If you are using
Internet Explorer 10 (or later), you might find some of the links I have used won't
work properly unless you switch to 'Compatibility View' (in the Tools Menu); for
IE11 select 'Compatibility View Settings' and then add this site. Also, if you
are using Mozilla Firefox, you might find several of the words and links
on this page have been hijacked by advertisers. I have no control over this so I
recommend you stop using Mozilla.

January 2015: A
recent computer meltdown has resulted in the codes I inserted into several
Essays at this site altering randomly (I have no idea why!). This has made the
formatting and fonts I have used vary erratically. I am currently trying to
correct this error, but it might take several weeks to implement fully.

~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~

A US comrade (Brian Jones) has attempted to
respond to a letter I sent to the
International Socialist Reviewconcerning several of the issues raised
in this Essay. The original letter can be accessed here, comrade Jones's reply here, and my response
to him here.

More recently, a UK comrade has also
tried to reply to some of my criticisms; the details can be found
here and
here.

More recently still, another US comrade has also tried to
respond to some of the points I have made in this Essay. On that, see
here.

~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~

As is the case with all my Essays, nothing here should be read as an attack
either on Historical Materialism [HM] -- a theory I fully accept --, or,
indeed,
on revolutionary socialism. I remain as committed to the self-emancipation of the
working class and the dictatorship of the proletariat as I was when I first became a revolutionary
nearly thirty years ago. [The
difference between Dialectical Materialism [DM] and HM, as I see it, is explained
here.]

It is also worth pointing out that a good 50% of my case
against DM has been relegated to the
End Notes.
Indeed, in this particular Essay, most of the supporting evidence and
argument is to
be found there. This has been done to allow the main body of the Essay to flow a
little more smoothly. This means that if readers want to appreciate more fully my
case against DM, they will need to consult this material. In many cases, I have
qualified my comments (often adding greater detail and substantiating evidence),
and I have even raised objections (some of which are obvious, many not -- and
some that will have occurred to the reader; indeed, several have actually been
raised by a handful of readers and/or critics; for instance, Brain Jones,
mentioned above) to my own arguments -- which I have then answered.
[I explain why I have adopted this tactic in
Essay One.]

If readers skip this material, then my answers to any
objections they might have will be missed, as will the extra evidence and
argument.

[Since I have been
debating this theory with comrades for over 25 years, I have heard all the
objections there are! Many of the more recent on-line debates are listed here.]

It should be pointed out that phrases like
"ruling-class theory", "ruling-class view of reality", "ruling-class ideology"
(etc.) used at this site (in connection with Philosophy and DM) aren't meant to imply that all or even most members of various ruling-classes
actually invented these ways of thinking or of
seeing the world (although some of them did -- for example,
Heraclitus,
Plato,
Cicero and
Marcus Aurelius).
They are intended to
highlight theories (or "ruling ideas") that are conducive to, or which rationalise the
interests of the various ruling-classes history has inflicted on humanity, whoever invents them.
Up until
recently this dogmatic approach to knowledge had almost invariably been promoted by thinkers who
either relied on ruling-class patronage, or who, in one capacity or another, helped run
the system
for the elite.

However, this will become the
main topic of Parts Two and Three of Essay Twelve (when they are published); until then, the reader is
directed here,
here, and
here for
more
details.

Finally, readers will find that I have
repeatedly linked to a specific section of my new Essay (Why
Dialectical Materialism Can't Explain Change) -- namely where I
quote literally dozens of passages from the DM-classics and lesser DM-works in
support of my allegations. I have done this since bitter experience has taught
me that the vast majority of DM-fans either haven't read these passages (or
they have failed to realise what they were being told), and so refuse to accept
the ridiculous consequences that flow from the
DM-theory of change. So, in debate with them I find I have to remind them
continually of what their own classics tell them; and even then -- when
they are confronted with the facts, in black and white, chapter and verse -- they refuse to believe
their eyes, and tend respond in several predictable ways (to which I have also
replied, here). Hence, I have adopted the same tactic in
this Essay, and have inserted scores of reminders in the text below. In which
case, apologies are owed to neutral readers for this constant repetition.

~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~

As of November 2014, this Essay is just over 155,500 words long;
three much shorter summaries of some of its main points can be accessed
here.

The material below does
not
represent my final view of any of the issues raised; it is merely 'work in
progress'.

Anyone using these links must remember that
they will be skipping past supporting argument and evidence set out in earlier
sections.

If your Firewall/Browser has a pop-up blocker, you will need to press the
"Ctrl" key at the same time or these and the other links here won't work!

If you are viewing this
with Mozilla Firefox you might not be able to read all
the symbols I have used. I do not know if other browsers are similarly affected.

I have adjusted the
font size used at this site to ensure that even those with impaired
vision can read what I have to say. However, if the text is still either too
big or too small for you, please adjust your browser settings!

In this Essay, I aim to show that Engels's
'Three Laws of Dialectics' -- where any sense can be made of them --
are far too confused for anyone to be able to determine whether or not they are
true.

However, for many dialecticians these 'Laws' encapsulate the core ideas of classical DM. Others regard
them as far too crude and formulaic.
TAR, however, adopts a middle course, downplaying their significance somewhat,
while preferring to define DM in terms of
"mediated Totality" alongside change through "internal contradiction", etc. [p.5.]
Nevertheless, its author noted that:

"The 'three laws' are...useful reminders of forms
in which dialectical contradictions sometimes work themselves out.... The three
laws are not, even in Hegel, the only way in which dialectical
development can take place. They can't be understood without the broader
definition of the dialectic discussed above [pp.3-8]. They are not, as Marx and
Engels were quick to insist, a substitute for the difficult, empirical task of
tracing the development of real contradictions, not a suprahistorical master key
whose only advantage is to turn up where no real historical knowledge is
available." [Rees (1998), pp.8-9.]

[Alas, Rees forgot to point out where Marx
"insisted" this, or anything like it. Engels's 'insistence' can be read
below.]

However, as Essay
Two has shown, this is
precisely how these 'Laws' (and other dialectical principles) have been
interpreted by dialecticians for over a century -- that is, as just such a
master key.

Indeed, in a recent article in Socialist Review, Rees
endorsed this 'Law' unreservedly; on the basis of just one example -- the
hardy perennial, water freezing and/or boiling -- he was happy to assert:

"Indeed this is a feature of many different sorts of change, even in the
natural world. Water that rises in temperature by one degree at a time shows no
dramatic change until it reaches boiling point when it 'suddenly' becomes steam.
At that point its whole nature is transformed from being a liquid into a vapour.

"Lower the temperature of water by a single degree at a time and again there
is no dramatic change until it reaches freezing point, when it is transformed
from a liquid into a solid -- ice.

"Dialecticians call this process the transformation of quantity into quality.
Slow, gradual changes that do not add up to a transformation in the nature of a
thing suddenly reach a tipping point when the whole nature of the thing is
transformed into something new." [Rees
(2008), p.24. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted
at this site.]

From that, Rees suddenly "leaps" to this conclusion:

"This is why Marx described the dialectic as 'an
abomination to the bourgeoisie' and why Lenin said of this method that it 'alone
furnishes the key to 'self-movement' of everything existing; it alone
furnishes the key to 'leaps', to the 'break in continuity'...to the destruction
of the old and the emergence of the new'". [Ibid. Bold emphasis added. Quotation
marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site.]

So, here we see yet another example of
a priori dogmatism, and one based on little or no evidence. One minute, these
'Laws' aren't a master key, next they are, and are then
imposed peremptorily on
"everything existing".

As we will soon
discover,
Rees blithely ignored the numerous cases where "qualitative" change isn't the
least bit "sudden", just as he ignored the many instances where this
'Law' doesn't work.
[Both of these claims will be fully substantiated in what follows.]

Nevertheless, as noted above, this Essay is aimed at showing that these 'Laws' are far too
vague and confused even to be assessed for their truth or their falsehood.

Hence they are certainly of no use at all in helping revolutionaries
understand the world and therefore how to change it.

Even so, Engels summarised these 'Laws' in the following way:

"The law of the transformation of quantity into
quality, and vice versa; The law of the interpenetration of opposites;
The law of the negation of the negation." [Engels (1954),
p.62.]

Earlier, he had characterised them thus:

"Dialectics as the science of universal
inter-connection. Main laws: transformation of quantity into quality -- mutual
penetration of polar opposites and transformation into each other when carried
to extremes -- development through contradiction or negation of the negation --
spiral form of development." [Ibid.,
p.17.]

"...[T]he transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa.
For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner
exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only
occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called
energy)…. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without
addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative
alteration of the body concerned." [Ibid.,
p.63.
Bold emphasis
alone added.]

Exactly how Engels knew
that it is impossible
to "alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or
motion" he annoyingly kept to himself. His certainty in this regard can't have
been based on the limited evidence available in his day, for there is no body of
evidence that could confirm that it is
"impossible" to alter the "quality" of a body in the way he
says. This is also true with respect to the vastly increased knowledge we have today.

Indeed, this is something Engels himself recognised:

"The empiricism of observation alone can never
adequately prove necessity." [Ibid,
p.229.]

Perhaps Engels was simply being careless in his choice
of words in these private notebooks? Maybe so, but no dialectician since his day
has noticed that it isn't possible to derive an "impossibility"
(or a "necessity") from
a set of contingent facts, no matter how large it is.

[But, we already know the answer to that one; Engels didn't derive this 'Law'
from a research tradition in the physical sciences, he copied it from Hegel,
who similarly based it on a handful of
anecdotal and trite examples,
and ones he badly garbled, too.]

To be sure, Engels went on to argue:

"This is so very correct that it does not follow
from the continual rising of the sun in the morning that it will rise again
tomorrow, and in fact we know now that a time will come when one morning the sun
will not rise. But the proof of necessity lies in human activity, in
experiment, in work: if I am able to make the
post hoc, it becomes identical with the propter hoc." [Ibid.,
pp.229-30. Italic emphases in the original.]

However, it isn't too clear how human intervention can create a
necessity where there was only a sequence of events before human beings
intervened. Engels seems to think this is obvious, when it isn't. In fact, as we will
soon see, it is possible to alter the qualitative state of a body without
the addition of matter and/or motion; in which case, Engels's conclusions above are
not just non-obvious, they are false.

Of course, this is quite apart from the fact that this 'Law' is
supposed to work in the natural world, independently of human intervention.
If so, Engels appeal to human action to derive a necessity here would mean, it
seems, that
this 'Law' operated only
contingently in nature.

This puzzle is rendered all the more acute
when we recall that for Engels matter itself is an
abstraction. [Cf.,
Engels
(1954), p.255: "Matter as such is a pure creation of
thought and an abstraction...."]. In that case, it seems
energy must be, too. If so, it isn't easy to see how anything can be altered
qualitatively by the addition or
subtraction of an 'abstraction'.

To be sure, Engels's characterisation of this 'Law' is slightly more
tempered in AD:

"This is precisely
the Hegelian nodal line of measure relations, in which, at certain definite
nodal points, the purely quantitative increase or decrease gives rise to a qualitative leap; for example, in the case of heated or cooled water, where
boiling-point and freezing-point are the nodes at which -- under normal pressure
-- the leap to a new state of aggregation takes place, and where consequently
quantity is transformed into quality." [Engels
(1976), p.56. I have used the
online version here, but quoted the page numbers for the Foreign Languages
edition. Bold emphasis added.]

"With this
assurance Herr Dühring saves himself the trouble of saying anything further
about the origin of life, although it might reasonably have been expected that a
thinker who had traced the evolution of the world back to its self-equal state,
and is so much at home on other celestial bodies, would have known exactly
what's what also on this point. For the rest, however, the assurance he gives
us is only half right unless it is completed by the Hegelian nodal line of
measure relations which has already been mentioned. In spite of all gradualness,
the transition from one form of motion to another always remains a leap, a
decisive change. This is true of the transition from the mechanics of celestial
bodies to that of smaller masses on a particular celestial body; it is equally
true of the transition from the mechanics of masses to the mechanics of
molecules -- including the forms of motion investigated in physics proper: heat,
light, electricity, magnetism. In the same way, the transition from the physics
of molecules to the physics of atoms -- chemistry -- in turn involves a decided
leap; and this is even more clearly the case in the transition from ordinary
chemical action to the chemism of albumen which we call life.Then within
the sphere of life the leaps become ever more infrequent and imperceptible.
--
Once again, therefore, it is Hegel who has to correct Herr Dühring." [Ibid.,
pp.82-83. Bold emphasis added.]

"We have already
seen earlier, when discussing world schematism, that in connection with this
Hegelian nodal line of measure relations -- in which quantitative change suddenly
passes at certain points into qualitative transformation -- Herr Dühring had a
little accident: in a weak moment he himself recognised and made use of this
line. We gave there one of the best-known examples -- that of the change of the
aggregate states of water, which under normal atmospheric pressure changes at
0°C from the liquid into the solid state, and at 100°C from the liquid into the
gaseous state, so that at both these turning-points the merely quantitative
change of temperature brings about a qualitative change in the condition of the
water." [Ibid.,
p.160. Bold emphasis added.]

However, in that book, and surprising though this might seem,
Engels had already provided his own neat refutation of this 'Law':

"Whereas only ten years ago the great basic law
of motion, then recently discovered, was as yet conceived merely as a law of the
conservation of energy, as the mere expression of the indestructibility
and uncreatability of motion, that is, merely in its quantitative aspect,
this narrow negative conception is being more and more supplanted by the
positive idea of the transformation of energy, in which for the first
time the qualitative content of the process comes into its own, and the last
vestige of an extramundane creator is obliterated. That the quantity of
motion (so-called energy) remains unaltered when it is transformed from kinetic
energy (so-called mechanical force) into electricity, heat, potential energy,
etc., and vice versa, no longer needs to be preached as something new; it
serves as the already secured basis for the now much more pregnant investigation
into the very process of transformation, the great basic process, knowledge of
which comprises all knowledge of nature." [Ibid.,
p.15. Bold emphases added.]

Attentive readers will no doubt notice that Engels argues that the
same amount of energy can be transformed and appear in a different form, with a
whole new set of qualities. So, here we have qualitative change with no
addition of matter or energy! In all my years studying DM (over thirty and
counting...), I have yet to encounter a single author (DM-supporter or critic) -- and I have waded through far more of this material than is good for
any human being to have to endure -- who has spotted this fatal admission
in this classical DM-text.

But, even that will sail right over the heads of the
DM-faithful. [Here is
why.]

We will be told, perhaps, that the fact that Engels has himself killed off this part of DM is an
academic, pedantic
detail -- a nit-picking point, mere 'semantics', "logic-chopping" --, etc.,
etc.

However, it is worth recalling this isn't a minor point; these
energetic changes govern much that happens in the entire universe -- indeed, as
Engels himself points out;

"[I]t serves as the already secured basis for the
now much more pregnant investigation into the very process of transformation,
the great basic process, knowledge of which comprises all knowledge of nature."
[Ibid.]

"...laws [have been] foisted
on nature and history as laws of thought, and not deduced from them." [Engels
(1954),
p.62.]

He also declared the following:

"Finally, for me there could be no question of
superimposing the laws of dialectics on nature but of discovering them in it and
developing them from it." [Engels (1976),
p.13. Bold emphasis
added.]

But, Engels's precipitous
deduction of a necessary law (i.e., one that uses the word "impossible")
from only a handful of cases -- largely drawn from a few areas of nineteenth
century chemistry, buttressed by a handful of quirky,
anecdotal examples taken from everyday
life and/or from the popular science of his day -- is a neat trick
dialecticians alone seem capable of performing.

Even if Engels had access to
evidence several orders of magnitude greater than we have today, that would
still not justify his use of "impossible".

Less partisan observers might be forgiven for
concluding that Engels either did not know what the word "foisted" meant, or he
hoped no one would notice when he indulged in a little of it himself.

Despite this, it might seem that Engels actually had an answer to
these objections (and one he
also lifted from
Hegel):

"'Fundamentally, we can know only the infinite.'
In
fact all real exhaustive knowledge consists solely in raising the individual
thing in thought from individuality into particularity and from this into
universality, in seeking and establishing the infinite in the finite, the
eternal in the transitory. The form of universality is the form of completeness,
hence of the infinite. We know that chlorine and hydrogen, within certain limits
of temperature and pressure and under the influence of light, combine with an
explosion to form hydrochloric acid gas, and as soon as we know this, we know
also that this takes place everywhere and at all times where the
above conditions are present....The form of universality in nature is law,
and no one talks of the eternal character of the laws of nature than the natural
scientists.... All true knowledge of nature is knowledge of the eternal, the
infinite, and hence the essentially absolute.

"...[This] can only take place in an infinite
asymptotic progress."
[Engels (1954),
pp.234-35. Italic emphases in the original.]

However, since the scientists of Engels's day (from whose work he
was generalising) were Christians,
as was Hegel, you'd expect them to talk this way. But, their own conclusions (about these
alleged "laws") do not
follow from the evidence they gathered any more than the existence of God does. As we will
see in a later Essay, in their attempt to explain the content of their work to
non-specialists,
scientists often indulge in amateur metaphysics, but
this should no more influence us than their political opinions do. And, since
scientists are constantly
changing their minds over
the nature of these 'eternal' laws, only the unwise would base their philosophy on
such shifting sands.

"How is it possible to translate the word
'infinite' as
'law-governed process'? Now Engels tries to equate the two, but an
'always' and 'at all times' are not an 'infinite'.

"In a later
Essay, we will see that this view of scientific law is a carry-over from ancient
animistic beliefs about nature, and so it is no surprise to see this idea
re-surface here in such
Hermetically-compromised
company. [On this, see here and here;
the first is Swartz (2009), the second Swartz (2003).]"

Nevertheless, where sense can be made of
it, Engels's First 'Law' is, at best, only
partially true -- as we shall soon see. There are countless processes in nature
(and society) that
'disobey' it, so it can't be a law (in any sense of that word, but see
here). And, even where it seems to
work, it does so only because Engels left several key terms vague and undefined --
in which indeterminate state they remain to this day.

[It could be argued that many scientific laws
face the same problems with regard to isolated exceptions. That objection has
been neutralised
here.]

Engels's First 'Law' is supposed to work
discontinuously (i.e., "nodally"), allowing nature and society to develop by
making "leaps" (a term which all DM-fans like to use, even while they leave
it studiously vague).

"It is said, natura non facit saltum [there are no leaps in nature]; and
ordinary thinking when it has to grasp a coming-to-be or a ceasing-to-be, fancies it has done so by representing it as a gradual emergence or disappearance. But we have seen that the alterations of being in general are not only the transition of one magnitude into another,
but a transition from quality into quantity and vice versa, a becoming-other which is an interruption of gradualness and the production of something qualitatively different from the reality which preceded it. Water, in cooling, does not gradually harden as if it thickened like porridge, gradually solidifying until it reached the consistency of ice; it suddenly solidifies, all at once. It can remain quite fluid even at freezing point if it is standing undisturbed, and then a slight shock will bring it into the solid state."
[Hegel
(1999), p.370, §776. Bold emphases alone added.]

And
here is Engels -- again copying Hegel:

"With this
assurance Herr Dühring saves himself the trouble of saying anything further
about the origin of life, although it might reasonably have been expected that a
thinker who had traced the evolution of the world back to its self-equal state,
and is so much at home on other celestial bodies, would have known exactly
what's what also on this point. For the rest, however, the assurance he gives
us is only half right unless it is completed by the Hegelian nodal line of
measure relations which has already been mentioned. In spite of all gradualness,
the transition from one form of motion to another always remains a leap, a
decisive change. This is true of the transition from the mechanics of celestial
bodies to that of smaller masses on a particular celestial body; it is equally
true of the transition from the mechanics of masses to the mechanics of
molecules -- including the forms of motion investigated in physics proper: heat,
light, electricity, magnetism. In the same way, the transition from the physics
of molecules to the physics of atoms -- chemistry -- in turn involves a decided
leap; and this is even more clearly the case in the transition from ordinary
chemical action to the chemism of albumen which we call life. Then within
the sphere of life the leaps become ever more infrequent and imperceptible. --
Once again, therefore, it is Hegel who has to correct Herr Dühring." [Engels
(1976), pp.82-83. Bold emphasis added.]

"We have already
seen earlier, when discussing world schematism, that in connection with this
Hegelian nodal line of measure relations -- in which quantitative change suddenly
passes at certain points into qualitative transformation -- Herr Dühring had a
little accident: in a weak moment he himself recognised and made use of this
line. We gave there one of the best-known examples -- that of the change of the
aggregate states of water, which under normal atmospheric pressure changes at 0°C
from the liquid into the solid state, and at 100°C from the liquid into the
gaseous state, so that at both these turning-points the merely quantitative
change of temperature brings about a qualitative change in the condition of the
water." [Ibid.,
p.160. Bold emphasis added.]

Here, too, is Plekhanov:

"[I]t will be understood without difficulty by
anyone who is in the least capable of dialectical thinking...[that]
quantitative changes, accumulating gradually, lead in the end to
changes of quality, and that these changes of quality represent leaps,
interruptions in gradualness…. That is how all Nature acts…."
[Plekhanov (1956),
pp.74-77, 88,
163. Bold emphasis alone added.]

"What
distinguishes the dialectical transition from the undialectical transition? The
leap. The contradiction. The interruption of gradualness. The unity (identity)
of Being and not-Being." [Ibid.,
p.282. Bold emphasis added.]

"The identity
of opposites (it would be more correct, perhaps, to say their 'unity,' --
although the difference between the terms identity and unity is not particularly
important here. In a certain sense both are correct) is the recognition
(discovery) of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite
tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature (including
mind and society). The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world
in their 'self-movement,' in their spontaneous development, in their
real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the
'struggle' of opposites. The two basic (or two possible? Or two historically
observable?) conceptions of development (evolution) are: development as decrease
and increase, as repetition, and development as a unity of opposites
(the division of a unity into mutually exclusive opposites and their reciprocal
relation).

"In the first
conception of motion, self-movement, its
driving force, its source, its motive, remains in the
shade (or this source is made external -- God, subject, etc.). In the
second conception the chief attention is directed precisely to knowledge of the
source of 'self'-movement.

"The first
conception is lifeless, pale and dry. The second is living. The second
alone furnishes the key to the 'self-movement' of
everything existing; it alone furnishes the key to 'leaps,' to the 'break in
continuity,' to the 'transformation into the opposite,' to the destruction of
the old and the emergence of the new." [Ibid.,
pp.357-58. Bold emphases alone added. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted
at this site.]

Unfortunately for these
a priori dogmatists, many
things in nature change qualitatively without passing through such "nodal"
points -- not even so much
as a tiny "leap".

These include
the following: melting or solidifying
plastic (polymers), metal, resin, rock, sulphur, tar
and
asphalt,
toffee, sugar, chocolate, wax, butter, cheese, and
amorphous
solids such as glass.01 As these are heated or
cooled, they gradually change (from liquid to solid, or vice versa). There isn't even a
"nodal point" with respect to balding heads! Individuals do not
suddenly become bald.01a
In fact, it is difficult to think of
many state of matter transformations (from solid to liquid (or vice versa)) that
exhibit just such "nodal points" -- and these include the transition from ice
to water (and arguably also the condensation of steam). Even the albumen of
fried or boiled eggs changes slowly (but non-"nodally") from clear to opaque white
while they are being cooked.1

Those who think that the above comments are seriously mistaken
should consult Note One, as well as
this and
this, and then
think again.

For anyone who doubts the above, there are scores of
videos on YouTube that show metal, plastic,
chocolate,
glass,
and other solids melting slowly -- for example, these:

Naturally, all this depends on how the duration of a
"nodal" point
is defined. Unfortunately DM-fans have to this day failed to specify the length
of a single "node" (nor have
they even so much as mentioned their duration -- indeed, discussions on the
Internet have shown that this objection wrong foots most DM-fans, so they either ignore it,
or call it "pedantic").
But, because of this, dialecticians are free to indulge in some sloppy, subjective, off-the-cuff, a prioriSuperscience (which they all seem fond of
indulging in -- hardly one fails to come up with
his or her own
favourite and/or idiosyncratic example, tested, of course, only in the
'laboratory of the mind', and studiously un-peer reviewed -- which is why I have
called this aspect of DM: Mickey Mouse
Science).

[Since the above was written, I have discovered that this isn't
strictly true. The very first book I have encountered (in over 25 years of
trawling through the wastelands of DM-literature) that at least tries to deal
with this 'difficulty' is Kuusinen (1961) -- a work I first read in 2007. My
response to Kuusinen's attempt to defend Engels can be found here.
I have also responded to several objections to my comments about the length of a
'dialectical' "node" in my other Essay, Engels
And Mickey Mouse Science.]

Another example offered up in this
regard is
Steven Jay Gould's
theory of "Punctuated Equilibria". Unfortunately,
amateur dialectical
palaeontologists have failed to notice that the alleged "nodal" points here
lasttens of thousands of years!This is a pretty unimpressive
"leap" -- it is more like a painfully slow crawl. Indeed, snails on downers
are
considerably more nimble!

Moreover, since no individual organism actually
changes into a new species, there is no obvious object or body here which alters in quality
as quantitative variations accumulate. This contradicts Engels once more:

"Hence
it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without
addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative
alteration of the body concerned." [Engels (1954),
p.63. Emphasis
added.]

Again, we seem to have
neither an Hegelian, nor
yet an
Aristotelian
"substance" in which such "qualities" can inhere, and hence
change. Worse still, it isn't easy to see what the alleged quantities are supposed to
be in this case, either.

It could be objected that these "quantities" are quite clearly
the many minor variations that accumulate over many generations in populations of organisms, which lead at some point
to a qualitative "leap", a species-change. But, many small variations are qualitative
already, and many of the latter occur in different organisms, not
cumulatively in just one of them. [Examples of this is given in the next but one
paragraph.] Moreover, novel qualitative changes introduced by mutation
can't arise slowly (and then make a DM-"leap" after they have been
accumulated), since they already appear suddenly. In other words, there is no slow
gradual change here, no "interruption in gradualness" (since there is no
obvious gradualness), leading to a mutational "leap"; mutations
themselves are
sudden and already qualitative.

So, at least here we appear to have changes in quality caused by no
obvious or straight-forward changes in quantity!

In any case, even if the above comments are rejected for some
reason, the following
questions remain: What precisely is being
slowly and quantitatively accumulated, here? And in what are all these
quantitative changes occurring/inhering? No one supposes that if, for example, several
hundred thousand Canada Geese all change colour slightly (for instance, if they all
become marginally pinker), that these will all additively combine somehow into one
big qualitative change (i.e., the presence of very deep pink in one of
these birds!). Or, that
if,
say, several thousand Red Deer can all individually run a little faster, that
every one of these extra cm/sec increments in each animal's running speed
will combine to make an extra km/sec in one incredibly nippy deer!

Natural selection, so we are told, will impact on those populations
of organisms
that produce less (surviving) offspring, so that certain characteristics are preserved,
which
then proliferate in the descendants of those who produce the most (or which survive
the most). But, speciation is
the result of much more complex processes than mere additive increase (even if
we knew what was being 'added' here, DM-style!). [On this, see
Coyne and Orr (2004).]

On the other hand, if
a species is to be regarded as an object in its own right -- perhaps stretched out in time,
as some taxonomists picture things
--,1a then that 'object' will
only
seem to alter as 'changes' accumulate. That is because, if a species is
defined in this way (as a temporally-extended 'object', a bit like the objects/manifolds
embedded the
4-space
of Relativity
Theory), then it
can't actually change in any
straight-forward sense. [To be sure, that depends on how we define the object in
question and how we depict change.]

It is no surprise therefore to find both these
notions have been left impressively vague by comrades who quote this particular example in
support of the First 'Law' (which is probably part of the reason they
think they can get away with referencing it). [For example,
here.]

Hence, if a species is characterised in
this way (as a sort of four-dimensional 'sausage' -- i.e., as a
manifold in 4-space), then even if the First 'Law' actually applied to it, this
'species' won't
have changed as a result of its 'internal contradictions', or as a result of
anything else, for that matter. That is because these manifolds do not change;
four-dimensional objects do not 'exist'
in time to change -- time is one of their 'in-built' dimensions,
as it were. Indeed, and on the contrary, 'time' exists in them, they
neither perdure
nor endure in it. Since everything temporally-true of
each of these manifolds is true of the whole of it 'all at once' (so to speak --
because it is a single, four-dimensional 'object'), it
can't lose or gain
properties or "qualities" --, unless, of course, we insist on embedding it in a
fifth-dimension
and (confusingly) call this new context "Time". But then, of course,
this five-dimensional 'object' won't change, either, and for the same reason.
[There is more on this in Essay Eleven
Part One.]

Without this 'extra-dimension', any predicates
true of this four-dimensional manifold will stay true of it for good, for there
is no past, present or future as far as this 'object' is concerned. In that case, 'change' would
amount to no more than our subjective mis-perception of a
'succession' of
orthogonalhyper-plane 'slices' through this manifold
that we happen to experience.

[This forms part of the so-called "Block
view of time". On this, see the PDF article
here.
Incidentally, I take no stance on this view of time here; I will, however, in a
later Essay.]

As should now seem obvious, dialecticians can
only afford to view the universe in this way if they are prepared to abandon
their belief in change -- or, consign change merely to our 'subjective'
apprehension of reality.

Alternatively, if a species isn't to
be defined
in this way (as
a four-dimensional collective sort of 'object'), then because no single
organism actually evolves, change to a species can't be the result of its 'internal
contradictions', once more -- since, on this view, a species is merely a certain sort of collection,
not an object.
Moreover, in
populations, individual animals/plants do not change by "contradicting" one
another (or their environment), howsoever the word "contradiction" is understood. There are no 'internal
contradictions' in such populations here to cause change -- or, if there are,
dialecticians have yet to point them out. Indeed, no single thing actually changes in
an evolutionary sense, only whole populations, and they
manifestly do so non-dialectically.1b

In that case, not only is Gould's theory not an example of this 'Law' at
work,
not even Darwin's is!1c

Recently,
dialecticians have appealed to
Chaos and Catastrophe
Theory in their endeavour to show that this nineteenth century 'Law' is bang
up-to-date. Processes in nature studied in this branch of science clearly change
rapidly. However, it is important to note that rapid change in nature and
society is neither
being denied or asserted in this Essay. What is being challenged is the thesis
that all change is "nodal". Some changes are, many aren't. Moreover,
as we will also see, the term "quality" is defined in DM-circles in terms that would
rule-out many of these catastrophic changes as being 'dialectical'. That is because no
new DM-"qualities" actually emerge in such transitions.

For example, in the famous "three
body" problem, whatever the outcome, the planetary bodies involved are still
planets and they are still satellites; their orbits are still orbits. What new
DM-"quality" has "emerged" in this case?

[Here is a
JavaScript simulation of this phenomenon. Indeed, the transitions in this example appear to be non-"nodal".
(You can alter the parameter in the top left hand corner of the page.)]

Moreover, chaotic (turbulent)
flows, either side of the alleged "node", are still flows, and the liquids/gases
involved are still the same substances. No new
Aristotelian/Hegelian "quality"
has "emerged" here, either.

To be sure, some chaotic systems certainly seem to conform
to this 'Law' -- but, that is only
because the phrase "nodal change" has been left conveniently vague, and
only because few dialecticians are prepared to ask awkward (but obvious) questions
about what a DM-"quality" is supposed to be. [On that, see
here,
here and
here.]

However, there are alternative scientific and/or mathematical models of
reality that explain chaotic systems (indeed, they do so with far more clarity) --,
and they do not fall foul of the other examples listed in this Essay, which
refute this 'Law'. So, if we needed a theory of change here, DM wouldn't be
it.

The difficulties the First 'Law' faces do not
stop there. When heated, objects change in quality from cold to
warm and then to hot, with no "nodal" point separating these particular qualitative stages.
Hot water is significantly "qualitatively" different from cold water. The same happens in reverse when they cool.
Moving bodies similarly speed up from slow to fast (and vice versa)
without any "nodal" punctuation marks affecting this transition.
Bodies with a high relative velocity are "qualitatively" different from those
with a low relative velocity -- and who doubt this should stand in front of a
stationary bus, and then in front of one moving at top speed. [Only joking!] In like manner,
the change from one colour to the next in the normal colour spectrum is
continuous, with no "nodal" points evident at all -- and this is also the case
with the colour changes that bodies experience when they are heated until they
are red-, or white-hot. Sounds, too, change smoothly from soft to loud, and in pitch
from low to high, and then back again in a "node"-free environment. In fact, with
respect to wave-governed phenomena in general, change seems to be continuous
rather than discrete, which means that since the majority of particles/objects
in nature move in such a manner, most things in reality seem to disobey this
aspect of Engels's rather unimpressive 'Law' -- at least, at the macroscopic level. Hence, here we have countless changes in "quality"
that are non-"nodal".

To be sure, some
wave-like changes are said to occur discontinuously (indeed, the word "node" is
used precisely here by Physicists), but this isn't the result
of continuous background changes. For example, quantum phenomena are
notoriously discontinuous, and such changes are not preceded by
continual or gradual quantitative increases, as this 'Law' demands. They occur
suddenly with no build-up. So, discontinuous quantum phenomena can't be
recruited to
fit this 'Law' -- unless, of course, it is altered on a
post hoc basis so that they can.
Naturally, that done, this 'Law' would no longer be
'objective'.

Several more comments on the
application of this 'Law' to microscopic and/or quantum phenomena will be
added at a later date.

Dialecticians often apply this "nodal" aspect of the
First 'Law' to
Capitalism -- in a bid to illustrate by analogy the revolutionary change from
one Mode of Production to another, as quantity allegedly builds into quality, at
some point initiating a sudden revolutionary 'leap'. [An excellent example of
this can be found
here, a more recent one is
Rees (2008);
another can be found
here. See also Molyneux (2012), pp.49-50.] But, how do we know that social
changes like this aren't like
solid-to-liquid phase or state of matter transformation we witness in metals,
glass or plastic? How do we know that they aren't gradual, too? Since Capitalism is clearly not a liquid,
but a solid of sorts, the transition to socialism should go rather
smoothly, if we rely on this analogy. [On this see Note 9.]

Interpreted that way, it looks as if the First
'Law' is of little
use to revolutionaries since it clearly suggests that they aren't needed,
and that Capitalism can be reformed away non-discontinuously -- a bit like the
way metal, say, can slowly melt, or the way that heads can slowly turn bald as
they lose their hair. Even worse, if this can happen and dialectical revolutionaries aren't needed, their
obsolete theory
isn't
either.2

[I hasten to add that I do not think
capitalism can be reformed away, but must be overthrown -- however, the analogy
drawn against Engels's First 'Law' could suggest this.]

But, this 'Law' is in difficulties in other respects,
too. Clearly not
every change in quantity "passes over" into a change in quality. And
yet, one way of
reading the "vice versa"codicil attached to this law suggests that they
should:

"The first law of the transformation of quantity into quality and
vice versa.
For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner
exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only
occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called
energy)…. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without
addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative
alteration of the body concerned." [Engels (1954),
p.63. Bold emphasis
added.]

"Yet the 'mechanical' conception amounts to nothing else.
It explains all change from change of place, all qualitative differences from
quantitative ones, and overlooks that the relation of quality and quantity is
reciprocal, that quality can become transformed into quantity just as much as
quantity into quality, that, in fact, reciprocal action takes place."
[Ibid.,
p.253. Bold emphasis
added. Quotation marks altered to conform to the
conventions adopted at this site.]

And he said the same in published work:

"In proof of this law we might have cited
hundreds of other similar facts from nature as well as from human society. Thus,
for example, the whole of Part IV of Marx's Capital -- production of
relative surplus-value -- deals, in the field of co-operation, division of
labour and manufacture, machinery and modern industry, with innumerable cases in
which quantitative change alters the quality, and also qualitative change
alters the quantity, of the things under consideration; in which therefore, to
use the expression so hated by Herr Dühring, quantity is transformed into
quality and vice versa. As for example the fact that the co-operation of
a number of people, the fusion of many forces into one single force, creates, to
use Marx's phrase, a 'new power', which is essentially different from the sum of
its separate forces." [Engels
(1972), p.160. Bold emphasis added; italic emphasis in the original.
Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site.]

Engels is quite clear here: just as quantity
passes over in quality, the reverse is also true, quality passes over into
quantity!

If this is so, then we should expect all
changes in quantity to "pass over" into changes in quality (or there would seem
to be no point to the vice versa codicil).

However, I have not been able to find a
single DM-theorist who interprets this 'Law' in this way (i.e., "reciprocally",
as Engels calls it), so perhaps I am the only one who has ever noticed this
'loop-hole' (in fact, it is more like a Grand Canyon) in
Engels's 'Law'. But, even if this weren't so, it would still be difficult to explain why
only some changes in quantity "pass over" into changes in quality. One
will look in vain for any attempt to address this problem in the highly clichéd
and repetitive writings churned out by DM-fans (on whose pages quantity definitely does not
morph into quality) -- or for some sort of vague recognition from these
clones that such a difficulty
even exists.

But, the "reciprocal" action of this 'Law' is hard to understand
for other reasons, too.
Is Engels saying that a "qualitative" change in matter passes over into
"quantity", i.e., that, say, the change from liquid water to steam adds
energy to the process? Or that, bald heads make their owners lose hair? If not, it is
not easy to see what this "reciprocal" aspect implies. [More on this
later.]

It could be argued that when steam condenses, or when ice melts,
latent heat
is released. So, a change in quality produces energy, just as Engels says.
However, quite apart from the fact that there is no change in quality here
(since the substance involved stays H2O
throughout), the reverse rule, if applied across the board, descends into
absurdity. For example, if a bald man loses his baldness, does this create new
matter or energy? Of course, the change itself is the result of new hair
growing, but that is an application of this 'Law' in forward gear, as it were --
that is, the gradual addition of new hair will change one quality
(bald) into another (hirsute). But, there is no way of making sense of the idea
that the change in quality here, of itself, creates new hair, which it
would have to do if this 'Law' is to work backwards. [I consider another example of
this 'law' supposedly working in reverse, here.]

[Word of warning: When confronted with examples like those
itemised below, DM-fans generally respond by pointing out that Engels's' Law
only applies to developing bodies and systems, which rules these
counter-examples out. I deal with that reply
here and
here.]

As we delve deeper, several more serious problems arise; for
example, the same number of molecules at
the same energy level can exhibit widely differing properties/qualities
depending on circumstances. Think of how the same amount of water can act
as a lubricant, or have the opposite effect, say, on wet clothes;
the same amount of sand can help some things slide, but prevent others
from doing so;
the same amount of poison given over a short space of time will kill, but
given over a longer period (in small doses) it could benefit the recipient --
Strychnine comes to
mind here.

To be sure, the effect of quantitative
stability of this sort
(supervenient
on definite qualitative change) is also sensitive to (1) time constraints and
(2) levels of concentration (of the substances involved), but this extremely
vague First 'Law' says nothing of these. And, try as one might, it isn't easy
to see how these unquestionably material
aspects of nature (concentration levels and duration) can be accommodated to the Ideal dialectical universe Engels
uncritically appropriated from Hegel (upside down or 'the right way up').

But, what sort of scientific 'Law' leaves
details like these out? In fact, if a Mickey Mouse 'Law' like this were to appear
in any of the genuine sciences, its author(s) would be treated with derision
-- and that is so even if it had been aired in an
undergraduate paper!

However, other recalcitrant examples
rapidly spring to mind: if the same colour is stared at for several minutes it
can undergo a qualitative change into another colour (several optical illusions
are based on this fact). Something similar can happen with regard to many
two-dimensional patterns and shapes (for example the
Necker Cube and other
optical illusions); these undergo considerable qualitative change when no
obvious quantitative differences are involved. There thus seem to be numerous
examples where quantity and quality do not appear to be connected in the way
that DM-theorists would have us believe.3

In fact, there are so many exceptions to this
'Law' that it might be wise to demote it and consign it to a more appropriate
category, perhaps classifying it alongside trite rules of thumb that sometimes work -- a bit
like "An apple a day keeps the doctor away", or even "A watched kettle
never boils".

Indeed, given the fact that this
'Law' has no discernible mathematical content it is rather surprising it
was ever called a law to begin with.

[Recall, I have responded to several obvious objections to
the above points in the Notes at the end -- links in the above
paragraphs.]

Nevertheless, the situation is even worse
than the above might suggest; there are countless examples in nature where significant
qualitative change can result from no obvious quantitative difference. These
include the qualitative dissimilarities that exist between different chemical
compounds
for the same quantity of matter/energy involved.

For instance,
Isomeric
molecules (studied in
stereochemistry)
represent a particularly good example
of this phenomenon. This is especially true of those that have so-called "chiral" centres (i.e., centres of asymmetry).
In such cases, the spatial ordering of the constituent atoms, not
their quantity, affects the overall quality of the resulting molecule -- which,
as we can see, Engels said couldn't happen:

"[Q]ualitative changes can only
occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called
energy)…. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body
without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative
alteration of the body concerned." [Engels (1954),
p.63.
Bold emphasis
alone added.]

Here, a change in molecular orientation
-- a change in geometry, not quantity -- alters quality.

[Word of warning, again: I have dealt with the
counter-argument that Engels's 'Law'
only applies to developing bodies and systems, hence the 'Isomers objection'
above is misguided, here and
here. Among other things, I point out that
Engels himself appeals to Isomers to illustrate this 'Law' -- e.g., Engels (1954),p.67-- so DM-fans can hardly object if use them to criticise
it!]

Consider one example of many: (R)-Carvone (spearmint) and
(S)-Carvone (caraway); these molecules have the same number of atoms (of the same elements),
and the same bond energies, but they are nonetheless
qualitatively distinct because of the different spatial arrangement of the atoms
involved. The same is true of some of the
Fullerenes.

Change in geometry -- change in quality.

This non-dialectical aspect of matter is especially true of
the so-called "Enantiomers" (i.e., symmetrical molecules that are mirror images
of each other). These include compounds like
(R)-2-clorobutane and (S)-2-chlorobutane, and the so-called
L- and D-molecules, which
rotate the plane of
polarised light the left (laevo) or the right (dextro) --
such as, L- and D-Tartaric
Acid. What might at first
sight appear to be small energy-neutral
differences like these have profound biochemical implications; a protein
with D-amino acids instead of L- will not work in
most living cells since the overwhelming majority of organisms metabolise L-organic molecules. These compounds not only have the same number of
atoms in each molecule, there are no apparent energy differences between them. Even so, they have easily distinguishable physical qualities.

Recall, too, that these are no less
material changes than any Engels himself considered, so no genuine
materialist should be embarrassed by them. It isn't as if I'm proposing
non-materialist causes here!

In response, it could be
argued that Engels
had already anticipated the above objection:

"It is surely hardly necessary to point out that
the various allotropic and aggregational states of bodies, because
they depend on various groupings of the molecules, depend on greater or lesser
quantities of motion communicated to the bodies.

"But what is the position in regard to change of
form of motion, or so-called energy? If we change heat into mechanical motion or
vice versa, is not the quality altered while the quantity remains the
same? Quite correct. But it is with change of form of motion...; anyone can be
virtuous by himself, for vices two are always necessary. Change of form of
motion is always a process that takes place between at least two bodies, of
which one loses a definite quantity of motion of one quality (e.g. heat),
while the other gains a corresponding quantity of motion of another quality
(mechanical motion, electricity, chemical decomposition). Here, therefore,
quantity and quality mutually correspond to each other. So far it has not been
found possible to convert motion from one form to another inside a single
isolated body." [Ibid.,
pp.63-64. Bold emphases added.]

However, Engels slides between
two different senses of "motion"
here: (1) change of place, and (2) energy added/subtracted. In this way, he is able to argue that
any change in the relation between bodies always amounts to a change in energy.
But, this depends on the nature of the field in which these bodies are embedded
(on this, see below, and
Note 4a);
Engels's profound lack of mathematical knowledge
clearly let him down here.

Independently of this, Engels also confused the expenditure
of energy with energy added to a system. The difference between the two
is easy to see. Imagine someone pushing a heavy packing case along a level
floor. In order to overcome friction, the one doing the pushing will have to
expend energy. But that energy has not been put into the packing case (as
it were). Now, if the same case is pushed up a hill, Physicists tell us that
recoverable energy has been put into the case in the form of
Potential Energy.

Now, as far as can be ascertained in the examples of interest to
dialecticians (but again, they are not at all clear on this), it is the
latter form of energy (but not necessarily always Potential Energy) that is
relevant to this 'Law', not the former. The former sort does not really change the quality of
any bodies concerned; the latter does. [Although, of course, in the limit it
can. Enough friction can melt a body, or set it on fire, for instance. I will
consider this presently.] If so, then the above
counter-examples (e.g., involving Enantiomers) will still apply, for the energy expended in
order to change one isomer into another is generally of the first sort, not the
second.

To be sure, some of the energy in the packing case example will
appear as heat (and/or perhaps sound), and will warm that case slightly. But
that energy will not be stored in the case as chemically
recoverable (i.e., structural, or new bond) energy.

Despite this, a few die-hard dialecticians could be found who might want to argue
that any expenditure of energy is relevant here. That would be an
unfortunate move since it would make this 'Law' trivial, for in that case it
would amount to the belief that any change at all (no matter how remote),
since it involves the expenditure of some form of energy somewhere (but
not necessarily energy put 'into' the bodies concerned), is the cause of qualitative change to
other bodies somewhere else. This would make a mockery of Engels's claim that only energy
added to the bodies concerned is relevant to this 'Law'.

"Change of form of motion is always a process
that takes place between at least two bodies, of which one loses a definite
quantity of motion of one quality (e.g. heat), while the other gains a
corresponding quantity of motion of another quality (mechanical motion,
electricity, chemical decomposition)." [Ibid.
Bold emphasis added.]

Several examples of this sort of change are given
below. The problems this creates are discussed at length in
Note 5 and Note 6a, where
attempts to delineate the
thermodynamic boundaries of the local energy budget involved (which
would have to be specified in order to prevent remote objects/energy expenditure
being allowed to cause proximate change) are all
shown to fail.

Moreover, as noted above, Engels himself considered
isomers as an example of the 'Law', even though there is no "development" in
this case! [On that, see here.]

Finally, Engels seems to think it is always clear what
constitutes a single body:

"Here, therefore, quantity and quality mutually
correspond to each other. So far it has not been found possible to convert
motion from one form to another inside a single isolated body." [Ibid.]

However, nature is not quite so accommodating. In fact, when we
look at the material world, and refuse to impose an a priori scheme like
this on it, we see that the picture is not as straightforward as Engels would
have us believe. Indeed, as we will soon discover, it is easy "to convert
motion from one form to another inside a single isolated body."The reader is again directed to Note
5 and Note 6a for more
details.

Even more embarrassing for this 'Law' are tautomers; these
feature as an:

"isomerism in which the
isomers change into one another with great ease so that they ordinarily exist
together in equilibrium." [Quoted from
here.]

Wikipedia characterises them in the following way:

"Tautomers
are organic compounds that
are interconvertible by a chemical reaction called
tautomerization. As most commonly encountered, this reaction results in
the formal migration of a hydrogen atom or proton, accompanied by a
switch of a single bond and adjacent
double bond. In solutions
where tautomerization is possible, a chemical equilibrium of
the tautomers will be reached. The exact ratio of the tautomers depends on
several factors, including temperature, solvent, and
pH.
The concept of tautomers that are interconvertible by tautomerizations is called
tautomerism. Tautomerism is a special case of structural isomerism and
can play an important role in non-canonical base pairing in DNA and especially RNA molecules.

"Prototropic tautomerism refers to the relocation
of a proton, as in the above examples, and may be considered a subset of
acid-base behaviour. Prototropic tautomers are sets of isomeric protonation states with the
same empirical formula and
total charge.

"Annular tautomerism is a type of prototropic
tautomerism where a proton can occupy two or more positions of a heterocyclic
system. For example, 1H- and 3H-imidazole;
1H-, 2H- and 4H-
1,2,4-triazole; 1H- and 2H-
isoindole.

"Ring-chain tautomerism occurs when the movement of
the proton is accompanied by a change from an open structure to a ring, such as
the aldehyde and pyran forms of glucose.

"Valence tautomerism is distinct from prototropic
tautomerism, and involves processes with rapid reorganisation of bonding
electrons. An example of this type of tautomerism can be found in bullvalene. Another
example is open and closed forms of certain heterocycles, such as
azide -- tetrazole. Valence
tautomerism requires a change in molecular geometry and should not be confused
with canonical
resonance structures
or mesomers." [Quoted from
here;
accessed 05/10/08. Paragraph numbering altered; spelling changed to conform to
UK English. Several links added.]

One standard Organic Chemistry text defines tautomers as follows:

"Tautomers are isomers differing only in the position of
hydrogen atoms and electrons. Otherwise the carbon skeleton is the same."
[Clayden, et al (2001), p.205.]

On enol tautomerism, it adds:

"In the case of dimedone, the enol must
be formed by a transfer of a proton from the central CH2
group of the keto form to one of the
OH groups.

"Notice that there is no change in pH -- a proton is lost
from carbon and gained on oxygen. The reaction is known as enolization as it is
the conversion of a carbonyl compound into an
enol. It is a strange reaction in which little happens. The product is almost
always the same as the starting material since the only change is the transfer
of one proton and the shift of the double bond." [Ibid., pp.524-25.]

Even though many of these reactions require
catalysts
(which add no energy or matter to the original compounds), these are
qualitatively different substances, refuting the First 'Law'. This is a
particularly intractable series of counter-examples because it involves the
"development" of one substance into another.

Of course, it could be argued that the above Wikipedia source acknowledges
the fact
that there is a change in matter or energy between the resonating isomers -- for
example, here:

"Tautomers
are organic compounds that
are interconvertible by a chemical reaction called tautomerization. As most commonly encountered, this reaction results in
the formal migration of a hydrogen atom or proton, accompanied by a
switch of a single bond and adjacent double bond. [Wikipedia. Link
above. Bold
added.]

But, no energy or matter is added to the molecule, it is merely
re-distributed within that molecule, as Clayden et al points out.

Resonance
(mesomerism) is more controversial still,4a0
but no less fatal to this 'Law':

"Though resonance is often introduced in such a
diagrammatic form in elementary chemistry, it actually has a deeper significance
in the mathematical formalism of valence bond theory (VB).
When a molecule can't be represented by the standard tools of valence bond
theory (promotion, hybridisation,
orbital
overlap, sigma and
pi bond formation) because no single
structure predicted by VB can account for all the properties of the molecule,
one invokes the concept of resonance.

