Considered
and decided by Randall, Presiding Judge, Kalitowski, Judge, and Huspeni, Judge.*

U N P U B L I S H E D
O P I N I O N

RANDALL, Judge

Appellants
appeal denial of their post-trial motion for JNOV and amended findings or,
alternatively, a new trial. Appellants
argue that the district court erred in its determination that respondent’s
rental increase was not retaliatory, abused its discretion in a number of evidentiary
rulings, and showed bias.

FACTS

Appellants
Ron Schaff and George Sayer are individual residents of Cedar Knolls
Manufactured Home Community (Cedar Knolls) in Apple Valley and represent a class of
individuals consisting of residents of Cedar Knolls. Respondent is the owner of Cedar Knolls.

The
lease between appellants and respondent provides that modification of the lease’s
terms and rule changes may only be made upon 60 days written notice to the
residents. The lease also provides that
rent increases must be reasonable. Both
lease provisions are in accordance with Minnesota
law.

In
December 1998, respondent gave the residents notice that water meters had been
installed and residents would, as of March 1, 1999, be billed directly for
their water and sewer usage in addition to rent. The residents were also informed that, as of
March 1, 1999, monthly rent would be reduced by $29 in order to offset the imposition
of direct utility
charges. Prior to March 1, 1999, the
water and sewer expenses had been included in the base rent on a pro rata basis
regardless of usage.

A. Cedar Knolls I

A
previous action (Cedar Knolls I) seeking damages and injunctive relief was filed
by Schaff and two other residents, William Anderson and David Knutson. The case was tried to a jury on March 22-24,
2004. During the trial, each of the
named plaintiffs testified that they wanted respondent to revert to the flat rate
amount in monthly rent to cover utility expenses.

Schaff testified:

Q: Is it also your position in this case that you want the park to go
back to a situation where instead of there being separate metering, you want a
situation where the sewer and water is once again included in the rent for
everybody?

Schaff: Those that have a lease that read the same as mine, yes sir.

William Anderson testified:

Q: And you understand, do you not, that if in fact, as you are
suggesting, the park should change how it bills for sewer and water, that that
will result in going back to the old way where it’s just simply the same for
everybody, correct? Do you understand
that?

Anderson: I understand
that.

Q: And that’s what you are saying
you want?

Anderson: Yes.

David Knutson testified:

Q: You are asking to go back to a flat rate, aren’t you? You want it included again in the rent?

Knutson: Yeah.

Q: It used to be included, the park changed that and separately
metered. Now you want it to be included
again, right?

Knutson: Right.

The
jury found in favor of the plaintiff class and awarded appellants approximately
$384,000 in damages relating to the past utilities charges. And the district court ordered respondent to stop
assessing charges for water and sewer usage pursuant to the 1999 rule
change. Because approximately one-third
of the current residents of Cedar Knolls were members of the class in Cedar
Knolls I, this injunctive order prohibited respondent from continuing to impose
the 1999 rule change against one-third of its residents.

The
residents who were not part of the class in Cedar Knolls I had entered into
leases that did not include utilities in the rental agreement. These residents were metered in 1999 and,
thus, paid sewer and water charges according to actual usage.

Respondent
requested a stay of enforcement of the injunction while it appealed. The request was denied. On April 28, 2004, respondent notified its
residents by letter of another proposed rule change. The letter stated,

In March 1999, a rental reduction of $29.00 per month was implemented
to offset the impact of the rule change by which you were invoiced monthly for
your individual water and sewer usage.
Prior to March 1999, the amounts incurred by Cedar Knolls for your water
and sewer usage had been an expense, which was included in your monthly
rent.

Because a number of residents brought a class action lawsuit
challenging the individual metering, a flat amount for the expense incurred by
Cedar Knolls for sewer and water usage will again be included in your monthly
rent. We are notifying you that
effective July 1, 2004, you will no longer be billed for your individual sewer
and water usage, and the rent for your home site will increase by $36.00 per
month to $464.00.

At that time, respondent gave notice of the monthly
increase of $36 per month to all residents.

B. Cedar Knolls II

On
April 30, 2004, Schaff and Sayer initiated this lawsuit on behalf of all
residents of Cedar Knolls, alleging that the proposed rule change (which was in
addition to a January 2004 increase of $18 per month) is retaliatory and
violates Minn. Stat. §327C.12 (2004); that it is an unenforceable substantial
modification of the lease and violates Minn. Stat. § 327C.02, subd. 2
(2004; and that the proposed rule change is a breach of the lease agreements.

