15002https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/73b22b5c7ee25c3e663318d3e0881212.pdfbc80a8a659e04a945fea2c3b41684648PDF TextTextClinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full or released in part.
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted
under Section 1.4 (d) of E.O. 13526.
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USMISSION GENEVA
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RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO 0103
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RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUFNBUT/HQ JTF PP NAPLES IT//CA/POLAD
ICRC FOLLOW-UP ON MISSING DETAINEES IN BOSNIA:
SUBJ:
GROWING CONCERN
TEXT:
& Q N F I D E N T I A L GENEVA 006384
USCINCEUR ECJ2 ECJ3 ECJ4 ECJ5 POLAD
E.O. 12356: 8/21/96
TAGS: PREF, PHUM, PREL, UN, BK, HR
SUBJECT: ICRC FOLLOW-UP ON MISSING DETAINEES IN BOSNIA:
GROWING CONCERN
1.
CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
EO 13526 1.4d
3. REFCOUNS DELIVERED ON AUGUST 18 TO ICRC DEPUTY
DELEGATE GENERAL FOR EUROPE, CHRISTOPHE GIROD, COPIES OF
U.S. SATELLITE IMAGERY OF POSSIBLE MASS GRAVE SITES IN
BOSNIA. WE PLAN TO PROVIDE THE SAME TO UN HIGH
COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AYALA LASSO. THE
SANITIZED IMAGERY, PROVIDED BY DEPARTMENT, WAS THAT
WHICH HAS BEEN REPORTED IN THE PRESS AND SHARED WITHIN
THE U.Nj
E0 13S7fi1.4ri
EO 13526 1.4d
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
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EO 13526 1.4d
5. COMMENT. THE ICRC VIEWPOINT ON SREBENICA AND ZEPA
HAS SHIFTED PERCEPTIBLY.[
IF WE CAN GIVE THEM
ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE, THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT THEY
WILL FOLLOW IT UP IN THE FIELD.GERSON
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•
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CLASS: -OONriDDHI'IAIr
LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHCAA7727 2432101-CCCC—RHEHAAX.
LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: 0 P 312059Z AUG 95
LINE4: FM SECSTATE WASHDC
OSRI: RUEHC
DTG: 312059Z AUG 95
ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC
TO: RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 6694
INFO: RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 3338
RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO PRIORITY 1697
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0367
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB PRIORITY 7851
SUBJ:
DEMARCHE TO ICRC ON ACCESS TO MISSING PERSONS FROM
SREBRENICA AND ZEPA; REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON GORAZDE
TEXT:
1
«C 0 H T I t T E W T I A f e
STATE 207727
GENEVA FOR RMA
E.O. 12356: DECL: 990831
TAGS: PREF PHUM BK SR HR ICRC
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE TO ICRC ON ACCESS TO MISSING PERSONS FROM
SREBRENICA AND ZEPA; REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON GORAZDE
REF: (A) 95 STATE 203532, (B) 95 STATE 194772, (C) 95 STATE 191010
1.
GOHriDDUTIffL -- ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE -- PLEASE SEE PARAS 4-5.
THE LACK OF ACCESS TO AND INFORMATION ABOUT MISSING
PERSONS FROM THE FORMER UN SAFE AREAS OF SREBRENICA AND
ZEPA CONTINUES TO BE A CAUSE OF GRAVE CONCERN TO US. W
E
ARE AWARE THAT THE ICRC HAS ATTEMPTED TO DEVELOP
INFORMATION ABOUT THE NUMBER, LOCATION AND CONDITION OF
DETAINEES AND OTHER PERSONS MISSING FROM THE SREBRENICA
AND ZEPA AREAS. THUS FAR, HOWEVER, I T APPEARS THAT A
LARGE NUMBER OF PERSONS -- FOR THE MOST PART DRAFT-AGED
MEN -- REMAINS UNACCOUNTED FOR.
3. WE ARE SIMILARLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE LACK OF
INFORMATION ON NUMBERS OF PERSONS AND PREVAILING
CONDITIONS IN THE REMAINING SAFE AREA OF GORAZDE. WE
UNDERSTAND THAT ICRC HAS (OR AT LEAST HAD) A PRESENCE IN
THE GORAZDE AREA. I F THIS IS THE CASE, ICRC COULD BE A
USEFUL SOURCE OF INFORMATION ABOUT CONDITIONS IN THE
GORAZDE ENCLAVE.
4. ACTION REQUESTED: RMA GENEVA IS REQUESTED TO
APPROACH APPROPRIATE ICRC OFFICIALS TO REITERATE OUR
CONTINUING CONCERN ABOUT THE FATE OF MISSING PERSONS FROM
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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SREBRENICA AND ZEPA, AND TO ASK FOR ANY UPDATED
INFORMATION WHICH ICRC MAY HAVE DEVELOPED. ADDITIONALLY,
RMA SHOULD INQUIRE OF ICRC OFFICIALS WHETHER, IN THEIR.
VIEW, THE USG COULD ASSIST THEIR EFFORTS IN OBTAINING
INFORMATION ABOUT MISSING PERSONS AND ACCESS TO DETAINEES.
5. CONCERNING GORAZDE, RMA SHOULD SEEK TO CLARIFY THE
STATUS OF THE ICRC PRESENCE THERE AND REQUEST THAT ICRC
SHARE WITH US ANY NEW INFORMATION I T DEVELOPS REGARDING
ACTUAL NUMBERS OF PERSONS REMAINING IN THE GORAZDE SAFE
AREA AND THE PREVAILING CONDITIONS IN THE ENCLAVE.
6. SARAJEVO -- MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
TALBOTT
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0 060011Z SEP 95
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
RUCNDT
060011Z SEP 95
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7139
RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO IMMEDIATE 0241
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 2803
RHEHAAA/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB IMMEDIATE 1559
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2857
RUFQAAA/USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USVIENNA 4058
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 1562
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 37 50
RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 0893
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 2068
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 27 91
RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 8917
RUCBSAA/USCINCACOM NORFOLK VA
RUFNBUT/HQ JTF PP NAPLES IT//POLAD//
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 3004
BOSNIA/CROATIA: CONTACT GROUP DISCUSSES
PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS IN SREBRENCIA, SECTORS NORTH AND
SOUTH
TEXT:
•€ O ' 'P-I D D H f I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 003368
N
JCS FOR DIR, DIR J5, J2,CHAIRMAN,
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE, CINCACOM FOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR
POLAD MINISTER PENNER
E.O.12356: DECL: 08/14/05
TAGS: PREL, UNSC, PHUM, NATO, BK, HR, SR,
SUBJECT: BOSNIA/CROATIA: CONTACT GROUP DISCUSSES
PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS IN SREBRENCIA, SECTORS NORTH AND
SOUTH
i.
coHriDDHTinr -
ENTIRE
TEXT.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
PER E.0.13526
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2. COUNSELORS FROM THE CONTACT GROUP PLUS ITALY MET
AFTERNOON OF SEPTEMBER 5 TO DISCUSS A GERMAN DRAFT
PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT RESPONDING TO THE SYG'S AUGUST
30 REPORT REGARDING THE FATE OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION
OF ZEPA AND SREBRENICA. (THE GERMAN DRAFT CIRCULATED
DURING THE MEETING ALREADY CONTAINED U.S. PROPOSED
LANGUAGE THAT STATES GIVE THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL
ACCESS TO SITES I T DEEMS IMPORTANT FOR ITS
INVESTIGATIONS.) ALL MEMBERS OF THE GROUP AGREED THAT
THE COUNCIL SHOULD RESPOND TO THE REPORT BY ADOPTING A
PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT. THE UK, FRENCH, ITALIAN AND
RUSSIAN DELEGATIONS ARGUED THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD NOT
BE SEEN AS GIVING DIRECTIONS TO THE INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNAL WHICH WAS AN AUTONOMOUS BODY. THEY THEREFORE
SUGGESTED THE DELETION OF THE SENTENCE IN THE ORIGINAL
DRAFT WHICH EXPRESSED THE COUNCIL'S HOPE THAT THE
TRIBUNAL'S INVESTIGATION INTO THE INCIDENTS MENTIONED
IN THE SYG'S REPORT BE INTENSIFIED. THE GERMAN
REPRESENTATIVE AGREED TO THE DELETION.
3. THE RUSSIAN REPRESENTATIVE SAID THAT THE STATEMENT
SHOULD ALSO REFLECT CONCERNS ABOUT VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN
RIGHTS IN CROATIA THAT HAD BEEN MENTIONED IN THE SYG'S
AUGUST 23 REPORT ON UNCRO. HE CIRCULATED TWO
PARAGRAPHS CONTAINING SPECIFIC LANGUAGE. ALL OTHER
DELEGATIONS SUGGESTED THAT THE COUNCIL TAKE UP THE
QUESTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN SECTORS NORTH
AND SOUTH IN A SEPARATE PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT. THE
RUSSIAN REPRESENTATIVE AGREED THAT HIS DELEGATION COULD
ACCEPT THE PRINCIPAL OF TWO PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENTS
WHICH WERE ADOPTED SIMULTANEOUSLY.
4. COUNSELORS WENT THROUGH THE GERMAN TEXT PARAGRAPH
BY PARAGRAPH AND AGREED TO SEND THE TEXT FOUND BELOW TO
CAPITALS. THEY ALSO WENT THROUGH THE RUSSIAN PROPOSALS
AND TURNED THEM INTO A FREE STANDING STATEMENT THAT
WOULD ALSO BE SENT TO CAPITALS. THE BRITISH
REPRESENTATIVE RAISED A QUESTION ABOUT THE REFERRENCE
TO "SECTORS" NORTH, SOUTH ANP WEST, AND THE USE OF THE
TERM "KRAJINA SERB" POPULATION IN THE RUSSIAN
STATEMENT. THE GROUP AGREED THAT I T WILL RECONVENE AT
1100 SEPTEMBER 6 TO CONTINUE ITS DISCUSSION OF THE TWO
TEXTS.
5. BEGIN TEXT OF GERMAN DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT
ON ZEPA AND SREBRENICA:
THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS CONSIDERED THE REPORT OF THE
SECRETARY GENERAL OF 30 AUGUST (S/1995/755) SUBMITTED
PURSUANT TO ITS RESOLUTION 1010 OF 10 AUGUST 1995.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL STRONGLY CONDEMNS THE FAILURE OF
THE BOSNIAN SERB PARTY TO COMPLY WITH THE DEMANDS
CONTAINED IN RESOLUTION 1010 (1995). THE BOSNIAN SERB
PARTY'S REFUSAL TO COOPERATE WITH THE UNITED NATIONS
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR) AND THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC) CANNOT
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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BUT REINFORCE THE DEEP CONCERN EXPRESSED IN THAT
RESOLUTION AND IN PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS AND STATEMENTS.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL STRESSES ITS DETERMINATION THAT
THE FATE OF PERSONS DISPLACED FROM SREBRENICA AND ZEPA
BE ESTABLISHED. IT REAFFIRMS ITS DEMANDS TO THE
BOSNIAN SERB PARTY TO GIVE IMMEDIATE ACCESS FOR
P O M E T P H >HT I A-fe SECTION 02 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 003368
JCS FOR DIR, DIR J5, J2,CHAIRMAN,
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE, CINCACOM FOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR
POLAD MINISTER PENNER
E.O.12356: DECL: 08/14/05
TAGS: PREL, UNSC, PHUM, NATO, BK, HR, SR,
SUBJECT: BOSNIA/CROATIA: CONTACT GROUP DISCUSSES
PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS IN SREBRENCIA, SECTORS NORTH AND
SOUTH
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNHCR, THE ICRC AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES TO PERSONS DISPLACED FROM
SREBRENICA AND ZEPA WHO ARE WITHIN THE AREAS OF THE
REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA WHO ARE WITHIN THE
AREAS OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA UNDER
THE CONTROL OF BOSNIAN SERB FORCES, AND TO PERMIT
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ICRC TO VISIT AND REGISTER ANY
PERSONS DETAINED AGAINST THEIR WILL.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL ALSO REAFFIRMS ITS DEMANDS TO THE
BOSNIAN SERB PARTY TO RESPECT FULLY THE RIGHTS OF ALL
SUCH PERSONS, TO ENSURE THEIR SAFETY AND TO RELEASE
THEM.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL TAKES NOTE OF THE INVESTIGATIONS
WHICH ARE BEING CARRIED OUT BY THE INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNAL ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO ITS RESOLUTION 827
(1993) . THE COUNCIL REITERATES IN THIS CONTEXT THAT
ALL STATES SHALL COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE TRIBUNAL AND
ITS ORGANS, INCLUDING BY PROVIDING ACCESS TO SITES THE
TRIBUNAL DEEMS IMPORTANT FOR ITS INVESTIGATIONS.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL REITERATES THAT ALL THOSE WHO
COMMIT VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
WILL BE HELD INDIVIDUALLY RESPONSIBLE IN RESPECT OF
SUCH ACTS.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO
CONTINUE HIS EFFORTS AND TO REPORT TO THE COUNCIL NO
LATER THAN 6 OCTOBER 1995 REGARDING COMPLIANCE WITH
RESOLUTION 1010 (1995) AND ANY FURTHER RELEVANT
INFORMATION THAT MAY BECOME AVAILABLE.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL WILL REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE
MATTER.
END TEXT OF GERMAN DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT.
6.
BEGIN TEXT OF RUSSIAN DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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ON CROATIA:
THE SECURITY COUNCIL EXPRESSES ITS DEEP CONCERN AT THE
GRAVE SITUATION OF REFUGEES AND PERSONS DISPLACED FROM
THEIR HOMES AS A RESULT OF THE CROATIAN OFFENSIVE IN
SECTORS WEST, SOUTH AND NORTH IN CROATIA AND AT REPORTS
OF VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AS
DESCRIBED IN THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF 23
AUGUST 1995 (S/1995/730). THE COUNCIL SHARES THE VIEW
OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL THAT THE MASS EXODUS OF THE
KRAJINA SERB POPULATION HAS CREATED A HUMANITARIAN
CRISIS OF SIGNIFICANT PROPORTIONS. THE COUNCIL IS ALSO
CONCERNED BY REPORTS OF VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS
INCLUDING THE BURNING OF HOUSES, LOOTING OF PROPERTY
AND KILLINGS IN SECTORS SOUTH AND NORTH AND DEMANDS
THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF CROATIA IMMEDIATELY TAKES
APPROPRIATE MEASURES TO PUT AN END TO SUCH ACTS.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL WELCOMES EFFORTS MADE BY THE
SECRETARY GENERAL IN COORDINATION WITH INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS IN RESPONSE TO THIS ACUTE
HUMANITARIAN SITUATION. ITS CALLS UPON ALL MEMBER
STATES TO PROVIDE URGENT HUMANITARIAN RELIEF AND
ASSISTANCE TO THESE REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL REITERATES THAT ALL THOSE WHO
COMMIT VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
WILL BE HELD INDIVIDUALLY RESPONSIBLE IN RESPECT OF
SUCH ACTS.
C Q t U r i - D D t l T I
JCS FOR DIR, DIR J 5 ,
ft-Ii
SECTION 03 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 003368
J2,CHAIRMAN,
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE, CINCACOM FOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR
POLAD MINISTER PENNER
E.O.12356: DECL: 08/14/05
TAGS: PREL, UNSC, PHUM, NATO, BK, HR, SR,
SUBJECT: BOSNIA/CROATIA: CONTACT GROUP DISCUSSES
PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS IN SREBRENCIA, SECTORS NORTH AND
SOUTH
THE SECURITY COUNCIL WILL REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE
MATTER.
END TEXT OF RUSSIAN DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON
CROATIA.
7.
SARAJEVO MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
GNEHM
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< SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03
< SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03
A
A
SSN:
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< SSN>3368
< SSN>3368
950905204830 M1840784
< TOR>950905204832 M1840785
< TOR>950905204834 M1840786
A
A
A
A
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PRT: SIT
SIT: BELL BREMNER CLARKER DAALDER FETIG FLANAGAN MITCHELL NSC PETERS
SAUNDERS SCHWARTZ SESTAK S M SUM2 VERSHBOW
U
•
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OAACZYUW RUCNDTA3401 2510016-CCCC--RHEHNSC RHEHAAA.
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0 080016Z SEP 95
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
RUCNDT
080016Z SEP 95
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7175
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO IMMEDIATE 0251
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 2813
RHEHAAA/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB IMMEDIATE 1569
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2867
RUFQAAA/USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 1570
RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 8930
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USVIENNA 4070
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 2083
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 27 99
RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 0901
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 3012
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 37 58
RUFNBUT/HQ JTF PP NAPLES IT//POLAD//
RUCBSAA/USCINCACOM NORFOLK VA
9/07/95 PRES. STATEMENTS CONDEMNING HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN BOSNIA AND CROATIA
TEXT:
0- O
. I D D H ' l ft L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 003401
I T
JCS FOR DIR, DIR J5, J2,CHAIRMAN,
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE, CINCACOM FOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR
POLAD MINISTER PENNER
E.O.12356: DECL: 09/07/05
TAGS: PREL, UNSC, PHUM, NATO, BK, HR, SR,
SUBJECT:9/07/95 PRES. STATEMENTS CONDEMNING HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN BOSNIA AND CROATIA
1.
OONFIDDNTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADOPTED TWO PRESIDENTIAL
STATEMENTS CONDEMNING THE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN
BOSNIAN AND CROATIA.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
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3. IN THE INFORMAL SESSION OF THE COUNCIL, THE
DELEGATION OF OMAN SUGGESTED THAT THE STATEMENT ON
BOSNIA INCLUDE A DEMAND FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE
BOSNIAN SERBS FROM THE SAFE AREAS OF ZEPA AND
SREBRENICA. THE MEMBERS OF THE CONTACT GROUP RESPONDED
THAT THE STATEMENT SHOULD REMAIN FOCUSED ON HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION, THE
DELEGATION OF OMAN WITHDREW ITS PROPOSAL.
4. BEGIN TEXT OF PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON ZEPA AND
SREBRENICA:
THE SEURITY COUNCIL HAS CONSIDERED THE REPORT OF THE
SECRETARY GENERAL OF 30 AUGUST 1995 (S/1995/755)
SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO ITS RESOLUTION 1010 (1995) OF 10
AUGUST 1995.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL STRONGLY CONDEMNS THE FAILURE OF
THE BOSNIAN SERB PARTY TO COMPLY WITH THE DEMANDS
CONTAINED IN RESOLUTION 1010 (1995). THE BOSNIAN SERB
PARTY'S REFUSAL TO COOPERATE WITH THE UNITED NATIONS
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR) ANE THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR THE RED CROSS (ICRC) CANNOT
BUT REINFORCE THE DEEP CONCERN EXPRESSED IN THAT
RESOLUTION AND IN PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS AND STATEMENTS.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL STRESSES ITS DETERMINATION THAT
THE FATE OF PERSONS DISPLACED FROM SREBRENICA AND ZEPA
BE ESTABLISHED. IT REAFFIRMS ITS DEMANDS TO THE
BOSNIAN SERB PARTY TO GIVE IMMEDIATE ACCESS FOR
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNHCR, THE ICRC AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES TO SUCH PERSONS WHO ARE WITHIN
THE AREAS OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
UNDER THE CONTROL OF BOSNIAN SERB FORCES, AND TO PERMIT
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ICRC TO VISIT AND REGISTER ANY
PERSONS DETAINED AGAINST THEIR WILL.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL ALSO REAFFIRMS ITS DEMANDS TO THE
BOSNIAN SERB PARTY TO RESPECT FULLY THE RIGHTS OF ALL
SUCH PERSONS, TO ENSURE THEIR SAFETY AND TO RELEASE
THEM.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL REITERATES THAT ALL THOSE WHO
COMMIT VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
WILL BE HELD INDIVIDUALLY RESPONSIBLE IN RESPECT OF
SUCH ACTS.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL TAKES NOTE OF THE INVESTIGATIONS
WHICH ARE BEING CARRIED OUT BY THE INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNAL ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO ITS RESOLUTION 827
(1993). THE COUNCIL REITERATES IN THIS CONTEXT THAT
ALL STATES SHALL COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE TRIBUNAL AND
ITS ORGANS, INCLUDING BY PROVIDING ACCESS TO SITES THE
TRIBUNAL DEEMS IMPORTANT FOR ITS INVESTIGATIONS.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO
CONTINUE HIS EFFORTS AND TO REPORT TO THE COUNCIL NO
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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LATER THAN 6 OCTOBER 1995 REGARDING COMPLIANCE WITH
RESOLUTION 1010 (1995) AND ANY FURTHER RELEVANT
INFORMATION THAT MAY BECOME AVAILABLE.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL WILL REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE
o o w ^ * ^ E » T I f t ^ L ^ SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 003401
l
JCS FOR DIR, DIR J5, J2,CHAIRMAN,
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE, CINCACOM FOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR
POLAD MINISTER PENNER
E.O.12356: DECL: 09/07/05
TAGS: PREL, UNSC, PHUM, NATO, BK, HR, SR,
SUBJECT:9/07/95 PRES. STATEMENTS CONDEMNING HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN BOSNIA AND CROATIA
MATTER.
END TEXT
5.
BEGIN TEXT OF PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON CROATIA:
THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS CONSIDERED THE REPORT OF THE
SECRETARY GENERAL OF 23 AUGUST 1995 (S/1995/730)
SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO ITS RESOLUTION 1009 OF 10 AUGUST
1995 ON CROATIA AND IN PARTICULAR THE HUMANITARIAN
SITUATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS DESCRIBED THEREIN.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL EXPRESSES ITS DEEP CONCERN AT THE
GRAVE SITUATION OF REFUGEES AND PERSONS DISPLACED
DURING THE CROATIAN OFFENSIVE AND AT REPORTS OF
VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW DESCRIBED
IN THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF 23 AUGUST
1995 (S/1995/730). THE COUNCIL SHARES THE VIEW OF THE
SECRETARY GENERAL THAT THE MASS EXODUS OF THE LOCAL
SERB POPULATION HAS CREATED A HUMANITARIAN CRISIS OF
SIGNIFICANT PROPORTIONS. THE COUNCIL IS ALSO CONCERNED
BY REPORTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS INCLUDING THE
BURNING OF HOUSES, LOOTING OF PROPERTY AND KILLINGS AND
DEMANDS THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF CROATIA IMMEDIATELY
INVESTIGATE ALL SUCH REPORTS AND TAKE APPROPRIATE
MEASURES TO PUT AN END TO SUCH ACTS.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL REITERATES ITS DEMAND THAT THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA RESPECT FULLY THE
RIGHTS OF THE LOCAL SERB POPULATION INCLUDING THEIR
RIGHT TO REMAIN OR RETURN TO SAFETY.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL WELCOMES EFFORTS MADE BY THE
SECRETARY GENERAL IN COORDINATION WITH INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS IN RESPONSE TO THIS ACUTE
HUMANITARIAN SITUATION. IT CALLS UPON ALL MEMBER
STATES TO PROVIDE URGENT HUMANITARIAN RELIEF AND
ASSISTANCE TO THESE REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL REITERATES THAT ALL THOSE W O
H
COMMIT VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
WILL BE HELD INDIVIDUALLY RESPONSIBLE IN RESPECT OF
SUCH ACTS. THE COUNCIL REITERATES IN THIS CONTEXT THAT
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ALL STATES SHALL COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNAL ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO ITS RESOLUTION 827
(1993) AND ITS ORGANS.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL WILL REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE
MATTER.
END TEXT
6.
SAREJEVO MINIMIZED CONSIDERED.
GNEHM
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A
A
DIST:
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Cable
ROUTINE
PREC
•^UNL'lUELUllAi:
CLASS
RAACZYUW RUEHGVA7023 2581118-CCCC--RHEHNSC.
LINE1
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE 2
R 151118Z SEP 95
LINE3
LINE 4 FM USMISSION GENEVA
RUEHGV
OSRI
DTG
151118Z SEP 95
USMISSION GENEVA
ORIG
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6268
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
INFO
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 9374
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 1010
RUSNSTC/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ2/J3/J4/J5/EC/POLAD//
RUFNBUT/HQ JTF PP NAPLES IT//CA/POLAD//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3841
RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO 0125
REQUEST FOR REFERENCE TO ICRC IN YUGOSLAV PEACE
SUBJ:
AGREEMENT; NO PROGRESS ON SREBRENICA MISSING
TEXT:
• COW
R I B P N T I A L - SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 007023
E.O. 12356: 09/14/1996
TAGS: PREF, PHUM, ICRC, UN, BK
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR REFERENCE TO ICRC IN YUGOSLAV PEACE
AGREEMENT; NO PROGRESS ON SREBRENICA MISSING
REF: STATE 207727
1.
UOHgJPBHTIAb - ENTIRE TEXT
2. SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST: ICRC PRESIDENT
SOMMARUGA MADE A REQUEST TO AMB. SPIEGEL THAT ANY PEACE
AGREEMENT REACHED IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA INCLUDE AN
EXPRESS REFERENCE TO THE ICRC AS THE ENTITY THROUGH
WHICH THE ISSUES OF DETAINEES AND THE MISSING SHOULD BE
PURSUED. HE CAUTIONED, HOWEVER, THAT I T WOULD BE A
MISTAKE TO LINK THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ISSUES THEMSELVES
TO THE NEGOTIATIONS. WITH RESPECT TO THE SREBRENICA
MISSING, SOMMARUGA TOLD AMB. SPIEGEL THAT HE IS SENDING
A VERY STIFF LETTER TO KARADZIC DEMANDING AN
EXPLANATION. ICRC INTERVIEWS OF SREBRENICA REFUGEES IN
TUZLA INDICATE THAT 3,000 ARRESTED BY THE BOSNIAN SERBS
IN SREBRENICA/POTOCARI ARE MISSING AND THAT ANOTHER
1,000 - 2,000 OF THOSE WHO FLED SREBRENICA ARE STILL
UNACCOUNTED FOR. ICRC'S DEMANDS FOR ACCESS TO ALL
DETAINEES HAS SO FAR RESULTED IN VISITS TO ONLY 164.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
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ICRC WOULD APPRECIATE ANY FURTHER INFORMATION THAT THE
MASS GRAVE SITES NEAR KASABA DEPICTED IN THE
DEPARTMENT-PROVIDED PHOTOGRAPHS ACTUALLY CONTAIN
CORPSES. ICRC REPORTS THAT THE EVACUATION FROM ZEPA WAS
M C CLEANER IN COMPARISON AND THAT THE NUMBER OF
UH
MISSING IS A G O DEAL LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED. THEY ALSO
OD
INDICTATE THAT GORAZDE HAS AN ESTIMATED POPULATION OF
30,000 - 40,000 WITH OVERCROWDED LIVING CONDITIONS IN
GORAZDE CITY, BUT WITH ADEQUATE FOODS WATER AND MEDICAL
SUPPLIES UNTIL THE BRIDGES LEADING TO GORAZDE W R
EE
RECENTLY DESTROYED. END S M A Y AND ACTION REQUEST.
