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<div class="field field-name-body field-type-text-with-summary field-label-hidden"><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"> <p>In our last issue, <a href="/print/V12/7/marshall-w.html">Will Marshall</a> debated <a href="/print/V12/7/borosage-r.html">Robert Borosage</a> and <a href="/print/V12/7/borosage-r.html">Stanley Greenberg</a> about what campaign 2000 taught us. The discussion continues here.</p>
<hr /><p>
<b>Lessons of 2000</b><br /><br />By Mark J. Penn</p>
<p><span class="dropcap">A</span>s George W. Bush's first 100 days in office come to a close, the<br />
election of 2000 suggests several lessons if Democrats expect to recapture<br />
Congress in the short term and the White House in the long term. To win broad<br />
support, Democrats need an inclusive message that emphasizes growth and<br />
prosperity while relying on a smaller but more activist government. </p>
<p>
In a postelection poll conducted by Penn, Schoen and Berland Associates for<br />
the Democratic Leadership Council on November 11 and 12, 2000, we examined the<br />
lessons of the election by surveying 1,200 Americans who voted in the<br />
presidential election. While Al Gore won on the individual issues of the<br />
campaign, he lost on the broader meta-themes of the election. Overall, he won<br />
voters who cared about the issues by a margin of 52 percent to 34 percent.<br />
Particularly, he won voters most concerned about education, health care, the<br />
economy, preserving Social Security, Medicare, and the environment. But George W.<br />
Bush's central messages of smaller government and of "changing the tone in<br />
Washington" allowed him to overcome his deficiency on the issues and position<br />
himself closer to the center rhetorically. </p>
<p>
Bill Clinton's New Democratic coalition succeeded by combining a vision of<br />
smaller government with one of greater government activism. Here Gore's message<br />
fell apart and Bush successfully captured the issue of the right role for<br />
government in the twenty-first century. Consequently, Gore rendered himself<br />
vulnerable to attacks that portrayed him as an old-style, big-government liberal<br />
à la Michael Dukakis--the very image that effectively brought down Dukakis in his<br />
presidential race against George H.W. Bush. So while Gore won on the issues, he<br />
lost on the governing philosophy necessary to implement important programs like<br />
prescription drugs, reforming Social Security, and improving education.</p>
<p>
<span class="subhead">Progress, Prosperity, and the Clinton Record</span></p>
<p>
Only sporadically did Al Gore talk about progress, prosperity,<br />
and the Clinton administration's achievements on the economy. But despite his<br />
resistance to it, this message was his biggest potential asset in his election.<br />
Sir Isaac Newton once said that he was able to achieve so much because he "stood<br />
on the shoulders of giants." Al Gore stood on the greatest Democratic<br />
achievements since Franklin D. Roosevelt--and yet failed to use them sufficiently<br />
in his campaign. Of those who voted for Gore, 34 percent cited progress and<br />
prosperity as the top reason. But a larger proportion of Bush supporters, 41<br />
percent, named smaller and better government as their prime reason for choosing<br />
the Republicans' candidate. If Gore had used progress and prosperity consistently<br />
rather than sporadically, he would have had a much clearer message and would have<br />
captured more of the voters who said they believed that the country was on the<br />
right track. Gore took 60 percent of "right track" voters; Clinton in 1996 took<br />
69 percent of right-track voters. </p>
<p>
Of those who said they were better off in 2000 than they had been eight years<br />
earlier--a traditional gauge for determining whether to support the party in<br />
power--Gore won a healthy but unremarkable 62 percent. Of those who said that the<br />
economy was headed in the right direction, he captured only half. So Gore failed<br />
both to sell himself as the only candidate who could prolong the nation's<br />
prosperity and to portray George W. Bush and his tax-cut plan as a clear and<br />
present danger to the robust economy. This point is even more salient now that<br />
Bush is threatening our well-being by sticking blindly to his two-year-old<br />
tax-cut proposal while offering no real leadership on the economy. </p>
<p>
Many pundits claim that "Clinton fatigue" was a key factor that cost Al Gore the<br />
presidency. But the postelection polls showed little evidence of such a<br />
phenomenon. Immediately following the election, President Clinton enjoyed a solid<br />
favorability rating of 57 percent in the Gallup poll. Clinton's job approval<br />
immediately before election day was among the highest of any president in the<br />
