Media and Political Hysteria Over Yemen Hides a Deeper Strategic Matrix of Long-Term Importance

US and Western European political leaders have begun to focus on Yemen as
a source of projected instability and as a haven for jihadist terrorism
against the West.

This simplistic and overly narrow view has largely been a reaction to media
reporting of the links of alleged (and unsuccessful) Nigerian-born terrorist
bomber, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, to a radical Yemeni group, and to intense
ongoing fighting between insurgents and Yemeni and Saudi government forces
on the Yemen-Saudi border.

The reality is far more complex and far-reaching.

The situation has a long history which has been ignored -- or which has lacked
priority -- as far as Western intelligence services have been concerned. The
current reaction has been one in which the US and UK leaderships, in particular,
have merely elected to follow the media outrage over the alleged links between
Abdulmutallab and "al-Qaida" training camps in Yemen. However, there
is a contextual and vitally-linked pattern of activities and competition which
engages, among others, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states, Russia,
Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Somaliland, Yemen, Djibouti, Libya, and
others.

Western states and the great Asian trading states are essentially unable,
or unwilling, to enter comprehensively into the matrix, and have elected, almost
as a distraction, to focus on current, specific factors, such as the "presence
of al-Qaida" in Yemen. And even in that regard, there is a clear inability
of the US, or UK, for example, to surgically deal even with the narrow problem
which they have identified as being "terrorist training" in Yemen.

This overall complex is, moreover, intrinsically linked to the longer-term
security and control of the Red Sea/Suez Canal sea lanes which are critical
to global trade.

Within just the Yemen Republic context, to a significant extent, the challenges
now facing Pres. 'Ali 'Abdullah Saleh are a culmination of issues, which center
around:

(i) Pres. Saleh's longstanding corruption, and in particular his links with
Somalian and Puntland leaders to the significant detriment of long-term Red
Sea security and Western (and other) interests;

(ii) Iran's active engagement in financing Shi'a and Sunni jihadist and rebel
activities in Yemen and along its border inside Saudi Arabia; and

(iii) The shared decision by Yemeni, Saudi, and Egyptian leaders (supported
by Libya) to isolate the Republic of Somaliland. This situation has favored
the ongoing corrupt business activities of Pres. Saleh and his Puntland Somalian
friend, Col. Abdullahi Yussuf Ahmed, former President of both the self-proclaimed
Puntland region (which he "founded" as a quasi-independent state within Somalia)
and of Somalia itself.

Linked with all of this is the question of the chronic instability in the
recently-created state of Eritrea. Eritrea is supported by Egypt, Israel, and
some Arab states, for different motives, including Egypt's desire to use Eritrea
to constrain and contain Ethiopia, which Egypt sees as a potential regional
threat (because of Ethiopia's control of the headwaters of the Blue Nile, which
is Egypt's lifeline). Eritrean Pres. Isayas Afewerke, already locked into a
power struggle with Ethiopia and particularly with Ethiopian Prime Minister
(and Isayas' former ally) Meles Zenawi, has been happy to work with Libyan
leader Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi to fund a range of terrorist activities against
Ethiopia, potentially leading to a renewal in 2010 of conventional war between
Eritrea and Ethiopia. The forthcoming and pivotal May 2010 Ethiopian Parliamentary
elections may be a trigger point for revived Eritrean conflict with Ethiopia,
and Eritrea has already -- in January 2010 -- begun brief military incursions
into Ethiopia and has been transporting clandestine supplies of weapons and
explosives into the heart of Ethiopia, even into the capital, Addis Ababa,
for use by anti-government forces sponsored by Eritrea.

That is part of the current context to be borne in mind when looking at Yemen
itself, and the position of Yemen Pres. Saleh.

The Western media gained a hint of Pres. Saleh's longstanding linkage with
Puntland when, during Yussuf's Presidency of Somalia in November 2008, a Yemeni
ship captured by pirates was suddenly freed without ransom being paid. Significantly,
most of the pirates operating off the Horn of Africa are from Puntland, and,
following the collapse of Somalia into civil war, the Somalian fishing fleet
fled the Somalia coast for safe-haven in Yemen. There, however, it was impounded
by Pres. Saleh. Pres. Saleh's son, and the son of former Somalian/Puntland
Pres. Yussuf, now jointly own and run that fleet of fishing vessels, among
their other joint enterprises.

