A Ford internal memo states that
the stability of the UN46 [Ford Explorer prototype] is worse
than Bronco II and that it can be improved by widening, lowering
and using a smaller P215 tire.

June 11, 1987

Ford internal memo on a meeting with
Firestone reports that the ATX design is approved by Ford.

1988

Fall 1988

Ford ADAMS reports states that the
Explorer demonstrated "performance issues" at 35 psi
but that they expected more favorable results at 26 psi.

November 25, 1988

An internal Ford Test Report shows
Explorer lifts two wheels at 55 mph due to high center of gravity,
tires and front suspension system.

1989

1989

Internal Ford document states that
the cornering capacity of the Explorer is "[n]ot to exceed
current [Bronco II] levels. Limit cornering capacity with larger
tires through suspension revisions and tire pressure reduction."

The document further discusses Tire Pressure Reduction:
"Engineering has recommended use of tire pressures below
maximum allowable inflation levels for all UN46 tires. As described
previously, the reduced tire pressures increase understeer and
reduce maximum cornering capacity (both 'stabilizing' influences).
This practice has been used routinely in heavy duty pick-up truck
and car station wagon applications to assure adequate understeer
under all loading conditions. Nissan (Pathfinder), Toyota,
Chevrolet, and Dodge also reduce tire pressures for selected
applications. While we cannot be sure of their reasons, similarities
in vehicle loading suggest that maintaining a minimal level of
understeer under rear-loaded conditions may be the compelling
factor."

January 11, 1989

An internal Ford memo reports a meeting
with Firestone to discuss front suspension "jacking"
on the Explorer and Bronco II, a phenomena that is "undesirable
from a vehicle stability standpoint."

January 26, 1989

In an internal Ford memo, Ford engineers
state the design goal [no two wheel lift] has not been met with
the P235 ATX tire.

February 9, 1989

Ford hires Arvin Calspan to test
the P245 tires. In a letter to James Avouris from George A.
Tapia of the Arvin Calspan Tire Research Facility, Tapia reports
that "[t]he P245 test tires at the 29 psi pressure condition
showed a severe 'tread package' separation from the tire carcass."

February 20, 1989

In an internal Ford memo, Ford engineers
recommend use of 26/26 (front/back) psi along with various other
spring changes due to stability testing showing two wheel lift
with 35 psi.

March 2, 1989

Internal Firestone memo to Ford states
that "in light of Ford's decision to specify 26 psi in
the P245 tire for the Explorer, Firestone has tested the vehicle
at 26 psi front and 35 psi rear" . . . "Calspan testing
showed severe tread separation, but our testing used a more
realistic procedure and we don't think it will be a problem."

April 5, 1989

An internal Ford memo reports that
Consumer's Union told Mr. Sloan, Ford Vice President of Public
Relations: "You have a real problem" with your Bronco
II.

In an internal Ford memo to Truck
Operations Managment, Ford engineer Jim Mason recommends design
changes to the Explorer:* Lists eight possible changes
* Analyzes them to show effect on stability index
* Analyzes them with regard to "timing" of Job 1 [they
will delay Job 1].* Indicates Consumers' Union results show Explorer is same as
Bronco II
* Says these design changes can make the Explorer as good as Blazer
* Management recommends adopting as many as possible without
delaying Job 1.

July 1989

Ford memo indicating that Ford lowered
the front of the Explorer half an inch and stiffened the front
springs to increase stability.

September 11, 1989

In an internal Ford email to Charles
White, Roger Stornant states, "I believe that new info
is that our competitors are recognizing CU Test as a requirement
and have designed their new utility vehicles to meet. OGC is
concerned we will be the only OEM with a vehicle that has a
significant chance of failing the CU test. I believe that management
is aware of the potential risk w/P235 tires and has accepted
risk. CU test is generally unrepresentative of real world and
I see no 'real' risk in failing except what may result in wave
of spurious litigation."

September 12, 1989

In an internal Ford email to Charles
White, Roger F. Stornant expresses that OGC is concerned that
the UN46 [Explorer] would fail Consumers Union tests with the
P235 tires.

