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The investments government and businesses make in basic and applied research and development (R&D) plant the seeds for the technologies, products, firms, and industries of tomorrow. They contribute substantially to the fact that at least one-half of America’s economic growth can be attributed to scientific and technological innovation.1 But the increased complexity of technological innovation as well as the growing strength of America’s economic competitors mean that it’s no longer enough to simply fund scientific and engineering research and hope it gets translated into commercial results.

The U.S. government needs to expand federal support for research and, just as important, it needs to improve the efficiency of the process by which federally funded knowledge creation leads to U.S. innovation and jobs.2

This report provides 50 policy actions the Trump administration and Congress can take to bolster America’s technology transfer, commercialization, and innovation capacity, from the local to the national level. These recommendations include:

Revise the tax code to support innovation by research-intensive, pre-revenue companies

Introduction

Innovation is key to increasing economic growth and wages in the moderate to long run. Yet innovation does not fall like “manna from heaven,” as economists once suggested. It is the product of intentional human action, and, to have more of it, we must enact public policies that connect research and development investments to firms and inventors in the communities where they are located.

After seven years of growth following the end of the Great Recession and after over 70 straight months of employment growth, there is a case to be made that the country has rebounded and the main thrust of economic policy should focus on those who have been left behind. But the reason so many Americans aren’t seeing their wages rise fast enough isn’t just because they’ve been left behind, it’s because the country as a whole isn’t moving ahead fast enough.

It’s certainly true the labor market has begun to inch closer to full employment (in fact, in December 2016 the unemployment rate dropped to 4.6 percent), but that’s far from a leading indicator of the health of the U.S. economy. For the reality is the economy still has a long way to go to return to its full potential. Employment growth in the 36 months following the trough of the recession was the slowest of the 11 post-World War II recoveries, and average productivity growth was twice as high in the four decades following World War II as it has been since the end of the Great Recession.3 Brookings economists Martin Baily and Nicholas Montalbano describe the country’s productivity growth as “weak since 2004 and dismal since 2010.”4 And as the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF) reports, U.S. productivity growth over the last decade is the lowest since the government started recording the data in the late 1940s.5 Yet if the United States could boost its productivity levels by even just one percentage point, it could make the economy $2.3 trillion bigger than it is otherwise projected to be in 10 years while shrinking the federal budget deficit by more than $400 billion.6

Meanwhile, other countries are increasing their technological sophistication, capturing crowded international markets and pushing U.S. firms—and, by extension, U.S. workers—behind. And whereas once America’s leading technology competitors were largely isolated to Western Europe and Japan, today many developing nations are crafting innovation strategies designed to wrest leadership in advanced technology categories such as life sciences, clean energy, new materials, flexible electronics, computing and the internet, and advanced manufacturing. As evidence of these trends, the United States has run a trade deficit in advanced technology products every year since 2002; the cumulative deficit since 2010 is $580 billion.7 Improving America’s capacity to innovate is a key step toward confronting these challenges.

America’s innovation economy exists at three levels: technological, industrial, and spatial. Much innovation occurs in particular technology areas, for example life science innovation funded by the National Institutes of Health (NIH), additive manufacturing supported by America Makes, and composite and lightweight materials supported by the Institute for Advanced Composites Manufacturing Innovation (IACMI) and the Lightweight Innovations for Tomorrow (LIFT) Institutes for Manufacturing Innovation, respectively. Innovation also occurs across firms in the same industries that collaborate to drive technology advancements (e.g., aerospace and automotive). For this reason, sector- and technology-based innovation policies and programs like Manufacturing USA’s Institutes of Manufacturing Innovation and the Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy do an effective job targeting R&D dollars.

The spatial level of innovation includes not just hot spots like Silicon Valley; Austin, Texas; or Boston, but also scores of communities throughout the country in places like Chattanooga, Tenn.; Denver; Minneapolis; Mobile, Ala.; and Pittsburgh, Pa. which are intensively developing their innovation ecosystems at the regional level. Indeed, as ITIF has shown, innovation occurs in all of America’s 435 congressional districts.8

This is particularly the case for knowledge spillovers—the ability of workers and firms to learn from one another without incurring costs. Recent research shows that the value of proximity for firms and workers to share ideas attenuates extremely quickly with distance. For example, Rosenthal and Strange find that, for software companies, the spillover benefits are 10 times greater when firms are within one mile of each other than when they are two and five miles apart, and by 10 miles there are no more within-city localization benefits.10

In other words, to be effective, technology policy needs to focus not just on the first two levels, technology and industry, but also on the spatial—the regional. Thus, if America’s innovation economy is to function maximally, Washington needs to promulgate smart policies and initiatives that effectively work in concert at the city, regional, state, and national levels.

The central component of an effective national technology policy system is robust government funding of scientific and engineering research. But in that respect, the United States is failing. If the federal government invested as much in R&D today as a share of GDP as it did in 1983, we would be investing over $65 billion more per year.11 Unfortunately, given budget and political constraints, the Trump administration and the forthcoming 115th Congress may find it difficult to significantly increase overall federal investment in science and technology. This despite the fact that doing so would be a wise investment, as economists estimate that a 1 percent increase in the U.S. R&D capital stock improves GDP by 0.13 percent.12 But regardless, one thing on which America should be able to achieve bipartisan consensus is the need to find ways to increase the return on investment from existing resources and programs.

What follows are 50 policy recommendations President Trump and Congress can enact to improve the economic impact of existing resources (with some modest additional investments). Many of these recommendations could be added to the COMPETES-related reauthorization legislation currently being considered in both the House and Senate. The recommendations are divided into five categories: strengthening innovation districts and regional technology clusters; launching or extending institutions supporting America’s innovation economy; facilitating technology transfer and commercialization activities; promoting the formation of high-growth firms; and stimulating private-sector innovation. These recommendations are the output of a joint research effort between the Brookings Institution and ITIF.

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https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/scientists.jpg?w=292The investments government and businesses make in basic and applied research and development (R&D) plant the seeds for the technologies, products, firms, and industries of tomorrow. They contribute substantially to the fact that at least one-half of America’s economic growth can be attributed to scientific and technological innovation.1 But the increased complexity of technological innovation as well as the growing strength of America’s economic competitors mean that it’s no longer enough to simply fund scientific and engineering research and hope it gets translated into commercial results.
Authors
Scott Andes
Senior Policy Analyst and Associate Fellow - Centennial Scholar Initiative, Anne T. and Robert M. Bass Initiative on Innovation and Placemaking Twitter scott_andes
Stephen Ezell
Vice President, Global Innovation Policy - The Information Technology and Innovation Foundation The U.S. government needs to expand federal support for research and, just as important, it needs to improve the efficiency of the process by which federally funded knowledge creation leads to U.S. innovation and jobs.2
This report provides 50 policy actions the Trump administration and Congress can take to bolster America’s technology transfer, commercialization, and innovation capacity, from the local to the national level. These recommendations include:
Strengthen innovation districts and regional technology clusters
- Prioritize innovation districts within federal R&D outlays - Task federal laboratories with a local economic development mission - Create off-campus “microlabs” to provide a front door to labs - Support technology clusters by assessing and managing local-level federal R&D investments - Assess federal real estate holdings and reallocate physical research assets to innovation districts - Allow labs to repurpose a small portion of existing funds for timely local collaboration - Standardize research partnership contracts within cities - Create NIH regional pre-competitive consortia to address national health concerns - Allow DOE labs to engage in non-federal funding partnerships that do not require DOE approval - Dismantle funding silos to support regional collaboration - Incentivize cross-purpose funding based on the economic strength of cities - Expand the national Regional Innovation Program - Support the innovation potential of rural areas - Facilitate regional makerspaces - Introduce an “Open Commercialization Infrastructure Act”
Bolster institutions supporting tech transfer, commercialization, and innovation
- Establish a core of 20 “manufacturing universities” - Complete the buildout of Manufacturing USA to 45 Institutes of Manufacturing Innovation (IMIs) - Create a National Engineering and Innovation Foundation - Create an Office of Innovation Review within the Office of Management and Budget - Create a network of acquisition-oriented DoD labs based in regional technology clusters - Establish manufacturing development facilities - Establish a foundation for the national energy laboratories
Expand technology transfer and commercialization-related programs and investments
- Increase the importance of commercialization activities at federal labs/research institutes - Allocate a share of federal funding to promote technology transfer and commercialization - Develop a proof-of-concept, or “Phase Zero,” individual and institutional grant award program within major federal research agencies - Fund pilot programs supporting experimental approaches to technology transfer and commercialization - Support university-based technology accelerators/incubators to commercialize faculty and student research - Allow a share of SBIR/STTR awards to be used for commercialization activities - Increase the allocation of federal agencies’ SBIR project budgets to commercialization activities - Modify the criteria and composition ... The investments government and businesses make in basic and applied research and development (R&D) plant the seeds for the technologies, products, firms, and industries of tomorrow. They contribute substantially to the fact that at least ... https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2016/12/06/trump-cant-deliver-on-his-coal-promises/Five charts that show why Trump can’t deliver on his coal promiseshttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/239426464/0/brookingsrss/topics/metropolitanareas~Five-charts-that-show-why-Trump-can%e2%80%99t-deliver-on-his-coal-promises/
Tue, 06 Dec 2016 17:11:59 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?p=345369

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President-elect Donald Trump has pledged to revive the coal industry and bring back coal mining jobs with fewer regulations and better trade deals. However, Trump’s vision of a revived coal industry that offers plentiful new jobs may remain just that: a vision.