Former Pres. Yussuf -- who, as "President" of Puntland, conducted frequent
raids and terrorist operations against the neighboring Republic of Somaliland
-- is now a guest of Pres. Saleh, living in exile in Yemen. Not surprisingly,
Yemen has shown considerable solidarity with Egypt in maintaining both an Arab
League and African Union boycott on trade with Somaliland, ending millennia
of cross-Red Sea trade in hides and other materials, and in the recognition
of Somaliland as the sovereign entity which historical and legal precedence
shows it to be.

But in the overall situation, at its heart, Egypt, Saudi Arabia (and the Persian
Gulf emirates, and Iran are engaged in an attempt to dominate the Red Sea,
which is vital in various ways and in varying degrees to their national survival.
Much of the trade viability of the Persian Gulf is linked with the ability
to utilize the Red Sea/Suez SLOC.

Within the context of this competition between the Arabian Peninsula states
and Iran over the Red Sea is the conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia (and
now Yemen) for control of much of the Arabian Peninsula itself, as outlined
in the November 17, 2009, report by Yossef Bodansky on Iranian involvement
in the declaration by Saudi Shi'a clerics of the "Republic of Eastern Arabia".
And also engaged in this competition is Israel, itself a Red Sea and Indian
Ocean state by virtue of its sea frontage on the Gulf of Aqaba and its projection
of naval power into the Indian Ocean.

Iran has long been a major sponsor of Islamist insurgent and tribal groups
in Somalia, regardless of whether these groups have been Sunni or Shi'a Muslims.
At the same time, Saudi Arabia has attempted to compete for regional influence
in the Horn by funding a massive proselytization of Ethiopians, to increase
the numbers of Muslims over the historically Orthodox Christians there, in
stark disavowal of the Prophet Mohammed's strict injunction that Ethiopians
should not be attacked or forced to convert to Islam because of the refuge
and respect which an Ethiopian king -- the King of Axum -- had given in 614
CE to some of Mohammed's followers and to one of his wives when they were being
pursued by Mohammed's enemies.

Significantly, and to varying degrees, Iran, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia have
allowed and even encouraged instability and division to occur along the Red
Sea littoral -- with regard to Eritrea, Yemen, and Sudan -- in order to gain
strategic leverage. Libya, long a Red Sea power aspirant (in order to gain
leverage at Egypt's rear, and over its Red Sea/Suez Canal seaway), has also
pumped money and weapons into the Red Sea disputes, particularly in support
of Eritrea and Somali elements opposed to Ethiopia. Libya, of course, demonstrated
its ability to disrupt Red Sea/Suez sea traffic -- to the massive detriment
of Egypt and the trading states -- when it used the mine-laying ship, Ghat,
to drop floating mines in the Red Sea in 1984.

In the midst of all of this, Ethiopia is moving toward parliamentary elections
in May 2010, and Eritrea and its allies (Egypt, Libya, and others) have been
stepping up military pressure on the Ethiopian border, and even shipping weapons
and explosives clandestinely into Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian capital. It is
not inconceivable that a significant military clash could occur between Ethiopia
and Eritrea before the May 2010 Ethiopian elections.

Thus, it is not just Yemen, or even the Arabian Peninsula, which is under
severe pressure from unrest and insurgency, but also the entire Horn of Africa,
including Somalia, Somaliland (which has been able to hold the line thus far),
Eritrea, and Sudan. And with this, the entire security of the Red Sea/Suez
sea lines of communications (SLOCs), so vital to Asian, European, and Australasian
trade, is also under threat.

What is also of significance in this is the fact that the Republic of Somaliland
-- one of the few areas of stability in the region -- is not yet recognized
by the international community even though it meets all of the legitimate criteria
of sovereignty as determined by the African Union (AU) and the United Nations
(UN). This situation is very much in the hands of Egypt, which -- because of
its fears over Ethiopia and the fact that Somaliland is a key transit access
for Ethiopian trade -- has refused to allow the AU or the Arab League to recognize
Somaliland's sovereignty, and the UN will not recognize a state until the regional
body (in this case the AU) first recognizes it.