"Based on the variability of the test, as demonstrated by
our own drivers, it is possible to pass the CU test with the P235
tires; however, if we were using the CU test as sign-off
requirement, we would not accept this combination (P235 ATX &
2dr)."

December 1989

Internal memo states that Explorer
with 235 tires set at 26 psi passed the rollover test.

1990

February 1990

In order to meet the production deadline,
Ford officials rejected some proposals to improve the stability
of the Explorer (i.e. widening the track width).

March 1990

JOB 1: '91-'94 Explorer [first date
of manufacture].

May 1, 1990

Ford asks Firestone in a letter from
Jim Avouris to issue a dealer bulletin regarding tire replacement,
emphasizing the importance of using the correct size tire and
the correct air pressures on the Explorer [due to rollover sensitivity].

September 12, 1990

In an email from Mazzola (Firestone)
to Staples (Ford), Ford requests that Firestone (a) change the
tire design to a low rolling resistance polymer and (b) change
the tire pressure to 30/35 psi for a 1.6 mpg improvement on
CAFE. The question is raised whether air pressure change will
affect "vehicle dynamics," [i.e., rollover].

In a memo from Dave Wotton at Ford
to Reichenbach at Firestone with tire objectives for the 1995
model Explorer [UN105] shows that the goal is same traction,
better rolling resistance and better wear properties. Timing
is November 94.

December 19, 1991

Firestone memo from Reichenbach to
Gibas at Ford saying it is "increasingly important"
that we know whether you will adopt the tire for the Explorer.

Memo from J.E. Behr of Firestone
to R.D. Bacigalupi, Ford Light Truck Engineering, answering
questions from Ford about changing the design of the ATX to
use a different tread compound for rolling resistance improvement.

1993

September 28, 1993

A memo from Reichenbach at Firestone
to Skyner at Ford asks to evaluate a tire wear concern on the
10K testing as the '95 Explorer is exhibiting right front inside
shoulder wear.

A memo from Arizona Game and Fish
Department wildlife manager Lowell Whitaker to his regional
supervisor describes two blow outs of Firestone tires.
"During the past few months I have been cautioned as a user of
Firestone tires by DPS (Departement of Public Safety) that there
have been a series of accidents caused by the separation of the
tread from the tire on Firestone tires."

A memo from Deputy Yuma County (Arizona)
Attorney John K. White regarding Firestone Firehawk ATX tires
reported:
"Some tires of this model have had their tread separate from
the body of the tire."
"Firestone is aware of the problem and will be replacing tires
where needed. (A shipment of tires is currently on its way for
various Sheriff's vehicles.)"
"It is strongly recommended that you do not drive vehicles
equipped with these tires at 'freeway speeds' (or at all, if
possible) until you have them...evaluated."

July 22, 1996

Letter from Robert J. Descheemaker
at the Arizona State Procurement Office to Roger Abrams of Bridgestone/Firestone
requesting replacement of all Firehawk ATX tires bought under
state contracts.

August 19, 1996

Ford CQIS computer report on Explorer
with 20k miles--Colonial Ford dealer in Danbury, Connecticut
has 16 Explorers with distorted tires like this--belt is obviously
distorted and about to separate

Glenn R. Drake, regional marketing
manager in the United Arab Emirates for Ford expresses concern
about Firestone's response to the tire problems in an email
to other Ford executives:
"If this was a single case, I would accept Firestone's response
as they are the experts in the tire business, case closed. However,
we now have three cases and it is possible that Firestone is not
telling us the whole story to protect them from a recall or a
lawsuit."

In an internal Bridgestone/Firestone
interoffice memo to M. Hamaya Firestone, K. Ball acknowledges
that P235/75R15 ATX II separation is 92.8% of all ATX II claims
and 53.6% of all Firestone light truck claims for the year of
1997. Additionally, warranty claims on ATX II tires jumped from
42 in 1995 to 279 in 1997, a sixfold increase. 1998 light truck
claims are 469 for separations and 8 for road hazards.

1997 light truck claims by plant for the ATX II show 117 for
Decatur, 101 for Wilson, and 51 for Joliette.

