Berlin: A Strategic Area

9992
·~iY.
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE fr June f20
prehe~e about setting a precedent
that could have no end if tha:t were
done. I understand that the committee
actually did approve the item, and then
decided to take it out because of the
State ownership of the land. I should
like to have a little amplification as to
what the committee would do If the
State or University did surrender suffi­cient
land to the Federal Government
for this purpose.
lion were provided in the regular bill for
1961.
REGULAR AcrfVITI!S OF THE DEPARTMENT
For the regular activities of the De­partment,
the committee recommends
an appropriation of $1,397,822,500, an in­crease
of $39.6 million over 1961. This
is $12 million under the estimates, and
$18.9 million over the amounts carried
in the bill as it came to us from the other
body.
RESEARCH AND COOPERATIVE EXTENSION
PROCR..-.MS
The committee recommends some
modest changes in the appropriations
for research, for the Federal research
and the "Payments to States" item.
The bill provides $78 million for the
Agricultural Research Service, an in­crease
of $6,782,500 over the 1961 appro­priations.
I may say that this is one item whi
is over the budget estimate and th
amount recommended by the other body.
The bill provides for the first time $1
million for a contingency research fund,
to meet unforeseen and urgent research
needs.
The committee also recommended a
number of increases totaling one and a
half million dollars for what it considers
urgent needs on current research.
PAYMENTS TO STATE EXPERIMENT STATION'S
For the research payments to the State
experiment stations, an increase of $4
million over 1961 is proposed. This
makes the total $36.5 million. One mil­lion
dollars of this is directed toward In­vestigations
of research on the elimina­tion
of weeds. This has become a very
serious problem.
For payments to States for cooperative
extension work, $59,790,000 is provided.
This is an increase of $3.2 million of new
funds for distribution to the various
States under the formula.
SOIL AND WATER CONo6ERVATION PROGRAMS
For the agricultural conservation pro­gram,
the committee recommends an
advance authorization for the 1962 pro­gram
of $250 million, this being the
amount that has been authorized for this
program for many years.
For soil and water conservation pro­grams
administered by the Soil Conser­vation
Service, the committee recom­mends
$176 million, an increase of $20.8
million over 1961. This increase is prin­cipally
for installing works of improve­ments
in the watershed programs.
SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM
The committee recommends an appro­priation
for the school lunch program
of $125 million, an increase of $15 mil­lion
over 1961. I am sure all the Mem­bers
of the Senate are aware that a
much larger amount than that is fur­nished
for the program through the allo­cation
of surplus commodities and the
expenditure of section 32 funds.
LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS
The committee recommends loan au­thorizations
totaling $318 million for the
lending programs administered by the
Farmers Home Administration. These
authorizations are $51 million over 1961
and are $33 million over the amounts
provided in the bill as it came from the
other body.
For rural electnf:cation loans, the
committee recommends the full budget
estimate of $195 million, plus a contin­gency
authorization of $50 million, mak­ing
a total $245 million of new loan au­thorizations
available for 1962.
For the rural telephone authoriza­tions,
a total of $162,500,000 is recom­mended,
of which $12,500,000 is for con­tingency
reserve authorization.
I believe that brief statement covers
the larger items in the blll.
Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Mr.
President, as the ranking Republican
member of the Subcommittee on Agri­culture
Appropriations, I commend the
senior Senator from Georgia for the ex­cellent
work he has done in handling
this complicated and exceedingly impor­tant
bill now before the Senate. Only
modest increases have been made over
the House figures. These are mainly in­creases
in authorizations for the REA,
RTA, and the Farmers Home Adminis­tration,
all of which were well justified
·n the hearings.
The bill as a whole represents a very
nd approach to the fiscal problems
of riculture, and the amount that is
bein asked for is needed.
I s port the bill as reported by the
Comm ee on Appropriations.
Mr. IRKSEN. Mr. President, I
should e to ask the distinguished
chairman the subcommittee about a
matter on ich I addressed a letter to
him, which pears at page 1090 of the
hearings.
I ask unani
of the letter b
at this point.
There being n
was ordered to be
as follows :
Hon. RICHARD B. RusSEL
Chairman, Subcommitte
Committee pn Approp
ate, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The
frul t-breeding sta tlon at Sou
University at Carbondale, Ill.,
nectlon with the work they hav
lng, there Is belle! that they caul
greenhouses to good advantage.
It I estimated that the cost o
greenh would be approximately,
repeat app tely, $70,000 and an a
way to join th nhouses In the sum
$30,000.
Representative Ro BE
of the House Subcommltte
Appropriations, h as also made
ments In support of this project whe
lngs were held.
One of the reasons for the $30,000 request
!or alleyways Is that due to the nature or
the project It Is necessary to Isolate the
greenhouses.
Any consideration the subcommittee can
give to this need will be appreciated.
Sincerely,
EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN,
U.S. Senate Minority Leader.
Mr. DIRKSEN. I may interpolate at
this point by saying that the matter
relates to the building of greenhouses
for a fruit-breeding station proposed at
the University of Southern TI!inois. The
whole amount involved would have been
$100,000, but it is my understanding
that these greenhouses would have to
be built on State, ra.ther than Federal
property, and that the committee is ap-
Mr. RUSSELL. The committee was
very anxious to provide for this item
We realize that the distinguished Sena­tor
from Illinois does not request a great
deal from the Committee on Appropria­tions.
We are familiar with his long
record of dealing with the agricultural
appropriations bill when he was a Mem­ber
of the other body. He handled it
for years. I do not know whether I
should say it was at that time my "priv­ilege"
or "misfortune" to meet him in
conference on many occasions, because
in those days he was a very hard man
to convince about the appropriation of
money.
The committee considered this item.
We approved it provided the funds were
to be expended on Federal laRds. The
clerk of the committee investigated and
ascertained that the Federal Govern­ment
owned no lands at this installation.
It is, I understand, a worthwhile State
station, but we did not feel we could
appropriate funds for the building of
greenhouses on State land without yield­ing
in the future to the numerous sim­'
lar requests which the committee fre­ucntly
receives. So we were compelled,
regretfully, to deny the Senator's re­uest.
There are instances, I understand,
hen title is conveyed to the Federal
Government to lands on State stations.
But in this instance we were powerless
to assist the Senator on this item.
Mr. DIRKSEN. The Senator may or
ay not be able to answer, but in the
vent sufficient land were conveyed to
he Federal Government for this pur­ose,
what. in the Senator's judgment,
ould be the action of the committee?
Mr. RUSSELL. It is always difficult
undertake to predict what action any
mmittee of the Senate will take; but
this were a cooperative project--and
nderstand that State experimental
M ·k is carried on there with both State
Federal funds--I know of no reason
the committee should not approve
very modest request, if the green­houses
were to be constructed on lands
owned by the Federal Government.
Mr. DIRKSEN. I thank the distin­guished
Senator from Georgia.
BERLIN-A STRATEGIC AREA
Mr. BRIDGES. Mr. President, the
city of Berlin today occupies in world
affairs one of the great strategic areas of
the world.
I intend to discuss this issue from a
bipartisan point of view. As the senior
Republican in the U.S. Senate, it is my
judgment that the paramount question
to which the Berlin issue relates in many
aspects Is t.hat of ,,,. nnt; ·
vival-allu ~he :.ul vna1 of Lh1s NatiOn
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 41, Folder 18, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
1961 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 9993
transcends all consideration of partisan­ship.
The safety and protection of the
American people transcend all con­siderations
of political parties. The
least we can do for the American people
is to give them all the facts and let them
know where they stand in this hour of
continued crisis.
VVe have had a desperate need for a
foreign policy which Americans can
understand; and which our allies under­stand;
and-most of all-which our
enemies can understand.
In our approach to some problems of
our foreign relations we have seemed at
times to blow hot, and then to blow
cold. During those times in the past
we did not assume a clear, concise posi­tion
which the world could understand.
VVe have had a clear position on Berlin
in the past, but now, because of a sug­gested
new proposal, we need to empha­size
the firmness and clarity of our posi­tion.
Last VVednesday, the distinguished
senior Senator from Montana [Mr.
MANSFIELD], delivered in the Senate an
important address, during the course of
which he advanced one solution to the
problem. VVhile he made clear that he
was speaking for himself, he still is
known as his party's spokesman in the
Senate. His proposal was that Berlin,
East and VVest, might be reunited as a
free city, to be held in trust by an inter­national
authority.
Under his plan, the free city would be
guaranteed jointly by the VVestern
Powers united in NATO and Eastern
Powers united in the vvarsaw Pact. En­trance
to the city from the VVest would
be controlled by what he termed "inter­national
peace teams."
The highly respected majority leader,
as we all know, made the proposal in all
good conscience. I also know he will
welcome the opinions of others.
Mr. President, I am strongly opposed
to the proposition that has been sug­gested.
The proposal, in some respects, re­sembles
the short-lived Trieste agree­ment.
It might work if Mr. Khrushchev
wanted it to, but it seems quite obvious
that if he actually desired any settle­ment
on Berlin he would not have been
using it to make trouble for so long
a time.
The importance of the proposal sug­gested
by the distinguished majority
leader has raised questions in news­papers,
on TV and radio, and among
people generally as to the extent to
which someone else might try to use it
as a trial balloon for the President and
his Department of State. The Senator
was speaking on his own, but I know
he recognizes what importance is at­tached
to his suggestion.
The Trieste agreement, for example,
was signed February 10, 1947, 'and held
as a free territory under United Nations
supervision. By October 5, 1954, it was
divided between Yugoslavia and Italy,
and the free territory is no more. Yugo­slavia
got what it wanted of the free
territory.
Under four Presidents-Roosevelt,
Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy-the
United States, as well as other VVestern
Powers, has been committed to defend
the independence of the western part of
Berlin and to maintain contact with it.
Of course, this formula could, I sup­pose,
be interpreted in varying degrees
by the wo~id's diplomats. But the posi­tion
of the United States has been ab­solutely
firm; we spent millions of dol­lars
and sacrificed many of our young
airmen in the famed airlift which stood
forth as a symbol before the world that
we act on what we say.
This is no time for weakness. It is
a time for a cold, realistic clarification
of where we stand, what we propose to
do, and what we expect the U.S.S.R.
to do.
Mr. Khrushchev continues to make
the cold war colder, and abuse of the
United States has been one of the prin­cipal
methods he has used to discredit
and belittle the United States.
At all times we must maintain our
honor, respect, and prestige. VVe cannot
for a moment back down on Berlin.
American leadership in world affairs
would be greatly weakened.
If history has taught us anything, it
has shown that where peace is con­cerned
there can be no vacillation or re­treat.
Mr. President, it seems to me that now
is the time to take a forceful step in the
direction of respect by making it def­initely
known, once again, that our po­sition
on Berlin has not changed.
Berlin represents one of the few re­maining
symbols of the free world's de­termination
not to be cowed by the bully
tactics of the Russian bear.
Briefly, our position on the future of
Germany and the issue of Berlin has
been that:
First. East and VVest Berlin should be
united by free elections, and the city's
freedom should be guaranteed by the
United States, France, Britain, and the
Soviet Union until such time as Berlin
becomes the capital of a reunited Ger­many.
Second. German reunification would
become a fact with the election of an
all-German parliament, formation of an
all-German government, conclusion of a
peace treaty between Germany and her
former enemies, and withdrawal of all
foreign troops under adequate safe­guards.
Again, I point out, these have been
basic objectives of our foreign policy
through the administrations of Presi­dents
Truman, Eisenhower, and
Kennedy.
In reporting on his Vienna talks with
Premier Khrushchev, Mr. Kennedy re­affirmed
our intention not to be in tim- .
idated into backing out of VVest Berlin.
VVhat Mr. Kennedy told us sounded like
tough, straight-from-the-shoulder talk,
as indicated by this excerpt from his re­marks:
I made it clear to Mr. Khrushchev that
the security or Western Europe and there­tore
our own security are deeply involved in
our presence and our access rights to West
Berlin; that these rights are based on law,
not on sufferance; and that we are deter­mined
to maintain these rights at any risk
and thus our obligation to the people or West
Berlin and their right to choose their own
future.
The President, in those words, upholds
the same principles on Berlin that were
maintained by the three previous Presi­dents.
If the suggestion of the distinguished
majority leader ever came to pass, it
would be a definite change. I, for one,
see no reason why a Russian threat to
sign a separate peace treaty with East
Germany should cause us to change our
course.
Of course, I have no quarrel with the
majority leader's right to express his
opm10n. In our justly cherished free
society with opportunity for debate and
free expression, all viewpoints must be
explored and given due weight. This
country of ours is the greatest and
strongest on earth. It was made that
way through the qualities of courage, in­telligence,
morality, and plain common
sense of individual Americans.
VVe are, perhaps, sometimes slow to
act, and too often leave the impression
that we are soft. But the world is be­ginning
to understand that humanity is
not softness-that the fiber of America
is no less strong than it was in 1776.
Our military posture, our domestic
prosperity, in fact, our very survival as
a Nation, are affected by success or fail­ure
in the conduct of our foreign rela­tions.
In my opinion, any weakening of
our position on Berlin would constitute
a major foreign policy failure.
Regardless of the zigs and zags of Rus­sian
diplomacy, regardless of their
frowns and smiles, we must never for­get
that the Communist goal always re­mains
to make the world bow down be­fore
the hammer and sickle. So, in my
judgment we should not retreat on Ber­lin.
If we back down in any degree on Ber­lin,
I doubt that many nations of the
earth will count on our word again.
And, in my opinion, we cannot afford to
stand alone.
First things must come first. The
urgency of the moment, I repeat, is sur­vival
itself. The people of this country
must prepare themselves for a rough and
tough road ahead; but they cannot ex­pect
the Nation to wipe away each of
their tears.
I cannot in good conscience, Mr.
President, let the proposed new status
of Berlin pass without my opposition.
And I shall vigorously and strenuously
oppose any change which would weaken
our position, until the very end.
In conclusion, let me state that the
threat to the United States is many
sided. One is by internal subversion ;
another, by economic penetration; oth­ers,
by espionage, blackmail, and mili­tary
might. But there is still another­an
important one-and that is a show
of weakness which might be taken as
appeasement. And, appeasement is
nothing more than surrender on the in­stallment
plan.
For that reason, I am utterly opposed
to changing our position on Berlin.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President,
first, I wish to express to my friend,
the distinguished senior Senator from
New Hampshire [Mr. BRIDGES], who is
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 41, Folder 18, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
9994 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE June 20
the ranking Republican Member of this
body, my deep appreciation and thanks
for the speech he has made this after­noon,
and 1 desire to compliment him
for the high tone in which it was de­livered.
Whether one speaks for or against
the proposal advanced by the senior
Senator from Montana is immaterial.
The point is that we ought to speak and
think and cogitate while there is still
time to do so, and in an unemotional
way. Time is of the essence in connec­tion
with this matter. In my opinion,
the distinguished senior Senator from
New Hampshire has rendered the coun­try
and the Senate a service, today, in
bringing to our attention his views on
this question, the most important im­mediate
question of our time.
The Senator from New Hampshire
was gracious enough to tell me ahead
of time that he was going to make his
speech, and to furnish me with a copy
of his remarks.
If I may, I should like to make a few
comments on what he has said, and
then make some comments of my own.
For example, the Senator from New
Hampshire stated:
The safety and protection of the Ameri­can
people transcend all considerations of
political parties. The least we can do for
the American people is to give them all the
facts and let them know where they stand
In this hour of continued crisis.
We nave h ad a desperate need for a
foreign policy which Americans can under­stand-
and which our allies understand­and
most of all , which our enemies can
understand.
I agree completely with the distin­guished
Senator from New Hampshire.
A little later he said:
Last Wednesday, the distinguished senior
Senator from Montana delivered In the Sen­ate
an Important address. during the course
or which he advanced one solution to the
problem. While he made clear he was
speaking for himself. he still Is known as
his pe.rty's spokesman In the Senate. This
proposal was that Berlin, East and West,
might be reunited as a "free city," to be held
In trust by an international authority.
I appreciate what my friend. the
Senator from New Hampshire, has said
relative to his acknowledgment of the
fact that I was speaking for myself, be­cause
I was; and, as a matter of fact,
to this day I have not discussed this mat­ter
with either the President of the
United States or the Secretary of State,
because I feel that I have some responsi­bilities
as a Senator of the United States.
A little later. the Senator made refer­ence
to the Trieste agreement. He said:
The Trieste agreement. for example, was
signed February 10. 1947, and held as a
"free territory" under United Nations
supervision. By October 5, 1954, tt was
divided up between Yugoslavia and Italy and
the "free territory" is no more. Yugoslavia
got what It wanted of the "free territory."
Let me call to the attention of the
Senate the fact that that treaty, which
seems to have been agreed to by both
Italy and Yugoslavia as being eminently
satisfactory at that time, came about be­cause
of the outstanding work done in
its behalf by Clare Boothe Luce, who at
that time was U.S. Ambassador to Italy,
and by Llewellyn Thompson, who at that
time was U.S. Ambassador to the Re-public
of Austria. In fact, Ambassador
Thompson spent so much time on the
treaty that he was almost always in
London, trying there to work out the
arrangements, and rarely was in Vienna.
Later in his remarks the distinguished
Senator from New Hampshire said:
This is no time for weakness. It Is a time
for cold, realistic clarification of where we
stand, what we propose to do, and what we
expect the U.S.S.R. tn do.
I agree completely.
Further on in his speech, the Senator
from New Hampshire stated:
If history has taught us anything, It has
shown that where peace is concerned there
can be no vacilia tlon or retreat.
Again I wholeheartedly agree.
Further on in his speech my friend had
the following to say:
The distinguished majority leader's sug­gestion
If It ever came to pass, would be a
definite change.
I, for one, see no reason why a Russian
threat to sign a separate peace treaty with
East Germany should cause us to change
our course.
Let me say that that possibility had
nothing to do with the remarks I made
last week, because if I correctly under­stand
the historical situation, whenever
the Soviet Union desires to sign a treaty
of peace with East Germany, it can do
so, and there would be nothing that we
or our allies could do about it.
Further on, the Senator from New
Hampshire said:
Our military posture, our domestic pros­perity,
In !act, our very survival as a nation,
are affected by success or failure In the con­duct
of our foreign relations. In my opin­Ion,
any weakening of our position on Berlln
would constitute a major foreign pollcy
!allure.
At this time, I should like to read an
excerpt from an editorial published in
the Christian Science Monitor on June
17, 1961. I believe that these few words,
more than anything else I have read or
heard, sum up what I was trying to do
when I was privileged to address the
Senate, last Wednesday, on this ques­tion.
I quote now from the editorial:
In this respect the proposals advanced in
the U.S. Senate by Senator MIKE MANSFIELD,
o! Montana, a day before the Khrushchev
broadcast make a great deal of sense. These
proposals, which are put forward by the
Senate majority leader personally and not on
behalf of the Kennedy administration, should
be read-
And I wish to direct the attention of
the Senator to this-should
be read not as a substitute for !ull
insistence on Western rights in West Berlin
but as a poss1ble supplement to the Anglo­French-
American diplomatic position.
Further on, the distinguished senwr
Senator from New Hampshire says:
First things must come first. The urgency
of the moment, I repeat, Is survival itsel!.
The people of this country must prepare
themselves for a rough road ahead, but they
cannot expect the Nation to wipe away each
o! their tears.
I cannot In good conscience, Mr. President,
let the proposed new status o! Berlin pass
without my opposition. And, I shall vigor­ously
and strenuously oppose any change
which would weaken our position, untll the
very end.
I can find no real argument there, be­cause
I do not think that I was P;dvocat­ing
a weakening of our position in Ber­lin,
or a backing away, or a retreat, in
the proposal which I advanced. As the
Christian Science Monitor indicated, I
was trying to bring about a possible sup­plemental
position insofar as our status
in that area was concerned.
There has been some reference to the
fact that I am the majority party's
spokesman in the Senate. I do not know
how to answer this. I suppose that is
a cross I have to bear on occasion, just
as the distinguished minority leader has
to bear a somewhat similar burden if he
makes a speech and is thereby consid­ered
as the spokesman of his party. But
let me say, knowing the 100 Senators of
this body, no Senator can speak for any
other Senator. So far as we are con­cerned,
leader or not, we are on an equal
basis. ·
Before any Senator is a majority lead­er,
he is the Senator of the State from
which he comes, and he is a Senator of
the United States. Before a Senator
has responsibilities to any administra­tion,
he has responsibilities to the peo­ple
of the United States in the light of
his conscience.
Several days ago I made a statement
on Berlin as a Senator from Montana,
as one s ·enator with responsibilities to
the people of his State and the Nation.
The statement was not at any time, or
in any way, discussed in advance with
any person in the executive branch. It
was not intended as praise for this ad­ministration
or criticism of its predeces­sor.
And it was, in no sense, a "trial bal­loon."
The statement proposed that we face
the facts of the situation which is devel­oping
at Berlin and that we face them
now and discuss them fully, just as the
distinguished Senator from New Hamp­shire
did in his service to the country this
afternoon. It contained a proposal
which suggested a third way on Berlin­neither
that which the Soviet Union has
proposed nor that which presently ex­ists.
The statement was designed to in­vite
discussion in the Senate of this
grave situation and to elicit further pro­posals
with respect to that situation. For
in this matter, the Senate has a respon­sibility,
even as the President of the
United States has the ultimate respon­sibilty.
The developments in Berlin involve the
entire future of the United States, the
Soviet Union, Europe, and the world.
Therefore I trust that any discussion
will reflect the seriousness and soberness
of this situation. And I trust, further­more,
that the discussion will not be
bent to political purposes.
Let me say again that I commend and
compliment the Senator from New
Hampshire for the nonpartisan, frank,
and honest way in which he discussed
his reaction to the Berlin situation on
the floor of the Senate this afternoon.
Finally, I trust that we will bear in
mind in this discussion the weight of re­sponsibility
which rests on the shoulders
of the President. He must make de­cisions
on behalf of all of us-decisions
which bind us all. He must make these
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 41, Folder 18, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
1961 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE 9995
decisi.ons knowing that, in the end, if a State, and neither can anyone vote
reasvi1 fails, either here or elsewhere, 'Vithout that chance, because there is al­wha~
may be. involved is the life of every ways someone who will criticize. That
man, woman, and child in the Nation. is fine. I only hope that when criticism
In these circumstances, every respon- is made it will be made on the basis of the
sible citizen of this Nation, and especially criticism advanced by the distinguished
those with public responsibilities, will Senator from New Hampshire, which is
think and speak with the soberness the criticism of a constructive nature, be­situation
requires. That, may I say, was cause on that basis we can all benefit and
characteristic of the discussion in the the country will be better off.
senate on the part of both Republican Mr. President, the issue which con­and
Democratic Senators after my state- fronts the people of this Nation at Berlin
ment the other day. And I hope that lt is fundamental. We are fully committed
is a characteristic which will be main- at Berlin, all of us, and lest there be any
tained as this discussion widens, and I misunderstanding of this commitment,
am sure it will be, based on the state- I repeat what I said last Wednesday:
ment by the Senator from New Hamp- We will not be driven, pushed or barred
shire this afternoon. from fulfilling our responsibilities to our-
Following my previous speech I re- selves and to freedom in Berlln by any na­ceived
a large response, for a Senator tion, half-nation, group of nations or what­from
Montana, in the mail. More than ever. Such measures as may be necessary to
half the letters I received were from assert that responsibllity will be taken. • • •
The range of this commitment extends from
Texas, California, New York, Illinois, a beginning of the words of firmness to a
and Pennsylvania. The letters were un- midpoint of expenditure of immense re­favorable
to the proposals which I made soures and enormous taxes and other sacr!­on
Berlin in a ratio of about 4 to 1. fices, to a final pledge of the lives and
A great many of these letters con- fortunes of every man, woman and child in
tained attacks on my integrity, motives, the Nation.
and patriotism. I do not relish these I do not take this commitment lightly.
attacks, since my skin is no thicker than And because I do not, Mr. President, I
that of any other Senator. But if per- regard it as an inescapable responsibility
sonal vilification is the price which must on the part of the Senate to see to it that
be paid for full public discussion of this the question of Berlin is discussed fully
critical issue, then it will be paid, re- and completely and in advance of pay­gardless
of whether the discussion tends ment on the commitment. So long as I
to support my view, or oppose it, or take repreesnt the State of Montana as a
some other turn. Senator of the United States, I shall not
Mr. BRIDGES. Mr. President, will the regard as closed and beyond discussion
Senator yield? any matter which involves the welfare
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. and the very life of every citizen of this
Mr. BRIDGES. As the distinguished Nation as directly as does the Berlin
Senator knows full well, speaking for my- situation. And I shall speak out on these
self, and I think for most people of this matters whenever my judgment · and
country, and certainly for my colleagues conscience compel it.
on this side of the aisle, there is no ques- In my statement last Wednesday I
tion about the integrity or patriotism of offered a proposal for a possible approach
the Senator from Montana, or his effort to solution of the Berlin question. It
to do what he considers in his conscience was neither the way suggested by Mr.
to be for the best interests of this coun- Khrushchev nor merely a continuance
try. I for one am very happy the Sena- of the status quo in that city. It was an
tor from Montana occupies the position attempt to find a third way, not in re­that
he does. I happen to differ with treat from where we now stand but in an
him on his approach, but I know his mo- advance to what I believe may be a firmer
tives are of the highest, and I am sorry ground for peace in Europe. I have based
anyone would vilify him or question his this proposal on the assumption that if
motives in the discussion of this issue. West Berlin is defensible as a free city,
Mr. MANSFIELD. I am deeply grate- as an allied enclave 110 miles inside the
ful to my friend, the distinguished Sen- communist world, all Berlin as a free city
ator from New Hampshire, for these re- would be even more defensible if it is
marks; but as far as my colleagues in threatened, for it would still be backed
this body are concerned, I have no doubt by allied guarantees. as is now the case,
that every Member feels toward me as I and, in addition, by the weight of a world
feel towards them-and I say this with opinion which is overwhelming for
all due modesty-as the Senator from peace. The small garrisons in West
New Hampshire has expressed himself, Berlin, Mr. President, are not what de­because
I think we get to know one an- fends that city-it is the allied guaran­other
here and to have an understanding tees of that city's safety, and these will
of the problems and confrontations be strengthened, not weakened, under
which occur from time to time. the proposals which I have made, even
I do not mind this criticism, and I did though some of the interpretations of
not rise to protest it. All of us, being these proposals may for one reason or
in the profession we are in, have to an- another suggest otherwise. I have based
ticipate some criticism. If we were not these proposals, furthermore, on the be­criticized,
I would say there was some- ' lief that any policy which, in effect, in­thing
wrong with us, because nobody in .\ sists that the Russians remain in Berlin
this Chamber or anywhere else can ad- and Germany, as ours now does, is not
vance proposals which will meet with the only impracticable but also wrong on its
full approval of the people of this country face, for our object must be to encourage
or with the full approval of the people of the withdrawal of Soviet forces eastward
No.103--5
if the pr::!sent costly stalemate in Europe
is ever to be brought to an end.
