Plaintiff
Richard King, proceeding pro se, brings this action
under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5
U.S.C. § 552, against the Department of Justice. On
March 28, 2017, the Court granted in part and denied in part
the Department's motion for summary judgment. Dkt. 47.
King now seeks to revisit the issues decided in that opinion.
Months after the final deadline to do so, King filed
“part one” of his opposition to the
Department's motion, along with a cross-motion for
summary judgment. Dkt. 50. He subsequently moved for leave to
file “part two” of his opposition and
cross-motion out of time and, at the same time, moved for
reconsideration of the Court's March 28, 2017 opinion.
Dkt. 52. Because King has failed to show good cause for
filing out of time and has failed to demonstrate that
reconsideration is warranted, the Court will deny King's
motion for leave to file out of time and motion for
reconsideration.

King
had more than ample time to provide the Court with his
response to the Department's motion for summary judgment.
Having obtained numerous extensions, having received clear
notice of his final deadline, and having missed that final
deadline by a period of many weeks, he cannot not now obtain
a do-over. As explained in the Court's March 28, 2017
opinion, one issue remains to be adjudicated, and, going
forward, King should devote his attention to that remaining
issue.

I.
BACKGROUND

King,
who has been incarcerated throughout this proceeding, filed
this action on September 3, 2015, seeking records relating to
his criminal convictions from four Department of Justice
components: the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(“FBI”), the Office of the Solicitor General
(“OSG”), the Drug Enforcement Agency
(“DEA”), and the Executive Office for United
States Attorneys (“EOUSA”). Dkt. 1 at 2-3
(Compl.). On March 3, 2016, the Department moved to dismiss
or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, arguing that
each of these components had conducted adequate searches and
had released all non-exempt, reasonably segregable records.
Dkt. 26 at 1. In light of the fact that King was incarcerated
and was proceeding pro se, the Court sua
sponte extended his time to file an opposition by
several weeks and ordered that he respond on or before April
15, 2016. See Dkt. 27. In that same order, the Court
cautioned King of the consequences should he fail to file a
timely response. Id.

Shortly
before his time to respond expired, King filed a motion
seeking an additional sixty days to oppose the
Department's motion, Dkt. 30, which the Court granted,
see Minute Order (April 11, 2016). Under the revised
schedule, King had until June 15, 2016 to file his
opposition. Id. Then, shortly before that date, King
moved for an additional sixty days to file his opposition.
Dkt. 33. The Court, again, granted the relief King requested
and extended his time to respond until August 15, 2016.
See Minute Order (June 13, 2016). Shortly before
that deadline, King sought a further extension, this time for
ninety days. Dkt. 36. The Court granted in part and denied in
part that request, giving King an extension until October 7,
2016, to file his opposition and cautioning him that
“[n]o further extensions of time will be granted absent
a showing of extraordinary circumstances.” Minute Entry
(Aug. 24, 2016). Notwithstanding that admonition, the Court
received a letter (dated October 2, 2016) from King on
October 25, 2016, arguing that he had been denied sufficient
access to the prison library and seeking yet an additional
ninety-day extension. Dkt. 38. The Court granted that motion
and granted King until January 23, 2017, to file, but noted
that 326 days was more than sufficient time to respond to the
Department's motion and that the Court would not grant
any further extensions. See Minute Order (Nov. 9,
2016).

King
did not file an opposition or cross-motion on January 23,
2017, but, instead, filed a motion to “toll” his
time to respond “until further notice” because,
he asserted, the facility in which he was incarcerated was
frequently and without warning placed on lockdown for
indefinite periods of time, thus depriving him of access to
the prison law library. Dkt. 41 at 2-3. In response, the
Court ordered the Department of Justice to disclose how many
days King had been on lockdown in the preceding year.
See Minute Order (Jan. 26, 2017). The Department
answered that order, explaining that King had been on
lockdown for 42 days between January 26, 2016 and January 26,
2017. Dkt. 42-1 at 1-2 (Cowart Decl. ¶ 3). In the ninety
days following the Court's order granting King the final
ninety-day extension, King was on a two-day lockdown that
ended the day of the Court's order, and one additional
lockdown from January 6, 2017, to January 17, 2017.
Id. (Cowart Decl. ¶ 3). Thus, counting only
that final extension period, King has had over 75 days to
respond-more than five times as much time as this Court's
Local Rules ordinarily provide for an opposition.
See Local Civ. R. 7(b). Moreover, in aggregate, King
had over 280 days when he was not on lockdown between the
time the Department filed its motion and the end of the final
extension period. Even accepting that the Department's
tally did not include occasional lockdowns “for short
periods of time, typically an hour up to a few hours, ”
Dkt. 42-1 at 2 (Cowart Decl. ¶ 4), the Court found that
King had received more than ample time to respond and thus
denied his request for an indefinite extension, Dkt. 46 at
3-4. The Court cautioned King, moreover, that it intended
promptly to resolve the Department's long-pending motion
to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, and
that it would do so based on “whatever papers [were]
then before the Court.” Id. at 4.