"Valence bond theory gives us a model for
benzene where
each carbon atom makes two sigma bonds with its neighbouring carbon atoms and
one with a hydrogen atom. But since carbon is
tetravalent, it has the ability to
form one more bond. In VB it can form this extra bond with either of the
neighbouring carbon atoms, giving rise to the familiar Kekulé ring structure.
But this can't account for all carbon-carbon bond lengths being equal in
benzene. A solution is to write the actual
wavefunction of the molecule as a linear
superposition of the two possible Kekulé structures (or rather the wavefunctions
representing these structures), creating a wavefunction that is neither of its
components but rather a superposition of them, just as in the
vector analogy
above (which is formally equivalent to this situation).

"In benzene both Kekulé structures have equal weight, but
this need not be the case. In general, the superposition is written with
undetermined constant coefficients, which are then variationally optimized to
find the lowest possible energy for the given set of basis wavefunctions. This
is taken to be the best approximation that can be made to the real structure,
though a better one may be made with addition of more structures.

"In molecular orbital [MO --
RL] theory,
the main alternative to VB, resonance often (but not always) translates to a
delocalization of electrons
in
pi orbitals (which are a separate concept from pi bonds in VB). For example,
in benzene, the MO model gives us 6 pi electrons completely delocalised over all
6 carbon atoms, thus contributing something like half-bonds. This MO
interpretation has inspired the picture of the benzene ring as a hexagon with a
circle inside. Often when describing benzene the VB picture and the MO picture
are intermixed, talking both about localized sigma 'bonds' (strictly a concept
from VB) and 'delocalized' pi electrons (strictly a concept from MO)." [Quoted
from here;
accessed 05/10/08.]

Figure One: Examples Of Resonance

In view of the fact that these are distinct qualitative
variations on a common theme, created by no new energy or matter added to the
body in question, it seems
therefore
this luckless First 'Law' has been refuted yet again.

[Word of warning, again: When confronted with examples
like those listed below, DM-fans generally respond by pointing out that Engels's' Law
only applies to developing bodies and systems, which supposedly rules these
counter-examples out. Once more, I have dealt with that objection
here and
here.]

Moving into Physics,
consider the Triple Point:

"In thermodynamics, the triple
point of
a substance is the
temperature and pressure
at which three phases (for example, gas,
liquid, and solid) of that substance coexist in thermodynamic equilibrium.
For example, the triple point of mercury
occurs at a temperature of −38.8344°C and a pressure of 0.2 mPa." [Quoted from
here.]

Once again, we have here changes in quality with no addition of energy
or matter at that point.

Moreover, if
two or more forces are aligned differently,
the qualitative results will invariably be altered even where the overall
magnitude of each force is held constant.

Consider just one
example: let forces F1 and
F2 be situated in parallel (but not along the same
line of action),
and diametrically opposed to one another. Here, these two forces can exercise a
turning effect on a suitably placed body. Now, arrange the same two forces in like manner so that they are still
parallel, but act diametrically along the same line (i.e., these
two force vectors have opposite senses). In this case, as seems clear, these
forces will have no turning effect on the same body. Here we have a change in quality with no
change in quantity, once more. Since there are many ways to align forces (as there are with
other vector
quantities, like velocities and accelerations, etc.), there are countless
counter-examples to the rather pathetic First 'Law' here alone.4a

Perhaps more significantly, this 'Law' takes
no account of qualitative changes that result from (energetically-neutral) ordering relations in nature and society. Here, identical physical
structures and processes can be ordered differently to create significant
qualitative changes. One example is the different ordering principles found in
music, where an alteration to a sequence of the same notes in a chord or
in a melody can have a major qualitative impact on harmony, with no quantitative
change anywhere apparent. So, the same seven notes (i.e., tones and semi-tones)
arranged in different
modes (Ionian, Dorian, Phrygian, Lydian, Mixolydian,
Aolean and Locrian) sound totally different to the human ear. Of course, there
are other ways of altering the quality of music in an energetically neutral
environment over and above this (such as timing).

Another example
along the same lines concerns the ordering principles found in language, where
significant qualitative changes can result from the re-arrangement of the same parts of
speech. For instance, the same number of letters jumbled up can either
make sense or no sense, as the case may be -- as in, say, "dialectics" and
"csdileati" (which is "dialectics" scrambled). [Which one of these makes more sense I will
leave it to the reader to decide.]

Perhaps more radically, the same words can
mean something qualitatively new if sequenced differently, as in, say: "The cat
is on the mat" and "The mat is on the cat". Or, even worse: "It
is impossible to understand Marx's Capital, and especially its first
chapter, without having thoroughly studied and understood the whole of Hegel's
Logic", compared
with "It
is impossible to understand Hegel's Logic, and especially its first
chapter, without having thoroughly studied and understood the whole of Marx's
Capital." Here there is considerable qualitative difference with no
quantitative change at all.

[What are the odds that Engels would have tried to alter his
First
'Law' to counter that awkward fact?]

There are many other examples of this phenomenon, but a few more
should suffice for the purposes of this Essay: a successful strike (one that
is, say, planned first then actioned second) could turn into its
opposite (if it is actioned first and planned second). Now even
though the total energy input here would be ordered differently in each case,
the overall energy budget of the system (howsoever that is characterised) need not be
any different. So,
the
addition of no extra matter or energy here can turn successful action into
disaster if the order of events is reversed. Of course, we can all imagine
situations where this particular example could involve different energy budgets, but this
is not necessarily the case, which is all I need.

There are literally thousands of everyday
examples of such qualitative changes (where there are no obvious associated quantitative
differences),
so many in fact that Engels's First 'Law' begins to look even more pathetic in
comparison. Who, for example, would put food on the table then a plate on top of
it? A change in the order here would constitute a qualitatively different (and
more normal) act: plate first, food second. Which of us would jump out of an
aeroplane first and put their parachute on second -- or cross a road first, look
second? And is there a sane person on the planet who goes to the toilet first
and gets out of bed second? Moreover,
only an idiot would pour 500 ml of water
slowly into 1000 ml of concentrated
Sulphuric Acid, whereas, someone who knew
what they were doing would readily do the reverse. But, all of these have
profound qualitative differences if performed in the wrong order (for the same
energy budget).5

How could Engels have missed
examples like these? Is dialectical myopia so crippling that it prevents
dialecticians using their common sense?

Pushing these ideas further: context, too, can
affect quality in a quantitatively neutral environment. So, a dead body
in a living room has a different qualitative significance compared to that same
body in the morgue (for the same energy input). A million pounds in my bank account has a different
qualitative feel to it when compared to the same money in yours.

"Ceci n'est pas une pipe" has a different
qualitative aspect if appended to a picture of a pipe, compared to being
attached to a picture of, say, a cigarette. Indeed, "Ceci n'est pas une pipe" itself can change from
qualitatively false to true depending on how it is interpreted. Hence, as a
depiction of what the painting by
Magritte is about (i.e., a pipe) it is false.
But, despite this, it is also literally true, since manifestly a picture of a
pipe is not a pipe! Change in quality here, but no change in quantity.6

Figure Two: Gallic Refutation?

Furthermore, qualitative change can be induced by other
qualitative changes, contrary to Engels's claim:

"...[Q]ualitative changes can
only occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or
motion...."[Engels (1954), p.63. Emphasis added]

For example, in a 1:1
mixture of paint, one litre of brown can be made by mixing two half litres each of red and green,
but the same qualitative effect can be achieved by using less or more of both
(say, 2 litres of each), but in the same ratio. Here a change in the quantity of mixed paints has no
effect on the qualitative properties of the mixture (i.e., its colour) that
results, while
the qualities that are mixed have. In this
case, two qualities (two colours) will have changed into a new quality (a new
colour) when mixed. Not only do the same amounts (and proportions) of red and
green paint exist before and after mixing, for any fixed amount of each, the two former qualities
will have merged
into a single quality. So, here we have qualitative change produced by qualitative change.

Of course, it could be argued that the
mixture contains more paint than it did before (which means that there actually has been a
quantitative change), but this is not
so. In general, prior to mixing there were n litres of each colour (and 2n
litres of both) preserving the 1:1 ratio; after mixing the same amount of paint still exists,
namely n litres of each (and 2n litres of both, for any n), still preserving the
1:1 proportion. The qualitative
change in colour has nothing to do with the quantities involved, but everything
to do with the mixing of the two previous qualities in the same ratio.

To be sure, if the ratio
of the mixed paints were changed, a different qualitative outcome would emerge, but as noted above, even
this won't happen "nodally", and so it seems to be of little relevance
to the First 'Law'. Hence, if the ratio is kept the same, we would have here a
change in quality initiated by qualitative change only, and not by an increase in
quantity.6a

And this example also applies to the
development of this body of matter; at the start we had 2n litres of paint,
and we finished with 2n litres. But, at the end we also have a new quality (a new
colour) created by no increase in matter. And, the same will be true if these
mixtures are increased indefinitely by the continuous addition of paint (in the
same ratio -- say, by pouring it into a huge vat at the same rate from two
pipes -- both of which are fed from two tanks, the entire ensemble located in
one room of a factory); here the "same object" will be this particular room, to
which no new energy or matter has been 'added'. Moreover, what applies to colour will apply to other qualities, too --
for example, heat (where the mixing of two 2n litres of hot and cold water
creates a warm mixture also of 2n litres).

In addition, mixing 2n litres of molten metal (with
severally different qualities) can lead to a qualitatively new
alloy, for
example, brass
or pewter.
This point clearly applies to any mixing of 2n units (or other amounts) of any
sort of matter. Indeed, something similar can be achieved with the mixing of an
assortment of chemicals
(as solids, liquids, or gases) that are capable of being mixed, as it can with light, sounds and
tastes.7

Matter in general is thus
reassuringly non-dialectical.

Any who object to these examples need only reflect on the fact
that they do not represent a challenge to materialism (since they are all manifestly
material
changes), they merely throw into doubt Engels's rather restrictive 'Law'.

In short, only someone more intent on defending Engels than
they are in understanding nature will find reason to cavil at this point.

Other instances of qualitative change where
there is no implied change in quantity include the following: the "Big Bang"
(if it actually happened) led to the formation of a whole universe of
qualitative changes, with no overall increase in energy or matter (in the
universe). Now, here we have a massive change in quality (with Galaxies and
planets, and all the rest, emerging out of the original debris) with no overall
change in the quantity of energy in the universe.

In the limit, we have the following: the "Big Bang"
(so we are told) led to the formation of a whole universe of
qualitative changes, with no overall increase in energy or matter (in the
universe). Now, here we have a massive change in quality (with Galaxies and
planets, and all the rest, emerging out of the original debris) with no overall
change in the quantity of energy in the universe.

As should seem plain, this constitutes the
ultimate counter-example to this rather pathetic 'Law': the development of
everything refutes it.

On the other hand, if the 'Big Bang' example is
rejected
-- and an infinite universe is postulated in its place -- since there can be no increase in energy
in the entire universe, any qualitative changes in the whole of nature will
still occur with no
increase in the universal quantity of energy.

The largest cut diamond on earth (in a safe, say, in New York) could change
into the second largest if another, bigger diamond is cut in, say, Amsterdam. This
example also applies to other remote changes. For instance, the biggest star in a
galaxy could become the second biggest if another star hundreds of millions of
light years away (but in the same galaxy) grows in size (perhaps over millions
of years) through accretion of matter. So, in both cases, there would be a
qualitative change to the first object with no relevant matter or energy added or
subtracted from/to that object. There are countless examples of remote change like this.

A
cheque drawn, say, in New York will become instantaneously worthless
(qualitative change) if the issuing bank in Tokyo goes bust (meaning that no
quantitative change will have happened to that cheque).

A Silver Medallist in,
say, the Olympics can become the Gold Medal winner in a certain event (qualitative
change) if the former Gold medallist is disqualified because of drug-taking
(meaning that no quantitative change will have occurred to that Silver
Medallist).

[Notice that many of the examples in the last
few paragraphs relate to developmental changes.]

Two identical "Keep off the Grass" signs can mean
something different (qualitative change) if one of them is posted on a garden lawn and
the other is
positioned near a stand of Marijuana plants, at the same height above sea level
(thus, with no difference in energy).

A circle looks like an ellipse
(qualitative change) when viewed from certain angles for no change in energy.

The same three
mathematical (or physical) points can undergo a qualitative change if, say, from
being arranged linearly they are then re-arranged as the corners of a triangle
(with no energy added to these points). Here, there would be a qualitative change with no quantitative change,
once again.
There are, of course, a potentially infinite number of examples of that
sort of change imaginable for 2-, or 3-dimensional shapes, for n points (be
they mathematical or physical -- so this isn't necessarily an abstract
set of counter-instances).8

Worse still, as we saw
earlier, the aforementioned
"reciprocal" "vice versa" codicil attached by Engels
to this 'Law' renders it totally useless -- if not completely crazy --, since it
suggests, for instance, that qualitative change can effect quantitative
material change. Consider this example of Trotsky's:

"A housewife knows that a
certain amount of salt flavours soup agreeably, but that added salt makes the
soup unpalatable. Consequently, an illiterate peasant woman guides herself in
cooking soup by the Hegelian law of the transformation of quantity into
quality…." [Trotsky (1971),
p.106.]

Engels's vice versa
codicil suggests that a change in quality from "palatable" to "too salty" can
create an increase in the salt content of soup!

Now, this is not an unsympathetic
interpretation on my part, for, as we have already seen, Engels himself signed up to it:

"Yet the 'mechanical' conception amounts to nothing else.
It explains all change from change of place, all qualitative differences from
quantitative ones, and overlooks that the relation of quality and quantity is
reciprocal, that quality can become transformed into quantity just as much as
quantity into quality, that, in fact, reciprocal action takes place."
[Engels (1954),
p.253. Bold emphasis added; quotation marks altered to conform to the
conventions adopted at this site.]

As did Novack:

"The
dialectical process of development does not end with the transformation of
quantity into quality…. The process continues in the opposite direction and
converts new quality into new quantity." [Novack (1971), p.92.]

This suggests that changes in quality are
capable of
inducing quantitative changes, that is, that new matter or energy can be created
by a qualitative change!

Hence, as noted above, if this vice versa codicil is to
be believed, a
qualitative change from, say, unpalatable soup to tasty-soup would in
effect produce
a quantitative pay-off: it must cause soup to have more salt in
it! Clearly this magic trick will be of interest to those who still (foolishly)
think that matter and energy can't be created ex nihilo. And yet there
seems to be no other way of reading the vice versa codicil except as just
such a 'metaphysical blank cheque'.

It could be objected that such a qualitative change will have
been produced by a quantitative increase in salt, but that is just the First 'Law'
applied in forward gear, as it were. If we apply that 'Law' in reverse, then we
can't appeal to a quantitative increase leading to a qualitative change, but
must appeal to a qualitative change inducing a quantitative change -- that is,
that a change in taste must be able to create salt out of thin air.

Nevertheless, it is worth examining
Trotsky's
anecdote more closely, since it will help expose the many serious errors and
confusions that afflict even the few examples dialecticians have
scraped together to illustrate this ramshackle 'Law.'

"Every individual is a
dialectician to some extent or other, in most cases, unconsciously. A
housewife knows that a certain amount of salt flavours soup agreeably, but that
added salt makes the soup unpalatable. Consequently, an illiterate peasant woman
guides herself in cooking soup by the Hegelian law of the transformation of
quantity into quality…. Even animals arrive at their practical conclusions…on
the basis of the Hegelian dialectic. Thus a fox is aware that quadrupeds and
birds are nutritious and tasty…. When the same fox, however, encounters the
first animal which exceeds it in size, for example, a wolf, it quickly concludes
that quantity passes into quality, and turns to flee. Clearly, the legs of a fox
are equipped with Hegelian tendencies, even if not fully conscious ones. All
this demonstrates, in passing, that our methods of thought, both formal logic
and the dialectic, are not arbitrary constructions of our reason but rather
expressions of the actual inter-relationships in nature itself. In this sense
the universe is permeated with ‘unconscious’ dialectics." [Trotsky
(1971),
pp.106-07.]

But, what exactly did Trotsky imagine the change of quantity into
quality to be, here?

Does an increase in the quantity of salt alter
the salt's own
quality? Presumably not. Does the quantity of soup change? Perhaps only
marginally; but even so, the quantity of soup is not what allegedly changed
the quality of the soup -- that is supposed to have resulted from the quantity of salt added.

In fact,
the quantity of the original soup has not actually changed -- merely the quantity of the
salt/soup mixture --; and neither has the quality of the salt altered (just its alleged
quantity).

What appears to have happened (in this less than half-formed
'thought experiment') is that the addition of too much salt to the soup is
supposed to change the taste of the resulting salt/soup mixture as this is perceived by the taster. Hence, at a certain
("nodal") point, a further increase in the quantity of salt alters the quality (i.e., the taste) of the soup, so that its
acceptability changes either side of that juncture.

But, once more, even here the
increased quantity of salt has not passed over into any change in
itsown quality. What has occurred is that one quality (a palatable taste) has
morphed into another quality (an unpalatable taste) as a result of a
quantitative change made to one ingredient (salt) added to the salt/soup mixture. So, a
certain
quality of the soup has changed from being acceptable to being
unacceptable as a result of the increased quantity of salt that the mixture contains.

However, the relevant quality of the added salt remains the same no matter
how much is added. Salt is (largely)
Sodium Chloride, and it tastes salty whether it is delivered by the spoon, the bucket
or the train-load. In that case, neither the quantity nor the quality of the
salt has "passed over" into anything in the salt; there does not therefore seem to be
anything in the initial part of this
story for that particular aspect of the salt to "pass over" into.

Consequently, the first half of this 'Law' is
either mis-stated or it does not apply in this case -- i.e., to the salt.

As far as the second half is concerned (i.e., the alleged
alteration in quality eitherin the salt or the soup), the postulated change relates to the taste of the
soup. But manifestly, the soup remains salty no matter how much salt is
poured in, as we saw. What we seem to have here is a batch of soup that becomes
increasingly salty as more salt is added.

What qualitative change then is meant to
have taken place? Again, it seems that this change relates to the acceptability of the
taste of the soup as perceived by the taster. Hence, at -- or slightly
beyond -- the alleged "nodal" point, the taste of the soup will become
objectionable. But, this particular change is confined to the one doing the tasting.
Manifestly, it isn't
the soup that alters in this respect. On one side of the "nodal" point the soup is objectively salty (i.e., it
contains dissolved salt); on the other side it is still objectively
salty, but with more salt in it. The difference is that on one side, the taster
tolerated the taste and continued to like it, but on the other side the taste
became intolerable and she ceased to enjoy what she was sampling. This means that the soup
itself has not actually changed in this respect, merely the taster's appreciation of it
that has.

It now seems that a change in the quantity (of salt) does not
actually affect the soup –- except, perhaps, its volume (very slightly)
and its composition as a salt/soup mixture. No matter how much salt is dumped
into the soup it remains just that, a salt/soup mixture, only with higher
proportions of the former ingredient -– and this is so even at the limit where
it perhaps turns into sludge or a semi-solid lump, or whatever. A trillion tons of salt can't
change that.8a

Consequently, even with
respect to the relevant quality (interpreting the latter as this salt/soup
mixture, if it can be so described), the concoction does not change (or, at
least, not in a way that is relevant to Trotsky's purposes). Hence, a change in
the quantity of salt has not "passed over" into a change in the quality of the
soup (as soup), which means that the second part of this 'Law' seems to be defective, too.

If there is a qualitative change
anywhere at all (which is relevant to the point Trotsky is trying to make), it seems to
occur in the third party -– that is, in the taster. We are forced
to interpret things this way unless, of course, we are to suppose that tastes
actually reside 'objectively' in soups, as one of their alleged 'primary' qualities. If
that were so, qualities like this (that reside in soups, and not
solely in tasters) would have to be able to
alter 'objectively', even when they
are not being tasted! But, it can't
mean that; no sane dialectician (one imagines!) believes that tastes reside in
the objects we eat. Hence, if this 'Law' is to work in this case, the qualitative
change must reside in the soup-taster, not the soup.8b

If so, this qualitative change must have been
induced by a quantitative change in the taster, if the 'Law' is to apply to her. But, what quantitative change
could have taken place in this taster that might have prompted a
corresponding change in (her) quality, or in her changed perception of a
quality? Does she grow new nerve cells, or an extra head? In fact, there's none at all -- or, none that
Trotsky mentioned, and certainly none that is obvious.

Plainly, it is a
quantitative change in the salt/soup mixture that altered its quality as
perceived by that
taster, but it had no effect on any quality actually in the soup (as
previous comments sought to show -- tastes do not reside in soups!). But, there now seem to be no
(relevant) quantitative
changes in the taster which initiate a corresponding qualitative change in her.

In that case, the best
that can be made of this half-baked example is that while quantitative change
leads to no qualitative change in some things (i.e., soups), it can prompt certain
qualitative changes in other things
(i.e., tasters), the latter of which were not caused by any quantitative
changes in those things themselves, but by something altogether mysterious.

So, the second part of the 'Law' is
now doubly defective.

Of course, it could be objected that there is indeed a
quantitative change in the said taster, namely the quantitative increase in salt
particles hitting her tongue. But, this just pushes the problem one stage
further back, for unless we are to suppose that tastes reside in salt molecules
(or in Sodium and Chlorine
ions), the qualitative change we seek will still have
occurred in the taster and not in the chemicals in her mouth -- and we are back where we were
a few paragraphs back.
There seems to be no quantitative change to the taster apparent here; she
does not grow another tongue or gain more taste buds. It is undeniable that
there will have been an increase in salt molecules hitting her tongue,
and that these will have a causal effect on the change in taste as she perceives
it, but even
given all that, no change in quantity to the taster herself will have taken
place.

Again, it could be objected that there is a
material/energetic change here; matter or energy will have been transferred to the
taster (and/or her central nervous system) which causes her to experience a qualitative change in her appreciation of
the soup.

In fact, what has happened is that the original salt has merged/interacted with
the taster's tongue/nervous system upon being ingested. But, it is at precisely
that point that the
earlier problems associated with the salt/soup mixture now transfer to the
salt/nervous system 'mixture'.
Since tastes do not exist in nerves any more than they exist in soups, we are no
further forward. And, as far as changes to the quantity of the taster is concerned,
this will depend on how we draw the boundaries between inorganic salt molecules
and living cells. Since this 'difficulty' is considered in more detail below, no more will be
said about it here.

[This section continues the argument (set out
in the previous one) against Trotsky's attempt to illustrate Engels's First
'Law' with a parable about a cook
adding some salt to soup.]

In any case, it seems rather odd to describe a change in taste
(or in the appreciation of taste) as
a qualitative change to a taster, whatever caused it. As the term "quality" is
understood by dialecticians, this can't in fact be a qualitative change
of the sort they require. Qualities, as characterised by dialecticians -- or, rather, by those that bother to say
what they mean by this word -- are those properties of bodies/processes
that make them what they are, alteration to which will change that body/process into
something else:

"Each of the three spheres of the logical idea proves to be a systematic whole
of thought-terms, and a phase of the Absolute. This is the case with Being,
containing the three grades of quality, quantity and
measure.

"Quality is, in the first place, the character identical with being: so
identical that a thing ceases to be what it is, if it loses its quality.
Quantity, on the contrary, is the character external to being, and does not
affect the being at all. Thus, e.g. a house remains what it is, whether it be
greater or smaller; and red remains red, whether it be brighter or darker."
[Hegel (1975),
p.124, §85.]

As the Glossary at the Marx Internet Archive notes:

"Quality is an aspect of something by which it is what it is and not something
else and reflects that which is stable amidst variation. Quantity is an aspect
of something which may change (become more or less) without the thing thereby
becoming something else.

"Thus, if
something changes to an extent that it is no longer the same kind of thing, this
is a 'qualitative change', whereas a change in something by which it still the
same thing, though more or less, bigger or smaller, is a 'quantitative
change'.

"In Hegel's
Logic, Quality is the first
division of Being, when the world is
just one thing after another, so to speak, while Quantity is the second
division, where perception has progressed to the point of recognising what is
stable within the ups and downs of things. The third and final stage, Measure, the unity of
quality and quantity, denotes the knowledge of just when quantitative change
becomes qualitative change." [Quoted from
here.
Accessed August 2007. This definition has been altered slightly since.]

This is an Aristotelian notion.

Cornforth tries gamely to tell us what a 'dialectical quality'
is:

"For instance, if a piece of
iron is painted black and instead we paint it red, that is merely an external
alteration..., but it is not a qualitative change in the sense we are here
defining. On the other hand, if the iron is heated to melting point, then this
is such a qualitative change. And it comes about precisely as a change in the
attraction-repulsion relationship characteristic of the internal molecular state
of the metal. The metal passes from the solid to liquid state, its internal
character and laws of motion become different in certain ways, it undergoes a
qualitative change." [Cornforth (1976), p.99.]

And yet, as we have seen, no new substance emerges as a result;
liquid iron, gold and aluminium is still gold, iron and aluminium. [Worse,
metals melt slowly, not nodally!]

Of course, it could be argued that liquid and solid states of matter are, as
Cornforth seems to think, different kinds of things,
as required by the definition. But, to describe something as a liquid isn't to
present a kind of thing, since liquids comprise many different kinds of
things. The same is true of gases and solids. So, a state of matter isn't a
"kind of thing" but a quality possessed by kinds of things
-- so we speak of liquid iron, liquid mercury, gaseous oxygen, gaseous
nitrogen; and if that quality
changes, the "kind of thing" that a particular substance is does not (in
general) change. To be sure, some substances change when heat is added -- for example,
Ammonium Chloride (solid)
sublimates into Ammonia gas and Hydrochloric Acid (when heated), but this
isn't typical. [In fact, DM-theorists would be on firmer ground here (no pun
intended) than they
are with their clichéd water as a liquid, solid or gas example.] Again, liquid mercury
is still mercury just as solid mercury is. Melted sugar is still sugar. So is
plastic, and so are all the metals. The elements aren't situated where they are in
the Periodic Table because they are solid, liquid or gas, but because of their
Atomic
Number. This shows that states of matter aren't "kinds of things"; if
they were, solid mercury would no longer be mercury.8b1

But, the volunteered DM-objection at the beginning of the previous
paragraph (that different states of matter are different "kinds of things"),
should it ever be advanced by a dialectician, only goes to show how vague the 'definition'
of "quality" is. Indeed, it
allows DM-fans to count different states of matter -- but not shape, colour,
heat or motion -- as different "kind of things"; so that, for example, an
object in motion isn't counted as a different "kind of thing" from the same
object at rest; or that spherical or cylindrical ingots of iron aren't different
"kinds of thing". Sure, gases, liquids and solids have different physical
properties, but so do moving and stationary bodies, and so do spherical and
cylindrical objects. And so do different colours; as do coloured objects. It isn't easy to see why green
and red objects aren't different "kinds of things" if liquids and solids are
allowed to be. And, it is no use pointing to the "objective" nature of states of matter as
opposed to the "subjective" nature of colour, since shape and motion are just as
"objective".

Other than Cornforth,
Kuusinen is one of the few DM-theorists who
seems to make any note of this
'difficulty':

"The totality of essential features that make a
particular thing or phenomenon what it is and distinguishes it from others, is
called its quality.... It is...[a] concept that denotes the inseparable
distinguishing features, the inner structure, constituting the definiteness of a
phenomenon and without which it cease to be what it is." [Kuusinen (1961),
pp.83-84. Italic emphasis in the original.]

But, it isn't at all clear that someone's liking/not liking
soup defines them as a person -- or as a being of a particular sort.
While scientists might decide to classify certain aspects of nature (placing
them in whatever categories they see fit), none, as far as I'm aware, has so
far identified two different sorts of human beings: "soup-likers for n
milligrams of salt per m litres of soup versus soup-dislikers for the same or
different n or m". And even if they were to do this, that would merely save this part of DM by
means of a re-definition, since it is reasonably clear that these two different sorts of
human beings do not actually exist -- , or, at least, they didn't until I just invented them.
Once again, that would make this part of DM eminently subjective, too, since it would
imply that changes in quality are relative to a choice of descriptive framework.
Once again, this introduces a fundamental element of arbitrariness into what
dialecticians claim is a
scientific law.

Moreover, as has also been noted, H2O
as ice, water or steam, is still H2O.
As a liquid or a gas,
Helium is
still Helium.
If so, these changes can't apply to any of the qualities covered by
the DM/Aristotelian/Hegelian principles quoted above. So, it now seems that these
hackneyed examples of
Q«Q
either undermine the meaning of a key
DM-concept on which this 'Law' was supposedly based (i.e., "quality"),
vitiating its applicability in such instances -- or they weren't examples of
this 'Law', to begin with.8b2

Update 07/03/2014: I have just received a copy of
Burger et al (1980), the existence of which I had been unaware until a
few weeks ago. One of the contributors to this book [i.e., Erwin Marquit
(Marquit (1980)] makes a valiant attempt to define "quality" (and "system"),
among other things. In fact, it is the best attempt I have seen to date.
Unfortunately, this attempt fails badly; I will add some thoughts on this over
the next few months.

Given this new twist, it now seems that quantitative changes to
material bodies (such as salt/soup mixtures) actually cause changes to sensory
systems (of a vague and perhaps non-quantitative -- or even non-qualitative
-- kind); these in turn bring
about some sort of qualitative change in the sensory modalities of the
tasters involved. If so, the original 'Law' (applied in this
area) is woefully wide of the
mark; it should have read something like the following:

E1: Change in quantity merely causes change in quantity
to the material bodies involved [no misprint!], but at a certain point this causes qualitative
alterations (but these might not be Hegelian, or even Aristotelian, qualities)
to the way some human beings perceive the world, even though these
individuals have not
undergone a quantitative change themselves.

Put like this, it isn't at all clear that anyone would
conclude this (or anything like it) from their cooking soup (as Trotsky
maintained). And we can be pretty sure about that-- since not even Engels got close to this more
accurate version of his own 'Law'. Nor did Trotsky! It is scarcely
credible that non-dialectical cooks, workers, or anyone else, for that matter,
would advance much further -- or even this far -– based only on their own
experience.

Of course, this can only mean that peasant
cooks are not "unconscious dialecticians", and neither is anyone else outside
the DM-fraternity --, and this is probably because they are not quite so easily
conned by mystical Idealists.

[I resume my analysis of the other things Trotsky said above
(about foxes, etc.) in Essay Nine
Part One.]

Anyone who
still thinks Trotsky is right in what he says about animals should check out
the following video, which shows an ordinary-sized domestic cat
chasing off two much larger alligators:

Video Six: Trotsky Trumped?

Yet another catastrophic failure of Engels's 'Law'...?

And here is a video of a cat chasing off a larger dog, which was
attacking a small boy:

Nevertheless, the above 'definitions' of "quantity" and "quality"
aren't without their own problems.

"Each of the three spheres of the logical idea proves to be a systematic whole
of thought-terms, and a phase of the Absolute. This is the case with Being,
containing the three grades of quality, quantity and
measure.

"Quality is, in the first place, the character identical with being: so
identical that a thing ceases to be what it is, if it loses its quality.
Quantity, on the contrary, is the character external to being, and does not
affect the being at all. Thus, e.g. a house remains what it is, whether it be
greater or smaller; and red remains red, whether it be brighter or darker."
[Hegel (1975),
p.124, §85.]

"Quality is an aspect of something by which it is what it is and not something
else and reflects that which is stable amidst variation. Quantity is an aspect
of something which may change (become more or less) without the thing thereby
becoming something else.

"Thus, if
something changes to an extent that it is no longer the same kind of thing, this
is a 'qualitative change', whereas a change in something by which it still the
same thing, though more or less, bigger or smaller, is a 'quantitative
change'.

"In Hegel's
Logic, Quality is the first
division of Being, when the world is
just one thing after another, so to speak, while Quantity is the second
division, where perception has progressed to the point of recognising what is
stable within the ups and downs of things. The third and final stage, Measure, the unity of
quality and quantity, denotes the knowledge of just when quantitative change
becomes qualitative change." [Quoted from
here.]

First of all, it isn't too clear if there is a real distinction
between "quantity" and "quality" here if we rely on what Hegel says:

"[A] house remains what it is, whether it be greater or
smaller; and red remains red, whether it be brighter or darker."
[Hegel (1975),
p.124, §85.]

For Hegel, house size seems to be the "quantity" here, but
beyond a certain size, houses are no longer houses. Hence, a 'house' the size of
a grain of sand isn't a house. Neither is one the size of a galaxy. Isn't this a
"qualitative" change? So, size is also a "quality". Moreover, extremely dark
blue is no longer blue (since it is indistinguishable from black). Is this
another "qualitative" change? Or is it "quantitative"? In that case, there seems
to be no clear distinction here between what is a "quantitative" and what is
a "qualitative" change. And it is no use appealing to yet another
'get-out-of-a-dialectical-hole-free-card', saying that quantity has "passed over"
into quality in these instances, since this slide in fact affects the
definition of these two terms. If we have no clear idea what we are talking about, then
it isn't possible to say what has "passed over" into what.
And, where is the alleged "development" here? Or, are we to suppose that
the very same house is gradually reduced in size so that it gradually assumes the
size of a grain of sand?

Secondly, as we have seen, the phrases "something new" and
"ceasing to be what it is" are hopelessly vague, too. We aren't told what
constitutes novelty or what "ceasing to be" amounts to, either. As we have
also seen, dialecticians,
including Hegel, regard ice, water and steam as "something new", when we now know
they aren't. But, these equivocations 'allow' dialecticians to apply this 'Law'
when and where is suits them, just as it 'allows' them to refuse to acknowledge
counter-examples when and where they like, too. indeed, it is reasonably safe to
predict that several of the
counter-examples listed above will have been
rejected out-of-hand by dialecticians on this basis alone. For instance, heating water from cold to very hot is a
"qualitative" non-"nodal" change by any ordinary standard,
and it produces nothing
"new" -- if by "new" we mean a "new substance", or
a "new kind of thing". And
yet, if we mean either of these, then ice and steam aren't "new" either.
Nevertheless, you will find dialecticians who will brush these off as irrelevant; either that, or they just ignore them. [A
good example of both tactics can be found
here. There are
plenty more here.]

What is finally decided upon here will, of course, depend on how
we view the status of Aristotelian "essences" (or "essential properties").
Further discussion of this will take us too far from the main topic of
this Essay, so no more will be said about it here.8c

The other hackneyed examples DM-theorists
regularly roll out to illustrate this 'Law' (i.e., boiling water, balding heads,
Mendeleyev's table, the alleged fighting qualities of Mamelukes, and, of late,
Catastrophe and
Chaos Theory), in fact only
seem to work because of the way that the word "quality" has been
'defined'
(or, rather, the way is hasn't been
clearly defined) by dialecticians.9

For example, in the case
of boiling water, the increase in quantity of one item (i.e., heat) is alleged
to alter the quality of the second (i.e., water). As noted
above, "quality" is
characterised in Hegel's work in Aristotelian terms (i.e., as that
property which is
essential to a substance/process, without which it must change
into some other --, or as "determinate being", to use the Hegelian jargon; on
this, see Inwood (1992), pp.238-41). And yet, by no stretch of the imagination is
liquidity an essential property of water. Once again, either side of the alleged
"qualitative" change, this substance remains H2O.
Boling or freezing does not change it into another substance;
water in its solid, liquid or gaseous form is still
H2O.
Quantitative addition or subtraction of energy does not result in a qualitative
change of the required sort; no new Hegelian or Aristotelian "quality"
emerges here. No "new
kind of thing" emerges as a
result. [On this, also see Note 9.]

Unfortunately, this
means that the most widely-, and over-used example in the DM-book-of-tricks
supposedly illustrating this 'Law' does not in fact do so!

In that case, this
'Law' should perhaps be re-written in the following way:

E1: An increase in the quantity of one item leads
to a change in what is perhaps not one of the qualities of another.

With that, much of the 'metaphysical bite' of this 'Law'
disappears; in fact it becomes rather toothless.

In addition, it seems a little odd to describe an increase in heat
as an increase in quantity when what happens is that the relevant water
molecules just move about faster if energy is fed into the system. Of course, it
could be objected that this is precisely Engels's point; since energy can be
measured (here, as an increase in heat, say), then that increase in heat is indeed
an increase in quantity -- in this case, "quantity of motion". But, the original idea appeared in Hegel at a
time when heat was regarded as a substance,
Caloric.
[For Hegel's view, see
here.] We now know that what
really happens is that molecules just move faster -- after having interacted with
still other faster moving molecules. [This is something Engels admits anyway; see
Engels (1954),
pp.63-64.]

So, when Engels speaks here of an increase in
energy as a quantitative increase, he was either using a
façon de parler, or he had not quite abandoned the old idea that
heat is a substance. Of course, we might still want to call this phenomenon an increase
in "energy" if
we so wish, but if we do, that would merely plunge this part of the First
'Law' into complete darkness, since the word
"energy" (if it too is not a façon de parler) is not the name of an
identifiable substance that can be qualified in this way.10

Furthermore, using "quantity" to depict the
change in motion of molecules is rather dubious, anyway. Certainly, we can speak of an
increase in velocity here, but there is no such thing as a quantity of
velocity that could sensibly said to increase. Velocity is not a substance either, and
although we certainly use numbers to depict it, we do not refer to anything
called the "quantity of velocity" (except again, perhaps as a façon de parler). Since velocity is a
vector, its magnitude is given by a scalar,
but velocity itself is just that scalar operating in a that
direction. To call the magnitude of a vector a "quantity" would be to confuse a
vector (or indeed a direction) with a substance.

And this is not mere pedantry. As we saw above, this is in line
with Hegel's own definition of the word:

"Quality is, in the first place, the character identical
with being: so identical that a thing ceases to be what it is, if it loses its
quality. Quantity, on the contrary, is the character external to being, and does
not affect the being at all. Thus, e.g. a house remains what it is, whether it
be greater or smaller; and red remains red, whether it be brighter or darker."
[Hegel (1975),
p.124, §85.]

This too is underlined by the Glossary at the Marx
Internet Archive:

"Quantity is an aspect of something which may change (become more or less)
without the thing thereby becoming something else.

"Thus, if
something changes to an extent that it is no longer the same kind of thing, this
is a 'qualitative change', whereas a change in something by which it still the
same thing, though more or less, bigger or smaller, is a 'quantitative
change'.

"In Hegel's
Logic, Quality is the first
division of Being, when the world is
just one thing after another, so to speak, while Quantity is the second
division, where perception has progressed to the point of recognising what is
stable within the ups and downs of things. The third and final stage, Measure, the unity of
quality and quantity, denotes the knowledge of just when quantitative change
becomes qualitative change." [Quoted from
here. Bold added.]

Hence, if we adhere to this definition strictly, there can be no
"quantity" of energy, because it is not a "thing", or an "aspect" of a thing in
any meaningful sense of these words.

Nevertheless, even if it were
appropriate to depict energy in this way, neither the heat nor the faster
molecules change in quality themselves. Any amount of heat still stays as
heat; motion is still motion. This shows that energy and heat are not
"kinds of things", and hence that their increase isn't even quantitative,
since they can't therefore be "aspects of something. If they were then according
to this 'Law' and increase in energy at some point would "pass over" and it
would change into a "new kind of thing".

If so, then the "quantitative" aspect of
Engels's First 'Law' is defective, since, given that quantity has to be an
aspect of certain "kinds of thing", and energy and motion are not "kinds of
things", they can't increase or decrease in quantity.10a00

Hence, the First 'Law' does apply
to this 'phenomenon'!

In that case, it should now perhaps be re-written along the following lines:

E2: An increase in the
quantity of one item (e.g., heat) leads to no qualitative change in that item,
while it can induce an alteration in the quality of another item (e.g., water),
which will in turn have changed in quality while undergoing no quantitative
change itself -- but which qualitative change is inadmissible anyway since it
isn't a quality
definitive of the latter (e.g., water as H2O).

Or, even:

E3: An increase in what
isn't the
quantity of one item (e.g., heat) leads to no qualitative change in that item,
while it can induce an alteration in the quality of another item (e.g., water), which will in
turn have changed in quality while undergoing no quantitative change itself --
but which qualitative change is inadmissible anyway since it isn't a quality
definitive of the latter (e.g., water as H2O).

This is not an impressive 'Law'; still
less is this hackneyed example (water) a convincing instance of it.

As far as balding heads
are concerned, it isn't easy to see how this over-worked example illustrates the
First 'Law', either. That is because it is difficult to believe
that someone with, say, n hairs on his or her head is hirsute, when the same
person with n-1 hairs is objectively bald -- even if at some point or other
(and not necessarily the same point) we all might
subjectively change the words we use to depict either.

Now, if it could be shown that those with
precisely n-1 hairs on their heads (for some specific n) are always objectively bald, and that this is an essential defining quality of baldness,
or of bald people (in the Aristotelian/Hegelian sense
required), so that a
change from n to n-1 hairs always results in baldness, and which rule is true for all hirsute human beings,
then the First 'Law' might have some life left in it in this one instance.
It could then be a dialectical 'Law' that applies only to the balding parts
of nature, but nothing else. [Which is longhand for saying it can't therefore
be a law.]

Anyway, is baldness really a "new kind of
thing"? With
respect to baldness, human anatomists (and even hairdressers) have yet to define
hair loss in such
Aristotelian terms. Hence, and unfortunately for DM-fans, they have so far failed to categorise all
follically-challenged
individuals in this way, declaring that anyone with n-1 hairs is
essentially bald, whereas anyone with n hairs is still essentially non-coot.
Until they do, there are no "nodal" points here, just as there seem to be no
particular (Aristotelian/Hegelian) "qualities" definitive of bald human beings
for dialecticians to latch onto. So, in this case, too, it is impossible to see how an 'objective'
example of this dialectical 'Law' could apply --, merely a 'subjective' impression
of it,
and one that has to rely on a quirky application of an already vague
Aristotelian/Hegelian
'definition' of "quality".

So, it seems that the change in "quality", if it occurs
here, takes place not in the one going bald, but in the one describing him/her
that way. In
which case, with
respect to human balding, a change in
the quantity of hair on one person's head will merely change the quality of someone else'sopinion of him/her -- and even that occurs subjectively and (possibly even) non-"nodally",
too.

There isn't much here on which to base a
dialectical 'Law', at least nothing that would fail to brand this part of DM
as a fringe science, at best.

Clifford Conner tries to sell us this example of a change in
"quality":

"Atomic bombs and nuclear reactions have given us
an unsurpassable illustration of this law, and Engels would surely have
appreciated this one, too. When the nuclear fuel is brought together, if there
is less than a certain exact amount, which is called the 'critical
mass', nothing will happen. But, if a little more fuel is added, and a
little more, and a little more, eventually the 'critical mass' will be reached
and the
nuclear chain reaction will be initiated." [Conner (1992), p.29. Quotation
marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site.]

But, has a new "kind of thing" emerged here? In fact, no "new
kind of thing" has resulted from this process. All that happens is that a
certain sort of reaction speeds up dramatically:

"Fission chain reactions occur because of
interactions between neutrons and
fissile
isotopes (such as 235U). The
chain reaction requires both the release of neutrons from fissile
isotopes undergoing nuclear fission
and the subsequent absorption of some of these neutrons in fissile
isotopes. When an atom undergoes nuclear fission, a few neutrons
(the exact number depends on several factors) are ejected from the
reaction. These free neutrons will then interact with the
surrounding medium, and if more fissile fuel is present, some may be
absorbed and cause more fissions. Thus, the cycle repeats to give a
reaction that is self-sustaining.

"Nuclear power plants
operate by precisely controlling the rate at which nuclear reactions
occur, and that control is maintained through the use of several
redundant layers of safety measures. Moreover, the materials in a
nuclear reactor core and the uranium enrichment level make a nuclear
explosion impossible, even if all safety measures failed. On the
other hand, nuclear weapons are specifically engineered to produce a
reaction that is so fast and intense it can't be controlled after
it has started. When properly designed, this uncontrolled reaction
can lead to an explosive energy release." [Wikipedia,
accessed 08/11/11.]

Figure Three: A Non-Dialectical Chain Reaction

As another source points out:

"Although two to three neutrons are
produced for every fission, not all of these neutrons are available
for continuing the fission reaction. If the conditions are such that
the neutrons are lost at a faster rate than they are formed by
fission, the chain reaction will not be self-sustaining.

"At the point where the chain
reaction can become self-sustaining, this is referred to as critical
mass.

"In an atomic bomb, a mass of fissile
material greater than the critical mass must be assembled
instantaneously and held together for about a millionth of a second
to permit the chain reaction to propagate before the bomb explodes.

"The amount of a fissionable
material's critical mass depends on several factors; the shape of
the material, its composition and density, and the level of purity.

"A sphere has the minimum possible
surface area for a given mass, and hence minimizes the leakage of
neutrons. By surrounding the fissionable material with a suitable
neutron 'reflector', the loss of neutrons can reduced and the
critical mass can be reduced.

"By using a neutron reflector, only
about 11 pounds (5 kilograms) of nearly pure or weapon's grade
plutonium 239 or about 33 pounds (15 kilograms)
uranium 235 is needed to achieve critical mass." [From
here. Accessed 08/11/11. Quotation marks altered to conform to
the conventions adopted at this site.]

So, and again, no "new kind of thing" results from this process
-- the "old kind of thing" merely speeds up. Hence, this can't be an example of
the First 'Law'.

Conner continues:

"I was reminder of the transformation of quantity
into quality by an article i read...about resort beaches in New Jersey. Health
inspectors periodically check the ocean water for
faecal
coliform bacteria. They measure it in parts per millilitres of water. If it
is below 200 parts, the allow the beaches to remain open; above that number they
close them down. Some resort owners were caught throwing chlorine tablets into
the ocean just before the inspectors were dues to arrive.

"It was a futile attempt, as it turned out, to
prevent a transformation of quantity into quality, but it was rather remarkable
to see capitalists sneaking around trying to 'unpollute' the environment."
[Conner (1992), p.29. Spelling modified to agree with UK English; quotation marks altered to
conform to the conventions adopted at this site.]

But, this isn't as remarkable as seeing
DM-fans scratching around, desperately trying to impose their ramshackle
'theory' on the world. In this latest example of
Mickey Mouse Science, Conner
failed to ask himself what the new "quality" is that is supposed to have come
into being here. But, no new "kind of thing" has emerged; all we have are more
bacteria in the water over and above a figure set by the authorities. Either
side of this figure, the water is still polluted, it is just that above 200 the
authorities deem that it is 'cost effective' to close the beach.

As
Karl Popper
noted, just like Freudians (and he could have added just like Fundamentalist
Christians, too), Dialectical Marxists only look for conformation of
their 'theory', and even then they have to ignore what that theory
actually tells them!

"I found that those of my friends who were admirers of Marx, Freud, and
Adler,
were impressed by a number of points common to these theories, and especially by
their apparent explanatory power. These theories appear to be able to explain
practically everything that happened within the fields to which they referred.
The study of any of them seemed to have the effect of an intellectual conversion
or revelation, open your eyes to a new truth hidden from those not yet
initiated. Once your eyes were thus opened you saw confirmed instances
everywhere: the world was full of verifications of the theory. Whatever happened
always confirmed it. Thus its truth appeared manifest; and unbelievers were
clearly people who did not want to see the manifest truth; who refuse to see it,
either because it was against their class interest, or because of their
repressions which were still 'un-analyzed' and crying aloud for treatment.

"The most characteristic element in this situation seemed to me the incessant
stream of confirmations, of observations which 'verified' the theories in
question; and this point was constantly emphasize by their adherents. A Marxist
could not open a newspaper without finding on every page confirming evidence for
his interpretation of history; not only in the news, but also in its
presentation -- which revealed the class bias of the paper -- and especially of
course what the paper did not say. The Freudian analysts emphasized that their
theories were constantly verified by their 'clinical observations.' As for
Adler, I was much impressed by a personal experience. Once, in 1919, I reported
to him a case which to me did not seem particularly Adlerian, but which he found
no difficulty in analyzing in terms of his theory of inferiority feelings,
although he had not even seen the child. Slightly shocked, I asked him how he
could be so sure. 'Because of my thousandfold experience,' he replied; whereupon
I could not help saying: 'And with this new case, I suppose, your experience has
become thousand-and-one-fold.'

"What I had in mind was that his previous observations may not have been much
sounder than this new one; that each in its turn had been interpreted in the
light of 'previous experience,' and at the same time counted as additional
confirmation. What, I asked myself, did it confirm? No more than that a case
could be interpreted in the light of a theory. But this meant very little, I
reflected, since every conceivable case could be interpreted in the light
Adler's theory, or equally of Freud's. I may illustrate this by two very
different examples of human behaviour: that of a man who pushes a child into the
water with the intention of drowning it; and that of a man who sacrifices his
life in an attempt to save the child. Each of these two cases can be explained
with equal ease in Freudian and Adlerian terms. According to Freud the first man
suffered from repression (say, of some component of his
Oedipus
complex), while the second man had achieved sublimation. According to Adler
the first man suffered from feelings of inferiority (producing perhaps the need
to prove to himself that he dared to commit some crime), and so did the second
man (whose need was to prove to himself that he dared to rescue the child). I
could not think of any human behaviour which could not be interpreted in terms
of either theory. It was precisely this fact -- that they always fitted, that
they were always confirmed -- which in the eyes of their admirers constituted
the strongest argument in favour of these theories. It began to dawn on me that
this apparent strength was in fact their weakness." [Popper (1966),
pp.34-35. Spelling modified to agree with UK English; quotation marks
altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site.]

Of course, Popper used this observation to attack Marx's Theory
of History, but as we will see in a later Essay, that was misguided. Even so,
his comments certainly fit the sort of Mickey Mouse Science we find
DM-apologists peddling.

As I noted above:

The phrases "something new" and
"ceasing to be what it is" are hopelessly vague.... We are not told what
constitutes novelty or what "ceasing to be" amounts to, either.... Dialecticians,
including Hegel, regard ice, water and steam as "something new", when we now know
they aren't. But, such equivocation 'allows' dialecticians to apply this 'Law'
when is suits them, just as it 'allows' them to refuse to acknowledge
counter-examples when and where they like, too.

Several more examples will
be added at a later date.

As far as the other examples dialecticians
use to illustrate this 'Law' are concerned: there are far too few in number that
actually work (even when the
above difficulties are ignored) to justify the epithet
"Law" being attached to any of them. If, in comparison, say,
Newton's
Second Law of motion worked as fitfully as this 'Law' does (or was as
vaguely-worded and was as non-mathematical), physicists would certainly refuse
to describe it as a law. If, for instance, the rate of change of momentum even
under controlled conditions were in fact proportional to the applied
force in now and then (and even then, if this were the case only if key terms were either ignored,
remained ill-defined or were twisted out of
shape), no one would have taken Newton seriously. And rightly so.

