PIEPER, J.: This
appeal arises out of Appellant Bruce Scott Johnson's magistrate's court
conviction after a jury trial for driving under the influence (DUI). The
circuit court affirmed. On appeal, Johnson argues the magistrate's court erred
in: (1) failing to dismiss the charge based on the State's failure to record
audio until the two minute and thirty-second mark of the incident site
videotape and (2) failing to dismiss the charge based on the State's failure to
videotape the breath test. We need not reach the issue regarding the incident
site video as we find reversal appropriate based on the failure to videotape
the administration of breath test.

FACTS

The facts in this case are undisputed. Johnson was
arrested on suspicion of DUI on August 3, 2008. Prior to trial, Johnson made
two motions to dismiss. First, Johnson argued the charge should be dismissed
because the incident site videotape was missing audio for the first two and a half
minutes. However, audio was recorded when Trooper Patterson gave Johnson a
Miranda warning and performed roadside sobriety tests. Second, Johnson asked
the court to dismiss the charge because Trooper Patterson moved Johnson
off-camera to administer the breath test. When Trooper Patterson tried to
administer the breath test he discovered the machine was not working, so he
administered the test from another machine but failed to activate that
machine's video camera. Johnson asserts that the viewer can hear the breath
test machine running, but Johnson is not seen on the videotape.[1]
Trooper Patterson did not submit an affidavit regarding either videotape.

The magistrate denied Johnson's motions to dismiss.
Instead, the magistrate suppressed the breath test because Johnson was out of
range of the camera during administration of the breath test. As to the
incident site videotape, the magistrate denied the motion to dismiss in full.
The circuit court affirmed, expressing concern that the officer did not submit
an affidavit but finding Johnson failed to establish reversible error. Johnson
did not file a motion to alter or amend the judgment. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In a criminal appeal from the magistrate's court, the
circuit court does not review the matter de novo; rather, the court reviews the
case for preserved errors raised by appropriate exception. Town of Mt.
Pleasant v. Roberts, 393 S.C. 332, 341, 713 S.E.2d 278, 282 (2011); S.C.
Code Ann. § 14-25-105 (Supp. 2010). The appeal must be heard by the circuit
court upon the grounds of exceptions made and the record on appeal, without the
examination of witnesses. S.C. Code Ann. § 18-3-70 (Supp. 2010). The circuit
court "may either confirm the sentence appealed from, reverse or modify
it, or grant a new trial." Id. The appellate court's review in
criminal cases is limited to correcting the order of the circuit court for
errors of law. City of Rock Hill v. Suchenski, 374 S.C. 12, 15, 646
S.E.2d 879, 880 (2007).

ANALYSIS

We decide this appeal based on the officer's failure to
capture Johnson on videotape during the administration of the breath test.[2] In doing so, we must address whether
section 56-5-2953(A)(2) of the South Carolina Code (2006) was violated, whether
the State offered a valid excuse for its failure to comply with section
56-5-2953, and whether the magistrate's remedy of suppression of the breath
test was adequate.

The applicable provisions of the statute in question include:

(A)(2) The videotaping at the breath site:

(a) must be completed within three hours of the
person's arrest for a violation of Section 56-5-2930, 56-5-2933, or 56-5-2945 or a probable cause
determination that the person violated Section 56-5-2945, unless
compliance is not possible because the person needs emergency medical treatment
considered necessary by licensed medical personnel;

(b) must include the reading of Miranda rights, the
entire breath test procedure, the person being informed that he is being
videotaped, and that he has the right to refuse the test;

(c) must include the person taking or refusing the
breath test and the actions of the breath test operator while conducting the
test;

.
. .

(B) Nothing in this section may be construed as
prohibiting the introduction of other evidence in the trial of a violation of Section 56-5-2930, 56-5-2933, or 56-5-2945. Failure by the
arresting officer to produce the videotapes required by this section is not
alone a ground for dismissal of any charge made pursuant to Section 56-5-2930, 56-5-2933, or 56-5-2945 if the arresting
officer submits a sworn affidavit certifying that the videotape equipment at
the time of the arrest, probable cause determination, or breath test device was
in an inoperable condition, stating reasonable efforts have been made to
maintain the equipment in an operable condition, and certifying that there was
no other operable breath test facility available in the county or, in the
alternative, submits a sworn affidavit certifying that it was physically
impossible to produce the videotape because the person needed emergency medical
treatment, or exigent circumstances existed. Further, in circumstances
including, but not limited to, road blocks, traffic accident investigations,
and citizens' arrests, where an arrest has been made and the videotaping
equipment has not been activated by blue lights, the failure by the arresting
officer to produce the videotapes required by this section is not alone a
ground for dismissal. However, as soon as videotaping is practicable in these circumstances, videotaping must begin and conform with
the provisions of this section. Nothing in this section prohibits the court
from considering any other valid reason for the failure to produce the
videotape based upon the totality of the circumstances; nor do the provisions
of this section prohibit the person from offering evidence relating to the
arresting law enforcement officer's failure to produce the videotape.