Three
weeks later, on March 28, 2017, the Court issued a Memorandum
Opinion and Order granting in part and denying in part the
Department's motion for summary judgment. See
Dkt. 47 at 11. King, by that point, had had more than 300
days to respond. Id. at 1. Because he failed to do
so, the Court “accept[ed] the Department's factual
assertions to the extent they [were] supported by
declarations or other competent evidence” and
independently assessed “the sufficiency of the
Department's legal arguments, ” as required by the
D.C. Circuit's decision in Winston & Strawn, LLP
v. McLean, 843 F.3d 503, 507 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Dkt. 47
at 4. The Court concluded that the Department was entitled to
summary judgment on King's claims with respect to the
FBI, OSG, and the DEA. Id. at 5-10. The Court denied
summary judgment on King's EOUSA claim, however, because
the relevant declaration did not indicate whether the agency,
in withholding responsive records, had applied the proper
test. Id. at 10-11. The Court allowed the Department
to file a renewed motion for summary judgment on this claim,
id. at 11, which is due on January 8, 2018,
see Minute Order (Nov. 7, 2017).

On May
19, 2017, nearly two months after issuing its opinion, the
Court received a letter from King dated May 11. Dkt. 50 at
1-4. That letter asserts that five days before the Court
ruled on the Department's motion, King sent the Court
“part one” of his combined opposition to the
Department's motion and cross-motion for summary
judgment.[1]Id. at 1-2. King surmises that
that submission was lost in the mail, and he attributes his
delay in completing “part two” of his opposition
and cross-motion to prison lockdowns in March, April, and
May. Id. at 2-3. Although he purported to attach a
copy of his “part one” submission to his May 11,
2017 letter, the Court received only the first three pages
and the last page. See Dkt. 50 at 5-9.

Subsequently,
King filed an undated motion[2] for leave to file (1) “part
two” of his combined opposition and cross-motion for
summary judgment and (2) a motion for reconsideration of the
Court's March 28, 2017 Memorandum Opinion and Order. Dkt.
52 at 1- 2. King claims that he “was in the home
stre[t]ch of [preparing] part two at the end of April,
” but lockdowns for “almost all of May”
derailed his progress. Id. at 4. “[I]n an
abundance of caution, ” however, King “mail[ed]
what [he had-that is, “part two”] with some of
the exhibits to prove [he was] not slacking.”
Id. King attached twenty-six pages of a document
captioned “Part Two Of Plaintiff's Opposition . . .
And Motion for Reconsideration of [the Court's March 2017
Order] And Plaintiff's Cross[-]Motion For Summary
Judgment.” Id. at 5-30. This document ends
with the note, “To be continued, ” presumably
alluding to a forthcoming “part three.”
Id. at 30.

On
August 3, 2017, the Court asked the Department to indicate
“whether [its] counsel . . . received ‘part
one' of [King's] opposition” and, if so, the
date of receipt. Minute Order (Aug. 3, 2017). The Court also
instructed the Department to indicate “the days on
which [King] was on lockdown or otherwise precluded from
accessing legal and computing resources” since January
26, 2017 (the date of the Court's first request for
King's lockdown statistics). Id. In response,
the Department's counsel stated that he had “an
original copy of ‘part one'” but was
“unable to confirm the date of receipt.” Dkt. 58
at 1. The Department further reported that, for the
eight-month period from January 26 to September 18, 2017 (the
day on which the Department responded), King was on lockdown
during the following periods: February 10, 2017 through
February 21, 2017; April 19, 2017 through April 25, 2017; May
6, 2017 through May 29, 2017; June 22, 2017 through June 26,
2016; and August 8, 2017 through August 14, 2017. Dkt. 58-1
at 1-2 (Horikawa Decl. ¶¶ 3-4, 7). Thus, for the
sixty days between January 26, 2017, when King's
opposition and cross-motion were due, and March 28, 2017,
when the Court issued its Memorandum Opinion and Order, King
was on lockdown for only 19 days.

II.
ANALYSIS

King's
late submission of “part one” of his combined
opposition and cross-motion, subsequent motion for leave to
file “part two” of his motion out of time, and
motion for reconsideration require that the Court address two
issues. First, has King established “good cause”
for failing to file his combined opposition and cross-motion
in a timely manner? Second, has he shown that reconsideration
of the Court's March 28, 2017 Memorandum Opinion and
Order is warranted? The Court considers each of these issues
in turn.

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