The attached After Action Report describes the “Warrior” Brigade's pre-planning, preparation, and execution of its redeployment from the Republic of Vietnam. The period covered by the report is from 8 November 1970, when the Brigade was formed as a separate unit, until the completion of redeployment, 28 April 1971.

.This redeployment marks the end of a combat record spanning more than five years in Vietnam. The 2nd Brigade Task Force came ashore with the “Tropic Lightning” Division on 5 January 1966. Since that time the Brigade has compiled an outstanding record in Vietnam. The “Warrior” Brigade has operated throughout MR III and was part of the 25th drive into Cambodia to disrupt the enemy's sanctuaries there. Since becoming a separate unit, the 2nd Brigade continued its counterinsurgency operations in the area east of Long Binh. For its combat role in Vietnam, the 2nd Brigade received the United States Army Valorous Unit Award and two awards of the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry with Gold Palm. The Brigade's contributions in the critical area of civic actions have been recognized by the award of the Vietnamese Civic Actions Award.

This After Action Report encompasses the last five and a half months that the “Warrior” Brigade remained in Vietnam. It is a detailed report of the activities necessary for the withdrawal of a tactical unit whose mission changed from combat to one of redeployment. Details are given regarding the areas of equipment turn-in and the out-processing of the Brigade's 6000 men. Most of the problems that could develop during redeployment were avoided due to the fact that many key members of this Brigade had been directly involved in the 25th Infantry Division's redeployment. Their insight greatly aided the 2nd Brigade in the planning and preparati9n for redeployment and in the redeployment operation. This report was made with the objective of aiding other units which will become involved in redeployment operations in the future.

JOSEPH R. ULATOSKI

1 Incl. Colonel, Infantry

as Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

10- DA, Washington, D.C., ATTN: ACSFOR

5 DA, Washington, D.C., ATTN: OCMH

5- DA, Washington, D.C., ATTN: AGCP (TAGO)

5- DA, Washington, D.C., ATTN: COPO Chief, Plans and Programs

5- C&GSC Ft Leavenworth, Kansas

5 - SAWC. Carlisle Barracks, Pa.

5 -USAGS. Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indianapolis, Ind.

5 - Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Wash., D.C.

5 - Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va.

5 - USAIS, Fort Benning, Ga.

5 - USAAS, Fort Knox, Ky.

5 - USAFS, Fort Sill, Ok.

5 - USAQS, Fort Lee, Va.

5 - USCONARC, Fort Monroe, Va.

5 - CG, USARHAW, Schofield Barracks, Hi.

3 - CINC, USAREUR, Heidelberg, Germany

3 - CINC, USARPAC, ATTN: AVGPOP - DT

3 - CINC, USARPAC, ATTN: DCG

3 - COMUS MACV, ATTN: J3

3 - COMMAVFORV, ATTN: Operations

3 - CG, USARV, ATTN: AVHDO

3 - CG, USARV, ATTN: AVHCS - MH

5 - CG, USARV, ATTN: AVHDO - P

3 - CG, USARV, ATTN: G4

3 - CG, USARV, ATTN: 17th MHD

3 - CG, I FFORCEV, ATTN: G3

3 - CG, II FFORCEV, ATTN: G3

3 - CG, XXIV Corps, ATTN: G3

3 - CG, CMAC, ATTN: G3

3 - CG, DMAC, ATTN: G3

5 - CO, 3rd Bde., 1st Cav Div (AM), ATTN: S3

8 - CG, 101st Abn Div (AM), ATTN: G3

8 - CG, 23rd Inf Div, ATTN: G3

3 - CMDR, 1st ATF, ATTN: G3

3 - CG, RTAVF, ATTN: G3

3 - CG, 18th ARVN Div, ATTN: G3

5 - CG, 173rd Inf Bde (Abn), ATTN: S3

5 - CG, 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech), ATTN: S3

3 - CO, 2nd Sqdn, 11th ACR, ATTN: S3

3 - CO, 23rd ARTY Gp, ATTN: S3

5 - CO, 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div

3 - CG, 1st Sig Bde, ATTN: S3

3 - CG, 1st Avn Bde, ATTN: S3

3 - CG, 44th Med Bde, ATTN: S3

3 - CG, 18th Engr Bde, ATTN: S3

3 - CG, 20th Engr Bde, ATTN: S3

3 - CG, 18th MP Bde, ATTN: S3

3 - CG, Saigon Support Command, ATTN: AVCS - GP

Table of Contents

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Tactical

Planning

CONCEPT OF REDEPLOYMENT

Administration / Personnel

Intelligence

Tactical Concept

Logistics Concept

CA / PSYOPS Operations

Communications / Electronics

Engineering Concept

Public Information

Base Camp Transfer

Battalion and Separate

Unit Problems

Historical Synopsis

Area of Operations

Fig 1 - 4

Keystone Information Center

Redeployment Planning Group

Redeployment Activities

Brigade Strength

Unit Redeployment Status

Personnel Out-processing Status

Personnel Processing

Cumulative Pieces Turned In

Property Turn-In (Brigade)

Property Turn-In (Units)

Personnel and Administration

Out-processing

Out-processing Roster

Out-processing Station Check

Check List - Out-processing

Administrative Services

Postal

Special Services

Funds

Chaplain Activities

Provost Marshal

Finance

Civilian Personnel

Staff Judge Advocate

Intelligence

Operations

Sequence of Events

Ceremonies

Battalion Awards Ceremonies

Separate Unit Awards Ceremonies

Brigade Farewell Ceremony

Schedule of Awards Ceremonies

Logistics

Unit Inventory / Disposition Report

Reports Within the Brigade

Daily Turn-In Report Format

Selected items Turn-In Chart

Documentation

Documentation Required for Turn-in

USARV Form 562

USARV Form 563

USARV Form 593

Closing of Property Books

Letter of Relief from Responsibility

Transportation

Maintenance Support and PLL

Problems and Recommendations

CA / PSYOP

Chronology of Events

Leaflet-Give Your Support to the GVN

Leaflet-Redeployment of American troops

Leaflet-RF/PF Resolved to Protect Country

Enemy Propaganda

Signal

VHF Systems Diagram

HF RTT Net

FM Command Net

Teletype Nets

Engineer

Information

MACOI Official Announcement

MACOI Guidance

Press Kit Contents

Command Information Fact Sheet

Base Camp Transfer

Chronology

Battalion and Separate Unit Problems

Historical Synopsis

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

HEADQUARTERS, 2ND BRIGADE 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION

APO SAN FRANCISCO 96268

KEYSTONE ROBIN (CHARLIE)

AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. PURPOSE: This report reflects the actions taken to accomplish the redeployment of the 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division. Hopefully it will be of assistance to any unit which has to plan and execute a similar redeployment mission.

2. MISSION: On 20 December 1970, the 2nd Brigade was notified that it was a Keystone Robin (Charlie) unit and that it would redeploy from the Republic of Vietnam not later than 28 April 1971. The 2nd Brigade immediately formed a Redeployment Planning Group and published the operation plan to commence stand-down by phasing of units starting on 1 March 1971. The brigade colors and subordinate unit colors would return to Hawaii with the exception of 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry and 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry whose colors would return to Ft. Lewis, Washington. Appropriate inactivation ceremonies would be conducted at each location in conjunction with the selected Honor Guards. The majority of the “Warrior“ Brigade personnel were to be reassigned in United States Army Vietnam (USARV) and the equipment was to be issued by USARV throughout army supply channels.

3. SITUATION:

A. Tactical: The 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division was reorganized as a separate brigade on 8 November 1970, and placed under operational control of II Field Force, Vietnam. The 2nd Brigade's area of operations (AO) encompassed Bien Hoa, southern Long Khanh and northern Phuoc Tuy Provinces with the forward operations center located at Xuan Loc in Long Khanh Province, and the rear base camp at Camp Frenzell-Jones in the Long Binh complex. Allied units operating in the area were the 18th ARVN Division, Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force, 1st Australian Task Force, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, and 3rd Brigade 1st Australian Task Force, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, and 3rd Brigade 1st Cav (Airmobile). In addition to conducting combined operations, the up-grading of Territorial Forces within the AO was a primary mission of the brigade. This effort was accomplished by forming mobile training teams from the 2nd Brigade's maneuver battalions which conducted tactics classes and patrols during the day and combined ambush patrols at night. The Regional and Popular Force (RF / PF) units improved their operational capability during this program. Numerous joint RF and PF operations were conducted with emphasis placed on giving allied leaders experience in employing US support assets, including helicopter, artillery and USAF support. This ability to use US support assets was of critical importance due to the implementation of the Vietnamization Program which called for an increased combat role by the Vietnamese. In general, the RF and PF forces increased their military skills under the tutelage of 2nd Brigade units and became more effective in protecting their villages and hamlets from the VC tax collecting, proselytizing and supply gathering activities. Denial of the villages to the VC/NVA insured the continued success of the Republic of Vietnam's pacification program. The experience and confidence gained from these operations led to separate offensive operations and allowed 2nd Brigade units to concentrate operations in those areas of increased enemy activity. Enemy units opposing allied forces in the 2nd Brigade's AO were the 274th NVA Regiment, 74th NVA Artillery Regiment, 3rd Battalion, 33rd NVA Regiment, elements from SR-4 Headquarters, 84th Rear Service Group and local VC guerilla units. Operations were designed to deny enemy access to villages and hamlets in the three province areas in order to cut off food sources, prevent consolidation of enemy units and to prevent the infiltration of men and supplies from War Zone D. Continuous operations by the brigade and allied units inflicted heavy damage on the enemy by destroying base areas and caches south and west of Xuan Loc and interdicting the enemy's “shadow supply” system along Highway QL-1. An indication of the success of these operations was the enemy's inability to launch any significant offensive during the 1971 Tet Holiday period.

With the coming of the Tet Holiday period, the 2nd Brigade went on an increased alert status in preparation for any enemy offensive activity. A mechanized maneuver battalion was sent to the vicinity of Long Thanh and Nhon Trach District, Bien Hoa Province to give added support to allied units and installations in that area. Continuous defensive patrols and monitoring of enemy activity by 2nd Brigade maneuver battalion prevented enemy offensive activity during Tet.

The month of February found the enemy shifting his supply operations north of Highway QL-1 due to the preemptive operations undertaken by 2nd Brigade forces south of QL-1. An increasing number of contacts with small groups of VC/NVA were reported along the commo-liaison routes which linked War Zone D with the Brigade's AO. In March, 2nd Brigade units began the withdrawal process, slowly moving personnel and equipment westward from Xuan Loc to Camp Frenzell-Jones. The resultant vacuum left by 2nd Brigade withdrawals was filled by RF and PF, ARVN and Free World Forces who handled their new AI responsibilities with an increasing degree of professionalism. The 2nd Brigade continued to put pressure on the enemy during the withdrawal period in order to preempt any enemy offensive activity against the Bien Hoa / Long Binh complex as well as US and allied units in the three province area.

(p2)

B. Planning: To plan and organize the “Warrior” Brigade's redeployment, a Redeployment Planning Group (RPG) was formed on 27 December 19770. The RPG consisted of representatives from each primary and special staff section, headed by the Deputy Brigade Commander for Operations. The combined efforts produced the 2nd Brigade's Operations Plan 183-70 (U) issued on 20 January 1971. The plan was issued in two volumes. Volume I, classified Secret, contained specific dates, suspenses, concept of tactical withdrawal, and significant milestones which were to be accomplished. Volume II was unclassified, and instructed the units within the brigade on specific functions, proper techniques and rules of the game to be followed to efficiently and professionally redeploy their elements.

Once the OPLAN was completed, an officer was designated as the Brigade Keystone Redeployment Coordinator. The coordinator and selected members of the RPG formed the Keystone Information Center (KIC) to coordinate redeployment activities at all staff levels. The KIC continuously displayed and up-dated a series of progress charts within each staff area, and provided the management tools necessary for commanders to continuously monitor the phases of redeployment. Annex A (Keystone Information Center).

The planning for and implementation of transfer of the areas of operations was eased by efficient prior planning on the part of II Field Force, Vietnam. On 12 March 1971, all areas of responsibility were transferred to Free World Forces and the 2nd Brigade requested areas of operations from responsible units to continue the tactical employment of the brigade until 6 April 1971.

4. CONCEPT OF REDEPLOYMENT:

A. Personnel and Administration: The primary function of the AC/S1 operations during redeployment was the reassignment of approximately 6000 brigade personnel. Activities of the Chaplain, Provost Marshal, and Finance had to be concluded; all non-appropriated funds had to be transferred or closed; and records disposition had to be completed. Careful perceptive planning pertinent to the reassignment of brigade personnel was one of the major factors contributing to the successful inactivation of the 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division. For details of all AG/S1 activities in connection with redeployment, see Annex B (Personnel and Administration).

B. Intelligence: The Brigade S2 section was required to dispose of all intelligence material and sensor strings. Details of these activities are at Annex C (Intelligence).

C. Tactical Concept: As withdrawal plans were being formulated, it was not known which units would assume responsibility for the area of operations. Several different possibilities existed. Plans were made to allow for the orderly withdrawal on 12 March of one battalion followed by each of the other battalions as forces became available to assume the areas of operations.

The order of withdrawal was based upon which units presented the largest logistical problem and which units were necessary to keep routes of communication open into the brigade area.

(p3)

As the withdrawal date drew near, it was determined that on 12 March, Long Khanh Province, 1 ACD, RTAVF, and the 1st ATF would assume portions of the brigade area of operations. The 2nd Brigade was to then request areas of operation from the responsible units to continue the tactical mission.

On 12 March, the 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry and C Battery, 1st Battalion, 8th Field Artillery commenced their withdrawal from the eastern portion of Long Khanh Province. On 23 March, the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry and D Battery, 1st Battalion , 8th Field Artillery commenced their withdrawal from an AO the battalion had requested from Long Khanh Province. Simultaneously on 23 March, the 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry assumed responsibility for the negotiated area of operations of the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry. On 26 March, the 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry assumed responsibility for the negotiated area of operations of the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry. On 26 March, the 1st Battalion (Mech), 5th Infantry and A Battery, 1st Battalion, 8th Field Artillery, turned over their temporary area of operations to Long Khanh Province, and commenced their withdrawal. On 6 April, the 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry and B Battery, 1st Battalion, 8th Field artillery withdrew in force, completing the turn-over of all temporary areas of operation, and terminated the tactical mission of the 2nd Brigade. See Annex D (Operations) and figures 1,2,3 and 4.

