Chancellorsville, BATTLE OF. in April,
1863, Hooker, in command of the
Army of the Potomac, became impatient, and
resolved to put it in motion towards
Richmond, notwithstanding his ranks were
not full. Cavalry under
Stoneman were sent to destroy railways in
Lee's rear,
but were foiled by the high water in the streams.

THE RUINS OF CHANCELLORSVILLE

After a pause, Hooker determined to attempt to turn
Lee's flank, and, for
that purpose, sent 10,000 mounted men to raid in his rear. Then he moved
36,000 of the troops of his right wing across the Rappahannock, with orders
to halt and intrench at Chancellorsville, between the Confederate army near
Fredericksburg and Richmond. This movement was so masked by a demonstration
on Lee's front by Hooker's left wing, under General Sedgwick, that the right
was well advanced before Lee was aware of his peril. These troops reached
Chancellorsville, in a region known as "The Wilderness," on the
evening of April 30, 1863, when Hooker expected to see
Lee, conscious of
danger, fly towards Richmond. He did no such thing, but proceeded to strike
the National army a heavy blow, for the twofold purpose of seizing the
communications between the two parts of that army and compelling its
commander to fight at a disadvantage, with only a part of his troops in
hand. Hooker had made his headquarters in the spacious brick house of Mr.
Chancellor, and sent out Pleasonton's cavalry to reconnoiter. A part of
these encountered the Confederate cavalry, under
Stuart, and were defeated.

Lee had called
" Stonewall " Jackson's large force to come up when he
perceived Sedgwick's movements. Lee left
General Early with 9.000 men and
thirty cannon to hold his fortified position at
Fredericksburg against
Sedgwick, and, at a little past midnight (May 1, 1863), he put
Jackson's
column in motion towards Chancellorsville. It joined another force under
General Anderson at eight o'clock in the morning, and he, in person, led the
Confederates to attack the Nationals. Hooker had also disposed the latter in
battle order. Aware of the peril of fighting with the Wilderness at his
back, he had so disposed his army as to fight in the open country, with a
communication open with the Rappahannock towards Fredericksburg. At eleven
o'clock the divisions of Griffin and Humphreys, of
Meade's corps, pushed out
to the left, in the direction of
Banks's Ford, while Sykes's division of the
same corps, supported by
Hancock's division, and forming the centre column,
moved along a turnpike. Slocum's entire corps, with Howard's, and its
batteries, massed in its rear, comprising the right column, marched along a
plank road. The battle was begun about a mile in advance of the National
works at Chancellorsville, by the van of the centre column and Confederate
cavalry. Sykes brought up his entire column, with artillery, and, after a
severe struggle with McLaws, he gained an advantageous position, at noon, on
one of the ridges back of Fredericksburg. Banks's Ford, which
Lee had
strenuously sought to cover, was now virtually in possession of the
Nationals, and the distance between Sedgwick, opposite
Fredericksburg, and
the army at Chancellorsville was shortened at least 12 miles.

Meanwhile, Slocum and Jackson had met and struggled fiercely on the plank
road. Perceiving Jackson endeavoring to flank Slocum, and his strong column
over-lapping Sykes's flank, Hooker, fearing his army might be beaten in
detail before he could successfully resist the furious onslaught of
Jackson,
ordered its withdrawal behind his works at Chancellorsville, the
Confederates following close in the rear of the retreating troops. So ended
the movements of the day. Hooker's position was a strong one. The National
line extended from the Rappahannock to the Wilderness church, 2 miles west
of Chancellorsville. Meade's corps, with Couch's, formed his left; Slocum's,
and a division of Sickles's, his centre, and Howard's his right, with
Pleasonton's cavalry near. Lee's forces had the Virginia cavalry of Owen and Wickham on the right, and
Stuart's and a part of Fitzhugh Lee's on the left.
McLaws's forces occupied the bridge on the east of the Big Meadow Swamp, and
Anderson's continued the line to the left of McLaws. Such was the general
disposition of the opposing armies on the morning of May 2.

Lee was unwilling to risk a direct attack on Hooker, and
Jackson advised a
secret flank movement with his entire corps, so as to fall on Hooker's rear.
Lee hesitated, but so much did he lean on
Jackson as adviser and executor
that he consented. With 25,000 men Jackson made the perilous movement,
marching swiftly and steadily through the thick woods, with
Stuart's cavalry
between his forces and those of the Nationals. But the movement was early
discovered; the Nationals, however, believing it to be a retreat of the
Confederates towards Richmond. Sickles pushed forward Birney's division to
reconnoiter, followed by two brigades of
Howard's corps. Birney charged upon
the passing column, and captured a Georgia regiment, 500 strong, but was
checked by Confederate artillery. The Nationals now held the road over which
Jackson was moving. Disposition was made to pursue the supposed fugitives,
when Jackson made a quick and startling movement towards Chancellorsville,
concealed by the thick woods, at six o'clock in the evening, suddenly burst
forth from the thickets with his whole force, like an unexpected and
terrible tornado, and fell with full force upon Howard's corps (the 11th),
with tremendous yells, just as they were preparing for supper and repose. Devens's division, on the extreme right, received the first blow, and almost
instantly the surprised troops, panic-stricken, fled to the rear,
communicating their alarm to the other divisions of the corps. The
Confederates captured men and guns and a commanding position, while the
fugitives, in evident confusion, rushed towards Chancellorsville, upon the
position of General Schurz, whose division had already retreated. The tide
of affrighted men rolled back upon General Steinwehr.

