Monday, 27 April 2015

In a recent post, Gillan Scott, deputy editor of the
Archbishop Cranmer blog, suggested that the Church of England might be more
interested in managing decline than engaging in mission [1]. He quotes Peter
Broadbent, Bishop of Willesden:

“Unfortunately, there are bishops around the place who think:
‘Well actually, we’ve just got to cater for this ongoing decline in our
Church.’ And I worry about that.”

Gillan goes on to illustrate the point with his own growing
church, which has been unable to appoint a much-needed assistant because of the
shortage of clergy elsewhere in the diocese. Put simply, the needs of the
institution have priority over the needs of an individual congregation. The
implication is that institutionalism is a barrier to church growth and is a
contributor to church decline. Gillan states:

But often it would appear that those churches which are
growing are doing so despite rather than because of the structures and
hierarchy.

Institutionalism happens when the organisation has grown to
the point that it must maintain its “structures and hierarchy”, and the role of
its individual parts is to service that maintenance. It stifles local innovation
and thus limits growth. If decline sets in, then the organisation cannot
produce sufficient new growth to recover.

Organisational Lifecycle

Institutionalism is an example of a stage in a lifecycle
that can affect any organisation, religious, political, corporate, or cultural;
a church, a company, or even a nation. Adizes [2, p.103] spells out the
corporate lifecycle, to summarise: Courtship, Infant, Adolescent, Prime,
Aristocracy, Bureaucracy, and Death. It is at the aristocracy stage where
institutionalism sets in through internal politics [2, p.106], despite, or perhaps
because of its success. Formality replaces informality, money is spent on
control rather than sales and innovation, and the emphasis moves on to how things are done, rather than why [2, p.64].

The organisational lifecycle has been applied to individual
congregations [3]. McIntosh gives the stages as: Emerging, Growing,
Consolidating, Declining, and Dying [3]. By the declining stage the purpose of
the church has been forgotten because of the work needed to keep afloat what
they have left. Applying this lifecycle to a denomination, like the Church of
England, it can be seen that most in the UK are now institutions somewhere
between the declining and dying stage.

A Model of Decline By Institutionalism

Because of the generic pattern of an organisational
lifecycle, the situation is ideal for a system dynamics explanation. System
dynamics is a modelling methodology that links behaviour to cause and effect.
To keep things as simple as possible, just consider two variables: Church, the number of people in the
denomination; and Institutionalism,
the collection of variables that indicate the church’s emphasis on the wider
corporate needs, rather than the local work where growth takes place [4]. Institutionalism is an example of a soft
variable, one that is hard to measure, but whose meaning is generally
understood [5].

Consider 3 hypotheses:

1.The more people in church, the more are added to
the church. This is feedback loop R1, figure 1.

2.The more people in church, the more leave,
feedback loop B1, figure 1.

3.Themore people in church, the more it becomes institutionalised, thus the
less are added to the church, loop B2, figure 1.

Figure 1: Causal
Loop Diagram of Church and Institutional Growth

The feedback loops are causally circular, with the effect
“feeding back” to change the original cause. R1 is a reinforcing loop, a
virtuous cycle, giving exponential church growth. B2 is a balancing loop,
limiting the growth of the church due to rising institutionalism. Lay people
and clergy move from innovative agents of evangelism to people whose role is
merely to “turn up, pay up and shut up”, servicing the institutional needs. B1
is also balancing, reducing the size of the church.

R1 can be thought of as a positive force, with B1 and B2 as
negative forces opposing it. The future size of the church depends on which
force “wins”.

In order to examine the outcome of the hypotheses, a system
dynamics model is required. This will enable computer simulation to illustrate the
models behaviour. Readers who prefer to avoid technical details can skip the
next section!

System Dynamics Model

The model is given in figure 2. There is one stock for the church, where both R1 and B1 come from
connections to its flows. Institutionalism
is also a stock, the loop B2 being formed, through the flows: growth of institutionalism, and add to church.