The suggestions which I have made
may or may not have merit. They were
obviously not intended to be the last
word on this subject. Other proposals
may be cffered by other Members which
may or may not have merit. More im­portant
than any particular proposals,
mine or those of anyone else, is that this
issue and its possible solution be
thoroughly explored and, one would
hope, explored without rancor or con­siderations
of political advantage, in the
light of the best interests of this Na­tion.
As I see it, Mr. President, it is not
in the best interests of this Nation to
go on spending billions of dollars abroad
without bringing closer the day when
these one-sided expenditures may be
terminated in a more constructive situa­tion-
and Berlin alone and directly has
already cost this Nation in excess of $1.5
billion. It is not in the best inter­ests
of this Nation to spend the lives
of citizens and to risk the devastation
of this Nation and the word if we can
create a situation where this need will be
obviated.
To be sure, there may be no alterna­tive.
To be sure, in the end we may
have no choice but to spend the billions
and the lives, but until that end arrives,
I , for one, shall go on seeking a better
way.
I do not now believe and have never
believed in change for the sake of change
in public policy any more than in auto­mobiles.
But I believe it is essential to
the security and welfare of the people of
this Nation that we do not doom our­selves
to the mental prison of equating
all change with retreat and defeat. For
in foreign policy, no less than in all
other aspects of human existence,
an ordered change is the key to rational
survival and progress. Unless we are
not afraid, first, to consider changes in a
world of change and, second, to make
changes if reason tells us they should be
made, we shall find ourselves, in foreign
policy, time and again in pursuit of the
last car of a train that is always pulling
away from us.
Mr. President, again I commend the
Senator from New Hampshire. In my
opinion he has performed a real public
service this afternoon.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con­sent
that a number of editorials both for
and against the proposal advanced by
me last week in the Senate be printed
in the RECORD at the conclusion of my
remarks.
There being no objection, the material
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows :
[From the Christian Science Monitor.
June 17, 1961 1
IF Moscow REALLY WANTS A GERMAN
TREATY
Premier Khrushchev's report to the peo­ple
of the Soviet Union on his talks at
Vienna with President Kennedy Is a new
statement o! old pretensions. These preten­sions
do not take on any more validity from
the fact that they have been voiced for 2 12
years, but there Is danger of their becoming
partly accepted by familiarity.
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 41, Folder 18, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
9996 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE .June 20
The head of thn C bloc says,
"The absence of a pe tce treaty with Ger­many
has created a d'~ply abnormal and
dn.ngerous situation 1n Europe." He adds
the charge that Britain, France, and the
United States broke postwar agreements by
turning West Germany Into a milltarlst
state, whereas the facts are the Soviet au­thorittes
first closed off their occupation
zone and began there deYelopment of para­mtlltary
forces under the Soviet Army.
Thus began the problem of a divided Ger­many
and of a Communist puppet regime in
East Germany which has no basis in the
wishes of the people but ruled by Russian­backed
force. That is "a deeply abnormal
and dangerous situation" but it is not the
one Mr. Khrushchev llkes to talk about.
He prefers to focus attention on West
Berlin, where he proposes what would tech­nically
be called a free city but which
would, In fact, end the freedom of more than
2 million West Berliners within a few years.
Unless that proposal Is accepted, he threat­ens
before the end of the year to make a
treaty with his pawns, Walter Ulbricht and
company, which be pretends would give them
complete control over access to Berlln.
COMMUNIST PLANS FOrt WEST BERLIN
If they used that control with scrupulous
respect !or the rights of West Berliners to
oome and go, and for the rights or others
to visit and trade with them, the situation
would not be materially worsened. But
what Mr. Ulbricht has In mind Is Indicated
by a press conference In which be suggests
that the Tempelho! Airport, which was West
Berlln 's llfellne In the blockade o! 1948, be
closed, and that West Berlin cease to grant
asylum to East German refugees.
What Mr. Khrushchev envisages can be
Inferred from his parrot!ng of a completely
fictitious Communist claim that the half
city of West Berlin "is situated on territory
of the German Democratic [East German [
Republic." There was no East German
state when the postwar outllnes of Berlin
were drawn. As a matter or fact, especially
if they protest a. West German Parliament
meeting ln West Berlin, the Communists
have no right to install the East German
Government In East Berlin, since even the
Soviet sector or that city Is on a different
legal footing from the Soviet occupation
zone around it.
In this respect the proposals advanced In
the United States Senate by Senator Mike
Mansfield of Montana a day before the Khru­shchev
broadcast makE! a great deal of sense.
These proposals, which are put forward by
the Senate majority leader personally and
not on behalf o! the Kennedy administra­tion.
should be read not as a subsltute for
full Insistence on Western rights In West
Berlin but as a possible supplement to the
Anglo-French-American diplomatic position.
CONCESSIONS AND COUNTERCONCESSIONS
So long as Soviet arrogance tries to under­mine
the safety or West Berlin and its peo­ple
(with stratagems reminiscent or the Nazi
encompassment and capture of the free city
of Danzig) the West should stand flatly on
every sentence and comma of Its occupation
rights in defense of the West Berliners.
One of the hollow aspects or the Khru­shchev
position Is the pretense that Moscow
seeks a peace treaty as to all of Germany
In conjunction with Its wartime allies. If
this were more than a sham, the Kremlln
would deal seriously with the Western con­tention
that the whole German people
should have an opportunity to vote on their
future status.
If Mr. Khrushchev and his foreign office
have any thought or achieving an agreed
settlement on the narrower and Included
question of Berlln, they might consider what
arrangements In return could conceivably
compensate for the concessions they ask and
provide rellable safeguards for the people of
West Berlln. This, In efl'ect, Is what the
Mansfield plan asks the Communists--or
others who pass judgment on Issues of the
cold war-to do.
First, for example, 1! a free and lnterna­tlonallzed
status would be good for half a
city (West Berlln), why would It not be at
least twice as good for a whole city, including
East Berlln? The first postulate that should
be laid, therefore, In any thought of changed
conditions for Berlln is that the change
should apply to the whole city.
REAL INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY NEEDED
Even that would be far from enough to
assure the security of the city's government
or the ultimate physical safety of Its citizens.
Earller statements have suggested that some
international authority guarantee the neu­trallty
and self-government of West Berlin.
The only authority remotely capable of doing
this-and Its capability In such a great­power
vise would br very doubtful until
proved In other cases-would be the United
Nations. Yet the Unite<! Nations would cer­tainly
be estopped from giving any effective
protection to an area such as Berlin If Mr.
Khrushchev should succeed In introducing
his fragmentation of the secretariat by a
three-party veto.
The residents of Berlln also would need
absolutely dependable and even enlarged
guarantees of freedom of passage for them­set
ves, their goods, and their guests going to
and from Berlin through the 110-mile corri­dor
to West Germany. As to this, Mr.
Khrushchev says with one breath that the
Soviet Union favors free access and with the
next breath that the East German Commu­nists
could take it away.
The Mansfield formula Is that the city's
neutrality be guaranteed by the members
both of the North Atlantic Treaty and the
Warsaw Pact, and that Western access routes
to the city be garrisoned with International
peace teams.
These points, It should be recognized, are
counterproposals to the Soviet demands, not
modifications of the American, French, and
British insistence on their right to protect
West Berllners at the West Berllners' request.
Incidentally, one translation has Premier
Khrushchev saying, "The Western powers
say they will Insist on their rights In West
Berlln. TI>at is a threat to peace." Since
when did it become a threat to peace for any
nation to Insist on its rights? The official
Tass version has smoothed up this passage,
but the characterization Is essentially true
of the Communist position.
CHANGES SHOULD NOT BE ONE SIDED
Premier Khrushchev goes out of his way
to say that I! any country "violates peace
and crosses the borders" of East Germany
It will be met with Soviet weapons. Presi­dent
Kennedy expllcltly assured the Soviet
leader at Vienna that so long as the rights
or access are respected there would be no
use of force. But If either Soviet or East
German authorities should Interpose bar­riers.
that would be the In! tlal use of force.
The Communists have no moral or other
right to demand that the West sacrifice the
safety and liberties of 2 million people even
In the name of peace-that Is, to dissuade
the Communists from breaking the peace.
Theoretically, It Is quite possible to
imagine a better and more stable situa­tion
for Berlln than now exists. But to
accomplish this would require substantial
concessions from both sides, not just from
one. If a bargain Is to be struck, it should
be for the benefit of all, particularly the
West Berliners. If Moscow expects the West
to consider modification, it should be will­Ing
to consider equally important and t;noce
necessary ones.
Only on this basis should the Western
three powers contemplate any bargaining
about Berlln. Not one cardboard kopeck
should be given up without full value for
the security of West Berhners in return. If
any one calls his Intransigeance, let him
ask If he would llke his own security dealt
with on any other basis.
Viewed as an exercise In analysis of what
guarantees the Communists ought to be
willing to give in return !or what they new
are brashly and brazenly demanding, the
Mansfield plan has value. It should not
be regarded in any other light, certainly
not as any weakening of Western resistance
to attempted intimidation.
[From the Washington Daily News, June 16,
19Gl]
BERLIN DJLEMMA
Senate Majority Leader MANSFIELD has
contributed an idea to the latest battle over
Berlln
He says Nlkita Khrushchev's propJ)sal to
convert West Berlln Into a free city and
to kick out the Western powers Is unac­ceptable.
But he adas that the Western
pollcy of standing on the status quo Is not
necessary the way to peace.
A third way, he suggests, might be to
convert the entire city-East and West­Into
a free city; "held in trust and in peace
by some International authority until such
time as it Is again the capital of Germany."
Access routes to the city would be guarded
by International peace teams.
Senator MANSFIELD's suggestion has the
merit of some fresh thinking on a problem
that has plagued the world since the end ot
the war and perlodlcally becomes a danger­ous
crisis area. Khrushchev indicates he Is
heading for another flash crisis there at the
end of this year.
The Senate leader also calls for widespread
discussion and debate about the Berlin prob­lem.
The best place to start would be at the
beginning-way back In the late 1940's-to
refresh the world's memory on why Berlln
exists today in an extremely abnormal state.
To listen to Moscow, this Is all the fault of
the Western powers and the West Berliners.
The fact Is that the Soviets, in 1948, walked
out of the four-power (United States, Brt t­aln,
France, Russia) Kommandatura, after
they got the short end of a free, Berlin-wide
election. They set up their own puppet
municipal regime in East Berlln and thus
divided the city In two. They even cut the
telephone cables between the two halves or
the city. Even today It Is Impossible to
make a telephone call between East and West
Berlln.
There is going to be a lot of shouting about
Berhn In the months ahead and the world
should be reminded how the present situa­tion
developed.
It Is difficult to believe that anyone who
knows the facts about Berlln--or who bas
had the fascinating experience of seeing that
divided city--ever could give even second
thoughts to Khrushchev's outrageous pro­posal.
[From the Washington Post. June 16, 19611
SONG BY THE FIRESIDE
It's all very simple. If the United States
and the West will just agree to Soviet pollcy
on Berlln, Laos, the United Nations, nuclear
tests and disarmament, we'll all coexist
splendidly. Last one to gl ve In is a war­monger.
That, in essence, represents the chatty con­tent
of Mr. Khrushchev's fireside chat to
the Soviet people. He expressed satisfac­tion
over his talks with President Kennedy
in Vienna; but the satisfaction, If any, must
have derived principally from the oppor­tunity
to clarify what are almost completely
opposite positions. From the standpoint of
the United States and Its allies, about the
only reasonable aspect of Mr. Khrushchev's
presentation was its relatively restrained
tone.
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 41, Folder 18, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
1961 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE 9997
The Soviet leader has adopted the troika
as his mode of international conveyance to
the United Nations, nuclear tests and vir­tually
every other issue. He wants general
and complete disarmament, and unless his
terms are accepted the United States IS
against it. He wants a neutral and Inde­pendent
Laos, but the Americans are some­how
responsible for the continued truce
violations by the Communist Pathet Lao.
The Soviet Union does not want a war, but
it is going to sign a treaty this year giving
control of the access to Berlin to East Ger­many,
and anyone who res ists will be guil ty
of aggression.
Well, it is a pretty dismal line-about as
reasonable as the sort of stuff once ~ pouted
by a fellow named Hitler. Berlin is of
course the most troublesome issue, and
there is considerable point to Senator MIKF:
MANSFIELD's call for the West to ab:mdon
some of its fictions about the problem and
seck to mount son1e counterpres~urc for
improved status of Berlin. But to use a
Soviet metaphor. the chance of anything
better, in Mr. Khrushchev's pre,ent mood,
seems about as likely a• fried snowballs.
All of which means that the West had better
prepare for a tough test of n~rvcs this fall.
JFrom the New York Herald Tribune, June
17,19611
ACHESON HEADS TASK FORCE To WATCH
BERLIN
(By Marguerite Higgins)
WASHINGTON, June 16.-President Kennedy
has formed a special task force to keep watch
on the Berlin crisis. It Is headed by former
Secretary of State Dean Acheson.
Mr. Acheson, who is widely known for his
tough unyielding stand on maintaining the
freedom of West Berlin, is currently com­pleting
a report on the alternative resp on ses
open to the West in light of heightening So­viet
pressure designed to drive the Allies out
of the city.
After the report is finished Mr. Acheson
Is expected to serve as the administration's
chief crisis watcher on the Berlin situation,
ready to give warning and advice on a ll new
developments.
ENCOURAGES BERLIN
The key role on Berlln to be played by Mr.
Acheson Is particularly welcome to the West
Germans, who In the past few days have been
fretful over reports of alleged changes in
American policy.
In fact, the State Department has spent
much of this week trying to calm fears
aroused:
1. By a speech In which Senator MrKE
MANSFIELD, Democrat, of Montana, Senate
majority leader, proposed accepting the
"free city" idea for West Berlin if the same
system were extended to East Berlin. This
alarms the West Germans, who feel psy­chologically
that the physical presence of
Americans In Berlin Is the best deterrent to
Russian action against the city. Under the
Mansfield Idea, all Allled occupation troops,
Including American, would In due course
leave Berlin.
2. By reports out of London that the
United States was contemplating a radical
new approach to Berlin.
The State Department has diplomatically
disowned the Mansfield Idea and denied that
it was In any sense an administration trial
balloon-a conclusion drawn by most Euro­pean
papers. It also denied that any radi­cal
new approach on Berlin was contem­plated.
Mr. Acheson's assignment to the Berlin
problem will be a reassurance to the Euro­peans
in itself, for he agreed completely
with West German Chancellor Konrad Ade­nauer
In opposing Soviet desires to make
unllateral changes In Berlin's status.
Mr. Acheson is on record as saying: "The
presen t status of the Western Allies in Ber-lin
is highly satisfactory. Why fuss around
wich other ideas? Premier Khrushchev is
t11e only one who wants it changed."
U.S. REPLY IS FIRM
The American reply to Mr. Khrushchev's
most recent memorandum on Berlin was the
subject of consultation here today with both
Brit-ain and France. The American draft
reply is firm, refuses to contemplate the
ch:tnges proposed by the Russians, but leaves
the door slightly ajar for negotiations on
the issue.
Mr. Acheson will be assisted in his Berlin
tasl< force mainly by specialists from with­in
the administration such as Walt Whit­man
Rostow, deputy White House assistant
on no.tional security affairs; Foy Kohler, As­sistant
Secretary of State for Europ0an Mat­tr
·~·s, and others.
Tilc:·e have been unconfirmed reports that
Gen. Lucius D. Clay, the con1n1andcr in Eu­rope
during the Berlin blockade of 1948,
m ight be included in the task force of crisis­watchers
because he has had decision-m~k­ing
experience in dealing with Soviet pres­sure.
It was not ru:cd out at the White
House today that General Clay might be
consulted, but his aid hns as yet not been
requested.
JFrom the New York Post, June 18. 19611
SENATOR MANSFIELD'S I-!EaESY
Once again Senate Majority Leader MANS­FIELD,
Democrat, of Montana, h as made a
valio.nt effort to generate fresh thought on
the problem of Berlin and rescue the West
from the peril of its own cliches. His sug­gestion
that the status quo in the divided
Germa.n city is not sacrosanct seems to have
sel1t a shudder of horror through Bonn and
provoked frenzy in the top echelons of the
GOP. It desenes a more responsible hear­ing.
M'NSFIELD's proposal, similar to a plan he
ad vocated 2 years ago, would erase the line
between East and West Berlin and unify the
two sectors as one city whose freedom and
acccssability would be internationally guar­anteed
by NATO, the Warsaw Pact countries
and both West and East Germany. In view
of Mr. Khrushchev's drive to sign a peace
treaty with the German Communist regime
and transfer to it the responsibility for keep­ing
West Berlin's communications lines open
to the free world, MANSFIELD's plan might
honorably save the city from the attrition
that Communist leader Ulbricht has out­lined.
It might also avert an explosive
world crisis.
Our adamant insistence that a position
adopted more than a decade ago must re­main
unchanged despite a major shift in the
East-West balance of power plainly remains
the battlecry of West German politicians; no
one dares to question the formula. But must
German Internal politics mute all debate
here? Is no new Idea tolerable? Must we
sit back and wait for Khrushchev to set
the timetable of crisis?
Senator MANSFIELD is basically asking
whether we can properly ignore the possi­bility
of a third way out of the dangerous
Berlin deadlock . He sees more clearly than
most Western statesmen that to stand firm
on Berlin while it remains a pivot of new
disaster for m ankind may be a fetish rather
than a policy. When and how the flash­point
will be reached, as Joseph Barry notes
in his dispatch from Paris on magazine page
9, no one precisely knows. Nor is there any
allied agreement on how to recognize it, to
say nothing Of h andling it. MANSFIELD'S
thtrd way provides hope that the explosive
issue can be solved without either side sur­rendering
any crucial principle or special
advantage.
The proposal is not, as Senator DmKSEN
and Representative HALLECK were so quick
to charge, o. renunciation of our pledge to
defend West Berlin. Neither does It mean
abandonment of Germany's hope of even­tual
reunification-for which, incidentally,
there is more lipservice than real longing in
today's prosperous Federal Republic. It
simply reflects, as MANSFIELD stated, an
"honest recognition of the fact that it is too
late in the game to expect that Germany
will be reunified in peace by fiat of the
United State, France, Great Britain, and
Russia, as was expected 15 years ago."
MANSFrELD wants to do more to presen·e
Berlin as a symbol of freedom than issue
periodic declarations of our fidelity.
If it is said that his plan is unacceptable
because it may Involve the recogmtlon of
East Germany, which is one of Mr. Khru­shchev's
goals, let us not panic. Nonrecog­nition
of the Communist regime is one of
Dr. Adenauer's most percious pieties. But
in terms of world peace and Berlin's free­dom,
it may also be one of the most dis­pensable.
Admittedly there are hazards inYOI\"Cd in
Senator MANSF"IELD's proposal, but Senator
CASE, Republican, of South Dakota, obsen·ed
sanely that it was a good starting point for
exploration.
And that is the vital point. Reasonable
men may differ on the merits or practicality
of MANSFIELD's ideas. What is inexcusable
is the suggestion that he was guilty of some
high crime by bringing up the subject. In
a world as precarious as ours, no man has
the right to say that the last word has been
spoken on any great issue.
{This editorial was broadcast on June 15.
1961, over WRDW Television, Augusta, Ga.)
This is a WRDW-TV editorial.
"Berlin is likely to become the pivot of a
new disaster f or mankind"-these 13 words
concluded an address made by Senate Ma­jority
Leader MIKE MANSFIELD on the floor
of the U.S. Senate. In that address Mr.
MANSFIELD suggested a third alternative in
the Berlin situation.
The Senator stated that he did not believe
that "the way to peace can be found either
in the maintenance of the status quo In
Berlin or in the change which Mr. Khru­shchev
proposes."
Senator MANSFIELD suggests that the en­tire
city of Berlin be put under an Interna­tional
trusteeship. Under such a plan,
routes of access would be garrisoned by in­ternational
peace teams • • • both East and
West governments would pay the cost of such
an arrangement under written agreements,
and the interim status would be guaran­teed
by the NATO and Warsaw Pact coun­tries.
Such a change in Berlin would be ter­ribly
difficult, but as the Senator put it, "It
is not really, an infinitesimal task when com­pared
with the full implications of an
essay in military solution with what comes
after lt."
As Mr. MANSFIELD states, "This approach
may evoke no response from Mr. Khrushchev.
But does Mr. Khrushchev's reactions, what­ever
they may be, dissolve us from our ra­tional
responsibilities to ourselves and to
thb world in this situation."
Mr. MANSFIELD has thought well when he
says, "If the present positions of the parties
concerned remain unchanged, sooner or later,
this crisis postponed, this crisis avoided, wi!l
cease to lie dormant. If we wait for the
moment of heat, It may be too late to Lhink
at all."
The Montana Senator concluded, "Sooner
or later the Western nations and the Soviet
Union must seek a new way, a third way to
the solution or the Berlin problem. Unless
this search is pursued with energy and dis­patch
and to fruition, sooner or later, Ber­lin
is likely to become the pivot of a new
disaster for mankind."
Once again, we feel that Senator MANS­FIELD
has displayed cogent observance and
realistic approach and we would agree whole­heartedly
with his Berlin proposal.
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 41, Folder 18, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
999 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE June 20
This was a WRDW-TV editorial, Jack Belt,
speaking f()I" WRDW Television.
(From the Washington Evening Star, June
18, 1001 I
BE:RLIN
rr as Premier KhrUshchev says, the lack
of ;, German peace treaty "keeps alive the
smoldering coals or World War II," then Ber­lin
Is the bellows that could enfiame the
world In another conflagration.
During the 16 years Germany and Berlin
have been divided, the Russians have had
only to squeeze the bellows and world ten­stons
have flared anew
Premier Khrushchev fanned the flames
a.gam last week In calling for a peace treaty
which would recognize formally the exist­ence
or two German states and end the
West's occupation rights In West Berlin. Mr.
