But in the larger scheme of things, xenophobia is a distraction from the leadership role that Nigeria and South Africa should play on the continent on fundamental issues of immigration and economic integration.

A constant irritant

Accurate figures are hard to get. But Statistics South Africa put the number of Nigerian migrants at about 30,000 in 2016, far below Zimbabweans and Mozambicans.

Xenophobia has remained a constant irritant in Nigeria-South Africa relations since the major attacks on African migrants in poor neighbourhoods in Cape Town, Durban and Johannesburg in 2008 and 2015. But, contrary to popular perception, xenophobic attacks do not disproportionately target Nigerians. Nigerians often exaggerate the effect of violence on their citizens. That is probably because Nigeria has a better organised, savvy, and loud diaspora constituency in South Africa.

Unfortunately, the loudness of the Nigerian diaspora transforms victimhood into foreign policy, generating the reactions that have been witnessed recently. It also plays into the naïve narrative of the “liberation dividend”. This entails Nigerians seeking to be treated uniquely because of their contribution to the struggle for majority rule in South Africa. There were no such expectations from the other countries that supported South Africa’s liberation struggle.

This narrative has taken on an equally economic tinge. South African companies are heavily invested in Nigeria. So, they often become targets of Nigerian ire in times of xenophobia.

The accurate picture is that xenophobia affects all African migrants. These are mostly migrants from Malawi, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and, increasingly Ethiopians, Kenyans and Somalis. Nigerians are affected. But they’re not on top of the list.

Migrants are easy targets. That’s because they are seen as being better off by the locals. They therefore become targets of people who feel their circumstances have not been addressed by government. It is no surprise that xenophobic attacks have typically occurred in poor neighbourhoods that have been affected by service delivery protests since the mid-2000s.

Second, xenophobia thrives on ineffective policing in South Africa. Barely two days after the Johannesburg attacks started, the national police spokesman admitted that the police were running out of resources to manage the violence. This prompted the Premier of Gauteng, the country’s economic hub, to threaten to also deploy the army if the violence continued.

But the police are sometimes complicit in stoking anti-foreign sentiments. The July 2019 raids on foreign-owned businesses in Johannesburg in apparent efforts to stamp out illicit goods added to the current climate of xenophobia. When some business owners retaliated against the police, some local leaders appropriated the language of “threats on South Africa’s sovereignty” to justify the police response.

Reforms are urgently needed to create a competent, less corrupt, better-resourced, and civic-minded police service.

Xenophobia is also an outcome of a rickety migration and border control regime. Efficient border controls are one of the hallmarks of sovereignty and the first line of defence against xenophobia. Broken borders breed criminality. These include human and drug trafficking. Human and drug trafficking feature prominently in the discourse on xenophobia in South Africa.

How, then, does xenophobia distract South Africa and Nigeria from what should be their leadership on core African issues?

Overreaction

The weighty issues of creating a humane and just society for South Africans and migrants alike will ultimately be led by the South African government. Outsiders can make some diplomatic noises and occasionally boycott South Africa. But these actions are unlikely to drive vital change.

In fact, the overreactions by Nigeria and other African countries simply undercut the South African constituencies that have a crucial stake in wide-ranging reforms that address the multiplicity of problems around xenophobia.

In the previous instances of xenophobic violence, Nigeria urged the African Union (AU) to force South Africa to take action. But such unhelpful statements only inflame passions and prevent civil diplomatic discourse.

Instead, the best policy would be for Nigeria to engage South Africa through their existing binational commission. Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari is scheduled to visit South Africa next month.

Taking the lead

Rather than the perennial relapse into shouting matches and hardening of rhetoric, it is essential for Pretoria and Abuja to take decisive leadership at the continental level. The two nations must articulate immigration policies.

Also, without the leadership of its two major economies, Africa is not going to make any traction on the new treaty establishing the African Continental Free Trade Agreement. Ironically, the WEF meeting in Cape Town addressed ways to boost intra-African trade. Nigeria should not have boycotted it because of xenophobia.

]]>blessyarthur@gmail.com (Gilbert M. Khadiagala, University of the Witwatersrand)Opinion & AnalysisThu, 12 Sep 2019 09:03:06 +0000Robert Mugabe: as divisive in death as he was in lifehttp://businesstimesafrica.net/index.php/details/item/5035-robert-mugabe-as-divisive-in-death-as-he-was-in-life
http://businesstimesafrica.net/index.php/details/item/5035-robert-mugabe-as-divisive-in-death-as-he-was-in-life

Robert Mugabe, the former president of Zimbabwe, has died. Mugabe was 95, and had been struggling with ill health for some time. The country’s current President Emmerson Mnangagwa announced Mugabe’s death on Twitter on September 6:

The responses to Mnangagwa’s announcement were immediate and widely varied. Some hailed Mugabe as a liberation hero. Others dismissed him as a “monster”. This suggests that Mugabe will be as divisive a figure in death as he was in life.

The official mantra of the Zimbabwe government and its Zimbabwe African National Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF) will emphasise his leadership of the struggle to overthrow Ian Smith’s racist settler regime in what was then Rhodesia. It will also extol his subsequent championing of the seizure of white-owned farms and the return of land into African hands.

Inevitably, the focus will primarily be on his domestic record. Yet many of those who will sing his praises as a hero of African nationalism will be from elsewhere on the continent. So where should we place Mugabe among the pantheon of African nationalists who led their countries to independence?

The early African nationalist leaders were often regarded as gods at independence. Yet they very quickly came to be perceived as having feet of very heavy clay.

