On War & Stuff

Afghanistan: Why Europe Must Stay

According to a recent opinion poll by the Financial Times, clear majorities of people in the UK, France, Italy and Germany believe their countries shouldn’t send any more troops to fight in Afghanistan. And the governments, ever mindful of their fickle electorates, agree. “We have made the necessary effort,” French Defence Minister Herve Morin said yesterday. “Considering additional reinforcements is out of the question for now.”

In Finland, Professor Juhani Suomi, one of the most influential historians of his generation, recently ridiculed Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb for basically trying to kiss ass by doubling the Finnish troop strength in Afghanistan — from 100 to 200. Suomi, like many other scholars and politicians in Europe, points out that as the U.S. bolsters its own war effort, Afghanistan will once again become an American fight and will be seen as such by the ever-reluctant ISAF contributors who never wanted to be there in the first place.

This line of reasoning might be politically expedient, but I think it’s fundamentally flawed. To start with, you don’t prosecute a war by listening to your pollsters. I realise I’m starting to sound like George W. Bush, but I believe there are times when you need to send your armies overseas regardless of public opinion. And although stability hardly grows from the barrel of a gun, any lasting solution to the region’s ills will by necessity have a military component. Ironically, Afghanistan is unpopular in Europe exactly because the very governments that now refuse to commit more forces have failed to explain to their voters why the war matters. It shouldn’t be all that hard — just start with the fact that a country’s nuclear arsenal may soon be in the hands of homicidal fanatics, and take it from there.

As for the argument that we should all pull out because it’ll end in tears anyway, let’s for a moment meditate on what will happen if we do:

The coalition crumbles, leaving the U.S. and Britain to fight alone. Reconstruction grinds to a halt.

Debilitated by its failure, NATO shrinks to irrelevance. Fireworks in Moscow.

Faced with a fight to the death, the Kabul government chooses engagement with the Taleban instead.

The Taleban kills everyone else and seizes power.

Military coup in Pakistan.

Al-Qaeda hits Europe and America.

Supported by an international coalition, the U.S. starts a bombing campaign to topple the Taleban. Osama bin Laden escapes.

[UPDATE: WPR’s Judah Grunstein chimes in with a more optimistic take.]

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22 Responses

* The coalition crumbles, leaving the U.S. and Britain to fight alone. Reconstruction grinds to a halt.

From a European point of view: So what?

* Debilitated by its failure, NATO shrinks to irrelevance. Fireworks in Moscow.

Unlikely.
It might shrink to the collective security pact that it was always meant to be and that does a great service; protect sovereignty against foreign powers and prevent infights.

* Faced with a fight to the death, the Kabul government chooses engagement with the Taleban instead.

From a European point of view: So what?

* The Taleban kills everyone else and seizes power.

From a European point of view: So what? That happened a couple year ago and was worth only two times two minutes in TV evening news.

* Military coup in Pakistan.

Now this is fantasy. There’s no real connection between failure of the corrupt Karzai regime and the resilience of the Pakistani state.
A successful anti-Taliban war in Afghanistan might even destabilize Pakistan; as if when we succeeded to seal off the borders and keep the pressure out.

* Al-Qaeda hits Europe and America.

Seriously; AQ HQ has the tribal areas of Pakistan as safe haven. It does not need Afghanistan or subsistence. One of the most dangerous (if not THE most dangerous) AQ affiliates is in Algeria, completely untouched by events in Afghanistan.

* Supported by an international coalition, the U.S. starts a bombing campaign to topple the Taleban. Osama bin Laden escapes.

Sure, doing that about every five years would still be less costly in treasure and blood than to occupy the country with the worst history for occupation in the world.

You forgot some very powerful factors that favor a withdrawal:

1)
No infidels in Afghanistan = much less recruiting drive for Taliban in Pakistan.
2)
Less losses for us.
3)
Less distraction for us (we could focus on fixing domestic troubles).
4)
Less blowback in 10-20 years.
5)
Less military expenditures for us.
6)
The Taliban might actually lose an Afghan civil war. There are more powers than just Karzai’s clique, OEF, ISAF and Taliban in Afghanistan, after all.
7)
No more damage to our democracies. Seriously, it’s not politically healthy if several successive governments make policy against the will of their nation. That adds to a lot of discontent and can boost extremist parties and reduce the support of the political system overall.