Figure 2: System Dynamics Model of Church and Institutional Growth

Three further hypotheses are needed. B3 is a resistive force
that represents the difficulty of increasing institutionalism when it gets near
the organisational capacity. R2 is a positive force coming from people within
the church who want to increase denominational institutionalism, perhaps for
their own self-preservation or power. B4 represents attempts to reduce
institutionalism.

Model Results

Assume there are no attempts to reduce institutionalism.
Instead it is allowed to grow to capacity, the situation that perhaps
represents many denominations. A
new denomination grows rapidly, through R1, for around 50-70 years figure 3,
curve 1. Institutionalism also grows although its growth is delayed compared
with that of the church, figure 3, curve 2.

Figure 3: Results of Church and Institutional Growth Model

Around the 70 year mark church growth slows and reaches a
peak because the effects of institutionalism, B2, have slowed the growth,
allowing additions to the church to just about balance the number leaving
(which includes death), figure 4. After that point the losses exceed the
additions and the church denomination continues to decline until it is
eventually extinct, figure 3. In reality the extinction is faster, a straight
line rather than the slowing curve of figure 1, as aging becomes a factor. This
extinction has come about because institutionalism has been allowed to saturate
at capacity, and no attempt has been made to reduce it.

Figure 4:
Comparison of Additions to, and Losses from, Church

Note that extinction has resulted regardless of the size of
the target population (unlimited in this model). Extinction in this model is
due to a lack of supply, not alack of demand.

As this model is for illustrative purposes only, the values
of timescales and the church size should not be taken literally. They are merely
relative. They may have different values depending on the denomination, or
their social setting. It is in the shape
of the curves that the model illustrates reality [4].

Combating Institutionalism

A policy is introduced whereby the church attempts to reduce
institutionalism (B4) in proportion to the amount of net decline it
experiences. That is, the policy is not enacted until decline takes place. The
policy is allowed an average of a 30 year delay to take full effect; a high
number because it needs to effect most of the denomination, not just a few
parts [6].

One such result shows church decline slowing from about 110
years, but it is insufficient to bring about growth, figure 5, curve 1. The
oscillation in institutionalism is due to the delay between policy
implementation and effect. Once it is perceived to have some effect on reducing
decline, the policy backs off, before it has time to have full effect.

Figure 5: Attempt to Reduce Institutionalism in Proportion to Net Church Losses

Of course the effect of the policy on halting decline
depends on its effectiveness in dealing with institutional resistance. Figure 6
shows the base case of no such policy, curve 1, compared with 3 policies of
differing effectiveness, curves 2-4. It shows that it is possible for a
declining church to get back to growth. However the policy should be continue
to be applied with the same intensity, and not applied less just because
numbers recover a bit, as in these simulations. Complacency in results will
breed oscillations, instability and eventually decline, as many companies know
to their cost.

Figure 6: Comparison of Attempts to Reduce Institutionalism (2-4), with No Attempt (1).

Denominational Decline

What does actual denominational decline look like? The
Church of England does not have consistent membership figures over a long
period of time, and it is only in the last few decades that attendance has been
measured. However the Methodist Church has good membership statistics over most
of its lifetime [7]. The graph is shown in figure 7.

Figure 7: Membership of Methodist Church of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Some of the growth from 1760 to 1900 in figure 7 was
population growth, but the bulk of it was due to conversion. The length of the
growth phase indicates that the Methodist church successfully dealt with issues
of institutionalism during its early stages, especially in the transition from
the first generation of leaders. Note a split in the 1850s and the effect of
revival in 1904-5, which contrary to popular belief had considerable impact in England
as well as Wales.

However from 1900 onwards the numbers plateaued, and then
fell from the Second World War onwards, with a blip in the 1950s, probably due
to Billy Graham crusades. Comparing figure 7 with figure 3 it is clear that if
institutionalism is one of the causes of Methodist decline, then it has not
been tackled, and extinction is not far away.

