The Suazo Córdova Administration

Suazo Córdova, a country doctor from La Paz, was a veteran of
Honduran political infighting, but he lacked the kind of experience that
might have prepared him for the internationalist role he would play as
president of the republic. His initial approach to the question of
Honduras's role in the growing regional crisis appeared to stress
coexistence rather than confrontation. This approach reflected
Honduras's historical passivity in regional and international affairs
and took into account the regional balance of power, which did not favor
Honduras. As a result, Suazo Córdova's inaugural speech stressed the
issues of self-determination and the administration's desire to remain
neutral in the face of regional upheaval.

In keeping with this conciliatory approach, on March 23, 1982,
Minister of Foreign Affairs Edgardo Paz Barnica proposed a peace plan to
the permanent council of the OAS. The plan was based on the following
six points: general disarmament in Central America, the reduction of
foreign military and other advisers (then a real point of contention
with the Nicaraguan government), international supervision of any final
agreement, an end to regional arms traffic, respect for delineated and
demarcated borders, and the establishment of a permanent multilateral
dialogue. The proposal met with little support from other Central
American states, particularly Nicaragua.

Gradually, the Suazo Córdova administration began to perceive the
FSLN (commonly referred to as Sandinista) administration as
obstructionist in regional and international forums, as well as a
subversive force that intended to undermine political stability in
Honduras through intimidation, propaganda, and direct aid to incipient
insurgent groups. The emergence of a consensus on this point within both
the Honduran administration and armed forces coincided with a
significant expansion of the United States role in Honduras, both as
policy adviser and as purveyor of military and economic aid.

Brigadier General Gustavo Álvarez Martínez, who assumed the
position of commander of the armed forces in January 1982 emerged as a hardliner against the
Sandinistas. Álvarez publicly declared Honduras "in a war to the
death" with Nicaragua; he believed such a war should be conducted
under the auspices of a triple alliance among Guatemala, El Salvador,
and Honduras. Some observers also believed that Álvarez had another
aspect to his anticommunist strategy, namely covert domestic
surveillance and extralegal executions. Álvarez's training in
Argentina, where such "dirty war" tactics were common in the
1970s, lent some credence to the charges of increased disappearances and
other less extreme forms of harassment against the Honduran left. Álvarez's
main rival for the post of armed forces commander, Colonel Leónidas
Torres Arias, the former head of military intelligence, had assumed an
attaché post in Buenos Aires, Argentina, after losing the struggle for
command. From Argentina, Torres proceeded to castigate Álvarez in the
media, charging that the general operated a personal death squad. The
Honduran Committee for the Defense of Human Rights appeared to confirm
Torres's charges to some degree by reporting an increase in the number
of political disappearances nationwide. According to foreign observers,
the total numbers in no way rivaled those registered in El Salvador or
Guatemala; the increase, however, was statistically significant for
previously tranquil Honduras.

Álvarez's strong-arm tactics drew criticism from some observers,
particularly the foreign press and international human rights groups. At
the same time, however, leftist subversive activity did expand in the
early 1980s. Much of this increase was attributed directly or indirectly
to Sandinista support for like-minded Honduran groups such as the PCH,
the Lorenzo Zelaya Popular Revolutionary Forces (Fuerzas Populares
Revolucionarias-Lorenzo Zelaya--FPR-LZ), and the Honduran Revolutionary
Party of Central American Workers (Partido Revolucionario de los
Trabajadores Centroamericanos de Honduras--PRTC-H). Beginning with minor
bombings, these groups eventually progressed to kidnappings and
hijackings. The most ambitious effort was
that launched by a platoon-sized unit of Nicaraguan-trained PRTC-H
members who crossed the border from Nicaragua into Olancho department in
September 1983. A rapid response by Honduran troops isolated the PRTC-H
column; twenty- three of the guerrillas surrendered, and another
twenty-six died in the mountains, many of starvation and exposure. A
similar incursion in 1984 also failed to strike a revolutionary spark
among the conservative Honduran peasantry.

The perception of a genuine leftist revolutionary threat to Honduran
stability enhanced Brigadier General Álvarez's power and heightened his
profile both in Honduras and the United States. The resultant appearance
of an imbalance of power between the military and the nascent civilian
government called into question the viability of Honduras's democratic
transition. Some observers saw in Álvarez a continuation in the long
series of military caudillos who had ruled the nation since
independence. A coup and reimposition of direct military rule appeared a
virtual certainty to those who doubted Honduras's affinity for any form
of democratic government. Others, however, pictured Álvarez more in the
mold of Argentina's Juan Perón--a military-based caudillo who
successfully made the transition to populist civilian politics. Like
most officers, Álvarez had ties to the PNH. Álvarez served as
president of the Association for the Progress of Honduras (Asociación
para el Progreso de Honduras--Aproh), a group made up mainly of
conservative businesspeople and PNH leaders. The initial goals of Aproh
were to attract foreign investment and to block the growth of
"popular organizations" (labor unions, campesino groups, and
other activist groups) such as those that supported the FMLN in El
Salvador. Aproh's acceptance of funding from the South Korea-based
Unification Church proved controversial and generated negative publicity
for both the organization and for Álvarez. The general's purportedly
popular following, moreover, was suspect. He seemed much more
comfortable and adept at high-level political maneuvering than at
grassroots organization. Eventually, even his support within the armed
forces proved to be inadequate to sustain his ambitions.