Eritrea's historical source of revenue has been as a trading and entrepôt
for Ethiopian imports and exports, and this was a natural rôle for it
when it was a province of Ethiopia [for years Eritrea was known within the
Ethiopian Empire as the Bar Negus: the Kingdom of the Sea. When Eritrea, independent
from Ethiopia after the collapse of the Dergue in 1991, attempted to blackmail
Ethiopia into accepting the new Eritrean currency, the nakfa (introduced November
1997), which was not internationally tradable, as payment for Ethiopian coffee
for onward export -- Eritrea, as a trader, was the fourth biggest coffee exporter
in the world, based on through shipment of Ethiopian coffee -- Ethiopia ceased
trading through Eritrea.

Eritrean leader Isayas had not bargained on Ethiopia, landlocked following
the loss of Eritrea, being able to trade through routes other than the Eritrean
Red Sea port of Massawa and other lesser ports, and found Eritrea bankrupt
when Ethiopia began trade through Djibouti, and subsequently Somaliland. Eritrea,
almost overnight, became bankrupt, and Isayas faced the need to distract an
increasingly hostile population.

This led to significant control of the Eritrean population (which continues
today), and to the 1998-99 Eritrea-Ethiopia war, which, when concluded, failed
to bring about a resumption of Ethiopian trade through Eritrean ports, leading
to the continuing situation of desperation in Eritrea, and the likelihood of
yet another conflict.

The situation is ultimately detrimental to Egypt, given that the isolation
of Ethiopia (and Somaliland) actually contributes to the insolvency of Eritrea,
which Egypt (and others) have been using as a buffer to keep Ethiopia landlocked.
The potential threat to Egypt's Nile waters from Ethiopia is, in fact, not
addressed by keeping Ethiopia landlocked, and nor is Egypt's absolute strategic
need for a stable Red Sea SLOC (leading to and from the Suez Canal) better
guarded by having Ethiopia kept landlocked.

Within all of this, the US, and many other NATO states, along with Japan,
Australia, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and others, have committed
major naval forces to the Red Sea/Horn of Africa region of the Indian Ocean
in an attempt to suppress regional piracy, all of which (virtually) comes from
Puntland and is supported by former Puntland/Somalia Pres. Yussuf, who is now
a guest of Yemen Pres. Saleh. At no point have the NATO powers thought of addressing
the piracy issue by tackling Yussuf and Saleh head-on, or through direct punitive
attacks on the Puntland piracy havens.

Moreover, the US and the NATO states -- as well as the other maritime powers
now projecting naval force into the Indian Ocean off the Horn of Africa --
have neither the resources nor will to deal decisively with the pirates in
their land havens, the villages of Puntland, or with the Iranian- and salafist-backed
insurgencies now underway on the Arabian Peninsula. Only France, with a significant
history of sustaining forces in the region (particularly Djibouti) has shown
some real independence of action.

Thus, the advantage, strategically, remains with Iran, which is destabilizing
the area through proxy forces. Much is being made of the so-called "al-Qaida
in the Arabian Peninsula" (AQAP), which claimed responsibility for the attempted
bombing by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab on December 25, 2009, of US Northwest
Airlines Flight 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit.

Certainly, there is a link between Yemen -- now the modern state encompassing
the ancestral home of al-Qaida founder Osama bin Laden's family -- and the
global al-Qaida phenomenon. The reality, however, is that al-Qaida, and bin
Laden, although ostensibly salafist Sunnis, have long had distinct Iranian
connections. Moreover, there is more than one group in Yemen and Saudi Arabia
claiming to be part of al-Qaida. The Western fixation with categorizing and
naming amorphous and transitory groups as though they were permanent and organized
fixtures, based on their claims, leads to attempts to see the regional situation
in black and white terms.

Within the Yemeni context, as well, is the continued rivalry between north
and south, between the factions which once gravitated toward the control of
Sana'a (and the former Yemen Arab Republic), and those which once gravitated
toward the control of Aden and the old Arabian Sea (Gulf of Aden) sultanates.
There were, in fact, nine sultanates which signed protectorate agreements with
the United Kingdom in the early 20th Century to form the British Aden Protectorate,
and, after several geopolitical transitions, and with the departure of the
British from Aden, the area became the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen
(PDRY: South Yemen). The PDRY became a major Soviet proxy state, and attempted
to project power against Saudi Arabia, and the Sultanate of Oman.