The
underlying action was tried before the district court on June 14 and 15,
2004. It is undisputed that the
residents received a $29 decrease in rent when the metering and separate
billing had commenced with the 1999 rule change. Thus, the $36 a year increase represents a net
increase of $7 per month over a five-year period.

Kyle
Howieson, respondent’s regional manager, testified at trial that the April 28,
2004 rule change was in response to the court’s order to cease charging
separately for utilities. Howieson
testified that the change was based on amounts charged respondent by the City
of Apple Valley
for water and sewer services. Howieson also
testified that he looked at a 12-month period and calculated the monthly
averages. Howieson testified further that
he did not consider the amount of the damages verdict in Cedar Knolls I in
determining the amount of the rental increase.

Respondent
also offered the testimony of Rodger Skare, a licensed real estate appraiser
and senior vice president at Colliers International. Colliers is a full-service commercial real
estate company. Skare compared the rents
charged at five other manufactured home communities in the vicinity of Cedar
Knolls. Based on this comparison, Skare
concluded that the rule change was reasonable.
Appellants’ counsel cross-examined Skare at length about his
compilations and calculations.

On June
22, 2004, the district court issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law
and order for judgment. The district
court found that the judgment in Cedar Knolls I prohibited respondent from
enforcing the 1999 rule change against one-third of its residents. And the court found that the named plaintiffs
in Cedar Knolls I wanted respondent to return to the situation where a flat
amount for water and sewer usage was included in their monthly lot rent. The district court also noted that none of
appellants’ witnesses offered any evidence as to the impact of the proposed
rule change on other residents. Further,
the district court noted that respondent had demonstrated through Howieson’s
testimony that the overall economic impact of the proposed rule change on all
of the residents would be less than $1 per month, higher or lower, for the
average Cedar Knolls resident. Finally,
the district court pointed out that the proposed base rent of $464 is
consistent with what residents of Cedar Knolls would have been paying had
individual metering never been implemented.

Based
on these findings, the district court concluded that the proposed $36 increase
was reasonable, and that the rule change was neither unreasonable nor a
substantial modification of the lease agreements. The court also concluded that the increase
was not a penalty under the statute.

Appellants
subsequently brought a post-trial motion for JNOV and amended findings, or,
alternatively, a new trial. On August
17, 2004, the district court denied appellants’ post trial motion. This appeal followed.

D E C I S I O N

Appellants
challenge the district court’s denial of their motion for JNOV and amended
findings or, alternatively, a new trial.
Because appellants had a bench trial, rather than a jury trial, they
were not entitled to bring a JNOV motion. “[A JNOV] motion is only available in jury
trials.” 1A David F. Herr & Roger S.
Haydock, Minnesota Practice § 50.10 (2003).
Therefore, we review appellants’ challenge, but we will analyze their
claims in the context of the district court’s denial of appellants’ motion for amended
findings and a new trial.

A court may amend its findings or make additional
findings, and, if judgment has been entered, amend the judgment
accordingly. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.02. On appeal, the scope of review is limited to
deciding whether the district court’s findings are clearly erroneous and
whether the district court erred in its legal conclusions. Foster
v. Bergstrom, 515 N.W.2d 581, 585 (Minn.
App. 1994). The district court’s
findings of fact will be reversed only if the reviewing court is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Snesrud
v. Instant Web, Inc., 484 N.W.2d 423, 428 (Minn. App. 1992), review
denied (Minn. June 17, 1992). The
district court also has the discretion to grant a new trial, and we will not
disturb such a decision absent a clear abuse of that discretion. Halla Nursery, Inc. v. Baumann-Furrie
& Co., 454 N.W.2d 905, 910 (Minn.
1990). However, a district court’s
decision on a purely legal issue is independently reviewed. Frost-Benco Elec. Ass’n v. Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n,
358 N.W.2d 639, 642 (Minn.
1984).