This is not just a Methodist issue. Statistics indicate that
most pre-20th century denominations will be extinct by 2050, except the
Church of England, whose decline is slower, and the Baptists, who are independently
organised. By the middle of the century the Christian landscape will be
dominated by what are now Pentecostal and independent churches, who may well
have changed and have their own issues with institutionalism by then.

Such decline is not just a church phenomenon. By 2050 the
inability of most Western societies to deal with their huge debts may have led
to their downsizing, (euphemism for becoming poorer!) And all nations will be
hit by dwindling natural resources and climate change, with a likely decline in
world population. The lack of a few Christian denominations may be the least of
the problems faced by people in the middle of the century!

Tackling Institutionalism and Recovering Growth

Can institutionalism in denominations be tackled and growth
recovered? Given countries’ inability to deal with their debts, energy needs,
and climate change – always too little too late – it does not bode well. Church
is an even more sluggish institution!

Gillan Scott suggests that the
battle for the church’s very existence, its numerical survival, is more
important than its current struggle on how it deals with LGBT issues [1]. As a
“gay-affirming” ideology continues to spread in the West, the church has become
dominated by debates on introducing same-sex marriage, and falling into line
with government policy, rather than how it can avoid decline, extinction and
see growth. Which issue is more important? Perhaps the two issues are connected.

The policy to introduce
same-sex marriage in the church could be construed as a force for institutionalism, as it assists the
desire of a denomination to remain relevant
to society. I do not know about the Church of England, but in the Church
in Wales the policy is being driven by the denominational leadership, and those it employs [8]; the ones with the most to lose if the denomination becomes
irrelevant, and the least to lose if the revised marriage policy is introduced.
Introducing same-sex marriage seems a classic case of a policy designed to
service the needs of an institution, rather than help the individual and
congregational agents of growth.As such, if introduced, it will be a force to maintain the
institutionalism that is resisting the church’s attempt to avoid extinction,
part of feedback loop R2, figure 2 [9].

What could be a way forward for denominations with institutionalism issues?

If we accept that most
historic denominations are heading for extinction in their current form [10],
then, rather than make minor changes to that form, perhaps it is better to
discontinue the form altogether. That is, policies are needed to deregulatehow congregations operate. Let a denomination divide up into
smaller groupings with different beliefs of liberal and conservative
persuasions. Allow congregations to join the group they identify with best, or
go independent.

Allow congregations to pay for
their own ministers and not have to send money into a central pot. Let them
keep all their income, so that if successful they can invest in their work, or that
of their chosen associates. Let congregations choose ministers from outside denominational
ranks, and adapt their operational management and clergy structures. What is
left of central denominations can provide support services, pensions, advice
etc, on a consultancy basis.

Such deregulated
denominations would allow spiritual renewal to flourish with less hinderance, with
healthy competition driving up standards. Enthusiasts would be generated,
conversions would follow. This I think would give the best chance for avoiding
extinction and encourage church growth. It would probably look a bit like the
early church.

Adizes,
I. (1992). Corporate Lifecycles: How and
why corporations grow and die and what to do about it. NYIF.

[3]

Arn,
W. (1985). Five Stages in the Life-Cycle
of Churches, Pasadena, CA: American Church Growth.

Davies,
G. Understanding Parish Growth Stages,
Diocese of Sydney.

McIntosh
G.L. (2009). Taking Your Church To The
Next Level, Baker Books.

Saarinen,
M.F. (2001). The Life Cycle of a
Congregation, MD:Alban Institute.

[4]

This
is an example of a metaphorical model, one whose purpose is to provide
transferable insight, rather than exactly replicate a specific situation. See
Morecroft J. (2007). Strategic Modelling
and Business Dynamics. Wiley. P.414.