D. Logistics Concept and Preparation: The problem facing the “Warrior Brigade{ S4, was to move a separate brigade and its equipment from a field combat configuration to Camp Frenzell-Jones, clear and turn-in all real property and bulk supplies in the area, billet and feed almost 6000 members of the brigade, and prepare and turn-in all TO&E and PC&S equipment in the brigade. The accomplishment of these and the numerous related tasks called for prior planning, close monitoring and continuous supervision of the brigade activities throughout the total logistical spectrum. The details of this planning and the execution of the logistic effort are fully analyzed at Annex E (Logistics).

E. CA/ PSYOPS: During redeployment, the Brigade S5 section was required to complete, terminate, or transfer civic action projects and programs within the brigade area of operations. In addition, a psychological operation was conducted to explain the brigade's departure to the Vietnamese. Details of these activities with a discussion of problems encountered and their solutions are included in Annex F (CA/ PSYOPS).

F. Communications / Electronics: The 532nd Signal Company was responsible for the phased turn-in of their organic communications equipment while they maintained essential communications facilities in support of the brigade during the redeployment period. Details of the turn-in, problem areas, and the phase down of communications are discussed in Annex G (Signal).

(p4)

G. Engineering Concept: Engineer efforts were required to continue normal combat support of those maneuver elements still committed to combat operations, to prepare three base camps and six fire support bases for closure or turn-over to allied units, and to prepare all organic engineer equipment and recoverable engineer material for turn-in. To accomplish this, a platoon with selected equipment was formed from the organic engineer company to provide the combat support during the final stages of combat operations, and to do the necessary engineer work preparing base camps and fire support bases for closure or turnover. The Engineer Company (-) was then able to concentrated on its own stand-down in the final stages of the Engineer Company stand-down period. See Annex II (Engineer).

H. Public Information: The 20th Public Information Detachment was required to prepare press packets and release for the announcement of re-deployment and stand-down of individual units throughout the brigade. The actual monitoring and edition of releases and specific times for release were determined by the USARV Information Office. Problems encountered and recommendations of the Public Information Officer are found in Annex I (Information).

I. Base Camp Transfer: The “Warrior Brigade” redeployment required the development of detailed plans for the orderly transfer of responsibility for base camp functions and real property accountability. Details of this will be found in Annex J (Base Camp Transfer).

J. Battalion and Separate Unit Problems: For future redeploying units, the requirement was placed on battalions and separate units to submit an after action report which stated their problems and their recommended solutions to these problem areas. All the reports were consolidated and edited and the results are found in Annex K (Battalion and Separate Unit Problems).

5. HISTORICAL SYNOPSIS:

The 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division accomplished its mission in SVN. The dedication to duty, professionalism, sacrifices and valor of its soldiers will be favorably reflected in the military history of our nation, and will be a highlight in a proud chapter in the military heritage of the 25th Infantry Division. See Annex L (Historical Synopsis). (p 5) (pp 7,8,9,10 maps)

1. BACKGROUND: The 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division envisioned its redeployment in three phases: Phase I being the initial planning phase; Phase II, the detailed planning phase; and Phase III, the execution phase.

2. DEVELOPMENT: Upon receipt of redeployment notification, a Redeployment Planning Group (RPG) as outlined in Appendix 1 was established. This group's primary task was to develop a plan for disengagement and a stand-down schedule. The group further wrote and published the 2nd Brigade's operation order 183-70 and made the necessary changes to the basic order as required. In addition, it was determined that due to the magnitude and complexity of the redeployment task, there was a requirement for a centralized control and information center. This requirement was fulfilled by the establishment of the Keystone Information Center (KIC), located in the Brigade conference room and manned by members of the original Redeployment Planning Group.

3. IMPLEMENTATION: Once the KIC was activated, a series of charts displaying redeployment status were displayed on the walls, arranged by functional areas. These charts were briefed to the Commander on a daily basis and were also available for unit commanders' inspection on a 24-hour basis. Examples of a few of the more important charts are: Redeployment Activities at Appendix 2; Brigade Strength at Appendix 3; Unit Redeployment Status at Appendix 4; Personnel Out-processing Status at Appendix 5; Personnel Processing at Appendix 6; Cumulative Keystone Pieces Turned In at Appendix 7; Keystone Property Turn-In (for each of the ten major categories) at Appendix 8; Keystone Property Turn-In (by each unit in each of the ten major categories) at Appendix 9.

4. FUNCTIONS: The Brigade Keystone Information Center performed the following functions:

A. The center was manned by personnel from the RPG on a daily basis and provided a focal point to which units could turn in daily reports, and from which they could gain information and answers to their questions.

B. Since the center was manned by the original Redeployment Planning Group personnel, the center carried out individual redeployment briefings for each unit prior to stand-down. This procedure had the advantage that the center personnel, being intimately acquainted with current unit problems, could bring these to the attention of units to stand-down later.

C. Personnel from the KIC formed the nucleus of the briefing team which presented all the briefings concerned with redeployment of the 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.

(p11)

D. The KIC further was tasked with collating and publishing all changes to the brigade's operations order. These changes were published by means of conference notes.

E. Personnel from the KIC were responsible for writing, editing, collating, and publishing the 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division's Redeployment After Action Report.

A. Careful, perceptive and thorough planning was the key to the highly successful personnel redeployment of the 2nd Brigade. In anticipation of redeployment instructions, planning began in early December 1970 while the brigade was still in the formulative stages. It was recognized that 100% accuracy of personnel accountability had to be achieved prior to redeployment, and immediate action was taken to purify personnel rosters. Without automatic data processing capability, it was necessary to do most of the work manually. With only a key punch, verifier, and sorter, it became necessary to use machine time at other US units in the same general vicinity. This approach resulted in only minor difficulties and rosters were purified prior to the stand-down date.

B. Non-receipt of firm personnel redeployment criteria and overall classification of information delayed completion of redeployment plans. However, emphasis was placed upon eliminating backlogs in routine work areas, intensifying efforts to purify morning reports, making plans and preparations for out-processing facilities, requisitioning blank forms, certificates, and citations, identifying personnel on TDY and those in CONUS pending the outcome of requests for compassionate reassignment or hardship discharge, and for reviewing other areas of operations to determine the impact of redeployment.

C. In order to meet the increased clerical requirements of typing special orders and awards, it was necessary to obtain clerks from the various maneuver battalions. In addition, the PSNCO's of all maneuver battalions were assigned to the 225th Support Battalion prior to stand-down, and attached to their battalion so that they would be able to resolve any personnel matters not completed prior to the end of their unit's stand-down.

3. PERSONNEL SERVICES REDEPLOYMENT CONTROL: The AG Personnel Services Division provided overall coordination, control and guidance for the redeployment of all personnel, including transportation, financial and postal service, a patch-sewing facility, and medical areas. Additionally, it was responsible for scheduling and coordinating out-processing activities with units as they proceeded through stand-down and served as a central source of personnel redeployment information.

4. APPLICATION OF THE PERSONNEL CRITERIA:

(p.23)

A. The Brigade was severely handicapped because the official criteria was not published prior to the first unit's stand-down. When the criteria was finally published, further changes were made, creating a feeling of uncertainty in the minds of brigade personnel. Basic information was obtained through personal visits and telephone contact with responsible personnel at USARV Headquarters. This enabled the brigade to go ahead with redeployment on schedule. Generally speaking, tour curtailments up to 90 days were available to all personnel who completed nine months in-country, or who were within ninety days of ETS. Additionally, personnel who completed ten months in country were permitted to DEROS and ETS if they were within 150 days of ETS. Personnel who completed twelve months in country were permitted to DEROS and ETS if they were within 179 days of ETS, and had extended their tours to receive the 150-day early release.

B. The personnel redeployment planning provided for normal attrition in all units throughout the redeployment period with intra-brigade assignments made from early deploying units to later deploying units only to fill critical duty positions and to man the 115-man security guard force for base camp defense. It was established policy that men would not be transferred from an early stand-down unit to a later unit for the sole purpose of receiving a curtailment. The policy had the support of the Brigade Commander and was, overall, quite successful. The following fact were considered and resulted from a careful analysis of the current and projected strength postures of all units:

(1) Commanders were interested in personnel with critical skills rather than just “bodies”. This was especially true in the movement of men from the first stand-down battalion to the last battalion in order to maintain the last battalion's combat strength. This involved the transfer of approximately 180 men from the first redeploying maneuver battalion to the last maneuver battalion. In selecting these personnel, every effort was made to assign personnel who would receive a curtailment under the DEROS criteria.

(2) One officer and 19 enlisted men were assigned from the various stand-down units to the 225th Support Battalion. These men were used by the 79th Maintenance Battalion at the Keystone Turn-in Point at Long Binh Post for turn in of equipment and material as units of the 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division proceeded into stand-down.

(3) The general redeployment criteria was listed in paragraph. 4A above. Specifically, all personnel assigned to Keystone Robin units (increment VI) programmed for redeployment or inactivation, who had 90 days or less remaining on the FST upon completion of unit stand-down, were curtailed with the following exceptions:

a. Personnel who had extended their FST for the purpose of early release from active duty, unless the individual involved elected in writing to negate the extension. (p24)

b. Personnel serving on a tour extension who had taken the 30-day special leave.

c. Personnel who had extended for 180 days, and who had not commenced travel in conjunction with the 30-day special leave were afforded the opportunity to:

1. Transfer to a unit remaining in Vietnam to complete the extended tour with the new unit and utilize the 30-day special leave.

2. Terminate the extension and DEROS in accordance with existing criteria.

d. The FST for court reporters remained twelve months.

e. An exception to AR 613-30 was granted so that individuals reassigned from RVN who had completed nine or more months o f their FST received credit for normal tour completion.

(4) An additional source of curtailments was announced in early March with the announcement of an early release program for OBV II officers. In general, under this program, it became possible for these officers to be released up to sixty days prior to their normal ETS and also be granted a 90 day curtailment of their FST. These two contingencies made it possible for certain OBV II officers to be released from active duty up to 150 days prior to their normal ETS.

C. To execute this plan and insure equitable treatment was afforded all members of the brigade, machine rosters were initially sent to each unit. The unit corrected any errors on the roster and annotated availability dates for release of each man. Individuals were also given the opportunity to indicate their preference for one in-country unit if they were not eligible for a curtailment. From the ”availability roster”, other rosters were then prepared and broken down as to junior enlisted, senior enlisted, and officers. These were sent to USARV where assignments were obtained for those personnel being reassigned in-country. The rosters were returned to PSD where appropriate orders were cut reflecting in-country reassignment, PCS, or ETS. These orders were returned to the units about fifteen days prior to the unit's first day of stand-down. Despite an extremely small number of intra-brigade transfers, more than 450 officer efficiency reports were prepared, numerous orders were cut, and more than 6,000 soldiers were completely and accurately out-processed and shipped to new stations. These actions, which normally would have been completed in 12 months, were completed in 50 days.

5. REDEPLOYMENT DOCUMENTS: 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division OPLAN 183-70 covered all personnel and administrative aspects of redeployment. It remained the basic reference throughout redeployment and was based on the USARV AG Redeployment / Inactivation Manual 600-1 and experience gained in standing-down the Division. (p25)

6. OUTPROCESSING: The Records Section was in charge of the out-processing operations. Personnel due for out-processing “in-country” were brought to the initial assembly area at 0730 hours by the losing unit with all baggage after having completely cleared their unit. After an initial briefing in the staging area, small groups were moved to the processing area. After being processed through checking stations for finance, shots, personnel management, records assembly, postal, and ID cards and tags, personnel being reassigned up-country were moved to the 8th Aerial Port at Bien Hoa for shipment under the control of a Brigade Transportation NCO. DEROS personnel underwent the same out-processing, only it was conducted in the afternoon, prior to movement to the 90th Replacement Battalion. All individuals, except those who had been flagged, were permitted to hand carry their records to their new unit of assignment. Records of those personnel under a flagging action were sent to the new unit via registered mail. For more detailed information on out-processing, see Appendix

7. AWARDS AND DECORATIONS: The area of awards and decorations was a constant source of problems throughout the brigade's period of stand-down. The basic problem was not receiving the approved awards back in time for unit awards ceremonies. The brigade did not have approval authority for awards above the Purple Heart. Approval authority rested with II Field Force Vietnam. They were not able to react to our requirements and priorities with the urgency dictated by the situation. Late changes in personnel redeployment criteria from 60 to 90 days significantly increased the number of service awards which had to be written and justified.

A. Units were required to submit their recommendations for achievement and service awards not later than fifteen days before the unit's first day of stand-down. This requirement was not adhered to and resulted in many valor and achievement awards being submitted late. When the unit commanders realized they were not going to get all of their awards back in time for awards ceremonies, additional clerical help was provided by the brigade to II Field Forces in an effort to get all awards presented.

B. Units were provided general guidelines governing the requirements for presentation of service and achievement awards. An individual could not normally be awarded more than two achievement awards during this FST; an individual could only be awarded one service medal for a normal FST, and that could not be recommended unless the individual was within sixty days of DEROS or adjusted DEROS. Despite the tight control on recommendations for awards, numerous recommendations were received which had incorrect information or lacked essential information. These incorrect recommendations were returned to the units or corrected in the Awards Section. This further hampered and delayed their approval and presentation.

C. It is strongly recommended that approval authority for awards higher than the Purple Heart be given to brigade-sized units authorized a commanding officer in the grade of Brigadier General.

(p26)

8. ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES: Normal administrative services continued throughout the redeployment of the brigade. Records management inspections, reproduction of orders, closing of publication accounts, and control of classified documents were of particular significance. For additional information see Appendix 2.

9. POSTAL: Postal operations continued at approximately the same rate throughout the period of redeployment. However, additional emphasis was placed on insuring that postal locator cards were completed for proper disposition of personal mail. Unit mailrooms were inspected and closed, and drop-boxes sealed. Detailed information is contained in Appendix 3.

10. SPECIAL SERVICES: Special Service functions are particularly valuable to the morale and esprit de corps of troops while units are being redeployed. Though emphasis should be placed on this area of activity at every echelon of command, it must be given special consideration during stand-down. For information concerning Brigade Special Services activities, see Appendix 4.

11. PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. Changes in Assignments: Changes of in-country assignments were reluctantly made throughout the redeployment phase. Many of these changes were a result of individuals obtaining a job in a specific unit on his own. These changes resulted in numerous telephone calls and amendments and revocations of orders.

RECOMMENDATION: That once assignment instructions are issued, changes be kept to the absolute minimum. That HQ USARV try to grant initial requests for assignment based on individual preferences shown on the assignment rosters.

