@techreport{Leininger2004Fending,
abstract = {The implications of evolutionarily stable behavior in finite populations have
recently been explored for a variety of aggregative games. This note proves an
intimate relationship between submodularity and global evolutionary stability of
strategies for these games, which -apart from being of independent interest -
accounts for a number of results obtained in the recent literature: we show that
any evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) of a submodular aggregative game must
also be globally stable. I.e. if one mutant cannot successfully invade a population,
any number of mutants can even less do so.},
author = {Wolfgang Leininger},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {C79; D72; 330; Evolution\"{a}re Spieltheorie; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {1266},
title = {Fending off one means fending off all : evolutionary stability in submodular games},
type = {CESifo working papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18904},
year = {2004}
}