For
an example of a delay between introducing a policy and its effect, consider
charismatic renewal. It started in the early 1960s, but it was not until the
1990s did the cultural change it introduced become widespread in the church.
The Alpha Course, the movement’s most influential tool, came about in the 1990s.
Most of the church has still not embraced the cultural and spiritual change and
probably never will.

[7]

Data
for 1767-1970 is taken from: Currie R. Gilbert A.D. & Horsley L. (1977). Churches and Churchgoers: Patterns of Church
Growth in the British Isles since 1700, table A3. Before the formation of
the Methodist Church of GB and NI the different church streams have been added
together.

Data
for 2000, 2010, and estimates of 2015, 2020 are taken from Brierley P. (2014). UK Church Statistics 2015-2020, Brierley
Consultancy.

[8]

The current consultation on same-sex marriages in the Church in Wales comes from its governing body and Bench of Bishops. There has been no movement of lay people or clergy calling for change; no protests at the current status quo; no congregational petitions to the leadership; no emergence of prayer-groups praying for change of the definition of marriage. The call for change is top-down, not bottom-up, suggesting it is driven by institutional needs, not congregational or individual.

[9]

It
could be argued that introducing same-sex marriage in church would attract more
people because of the marriages, and the church’s increased relevance to
society. These hypotheses are not in the model. They could be added by allowing
the church to draw from a limited pool of people, rather than the unlimited
pool in figure 2. The pool could then be divided into people who would favour
the policy, the ambivalent, and those opposed. In addition, the effect of the
policy on church leaving rates would need to be added. Model calibration would
be difficult. My conversations with researchers in the USA denominations that
have introduced same-sex blessings and marriages is that the effect on people
leaving is larger than that of people joining, and that neither were major factors in the denominations’ decision to implement the policies.

[10]

It is
denominationalism that is heading for extinction in the UK, not Christianity, and not all congregations currently part of historic denominations. Some will
survive and grow.

Friday, 3 April 2015

Nagaland, an Indian state bordering Burma, saw dramatic
growth in the number of Christians during the 20th century [1]. Composed of 16
separate tribes with different languages, the Naga people use English as their
predominant language, which has undoubtedly helped the spread of
Christianity. The growth of
Christianity among 13 of the tribes has been documented by Paul Hattaway [1],
showing substantial church growth through the 1950s and 1960s, with a massive
increase in growth from 1976. Reading the narrative [1] there had been a series
of evangelistic campaigns with sporadic and regional revival for 20 years, but then
from 1976 there was a nationwide outpouring of the Holy Spirit, a national
revival. By 1980 the church had increased by 55% in 4 years; from 26% of the
Christian population in 1976, to
41% of the population in 1980 [2].

The Naga churches were largely Baptist, having been founded
by such missionaries earlier in the 20th century. The Baptist church
membership data for the period was obtained by Edwin Orr [3]:

At the time of the revival the Naga state was largely closed
to outsiders due to tensions with the Indian government. Thus the revival was a
purely internal affair and ideal to compare with the Limited Enthusiasm model
[4]. The starting date for the revival was1976 [1], where the
church had experienced a moderate increase from the previous year. Thus the comparison between data and model runs from 1976 to 1982, with the 1979 data excluded, as it is lower than expected [5].

The model simulation,
given in figure 1, shows a good fit to all points (except 1979), with a
reproduction potential of around 1.46. The
enthusiastic period for the Nagaland revival is 6 months, which is 8 times larger than that of the 1904/5 Welsh revival, which
explains why the revival in Nagaland lasted so much longer than in Wales. This
longer enthusiastic period may well be due to a lower population density in
Nagaland, compared with Wales, with the associated longer journey and
communication times.

Figure 1: Church Membership Nagaland and Limited Enthusiasm Model

The huge impact of the revival on the growth of the church
can be seen by the reduction in the number of unbelievers, figure 2. The graph also shows an unusual nature
of this revival, that in 1976 the church started with a large number of
enthusiasts, who reached their peak in 1977 (figure 2), even though most of revival,
and the growth, was after that date. Thus the revival appeared to be different
to the normal pattern, where revivals start with only a few enthusiasts and
take time to build. In this sense the enthusiasm was skewed towards the
beginning of the revival, with much of the converts due to that initial
enthusiastic momentum.

