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entitled 'Air Force Procurement: Aerial Refueling Tanker Protest' which
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Testimony before the Air and Land Forces Subcommittee, Committee on
Armed Services, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT:
Thursday, July 10, 2008:
Air Force Procurement:
Aerial Refueling Tanker Protest:
Statement of Daniel I. Gordon, Deputy General Counsel:
GAO-08-991T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-991T, a testimony to the Air and Land Forces
Subcommittee, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives.
GAO's Role Under The Competition in Contracting Act:
The Boeing Company protested the award of a contract to Northrop
Grumman Systems Corporation by the Department of the Air Force for KC-X
aerial refueling tankers. Boeing challenged the Air Force’s technical
and cost evaluations, conduct of discussions, and source selection
decision. Because Boeing competed for the contract, it is an interested
party for purposes of filing a protest. Under the Competition in
Contracting Act of 1984, GAO is required to consider protests of
contract awards filed by interested parties. In deciding protests, GAO
makes a determination of whether the agency’s actions complied with
procurement statutes and regulations.
GAO's Findings:
Review of the extensive record, including a hearing, led GAO to
conclude that the Air Force had made a number of significant errors
that could have affected the outcome of what was a close competition
between Boeing and Northrop Grumman. The errors included not assessing
the relative merits of the proposals in accordance with the evaluation
rules and criteria identified in the solicitation, not having
documentation to support certain aspects of the evaluation, conducting
unequal and misleading discussions with Boeing, and having errors or
unsupported conclusions in the cost evaluation. Accordingly, GAO
sustained Boeing’s protest.
The redacted decision is at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/decisions/bidpro/311344.htm].
What GAO Recommends:
In its decision, GAO recommends that the Air Force reopen discussions
with the offerors, obtain revised proposals, re-evaluate the revised
proposals, and make a new source selection decision, consistent with
GAO’s decision. GAO further recommends that, if the Air Force believed
that the solicitation does not adequately state its needs, the agency
should amend the solicitation prior to conducting further discussions
with the offerors. GAO recommends that if Boeing’s proposal is
ultimately selected for award, the Air Force should terminate the
contract awarded to Northrop Grumman.
To view the full product, click on [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-08-991T]. For more information, contact Daniel I. Gordon
at (202) 512-8219 or gordond@gao.gov or Michael R. Golden at (202) 512-
8233, goldenm@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Minority Member, and Members of the
Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss the June 18,
2008 decision of GAO in response to The Boeing Company's protest of the
Air Force's award of the aerial refueling tanker contract.
GAO has been deciding bid protests since the 1920s. The Competition in
Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA) now provides specific statutory
authority for our bid protest function. The Act codified GAO's role as
a quasi-judicial forum to provide an objective, independent, and
impartial process for the resolution of disputes concerning the awards
of federal contracts. We handle protests following the procedures set
out in the Bid Protest Regulations in Part 21 of Title 4 of the Code of
Federal Regulations. We conduct outreach and exchange views with the
Department of Defense (DoD) and civilian agencies on a regular basis
with regard to best practices and lessons learned from our bid protest
decisions.
In Fiscal Year 2007, we received nearly 1,300 bid protests challenging
procurements across the federal government. GAO received between 700
and 775 protests of DoD procurements over each of the past 5 years.
Because there are often multiple protests of a single procurement
action, we would estimate that 750 protests would involve approximately
500 defense procurements--out of the many tens of thousands of defense
procurement actions that could be protested each year. Bid protest
statistics and a detailed breakdown by DoD components are included in
our appendices to this statement.
The bid protest process is a legal one, and both the process and the
resulting product differ from those associated with the reports that
GAO issues in connection with its program audits and reviews. Protests
are handled solely by GAO's Office of General Counsel (OGC), not by its
audit teams. In developing the record, OGC provides all protest
parties--the protester, the awardee, and the contracting agency--an
opportunity to present their positions. In some cases, OGC conducts a
hearing to further develop the record. Under CICA, as amended, we have
100 calendar days to decide a protest.
The product of a protest before GAO--our legal decision--does not
address broad programmatic issues such as whether or not a weapons
program is being managed effectively or consistent with best practices.
Instead, a bid protest decision addresses specific allegations
challenging particular procurement actions as contrary to procurement
laws, regulations and the evaluation scheme set forth in the
solicitation. We sustain a protest when we find that the procuring
agency has not complied with procurement laws, regulations, and the
solicitation's evaluation scheme, and that this prejudiced the
protester's chances of winning the contract.
