SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INOPERABLE DUE TO BOTH AIRLOCK DOORS OPEN SIMULTANEOUSLY

"At 0107 CDT on October 23rd, 2014, both doors in one of the Secondary Containment airlocks were momentarily open concurrently. This occurred during vessel drain down following refueling activities, an Operation with the Potential to Drain the Reactor Vessel (OPDRV), which required Secondary Containment to be operable. The doors being open at the same time resulted in the momentary inoperability of Secondary Containment. One of the doors was immediately closed, and Secondary Containment was restored to an operable status.

"The station [Duane Arnold] has now completed the OPDRV associated with vessel drain down, and Secondary Containment is no longer required to be operable.

"The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made on 10/23/2014, at 0948 [EDT] (EN 50560). Notification of the event to the NRC was initially made as a result of an event where both doors in one of the Secondary Containment airlocks were momentarily open concurrently. This occurred during vessel drain down following refueling activities, an Operation with the Potential to Drain the Reactor Vessel (OPDRV), which required Secondary Containment to be operable. The doors being open at the same time resulted in the momentary inoperability of Secondary Containment. One of the doors was immediately closed, and Secondary Containment was restored to an operable status.

"Subsequent to the initial report, NextEra Energy Duane Arnold (NextEra) has determined that the doors in question were not mechanically degraded such that they were incapable of being closed. A momentary condition of having both secondary containment airlock doors open for a matter of seconds is not an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety. Furthermore, the conduct of OPDRVs during a momentary opening of both secondary containment doors that is immediately rectified does not constitute a condition prohibited by TS.

Therefore, this event is not considered a Safety System Functional Failure or a Condition Prohibited by TS and is not reportable to the NRC as a Licensee Event Report (LER) per 10 CFR 50.73.

An NRC general licensee reported that a fire damaged their facility. Inside this facility was an ASOMA Model 200 (Serial # 4649) device containing 13 mCi of Cm-244. The device is assumed to be damaged or destroyed. The licensee has limited access to the area and is contacting a qualified contractor to assist with disposal of the device.

Licensee hired a licensed contractor to recover the damaged source. The source was successfully recovered and was verified to be intact with no leakage. The source has been shipped to a licensed disposal facility.

The licensee completed the final report on the recovery and disposition of the Asoma Model 200 X-ray spectrometer which was damaged in the fire at the licensee's lab on November 29, 2014. All the surveys showed no elevated activity.

The following information was provided by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts via email:

"Morpho Detection is in the process of moving its facility, and as part of this process wipe-tests were conducted on older Ni-63 sealed sources (approx. 8 - 10 millicuries per source), that were in storage prior to transfer to a contractor for disposal. The leak tests showed that four groups of sealed sources had results that were above the threshold limit of 5 nanocuries. Thus one or more of the sealed sources within each group showed signs of leakage or contamination. Licensee reports that additional wipe tests were not conducted to determine the specific sources that were leaking.

"The Ni-63 sealed sources were identified by the licensee as Model Number NER-004 and GE Homeland Protection detector heads containing those sources.

"Overall, the leak tests revealed that Ni-63 contamination ranged from 0.030 to 0.98 microcuries for the four groups of sealed sources that were analyzed.

"Wipes were taken by the licensee by swabbing the exterior of a group of sealed sources of similar type (R&D dual-source detector heads were differentiated from R&D single source detector heads, etc.), thus the multiple sources within a group were swabbed with a single swab which was ultimately analyzed by a licensed contractor (Radiation Safety Control Services, Stratham NH).

"Subsequent to finding contamination, the sources were placed in containers, sealed, and wipe-tests (using swabs) were carried out on the exterior of the storage containers along with the interior and exterior of the cabinet in which they were being stored The wipe tests of the containers and cabinet showed no levels that indicated Ni-63 contamination.

"The licensee disposed of the sealed sources by contracting the services of Viola Environmental Services (12/09/14).

"The Agency [Commonwealth of Massachusetts] considers this event open.

"Notifications: The Department [PA DEP Bureau of Radiation Protection] was notified via email of this event [on December 5, 2014]. The event is immediately reportable as per 10 CFR 20.1906(d)(1).

"Event Description: A shipment exhibited damage consisting of a tear in the metal wall near the floor-wall junction of its container. Radiological surveillance around the tear exhibited removable surface contamination in the amount of 12,000 dpm/100 cm2 beta-gamma.

"Cause of the Event: Unknown at this time.

"ACTIONS: All areas were decontaminated and moved to a radioactive waste disposal container. The Department plans a reactive inspection. More information will be given when known, including the isotopes of concern."