B. Immunizations: In many cases individuals reported to the final out-processing area without required immunizations. This periodically created a backlog in the processing line and hindered the entire out-processing activity.

RECOMMENDATION: That immunizations be up-dated prior to arrival of personnel at the out-processing activity. Additionally, individuals being reassigned in-country should have their teeth checked prior to departing their unit. If necessary, additional dental support should be requested from higher HQ.

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C. ID Card and Tags: Several personnel were missing ID cards and tags during out-processing.

RECOMMENDATION: That units be instructed to submit names and pertinent information for all personnel needing ID tags. This should be accomplished as soon as redeployment is known. Replacement of ID cards should be accomplished prior to out-processing.

D. Postal Locator Cards: In many instances personnel reported to the pit=processing area without properly completed postal locator cards.

RECOMMENDATION: That the number and types of locator cards required for out-processing be emphasized by the Postal Officer and in the AG Contact Team Briefing.

E. Redeployment Criteria. Late notification of the redeployment criteria and subsequent changes, coupled with the USARV mandatory drop, caused significant personnel turbulence. Additionally, changes in redeployment criteria have significant effects on eligibility for appropriate awards for service. The change from a 60 to a 90 day criteria greatly increased the awards workload.

RECOMMENDATION: That one single curtailment criteria be applied to Keystone Robin units within the same increment and that this criteria not be changed once it has been announced.

F. Cutting of Orders: Much valuable time was used in cutting stencils or orders with the same format.

RECOMMENDATION: Action should be initiated immediately upon notification of stand-down to make flex-o-writers available to stand-down units. This service should also include arrangements for repair of inoperable flex-o-writers

G Awards: Awards were not processed quickly enough by II Field Force to enable them to be presented prior to the personnel departures.

RECOMMENDATION: That authority to approve awards up to and including Bronze Stars be delegated to brigade-size units authorized a commander of general officer grade. Otherwise, awards recommendations must be submitted at least 30 days prior to a unit's awards ceremony.

H. Canceling of Publication Accounts: Due to the security classification of Keystone Robin information, publication accounts were not cancelled until the stand-down announcement was made public on the first day of the brigade's stand down period.

RECOMMENDATION: That publication accounts be cancelled sixty days prior ;to a unit's first stand-down date. A classified message or code can be pre-arranged to effect implementation by Publication Centers in Baltimore and St. Louis.

A. Availability dates were established on each individual by the losing unit and were used to schedule personnel for out-processing and to project transportation requirements. Units were allowed to give up to 200 availability dates on any one day. Each unit was instructed to schedule their personnel for out-processing on any date within their scheduled stand-down period.

B. Minor changes to out-processing schedules were announced as they occurred/ Every evening all units were required to verify their out-processing schedule for the following day.

C. Experience in processing the first units showed that the correct amount of time had been allocated to unit stand-down periods. While operational, redeploying units had made many preparations; however, if necessary, experience showed that it would have been possible to increase the flow of personnel without adversely affecting the operation of the Personnel Services Division.

D. Although many availability dates for personnel being reassigned in-country were changed by accelerated out-processing, reassignment orders were not amended unless the availability date was changed more than seven days. The amendment of so many orders would have been highly impractical and would have resulted in unnecessary confusion for the individual and the gaining and losing commands. Accelerated out-processing for some DEROS personnel was accomplished, and orders were amended in each case.

2. OUT-PROCESSING OPERATIONS AND FACILITIES:

A. The Adjutant General Section was assigned overall responsibility for the coordination of all out-processing activities. The losing unit was responsible for scheduling transportation to the out-processing site, and the Brigade Transportation Officer was responsible for scheduling transportation to the gaining unit.

B. For out-processing, an existing facility was modified specifically for that purpose. It was centrally located with easy access to personnel, financial, medical, and transportation facilities.

C. Continual efforts to insure that all personnel of the brigade had ID cards and tags proved relatively effective; less than 5% of all personnel including officers needed ID cards, and less than 13% needed ID tags. Time and effort were saved by having units submit requests for ID tags and cards before out-processing began.

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D. The out-processing area was organized with different stations. The purpose of each station is indicated at Tab B. Out-processing check-lists were utilized for each individual. (Tab C)

E. Individual's records were forwarded to the new unit in two different ways, either signed for and hand carried, or in the case of flagged personnel, forwarded via registered mail.

3. BRIEFING: A Personnel Service Division Team met each unit on its first day of stand-down to review personnel, administrative, postal, special service, and records management functions and determine problem areas. These visits proved beneficial as experience from one unit served as a forum for airing all questions regarding AG matters. Personnel involved normally included the Bn CO, XO, S-1, PSNCO and awards clerks.

TABS:

A. Out-processing Roster

B. Out-processing Station Check

C. Out-processing Checklist

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DISPOSITION FORM

1. Attached is out-processing roster for your unit for ______________.

2. All personnel listed will report NLT 0730 on date indicated to the 225th Spt Bn Theater. Upon arrival at the initial assembly area, all personnel will have all bag and baggage, I.D. Card, I.D. Tags, health and dental records to include personal shot record, clothing record and postal locator cards. Except for individuals being delayed due to flight cancellations, no personnel will be returned to their units after reporting for out-processing. It is the responsibility of the losing unit to provide transportation for its personnel to the initial assembly area. If transportation support is required, units should contact the Brigade S-4.

3. All commanders should take necessary action to assure that their personnel have all required items and that individuals have completely cleared their unit on the day prior to the out-processing date.

1. During the redeployment of the 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, the Administrative Services Division was responsible for records management, reproduction of redeployment orders, control of classified material, and the operation of the classified and unclassified distribution center.

2. After the initial notification to each unit of its stand-down, a records management team visited each unit and staff section to provide assistance in disposition of records, cancellation of publication accounts, and guidance for records turn-in prior to the unit's last day of stand-down.

3. Final records turn-in was conducted on a designated date for each unit. All records were retired to the Okinawa Records Center. The records turn-in schedule allowed sufficient time for units to make corrections on file labels prior to the last few days of their stand-down.

4. Publication accounts with publication centers in CONUS and Japan were cancelled by USARV Publication Branch after they were given a list of all account numbers in the brigade. This was a problem area as the notification was not sent by HQ USARV until public notification of the stand-down was announced. In the future, it is recommended that publication accounts be cancelled by classified messages to the publication centers.

5. Administrative Services Division was responsible for reproducing, filing, consolidating, posting, and distributing all general, special, and letter orders. To keep up with the increased workload, duty hours were expanded to 14 hours a day during peak periods, and/or until every outstanding order had been processed. Priorities were established to handle rush requests.

6. The following is an outline of the functional role of the Administrative Services Division during redeployment:

1. The basic planning for redeployment of the Brigade Postal Section began on 15 December 1971. Emphasis was placed on locator services and insuring that locator cards were completed. A postal representative accompanied the AG Contact Team to coordinate with each unit. A postal inspection team inspected each unit mail room prior to the unit's inactivation.

2. Mail distribution changes were prepared and sent to the Staff Postal Officers, Headquarters, USARV in sufficient time to effect the changes on the dates requested. Mail directory actions were monitored throughout redeployment. Locator cards were prepared on individuals who had left the command with no locator card on file. Several documents were used to locate these individuals:

A. 2nd Bde, 25th Inf Div Personnel Roster

B. Out-processing Schedules

C. DERPS Roster

D. Locator File

E. Consolidated orders

For each individual located in this manner, a set of locator cards was prepared and sent to all activities concerned.

3. The processing of postal claims and inquiries was emphasized. Claims involving individuals who had left the command were forwarded to the new serving postal activity. All others were immediately processed and completed.

4. Close supervision on the proper procedures for preparing and distributing locator cards including hospitalized personnel, closing out mail records, and handling mail is required to insure correctness. Locator cards were prepared for the gain

1. The Special Services Office was responsible for establishing a well-rounded program of morale and recreational support for stand-down units. It also had the responsibility for the turn-in of all non-expendable special services property and the transfer of facilities and personnel to Long Binh Post.

2. A comprehensive athletic program was in effect throughout redeployment. A scheduled program of athletic events was not practicable; however, units were encouraged to have competitive games. Special Services provided guidance on the normal rules of the different sports. Stand-down units were given priority for the utilization of Special Services facilities. Units had the use of a 40' by 60' swimming pool, a well equipped photo lab, and a 6000 volume library. In addition to these facilities, craft kits and paperback books were distributed. Motion picture service continued throughout redeployment.

3. In-country R&R ceased on the first day of the unit's stand-down except to Vung Tau. Out of country R&R's continued throughout redeployment. Near the close of stand-down, USARV cancelled all R&R allocations for May (last day of brigade stand-down was 28 April), except for 22 allocations to Hawaii. A recreational area was developed at Vung Tau to provide 2 day in-country R&R's for a maximum of eighty-five men at a time.

4. Special Services non-expendable equipment was distributed to units on a limited basis prior to lateral transfer. Expendable equipment was equally distributed among stand-down units.

1. Situation: With the warning order for its impending redeployment, the 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division was faced with the dissolution of eight sundry funds, thirteen unit funds and several other funds.

2. Planning:

A. To ensure adequate audits were conducted, it was decided to consolidate this function at brigade level. Accordingly, an audit team was formed consisting of one lieutenant and two specialists, all having had prior experience with funds at Division level.

3. Implementation: The Brigade S-1 was appointed on orders as auditing officer. The auditing team set up an auditing schedule based on the stand-down schedule for the various units and published a letter of instruction for dissolution procedures. Soon after the receipt of the redeployment order, members of the auditing team were sent to the various units to assist and advise in the preparation of the funds books for audit. This “pre-audit” of the books not only assisted the custodians in preparing their books for the audit, but also shortened the time required for the actual audit. The audit schedule was arranged so that the books of the units were submitted for audit prior to their stand-down. This alleviated any last minute problems and allowed for some flexibility. Due to the fact that the units were required to dissolve their funds prior to stand-down, they were urged to stockpile beer and soda for unit stand-down parties. In addition, the brigade requested a grant from Central Post Fund based on $1.00 per man to finance bands and floor shows for stand-down units. This request was approved.

4. Problems / Recommendations: Many potential problems were avoided by pre-audits which were conducted by the auditing team. It was found that many of the units kept only minimal records, and in some cases receipts and vouchers were lacking. These deficiencies were in most cases corrected, thus reducing the time required for final audit. It is strongly recommended that upon receipt of redeployment warning orders, steps be taken to pre-audit all funds to determine those actions necessary to prepare the books for final audit.

1. Situation: A full TO&E complement of five chaplains and five enlisted assistants were assigned and present for duty when the brigade was alerted for stand-down. One chaplain was transferred in early March and another departed by DEROS in mid-March. One enlisted assistant was lost by DEROS in early March and two others departed on 1 April. This schedule of personnel losses within the section approximated the stand-down dates of the battalions served by the persons involved. Both unit and Chaplain Fund property was inventoried. It was determined that an adequate balance remained in the Chaplains Fund to cover all obligations.

2. Planning: All administrative policies and reports for the chaplain section were handled through the Brigade Chaplain's Office at Camp Frenzell Jones to allow the chaplains who served the battalions in the field the maximum time possible with the troops until they came in for stand-down. During the stand-down period, the chaplains each continued their established pattern of patient coverage at the two Long Binh hospitals.

3. Concept: Religious services and counseling would continue at fire support bases. The regular schedule of religious services would continue at Camp Frenzell Jones Chapel, and where possible, in field locations until each battalion's stand-down. Arrangements for special Battalion Memorial Services would be arranged through the Brigade Chaplains' Office during stand-down.

4. Execution:

A. Services: Arrangements were made to hold Protestant and Catholic worship services at the conclusion of the battalion Memorial Services at the beginning of each unit's stand-down. This plan enable the chaplain section to conduct services in addition to those regularly scheduled at the chapel without interfering with stand-down procedures and administrative processing.

B. Personnel: Early and continuous coordination was made with the USARV Chaplain's Office concerning reassignment of the brigade's chaplains and chaplain assistants.

C. Property: TO&E property, except for a minimum amount of equipment necessary for the operation of the chapel at Camp Frenzell Jones, was turned in to HHC, 2nd Brigade property book officer. The essential items retained were transferred to the successor users of the chapel. Jeeps, trailers and equipment used by individual chaplains were turned in through appropriate channels as the various units served by individual chaplains commenced stand-down.

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D. Consolidated Chaplains Fund: Fund owned property was laterally transferred to the Long Binh Post Consolidated Chaplains Fund, the 34th Engineer Group Consolidated Chaplains Fund, the USARV Consolidated Chaplains Fund, and the II Field Force Consolidated Chaplains Fund. All property having been laterally transferred, the 2nd Brigade Consolidated Chaplains Fund was dissolved on 20 March 1971, and the cash balance was sent to the Office of the Chief of Chaplains in accordance with AR 230-36, paragraph 2-11.

A. The Brigade Provost Marshal's Office (PMO) and the Criminal Investigation Section (CI) were located at Camp Frenzell-Jones with the Brigade Headquarters (rear). The PMO exercised operational control over all military police functions in the brigade; maintained a physical security section for the brigade; collected, coordinated, and distributed all military police reports; effected necessary liaison with the VN National Police and VN Military Police operating within the brigade area; provided civilian labor checkpoints at two installations; and coordinated with the Brigade staff and unit commanders on military police activities affecting their respective areas of interest.

B. The military police support for the brigade consisted of the 544th MP Platoon and a security MP platoon assigned to HHC, 2nd Brigade. The majority of the security platoon was located at the forward command post with the mission of providing tactical MP support particularly convoy escorts. It also responded to the Brigade Commander's requirements for maintenance of discipline, law and order at the forward command post. The remainder of the security platoon remained OPCON to the 544th MP Platoon at the rear area. The 544th MP Platoon provided law enforcement and security patrols on Camp Frenzell-Jones, and supplied personnel to operate the PMO and escort convoys not handled by the security platoon. Each platoon had the capability of meeting all military police missions, to include PW collection.

2. Planning:

A. Information and coordination necessary for redeployment planning include the following:

(1) The redeployment date of the brigade.

(2) The stand-down dates of individual units of the brigade.

(3) The date of relief of brigade military police from their respective missions, the designation of a relieving MP unit, and coordination between the brigade and units assuming responsibility for brigade areas.

(4) The closing date of the Brigade PMO.

(5) The disposition of MP/CI records, reports, open cases and evidence.

