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Arguably the automotive blockbuster news so far in 2012, the General Motors alliance with PSA Peugeot Citroen will do much to fill column-inches.

These types of deals have a history of mixed results. Chrysler in the '80s had an equity stake in Peugeot (this is not well remembered) which was largely unexploited, produced no tangible benefits to either company, and was sold off during one of Chrysler's periodic "we're a little short right now" periods.

In more recent times, GM, under the leadership of Jack Smith, embarked on a broad "alliance strategy," taking minority equity slices in Suzuki, Isuzu, Subaru maker Fuji Heavy as well as, in Europe, Fiat.

The goals were similar to those stated for the current linkup: sharing technologies, reducing fixed costs, economies of scale in purchasing, and access to a broader product portfolio. Some of it actually happened: Suzuki provided the Chevy "Tracker" small SUV and other low-end products; Isuzu shipped medium-commercial, city-delivery trucks under the Chevrolet and GMC badges; Fiat gave GM access to passenger-car diesel engines, (an area of woeful neglect in GM Europe's own product plan), as well as some purchasing savings.

But none of these alliances produced game-changing results. They were ultimately unwound, and the Fiat "divorce" cost an already-stressed GM a couple of billions.

What's typical of these minority investments in a financially threatened company is that they start with a grand and well-articulated "vision" projected by the two senior leaderships: "Why, with our two companies linked, our combined volume, our complementary strengths, anything is possible!"

But senior leadership's boundless enthusiasm is soon slowed, absorbed and ultimately fully digested when the "vision" reaches the bowels of the two ships. "WE aren't giving up the midsize architecture, you give YOURS up and use OURS!" Since jobs, budgets, influence and good old personal pride are at stake, much effort is expended in studying and analyzing why "ours is better," to the detriment of moving ahead. For GM, much is at stake: focusing on Europe only and blending Opel with Peugeot would theoretically benefit European operations, but could compromise or even kill the hard-won GM global architectural "Lego set."

For this alliance to work and produce actual benefits, an unrelenting senior-level focus is required, forcing timely "Plan A or Plan B" decisions on a pair of reluctant organizations. It's actually worth the full-time effort of one senior officer from each company, meeting daily and forcing decisions. Absent the senior management spurs, each company will participate in endless "joint study groups" which will periodically report to a "Joint Steering Committee", which will urge "timely" resolution of undecided issues. Meanwhile, both organizations will feel a bit less threatened by the battering seas of the market forces: after all, we're lashed to another vessel now! How could the storm sink us both?

I think this is a bold strategic move on the part of GM, and an act of "Realpolitik" on the part of Peugeot. But the leaders of the two companies have to adopt a no-compromise, laser-like focus on rapidly eliminating duplicate efforts, people, processes and products. "Business as usual" would doom this to becoming yet another in GM’S list of feel-good, marginally productive linkups that eventually have to be unwound, with each side extolling the significant financial benefits of the divorce.