July 13, 1998

FILED: Simmons v. Ford; et al [Explorer/ATX
separation; 2 injuries]

July 22, 1998

In an email to William Duckwitz at
NHTSA from State Farm Associate Research Administrator Samuel
Boyden, Boyden advises NHTSA of 21 Firestone ATX P235/75R15
tire failures causing injuries. Fourteen cases were in 1991-1995
Ford Explorers. The problem was dismissed as "unremarkable"
by NHTSA.

Ford Dealer Paul Wright, Technical
Branch Manager, Al Jazirah Vehicles, expresses concern and frustrations
in a letter to John W. Thompson, Tamimi Company Commercial Division
that despite his warning about the safety of the tires, he did
not receive a response and was being "kept in the dark
to what is happening."

October 24, 1998 (continued)

"As you know, this concern goes
back to mid-1997 when we first notified you of this concern.
I have to state that I believe this situation to be of a safety
concern, which could endanger both the vehicle and more importantly
the user of the vehicle. So I am asking what is going on? Do
we have to have a fatality before any action is taken of this
subject?"

"I would recommend to ensure that we do not have any further
incidents regarding tyres that Firestone RECALL all 1995/1996/1997
explorers fitted with this type of tyre, as this is a safety related
concern."

1999

Federal data from the Fatal Accident
Reporting System for 1995-98 was available to Ford, Firestone,
and NHTSA showing that Explorer fatalities were almost three
times as likely to be tire related as those with other SUVs
or cars and that Explorer crashes increased significantly in
the late 1990s compared with other SUVs.

An email from D.J. Candido, to Firestone
colleagues concluded that for countries prone to heat induced
separation, the Wilderness HT, with European specs, was the
best application choice. However, they also acknowledged that
this model is more prone to chip and tear. The best choice is
to develop a new tire with similar heat specs to the European
model and similar chip/tear specs to the Australian model.

In an attachment, Abreu further notes the most critical defects
from January 1995 to December 1998 are Tread leaving casing (135),
Belt leaving belt (136), Breaker leaving casing (137), shoulder
separation between rubber and casing (230), belt edge separation
(235).

January 28, 1999

In an email to Melanie Gumz, Glenn
Drake of Ford reports that he is suspicious of Firestone's
response to the problem and suggests that Firestone is not telling
the entire story in order to protect themselves from lawsuits
and a recall. Drake also questions the durability of the product
and the fact that Ford is about to change the tire on all Explorers
and mountaineers to a tire that has better high speed durability.
Drake recommends that Ford conduct its own analysis in order
to protect Ford and give the dealers and customers an independent
opinion. "[W]e owe it to our customers and our shareholders
to investigate this for our own peace of mind."

January 1999

In a memo to Firestone Distribution
entitled Ford Explorer - Concerns in the Middle East (P255/70R16),
John E. Behr, Account Executive for Original Equipment Tire
Sales, reported, "I attempted to assure the Ford people
that we are not aware of any defect with these tires, and that
we've supplied over 1.1 million of the same tires to Ford over
the past three years (1996 thru 1998) for usage in North America,
with excellent field performances."

January 29, 1999

In a memo to Bridgestone/Firestone
Distribution, John E. Behr, OE Sales, expresses that Ford is
concerned that the tires in the Middle East are defective.

Raises the issue of using the P255/70R16 Wilderness HT BSW H
instead of the P255/70R16 was requested by Ford. He advised that the
H tire would be better suited for high speed driving and more
resistant to heat buildup but would not be more puncture resistant.

In a letter to Keshav Das, Technical
Service Department of Firestone at Dubai, John Garthwaite, Ford
National Service Director, Al Jazirah Vehicles (Ford Dealer
in the Middle East), warns Bridgestone/Firestone of the serious
nature of the problem with P255/70/R16 AT tires. Garthwaite
indicates that an accident occurred with a tire at 30 psi. The
tread separated completely and the tire remained inflated. Garthwiate
expressed his strong conviction that there is a "distinct
problem with all or at least a certain production run of this
particular tyre."

February 25, 1999

Garthwaite continues to question
the safety of the P255/70/R16 tire in a subsequent letter to
Keshav Das. "These incidents involving Firestone P255/70/R16
tyres is beginning to become an epidemic." He further states
that "Nothing in your reply has done anything to re-assure
me that there may not exist a defect in a particular batch of
your product . . ."