Khrushchev said If the West was willing to
sign such a treMy then he woUld help
guarantee West Berlin's existence as a free
ctty, with necessary access routes
If the West does not join the Sovtet Union.
however, In signing such a treaty, he satd
the Russians would sign unllaterally with
the East Germans before the end of the
year. This would force the West to make Its
own arrangements with the East Germans, a
situation obsen·ers rear might lead to war
1r the East Germans try to block access routes
to the ctty.
In Ills latest speech, Premier Khrushchev
satd "the conclusion or a peace treaty wtth
Germany cannot be postponed any longer.
A peaceful settlement In Europe must be at­tained
this year ..
The Prcmter's haste Is due apparently to
a rear thnt West Germany might become
so strong It would be willing to start a war
to liberate East Germany or to reclaim
lnnd ceded nt the end of the war to Po­land.
To the Wc•t. Mr Khrushchev's rears seem
groundless. but as any visitor to the So­,
·lct Union can testify. the fear In Russta of
a rearmed Germany Is real Indeed
Premier Khrushchev said a treaty formal­Izing
the borders could help prevent hostili­ties
which he said would "mean war-and
a thermonuclear war at that."
The United States supports West Ger­manv's
demand for a unified Germany. The
Umted States has no mtentlon or recognizing
East Germany, and President Kennedy has
said no peace treaty would be signed untll
free and universal elections wPre held
throughout Germany
President Kennedy said 2 weeks ago that
"we arc not seeking to change the present
s1tua.t1on" m which allied troops nrc sta­tioned
1n West Berlin and have access rights
~uaran teed by treaty with the Russ~:ms. In a
Soviet-East German treaty there Is an im­plied
threat that war might break out over
access r~gh ts If the East Germans try an­other
Berlin blockade.
W1th little compromise VISible In these
conflicting views, Senate Majority Leader
MA,.,SFIH.u brought a fresh approach to the
subject in urging that all or Berlin be made
a free c1ty under lnternallonal protection
Th1s , he said. would be a third way be­twe<
·n the two pos1t1ons He said It was hls
own 1dea . and not the administration's. The
crmccpt however, met strong opposition.
West Germany 1mmcd1utely rejected the
Idea. because it would "deepen the division"
or Gl'rmany. Observers also doubted if the
M •nsficld propr>-<nl would be acceptable to
the C,>mmumsts who carefully have avoided
mcludmg En..<t Berlin m any plan to set up a
frl'e cny
rmmPdi •te pro.,pccts were for a hardening
of p >51 t1ems and an Increase of post Lions and
.ttl IUCreasc or tensions thts summer There
" ., poss1b1llty that the Russians will call an
11\lcrn ll.mal conference to sign a peace
t ren t\' 111 which ca.se It Is not likely the West
[From the New York Times, June 15. 1961 I
DISPUTED AREAS IN THE STATE OF THE UNION
(By Arthur Krock)
WASHINGTON, June 14.-DIJ!erence Of opin­Ion
and full freedom to express and promote
them, supply the life-blood of an open,
creative and free society. This Is no less the
fact because. as Is being widely noted, the
depth and duration or some of these dll!er­ences
among Americans are producing conse­quences
which suit Premier Khrushchev as
well as If he had planned them. But there
are controversies which the President has
the power to settle Insofar as national policy
Is concerned. yet which continue to rage be­cause
or the Irresolution or the conflict or
policy
For example. the administration builds up
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization In
Europe, and In the United Nations It weakens
the alliance It Is committed to noninter­vention
In the Western Hemisphere. but the
administration trained, equipped and trans­ported
the ant1-Castro Interventionists In
Cuba And then It denied them the air­power
coverage without which this am­phibious
landing had no chance to succeed.
The Preslden t Is sworn to preserve the
purchasing power or the dollar-specifically
to leave undisturbed the price of gold.
Nevertheless. he has been deluging Congress
with Government spendmg programs for
public welfare projects (of which the current
$6 billion housing bill as submitted Is
typ1cal). each In the same tone or urgency
that confers a No. 1 priority on each. The
administration JUstifies this nonmilitary
deficit spending on the unproved theory
that Its annual stimulation of the national
gross wealth will make it self-liquidating
before It can become lnfiatlonary. And this
calculation Is based on an even shakier
theory-that "real Income" Is produced by
Government spending and private spending
alike. despite the fact that the former can
spend only what It subtracts from the latter.
The administration evaluates the spread
of International communism to West Berlin,
Asta and Africa as a menace which mvst be
resisted by post tl vc and aggressl ve measures,
mcludlng military ones If these are required
to make the resistance effective and are
technically renslble. But Its policy Is wholly
passive toward Cuba, where the Castro gov­ernment
is becoming more and more closely
allied w1th Moscow and by covert and open
acts Is working on other Latin American peo­ples
to follow Its lead Yet no military base
which the United States maintains on the
Russian periphery as a deterrent to Soviet
att.tck on the West Is nearer. or In war more
dangerous potentially, to the Soviet Union
than Cuba Is to the United States.
The President in person has notified Pre­mtcr
Khrushchev that we will use force If
ncccss<try to support our occupation rights
and protect the people In West Berlin
a;:amst his plan to make It a free city, with
access facilities transferred to East Germany.
But while, In this grim showdown, our rights
ultimately might survive. West Berlin Itself
might not This is a sober military judg­ment
which calls for new but not surrender­type
thinking on an awesome problem. How­ever.
the only thinking of this kind revealed
thus far In administration quarters was Sen­ator
MANS>IELo's today· a "free city" com­posed
of the two Berllns wl th sound guar­antees.
which he also spec1ficd
rn sum. the indecisions of the President
and the administratiOn-Indecisions either
because no policy chotec has been made or
because two policies arc running In con­flict-
already are fostering, In at least six
vital areas of controversy. conse<jucnccs most
stuta.ble to Khrushchev In the s1xth area 1s
the controversy over further prolonging the
Geneva test-ban talks.
Although ( 1) no fallout peril would be
created bv resumln~~: selsmtc or even wean-
States. (21 no check on disarmament would
be tnvol\·ed because the existing stc:lckplles
already are sufficient to destroy civilization.
(3) and members of the Atomic Energy
Commission and the associated Joint Con·
gresslonnl Committees are urging that at a
minimum test preparations be made at once,
the President continues to hesitate.
He has been persuaded that world opinion
would not understand why test resumption
as a measure of vital secu.rlty has been forced
on the United St~tes by the Soviet Union.
Strange that this speculation should so
much Influence a President with his powers
of statement, an Ironclad case and reports
from qualified sources that there are at lea t
200 seismic events a year In Soviet territory
(From the Washington Evening Star, J une
15, 1961 1
BERLIN: A THIRD WAY
In his search for a "third way" In Berlin,
Majority Leader MIKE MANSFIELD rests hiS
case on the unassailable premise that the
deadlock there may "push the Western na­tions
and the Soviet Union Into a new vortex
or Irrationality at whose center lies the
graveyard or humanity." Those on both
sides who say they want to stand pat on
Berlin. come what may, should give serious
consideration to this prospect.
We do not lmow whether Senator MANS­FIELD's
remarks were of the Inspired "trial
balloon" variety, or whether he was speaking
on his own responslbll!ty. And perhaps It
doesn't matter. The Important thing, Is
that his speech makes sense.
As matters stand, both the West and the
Soviet Union are adhering to Irreconcilable
positions. These positions take little account
or the changes In Europe since the end or
World War II. some 16 years ago. And they
are also positions which, far from serving
real Interests. promise nothing better to all
concerned than the frightful consequences
of a nuclear collision
In this situation, the Montana Senator
calls for the taking of a new look-a search
for a third way In Berlin. Speclflcally, he
thinks that this third way may lie In the
creation or a free city which would encom­pass
not just West Berlin, but all of Berlin.
This free city would be "held In trust and
In peace by some International authority"
until such time as It can again serve as the
capital of Germany, and Its access routes
would be garrisoned by International peace
teams. Meanwhile. the hope would be that
the East and the West Germans could work
out their own unification problem.
Of course. all of this may be wishful think­Ing
Senator MANSFIELD does not pretend to
know how Mr. Khrushchev would react to
such a proposal. If It were put to hlm In
formal fashion, and there Is little In the
record to encourage belle! thl\t the Soviet
Premier would respond favorably. Still, as
the majority leader has stated, uncertainty
as to Mr. Khrushchev's reaction does not re­lieve
us of the obligation to explore any
and all avenues of peace "even as we steel
ourselves for what must come If the way
to peace cannot be found ...
What Is at stake here Is the future of man­kind-
most certainly Including Americans.
Russians and Germans. Even to, we cannot
yield to unilateral actiOn designed to force
us out of Berlin If Mr Khrushchev Will
concede nothing, then we and he- --mu t
accept the consequences But such a disa -
ter should not be called down upon the hu­man
race sirnply because nn ob~e~ tvc at­tachment
to old nnd outdated positions pn·­cludf's
exan"ll!Httlon of ratlonnl nllernnti\'C~
1 From til~ Great Fall Tribune. June 17.
19611
M'\N . ..,F ru.o ·s FRFE: CITY PLAN FOR BERLIN
M1KES Gooo S>.NSE
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 41, Folder 18, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
1961 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE 9999
trusteeship as a free city makes good sense.
That. would be a practical solution to the
renewed threat of a sUicidal East-West arms
conflict over the Berlin trouble spot, now
building up.
MANSFIELD's warning that "we are not en­gaged
In Berlin with the fast draw and TV
wax bullets any more than the Russians are
engaged In a harmless game of chess'' Is In
line with President Kennedy's report on his
exchange of views on Berlin with Khru­shchev
at Vienna.
As the President put It: "Our most solll;ber
talks were on the subject of Germany. and
Berlin."
Kennedy reamlrmed the U.S. determina­tion
to maintain at any risk Western access
routes to West Berlin and the freedom of
the city's 2 million Inhabitants.
Khrushchev, In turn, was emphatic In ex­pressing
his determination to change the ex­Isting
arrangement at Berlin.
As MANSFIELD sees It, ."sooner or later the
Western nations and the Soviet Union must
seek a new way"-an alternative to war-for
settlement of the Berlin controversy. Few
Informed observers disagree with his further
statement that unless a search for settle­ment
Is pursued with energy and dispatch,
sooner or later. "Berlin Is likely to become
the pivot of a new disaster to mankind."
!From the Providence Evening Journal. June
17, 19611
SENATOR MANSFIELD'S PLAN TO EASE THE
BERLIN CRISIS
As a counter to the Kremlin's demand that
West Berlin be turned Into a free city under
United Nations protection, Senator MIKE
MANSFIELD has revived his proposal that the
free-city status be applied to all Berlin.
This approach to the future of the former
German capital, now split In two by the cold
war and the source of a new crisis threat,
has not excited any more cheers In Bonn
than It did the first time Senator MANSFIELD
advanced It 2 years ago. Indeed, the pro­posal
has been greeted In West Germany with
even more dismay than In 1959 since In the
Interim Mr. MANSFIELD has become Senate
majority leader, exercising greater influence
than before.
From one point of view, the West German
perturbation has some basis In fact . Any
attempt to reunite the East and West sectors
of Berlin, one side a free society supported
economically by the West and the other side
totally communized, poses almost as many
practical problems as the reunification of
Germany Itself.
Indeed, the chances of the Soviet Union's
accepting the Idea are slight since the Krem­lin
designated East Berlin as the capital of
the Communist East German Government
and would be rei uctan t to remove Ulbricht's
headquarters from the city which still is the
emotional capital of all Germans.
Yet no move could be devised to break the
dangerous deadlock over Berlin that did not
arouse substantial objections. In contrast,
Senator MANSFIELD's proposal has several sig­nificant
virtues.
Khrushchev, whether intentionally or not,
has turned Berlin into a powder keg by de­manding,
In the form of successive near-ulti­matums,
that the Western Big Three retire
!rom West Berlin, which he has characterized
as a "bone In the throat" of the Communist
bloc that must be removed.
He sharpened the ultimatum in his meet­Ing
with President Kennedy In VIenna and
In his fireside chat to the Soviet people. It
will be Increasingly hard for him not to de­liver
something In the near future. Thus,
Western Insistence on the status quo for
West Berlin helps to keep Khrushchev on his
collision course.
The Mansfield idea, on the other hand,
would end the status quo and take the Big
Three stamp off West Berlin. Yet, It would
wring a matching concession from the SOviet
Union by forcing the ouster of the Ulbricht
government from East Berlin and restoring
the organic unl ty of the cl ty.
Thus, a change of status, satisfying an
acute Soviet need, would be achieved, but
the withdrawal from Berlin would be mu­tual.
One-sided concession by the West, de­manded
by the Kremlin, which would be a
disastrous and Intolerable defeat for the At­latlc
community and free world, would be
voided. Further, the danger of war over Ber­lin,
now a very real potential, would be
avoided for a few more years, giving the cold
war antagonists time to negotiate their criti­cal
differences.
At least, the proposal offers a talking point,
beyond the Soviet demands, and that Is more
than anyone or any nation in the Western
coalition has come up with yet.
The Idea is worth exploring further, even
If it turns out only as a gambit that would
place the Kremlin in the position of dog In
the manger, and take the West off the defen­sive
In the propaganda war over Berlin and
Germany.
1 i''ro n the WJshl.,gton Star. June 15, 19Gli
GOP HE\DS QUERY POLICY ON BERLIN
Republican leaders said yc,.terday t11e
cotPltry is entitled to know whether the pro­posal
of S2nate Dernocratic Lender MANSFIELD
to have all of Berlin declared a free city
under international control indicates any
chang~ in the foreign policy of the Kennedy
administration.
Senate Republican Leader DIRKSEN and
House Republican Leader HALLECK said that
when President Kennedy returned from his
Vienna meeting with SOviet Premier Khru­shchev
he made positive statements that this
country's position on Berlin had not been
changed and that the United States would
stand by its cxi•ting rights in West Ber­lin.
But Mr. HALLECK said it is hard to con­clude
that speeches in the Senate yesterday
by Senator MANSFIELD and other Democrats
were "made out of a clear sky."
Senator DIRKSEN said he got the impres ­sion
the remarks of both Democratic Lead­er
MANSFIELD and his assistant, Senator
HUMPHREY, were trial balloons to get the re­action
of the American people.
Advised of their statements, Senator MANS­FIELD
said he made his suggestion "entirely
on my own" and the administration "had
nothing whatever to do with it."
"I didn't even send copies of it to the
President or the State Department," Sen­ator
MANSFIELD told reporters. "It was not
a trial balloon, but a development of sug­gestions
I have been making for many
months."
!From the Baltimore Sun, June 15, 19611
EAST GERMANY ISSUES CALL FOR PEACE TREATY
MEETING
LONDON, Thursday, June 15.-Communlst
East Germany has demanded that West Ger­many
ban all rallies in a 3-m!le-wlde zone
along the border between the two Germanys,
especially demonstrations on June 17, anni­versary
of the 1953 anti-Communist uprising
In East Germany.
(By Bynum Shaw,
Bonn Bureau of the Sun)
BONN, June 14.-Communlst East Ger­many
today Issued an appeal to the United
States, Brita in, France, the Soviet Union,
Poland, and Czechoslovakia for the convoca­tion
of a conference to cone! ude a German
peace treaty.
The appeal, aimed at the beginning of
talks on a peace treaty with "both parts of
Germany" a lso called for a "norma!lzatlon
of the situation In w est Berlin."
West Berlin at present Is occupied by the
United States, Britain, and France. The
fourth part of the city, that which under
wartime agreements was occupied by the
Soviet Union, now bas been turned over to
East Germany. Communist appeals for nor­malization
never Include that portion of the
city In the text. ,
Today's East German resolution was ap­proved
by the Communist Central Commit­tee,
the State Council, the Council of Min­isters,
and the National Front. In all of
these organizations except the National
Front, Walter Ulbricht, former Red army
colonel, is the dominant figure. The resolu­tion
said the Bonn Government for years
has evaded all proposals based on peaceful
understanding
It said Bonn now faces a decision of "truly
htstonc importance "
In Bonn, a Government spokesman
shrugged off the East German proposal as
"parrot t,llk."
The spokesma:1 said there is no reason to
believe that the WPstern Powers are retreat­ing
before Soviet Premier Khrushchev's
VIenna demand s.
Government officials also were studying a
proposal by U.S. Senator MANSFIELD, Demo­crat,
of Montana. callmg for the creation
of a free city of Berlin which would In­clude
not only the Western but also the
Eastern sectors of the city.
While criticizing MANSFIELD's contention
that Berlin for the West is an untenable
position, these sources welcomer the pos­sibility
of a reestablishment of greater Ber­lin
as a unit.
Officials pointed out that in 1950 West
Germany had proposed free elections for all
of Berlin and the creation of an elective
council perhaps under four-power super­vision
for the operation of the city as a
whole.
JUDICIARY BILL GETS AN OK
There Is no hope here, however that the
Soviet Union would relinquish an Inch of
territory If the hope of gaining more.
Meanwhile, In Bonn, the Bundestag ap­proved
a bill which redefines the status of
the West German judic iary.
The bill would allow 72 judges who served
under the Hitler regime and are known as
"hanging judges," to ask for retirement in
the next year.
If they retire voluntarily, they will retain
full pension rights even If they are not yet
at the pensioning age of 65, If they de­cline
to accept this easy way out, they later
will be removed from office through a change
In the Constitution.
The enforced retirement would deprive
the judges of pension rights.
I From the Cincinnati Enquirer. June 16.
19611
PRELUDE TO RcmEAT?
This week's speech by Senator MIKF. MANS­FIELD,
the Democratic floor leader in the
Senate, Is illus trative of one of the gravest
weaknesses in the formulation of U.S. foreign
policy since the end of World War II.
Senator MANSFIELD, who is normally the
admmistration 's spokesman on such rna t­ters,
suggested as a third alternative that
the Berlin crisis be solved by converting the
prewar German capital mto a free city gov­erned
by an unnamed internatiOnal au­thority.
The Mansfield proposal is strikingly llke
Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev's long­time
advocacy of United Nations control of
Berlin. In view of the di,mal record of the
U.N. as an impartial arbiter in the Congo,
a U.N. mandate m Berlin would be tanta­mount
to a total ntrrender to the Soviet
Union and its Eas t German snteilite.
Quite apart from its basic unsoundness.
there are two particularly amazing features
in the Mansfield plan for Berlin.
First of all, Senator MANSFI>:LD told the
Senate that he was spcakmg simply as one
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 41, Folder 18, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
•
10000 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE . June 20
lawmaker. But a majority leader never
speaks as a mere lawmaker. Whether he
wants to be or not, he Is armed with the
prestige that his role as an administration
spokesman affords him. Every word he ut­ters,
consequently, will be Interpreted
throughout the world as having at least the
foreknowledge of the White House.
Secondly, Senator MANSFIELD could scarcely
have chosen a less opportune time to suggest
that the United States Is thinking of a Berlin
retreat. Too often In the past, we have ap­proached
an International crisis apparently
united, apparently conunltted, apparently
determined not to backtrack. And at that
crucial moment, someone steps forward with
an Intimation that the United States might
settle for !ar less than Its official spokesmen
have sought. This procedure Is like advertis­Ing
In advance that we don't mean whnt we
say. Our enemies are encouraged to stand
pat, to enlarge their demands.
The entire U.S. position In Berlin rests
on the occupation agreement concluded be­tween
the Big Four at the end of World
War II. We have been Insisting all along
that the Russians fulfill their obligations
under that compact and that they permit
the Western powers to fulfill theirs.
Entering Into' any new agreement would
immediately nulll!y the 1945 agreement. Our
rights In Berlin would be wiped away. So
would the obligations of the Russians.
Nothing, we think, would please Khru­shchev
more.
The administration should lo..e no time In
repudiating a surrender In Berlin and In
seeking to repair the damage that inevitably
accompanied the Mansfield proposal. Even
with such a disavowal from the White House,
the Western position will be seriously Im­paired.
[From the Dallas Morning News, June 16,
1961]
No MERIT IN MANSFIELD PLAN
Senator MIKE MANSFIELD's proposal that all
Berlin be turned over to an International
trusteeship as a free city Immediately raises
a question. Does President Kennedy ap­prove?
Only recently the President said flatly, "We
will fight for Berlin."
Then, at the summit conference, Khru­shchev
slammed the Issue of West Berlin
down on the table and Lssued an ultimatum
to the Western Powers to get out or the city
within 6 months.
While this now appears to have been the
most Important thing that happened at the
conference, the President did not mention
lt In hls report to the Nation. This creates
speculation as to whether the suggestion of
the Senate Democratic leader Is a move to
open the way for the President to back down
from his bold statement, "We will fight for
Berlin."
Mansfield's proposal ls utterly without
merit. It would merely strengthen Soviet
Russia. The original proposal for admlnls­tratlon
of Berlin was through a !our-power
agency, Including Russia. But Russia would
never cooperate and has schemed constantly
to put Berlin under Communist control.
This would be Russia's strategy under any
such program as Mansfield now suggests.
Russia desperately wants ·control of West
Berlin because that city Is a constant exhibit
of Western freedom against Soviet slavery.
A large majority of West Berlin citizens have
been constantly loyal to the West. To de­sert
them w,:,uld be a cowardly retreat by the
Western Powers. This woul(l depreciate
their prestige with the nations of the world
more than anything else that baa been done.
The President should immediately voice his
opposition to the Mansfield proposal. The
Senate should turn lt down.
[From the Phlladelphla. Evening Bulletin,
June 16, 1961]
THE FUTURE OP BERLIN
Premier Khrushchev has now served
warning, tor the third time, that the prob­lem
of Berlin and a divided Germany must
be solved wlthln a fixed period of time.
In 1958 he set the limit at 6 months, but
took no action to implement his threat.
Last year he fixed the new limit as "in 1961."
Now he has repeated this warning, in a
speech to the Russian people reporting on
his VIenna meeting with President Kennedy.
His speech contained little that was new,
and his manner was not bellicose. He sim­ply
restated the Russian condlltons for a
settlement--utterly unacceptable to the
West--but he stated them with a firmness
that left little doubt that East and West
this year will see a test of courage and de­termination
centering on Berlin.
His speech confirms President Kennedy's
report that the meeting at Vienna was a
somber one. What ls worse, it gives little
support to th6 one hope that President Ken­nedy
brought home: that as a result of the
meeting the chances for a dangerous mis­judgment
on either side should now be less.
The President's principal concern at
VIenna was to impress upon Khrushchev
that the West is In deadly earnest In de­claring
Its Intention of defending its rights
in Berlin, and will take whatever steps are
necessary to meet Its commitments to the
free people in West Berlin.
It Khrushchev was impressed, or his plans
altered, by the Vienna meeting, his address
to the Russian people did not show it. He
seems convinced that the West wlll, when
the chips are down, retreat !rom Its firm
position. .
II he continues to bold to this view and
acts upon lt, President Kennedy and our
Western allies wll! be compelled to find
means of showing him that be ls stll! mis­judging
the West; or make an lgnominous
retreat which would be Interpreted through­out
the world as meaning that the cold war
is lost.
FLIRTING WITH APPEASEMENT
President Kennedy's difficulties, in show­ing
that the West will not retreat at Berlin,
have been complicated meanwhile by the
fa<::t that Senator MIKE M.v<SFIELD has now
proposed, for the second time, exactly such
a solution for Berlin.
The danger doesn't lie in the scheme It­self,
since It's not likely to get far. What's
dangerous is the fact that lt has been put
forth by the Senate majority leader, and
that some of our European allies (and per­haps
Russia) are already wondering II It Is
a trial balloon sent up by the admlnlstratlon.
Senator MANSFIELD proposes that East and
West Berlin should be unified in a single
free city, which could better be called a de­fenseless
city. It would be held ln trust by.
an international authority. Both Soviet and
Western garrisons would be withdrawn, and
the city and its access routes would be
guarded by International peace teams.
The bugs In his plan are dragon size.
Khrushchev, for one thing, has repeatedly
declared of late that he wUI insist on a three­sided
makeup for any major International
control group, wlth a built-in Soviet veto to
paralyze Its work. It tills were agreed to
here, Berlln would be gone In a day.
Senator MANSi'IELD has Ignored some im­portant
questions: How long would West
Berlln remain free if its freedom depended
on the determination of International troops
from, say, India, to resist aggression or ,en.­croa<::
hment by Russia's East Gilrman pup­pets?