While the divisions of Devens and Schurz were reforming,
Steinwehr quickly changed front, threw his men behind some works, rallied
some of Schurz's men, and checked the pursuit for a brief space. But the
overwhelming number of the Confederates speedily captured the works. These
disasters on the right were partially relieved by Hooker, who sent forward
troops at the double-quick, under Generals Berry and French, and also a
courier to apprise Sickles, who had pushed some distance beyond the National
lines, of the disaster to the 11th Corps and his own peril. He was directed
to fall back and attack Jackson's left flank. He was in a critical
situation, but Pleasonton saved him by a quick and skilful movement, greatly
assisting in checking the pursuit. This was done long enough for Pleasonton
to bring his own horse-artillery and more than twenty of Sickles's guns to
bear upon the Confederates, and to pour into their ranks a destructive storm
of grape and canister shot. Generals Warren and Sickles soon came to Pleasonton's assistance, when there was a severe struggle for the possession
of cannon. Meanwhile Lee was making a strong artillery attack upon Hooker's
left and centre. Soon a great misfortune befell the Confederate commander,
in the loss of " Stonewall " Jackson, the strong right arm of his power.
Jackson had sent for
Hill, and was anxious to follow up the advantage he had
gained by extending his lines to the left and cutting off Hooker's
communication with the United States Ford. While waiting for
Hill, he pushed
forward with his staff, on a personal reconnaissance, and, when returning,
in the gloom of evening, his men, mistaking them for National cavalry, fired
upon them and mortally wounded the great leader. No more fighting occurred
in that part of the field. Birney's division drove back the Confederates at
midnight, recovered some lost ground, and brought back some abandoned guns
and caissons. During the night a new line of entrenchments was thrown up by
the Nationals; but Hooker's forces were in a very perilous position on
Sunday morning, May 3. When he heard of the movement of
Jackson on Saturday
morning, he had called from Sedgwick Reynolds's corps, 20,000 strong, and it
arrived the same evening. Hooker's force was now 60,000 strong, and
Lee's
40,000. The former ordered Sedgwick to cross the river and seize and hold
Fredericksburg and the heights behind it, and then, pushing along the roads
leading to Chancellorsville, crush every impediment and join the main army.
Each army made disposition for a battle on Sunday morning.
Stuart advanced
to the attack with Lee's left wing, and when he came in sight of the
Nationals he shouted, " Charge, and remember
Jackson!" With thirty pieces of
artillery presently in position on an elevation, his men made a desperate
charge under cover of their fire, and were soon struggling with Sickles's
corps and four other divisions. These were pushed back, and a fierce battle
ensued, the tide of success ebbing and flowing for more than an hour. During
this struggle Hooker had been prostrated, and Couch took command of the
army. Almost the whole National army became engaged in the battle, at
different points, excepting the troops under Meade and Reynolds. Couch fell
back towards the Rappahannock, and, at noon, Hooker, having recovered,
resumed chief command.

Lee's army was now united, but
Hooker's was divided. Sedgwick had seriously menaced
Lee's flank, but had
not joined Hooker. After a hard conflict and the loss of 1,000 men, Sedgwick
had captured the Confederate works on the heights back of
Fredericksburg,
and sent Early, their defender, flying southward with his shattered columns.
Intelligence of these events made Lee extremely cautious. Sedgwick, leaving
Gibbon in command at Fredericksburg, marched for Chancellorsville, when
Lee
was compelled to divide his army to meet this new peril. He sent McLaws with
four brigades to meet Sedgwick. At Salem church they had a sanguinary
conflict. The Confederates won, and the losses of Sedgwick, added to those
sustained in the morning, amounted to about 5,000 men. Hooker, at the same
time, seemed paralyzed in his new position, for his army appeared being
beaten in detail. On the following morning, perceiving that Hooker's army
had been much strengthened, Lee thought it necessary to drive Sedgwick
across the Rappahannock before again attacking the main body. Early was sent
to retake the Heights of Fredericksburg, and he cut Sedgwick off from the
city. Early was reinforced by Anderson, by which Sedgwick was enclosed on
three sides. At six o'clock in the evening the Confederates attacked him.
His forces gave way and retreated to Banks's Ford, and before morning the
remains of Sedgwick's corps had crossed the Rappahannock over pontoon
bridges. Gibbon also withdrew from Fredericksburg to Falmouth that night,
and, on Tuesday, Lee had only Hooker to contend with. He concentrated his
forces to strike Hooker a crushing blow before night, but a heavy rain-storm
prevented. Hooker prepared to retreat, and did so on the night of May 5 and
morning of the 6th, crossing the Rappahannock and returning to the old
quarters of the army opposite Fredericksburg. The losses of each army had
been very heavy. That of the Confederates was reported at 12,277, including
2,000 prisoners. and that of the Nationals was 17,197, including about 5,000
prisoners. The latter also lost thirteen heavy guns. about 20,000
small-arms, seventeen colors, and a large amount of ammunition. The
Union
Generals Berry and Whipple were killed.

From Harper's Brother's American History Volume II.

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