Do you seriously advocate a policy whereby Afghanistan is left to its own devices, with no international aid, military or otherwise (for surely there isn’t one without the other), and expect it to have no consequences whatsoever to the rest of the world?

With all due respect, to claim, as you seem to do, that there is no connection between the war in Afghanistan and what is happening in Pakistan (and vice versa), makes me think you either slept through history class or are wilfully ignoring the facts. I mean, for goodness sake, this is just ass-backwards, man:

“AQ HQ has the tribal areas of Pakistan as safe haven. It does not need Afghanistan or subsistence.”

AQ is in Pakistan exactly because it cannot be in Afghanistan, and it would be in both, should the Taleban return to power.

As to the brittleness of civilian rule in Pakistan, I’m at a loss as to why you choose to doubt it, in the face of all the evidence to the contrary.

–NATO and the US put in more troops, which will total to less than half the highest amount the Soviets ever had there.

–We still will not really control the territory that we want to, and rural Afghans will continue to rely on the mujahids to give them a rudimentary system of rule that doesn’t run counter to their cultural values as much as the West’s.

–The mujahidin groups win a huge propaganda victory when the US and NATO are just as unsuccessful at controlling the place with twice the troops.

–The ANA and ANP numbers, now growing, will evaporate when groups of them desert and switch sides, because they sense they are no longer on the winning side.

–European countries will, even more, ask why we are sending troops to a country that doesn’t want us there. They’ll set a timetable and pull out their troops before the end of Obama’s adminstration.

–Obama will have to escalate US troop numbers even more, now that NATO has become, for all de facto purposes, broken.

–The US troops that will be in Afghanistan will be tired, dispirited, and wondering why we are in a country where no one wants us.

–Because America’s weakening economy cannot really support a large US military force outside its borders, and we withdraw our troops back to Kuwait and Qatar.

Do you seriously advocate a policy whereby Afghanistan is left to its own devices, with no international aid, military or otherwise (for surely there isn’t one without the other), and expect it to have no consequences whatsoever to the rest of the world?”

Yes, I’m not so easily scared as many people and I don’t believe in cliches like a relevance of Afghanistan to our world.
It’s a land-bound, utterly isolated low economy country without cultural or political relevance to us. It has humanitarian problems, but it’s not alone in that regard; we don’t go into Darfur, after all. We could easily have more good effect with less effort elsewhere if this was about doing good for humanity.

Afghanistan has no resources that are scarce for AQ. The people don’t have the right background/education for terror acts against us in our countries. Look at the 9/11 terrorists. They were educated, spoke English and other Western languages, were able to live amongst us – Afghan peasants cannot do so, especially not if we are suspicious and don’t allow refugees here.
Afghanistan has land, but AQ does not need land. Its HQ has land in Pakistan and its cells aren’t in Afghanistan/Pakistan either.

“With all due respect, to claim, as you seem to do, that there is no connection between the war in Afghanistan and what is happening in Pakistan (and vice versa), makes me think you either slept through history class or are wilfully ignoring the facts. I mean, for goodness sake, this is just ass-backwards, man:”

Unlike those who had the stupid idea to occupy Afghanistan, I know history very well.

“AQ is in Pakistan exactly because it cannot be in Afghanistan, and it would be in both, should the Taleban return to power.”

So what?
The critical point is that it doesn’t help AQ.
There’s no such scarcity in effect for AQ that limits its operations. AQ does not need Afghanistan to survive, and AQ in Pakistan is AQ ideological HQ, not AQ active terror cells. The cells are elsewhere, like Algeria.
AQ in Afghanistan would mean next to nothing (except that they would probably undermine the Taliban by annoying the Afghan people). Furthermore, it would be great if AQ had a place where it would dare to live in public.
We would have easy time for intelligence and specops again.
Afghanistan is no critical resource for AQ – it’s merely a battleground and a source of motivation for them.
We cannot defeat or cripple AQ by winning Afghanistan. It’s simply not that relevant. Keep in mind we chased AQ from Sudan in the 90’s – it didn’t prohibit 9/11 although AQ still has no easy refuge in Sudan again.