last 20 years--higher even than before his re-election in 1996. </p>
<p>
Indeed, even 34 percent of Bush voters approved of Clinton's job performance and<br />
20 percent approved of Clinton personally. Of the late-breaking Bush swing<br />
voters, 35 percent approved of Clinton personally. This is strong evidence that<br />
using Clinton more often in terms of record and out on the hustings as the<br />
campaign wound down could have pushed Gore over the top. The early breakers were<br />
anti-Clinton; the late breakers had enough pro-Clinton voters in the mix to make<br />
the difference in the election.</p>
<p>
<span class="subhead">Gore's Populism</span></p>
<p>
Instead of running as a new-economy Democrat, Al Gore used an<br />
old-style populism that limited his appeal rather than expanded it. His message<br />
distanced him from swing voters who could have provided the margin of victory.<br />
Gore narrowly won the popular vote with this message by piling up large wins in<br />
states like California, where extra votes didn't matter, while the old-style<br />
message sent him tumbling backward in key border states, his home state of<br />
Tennessee, and the electoral college. His liberal positions on social issues, his<br />
economic populism, and his association with big government combined to turn what<br />
should have been a substantial win into a draw. Had Gore combined his positions<br />
of conscience on social issues with a more modern vision of the role of<br />
government, he would have carried a larger percentage of upwardly mobile,<br />
socially tolerant suburban men--and won the election. </p>
<p>
While Bush emphasized themes that sounded inclusive and bipartisan, Gore<br />
sounded divisive. In his populist rhetoric, Gore became the fighter who would pit<br />
the good versus the bad, the people versus the powerful, the poor versus the<br />
rich, and the Democrats versus the Republicans. His populism and his emphasis on<br />
himself as a fighter came at the expense of maximizing his advantage on the<br />
issues. While this theme was effective with some voters, it hit a wall with<br />
others. President Clinton stood for bridging partisanship with progress; Gore<br />
stood for winning the good fight, regardless of its divisiveness. So those in the<br />
middle who had voted for Clinton turned their backs on Gore. While many suburban<br />
women evidently wanted someone who would fight for them, many men wanted a<br />
president who stood more for freedom instead. While 55 percent of those making<br />
under $15,000 strongly supported the populist message, this dropped to 32 percent<br />
of those earning $15,000 to $30,000, an audience that should have been much more<br />
receptive to this message. </p>
<p>
Since taking office in 1992, Bill Clinton repeatedly referred to the New<br />
Democratic mantra of opportunity for all, responsibility from all, and a<br />
community of all. This message, on its face, consistently scored higher than the<br />
"people versus the powerful" message. And this gap was critical in 2000 among the<br />
swing groups that decided the election. Among independents, those earning $30,000<br />
to $50,000 annually, those earning $50,000 to $75,000, and those who made up<br />
their mind for Bush in the last month, the "opportunity for all" message polled<br />
at least seven points higher than the people-versus-the-powerful message. In an<br />
election decided by handfuls of votes, the difference between these two messages<br />
and campaign philosophies could have meant the difference between garnering 48<br />
percent of the vote versus 52 percent.</p>
<p>
<span class="dropcap">W</span>hile the vice president did realize that he had to reach the prize of<br />
the 1996 election--the much ballyhooed soccer moms--he missed the new target of<br />
the twenty-first century: the wired workers. Al Gore particularly failed to reach<br />
the voters who broke for Bush in the last month--primarily middle-class, white<br />
suburban males, many of whom had voted for Clinton in the past. While Gore did<br />
well with better-educated, higher-income, pro-choice white women, he performed<br />
dismally among these upscale white men. They comprised 20 percent of the<br />
late-deciding voters, a group who broke against Gore 29 percent to 57 percent in<br />
our poll. These people voted for Bush because they were attracted to his message<br />
of smaller government and greater economic freedom. They were turned off by<br />
populism. In the next election, Democrats need to "own" the new economy and stand<br />
for policies that will help all Americans succeed in our technology-based<br />
society.</p>
<p>
Clinton had managed to stand for saving Social Security and Medicare without<br />
being saddled with the onus of big government. But Al Gore left voters with the<br />
impression that while he would protect government programs, a vote for him would<br />
