Hundreds of self-deployed officers in the 2013 manhunt for murder suspect Christopher Dorner created unnecessary and dangerous chaos, while the inability of police to communicate on different radio bands increased hazards, states a report released Monday by a national think tank.

The non-profit, non-partisan Police Foundation in Washington, D.C., generally commended law enforcement for its response to the former LAPD officer’s nine-day siege that left two civilians and two officers dead and one officer critically injured. But the 102-page report also noted that collaboration among agencies, self-deployment policy and communication must be dramatically improved.

“Events were unfolding in a rapid and dynamic fashion with a high degree of uncertainty about (Dorner’s) motives, intent, and capacity,” the report emphasized. “This element of a decision-making environment imbued with rapid, dynamic, and uncertain conditions, particularly with the presence of vulnerabilities to officers and their families, makes the case study of the Dorner event valuable to the law enforcement community in the United States and other countries.”

Los Angeles Police Chief Charlie Beck said his department has already started to regulate self-deployment of officers and improve its communications systems.

“We are profoundly grateful to our law enforcement partners throughout the region,” Beck added. “We will continue to partner with them to protect our communities and improve our capabilities in the future.”

UNPRECENTED ATTACK

Dorner, a fired LAPD officer bent on revenge, terrorized Southern California in early February last year with a high-caliber vendetta against police and their families. He accused department officials – including his own lawyer – of railroading him out of his police job and used a Facebook manifesto to put the public on notice.

Dorner started by allegedly shooting his lawyer’s daughter, Monica Quan, and her fiance, Keith Lawrence, in Irvine on Feb. 3. Within days, police knew of his plans and identified his potential targets, which included 77 individuals. That meant 77 homes needed to be protected over 2,000-square-miles, mostly outside the LAPD jurisdiction.

Spouses had to be called. Children rounded up. Soccer games missed. Hundreds of LAPD officers were assigned to protective duty, covering 4,000 extra shifts.

So fearful were officers that those not on the list were checking their homes, gun in hand, before allowing their families to enter, the report said. Against this backdrop, resources, technology and emotions were stretched thin almost from the beginning.

By the time Dorner shot himself Feb. 12, 2013, inside a burning cabin north of Big Bear Lake, hundreds of law enforcement officers from 28 agencies traveled up to 100 miles to converge on Big Bear.

But, the report said, they assigned themselves, most with no understanding of what their role would be, how to interact with the command structure at the scene – or how to dress for winter weather at 7,000 feet – the report said.

SELF-DEPLOYED

While police work is often self initiated, the report advised agencies to prohibit or regulate self-deployment. The uninvited response from officers to Big Bear was so huge, police vehicles created a 1.5-mile clog on the main road, delaying the arrival of critical San Bernardino Sheriff’s SWAT vehicles, the report said.

Ill-prepared officers ended up inadvertently aiming weapons in each other’s direction, with no idea where Dorner was hiding, the report said.

“There were incidents of officers deliberately working outside the scope of the mission so they could be the ones who captured Dorner,” said the report. “The desire to capture the suspect appeared to outweigh training, policies and common sense.”

The report said hundreds of law enforcement officers were already on the mountain for “police and fire appreciation” day at the local ski resort, which had to be canceled midday. The addition of those joining the manhunt complicated the mission for San Bernardino Sheriff’s deputies, who had the jurisdiction and did not request assistance.

“The rush to capture the suspect and the lack of supervisor-level intervention led to command and control failures at many levels,” the report said. “Valuable time was wasted managing the vast number of ill-prepared police officers who left the much warmer coastal and inland climates of Southern California for the extreme cold of a mountain ski resort at 7,000 feet.”

For instance, an aircraft carrying an LAPD tactical team landed in the wrong place – on the slope behind the cabin where Dorner was hiding, complicating the standoff. San Bernardino Sheriff’s had to create a diversion to keep Dornan’s attention off the aircraft.

LAPD Chief Beck said his department is initiating a policy to regulate self-deployment.