However, Trump is ignoring the real reasons behind the industry’s struggles. In doing so, he is making unrealistic promises to revive a dying industry.

Since 2000, a series of market forces—the shale gas revolution, which has eroded coal’s price advantage; cost reductions in renewable energy technology; the overall flat demand in the power sector; shifts in global demand for coal; and declining coal mine labor productivity—have all contributed to coal’s decline, likely more so than government regulation.

Let’s look at each of these market forces in detail.

The decline in coal’s fortunes is largely a result of competition from cheap and abundant natural gas, which was freed in soaring volumes during the last decade due to technological advancements in horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing. The utility industry, motivated by profit and a desire to keep costs low, has been shifting significantly from coal to natural gas. In 2000, coal accounted for 51.7 percent of electricity generation, compared with just 15.8 percent for natural gas. By 2015, coal’s share had dropped to 33.2 percent, while natural gas rose to 32.7 percent of total generation. The Energy Information Administration predicted in March that natural gas’ share of the electricity market would surpass coal for the first time in 2016, a trend likely to pick up pace as long as natural gas prices remain low. To keep his promises of reviving the coal industry, Trump will have to figure out a way to increase the price of natural gas.

While cheap natural gas has inflicted the most damage on coal, renewable energy—including wind and solar—has also contributed to a shift away from coal in many parts of the United States. The cost to build a utility-scale solar photovoltaic plant has fallen by about 80 percent since 2009, while wind project costs have dropped by 60 percent. As a result, large solar and wind farms can compete in the power market even with low natural gas prices. The entry of renewable energy projects into the market is leading to a reduction in coal-fired generation in many places, including deep red states. For instance, Iowa and Kansas get 30 percent and 21 percent of their electricity from wind, respectively, and Texas has added more wind-based generating capacity than any other state. Many studies (see here and here) have noted that renewable energy development is poised to grow significantly, even in the event that the Clean Power Plan is not implemented. The levelized cost of electricity (LCOE)—or how much money it takes to produce one megawatt-hour (MWh) of electricity from a particular source—shows that wind and solar have become increasingly cost- competitive with coal, even on an unsubsidized basis.

Third, GDP growth and electricity consumption in the United States have become decoupled. Total electricity sales dropped 1.1 percent in 2015, marking the fifth decline in the previous eight years. A combination of factors—including significant uptake in energy efficiency investments, the growing popularity of rooftop solar, changing composition of the economy, and a slowdown in economic growth—account for declining rates of electricity demand growth. Given flattened demand, utility companies are forced to seek the lowest-cost sources of electricity to remain profitable in the face of sticky prices from unchanging demand. Because current LCOEs for non-coal sources are generally below the LCOE for coal, Trump would again have to increase prices for non-coal sources of electricity to bolster the coal industry.

Recent global shifts in coal demand do not suggest that coal’s strength lies outside U.S. borders, either. Coal exports fell for the third consecutive year in 2015, ending the year 23 million short tons (MMst) lower than in 2014 and more than 50 MMst less than the record volume exported in 2012. Some of this decrease is likely attributable to the slowdown in Chinese economic growth. The International Energy Agency forecasts that U.S. coal exports will continue to decline in the face of slowing Chinese consumption and cheap foreign competition. Greater demand from China and India, the two largest coal markets, is necessary to increase coal exports; all indications suggest that these countries will want to keep imports low for security and fiscal reasons. In short, there is little opportunity to boost the U.S. coal industry through exports.

Finally, U.S. coal industry productivity—a measure of the tons of coal that a mine produces per ­employee hour—has rapidly declined in the past decade, after peaking around 2000 in most coal-producing regions. Diminishing coal geology and a tendency to mine the cheapest and easiest-to-reach coal first have contributed to this trend. Declining productivity has led to increased costs and thinner profit margins for coal companies already facing headwinds from other market forces. Years of declining efficiency have reversed in the past three years, as miners have stabilized or even increased productivity at both surface and underground coal operations. However, this increase in productivity may be temporary, as production gains have likely come from closing of less-efficient mines, cost savings and lower capital expenditure rather than improved mining technology.

Together, these five long-running market forces help explain why the U.S. coal industry is in decline. Simple economics, not politics, will continue to drive the decline of the coal industry in the coming years. Reversing the trend will be next to impossible without pouring huge subsidies into the industry. Unfortunately, Trump’s unrealistic promises to save the coal industry detract from any serious conversation the nation should be having on what to do about coal workers losing their jobs and how to help them transition to new jobs in the advanced economy.

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https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/metro_20161205_coal_mine.jpg?w=274President-elect Donald Trump has pledged to revive the coal industry and bring back coal mining jobs with fewer regulations and better trade deals. However, Trump’s vision of a revived coal industry that offers plentiful new jobs may remain just that: a vision.
No one can deny the problems in the coal industry that Trump claims he will address. Coal production has plummeted to levels not seen since the early 1980s. The average number of employees at coal mines has decreased 12 percent to 66,000 employees, the fewest since 1978. And, the industry has been plagued by a series of bankruptcies.
However, Trump is ignoring the real reasons behind the industry’s struggles. In doing so, he is making unrealistic promises to revive a dying industry.
Since 2000, a series of market forces—the shale gas revolution, which has eroded coal’s price advantage; cost reductions in renewable energy technology; the overall flat demand in the power sector; shifts in global demand for coal; and declining coal mine labor productivity—have all contributed to coal’s decline, likely more so than government regulation.
Let’s look at each of these market forces in detail.
The decline in coal’s fortunes is largely a result of competition from cheap and abundant natural gas, which was freed in soaring volumes during the last decade due to technological advancements in horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing. The utility industry, motivated by profit and a desire to keep costs low, has been shifting significantly from coal to natural gas. In 2000, coal accounted for 51.7 percent of electricity generation, compared with just 15.8 percent for natural gas. By 2015, coal’s share had dropped to 33.2 percent, while natural gas rose to 32.7 percent of total generation. The Energy Information Administration predicted in March that natural gas’ share of the electricity market would surpass coal for the first time in 2016, a trend likely to pick up pace as long as natural gas prices remain low. To keep his promises of reviving the coal industry, Trump will have to figure out a way to increase the price of natural gas.
While cheap natural gas has inflicted the most damage on coal, renewable energy—including wind and solar—has also contributed to a shift away from coal in many parts of the United States. The cost to build a utility-scale solar photovoltaic plant has fallen by about 80 percent since 2009, while wind project costs have dropped by 60 percent. As a result, large solar and wind farms can compete in the power market even with low natural gas prices. The entry of renewable energy projects into the market is leading to a reduction in coal-fired generation in many places, including deep red states. For instance, Iowa and Kansas get 30 percent and 21 percent of their electricity from wind, respectively, and Texas has added more wind-based generating capacity than any other state. Many studies (see here and here) have noted that renewable energy development is poised to grow significantly, even in the event that the Clean Power Plan is not implemented. The levelized cost of electricity (LCOE)—or how much money it takes to produce one megawatt-hour (MWh) of electricity from a particular source—shows that wind and solar have become increasingly cost- competitive with coal, even on an unsubsidized basis.
Third, GDP growth and electricity consumption in the United States have become decoupled. Total electricity sales dropped 1.1 percent in 2015, marking the fifth decline in the previous eight years. A combination of factors—including significant uptake in energy efficiency investments, the growing popularity of rooftop solar, changing composition of the economy, and a slowdown in economic growth—account for declining rates of electricity demand growth. Given flattened demand, utility companies are forced to seek the ... President-elect Donald Trump has pledged to revive the coal industry and bring back coal mining jobs with fewer regulations and better trade deals. However, Trump’s vision of a revived coal industry that offers plentiful new jobs may remain ... https://www.brookings.edu/research/americas-male-employment-crisis-is-both-urban-and-rural/America’s male employment crisis is both urban and ruralhttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/239010098/0/brookingsrss/topics/metropolitanareas~America%e2%80%99s-male-employment-crisis-is-both-urban-and-rural/
Mon, 05 Dec 2016 22:00:32 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?post_type=research&p=345267

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In the wake of the 2016 presidential election, many analysts have interpreted Donald Trump’s victory as the product of economic anxiety among the white working class—particularly in the smaller towns and rural areas that provided his electoral margin in closely contested states like North Carolina, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.

Central to these discussions is the availability of work in such communities, particularly for men who have borne the brunt of manufacturing job losses. Research from President Obama’s Council of Economic Advisers highlighted the trends and factors underlying the decline in labor force participation among prime-aged men (ages 25–54). Earlier this year, I examined the metropolitan geography of non-working, prime-aged men, finding that smaller industrial centers in Michigan, Indiana, and Ohio exhibited low rates of male employment, as did mining centers in West Virginia and Louisiana, and agricultural centers in Arkansas, Texas, and inland California.