(6) Coordination between the 38th Scout Dog Platoon, S-1, USARV Dog Training Detachment, and PM for transfer of two scout dog handlers and dogs to the 544th MP Platoon.

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B. Parameters which were essential to the stand-down effort were:

(1) Full military police support must be available through the entire stand-down period;

(2) Flexibility and resources sufficient to cope with any situation must be maintained;

(3) A smooth transition between the stand-down MP unit and relieving MP unit is essential for continuous MP support;

(4) Close coordination must be maintained with commanders of MP units;

(5) Redeployment activities must be monitored to provide necessary assistance and guidance to commanders and staff sections as needed;

(6) Strict control of troops during stand-down must be maintained by unit commanders;

(7) Emphasis should be on prevention of incidents and service to the troops rather than upon strict enforcement during stand-down.

3. Execution:

A. On 25 March 1971, the security platoon returned to Camp Frenzell-Jones to assume discipline, law and order functions, OPCON to the 544th MP Platoon.

B. At 010001 April 1971, the security platoon began its stand-down, passing all MP missions to the 544th MP Platoon.

C. The 544th MP Platoon supported the brigade until 152400 April 1971, when MP support responsibility was relegated to the PM, Long Binh Post. At this time the 544th MP Platoon began its stand-down, being released on 24 April 1971.

4. Recommendations:

A. Effect coordination for the transfer of responsibilities with the gaining command as early as feasible.

B. Early planning on augmented patrols and increased awareness of the need for prevention of incidents and crime.

C. That MP assets in a separate infantry brigade be consolidated in one unit under one commander for better command and control.

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D. Prior to commencing stand-down, unit commanders should establish procedures to insure that pets are collected and turned in to a veterinary detachment to avoid having stray animals roaming loose on base camp.

1. Planning: Upon learning that the 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division would begin stand-down in early March, planning immediately began concerning the out-processing of personnel. There were certain data with which the Finance Office had to work.

A. It was understood that service to the 2nd Brigade personnel would at no time be lessened or impaired.

B. Detailed information would not be available until just prior to member's shipping date.

D. All services would be available to out-processing personnel to include allotment changes.

E. Partial payment would be available to all out-processing personnel upon request, except for ETS shipments.

2. Out-processing:

A. A finance information sheet was drafted and disseminated to all 2nd Brigade units. DEROS personnel were informed as to eligibility for partial pays, travel pay and the purchase of Treasury Checks.

B. Immediately upon receipt of the next day's shipping list from AG, our Pay Branch began “pulling” those records and forwarding them to the out-processing section. Here final processing was completed, and the records were readied for the out-processing members.

C. The AG and Finance offices were separated by a covered, concrete floored structure. Due to its convenience, this area was utilized for all out-processing. A processing line was established by stations with each station designated to accomplish a specific function.

Station 1 - Match the man with his record. Control movement into the processing area.

Station 2 - Individual receipts for his record by signing out-processing form DA 141 and signing his leave records.

Station 3 - Allotment changes.

Station 4 - Partial or month-end payments

Station 5 - Final review by NCO

Station 6 - Cashier

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D. Before members' arrival at the actual processing point, the Brigade AG briefed them concerning the above-mentioned method of out-processing, to include AG out-processing and medical out-processing stations.

E. The inactivation of the 2nd Brigade also brought with it the inactivation of the disbursing symbol number 6377. This complex task was accomplished by the careful implementation of the directions provided for in AR 37-103. The last day of disbursing for the 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division Finance Office was 25 April 1971, and the account was closed and final accounting reports submitted on 28 April 1971.

F. Problems and recommendations:

(1) The inherent problems confronted when standing down a unit such as the 2nd Brigade can never be fully solved because of the many variables encountered. Finance and AG must coordinate very closely and try to anticipate possible problem areas.

Recommendation: Every effort must be made to prepare orders and rosters in advance to allow for maximum processing time, but correct enough to have maximum accuracy. Changes to orders once issued must be kept at a minimum and on a timely basis.

(2) Several instances of no-show personnel occurred during out-processing. This caused records to be unnecessarily moved from the Pay Division to out-processing and returned again to the Pay Division and hampered an efficient work flow. Any extra movement of records increases the possibility of losing or misplacing a record. The in-transit record may result in delays when the member finally out-processes on an unscheduled basis.

Recommendation: Commanders must insure that all men scheduled to out-process at a specific time and place are there.

G. March payday: It was known that the March payday would be the 2nd Brigade Finance Office's last monthly payday. March payday fell within some of the heaviest out-processing. The problem was determining who was going to be on an individual unit's payroll and who was not. To expedite this situation, very close coordination was required between the individual unit, AG and Finance. It was further determined that no personnel out-processing during March would be on the unit's March payroll, and that personnel shipping between 1 - 4 April would not be on the March payroll, but would be paid as they out-processed. In this manner, many of the “border line” cases were handled, and the March payday problem was alleviated. FDRF's on hand with shipping dates after 4 April 1971 were used to prepare payrolls. The maximum number of members were paid by Class “A” Agents in each unit for the March payday.

H. DEROS and In-Country Transfers: DEROS personnel were processed during the afternoon hours and all in-country transfers and ETS personnel during the morning. The rate of in-country transfers and ETS out-processed in one hour was approximately 100. It required three out-processing clerks and one allotment clerk to process at this rate. DEROS personnel were processed on an “as usual” basis inside the Finance Office to provide them with complete service. Processing DEROS personnel in this manner insured a more continuous work flow during the day and afforded the finance clerks adequate time to process the DEROS FDRF properly and insure any unresolved pay problems are expedited.

1. SITUATION: Prior to the 2nd Brigade stand-down, the Brigade Labor Office had on record approximately 400 domestic hire and 129 direct hire employees. These were employed at Camp Frenzell-Jones and at two forward compounds at Xuan Loc. In addition, approximately 50 daily hire laborers were being employed daily by units at Camp Frenzell-Jones, while the two forward areas were utilizing 15 to 20 laborers daily. In order to effectively control this work force, the labor office initiated a system of labor supervisors to represent the civilian personnel of each unit. The labor supervisor was solely responsible for the hiring and the termination of employees of his unit, and was appointed on unit orders as an agent for the cashier of the 2nd Brigade AIK fund.

2. PLANNING: It was decided that the best way to control the reduction-in-force of the civilian personnel of the 2nd Brigade was by close coordination with the unit labor supervisors. A letter of instruction was given to each unit labor supervisor to provide guidelines for the termination of his civilian employees. Each unit was then asked to submit a roster of their civilian employees indicating a release date for each. At the same time, coordination was being made with the units that were replacing the 2nd Brigade at Camp Frenzell-Jones to transfer as many civilian workers as possible to the new units. A seniority roster of all direct hire employees was used as a basis for determining which employees would be transferred to the new units.

3. IMPLEMENTATION: SF Forms 52, “Request for Personnel Action”, were submitted to the Long Binh Area CPO as soon as effective release dates for direct hire personnel could be established and confirmed. The pass section of the labor office, utilizing the rosters submitted by each unit, was able to process on the employee's last working day all the paperwork for employees being terminated. This made the final processing of terminated employees through the labor office fast and efficient, and allowed a large number of employees to be processed at one time.

4. PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: The concept of operations and implementation of planning resulted in a smooth and orderly reduction-in-force, and no significant problems were experienced.

A. During stand-down, reassignments of accused persons within the brigade and outside the brigade, discharges UP Chapter 10, AR635-200, and orders of prisoners to Correctional Holding Detachment, closely coordinated between the Battalion S-1, SJA and AG. Claims were accepted and processed at the Brigade SJA Office until 21 April 1971. After that date they were referred to II Field Force for processing. All claims were either paid or otherwise disposed of by 15 April 1971, at which time all claims activities ceased. Legal assistance continued until 21 April 1971 when the SJA was scheduled for phase-out.

B. All efforts were aimed at disposing of all special courts-martial cases before the Brigade Headquarters entered stand-down. This was accomplished, and the Brigade Special Court-Martial docket was cleared by 5 April 1971. Two pending General Courts-Martial were processed by II Field Force as it had General court-martial jurisdiction over these cases.

2. OBSERVATIONS:

A. Early curtailment of RVN tours announced by USARV could have proved detrimental to pending trials.

B. Alert trial counsel and Battalion adjutants reacted promptly when witnesses were curtailed, and no major problems developed.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. Upon notification of redeployment / inactivation, all Battalion adjutants immediately identify all potential witnesses to a new court-martial case and inform the SJA office of pending charges and DEROS dates of all witnesses.

B. That firm identification and control of every Stockade prisoner and every pending court-martial be maintained.

C. That a close Battalion adjutant-AG- SJA working relationship be effected for rapid disposition of cases during periods of tour curtailment

1. GENERAL: The S-2 performed three primary missions during stand-down of the 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division. These were to maintain the current enemy situation during disengagement of brigade units; staff supervision of stand-down activities to insure safeguarding of classified information; and, the orderly transfer of intelligence assets and records. Intelligence operations and reports were continued until 6 April, the date the brigade's final tactical unit began its stand-down.

2. SENSOR FIELD DISPOSITION:

A. On 17 March, a meeting was held at II Field Force to coordinate the transfer of the brigade's unattended ground sensor (UGS) assets to units of III Corps and 1st Air Cavalry Division. Procedures for the orderly turn over of assets and monitoring responsibilities were agreed on to insure that continuous monitoring and communications were maintained.

B. On 22 March, all on-shelf sensors and associated equipment not required by the brigade were laterally transferred to III Corps.

A. All units down to and including companies, appointed an officer or warrant officer as Unit Security Control Officer (USCO). The USCO was charged with the responsibility of personally conducting inspections of buildings, vehicles, containers, structures, and in and around unit areas to insure that no classified material, official waste, printed material or material useful to the enemy was left behind. After the USCO completed his inspection, his areas was inspected and cleared by a Counter-intelligence Security Team from the 584th Military Intelligence Detachment. CI Agents also inspected vehicles and equipment being turned in at the Keystone facility to insure that they contained no classified material official waste or flammable items.

A. Intelligence collection activities were continued throughout the stand-down period commensurate with the brigade's requirements and capabilities. On 29 March 548th MID was disbanded and required members of the Detachment were assigned to HHC, 2nd Brigade in order to maintain a continuous flow of intelligence and security throughout the stand-down period.

B. Files and documents were disposed of IAW AR 340-2.

(1) Order of Battle files were turned over to the 1st Air Cavalry Division, 1st Australian Task Force, Royal Thai Volunteer Force, or Long Khanh Sector, as appropriate, for their respective areas of operation.

(2) All maps, photography and data pertaining to tactical areas of responsibility have been turned over to the above allied organizations or destroyed.

1. SITUATION: On 20 December 1971, the 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division was officially notified of its designation for redeployment. At that time the brigade was employing four battalions in operations against enemy forces in MR-7 and SR-4. One battalion was operating in Nhon Trach District, Bien Hoa Province. Three battalions were operating in Long Khanh Province, and the northern portion of Phuoc Tuy Province (see Figure 1). Located to the north of the brigade area of operations (AO) was the 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment; to the east, the 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (AM); to the south, the 1st Australian Task Force; and the west, the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force. The brigade operated out of a forward location at Xuan Loc; its rear was at Camp Frenzell-Jones. In each battalion AO, a fire support base was operational.

2. CONCEPT:

A. Tasks: During the redeployment, the 2nd Brigade established three priority tasks, described as follows:

(1) Continuance of combat operations. The key to this task was to apply constant pressure to enemy elements operating within the AO. The purpose of the task was to allow, through a phasing operation, all elements in the brigade to redeploy with minimum enemy threat.

(2) Disengagement: Disengagement was accomplished by phasing the combat maneuver elements out of the brigade's AO. Responsibility for these areas was transferred to other US and allied forces. In conjunction with the AO transfer, combat operations were conducted to cover disengaging units and provide for security of the force. Disengagement activities are shown within Appendix 1 (Sequence of Events).

(3) Redeployment. The brigade prepared for redeployment while maintaining constant pressure on the enemy. The requirement was that all of the brigade's redeploying units turn in their property for use as Keystone assets, and be reduced to zero strength, by the end of each unit's stand-down period; the brigade was to complete this task no later than 28 April 1971.

B. Phasing: To accomplish all these tasks, it was necessary to phase out the redeploying units. Maneuver battalions and supporting artillery batteries were carefully staggered to maintain maximum pressure on the enemy, and to facilitate a smooth and professional redeployment.

3. EXECUTION:

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A. Transfer of Area of Operation: The 2nd Brigade began transferring its AO on 31 Jan 1971. On that date, the brigade transferred all of its AO within Phuoc Tuy Province to the 1st Australian Task Force. Also, a large portion of the AO east of Xuan Loc was transferred to the 1st Calvalry Division (AM). On 3 March 1971, the brigade further consolidated its AO by transferring the Nhon Trach area to Bien Hoa Province. On 12 March 1971, the 2-12 Infantry disengaged. At this time, the remainder of the brigade AO was transferred to Long Khanh Sector, Bien Hoa Sector, and the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force (RTAVF). To continue operations with the remaining three battalions, the brigade requested specific areas from the above Free World Military Forces. On 23 March 1971 the 1 -27 Infantry disengaged and the 3-22 Infantry, terminating its AO with RTAVF, moved north into the 1-27 Infantry AO. On 27 March 1971, the 1 -5 Infantry (M) terminated its AO with Long Khanh Sector, and disengaged from combat operations. Finally, on 6 April 1971, 3-22 Infantry terminated its AO from Long Khanh Sector and RTAVF, and disengaged from tactical operations.

B. Disposition of Brigade Missions:

(1) Tactical mission: The tactical mission of the brigade was transferred to other members of the Free World Military Forces. As indicated in paragraph 3A above, this was accomplished by transferring areas of operation. On 6 April 1971, 2nd Brigade was relieved of all tactical missions and became OPCON to USARV.

(2) Training mission: Effective 17 March 1971, the 2nd Brigade was relieved of its one-company commitment to the RF/PF training mission (controlled by the 1st Cavalry Division).

(3) Contingency missions: On 31 January 1971, the 2nd Brigade was released from its commitment to ROME EAGLE. On 13 March 1971, the brigade was no longer responsible for reinforcement on a contingency basis of XUAN LOC or BLACKHORSE BASECAMP.

C. Sequence of events: See Appendix 1 to this Annex.

4. Fire Support: Fire support was made available to all maneuver units both while they continued combat operations, and finally, as they disengaged for redeployment. Each battalion had an artillery battery in direct support. These batteries commenced stand-down only after the supported unit began stand-down. The artillery battery covered the unit's disengagement and movement back to Camp Frenzell-Jones. When necessary, non-organic artillery units were utilized in pre-planning fires to insure complete coverage for disengaging units.

