The World Affairs Board is the premier forum for the discussion of the pressing geopolitical issues of our time. Topics include military and defense developments, international terrorism, insurgency & COIN doctrine, international security and policing, weapons proliferation, and military technological development.

Our membership includes many from military, defense, academic, and government backgrounds with expert knowledge on a wide range of topics. Registration is fast, simple and absolutely free so why not register a World Affairs Board account and join our community today?

About 15 years ago, they started something called Brigadization, trying to replace a division with a brigade; mainly taking a division, subtract 2 combat regiments out, and let the remaining regiment keep half of the division's logistics BUT they kept the taskings the same. What they learned was that no single re-enforced regiment can do the job of 3 regiments no matter how well supplied it was. They eventually was forced back to division. The poor brigade HQ was overtasked and had insufficient supplies to do the job of a division.

Simple math didn't even occurred to the PLA. If you taking half the supplies away and cut two thirds of your combat power, you're going to do less than half of what the division used to do.

A quick look at any of the Cat A Group Armies (and they are Group Armies, not Corps) showed that none of the divisions are in a position to take the artillery, engineering, service brigades. Simply put, a re-enforced division is not going to do the job of an army.

in short it requires a complete rebuild from ground-up. they're trying to change from a Soviet system to a US-style system but while it's a bit easier to change headquarter responsibilities and titles at the MND, it's a lot harder to do it with operational units.

There is a cult of ignorance in the United States, and there has always been. The strain of anti-intellectualism has been a constant thread winding its way through our political and cultural life, nurtured by the false notion that democracy means that "My ignorance is just as good as your knowledge."- Isaac Asimov

There is a cult of ignorance in the United States, and there has always been. The strain of anti-intellectualism has been a constant thread winding its way through our political and cultural life, nurtured by the false notion that democracy means that "My ignorance is just as good as your knowledge."- Isaac Asimov

Part i liked in this article got nthing to do with military and more to do with anthropology

Chinese culture as a whole is very high-context, reliant on nonverbal communication and understandings developed over a long period of time. Flattery, cajolery, and fulsome phrases are used with acquaintances, but genuine expressions of emotion are almost never used — even with loved ones and relatives. Ultimately, this use of “friend” is meant to draw you into a facsimile of social obligation, with the demands becoming greater depending on the level of your “friendship.”

The linked article to high vs low context cultures is very interesting. The above quote applies to most non-western cultures. The challenges of making relations between east and west. Imagine how much more conflicted east - east relations can be.

So was the link on drinking : D

Remember Your ABCs: If for some reason you are having difficulty finding a starting point, then begin with your ABCs:

Kenneth Allen,

Dennis Blasko, and

Bernard “Bud” Cole.

These three former military officers offer some of the best analysis available on the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), the PLA Ground Forces, and the PLA Navy (PLAN), respectively. In addition to bringing their military expertise to bear on the challenges of evaluating a foreign military, all three have voluminous publication records. This is not to say that talent is in short supply coming up; one need look no further than the prolific

Andrew Erickson on the PLAN,

Michael Chase on the Second Artillery (China’s conventional and strategic rocket forces),

Daniel Hartnett on military policy, and

Timothy Heath on party-army relations among many others.

However, chances are if a journal article or book does not make at least a nod to the ABCs of PLA studies, then it should be viewed with suspicion.

The China Leadership Monitor is the only thing I have time for at Stanford’s Hoover Institution. It is excellent (and free) for those of us into elite Chinese politics.

And Then There Were Seven: The New, Slimmed-Down Central Military Commission
by James Mulvenon, Wednesday, May 16, 2018

In October 2017 at the first plenary session of the 19th Central Committee, Chinese state media announced the lineup of the new Central Military Commission (CMC). While a smaller CMC had been rumored in the weeks prior, the new configuration shattered previous paradigms of military leadership. Not only was the number of members reduced from 11 to 7, but there was a wholesale change in the assignment of seats by office, reflecting the tectonic changes from the PLA’s massive reorganization discussed in CLM 49. This article examines the transition, analyzes the individuals chosen and the logic for their selection, and assesses the implications for party-Army relations.

Promotions all around!

Chinese President Xi Jinping last week promoted more than 170 senior military officers as part of an ongoing reform of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) designed to align people’s ranks with their place in the broader hierarchy.

The move came after the release on December 8 of a circular aimed at providing clearer procedures for the promotion of officers with the rank of major general or above across all branches of the armed forces.

The mass promotion was the biggest ever carried out by Xi, who also chairs the Central Military Commission.

A long-running problem within the PLA has been the lack of correlation between rank and status. For example, a corps commander with the rank of colonel would have seniority over a division leader with the rank of major general – a situation that would be impossible in most other militaries around the world.
While the dual system created loopholes and bred corruption, earlier attempts to reform it failed because of resistance from top Communist Party leaders and others with a vested interest to maintain the status quo.

Military observers said the overhaul was long overdue.

