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United Nations
Office of Internal Oversight Services
Internal Audit Division II
Audit Report
Audit of UNOG Security and Safety Section
(AE2005/311/06)
Report No. E05/R18
Report date: 22 December 2005
Auditors: Anita Hirsch, Chunlin Tang, Eve Satin
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UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES
Office of Internal Oversight Services
Internal Audit Division II
Audit of UNOG Security and Safety Section (AE2005/311/06)
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
From June to August 2005, OIOS conducted an audit of UNOG Security and Safety Section (SSS).
SSS is part of UNOG; its Chief has a dual reporting line to the Director of Administration, UNOG
and to the Director, Division of Safety and Security Services, Department of Safety and Security.
UNOG has accepted most recommendations made and is in the process of implementing them.
Security management system
� No official coordinating mechanism existed for the many United Nations entities in Geneva
and their respective security structures to allow for a "unified security management structure"
in Switzerland. UNOG commented that efforts had recently been made to formalize a
coordination mechanism under the leadership of the Director-General, UNOG in his capacity
as the Designated Official for Switzerland, who established a Senior Management Team.
� While UNOG had established its Senior Emergency Management Group (SEMG) in June
2003, it has never been activated.
Mission and functions
� The ST/SGB/2000/4 on the organization of the United Nations Office at Geneva does not fully
reflect UNOG SSS responsibilities vis-�-vis annex buildings and other United Nations
Secretariat entities in Geneva. Some core functions related to the safety and security of persons
and property were not properly carried out due to insufficient priority setting, lack of resources
and means to enforce applicable security regulations and rules. UNOG confirmed that the
revised ST/SGB would reflect the services SSS provides, as well as its change of status. A
policy on priorities would also be prepared.
� The Memoranda of Understanding with client organizations are not clear on the responsibility
of UNOG SSS in the event of a security crisis or emergency. UNOG agreed that a clear plan
of activities should be established.
SSS structure and organization
� The establishment of the Department of Safety and Security resulted in new reporting lines for
UNOG SSS. In practice, the necessary arrangements still need to be worked out to clarify what
issues on a day-to-day basis are reported to whom. The envisaged transfer of administrative
responsibilities from UNOG Central Support Services to SSS remains to be implemented.
� The planning function is decentralized resulting in duplication of efforts and scattered
information related to leave, training schedules, etc. and in questions as to the objectivity of the
assignment of staff to various stations. With the sharp increase in the size of the Section,
UNOG SSS should reinstate a central planning function, with adequate information sharing
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among units, and invest in specific software for planning and resource allocation. UNOG stated
that the creation of the Coordination and Planning Unit was planned for January-February
2006 and that a staff scheduling software had already been purchased in NewYork.
SSS processes
� Badges and magnetic cards - UNOG SSS recognized the security defects of the current badge
system. OIOS further identified risk areas in the outdated list of persons who authorise badge
issuance, the ineffective process for checks on external contractors and the release to an
external recycling company of expired badges intact without destroying them first. The 5-year
limit to retain information on badge holders leads to systematic destruction of essential paper
files even for long-term UNOG staff members.
� Access control - The requirement for all staff members to wear their badges at all times has not
fully been enforced. Screening of delivery trucks has not been systematic.
� Fire Group - The fire-related responsibilities of UNOG SSS are not clear. The extent of
autonomy, response and means that need to be deployed by UNOG SSS and by the local Fire
Service remain to be formally stated. The controls over fire extinguishers were unsatisfactory.
� Investigation - There are no formal terms of reference or guidelines for the activities of the
Investigation Sub-Unit.
� UNOG confirmed that the necessary action had already been initiated or would be initiated in
the months to come.
Human resources management
� Security officers in UNOG have the status of General Service staff with no further
requirements specific to the security function, such as stricter requirement for medical
clearance. Until recently, there has been no testing on substance or alcohol abuse, nor
psychological testing prior to release of firearms. Personnel files did not systematically include
police records. UNOG confirmed that medical checks, testing as well as background checks
were or would soon be implemented.
� The assignment of staff on a permanent basis to the night shift team, the high ratio of 28 per
cent of security officers performing office and administrative functions and workload statistics
developed for the various activities of the Section to support the allocation of resources, need
to be reconsidered. UNOG will look into the implementation of the recommendation in 2006.
