In
order to replace the forces already stationed in the Dutch
East Indies
gradually, a number of independent infantry-brigades were trained in
the Netherlands. In the set-up of these brigades an independent
reconnaissance squadron was included.
This squadron consisted of a staff platoon and a support platoon, 3
reconnaissance platoons and a mortar platoon. A
reconnaissance platoon
existed of a reconnaissance section and an armed foot section, whilst
the mortar
platoon existed of three sections of 2 x 8 mortars each. Due to the
handover of
sovereignty, when it was decided that all forces were to be returned to
the Netherlands, only three independent infantry-brigades departed for
the Dutch Indies.The 41ste, 42nd and the 43rd Independent
Reconnaissance Squadrons formed part of these brigades.2.
The 41st Independent Reconnaissance Squadronby
H.H.Prinsen, reserve 1e lieutenant, retired.

The
conscripted recruits were called up on 19th January and 3rd March
1948
in the " Prins Willem III " barracks in Amersfoort. Major G. van Schaik
was appointed squadron commander.
On completion of training, the squadron left for the
Dutch Indies from Rotterdam by the
M.V. "Zuiderkruis" on 8th October
1948. On the voyage out, the squadron commander fell ill, and
unfortunately, on arrival in the Dutch Indies, had to be admitted into
the
Military Hospital in Batavia where he was declared unfit for service in
the
tropics.
On 1ste November 1948 the M.V. "Zuiderkruis" arrived
in Tandjong Priok harbour.
The squadron disembarked on 2nd November and was moved by lorries
to Batavia's railway station. From here followed a journey by
train to Bandoeng where it arrived at 14.00 pm.
Immediately on arrival, the squadron was split up per platoon and added
to:
1st Platoon-reconnaissance section, Lieutenant B.H. Klap;
1st Platoon-tirailleursection;
1e Squadron 1st Regiment Huzaren van Boreel, Major Van Stokkum;
2nd Platoon Reconnaissance section,
Lieutenant
V.M.F.B.P.Bouwdijk-Bastiaanse;
2nd Platoon tirailleur section, Lieutenant L.H.Ypes;
2nd Squadron 1st Regiment Huzaren van Boreel, major Simons;
3rd Platoon reconnaissance section, Lieutenant J. in 't
Veldt;
3rd Platoon tirailleur section, Lieutenant M.C.van Trigt;
Reserve Squadron 1st Regiment Huzaren van Boreel, Cavalry Captain Koch;
Mortar Platoon, Lieutenant H.H.Prinsen;
Mortar Platoon 1st Regiment Huzaren van Boreel, Cavalry Captain
Laurillard.
The platoons were transported by road to their destinations. The
staff-platoon stayed in Bandoeng for a short while and was then split
up and divided
over the platoons and squadrons of 1st Reconnaissance Regiment.
All equipement had been sent from Holland in advance and taken delivery
of
by the 1st Reconnaissance Regiment. In reality, it soon became clear
that the equipement had been "taken into custody"!
Very reluctantly only what was
required most urgently was released
to
the 41st IRS.
The Commander of the 1st Reconnaissance Regiment intended to use the
initial period for an extended training, in particular for infantry
patrol work!
The 2nd Platoon (Lieutenant Bouwdijk Bastiaanse/Ypes) and the Mortar
Platoon became actively almost immediately. The reason for this was
partly to
suppress the unrest from the side of TNI ans DI (Daril Islam), etc., in
the
areas concerned (Tjitjalengka-Garoet). Gradually the platoons were
given more
independent tasks, i.e. the manning of certain posts and the
responsibility for the protection of parts of certain areas. Mention
must be made of
the fact that much of the equipement required for these tasks remained
withheld.
These two platoons had to do much active patrolling, sometimes over
very long
distances with various succes and fairly frequent exchanges of fire
with TNI, DI and other groups and/or bands.
In addition the 2nd Platoon took part in the convoy duties of the 2nd
Squadron of the 1st Reconnaissance Regiment. In particular, in this
region the
activities of the TNI Siliwangi Division in the areas Nagrek,
Tjitjalenka and Madjalaja derserve mention. With effect from
29th March
1949 the 3rd Platoon (Lieutenant In 't Veld/ Van Tricht), the mortar
Platoon
(Lieutenant Prinsen) and part of the Staff were brought under the
command of the sub squadron commander, 1st Lieutenant G.Melis, and
added to the
3rd Squadron of the 1st Reconnaissance Regiment (Major Diemont).
This detachment under Lieutenant Melis was made responsible for the
posts
Patjet, Lamadjang, Tjiparaj, Bandjaran , Pameungpeuk, Ardja Sari,
Bodjong and
as from 7th July 1949 for the new post Koentji.
Roughly the foot of the mountain area south of Bandoeng, with a
TNI-pocket of
the Siliwangi Division.
20th August 1949 is the date the 41ste became independent tactically.
The
squadron was joined together finally under the command of cavalry
captain J.J. de Kat Angelino. The greater part of the former terrain of
the 2nd
Squadron 1st Reconnaissance Regiment became the action ground, that is,
the Northwest and Southwest of Garoet, roughly bordered by respectively
the Nagrek pas-Gunung Masigit-Gunung Tjikuray and in the East by the
line North out of Garoet. Detachments were posted in Leles, Trogong,
Panundjuk, Kadugora, Tjipanas and Bodjong Batoe.
