Garibaldi and his Red Shirts - F. J. Snell

To Palermo!

To "impose morally on the enemy," Landi sent Sforza and his cacciatori to
occupy an elevated position known to the Italians as the Pianto dei Romani
(Weeping of the Romans). In the Sicilian dialect the name appears to have
signified "the vineyards of the Romani family "; and the steep side of the hill
was seamed with terraces suited to the cultivation of the grape. Though Sforza's
orders had been to impose on the enemy morally, he deemed himself strong enough
to risk an engagement, and the result was the battle of Calatafimi, in which the
Neapolitans attacked, but were presently forced up the slope by a succession of
bayonet charges.

Twice that day Garibaldi owed his life to the devotion of his followers. A
sailor of Ancona named Elia was cruelly wounded in the mouth by a bullet which,
if he had not barred its flight, must have laid the General low. At another
time, when Garibaldi was surrounded by the enemy, it was Sirtori who rushed to
his assistance.

Gradually the summit was approached, but there the enemy, whose supports had
come up, were in great force and by no means out of heart. Even Bixio, the
bravest of the brave, deemed it necessary to sound the retreat, but Garibaldi
would not listen to the proposal. "Here," said he, "we make Italy or die." It
has been urged by some critics that similarly Buller should have pushed on at
all costs
at the battle of Colenso, since a defeat of the Boers at that stage of the
campaign would probably have ended their resistance. But the cases are not quite
parallel, as the destruction of the British army would have entailed the loss of
Natal and the re-conquest of South Africa, while the failure of Garibaldi's
expedition would have given the Neapolitans no firmer hold on the hinterland
than they had before. On the other hand, the prestige of the party of freedom
would have been ruined for a generation, and that was no small matter.

In every crisis something must be allowed to temperament, and Garibaldi, in the
heat of action, was not wont to weigh possibilities too nicely. He had an
instinctive feeling that if once the Neapolitans were overcome, they would lose
their morale and would never rally again. The General himself, sword in hand,
led the final charge ; and the enemy, unable to withstand the fury of the
assault, abandoned the plateau and were soon in full flight to Calatafimi, which
Landi did not attempt to defend. Indeed, he and his beaten army did not pause
until they were safe within the gates of Palermo. We have noted that it took
them six days to march from Palermo to Alcamo. The retreat was accomplished in
twenty-four hours! The whole countryside had risen upon them, and horrible
scenes were enacted, especially at Partinico and Montelepre, where the royal
troops lost part of their baggage. It was exactly as Garibaldi had
foreseen—the Neapolitans were thoroughly discouraged. But Sforza's men had
fought
magnificently; Garibaldi himself bears witness to the fact.

"The enemy, who yielded to the bayonet charges of my old Cacciatori delle
Alpi, dressed in plain clothes, fought valiantly, and only yielded their
positions after fierce fighting hand-to-hand. The battles we sustained in
Lombardy were certainly less hardly contested than the battle of yesterday. The
Neapolitans, when they exhausted their cartridges, threw stones at us like madmen.

"I must confess that the Neapolitans fought like lions, and certainly I have not
had in Italy a battle so fierce nor adversaries so brave. From this you can
guess what was the courage of my old Cacciatori delle Alpi and the good
Sicilians who fought with us."

On May 17 the Garibaldians marched from Calatafimi to Alcamo, and two days later
obtained their first sight of Palermo. Between the plateau of Renda (at which
they had arrived overnight) and the city stretched a broad and richly cultivated
plain bearing the romantic name of Conca d'Oro (Golden Shell), from its groves
of orange and lemon. Much had been accomplished, but the crucial question still
remained—How was Palermo to be entered by a few hundred heroes in the face
of a huge garrison of thirty thousand men behind ramparts? It turned out that
the Neapolitans had no intention of allowing the invaders to solve the problem
at their leisure, for on May 21 the Swiss colonel, Von Mechel, seconded by a
Neapolitan officer, Major Bosco, marched out with a considerable force, and
drove back the
skirmishers of the Thousand, while two other columns began operations against
the squadre, which they dispersed, killing their leader Pilo.

Garibaldi had no choice but to quit Renda and join hands with a larger body of
squadre at Parco, on the southern verge of the Conca d'Oro. Thence he
ordered a retreat to the Piano dei Greci (Plain of the Greeks), a level alp
about two thousand feet above the sea. There he was deserted by many of the
Sicilians who were convinced that the game was up. No doubt the position was one
of great peril. Two battalions under Colonna were on the line of retreat from
Parco, whilst Von Mechel's four battalions might, by a rapid movement, have
fallen on Garibaldi's flank. Von Mechel, however, though a tough fighter, was
tardy, while Colonna, instead of continuing the pursuit, saw fit to return to
Palermo.

