Friday, March 30, 2012

2003: When will the Americans start begging the world to let them off the hook in Iraq? It seems that the Americans are not going to start begging any time soon. What seems imminent is massive casualties in Baghdad as the Americans try to quicken its fall. We want our army generals to win all kinds of wars for us. In normal times, however, we rail against them for killing democracy in Pakistan instead of killing our enemies. We complain about the growing burden of the defence budget and beef about too many army officers holding civilian posts. But when there is war, we pluck the generals out of their obscurity and want them to give us solace. They do an honest job, giving us hope that we will not lose the war, but they do it at the cost of reality. They also do it at the cost of professionalism and all the lessons they were made to imbibe as officers. Ex-army chief General Aslam beg said in “Nawa-e-Waqt” (3 April 2003) that an invading army normally should have five-to-one superiority but the Americans didn’t have it in Iraq. But if the Americans wanted to yield some corpses they would attack Baghdad. Such an act would be disastrous for the Americans and would bog them down. After that, they would beg the world to extricate them from the quagmire but no one would be able to help them. Aslam Beg has always been strong on predictions which usually don’t come to pass. He predicted an American defeat at the hands of Saddam Hussein in 1991 and was proved wrong. Since he was then chief of the army in Pakistan his “defiance”, while much admired by the Urdu press, destabilised Pakistan’s political system. He believed that Americans would not fight on land after the defeat in Vietnam, but now the Americans seem willing to fight on land and even take body bags. The progress of war in Iraq is quite rapid despite some miscalculations by Rumsfeld and his cohorts in Washington. When is an army bogged down? One month? Two months? Two years? When will the Americans start begging the world to let them off the hook in Iraq? It seems that the Americans are not going to start begging any time soon. In fact Baghdad has fallen more quickly than most had anticipated. Talking to “Khabrain” (3 April 2003), General (Retd) Zahid Ali Akbar said that if America bombed Pakistan then Pakistan should threaten the United States with a nuclear strike on their naval fleet nearest to Pakistan. He said if too many body bags reached America the public there would reject Bush and elect a Democrat president who may firmly take the US back to the United Nations. He said if he was in Saddam’s shoes he would have made chemical weapons. He said if he was General Musharraf he would prepare a missile with a 2000-mile range so as to reach Israel. Zahid Ali Akbar got out of hand as happens usually with generals when they face the public and try to hand them a virtual victory through the use of loose language. A Pakistani threat of a nuclear strike against America is highly unrealistic. America is thousands of miles away and we don’t have an ICBM. Targeting an American fleet passing near Pakistan is comic because that would be a moving target and could simply float out of range upon being threatened. The same would apply to the base at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean if we have a missile that can go that far. The target would be too small. As for our missiles, Zahid Ali Akbar should know that they are not as “smart” yet as we would like them to be. The good thing about the Indian cities is that if you miss by a few miles you still hit human targets, but in the sea even the best missiles may miss. It is shocking that Zahid Ali Akbar wants to hit Israel without looking into the consequences of such an aggression on an empty stomach. In talking loose he may have pleased the public but he has put paid to the India-specific national nuclear strategy frequently announced by Islamabad. Famous war expert Captain (Retd) Saeed Tiwana wrote in daily “Pakistan” (3 April 2003) that American troops in Iraq desert would get roasted in the heat of the coming summer. He said the American war-planners were at each other’s throat and that President Bush was taking strong pain-killers like his father, Saddam’s earlier victim. He said America would get “phainti” (great beating) in Iraq and President Bush would stand trial for war crimes. Tiwana is unleashed every time there is war. He is a poor man’s Ollie North. It is good to hear that son Bush is taking pain-killers like father Bush, but Tiwana should tell us what pill we should take to dispel the disrepute into which he brings the Pakistan army every time he opens his mouth. We are all with Tiwana but he should know that we can produce better fantasy on the Iraq war than he can. REFERENCE: Second opinion: Threatening America with a nuclear strike? Khaled Ahmed’s Urdu Press Review Friday, April 11, 2003 http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_11-4-2003_pg3_6

US Democrat Charlie Wilson with Colonel Imam

ISLAMABAD: Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, the chief of Jamaat ud Dawa (JuD) a charity organisation accused by West and India for exporting terror from Pakistan, has confessed for the first time about his meeting with al Qaida founding father Osama Bin Laden and said that he studied from the same scholar who taught bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. “Yes once I had met Osama Bin Laden but that is an old story I met him probably in 1982 in Saudi Arabia and in that meeting we just waived at each other,” said Saeed in an interview with Dawn.com. Saeed’s organisation was banned by the United Nations Security Council days after the Mumbai attacks in November 2008 for its alleged involvement in the attacks and extremists activities. However local courts have allowed the organisation to work in Pakistan. Saeed, the most wanted man by India, is a holder of double master’s degree in Islamic Studies and also is a former teacher at Engineering University, Punjab. He said he was a proud student of Sheikh Bin Baz. Bin Baz was the grand mufti (scholar) of Saudi Arabia from 1993 to until his death in May 1999. AfPak head and a retired CIA officer, Bruce Riedel in his book titled “The Search for Al Qaeda” has described Bin Baz as one who “preached a very reactionary brand of Islam, proclaiming earth is flat, banning high heels for women as too sexually provocative, barring men from wearing Western suits and imposing other restrictions on behavior.” When asked is it not a coincidence that he studied under the same cleric who taught Osama Bin Laden and Aiman al al-Zawahiri? Saeed said it was the honour for both the students and the teacher. When asked about the reports regarding the financial help by Osama Bin Laden for establishing Lashkar-i-Taiba back in 1989-90, Saeed denied by calling it “baseless allegation.” Asked how it was possible that he could not have met Bin Laden in neighboring Afghanistan while he was waging Jihad next door in Indian administered Kashmir, Saeed brushed aside the question saying, “put this matter aside.” Saeed declared the killing of Osama Bin Laden as extra judicial act and in the same breath he said that it was yet to be verified if the al Qaeda chief was in the Abbotabad compound or not. He said that US was the biggest terrorist who did not prove anything against bin Laden in any court of law. When asked if his men or he himself were helping the jihad in Afghanistan, Saeed said that the Afghanis were doing well themselves and they did not need anybody’s help. “We are doing what we can do for them,” he added. Saeed who used to hide from cameras has started appearing on television screen these days, when asked about the reason behind this change of mind he said that he has taken this decision to counter the propaganda against himself and his organisation. REFERENCE: Osama, Zawahri and I had same teacher: Hafiz Saeed By Azaz Syed http://www.dawn.com/2012/02/07/bin-laden-zawahri-and-i-had-same-teacher-hafiz-saeed.html

Late. Abd al-Aziz ibn Abd Allah ibn Baaz [Saudi Grand Mufti who issued Fatwa against Saddam and then against Osama Bin Ladin] Let me be blunt and allow me to say that since the first day of arrival of First Oil Rich Pedophile/Pederast Arab Rascal Sheikh in Pakistan our Rulers from General Ayub to Zardari [Bhutto is included] played the Role of Pimps and Paddlers for them e.g. Wild Hunting Parties [with every kind of vice] in the most poor areas of Pakistan i.e. South Punjab – The Seraiki Belt – or you may say the HQ of Punjabi Taliban. They way these Rascals Treat Working Class [Educated Middle Class] from Pakistan, India and Bangladesh could only be called worst kind of slavery and cruelty because from Airport to Work Place these Arabs [from Executive to Citizen] insult them and violate every Law given in the book particularly the Labour Laws. And these very Arabs are Financing the Khawarijs in Pakistan, let me show all of you their real face:

Khadim ul Harmain Sharifain - Shah Fahad The Debauch - In reality, it was a test of the ebullient Fahd’s capacity to govern. The Crown Prince would have to live down his personal reputation as a reckless womanizer, drinker, and gambler. REFERENCE: King Fahd’s Saudi Arabia by Harvey Sicherman August 12, 2005 http://www.fpri.org/enotes/20050812.middleeast.sicherman.fahdsaudiarabia.html

Real Face of King Fahd: There were stories of all night sessions at seedy clubs in Beirut, of affairs with belly dancers, and of the wife of a Lebanese businessman paid $100,000 a year to make herself available. Then in 1969, Fahd was said to have lost $1,000,000 in a single dusk-to-dawn marathon of Scotch-fuelled gambling at the tables of a MonteCarlo nightclub. He was summoned back to Riyadh by his brother, the then King Faisal Abdul Aziz ibn Saud. REFERENCE: Life and legacy of King Fahd By Paul Wood BBC defence correspondent Last Updated: Monday, 1 August 2005, 10:14 GMT 11:14 UK http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4734505.stm