“As to the brittleness of civilian rule in Pakistan, I’m at a loss as to why you choose to doubt it, in the face of all the evidence to the contrary.”

I criticized your connection to Pakistani military coup Afghanistan war, I did not mean to claim that a military coup was unrealistic.

You didn’t get the crucial element, though:
A Taliban defeat in Afghanistan would stress Pakistan more than a Taliban victory in Afghanistan.
Victory=Taliban move into Afghanistan.
Defeat=Taliban have to stay in Pakistan.

Furthermore, most of the Pakistani people and military are not pro-Taliban (therefore no pro-Taliban coup).
The troubles are only about a very, very loud minority. That’s why I don’t expect Pakistan to crumble quickly to the Taliban – despite the presence of Western forces in Afghanistan which helps to radicalize and recruit Taliban.

You’re using standard myths that we were fed about Afghanistan, myths designed to support the war. Myths that don’t fit well to realities and history.

I’ve covered Afghanistan since the 80s, have traveled with many of the present Taleban and met with a number of those now fighting ISAF and Karzai (and many who’ve since been killed), and those in the government. I don’t claim to be an expert on Afghanistan, but I do have a reasonably good idea of what the country and its people are about. Ditto with Pakistan. So while you’re more than welcome to think I’m a fool, you’re mistaken in thinking that I can be fed any kind of “myths” about Afghanistan.

Of course, I sincerely hope you will be proven right in thinking that these troubles will seem but a hiccup in the larger scheme of things.

Ok, fine–that’s where we disagree then. I think there has to be a proven strategy before we pour troops in. For instance, pick a single district in Kandahar province and test the kind of troop concentration we are talking about, along with diplomacy, competent delivery of aid, our new brilliant tactics (whatever those are). If you see improvement there in 2009, then I’m all for adding more troops elsewhere.

The only new thing I’ve seen from the U.S./NATO is the terrible idea of “community policing,” “arbakai,” “arming the tribes” or whatever you would like to call it. That is not going to be a game-changer, since it is wishful thinking from the folks who brought you the “Anbar Awakening” that everything just transfers to Afghanistan nice and smoothly.

IMHO we should all take a break from that tired old Soviet analogy. Here’s a better one: avian flu. A faraway threat with currently no impact on our lives, yet the international community recognises that complacency kills, and has acted accordingly.

(And by this I DON’T mean to imply that Al-Qaeda’s ideology, whatever that may be at the moment, is a disease.)

Yeah, exactly. The problem is that while there are some straightforward ways of dealing with an epidemiological crisis like that (difficult though they may be), there isn’t one for Afghanistan’s insurgents. And unless NATO and the U.S. think of at least one (though preferably a bunch, since one size ain’t going to fit all), I can’t see how 30k more troops will help.

True, but to take the metaphor a step further: no government will stop developing a vaccine, no matter how expensive, against H5N1 just because the voters think a pandemic will never occur. And the UN is not going to pull WHO out of the worst-hit countries just because the fight against the virus might seem hopeless.

ISAF/OEF have extremely little to show for the effort. That’s historically an indicator for failure in warfare.

The Afghan government is a bunch of corrupt and incompetent people. They do not work for the good of the country or at least for a strong state. This unhinges most possible COIN strategies.
The war aim of creating a strong Afghan state that keeps people like AQ out is bound to fail. The most promising COIN strategies are about reinforcing the local institutions and creating local resilience – extremely difficult because the Taliban dominate the countryside. Even if successful; it’s a design for a so-called “failed state” that won’t keep out extremists after our departure anyway.

All the terrible things that are supposed to happen without the mission are mere speculation. I’m not easily scared and tend to not believe the speculation.
We believed that SE Asia would turn red if the West loses in Vietnam, but the consequences of withdrawal turned out to be quite acceptable instead.

We could do much more good in easier places if we want to be selfless amidst a crisis and just help others. Many more peaceful places could benefit a lot of our help (the “building schoolhouses” sub-mission). Seriously, we could even think about keeping our decades-old promise and raise our development aid to 0.7% GNP.