Reaching the Piano dei Greci on May 25, Von Mechel was informed that Garibaldi
had marched in the direction of Corleone, and accordingly he advanced on that
town. There he came in contact with a detachment of Garibaldi's allies under an
artillery officer named Orsini, and captured two guns. More than ever persuaded
that he was on the right track, he prosecuted his march beyond Corleone, but for
the second time found that Garibaldi had given him the slip; and on May 28 Von
Mechel received the news that the enemy whom he believed himself to be pursuing
had entered Palermo and were fighting in the streets of the capital!

What had happened was as follows. On May 25,
an hour before midnight, the Thousand had marched into Misilmeri, where a large
force of squadre had been assembled by La Masa, and on the following day
Garibaldi took the opinion of the Sicilian leaders as to the best line of
action. "A Palermo! A Palermo!" rang the voices of most of them, but they
were not men of military experience, and it may well be doubted whether trained
officers would have sanctioned what everybody knew would be the next move,
except as a forlorn hope. The Sicilians claimed the post of honor, and it was
agreed that they should march in front of the North Italians. This unfortunate
concession, which it must have been difficult to avoid, endangered the success
of the enterprise, but the mistake was neutralized, to some extent, by the
formation of an advance guard of scouts and pickets drawn from each company of
the Thousand. The route chosen was not the public highway, but a more direct
road leading from the summit of Gibilrossa Pass on toward Ciacalli, and thence
into the Conca d'Oro.

While Garibaldi was at Misilmeri he received a visit from a Hungarian named
Eber, who was acting as correspondent for the English Times, who gave him to
understand that the most vulnerable point—the Achilles' heel of the
Palermitan defenses—was on the side of Gibilrossa. For this reason
Garibaldi resolved to assault the so-called Porta Termini, but all chance of
surprising the enemy was destroyed by the frantic behavior of Rotolo's Sicilians
in shouting and firing off their guns. When, therefore, the
Garibaldian vanguard under Tukory, a brave Hungarian, made a dash on the Ponte
dell' Ammiraglio, they encountered a murderous reception. The brave fellows
quailed, but did not fall back. The three thousand Sicilians, on the other hand,
disappeared like magic into the vineyards that lined both sides of the road.

Then the voice of Garibaldi was heard crying "Avanti, Cacciatori, avanti!
Entrate nel centro!" ("Forward, my men, forward! Make your way into the
heart of the city!"). The Genoese carbineers and the two leading companies of
Bixio's battalions responded like heroes, and after a desperate struggle hurled
back the enemy. Over a mile distant was the spot known as the Porta
Termini—there had been a gate there once—and thither the bulk of the
Thousand raced, Garibaldi and a few of the staff remaining to fetch out the
runaways from the vineyards.

The Porta Termini was defended by a high barricade, and the credit of pulling it
down belongs especially to Bixio, who, though he carried a bullet in his breast,
would not relax his efforts until a passage was cleared. Tukory, alas! was
mortally wounded. Garibaldi, still shouting "Avanti! Avanti!" led the way
into the city on horseback; and what was left of the Thousand followed him
without flinching to the Fiera Vecchia (Old Market-place). The road was slippery
with blood and the Sicilians did not like cross-fires, but, in point of fact,
the royalists were poor rifle-shots. In order to convince the peasants that the
danger was much less than they
supposed, Francesco Carbone, a Genoese lad of seventeen, sat down on a chair
with the tricolor unfurled above it, and calmly exposed himself to the
Neapolitan bullets.

This exhibition had a good effect, and from that moment the squadre
showed more and more determination and courage. The city population also rose,
and barricades were erected, first of carriages and household furniture, and
then of large paving stones. Street-fighting proceeded continuously; and on the
third day, May 29, a battle raged in the Archbishop's Palace and in the
Cathedral. After a stubborn conflict the Neapolitans got the upper hand, and it
was reported to Garibaldi that they were advancing into the middle of the city.
Taking fifty men with him, mostly civilians, the General ordered his bugler to
sound the charge, and the enemy were driven in headlong flight to the Cathedral.

