Challenger Panel To Review Joint Problems

May 2, 1986|By Mike Thomas of The Sentinel Staff

The presidential commission investigating the Challenger tragedy will meet in private today to discuss the history of problems with joints in the space shuttle's booster rockets. A joint low on Challenger's right booster leaked and set off destruction of the spaceplane Jan. 28.

At the session in Washington will be John Miller, an engineer at the Marshall Space Flight Center who began warning NASA managers in 1977 that the joint was not adequately designed.

In a 1979 memorandum, Miller complained that the joint did not come up to government and industry standards, shortcomings that he said could result in catastrophic failure. The memorandum was printed by The Orlando Sentinel on April 24.

Miller called the joint design ''completely unacceptable.'' He also pointed out that the second synthetic rubber seal in the joint could not be relied on as a backup. Despite this warning, NASA classified the O ring as redundant until 1982, after several launches.

A panel of aerospace experts also warned in 1980 that the joint and boosters should get more thorough testing, including test-firings in cold temperatures.

Several officials from Marshall, which oversaw the design of the joint, will attend today's meeting, said sources close to the investigation. The officials include Marshall director William Lucas and Jack Lee, who is overseeing the center's investigation into the tragedy.

Commission member Richard Feynman said Thursday that he has seen some memorandums warning about problems with the booster joint but would not comment further. The commission is working on its report to President Reagan, expected by June 6.

The Sentinel reported March 23 the joint was designed poorly and its performance little understood because of inadequate testing.

Design flaws, compounded by freezing temperatures the morning of the Challenger launch, caused the joint to fail, NASA officials and members of the commission have said.

The Sentinel reported April 18 that NASA managers at Marshall did not heed the warnings of their engineers because it would have taken too much time and money to redesign the joint. Engineers at booster maker Morton Thiokol Inc. also convinced NASA officials that the joint was adequate.

Metal casings for the boosters and other parts had been ordered before the design was tested fully. By the time flaws were found in 1977 and 1978, NASA would have had to scrap millions of dollars in hardware to redesign the joint.