While the focus on metropolitan areas illustrates important regional patterns relating to economic function and migration, it may obscure important differences in employment within metro areas, while also overlooking the non-metropolitan communities on which economists have focused increasing attention. By examining the full range of U.S. community types, this analysis shows that cities and smaller communities ultimately have a shared interest in improving access to employment opportunities for prime-aged workers.

To illustrate conditions and trends in work across the urban-rural continuum, I examined U.S. Census data for cities and counties according to a novel Brookings Metro classification system1:

139 primary cities anchor the nation’s 100 largest metropolitan areas; they include the largest city in each of those metro areas, along with other cities in the metro name with populations of at least 100,000 (e.g., all three cities named in the Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim metropolitan area).

81 high-density suburban counties surround or abut many of these cities; at least 95 percent of residents in these counties live in a census-defined “urbanized area” that forms the dense core of the metropolitan area; these are often referred to as “older” or “first” suburbs (e.g., Alameda, CA; New Haven, CT; Fulton, GA).

157 mature suburban counties represent the next era of metropolitan development, where today 75–95 percent of residents live in an urbanized area (e.g., Kendall, IL; Howard, MD; Collin, TX).

344 emerging suburban and exurban counties lie at the fringe of major metro areas, where fewer than 75 percent of residents live in urbanized areas (e.g., Fauquier, VA; Aiken, SC; St. Croix, WI).

1,318 rural counties form the rest of the U.S. map, from Aroostook in northern Maine (population 72,000) to Golden Valley in central Montana (population 880).

Figure 1.

Classifying the United States in this way reveals that primary cities, high-density and mature suburbs, and small metro area counties contain roughly similar numbers of residents (Figure 1). The less urbanized parts of the country contain smaller numbers of people, with rural areas accounting for the smallest share (just 6 percent of total U.S. population).

This view of the urban-rural continuum also points to three key findings regarding the geography of work (and non-work) among prime-aged men in the United States.

Rates of work among prime-aged men are below average in both cities and smaller, less urbanized communities. The latest available data, which reflect conditions between 2010 and 2014, indicate that slightly over 80 percent of all prime-aged men nationwide were working during that time.2 Prevailing rates were lower, however, in both large cities and smaller, less urban communities (Figure 2). In big cities and smaller metro areas, 79 percent of prime-aged men were employed during those years. The shares dropped to 75 and 72 percent, respectively, in micropolitan and rural areas.

Figure 2.

Even among these smaller places, rates of employment among prime-aged men varied across the United States. States beyond just the Rust Belt and Appalachia exhibited low rates of work in their micropolitan and rural areas. In fact, among states with at least 50,000 residents in these types of communities, rates were lowest in Florida, Arizona, and California (Figure 3). In non-metropolitan Louisiana, South Carolina, and Georgia, too, less than two-thirds of prime-aged men were employed in the 2010–2014 period. While Kentucky and West Virginia also exhibited employment rates below 70 percent in their smaller areas, these statistics indicate that even many states with racially and ethnically diverse rural areas suffer employment challenges in such communities.

Low rates of work among prime-aged men also affect many big cities with diverse populations. Among the 139 primary cities, 18 exhibited employment rates below 70 percent for these men from 2010–2014. Interestingly, Rust Belt cities—including three in Ohio and one each in Michigan and Pennsylvania—figure most prominently among those with very low prime-aged male employment rates. Other racially segregated cities in the Northeast (Hartford, Newark, Rochester, Springfield, and Syracuse) exhibit similarly low rates of work among these men.

Figure 3.

Many non-metro communities and cities share low rates of work

Micropolitan/rural areas in state

Prime-aged male employment rate (2000 to 2010-14)

Primary city

Prime-aged male employment rate (2000 to 2010-14)

Florida

57.2

Youngstown, Ohio

47.6

Arizona

58.1

Detroit, Mich.

51.1

California

64.5

Dayton, Ohio

61.1

Louisiana

65.5

Cleveland, Ohio

62.5

South Carolina

65.8

Hartford, Conn.

62.6

Georgia

66.5

Harrisburg, Pa.

65.6

Kentucky

66.9

Syracuse, N.Y..

66.0

Mississippi

69.2

Newark, N.J.

66.1

West Virginia

69.3

Springfield, Mass.

66.5

Virginia

69.9

Rochester, N.Y.

67.1

All micropolitan/rural areas

73.8

All primary cities

79.3

Source: Brookings analysis of 2010-14 American Community Survey dataNote: States displayed had at least 50,000 micropolitan/rural residents in 2010-14

Employment rates among men fell dramatically in smaller communities, but rose in cities. Considerably lower rates of work among prime-aged men in micropolitan and rural areas reflect a long-term decline in their employment. From 2000 to 2010–2014, the share of males ages 25–54 who were employed dropped by 4.8 percentage points in micropolitan counties, and by 5.4 percentage points in rural counties (Figure 4). By contrast, employment among this group in cities rose by 2 percentage points during that time and fell only modestly in high-density suburbs. This suggests that a community’s level of urbanization was closely related to its employment outcomes for prime-aged male workers.

Figure 4.

While industrial Midwestern states did not have particularly low non-metro male employment rates in 2010–2014, many saw those rates fall significantly since 2000. Southern states—including South Carolina, Georgia, and Tennessee—suffered the most dramatic declines, but Michigan, Indiana, and Pennsylvania also registered drops of 6–8 percentage points in the share of their micropolitan and rural prime-aged males in work (Figure 5).

Many cities saw equivalent gains in employment rates among this group, including the largest (New York), second-largest (Los Angeles), and fourth-largest (Houston) cities in the country. Some of the changes in non-metro areas and cities may be attributable to changes in the strength of local economies and their demand for workers. At the same time, the changes may also reflect shifts in the underlying populations of those areas over time, as small communities lose more employable residents to out-migration and big cities gain them through in-migration. Notwithstanding those widespread gains, older industrial cities like Akron, Allentown, Augusta, Detroit, Syracuse, and Tacoma experienced declines in prime-aged male employment similar to those occurring in rural areas nationwide.

Figure 5.

Male employment fell dramatically in many states’ non-metro areas, while it rose dramatically in several big cities

Micropolitan/rural areas in state

Change in prime-aged male employment rate (2000 to 2010-14)

Primary city

Change in prime-aged male employment rate (2000 to 2010-14)

South Carolina

-9.4

Miami, Fla.

12.5

Georgia

-8.9

Jersey City, N.J.

10.0

Tennessee

-8.1

Newark, N.J.

10.0

Michigan

-7.7

Los Angeles, Calif.

8.2

Missouri

-7.7

McAllen, Texas

7.8

Florida

-7.6

Houston, Texas

7.1

North Carolina

-7.2

Ontario, Calif.

7.0

Oregon

-7.1

Oakland, Calif.

6.9

Indiana

-6.5

Oxnard, Calif.

6.5

Pennsylvania

-6.4

New York, N.Y.

6.3

All micropolitan/rural areas

-5.1

All primary cities

2.0

Source: Brookings analysis of 2000 census and 2010-14 American Community Survey dataNote: States displayed had at least 50,000 micropolitan/rural residents in 2010-14

Big cities remain home to more out-of-work prime-aged men than other types of communities. As shown in Figure 2, prime-aged men in cities exhibited below-average employment rates in 2010–2014, as did those in small metro areas, micropolitan areas, and rural communities. This finding—combined with the fact that primary cities are the most populous of the seven community types analyzed here (see Figure 1)—shows that cities contain a larger number of out-of-work prime-aged men than any other community type (see Figure 6). An estimated 2.9 million non-working males ages 25–54 lived in big cities in 2010–2014. The next-largest group occupied small metro areas, followed by high-density and mature suburbs. If micropolitan and rural areas are considered together, they still contained fewer out-of-work prime-aged men than either primary cities or small metro areas.

Figure 6.

This analysis points to two key takeaways.

First, for as much as the 2016 election pitted urban versus rural interests (reflected in maps of the presidential vote), these places share an important interest in improving the availability and quality of jobs. In the wake of the election, analysis has focused on the white working class and how to alleviate the economic distress facing the smaller communities in which many of those individuals live. But just a year and a half ago, the conversation focused on urban places like Baltimore and Ferguson, where tensions between communities of color and law enforcement exposed longstanding economic frustrations. Addressing the employment challenges faced by both types of communities will take serious, long-term commitment and public policy focus untethered from the news cycle.

Second, while jobs are certainly a shared priority for cities and rural areas, their divergent trend lines in employment opportunity merit reflection. The past 10–15 years have strengthened the economic hand of many cities, as coming-of-age generations seek a more urban lifestyle, and as an increasingly services-focused U.S. economy concentrates in places with greater access to highly skilled labor, innovative institutions, and strong global connectivity. These dynamics, in turn, have raised demand for workers in such places, even for those with lower levels of formal skills, drawing them into jobs at increased rates.