"All rules of statutory construction are
subservient to the one that the legislative intent must prevail if it can be
reasonably discovered in the language used, and that language must be construed
in the light of the intended purpose of the statute." State v. Sweat,
386 S.C. 339, 350, 688 S.E.2d 569, 575 (2010). "When a statute is penal
in nature, it must be strictly construed against the State and in favor of the
defendant." Town of Mt. Pleasant v. Roberts, 393 S.C. 332, 342, 713
S.E.2d 278, 283 (2011). The court should look to the plain language of the
statute. Binney v. State, 384 S.C. 539, 544, 683 S.E.2d 478, 480
(2009). If the language of a statute is unambiguous and conveys a clear and
definite meaning, then the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and
the court has no right to impose a different meaning. State v. Gaines,
380 S.C. 23, 33, 667 S.E.2d 728, 733 (2008). In interpreting a statute, the court will give words their
plain and ordinary meaning, and will not resort to forced construction that
would limit or expand the statute. Harris v. Anderson Cnty. Sheriff's
Office, 381 S.C. 357, 362, 673 S.E.2d 423, 425 (2009).

However, if a statute is ambiguous, courts must
construe the terms of the statute. Roberts, 393 S.C. at 342, 713 S.E.2d
at 283. "A statute as a whole must receive practical, reasonable, and
fair interpretation consonant with the purpose, design, and policy of
lawmakers." Sloan v. S.C. Bd. of Physical Therapy Exam'rs, 370
S.C. 452, 468, 636 S.E.2d 598, 606-07 (2006). The language of the statute must
be read in such a way that harmonizes its subject matter and accords with the
statute's general purpose. Roberts, 393 S.C. at 342, 713 S.E.2d at
283. "Any ambiguity in a statute should be resolved in favor of a just,
equitable, and beneficial operation of the law." Id. However,
courts will reject a statutory interpretation that would lead to an absurd
result not intended by the legislature or that would defeat plain legislative
intention. Id.

Johnson argues the officer violated the
statute when the officer moved Johnson to a different breath test machine for
the administration of the breath test, such that Johnson could not be seen on
the videotape. The State concedes the video did not capture the administration
of the breath test.

To determine whether the officer violated
section 56-5-2953(A)(2), we look at the plain language of the statute.
"The videotaping at the breath site . . . must include the person taking
or refusing the breath test and the actions of the breath test operator while
conducting the test." S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2953(A)(2)(c). In light of the
concession by the State, we find the officer violated section
56-5-2953(A)(2)(c) when he failed to capture the administration of the breath
test on the videotape.

We must next decide if the State should be excused
from its noncompliance with the videotaping requirements found in section
56-5-2953(A). Johnson claims when an officer does not provide a sworn
affidavit certifying that the equipment was inoperable, that reasonable efforts
were made to maintain the equipment in an operable condition, and that there
was no other operable breath test facility in the county, a DUI charge must be
dismissed. The State argues the magistrate and the circuit court correctly
considered language in section 56-5-2953 permitting a court to consider any
other valid reason for the failure to produce a video.

Pursuant to subsection (B) of section 56-5-2953,

[n]oncompliance is excusable: (1) if the arresting
officer submits a sworn affidavit certifying the video equipment was inoperable
despite efforts to maintain it; (2) if the arresting officer submits a sworn
affidavit that it was impossible to produce the videotape because the defendant
either (a) needed emergency medical treatment or (b) exigent circumstances
existed; (3) in circumstances including, but not limited to, road blocks,
traffic accidents, and citizens' arrests; or (4) for any other valid reason for
the failure to produce the videotape based upon the totality of the
circumstances.

Roberts, 393 S.C. at 346, 713 S.E.2d at 285.

The
first three excuses above are inapplicable to the present case. The State
admits the officer did not submit a sworn affidavit. Further, although the
State argues in its appellate brief that the officer was working at an accident
scene on I-26 when Johnson nearly collided with the officer, the record does
not support a finding that there was an emergency circumstance that prevented
the officer from complying with the statute. The officer left the scene of the
accident to pursue Johnson. Thus, we must consider whether the State offered
any other valid reason for the failure to produce the videotape under the
totality of the circumstances.

The magistrate noted the reason the officer asked
Johnson to stand out of range of the camera was because the first machine was
not working. The officer moved Johnson to another machine in the same room but
failed to activate the videotape for that second machine. The officer remained
on camera from the first machine the entire time. Based on these facts, the
magistrate decided to suppress the breath test and deny Johnson's motion to
dismiss the charges.