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5. Movement Security: In that vulnerability to enemy initiated attacks increases greatly during the disengagement phase, movement security was stressed to all subordinate elements. Moves were conducted tactically, utilizing armed vehicle escorts. When possible, organic aircraft would provide overhead cover and / or a command and control capability to the disengaging unit. Radio communications were maintained until all elements had closed Camp Frenzell-Jones. To increase security for the 3-22 Infantry's disengagement, the last maneuver battalion to stand-down, vehicular strong points were established from the field locations, along the route(s) of march, to Camp Frenzell-Jones.

6. CEREMONIES: See Appendix 2 to this Annex.

7. LESSON LEARNED: Transfer of Area of Operation.

A. Observation: The early transfer of the brigade AO to other FWMF was designed to facilitate redeployment activities. It was also considered to be of prime importance that, as the maneuver battalions phased out of the field, maximum pressure would be maintained on the enemy forces. However, after 12 March (when the AO was transferred), enemy contacts became more and more infrequent.

B. Evaluation: It appears that as the brigade consolidated its position, and operational areas were reduced in size, the enemy forces strived to bypass US Forces and accomplish resupply / commo liaison missions.

C. Recommendation: When transferring AO responsibility and subsequently requesting operational areas, insure these areas are sufficiently large enough so as to give units the needed flexibility to prevent enemy bypass operations. In addition, periodic joint operations of short duration should be conducted in areas vacated by US forces in order to preempt enemy plans to bypass known operational areas of US forces.

1. Awards Ceremonies: Awards ceremonies were scheduled no later than two days after a unit commenced stand-down. Awards were presented by the Brigade Commander. After Action Reports for the battalion awards ceremonies, separate unit awards and inactivation ceremonies, and the Brigade Farewell Ceremony are attached as Tabs A through C.

A. Each ceremony was held at 1000 hours on the 2nd day of the unit's stand-down.

B. Final rehearsal for each ceremony was conducted two hours prior to the time of the ceremony

C. Participating personnel included:

(1) Unit commander.

(2) Ceremonial unit commander if more than one unit was present.

(3) Unit NCOIC.

(4) Persons to be decorated.

(5) Unit guidon bearer.

D. If more than one unit participated in the ceremony, the senior unit commander commanded the ceremonial formation..

E. All available unit personnel participated in the ceremony.

2. Responsibilities:

A. Commander of the ceremonial formation insured that personnel were present for rehearsals and the ceremony.

B. Unit Executive Officer insured that persons to be decorated were present for rehearsals and the ceremony; that they were in correct uniform; that orders authorizing awards were read; that awards were on hand for presentation; and that orders authorizing unit inactivation were on hand.

C. S-3:

(1) Assisted in coordination and execution of the ceremony.

(2) Provided for VIP and guest seating and arranged for the band.

D. Brigade Signal Officer made provisions for:

(1) Public address system with back-up (for rehearsals and the ceremony).

1. GENERAL: At the time of notification of stand-down, the 2nd Brigade was located in Long Khanh and Bien Hoa Provinces operating from Fire Support Bases Heidi, Beverly, Swartz, and Leopard with a Forward Command Post at Xuan Loc. The Brigade Rear, consisting of direct support units, organizational maintenance areas, administrative areas, and other supporting elements, was located at Camp Frenzell-Jones (CJF), Long Binh. In addition to the consolidated logistics support provided at CFJ, a Forward Support Element (FSE), consisting of a Class I and Class III point was co-located with the 2/12th Infantry rear at Husky Compound, Xuan Loc. This FSE provided support to all forward elements except the 1 /5th Infantry (M). The main supply route was Highway 1 from Long Binh to Xuan Loc, and QL 2 from Xuan Loc to FSB Beverly. An airstrip was available at Xuan Loc. On 5 March, the brigade Forward Command Post and supporting elements moved from Xuan Loc to FSB Carol.

2. PLANNING Upon receiving official notification of the brigade's stand-down, the Brigade S -4 provided one officer to participate in the formulation of a plan for redeployment /inactivation of the brigade and its elements. Included in the initial planning group were representatives of the Brigade S-1 and S-3. All redeployment coordination was accomplished by direct contact between key logistical personnel of the 2nd Brigade and personnel of Saigon Support Command, II FFORCEV, USARV, and HQ, MACV. References used in the planning were USARV OPLAN 183-70, After Action Reports of the 25TH Infantry Division and 199th Infantry Brigade, and the USARV Redeployment Guide for Units. Initial planning included the following:

A. Establishing in coordination with the S-3, a stand-down schedule of units. Factors involved in developing this schedule were:

(1) Gradual phase-down of operations within the brigade area of operations.

a. Initial plans were to organize a Roll-Up Force (RUF) which would have the capability of supporting the brigade in the latter phases of stand-down, and subsequent to stand- down of the 225th Support Battalion.

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b. In early March, the Commanding Officer, 2nd Brigade, decided not to form a RUF for the brigade. This necessitated that coordination be affected for logistical support from Long Binh Post subsequent to the 225th Support Battalion's stand-down, and the necessity to complete turn-in of all property and audit all property books by 28 April 71.

B. Notifying all property book officers of the requirement to submit to USARV an inventory of all PEMA items, PC&S property, and other selected items NLT 2 January 1971 (See Appendix 1).

C. Providing continuing logistical support to those units in the field until their actual stand-down.

D. Requiring all unit S-4's, Property Book Officers, and Maintenance Officers to tour the Keystone Processing Point NLT 5 days before their respective unit's stand-down.

E. Placing immediate emphasis on identification and turn-in of unneeded TO&E equipment. Unneeded TO&E equipment was turned in between 4 Jan and the beginning of respective unit stand-downs.

(1) To avoid delay and overcrowding at the processing location, units were required to coordinate with the Brigade Project Officer at least 24 hours in advance of desired turn-in time.

(2) Units were advised to turn in all property for property book credit first. After ensuring the property books were at zero balance, equipment was turned in as “found on post”.

F. Establishing a turn-in schedule, by unit, category, and quantity to be utilized after a unit had commenced stand-down.

A. Upon official designation as a Keystone Robin (Charlie) unit, each subordinate element was directed to begin turn-in of all categories of equipment and supplies not considered to be mission-essential by the unit commander(s).

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B. Whenever possible, equipment and/or facilities were laterally transferred to incoming units. Transfer of facilities to ARVN and the transfer of facilities and equipment to U.S. units were accomplished only after having gained the approval of J-4, MACV and G-4, II FFORCEV (Real Property Custodian).

C. The actual turn-in and processing of equipment was accomplished at the Keystone Robin turn-in facilities established by 79th Maintenance Battalion, Long Binh, Medical, aviation, and COMSEC equipment were turned in through appropriate supply channels. The close proximity of CFJ to the turn-in points precluded a requirement for any brigade processing points.

D. The primary responsibilities of the brigade pertaining to equipment turn-in were to:

(2) Provide transportation for unit equipment to the turn-in points when required.

(3) Reduce the on-hand supply levels and insure turn-in of all unneeded material.

(4) To clear and audit property books prior to their being forwarded to G-4, USARV (See Appendix 4)

4. EXECUTION:

A. Disposition of TO&E and PC&S Equipment:

(1) The majority of all brigade equipment was processed through the Keystone turn-in points at Long Binh. The facilities opened on 4 January to allow units to reduce their equipment density by turning in non-mission essential items. This allowed units to familiarize themselves with the standards and procedures required for turn-in. During this early pre-stand-down turn-in, the 79th Maintenance Battalion did not maintain a formal schedule. The Brigade S-4 monitored and, when necessary, scheduled the units' turn-in times to prevent confusion and bottlenecks. The units took advantage of this early turn-in to eliminate their non-mission essential equipment. The most commonly turned in items included:

a. Protective masks d. Mine detectors b. Bayonets e. Trailers

c. Test sets

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(2) When the keystone Processing Point (KPP) opened on 4 January 1971, the 2nd Brigade furnished one officer and twenty-five enlisted men to the 79th Maintenance Battalion to aid in the processing of equipment. The officer in charge of the group also acted as liaison officer for the brigade. He was quite valuable in answering questions, solving minor problems as units began utilizing the turn-in facility and acting as the point of contact between the brigade and the 79th Maintenance Battalion.

(3) Lateral transfer of equipment from the 2nd Brigade to other units was accomplished IAW the guidance set forth in USARV OPLAN 183-70. This proved to be quite beneficial to the brigade as the transportation and documentation requirements for Keystone turn-in were eliminated. Mess equipment at CFJ was transferred in place to Long Binh Post or incoming units, concurrent with the closing of the unit messes.

a. Generally, transfers were accomplished as follows: Requests for equipment, by type and quantity, were submitted to the Brigade S-4. The Brigade S-4 in turn, compared the requirements with the property book assets of brigade units. When a unit was committed to a lateral transfer, coordination between property book officers was affected. Requests for approval (to G-4, USARV) and preparation of DA Forms 3161, were the responsibility of the losing unit. Problems resulted when the gaining units failed to validate outstanding requisitions with ICCV early enough to allow sufficient time for action by G-4, USARV and physical transfers prior to the date losing units were required to close out property books. Losing unit property book officers were therefore forced to turn-in property through the KPP and could not wait for approval of lateral transfers.

B. Disposition of Special Items.

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(1) Temporary Loan. Items on temporary loan to brigade units were turned-in to depot through the Brigade Supply Officer on a routine temporary loan turn-in basis. A problem encountered with temporary loan was the identification of temporary loan items within the brigade. In some instances, items had been on loan to the brigade for a prolonged period of time, and documentation was either missing or incomplete. ICCV and USADLB records of temporary loans were not completely in agreement with brigade records and did not substantiate previous turn-ins. Necessarily, discrepancies were resolved on an item-by-item basis among the property book officers, ICCV, and USADLB.

(2) ENSURE Items: A list provided by the operation section of the Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV) was utilized in determining what items had been issued to 2nd Brigade. Some of these items could neither be identified nor located within the units. Additionally, improper documentation was more the rule rather than the exception. Disposition instructions from ACTIV resulted in most items being marked as ENSURE items and turned in to Keystone. A final report to ACTIV was required indicating quantity and disposition of all ENSURE items within the brigade.

(3) House Trailers: Two (2) house trailers at CFJ were transferred to Long Binh Post. In addition, two (2) house trailers had been utilized at the Brigade Forward Command Post in Xuan Loc. Disposition of these trailers consisted of one being transferred to MACV (Advisory Team 87 in Xuan Loc) and the other was transferred to Long Binh Post. All transfers were directed by USARV and accomplished IAW the provisions of USARV Reg 405-6.

(4) CONNEX Containers: HQ, USARV directed that all CONEX containers be returned to the transportation system loaded or returned to the CONEX yard at USADLB. As each unit closed out, a final CONEX inventory was submitted to the Brigade CONEX Control Officer indicating disposition of all CONEX's reported on the previous inventory.

(5) Organizational Colors: Initially, all organizational colors were laterally transferred to HHC, 2nd Brigade. Subsequently, the colors were dropped from the HHC property book by a disposition statement made by the Bde S-4. Honor guards accompanied the colors to Hawaii with the exceptions of 2-12th Inf and 3-22nd Inf. Honor guards accompanied these units to Fort Lewis for inactivation ceremonies.

(6) Class I: As the units approached stand-down, their basic loads of Combat Rations were converted by turn-in and reissued as operational rations (utilizing DA Form 3161). These operational rations were utilized in providing re-supply of normal field requirements. The Class I point was operational until 7 April. Until its closing, the Class I point made substitutions to reduce on-hand balances of some items and to preclude drawing other items from depot. After the Class I point closed, the four messes still in operation drew Class I supplies directly from the 506th S&S Company at Long Binh. This procedure was coordinated with and approved by Saigon Support Command. Full pallets of Combat Rations at the Class I point were returned to Depot while smaller quantities were either issued or transferred to the 506th S&S Company.

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(7) Class IV Material:

a. Stocked Class IV: It was necessary for the Class IV Yard to remain operational until the last unit began stand-down since requests for sandbags and concertina wire were received through the last day of operations. The material in the Brigade Class IV Yard was transferred to different units in the Long Binh /Bien Hoa area on a first-come, first-serve basis.

b. Class IV at Fire Support Bases: For those fire support bases transferred to ARVN units, Class IV material was left in place. For those fire support bases which were closed, Class IV material was retrograded to CFJ and turned in through the Property Disposal Officer (PDO). These materials mainly consisted of culverts, PSP, steel matting, and heavy timber.

(8) Ammunition:

a. Units were relieved from accountability for their basic load of ammunition by submitting a DA Form 581 (turn-in) to LBASD and receiving a DA Form 581 (issue) for the same ammunition. The ammunition was then classed as the operational load for the unit and where possible, was expended. As each unit returned to CFJ for stand-down, all Class V still crated, was turned in directly to the LBASD. Loose rounds and broken boxes of ammunition were separated, boxed, marked, and turned in to LBASD.

b. Ammunition that was not IIFFV ASR was transferred, where possible, to the incoming unit. The remainder was retrograded to CFJ or LBASD, when feasible, for turn-in.

C. Logistic Support Activities:

1. Sponsor Units: Normally a period of two to four days lapsed between the close-out of a unit's property books and the date the unit transferred all of its personnel. During this period, each unit needed some equipment such as vehicles, bedding, and typewriters for continued operations prior to close-out. To provide this support, informal coordination was made with a unit not yet in stand-down, who provided necessary support through the use of temporary hand receipts. The last two units to close received this support from one of the units taking over CFJ.

2. Mess Activities:

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a. Messing: The messes closed one at a time as the personnel strength of CFJ declined. As a mess closed, it passed on to another mess any serviceable condiments and expendables still on hand. Coordination was made through the 2nd Brigade Food Service Advisor to have the property transferred messes to Long Binh Post or to an incoming unit. All unit messes remained operational throughout their respective unit stand-down. Expansion of normal feeding hours and the Brigade Food Advisor closely monitoring messing operations ensured a minimum number of problem areas. At the end of each unit's stand-down, the mess facility was either transferred to an incoming unit or closed and transferred to LBP HQ, temporarily, until units arrived at CFJ to assume operational responsibility for the mess. In either case, the mess equipment was left in place.

b. Audits: LAW AR 30-1, a final review of mess records was conducted as each mess hall was closed. A letter of release was given to the unit commander responsible for each mess, and a copy was inserted in respective permanent unit files.