The reason why I have called DM "Mickey Mouse
Science" is quite plain. The examples usually given by DM-fans to illustrate the
First 'Law' are (almost without exception) either amateurish,
anecdotal or impressionistic. If someone were to submit a paper to a science
journal purporting to establish the veracity of a new law with the same level of
vagueness, imprecision, triteness, lack of detail and/or mathematics, aggravated
by comparable theoretical naivety, it would
be rejected out-of-hand at the first stage, its author's reputation forever
tarnished.

Indeed, dialecticians would
themselves treat with derision any attempt to establish, say, either the truth of classical
economic theory or the falsity of Marx's work with an evidential display that was as crassly amateurish as this
--, to say
nothing of the contempt they would show for such theoretical wooliness. In circumstances
like these, dialecticians, who might otherwise be quick to cry "pedantry"
at the issues raised here (and in other Essays published at this site), would become
devoted pedants themselves, and would nit-pick with the best at such inferior anti-Marxist work.10a0

[Indeed,
they already do this to my work. In one breath they complain about my alleged "pedantry", in the
next they home in on what they assume are minor errors (in detail or in wording)
that I have supposedly committed.
Here is just the latest example; concentrate on the comments of one "Gilhyle".
Here is another.
Toward Engels they show infinite patience; critics like me are pilloried for the
simplest of assumed errors.]

Now, anyone who has studied or practiced real science
will already know this. It is only in books on DM (and
Internet discussion boards) that Mickey Mouse
material of this sort seems acceptable.10a

At this point we might wonder where Engels's predilection for
Mickey Mouse Science came from. After all, he was familiar with the careful and
detailed work of contemporary scientists (like Darwin). Why then was he prepared
to assert that his 'Laws' were indeed laws on the basis of very little primary data
(or none at all), but relied on secondary or tertiary (but nonetheless selectively-chosen) evidence and
sloppy analysis, instead? Well, we need look no further than Hegel for a clue, for Hegel
was the original Mickey Mouse Scientist (making Engels merely the
Sorcerer's Apprentice).

Figure Four: Researching For A PhD In
Dialectics?

Here is Hegel's detailed 'proof' of this 'Law':

"The system of natural numbers already shows a nodal line of qualitative
moments which emerge in a merely external succession. It is on the one hand a
merely quantitative progress and regress, a perpetual adding or subtracting, so
that each number has the same arithmetical relation to the one before
it and after it, as these have to their predecessors and successors, and so on.
But the numbers so formed also have a specific relation to other
numbers preceding and following them, being either an integral multiple of one
of them or else a power or a root. In the musical scale which is built up on
quantitative differences, a quantum gives rise to an harmonious relation without
its own relation to those on either side of it in the scale differing from the
relation between these again and their predecessors and successors. While
successive notes seem to be at an ever-increasing distance from the keynote, or
numbers in succeeding each other arithmetically seem only to become other
numbers, the fact is that there suddenly emerges a return, a surprising
accord, of which no hint was given by the quality of what immediately preceded
it, but which appears as an actio in distans [action at distance --
RL], as a connection with
something far removed. There is a sudden interruption of the succession of
merely indifferent relations which do not alter the preceding specific reality
or do not even form any such, and although the succession is continued
quantitatively in the same manner, a specific relation breaks in per saltum
[leaps -- RL].

"Such qualitative nodes and leaps occur in chemical combinations when the
mixture proportions are progressively altered; at certain points in the scale of
mixtures, two substances form products exhibiting particular qualities. These
products are distinguished from one another not merely by a more or less, and
they are not already present, or only perhaps in a weaker degree, in the
proportions close to the nodal proportions, but are bound up with these nodes
themselves. For example, different oxides of nitrogen and nitric acids having
essentially different qualities are formed only when oxygen and nitrogen are
combined in certain specific proportions, and no such specific compounds are
formed by the intermediate proportions. Metal oxides, e.g. the lead oxides, are
formed at certain quantitative points of oxidation and are distinguished by
colours and other qualities. They do not pass gradually into one another; the
proportions lying in between these nodes do not produce a neutral or a specific
substance. Without having passed through the intervening stages, a specific
compound appears which is based on a measure relation and possesses
characteristic qualities. Again, water when its temperature is altered does not
merely get more or less hot but passes through from the liquid into either the
solid or gaseous states; these states do not appear gradually; on the contrary,
each new state appears as a leap, suddenly interrupting and checking the gradual
succession of temperature changes at these points. Every birth and death, far
from being a progressive gradualness, is an interruption of it and is the leap
from a quantitative into a qualitative alteration.

"It is said, natura non facit saltum [there are no
leaps in nature]; and ordinary thinking when it has to grasp a coming-to-be or a
ceasing-to-be, fancies it has done so by representing it as a gradual
emergence or disappearance. But we have seen that the alterations of being in
general are not only the transition of one magnitude into another, but a
transition from quality into quantity and vice versa, a becoming-other
which is an interruption of gradualness and the production of something
qualitatively different from the reality which preceded it. Water, in cooling,
does not gradually harden as if it thickened like porridge, gradually
solidifying until it reached the consistency of ice; it suddenly solidifies, all
at once. It can remain quite fluid even at freezing point if it is standing
undisturbed, and then a slight shock will bring it into the solid state.

"In thinking about the gradualness of the coming-to-be of
something, it is ordinarily assumed that what comes to be is already sensibly or
actually in existence; it is not yet perceptible only because of its
smallness. Similarly with the gradual disappearance of something, the
non-being or other which takes its place is likewise assumed to be
really there, only not observable, and there, too, not in the
sense of being implicitly or ideally contained in the first something, but
really there, only not observable. In this way, the form of the in-itself,
the inner being of something before it actually exists, is transformed into a
smallness of an outer existence, and the essential difference, that of the
Notion, is converted into an external difference of mere magnitude. The attempt
to explain coming-to-be or ceasing-to-be on the basis of gradualness of the
alteration is tedious like any tautology; what comes to be or ceases to be is
assumed as already complete and in existence beforehand and the alteration is
turned into a mere change of an external difference, with the result that the
explanation is in fact a mere tautology. The intellectual difficulty attendant
on such an attempted explanation comes from the qualitative transition from
something into its other in general, and then into its opposite; but the
identity and the alteration are misrepresented as the indifferent,
external determinations of the quantitative sphere.

"In the moral sphere, in so far as it is considered under
the categories of being, there occurs the same transition from quantity into
quality and different qualities appear to be based in a difference of magnitude.

"It is through a more or less that the measure of frivolity or thoughtlessness
is exceeded and something quite different comes about, namely crime, and thus
right becomes wrong and virtue vice. Thus states, too, acquire through their
quantitative difference, other things being assumed equal, a distinct
qualitative character. With the expansion of the state and an increased number
of citizens, the laws and the constitution acquire a different significance. The
state has its own measure of magnitude and when this is exceeded this mere
change of size renders it liable to instability and disruption under that same
constitution which was its good fortune and its strength before its expansion."
[Hegel (1999), pp.368-71, §§774-778.
Emphases in the original.]

"The identity between quantity and quality, which is found in Measure, is at
first only implicit, and not yet explicitly realised. In other words, these two
categories, which unite in Measure, each claim an independent authority. On the
one hand, the quantitative features of existence may be altered, without
affecting its quality. On the other hand, this increase and diminution,
immaterial though it be, has its limit, by exceeding which the quality suffers
change. Thus the temperature of water is, in the first place, a point of no
consequence in respect of its liquidity: still with the increase of diminution
of the temperature of the liquid water, there comes a point where this state of
cohesion suffers a qualitative change, and the water is converted into steam or
ice. A quantitative change takes place, apparently without any further
significance: but there is something lurking behind, and a seemingly innocent
change of quantity acts as a kind of snare, to catch hold of the quality. The
antinomy of Measure which this implies was exemplified under more than one garb
among the Greeks. It was asked, for example, whether a single grain makes a heap
of wheat, or whether it makes a bald-tail to tear out a single hair from the
horse's tail. At first, no doubt, looking at the nature of quantity as an
indifferent and external character of being, we are disposed to answer these
questions in the negative. And yet, as we must admit, this indifferent increase
and diminution has its limit: a point is finally reached, where a single
additional grain makes a heap of wheat; and the bald-tail is produced, if we
continue plucking out single hairs. These examples find a parallel in the story
of the peasant who, as his ass trudged cheerfully along, went on adding ounce
after ounce to its load, till at length it sunk under the unendurable burden. It
would be a mistake to treat these examples as pedantic futility; they really
turn on thoughts, an acquaintance with which is of great importance in practical
life, especially in ethics. Thus in the matter of expenditure, there is a
certain latitude within which a more or less does not matter; but when the
Measure, imposed by the individual circumstances of the special case, is
exceeded on the one side or the other, the qualitative nature of Measure (as in
the above examples of the different temperature of water) makes itself felt, and
a course, which a moment before was held good economy, turns into avarice or
prodigality. The same principles may be applied in politics, when the
constitution of a state has to be looked at as independent of, no less than as
dependent on, the extent of its territory, the number of its inhabitants, and
other quantitative points of the same kind. If we look, e.g. at a state with a
territory of ten thousand square miles and a population of four millions we
should, without hesitation, admit that a few square miles of land or a few
thousand inhabitants more or less could exercise no essential influence on the
character of its constitution. But on the other hand, we must not forget that by
the continual increase or diminishing of a state, we finally get to a point
where, apart from all other circumstances, this quantitative alteration alone
necessarily draws with it an alteration in the quality of the constitution. The
constitution of a little Swiss canton does not suit a great kingdom; and,
similarly, the constitution of the Roman republic was unsuitable when
transferred to the small imperial towns of Germany." [Hegel (1975), pp.158-59.]

Readers will no doubt note that rank
amateurism is not confined to Engels (or even Woods and Grant); Hegel could
'amateur' with the best of them.10a1

So, this 'Law' can be made to work in a
few selected instances if we bend things enough (and if we fail to define either "quality", "node", "leap",
"same body", "new kind of thing", and "addition of energy" -- or, if we ignore
Hegel's own vague 'definition' of "quality" into the bargain).

In
contrast there are countless examples where this 'Law' does not apply, no matter
how we try to twist or bend it.10b

Why Engels's First 'Law' was ever called a
law is therefore something of a Dialectical Mystery.

[Other examples of this 'Law', to which
DM-fans appeal, are discussed in more detail in
Note 9.]

"The law of the interpenetration of opposites....
[M]utual penetration of polar opposites and transformation into each other when
carried to extremes...." [Engels (1954),
pp.17,
62.]

Here, in a published work, he says more or
less the same:

"Already in
Rousseau, therefore, we find not only
a line of thought which corresponds exactly to the one developed in Marx's
Capital, but also, in details, a whole series of the same dialectical turns
of speech as Marx used: processes which in their nature are antagonistic,
contain a contradiction; transformation of one extreme into its opposite;
and finally, as the kernel of the whole thing, the negation of the negation.
[Engels (1976)
p.179. Bold emphasis added.]

Lenin added a few extra details:

"[Among the elements of
dialectics are the following:] [I]nternally contradictory tendencies…in
[a thing]…as the sum and unity of opposites…. [This involves] not only
the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every
determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other [into
its opposite?]….

"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of
the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all
phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the knowledge of
all processesof the world in their 'self-movement', in their spontaneous
development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of
opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This] alone
furnishes the key to the self-movement of everything existing….

"The unity…of opposites is
conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive
opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute…." [Lenin
(1961),
pp.221-22,
357-58. Emphases in the original.]

It is worth noting at the outset that the
doctrine that nature and all it contains is a UO, and that change is powered
by their 'contradictory' interaction, is also found in all known mystical
religions/philosophies. [More on that in Essay Fourteen Part One (summary
here). Until
that Essay is published, the reader is directed
here and
here.]

[An up-dated and greatly expanded version of this argument has
now been published in Essay Seven
Part Three.]

Surprisingly, DM-theorists (like Lenin and Engels,
quoted above) are
decidedly unclear as to whether objects/processes change because of (1) A
contradictory relationship between their internal opposites, or because (2) They change
into these opposites, or even because (3) Change itself creates such
opposites.

Lenin's words merely illustrate this
confusion in an acute form; he speaks, for instance, of the "transitions of every
determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other…."
We will see below the havoc such an idea would create, if true.

Engels is equally unclear: "[M]utual penetration of polar
opposites and transformation into each other...." The same can be said of
Plekhanov:

"And so every phenomenon, by the
action of those same forces which condition its existence, sooner or later, but inevitably, is transformed into its own opposite…." [Plekhanov
(1956),
p.77. Bold emphasis added.]

And, here is Mao:

"Why is it that '...the human mind should take
these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile,
transforming themselves into one another'? Because that is just how things are
in objective reality. The fact is that the unity or identity of opposites in
objective things is not dead or rigid, but is living, conditional, mobile,
temporary and relative; in given conditions, every contradictory aspect
transforms itself into its opposite....

"In speaking of the identity of opposites in
given conditions, what we are referring to is real and concrete opposites and
the real and concrete transformations of opposites into one another....

"All processes have a beginning and an end,
all
processes transform themselves into their opposites. The constancy of all
processes is relative, but the mutability manifested in the transformation of
one process into another is absolute." [Mao (1961b),
pp.340-42. Quotation
marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphases added.]

Once more, these inform us that objects and
processes not only
change (1) Because of a struggle between their 'internal opposites', but also that (2)
They change into
these opposites (indeed,
according to Lenin, they change into all
of them!) as a result of that "struggle", and that they (3)
Produce these opposites while they change
--, or,
they do so as a
result of that change.10b1

[In what follows, I will be ignoring the equivocation (noted
below) whereby dialecticians sometimes seem to mean by "internal opposite",
"spatially-internal opposite", and sometimes they appear to mean "conceptually-",
or "logically-internal opposite" --
the latter of which was certainly what Hegel appeared to mean by this phrase.]

As we are about to see, this idea -- that
there are such things as "dialectical contradictions" and "unities of opposites"
(etc.), which cause change because they "struggle" with one another
and then change into each other -- presents
DM-theorists with some rather nasty dialectical headaches, if interpreted along
the lines expressed in the DM-classics and in the writings of countless
DM-theorists (quoted above and at greater length
here,
where several objections that have been levelled against the argument presented
in this Essay have been
neutralised).

In order to
see this, let us suppose that object/process A is comprised of, or
possesses, two
"internal contradictory opposites", or "opposite tendencies", O*
and O**,
and it thus changes as a result.

[Henceforth, in order to save on complexity,
I will omit the phrase "or possesses".]

But, O* can't
itself change intoO**
since O**already exists! If O** didn't already exist then, according to this
theory, O* couldn't change, for there would be no opposite with
which it could "struggle" in order to bring that
about.

[Once more, several obvious objections to
this line-of-attack are neutralised below. Incidentally, the same problems arise if these are viewed as
'external contradictions'. (However, as we will see in Essay Eight
Part One, 'external
contradictions'
attract serious difficulties of their own.)

I have avoided using "A" and "non-A"/"not-A",
here, in order to prevent certain options from being closed off too soon. Not
much hangs on this, anyway, which readers can confirm for themselves if they replace O*
and O** with "A" and/or "non-A"/"not-A" respectively throughout.

Concentrating on A alone won't help, anyway. If
A changes into non-A/not-A, A will have to exist at
the same time as non-A/not-A, or A and non-A/not-A couldn't 'struggle' with one
another in order for A to change into one or other of non-A/not-A.
Once more: if non-A/not-Aalready exist, A
can't change into either of them, since, plainly, it/they already exist!]

What is more, these 'opposites'
have to co-exist -- as Gollobin points out:

"Opposites in a thing are not only mutually
exclusive, polar, repelling, each other; they also attract and interpenetrate
each other. They begin and cease to exist together.... These dual aspects
of opposites -- conflict and unity -- are like scissor blades in cutting, jaws
in mastication, and two legs in walking. Where there is only one, the process
as such is impossible: 'all polar opposites are in general determined by the
mutual action of two opposite poles on one another, the separation and
opposition of these poles exists only within their unity and interconnection,
and, conversely, their interconnection exists only in their separation and their
unity only in their opposition.' In fact, 'where one no sooner tries to hold on
to one side alone then it is transformed unnoticed into the other....'" [Gollobin
(1986), p.113; quoting Engels (1891a),
p.414. Bold emphases added.]

Mao made the same point:

"The fact is that no contradictory aspect can
exist in isolation. Without its opposite aspect, each loses the condition for
its existence. Just think, can any one contradictory aspect of a thing or of a
concept in the human mind exist independently? Without life, there would be no
death; without death, there would be no life. Without 'above', there would be no
'below').... Without landlords, there would be no tenant-peasants; without
tenant-peasants, there would be no landlords. Without the bourgeoisie, there
would be no proletariat; without the proletariat, there would be no bourgeoisie.
Without imperialist oppression of nations, there would be no colonies or
semi-colonies; without colonies or semicolonies, there would be no imperialist
oppression of nations. It is so with all opposites; in given conditions, on the
one hand they are opposed to each other, and on the other they are
interconnected, interpenetrating, interpermeating and interdependent, and this
character is described as identity. In given conditions, all contradictory
aspects possess the character of non-identity and hence are described as being
in contradiction. But they also possess the character of identity and hence are
interconnected. This is what Lenin means when he says that dialectics studies
'how opposites can be ... identical'. How then can they be
identical? Because each is the condition for the other's existence. This is the
first meaning of identity.

"But is it enough to say merely that each of the
contradictory aspects is the condition for the other's existence, that there is
identity between them and that consequently they can coexist in a single entity?
No, it is not. The matter does not end with their dependence on each other for
their existence; what is more important is their transformation into each other.
That is to say, in given conditions, each of the contradictory aspects within a
thing transforms itself into its opposite, changes its position to that of its
opposite. This is the second meaning of the identity of contradiction.

"Why is there identity here, too? You see, by
means of revolutionthe proletariat, at one time the ruled, is
transformed into the ruler, while the bourgeoisie, the erstwhile ruler, is
transformed into the ruled and changes its position to that originally occupied
by its opposite. This has already taken place in the Soviet Union, as it will
take place throughout the world. If there were no interconnection and identity
of opposites in given conditions, how could such a change take place?" [Mao
(1961a), pp.338-39. Bold emphases alone added.]

As, indeed, did Engels:

"And it is just as impossible have one side of a
contradiction without the other, as it is to retain the whole of an apple in
one's hand after half has been eaten." [Engels (1891b), p.496. Bold
emphasis added.]

The online version renders this passage slightly differently:

"And one cannot have one side of this
contradiction without the other, any more than a man has a whole apple in his
hand after eating half." [Quoted from
here.]

In that case, these 'opposites' must co-exist.

Anyway, it is
hard to see how
O* could "struggle" with
O** if
O** didn't co-exist with
O*!

Moreover,
it is no use propelling O** into the future so that it is what
O*will change into, since O* will do no such thing unless
O** is already there, in the present, to make that happen!

So, if object/process A is already composed of a 'dialectical union' of
O* and
not-O*
(interpreting
O** now as not-O*),O* can't change into not-O*
since
not-O*
already exists.

[Several alternatives now suggest themselves which might
allow dialecticians to dig themselves out of this
deep dialectical ditch. I have considered some of them in Note 10b1a.10b1a]

Naturally, these problems will simply re-appear at the next stage as
not-O*
readies itself to change into whatever it changes into. But, in this case there
is an
added twist, for there is as yet no not-not-O*
in existence to make this happen. In which case, the dialectical process
will simply grind to a halt, unless a not-not-O*
pops into existence (out of thin air, it seems) to start things up again or to
keep things going. But, what could possibly engineer, or have engineered,
that?

Indeed, at the very least, this 'theory' of change leaves it entirely mysterious how
not-O* itself came about
in the first place. It seems to have popped into existence from nowhere, too.

[Gollobin (above) sort of half recognises this without realising the serious problems
it creates
for his theory.]

Returning to the last point: where not-O*
itself came from. It seems it will have to have come fromO*
since
O* can only change because of its struggle with
not-O*,
which does not yet exist! And pushing the process into the past (via a
'reversed' version of the NON) will merely reduplicate the above problems -- as
we have seen in Note10b1a, in relation to C,
S, and F -- Capitalism, Socialism and Feudalism.

Maybe this is too
quick. In order to see if the above is a little too hasty, it might be wise to push this
into the past to see if we can circumvent these 'difficulties'. To that end, let us suppose
that
O* itself came from object/process X, and
that not-O*
came from object or process Y. However, according to the
DM-classics, X
itself can only change because it "struggles" with its own "opposite" -- call
this "not-X". As a result of that "struggle", X changes into not-X. But, and once
again, not-X already exists, so X can't change into it! If
not-X didn't already exist, there would be nothing with which X
could "struggle", and hence change.

We hit the same non-dialectical brick wall.

Of course, this
leaves the origin of not-X itself unexplained! And yet, it can only have come into
existence because of an earlier "struggle" with its own opposite, X!
However, as we have seen, X can't change into not-X, since not-X already
exists! If it didn't, X couldn't in fact change since there would be nothing
there with which it could "struggle". In which case, both X and
not-X must have popped into existence from nowhere.

The same problems
afflict Y. Once more, according to the DM-classics, Y itself can
only change because of a "struggles" with its own "opposite" -- call this "not-Y".
As a result, it changes into that opposite, not-Y. But, and once again, not-Y
already exists, so Y can't change into it! If not-Y didn't
already exist, there would be nothing with which Y could "struggle", and
hence change.

In addition, this
leaves the origin of not-Y unexplained. Not-Y can only have come
into existence because of an earlier "struggle" with its own opposite, Y!
But, Y can't change into not-Y, since not-Y already exists!
If it didn't, Y couldn't change. In which case, both Y and not-Y
must have popped into existence from nowhere, too.

It could be objected that
the above seems to place objects and/or processes
in fixed categories, which is one of the main criticisms dialecticians make of
FL. Hence, on that
basis, it could be maintained that the argument presented in this Essay is completely misguided.

Fortunately, repairs are relatively easy to make: let us now suppose that object/process A is comprised of two
changing
"internal/external opposites" O*
and O** -- the latter once again interpreted as not-O*
--,
andthus develops as a result.

The rest still follows as before: if object/process A is already composed of a changing
'dialectical union' of
O* and not-O*,
and
O* develops into not-O*
as a result, then this can't happen. As we have already seen, it isn't possible for O* to change into not-O*
if
not-O*
already exists, and this is so whether or not
O* and not-O*
are changeless or constantly changing objects and/or processes.

Of
course, it could be objected that not-O* develops into O*
while not-O* develops into
O*.

[This objection might even incorporate that eminently obscure Hegelian
term-of-art: "sublation".
More on that presently.]

If
that were so, while this was happening,O*
and not-O* would no longer be
opposites of one another --, not unless we widen the term "opposite"
to mean "anything that an object/process turns into, and/or any intermediate
object/process while that is happening". Naturally, that
would make this 'Law' work by definitional fiat, rendering it eminently
'subjective', once more. It would also threaten to undermine this 'Law' in other
ways, since, as we will see, each object/process has to have a unique
"opposite" (something Hegel and Lenin called its "other").

Ignoring this 'difficulty' for now -- and even supposing it were the case that not-O* 'developed' into O*
while not-O* 'developed' into
O*, and that such process were governed by the obscure
term "sublation" -- this option still won't work (as we are
about to find out).

In order to see this, it might be a good idea to develop this objection further. To that end, it
could be argued that
Engels had anticipated the above difficulties when he said:

"[RL: Negation of the negation is] a very simple process which is
taking place everywhere and every day, which any child can understand as soon as
it is stripped of the veil of mystery in which it was enveloped by the old
idealist philosophy and in which it is to the advantage of helpless
metaphysicians of Herr Dühring's calibre to keep it enveloped. Let us take a
grain of barley. Billions of such grains of barley are milled, boiled and brewed
and then consumed. But if such a grain of barley meets with conditions which are
normal for it, if it falls on suitable soil, then under the influence of heat
and moisture it undergoes a specific change, it germinates; the grain as such
ceases to exist, it is negated, and in its place appears the plant which has
arisen from it, the negation of the grain. But what is the normal life-process
of this plant? It grows, flowers, is fertilised and finally once more produces
grains of barley, and as soon as these have ripened the stalk dies, is in its
turn negated. As a result of this negation of the negation we have once again
the original grain of barley, but not as a single unit, but ten-, twenty- or thirtyfold.
Species of grain change extremely slowly, and so the barley of today is almost
the same as it-was a century ago. But if we take a plastic ornamental plant, for
example a dahlia or an orchid, and treat the seed and the plant which grows from
it according to the gardener's art, we get as a result of this negation of
the negation not only more seeds, but also qualitatively improved seeds,
which produce more beautiful flowers, and each repetition of this process, each
fresh negation of the negation, enhances this process of perfection. [Engels
(1976), pp.172-73. Bold emphases
added.]

"But someone may
object: the negation that has taken place in this case is not a real negation: I
negate a grain of barley also when I grind it, an insect when I crush it
underfoot, or the positive quantity a when I cancel it, and so on. Or I
negate the sentence: the rose is a rose, when I say: the rose is not a rose; and
what do I get if I then negate this negation and say: but after all the rose is
a rose? -- These objections are in fact the chief arguments put forward by the
metaphysicians against dialectics, and they are wholly worthy of the
narrow-mindedness of this mode of thought. Negation in dialectics does not mean
simply saying no, or declaring that something does not exist, or destroying it
in any way one likes.Long ago
Spinoza said: Omnis determinatio est
negatio -- every limitation or determination is at the same time a negation.
And further: the kind of negation is here determined, firstly, by the general
and, secondly, by the particular nature of the process. I must not only negate, but also sublate the negation. I must therefore so arrange the first
negation that the second remains or becomes possible. How? This depends on the
particular nature of each individual case. If I grind a grain of barley, or
crush an insect, I have carried out the first part of the action, but have made
the second part impossible. Every kind of thing therefore has a peculiar way
of being negated in such manner that it gives rise to a development, and it is
just the same with every kind of conception or idea....

"But it is clear
that from a negation of the negation which consists in the childish pastime of
alternately writing and cancelling a, or in alternately declaring that
a rose is a rose and that it is not a rose, nothing eventuates but the silliness
of the person who adopts such a tedious procedure. And yet the metaphysicians
try to make us believe that this is the right way to carry out a negation of the
negation, if we ever should want to do such a thing. [Ibid., pp.180-81. Bold emphases
and link added.]

Engels's argument is that "dialectical negation" isn't the same as ordinary (or
even logical) negation in that it isn't simple destruction, nor is it a
cancelling. Dialectical negation "sublates"; that is, it both destroys and
preserves, so that something new or 'higher' emerges as a result. Nevertheless,
as we have already seen, Hegel's use of this word (i.e., "sublate") is highly
suspect in itself, just as we will also
see: this 'Law' (i.e., the NON) is even more dubious still (partly because Hegel
confused ordinary negation with 'cancelling out', or with destruction, as,
indeed, did Engels).

Despite all this,
it is worth asking: Does the above comment by Engels neutralise the argument
presented earlier? Is the argument here guilty of the following:

"These objections are in fact the chief arguments put
forward by the metaphysicians against dialectics, and they are wholly worthy of
the narrow-mindedness of this mode of thought."? [Ibid.]

To answer this question, let us once again suppose that object/process A is comprised of
two changing "internal opposites"/"tendencies" O* and not-O*, and thus
develops as a result. Given this scenario, O* would change/develop into a
"sublated"
intermediary --, but not intonot-O* --, incidentally,
contradicting the DM-worthies.
If was are to believe what they tell us, O* should, of course, change into not-O*,
not into some intermediary.

Putting this minor quibble to one side, too: Given this 'revised' view,
we may now suppose that O* does indeed change into that intermediary. To that end, let us call the latter,
"Oi*"
(which can be interpreted as a combination of the old and the new; a 'negation'
which also 'preserves'/'sublates').

If
so, Oi*
must remain forever in that state, unchanged, for there is as yet no not-Oi*
in existence to make it develop any further!

[Recall that according to this 'theory', everything (and that must include Oi*)
changes because of a 'struggle' with its 'opposite'.]

So, there must be a not-Oi*
in existence
to make Oi*
change further. To be sure, we could try to exempt Oi*
from this essential requirement on an ad hoc
basis (arguing, perhaps, that Oi*
changes spontaneously with nothing actually causing it), and yet if we do that,
there would seem to be no reason to accept the version of events expressed in
the
DM-classics, which tells us that every thing/process in the entire universe changes because of the
"struggle" of
opposites (and Oi* is certainly a thing/process).
Furthermore, if we make an exemption here, then the whole point of the
exercise would be lost, for if some things do, and some things do not change
according this dialectical 'Law', we would be left with no way of telling which
changes were, and which were not subject to it.

[That would also mean that the Second 'Law' isn't a law, either -- which is what we found
was the case with
the First 'Law', too.]

This is, of course, quite apart from the fact that such a subjectively
applied exemption certificate (issued to Oi*)
would mean that nothing at all could change, for everything in the universe
is in the process of change, and is thus already a 'sublated' version of
whatever it used to be.

Ignoring this 'difficulty', too: Even ifOi*
were to change into not-Oi* (as we suppose it must, given
the doctrine laid down in the DM-classics), then all the problems we met earlier simply reappear, for Oi*
would only be able to change if not-Oi*
already exists to make that happen! But, not-Oi*
can't already exist, for Oi*
hasn't changed into it yet!

On the other hand, even if we were to suppose not-Oi*
already exists, Oi*
couldn't change into it since not-Oi*
already exists!

Again, it could be objected that the dialectical negation of
O*,
which
produces not-O*,
isn't ordinary negation, as the above seems to assume.

In that case, let us now suppose that
O* turns into its 'sublated' opposite, not-Os*.
But, if that is to happen, according to the
Dialectical Classics, not-Os*
must already exist if
O* is to struggle with it and then change into it!
But, and once again, if that is so,
O* can't turn into not-Os*,
for it already exists! Alternatively, if not-Os*
didn't already exist, then O*
couldn't change since
O*
can only change if it "struggles" with what it changes into, i.e., not-Os*!

We hit the same non-dialectical brick wall, once more.

It could be objected that the above abstract argument misses the
point; in the real world things manifestly change. For instance, to use Mao's
example, peace changes into war, and
vice versa. Love can change into hate, and so on.

No one doubts this, but DM can't explain why this happens. For peace to change
into war, or vice versa, it would have to struggle with it. Has anyone
witnessed this odd event? Can abstractions like these actually struggle with one another? And yet, both Mao
and Lenin tell us the following:

"The
identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually
exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The
condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their
'self-movement', in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the
knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of
opposites…. [This] alone furnishes the key to the self-movement of everything
existing….

"The unity…of opposites is conditional,
temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites
is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute…." [Lenin (1961),
pp.357-58.
Bold emphases added.]

"The
universality or absoluteness of contradiction has a twofold meaning. One is
that contradiction exists in the process of development of all things, and the
other is that in the process of development of each thing a movement of
opposites exists from beginning to end.

"Engels said, 'Motion itself is a contradiction.' Lenin defined the law of the
unity of opposites as 'the recognition (discovery) of the contradictory,
mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and
processes of nature (including mind and society)'. Are these ideas
correct? Yes, they are. The interdependence of the contradictory aspects
present in all things and the struggle between these aspects determine the life
of all things and push their development forward. There is nothing that does not
contain contradiction; without contradiction nothing would exist....

"The
contradictory aspects in every process exclude each other, struggle with each
other and are in opposition to each other. Without exception, they are contained
in the process of development of all things and in all human thought. A
simple process contains only a single pair of opposites, while a complex process
contains more. And in turn, the pairs of opposites are in contradiction to one
another.

"That is how all things in the objective world
and all human thought are constituted and how they are set in motion....

"War and peace, as everybody knows, transform
themselves into each other. War is transformed into peace; for instance, the
First World War was transformed into the post-war peace, and the civil war in
China has now stopped, giving place to internal peace. Peace is transformed into
war; for instance, the Kuomintang-Communist co-operation was transformed into
war in 1927, and today's situation of world peace may be transformed into a
second world war. Why is this so? Because in class society such contradictory
things as war and peace have an identity in given conditions.

"All contradictory things are interconnected; not
only do they coexist in a single entity in given conditions, but in other given
conditions, they also transform themselves into each other. This is the full
meaning of the identity of opposites. This is what Lenin meant when he discussed
'how they happen to be (how they become) identical -- under what
conditions they are identical, transforming themselves into one another'....

"Why is it that 'the human mind should take these
opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, transforming
themselves into one another'? Because that is just how things are in objective
reality. The fact is that the unity or identity of opposites in objective things
is not dead or rigid, but is living, conditional, mobile, temporary and
relative; in given conditions, every contradictory aspect transforms itself
into its opposite. Reflected in man's thinking, this becomes the Marxist
world outlook of materialist dialectics. It is only the reactionary ruling
classes of the past and present and the metaphysicians in their service who
regard opposites not as living, conditional, mobile and transforming themselves
into one another, but as dead and rigid, and they propagate this fallacy
everywhere to delude the masses of the people, thus seeking to perpetuate their
rule....

"All processes have a beginning and an end,
all processes transform themselves into their opposites. The constancy of
all processes is relative, but the mutability manifested in the
transformation of one process into another is absolute.

"There are two states of motion in all things,
that of relative rest and that of conspicuous change. Both are caused by the
struggle between the two contradictory elements contained in a thing. When
the thing is in the first state of motion, it is undergoing only quantitative
and not qualitative change and consequently presents the outward appearance of
being at rest. When the thing is in the second state of motion, the quantitative
change of the first state has already reached a culminating point and gives rise
to the dissolution of the thing as an entity and thereupon a qualitative change
ensues, hence the appearance of a conspicuous change. Such unity, solidarity,
combination, harmony, balance, stalemate, deadlock, rest, constancy,
equilibrium, solidity, attraction, etc., as we see in daily life, are all the
appearances of things in the state of quantitative change. On the other hand,
the dissolution of unity, that is, the destruction of this solidarity,
combination, harmony, balance, stalemate, deadlock, rest, constancy,
equilibrium, solidity and attraction, and the change of each into its opposite
are all the appearances of things in the state of qualitative change, the
transformation of one process into another. Things are constantly transforming
themselves from the first into the second state of motion; the struggle of
opposites goes on in both states but the contradiction is resolved through the
second state. That is why we say that the unity of opposites is conditional,
temporary and relative, while the struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is
absolute.

"When we said above that two opposite things can
coexist in a single entity and can transform themselves into each other because
there is identity between them, we were speaking of conditionality, that is to
say, in given conditions two contradictory things can be united and can
transform themselves into each other, but in the absence of these conditions,
they can't constitute a contradiction, can't coexist in the same entity and
can't transform themselves into one another. It is because the identity of
opposites obtains only in given conditions that we have said identity is
conditional and relative. We may add that the struggle between opposites
permeates a process from beginning to end and makes one process transform itself
into another, that it is ubiquitous, and that struggle is therefore
unconditional and absolute.

"The combination of conditional, relative
identity and unconditional, absolute struggle constitutes the movement of
opposites in all things." [Mao (1961b),
pp.316, 337-38, 339-40, 342-43. Bold emphases alone added; quotation marks
altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site.]

If the above DM-classicists are right, how can peace change into war unless it "struggles" with it?

It could be argued that the contradictory aspects (or
underlying processes/tendencies) of a given society, or societies -- which might give the
appearance of peace -- are what turn peace in to war; it is the mutual struggle of
these contradictory aspects (or underlying processes/tendencies) that change the
one into the other.

In that case, let us call these underlying contradictory
aspects (or underlying processes/tendencies) UA and UA*. If the above is correct, it is the
struggle between UA and UA* that changes Peace (P) into War (W).
But, if this is indeed so, the DM-classics are wrong; P and its opposite, W, do
not actually struggle with one another, even though they are
opposites, and even though they should do this (if the
DM-classics are to be
believed).
What changes P into W is a struggle between their
non-opposites,UA and UA*. And yet, if either UA or
UA* changes
P into W, then
one or both of them must be the opposite(s) of P, and if they are
the opposite(s) of P they should
change into P! Either that, or the DM-classics are wrong.

On the other hand, if UA and UA* are indeed
opposites of one another, they should change into each other. But, they can't do
that since they both already exist!

Once again,we hit the same non-dialectical brick wall.

It could be argued that if we consider a more concrete example,
we might be able to understand what the DM-classics meant when they claimed that
things change into their opposites.

[In what follows, I examine 'concrete cases' that have been put
to me in discussion by those who doubt that the general criticisms above apply
in these instances. Apologies are owed in advance for the somewhat repetitive
nature of this material, but those who raised these examples thought they could
circumvent the above criticisms by introducing them. In every case,
they only imagined this by ignoring one or more of the core DM-theses advanced
in
the classics: 1) Everything changes because of a
'struggle' with its 'dialectical opposite', (2) Everything changes in to that
'opposite', and (3) Change produces that opposite. In that case, the following
material is aimed at showing that if we accept what the DM-classics have to tell
us,
the aforementioned general criticisms apply in each particular case. Hence the
need for repetition.]

Consider "John"
again: While it might be the
case that John is a boy, in a few years time it will be the case that John
is a man (all things being equal). Now, the fact that other individuals are already
men doesn't
stop John changing into a man (his opposite). So, John can change into his
opposite even though that opposite already exists. In that case, the above
objections fail.

Or, so it could be maintained.

And yet, as we have seen, this theory tells us that all things/processes change because
they "struggle" with their 'opposites', and that they "struggle" with what they
will become (i.e., that 'opposite').

Are we to assume, then, that John has to struggle with his
opposite? If so, he must struggle with all the
individuals that are already men if he is to become a man himself
(assuming that all other men are his opposite).

Alternatively, are we to suppose that John must struggle with what he
himself is to become, his
individual opposite -- i.e., himself as a man --, even
before it/he exists?
If not, then the above response is beside the point; John can only
change if he struggles with his opposite, but that opposite does not yet exist.
Plainly, if his opposite does not yet exist, he can't struggle with it, and
hence can't change. We hit the same problem.

Moreover, in view of the fact
that John must turn into his opposite, doesn't that mean he has to turn
into these other men, too? Or, does he turn into just one of them? But, it seems he must
do one or the other if the
DM-Classics are to be believed.

Anyway, according to the DM-worthies
quoted
here, John can only
change because of a struggle between opposites taking place in the here-and-now.
If so, are we
really supposed to
believe that "John-as-a-man" is struggling with "John-as-a-boy"
in the here-and-now?
Or, that the abstraction,
manhood, is struggling with that other abstraction, boyhood?

Some might be tempted to reply that this is precisely what
adolescence is, and yet, if that were the case, John-as-boy and John-as-a-man would
have to be locked in struggle in the here-and-now. Of course, adolescence
can't struggle with anything, since it, too, is an abstraction. And a struggle
in John's mind over what he is to become can't make him develop into a man,
either! It should hardly need pointing out that a struggle in the mind can't
change a boy into a man. This isn't to deny that such struggles take place, it
is merely to point out that thinking doesn't make something so -- if it did,
beggars would ride.

Nevertheless, John-as-a-man doesn't yet exist, so John-as-a-man can't struggle with John-as-boy. On the other hand, if
John-as-a-man does exist alongside John-as-boy, so that 'he' can struggle with his youthful
self, then John-as-boy can't change into 'him', for John-as-a-man already
exists!

To be sure, John's 'opposite' is whatever he will become (if he is
allowed to develop naturally), but, as noted above, that 'opposite' can't now
exist otherwise John wouldn't need to become him! But, and once again, if that
opposite doesn't exist,
John
can't change, for there would be nothing with which he could struggle.

Looking at this a little more concretely: In ten or fifteen years time, John
won't become just any
man, he will become a particular man. In that case, let us call the man that
John becomes "ManJ".
But, once more, ManJ must exist now
or John can't change into him (if
the
DM-classics are to be believed) -- for John can only become a man if he
is now locked in struggle with what he is to become, his own opposite, ManJ.

Once more: if that is so, John can't
become ManJ since ManJ
already exists!

It could be objected that the DM-classics are arguing that an
object in change takes on an opposite property or quality, expressed as the
negation of the predicate term that once applied to it. So, in abstract terms,
if
A is F (where "A" is perhaps the name of a person, such as John,
or that of some object or process, and "F" is some property or quality he/it
possesses) -- then the A that is F becomes the A that is not-F.
[Or, rather: it used to be the case that "A is F"; now
it is the
case that "A is not-F".] This is
surely possible, indeed, actual. Moreover, A being F doesn't
prevent it becoming not-F on the grounds that F already exists, or
even because not-F already exists (since, plainly, not-Fdoesn't
yet exist). So, dialectical change is not only possible, it is actual.

This is just a generalisation of the point made above about John
becoming a man, and is susceptible to the same sort of rebuttal: if not-F
doesn't already exist, then A can't struggle with it, and hence can't
change.

It could be argued that not-Fdoes exist, so this
struggle can take place. Hence, A can both struggle with not-F
and become not-F. More concretely, tendencies in John that maintain
him as a boy (F) are locked in a struggle with those that are changing
him into a man/not-a-boy (not-F).

But, are we really supposed to believe that John
changes into a tendency (for that is what not-F is, according to this
objection)?

Independently of that, it is difficult to believe that
anyone who has read the
DM-classics could imagine that this new interpretation
finds any support in what they have to say. For example, if it is indeed the
case that the A that is
F turns into the A is not-F -- or if A's being F
develops into A's being not-F -- then, according to those
classics, they must struggle with one another. But, how can this happen if it is admitted
that the A is not-F doesn't yet exist?

It could be countered that what is important here is that F
applied to A turns into its opposite, not-F. Now, many not-Fs
will typically already exist. For example, John might be alive one day (i.e.,
A is F), but the next he could be dead/not alive (i.e., A is
not-F). But, many others were dead or weren't alive the day before, when John was
alive. But, that doesn't stop him from becoming not alive (not-F), contrary to
the repeated assertions above. The fact that some things are not-F
doesn't prevent other things from becoming not-F, too.

Again, this is just a re-packaged version of the point made above
about John becoming a man. In this case, when he dies John doesn't just become any old
corpse, he becomes John's corpse. If that is so, and the
DM-classics are to be
believed, then that can only happen if John struggles with his opposite, i.e.,
with his own corpse! Do we all really have to fight our own future dead bodies
in order to die?

It could be objected that this could happen if F struggles
with not-F. Life and death/not-life are dialectically opposed to one
another, as Engels pointed out. So, the forces that keep John, for example,
alive are opposed to those that are killing him, and which will kill him one day.

But, if that is so, and the DM-classics are correct, then these
dialectical opposites must turn into one another. Is it really the case then
that the forces that keep John alive will turn into those that are killing him,
and vice versa? Will
anabolic processes become
catabolic
processes, and catabolic processes become anabolic processes? In fact these
processes don't even struggle with
one another! [Follow the links below for more details.] But, they should if we
were to believe
everything we read in those dusty old DM-classics.

Furthermore, and returning to the whatever A refers to, mentioned above:
A
doesn't just change into any old not-F, it changes into a particular
not-F. Let us call the particular not-F that A changes into
"FA".
Once more, according to the dialectical classics, every object/process changes
because (1) It struggles with its opposite and (2) It changes into that
opposite. If so, A can only change by struggling with FA;
but FA
already exists, so A can't change into it. If FA
didn't already exist, A couldn't struggle with it in order to
change.

No matter how many bends we try to negotiate with this rusty banger of a
theory, it still ends up wrapped around the same
old non-dialectical tree trunk.

Consider another concrete example: wood being fashioned into a
table. Once more, according to the
dialectical classics all objects and
processes change because of a 'struggle' of opposites, and they also change
into those opposites.

So, according to this 'theory', the wood that is used to make a table has to
'struggle' with what it turns into; that is, this wood has to 'struggle' with
the table it turns into!

In that case, the table must already exist, or it couldn't 'struggle' with the
wood from which it is to be made.

But, if the table already exists, then the wood can't be changed into it.
Indeed, why bother making a table that already exists?

On the other hand, if the table doesn't already exist, then the wood can't
'struggle' with its own opposite; that is, it can't 'struggle' with the table it
has yet to become!

Either way, this sort of change can't happen, according to this 'theory'.

And, it is little use introducing human agency here, for if a
carpenter is required to make a table, then he/she has to 'struggle' with the
wood to make it into that table -- since we are told that every object and
process in nature is governed by this 'Law'. But, according to the
Dialectical Classics, objects and processes 'struggle' with their dialectical
'opposites', and they turn into those opposites. If so, wood must turn
into the carpenter, not the table! And the carpenter must change into wood!

[These, of course, are simply more concrete versions of the
general argument
outlined above. For an answer to the objection that objects and processes change
in stages, see Note 10b2 (link above).]

Consider another hackneyed DM-example: water turning into steam at
100oC (under normal
conditions). Are we really supposed to believe what the
DM-classics tell
us, that the 'opposite' that
water becomes (i.e., steam) makes water turn into steam? But, this must be
the case if the classics are correct.

Hence, while you might think it is the
heat/energy you are putting into the water that turns it into steam, what really
happens, according to these wise old dialecticians, is that steam makes water
turn into steam!

In that case, save energy and turn the gas off!

It might be useful to make this example a little more concrete: To that end, let us track a water molecule to see what happens to it
this liquid is heated.
In order to
identify it, call it, "W1",
and the steam molecule it turns into, "S1".
But, if the DM-classics above are correct W1
can only turn into S1
by 'struggling' with it. In that case, S1must already exist, otherwise W1
couldn't struggle with it and thus change! But, how can W1
turn into S1
if S1
already exists?

In fact, according to the DM-classics, opposites turn
into each other; if so, S1
must change into W1
at the same time that W1
is turning into S1!
So, while you are boiling a kettle --
according to this Super-scientific 'theory' -- steam must be condensing back into the water you are boiling, and it must
be doing so at the same rate it is turning into steam!

One wonders, therefore, how dialectical kettles manage to boil dry.

Of course, the same argument applies to water freezing (and, as
we have seen, to
any and all alleged examples of 'dialectical'-change).

It could be objected that the opposite that liquid water turns
into is a gas (i.e., steam/water vapour); so the dialectical classicists are correct.

However, if we take the DM-classics at their word, this gas must
'struggle' with liquid water in the here-and-now if water is to change into it.
But, plainly, this gas doesn't yet exist,
or the water would already have changed into it! In
which case, water would never boil if this 'theory' were true, since the gas it
is supposed to change into isn't there yet for it to struggle with. And yet, it is
plainly the heat we add that causes the change not the gas!

It could be maintained that what happens is that the heat energy
input into the system makes water boil. Indeed, but then, if heat makes
water boil, that water must struggle with this heat, and then change into it,
just as heat must change into water! If not, the DM-classics are wrong, and dialecticians are left
with no theory of change.

[Follow the above link for an explanation why Hegel and Lenin both
adopted this rather odd theory of change.]

Finally, it could be pointed out that
Lenin actually argued as
follows:

"The identity of opposites (it would be more
correct, perhaps, to say their 'unity,' -- although the difference between the
terms identity and unity is not particularly important here. In a certain sense
both are correct) is the recognition (discovery) of the contradictory,
mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all
phenomena and processes of nature (including mind and society). The
condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement,'
in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them
as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites. The two
basic (or two possible? Or two historically observable?) conceptions of
development (evolution) are: development as decrease and increase, as
repetition, and development as a unity of opposites (the division of a
unity into mutually exclusive opposites and their reciprocal relation)." [Lenin
(1961),
pp.357-58. Italic emphases in the original; bold emphasis added. Quotation marks altered to conform to
the conventions adopted at this site.]

As
one critic of my argument put things (this is in fact one of the few detailed
and carefully argued responses to my objections I have encountered in the last eight
years on the Internet):

"This is a complete misreading of the law of
unity and interpenetration of opposites. To borrow Rosa's symobology (sic), a
contradiction means in essence that an entity A contains internally
contradictory tendencies O* and O** which cause A to turn into not-A. The
struggle within A is between O* and O**, the internal tendency for it to stay
the same (O*) and the internal forces acting on it to change (O**). The whole
essence of dialectics is that O* and O** can not exist within a stable
equilibrium. Rosa quotes Lenin saying quite clearly that we are not dealing with
O* turning into O**, but with the working-out of 'internally contradictory
tendencies' within A.

"Now, Rosa may point out that some presentations
of dialectics may say that things 'struggle with and become' their opposites.
This is looking at the outside -- the change from A to not-A, because of the
internal tendencies O* and O**. Not-A does not yet exist as a realized entity;
it does not need to. The struggle is the internal struggle between O* (which
preserves A) and O** (which causes its transformation into not-A). In essence we
can say that O** is the seed of the unrealized entity not-A which exists within
the realized entity A, and A struggles (in the form of O*) against its
transformation into not-A (through the operation of O**).

"Now, Rosa's going to object that dialectics
pictures entities that 'struggle with' what they are going to become, which
presupposes that these entities already exist. But this is because she fails to
distinguish between the realized entities A and not-A, and the internal
tendencies O* and O**. When A exists, both O* and O** exist, and struggle with
one another. These may be united within a physical object such as a seed, which
contains structures that form its O* to keep it a seed, and yet has a tendency
O** to transform into its opposite, a seedling. Or they may be united in
capitalist society, such as the capitalist class O* which struggles with the
working class O** over the control of the means of production. The working out
of this contradiction is nothing less than the struggle for socialism....

"Again, Lenin talks about these tendencies
in phenomena and processes that elude your grasp. The above is precisely what I
have been illustrating with the difference between A (the entity) and O*/O**
(its contradictory tendencies) that you have not understood.

"Things do not change into their contradictions, which is what your
mock-refutation entails, they change into their opposites. That is, A does not
change into O**, but into not-A. O* does not change into O** but into not-O*."
[Bold added.]

Readers will look long and hard and to no avail to find where I
say that things "change into their contradictions", but into their
contradictories, in this case into not-A (which is what the
DM-classics tell us). Just as they will look long and hard for a singe quotation
from the DM-classics (certainly this critic offered none) that supports this
revisionist reading of the theory. The above critic will also need to tell us why not-A
isn't the 'contradictory' of A.

It could be objected that the above critic did refer us to
this quotation from Lenin:

"The identity of opposites (it would be more
correct, perhaps, to say their 'unity,' -- although the difference between the
terms identity and unity is not particularly important here. In a certain sense
both are correct) is the recognition (discovery) of the contradictory,
mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all
phenomena and processes of nature (including mind and society)." [Lenin
(1961),
p.357. Bold emphasis alone added. Quotation marks altered to conform to the
conventions adopted at this site.]