Those same dynamics have simultaneously disadvantaged many small towns and rural areas. If what economists call “agglomeration” is increasingly the route to employment opportunity, can small places succeed? As my colleague Mark Muro has argued convincingly, manufacturing jobs aren’t coming back to those communities to a degree anywhere close to the number that have departed. Part of the answer may lie in strengthening connections between larger and smaller places through infrastructure investment and shared economic development strategies. Such efforts could unite economic leaders in cities and their surrounding rural areas in older industrial states, if state lawmakers choose not to pit those interests against one another. Yet if recent trends hold, efforts to bring jobs back to small-town America seem likely to face an uphill battle against market forces that have put jobs further out of reach for many of their residents.

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https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/dtmhxoula-q-olia-gozha-e1480974982451.jpg?w=271In the wake of the 2016 presidential election, many analysts have interpreted Donald Trump’s victory as the product of economic anxiety among the white working class—particularly in the smaller towns and rural areas that provided his electoral margin in closely contested states like North Carolina, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.
This piece does not purport to explain why people voted the way they did, or what role economic factors played in their decisions. Rather, it acknowledges that the state of the economy in small-town and rural America highlighted throughout the campaign and after the election surely deserves attention. Economists such as David Autor have chronicled how increasing Chinese imports over the past two decades produced long-term economic dislocation in many of these communities. Anne Case and Angus Deaton uncovered alarming evidence that mortality rates have risen among white Americans with lower levels of education, paralleling a rapid increase in drug overdoses largely concentrated in non-urban areas.
Central to these discussions is the availability of work in such communities, particularly for men who have borne the brunt of manufacturing job losses. Research from President Obama’s Council of Economic Advisers highlighted the trends and factors underlying the decline in labor force participation among prime-aged men (ages 25–54). Earlier this year, I examined the metropolitan geography of non-working, prime-aged men, finding that smaller industrial centers in Michigan, Indiana, and Ohio exhibited low rates of male employment, as did mining centers in West Virginia and Louisiana, and agricultural centers in Arkansas, Texas, and inland California.
While the focus on metropolitan areas illustrates important regional patterns relating to economic function and migration, it may obscure important differences in employment within metro areas, while also overlooking the non-metropolitan communities on which economists have focused increasing attention. By examining the full range of U.S. community types, this analysis shows that cities and smaller communities ultimately have a shared interest in improving access to employment opportunities for prime-aged workers.
To illustrate conditions and trends in work across the urban-rural continuum, I examined U.S. Census data for cities and counties according to a novel Brookings Metro classification system1:
- 139 primary cities anchor the nation’s 100 largest metropolitan areas; they include the largest city in each of those metro areas, along with other cities in the metro name with populations of at least 100,000 (e.g., all three cities named in the Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim metropolitan area). - 81 high-density suburban counties surround or abut many of these cities; at least 95 percent of residents in these counties live in a census-defined “urbanized area” that forms the dense core of the metropolitan area; these are often referred to as “older” or “first” suburbs (e.g., Alameda, CA; New Haven, CT; Fulton, GA). - 157 mature suburban counties represent the next era of metropolitan development, where today 75–95 percent of residents live in an urbanized area (e.g., Kendall, IL; Howard, MD; Collin, TX). - 344 emerging suburban and exurban counties lie at the fringe of major metro areas, where fewer than 75 percent of residents live in urbanized areas (e.g., Fauquier, VA; Aiken, SC; St. Croix, WI). - 567 small metropolitan counties comprise metropolitan areas outside the 100 largest (e.g., Muskegon, MI; St. Lucie, FL; Pueblo, CO). - 658 micropolitan counties are part of census-defined micropolitan areas centered on smaller cities and towns with populations between 10,000 and 50,000 people (e.g., Twin Falls, ID; Clinton, NY [Plattsburgh]; Dare, NC [Kill Devil Hills]). - 1,318 rural counties form the rest of the U.S. map, from Aroostook in northern Maine (population ... In the wake of the 2016 presidential election, many analysts have interpreted Donald Trump’s victory as the product of economic anxiety among the white working class—particularly in the smaller towns and rural areas that provided his ... https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2016/12/05/redefining-the-art-of-the-deal/Redefining the Art of the Dealhttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/239000374/0/brookingsrss/topics/metropolitanareas~Redefining-the-Art-of-the-Deal/
Mon, 05 Dec 2016 21:39:43 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?p=345333

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Donald Trump’s dramatic move to save 800 jobs at Carrier has attracted praise from supporters who see the president-elect as a man of his word. It has also drawn criticism from experts who view the one-off deal as a political stunt and a dangerous precedent that doesn’t alter the underlying conditions of the economy.

To be clear: fornumerousreasons, Trump’s negotiations with Carrier are troubling and do not reflect sound economic policy. Yet we know that Trump’s proclivity for deal-making will persist. His professional experience is a series of transactions that have resulted in tall buildings, private golf clubs, and casinos. And members of his incoming cabinet, as well as leading Republicans in Congress, have signaled their support for this kind of intervention to achieve concrete results for the American people.

The question is: how can Trump’s instincts be adapted to benefit the largest share of people in an open and accountable manner?

Corporate retention subsidies are doled out every day in state and local economic development; it’s the president-elect’s direct intervention, and the power of his office, that makes this transaction news. On its face, the Carrier deal is pretty typical, saving 800 jobs for an unspecified period of time using a modest state subsidy that the corporation didn’t need to be competitive. I’ve written often about how such short-term, isolated, and subsidy-driven transactions to grow jobs and the economy are inefficient and can be better deployed.

Though job subsidies, and the headlines they attract, remain difficult to resist, many metropolitan leaders across the country are shifting from a transactional to a more systemic approach to economic development – one that can deliver better results for residents over the long-term.

Larger federal reforms are certainly needed to grow more good jobs in the American economy, but here are a few ways our new ribbon-cutter-in-chief could carry out future place-based interventions in a more sustainable, scaled manner:

Formally partner with local communities to identify good “deals.” Many local communities or regions have signature efforts to grow good jobs and connect workers and families to them. Rather than negotiate solely with companies or react top-down to project opportunities, the Trump administration could organize a formal effort to surface bottom-up efforts from communities that meet a high bar for improving people’s lives and could benefit most from federal action. For instance, a new White House Interagency Council on Community Action could focus on how existing federal resources can be better deployed to support key community solutions.

Expand the definition of a deal to include a wider array of transformative community projects. Large firm relocation and retention deals need not be President-elect Trump’s only opportunities for photo-ops and celebratory tweets. Instead, Trump’s administration could emphasize transformational community programs and initiatives, such as large-scale neighborhood redevelopments, industry-community college training collaborations, or initiatives to scale up small- and mid-sized firms.

Support industries, not individual firms. Every region in the country is dependent upon specialized industries to drive growth and opportunity. Some states, such as Colorado and Nevada, have programs that support the growth of such clusters, many of which span urban and rural areas. The Trump administration should work with local communities or regional industry consortia to determine how federal policies and programs can accelerate, not hinder, the growth and competitiveness of entire industries, rather than just one large anchor firm.

The wisdom of the Carrier deal aside, it’s worth acknowledging that Trump’s demonstrated commitment to results and getting things done is also what motivates mayors and other local leaders. Public policy should be geared towards producing tangible benefits for people. But in the realm of transactional deals, lessons learned by leaders across America’s metropolitan areas can help guide the next administration toward a broader, more effective effort to create greater prosperity in communities.

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Donald Trump’s dramatic move to save 800 jobs at Carrier has attracted praise from supporters who see the president-elect as a man of his word. It has also drawn criticism from experts who view the one-off deal as a political stunt and a dangerous precedent that doesn’t alter the underlying conditions of the economy.
To be clear: for numerous reasons, Trump’s negotiations with Carrier are troubling and do not reflect sound economic policy. Yet we know that Trump’s proclivity for deal-making will persist. His professional experience is a series of transactions that have resulted in tall buildings, private golf clubs, and casinos. And members of his incoming cabinet, as well as leading Republicans in Congress, have signaled their support for this kind of intervention to achieve concrete results for the American people.
The question is: how can Trump’s instincts be adapted to benefit the largest share of people in an open and accountable manner?
Corporate retention subsidies are doled out every day in state and local economic development; it’s the president-elect’s direct intervention, and the power of his office, that makes this transaction news. On its face, the Carrier deal is pretty typical, saving 800 jobs for an unspecified period of time using a modest state subsidy that the corporation didn’t need to be competitive. I’ve written often about how such short-term, isolated, and subsidy-driven transactions to grow jobs and the economy are inefficient and can be better deployed.
Though job subsidies, and the headlines they attract, remain difficult to resist, many metropolitan leaders across the country are shifting from a transactional to a more systemic approach to economic development – one that can deliver better results for residents over the long-term.
Larger federal reforms are certainly needed to grow more good jobs in the American economy, but here are a few ways our new ribbon-cutter-in-chief could carry out future place-based interventions in a more sustainable, scaled manner:
- Formally partner with local communities to identify good “deals.” Many local communities or regions have signature efforts to grow good jobs and connect workers and families to them. Rather than negotiate solely with companies or react top-down to project opportunities, the Trump administration could organize a formal effort to surface bottom-up efforts from communities that meet a high bar for improving people’s lives and could benefit most from federal action. For instance, a new White House Interagency Council on Community Action could focus on how existing federal resources can be better deployed to support key community solutions. - Expand the definition of a deal to include a wider array of transformative community projects. Large firm relocation and retention deals need not be President-elect Trump’s only opportunities for photo-ops and celebratory tweets. Instead, Trump’s administration could emphasize transformational community programs and initiatives, such as large-scale neighborhood redevelopments, industry-community college training collaborations, or initiatives to scale up small- and mid-sized firms. - Support industries, not individual firms. Every region in the country is dependent upon specialized industries to drive growth and opportunity. Some states, such as Colorado and Nevada, have programs that support the growth of such clusters, many of which span urban and rural areas. The Trump administration should work with local communities or regional industry consortia to determine how federal policies and programs can accelerate, not hinder, the growth and competitiveness of entire industries, rather than just one large anchor firm.
The wisdom of the Carrier deal aside, it’s worth acknowledging that Trump’s demonstrated commitment to results and getting things done is also what motivates ... Donald Trump’s dramatic move to save 800 jobs at Carrier has attracted praise from supporters who see the president-elect as a man of his word. It has also drawn criticism from experts who view the one-off deal as a political stunt and a ... https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2016/12/02/my-conversation-with-two-mayors-about-trump-and-cities/My conversation with two mayors about Trump and citieshttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/237457896/0/brookingsrss/topics/metropolitanareas~My-conversation-with-two-mayors-about-Trump-and-cities/
Fri, 02 Dec 2016 21:12:35 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?p=345042