The skewed nature of the revival is also seen in figure 3,
which shows the reproduction potential above the threshold for only one year
after the start of the revival (indicated by the arrow) [6]. Once a sufficient
number of unbelievers were converted the threshold rose above the reproduction
potential and the revival growth slowed.

An attempt was made to fit the Limited Enthusiasm model to
the data from 1975 in order to include a slow build up of numbers, but no
satisfactory fit could be found. That leaves the question as to the origin of
the large number of enthusiasts in 1976, given there had been little church
growth before that year. There are at least three possibilities:

1.Between 1975 and 1976 a small number of
enthusiasts made many new enthusiasts from the inactive believers - the renewal
process;

2.Between those dates the spiritual life of the
enthusiasts was building, raising the reproduction potential until it tipped
the church into revival and produced a large number of enthusiasts;

3.There was a sudden mass baptism with the Holy
Spirit of many believers between 1975 and 1976 - a Nagaland Pentecost.

All three theories could be tested by extensions to the
limited enthusiasm model. However the reality may go back further than 1975.
Hattaway notes [1, p.84] that the revivals of the 1960s had left the churches
with a lack of trained leadership for the host of new converts. Thus it is
possible that growth was being stifled for organisational reasons, rather than
a lack of the Holy Spirit. They could not disciple converts fast enough, or retain them in church.

However in 1972 the evangelist Billy Graham visited Nagaland
and was responsible for many leaders dedicating themselves to Christian service
and to being appropriately trained. Over 100,000 had gathered to hear him
preach in the capital, Kohima. The following 4 years saw an increase in prayer
meetings for revival with “tremendous demonstrations of God’s power” [1, p.85].
It is likely that by 1976 the new leaders were both spiritually and practically
prepared to cope with revival and were a crucial part of the large number of
enthusiasts at its beginning.

In that case it can be concluded that Billy Graham was a key
catalyst in the huge Nagaland outpouring of 1976-1982, even though he was not there
during the period! But his preparatory work was critical. Revivals come from
the work of the Holy Spirit and good preparation.

References & Notes

[1] Hattaway P. (2006), From Head-Hunters
to Church Planters, Piquant.

[2] The population here refers to the nominal Christian
population, about 75% of the total population. The remainder of the total population
were tribal religions, Muslims, Hindus etc. The 1970s revival was a phenomenon
within the Christian community. The previous decades saw Christian growth at
the expense of the indigenous tribal religions, but had left many with the name
Christian but without the commitment and church attendance.

[5] There are at least three possibilities for the
discrepancy in 1979.

Firstly, the reporting of church membership data can be
delayed in a particular year if there were some mitigating circumstances. Given
the ongoing conflict between the Indian government and the Naga state, and the
difficulty of travel in the country, it easy to see how this can happen. If the
1979 figure had been genuinely low then the pattern would have carried on until
1980. However the 1980 figure follows from 1976-1978.

Secondly, there could be two phases to the revival; one
ending in 1979, and another starting in 1980. This is not mentioned in
Hattaway’s book [1], but that does not mean it did not happen.

Thirdly, the delays in the geographical spread of the
revival could have hindered growth in one year. The Limited Enthusiasm church
growth model, like the SIR epidemic model, assumes homogenous mixing. The Naga
terrain, and varied ethnicity, is anything but homogeneous!

[6] The reproduction potential measures the strength of the revival. It is the number of enthusiasts, not just converts, that one enthusiast could potentially make during the whole of their enthusiastic period. The Limited Enthusiasm model shows that revival growth takes place if the reproduction potential exceeds a threshold. This threshold increases as the pool of potential converts, the unbelievers, gets smaller. Thus revivals end before everyone is converted.