One insider, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said that in the past it was easier for officers in administrative positions to gain promotions as they had closer ties to senior leaders, which “caused resentment among officers whose duties required them to put their lives at risk”.

“It could take years for the commander of a combat unit to earn a promotion [in rank] because the PLA hasn’t fought a major war in decades,” he said.
Zeng Zhiping, an expert on military law at Soochow University in east China’s Jiangsu province and a retired PLA lieutenant colonel, said a lack of checks and balances with regard to the promotion process had led to widespread abuse of the system, with some officers effectively buying their way up the hierarchy.
That had created the problem of senior officers lacking experience and, more importantly, the respect of their troops, he said.

“The new rules are essential for the PLA because it’s impossible to convince any soldier to follow a commander who doesn’t understand modern warfare.”
Adam Ni, co-editor of the China Neican online newsletter, said the new rules would pave the way for the merging of the PLA’s parallel hierarchies of ranks and job positions, though the process could take years to complete.

“In the long term, military ranks and [job] grades will be integrated into one system, which is easier for the top brass to manage and may help improve the PLA’s command and control system,” he said.

“But I am hesitant to say that this will lead to a fairer and more transparent promotion system, because there are other factors such as factional struggles.
“The PLA is an army that follows the rule that ‘the party controls the gun’,” he said.

Antony Wong Dong, a military observer based in Macau said that Xi had been planning the streamlining of the ranking system for many years but had faced resistance from other senior officials.

“That’s why Xi targeted senior officers with the circular,” he said, adding that the move, if implemented successfully, was likely to improve morale among middle-ranking officers.

While China has made giant strides in upgrading and developing new military hardware and weapon systems, analysts have said repeatedly that it needs to strengthen its command and control hierarchy to meet the needs and challenges of modern warfare.

Drew Thompson, a visiting senior research fellow at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at National University of Singapore, said China’s military modernisation had been uneven.

“The PLA’s biggest challenge is simultaneously improving both its hardware and software,” he said.
“While it is probably capable of conducting punitive strikes, it is an open question whether it can conduct a joint operation under hi-tech conditions.”

BEIJING, Dec. 12 (Xinhua) -- Seven Chinese military officers have been promoted to the rank of general, the highest rank for officers in active service in China.
Xi Jinping, chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), presented the officers with certificates of order at a ceremony held by the CMC in Beijing on Thursday.
The promoted officers are Commander of the Eastern Theater Command of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) He Weidong, Political Commissar of the PLA's Eastern Theater Command He Ping, Political Commissar of the PLA's Southern Theater Command Wang Jianwu, Commander of the PLA's Northern Theater Command Li Qiaoming, Commander of the PLA Rocket Force Zhou Yaning, Commander of the PLA Strategic Support Force Li Fengbiao, and head of the PLA's Academy of Military Sciences Yang Xuejun.

Xu Qiliang, CMC vice chairman, announced the orders of promotion at the ceremony, which was presided over by his fellow CMC vice chairman Zhang Youxia.

I'm curious. Is not the PLA now a volunteer force and not a conscript? So with the economy of China improving along with wages wouldn't that make it harder to maintain their volunteer force since private pay jobs can rival and beat military jobs with way less stress. Bad economy = volunteer, Good economy = do not volunteer.

I'm curious. Is not the PLA now a volunteer force and not a conscript? So with the economy of China improving along with wages wouldn't that make it harder to maintain their volunteer force since private pay jobs can rival and beat military jobs with way less stress. Bad economy = volunteer, Good economy = do not volunteer.

The same reason why more recruits come from Arkansas than Silicon Valley: the lack of a smooth-as-ice socio-economic system means what the armed forces have to offer one candidate looks much more attractive than the same package offered to another.

The same reason why more recruits come from Arkansas than Silicon Valley: the lack of a smooth-as-ice socio-economic system means what the armed forces have to offer one candidate looks much more attractive than the same package offered to another.

In 2016 California was the largest source of enlisted personal at 17,729 recruits Arkansas provided 2000 or less. Silicon Valley at a population of 4 million as opposed to Arkansas 3 million. In the bay area Cal, Stanford, San Jose State and all UC's & CSU have ROTC. High schools have JROTC as well. There are number of local guard reserve units staffed by locals

63% of the enlisted personal come from households making $49,531 or more.

The Post 911 and Montgomery GI Bill give incredible learning and financial opportunities. Also the military is consistently educating it personal. Courses on leadership etc... The leadership of the United States Army is more diversified than elite university in the US.

I'm a 59 year old white guy who doesn't get it and I was invited to a USN Educator Orientation Visit in San Diego. It was cool to see a LA Class nuclear sub forward frames only, as well as a Ticonderoga Cruiser. Seeing the SH-60, got to talk wire cutters and settling with power. BUDS / SWCC talked to the applicants. Cool.

Really impressive was a 19 year old coxswain of 34' Muson? Utility boat. The best part was these 20's and younger was the quiet confidence of having done stuff. It was more impressive than the hardware. I am more confident in our youth than I am in our political parties and their leadership.