As an independent unit the squadron joined the 3rd Infantry Brigade
commanded by Colonel H.M.G.J. Lenz, with headquarters in Garoet. With
this
independency and its own responsibility having been fully armed and
equiped with their own communication equipment, supplies and
intelligence, a very keen unit was formed.
It
was both prepared and ideally suited to carry out various orders
excellently,noted Colonel Lenz after a time.
This
was also necessary because the 41st Independent Reconnaissance
Squadron's orders were: " to free the area between Nagrek and Garoet
from DI and later TNI,
to restore peace and order". All this emplied
very intensive
patrolling and continued pressure resulting in a great many enemy
losses.

A record number of "patrolling hours" per man in the 3rd Infantry
Brigade was reached in September 1949.
In addition, joint actions
were
carried out with other units of the
Brigade, in or outside the Brigade territory. Also some
moderately dangerous attacks on their own posts were repulsed e.g. at
Leles,
Daradjat and
Trogong.
Apart from battle
patrols, intelligence gathering patrols were
carried out.
Because of the large spread of smallpox amongst the civil
population in
these areas, the Red-Cross teams were
accompanied by patrols. For the benefit
the evacuated population "foodsupplies"transports took place.
Also convoy protection was supplied twice daily between Garoet and
Tasikmalaja v.v. wich often lead to exchanges of fire.
For a short
period also the main commander of
the 3rd Infantry Brigade, Squadron units often escorted Colonel Lenz.
A
completely different situation existed after the
hand-over of
sovereignty.
DI and TNI tried to avoid
fire
contact.
The DI was even seen to make some friendly gestures
"Fraternisation"
with
compulsory, resulting in the start of a training session
of
twenty TNI-servicemen in Trogong on 9th January 1950.
However, convoy-escort duty was still provided when KNIL
detachments
were moved
from Tasikmalaja to Soekaboemi following the hand-over of Sovereignty.
In the afternoon of 23rd January 1950 a reinforced battalion was
directed to Bandoeng to lend assistance to the maintaining of order and
peace
during and after the withdrawal of the revolting armed troops
under the
well-known Captain Raymond Westerling, and to petrol in the
town to reassure the
civil population.*)
This detachment remained stationed in Bandoeng until the
repatriation of the
Squadron to the Netherlands.
Following
the further
hand-over of territories on 26the January, most of the Squadron was
transferred to the Pengalengan district. A detachment
stayed behind
to lend convoy and other protection duties. One day after their
departure
most of the servants that were left behind were killed on the
aloon-aloon
in Trogong by the Indonesians.
The guard duties proved the final and lightest tasks to be carried
out
by
the Squadron in the Dutch Indies. Some
difficulties were experienced
now
and again, though,
from the side of the TNI, who had settled themselves in
the maintime at the foot of the mountains South of
Bandoeng. The 41ste
Independent Reconnaissance Squadron managed to limit itself
to some robust and
not to misconstrued shows of strength which
provided
sufficient to prevent (serious) irregularities. The latter was not the
case with
the platoon posted in Bandoeng.
During a confrontation one night between the crew of
an armoured 3/4
ton
vehicle
and a number of TNI soldiers, the TNI suffered a number of killed and
wounded. The soldiers manning the TNI post fell back and
whilst doing so met an
advance party of the TNI Battalion manning the Trade Fair Building.
This resulted in a mutual exchange of fire in the dark.
Althought the correct
number of victims was never published, this
incident caused
the stay of the 41st to be shortened considerably. Both
TNI and the Civil Republican
Government insisted on the 41st Squadron's leaving
the Indies at the
earliest possible moment! Pending their departure for the Netherlands
the whole
Squadron
was
concentrated and billeted in the barracks at the
Papandjanlaan
in Bandoeng.
On 31st May 1950 about
70% of the squadron sailed for the Netherlands
per
M.V. "General J.H. McRae" under the command of
Lieutenant B.H.Klap. The
remainder left the harbour of Tandjong Priok on the 6th June 1950 under
the
command of Lieutenant H.H.Prinsen per
M.V. "Kota Inten". These
vessels
reached Rotterdam harbour on 23rd June
and 6th Juli
respectivily.
----------------------------
*)
The revolt was carried out by the APRA
(Ankatan Perang Ratoe
Adil
= Forces of the honorable king)
Former
KNIL Captain Westerling had managed to raise a
small force of
a few
hundred followers on his return from Celebes. He had
recruited this
small army from various
local village militias trained by himself such
as Laskar Ra'jat, ex TNI-soldiers and some
other anti Republican fractions. Their aim
was to force
Soekarno, who wanted a centrally led Republican state,
to agree to a federation of a number of Indonesian
states
with a certain degree of autonomy.
Also West-Java (Pasoedan) was alloted this autonomy.
Rumours to this effect
had already been calculating since
the beginning of 1949, more solid
and real
indications had not been lacking either. The APRA
attacks were
aimed at Batavia and Bandoeng. The attack on Batavia did not
materialise and therefore the APRA troops had to
leave Bandoeng
without gaining their end.
---------------------------
personalia,
regular-reservists, of the 41st Independent
Reconnaissance Squadron,
the last rank between ( )