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Most histories of the U.S. Army in World War II view the Mediterranean Theater of Operations primarily as a deadly training ground for very green forces, where lessons learned on beaches of Oran, in hills of the Kasserine Pass area, and at the collapse of the Tunis bridgehead all contributed to later success in Western Europe. Steven Barry, however, contends that victory in the MTO would not have materialized without the leadership of battalion-level commanders. They operated at a high level, despite the lack of combat experience for themselves and their troops, ineffective leadership at higher levels, and deficiencies in equipment, organization, and mobilization. Barry portrays these officers as highly trained, adaptable, and courageous in their first combat experiences in North Africa and Sicily. Their leadership, he argues, brought discipline, maturity, experience, and ability to translate common operational guidance into tactical reality, and thus contributed significantly to battlefield success in North Africa and Sicily in 1942-943. He examines their prewar experiences, including professional military education and unit training exercises; personal factors such as calmness and physical resilience under fire; and ability to draw upon doctrine, creatively apply resources at their disposal, and clearly define and communicate mission goals and means. He also reveals how battalion leaders incorporated technological innovations into combined arms maneuvers by employing tank capabilities and close air support doctrine. As Barry's assessment shows, these battalion commanders were not the sole reason for the Allied triumph in North Africa and Sicily, but victory would not have been possible without the special brand of military leadership they exhibited throughout those campaigns. Under their leadership, even inexperienced units were able to deliver credible combat performance, and without the regular army battalion leaders, U.S. units could not have functioned tactically early in the war. One of the few studies to focus on tactical adaptation at the battalion level in conventional warfare, Barry's book attests to the pivotal value of professional military education, and makes an important contribution to today's "organizational learning" debate, while providing an in-depth view of adaptation of U.S. infantry and armored forces in 1942-1943.Read more...

West Point evolution --
A new approach in the classroom --
Forging cadets into soldiers: tactical training --
Into the gym and onto the fields --
Role models --
Forging leaders beyond the Hudson --
Regular Army training --
The Civilian Conservation Corps and New Deal impacts --
The Thomason Act diversifies --
The next step: Army service schools --
The Army General Headquarters maneuvers --
Wading in with Torch --
The Western Task Force arrives in Morocco --
Mixed results: elite units at Oran --
Waters at the Torch landings --
The Big Red One at Oran --
The training of one division: 1st Armored Division --
The Eastern Assault Force at Algiers --
The race for Tunisia --
Battalion leadership in the fight for Chouigui Pass --
Medjez el Bab: indicators of weak leadership --
The struggle to coordinate at Longstop Hill --
Evaluating armored warfare data --
A long February in the Tunisian passes --
Marooned infantrymen: the 168th committed by the II Corps --
Hightower, leadership traits, and defeat at Faid Pass --
Alger, overwhelming numbers, and the defeat at Sidi Bou Zid --
Stopping the bleeding at Kasserine --
A greenless spring to end Tunisia --
Operational leadership challenges --
From el Guettar to Matuer: the infantry divisions put it all together --
Howze, battle plays, and the breakthrough at Mateur --
Cole and the issue of greenness --
The last first battle, Sicily --
Thunderbirds rising: building learning organizations prior to combat --
Rock of the Marne overcoming friction at Licata --
The Fighting First at Gela --
Paratroopers in action against armor --
Conclusion --
Historiography essay.

Abstract:

Examines the largely unsung leadership of U.S. Army battalion commanders in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations of World War II and concludes that they were hugely instrumental in overcoming their German Adversaries to emerge victorious, first in North Africa (Operation TORCH) and then in Sicily (Operation HUSKY).Read more...

Reviews

Editorial reviews

Publisher Synopsis

""Battalion Commanders at War" is an important read for students of the U.S. Army, and not merely during World War II."--"New York Military Affairs Symposium Review"