Does l:le seriously belleve that the
Soviet Union Is prepared to let East Ber­llners
and East Gilrmans be sUddenly ex­posed
to all the freedoms and prosperity now
enjoyed by West Berliners? I! he does, he
Is entitled without contest to the Pollyann&
medal of 1961.
Senator MANSFIELD puts forth his plan as
a third way to avoid dangers growing out of
the rlgtd positions taken by Russia and the
West.
His language suggests that both sides are
being stubbornly unreasonable.
The fact ls that the West is standmg on
agreements reached with the Soviet Union
in 1944. The Soviets are threatening to vio­late
them, to gobble up Berlln and one-third
of Germany. The difference Is like that be­tween
the rigid positions of an honest citi­zen
and the robber, who, at the point or a
gun, demands his purse.
[From the New York Herald Tribune, June
16, 1961]
SENATOR MANSFIELD'S INVITATION TO
MISCALCULATE
Senator MANSFIELD's proposal for making
a free city of Berlin was prompted, no doubt,
by that irresistible desire to be helpful which
frequently animates Members of Congress
when they happen to ponder great interna­tional
problems.
Whether from vanity or discretion, he in­sists
that this is his own idea, and not that
of an administration whose majority he
leads in the Senate.
But surely had he stopped to think, Sen­ator
MANSFIELD might have considered the
immediate background of events against
which this proposal was paraded, President
Kennedy's meeting with Mr. Khrushchev ln
Vienna disclosed that Berlin Is to be the tar­get
of a fresh onslaught by Soviet diplo­macy.
The !act that the Senate majority leader
openly suggests a Berlin solution radically
different !rom the position taken by the
West, and hal!way toward Mr. Khrushchev's
own, ls a serious diplomatic blunder.
We may be all too used to Senators speak­Ing
only for themselves, but nobody else I•
Indeed, one of the oldest ruses of diplomacy
Is to characterize as purely personal some­thing
which ls later to be unmasked as offi­cial.
We cannot blame Mr. Khrushchev, or
even Dr. Adenauer, !! they see a trial bal­loon
ln Mr. MANSFIELD's suggestion. Nor
wlll the foolish lmpractlcablllty or Its de ·
talls influence their judgment; trial bolloon'.
after all, are not meant to stay aloft very
long.
[From the New York Times, June 16, 1961]
THE TROUBLES KHRUSHCHEV SELDOM
MENTIONS
(By James ;Reston)
WASHINGTON, June 15.-There ls an odd
distortion In Premier Khrushchev's repon ·
today on his Vienna talks with President
Kennedy.
In discussing what the West might do lr
Moscow made a separate peace treaty w~+'· >
the Communist regime of East Germany, '·"
said: "Some threaten they will not recogn'7"
the treaty and will use force to oppose i
Any force against us will be answered by
force. We have the means."
This ls odd because President Kennedy
personally reassured Mr. Khrushchev on th"
point In Vienna. He drew a sharp dlstlnctln''
between the legal aspects of signing a tree ,
with East Germany and the practical prob­lem
o! getting SU!Jplles through to West Ber­lin.
The President emphasized that the United
States would continue to meet its obliga ­tions
to supply the 2,200,000 people of Wes,
Berlln, by force 1! necessary, but that It was
not particularly concerned about who
stamped the papers at the East Berlin bor­der,
just so the supplles went through,
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 41, Folder 18, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
1961 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE 10001
Nevertheless, In his fireless-side chat to­night,
the Soviet leader set up the straw­man
and threatened to use force under cir­cumstances
which the President had told
him would not occur. In fact, when Presi­dent
Kennedy went on to London from
Vienna, the point was repeated that the
Western nations were not going to war over
the color of the stamp on scraps of paper
but that they were determined to get the
supplies through.
Khrushchev, however, is setting the stage
for summoning a big peace conference on
Germany at the October meeting of the
Communist parties. Washington won't like
this and won't participate in such a confer­ence,
but nobody here is going to mobilize
the troops to bang through Helmstedt toward
West Berlin just because the Soviet leacter
needs to sign a peace treaty with East Ger­many
for internal Communist reasons.
Having had previous problems with his
own allies, President Kennedy understands
Mr. Khrushchev's political problems. There
is plenty of trouble in the Communist para­dise.
Their agricultural policies have been
a spectacular failure. This was supposed
to be Khrushchev's specialty when he came
to power, but it has been his greatest disap­pointment.
In China the food situation is
desperate and may prove by the end of this
year to be the biggest flop and tragedy of
1961.
One result of this is that China is con­stantly
pressing the Soviet Union for more
supplies than Moscow wishes to give and
at the same time challenging Khrushchev's
ideological and political leadership.
All is not well for Khrushchev In other
places either. His dreams of conquest in the
Middle East have not materialized. Nasser
has turned on him and vice versa. Iraq has
not fallen into his lap as the Communist
brethren anticipated. Albania has been de­fying
Moscow and has forced Khrushchev to
dismantle his submarine base in that coun­try.
In fact, Khrushchev's whole campaign to
establish a three-headed control of interna­tional
machinery is a direct result not of
Soviet successes recently but of a spectacu­lar
Soviet defeat in the Congo, where the
U.N. forced the Communists out.
It is no wonder Khrushchev wants to pre­pare
the way for at least the impression of
a victory at the big Communist blowout in
October. In Communist terms, his record
is not one of unrelieved success. He is
picking up some easy victories in Laos and
other places close to Soviet borders, but his
difficulties with Peiplng, Carlo, and Albania,
his failure to get the supplies anticipated
from East Germany, the increasing pressure
for more food and freedom in Eastern Eu­rope
and even In the Soviet Union itself­ali
these make his life less serene than it
sometimes appears to be in the West.
Thus, his threats to use force in Germany
sound brave enough but actually mean very
little. If he really wants to show how brave
he Is, a li he has to do is to encourage the
East Germans to block the supply routes
to Berlin, and then he will have a test of
courage that will make Stalingrad look like
a tea party.
For this Government is not thinking of
making all of Berlin a free city, no matter
what Senator MIKE MANSFIELD says, and It
is not thinking of war to keep Khrushchev
from signing a peace treaty with East
Germany.
It is merely saying that it will not a ban­don
the West Berliners; that It will supply
them no matter who stamps the papers, and
It is advising Khrushchev not to let the sup­plies
be stopped unless he wants to risk
everything achieved by the Soviet revolution
in the last 40 years.
1 From the New York Daily News, June
16, 1961]
APPEASEMENT AND DEFEATISM
-to come out for a new Berlln setup that
has the mackerel-in-the-moonlight smell of
appeasement and defeatism.
It is the Montana 'Democrat's (and Sen­ate
majority leader's) thought that, pending
unification of Germany, all Berlin should be
trusted to some international authority, with
en trances and exits kept open by peace
forces like those which have prevented war
between Israel and Egypt but have not pre­vented
persistent unrest in the former Bel­gian
Congo.
Such a rejiggering in Berlin would obvi­ously
open the whole city to conquest by
Communist mobs, with the Red Army back­ing
them up, unless the peace f or ces were
big enough to beat back the Russian legions.
By agreeing to it, the Western AJlies would
recognize East Germany's Communist "gov­ernment,"
at least unofficiaJiy, and cause the
captive nations to lose aJI hope of liberation.
Concerning the Ma n sfield proposal. Sena­tor
EvERETT M. DIRKSEN, of Illinois, wants to
know whether it is a trial balloon indicat ­ing
that the Kennedy administration now
plans to weasel gradually and slyly out of its
repeated promises to stand firm on West
Berlin.
MANSFIELD says it is not; but, with all due
respect to him, it seems to us that what is
needed in some reassurance from the Presi­dent
himself. Khrushchev, you'Jl remem­ber,
said long before the 1960 election that
he expected to be able to deal with a new
U.S. President, whereas he couldn't get to
first base with Eisenhower.
]From the Washington Star, June 16, 1961]
WEST GERMANS PROTES T PLAN OF MANSFIELD
BoNN, GERMANY, June 16.- The West
German Government has come out strongly
against the Mansfield proposals for a com­promise
solution to the Berlin problem.
Foreign Ministry spokesman, Guenther
von Hase, told a news conference yesterday
the plan would mean deepening the division
of Germany and legalizing to a certain de­gree
Communist East Germany. Mr. Hase
said West Germany would never agree to
this.
U.S. Senator MIKE MANSFIELD had pro­posed
uniting the present Communist and
Western sectors of Berlin and creating a uni­fied
free city. I t would be held in trust by
an international organization until Germany
is reunified.
Senator MANSFIELD argued in his speech
before the Senate that this would be one way
to avert the threat of nuclear war that hangs
over the Berlin issue because of the seeming
impossibility of the United States and the
Soviet Union to agree on a solution. He
emphasized that he was speaking for him­self,
not for the administration.
"We are convinced that the Senator put
forward this plan with the best of inten­tions,
but we regret that we cannot call it
good," Mr. Hase said.
"To foJiow the plan would mean dividing
Germany into three parts," Mr. Hase said,
meaning West and East Germany, plus the
new free city of Berlin.
The longstanding policy of West Germany
is to end the present division of the coun­try
through free elections and reestablish
Berlin as the national capital.
"The solution of the Berlin problem can­not
be treated separately," Mr. Hase said.
"Berlin ts a part of free Germany and must
become the capital of a unified Germany."
Then Mr. Hase bore down on the Mans­field
proposal that West Germany and East
Germany get together on a new status for
Berlin. Mr. Hase said this would give a form
of rec.J;;nition and legalization to Commu­nist
East Germany, a step West Germany
has firmly opposed. It even refuses to main­tain
diplomatic relations with countries that
extend them to East Germany.
Praise was given Senator MANSFIELD for
treating Berlin as a whole, in contrast with
Premier Khrushchev. In his memorandum
to President Kennedy Mr. Khrushchev de­manded
that only the western sector o! the
city be internationalized and demilitarized.
The eastern sector would remain the capi­tal
of East Germany, fully under Commu­nist
controL
Mr. Hase said: "The Senator speaks cor­rectly
of the whole of Berlin," but that was
a ll he had good to say abou t the Mansfield
pla!1.
1 From t!1e Washington Daily News, June 16,
1961]
MIKE DENIES FLYING BERLIN BALLOON
WASHINGTON, June 15.-Republican Con­gressional
chiefs demanded to know today
whether Senate DemocratiC Leader MIKE
MANSFIELD's proposal that Berlin be made a
free city was a trial balloon for an admin­istration
policy shift.
MANSFIELD promptly denied that his su g­gestion
yesterday in a Senate speech was
designed to test. public reaction. The Mon­tana
Democrat said the speech merely was
a compilation of views he and others had
expressed previously. MANSFIELD said he had
not given an advance copy of his remarks
to the White House or the State Depart­ment.
Asked about the GOP statement, Associate
White House Press Secretary Andrew Hatcher
declined comment.
MANSFIELD said yesterday that Russia and
the United States must compromise their
differences on Berlin or risk nuclear war. He
proposed a third way-making East an<l West
Berlin a free city. It would remain under
international trusteeship pending German
reunification.
WONDER IF IT'S A FEELER
Senate Republican Leader EvERETT M.
DIRKSEN and House GOP chief CHARLES A.
HALLECK questioned Whether MANSFIELD'S
statement was a feeler to determine public
reaction to any new Berlin policy.
HALLECK said the people are entitled to
know "whether there is an official change in
our p osition toward Berlin."
President Kennedy told the Nation after
his Vienna meeting with Khrushchev that
he emphasized to the Soviet Premier this
country's determination to defend its treaty
rights and access to West Berlin.
BONN, June 15.-West Germany never
would sign a proposal, such as Senator
MANSFIELD suggests, to make Berlin a free
city under an international trusteeship, a
Government spokesman said tOday.
Foreign Ministry spokesman Karl Gunther
Von Hase said that MANSFIELD's suggestion
was "incompatible with the inalienable claim
of the German people toward reunification
and freedom."
Von Hase said East Germany's leaders
would have no right to sign such a plan
either, since East Germany "is far from sov­ereign."
Mansfield's remarks came as something or
a shock In West Germany, where they re­ceived
banner headlines.
BERLIN, June 15.- East German Commu­nist
leader Walter Ulbricht today openly
threatened Interference with West Berlin's
traffic should a German peace treaty be
signed. He hinted that A111ed planes would
be force down !! they tried another Berlin
airlift.
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 41, Folder 18, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
10002 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE June 20
Speaking In East Btrlln, U.l.>r.,ht advised
the United States, Britain and France to
start Immediate negotiations If they want to
travel to Berlln after a treaty Is signed. He
said road, rall and air traffic would be In­terrupted
unless the West signed agreements
with East Germany.
GERMAN RAPS "FREE CITY"
The proposal by Senator MIKE MANSFIELD,
Democratic majority leader, to turn Berlln
Into a free city would make the German
metropolis "a city without freedom," Baron
Karl T. Guttenberg, member of the German
Parllament, declared yesterday. He spoke at
Waldorf ceremonies commemorating the
8th anniversary of the East German uprising.
Guttenberg said that replacing the oc­cupying
powers-the United States, Great
Britain and France--by any International au­thority
would mean setting up an instru­ment
for Eastern Intervention.
!From the Washington Post, June 17, 19611
RUMORS OF CoNCESSIONS: WEST AGAIN FACES
ISSUE OF ACTION ON BERLIN
(By Chalmers M. Roberts)
Once again the United States and Its
Brl tlsh and French all1es face this question
over Berl)n: should they attempt to stand
pat on the present arrangement; should
they offer to negotiate but only In a Jlmlted
way which could lead to no new agreement
with the Soviet Union; or should they take
the risk of some daring new proposals?
Officially, the United States Is standing
pat. But everyone who went through the
last Berlin crisis, the one precipitated by
Soviet Premier Nlklta S. Khrushchev's ulti­matum
of Thanksglvmg Day, 1958, assumes
the West wlll go to the conference table
once again to avert a mllltary showdown.
The real question, then, Is whether the
West will again offer some small concessions
or whether It wlll try for a settlement on
the basis of some major new proposals.
Yesterday both the State Department and
the Bntlsh Foreign Office flatly denied a
London Dally Tele~;raph report that Western
experts were working on a plan In which
the West would concede some kind of recog­nition
of Communist East Germany and
the present Oder-Nelsse border between East
Germany and Poland In exchange for a
permanent arrangement for free West
Berlin.
Secretary of State Dean Rusk told news­men
the article was "just not accurate," that
he foresaw no change In the pollcy of stand­Ing
firm on Berlin.
Denials to the contrary notwithstanding,
It Is a fact that there has been at least diS­cussion-
some time back, not just since
Khrushchev's demand for a German peace
treaty In 1961-of this very Idea. How far
It has gone Is unknown but It Is a fact that
some very Important persons In the Admin­Istration
have at least scouted the Idea as
a possibility.
The State Department also took pains to
knock down the Idea that Senate Majority
Leader MIKE MANSFIELD'S Wednesday speech,
calllng for establishment of a free city com­posed
of both East and West Berlln, was an
Administration trial balloon.
MANSFIELD has said he was talking entirely
on his own. In fact he avoided telling r.ny­one
In the Administration In advance lest
they try to argue him out of making lt. His
point was to get discussion going.
These are not tl>e only people In Washing­ton
talking about a bold approach to the
Berlin Issue. Columnist Walter Lippmann
alluded to It on a television Interview Thurs­day
night.
Where It wlll come out Is now totally un­certain
since agre-ement will be necessary
not just among the experts but among Pres­Ident
Kennedy, French President Charles de
Gaulle and British Prime Minister Harold
Macmillan. Their current posture Is to
"stand firm."
Today In West Berlin there will be a mas­sive
rally, called by Mayor Willy Brandt, to
give the West Berliner's answer to Khru­shchev.
It will be the eighth anniversary
of the abort! ve 1953 East Berlin and East
German uprising, an uprising crushed by
Soviet mill tary power.
The White House yesterday had no com­ment
on Khrushchev's radio-television
speech of Thursday though the President
received a transcript of the text.
[From the New York Mirror, June 17, 1961]
AaE WE READY?
In the teeth of the Khrushchev ultima­tum,
the free world must make a choice. Its
nations must stand up and be counted.
There Is no "third way "
For if a third way Is to be entertained,
the way proposed by Senator MANSFIELD, for
Instance, to the disservice of his country, In
our opinion, then there Is to be more com­promise
and appeasement.
The time for all that Is past.
This may be our last chance.
Khrushchev's ultimatum Is that there
must be a German peace treaty on his terms
by the end of this year, December 31, 1961.
This means a treaty agreement between
East and West with both Germanys or a
unilateral treaty on Communist Russia's
part with Communist East Germany.
It Is not enough to say that must call
Khrushchev's bluii; we must stand firm even
at the risk that he Is not bluJilng.
But Is this a time for utter pessimism?
We believe not. All the cards are not In
Khrushchev's hands, for-
We hold some aces on our own side, If
we've got the guts to play out the game-­we
and our allies.
Our advantage lies In the enemy's weak­ness;
he Is weak In many ways.
1. The Russian people, with whom we
have no quarrel, Insistently are demanding
more of the fruits of peace, more of the
good things of life which ccmmunlsm prom­Ised
and never gave.
2. We are In West Berlin by right and
treaty.
3. The only solution of the so-called Ger­man
problem Is by free, supervised elections
conducted throughout all Germany. The
world should be reminded continually that
Soviet Russia agreed to elections-and re­neged.
4. West Berlin, an enclave within East Ger­many,
has become the world's brightest
showcase of freedom. By thousands each
week, refugees fiee to Its sanctuary from the
Communist surroundings.
5. More Important than all else Is the eco­nomic
power which we, and to a greater
extent our allles, hold over the Communist
heartland and Its subverted satellites. Are
we and our allies ready to take a declsl ve
step now and cut off all trade with commu­nism
and Its bullyragging leader? Therein
lies a positive and powerful reply to Khru­shchev.
All trade means all In both directions. It
means not only the strategic goods but the
nonstrategic as well-the "soft" goods, the
luxury Items, the machine tools (how can
they be called nonstrategic), the food, the
loans, the grants, etc. It means we should
buy nothing from Russia or any other Com­munist
land, no oll, no furs or raw materials,
no gourmet's delights such as caviar and
Polish hams, no geegaws !or the Christmas
trees, or felt hats, pocketbooks, leather­goods-
anything.
It Is with the bard currencies Russia gains
!rom her trade with the West that she
finances propaganda, subversion, espionage,
riots In which the mobs and students are
paid performers. That money should be cut
off.
Such a program would call for courage, for
patriotism ahead of profit; !or survival ahead
of greed.
Are we ready to stand up? Are our allies
ready?
The chance to answer the questions affirm­atively
may never come again.
[From the New York Times, June 18, 1961)
WESTERN DIFFERENCES
As to the possibility of negotiating a new
agreement on Berlin, there have been dif­ferences
In the West. The British have
leaned toward fiexlblllty on negotiating a
new agreement, while the West Germans
have spoken strongly against any compro­mise.
Talk of a "new approach" to the problem
was heard In the Senate where Majority
Leader MIKE MANSFIELD repeated a proposal
he has made before. It calls !or making all
Berlin a free cl ty to be held In trust by an
International authority, and for garrisoning
the access routes with International peace
terms.
The proposal aroused speculation that Mr.
MANSFIELD was sending up a trial balloon !or
the administration, but he Insisted he was
speaking only for himself. Secretary of
State Dean Rusk, In an effort to counter sus­picion
that a revision of policy might be In
the making, declared there had been no
change In the U.S. determination to stand
firm on Its rights In West Berlin and to pro­tect
the city's people.
Perhaps the strongest comment of the
Khrushchev proposals came from Dirk U.
Stlkker, the new Secretary General of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, who
accused the Soviet Premier or deliberately
provoking tension. Dr. Stlkker said: "We
must make up our minds about what we are
ready to do."
Thus It appears the anti-Communist al­liance
will face a sfern test of nerves and wlll
In the next few months.
1 From the New York Times, June 18, 19611
GERMAN UNITY CRY HAs WEAKER SouND-­HoPEs
FOR A FREE, UNDIVIDED COUNTRY ARE
DIMMED BY THE INCREASED PRESSURE FROM
KHRUSHCHEV
(By Gerd Wilcke)
BoNN, GERMANY, June 17.-Today Is Na­tional
Unity Day In West Germany and West
Berlin and hundreds of thousands of free
Germans are gathering to commemorate the
uprising 8 years ago of the population of
East Germany against Communist rule.
In essence, the words spoken at today's
rallles are similar to those used last year
and the years before. But the cry for unity
has attained a hollow sound. As one of the
more responsible newspapers of West Ger­many
put It this week:
"We wlll commemorate the day as we did
In the past seven years. But next year's June
17 will not be the same. We can predict
thIs wl thou t resorting to crystal bails. It Is
self-explanatory because Premier Khru­shchev
has left no doubt that he Is deter­mined
to settle the German and Berlin ques­tions
before the end of the year."
The editorial and other written and
spoken comment on this "Tag der Elnhelt"
reflect a far greater sense of reall ty than
Germans were willing to subscribe to In the
past. Although used to propagandistic pin­pricks
from the East there Is, after Premier
Khrushchev's Thursday speech, a greater
conviction among Germans that he means
business.
GERMAN DOUDTS
At the same time there Is an Increasing
lack of conviction that the West means bUSI­ness
to the same degree. As one German
put It: "The Impact of Premier Khrushchev's
radio n.nd tete•1lslon address was great here
not because he said anything new but be-
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 41, Folder 18, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
1961 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE 10003
cause he said it after seeing the American
President."
Although Germans admired the firm way
President Kennedy presented the West's
case in Vienna, they are not entirely con­vinced
that the President will stick it out.
They read with amazement of Senator
MIKE MANSFIELD's suggestion for a compro­mise
in Berlin. Although they cannot be
certain from this distance whether Senator
MANSFIELD refiects the President's views,
they are certain that he represents a current
of thought.
What w!ll happen If the Russians put
through their plan?
In VIenna President Kennedy was ex­tremely
forthright In telling Premier Khru­shchev
what the Western all!es were ready
to do to maintain their access to Berlin.
But the feeling is that the President did not
make clear enough what the West would do
if the Russians sign a separate peace treaty
with Communist East Germany.
This, it is felt, provided Premier Khru­shchev
with au Important opening that
could allow him to sign a treaty without
fear that the West would offer any vigorous
military response.
Now the prospect is that Premier Khru­shchev
will call a conference before the year
Is out to proceed with a treaty for East
Germany, The West, as has been indicated,
w!ll Ignore the conference.
Once the treaty Is signed, Germans feel,
a period of quiet may follow to settle nerves
and allow the West to get accustomed to the
Idea before the squeeze is put on. The
squeeze could take several forms.
First the East Germans could demand the
right to stamp the papers of the Western
allies using the access routes to Berlin.
PERSONNEL CHECKS
Even If the West took the view that It
would not be worthwhile to go to war over
rubber stamps or even if the late John
Foster Dulles' theory was followed-that the
East Germans were merely acting as agents
of the Soviet Union-the question of East
Germans checking on allied personnel would
be a ticklish one.
Then, as East Germany's Communist
Chief Walter Ulbricht discussed in his news
conference this week, there is the question
of air safety over Berlin.
'I)le Russians could someday withdraw
thetr representative from the all!ed air con­trol
center and send an East German In­stead.
The West would have to take a
stand immediately. Aside from the military
needs, It would have to consider the safety
of the 100-odd commercial planes that touch
on Berlin every day.
Then there are the more than 2 million
Berliners who have remained free because
they had the protection of the allies. A
cutoff from West Germany would bring back
old hardships even it a new airlift-if that
Is still feasible-would keep open a lifeline.
AI though present supplies of vital food­stuffs,
coal, building materials, gasoline and
so forth are so huge that West Berliners
could get by for up to a year, immediate
problems would arise In other fields.
Because the city is not self-sufficient Bonn
pumps about 1,500 million deutsche marks
( $375 million) into Berlin each year. Bonn
also buys more than 60 percent of the city's
manufactured products.
If the money were cut off, the city's budg­et
would be unbalanced and it would have
no funds to extend business credits, pay old­age
penstons or restitutions to Nazi victims.
An Isolation of Berlin also would shut
the gateway of the thousands of East Ger­mans
who seek refuge in the West every
~onth, He~r Ulbricht calls the refugee camps
spy nests of the Western allies. For those
who go there the reception centers are the
last ray of hope that there st!ll is freedom
and human dignity.