However, when asked (several times), the above critic
refused to comment on this quotation from Lenin:

"Dialectics
is the teaching which shows how Opposites can be and
how they happen to be (how they become) identical, -- under
what conditions they are identical, becoming transformed into one another,
-- why the human mind should grasp these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as
living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another." [Lenin
(1961),
p.109. Bold emphasis alone added.]

According to the above, the opposite tendencies
within A -- that is,"the internal tendency for it to stay the same (O*)"
and "the internal forces acting on it to change (O**)" must change into
one another. But, how can they do that if each of them already exists? No
wonder this critic ignored Lenin's words. [However, see below.]

But, what about this part of the argument?

"Now, Rosa may point out that some presentations
of dialectics may say that things 'struggle with and become' their opposites.
This is looking at the outside -- the change from A to not-A, because of the
internal tendencies O* and O**. Not-A does not yet exist as a realized entity;
it does not need to. The struggle is the internal struggle between O* (which
preserves A) and O** (which causes its transformation into not-A). In essence we
can say that O** is the seed of the unrealized entity not-A which exists within
the realized entity A, and A struggles (in the form of O*) against its
transformation into not-A (through the operation of O**)."

Unfortunately, this ignores the philosophical
background to Hegel's theory (which Lenin accepted, even if he had to put it
"back on its feet"). That background is outlined
here.

It could be argued that this critic has answered the point
made by Lenin (that opposites are transformed into one another):

"Now, Rosa may point out that some presentations
of dialectics may say that things 'struggle with and become' their opposites.
This is looking at the outside -- the change from A to not-A, because of the
internal tendencies O* and O**."

And yet this fails to explain why O* and O* do
not change into one another. Despite being pressed on this many times, this critic
refused to respond. Moreover, this isn't to look "at the outside" (whatever
that means!). The DM-classics are quite clear, this applies to "everything
existing" and it is an "absolute":

"The law of the interpenetration of
opposites.... [M]utual penetration of polar opposites and transformation into
each other when carried to extremes...." [Engels (1954), pp.17,
62.]

"Dialectics, so-called objective
dialectics, prevails throughout nature, and so-called subjective dialectics,
dialectical thought, is only the reflection of the motion through opposites
which asserts itself everywhere in nature, and which by the continual
conflict of the opposites and their final passage into one another, or into
higher forms, determines the life of nature." [Ibid.,
p.211.]

"For a stage in the outlook on nature where all
differences become merged in intermediate steps, and all opposites pass into
one another through intermediate links, the old metaphysical method of
thought no longer suffices. Dialectics, which likewise knows no hard and fast
lines, no unconditional, universally valid 'either-or' and which bridges
the fixed metaphysical differences, and besides 'either-or' recognises also in
the right place 'both this-and that' and reconciles the opposites, is the sole
method of thought appropriate in the highest degree to this stage. Of course,
for everyday use, for the small change of science, the metaphysical categories
retain their validity." [Ibid.,
pp.212-13.]

"And so
every phenomenon, by the action of those same forces which condition its
existence, sooner or later, but inevitably, is transformed into its own opposite…."
[Plekhanov (1956),
p.77.]

"[Among the
elements of dialectics are the following:] [I]nternally contradictory
tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum and unity of opposites…. [This involves] not
only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every determination,
quality, feature, side, property into every other [into its opposite?]….

"In brief,
dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This
embodies the essence of dialectics….

"The
splitting of the whole and the cognition of its contradictory parts…is the
essence (one of the 'essentials', one of the principal, if not the
principal, characteristic features) of dialectics….

"The
identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually
exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The
condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their
'self-movement', in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the
knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of
opposites…. [This] alone furnishes the key to the self-movement of everything
existing….

"The
unity…of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle
of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are
absolute…." [Lenin (1961), pp.221-22,
357-58.]

"'This harmony is precisely absolute Becoming
change, -- not becoming other, now this and then another. The essential thing is
that each different thing [tone], each particular, is different from another,
not abstractly so from any other, but from its other. Each particular
only is, insofar as its other is implicitly contained in its Notion....' Quite
right and important: the 'other' as its other, development into its opposite."
[Ibid., p.260. Lenin is here commenting on Hegel (1995a), pp.278-98; this
particular quotation coming from p.285.]

"Dialectics
is the teaching which shows how Opposites can be and
how they happen to be (how they become) identical, -- under
what conditions they are identical, becoming transformed into one another,
-- why the human mind should grasp these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as
living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another." [Ibid.,
p.109.]

"Of course, the fundamental proposition of
Marxian dialectics is that all boundaries in nature and society are conventional
and mobile, that there is not a single phenomenon which cannot under
certain conditions be transformed into its opposite." [Lenin (1916). Quoted
from
here.]

"Why is it
that '...the human mind should take these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as
living, conditional, mobile, transforming themselves into one another'? Because
that is just how things are in objective reality. The fact is that the unity or
identity of opposites in objective things is not dead or rigid, but is living,
conditional, mobile, temporary and relative; in given conditions, every
contradictory aspect transforms itself into its opposite....

"In speaking
of the identity of opposites in given conditions, what we are referring to is
real and concrete opposites and the real and concrete transformations of
opposites into one another....

"All
processes have a beginning and an end, all processes transform themselves into
their opposites. The constancy of all processes is relative, but the mutability
manifested in the transformation of one process into another is absolute." [Mao
(1961b),
pp.340-42.
In all of the above, bold emphases alone added; quotation marks have been altered to
conform to the conventions adopted at this site.]

[And these are only from the classics; we have seen that
'lesser'
DM-works also say the same thing. However, this critic was a fellow Trotskyist, and so
might not be prepared to accept what Mao had to say. But, as we can see, Mao was
merely echoing Lenin.]

It could be argued that some of the above passages merely say that
everything changes into its opposite; they don't say that they change into one
another. But, if everything changes into its opposite, and that opposite is also
part of everything, then it too must change into its opposite; that is, O*
must change into O**, andO** must change into O*.

But, what of the argument itself? Are "tendencies"
causal agents? Aren't they (i.e., both the tendencies and the changes) rather the result of other causes? For example, do we
say that the "tendency" for glass to break is what makes it break, or do we
appeal to inter-molecular forces within glass, and an external shock? But, can't
we call these inner forces "tendencies", too? Are there such inner "tendencies"
in glass? If there are, what are their causes? Or, are they uncaused? In
fact, if we just appeal to "tendencies" to explain things, noting is explained.
"Why did that glass break?" "It just has a tendency to do so." "Why is it
raining?" "It simply has a tendency to do so in this area." "Why did those cops
attack the strikers?" "They have a tendency to defend the bosses." So, an appeal to
a "tendency" is no explanation at all.

Or rather, if we insist on regarding and appeal to
"tendencies" as an explanation, that is because we also view the word as a
shorthand for other causes (known or unknown) at work in the system. Consider
the "tendency" of the rate of profit
to fall. Is that uncaused? But, no Marxist will argue it is. Indeed,
Marxists point to
several contributory causal factors that combine to make the rate of profit
tend to fall over time. Would any of us have been satisfied if Marx had simply said
there a "tendency" for the rate of profit to fall, and made no attempt to
explain its cause/causes?

Hence, "tendencies" aren't causes; they are
the result of one or more causes themselves. So, this critic is mistaken, an
internal "tendency" can't "preserve A", nor can the opposite "tendency",
O**, cause a "transformation into not-A", since these "tendencies" are
derivative not causative. Indeed, as the DM-classics inform us, the cause of
these "tendencies" is the "unity and interpenetration of opposites", the
"contradiction" and the "struggle" that results from this.

As Gollobin points out (quoting Engels):

"Opposites in a thing are not only mutually
exclusive, polar, repelling, each other; they also attract and interpenetrate
each other. They begin and cease to exist together.... These dual aspects
of opposites -- conflict and unity -- are like scissor blades in cutting, jaws
in mastication, and two legs in walking. Where there is only one, the process
as such is impossible: 'all polar opposites are in general determined by the
mutual action of two opposite poles on one another, the separation and
opposition of these poles exists only within their unity and interconnection,
and, conversely, their interconnection exists only in their separation and their
unity only in their opposition.' In fact, 'where one no sooner tries to hold on
to one side alone then it is transformed unnoticed into the other....'" [Gollobin
(1986), p.113; quoting Engels (1891a),
p.414. Bold emphases added.]

So, as Lenin also noted, these 'internal
opposites' not only struggle, they turn into one another:

"Dialectics
is the teaching which shows how Opposites can be and
how they happen to be (how they become) identical, -- under
what conditions they are identical, becoming transformed into one another,
-- why the human mind should grasp these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as
living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another." [Lenin
(1961),
p.109. Bold emphasis alone added.]

But, this can't happen, and for reasons explored
above.

Well, perhaps it is the struggle between
these "opposite tendencies" that causes A to change? Here is my critic
again:

"When A exists, both O* and O** exist, and struggle with
one another. These may be united within a physical object such as a seed, which
contains structures that form its O* to keep it a seed, and yet has a tendency
O** to transform into its opposite, a seedling. Or they may be united in
capitalist society, such as the capitalist class O* which struggles with the
working class O** over the control of the means of production. The
working out of this contradiction is nothing less than the struggle for
socialism...."

But, the
DM-classics are quite clear: when these
opposites struggle, they change into one another, as noted above several times. [And it is no use this critic blithely asserting that this is to be found
only in "some presentations" of the theory. It is found throughout the
DM-classics and other DM-texts, as we have seen.] So, O* must change into O**, and vice versa.
Otherwise, O* and O** will be changeless beings. If they
themselves have causal powers, or are causal powers, then
they, too, must also be objects (structures?), relations, or processes of some sort. In which case, they, too,
must change. On the other hand, if they don't have causal powers, or they
aren't causal powers, then, of course, they can't cause
change themselves. And, we can see this critic also assumes this to be so,
since he has stopped calling O* and O** "tendencies"; they have
become the "capitalist class" and the "working class", respectively. And, these
surely change one another, and thereby change themselves. They are the most
important cause, or one of the most important causes, of change in Capitalism.

Indeed, this critic admits they do
change:

"That is, A does not change into
O**, but
into not-A. O*
does not change into O** but into not-O*."

And yet, if we ignore the impromptu 'theory' this critic has
pulled out of thin air and accept the account given in the DM-classics, this can only happen if O* struggles with not-O*,
and then turns into it,
which puts us exactly where we were several paragraphs back.

In which case, my refutation still stands.

[Readers are encouraged to read my lengthier reply to this
critic,
here. Several more objections are fielded
here. I
will return again to
the tendencies within capitalism that this objector thinks cause it to change or
remain the same.]

This, of course, doesn't deny that change occurs, only that
DM can account for it.

Alternatively, if DM were true, change would be impossible.

Howsoever we try to re-package this 'Law' we end up with
the same insuperable
problems, which can't simply be
Nixoned away.

However, as we have seen, this 'theory' is just an elaboration of the following example of a prioriSuperscience
concocted by the Mystery MeisterHimself:

"Neither
in heaven nor in earth, neither in the world of mind nor nature, is there
anywhere an abstract 'either-or' as the understanding maintains. Whatever
exists is concrete, with difference and opposition in itself. The finitude of
things with then lie in the want of correspondence between their immediate being
and what they essentially are. Thus, in inorganic nature, the acid is implicitly
at the same time the base: in other words its only being consists in its
relation to its other. Hence the acid persists quietly in the contrast: it is
always in effort to realize what it potentially is. Contradiction is the very
moving principle of the world." [Hegel (1975),
p.174. Bold emphases added.]

As this quotation indicates, and as the next few sections of this
Essay and Essay Eight Part
Three will demonstrate, Hegel
made a quasi-'logical' attempt to 'derive' such 'opposites' from his criticism
of the LOI, but his reasoning was
defective from beginning to end -- and
demonstrably so. The bottom line
is that, far from
specifying that each object was paired with its unique dialectical "other", Hegel
inadvertently conceded that objects and processes were confronted on all sides by countless
"others", fatally damaging his theory of change.

Leaving such technicalities aside, and ignoring
for the moment the question of how Hegel, Engels, Lenin and Plekhanov knew this
'Law' was true of
everything in the entire universe, for all of time -- this topic was examined in more detail in
Essay Two)
-- when
it is based only on a ham-fisted Idealist 'thought experiment', it is worth pointing out that
many things seem to have
no internally-interconnected opposites. For example,
electrons, which, while they
appear to have several external opposites (even though it isn't too clear what
the opposite of an electron is -- is it a
positron or
is it a proton?
--, it is clear that electrons do not seem to turn into either of them), they
appear to have no internal
opposites as far as can be ascertained. In that case, they must be changeless
beings -- or, if they do change, it can't be a result of their "internal
contradictions".10c

Admittedly, electrons had only just been discovered
in Lenin's day, but that makes his dogmatism even more puzzling --
especially when it is recalled that it was Lenin who insisted that all knowledge is
provisional and relative.

It is worth noting at the start that the relevancy of the comments
in this section depend on what dialecticians mean by "internal opposite".
Sometimes they seem to mean
"spatially-internal", at other times they appear to mean "logically-internal".
[This ambiguity is
examined in more detail in Essay Eight
Part One. However, much
of the present and subsequent sections depend on interpreting "internal
opposites" in one way -- i.e., spatially.]

[Even so, the other alternative (i.e.,
interpreting "internal opposites" logically) will also be considered.
On the serious difficulties this equivocation presents DM-theorists, see
here.]

Anyway, it is plain that this
particular equivocation
has arisen because of an inappropriate organicist metaphor dialecticians
have inherited from Hegel. Of course, the parts of an organism are both spatially-, and
logically-internal to that organism, but, when we move beyond Biology, this
metaphor loses its plausibility, and the above equivocation (between the spatial
and the logical meaning of "internal") is bound to create problems -- indeed, as we
are about to find out.

Despite the above fatal flaws, it is difficult to
believe Lenin and the others were serious in claiming that everything is
a UO (incidentally, a dogma they neglected to prove, merely basing this idea on
an a priori observation Hegel lifted from Spinoza (that is, that 'every
determination is also a negation'); more on this later) -- just as it is impossible to make sense of Lenin's claim that "every
determination, quality, feature, side, property [changes] into every
other…."

"[Among
the elements of dialectics are the following:] [I]nternally contradictory
tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum and unity of opposites…. [This
involves] not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of
everydetermination, quality, feature, side, property into
every other [into its opposite?]…." [Lenin (1961),
p.221. Emphases in the original.]

Are we really supposed to believe that, say, a
domestic cat is a UO? But, what is the opposite of a cat? A dog? A tulip? A tin
of beans?

In the logical sense of
this term, it should be 'non-cat'. And yet, if "non-cat" were the opposite of "cat", it
would mean that if everything does indeed change into its opposite, cats must
change into everything that they are not -- that is, each cat must change
into any one or more of the following 'non-cats': a tin of beans, an oak tree, a
pebble beach, a pair of cuff
links, a dog basket, a rift valley, a petrol station, a carburettor, an
asteroid, or a galaxy, to name but a
few 'non-cats'. [The obvious dialectical response to this objection will be considered
presently.]

On the other hand, if we interpret "internal" spatially, then,
according to Lenin, cats must contain all these things if they are indeed
unitiesof their opposites -- i.e., they must presumably be a unity of cat and 'non-cat', especially if
'struggle' with the latter (i.e., this 'non-cat') causes a cat to change. Is, therefore, each unassuming domestic
moggie a repository of all its myriad opposites, and do these opposites
contain their own sets of opposites, ad infinitem, like glorified Russian Dolls?

Well, it seems they must if, according to Lenin: "everydetermination,
quality, feature, side, property [changes] into every other…." If change
is the result of an "internal" struggle between opposites (declared above to be an
"absolute" by Lenin), and everything changes
into everything else, or at least into its 'opposite', then cats must both contain and
change into (at some point) a whole host of things, which must in turn contain and change into yet
more things (or even, perhaps, back into cats).10d

It is little use complaining that these are
ridiculous conclusions; if everything changes into its 'opposite' (or, indeed, into all
of them), then all must
follow. Those who still object should rather pick a fight with dialecticians --
not me -- for concocting such a crazy view of change.

So, if cats change, as surely they do, then
they must both struggle with and change into their opposites. But, where are these 'opposite cats'
with which they are supposed to be struggling? And how
do they feature in and cause the changes they allegedly bring about in the original
animal? On the other hand, if they don't do this, does this mean
that feline parts of nature aren't subject to dialectical law? Is this why cats have
nine lives?

Now, Engels did at least try to
address these fatal
objections to his theory; he argued that we must learn from nature what the actual
properties of objects and processes are in each case, and hence, presumably,
what each can legitimately change into. [To be sure, he made this point in
relation to the First and Third of his 'Laws', but there is no reason to suppose he would have denied this of
his Second 'Law'.] In addition, he pointed out that 'dialectical negation'
isn't annihilation. [Engels (1954), p.63 and (1976),
p.181.]

Are we really supposed to believe that all of these reside inside each lump of iron?
Or, which are 'logically' connected with them, as one of Hegel's
unique "others"? If we adopt the logical view of "internal opposites",
how can all of the above be logically-related to iron ore and its unique
"other"? If not,
what exactly is the point
of this 'Law' if iron can change, or be changed into any one of the above?

If each one of the above isn't the unique "other" of iron
ore, and yet iron ore can be turned into all of them, then that fact alone seems to
return a rather unfavourable verdict concerning the validity of this 'Law'.

Again, switching back to the 'spatial view'
of "internal opposites": if these items don't exist inside each lump of iron --
or, even if these items do not confront each other as antagonistic external or 'logical'
opposites --, how is it possible for human labour and/or natural forces to turn iron
ore into such things while remaining in conformity with 'dialectical Law'? Does human labour work with,
or work against the 'Laws' of
dialectics? If a lump of iron doesn't (logically or spatially)
'contain', say, a carving knife, how is it possible for human beings to change
iron into carving knives, and for this to be done dialectically? Are
there changes in reality that aren't governed by 'dialectical law'?

Are these iron 'Laws'
not in fact applicable to iron itself?

In that case, exactly which opposites are
('logically'/physically) united in, or with any particular lump of iron ore? Or,
indeed, with all such lumps?

Of course, it could be objected that the above
considerations are ridiculous and completely misconstrue the nature of this 'Law'. No one supposes
that cats and nuggets of iron ore contain their opposites. Indeed, this is how
Woods and Grant explained things:

"Nature seems to work in pairs. We have the
'strong' and the 'weak' forces at the subatomic level; attraction and repulsion;
north and south in magnetism; positive and negative in electricity; matter and
anti-matter; male and female in biology, odd and even in mathematics; even the
concept of 'left and right handedness in relation to the spin of subatomic
particles.... There are two kinds of matter, which can be called positive and
negative. Like kinds repel and unlike attract." [Woods and Grant (1995),
p.65.]11

But, if nature works in pairs (at least),
what is the paired opposite of a cat that causes that animal to change? If
they
have no opposites, then these feline parts of nature (at least) do
not work/exist in 'dialectical pairs'. And, what applies to cats must surely apply to countless other
things. What then are the external and/or internal opposites of things like the
following: Giraffes, Snowy Owls, Mountain Gorillas, Daffodils, Oak trees,
Chinese Puzzles, broom
handles, craters on the Moon, copies of Anti-Dühring,the ten
thousandth moth to hatch in
Cook County, Illinois, USA, in May 2012 -- or
the question mark at the end of this sentence (on your screen, not mine)? All of these are subject to
change, but not, it seems, as a result of any obvious oppositional pairing, tension
or 'struggle' with anything unique to each.

Is a question mark, for example, really locked in a life-and-death struggle
with other punctuation marks? Or, even with its
Hegelian 'other'? But, what is
the 'other'
of a "?"? An "!"?

It could be objected to this that in the case
of cats (and some of the other objects listed above), the opposites concerned are plainly "male" and "female".
But, even if that were so, these are manifestly not "internal opposites", and neither are
they "internally related" to each other -- they are causally,
historically and biologically related. Sexual
diversity isn't a logical feature of reality -- if it were, there would
be no hermaphrodites or
asexual organisms.
So, change in this case can't be the result of
any 'internal contradictions' that exist between male and female organisms. Even if this
weren't so, is it really the case
that males and females must always conflict? [Anyone
who has, for example, seen
Leopard Slugs mating might be forgiven for thinking that
these fortunate creatures have had a dialectical exemption certificate encoded
into their DNA at some point. They do not 'conflict'!]

This is to say nothing of gay sex. Where is the 'unity of
opposites' here? And what are we to say about stories like the following report
from the BBC (again!):

"Two
incidents occurred on
Goodhope Bay,
and one on Funk beach. The incident in 2006 occurred on a different beach again,
called Trypot.

"'This
really made us sit up and take notice,' said de Bruyn, of the new sightings.

"All
four known sexual incidents followed a common pattern. Each time a seal chased,
captured and mounted the penguin. The seal then attempted copulation several
times, lasting about five minutes each, with periods of rest in between. Male
and female penguins mate via an opening called a cloaca, and the seals are
thought to have actually penetrated the penguins in some of the acts, which were
caught on film by Haddad. In three of the four recorded incidents the seal let
the penguin go. But on one of the more recent occasions, the seal killed and ate
the penguin after trying to mate with it. Fur seals often catch and eat penguins
on the island.

"The
incidents are the only time
pinnipeds,
the group that includes seals, fur seals and sea-lions, have been known to have
sex with an animal from a different biological class, in this case a mammal
trying to have sex with a bird. The scientists can only speculate about why the
seals are behaving this way. But the new observations suggest that having sex
with penguins may be becoming a learned behaviour among seals on the island.

"'Seals have capacity for learning -- we know this from their foraging behaviour
for example,' explained de Bruyn. 'So male seals may see each other coercing
penguins, then attempt it themselves. That might explain why the number of
incidents appears to be increasing....

"But
'if this is learned behaviour, we really can’t think of what the reward may be
for these young males,' he adds. 'Other than perhaps learning that these birds
are an easier target to practice their copulatory skills.'

"The
seals were not yet old or large enough to defend harems of female seals,
explained de Bruyn.

"'Perhaps it is a release of sexual frustration, given the hormonal surges
during seal breeding season. It is very unlikely to be failed mate recognition
-- i.e. the misidentification of the penguin as a female seal. All in all it's
difficult to say really,' he admits." [Quoted from here; accessed 19/11/2014.
Several paragraphs merged to save space; spelling adjusted to UK English.
Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site. Some
links added. Video film in the original has been omitted.]

Perhaps the dialectic by-passed these animals, permitting the
copulating of a mammal with a bird, but we are all familiar with dogs 'dry
humping' a human (or even a chair) leg. Maybe 'Being' has a wicked sense of
humour and has planted these examples to test the faith of DM-fans, a bit like
some Christians think 'God' has placed fossils in the ground to test their
faith.

Of course, the following research would have to be ruled out in
advance by all decent, 'God'-, er..., 'Being'-fearing DM-fans, since it is a
clear violation of 'dialectical law' as the latter supposedly features in/governs sexual reproduction:

"'Three
people, one baby' public consultation begins

"By James
Gallagher, Health and
science reporter, BBC News

"A public
consultation has been launched to discuss
the ethics of using three people to create
one baby. The technique could be used to
prevent debilitating and fatal
'mitochondrial' diseases, which are
passed down only from mother to child.
However, the resulting baby would contain
genetic information from three people -- two
parents and a donor woman. Ministers could
change the law to make the technique legal
after the results of the consultation are
known.

"About one in
200 children are born with faulty
mitochondria -- the tiny power stations
which provide energy to every cell in the
body. Most show little or no symptoms, but
in the severest cases the cells of the body
are starved of energy. It can lead to muscle
weakness, blindness, heart failure and in
some cases can be fatal. Mitochondria are
passed on from the mother's egg to the child
-- the father does not pass on mitochondria
through his sperm. The idea to prevent this
is to add a healthy woman's mitochondria
into the mix. Two main techniques have been
shown to work in the laboratory, by using a
donor embryo or a donor egg.

"How do
you make a baby from three people?

"1) Two embryos are fertilised with sperm
creating an embryo from the intended parents and another from the donors. 2) The
pronuclei,
which contain genetic information, are removed from both embryos but only the
parents' is kept 3) A healthy embryo is created by adding the parents' pronuclei
to the donor embryo, which is finally implanted into the womb.

"However,
mitochondria contain their own genes in
their own set of DNA. It means any babies
produced would contain genetic material from
three people. The vast majority would come
from the mother and father, but also
mitochondrial DNA from the donor woman. This
would be a permanent form of genetic
modification, which would be passed down
through the generations.

"It is
one of
the
ethical
considerations
which
will be
discussed
as part
of the
Human
Fertilisation
and
Embryology
Authority's
consultation.
The
chair of
the
organisation,
Prof
Lisa
Jardine,
said:
'It is
genetic
modification
of the
egg --
that is
uncharted
territory.
Once we
have
genetic
modification
we have
to be
sure we
are damn
happy.'
She said
it was a
question
of
'balancing
the
desire
to help
families
have
healthy
children
with the
possible
impact
on the
children
themselves
and
wider
society'....

"However,
treatments in
IVF clinics will be years away even if
the public and ministers decide the
techniques should go ahead. There are still
questions around safety which need to be
addressed. One of the pioneers of the
methods,
Prof Mary Herbert from Newcastle
University, said: 'We are now undertaking
experiments to test the safety and efficacy
of the new techniques. This work may take
three to five years to complete.'" [Quoted
from
here. Some links added; several
paragraphs merged to save space. Quotation
marks modified to conform to the conventions
adopted at this site. Bold
emphases in the original. Accessed
17/08/2012.]

And, in late February 2014, we read that three-parent babies are
expected to be born in the UK in the next year or so:

"(Reuters) -- Britain proposed new regulations on
Thursday that would make it the first country in the world to offer
'three-parent' fertility treatments to families who want to avoid passing on
incurable diseases to their children.

"The move was praised by doctors and but feared by critics, who say the
technique will lead to the creation of genetically modified designer babies. The
technique is known as three-parent in vitro fertilization (IVF) because the
offspring would have genes from a mother, a father and from a female donor. The
British plans come as medical advisers in the United States began a series of
public hearings this week to consider whether there is scientific justification
for allowing human trials of the technique.

"The treatment, only at the research stage in laboratories in Britain and the
United States, would for the first time involve implanting genetically modified
embryos into women. The process involves intervening in the fertilization
process to remove faulty mitochondrial DNA, which can cause inherited conditions
such as fatal heart problems, liver failure, brain disorders, blindness and
muscular dystrophy.

"It
is designed to help families with mitochondrial diseases -- incurable conditions
passed down the maternal line that affect around one in 6,500 children
worldwide. Mitochondria act as tiny energy-generating batteries inside cells.

"'Jumping the gun'

"Announcing draft plans to allow the technique and launching a public
consultation on them, Britain's chief medical officer Sally Davies said the
proposed move would give women who carry severe mitochondrial disease the chance
to have children without passing on devastating genetic disorders. 'It would
also keep the UK in the forefront of scientific development in this area,' she
said in a statement.

"But David King of the campaign group
Human Genetics Alert
accused the government of 'jumping the gun' in laying out new laws before the
treatments had been thoroughly investigated.

"'If passed, this will be the first time any government has legalized
inheritable human genome modification, something that is banned in all other
European countries,' he said in a statement. 'Such a decision of major
historical significance requires a much more extensive public debate.'

"Although some critics of mitochondrial transfer say it is akin to creating
designer babies, replacing faulty mitochondria with healthy ones would not be
genetic engineering in the usual understanding of the term. It would not make a
child smarter, sportier, more attractive, or otherwise different from what his
genome and environment would produce in the normal way.

"Britain said the proposed new rules would be subject to public scrutiny and
parliament's approval. Many scientists, campaigners and medical experts welcomed
the government's decision. Jeremy Farrar, director of the
Wellcome
Trust international medical charity, urged the government to 'move swiftly
so that parliament could debate the regulations at the earliest opportunity and
families affected by these devastating disorders can begin to benefit'.

"Peter Braude, a professor of obstetrics and gynaecology at King's College
London, welcomed the move, saying: 'It is true that genetic alteration of
disease risk is an important step for society and should not taken lightly.'

"'However the proposed changes to the regulations ensure it will be limited to
informed couples, who understand from sad personal experience the significant
effects of their disease, and are best placed to balance the risks of the
technology with the possibility of having children without mitochondrial
disease,' he added.

"Scientists are researching several three-parent IVF techniques. One being
developed at Britain's Newcastle University, known as pronuclear transfer, swaps
DNA between two fertilized human eggs. Another, called
maternal
spindle transfer, swaps material between the mother's egg and a donor egg
before fertilization.

"A
British ethics panel review of the potential treatments in 2012 decided they
were ethical and should go ahead as long as research shows they are likely to be
safe and effective. Because Britain is in the vanguard of this research, ethical
concerns, political decisions and scientific advances are closely watched around
the world.

"Britain's public consultation on the draft regulations began on Thursday and
was scheduled to run until May 21, 2014." [Quoted from
here; accessed 28/02/2014, updated
here,
03/06/2014. Quotation marks modified to conform to the
conventions adopted at this site. Spelling altered in line with UK English.
Several paragraphs merged to save space. Links added.]

[I am in the process of adding
further examples of anti-dialectical science to
Appendix A.]

Notice, there is no mention in the
above of the
brazen violation of Engels's Second 'Law' (as a legitimate objection to this research),
and I have yet to see a single article/blog written by a DM-fan
anathematising this sort of work (or, indeed, gay sex or 'dry-humping' dogs!). But, what price the
UO if it is so easily by-passed/abrogated by
reactionary scientists and animals like these?

To be sure, modern medicine is quite
remarkable -- a few snips of the surgeon's scissors and Bob's your aunty. And yet --
but this should hardly need pointing out -- males don't change into females (nor
vice versa) of their own accord, which is what the
DM-classics tell us must happen with,
or to, all such opposites.

Moreover, while it is true that cats are able to
reproduce because of well known goings-on between the male and the female of the
species, cats themselves
do not change because of the relationship between the opposite sexes of
the cat family. If they
did, then a lone cat on a desert island would surely be capable of living forever
(or, at least, of not changing).
In that case,
as long as this eternal (and miserably celibate) moggie kept clear of members of the opposite sex, it
would be able to look forward to
becoming a sort of feline Super-Methuselah.

But, what are we to say of those organisms
that do not reproduce sexually. And worse, what are we to make of, say,
hermaphrodites? Are the latter an expression of some sort of cosmic/bourgeois
plot against DM? Even worse, what about
Pseudohermaphroditism?

And what should we conclude about things like broom handles and copies
of Trotsky'sIDM? Do they change because of the tension created by their
own inner/outer or 'logical' opposites? But, what could they possibly be? Is the
opposite of IDM, Mein Kampf or Stalin's Problems of Leninism?
Could it even be these Essays?

In view of the fact
that the
Dialectical Gospels tell us
that such opposites "turn into one another", does this mean that IDM will
change into one of my
Essays? Well, perhaps TAR will, since my work was originally aimed
specifically in opposition to that book. In which case, had this work not been
undertaken, would TAR and IDM have been eternally changeless books?

In that case, the above passage from RIRE does
little to help resolve this problem.

On the other hand, if cats don't change as a
result of the machinations of their external or 'logical' opposites, but because of their
'internal contradictions', then factors internal to cats must surely be
responsible for their development (if, as noted above, we interpret "internal"
spatially
--
since we seem to have got nowhere interpreting it 'logically'). Should we now look inside cats for these
illusive opposites? If so, do these opposites appear at the level of that
animal's internal organs?
But what is the opposite of, say, a cat's liver? Does it have one? If not, is it
an
everlasting liver? On the other hand, if it does, will a cat's liver one
day turn into a cat's 'non-liver' (a
fossil
trilobite, say, or the
Dog Star,
maybe)?

In order to discover what the 'internal contradictions'
are in this case, perhaps we should delve even deeper into
the inner workings of these awkward, feline aspects of 'Being'?

If cats' livers have no opposites, then
perhaps their liver cells do? But once more, what is the opposite of a
cat's liver cell? A kidney cell? A blood cell? (An onion cell?)

As we ferret deeper into the nether regions
of feline inner space, perhaps these elusive opposites will appear at the
molecular or atomic level? Some dialecticians seem to think so -- but they have
only been able to pull this dodge by ignoring their own claims that all of
nature works in pairs. [In that case, we have yet to be told what, say, the River
Amazon is twinned with, let alone what the
Oort Cloud's dialectical alter ego --
its "other" -- could possibly be.]

Nevertheless, it could be argued that
'internal opposites' actually involve the relations that exist between sub-atomic
or inter-atomic forces and processes at work inside lumps of iron, cats, and
much else besides.12

But, if each
thing (and not just each part of a thing), and each system/process in the
Totality, is a UO (as we
have been assured they
are by the above DM-luminaries), then
cats and iron bars (and not just electrons,
π-mesons
(Pions) and positrons, etc.) must
have their own internal and/or external opposites -- that is, if they
are to change.

So, for a cat to become a 'non-cat' -- which
is, presumably, the 'internal' or 'external' opposite it is supposed to turn into --, it must be in dialectical tension with that opposite
in the here-and-now, if the latter is to help cause it to change. [We saw this in an abstract
form earlier.] If not, then
we can only wonder what dialecticians imagine the forces are (and from whence
they originate) that cause cats, or lumps of iron, to change into whatever their opposites are
imagined to be.

And even if molecular, inter-atomic or sub-atomic
forces actually power the development of cats, cats in general will still have to change because of
their paired macro-level opposites (whose identities still remain a
mystery). It isn't as if each cat is struggling against all the
protons, electrons and
quarks there
are beneath its fur. Nor
are we to suppose that
cats
are constantly conflicting with their internal organs, fur or whiskers. If they
were, then according to DM-lore
quoted here,
cats would have to turn into their internal organs, fur or whiskers, and the
latter would have to turn into cats!

And even if sub-atomic particles were locked
in a sort of quantum wrestling match with one another, the
changes they induced in the average 'dialectical
moggie' must find expression in
macro-phenomena at some point, or cats would not alter at all. But what on
earth could those macro-phenomena be?

Furthermore, if change is to be located
ultimately at the quantum level, then what are all those sub-atomic particles changing
into? Many are
highly stable. But, even supposing they weren't,
and if the
DM-classics are to be believed, whatever they
change into must exist right now if it is to cause them to change into it. And
yet, if these opposites already exist, the original particles can't change into
them. The very best that could happen here is that these 'opposite particles'
must replace the
originals (which then magically disappear!).

In which case, given this view of nature, things do not
actually change, they just vanish, and other (seemingly identical) things take their place -- and
they do so undialectically, too, since
their opposites will have simply vanished. But, with no
more 'opposites' to motivate them, they plainly can't be subject to further
change.

Moreover, if the forces that cause cats to
change are solely internal to cats, then as far as the mutability of such
mammals is concerned, they must be hermetically
sealed-off from the rest of nature (as must everything else -– this dire dialectical
difficulty is examined in more detail in Essay Eight Part
One, and Essay Eleven
Parts One and
Two), otherwise change would
not be internal to cats.

If, on the other hand, the causes of
feline change are external to cats, then 'internal contradictions' can't be
responsible for changing them into
'non-cats', and we are back where we started.

Furthermore, if we now ignore this 'either-or', and
claim that cats change because of 'internal' and 'external'
contradictions, then we would be faced with the prospect of cats changing into
their internal and external
opposites, if the
Dialectical Prophets are to be believed. But, and once more, if these
opposites already exist (which they must do if they
are to help bring about such changes), then cats can't change into them!

The same difficulties apply to sub-atomic particles: if
the forces that cause change are solely internal
to such particles, then as far as their mutability is concerned, they must be hermetically
sealed-off from the outside world, otherwise change would
not be internal to these particles. If, on the other hand, the causes of
particulate change are external, then 'internal contradictions' can't be
responsible for changing them into a 'non-whatever'.

Alternatively, once more, if the opposites of
such particles cause them to change into such opposites, then they needn't
bother changing, for those opposites already exist. On the other hand, if those
opposites do not already exist, what could possibly cause these changes?

In the macro-world, the idea that change is
the result of 'internal contradictions' would seem to mean that when, say, a cat
gets run over, that cat actually self-destructs, and the car that hit it had nothing to do with
flattening it. One might well wonder then why nature produced such suicidal beasts. [Is this perhaps
an example of natural de-selection?]

This seems to be the implication of the sort of things
dialecticians say:

"The
identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually
exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The
condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their
'self-movement', in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the
knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of
opposites…. [This] alone furnishes the key to the self-movement of everything
existing….

"The
unity…of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle
of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are
absolute…." [Lenin (1961), pp.357-58.
Bold emphases added. There are plenty more quotations of the same sort listed
here.]

Of course, it could be argued (along
Leibnizian
lines) that had the cat been internally strong enough it would have survived its
unequal tussle with the car. So, the real cause of this cat's changed shape is
in fact to
be found inside that cat. [This argument is outlined
here.] As we will see in
Essay Eight Part One, some
DM-theorists do indeed argue along similar lines.

There is something to be said for this
argument, but fortunately not much. Whatever it is that causes a cat to alter
when run over is clearly not whatever it is that maintains that cat's anatomical
integrity from day to day. Something must have upset this regime in order to
transform this cat's shape; cats do not spontaneously
flatten themselves. Few of us would be
happy to be told by a Leibnizian drunk driver that it isn't his fault that
the family pet is spread half-way across the road because the cat itself is the
cause of its radically altered anatomy. In such cases, we clearly have an example of
interacting causes for the demise of that cat, none of which can be put down solely to events internal to that unfortunate animal.
Of course, dialecticians do not deny this, but as Essay Eight Part One will show, their
'theory' can't account for such complexities.

Someone could object that dialectics can account for
such catastrophic reconfigurations of cats. A combination of internal and
external forces is the cause of their new geometry. But, not even that will work,
for if a cat is to change into a flat cat, then according to the DM-worthies
quoted
here
(where we are told that all objects and processes "inevitably" turn into their
opposites because they struggle with them), such a flat cat must already
exist in order to flatten the non-flat cat into a flat cat. So the driver
(unless we are desperate enough to describe her/him as a "flat cat", on the
basis that he/she is the obvious cause of the flattened cat in question), given
this new turn of events, didn't flatten the cat, the non-existent flat cat did that!

[Or, of course, if we are even more desperate to find a
cause, some cause, any cause, to rescue this theory, we could suppose there are ethereal flat cats
(in a nether world somewhere) working evil on their less
pancake-like counterparts this side of the veil -- and just in time, too, for
lorries to run them over. Is this too stupid an explanation to contemplate? Well DM-theorists already
postulate the existence of all manner of weird and wonderful 'abstractions'
--
which are nowhere to be found in the material world -- to account for events and
processes in nature. So, perhaps this is an 'abstract' flat cat? (In fact,
those who already "understand dialectics"
should be able to get their heads
around this
conundrum with ease.)]

Furthermore, if we opt for that earlier get-out clause and
describe the driver as a "flat cat", so that at least we would have a
dialectical sort of cause that reconfigured such cats, then that driver (this
'flat cat')
must likewise turn into her/his opposite, too, if the
Dialectical Gospels are to be believed.
Alarmingly, this opposite must either
become a non-driver or a flat cat! So, in this
Hermetic pile-up both driver and cat
become flat cats! And the non-flat cat that the car hit must become a car
driver!

A nice coincidence of opposites!

Despite this, and whatever their commitment to this 'Law'
finally amounts to, one
supposes(!) that no dialectician still in command of her/his senses would
excuse, say, a policeman for inflicting on her/him actual bodily harm on the
basis that Leibnizian nature unwisely failed to incorporate into the heads of militants
the ability to withstand
Billy Clubs.

Once again, dialectics would be disproved
in practice; gashed heads on picket lines are not produced by "self-development".

Alternatively, if the causes of feline (or
cranial!) mutability
are both internal and
external, then change
can't be the sole result of 'internal contradictions', and things would not in
fact be
"self-developing", as Lenin maintained.

Alas, as we have seen, there doesn't appear to be any way we can
squeeze into this picture
an 'opposite' that non-flat cats turn into so that that 'opposite' can help produce the
required flattening in the said feline.

So, even while unfortunate moggies sometimes turn into pancake-like non-cats in traffic accidents, the opposite that they 'develop' into
can't have
been part of the UO that ironed them into that novel shape.

In which case, it remains a mystery what the
'opposite' of a cat
is (i.e., what a
cat must turn into), which is part of the UO that brings about such topological
re-configurations --, if the
DM-worthies are to be believed.
Is there a third causal item here (as we supposed above), yet to be discovered
either by Zoologists, forensic scientists, time travellers, or cat psychics -- over
and above the non-flat cat and the flat cat -- which is part of such all too
common feline tragedies?

The flat cat catastrophe isn't a problem confined to furry mammals;
it re-surfaces and applies in a different guise with respect to several
structures and processes in 'Materialist Dialectics', too.

For example: if (1) all things change into their dialectically-paired
opposites, and (2) change is caused by the 'dialectical tension' between
these opposites, and if (3) Capitalism is to change into Socialism, then
Socialism must now exist somewhere for that to happen!

As far as
revolutionaries are concerned, that observation alone means that not only is DM
of no use to them, it is worse than useless.

But, is there any
truth to this latest allegation?

In order to see that
there is indeed more than enough truth in the above accusations it might be a
good idea to examine the connection between the Capitalist Relations of Production [CRAP], and Socialist
Relations of Production [SORP] --, but, more pointedly, the
link between Forces and
Relations of Production [FP and RP, respectively], where it is patently obvious that neither of these change into the other
(their 'other', their 'opposite').

For the purposes of argument, let us assume that SORP
doesn't actually exist anywhere on earth right now.
However, given
the above DM-theses, if CRAP is to change into SORP, SORP must already exist
in the here-and-now for CRAP to change into it, by struggling with it!

But, if SORP already exists, it can't have come from CRAP
(its 'opposite') since CRAP can only change because of the action of its own
opposite (namely -- SORP!) -- unless SORP exists before it exists!

The same comments
apply to "potential SORP" (or even to some sort of "tendency to produce
SORP", be this a 'sublated' tendency, or indeed an actuality -- it matters not).

In order to see this, let us call "potential SORP",
"PSORP", and a 'sublated' "tendency to
produce SORP", "TSORP".

According to the
DM-classics, if PSORP is to change into
SORP, it has to (1) struggle with its opposite, and (2) change into that
opposite. So, PSORP has to both struggle with and
change into SORP. But, that means that SORP must already exist, otherwise
PSORP will have nothing with which it can struggle. And, if that is so, PSORP can't change
into it!

The same comments
apply to any potential or tendency in CRAP to produce SORP. So, if we call the
tendency in CRAP to produce SORP, "TSORP", from earlier, and if TSORP is to change into
SORP, SORP must already exist, otherwise no struggle can take place between
them.

But, let us suppose
there is a tendency in Capitalism to produce SORP (howsoever this is understood), and a tendency to oppose its
production.
Let us call each of these "TCRAP" and "TCRAP*", respectively.

Once again, if these
are 'dialectical opposites' (and always assuming they aren't the only changeless
things/processes in the entire universe), they can only change by struggling with one
another, thus changing into one another -- if the
DM-classics are to be
believed.

However, they can't
change into one another since each of them already exists!

[Anyway, are we
really supposed to believe that the tendencies (in capitalism) to produce
socialism, as well as those tendencies that oppose it, must change into one another
-- for example, that, say, the working class must change into the Capitalist
Police/Courts (etc.), and Capitalist Police/Courts (etc.) must change into the working class?]

So, the same
non-dialectical brick wall blocks our path, once again.

Let us now assume
that it is TCRAP that changes CRAP into SORP. But, if that is so, TCRAP must
struggle with and change into CRAP, not SORP! That is because the
DM-worthies tell us that everything in the entire universe changes into that
with which it struggles.

In that case, SORP must have popped into existence from nowhere --, or it must
have always existed --, if DM is correct.

Once more, this isn't to deny change, nor is it to suggest that the present author doesn't want to see the back of
CRAP
and the establishment of SORP; but if DM were correct, this will not only never
happen, it can't happen.

To
be sure, in the real world very material workers struggle against equally material Capitalists,
but neither of these turn into one another, and they can't help change CRAP
into SORP, since neither of these is the opposite of CRAP or SORP, nor vice
versa, either.

[On the 'contradictions' Marx which speaks about in Das Kapital, see
here.
On 'real material contradictions', see
here.]

If it is further complained that in many of
the above examples human intervention has to be taken in to account, for
it is human labour that changes many of the processes that
already occur, or which might occur naturally, into the artificial products
mentioned earlier. Because of this, different principles apply since
our activity will have interfered with the normal operation of the natural
opposites of things like iron ore.

But, aren't we part of nature?

Putting this awkward reminder to one side for
now, what about those substances that didn't exist (so far as we know) before human
beings made them?

Has humanity made things that are
both above and
beyond the dialectical 'Law'?

Again, if each of these plastics does
indeed have
a "unique" opposite (which they must have, or they couldn't change
-- if the
DM-classics are to be believed), how is it
that human labour was able to make/bring into existence each of these opposites
at the same time as making a new plastic? Or, was this done by default, as it were? Do these "unique"
opposites pop into existence in some sort of metaphysical antechamber the moment
we invent/manufacture each of these plastics? If not, how are they going to change if there are no opposites with which they can
then begin their struggle?

[Incidentally, it is no use appealing to the inter-atomic and/or
sub-atomic forces here as the causes of change in the above substances, since
that would leave the unique "other" of, say, PVC out of the picture. And, as we
have seen it must have a unique "other" if it is to change -- according to the
DM-classics. Anyway, do these inter-atomic and/or sub-atomic forces change into one
another? If so, a Nobel Prize awaits the first DM-fan to publish on this.]

Furthermore, if human labour
is able to turn plastics into all manner of things (such
as bottles, bags, food containers, guttering, drainpipes, insulation, toys, car
parts, pens, keyboards, DVDs, cell phone casings, chess pieces, etc.,
etc.), do they not
therefore have countless artificial (or is it natural?) 'opposites' themselves --
namely the things we turn them into? [I.e., do
they have as
many 'opposites' as the things we can change these plastics into?] And, were all these
artificial 'opposites' created the moment the original substances were
manufactured? All of them? But, they must have been, since,
according to the
dialectical classics,
every object in the universe has a unique 'opposite' (its
"other"), and sooner or later turns into that 'opposite' -- and they do this by struggling with that
'opposite'. Or, this happens
because we struggle with these 'opposites'. So, has anyone in human history
struggled with the plastic bag they hoped to manufacture, before they
made it?

On the other hand, and
once again, if these 'opposites' only popped into existence when the above plastics are changed into them (meaning that human labour
can't have created these 'opposites' in the act of making the original
plastic substance), how is it possible for those
non-existent 'opposites' to 'contradict' the existent unchanged plastic so that the
plastic could be changed into
them?

But worse, if the 'opposite' of, say, PVC
causes it to change, how does human labour feature anywhere
in this
transformation? What is the point of
building factories and studying
polymer chemistry if
(according to the DM-classics) the 'opposite' of PVC
is what changes
lumps of PVC into plastic buckets, or storage containers, all by itself? When human beings work on PVC to change
it into
all of the many things that they can and do change it into (using complex techniques and expensive machinery),
are they merely onlookers -- not part of the action, as it were --, just viewing things that
would have happened anyway, naturally?

Or, have the capitalists discovered a way of
by-passing
dialectical 'Law'? Are all polymer scientists therefore reactionaries?

But, if human labour [HL] can change such things into their
'opposites', then that must mean that HL is the unique 'opposite' of,
say, PVC, otherwise it couldn't change it into anything (according to the
DM-worthies). In that case,
HL must change into PVC -- and vice versa!

We are also told that exchange value [EV] is "congealed labour
time" [LT]. This is, of course, a serious problem, since use value [UV]
is supposed to 'contradict' EV -- but, UV and EV do not seem to "struggle" much
either. But,
according to the Dialectical Gospels, UV must both struggle with
and change into EV. Has anyone
ever witnessed this 'abstract wrestling match'? Here is Scott Meikle (who might have):

"All the contradictions of capitalist
commodity-production have at their heart the contradiction between use-value and
exchange-value. Marx reveals this contradiction to lie at the heart of the
commodity-form as such, even in its simplest and most primitive form....

"The simple form of value itself contains
the polar opposition between, and the union of, use-value and exchange-value....
[Marx writes that] 'the relative form of value and the equivalent form are two
inseparable moments, which belong to and mutually condition each other...but at
the same time they are mutually exclusive and opposed extremes.' Concerning the
first he observes that the value of linen can't be expressed in linen; 20 yards
of linen = 20 yards of linen is not an expression of value. 'The value of linen
can therefore only be expressed relatively, that is in another commodity. The
relative form of the value of the linen therefore presupposes that some other
commodity confronts it in the equivalent form.' Concerning the second: 'on the
other hand, this other commodity which figures as the equivalent, can't
simultaneously be in the relative form of value.... The same commodity can't,
therefore, simultaneously appear in both forms in the same expression of value.
These forms rather exclude each other as polar opposites.'

"This polar opposition within the simple form is
an 'internal opposition' which as yet remains hidden within the
individual commodity in its simple form: 'The internal opposition between
use-value and exchange-value, hidden within the commodity, is therefore
represented on the surface by an external opposition,' that is the relation
between two commodities such that one (the equivalent form) counts only
as a use-value, while the other (the relative form) counts only as an
exchange-value. 'Hence, the simple form of value of the commodity is the simple
form of the opposition between use-value and value which is contained in the
commodity.'" [Meikle (1979), pp.16-17. Italic emphases in the original.]

Despite this, how does Meikle tackle the problem of
change? Indeed, how does he introduce opposition?

"The poles of an opposition are not just united.
They also repel one another. They are brought together in a unity, but within
that unity they are in tension. The real historical existence of the product of
labour in the commodity-form provides an analogue of the centripetal force that
contains the centrifugal forces of the mutual repulsion of use-value and
exchange-value within it." [Ibid., p.26.]

Well, the first point is that opposition here is simply asserted,
it isn't derived logically or conceptually. In which case, this is just another
brute fact and not the least bit necessary, as we had been led to believe.
[I have elaborated this argument in considerable detail in Essay Eight
Part
Two.]

However, there are so many metaphors in the above passage it isn't easy to
make much sense of it. Anyway, it is reasonably clear that Meikle has
reified the products of social relations (UV and EV)
and in this reified state they have become the actual agents, with human beings (or,
perhaps, commodities themselves) the patients. How else are we to understand the
word "repel" here? Do they actually repel each other (like magnets, or
electrical charges)? Or, do we do this because of the way we manufacture use values and
then exchange them?