UMR
3. AMB SPIEGEL BRIEFED ICRC PRESIDENT S M A U A ON
OMRG
SEPTEMBER 13 O THE OUTCOME OF THE YUGOSLAVIA PEACE
N
TALKS HELD IN GENEVA SEPTEMBER 8. S M A U A IN TURN
OMRG
REQUESTED THAT ANY PEACE AGREEMENT INCLUDE A PROVISION
EXPRESSLY IDENTIFYING ICRC AS THE ORGANIZATION THROUGH
WHICH THE ISSUES RELATING TO DETAINEES AND MISSING
PERSONS SHOULD BE PURSUED. IN SOMMARUGA'S VIEW THE
PROVISION IN THE TEXT SHOULD G N FURTHER THAN STATING
O O
THAT ICRC WILL W R WITH THE PARTIES ON THESE ISSUES.
OK
IT SHOULD NOT ATTEMPT TO DEAL WITH THE SUBSTANCE OF THE
ISSUES LEST THEY BECOME ENTANGLED WITH POLITICAL ISSUES.
4. S M A U A NOTED THAT ICRC HAS ALREADY BEEN THE
OMRG
FACILITATOR FOR DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES ON THESE
TOPICS. IT IS PRESENT AT DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN BELGRADE
AND ZAGREB AND PLAYS THE SUPPORTING ROLE AT THE THREE
PARTIES' REGULAR DISCUSSIONS AT THE SARAJEVO AIRPORT
CONCERNING DETAINEES AND MISSING.
5. AMB. SPIEGEL UNDERTOOK TO PASS O SOMMARUGA'S
N
REQUEST. HE NOTED THAT PROGRESS ON THESE ISSUES MIGHT
SERVE AS CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES BETWEEN THE
PARTIES. S M A U A AGREED, BUT CAUTIONED THAT W R ON
OMRG
OK
THE DETAILS OF THE ISSUES SHOULD NOT BE INCLUDED IN
DISCUSSIONS OF POLITICAL ISSUES. OTHERWISE PROGRESS ON
BOTH COULD BE SLOWED.
THE SREBRENICA MISSING
6. IN RESPONSE TO AMB. SPIEGEL'S INQUIRY, S M A U A
OMRG
SAID THAT HE WILL SEND A VERY STIFF LETTER TO KARADZIC
O THE SREBRENICA MISSING. ICRC HAS REPORTS F O
N
RM
SREBRENICA REFUGEES IN TUZLA OF APPROXIMATELY 8000
MISSING. OF THESE, ABOUT THREE THOUSAND W R REPORTED
EE
TO BE IN SREBRENICA/POTOCARI W E SREBRENICA FELL AND
HN
W R ARRESTED BY THE SERBS. THE OTHER FIVE THOUSAND
EE
REPORTEDLY FLED SREBRENICA BEFORE THE ENCLAVE FELL.
7. S M A U A SAID THAT ICRC HAS BEEN TOLD BY SERBIAN
OMRG
AUTHORITIES THAT IT MAY HAVE A
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CCESS TO ALL THE
DETAINEES, BUT SO FAR IT HAS BEEN GIVEN ACCESS TO ONLY
164 HELD AT FIVE POINTS OF DETENTION- ICRC DOES NOT
K O WHETHER THERE ARE OTHER DETENTION LOCATIONS.
NW
SOMMARUGA'S LETTER TO KARADZIC WILL CONTAIN NAMES OF THE
MISSING, STATE THE ALLEGATIONS THAT A MASSACRE HAS TAKEN
-G O MH> I D D 1 T I-A IT-SECTION 02 OF 02 GENEVA 007023
1
E.O. 12356: 09/14/1996
TAGS: PREF, PHUM, ICRC, UN, BK
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR REFERENCE TO ICRC IN YUGOSLAV PEACE
AGREEMENT; NO PROGRESS ON SREBRENICA MISSING
PLACE AND ASK IN POINTED TERMS ABOUT THE FATE OF THE
MISSING THREE THOUSAND WHO WERE ARRESTED. (ICRC TOLD US
THAT WHEN THEY RAISED THE ISSUE WITH BOSNIAN SERB VICE
PRESIDENT KOLJEVIC WHEN HE WAS IN GENEVA SEPTEMBER 8, HE
DID NOT DENY THE ALLEGATIONS OF A MASSACRE BUT SIMPLY
SAID THAT HE WOULD LOOK INTO THEM.)
8. WITH RESPECT TO DETAINEES, SOMMARUGA SAID THAT ICRC
IS AWARE OF ABOUT 2000 IN ALL OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
- 800 HELD BY THE CROATS, 600-800 BY THE BOSNIAN SERBS
AND 300 BY THE BOSNIACS AND HVO.
9. IN SEPARATE DISCUSSIONS WITH ICRC OFFICIALS IN
RESPONSE TO REFTEL WE WERE TOLD THAT THE 164 VISITED ARE
HELD IN FIVE LOCATIONS NEAR BATKOVIC AND PRESUMABLY ARE
IN THE GROUP OF FIVE THOUSAND WHO FLED FROM SREBRENICA.
THERE ARE VARYING ESTIMATES OF THE NUMBER OF PERSONS IN
THIS GROUP WHO HAVE SAFELY ESCAPED BOSNIAN SERB
TERRITORY. BOSNIAN MINISTER MURATOVIC TOLD ICRC THAT IT
IS BETWEEN THREE AND FOUR THOUSAND, LEAVING ANOTHER ONE
TO TWO THOUSAND MISSING. ICRC IS WORKING ON COMPILING
THE NAMES OF THE MISSING IN THIS GROUP AND ASKING THE
BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT FOR WHATEVER INFORMATION IT HAS ON
THEM.
10. WE ALSO PASSED TO ICRC, UNHCR AND THE UN HUMAN
RIGHTS CENTER DEPARTMENT-PROVIDED PHOTOGRAPHS OF MASS
GRAVE SITES NEAR KASABA. ICRC ASKED WHETHER WE HAD ANY
FURTHER INFORMATION TO INDICATE THAT THE SITES ACTUALLY
CONTAINED CORPSES. BOTH ICRC AND UNHCR HAVE TOLD US
THAT THEY HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO OBTAIN ACCESS TO THE
SITES. ICRC, HOWEVER, NOTED THAT I T IS NOT PRESSING THE
ISSUE WITH THE BOSNIAN SERBS. IT DOES NOT VIEW ITS ROLE
AS THAT OF AN INVESTIGATOR" IT WILL RECITE THE
ALLEGATIONS TO THE BOSNIAN SERBS, BUT IT IS UP TO THE
BOSNIAN SERBS TO PROVIDE THEM WITH ANSWERS.
ZEPA
11. ICRC ALSO TOLD US THAT THE EVACUATION OF ZEPA WAS A
MUCH CLEANER OPERATION. ICRC IS STILL IN THE PROCESS OF
TRACING THE MISSING AND HAVE VISITED 796 WHO FLED ZEPA
TO SERBIA. THEY BELIEVE THAT THE NUMBER OF ZEPA MISSING
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WILL TURN OUT TO BE A GOOD DEAL LESS THAN A HUNDRED.
GORAZDE
12. IN GORAZDE, ICRC HAS TWO EXPATS AND 10 LOCAL
STAFF. THEY ESTIMATE THAT THE POPULATION OF THE GORAZDE
ENCLAVE IS 30,000 - 40,000. GORAZDE CITY IS OVERCROWDED
AND LIVING CONDITIONS ARE POOR. UNTIL VERY RECENTLY,
HOWEVER, FOOD SUPPLIES HAVE BEEN ADEQUATE, HELPED BY AN
ACTIVE BLACK MARKET. MEDICAL SUPPLIES HAVE ALSO BEEN
ADEQUATE UNTIL RECENTLY, SUPPLIED BY MSF. LOCAL WELLS
PROVIDE SUFFICIENT WATER. HOWEVER, WITH THE RECENT
DESTRUCTION OF BRIDGES LEADING TO GORAZDE, FOOD AND
MEDICAL SUPPLIES ARE RAPIDLY DWINDLING"
13. SARAJEVO MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
SPIEGEL
BT
#7023
NNNN
SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
< SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02
SSN: 7023
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A
A
/v
DIST:
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Page 1 of 4
Cable
PREC
CLASS
LINE1
LINE2
LINE 3
LINE 4
OSRI
DTG
ORIG
TO
INFO
SUBJ:
IMMEDIATE
GOmriPBHTIM,
OAACZYUW RUCNDTA3936 284 0105-CCCC—RHEHNSC RHEHAAA.
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
0 110105Z OCT 95
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
RUCNDT
110105Z OCT 95
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7983
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO IMMEDIATE 034 0
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 2918
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHEHAAA/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB IMMEDIATE 167 0
RUFQAAA/USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2960
RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 0981
RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 3095
RUCBACM/USCINCACOM NORFOLK VA
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 3867
RUFNBUT/HQ JTF PP NAPLES IT//POLAD//
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 9158
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 2254
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 1652
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2896
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USVIENNA 4210
BOSNIA/CROATIA: DISCUSSION OF THE SYG'S
REPORT ON UNCRO; SYG'S BRIEFING ON UNPROFOR
REDUCTIONS; SYG'S UPDATE ON REQUEST FOR
ACCESS TO ZEPA AND SREBRENICA DETAINEES;
BRIEFING ON CURRENT SITUATION.
TEXT:
• O M F . H F J^I 1 TftT SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 003936
C
T
JCS FOR DIR, DIR J5, J2,CHAIRMAN,
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE, CINCACOM FOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR
POLAD MINISTER DURKEE
E.O.12356: DECL:10/05/2005
TAGS: PREL, NATO, UNSC, PHUM, NATO, BK, HR, SR,
SUBJECT: BOSNIA/CROATIA: DISCUSSION OF THE SYG'S
REPORT ON UNCRO; SYG'S BRIEFING ON UNPROFOR
REDUCTIONS; SYG'S UPDATE ON REQUEST FOR
ACCESS TO ZEPA AND SREBRENICA DETAINEES;
BRIEFING ON CURRENT SITUATION.
DECLASSIFIED
RE 0 13526
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPf - -
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD015\0CT95\MSGS\M1895096.html
1.
OONroDDHTIMr ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY. IN INFORMALS ON 10 OCTOBER, THE COUNCIL
WELCOMED THE 29 SEPTEMBER REPORT OF THE SYG ON UNCRO
AND APPROVED A DRAFT LETTER FROM THE COUNCIL PRESIDENT
TO THE SYG AGREEING WITH THE REPORT'S CONCLUSIONS.
AMBASSADOR GHAREKHAN INFORMED THE COUNCIL OF THE SYG'S
DECISION TO REDUCE UNPROFOR. GHAREKHAN REPORTED ON
UNPROFOR'S CONTINUED EFFORTS TO GAIN ACCESS TO
CIVILIANS FROM ZEPA AND SREBRENICA DETAINED BY THE
BOSNIAN SERBS. HE ALSO BRIEFED THE COUNCIL ON THE
STATUS OF THE CEASE-FIRE BROKERED BY HOLBROOKE ON 5
OCTOBER. END SUMMARY.
3. AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH STATED THAT WE SUPPORTED THE
SYG'S DECISION TO WITHDRAW UNCRO BATTALIONS FROM
SECTORS NORTH, SOUTH, AND WEST. INDERFURTH STRESSED
THAT THE CROATIAN GOVERNMENT MUST DO MORE TO ENSURE THE
HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE SERB MINORITIES AND UNDERLINED US
SUPPORT FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS ACTION TEAMS
TO MONITOR THE SITUATION IN THOSE AREAS.
4. COUNCIL MEMBERS SUPPORTED THE SYG'S RECOMMENDATION
REDUCING UNCRO TO 2,500 BY THE END OF OCTOBER. MEMBERS
AGREED TO ISSUE A LETTER TO THE SYG ON BEHALF OF THE
COUNCIL NOTING THEIR AGREEMENT WITH THE SYG'S REPORT.
TEXT FOLLOWS PARA 10. MEMBERS EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT
THE CONTINUING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND
BURNING/LOOTING OF HOUSES IN KRAJINA. ITALIAN DEP
PERMREP FERRARIN STATED THAT THE GOC "SHOULD INTERVENE
AND BRING THE CULPRITS TO JUSTICE."
5. AMBASSADOR GHAREKHAN INFORMED THE COUNCIL OF THE
SYG'S DECISION TO REDUCE UNPROFOR BY 9,000 TROOPS
LEAVING 21,000 TROOPS IN THEATER. GHAREKHAN SAID THAT
SEVERAL FACTORS, INCLUDING THE FALL OF ZEPA AND
SREBRENICA, THE HV/HVO AND BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT RECENT
OFFENSIVES, AND THE CREATION OF THE RRF WARRANTED THE
REDUCTION IN UNPROFOR PERSONEL. RECONFIGURATION OF
UNPROFOR WILL ENHANCE OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY BY
CREATING "GENERALIZED BATTALIONS" WITH FLEXIBLE
OPERATION CAPABILITIES. THE REDUCTION WILL HELP
ALLEVIATE SOME PRESSURE ON THE SECRETARIAT TO REDUCE
COSTS IN RESPONSE TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF THE UN.
6. AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH STATED THAT ALTHOUGH THE US
DID NOT QUESTION THE AUTHORITY OF THE SYG, THE COUNCIL
SHOULD BE INFORMED BEFORE AN ALTERATION TO A MANDATE IS
MADE. INDERFURTH SAID A SC MANDATE ESTABLISHES A LINK
BETWEEN THE OPERATION AND ITS SIZE WHICH USUALLY
REQUIRES A SC DECISION TO ALTER.
RUSSIAN DEP PERMREP
FEDOTOV EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE "PROCEDURE OF
INFORMATION" WHICH ALLOWED CNN ACCESS TO INFORMATION
BEFORE THE COUNCIL WAS NOTIFIED. FRENCH PERMREP
DEJAMAIS URGED THE SYG TO EXERCISE CAUTION IN
WITHDRAWING UNPROFOR SINCE THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE IN SUCH
A DELICATE STAGE.
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7. GHAREKHAN REPORTED TO THE COUNCIL ON THE
HUMANITARIAN SITUATION IN SREBRENICA AND ZEPA AS CALLED
FOR IN SCR 1010. UNHCR AND ICRC ARE STILL BEING DENIED
ACCESS TO DETAINEES. THE BOSNIAN SERBS W R DENYING
EE
UNPROFOR'ACCESS TO THAT AREA, CONSEQUENTLY, NO
INVESTIGATION OF THE ALLEDGED MASS GRAVES WAS
POSSIBLE. OF THE 8,000 PERSONS REPORTED AS MISSING
G O U r i ' D D H T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN N W YORK 003936
E
JCS FOR DIR, DIR J5, J2,CHAIRMAN,
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE, CINCACOM FOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR
POLAD MINISTER DURKEE
E.O.12356: DECL:10/05/2005
TAGS: PREL, NATO, UNSC, PHUM, NATO, BK, HR, SR,
SUBJECT: BOSNIA/CROATIA: DISCUSSION OF THE SYG'S
REPORT ON UNCRO; SYG'S BRIEFING ON UNPROFOR
REDUCTIONS; SYG'S UPDATE ON REQUEST FOR
ACCESS TO ZEPA AND SREBRENICA DETAINEES;
_
BRIEFING ON CURRENT SITUATION.
AFTER THE BSA OFFENSIVE IN SREBRENICA, 3,000 HAVE BEEN
IDENTIFIED AS BEING DETAINED, THE OTHER 5,000 HAVE
"SIMPLY DISAPPEARED".
8. MANY DELEGATIONS EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE
RESTRICTED ACCESS OF UNPROFOR TO THE SITES OF THE
ALLEDGED MASS GRAVES. AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH STATED
THAT THE RESTRICTION SEEMED TO INDICATE THAT " U FEARS
OR
W R WELL-FOUNDED".
EE
9. GHAREKHAN INFORMED THE COUNCIL THAT THE CEASE-FIRE
AGREEMENT OF 5 OCTOBER WAS NOT YET IN EFFECT BECAUSE
GAS AND ELECTRICITY HAD NOT BEEN RESTORED TO SARAJEVO.
ELECTRICITY WAS PREDICTED TO RESUME 10 OCTOBER AND GAS
WOULD BE FORTHCOMING PENDING THE RESOLUTION OF
TECHNICAL PROBLEMS. WITHOUT A CEASE-FIRE, FIGHTING
CONTINUED. BOSNIAN ARMY LAUNCHED AN OFFENSIVE AT MT.
VLUK SUPPORTED BY ARTILLERY SOUTH OF TUZLA. THE ATTACK
ELICITED A BSA RESPONSE WHICH RESULTED IN THE DEATH OF
ONE NORWEGIAN PEACEKEEPER. FIGHTING WAS INTENSE IN
DOBOJ AND MAGLAI. A REFUGEE CAMP IN ZEVENICA WAS HIT
RESULTING IN THE DEATH OF 10 CIVILIANS AND THE INJURY
OF 34 OTHERS.
10. BEGIN TEXT OF LETTER TO THE SYG ON BEHALF OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL ON UNCRO:
--THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAVE CONSIDERED
Y U REPORT OF 2 9 SEPTEMBER PURSUANT TO SECURITY
OR
COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1009 (1995) (S/1995/835). THE
MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AGREE WITH THE
ARRANGEMENTS SET OUT IN THAT REPORT FOR THE REMAINDER
OF THE CURRENT MANDATE OF U C O PENDING, IN THE CASE OF
NR
EASTERN SLAVONIA, THE OUTCOME OF THE ON-GOING
NEGOTIATIONS ON THE SUBJECT.
END TEXT.
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11.
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MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
ALBRIGHT
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<~TOR>951010221420 M1895097
A
A
DIST:
SIT: BELL CLARKER DAALDER FEELEY NSC PETERS SAUNDERS SCHWARTZ SESTAK
VERSHBOW
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PREC
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OSRI
DTG
ORIG
TO
INFO
SUBJ:
IMMEDIATE
OOHriDEHTIAL
OAACZYUW RUEHBWA5004 2841609-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
0 111609Z OCT 95
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
RUEHBW
111609Z OCT 95
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7367
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 1847
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0480
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0750
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB IMMEDIATE 2696
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1473
RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO IMMEDIATE 0216
RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 4111
DEMARCHE TO FRY FOREIGN MINISTER MILUTINOVIC
ABOUT BANJA LUKA ETHNIC CLEANSING
TEXT:
»-lH -P. I ft B M T I A h 'BELGRADE 005004
E.O. 12356:DECL:OADR
TAGS: PRE, PGOV, PHUM, SR
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE TO FRY FOREIGN MINISTER MILUTINOVIC
ABOUT BANJA LUKA ETHNIC CLEANSING
REF:
1.
HILL-PERINA TELCON 10/10/95
COHFIDfiMTIftfr - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. PER REFTELCON, I CALLED FRY FOREIGN MINISTER
MILUTINOVIC TO REGISTER WASHINGTON'S STRONG ANGER ABOUT
RENEWED REPORTS OF ETHNIC CLEANSING IN THE BANJA LUKA
AREA.
3. I SIAD THAT UN REPORTS OF NEW BOSNIAN SERB
ATROCITIES IN THE REGION WERE BEING PICKED UP BY
ALL THE INTERNATIONAL MEDIA, INCLUDING A FRONT-PAGE
STORY THAT WOULD BE PUBLISHED IN THE NEW YORK
TIMES. THIS INCLUDED CHARGES THAT UP TO FIVE
THOUSAND CIVILIAN MUSLIM MEN WERE MISSING AND
UNACCOUNTED FOR. I F TRUE, THIS COULD NOT HELP BUT
EVOKE IMAGES OF NEW MASSACRES SUCH AS HAD TAKEN
PLACE IN SREBRENICA. IN ADDITION, THE CONTINUED
EXPULSION OF THOUSANDS OF MUSLIM CIVILIANS WAS
UNDENIABLE AND DOCUMENTED ON TELEVISION ALMOST
EVERY EVENING. SUCH ACTIONS WERE VICIOUS AND
TOTALLY CONTRARY TO OUR JOINT EFFORTS TO INITIATE
PEACE TALKS. INDEED, THEY COULD ENDANGER THE PEACE
PER E.0.13526
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PROCESS I F NEW MASSACRES WERE DOCUMENTED.
4. MILUTINOVIC PROFESSED SHOCK AND DISMAY AT THE
REPORTS AND SAID THAT THIS WAS THE FIRST HE HAD
HEARD OF THEM. "WHAT SHOULD WE DO?" HE ASKED. I
SAID THAT BELGRADE MUST INSIST THAT BOSNIAN SERB
AUTHORITIES STOP SUCH ACTIONS IMMEDIATELY, ARREST
ANY PARAMILITARY FORCES THAT MAY BE RESPONSIBLE,
AND COOPERATE WITH UN INVESTIGATION OF MISSING
INDIVIDUALS. MILUTINOVIC AGREED THAT THIS WAS A
VERY NEGATIVE DEVELOPMENT FOR THE PEACE PROCESS AND
SAID HE WOULD DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH MILOSEVIC.
(NOTE: I PLAN ALSO TO SEND BOTH MILUTINOVIC AND
MILOSEVIC A COPY OF THE NYT ARTICh, WHEN RECEIVED.)
5. IN A SIDE DISCUSSION OF THE CEASEFIRE,
MILUTINOVIC SAID I T WAS "INCREDIBLY STUPID" OF "RSK
FOREIGN MINISTER" BUHA TO HAVE REJECTED AGREEMENT
TO A DELAYED CEASEFIRE, ALTHOUGH THE BOSNIAN
GOVERNMENT SIDE BORE THE MAIN RESPONSIBILITY FOR
SEEKING ARTIFICIAL DELAYS. MILUTINOVIC CALLED ME
BACK AT MIDDAY OCTOBER 11 TO SAY THAT BUHA HAD JUST
SIGNED A DOCUMENT AGREEING TO A CEASEFIRE AS SOON
AS POSSIBLE. HE SAID HE HOPED THERE WOULD BE NO
FURTHER DELAYS FROM EITHER SIDE AND THE CEASEFIRE
COULD GO INTO EFFECT IMMEDIATELY. PERINA
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FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
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USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
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RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
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RUCBACM/USCINCACOM NORFOLK VA
RUEHTHAMEMBASSY ATHENS 1658
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 3101
RUFNBUT/HQ JTF PP NAPLES IT//POLAD//
BOSNIA/CROATIA: COUNCIL ADOPTS A PRESIDENTIAL
STATEMENT CONDEMNING "ETHNIC CLEANSING" IN
WESTERN BOSNIA, SECRETARIAT'S BRIEFING ON THE
CURRENT SITUATION
TEXT:
0 & t D > D D-H T I h b SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 003981
-»
JCS FOR DIR, DIR J5, J2,CHAIRMAN,
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE, CINCACOM FOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR
POLAD MINISTER DURKEE
E.O.12356: DECL:10/12/2005
TAGS: PREL, NATO, UNSC, PHUM, NATO, BK, HR, SR,
SUBJECT: BOSNIA/CROATIA: COUNCIL ADOPTS A PRESIDENTIAL
STATEMENT CONDEMNING "ETHNIC CLEANSING" IN
WESTERN BOSNIA, SECRETARIAT'S BRIEFING ON THE
CURRENT SITUATION
1. GOHFIDIJHTIJWJ ENTIRE TEXT.
PER E.(X 13526
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PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ADOPTED
2. AMBASSADORS F O THE CONTACT G O P PLUS ITALY MET
RM
RU
MORNING OF SEPTEMBER 12 TO DISCUSS A FRENCH REVISION OF
THE GERMAN PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT O BOSNIAN SERB
N
"ETHNIC CLEANSING." THE FRENCH DRAFT WAS BASED O THE
N
GERMAN TEXT OF OCTOBER 12, BUT INCLUDED LANGUAGE
WELCOMING THE FACT THAT THE OCTOBER 5 CEASE-FIRE
AGREEMENT HAD ENTERED INTO FORCE, AND DEMANDING THAT
BOTH SIDES COMPLY WITH THE CEASE FIRE. IN AN EFFORT TO
ACCOMODATE THE RUSSIAN CONCERNS THE TEXT EXPRESSED DEEP
CONCERN ABOUT ANY OPERATION THAT PROVOKES LARGE SCALE
MOVEMENTS OF CIVILIAN POPULATIONS.
3. THE RUSSIAN REPRESENTATIVE PRESSED CONTACT GROUP
MEMBERS TO ACCEPT SPECIFIC REFERENCES TO THE RECENT
MILITARY OFFENSIVES BY THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT AS A W Y
A
TO "BALANCE" THE TEXT. AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT SAID THE
SUGGESTION W S NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THE USG. SHE POINTED
A
OUT THAT THE PRACTICE OF "ETHNIC CLEANSING" W S NOT
A
AKIN TO MILITARY OPERATIONS AND THEREFORE, DID NOT
DESERVE EQUAL CONDEMNATION BY THE COUNCIL.
