The Littoral Combat Ship is more than just an eyesore — it's a noncapable, cyber-vulnerable, thin-skinned floating pile of misshapen steel that's more than doubled in costs over the course of its development.

The Navy wants 52 more at a total cost of $37 billion.

Worse off, it seems that while things like contractors (even ones who cut grass) and veteran's college benefits are on the table for cuts, expensive programs like the LCS seem completely untouchable.

Although designed for operations in shallow waters close to shore, known as the littoral zone, the ship lacks the firepower needed to get close to shore, according to a classified memo from a Navy admiral.

The program has been plagued by issues, including cracks, corrosion, faulty anti-mine systems and lift platforms, and bad propulsion systems.

Some sailors have even decided LCS should stand for "Little Crappy Ship."

AP/Dennis Griggs

There are two versions and neither works. A steel-hulled vessel is being made in Wisconsin by Lockheed Martin, and an aluminum trimaran is being built in Mobile, Alabama, by a group led by Austal Ltd. Lockheed’s version had a cracked hull, and the Austal ship developed corrosion.

It's almost like the military tried to waste money. Says one expert: "Since neither design had yet proven either its usefulness or functionality it seems that the Navy’s object was to make the LCS program 'too big to fail' as soon as possible."

Due to various setbacks, the ship’s cost has doubled since 2005, now costing $440 million per ship.

In a January report, the ship’s weapons tester said that the ship is not expected to be survivable in that it is “not expected to maintain mission capability after taking a significant hit in a hostile combat environment.”

The ship was designed to replace frigates, but now some Navy officers are already planning the LCS's replacement.

One admiral’s memo states that the LCS cannot operate independently, and would have to be protected by better armed and better armored ships.

The ship is so vulnerable to attack that a defense expert writes that "About the only threat the LCS might handle is the 'swarms' of Iranian machinegun and RPG-carrying speedboats in the Persian Gulf."

Building and buying the 52 ship contract will cost $37 billion. Conversely, the entire Marine Corps costs $28 billion a year to run.

Copeman's 10-page report dedicated to naval defense posture up to 2025 had only three graphs about the LCS.

The ship features a "plug and play" system which allows for the quick changing out of weapons. Not only have there been reports that the change isn't so quick, however, but internal Naval reports expressed worry that the weapons systems weren't heavy enough for combat.

Despite her mission for close-to-shore operations, planners fear she's too wide to fit in many international ports.

The Navy's surface warfare chief said recently that the Navy had "yet to settle key LCS issues regarding missions, tactics and the design features to support them." Shouldn't they have done this before they built them?