A Realistic Central American Peace Effort

February 20, 1987|By William Ratliff.

Last Sunday, four non-Marxist Central American presidents met in San Jose, Costa Rica, to ponder the wars that ravage their region and discuss possible roads to peace. The discussions, planned and hosted by Costa Rican President Oscar Arias, included, in addition to Arias, the chief executives of Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras. Nicaragua has accepted an invitation to a later session.

The summit was of particular importance for two reasons: First, it marked the first time non-Marxist Central American leaders have tried to come up with a peace plan of their own and, second, the plan expected from them--now in its draft form--should be the most realistic yet devised.

Many in the United States look to this effort as a turning point in the quest for peace. Sen. Christopher Dodd (D, Conn.), a critic of the contras, is enthusiastic, while the Reagan administration fears it may undercut the contras.

President Arias put it on the line when he immediately pointed to the critical problem in the region: ``I have no doubt that peace in Central America depends on Nicaragua. Without democracy in Nicaragua, the armed struggle will continue.``

He`s right. This is the reality the Contadora countries--Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia and Panama--have refused to face over the last four years. The Sandinistas could end the conflict tomorrow by opening up their political system.

The Costa Rican proposal looks to the problems of the region as a whole, as have several years of unsuccessful Contadora documents, with calls for cease-fires, amnesties and reductions in armies and foreign advisers--all supervised by the United Nations, Organization of American States and the Contadora countries. But it also places greater emphasis than any previous proposal on bringing a unifying democracy to Nicaragua. And it has timetables for all of the above. As a concession to the Sandinistas, it does not insist on talks between Managua and the exiled opposition, which UNO leaders consider essential.

Its prospects aren`t good. Arias announced the summit on Jan. 28, and on Jan. 30 the Nicaraguan Foreign Ministry slammed it, charging that ``some Central American countries are joining the dirty, immoral and illegal war of the United States against Nicaragua.``

Why this response from Nicaragua? What is this opening Arias and others are calling for? Nothing more than a return to the policies the Sandinistas promised in 1979 before taking power--political pluralism and a nonaligned foreign policy. Such an opening would reach out to Nicaraguans who backed the overthrow of Somoza and supported and/or served in the new government before the Sandinistas took all real power in the country for themselves.

When abroad, these people give UNO and the contras their political legitimacy. If these Nicaraguans--former La Prensa editor Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, Arturo Cruz, Alfonso Robelo and others--returned home, no lingering contra could get a water pistol from Washington. Further, the return of these exiles would inject life into a moribund Nicaraguan economy and prevent an expansionist foreign policy.

Why is this so unlikely to happen? In part because Nicaragua rejects the democratization demands as interference in its domestic affairs. But beyond this, to the Sandinistas it would mean a betrayal of their anti-imperialist revolution. The movement was founded in the early 1960s--openly modeled on the Cuban revolution--and like Fidel Castro, its leaders have always argued that the fundamental problem of the region has been its systematic exploitation by the United States and its stooges.

It follows that the revolution in Nicaragua must be part of a revolution to eliminate U.S. influence throughout the region, lest Managua be smothered by external influences and drawn back under U.S. control.

This explains why the Sandinista government instinctively rejects democrats who are not relentlessly critical of the United States, why it rebuffed 18 months of overtures and aid from the Carter administration and built the largest army in Central America by the end of 1980, before the U.S. began arming rebels now known as the contras.

If it is to work, the final San Jose proposal must get other Latin American governments to acknowledge that Sandinista policies are at the root of the conflict. Only then will it be possible to apply the kinds of Western Hemisphere pressures that might get all parties to accept a workable negotiated settlement.

The Arias proposal is the best idea yet for real, lasting peace through negotiations in Central America. The region`s oldest democracy has taken the lead in stating a pervasive Central American concern: Without a change of attitude in Managua, regional conflict will continue in Central America for the indefinite future.