4. IN INFORMALS, THE COUNCIL WELCOMED THE DRAFT
PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT AND AGREED THAT THE URGENT
NATURE OF THE SITUATION CALLED FOR AN IMMEDIATE
RESPONSE. OMANI, ARGENTIN AND INDONESIAN AMENDMENTS
W R ADDED TO THE TEXT.
EE
5. AFTER ADDITIONAL DEBATE THE COUNCIL ADOPTED O
N
OCTOBER 12 THE PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT FOUND BELOW.
BRIEFING BY THE SECRETARIAT
6. ASSISTANT SECRETARY-GENERAL RIZA BRIEFED THE
COUNCIL O CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS. THE CEASE-FIRE IN
N
BOSNIA TOOK EFFECT ON 11 OCTOBER AT 0001 LOCAL TIME.
LIMITED ACCESS TO FRONT LINES PREVENTED UNPROFOR F O
RM
MONITORING COMPLIANCE WITH CEASE-FIRE. RIZA SAID THAT
BOSNIAN SERB ETHNIC CLEANSING IN WESTERN BOSNIA WAS
CONTINUING. THE BOSNIAN SERBS GAVE 1,200 MUSLIMS AND
CROATS 2 MINUTES TO LEAVE THEIR H M S IN THE BANJA LUKA
OE
AREA. UNHCR REPORTS INDICATED WIDE SPREAD HUMAN RIGHTS
ABUSES IN NORTHERN ?!BERY. A LARGE NUMBER OF DRAFT-AGE MEN W R
EE
SEPARATED F O THE EXPELLED PERSONS AND ARE CURRENTLY
RM
UNACCOUNTED FOR. UNHCR FEARS THAT IF THE BOSNIAN SERB
EXPULSION CAMPAIGN CONTINUED AS MANY AS 20,000 MAY S O
ON
BE DISPLACED.
7.
BEGIN TEXT OF PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT:
DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT
THE SECURITY COUNCIL WELCOMES THE ENTRY INTO FORCE
OF THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE BOSNIAN PARTIES
OF 5 OCTOBER 1995.
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THE SECURITY COUNCIL TAKES THIS OPPORTUNITY TO
EXPRESS ITS GRATITUDE TO ALL THOSE W O NEGOTIATED THE
H
CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT, AND TO THE UNITED NATIONS
PROTECTION FORCE AND OTHERS WHO, OFTEN AT RISK TO THEIR
O N LIVES, HAVE MADE POSSIBLE, WITH THE COOPERATION OF
W
- f e O H l l U l L N l l A l j SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN N W YORK 003981
E
JCS FOR DIR, DIR J5, J2,CHAIRMAN,
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE, CINCACOM FOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR
POLAD MINISTER DURKEE
E.O.12356: DECL:10/12/2005
TAGS: PREL, NATO, UNSC, PHUM, NATO, BK, HR, SR,
SUBJECT: BOSNIA/CROATIA: COUNCIL ADOPTS A PRESIDENTIAL
STATEMENT CONDEMNING "ETHNIC CLEANSING" IN
WESTERN BOSNIA, SECRETARIAT'S BRIEFING ON THE
CURRENT SITUATION
1. ^eOllFTDEWTIAL ENTIRE TEXT.
ALL THE PARTIES, THE RESTORATION OF GAS AND ELECTRICITY
SUPPLIES TO THE INHABITANTS OF SARAJEVO ENABLING THEM TO
LIVE IN M R DECENT CONDITIONS.
OE
THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEMANDS THAT ALL PARTIES FULLY
COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT
AND REFRAIN F O ANY MILITARY ACTIVITY THAT COULD
RM
JEOPARDIZE THE PEACE PROCESS. IT EXPRESSES ITS DEEPEST
CONCERN AT ANY OPERATION THAT PROVOKES LARGE-SCALE
MOVEMENTS OF POPULATION DETRIMENTAL TO THE PEACE PROCESS
AND A FINAL AND FAIR SETTLEMENT. THE COUNCIL IS
PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT N W REPORTS RELATED TO THE
E
MOVEMENTS OF THE DISPLACED POPULATION IN THE AREAS OF
SANSKI MOST AND MRKONJIC GRAD.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL REITERATES ITS STRONG
CONDEMNATION OF ALL PRACTICES OF ETHNIC CLEANSING
WHEREVER THEY OCCUR AND BY W O S E E COMMITTED. IT
HMOVR
DEMANDS THEIR IMMEDIATE CESSATION AND UNDERLINES THE
NEED TO ALLEVIATE THE SUFFERINGS CAUSED BY THESE ACTS.
THE COUNCIL URGES ALL BOSNIAN PARTIES TO RESPECT FULLY
THE RIGHTS OF ALL COMMUNITIES INCLUDING THEIR RIGHT TO
REMAIN W E E THEY ARE OR TO RETURN TO THEIR H M S IN
HR
OE
SAFETY.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS IN PARTICULAR DEEPLY
CONCERNED ABOUT N W REPORTS CONCERNING ACTS OF ETHNIC
E
CLEANSING COMMITTED IN THE BANJA LUKA AND PRIJEDOR
AREAS, ESPECIALLY ABOUT REPORTS, INCLUDING THOSE BY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS, THAT NON-SERB
MEN AND BOYS OF DRAFT AGE ARE BEING TAKEN A A BY
WY
BOSNIAN SERB AND OTHER PARAMILITARY FORCES. THE COUNCIL
DEMANDS THAT THESE PERSONS BE IMMEDIATELY RELEASED.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEMANDS THAT THE BOSNIAN SERB
PARTY GRANTS IMMEDIATE AND UNIMPEDED ACCESS FOR UNITED
NATIONS PERSONNEL AND THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS TO ALL THE
AREAS OF CONCERN. IT ALSO DEMANDS THAT ICRC
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REPRESENTATIVES BE ALLOWED TO VISIT AND REGISTER ANY
PERSONS DETAINED AGAINST THEIR WILL. THE COUNCIL
REITERATES IN THIS CONTEXT THE DEMANDS SET OUT IN
RESOLUTION 1010 (1995) AND IN THE STATEMENT OF ITS
PRESIDENT OF 7 SEPTEMBER 1995 ON SREBRENICA AND ZEPA.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL REAFFIRMS THAT THOSE WHO HAVE
COMMITTED OR HAVE ORDERED THE COMMISSION OF VIOLATIONS
OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW WILL BE HELD
INDIVIDUALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THEM. THE COUNCIL.RECALLS
IN THIS CONTEXT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNAL PURSUANT TO ITS RESOLUTION 827 (1993) AND
REITERATES THAT ALL STATES SHALL COOPERATE FULLY WITH
THE TRIBUNAL AND ITS ORGANS.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL WILL REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF
THE MATTER.
END TEXT.
8.
MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
ALBRIGHT
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DUTCH REPORT ON SREBRENICA TO OFFER GRIST
FOR DEFENDERS AND DETRACTORS OF BLUE HELMET ACTIONS
TEXT:
C 0»-H B I B E M ' T I f t L
SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 005512
E.O. 12356: DECL: 10/13/15
TAGS: MARR, PREL, UN, NATO, BK, NL
SUBJECT: DUTCH REPORT ON SREBRENICA TO OFFER GRIST
FOR DEFENDERS AND DETRACTORS OF BLUE HELMET ACTIONS
REFS:
1.
A) THE HAGUE 54 52
GOHMDWPIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT.
SUMMARY
2. THE OFFICIAL MOD REPORT ON DUTCH ACTIONS DURING
AND AFTER THE FALL OF SREBRENICA IS LIKELY TO OFFER
SOME GRIST FOR BOTH DEFENDERS AND DETRACTORS OF DUTCH
ACTIONS, ACCORDING TO AN MOD OFFICIAL FAMILIAR WITH
THE REPORT. THE MOD BELIEVES THE REPORT -- SCHEDULED
FOR RELEASE OCTOBER 23 -- WILL CLARIFY A NUMBER OF
MISPERCEPTIONS REGARDING DUTCH ACTIONS THAT HAVE
APPEARED BOTH IN THE DUTCH AND INTERNATIONAL MEDIA IN
RECENT WEEKS. IN PARTICULAR, THE REPORT WILL
HIGHLIGHT THE MILITARY LIMITATIONS UNDER WHICH THE
DUTCH OPERATED AND THE RISKS TO REFUGEES AND BLUE
HELMETS ALIKE I F THE DUTCH RESPONSE HAD BEEN MORE
AGGRESSIVE. ON THE DOWNSIDE FOR THE MOD AND GON, THE
REPORT WILL CONTAIN REFERENCES TO MISBEHAVIOR ON THE
PER E.0.13526
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PART OF DUTCH TROOPS, INCLUDING SELLING OF WEAPONS,
RIGHT-WING SYMPATHIES, AND POOR TREATMENT OF WOMEN
THAT WILL NOT HELP THE ARMY'S EMBATTLED IMAGE.
3. ALTHOUGH THE REPORT COULD BE DAMAGING POLITICALLY
TO DEFENSE MINISTER VOORHOEVE, MOD OBSERVERS DO NOT
SEE A HIGH RISK OF HIS BEING FORCED TO RESIGN. AS
SEPTEL WILL ELABORATE, THE REPORT IS LIKELY TO HAVE
AN IMPACT ON THE DECISIONMAKING PROCESS RELATING TO
PEACEKEEPING PARTICIPATION. AT THIS STAGE WE DO NOT
SEE, EXCEPT IN CERTAIN QUARTERS, ANY SIGNS OF REDUCED
DUTCH WILLINGNESS TO UNDERTAKE SUCH MISSIONS
GENERALLY. THIS CONTROVERSY HAS ALSO MOTIVATED DUTCH
EFFORTS WITH THEIR EU COLLEAGUES TO GET SOMETHING IN
A BOSNIA PEACE SETTLEMENT REQUIRING AN ACCOUNTING OF
THE MEN TAKEN AWAY IN SREBRENICA AND ZEPA. END
SUMMARY.
REPORT NOT TO PULL PUNCHES
4. AN MOD OFFICIAL FAMILIAR WITH THE DEFENSE
MINISTRY'S SOON-TO-BE-RELEASED REPORT ON DUTCH
ACTIONS DURING AND AFTER THE FALL OF SREBRENICA SAFE
AREA INDICATED THAT THE REPORTWOULD CONTAIN
INFORMATION THAT COULD BE USED TO BOLSTER THE
ARGUMENTS OF BOTH DEFENDERS AND DETRACTORS OF DUTCH
ACTIONS. ON BALANCE, HOWEVER, HE BELIEVED THE REPORT
WOULD OFFER A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE MILITARY
ASPECTS OF THE SITUATION IN SREBRENICA, PARTICULARLY
THE LIMITATIONS UNDER WHICH THE TROOPS OPERATED AND
THE RISKS OF ALTERNATIVE, TOUGHER ACTIONS. FOR
EXAMPLE, THE REPORT POINTS OUT THAT DUTCH FORCES
LINED UP OBSERVING REFUGEES BOARD A BUS — A
PHOTOGRAPH OF WHICH HAS BEEN USED TO DEPICT THE DUTCH
AS HAVING COLLUDED IN ETHNIC CLEANSING — HAD IN FACT
FORMED A COLUMN TO PREVENT WOMEN AND CHILDREN FROM
BEING TRAMPLED IN THE RUSH FOR THE BUSES.
IN DEFENSE OF DUTCH ACTIONS
5. AMONG THE KEY POINTS THE REPORT WILL EMPHASIZE TO
BACK UP DUTCH ACTIONS ARE:
-- THE DUTCH TROOPS DID UNDERTAKE MILITARY MANEUVERS
PRIOR TO AND DURING THE COURSE OF THE SERB ATTACK TO
PREVENT THE TAKEOVER OF THE SAFE AREA.
— FOLLOWING THE TAKEOVER, THE DUTCH TROOPS' FREEDOM
OF MOVEMENT WAS SHARPLY CIRCUMSCRIBED, LIMITING THEIR
ABILITY TO WITNESS EVENTS OUTSIDE THE COMPOUND.
-- GIVEN THIS RESTRICTED MOVEMENT, THE TROOPS HAD NO
MEANS OF KNOWING THAT MASS EXECUTIONS WERE TAKING
PLACE.
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-- ACTIVE DUTCH RESISTANCE TO THE SERBS WOULD NOT
HAVE PREVENTED THE SERB TAKEOVER, AND COULD HAVE
RESULTED IN HIGH CASUALTIES A O G REFUGEES. THE
MN
REPORT NOTES THAT THE POTOCARI COMPOUND, W E E THE
HR
DUTCH AND MUSLIM REFUGEES W R CONCENTRATED, WAS
EE
0 0 H F i P S H T I A fr-SECTION 02 OF 03 THE HAGUE 005512
.
E.O. 12356: DECL: 10/13/15
TAGS: MARR, PREL, UN, NATO, BK, NL
SUBJECT: DUTCH REPORT ON SREBRENICA TO OFFER GRIST
FOR DEFENDERS AND DETRACTORS OF BLUE HELMET ACTIONS
SURROUNDED BY SERB ARTILLERY. ANY USE OF THAT
ARTILLERY COULD HAVE KILLED HUNDREDS OF REFUGEES.
POTENTIALLY DAMAGING REVELATIONS
6. ON THE DOWNSIDE OF THE LEDGER, THERE ARE A NUMBER
OF FACTS THAT COULD CAUSE POTENTIAL PROBLEMS FOR THE
MOD. ALTHOUGH S M REVELATIONS RELATING TO THE
OE
PERSONAL BEHAVIOR OF SOLDIERS ARE NOT SPECIFICALLY
RELEVANT TO THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE DUTCH DID ALL
THEY COULD TO AVERT HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES, THEY ARE
LIKELY TO BECOME INEXTRICABLY INTERWOVEN WITH PUBLIC
AND PARLIAMENTARY PERCEPTIONS OF THE DUTCH ROLE IN
SREBRENICA. THESE INCLUDE:
-- THE DUTCH DID NOT REPORT EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS OF
ATROCITIES TO THE U.N. UNTIL THEY W R DEBRIEFED IN
EE
ZAGREB JULY 22 OUT OF A DESIRE NOT TO ANTAGONIZE THE
SERBS AND ENDANGER THE SAFETY AND SAFE DEPARTURE OF
THE TROOPS.
-- THERE W R DISCIPLINARY PROBLEMS A O G THE DUTCH
EE
MN
FORCES THAT INCLUDED SELLING EQUIPMENT, EXTREME
RIGHT-WING SYMPATHIES, AND P O TREATMENT OF W M N
OR
OE,
SPECIFICALLY W M N WITHIN THEIR O N UNITS.
OE
W
COMPREHENSIVE AND UNJUDGMENTAL
7. THE FINAL REPORT, WHICH WILL BE RELEASED
FOLLOWING CABINET REVIEW OCTOBER 23, IS BASED O
N
INTERVIEWS WITH 4 90 OF THE 4 99 SOLDIERS IN SREBRENICA
CONDUCTED BY 189 DEBRIEFERS. EACH INTERVIEW TOOK AN
AVERAGE OF.FOUR HOURS, WITH S M LASTING UP TO TEN
OE
HOURS. ACCORDING TO THE MOD, THE REPORT DOES NOT
PRESCRIBE A JUDGEMENT, BUT IS DESIGNED TO LET PEOPLE
C M TO THEIR O N -- BUT BETTER INFORMED — OPINIONS,
OE
W
WHICH THEY HOPE WILL LEAD TO A M R NUANCED
OE
PERSPECTIVE OF DUTCH ACTIONS.
IMPLICATIONS FOR IFOR
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8. NEITHER MOD NOR MFA OFFICIALS EXPECT THE REPORT
WILL NEGATIVELY AFFECT DUTCH PARTICIPATION IN IFOR.
IN FACT, THE MOD SAID THEY EXPECT TO BE ABLE TO POINT
TO IFOR'S MORE ROBUST APPROACH AND BETTER COMMAND AND
CONTROL MECHANISMS AS EVIDENCE THAT THE GOVERNMENT
AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAVE DRAWN THE LESSONS OF
THE FAILURE OF SREBRENICA AND HAVE ALREADY MOVED TO
ENSURE SUCH EVENTS DO NOT OCCUR AGAIN. NEVERTHELESS,
ALL FUTURE DEPLOYMENTS, INCLUDING IFOR, WILL BE MORE
CLOSELY SCRUTINIZED AND HIGHLY POLITICIZED.
SEEKING AN ACCOUNTING IN PEACE ACCORD
9. AS THE DEPARTMENT MAY BE AWARE, MFA OFFICIALS
HAVE INDICATED THAT THE NETHERLANDS HAS BEEN WORKING
WITHIN THE EU TO SEEK TO BUILD INTO AN EVENTUAL PEACE
SETTLEMENT A REQUIREMENT FOR AN ACCOUNTING OF THE MEN
WHO WERETAKEN AWAY OR OTHERWISE MISSING FROM
SREBRENICA AND ZEPA. THEY FEAR THAT I F NOTHING IS
WRITTEN INTO THE SETTLEMENT NOW, THERE WILL NEVER BE
AN ADEQUATE ACCOUNTING.
COMMENT
10. THERE HAS BEEN SOME LIMITED SPECULATION THAT
ELEMENTS OF THE REPORT COULD DAMAGE DEFENSE MINISTER
VOORHOEVE POLITICALLY, AND POTENTIALLY FORCE HIS
RESIGNATION. GIVEN THE REPORT'S MIXTURE OF GOOD AND
BAD NEWS, THE KEY FACTOR WILL BE WHAT USE PARLIAMENT
CHOOSES TO MAKE OF THE REPORT. I F THEY ARE LOOKING
TO PUT THE ISSUE TO REST, THE REPORT WILL GIVE THEM
THE MEANS TO DO SO; CONVERSELY, I F THEY WANT A
SCAPEGOAT, THEY COULD FIND ENOUGH AMMUNITION TO
DAMAGE VOORHOEVE. MOST OF OUR CONTACTS (INCLUDING IN
THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE, MFA, AND MOD) DOUBT
•0 0 t F 1- DfrH T I - L SECTION 03 OF 03 THE HAGUE 005512
»
A
E.O. 12356: DECL: 10/13/15
TAGS: MARR, PREL, UN, NATO, BK, NL
SUBJECT: DUTCH REPORT ON SREBRENICA TO OFFER GRIST
FOR DuFENDERS AND DETRACTORS OF BLUE HELMET ACTIONS
VOORHOEVE IS AT RISK. THEY BELIEVE PARLIAMENT IS
INCREASINGLY COGNIZANT OF THE DAMAGE THEIR CONTINUED
FOCUS ON THE ISSUE IS DOING TO THE DUTCH REPUTATION
INTERNATIONALLY, AND WILL LIKELY LET THE ISSUE GO
AFTER A THOROUGH AIRING OF THE REPORT.
MINIMIZE CONSIDERED
DORNBUSH
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•fiffllirinffNTTM.
OAACZYUW RUEHBWA5248 2972354-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZZK
0 242354Z OCT 95 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
RUEHBW
242354Z OCT 95
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 7 504
////
MILOSEVIC PLEDGES ACCESS, ACCOUNTABILITY IN
WAKE OF RECENT ETHNIC CLEANSING BY BOSNIAN SERBS
TEXT:
- 0 tl F l''U I I 1 1 J L SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 005248
C
L T
L
NODIS
FOR THE SECRETARY AND A/S HOLBROOKE FROM A/S SHATTUCK
E.O. 12958: DECL:10/24/05
TAGS: PREL, BK, SR
SUBJECT: MILOSEVIC PLEDGES ACCESS, ACCOUNTABILITY IN
WAKE OF RECENT ETHNIC CLEANSING BY BOSNIAN SERBS
1.
(U) CLASSIFIED BY RUDOLF V. PERINA, CHIEF OF MISSION
PER 1.5(B). NIACT PRECEDENCE AS REQUESTED BY A/S
HOLBROOKE.
2. -(C)- SUMMARY: DURING A MEETING WITH SERBIAN
PRESIDENT MILOSEVIC ON OCTOBER 24, A/S SHATTUCK RAISED
ISSUES OF ICRC, NGO AND PRESS ACCESS TO AREAS OF BOSNIA
AND CROATIA WHERE GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES OR ETHNIC
CLEANSING ARE TAKING OR HAVE TAKEN PLACE. MILOSEVIC
PROMISED THAT HE WOULD DO HIS BEST TO INSIST ON ACCESS
AND TO PRESS FOR THE ARREST OF THE GUILTY. A/S SHATTUCK
URGED IMMEDIATE ACTION BY SERBIA AND THE BOSNIAN SERBS
TO SAVE THE LIVES OF MISSING MUSLIMS FROM THE BANJA LUKA
AREA, SAYING THAT WORDS ON THIS ISSUE ARE WELCOME BUT
ACTIONS ARE CRITICAL AND THE TEST OF ANY REAL PROGRESS.
A/S SHATTUCK ASKED FOR FULL AND ONGOING FRY COOPERATION
WITH THE INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL. MILOSEVIC
AGREED "IN PRINCIPLE," BUT NOTED THAT THE LEGAL ISSUES
WERE "COMPLICATED." HE AGREED TO MEETINGS BETWEEN
SERBIAN AUTHORITIES AND THE TRIBUNAL TO DISCUSS MEANS OF
COOPERATION. MILOSEVIC AGREED TO A/S SHATTUCK'S
SUGGESTION THAT THE CROATIAN MISSION IN BELGRADE BE
ALLOWED TO ADD STAFF TO PROCESS APPLICATIONS OF KRAJINA
SERBS WHO WISHED TO RETURN. LATER A PRESS STATEMENT
FROM MILOSEVIC'S OFFICE, AIRED ON THE STATE-CONTROLLED
PER E.0.13526
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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TELEVISION CALLED FOR ACCESS BY HUMANITARIAN
ORGANIZATIONS AND THE PRESS TO ANY LOCATIONS WHERE
ALLEGED WAR CRIMES HAD TAKEN PLACE (SEPTEL). END
SUMMARY.
3. -fO) • ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS
AND LABOR JOHN SHATTUCK, ACCOMPANIED BY COM PERINA, MET
OCTOBER 24 IN BELGRADE WITH SERBIAN PRESIDENT MILOSEVIC
AND FOREIGN MINISTER MILUTINOVIC. PRESIDENT MILOSEVIC
GREETED SHATTUCK AND TOLD HIM HE ESPECIALLY WANTED TO
STRESS WHAT HAD HAPPENED TO ETHNIC SERBS IN CROATIA. NO
ONE, HE SAID, UNDERSTOOD THE WORLD'S PASSIVE RESPONSE.
THIS WAS THE THIRD GENOCIDE CARRIED OUT AGAINST SERBS IN
EUROPE AND THE LARGEST GENOCIDE IN EUROPE SINCE WORLD
WAR TWO. HE ESTIMATED A HALF MILLION SERBS HAD BEEN
DRIVEN OUT OF CROATIA.
4.
SHATTUCK OPENED HIS STATEMENT BY SAYING THAT
HIS VISIT WAS NOT PART OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS BUT HE
WAS SENT BY THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE WITH A
TWO-PART MESSAGE CONCERNING BANJA LUKA AND THE KRAJINA.j(NT ACCESS
IMMEDIATELY FOR THE ICRC, NGOS AND THE PRESS TO THE
BANJA LUKA AREA BECAUSE LIVES WERE AT STAKE AND URGENT
ACTION TO SAVE THEM IS ESSENTIAL. HE ALSO APPEALED TO
THE SERBIAN PRESIDENT ON BEHALF OF THE U.S. TO USE HIS
INFLUENCE TO ALLOW INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND NGOS
TO LOCATE PEOPLE WHO HAD BEEN SEPARATED FROM THEIR
FAMILIES, INCLUDING THOSE LISTED BY ICRC AS MISSING.
5. -W- MILOSEVIC REPLIED THAT HE WAS NOT IN THE CHAIN
OF COMMAND IN THE REPUBLIKA SRPSKA (RS) BUT WOULD DO HIS
BEST TO SECURE THE ARREST OF THOSE GUILTY OF ETHNIC
CLEANSING. HE CLAIMED HE HAD BEEN TOLD BY THE RS THAT
INDIVIDUAL SOLDIERS HAD BEEN GUILTY OF EXCESSES BUT HE
DID NOT NECESSARILY ACCEPT THIS POINT OF VIEW AND WOULD
SEARCH FOR THE TRUTH. HE WOULD INSIST ON ACCESS FOR THE
PRESS AND NGOS AND WOULD INSTRUCT FM MILUTINOVIC
"TONIGHT" TO SEE THAT THE PEOPLE ON THE ICRC LIST WERE
FOUND. MILOSEVIC ALSO CONFIDED THAT HIS "SPECIAL
POLICE" WERE LOOKING FOR THE TWO FRENCH PILOTS MISSING
SINCE THEIR PLANE WAS SHOT D W OVER BOSNIA.
ON
6. -fe) A/S SHATTUCK POINTED OUT THAT INDIVIDUALS WERE
RESPONSIBLE FOR CRIMES, AND THE INTERNATIONAL WAR
CRIMES TRIBUNAL WAS VERY IMPORTANT. SHATTUCK URGED
MILOSEVIC TO REQUIRE SERBIA'S FULL AND ONGOING
COOPERATION WITH THE TRIBUNAL. MILOSEVIC RESPONDED
THAT HE AGREED AND WOULD NOT OBSTRUCT WAR CRIMES
INVESTIGATIONS. HOWEVER, WHILE "ALL CRIMINALS
WOULD BE ARRESTED," THE CONSTITUTION OF SERBIA
PROHIBITED THE EXTRADITION OF ITS CITIZENS.
NEVERTHELESS, SERBIAN LAWS AGAINST "HATE CRIMES"
WERE STRONGER THAN INTERNATIONAL LAWS. MILUTINOVIC
ADDED THAT THE CORRECT LEGAL PROCEDURE IN THE FRY
WAS TO ASK LOCAL COURTS TO MAKE INITIAL
INVESTIGATIONS.