Saudi Arabia’s King Fahd: [The Mutawwa in Chief due to his fingering Streets of Pakistan are burning] Real Face: His visits with his retinue of 3,000 had earned the local tradesmen riches indeed. It is estimated that an extra €30,000 (£21,000) a day was spent just in Puerto Banus. As heir apparent, Fahd first visited Marbella in 1974 and stayed at the Incosol hotel and spa. He booked 100 rooms but some of the princesses didn’t like the decor so he ordered the dark carpets to be changed to white. As a reward, Fahd left the hotel a tip of $300,000 — enough for the entire staff to receive, in effect, an extra year’s salary. He told one Spanish journalist that he liked Marbella because “it was a land blessed by Allah”, referring to the Arab occupation of most of Spain from the 8th to the 13th century. In the early 1980s he started the construction of his Mar Mar Palace, a replica of the White House. Because of increasing ill health (he suffered a stroke 10 years ago), he last visited in August 2002, just after a £134m refurbishment of the palace. REFERENCE: Marbella mourns its own King Midas King Fahd’s epic spending enriched his favourite part of Spain, says Deirdre Fernand From The Sunday Times August 7, 2005 http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/article552402.ece

Vice-President George H. W. Bush returns from his trip to the Middle East, where he has passed along a message to Iraq to step up its air war against Iran (see July 23, 1986). The covert machinations nearly become public knowledge when US embassy officials in Saudi Arabia, learning of the Saudi transfer of US arms to Iraq earlier in the year (see February 1986), question the Saudi ambassador to the US, Prince Bandar. Bandar, fully aware of the arms transfer, tells the officials that the transfer was “accidental” and the amount of arms transferred was negligible. The State Department is also curious about the transfer, warns that the arms transfer violates the Arms Export Control Act, and says it must inform Congress of the transfer. Such a notification would endanger the entire process, and possibly short-circuit another arms deal in the works, a $3.5 billion transfer of five AWACS planes to Saudi Arabia, of which Congress has already been informed. But after the White House notifies the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Richard Lugar (R-IN), and mollifies Lugar by telling him the arms sales to Iraq were “inadvertent,” “unauthorized,” and involved only a “small quantity of unsophisticated weapons,” Lugar agrees to keep silent about the matter. Another senator later approaches Lugar about rumors that Saudi Arabia is sending US arms to Iraq, and recalls that “Dick Lugar told me there was nothing to it, and so I took his word.” [NEW YORKER, 11/2/1992] REFERENCE: August 5, 1986: Covert Arms Sales to Iraq Nearly Revealed http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=us_iraq_80s_134#us_iraq_80s_134 Profile: Bandar bin Sultan a.k.a. "Bandar Bush", Prince Bandar http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=bandar_bin_sultan

Shaking Hands: Iraqi President Saddam Hussein greets Donald Rumsfeld, then special envoy of President Ronald Reagan, in Baghdad on December 20, 1983. REFERENCE: US NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE Shaking Hands with Saddam Hussein: The U.S. Tilts toward Iraq, 1980-1984 National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 82 Edited by Joyce Battle February 25, 2003 http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/

What a joke that Aal-e--Saud and Saudi Muttawwa Abd-al-Aziz ibn Abd-Allah ibn Baaz issued a Fatwa of Takfeer [Apostasy] against Saddam Hussein [that too after he was no more of any use to Corrupt Aal-e-Saud and Wahhaabi Muttawwas whereas an Anarchist Pakistan Ahl-e-Hadith Scholar Late. Ehsan Elahi Zaheer [who was on the payroll of Aal-e-Saud and Saudi Muttawwas rather he was student of Salafi Islamic scholars such as Muhammad Nasiruddin al-Albani and Abd-al-Aziz ibn Abd-Allah ibn Baaz] had addressed Sddam Hussein and his Ba'ath Party Member [as per Saudi Fatwa "Apostate, Secular, Socialist i.e. KAAFIR] REFERENCE: Ehsan Elahi Zaheer http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ehsan_Elahi_Zaheerصدام حسين مع إحسان إلهي ظهير رحمه الله - فيديو نادر

Really sometime "This Muslim Ummah" is so hypcortie that one wants to puke.

Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, accompanied by senior aide Paul Wolfowitz and US CENTCOM commander-in-chief General Norman Schwarzkopf, visits Saudi Arabia just four days after Iraq invades Kuwait (see August 2, 1990). [SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, 8/3/2000; DUBOSE AND BERNSTEIN, 2006, PP. 100] Cheney secures permission from King Fahd for US forces to use Saudi territory as a staging ground for an attack on Iraq. Cheney is polite, but forceful; the US will not accept any limits on the number of troops stationed in Saudi Arabia, and will not accept a fixed date of withdrawal (though they will withdraw if Fahd so requests). Cheney uses classified satellite intelligence to convince Fahd of Hussein’s belligerent intentions against not just Kuwait, but against Saudi Arabia as well. Fahd is convinced, saying that if there is a war between the US and Iraq, Saddam Hussein will “not get up again.” Fahd’s acceptance of Cheney’s proposal goes against the advice of Crown Prince Abdullah. [SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, 8/3/2000; DUBOSE AND BERNSTEIN, 2006, PP. 100-101] With Prince Bandar bin Sultan translating, Cheney tells Abdullah, “After the danger is over, our forces will go home.” Abdullah says under his breath, “I would hope so.” Bandar does not translate this. [MIDDLE EAST REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 9/2002; HISTORY NEWS NETWORK, 1/13/2003] On the same trip, Cheney also visits Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, who rejects Cheney’s request for US use of Egyptian military facilities. Mubarak tells Cheney that he opposes any foreign intervention against Iraq. [SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, 8/3/2000] US forces will remain in Saudi Arabia for thirteen years (see April 30-August 26, 2003). REFERENCE: August 5, 1990 and After: Cheney Secures Permission for US Forces to Attack Iraq from Saudi Arabia http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a080590cheneysaudi#a080590cheneysaudi Profile: Bandar bin Sultan a.k.a. "Bandar Bush", Prince Bandar http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=bandar_bin_sultan

USA/Great Britain/King Fahd financed Iraq Iran War but when Saddam Hussein entered Kuwait [Worst than Saudi Arabia] Fahd ordered Saudi Retard Toady Mutawwas to Issue Fatwa against the Same Saddam. Debauch Saudi Wahabi Somersault Fatwa of Takfeer against Saddam Hussein. In 1996 then-UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright was asked by 60 Minutes correspondent Lesley Stahl, in reference to years of U.S.-led economic sanctions against Iraq, “We have heard that half a million children have died. I mean, that is more children than died in Hiroshima. And, you know, is the price worth it?” To which Ambassador Albright responded, “I think that is a very hard choice, but the price, we think, the price is worth it.” - BAGHDAD, Oct. 10 — A team of American and Iraqi public health researchers has estimated that 600,000 civilians have died in violence across Iraq since the 2003 American invasion, the highest estimate ever for the toll of the war here. The figure breaks down to about 15,000 violent deaths a month, a number that is quadruple the one for July given by Iraqi government hospitals and the morgue in Baghdad and published last month in a United Nations report in Iraq. That month was the highest for Iraqi civilian deaths since the American invasion. But it is an estimate and not a precise count, and researchers acknowledged a margin of error that ranged from 426,369 to 793,663 deaths. It is the second study by researchers from the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health. It uses samples of casualties from Iraqi households to extrapolate an overall figure of 601,027 Iraqis dead from violence between March 2003 and July 2006. REFERENCE: Iraqi Dead May Total 600,000, Study Says By SABRINA TAVERNISE and DONALD G. McNEIL Jr. Published: October 11, 2006 http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/11/world/middleeast/11casualties.html

On the brink of war, both supporters and critics of United States policy on Iraq agree on the origins, at least, of the haunted relations that have brought us to this pass: America's dealings with Saddam Hussein, justifiable or not, began some two decades ago with its shadowy, expedient support of his regime in the Iraq-Iran war of the 1980's. Both sides are mistaken. Washington's policy traces an even longer, more shrouded and fateful history. Forty years ago, the Central Intelligence Agency, under President John F. Kennedy, conducted its own regime change in Baghdad, carried out in collaboration with Saddam Hussein. The Iraqi leader seen as a grave threat in 1963 was Abdel Karim Kassem, a general who five years earlier had deposed the Western-allied Iraqi monarchy. Washington's role in the coup went unreported at the time and has been little noted since. America's anti-Kassem intrigue has been widely substantiated, however, in disclosures by the Senate Committee on Intelligence and in the work of journalists and historians like David Wise, an authority on the C.I.A. From 1958 to 1960, despite Kassem's harsh repression, the Eisenhower administration abided him as a counter to Washington's Arab nemesis of the era, Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt -- much as Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush would aid Saddam Hussein in the 1980's against the common foe of Iran. By 1961, the Kassem regime had grown more assertive. Seeking new arms rivaling Israel's arsenal, threatening Western oil interests, resuming his country's old quarrel with Kuwait, talking openly of challenging the dominance of America in the Middle East -- all steps Saddam Hussein was to repeat in some form -- Kassem was regarded by Washington as a dangerous leader who must be removed. REFERENCE: A Tyrant 40 Years in the Making By Roger Morris Published: March 14, 2003 Roger Morris, author of ''Richard Milhous Nixon: The Rise of an American Politician,'' is completing a book about United States covert policy in Central and South Asia. http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/14/opinion/a-tyrant-40-years-in-the-making.html