The report also lauded agencies that showed restraint. Irvine police officers, investigating the shooting deaths of two Dorner victims, were complimented for not joining the mountain search, and staying at the command post to interview key witnesses.

“A (supervisor) made an important and courageous call. I’m glad he made it,” said Irvine Police Chief David Maggard.

Corona, where two LAPD officers were fired upon, also gave the order for its officers not to self-deploy up the mountain.

The report also commended San Bernardino Sheriff’s Sgt. Jeremiah MacKay, who was shot during the gun battle with Dorner.

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS

The inability of police to communicate on radios out of their jurisdiction has been a long-standing problem, but never so much as during the Dorner manhunt, the report said. Riverside officers were shot without being warned that Dorner was in the area because of radio delays. An LAPD officer officer in Corona tried to use his cellphone while chasing Dorner, but the phone fell and broke in the heat of the moment.

Riverside Chief Sergio Diaz said radio problems can’t be fixed immediately, but departments must be prepared.

“This was an unusual incident that spanned several jurisdictions in several counties, over a number of days,” Diaz said. “That complicates the issue, but it happened a couple months later during the Patriot Day bombings in Boston. Those incidents are going to happen every once in a while.”

By the time Riverside Police Department received and broadcast a warning from Los Angeles that Dorner was in the area, the rogue ex-cop was already spraying bullets into a patrol car. Officer Michael Crain was killed, another officer was injured.

Earlier, two LAPD officers in Corona tried to chase Dorner but they were too far away from their jurisdiction for their radios to work. They couldn’t call for backup or alert anybody that he was in the area, the report said. One officer tried to use his cellphone, but it fell and broke.

Dorner opened fire on the patrol car, but the officers were not seriously injured. They ended up flagging down a civilian and borrowing a cellphone to call 911, said the report.

The report advises departments to work on creating communication systems that allow various jurisdictions to talk to each other, an effort that is already under way but may not be completed for at least another 10 years, an outgrowth of 9/11.

In Orange County, the county and its 34 cities all communicate on the same system – the only such system in California. Visiting jurisdictions can easily patch into the system, said Orange County Sheriff’s Lt. Jeff Hallock. But Orange County’s band may not be compatible with jurisdictions outside the county.

BUILDING TRUST

Initially, LAPD officers and their families were on Dorner’s target list so the entire department felt it had a stake in the investigation, the report said. Then Dorner threatened all officers, and those with a personal stake multiplied.

Without collaboration, more mistakes were made, the report said. Officers in one jurisdiction, for example, felt they did not need to listen to supervisors in another jurisdiction.

The report recommended that agencies reach across county lines in advance and plan how to handle emergencies and natural disasters. Such communication would increase trust and melt misconceptions.

When LAPD officials first realized that Dorner was hunting his enemies in the department, they decided not to impose on smaller agencies to protect LAPD employees. Instead, the department strung together 77 protective units and sent them all over Southern California, mostly without notifying other jurisdictions.

The Corona Police Department didn’t even know the LAPD was in town until two Los Angeles officers were fired upon.

“Communication between agencies contributed to confusion and delays,” the report concluded.

Because of the lack of collaboration, some line officers arrived with preconceived notions that were unfounded. Some officers thought Irvine – known as one of the safest cities in the United States – didn’t have the experience to handle a homicide. Another misconception was that the LAPD was the only agency with the resources to capture Dornan.

Others argued that Dornan had not committed a crime in LAPD’s jurisdiction, so the department had no standing.

Because of competing interests, the command center was located in Norwalk – 100 miles from Big Bear – because the facility was politically neutral, not because it was logistically better, the report said.

The foundation’s report also noted the Dorner investigation was a high-pressure situation that stretched the limits of law enforcement.

“It is important to remember that it was less than 12 hours from the discovery of Dorner’s online threats to the tragic shooting in Riverside,” the report said.

“Managing a response during such a compressed time frame is difficult in one jurisdiction. As the crimes flowed from San Diego County to Riverside, the potential for chaos was clear.”

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