7. -fS-)- WHEN A/S SHATTUCK BROUGHT UP THE QUESTION
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OF INVESTIGATING THE GRAVES NEAR SREBRENICA,
MILOSEVIC RESPONDED IMMEDIATELY THAT HE WOULD RAISE
THE ISSUE THE NEXT DAY AND S W N REASON W Y ACCESS
A O
H
SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED. HE W N ON TO SAY HE WOULD'
ET
ISSUE A PRESS RELEASE CALLING FOR BANJA LUKA TO BE
OPEN TO PRESS AND NGOS.
- - V F' 1 - E N 1 1 A L SECTION 02 OF 02 BELGRADE 005248
C 0 i
U
"
NODIS
FOR THE SECRETARY AND A/S HOLBROOKE F O A/S SHATTUCK
RM
E.O. 12958: DECL:10/24/05
TAGS: PREL, BK, SR
SUBJECT: MILOSEVIC PLEDGES ACCESS, ACCOUNTABILITY IN
WAKE OF RECENT ETHNIC CLEANSING BY BOSNIAN SERBS
8. 4 * ) - W E A/S SHATTUCK URGED THAT COOPERATION
HN
WITH THE W R CRIMES TRIBUNAL BE INCLUDED IN THE
A
PRESIDENT'S PRESS STATEMENT, MILOSEVIC RESPONDED
THAT HE MUST FIRST LOOK INTO THE LEGAL ISSUES,
WHICH W R "COMPLICATED." SHATTUCK SUGGESTED THAT
EE
TRIBUNAL REPRESENTATIVES GET IN TOUCH WITH THE
PROPER FRY AUTHORITIES TO ASSURE FULL COOPERATION
CONSISTENT WITH FRY CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND
MILOSEVIC RESPONDED THAT HE FELT THAT W S A
A
REASONABLE PROPOSAL.
9. -f&h A/S SHATTUCK NOTED THAT THERE W R MANY
EE
OTHER IMPORTANT ISSUES OF CONCERN RAISED IN THE
SERBIA/MONTENEGRO HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT INCLUDING
KOSOVO, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND MINORITY RIGHTS.
MILOSEVIC REPLIED THAT ALL HE ASKED WAS THAT
SHATTUCK BE "OBJECTIVE." HE ASSERTED THERE W S
A
M R FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN THE FRY THAN IN
OE
SURROUNDING COUNTRIES AND COMPLAINED THAT THERE
W R 20 NEWSPAPERS IN KOSOVO, ALL OF WHICH ATTACKED
EE
HIM.
10. 4 f i i . TURNING TO THE PROBLEM OF SERB REFUGEES
F O THE KRAJINA, SHATTUCK TOLD MILOSEVIC THAT THE
RM
U.S. TOOK THIS PROBLEM VERY SERIOUSLY, AS EVIDENCED
BY HIS THREE TRIPS TO CROATIA WITHIN THE LAST SIX
WEEKS. OUR EMBASSY IN ZAGREB HAD JUST TURNED OVER
TO CROATIAN AUTHORITIES A LIST OF 3,000 SERBS W O
H
WISHED TO RETURN TO KRAJINA. W W U D CONTINUE TO
E OL
PRESS ON THIS.
11. Jr&^ SHATTUCK ASKED IF THE FRY WOULD SUPPORT
ADDING STAFF TO THE CROATIAN MISSION IN BELGRADE TO
PROCESS APPLICATIONS OF KRAJINA SERB REFUGEES W O
H
WISHED TO RETURN. MILOSEVIC AGREED AND MILUTINOVIC
ADDED THAT THE REAL PROBLEM W S THE CROATIAN
A
PROPERTY L W WHICH SET A LIMIT ON TIME FOR PEOPLE
A
TO CLAIM PROPERTY.
12. OC)- MILOSEVIC SEVERAL TIMES PROMISED A PRESS
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RELEASE FROM THE MEETING WHICH WOULD ADVOCATE NGO
AND PRESS ACCESS TO BANJA LUKA, THE KRAJINA, AND
THE SREBRENICA AREA. COM PERINA NOTED THAT
QUESTIONS OF ACCESS HAD BEEN RAISED PREVIOUSLY WITH
BOSNIAN VICE PRESIDENT KOLJEVIC WHO SEEMED TO BE
PROCRASTINATING. A/S SHATTUCK CONCLUDED THAT THE
PRESS STATEMENT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL BUT THAT
ACTION ON GRANTING ACCESS WAS MOST IMPERATIVE
BECAUSE LIVES WERE AT STAKE. ACTIONS BY SERBIA AND
THE BOSNIAN SERB WOULD BE CAREFULLY MONITORED, AND
REAL HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRESS WOULD NOT OCCUR UNTIL
THESE ACTIONS WERE TAKEN.
13.
A MILOSEVIC OFFICE PRESS STATEMENT,
SUBSEQUENTLY AIRED OVER STATE-RUN TV EVENING NEWS,
CALLED FOR AN INVESTIGATION INTO ALLEGED VIOLATIONS
OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN THE BANJA LUKA REGION AND
URGED FULL ACCESS FOR HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS
AND PRESS TO LOCATIONS WHERE ALLEGED WAR CRIMES
WERE COMMITTED (FULL STATEMENT FOLLOWS SEPTEL.)
14. -46+- COMMENT: MILOSEVIC WAS OPEN AND
EXPANSIVE; HE WAS CLEARLY ATTEMPTING TO PROJECT AN
IMAGE OF COOPERATION. HIS STATEMENTS ON ACCESS AND
ACCOUNTABILITY — ALTHOUGH TEMPERED SLIGHTLY BY
DISCLAIMERS THAT HE WAS NOT DIRECTLY IN THE CHAIN
OF COMMAND -- WERE NEVERTHELESS POSITIVE. HIS
WILLINGNESS TO GO PUBLIC WITH THIS POSITION- IS
CONSTRUCTIVE. THAT SAID, THE TEST LIES IN
IMPLEMENTATION RATHER THAN STATEMENTS OF INTENT,
AND REAL PROGRESS CAN ONLY BE MEASURED BY THAT
STANDARD. WE WILL BE FOLLOWING UP PROMPTLY TO
DISCOVER WHETHER THESE STATEMENTS ARE TRANSLATED
INTO CONCRETE ACTIONS TO SAVE LIVES AND TO BRING
THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR VIOLATIONS TO ACCOUNT.
PERINA
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SUM2 VERSHBOW WHSR_SPECIAL
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IMMEDIATE
CQMriDDHTIAL
OAACZYUW RUCNDTA4265 304 0135-CCCC--RHEHNSC RHEHAAA.
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
0 310135Z OCT 95
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
RUCNDT
310135Z OCT 95
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8562
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO IMMEDIATE 0382
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 2954
RHEHAAA/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB IMMEDIATE 1715
RUFQAAA/USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2993
RUFNBUT/HQ JTF PP NAPLES IT//POLAD//
RUCBACM/USCINCACOM NORFOLK VA
RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 9401
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USVIENNA 4364
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 2342
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2969
RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 1020
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 3135
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 4 030
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 1692
BOSNIA/CROATIA IN SECURITY COUNCIL:
GHAREKHAN BRIEFING AND FATE OF MEN IN CONTESTED TOWNS.
CLASSIFIED BY: CAMERON R HUME, POL MIN-COUNS
TEXT:
C Q N P i . D B . M T i A L
SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 004265
JCS FOR DIR, DIR J5, J2,CHAIRMAN,
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE, CINCACOM FOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR
POLAD MINISTER DURKEE
E.O.12958: DECL:10/30/2005
TAGS: PREL, NATO, UNSC, PHUM, NATO, BK, HR, SR,
SUBJECT: BOSNIA/CROATIA IN SECURITY COUNCIL:
GHAREKHAN BRIEFING AND FATE OF MEN IN CONTESTED TOWNS.
CLASSIFIED BY: CAMERON R HUME, POL MIN-COUNS
REASON: 1.5 (D)
BOSNIAN UPDATE
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.0.13526
�F:\Cable\Data_Source\Cables\CD015\OCT95\MSGS\M1927451.html
1.
IN SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMALS ON 30 OCTOBER,
USYG GHAREKHAN BRIEFED ON THE CURRENT SITUATION.
GHAREKHAN SAID THAT THERE WAS NOT MUCH MILITARY
ACTIVITY IN BOSNIA EXCEPT FOR A FEW SMALL ARMS FIRINGS
IN SAREJEVO. GHAREKHAN REPORTED THAT FEDERATION TROOPS
WERE STILL RESTRICTING UNPROFOR'S MOVEMENT IN N
W
BOSNIA.
NATO AIR STRIKES AND NATO PRESENCE IN BOSNIA
2. 4 0 IN RESPONSE TO RUSSIAN REQUESTS FOR
INFORMATION ON DAMAGE ASSESMENTS OF NATO AIR OPERATION
GHAREKHAN STATED THAT 816 SORTIES WERE FLOWN AGAINST
BOSNIAN SERB INTEGRATED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS, FIXED
MILITARY TARGETS, AND HEAVY WEAPONS. MOST OF THESE
STRIKES WERE SUCCESSFUL ALTHOUGH BAD WEATHER
PERIODICALLY LIMITED OPERATIONS. THE BSA RESPONDED
QUICKLY TO THESE ATTACKS. CONSEQUENTLY, THE NUMBER OF
HEAVY WEAPONS AROUND SARAJEVO WAS NOT SIGNIFICANTLY
REDUCED. BSA AIR DEFENSES REMAINED FUNCTIONAL. AFTER
THE RESUMPTION OF THE AIR STRIKES 14 SEPTEMBER, NATO
ASSESSED THAT EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS AND AIR DEFENSE
SYSTEMS AROUND BANJA LUKA WERE DISABLED AND
COMMUNICATIONS SEVERELY DEGRADED. GHAREKHAN SAID THAT
NATO DID NOT INCLUDE ANY REPORTS OF COLLATERAL DAMAGE
IN ITS REPORT TO THE SYG.
3. t e t " IN RESPONSE TO A RUSSIAN QUESTION ABOUT THE
PRESENCE OF NATO PERSONNEL IN ZAGREB, GHAREKHAN SAID
THAT THIS WAS NOT A "FORWARD DEPLOYMENT OF NATO."
GHAREKHAN SAID THAT A LIMITED NUMBER OF NATO
SPECIALISTS COMMISSIONED TO DEVISE NATO DEPLOYMENT FOR
AN UNPROFOR WITHDRAWAL UNDER HOSTILE CIRCUMSTANCES
REMAINED IN THEATER WITH THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SYG AND
THE GOC.
4. -f&h RUSSIAN PERMREP LAVROV ASSERTED THAT
COMPLIANCE BY THE BOSNIAN SERBS WITH THE CONDITIONS SET
OUT BY THE 3 SEPTEMBER''UN FORCE COMMANDER'S LETTER
TERMINATED THE NATO AIR OPERATION. A RESUMPTION OF AIR
STRIKES WOULD
REQUIRE THE CONSENT OF BOTH NATO AND THE UN. GHAREKHAN
ANSWERED THAT UN AND NATO AGREED ON 20 SEPTEMBER THAT A
RESUMPTION OF AIR STRIKES WAS NOT NEEDED AT THAT TIME.
AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT SAID THAT, WHILE WE HOPE THERE IS
NO RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES IN BOSNIA, I T IS CLEAR
THAT THE AIR STRIKES WERE SUSPENDED, NOT TERMINATED.
PENDING FATE OF NON-SERB DRAFT-AGED MEN IN
SREBRENICA, ZEPA AND BANJA LUKA AREA
5. t e f GERMAN PERMREP EITEL EXPRESSED
THE NON-SERB, DRAFT-AGED MEN ROUNDED UP
SREBRENICA, ZEPA AND BANJA LUKA, EITEL
COUNCIL TO REACT IN LIGHT OF THE "WORST
CONCERN ABOUT
BY THE BSA IN
URGED THE
WAR CRIME IN
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EUROPE SINCE WWII, THE SUMMARY KILLING OF 6,000 MEN."
EITEL UNDERLINED THAT THE COUNCIL CANNOT ACT ON
UNSUBSTANTIATED NEWSPAPER REPORTS AND THEREFORE
REQUESTED A COMPREHENSIVE REPORT BY THE SYG. EITEL
SUGGESTED THAT THE REPORT INCLUDE 5 ELEMENTS:
(1) HOW
MANY MEN ARE UNACCOUNTED FOR? (2) ARE THE REPORTS OF
• O O N D I D B H T T A H SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 004265
JCS FOR DIR, DIR J5, J2,CHAIRMAN,
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE, CINCACOM FOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR
POLAD MINISTER DURKEE
£.0.12956: DECL:10/30/2005
TAGS: PREL, NATO, UNSC, PHUM, NATO, BK, HR, SR,
SUBJECT: BOSNIA/CROATIA IN SECURITY COUNCIL:
GHAREKHAN BRIEFING AND FATE OF MEN IN CONTESTED TOWNS.
BOSNIAN SERB SUMMARY KILL
INGS PROBABLE?
(3) ARE THERE
EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS OF BOSNIAN SERB HUMAN RIGHTS
ABUSES?
(4) TO WHAT EXTENT WERE FRY PARAMILITARY
FORCES INVOLVED? (5) WHAT ARE THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
FOR BOSNIAN SERB ACTIONS?
6. - f G f MOST COUNCIL MEMBERS AGREED THAT THERE WAS AN
URGENT NEED TO ESTABLISH THE FATE OF THE DETAINED MEN.
OMANI PERMREP AL-KHUSSAIBY REGRETTED THAT THE COUNCIL
HAD FAILED TO TAKE ACTION EARLIER. HE SUPPORTED THE
GERMAN SUGGESTION FOR A REPORT BY THE SYG AND APPEALED
TO THE COUNCIL TO TAKE STRONG ACTION AGAINST THE
BOSNIAN SERBS. ARGENTINE PERMREP CARDENAS CAUTIONED
THE COUNCIL AGAINST TAKING ON THE INVESTIGATIVE
RESPONSIBILITY; PROSECUTION OF CRIMINALS SHOULD BE
HANDLED BY THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL. RUSSIAN PERMREP
LAVROV QUESTIONED HOW THE COUNCIL WOULD PROCEED AFTER
THE FACTS WERE ESTABLISHED. HE REMINDED THE COUNCIL
THAT THE KILLING OF SERBS IN THE KRAJINA WAS DENOUNCED
BY THE CROATIAN AUTHORITIES AS BEING CARRIED OUT BY
GROUPS OUTSIDE OF GOVERNMENT CONTROL IN STOLEN
GOVERNMENT UNIFORMS.
7. ^GQ AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT SAID IT HAS BEEN DIFFICULT
TO GET INFORMATION FROM THE SYG. SHE SUPPORTED THE
GERMAN PROPOSAL THAT THE SECRETARIAT PREPARE A REPORT
TO THE COUNCIL CONTAINING ALL IT KNEW ABOUT HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN SREBRENICA, ZEPA AND BANJA LUKA.
ALBRIGHT EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT SOME EVIDENCE OF THE
ABUSES HAS BEEN DESTROYED AND SHE CALLED ON ALL PARTIES
TO TURN OVER EVIDENCE TO THE TRIBUNAL.
8. J & r COUNCIL AGREED TO HAVE THE SYG PROVIDE
INFORMATION ABOUT THE FATE OF THE DETAINED MEN. HOW TO
PROCEED AFTER SUCH FACTS ARE KNOWN IS TO BE DECIDED
LATER.
9. -f-et- USUN PLANS TO DRAFT A RESOLUTION CONTAINING THE
FOLLOWING ELEMENTS:
--DEMANDING THAT ALL STATES COOPERATE WITH THE WAR
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CRIMES TRIBUNAL;
--DEMANDING THAT THE PARTIES NOT DISTURB ANY EVIDENCE
OF WAR CRIMES;
—DEMANDING THAT THE BOSNIAN SERBS GRANT ACCESS TO THE
DETAINEES OR ALLEGED SITES OF MASS GRAVES TO
APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES INCLUDING THE
TRIBUNAL;
--REQUESTING THE SECRETARIAT TO ISSUE A WRITTEN REPORT
ON HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN SREBRENICA, ZEPA AND
BANJA LUKA AREAS.
10. -fSf* I F THE DEPARTMENT APPROVES THE DRAFT WE WILL
CIRCULATE I T IN THE CONTACT GROUP AND AMONG MEMBERS OF
THE COUNCIL.
ALBRIGHT
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IMMEDIATE
'COHPIPGWPIM,
OAACZYUW RUCNDTA4313 3060128-CCCC—RHEHNSC RHEHAAA.
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
0 020128Z NOV 95
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
RUCNDT
020128Z NOV 95
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATK 8648
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB IMMEDIATE 1723
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO IMMEDIATE 0390
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 2962
RHEHAAA/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUFQAAA/USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 3004
RUFNBUT/HQ JTF PP NAPLES IT//POLAD//
RUCBACM/USCINCACOM NORFOLK VA
RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 94 36
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USVIENNA 4398
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 2368
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2980
RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 1028
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 3143
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 4 060
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 1700
BOSNIA:
CONTACT GROUP DISCUSSES AMERICAN
C O W F I D C tl T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 004313
'
JCS FOR DIR, DIR J5, J2,CHAIRMAN,
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE, CINCACOM FOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR
POLAD MINISTER DURKEE
E.O.12958: DECL:11/01/2005
TAGS: PREL, NATO, UNSC, PHUM, NATO, BK, HR, SR,
SUBJECT: BOSNIA: CONTACT GROUP DISCUSSES AMERICAN
DRAFT RESOLUTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
CLASSIFIED BY: CAMERON R HUME, POL MIN-COUNS
REASON: 1.5 (D)
1. -fe}- ON NOV 1, CONTACT GROUP PLUS ITALY MET AT THE
COUNSELOR LEVEL TO DISCUSS US DRAFT RESOLUTION ON
HUMANITARIAN ABUSES IN SREBRENICA, SANSKI MOST AND
AREAS AROUND BANJA LUKA.
PER E.0.13526
LINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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2. 4 0 _ MEMBERS OF THE CONTACT
TO THE 31 OCTOBER TEXT (REF A)
DRAFTING REVISIONS. THE GROUP
PROPOSALS TO ADD ONE OPERATIVE
PARAGRAPH AS FOLLOWS:
GROUP PLUS ITALY AGREED
WITH A FEW MINOR
ACCEPTED FRENCH
AND ONE PREAMBULAR
— PREAMBULAR 5: "COMMENDING THE EFFORTS BY THE
UNITED NATIONS PEACE FORCES AND OTHER UN PERSONNEL IN
THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, IN PARTICULAR IN THE REPUBLIC OF
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA DESPITE EXTREME DIFFICULTIES,"
--OPERATIVE 6: "REAFFIRMS ITS SUPPORT FOR THE
ACTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE FORCES AND OTHER UN
PERSONNEL, STRESSES THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE OF THEIR
CONTRIBUTION, AND DEMANDS THAT ALL PARTIES FULLY ENSURE
THEIR SAFETY AND COOPERATE FULLY WITH THEM."
3. •(•€•)- THE RUSSIAN REPRESENTATIVE STATED THAT GOR
COULD SUPPORT THE US DRAFT BUT URGED THE GROUP TO ALSO
CONSIDER A RUSSIAN DRAFT ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
IN CROATIA, SO AS TO NOT IMPLY A DOUBLE STANDARD. THE
RUSSIAN REPRESENTATIVE WAS FLEXIBLE AS TO THE NEXT STEP
WITH THE DRAFT. HE SUGGESTED EITHER INCORPORATING
ELEMENTS OF THE DRAFT INTO THE US TEXT OR ADOPTING TWO
SEPARATE DRAFTS.
4. 4&). OTHER MEMBERS OF THE GROUP SAID THAT THEY WOULD
SEND THE RUSSIAN DRAFT TO THEIR CAPITALS, BUT DID NOT
ENVISION ANY MAJOR PROBLEMS. MOST INDICATED THAT THEY
WOULD LIKELY PREFER A SINGLE DRAFT INCORPORATING
ELEMENTS OF THE RUSSIAN TEXT.
5. -fSf USUN RECOMMENDS THAT WE INCORPORATE PREAMBULAR
PARAGRAPH 2 AND OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS 2, 3, AND 4 INTO
THE U.S. TEXT. SUCH A TEXT WOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THE
COUNCIL CONDEMNED ALL VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS
EQUALLY. WE NOTE THAT THE RUSSIAN TEXT DOES NOT TRY TO
EQUATE THE SERIOUSNESS OF CROATIAN HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS WITH THOSE COMMITTED BY THE BOSNIAN SERBS.
WE BELIEVE THAT A MERGED TEXT WOULD FIND CONSENSUS IN
THE CONTACT GROUP AND COULD EASILY AND QUICKLY BE
ADOPTED BY THE COUNCIL. UNLESS INSTRUCTED OTHERWISE,
WE INTEND TO PROCEED ALONG THOSE LINES WHEN THE CONTACT
GROUP PLUS ITALY MEETS ON NOVEMBER 2.
6., BEGIN TEXT OF RUSSIAN DRAFT RESOLUTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN CROATIA:
RECALLING ALL ITS EARLIER RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS, AND
REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTIONS 1009 (1995) OF 10 AUGUST
1995, AND THE STATEMENTS OF ITS PRESIDENT OF 7
SEPTEMBER 1995 (S/PRST/1995/44
, AND OF 3 OCTOBER 1995
(S/PRST/1995/49),.
DEEPLY CONCERNED AT REPORTS, INCLUDING BY UNCRO AND UN
HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES, OF GRAVE VIOLATIONS OF
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN KRAJINA, INCLUDING
THE BURNING OF HOUSES, LOOTING OF PROPERTY AND KILLINGS
OF MEMBERS OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION,
G O-H r i D D H T I A L
SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 004313
JCS FOR DIR, DIR J5, J2,CHAIRMAN,
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE, CINCACOM FOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR
POLAD MINISTER DURKEE
E.O. 12958 : DECL:11/01/2005
TAGS: PREL, NATO, UNSC, PHUM, NATO, BK, HR, SR,
SUBJECT: BOSNIA: CONTACT GROUP DISCUSSES AMERICAN
DRAFT RESOLUTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
EXPRESSING ITS SUPPORT FOR THE WORK OF THE
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO ITS
RESOLUTION 827,
-1.
CONDEMNS IN THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE TERMS ALL
VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN THE
TERRITORY OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA BY WHOMEVER
COMMITTED;
--2. REAFFIRMS ITS DEMANDS THAT CROATIA TAKES URGENT
MEASURES TO PUT AN END TO HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, AND
INVESTIGATES ALL REPORTS OF SUCH VIOLATIONS SO THAT
THOSE RESPONSIBLE IN RESPECT OF SUCH ACTS BE JUDGED AND
PUNISHED;
--3. REITERATES ITS DEMAND THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF
CROATIA RESPECT FULLY THE RIGHTS OF THE LOCAL SERB
POPULATION INCLUDING THEIR RIGHT TO REMAIN OR RETURN IN
SAFETY;
--4. REITERATES ITS CALL UPON THE GOVERNMENT OF
CROATIA TO LIFT ANY TIME LIMITS PLACED ON THE RETURN OF
REFUGEES TO CROATIA TO RECLAIM THEIR PROPERTY;
--5. DEMANDS THAT ALL STATES, IN PARTICULAR THOSE IN
THE REGION OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, AND ALL PARTIES TO
THE CONFLICT IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, COMPLY FULLY
WITH ITS DECISION IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF RESOLUTION 827
(1993) AND COOPERATES FULLY WITH THE INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNAL ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO THAT RESOLUTION
INCLUDING BY PROVIDING ACCESS TO SITES THE TRIBUNAL
DEEMS IMPORTANT FOR ITS INVESTIGATIONS, AND BY
COMPLYING WITH THEIR OBLIGATION TO COMPLY WITH REQUESTS
FOR ASSISTANCE OF ORDERS ISSUED BY A TRIAL CHAMBER
UNDER ARTICLE 29 OF THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNAL;
--6. DEMANDS THAT ALL PARTIES REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTION
INTENDED TO DESTROY, ALTER, OR DAMAGE ANY EVIDENCE OF
VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW;
--7.
DECIDES TO REMAIN SEIZED OF THE MATTER.
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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END TEXT.
ALBRIGHT
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< TOR>951101213533 M1931407
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DIST:
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SUM2 VERSHBOW
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Cable
PREC:
CLASS:
LINEl:
LINE2:
LINE3:
LINE4:
OSRI:
DTG:
ORIG:
TO:
INFO:
IMMEDIATE
COMffiDEMTML
OAACZYUW RUCNDTA4285 3050034-CCCC--RHEHNSC RHEHAAA.
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
0 010034Z NOV 95
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
RUCNDT
010034Z NOV 95
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8598
RHEHAAA/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB IMMEDIATE 1717
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO IMMEDIATE 0384
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 2956
RUFQAAA/USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2995
RUFNBUT/HQ JTF PP NAPLES IT//POLAD//
RUCBACM/USCINCACOM NORFOLK VA
RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USVIENNA 4373
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 9412
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 2352
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2 971
RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 1022
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 3137
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 4 037
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 1694
BOSNIA: U.S. CIRCULATES A DRAFT RESOLUTION ON
SUBJ:
TEXT:
0 O W F I-D H tl T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 004285
*
JCS FOR DIR, DIR J5, J2,CHAIRMAN,
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE, CINCACOM FOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR
POLAD MINISTER DURKEE
E.O. 12958: DECL:10/30/2005
TAGS: PREL, NATO, UNSC, PHUM, NATO, BK, HR, SR,
SUBJECT: BOSNIA: U.S. CIRCULATES A DRAFT RESOLUTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN BOSNIA TO MEMBERS
OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
CLASSIFIED BY: CAMERON R HUME, POL MIN-COUNS
REASON: 1.5 (D)
REF:
1.
