UN weapons inspectors should
be setting out clearly defined and precise tasks for Iraq to carry
out to verify that its weapons of mass destruction capability
is disarmed. The US is blocking this process, and trying to get
a 'war resolution' instead of a `disarmament checklist'.

THE INSPECTION PROCESS WE
SHOULD BE FOLLOWING

The UN weapons inspection
process broke down in Dec. 1998 after the US asked inspectors
to withdraw from Iraq to create the right political climate for
a four-day US/UK bombing raid (see War Plan Iraq, Chapter
IV, for details).

After a year, in Resolution 1284,
passed in Dec. 1999, the Security Council created a new inspectorate
UNMOVIC (UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission),
and a new timetable for inspections by UNMOVIC and the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

THE CENTRAL PROVISION: KEY
DISARMAMENT TASKS

Para. 7 of Resolution 1284:
the Security Council 'Decides that UNMOVIC and the IAEA, not later
than 60 days after they have both started work in Iraq, will each
draw up, for approval by the Council, a work programme for
the discharge of their mandates, which will include... the key
remaining disarmament tasks to be completed by Iraq... and
further decides that what is required of Iraq for the implementation
of each task shall be clearly defined and precise'. (www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/).
After four months of co-operation, economic sanctions could be
suspended (Para. 33).

NO MORE MOVING THE GOALPOSTS

The point of the 'key disarmament
tasks' is that the Security Council is supposed to set out in
black and white exactly what Iraq has to do in order to get economic
sanctions first suspended, and then eventually lifted. The tasks
must be 'clearly defined and precise' in order to stop the US
and UK from being able to 'move the goalposts'. This is precisely
what has been happening since Iraq invited the inspectors back
in on 16 Sept. 2002. First the key area was said to be 'access',
particularly to the 'Presidential palaces'. When these were inspected
without problems, new issues were raised, including flights by
US U-2 spy planes and interviews with weapons scientists. As each
problem is resolved, the US and UK jump to another issue. The
Guardian comments, `the US and Britain are not just moving
the goalposts. They are widening the goalmouth and doubling the
size of the penalty area.' (Guardian, 27 Jan., p. 19)

The White House spokesperson dismisses
all forms of co-operation: 'It would not surprise the US if Saddam
Hussein pretends all of a suddden to have change of heart and
allow the U2 to fly or to show up with some of the weapons he
promised he never had. But it wouldn't change the fact that Saddam
Hussein is not co-operating.' (Times, 7 Feb., p. 1) However
much co-operation there is in reality, according to US propaganda
Iraq is 'not co-operating'. This is because the US is determined
on war. Inspections are an unwanted obstacle to war. Co-operation
is an unwanted obstacle to war.

BENCHMARKS AND KEY DISARMAMENT TASKS

Hence the importance of implementing
1284 and drawing up clear, precise and unmoveable 'key disarmament
tasks'. On 24/25 Feb., Hans Blix is presenting to the UNMOVIC
College of Commissioners, an advisory group of experts, 'a list
of more than 35 outstanding issues surrounding Iraq's disarmament'.
(Guardian, 22 Feb., p. 4) 'His questions are inspired largely
by resolution 1284'. (Telegraph, 22 Feb., p. 14) Critically,
'some countries would like to turn the Blix list into an ultimatum
to Iraq'. (Independent, 22 Feb., p. 4) `Seeking
a way through, some countries have pushed for clear benchmarks
on co-operation by which Iraq can be measured. But US officials
say even those could be manipulated. There are serious doubts
whether an ostensibly technical solution can bridge a fundamentally
political question.' (FT, 21 Feb., p. 5)

The US and UK are desperate to prevent
the key disarmament tasks being formulated and presented to the
Security Council. 'In private, British officials fear that Mr
Blix's "benchmarks" for Iraqi compliance may make their
uphill struggle to win the resolution even more difficult. Mr
Blix's questions could be seized upon by opponents of war 
France, Germany, Russia, China and Syria  to string out
the UN process on grounds that the UN must be given time to provide
clear answers. Diplomats said America and Britain will resist
any attempt to insert the benchmarks into the resolution as part
of a formal ultimatum to Iraq. They are worried that this would
invite another interminable series of discussions over whether
Iraq has disarmed and whether inspectors should be given more
time, and may invite a third resolution.' (Telegraph, 22
Feb., p. 14)

'Some countries have suggested that
those questions could be used to formulate specific tasks ahead
of the end of March, possibly with a deadline, which could clarify
matters for the Security Council's middle ground as it approaches
decision time. But the US argues that resolution 1441 is all the
benchmark it needs, amid fears that a list of tasks could be used
to string out the process. Colin Powell, secretary of state, has
said he does not expect the resolution itself to set a "timeline".
"The chances of it being put forward by the US or the UK
is close to nil," said one Council official. But "around
the debate there will be a lot of trying to find measures by which
to judge Iraq".' (FT, 22 Feb., p. 6) In other words,
there will be some members of the Security Council trying to implement
Resolution 1284, despite US/UKobstructionism.

