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The exercise has demonstrated that whenever the call of duty has been blown, the services have pulled together with alacrity.

Air Chief Marshal B.S. Dhanoa seems determined to position the Indian Air Force as a critical tool of statecraft in an increasingly complex strategic neighbourhood. Speaking at the Vivekanada Foundation recently, he strongly argued a case for the IAF as a force that has the capability to punch well above its weight.

The Gagan Shakti exercise, which saw the IAF fly over 11,000 sorties between 10 and 22 April, helped dispel widespread apprehensions that IAF’s combat edge was seriously blunted by declining force levels. The exercise demonstrated that offensive capability was still at the heart of Indian air power.

With India’s armed forces in complete agreement that future conventional conflicts are more likely than not to fall under the template of ‘high-tempo and intense limited conflict’ scenarios, the operational outcomes expected in both continental and maritime domains would revolve around speedy depletion of the enemy’s combat potential.

In such operational scenarios, it would be disastrous for India’s strategic community to ignore IAF-delivered air power as a key constituent of its deterrent, enabling and coercive strategies.

It is in this context that five doctrinal underpinnings of the IAF were exercised and validated during Gagan Shakti exercise. These are persistence, persuasion, compellence, endurance and jointness. It demonstrated the capacity to fly more than 5,000 sorties during the first 3-4 days of the exercise in a ‘sustained surge’ phase that comprised missions ranging from long-distance precision strikes, interdiction of army and maritime targets, attacks against targets in the tactical battle area (TBA) and robust multi-layered air defence.

A battalion level airborne drop in the second phase of the exercise and speedy inter-valley and inter-theatre switching of forces with the entire array of the IAF’s modern and legacy airlift capability (C-17s, C-130s, Il-76s, An-32s and Mi-17 helicopters of varied sophistication) demonstrated a persuasiveness that has been a work-in-progress over the past few years.

More than anything, this capability gives some heft to the current debate on how serious is India’s two-front capability. While some analysts are sceptical about India’s capability to orchestrate adequate operational capability to support a credible two-front strategy, the air chief refused to be drawn into the debate. He said, “You have seen our capability, we do have a Plan-B.”

What this reflects is that while there is a ‘public position’ on a two-front threat, there is also a more professional position that looks at it not as an inescapable possibility, but as a contingency that needs careful attention without unnecessary alarm.

Displaying a flexibility of operational thought in recent years, the IAF has progressively moved away from the traditional air power template of deep strikes on stand-alone targets to create strategic effects. Gagan Shakti has, however, validated the proposition that offensive air power remains the best tool for compellence in a conventional scenario, but this time around, the IAF rotated this strategy around joint missions with the Indian Army and Indian Navy.

For example, interdiction missions around the TBA against high-value elements of an adversary’s combat potential like his armour, artillery and transportation networks, and simulated maritime strikes in littorals like Lakshadweep and around choke points in the global commons like the Malacca and Sunda Straits reflect a willingness to convert doctrinal pronouncement into deliverables. The ability to operate high-end offensive platforms from short air strips in remote locations of Arunachal Pradesh and deliver both precision and non-precision weapons with accuracy indicates that the IAF is indeed in good training-shape.

Sustaining operations over slightly under two weeks and generating more than 11,000 sorties is reflective of combat endurance, a trait that India’s armed forces have had to demonstrate to force favourable war-outcomes as they did in 1971 and 1999.

Finally, even though this author and others in the recent past have been critical of ‘jointness’ and continue to argue that systemic changes are needed to leverage the actual potential of the three services, Gagan Shakti has demonstrated that whenever the call of duty has been blown, the services have pulled together with alacrity. Never have so many joint operations been squeezed into an exercise as was done in Gagan Shakti. The search for optimal jointness will continue to be a strange quest in the Indian context.

Arjun Subramaniam is a retired Air Vice Marshal from the IAF and currently a Visiting Fellow at Oxford.

As I argued what is needed is the higher direction and jointness will happen. I had given examples in the CDS thread.

ACM Dhanoa has shown that no need for the theater commands which will reduce the IAF flexibility to deploy as the situation warrants.