No.l03--6
' i DECISION NEEDED
The rqueeze on Berlin, ·which for the So­viet
camp would be a step-by-step fight to
gain recognition for East Germany, could
go on Indefinitely but surely a point would
come where the West would have to decide
how much It wants to take.
One cannot judge from here where this
point Is as It involves the great unknown of
the West's contigency planning going on in
Western capitals.
But this much is clear. Premier Khru­shchev's
apparent conviction that he can get
away with a separate peace treaty and Its
consequences for Berlin despite allied warn­ings
has made a deep Impression on Ger­mans
and has disturbed them.
Although the West has said no to Premier
Khrushchev's formula, people here feel that
a negative response alone Is no policy. What
is more, they fear that any compromiEe on
Berlin is the first step out of Berlin.
What weapons can West Germans use to
fight a compromise? The biggest, it seems,
is the weapon of discouragement.
After the United States, West Germany
makes the largest manpower contribution
to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
If the Germans were to lose faith in the
West, the concept of Western defense would
go by the board. It also would bring up
the danger that a future West German Gov­ernment
might look for Its own accommoda­tions
with the Russians. It would not be
the first time in history.
All this refiects a great turning point in
the Germans' thinking. They feel Premier
Khrushchev is determined to have things
his way. But they ask themselves: "How
determined is the West?"
[From the Wall Street Journal, June 16,
1961]
THE BONE IN KHRUSHCHEV'S THROAT
Berlin, the bone Khrushchev says must
come out of the Soviet throat, is u sually
regarded as the one object above all that the
United States will not release. Yet a good
many Americans have long felt that, because
our position there is so awkward and poten­tially
dangerous, some new arrangement
needs to be worked out with the Soviets.
The position is awkward and potentially
dangerous, as it must be in an enclave 110
miles east of the Iron Curtain. A new ar­rangement
is needed-the kind that would
reratify Western rights in West Berlin and
make the Soviets and their East German
stooges respect them once and for all.
That, however, is not what is usually
meant by a new arrangement; Increasingly
the talk Is of a compromise between the So­viet
and the United States positions. One
of the most thoughtful of such plans in
Senator MANSFIELD's for a "third way" out
of the Berlin problem which Khrushchev
posed once more in his speech yesterday.
Khrushchev proposes that West Berlin be
made a free city, detached from West Ger­many,
with East Berlin an integral part of
East Germany; in this way he hopes to gain,
gradually if not at once, all Berlin. MANs­FIELD
proposes that the whole city be united
as a free city held in trust by an interna­tional
authority, presumably the U.N. Its
status would be guaranteed by NATO and the
Communist Warsaw Pact satellites; Its access
routes would be garrisoned by international
peace teams.
Like all "third ways" we have so far heard
ot, this falls short of the requirements of
U.S. security. U.N. troops are too easily used
!or the political purposes of their national
masters, as has been notoriously the case in
the Congo; they are not safe substitutes for
United States, British, and French soldiers
in Berlin. Indeed, if Khrushchev were to
accept such a proposal, It would be cause for
real alarm, for it would mean he saw his
dream of grabbing all Berlin coming true.
. The reality, we suspect, is that it is all but
tmposstble to negotiate a safe new arrange­ment
wtth the Soviets along these lines. we
are in Berlin by our rights of conquest; we
remain by power. But does this make it an
in tolerable situation?
Let us remember that Berlin is in truth
a bone gagging Khrushchev's throat; to that
extent, his discomfort should be a comfort
to us. West Berlin is the gateway to free­dom
for millions from the East. It is living
proof, day in and day out, of the lie of the
Communist promise. No wonder Khru­shchev
can't stand it. But we can.
Khrushchev is expected to make more
tro:>ble in Berlin later in the year-inter­fermg
with traffic and a lot of other things.
Certamly the harassments and complica­tiOns
he can cause are almost limitless, as we
know from the Berlin blockade and Jesser
annoyances since then. This prospect has
led some to fear that he may be able to
mbble. us out of Berlin, somewhat as he is
domg m Laos.
It could happen-but only if we let it
happen. Berlin is not Laos. Rightly or
wrongly, we let Laos go because everything
including the apathy of the people, seemed
against us; and we could let it go without
abandoning all Asia. In Europe, the divid­ing
line was long since clearly drawn, and
Berlm Is the outpost. Our determination
to defend Berlin represents nothing more nor
less than our determination to defend West­ern
Europe and America.
With that resolve, we can meet Khru­shchev's
provocations, whatever they may be.
And if he should throw at us the ultimate
provocation of war, then we must face that
in the reallza tion only surrender could have
averted it. The worst thing that could hap­pen
to America is not war but the despairing
notion that nothing is worth fighting for.
The firmer we are, the less chance of war.
Fundamentally, Berlin is Khrushchev's
problem, not ours. Let him push and prod,
nibble and seek to negotiate us out; we need
only stand fast. It is not up to us to offer
new arrangements to accommodate his greed·
it Ls up to him to begin acting civilized. '
If he ever should, then It might be pos­sible
to make a safe and more peaceful settle ­ment_
of th~ status of Berlin. But if he per­sists
m belltgerence, our first duty is to make
clear there is no third way out of our com­mitment
to freedom.
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 41, Folder 18, Mansfield Library, University of Montana

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Transcript

9992
·~iY.
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE fr June f20
prehe~e about setting a precedent
that could have no end if tha:t were
done. I understand that the committee
actually did approve the item, and then
decided to take it out because of the
State ownership of the land. I should
like to have a little amplification as to
what the committee would do If the
State or University did surrender suffi­cient
land to the Federal Government
for this purpose.
lion were provided in the regular bill for
1961.
REGULAR AcrfVITI!S OF THE DEPARTMENT
For the regular activities of the De­partment,
the committee recommends
an appropriation of $1,397,822,500, an in­crease
of $39.6 million over 1961. This
is $12 million under the estimates, and
$18.9 million over the amounts carried
in the bill as it came to us from the other
body.
RESEARCH AND COOPERATIVE EXTENSION
PROCR..-.MS
The committee recommends some
modest changes in the appropriations
for research, for the Federal research
and the "Payments to States" item.
The bill provides $78 million for the
Agricultural Research Service, an in­crease
of $6,782,500 over the 1961 appro­priations.
I may say that this is one item whi
is over the budget estimate and th
amount recommended by the other body.
The bill provides for the first time $1
million for a contingency research fund,
to meet unforeseen and urgent research
needs.
The committee also recommended a
number of increases totaling one and a
half million dollars for what it considers
urgent needs on current research.
PAYMENTS TO STATE EXPERIMENT STATION'S
For the research payments to the State
experiment stations, an increase of $4
million over 1961 is proposed. This
makes the total $36.5 million. One mil­lion
dollars of this is directed toward In­vestigations
of research on the elimina­tion
of weeds. This has become a very
serious problem.
For payments to States for cooperative
extension work, $59,790,000 is provided.
This is an increase of $3.2 million of new
funds for distribution to the various
States under the formula.
SOIL AND WATER CONo6ERVATION PROGRAMS
For the agricultural conservation pro­gram,
the committee recommends an
advance authorization for the 1962 pro­gram
of $250 million, this being the
amount that has been authorized for this
program for many years.
For soil and water conservation pro­grams
administered by the Soil Conser­vation
Service, the committee recom­mends
$176 million, an increase of $20.8
million over 1961. This increase is prin­cipally
for installing works of improve­ments
in the watershed programs.
SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM
The committee recommends an appro­priation
for the school lunch program
of $125 million, an increase of $15 mil­lion
over 1961. I am sure all the Mem­bers
of the Senate are aware that a
much larger amount than that is fur­nished
for the program through the allo­cation
of surplus commodities and the
expenditure of section 32 funds.
LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS
The committee recommends loan au­thorizations
totaling $318 million for the
lending programs administered by the
Farmers Home Administration. These
authorizations are $51 million over 1961
and are $33 million over the amounts
provided in the bill as it came from the
other body.
For rural electnf:cation loans, the
committee recommends the full budget
estimate of $195 million, plus a contin­gency
authorization of $50 million, mak­ing
a total $245 million of new loan au­thorizations
available for 1962.
For the rural telephone authoriza­tions,
a total of $162,500,000 is recom­mended,
of which $12,500,000 is for con­tingency
reserve authorization.
I believe that brief statement covers
the larger items in the blll.
Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Mr.
President, as the ranking Republican
member of the Subcommittee on Agri­culture
Appropriations, I commend the
senior Senator from Georgia for the ex­cellent
work he has done in handling
this complicated and exceedingly impor­tant
bill now before the Senate. Only
modest increases have been made over
the House figures. These are mainly in­creases
in authorizations for the REA,
RTA, and the Farmers Home Adminis­tration,
all of which were well justified
·n the hearings.
The bill as a whole represents a very
nd approach to the fiscal problems
of riculture, and the amount that is
bein asked for is needed.
I s port the bill as reported by the
Comm ee on Appropriations.
Mr. IRKSEN. Mr. President, I
should e to ask the distinguished
chairman the subcommittee about a
matter on ich I addressed a letter to
him, which pears at page 1090 of the
hearings.
I ask unani
of the letter b
at this point.
There being n
was ordered to be
as follows :
Hon. RICHARD B. RusSEL
Chairman, Subcommitte
Committee pn Approp
ate, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The
frul t-breeding sta tlon at Sou
University at Carbondale, Ill.,
nectlon with the work they hav
lng, there Is belle! that they caul
greenhouses to good advantage.
It I estimated that the cost o
greenh would be approximately,
repeat app tely, $70,000 and an a
way to join th nhouses In the sum
$30,000.
Representative Ro BE
of the House Subcommltte
Appropriations, h as also made
ments In support of this project whe
lngs were held.
One of the reasons for the $30,000 request
!or alleyways Is that due to the nature or
the project It Is necessary to Isolate the
greenhouses.
Any consideration the subcommittee can
give to this need will be appreciated.
Sincerely,
EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN,
U.S. Senate Minority Leader.
Mr. DIRKSEN. I may interpolate at
this point by saying that the matter
relates to the building of greenhouses
for a fruit-breeding station proposed at
the University of Southern TI!inois. The
whole amount involved would have been
$100,000, but it is my understanding
that these greenhouses would have to
be built on State, ra.ther than Federal
property, and that the committee is ap-
Mr. RUSSELL. The committee was
very anxious to provide for this item
We realize that the distinguished Sena­tor
from Illinois does not request a great
deal from the Committee on Appropria­tions.
We are familiar with his long
record of dealing with the agricultural
appropriations bill when he was a Mem­ber
of the other body. He handled it
for years. I do not know whether I
should say it was at that time my "priv­ilege"
or "misfortune" to meet him in
conference on many occasions, because
in those days he was a very hard man
to convince about the appropriation of
money.
The committee considered this item.
We approved it provided the funds were
to be expended on Federal laRds. The
clerk of the committee investigated and
ascertained that the Federal Govern­ment
owned no lands at this installation.
It is, I understand, a worthwhile State
station, but we did not feel we could
appropriate funds for the building of
greenhouses on State land without yield­ing
in the future to the numerous sim­'
lar requests which the committee fre­ucntly
receives. So we were compelled,
regretfully, to deny the Senator's re­uest.
There are instances, I understand,
hen title is conveyed to the Federal
Government to lands on State stations.
But in this instance we were powerless
to assist the Senator on this item.
Mr. DIRKSEN. The Senator may or
ay not be able to answer, but in the
vent sufficient land were conveyed to
he Federal Government for this pur­ose,
what. in the Senator's judgment,
ould be the action of the committee?
Mr. RUSSELL. It is always difficult
undertake to predict what action any
mmittee of the Senate will take; but
this were a cooperative project--and
nderstand that State experimental
M ·k is carried on there with both State
Federal funds--I know of no reason
the committee should not approve
very modest request, if the green­houses
were to be constructed on lands
owned by the Federal Government.
Mr. DIRKSEN. I thank the distin­guished
Senator from Georgia.
BERLIN-A STRATEGIC AREA
Mr. BRIDGES. Mr. President, the
city of Berlin today occupies in world
affairs one of the great strategic areas of
the world.
I intend to discuss this issue from a
bipartisan point of view. As the senior
Republican in the U.S. Senate, it is my
judgment that the paramount question
to which the Berlin issue relates in many
aspects Is t.hat of ,,,. nnt; ·
vival-allu ~he :.ul vna1 of Lh1s NatiOn
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 41, Folder 18, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
1961 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 9993
transcends all consideration of partisan­ship.
The safety and protection of the
American people transcend all con­siderations
of political parties. The
least we can do for the American people
is to give them all the facts and let them
know where they stand in this hour of
continued crisis.
VVe have had a desperate need for a
foreign policy which Americans can
understand; and which our allies under­stand;
and-most of all-which our
enemies can understand.
In our approach to some problems of
our foreign relations we have seemed at
times to blow hot, and then to blow
cold. During those times in the past
we did not assume a clear, concise posi­tion
which the world could understand.
VVe have had a clear position on Berlin
in the past, but now, because of a sug­gested
new proposal, we need to empha­size
the firmness and clarity of our posi­tion.
Last VVednesday, the distinguished
senior Senator from Montana [Mr.
MANSFIELD], delivered in the Senate an
important address, during the course of
which he advanced one solution to the
problem. VVhile he made clear that he
was speaking for himself, he still is
known as his party's spokesman in the
Senate. His proposal was that Berlin,
East and VVest, might be reunited as a
free city, to be held in trust by an inter­national
authority.
Under his plan, the free city would be
guaranteed jointly by the VVestern
Powers united in NATO and Eastern
Powers united in the vvarsaw Pact. En­trance
to the city from the VVest would
be controlled by what he termed "inter­national
peace teams."
The highly respected majority leader,
as we all know, made the proposal in all
good conscience. I also know he will
welcome the opinions of others.
Mr. President, I am strongly opposed
to the proposition that has been sug­gested.
The proposal, in some respects, re­sembles
the short-lived Trieste agree­ment.
It might work if Mr. Khrushchev
wanted it to, but it seems quite obvious
that if he actually desired any settle­ment
on Berlin he would not have been
using it to make trouble for so long
a time.
The importance of the proposal sug­gested
by the distinguished majority
leader has raised questions in news­papers,
on TV and radio, and among
people generally as to the extent to
which someone else might try to use it
as a trial balloon for the President and
his Department of State. The Senator
was speaking on his own, but I know
he recognizes what importance is at­tached
to his suggestion.
The Trieste agreement, for example,
was signed February 10, 1947, 'and held
as a free territory under United Nations
supervision. By October 5, 1954, it was
divided between Yugoslavia and Italy,
and the free territory is no more. Yugo­slavia
got what it wanted of the free
territory.
Under four Presidents-Roosevelt,
Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy-the
United States, as well as other VVestern
Powers, has been committed to defend
the independence of the western part of
Berlin and to maintain contact with it.
Of course, this formula could, I sup­pose,
be interpreted in varying degrees
by the wo~id's diplomats. But the posi­tion
of the United States has been ab­solutely
firm; we spent millions of dol­lars
and sacrificed many of our young
airmen in the famed airlift which stood
forth as a symbol before the world that
we act on what we say.
This is no time for weakness. It is
a time for a cold, realistic clarification
of where we stand, what we propose to
do, and what we expect the U.S.S.R.
to do.
Mr. Khrushchev continues to make
the cold war colder, and abuse of the
United States has been one of the prin­cipal
methods he has used to discredit
and belittle the United States.
At all times we must maintain our
honor, respect, and prestige. VVe cannot
for a moment back down on Berlin.
American leadership in world affairs
would be greatly weakened.
If history has taught us anything, it
has shown that where peace is con­cerned
there can be no vacillation or re­treat.
Mr. President, it seems to me that now
is the time to take a forceful step in the
direction of respect by making it def­initely
known, once again, that our po­sition
on Berlin has not changed.
Berlin represents one of the few re­maining
symbols of the free world's de­termination
not to be cowed by the bully
tactics of the Russian bear.
Briefly, our position on the future of
Germany and the issue of Berlin has
been that:
First. East and VVest Berlin should be
united by free elections, and the city's
freedom should be guaranteed by the
United States, France, Britain, and the
Soviet Union until such time as Berlin
becomes the capital of a reunited Ger­many.
Second. German reunification would
become a fact with the election of an
all-German parliament, formation of an
all-German government, conclusion of a
peace treaty between Germany and her
former enemies, and withdrawal of all
foreign troops under adequate safe­guards.
Again, I point out, these have been
basic objectives of our foreign policy
through the administrations of Presi­dents
Truman, Eisenhower, and
Kennedy.
In reporting on his Vienna talks with
Premier Khrushchev, Mr. Kennedy re­affirmed
our intention not to be in tim- .
idated into backing out of VVest Berlin.
VVhat Mr. Kennedy told us sounded like
tough, straight-from-the-shoulder talk,
as indicated by this excerpt from his re­marks:
I made it clear to Mr. Khrushchev that
the security or Western Europe and there­tore
our own security are deeply involved in
our presence and our access rights to West
Berlin; that these rights are based on law,
not on sufferance; and that we are deter­mined
to maintain these rights at any risk
and thus our obligation to the people or West
Berlin and their right to choose their own
future.
The President, in those words, upholds
the same principles on Berlin that were
maintained by the three previous Presi­dents.
If the suggestion of the distinguished
majority leader ever came to pass, it
would be a definite change. I, for one,
see no reason why a Russian threat to
sign a separate peace treaty with East
Germany should cause us to change our
course.
Of course, I have no quarrel with the
majority leader's right to express his
opm10n. In our justly cherished free
society with opportunity for debate and
free expression, all viewpoints must be
explored and given due weight. This
country of ours is the greatest and
strongest on earth. It was made that
way through the qualities of courage, in­telligence,
morality, and plain common
sense of individual Americans.
VVe are, perhaps, sometimes slow to
act, and too often leave the impression
that we are soft. But the world is be­ginning
to understand that humanity is
not softness-that the fiber of America
is no less strong than it was in 1776.
Our military posture, our domestic
prosperity, in fact, our very survival as
a Nation, are affected by success or fail­ure
in the conduct of our foreign rela­tions.
In my opinion, any weakening of
our position on Berlin would constitute
a major foreign policy failure.
Regardless of the zigs and zags of Rus­sian
diplomacy, regardless of their
frowns and smiles, we must never for­get
that the Communist goal always re­mains
to make the world bow down be­fore
the hammer and sickle. So, in my
judgment we should not retreat on Ber­lin.
If we back down in any degree on Ber­lin,
I doubt that many nations of the
earth will count on our word again.
And, in my opinion, we cannot afford to
stand alone.
First things must come first. The
urgency of the moment, I repeat, is sur­vival
itself. The people of this country
must prepare themselves for a rough and
tough road ahead; but they cannot ex­pect
the Nation to wipe away each of
their tears.
I cannot in good conscience, Mr.
President, let the proposed new status
of Berlin pass without my opposition.
And I shall vigorously and strenuously
oppose any change which would weaken
our position, until the very end.
In conclusion, let me state that the
threat to the United States is many
sided. One is by internal subversion ;
another, by economic penetration; oth­ers,
by espionage, blackmail, and mili­tary
might. But there is still another­an
important one-and that is a show
of weakness which might be taken as
appeasement. And, appeasement is
nothing more than surrender on the in­stallment
plan.
For that reason, I am utterly opposed
to changing our position on Berlin.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President,
first, I wish to express to my friend,
the distinguished senior Senator from
New Hampshire [Mr. BRIDGES], who is
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 41, Folder 18, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
9994 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE June 20
the ranking Republican Member of this
body, my deep appreciation and thanks
for the speech he has made this after­noon,
and 1 desire to compliment him
for the high tone in which it was de­livered.
Whether one speaks for or against
the proposal advanced by the senior
Senator from Montana is immaterial.
The point is that we ought to speak and
think and cogitate while there is still
time to do so, and in an unemotional
way. Time is of the essence in connec­tion
with this matter. In my opinion,
the distinguished senior Senator from
New Hampshire has rendered the coun­try
and the Senate a service, today, in
bringing to our attention his views on
this question, the most important im­mediate
question of our time.
The Senator from New Hampshire
was gracious enough to tell me ahead
of time that he was going to make his
speech, and to furnish me with a copy
of his remarks.
If I may, I should like to make a few
comments on what he has said, and
then make some comments of my own.
For example, the Senator from New
Hampshire stated:
The safety and protection of the Ameri­can
people transcend all considerations of
political parties. The least we can do for
the American people is to give them all the
facts and let them know where they stand
In this hour of continued crisis.
We nave h ad a desperate need for a
foreign policy which Americans can under­stand-
and which our allies understand­and
most of all , which our enemies can
understand.
I agree completely with the distin­guished
Senator from New Hampshire.
A little later he said:
Last Wednesday, the distinguished senior
Senator from Montana delivered In the Sen­ate
an Important address. during the course
or which he advanced one solution to the
problem. While he made clear he was
speaking for himself. he still Is known as
his pe.rty's spokesman In the Senate. This
proposal was that Berlin, East and West,
might be reunited as a "free city" to be held
In trust by an international authority.
I appreciate what my friend. the
Senator from New Hampshire, has said
relative to his acknowledgment of the
fact that I was speaking for myself, be­cause
I was; and, as a matter of fact,
to this day I have not discussed this mat­ter
with either the President of the
United States or the Secretary of State,
because I feel that I have some responsi­bilities
as a Senator of the United States.
A little later. the Senator made refer­ence
to the Trieste agreement. He said:
The Trieste agreement. for example, was
signed February 10. 1947, and held as a
"free territory" under United Nations
supervision. By October 5, 1954, tt was
divided up between Yugoslavia and Italy and
the "free territory" is no more. Yugoslavia
got what It wanted of the "free territory."
Let me call to the attention of the
Senate the fact that that treaty, which
seems to have been agreed to by both
Italy and Yugoslavia as being eminently
satisfactory at that time, came about be­cause
of the outstanding work done in
its behalf by Clare Boothe Luce, who at
that time was U.S. Ambassador to Italy,
and by Llewellyn Thompson, who at that
time was U.S. Ambassador to the Re-public
of Austria. In fact, Ambassador
Thompson spent so much time on the
treaty that he was almost always in
London, trying there to work out the
arrangements, and rarely was in Vienna.
Later in his remarks the distinguished
Senator from New Hampshire said:
This is no time for weakness. It Is a time
for cold, realistic clarification of where we
stand, what we propose to do, and what we
expect the U.S.S.R. tn do.
I agree completely.
Further on in his speech, the Senator
from New Hampshire stated:
If history has taught us anything, It has
shown that where peace is concerned there
can be no vacilia tlon or retreat.
Again I wholeheartedly agree.
Further on in his speech my friend had
the following to say:
The distinguished majority leader's sug­gestion
If It ever came to pass, would be a
definite change.
I, for one, see no reason why a Russian
threat to sign a separate peace treaty with
East Germany should cause us to change
our course.
Let me say that that possibility had
nothing to do with the remarks I made
last week, because if I correctly under­stand
the historical situation, whenever
the Soviet Union desires to sign a treaty
of peace with East Germany, it can do
so, and there would be nothing that we
or our allies could do about it.
Further on, the Senator from New
Hampshire said:
Our military posture, our domestic pros­perity,
In !act, our very survival as a nation,
are affected by success or failure In the con­duct
of our foreign relations. In my opin­Ion,
any weakening of our position on Berlln
would constitute a major foreign pollcy
!allure.
At this time, I should like to read an
excerpt from an editorial published in
the Christian Science Monitor on June
17, 1961. I believe that these few words,
more than anything else I have read or
heard, sum up what I was trying to do
when I was privileged to address the
Senate, last Wednesday, on this ques­tion.
I quote now from the editorial:
In this respect the proposals advanced in
the U.S. Senate by Senator MIKE MANSFIELD,
o! Montana, a day before the Khrushchev
broadcast make a great deal of sense. These
proposals, which are put forward by the
Senate majority leader personally and not on
behalf of the Kennedy administration, should
be read-
And I wish to direct the attention of
the Senator to this-should
be read not as a substitute for !ull
insistence on Western rights in West Berlin
but as a poss1ble supplement to the Anglo­French-
American diplomatic position.
Further on, the distinguished senwr
Senator from New Hampshire says:
First things must come first. The urgency
of the moment, I repeat, Is survival itsel!.
The people of this country must prepare
themselves for a rough road ahead, but they
cannot expect the Nation to wipe away each
o! their tears.
I cannot In good conscience, Mr. President,
let the proposed new status o! Berlin pass
without my opposition. And, I shall vigor­ously
and strenuously oppose any change
which would weaken our position, untll the
very end.