The less obvious arguments against the war are being kept from the public discussion. Nobody discusses that AQ does apparently NOT need Afghanistan as safe haven. Nobody discusses that our very presence there is fueling the fire by helping the Taliban to radicalize and recruit Pashtuns with nationalistic, cultural and religious arguments.

As usual, pro-war folks step into some classic traps like sunk costs, ignorance to losses, no cost/benefit consideration, no consideration of alternatives and believing propaganda till it’s over.

You ignore the ‘fueling the fire’ problem, for example:
“They don’t reinforce the epidemic to fight it, correct?”

I find it quite incredible that after following the bloodshed in Afghanistan for 20 years, and after losing a number of friends and acquaintances to that war, I am now glibly being called “pro-war”. I suppose I should congratulate myself for getting it right when I predicted a few months ago that as Iraq falls off the radar, we will see a lot more bad punditry on Afghanistan. (More on that here.)

A few notes, though:

ISAF/OEF have extremely little to show for the effort. That’s historically an indicator for failure in warfare.

Of course, and if you’d care to acquaint yourself a little better with this blog, you’d find that if anything, I’ve been extremely critical of the war effort. Even so, what the U.S. and NATO *do* have to show for the effort is the fact that a semblance of law and order does exist in parts of the country and that the Taleban have been denied access to power. I know, of course, that to your thinking none of this makes any difference because for all you care, the Taleban can have their stinking country, but that is where we differ.

The Afghan government is a bunch of corrupt and incompetent people. They do not work for the good of the country or at least for a strong state. This unhinges most possible COIN strategies.

Host government corruption didn’t stop the American COIN tacticians from making the best out of a very bad situation in Iraq, the idea being that you change the military equation to give the government breathing space to improve its performance (which hasn’t happened in Iraq, but that’s another story). Again, before you start accusing me of uncritically taking for granted any victory narratives about “the surge”, please read my blog posts and you’ll find that the opposite is true.

The war aim of creating a strong Afghan state that keeps people like AQ out is bound to fail. The most promising COIN strategies are about reinforcing the local institutions and creating local resilience – extremely difficult because the Taliban dominate the countryside. Even if successful; it’s a design for a so-called “failed state” that won’t keep out extremists after our departure anyway.

This makes no sense to me. How is a strong Afghan state, “even if successful”, “a design for a so-called failed state”? The only way I can decode this nonsense is something like, “Afghanistan will never be a healthy state, so let’s get the hell out and let them stew in their own mess”. What arrogance.

All the terrible things that are supposed to happen without the mission are mere speculation.

Of course — that’s why they’re called worst-case scenarios. BTW, your own assertions don’t add up to much more, either.

The less obvious arguments against the war are being kept from the public discussion. Nobody discusses that AQ does apparently NOT need Afghanistan as safe haven. Nobody discusses that our very presence there is fueling the fire by helping the Taliban to radicalize and recruit Pashtuns with nationalistic, cultural and religious arguments.

Okay, entering conspiracy country here. Seriously, nothing is “being kept” out of public discussion in Europe. I think you’d do well to at least consider the possibility that the reason why those “less obvious” arguments are not being discussed is that they’re either illogical (“AQ does not need Afghanistan”) or have no basis in real-world research (“Western presence is radicalising the Pushtun”).

You ignore the ‘fueling the fire’ problem, for example:
“They don’t reinforce the epidemic to fight it, correct?”

Actually, the way smallpox was finally eradicated was by ring vaccinations, that is, letting the epidemic burn itself out while surrounding it with resistant populations. A pretty apt metaphor, I think, for what should be done in Afghanistan/Pakistan — alas, only achievable without boots on the ground in a German pipedream.

“I find it quite incredible that after following the bloodshed in Afghanistan for 20 years, and after losing a number of friends and acquaintances to that war, I am now glibly being called “pro-war”.”

How is being pro-Afghan War being called today if not “pro-war”? You don’t seem to advocate a disengagement, after all.

“This makes no sense to me. How is a strong Afghan state, “even if successful”, “a design for a so-called failed state”? The only way I can decode this nonsense is something like, “Afghanistan will never be a healthy state, so let’s get the hell out and let them stew in their own mess”. What arrogance.”