In 1963 Britain and Israel backed American intervention in Iraq, while other United States allies -- chiefly France and Germany -- resisted. But without significant opposition within the government, Kennedy, like President Bush today, pressed on. In Cairo, Damascus, Tehran and Baghdad, American agents marshaled opponents of the Iraqi regime. Washington set up a base of operations in Kuwait, intercepting Iraqi communications and radioing orders to rebels. The United States armed Kurdish insurgents. The C.I.A.'s ''Health Alteration Committee,'' as it was tactfully called, sent Kassem a monogrammed, poisoned handkerchief, though the potentially lethal gift either failed to work or never reached its victim.Then, on Feb. 8, 1963, the conspirators staged a coup in Baghdad. For a time the government held out, but eventually Kassem gave up, and after a swift trial was shot; his body was later shown on Baghdad television. Washington immediately befriended the successor regime. ''Almost certainly a gain for our side,'' Robert Komer, a National Security Council aide, wrote to Kennedy the day of the takeover. As its instrument the C.I.A. had chosen the authoritarian and anti-Communist Baath Party, in 1963 still a relatively small political faction influential in the Iraqi Army. According to the former Baathist leader Hani Fkaiki, among party members colluding with the C.I.A. in 1962 and 1963 was Saddam Hussein, then a 25-year-old who had fled to Cairo after taking part in a failed assassination of Kassem in 1958. According to Western scholars, as well as Iraqi refugees and a British human rights organization, the 1963 coup was accompanied by a bloodbath. Using lists of suspected Communists and other leftists provided by the C.I.A., the Baathists systematically murdered untold numbers of Iraq's educated elite -- killings in which Saddam Hussein himself is said to have participated. No one knows the exact toll, but accounts agree that the victims included hundreds of doctors, teachers, technicians, lawyers and other professionals as well as military and political figures. The United States also sent arms to the new regime, weapons later used against the same Kurdish insurgents the United States had backed against Kassem and then abandoned. Soon, Western corporations like Mobil, Bechtel and British Petroleum were doing business with Baghdad -- for American firms, their first major involvement in Iraq. REFERENCE: A Tyrant 40 Years in the Making By Roger Morris Published: March 14, 2003 Roger Morris, author of ''Richard Milhous Nixon: The Rise of an American Politician,'' is completing a book about United States covert policy in Central and South Asia. http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/14/opinion/a-tyrant-40-years-in-the-making.html

But it wasn't long before there was infighting among Iraq's new rulers. In 1968, after yet another coup, the Baathist general Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr seized control, bringing to the threshold of power his kinsman, Saddam Hussein. Again, this coup, amid more factional violence, came with C.I.A. backing. Serving on the staff of the National Security Council under Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon in the late 1960's, I often heard C.I.A. officers -- including Archibald Roosevelt, grandson of Theodore Roosevelt and a ranking C.I.A. official for the Near East and Africa at the time -- speak openly about their close relations with the Iraqi Baathists. This history is known to many in the Middle East and Europe, though few Americans are acquainted with it, much less understand it. Yet these interventions help explain why United States policy is viewed with some cynicism abroad. George W. Bush is not the first American president to seek regime change in Iraq. Mr. Bush and his advisers are following a familiar pattern. The Kassem episode raises questions about the war at hand. In the last half century, regime change in Iraq has been accompanied by bloody reprisals. How fierce, then, may be the resistance of hundreds of officers, scientists and others identified with Saddam Hussein's long rule? Why should they believe America and its latest Iraqi clients will act more wisely, or less vengefully, now than in the past? If a new war in Iraq seems fraught with danger and uncertainty, just wait for the peace. REFERENCE: A Tyrant 40 Years in the Making By Roger Morris Published: March 14, 2003 Roger Morris, author of ''Richard Milhous Nixon: The Rise of an American Politician,'' is completing a book about United States covert policy in Central and South Asia. http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/14/opinion/a-tyrant-40-years-in-the-making.html

Late. Abd al-Aziz ibn Abd Allah ibn Baaz [Saudi Grand Mufti who issued Fatwa against Saddam and then against Osama Bin Ladin] - When Saddam invaded Kuwait - [Immediately a Fatwa was issued against Saddam - "During the Iran-Iraq war, Saudi Arabia bankrolled the Saddam Hussein regime with the express approval of Washington DC which at that time saw Saddam Hussein as a bulwark against Shia fundamentalism. It came as a terrific shock to the Saudi Royals when Saddam Hussein turned his attention to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Again, the Royal family turned to the Ulema and obtained (with difficulty) a Fatwa, permitting the use of non-Muslim foreign troops on Saudi soil to defend Saudi Arabia against a foreign invader - one the Ulema regarded as a secular apostate. Thus the Saudi Royal family invited the USA to send it its troops for Operation Desert Storm- the operation to defend Saudi Arabia and liberate Kuwait - largely at Saudi expense." As per 9/11 Commission Report “In August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. Bin Ladin, whose efforts in Afghanistan had earned him celebrity and respect, proposed to the Saudi monarchy that he summon mujahideen for a jihad to retake Kuwait. He was rebuffed, [Saudi Fatwa issued in 90s against Osama Bin Ladin - http://abdurrahman.org/jihad/binlaadin.pdf Usama Ibn Ladin Al-Kharijee (our position toward him and his likes) - By Abdul Aziz Ibn Abdullaah Ibn Baz [PDF] - Taken from http://www.troid.org/] and the Saudis joined the U.S.-led coalition. After the Saudis agreed to allow U.S. armed forces to be based in the Kingdom, Bin Ladin and a number of Islamic clerics began to publicly denounce the arrangement. The Saudi government exiled the clerics and undertook to silence Bin Ladin by, among other things, taking away his passport. With help from a dissident member of the royal family, he managed to get out of the country under the pretext of attending an Islamic gathering in Pakistan in April 1991.”

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Misconception: The Islaamic Threat

In recent years, a great deal of attention in the media have been given to the threat of "Islaamic Fundamentalism". Unfortunately, due to a twisted mixture of biased reporting in the Western media and the actions of some ignorant Muslims, the word "Islaam" has become almost synonymous with "terrorism". However, when one analyses the situation, the question that should come to mind is:

Do the teachings of Islaam encourage terrorism?

The answer: Certainly not!

Islaam totally forbids the terrorist acts that are carried out by some misguided people. It should be remembered that all religions have cults and misguided followers, so it is their teachings that should be looked at, not the actions of a few individuals. Unfortunately, in the media, whenever a Muslim commits a heinous act, he is labeled a "Muslim terrorist".

However, when Serbs murder and rape innocent women in Bosnia, they are not called "Christian terrorists", nor are the activities in Northern Ireland labeled "Christian terrorism". Also, when right-wing Christians in the U. S. bomb abortion clinics, they are not called "Christian terrorists". Reflecting on these facts, one could certainly conclude that there is a double-standard in the media! Although religious feelings play a significant role in the previously mentioned "Christian" conflicts, the media does not apply religious labels because they assume that such barbarous acts have nothing to do with the teachings of Christianity. However, when something happens involving a Muslim, they often try to put the blame on Islaam itself - and not the misguided individual.

Certainly, Islaamic Law (Sharee'ah) allows war - any religion or civilisation that did not would never survive - but it certainly does not condone attacks against innocent people, women or children. The Arabic word "jihaad", which is often translated as "Holy War", simply means "to struggle". The word for "war" in Arabic is "harb", not "jihaad". "Struggling", i.e. "making jihaad", to defend Islaam, Muslims or to liberate a land where Muslims are oppressed is certainly allowed (and even encouraged) in Islaam.

However, any such activities must be done according to the teachings of Islaam. Islaam also clearly forbids "taking the law into your own hands", which means that individual Muslims cannot go around deciding who they want to kill, punish or torture.

Trial and punishment must be carried out by a lawful authority and a knowledgeable judge. Also, when looking at events in the Muslim World, it should be kept in mind that a long period of colonialism ended fairly recently in most Muslim countries. During this time, the people in these countries were culturally, materially and religiously exploited - mostly by the so-called "Christian" nations of the West. This painful period has not really come to an end in many Muslim countries, where people are still under the control of foreign powers or puppet regimes supported by foreign powers.

Also, through the media, people in the West are made to believe that tyrants like Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Moamar Qaddafi in Libya are "Islaamic" leaders - when just the opposite is true. Neither of these rulers even profess Islaam as an ideology, but only use Islaamic slogans to manipulate their powerless populations. They have about as much to do with Islaam as Hitler had to do with Christianity! In reality, many Middle Eastern regimes which people think of as being "Islaamic" oppress the practice of Islaam in their countries. So suffice it to say that "terrorism" and killing innocent people directly contradicts the teachings of Islaam. .......... Prepared by: Abu 'Iyaad REFERENCE: Misconception: The Islaamic Threat http://www.fatwa-online.com/aboutislaam/0020221.htmhttp://www.fatwa-online.com/index.htmhttp://www.fatwa-online.com/worship/jihaad/jih009/index.htm

Question: O esteemed Shaykh, what is happening now (in Iraaq) so what is the position of the Muslim towards this trial, and is there a Jihaad, and are do those soldiers who are in the Gulf have the ruling of being mujaahideen, and may Allaah reward you.

