The Danger of Congressional Control of Elections

by

Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist No. 59, addresses this same topic from an
opposing viewpoint. This essay was written anonymously by "VOX POPULI,"
and appeared in The Massachusetts Gazette on October 30, 1787.

. . I beg leave to lay before the candid public the first clause in the
fourth section of the first article of the proposed Constitution:

"The times, places and manner of holding elections, for senators and
representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof;
but the Congress may, at any time, by law, make or alter such regulations except
as to the places of choosing senators."

By this clause, the time, place and manner of choosing representatives is
wholly at the disposal of Congress.

Why the Convention who formed the proposed Constitution wished to invest
Congress with such a power, I am by no means capable of saying; or why the good
people of this commonwealth [Massachusetts] should delegate such a power to
them, is no less hard to determine. But as the subject is open for discussion, I
shall make a little free inquiry into the matter.

And, first. What national advantage is there to be acquired by giving them
such a power?

The only advantage which I have heard proposed by it is, to prevent a partial
representation of the several states in Congress; "for if the time, manner
and place were left wholly in the hands of the state legislatures, it is
probable they would not make provision by appointing time, manner and place for
an election; in which case there could be no election, and consequently the
federal government weakened."

But this provision is by no means sufficient to prevent an evil of that
nature. For will any reasonable man suppose—that when the legislature of any
state, who are annually chosen, are so corrupt as to break thro' that government
which they have formed, and refuse to appoint time, place and manner of choosing
representatives—I say, can any person suppose, that a state so corrupt would not
be full as likely to neglect, or even refuse, to choose representatives at the
time and place and in the manner prescribed by Congress? Surely they would. So
it could answer no good national purpose on that account; and I have not heard
any other national advantage proposed thereby.

We will now proceed, in the next place, to consider why the people of this
commonwealth should vest Congress with such a power.

No one proposes that it would be any advantage to the people of this state.
Therefore, it must be considered as a matter of indifference, except there is an
opportunity for its operating to their disadvantage—in which case, I conceive it
ought to be disapprobated.

Whether there is danger of its operating to the good people's disadvantage,
shall now be the subject of our inquiry.

Supposing Congress should direct, that the representatives of this
commonwealth should be chosen all in one town, (Boston, for instance) on the
first day of March—would not that be a very injurious institution to the good
people of this commonwealth? Would not there be at least nine-tenths of the
landed interest of this commonwealth entirely unrepresented? Surely one may
reasonably imagine there would. What, then, would be the case if Congress should
think proper to direct, that the elections should be held at the north-west,
south-west, or north-east part of the state, the last day of March? How many
electors would there attend the business? And it is a little remarkable, that
any gentleman should suppose, that Congress could possibly be in any measure as
good judges of the time, place and manner of elections as the legislatures of
the several respective states.

These as objections I could wish to see obviated. And I could wish the public
inquiry might extend to a consideration, whether or not it would not be more
conducive, to prevent a partial representation, to invest Congress with power to
levy such a fine as they might think proper on states not choosing
representatives, than by giving them this power of appointing time, manner and
place.

It is objected by some, that Congress could not levy, or at least, could not
collect, such a fine of a delinquent state. If that is the case, Congress could
not collect any tax they might think proper to levy, nor execute any order
whatever; but at any time any state might break through the national compact,
dissolve the federal constitution, and set the whole structure afloat on the
ocean of chaos.

It is, therefore, proposed to the public to consider, whether the said clause
in the fourth section of the first article can answer the only purposes for
which it is said to have been provided, or any other which will prove any
advantage either to the nation or state.