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Mayors, grounded as they are in the day-to-day workings of the cities they lead, often bring a unique – and refreshingly pragmatic – perspective to national political debates. My recent conversation with two former mayors was no exception. Scott Smith, a Republican from Mesa, Arizona, and Michael Nutter, a Democrat from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and I had a far-reaching discussion that touched on some key policy priorities of the next administration, including immigration, trade, and infrastructure, and explored how a federal-local partnership might be improved in the years to come. While our full conversation can be heard on the Brookings Intersections podcast, here are a few statements the two mayors made that stood out:

On Immigration

Mayor Scott Smith: “I think, and this is both the challenge and the reality of the debate on immigration, if Donald Trump or anybody says I’m going to deport X-number of criminals — and when I say “criminals” I mean people who have served prison time — you will get broad-based support on both sides of the aisle, even among Latinos. Nobody who has a criminal record and is here illegally should stay here. Deport them. But if you say ‘I’m going to go out and deport illegals,’ once again, both sides of the aisle, a majority of Republicans in Maricopa County would say, no, you’ve gone too far. So we’re more than mincing words here.”

Mayor Michael Nutter: “What we need is a rational, reformed immigration policy for all 50 states and territories that offers a pathway to citizenship. Folks came here for a particular reason, mostly to become citizens. They work hard, take care of their families, start businesses, employ others in some instances, and are not the problem.”

On Trade and Economic Growth

Mayor Scott Smith: “As a mayor your greatest wish is for safety and prosperity, and there’s no way you obtain prosperity without trade. Whether you like it or not, we’re in an interdependent world economy.”

Mayor Michael Nutter: “We just have to help people reorient themselves. There are a whole bunch of jobs in the United States of America that are unfilled today because the people that we need to fill those jobs don’t necessarily have the skill sets for them. So we still have this mismatch between available jobs and skill sets. We have to have a massive campaign to help people understand you can take some of the skills you have with additional training and get a really good manufacturing job.”

On Infrastructure

Mayor Michael Nutter: “The next big step for the federal government is to adopt, like every other government in the United States of America, a full capital plan that is five or six years in length. You can’t make long-term plans on short-term money.”

Mayor Scott Smith: “Historically, we looked at infrastructure as a generational investment, a way to a better future, a way to create long-term economic opportunity. Somehow it morphed into a debate over short-term stimulus.”

On the federal-local partnership

Mayor Scott Smith: “If we look for more opportunities to let the cities and local communities decide how best to allocate resources, and challenge them to leverage those resources, you’ll find… cooperation will increase and trust will go up. Trust goes up when there’s success. When people can touch and feel and experience success from government, they soon trust government. Let’s redefine and expand upon that partnership which empowers communities because it’s worked. It’s proven that it works.”

Mayor Michael Nutter: “We need a new partnership between and among cities, metro areas, the federal government, and other political leaders. Two days a year we can be as political as we want, but the other 363, it really should be about getting stuff done, making things happen.”

On how America can move forward after a divisive election

Mayor Michael Nutter: “Could we, as electeds, remember why we came into this business in the first place and what are we trying to get done? We’re trying to improve the lives of people: I think that’s what most electeds want to do. A lot of the partisanship, the debates back and forth, the great oratories at 2 a.m. in the morning — I mean, that’s not doing anything. No kid is going to read as a result of that. No road is going to get paved. No bridge is going to get built. So I think we’ve got to get back to business.”

Mayor Scott Smith: “I didn’t vote for Barack Obama, but he was my president and I wanted him – I needed him to succeed. Donald Trump is everyone’s president. We need him to succeed. Yes, a lot of the burden is on him because, in many ways, he’s poisoned the well, and he has a lot of work to be done to try and undo that. But it can be done. America has had a lot of crazy characters in office. We’ve had more than a few scoundrels as president and somehow we have not only survived, we’ve thrived. So I’m pretty confident we’ll make it through this time, too.”

These mayors hailed from two counties that strongly supported opposing candidates for president. But their post-election reflections demonstrate how ugly campaign politics and rhetoric can – and must – give way to commonsense policies and partnerships in governing. Rather than threaten cities over immigration policy, the next administration must recognize that its ambitious domestic agenda requires an effective partnership with local leaders who share their desire to deliver better opportunities for Americans.

The Hon. Michael Nutter is the former Mayor of Philadelphia and is a Professor of Professional Practice for Urban and Public Affairs at Columbia University. The Hon. Scott Smith is the former Mayor of Mesa, Arizona and former President of the U.S. Conference of Mayors. Both are also Nonresident Senior Fellows at the Brookings Institution Metropolitan Policy Program.

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Mayors, grounded as they are in the day-to-day workings of the cities they lead, often bring a unique – and refreshingly pragmatic – perspective to national political debates. My recent conversation with two former mayors was no exception. Scott Smith, a Republican from Mesa, Arizona, and Michael Nutter, a Democrat from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and I had a far-reaching discussion that touched on some key policy priorities of the next administration, including immigration, trade, and infrastructure, and explored how a federal-local partnership might be improved in the years to come. While our full conversation can be heard on the Brookings Intersections podcast, here are a few statements the two mayors made that stood out:
On Immigration
Mayor Scott Smith: “I think, and this is both the challenge and the reality of the debate on immigration, if Donald Trump or anybody says I’m going to deport X-number of criminals — and when I say “criminals” I mean people who have served prison time — you will get broad-based support on both sides of the aisle, even among Latinos. Nobody who has a criminal record and is here illegally should stay here. Deport them. But if you say ‘I’m going to go out and deport illegals,’ once again, both sides of the aisle, a majority of Republicans in Maricopa County would say, no, you’ve gone too far. So we’re more than mincing words here.”
Mayor Michael Nutter: “What we need is a rational, reformed immigration policy for all 50 states and territories that offers a pathway to citizenship. Folks came here for a particular reason, mostly to become citizens. They work hard, take care of their families, start businesses, employ others in some instances, and are not the problem.”
On Trade and Economic Growth
Mayor Scott Smith: “As a mayor your greatest wish is for safety and prosperity, and there’s no way you obtain prosperity without trade. Whether you like it or not, we’re in an interdependent world economy.”
Mayor Michael Nutter: “We just have to help people reorient themselves. There are a whole bunch of jobs in the United States of America that are unfilled today because the people that we need to fill those jobs don’t necessarily have the skill sets for them. So we still have this mismatch between available jobs and skill sets. We have to have a massive campaign to help people understand you can take some of the skills you have with additional training and get a really good manufacturing job.”
On Infrastructure
Mayor Michael Nutter: “The next big step for the federal government is to adopt, like every other government in the United States of America, a full capital plan that is five or six years in length. You can’t make long-term plans on short-term money.”
Mayor Scott Smith: “Historically, we looked at infrastructure as a generational investment, a way to a better future, a way to create long-term economic opportunity. Somehow it morphed into a debate over short-term stimulus.”
On the federal-local partnership
Mayor Scott Smith: “If we look for more opportunities to let the cities and local communities decide how best to allocate resources, and challenge them to leverage those resources, you’ll find… cooperation will increase and trust will go up. Trust goes up when there’s success. When people can touch and feel and experience success from government, they soon trust government. Let’s redefine and expand upon that partnership which empowers communities because it’s worked. It’s proven that it works.”
Mayor Michael Nutter: “We need a new partnership between and among cities, metro areas, the federal government, and other political leaders. Two days a year we can be as political ...
Mayors, grounded as they are in the day-to-day workings of the cities they lead, often bring a unique – and refreshingly pragmatic – perspective to national political debates. My recent conversation with two former mayors was no ... https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2016/11/30/5g-technologies-will-power-a-greener-future-for-cities/5G technologies will power a greener future for citieshttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/236346670/0/brookingsrss/topics/metropolitanareas~G-technologies-will-power-a-greener-future-for-cities/
Wed, 30 Nov 2016 19:13:48 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?p=344622

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Once launched, fifth generation (5G) wireless technologies promise to connect billions of devices together in the internet of the things. 5G combines wireless technologies like 4G and Wi-Fi with new computing methods such as network functions virtualization and software defined networking to dramatically speed up communications in large networks of digital devices. In a new paper, Darrell West outlines the ways in which cities can apply these technologies to use scarce natural resources more efficiently. Water availability, air quality, and energy efficiency can each be improved by a network of sensors and computers analyzing real-time data. Reducing waste with 5G technologies will reap benefits from cost savings to better public health.