With that background, my testimony today will summarize our recently
issued decision in the Boeing protest of the Air Force's award of a
contract to Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation. The tanker
procurement is a large and complex one, and Boeing advanced numerous
protest grounds, which required us to use almost all of the 100
calendar days allowed by CICA to resolve the protest. In this regard,
Boeing supplemented its initial protest seven times, raising more than
20 main challenges to the agency's evaluation and source selection.
Our review of the record led us to conclude that the Air Force had made
a number of significant errors that could have affected the outcome of
what was a close competition between Boeing and Northrop Grumman. We
therefore sustained Boeing's protest. We also denied a number of
Boeing's challenges to the award to Northrop Grumman, because we found
that the record did not provide us with a basis to conclude that the
agency had violated the legal requirements with respect to those
challenges.
Several other points should be noted. First, our protest decision does
not reflect any view on the merits of Boeing's and Northrop Grumman's
proposed tankers or the firms' proposals. Judgments about which company
will more successfully meet the Air Force's needs are for the Air
Force, not GAO, to make. Second, bias, undue influence or other
intentional wrongdoing was not alleged by Boeing in its protest, nor
did GAO see any evidence of such intentional wrongful conduct by the
Air Force in this procurement. Third, this statement is based on the
public version of our decision. A limited amount of information that is
proprietary to the parties or source selection sensitive has been
redacted from the decision, but none of the redacted information is
critical to understanding the decision. Finally, we made a number of
recommendations to the Air Force in sustaining the protest. By statute,
the Air Force has 60 days to inform our Office of the Air Force's
actions in response to our recommendations. We recognize that acquiring
new aerial refueling tankers is a critical need for the Air Force and
the nation. We think that it is important that the Air Force act with
all due dispatch to correct the procurement flaws indicated in our
decision and to move forward to meet the agency's mission needs.
Background:
Aerial refueling is a key element supporting the effectiveness of DoD's
air power in military operations and is, as such, an important
component of national security. The Air Force's tanker fleet,
consisting of the medium-sized KC-135 and larger KC-10, is old; the KC-
135 aircraft currently has an average age of 46 years and is the oldest
combat weapon system in the agency's inventory. To begin replacing the
aging refueling tanker fleet, the Air Force established a three-pronged
approach under which it intended to first conduct a procurement to
replace the older KC-135 tankers, while maintaining the remaining KC-
135 and KC-10 tankers; the first procurement, which is the acquisition
that is the subject of our decision, was identified by the Air Force as
the KC-X procurement or program.
Although the Air Force intends to ultimately procure up to 179 KC-X
aircraft, the agency's solicitation that led to the contract award at
issue here provided for an initial contract for system development and
demonstration of the KC-X aircraft and procurement of up to 80
aircraft. The solicitation provided that award of the contract would be
on a "best value" basis, and stated a detailed evaluation scheme that
identified technical and cost factors and their relative weights. With
respect to the cost factor, the solicitation provided that the Air
Force would calculate a "most probable life cycle cost" estimate for
each offeror's proposal, including military construction and fuel
costs. In addition, the solicitation provided a detailed system
requirements document that identified minimum requirements (called key
performance parameter thresholds) that offerors must satisfy to receive
award. The solicitation also identified desired features and
performance characteristics of the aircraft (which the solicitation
identified, in certain cases, as "objectives" that offerors were
encouraged, but were not required, to provide).
The Air Force received proposals and conducted numerous rounds of
negotiations with Boeing and Northrop Grumman. The agency selected
Northrop Grumman's proposal for award on February 29, 2008, and Boeing
filed its protest with our Office on March 11. In accordance with our
Bid Protest Regulations, we obtained a report from the Air Force and
comments on that report from Boeing and Northrop Grumman. The
documentary record produced by the Air Force in this protest was
voluminous and complex. Our Office also conducted a 5-day hearing to
receive testimony from a number of Air Force witnesses to complete and
explain the record. Neither Boeing nor Northrop Grumman produced any
witnesses at the hearing, although each was invited to do so. Following
the hearing, we received further comments from the parties, addressing
the hearing testimony as well as all other aspects of the record.
The Legal Standard:
Procuring agencies are obligated to conduct proposal evaluations in
accordance with the evaluation scheme set forth in the solicitation.
