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As mentioned in a previous post, Android 4.0 (ICS) adds both a system UI and SDK API's that let you add certificates to the system trust store. On all previous version though, the system trust store is read-only and there is no way to add certificates on non-rooted devices. Therefore, if you want to connect to a server that is using a certificate not signed by one of the CA's included in the system trust store (including a self-signed one), you need to create and use a private trust store for the application. That is not particularly hard to do, but 'how to connect to a server with a self-signed certificate' is one of the most asked Android questions on StackOverflow, and the usual answer goes along the lines of 'simply trust all certificates and you are done'. While this will indeed let you connect, and might be OK for testing, it defeats the whole purpose of using HTTPS: your connection might be encrypted but you have no way of knowing who you are talking to.…

Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) offers equivalent or higher levels of security than the currently widely deployed RSA and Diffie–Hellman (DH) algorithms using much shorter keys. For example, the computational effort for cryptanalysis of a 160-bit ECC key is roughly equivalent to that of a 1024-bit key (NIST). The shift to ECC has however been fairly slow, mostly due to the added complexity, the need for standardization, and of course, patents. Standards are now available (more than a few, of course) and efficient implementations in both software and dedicated hardware have been developed. This, along with the constant need for higher security, is pushing the wider adoption of ECC. Let's see if, and how we can use ECC on Android, specifically to perform key exchange using the ECDH (Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman) algorithm.

Android uses the Bouncy Castle Java libraries to implement some of its cryptographic functionality. It acts as the default JCE crypto provider, accessible th…

The latest version is now available in the Android Market. There are no new user visible features, but the renewed UI and full support for tablets warrant the major version bump.

Hanzi Recognizer now has an app-wide action bar, available both on the newer Ice Cream Sandwich (4.0) and Honeycomb (3.x) Android versions, and on all mainstream Android 2.x versions. Functions previously only accessible via the overflow menu are now easier to use and discover courtesy of the action bar. Here's a screenshot of the app's main screen:

The two icons on the right kick off the keyword (reading or meaning) search and the favorites/history screen, respectively. All other screens have a home icon on the left as well, providing an easy way to get to the main screen from anywhere. Less frequently used activities such as Settings and About are available via the Menu key, as before.

The favorites and history tabbed screen now has a new look, consistent with the Honeycomb and ICS visual style. Ch…

In the previous twoposts we looked at the internal implementation of the Android credential storage, and how it is linked to the new KeyChain API introduced in ICS. As briefly mentioned in the second post, there is also a new TrustedCertificateStore class that manages user installed CA certificates. In this entry we will examine how the new trust store is implemented and how it is integrated in the framework and system applications.

Storing user credentials such as passwords and private keys securely is of course essential, but why should we care about the trust store? As the name implies, the trust store determines who we trust when connecting to Internet servers or validating signed messages. While credentials are usually used proactively only when we authenticate to a particular service, the trust store is used every time we connect to a secure server. For example, each time you check GMail, Android connects to Google's severs using SSL and validates their certificates based on…

In the previous entry, we found how Android's keystore daemon manages keys and certificates, and how to connect to it using the provided keystore_cli utility. Now we will look at the intermediate layers between the OS daemon and the public KeyChain API introduced in ICS.

Browsing the android.security package, we find two AIDL files: IKeyChainService.aidl and IKeyChainAliasCallback.aidl. This is a hint that the actual key store functionality, like most Android OS services, is implemented as a remote service that the public API's bind to. IKeyChainAliasCallback is just the callback called when you select a key via KeyStore#choosePrivateKeyAlias(), so it's of little interest. IKeyChainService has the actual methods KeyChain uses to get a handle to a private key or a certificate, plus some internal API's used by the Settings and certificate installer applications. Naturally, the whole interface is marked as hidden, so SDK applications cannot directly bind to the service.