I can find no real argument there, be­cause
I do not think that I was P;dvocat­ing
a weakening of our position in Ber­lin,
or a backing away, or a retreat, in
the proposal which I advanced. As the
Christian Science Monitor indicated, I
was trying to bring about a possible sup­plemental
position insofar as our status
in that area was concerned.
There has been some reference to the
fact that I am the majority party's
spokesman in the Senate. I do not know
how to answer this. I suppose that is
a cross I have to bear on occasion, just
as the distinguished minority leader has
to bear a somewhat similar burden if he
makes a speech and is thereby consid­ered
as the spokesman of his party. But
let me say, knowing the 100 Senators of
this body, no Senator can speak for any
other Senator. So far as we are con­cerned,
leader or not, we are on an equal
basis. ·
Before any Senator is a majority lead­er,
he is the Senator of the State from
which he comes, and he is a Senator of
the United States. Before a Senator
has responsibilities to any administra­tion,
he has responsibilities to the peo­ple
of the United States in the light of
his conscience.
Several days ago I made a statement
on Berlin as a Senator from Montana,
as one s ·enator with responsibilities to
the people of his State and the Nation.
The statement was not at any time, or
in any way, discussed in advance with
any person in the executive branch. It
was not intended as praise for this ad­ministration
or criticism of its predeces­sor.
And it was, in no sense, a "trial bal­loon."
The statement proposed that we face
the facts of the situation which is devel­oping
at Berlin and that we face them
now and discuss them fully, just as the
distinguished Senator from New Hamp­shire
did in his service to the country this
afternoon. It contained a proposal
which suggested a third way on Berlin­neither
that which the Soviet Union has
proposed nor that which presently ex­ists.
The statement was designed to in­vite
discussion in the Senate of this
grave situation and to elicit further pro­posals
with respect to that situation. For
in this matter, the Senate has a respon­sibility,
even as the President of the
United States has the ultimate respon­sibilty.
The developments in Berlin involve the
entire future of the United States, the
Soviet Union, Europe, and the world.
Therefore I trust that any discussion
will reflect the seriousness and soberness
of this situation. And I trust, further­more,
that the discussion will not be
bent to political purposes.
Let me say again that I commend and
compliment the Senator from New
Hampshire for the nonpartisan, frank,
and honest way in which he discussed
his reaction to the Berlin situation on
the floor of the Senate this afternoon.
Finally, I trust that we will bear in
mind in this discussion the weight of re­sponsibility
which rests on the shoulders
of the President. He must make de­cisions
on behalf of all of us-decisions
which bind us all. He must make these
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 41, Folder 18, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
1961 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE 9995
decisi.ons knowing that, in the end, if a State, and neither can anyone vote
reasvi1 fails, either here or elsewhere, 'Vithout that chance, because there is al­wha~
may be. involved is the life of every ways someone who will criticize. That
man, woman, and child in the Nation. is fine. I only hope that when criticism
In these circumstances, every respon- is made it will be made on the basis of the
sible citizen of this Nation, and especially criticism advanced by the distinguished
those with public responsibilities, will Senator from New Hampshire, which is
think and speak with the soberness the criticism of a constructive nature, be­situation
requires. That, may I say, was cause on that basis we can all benefit and
characteristic of the discussion in the the country will be better off.
senate on the part of both Republican Mr. President, the issue which con­and
Democratic Senators after my state- fronts the people of this Nation at Berlin
ment the other day. And I hope that lt is fundamental. We are fully committed
is a characteristic which will be main- at Berlin, all of us, and lest there be any
tained as this discussion widens, and I misunderstanding of this commitment,
am sure it will be, based on the state- I repeat what I said last Wednesday:
ment by the Senator from New Hamp- We will not be driven, pushed or barred
shire this afternoon. from fulfilling our responsibilities to our-
Following my previous speech I re- selves and to freedom in Berlln by any na­ceived
a large response, for a Senator tion, half-nation, group of nations or what­from
Montana, in the mail. More than ever. Such measures as may be necessary to
half the letters I received were from assert that responsibllity will be taken. • • •
The range of this commitment extends from
Texas, California, New York, Illinois, a beginning of the words of firmness to a
and Pennsylvania. The letters were un- midpoint of expenditure of immense re­favorable
to the proposals which I made soures and enormous taxes and other sacr!­on
Berlin in a ratio of about 4 to 1. fices, to a final pledge of the lives and
A great many of these letters con- fortunes of every man, woman and child in
tained attacks on my integrity, motives, the Nation.
and patriotism. I do not relish these I do not take this commitment lightly.
attacks, since my skin is no thicker than And because I do not, Mr. President, I
that of any other Senator. But if per- regard it as an inescapable responsibility
sonal vilification is the price which must on the part of the Senate to see to it that
be paid for full public discussion of this the question of Berlin is discussed fully
critical issue, then it will be paid, re- and completely and in advance of pay­gardless
of whether the discussion tends ment on the commitment. So long as I
to support my view, or oppose it, or take repreesnt the State of Montana as a
some other turn. Senator of the United States, I shall not
Mr. BRIDGES. Mr. President, will the regard as closed and beyond discussion
Senator yield? any matter which involves the welfare
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. and the very life of every citizen of this
Mr. BRIDGES. As the distinguished Nation as directly as does the Berlin
Senator knows full well, speaking for my- situation. And I shall speak out on these
self, and I think for most people of this matters whenever my judgment · and
country, and certainly for my colleagues conscience compel it.
on this side of the aisle, there is no ques- In my statement last Wednesday I
tion about the integrity or patriotism of offered a proposal for a possible approach
the Senator from Montana, or his effort to solution of the Berlin question. It
to do what he considers in his conscience was neither the way suggested by Mr.
to be for the best interests of this coun- Khrushchev nor merely a continuance
try. I for one am very happy the Sena- of the status quo in that city. It was an
tor from Montana occupies the position attempt to find a third way, not in re­that
he does. I happen to differ with treat from where we now stand but in an
him on his approach, but I know his mo- advance to what I believe may be a firmer
tives are of the highest, and I am sorry ground for peace in Europe. I have based
anyone would vilify him or question his this proposal on the assumption that if
motives in the discussion of this issue. West Berlin is defensible as a free city,
Mr. MANSFIELD. I am deeply grate- as an allied enclave 110 miles inside the
ful to my friend, the distinguished Sen- communist world, all Berlin as a free city
ator from New Hampshire, for these re- would be even more defensible if it is
marks; but as far as my colleagues in threatened, for it would still be backed
this body are concerned, I have no doubt by allied guarantees. as is now the case,
that every Member feels toward me as I and, in addition, by the weight of a world
feel towards them-and I say this with opinion which is overwhelming for
all due modesty-as the Senator from peace. The small garrisons in West
New Hampshire has expressed himself, Berlin, Mr. President, are not what de­because
I think we get to know one an- fends that city-it is the allied guaran­other
here and to have an understanding tees of that city's safety, and these will
of the problems and confrontations be strengthened, not weakened, under
which occur from time to time. the proposals which I have made, even
I do not mind this criticism, and I did though some of the interpretations of
not rise to protest it. All of us, being these proposals may for one reason or
in the profession we are in, have to an- another suggest otherwise. I have based
ticipate some criticism. If we were not these proposals, furthermore, on the be­criticized,
I would say there was some- ' lief that any policy which, in effect, in­thing
wrong with us, because nobody in .\ sists that the Russians remain in Berlin
this Chamber or anywhere else can ad- and Germany, as ours now does, is not
vance proposals which will meet with the only impracticable but also wrong on its
full approval of the people of this country face, for our object must be to encourage
or with the full approval of the people of the withdrawal of Soviet forces eastward
No.103--5
if the pr::!sent costly stalemate in Europe
is ever to be brought to an end.
The suggestions which I have made
may or may not have merit. They were
obviously not intended to be the last
word on this subject. Other proposals
may be cffered by other Members which
may or may not have merit. More im­portant
than any particular proposals,
mine or those of anyone else, is that this
issue and its possible solution be
thoroughly explored and, one would
hope, explored without rancor or con­siderations
of political advantage, in the
light of the best interests of this Na­tion.
As I see it, Mr. President, it is not
in the best interests of this Nation to
go on spending billions of dollars abroad
without bringing closer the day when
these one-sided expenditures may be
terminated in a more constructive situa­tion-
and Berlin alone and directly has
already cost this Nation in excess of $1.5
billion. It is not in the best inter­ests
of this Nation to spend the lives
of citizens and to risk the devastation
of this Nation and the word if we can
create a situation where this need will be
obviated.
To be sure, there may be no alterna­tive.
To be sure, in the end we may
have no choice but to spend the billions
and the lives, but until that end arrives,
I , for one, shall go on seeking a better
way.
I do not now believe and have never
believed in change for the sake of change
in public policy any more than in auto­mobiles.
But I believe it is essential to
the security and welfare of the people of
this Nation that we do not doom our­selves
to the mental prison of equating
all change with retreat and defeat. For
in foreign policy, no less than in all
other aspects of human existence,
an ordered change is the key to rational
survival and progress. Unless we are
not afraid, first, to consider changes in a
world of change and, second, to make
changes if reason tells us they should be
made, we shall find ourselves, in foreign
policy, time and again in pursuit of the
last car of a train that is always pulling
away from us.
Mr. President, again I commend the
Senator from New Hampshire. In my
opinion he has performed a real public
service this afternoon.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con­sent
that a number of editorials both for
and against the proposal advanced by
me last week in the Senate be printed
in the RECORD at the conclusion of my
remarks.
There being no objection, the material
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows :
[From the Christian Science Monitor.
June 17, 1961 1
IF Moscow REALLY WANTS A GERMAN
TREATY
Premier Khrushchev's report to the peo­ple
of the Soviet Union on his talks at
Vienna with President Kennedy Is a new
statement o! old pretensions. These preten­sions
do not take on any more validity from
the fact that they have been voiced for 2 12
years, but there Is danger of their becoming
partly accepted by familiarity.
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 41, Folder 18, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
9996 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE .June 20
The head of thn C bloc says,
"The absence of a pe tce treaty with Ger­many
has created a d'~ply abnormal and
dn.ngerous situation 1n Europe." He adds
the charge that Britain, France, and the
United States broke postwar agreements by
turning West Germany Into a milltarlst
state, whereas the facts are the Soviet au­thorittes
first closed off their occupation
zone and began there deYelopment of para­mtlltary
forces under the Soviet Army.
Thus began the problem of a divided Ger­many
and of a Communist puppet regime in
East Germany which has no basis in the
wishes of the people but ruled by Russian­backed
force. That is "a deeply abnormal
and dangerous situation" but it is not the
one Mr. Khrushchev llkes to talk about.
He prefers to focus attention on West
Berlin, where he proposes what would tech­nically
be called a free city but which
would, In fact, end the freedom of more than
2 million West Berliners within a few years.
Unless that proposal Is accepted, he threat­ens
before the end of the year to make a
treaty with his pawns, Walter Ulbricht and
company, which be pretends would give them
complete control over access to Berlln.
COMMUNIST PLANS FOrt WEST BERLIN
If they used that control with scrupulous
respect !or the rights of West Berliners to
oome and go, and for the rights or others
to visit and trade with them, the situation
would not be materially worsened. But
what Mr. Ulbricht has In mind Is Indicated
by a press conference In which be suggests
that the Tempelho! Airport, which was West
Berlln 's llfellne In the blockade o! 1948, be
closed, and that West Berlin cease to grant
asylum to East German refugees.
What Mr. Khrushchev envisages can be
Inferred from his parrot!ng of a completely
fictitious Communist claim that the half
city of West Berlin "is situated on territory
of the German Democratic [East German [
Republic." There was no East German
state when the postwar outllnes of Berlin
were drawn. As a matter or fact, especially
if they protest a. West German Parliament
meeting ln West Berlin, the Communists
have no right to install the East German
Government In East Berlin, since even the
Soviet sector or that city Is on a different
legal footing from the Soviet occupation
zone around it.
In this respect the proposals advanced In
the United States Senate by Senator Mike
Mansfield of Montana a day before the Khru­shchev
broadcast makE! a great deal of sense.
These proposals, which are put forward by
the Senate majority leader personally and
not on behalf o! the Kennedy administra­tion.
should be read not as a subsltute for
full Insistence on Western rights In West
Berlin but as a possible supplement to the
Anglo-French-American diplomatic position.
CONCESSIONS AND COUNTERCONCESSIONS
So long as Soviet arrogance tries to under­mine
the safety or West Berlin and its peo­ple
(with stratagems reminiscent or the Nazi
encompassment and capture of the free city
of Danzig) the West should stand flatly on
every sentence and comma of Its occupation
rights in defense of the West Berliners.
One of the hollow aspects or the Khru­shchev
position Is the pretense that Moscow
seeks a peace treaty as to all of Germany
In conjunction with Its wartime allies. If
this were more than a sham, the Kremlln
would deal seriously with the Western con­tention
that the whole German people
should have an opportunity to vote on their
future status.
If Mr. Khrushchev and his foreign office
have any thought or achieving an agreed
settlement on the narrower and Included
question of Berlln, they might consider what
arrangements In return could conceivably
compensate for the concessions they ask and
provide rellable safeguards for the people of
West Berlln. This, In efl'ect, Is what the
Mansfield plan asks the Communists--or
others who pass judgment on Issues of the
cold war-to do.
First, for example, 1! a free and lnterna­tlonallzed
status would be good for half a
city (West Berlln), why would It not be at
least twice as good for a whole city, including
East Berlln? The first postulate that should
be laid, therefore, In any thought of changed
conditions for Berlln is that the change
should apply to the whole city.
REAL INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY NEEDED
Even that would be far from enough to
assure the security of the city's government
or the ultimate physical safety of Its citizens.
Earller statements have suggested that some
international authority guarantee the neu­trallty
and self-government of West Berlin.
The only authority remotely capable of doing
this-and Its capability In such a great­power
vise would br very doubtful until
proved In other cases-would be the United
Nations. Yet the Uniteat is a threat to peace." Since
when did it become a threat to peace for any
nation to Insist on its rights? The official
Tass version has smoothed up this passage,
but the characterization Is essentially true
of the Communist position.
CHANGES SHOULD NOT BE ONE SIDED
Premier Khrushchev goes out of his way
to say that I! any country "violates peace
and crosses the borders" of East Germany
It will be met with Soviet weapons. Presi­dent
Kennedy expllcltly assured the Soviet
leader at Vienna that so long as the rights
or access are respected there would be no
use of force. But If either Soviet or East
German authorities should Interpose bar­riers.
that would be the In! tlal use of force.
The Communists have no moral or other
right to demand that the West sacrifice the
safety and liberties of 2 million people even
In the name of peace-that Is, to dissuade
the Communists from breaking the peace.
Theoretically, It Is quite possible to
imagine a better and more stable situa­tion
for Berlln than now exists. But to
accomplish this would require substantial
concessions from both sides, not just from
one. If a bargain Is to be struck, it should
be for the benefit of all, particularly the
West Berliners. If Moscow expects the West
to consider modification, it should be will­Ing
to consider equally important and t;noce
necessary ones.
Only on this basis should the Western
three powers contemplate any bargaining
about Berlln. Not one cardboard kopeck
should be given up without full value for
the security of West Berhners in return. If
any one calls his Intransigeance, let him
ask If he would llke his own security dealt
with on any other basis.
Viewed as an exercise In analysis of what
guarantees the Communists ought to be
willing to give in return !or what they new
are brashly and brazenly demanding, the
Mansfield plan has value. It should not
be regarded in any other light, certainly
not as any weakening of Western resistance
to attempted intimidation.
[From the Washington Daily News, June 16,
19Gl]
BERLIN DJLEMMA
Senate Majority Leader MANSFIELD has
contributed an idea to the latest battle over
Berlln
He says Nlkita Khrushchev's propJ)sal to
convert West Berlln Into a free city and
to kick out the Western powers Is unac­ceptable.
But he adas that the Western
pollcy of standing on the status quo Is not
necessary the way to peace.
A third way, he suggests, might be to
convert the entire city-East and West­Into
a free city; "held in trust and in peace
by some International authority until such
time as it Is again the capital of Germany."
Access routes to the city would be guarded
by International peace teams.
Senator MANSFIELD's suggestion has the
merit of some fresh thinking on a problem
that has plagued the world since the end ot
the war and perlodlcally becomes a danger­ous
crisis area. Khrushchev indicates he Is
heading for another flash crisis there at the
end of this year.
The Senate leader also calls for widespread
discussion and debate about the Berlin prob­lem.
The best place to start would be at the
beginning-way back In the late 1940's-to
refresh the world's memory on why Berlln
exists today in an extremely abnormal state.
To listen to Moscow, this Is all the fault of
the Western powers and the West Berliners.
The fact Is that the Soviets, in 1948, walked
out of the four-power (United States, Brt t­aln,
France, Russia) Kommandatura, after
they got the short end of a free, Berlin-wide
election. They set up their own puppet
municipal regime in East Berlln and thus
divided the city In two. They even cut the
telephone cables between the two halves or
the city. Even today It Is Impossible to
make a telephone call between East and West
Berlln.
There is going to be a lot of shouting about
Berhn In the months ahead and the world
should be reminded how the present situa­tion
developed.
It Is difficult to believe that anyone who
knows the facts about Berlln--or who bas
had the fascinating experience of seeing that
divided city--ever could give even second
thoughts to Khrushchev's outrageous pro­posal.
[From the Washington Post. June 16, 19611
SONG BY THE FIRESIDE
It's all very simple. If the United States
and the West will just agree to Soviet pollcy
on Berlln, Laos, the United Nations, nuclear
tests and disarmament, we'll all coexist
splendidly. Last one to gl ve In is a war­monger.
That, in essence, represents the chatty con­tent
of Mr. Khrushchev's fireside chat to
the Soviet people. He expressed satisfac­tion
over his talks with President Kennedy
in Vienna; but the satisfaction, If any, must
have derived principally from the oppor­tunity
to clarify what are almost completely
opposite positions. From the standpoint of
the United States and Its allies, about the
only reasonable aspect of Mr. Khrushchev's
presentation was its relatively restrained
tone.
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 41, Folder 18, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
1961 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE 9997
The Soviet leader has adopted the troika
as his mode of international conveyance to
the United Nations, nuclear tests and vir­tually
every other issue. He wants general
and complete disarmament, and unless his
terms are accepted the United States IS
against it. He wants a neutral and Inde­pendent
Laos, but the Americans are some­how
responsible for the continued truce
violations by the Communist Pathet Lao.
The Soviet Union does not want a war, but
it is going to sign a treaty this year giving
control of the access to Berlin to East Ger­many,
and anyone who res ists will be guil ty
of aggression.
Well, it is a pretty dismal line-about as
reasonable as the sort of stuff once ~ pouted
by a fellow named Hitler. Berlin is of
course the most troublesome issue, and
there is considerable point to Senator MIKF:
MANSFIELD's call for the West to ab:mdon
some of its fictions about the problem and
seck to mount son1e counterpres~urc for
improved status of Berlin. But to use a
Soviet metaphor. the chance of anything
better, in Mr. Khrushchev's pre,ent mood,
seems about as likely a• fried snowballs.
All of which means that the West had better
prepare for a tough test of n~rvcs this fall.
JFrom the New York Herald Tribune, June
17,19611
ACHESON HEADS TASK FORCE To WATCH
BERLIN
(By Marguerite Higgins)
WASHINGTON, June 16.-President Kennedy
has formed a special task force to keep watch
on the Berlin crisis. It Is headed by former
Secretary of State Dean Acheson.
Mr. Acheson, who is widely known for his
tough unyielding stand on maintaining the
freedom of West Berlin, is currently com­pleting
a report on the alternative resp on ses
open to the West in light of heightening So­viet
pressure designed to drive the Allies out
of the city.
After the report is finished Mr. Acheson
Is expected to serve as the administration's
chief crisis watcher on the Berlin situation,
ready to give warning and advice on a ll new
developments.
ENCOURAGES BERLIN
The key role on Berlln to be played by Mr.
Acheson Is particularly welcome to the West
Germans, who In the past few days have been
fretful over reports of alleged changes in
American policy.
In fact, the State Department has spent
much of this week trying to calm fears
aroused:
1. By a speech In which Senator MrKE
MANSFIELD, Democrat, of Montana, Senate
majority leader, proposed accepting the
"free city" idea for West Berlin if the same
system were extended to East Berlin. This
alarms the West Germans, who feel psy­chologically
that the physical presence of
Americans In Berlin Is the best deterrent to
Russian action against the city. Under the
Mansfield Idea, all Allled occupation troops,
Including American, would In due course
leave Berlin.
2. By reports out of London that the
United States was contemplating a radical
new approach to Berlin.
The State Department has diplomatically
disowned the Mansfield Idea and denied that
it was In any sense an administration trial
balloon-a conclusion drawn by most Euro­pean
papers. It also denied that any radi­cal
new approach on Berlin was contem­plated.
Mr. Acheson's assignment to the Berlin
problem will be a reassurance to the Euro­peans
in itself, for he agreed completely
with West German Chancellor Konrad Ade­nauer
In opposing Soviet desires to make
unllateral changes In Berlin's status.
Mr. Acheson is on record as saying: "The
presen t status of the Western Allies in Ber-lin
is highly satisfactory. Why fuss around
wich other ideas? Premier Khrushchev is
t11e only one who wants it changed."
U.S. REPLY IS FIRM
The American reply to Mr. Khrushchev's
most recent memorandum on Berlin was the
subject of consultation here today with both
Brit-ain and France. The American draft
reply is firm, refuses to contemplate the
ch:tnges proposed by the Russians, but leaves
the door slightly ajar for negotiations on
the issue.
Mr. Acheson will be assisted in his Berlin
tasl< force mainly by specialists from with­in
the administration such as Walt Whit­man
Rostow, deputy White House assistant
on no.tional security affairs; Foy Kohler, As­sistant
Secretary of State for Europ0an Mat­tr
·~·s, and others.
Tilc:·e have been unconfirmed reports that
Gen. Lucius D. Clay, the con1n1andcr in Eu­rope
during the Berlin blockade of 1948,
m ight be included in the task force of crisis­watchers
because he has had decision-m~k­ing
experience in dealing with Soviet pres­sure.
It was not ru:cd out at the White
House today that General Clay might be
consulted, but his aid hns as yet not been
requested.
JFrom the New York Post, June 18. 19611
SENATOR MANSFIELD'S I-!EaESY
Once again Senate Majority Leader MANS­FIELD,
Democrat, of Montana, h as made a
valio.nt effort to generate fresh thought on
the problem of Berlin and rescue the West
from the peril of its own cliches. His sug­gestion
that the status quo in the divided
Germa.n city is not sacrosanct seems to have
sel1t a shudder of horror through Bonn and
provoked frenzy in the top echelons of the
GOP. It desenes a more responsible hear­ing.
M'NSFIELD's proposal, similar to a plan he
ad vocated 2 years ago, would erase the line
between East and West Berlin and unify the
two sectors as one city whose freedom and
acccssability would be internationally guar­anteed
by NATO, the Warsaw Pact countries
and both West and East Germany. In view
of Mr. Khrushchev's drive to sign a peace
treaty with the German Communist regime
and transfer to it the responsibility for keep­ing
West Berlin's communications lines open
to the free world, MANSFIELD's plan might
honorably save the city from the attrition
that Communist leader Ulbricht has out­lined.
It might also avert an explosive
world crisis.
Our adamant insistence that a position
adopted more than a decade ago must re­main
unchanged despite a major shift in the
East-West balance of power plainly remains
the battlecry of West German politicians; no
one dares to question the formula. But must
German Internal politics mute all debate
here? Is no new Idea tolerable? Must we
sit back and wait for Khrushchev to set
the timetable of crisis?
Senator MANSFIELD is basically asking
whether we can properly ignore the possi­bility
of a third way out of the dangerous
Berlin deadlock . He sees more clearly than
most Western statesmen that to stand firm
on Berlin while it remains a pivot of new
disaster for m ankind may be a fetish rather
than a policy. When and how the flash­point
will be reached, as Joseph Barry notes
in his dispatch from Paris on magazine page
9, no one precisely knows. Nor is there any
allied agreement on how to recognize it, to
say nothing Of h andling it. MANSFIELD'S
thtrd way provides hope that the explosive
issue can be solved without either side sur­rendering
any crucial principle or special
advantage.