The following information was provided by the State of California via email:

"On December 9, 2014, the RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] of Geocon, Inc., contacted San Diego County Radiologic Health regarding a gauge that was run over and damaged at a temporary jobsite on December 8, 2014. ICE RAM-South [Inspection Compliance Enforcement Radioactive Material] was notified of the incident and an inspector contacted the RSO. The gauge, a Troxler model 3440, S/N 27309 (8 mCi Cs-137, 40 mCi Am:Be-241), was left unattended by the operator while talking with another worker when a loader ran over the gauge and struck the gauge handle. The damage to the gauge was to the electrical housing and the scalar rod (snapped into two pieces near the gauge body but remained attached at the handle). The Cs-137 source was locked in the shielded position just prior to the incident. The Cs-137 source remained in the shielded position and the source rod and the protective housing containing the Am:Be-241 source were intact after the incident. After the incident, the area was secured and the RSO was contacted. The RSO arrived at the scene and performed a radiation survey (make/model and type not reported). The RSO found that the dose rates were normal for a gauge out of the transport case (dose rate and background not reported). After inspecting the gauge, it was determined that the gauge could be placed in the transport case in its normal position. The RSO then surveyed the transport case and found that the dose rates were normal for a gauge in the transport case (not reported).

"The RSO was instructed to prepare a report of the incident to be submitted to our office within 30 days. The investigation is on-going and any citations will be determined at a later date. "

"At approximately 2200 EST, on December 09, 2014, an area operator attempted to open the shutter on source holder 10071961 (Hemlock identifier). The shutter operation failed with the shutter stuck in the closed position. The operator then contacted an area Equipment Care Operator who verified the shutter would not operate. The area operator informed a day tech of the failed shutter operation on December 10, 2014. Operating the shutter was part of a routine annual calibration PM [preventive maintenance]. The process was previously shut down, therefore, this incident caused no loss of production. The source holder is located at S-457 on HP tank 35600."

The licensee performed a radiation survey of the fixed gauge which indicated higher than expected radiation readings (40 mR/hr at <30 cm). Based on these readings, the licensee has determined that the shutter is stuck in a partially open position. The licensee has contacted the manufacturer to repair the device.

"At 0417 EST on December 17, 2014, the Shift Manager was notified by Radiation Protection (RP) personnel that the Unit 2 AMP-200 radiation monitor used for backup monitoring of the Unit 2 Main Plant Vent when the Unit 2 Wide Range Noble Gas Monitor (WRNGM) is [Out of Service] OOS had experienced a malfunction that caused it to spike high for approximately five minutes before returning to a baseline value of 0 mR/hr. At the same time, the Unit 2 WRNGM was already out of service for the completion of a planned surveillance test. The Unit 2 WRNGM had been removed from service at 0740 EST on December 16, 2014.

"While the WRNGM is OOS, the AMP-200 radiation monitor is procedurally relied upon for being used as the means for determining Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency entry criteria under the applicable Emergency Action Level (EAL) Initial Conditions (ICs). The Unit 2 Main Vent Gaseous Monitor is procedurally relied upon for being used as the means for determining Unusual Event entry criteria for the same EAL ICs and remained in service during this time.

"After investigation by site RP and Maintenance personnel, the functionality of the Unit 2 AMP-200 was restored at 0700 EST on December 17, 2014 following a successful source check of the instrument. The investigation identified that the AMP-200 cable contacts were found wet and were subsequently cleaned and dried. Actions have been taken to prevent reoccurrence of the wetting condition.

"During the time from 0417 to 0700 EST on December 17, 2014, Unit 2 had a condition that represented a loss of emergency assessment capability and is a reportable condition in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified and the NRC the notification time with the NRC Headquarters was 1210 EST."

All control rods fully inserted. All busses are energized via offsite power. Decay heat is being released via AFW and the condenser bypass valves. The unit is stable in Mode 3. Cause of the loss of load is being investigated.

"This report is made due to notification from PPL Susquehanna to Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) regarding a sewerage leak at the plant property. The notification was made at 1335 EST hours on 12/17/14.

"During a routine inspection by a contractor who performs checks for PPL Susquehanna, an area was identified as a potential leak location. When the sewerage grinder pump was run, there was visible evidence in the soil that a leak existed.

"Extent and duration of the leak is not know at this time. This event requires notification to Pennsylvania DEP."

"Recent seismic testing results of the above Class 1E KF under-frequency relays uncovered inaccurate qualification by similarity to the tested relay 1328D72A03 (qualified in 2011). The subject relays do not meet the previously published ZPA rating, but meet a rating of 1.7g in accordance with IEEE C37.98-1987 requirements.

"Records show a total of 37 suspect relays were provided to seven customers. ABB does not have the capability to perform the evaluation to determine if a defect exists, thus we are notifying the purchasers or affected licensees of this determination so that they may evaluate the deviation, pursuant to 10 CFR. 21.21(b).

"If you have any questions regarding this notice, please contact the ABB Technical Support 954-752-6700.