� In view of the Headquarters Minimum Operating Security Standards (H-MOSS), a
comprehensive training programme has been developed. However, the new objective of 10
training days per staff and year could result in a chronic deficit of staff during the training, as
the original basis for additional staffing resources required under H-MOSS was only five days.
� Performance appraisals for the period 2003/2004 contained standard comments and, in some
cases, did not fully reflect actual functions of the staff. The PAS should be used as an effective
tool for performance management and to provide guidance for career development. UNOG
indicated that this would be implemented by the end of the current PAS period.
Firearms management and safekeeping
� A task force is currently reviewing the firearms policy. However, considering its critical
importance, UNOG SSS should, without delay, clearly define the responsibilities of the
custodian and collect outstanding firearms or duly document their location or transfer. UNOG
indicated that improvements, such as a software application, SOPs and a new post for firearm
management were being implemented.
December 2005
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER Paragraphs
I. INTRODUCTION 1-3
II. AUDIT OBJECTIVES 4
III. AUDIT SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 5-6
IV. AUDIT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Security management system 7-10
B. Missions and functions 11-23
C. Structure and organization 24-29
D. Processes 30-45
E. Human resources 46-57
F. Asset management 58-61
G. Headquarters minimum operating security standards 62-65
V. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 66
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I. INTRODUCTION
1. From 13 June to 26 August 2005, OIOS conducted an audit of UNOG's security and
Safety Section. The audit was conducted in accordance with the International Standards for
the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing.
2. The Security and Safety Section is part of UNOG, its Chief reporting to the Director
of Administration and at the same time to the Director, Division of Safety and Security
Services of the newly created Department of Safety and Security at New York Headquarters.
The Section is composed of the operations in the Palais des Nations building, comprising the
Palais operations Unit and the Specialised Interventions Unit, the Administration and Support
Unit and the Special Services and Annexes Subunits. As of July 2005, total staff was 146, of
which 36 were posted in annex buildings, servicing other extra budgetary entities. Total
budget for the Section in 2004-2005 amounted to $25 million for the regular budget and $4.1
million for extrabudgetary activities.
3. The findings and recommendations contained in this report have been discussed
during the Exit Conference held on 12 September 2005 with the Officer-in-Charge, Division
of Administration, the Chef de Cabinet, Office of the Director-General, the Chief, Deputy
Chief and Assistant Chief of the Security and Safety Section. A draft of this report was shared
with the Officer-in-Charge, Division of Administration on 8 November 2005, whose
comments have been reflected in the report in italics. UNOG has accepted most
recommendations and is in the process of implementing them.
II. AUDIT OBJECTIVES
4. The main objectives of the audit were to evaluate the adequacy and effectiveness of
controls to ensure:
� Effectiveness and efficiency of operations;
� Safeguarding of assets; and
� Compliance with relevant United Nations regulations, rules and instructions.
III. AUDIT SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
5. The audit focused on the main organizational components of UNOG SSS, namely its
environment, and the Security Management System in Geneva, its missions, structure,
processes and resources. The review focused on the current organization and processes, taking
into account all changes to be implemented as part of the Headquarters Minimum Operating
Security Standards (H-MOSS) compliance process.
6. The audit activities included a review and assessment of existing operating
procedures and the compliance thereof, interviews with staff, analysis of applicable data and a
review of the available documents and other relevant records.
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IV. AUDIT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Security Management System
(a) Security coordination mechanisms
7. Strengthening the Security Management System requires a coordinated response to
emergency situations at a duty station. However no official mechanism exists for the many
United Nations funds and programmes in Geneva, let alone specialized agencies, and their
respective security structures to allow for a "unified security management structure" in
Switzerland.
8. The United Nations security accountability framework relies on a Designated Official
at each duty station, who is fully responsible for the safety and security of United Nations
personnel. Given the number of organizations and agencies, the executive direction of which
is in Geneva, the role and responsibilities of the Designated Official as the "senior United
Nations official at a duty station" needs to be clarified as applied to Geneva and Switzerland.
UNOG commented that, although the Director General had been recently confirmed
Designated Official for Switzerland by the Under-Secretary-General, Department of Safety
and Security, there was still a need to communicate the significance of this function and the
associated responsibilities to other United Nations system entities.
