Tunisia's Islamist-led coalition government has also managed to avoid the Egyptian revolution's two complex, but intimately connected historical disappointments: (1) the divisive, religious identity-politics constitution uncompromisingly written and imposed by the Islamist identity-politics victors of Egypt's free, post-revolution election and (2) the Egyptian military's subsequent popular and nationalist coup which toppled the inflexible, incompetent, distrusted, though democratically elected Islamist government, which imposed the destructive constitution.

No doubt the mistakes made by Egypt's former President Mohamed Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood regime informed and perhaps even tempered the decisions of Tunisia's political Islamist Ennahda party.

However, Tunisia's revolt preceded Egypt's. In November 2011, Ennahda won Arab Spring's first free election and assumed governing and constitution-drafting responsibilities well before the Brotherhood governed in Cairo. Ennahda's key leaders also publicly committed themselves to creating a democracy, well before Morsi and his cadre gave Egyptians a similar assurance.

But Morsi and his cohort lied. Enshrining Islamist identity-politics in the post-revolution constitution superseded revolutionary unity. It also killed democracy. Though at times they wavered, on the essential issues, Ennahda's leaders kept their word. They shared power with secular allies and when conflicts occurred, ultimately (if begrudgingly) sought consensus solutions. Muslim Brotherhood religious belligerence alienated secularists. When Morsi confronted serious challenges, he invoked rule by decree.

Despite gridlocked disagreements over drafting the constitution, Tunisian political leaders maintained a unified commitment to democracy. Abolhassan Bani-Sadr deserves credit for emphasizing the importance of a unified democratic front. Bani-Sadr, Iran's first president after the 1979 revolution, has been living in exile since 1981, the year the Ayatollah Khomeini removed him from power.

As disagreements over Tunisia's constitution hardened, violent Islamic militants tried to shatter the democratic front. In February Islamist terrorists assassinated opposition politician Chokri Belaid. Angry secularists burned an Ennahda party office. However, secularist and Ennadha leaders called for calm, arguing that the militants' strategic target was the democratic consensus.

In July militants murdered left-wing leader Mohamed Brahmi and al-Qaida-aligned Ansar al-Sharia terrorists killed eight Tunisian soldiers. Secularists accused Ennahda of failing to vigorously confront Muslim terror. The charge may have been unfair, but Ennahda had to acknowledge that a democracy cannot tolerate political assassination.

Four Tunisian civil organizations responded to the violence and division by forming the Quartet. The Quartet Initiative called for a national dialogue to resolve deadlocked constitutional disputes, draft and approve a consensus constitution, and transition to a constitutional democracy. Essentially, the Quartet challenged Ennahda to demonstrate it supported a “peaceful rotation of power.” In October Ennahda accepted the initiative. Its coalition agreed to turn the government over to a caretaker president and hold new elections after parliament approved a consensus constitution.

Last week, Tunisia's parliament approved a new constitution, and it is not based on sharia law. It provides for a separation of powers within the government, and guarantees civil rights, including the right to freedom of conscience. Women have equal political rights. In 2011, I surmised it would take three decades (at least) before we can knowledgably judge the success or failure of Tunisia's democratic revolt. However, to purloin a great phrase, adopting a consensus constitution and conducting a “peaceful rotation of power” would mark the end of the revolution's beginning.