Shaykh Ubayd al-Jaabiree: I dont know why this question (is asked) when, when we have just ended the speech with what I consider to comprise the answer to it and to its likes. However, despite this, just so that it is said, that Ubayd has neglected some of the questions.

So I say: Firstly, not all of the Iraaqi society is Muslim. Rather, amongst them is the Marxist, amongst them is the Ba'athist Heretic, and amongst them are numerous orientations. And there are Muslims amongst them...

And amongst them are the Raafidah. And the positions of the Scholars towards the Raafidah is well known, amongst them are those who declared them Disbelievers.

Secondly, we have Rulers and those who have authority, and it is obligatory to give them hearing and obedience, and around our rulers are those who have knowledge, and experience, and speciality in the political affairs. So we do not undermine them, and we have already mentioned previously that the general affairs are not for just any person. Rather, they are for whom? For those in authority.

And as it is appropriate, I also say that those who call to cutting off from the products of America and Britain and others, then those people have a resemblance to the Raafidah. Shaykh ul-Islaam Ibn Taymiyyah mentions in Minhaaj us-Sunnah, in the first volume, and I believe it is page 38, "From the stupidity of the Raafidah is that they do not drink from the river that was unearthed (i.e. dug out, like a well) by Yazeed". So those Harakiyyoon and Hizbiyyoon, have resembled the Raafidah. And what an evil model (that is). And the most repugnant for a person that his model, and way is that of the Raafidah.

Thirdly, the banner of fighting in Iraaq, who is carrying it? It is carried by Saddaam Hussain at-Takreetee, and he is the leader of the Ba'athi Party in his land...and the Ba'athi Party, is secularist, disbelieving, heretical. Its foundation is upon mixing and not differentiating between a Sunni Muslim, Guidance from the Scholars Concerning Iraaq and between the Jew, Christian, Communist, and others. They are all the same, equal. And for this reason, their slogan is, as their poet has said:

I believe in, -- (Shaykh Ubayd): I seek refuge in Allaah --
I believe in al-Ba'ath as the Lord which has no partner
And in Arabism as a religion, which has no other (religion)

This is their religion, qawmiyyah (nationalism) and shu'oobiyyah, and their religion is not Islaam. So built upon this, the one who fights under the banner of the Iraaqi government, then he is fighting under a banner of disbelief. And we do not dispute that the people of Iraaq have the right to defend themselves. They can defend themselves, their blood, their honour and their wealth, they can defend those who transgress upon them, whether America or Britain or other than them.

So it is obligatory upon us, the community of Muslims that we ask Allaah in our supplication that He delivers the Muslims amongst the people of Iraaq. So whoever said O Allaah save the [Iraaqi Society]1 , then he has erred. This supplication of his reaches even the Marxist and the Communist. And the Ba'ath Party is at the front of the [supplication of the] one who supplicates for the Iraaqi society (in general). No, but supplicate to Allaah that He delivers the Muslims amongst the people of Iraaq. And that he relieves them of their distress. This is what I can add now. .......... Translated by: Abu 'Iyaad REFERENCE: NEWS\ Monday 31 March 2003 Shaykh 'Ubayd al-Jaabiree on the Position Towards Iraq From a Paltalk Session today 31/03/2003 at 8:30pm UK Time http://www.fatwa-online.com/news/0030331.htm

BAGHDAD — Iraq's two most deadly Shiite Muslim militias have killed thousands of Sunni Arabs since February, with the more experienced Badr Brigade often working in tandem with Al Mahdi army, collecting intelligence on targets and forming hit lists that Al Mahdi militia members carry out, a senior U.S. military official said Wednesday. In some cases, death squads have been accompanied by a "clerical figure to basically run" an Islamic court to provide "the blessing for the conduct of the execution," the official said. The disclosures came during a U.S. intelligence briefing that included details about Shiite militia death squad operations and links to Iranian finance and weapons networks. The military official said there were corrupt Iraqi security officers who allowed Shiite militia members to kill Sunni Arabs in Baghdad neighborhoods that had been secured by joint U.S.-Iraqi military sweeps aimed at quelling sectarian violence. The official spoke on condition of anonymity, but was one of a series of high-ranking American officials who gave detailed briefings to reporters this week, at a time when the U.S. military is struggling to restore order to Baghdad and to press the Iraqi government to move decisively against Shiite militias. The Badr Brigade, the military wing of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq -- a member of the leading Shiite political bloc with 30 seats in parliament -- was responsible for most of the Shiite death squad killings last year, the official said. That changed in February, when Sunni Arab insurgents bombed the Shiite shrine of the Golden Mosque in Samarra, and Al Mahdi army, a militia loyal to radical anti-Western Shiite cleric Muqtada Sadr, moved to the front of a rising sectarian bloodbath. Sadr's political organization also holds 30 parliamentary seats and controls several government ministries. The hallmarks of the Shiite death squads have been mass killings in which the victims are found with their "hands bound, shot in the back or head," and their bodies showing signs of torture, the U.S. official said. Mosques and safehouses in Sadr City, a huge poor Shiite neighborhood that is the Al Mahdi stronghold in Baghdad, have been the base for many death squad operations, the official said. The official also said that Iraq's Interior Ministry, known to be heavily infiltrated by both Shiite militias, was complicit in many of the killings. Militia members have used Iraqi security forces' uniforms and vehicles during assassinations and checkpoint sweeps. "Those would get up to 60 individuals detained in a sweep," the official said. "OK, and again, often they would release those who were Shiite. We'd see that over the course of, say, that afternoon. And then there'd be individuals ransomed, and then there would perhaps be a mass killing in Sadr City and burial." American military officials have arrested at least 30 death squad members, the official said, all of them associated with extreme Al Mahdi militia elements. Death squad cells within the Badr Brigade still carry out killings, the official said, but the number of slayings by Al Mahdi extremist cells has far outstripped them. Al Mahdi militia's growth has hindered Sadr's ability to control the paramilitary force, the official said, citing instances when the cleric's commands to fighters to stand down were ignored by militia commanders. The official said U.S. investigators in Iraq have evidence that militiamen have acquired shoulder-fired rockets capable of shooting down aircraft, as well as Iranian-made explosives capable of puncturing armor plating. Iran has "enhanced violence" in some militia-dominated Iraqi cities with its flow of weapons, the official said, but he downplayed the Shiite-controlled country's long-term influence in Iraq, saying that Iraq's historic independent streak would eventually outweigh its affinities for its neighbor. REFERENCE: THE CONFLICT IN IRAQ Killings by Shiite Militias Detailed September 28, 2006|Solomon Moore | Times Staff Writer http://articles.latimes.com/2006/sep/28/world/fg-intel28

In fact I suggested a number of people and I'm sure you've seen it in my messages to my superiors, a number of people who could meet with senior Iranian officials and various ways in which that could happen. In that January meeting I told him that I was not confident that we were headed in the right direction.. . .Mr. Ghorbanifar by then was aware of my role in support for the Nicaraguan resistance. He had seen my name in the newspapers. He is a very well-read individual. I had been told by the Central Intelligence Agency, by Director Casey himself and by others in the C.I.A., that they believed Mr. Ghorbanifar to be an Israeli intelligence agent. * * * Mr. Ghorbanifar took me into the bathroom and Mr. Ghorbanifar suggested several incentives to make that February transaction work. And the attractive incentive for me was the one he made that residuals could flow to support the Nicaraguan resistance. * * * I must confess to you that I thought using the Ayatollah's money to support the Nicaraguan resistance was a right idea. And I must confess to you that I advocated that. * * * And I saw that idea of using the Ayatollah Khomeini's money to support the Nicaraguan freedom fighters as a good one. I still do. I don't think it was wrong. I think it was a neat idea. And I came back and I advocated that and we did it. We did it on three occasions. Those three occasions were February, May and October. And in each one of those occasions as a consequence of that whole process we got three Americans back. And there was no terrorism, while we were engaged in it, against Americans. For almost 18 months there was no action against Americans until it started to come unraveled. I believed then and I believe now that we had a chance to achieve a strategic opening and right up until the last minute that I left the N.S.C. I was in communication with the Israelis and others who were working on the second channel to achieve that end. The fact is that whether it was Mr. Ghorbanifar himself who originated the idea or Mr. Nir or others within the Israeli Government, it was a good idea. It was a good idea because we weren't using the taxpayers' money, we were using the Ayatollah's money. And it went indeed to support the Nicaraguan resistance. REFERENCE: IRAN-CONTRA HEARINGS; Day 2: The President's Knowledge and the Ayatollah's Money Published: July 09, 1987 http://www.nytimes.com/1987/07/09/world/iran-contra-hearings-day-2-the-president-s-knowledge-and-the-ayatollah-s-money.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm

The Mahdi Army: The Mahdi Army—named after a Shiite messianic figure—is a militia of several thousand members loyal to the young anti-U.S. cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. The group led two uprisings last year against U.S. forces before agreeing to a ceasefire in October 2004. The militia is heavily influential in Najaf, a city in southern Iraq, and in Sadr City, a Baghdad slum of some 2.5 million Shiites. Some news reports suggest the Mahdi Army may be regrouping and rearming itself. In recent months, Sadr’s group has been accused of abducting Sunni Arabs as well as members of rival Shiite militias like the Badr Organization, British troops, and journalists, including Rory Carroll, an Irish reporter for the British newspaper the Guardian. On October 27, in Medayna, a village northeast of Baghdad, a group of so-called Sadrists reportedly raided and set ablaze several homes suspected of harboring Sunni insurgents; the ensuing fight left some twenty people dead. Some experts say the group is not an organized, disciplined unit with clear political objectives. ''I think the Sadrists are a social movement, not really so much an organization,'' said Juan Cole, a Middle East expert at the Universityof Michigan , in an interview with the New York Times. ''So you have these neighborhood-based youth gangs masquerading as an 'army.' Then you have the mosque preachers loyal to Muqtada who try to swing their congregations, and who interface with the youth gangs.''Other experts say Sadr is receiving aid from Iran’s intelligence services and Revolutionary Guard, though this is widely disputed. “Sadr is a very poor prospect as an Iranian proxy,” argues Michael Knights, a London-based associate with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. “He’s xenophobic. He’s very disenchanted with Iranian-sponsored exiles who are currently heading up Iraq’s Shiite block, including of course Prime Minister [Ibrahim al-] Jaafari and SCIRI. He has recently flexed militarily with SCIRI’s Badr forces, so he’s generally not an ideal proxy for the Iranians to use.” Regardless, Sadr has emerged as a powerful figure in Iraqi politics and relishes his new kingmaker position. Though he has refused to participate directly in Iraqi politics, his supporters won a handful of parliamentary seats in the January 30 elections and thirty of his candidates joined the mainstream Shiite coalition, the United Iraqi Alliance, ahead of the December 15 parliamentary elections. REFERENCE: Shiite Militias and Iraq's Security Forces Author: Lionel Beehner November 30, 2005 http://www.cfr.org/iraq/shiite-militias-iraqs-security-forces/p9316

The Badr Organization: The Badr Organization, formerly known as the Badr Brigade, was built by Iraqi Shiite defectors and soldiers captured by Iran during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War. Its members were funded, trained, and equipped by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. In 2003, the 10,000-strong militia changed its name from the Badr Brigade to the Badr Organization of Reconstruction and Development after pledging to disarm and devote itself to peaceful purposes and is now the armed wing of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), a Shiite opposition party founded in 1982 by Iraqi exiles in Iran. SCIRI, which has emerged as Iraq’s most powerful political party, advocates the creation of a separate, Shiite-run region comprising nine oil-rich provinces in southern Iraq. In a rare November 27 interview with the Washington Post, SCIRI’s leader, Abdul Aziz Hakim, downplayed his organization’s ties to Iran and denied accusations that the Badr Organization practiced torture or targeted Sunni Arabs. The group, however, has remained armed, experts say, and has been accused of assassinating, torturing, and unlawfully detaining Sunni Arabs. Peter Khalil, former director of national security policy with the CPA and a Middle East analyst with the Eurasia Group, says the Badr Organization continues to receive support, both military and financial, from Iran (Al-Malaf.net, a Jordanian news site, alleges the Badr Organization still receives a monthly stipend from Tehran of roughly $3 million). The militia group has also said it will run candidates, separate from SCIRI, in the upcoming December 15 parliamentary elections as part of the United Iraqi Alliance, the most powerful Shiite coalition. The Badr Organization has recently clashed with British troops in Basra and with the al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army, also based in Iraq’s predominantly Shiite south. In August, after Sadr’s headquarters in Najaf were set aflame, the Mahdi Army staged a reprisal attack against Badr troops. “It’s a mafia-style war between two descendants of Iraq’s leading ayatollah-led families, the Sadrs and the Hakims, who don’t exactly express affection for each other,” writes Robert Dreyfuss, a national security expert, in TomPaine.Com. Further attacks were called off by Sadr after Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani intervened to quell the dispute. The Badr Organization denied responsibility for setting fire to Sadr’s offices. REFERENCE: Shiite Militias and Iraq's Security Forces Author: Lionel Beehner November 30, 2005 http://www.cfr.org/iraq/shiite-militias-iraqs-security-forces/p9316

Shia Death Squads Part - 5/5

The Wolf Brigade: One of the Badr Organization’s offshoots is the Wolf Brigade, a unit of roughly 2,000 special commando police officially under the Ministry of the Interior that is among Iraq’s most feared groups. Last November, the brigade—which was formed in the fall of 2004 by a former three-star Shiite general and SCIRI official whose nom de guerre is Abu Walid—fought alongside U.S.-led forces in Mosul, a Sunni stronghold northwest of Baghdad. Its members dress in garb—olive uniform, red beret, wraparound sunglasses—redolent of Saddam’s elite guard; their armband logo is a menacing-looking wolf. Last December, the Wolf Brigade won further notoriety after the success of Terrorism in the Grip of Justice, a primetime show on U.S.-funded al-Iraqiya television that featured live interrogations of Iraqi insurgents by Wolf Brigade commandos. In one show, Abu Walid questioned around thirty shabbily dressed suspects, some clutching photos of their victims, waiting to confess their crimes. The Wolf Brigade was reportedly responsible for the July seizure of eleven Sunni bricklayers who were then locked in the back of police cars and held for sixteen hours in scorching-hot temperatures. The brigade’s fierceness has given it a mythological aura among Shiite Iraqis: Parents are said to warn their children about the “wolves.” There are also patriotic songs devoted to the group. However, in May, the Sunni-controlled Muslim Scholars Association and other Sunni Arab leaders accused the Wolf Brigade of targeting Palestinian refugees in Iraq, using torture to extract confessions from prisoners, raiding Sunni homes, and engaging in “mass killings” and arrests in northeastern Baghdad. Walid denies the charges. Yet human rights groups say the Wolf Brigade, because of its counterterrorism television show, is violating the Geneva Conventions by publicly humiliating detainees. Despite its heavy-handed tactics, the group has proved useful to counterinsurgency operations. In mid-November 2004, the Wolf Brigade successfully arrested more than 300 suspected insurgents, including several Sunni officials, in Baqubah, a city northeast of Baghdad. The militia has also spawned copycat groups, not necessarily under the aegis of the Interior Ministry, with names like the Tiger, Scorpion, or Snake brigades. REFERENCE: Shiite Militias and Iraq's Security Forces Author: Lionel Beehner November 30, 2005 http://www.cfr.org/iraq/shiite-militias-iraqs-security-forces/p9316

Monday, March 26, 2012

KUWAIT CITY, March 25: The Muslim Brotherhood, the main Islamist force that emerged after the Arab Spring, is plotting to take over Gulf states, Dubai’s police chief said in remarks reported on Sunday. Lieutenant General Dahi Khalfan said he had his reasons to claim that the “Brotherhood was plotting to change the regimes in the Gulf,” in an interview published in the Kuwaiti daily Al-Qabas. “My sources say the next step is to make Gulf governments (their ruling families) figurehead bodies only without actual ruling. The start will be in Kuwait in 2013 and in other Gulf states in 2016,” he said. Khalfan has been involved in a tit-for-tat controversy with the Brotherhood after he threatened earlier this month to arrest cleric Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a leading Brotherhood figure, for criticising the United Arab Emirates for deporting Syrian protesters.The police chief said he based his information on “leaks” from western intelligence agencies and said this “had been known to us”. “If these leaks from western intelligence were to be correct, by 2016 all Gulf rulers” will be just figureheads with no actual power, Khalfan said. “I am warning Gulf states about these groups.” All of the six oil-rich Arab states in the Gulf have been governed for centuries by ruling families that dominate almost every aspect of life and who have the final say on almost everything. These states — Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE — together sit on more than 40 per cent of the world’s proven oil reserves and around a fifth of its natural gas. Khalfan said the alleged plot will begin in Kuwait because “it is ready more than any other Gulf state… this is a strategy”. Islamists made an impressive show in a February 2 snap election in Kuwait, securing more than 20 seats in the 50-member parliament.—AFP REFERENCE: Dubai’s top cop sees plot against Gulf From the Newspaper | International | 26th March, 2012 http://www.dawn.com/2012/03/26/dubais-top-cop-sees-plot-against-gulf.html