The proposal is not, as Senator DmKSEN
and Representative HALLECK were so quick
to charge, o. renunciation of our pledge to
defend West Berlin. Neither does It mean
abandonment of Germany's hope of even­tual
reunification-for which, incidentally,
there is more lipservice than real longing in
today's prosperous Federal Republic. It
simply reflects, as MANSFIELD stated, an
"honest recognition of the fact that it is too
late in the game to expect that Germany
will be reunified in peace by fiat of the
United State, France, Great Britain, and
Russia, as was expected 15 years ago."
MANSFrELD wants to do more to presen·e
Berlin as a symbol of freedom than issue
periodic declarations of our fidelity.
If it is said that his plan is unacceptable
because it may Involve the recogmtlon of
East Germany, which is one of Mr. Khru­shchev's
goals, let us not panic. Nonrecog­nition
of the Communist regime is one of
Dr. Adenauer's most percious pieties. But
in terms of world peace and Berlin's free­dom,
it may also be one of the most dis­pensable.
Admittedly there are hazards inYOI\"Cd in
Senator MANSF"IELD's proposal, but Senator
CASE, Republican, of South Dakota, obsen·ed
sanely that it was a good starting point for
exploration.
And that is the vital point. Reasonable
men may differ on the merits or practicality
of MANSFIELD's ideas. What is inexcusable
is the suggestion that he was guilty of some
high crime by bringing up the subject. In
a world as precarious as ours, no man has
the right to say that the last word has been
spoken on any great issue.
{This editorial was broadcast on June 15.
1961, over WRDW Television, Augusta, Ga.)
This is a WRDW-TV editorial.
"Berlin is likely to become the pivot of a
new disaster f or mankind"-these 13 words
concluded an address made by Senate Ma­jority
Leader MIKE MANSFIELD on the floor
of the U.S. Senate. In that address Mr.
MANSFIELD suggested a third alternative in
the Berlin situation.
The Senator stated that he did not believe
that "the way to peace can be found either
in the maintenance of the status quo In
Berlin or in the change which Mr. Khru­shchev
proposes."
Senator MANSFIELD suggests that the en­tire
city of Berlin be put under an Interna­tional
trusteeship. Under such a plan,
routes of access would be garrisoned by in­ternational
peace teams • • • both East and
West governments would pay the cost of such
an arrangement under written agreements,
and the interim status would be guaran­teed
by the NATO and Warsaw Pact coun­tries.
Such a change in Berlin would be ter­ribly
difficult, but as the Senator put it, "It
is not really, an infinitesimal task when com­pared
with the full implications of an
essay in military solution with what comes
after lt."
As Mr. MANSFIELD states, "This approach
may evoke no response from Mr. Khrushchev.
But does Mr. Khrushchev's reactions, what­ever
they may be, dissolve us from our ra­tional
responsibilities to ourselves and to
thb world in this situation."
Mr. MANSFIELD has thought well when he
says, "If the present positions of the parties
concerned remain unchanged, sooner or later,
this crisis postponed, this crisis avoided, wi!l
cease to lie dormant. If we wait for the
moment of heat, It may be too late to Lhink
at all."
The Montana Senator concluded, "Sooner
or later the Western nations and the Soviet
Union must seek a new way, a third way to
the solution or the Berlin problem. Unless
this search is pursued with energy and dis­patch
and to fruition, sooner or later, Ber­lin
is likely to become the pivot of a new
disaster for mankind."
Once again, we feel that Senator MANS­FIELD
has displayed cogent observance and
realistic approach and we would agree whole­heartedly
with his Berlin proposal.
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 41, Folder 18, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
999 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE June 20
This was a WRDW-TV editorial, Jack Belt,
speaking f()I" WRDW Television.
(From the Washington Evening Star, June
18, 1001 I
BE:RLIN
rr as Premier KhrUshchev says, the lack
of ;, German peace treaty "keeps alive the
smoldering coals or World War II" then Ber­lin
Is the bellows that could enfiame the
world In another conflagration.
During the 16 years Germany and Berlin
have been divided, the Russians have had
only to squeeze the bellows and world ten­stons
have flared anew
Premier Khrushchev fanned the flames
a.gam last week In calling for a peace treaty
which would recognize formally the exist­ence
or two German states and end the
West's occupation rights In West Berlin. Mr.
Khrushchev said If the West was willing to
sign such a treMy then he woUld help
guarantee West Berlin's existence as a free
ctty, with necessary access routes
If the West does not join the Sovtet Union.
however, In signing such a treaty, he satd
the Russians would sign unllaterally with
the East Germans before the end of the
year. This would force the West to make Its
own arrangements with the East Germans, a
situation obsen·ers rear might lead to war
1r the East Germans try to block access routes
to the ctty.
In Ills latest speech, Premier Khrushchev
satd "the conclusion or a peace treaty wtth
Germany cannot be postponed any longer.
A peaceful settlement In Europe must be at­tained
this year ..
The Prcmter's haste Is due apparently to
a rear thnt West Germany might become
so strong It would be willing to start a war
to liberate East Germany or to reclaim
lnnd ceded nt the end of the war to Po­land.
To the Wc•t. Mr Khrushchev's rears seem
groundless. but as any visitor to the So­,
·lct Union can testify. the fear In Russta of
a rearmed Germany Is real Indeed
Premier Khrushchev said a treaty formal­Izing
the borders could help prevent hostili­ties
which he said would "mean war-and
a thermonuclear war at that."
The United States supports West Ger­manv's
demand for a unified Germany. The
Umted States has no mtentlon or recognizing
East Germany, and President Kennedy has
said no peace treaty would be signed untll
free and universal elections wPre held
throughout Germany
President Kennedy said 2 weeks ago that
"we arc not seeking to change the present
s1tua.t1on" m which allied troops nrc sta­tioned
1n West Berlin and have access rights
~uaran teed by treaty with the Russ~:ms. In a
Soviet-East German treaty there Is an im­plied
threat that war might break out over
access r~gh ts If the East Germans try an­other
Berlin blockade.
W1th little compromise VISible In these
conflicting views, Senate Majority Leader
MA,.,SFIH.u brought a fresh approach to the
subject in urging that all or Berlin be made
a free c1ty under lnternallonal protection
Th1s , he said. would be a third way be­twe<
·n the two pos1t1ons He said It was hls
own 1dea . and not the administration's. The
crmccpt however, met strong opposition.
West Germany 1mmcd1utely rejected the
Idea. because it would "deepen the division"
or Gl'rmany. Observers also doubted if the
M •nsficld propr>-mmumsts who carefully have avoided
mcludmg En..51 t1ems and an Increase of post Lions and
.ttl IUCreasc or tensions thts summer There
" ., poss1b1llty that the Russians will call an
11\lcrn ll.mal conference to sign a peace
t ren t\' 111 which ca.se It Is not likely the West
[From the New York Times, June 15. 1961 I
DISPUTED AREAS IN THE STATE OF THE UNION
(By Arthur Krock)
WASHINGTON, June 14.-DIJ!erence Of opin­Ion
and full freedom to express and promote
them, supply the life-blood of an open,
creative and free society. This Is no less the
fact because. as Is being widely noted, the
depth and duration or some of these dll!er­ences
among Americans are producing conse­quences
which suit Premier Khrushchev as
well as If he had planned them. But there
are controversies which the President has
the power to settle Insofar as national policy
Is concerned. yet which continue to rage be­cause
or the Irresolution or the conflict or
policy
For example. the administration builds up
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization In
Europe, and In the United Nations It weakens
the alliance It Is committed to noninter­vention
In the Western Hemisphere. but the
administration trained, equipped and trans­ported
the ant1-Castro Interventionists In
Cuba And then It denied them the air­power
coverage without which this am­phibious
landing had no chance to succeed.
The Preslden t Is sworn to preserve the
purchasing power or the dollar-specifically
to leave undisturbed the price of gold.
Nevertheless. he has been deluging Congress
with Government spendmg programs for
public welfare projects (of which the current
$6 billion housing bill as submitted Is
typ1cal). each In the same tone or urgency
that confers a No. 1 priority on each. The
administration JUstifies this nonmilitary
deficit spending on the unproved theory
that Its annual stimulation of the national
gross wealth will make it self-liquidating
before It can become lnfiatlonary. And this
calculation Is based on an even shakier
theory-that "real Income" Is produced by
Government spending and private spending
alike. despite the fact that the former can
spend only what It subtracts from the latter.
The administration evaluates the spread
of International communism to West Berlin,
Asta and Africa as a menace which mvst be
resisted by post tl vc and aggressl ve measures,
mcludlng military ones If these are required
to make the resistance effective and are
technically renslble. But Its policy Is wholly
passive toward Cuba, where the Castro gov­ernment
is becoming more and more closely
allied w1th Moscow and by covert and open
acts Is working on other Latin American peo­ples
to follow Its lead Yet no military base
which the United States maintains on the
Russian periphery as a deterrent to Soviet
att.tck on the West Is nearer. or In war more
dangerous potentially, to the Soviet Union
than Cuba Is to the United States.
The President in person has notified Pre­mtcr
Khrushchev that we will use force If
ncccssIELo's today· a "free city" com­posed
of the two Berllns wl th sound guar­antees.
which he also spec1ficd
rn sum. the indecisions of the President
and the administratiOn-Indecisions either
because no policy chotec has been made or
because two policies arc running In con­flict-
already are fostering, In at least six
vital areas of controversy. conse.NSE
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 41, Folder 18, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
1961 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE 9999
trusteeship as a free city makes good sense.
That. would be a practical solution to the
renewed threat of a sUicidal East-West arms
conflict over the Berlin trouble spot, now
building up.
MANSFIELD's warning that "we are not en­gaged
In Berlin with the fast draw and TV
wax bullets any more than the Russians are
engaged In a harmless game of chess'' Is In
line with President Kennedy's report on his
exchange of views on Berlin with Khru­shchev
at Vienna.
As the President put It: "Our most solll;ber
talks were on the subject of Germany. and
Berlin."
Kennedy reamlrmed the U.S. determina­tion
to maintain at any risk Western access
routes to West Berlin and the freedom of
the city's 2 million Inhabitants.
Khrushchev, In turn, was emphatic In ex­pressing
his determination to change the ex­Isting
arrangement at Berlin.
As MANSFIELD sees It, ."sooner or later the
Western nations and the Soviet Union must
seek a new way"-an alternative to war-for
settlement of the Berlin controversy. Few
Informed observers disagree with his further
statement that unless a search for settle­ment
Is pursued with energy and dispatch,
sooner or later. "Berlin Is likely to become
the pivot of a new disaster to mankind."
!From the Providence Evening Journal. June
17, 19611
SENATOR MANSFIELD'S PLAN TO EASE THE
BERLIN CRISIS
As a counter to the Kremlin's demand that
West Berlin be turned Into a free city under
United Nations protection, Senator MIKE
MANSFIELD has revived his proposal that the
free-city status be applied to all Berlin.
This approach to the future of the former
German capital, now split In two by the cold
war and the source of a new crisis threat,
has not excited any more cheers In Bonn
than It did the first time Senator MANSFIELD
advanced It 2 years ago. Indeed, the pro­posal
has been greeted In West Germany with
even more dismay than In 1959 since In the
Interim Mr. MANSFIELD has become Senate
majority leader, exercising greater influence
than before.
From one point of view, the West German
perturbation has some basis In fact . Any
attempt to reunite the East and West sectors
of Berlin, one side a free society supported
economically by the West and the other side
totally communized, poses almost as many
practical problems as the reunification of
Germany Itself.
Indeed, the chances of the Soviet Union's
accepting the Idea are slight since the Krem­lin
designated East Berlin as the capital of
the Communist East German Government
and would be rei uctan t to remove Ulbricht's
headquarters from the city which still is the
emotional capital of all Germans.
Yet no move could be devised to break the
dangerous deadlock over Berlin that did not
arouse substantial objections. In contrast,
Senator MANSFIELD's proposal has several sig­nificant
virtues.
Khrushchev, whether intentionally or not,
has turned Berlin into a powder keg by de­manding,
In the form of successive near-ulti­matums,
that the Western Big Three retire
!rom West Berlin, which he has characterized
as a "bone In the throat" of the Communist
bloc that must be removed.
He sharpened the ultimatum in his meet­Ing
with President Kennedy In VIenna and
In his fireside chat to the Soviet people. It
will be Increasingly hard for him not to de­liver
something In the near future. Thus,
Western Insistence on the status quo for
West Berlin helps to keep Khrushchev on his
collision course.
The Mansfield idea, on the other hand,
would end the status quo and take the Big
Three stamp off West Berlin. Yet, It would
wring a matching concession from the SOviet
Union by forcing the ouster of the Ulbricht
government from East Berlin and restoring
the organic unl ty of the cl ty.
Thus, a change of status, satisfying an
acute Soviet need, would be achieved, but
the withdrawal from Berlin would be mu­tual.
One-sided concession by the West, de­manded
by the Kremlin, which would be a
disastrous and Intolerable defeat for the At­latlc
community and free world, would be
voided. Further, the danger of war over Ber­lin,
now a very real potential, would be
avoided for a few more years, giving the cold
war antagonists time to negotiate their criti­cal
differences.
At least, the proposal offers a talking point,
beyond the Soviet demands, and that Is more
than anyone or any nation in the Western
coalition has come up with yet.
The Idea is worth exploring further, even
If it turns out only as a gambit that would
place the Kremlin in the position of dog In
the manger, and take the West off the defen­sive
In the propaganda war over Berlin and
Germany.
1 i''ro n the WJshl.,gton Star. June 15, 19Gli
GOP HE\DS QUERY POLICY ON BERLIN
Republican leaders said yc,.terday t11e
cotPltry is entitled to know whether the pro­posal
of S2nate Dernocratic Lender MANSFIELD
to have all of Berlin declared a free city
under international control indicates any
chang~ in the foreign policy of the Kennedy
administration.
Senate Republican Leader DIRKSEN and
House Republican Leader HALLECK said that
when President Kennedy returned from his
Vienna meeting with SOviet Premier Khru­shchev
he made positive statements that this
country's position on Berlin had not been
changed and that the United States would
stand by its cxi•ting rights in West Ber­lin.
But Mr. HALLECK said it is hard to con­clude
that speeches in the Senate yesterday
by Senator MANSFIELD and other Democrats
were "made out of a clear sky."
Senator DIRKSEN said he got the impres ­sion
the remarks of both Democratic Lead­er
MANSFIELD and his assistant, Senator
HUMPHREY, were trial balloons to get the re­action
of the American people.
Advised of their statements, Senator MANS­FIELD
said he made his suggestion "entirely
on my own" and the administration "had
nothing whatever to do with it."
"I didn't even send copies of it to the
President or the State Department" Sen­ator
MANSFIELD told reporters. "It was not
a trial balloon, but a development of sug­gestions
I have been making for many
months."
!From the Baltimore Sun, June 15, 19611
EAST GERMANY ISSUES CALL FOR PEACE TREATY
MEETING
LONDON, Thursday, June 15.-Communlst
East Germany has demanded that West Ger­many
ban all rallies in a 3-m!le-wlde zone
along the border between the two Germanys,
especially demonstrations on June 17, anni­versary
of the 1953 anti-Communist uprising
In East Germany.
(By Bynum Shaw,
Bonn Bureau of the Sun)
BONN, June 14.-Communlst East Ger­many
today Issued an appeal to the United
States, Brita in, France, the Soviet Union,
Poland, and Czechoslovakia for the convoca­tion
of a conference to cone! ude a German
peace treaty.
The appeal, aimed at the beginning of
talks on a peace treaty with "both parts of
Germany" a lso called for a "norma!lzatlon
of the situation In w est Berlin."
West Berlin at present Is occupied by the
United States, Britain, and France. The
fourth part of the city, that which under
wartime agreements was occupied by the
Soviet Union, now bas been turned over to
East Germany. Communist appeals for nor­malization
never Include that portion of the
city In the text. ,
Today's East German resolution was ap­proved
by the Communist Central Commit­tee,
the State Council, the Council of Min­isters,
and the National Front. In all of
these organizations except the National
Front, Walter Ulbricht, former Red army
colonel, is the dominant figure. The resolu­tion
said the Bonn Government for years
has evaded all proposals based on peaceful
understanding
It said Bonn now faces a decision of "truly
htstonc importance "
In Bonn, a Government spokesman
shrugged off the East German proposal as
"parrot t,llk."
The spokesma:1 said there is no reason to
believe that the WPstern Powers are retreat­ing
before Soviet Premier Khrushchev's
VIenna demand s.
Government officials also were studying a
proposal by U.S. Senator MANSFIELD, Demo­crat,
of Montana. callmg for the creation
of a free city of Berlin which would In­clude
not only the Western but also the
Eastern sectors of the city.
While criticizing MANSFIELD's contention
that Berlin for the West is an untenable
position, these sources welcomer the pos­sibility
of a reestablishment of greater Ber­lin
as a unit.
Officials pointed out that in 1950 West
Germany had proposed free elections for all
of Berlin and the creation of an elective
council perhaps under four-power super­vision
for the operation of the city as a
whole.
JUDICIARY BILL GETS AN OK
There Is no hope here, however that the
Soviet Union would relinquish an Inch of
territory If the hope of gaining more.
Meanwhile, In Bonn, the Bundestag ap­proved
a bill which redefines the status of
the West German judic iary.
The bill would allow 72 judges who served
under the Hitler regime and are known as
"hanging judges" to ask for retirement in
the next year.
If they retire voluntarily, they will retain
full pension rights even If they are not yet
at the pensioning age of 65, If they de­cline
to accept this easy way out, they later
will be removed from office through a change
In the Constitution.
The enforced retirement would deprive
the judges of pension rights.
I From the Cincinnati Enquirer. June 16.
19611
PRELUDE TO RcmEAT?
This week's speech by Senator MIKF. MANS­FIELD,
the Democratic floor leader in the
Senate, Is illus trative of one of the gravest
weaknesses in the formulation of U.S. foreign
policy since the end of World War II.
Senator MANSFIELD, who is normally the
admmistration 's spokesman on such rna t­ters,
suggested as a third alternative that
the Berlin crisis be solved by converting the
prewar German capital mto a free city gov­erned
by an unnamed internatiOnal au­thority.
The Mansfield proposal is strikingly llke
Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev's long­time
advocacy of United Nations control of
Berlin. In view of the di,mal record of the
U.N. as an impartial arbiter in the Congo,
a U.N. mandate m Berlin would be tanta­mount
to a total ntrrender to the Soviet
Union and its Eas t German snteilite.
Quite apart from its basic unsoundness.
there are two particularly amazing features
in the Mansfield plan for Berlin.
First of all, Senator MANSFI>:LD told the
Senate that he was spcakmg simply as one
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 41, Folder 18, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
•
10000 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE . June 20
lawmaker. But a majority leader never
speaks as a mere lawmaker. Whether he
wants to be or not, he Is armed with the
prestige that his role as an administration
spokesman affords him. Every word he ut­ters,
consequently, will be Interpreted
throughout the world as having at least the
foreknowledge of the White House.
Secondly, Senator MANSFIELD could scarcely
have chosen a less opportune time to suggest
that the United States Is thinking of a Berlin
retreat. Too often In the past, we have ap­proached
an International crisis apparently
united, apparently conunltted, apparently
determined not to backtrack. And at that
crucial moment, someone steps forward with
an Intimation that the United States might
settle for !ar less than Its official spokesmen
have sought. This procedure Is like advertis­Ing
In advance that we don't mean whnt we
say. Our enemies are encouraged to stand
pat, to enlarge their demands.
The entire U.S. position In Berlin rests
on the occupation agreement concluded be­tween
the Big Four at the end of World
War II. We have been Insisting all along
that the Russians fulfill their obligations
under that compact and that they permit
the Western powers to fulfill theirs.
Entering Into' any new agreement would
immediately nulll!y the 1945 agreement. Our
rights In Berlin would be wiped away. So
would the obligations of the Russians.
Nothing, we think, would please Khru­shchev
more.
The administration should lo..e no time In
repudiating a surrender In Berlin and In
seeking to repair the damage that inevitably
accompanied the Mansfield proposal. Even
with such a disavowal from the White House,
the Western position will be seriously Im­paired.
[From the Dallas Morning News, June 16,
1961]
No MERIT IN MANSFIELD PLAN
Senator MIKE MANSFIELD's proposal that all
Berlin be turned over to an International
trusteeship as a free city Immediately raises
a question. Does President Kennedy ap­prove?
Only recently the President said flatly, "We
will fight for Berlin."
Then, at the summit conference, Khru­shchev
slammed the Issue of West Berlin
down on the table and Lssued an ultimatum
to the Western Powers to get out or the city
within 6 months.
While this now appears to have been the
most Important thing that happened at the
conference, the President did not mention
lt In hls report to the Nation. This creates
speculation as to whether the suggestion of
the Senate Democratic leader Is a move to
open the way for the President to back down
from his bold statement, "We will fight for
Berlin."
Mansfield's proposal ls utterly without
merit. It would merely strengthen Soviet
Russia. The original proposal for admlnls­tratlon
of Berlin was through a !our-power
agency, Including Russia. But Russia would
never cooperate and has schemed constantly
to put Berlin under Communist control.
This would be Russia's strategy under any
such program as Mansfield now suggests.
Russia desperately wants ·control of West
Berlin because that city Is a constant exhibit
of Western freedom against Soviet slavery.
A large majority of West Berlin citizens have
been constantly loyal to the West. To de­sert
them w,:,uld be a cowardly retreat by the
Western Powers. This woul(l depreciate
their prestige with the nations of the world
more than anything else that baa been done.
The President should immediately voice his
opposition to the Mansfield proposal. The
Senate should turn lt down.
[From the Phlladelphla. Evening Bulletin,
June 16, 1961]
THE FUTURE OP BERLIN
Premier Khrushchev has now served
warning, tor the third time, that the prob­lem
of Berlin and a divided Germany must
be solved wlthln a fixed period of time.
In 1958 he set the limit at 6 months, but
took no action to implement his threat.
Last year he fixed the new limit as "in 1961."
Now he has repeated this warning, in a
speech to the Russian people reporting on
his VIenna meeting with President Kennedy.
His speech contained little that was new,
and his manner was not bellicose. He sim­ply
restated the Russian condlltons for a
settlement--utterly unacceptable to the
West--but he stated them with a firmness
that left little doubt that East and West
this year will see a test of courage and de­termination
centering on Berlin.
His speech confirms President Kennedy's
report that the meeting at Vienna was a
somber one. What ls worse, it gives little
support to th6 one hope that President Ken­nedy
brought home: that as a result of the
meeting the chances for a dangerous mis­judgment
on either side should now be less.
The President's principal concern at
VIenna was to impress upon Khrushchev
that the West is In deadly earnest In de­claring
Its Intention of defending its rights
in Berlin, and will take whatever steps are
necessary to meet Its commitments to the
free people in West Berlin.
It Khrushchev was impressed, or his plans
altered, by the Vienna meeting, his address
to the Russian people did not show it. He
seems convinced that the West wlll, when
the chips are down, retreat !rom Its firm
position. .
II he continues to bold to this view and
acts upon lt, President Kennedy and our
Western allies wll! be compelled to find
means of showing him that be ls stll! mis­judging
the West; or make an lgnominous
retreat which would be Interpreted through­out
the world as meaning that the cold war
is lost.
FLIRTING WITH APPEASEMENT
President Kennedy's difficulties, in show­ing
that the West will not retreat at Berlin,
have been complicated meanwhile by the
fa
the Communist regime of East Germany, '·"
said: "Some threaten they will not recogn'7"
the treaty and will use force to oppose i
Any force against us will be answered by
force. We have the means."
This ls odd because President Kennedy
personally reassured Mr. Khrushchev on th"
point In Vienna. He drew a sharp dlstlnctln''
between the legal aspects of signing a tree ,
with East Germany and the practical prob­lem
o! getting SU!Jplles through to West Ber­lin.
The President emphasized that the United
States would continue to meet its obliga ­tions
to supply the 2,200,000 people of Wes,
Berlln, by force 1! necessary, but that It was
not particularly concerned about who
stamped the papers at the East Berlin bor­der,
just so the supplles went through,
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 41, Folder 18, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
1961 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE 10001
Nevertheless, In his fireless-side chat to­night,
the Soviet leader set up the straw­man
and threatened to use force under cir­cumstances
which the President had told
him would not occur. In fact, when Presi­dent
Kennedy went on to London from
Vienna, the point was repeated that the
Western nations were not going to war over
the color of the stamp on scraps of paper
but that they were determined to get the
supplies through.