Resource shortages pose a particularly vexing problem for cities that fail to address them. Poor water and air quality pose an immediate threat to public health in some cities, while a continued reliance on fossil fuel energy contributes to rising temperatures worldwide. For water, wirelessly connected sensors can detect contamination and identify ways to reduce waste. The Environmental Protection Agency estimates that water leaks in U.S. households waste 1 trillion gallons of water every year, enough to fill 1.5 million Olympic-sized swimming pools. Sensors would also allow for more precise use of water in agriculture and industrial applications. Agriculture alone accounts for 80 percent of water demand in the U.S., representing substantial water savings potential.

5G technologies can address air quality and energy consumption by creating smarter transportation management systems. Traffic congestion in cities carries tremendous costs in terms of wasted fuel and wasted time. Drivers in Washington D.C. averaged 82 hours spent stuck in traffic each year, while drivers in China and India face even greater amounts of time burning fuel but going nowhere. The World Health Organization estimates that fine particulate air pollution from idling car exhaust and other sources kills over 3 million people worldwide each year. Using cameras and sensors to create dynamic traffic control systems instead of relying on fixed traffic light cycles can reduce energy consumption, wasted time, and mortality.

Besides transportation, buildings also use large quantities of energy for lighting, heating, cooling, and other operations, accounting for as much as 42 percent of global energy consumption. More efficient building design would reduce the amount of energy needed to maintain comfortable temperatures throughout the year. Dynamic systems can also adjust temperature and lighting to changes in occupancy, expending energy only when it benefits a building’s residents. Smart electricity meters would also provide residents with detailed information on consumption patterns and recommend ways to cut costs. Meters installed in the Empire State Building measure energy use for each of 100 tenants, and slashed energy costs by 38 percent, saving $4.4 million each year.

To help cities fully realize the gains from efficient resource management, West makes several recommendations. City agencies should join together to buy 5G technologies at high volumes and low costs. The combined purchasing power of cities also allows them to push for greater interoperability and innovation. To pave the way for the rollout of 5G, governments must allocate enough wireless spectrum to satisfy the demand of new technologies, and develop international standards for which frequencies will carry 5G signals. Most importantly, the integration with critical infrastructure means that these technologies must be secured against hackers. By taking these intermediate steps, cities can use 5G technologies to improve their environmental quality, save energy, and cut costs at the same time.

Related Books

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https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/traffic_management.jpg?w=286Once launched, fifth generation (5G) wireless technologies promise to connect billions of devices together in the internet of the things. 5G combines wireless technologies like 4G and Wi-Fi with new computing methods such as network functions virtualization and software defined networking to dramatically speed up communications in large networks of digital devices. In a new paper, Darrell West outlines the ways in which cities can apply these technologies to use scarce natural resources more efficiently. Water availability, air quality, and energy efficiency can each be improved by a network of sensors and computers analyzing real-time data. Reducing waste with 5G technologies will reap benefits from cost savings to better public health.
Resource shortages pose a particularly vexing problem for cities that fail to address them. Poor water and air quality pose an immediate threat to public health in some cities, while a continued reliance on fossil fuel energy contributes to rising temperatures worldwide. For water, wirelessly connected sensors can detect contamination and identify ways to reduce waste. The Environmental Protection Agency estimates that water leaks in U.S. households waste 1 trillion gallons of water every year, enough to fill 1.5 million Olympic-sized swimming pools. Sensors would also allow for more precise use of water in agriculture and industrial applications. Agriculture alone accounts for 80 percent of water demand in the U.S., representing substantial water savings potential.
5G technologies can address air quality and energy consumption by creating smarter transportation management systems. Traffic congestion in cities carries tremendous costs in terms of wasted fuel and wasted time. Drivers in Washington D.C. averaged 82 hours spent stuck in traffic each year, while drivers in China and India face even greater amounts of time burning fuel but going nowhere. The World Health Organization estimates that fine particulate air pollution from idling car exhaust and other sources kills over 3 million people worldwide each year. Using cameras and sensors to create dynamic traffic control systems instead of relying on fixed traffic light cycles can reduce energy consumption, wasted time, and mortality.
Besides transportation, buildings also use large quantities of energy for lighting, heating, cooling, and other operations, accounting for as much as 42 percent of global energy consumption. More efficient building design would reduce the amount of energy needed to maintain comfortable temperatures throughout the year. Dynamic systems can also adjust temperature and lighting to changes in occupancy, expending energy only when it benefits a building’s residents. Smart electricity meters would also provide residents with detailed information on consumption patterns and recommend ways to cut costs. Meters installed in the Empire State Building measure energy use for each of 100 tenants, and slashed energy costs by 38 percent, saving $4.4 million each year.
To help cities fully realize the gains from efficient resource management, West makes several recommendations. City agencies should join together to buy 5G technologies at high volumes and low costs. The combined purchasing power of cities also allows them to push for greater interoperability and innovation. To pave the way for the rollout of 5G, governments must allocate enough wireless spectrum to satisfy the demand of new technologies, and develop international standards for which frequencies will carry 5G signals. Most importantly, the integration with critical infrastructure means that these technologies must be secured against hackers. By taking these intermediate steps, cities can use 5G technologies to improve their environmental quality, save energy, and cut costs at the same time.
Read the entire paper, titled “Achieving sustainability in a 5G world”, here.
Related Books
- Upcoming
The Public Wealth of Cities ... Once launched, fifth generation (5G) wireless technologies promise to connect billions of devices together in the internet of the things. 5G combines wireless technologies like 4G and Wi-Fi with new computing methods such as network functions ... https://www.brookings.edu/podcast-episode/priorities-for-the-trump-administration-mayors-speak-on-trade-immigration-and-economic-opportunity/Priorities for the Trump administration: Mayors speak on trade, immigration, and economic opportunityhttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/236346530/0/brookingsrss/topics/metropolitanareas~Priorities-for-the-Trump-administration-Mayors-speak-on-trade-immigration-and-economic-opportunity/
Wed, 30 Nov 2016 18:52:12 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?post_type=podcast-episode&p=344560

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Amy Liu, vice president and director of the Metropolitan Policy Program at Brookings, talks with the former mayors of Philadelphia and Mesa, Arizona, Michael Nutter and Scott Smith, now both nonresident senior fellows at Brookings, about what motivated voters in their former constituencies and how a Trump presidency will affect issues of trade, immigration, and economic opportunity.

“What we need is a rational, reformed immigration policy for all 50 states and territories that is a pathway to citizenship,” says Mayor Nutter. “Folks came here for a particular reason, mostly to become citizens. They work hard; take care of their families; start businesses; employ others, in some instances; and are not the problem. And so, whether it’s 11 million, 16 million, 2 or 3 million, [mass deportation] is virtually impossible and he knows, Mr. Trump knows that that is not something that is immediately doable.”

Mayor Smith explains: “I think part of the problem is we want to recreate the economy of the 50s and 60s and that’s not the economy we live in. That doesn’t mean that you just toss it aside and give up; that means that you redirect. There’re some places that are doing a very good job at that; there are other places that are not because they’re trying to hold on to what they used to be as opposed to what we can be.”