3. Transportation (See Appendix 5).

4. Maintenance and PLL (See Appendix 6).

5. Honor Guard Support:

a. A relatively minor logistical task was that of providing support for the Brigade Honor Guard in preparation for its return to Hawaii, and for 2nd Bn, 12th Inf., and 3rd Bn, 22 Inf. to Fort Lewis. As soon as confirmed lists of returnees were available, units were directed to submit, to Brigade S-4, a roster of personnel indicating uniform sizes. The following items were procured by Brigade S-4 for each member of the Honor Guards.

2 sets of Khakis 2 sets of jungle fatigues

1 pair of jungle boots 1 jungle hat

1 garrison cap 1 pistol belt

1 helmet w/liner and camouflage cover

b. One member of the Honor Guard was designated as supply officer and charged with the responsibility of supervising the issue of equipment and subsequent turn-in at Schofield Barracks and Fort Lewis. Unit orders were published designating this supply officer as accountable officer for the organizational colors being returned to Schofield Barracks and Fort Lewis.

c. Phase-out of Brigade Supply: Immediately upon notification of stand-down, the Brigade Supply Officer (BSO) began to take the necessary actions to reduce stocks on hand.

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1. Shortly after the notification, all out of country requisitions, except Red Ball, were automatically canceled by the Depot. This was followed on 4 March, by a cancellation of all unfilled requisitions. An agreement was made with Deport to allow all 2nd Brigade requisitions to be hand-carried. This applied only to those items required for continued operations, and which were not on hand in the Brigade supply yard.

2. A print-out was received from Depot giving disposition instructions to support units for items on hand. These items were to be turned in either to retrograde sections, or stock control sections at Long Binh Depot for further disposition. Stocks on hand of less than full pallet quantities were repacked in multi-pack form by brigade supply personnel and turned in to Depot utilizing preprinted DA Forms 1348. This operation was phased over a period of several weeks as it became evident that certain items would be excess. Daily turn-ins were made to Depot as these excess items were generated.

3. Through turn-in of excess stock and normal attrition, the stocks on hand were brought to a zero balance and stock record accounts were closed.

A. Not later than five days after notification, all units were required to submit to G-4, USARV an inventory of all on-hand PEMA items, PC&S property, and Special Services property. Paragraph 2, below, shows the inventory format. Three copies of this inventory were used as the basis for determining assets on hand within the brigade and the volume of turn-in activity through Keystone.

B. As the units closed out property books, a disposition report, accompanied by the property books, was forwarded to G-4, USARV. In this report, columns 6, 7. and 8 were completed to show the UIC of the receiving unit, quantity, and date of turn-in or transfer.

2. FORMAT OF REPORT.

A. Inactivating /redeploying units will submit their inventories in the following format using columns 1 through 5:

UIC______________

OPERATIONAL OR DISPOSITION

LINNOMENCLATURE FSNQUANTITYNON-OPERATIONAL UNIT QTYDATE

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

I. Authorized PEMA items (Reportable under AR 711-5)

a. Firepower and Mobility

(1) Wheeled Vehicles

(2) Tracked Vehicles

(3) Weaponry

b. Communications /Electronics

(1) Radios

(2) Generators

(3) Vision Devices

(4) Other

c. Special Purpose Equipment

(1) Engineer Equipment

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(2) Water Purification Equipment

(3) Generators (non-signal)

(4) Other

II. Post, Camp, and Station Property

a. Garrison Equipment (See USARV Reg. 30-1)

b. Billeting and Office Equipment

c. All Secondary Items

(1) Secondary Weaponry

(2) Secondary COMMEL

(3) Secondary QM

(4) Secondary Kits, Sets, and Outfits

III. Special Services Property

IV. Excess PEMA items (as in part I above)

B. Stand-down units will submit disposition reports by completing the last three columns of extra retained copies of the unit inventories. All units will enter the name of the receiving logistical support activity.

1. In order to monitor the progress of each unit's turn-in and to provide information on the overall brigade status, reports were required to be submitted to Brigade S-4 by all subordinate units. TAB A shows the format for daily reports to Brigade S-4. This report was originally submitted each Friday by each unit, but was later changed to a daily report as all units moved into CFJ. The figures reported as “on-hand” and “turned in” are on individual items as opposed to line items. This data was used to figure the percentage of turn-in of all items of property listed in a unit's property book.

2. The figures on turn-in of selected items enabled Brigade S-4 to monitor the overall status of the brigade in major items of equipment. TAB B shows the format used to portray these figures. The figures on the chart represent the items turned in as of 2 March 1971, one day after the stand-down of the first unit in the brigade.

3. Prior to their actual stand-down, units were required to submit a list of projected turn-ins to the Bde S-4 prior to each turn-in being made. This enabled the Bde S-4 and commanders to note those items no longer available within specific units or it served to halt the turn-in of mission-essential equipment. Also, it served to compare the progress of turn-in between units.

A. TAB A prescribes the documentation required for various types of equipment to be turned in to the Keystone Processing Point. The documentation indicated was necessary for both early (pre-stand-down) and scheduled turn-in periods during the units' stand-down.

D. The “To” and “From” blocks of the DA Form 2408-7 were required to be left blank.

E. Turn-in of small arms:

1. Serial numbers were listed on the reverse side of the DA Form 2765-1 or DA Form 2408-7.

2. No more than 25 items could be turned-in on a single DA Form 2765-1 or DA Form 2408-7

F. Minor changes in documentation requirements and procedures were made by the Keystone processing units during the stand-down period. These changes were verbally disseminated to brigade units as soon as they were made.

G. A copy of DD For 200, Report of Survey, was required, when applicable, at the processing point.

1._____________I hereby certify that the Log Book for the above described item of equipment was lost/destroyed due to_____________________________________________________________________________________

2. _____________I have inspected the above equipment /material and certify that to the best of my ability, it is free of all ammunition, components, explosives, trash, caked mud, human remains, fuel, coolants, and other extraneous material.

3. _____________I certify that the basic issue items pertaining to the above described equipment /material are being retained in this unit for use or replacement items. (AR 711-16)

4.______________I certify that the above equipment /material was damaged by Fair Wear and Tear or Combat Loss. (AR 735-11)

5.______________I certify that the below listed items are missing from the above equipment /material. Responsibility for the missing items has been or is being determined, IAW AR 711-15, AR 725-25.

FSN NOUN QTY

_____(Signature)_____________________

Name, Rank, Unit, APO

6. ______________I certify that the above described equipment /material is no longer needed for investigation or survey, and is hereby released for repair or disposal IAW AR 735-11. I further certify that an Actual Cost of Damage (ACOD) is, is not required on the above described equipment /material.

___________________________________

Signature Block of Survey Off

7. ________________Items 1 through 6, above, are as true as I can ascertain ______________________________ (Date)

1. USARV OPLAN 183-70 directed an examination be made of all property books and records to insure that all balances were actually zero and that there were no discrepancies noted in the records. This examination was conducted by various battalion property book officers for the first brigade units to stand-down and zero property books. Upon the completion of the stand-down and property book audit of the first battalion-sized units, the property book officers of these units were transferred to the S-4 section to function as examining officers for all other property records within the Brigade. When the examining officer was satisfied that the records were closed out and no discrepancies were noted, he notified the Bde S-4 who then sent a letter to the respective unit commander and property book officer formally relieving them of responsibility and accountability of all the unit's property and records. See TAB A for a copy of this letter and distribution.

2. Within 12 hrs after a unit's property books were brought to a zero balance, the Brigade S-4 forwarded the following to USARV, G-4 ATTN: AVHGD - SPR.

1. UP file number 14-01, Section IX, Appendix A, AR 340-2, dated 30 September 1969, an examination was made of all property records of your unit. This examination encompassed the organization and installation property books, document registers, and document files. This examination revealed no significant discrepancies or irregularities in these records and a formal audit is not required. Further, it was determined that all property has been turned in to an authorized activity. All records referred to above will be forwarded to HQ, USARV, ATTN: AVHGD-SPR, IAW Annex F to USARV OPLAN 183-70.

2. A copy of this correspondence will be maintained as prescribed in file number 2 -05m Section II, Appendix A, AR 340-2 and disposition of that file will be as indicated.

A. When the brigade's redeployment was announced in January 1971, the Brigade Transportation Officer faced a three-fold mission in satisfying transportation requirements for all phases of the inactivation:

(1) Movement of brigade personnel and equipment from field locations to CFJ, Long Binh.

(2) Shuttle of equipment for turn-in from the CFJ area to turn-in points at Long Binh Post.

(3) Administrative transportation of personnel and shipment of personnel to their new in-country duty stations.

B. Contact was made immediately with Saigon Support Command. The Brigade Transportation officer was designated to act as transportation coordinator between the brigade and the various Saigon Support Command and Long Binh Post transportation agencies. The brigade units were tasked to provide a detailed analysis of their projected transportation requirements to the transportation officer, who in turn provided a consolidated forecast to Saigon Support Command. This forecast was used for planning purposes only. Final transportation requests were to Movements Control Center 24 hours in advance of actual requirements.

2. EXECUTION:

A. Shuttle of Equipment for Turn-in: On 4 Jan 71, the brigade began its turn-in of equipment at Long Binh. Throughout the latter part of the pre-stand-down turn-in period, the turn-in level was fairly low; requiring from two to four 2 ½ ton trucks and four to six S&P's. Because of accurate forecasts and the early coordination, Saigon Support Command was prepared to support the increased requirements. At no time did equipment turn-in slow down due to lack of transportation.

B. Administrative Transportation of Personnel:

(1) Because of the close proximity of CFJ to Long Binh Post and the Unaccompanied Baggage Facility, it was decided that a separate facility for packing and shipping unaccompanied baggage need not be established. Instead, transportation was provided, on an as-needed basis, to shuttle personnel and their hold baggage to the Long Binh facility. This proved to be satisfactory and in no way interrupted the operation of the Long Binh facility.

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(2) A larger problem lay in the movement of brigade personnel to their new assignments. Beginning 5 March 1971, through 28 April 1971, an average of 100 - 150 personnel were out-processed daily to both local and up-country assignments. For those personnel reassigned locally, transportation was to have been provided by the gaining unit. In some instances, gaining units did not show and the Brigade Transportation Officer was forced to provide transportation for the people. In most cases, personnel reassigned locally arrived at their new units prior to 1200 hours the same day they were processed. Personnel reassigned to units up-country were flown to their new duty station from Bien Hoa AB. The brigade furnished an out-processing roster from which information was extracted to compose a flight roster for all personnel requiring airlift to their new assignment. This flight roster was then provided to the brigade representative at Bien Hoa AB who booked the personnel on regularly scheduled and special mission aircraft to their new duty station. As a matter of convenience for the up-country personnel, they were booked for flights departing Bien Hoa AB the same day they were out-processed. Transportation was provided from CFJ to Bien Hoa AB by the Brigade Transportation Officer. A representative from brigade accompanied the up-country personnel to assist them upon arrival at the terminal. The combined modes of local shuttle and up-country airlift provided the brigade with a transportation system that comfortably kept pace with the administrative flow of out-processing personnel.

1. CONTINUED MAINTENANCE SUPPORT: As units turned in equipment to Keystone, requirements for direct support maintenance diminished considerably. USARV OPLAN 183-70 required that only organizational maintenance be performed prior to turn-in of a vehicle. In cases where a needed repair part was on hand, it was installed. If the part was not readily available at the depot on a “fill or kill” basis, the DA Form 2408-14 was used to note the missing part and the vehicle was turned in. If a vehicle required general support maintenance, the length of time required to repair and return the vehicle would, in most cases, exceed the time remaining before redeployment of the unit. Accordingly, these vehicles were not evacuated to higher maintenance but were turned in with a notation on the DA Form 2408-14 and USARV Form 593. (See Appendix 3 for documentation).

B. Items were repackaged and clearly marked with FSN and nomenclature.

C. Approximately two weeks prior to stand-down, units turned in a PLL listing which was processed through the computer at depot. Depot returned disposition instructions in the form of DA Forms 1348. These DA Forms 1348 were then attached to the actual item when it was turned in to depot. From depot; the items were either sent to Okinawa or redistributed in other supply channels.

D. Battalion consolidated company PLL's prior to turn-in.

E. Serviceable direct exchange items were turned in on DA Form 2765-1 and unserviceable items on DA Form 2402.

F. Technical assistance was provided by Tech Supply personnel in preparation for turn-in.

G. Maximum utilization of PLL items on hand was accomplished by all units prior to stand-down so only a minimum amount of PLL items had to be turned in.

GENERAL: This appendix outlines some of the problems encountered by the 2nd Brigade in its stand-down. Recommendations given are intended to provide assistance in the planning for other stand-down activities.

A. Disposition of Temporary Loan Items: There appeared to be no valid system of recording items on temporary loan to the brigade. Records maintained by the brigade did not coincide with print-outs from the depot and ICCV. This difficulty in identifying an item as a temporary loan item greatly complicated the proper disposition of the item.

RECOMMENDATION: That action be taken to consolidate and validate a list of all items on temporary loan to major units in USARV which are required to be turned in through temporary loan channels.

B. ENSURE Items: Accountability for ENSURE items was poor. This is due, in part, to the inability of supply personnel to identify properly the non-standard items and the lack of proper supply accountability procedures throughout the ENSURE System.

RECOMMENDATIONS: That action be taken to develop a list of ENSURE items with appropriate description to indicate the number of such items and their supposed location. This list should then be validated by units concerned and be periodically up-dated.

C. Lateral Transfer of Property: The processing of lateral transfers between stand-down (losing) units and other units was slow and frequently wasted time for the losing unit. Redeploying elements were plagued by units, who although desiring lateral transfers of equipment, were unaware of the procedures set forth in Appendix F, USARV OPLAN 183-70. The losing unit was requested to explain the procedures and identify items on hand. Once this was done, there was no assurance that the gaining unit would follow through to G-4, USARV for approval of the lateral transfer. If the gaining unit was slow in obtaining USARV approval, the losing unit was pressed for time and, in come cases, had to dispose of the items through Keystone. The end result was frequently a waste of time for all concerned.

RECOMMENDATION: That units desiring lateral transfer of equipment from Keystone units be required to go through G-4, USARV for tentative approval on specific items prior to visiting stand-down units. ICCV should provide validated MILSTRIP numbers to the gaining unit with a copy of the Inventory Report (Appendix 1) submitted by the stand-down unit, in order that the gaining unit can have an accurate list of equipment available. Additionally, G-4, USARV, should explain, when necessary, the procedures outlined in USARV OPLAN 183-70 regarding lateral transfer of equipment from Keystone units.