Such proposal evaluation judgments are by their nature often
subjective; nevertheless, the exercise of these judgments in the
evaluation of proposals must be reasonable and must bear a rational
relationship to the announced criteria upon which the successful
competitor is to be selected. In order for GAO to perform a meaningful
review, the protest record must contain adequate documentation showing
the bases for the agency's evaluation conclusions and source selection
decision.
In negotiated procurements, when procuring agencies conduct discussions
with offerors with respect to their proposals, the discussions must be
meaningful and fair, and they must not be misleading.
Judgments about which offeror will most successfully meet governmental
needs are for the procuring agencies. Our protest decisions are limited
to the record we develop, shaped by the allegations raised by the
protester and the responses put forward by the agency and awardee, and
measured against the criteria established for the procurement by
applicable statutes, regulations, and the agency's solicitation.
GAO's Review of the Record:
As discussed above, each of the parties--the Air Force, Boeing, and
Northrop Grumman--had a full and complete opportunity to submit
argument and evidence for the record. The documentary evidence in the
record was voluminous. From our review of the record, including the
hearing testimony of 11 Air Force witnesses, GAO found a number of
significant errors in the Air Force's technical and cost evaluation and
that the agency conducted misleading and unequal discussions with
Boeing.
First, we found that, although the solicitation identified the relative
order of importance of the requirements and features of the aircraft
solicited by the Air Force, the record did not show that the Air Force,
in its evaluation and source selection decision, applied the identified
relative weighting in assessing the merits of the firms' proposals. In
comparing Boeing's assessed advantages against Northrop Grumman's
assessed advantages, the Air Force did not account for the fact that
many of Boeing's assessed advantages were derived from requirements and
features of the aircraft which the solicitation identified as being
more important than those from which Northrop Grumman's assessed
advantages were derived. Moreover, the solicitation requested that
offerors propose to satisfy as many of the solicitation's desired
aircraft features and performance as possible, but the record did not
show that the Air Force in its evaluation or source selection decision
credited Boeing with satisfying far more of these features and
functions than did Northrop Grumman.
Second, we found that a key discriminator relied upon by the Air Force
in its selection of Northrop Grumman's proposal for award was not
consistent with the terms of the solicitation. Specifically, the Air
Force credited Northrop Grumman for proposing to exceed a solicitation
key performance parameter objective for fuel offload versus unrefueled
range (that is, the amount of fuel a tanker could offload to a receiver
aircraft at a given distance of flight by the tanker without itself
refueling) to a greater extent than Boeing proposed, but the
solicitation plainly provided that no consideration would be given for
proposing to exceed key performance parameter objectives.
Third, we found that the record did not show that the Air Force
reasonably determined that Northrop Grumman's proposed aircraft could
refuel all current Air Force fixed-wing, tanker-compatible aircraft
using current Air Force procedures, as was required by the
solicitation. During the procurement, the Air Force twice informed
Northrop Grumman that the proposed maximum operating velocity for that
firm's proposed aircraft would not be sufficient under current Air
Force procedures to achieve overrun speeds for various Air Force
aircraft. (In aerial refueling operations, if a receiver aircraft
overruns the tanker during the final phase of rendezvous, the tanker
and receiver pilots are directed to adjust to specified overrun speeds,
and after overtaking the receiver aircraft, the tanker will decelerate
to a refueling airspeed.) In response to the Air Force's concerns,
Northrop Grumman promised a solution to allow its aircraft to achieve
the required overrun speeds. The record did not show that the Air Force
reasonably evaluated the capability of Northrop Grumman's proposed
aircraft to achieve the necessary overrun speed in accordance with
current Air Force procedures.
In addition, we found that the Air Force did not reasonably evaluate
the capability of Northrop Grumman's proposed aircraft to initiate
emergency breakaway procedures, consistent with current Air Force
procedures, with respect to a current fixed-wing, tanker-compatible Air
Force aircraft. A breakaway maneuver is an emergency procedure that is
done when any tanker or receiver aircraft crewmember perceives an
unsafe condition that requires immediate separation of the aircraft. In
such a situation, the tanker pilot is directed to accelerate, and if
necessary to also climb, to achieve separation from the receiver
aircraft.
Fourth, we found that the Air Force conducted misleading and unequal
discussions with Boeing. The agency informed Boeing during the
procurement that it had fully satisfied a key performance parameter
objective relating to operational utility. Later, the Air Force decided
that Boeing had not fully satisfied this particular objective, but did
not tell Boeing this, which would have afforded Boeing the opportunity
to further address this. GAO concluded that it was improper for the Air
Force, after informing Boeing that it had fully met this objective, to
change this evaluation conclusion without providing Boeing the
opportunity to address this requirement in discussions. In contrast,
Northrop Grumman, whose proposal was evaluated as only partially
meeting this requirement, received continued discussions addressing
this same matter during the procurement.