ISLAMABAD: The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has deported dozens of the disciples of noted scholar Dr Israr Ahmad for holding Dars-e-Qur’aan sessions in Dubai, fearing the spread of Talibanisation in the country. The UAE government has also set a deadline for several other Pakistani families to close their businesses and leave the country after it found them involved in religious activities. The Pakistan’s consulate in Dubai is reluctant to share details with the media on the subject. However, the Foreign Office spokeswoman confirmed the deportations. “They violated the laws,” FO spokeswoman Tasnim Aslam told The News but added that she had no knowledge of the exact numbers of the deportees. According to her account, private religious congregations are not allowed there. Religious gatherings could not be held in Dubai except for the Friday sermon, said a source, adding that the Dars-e-Qur’aan congregation was a private function. The News has learnt that the Dubai police arrested around 70 Pakistanis for attending the congregation. The majority of them are believed to be the disciples of Dr Israr Ahmad. About 30 of them have been deported, while the rest have been directed to wind up their businesses and leave the country by the end of July, Bakhtiyar Khilji, chief administrator of Tanzeem-e-Islami - the party headed by Dr Israr Ahmad - told The News. Khilji feared that this “crackdown” by the UAE government might lead to an en masse deportation of Dr Israr’s followers. “The UAE government happens to be very sensitive to such congregations. The police had arrested the people whenever suspicion of their participants to the Dars-e-Qur’aan congregation arose.” When this correspondent contacted Pakistan consulate in Dubai, Dr Zafar Iqbal, press consular, showed reluctance to share the details, saying it could trigger a controversy. Waseem Ahmad, welfare attache at the consulate, who was directly involved in this issue, also refused to speak on the subject. REFERENCE: UAE deports Pakistanis for Dars-e-Qur’aan Friday, May 11, 2007 http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=55384&Cat=6&dt=5/11/2007

Clare M. Lopez is a strategic policy and intelligence expert with a focus on Middle East, homeland security, national defense, and counterterrorism issues. Lopez began her career as an operations officer with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), serving domestically and abroad for 20 years in a variety of assignments, acquiring extensive expertise in counterintelligence, counternarcotics, and counterproliferation issues with a career regional focus on the former Soviet Union, Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans. She has served in or visited over two dozen nations worldwide, speaks several languages, including Spanish, Bulgarian, French, German, and Russian, and currently is studying Farsi. Now a private consultant, Lopez is a Professor at the Centre for Counterintelligence and Security Studies (CI Centre- www.cicentre.com ). Formerly, she was Executive Director of the Iran Policy Committee, a Washington, DC think tank, from 2005-2006. She has served as a Senior Scientific Researcher at the Battelle Memorial Institute; a Senior Intelligence Analyst, Subject Matter Expert, and Program Manager at HawkEye Systems, LLC.; and previously produced Technical Threat Assessments for U.S. Embassies at the Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, where she worked as a Senior Intelligence Analyst for Chugach Systems Integration. Lopez received a B.A. in Communications and French from Notre Dame College of Ohio and an M.A. in International Relations from the Maxwell School of Syracuse University. She completed Marine Corps Officer Candidate School (OCS) in Quantico, Virginia before declining a commission in order to join the CIA. Lopez is a member of the Advisory Board for the Intelligence Analysis and Research program and guest lecturer at her undergraduate alma mater, Notre Dame College of Ohio; she also has been a Visiting Researcher and guest lecturer on counterterrorism, national defense, and international relations at Georgetown University. Lopez is a regular contributor to print and broadcast media on subjects related to Iran and the Middle East and the co-author of two published books on Iran. REFERENCE: Clare M. Lopez Vice President of the Intelligence Summit http://www.intelligencesummit.org/speakers/ClareLopez.php

"The question of reading ‘az-Zilaal’ is a matter open to question, since ‘az-Zilaal’ comprises things which are very dubious, and that we should attach the youth to it and that they should accept the thoughts contained in it - this is the dubious matter since it may have an evil affect upon the minds of the youth. The tafseer of Ibn Katheer and the many tafseers of the scholars of the Salaf are such that they leave no need for the like of this tafseer. Then in reality it is not a tafseer, but rather deals with the general themes of the Soorahs of the Qur’aan in general. So it is not a tafseer in the sense well-known to the scholars since the earliest times - i.e. that the meaning of the (Aayahs) are explained by narrations (‘Aathaar), and that matters contained in them pertaining to the language and eloquence are explained and Sharee’ah rulings contained in them are explained - and before all of this what Allah - the Most Perfect and Most High - means in the Aayahs and the Soorahs is made clear. As for ‘Zilaalul - Qur’aan’, then it is a ‘tafseer’ dealing with general concepts, and we made call it an ‘objective explanation’ - from the ‘objective tafseers’ that are known in this age. However it is not to be depended upon due to the affairs of Soofism contained in it, and due to the wordings it contains that do not befit the Qur’aan - such as terms pertaining to music and rhythms. * *[‘az-Zilaal’: 3/1786; 5/2719, 2915, 2917; 6/3404, 3811, 3821, 3845, 3906, 3908, 3915 and 3957 :- 12th edition, 1406H, Daardul-‘Ilm] Also by ‘Tawheed’ he does not mean Tawheed of worship, but rather he mostly means Tawheed of Lordship (Ruboobiyyah), and if he mentions anything of tawheed of Worship - then he concentrates upon Tawheed of sovereignty and the right to legislate (al-Haakimiyyah) * [‘Ma’aalim fit-Tareeq’: p.26, 29, 38, 40: 15th edition, 1412H, Daarush-Shurooq & ‘al-‘Adaalah ‘al-Ijtimaa’iyyah’ (p.182) - 9th edition:1403 : Daarush-Shurooq] Then there is no doubt that ‘Haakimiyyah’ is part of Tawheed of worship, but it is not the ‘Uloohiyyah’ that is required. Then the book should not be set along with Ibn Katheer - that is what I hold - and if the books of the Salaf were to be chosen instead, and the books giving attention to ‘Aqeedah, and tafseer of the qur’aan, and Sharee’ah rulings - then that would be more fitting for the youth." * *[From the cassette: ‘Majmoo’ maa qaalahu Ibn Baaz hawla naseehatihil - ‘Aamaah liqaa-ma’a hadeethatih. Makkah, 9/8/1412H}. REFERENCE: Shaikh Salih al-Fawzan on Sayyid Qutb http://www.salafipublications.com/sps/sp.cfm?secID=NDV&subsecID=NDV01&loadpage=displaysubsection.cfm Exposing al-Ikhwaan al-Muflisoon: the Aqeedah of Walaa and Baraa’ http://www.salafipublications.com/sps/sp.cfm?subsecID=GRV01&articleID=GRV010001&articlePages=1 Hizb ut-Tahreer http://www.salafipublications.com/sps/sp.cfm?secID=GRV&subsecID=GRV03&loadpage=displaysubsection.cfm

How can Americans be unaware of this history? Credit a mixture of wishful thinking and a national obsession with secrecy, which has shrouded the US government’s extensive dealings with the Brotherhood. Consider President Eisenhower. In 1953, the year before the Brotherhood was outlawed by Nasser, a covert US propaganda program headed by the US Information Agency brought over three dozen Islamic scholars and civic leaders mostly from Muslim countries for what officially was an academic conference at Princeton University. The real reason behind the meeting was an effort to impress the visitors with America’s spiritual and moral strength, since it was thought that they could influence Muslims’ popular opinion better than their ossified rulers. The ultimate goal was to promote an anti-Communist agenda in these newly independent countries, many of which had Muslim majorities. One of the leaders, according to Eisenhower’s appointment book, was “The Honorable Saeed Ramahdan, Delegate of the Muslim Brothers.”* The person in question (in more standard romanization, Said Ramadan), was the son-in-law of the Brotherhood’s founder and at the time widely described as the group’s “foreign minister.” (He was also the father of the controversial Swiss scholar of Islam, Tariq Ramadan.) Eisenhower officials knew what they were doing. In the battle against communism, they figured that religion was a force that US could make use of—the Soviet Union was atheist, while the United States supported religious freedom. Central Intelligence Agency analyses of Said Ramadan were quite blunt, calling him a “Phalangist” and a “fascist interested in the grouping of individuals for power.” But the White House went ahead and invited him anyway. By the end of the decade, the CIA was overtly backing Ramadan. While it’s too simple to call him a US agent, in the 1950s and 1960s the United States supported him as he took over a mosque in Munich, kicking out local Muslims to build what would become one of the Brotherhood’s most important centers—a refuge for the beleaguered group during its decades in the wilderness. In the end, the US didn’t reap much for its efforts, as Ramadan was more interested in spreading his Islamist agenda than fighting communism. In later years, he supported the Iranian revolution and likely aided the flight of a pro-Teheran activist who murdered one of the Shah’s diplomats in Washington. Cooperation ebbed and flowed. During the Vietnam War, US attention was focused elsewhere but with the start of the Soviet war in Afghanistan, interest in cultivating Islamists picked up again. That period of backing the mujahedeen— some of whom morphed into al-Qaeda—is well-known, but Washington continued to flirt with Islamists, and especially the Brotherhood. In the years after the September 11 attacks, the United States initially went after the Brotherhood, declaring many of its key members to be backers of terrorism. But by Bush’s second term, the US was losing two wars in the Muslim world and facing hostile Muslim minorities in Germany, France, and other European countries, where the Brotherhood had established an influential presence. The US quietly changed its position. The Bush administration devised a strategy to establish close relations with Muslim groups in Europe that were ideologically close to the Brotherhood, figuring that it could be an interlocutor in dealing with more radical groups, such as the home-grown extremists in Paris, London and Hamburg. And, as in the 1950s, government officials wanted to project an image to the Muslim world that Washington was close to western-based Islamists. So starting in 2005, the State Department launched an effort to woo the Brotherhood. In 2006, for example, it organized a conference in Brussels between these European Muslim Brothers and American Muslims, such as the Islamic Society of North America, who are considered close to the Brotherhood. All of this was backed by CIA analyses, with one from 2006 saying the Brotherhood featured “impressive internal dynamism, organization, and media savvy.” Despite the concerns of western allies that supporting the Brotherhood in Europe was too risky, the CIA pushed for cooperation. As for the Obama administration, it carried over some of the people on the Bush team who had helped devise this strategy. Why the enduring interest in the Brotherhood? Since its founding in 1928 by the Egyptian schoolteacher and imam Hassan al-Banna, the Brotherhood has managed to voice the aspirations of the Muslim world’s downtrodden and often confused middle class. It explained their backwardness in an interesting mixture of fundamentalism and fascism (or reactionary politics and xenophobia): today’s Muslims aren’t good enough Muslims and must return to the true spirit of the Koran. Foreigners, especially Jews, are part of a vast conspiracy to oppress Muslims. This message was—and still is—delivered through a modern, political party-like structure, that includes women’s groups, youth clubs, publications and electronic media, and, at times, paramilitary wings. It has also given birth to many of the more violent strains of radical Islamism, from Hamas to al-Qaeda, although many of such groups now find the Brotherhood too conventional. Little wonder that the Brotherhood, for all its troubling aspects, is interesting to western policy makers eager to gain influence in this strategic part of the world. But the Brotherhood has been a tricky partner. In countries where it aspires to join the political mainstream, it renounces the use of violence locally. Hence the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt says it no longer seeks to overthrow the regime violently—although its members there think nothing of calling for Israel’s destruction. In Egypt, the Brotherhood also says it wants religious courts to enforce shariah, but at times has also said that secular courts could have final say. This isn’t to suggest that its moderation is just for show, but it’s fair to say that the Brotherhood has only partially embraced the values of democracy and pluralism. REFERENCE: Washington’s Secret History with the Muslim Brotherhood Ian Johnson http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2011/feb/05/washingtons-secret-history-muslim-brotherhood/