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D. Transportation of Reassigned Personnel: Brigade was tasked with the responsibility of arranging transportation for reassigned personnel to their new stations. The lack of available billets and mess facilities at Camp Frenzell-Jones dictated that reassigned personnel move to their new duty stations the same day that they out-processed. In the case of personnel assigned in the local area this posed no problem. Sufficient buses and cargo vehicles were available to move them directly from the out-processing center to their new assignment. For personnel reassigned up-country, air transportation was required, and the Brigade Transportation Officer was hard-pressed to keep up with this one-day time frame. Close coordination and excellent cooperation between the Transportation Officer, 3rd Region TMA and Bien Hoa AFB ATCO produced a system whereby personnel were booked on flights within 24 hours after completion of out-processing. Though the system was successful and provided good service to Brigade personnel, it is felt that the transportation officer of a tactical unit is not equipped to run such an operation.

RECOMMENDATION: That in future inactivation or redeployment of tactical units, the responsibility of transient personnel moving to new in-country units, or duty stations, be divided between the redeploying unit and the transient detachment in that area of responsibility. The tactical unit should bear the responsibility of insuring local re-assignees are delivered to their new units and the transient detachment should be tasked to handle all personnel requiring air-lift to their new assignments. This recommendation is based on the premise that it is more effective to utilize a system that is already in operation rather than create an entirely new system that will be temporary in nature.

E. Turn-in of Motion Picture Projectors: During stand-down, it became quite evident that there were no published instructions out-lining procedures for the turn-in of motion picture projectors. This created an undesirable situation as there was an increased demand for projectors during stand-down, and property book officers were, concurrently, attempting to zero their property books.

RECOMMENDATION: A detailed briefing should be given to those personnel holding motion picture projectors and film accounts. The commodity manager for audio visual aids, ICCV, should be notified so that he can provide specific instructions for disposition of projectors and outline the procedures for closing film accounts.

A. Purpose: This annex outlines S-5 operations in the fields of Psychological Operation, Civil Affairs, and Kit Carson Scouts in support of redeployment activities of the 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division:

B. Chronology: The chronology of actual occurrence dates for S-5 redeployment milestones is found at Appendix 1.

2. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS:

A. Background and Planning:

(1) Guidance for the formulation of PSYOP campaign in support of the 2nd Brigade's redeployment was received from MACV and USARV directives and After Action Reports from previously redeployed units. This guidance emphasized four main themes to be used in redeployment PSYOP campaign; first, PSYOP campaigns would promote pride and confidence in the RVNAF's victories and ability to protect the people from Communists; second, campaigns would emphasize that the redeployment was a result of joint planning on the part of the US and GVN leaders; third, the accomplishments of the people of RVN in pacification would be emphasized; and fourth, that the redeployment represented a step forward toward peace and further proof of the friendship of the US.

(2) After reviewing after action reports of redeployed units, it was decided the S-5, 2nd Brigade would conduct the redeployment campaign and assign tasks to the battalions as required. The proposed leaflets were submitted to the ACof S G5 II FFV, for approval. II FFV was requested to allocate 2 ½ million leaflets for the Brigade's redeployment campaign.

B. Execution:

(1) Redeployment:

a. Prior to the first battalion assuming a stand-down posture, support GVN, VIP, and Deny VC Tax themes were used extensively.

b. Upon stand-down of the first battalion, a formal redeployment campaign was initiated. The leaflets at Appendix 2 thru 4 are examples of the leaflets used in the population areas in the 2nd Bde's AO. In addition, posters were made of RF/PF personnel to instill pride in the RF/PF and the GVN.

c. Enemy counter Propaganda: Only one piece of enemy propaganda was found. It was found in a bunker complex at YT445145 on 15 Mar 1971. There was no evidence that any had been disseminated, yet the text was in English (See Appendix 5).

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C. Turn-in of Special Equipment.

(1) To avoid difficulties encountered by redeployed units in transferring equipment, a letter was sent to USARV requesting the disposition of equipment 15 days prior to the first battalion assuming a stand-down posture.

(2) The following transfers were made to 101st ABN Division in accordance with USARV instructions.

a. 3 ea. UIH-6 Public Address System

b. 2 ea. Sony Tape Recorders

c. 2 ea. Polaroid Cameras

(3) The following equipment was turned into Keystone Processing Center.

a. 11 ea. UAN/PIQ-5A Public address system

b. 1 ea. UIH-5 Public address system

3. CIVIL AFFAIRS:

A. Civic Action: Realizing that the 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division would redeploy in the near future, the Command policy was that no long term civic action projects would be undertaken, and therefore, during redeployment, there were no projects to transfer, terminate or complete.

B. MEDCAP:

(1) The battalions were required to conduct MEDCAP until assuming a stand-down posture or until shortage of personnel and medicine supplies made it impossible to continue.

(2) After receipt of the classified notification of the 2nd Brigade redeployment, an extra effort was made to have VN medical personnel on all MEDCAP and a portion of VN medicine used.

C. Wood, PSP, culvert and barbed wire from a closed FSB was distributed by the Brigade S-5 to Suoi Cat refugee Center, Long Khanh POLWAR Company, and local RF and PF units.

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4. KIT CARSON SCOUT PROGRAM:

A. The termination of the Brigade's Kit Carson Scout program (KCS) was accomplished in 3 phases. The first phase commenced when the classified notification of redeployment was received. This phase consisted of no longer recruiting KCS and gradually reducing the number of KCS through termination of AWOL and undesirable scouts. During the 2nd phase, the units of the 2nd Bde, 25th Inf Div employing KCS submitted efficiency reports and recommendations for each KCS. Recruiting dates were established and allied units in the area were notified of these dates. The 1st ATF requested 15 KCS be transferred to them and the 1st CAV Div requested 90 KCS. The 3rd phase was transfer or termination and transportation of terminated KCS to the Chieu Hoi Center from which they were recruited.

B. The following is the final disposition of the 2nd Bde 25th Inf Div scouts.

(1) Transferred:

a. 1st CAV 40

b. 1st ATF 9

c. 3rd pf the 17th CAV 8

(2) Terminated 70

5. LESSONS LEARNED

A. Observation: Because of extensive prior planning, there was only one S-5 problem area in the redeployment of the 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division. This problem was transporting of terminated KCS back to the Chieu Hoi Center from which they were recruited. It was noted that in most cases, that as soon as the KCS was turned over to the Chieu Hoi Center director, they immediately left the center.

B. Evaluation: If the terminated KCS are allowed to leave the Chieu Hoi Center as soon as they are released by the Americans, it serves no purpose in escorting them to the Chieu Hoi Center.

C. Recommendation: Recommend that KCS be taken to the nearest Chieu Hoi Center with a letter to the Director of the center explaining where the KCS was recruited, and reason for termination. This would assist in the redeployment and save numerous man-hours.

The ARVN regular, RF and PF forces have continually emerged victorious on battlefields throughout SVN and in Cambodia. Consequently the North Vietnamese Communists and the NLF are forced to break down into small groups to sneak into the hamlets and villages to rob food and medicines.

To prevent the Communists from terrorizing you and to root them out, the ARVN forces are conducting operations to capture them.

Give your support to the Army and Government of the RVN in their drive so that prosperity and peace will be restored for the whole people.

With the growth and progress of the ARVN, President Nguyen Van Thieu has announced that the ARVN will take the full responsibilities as soon as possible. By now the President's statement has been realized as American troops are being redeployed from SVN.

Also on the growth and progress, the RF, and PF, and PSDF are now strong and efficient enough to defeat and stamp out the enemy.

Compatriots, assist the government in defending the nation's freedom just by your support and your reporting information about Communist activities to your local authorities. Doing so means you are taking a direct share in the restoring of peace in the country and prosperity for all.

Back: Today the RF /PF and PSDF have grown up to be elite unit with overwhelming power. Fighting men of the RF and PF have proven themselves efficient and daring by their great victories on the battle-fields through the four military zones.

The ARVN as a whole, are now strong and ready to undertake the mission of defending freedom while destroying the enemy. Due to this fact, the GVN has concluded a compromise with the government of the United States on a gradual redeployment of American troops out of SVN.

Compatriots, give your support to the ARVN, which is emerging victorious over our communist foes, so that peace will be restored sooner in our country.

The 8 point statement of the provisional revolutionary Government of the Republic of S.V. at the September 17th 1970, 84-plenary session of the “Paris conference on V.N.” responds to the deep desire for peace of the people in SVN, in the USA and the world!! It is reasonable and just: It opens an exit for US government to withdraw its troops from SVN without dishonor!

U.S. militarymen !

To return home alive and to meet happily with your families, you must:

Struggle against the Nixon's Government for your immediate repatriation, for a rapid and total withdrawal of US troops from SVN, by June 30, 1971.

Sit on the spot! Refuse to go in operation to avoid Shameful death!

Your parents, wives, and children are waiting for you in your fatherland!

A. Units of the 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, entered Keystone stand-down between 1 Mar and 28 April 71. To support this operation, Communications-Electronics (COMMEL) missions were grouped into three (3) major areas:

(1) Continued COMMEL support of units prior to entering stand-down.

(2) COMMEL support of units between stand-down and redeployment.

(3) Closing of COMSEC accounts and turn-in of COMSEC equipment by the Bde COMSEC Logistic Support Section (CLSS).

B. Planning for the phase-out of Brigade COMMEL systems and facilities was based on two primary factors:

(1) The schedule and sequence of unit stand-down and redeployment, and

(2) The schedule for stand-down and redeployment of the Brigade Signal Company.

Non-organic COMMEL support was provided by the 1st Signal Brigade. The type and quantity of COMMEL support requested and received will be described in subsequent paragraphs.

2. COMMEL SUPPORT:

A. Situation Upon Notification: Upon notification of redeployment, the Forward Headquarters of the Brigade was located in Ogle Compound Xuan Loc. Brigade Rear and support units were located at Camp Frenzell Jones, Long Binh. A diagram of VHF, multi-channel systems in operation at the time of notification is shown in Appendix 1. A diagram of the HF Radio-Teletype net is shown in Appendix 2. A diagram of the Brigade FM Command Net is shown in Appendix 3. A diagram of the Common User and TOC Teletype Net is in Appendix 4.

(2) Photographic and Public Address (PA) requirements for ceremonies were requested and provided by the 1st Signal Brigade. Photographers were provided by SEAPIC and PA equipment, operated by personnel from the Brigade Signal Company, was provided by the 39th Signal Battalion.

3. COMMEL SUPPORT OF UNITS PRIOR TO, AND DURING STAND-DOWN: During redeployment operations, units not yet in stand-down maintained communications internally and with Brigade using organic COMMEL assets. In one case, organic communications were supplemented with the installation of a VHF System by the Brigade Signal Company. Units in stand-down with elements still engaged in operations, withheld sufficient COMMEL equipment to support those elements. All brigade Communications elements deployed on schedule. The following is a summary of COMMEL Operations during redeployment:

A. VHF Systems: As each unit served by a Brigade VHF system began stand-down, the system was deactivated; the equipment returned to Camp Frenzell Jones and prepared for turn-in. System deactivation commenced on 5 March when the 2/12 Inf Bn relocated from FSB Heidi to Huskey Compound in Xuan Loc. System deactivations were completed on 4 April, the day prior to the relocation of the 3/22 Inf Bn to Camp Frenzell Jones. VHF systems operated in support of the Brigade by the 53rd Signal Bn, and later the 36th Signal Bn were discontinued on 6 Mar when the Brigade Forward relocated. No VHF support was necessary at Camp Frenzell Jones.

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B. Telephone: Tactical unit telephone nets remained operating until unit stand-down. The Brigade tactical switchboard closed on 6 April. At that time all units relied exclusively on the Plantation dial telephone system.

C. Teletype: Tactical teletype circuits to Brigade Forward were re-routed from Ogle Compound to Camp Frenzell Jones effective 051200H March. By 7 April all organic tactical teletype circuits had been deactivated. The Brigade continued to receive teletype support from the Redcatcher USASTRATCOM Area CommCen until the end of redeployment.

D. Radio-Teletype: Units were released from the Brigade RTT Net as they commenced stand-down. Signal Company equipment was used to replace Battalion equipment in order to facilitate early turn-in of equipment. The NCS closed on 5 April.

E. FM Radio: As each unit commenced stand-down, it was released from Brigade FM nets. The Brigade left the II FFORCEV CG Command net at 060001H April. After 6 April, no subordinate units remained in the Brigade Command Net.

F. Photographic: The Brigade Photo section continued operation until 13 April. Photographic support for all ceremonies was provided by SEAPIC.

G. MARS: Upon notification of redeployment, the Bde Signal Company was operating two MARS stations; one in the MACV compound at Xuan Loc, the other at Camp Frenzell Jones. The Xuan Loc station closed on 2 March and the equipment was returned to USARV. The station at Camp Frenzell Jones was transferred, both equipment and personnel, to the 11 ACR. This station remained at Camp Frenzell Jones and was never closed.

H. Courier Service: The Brigade Air Courier ceased on 5 March. Motor Messenger service was discontinued on 6 April except for service between CFJ and II FFORCEV which continued until the end of redeployment.

4. TRANSFER FO SIGNAL ASSETS:

Soon after notification of redeployment, representatives of the 18th ARVN Division toured Ogle Compound. The only Brigade Signal Assets agreed to be transferred to ARVN were four reels of 26 pair cable and 2 ½ miles of WD-1. This outside plant material was installed for Base Camp Defense purposes and was left, complete with cable diagrams, intact.

5. EQUIPMENT TURN-IN:

A. COMSEC: The Brigade COMSEC Logistics Support Section (CLSS) closed a total of 5 sub-accounts and 12 hand receipt accounts during the period 1 March thru 6 April. During this period, a total of 372 end-items of classified COMSEC equipment and 196 spare sub-assemblies were transferred to USASTRATCOM-Vietnam. A total of 57 classified COMSEC documents were also transferred with a total of 3,526 documents being destroyed. 46 Equipment mounts were returned thru normal supply channels and approximately 380 cables were either returned thru supply channels or transferred to other units in Vietnam.

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B. Mars Equipment: All Brigade MARS facilities were either closed or transferred in accordance with the schedule described in paragraph 3 G.

C. Antenna Towers: Upon notification of redeployment, two towers were on hand in the Brigade. The 160' tower at Ogle Compound was dismantled on 7 March and returned to USARV assets. The 50' tower at Camp Frenzell Jones was dismantled and returned on 12 April.