Nationalist leaders symbolised African freedom and liberation. But few were to prove genuinely tolerant of democracy and diversity. One party rule, nominally in the name of “the people”, became widespread. In some cases, it was linked to interesting experiments in one-party democracy, as seen in Tanzania under Julius Nyerere and Zambia under Kenneth Kaunda.

In Zimbabwe’s case, Mugabe proved unable to shift the country, as he had wished, to one-partyism. However, this did not prevent Zanu-PF becoming increasingly intolerant over the years in response to both economic crisis and rising opposition. Successive elections were shamelessly perverted.

When, despite this, Zanu-PF lost control of parliament in 2008, it responded by rigging the presidential election in a campaign of unforgivable brutality. Under Mugabe, the potential for democracy was snuffed out by a brutal despotism.

A wasted inheritance

Whether the economic policies they pursued were ostensibly capitalist or socialist, the early African nationalist leaders presided over rapid economic decline, following an initial period of relative prosperity after independence.

In retrospect, it’s widely recognised that the challenges they faced were immense. Most post-colonial economies were underdeveloped and depended upon the export of a small number of agricultural or mineral commodities. From the 1970s, growth was crowded out by the International Monetary Fund demanding that mounting debts be surmounted through the pursuit of structural adjustment programmes. This hindered spending on infrastructure as well as social services and education and swelled political discontent.

In contrast, Mugabe inherited a viable, relatively broad-based economy that included substantial industrial and prosperous commercial agricultural sectors. Even though these were largely white controlled, there was far greater potential for development than in most other post-colonial African countries.

But, through massive corruption and mismanagement, his government threw that potential away. He also presided over a disastrous downward spiral of the economy, which saw both industry and commercial agriculture collapse. The economy has never recovered and remains in a state of acute and persistent crisis today.

On the political front, the rule of some leaders – like Milton Obote in Uganda and Siad Barre in Somalia – created so much conflict that coups and crises drove their countries into civil war. Zimbabwe under Mugabe was spared this fate – but perhaps only because the political opposition in Matabeleland in the 1980s was so brutalised after up to 30 000 people were killed, that they shrank from more conflict. Peace, then, was merely the absence of outright war.

Some leaders, notably Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere in Tanzania, are still revered for their commitments to national independence and African unity. This is despite the fact that, domestically, their records were marked by failure. By 1966, when Nkrumah was displaced by a military coup, his one-party rule had become politically corrupt and repressive.

Despite this, Nyerere always retained his reputation for personal integrity and commitment to African development. Both Nkrumah’s and Nyerere’s ideas continue to inspire younger generations of political activists, while other post-independence leaders’ names are largely forgotten.

Will Mugabe be similarly feted by later generations? Will the enormous flaws of his rule be forgotten amid celebrations of his unique role in the liberation of southern Africa as a whole?

A Greek tragedy

The problem for pan-Africanist historians who rush to praise Mugabe is that they will need to repudiate the contrary view of the millions of Zimbabweans who have suffered under his rule or have fled the country to escape it. He contributed no political ideas that have lasted. He inherited the benefits as well as the costs of settler rule but reduced his country to penury. He destroyed the best of its institutional inheritance, notably an efficient civil service, which could have been put to good use for all.

The cynics would say that the reputation of Patrice Lumumba, as an African revolutionary and fighter for Congolese unity has lasted because he was assassinated in 1961. In other words, he had the historical good fortune to die young, without the burden of having made major and grievous mistakes.

In contrast, there are many who would say that Mugabe simply lived too long, and his life was one of Greek tragedy: his early promise and virtue marked him out as popular hero, but he died a monster whom history will condemn.

]]>blessyarthur@gmail.com (Roger Southall, University of the Witwatersrand)Opinion & AnalysisMon, 09 Sep 2019 04:49:13 +0000How economic sanctions can be a tool to checkmate xenophobia in South Africahttp://businesstimesafrica.net/index.php/details/item/5017-how-economic-sanctions-can-be-a-tool-to-checkmate-xenophobia-in-south-africa
http://businesstimesafrica.net/index.php/details/item/5017-how-economic-sanctions-can-be-a-tool-to-checkmate-xenophobia-in-south-africa

A time like this is when population strength becomes an advantage. But how often does the government play this card to its favour. It is not enough to send delegates over to a country annihilating your citizens. That’s rather cold. This is not calling for a brutal an eye-for-an-eye.

Levying sanctions, even though might be lifted minutes after, is a clear message that a government communicates the feelings of its citizens. And, this is not asking for too much from a country that has a population advantage over erring racists whose security operatives have failed to ensure safety.

Of course, workers and investors in those South African companies in Nigeria are largely Nigerians and might appear as a bullet shot to one’s boot, at the expense of economic growth. That’s right. However, while this doesn’t matter is for the fact that such sanction is purposeful and arises to an effect.

This can only be a better way to symbolise distress while other measures to contain the attack are looked into. With the correct body language, a lot can be achieved by merely placing sanctions that will halt operation of those companies, no matter how temporary. Such will not only big up the momentum to resolve matters but also put such government on their toes to ensure a second time never comes to be.

What we must understand

No one decides to leave his comfort zone to settle outside if basic needs of life are in place. The high rate of migration out of the Nigerian shores only tells how much government (past and present) have fail(ed)(ing). It’s common sense. No one loves to live as an endangered species. Hence, the government should not take matters as the xenophobic attack lightly.