Of the 11000 sorties in 15 day period how many were combat sorties? We don't have a detail break down but by the end of three days there should be no worthwhile targets in the Western front.To figure this out take into account the load-out, the accuracy of guided and non-guided bombs in those 5K sorties add the escort missions to the mix.

The para drop of a battalion and the occupying of an airfield shows the rolling support for the IA frontlines.

Yes you're right.A crude attempt was made trying to implicateJagjivan Ram's son by kidnapping him and his moll, a school teacher, planting some Jaguar papers and lurid pics in the car. Surya mag run by Menaka G. had graphic pics of Suresh R (?) and his moll indulging in " aerobic sexercises", talking selfies of their bedroom antics.Raj Narayan allegedly passed these pics to MPs which produced a great cartoon from Laxman I think, where Raj N is seen according MPs in parliament whispering " want dirty pics?" flashing them from the insides of his coat!

"The European manufacturers have told Air Force that they would not integrate the Meteor missile on either Russian platforms or with the Israeli equipment which can create issues but efforts are on to find a way out on the issue," sources told Mail Today.

Might be saar. But Meteor could be bought next year and inducted starting 2020. SFDR based missile might take longer? Astra flight tests after all the redesigns was about 6 years ago iirc. SFDR might take a similar amount of time give or take a couple of years. Until then, even if we get the iDerby-ER for the Tejas, MKI and Mig-29 fleet will need a proper BVR shot.

https://twitter.com/indiandefence11/sta ... 6417428481 ---> An Indian Air Force MiG-25 showing off it's mighty Tumansky R-15B-300 Afterburning Turbojets. These powerful engines allowed these Foxbats to touch speeds of Mach 3+ however it would result in permanent engines scrapping. Also it had a high fuel consumption.

And also, why is a public mailbox considered considered secure for such non-public information ? If it can't be discussed on these forums (and Googleable by adversaries) it must not be discussed. Period.

https://twitter.com/indiandefence11/sta ... 2434537473 ---> Indian Air Force ground crew installing a Griffin 3 Laser Guided Bomb on a MiG-27 fighter bomber. Developed by IAI to convert gravity bombs to precision bombs, it is used by IAF Su-30MKI, SEPECAT Jaguars and MiG-27 along with newer LCA Tejas.

ramana wrote:So, how is the Hardened Air Shelter(HAS) program going for the IAF to upgrade aircraft hangers?

I have given up on fast progress on this front. Will believe something is happening when i see it with my eyes on google earth. Have fretted about this particular vulnerability of the IAF for long (as it for the PLAAF).Btw for all our worry about secrecy, and what is in the public domain, one can find detailed engineering drawings on a particular GoI website.

https://twitter.com/indiandefence11/sta ... 6417428481 ---> An Indian Air Force MiG-25 showing off it's mighty Tumansky R-15B-300 Afterburning Turbojets. These powerful engines allowed these Foxbats to touch speeds of Mach 3+ however it would result in permanent engines scrapping. Also it had a high fuel consumption.

Just look at the size of this thing. MiG25 is basically an interceptor. Huuuge.

ramana wrote:So, how is the Hardened Air Shelter(HAS) program going for the IAF to upgrade aircraft hangers?

I have given up on fast progress on this front. Will believe something is happening when i see it with my eyes on google earth. Have fretted about this particular vulnerability of the IAF for long (as it for the PLAAF).Btw for all our worry about secrecy, and what is in the public domain, one can find detailed engineering drawings on a particular GoI website.

I think some 100 shelters for SU-30 MKI size aircraft at 5000 crore is built up accross the country. Many of Western Air command and SWC airfields have them for Mig 21/ Mig 27/ Jaguar sized aircraft.

prashantsharma wrote:I have given up on fast progress on this front. Will believe something is happening when i see it with my eyes on google earth. Have fretted about this particular vulnerability of the IAF for long (as it for the PLAAF).Btw for all our worry about secrecy, and what is in the public domain, one can find detailed engineering drawings on a particular GoI website.

I think some 100 shelters for SU-30 MKI size aircraft at 5000 crore is built up accross the country. Many of Western Air command and SWC airfields have them for Mig 21/ Mig 27/ Jaguar sized aircraft.

Please be consistent. In India there is very little official information released by the armed forces or MoD. The classic example is MiG 25 whose presence in IAF was officially acknowledged on the day they were retired !

