Not only has Tehran thumbed its nose at diplomatic efforts to
settle disputes over its nuclear (weapons) program, now it's
offering to share its nuclear know-how with others. At the United
Nations last week, Iran's President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, said
Tehran is ready - and willing - to share "peaceful" nuclear
technology with other Islamic states.

Making matters worse, the U.N.'s International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) reported that Iran has already produced seven tons of
uranium hexafluoride - enough precursor material to support the
building of one nuclear weapon - since ending its moratorium on
uranium-enrichment activities earlier this month.

Will the Iranian nuclear juggernaut be stopped before Tehran
becomes a certified nuclear power - and spreads its atomic wares
across the Muslim world? The next best chance to do that comes this
week, when the 35-nation IAEA board of governors meets in
Vienna.

The United States and like-minded nations (France, Britain,
Germany, Japan, Australia) are trying to pressure Iran back to the
nuclear negotiating table - or get the IAEA to (finally!) refer
Iran to the U.N. Security Council for possible economic sanctions
over its violation of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
safeguards.

But not everyone is convinced; diplomatic deal-making over voting
Iran to the Security Council is reaching a fever pitch. Tehran is
seducing potential supporters with its significant energy
resources, while flirting with Muslim members of the IAEA board
(Yemen, Nigeria, Algeria) by offering to share its ill-gotten
nuclear spoils.

In fact, late last week, opponents of referral were trying to
delay consideration of Iran's nuclear program for at least a few
weeks to give Iran time to return to negotiations, gather
supporters or undermine Washington's position.

Big powers such as Russia, China and India are leaning against a
quick referral. Beijing and Delhi thirst for Iranian oil and gas,
while Moscow is eager to build/fuel Iran's Bushehr reactor.
Venezuela, South Africa and Brazil are thinking about their own
nuclear ambitions.

Despite threats to downgrade relations with the IAEA, Tehran is
hinting at a compromise. Iran will invite Europe, Russia, China and
South Africa to participate in nuclear joint ventures that would
let Iran keep its nuclear fuel cycle, while calming fears that
Tehran isn't diverting fissile material to a nuclear-weapons
program.

But why should we trust Iran to cooperate with anyone,
considering its record of resisting the IAEA over the last couple
of years?

Even after 21/2 years of intensive, on-the-ground investigation,
the IAEA says that many key aspects of Iran's (18-year,
clandestine!) nuclear program remain murky due to a dearth of
Iranian cooperation. In fact, even after 30 months, the IAEA still
can't "conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or
activities in Iran."

IAEA head Mohamed El Baradei claims that Tehran continues to dodge
questioning, even resisting IAEA requests to interview nuclear
scientists. It also won't let the watchdog conduct a full
inspection at other possible nuclear sites, such as Parchin.

Among the burning mysteries: a) how Iran developed its
uranium-enrichment capability; b) what assistance Iran got from
A.Q. Khan, the rogue Pakistani nuclear scientist; and c) was Tehran
conducting nuclear work at Lavian-Shian before it was exposed as a
possible nuclear site and bulldozed under in 2004?

There are also troubling questions about Iran's research on
plutonium, which isn't generally used for nuclear reactor fuel, but
is used in advanced nuclear weapons. The IAEA would also like to
know why Iran has been experimenting with polonium, and attempted
to buy beryllium - both used for triggering nukes.

Considering Iran's record of denial and deception, the United
States and its allies in this effort are absolutely right to demand
a full cessation of all Iranian enrichment-related activities,
complete disclosure to the IAEA and a continuation of negotiations
with the EU-3 (France, Germany, Britain) over its nuclear
program.

Moreover, under no circumstances should Iran be allowed to develop
or maintain a nuclear fuel cycle, which would allow it to
manufacture or enrich its own nuclear fuel not just for civilian
reactors, but also for bombs. The IAEA assessment makes it plain
that there'd be no way to verify that Iran isn't diverting nuclear
material to a military program.

Without question, the Iranian nuclear issue has reached critical
mass. What happens in Vienna over the next couple of weeks will
determine not only the IAEA's - and the United Nations' -
credibility in nuclear nonproliferation, it will, more importantly,
determine Iran's nuclear fate - and its ability to share its
nuclear know-how with others.