9. Efforts have recently been made to formally create a coordination mechanism, under
the leadership of the Designated Official for Switzerland, with several meetings held with
representatives of UN Geneva based entities. Early November 2005, the Director-General,
UNOG in his capacity as Designated Official for security matters for Switzerland, consulted
with Heads of Specialized Agencies, Funds and Programs in Geneva and by memorandum
dated 22 November 2005, established the Senior Management Team. An ad hoc Working
Group will assist the SMT with all matters included in the SMT's Terms of Reference at the
working level. The DO also established the Executive Secretariat of the SMT and of its
Working Group, and defined the Terms of Reference of the Executive Secretary.
(b) The UNOG Senior Emergency Management Group (SEMG)
10. Using the model of the Crisis Management Operational Plan, developed at New York
Headquarters in 2002, UNOG developed its own plan in 2003, articulated around a SEMG,
which "Identifies potential security threats or emergency situations, analyzes current crisis
situations and identifies possible response scenarios, advises the Director-General on matters
related to prevention and response to emergency situations, upon the occurrence of a crisis,
will decide on the appropriate security phase to be retained in order to protect the staff and the
property." While the SEMG was established in June 2003 and its members appointed, the
Group was never activated. OIOS supports UNOG's recent initiative to update the list of
members of the SEMG and to plan for a workshop on crisis management to take place in the
fall 2005, to bring all members together and start building awareness on their functions and
eventual responsibilities.
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B. Missions and functions
(a) Mission statement
11. The ST/SGB/2000/4 on the organization of the United Nations Office at Geneva
summarizes UNOG SSS mission as: "Ensuring the safety and security of persons and property
at the Palais des Nations, including providing special security services for conferences and
other events, and for United Nations officials, as required". This statement does not fully
reflect UNOG SSS responsibilities, namely the services provided in the Annexes and other
United Nations Secretariat entities.
Recommendation:
The UNOG Division of Administration should initiate a revision of
the January 2000 ST/SGB on the Organization of UNOG to
properly reflect that UNOG SSS provides security services to a
variety of United Nations entities within and outside the Palais des
Nations (Rec. 01).
12. UNOG confirmed that a revised version of the relevant ST/SGB had already been
initiated in July 2004 and that it would be further revised by March 2006, so as update the
services SSS provides, as well as its change of status. OIOS will close the recommendation
upon issuance of the revised ST/SGB.
(b) Operational priorities and allocation of resources
13. Despite its mission statement and UNOG SSS management confirmation that Palais
operations were always a priority, insufficient prioritisation and conflicting activities were
recurrent topics among the security officers who were interviewed. OIOS also observed that
the Section seemed to be stretched too thin to conduct its missions in full. To replace staff on
leave, on external missions or on training, the Section resorts to temporary staff, who are
often assigned to the Palais operations, since Annexes or special missions require specific
expertise. OIOS calculated that, for the month of July 2005, the share of temporary resources
to total staff in the Palais operations reached a level as high as 64 per cent. OIOS believes that
UNOG SSS should determine the level of temporary resources acceptable to adequately
perform its functions in the Palais des Nations.
14. OIOS also noted that UNOG SSS lacked the resources and means to enforce
applicable regulations and rules, to achieve its missions, regarding the following:
� Control access and surveillance in the premises are impaired, as the policy to wear
badges visible at all times is not fully enforced in the Palais des Nations;
� Security coordination with staff is limited due to high absenteeism of wardens in UNOG
SSS' periodic training sessions on security and fire safety;
� The policy of control for the removal of assets, set out in ST/SGB/193/rev.1 provides
for a follow-up of equipment removed from the premises, which is not complied with
and UNOG SSS does not have the resources to conduct the necessary checks.
15. UNOG stated that on the one side SSS services at Geneva include security services at
`client' annexes, which aim to provide quality management to be able to service UNOG and
its annexes, without any priority among them. On the other side, SSS services at Geneva have
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priority over external conferences. A policy on the matter is being prepared. As for badge
control, it was indicated that SSS is reviewing its access control policy, based on a new
system that is being developed in coordination with DSS, and measures to enforcement of
badge wearing are being examined. The project should be finalized by late 2006. The issue of
the fire-wardens will be revisited in the context of the full review of fire and safety in UNOG,
to be carried out in mid 2006. While equipment and property tracking is within the purview of
the Mail Pouch and Inventory Section, UNOG SSS indicated it would work with the latter in
order to determine the most suitable strategy.