And, do these "opposites" show any sign of turning into one
another, as the DM-classicists assured us
they must?

Furthermore, how can the forms that underpin UV and EV (i.e., the equivalent and relative form) provide an analogue of
the forces Meikle mentions? If forces are to act on other forces, or on other
bodies, they need to fulfil a handful of crucial conditions first -- the most important of which is
that they should at least
have the decency to exist. But, these two forms can't
co-exist. This is what Marx had to say:

"The relative
form and the equivalent form are two intimately connected, mutually dependent
and inseparable elements of the expression of value; but, at the same time, are
mutually exclusive, antagonistic extremes -- i.e., poles of the same expression.
They are allotted respectively to the two different commodities brought into
relation by that expression. It is not possible to express the value of linen in
linen. 20 yards of linen = 20 yards of linen is no expression of value. On the
contrary, such an equation merely says that 20 yards of linen are nothing else
than 20 yards of linen, a definite quantity of the use value linen. The value of
the linen can therefore be expressed only relatively -- i.e., in some other
commodity. The relative form of the value of the linen presupposes, therefore,
the presence of some other commodity -- here the coat -- under the form of an
equivalent. On the other hand, the commodity that figures as the equivalent
cannot at the same time assume the relative form. That second commodity is not
the one whose value is expressed. Its function is merely to serve as the
material in which the value of the first commodity is expressed.

"No doubt, the expression 20 yards of linen = 1 coat, or 20 yards of linen are
worth 1 coat, implies the opposite relation. 1 coat = 20 yards of linen, or 1
coat is worth 20 yards of linen. But, in that case, I must reverse the equation,
in order to express the value of the coat relatively; and, so soon as I do that
the linen becomes the equivalent instead of the coat. A single commodity
cannot, therefore, simultaneously assume, in the same expression of value, both
forms. The very polarity of these forms makes them mutually exclusive."
[Marx (1996),
pp.58-59. Bold emphases added.]

"We saw in a former chapter that the exchange of
commodities implies contradictory and mutually exclusive conditions. The
differentiation of commodities into commodities and money does not sweep away
these inconsistencies, but develops a modus vivendi, a form in which they can
exist side by side. This is generally the way in which real contradictions are
reconciled. For instance, it is a contradiction to depict one body as constantly
falling towards another, and as, at the same time, constantly flying away from
it. The ellipse is a form of motion which, while allowing this contradiction to
go on, at the same time reconciles it." [Ibid.,
p.113. Bold emphasis added.]

If these items "mutually exclude" one another, how can they both exist at
the same time? On the other hand, if they both do co-exist, so that
they can indeed 'contradict' one another, how can one of them "exclude" the other?
[Again, I have said much more about this in Essay Eight
Part
Two.]

Other than conceptually, how then can they repel -- or provide the wherewithal for other
objects and processes to repel -- anything?

This is, of course, the unyielding rock upon which we have
seen all such Idealist speculations founder.

It could be argued that these 'repulsions' occur in our thought
about the simple commodity form. But, even there, they can't co-exist,
for if they could, they wouldn't 'mutually exclude' one another! On
the other hand, if they do genuinely "exclude" one another, we can't even think
of them acting on one another, for if we were to so think, we must, of necessity, misconceive
them.

Or, are we supposed to imagine there is some sort of wrestling
match taking place in our heads,
such that, when we think of the one it elbows out of the way (out of
existence?) the other? Perhaps then, depending on circumstances, we could declare equivalent form
the winner over relative form by two falls to a submission (UK
rules)?

Figure Six: Equivalent Form Slam Dunks
Relative Form In A Skull Near You

It could be objected that the fact that something is a relative
form excludes it from being an equivalent form. This is where the opposition
arises; the one is the opposite of the other.

But, "opposite" isn't the same as "oppositional", as I have
shown here.

Of
course, in Marxist economics we have (1) Labour Power [LP] and )2) Capital [C] cycles, and the like, but does LP
really "struggle" against C? Not obviously so, it would seem.
As we have already noted, very
material workers most certainly struggle against their equally material bosses, but how is it
possible forLP to struggle against C?

Someone might object that this misrepresents DM; it is the inherent dialectical
contradiction between capital and labour (or that between the relevant
classes) that foments struggle.

Perhaps so, but until we are told what a 'dialectical contradiction' is, that
response itself is devoid of sense (since it contains a meaningless phrase:
"dialectical contradiction"). [More on that in Essay Eight Parts
One,
Two and
Three.]

Once more, this isn't to deny change, merely to underline
the fact that DM can't account for it.

Furthermore, is it really the case that everything turns
into its 'opposite', and is made to do so by "struggling" with its "opposite",
its "other", as
Hegel, Engels, Lenin, Mao and Plekhanov said? To be sure,
certain states of matter do change into what might conventionally be called their "opposites" (e.g.,
a hot object might change and become cold; something above might later be below,
and so on -- but even here, these opposites do not cause these changes!), but this is certainly not true of everything. Do men, for instance, turn into
women, fathers into sons, brothers into sisters, left- into a right-hands,
the working class into the capitalist class, forces of production into relations of production,
use values into exchange values, negative numbers/electrical charges into positive numbers/electrical charges, electrons into
protons,
and matter into 'anti-matter'? If not, what is the point of saying that
everything changes into its opposite? And why claim that objects and processes have internal or
external opposites if in most cases they feature nowhere in the action --, or,
again, if
many things do not turn into them?12a

Furthermore, if
Lenin were correct
when he said that "every
determination, quality, feature, side, property [changes] into every
other…", it would mean that everything (and every property) must
change into every other property!

But, if that were so, heat, for example,
would change into, say, colour, hardness and generosity (and much else besides);
liquidity would transform itself into brittleness, circularity and
inquisitiveness (and much else besides); gentleness would turn into speed,
opacity and bitterness (and much else besides); triangularity would develop into arrogance, honesty and duplicity (and
much else besides), and so on.

Is there a single person on
the planet not suffering from dialectics who believes any of this?

Once again, if these bizarre changes
aren't the case (as they plainly are
not!), and if such things are not implied by these
terminally vague 'Laws' or by what Lenin said, what is the point of him asserting that this is
precisely what everything does?

Of course, it could be pointed out that these
comments were recorded in notebooks, so we shouldn't interpret them too
literally, or regard them as expressing Lenin's more considered beliefs. But,
has a single dialectician ever pointed this out about this comment when they
have quoted it? Hardly. Anyway, as we have seen, since
Hegel's unique 'other'
requirement is unsustainable, this is indeed a consequence of the Second 'Law'.

That was the point of the
observation made earlier about dialecticians vacillating between the idea that
UOscause
change and the belief that objects and processes change into their opposites --
sometimes veering toward the doctrine that change produces these
opposites. The first
of these alternatives is examined in Essay Eight
Part One, but if the second alternative
were the case, we would surely witness some bizarre
transformations in nature and society as men changed into women, cats into dogs,
banks into charities and the Capitalist Class into the Working Class -- and
then back again!

However, as has been argued in detail above,
if change merely creates these opposites then, plainly, that outcome
can't have
been the result of a "struggle" between two co-existing opposites --
clearly not, since at least one of them would not yet exist! Hence, with respect to objects
in the latter category, change would create them, not them it.

This completely scuppers the DM-account of
change for it is now clear that there
is nothing in the DM-scheme-of-things that could cause the many and
varied changes we see in nature and society.

In which case, and once again: if and when
change occurs, dialectics -- the much vaunted theory of change -- can't explain it.

"…life consists precisely and primarily in this
-- that
a living thing is at each moment itself and yet something else. Life is
therefore also a contradiction which is present in things and processes
themselves, and which constantly asserts and resolves itself; and as soon as the
contradiction ceases, life, too, comes to and end, and death steps in." [Engels
(1976),
p.153.]

But, what is the 'contradiction'
supposed to be here? Is it: (1) Living cells contain dead matter; (2) Life is a
constant struggle to avoid death; (3) Life can only sustain itself by a constant
struggle with dead matter; or does this in fact relate to (4) The contrast
and/or conflict that is supposed to exist between these two processes -- life and death --, which
conflict constitutes the
dynamism we see in living things? And, what on earth is the (5)
"Something else" that each living thing
is supposed to be, or to become, according to Engels?

As far as (1) is concerned, the contrast between
living and dead matter seems to depend on the obsolete idea that there is an
intrinsic difference between living and non-living molecules -- that there is a 'life
force' at work in nature. While it is unclear whether or not Engels believed this
(in fact, in several places he seems to reject this idea --, e.g., Engels
(1954), p.282), it is reasonably clear that subsequent dialecticians don't accept it. So, it seems reasonable to conclude that this
can't be what underlies the
'contradiction'
in this case.

With respect to (2): while it is undeniable
that most living things constantly strive to stay alive, it is
still unclear what the alleged
UO is supposed to be
here. If a living cell is a UO, and the
scene of a bitter struggle between life and death -- in the sense that each cell
contains within itself both life and death, slugging it out, as it were
--, what physical form do these mysterious processes/beings take? It isn't
as if we could easily identify either or both -- as we can with, say,
magnetic
or electrical phenomena. There, the presence of apparently opposite poles
and/or charges is specifiable and measurable. Here (with respect to life), there do
not seem to be any easily identifiable opposing forces. [Anabolic and
catabolic processes will be considered presently.]

And yet, if dialecticians are
correct, and everything is indeed a UO, each living cell should (it seems) contain
death within itself (as an 'internal opposite'), and not just have it confronting it externally. But,
what material form does 'death' take? Are we to imagine that a black,
shrouded figure, sickle in hand, inhabits every living cell?

Figure Seven: The Two Main Protagonists In Each
Dialectical Cell?

If not, how is
'death' to be conceived of in this case? Indeed, what form does 'life' itself take? Is it perhaps an
incarnation of the
Archangel Gabriel? Or,
maybe
Louis Pasteur?

On the other hand, if this particular UO is a set of
opposing processes (or, indeed, if it is to be regarded as a special
type of interaction between certain
sorts of forces), as options (3) and (4) seem to suggest (picturing living systems
constantly battling against disintegration, the latter perhaps manifested in catabolic reactions),
then we are surely on firmer ground.

But, why would anyone
want to call such a set-up a UO? What exactly are the opposites that are
struggling here? It isn't as if inside each vibrant cell there is another older
(or even a decaying) cell waiting to emerge, nor yet one that is fighting the
embattled host cell all the time, stabbing it 'inside the back', as it were. Nor is it
credible to suppose that
catabolism and
anabolism are locked in
constant struggle with each other. Indeed, it isn't easy to see
catabolism as directly 'contradictory' even to anabolism (howsoever the word
"contradiction" is understood). These processes do not oppose
one another by preventing the other working, or by immediately picking apart what
the other has produced; they just work in different ways, often in separate
parts of a cell. Nor are they 'internally-related', as they should be if they
constitute a genuine 'dialectical contradiction'. [Or if they are, DM-fans have
been remarkably coy about the details.]

They certainly do not turn into one another
(as we have been led to believe they should by the
dialectical
classics). Nor do the outputs of one always turn into the inputs of the
other. For example, the
Krebs
metabolic cycle produces water and carbon dioxide from carbohydrates, fats
and proteins. But, no cycle in animal cells does the reverse. Sure, these
products are broken down, but not in a reverse Krebs cycle.

So, anabolic and catabolic processes do not
typically
confront one another in normal cells, opposing whatever the other does. To
imagine such a set-up as 'contradictory' would be about as intelligent as, say,
maintaining that a group of men digging a road up somewhere was 'contradicting'
("opposing" or "struggling against") another group repairing
a house a few hundred yards down the way. Or, that, say, the manufacture of
aeroplanes 'contradicts' the scrapping of aluminium chairs!

And, even if it were accurate to
describe catabolism as undoing the results of anabolism, that would still not amount to either of them 'contradicting'
one another. Undoing is not 'contradicting' -- if it were, then doing
would be a tautology!

Of course, if someone were to insist that
despite the above, such processes are contradictory, they would owe the rest of us an
explanation of the literal nature of the contradiction allegedly involved here. In that
case, it would be pertinent to ask how either process could possibly be
"gainsaying" the other.12b

But, even if this, too, were rejected, DM would still
not be out of the non-dialectical woods. While it could be argued that in this
case we do have 'opposites' that
are internal to cells, we do not as yet have opposites internal to anabolic or
catabolic processes themselves. So, if either of these two cause the other to change, that
would clearly be another example of an externally-motivated
transformation. Moreover, as noted above, anabolism would have to turn into catabolism, and
vice versa -- that is, if the
Dialectical Gospels
are to be believed.

However, according to
Lenin all change is internally-motivated, and everything develops of itself:

"Dialectical logic
demands that we go further…. [It] requires that an object should
be taken in development, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it)…."
[Lenin (1921),
p.90.]

Anabolic processes certainly
involve objects (i.e., molecules), but if they undergo development, that
can't
be the result of an interaction (or 'struggle') with catabolic processes (which would be an
external influence, once more). On the other hand, if they alter each other (but how?), then
Lenin's "demand" and "requirement" will have to be withdrawn.

Nevertheless, here, as elsewhere,
the words dialecticians employ look decidedly figurative -- except, in
this case it isn't easy to
see what the trope could possibly be.
And yet, if these words are figurative, that would be all to the good; it would at least
allow the interpretation of the 'contradictions' referred to by this 'Law' to be
viewed, say, poetically. No one minds if
poets
contradict themselves (e.g.,
Walt Whitman),
or one another.

Even if the word "struggle" were substituted for
"contradict", the situation would not change noticeably. Since literal
struggles can only take place between agents, that would mean that this
part of DM could work only if biochemical reactions in vivo are
personified, or if they were under the control of an agent of some sort. In
that case, this use of the word "struggle" would clearly be figurative,
too. [More on this here, here, and
here.]

Anyway, as pointed out above, catabolic and
anabolic process do not 'struggle' with one another.

However, it could be pointed out that the
above considerations are highly abstract, and are thus irrelevant (although it
isn't easy to see how
a cat is abstract). Hence, it could be objected
that DM is in fact concerned with real material
contradictions confirmed in practice.13

But, how could such things be checked to make sure they
are genuine "material
contradictions"? Fortunately, John Rees explained how (but in relation to concepts drawn from
HM):

"[O]nce we are sure that our
concept of 'capital' is a true reflection of the actual existing capital –- then
we can also be sure that any further categories that emerge as a result of
contradictions which we find in our concepts will necessarily be matched by
contradictions in the real capitalist world." [Rees (1998), p.110.]

However, he added the following proviso:

"This…is only a safe
assumption on the basis of constant empirical verification…." [Ibid., p.110.]

The idea appears to be that any
contradictions that remain (in a theory that has itself been thoroughly checked
against reality at every stage) must "of necessity" be a genuine reflection of
actual objects and processes in nature and society (or, in Rees's case, only in
society, perhaps). This safeguard is necessary
to rid 'materialist dialectics' of the Idealist 'excesses'
of Hegel, as well as prevent any of its theories from being, or becoming,
defective (in that defective theories are 'self-contradictory'; more on this in
Essay Eleven Part
One). [Rees (1998), pp.52-53, 108-18.] As Novack points out:

"A consistent materialism can't proceed from
principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition,
self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms
may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon evidence taken
from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in practice...."
[Novack (1965), p.17. Bold emphasis added.]

Nevertheless, as far as DM-contradictions
are concerned, it isn't at all clear how this process is supposed to work --
even when it is executed exactly as intended. Presumably, on this basis,
'incorrect' contradictions will be eliminated because: (1) They are
self-contradictions, or (2) They have been falsified by experience, or (3)
They could
not be verified (by appropriate methods).

But, with respect to any of the
contradictions that theorists might want to retain (and thus regard as correct
'reflections' of reality), how could they be sure that future contingencies
would never arise (in the shape of further evidence)
that would require their elimination? [On this,
see
below.] In view of Lenin's declaration that all knowledge is
incomplete, it seems they can't.

Despite this, (1)
can't be right, otherwise we should have to reject Engels's analysis of motion,
which pictures it as self-contradictory. Along with that would go many other
'dialectical contradictions'. [On this, see Essay
Five and Essay Eleven
Part One.]

In connection with option (2), what evidence could possibly refute
a contradiction? How is it possible for a contradiction to be falsified
by experience? Presumably, that would occur if propositions appertaining to experience contradicted
something that was already contradictory to begin with. But, what sort of
monstrosity would that be?

Consider again Engels's depiction of the
contradictory nature of living cells:

"We saw above that life consists
precisely and primarily in this –- that a living thing is at each moment itself
and yet something else. Life is therefore also a contradiction which is present
in things and processes themselves, and which constantly asserts and resolves
itself; and as soon as the contradiction ceases, life, too, comes to and end,
and death steps in." [Engels (1976),
p.153.]

"Abstract identity (a
= a; and negatively, a can't be simultaneously equal and unequal to a) is
likewise inapplicable in organic nature. The plant, the animal, every cell is at
every moment of its life identical with itself and yet becoming distinct from
itself, by absorption and excretion of substances…, in short, by a sum of
incessant molecular changes which make up life….

"Life and death.
Already no physiology is held to be scientific if it does not consider death as
an essential element of life (note, Hegel, Enzyklopädie, I, pp.152-53),
the negation of life itself, so that life is always thought of in
relation to its necessary result, death, which is always contained in it in
germ. The dialectical conception of life is nothing more than this…. Living
means dying." [Engels (1954),
pp.214,
295.]

[The problems connected with Hegel's and
Engels's egregious understanding of the
LOI will be tackled in Essays
Six, Eight Part
Three and Twelve (summary
here).]

This new batch of difficulties
faced by Engels's 'theory' can be brought out by the following argument:

[It is worth noting that this 'argument'
isn't valid, and has only been reproduced here to try to make sense of what Rees
and Engels could possibly have meant.]

From this it is quite clear that
confirmation of a 'dialectical contradiction' is all of a piece with its
refutation. So, it is still unclear how they can be verified by
experiences and/or experiments that also refute them.

It could be pointed out that, in this case,
DL shows its
superiority over 'formal thinking' concerning the point of death, when a cell or
organism is still alive, but just about to die, since it is the logic of change.
And yet, this response looks rather hollow now that we know that if DL were
true, change
would be impossible.

Finally, it could be argued that
observation might confirm that a cell is alive and not-alive all at once --
i.e., it could be claimed that dialectical contradictions can in fact be observed.
That response will be
considered below.

However,
as noted above, if reality itself
were contradictory, the 'falsification' of a contradiction would also
amount to its automatic 'verification', and vice versa. So, it seems
that option (2) above is closed-off as far as the investigation of
'dialectical contradictions' is concerned. This must mean that Rees's requirement that
contradictions be tested against experience is an empty gesture, since, with
respect to DM-contradictions, if reality were contradictory, it would both confirm and refute their
presence.
In which case, DM-theorists would have no reason whatsoever to reject a
single
contradiction that featured in their theory. On the other hand, they would
at the same time have eminently
good reason for rejecting all of them -- at least to prevent their theory
from becoming defective. [More on this in Essay Eleven
Part One.]

The quandary now facing dialecticians we
might call the "Dialecticians' Dilemma" [DD]. The DD arises from the
uncontroversial observation that if reality is fundamentally contradictory then
a true theory should reflect this supposed state of
affairs. [Why this is so is explained
here.] As
Engels himself pointed out:

"That is what comes of accepting 'consciousness',
'thought', quite naturalistically, as something given, something opposed from
the outset to being, to nature. If that were so, it must seem extremely strange
that consciousness and nature, thinking and being, the laws of thought and the
laws of nature, should correspond so closely. But if the further question is
raised what thought and consciousness really are and where they come from, it
becomes apparent that they are products of the human brain and that man himself
is a product of nature, which has developed in and along with its environment;
hence it is self-evident that the products of the human brain, being in the last
analysis also products of nature, do not contradict the rest of nature's
interconnections but are in correspondence with them." [Engels (1976),
p.44. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this
site.]

This was quoted approvingly by Lenin:

"If we find that the laws of thought correspond
with the laws of nature, says Engels, this becomes quite conceivable when we
take into account that reason and consciousness are 'products of the human brain
and that man himself is a product of nature.' Of course, 'the products of the
human brain, being in the last analysis also products of nature, do not
contradict the rest of nature's interconnections but are in correspondence with
them'. There is no doubt that there exists a natural, objective interconnection
between the phenomena of the world. Engels constantly speaks of the 'laws of
nature,' of the 'necessities of nature', without considering it necessary to
explain the generally known propositions of materialism." [Lenin (1972),
p.179. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this
site.]

However, and this is the problem, in order to
reflect nature any such theory
must contain contradictions itself, or it would not be an accurate reflection of
nature. But, if the development of science is predicated either on the
removal of contradictions from theories, or on the replacement of older
theories with newer, less contradictory variants, as DM-theorists contend (on
this see Essay Thirteen Part Two, when it is published), then science couldn't
advance toward a 'truer' and fuller account of reality. That is because
scientific theories would then reflect the world less accurately, having had all (or most) of their
contradictions removed.

[Of course, if the advancement of science is
not dependent on the removal of all or most contradictions, then scientists would face intractable difficulties of their own
-- for example: How to tell a
defective theory (i.e., one that is shot through with contradictions) from a
non-defective theory. Fortunately, to date, scientists have not adopted
either of these
ill-advised dialectical tactics, and have remained stubbornly loyal to the
protocols of FL.]

[FL = Formal Logic.]

Conversely, if a true theory aims to reflect
more accurately the contradictions in nature (which it must do if reality is
contradictory) then, in order to be consistent with such dialectical demands, scientists
shouldn't attempt to remove
contradictions from -- or try to resolve them in, or between -- theories.
Clearly, on that score, science could not advance, since there would be no
reason to replace a contradictory theory with a less contradictory one. Indeed,
if DM were correct, scientific theories should become more contradictory
-- not less -- as they reflected supposedly 'contradictory'
reality more fully. This means, of course, that scientific theory as a whole
should become more
defective over time!

On the other hand, if science advances
because of the elimination of contradictions then a fully true theory should
have had all (or most) of its contradictions
removed.

Science should then reflect (in the limit) the fact that
reality contains no contradictions!

[It is worth noting here that critics
of DM have already arrived at that unsympathetic conclusion, and they managed
to do that
without an ounce of dialectics to slow them down.]

However, according to DM, scientific theories
should be replaced by those that more faithfully depict reality as fundamentally
contradictory -- despite the fact that scientists will have removed every
(or nearly every) contradiction in order reach that point! On the other hand, if scientists failed to remove
contradictions (or, if they refused to replace an older theory with a newer,
less contradictory one), so that their theories reflected the contradictory nature of reality more accurately,
they would then have no good reason to reject any particular theory no matter how
inconsistent it might be.

Whichever way this rusty old DM-banger is
driven, the 'dialectical' view
of scientific progress (and of 'contradictions') hits a very material brick wall
in the shape of the DD every time.

Once more, it could be
objected that dialecticians do not believe that scientific theories
should have all or most of their contradictions removed if science is to
advance, merely those that hold up progress.

However, dialecticians have so far failed to distinguish
those contradictions which are the mere artefacts of a defective theory
from those that supposedly reflect the 'objective' state of the world. But, how
is it possible to distinguish the latter from the former in DM-terms? How is it
possible to decide whether a contradiction is an accurate reflection of reality
or whether it is the consequence of a faulty theory
if all of reality (including scientific theory) is supposed to be contradictory?

An appeal to
practice here would be no help, either, since that takes place in the phenomenal world,
at the level of experience, which is itself riddled with DM-contradictions!
In that case, it isn't easy to see how practice can help confirm (or refute) a theory
if its deliverances are themselves part of the same contradictory reality on test.

[We
saw above that, given DM, confirmation
and refutation are all of a piece, anyway. And,
as we will see in Essay Ten Part One, practice is
no friend of dialectics, either.]

Consider a concrete example: DM-theorists generally agree
that the wave-particle duality of light confirms the thesis that nature is fundamentally
contradictory/dialectical. In this case, light is supposed to be a
UO of wave and particle.
Precisely how they are a unity (i.e., how it could be true that matter at
this level is
fundamentally particulate and fundamentally non-particulate all at once)
is of course left eminently obscure. Moreover, exactly how this phenomenon helps account for the material world
is even less clear.

Even though all dialecticians refer to this
'contradiction', not one has yet explained how and why it is a contradiction, nor less how and
why it is a 'dialectical contradiction' (even if we knew
what these were).

Consider these two propositions:

Q1: Light is a wave.

Q2: Light is particulate.

Now, Q1 would contradict Q2 if the following were the case:

Q3: No wave can be particulate.

Q4: Light must be one or the other, wave or
particle.

[Q4 is required or Q1 and Q2 would merely be inconsistent.]

But is Q3 true? Surely not, for if physicists are correct, light
is both!

However, that would
beg the question. So, independently of the
latter, there are in fact plenty of examples of waves in
nature that are particulate; e.g., sound waves, water waves and
Mexican
waves. So, Q3 is in fact false!

Moreover, Q4 could be false, too. Light could turn out to be something
else about which we do not yet have a concept. That, of course, would make Q1
and Q2 merely inconsistent. Do 'dialectical logicians' know what to do with
'dialectical inconsistencies'?13a0

But, even if in some way this were a
contradiction, it does nothing to explain change
-- unless we are supposed to accept the idea that the fact that light is a particle
changes it into a wave, and vice versa. Are we to conclude
therefore that
these two states/processes are 'struggling' with one another? [The
DM-classics tell us they should be!] But what is the point of that?
What role does this particular 'contradiction' play either in DM or in Physics? At best, it seems to be merely
ornamental.

[One benighted DM-fan, when confronted with this objection in private correspondence,
claimed that these were 'illustrative' contradictions (even
though they do no dialectical work). This can only mean that dialecticians
now resemble Fundamentalist Christians even more than one might otherwise have thought.
Many of the latter think that, say, the
three-dimensionality of space 'illustrates' the truth of the Trinity, God having left this
and other clues littered across reality for us to find. [Don't
believe me? Then check
this out.]
In a similar way, and with regard to dialectics, perhaps 'Being Itself' has sent
this conundrum our way to inform DM-fans they are on the right path to Dialectical
Nirvana: the 'illustrative', but useless, duality of wave and particle! But what
exactly does it "illustrate"? The fact that this contradiction does no work?
The fact that waves and particles of light are locked in a pointless 'struggle'?]

Now, if we put to one side the 'solution' to
this puzzle offered by, say,
Superstring Theory, there are
in fact more than a handful of Physicists --
with, it seems, a more robust commitment to
scientific realism
than the average dialectician can muster -- who believe that this 'paradox' can
be resolved within a realist picture of nature. [Evidence is presented
here, and
here. Also see Wick (1995).] Whether or
not they are correct need not detain us since DM-theorists (if consistent) ought
to advise these rather rash Scientific Realists not to bother trying to solve
this riddle. That is
because dialectics has already provided us with an a priori solution: since nature is
fundamentally contradictory there is in fact no solution --, which
paradoxical state of affairs
should, of course, simply be "grasped", or "Nixoned".

However, in this case it is possible to see how
practice can't help; if experiments are conducted, which allegedly show
that light is both a particle and a wave, then DM-theorists would have no reason to
question this supposedly contradictory data, nor to try to resolve this difficulty.

Nevertheless, anyone not committed
to such an obtuse view of reality would have good reason to question
it; and this might, for all anyone knows, assist in the advancement of science.

Not so with DM-fans, whose advice could
permanently hold things up.13a

[However, experiments have so far merely
shown that under certain conditions light is particulate, under others it is
wave-like, but not both.]

In that case, practice alone can't distinguish between these
two views (the realist and the dialectical), even though one of these will seriously hold up progress. Moreover, since we know that practically any theory can be made to conform to
observation if enough adjustments are made elsewhere, this criterion is doubly
defective.

[This allegation will be
substantiated in more detail in Essay Ten, and in a
later Essay on the nature of science -- Thirteen Part Two.]

[QM = Quantum Mechanics.]

Once more, in advance of any test, if they are consistent,
DM-theorists should advise scientists not to bother trying to refute certain interpretations
of QM, or resolve the paradox upon which it is based, since there is no point doing
so in view of their a priori theory,
which sees nature as fundamentally contradictory.

Unfortunately, if physicists took this advice,
science could not advance to a
superior view of nature (if one exists) by eliminating this alleged
contradiction. At best, this a priori approach to knowledge
would close all available options down, forcing scientists to adopt a view of
reality that might not be correct -- and, given what we already know about the
history of Physics, probably isn't correct.13b

Fortunately, there is little
evidence that Physicists have taken any note of this aspect of dialectics,
even if any of them have ever heard of it.

Now, only those who disagree with
Lenin about the incomplete nature of science (or, alternatively, those who have a
rather poor grasp of the History of Physics) would risk concluding that
contemporary science has already attained a final and complete picture of reality, at least in
this particular area. If that is so, Physics surely could only advance by resolving this
alleged paradox -- eliminating one of the best examples in the DM-Grimoire,
which allegedly shows that nature is
fundamentally contradictory.

Of course, only those who wish to
foist
their ideas on nature would object at this point.

On the other hand, if DM-theorists' advice to scientists is that
they should in general try to replace contradictory theories (such as this
aspect
of QM, as it is alleged to be)
with less logically-challenged versions, then they will have to abandon the idea
that nature is fundamentally contradictory -- at least here. This
conclusion is all the more pressing in view of the fact that some scientists think they have
already solved this problem -- David Bohm, for example,
being one of the most important.14

But, this is just the DD once again: the dialectically-inspired belief in the 'contradictory'
nature of reality, coupled with the claim that science can only advance by removing
contradictions can't, it seems, distinguish between contradictions that hold
up the progress of science (and which are therefore artefacts of a defective or
incomplete theory) from those that reveal the essentially 'contradictory' nature
of reality.

Although some (like Plekhanov) have
acknowledged the problem, it remains unresolved to this day.

The various ways there might be for
DM-theorists to extricate themselves from the hole they have dug for themselves will be examined in a later
Essay, and shown to fail.

Dialecticians are therefore advised to stop
digging.

In addition, it is unclear how option
(3) above itself is supposed to work. How
is it possible for anyone even to try to verify a
DM-contradiction? For example, does humanity possess technology sensitive enough
to observe time intervals of the order of, say, 10-100
seconds, so that Engels's claims about motion can be checked? What then about
intervals of 10-1000
seconds? And yet, observation of motion would have to be made using time
intervals of this order of magnitude (and far better) in order to confirm
whether this phenomenon remains contradictory at this level of accuracy, at least. But, where
do we stop?

Naturally, some might want to appeal to
Planck time
intervals (of the order of 5 x 10-44
seconds) to provide a natural place to halt, but this is no help at all. A
single one of these Planck 'instants' is, so we are told, 1026times shorter than the shortest time interval so far measured -- an
alto-second (or 10-18
seconds). In that case, there is little prospect that these far shorter
intervals will ever be measured. And since Planck intervals are theoretical entities, the
chances are that this limit too will
be revised away one day (in line no doubt with Lenin's claim that
knowledge is never final).

Anyway, the answer to this particular
'difficulty' is irrelevant. That is
because, no matter how brief/ephemeral the time frame involved, no measurement could
conceivably test whether a moving object was in two places at once, only
whether it is in two places in the same finite interval. [More on that in
Essay Five.]14a

To resume the argument -- more specifically: with respect to the
alleged contradiction outlined in L1, above (i.e., "Cell C1
is both alive and not alive"), how would it be possible to confirm the
alleged fact that a cell was alive and dead at the same time? Certainly, just
looking at cells won't help. Nor is it much use referring to the vagueness
of the boundary between life and death. That is because Engels
himself regarded living cells as a unity of living and dead processes
(or of opposing tendencies)
while such cells were still alive, and this is the alleged
contradiction that needs to be confirmed.

Now, it is worth reminding ourselves at this
point that confirmation is required to prevent this theory being branded
dogmatic, a priori and thus Idealist. This is in fact a demand that
DM-theorists themselves insist upon:

""All
three are developed by Hegel in his idealist fashion as mere laws of thought:
the first, in the first part of his Logic, in the Doctrine of Being;
the second fills the whole of the second and by far the most important part of
his Logic, the Doctrine of Essence; finally the third figures
as the fundamental law for the construction of the whole system. The mistake
lies in the fact that these laws are foisted on nature and history as laws of
thought, and not deduced from them. This is the source of the whole forced and
often outrageous treatment; the universe, willy-nilly, is made out to be
arranged in accordance with a system of thought which itself is only the
product of a definite stage of evolution of human thought." [Engels
(1954),
p.62. Bold emphasis alone added.]

"Finally, for me there could be no question of
superimposing the laws of dialectics on nature but of discovering them in it and
developing them from it." [Engels (1976),
p.13. Bold emphasis
added.]

"The dialectic does not liberate the investigator
from painstaking study of the facts, quite the contrary: it requires it."
[Trotsky (1986), p.92. Bold emphasis added]

"Dialectics and materialism are the basic
elements in the Marxist cognition of the world. But this does not mean at all
that they can be applied to any sphere of knowledge, like an ever ready master
key. Dialectics can't be imposed on facts; it has to be deduced from facts,
from their nature and development…." [Trotsky (1973), p.233.
Bold emphasis added]

"A consistent materialism can't proceed from
principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition,
self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms
may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon evidence taken
from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in practice...."
[Novack (1965), p.17. Bold emphasis added]

"This…is only a safe
assumption on the basis of constant empirical verification…." [Rees (1998), p.110.]

"Our party philosophy, then, has a right to lay
claim to truth. For it is the only philosophy which is based on a standpoint
which demands that we should always seek to understand things just as they
are…without disguises and without fantasy….

"Marxism, therefore, seeks to base our ideas
of things on nothing but the actual investigation of them, arising from and
tested by experience and practice. It does not invent a 'system' as previous
philosophers have done, and then try to make everything fit into it…."
[Cornforth (1976), pp.14-15. Bold emphases added.]

"Engels emphasises that it would be
entirely wrong to crudely read the dialectic into nature. The dialectic has
to be discovered in nature and evolving out of nature....

"Of course, that does not mean we
should impose some a priori dialectical construct upon nature. The
dialectic, as Engels explains time and again, has to be painstakingly
discovered in nature....

"Engels did not make the laws of
nature dialectical. He tried, on the contrary, to draw out the most
general dialectical laws from nature. Not force artificial,
preconceived, inappropriate notions onto nature." [Jack Conrad,
Weekly
Worker, 30/08/07. Bold emphases added.]

Once more: how is it possible to confirm that cells are
indeed as dialecticians say they are?

Perhaps a digression into
a consideration of the
nature and application of
vague predicates (such as "...is alive", or "...is
dead") would be useful here --, at least, so far as this alleged 'contradiction' is concerned?

However, such a detour is unlikely
to help. That can be seen from a consideration
of another less fraught but equally vague distinction: the imprecise boundary between
night and day. In relation to this transition, few DM-theorists would want to argue
(it is to be hoped!) that daylight is itself a contradictory combination of night and
day at any specific point on earth not near the boundary of the Sun's westward moving
shadow. Hence, at mid-day in high summer on the
Tropic of Cancer in blazing sunlight,
say, only a complete fool would want to argue that because the boundary between
night and day is vague, and because day eventually turns into night, bright
daylight is a contradictory combination of night and day (or of darkness and
light). And even if it were possible to find a few maverick, hard-core
DM-fans who were prepared to argue along these lines, even fewer would agree
with them -- except they might both agree and disagree, just to wind them
up.

Less supercilious critics would ask these mad
dog dialecticians for the
empirical evidence that backs up the odd idea that light itself (in the
form of bright mid-day tropical sunshine) is a
UO of light and darkness (or,
perhaps of
night and day) 'dialectically' slugging it out. Indeed,
they might also want to know what work this idea could possibly do in DM,
even if it were correct. Are we to suppose that light 'struggles'
with its opposite, darkness, at mid-day? Presumably not, since darkness is just
the absence of light! Must we argue that darkness
makes light change into darkness, and vice versa (which is what the
DM-classicists
tell us all such 'opposites' must do)? If they are prepared to argue that way, this innovative
piece of Physics will no doubt force scientists to re-write their theory of light, for up
to now they
had recklessly assumed that light was created by
the way sub-atomic particles
behave, and that this was itself the result of a transformation of one form of matter/energy into
another. They had certainly given no thought to the possibility that it was the result of the operation of a privation
-- the lack of
light -- on light itself, which made nightfall occur!

In the real world, the latter, of course,
has more to do with the rotation of the Earth, and nothing at all to do with a
battle between photons and the absence of photons.

In that case, it seems that this 'dialectical union' of light and
dark does no work at all, even if we were foolish enough to believe in it.

So, there are circumstances where even
potentially vague predicates have
clear applications -- or they can be paraphrased so that they mimic those that do.
In that case, in order to test Engels's claims about living things, we would need a way of
deciding
whether a certain cell wasa UOwhile it was still
unambiguously alive. That is why it was argued (above) that a digression into
the applicability of vague predicates would be of no use to dialecticians. No matter how vague the
predicate, it would still be impossible to verify Engels's claim that a cell was
alive and dead at the same time (or that it was dialectical mix of the two,
or of two such 'tendencies' (anyway, how does one confirm a
tendency?)) while
it was still clearly and unambiguously alive.

Even at the boundary between the life
and death, we don't possess
equipment sensitive enough to verify Engels's a priori thesis, even if we
knew how to go about doing it.

Of course, it would always be open to a
DM-supporter to point out that a living cell is constantly exchanging dead
matter with its environment, or that certain parts of the cell are not actually
alive while the rest of that cell is. Nevertheless, exactly how this
confirms the claim that a cell is alive and dead all at once (or is a
combination of such 'tendencies') is still unclear.
At best, it would simply demonstrate that living things contain dead
matter. It would no more show that when a cell is alive it is also dead than
would an analogous claim demonstrate that people are clothed and naked at the
same time (or that they possess hidden 'tendencies to dress and undress')
because they all have nothing on underneath their garments, and were
contradictory UOs for all that.

On the other hand, if anyone were
foolish enough to suppose this, they would have to suppose further that one of
these opposites (being naked, say) was locked in some sort of struggle with the
other (being clothed) -- or the aforementioned 'tendencies' were --, which
'explains' why we put clothes on or take them off at various times in the day!
In that case, if this 'theory' is to be believed, it isn't we
who struggle to take our clothes off, but our nakedness that makes us do this!

Again, it could be objected that the issue
here is in fact the following: living things are changing all the time; hence, they are a dialecticalunity of living and dead matter, or of analogous processes and tendencies. Cells constantly absorb dead matter from
their environment and turn it into living matter. Dialecticians certainly do
not maintain that an organism (or a cell) is wholly alive and
completely dead all at once, as the above comments foolishly suggest. Cells are a dialectical
union of two contradictory processes, which union slowly changes the
host organism, perhaps
even killing it.

Or,
so it could be argued.

Nevertheless, such a response will not do.
This discussion is centred on the controversial idea that DM-'contradictions' can
be verified or falsified in some way, not that they can be re-jigged
theoretically (or 'sanitised') every time this theory encounters an objection. [That
particular ploy will be
addressed in a later Essay.]

The introduction of yet more jargon
here does not help, nor does it amount to any sort of confirmation. It does, however, increase suspicion that
this is all that dialecticians are able to offer in order to 'substantiate' their
theory: yet more jargonised expressions. And, if that is so, the
self-imposed requirement that dialectics be confirmed (somehow) by
checking it against material reality is an empty gesture.

It could be countered that the above
quotations clearly show
that dialecticians are also interested in generalisation. DM-theorists try
to deduce general laws from nature, which is all that Engels has
done here. Since this is what scientists also do all the time, where is the problem?

The nature of science and what scientist actually do will be
examined in Essay Thirteen Part Two, but in advance of that it is worth directing the
reader's attention to
this section of Essay Eleven Part One, where this topic is dealt with in
more detail.

However, to return to more pressing matters: how is even this
generalisation (about the nature of life) to be confirmed? In view of the fact that scientists do not make generalisations and then fail to test them, how might we test
Engels's claims about life and death?

Manifestly, it isn't
possible to verify this particular DM-claim (i.e., that cells are a
dialectical union of two 'contradictory' processes or tendencies). As it stands, this thesis is
no less a
priorithan anything else to be found in DM. Certainly, no one doubts that living
things absorb non-living matter from their environment, but how this verifies the
claim that they are a dialectical unity of life and death remains
obscure. Still less does it support the thesis that life is somehow 'contradictory',
or a union of 'contradictory' processes or tendencies.

Clearly we need to examine this question more closely. Perhaps the intended contradiction is meant to be
something like the following?

C1a: Cell C1
is a (dialectical) combination of living and dead matter/processes.

[To avoid repetition, I
will omit the couplet "processes or tendencies" from now on; it can be read into
my use of "processes".]

But, once again, in what way is a combination
of living and dead matter/processes a contradiction? If it were, then
surely
any collection of alleged opposites would be contradictory, too. Thus, presumably,
the human body would be contradictory simply because it comes equipped with a
left and a right hand -– meaning, perhaps, that those who have lost a limb in an
accident are not quite as contradictory as their less orthopaedically-challenged friends
are. And, if a surgeon removes a kidney in an operation, should we say she
has "resolved a contradiction"? Indeed, in like manner one could argue that
we contradict ourselves every time we look in a mirror, turn around, walk
backwards, or shake hands. Apart from sounding enigmatic, what is the point of
such talk? Other than representing an appeal to yet another linguistic trick (i.e.,
combining a word with its alleged opposite, as in the schematic "C1 is both A and non-A", or "C1
is both A and B", where A and B are opposites), there is nothing to
recommend this
approach.

[Indeed, quite the opposite (no pun intended), as we will see
in Essay Eight Parts One,
Two and
Three.]

Naturally, dialecticians might want to cling onto this
odd way of describing
things (and
this site certainly does this, but without once explaining why such
things are contradictions to begin with -- on that site, see
here), but if empirical evidence is to decide on such issues (as Engels,
Novack, Cornforth, TAR and
RIRE (and others)
maintain), a verbal artifice like this will hardly do. Otherwise
why bother saying that DM requires verification to avoid being labelled
"Idealist" if it can only be 'confirmed' by yet more word-juggling?
If such an approach were generalised, scientists would only ever
need to invent a few verbal tricks of their own, and count that as an adequate verification
of any given theory or hypothesis. They could certainly save time and
money, which they now unwisely waste on all those 'pointless' experiments!

[Some might conclude that the above emphasis on
verification and confirmation proves that the present author is a "positivist" or
an "empiricist". On that, see Note 15a.]

Once more it could be objected that this
completely misses the point: left and right hands may be opposites, but they are
not dialectically united opposites in change, and neither are mirror images. The parts of
a cell are united in this way, as contradictory processes. But,
aren't two hands in the same body connected; aren't two lungs or two kidneys?

Be this as it may, this would still
fail to show
that this 'unity' amounted to a contradiction -– nor would it demonstrate
that this aspect of DM had been verified, or even that it is verifiable
-- or capable of being confirmed in any way at all,-- other than, of course, by
the use of yet more obscure terms-of-art wrenched from the dialecticians' phrasebook.

Anyway, the contradiction between living and dead matter only arises
inside the cell; this alleged contradiction is not thought to exist
between just any old aggregate of living and dead matter. For a
dialectical unity to hold, the two types of matter (or forces) must enter into some
sort of close
proximity with one another -- an organic union, perhaps? --, and some form of "mediation" must
exist
between them, or they must be connected by an "internal relation" of
some sort. [Unfortunately, the precise details of the DM-story here depend on who is telling it.] In
that case, it would seem that dead matter must enter the cell and link up/interact with
living matter, in a process of some kind -- but, alas, in an as-yet-unspecified
manner.

However, what stops us from saying
that when 'dead' matter enters the cell it becomes living matter? Clearly, in
that case, there would no longer be anything for a DM-'contradiction' to latch
onto, since there would only be one type of matter/process in the cell: the living
sort.

Naturally, DM-theorists will want to
challenge this move -– but they can only do so by advancing an
opposite stipulation to the effect that dead matter remains
dead when it enters the cell, to rebut the contrary stipulation
above. This counter-stipulation would
then allow DM-fans to continue claiming that
the dead matter in question becomes part of a dialectical union/process with living matter
when inside the cell.

Now, it is worth emphasising that this DM-counter-move could only ever be
based on a stipulation. That is because the
inspection of cellular processes -- no matter how detailed or fine-grained
it might prove to be -- would fail tell us which of these two alternatives is
correct. It isn't possible to see that dead matter remains dead/alive
inside a cell, any more than it is possible to see
when night becomes day (or confirm it in any other way that isn't itself based on
yet another
stipulation). To be sure, the examination of living cells reveals
all sorts of activity going on -– but observation alone can't decide which
aspects of this activity are living and which are not, or which ones are the
'struggling' processes DM-theorists require. This is, of course, part
of the problem that scientists face trying to define life. [Are
prions, for
instance, alive? They are certainly active inside cells.]

It might be objected here that it is
possible to confirm that when non-living matter enters a cell it remains in the same
state for a while until it is metabolised by that cell. Hence the above
contentions are wrong.

However, what we actually see and what
we might want to say are two different things. To illustrate this, let us
track, say, a single
Glucose molecule,
G1,
as it passes across a membrane into a cell. Naturally, in order to do this we
will have to assume god-like powers of vision and observation; but, ignoring that formidable obstacle for the present, we might want to say that while on the
outside, G1
is non-living, and -- in view of the objection just noted -- we might also want
to maintain that it is still non-living soon after it enters the cell. Once
inside, G1
will naturally mingle with other molecules that form part of the metabolic
processes of the cell in question.

For the sake of clarity, let us call the
latter set of
molecules, "M", all the while allowing for that set to change its content
over time. But, are any of molecules belonging to M actually
alive themselves? If we are to derive a contradiction here we need to be
in a position to say that some are alive in order to further maintain
that both living and non-living molecules co-exist, side by side as part of a
'contradictory' process P. Otherwise, there would
be no way to identify both halves of the alleged 'contradiction'.

But, would we be able
to see (or would we be able to verify in any other way) that any of the elements of
M are alive, whatever we finally decide to say? In order for us to
verify (as opposed to simply assuming or stipulating,
again) that a 'contradiction' exists here, we would have to register an instrumental
or sensory
impression of some sort that confirmed that certain cellular molecules belonging
to M are indeed alive at the same time that G1,
its latest recruit,
isn't. Or, that there are analogous processes at work in P. But, to what could we appeal, here? Unless we are to suppose that there
is something special about living molecules, or processes, which makes them look alive
--
or which makes the 'qualities' they exhibit detectable -- or, indeed, we assume they are controlled by
a "vital force" of some sort (which could also be observed/confirmed in some way), any subsequent declaration
that these molecules (or processes) are alive could only ever be based on yet another stipulation.

Of course, the above analysis looks rather
reductionist, and no dialectician would want to argue that molecules
taken singly actually contradict one another in this way -- in the sense that
while one or more of them is alive, another molecule nearby isn't --, even if collections of them are
still to be regarded as UOs
in their own right. Although, it is also worth reminding ourselves that DM-theorists certainly talk about
sub-atomic particles doing just this! Indeed,
Hegel himself spoke of acids and
bases as contradictory pairs (i.e., when he declared that one was the "other" of the other), and they
could hardly do that if their individual molecular structures failed to do this,
too.

Even so, dialecticians might want to add, as
indeed they do, that life "emerges" at certain levels of molecular organisation, as quantity turns into
quality (etc.).15
Hence, it is only at such higher levels of complexity that the contradiction
arises, or becomes apparent. Naturally, that would mean the
above criticisms are badly off target.

Or, so it could be maintained, once more.

However, to reiterate, this dispute arose because it
was assumed that it is possible to see, verify, or confirm (in some
way or other, by an appeal to something empirical) the existence of
DM-'contradictions', which would justify describing them as "real, material
contradictions". This is required, it was claimed, in order to stop DM sliding back
into the Idealist swamp from which it had emerged. Short of doing that, DM
would be no different from Hegelian Idealism, in this respect at least.

In the present case, the
'contradiction' was supposed to be the following: that
inside a cell living matter exists alongside matter that isn't
alive,
in some sort of 'dialectical' process, union or tension.

[I
have already discussed
the only other viable option: that there exist opposite forces inside
living cells -- i.e., those instantiated by anabolic and catabolic processes.]

Difficulties then arose over ascertaining
what sense could be made of the claim that there was
a dialectical 'contradiction' here, as well as over the question whether this 'dialectical' link could be confirmed by
observation, or by any other empirical means, as
DM-theorists
themselves
demand of their own theory.

It now turns out that this particular thesis
can only be verified by an appeal to yet another rather shaky DM-'Law', but not by
an appeal to anything empirical.
If so, it seems that the existence of DM-'contradictions' can only be confirmed by
reference to Q«Q
–- but not by comparison with reality --, as we had been led all along to
believe.

[Q«Q
= The Law of the Transformation of Quantity into Quality, and vice versa.]

As we saw
earlier, Q«Q
is either a conventionalised, vaguely-stated 'Law' (more accurately, it is
at best a trite rule of thumb which fails more times that it works), or
it is yet another
example of metaphysical confusion. It certainly can't bear the weight that this
latest response places upon it. But, even if it could, we still
await the empirical confirmation of Engels's claims about living cells; once again, an appeal to
yet more theory is no help at all:

"A consistent materialism can't proceed from
principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition,
self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms
may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon evidence taken
from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in practice...."
[Novack (1965), p.17. Bold emphasis added.]

It could be objected that
the above argument fails to comprehend the dialectical process underlying
knowledge, the interplay between the abstract and the concrete. But, even if
this 'process' were relevant, reliable or, at least, comprehensible, in
what way could it help us understand how it is possible to verify or confirm this supposedly 'dialectical' process by observation, or by any other empirical means?
Clearly, the above difficulties (concerning empirical confirmation) afflict
dialectical processes just as much as they afflict alive/dead 'dialectical'
molecules.15a

[DM-epistemology (including the alleged
relation between the 'abstract' and the 'concrete') is examined in more detail
in Essay Two, Essay Three Parts
One,
Two and Three, and Essay Ten Part
One.]

Or, are we to suppose that DM-theorists can
somehow non-empirically 'intuit' processes of this
sort in nature and society? Must we concede that
they have a special way of confirming such
Supertruths
in ways that us mortals do not possess -- but which 'ways' they can't actually
explain to anyone else? [If so, how are they different from old-fashioned, unvarnished mystics?]

Inside or outside the cell, then, we seem to
be unable to confirm the presence of 'contradictions' -- exceptstipulatively
--;
certainly not by observation or by experiments that are themselves
observation-based (or that are free from yet more ad hoc stipulation),
and which are not merely "thought experiments",
themselves.