The government, as chief custodian of its citizens wherever in the world they reside, must therefore stand at all times to the rescue, displaying compassion and delivering on its security mandate. It suffices to note that the deficit in infrastructure, health, education, etc. is all that influences trans-border migration.

The question

Should a failed government not then be ashamed to further forsake its citizens on a near-to-cheap call for business sanctions that might speed up the checkmating of the mayhem, in form of the killings, going on in South Africa? Reports have it that over 100 South African businesses operates in Nigeria. While this isn’t strange, what is strange is seeing the host country suffering at the mercy of its business partners. With reference to the likes of;

DSTV

SHOPRITE

MTN

PROTEA HOTELS

LTA CONSTRUCTIONS

POWER GIANT

ESKOM NIGERIA

PEP RETAIL STORES

The conversion

The consequence on the part of South Africa is in billions, and no country folds hands to see such happen. In a country of 200 million population, a 1% of people in the boycott gives a rough figure of 2 million non-patronising clients or customers. When an average of a thousand naira is marked off per person that’s N2 billion and if this takes effect for 7 days, that’s N14 billion deficit.

Understanding the root cause of xenophobia

In simple terms, home citizens are afraid as foreigners increases and takes up jobs “meant” for citizens. The case is increased competition for jobs and services. Whenever there is economic hardship, locals feel the foreigners are the chief causes. But, how true? Their belief is simple: once foreigners are out, available resources become evenly distributed.

Way forward

The South African government has a lot to do to ensure safety of lives –irrespective of nationality. And, in the event it cannot, it must be explicitly stated, so, the world (foreigners) may decide to continue the risk or simply back out.

Foreign governments with citizens in South Africa must also challenge the South African government. Doing so comes in different ways –dialogues, sanctions in form of boycott, among others. With the right body language, future occurrence of such racist act as xenophobia can be put to sleep, forever.

For whatever reason President Muhammadu Buhari had chosen a new Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development, the new replacement for Audu Ogbeh must sit up to embrace the responsibilities that are orchestrated by such position.

With food security, rural income growth and job creation amongst the top mandates of the ministry, the new minister, Sabo Nanono, must begin to find answers to issues like why Nigeria – despite being the largest producer of yam – is displaced by Ghana, to sit as the largest yam exporter country.

Going by the report from Food and Agriculture Organisation, FAO, reveals that Ghana accounts for over 94 percent of total yam exports in West Africa. Shocking, however, that Ghana’s yam farmers, put together, cannot produce enough yam to near the margin as the leading producer of the commodity.

First take-away

If this is so, there, perhaps, is a need for us to query the system and ask what factors have been responsible for this happenstance. If Nigeria produces about 70% of the world’s yam, what then is the clog in the wheel, hindering the country from tapping into this lucrative activity that can supplement oil revenue?

Experts say the report is false

Some experts during a round table discussion have said that the statement lacked the true reality of things in the yam market. For this group, they argued that it doesn’t matter who is doing the export. And, that what mattered is who the producer, is.

Careful observation has shown that the problem with Nigeria leading the export trade of yam has more to do with the country’s lack of structure, process and storage. The point is if there is anything special about Ghana on the yam export window it is how this 30 million population country is seizing the opportunity of their structured build up around the business.

The ministry of Agriculture and its agents needed to see what branding looks like in a typical Ghanaian yam market. One of the factors to be enumerated is Nigeria’s poor sense of packaging and branding. Unfortunately, these are not impossible things. Sincerely, what we have seen of packaging of yam in Ghana is enough to sweep one off the feet. In Ghana, yams are well packed like beverages, a complete shift of what we have here in Nigeria.

Largest exporter or re-exporter

Men in export business of Nigerian original have refused to accept Ghana as the largest exporter. According to their argument, Ghana has been buying in large quantities from Nigeria to pad it business. They have mentioned how Ghana actually purchases yam from Nigerian local farmers, how it is repackaged and branded as homemade.

They revealed that this has been possible courtesy of Nigerian porousborders. Aggregating all these concessions, we should ask the right question –why can’t Nigeria do the same to compete favorable with rivals.

What can we learn from Ghana?

The yam scenario has educated us on how much can be done from a significantly well managed limited stock or resources. In Ghana, there is a body of yam producers and exporters. They facilitate sales and its members can explore the trade opportunities under the banner of the organisation. Perhaps, our Agric. Minister can take a leave or two from the Ghana Yaminitiative.

According to the Ghana Yam and Exporters Association, the strategy was to assist members to ensure food safety or traceability. In doing this, on a commodity as yam, undergoing the following procedures go a long way to show seriousness of a stakeholder.

Ghana’s yam packaging procedure

Selection: – The yams are carefully selected on the basis of

Uniformity – yams with the same variety and sizes.

Yam should be firm and free from obvious defects, smooth and straight.

Yam should be cured 7-8 days at 30˚c (86˚ – 90˚F ) leaving it in an airy and shady place for a week with 90-95% R.H (Relative humidity).

Yam that is light in weight for their size must be avoided (rot can set inside without it being visible externally).

The Nigerian challenge

The yam challenge isn’t completely a unique one. It is, about, same challenge as faced by farmers generally operating in the country. Here we are, still struggling with;

Lacks of good storage facilities

Transportation system hiccups

Dearth of machinery

Large dependency on human limited strength

Outside all of this is the challenge of hike in price for local consumers.

Appraising stats

As far back as 1993, the world production of yam was pegged at 28.1 million tons where 96% of this came from West Africa with the main producers being; Nigeria, the world’s largest yam producer with 71% of world production; Côte d’Ivoire 8.1%; Benin 4.3% and Ghana 3.5%.