16. OIOS found that general objectives were not further developed into concrete
performance indicators for SSS. The indicators as disclosed in the proposed programme
budget could be improved to effectively measure the Section's performance.
Recommendation:
UNOG SSS should formally set operational priorities, assign
adequate resources and develop performance indicators for its
activities including other stakeholders' prerequisite actions, to
enforce existing instructions and policies (Rec. 02).
17. UNOG noted the recommendation and stated that the establishment of realistic
indicators would be discussed at the UNSSSNET meeting in December 2006.
(c) Services rendered to United Nations entities
18. From the Memoranda of Understanding signed with the client organizations, UNOG
SSS provides "security and safety services, within the premises." From this general
statement, it is not clear what the responsibility of UNOG SSS is in the event a crisis occurs,
since no clear link is made between the level of security to be achieved and the resources
provided by the clients.
19. Recently, UNOG SSS undertook H-MOSS compliance reviews and issued
recommendations to the clients on the improvements to security. However, UNOG SSS is not
part of the ensuing decision-making process, which is entirely left with the client. For
example at UNHCR and ITC, the decision to increase the security resources was concomitant
with UNOG's. Still it took UNHCR eight months from the approval of new posts to submit to
UNOG SSS an official request to provide the additional guards. The process is protracted,
where the decision to authorize additional resources has not yet been taken, or action needs to
be coordinated with the Swiss authorities (FIPOI).
Recommendation:
UNOG SSS should liaise with UNOG FRMS and clients to clarify
the nature and extent of its responsibilities vis-�-vis clients in case
of emergency or crisis situations with due consideration to the
adequacy of resources provided (Rec. 03).
20. UNOG agreed that a clear plan of activities should be established.
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(d) Services to United Nations staff
21. With the exception of a 45-minute presentation of UNOG SSS at the twice-yearly
orientation programme for newly recruited staff of the UN Secretariat in Geneva, no induction
training specific to Geneva is in place to raise staff awareness for security issues. The security
intranet site only provides instructions on evacuation and could usefully include information
and guidance to staff on other security and safety issues. UNOG SSS indicated that a project
to develop such an intranet page exists and was submitted to the Director-General, but that for
the moment, neither they, nor the UNOG Information and Communication Technology
Section, could make the resources available. UNOG indicated that the Internet project would
be taken into consideration by May 2006.
22. Security officers at Door six, collect payments from and issue receipts to staff
members for posting small announcements on the bulletin board. At times, receipts issued
were not properly numbered and dated. Periodically, one designated Security Officer deposits
the accumulated amount of cash collected into the bank account of the Staff Council. The
UNOG Staff Council treasurer compares the deposit slips with pertinent entries in the bank
statement. For some days in July and August 2005, no receipt was issued to staff members
due to lack of blank receipts. Instead, a log of daily total amount received is maintained in the
Door six security logbook. These duties are not included in the job descriptions of Security
Officers and do not relate to their primary mission.
Recommendation:
UNOG should assign to another UNOG office the functions of
handling and depositing cash and posting of announcements, which
are not within the mandate of the UNOG SSS. In the meantime,
UNOG SSS should ensure that proper receipts are issued and
periodically verified to deposit slips and bank statements (Rec. 04).
23. UNOG accepted the recommendation and will review the issue with the Staff
Coordination Council in January 2006.
C. Structure and organization
(a) Reporting lines
24. The General Assembly resolution 59/276, creating the Department of Safety and
Security, resulted in new reporting lines for UNOG SSS. A memo from the Under-Secretary-
General for Safety and Security, dated 31 May 2005, provided that the Chief of Security
reports regularly to, and gets policy direction and operational guidance from, the Director,
Division of Safety and Security Services, in the Department of Safety and Security. However,
a reporting line also exists to the Director-General "in fulfilling the overall responsibility for
security" in Geneva. In August 2005, the Director-General delegated his responsibility to the
Director of Administration, and for the interim period, to the Officer-in-Charge of the
Division of Administration, through the Chief of Central Support Services, reverting to the
initial structure until further instruction is received from DSS.
