Iraq after ISIL: Baiji

Shi’a PMF forces helped to capture and still control significant parts of this Sunni Arab district. They also looted the area’s most valuable asset, an oil refinery. Civilian returns have been minimal to this district, which faces diminished economic prospects, ongoing security threats from the frontline, and the presence of ISIL and predatory armed groups.

This research summary is part of a larger study on local, hybrid and sub-state security forces in Iraq (LHSFs). Please see the main page for more findings, and research summaries about other field research sites.

Baiji district in Salah al-Din governorate, with a population of
about 205,000 residents, is on the road connecting Iraq’s two largest
cities, Baghdad and Mosul.2 Baiji
is integral to Iraq’s economy because it contains the country’s largest
oil refinery, as well as ancillary industries, including a fertilizer
factory and a power plant. At its peak, the refinery complex employed
more than 20 percent of the district’s workforce3 and
supplied more than a third of Iraq’s domestic energy needs (petrol,
diesel, heating oil, motor oil), worth between 5.5 and 6.5 million US
dollar per month.4 Like
many areas of Salah al-Din, Baiji fell to ISIL in June 2014. After the
ISIL invasion, the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) took control of
much of the district’s security, and they remain its primary security
actor, despite the formal leadership of the Iraqi Army’s Salah ad-Din
Operations Command and the Federal Police. Prolonged clashes between
ISIL and pro-government forces, as well as looting by the PMF, have
decimated the district’s infrastructure. In the future, Baiji will
continue to be afflicted by ISIL attacks and faces the almost total
destruction of its infrastructure. Given this environment, many
residents have chosen not to return, and the PMF have blocked residents
who do attempt to return, citing security concerns.

ISIL Invasion of 2014 and Recapture

Prior to the ISIL invasion of 2014, the conditions for the eventual
rise of the Islamic State were already in place. Situated at the
northern corner of the “Sunni triangle,” Baiji fell prey to the
insurgent, extremist ideology that emerged after the US invasion of
Iraq.5 ISIL
fighters seized the city of Baiji on June 11, 2014. The militants
occupied the periphery of the oil refinery, effectively trapping Iraqi
Security Forces (ISF) within its confines, and in October 2014, US
forces airdropped food, water, and ammunition to the Iraqi forces
stranded there.6

In November 2014, a joint force composed of the Counter-Terrorism Service, the Federal Police, and the PMF (League of the Righteous, Hezbollah Brigades, Badr Organization, Ali al-Akbar Brigades, Imam Ali Brigades, Harakat al-Nujaba)7 mounted
an offensive from the direction of Tikrit in the south. Reports suggest
that fighters from the Lebanese Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary
Guards Corps participated in the operation;8 the US-led Coalition carried out several air strikes.9 The
joint forces advanced steadily north and captured Hujjaj, Albu Tu’ma,
and Mazra’ villages before entering Baiji city on November 11, 2014, and
breaking the refinery’s siege.

Despite this early success, it would take another year for
pro-government forces to gain control of Baiji city, with ISIL making
significant inroads in the meantime. Iraqi forces were overstretched in
their efforts to secure Baiji and its sprawling oil refinery and prepare
an operation to retake neighboring Tikrit.10 On December 17, 2014, ISIL seized Baiji city after intense clashes11 and
gained control of parts of the refinery complex. PMF forces held the
line south of Baiji, at Mazra’ village. According to one report, which
local sources could not confirm, they were supported by 70 fighters from
the Sunni Liwa Salah ad-Din, also known as the 51st Brigade.12 After
months of battles and rapidly shifting lines of control, pro-government
forces pushed ISIL out of Baiji city and its refinery in late October
2015.13 ISIL
militants retreated from their positions and headed north to the
Makhoul mountains, east to Fatha (toward Hawija), and west to Siniyya
and the desert, according to locals. Most of these areas remained under
ISIL control at the time of writing. With the recapture of Baiji city in
October 2015, the ISF also regained control of Highway 1, which has
been vital to ongoing anti-ISIL operations in anticipation of Mosul’s recapture because it links Baghdad to northern Iraq.14

PMF forces have played a significant role in all military operations in Baiji. The top leaders of the Badr Organization and the League of the Righteous were present at the city’s recapture.16 Moreover, the PMF’s operational commander and leader of the Hezbollah Brigades, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, spoke to PMF forces in Baiji after the victory, threatening to hold the US and UK to account for “the bloodbath in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.”17 (The US-led Coalition conducted over 40 airstrikes in Baiji between September and October 2015 in support of the joint forces fighting ISIL.18) The PMF remains the principal security actor in the district today.