That yam takes the centre stage in the African diet can be easily noticed with varieties of food made from its tubers. The least, perhaps, is to mention the place of yam in the cultural, economic and religious aspects of Africans. This indicates that yam is one stock whose investment is worthy and, perhaps, why Ghana is tapping into it.

In 2007, worldwide yam production stood at 52 million tons, of which Africa reportedly produced 96%. Also, the lion share came from West Africa with approximately 94% of the total production. Also, we found Nigeria producing 71%, which was more than 37 million tons.

Point of reflection

Like the saying goes, man is the architect of his fate. If a 30 million population country with landmass about 3 states put together in Nigeria can lead the yam race, a country with over 200 million in population should be more promising. That it is the leading producer doesn’t suffice.

However, having been identified as the largest producer should be enough motivation to get the country started to review its strategies in areas of export management.

The document - Economic Transformation, Inclusive Growth and Competitiveness: Towards an Economic Strategy for South Africa – is truly radical in parts.

For example, who would have thought we’d hear an ANC minister call for exempting small businesses from certain regulations, such as bargaining council agreements, which are little more than a monopoly enjoyed by big business and labour. The left-wing of the ANC will fight this tooth and nail – but Mboweni will have to face down the hardliners in his own party.

Common sense dictates that the automatic extension of bargaining council agreements to smaller businesses (which have to abide by agreements they are not consulted on) should never have been on the statute book, but once there it seemed it would remain there forever. Mboweni clearly understands what is holding the economy in its no-growth trap. This is why he wants to make it easier to create new jobs by removing the red tape.

What’s also encouraging is that he says the current economic trajectory is unsustainable. Business has been saying this for years, and it seemed as if government was tone-deaf to these arguments.

Says Nicolaas Van Wyk, CEO of Saiba: “We think its a great document that will if implemented great new jobs and economic growth. Tito seems to be one of the few ministers with a clear grasp of reality, and of South Africa’s true potential. There is no real reason why we need to suffer as we do. We have been lumbered with a broken economy that resisted all efforts to fix it because of corrupt politicians and businessman who served no-one’s interest other than their own.”

What about an economic TRC to close the book on our corrupt past?

Van Wyk says perhaps there is merit in forming an Economic Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), similar to that for political crimes in the 1990s, where voluntary disclosure of economic and commercial transgressions could be aired, forgiven (with a reasonable fine), and allow the guilty who have corrupted the country to "get the hell out of Dodge".

“Our real economic foes are not internal but external. We need to shift our collective attention to positioning SA as a new Africa lion and emulate the Asian tigers of Singapore and Korea. If the President sets a new target whereby SA becomes the superpower in Africa, then all our local challenges will fade in the face of a new unifying national goal,” says van Wyk.

The meat of Tito’s growth plan

Looking to the meat of the Mboweni plan, there are some worthy goals that everyone can get behind, such as:

Full or partial relaxation of regulations impacting small businesses, such as labour laws and bargaining council agreements. This is perhaps the most radical recommendation, since it is well documented that employment opportunities are most likely to come from the small business sector.

Relaxed visa requirements to make it easier for tourists to come to SA. Saiba has long advocated for a more coherent policy to allow tourism to kick-start the economy (which it can easily do). In fact, it could create 2 million jobs over the next decade.

Allowing third-party access to the country rail network, which would make better use of our transport infrastructure.

Kick-starting an infrastructure boom in coordination with government, the private sector and state-owned companies, so as to ease the pressure on the balance sheets of over-stretched SOEs.

SA’s demand for water will exceed supply at the end of the next decade. Far more investment is needed in water-resource development, bulk-water supply, and waste-water management.

Eskom’s financial problems (debt of R450 billion) could be solved through the sale of coal-fired power stations, and by allowing private power producers to sell back into the grid. The Integrated Resource Plan (IRP), the ruling government document on future energy supply, needs to compare least-cost options with the alternatives and be updated regularly.

Allocating broadband spectrum to private companies through an auction, keeping a small portion of the spectrum for a government-controlled network, and allowing competition in Telkom’s infrastructure.

Reducing barriers to entry in banking to allow more competition, particularly for services such as mobile money.

Reviewing fuel-price regulation and passing on the benefits of spot price benchmarks to consumers. Also reviewing regulation which has supported companies like Sasol.

“Tito’s plan will work but only if we stop scoring own goals, playing the blame game and looking for scapegoats. Our political forefathers established our democracy on the basis that SA will become a rainbow nation. It may have worked at the time to heal and unify, but something toxic has intervened in pursuit of the ‘Rainbow Nation’, and that has been fully on display in the hearings of the Zondo Commission. Let’s channel the thoughts and energies of the great African Kings that established vast economic empires in pre-Colonial times. Our real competitors are the US, China, and Europe.

“Minister Mboweni’s growth plan is an excellent starting point for the rebirth of the nation. We must be careful not to waste much more time debating and discussing. Now is the time for action. Our economy contracted 3,2% in the first quarter, so we are going backwards and the country is shedding jobs.

“SA can become a commercial superpower that supplies all of Africa with rail, energy and services. Why should we leave it to the Chinese to move into our zone and capture our resources and opportunities?

“Tito’s plan is good, but it does not go far enough. He is still thinking small and allowing current events to box him in. He can do more and go bigger,” concludes van Wyk.

