as existing humanity
is concerned. Meanwhile, however, with every year that elapses the forces
at present in equilibrium are changing in magnitude--the pressure of populations
which have to be fed is rising, and an explosion along the line of least
resistance is, sooner or later, inevitable.

As I read the teaching of the recent Hague Conference, no responsible
Government on the Continent is anxious to form in themselves that line
of least resistance; they know only too well what War would mean; and we
alone, absolutely unconscious of the trend of the dominant thought of Europe,
are pulling down the dam which may at any moment let in on us the flood
of invasion.

Now no responsible man in Europe, perhaps least of all in Germany, thanks
us for this voluntary destruction of our defences, for all who are of any
importance would very much rather end their days in peace than incur the
burden of responsibility which War would entail. But they realise that
the gradual dissemination of the principles taught by Clausewitz has created
a condition of molecular tension in the minds of the Nations they govern
analogous to the "critical temperature of water heated above boiling-point
under pressure," which may at any moment bring about an explosion which
they will be powerless to control.

The case is identical with that of an ordinary steam boiler, delivering
so and so many pounds of steam to its engines as long as the envelope can
contain the pressure; but let a breach in its continuity arise--relieving
the boiling water of all restraint--and in a moment the whole mass flashes
into vapour, developing a power no work of man can oppose.

The ultimate consequences of defeat no man can foretell. The only way
to avert them is to ensure victory; and, again following out the principles
of Clausewitz, victory can only be ensured by the creation in peace of
an organisation which will bring every available man, horse, and gun (or
ship and gun, if the war be on the sea) in the shortest possible time,
and with the utmost possible momentum, upon the decisive field of action--
which in turn leads to the final doctrine formulated by Von der Goltz in
excuse for the action of the late President Kruger in 1899:

"The Statesman who, knowing his instrument to be ready, and seeing War
inevitable, hesitates to strike first is guilty of a crime against his
country."

It is because this sequence of cause and effect is absolutely unknown
to our Members of Parliament, elected by popular representation, that all
our efforts to ensure a lasting peace by securing efficiency with economy
in our National Defences have been rendered nugatory.

This estimate of the influence of Clausewitz's sentiments on contemporary
thought in Continental Europe may appear exaggerated to those who have
not familiarised themselves with M. Gustav de Bon's exposition of the laws
governing the formation and conduct of crowds I do not wish for one minute
to be understood as asserting that Clausewitz has been conscientiously
studied and understood in any Army, not even in the Prussian, but his work
has been the ultimate foundation on which every drill regulation in Europe,
except our own, has been reared. It is this ceaseless repetition of his
fundamental ideas to which one-half of the male population of every Continental
Nation has been subjected for two to three years of their lives, which
has tuned their minds to vibrate in harmony with his precepts, and those
who know and appreciate this fact at its true value have only to strike
the necessary chords in order to evoke a response sufficient to overpower
any other ethical conception which those who have not organised their forces
beforehand can appeal to.

The recent set-back experienced by the Socialists in Germany is an illustration
of my position. The Socialist leaders of that country are far behind the
responsible Governors in their knowledge of the management of crowds. The
latter had long before (in 1893, in fact) made their arrangements to prevent
the spread of Socialistic propaganda beyond certain useful limits. As long
as the Socialists only threatened capital they were not seriously interfered
with, for the Government knew quite well that the undisputed sway of the
employer was not for the ultimate good of the State. The standard of comfort
must not be pitched too low if men are to he ready to die for their country.
But the moment the Socialists began to interfere seriously with the discipline
of the Army the word went round, and the Socialists lost heavily at the
polls.

If this power of predetermined reaction to acquired ideas can be evoked
successfully in a matter of internal interest only, in which the "obvious
interest" of the vast majority of the population is so clearly on the side
of the Socialist, it must be evident how enormously greater it will prove
when set in motion against an external enemy, where the "obvious interest"
of the people is, from the very nature of things, as manifestly on the
side of the Government; and the Statesman who failed to take into account
the force of the "resultant thought wave" of a crowd of some seven million
men, all trained to respond to their ruler's call, would be guilty of treachery
as grave as one who failed to strike when he knew the Army to be ready
for immediate action.

As already pointed out, it is to the spread of Clausewitz's ideas that
the present state of more or less immediate readiness for war of all European
Armies is due, and since the organisation of these forces is uniform this
"more or less" of readiness exists in precise proportion to the sense of
duty which animates the several Armies. Where the spirit of duty and self-sacrifice
is low the troops are unready and inefficient; where, as in Prussia, these
qualities, by the training of a whole century, have become instinctive,
troops really are ready to the last button, and might be poured down upon
any one of her neighbours with such rapidity that the very first collision
must suffice to ensure ultimate success--a success by no means certain
if the enemy, whoever he may be, is allowed breathing-time in which to
set his house in order.