Incidentally, to return to an earlier
difficulty, not even a god-like observer could see or confirm in any
other empirical way whether certain molecules (or processes) are alive or dead -- at any
level of complexity or detail -- without recourse to a prior stipulation to
either effect. In that case, short of such a convention,not even an 'Ideal Observer' could verify the
presence of such 'contradictions'.

That being so, the
claim 'contradictions' exist in nature and society can't have been derived from
experience (nor yet by a process of abstraction) -- it can only have been projected onto
reality as just another a priori metaphysical
dogma.

Now, even though John Rees and others repeatedly refer
their
readers to the necessary empirical checks that must be made in order to verify
the presence of DM-'contradictions', what we actually find in their place
in TAR (and in other DM-texts, such as DN, AD, DMH, FPM, PN, IDM and RIRE) are a
handful of superficial, conceptual,quasi-investigations
into things like motion, identity, living and/or dead matter, matter in general
(which
we
are told is an "abstraction", anyway!),
and the nature of the reality -- with little or no empirical evidence to back
them up (that has not itself been slanted by yet more stipulations). [These allegations were thoroughly substantiated in Essay
Two, as well as in this Essay.]

All this is not the least bit surprising; no empirical
verification of a contradiction is possible -- even in theory -–, as
was demonstrated earlier.

[Graham Priest's
allegations to the contrary will be examined in a later Essay. However, it is
quite plain that his 'contradictions' aren't 'dialectical contradictions', to begin with, just
rather confused ways of speaking. On that, see Slater (2002, 2004, 2007b, 2007c).]

Now, DM-theorists might sincerely believe
that there is a 'contradiction' between living and dead matter, life and death
(or, indeed, that there are other 'contradictions' in society and nature) --
and that there are
'dialectical' processes at work all over the place --, but until they inform us
which particular set of observations or experiments (not themselves
dependent on further persuasivestipulations) confirm these acts of faith,
they can't consistently maintain that their ideas have been continually checked
against reality, andverified by experience. In fact, they have yet to provide
even so much as a
vague description how the existence of a single 'contradiction' can be
confirmed in nature or in society.

Of course, the above objections leave
unchallenged the naive idea that DM-'contradictions' had originally been discovered
empirically,
or were prompted by observation, or, indeed, that they had ever been
based on physical evidence of any sort. In fact, as is well known, many were
simply lifted from Hegel
(or from earlier Idealists). Even those that weren't borrowed in this way are
based on Hegel's
work (and he, too, offered little or no evidence in support of his dogmatic
pronouncements) -- upside down or the
'right way up'.

Subsequent observations to 'verify' these 'contradictions' would be otiose, anyway -– that is, if DM-theoristsever bothered to carry out any such tests. John Rees certainly mentions
none of the experiments he performed in this regard, neither do Woods and Grant -- the same can
be said of Hegel, Engels, Dietzgen, Plekhanov, Lenin, Mao, Trotsky...

Dialecticians have
not gone down in history as great experimental scientists.

Self-appointed Superscientists, certainly.

Experiments would be
otiose anyway; that is because it isn't possible to see (or to experience)
'contradictions' in nature without a decision already having been made to label them this way (the latter
choice itself having been based on an explicit or implicit Idealist convention borrowed from
thinkers who were themselves card-carrying members of an ancient, mystical,
apriorist, philosophical tradition). This helps explain why so littleevidence
(as opposed to repeated assertions)
appears in DM-texts, and why there is none at all to substantiate the
claim that 'contradictions' exist right throughout nature and society
everywhere and all the time.

Any who
doubt this should compare the average DM text (even those that sincerely
try to prove there is a dialectic of nature, such as RIRE, or Gollobin
(1986)) with a bona
fide scientific/technical paper that has been published in any
randomly chosen issue of, say, Nature.
The difference between
Mickey Mouse Dialectical Science and genuine science will
immediately be apparent.

In the place of hard evidence, what we
invariably find in DM-texts are the same hackneyed examples dredged up year-in year-out. These include the following hardy perennials: boiling and/or freezing water, cells that are alive and dead, grains of barley that 'negate'
themselves, magnets that are
UOs, Mamelukes' ambiguous fighting ability when
matched against French soldiers, Mendeleyev's
Table, the sentence "John is a man", homilies about parts and wholes (e.g., "The whole is greater than the sum of
the parts", etc., etc.), characters from Molière who discover they have been speaking prose
all their lives, laughably
weak
and misguided attempts to depict the principles of FL,
"Yay, Yay", and "Nay, Nay", anything more than this "cometh of evil",
wave/particle
'duality', 'emergent' properties popping into existence all over the
place, etc., etc., etc.
Even then, we are never given a scientific report on these phenomena; all
we find in DM-texts are a few brief, amateurish and impressionistic sentences
(or, at most, paragraphs) on each
example. At
its best (in, say, Woods and Grant (1995), or Gollobin (1986)), all we
encounter are a few chapters of secondary or tertiary evidence, specially-selected, and heavily slanted in the favoured
direction. No contrary evidence is even so much as mentioned.

In contrast, and in relation to, say,
economics or current affairs, Marxists are keen to provide countless pages
of primary and secondary data and analysis (much of it original), which they update
regularly. But, when it comes to
dialectics all we are presented with is watery-thin 'evidence', and even thinner reasoning. Small wonder then that
to its Marxist opponents, like myself, this area of theory is
regarded as
risibly weak and is treated with the contempt it deserves.

Incidentally, Lenin let it slip that evidence is irrelevant in
this regard:

"This aspect of dialectics (e.g. in Plekhanov)
usually receives inadequate attention: the identity of opposites is taken as the
sum-total of examples ['for example, a seed,' 'for
example, primitive communism.' The same is true of Engels. But it is 'in the
interests of popularisation...'] and not as a
law of cognition (and as a law of the objective world)." [Lenin
(1961),
p.357.
Emphases in the original. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions
adopted at this site.]15a1

A 'Law of Cognition' follows from a priori reasoning, not
from the facts.

Nevertheless, even though the examples
of 'contradictions' referred to by dialecticians are viewed as instances
of genuine DM-principles at work in nature and society, they are
mistakenly identified as such.
Without exception these alleged 'contradictions' turn out to be
anything but contradictions; they are invariably little more than badly described, paradoxical, quirky,
or
oppositional situations -–, or they are just plain contraries. Even
then, little or no evidence is presented to substantiate the hyper-bold extrapolations
DM-theorists regularly advance from even this impoverished evidential
base to all of nature for all of time. In place of convincing
evidence we are offered sketchy, half-baked analyses, derived from a few
superficial "thought experiments" (andeven these are badly
constructed) -- with some homespun
Stone Age Logic thrown in for good
measure. Our intelligence is then insulted with the claim that this Dialectical Mishmash is the very epitome of the scientific method!

[Again, these serious allegations are
thoroughly substantiated in the Essays posted
at this site.]

There thus seems to be no way of interpreting living cells
as UOs other than in a poetic or figurative sense -- as a
sort of throwback to the
romantic era in Biology
-- but otherwise of little
relevance to modern science. And yet, once again, this shouldn't surprise anyone given
that the ideas found in DM originated in mystical
Hermetic Theology (which belief
system we know for
a fact had a profound influence on the aforementioned
Romantics and Natürphilosophers
of Hegel's day, and thus on Hegel himself). [On this see Essay Fourteen Part One (summary
here).]

This part of dialectics, therefore, clearly
depends on ancient forms of mysticism, not on modern science. It is little wonder
then that it can't be confirmed in any way at all.

So, no literal sets of internal
opposites are apparent here; this means that, at best,
DM-UOs are
figurative. But, are these dialectical figures of speech of much use to
DM-theorists keen to parade their scientific credentials? Indeed, are they of any
assistance to revolutionaries in their endeavour to understand
Capitalism and how it can be overthrown?

Well, once again, given the fact that dialectics has
dominated revolutionary thought for over a hundred and forty years, and during
that time Dialectical Marxism has enjoyed legendary
lack
of success, the only viable response to the above questions must
be negative. If practice is a test of truth, dialectics stands
condemned out of its own contradictory mouth. In that case, this 'theory' is clearly of no
use to revolutionaries either in their endeavour to understand Capitalism or in their
desire to overthrow it.

Independently of the above,
these aren't even good metaphors.

For example, as we
have already seen, workers do not contain capitalists (their alleged
internal 'opposites') literally or metaphorically; the same is
probably true vice versa. And, even though Capitalism contains both
workers and capitalists, as entire classes they do not seem to change into
one another.15a2
More-or-less the same can be said of the forces and relations of production and
of the alleged 'contradiction' between use and exchange value. Do factories,
power lines and transport systems literally 'struggle' against mill owners,
bankers, and/or bourgeois politicians? Do they even seem to do this figuratively?
Does the hypothetical use value of, say, a sugar spoon 'struggle' against its
monetary (or exchange) value? Does the actual use of an escalator in a shopping
mall 'struggle' against…, well, what? Do any of these objects collectively or
severally have the wit, brains or brawn to 'struggle' against anything at all? Does
a single one turn into the other, as we were told
they must?

[Certainly, these and other things
cause capitalism to change all the time, but not by 'contradicting' anything,
and for the reasons given above, in Essays Five and Eight
Parts One,
Two, and
Three, as well as for those summarised below.]

This is to deny neither the
irrationalities we see in Capitalism nor the horrors we witness every day, but since
agent-orientated verbs like "contradict", "struggle", "oppose" (etc.) are
clearly out of place in the study of inanimate matter (save we use them
figuratively -- but we have just seen that these
metaphors are particularly ill-suited to this particular task) and social
change,
these comments will strike those with a reasonably secure grasp of the
vernacular as entirely uncontroversial.

Nor is this to claim that
HM can't
account for such things either; indeed it can, but it needs no help
from Hermetic
Mysticism to that end. In fact, the reverse is the case: dialectics
only succeeds mystifying HM.

However, the fact that these assertions will sound
controversial only to dialecticians suggests that linguistic naivety is their only
defence.

As far as option (5) above is concerned -- the "something else"
that each living thing is supposed to be, or to become, according
to Engels (i.e., whatever it was he imagined living things were
supposed to change into) --, no obvious candidates come to mind.
Engels was perhaps appealing to the alleged fact that the
LOI does not apply to
living matter, and that living things are constantly changing into "what they
are not" -- that is, that at any moment a living thing is "A and not
A"
--
"itself and something else" (etc.).

Indeed, here is how Thalheimer expressed this point:

"The most general and the most inclusive
fundamental law of dialectics from which all others are deduced is the law of
permeation of opposites. This law has a two-fold meaning: first, that all
things, all processes, all concepts merge in the last analysis into an absolute
unity, or, in other words, that there are no opposites, no differences which
can't ultimately be comprehended into a unity. Second, and just as
unconditionally valid, that all things are at the same time absolutely different
and absolutely or unqualifiedly opposed. The law may also be referred to as
the law of the polar unity of opposites. This law applies to every single
thing, every phenomenon, and to the world as a whole. Viewing thought and
its method alone, it can be put this way: The human mind is capable of
infinite condensation of things into unities, even the sharpest
contradictions and opposites, and, on the other hand, it is capable of
infinite differentiation and analysis of things into opposites. The human
mind can establish this unlimited unity and unlimited
differentiation because this unlimited unity and differentiation is present
in reality....

"...[I]t is more difficult
with such opposites as true and false and still more difficult with the concepts
of being and non-being, which are the most general of all, the most inclusive,
and, at the same time the poorest in content. The average person will say: how
can one unite such absolute opposites as being and non-being? Either a thing is
or it is not. There can be no bridge or common ground between them. In the
treatment of Heraclitus I have already shown how the concepts of being and
non-being actually permeate each other in everything that changes, how they are
contained in changing things at the same time and in the same way; for a thing
which is developing is something and at the same time it is not that something.
For example: a child which is developing into a man is a child and at the same
time not a child (sic). So far as it is becoming a man it ceases to be a child.
But it is not yet a man, because it has not yet developed into a man. The
concept of becoming contains the concepts of being and non-being. In this
concept they permeate each other...." [Thalheimer (1936), pp.161, 165-66. Bold
emphases added.]

[Other DM-theorists say the same sort of
thing.]

But, as we saw earlier,
this can only mean that whatever livings things "are not" must already
be present in or near to whatever "they are" if this combination is to count as a
UO,
and if all living things are to change into what they "are not".

In this instance, one suspects that Engels
and Thalheimer have
simply confused a logical principle with an empirical fact: since anything that changes must
change into "what it is not" (as a mater of discursive logic, although
there are exceptions even to this rule)15b -- either in whole
or in part -- these two clearly thought that this general (I would say
grammatical) point applies to living things (indeed, to anything) as it changes.15c

Now, this brings us back to the problems we
noted earlier about the confused way that DM-theorists picture change -- outlined
above in general, and in particular
in the case of domestic cats. These hapless animals, it seems, must
undergo some sort of dialectical change into what they "are not" (or
they would remain the same, clearly -- as this argument goes). And this is just the verbal trick
DM-theorists put to no good, having inherited more than their fair share of
dubious notions from Hegel's very own shaky 'logic'.

However, as with other examples of
metaphysical word-juggling (found throughout
Traditional Philosophy), this one
has a tendency to strike back, especially against those who use it unthinkingly. In
this case, since living things are clearly not cars,
not calculators, not mountains, not Quasars, not sewage
systems, not volcanoes, not books on
DM -- meaning, of course, that
all of these (and more) are "what living things are not" --,
Engels's formulation that living things are constantly changing into "what they
are not" must imply that all living cells are constantly changing into cars,
calculators, mountains, Quasars, sewage systems, volcanoes and books on DM (and
much else besides). The
fact that living things do not do this (to anyone's knowledge) suggests that
cats do not actually change into "what they are not", or anything remotely like
it. Here, material reality once again stands in the way of another dotty piece of dialectical
chicanery.

And, it is no use complaining that this makes
a mockery of Engels's claim, since his confusion of a logical principle with
empirically determinable facts invites such ridicule. Moreover, dialecticians have no way of
neutralising the above objection, or, rather none that leaves this piece of quirky Hegelian
word-magic
intact. If it is logically true that everything changes into "what it is not",
and what an object "is not" is everything that it logically is not,
then it must change into everything in the universe that it logically is not.

[As we have seen, Hegel tried to block this untoward implication of his 'logic' by
appealing to a unique dialectically-united "other" with which objects and
processes are pared, so that when they change, they do so in a determinate
manner. But, Hegel carelessly holed his own theory below the
waterline, for it was obvious to him (as it is to the rest of humanity!) that objects
and processes can change in many ways -- more on that
here. In that
case, dialecticians can't appeal to this hypothetical "other" to neutralise the
above objection.]

In which case, things
do not change as a result of logical principles magicked into existence
because
of Hegel's tenuous grasp even of AFL.

[AFL = Aristotelian Formal Logic.]

On the other hand, if Engels's formulation
doesn't mean this (i.e., that things do not change into what they "are not"), what
then does it mean? While this saying of his might look
profound, no sense can be attached to it.

Once again, it could be objected that this makes a nonsense of
Engels's claims, not because they are confused, but because of the
repeated refusal by Ms Lichtenstein to interpret him in a sympathetic way.

Well, quite
apart from the fact that dialecticians are not known for their sympathetic reading
of their opponents' writings (a quick leaf through Lenin's Materialism and
Empirio-Criticism will amply confirm that accusation -- as
should a five minute 'debate' with a dialectical clone on an
internet discussion
board), the
above criticism actually takes Engels words both seriously and literally. When
that is done, it is easy to see that no sense can be made of them. Anyone who still
thinks
otherwise is welcome to make of them what they
can (or e-mail me with their best
shot!).

[They would then, of course, be the dialectical
equivalent of those individuals who still think sense can be made of the
Christian Trinity.]

However, whatever sense can be made of Engels's enigmatic prose,
if any can, it is quite clear that dialecticians have totally misconstrued the LOI. As will be argued in
detail in Essays Six, and Eight Parts
Two and
Three,
in relation to the LOI, if a living thing changes, then anything identical to it will
change equally quickly. That, of course, makes identity no enemy of change.

But, if we absolutely must view nature
metaphorically,
poetically, or mystically
-- as DM-theorists seem determined to do, given their acceptance of many of the
Hermetic
ideas they have appropriated from Hegel's work (upside down or the 'right way up') --
that would now allow space for the equally batty idea that
nature is not driven by 'contradictions', it is in fact powered by
'dialectical tautologies'.

As a result of the present author's own incautious (but temporary, and wholly insincere)
dalliance with Metaphysical Superscience/Poetry,
compounded by no little word-juggling and home-spun 'logic', this observation can easily be confirmed by the way that each living thing
changes:

(1) Every single one that we know of changes
identically quickly as it itself does.

(2) Each and every one of them alters into something which has
changed just as much as each itself has done. And,

(3) The "something"
that each changes into is identical to the thing it has just changed into.

Now,
since this 'thesis' is apparently
tautologious -- or it is at least dialectically/poetically so (i.e., whereby we
are allowed to make stuff up as we go along, or as the fancy takes us) -- it might
be appropriate to call this novel word-juggled 'theory': Dialectricks.

Anyway, the words I have used can easily be
're-defined' on 'sound' and 'consistent' dialectical lines so that the above
'thesis' becomes "tautologious" --
of course, with "tautologious" understood in a special and permanently
unexplained sort of way, rather like the way that "contradiction" has its
own special and permanently unexplained DM-sort of sense. Indeed, we could insist that just as "contradict" means
"conflict", "tautologious" means "harmonious", and
dig our heels in DM-style, 'Nixoning'
away any and all quibbles on the grounds that erstwhile critics just do not
"understand" Dialectricks.

Once again, this (temporary and wholly insincere) a priori
'theory' of mine has the advantage of being consistent with
every conceivable observation -- unlike dialectics with its dubious
DM-'contradictions'. Whether things stay the same, or change (fast or slow, it
matters not), they do so no faster than they themselves manage to do it, and they all change into things
that are identical with whatever they have just changed into. That, naturally, makes this tautologically-poetic
'theory' of mine far more 'scientific' than DM.

I have absolutely no doubt that Marxism will
be no less unsuccessful if we were foolish enough to adopt Dialectricks.

[As noted above, those still unconvinced by
'innovative
logic' like this clearly do not "understand" Dialectricks, but that is probably because they suffer from too much lack of
tenderness
for the world.

Moreover, those
impatient with crazy 'logic' like this
should perhaps turn an equally critical eye on the same sort of lunacy found in DM
all the time.]

Engels rehearsed
several rather odd ideas in
AD
and DN, which are
so questionable (or, just plain dotty) thateven some of his fans find
them "unhelpful".

For example, Helena Sheehan claims that Engels's adherence to
"inappropriate Hegelian terminology" lies behind some of his less defensible
musings [Cf., Sheehan (1993), p.41], even though she is highly sympathetic to
his ideas in general. [Ibid., pp.25-48.] The authors of The Dialectical Biologist
also reject several of Engels's ideas as "quaint". [Levins and Lewontin (1985), p.279.]
Two other comrades (Paul McGarr and Philip
Gasper) similarly distanced themselves from certain unspecified failings
in Engels's work. [Cf.,
McGarr (1994), p.155
-- which labels some of Engels's examples "trite" --, and
Gasper (1998), p.144
-- which says several of them aren't "very convincing".] This is even though both comrades are quite willing to accept
many of Engels's other 'scientific' ideas at face value, subjecting them to very little critical
scrutiny.

But, who is to decide which of Engels's examples
(illustrating the
operation of the "laws of dialectics") are "inappropriate" and
"unhelpful" (to use
TAR's own words; cf., p.75), and which are not?

To assist in the above decision, here are a few of Engels's more 'interesting'
ideas for those who have made it this far to consider:

"[I]t is a contradiction that the root of A
should be the power of A…[as it is] that a negative magnitude should be the
square of anything…. The square root of minus one is therefore not only a
contradiction, but even an absurd contradiction…. [Again, there is the]
contradiction that in certain circumstances straight lines and curves may be
identical…that lines that intersect…can nevertheless be shown to be parallel…."
[Engels (1976),
pp.153-54.]

Again, which of these is "unhelpful", "inappropriate", or just
plain confused? Indeed, many of the above ideas are difficult to square with a
materialist theory of any kind, let alone Engels's "dialectical",
a priori version.

If mathematical entities like the above are
contradictory (as Engels says they are), then they should change. But, which of
them
are changing? And what are they changing into? On the other hand, if they are changeless, what is the point of calling
them contradictory? Again, if they are contradictory, why do they remain
in the same state forever? Indices won't one day turn into
Matrices, neither
will
Affine Transformations change into
Hermite Polynomials.
Negative
numbers don't turn into positives; sure, we can multiply negative integers to yield positives, but no one supposes that the original numbers have changed,
otherwise no one would be able to use them again. Indeed, if you multiply -2 by -1 to
obtain 2, you will see that both the "-2" and the "-1" are still on the
page/screen, unchanged. They certainly don't
change through 'internal contradictions', either. What, for example, is the 'internal
contradiction' in -2? Is it -4/2, or 8/-4, or -8/-1 x -1/4...?

Or are we to suppose that when -2 'changes'
into 2 when multiplied by -1 that -2 and 2 must have been locked in some sort of
'struggle'? Well, it seems they must if they are 'opposites' (and this struggle
must turn the one into the other, if the
Dialectical-classicists
are to be believed). But, what then of the
-1? How does it feature in this quasi-Platonic drama? It is certainly not the
'opposite' of 2 or -2, and yet it seems capable of 'changing' both --, and, indeed,
capable of
mapping any number onto its 'opposite'. To be sure, if we multiply -2 severally
and serially by
the entire set of negative integers we will obtain the set of positive even
integers. Does this mean that -2 has an infinite number of 'opposites', with
which it 'struggles'? But, that contravenes
a key Hegelian requirement,
that each and every object/process has its own unique opposite, its "other".

More to the point, where are the real
'material forces' these 'contradictions' supposedly represent? And, where is the
"careful empirical work" that substantiates
bold claims such as these, evidence that DM-theorists, TAR's author and Engels in
particular, insist
must always be produced? [TAR, pp.108-12. On this, see
Essay Two.]

Moreover, Engels's claims make little sense even in
their own terms. For example, the iterative rule uk
= (-a)k [where "k" and
"a" are integers] alternately maps k onto the set of
negative or positive integers, for odd or even k. But, where is the "development" in this
process? Where
is the 'struggle'? In fact,
and to
rain on this parade, when a = 0, the result of the iteration is always the same
-– i.e., zero. Is this an example of change that produces no change? Is this
yet another 'contradiction'? Or, is this part of mathematics reactionary?

Engels also uses the rather strange term
"absurd contradiction" ["The square root of minus one is therefore not only a
contradiction, but even an absurd contradiction"] without explaining the
difference between an "absurd contradiction" and an ordinary contradiction. That is especially puzzling since many of the
'contradictions' Engels regards as scientifically/mathematically important look no less absurd.

Moreover, with respect to his comments about "the
square root of minus one", what is so contradictory about
Complex
Numbers? What are they developing into? Against what are they locked
in "struggle"?

Is, for example, the expression "a + bi" the
contradictory of "-a + bi", "a – bi", "-a – bi", "1/(a + bi)", "1/(a - bi)",
"1/(-a - bi)", or "1/(-a + bi)"? If the answer is that it is any particular one of these, then why is "a + bi" not changing into it, as we
are assured is
the inevitable fate of all such 'contradictory' opposites?

Perhaps
then, each complex number
is the contradictory only of its
complex conjugate
(in this case "a + bi"
would supposedly 'contradict' "a – bi"),
since the product of these two yields a
Real Number, namely "a2-b2". But, why does this
make them contradictory? Once more: these two conjugates don't turn into one another.
In fact, they don't change at all.

And yet, 1/(a + bi) x a + bi = 1; so why aren't these two
'contradictory'? But, what development is there even here?

Moreover, after any randomly
chosen conjugate pair has been multiplied out and the answer written down, there are countless
trillion copies of the very same symbols awaiting multiplication, queuing up in 'abstract
space', all of which will yield identically the same results with no detectable
development over the many thousands of years the human race will be doing this
(if we survive that long!). Or, to put the same point more concretely:
anyone can write out and then multiply -- in impeccably physical ink, on
boringly material paper -- "(1 + i)" and "(1 - i)", until the cows next evolve,
the result won't change: (1 + i)(1 - i) = 2. Once more, if the planet and/or
humanity lasts this long, it will yield the same result
in one hundred million years time, and still on paper, still written in ink.
Hence, this is just as much a 'concrete' as it is an 'abstract' example.

Of course, if you believe everything is 'contradictory' from
the start, mathematical objects and processes will naturally be classified
accordingly, even where the indications are that they aren't the least bit
dialectical -- having failed to notice perhaps that numbers do not 'struggle'
amongst themselves (and neither do variables, lines, planes or
manifolds),
nor do they mirror any identifiably material developments in the real world.16

Anyway, how
is this different from imposing
DM on
the subject matter, something dialecticians continually protest they do
not do?

Of course, Engels focussed part of his comments on "the
square root of minus one", but this must have been a mistake, since minus one
has two square roots: "i" and "-i" [since i2
= -1, and (-(i))2 = -1],
which fact alone rather ruins Engels's point (unless, of course, we now
introduce into mathematics the idea that certain of its structures
dialectically dither, as it were).

Moreover, what he would have said of the potentially
infinite set of
roots of unity there are in complex number theory, we will never know. For
instance zn= 1(where
z is a complex number; n = 1, 2, 3, ... ) has n roots.

Furthermore, Engels's comment
about lines and curves is no less ill-considered. The fact that some things have
a dual
aspect (if this is indeed the case with lines and curves!) in no way
makes them contradictory. If it did, then we would have to say that the number
seven, for instance, is potentially infinitely contradictory, because while it
is the sum of countless odd, even and negative integers, it is also one of the
square roots of forty-nine and it is identical to the rational number 147/21 -– in addition
to being the result of the application of countless other functions to arbitrary sets of numbers and
expressions (such as "49x6/7x6",
for x ¹
0).

And yet, despite its
infinitely 'contradictory' nature, 7 never actually changes. Are all the "material forces"
in nature that 7
supposedly 'reflects' in eternal equilibrium, therefore? Or, has this number been knobbled by
the CIA?

Once more, if lines and planes are
contradictory, what are they 'struggling' with, and what are they 'developing' into?

Even in dialectical terms, none of this makes any sense.

Moreover, it isn't at all clear why Engels
regarded the following as contradictory: "the root of A" is also "the power of A".
Charitably, this might have been the case if roots and powers were themselves contradictory to one another,
and they could turn into each other as a result. But, who apart from
Engels and a few of his die-hard disciples would want to accept these
consequences?

On a similar basis, one
might just as well argue that because 10 is a square root of 100, and 102= 100, and 10 = 100½,
and log10102
= 2, and log10010
= ½ that the log function is deeply contradictory in that it 'contradicts' the
relevant powers and roots of 10 and 100, which 'contradict' one another into the
bargain. But, even given the recklessly profligate nature of
DL, is it possible
for four items to contradict one another all at once? If it is, should we not
now abandon the idea that all concepts/objects/processes are paired
UOs (each with its own
unique
Hegelian 'other') in
favour of the more generous notion that they consist of countless UOs --
dialectically adjusting the word "opposite" to accommodate this new
development of the concepts involved -- now that we can see that each
concept, object or process has a potentially infinite number of 'opposites'? But,
tinkering with the meaning of the word "opposite" just to cater for this
rapidly burgeoning theory would be no less of a conventionalist cop-out here
than it would be anywhere else.

It is worth recalling that Engels's comments on this topic didn't appear in an obscure or minor DM-work, nor were they scribbled
hastily on the back of an envelope. They were published in a widely recognized
and accepted DM-classic, one that has inspired generations of DM-fans,
and one that Engels rather oddly claims to have "read" to Marx. [That
will have
taken days. (In fact it is
easy to show
that it must have.) Can you imagine it! One wonders how often the ageing Marx
must have nodded off, not fully realising the nature of what it was that some would
later claim he accepted!]

Certainly, Lenin and Trotsky didn't find these rather peculiar
ideas at all "unhelpful", or "quaint" -- or, if they did,
they remained diplomatically quiet about it.17

On the other hand, if we are now supposed to ignore these
foibles -– in the way that scientists today disregard, say,
Newton's alchemical
and theological ramblings -–, then why pay any regard to the other equally strange claims
Engels advances? Why should we now accept Engels's assertion that ice "contradicts"
water, that life is "contradictory", that grains of barley are "negated" to form
mature plants?

And, how exactly does
ice 'contradict' water? Does it oppose it? Do they exist together at the same
time locked in struggle? Does one force the other to emerge from the shadows as
the temperature changes? Does something higher emerge as "new content
arises from old conditions", if ice is melted and refrozen hundreds of times?
[Engels (1976), pp.154-82.] Water has been freezing and thawing for billions of
years. Has it morphed into something 'higher'? Is it ever going to become H3O,
or something else,
as a result?

[NON = Negation of the Negation.]

It could be argued that this is a spurious counter-example to the
NON; as Cornforth points out:

"In many processes the working out of their
contradictions results in a directed or forward movement, in which the process
moves forward from stage to stage, each stage being an advance to something new,
not a falling back to some stage already past.

"Other processes, however, are not characterised
by such a forward movement.

"For instance, water when cooled or heated
undergoes a qualitative change, passes into a new state (ice or steam), but the
movement is without direction and can't be called either progressive or
retrogressive.

"...If some processes have direction and others
have not, this depends solely on the particular character of the processes
themselves and of the conditions under which they happen." [Cornforth (1976),
pp.108-09.]

We will have occasion to look at Cornforth's account of change in
Essay Eight Part One,
where it will soon become apparent that he, along with other DM-theorists, isn't too clear about what constitutes a process, an object, or even
a system, let alone what it means to assert any of these 'develop'. So,
according to Cornforth, the non-development of water isn't a counter-example, after all. And yet we are left
entirely in the dark as to why some processes 'develop' while others do not.

But, what about a
genuine development? For example, the 'negation' of feudalism to form
Capitalism, and the 'negation' of that in turn to form a socialist society?
Certainly, Cornforth doesn't count this as non-progressive; indeed. it is a clear example of development
via the NON:

"[C]apitalist private property arises only on the
ruin and expropriation of the pre-capitalist individual producers.... But when
capitalist private property is itself negated -- when 'the expropriators are
expropriated' -- then the individual property of the producers is restored once
more, but in a new form, on a higher level....

"When capitalism arose, the only way
forward was through this negation of the negation....

"The principle of the negation of the negation is
thus an expression of the simple truth that one can't put the clock back and
reconstitute the past. One can only move forward into the future through the
working out of all the contradictions contained within the given stage of
development and though the negations consequent on them." [Ibid., pp.118-19.
Italic emphasis in the original; bold emphasis added.]

Cornforth wasn't alive to see it, but one wonders what he'd have
made of the events in the former USSR and Eastern Europe between 1989 and 1991
(and now, perhaps, in China, and possibly Cuba). If history can't go back, only forward, then the sort of
free market capitalism that has swept through these countries (without a
single
worker lifting a finger to defend 'his/her' state) must represent a higher stage
of property relations: the negation of the negation of the negation. Either
that, or the NON no longer works (and perhaps never did).

Of course, if this is rejected for whatever reason, then the only response possible is
that, contrary to what Cornforth says, DM-theorists don't in fact learn from
history -- rather, they impose their abstract schemas on it:

"If some processes have direction and others
have not, this depends solely on the particular character of the processes
themselves and of the conditions under which they happen." [Ibid.,
pp.108-09.]

"Marxism, therefore, seeks to base our ideas of
things on nothing but the actual investigation of them.... It does not invent a
'system' as previous philosophers have done, and then try to make everything fit
into it." [Ibid., p.15.]

And those who, like me, regard such regimes as
State Capitalist should avoid crowing too loudly at the refutation that
history has visited upon
Stalinism. If, for example, the 1917 revolution has been reversed (in 1921,
1929, 1989, 1991, or whenever), then the NON must have made a serious error, and
should perhaps be tossed onto the trash-heap of history (along with the
crystalline
spheres,
humoral theory and
Caloric) -- as a bogus 'scientific' concept.

Hence, it is worth asking of those who tell us that
the NON applies only to things that "develop": Why saddle DM with such a crazy
set of examples (e.g., "ice contradicts water", and roots 'contradict' powers)
if they play no part in understanding the world and how to change it?

Indeed, this is what Professor Nidditch had to say
about Aristotle's use of variables:

"One has to give Aristotle
great credit for being fully conscious of this [i.e., of the need for a general
account of inference -- RL] and for seeing that the way to general laws is by
the use of variables, that is letters which are signs for every and any
thing whatever in a certain range of things: a range of qualities, substances,
relations, numbers or of any other sort or form of existence....

"If one keeps in mind that
the Greeks were very uncertain about and very far from letting variables take
the place of numbers or number words in algebra, which is why they made little
headway in that branch of mathematics...then there will be less danger of
Aristotle's invention of variables for use in Syllogistic being overlooked or
undervalued. Because of this idea of his, logic was sent off from the very start
on the right lines." [Nidditch (1998), pp.8-9. Italic emphasis in the
original.]

Of course, that
fact alone completely undermines the idea that traditional FL couldn't cope with change,
and that it uses only "fixed concepts and categories". Moreover, as is pointed out in Essay
Four, variables are as widely used in MFL as they are in Mathematics -– in which
case, MFL is even more 'change-friendly', as it were, than traditional AFL ever
was. [These claims are substantiated in
Essay Four.]

[A word of warning needs to be interjected at this point: in view of the
comments made here, the use of
the word "variable" should to be treated with some caution. Indeed, as
we will see, there can be no 'variable magnitudes'.

However, throughout both this Essay and this site I have in
general used "variable" in its traditional sense; the complications
discussed at the above link, if introduced into the argument, would make these Essays more precise, but needlessly
recondite, for no real gain.]

However, what Engelsactually
said is worth examining on its own merits:

"The turning point in mathematics was Descartes'
variable magnitude. With that came motion and hence dialectics in mathematics,
and at once, too, of necessity the differential and integral calculus…." [Engels
(1954),
p.258.]

Several points need making about this passage and about
Engels and Marx's ideas on Mathematics and the foundations of the Calculus in
general.

(1) The claim that Descartes's invention of
"variable magnitudes" introduced "motion" into Mathematics is as
confused as it is
inaccurate. A more balanced account from a Marxist perspective can be found in
Hadden (1994). As Hadden points out, variables began to be used by
mathematicians in the late Middle Ages as a result of the development of ideas
connected with the nature of
what were taken to be the commensurable values of commodities. For example,
Nicholas Oresme had anticipated much of Descartes's analytic Geometry in the
Fourteenth Century, and had already begun to use algebraic ideas to study motion. [On this, see
Boyer (1959), pp.60-95, Boyer (1968), pp.288-95, Edwards (1979), pp.81-93, and
Katz (1993), pp.292-99. Some of the original papers can be found in Clagett
(1959).]

Also worthy of note is the fact that Muslim mathematicians had
invented the use of algebraic variables long before Descartes. Engels
can't have been unaware of this. [The name "Algebra"
gives the game away.]

Nevertheless, Engels's point stands or falls on its own merits,
irrespective of who actually introduced variables into Mathematics, or
when and why this was done.

However, as Frege noted, the idea that variables in mathematics
refer to 'varying magnitudes' is confused in the extreme. [Frege (1904). Since
it is impossible to find anything on-line about this, and there is precious little
in the 'Frege literature', as far as I am aware, his
arguments have been summarised in Note 17a.]17a

(2) As far as Engels's own views on mathematics are concerned, they
seem to oscillate between naïve versions of Abstractionism and confused forms
of Platonism. Examples of both can be found in Engels (1976): pp.47-50 (naïve
Abstractionism), pp.62-63 (naïve Platonism), p.154 (confused Platonism),
pp.171-72 (inconsistent Platonism). [Abstractionism is criticised heavily in
Essay Three Parts One and
Two.]

In addition, his ideas on the nature of zero
are decidedly odd. [Engels (1954), p.261.] Engels fetishised this
symbol, attributing to it what seem to be autonomous powers:

"...[Z]ero is richer in content than any other
number. Hence, it is part of the nature of zero itself that it finds this
application [i.e., that it equals zero] and that it alone can be applied in this
way. Zero annihilates every other number with which it is multiplied...."
[Engels (1954),
p.261.]

Does this mean that if someone tried to calculate,
say, "0 x
12", the number "12" would be "annihilated", never to be used by
anyone ever again? Or, are we to assume that the numeral itself will disappear from the page in a
puff of
smoke? If not, what precisely is the force of the word "annihilate" here?

As argued in detail in Essays
Two, Three Parts
One and
Two, and Essay Twelve (summary
here),
Abstractionism is itself a form of Idealism founded on a syntactically inept
misinterpretation of general terms as if they were the names of
Abstract
Particulars, in effect conjuring these into existence by the mere 'power' of
naming alone (or, to be more accurate, by means of the nominalisation of predicate
expressions, so that they cease being predicative and operate as the names of
these Abstract Particulars). On any interpretation,
this relies on and supports the ancient doctrine that the underlying structure of reality
is abstract, hence rational and mind-like. That accounts for the confused
Platonism in Engels's writings, witnessed above.

[In fact, comrades who are overly impressed with Engels's
mathematical ideas should consult van Heijenoort (1948) in order to have that
intellectually debilitating condition
cured;
a copy can be found here.]

(3) Unfortunately, the publication of Marx's Mathematical
Manuscripts[Marx (1983)] has revealed the spectacle of a first-rate mind
vainly attempting to shoehorn an interpretation of the
Calculus into a
dialectical boot it won't fit.

Correction 20/06/14: In fact, up until
today, I had only read a few chapters of Marx's Mathematical Manuscripts,
having unwisely taken the word of his commentators that the latter is a work of
'dialectics' (in the traditional Engels/Lenin sense of that word). I have now
checked these manuscripts in detail, line-by-line, and can find only one page
and one expression that is unambiguously 'dialectical' (in the above sense):
Here it is:

"The whole difficulty
in understanding the differential operation (as in the negation of the negation
generally) lies precisely in seeing how it differs from such a simple
procedure and therefore leads to real results." [Marx
(1983), p.3.] [Italic emphasis in the original.]

That's it! That is the extent of the
'dialectics' (in the above sense of the word) in these manuscripts. And even
then this indirect reference to 'dialectics' (in the above sense of that word)
is equivocal, at best. Anyway, Marx certainly does nothing with it.

Hegel is mentioned only once in the entire book (that is, if we ignore
the many references to him made by the editors and the other commentators in
this volume), and then only in passing -- as many times as Kant and Fichte (p.119).

"Contradiction", as far as I can see, makes only one appearance:

"This leap from
ordinary algebra, and besides by means of ordinary algebra, into
the algebra of variables is assumed as au fait accompli, it is not
proved and is prima facie in contradiction to all the laws of
conventional algebra, where y = f(x), y1
= f(x+h) could never have this meaning." [Ibid.,
p.117.Italic emphases in the
original.]

I think it is pretty clear that this isn't a
'dialectical' use of this word (with that word understood in the above manner,
again).

Finally, there is this passage:

"And here it may be
remarked that the process of the original algebraic derivation is again turned
into its opposite." [Ibid.,
p.56.]

If readers check, they will also see that Marx isn't arguing 'dialectically'
here (with that word understood in the above manner, again), he is simply making
a point about the algebraic manipulations he had just completed and is about to
complete.

Hence, the comment I made above -- i.e., "Unfortunately, the publication of Marx's
Mathematical
Manuscripts [Marx (1983)] has revealed the spectacle of a first-rate mind
vainly attempting to shoehorn an interpretation of the
Calculus into a
dialectical boot it won't fit" -- is entirely misguided. So, this isn't a
work of 'dialectics' (again, in the above sense of that word).

As
the editors of these manuscripts themselves admit, Marx's analysis of the
Calculus was based on his reading of textbooks that were badly out-of-date even
in his own day. Marx was clearly unaware of the important work done in
Analysis
by Cauchy, and of the definitive results obtained by
Weierstrass and
Riemann –-
work that was in fact available in his lifetime (the former having been
completed in the 1820s, the latter in the late 1850s).17b

Several of the authors writing in the Appendix to the above work
make some attempt to explicate and defend Marx's ideas, as well as outline a few
criticisms of their own of subsequent developments in
Analysis. As these
theorists correctly point out, mathematicians working after Weierstrass found
that the development of his results required a much clearer understanding of the
nature of real numbers, continuity and the logic of infinity than were apparent
at the time. Unfortunately,
early
Logicist theories in this area foundered when
alleged contradictions were
uncovered in Frege's
Grundgesetze. Subsequently,
Hilbert's entire
foundational
program was dealt a severe (but, as it turns out, spurious) blow by
Gödel's Theorem.18
Nevertheless, these comrades pointedly failed to show how dialectics could possibly help, or have
helped, in any way at all here;
indeed, it is quite obvious (from the considerations aired below) that the opposite
is in fact the case.

Despite this, several other points arise from
the comments the above
authors (i.e.,
Yanovskaya, Kol'man and Smith) make about Marx's unpublished writings on the Calculus.

(A) Smith himself admits that Marx's analysis
is technically limited; for example, it only relates to certain types of
analytic functions
(Smith (1983), pp.265-66). Moreover, Marx's method of proof relies
on binomial and other expansions; however, when it is
applied to more complex analytic functions -- such as f(x) = (1 - x - x3)-2/3
--,
it faces the sort of problems that afflicted, say,
Euler's
work: it can't cope with infinite expansions, nor can it take account of
expansions that don't converge. Hence, Marx would have found it impossible to
explain why trigonometric functions can't be differentiated
if angles are measured in degrees rather than
radians. Here, the derivative
depends on
small angle approximations
converging on a
limit for small values, and this only happens if angles are measured in
radians. Since Marx paid no heed to convergence, and had no way of generating
general results upon which this branch of the calculus depends, there is no way
these functions can be differentiated using his method -- even if, per
impossible, his comments about simple algebraic functions had been 100%
correct!

[On this, and how these and other 'difficulties'
were tackled between, say, 1680 and 1870, see Kitcher (1984), pp.229-71, and
Lavine (1994). For a
college entry-level discussion of some of the mathematics involved in small
angle approximations (measured in radians), see, for
example, Berry et al (2004), pp.157-65, 210-15, and Heard et al
(2005), pp.69-83.]

Moreover, other types of ordinary derivatives were not considered by Marx
-- for example: dT/dx (the rate of change of temperature with respect to
position, where no 'motion' is implied by the variables used); dA/dt or
dV/dt (the rate of change of area/volume with respect to time). What sort of
'motion' could these possibly involve? Can an area or a volume be in two
places at once, and in one of these and not in it at the same time? What about dr/dt
-- the rate of change of a
position vector
with respect to time? In this particular case, it is even more difficult to see how a
changing vector can be given a 'dialectical' make-over.
Can a magnitude
and a direction occupy two places at once, but not be in one of them while being in another at the same moment --
especially if vectors
themselves define locations?

Not only that, but
higher-order derivatives
were ignored by Marx, and it isn't at all clear how these can be reconciled with a
'dialectical' account of change. Are we to suppose that, for instance, d2y/dx2
-- or d(dy/dx)/dx -- expresses how the first derivative itself changes,
or how the variables themselves undergo more complex sorts of 'motion' -- or
what? What then about dny/dxn?
[To say nothing of (dy/dx)n.]

And what about several of the more complex
(but still rather simple) ways that ordinary derivatives
can inter-relate? For example, what sort of 'dialectical spin' can be put on
the following?

Are we to suppose that the 'movement' of all these variables is
equal, inter-coordinated -- or even comparable?

[Marx did try to examine some of these, but as I will show in a
later re-write of this Essay, his endeavours fail rather badly -- nor do they even
so much as attempt to tackle the problems raise earlier.]

[Update, September 2012: I have just been sent a PDF of a
new
translation of Marx's Mathematical Manuscripts, which not only
contains fresh material (along with new interpretive essays), it confirms once
again that Marx was no amateur mathematician, but was very well versed in
Analysis from the pre-Cauchy
era. I haven't yet had time to digest this material in any detail, but an
initial inspection reveals that one or two comments posted in this Essay are now
a little inaccurate, and will need to be revised -- particularly those above
about Higher Derivatives. However, having said that, this new material confirms
the conclusion reached in this section that Marx confused the movement of
variables with movement in reality, and that what he says about
variables (or, rather, how he refers to them, and what use he makes of them)
is untenable. As noted below, this
vitiates any attempt to introduce 'dialectics' into mathematics, rendering
Marx's attempt to re-configure the Calculus as just so much wasted effort (by an
undoubted genius -- on a par with all the time Newton wasted on
Alchemy and Biblical Numerology).]

On top of this, Marx totally ignored partial derivatives.
Perhaps that was because it would have involved him in having to consider
variables 'changing' in three or more directions at once!

Finally, although Engels mentions it, there seems to have been no consideration
whatsoever given to the
whole of the
Integral Calculus.
It is impossible, anyway, to see how the
latter could be accommodated within a 'dialectical' framework -- and with that,
out would go much of Modern Mathematics and Science. [On the origin of modern
theories of integration, see Hawkins (1980).]

It could be argued that the Integral Calculus
is a sort of 'reverse' Differentiation. But that isn't so. Quite apart
from their different proof structures, there are functions that can't be
differentiated which can be
integrated, and vice versa.

(B) Independently of the above, Marx's approach is seriously flawed.
That is because it requires a variable, x (taking values in the domain of a function,
f(x)), to
'change' into x1,
and that this be represented as part of the factorisation of f(x) -- i.e.,
g(x)(x1
– x), where g(x) and (x1
– x) are both factors of f(x).

Now, in order to avoid well-known problems
(notoriously outlined by
Bishop
Berkeley in
The Analyst) that had plagued earlier attempts to make the Calculus rigorous, Marx set the
value of x1 such that
x1 = x
(or, rather, he allowed it to "move" back!). This manoeuvre is 'justified' (but
not by Marx, by his commentators) with an appeal to appropriately vague 'dialectical principles' (to
be examined presently), the upshot of which is that unless the meanings of "="
and "–" have themselves changed, the factor (x1
– x) must equal zero! But, that just leaves the Calculus in the same state it
had been in the 18th
century, with all the problems that had bedevilled it since
Newton and Leibniz's
day.

[Several commentators have tried to blow away
the chaff surrounding Marx's argument, leaving behind the 'rational core', so to
speak. Their arguments will also be examined in a later re-write of this Essay.]

Hence, despite the obvious genius he
displayed in other areas, Marx's ideas on the Calculus are entirely worthless.

In fact, there is little evidence anyone has
made a serious use of his ideas -- including
mathematicians working in the former USSR, where lip-service had at least
to
paid to them (for career and/or neck-saving reasons). Sure, Marx's ideas
in this area were extensively studied [Dauben (2003)], but there is no evidence
they were put to any use. And, as far as can be ascertained, no one since
has bothered to
develop Marx's ideas into a rigorous system, or ironed-out its fatal
defects. [However, on more recent attempts to rehabilitate Marx's
re-interpretation of these symbols, see below.]

(C) Even if the above criticisms are misguided in some way --
and Engels's point about variables introducing dialectics into Mathematics
were correct, andMarx'sanalysis were flawless -- it would
still be of no use. That is because it is a fatal error to redirect
attention away from motion itself onto the symbols depicting it in an attempt to explain how the Calculus
handles movement and change in nature. Marx committed just such an error when he
confused the alleged 'motion' of variables and 'quantities' with motion itself in the real
world. [It has to be said that Newton and Leibniz were guilty of this, too.] This can be seen by
the subsequent use of 'dialectical reasoning' to justify the
'change' of x into x1
(by his commentators, noted above).

In this regard, Aristotle's general comment
on the rationale underlying Plato's
Theory of Forms
is apposite: in any attempt to solve a problem it isn't a good idea to begin by doubling it. In this particular
case, whatever difficulties there are with understanding the mathematics of
motion, they aren't helped by reduplicating the very same problems in the motion of symbols!
Clearly, the latter would then need explaining, too.

But, how can symbols move?
Do they dash about the page? Do they mutate before our eyes? Of course, they are
supposed to 'take on new values', but beyond this obscure metaphor, what does
this mean?
Are they magnetic? Do they attract these values in other ways? Do they adopt them, impersonate them..., fight them?
But, what else can "take on" mean? [Of course, as Wittgenstein pointed, the
solution here is to see these symbols as an expression of the rules we
use to make sense of motion. (More on that later.) However, on variables, see
here.]

To be sure, a clear account of the rate of change of, say,
position with respect to time might not be easy to formulate, but the
introduction of the rate of change of symbols with respect to time is
doubly confused. [Wouldn't this need second-order symbol..., and so on?]

In
fact, any attempt to depict motion by the behaviour of symbols -– in this
case variables in supposed 'motion' -– would constitute yet another example
of Linguistic Idealism
[LIE]. On that basis, the 'dialectical
motion' of variables (i.e., linguistic expressions) -- if interpreted
as reflecting change in reality --, will plainly have been conflated
with real changes in nature. Hence, instead of seeing mathematical variables as a
means to an end (i.e., as an expression of the rules we use to make sense of motion),
they become an end in themselves: their 'motion' has now replaced the very thing they had been introduced all along to
explain!

Inferences drawn with respect to such
variables are then misidentified as a scientific analysis of real motion in the
material world. Hence, from a consideration of 'moving' variables we somehow
obtain super-dialectical truths about motion in nature, valid for all of space
and time!

Which, as we have seen, is precisely the trap
that ensnared Marx.

There have been several
other attempts to defend Marx's account of the Calculus; cf., Blunden (1983),
Carchedi (2008), Struik (1948),
Kennedy (1977) -- republished as Kennedy (2006) --, and Gerdes (1983). [These will be considered in detail here at a
later date.]

Suffice it to say that
every single one of these commentators confuses real motion with 'moving variables'
-- among other things --, and hence their conclusions are susceptible not
only to the above comments, but also to
Frege's criticisms.19

But, what about Engels's other "unhelpful" idea that parrots and domesticated
animals understand what is said to them?