Microplastics are now everywhere as scientists said they have found the plastic particles, many invisible to the human eye, in rain, drinking water and oceans worldwide, raising questions about their effects on human and animal health.

Although the presence of plastic particles in the world’s oceans is well-documented, recent research shows that plastic fibres also are being found thousands of miles inland.

Plastic microfibres were inadvertently found by scientists measuring nitrogen levels in acid rain in the mountains of Colorado.

Tiny pieces of plastic showed up in 90 percent of rain samples taken from the foothills outside Denver and Boulder, and from remote sites in Rocky Mountain National Park, a 2019 study by the United States Geological Service said.

The fibres, only visible with a microscope, appeared to have come from plastic fabrics and were blue, red, silver, purple, green and yellow. Small plastic beads and shards also were observed with magnification.

“It is raining plastic,” concluded researcher Greg Wetherbee from the Denver-based USGS Hydrologic Networks Branch. Finding plastic fibres on top of 10,300-foot mountain peaks shows that “plastic is ubiquitous and not just an urban condition,” Wetherbee said.

European researchers this year found microplastics and tiny plastic fibres in pristine regions of remote French Pyrenees mountain regions. Researchers said the microplastics were carried by wind. They estimated that France is “blanketed by 2,000 tons of plastic particles” every year.

“Plastic litter is an increasing global issue and one of the key environmental challenges we face on a global scale,” researcher Steve Allen, from Britain’s University of Strathclyde, said in a press release.

The smallest microfibres and plastics are tiny enough to slip through most filters and even enter the bloodstreams of organisms that ingest them.An Australian study showed that people are consuming about 2,000 pieces of microplastic a week, or 21 grams a month — about the weight of a credit card.

Microplastic fibres were also found in Arctic snowfields, new research from the Alfred Wegener Institute and the Swiss WSL Institute for Snow and Avalanche Research SLF reported this month.

Microplastics, defined as pieces of plastic smaller than 5 millimeters, are created from the disintegration of plastic trash or are fabricated for industries, such as microbeads in cosmetics or plastic beads used in abrasive blast cleaning.

Microfibres are plastic filaments released from acrylics, polyester or nylon fabrics and rinsed out of washing machines by the thousands per article of clothing.

Plastic is useful, cheap and can improve human life by keeping food airtight, keep medical supplies sterile or reduce the costs of objects and textiles. But the inability of plastic to biodegrade has caused a worldwide plastic glut, environmental agencies say.

The smallest microfibres and plastics are tiny enough to slip through most filters and even enter the bloodstreams of organisms that ingest them. An Australian study showed that people are consuming about 2,000 pieces of microplastic a week, or 21 grams a month — about the weight of a credit card.

“No Plastic in Nature: Assessing Plastic Ingestion from Nature to People,” published in June by the World Wildlife Federation based on research by Thava Palanisami at University of Newcastle, Australia, showed that the most plastic is consumed through water, both bottled and tap.

Twice as much plastic is ingested through water in the United States and India as in Europe or Indonesia. Almost all U.S. tap water contains about 5 plastic microfibres per cup, the Australian study showed.

Other high sources of plastic consumed by humans were found in shellfish, beer and salt.

The majority of of the world’s virgin plastic has been created from petrochemicals since 2000, the study said.

It’s unclear how microplastics affect human health, but a study published last year by scientists from Johns Hopkins University and University of Toronto shows ingested tiny plastic particles appear to cause reproductive disruption in shellfish and lead to smaller, less-healthy offspring.

In vitro studies on animals show microplastics are toxic to lung cells, liver and brain cells, and plastic fibres “seem to produce mild inflammation of the respiratory tract,” the Australian study said.

Microplastics washed out in laundry and found in rain runoff make their way to the ocean, where other plastic trash also is ground into particles by wave motion.

Some descends to the ocean floor, but other plastic floats in areas like the so-called Great Pacific Garbage Patch, a 600,000-square-mile island of floating plastic twice the size of Texas. A 2015 study cited by the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration estimates 8 million metric tons of plastic end up in the ocean every year.

Since 2006, the U.S. NOAA has operated a Marine Debris Program to focus efforts on cleaning up plastic and so-called derelict man-made marine garbage like abandoned lobster and clam traps.

But the best strategy for removing microplastics from the ocean is preventing them in the first place by better use and recycling of plastics, the agency said.

Its advice: “Plastic has important uses, so stopping production isn’t realistic, but changing your habits so you’re not using unnecessary plastic is important.”

African footballers – like other players from developing countries – invariably earn sums of money far greater than their contemporaries back home.

On average, some African players in the elite leagues can earn between €15,000 and €100,000 or more as salaries. Those in leagues one, two and three can also earn around €10,000–50,000, €5000–20,000 and €2000–10,000. A few high-profile players earn more than €150,000 per month in prestigious European clubs.

As a result, there’s a great deal of pressure on players to show that they are spending some of what they earn back home. Some authors have asserted that these professional footballers spend their earnings on conspicuous consumption, such as high-end imported goods.

To get to grips with this perception I examined the effects of African migrant players’ “giving back” behaviour. I did this by analysing the various socioeconomic projects that they invest in in the communities they come from.

As part of my study I interviewed former and current professional footballers in Europe to understand the rationale behind how they used their earnings and what investments they made in society.

I found that some players invested in valuable projects like hospitals, schools, education, oil and gas businesses as well as football academies. This reflected what they termed as “giving back to the society”.

My findings suggest that players who make investment contributions are demonstrating their social and cultural ties with families, relatives, friends, teammates and the communities where they might have started their football careers.