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Recommendation:
UNOG should, in consultation with DSS, clarify the reporting lines
of UNOG SSS, including practical guidelines as to what security-
related issues should be reported to whom, and disseminate them to
all staff members concerned (Rec. 05).
25. UNOG commented that the reporting lines had already been clarified in a
Memorandum from the USG/DSS dated 31 May 2005, a videoconference on 5 July 2005 and
a Memorandum from the Director-General, UNOG dated 15 August. OIOS still believes that
these should be further developed and detailed to be fully operational.
26. It is also planned that administrative management of approved budget resources and
staffing tables for Security and Safety services at all duty stations should be centralized at
Headquarters. However, the conditions of this transfer of administrative responsibilities for
the SSS, as well as those for the delegation to administer approved budget and staffing tables
in UNOG, remain to be defined. As of now, SSS is lacking the skills to fully carry out
administrative responsibilities and the process to approve the reclassification of security posts
into administrative ones has not yet been initiated. UNOG commented that the establishment
of the Administrative Unit within SSS, which would tentatively consist of four GS posts under
the supervision of the Deputy Chief, SSS, was under way.
(b) Internal organization
27. The planning function within SSS has been decentralized resulting in duplication of
efforts and scattered information related to leave, training schedules, etc. Also questions have
come up as to the objectivity of the assignment of staff to the various stations. With the sharp
increase of the size of the Section, OIOS believes that a central planning function should be
reinstated, with adequate information sharing among units, and specific software for planning
and resource allocation. In the latest organigramme submitted by UNOG SSS to DSS, an
Operational Planning Unit is created and, although it falls under the Uniform Security
Operations Group, UNOG SSS confirmed that it would be a central planning function. UNOG
stated that the creation of the Coordination and Planning Unit was planned for January-
February 2006 and that a staff scheduling software had already been purchased in New York.
28. Throughout the audit, many of the problems raised and complaints formulated
officially or unofficially were related to inadequate or insufficient information and
communication. It was also reported on several instances that the monthly Section meetings
were not satisfactory (no minutes exist), and none took place in the recent period. The
creation of an internal and external information function, as provided for in H-MOSS, would,
in OIOS' view, solve some of these `transparency' issues. UNOG SSS should also invest
more efforts in communicating the objectives, target dates, progress made and changes
introduced by H-MOSS, to ensure that all staff are informed and understand the objectives
and stakes of the project.
Recommendation:
UNOG SSS should introduce regular formal communication to
enhance information sharing within the Section and update all staff
members on the status and progress of H-MOSS implementation
(Rec. 06).
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29. UNOG SSS commented that conclusions from an internal survey and a working group
were being reviewed and that internal vectors of communication already included a
broadcast system, monthly meetings, minutes of which were systematically prepared, and a
monthly newsletter. OIOS will close the recommendation upon receipt of the minutes of the
monthly meetings and copies of the monthly newsletter.
D. Processes
30. OIOS reviewed UNOG SSS' main activities to ensure that adequate and
comprehensive procedures were in place. In the context of H-MOSS implementation, UNOG
SSS developed and promulgated security policies, techniques and procedures, via Standard
Operating Procedures. The task of identifying and developing the areas necessitating SOPs
had been delegated to the Units. Further instructions on ways to manage, monitor and update
these procedures should be developed through a workshop, to take place in the fall of 2005.
31. From our review of the various processes of UNOG SSS, shortfalls, as well as good
practices, were identified in the following areas.
(a) Badges and magnetic cards
32. In general, UNOG SSS is well aware of the security defects of the current badge
system, including easily forgeable identity badges. It is expected that the implementation of
the Secretariat-wide Global ID System will introduce significant improvement. It is
noteworthy that the online identification system used by UNOG SSS has significantly reduced
the delays in badge-issuance and allows for instant checks by access control officers.