March 11, 1999

An internal Bridgestone/Firestone
Letter to S. Katsura, et. al. from Firestone Account Executive,
John E. Behr expresses concern over the result of Ford's proposed
consumer notification program and the potential effects and
"perception" it would convey in Saudi Arabia as well
as "complications it could create in North America."
The letter also indicates that other Ford people also disfavored
the notification program.

Ford planned to change the tire in the Middle East to the H-rated
European tire that is more heat resistant.

March 12, 1999

An internal Ford memo to Dave MacKinnon
from Church Seilnacht states the following:

"John [Behr] also reaffirmed that the "H" rated
tire is the most resistant to damage from underinflated
operation."

March 12, 1999 (continued)

"Firestone legal has some major
reservations about the plan to notify customers and offer them
an option. First, they feel that the U.S. D.O.T. will have to
be notified of the program, since the same product is sold in
the U.S. Second, they are afraid that the Saudi government will
see this as a recall and react dramatically, including prohibiting
the import of the current OEM tire. They believe the best course
of action for the vehicles already in the market is to handle
the tire issues on a case-by-case basis."

"Related to the Firestone legal concerns is the possibility
that we will be expanding the owner relations issue. The owners who
receive the notification letter may see the program as a recall and
not be willing to pay anything to upgrade the tires. So, instead of
8 owner relations issues, we now have X times as many."

"I [talked to] Corey MacGillivray in the OGC last Monday
about the proposal. He didn't think that working on a case-by-case
basis with the owners of the damaged vehicles presented a problem,
but he was concerned about the implications of the owner letter
(similar to the Firestone concerns)."

In a fax from Arabian Car Marketing
to Ford Middle East and North Africa Company, Oman Ford advises
Ford Middle East that it is replacing Firestone tires with Michelin
tires prior to delivery because Explorer users are becoming
aware of (through the internet) the off-road limitations of
the Explorer.

June 24, 1999

FILED: Jenkins v. Bridgestone/Firestone,
Inc. [injuries unknown]

June 30, 1999

Fax labeled "Top Urgent &
Very Important" to Ford Middle East from Arabian Car Marketing
Company warns Ford Middle East and North Africa that the tires
are failing: "news of fatal accidents on Explorer is spreading
rapidly." "The tire problem has already resulted in
a severe decline in Explorer sales." "We are also
worried about further fatalities and possible lawsuits."

The teams suggested as one of the possible actions to improve the
circumstances in Venezuela, increasing the recommended
inflation pressure on the vehicle from 28 to 30 in the front and
from 26 to 30 in the back. The 30 psi standard was considered to be
the USA standard of inflation.

Letter from B.V. Halverson to Mr.
J. Gonzalez of Bridgestone Firestone acknowledges that "sustained
high speed driving must be considered as a normal input in the
performance of vehicles and tires in Venezuela." Mr. Carlos
Maren "really wanted a BFS recommendation that would guarantee
that a tire would never have a separation."

"Unique GCC usage patterns, environmental conditions and
maintenance practices may result in tire degradation and
potentially, tread separation. Nineteen rollovers, fourteen
fatalities and ten injuries are alleged to have been attributed to
this condition."

August 17, 1999

Approximately 6,800 1995-99 MY Explorer
and Mountaineer vehicles produced at the Louisville Assembly
Plant from Job 1, 1995, through July 30, 1999, are potentially
affected."

"Based on the Field Review Committee recommendation, a field
action has been approved to request owners to return potentially
affected vehicles to dealers for replacement of the Firestone
Wilderness brand tires with Goodyear Wrangler brand tires."

In a letter to owners of light truck
vehicles, Bridgestone/Firestone offers free tire inspection
and free rotation service as a special offer to Venezuelan owners
of light truck vehicles.

August 27, 1999

In a letter to C.E. Mazzorin, Ford's
L.A. Klein indicates that the tire problems in the Middle East
are largely due to the fact that the tire was not designed for
the Middle Eastern market. The tire's speed rating is "S"
which allows for speeds up to 112 mph. The Middle East requires
higher speed ratings.

