voxpopuli

Comment history

Science involves collection and analysis of data. The sufficiency of that data to support a theory (the answers the theory postulates) is the real "test." Your statement that "the test of any theory is whether or not it provides answers to basic questions" is just wrong.

There are some legitimate critiques of some of the evidence behind the evolutionary theory, but your critique and questions reveal only that you really don't know what the theory of evolution says or what science is or how it is conducted.

For example, the study of the origins of life is Abiogenesis not Evolution (which is concerned with what happened after life began)--thus arguments that the Theory of Evolution does not provide sufficient evidence for the creation of life are erroneous.

There's classified employees at the University of Kansas. Most employees are classified. Plame's supervisor says she never was a deep-cover NOC. Pilgrim noted that she worked at CIA headquarters for several years. Common ssense should tell us no covert agent would do so.

You are talking about two different meanings of the word "classified." Classified as the category of employee, such as at the University, is not the same as Classified as in information categorized as secret and not to be disseminated among those with access to it.

Plame's employment, regardless of whether she went in and out of the CIA headquarters, was Classified in this second sense. It was officially categorized as secret regardless of whether people knew about it. If you want to say that whether something is technically categorized as classified is not important in cases where it is not truly a secret--ok. But that differs from the standard that Pilgrim put forward for a traitor and to which I was responding.

I would also note, however, that the CIA considered it a breech of secrecy and they are likely to know considerably more about what Plame actually did for them than has been released to the public. Since they considered it a breech and her status with the CIA was officially classified as a secret, I am not really convinced by anecdotal testimony of people saying everyone knew or they saw her going in and out of the CIA building--especially since there has been equal amounts of anecdotal testimony saying that it was a secret and challenging the testimony of others who said it was not.

I still believe that the standard discussed by Pilgrim would also apply to the Plame situation and whoever leaked the information to the press.

I respect the consistancy of your stance generally, although with regard to Plame, I believe her status was classified regardless of whether she was covert or not. I don't think that has ever been questioned. It was a leak of classified information. Her covert status is an issue only with regard to prosecution for violating statutory provisions. Considering this, is the leaker a traitor or not?

I can't agree that leaking illegal government activities is the same as other leaking. I just don't trust any government so much that I would give them such unchecked power. The Constitution limits governmental power and if reporting abuse of power is being a traitor, the Constitution would lack any real meaning.

I also think torture and other clearly inhuman actions cause more long-term damage in the war on terror than it would ever likely prevent. I think the soldier who informed about Abu Ghraib did his duty and helped to put an end to the harm that was being done to our military and our country by the horrible acts taken in America's name at the prison.

Does it make any difference to anyone whether the CIA operation involved any legally or morally questionable actions such as in a certain Iraq prison?

I am simply questioning the basis for harm in the above article--that "interrogators cannot question him because leaks to the media prevent them from engaging in practices that would pry loose the critical information." That logic would seem to apply equally to leaks about the use of torture.

I would also be interested in how one would distinguish this from the Plame situation. Would leakers in that case also be traitors because they are "One who betrays another's trust or is false to an obligation or duty"? How about the soldier who leaked the information that broke the story on Abu Ghraib?

Commonsense--I did read the case, as well as the substantial arguments and evidence put forward by Jamesaust and Baille. You have provided no basis for calling this judicial activism that has not been more than adaquately rebutted. Your use of the term judicial activism isn't even consistant with any legitimate (or reasonable) interpretation of what is and is not the role of the judiciary--it is simply a decision with which you disagee. You think the judge came to the wrong decision. That's fine, but it doesn't make it judicial activism even if you are correct and the judge is wrong--although I personally believe his decision is the correct interpretation as did the two AG's prior to Kline, if I remember correctly.

Jamesaust--I agree with almost everything you said, but I would point out that Courts (including the U.S. Supreme Court) commonly consider and determine public policy issues in their decisions (Schaffer v. Weast is a recent example from the U.S. Supremes). It is not judicial activism to do so where the policy consideration is one that speaks to the likely intent of the legislature.

I would also clarify a point about the definition of sexual abuse. The statute does include consensual sex among 15 year olds as sexual abuse--it just doesn't have to be reported unless there is suspicion of injury (which I am sure you know but your discussion was a little misleading), and also that I don't believe the statute (or the decision for that matter) says that consensual sex among minors cannot in some circumstances involve injury (which I thought you implied in your discussion--if not, my bad) and thus trigger the reporting requirement.

Is it just me, or does anyone else think the legislature should do more to distinguish between abuse consisting of consensual fondling between two 15 year olds and abuse involving intercourse with a 12 year old? Both situations fall under the broad definition of "sexual abuse" without any recognition of the obvious differences between such situations.

Baille--you're working too hard. The court provides sufficient justification for jurisdiction when it says:

While everyone agrees that the Attorney General's Opinion does not bind any of the district or county attorneys in Kansas, it creates an untenable situation for reporters . . . the Kansas Supreme Court has long held that "[t]he attorney general's powers are as broad as the common law unless restricted or modified by statute." Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, Inc. v. Knutson, 239 Kan. 663, 667 (1986), citing State v. Finch, 128 Kan. 665 (1929). Thus, it appears that even if a county or district attorney chose to interpret the reporting statute in a manner . . . inconsistent with the Kline Opinion, the Attorney General has the power to commence a prosecution for failure to report. Several plaintiffs testified that a conviction for failure to report could result in the loss of licensure.

Thus the power inherent in the AG's opinion more than justifies judicial review.

CommonSense--reading the decision, I don't find any support for your claim that this is a case of judicial activism or simply a policy decision.

If judicial activism is going beyond the court's power to interpret the law rather than write it, the court appropriately addresses the issue.

The statute does not define injury, but requires an injury have occurred due to sexual abuse in order for the reporting requirement to kick in. The court must therefore determine the legislative intent with regard to the term injury. That is clearly a matter for judicial interpretation. To adopt the AG's argument that all illegal sexual conduct is inherently injurous would, as the court points out, be equivilent to erasing the injury requirement from the statute--in other words, it would be judicial activism.

I understand you don't like the result of the decision, but it is the legislature's job to create laws that are carefully drafted to clearly indicate their intent. If this outcome is not the one they intended, they should have defined injury in the statute or left the injury requirement out of the statute entirely. You should aim your contempt at the legislature for allowing this to be an issue--not the Judge for filling the gap the legislature left open.