I recollect that a few years ago there were similar discussions on what is "official information" and what is "public domain" etc.

Give us an update on Akash and other missile programmes where BEL is actively involved?

Akash is the first indigenously developed air defence missile system in our country, realised by DRDO with support from BEL, BDL & private players. It is a massive, state-of-the-art missile system, which has been realised through professional project management spearheaded by BEL. While the Radars, Control Centres, Simulators, associated maintenance vehicles and the integrated software for the System are supplied by BEL, the missiles are from BDL, Squadron Control Centre is from ECIL and the Launchers are supplied by Tata Power SED and L&T. There are around 500 vendors, out of which 108 are MSMEs.

BEL with nine Strategic Business Units (SBUs) in its Bangalore plant and others in eight more Units across India, sourced many systems / sub-systems for Akash from various SBUs specialising in a particular segment of the company’s product portfolio. The three level R&D structure and CMMi Level 5 certified Software Development Centre of BEL have significantly helped in overcoming many critical sourcing problems at critical phases of the project. BEL is also assisted by its overseas offices in US and Singapore for sourcing imported components.

Tell us about your ongoing projects for the Indian Air Force?

BEL has manufacturing Units at 9 locations pan India. Seven of our Strategic Business Units are certified for AS9100 Rev C Aerospace standard. The facilities for manufacturing of avionics products are also spread across our different units as follows:

Presently, BEL is also exploring both indigenous development options / Collaboration with foreign partners for servicing the EW suite requirement of various other Air / Helicopter Platforms. BEL is involved in the development of payloads for RUSTAM UAV along with DRDO and other similar programs.

BEL’s Ghaziabad Unit is involved in supplying the IFF Mk IX (Identification Friend and Foe) systems for Boeing aircraft for the Navy. It is developing the IFF Mk XII systems which will be used in all military aircraft.

The manufacturing Unit at Panchkula has developed Head Up Display (HUD) systems for LCA and HJT in association with CSIO. It has also designed the Night Flying system for LCA (AF) and LCA (N) which aids in both internal and external illumination of aircraft. These are being supplied to LCA of the Air Force. In future, the Unit plans to manufacture products like Helmet Mounted Display System (HMDS) for helicopters and aircraft, LED-based Taxi / Landing lights, Aircraft Navigation Lights for LCA and Su 30 aircraft.

BEL is working in many new strategic areas such as AESA based modern Multi-mode Radars for Airborne applications, Next Generation Electronic Warfare suites for fighter Aircraft & Helicopters, sensors and data links for UAVs, Integrated EW systems for various terrains / ships, AESA based Air Defence Surveillance and Fire Control Radars, Tactical Communication Systems, Battlefield Management Systems, Multi-sensor Stabilisation Systems with sensors, Electronic suites for Gun upgrade and new gun program with Target acquisition and Fire Control capabilities.

The important projects that BEL is doing for the Indian Air Force as Offset Exports are:

AVRO Aircraft Replacement Program: BEL will supply Defensive Aid Systems (DAS) for this program which consists of the integration of Radar Warning Receiver (RWR), Missile Approach Warning Systems (MAWS) from BEL and Countermeasure Dispensing System (CMDS) from M/s BDL.

Survey and Target Towing Aircraft program: BEL will supply Radar Warning Receiver (RWR) for this program. This program is under TEC stage.

Please elaborate on the latest achievements in the development of indigenous radar systems.

DRDO Lab LRDE is our strategic design partner in this success. BEL has also successfully inducted Rohini’s variant 3D-Tactical Control Radar in the Indian Army and Revathi in the Indian Navy.

Similarly, 3D portable radar, Aslesha, is a great success. BEL has secured business of its variant called Bharani-II. BEL is also developing the mountain version of Aslesha radar, Aslesha Mk-II. New developments with DRDO are in the field of 4 Dimensional, Medium range, Fully Active Phased Array Radars like Arudhra Radar, Mountain Radar and Ashwini Radar.

BEL is also working with Thales through Joint Venture Company, BEL Thales Systems Limited, on the development of Long Range High Power Radar and Multi Function Radar Pharos.