September 1999

In a letter to it's GCC dealers,
Ford stated:
"Ford and Firestone have been working to identify a Firestone
tire that we can recommend that may offer a greater margin of
resistance to puncture and or tread separation for the conditions
unique to the GCC region than the current tire. That tire has been
identified as the 'special service' tire currently available only in
the Saudi Arabian market. This tire is more puncture resistant than
the current production tire.

Fall 1999

Ford began replacing Firestone tires
on Explorers in ten Middle East countries.

In a letter from John Garthwaite,
National Service Director, Al Jazirah Vehicles, Saudi Arabia,
to David MacKinnon, Director of Ford Customer Service, Dubai,
Garthwaite once again advises of tread separation problems in
Saudi Arabia. He suggests an in-depth Firestone tire investigation.
"I am afraid that I can see a pattern emerging here. The
tyre in this second case is totally destroyed but it is clear
to me that the body damage is indicative of tread separation
in the first instance."

"While driving vehicle, the tire tread separated from the
main carcass of the tire. The tire failure is discovered when the
driver hears the tire tread hitting the wheel house or the tire goes
flat."

"MORS (Master Owners Relation System) - Reviewed all 95/99
MORS reports (4236) for tires and wheels. Found 32 'possible' tread
separation claims on Firestone (22) and Goodyear (10). 3 of the 32
possible claims were for the P225/70R15 tire from Firestone. 10 of
the 32 possible claims were for the P235/75R15 tire from Goodyear.
18 of the 32 possible claims were for the P235/75R15 tire from
Firestone."

September 15, 1999

Internal Ford memo from Carlos Mazzorin
to Jac Nasser and others:

The attachment dated August 27, 1999 states:

"Issue description: While driving the vehicle at high
speeds, for prolonged periods of time, the tire tread separated
(belt edge separation) from the main carcass of the tire. 19
rollovers attributed to this issue have occurred in Saudi Arabia,
Oman and Qatar combined. Several fatalities have resulted. The issue
has also occurred in Venezuela, and fatalities have also resulted in
that market. No known instances have occurred in other
markets."

"Ford first became aware of the issue in GCC markets in
December 1998." In Venezuela, Ford "discovered the issue
in early Spring 1999."

Interoffice memo from L.A. Klein
to C.E. Mazzorin reveals Ford's admission that it was responsible
for choosing to use the North American tire in the GCC (Gulf
Countries) market and determines the tire was not suitable for
this area. Firestone was not part of that decision.

October 1, 1999 (continued)

GCC Market:

* "Negotiations with Firestone have stopped. Firestone's
position that the tire meets all quoted functional specifications,
and that it was not meant for the GCC market application is
confirmed by our research. It appears that Ford chose to use the
North American specified tire in the GCC market, and Firestone was
not part of that decision."

Ford also indicates that the tires failing in Venezuela were
specifically designed for the Venezuelan market and therefore the
responsibility lies with Firestone.

October 19, 1999

Report entitled 1999 Firestone Quarterly
Meeting: Critical Performance Issues, Aiken, SC indicates that
tire separations were up to 3365 from 2929. Belt edge separation
up 18.3%, belt leaving belt was up 10.1%, and SW separation
- rubber from casing was up 63.6% for 1999 third quarter compared
to 1998. This report does not separate out the individual tires.

Firestone Adjustment Performance - Service Group states that more
improvement in separations are needed to reduce LT REC adjustments.

Firestone Adjustment Performance of major lines indicated that
Wilderness AT and Wilderness HT experienced increases in adjustments
related to Ford F150 sizes.

"In July 1997 [Ford Venezuela] representatives were called
to a meeting in Caracas with a group of independent lawyers
representing four (4) customers. The objective of this meeting as
expressed by these lawyers, was to draw Ford attention to a
situation related to their customers, but that they felt could be
greater."

"High incidence of vehicle rollover after a tire blowout or
tread loss has not been detected for other vehicle brands: Toyota,
GM, and Chrysler all have significant market presence in this market
segment."

January 1, 2000

In a Bridgestone/Firestone 1999 Year
End Minor Profit Loss Report from William Thomas to Dave Laubie,
attached charts show 1998 and 1999 data on tire tread separations
by tire type and plant indicating large numbers of tread separations
in tires manufactured at Decatur plant and with 235/75R15 tire.
The report also shows increasing claims for SXR4S Tire in 1999.
Overall separation are up 10 in 1999 over 1998. 25% of total
separations in 1999 were ATX II.

