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Learning in Repeated Games without Repeating the Game

Leoni, Patrick (2004). Learning in Repeated Games without Repeating the Game. Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics No. 215, University of Zurich.

Abstract

"This paper extends the convergence result on Bayesian learning in Kalai and Lehrern(1993a, 1993b) to a class of games where players have a payoff function continuous for the product topology. Provided that 1) every player maximizes her expected payoff against her own beliefs, 2) every player updates her beliefs in a Bayesian manner, and 3) prior beliefs other players&#146; strategies have a grain of truth, we show that after some finite time the equilibrium outcome of the above game is arbitrarily close to a Nash equilibrium. Those assumptions are shown to be tight."

Abstract

"This paper extends the convergence result on Bayesian learning in Kalai and Lehrern(1993a, 1993b) to a class of games where players have a payoff function continuous for the product topology. Provided that 1) every player maximizes her expected payoff against her own beliefs, 2) every player updates her beliefs in a Bayesian manner, and 3) prior beliefs other players&#146; strategies have a grain of truth, we show that after some finite time the equilibrium outcome of the above game is arbitrarily close to a Nash equilibrium. Those assumptions are shown to be tight."

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