USUN/IO-UNP TELECONS
PER E.0.13526
- f e f USUN CONVENED A COUNSELORS' LEVEL MEETING OF
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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THE CONTACT GROUP PLUS ITALY TO GIVE OTHER CONTACT
GROUP DELEGATIONS COPIES OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION FOUND
8ELOW. THE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE NOTED THAT THE DRAFT
FOLLOWS UP ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S OCTOBER 30
DISCUSSION OF REPORTS OF SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS 8Y BOSNIAN SERB FORCES IN THE AREAS OF
SREBRENICA, ZEPA, SANSKI MOST, AND BANJA LUKA. HE
EXPLAINED THAT THE TEXT IS TIGHTLY FOCUSED ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, AND IS BASED ON EXISTING LANGUAGE IN SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 1010 AND 827. HE ADDED THAT W
E
W U D CIRCULATE THE TEXT TO OTHER MEMBERS OF THE
OL
COUNCIL DURING THE EVENING OF OCTOBER 31, THAT CONTACT
G O P AMBASSADORS SHOULD DISCUSS IT ON NOVEMBER 1, AND
RU
THAT IT WOULD BE ON THE AGENDA OF THE COUNCIL'S NEXT
INFORMAL SESSION.
2. -fe)-WE ALSO S O E THE TEXT TO BOSNIAN FOREIGN
HWD
MINISTER SACIRBEY W O TOLD US THAT HE FULLY SUPPORTED
H
IT. OMANI PERMREP AL-KHUSSAIBY (THE INCOMING COUNCIL
PRESIDENT) SAID SUCH A RESOLUTION WAS OVERDUE AND THAT
HE WOULD PUT IT ON THE AGENDA FOR THE FIRST INFORMAL
SESSION DURING HIS PRESIDENCY. AL-KHUSSAIBY SAID THAT
HE WOULD DISCUSS THE DRAFT DURING HIS NOVEMBER 1 ROUND
OF BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS WITH ALL COUNCIL MEMBERS,
AND I F IT APPEARED TO ENJOY BROAD SUPPORT HE MIGHT
CONVENE AN INFORMAL SESSION FOR THE AFTERNOON OF
NOVEMBER 1. (THUS, W
E MIGHT NEED AN EOV BY AS EARLY
AS LATE AFTERNOON OF NOVEMBER 1.)
3.
4 0 " BEGIN TEXT OF U.S. DRAFT RESOLUTION:
THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
RECALLING ALL ITS EARLIER RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS, AND
REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTIONS 1004 (1995) OF 12 JULY
1995, AND 1010 OF (1995) OF 10 AUGUST 1995, AND THE
STATEMENT OF ITS PRESIDENT OF 7 SEPTEMBER 1995
(S/PRST/1995/43), AND DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT DESPITE
REPEATED CALLS THAT IT D SO, THE BOSNIAN SERB PARTY
O
HAS NOT COMPLIED WITH THE DEMANDS CONTAINED THEREIN,
DEEPLY CONCERNED AT REPORTS, INCLUDING BY THE
SECRETARIAT OF THE UNITED NATIONS, OF GRAVE VIOLATIONS
OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN AND AROUND
SREBRENICA, AND IN THE AREAS OF BANJA LUKA AND SANSKI
MOST, INCLUDING REPORTS OF MASS MURDER, FORCED
DETENTION, AND RAPE, OF MEMBERS OF THE CIVILIAN
POPULATION,
REITERATING ITS EXPRESSION OF STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE
EFFORTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS
(ICRC) IN SEEKING ACCESS TO DISPLACED PERSONS AND
CONDEMNING IN THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE TERMS THE FAILURE
OF THE BOSNIAN SERB PARTY TO COMPLY WITH THEIR
COMMITMENTS TO THE ICRC IN RESPECT OF SUCH ACCESS,
EXPRESSING ITS STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE W R OF THE
OK
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO ITS
LINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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RESOLUTION 827,
-- 1. CONDEMNS IN THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE TERMS ALL
C 0
r t D D H T"! 'ft L' SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 004285
1
JCS FOR DIR, DIR J5, J2,CHAIRMAN,
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE, CINCACOM FOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR
POLAD MINISTER DURKEE
E.O.12958: DECL:10/30/2005
TAGS: PREL, NATO, UNSC, PHUM, NATO, BK, HR, SR,
SUBJECT: BOSNIA: U.S. CIRCULATES A DRAFT RESOLUTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN BOSNIA TO MEMBERS
OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN THE
TERRITORY OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA;
-- 2. REAFFIRMS ITS DEMAND, THAT THE BOSNIAN S
ERB
PARTY GIVE IMMEDIATE ACCESS TO REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, THE ICRC
AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES TO PERSONS DISPLACED
FROM SREBRENCIA, ZEPA, AND THE REGIONS OF BANJA LUKA
AND SANSKI MOST WHO ARE WITHIN THE AREAS OF REPUBLIC OF
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA UNDER THE CONTROL OF BOSNIAN
SERB FORCES AND THAT THE BOSNIAN SERB PARTY PERMIT
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ICRC TO VISIT AND REGISTER ANY
PERSONS DETAINED AGAINST THEIR WILL, INCLUDING ANY
MEMBERS OF THE FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA;
—
3.
REAFFIRMS ALSO ITS DEMAND THAT THE BOSNIAN SERB
PARTY RESPECT FULLY THE RIGHTS OF ALL SUCH PERSONS AND
ENSURE THEIR SAFETY, AND TO RELEASE THEM;
-- 4. DEMANDS THAT ALL STATES, IN PARTICULAR THOSE IN
THE REGION OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, AND ALL PARTIES TO
THE CONFLICT IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, COMPLY FULLY
WITH ITS DECISION IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF RESOLUTION 827
(1993) AND COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNAL ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO THAT RESOLUTION
INCLUDING BY PROVIDING ACCESS TO SITES THE TRIBUNAL
DEEMS IMPORTANT FOR ITS INVESTIGATIONS, AND BY
COMPLYING WITH THEIR OBLIGATION TO COMPLY WITH REQUESTS
FOR ASSISTANCE OR ORDERS ISSUED BY A TRIAL CHAMBER
UNDER ARTICLE 29 OF THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNAL;
— 5. DEMANDS THAT ALL PARTIES, AND IN PARTICULAR THE
BOSNIAN SERB PARTY, REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTION INTENDED TO
DESTROY, ALTER, OR DAMAGE, ANY EVIDENCE OF VIOLATIONS
OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW;
-- 6. REQUESTS THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL SUBMIT TO
THE COUNCIL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE A WRITTEN REPORT
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
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CONTAINING ALL INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO UNITED NATIONS
PERSONNEL CONCERNING RECENT VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN THE AREAS OF SREBRENICA, ZEPA,
BANJA LUKA AND SANSKI MOST;
—
7.
DECIDES TO REMAIN SEIZED OF THE MATTER.
END OF U.S. DRAFT RESOLUTION.
4.
(U) SARAJEVO MINIMIZE CONSIDERED
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A
A
DIST:
SIT: BELL CLARKER DAALDER FEELEY NSC PETERS SAUNDERS SCHWARTZ SESTAK
VERSHBOW
•
CLINTON LIBRARY P O O O Y
HTCP
�Dublin CoreThe Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.TitleA name given to the resource<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>DescriptionAn account of the resourceThis collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.ProvenanceA statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.Clinton Presidential RecordsPublisherAn entity responsible for making the resource availableClinton Presidential Library & MuseumTextA resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.Dublin CoreThe Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.TitleA name given to the resourceDeclassified Documents concerning Genocide in the former YugoslaviaIdentifierAn unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context2013-0831-MDescriptionAn account of the resourceThis Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on genocide in the former Yugoslavia. Material includes Department of State cables on the international response after the Srebrenica massacre, U.N. discussions and reports on Bosnia, and a demarche to a Serbian foreign minister.CreatorAn entity primarily responsible for making the resourceNational Security CouncilNSC CablesFormatThe file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resourceAdobe Acrobat DocumentMediumThe material or physical carrier of the resource.Reproduction-ReferenceProvenanceA statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.Clinton Presidential Records: NSC Cable, Email, and Records Management SystemPublisherAn entity responsible for making the resource availableWilliam J. Clinton Presidential Library & MuseumDate CreatedDate of creation of the resource.2/6/2015SourceA related resource from which the described resource is derived2013-0871-MBosniaDeclassifiedForeign PolicyGenocideSrebrenicaUnited Nationshttps://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/e6b2e7c32970b59254a162eaac07a988.pdfef9ad7152cf1b34f19d69476063542a6PDF TextTextClinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were
released in full or released in part.
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted
under Section 1.4 (b) ofE.O. 13526 or (b)(6) ofthe FOIA.
�CONFIBEN'l'IAL
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER JOHN MAJOR
Calling to update you regarding our decisions on what to do
about Gorazde and Sarajevo in the coming weeks.
Status
quo is clearly no longer tolerable.
Need to ensure meeting in London is success.
Must not
result in public discord or become forum for mere posturing
by participants.
Chris will discuss our views on London meeting
detail with Malcolm Rifkind later on tonight.
in more
We have reached defining moment for our policy toward
Bosnia.
We need to draw line at Gorazde, make UN presence
work and avert UN withdrawal.
Issue is finding the best way to do this.
My military advisors feel strongly most important
to be able to bring air power to bear decisively,
timid manner done to date.
thing is
not in
They propose issuing clear warning to Bosnian Serbs:
any
attack on Gorazde or Sarajevo will be met by a sustained air
campaign.
Do not intend to cross line to all-out war against Bosnian
Serbs.
If they heed warning and do not attack, there will
be no air campaign.
Would have effect of restoring strict enforcement of heavy
weapons exclusion zones, without complication of weapons
collection points.
This means UNPROFOR neutrality is
retained.
However -- cannot be just another empty threat.
If Bosnian
Serbs ignore our warning and attack, we must all be prepared
to follow through, without wavering even if we suffer losses
or additional hostages are taken.
Will need to begin now to
reduce exposure of UN personnel.
First targets would have to be full range of Bosnian Serb
air defense capabilities:
SAMs, Anti-aircraft guns, radar
and command centers.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O] 13526
-C"'O"I"'J"'P"'I"'b'T'lE"j"''J "'I~
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on:
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1,Qlb' ~'n.
~
�CONFIDENTIAL/
2
Once air defenses neutralized, mount major air campaign
against any Bosnian Serb forces attacking Gorazde or
Sarajevo.
However, dual key could not apply in its current form.
Local ground commanders would of course retain voice in
Close Air Support role and close-proximity air strikes
directly affecting their troops.
But there could be no UN
political veto over individual missions.
Current restrictions regarding strict proportionality
would
also have to be removed.
Would want ability to strike
strategic targets throughout Bosnia, if necessary.
Will need your help in moving
approaching Boutros-Ghali.
this to a NAC decision
and in
In addition to supporting effective Bosnian defense of
Gorazde, important to open secure land access routes to
Sarajevo.
We see this as most pressing mission for RRF.
My military advisors agree with your assessment that
deploying 1,000 French troops to Gorazde will diminish the
ability of RRF to act in Sarajevo, without materially
contributing to improved the military balance in Gorazde.
I
have relayed (will relay) this to Jacques.
We will need to work together to arrive at common U.S.-UKFrench approach by Friday, and then bring other allies
along.
I hope we will be able to generate the political
support needed at the London meeting and in the NAC to move
forward together on this.
�-5"l':""C"'R""EI:"''l''r~
20838
THE WHITE
HOUSE
WASHINGTON
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM
FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ANTHONY LAKE
SUBJECT:
Response to the Fall of Srebrenica
Deputies met on July 11 and 12 to consider appropriate responses
to the Bosnian Serb assault and occupation of the UN Safe Area at
Srebrenica.
Chris, Bill Perry, Shali and I have also been in
continuing contact in shaping a U.S. strategy.
Everyone agrees on the need to reassert UNPROFOR's ability to
carry out its humanitarian and protection missions in Bosnia, and
to halt the pattern of successful Bosnian Serb military
aggressiveness that has marked the past month.
Failure to
reverse this pattern will result in attacks on the other enclaves
and renewed strangulation of Sarajevo, precipitating the collapse
of the UNPROFOR mission and initiation of a withdrawal under
circumstances that will be perceived as defeat for the UN, NATO
and our allies.
It will also accelerate passage of unilateral
lift legislation by the Congress in a manner that will damage
relations with our allies.
Deputies
agreed on the following immediate actions:
• To support the UNSCR introduced by the French calling for the
use of all available resources to restore the Srebrenica Safe
Area, although acknowledging privately that UNPROFOR does not
now possess the military capability to reverse the Bosnian
Serb occupation of Srebrenica (nor, in all likelihood, to
prevent the fall of Zepa).
• To weigh in with Milosevic (and, through the UN, with Karadzic
and Mladic) to obtain support for UNHCR efforts to assist in
the movement, care and supply of the refugees and the Dutch
UNPROFOR troops in Srebrenica; at the same time, to work with
the Bosnian government to obtain their consent for the
evacuation of the refugees to Tuzla rather than forcing them
to remain unsupported behind Serb lines.
• To use our public statements and our consultations with allies
to send a clear signal of continuing U.S. resolve to support
the retention of UNPROFOR as the best available option for
resolving the crisis short of a major Balkan war.
~...J6"'E""CM>'RE1C'Il""i -
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__
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on:
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. - ---~~~---~c:
. 1
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.
: ~INTON
~~'!.~~',
LIBRARYPHOTOCOPY
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-.
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Vice President
Chief of Staff
�2
•
To review the viability of U.S. and NATO quick/emergency
withdrawal options as a matter of highest priority, in light
of the speed with which Srebrenica was overrun.
Beyond these immediate actions, Deputies also agreed on the need
to work with allies on the development of a follow-on strategy to
deter further Serb provocations and prevent the collapse of the
UNPROFOR mission:
• At a minimum, this strategy must preserve Bosnian government
presence in and access to Sarajevo, and it must sustain
UNPROFOR deployments in Federation territory so as to continue
maintaining peace where it exists.
•
To this end, we will support robust use of the existing
elements of the RRF to secure overland access, to Sarajevo
using the Mt. Igman route, and possibly to restore control
over Sarajevo airport.
•
Given the political imperative not to be seen as abandoning
all of the eastern enclaves, and the fact that NATO
credibility (through commitment to enforcing the weapons
exclusion zone) is engaged in Gorazde, the strategy should
include a commitment to protect this safe area, even if
protection of Zepa proves unfeasible.
Deputies agreed that efforts to stabilize the situation will be
critical to our efforts to avoid Congressional action on
unilateral lift.
The current Dole language, while not requiring
immediate lifting of the embargo, would require unilateral U.S.
action in violation of binding UN resolutions within 12 weeks of
a request by the Bosnian Government for UNPROFOR withdrawal.
Failure to demonstrate that UNPROFOR retains a viable mission
after the fall of Srebrenica will virtually guarantee passage of
the bill and encourage the Bosnian government to pull the
trigger.
�THE PRESltENT HAS ~FN
-.-.."_ '\ '-\
c..,
J
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
CHANCELLOR HELMUT KOHL
Calling
about Bosnia
situation
after fall of Srebrenica.
We need to regroup and devise strategy for making
presence work, so we can halt Serb aggressiveness
UN withdrawal.
UN
and avert
Jacques Chirac has just called with a more radical proposal:
to retake Srebrenica militarily by deploying ground forces
of the four major powers.
Jacques posed this as an either/or choice:
large-scale
intervention in Srebrenica, or UNPROFOR must pullout.
I told Jacques that we believe UNPROFOR should not withdraw,
but that I agreed we need to shore up its credibility after
Srebrenica.
We agreed our Chiefs of Staff would follow up so that we
could get a better understanding of the proposal and its
implications.
Shali spoke to Admiral Lanxade this evening, learned that
French military believes retaking Srebrenica too risky.
They are focusing on reinforcement of Gorazde (possibly with
1000 French peacekeepers) as well as opening Mt. Igman route
into Sarajevo using Rapid Reaction Force.
We think that is more realistic approach: to reestablish
UNPROFOR's resolve in more important areas.
Understand he spoke to you earlier today.
What is your
interpretation of Chirac's proposal?
Do you think he really
wants to pullout
if we don't agree?
Want to stay in close touch with you over coming days so
that we can avoid a rift with France and come up with a
realistic approach to reestablish UNPROFOR's effectiveness
and credibility.
Failure in this effort will mean devastating setback for
NATO and UN, and humanitarian disaster of large proportions.
Will also make it harder to defeat unilateral lift
legislation in Congress.
IfAnLr:Declassify on:
..JC::.g"ll>.lj"'P'TI"fEJ""E'1'N:r''Ii'"
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
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THE WHITE
HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORP~DUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telcon with.French President Jacques Chirac
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
President Jacques Chirac
Notetaker: Alexander Vershbow and Anthony
Gardner
DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:
July 13, 1995, 3:22-3:58 p.m.
Oval Office
The President:
I
Hello, Jacques?
(U)
President Chirac: Hello, Bill. How are you? I will speak in
French. I'm very worried about Bosnia and there are things we
want you to know.
(Swi tching to French)
First of all, my
congratulations on the strong statement you issued that if we
cannot restore the UN mission, then the days of UNPROFOR are
numbered and that that causes you concern. Our. analysis is the
same. The fall of Srebrenica, the probable fall of Zepa tomorrow
and the real threat to Gorazde represent a major failure of the
UN, NATO and all the democracies. You see what we are seeing on
TV, how the Serbs are separating men from women, sending women to
be raped and killing men who are old enough to bear arms. In m
o inion we can no Ion er .
ust stand b and watch this. ,._- -----. I.~
flo)
..
Therefore we must restore
Eei"'""Efie l. was guaranteed by the UN. That means
way
situation in the eastern enclaves. ~
Therefore, firm and limited military action is called for.
France is ready to put all of its forces behind the mission. I
don't yet know what the British want to do. They are directly
concerned since they are in Gorazde, next door to Srebrenica. I
wonder whether or not their intention is to pick up and leave
Gorazde just as the Dutch left Srebrenica. I don't want France
to be an accomplice to such a situation. Either we agree to
carry out a joint military intervention to protect the three
enclaves -- to recapture Srebrenica and guarantee the integrity
of Gorazde and Zepa, which account for 100,000 Muslims (today
20,000 to 40,000 Muslims are fleeing Srebrenica) and we use
military intervention to impose the'will of the UN, which can
-<'C"'O"N"'F"I"'B'l'II!:~N(J'11"J IT:A]JiiY.'
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DECLASSU"IED IN pAKf
PER ~O.13526
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only come from the U.S., France, the UK and Germany -- and France
is prepared to throw all of its forces into the effort to restore
the situation in Srebrenica -- or we do nothing.
But if the
option is to do nothing, then that is exactly the situation we
were in in 1939, and France will withdraw -- of course, by
agreement with our British friends and the rest of UNPROFOR.
So
the issue is whether the U.S. is prepared to cooperate in
combating ethnic cleansing, or do we sit back and let these
people fight each other and we go home.
We cannot allow
ourselves to be accomplices! ~
The President:
Let me first say that we appreciate the strong
stance you have taken and your determination to do something.
Obviously, we have been thinking about this a lot.
I will take
up your specific proposals with my military commanders, but I
wanted to speak with you first.
I would like you to think about
a few things.
Gorazde is much more important than Zepa and
Srebrenica in terms of its size and psychological impact.
The
Bosnian Government has 9000 troops in Gorazde, who are apparently
are willing to fight.
In Srebrenica there were about 3000
Bosnian troops but, as you know, they left under pressure of
shelling.
They left without putting up a fight, although I think
they could have done so. The British have 300 troops in Gorazde,
so I think they will be more inclined to take a stand there.
We
all know that if something happens to Gorazde, the Bosnian Serb
army will feel they have a free hand to move on to Sarajevo.
Our
military advisers say there are significant hazards in attempting
to land a force with helicopters in Srebrenica and that UNPROFOR
might be better off securing Gorazde first and then move back
eastward dye to the inherent difficulty of defending the area
there.
ye)
The other issue I would like to raise with you -- which we
discussed in Halifax and here during your visit, and which has
become more pressing -- is the necessity of knowing what the
rules of engagement are going to be if you take the initiative in
Srebrenica, Zepa or Gorazde.
You cannot be in a position to
fight in Zepa and then ask for NATO support without clear rules
of engagement.
If there is going to be fighting, it has to be
different than in the past.
Before we provide air power, we have
to know that it would be used and that we could inflict real pain
on the Serbs in other areas.
Before UNPROFOR gets into a
military campaign, we must have a clear sense of what the next
move is and what the acceptable military options are under
UNPROFOR and NATO. Now that you have told me what you want to
do, I will talk to our military advisers, but they are very
skeptical about bringing in forces with helicopters, especially
if the Bosnians won't fight.
I think we should first secure
Gorazde and then Sarajevo.
I will have conversations with them
and get back in touch with you. ~
CONFIB8MTIM.,
�!
CONiIB8N'fI1\L
3
I would like to make two more points. Fi=st, I think your stated
intentions to reopen Mount Igman road is very important -- a
critical point. Second, we need General Shalikashvili to speak
with Admiral Lanxade or have Secretary Cr-=istopher speak with
your foreign minister to talk in detail aoout what you have in
mind for the enclaves. We need to consider whether the Muslims
will return to the enclaves, how we will protect them if they
come back, and whether it would be under the old UN rules of
engagement. Will the Bosnian Serb Army just end their advances?
Therefore, I believe we should focus on ,Gorazde and press for
ministerial and military talks. You have given me many things to
think about. I would like to have a follow up be~een the
generals and foreign ministers on the details. jCl
The President: We cannot defend democratic values in the
abstract. My military advisers tell me the Muslims could have
made a hell of a fight in Srebrenica and raised the price of the
Serbs' occupation, but they wouldn't do it. We can't fight just
because the UN says they are ."safe areas". We can't send the
Muslims back and commit ourselves to stay forever if they won't
�4
defend themselves. That's the problem with the strategy you
suggest. Yesterday we saw the effects of the imbalance in arms.
Have you had any second thcughts about lifting the arms embargo?
yr
/.Ub1
•
I
The President: If we intervene to regain the enclaves on their
behalf and they won't fight, how do we keep them open?
UNPROFOR's mission would be completely changed and you would have
entered into combat on the side of the Bosnian Government when
they don't fight for themselves. I agree the Serbs have made a
mockery of the UN. They took Srebrenica and got it for free. We
didn't even bomb them. We should raise the price, and even hit
Pale. I have argued that we should allow NATO to take tougher
action, but that was not to be. If we enter the war to defend
the Bosnians, they have to be ready to defend themselves. That's
what worries me. ~
President Chirac:
embargo? JPf
When does the Congress vote on lifting the
The President: Next week. I'm trying to defeat it. I agree
with you: I am vehemently opposed to unilateral lift. If they
pass it, I will veto it, and they would be obliged to override my
veto. )Il1
President Chirac:
Can Congress override the veto?
~)
The President: Yes, with a two-thirds vote, but I don't think
they'll have two thirds. I'm not worried about it. I would like
CONFIBSN'f:l:AL
�C9~IHDl>NHAL
5
to confer with my military
rna tt e r .
advisers
and get back in touch on this
.;.e:r
President Chirac:
to contact General
very much. ~
The President:
OK, I quite agree.
I will ask Admiral Lanxade
Shalikashvili as soon as possible.
Thank you
OK. Good-bye.
(U)
-- End of Conversation
CONFTDEHTIAL
�•
OUR OWN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY TEAM MET THIS MORNING
WILL MEET AGAIN TOMORROW TO CONSIDER MANY OF THE POINTS
ARE DEALING WITH IN YOUR CABINET MEETING.
•
DEFINITIVE ANSWERS TO SEVERAL OF THE QUESTIONS YOU RAISE WILL
HAVE TO AWAIT THE OUTCOME OF TOMORROW'S SESSION
•
I CAN PROVIDE YOU WITH OUR GENERAL THINKING
ISSUES THE PM RAISED IN HIS LETTER.
•
WHILE WE INTEND TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO SUSTAIN A VETO OF.ANY
UNILATERAL LIFT LEGISLATION, YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THERE IS A
REAL CHANCE THAT A VETO COULD BE OVERRIDDEN, ESPECIALLY IF WE
FAIL TO TAKE ACTION TO RESTORE UNPROFOR CREDIBILITY
•
IF GORAZDE
HILL.
ON MOST OF THE
FALLS, COULD MAKE THINGS MORE DIFFICULT
ON THE
•
I AM MEETING WITH SACIRBEY THIS AFTERNOON, AND WILL PRESS HIM
ON GIVING US A CHANCE TO RESTORE UNPROFOR CREDIBILITY.
THIS
MUST INCLUDE ALLOWING UNPROFOR TO REMAIN, AND ASSISTING IN THE
DEPLOYMENT OF THE RRF. BUT AGAIN, WE MUST BE WILLING TO DO
MAKE UNPROFOR MORE CREDIBLE.
THE STATUS QUO WILL NOT SUFFICE.
•
REGARDING THE OPTIONS FOR GORAZDE, YOU ARE RIGHT IN YOUR VIEW
THAT WE WOULD NOT BE PREPARED TO SUPPORT DEPLOYMENT OF 500015,000 TROOPS TO REPEL A SERB ATTACK ON ITS OWN.
•
WE AGREE THAT THE WEIGHT OF THE EFFORT TO DEFEND GORAZDE
THE GROUND STILL RESTS WITH THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT.
•
WE DO SOME MERIT IN THE FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR A MORE MODEST
REINFORCEMENT OF THE UN PEACEKEEPERS THERE, AND ARE WEIGHING
THE PROS AND CONS OF PROVIDING THE NECESSARY LIFT FOR A SMALL
FRENCH DEPLOYMENT.