Officials from Bridgestone/Firestone
were briefed as early as February about rising warranty costs
for the now recalled tires according to internal Bridgestone/Firestone
documents including a series of charts distributed at a sales
meeting in February, 2000. One chart tracking "separations
increasing" revealed that the number of warranty claims
for tread separation had risen from 4,200 in 1998 to 4,694 in
1999 (an increase of 11.8 percent). Another chart stated that
"Wilderness AT needs improvement." While still other
charts analyzed patterns in tread separations emphasizing tires
for light trucks. These charts revealed that the number of tread
separations involving Wilderness tires had risen 144 percent
from 1998 to 1999.

February 7, 2000 & Feb. 10,
2000

KHOU, CBS affiliate station in Houston,
breaks story of significant numbers of deaths and lawsuits with
Firestone tires on Ford Explorers. Firestone Statement on February
4 before the programs aired says: "The Radial ATX has proved
to be a reliable workhorse for U.S. consumers. Our experience
with the Radial ATX indicates high consumer satisfaction with
the quality and reliability of these tires. No court or jury
has ever found any deficiency in these tires."

February 10, 2000

In a letter from Christine Karbowiak,
Vice President, Public Affairs, Firestone, to Robert Decherd,
Chairman, President and CEO of A.H. Belo Corp., and Peter Diaz,
President and General Manager of KHOU-TV, Firestone states that
KHOU-TV's broadcast series regarding its tires, "contains
falsehoods and misrepresentations that improperly disparage
Firestone and its product, the Radial ATX tire." It further
asserts, "This series has unmistakably delivered the false
messages that Radial ATX tires are dangerous, that they threaten
the safety of anyone using them, and that they should be removed
from every vehicle on which they are installed. Each of these
messages is simply untrue."

February 25, 2000

Bridgestone/Firestone report indicates
that separations in Wilderness tires are on the rise, but ATX
are decreasing.

March 5, 2000

NHTSA ODI resume (IE00-016 ' different
from current investigation file number) indicates 22 complaints,
8 crashes, and 4 fatalities due to tire tread separation. (All
ODI complaints are sent to company when received.)

Firestone survey of 243 tires on
63 vehicles that were trade-ins or lease return vehicles shows
that 31% of the 15" tires were under-inflated and 51% of
the 16" tires were under-inflated and at total of 9 tires
had less than 20 psi.

April 25, 2000

In response to a request from NHTSA,
Samuel Boyden, State Farm Associate Research Administrator,
emailed a breakdown by calendar year and tire type (Firestone
ATX, ATX II, and Wilderness tires) for the period covering 1996
to April 2000. This contained information on 70 reports.

May 2000

Ford offers to replace tires for
customers in Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela.

May 2000

Ford shifts to Goodyear tires in
Venezuela as it waits for a U.S. Firestone response. Ford's
action covers about 39,800 vehicles.

Unknown to NHTSA, lawsuits and notices of intent to file involved
at least 35 fatalities and 130 injuries.

May 8, 2000

NHTSA sends a list of interrogatories
to Bridgestone/Firestone as part of its investigation of the
tire failures. NHTSA requests that Firestone respond by June
19th.

May 10, 2000

NHTSA sends a list of interrogatories
to Ford as part of its investigation of the tire failures. NHTSA
requests that Ford respond by June 23rd.

June 6, 2000

Internal Ford Memo lists 21 vehicles
sold in Gulf Countries. Lists Explorer (in Venezuela) psi at
28/28 for the 15" tire. The new 15" tires are listed
at 30/30.

June 16, 2000

Ford requests an extension of the
deadline to respond to NHTSA's interrogatories with an anticipated
completion date of October 13th.

June 20, 2000

In response to NHTSA's interrogatories,
Bridgestone/Firestone submits a partial response.

June 22, 2000

NHTSA grants Bridgestone/Firestone
an extension until August 14th to provide information in response
to its interrogatories.

July 24, 2000

In response to NHTSA's interrogatories,
Ford submits a partial response.