Khrushchev, however, is setting the stage
for summoning a big peace conference on
Germany at the October meeting of the
Communist parties. Washington won't like
this and won't participate in such a confer­ence,
but nobody here is going to mobilize
the troops to bang through Helmstedt toward
West Berlin just because the Soviet leacter
needs to sign a peace treaty with East Ger­many
for internal Communist reasons.
Having had previous problems with his
own allies, President Kennedy understands
Mr. Khrushchev's political problems. There
is plenty of trouble in the Communist para­dise.
Their agricultural policies have been
a spectacular failure. This was supposed
to be Khrushchev's specialty when he came
to power, but it has been his greatest disap­pointment.
In China the food situation is
desperate and may prove by the end of this
year to be the biggest flop and tragedy of
1961.
One result of this is that China is con­stantly
pressing the Soviet Union for more
supplies than Moscow wishes to give and
at the same time challenging Khrushchev's
ideological and political leadership.
All is not well for Khrushchev In other
places either. His dreams of conquest in the
Middle East have not materialized. Nasser
has turned on him and vice versa. Iraq has
not fallen into his lap as the Communist
brethren anticipated. Albania has been de­fying
Moscow and has forced Khrushchev to
dismantle his submarine base in that coun­try.
In fact, Khrushchev's whole campaign to
establish a three-headed control of interna­tional
machinery is a direct result not of
Soviet successes recently but of a spectacu­lar
Soviet defeat in the Congo, where the
U.N. forced the Communists out.
It is no wonder Khrushchev wants to pre­pare
the way for at least the impression of
a victory at the big Communist blowout in
October. In Communist terms, his record
is not one of unrelieved success. He is
picking up some easy victories in Laos and
other places close to Soviet borders, but his
difficulties with Peiplng, Carlo, and Albania,
his failure to get the supplies anticipated
from East Germany, the increasing pressure
for more food and freedom in Eastern Eu­rope
and even In the Soviet Union itself­ali
these make his life less serene than it
sometimes appears to be in the West.
Thus, his threats to use force in Germany
sound brave enough but actually mean very
little. If he really wants to show how brave
he Is, a li he has to do is to encourage the
East Germans to block the supply routes
to Berlin, and then he will have a test of
courage that will make Stalingrad look like
a tea party.
For this Government is not thinking of
making all of Berlin a free city, no matter
what Senator MIKE MANSFIELD says, and It
is not thinking of war to keep Khrushchev
from signing a peace treaty with East
Germany.
It is merely saying that it will not a ban­don
the West Berliners; that It will supply
them no matter who stamps the papers, and
It is advising Khrushchev not to let the sup­plies
be stopped unless he wants to risk
everything achieved by the Soviet revolution
in the last 40 years.
1 From the New York Daily News, June
16, 1961]
APPEASEMENT AND DEFEATISM
-to come out for a new Berlln setup that
has the mackerel-in-the-moonlight smell of
appeasement and defeatism.
It is the Montana 'Democrat's (and Sen­ate
majority leader's) thought that, pending
unification of Germany, all Berlin should be
trusted to some international authority, with
en trances and exits kept open by peace
forces like those which have prevented war
between Israel and Egypt but have not pre­vented
persistent unrest in the former Bel­gian
Congo.
Such a rejiggering in Berlin would obvi­ously
open the whole city to conquest by
Communist mobs, with the Red Army back­ing
them up, unless the peace f or ces were
big enough to beat back the Russian legions.
By agreeing to it, the Western AJlies would
recognize East Germany's Communist "gov­ernment"
at least unofficiaJiy, and cause the
captive nations to lose aJI hope of liberation.
Concerning the Ma n sfield proposal. Sena­tor
EvERETT M. DIRKSEN, of Illinois, wants to
know whether it is a trial balloon indicat ­ing
that the Kennedy administration now
plans to weasel gradually and slyly out of its
repeated promises to stand firm on West
Berlin.
MANSFIELD says it is not; but, with all due
respect to him, it seems to us that what is
needed in some reassurance from the Presi­dent
himself. Khrushchev, you'Jl remem­ber,
said long before the 1960 election that
he expected to be able to deal with a new
U.S. President, whereas he couldn't get to
first base with Eisenhower.
]From the Washington Star, June 16, 1961]
WEST GERMANS PROTES T PLAN OF MANSFIELD
BoNN, GERMANY, June 16.- The West
German Government has come out strongly
against the Mansfield proposals for a com­promise
solution to the Berlin problem.
Foreign Ministry spokesman, Guenther
von Hase, told a news conference yesterday
the plan would mean deepening the division
of Germany and legalizing to a certain de­gree
Communist East Germany. Mr. Hase
said West Germany would never agree to
this.
U.S. Senator MIKE MANSFIELD had pro­posed
uniting the present Communist and
Western sectors of Berlin and creating a uni­fied
free city. I t would be held in trust by
an international organization until Germany
is reunified.
Senator MANSFIELD argued in his speech
before the Senate that this would be one way
to avert the threat of nuclear war that hangs
over the Berlin issue because of the seeming
impossibility of the United States and the
Soviet Union to agree on a solution. He
emphasized that he was speaking for him­self,
not for the administration.
"We are convinced that the Senator put
forward this plan with the best of inten­tions,
but we regret that we cannot call it
good" Mr. Hase said.
"To foJiow the plan would mean dividing
Germany into three parts" Mr. Hase said,
meaning West and East Germany, plus the
new free city of Berlin.
The longstanding policy of West Germany
is to end the present division of the coun­try
through free elections and reestablish
Berlin as the national capital.
"The solution of the Berlin problem can­not
be treated separately" Mr. Hase said.
"Berlin ts a part of free Germany and must
become the capital of a unified Germany."
Then Mr. Hase bore down on the Mans­field
proposal that West Germany and East
Germany get together on a new status for
Berlin. Mr. Hase said this would give a form
of rec.J;;nition and legalization to Commu­nist
East Germany, a step West Germany
has firmly opposed. It even refuses to main­tain
diplomatic relations with countries that
extend them to East Germany.
Praise was given Senator MANSFIELD for
treating Berlin as a whole, in contrast with
Premier Khrushchev. In his memorandum
to President Kennedy Mr. Khrushchev de­manded
that only the western sector o! the
city be internationalized and demilitarized.
The eastern sector would remain the capi­tal
of East Germany, fully under Commu­nist
controL
Mr. Hase said: "The Senator speaks cor­rectly
of the whole of Berlin" but that was
a ll he had good to say abou t the Mansfield
pla!1.
1 From t!1e Washington Daily News, June 16,
1961]
MIKE DENIES FLYING BERLIN BALLOON
WASHINGTON, June 15.-Republican Con­gressional
chiefs demanded to know today
whether Senate DemocratiC Leader MIKE
MANSFIELD's proposal that Berlin be made a
free city was a trial balloon for an admin­istration
policy shift.
MANSFIELD promptly denied that his su g­gestion
yesterday in a Senate speech was
designed to test. public reaction. The Mon­tana
Democrat said the speech merely was
a compilation of views he and others had
expressed previously. MANSFIELD said he had
not given an advance copy of his remarks
to the White House or the State Depart­ment.
Asked about the GOP statement, Associate
White House Press Secretary Andrew Hatcher
declined comment.
MANSFIELD said yesterday that Russia and
the United States must compromise their
differences on Berlin or risk nuclear war. He
proposed a third way-making East anr.,ht advised
the United States, Britain and France to
start Immediate negotiations If they want to
travel to Berlln after a treaty Is signed. He
said road, rall and air traffic would be In­terrupted
unless the West signed agreements
with East Germany.
GERMAN RAPS "FREE CITY"
The proposal by Senator MIKE MANSFIELD,
Democratic majority leader, to turn Berlln
Into a free city would make the German
metropolis "a city without freedom" Baron
Karl T. Guttenberg, member of the German
Parllament, declared yesterday. He spoke at
Waldorf ceremonies commemorating the
8th anniversary of the East German uprising.
Guttenberg said that replacing the oc­cupying
powers-the United States, Great
Britain and France--by any International au­thority
would mean setting up an instru­ment
for Eastern Intervention.
!From the Washington Post, June 17, 19611
RUMORS OF CoNCESSIONS: WEST AGAIN FACES
ISSUE OF ACTION ON BERLIN
(By Chalmers M. Roberts)
Once again the United States and Its
Brl tlsh and French all1es face this question
over Berl)n: should they attempt to stand
pat on the present arrangement; should
they offer to negotiate but only In a Jlmlted
way which could lead to no new agreement
with the Soviet Union; or should they take
the risk of some daring new proposals?
Officially, the United States Is standing
pat. But everyone who went through the
last Berlin crisis, the one precipitated by
Soviet Premier Nlklta S. Khrushchev's ulti­matum
of Thanksglvmg Day, 1958, assumes
the West wlll go to the conference table
once again to avert a mllltary showdown.
The real question, then, Is whether the
West will again offer some small concessions
or whether It wlll try for a settlement on
the basis of some major new proposals.
Yesterday both the State Department and
the Bntlsh Foreign Office flatly denied a
London Dally Tele~;raph report that Western
experts were working on a plan In which
the West would concede some kind of recog­nition
of Communist East Germany and
the present Oder-Nelsse border between East
Germany and Poland In exchange for a
permanent arrangement for free West
Berlin.
Secretary of State Dean Rusk told news­men
the article was "just not accurate" that
he foresaw no change In the pollcy of stand­Ing
firm on Berlin.
Denials to the contrary notwithstanding,
It Is a fact that there has been at least diS­cussion-
some time back, not just since
Khrushchev's demand for a German peace
treaty In 1961-of this very Idea. How far
It has gone Is unknown but It Is a fact that
some very Important persons In the Admin­Istration
have at least scouted the Idea as
a possibility.
The State Department also took pains to
knock down the Idea that Senate Majority
Leader MIKE MANSFIELD'S Wednesday speech,
calllng for establishment of a free city com­posed
of both East and West Berlln, was an
Administration trial balloon.
MANSFIELD has said he was talking entirely
on his own. In fact he avoided telling r.ny­one
In the Administration In advance lest
they try to argue him out of making lt. His
point was to get discussion going.
These are not tl>e only people In Washing­ton
talking about a bold approach to the
Berlin Issue. Columnist Walter Lippmann
alluded to It on a television Interview Thurs­day
night.
Where It wlll come out Is now totally un­certain
since agre-ement will be necessary
not just among the experts but among Pres­Ident
Kennedy, French President Charles de
Gaulle and British Prime Minister Harold
Macmillan. Their current posture Is to
"stand firm."
Today In West Berlin there will be a mas­sive
rally, called by Mayor Willy Brandt, to
give the West Berliner's answer to Khru­shchev.
It will be the eighth anniversary
of the abort! ve 1953 East Berlin and East
German uprising, an uprising crushed by
Soviet mill tary power.
The White House yesterday had no com­ment
on Khrushchev's radio-television
speech of Thursday though the President
received a transcript of the text.
[From the New York Mirror, June 17, 1961]
AaE WE READY?
In the teeth of the Khrushchev ultima­tum,
the free world must make a choice. Its
nations must stand up and be counted.
There Is no "third way "
For if a third way Is to be entertained,
the way proposed by Senator MANSFIELD, for
Instance, to the disservice of his country, In
our opinion, then there Is to be more com­promise
and appeasement.
The time for all that Is past.
This may be our last chance.
Khrushchev's ultimatum Is that there
must be a German peace treaty on his terms
by the end of this year, December 31, 1961.
This means a treaty agreement between
East and West with both Germanys or a
unilateral treaty on Communist Russia's
part with Communist East Germany.
It Is not enough to say that must call
Khrushchev's bluii; we must stand firm even
at the risk that he Is not bluJilng.
But Is this a time for utter pessimism?
We believe not. All the cards are not In
Khrushchev's hands, for-
We hold some aces on our own side, If
we've got the guts to play out the game-­we
and our allies.
Our advantage lies In the enemy's weak­ness;
he Is weak In many ways.
1. The Russian people, with whom we
have no quarrel, Insistently are demanding
more of the fruits of peace, more of the
good things of life which ccmmunlsm prom­Ised
and never gave.
2. We are In West Berlin by right and
treaty.
3. The only solution of the so-called Ger­man
problem Is by free, supervised elections
conducted throughout all Germany. The
world should be reminded continually that
Soviet Russia agreed to elections-and re­neged.
4. West Berlin, an enclave within East Ger­many,
has become the world's brightest
showcase of freedom. By thousands each
week, refugees fiee to Its sanctuary from the
Communist surroundings.
5. More Important than all else Is the eco­nomic
power which we, and to a greater
extent our allles, hold over the Communist
heartland and Its subverted satellites. Are
we and our allies ready to take a declsl ve
step now and cut off all trade with commu­nism
and Its bullyragging leader? Therein
lies a positive and powerful reply to Khru­shchev.
All trade means all In both directions. It
means not only the strategic goods but the
nonstrategic as well-the "soft" goods, the
luxury Items, the machine tools (how can
they be called nonstrategic), the food, the
loans, the grants, etc. It means we should
buy nothing from Russia or any other Com­munist
land, no oll, no furs or raw materials,
no gourmet's delights such as caviar and
Polish hams, no geegaws !or the Christmas
trees, or felt hats, pocketbooks, leather­goods-
anything.
It Is with the bard currencies Russia gains
!rom her trade with the West that she
finances propaganda, subversion, espionage,
riots In which the mobs and students are
paid performers. That money should be cut
off.
Such a program would call for courage, for
patriotism ahead of profit; !or survival ahead
of greed.
Are we ready to stand up? Are our allies
ready?
The chance to answer the questions affirm­atively
may never come again.
[From the New York Times, June 18, 1961)
WESTERN DIFFERENCES
As to the possibility of negotiating a new
agreement on Berlin, there have been dif­ferences
In the West. The British have
leaned toward fiexlblllty on negotiating a
new agreement, while the West Germans
have spoken strongly against any compro­mise.
Talk of a "new approach" to the problem
was heard In the Senate where Majority
Leader MIKE MANSFIELD repeated a proposal
he has made before. It calls !or making all
Berlin a free cl ty to be held In trust by an
International authority, and for garrisoning
the access routes with International peace
terms.
The proposal aroused speculation that Mr.
MANSFIELD was sending up a trial balloon !or
the administration, but he Insisted he was
speaking only for himself. Secretary of
State Dean Rusk, In an effort to counter sus­picion
that a revision of policy might be In
the making, declared there had been no
change In the U.S. determination to stand
firm on Its rights In West Berlin and to pro­tect
the city's people.
Perhaps the strongest comment of the
Khrushchev proposals came from Dirk U.
Stlkker, the new Secretary General of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, who
accused the Soviet Premier or deliberately
provoking tension. Dr. Stlkker said: "We
must make up our minds about what we are
ready to do."
Thus It appears the anti-Communist al­liance
will face a sfern test of nerves and wlll
In the next few months.
1 From the New York Times, June 18, 19611
GERMAN UNITY CRY HAs WEAKER SouND-­HoPEs
FOR A FREE, UNDIVIDED COUNTRY ARE
DIMMED BY THE INCREASED PRESSURE FROM
KHRUSHCHEV
(By Gerd Wilcke)
BoNN, GERMANY, June 17.-Today Is Na­tional
Unity Day In West Germany and West
Berlin and hundreds of thousands of free
Germans are gathering to commemorate the
uprising 8 years ago of the population of
East Germany against Communist rule.
In essence, the words spoken at today's
rallles are similar to those used last year
and the years before. But the cry for unity
has attained a hollow sound. As one of the
more responsible newspapers of West Ger­many
put It this week:
"We wlll commemorate the day as we did
In the past seven years. But next year's June
17 will not be the same. We can predict
thIs wl thou t resorting to crystal bails. It Is
self-explanatory because Premier Khru­shchev
has left no doubt that he Is deter­mined
to settle the German and Berlin ques­tions
before the end of the year."
The editorial and other written and
spoken comment on this "Tag der Elnhelt"
reflect a far greater sense of reall ty than
Germans were willing to subscribe to In the
past. Although used to propagandistic pin­pricks
from the East there Is, after Premier
Khrushchev's Thursday speech, a greater
conviction among Germans that he means
business.
GERMAN DOUDTS
At the same time there Is an Increasing
lack of conviction that the West means bUSI­ness
to the same degree. As one German
put It: "The Impact of Premier Khrushchev's
radio n.nd tete•1lslon address was great here
not because he said anything new but be-
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 41, Folder 18, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
1961 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE 10003
cause he said it after seeing the American
President."
Although Germans admired the firm way
President Kennedy presented the West's
case in Vienna, they are not entirely con­vinced
that the President will stick it out.
They read with amazement of Senator
MIKE MANSFIELD's suggestion for a compro­mise
in Berlin. Although they cannot be
certain from this distance whether Senator
MANSFIELD refiects the President's views,
they are certain that he represents a current
of thought.
What w!ll happen If the Russians put
through their plan?
In VIenna President Kennedy was ex­tremely
forthright In telling Premier Khru­shchev
what the Western all!es were ready
to do to maintain their access to Berlin.
But the feeling is that the President did not
make clear enough what the West would do
if the Russians sign a separate peace treaty
with Communist East Germany.
This, it is felt, provided Premier Khru­shchev
with au Important opening that
could allow him to sign a treaty without
fear that the West would offer any vigorous
military response.
Now the prospect is that Premier Khru­shchev
will call a conference before the year
Is out to proceed with a treaty for East
Germany, The West, as has been indicated,
w!ll Ignore the conference.
Once the treaty Is signed, Germans feel,
a period of quiet may follow to settle nerves
and allow the West to get accustomed to the
Idea before the squeeze is put on. The
squeeze could take several forms.
First the East Germans could demand the
right to stamp the papers of the Western
allies using the access routes to Berlin.
PERSONNEL CHECKS
Even If the West took the view that It
would not be worthwhile to go to war over
rubber stamps or even if the late John
Foster Dulles' theory was followed-that the
East Germans were merely acting as agents
of the Soviet Union-the question of East
Germans checking on allied personnel would
be a ticklish one.
Then, as East Germany's Communist
Chief Walter Ulbricht discussed in his news
conference this week, there is the question
of air safety over Berlin.
'I)le Russians could someday withdraw
thetr representative from the all!ed air con­trol
center and send an East German In­stead.
The West would have to take a
stand immediately. Aside from the military
needs, It would have to consider the safety
of the 100-odd commercial planes that touch
on Berlin every day.
Then there are the more than 2 million
Berliners who have remained free because
they had the protection of the allies. A
cutoff from West Germany would bring back
old hardships even it a new airlift-if that
Is still feasible-would keep open a lifeline.
AI though present supplies of vital food­stuffs,
coal, building materials, gasoline and
so forth are so huge that West Berliners
could get by for up to a year, immediate
problems would arise In other fields.
Because the city is not self-sufficient Bonn
pumps about 1,500 million deutsche marks
( $375 million) into Berlin each year. Bonn
also buys more than 60 percent of the city's
manufactured products.
If the money were cut off, the city's budg­et
would be unbalanced and it would have
no funds to extend business credits, pay old­age
penstons or restitutions to Nazi victims.
An Isolation of Berlin also would shut
the gateway of the thousands of East Ger­mans
who seek refuge in the West every
~onth, He~r Ulbricht calls the refugee camps
spy nests of the Western allies. For those
who go there the reception centers are the
last ray of hope that there st!ll is freedom
and human dignity.
No.l03--6
' i DECISION NEEDED
The rqueeze on Berlin, ·which for the So­viet
camp would be a step-by-step fight to
gain recognition for East Germany, could
go on Indefinitely but surely a point would
come where the West would have to decide
how much It wants to take.
One cannot judge from here where this
point Is as It involves the great unknown of
the West's contigency planning going on in
Western capitals.
But this much is clear. Premier Khru­shchev's
apparent conviction that he can get
away with a separate peace treaty and Its
consequences for Berlin despite allied warn­ings
has made a deep Impression on Ger­mans
and has disturbed them.
Although the West has said no to Premier
Khrushchev's formula, people here feel that
a negative response alone Is no policy. What
is more, they fear that any compromiEe on
Berlin is the first step out of Berlin.
What weapons can West Germans use to
fight a compromise? The biggest, it seems,
is the weapon of discouragement.
After the United States, West Germany
makes the largest manpower contribution
to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
If the Germans were to lose faith in the
West, the concept of Western defense would
go by the board. It also would bring up
the danger that a future West German Gov­ernment
might look for Its own accommoda­tions
with the Russians. It would not be
the first time in history.
All this refiects a great turning point in
the Germans' thinking. They feel Premier
Khrushchev is determined to have things
his way. But they ask themselves: "How
determined is the West?"
[From the Wall Street Journal, June 16,
1961]
THE BONE IN KHRUSHCHEV'S THROAT
Berlin, the bone Khrushchev says must
come out of the Soviet throat, is u sually
regarded as the one object above all that the
United States will not release. Yet a good
many Americans have long felt that, because
our position there is so awkward and poten­tially
dangerous, some new arrangement
needs to be worked out with the Soviets.
The position is awkward and potentially
dangerous, as it must be in an enclave 110
miles east of the Iron Curtain. A new ar­rangement
is needed-the kind that would
reratify Western rights in West Berlin and
make the Soviets and their East German
stooges respect them once and for all.
That, however, is not what is usually
meant by a new arrangement; Increasingly
the talk Is of a compromise between the So­viet
and the United States positions. One
of the most thoughtful of such plans in
Senator MANSFIELD's for a "third way" out
of the Berlin problem which Khrushchev
posed once more in his speech yesterday.
Khrushchev proposes that West Berlin be
made a free city, detached from West Ger­many,
with East Berlin an integral part of
East Germany; in this way he hopes to gain,
gradually if not at once, all Berlin. MANs­FIELD
proposes that the whole city be united
as a free city held in trust by an interna­tional
authority, presumably the U.N. Its
status would be guaranteed by NATO and the
Communist Warsaw Pact satellites; Its access
routes would be garrisoned by international
peace teams.
Like all "third ways" we have so far heard
ot, this falls short of the requirements of
U.S. security. U.N. troops are too easily used
!or the political purposes of their national
masters, as has been notoriously the case in
the Congo; they are not safe substitutes for
United States, British, and French soldiers
in Berlin. Indeed, if Khrushchev were to
accept such a proposal, It would be cause for
real alarm, for it would mean he saw his
dream of grabbing all Berlin coming true.
. The reality, we suspect, is that it is all but
tmposstble to negotiate a safe new arrange­ment
wtth the Soviets along these lines. we
are in Berlin by our rights of conquest; we
remain by power. But does this make it an
in tolerable situation?
Let us remember that Berlin is in truth
a bone gagging Khrushchev's throat; to that
extent, his discomfort should be a comfort
to us. West Berlin is the gateway to free­dom
for millions from the East. It is living
proof, day in and day out, of the lie of the
Communist promise. No wonder Khru­shchev
can't stand it. But we can.
Khrushchev is expected to make more
tro:>ble in Berlin later in the year-inter­fermg
with traffic and a lot of other things.
Certamly the harassments and complica­tiOns
he can cause are almost limitless, as we
know from the Berlin blockade and Jesser
annoyances since then. This prospect has
led some to fear that he may be able to
mbble. us out of Berlin, somewhat as he is
domg m Laos.
It could happen-but only if we let it
happen. Berlin is not Laos. Rightly or
wrongly, we let Laos go because everything
including the apathy of the people, seemed
against us; and we could let it go without
abandoning all Asia. In Europe, the divid­ing
line was long since clearly drawn, and
Berlm Is the outpost. Our determination
to defend Berlin represents nothing more nor
less than our determination to defend West­ern
Europe and America.
With that resolve, we can meet Khru­shchev's
provocations, whatever they may be.
And if he should throw at us the ultimate
provocation of war, then we must face that
in the reallza tion only surrender could have
averted it. The worst thing that could hap­pen
to America is not war but the despairing
notion that nothing is worth fighting for.
The firmer we are, the less chance of war.
Fundamentally, Berlin is Khrushchev's
problem, not ours. Let him push and prod,
nibble and seek to negotiate us out; we need
only stand fast. It is not up to us to offer
new arrangements to accommodate his greed·
it Ls up to him to begin acting civilized. '
If he ever should, then It might be pos­sible
to make a safe and more peaceful settle ­ment_
of th~ status of Berlin. But if he per­sists
m belltgerence, our first duty is to make
clear there is no third way out of our com­mitment
to freedom.
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 41, Folder 18, Mansfield Library, University of Montana