At the hearing before the circuit court, counsel for
the State argued for the first time that the officer believed the camera was
activated for the second machine and did not realize it was not activated until
after he had administered the test. We find this new argument unpreserved. In
considering whether the officer had a valid reason for his failure to capture
Johnson's breath test on video, we consider only the grounds argued before the
magistrate. SeeState v. Carmack, 388 S.C. 190, 200, 694 S.E.2d
224, 229 (Ct. App. 2010) ("[I]n order for an issue to be preserved for
appellate review, it must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial
judge.").

Here, the record does not indicate that the video
recording equipment for the second datamaster machine was inoperable or that
the police otherwise lacked the ability to create a videotape of the
administration of the breath test. Rather, we have only the officer's
assertion that the first machine was not functioning, so he moved over to the
second machine. Under the totality of the circumstances, we find the State did
not articulate a valid reason for the officer's failure to comply with the
mandates of section 56-5-2953 when the officer moved to the second machine to
administer the breath test.

Finally, we must decide the appropriate remedy for the
State's unexcused failure to comply with section 56-5-2953.

In City of Rock Hill v. Suchenski, the supreme
court held an inexcusable violation of section 56-5-2953 requires dismissal of
the charge. 374 S.C. 12, 16, 646 S.E.2d 879, 881 (2007). On appeal, the City
argued its noncompliance was excused pursuant to the exceptions listed in
section 56-5-2953(B); however, the supreme court refused to consider the City's
arguments because they were not preserved for appellate review. Id. at
15-16, 646 S.E.2d at 880. In finding dismissal appropriate, the supreme court
stated "failure to produce videotapes would be a ground for dismissal if
no exceptions apply." Id. at 16, 646 S.E.2d at 881. Suchenski has been interpreted as a case involving the failure to preserve error for
appellate review. See, e.g., Roberts, 393 S.C. at 346, 713
S.E.2d at 285; State v. Oxner, 391 S.C. 132, 135, 705 S.E.2d 51, 52
(2011); State v. Branham, 392 S.C. 225, 229 n.3, 708 S.E.2d 806, 809 n.3
(Ct. App. 2011).

In Roberts, the supreme court returned to the Suchenski decision and found that unexcused noncompliance with section 56-5-2953 mandates
dismissal of a DUI charge:

As evidenced by this Court's decision in Suchenski,
the Legislature clearly intended for a per se dismissal in the event a
law enforcement agency violates the mandatory provisions of section 56-5-2953.
Notably, the Legislature specifically provided for the dismissal of a DUI
charge unless the law enforcement agency can justify its failure to produce a
videotape of a DUI arrest. Id. § 56-5-2953(B) ("Failure by the
arresting officer to produce the videotapes required by this section is not
alone a ground for dismissal of any charge made pursuant to section 56-5-2930 .
. . if [certain exceptions are met]."). The term "dismissal" is
significant as it explicitly designates a sanction for an agency's failure to
adhere to the requirements of section 56-5-2953.

Furthermore, it is instructive that the Legislature
has not mandated videotaping in any other criminal context. Despite the
potential significance of videotaping oral confessions, the Legislature has not
required the State to do so. By requiring a law enforcement agency to
videotape a DUI arrest, the Legislature clearly intended strict compliance with
the provisions of section 56-5-2953 and, in turn, promulgated a severe sanction
for noncompliance.

Thus, we hold that dismissal is the appropriate
sanction in the instant case as this was clearly intended by the Legislature
and previously decided by this Court in Suchenski.

393
S.C. at 348-49, 713 S.E.2d at 286.

Therefore,
the magistrate's remedy of suppression constitutes reversible error. Just as the
supreme court found in Roberts, we also find dismissal is the
appropriate sanction for the officer's unexcused violation of section 56-5-2953.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly,
Johnson's conviction is hereby

REVERSED.

HUFF
and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.

[1] Johnson did not provide this court with copies of
either the incident site videotape or the breath test videotape. Nonetheless,
Johnson's assertions regarding the deficits in the videotapes are not contested
by the State.

[2] Based on this resolution, we decline to address
Johnson's remaining issue on appeal. SeeState v. Sweet, 374
S.C. 1, 9, 647 S.E.2d 202, 207 (2007) (declining to address the appellant's
remaining arguments when the decision was dispositive as to one issue).

[3] Section 56-5-2953 was amended effective Feb. 10,
2009. See Act No. 201, 2008 S.C. Acts 1682-85. The amended version of
the statute is not applicable to Johnson's August 3, 2008 arrest.