Fifth, GAO found that the Air Force improperly accepted Northrop
Grumman's proposal, even though that firm took exception to a material
solicitation requirement. Specifically, the solicitation required
offerors to plan and support the agency to achieve initial organic
depot-level maintenance within 2 years after delivery of the first full-
rate production aircraft. Northrop Grumman was informed several times
by the Air Force that the firm had not committed to the required 2-year
timeframe, but Northrop Grumman refused to commit to the required
schedule. GAO concluded that Northrop Grumman's refusal to do so could
not considered an "administrative oversight" as was found by the Air
Force in its evaluation.
Sixth, we found that the Air Force did not reasonably evaluate military
construction costs in evaluating the firms' cost proposals. The
solicitation provided that the Air Force would calculate a most
probable life cycle cost estimate for each offeror. A most probable
life cycle cost estimate reflects the agency's independent estimate of
all contract, budgetary, and other government costs associated with all
phases of the aircraft's life cycle from system development and
demonstration through production and deployment and operations and
support; military construction costs were specifically identified as a
cost that the agency would evaluate in calculating the firms' most
probable life cycle costs. Because the agency believed that its
anticipated requirements could not be reasonably ascertained, the Air
Force established a notional (hypothetical) plan, identifying a number
of different types of airbases, to provide for a common basis for
evaluating military construction costs. GAO found that, in addition to
four errors related to military construction costs that the Air Force
conceded during the protest, the record otherwise showed that the
agency's military construction cost evaluation was flawed, because the
agency's evaluation did not account for the offerors' specific
proposals and because the record did not otherwise support the
reasonableness of the agency's notional plan.
Seventh, we found that the Air Force improperly increased Boeing's
estimated non-recurring engineering costs in calculating that firm's
most probable life cycle cost. Specifically, the Air Force assigned a
moderate risk to Boeing's system development and demonstration costs,
because, despite several efforts to obtain support from Boeing for its
proposed non-recurring engineering costs, Boeing had not sufficiently
supported its estimate. Although we found the Air Force's assignment of
a moderate cost risk reasonable, GAO also found that the Air Force
unreasonably increased Boeing's estimated non-recurring engineering
costs in calculating the firm's most probable life cycle cost where the
Air Force did not find that Boeing's estimated costs were unrealistic
or not probable.
Finally, GAO found unreasonable the Air Force's use of a simulation
model to determine the amount by which Boeing's non-recurring
engineering costs should be increased in calculating that firm's most
probable life cycle cost. Although such simulation models can be useful
evaluation tools, here the Air Force used as data inputs in the model
the percentage of cost growth associated with weapons systems at an
overall program level, and there was no indication that these inputs
would be a reliable predictor of anticipated growth in Boeing's non-
recurring engineering costs.
There were two other aspects of the Air Force's evaluation that GAO
found troubling, but which did not factor into our sustaining the
protest. Specifically, GAO received much argument and hearing testimony
addressing the Air Force's evaluation of the fuel costs associated with
the firms' proposed aircraft, and the record indicated that the agency
did not do much more than assess whether the offerors' proposed fuel
burn rates (gallons of fuel burned per hour) were reasonable. The
record also showed that even a small increase in the amount of fuel
that is burned per hour by a particular aircraft would have a dramatic
impact on the overall fuel costs. Although we did not sustain Boeing's
challenge to the Air Force's evaluation of the firms' respective fuel
burn rates, we suggested that this was a matter that the agency may
wish to review to ascertain whether a more detailed analysis of the
fuel costs was appropriate.
Similarly, the Air Force evaluated a weakness for Northrop Grumman's
boom approach but concluded that this evaluated concern posed a low
schedule or cost risk. Because the record did not contain any
documentation explaining why the Air Force's evaluated concern with
Northrop Grumman's proposed boom design represented low risk, we
received hearing testimony addressing the agency's evaluation. Although
the record, including the hearing testimony, indicated that some
analyses of the impact of the agency's evaluated concerns with Northrop
Grumman's boom may have been performed, little detail was provided.
Here too, we did not find a sufficient basis in the record to sustain
Boeing's challenge, but suggested that this was another matter that the
agency may wish to review further.
