The main thrust of Sen's argument is that the overriding
cause of the famine was the approach of the Bengal Government. He claims
that they adopted the FAD approach, acting on the belief that the famine
was caused by a sudden sharp decline in food availability. As a result,
they failed to anticipate the famine; they failed to recognize it when it
came; and there were disastrous policy failures in dealing with it.

" The failure of the government to anticipate
the famine and even to recognize it when it revealed itself, seems to have
been the result largely of erroneous theories of famine causation, rather
than mistakes about facts dealing with food availability" (Sen 1977
p55)

This is untrue in all respects, as is shown in Appendix II which gives a detailed description
of the Bengal Governments actions. The sources are agreed that the Bengal
Government made much the same assessment as Sen of food availability (until,
in July or August, when the famine was reaching its peak, they started to
realize that there was a major shortage). They believed that there was only
a first-degree shortage. Surprisingly,i n support of his claim that the Bengal
Government was obsessed by the FAD approach, Sen gives two pages of evidence
showing just the opposite: that the Bengal Government was firmly convinced
that there was adequate food available, and that the hunger was due to changes
in distribution (1977 00 53,54; 1981 pp 80-82). They also had the same theory
of famine causation, and of the appropriate way of dealing with the famine.
They believed that lack of purchasing power rather than lack of food caused
starvation. They believed that price control was necessary under wartime
inflation to prevent certain groups getting more than their fair share.
They believed in public relief schemes. They believed that a large supply
of food had to be distributed through the public distribution system. They
believed that some degree of rationing was desirable. They believed that
speculation and hoarding were major causes of the famine. They attempted
therefore to provide the population, and particularly the population of
Calcutta, with the purchasing power necessary to obtain the food. They instituted
public relief measures. They intervened on the market. Had they been right
in their assessment of food supplies, and on the cause of the famine they
might have been successful. However, they held the same views as Sen, and
they acted accordingly. Three million people died.

If they had held the FAD view, as Sen states, their
logic would have been as follows: "There is widespread hunger and even
starvation. Under the FAD approach, the only possible reason is a shortage
of food. Ergo, we must import one and a half million tons immediately."
Whether their analysis was right or wrong, their response would have saved
three million lives.

7.1 Monitoring the Shortage

Sen is indignant that the government should have
spent any time at all on monitoring available supply, once it had been decided
that the famine was due to maldistribution:

"The government's thinking on the nature
of the food problem, while encompassing a variety of factors, seems to
have been persistently influenced by attempts to estimate the size of the
real shortage' on the basis of requirements' and availability'; it was
a search in a dark room for a black cat which was not there." (Sen
1977 p53).

I must disagree in the strongest possible terms.
The effects of treating a serious food shortage as merely a change in distribution
are horrendous. It would be criminal negligence bordering on the genocidal
to treat any famine as merely a first-degree shortage without constantly
reconsidering the possibility that either initial estimates were wrong or
the degree of shortage had changed. This at least the Bengal Government
was not guilty of.