Do Not Declare Someone A Hypocrite or Disbeliever Because Of Sins/Disobedience

1. (S/NF) Summary: During recent trips to southern Punjab, Principal Officer was repeatedly told that a sophisticated jihadi recruitment network had been developed in the Multan, Bahawalpur, and Dera Ghazi Khan Divisions. The network reportedly exploited worsening poverty in these areas of the province to recruit children into the divisions’ growing Deobandi and Ahl-eHadith madrassa network from which they were indoctrinated into jihadi philosophy, deployed to regional training/indoctrination centers, and ultimately sent to terrorist training camps in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Locals believed that charitable activities being carried out by Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith organizations, including Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the Al-Khidmat Foundation, and Jaish-e-Mohammad were further strengthening reliance on extremist groups and minimizing the importance of traditionally moderate Sufi religious leaders in these communities. Government and non-governmental sources claimed that financial support estimated at nearly 100 million USD annually was making its way to Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith clerics in the region from “”missionary”" and “”Islamic charitable”" organizations in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates ostensibly with the direct support of those governments. Locals repeatedly requested USG support for socio-economic development and the promotion of moderate religious leaders in the region as a direct counter to the growing extremist threat. End Summary.

2. (S/NF) During a recent visit to the southern Punjabi cities of Multan and Bahawalpur, Principal Officer’s discussions with religious, political, and civil society leaders were dominated by discussions of the perceived growing extremist threat in Seraiki and Baloch areas in southern and western Punjab. Interlocutors repeatedly stressed that recruitment activities by extremist religious organizations, particularly among young men between the ages of 8 and 15, had increased dramatically over the last year. Locals blamed the trend on a strengthening network of Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith mosques and madrassas, which they claimed had grown exponentially since late 2005. Such growth was repeatedly attributed to an influx of “”Islamic charity”" that originally reached Pakistani pseudo-religious organizations, such as Jamaat-ud-Dawa and the Al-Khidmat foundation, as relief for earthquake victims in Kashmir and the North West Frontier Province. Locals believe that a portion of these funds was siphoned to Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith clerics in southern and western Punjab in order to expand these sects’ presence in a traditionally hostile, but potentially fruitful, recruiting ground. The initial success of establishing madrassas and mosques in these areas led to subsequent annual “”donations”" to these same clerics, originating in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The value of such donations was uncertain, although most interlocutors believed that it was in the region of $100 million annually.

3. (S/NF) According to local interlocutors, current recruitment activities generally exploit families with multiple children, particularly those facing severe financial difficulties in light of inflation, poor crop yields, and growing unemployment in both urban and rural areas in the southern and western Punjab. Oftentimes, these families are identified and initially approached/assisted by ostensibly “”charitable”" organizations including Jamaat-ud-Dawa (a front for designated foreign terrorist organization Lashkar-e-Tayyaba), the Al-Khidmat Foundation (linked to religious political party Jamaat-e-Islami), or Jaish-e-Mohammad (a charitable front for the designated foreign terrorist organization of the same name).

4. (S/NF) The local Deobandi or Ahl-e-Hadith maulana will generally be introduced to the family through these organizations. He will work to convince the parents that their poverty is a direct result of their family’s deviation from “”the true path of Islam”" through “”idolatrous”" worship at local Sufi shrines and/or with local Sufi Peers. The maulana suggests that the quickest way to return to “”favor”" would be to devote the lives of one or two of their sons to Islam. The maulana will offer to educate these children at his madrassa and to find them employment in the service of Islam. The concept of “”martyrdom”" is often discussed and the family is promised that if their sons are “”martyred”" both the sons and the family will attain “”salvation”" and the family will obtain God’s favor in this life, as well. An immediate cash payment is finally made to the parents to compensate the family for its “”sacrifice”" to Islam. Local sources claim that the current average rate is approximately Rps. 500,000 (approximately USD 6500) per son. A small number of Ahl-e-Hadith clerics in Dera Ghazi Khan district are reportedly recruiting daughters as well.

5. (S/NF) The path following recruitment depends upon the age of the child involved. Younger children (between 8 and 12) seem to be favored. These children are sent to a comparatively small, extremist Deobandi or Ahl-e-Hadith madrassa in southern or western Punjab generally several hours from their family home. Locals were uncertain as to the exact number of madrassas used for this initial indoctrination purpose, although they believed that with the recent expansion, they could number up to 200. These madrassas are generally in isolated areas and are kept small enough (under 100 students) so as not to draw significant attention. At these madrassas, children are denied contact with the outside world and taught sectarian extremism, hatred for non-Muslims, and anti-Western/anti-Pakistan government philosophy. Contact between students and families is forbidden, although the recruiting maulana periodically visits the families with reports full of praise for their sons’ progress. “”Graduates”" from these madrassas are either (1) employed as Deobandi/Ahl-e-Hadith clerics or madrassa teachers or (2) sent on to local indoctrination camps for jihad. Teachers at the madrassa appear to make the decision based on their read of the child’s willingness to engage in violence and acceptance of jihadi culture versus his utility as an effective proponent of Deobandi or Ahl-e-Hadith ideology/recruiter.

6. (S/NF) Children recruited at an older age and “”graduates”" chosen for jihad proceed to more sophisticated indoctrination camps focused on the need for violence and terrorism against the Pakistan government and the West. Locals identified three centers reportedly used for this purpose. The most prominent of these is a large complex that ostensibly has been built at Khitarjee (sp?). Locals placed this site in Bahawalpur District on the Sutlej River north of the village of Ahmedpur East at the border of the districts of Multan, Bahawalpur, and Lodhran. The second complex is a newly built “”madrassa”" on the outskirts of Bahawalpur city headed by a devotee of Jaish-e-Mohammad leader Maulana Masood Azhar identified only as Maulana Al-Hajii (NFI). The third complex is an Ahl-e-Hadith site on the outskirts of Dera Ghazi Khan city about which very limited information was available. Locals asserted that these sites were primarily used for indoctrination and very limited military/terrorist tactic training. They claimed that following several months of indoctrination at these centers youth were generally sent on to more established training camps in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and then on to jihad either in FATA, NWFP, or as suicide bombers in settled areas. Many worried that these youth would eventually return to try and impose their extremist version of Islam in the southern and western Punjab and/or to carry out operations in these areas.

7. (S/NF) Interlocutors repeatedly chastised the government for its failure to act decisively against indoctrination centers, extremist madrassas, or known prominent leaders such as Jaish-e-Mohammad’s Masood Azhar. One leading Sufi scholar and a Member of the Provincial Assembly informed Principal Officer that he had personally provided large amounts of information on the location of these centers, madrassas, and personalities to provincial and national leaders, as well as the local police. He was repeatedly told that “”plans”" to deal with the threat were being “”evolved”" but that direct confrontation was considered “”too dangerous.”" The Bahawalpur District Nazim told Principal Officer that he had repeatedly highlighted the growing threat to the provincial and federal governments but had received no support in dealing with it. He blamed politics, stating that unless he was willing to switch parties — he is currently with the Pakistan Muslim League — neither the Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz provincial nor the Pakistan Peoples Party federal governments would take his requests seriously. The brother of the Federal Minister for Religious Affairs, and a noted Brailvi/Sufi scholar in his own right, Allama Qasmi blamed government intransigence on a culture that rewarded political deals with religious extremists. He stressed that even if political will could be found, the bureaucracy in the Religious Affairs, Education, and Defense Ministries remained dominated by Zia-ul-Haq appointees who favored the Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith religious philosophies. This bureaucracy, Qasmi claimed, had repeatedly blocked his brother’s efforts to push policy in a different direction.