July 25, 2000

After a story aired on KCBS regarding
Ford Explorers and ATX tires, Firestone instructed dealers to
replace tires with Bridgestone or Firestone tires of the customer's
choice. However, "[t]his sale should be a regular sales
ticket. Do not use an adjustment ticket." [Adjustments
(warranties) are used by NHTSA and industry to track defects.]

July 31, 2000

Public learns of Ford's replacement
of Firestone tires on Explorers in Venezuela.

July 31, 2000

Ford submits another partial response
to NHTSA's original interrogatories.

August 2, 2000

NHTSA reports it is probing 21 deaths
in crashes of pickup trucks and SUVs where tire failure may
have played a role

Bridgestone/Firestone asks NHTSA
to again extend its deadline to respond to NHTSA's initial interrogatories
until September 5th.

August 15, 2000

NHTSA raises the number of traffic
deaths linked to Firestone tires from 46 to 62. It is also looking
into reports of 100 injuries.

August 18, 2000

Ford's partial response to NHTSA's
inquiries.

August 28, 2000

Bridgestone announces a boost in
replacement production to 650,000.

August 29, 2000

NHTSA requests supplemental information
from Ford as part of its ongoing investigation of the Firestone
tire failures. NHTSA requests that Ford respond by September
31st.

August 31, 2000

Venezuela's consumer protection agency,
Indecu, asked prosecutors to bring criminal charges against
both Bridgestone/Firestone and Ford. Ford's Jacques Nasser responded
by stating, "The accusation from the Venezuelan government
that Ford Venezuela lied is absolutely unfounded." Venezuelan
authorities contend that Ford and Firestone held secret meetings
to determine what was wrong following the first reports of incidents
in 1998. Instead of instituting a recall, officials allege that
Ford asked Firestone to redesign the Wilderness tire.

August 31, 2000

NHTSA raises to 88 from 62 the number
of deaths associated with the Firestone tires.

Venezuelan consumer agency, Indecu, recommends that Ford and
Firestone be prosecuted for 46 deaths related to the tires in
Venezuela.

September 1, 2000

Firestone declines NHTSA's request
to voluntarily expand recall to 1.4 million tires not included
in the original recall.

NHTSA issues consumer advisory on additional 1.4 million
Firestone tires. NHTSA states that some of the tires have "high
tread separation rates."

September 4, 2000

Bridgestone/Firestone issues a recall
in Venezuela of 62,000 Venezuelan-made 15-inch and 16-inch Wilderness
tires. Previously, only US-manufactured tires were being replaced.

September 4, 2000

Bridgestone/Firestone reaches agreement
with union to settle labor disputes and avert a strike at nine
U.S. plants.

September 6, 2000

Mr. Wyant, Firestone Vice President
of Quality Assurance, testified that, "They [Ford] see
every bit of the field performance data that is devoted to approving
a tire."

Ford states in a filing with the
Securities and Exchange Commission that "we have preliminarily
agree to bear a portion of the costs of Firestone's recall."

September 12, 2000

Public Citizen President Joan Claybrook
delivers testimony before the United States Senate Committee
on Commerce, Science and Transporation on Ford and Firestone's
knowledge of the safety defects, NHTSA's legislative and enforcement
weaknesses and calls for an expanded recall.

September 18, 2000

Public Citizen files amicus curaie
brief in support of plaintiff's motion to compel and opposition
to protective order in the case of Trahan v. Ford Motor
Co. and Bridgestone/Firestone.

September 20, 2000

Sen. Richard Shelby (R-Ala.) drops
a provision that would have prevented NHTSA from issuing a consumer
information test on motor vehicle rollover.

September 20, 2000

Sens. McCain and Hollings and the
Senate Commerce Committee propose new auto safety legislation
that would strengthen NHTSA's incentive and enforcement powers
but would "not require companies to test their products
before certifying that they comply with federal motor vehicle
safety standards."

September 26, 2000

Senate Commerce Committee auto safety legislation
(S. 3059) as reported promises to strengthen safety regulations
but fails to "establish criminal penalties for knowingly
selling vehicles that do not comply with safety standards, for
failing to notify the Secretary of Transportation and the public
of safety defects or noncompliance with safety standards, and
for refusing to comply with the recall provisions of the Safety
Act," Public Citizen's analysis of the legislation said.