33. OIOS noted in particular that:
� The list of persons authorizing the badge issuance was outdated;
� There is no coordination between the issuance of badges by the ID Unit and the release
of magnetic cards by another UNOG SSS unit. A standard check-in procedure could be
developed to streamline and coordinate these two processes. UNOG SSS explained that
magnetic cards would fall under the ID Unit upon completion of the Pregny security
gate currently under construction;
� The period left for external contractors to provide the necessary document to issue a
non-temporary badge was long (up to 45 days). Following UNOG SSS comment, that
some contractors had difficulty providing the documents within a given time, OIOS
believes that the control in place is ineffective and could be enhanced;
� Expired badges are released intact to an external company for recycling. UNOG SSS
should consider destroying them prior to their release;
� The 5-year limit to retain information on badge holders leads to systematic destruction
of essential paper files older than five years, including information relating to long-term
UNOG staff still holding badges;
� Practices at different duty stations could be adopted, which require the badge holder to
acknowledge his/her responsibility to return the badge or report its loss.
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Recommendations:
UNOG SSS should improve security procedures related to the
issuance and management of badges, namely:
- Ensuring that the list of persons authorizing badge
issuance is up-to-date;
- Reconsidering the policy for issuing badges to external
contractors;
- Destroying expired badges prior to their release;
- Ensuring valid information is available on all current
badge holders;
- Requiring badge holders to acknowledge their
responsibility to return badges or to report their loss
(Rec. 07).
34. UNOG stated that efforts were being made to update the list of authorizing persons,
issue instructions regarding destruction of badges and finalizing the ID Standard Operating
Procedures. The issue of external contractors would be looked into within the context of the
complete review of the access control policy.
(b) Access control
35. The requirement for all staff members to wear their badges at all times is not fully
enforced at the Palais des Nations, making it difficult for security officers to control access at
the gates and within the premises. OIOS also observed that delivery trucks screening was not
systematically performed. In response to the audit findings, UNOG recently issued a circular
requesting staff members, conference participants, journalists and all persons visiting the
Palais des Nations to show their ground pass to security officers on duty upon request and to
wear it visibly at all times while on UNOG grounds. OIOS appreciates the immediate action
taken. UNOG further indicated that standing orders are in place for delivery trucks to be
systematically checked.
36. Visitors joining the guided tours of the Palais are not accompanied to the gate at the
end of the tour and are free to wander around the premises where no access is restricted.
UNOG indicated that it is envisaged to negotiate with DPI means and ways to establish more
strict controls on visitors.
Recommendation:
UNOG SSS should enforce controls over access of all vehicles and
users of the Palais des Nations to its gates and premises in order to
keep the security risk at a minimum level (Rec. 08).
37. Logbooks are kept at each entry gate at the Palais des Nations and the Annexes. OIOS
noted that the information they contained was not consistent and ranged from general
information memos to inventory of visitors' badges and records of incidents. OIOS found
neither clear guidelines on the information to be kept nor indications on how to follow-up on
some issues.
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Recommendation:
UNOG SSS should develop clear guidelines on the information to
be recorded in visitors' logbooks and the manner to address and
solve issues reported therein (Rec. 09).
38. UNOG indicated that SOPs have been established and responsibilities assigned. In
the future, logbooks will have to be signed by the chief of the subunits and regular checks
done by the heads of unit. OIOS will close this recommendation, once it receives the SOPs
and the newly released instructions regarding logbooks.
(c) Fire and safety group
39. Deriving from the responsibility to ensure the safety and security of persons and
property, UNOG SSS has a Fire and Safety Unit with 12 posts. Ultimately, UNOG relies on
the intervention of the local Fire Service. The extent of autonomy, response and means that
need to be deployed by UNOG SSS and by the Swiss fire service, is not documented officially
and should be clarified, as well as the responsibilities of the UNOG SSS Fire and Safety Unit.
The Chief, SSS explained that autonomy of 30 minutes was used to determine the necessary
resources.
40. The Fire Emergency System in the premises operates around wardens who are
designated staff members who ensure the implementation of security plans in the zones under
their charge. However, attendance in specific `wardens' training provided by UNOG SSS
proved to be as low as fifty per cent in the recent period. The role and responsibilities of
wardens should be re-emphasized with staff members and management to ensure that
information on security arrangements is shared and coordinated at all levels.
Recommendation:
UNOG SSS should formally define its responsibilities with regard
to fire and safety services, as well as develop a scheme for warden
duties to ensure recognition of their functions and availability for
training at given times (Rec. 10).
41. UNOG commented that a project is under progress to establish a formal framework
with the Host Country fire and safety authority.