mean a return to the era of big government. Gore led by 36 points on the<br />
attribute "is for big government." This association played a significant role in<br />
limiting Gore's success. One of his constant refrains, and a key part of his<br />
message, was that Bush was beholden to the special interests. Despite this, Gore<br />
was seen by a five-point margin as more captive of special interests than Bush.</p>
<p>
As president, Bush needs not just to provide a general framework for his views<br />
but to put forward policy prescriptions. Thus far many of his policies have been<br />
to roll back popular environmental and workplace protections put in place by the<br />
Clinton administration. Here Bush is vulnerable, because voters in fact prefer<br />
the policies of Gore and the Democrats.</p>
<p>
While Al Gore did not capture a majority in the 2000 election, neither did George<br />
W. Bush. The vital center is up for grabs in 2002. This crucial core of the<br />
electorate is looking neither for a return to big government nor a return to<br />
fend-for-yourself policies. Most voters are still looking for fiscally<br />
responsible progress on major issues of the day like the availability of health<br />
care, and for policies that reflect a smaller but more active government,<br />
leadership on the economy, and a prosperity agenda. If the Democrats can<br />
convincingly offer that message, they will be the majority party. </p>
<p></p><hr /><p>
<b>Back to the Future with the DLC</b><br /><br />By Guy Molyneux</p>
<p>
<span class="dropcap">T</span>he analysis of the 2000 election offered by the Democratic<br />
Leadership Council inevitably brings to mind Yogi Berra's great expression "It's<br />
déjà vu all over again." For the past eight years, the DLC has stepped<br />
forward eagerly to take credit for every Democratic success, and just as eagerly<br />
to blame other Democrats for any setbacks. Whenever Bill Clinton was up in the<br />
polls, he was being a New Democrat; when he was down, it was because he wasn't<br />
enough of a New Democrat. Mark Penn's analysis of the post-election survey he<br />
conducted on behalf of the DLC, unfortunately, largely continues the tradition<br />
of tautology masquerading as analysis. </p>
<p>
If this sounds unfair, ask yourself this question: If Theresa LePore had not<br />
invented her butterfly ballot and Gore were now president, wouldn't the DLC be<br />
explaining "Why Gore Won" instead of "Why Gore Lost"? And wouldn't every one of<br />
us bet our life savings that the DLC's answer would be "because he was a New<br />
Democrat"? </p>
<p>
My own view is that "Why did Gore lose?" is exactly the <i>wrong</i> question for<br />
Democrats to ask today. First, it takes us back down the road of recriminations<br />
and assignment of blame that has always served to divide and thus weaken the<br />
Democratic Party. Second, and even more important, it asks us to look backward<br />
when what we need to do is look forward. The right question is "How can Democrats<br />
win?" And both traditional Democrats and New Democrats have relevant, practical<br />
insights to offer, but only through honest and serious discussion. </p>
<p>
That said, having a clear understanding of the 2000 election is essential. We<br />
won't chart our course effectively if we don't know where our point of departure<br />
is. Mark Penn looks at the election and reaches three main conclusions. None are<br />
terribly helpful in providing a road map for Democrats.</p>
<p>
1. <i>Gore's populism limited his appeal rather than expanded it. </i>The sole<br />
evidence for this central DLC claim is that "only" 70 percent of voters in the<br />
survey were attracted to a populist message. That's a pretty thin reed on which<br />
to hang this audacious interpretation. Consider other relevant evidence on this<br />
point. </p>
<p></p><li> Gore's high point in the polls came immediately after his Democratic<br />
convention speech. It may be hard to separate the impact of his populism from his<br />
distancing from Clinton ("I am my own man"), but certainly his promise to fight<br />
for the people did not hurt him.
<p></p></li><li> Gore's political targets were very unpopular, much more so than Democratic<br />
"special interests." According to an NBC/<i>Wall Street Journal</i> poll, a large<br />
majority of voters say that oil companies (74 percent), drug companies (69<br />
percent), and HMOs (60 percent) are too powerful and have too much influence; far<br />
fewer feel that way about teachers' and public employees' unions (30 percent), or<br />
even the entertainment industry (52 percent) or trial lawyers (53 percent).
<p></p></li><li> The specific populist issues Gore talked about--a patients bill of rights,<br />
drug coverage for seniors, a higher minimum wage--were all winning issues, as<br />
Penn concedes. Why else would Republicans have embraced them?
