Greg Sheridan

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John Howard is George Bush's poodle. When Washington says jump, Canberra says: how high? The Americans lay down the law and the Australians still go all the way with LBJ.

Actually, in my view, Australian prime ministers going back as far as Alfred Deakin have had a pretty clear-eyed view of Australia's national interests and have approached their great power allies, first the United Kingdom and then the United States, with a determination to make the alliance work for Australia, to secure Australia's national interests.

Certainly this has been the story under Howard and Bush. and my new book, The Partnership, argues four main propositions in support of that idea.

One, that most of the initiative for the relationship has come from the Australian side during that time, that Howard has had more of the running of the relationship than Bush.

Two, that Howard and Bush have transformed ANZUS from a predominantly regional arrangement to a truly global partnership.

Three, that Howard has got most of what he wanted from the relationship at very little cost, either militarily, politically or economically.

And four, that the US alliance greatly enhances Australian national power.

So what is it that the Howard government has wanted from the alliance?

The Howard government wanted, and got, enhanced intelligence access, deeper defence cooperation, greater Australian influence in US decision-making, a free trade agreement and increased US involvement in Asia, especially in Indonesia.

The Howard government also wanted the prestige in Asia that comes from everyone recognising Canberra's influence in Washington. And of course it wanted a political pay-off at home.

One of the key contributions Howard has made to the relationship has been military. His willingness to share military and political risk has greatly endeared him to the Americans. Howard was lucky to have such a competent army to call on. The contribution of the Australian SAS in Afghanistan, in Operation Anaconda where they saved the Americans' bacon, and in Iraq where they captured the Iraqi air force, was central in establishing Australian prestige throughout the US system.

But where can we see Australian influence actually at work on the US?

One concrete story I tell involves the Australian commander in Iraq, then Brigadier Maurie McNarn, vetoing numerous proposed US targets and US weapons systems as being militarily unnecessary, strategically counter-productive and contrary to rhe rules of law. On one occasion the American air force officer was livid with McNarn for giving this advice. McNarn produced it for him in written form.

The American was apoplectic. What if this advice leaks, he thundered. Well, McNarn replied with some equanimity, it won't leak if you don't' conduct the illegal action.

Despite some harsh words and occasional harsh feelings, the Americans always respected Australia's red card over target selection and weapons systems.Similarly, in response to Australian requests, George W Bush issued a presidential directive changing US national disclosure policy, to upgrade Australia's access to US intelligence. Material which had previously been classified as to be seen by 'no foreign eyes' would now be available to Australians.

Australians were allowed to plug in directly to American intelligence systems. Direct access was available especially to battlefield intelligence.

Canberra also had some success in getting Washington to try, unsuccessfully as it turned out, to get a second UN Security Council resolution authorising the use of force against Iraq in 2003. The Partnership reveals a conversation in which Bush complains to Australia's foreign minister, Alexander Downer, that the US effort at the UN had been primarily to please Tony Blair and John Howard.

One area where the Australians tried and conspicuously failed to influence the Americans was in post-conflict planning for Iraq. The Australians were shocked at how much the giant American agencies, the Pentagon, the CIA and the State Department, kept warring with each other even after decisions had ostensibly been made.

The US-Australian alliance is more intimate now than it has been at any time at least since World War 11. That may be a good thing or a bad thing. But the very best Australian minds, across all the great departments and agencies of government, are bent to the task of making the alliance perform to support Australia's national interests. Amidst all the polemic on Iraq and related issues, the story of what they are doing and why is often lost. But it is a gripping story, worth the telling, and worth knowing better.