42. Extinguishers in the United Nations premises should be controlled and replaced on a
regular basis, a responsibility that has been outsourced to several companies in Switzerland,
and was monitored by the UNOG Building and Engineering Section. Upon OIOS' request,
UNOG SSS performed an extensive check of fire extinguishers, the control of which revealed
to be unsatisfactory. UNOG SSS already took action to set-up a database to monitor their
control and replacement.
(d) Investigation
43. General Assembly Resolution 59/287 of 13 April 2005, requests that an administrative
mechanism of mandatory reporting to OIOS be put in place. OIOS noted that the Investigation
Sub-Unit performed its missions without any formal terms of reference or guidelines for its
activities, as well as no guidelines on sharing or transferring cases to the OIOS Investigation
Division, leaving the decision to file an investigation case to the discretion of UNOG
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management.
44. Until recently, none of the investigators had an investigation background or had
undergone specific investigation training. Although professional investigators have now been
recruited, no presentation or training on the specificities of investigations in the United
Nations has been provided so far. Although OIOS provided basic investigation training to
three SSS staff members, the Security Officers trained were not staff from the Investigation
sub-unit.
Recommendation:
UNOG SSS should (i) arrange for investigation training of all its
investigators to enhance their performance, (ii) ensure that all legal
provisions applicable to investigation in the United Nations are
complied with and (iii) establish a mechanism for referring cases to
the Investigation Division of the Office of Internal Oversight
Services (Rec. 11).
45. UNOG indicated that additional training for investigators should be implemented by
the end of 2006. OIOS will close the recommendation upon receipt of the training plan.
E. Human resources management
(a) Status and specificities of the security function
46. The status of security officers in UNOG is that of General Service staff, with no
further requirements attached to the specificity of the security function (at United Nations
Headquarters, security officers fall in the Security Service category):
- There is no stricter requirement for medical clearance - most personnel files reviewed
by OIOS included medical clearance forms older than four years;
- Until recently, there was no testing on substance or alcohol abuse, nor was
psychological testing conducted prior to the release of firearms;
- In a sample review of personnel files, police records were not always on file.
47. UNOG stated that the new ST/AI/2005/12 requires annual medical examination for
security officers, random testing for illegal drugs and controlled substances, as well as
psychological testing prior to the release of firearms, will be conducted. A request for police
records has also been introduced in the H-MOSS recruitment process.
(b) Functions and staff allocation
48. Job descriptions within UNOG SSS were obsolete and OIOS was informed that they
would be updated following the completion of H-MOSS recruitment.
49. Security services in different duty stations use shifts of various duration: 8 hours in
Geneva, and 12 hours in Vienna, for instance. UNOG SSS could usefully compare the
cost/benefits of these arrangements and, if need be, submit the most beneficial scheme to DSS
for approval.
50. The responsibility of surveillance at night time is assigned to a permanent team,
selected on a voluntary basis. Having a quite aged team, with an average of 55 years and
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comparatively higher average of 21 days of sick leave compared to UNOG SSS' average of
14 days, raises the questions on conditions and rotation of the night shift team.
Recommendation:
UNOG SSS should review its various shift arrangements with a
costs/benefits analysis and ascertain they implement the most
beneficial shift system. (Rec. 12).
51. UNOG noted the recommendation and its implementation would be looked into early
2006.
52. The ratio of security officer performing office and administrative functions was 28 per
cent of total security officers on day duty. This ratio should be reviewed to better comply with
the destination/nature of the posts. Workload statistics should also be developed for the
various activities of the Section to support the allocation of resources.
Recommendation:
UNOG SSS should review the size of its administrative and support
structure to ensure that it is adequate and efficient with regard to its
operations (Rec. 13).
53. UNOG indicated that the creation of the Administrative Unit and the Coordination
and Planning Unit should contribute to strengthening the operational tasks of SSS but that
the report writing part of security work could not be avoided.
(c) Training
54. OIOS found that UNOG SSS' training plan up to 2005 was not consistent with the
proportionate response principle. Security officers were not always trained on the use of non-
lethal weapons and annual recycling on firearms was not always performed on time. The
recent emphasis put on training will address the problem, providing additional financial and
human resources. A comprehensive training program has already been developed with an
objective of 10 training days per staff and year. However, all additional staffing resources
required under H-MOSS were determined based on a 5-day-a-year training policy assumption.