A. Retaliation

Appellants first challenge the district court’s
determination that the proposed rent increase was not retaliation for the civil
judgment in favor of the appellants in Cedar Knolls I. Minn. Stat. 327C.12 (2004) provides that an
owner of a manufactured home community may not increase rent as a penalty for a
resident’s attempt to exercise their rights or remedies under the law. Specifically, the statute provides that

[a] park owner may not
increase rent, decrease services, alter an existing rental agreement or seek to
recover possession or threaten such action in whole or in part as a penalty for
a resident’s:

(a) good faith
complaint to the park owner or to a government agency or official;

(b) good faith attempt
to exercise rights or remedies pursuant to state or federal law; or

(c) joining and
participating in the activities of a resident association as defined under
section 327C.01, subdivision 9a.

In any proceeding in
which retaliatory conduct is alleged, the burden of proving otherwise shall be
on the park owner if the owner's challenged action began within 90 days after
the resident engaged in any of the activities identified in clause (a), (b), or
(c). If the challenged action began more than 90 days after the resident
engaged in the protected activity, the party claiming retaliation must make a
prima facie case. The park owner must then prove otherwise.

Minn. Stat. § 327C.12. Further, under Minn. Stat. § 327C.06, subd. 2
(2004), “[n]o rent increase shall be valid if its purpose is to pay, in whole
or in part, any civil or criminal penalty imposed on the park owner by a court
or a government agency.”

Appellants argue that the increase here was retaliation for
the civil judgment in Cedar Knolls I. And
appellants contend that the district court failed to properly apply the
above-referenced statutory law to the facts in this case. Specifically, appellants contend that the
district court erred by not specifically citing Parkin v. Fitzgerald,
307 Minn.
423, 430, 240 N.W.2d 828, 832 (1976) in its findings. In Parkin,
the Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted the statutory predecessor to Minn.
Stat. § 504B.285, which protects tenants from retaliatory eviction by landlords.
The supreme court, in Parkin, adopted the following standard
in order to determine whether a landlord has satisfied his burden of proving a
nonretaliatory purpose for a tenant-adverse action:

A
landlord must establish by a fair preponderance of the evidence a substantial
nonretaliatory reason for the eviction, arising at or within a reasonably short
time before service of the notice to quit. A nonretaliatory reason is a reason
wholly unrelated to and unmotivated by any good-faith activity on the part of
the tenant protected by the statute (e.g., nonpayment of rent, other material
breach of covenant, continuing damage to premises by tenants, or removal of
housing unit from market for a sound business reason). Such a standard will
give full protection to tenants and will enhance the legislative policy of
liberal construction of statutory covenants to insure adequate housing.

Id. at 832-33.

To highlight the retaliatory nature of respondent’s proposed
rule change, appellants argue that, in an April 28, 2004 letter to residents, respondent
admitted that the proposed rule change was in response to the prior class
action. Appellants argue that this
letter, on its face, shows the retaliatory nature of respondent’s actions. Further, appellants argue that respondent’s
rental increase constituted a substantial modification for those residents who
were not part of Cedar Knolls I,
but had entered into agreements allowing for individually metered systems. Therefore, appellants argue, the district
court’s findings do not accurately reflect the facts of the case,[1]
nor do they reflect consideration of the applicable law, including respondent’s
burden of proof. We disagree.

While
the post-trial court did not issue findings in denying appellants’ motion,
there is sufficient evidence in the record to support its conclusions. On June 14 and 15, 2004, the case was tried before
the district court as a bench trial. In
its June 23, 2004 order, the district court found that:

3. In or around March 1999, [respondent’s]
predecessor implemented a rule change by which it reduced the monthly lot rent
for its residents by $29.00 per month and, at the same time, began separately
invoicing the residents for their individual sewer and water consumption based
upon metered usage. . . .

4. A class action lawsuit was commenced in late
2002 by a group of Cedar Knolls residents who contended that the March, 1999,
rule change reducing rent and imposing individual metered sewer and water
charges was unenforceable as an unreasonable rule and substantial modification
of their lease agreements. . . .

. . . .

6.
Cedar Knolls residents Ron Schaff, William Anderson, and David Knutson
were the named plaintiffs and class representatives in Cedar Knolls I. Each of these individuals testified during
the trial in Cedar Knolls I that they wanted [respondent] to stop
billing for sewer and water according to individual metered usage, and instead
to return to the situation that existed prior to the March 1999 rule change
where a flat equivalent amount for each resident’s sewer and water was included
in monthly lot rent.