September 27, 2000

Auto safety legislation reported
by the Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Protection Subcommittee
of the House Commerce Committee "drastically
limits the information that manufacturers will have a duty to
provide to NHTSA on a regular basis, and sets up numerous hurdles
which the agency must jump over before being able to accomplish
basic rulemaking on the content of manufacturer's submissions."

October 2, 2000

Firestone agrees to release by October
9, 2000 all test results, quality assurance and adjustment data,
and all correspondence between Ford and Firestone concerning
specifications and criteria from Ford and the manufacture, design,
testing and failure of the ATX tire -- documents that the company
had previously attempted to keep secret.

October 11, 2000

The U.S. Senate unanimously passes
H.R. 5164, the Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability
and Documentation Act (T.R.E.A.D.), which becomes public law
on November 1, 2000

October 31, 2000

Public Citizen releases report showing
that the auto industry has contributed $37.8 million to lawmakers
since 1995, 75 percent of which went to Republicans.

November 21, 2000

Goodyear reveals that safety defects
in its Load Range E tires have led to at least 15 deaths and
129 injuries. The company had been aware of the defects but
faces no criminal penalties.

December 2, 2000

Ford's former vice president for
quality assurance, robert O. Martin, testifies that tires produced
at the Decatur plant may have been overrespresented in fatal
crashes because they were installed in warm-weather states.

December 11, 2000

Ford officials tell NHTSA that flaws
in designs and manufacturing processes of Firestone tires are
to blame for tire failures, not the vehicles themselves. "Our
experience...leads us to conclude that the vehicle is not a
significant contributor to tread separation," according
to their report.

December 17, 2000

NHTSA reports that 148 deaths and
525 injuries can now be attributed to crashes involving Ford
Explorers and Firestone tires.

December 21, 2000

Tom Baughman, engineering director
for Ford's truck operations, states in a deposition that the
15-inch Wilderness AT tires "are not robust against variations
and inflation pressure and in operating condition, load and
speed."

2001

January 4, 2001

Evidence compiled by Public Citizen
and Safetyforum.com reveals that Ford and Firestone limited
last year's recall to tires made at the Decatur, Ill. plant,
analyzed only one narrow database and ignored information about
tire failures that spawned major litigation claims, consumer
complaints and adjustment records that show replacement of equipment
under warranty.

January 9, 2001

NHTSA releases a new rollover rating
program, but the star rating system is limited because it is
static and purely informational.

February 2, 2001

Firestone releases report on the
causes of tread separation showing that the rate at which customers
brought their tires in for problems was essentially the same,
whether the tires were made at plants in Decatur, Ill., Joliet, Quebec or
Wilson, N.C.

April 25, 2001

Public Citizen and Safetyforum.com
release report concluding that approximately 10 million non-recalled
15-inch Wilderness tires and 16-inch Wilderness AT tires should
also be recalled, as they are subject to the same design flaws
as the 6.5 million recalled tires.

June 19, 2001

Joan Claybrook's submitted testimony
to two House subcommittees investigating the issue encourages
NHTSA to raise its standards for rollover crashworthiness.

June 27, 2001

Safety consultant Sean Kane asserts
in a New York Times article that some consumer lawyers
may have been aware of patterns of failure in Firestone tires
but did not alert NHTSA, due to private lawsuits.

August 24, 2001

Bridgestone/Firestone Inc. agrees
to pay $7.5 million to settle a case brought by Dr. Joel Rodriguez
and his wife, Marisa, who was injured in a rollover crash. This
was the first crash involving a Ford Explorer and Wilderness
AT tire that had gone to trial.

August 27, 2001

The Wall Street Journal reports that
the federal government has linked 203 deaths and over 700 injuries to
the Ford Explorer and Firestone tires.

October 4, 2001

Firestone announces that it will
recall 3.5 million additional Wilderness AT tires manufactured
prior to 1998 at plants other than the Decatur, Ill. plant.

YEAR 2002

Blame starts to shift from Firestone to Ford for
the high rollover rate of the Ford Explorer.