Then, the unified group under PDRY and Soviet control was the Popular Front
for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf (PFLOAG), which conducted a major
insurgency across the Omani border, into the Dhofar region, against the old
Sultan of Muscat & Oman, Sultan Sa'id. This led to a major Cold War confrontation,
with the British backing of Sultan Qaboos bin Sa'id al-Said, who had overthrown
his father. This was a protracted insurgency which Oman won. Significantly,
Oman largely embraces a distinct form of Islam, the Khariji sect, which rejected
both Sunni and Shi'ite formulas; the Ibadi branch of the Kharijites became
(in the Prophet Mohammed's lifetime) Oman's official religion, making it the
only Kharijite country in Islam.

The geopolitical importance of Oman should not be overlooked, despite the
fact that the country and the Sultan have been quiet during the current crises:
Oman controls the southern shore of the Strait of Hormuz and a vital part of
the Arabian Sea coastline.

It is not insignificant that the new -- and cautious -- Iranian-Russian alliance
is jointly and severally interested in projecting power deep into the Indian
Ocean and through the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa. Russia's historical
involvement (as the USSR) in the PDRY (and to a lesser extent the YAR), and
in Somalia have not been forgotten. Neither has Iran's military involvement
during the 1970s in support of Oman against the PDRY -- the Shah and Sultan
Qaboos cooperated closely -- been forgotten in Tehran. Further, the historical
links across the Strait of Hormuz are profound: Baluchistan, now divided between
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran, was once Omani territory.

These are all links which are of profound significance, and yet they are unrecognized
by current analysts who insist on dividing consideration of conflict and political
phenomena along the lines of modern nation-state boundaries.

Iran's determination to proceed with its proxy drive into the Arabian Peninsula,
the Horn of Africa, and the Red Sea has been compounded by the declining ability
and will of the US to sustain its position in the region, and by the strength
and cooperation of the new alliance with Russia. Clearly, Russia and Iran remain
cautious of each other, but have mutual objectives at this point, and a history
of seeking influence over the Arabian Peninsula and Red Sea/Horn.

As Holy Roman Emperor Charles V said of the French King, Francis I, in the
16th Century: "My cousin and I are in complete agreement: we both want Milan."

Clearly, the Yemen/Red Sea/Horn of Africa/Arabian Peninsula situation cannot
be divorced from the Northern Tier -- the area including Iraq, Iran, Azerbaijan,
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and so on. Attempts by Western media and policymakers
to treat the Yemen situation as separate, and a "new theater", once again ignore
the complex integration and internally competitive dynamic of the entire region.
Bearing in mind the Iranian southward projection, and Pakistan's rôle
as a key littoral maritime player in the Arabian Sea (and key partner in the
US-dominated Combined Naval Task Forces (CTF) 151, the joint statement issued
by the Iranian, Afghanistan, and Pakistan governments on January 16, 2010,
was instructive. It said that, as the Xinhua news agency report of that date
noted, "Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan affirm that the three countries bear
a shared and common responsibility for security and stability in the region,
and reaffirmed the commitment to playing their due rôle in the reconstruction
of Afghanistan."

Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi said on January 16, 2010,
that Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan were the most important neighbors for establishing
peace and stability in Afghanistan, adding that peace in Afghanistan meant
peace in the region. Minister Qureshi said that the Islamabad trilateral meeting
decided to move forward in line with the tripartite summit in Tehran in 2009
to adopt regional approach to find out solution to problems in the region.
He said that intelligence chiefs of the three countries will also meet in Tehran
soon to discuss cooperation in intelligence sharing.

All of this is reflective of the changing fortunes of the great powers in
the region. Power vacuums, or perceived vacuums, lead to surges by other aspirant
powers. That is what is now happening in what this writer has termed "the North-West
Quadrant of the Indian Ocean", which includes the Persian Gulf, the Arabian
Sea and Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea/Gulf of Aqaba/Suez. Additionally, all
the action in this neighborhood has a hugely important global impact on the
transportation of oil and gas and the VLCC tankers that carry the assets.

There is a great deal of shuffling which is reminiscent of the beginning of
the 1960s, and the British withdrawal orchestrated by socialist Prime Minister
Harold Wilson, a process which led to the Soviet surge into South Yemen and
the Horn of Africa. The local players have no option but to try to rebuild
their security in the knowledge that their superpower allies -- in this case,
the US -- may not offer security support into the future.

This article was written by Gregory R. Copley for the OilPrice.com Free Market
Intelligence Report which focuses on Big Picture Geopolitical analysis, Investment
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