The research

I developed a database of 1084 African professional players who are playing or had played in 30 different European leagues and other parts of the world.

Most were from West Africa (58.3%), followed by North Africa (17.9%), Central Africa (17.34%), Southern Africa (4.7%) and East Africa (1.8%).

Five countries each from Southern and East Africa did not have professional players. This means that at the time of the research, they did not have any players plying their trade outside of their territories. These countries were Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, Seychelles, Sudan, Eritrea, Tanzania, Djibouti and South Sudan.

The interviews I conducted included speaking to former and current African professional players who have played in Europe and other parts of the world. Among them were Abedi Pele Ayew (Ghana), Emmanuel Eboue (Ivory Coast), Marcel Desailly (Ghana), Mike Alozie (Nigeria) Bouna Coundoul (Senegal), Samuel Eto'o (Cameroon), Reuben Ayarna (Ghana), Victor Wanyama (Kenya), Stephen Appiah and Asamoah Gyan (Ghana), and Chivuta Noah (Zambia). I interviewed 30 former and current African professional players that covered a period over five years – 2013 to 2018.

The questions I asked were aimed at understanding how players used their resources from football, including money, and the rationale behind their decisions.

Where players came from

Most of the players I spoke to set out to pursue opportunities abroad because they had limited opportunities at home to support their professional aspirations and expectations. Nearly all came from financially deprived areas. This meant that they had to mobilise resources to support their careers at a formative stage.

This involved strategising to overcome the challenges with the contributions from significant others in the communities to become successful professionally abroad.

The study showed that players were able to mobilise resources from their families, friends, relatives, team mates and club officials. They had also been able to mobilise other kinds of support such as documentation, money, sport kits and gear. In addition, they had built social relations and networks via the societal support and contributions to help them achieve their professional status abroad.

Eventually, when players became professional abroad and were being rewarded financially, some remitted in various ways to the country they came from. All of them remitted money which, according to the players, can be termed as an African culture.

Time to pay back

Players’ investment behaviour was classified according to the type of projects they got involved in within the communities. This led to an appreciation of how and why they choose to do certain projects based on the support and resources they might have received from their communities.

Players took very different investment initiatives. Some were purely economic; others had a more social dimension. Contributions from the players could be categorised into private investments, social enterprise investments and economic investments.

Contributions and assistance that constituted a form of “giving back” did not necessarily connote gifts and counter-gifts. Instead, they served as a potential complement to support the efforts of local and regional growth.

When deciding how to give back, the players considered those who had significantly contributed to their professional football careers. These included their families and extended families. Other factors that played a role were inter-generational obligations and non-familial actors.

These investments into valuable social and economic initiatives in communities fulfilled two important functions. First, they enhanced local and regional developmental activities. Second, they helped safeguard the athletes’ post-playing career.

Since the November 2017 coup that toppled Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe and the elections in 2018, the regime of President Emmerson Mnangagwa has forged two forms of rule. These have been based on coercion on the one hand, and on the other dialogue.

The response of the state to the protests was swift and brutal. Seventeen people were killed and 954 jailed nationwide. In May the state turned its attention to civic leaders, arresting seven for “subverting” a constitutional government. The repressive state response was felt once again on 16 and 19 August, when the main opposition Movement for Democratic Chance (MDC) and civic activists were once again prevented from marching against the rapid deterioration of Zimbabwe’s economy.

These coercive acts represent a continuation of the violence and brutality of the Mugabe era.

At the same time Mnangagwa has pursued his objective of global re-engagement and selective national dialogue. This is in line with the narrative that has characterised the post-coup regime.

In tracking the dialogue strategy of the Mnangagwa government, it is apparent that it was no accident that key elements of it were set in motion in the same period as the agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on a new staff monitored programme.

The purported objective is to move the Zimbabwe Government towards an economic stabilisation programme. This would result in a more balanced budget, in a context in which excessive printing of money, rampant issuing of treasury bills and high inflation, were the hallmarks of Mugabe’s economic policies.

The dialogue initiatives also took place in the context of renewed discussions on re-engagement with the European Union (EU) in June this year.

But, Mnangagwa’s strategy of coercion and dialogue has hit a series of hurdles. These include the continued opposition by the MDC. Another is the on-going scepticism of the international players about the regime’s so-called reformist narrative.

Dialogues

Mnangagwa has launched four dialogue initiatives.

Political Actors: This involves about 17 political parties that participated in the 2018 elections. They all have negligible electoral support and are not represented in parliament. The purported intent is to build a national political consensus. The main opposition party, the MDC, boycotted the dialogue, dismissing it as a public relations exercise controlled by the ruling Zanu-PF.

The Presidential Advisory Council: This was established in January to provide ideas and suggestions on key reforms and measures needed to improve the investment and business climate for economic recovery. This body is largely composed of Mnangagwa allies.

The Matabeleland collective: This is aimed at building consensus and an effective social movement in Matabeleland to influence national and regional policy in support of healing, peace and reconciliation in this region. But it has come in for some criticisms. One is that it has been drawn into Mnangagwa’s attempt to control the narrative around the Gukurahundi massacres. These claimed an estimated 20 000 victims in the Matabeleland and Midlands regions in the early 1980’s. Another criticism is that it has exacerbated the divisions within an already weakened civic movement by regionalising what should be viewed as the national issue of the Gukurahundi state violence.