In sum, GAO concluded from its review of the record that the Air Force
had made a number of significant errors that could have affected the
outcome of what was a close competition between Boeing and Northrop
Grumman. Accordingly, GAO sustained Boeing's protest. GAO also denied a
number of Boeing's challenges to the award to Northrop Grumman, because
the record did not provide a basis to conclude that the agency had
violated the legal requirements with respect to those challenges.
Our Recommendations:
GAO recommends that the Air Force reopen discussions with the offerors,
obtain revised proposals, re-evaluate the revised proposals, and make a
new source selection decision, consistent with this decision. If the
Air Force believes that the solicitation does not adequately state its
needs, the agency should amend the solicitation prior to conducting
further discussions with the offerors. If Boeing's proposal is selected
for award, the Air Force should terminate the contract awarded to
Northrop Grumman. GAO also recommended that Boeing be reimbursed the
reasonable costs of filing and pursuing the protest, including
reasonable attorneys' fees.
Mr. Chairman this concludes our prepared statement. I would be happy to
respond to any questions regarding our bid protest decision that you or
other Members of the subcommittee may have.
[End of section]
Appendix I: Statistics for All GAO Bid Protests:
2004-2008 Statistics for All GAO Bid Protests:
Fiscal Year: 2004;
Total Cases[A]: 1354;
Dismissals[A]: 989;
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 365;
Sustained[A]: 75.
Fiscal Year: 2005;
Total Cases[A]: 1262;
Dismissals[A]: 956;
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 306;
Protests: Sustained[A]: 71.
Fiscal Year: 2006;
Total Cases[A]: 1223;
Dismissals[A]: 974;
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 249;
Protests: Sustained[A]: 72.
Fiscal Year: 2007;
Total Cases[A]: 1277;
Dismissals[A]: 942;
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 335;
Protests: Sustained[A]: 91.
Fiscal Year: 2008[B];
Total Cases[A]: 1071;
Dismissals[A]: 845;
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 226;
Protests: Sustained[A]: 49.
[A] These figures represent the number of protests. Often there are
multiple protests filed for a single procurement action.
[B] These figures cover the period between October 1, 2007 to June 27,
2008.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix II: 2004-08 Statistics for GAO Bid Protests Involving DOD
Components:
2004 DOD Component Statistics:
Component: Air Force;
Total Cases[A]: 132;
Dismissals[A]: 84;
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 48;
Protests: Sustained[A]: 3.
2004 DOD Component Statistics: Component: Army;
Total Cases[A]: 324;
Dismissals[A]: 245;
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 79;
Protests: Sustained[A]: 18.
2004 DOD Component Statistics: Component: Defense Logistics Agency;
Total Cases[A]: 115;
Dismissals[A]: 103;
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 12;
Protests: Sustained[A]: 1.
2004 DOD Component Statistics: Component: Marine Corps;
Total Cases[A]: 14;
Dismissals[A]: 10;
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 4;
Protests: Sustained[A]: 3.
2004 DOD Component Statistics: Component: Navy;
Total Cases[A]: 112;
Dismissals[A]: 64;
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 48;
Protests: Sustained[A]: 11.
2004 DOD Component Statistics: Component: DOD (Miscellaneous);
Total Cases[A]: 34;
Dismissals[A]: 12; 2004
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 22;
Protests: Sustained[A]: 0.
2004 DOD Component Statistics: Component: Defense - Total;
Total Cases[A]: 731;
Dismissals[A]: 518;
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 213;
Protests: Sustained[A]: 36.
[End of table]
2005 DOD Component Statistics: Component: Air Force;
Total Cases[A]: 127;
Dismissals[A]: 93;
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 34;
Protests: Sustained[A]: 13.
2005 DOD Component Statistics: Component: Army;
Total Cases[A]: 282;
Dismissals[A]: 223;
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 59;
Protests: Sustained[A]: 7.
2005 DOD Component Statistics: Component: Defense Logistics Agency;
Total Cases[A]: 121;
Dismissals[A]: 108;
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 13;
Protests: Sustained[A]: 0.
2005 DOD Component Statistics: Component: Marine Corps;
Total Cases[A]: 12;
Dismissals[A]: 4;
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 8;
Protests: Sustained[A]: 1.
2005 DOD Component Statistics: Component: Navy;
Total Cases[A]: 135;
Dismissals[A]: 105;
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 30;
Protests: Sustained[A]: 5.