BEL has extensive experience in modernization of legacy IAF systems. Please provide some of the latest examples in this regard?

BEL with its three-tier R&D approach and commitment to the user is able to address the obsolescence of the legacy radars and maintain the system beyond its expected life, viz THD 1955 and TRS 2215 for the last 40 and 30 years, respectively.

The IAF has also operationalized Divya Drishti, a COMINT analysis system Divya Drishti is a joint SI Dte – DRDO programme, with the aim of interception, monitoring, direction finding and analysis (IMDFAS) of communication signals. The system will be installed at various locations on static and mobile stations. All stations will be connected through a satellite communication network. The system caters to the mission of building aircraft flight profile (Mission Analysis).

Ground Based Mobile ELINT System (GBMES) comprises of one Control Station (CS) and three Receiving Stations (RxS) integrated in master slave concept to search, detection, monitor, record and process the hostile emissions as well as to find the location of the emitter fulfilling the strategic EW requirements of the Indian Air Force (IAF). One of the three Receiving Stations is also configured to operate in master slave configuration (with minimal degradation) in the absence of Control station. Each Receiving Station contains three ELINT Receiver Segments in the 70MHz-40GHz frequency range. In addition, one COMINT Receiver Segment covering the 30 -1000MHz frequency range is employed tointercept, Monitor the COMINT signals.GBMES is envisaged to operate in the frequency range from 70 MHz to 40 GHz covering Radar bands and 30 MHz to 1000 MHz communication bands. The system is capable of interception, analysis and location fixing of radar signals and interception, monitoring of communication signals.

SAM units have come with their own radarsAkash with 8 3D CAR and 16 Rajendra; some 7 squadrons more are in negotiation, BEL expects it this fiscal, thats another 21 radarsSpyder with at least 3 EL/M-2106MRSAM with EL/M-2084 (some 9 squadrons were reported)

Now local AESA units which have cleared trials18 Ashwini LLTR8 Arudhra MPR

Add to this the recent clearance for digitizing 16 Pechora Firing Units. Pechora radars, by virtue of their bands are anti-stealth.

Then the 5 operational IACCS and the several other which have been stood up, the operational AFNET and all sorts of comms upgrades.

I feel the focus on merely squadron numbers is misleading.

We also know five S-400 *firing units* are under negotiation. That's another 5 batteries for high value areas & I fully expect a DRDO LRSAM to make up the rest of the numbers, because 5 batteries are laughably small for India's size. The Indo-Pak border is 3300 km & even if each S-400 is deployed near the border, huge numbers of internal Vital Points will still require LRSAM cover.

Indeed such major overhaul of ADGES has not happend since 80's , THis is building a new system virtually from scratch and qualitatively it would be in a league of its own even when compared to the world.

Not at all comparable. The SA-3 Goa radars are completely outclassed in range, performance and capability and sensor diversity. We are talking of comparing a 2020 model F/A-18 to a 1960s A-4 and even with upgrades, latter won't compare as a strike fighter. Having said that, these were robust, capable systems and with upgrades, the UHF band surveillance radar will play a very useful role! We had 30 squadrons of SA-3, and IAF should do all it can to refurbish and upgrade as many of those radars as it can. Now, the FCR of the SA-3 is a different matter. It desparately needs an upgrade as it operates in X-Band and hence many jammers proliferate in that band.All radars now in IAF service will feed into the IACCS which then designates SAMs or fighters to deal with the threat

Karan M wrote:Not at all comparable. The SA-3 Goa radars are completely outclassed in range, performance and capability and sensor diversity. We are talking of comparing a 2020 model F/A-18 to a 1960s A-4 and even with upgrades, latter won't compare as a strike fighter. Having said that, these were robust, capable systems and with upgrades, the UHF band surveillance radar will play a very useful role! We had 30 squadrons of SA-3, and IAF should do all it can to refurbish and upgrade as many of those radars as it can. Now, the FCR of the SA-3 is a different matter. It desparately needs an upgrade as it operates in X-Band and hence many jammers proliferate in that band.All radars now in IAF service will feed into the IACCS which then designates SAMs or fighters to deal with the threat

Even if radars and other components are updated, the missiles need to be refurbished these missiles are very much NEOL.