8. (S/NF) Interlocutors repeatedly requested USG assistance for the southern and western Punjab, believing that an influx of western funds could counter the influence of Deobandi/Ahl-e-Hadith clerics. Principal Officer was repeatedly reminded that these religious philosophies were alien to the southern and western Punjab — which is the spiritual heartland of South Asia’s Sufi communities. Their increasing prominence was directly attributed to poverty and external funding. Locals believed that socio-economic development programs, particularly in education, agriculture, and employment generation, would have a direct, long-term impact in minimizing receptivity to extremist movements. Similarly, they pressed for immediate relief efforts — particularly food distribution and income support — to address communities’ immediate needs. Several interlocutors also encouraged direct USG support to Brailvi/Sufi religious institutions, arguing that these represented the logical antithesis to Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith philosophy and that if adequately funded, they could stem the tide of converts away from their moderate beliefs.

Comment

9. (S/NF) A jihadi recruiting network relying on Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith religious, charitable, and educational institutions is increasing its work in impoverished districts of southern and western Punjab. Local economic conditions coupled with foreign financing appear to be transforming a traditionally moderate area of the country into a fertile recruiting ground for terrorist organizations. The provincial and federal governments, while fully aware of the problem, appear to fear direct confrontation with these extremist groups. Local governments lack the resources and federal/provincial support to deal with these organizations on their own. The moderate Brailvi/Sufi community is internally divided into followers of competing spiritual leaders and lacks the financial resources to act as an effective counterweight to well-funded and well-organized extremists.

10. (S/NF) Post believes that this growing recruitment network poses a direct threat to USG counter-terrorism and counter-extremism efforts in Pakistan. Intervention at this stage in the southern and western Punjab could still be useful to counter the prevailing trends favoring extremist organizations. USAID development resources in agriculture, economic growth, education, and infrastructure development are useful and necessary and will address some of the immediate needs. In post’s view short-term, quick impact programs are required which focus on: (1) immediate relief in the form of food aid and microcredit, (2) cash for work and community-based, quick-impact infrastructure development programs focusing on irrigation systems, schools, and other critical infrastructure, and (3) strategic communication programs designed to educate on the dangers of the terrorist recruiting networks and to support counter-terrorist, counter-extremist messages. REFERENCE: 2008: Extremist recruitment on the rise in south Punjab madrassahs DAWN.COM 2nd June, 2011 http://www.dawn.com/2011/05/22/2008-extremist-recruitment-on-the-rise-in-south-punjab-madrassahs.html

1. (S) Summary: A well-placed Deobandi religious leader told Principal Officer in a meeting on March 18 that extremist group Sipah-e-Sahaba (SSP) was increasing its activities in the central Punjab city of Faisalabad, the province’s second largest, in collaboration with elements of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and a splinter group from the banned terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM). The cleric reported that SSP had recently launched a pamphlet campaign across the city in which it called for people to take steps to enforce Islamic law including: (1) cease business and social activities at the five daily calls to prayer, (2) remove all sources of “”vulgarity”" such as televisions, cd players, and radios from their homes, (3) seek dispute resolution through local imams rather than the courts, (4) take Friday rather than Sunday as the weekly holiday, and (4) strictly enforce purdah for female family members. The pamphlet states that it comes from SSP with support from the TTP and specifically praises “”the enforcement of Sharia in Swat”" and recommends it as a model for Faisalabad. According the religious scholar, a number of girls’ educational institutions in Faisalabad have received letters stating that if they fail to observe purdah, they could be attacked by suicide bombers. The cleric surmised that SSP activities would increase in Faisalabad on the return of its leader Maulana Ludhianvi from a Libyan-government sponsored trip to that country. End Summary.

2. (S) Leading Faisalabad-based Deobandi scholar and IVLP alumnus Maulana XXXXXXXXXXXX called on the Principal Officer on March 18 to discuss his concerns regarding what he termed as “”growing extremist activity”" in Punjab’s second-largest city Faisalabad. XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed that in the last month he has observed a dramatic increase in propaganda activities from Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). He believed that this increase coincided with a number of visits to Faisalabad from activists both of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and a splinter group from the southern Punjab-based Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM). XXXXXXXXXXXX believed that the activists were involved in recruiting for TTP militant operations in the FATA and NWFP through madrassas in southern Punjab and hoped to replicate that success in Faisalabad. XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that SSP leaders had long-standing ties with JeM, as both were Deobandi organizations that had collaborated in the past in anti-Shia and anti-India activities.

3. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX shared with Principal Officer an Urdu-language sticker that he claimed he had confiscated from several of his madrassa students in Faisalabad. The sticker, which he stated was also being printed and distributed as a pamphlet, praised the implementation of Sharia law in Swat and exhorted Muslims to pursue the same sort of Sharia law in Faisalabad. It then recounted five steps that every Faisalabad based Muslim should take to begin the process of implementation in the district. The steps were: : (1) cease business and social activities at the five daily calls to prayer, (2) remove all sources of “”vulgarity”" such as televisions, cd players, and radios from their homes, (3) seek dispute resolution through local imams rather than the courts, (4) take Friday rather than Sunday as the weekly holiday, and (4) strictly enforce purdah for female family members.

4. (S) Maulana XXXXXXXXXXXX told Principal Officer that he had initially dismissed the pamphlet campaign, but became increasingly concerned after learning of specific threats received by several girls’ schools (NFI) in Faisalabad. He claimed that these schools had received letters sent from SSP, referencing the situation in Swat, and warning that if these schools did not begin having their students observe complete purdah, the schools could be the target of violence, including suicide bombing. Maulana XXXXXXXXXXXX did not produce a copy of the threat letter. Principal Officer inquired whether any violence had yet occurred in Faisalabad in connection with the SSP campaign. Maulana XXXXXXXXXXXX responded that to his knowledge it had not, but he believed that it could occur in short order if police did not check SSP activities.

5. (S) Maulana XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that in addition to its pamphlet campaign, SSP had organized a number of traditional religious conferences in Faisalabad during the Islamic month of Rabwa (currently ongoing). Traditionally such conferences are organized in this month of the Prophet’s birth to discuss the model life that the Prophet lead and to exhort Muslims to follow his example. According to Maulana XXXXXXXXXXXX, this year during the SSP conferences, the organizers have exhorted attendees to follow the Prophet’s example and press for the adoption of complete shariah law in Faisalabad, using Swat as a model. These exhortations specifically call for action against vulgarity and women not observing purdah. In one case, Maulana XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed that he learned that leaders of the recently banned al-Rashid Trust were coming to address a March 8 SSP conference. He stated that he had informed the District Police Officer, who cancelled the event.

6. (S) Maulana XXXXXXXXXXXX shared that he had received reliable information that SSP leader Maulana Ludhianvi was on a fundraising trip to Tripoli sponsored by the Libyan government. XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed that Ludhianvi had made contact with Libyan officials in the guise of working against Iran and Shia agents in Pakistan. (Note: SSP was originally founded as a violent anti-Shia organization and has, in the past, received extensive foreign funding from a variety of Sunni states, including Saudi Arabia. End Note). According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, Ludhianvi was scheduled to return to Pakistan in “”a few days”" and was bringing with him a “”donation”" from the Libyan government valued at nearly 25 million Pakistani rupees (approximately $312,000) that XXXXXXXXXXXX was certain would be used to increase further SSP activities.

7. (S) Comment: Maulana XXXXXXXXXXXX is a long-standing contact of Consulate Lahore, who visited the United States in XXXXXXXXXXXX as part of our International Visitor Leadership Program. XXXXXXXXXXXX repeatedly credits his trip to the United States and particularly his discussions with Muslim leaders there for changing his previously anti-Western views. XXXXXXXXXXXX has numerous ties within the broader Deobandi community and is well-positioned to obtain information on activities of Deobandi-linked terrorist/extremist groups such as SSP and JeM. He has not/not previously shared such extensive information with post about these groups’ activities in Faisalabad. Post believes he has done so on this occasion largely out of concern for his and other moderate Deobandi leaders’ safety if these groups expand activities in Faislabad. The significant decline in the Pakistani textile industry and accompanying large-scale lay-offs in Faisalabad –the center of that industry in Punjab — provides groups like SSP with a ready pool of unemployed recruits, who are susceptible to these groups’ rhetoric about an Islamic utopia based on Sharia and prepared to engage in violence to bring it about. End Comment. REFERENCE: 2009: Was Qaddafi funding Sipahe Sahaba? From the Newspaper | International | 26th May, 2011 http://www.dawn.com/2011/05/26/2009-was-qaddafi-funding-sipahe-sahaba.html