<p>
All of this speaks to the power of Gore's populism. It was the single-most<br />
effective Gore message tested. Even 67 percent of the "Bush swings"--the swings<br />
who voted for Bush--say it was an appealing message. You can argue that Gore's<br />
version of populism did not take him far enough, perhaps because it was not bold<br />
enough or because he was not the right messenger. But there is no evidence here<br />
that it hurt Gore in this election. </p>
<p>
The absence of clear evidence in this survey for populism's lack of appeal is<br />
itself revealing. The DLC could have posed direct questions that would actually<br />
have tested its theories, such as, Were voters turned off by Gore's promise to<br />
"fight for people" over the special interests? Did they feel he was too<br />
anti-business? Were Gore's DLC commitments, like permanent normal trade relations<br />
for China, an electoral advantage? The questions apparently <i>not</i> asked in<br />
this survey are often more interesting than those that were.</p>
<p>
2. <i>Gore did not take full advantage of the Clinton administration's economic<br />
record.</i> This is a much more plausible claim. However, there was no inherent<br />
reason that Gore could not have combined populist language with a prosperity<br />
message. In fact, the survey tested voter reaction to two similar prosperity<br />
messages--a DLC-sanctioned one that frames the choice as going forward versus<br />
going backward, and one that asks if we will enrich all families or only a few.<br />
The latter provides a revealing, and presumably unintentional, test of populism's<br />
appeal; this variant is more effective, both overall and with the Bush swing<br />
voters. The DLC's own survey reveals that prosperity versus populism is what Bill<br />
Clinton might have called a "false choice"--Gore could, and should, have embraced<br />
both.</p>
<p>
And even if there is truth in this critique of Gore, where does this take us now?<br />
Now that Democrats are the out party, and with the economy slowing, the question<br />
of how much credit Democrats should claim for prosperity seems less than<br />
relevant.</p>
<p>
3. Gore lost because he failed to capture the votes of highly educated "wired<br />
workers." Let's step back and see where Gore actually lost ground in 2000,<br />
compared with Clinton in 1996. </p>
<p></p></li><li> Among voters without a college education, Gore ran 3 percentage points<br />
behind Clinton; he actually did slightly better than Clinton among the college<br />
educated.
<p></p></li><li> Gore showed clear improvement in just one income category: those earning<br />
more than $100,000 (43 percent, versus Clinton's 38 percent). He lost ground in<br />
only one category: those earning less than $15,000.
<p></p></li><li> Gore lost by 22 points in small towns and rural areas but won large<br />
metropolitan areas handily. John B. Judis notes that Gore did best in states with<br />
the highest proportions of postgraduates and in the most economically dynamic<br />
areas [see "<a href="/print/V11/25/judis-j.html">Two More Years</a>," <i>TAP,</i> December 4, 2000]. The four states Gore<br />
lost narrowly, and arguably should have won, were West Virginia, Tennessee,<br />
Missouri, and Arkansas. Looking for a common denominator here, who would come up<br />
with "wired workers"?
<p>
To review this record and conclude that Al Gore's biggest problem in this<br />
election was losing "wired workers" by 3 points is to substitute ideology for<br />
analysis. Clearly, Gore held the constituencies most attracted to the New<br />
Democrat message but lost the working class, especially men. And surely it cannot<br />
be the case that Gore's excessive populism--as opposed to, say, issues such as<br />
the environment, gun control, or Clinton's scandal--accounts for these patterns.</p>
<p><span class="dropcap">P</span>erhaps the greatest shortcomings of the DLC's 2000 analysis are sins<br />
of omission--it completely misses the real story. Penn denies the reality of the<br />
adverse environment created by impeachment and Clinton's scandals. For a year,<br />
George W. Bush's best applause line--always--was his promise to restore "honor<br />
and dignity" to the White House. This was the fundamental raison d'être of Bush's<br />
campaign, yet the DLC survey fails to include it among the three Bush "themes"<br />
tested. Penn points to Clinton's 57 percent job approval rating, to argue the<br />
president was not a burden for Al Gore, while conveniently ignoring Clinton's<br />
abysmal 36 percent personal-favorability rating. </p>
<p>
The DLC's own poll shows that voters who cared about personal character voted<br />
overwhelmingly for Bush and that those who cared about issues supported Gore. Is<br />
this of no consequence? Penn's analysis is also static, taking no account of<br />
Gore's rise and fall in the polls. We know that Gore lost his lead during the<br />
debates, while he was being attacked for his exaggerations and lack of integrity,<br /><i>not</i> after his populist convention speech. Surely this is relevant. An<br />
analysis of the 2000 election that makes no mention of Gore's weaknesses as a<br />