Destroyed building in Baiji city center. Baiji district has seen near-total levels of infrastructure destruction, much of which locals blame on Shi'a PMFs.

Graffiti outside a building in the southern Asri neighborhood of Baiji. The bottom graffiti derides the ISIL slogan above it, which is overwritten with “No ISIL in Hussein’s land” and signed by the Ali al-Akbar Brigade, a Shi’a PMF.

PMF Looting and Infrastructure Damage

After near-total
destruction, it will be difficult to rebuild Baiji. About 80 percent of
the district’s infrastructure has been damaged, turning the area into a
“shell of its former self.”19 Although
long months of battle have had their effect, locals pin the blame for
Baiji’s destruction on the PMF rather than ISIL. One source claimed that
the former were 70 percent responsible for the district’s
infrastructure damage, that 20 percent was caused by ISIL, and that 10
percent resulted from airstrikes. Another source claimed that PMF forces
have engaged in acts of destruction and looting and have prevented
local officials from initiating basic infrastructure repairs, such as
the removal of debris.

The most significant infrastructure damage occurred in the looting of the oil refinery, Baiji’s most important economic asset.20 In
addition to the damage caused by cross-fighting, the PMF stole
equipment from the refinery and sold it for profit, according to a
representative of a local security force and a refinery official.
According to an oil refinery worker interviewed for this study, the
refinery might never regain its pre-2014 level of production because 45
percent of the facility has been destroyed: an estimated damage of two
billion USD (an independent expert interviewed for this study claimed
the real figure was significantly lower).21 According
to local sources, PMF looting extended to the fertilizer plant, the
power plant, the railroad station, water purification stations, and most
of the private and public property in Baiji.

Although the damage and looting of the refinery have generally been
blamed on the PMF (both in media reports and in all this study’s
interviews),22 there
are competing views on the level of involvement by different PMF
forces. These discrepancies are at least partly due to the multiple
waves of operations and fighting surrounding the refinery. Most sources
seem to suggest that the Hezbollah Brigades were centrally involved in
the early fighting and the looting of the facility but that as the
League of the Righteous gained greater influence in Baiji, it carried
out more recent waves of damage and looting. One source claimed that
members of the League of Righteous exerted de facto control over the
refinery as of August 2017, despite the presence of the oil police – a
specialized unit of the ISF.

The Iraqi government, however, has not officially stated that the damage was criminal activity.23 When
the Ministry of Oil attempted to investigate acts of theft and damage
to the refinery, militias denied them access, according to locals.
Militias have also been accused of driving the stolen equipment to the
south of Iraq, where it crossed the border into neighboring Iran.

Current Lines of Control

While the Iraqi Army’s Salah ad-Din Operations Command is formally in
charge of security in Baiji district, all stakeholders interviewed for
this research in August 2017 agreed that Shi’a Arab PMF and their local
Sunni Arab proxies hold the true power in Baiji.

Local police forces and the PMF’s al-Taff Brigade, a splinter group
from the Abbas Combat Division, were the primary security actors south
of Baiji city, in Hujjaj and Albu Tu’ma villages. The al-Taff Brigade
comprises mainly Shi’a Arabs from southern governorates, but one of its
regiments (al-Takhi Regiment) draws from the Jibbour tribe, who are
local Sunni Arabs.24

Inside Baiji city and to its north, in Makhoul sub-district, the
al-Sadr Martyr Brigade (approximately 400 fighters) and the Supreme
Reference Supporters Brigade (ansar al-marja’iyya) (approximately
300 fighters) are the primary security actors. For example, these
forces control the main checkpoint leading into the city. Other groups
are also present. According to an oil worker interviewed in August 2017,
the League of the Righteous is officially securing the area around the
refinery, which includes about 1,400 houses. The League of the Righteous
also controls the northern areas of Baiji district, according to the
worker and an additional source interviewed.

The Sunni Arab Liwa Salah ad-Din has a regiment of between 260 and
300 fighters in Baiji. According to one source, 85 percent of the
regiment is composed of fighters from the local Qaysi tribe. This force
operates primarily in the rural areas north of Baiji city but has
recently been allowed into certain neighborhoods on the eastern side of
the city. Liwa Salah ad-Din has a much larger footprint in neighboring Shirqat district.