Said “most promising COIN strategies” include a local empowerment/militia powers – a warlord country effectively. No strong state. I should have been more elaborate on this.
And why exactly is it arrogant to think that they shall sort out their own troubles and that we’re not capable to do so for them? The contrary would be arrogant in my opinion.

“Okay, entering conspiracy country here. Seriously, nothing is “being kept” out of public discussion in Europe. I think you’d do well to at least consider the possibility that the reason why those “less obvious” arguments are not being discussed is that they’re either illogical (”AQ does not need Afghanistan”) or have no basis in real-world research (”Western presence is radicalising the Pushtun”).”

1) Not meant as conspiracy theory, rather meant in terms of mainstream/non-mainstream. Just like there was no real discussion about alternatives to occupation in the first place.
2) It’s not illogical to think that AQ does not need Afghanistan since they were pretty much kept out of it for five years and still exist. Furthermore, most active AQ affiliate cells have no relevant connections to Afghanistan anyway afaik.
3) The presence of foreign and Christian troops in Afghanistan is being used as recruiting argument by the Taliban in this real world.

“A pretty apt metaphor, I think, for what should be done in Afghanistan/Pakistan — alas, only achievable without boots on the ground in a German pipedream.”

Now it’s my turn to see no sense in something, I guess.

————

The Afghanistan War isn’t going well, it doesn’t justify the effort so far, I have no confidence in the military to improve quickly and drastically.
I am not scared by possible effects of a withdrawal and the whole war is stealing attention/treasure that we need to fix domestic problems (much larger ones than the obvious crisis).
I’m in favor of withdrawing and letting them solve their troubles themselves. It was a stupid idea to do more than hit & run strikes there in the first place.

We can play good people elsewhere with much less trouble and more bang for the buck if we insist on philanthropy.

“And why exactly is it arrogant to think that they shall sort out their own troubles and that we’re not capable to do so for them? The contrary would be arrogant in my opinion.”

You obviously don’t have any first-hand experience of Afghanistan, at least not pre-2001. Otherwise you’d be less flippant in suggesting it’s all for the better if they’re left alone to sort things out. It’s arrogant because it’s based on armchair theorising, not familiarity with the extent of the country’s suffering and the destruction of its infrastructure and institutions.

“The presence of foreign and Christian troops in Afghanistan is being used as recruiting argument by the Taliban in this real world.”

Sure, but that’s a far cry from “Western presence is radicalising the Pushtun”. I’ve seen no research to indicate that, although clearly every air strike gone wrong will make the Taleban’s advertising slogan more effective.

“The Afghanistan War isn’t going well, it doesn’t justify the effort so far, I have no confidence in the military to improve quickly and drastically.
I am not scared by possible effects of a withdrawal and the whole war is stealing attention/treasure that we need to fix domestic problems (much larger ones than the obvious crisis).”

Our troops should stay there to reduce civilian’s suffering?
Are you aware of the endurance that insurgencies with safe havens can have? Decades.
We prolong the suffering as long as we stay there, even though overtly we do something to reduce the suffering in some places (but destroy/kill elsewhere).

As I wrote, we could do more good for less effort elsewhere if we want to be philanthropic. We cannot address all the suffering in the world, why focus on suffering in a place where we can do the least with so much effort?

“We cannot address all the suffering in the world, why focus on suffering in a place where we can do the least with so much effort?”

As it happens, the worst suffering in the world occurs in countries torn apart by armed conflict. Unless you’re ready to bolster aid efforts with some sort of military power, forget Darfur, Congo and Somalia.

See above — surely you don’t mean that we should send them, unarmed, to the country that needs them most, Somalia?

For what it’s worth, I DON’T advocate a military solution to Afghanistan’s problems. But security goes hand in hand with development, and just because we screwed up in Afghanistan after 2001 and let the window of opportunity close doesn’t mean we should now just pack up and leave.

I’m painfully aware of how long putting down insurgencies generally takes, and I’m also aware of the international community’s short attention span. Yet, this thing needs to be resolved. Afghanistan, because of its location — because of its proximity to both Central Asia and a nuclear power — has the potential to cause tectonic shifts in our security environment, if we let it implode.