The new 10-day objective would unlikely be achieved or would result in a chronic deficit of
staff in the future whenever security officers are in training.
55. OIOS also noted from the 2004 and 2005 training statistics, that the training efforts are
not evenly spread and some security officers never undertook training over the period under
review. UNOG SSS explained that new training requirements would put increasing pressure
on security officers to undergo training and that compulsory training prerequisites would be
listed under each job description.
(d) Performance Appraisal System (PAS)
56. In reviewing PAS evaluations completed for the period 1 April 2003-31 March 2004,
OIOS noted that many forms contained standard comments on the staff member and were
sometimes mere copy and paste. Some of the PAS also did not reflect the functions actually
fulfilled by the staff member. Further attention should be put in the PAS exercise to provide
useful comments and guidance to the concerned staff and to ensure that the evaluation is
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assigned and carried out by the direct supervisor.
Recommendation:
UNOG SSS should ensure that the performance appraisal of staff is
assigned and carried out by the direct supervisor and provides
adequate guidance and advice on each of the staff's professional
and personal goals (Rec. 14).
57. UNOG agreed with the recommendation and will endeavor to have full compliance by
the end of the current PAS cycle.
F. Asset management
58. In reviewing the current firearm management system, OIOS noted the following
shortfalls:
� When releasing firearms to security officers, there are no written statements to
acknowledge their responsibility and eventual disciplinary sanctions;
� One firearm was sent for repair without any justification or receipt from the Geneva
armoury;
� Some security officers on mission in peacekeeping operations left with their firearm, in
one case more than nine years ago and no action was taken to collect the firearm or
transfer it formally to the DPKO.
59. OIOS is aware that UNOG plans to establish a central armory by the end of 2005, that
additional firearms will not be purchased until then, and that a taskforce has been established
to improve the existing policy related to firearms.
Recommendation:
UNOG SSS should, considering the critical importance of
comprehensive and strict firearm instructions, improve its firearm
policy by defining clearly the responsibilities of the custodian as
well as the officer who accepts firearms, and by immediately
collecting outstanding firearms or clearly documenting their
location and transfer of responsibility (Rec. 15).
60. UNOG indicated that a software application was developed in October 2005, SOPs
should be finalized by January 2006 and a new Lieutenant post for firearm management had
been advertised. OIOS will close the recommendation upon confirmation that the software
has been implemented, the post filled and upon receipt of the new SOPs.
61. OIOS also noted that no internal control, especially segregation of duty, is in place for
the management of listening devices. Controls should be strengthened to ensure appropriate
use is made of the equipment. UNOG stated that a SOP had been developed and that a
security briefing to new security staff on the topic was planned for the first quarter of 2006.
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G. Headquarters minimum operating security standards (H-MOSS)
62. As H-MOSS compliance is an inter-dependent chain of security measures, physical,
regulatory, practices and processes, security in UNOG is only as good as the weakest link of
the chain. Considering the implementation schedule, recruitment of security officers is
expected to be completed by the end of 2005, however the training and upgrading of all
security officers will take another one to two years, and so with other developments to
professionalize the services, such as earlier retirement age (to be negotiated with the United
Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund), regular physical exercise requirement, etc.
63. Physical improvements at UNOG will not be fully delivered before the end of 2007,
not to mention Global ID, the implementation timeline of which is still to be determined.
64. As seen throughout the report, H-MOSS touches on every activity of UNOG SSS and
many are work in progress. However, the H-MOSS compliance process, and its numerous
sub-projects, is not summarized in an action plan listing the steps, deadlines and staff
assigned for each action. UNOG SSS explained that the mapping of all objectives and actions
could not be achieved within existing resources and that only an offsite meeting would
warrant the availability and dedication necessary for the exercise.
Recommendation:
UNOG should improve its monitoring of the H-MOSS compliance
project by developing an implementation plan with clear timelines,
task-assignment and financial resources to complete the process
(Rec. 16).
65. UNOG commented that the new H-MOSS operational plan was under preparation.
OIOS will close the recommendation upon receipt and review of the new H-MOSS
operational plan.
V. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
66. I wish to express my appreciation for the assistance and cooperation extended to the
auditors by the staff of UNOG Security and Safety Section.
Egbert C. Kaltenbach, Director
Internal Audit Division II
Office of Internal Oversight Services
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