The Tripartite National Forum. This was launched in June, 20 years after it was first suggested by the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions. The functions of this body set out in an Act of Parliament, include the requirement to consult and negotiate over social and economic issues and submit recommendations to Cabinet; negotiate a social contract; and generate and promote a shared national socio-economic vision.

The establishment of the forum could provide a good platform for debate and consensus. But there are dangers. The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions warned of the long history of the lack of “broad based consultation on past development programmes”. It insists that

reforms must never be deemed as tantamount to erosion of workers’ rights.

The strategy

In assessing the central objectives of the various strands of Mnangagwa’s dialogue strategy, three factors stand out.

The first is that the Political Actors Dialogue, the Presidential Advisory Council and the Matabeleland Collective were developed to control the pace and narrative around the process of partnership with those players considered “reliable”. Major opposition and civic forces that continued to question the legitimacy of the Mnangagwa boycotted these processes.

Secondly, the formal establishment of the long awaited Tripartite National Forum may serve the purpose of locking the MDC’s major political ally, the Zimbabwe Council of Trade Unions, into a legally constructed economic consensus. The major parameters of this will likely be determined by the macro-economic stabalisation framework of the IMF programme.

When brought together, all these processes place increased pressure on the political opposition to move towards an acceptance of the legitimacy of the Mnangagwa regime, and into a new political consensus dominated by the ruling Zanu-PF’s political and military forces, thus earning them the seal of approval by major international forces.

The MDC has responded with a combined strategy of denying Mnangagwa legitimacy, protests as well as calls for continued global and regional pressure. The MDC believes that the continued decline of the economy will eventually end the dominance of the Mnangagwa regime.

As part of its 2018 election campaign, the MDC made it clear it would accept no other result than a victory for itself and Chamisa. That message has persisted and is a central part of the de-legitimation discourse of the opposition and many civic organisations. The MDC has regularly threatened protests since 2018.

What next

The MDCs strategies have not resulted in any significant progress. The hope that the economic crisis and attempts at mass protests to force Zanu-PF into a dialogue are, for the moment, likely to be met with growing repression. Moreover, the deepening economic crisis is likely to further thwart attempts to mobilise on a mass basis.

The EU, for its part, is still keen on finding a more substantive basis for increased re-engagement with Mnangagwa and will keep the door open. Regarding the US, given the toxic politics of the Trump administration at a global level, and the ongoing strictures of the US on the Zimbabwe government, there has been a closing of ranks around a fellow liberation movement in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region.

Mnangagwa’s recent appointment as Chair of the SADC Troika on Politics, Peace and Security in Tanzania will only further cement this solidarity.

There is clearly a strong need for a national dialogue between the major political players in Zimbabwean politics. But there is little sign that this will proceed. Moreover, the current position of regional players means that there is unlikely to be any sustained regional pressure for such talks in the near future.

It took President Muhammadu Buhari 54 days after his second term began to send a list of ministerial nominees to the Nigerian Senate for screening. This is a better record than his first term, which began in May 2015. Then Nigerians had to wait six months before the list of ministerial portfolios and offices was announced.

This time around the Senate took just a few days to approve the list, the vast majority of whom served in Buhari’s previous cabinet. Only 14 out of 43 were first-term cabinet members.

The big change was that Buhari elected to expand cabinet positions from 36 to 43. This is likely to mean an expansion of the ministries from the current 23 to accommodate all the appointees.

In Buhari’s first term there were 15 women. That number has more than halved to seven.

In 2015 the excuse for the lengthy delay was that the president needed time to make the selection. This was because he was seeking to appoint individuals untainted by the endemic corruption that has come to typify politics in Nigeria. Back then, Nigerians were open to giving the president a grace period. Several analysts agreed that the blatant corruption seen under Goodluck Jonathan’s administration played a major role in the goodwill towards Buhari.

But it soon became clear that Buhari’s administration would not be radically different. The first cabinet was made up of individuals who were known more for being the president’s political bedfellows than for their technocratic qualifications or achievements. That in itself is not out of the ordinary in almost any political dispensation across the globe. An easily agreeable cabinet makes for swifter and less contentious decision-making.

In Nigeria, however, it is viewed more like compensation for previous political support than selections made on merit.

Buhari’s new cabinet is just like the last. But his supporters are likely to argue that politics, especially in contemporary Nigeria, requires a heavy amount of pragmatism.

What, then, have we learned from Buhari’s appointments?

In my view, the second term cabinet make-up reflects the moribund state of political governance in Nigeria and the tone-deafness of Buhari’s government. Some of the names on the ministerial list are of politicians who have previously been charged with corruption. Others have been associated with corrupt practices while in political office .

And almost all the names on the list are politicians who have served in government in one form or another before – former governors, senators, and political office holders. This raises questions about the sincerity of the president’s pledge in 2015 to select incorruptible people as ministers.

Issues to be considered

There’s a lot that’s wrong with the cabinet.

Firstly, choosing a ministerial cabinet in Nigeria isn’t as simple as just selecting random individuals, even if they are the most qualified candidates. Nigeria has a complex political reality that has to be taken into consideration to fully appreciate the rationale that underlies the way governance looks within the country.

One factor that must be considered is Nigeria’s ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity. To ensure equal representation, the Nigerian Constitution stipulates that each of the country’s 36 states must be represented in the cabinet.

This was necessitated by the ethnic marginalisation that came about after the “forced” amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria by the British, the Biafran Civil War, and several other difficult historical episodes. So, in choosing prospective ministers from each of the 36 states in the country, it could be argued that Buhari is simply following standard political precedent.