At the time of writing, it is possible
that Paris will make a serious effort in this direction: 'The
French memorandum  expected to be tabled "in the next
few days", according to a senior official  will continue
to stress the disarmament of Iraq through peaceful means, but
propose strict deadlines for the dismemberment of Iraq's alleged
illicit arms programme. The US has so far resisted setting benchmarks,
amid fears they could sow further ambiguity and string out discussions.'
(FT, 24 Feb., p. 1)

The real danger to the US is quite
the opposite: unambiguous 'benchmarks' could help Iraq
prove its co-operation and its disarmament are full and complete,
thus denying the US the war it craves. For example, `France now
wants a precise deadline for inspectors to interview the 83 experts
who Baghdad claims destroyed its chemical weapons stockpiles.'
(FT, 24 Feb., p. 1)

TASKS TIMELINE

The British broadsheets say
that the 'key disarmament tasks' required by Resolution 1284 must
be drawn up by 27 Mar., after 120 days of resumed work, rather
than the 60 days specified in 1284. (Telegraph, 22 Feb.,
p. 14; and 24 Feb., p. 14), (FT, 22 Feb., p. 6), (Times,
21 Feb., p. 17) This is because UNMOVIC has decided that the first
two months were not really 'work', and that the 60 days started
on 27 Jan. (Phone conversation, Ewen Buchanan of UNMOVIC, 24 Feb.)
It is difficult to believe this was a purely internal UNMOVIC
decision, and that the US had nothing to do with it.

Resolution 1284 says that 120 days
after an 'Ongoing Monitoring and Verification' (OMV) programme
becomes fully operational, economic sanctions can be suspended.
But the OMV plan has not yet been approved.

1284 WAS ONCE 'THE WAY FORWARD'

Peter Hain, then a Foreign
Office minister, wrote in the Independent on 7 Aug. 2000,
'The Security Council Resolution for which Britain worked so hard
last year offers Iraq a path towards the suspension of sanctions,
but Saddam refuses to take that path. If Saddam Hussein were
to allow a new disarmament body into Iraq, he could quickly move
towards suspension if he cooperated with the weapons inspectors.'

Hain said on 11 Sept. 2000, '1284
is the way forward and essentially what it allows for is sanctions
to be suspended in return for a new arms inspection team under
Dr Hans Blix to go into Iraq and begin inspections... There is
a very clear policy and it is a win-winfor everybody.
UN inspectors could return, Iraqi people get relief, Iraq's neighbours
feel safer with Saddam Hussein's weapons under some measure of
control.' (Hain defended sanctions on 24 Mar. 2000 saying, 'One
of the arguments that the critics of sanctions have to face is
that although sanctions have had many consequences, one of them
has been the containment of Saddam Hussein's war machine.')

British Ambassador to the UN, Sir
Jeremy Greenstock, spoke to the Security Council on behalf of
the Blair Government on 17 Dec. 1999, praising the new resolution:
'The Council now has the policy which it needs; and this resolution
is now the law of the globe... The Security Council needs, and
the UN system as a whole needs, the weight of the full Council
and the full membership in implementing this mandatory resolution...
If we succeed in that, it will be to the advantage of the people
of Iraq and of the region, in the interests of the future authority
of the United Nations, and to the great credit of this Council.’
(Hain and Greenstock quotes are from the Foreign
Office website).

Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said on 21 Feb.: ‘It is for [Saddam
Hussein] to prove that he has, once and for all, given up what
we know he has.’ (Telegraph, 22 Feb., p. 14). This can
only be done properly and in accordance with international law
and UN Resolutions if clear and precise ‘key disarmament tasks’
are spelt out. It is for Jack Straw and the British and US Governments
to follow ‘the law of the globe’, to make Iraq’s neighbours ‘feel
safer’, to create ‘relief’ for the Iraqi people, and to defend
‘the future authority of the UN’, by allowing the weapons inspectors
to implement ‘mandatory resolution’ 1284, and define Iraq’s remaining
key disarmament tasks.

On 25 Feb. Tony Blair is due to say in the House of Commons, ‘He
knows, and the world knows, what he has to do.’ (Sunday Times,
23 Feb. 2003, p. 2). This isn’t true. It is up to the anti-war
movement to make it true, to allow the inspectors to disarm Iraq:
a real ‘win-win’ situation for everybody.

BOOK

War Plan Iraq: Ten Reasons Why We Shouldnt Launch Another War
Against Iraq by Milan Rai