The losses of the Neapolitans had been serious, but not serious enough to
provoke thoughts of surrender. They were suffering, however, from a shortage of
provisions. General Lanza, therefore, humbled himself so far as to address a
note to "his Excellency General Garibaldi." But for his straits it may be
doubted whether the Neapolitan commander would have adopted this courteous
style. It is true Garibaldi had served in the Piedmontese army with the brevet
of a major-general, but Cavour not having openly supported the expedition, its
leader was technically a filibuster and might be considered to have forfeited
his temporary rank and distinction,

Lanza suggested that a conference should take place between two of his officers
and Garibaldi, on board the flagship of the English Admiral, Sir Rodney Mundy.
An armistice was arranged, which was to commence at noon the same day (May 30),
and Garibaldi, in company with the Neapolitan officers—who would have
preferred separate accommodation—proceeded in a boat of H.M.S.
Hannibal to the English man-o'-war, where both sides were saluted with
equal honor by a guard of marines. Garibaldi had donned for the occasion the
uniform of a Piedmontese general—a proceeding quite in harmony with his
secret understanding with Cavour.

THEASSAULTOFTHEBARRICADEAT PORTA TERMINI.

Admiral Mundy had protested against the bombardment of Palermo by the Neapolitan
warships, and throughout the affair had acted as moderator in the interests of
humanity, but the conduct of the British consul seems equally to deserve
mention. Old Mr. Goodwin, who had for forty years served his country in that
capacity in Italy, was implored to take refuge on board the Hannibal
during the bombardment, but steadfastly refused. Over the balcony of the
consulate floated the red English ensign, and the area was packed with a
multitude of women and children, who felt that there, if anywhere, they might
expect safety. Once Mr. Goodwin was asked by Maniscalco, the chief of police, if
he did not think it right that people who rebelled against their lawful rulers
should be annihilated. White with indignation, the Englishman expressed surprise
that such a question should have been addressed to him, but, as Signor
Maniscalco had chosen to consult him, he felt bound to reply that tyranny on the
part of a government always gave just cause for armed insurrection.

On the very morning of the conference Von Mechel arrived, and overcoming a small
guard of Sicilians posted at the Porta Termini, forced his way to the Fiera
Vecchia—the identical route that had been followed by Garibaldi. One of
his battalions, consisting of Bavarians, was the finest in the army, and the
whole force was in splendid condition. The Hungarian, General Turr, conversing
many years afterward with Mr. G. M. Trevelyan, remarked, "If Von Mechel had
arrived a day earlier, we should have been lost." As it was, the gallant Swiss
was with difficulty restrained from prosecuting his advantage, and paid little
heed to the remonstrances of Lieutenant Wilmot, who pointed out that a breach of
the truce would implicate the British admiral. Lanza's officers, who had been
charged with the General's note to Garibaldi, then appeared, and, after
listening to their explanations Von Mechel reluctantly suspended operations,
though he would not recede from the position he had captured. It seems that for
a short time Lanza and his staff were half disposed to ignore the truce and
seize the opportunity to effect the reconquest of the city. Finally more
honorable counsels prevailed, and in the afternoon the conference took place, as
arranged.

There were present not only the representatives of the contending forces, but
the British, French, American, and Piedmontese admirals. The
Neapolitans proposed that the people of Palermo should address a humble petition
to King Francis, the feeble successor of Ferdinand, defining their wishes; but
Garibaldi emphatically rejected the suggestion, and the conference broke up
without result. Garibaldi now seriously thought of a retreat over the mountains,
partly because he was in great want of ammunition. During the night, however, a
Greek vessel put in with a cargo of powder; and meanwhile the populace worked
with a will to hem in Von Mechel with barricades.

Lanza fully intended to attack at noon, May 31, but on ascertaining that Von
Mechel was isolated and the Palermitans in a mood to resist to the uttermost, he
agreed to extend the armistice. The Government of Naples was consulted, and at
length, on June 6, terms of capitulation were signed. The royal forces were to
evacuate the Palace and other parts of the city immediately, the sole exception
being the Castellamare, which, with its six prisoners of state, was to be handed
over to Garibaldi later. The garrison was to march out with the honors of war.
It numbered twenty thousand men, while of Garibaldi's Thousand only three
hundred and ninety remained.

On June 18 Medici arrived in the Gulf of Castellamare, twenty-five miles west of
Palermo, with a well-equipped force of three thousand five hundred, too late to
assist in the capture of the city. Splendid as was that achievement, however, it
was not the conclusion of Garibaldi's enterprise; and the new contingent was a
welcome addition to his attenuated army. On
the following day the last detachment of Neapolitans embarked for the mainland,
their departure being watched by huge crowds of citizens; and at the same time
the Castellamare was surrendered to Garibaldi. There, in a little room over the
gateway, Baron Riso and five young nobles, with their parents and other
relations, were ushered into the presence of their deliverer, who, it was
observed, had tears in his eyes.