An example will make this clearer. In 1887 Germany was on the very verge
of War with France and Russia. At that moment her superior efficiency,
the consequence of this inborn sense of duty--surely one of the highest
qualities of humanity--was so great that it is more than probable that
less than six weeks would have sufficed to bring the French to their knees.
Indeed, after the first fortnight it would have been possible to begin
transferring troops from the Rhine to the Niemen; and the same case may
arise again. But if France and Russia had been allowed even ten days' warning
the German plan would have been completely defeated. France alone might
then have claimed all the efforts that Germany could have put forth to
defeat her.

Yet there are politicians in England so grossly ignorant of the German
reading of the Napoleonic lessons that they expect that Nation to sacrifice
the enormous advantage they have prepared by a whole century of self- sacrifice
and practical patriotism by an appeal to a Court of Arbitration, and the
further delays which must arise by going through the medieaeval formalities
of recalling Ambassadors and exchanging ultimatums.

Most of our present-day politicians have made their money in business--a
"form of human competition greatly resembling War," to paraphrase Clausewitz.
Did they, when in the throes of such competition, send formal notice to
their rivals of their plans to get the better of them in commerce? Did
Mr. Carnegie, the arch- priest of Peace at any price, when he built up
the Steel Trust, notify his competitors when and how he proposed to strike
the blows which successively made him master of millions? Surely the Directors
of a Great Nation may consider the interests of their shareholders--i.e.,
the people they govern--as sufficiently serious not to be endangered by
the deliberate sacrifice of the preponderant position of readiness which
generations of self-devotion, patriotism and wise forethought have won
for them?

As regards the strictly military side of this work, though the recent
researches of the French General Staff into the records and documents of
the Napoleonic period have shown conclusively that Clausewitz had never
grasped the essential point of the Great Emperor's strategic method, yet
it is admitted that he has completely fathomed the spirit which gave life
to the form; and notwithstandingthe variations in application which have
resulted from the progress of invention in every field of national activity
(not in the technical improvements in armament alone), this spirit still
remains the essential factor in the whole matter. Indeed, if anything,
modern appliances have intensified its importance, for though, with equal
armaments on both sides, the form of battles must always remain the same,
the facility and certainty of combination which better methods of communicating
orders and intelligence have conferred upon the Commanders has rendered
the control of great masses immeasurably more certain than it was in the
past.

Men kill each other at greater distances, it is true-- but killing is
a constant factor in all battles. The difference between "now and then"
lies in this, that, thanks to the enormous increase in range (the essential
feature in modern armaments), it is possible to concentrate by surprise,
on any chosen spot, a man-killing power fully twentyfold greater than was
conceivable in the days of Waterloo; and whereas in Napoleon's time this
concentration of man-killing power (which in his hands took the form of
the great case-shot attack) depended almost entirely on the shape and condition
of the ground, which might or might not be favourable, nowadays such concentration
of fire-power is almost independent of the country altogether.

Thus, at Waterloo, Napoleon was compelled to wait till the ground became
firm enough for his guns to gallop over; nowadays every gun at his disposal,
and five times that number had he possessed them, might have opened on
any point in the British position he had selected, as soon as it became
light enough to see.

Or, to take a more modern instance, viz., the battle of St. Privat-Gravelotte,
August 18, 1870, where the Germans were able to concentrate on both wings
batteries of two hundred guns and upwards, it would have been practically
impossible, owing to the section of the slopes of the French position,
to carry out the old-fashioned case-shot attack at all. Nowadays there
would be no difficulty in turning on the fire of two thousand guns on any
point of the position, and switching this fire up and down the line like
water from a fire-engine hose, if the occasion demanded such concentration.

But these alterations in method make no difference in the truth of the
picture of War which Clausewitz presents, with which every soldier, and
above all every Leader, should be saturated.

Death, wounds, suffering, and privation remain the same, whatever the
weapons employed, and their reaction on the ultimate nature of man is the
same now as in the struggle a century ago. It is this reaction that the
Great Commander has to understand and prepare himself to control; and the
task becomes ever greater as, fortunately for humanity, the opportunities
for gathering experience become more rare.

In the end, and with every improvement in science, the result depends
more and more on the character of the Leader and his power of resisting
"the sensuous impressions of the battlefield." Finally, for those who would
fit themselves in advance for such responsibility, I know of no more inspiring
advice than that given by Krishna to Arjuna ages ago, when the latter trembled
before the awful responsibility of launching his Army against the hosts
of the Pandav's:

This Life within all living things, my Prince, Hides beyond harm. Scorn
thou to suffer, then, For that which cannot suffer. Do thy part! Be mindful
of thy name, and tremble not. Nought better can betide a martial soul Than
lawful war. Happy the warrior To whom comes joy of battle....
. . . But if thou shunn'st This honourable field--a Kshittriya-- If, knowing
thy duty and thy task, thou bidd'st Duty and task go by--that shall be
sin! And those to come shall speak thee infamy From age to age. But infamy
is worse For men of noble blood to bear than death! . .
. . . . Therefore
arise, thou Son of Kunti! Brace Thine arm for conflict; nerve thy heart
to meet, As things alike to thee, pleasure or pain, Profit or ruin, victory
or defeat. So minded, gird thee to the fight, for so Thou shalt not sin!