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Amy Liu, vice president and director of the Metropolitan Policy Program at Brookings, talks with the former mayors of Philadelphia and Mesa, Arizona, Michael Nutter and Scott Smith, now both nonresident senior fellows at Brookings, about what motivated voters in their former constituencies and how a Trump presidency will affect issues of trade, immigration, and economic opportunity.
“What we need is a rational, reformed immigration policy for all 50 states and territories that is a pathway to citizenship,” says Mayor Nutter. “Folks came here for a particular reason, mostly to become citizens. They work hard; take care of their families; start businesses; employ others, in some instances; and are not the problem. And so, whether it’s 11 million, 16 million, 2 or 3 million, [mass deportation] is virtually impossible and he knows, Mr. Trump knows that that is not something that is immediately doable.”
Mayor Smith explains: “I think part of the problem is we want to recreate the economy of the 50s and 60s and that’s not the economy we live in. That doesn’t mean that you just toss it aside and give up; that means that you redirect. There’re some places that are doing a very good job at that; there are other places that are not because they’re trying to hold on to what they used to be as opposed to what we can be.”
Related links:
Mayors weigh in on Trump’s proposed deportation of immigrants
Why cities and metros must lead in Trump’s America
Michael Nutter: An open letter to President-Elect Trump
With thanks to audio producer Gaston Reboredo, Vanessa Sauter, Basseem Maleki, Fred Dews, and Richard Fawal.
Subscribe to Intersections on iTunes or through your preferred podcast app.
Send feedback to intersections@brookings.edu and follow us on Twitter @policypodcasts.
Intersections is part of the Brookings Podcast Network.Amy Liu, vice president and director of the Metropolitan Policy Program at Brookings, talks with the former mayors of Philadelphia and Mesa, Arizona, Michael Nutter and Scott Smith, now both nonresident senior fellows at Brookings, about what ... https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2016/11/30/reinvigorating-mature-industries-through-global-engagement/Reinvigorating mature industries through global engagementhttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/236346534/0/brookingsrss/topics/metropolitanareas~Reinvigorating-mature-industries-through-global-engagement/
Wed, 30 Nov 2016 16:30:35 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?p=344563

Indianapolis plans to find an answer. The Indy Chamber, which leads the region’s export and FDI efforts, zeroed in on the life sciences industry—not an obvious candidate for a new global economic development initiative. After all, the industry is already an established economic development priority for the region and state that doesn’t seem to need much help, as it currently accounts for nearly one-third of the region’s exports and a few major foreign investments. Its strengths derive primarily from a small core of major multinationals, which aren’t the right targets for export or FDI assistance. Contrast this to Portland and Milwaukee, which chose clusters that are highly specialized but relatively small, have a base of small to mid-sized firms, and—while not in “new” industries—are new regional priorities that lend themselves to marketing and branding efforts.

But the Indy Chamber’s choice was a deliberate response to three challenges that surfaced from research conducted by BioCrossroads, the region’s life sciences sector-development organization. First, a historic reliance on large public companies makes Indianapolis susceptible to the volatility of industry cycles, including patent expirations. Second, the metro suffers from shortages of specific types of high-skilled talent, with the state retaining less than half of in-state college graduates in engineering, biology, and computer science. Third, as sponsored research conducted through outside partners and the acquisition of later-stage firms has supplanted a considerable level of basic in-house research and development (R&D), and as universities face declining federal research funding, there is a growing need for a bridging mechanism to foster research collaboration to maximize limited funds.

Two strategic responses led by BioCrossroads were emerging prior to the region’s export and FDI efforts. One, the Indiana Biosciences Research Institute (IBRI), is a $350 million industry-led research center that aims to recruit up to 200 world-class researchers in the metabolic disease and nutrition fields, with the goal of carrying out R&D projects with high potential for sponsored research, commercialization, or spinoff start-ups. The other, 16 Tech, is a planned 60-acre innovation district that will house IBRI and other tech-based firms, and recently received approval for $75 million in bonds for infrastructure development. Its goal is to attract entrepreneurial talent by offering R&D facilities (including accelerators and “maker spaces”) where start-ups, research organizations, and corporations can readily collaborate and commercialize new ideas.

The challenge for Indianapolis, then, is the opposite of that faced by Milwaukee or Portland. Rather than elevating an emerging ecosystem to global prominence, it must take an already globally prominent industry and help an ecosystem emerge underneath it. “Life sciences isn’t a sector we’re trying to get,” says David Johnson, the CEO of BioCrossroads and its parent organization, the Central Indiana Corporate Partnership. “It’s one that we already have—but it’s one we can’t take for granted, and its success will not continue if we don’t bring in new companies, more capital, and talent.”

The region’s global trade and investment plan builds on this work by focusing all refined FDI and export tactics on strengthening the cluster. For FDI, this means aligning with IBRI by recruiting firms in the metabolic health and nutrition fields. It also means making a more targeted, research-driven case about the region’s specific specialization within life sciences: a unique mix of capabilities in production and distribution, alongside R&D. Other tactics include identifying global suppliers and joint venture partners of local firms as potential investors, and eventually using 16 Tech’s co-working spaces as soft landing pads for foreign startups. Indy’s export development efforts are focused on strengthening the cluster’s existing base of small and mid-sized firms through export grants and related educational programming.

At the same time, the Indy Chamber recognizes that, while helping firms export and facilitating FDI are important, its long-term goal is to support a highly functioning cluster that will generate these outcomes on its own. As part of the plan, the Indy Chamber has formed stronger partnerships with BioCrossroads and the Central Indiana Corporate Partnership to support the development of IBRI and 16 Tech. The Chamber has carved out specific roles that fit its advocacy and marketing strengths, including advocating for state appropriations and carrying out a talent attraction campaign to complement BioCrossroads’ workforce development efforts. And, because the region’s pharmaceutical firms are highly manufacturing-intensive relative to other U.S. clusters, the Chamber is leading efforts to improve the region’s logistics capabilities and secure investment for multimodal infrastructure projects.

It isn’t certain that Indianapolis, or any other region, can effectively use exports and foreign investment to inject new talent and R&D capacity into a mature cluster composed of mostly large multinationals. But Indy’s approach—start with solid research, form new partnerships, and build on existing initiatives led by the private sector—is a promising experiment to watch.

The Central Indiana Corporate Partnership is a member of the Metropolitan Leadership Council, a network of business, civic and philanthropic leaders that acts as a financial and intellectual partner of the Brookings Metropolitan Policy Program.

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Two metro areas, Milwaukee and Portland, Oregon, offer the strongest evidence for a theory we’ve developed over five years of working on global trade and investment plans: It is crucial, especially for second-tier metro areas, to organize trade and investment efforts around a single globally relevant specialization. Despite early successes, though, it’s not clear that this model is universally applicable. Both Milwaukee (water technologies) and Portland (green cities) are focused on establishing an initial global presence for an emerging, fast-rising cluster. But can metro areas also use exports and foreign direct investment (FDI) to reinvigorate mature clusters that are already thoroughly global?
Indianapolis plans to find an answer. The Indy Chamber, which leads the region’s export and FDI efforts, zeroed in on the life sciences industry—not an obvious candidate for a new global economic development initiative. After all, the industry is already an established economic development priority for the region and state that doesn’t seem to need much help, as it currently accounts for nearly one-third of the region’s exports and a few major foreign investments. Its strengths derive primarily from a small core of major multinationals, which aren’t the right targets for export or FDI assistance. Contrast this to Portland and Milwaukee, which chose clusters that are highly specialized but relatively small, have a base of small to mid-sized firms, and—while not in “new” industries—are new regional priorities that lend themselves to marketing and branding efforts.
But the Indy Chamber’s choice was a deliberate response to three challenges that surfaced from research conducted by BioCrossroads, the region’s life sciences sector-development organization. First, a historic reliance on large public companies makes Indianapolis susceptible to the volatility of industry cycles, including patent expirations. Second, the metro suffers from shortages of specific types of high-skilled talent, with the state retaining less than half of in-state college graduates in engineering, biology, and computer science. Third, as sponsored research conducted through outside partners and the acquisition of later-stage firms has supplanted a considerable level of basic in-house research and development (R&D), and as universities face declining federal research funding, there is a growing need for a bridging mechanism to foster research collaboration to maximize limited funds.
Two strategic responses led by BioCrossroads were emerging prior to the region’s export and FDI efforts. One, the Indiana Biosciences Research Institute (IBRI), is a $350 million industry-led research center that aims to recruit up to 200 world-class researchers in the metabolic disease and nutrition fields, with the goal of carrying out R&D projects with high potential for sponsored research, commercialization, or spinoff start-ups. The other, 16 Tech, is a planned 60-acre innovation district that will house IBRI and other tech-based firms, and recently received approval for $75 million in bonds for infrastructure development. Its goal is to attract entrepreneurial talent by offering R&D facilities (including accelerators and “maker spaces”) where start-ups, research organizations, and corporations can readily collaborate and commercialize new ideas.
The challenge for Indianapolis, then, is the opposite of that faced by Milwaukee or Portland. Rather than elevating an emerging ecosystem to global prominence, it must take an already globally prominent industry and help an ecosystem emerge underneath it. “Life sciences isn’t a sector we’re trying to get,” says David Johnson, the CEO of BioCrossroads and its parent organization, the Central Indiana Corporate Partnership. “It’s one that we already have—but ... Two metro areas, Milwaukee and Portland, Oregon, offer the strongest evidence for a theory we’ve developed over five years of working on global trade and investment plans: It is crucial, especially for second-tier metro areas, to organize ... https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2016/11/29/another-clinton-trump-divide-high-output-america-vs-low-output-america/Another Clinton-Trump divide: High-output America vs low-output Americahttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/236346538/0/brookingsrss/topics/metropolitanareas~Another-ClintonTrump-divide-Highoutput-America-vs-lowoutput-America/
Tue, 29 Nov 2016 20:25:26 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?p=344413

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Last week, as my colleague Sifan Liu and I were gnawing on some questions asked by Jim Tankersley of The Washington Post, we happened upon a revealing aspect of the election outcome. While looking at number of influences on the presidential vote outcome, we found that in a year of massive divides, one particular economic split stands out.

Our observation: The less-than-500 counties that Hillary Clinton carried nationwide encompassed a massive 64 percent of America’s economic activity as measured by total output in 2015. By contrast, the more-than-2,600 counties that Donald Trump won generated just 36 percent of the country’s output—just a little more than one-third of the nation’s economic activity.