•
ON
SUCH A DEMONSTRATION OF RESOLVE, IF DONE IN PARALLEL WITH
A ROBUST AIR CAMPAIGN, WOULD PROVIDE A DETERRENT TO THE
BOSNIAN SERBS THAT WAS CLEARLY LACKING AT SREBRENICA AND
ZEPA.
•
YOUR THIRD OPTION, WHICH AMOUNTS TO SIMPLY STAYING WITH THE
STATUS QUO, IS CLEARLY UNACCEPTABLE.
•
IF UNPROFOR MAKES NO EFFORT TO CHANGE THE CALCULUS OF THE
SITUATION FOLLOWING THE BRUTAL ETHNIC CLEANSING OF SREBRENICA:
•
THE FRENCH HAVE ALREADY
WITHDRAW,
INDICATED
•
THE U.S. CONGRESS WILL BE CERTAIN
LIFT BILL OVER A VETO, AND
•
THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT
UNPROFOR'S WITHDRAWAL.
THAT THEY WILL
TO PASS A UNILATERAL
IS INCREASINGLY
LIKELY TO DEMAND
�2
•
REALISTICALLY, HOWEVER, IT MAY BE MORE IMPORTANT TO LAY DOWN A
MARKER OF CHANGED UNPROFOR RESOLVE AT GORAZDE THAN TO COMMIT
TO HOLDING IT AT ALL COSTS INDEFINITELY.
BUT CLEARLY
SOMETHING MUST BE DONE NOW
TO KEEP THE FRENCH ON BOARD AND
AVOID ENCOURAGING A SERB ONSLAUGHT NOT'ONLY AGAINST GORAZDE,
BUT SARAJEVO AS WELL.
•
TURNING TO OUR PROPOSAL FOR THE USE OF AIR POWER, SINCE THE
BOSNIAN SERBS HAVE INDICATED THAT ANY USE OF NATO AIR POWER
WOULD BE REGARDED AS AN ACT OF WAR, THEIR VIEWS ON THIS MATTER
CANNOT BE THE DETERMINING FACTOR.
•
THE USE OF AIR POWER HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED BY THE UN AS
PART OF THE CHAPTER VII APPROACH TO THE MANDATE TO WHICH
WE HAVE ALL AGREED.
•
THUS FAR, THERE HAS BEEN NO SERIOUS EFFORT TO APPLY THAT
AIR POWER IN A MANNER THAT MIGHT ACTUALLY HAVE AN IMPACT
ON BOSNIAN SERB FORCES VIOLATING UN MANDATES .
• AS A RESULT, THE THREAT TO UN PERSONNEL FROM BOSNIAN
SERBS WILLING TO RESORT TO CRIMINAL TACTICS OF HOSTAGETAKING HAS OUTWEIGHED THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS.
•
CLEARLY, ANY RENEWED AIR CAMPAIGN WOULD NEED UNPROFOR TO
TAKE REALISTIC MEASURES TO REMOVE ITS PERSONNEL FROM HIGH
THREAT AREAS WHERE THEY ARE UNNECESSARILY DEPLOYED.
•
WHAT WE PROPOSE FOR GORAZDE IS A MILITARILY SOUND AIR CAMPAIGN
TO RESTORE SERB RESPECT FOR THE HEAVY WEAPONS EXCLUSION ZONE,
AND, IF NECESSARY, ATTACK FORCES VIOLATING IT AS PART OF A
SERB OFFENSIVE EARLY ENOUGH TO SUPPORT EFFORTS TO DEFEND THE
SAFE AREA.
•
SUCH A CAMPAIGN WOULD GREATLY ENHANCE THE DETERRENT POSTURE OF
THE UN AND THEREBY CONTRIBUTE TO SUCCESSFUL MAINTENANCE OF THE
UN'S ROLE IN SARAJEVO.
�3025660E.FIN
Page lof4
,.
MSMail
DATE-TIME
06 August 95 18:00
Vershbow, Alexander R.
CLASSIFICATION
-€ONFIfJEN HAL
SUBJECT
FW: Bosnia Human Rights Abuses [CONrID~IlAL]
TO
Drew, Samuel N.
CARBON_COPY
NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY
From: Malley, Robert
To: Schwartz, Eric P.; Vershbow, Alexander R.
CC: /R, Record at Al
Subject: Bosnia [CONFIDENTIAL]
Date: Friday, August 04, 199506:26 PM
[[ 6054.DOC : 4671 in 6054.DOC ]][[ BOSNIA2,DOC : 4672 in
BOSNIA2.DOC ]]
Sandy B. asked us to draft a possible presidential statement on atrocities
in Srebrenica and Zepa. Attached for your comments/concurrence is a package
that includes a draft statement (I am still waiting for an attached fact
sheet from the agency).
ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE
ATTACHMENT
FILENAME
4 August 95 18:21
6054.DOC
.(J ONi"lDEI'ITiAL
6054
Crn-JfIDliblTIkL
.('ONfIDRNTIAh
CONFmS~ITIAh
August 4, 1995
ACTION
�3025660E.FIN
Page 2 of4
MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
THROUGH: MORTON HALPERIN
FROM: ROB MALLEY
SUBJECT: Human Rights Atrocities ih Bosnia
There is increasingly solid evidence of atrocities committed by the
Bosnian Serb army during its attack on Srebrenica and Zepa. During
a mission to central and northeastern Bosnia, A/S Shattuck was able
to confirm through interviews with refugees reports and
. intelligence we have been receiving. Approximately 12,000 persons
from the two former enclaves are still missing and unaccounted for.
Hundreds, perhaps up to a thousand, persons (principally men and
boys) appear to have been killed in mass executions. Others are
either in detention or seeking to flee the area. Reports of other
brutalities, including rape, sexual abuse and mutilations abound.
There also are some indications that chemical weapons might have
been used.
State is undertaking a series of steps to pressure the Bosnian
Serbs to grant access to and permit free passage for those still at
large or in detention:
I. Demarche to Belgrade to communicate the requirement that an
international mission be permitted to enter the former safe areas
and extract all former residents.
2. Demarche to Russia and Greece to exercise pressure on Belgrade
and Pale.
3. Efforts at the UNSC for the issuance of a statement on the need
for accounting, access to and safe passage for those remaining in
enclaves.
White House action will be needed to support this effort which,
given the unknown fate of thousands of persons, is of the utmost
urgency. A first step would be a presidential statement that
condemns the atrocities, calls for access to and safe passage for
those remaining in the enclaves, and reminds perpetrators of these
actions that they will be held accountable. (A draft statement is
attached at Tab A). The statement would be released in conjunction
with a fact sheet detailing known incidents of atrocities (attached
at Tab B). If these initial efforts prove to be unsuccessful, more
forceful action should be considered.
Concurrence by: Sandy Vershbow; Eric
Schwartz
RECOMMENDATION
�3D25660E.FIN
Page 3 of4
That you approve release of the attached presidential statement and
fact sheet.
Approve __
Disapprove __
Attachments
Tab A Presidential Statement
Tab B Fact Sheet
ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE.
4 August 95 18:25
ATTACHMENT
FILENAME
BOSNIA2.DOC
Evidence is mounting every day of unspeakable atrocities committed
by Bosnian Serb armed forces during their attack on Srebrenica and
Zepa. There are reports of mass executions, beatings, rape, sexual
abuse and other flagrant violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law. Thousands of civilians from
Srebrenica and Zepa are missing and unaccounted for. As I have made
clear before, the United States condemns these outrageous actions in
the strongest terms.
Our first obligation is to the men, women and children held by the
Bosnian Serbs or still at large in and around the former enclaves of
Srebrenica and Zepa. The Bosnian Serbs must provide international
access to and safe passage for those persons still being detained.
They must provide a full accounting of people from the two areas
whose fate remains unknown. And they must not harm persons who have
survived the Bosnian Serb onslaught and are in need of immediate
protection and assistance. I have directed my Administration to
make our concerns known to all relevant parties and to work with the
international community to see to it that these basic requirements
are met.
Public condemnation of the atrocities alone is insufficient. There
also must be justice, and those who have committed these acts must
be held accountable. To that end, I also have directed my
Administration to intensify efforts to collect information on what
happened in Srebrenica and Zepa. Evidence will be turned over to
the War Crimes Tribunal and serve to prosecute those culpable of war
crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. I urge States to
fulfill their international obligation to arrest those already
indicted by the Tribunal if they enter their territory and surrender
them to the Tribunal.
�3.025660E.FIN
Page 4 of4
Bosnian Serbs need to be on notice that such criminal actions
constitute the single most important obstacle to a political
solution. Ongoing atrocities make it impossible for the
international community even to consider any sanctions relief. They
must not and will not remain unpunished
�30 I 5B9A6.FIN
Page I of3
MSMail
DATE-TIME
25 July 95 20:42
FROM
Vershbow, Alexander R.
CLASSIFICATION
• CmWIDmn'fAL
SUBJECT
Subject: Massacres at Srebrenic/t' fCQNFIDEN'fIAf+.'
TO
Bass, Peter E.
Cicio, Kristen K.
Emery, Mary C.
Hall, Wilma G.
Veit, Katherine M.
Drew, Samuel N.
Gardner, Anthony
Marshall, Betty A.
Maxfield, Nancy H.
Peters, Mary A.
Schmidt, John R.
Vershbow, Alexander R.
For TL and SRB:
.
,
Whatever you think of Galbraith's recommendation re Zepa, the fact of Serb
mass killings at Srebrenica is becoming increasingly clear. Grim reading.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS. CQNFIDE?<f'fIAL DTG:251907Z mL 95
FM: AMEMBASSY ZAGREB
TO:SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6565
--..c.G:....Q::UO'N~F~I A L ZAGREB 002788
J:)A-f~r-l!<;T~'I""t"t
~IQDIliE.O. 12356: DECL: 07/25/00
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, BK, HR
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE MASS EXECUTION OF SREBRENICA
MALES IS REASON TO SAVE ZEPA
I. A UN OFFICIAL HAS RECOUNTED TO ME AN INTERVIEW
SHE CONDUCTED OF A SREBRENICA REFUGEE IN TUZLA. THE
ACCOUNT, WHICH SHE FEL T WAS HIGHLY CREDIBLE, PROVIDES
DISTURBING EVIDENCE THAT THE BOSNIAN SERBS HAYE...
MASSACRED MANY IF NOT MOST OF:rHE 5 OOOPLUSUEl:LASSIFIED
)" -A<_r~".
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INTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY:'
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�3015B9A6.FIN
Page 2 aD
MILITARY AGE MEN IN THEIR CUSTODY FOLLOWING THE FALL
OF SREBRENICA.
2. IF THE BOSNIAN SERB ARMY MASSACRED THE DEFENDERS
OF SREBRENICA, WE CAN BE SURE A SIMILAR FATE AWAITS
MANY OF THE 16,000 PEOPLE IN ZEPA. THE LONDON
DECLARATION IMPLICITLY WRITES OFF ZEPA. IN VIEW OF
THE NUMEROUS ACCOUNTS OF ATROCITIES IN SREBRENICA A.1"'lD
THE POSSIBILITY OF A MAJOR MASSACRE THERE, I URGE
RECONSIDERATION OF AIR STRIKES TO HELP ZEPA.
3. THE SREBRENICA REFUGEE IS A 35-YEAR-OLD MAN. HE
FLED SREBRENICA AS THE SERBS TOOK OVER, BUT WAS LATER
ROUNDED UP IN A FOREST ALONG WITH SEVERAL THOUSAND
OTHER REFUGEES. AT LEAST OVERNIGHT HE WAS HELD IN A
SMALL BUILDING PACKED WITH MEN. THROUGH THE NIGHT
THE SERBS TOOK OUT MEN IN SMALL GROUPS AND THEY WERE
NOT SEEN AGAIN. THE REFUGEES WERE TRANSPORTED IN
TRUCKS A1\'D BUSES TO A STADIUM, APPARENTL Y AT
BRATUNAC. ALONG THE WAY, SERBS FIRED INTO THE TRUCKS
AND BUSES APPARENTLY KILLING NUMEROUS REFUGEES.
4. AT THE STADIUM, GENERAL MLADIC ADDRESSED THE
PRISONERS, TAUNTING THEM THAT "THEIR ALIJA" HAD BEEN
UNABLE TO HELP THEM AND THAT THE MUSLIMS OUGHT TO
HAVE STAYED IN YUGOSLAVIA. HE THEN ASSURED THE MEN
THAT, IF THEY WERE COOPERATIVE, THEY WOULD BE
RETURNED TO THEIR FAMILIES. AT THIS STAGE, THE MEN
WERE BOUND WITH HANDS TIED BEHIND THEIR BACKS.
5. FROM THE STADIUM, THE MEN WERE TAKEN ON TRUCKS TO
KONJEVIC POLIE. THEY WERE TAKEN FROM THE TRUCKS,
MADE TO LIE DOWN, AND THEN MACHINE GUNNED. THIS
REFUGEE SURVIVED BECAUSE THE BULLET GRAZED HIS .
TEMPLE, CREATING A VERY BLOODY APPEARANCE BUT DOING
LITTLE REAL DAMAGE. AFTER THE SOLDIERS LEFT, HE, AND
ANOTHER MAN WHO ALSO SURVIVED, HID IN A DITCH. THE
SOLDIERS CAME BACK AND BULLDOZED THE BODIES.
6. ACCORDING TO THE UN SOURCE, THE MAN HAD MARKS ON
HIS WRISTS FROM WHERE HIS HANDS HAD BEEN BOUND. HE
ALSO HAD WOUNDS ON HIS LEGS AND ARMS FROM WHERE
MACHINE GUN BULLETS HAD SPRAYED ROCKS ONTO HIM.
7. THE REFUGEE BELIEVES THAT ALL THE MEN IN THE
STADIUM WERE MURDERED IN THIS WAY._(i;)(~
WHO ALSO INTERVIEWED SREBRENICA
REFUGEES IN TUZLA (pLEASE PROTECT), TOLD ME THATlf!b)(6)~
ALSO BELIEVES THAT THOUSANDS MAY HAVE DIED IN TRANSIT
TO KONJEVIC POLJE OR AT THE EXECUTION SITE.
�3015B9A6.FIN
Page 3 of3
8. IF THIS ACCOUNT IS ACCURATE, THERE MAYBE NO
SURVIVORS OF THE MEN ROUNDED UP IN SREBRENICA. WE
SHOULD REDOUBLE EFFORTS TO SEE THESE MEN. IF THE
SERBS REFUSE ACCESS, THE IMPLICATIONS ARE OBVIOUS.
9. AGAIN, IT IS NOT TOO LATE TO PREVENT A SIMILAR
TRAGEDY AT ZEPA. ZEPA'S DEFENDERS VALIANTL Y CONTINUE
TO HOLD ON. UNDOUBTEDLY THEY REALIZE THE FATE THAT
AWAITS THEM. THEY SHOULD NOT BE ABANDONED.
GALBRAITH
�DEPARTMENT
OF STATE
(SA)
07.22.
• 95
22.' I 1
NO.
1460120825
PAGE
Rer
I.
APPR:
RF
DRAFT:
JC
OTHER:
SB
OTHER:
WFD
OTHER:
ML
~
~
C8I1FIBEMTli'd> -
OTHER:
OTHER:
NIACT
IMMEDIATE
IMMEDIATE
E.O. 12356:
TAGS:
ANATO
USUN, MOSCOW,
KIEV
DECL:OADR
NATO, MARR
SUBJECT:
PRESIDENTIAL
MESSAGE
TO NATO CAPITALS
1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
NIACT IMMEDIATE PRECENDENCE
BECAUSE OF ONGOING NAC MEETINGS AND BECAUSE TEXT MUST BE
DELIVERED AT OOB MONDAY, JULY 24, AND TOMORROW IS SUNDAY.
2. NATO CAPITALS EXCEPT LONDON AND PARIS SHOULD DELIVER
THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT AT OOB MONDAY,
JULY 24. THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL WILL MEET AT 3:30
PM THAT DAY TO REVIEW PROGRESS IN THE NATO MILITARY
COMMITTEE ON FORMULATING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
IMPLEMENTING THE DECISIONS REACHED AT THE LONDON BOSNIA
CONFERENCE LAST FRIDAY.
EMBASSIES LONDON AND PARIS
SHOULD INFORM AUTHORITIES OF THE FACT AND CONTENT OF
THIS MESSAGE.
3.
BEGIN
TEXT.
(FOR BRUSSELS, OTTAWA, COPENHAGEN, BONN, ITALY, THE
HAGUE, OSLO, MADRID, AND ANKARA)
WE WENT TO LONDON
CONVINCED THAT THE STATUS QUO IN BOSNIA WAS UNTENABLE
AND THAT ONLY STRONG AND DECISIVE ACTION WOULD BE
eeUF I Qg,~TTT A I ,
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
\1"
lW,\
J
'l-fI
2
Of
lW,-
�DEPARTMENT
OF STATE
••..
C~e""l~l f1DrTEfClNf1"''Ff II:AirLi:PP-I'
(SA) 07.22.
. 95 22: I J
NO.
1460120825
2
SUFFICIENT TO HALT SERB AGGRESSION, RESTORE UNPROFOR'S
EFFECTIVENESS, AND REESTABLISH CONDITIONS THAT COULD
LEAD TO A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.
WE WERE PARTICULARLY
DETERMINED THAT CLEAR DECISIONS BE TAKEN TO PREVENT THE
BOSNIAN SERBS FROM ATTACKING THE LAST REMAINING SAFE
AREA IN EASTERN BOSNIA, GORAZDE, AND THAT MEASURES BE
ADOPTED FOR RELIEVING THE SERBS' SIEGE OF SARAJEVO.
THE
LONDON MEETING ACHIEVED THESE OBJECTIVES.
OUR EFFORTS
THERE MUST NOW BE PURSUED WITHIN NATO, WITHOUT DELAY, IN
ORDER TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM AND TO CONFIRM THE
.SERIOUSNESS OF OUR PURPOSE.
(FOR ATHENS, LUXEMBOURG, REYKJAVIK, AND LISBON)
THE
LONDON CONFERENCE ON BOSNIA WAS SUCCESSFUL IN SENDING AN
IMPORTANT SIGNAL TO THE BOSNIAN SERBS OF RESOLVE AND
DETERMINATION.
THAT EFFORT MUST NOW BE PURSUED WITHIN
NATO, WITHOUT DELAY, IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM AND
TO CONFIRM THE SERIOUSNESS OF OUR PURPOSE.
(CONTINUATION FOR ALL)
LONDON WAS IN OUR VIEW AN
IMPORTANT SUCCESS.
THE CONFERENCE SEIZED THE
INITIATIVE, DESPITE THE VARIETY OF VIEWS REPRESENTED
THERE, AROUND THE BASIC PROPOSITIONS OUTLINED IN MALCOLM
RIFKIND'S CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT.
CLARITY OF WILL, AND
EXPEDITIOUS ACTION AT NATO IN THE NEXT DAYS, WILL BE
ESSENTIAL TO AVOIDING ANY CONFUSION IN PALE LEADING TO
MISCALCULATION.
WE CANNOT AFFORD ANY MISSTEPS OR
HESITATION IF WE ARE TO AVOID THE SORT OF ESCALATION OF
CONFLICT WHICH WE WISH TO AVOID.
AT THE SAME TIME, NATO
MUST BE PREPARED TO RESPOND QUICKLY IF THE WARNINGS OF
LONDON ARE NOT HEEDED.
IT IS BY MOVING FORWARD RESOLUTELY TOGETHER THAT WE CAN
BEST ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVES, INCLUDING THE RETENTION OF
UNPROFOR.
BY STANDING TOGETHER AS ALLIES WE PROVIDE THE
STRONGEST DETERRENT TO FURTHER ATTACKS, AND THE BEST
PROTECTION TO UNPROFOR ON THE GROUND.
THE COURAGE OF
THOSE TROOPS, AND THE COMMITMENT OF THE NATIONS WHO HAVE
PROVIDED THEM, MERITS NATO'S STRONG SUPPORT.
WE ARE .
CONVINCED THAT THE OUTCOME OF THE LONDON CONFERENCE,
COUPLED WITH A CLEAR AND RAPID DISPLAY OF ALLIANCE
DECISIvENESS, IS THE BEST HOPE FOR TURNING THE BOSNIAN
SERBS FROM THE BATTLEFIELD.
SATURDAY'S DISCUSSIONS AT NATO ON FOLLOWUP TO THE LONDON
CONFERENCE WENT WELL AND DEMONSTRATED A CONSIDERABLE
DEGREE OF CONSENSUS.
NATO'S MILITARY AUTHORITIES WILL
NOW EXAMINE THE SPECIFICS OF HOW NATO WILL IMPLEMENT THE
LONDON DECISIONS, AND THE COUNCIL WILL MEET MONDAY
-AeAOI~l:PF~I"'eEtI':!I1'N'T'ITI1rAD'h
PAGE
3
�DEPARTMENT
OF STATE
(SA)
07.22.
. 95
22: I I
NO.
c.
Cg~IFI I:lEM'UAL
3
AFTERNOON TO MOVE FORWARD.
WE WOULD HOPE THAT ON MONDAY
DECISIONS CAN BE TAKEN THAT ARE FIRM AND CLEAR IN
SUPPORT OF THE LONDON MEETING.
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE,
NATO SHOULD STATE THAT IT IS PREPARED TO USE ITS AIR
POWER IN A SUBSTANTIAL AND DECISIVE RESPONSE TO ANY
ATTACKS ON GORAZDE.
AS THE CONFERENCE CHAIRMAN STATED IN LONDON, THE
SITUATION IN BOSNIA AND THE FUTURE OF THE UN MISSION IS
NOW AT A TURNING POINT.
THERE ARE OBVIOUS QUESTIONS,
GIVEN PAST EXPERIENCE, ABOUT WHETHER WE WILL BE PREPARED
TO FOLLOW THROUGH.
NATO MUST MAKE IT CLEAR THAT IT IS.
END TEXT.
YY
1460120825
PAGE
4
�CQHFIbENTIAL
6886
NAnONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON.
D.C. 20506
September 18, 1995
INFORMATION
.
,MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
"
IU
FROM
RICHARD SCHIFTER
SUBJECT:
A Proposal for a Southeastern European Cooperative
Development Initiative
More Balkanization?
I had a visit last week from a delegation from Sanjak. Sanjak, a
Turkish generic term for district, is the label given to an area
lying immediately east of Bosnia, now divided between Serbia and
Montenegro and populated predominantly by persons who refer to
themselves as Bosniaks. They are Muslims. The delegation was in
Washington to gain support for their effort to establish an
autonomous region of Sanjak within the FRY.
I heard the delegation out, explained that we now sought to end the
fighting and suggested that they could assert their cause at a
later date, when an effort is made to reach an overall settlement.
But before the delegation left, I asked its leader what his native
language was. He said it was Serbo-Croatian. I asked him whether
people who saw him in the street would be able to identify him as a
"Bosniak," as distinct from a Serb. He conceded that most people
think he looked like a German. I asked whether he thought that a
fervent religious belief separated the people in his region from
the Serbs. He said that that was not the case. When I then asked
what this effort at separation was all about, he spoke vaguely
about different cultures. I did not embarrass him by asking him to
spell out the cultural differences forme.
-
A Vision of a Better Regional Order
~----_.-----
-----
-- ..
_
---
The Sanjak delegation's outlook contrasted sharply with the world
view expressed to me over a year ago by one of the leaders of the
ethnic Greeks of Albania. He made the point that he was committed
to the preservation of the ethnic and linguistic identity of
Albania's Greeks but was not interested'in the redrawing of borders
or in autonomy.
He was impressed by the progress made by the
European Union in making borders increasingly irrelevant and was
hopeful that.in twenty years his region will have reached the same
level of political development.
..JC:lOJl~~lFE'Ir:bI":EE:NNTTIIALA1~'
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DECLA ::ILl kFlED
" . ~ PER E.O. 13526
· ~~ l.J"ln
•.. 1-<> \1;- 63 ~ - ".
�It now seems as if the end of the war in the former Yugoslavia is
in sight.
Even if that end does not arrive iImnediately, it is
likely to come about in the foreseeable future. We have begun to
plan the funding of a major construction effort to bind up the
area's wounds. I recommend that without adding to the cost of the
Bosnia reconstruction effort, we try to do more than recreate the
',status quo ante, that we use the opportunity to deal with the
'iregion's underlying problems.
To be specific, I recommend that we embed the Bosnia reconstruction
efforts in a comprehensive regional initiative designed to realize
the dream of my Greek-Albanian interlocutor. The initiative would
seek to bring the countries of Southeastern Europe together in a
joint effort to develop their respective economies, build a
coordinated transportation and communications system, deal jointly
.with the problem of intergroup distrust and hatred, and create a
sturdy democratic infrastructure. This project would contribute to
our objective of enlargement of democratic space and would help
solidify Western ties to countries that might not be early
candidates for NATO and EU membership.
It would also be an
exercise which Russia could not rationally view as threatening.
Under the OSCE Umbrella
The effort could appropriately be undertaken under the umbrella of
the OSCE, with its emphasis on security, economic development, and
human rights. It should encompass Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, the
states of the former Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania.
The OSCE
should create a Southeastern European Cooperative Development
Initiative (SECD!?), led by a Coordinating Board on which the
countries of the region. and the donors of assistance would be
represented.
(Perhaps we need to find an excuse for giving Russia
a seat as well.)
The Board would plan and recommend development
projects, first and foremost relating to reconstruction and
coordinated regional economic development (giving real meaning to
the OSCE second basket), but also focusing on imprOVing relations
among the countries of the region and among its ethnic groups
(fi~st basket), and creating governmental institutions protective
of human rights ("l;hirdasket).
b
With regard to the latter, the
establishment of OSCE jurisdiction would allow linkage of economic
development with third-basket issues in countries such as Croatia,
the FRY, Albania, and Slovakia.
The Board's role should be to coordinate rather than direct. Each
donor would be free to adopt its own .program and each recipie.nt
would be free to make its own arrangement with any donor. But the
Board, if effectively led, would seek to enlist the cooperation of
all donors and of the relevant international lending agencies and
would from that base be able to urge the regional recipients to
cooperate as well.