candidate and denies the difficulties created by scandal is hard to take<br />
seriously.</p>
<p>
The larger problem with asking "Why Gore Lost" as a starting point for developing<br />
Democratic strategy is that he didn't. Gore not only won the popular vote by<br />
500,000 votes, but he probably won the electoral college as well. Penn holds up<br />
the 1996 election, in which Clinton received 49 percent of the vote, as the<br />
pinnacle of Democratic success. But Gore's 48 percent is characterized as<br />
failure. Why is the bar set higher for Gore, when he was not an incumbent<br />
president, he faced a much tougher opponent, and the strongest third-party<br />
candidate was on the left rather than the right? </p>
<p>
Although Gore's popular-vote plurality is unimpressive, Democrats won the issue<br />
debate in this election decisively. Among people whose vote was based mainly on<br />
issues (62 percent of voters), Gore won in a landslide, 55 percent to 40 percent;<br />
those who cared about personal qualities went for Bush 62 percent to 35 percent.<br />
Furthermore, the key to the GOP's overall success in the 2000 election was its<br />
hidden agenda and obscuring of policy differences. In 1996 and 1998, the<br />
Republicans abandoned the agenda of 1994. In 2000 they went one step further and<br />
embraced the Democratic agenda--or at least its language and themes. Republicans<br />
ran as proponents of HMO reform, defenders of Social Security, supporters of<br />
prescription drug coverage for seniors, and friends of public education. Their<br />
hypocrisy constitutes more powerful evidence of the appeal of the traditional<br />
Democratic agenda than any poll could provide. </p>
<p>
In short, <i>this is not 1981.</i> The Democratic Party faces challenges, but also<br />
great opportunities. It will not take advantage of these opportunities if it<br />
fails to understand the ways in which the political environment has improved and<br />
the real weaknesses of the right, or if it expends more energy looking for<br />
scapegoats than in moving forward. </p>
<p>
Strategically, the single-most important challenge for the party is winning more<br />
votes among non-college white men. The labor movement--a quintessentially "old"<br />
Democrat institution--can speak with some authority on this topic. White male<br />
union members voted for Al Gore by a margin of 24 points, while Bush won by 24<br />
points among all white men nationally. Non-college union men voted for Gore by 31<br />
points, even as nationally Bush won the white non-college male vote by 29 points.<br />
Labor accomplished this despite the fact that white male union members are much<br />
more conservative than liberal, despite a massive National Rifle Association<br />
campaign to reach them, and despite Al Gore's embrace of free trade.</p>
<p>
How did labor do it? With a strong populist message that focused on Bush's record<br />
of favoring the rich and special interests over working families, and by hitting<br />
him hard on his support for Social Security privatization--a position that the<br />
DLC would have the party take--and right-to-work laws. Labor overcame cultural<br />
conservatism by appealing to voters' pocketbooks and their self-interest as<br />
working people--a rather traditional Democratic approach.</p>
<p>
Reasonable people can debate about the right way for Democrats to appeal to these<br />
voters, yet they must recognize labor's success for what it is: not a strained<br />
analysis of survey data, but real votes in the bank. If someone has better ideas<br />
for reaching white men and persuading them to support Democrats, they should come<br />
forward. But the unions' record deserves respect, and those who would take the<br />
Democratic Party in a different direction bear the burden of proof.</p>
<p>
What are the issue positions the DLC believes the party should now embrace?<br />
Curiously, the survey omits much that would be helpful. Would supporting Medicare<br />
vouchers, Social Security privatization, or fast-track trade procedures make the<br />
party stronger? Would it especially help to reach the non-college men who<br />
abandoned the party in 2000? The DLC survey didn't ask these questions. </p>
<p>
But evidence suggests that, in many cases, DLC positions would weaken rather than<br />
strengthen the party. The most important example, which President Bush is<br />
determined to make relevant, is Social Security privatization. While the idea of<br />
private accounts is popular in the abstract, surveys always reveal strong<br />
opposition to the benefit cuts required by privatization. A poll by AARP last<br />
year showed opposition at almost two-thirds. Moreover, this issue was put to the<br />
test in 2000--and Al Gore, not George W. Bush, was the beneficiary.</p>
<p>
Fourteen percent of the electorate said Social Security was their top issue; they<br />
voted for Gore by 58 percent to 39 percent. As Jeffrey Bell and Frank Cannon<br />
argued in <i>The Weekly Standard,</i> Gore's Social Security assault at the<br />
campaign's conclusion caused much of the late shift to Gore in key battleground<br />
states. Seniors were the only age group among whom Gore (at 51 percent)<br />
outperformed Clinton (48 percent).</p>