Although Baiji district is predominantly under government control,
security is still a significant problem. As of March 2017, ISIL still
held territory around the Makhoul mountains, parts of Baiji’s power
plant, and the desert to the west, and the group has used these
positions to launch attacks on other parts of Baiji. These attacks
intensified following the ISF’s focus on the liberation of Mosul.25 The militants also frequently attempted to disrupt transit on Highway 1, making notable attacks in January 2017.26

IDP Resettlement and Obstacles to Return

The ISIL invasion of 2014 and ongoing fighting between security
forces to reclaim Baiji have displaced the majority of the district’s
residents. At the time of research, the International Organization for
Migration’s displacement tracking matrix estimated that 31,530 displaced
individuals had returned to Baiji district, which corresponds to
roughly 15 percent of the district’s population.27 The
biggest obstacles to return for the displaced are the presence of Shi’a
PMF units and the almost total infrastructure damage within the
district. Locals also said that residents have few economic incentives
to return as long as the oil refinery remains offline and no
compensation is offered for damage to their property.

Returns have been painfully slow and faced limitations, but they have
been allowed in some areas. According to local sources, the first IDPs
were able to return to Hujjaj and Albu Tu’ma villages south of Baiji in
June 2015. At the end of 2015, IDPs could return to Mazra’ village eight
kilometers south of Baiji city and, in the summer of 2016, to Albu’ayji
village, directly southeast of Baiji. In June 2017, 460 families
returned to Baiji city (Harijiya, Asri, Jarriya, Jadida neighborhoods),
although all of the returnees were family members of security forces.

Although locals report an improved processing of returnee claims,
tensions will persist between the Sunni majority and the Shi’a Arab PMF
units in charge of securing Baiji, especially due to the looming ISIL
threat in the district that has already caused significant loss in life
to the PMF. Sunni IDPs have come under scrutiny by PMF units for their
perceived ISIL affiliation. Human Rights Watch, reporting in 2016,
indicated that League of the Righteous militiamen rounded up thousands
of families fleeing from the desert west of Baiji and held them at a
food warehouse near Tikrit.28 Other
sources have claimed that PMF units operate detention facilities in
Baiji, where many of the detained (some estimates place this number at
about 7,000 throughout Salah al-Din) were held at the facility based on
information provided by informal sources. As an example, one source
interviewed for this study claimed that the PMF detained 28 people in
Albu Tu’ma village in late 2015; 18 months later, their fates were still
unknown. Similarly, Amnesty International reported that a resident
fleeing fighting from Shirqat was stopped at the fertilizer plant
checkpoint in Baiji, where he was blindfolded by men he believed to be
PMF fighters: “I spent seven weeks under torture; they wanted me to
confess to being Daesh. I was held with about 30 other people in a
school…”29 In
another, similar incident at a check-point near the Baiji oil refinery,
an IDP family was held by PMF units and interrogated about their
perceived ISIL affiliation.30 A
source interviewed for this report also stated that PMF units use ISIL
threats as an excuse to prevent the return of displaced individuals,
claiming that their areas are still under ISIL control. He claimed that
ISIL relatives are explicitly barred from returning by local authorities
if their names show up on a government database that tracks so-called
ISIL families. Additionally, according to another source, many of these
families are in the Shahama IDP camp, and if they wish to return, they
need to receive approval from both PMF forces and local authorities.
Generally, returnees need to present a form that allows free movement
and that is regulated by the PMF, the Sunni Arab hashd,
the police, and an intelligence representative. However, the Shi’a PMF,
who possess local IDP files, additionally require returnees to Baiji to
present a form that allows for “routine” security checks. Thus, the
ability to return (and stay) effectively hinges on the PMF’s security
concerns.

Conclusions

Baiji remains in the grip of Shi’a Arab PMFs, despite the presence of
other security actors in the district. Although certain groups of
displaced populations were allowed to return as of September 2017, the
threat posed by ISIL, near-total levels of infrastructure destruction,
widespread looting, and the continued presence of Shi’a PMFs accused of
the damage and rights violations against local Sunnis continue to pose
strong disincentives for returns. It is unclear whether Baiji city will
ever regain its status as an industrial hub, as long as officials from
the Ministry of Oil cannot fully assess the damage at the oil refinery.
Reinvestment in ancillary industries and other damaged infrastructure in
Baiji will likely be minimal until the oil refinery goes online.

17 “Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis Threatens the US and Pledges to
Hold the US to Account for its ‘Sins’ in Iraq if it Does Not Stop Now,”
YouTube video, 1:10 minutes, October 24, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wU6VBMrijOk