G8~lFIBElf'fI1tL
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.
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.
The Board should not. have a staff of its own.
Secretarial
assistance should be rendered by the OSCE.
Each board members
should be supported by technical staff from the country the member
represents. The Board would seek to work closely with the IMF, the
IBRD, the EBRD, UNHCR, OECD, and COE. The staffs of these agencies
.
,could be enlisted in providing relevant studies.
'j
As distinct from the OSCE coordinating role with regard to economic
development, effective centralized authority will be needed to make
certain that'Helsinki human-rights standards are applied. Problems
posed by the OSCE consensus principle can be overcome by entrusting
application of third-basked standards to the OSCE High Commissioner
on National Minorities and insisting at the outset on a broad grant
of authority to him.
As national minority issues are closely
related to the region's human rights problems, he would be the
logical person to take the-lead regarding third-basket issues.
u.S. Leadership
If we decide to go forward with such an effort and are able to
persuade the donors and the countries of the region to join in it,
we should make a major effort to gear ourselves up for the exercise
of effective leadership. A USG support group for SECDI should be
established by Executive Order.
In contrast to the OSCE
Coordinating Board, which should coordinate by persuasion, the
support group should have directive authority over all USG funds
allocated for economic development and' democracy building in the
region (AID and USIA) and should work closely with such USG-funded
organizations as USIP and NED. It should also coordinate closely
with all Federal agencies which could contribute to this effort
(Treasury and Commerce could play a particularly significant role)
and should seek to enlist the support of the private sector, both
profit and nonprofit. Given the region's great humanitarian needs,
the churches should be involved in a major way.
A high-profile effort of this kind would be right and proper on its
own merits. It would also be appreciated by members of the general
public, because of its humanitarian character, by the churches, by
the ethnic groups. with roots in the region, and by the U.S •
businesses which could be invited to play a constructive role in
this effort. Our leadership in this undertaking, as a follow-up to
our leadership in bringing peace to the region, could overcome the
negative image created by our inability to solve the problem
earlier. It would be an effort with which the White House couJ.d
appropriately identify itself.
.
Can we discuss this idea?
cc: Dan Fried, Mort Halperin, Sandy Vershbow
�WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: BASS, BERGER, DOHSE, FUERTH, HARMON, LAKE, SENS, SIT, SODERBERG, SIT:, BELL,
CLARKER, DREW, HARMON, LAKEA, NSC, PETERS, SAUNDERS, SCHWARTZ, SESTAK, SUM,
SUM2, VERSHBOW
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------PREC: IMMEDIATE
FM: AMEMBASSY
CLASS.' eOI'UFI DEN"fIAI..,
DTG:141622Z
JUL 95
LONDON
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1260
RHEHAAAIWHITEHOUSE
WASHDC IMMEDIATE
. RUSNAAA/USEUCOM
VAIHINGEN AB GE PRIORITY
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY
ZAGREB PRIORITY 1619
RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY
SARAJEVO PRIORITY 0009
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY
BELGRADE PRIORITY 9077
RUFOAAA/USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION
US UN NEW YORK PRIORITY 7193
€
Q N ~ I Q E r~ 'f I A"LLONDON
r
009960
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL UK FR BK
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S TELCON WITH MAJOR:
PROPOSE BOSNIA CONFERENCE
PM LIKELY TO
REF: LONDON 9894
1. COFJFIBErmAC
ENTIRE TEXT.
2. A CONTACT AT NUMBER TEN ADVISES THAT PRIME MINISTER
MAJOR IS LIKELY TO PROPOSE AN EARLY MINISTERIAL LEVEL
MEETING ON BOSNIA (REFTEL) DURING HIS TELCON WITH THE
PRESIDENT LATER TODAY. MAJOR IS SAID TO BE CONSIDERING
A MEETING OF FOREIGN AND DEFENSE MINISTERS OF CONTACT
GROUP AND TROOP CONTRIBUTOR COUNTRIES WHICH WOULD TAKE
PLACE IN LONDON LATE IN THE WEEK OF JULY 17. THE
MEETING MIGHT BE PRECEDED BY A SESSION, A DAY OR TWO
EARLIER, OF SENIOR MILITARY ADVISORS.
3. THE BACKDROP TO THE PROSPECTIVE MEETING IS BRITISH
CONCERN OVER THE STATE OF ALLIED COHESION AGAINST A
DANGEROUS, FAST CHANGING SITUATION ON THE GROUND. THE
BRITISH OBJECTIVE WOULD BE TO EMERGE FROM THE MEETING
WITH A CONSENSUS ON A WAY FORWARD, INCLUDING ON MILITARY
OPERATIONS. THEY ARE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT THE
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
tJ'I 't(/TlII~
~\v N;o!~
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�eOrJrIOEi\J i iAL
ONTACT GROUP MEMBER COUNTRIES FIND THEIR WAY BACK TO A
COMMON APPROACH.
4. OUR CONTACT SAID THE FRENCH ARE TELLING LONDON THAT
THE U.S. IS RECEPTIVE TO PARIS' PROPOSAL OF "DRAWING A
LINE IN THE SAND" AT GORAZDE AND THAT WASHINGTON HAS
INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE HELICOPTER LIFT AND
CAS FOR THEIR FORCES. HE ADDED THAT HMG HAS CONCERNS
ABOUT THE FRENCH PROPOSAL, WHICH IT CONSIDERS A
NON-VIABLE MILITARY OPERATION WHICH WOULD RESULT IN
TURNING UNPROFOR INTO A PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATION.
CROWE
BT
#9960
NNNN
<'SECT>SECTlON:
01 OF 01
<'SSN>9960
<'TOR> 950714125133
M1764412
FROM:
SITREPRT
�GOPJFlBEIIi IIAl '
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DIST: BASS, BERGER, DOHSE, FUERTH, HARMON, LAKE, SENS, SIT, SODERBERG, SIT:, BELL,
CLARKER, DREW, HARMON, LAKEA, NSC, PETERS, SAUNDERS, SCHWARTZ, SESTAK, SUM,
SUM2, VERSHBOW
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS:66QQ~N~FI~B~EroroTiIIPA~LDTG:141544Z
JUL 95
FM:AMEMBASSYLONDON
TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE
WASHDC IMMEDIATE
1251
RUEHV..}/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO PRIORITY 0006
. RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY
ZAGREB PRIORITY 1616
RUCNDT/USMISSION
USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 7190
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY
MOSCOW PRIORITY 3874
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY
BELGRADE PRIORITY 9074
CO"
--
J:' I ~E N T I A L LONDON 009948
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL BK UK
SUBJECT: HMG PAUSES TO REFLECT ON BOSNIA POLICY,
REAFFIRMS VALUE OF UNPROFOR
REF: LONDON 9894
1. SONFiElEi'< IIAL AS MARKED.
INFORMATION.
OADR FOR FOREIGN GOVERNMENT
,.
2.
SUMMARY:
THE BRITISH ARE NOT PREPARED TO TAKE
~ Y QUICK DECISIONS ON POSSIBLE MILITARY ACTIONS IN
BOSNIA, INCLUDING DRAWING A LINE IN THE SAND AT GORAZDE,
DESPITE STRONG FRENCH PRESSURES TO DO SO. SENIOR
OFFICIALS ARE HIGHLY SKEPTICAL OF ANY OPERATION TO
REINFORCE ZEPA OR GORAZDE, BUT BELIEVE THAT OPENING UP
OVERLAND ACCESS TO SARAJEVO WOULD BE FEASIBLE MILITARILY
AND DESIRABLE IN POLICY TERMS. MEANWHILE, BOTH THE
PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN SECRETARY HAVE REAFFIRMED THE
BRITISH COMMITMENT TO REMAIN IN BOSNIA UNLESS THE
SITUATION DETERIORATES SIGNIFICANTLY FURTHER. END
SUMMARY.
DECLASSIFIED
PER EoO. 13526
NO HASTY DECISIONS
;:-;;;(~~-~I-~R-LEVEL
lh
CONTACTS AT THE FCO, MOD AND
~~ q 11 l
~oll:6t~hY'
OWNING STREET (CONTACT GROUP REPRESENTATIVE CHARLTON,
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�CONFIOEN IIJl.L
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OMAND, AND ASSISTANT PRIVATE
SECRETARY FOR OVERSEAS AFFAIRS OAKDEN) TOLD US JULY 14
THAT HMG WAS NOT PREPARED TO TAKE ANY QUICK DECISIONS ON
POSSIBLE MILITARY ACTIONS IN BOSNIA DESPITE STRONG
PRESSURES FROM PARIS TO DO SO. THE BRITISH AGREE THAT A
DEFINING MOMENT HAS BEEN REACHED ON BOSNIA, BUT FOR THIS
VERY REASON THEY BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT TO TAKE A FEW DAYS
TO LOOK QUIETLY AT THE OPTIONS BEFORE TAKING ANY
DECISION. WE ARE TOLD THAT A HIGH-LEVEL GROUP, TO
INCLUDE THE PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN AND DEFENSE
SECRETARIES) IS TO MEET SHORTLY TO ASSESS THE SITUATION.
4. j.ef'PART OF THIS RELUCTANCE TO TAKE SNAP DECISIONS
SfEMS FROM UNCERTAINTY IN WHITEHALL AS TO EXACTLY WHAT
THE FR~NCH ARE PROPOSING. WHAT EXACTLY DOES PRESIDENT
· CHIRAC HAVE IN MIND WHEN HE SPEAKS OF "LIMITED MILITARY
ACTION TO .PROTECT THE OTHER ENCLAVES?" AS NOTED SEPTEL,
PRIME MINISTER MAJOR WILL BE CALLING CHIRAC TODAY TO TRY
TO CLARIFY FRENCH INTENTIONS.
PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS ON THE MILITARY OPTIONS
5. JJA"'OUR CONTACTS STRESSED TO US THAT THERE ARE FEW
"'ffABLE MILITARY OPTIONS IN BOSNIA. CHARLTON REAFFIRMED
THE BRITISH VIEW THAT IT WAS OUT OF THE QUESTION TO
THINK THAT SREBRENICA COULD BE RETAKEN WITH THE
ASSISTANCE OF THE RRF. HE NOTED THAT IT WOULD TAKE AN
AIRBORNE DIVISION OR TWO, WHICH WOULD HAVE TO COME FROM
THE U.S. AS TO ZEPA, CHARLTON SAID THAT THE BRITISH
WERE UNDER NO ILLUSIONS THAT IT COULD BE HELD, EVEN WITH
REINFORCEMENT IF THAT WERE POSSIBLE, AGAINST A BOSNIAN
SERB ATTACK. TO BE AT ALL EFFECTIVE, REINFORCEMENT
WOULD REQUIRE THE PARTICIPATION OF U.S. ATTACK
. HELICOPTERS. OMAND SAID THAT THE BOSNIAN SERBS COULD
TAKE ZEPA TOMORROW IF THEY WANTED, ALTHOUGH HE DOUBTED
THEY WOULD MOVE OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS. IT WAS MORE
LIKELY THAT THEY WOULD PAUSE TO "DIGEST" SREBRENICA AND
"BEHAVE" FOR A WHILE IN ORDER TO MITIGATE THE
INTERNATIONAL REACTION. (OMAND NOTED THERE WERESOME
SIGNS OF THIS; THE BOSNIAN SERBS WERE AT THE MOMENT
BEING MORE COOPERATIVE ON SARAJEVO CONVOYS.)
s.LJ OMAND SAID THAT THERE WAS NO SUPPORT IN HMG FOR
PULiiNG OUT OF GORAZDE, BUT EQUALLY MOD SAW NO POINT IN
EINFORCING THE ENCLAVE. (OAK DEN SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD US
THAT THE POLITICAL LEVEL HAD NOT MADE ANY DECISION YET
ON THE ISSUE OF REINFORCEMENT OF GORAZDE.) THE BRITISH
TROOPS WERE NOT THERE TO FIGHT. HE THOUGHT IT STILL
UNCLEAR WHETHER THE BOSNIAN SERBS WOULD MOVE ON GORAZDE;
SURELY THEY RECKONED THEY WOULD BE IN FOR A FIGHT, THE
ASSUMPTION BEING THAT BOSNIAN FORCES, WHO WERE FAR MORE
NUMEROUS THAN THEY HAD BEEN IN SREBRENICA, WOULD STAND
RATHER THAN FLEE. EVENTUALLY, HOWEVER, THE BOSNIAN
SERBS COULD TAKE GORAZDE. WHEN ASKED HOW HMG WOULD
�~L
REACT IF GORAZDE WERE ATTACKED, OMAND COUNTERED THAT
THIS WAS A HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION THAT COULD ONLY BE
DECIDED AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL. HIS ASSUMPTION,
HOWEVER, WAS THAT BRITISH TROOPS WOULD BE TOLD TO DEFEND
THEIR POSITIONS AS BEST THEY COULD UNTIL IT BECAME CLEAR
THAT THE TOWN WAS LOST, FOLLOWING WHICH THEY WOULD ACT
MIJCH AS THE DUTCH HAD IN SREBRENICA, FOCUSING ON HELPING
REFUGEES.
7 jPl'THE
BRITISH HAVE BEEN TALKING TO THE FRENCH FOR
SOME TIME ABOUT SECURING OVERLAND ACCESS TO SARAJEVO, .
AND THEY REGARD THIS AS A MUCH MORE FEASIBLE MILITARY
OPERATION THAN REINFORCING THE EASTERN ENCLAVES.
CHARLTON SAID THAT THE MORE LOGICAL ROUTE WAS OVER MT .
. IGMAN; ALTHOUGH THE ROAD WAS POOR AND VULNERABLE TO
BOSNIAN SERB ARTILLERY, IT RAN THROUGH GOB-HELD
TERRITORY. TRYING TO PUSH THROUGH FROM KISLEYAK WOULD
BE CONSIDERABLY MORE DIFFICULT, IN THAT IT WOULD INVOLVE
CROSSING A LARGE EXPANSE OF BOSNIAN SERB TERRITORY.
CHARLTON THOUGHT THAT OPENING UP AN OVERLAND ROUTE TO
SARAJEVO WAS CRUCIAL IF THE VIABILITY OF THE CITY WAS TO
BE RESTORED. OMAND REITERATED HIS PREVIOUS INFORMATION
TO US THAT GENERAL SMITH HAS AUTHORITY FROM HMG TO MOVE
TO SECURE ACCESS TO SARAJEVO WHENEVER HE IS READY, USING
EITHER ROUTE. HOWEVER, SMITH'S VIEW IS THAT NOW (I.E.
THE NEXT FEW DAYS) IS NOT THE BEST TIME TO DO THIS,
SINCE AT PRESENT THE BOSNIAN SERBS ARE BEING MORE
HELPFUL IN ALLOWING CONVOYS THROUGH TO THE CITY.
MOREOVER, SMITH NEEDS THE RRF TO BOLSTER UNPROFOR
POSITIONS ELSEWHERE.
FRANCO-BRITISH
DIFFERENCES
8. JZf CHARLTON SOUGHT TO DOWNPLAY ANY PERCEPTION OF
t1BSTANTIVE DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN PARIS AND LONDON OVER
BOSNIA. ANY DIFFERENCES THERE MIGHT BE WERE MATTERS OF
STYLE RATHER THAN POLICY. IT WAS NOT THE BRITISH
CUSTOM, HE NOTED, TO LAUNCH INITIATIVES WITHOUT
CAREFULLY THINKING THROUGH WHETHER THEY WERE FEASIBLE.
NOR WAS LONDON IN THE HABIT OF GOING AROUND THREATENING
TO WITHDRAW BRITISH TROOPS. THIS SAID, CHARLTON
ACKNOWLEDGED A FAIR DEGREE OF IRRITATION IN LONDON OVER
PRECIPITATE FRENCH RHETORIC, WHICH HE HOPED COULD BE
SMOOTHED OUT IN TODAY'S PHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN MAJOR
AND CHIRAC. SOMEWHAT IN CONTRAST, OMAND AND OAKDEN
ACKNOWLEDGED DIFFERENCES, WITH BOTH EXPRESSING CONCERN
OVER FRENCH PRESSURE FOR SOME MILITARY ACTION SUCH AS
DRAWING A LINE IN THE SAND AT GORAZDE. OAKDEN NOTED
THAT THIS WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO TURNING UNPROFOR INTO A
PEACEMAKING OPERATION.
SUPPORT FOR CONTINUED UNPROFOR PRESENCE
�I
,
I
I
I
I
CQPJFlDEi\J HAL
9. (U) MEANWHILE, THE PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN
SECRETARY HAVE PUBLICLY REITERATED THEIR COMMITMENT
KEEP BRITISH TROOPS IN BOSNIA UNLESS CONDITIONS
DETERIORATE SIGNIFICANTLY FURTHER. SPEAKING TO THE
HOUSE OF COMMONS JULY 13, MAJOR SAID:
TO
i
I
-- "IF UNPROFOR WITHDREW WE WOULD CERTINL Y PUT AT
RISK THE PEACE WHICH REMAINS IN CENTRAL BOSNIA, NOT
LEAST BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF BRITISH TROOPS.
WE MIGHT PUT AT RISK THE HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF
LIVES THAT HAVE BEEN SAVED AS A RESULT OF THE
PRESENCE OF UN TROOPS."
)
I
-- "ONE OF THE PRIMARY REASONS WHY I FELT IT RIGHT
TO SEND BRITISH TROOPS THERE IN THE FIRST PLACE AND
WHY I WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO REMOVE THEM UNLESS IT
BECAME IMPERATIVE TO DO SO, IS THE DANGER OF A
WIDER BALKANS WAR. I CONCEDE THE SITUATION IS
SERIOUS AND I HAVE SAID TO THIS HOUSE BEFORE THAT
CIRCUMSTANCES COULD ARISE IN WHICH IT WOULD BE
IMPOSSIBLE FOR UN TROOPS TO REMAIN."
-- "BUT UNTIL AND UNLESS THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES ARISE,
I BELIEVE IT IS RIGHT FOR THEM TO DO SO AND TO
CONTRIBUTE TO PEACEKEEPING IN THE WAY THEY HAVE
THUS FAR."
10. (U) SEPARATELY, FOREIGN SECRETARY RIFKIND TOLD THE
PRESS THAT BRITISH TROOPS WOULD REMAIN IN BOSNIA IF IT
WAS FELT THAT THEY COULD STILL CARRY OUT THE UNPROFOR
MANDATE WITHOUT UNACCEPTABLE RISK. HE POINTED OUT THAT
THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE BOSNIAN MUSLIM POPULATION IS
LOCATED IN CENTRAL BOSNIA, WHERE BRITISH AND OTHER
TROOPS CONTINUED TO CARRY OUT THEIR MISSION SUCCESSFULLY.
11,.;erBOTH
OMAND AND CHARLTON CONFIRMED TO US THAT THE
G'fNERAL MOOD AMONG MINISTERS WAS STILL IN FAVOR OF
.
STAYING IN BOSNIA.
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Piscnggj-QP Paper
Elements o f a Post-UNPROFOR S t r a t e g y ;
Support t h e F e d e r a t i o n ; C o n t a i n t h e C o n f l i c t
Overvj.evf
At t h e May 23 P r i n c i p a l s Committee m e e t i n g t h e r e was a
g e n e r a l consensus t h a t U.S. p o l i c y f o l l o w i n g UNPROFOR
w i t h d r a w a l would be t o seek m u l t i l a t e r a l l i f t o f t h e arms
embargo, l i m i t e d s u p p o r t f o r arming and t r a i n i n g t h e Bosnian
Army, b u t no commitment t o a i r s t r i k e s . P r i n c i p a l s a l s o agreed
t h a t U.S. s e c u r i t y a s s i s t a n c e s h o u l d be l a r g e l y l i m i t e d t o t h e
p r o v i s i o n o f f i n a n c i n g f o r Bosnian arms purchases f r o m o t h e r
s u p p l i e r s and t h a t t r a i n i n g s h o u l d be conducted by a t h i r d
p a r t y , i f p o s s i b l e . There was a l s o agreement t h a t such
p o l i c i e s would have t o be accompanied by enhanced e f f o r t s t o
c o n t a i n t h e f i g h t i n g w i t h i n c u r r e n t bounds, i n c l u d i n g
m a i n t a i n i n g , and p o s s i b l y r e i n f o r c i n g , peacekeepers i n
Macedonia.
P r i n c i p a l s agreed t h a t a l l t h e s e elements o f a p o s s i b l e
post-UNPROFOR s t r a t e g y need f u r t h e r a n a l y s i s , as do s e v e r a l
o t h e r q u e s t i o n s i n c l u d i n g : What r e l i e f and o t h e r m i l i t a r y
o p e r a t i o n s c o u l d o r s h o u l d remain i n p l a c e ? How would we work
w i t h A l l i e s and f r i e n d s t o c o n t a i n t h e f i g h t i n g ? What are
Russia's l i k e l y responses t o our e f f o r t s t o l i f t t h e arms
embargo and b o l s t e r t h e s e c u r i t y o f Bosnia-Herzegovina?
Political/Military
Goals
Our p r i n c i p a l g o a l s f o l l o w i n g UNPROFOR's p a r t i a l o r
complete w i t h d r a w a l would be t o :
P r e s e r v e ' t h e s o v e r e i g n t y o f t h e GOBH over as much o f i t s
t e r r i t o r y as p o s s i b l e ;
We c o u l d c o n t i n u e t o r e c o g n i z e t h e b o r d e r s o f t h e
R e p u b l i c o f Bosnia-Herzegovina as o f 1992 and n o t
accept t h e t e r r i t o r i a l s t a t u s quo c r e a t e d by Serb
m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s and e t h n i c c l e a n s i n g , j u s t as we
d i d w i t h S o v i e t conquest o f t h e B a l t i c s i n t h e 1940s.
•
M a i n t a i n t h e Bosniac-Croat F e d e r a t i o n and good
between Zagreb and S a r a j e v o ;
relations
Whether t h e s e a l l i a n c e s o f convenience can endure
remains t o be seen. The F e d e r a t i o n o f f e r s t h e b e s t
p r o s p e c t f o r d e v e l o p i n g a c o u n t e r w e i g h t t o extreme
n a t i o n a l i s m and Serbian r e g i o n a l hegemony. M a i n t a i n i n g
some common sense o f purpose between Zagreb and
Sarajevo i s t h e b e s t way t o s a f e g u a r d t h e GOBH from a
Serb-Croat grand b a r g a i n t h a t c o u l d l e a v e Bosnia a
Balkan P a l e s t i n e i n t h e m i d d l e o f G r e a t e r S e r b i a and
Greater C r o a t i a .
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Croatian support would be e s s e n t i a l t o success o f
e f f o r t s t o arm and t r a i n the Bosnian Army, i f only t o
ensure t r a n s i t o f equipment. But Zagreb would surely
want some s i m i l a r s e c u r i t y assistance and closer t i e s
t o NATO (through PFP) and the EU.
Prevent a widening of the c o n f l i c t and b o l s t e r r e g i o n a l
stability;
This remains our abiding s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t . We must
prevent the c o n f l i c t from widening i n t o a general
Balkan War t h a t could engage two NATO a l l i e s (with very
d i f f e r e n t agenda), threaten the s t a b i l i t y of f r a g i l e
new democracies i n the region, and increase the r i s k s
of deeper U.S. engagement.
Deter f u r t h e r aggression by Belgrade, while keeping a l i n e
open t o Milosevic and h i s successors.
Threats t o Kosovo, Macedonia, and other neighbors would
have t o be deterred, but moderation of Serb p o l i c i e s i s
the long-term goal.
gegerai Elemeotg of the strategy
Security Assistance
We would seek support o f a l l NATO a l l i e s , PFP Partners, and
moderate Islamic states f o r a s e c u r i t y assistance package f o r
the GOBH. But we should be prepared t o proceed w i t h a
c o a l i t i o n of the w i l l i n g .
A l l i e s would balk at supporting l i f t f o r fear t h a t i t would
prolong the war and exacerbate the r i s k s o f i t s widening. We
would need t o convince them t h a t we only want t o give the GOBH
a chance t o survive and be able t o negotiate a v i a b l e
settlement. A convincing containment s t r a t e g y would also be
e s s e n t i a l t o e n l i s t i n g t h e i r support.
Security assistance t o Bosnian government would be designed
t o give i t s u f f i c i e n t m i l i t a r y capacity t o defend the t e r r i t o r y
s t i l l under i t s c o n t r o l and enhance i t s a b i l i t y t o regain, by
force o r at the n e g o t i a t i n g t a b l e , t e r r i t o r y now c o n t r o l l e d by
the BSA. The magnitude o f assistance could range from what
would be required t o defend the status quo, t o a more robust
package t h a t would allow i t t o make s t r a t e g i c gains, t o an
extensive reequipping t h a t would allow i t t o r e e s t a b l i s h i t s
c o n t r o l over t e r r i t o r y a l l o t t e d i t under the Contact Group
Plan. C l e a r l y cost w i l l be a major f a c t o r here, and past
estimates o f the robust package have exceeded $1 b i l l i o n .
We and the GOBH would have t o balance various goals w i t h
the r i s k s of t r i g g e r i n g engagement o f superior Yugoslav Army
(VJ) and K r a j i n a Serb Army (KSA) forces i n the f i g h t i n g i n ways
t h a t could only be countered by d i r e c t U.S. and/or A l l i e d
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-3m i l i t a r y support. A l l but t h e f i r s t o p t i o n r i s k b r i n g i n g other
Serb f o r c e s t o Pale's defense.
Bosnian/Croat Harmony
Sarajevo has few a l t e r n a t i v e s o t h e r t h a n a l l i a n c e w i t h
Zagreb. Zagreb, on t h e o t h e r hand, may need a d d i t i o n a l
i n c e n t i v e s s t a y w i t h t h e program. We and o t h e r A l l i e s might
o f f e r Zagreb c e r t a i n rewards f o r c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h Sarajevo such
as a d d i t i o n a l t e c h n i c a l and m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e , deeper
b i l a t e r a l economic and p o l i t i c a l t i e s , and membership i n PFP.