<p>
There is nothing Democrats could do that would damage their party more than<br />
supporting privatization of Social Security--except perhaps getting behind<br />
voucherization of Medicare.</p>
<p>
<span clas="dropcap">P</span>erhaps, then, the DLC's strategic genius lies in formulating<br />
"themes," rather than issues. But unified Republican control of the federal<br />
government poses very different strategic and tactical questions from those faced<br />
by the Clinton and Gore campaigns. The first challenge is to develop a<br />
persuasive critique of Republican policies and the Bush administration. That has<br />
not been, to say the least, a DLC strength. Penn's report actually criticizes<br />
Gore for drawing too many sharp distinctions. But this time around, it was the<br />
Republicans who sought to obscure differences and blur ideological lines. If<br />
anything, Democrats failed to draw lines clearly and sharply enough, especially<br />
on education. </p>
<p>
In any case, Democrats are now the opposition party and must make the case for<br />
change. Traditional Democrats will charge that Republicans cater to corporate<br />
special interests at the expense of the environment and consumers, and to the<br />
wealthy rather than working families--and a lot of polling data shows that this<br />
criticism is powerful. The DLC rejects this critique, but where will the DLC find<br />
fault with the GOP? For not being sufficiently fiscally conservative? History<br />
provides no support for the proposition that an incumbent party can be defeated<br />
with "me too" politics. Even if Democrats set aside their moral and political<br />
commitments--to fight for social justice while defending social provision--and<br />
conduct a cold-blooded, utilitarian calculation of political advantage, the DLC<br />
appears to offer the party very little.</p>
<p>
Traditional Democrats can, of course, make their own countervailing case against<br />
New Democratic politics. It was under the leadership of New Democrat Bill Clinton<br />
that the Dems lost a House majority they had held for 40 years. Under Clinton,<br />
Democratic governors almost qualified for a listing on the endangered species<br />
list and the party lost ground in many state legislatures. As William Schneider<br />
recently observed in <i>The Atlantic Monthly,</i> "In a variety of ways Clinton<br />
left the Democrats in the worst shape they have been in in more than fifty<br />
years." Even at the presidential level, the party has now nominated New Democrats<br />
in three successive elections and secured 43 percent, 49 percent, and 48 percent<br />
of the vote. Doesn't that suggest that New Democrats may not have all the<br />
answers?</p>
<p>
Nevertheless, traditional Democrats should resist the urge to continue with an<br />
internecine battle that has now grown tedious as well as destructive. One thing<br />
we can say for sure: The party needs both traditional and New Democrats--and the<br />
constituencies they represent--to get where it wants to go. Without labor,<br />
African Americans, and the women's movement, the party would quite literally not<br />
exist. Without New Democrats and the voters they speak for, Democrats cannot<br />
build a durable majority. This is a time for what we might call Democratic<br />
bipartisanship.</p>
<p>
We can identify many areas where traditional Democrats and New Democrats can come<br />
together, including commitment to fiscal responsibility and investment in<br />
education and training over huge tax cuts. Both groups can get behind private<br />
retirement accounts, <i>outside of Social Security,</i> as Clinton and Gore<br />
proposed. Even support for sensible labor and environmental standards in trade<br />
agreements provides important common ground.</p>
<p>
In 1998, a New Democrat president was on the edge of the precipice, facing<br />
disaster. Then, union members, African Americans, and the rest of the party base<br />
came together to save his presidency. Now, a hostile administration is declaring<br />
war on the labor movement, environmentalists, and other core Democratic<br />
constituencies. The question today is will New Democrats stand with traditional<br />
Democrats, or will the finger-pointing continue? Will the DLC put as much energy<br />
into exposing George W. Bush's flaws as it has Al Gore's? Will it search for<br />
common ground with other Democrats, or only for wedge issues?</p>
<p>
In times like these, the DLC must answer the old trade union question:<br />
Which side are you on? </p>
<p></p><hr /><p><b>Dems: Round Two</b><br /><br />Will Marshall Responds</p>
<hr /><p><span class="dropcap">A</span> key lesson of campaign 2000 is that political parties should learn<br />
from their successes. As the race began, the Democratic electoral models were the<br />
Clinton-Gore campaigns of 1992 and 1996. Bill Clinton, after all, was the first<br />
Democrat since Franklin D. Roosevelt to win a second White House term. The big<br />
mystery is why Al Gore abandoned the New Democratic strategy that had produced<br />
these victories--not to mention a record of prosperity, peace, and social<br />
progress that enjoyed wide public approval--in favor of a hackneyed populism and<br />