Although Álvarez had appeared ascendant by 1982, some observers
described the political situation in Honduras as a triumvirate:
Brigadier General Álvarez formulating national security policy and
refraining from a direct military takeover of the government; President
Suazo supporting Álvarez's policies in return for military tolerance of
his rule and military support for his domestic policies; and the United
States government providing the economic and military aid that helped
sustain the arrangement. Some disputed the claim that Suazo was
subservient to the military by pointing out the fact that the president
refused to increase the budget of the armed forces. That budget,
however, failed to take foreign military aid into account. The increase
in United States military aid from US$3.3 million in fiscal year (FY) 1980 to US$31.3 million in FY 1982, therefore, represented a
substantial expansion in the military's role in government.

Álvarez strongly supported United States policy in Central America.
He reportedly assisted in the initial formation of the Nicaraguan
Resistance (more commonly known as the Contras, short for contrarevolucionarios--counterrevolutionaries
in Spanish), arranged large-scale joint exercises with United States
forces, and agreed to allow the training of Salvadoran troops by United
States special forces at a facility near Puerto Castilla known as the
Regional Center for Military Training (Centro Regional de Entrenamiento
Militar--CREM). The latter action
eventually contributed greatly to Álvarez's ouster in early 1984.

The other major factor in the Álvarez ouster was the general's
attempt to streamline the command structure of the armed forces.
Traditionally, a collegial board made up of field-grade officers
consulted with the commander in the formulation of policy for the
Honduran armed forces. Álvarez proposed to eliminate this organization,
the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (Consejo Superior de las Fuerzas
Armadas--Consuffaa), and to replace it with a board of eight senior
officers. The reorganization would have concentrated and enhanced Álvarez's
power over the military by allowing him to name his most trusted
commanders to a leadership board that would rubber-stamp his policy
proposals. At the same time, the reorganization had promised to make the
armed forces function more efficiently, an important consideration if
hostilities broke out between Honduras and Nicaragua.

Alvarez's view on involvement in Nicaragua led directly to the 1984
rebellion by his officers. Most observers had expected Honduras to serve
as one staging area for a United States military intervention in
Nicaragua if such an operation took place. The flawed but successful
Operation Urgent Fury on the Caribbean island of Grenada in November
1983 had seemed to increase the likelihood of military action against
the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. Although Álvarez supported a
military solution to the "Nicaraguan problem," a significant
faction of the Honduran officer corps held divergent convictions. These
more nationalistic, more isolationist officers saw Álvarez as
subservient to the United States, giving up more in terms of sovereignty
than he received in aid. These officers also resented Álvarez's
posturing in the media and his apparent aspirations to national
leadership. On a more mundane level, certain officers also feared that
Álvarez would force them out after he had solidified his power base
within the officer corps. The prospect of early, involuntary retirement,
with its attendant loss of licit and illicit income, prompted a clique
of senior officers to move against Álvarez on March 31, 1984, seizing
him and dispatching him on a flight to Miami.

The ouster of Álvarez produced a number of repercussions both in
Honduran domestic politics and in Honduran-United States relations. The
armed forces, which had appeared to be moving in a more activist and
outward-looking direction under Álvarez, assumed a more isolationist
stance toward regional relations and United States policy initiatives.
Air Force Brigadier General Walter López Reyes, the new commander in
chief, demanded further increases in military aid in return for Honduran
cooperation in regional affairs. After some equivocation, López closed
the CREM. He also scaled back Honduran-United States military exercises.
On May 21, 1985, President Suazo Córdova and United States President
Ronald W. Reagan signed a joint communiqué that amended a 1982 annex to
the 1954 Military Assistance Agreement between the two countries.
Although the new accord allowed the United States to expand and improve
its temporary facilities at Palmerola Air Base near Comayagua, it
generally limited Honduran cooperation in comparison to the terms of the
1982 annex.

By 1984 the armed forces under López began to exert pressure on the
United States-backed Contra forces, the bulk of which operated from
bases in the southern departments of El Paraíso and Olancho. Honduran
foreign minister Edgardo Paz Barnica reflected the new attitude toward
the Contras in January 1985, when he announced that the government
planned to expel them from Honduras. Although that statement reflected
bravado and frustration more than reality, the Honduran military took
more active steps to pressure both the Contras and, indirectly, the
United States government. In February 1985, the armed forces ordered the
Contras to close a hospital that they had set up outside of Tegucigalpa.
The Hondurans also ordered the Contras to shut down an office that had
been used to receive official visitors, mainly from the United States.
Around the same time, Honduran troops turned back two United States
Department of State employees from a planned visit to a Contra training
camp; the troops told the Americans that they lacked a newly required
permit to enter the area.