Dealing With
Serbia
D e t e r r i n g f u r t h e r Serb a g g r e s s i o n would l i k e l y r e q u i r e
r e i n f o r c i n g t h e "Christmas warning" t o M i l o s e v i c about
responding t o S e r b - t r i g g e r e d v i o l e n c e i n Kosovo, and adding
t h r e a t s t o take u n s p e c i f i e d m i l i t a r y a c t i o n s against Serbia i f
i t e s c a l a t e s i t s support t o t h e Bosnian Serbs o r i n t i m i d a t e s
Macedonia o r o t h e r n e i g h b o r s .
F o r g i n g a n t i - M i l o s e v i c c o a l i t i o n c o u l d cause d i v i s i o n s
w i t h i n t h e A l l i a n c e and t h e EU and r e i n f o r c e Serb n a t i o n a l i s m
u n l e s s we make i t c l e a r o u r e f f o r t s a r e n o t d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t
S e r b i a p r o p e r b u t a t t h e a g g r e s s i v e n a t i o n a l i s m sponsored by
t h e c u r r e n t government. A t t h e same t i m e , we c o u l d t a k e steps
t o s u p p o r t o p p o s i t i o n p o l i t i c a l groups i n S e r b i a who f a v o r more
moderate r e g i o n a l p o l i c i e s . We c o u l d c o n t i n u e t o h o l d o u t t o
M i l o s e v i c t h e promise o f f u r t h e r i n t e g r a t i o n i f he r e a l l y
breaks w i t h Pale and r e s p e c t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l norms.
Regional
Our
Containment
r e g i o n a l containment
e f f o r t s might i n c l u d e :
R e t a i n some r e s i d u a l UNPROFOR o r o t h e r peacekeeping
presence i n t h e F e d e r a t i o n t e r r i t o r y t o m a i n t a i n
Bosniac-Croat harmony.
•
R e t a i n a r o b u s t UNCRO t o p r e v e n t a re-eruption o f t h e
Serb-Croat war and l i m i t KSA support t h e BSA.
KSA support was i n s t r u m e n t a l i n t h e BSA's a b i l i t y
t o beat back t h e Bosnian V Corps o f f e n s i v e i n Bihac
d u r i n g t h e f a l l o f 1994.
—
•
There i s i n t e l l i g e n c e s u g g e s t i n g t h a t i f t h e KSA
were d r i v e n o u t o f UN Sectors N o r t h and South by
t h e C r o a t i a n Army, t h e y would move i n t o t h e
Posavina c o r r i d o r and support BSA o p e r a t i o n s
a g a i n s t t h e Gorazde p o c k e t .
M a i n t a i n and p o s s i b l y augment UNPREDEP i n Macedonia t o h e l p
s t a b i l i z e t h a t c o u n t r y and d e t e r a Serb crackdown i n
Kosovo. I n t h e c o n t e x t o f arming t h e Bosnians, we would
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-4have t o be c a r e f u l n o t t o g i v e Kosovar A l b a n i a n s t h e sense
t h a t U.S. o r A l l i e d f o r c e s would come t o t h e a i d o f an
armed u p r i s i n g a g a i n s t Serb a u t h o r i t i e s .
Deploy some o t h e r b o r d e r m o n i t o r i n g f o r c e s l i k e UNPREDEP i n
Hungary and A l b a n i a . This and o t h e r a c t i o n s t o p r e v e n t
s p i l l o v e r c o u l d be o r g a n i z e d by NATO t h r o u g h PFP.
R e i n f o r c e s t a b i l i t y a l o n g t h e p e r i p h e r y by r e d i r e c t i n g
resources c u r r e n t l y used f o r peacekeeping and h u m a n i t a r i a n
a s s i s t a n c e t o promote economic development and c o o p e r a t i o n
among t h e f r o n t - l i n e Balkan s t a t e s .
E f f o r t s g r i p r tQ Withdraw?!
To be e f f e c t i v e , elements o f t h i s s t r a t e g y would need t o be
i n p l a c e w e l l b e f o r e e x t r a c t i o n o f UNPROFOR a c t u a l l y b e g i n s .
The m i l i t a r y imbalance i s such t h a t t h e BSA c o u l d r e a d i l y p u t
p r e s s u r e on t h e enclaves and Sarajevo b e f o r e and d u r i n g
UNPROFOR w i t h d r a w a l . A l s o , as t h e SNIE 95-7 notes, t h e Bosnian
government would be l i k e l y t o s t r o n g l y r e s i s t a p a r t i a l o r
complete w i t h d r a w a l o f UNPROFOR unless t h e U.S. o r NATO commits
t o m i l i t a r y s u p p o r t . T h i s commitment would j u s t as s u r e l y
t r i g g e r BSA a c t i o n s t o p r e c l u d e complete w i t h d r a w a l .
We would need t o b u i l d consensus among t h e A l l i e s and o t h e r
p o t e n t i a l p a r t n e r s and secure a t l e a s t Russian acquiescence
f o r t h e main goals o f t h i s approach.
To g i v e t h e GOBH f o r c e s a chance, we would need t o e x p l o r e
ways t o h e l p t h e Bosnians "creep o u t " o f t h e r e s t r i c t i o n s
of- t h e arms embargo. T h i s might i n c l u d e :
P r o v i d i n g some i n t e l l i g e n c e s u p p o r t t o GOBH t o enhance
t h e i r a b i l i t y t o o r g a n i z e defenses a g a i n s t BSA
a c t i o n s . For example, we might s t a r t p r o v i d i n g t h e
GOBH w i t h data from t h e P r e d a t o r UAV f l i g h t s and o t h e r
sources.
Programs t h a t Gen. Sewell has broached w i t h t h e
F e d e r a t i o n f o r r e a r area o p e r a t i o n s , NCO t r a i n i n g , e t c .
Developing m i l i t a r y - t o - m i l i t a r y c o n t a c t s between t h e
GOBH and t h i r d c o u n t r i e s ( C r o a t i a , Turkey, o r
n o n - f r o n t - l i n e CE s t a t e s such as Poland o r t h e Czech
R e p u b l i c ) , t h a t would enable r a p i d l a u n c h i n g o f t h e
e n v i s i o n e d t r a i n i n g programs.
Reconsider t h e o p t i o n o f a l l o w i n g UNPROFOR u n i t s , on a
n a t i o n a l b a s i s , t o t u r n t h e i r equipment o v e r t h e GOBH
upon w i t h d r a w a l . I n t h i s way t h e Bosnian Army c o u l d
a l s o p r o v i d e some p r o t e c t i o n t o t h e e v a c u a t i o n f o r c e .
Our assumption has been t h a t t h i s would t r i g g e r h o s t i l e
Serb a c t i o n a g a i n s t these f o r c e s , b u t i f t h e e x t r a c t i o n
environment i s h o s t i l e i n any event t h i s may n o t be so
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-5L i f t i n g Qpt4png
Multilateral
We would c a l l f o r an end o f t h e arms embargo because i t s
c o n t i n u a t i o n i n t h e absence o f a peacekeeping f o r c e o r o t h e r
UNSC a c t i o n t o p r e s e r v e t h e peace would deny Bosnia-Herzegovina
i t s r i g h t t o s e l f - d e f e n s e under A r t i c l e 51 o f t h e UN C h a r t e r .
I t would seem d i f f i c u l t f o r Russia o r o t h e r s t a t e s t o j u s t i f y
c o n t i n u a t i o n o f t h e arms embargo i n t h i s c o n t e x t .
Indeed,
Russian Rep C h u r k i n proposed l i f t i n g t h e arms embargo l a s t year
as p a r t o f t h e Contact Group's package o f i n c e n t i v e s and
d i s i n c e n t i v e s i f Bosnia accepted t h e CG p l a n and t h e Serbs d i d
not.
S t i l l , one c o u l d expect Russia and even some NATO a l l i e s
t o argue t h a t l i f t i n g t h e embargo would o n l y e s c a l a t e t h e
v i o l e n c e w i t h o u t a l t e r i n g t h e outcome f u n d a m e n t a l l y and r u n t h e
r i s k o f w i d e n i n g o f t h e c o n f l i c t . A l l i e s would a l s o be wary o f
l i f t because o f t h e i n e v i t a b l e p r e s s u r e s t o p r o v i d e m i l i t a r y
a s s i s t a n c e t o t h e Bosnian government.
NATO/Coalition
I f Russia o r some a n o t h e r UNSC member (China) appeared t o
be t h e p r i n c i p a l o b s t a c l e t o m u l t i l a t e r a l l i f t , we might press
f o r a N A T O / c o a l i t i o n a c t i o n t o achieve t h e d e s i r e d g o a l . Our
argument would h i n g e on r i g h t s t o s e l f - d e f e n s e under A r t i c l e 51
o f t h e UN C h a r t e r . However, absent a UNSC a c t i o n t o remove t h e
embargo, we would s t i l l be v u l n e r a b l e t o t h e c r i t i c i s m s we have
l e v e l e d a t proponents o f u n i l a t e r a l l i f t and r i s k l o o s i n g
s u p p o r t f o r compliance w i t h o t h e r UN-mandated s a n c t i o n s regimes.
L i f t Only
" L i f t and p r a y " would seem t o be a c o m p l e t e l y i n d e f e n s i b l e
s t r a t e g y b o t h a t home and abroad. Even t h e most i s o l a t i o n i s t
Republicans a r e n o t a d v o c a t i n g t h i s approach. While t h i s would
end t h e stigma o f s u p p o r t i n g UNPROFOR, i t would c r e a t e t h e
i m p r e s s i o n t h a t we had d e c i d e d t o l e a v e t h e Bosnian government
t o f e n d f o r i t s e l f on t h e b l a c k market o r r e l y on I s l a m i c
states.
,
The GOBH m i g h t w e l l r e s i s t w i t h d r a w a l i n t h i s c o n t e x t .
Indeed, t h e o n l y advantage o f t h i s approach would seem t o be
t h a t i t would decrease t h e BSA's i n c e n t i v e t o c o m p l i c a t e o r
r e s i s t w i t h d r a w a l . However, t h e BSA would know t h a t t h e GOBH
would r e c e i v e arms from I s l a m i c and o t h e r c o u n t r i e s , even i f
the U.S. and Europe had made no commitments.
T h i s outcome
would p u t p r e s s u r e on t h e F e d e r a t i o n and would r i s k t h e ensuing
c o n f l i c t from becoming a c l a s h between Muslims and C h r i s t i a n s .
Arming and T r a i n i n g
On t h e f a c e o f i t , arming and t r a i n i n g by " t h i r d c o u n t r i e s "
has a number o f b e n e f i t s .
I t would l i m i t t h e e x t e n t o f U.S.
engagement, making i t e a s i e r t o a v o i d t h e " A m e r i c a n i z a t i o n " o f
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-6the post-withdrawal c o n f l i c t . In t u r n , t h i s could help prevent
the s t r u g g l e from becoming a surrogate c o n f l i c t between
Russian-backed Serbs and the U.S.-backed GOBH.
I d e n t i f y i n g l i k e l y " t h i r d c o u n t r i e s " i s more problematic.
As f o r arming, many West European governments might be
r e l u c t a n t t o f u e l the c o n f l i c t due t o fears o f widening. Some
f r o n t l i n e Central European governments might have s i m i l a r
fears, and e n l i s t i n g them i n such an e n t e r p r i s e would run
contrary t o our e f f o r t s t o continue the d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n o f
these s o c i e t i e s . This leaves Turkey, I r a n , and/or other
Islamic c o u n t r i e s , a l l o f whom have l o t s o f capacity and high
m o t i v a t i o n . But i f these states get involved, modulating the
flow w i l l become more complicated, not t o mention the
p o l a r i z i n g impact of making t h i s a clash between Islam and
Christianity.
As f o r t r a i n i n g , i f the Bosniac/Croat Federation holds,
Croatia would o f f e r s p r o x i m i t y , high m o t i v a t i o n , and an
eagerness t o cooperate w i t h NATO. The downside r i s k s are t h a t
e n l i s t i n g Croatia so f r o n t a l l y i n the c o n f l i c t against the
Bosnian Serbs would r i s k reopening the Serb-Croat c o n f l i c t i n a
bigger way.
C l e a r l y , Croatia's cooperation would be e s s e n t i a l
to any arming and t r a i n i n g package f o r Bosnia. However, i t s
use as a t r a n s i t and staging area are d i f f e r e n t than i t s use as
the t r a i n i n g ground and launch pad f o r o f f e n s i v e operations
against Serbs.
Robust L i f t and S t r i k e
Here the assessment i s i n many ways unchanged from the
e a r l y days o f the war i n 1992.
L i f t i n g the arms embargo and
beginning some arming and t r a i n i n g o f the GOBH forces w i l l take
time. During t h a t time they would be very vulnerable t o BSA
m i l i t a r y a c t i o n s . The most e f f e c t i v e way t o m i t i g a t e t h i s
would be t o conduct supporting a i r s t r i k e s against BSA heavy
weapons, m i l i t a r y f a c i l i t i e s , and operations. I f l i a i s o n w i t h
the Bosnian Army was established, i t might be possible t o use
Bosnian forces as forward a i r c o n t r o l l e r s and t a r g e t
designators. At a minimum, we could argua t h a t NATO's August
1993 decisions t o undertake a i r s t r i k e s t o prevent the
s t r a n g u l a t i o n o f Sarajevo and other safe areas remain v a l i d .
An even more robust option, would be designed t o l i m i t VJ
involvement by t h r e a t e n i n g t o t a r g e t VJ m i l i t a r y i n s t a l l a t i o n s
i n the FRY and the Drina River Bridges and other t r a n s i t points
between the FRY and Bosnia i f m i l i t a r y support continues.
This would give the GOBH the best chance f o r s u r v i v a l , but
i t has several s i g n i f i c a n t r i s k s . Such strong a c t i o n against
the Serbs might t r i g g e r more d i r e c t Russian support. I t could
also spark an u p r i s i n g i n Kosovo or Vodjvodina provinces t h a t
could t r i g g e r the wider war we seek t o avoid.
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s t r i t e , Np L i f t
T h i s o p t i o n , a l s o c o n s i d e r e d i n l a t e 1992, i s g a i n i n g
s u p p o r t e r s o u t s i d e government once a g a i n f o r d i f f e r e n t
reasons. T h i s approach would seek t o " l e v e l t h e p l a y i n g f i e l d "
by t a r g e t i n g BSA heavy weapons and o t h e r m i l i t a r y t a r g e t s .
Once UNPROFOR was o u t , i t c o u l d be accomplished w i t h o u t f e a r o f
hostage t a k i n g . Forward a i r c o n t r o l l e r s would be r e q u i r e d , b u t
i t m i g h t be p o s s i b l e t o t r a i n Bosnian government f o r c e s t o
p e r f o r m t h a t f u n c t i o n f o r NATO f o r c e s . Most m i l i t a r y
assessments have concluded t h a t a i r s t r i k e s a l o n e would be
i n s u f f i c i e n t t o save t h e enclaves and break a s i e g e o f
S a r a j e v o . However, a i r s t r i k e s m i g h t be s u c c e s s f u l i n
a c h i e v i n g o t h e r , l e s s demanding g o a l s a t t h e n e g o t i a t i n g t a b l e .
Ruroanitarian R e l i e f : Over t o t h e Bosnians
PRM's paper e x p l a i n s i n g r e a t d e t a i l how t h e w i t h d r a w a l o f
UNPROFOR would d i s r u p t r e l i e f e f f o r t s by i n t e r n a t i o n a l
o r g a n i z a t i o n s . However, we need t o e x p l o r e t h e f e a s i b i l i t y o f
t u r n i n g over management and d e l i v e r y o f r e l i e f e f f o r t s t o t h e
Bosnian government.
Our p r o v i s i o n o f s e c u r i t y a s s i s t a n c e might
f r e e r e s o u r c e s and p e r s o n n e l f o r such e f f o r t s and t h e Bosnians
c o u l d o p e r a t e w i t h o u t c u r r e n t r e s t r i c t i o n s on UN and
i n t e r n a t i o n a l a g e n c i e s . A l s o , i f we can h o l d t h e F e d e r a t i o n
t o g e t h e r , t h e s e r e g i o n s and C r o a t i a c o u l d remain secure s u p p l y
bases.
Assessing/Managing t h e Russian R e a c t i o n
I n Moscow's f r a c t i o u s p o l i t i c a l environment, an expanded
U.S.-NATO r o l e i n Bosnia would appear a t f i r s t g l a n c e t o be a
t e m p t i n g t a r g e t e i t h e r f o r Y e l t s i n ' s opponents o r f o r Y e l t s i n
h i m s e l f and o t h e r s eager t o p o s t u r e i n defense o f Russian
n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s i n t h e r u n up t o p a r l i a m e n t a r y and
p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n s . While some s u p p o r t t o t h e Serbs and
p o i n t e d c r i t i c i s m o f U.S. moves would be i n e v i t a b l e , t h e
o v e r a l l impact on e l i t e and p o p u l a r s e n t i m e n t may be more
manageable and l e s s e x p l o s i v e t h a n g e n e r a l l y p r e d i c t e d .
How
S t r o n g i s Pan-Slavism? .
U.S. and Russian p o l l i n g d a t a r o u t i n e l y h i g h l i g h t t h e
absence o f any s i g n i f i c a n t p o p u l a r Russian s u p p o r t f o r S e r b i a
o r i t s agenda i n t h e Balkans. D e s p i t e c o n s t a n t Russian (and
Western) a s s e r t i o n s t o t h e c o n t r a r y , t h e Russian view o f S e r b i a
corresponds r o u g h l y w i t h a t t i t u d e s t o w a r d Poland o r Turkey
( i . e . , t h e s e s t a t e s a r e seen as m i l d l y f r i e n d l y t o Russia a t
b e s t ) . L i k e most f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s s u e s , events i n a
post-UNPROFOR Bosnia would r e s o n a t e f a i n t l y w i t h a Russian
e l e c t o r a t e p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h day-to-day socioeconomic concerns.
P o l i t i c i a n s from across t h e p o l i t i c a l spectrum would f i n d i t
d i f f i c u l t t o rouse average Russians o u t o f t h e i r i n d i f f e r e n c e
or t o s t i r up s e r i o u s o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e Y e l t s i n government f o r
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-8Moscow has been a c t i v e l y w o r k i n g t o r e t a i n and expand i t s
p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e i n t h e Balkans ( i n c l u d i n g w i t h Greece) and
c l e a r l y does n o t -want t o be m a r g i n a l i z e d by Western d e c i s i o n s
on Bosnia. B u t a c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h t h e West over e f f o r t s t o
save t h e rump Bosnia would n o t n e c e s s a r i l y advance t h o s e
i n t e r e s t s . Moreover, such an stance would a l s o be p e r c e i v e d as
a n t i - M u s l i m and t h e r e f o r e do damage t o Moscow's warming
r e l a t i o n s w i t h I r a n and o t h e r I s l a m i c s t a t e s .
Russia's s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s i n t h e Balkans, d e s p i t e
Z h i r i n o v s k y ' s r h e t o r i c , a r e f a r from e v i d e n t t o t h e average
Russian. Given t h e l i n g e r i n g o u t r a g e o v e r t h e war i n Chechnya
— much c l o s e r t o home — Moscow would have a h a r d t i m e
j u s t i f y i n g d i r e c t m i l i t a r y i n v o l v e m e n t i n S e r b i a , even
a d v i s o r s / t r a i n e r s , t o t h e Russian p u b l i c .
The Duma has gone on r e c o r d as f a v o r i n g m i l i t a r y s u p p o r t t o
the Serbs i f t h e arms embargo on Bosnia i s l i f t e d .
B u t Russian
arms s a l e s now g e n e r a l l y o p e r a t e on a cash b a s i s . I t i s n o t
c l e a r t h a t Russia has e i t h e r t h e r e s o u r c e s o r t h e p o l i t i c a l
m o t i v a t i o n t o p r o v i d e s i g n i f i c a n t amounts o f m i l i t a r y
a s s i s t a n c e on c r e d i t t o a b a n k r u p t S e r b i a . The p o s s i b i l i t y o f
n o n - o f f i c i a l Russian s u p p o r t t o t h e Serbs, i n t h e form o f
v o l u n t e e r s and arms, i s a r e a l p o s s i b i l i t y , b u t t h e magnitude
of such s u p p o r t seems u n l i k e l y t o be d e c i s i v e .
Managing Russian E l i t e P e r c e p t i o n s
To be sure, t h e Moscow-based e l i t e i s l i k e l y t o b r i s t l e a t
a more muscular U.S.-NATO p o s t u r e i n Bosnia. A l t h o u g h most
f o r e i g n p o l i c y c i r c l e s have embraced g r e a t power r h e t o r i c and
b l u s t e r on many h i g h - p r o f i l e i s s u e s , t h e r e i s l i t t l e f i r e i n
the b e l l y l e f t f o r t h e Balkans. The e l i t e ' s Bosnia a n x i e t i e s
reached t h e i r h i g h - w a t e r mark more t h a n a year ago and were
sparked l a r g e l y by t h e A p r i l 1994 a i r s t r i k e s around S a r a j e v o .
T h i s g r o w i n g Bosnia f a t i g u e has a l s o been f e d by t h e a c t i o n s o f
the Bosnian Serbs on t h e ground and by Moscow's h i g h - p r o f i l e
d i p l o m a t i c f o r a y s — and f a i l u r e s — i n t h e r e g i o n , t h e Contact
Group, and t h e UNSC. Churkin's u n p r o d u c t i v e v i s i t and gloomy
assessment a r e a n o t h e r example o f t h i s f r u s t r a t i o n .
The steady downgrading o f Russian e f f o r t s i n t h e Balkans
a l s o i s l i n k e d i m p l i c i t l y t o t h e Russian e l i t e ' s g r o w i n g
p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h NATO expansion. While Y e l t s i n and Kozyrev
would s t i l l be t h e key p l a y e r s i n how t h e Russian i n t e r n a l
debate on post-UNPROFOR Bosnia develops, t h e y w i l l need a c l e a r
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e p o t e n t i a l c o s t s o f opposing i n t e r n a t i o n a l
consensus on t h i s i s s u e . Given t h e Russian l e a d e r s h i p ' s
o v e r r i d i n g s t a k e i n t r y i n g t o h o l d t h e l i n e on NATO expansion
and r e p a i r i n g t h e damage caused by Chechnya, we can expect t h a t
Moscow w i l l be f a r l e s s i n c l i n e d t o f a n a new round o f c r i s i s
i n r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e U.S. and i t s A l l i e s over Bosnia.
S t i l l , i t w i l l be p a r t i c u l a r l y i m p o r t a n t f o r t h e U.S. t o
engage d i r e c t l y w i t h Russian o f f i c i a l s e a r l y and t r y t o
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-9i n f l u e n c e e l i t e opinion as our o v e r a l l d i r e c t i o n becomes
c l e a r e r . I n a d d i t i o n t o g i v i n g Russian o f f i c i a l s a sense o f
engagement i n the development of p o l i c y , we should also look a t
face-savers t h a t would make i t easier f o r Moscow t o abstain
from a UNSC vote on l i f t i n g the arms embargo. For example, we
could advance a UNSC r e s o l u t i o n t h a t would l i f t the arms
embargo on a l l the Yugoslav successor s t a t e s . This would have
l i t t l e p r a c t i c a l impact on Serbia's m i l i t a r y p o t e n t i a l .
S h i f t i n g Alignments
In the post-UNPROFOR environment, we would l i k e l y have t o
deal w i t h s h i f t i n g alignments among Contact Group members.
While Germany and the UK would probably be supportive o f
e f f o r t s t o i s o l a t e Serbia, one can imagine Russo-French
resistance t o t h i s tack and even c o l l u s i o n t o cut deals w i t h
Belgrade and Pale. The EU's Common Foreign and Security P o l i c y
would o f f e r countervaling pressures t h a t might l i m i t the depth
of such f i s s u r e s . But maintaining even the l i m i t e d degree o f
Western u n i t y we have today would be d i f f i c u l t as o l d biases
and d i f f e r i n g g e o p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s became more pronounced.
Drafted: S/P: SFlanagan
6/14/95, Revised 7/7/95, SPEUR 5169
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�Dublin CoreThe Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.TitleA name given to the resource<strong>Declassified Documents</strong>DescriptionAn account of the resourceThis collection of declassified records focus primarily on foreign affairs. These records were declassified and made available to the public through a <a href="http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/mandatory-declassification-review-requests">Mandatory Declassification Review</a> request.ProvenanceA statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.Clinton Presidential RecordsPublisherAn entity responsible for making the resource availableClinton Presidential Library & MuseumTextA resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.Dublin CoreThe Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.TitleA name given to the resourceDeclassified Documents concerning Genocide in the former YugoslaviaIdentifierAn unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context2012-0800-MDescriptionAn account of the resourceThis Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on genocide in the former Yugoslavia. Material includes an NSC discussion paper from July 1995 regarding a post-U.N. protection force strategy to contain the Balkan conflict.CreatorAn entity primarily responsible for making the resourceNational Security CouncilEuropean AffairsAlexander VershbowFormatThe file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resourceAdobe Acrobat DocumentMediumThe material or physical carrier of the resource.Reproduction-ReferenceIs Part OfA related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.<a href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7585499" target="_blank">National Archives Catalog Description</a>ProvenanceA statement of any changes in ownership and custody of the resource since its creation that are significant for its authenticity, integrity, and interpretation. The statement may include a description of any changes successive custodians made to the resource.Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office FilesPublisherAn entity responsible for making the resource availableWilliam J. Clinton Presidential Library & MuseumDate CreatedDate of creation of the resource.2/6/2015SourceA related resource from which the described resource is derived2012-0800-MBosniaDeclassifiedForeign PolicyGenocideSrebrenicaUnited Nations