over-the-top appeals to interest groups. </p>
<p>
Stan Greenberg and Robert Borosage blame Clinton for Gore's defeat. Yes, the<br />
Clinton scandals presented Gore with a problem. But let's not pretend that it was<br />
insoluble. Forthright condemnation of Clinton's personal behavior, coupled with<br />
fresh ideas for building on the economic and social reforms of the 1990s, would<br />
have perfectly mirrored the public's own ambivalence. Instead, Gore made the<br />
fatal mistake of distancing himself not only from Clinton but from the popular<br />
achievements he co-authored with Clinton--and that constituted the strongest<br />
rationale for his candidacy.</p>
<p>
This decision deprived Gore of a grand narrative linking his campaign proposals<br />
to the political and governing innovations of the 1990s, such as restoring fiscal<br />
discipline, stimulating competition and new-economy growth, ending welfare and<br />
rewarding work, making government less bureaucratic and more accountable, and<br />
rebuilding functioning markets in poor urban and rural communities. Gore's<br />
election-year conversion to "fighting for you" populism reinforced public doubts<br />
about his authenticity; it also failed to awaken the supposedly dormant class<br />
grievances of the "forgotten majority" of working middle-class voters. </p>
<p>
I agree with Greenberg and Borosage that Democrats should offer a spirited<br />
challenge to George W. Bush's brazen bid to drive the nation's political agenda<br />
rightward. New Democrats have vigorously opposed the Bush tax plan, the attempt<br />
to roll back environmental protections, the decision to withdraw from the Kyoto<br />
climate-change treaty, school vouchers, and the administration's impulse to<br />
disengage from global hot spots. At the same time, we don't think Democrats can<br />
succeed by simply defending old programs and underperforming public systems.<br />
That's why we're determined not just to oppose the Bush administration but to<br />
propose a progressive alternative that tackles the big challenges facing our<br />
society: equipping working Americans to succeed in the new economy, enabling<br />
low-income families to lift themselves out of poverty, investing more in public<br />
education while demanding accountability for student performance, achieving<br />
universal health coverage through nonbureaucratic means, harnessing market forces<br />
to combat climate change and other environment problems, and modernizing<br />
Social Security and Medicare. This is the agenda Al Gore should have run on--and<br />
won on--in 2000. </p>
<p>Robert L. Borosage and Stanley B. Greenberg Respond</p>
<hr /><p>
Handwringing about the 2000 election is useful only to the extent<br />
that it helps inform future strategy. Unfortunately, the essays by Will Marshall<br />
and Mark Penn not only revise history and distort data; they draw the wrong<br />
lessons and point in the wrong direction. Consider four key issues.</p>
<p>
<i>Values.</i> The right's cultural war against Bill Clinton, amplified by his own<br />
missteps, weakened Democrats and Al Gore on values and trust and allowed Bush to<br />
rise on "restoring honor and dignity to the White House." The cultural assault<br />
was particularly effective among white non-college-educated voters. Penn and<br />
Marshall ignore this reality; they urge Democrats to abandon these voters and<br />
focus on the better-off. This is surely wrongheaded. Democrats should be the<br />
party that supports working- and middle-class families and their values. To forge<br />
an enduring reform majority, they must compete for the non-college-educated<br />
electorate. </p>
<p>
<i>Populism.</i> Marshall and Penn rail against corporation bashing. But a populist<br />
formulation--making our prosperity enrich everyone--was the actual theme of<br />
Gore's campaign. And on themes and issues, Gore easily defeated Bush. Not<br />
surprisingly, critics of the Bush budget, including the Democratic Leadership<br />
Council, have found the populist argument their most effective theme in attacking<br />
Bush's plan. </p>
<p>
<i>Interest groups.</i> Marshall and Penn decry Gore's focus on union households,<br />
racial minorities, and better-educated women. While Democrats should surely cast<br />
a wider net, they should not ignore the accomplishments of 2000--the enhanced<br />
majorities and mobilization of groups that together are a growing, not declining,<br />
force in America. Read your census. </p>
<p>
<i>Good times.</i> Marshall and Penn fault Gore for blowing the "good times." But<br />
according to Penn's own survey data, voters thought Gore was more likely than<br />
Bush to "continue the prosperity." Disposable income was faltering in the year<br />
leading up to the election and fell in the quarter of the election. People,<br />
especially Penn's wired workers, were already feeling the financial pressure.<br />
Even in good times, most Americans were making modest gains at best and were<br />
looking for leaders who understood that. As the economy falters on Bush's watch,<br />
Democrats must rediscover their instinctive advocacy for increased living<br />
standards for average Americans.