7. On April 28, 2004 [respondent] notified its
residents that effective July 1, 2004, [respondent] would stop billing for
metered water and sewer usage and that at the same time the rent would be
increased by $36.00 per month.

Ultimately,
the district court concluded that the new rule change was not unreasonable or a
substantial modification and that it was not retaliatory.

It
is clear from the record that the $36 amount is a flat fee meant to supplant
the individual metering for utilities.
As part of that surcharge, the residents from Cedar Knolls I received a
rental reduction of $29 to effectuate the change in utilities from the flat
rate which was included in the rental payment prior to separate metering. The difference in the amounts was $7 per
month in a five-year period. We hold, as
a matter of law, that such an increase is not unreasonable. The residents who had been involved in the
first lawsuit (successfully) got what they wanted–a return to the old flat rate
system. The new tenants who had always
been on the metered system–were now charged a flat rate. Evidence was presented that the flat rate was
averaged from the actual utility bill. The
record indicates many of those complaining about the switch to a flat charge of
$36 a month were actually paying more than that on a metered basis for actual
usage. Respondent argues, logically,
that this new flat-rate billing will actually represent a savings to some of
the complainants. Finally, after
evaluating the credibility of the witnesses and weighing the evidence, the district
court sorted through the parties’ claims and defenses and concluded that there
was no violation of Minn. Stat. § 327.12C.
With the district court’s vantage point as the trier of fact, this
conclusion was well within its discretion.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to amend its
findings. The rent increase was not
retaliatory.

B. Evidentiary rulings and bias

Appellants next contend that the district court committed
a number of evidentiary errors, showed bias, and when taken cumulatively, these
errors show that appellants were deprived of a fair trial.

Evidentiary rulings are within the district court’s sound
discretion and will be reversed only if there has been an abuse of
discretion. Bahl v. Country Club Mkt.,
Inc., 410 N.W.2d 916, 919 (Minn.
App. 1987). The admission of expert
opinion testimony is within the broad discretion of the district court. State v. Ritt, 599 N.W.2d 802, 810 (Minn. 1999); Dunshee v. Douglas, 255 N.W.2d 42, 47
(Minn. 1977). “If scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact at issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise.” Minn. R. Evid. 702.

Appellants argue that the admission of Mr. Skare’s expert
testimony and exhibits, which did not include the $36.00 increase, was in error. Appellants further argue that the district
court should not have considered the data from apartment rental or those mobile
home parks “hand-picked” by respondent. The
district further compounded the error, appellants argue, when it refused to
include appellants’ exhibits 22 and 23 which used Skare’s data but included the
$36.00 rental increase omitted by Skare’s exhibit. Additionally, appellants
argue that the district court was biased against them. We disagree.

Here, the district court heard
expert testimony from Mr. Skare regarding comparable properties. Skare supplied a number of exhibits to the
court, as well as testified based upon his expertise in real estate
appraisals. The issue of the $36.00, or
lack thereof, in the exhibits was brought up during cross-examination. Therefore, the district court was apprised of
this issue and weighed the evidence with this in mind. With regard to the data on apartments
buildings, the district court determined that the data was not going to be
“terribly helpful” so limited the amount of testimony in this area. The court did, however, determine that the
data from other mobile home parks could be instructive. Skare admitted that the data was not
comprehensive, and appellants had the ability to rebut this evidence with its
own evidence. With regard to the
exclusion of exhibits 22 and 23, these exhibits were prepared by appellant’s
own counsel. The district court
concluded that the exhibits were being entered for argument, which had already
been addressed during cross-examination.
Finally, we find no bias on the part of the district court in this
matter.

The district court did not err in
refusing to amend its findings. There is
evidence reasonably supporting the findings.
The district court properly denied appellants’ motion for a new
trial. See ZumBerge v. N. States Power Co., 481 N.W.2d 103, 110 (Minn.
App. 1992) (“[o]n appeal from a denial of a motion for a new trial, the verdict
must stand unless it is manifestly and palpably contrary to the evidence,
viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict.”), review denied (Minn. Apr. 29, 1992).

[1] Specifically, appellants attack the findings
that the rent increase was necessary in order to comply with Cedar Knolls I. Also, throughout the findings, the district
court used the terms “rental increase” and “utility charges” interchangeably,
even though the statute defines these two terms separately.