"Comparison
with animals proves that this explanation of the origin of language from and in
the labour process is the only correct one. The little that even the most
highly-developed animals need to communicate to each other does not require
articulate speech. In a state of nature, no animal feels handicapped by its
inability to speak or to understand human speech. It is quite different when it
has been tamed by man. The dog and the horse, by association with man, have
developed such a good ear for articulate speech that they easily understand any
language within their range of concept (sic)…. Anyone who has had much to do
with such animals will hardly be able to escape the conviction that in many
cases they now feel their inability to speak as a defect…. Let no one
object that the parrot does not understand what it says…. [W]ithin the limits of
its range of concepts it can also learn to understand what it is saying. Teach a
parrot swear words in such a way that it gets an idea of their meaning…; tease
it and you will soon discover that it knows how to use its swear words just as
correctly as a Berlin costermonger. The same is true of begging for titbits."
[Engels (1876), pp.356-57.]

Here is an extract from
Essay Thirteen
Part Three dealing with this passage:

Contrary to what Engels asserts, we shouldn't want to concede that animals understand our use of language (or,
indeed, that they grasp the import of swear words, for instance) simply
because parrots, for example, are capable of making certain sounds, or just because some humans
are overly sentimental and believe that their pet dog can "understand
every word they say". If understanding were attributable to animals solely
on the basis of vocalisation, then we might have to admit that, for example, the
ability most of us have of repeating foreign words upon hearing them means that
we too understood the language from whence they came, when quite often we do
not. [For example, although I can read both Hebrew and Greek, I actually
understand very few words of either language.]

But, even in such cases we would still
be viewing other languages from our standpoint as sophisticated users of our own
language, which means that the dice have already been heavily loaded (so to speak) in our
favour. Because of this, we often make an educated guess concerning the meaning
of any new (foreign) words we might encounter, based on knowledge of our own
language. Moreover, we do this against a background of shared behaviour and a common
culture that links us, directly or indirectly, with all other human beings. The same cannot be said of parrots,
dogs and horses.

We should, I think, only want to count
someone (or something) as having understood what is said (or what was said to
it) if it possessed a sufficiently detailed verbal and behavioural repertoire,
at the very least. If, for example, such a 'proto-linguist' could not form
new sentences from his/her 'vocabulary', if he/she/it were incapable of
negating any of their words, or could not cope with word-order change, if they
were unable to refer to anything proximate to or remote from their immediate
surroundings, if they could not identify or specify any of the implications of what they
said, or of what was said to them, if they could not reason (hypothetically) both with truths and
falsehoods, appreciate stories and/or fiction, if they could not respond to
humour, or engage in self-criticism, if they were regularly perplexed by new sentences they had never
encountered before (even those that contained 'words' drawn from their own
repertoire), if they could not follow or give instructions, and so on, then I
think most of us would have serious doubts about their
capacity to understand the target language.

On the other hand, had Engels said the
following to one of his parrots: "Swearing is not allowed here because it
represents the language of oppression" (to paraphrase Trotsky) -- and the
parrot had stopped swearing as a result (or had deliberately sworn even more!) -- we might
be a little more
impressed with his claims.

Despite this, Engels's ideas do not seem to
hang together even on their own terms. If language and understanding
are the product of social development (augmented by co-operative
labour. Indeed, Engels even says:

"Comparison with animals
proves that this explanation of the origin of language from and in the labour
process is the only correct one....

"First labour, after it and then with
it speech -- these were the two most essential stimuli under the influence of
which the brain of the ape gradually changed into that of man...."
[Engels (1876),
pp.356-57.]

If so, how could an animal comprehend our speech without also
having gone through the same social development and engaged in the same sort of
collective labour with human beings?

It could be argued that animals have,
and still do work alongside human beings. Think of the phrase "work
horse", and the use to which dogs are put in guarding, sledging and hunting, to
say nothing of the work done by oxen, donkeys, camels and pigeons, to name but a
few. However, without wishing to minimise the use to which human beings have put
many animals, this hardly counts as collective labour (any more than the
use of wood in buildings counts as part of the collective labour contributed by
a tree), but more closely resembles the use of living tools. The
differences between human and animal labour do not need to be listed to see that
this line of defence won't work. Which Marxist wants to argue that an ox, for
example, shows any desire to communicate, or that a donkey or a pigeon shows any
sign of verbalising its aims and intentions? But, if their efforts counted as
collective labour, we should be prepared to argue that these animals do
indeed show signs of a "need to communicate".

Moreover, Engels appears to think (somewhat
inconsistently) that mere proximity to human
beings is sufficient to engender (in certain animals) the "need to communicate".
If this were so, then manifestly an ability to use language could not have been the result of
collective labour. Surely, in humans (on Engels's own admission) the
"need to communicate" arose out of collective labour, not from mere
association. In the passage above, Engels seems to think that this "need to
communicate" is a free-floating force when it comes to animal behaviour,
which can somehow be divorced from its connection with cooperative human labour.
This explains
why he also appears to believe that mere association with human beings creates
such a "need" in these animals. To be sure, the behaviour of domestic animals is
different from that of individuals belonging to the same (or similar) species in
the wild, but if mere
proximity to human beings could account for language, then we should expect
cats, cows, donkeys, camels, oxen, sheep, goats, rats, mice, gerbils, fleas, bacteria and lice to be able to
communicate with us (to say nothing of viruses).

Conversely, if animals were able to talk and/or understand us then language
can't be a
social phenomenon, nor would it be the result of co-operative labour....

Brain size can't be the determining factor here, nor can the length of time
these animals have been in human company. As should seem obvious, cats and cows
have bigger brains than parrots, and have been far closer to human beings for far longer
(as have rats and mice).

Is this another example of
Engels's prescience, or an indication that on some things his ideas were
just a
little dotty?

In his
review of
TAR, Alex Callinicos
wondered why John Rees had not discussed these and similar ideas in his book.
[Callinicos (1998), pp.99-100.] In view of the above, I think it is reasonably
clear why that material was omitted: it represents a low
point in the thinking of an otherwise great revolutionary, and thus best left
tactfully ignored.

Despite this, it is quite clear that the '"nodal" aspect of the
First 'Law' is incompatible with the Unity and Interpenetration of Opposites
[UIO], or at least with the link between the UIO and the DM-criticism of the LEM.

To see this, consider object/process P which is just about
to undergo a qualitative change (a "leap") from, say, state PA
to state PB.
For there to be a "nodal" change here it would have to be the case that
P is in
state PA
one instant/moment, and in state PB
an instant/moment later (howsoever these "instants/moments" are
understood). There is no other way
of making sense of the abrupt nature of "nodal" change.

[To spare the reader, I will just refer to these as "instants"
from now on.]

But, if that is so, then any state description of P would
have to obey the LEM, for it would have to be the case that at one instant it
would be true to say that P was in state PA
at that instant but not in state PB
at the same instant; i.e., it would not be true to say that P was in
both states at once. That is, if we assume that PB
is not-PA,
then at any one instant, if this change is "nodal", the following would have to be the
case: P is either in state PA
or it is in state not-PA,
but not both. In that case, these two states wouldn't interpenetrate one another
(in the sense that both exist or apply to P at the same time), and the LEM
would apply to this process over this time period, at least.

On the other hand, if these two states do in fact interpenetrate
each other (in the sense that both exist or apply to P at the same time) such that the "either-or" of the LEM
doesn't apply, and it were the
case that P was in both states at once, then the transition from
PA to PB
would be smooth and not "nodal", after all.

This dilemma is independent of the length of time a "node" is
held to last (that is, if we are ever told!). It is also worth noting
that this inconsistency applies at just the point where dialecticians tell us DL
is superior to FL --, that is, at the point of change.

So, once more, we see that
not only can DL not explain change,
at least two of Engels's three 'Laws' are inconsistent with one another (when
applied to objects/processes that undergo change).

The 'Negation of the Negation'
[NON] fares no better than the first two 'Laws'. Indeed, since it is itself an
elaboration of the previous 'Law', it suffers from all the latter's weakness.
[Readers are therefore referred back to
Section C for
more details.]

As with other
DM-theses, the NON is based on a confusion of logico/linguistic categories with
objects and processes in material reality, an ancient error Engels copied from
Hegel. In fact, Hegel lifted this idea from Kant. [On this, see
Redding (2007). More on
this
below, and in Essays Eight
Part Two, Twelve Part Five
and Fourteen Part One (summaries of the last two can be found
here and
here).]

Nevertheless, the few examples that
DM-theorists have scraped together over the last hundred years or so that
supposedly illustrate this 'Law' fail to work even in the way
they were apparently intended. For example, concerning grains of barley Engels
argues that:

"[T]he grain as such ceases to exist, it is negated, and in its place there
appears the plant which has arisen from it, the negation of the grain…. It grows,
flowers, is fertilised and finally once more produces grains of barley, and as
soon as these have ripened, the stalk dies, is in its turn negated…." [Engels
(1976),
pp.172-73.]

However, Engels failed to notice that
many
plants do not cease to exist (and so can't have been 'negated') when they
produce seeds. Do apples trees wither and die when or soon after they grow their first crop of
apples? Do fig trees do the same each time they produce figs? Is it really
necessary to re-plant a whole vineyard each year?

Consider also the animal kingdom: Do all
animals drop dead when they produce their off-spring? Are all human children
made orphans the moment they are born?

If not, much of the living world ignores this
obscure 'Law'.

[This is quite apart from the fact that most
plants, and some animals, reproduce asexually; precious little 'negating' going
on there. More on this below.]

Leaving aside for now the confusion noted
earlier (about whether plants (or
whatever) actually change because of a struggle between "internal opposites", or even whether
they change into those opposites), if each grain is indeed a
UO (i.e., a
union of grain and 'non-grain', i.e., a union of the plant it is and the plant
it becomes -- where 'non-grain' is the plant the grain becomes and where the
latter is
itself the negation of the grain, and so on),
the grain itself must also contain the plant, not potentially, but actually. If
this were not so, the grain would not itself be a union of these opposites -- and
hence there would be nothing to cause it to change, and nothing for it to change
into.

[Objections to this way of reading Engels will be neutralised presently.
We also saw
here that dialecticians equivocate between two meanings of "internal"
(in
"internal contradiction") -- that is, between a topological and a logical sense
of this word.]

However, this 'plant-inside-the-grain' sort of organism must
(for
the same reason) contain its own opposite, yet another plant (i.e., a
'plant-inside-the-plant-inside-the-grain' sort of organism, if, according to
Lenin, the 'plant inside
the grain' is itself a UO). If it is, then it too must
contain its own opposite, yet another grain (i.e., a
'grain-inside-the-plant-inside-the-plant-inside-the-grain' sort of organism --
and so on, forever.

This objection can't be neutralised by arguing that the opposite
of the 'plant-inside-the-gain' is in fact the grain itself, for if this were the
case, the 'plant-inside-the-grain' would turn onto that grain, if all things turn
into their opposites, as we are told they must. For the 'plant-inside-the-gain' to develop into a plant it
has to be in some sort of 'internal struggle' with its own opposite, that is, with
what it has to yet to become (i.e., a plant), which in turn has to be internal
to that 'plant-inside-the-grain' sort of organism. This mist be so if the Dialectical
Classics (quoted
here) are to be
believed. Furthermore, this 'plant-inside-the-plant-inside-the-grain' sort of
organism is not itself changeless. Hence, if it is to change into its opposite
(which opposite I have here surmised to be a
'grain-inside-plant-inside-the-plant-inside-the-grain' sort of organism -- but,
that is just my guess), that opposite must already exist for it to change into,
or this would be a change with no DM-cause inducing it. The rest follows as
before.

This must indeed be so if all things are UOs, as Hegel,
Engels and Lenin
said they were. In
that case, Engels's NON (at least as far as barley is concerned) seems to imply
the actual existence of an infinite set of organic plant-and-seed 'boxes
within boxes', as it were, which is about as believable a picture of reality as that
painted
by 18th century
preformationist/ovist
biologists. This is because it would mean that every grain
that ever there was must contain, and must be contained by, every subsequent
plant that ever there grew, with each of these organic mega-Russian Doll-type organisms complete with its own
grains and plants within grains and plants within grains and…, etc, to infinity.

Of course, dialecticians (most likely those
of the
Low Church
tendency) who accept Engels's seed example as gospel will reject the above
analysis. According to them, the UO here is precisely what we see (and
understand) as barley seed, with all its law-governed inner processes and
interactions with its environment. These help change that seed into a plant,
unfolding the aforementioned 'negation' -- the latter of which does not destroy
the grain as such, but "sublates" the original negation/seed (it isn't too clear which)
from which the new plant emerges.

It could then be argued that none of this
means that the original seed contains the
subsequent plant in any way, as the above paragraphs rashly suppose. Whatever
opposites this natural process requires for it make a plant grow from seed can be ascertained from its
actual development.

[It is worth pointing out
that this 'get-out-of-a-metaphysical-hole-free-card' was withdrawn from circulation
here.]

But, what exactly are these "opposites",
anyway? And
why do the
Dialectical Classics say that things change into their
opposites because of an internal struggle between those very opposites, which
must already exist for this to happen?

"The law
of the interpenetration of opposites.... [M]utual penetration of polar opposites
and transformation into each other when carried to extremes...." [Engels (1954),
pp.17,
62.]

"[Among
the elements of dialectics are the following:] [I]nternally contradictory
tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum and unity of opposites…. [This
involves] not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of
everydetermination, quality, feature, side, property into
every other [into its opposite?]…. The unity…of opposites is conditional,
temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is
absolute, just as development and motion are absolute…." [Lenin (1961),
pp.221-22,
357-58. Emphases in the original.]

"And so every phenomenon, by the action of those same forces which
condition its existence, sooner or later, but inevitably, is transformed
into its own opposite…." [Plekhanov (1956),
p.77.]

This can only mean that barley grains contain
the plants they subsequently become; so they are like Russian
dolls. There does not seem to be any other way of reading this 'Law' as it is
depicted by DM-classicists. That is because there do not appear to be any
'external' opposites that make a seed change into its 'opposite', as the
Dialectical Classics assure us must always take place.

However, even if we ignore this
serious difficulty for the present,
what NON-sense can be made of the claim that a plant is the
negation of a seed? This idea seems to depend on the ancient belief that all words,
including the negative particle, are names -- in this case, the name of a
special sort of dialectical process. In fact, as noted above, this idea can be
traced back into the mists of time, but in its modern form it surfaces in Kant's
claim that there are such things as "real negations". [On that, see
here,
here and here.]

Be this as it may, it
is far from easy to follow the 'reasoning' here. Perhaps it goes
something like this:

If we have a negative particle in language,
and it corresponds to something in reality, then it must name or refer to that something.
So, since negativity appears in language it reflects real negativity in nature.
[Minus the Hegelian gobbledygook, I have yet to see anything more sophisticated than that in DM-writings.
Lenin's feeble attempt in this regard will be examined in Essay Thirteen
Part One. However, in the work of
Hegel and Kant commentators, the argument is far more sophisticated. I will be
examining these in Essay Eight Part Two.]

But, if that is so, it would become rather
difficult to rectify incorrect
naming and/or identification (something that is easy to do in the vernacular).

If and when misidentification happens in
every day life, we have reasonably clear ways of correcting ourselves. If we
mistake, say, George Bush for George W Bush, it is easy to put that right; we simply use a
definite description and a nominal qualifier (perhaps), such as: "I mean the
former
president of the USA, George Bush senior."

But, if "not" were the name of some
thing/some process (DM-fans call it "negativity", and credit it will
almost 'god'-like powers -- as a quick glance at the title of Dunayevskaya
(2002) should be enough to convince doubters) and was incorrectly identified as the name of something else -- let's say that it was mistakenly viewed as the name of "or" --, then it would be impossible to point this out. One could
hardly say: "Not is not or", which, if the DM-Identity
Theory of Predication (which is,
as we
have seen, is employed by dialecticians) were correct, would be equivalent to "Not = not or",
and the first "not" would name something other than not, namely "not or" with
which it is now 'identical'!

[Exactly why all words aren't names was
considered in Essay Three Part
One.]

More importantly,
negation in language typically attaches to
propositions (or clauses; however, see
here),
and if they, too, are names (in that a proposition supposedly names the true, or the false,
or a fact, or whatever), then it would seem that any named thing could be
negated. This certainly accounts for the
nominalisation of the word "negation" in Hegelian/DM-circles, where the word
slides imperceptibly between its nominal and verbal forms. One minute it is the
name of 'negativity' (or perhaps of a subsequently "sublated" 'opposite'), next
it is a process that creates novelty. Of course, it is this 'lexicographical slide'
that causes the problem. But, negation is something wedo in
language, and we do it to, or with, certain sorts of expressions. Treating it as the name
of something in the physical world could only therefore amount to the
fetishisation of the negative particle. [More on this, too, in Essay Twelve (summary
here), but the
approach I will adopt is summarised
here.]

Well, even if this 'syntactic slide' represented a
sound piece of Stone Age Logic, negation would still only apply to language, not
things. Or, to put this another way, if negation applied to objects and
processes in the world, DM-theorists have yet to provide us with the proof. [Further ruminations along these lines are explored
here. More details
will be given in Essay Twelve and Essay Four Part Two.]

Following Hegel and Kant, Engels just assumed that
'things'/processes could be
negated; his only 'proof' seems to have been the fact that it is possible to negate
sentences and clauses. To be sure, in Kant and Hegel's systems it made some sort of crazy
sense to suppose 'things'/processes can be negated. After all, in Hegel's 'mental universe' the line between reality and language/thought
had become thinner than George W's stated excuse for invading Iraq.
However, in a materialist
theory no physical meaning can be given to this odd idea. On a similar basis, one might just as well
think that conjunctions can attach to objects in reality just because we can speak about
cats and dogs (or, if we attached this connective to processes (such as "riding and
swimming")) -- which facility would supposedly then 'allow' us to claim that reality contains
'objects' called
"cats-and-dogs" (or "riding-and-swimming"), which an alleged
natural process of "conjunction" could turn them into.
This linguistic trick could then be justified by an appeal to the Fourth 'Law' of dialectics, the 'Conjunction
of the Conjunction' -- in a similar way to how we might suppose, DM-style, that reality contains
"negated-seeds". Or even, that nature contains 'and's (to which our
word "and" refers), or that things are
glued together and thus develop by the "power of andivity".

Of course, the motivation for thinking that reality contains
negation (and that it does not contain conjunctions) had its own spurious
'logical' origin. It derived from (1) Kant's theory that there are "real
negations"; (2) Hegel's defective 'analysis' of the LOI; (3) The odd idea that this 'Law' (stated negatively) implied the LOC
and (4) Hegel's
belief that the 'logical' processing of certain ideas (connected with Spinoza's
reckless claim that 'every determination implies a negation') had profound
implications for the entire universe, and for all of time. (2)-(4) are demolished here.
[A summary can be found
here.]
(1) is partially tackled below, but more
fully in Essay Eight Part Two.

[LOI = Law of Identity; LOC = Law of
Non-contradiction.]

Even so, this 'secondary' argument (that the world must contain
negativity if we have a word for it) fails too, for as we have seen,
if this were a sound argument, then reality should also contain adverbs, prepositions,
conjunctions and expletives (among other odd items).

We saw in Essay Three
Part One (and
will see again in more detail in Essay Twelve (summary
here)), that the
idea that inferences like this (i.e., the derivation from language alone of
fundamental theses, which are valid for all of space and time) is a dodge that ancient mystics invented to
account for the link between the word of 'god' and 'His' creation. This ideological
thought-form was then
employed to help rationalise and 'legitimate' State Power, since, in that case,
the natural world and the State were supposed
to
reflect the 'divine'/logical order of reality.

Moreover, if the structure of language in
fact allowed
us to infer a priori truths about reality from linguistic expressions
then we might just as well openly accept the Ideal nature of the world, and be
done with it -- as Novack pointed out:

"A consistent materialism can't proceed from
principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition,
self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms
may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon evidence taken
from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in practice...."
[Novack (1965), p.17. Bold emphasis added.]

In that case, the materialist
flip Hegel's system is supposed to have had inflicted upon it, transforming it into 'Materialist Dialectics',
must have been through the full 360 degrees, and not the
advertised 180.19a

Engels argued that as things stand,
the development of grain into barley is a natural process; hence the plant that
subsequently grows from each seed is its 'natural' negation. But, many
things can 'naturally' happen to seeds. For example, they can be eaten or burnt as energy. But they can also rot, ferment, dry-out and be
thrown at weddings. In fact, since anything that happens in nature must
be natural (it is surely not supernatural), all such processes must,
it seems, be governed by these and other DM-'Laws' (that is, if they are
genuine
laws).

Nor could it be agued that the "natural"
development of objects and process is whatever would happen to them if they were
'left alone' to develop naturally as a result of the operation of their
"internal contradictions". That is because nothing in the DM-universe is
ever 'left alone' -- everything is part of an allegedly interconnected DM-Totality.
Whatever happens in nature must have been 'mediated' to do so by some
DM-'Law' or other, if DM-theorists are to be believed.

It could be argued that if seeds are left to
develop according their own "internal contradictions", the NON will assert
itself quite naturally. In that case, the above examples (of seeds being crushed, or eaten, etc.)
are not relevant to this 'Law'.

However, quite apart from the fact that the
phrase "internal contradiction" is itself as clear as mud (and has yet to be
explicated by a single DM-theorist, as Essay Eight Parts
One,
Two and
Three show), dialecticians
themselves appeal to "external contradictions" to account for change (since,
without these, their theory would imply that everything in nature is either
self-moving, or is hermetically sealed-off from the rest of the universe; on
this see Essay Eight Part One,
again).

Anyway, several of the above examples involve
'internal change': rotting and fermenting, for instance. Moreover, when grain is
in an animal's stomach that animal's internal regime will take over, and the grain
will 'naturally' develop into tissue or energy. In fact, 'internal' to a wedding
celebration, the 'contradictions' inherent in the bourgeois institution of
marriage will surely prompt someone to throw grain at the hapless couple. All
quite 'natural'.

So, exactly where the 'natural' boundaries of
this 'Law' are to be found is somewhat unclear. Once more, this isn't surprising
since DM-theorists haven't given the fine detail
of their own theory very much thought.

Clearly, the advancement of science and
technology often confronts older theories with unexpected problems. Hence, Engels was not to know that one day a company like
Monsanto would
turn up and develop its
so-called "Terminator
Gene". This is a gene that can, by all accounts, stop certain plants from
producing seeds, which 'scientific advance' seems capable of halting the NON in its tracks --,
forcing farmers to buy all their grain from Monsanto, etc.20

Is, therefore, the NON so weak and ineffectual that a large corporation can
countermand its inevitability? Or, is the NON still at work somewhere in all
this, 'negating' the rights of Third World farmers behind their backs, as it
were, so that they will no longer be able to produce their own planting seed --, if, that
is, Monsanto change their minds, ignore public pressure, and go ahead with the
production of this
gene? Are Monsanto potential negators of the NON? Or have they learnt how to
control it?

In this case, shouldn't we rename
Monsanto "NONsanto", as a result?

But, we needn't wait until Monsanto change
their minds and produce this NON-starter; anyone who buys fruit these days knows about seedless grapes. In
fact, most fruit nowadays does not come from seed; it is produced by propagation
from grafts and cuttings.21

The question now arises: how come the NON is
so easy by-passed? Countless processes in nature seem to be, as it were, non-NON-events of this sort, as
human beings have succeeded in 'upsetting' the 'natural' DM-order of things.

And what are we to say about
genetic engineering
in general? Is this an interference in the operation of the NON, an infringement
of the 'dialectical law' that all change is 'internally-generated'? Or is this
still a
natural process, in view of the fact that none of the scientists or
capitalists involved are supernatural beings (so we are led to believe), but are
patently physical objects?

In that case, if all the above are natural
processes, then it can truly be said that no grain is an island.

Anything that happens to
grain anywhere inside the universe must be natural.

Hence, even if barley is dropped into the
sea, crushed by a falling tree, genetically modified, or hit by American
'friendly fire', all these (and many more) are natural events and must,
one presumes, be governed by DM-'Laws'. In that case, there doesn't seem to be a single
thing that could constitute, or which could act as the 'natural
negation' of a grain of barley. So, does it have one?

On the contrary it
seems, given the supposed
universal dominion of the 'Laws' of dialectics (which DM-fans tell us are the most
"general" laws there are), there must be countless
'natural negations' of anything and
everything.

Indeed, it now seems that anything and everything
could be the natural, or even 'dialectical', 'opposite'
of grain -- especially, if according to Lenin "every
determination, quality, feature, side, property [changes] into every
other…." If that is so, and if we apply this hyper-generous and open-ended 'Law' to
Capitalism, once again, it should be possible for the latter, too, to change into a grain of barley, and
vice versa. And it is little use saying that this sort of change has never
been observed, since, according to the above, anything could be the opposite of
grain and/or of Capitalism. Like the proverbial
Black
Swan, perhaps we just have to wait long enough.

In that case, since barley is
"not-Capitalism", and Capitalism can only change into what it "is not",
recklessly profligate 'logic' like this suggests that revolutionaries should consider
radically re-configuring their aims and objectives. Instead of the struggle for socialism, they should
perhaps struggle for…, well, er, sowing. Clearly this suggests, too, that our
slogans will need to be revised somewhat --, perhaps to: "Capitalism digs its
own garden", or "You have nothing to lose but your daisy chains",
or "There is a tractor haunting Europe". Or maybe even "From each according to his ability, to each
according to his seed"?

Now, any who object to the above
off-the-wall conclusions should direct their ire at this 'Law', and its Hermetic 'Law'-givers,
not
at this piss-taker.

Either that, or they should say clearly, and for the first time ever, what NON-sense there is to this
'Law'.21a

Nevertheless, and despite the above, as far as the descendants of barley
plants are
concerned, little development seems to take place; barley stays barley for
countless generations -- unless change is externally induced (on that, see below).

More interesting, however, is the fact that,
based on such long-term lack of change --, and if the NON
is to be used as the DM-model for social change (as dialecticians often
insist) --, Marxists should now
become staunch conservatives, since, in the majority of cases, the NON is
itself impressively conservative.

So, the NON, applied to barley (and everything
else in the living world, it seems), implies a near universal biological stasis (unless, once
again, change is introduced
from the outside). In that case, anyone foolish enough to use this 'Law' as a metaphor for social change,
if they are consistent,
should be committed to the idea that society must develop peaceably,
naturally, slowly -- possibly cyclically -- with no overall change at the end
(unless, again, this is induced from the outside).

However, since organisms develop as a result of mutations
(mostly in response to violent, externally-induced interruptions to the
'natural' order of growth and reproduction), this process can't, it seems, be
reconciled with the above NON-inspired, internally-generated 'theory' of change (or,
rather, lack
of it).

If, on the other hand, this superior,
'externalist' model of development (through mutation) is adopted (wherein the facts of nature are
allowed to speak to us for a change, and speciation is recognised as largely externally-motivated),
then the revolution, if and when it does occur, should result from the intervention of
Aliens, or other NON-humans as external causes -- if, that is, we
insist on using the NON as a metaphor for revolutionary change.

In that case, it looks like the 'internal
contradictions' of Capitalism aren't enough to bring about its
end -- since they
are far too conservative -- if Engels's analogy drawn against barley
seeds is to be believed.

Some might object to the above on the grounds that it confuses
classical materialist dialectics with
Second International Marxism, where the NON was interpreted in deterministic
terms. Since history is governed by the actions of human beings, this leaves
room for human decision, choice and intervention.

Or, so this objection might proceed.

However, given the 'law'-like nature of the
NON, its effects seem to be no more easy to escape than those of the law of gravity. Of
course, DM-theorists get around this by arguing that 'freedom' somehow 'emerges'
from 'necessity', as the First 'Law' (i.e., Q«Q) kicks into gear at some level of complexity.21b
But, that 'Law' is far too weak to sustain this semi-miraculous
defence; as we have seen,
it can't even account for baldness or melting butter!

Anyway, this topic will be taken up in detail in Essay Three Part
Five. There, we will see that, unless dialecticians come up with new
evidence/argument, the NON (whether or not it is interpreted along the
lines of Second International
theorists) is eminently 'deterministic', eminently NON-Marxist.

In response, it could also be argued that
some mutations are
internally-generated. Perhaps so, but these are errors of replication and can in
no way be seen as negations (they are more like random spelling mistakes).
Indeed, these 'copying errors' can't have been created by "internal
contradictions", since, if the
Dialectical
Holy Books are to be believed, such changes can only occur if a DNA sequence
struggles with the sequence it is to become, its "opposite". This will require
that "opposite" exists before it exists! [This argument is developed and
defended in detail here.]

Moreover, the random nature of these internal
copying errors is difficult to square with a law-governed process. Not only are
most mutations highly lethal (whether they are internally-, or
externally-caused), they aren't the least bit directional.
Hence, at any particular point in its history a particular mutation might be of no use to an
organism, or population (in terms
of natural selection); at another, it could be a species-saver. There doesn't,
therefore, appear to be much here that can be squeezed even into this NON-boot.22

In addition, it isn't easy to see how this
NON-theory is
applicable to other natural life-cycles. What for instance are we to make of the
development of
moths and butterflies?
Engels seemed to think their development illustrated his 'laws':

"With most insects, this process follows the same lines as
in the case of the grain of barley. Butterflies, for example, spring from the
egg by a negation of the egg, pass through certain transformations until they
reach sexual maturity, pair and are in turn negated, dying as soon as the
pairing process has been completed and the female has laid its numerous eggs."
[Engels (1976),
p.173.]

But, moths and butterflies go through the following developmental stages:

Adult→Egg→Pupa→Chrysalis→Adult

Which is the negation of which
here? And which is
the NON? And
what about organisms that reproduce by splitting, such as
amoebae and
bacteria?
In any such spit, which half is the negation and which the NON?23

"If you thought human sexual relationships were
tricky, be thankful you're not an African bat bug. They show what could be the
most extreme case of transsexualism yet discovered. Male bat bugs sport female
genitalia, and some females have genitalia that mimic the male's version of the
female bits -- as well as their own redundant vagina.

"Bat bugs, and their relatives the bed bugs, are
renowned among entomologists for their gruesome and bizarre method of
reproduction. Males never use the vagina, instead piercing the female's abdomen
and inseminating directly into the blood, where the sperm then swim to the
ovaries. It is this 'traumatic insemination', as it is termed, which is at the
root of the extreme levels of gender bending in the African bat bug, says Klaus
Reinhardt of the University of Sheffield, UK.

"Female bat bugs have evolved a countermeasure to
the stabbing of the male's penis -- structures on their abdomens known as
paragenitals. These are a defence mechanism that limits the damage by guiding
the male's sharp penis into a spongy structure full of immune cells.

"When Reinhardt's team studied bat bugs in a cave
on Mount Elgon, Kenya -- already famous as a place that elephants visit to mine
for salt -- they found that the males also had defence genitals. What's more,
they had scarring on their abdomens similar to that of the females following
copulation. In other words, males had been using their penises to stab other
males.

"If that isn't strange enough, when the team
looked at 43 preserved female bat bugs, they found that 84% had male versions of
the defence genitals. Females with this male version of female genitals had less
scarring due to penetration than the other females.

"'This is what we think might have happened,'
says Reinhardt. 'Males started getting nobbled (sic) by other males, so they
evolved the female defensive genitals. As this reduced the amount of penis
damage they were getting, females evolved the male version of the female
genitals.'

"While theoretical models have predicted that
females should evolve different morphologies to escape male attention, this is
the first time it has been seen in genitalia, Reinhardt says. 'It's a
spectacular example of evolution through sexual conflict.'" [New
Scientist, 195, 2622, 22/09/07, p.11. Quotation marks altered to
conform to the conventions adopted at this site.]

It is to be hoped that the NON visits these highly confused
insects one day to give them more than just friendly marriage guidance counselling.24

And, it appears that scientists can now
by-pass this 'Law' at will:

"With a surprisingly simple genetic tweak,
scientists have transformed
nematode worms into hermaphrodites. They
report in the journal Science that lowering the activity of just two
genetic pathways produces the change.

"Evolution from a species consisting of males and females into one consisting of
only males and hermaphrodites happens naturally in many nematodes. A
team of US researchers says their experiment explains how this might take place.

"They
say it also provides a simple model helping scientists to work out the mechanism
of evolutionary change. The
researchers chose to study the evolution of female worms into hermaphrodites
because it was a 'striking change' that occurred relatively recently.

"Ronald Ellis, a biologist from the University of Medicine and Dentistry New
Jersey in the US, who led the research, said that most big evolutionary changes
within species happened too long ago to study at the genetic level.

"'But
this dramatic change happened fairly recently and in a group of animals that we
know a lot about...[,] that's why we're studying it to find out how complex traits
are created,' he told BBC News.

"Dr
Ellis said it was exciting to discover that, by lowering the activity of just
two genetic pathways he and his team were able to 'take what should have been a
female animal and turn it into a cell fertile hermaphrodite'. The
two genes the researchers 'tweaked' were one involved in making sperm and
another involved in activating them.

"'These were small changes to the activity of genetic pathways that already
existed,' said Dr Ellis. 'So
the pieces were already in place, they just had to be altered so they worked in
a slightly new way.' He
said the finding was surprising because it was such a simple change that
produced a trait that was so dramatic.

"Genes of change

"The
scientists use nematode worms as simple models to show how evolution works at a
genetic level. 'We
understand how evolution tweaks simple traits, like a giraffe's neck [getting]
longer and longer over time,' he said. 'But
most of the most important changes -- the creation of the eye, the development
of feathers in birds, wings in insects -- involved the creation of novel traits.

"'The
better we understand this, the better we can understand the kinds of changes
that created humans from our ancestors.' Dr
David Lunt, an evolutionary biologist from the University of Hull, UK, who was
not involved in this study told BBC News that said this was an 'excellent
experiment'.

"'Scientists study the evolution of sexual systems because it allows us to see
all the forces of evolution at once,' he explained. 'We
have very few model systems anywhere near as powerful as this one.'" [BBC
News, 15/11/09. Emphases in the original; quotation marks altered to conform
to the conventions adopted at this site. Some paragraphs merged. See also
here.]25

However, there appear to be countless
processes in nature that are equally NON-defying: for example, how does the NON apply to
such things as the
periodic extinction of life on earth (by
meteorites, or other ambient causes)? When a comet hits the earth (if it does),
which is the negation and which the NON? And where is the development here? Do
meteorites develop into anything new after they slam into the Earth? Is the resulting crater creative?

Furthermore, when a
planet orbits a star, is there even a tiny sliver of space for the NON to gain a
toe-hold? The said planet may continue to orbit for hundreds of thousands of years
with little significant change (in mass, speed, inclination to the
ecliptic,
etc.). Again, where is the development?

[Objections to these objections (on the lines that the NON
in fact only applies to 'development') will considered in Essay
Eight Part One.]

Again, it could be argued that this seriously misconstrues the
NON; but we have already seen that
events and processes, which dialecticians regard as eminently developmental, do
not in fact develop; indeed, they go backwards.

So, until DM-theorists actually tell us what is and what is not
'genuinely developmental' (and/or what is or is not in fact a correct example of the NON
at work), the above objections must stand as counter-instances with as much
right to be such
as the (very few) instances to which dialecticians themselves appeal to
illustrate this 'Law'. If these counter-examples are defective, then those that DM-fans regularly use are, too.

What this shows is that this 'Law' is not just the
scrag-end of a piss poor theory, but that as an account of the natural world
(and much else besides) it is a definite NON-starter.

Finally, as noted in
Essay Two, with respect to each of
these
'Laws', DM-theorists have been quite
happy to derive Superscientific theses from a handful of
obscure words -- only in this case, such Supertruths have been
obtained from badly garbled less than half-formed ideas and seriouslybotched
'thought experiments'.

01.April 2011: Since
writing this material, I have obtained a copy of Levy (1937), which is
in parts a sophisticated defence of classical DM. Indeed, this book contains
what is perhaps the most intelligent defence of the 'dialectical outlook'
(applied to the physical sciences) that I have so far read.
I will add
several comments on this book at a later date.

Recently, an American comrade was highly critical of passages
like this (i.e., those about metals (etc.) melting slowly). Readers can access
his criticisms, and my reply, here.
Earlier, another comrade raised similar concerns. What he had to say, and my
response, can be read
here.

A few years back, a UK
comrade also raised
several legitimate points about glass, arguing (at first) that it is a
liquid, not a solid. In which case, he claimed that the assertions advanced in the main body of this Essay (that this
particular phase
transition is slow, not rapid) are incorrect.

However, scientists aren't quite so sure about glass. Here is what one online source tells us about
it:

"It is sometimes
said that glass in very old churches is thicker at the bottom than at the top
because glass is a liquid, and so over several centuries it has flowed towards
the bottom. This is not true. In Mediaeval times panes of glass were often
made by the Crown glass process. A lump of molten glass was rolled, blown,
expanded, flattened and finally spun into a disc before being cut into panes.
The sheets were thicker towards the edge of the disc and were usually installed
with the heavier side at the bottom. Other techniques of forming glass panes
have been used but it is only the relatively recent float glass processes which
have produced good quality flat sheets of glass.

"To answer the
question 'Is glass liquid or solid?" we have to understand its thermodynamic and
material properties.'...

"Some
people claim that glass is actually a supercooled liquid because there is no
first order phase transition as it cools. In fact, there is a
second order transition between the supercooled liquid state and the
glass state, so a distinction can still be drawn. The transition is not as
dramatic as the phase change that takes you from liquid to crystalline solids.
There is no discontinuous change of density and no latent heat of fusion. The
transition can be detected as a marked change in the thermal expansivity and
heat capacity of the material....

[The author of
this article now goes into considerable detail, which I won't quote -- RL]

"There is no
clear answer to the question 'Is glass solid or liquid?'. In terms of molecular
dynamics and thermodynamics it is possible to justify various different views
that it is a highly viscous liquid, an amorphous solid, or simply that glass is
another state of matter which is neither liquid nor solid. The difference is
semantic. In terms of its material properties we can do little better.
There is no clear definition of the distinction between solids and highly
viscous liquids. All such phases or states of matter are idealisations of real
material properties. Nevertheless, from a more common sense point of view,
glass should be considered a solid since it is rigid according to everyday
experience. The use of the term 'supercooled liquid' to describe glass
still persists, but is considered by many to be an unfortunate misnomer that
should be avoided. In any case, claims that glass panes in old windows have
deformed due to glass flow have never been substantiated. Examples of Roman
glassware and calculations based on measurements of glass visco-properties
indicate that these claims can't be true. The observed features are more
easily explained as a result of the imperfect methods used to make glass window
panes before the float glass process was invented...." [Quoted from
here. Bold emphasis alone added. Accessed 10/11/08. Quotation marks altered
to conform to the conventions adopted at this site. Some links also added.]

"Glass is an amorphous form
of matter. You may have heard different explanations about
whether glass should be classified as a solid or as a
liquid. Here is a look at the modern answer to this question
and the explanation behind it.

"Is
Glass a Liquid?

"Consider the characteristics
of liquids and solids. Liquids have a definite volume, but
they take the shape of their container. A solid has a
fixed shape as well as fixed volume. So, for glass to be a
liquid it would need to be able to change its shape or flow.
Does glass flow? No, it does not!

"Probably the idea that glass
is a liquid came from observing old window glass, which is
thicker at the bottom than at the top. This gives the
appearance that gravity may have caused the glass to slowly
flow.

"However, glass does not
flow over time! Older glass has variations in thickness
because of the way that it was made. Glass that was blown
will lack uniformity because the air bubble used to thin out
the glass does not expand evenly through the initial glass
ball. Glass that was spun when hot also lacks uniform
thickness because the initial glass ball is not a perfect
sphere and does not rotate with perfect precision. Glass the
was poured when molten is thicker at one end and thinner at
the other because the glass started to cool during the
pouring process. It makes sense that the thicker glass would
either form at the bottom of a plate or would be oriented
this way, in order to make the glass as stable as possible.

"Modern glass is produced in
such a way that has even thickness. When you look at modern
glass windows, you never see the glass become thicker at the
bottom. It is possible to measure any change in the
thickness of the glass using laser techniques; such changes
have not been observed....

"Although
glass does not flow like a liquid, it
never attains a crystalline structure
that many people associate with a solid.
However, you know of many solids that
are not crystalline! Examples include a
block of wood, a piece of coal and a
brick. Most glass consists of silicon
dioxide, which actually does form a
crystal under the right conditions. You
know this crystal as quartz.

"Physics Definition of Glass

"In
physics, a glass is defined to be any
solid that is formed by rapid melt
quenching. Therefore, glass is a
solid by definition.

"Why Would Glass Be a Liquid?

"Glass
lacks a first order phase transition,
which means it does not have a volume,
entropy and enthalpy throughout the
glass transition range. This sets glass
apart from typical solids, such that it
resembles a liquid in this respect.
The atomic structure of glass is similar
to that of a supercooled liquid. Glass
behaves as a solid when it is cooled
below its glass transition temperature.
In both glass and crystal the
translational and rotational motion is
fixed. A vibrational degree of freedom
remains." [Quoted from
here. Accessed 07/09/2012. Bold
emphases added.]

In that case, according to the criteria we ordinarily apply to
other substances, glass is a solid, and when heated it loses its 'solid'
properties gradually, and non-"nodally".

"In the scientific sense the term glass is often extended to all amorphous solids (and
melts that easily form amorphous solids), including plastics, resins, or other
silica-free amorphous solids....

"Glass
is generally classed as an amorphous solid rather than a liquid. Glass
displays all the mechanical properties of a solid. The notion that glass flows
to an appreciable extent over extended periods of time is not supported by
empirical research or theoretical analysis. From a more commonsense point of
view, glass should be considered a solid since it is rigid according to everyday
experience." [Quoted from
here. Bold
emphasis alone added. Accessed 10/11/08. This Wikipedia page has changed
considerably since it was first accessed, although none of the above substantive
points seem to have been altered.]

"'It surprises most people that we still don't
understand this,' said David R. Reichman, a professor of chemistry at Columbia,
who takes yet another approach to the glass problem. 'We don't understand why
glass should be a solid and how it forms.'...

"Scientists are slowly accumulating more clues. A
few years ago, experiments and computer simulations revealed something
unexpected: as molten glass cools, the molecules do not slow down uniformly.
Some areas jam rigid first while in other regions the molecules continue to
skitter around in a liquid-like fashion. More strangely, the fast-moving regions
look no different from the slow-moving ones....

"For scientists, glass is not just the glass of
windows and jars, made of silica, sodium carbonate and calcium oxide. Rather, a
glass is any solid in which the molecules are jumbled randomly. Many plastics
like polycarbonate are glasses, as are many ceramics....

"In freezing to a conventional solid, a liquid
undergoes a so-called phase transition; the molecules line up next to and on top
of one another in a simple, neat crystal pattern. When a liquid solidifies into
a glass, this organized stacking is nowhere to be found. Instead, the molecules
just move slower and slower and slower, until they are effectively not moving at
all, trapped in a strange state between liquid and solid.

"The glass transition differs from a usual phase
transition in several other key ways. Energy, what is called
latent heat,
is released when water molecules line up into ice. There is no latent heat in
the formation of glass.

"The glass transition does not occur at a single,
well-defined temperature; the slower the cooling, the lower the transition
temperature. Even the definition of glass is arbitrary -- basically a rate of
flow so slow that it is too boring and time-consuming to watch. The final
structure of the glass also depends on how slowly it has been cooled." [New
York Times, 29/07/08. Accessed 10/11/08. Bold emphases added. Quotation
marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site.]

"Glass is an amorphous solid. A material is
amorphous when it has no long-range order, that is, when there is no regularity
in the arrangement of its molecular constituents on a scale larger than a few
times the size of these groups. [...] A solid is a rigid material; it does not
flow when it is subjected to moderate forces [...]." [Doremus (1994), p.1.]

"Glass includes all materials which are
structurally similar to a liquid. However, under ambient temperature they react
to the impact of force with elastic deformation and therefore have to be
considered as solids." [Pfaender (1996), p.17.]

"Amorphous substances, like crystalline solids, are usually characterized by
certain areas of short-range order. [...] A long-range order,
as in crystals, does not exist in amorphous substances. The designations
'amorphous' and 'noncrystalline' describe the same fact. [...]

"Glasses are noncrystalline or amorphous substances. Nevertheless, the term
vitreous state is restricted to (i) solids obtained from melts, or (ii) solids
produced by other methods and obtained in a compact form or as thin coherent
films [...].

"Glasses have numerous properties in common with crystalline solids, such as
hardness and elasticity of shape [...]. The term 'amorphous solid state' has a
more comprehensive meaning broader than that of the 'vitreous state'. All
glasses are amorphous, but not all amorphous substances are glasses." [Feltz
(1993), pp.7-8. Italic emphases in the original.]

"As kinetically frozen forms of liquid, glasses
are characterized by a complete lack of long-range crystalline order and are the
most structurally disordered types of solid known." [Jeanloz and Williams
(1991), p.659.]

Several more quotations along the same lines can be found at the
above link (where a simple test to decide whether or not a substance is solid or
liquid is outlined (in the Appendix at the end)). [However, I haven't yet been able to
check the above quotations or the references.]

And, here is what we find in a recent article from Science
Daily:

"Scientists fully understand the
process of water turning to ice. As the temperature cools, the
movement of the water molecules slows. At 32oF, the molecules
form crystal lattices, solidifying into ice. In contrast, the
molecules of glasses do not crystallize. The movement of the
glass molecules slows as temperature cools, but they never lock
into crystal patterns. Instead, they jumble up and gradually
become glassier, or more viscous. No one understands exactly
why." [Science
Daily, 13/08/07. Bold emphasis added.]

So, I wasn't wrong to call glass a solid, or allege that the
phase change here is slow, or "gradual", and not at all "nodal".

And, on the so-called "Glass Transition", Wikipedia had this to
say:

"The liquid-glass transition (or glass
transition for short) is the reversible transition in amorphous
materials (or in amorphous regions within semicrystalline
materials) from a hard and relatively brittle state into a molten or
rubber-like state. An amorphous solid that exhibits a glass
transition is called a glass.
Supercooling a viscous liquid
into the glass state is called vitrification,
from the Latin vitreum, 'glass' via French vitrifier.

"Despite the massive change in the physical
properties of a material through its glass transition, the
transition is not itself a phase transition
of any kind....

"The glass transition of a liquid to a
solid-like state may occur with either cooling or compression. The transition
comprises a smooth increase in the viscosity of a material by as much as 17 orders of magnitude
without any pronounced change in material structure." [Quoted from
here;
accessed 05/11/11. Bold emphases alone added. Quotation marks altered to conform
to the conventions adopted at this site.]

Another source gives several examples of amorphous materials:

"Amorphous materials are ubiquitous in
natural and engineered systems. Granularfault gouge
in earthquakes faults, thin film lubricants, and bulk metallic glasses are
seemingly disparate systems which are similar in that they possess an amorphous
structure. Colloids, emulsions, window glass, dense polymers, and even
biological tissues are other examples.

So, and once again, not all state of
matter/phase changes are "nodal". The same points can be made with respect to
other so-called "amorphous
solids".

"Amorphous materials are ubiquitous in
natural and engineered systems. Granularfault gouge
in earthquakes faults, thin film lubricants, and bulk metallic glasses are
seemingly disparate systems which are similar in that they possess an amorphous
structure. Colloids, emulsions, window glass, dense polymers, and even
biological tissues are other examples.

"Melting Point: A crystalline solid
has a sharp melting point, i.e., it changes into liquid state at a definite
temperature. On the contrary an amorphous solid does not have a sharp melting
point. For example, when glass is heated, it softens and then starts flowing
without undergoing any abrupt or sharp change from solid to liquid state...."
[Quoted from
here; accessed 20/02/2015. Bold emphasis added.]

"In an amorphous solid, the
local environment, including both the distances to neighbouring units and the
numbers of neighbours, varies throughout the material. Different amounts of
thermal energy are needed to overcome these different interactions.
Consequently, amorphous solids tend to soften slowly over a wide temperature
range rather than having a well-defined melting point like a crystalline solid."
[Quoted from
here; accessed 03/03/2015. Spelling altered to UK English. Bold emphasis
added.]

To be sure, much of this was unknown in Engels's day -- but he surely
can't have been unaware of the fact that glass melts slowly. Why then did he
"foist" this 'Law' on the facts?

It could be objected (and has been objected,
here) that Engels is quite specific; the First 'Law' links the addition or
subtraction of matter and/or energy to changes in quality in the natural world,
but not in relation to social development:

"The law of the transformation of quantity into
quality and vice versa. For our purpose, we could express this by
saying that in nature, in a manner exactly fixed for each individual
case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or
subtraction of matter or motion (so-called energy).

"All
qualitative differences in nature rest on differences of chemical
composition or on different quantities or forms of motion (energy) or, as is
almost always the case, on both. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of
a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without
quantitative alteration of the body concerned. In this form, therefore, Hegel's
mysterious principle appears not only quite rational but even rather obvious." [Engels
(1954), p.63. Bold emphases alone added.]

Maybe so, but a few pages later he added this:

"In biology, as in the history of human
society, the same law holds good at every step, but we prefer to dwell here
on examples from the exact sciences, since here the quantities are accurately
measurable and traceable." [Ibid.,
p.68. Bold emphasis added.]

Here, he links "the same law" with social change. He then
says this:

"But to have formulated for the first time in its
universally valid form a general law of development of nature, society, and
thought, will always remain an act of historic importance." [Ibid.,
p.68. Bold emphasis added.]

So, the "same law" applies universally to the
"development
of nature, society, and thought".

Not much wiggle room there, one feels.

It could be argued that Engels does not
specifically apply this Law in its 'addition of matter and motion' form to
social change, and no wonder; the latter sort of change can't be reduced to
such crude formulations.

Or, so it could be maintained.

But, if that is so, it can't be the "same
law", nor could it be completely general. Notice that in the same section of
DN, Engels refers us back to the
'matter and motion' formulation of this 'Law':

"The law of the transformation of quantity into
quality and vice versa. For our purpose, we could express this by
saying that in nature, in a manner exactly fixed for each individual
case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or
subtraction of matter or motion (so-called energy).

"All
qualitative differences in nature rest on differences of chemical
composition or on different quantities or forms of motion (energy) or, as is
almost always the case, on both. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of
a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without
quantitative alteration of the body concerned. In this form, therefore, Hegel's
mysterious principle appears not only quite rational but even rather obvious." [Ibid.,
p.63. Bold emphases alone added.]

And, he then says:

"In biology, as in the history of human
society, the same law holds good at every step, but we prefer to dwell here
on examples from the exact sciences, since here the quantities are accurately
measurable and traceable." [Ibid.,
p.68. Bold emphasis added.]

So, and once more, Engels specifically
tells us that this is the "same law"; hence the 'matter and motion' protocols must apply
here, too.

It could be objected that these comments appear
in notebooks, so the precise formulation should not be relied upon too
much.