It’s also clear that Buhari has again found it prudent to reward political allies with positions. In truth, this is normal practice in most countries. One must ask, then, why the expectations were different where Buhari’s cabinet was concerned. The answer is that he has been a self-declared anti-corruption reformer since his first term. Going against the political grain by choosing merit over kinship might have alienated some of his allies. But it would have gained him goodwill among the Nigerian people.

The gender imbalance of Buhari’s cabinet also serves to advance a common refrain that his government is tone-deaf. The president was criticised during his first term for not appointing enough women ministers. Buhari made a promise to address this during his second term. But the opposite has happened.

This gives the impression of a government that is resistant to progressive ideas and change and makes no pretence about it.

What now?

For cynical observers of the current administration, the adverse effect the drawn-out wait for the ministerial list has had on Nigeria’s economy has not been worth it. If anything, it is a reminder of the snailspeed approach that the current administration has adopted in managing the nation’s affairs.

The nation’s security sector is in poor shape; abductions and terror attacks are becoming commonplace. There seems to be no end in sight to the Fulani herdsmen crisis either. The economy is still being supported by foreign loans, and there have been grim prognostications from the likes of the International Monetary Fund. There is a very real risk of recession.

In conclusion, if there is a recurring theme to be picked up from Buhari’s cabinet, it is that things are set to remain the same for the next four years in terms of the political governance, and the administration’s poor management of the Nigerian economy.

The Chadian case highlights the way social media has increasingly been framed as a threat, especially by authoritarian leaders. Since the beginning of 2019 at least nine other African countries have also experienced government ordered internet shutdowns.

A recently published volume jointly edited by us digs deeper into this pattern. We explored the various ways social media has been entangled with politics and security. Social Media and Politics in Africa: Democracy, Censorship and Security includes cases from nine African countries. The 18 contributors to the volume include academics in Africa, Europe, North America, and Australia. Journalists and practitioners in the field of international development also contributed.

Political leaders often view social media as a threat because it can provide the public with greater access to information. It also has the potential to mobilise and challenge leadership. Some authors found ways in which digital platforms were creatively used to expand political participation.

But many authors found the opposite to be the case. In researching cases in Kenya, Stephanie Diepeveen and Alisha Patel demonstrated how social media contributed to reinforcing existing power structures and dominant narratives.

Similarly, a study by Jean-Benoît Falisse and Hugues Nkengurutse found that public political discussions on Facebook and Twitter in Burundi generally didn’t include ordinary citizens. Instead, they were dominated by a small number of elites who acted as brokers.

In recent years Africa has seen the world’s highest internet penetration growth rates. This means that we should expect social media to play an increasingly prominent role in politics and security on the continent.

This book helps us understand the diverse and complex ways social media is shaping political engagement.

Social media and elections

Three chapters are devoted to social media and elections. In them, the authors show how social media helped develop spaces for engagement and debate.

The first, by us and Jamie Hitchen, found that WhatsApp was an especially important avenue for smaller political parties and new voters in Sierra Leone. The two others – one on Senegal by Emily Riley, the other by researcher and lecturer Nkwachukwu Orji focusing on Nigeria – show the ways civil society organisations use social media in the hope of adding transparency to the electoral process.

Yet, these chapters each warn of the problems of “fake news” on social media. For example, Orji cautions in his Nigerian study that the absence of a strategy to address misinformation can incite election-related violence.

In addition, many government attempts to limit social media occurred during election periods or at unanticipated moments of instability. This happened in Ethiopia during the internet shutdown following the “coup attempt” in June 2019.

Other states have taken more sustained measures to curtail the use of digital platforms. Tanzania, for instance, outlaws the spreading of “false” information under its Cybercrimes Act. UK academic Charlotte Cross explores the law’s origins and implementation. She also highlights the heavy burden that individuals have paid for criticising the government on social media.

Traditional and new media

Social media’s complex symbiotic relationship with mainstream media is still evident in powerful ways.

Somalia specialist Peter Chonka, for example, argues that the blurring of public and private boundaries inherent in the country’s social media environment can be disruptive. It has resulted in a lack of coherence in political communication by state actors. This further challenges their legitimacy. Tensions between traditional and modern forms of communication are reflected in the online clash of views over “appropriate” online content, moral values and perceived threats to national security.

Media scholar Brian Ekdale highlights the debates around “morality” in social media content. He researched a Kenyan government official’s attempts to block a local art collective’s music video that had been uploaded to YouTube. Ekdale then considers what this shows about the ongoing tensions between global media technology giants and local users and regulators on the continent.

Looking beyond the digital

Social media is more than views and opinions shared online. The technology can also help orchestrate protests that move beyond the digital realm. Two studies look at this. One is by George Karekwaivanane and Admire Mare on the #ThisFlag campaign’s efforts to remove Robert Mugabe from power in Zimbabwe. The other is Tanja Bosch’s analysis of the #ZumaMustFall movement’s attempts to remove Jacob Zuma from the presidency of South Africa.

Both detail the role that social media can play alongside physical demonstrations on the streets. They each also draw attention to the numerous challenges that these movements faced. In doing so, they contribute to Bruce Mutsvario and Kate Wright’s argument that a better understanding is needed about the preconditions of effective digital activism.

Finally, Denis Galava argues that increased social media legislation in East Africa is part of a wider historic pattern of systemic state surveillance of the region’s citizens.

These contributions highlight an important point made in this book. Any credible research into social media should be permeated by an acute awareness of how the past informs the present.