</p>
<p>
Guy Molyneux Responds</p>
<hr /><p>
Despite their substantial disagreements, New Democrats and<br />
traditional Democrats share important common ground. After all, George W. Bush<br />
means not only to rescind every one of Bill Clinton's accomplishments but also to<br />
repeal much of the New Deal and what remains of the Great Society. If Bush cannot<br />
unite the Democratic Party, it's hard to imagine what could. </p>
<p>
The central task for Democrats is to develop a compelling critique of the Bush<br />
administration. This is a time to define party differences in ways that are<br />
salient to voters. That is harder than it sounds, because Bush cloaks his agenda<br />
in soothing, almost Democratic rhetoric--Gingrichism with a human face. </p>
<p>
Let me propose a division of labor that will allow each Democratic camp to make a<br />
useful contribution while remaining true to its values and analysis. First,<br />
populists need to make the case that Bush is advancing the interests of big<br />
business and the wealthy at the expense of average working people. The<br />
administration's strategists, who seem to have a political tin ear in this<br />
regard, are helping out by making their slavish devotion to the corporate agenda<br />
so transparent. With his tax breaks for the wealthy, his repeal of the ergonomics<br />
standard, and his backsliding on carbon dioxide emissions, Bush leaves no doubt<br />
about whom he is fighting for. </p>
<p>
The second component of the Democratic critique is less obvious, but just as<br />
important: Bush is pursuing a reactionary agenda that will take the nation<br />
backward rather than forward. Listen carefully to his speeches and note his<br />
frequent use of the word "reform." He is staking an aggressive claim to the<br />
reform mantle favored by the Democratic Leadership Council. But surely when Will<br />
Marshall talks about "reform-minded centrism," he means something very different.<br />
New Democrats should lay out a serious program for public investment that<br />
empowers Americans in the global economy--and expose Bush's reform agenda as a<br />
fraud.</p>
<p>
If we all stick to our traditional roles, New Democrats will attack populists for<br />
their misguided "class warfare" charges, and populists will return fire. But<br />
what's the point of continuing this argument? Let's rewrite the script, agree to<br />
disagree, and focus on doing what we each do best. My own guess is that these two<br />
messages are more complementary than we often suppose. </p>
<p>
Mark J. Penn Responds</p>
<hr /><p><span clas="dropcap">A</span>l Gore received 600,000 more votes than George W. Bush,<br />
principally in New York and California. Had Gore been able to distribute those<br />
votes in the Midwest and the border states of the South that Bill Clinton won in<br />
1996, he would have coasted in the electoral college. There is no clearer<br />
evidence than this that Gore's handlers looked only at the overall polls and not<br />
at the critical swing voters in key states.</p>
<p>
Populism is a message that accentuates divisions. But as Bill Clinton said,<br />
you can stand up for people without putting down others. That is a much more<br />
successful message than the one used in Gore's campaign. </p>
<p>
As to the repeated claim that Gore did better with voters earning more than<br />
$100,000, the fact is that he did better with higher-income women but not with<br />
men, because choice and guns were in fact a positive issue with women up the<br />
economic ladder. That was not the case with men who vote on economic issues,<br />
where he did substantially worse. Had he used the prosperity message, not the<br />
populism message, he would have been able to win over the women who vote on<br />
social issues and the men who vote on economic ones.</p>
<p>
Wired workers are 26 percent of the national workforce, and they are in every<br />
state. The use of old stereotypes of America is exactly the sort of analysis that<br />
misses important election dynamics. There were more than enough knowledge workers<br />
in Tennessee, Arkansas, Missouri, and West Virginia to have swung the election to<br />
Gore. Just as important, however, is the fact that Gore was perceived as being<br />
even further to the left than the Democratic Party itself--and that also hurt him<br />
in these states.</p>
<p>
Al Gore could easily have distanced himself from the problems of 1998 without<br />
also distancing himself from the successful economic and other policies of Bill<br />
Clinton. It is true that he led after his convention, but it is also true that<br />
the only other time he led was after he showed loyalty to Clinton at the end<br />
of the impeachment trial. His failure to show loyalty afterward undermined his<br />
own character; and his failure to use the issue of prosperity properly becomes<br />
more evident with each passing day. </p>
</li></div></div></div>Wed, 19 Dec 2001 19:15:55 +0000141322 at http://prospect.orgMark Penn