2005 DOD Component Statistics: Component: DOD (Miscellaneous);
Total Cases[A]: 29;
Dismissals[A]: 19;
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 10;
Protests: Sustained[A]: 2.
2005 DOD Component Statistics: Component: Defense -Total;
Total Cases[A]: 706;
Dismissals[A]: 552;
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 154;
Protests: Sustained[A]: 28.
[End of table]
2006 DOD Component Statistics: Component: Air Force;
Total Cases[A]: 148;
Dismissals[A]: 105;
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 43;
Protests: Sustained[A]: 13.
2006 DOD Component Statistics: Component: Army;
Total Cases[A]: 334;
Dismissals[A]: 277;
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 57;
Protests: Sustained[A]: 12.
2006 DOD Component Statistics: Component: Defense Logistics Agency;
Total Cases[A]: 70;
Dismissals[A]: 62;
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 8;
Protests: Sustained[A]: 3.
2006 DOD Component Statistics: Component: Marine Corps;
Total Cases[A]: 32;
Dismissals[A]: 29;
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 3;
Protests: Sustained[A]: 1.
2006 DOD Component Statistics: Component: Navy;
Total Cases[A]: 101;
Dismissals[A]: 73;
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 28;
Protests: Sustained[A]: 4.
2006 DOD Component Statistics: Component: DOD (Miscellaneous);
Total Cases[A]: 54;
Dismissals[A]: 42;
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 12;
Protests: Sustained[A]: 5.
2006 DOD Component Statistics: Component: Defense Total;
Total Cases[A]: 739;
Dismissals[A]: 588;
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 151;
Protests: Sustained[A]: 38.
[End of table]
2007 DOD Component Statistics: Component: Air Force;
Total Cases[A]: 136;
Dismissals[A]: 103;
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 33;
Protests: Sustained[A]: 16.
2007 DOD Component Statistics: Component: Army;
Total Cases[A]: 323;
Dismissals[A]: 242;
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 81;
Protests: Sustained[A]: 22.
2007 DOD Component Statistics: Component: Defense Logistics Agency;
Total Cases[A]: 97;
Dismissals[A]: 80;
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 17;
Protests: Sustained[A]: 0.
2007 DOD Component Statistics: Component: Marine Corps;
Total Cases[A]: 20;
Dismissals[A]: 18;
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 2;
Protests: Sustained[A]: 0.
2007 DOD Component Statistics: Component: Navy;
Total Cases[A]: 129;
Dismissals[A]: 96;
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 33;
Protests: Sustained[A]: 8.
2007 DOD Component Statistics: Component: DOD (Miscellaneous);
Total Cases[A]: 70;
Dismissals[A]: 36;
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 34;
Protests: Sustained[A]: 16.
2007 DOD Component Statistics: Component: Defense Total;
Total Cases[A]: 775;
Dismissals[A]: 575;
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 200;
Protests: Sustained[A]: 62.
[End of table]
2008 DOD Component Statistics[B]: Component: Air Force;
Total Cases[A]: 122;
Dismissals[A]: 101;
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 21;
Protests: Sustained[A]: 9.
2008 DOD Component Statistics[B]: Component: Army;
Total Cases[A]: 309;
Dismissals[A]: 247;
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 62;
Protests: Sustained[A]: 9.
2008 DOD Component Statistics[B]: Component: Defense Logistics Agency;
Total Cases[A]: 57;
Dismissals[A]: 50;
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 7;
Protests: Sustained[A]: 1.
2008 DOD Component Statistics[B]: Component: Marine Corps;
Total Cases[A]: 11;
Dismissals[A]: 10;
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 1;
Protests: Sustained[A]: 0.
2008 DOD Component Statistics[B]: Component: Navy;
Total Cases[A]: 93;
Dismissals[A]: 61;
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 32;
Protests: Sustained[A]: 8.
2008 DOD Component Statistics[B]: Component: DOD (Miscellaneous);
Total Cases[A]: 38;
Dismissals[A]: 36;
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 2;
Protests: Sustained[A]: 0.
2008 DOD Component Statistics[B]: Component: Defense Total;
Total Cases[A]: 630;
Dismissals[A]: 505;
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 125;
Protests: Sustained[A]: 27.
[A] These figures represent the number of protests. Often there are
multiple protests filed for a single procurement action.
[B] These figures cover the period between October 1, 2007 to June 27,
2008.
[End of table]
[End of section]
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