Candidates’ counties won and share of GDP in 2000 and 2016

Year

Candidates

# of Counties won

Aggregate share of GDP

2000

Al Gore

659

54%

George W. Bush

2397

46%

2016

Hillary Clinton

472

64%

Donald Trump

2584

36%

Source: Brookings analysis of Moody’s Analytics estimate

To see how this could be, take a look at this quick visualization, which suggests what’s going on:

Share of 2015 real GDP by county

Here you can see very clearly that with the exceptions of the Phoenix and Fort Worth areas and a big chunk of Long Island Clinton won every large-sized county economy in the country. Her base of 493 counties was heavily metropolitan. By contrast, Trumpland consists of hundreds and hundreds of tiny low-output locations that comprise the non-metropolitan hinterland of America, along with some suburban and exurban metro counties, as Indeed Chief Economist Jed Kolko pointed out in a tweet.

Moreover, while this divide is striking by any standard, it appears to be “unprecedented in the era of modern economic statistics,” as Tankersley noted in his story, for a losing presidential candidate to have represented so large a share of nation’s economic base. By comparison, Democratic Presidential candidate Al Gore in 2000 won counties that generated only about 54 percent of the country’s gross domestic product en route to winning the popular vote, while losing the election in the Electoral College. Gore, won more than 100 more counties in 2000 than Clinton did in 2016, meaning that his appeal, while less monolithic across high-output counties, extended into more lower-output areas.

The upshot: No election in decades has revealed as sharp a political divide between the densest economic centers and the rest of the country — between what Tankersley labeled in a tweet “high-output” and “low-output” America.

All of which suggests multiple problems. Most broadly, the stark political divide underscores the likelihood of the two parties talking entirely past each other on the most important issues of economic policy. Given the election map we revealed, the Trump administration will likely feel pressure to respond most to the desires and frustrations of the nation’s struggling hinterland, and discount the priorities and needs of the nation’s high-output economic base.

On one hand, more attention to the economic and health challenges of rural and small-city Rustbelt America could be welcome, especially if it focuses on the right things: realism about current economic trends, adjustment to change, improving rural education and skills training, and enhancing linkages to nearby metropolitan centers. However, Trump’s promises to “bring back” the coal economy and “bring back” millions of manufacturing jobs (that now don’t exist thanks to automation) don’t speak wisely to real-world trends in low-output America. They look backwards and speak instead to local frustrations.

On the other hand, our tile map raises doubts that the nation’s core metropolitan economic base will easily secure the investments it needs—investments that has been shown to drive broader prosperity that benefits the entire nation. Without a doubt, the mostly metropolitan counties of high-output America will need now to make more of their own arrangements, by establishing their own applied R&D centers, developing their own industry-relevant skills pipelines, and deepening local industry clusters. “Bottom up” will now be mandatory. Yet with that said, big issues loom given the fact that no county can flourish entirely on its own. How, for example, will high-output America secure the critical, historically federal innovation investments it requires to fuel the dynamism of its local advanced industries and the long supply chains that they support? How will the heavily federal safety net be maintained? And will necessary federal infrastructure investments be made in a targeted, efficient way that maximizes return on investment? Clearly, as my colleague Bruce Katz declares, cities and metropolitan areas are going to need to demand what they need, while taking matters into their own hands as best they can.

In the end, our data makes plain that while cultural resentments played a huge role in this month’s election, so too did a massive economic divide between relatively prosperous high-output counties and struggling lower-out rural ones. Hashing out a serviceable politics and policy mix to serve that bifurcated reality is going to be a huge challenge.

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https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/metro_20161129_blue-red-divide.png?w=320Last week, as my colleague Sifan Liu and I were gnawing on some questions asked by Jim Tankersley of The Washington Post, we happened upon a revealing aspect of the election outcome. While looking at number of influences on the presidential vote outcome, we found that in a year of massive divides, one particular economic split stands out.
Our observation: The less-than-500 counties that Hillary Clinton carried nationwide encompassed a massive 64 percent of America’s economic activity as measured by total output in 2015. By contrast, the more-than-2,600 counties that Donald Trump won generated just 36 percent of the country’s output—just a little more than one-third of the nation’s economic activity. ________________________________________________________
Candidates' counties won and share of GDP in 2000 and 2016
2000
Al Gore
659
54%
George W. Bush
2397
46%
2016
Hillary Clinton
472
64%
Donald Trump
2584
36%
Source: Brookings analysis of Moody's Analytics estimate ________________________________________________________
To see how this could be, take a look at this quick visualization, which suggests what’s going on:
Share of 2015 real GDP by county
Here you can see very clearly that with the exceptions of the Phoenix and Fort Worth areas and a big chunk of Long Island Clinton won every large-sized county economy in the country. Her base of 493 counties was heavily metropolitan. By contrast, Trumpland consists of hundreds and hundreds of tiny low-output locations that comprise the non-metropolitan hinterland of America, along with some suburban and exurban metro counties, as Indeed Chief Economist Jed Kolko pointed out in a tweet.
Moreover, while this divide is striking by any standard, it appears to be “unprecedented in the era of modern economic statistics,” as Tankersley noted in his story, for a losing presidential candidate to have represented so large a share of nation’s economic base. By comparison, Democratic Presidential candidate Al Gore in 2000 won counties that generated only about 54 percent of the country’s gross domestic product en route to winning the popular vote, while losing the election in the Electoral College. Gore, won more than 100 more counties in 2000 than Clinton did in 2016, meaning that his appeal, while less monolithic across high-output counties, extended into more lower-output areas.
The upshot: No election in decades has revealed as sharp a political divide between the densest economic centers and the rest of the country — between what Tankersley labeled in a tweet “high-output” and “low-output” America.
All of which suggests multiple problems. Most broadly, the stark political divide underscores the likelihood of the two parties talking entirely past each other on the most important issues of economic policy. Given the election map we revealed, the Trump administration will likely feel pressure to respond most to the desires and frustrations of the nation’s struggling hinterland, and discount the priorities and needs of the nation’s high-output economic base.
On one hand, more attention to the economic and health challenges of rural and small-city Rustbelt America could be welcome, especially if it focuses on the right things: realism about current economic trends, adjustment to change, improving rural education and skills training, and enhancing linkages to nearby metropolitan centers. However, Trump’s promises to “bring back” the coal economy and “bring back” millions of manufacturing jobs (that now don’t exist thanks to automation) don’t speak wisely to real-world trends in low-output America. They look backwards and speak instead to local frustrations.
On the other hand, our tile map raises doubts that the nation’s core ... Last week, as my colleague Sifan Liu and I were gnawing on some questions asked by Jim Tankersley of The Washington Post, we happened upon a revealing aspect of the election outcome. While looking at number of influences on the presidential ... https://www.brookings.edu/events/thank-you-for-being-late-a-conversation-with-thomas-l-friedman/Thank you for being late: A conversation with Thomas L. Friedmanhttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/236365230/0/brookingsrss/topics/metropolitanareas~Thank-you-for-being-late-A-conversation-with-Thomas-L-Friedman/
Tue, 29 Nov 2016 19:33:50 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?post_type=event&p=344336

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The three-time Pulitzer Prize recipient and columnist for The New York Times Thomas Friedman asserts that we have entered an age of dizzying acceleration. His new book, Thank You For Being Late: An Optimist’s Guide to Thriving in the Age of Accelerations, serves as a field manual for how to think about and live in this era of technological and global shifts. The book makes the case for ‘being late’—pausing to appreciate this amazing historical era and to reflect on its possibilities and dangers.

On Thursday, December 15, the Brookings Metropolitan Policy Program will host Friedman for a conversation about his book and a discussion about the lessons he draws from his hometown in Minnesota about how communities can create a “topsoil of trust” to anchor their increasingly diverse and digital populations.

Following the discussion, he will take questions from the audience.

Copies of “Thank You For Being Late” will be available for purchase at a 10% discount.

Register and reserve your copy today.

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https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/thankyou_color-palate.png?w=243The three-time Pulitzer Prize recipient and columnist for The New York Times Thomas Friedman asserts that we have entered an age of dizzying acceleration. His new book, Thank You For Being Late: An Optimist's Guide to Thriving in the Age of Accelerations, serves as a field manual for how to think about and live in this era of technological and global shifts. The book makes the case for ‘being late’—pausing to appreciate this amazing historical era and to reflect on its possibilities and dangers.
On Thursday, December 15, the Brookings Metropolitan Policy Program will host Friedman for a conversation about his book and a discussion about the lessons he draws from his hometown in Minnesota about how communities can create a “topsoil of trust” to anchor their increasingly diverse and digital populations.
Following the discussion, he will take questions from the audience.
Copies of “Thank You For Being Late” will be available for purchase at a 10% discount.
Register and reserve your copy today.
The three-time Pulitzer Prize recipient and columnist for The New York Times Thomas Friedman asserts that we have entered an age of dizzying acceleration. His new book, Thank You For Being Late: An Optimist's Guide to Thriving in the Age of ...