However, when we read
AD, a published
work, we see Engels himself connecting this 'Law' to social change:

"In proof of this law we might have cited
hundreds of other similar facts from nature as well as from human society. Thus,
for example, the whole of Part IV of Marx's Capital -- production of
relative surplus-value -- deals, in the field of co-operation, division of
labour and manufacture, machinery and modern industry, with innumerable cases in
which quantitative change alters the quality, and also qualitative change
alters the quantity, of the things under consideration; in which therefore, to
use the expression so hated by Herr Dühring, quantity is transformed into
quality and vice versa. As for example the fact that the co-operation of a
number of people, the fusion of many forces into one single force, creates, to
use Marx's phrase, a 'new power', which is essentially different from the sum of
its separate forces." [Engels
(1972), p.160. Bold emphasis alone added.
Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site.]

Here, this 'Law' is applied to social change, and
in its 'addition of matter and motion' form, too -- for Engels specifically refers
to the:

"[C]o-operation of a number of people, the fusion
of many forces into one single force, creates, to use Marx's phrase, a 'new
power', which is essentially different from the sum of its separate forces." [Ibid.]

And human beings are, plainly, made of matter, and many have been
known to move.

He then adds:

"In
conclusion we shall call one more witness for the transformation of quantity
into quality, namely -- Napoleon. He describes the combat between the French
cavalry, who were bad riders but disciplined, and the Mamelukes, who were
undoubtedly the best horsemen of their time for single combat, but lacked
discipline, as follows:

"'Two Mamelukes were undoubtedly more than a
match for three Frenchmen; 100 Mamelukes were equal to 100 Frenchmen; 300
Frenchmen could generally beat 300 Mamelukes, and 1,000 Frenchmen invariably
defeated 1,500 Mamelukes.'

"Just as with Marx a definite, though varying,
minimum sum of exchange-values was necessary to make possible its transformation
into capital, so with Napoleon a detachment of cavalry had to be of a definite
minimum number in order to make it possible for the force of discipline,
embodied in closed order and planned utilisation, to manifest itself and rise
superior even to greater numbers of irregular cavalry, in spite of the
latter being better mounted, more dexterous horsemen and fighters, and at least
as brave as the former. But what does this prove as against Herr Dühring? Was
not Napoleon miserably vanquished in his conflict with Europe? Did he not suffer
defeat after defeat? And why? Solely in consequence of having introduced the
confused, hazy Hegelian notion into cavalry tactics!" [Ibid.,
pp.163-64. Bold emphasis added. Quotation marks altered to conform to the
conventions adopted at this site.]

Here, Engels again tells us this 'Law' operates in the
same way, and that an increase in the number of disciplined soldiers involved (which
is manifestly an increase in matter) changes their quality. So, no wonder he
called this a "general law", and "the same law" applying to the
"development
of nature, society, and thought".

It could now be objected that this is ridiculous,
since Engels knew that complex social changes can't be reduced in such a crude
manner to 'matter and motion'. But, as we will see throughout this Essay,
Engels is so confused about such things this isn't a safe inference to make.
This is quite apart from the fact that we have yet to see the proof that such a
reduction can't be made. Short of that, DM-fans will have to impose this
particular belief on nature (i.e., the idea that such a reduction can't be made), despite the fact that
this is something they tell us they never do.

[Incidentally, the above comment doesn't make any concessions to
reductionism, it merely questions, once again, DM-fans' consistency.]

Hence, all the above objections fail.

01a.
It could be argued that balding is a classic example of the operation of this
law in that, like the 'heap of sand' paradox, it expresses a
sorites
problem. So, we have a gradual process as one hair is lost each time; hence, at
some point, the individual concerned suddenly becomes bald. I have neutralised
this argument here.

1.
"Not so!" I hear some readers exclaim. But,
as we will see, the nature
of these "nodal points" is left entirely obscure by dialecticians. Until
they clarify what they mean by this concept, not even they will know whether
or not the claims made in the main body of this Essay are accurate.

To be sure, the picture
nature presents us with in this regard is highly complex, which is one of the
reasons why Engels's 'Laws' can't possibly capture its complexity,
regardless of the other serious flaws they contain.

However, it is worth emphasising at this point that the nature of
state of
matter transitions is not being questioned in this Essay, only whether all of them are sudden/"nodal".

Consequently, either the "nodal" aspect of
the First 'Law' is defective, or it only works in some cases, not others -- in
which case, it can't be a law.

In fact, Physicists tell us that what they
call "second-order" Phase Transitions can proceed smoothly. As
one online source says:

"Second-orderphase transitions, on the other hand, proceed smoothly. The old phase transforms
itself into the new phase in a continuous manner."

[See also Note 9
-- where we will find that "first order" phase changes aren't all that straight-forward, either.]

Moreover, under certain
conditions
it is possible to by-pass phase transformations altogether. [More on that later.]

Furthermore, it is important to distinguish between states of
matter, and phases:

"Phases are sometimes confused with states of matter, but
there are significant differences. States of matter refers to the differences
between gases, liquids, solids, etc. If there are two regions in a chemical
system that are in different states of matter, then they must be different
phases. However, the reverse is not true -- a system can have multiple phases
which are in equilibrium with each other and also in the same state of matter.
For example, diamond and
graphite
are both solids but they are different phases, even though their composition may
be identical. A system with oil and water at room temperature will be two
different phases of differing composition, but both will be the liquid state of
matter." [Wikipedia.]

On another page we find the following:

"States of matter are sometimes confused withphases. This is likely due to the fact that in many
example systems, the familiar phase transitions are also transformations of the
state of matter. In the example of water, the phases of ice, liquid water, and
water vapour are commonly recognized. The common phase transitions observed in a
one component system containing only water aremelting/solidification(liquid/solid),evaporation/condensation(liquid/gas) andsublimation/deposition(solid/gas).

"Transitions between different states of matter
of the same chemical component are necessarily a phase transformation, but not
all phase transformations involve a change in the state of matter. For example,
there are 14 different forms of ice, all of which are the solid state of matter.
When one form of ice transforms into another, the crystal structure, density,
and a number of physical properties change, but it remains a solid." [Wikipedia.
Bold emphasis added.]

So, here we have a phase change while the supposed "quality"
remains the same!

It isn't easy to see how this can be made consistent with the
First 'Law'.

And, as this Wikipedia article goes on to say:

"In general, two different states of a system are
in different phases if there is an abrupt change in their physical properties
while transforming from one state to the other. Conversely, two states are in
the same phase if they can be transformed into one another without any abrupt
changes." [Wikipedia.
Bold emphasis added.]

So, even here, some "qualitative" changes are non-"nodal".

Indeed, the situation is even more complicated still:

"In the
diagram, the phase boundary between liquid and gas does not continue
indefinitely. Instead, it terminates at a point on the phase diagram called the
critical point. At
temperatures and pressure above the critical point, the physical property
differences that differentiate the liquid phase from the gas phase become less
defined. This reflects the fact that, at extremely high temperatures and
pressures, the liquid and gaseous phases become indistinguishable. In water,
the critical point occurs at around 647K (374°C or 705°F) and
22.064 MPa." [Wikipedia.
Bold emphasis added.]

"In physical chemistry,
thermodynamics,
chemistry and condensed matter physics,
a critical point, also called a critical state, specifies the
conditions (temperature, pressure) at which the liquid state of the matter
ceases to exist. As a liquid is heated, its density decreases while the pressure
and density of the vapour being formed increases. The liquid and vapour
densities become closer and closer to each other until the critical temperature
is reached where the two densities are equal and the liquid-gas line or phase
boundary disappears. Additionally, as the equilibrium between liquid and gas
approaches the critical point, heat of vaporization
approaches zero, becoming zero at and beyond the critical point. More generally,
the critical point is the point of termination of a phase equilibrium
curve, which separates two distinct phases. At this point, the phases are no
longer distinguishable." [Wikipedia.
Bold emphasis added. Spelling changed to conform to UK English.]

The above page has been altered since I originally consulted it.However, what is had to say is conformed by
this specialist site:

"At T6
the two phases cannot be distinguished any more. This point in the p-T-diagram
is called the critical point. The distinction between gas and liquid
cannot be made any more. From the critical point on we call both phases
together the liquid phase in contrast to the solid phase." [Quoted
from
here; accessed 23/02/2015. Bold emphases alone added.]

This can only mean that qualitative differences between the
liquid and gaseous phases of water are energy-neutral beyond this "critical point",
contradicting Engels.

Here is what a standard Physical Chemistry textbook had to say:

"[W]e must distinguish the
thermodynamic description of a phase transition and the rate at which the
transition occurs. A transition that is predicted from thermodynamics to be
spontaneous may occur too slowly to be significant in practice. For instance, at
normal temperatures and pressures the
molar
Gibbs energy of graphite is lower than that of diamond, so there is a
thermodynamic tendency for diamond to change into graphite. However, for this
transformation to take place, the C[arbon] atoms must change their locations,
which is an immeasurably slow process in a solid except at high temperatures."
[Atkins and de Paula (2006), p.118. Bold emphases added.]

In that case, nature (i.e., the real material world,
not the Ideal world that Hegel and Engels dreamt up) is far more complex than
this Mickey Mouse 'Law' would have
us believe.

Once more, not every change is "nodal".

Indeed, scientists in the USA recently reported they had
discovered a new state of matter, which while being solid, appears to behave
like a liquid (hence, here we would have a change of quality with no change in quantity):

"In the 15 January 2004 issue of the journal
Nature, two physicists from Penn State University will announce their
discovery of a new phase of matter, a 'supersolid' form of
helium-4
with the extraordinary frictionless-flow properties of a superfluid. 'We
discovered that solid helium-4 appears to behave like a superfluid when it is so
cold that the laws of quantum mechanics govern its behaviour,' says
Moses
H. W. Chan, Evan Pugh Professor of Physics at Penn State. 'We apparently
have observed, for the first time, a solid material with the characteristics of
a superfluid.'

"'The possible discovery of a new phase of
matter, a supersolid, is exciting and, if confirmed, would be a significant
advance,' comments John Beamish, professor of physics at the University of
Alberta and the author of a review of Chan's discovery published in the 'News
and Views' section of Nature. 'If the behaviour is confirmed, there are
enough questions to be answered about the nature and properties of supersolid
helium to keep
both experimentalists and theorists busy for a long time.'...

"'Something very unusual occurred when the
temperature dropped to one-tenth of a degree above
absolute
zero,' Chan says. 'The oscillation rate suddenly became slightly more rapid,
as if some of the helium had disappeared.' However, Chan and Kim were able to
confirm that the helium atoms had not leaked out of the experimental capsule
because its rate of oscillation returned to normal after they warmed the capsule
above one-tenth of a degree above absolute zero. So they concluded that the
solid helium-4 probably had acquired the properties of a superfluid when the
conditions were more extreme....

"If Chan's experiment is replicated, it would
confirm that all three states of matter can enter into the "super" state, known
as a
Bose-Einstein condensation, in which all the particles have condensed into
the same quantum-mechanical state. The existence of superfluid and 'supervapor'
had previously been proven, but theorists had continued to debate about whether
a supersolid was even possible. 'One of the most intriguing predictions of the
theory of quantum mechanics is the possibility of superfluid behaviour in a
solid-phase material, and now we may have observed this behaviour for the first
time,' Chan says." [Science
Daily, 15/01/2004. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions
adopted at this site; spelling changed to conform to UK English. Added,
February, 2015; It should be pointed out that further work has thrown some of
the above into doubt, and
work is
continuing to prove the existence of supersolids.]

Sure, the above change is sudden (whoever denied that some
changes were?), but, while that particular aspect of the First 'Law' has been
partially confirmed
in this case, the
main part (where Engels said it was impossible to alter the quality of an
object/process without the addition or subtraction of matter or energy) has
been refuted by the discovery of such
superfluids/supervapors, and now by these
supersolids,
and the substance
in question remained Helium either side of the change.

Even so, it is entirely unclear whether the term "quality" -- as it is
used by dialecticians -- means the same as "state
of matter" or "phase".
Either way, the substance involved, whether it is in a different phase or state,
remains the same substance. So, in that sense, if "quality" is defined in terms of
the nature of substances (as was the case with Hegel and
Aristotle
-- on that, see here), it is clear that even
though there are phase/state of matter changes, they can't count as qualitative changes
of the right sort,
since these substances remain the same throughout. Hence, howsoever
slowly or quickly iron melts or solidifies, for example, it remains iron.

Moreover, as noted above, until we are told the exact length of a dialectical "node", the
First 'Law' can't be considered anything other than a hopelessly vague and/or
subjective rule-of-thumb -- at best. If
"nodal" points are several minutes long, then many of the examples dialecticians
give would cease to be "nodal". On the other hand, if they last, say, a
few nanoseconds, perhaps none at all would survive. A case of survival of the
quickest, one presumes.

However, the bemused reader can search
through
DM-texts till the cows next evolve for any hint of clarity or precision in this
regard; indeed, DM has been so amateurishly
constructed
that this point will not even have occurred to most DM-fans. And, even now (after
reading this), they will hand-wave it aside as a pedantic irrelevance -- so
sloppy have their thought processes become. [On 'pedantry', see
here.]

We can
be thankful that scientists are not so slap-dash; can you image a Physicist
waving aside as irrelevant the timing or duration of, say, certain nuclear reactions?

One
imagines that if ever the Olympics were run by such cavalier dialecticians,
everyone would get Gold on the grounds that precise timing is a 'pedantic irrelevance'.

In
that case, it is to be hoped that DM-fans are never given the opportunity to run a train service -- and are allowed nowhere near a demolition
site.

1a. For
example, Ghiselin (1975), and Hull (1976, 1988). On this, see
here.

1b. Of course, it could be objected that organisms do in fact 'contradict' one
another when, for example, they compete for scarce resources, etc. Contradictions
thus apply to the
'struggle' for survival among
conspecifics.
Or so it might be argued.

But, even
if this were a correct way of picturing 'dialectical contradictions', there
still do not appear to be any that are internal to particular organisms
which motivate evolutionary change in those organisms.

And, this is not just because evolution works
on populations, not individuals. It is because changes to organisms are both
internally- and externally-induced. As we will
see,
mutations,
of course, can be internally-generated (as copying 'errors', etc.), but
many are not; they are externally-motivated by radiation, viral and/or chemical agents. Indeed, some organisms even share
mutations (for example,
bacteria). What kind of 'contradiction' is that?

In addition, populations of organisms change
in response to environmental pressure (which, so we are told, selects out
unfavourable variations). This is clearly an external constraint.

As we shall also see, depicting any of these as 'contradictions' --
howsoever they are caused -- is seriously confused. [This topic is discussed in
more detail in Essay
Eight Parts One,
Two, and
Three.]

[On this topic in general, see Ridley (2004); on the 'external'
and 'internal' causes of speciation, see Coyne and Orr (2004).]

Notwithstanding all this, it isn't easy to
see how conspecific competition could be 'contradictory'. Not
only do many animals and plants cooperate
(on this see
Kropotkin
(1939), and Ryan (2002)), those that compete
with
heterospecifics do not in general struggle against members of their own species.
So, for example, if a herd of deer is running away from a predator, and the
fastest individuals escape/survive, no one imagines that they do this by
struggling with those that didn't/can't -- for example, by deliberately hindering or tripping fellow
conspecifics. Of course, there are many examples of organisms that do compete
conspecifically, but there are just as many (perhaps more) that do not. So, if
this 'Law' applies here, it does so only fitfully. Once more, calling this sort of competition a
"contradiction" would be a
serious error.

Moreover, according to the
Dialectical Classics, objects and
processes change because of (1) A "struggle" between "opposites", and
because (2) Those "opposites" change into "one another". But,
competing conspecifics or heterospecifics manifestly do not change into one
another as a result of this alleged 'contradiction', or even this 'struggle'. A
well-fed lion does not, for example, change into a starving lioness, nor yet a
hungry hyena, which it would have to do if the
dialectical classics are to be
believed (i.e.,
when they tell us that that objects and processes change into that with
which they 'struggle'). Any who are tempted to question this inference are invited to read the
many passages I have quoted from the
DM-classics that tell us precisely this. [Follow the above link.]

Concerning animal cooperation, here is an amazing
video of a Hippopotamus rescuing a Wildebeest from the jaws of a Crocodile:

Video Eight: Hippo Refutes Hegel?

[Unfortunately, The Original Film
Is No Longer Available, So I Have Used A Related Video.]

Where is the 'contradiction' here?
Some might think that the Hippo 'contradicted' the Crocodile, but if you watch
carefully, the former says nothing at all to the latter, and the Hippo doesn't turn into the
Crocodile, nor vice versa -- as
we
were told should happen to objects
and processes in nature that "struggle" with one another, 'dialectically'.

Furthermore, any who think that
altruistic
or cooperative behaviour in animals and plants can be explained along neo-Darwinian
lines, perhaps as a consequence of the 'Theory
of Inclusive Fitness', would do well to read Stove (1994a, 1994b) -- the latter has just been re-issued as Stove (2006) --, as well as
Franklin (1997), which a response to Blackburn (1994) --, and then think
again. [I have discussed this in more detail in Essay Thirteen
Part Three.]

[For those unfamiliar with work of
David Stove,
it is worth adding that up until his death in 1994 he was an avowed atheist.
He had also been a communist in his youth. He believed that Darwin's theory was the best explanation we have for
the origin of the species, but he held that it wasn't itself without serious
flaws,
especially in relation to human evolution. Later in life he turned
into a
right-wing conservative who
propounded many offensive views, especially
about race and about women;
but that should no more stop us reading his critique of neo-Darwinism
than dialecticians allow Hegel's right-wing views prevent them from reading his
'Logic'.]

Update, August 2011: The National
Geographic Wild Channel has just shown a documentary about a lioness protecting a new born Wildebeest from
attacking Hyenas. Precious little 'contradicting' going on in this encounter,
either. Here is
a brief trailer of that film:

Video Nine: Spot The 'Contradiction'

And,
here is film of another lioness adopting an
Oryx
calf, apparently one of several that year:

Video Ten: Better Luck This Time...

Update, April 2013: The BBC has
a video of a female goat that has adopted two (sheep) lambs. (Not much
'contradicting' noticeable here, either.)

And here is a brief picture report from The Guardian:

"Kimon, an eight-year-old pet female long-tailed
monkey, treats a kitten as her baby in Bintan Island, Indonesia." [Quoted from
here.]

As I have repeatedly said: nature is far too complex to squeeze
into a DM-boot it won't fit.

1c. It is worth noting the response of one comrade (here),
who offered what amounts to a subjectivist
counter-argument, along the following lines:

"She [i.e., Rosa L] also does not understand that
thousands of years are actually very short periods of time, geologically
speaking."

Which fact is not, of course, something that
evolution itself understands, possessing neither a memory nor a working
knowledge of Geology. Hence, the processes involved clearly do not know when
something is short or long, nor do they know when to speed up just to make sure
they 'obey' this 'Law'. [The point of that rather odd remark will become clear
presently.]

As should seem plain, a comparison like this (with all of
geological time) depends on a subjective
view of events, one that we as observers of the whole process form of the course of evolution
and the development of the Earth. The processes themselves have no appreciation
of the time periods involved. In that case,
to describe these "nodal" points as either "long" or "short" would be
to do so from
our perspective. From the 'perspective' of the organisms involved,
tens of thousands of years wouldn't be a short time. So, for amateur
dialectical palaeontologists to describe these "nodal" episodes as
either
"long" or "short" would be no less subjective.

It could be argued that a ten-, or twenty-thousand year period
is short when compared with the hundreds of millions of years that
organisms have been evolving; so this is not even remotely
subjective.

Of course, the point is that nature itself can't
take this view -- since, plainly, it isn't conscious! Human observers certainly make
comparisons of this sort, and as such these comparisons aren't
observer-independent -- hence, they aren't objective. [Of course, that depends on how "objective"
is understood.]

Again, exception could be taken to this
in that the above doesn't imply these comparisons aren't objective. That is
because these
time periods exist independently of human observers.

But, once more, comparisons don't exist in nature.
Without conscious beings to do the comparing, they would never be, or have been, made. So,
while the processes concerned certainly exist without human observers to record
them, this isn't true of the comparisons themselves. [Which
is the reason for those earlier, rather odd comments.]

Moreover, the phenomena themselves do not dictate
to us that we should, or must compare the rapid speciation of a certain organism with the
whole of geological time, no more than we would allow similar comparisons
to be made with anything else. So, for example, it certainly won't do for someone
sat in a restaurant,
say, who has been waiting several hours for their food to arrive
to be told that in comparison to the amount of time since the Pre-Cambrian
Period they have in fact been served rather quickly.

Such comparisons aren't forced on us by nature,
and that is why we can't just use them anywhere or anyhow we please, as that weak joke
sought to bring out. If we insist on drawing lines somewhere, that needs
justification of some sort. As far as I am aware, no such justification has been produced
by a single dialectician.

Anyway, why should we compare the speciation
underway in one population with all of geological time? If we
have to make comparisons, a more relevant one would seem be one drawn against the length of time that species
has been in existence, which may only be of the order of tens of thousands of years. In that case, the time period Gould envisaged
for a new bout of speciation would be relatively long (or, rather, it will not
always be relatively short), compared to the time period that the said species had been
around, making this "nodal" point quite
protracted, and
hence not really "nodal" at all.

There is
nothing in nature itself that tells us we have to slice things up
one way rather than another (although it might be possible to give some sort of a
rationale for one specific choice over an alternative, as was done, for
instance, in the previous paragraph). While development may or may not be
punctuated, geological time itself hasn't been punctuated for us, with objective periods
highlighted for our convenience. Certainly geologists have divided up the
past
into the familiar
geological
ages, but that in itself doesn't force any particular choice on
us when it comes to comparing the development of a certain species with the whole of
earth's history.

And we
should certainly resist slicing up the past just to make life easy for
dialecticians. Naturally, they can parse nature as they see fit,
but then that would merely highlight the subjectivism that we already know is
inherent in this 'upside-down' version of Hegelian Idealism.

In that case, and once more, the comparison of any of these alleged
"nodes" with all of geological time would be no less subjective.

Of course, all this sits rather awkwardly with
what Engels himself said 'leaps':

"With this
assurance Herr Dühring saves himself the trouble of saying anything further
about the origin of life, although it might reasonably have been expected that a
thinker who had traced the evolution of the world back to its self-equal state,
and is so much at home on other celestial bodies, would have known exactly
what's what also on this point. For the rest, however, the assurance he gives us
is only half right unless it is completed by the Hegelian nodal line of measure
relations which has already been mentioned. In spite of all gradualness, the
transition from one form of motion to another always remains a leap, a decisive
change. This is true of the transition from the mechanics of celestial
bodies to that of smaller masses on a particular celestial body; it is equally
true of the transition from the mechanics of masses to the mechanics of
molecules -- including the forms of motion investigated in physics proper: heat,
light, electricity, magnetism. In the same way, the transition from the physics
of molecules to the physics of atoms -- chemistry -- in turn involves a decided
leap; and this is even more clearly the case in the transition from ordinary
chemical action to the chemism of albumen which we call life. Then within
the sphere of life the leaps become ever more infrequent and imperceptible. --
Once again, therefore, it is Hegel who has to correct Herr Dühring." [Engels
(1976), pp.82-83. Bold emphasis added.]

"We have already
seen earlier, when discussing world schematism, that in connection with
this Hegelian nodal line of measure relations -- in which quantitative change
suddenly passes at certain points into qualitative transformation -- Herr
Dühring had a little accident: in a weak moment he himself recognised and made
use of this line. We gave there one of the best-known examples -- that of the
change of the aggregate states of water, which under normal atmospheric pressure
changes at 0°C from the liquid into the solid state, and at 100°C from the
liquid into the gaseous state, so that at both these turning-points the merely
quantitative change of temperature brings about a qualitative change in the
condition of the water." [Ibid.,
p.160. Bold emphasis added.]

It is hard to see how a 'qualitative' change that
took place in a geological time period lasting maybe ten thousand years can be
described as "sudden" (Engels's choice of word, not mine). How would
describing such a
change as "sudden" (when it takes place in a time period that long) be different from
imposing dialectics on the facts?

Alternatively, if it is claimed that this
'dialectical' re-description isn't
subjective, then dialecticians need to inform us of the objective criteria upon
which this piece of convenient temporal parsing has been based -- and
then show how nature could possibly have agreed to implement these post hoc
(after the event) criteria, and why it
failed to signpost them more clearly for our convenience.

And, it
would be interesting to see this subjective re-description applied to several
of the other examples DM-theorists regularly use to illustrate this 'Law'. To
that end, consider a man who went bald
over the space of, say, ten years. Because this time interval is short
compared to
all of
geological time, we could
count this
as a 'rapid' change, with a short "nodal" point. But,is
that sensible?

On the
other hand, and more reasonably, we would surely compare this example of follicular
deterioration with that man's
life up to that point. In that case, let us
assume this individual is, say, thirty when he finally became
follically-challenged, with the first signs appearing when he was
perhaps twenty.
Given these background details, his subsequent hairless condition can now be
seen as the result of slow
change and the alleged "nodal" point would have to be adjusted accordingly to
conform to this new
and more
reasonable perspective. Indeed, it would clearly be a rather lengthy "nodal"
point --, in which case, describing it as "nodal" would be about as accurate as describing a
tortoise as "fleet of foot", and Tony Blair as "honest,
straight-forward and true".

[However, as is pointed out
here, there
is in fact no "nodal" point in this case; there is no point at which someone who is not
bald becomes bald if they lose just one more hair. Naturally, a person's hair
could
fall out overnight, in which case, we would have a much clearer "nodal" point; but in the majority cases
baldness is progressive, not acute.]

Consider another example: what if a certain body of water
were heated up very rapidly (for example, because the heat source was immense --
say, from a nuclear explosion), and it went from water to steam in just a few
seconds; here, the "nodal" point involved would clearly be very short. Compare this
with the same body of water heated up very slowly (perhaps as a result of
long-term global warming), so that it evaporated gradually over the space of
several centuries, for the same input of energy. Clearly,
there would be no
"nodal" point at all in this case -- because, in this instance the water would never actually boil,
even though it would still evaporate.
Indeed, evaporation takes place all the time, right round the world as the
oceans re-cycle water into the atmosphere very
undialectically. Even
if there were a "nodal" point here, it would be protracted, not short.
Calling it "nodal" would therefore do violence to this word once again.

In that case, the duration of "nodal" points
themselves seem to change
from short to long, and back again (or, they disappear entirely), depending on the context
(or the example under consideration),
for the same energy budget. Even better, they appear to do this without the intervention of
a single 'internal contradiction'.

However, subjectivist conclusions like the one
that opened this Note are
of little use even to dialecticians, for if we are now meant to refer to the
entire geological period if we want to classify such "nodal" changes, then the massive
'qualitative' transition from single-celled organisms to present day flora and
fauna manifestly took place over a "nodal" point lasting several billion years. Given
that comparison, the phrase "nodal
point" must lose whatever connection it might once have had with reality (that
is, if
it ever had any), since it looks as if it can mean anything to anybody.

Someone might still complain that the above several billion
year-long "nodal" point isn't a single point at all. There are in
fact tens of thousands of small "nodal" points dotted along this entire
period, all illustrating dialectical change.

But, who
says? Where are the objective criteria that decide where "nodal" points
begin and end? Or, that help us identify and/or
count them? Or, that tell us which periods we are supposed to compare with which?
Or, even what the Dickens a "nodal" point
is to begin with!

So far, not
only have DM-fans not thought to define
(or even so much as loosely characterise) these all-important "nodal" points, they have signally failed to say how we can count them, distinguish
them, compare them or even ascertain their length. [On that, see
here.]

In Mickey Mouse Science
like this, it looks like it is sufficient to wave a loose and ill-defined
phrase about and fool oneself into thinking that this constitutes genuine scientific knowledge.

This
probably helps explain why there is (to my knowledge) not a single PhD thesis (in any
of the sciences) devoted to this aspect of DM, and which attempts to tighten-up
the loose phraseology of any of its 'Laws', or that confirms a single one with adequate evidence. Of course, there are any number of books
and articles produced by DM-fans (which are mostly highly repetitive, and which re-cycle
the same handful of examples year in, year out)
that offer a few hastily cobbled-together ideas on this topic, supported by a
smattering of secondary and/or specially-selected 'evidence'. Almost invariably
this 'evidence' is padded-out over a few paragraphs, or over a few pages.
[Compare that with the scores of pages of detailed evidence found in
standard scientific research papers and monographs. I have given several examples
of genuine science at work in
Note 10a0.]

Woods and
Grant (1995) is an excellent example of this genre. Even though
their display of 'evidence' is more protracted than is the norm with
DM-literature, it is still highly selective and
plainly
slanted to
fit this 'Law' --, rather than this 'Law' having been being derived from all the available evidence.
Indeed, they consider none of the obvious points raised in this Essay.

In their case, Cornforth's words seem rather apt:

"Marxism, therefore, seeks to base our ideas
of things on nothing but the actual investigation of them, arising from and
tested by experience and practice. It does not invent a 'system' as previous
philosophers have done, and then try to make everything fit into it…."
[Cornforth (1976), pp.14-15. Bold emphasis added.]

As now seems clear,
not one of these forays into sophomoric 'dialectical' science
would satisfy the requirements even of a first year undergraduate paper in
Chemistry, Physics or Biology. Can you imagine saying that about any
branch of the genuine sciences?

And, as
pointed out above, even
if Gould's alleged "nodal" points were as
subjectively short as they are said to be, during each one of them no individual
organism actually undergoes
speciation, since speciation applies to populations,
or possibly even to 'gene
pools', not individuals.

So, in this case, the alleged passing over of
"quantity into quality" attaches to no identifiable object in nature; hence the
First 'Law' doesn't apply, even
here:

"...[T]he transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa.
For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner
exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only
occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called
energy)…. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body
without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative
alteration of the body concerned." [Engels (1954),
p.63. Emphasis
added.]

"Change of form of motion is always a process
that takes place between at least two bodies, of which one loses a definite
quantity of motion of one quality (e.g. heat), while the other gains a
corresponding quantity of motion of another quality (mechanical motion,
electricity, chemical decomposition). Here, therefore, quantity and quality
mutually correspond to each other. So far it has not been found possible to
convert motion from one form to another inside a single isolated body." [Ibid.,
pp.63-64. Bold emphasis added.]

Naturally,
this sloppy
approach
to science allows dialecticians to imagine that Gould's hypothesis can be used to
'illustrate' their 'theory', but with no 'objective' criteria
or data to
back it up. Which, once again, shows that DM has been imposed on
nature --,
or rather, in this case, it has been foisted on Gould.

Finally, it is worth noting that Gould's theory
was introduced partly to help resolve a serious difficulty that Darwin's theory
has
itself faced from the beginning: the fact that there are still far too many gaps in the
fossil record.

[On this,
see Schwartz (1999);
cf., also
this and
this. In fact, since Schwartz's new theory of
origins is pointedly non-gradualist, it should appeal to DM-fans more than
Darwin's!]

Now,
without adopting a position on this (since it is outside my area of expertise), we
need to remember that Gould and Eldredge's theory is still just a theory.
It might not pan out;
most theories do not. [This allegation will be defended in
Essay Thirteen Part Two.] In which case, DM-fans would be unwise to pin all their hopes on it.

There is an excellent article on this
here, which stresses the relatively rapid changes that
Gould and Eldredge's theory postulates, but it also underlines the fact that
these changes are still gradual and not saltational (i.e., they are
non-"nodal"):

"Punctuated equilibrium is therefore mistakenly
thought to oppose the concept of gradualism,
when it is actually more appropriately understood as a form of
gradualism...." [Wikipedia, quoted from
here.]

Others might be tempted to appeal to what
one might call the 'statistical' defence, and claim that the application of
Engels's 'Law' to individual objects (or organisms) in evolution is yet another
example of 'formal thinking'. However, and on the contrary, Engels's Laws apply to averaged
(etc.) data sets. Or, so it could be maintained.

But, unless we can specify what it is that bears
the qualities that actually undergo change, this 'Law' (as stated by Engels
and Hegel) can gain no grip --, for, in that case,
there would be no "quality" of anything specific that would change because of the increase in some
other
unspecified "quantity".

The only way round this 'difficulty', it seems,
would be
to attribute a "quality" to some sort of 'collective individual', the population (or gene
pool) in question. But, as noted above, even here change is smooth, and
non-"nodal", and largely externally-motivated. In that case, this option is of no use to dialecticians.
[On this see, Coyne and Orr (2004).]

To be sure, we use statistical concepts to help
us understand nature, but that doesn't mean such measures are
'objective' --, any more than the
Prime Meridian (through Greenwich, in South London,
UK),
the Equator, or the Centre of Mass of the Galaxy are 'objective'.

2. A
clear example of "nodal revolutionism" can be found in Woods and Grant (1995),
pp.61-63, but this idea is widespread throughout the genre, as anyone
familiar with dialectics is well aware. See also Kuusinen (1961), p.89.

3. One benighted DM-soul tried to argue
that the increase in quantity here is in fact
time (alas, the site where this was argued is likely to close any day
soon), forgetting that unless time is energy, this response refutes
Engels's 'Law'. That is quite apart from the rather bizarre idea that
time is a quantity -- and that it can be added to anything!

Other examples of the same phenomena can be
found at countless sites on the internet devoted to optical illusions;
here,
for instance.

Indeed, the very same material object can change qualitatively if
its context and/or background is altered, so that no material change to that object
will have occurred, but it will have qualitatively changed. The black figures
below are all identical, but they look qualitatively different (and this could form
part of a moving image on a level surface, so the figures below could look bigger as they moved
into this shape -- or 'developed' --, and thus alter qualitatively with no input of energy):

Of course, some energy might be expended in the above
example, but that is not necessarily so. On that, see
here. Moreover, Engels was quite specific;
energy had to be added to a system or body; however, in this instance
that plainly isn't the case. On that, see
here.

Lest someone be tempted
to
argue that these are not 'real' objects, but 'mental' entities, it is worth
recalling what Engels had to say:

"Dialectics,
however, is nothing more than the science of the general laws of motion and
development of nature, human society and thought." [Engels
(1976) p.180. Bold emphasis added.]

Necker cubes are at least objects of thought, and
so should be subject to this 'Law'.

"In chemistrytwo stereoisomers are said to be enantiomers if one can be superimposed
on the mirror image of the other, and vice versa. A simple analogy would
be that your left and right shoes are enantiomers of each other. Two molecules that are made up of the exact same atoms, having exactly
the same neighbours, and differing only in their spatial orientation are said to
be stereoisomers. A test for enantiomers can be stated thus: Do the
molecules possess mirror planes of symmetry? That is, is it possible to find a
plane that cuts through the molecule such that the two halves are mirror images
of each other? It has to bisect all of the chiral centres.

"An enantiomer of an optically active isomer rotates planepolarized light in an equal but opposite direction of the original isomer. A
solution of equal parts of an optically active isomer and its enantiomer is
known as a racemic solution and has a net rotation of plane polarized light of zero. A
more in-depth explanation of this is in the footnotes for optical isomerism....

"Research is expanding quite rapidly into the
field of chiral chemistry because, for the most part, only one enantiomer is active
in a biological system. Most biological reactions are enzymatic and the enzymes can only attach to one of the enantiomers. (The left-shoe stretcher
will only fit in the left shoe, not in the right shoe -- enzymes and their
targets must fit together.) This is usually not a problem because mother nature
only tends to make the one that you need, but if you are introducing a synthetic
chemical care must be taken. For example, one enantiomer of thalidomide cures morning sickness, the other causes birth defects.

"There are exceptions where both enantiomers are
biologically active. One example is (+)-carvone and (-)-carvone; one smells like
spearmint and the other like caraway." [Quoted from
here. This page was accessed
31/03/05. it has been changed since.
The original article is
here.]

Cameron [in Cameron (1995)] claims that in
DN Engels had
anticipated this objection:

"All qualitative differences in nature rest on
differences of chemical composition or on different quantities or forms of
motion (energy) or, as is almost always the case, on both. Hence it is
impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of
matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative alteration of the body concerned. In
this form, therefore, Hegel's mysterious principle appears not only quite
rational but even rather obvious.

"It is surely hardly necessary to point out that the
various
allotropic and aggregational states of bodies, because they depend on
various groupings of the molecules, depend on greater or lesser quantities
of motion communicated to the bodies.

"But what is the position in regard to change of form of
motion, or so-called energy? If we change heat into mechanical motion or
vice versa, is not the quality altered while the quantity remains the same?
Quite correct. But it is with change of form of motion as with
Heine's vices;
anyone can be virtuous by himself, for vices two are always necessary. Change of
form of motion is always a process that takes place between at least two bodies,
of which one loses a definite quantity of motion of one quality (e.g. heat),
while the other gains a corresponding quantity of motion of another quality
(mechanical motion, electricity, chemical decomposition). Here, therefore,
quantity and quality mutually correspond to each other. So far it has not been
found possible to convert motion from one form to another inside a single
isolated body." [Engels (1954),
pp.63-64. Bold emphases added.]

Cameron argues as follows:

"However, do all qualitative changes arise from the
'addition or subtraction of matter or motion'? Engels points to another factor
that is sometimes involved: 'by means of a change of position and of connection
with neighbouring molecules it ["the molecule" -- Cameron's insertion] can
change the body into an allotrope or a different state of aggregation'....
Engels then is arguing that qualitative change can come about by means of
'change of position' or as he put it in another passage, 'various groupings of
the molecules'...." [Cameron (1995), pp.66-67. Quotation marks altered to conform
to the convention adopted at this site.]

However, as Cameron goes on to point out, Engels also said the
following:

"For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner
exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only
occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called
energy)…. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without
addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative
alteration of the body concerned." [Engels (1954),
p.63.
Bold emphases
added.]

In which case, Engels was either thoroughly confused or he
regarded a simple change of position as a "quantitative" change.

Even so, the counter-examples considered here (i.e., those derived from
stereoisomers) do not just concern mere "changes of position", but a symmetrical
re-arrangement of constituent atoms. The point of referring to such isomers in
this Essay is that
these molecules are exact copies of each other, unlike those involved in
allotropy. [Indeed, that is why I did not use allotropic examples.]

Now, despite the fact that Engels refers to isomers in DN (see
below), it is doubtful whether he had heard of stereoisomers (even though they
were
first
isolated by
Louis
Pasteur; indeed structural chemistry didn't come into its own until the
1860s -- on this see Brock (1992), pp.257-69). Nevertheless, despite the above, it could be
maintained that Engels had covered this base with his comment that "qualitative" change
could occur:

"...by means of a change of position and of connection
with neighbouring molecules it can
change the body into an allotrope or a different state of aggregation."
[Engels (1954),
p.63. Bold emphasis added.]

In response, once more, it is worth pointing out that this makes
a mockery of Engels's claim that such changes can only come about through
the addition of matter and/or motion, and that it is "impossible" to alter a body
"qualitatively" in any other way.

This means that, should any dialecticians want to use the above
passage to argue that Engels had anticipated stereoisomers, then they will have to
drop the "only", and that "impossible", too. In that case, why call this a "Law"
if it admits of no clear boundaries? Would we call
Newton's Third Law a "law" if it turned out that it was typically
or commonly possible for a reaction not to have an equal and opposite reaction?

This is quite apart from the fact that Engels is denying that such ordering relations are a separate factor in
"qualitative" change:

"It is surely hardly necessary to point out that the
various
allotropic and aggregational states of bodies, because they depend on
various groupings of the molecules, depend on greater or lesser
quantities of motion communicated to the bodies." [Ibid.,
p.63. Bold
emphasis added.]

Here, Engels is plainly attempting to reduce aggregational change
to his principle requirement -- i.e., that "qualitative" change can "only" come about
through the addition of matter and/or energy. Hence, far from anticipating
stereoisomerism as a factor in "qualitative" change, Engels is here
ruling it out as just such a factor! He is in effect saying that the
re-arrangement of atoms is no more nor no less than the addition of matter
and/or energy, and that it isn't thus an extra or separate cause of such change
which he also had to consider.

This reading of Engels at least has the merit of rescuing him
from the accusation that he was an outright simpleton, who, on the very same page
(and in successive paragraphs) declared that (1) "Qualitative" change can
"only" come about through the addition of matter and/or energy, and that (2) It
is
"impossible" to alter a "quality" in any other way, even though (3) there
is
in fact another way to alter such "qualities"!

[Perhaps we can put his rather loose wording down to the fact
that these comments appeared in what were after all notebooks.]

However, as we will soon see (here
and here), Engels is decidedly unclear
what he meant by the "addition" of matter and/or motion/energy. And that isn't all; he is
hopelessly vague about what he meant by "quality", "development",
"body" and "process", too. Even though
he was no simpleton, Engels was definitely a sloppy thinker. [And this
can't be put
down to the fact that we are considering notebook entries, for he was no less
sloppy in published work on philosophy and science, such as
AD.] Moreover, in view of the fact
that subsequent dialecticians have merely copied Engels's ideas (and have
plainly devoted little or no thought to them), it is reasonably clear that his
epigones have failed to merit any other description in this regard, either.

Some might
object here
that these examples do not involve the development of single processes -- they
concern
parallel processes, or co-existent objects. In that case, they are not relevant
counterexamples to the First 'Law'.

However, Engels and other
DM-fans appeal
to various co-existent organic molecules and elements in the
Periodic Table to
illustrate the First 'Law' (on this, see Note 9 below), produced by parallel chemical
reactions. In that case, if they can appeal to examples like this to support
their 'Law', they can't legitimately complain when examples of the very same sort
are used against them.

[It could be objected
that the elements in the Periodic Table have all been produced from one another,
or at least from other simpler atoms, in what is known as
Stellar Nucleosynthesis, so there is development here. In response,
it is worth noting that (1) This was unknown in Engels day (so, he was
using an example where there is no development), and (2) This isn't true of
Hydrogen itself -- it didn't develop from simpler atoms, and (3)Despite what
we are constantly told by DM-fans, this 'Law'
does not apply to the Periodic Table!]

For example, Woods
and Grant list several molecules from Organic Chemistry
(but they merely lifted this material unchanged from Engels); here, the qualitative differences
between the organic compounds they mention are independent of
whether or not they have been derived from one another. They patently
exist side-by-side:

"Chemistry involves changes of both a
quantitative and qualitative character, both changes of degree and of state.
This can clearly be seen in the change of state from gas to liquid or solid,
which is usually related to variations of temperature and pressure. In Anti
Dühring, Engels gives a series of examples of how, in chemistry, the simple
quantitative addition of elements creates qualitatively different bodies. Since
Engels' time the naming system used in chemistry has been changed. However, the
change of quantity into quality is accurately expressed in the following
example:

and so on to C30H60O2, melissic acid, which melts only at 80o
and has no boiling point at all, because it does not evaporate without
disintegrating.'" [Woods
and Grant (1995), p.52, quoting Engels (1976),
p.163.]

Moreover, the plain fact is that Engels himself used the
example of isomers to illustrate this 'Law':

"In these series we encounter the Hegelian law in yet
another form. The lower members permit only of a single mutual arrangement of
the atoms. If, however, the number of atoms united into a molecule attains a
size definitely fixed for each series, the grouping of the atoms in the molecule
can take place in more than one way; so that two or more isomeric substances
can be formed, having equal numbers of C, H, and 0 atoms in the molecule
but nevertheless qualitatively distinct from one another. We can even
calculate how many such isomers are possible for each member of the series.
Thus, in the paraffin series, for C4H10
there are two, for C6H12
there are three; among the higher members the number of possible isomers
mounts very rapidly. Hence once again it is the quantitative number of atoms
in the molecule that determines the possibility and, in so far as it has been
proved, also the actual existence of such qualitatively distinct isomers."
[Engels (1954), p.67. Bold emphases
added.]

But, there is no
"development" here! Engels notes that there are qualitative differences
between already present molecules, so these can't have been produced from
one another. He says they are "qualitatively distinct" from one another as they
now stand, so not only are they "qualitatively distinct" from any they have been
developed from, they are "qualitatively distinct" from those they haven't, and
can't have been developed from.

Again, if Engels can
refer to examples where there is no
"development", or to qualitative differences that do not depend on
development, to illustrate his 'Law', dialecticians can hardly complain if
similar examples are used to refute it.

Anyway, it is quite
clear that Engels did not appreciate how this radically compromised his claim
that:

"It is
impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of
matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative alteration of the body concerned."
[Ibid.,
p.63. Bold emphasis added.]

Once more: here we
have change in geometry "passing over" into a qualitative change, refuting this
'Law'.

Nevertheless, it could be objected that Engels is quite clear: he is plainly arguing about qualitative change to the
same body. So, the above examples are all irrelevant, since what is being
compared there
is
qualitative change
appearing in different bodies.

Or, so it could be argued.

But, this is just a variation of the 'development' objection we
met above, and suffers from all the latter's weaknesses.

Furthermore, Engels's version of this 'Law' also leaves it entirely
obscure what the "addition" of matter and/or energy amounts to. As we will see
in Note 6a below, it is important to be
clear about this, otherwise it would be possible to show there are countless
counter-examples waiting in the wings that refute this 'Law'.

This is all quite apart from the fact it is not easy to see how
the elements we find in nature arose by the mere addition of elementary
particles. Many were produced by
fusion;
in that case, the objection recorded in Note 6aapplies to one of DM's most
overworked examples: Mendeleyev's Table. Of course, we could always try to
redefine "fusion" to mean "development", but that would save this 'Law' by yet
another terminological juggle,
imposing it on nature.

Moreover, and once more, if the "same body" requirement is
indeed part of Engels's 'Law', then many of the examples DM-theorists themselves
use will fall by the wayside. For example, this overworked one from Engels
himself goes
out of the window:

"In conclusion we shall call one more witness for
the transformation of quantity into quality, namely --
Napoleon. He describes the combat between the French cavalry, who were
bad riders but disciplined, and the Mamelukes,
who were undoubtedly the best horsemen of their time for single combat, but
lacked discipline, as follows:

But, where is the "same body", here? At best,
all we have is
a changing collection of non-identical Mamelukes and French soldiers. Hardly the
"same body".

[And, does anyone think that Napoleon actually carried this
experiment out? At best, this was a Napoleonic 'thought experiment'. But,
that hasn't stopped DM-fans quoting it as if it were gospel. In that case, we
don't even have a single material body to consider, here, just a few
vague musings about different collections of them!]

Furthermore, as noted above, the
organic chemical examples will
also have to be ditched, for the differences Engels noted between the various
molecules he listed do not depend on them being made from precisely the same
atoms, or in the same laboratory, or even at the same time.

This, too, will have to go:

"And now let the reader admire the higher and
nobler style, by virtue of which Herr Dühring attributes to Marx the opposite of
what he really said. Marx says: The fact that a sum of values can be transformed
into capital only when it has reached a certain size, varying according to the
circumstances, but in each case definite minimum size -- this fact is a
proof of the correctness of the Hegelian law. Herr Dühring makes him say:
Because, according to the Hegelian law, quantity changes into quality,
'therefore'
'an advance, when it reaches a certain size, becomes capital'.
That is to say, the very opposite." [Ibid,
p.159.]

It is quite obvious that the "same body" isn't implied in this
case.

But, even if it were, Marx's argument here (as reported by
Engels) is defective. Values
(it is assumed that these are "exchange values") do not become Capital by mere
quantitative increment. It requires the presence of a Capitalist Mode of Production
(and thus a change in the Relations of Production), or adifferent use of
that money, for this to
be so. The capitalists concerned have to do something with these
exchange values. So, the mere increase of exchange values doesn't automatically
"pass over" into a qualitative change and become Capital. These values have to be
invested (or put to some other specific productive use), and that too isn't automatic (in certain circumstances, they could be
consumed). So, what we have here is a change in quality passing over into
another change in quality! Quantity has nothing to do with it. The
same quantity of money could be used as Capital or fail to be so used.
It requires a change in its quality (its use, or its social context) to effect such a development.

Has a single DM-fan ever given this any thought?

Indeed, this 'error' crept into Das Kapital, too:

"The guilds of the middle ages therefore tried to prevent
by force the transformation of the master of a trade into a capitalist, by
limiting the number of labourers that could be employed by one master within a
very small maximum. The possessor of money or commodities actually turns into a
capitalist in such cases only where the minimum sum advanced for production
greatly exceeds the maximum of the middle ages. Here, as in natural science, is
shown the correctness of the law discovered by Hegel (in his 'Logic'), that
merely quantitative differences beyond a certain point pass into qualitative
changes." [Marx (1976),
p.423. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this
site.]

Over the last twenty-five years or so, in my trawl through the
Dialectical Dustbowl, I have yet to encounter a single dialectician
who has pointed out that the above application of Hegel's 'Law' by Marx contains a
serious error! So desperate have DM-fans become -- in their endeavour to find
support for their failed theory in what Marx wrote, every single one has
forgotten basic principles of Historical Materialism!

Hence, £x/$y (or their equivalent)
owned by a Medieval Lord in, say, Eleventh Century France, couldn't of its own become Capital
no matter how large this pot of money became (but see below), whereas £w/$z in Nineteenth
Century Manchester, even though that sum might be less than the £x/$y pounds
held by the aforementioned Lord (allowing for inflation, etc.), would be Capital if employed in
certain ways. It isn't
the quantity that is important here but the Mode of Production and the use to
which the money is put, that are.

Also worth
asking: How does this money actually "develop"? In what way can it
"develop"? Sure, money can be saved and/or accumulated, but how does a £1/$1 coin
"develop" if its owner saves or accumulates more of the same? Even if we redefine
"save" and "accumulate" to mean "develop" (protecting this 'law' by yet another
terminological dodge, thus imposing it on the facts), not all money will
"develop" in this way. What if all the money was stolen or had been expropriated from,
or by
another non-capitalist? What if it had been obtained (all at once) by selling land, slaves,
works of art, political or other favours, etc? Where is the "development" here?
But, such money could still operate/serve as Capital, howsoever it had
been acquired, depending on
its use and the Mode of Production in which this takes place.

Of course, this isn't to
deny that there were Capitalists (or nascent Capitalists) in pre-Capitalist
Europe; but whatever money they had, its nature as Capital wasn't determined
by its quantity, no matter how large it became, but by the use to which it was put. This is also true
of
the period of transition between Feudalism and Capitalism (before the Capitalist Mode of
Production was apparent/dominant); again, it is the use to which money is put that decides whether or not
it is
Capital, not its quantity.

Why did Marx make such a simple error? Was he already in
his 'coquetting' phase? [Well, we
already know that by the time he came
to write Das Kapital, he was in this phase.] That is, was
he already beginning to put Hegel's ideas in the equivalent of 'scare
quotes', which is what sceptics would do with them these days? This is in fact the onl