Thursday, April 3, 2014

Some thoughts on Soviet tank reliability in WWII

The Eastern
front was the largest land campaign of WWII and millions of soldiers fought and
died there in the period 1941-45. Although infantry dominated the fighting both
sides used a large number of tanks and armored vehicles and these played a big
role in breakthrough operations. Most historians focus on the ‘paper’
characteristics of tanks and the production statistics however a very important
aspect of complex weapon systems is their reliability and kill/loss ratio. In
the East the Germans were always outnumbered but the exchange
ratios were in their favor. I’ve often wondered of how much that has to do with
poor reliability of Soviet equipment.

Here is
something I read recently from ‘Moscow
to Stalingrad: Decision in the East’ by Earl F. Ziemke, in page 363:

Active as it was, the Soviet armor was
apparently not giving fully satisfactory performance at this stage, and in
early August, it became the subject of the following Stalin order:

‘Our armored forces and their units
frequently suffer greater losses through mechanical breakdowns than they do in
battle. For example, at Stalingrad Front in six days twelve of our tank
brigades lost 326 out of their 400 tanks. Of those about 260 owed to mechanical
problems. Many of the tanks were abandoned on the battlefield. Similar
instances can be observed on other fronts. Since such a high incidence of
mechanical defects is implausible, the Supreme Headquarters sees in it covert
sabotage and wrecking by certain elements in the tank crews who try to exploit
small mechanical troubles to avoid battle.’

Henceforth, every tank leaving the
battlefield for alleged mechanical reasons was to be gone over by technicians,
and if sabotage was suspected, the crews were to be put into tank punishment
companies or "degraded to the infantry" and put into infantry
punishment companies.'"

‘Regardless of our limited experience, it can be stated
that the Russian tanks are not suitable for long road marches and high speeds.
It has turned out that the highest speed that can be achieved is 10 to 12
km/hr. It is also necessary on marches to halt every half hour for at least 15
to 20 minutes to let the machine cool down. Difficulties and breakdowns of the
steering clutches have occurred with all the new Beute-Panzer. In difficult
terrain, on the march, and during the attack, in which the Panzer must be
frequently steered and turned, within a short time the steering clutches
overheat and are coated with oil. The result is that the clutches don't grip
and the Panzer is no longer maneuverable. After they have cooled, the clutches
must be rinsed with a lot of fuel.’

Also T-34
tanks captured by the Americans in Korea (built in 1945) continued to suffer
from the same issues. According to Zaloga’s ‘T-34-85 Medium Tank’, p21-22

An analysis of a T-34-85 captured in
Korea by the American tank producer Chrysler, conducted in 1951, provides a
good assessment of the T-34- 85……………………. The study, found the following
negative features about the tank:…………………………………. Wholly inadequate engine intake
air cleaners could be expected to allow early engine failure due to dust intake
and the resulting abrasive wear. Several hundred miles in very dusty operation
would probably be accompanied by severe engine power loss.' The report was also
critical of the lack of a turret basket, poor fire fighting equipment, poor
electrical weatherproofing, lack of an auxiliary generator to keep the
batteries charged, and lack of a means to heat engine oil for cold weather
starts. The report noted that although Soviet manufacturing techniques were
adequate for the job, there were many instances where poor or unskilled
workmanship undermined the design, and where overworked machines led to course
feeds, severe chatter or tearing of machined surfaces, a consequence no doubt
of the extreme pressures placed on plants to ensure maximum output. For
example, in the tank inspected (manufactured in 1945) the soldering job on the
radiator was so poor that it effectively lost half of its capacity.

It’s also
worth noting that even in 1941 German reports on captured Soviet T-26 and BT
tanks pointed out serious productions issues. For the T-26 tank: ‘The Pz.Kpfw.Zug created by the
division is no longer operational. One Panzer is completely burnt out due to an
engine fire. Both of the other Panzers have engine and transmission problems.
Repetitive repairs were unsuccessful. The Panzers always broke down after being
driven several hundred meters on good roads. As reported by technical
personnel, both of the engines in the Panzers are unusable because they were
incorrectly run in.’

And for the BT tank: ‘B. T. (Christi): The main cause of
failure is a transmission that is too weak in combination with a strong engine
that should provide the tank with high speed, but is over-stressed when driven
off road where the lower gears must be used for longer periods. In addition, as
in the T 26, problems continuously arise that are due to entire design and poor
materials, such as failure of the electrical system, stoppages in fuel
delivery, breaks in the oil circulation lines, etc.’

'On the
T-34 the transmission is also very poor. When it was being operated, the cogs completely
fell to pieces (on all the cogwheels). A chemical analysis of the cogs on the
cogwheels showed that their thermal treatment is very poor and does not in any
way meet American standards for such mechanisms.’

‘The
deficiency of our diesels is the criminally poor air cleaners on the T-34. The
Americans consider that only a saboteur could have constructed such a device’

The
reliability issues of Soviet tanks during WWII point to serious problems with
Soviet industry. The only other explanation is that a huge Nazi/White Guard
wrecker movement existed in Soviet factories…