D. Command and Control Consoles: The Brigade had two C&C Consoles which were both laterally transferred to the 101st Airborne Div.

E. TOE Lateral Transfers: Numerous items of TOE equipment were transferred to other US units. No difficulties were experienced in this area.

6. LESSONS LEARNED:

A. COMSEC Turn-in

(1) Observation: Much COMSEC equipment returned to CLSS was dirty and in a few instances damaged.

(2) Evaluation: CLSS was required to expend a great deal of time and effort cleaning equipment, statements must be obtained for damaged equipment. Early turn-in of COMSEC equipment facilitated quick closing of accounts and minimized the chance of misplaced equipment.

(3) Recommendation: COMSEC equipment be turned in to CLSS not later than second day of unit stand-down in order to allow maximum time for cleaning and necessary paper-work.

B. MACV Critical Circuit

(1) Observation: Request for deactivation of the MACV Critical Circuit was initiated in January.

(2) Evaluation: All requests for deactivation of critical circuits must be approved by JCS. Since this approval takes considerable time, the request must be made at an early date.

(3) Recommendation: That deactivation requests be initiated as soon as unit knows the date it becomes OPCON to USARV.

Engineer support of the Brigade stand-down included combat support of those maneuver elements still conducting operations, support required for transfer or closure of base camps and fire support bases, and support necessary to assist units in their stand-down activities. The necessary Engineer support was able to be accomplished by the organic Engineer Company augmented by the normal Pacific Architects and Engineering support of base camps. The Engineer Company commenced stand-down at about the time the Brigade was reduced to one maneuver battalion still conducting combat operations. While this battalion was still active, the Engineer Company kept one platoon and associated equipment still operational for support of that battalion.

2. OUTSTANDING PROJECTS:

A. A review was made of all Engineer activities in progress and planned. With the exception of two projects described below, it was determined that the others would no longer be needed. Thus projects were finished up as the combat units completed their operations and moved out of their Areas of Operation.

B. A 4600 acre Rome plow cut had been planned near the Checkerboard Rubber Plantation, southwest of Xuan Loc. It was determined from the RTAVF, who were to take over that part of the AO, that they desired the cut to be accomplished. Accordingly, coordination was made, and on 8 March the cut was started under 2nd Brigade control, with RTAVF logistical support. On 22 March, as 2nd Brigade units left the area, the entire project was turned over to the RTAVF, and it was completed under their control.

C. A 900 acre Rome plow cut had been planned near Phu Hoi village in Nhon Trach District, but the Brigade moved out of that AO prior to the land clearing assets becoming available. Upon determination that the District Chief still desired the cut, and when assets became available, a mechanized platoon from the last Brigade unit standing down was moved back into the area and the cut was accomplished during the period 18 March to 3 April.

3. FIRE SUPPORT BASES:

A. Six fire support bases were closed out. In each of these, Engineer support included mine-sweep teams and equipment support to level the berms and close sumps. Additionally, dump trucks and a loader were required at some of these to assist in handling the class IV materials taken up.

B. Three fire support bases were turned over intact to Allied units. FSB Leopard was taken by the RTAVF, and FSB's Schwartz and Carol were taken by Long Khanh Province. In these bases Engineer support consisted of mine-sweep teams and closing of sumps.

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4. BASE CAMPS:

A. Two base camps, Ogle Compound and Husky compound in Xuan Loc were turned over to elements of 18th Division (ARVN). In these support was required for minor repairs of facilities, mine-sweep teams, and dump truck support and a loader to assist in removal of trash and debris.

B. The main Brigade base camp at Frenzell Jones was turned over to other US units and required no appreciable Engineer effort other than the normal PA & E support.

5. STAND-DOWN FACILITY:

The Brigade obtained an area at Vung Tau for an R&R center for use by troops with free time during stand-down. Engineer effort to construct this included building of tent frames, walkways, mess facilities, showers, latrines, and an aid station.

6. LESSON LEARNED:

Type of Support Required:

A. Observation: The Engineer Company was committed unevenly to support stand-down operations.

B. Evaluation: While equipment support is relatively heavy, the vertical construction requirements drop off quickly during stand-down. It is therefore possible to schedule early turn-in of hand tools and related items and early shipment of construction specialists.

C. Recommendation: That dozers, lowboys, and dump trucks be retained well into stand-down, and that emphasis be placed on early turn-in of other type items.

B. From past experience it was known that a redeployment press kit was needed to hand out to media representatives. Copies were made available to visiting VIP's on the date of the brigade farewell ceremony and others were given out upon request. The kits were continuously up-dated by placing unit stand-down releases in them as MACOI made the announcements. (See Appendix 3)

3. COMMAND INFORMATION PROGRAM:

A. In order to achieve redeployment objectives, eight command information fact sheets were developed. The fact sheets covered hold baggage, prohibited items, war trophies, customs laws, VA benefits, service obligations, out-processing, and unit awards. These fact sheets were distributed on the basis of one sheet to every five men. The AG Distribution Center was tasked with the actual distribution of the sheets. An example of one of these fact sheets (Service Obligations) is at Appendix 4.

B. A special souvenir edition of the newspaper was distributed with the purpose of summarizing a year's tour in Vietnam.

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4 PUBLIC INFORMATION PROGRAM:

A. Visits by the major news media representatives were neither discouraged nor encouraged. A large number of press visits was not anticipated due to the waning interest in redeployment and in general Vietnam news. This declining interest was pointedly demonstrated during individual unit stand-downs and hence formed the basis for the IO's evaluation of possible press participation.

B. Each unit had an awards ceremony on the second day of stand-down. Various dignitaries attended as well as invited guests from within the brigade. The brigade farewell ceremony was publicized by invitations being sent out and several VIP's attended. A reception followed at the Command Mess. Photographic coverage of all events was handled by the brigade signal company.

C. During the redeployment period, special emphasis was placed on the continuance of the Hometown news Program. The importance of having personnel complete the DA Form 1526 was stressed to all battalion correspondents.

5. TROPIC LIGHTNING ASSOCIATION:

A. An attempt was made to reduce inventories by setting up sales at out-processing points and authorized concessions.

B. An audit was performed and all residual assets, including the funds, were sent to the 25th Infantry Division, Hawaii.

6. LESSONS LEARNED:

A. Lack of publication of unit's stand-down in the brigade newspaper.

(1) Observation: The time lag between the laying out of the newspaper and the return of the completed edition from Stars & Stripes in Tokyo, made it impossible to give any publication of the stand-down of the units in the “Tropic Lightning News” because of security considerations.

(2) Evaluation: Individual units and men were not given the attention they deserved for their group and individual accomplishments.

(3) Recommendations: Coordination be made with MACOI and permission received, if possible, to lay out the paper and send it to Tokyo ahead of MACV's announcement. The shipping of the lay-out should be done for enough in advance to insure the paper's return before units ship all their personnel.

APPENDICES:

1. MACOI's first official announcement

2. MACOI Guidance

3. Redeployment press kit contents

4. Command Information fact sheet (Service Obligations)

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APPENDIX 1 (MACOI First Official Announcement) to Annex I (Information) to 2nd Brigade,

Keystone Robin (Charlie) After Action Report.

13 March 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR CORRESPONDENTS:

SUBJECT: Sixth Increment of Troop Redeployment

UNIT: 2ND Battalion, 12th Infantry

PARENT COMMAND: 2ND Brigade, 25th Infantry Division

SERVICE: U.S. Army

COMMANDING OFFICER: LTC Ralph Salucci, Omaha, Neb.

SENIOR NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICER; CSM Richard Allen, Watertown, N.Y.

AWARDS FOR SERVICE IN VIETNAM:

Presidential Unit Citation,

Valorous Unit Award,

Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry,

Vietnamese Civic Action Medal

UNIT HISTORY: The 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry arrived in the Republic of Vietnam in the fall of 1966 as a part of the 4th Infantry Division from Fort Lewis, Washington. It participated in many actions throughout Military Region 2 as a part of the 4th Infantry Division. In May 1970, the unit became a part of the 25th Infantry Division and participated in U.S. and combined U.S. and Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces operations against enemy sanctuaries in Cambodia during May and June 1970. Since that time the Battalion has operated in Long Khanh Province of Military Region 3.

DISPOSITION OF UNIT: The 2nd Battalion 12th Infantry commenced stand-down today. Personnel of the unit will be reassigned within the Republic of Vietnam or returned to the United States using normal returnee procedures.

B. Name of commander and name of senior NCO at stand-down (and at redeployment if different)

C. Unit history

D. Arrival date in RVN

E. Summary of accomplishments and decorations in RVN

F. Quotes from higher commanders if available

G. Details of departure, including departure point, date, destination, numbers and types of equipment and personnel departing, and recommendations for press coverage of departure, including available press facilities and command designated to coordinate press arrangements for departure coverage.

3. MACOI will extract sufficient information to make the initial press announcement in Saigon. Units may use the cleared material after initial stand-down-redeployment announcement by MACOI. The space reduction figure will be determined and released by MACOI, and may be used in subsequent releases by subordinate units.

4. MACOI will handle in-activations similarly, announcing in-activations in Saigon, and clearing proposed releases on smaller units or activities for use of field IO's.

5. Normal clearance procedures will be followed for all subsequent releases.

If you're ETSing out of Vietnam, or merely reaching your DEROS for stateside assignment, you're probably curious as to what your military obligations are once you're released from active duty.

The answer to this question actually depends upon how much time you have spent in the service. Your total military obligation is six years, so unless you've spent that much time on active duty, you'll have some kind of obligation after your active duty ends and that's where the Army Reserve comes in.

There are two kinds of basic reserve service: Ready Reserve and Standby Reserve. Ready Reserve units hold regular weekly (or monthly) meetings, spend two weeks each summer on active duty for training, and are subject to active duty call-up in any emergency declared by the President or Congress. Army National Guard members are in units of the Ready Reserve.

In contrast, Standby Reservists serve no regular active duty, and they are subject to be called for active duty only in the event of declared war or national emergency declared by Congress.

The time spent in each of the reserve categories depends on how much time you've spent on active duty. Broken down, it looks like this:

ACTIVE DUTY 6 months 24 months 36 months

READY RESERVE 66 months 24 months 12 months

STANDBY RESERVE 0 months 0 months 24 months

For you Vietnam Veterans, things are a little bit better, because you don't have to attend any weekly or monthly meeting. You receive special consideration and will not be involuntarily assigned to a Ready Reserve unit for drill purposes. You may be expected, however, to attend summer camp for active duty training each summer for two years.

If you've extended to ETS, you are given credit for having served a full two or three year tour even if you get out of the service 3-to-6 months early.

Your assignment to a reserve unit will usually be made sometime about 90 days after you are released from active duty. The Army will take the appropriate steps to assign you to a unit located near your residence and will notify you of this action.

The best thing to remember about your reserve obligation is that you should be very careful to do everything the way the Army says to do it. Failure to comply with these instructions could result in your recall to active duty to complete the remainder of your six-year obligation.

In most cases, once you have served one or two years in a Ready Reserve unit, then two years in the Standby Reserves, you will have fulfilled your military obligation to your country.

At the time the Brigade began stand-down, there were three base camps and six fire support bases operated by elements of the Brigade. During the course of final operations, it was necessary to open three additional fire support bases. In all cases, when the base was no longer needed by the Brigade, it was first determined whether the unit taking responsibility for the area desired to take over the facility intact. If this was not the case, the facility was closed out.

2. DISPOSITION OF BASE CAMPS:

A. Ogle Compound in Xuan Loc was turned over to HHC, 18th Division (ARVN) on 9 March 1971. Detailed procedures followed and reports rendered were in accordance with USARV Regulation 700-26. No problems developed during the planning or the actual transfer.

B. Husky Compound in Xuan Loc was turned over to 52nd Regiment, 18th Division (ARVN) on 12 March 1971. The same procedures were used as for Ogle Compound. Again no problem areas developed.

C. Camp Frenzell Jones in Long Binh was retained by US forces for the use of elements of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and 23rd Artillery Group. The over-all control of the compound was transferred to Long Binh Post on 13 April 1971. A representative from Long Binh Post was collocated with the Installation Coordinator of the 2nd Brigade well ahead of the transfer date, and the turn-over of all post functions proceeded in an orderly manner.

3. DISPOSITION OF FIRE SUPPORT BASES:

A. FSB's Rivers, Barbara, Heidi, Asper, Joan, and Marisa were closed out by 2nd Brigade. In most cases a nearby RF unit, District HQ, or refugee camp desired the fortification materials and provided assistance in moving it. The material not desired by them was returned to Long Binh. The berms were then pushed down and the land returned to the configuration of the surrounding terrain. All areas were mine-swept to detect any possible improper disposition of equipment or ammunition.

B. FSB Leopard was turned over intact to the RTAVF. FSB's Schwartz and Carol were turned over to Long Khanh Province. TO & E equipment was removed, but all bunkers and fortifications remained in place. These bases were also mine-swept.

1. GENERAL: Battalions, separate companies and detachments within the brigade were required to submit after action reports before the completion of their stand-down period. The following represents a consolidation of these reports stressing pertinent points which may assist other units involved in future redeployment activities.

B. Fire Support Bases. Artillery fire support was continuous throughout the period of preparation for and actual disengagement. As each maneuver battalion was extracted, the artillery battery in direct support was the last unit to disengage.

C. Movement security. No significant problem or incident occurred during the phased withdrawal of units from combat. Highway QL1 and QL2, the major road networks utilized, were classified condition GREEN, yet the brigade as a safety measure, required that all convoys have armed escorts and be continuously covered by helicopter gunship support.

3. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS: The brigade had very few equipment problems due to the fact we were afforded an opportunity to participate in a free turn-in period at the Keystone Processing Point prior to the actual stand-down turn-in schedule. This materially assisted in the over-all turn-in process by allowing non-combat essential equipment to be turned in early, thus reducing the workload during stand-down. The one major problem encountered was with the lateral transfer of equipment to other US units. Representatives of these units were brought in to coordinate the lateral transfer just prior to stand-down. This delay resulted in large quantities of useful equipment being turned in to the Keystone facility rather than being laterally transferred to the remaining units. More timely coordination and the expediting of paperwork by receiving units would have averted this problem, thereby assisting both the losing and gaining units. Insuring that proper, valid Milstrip numbers and other documentation had been completed prior to coordination and turn-over would have greatly speeded up the transfer process at individual unit level.

4. IMPACT OF RUMORS BEFORE PUBLIC ANNOOUNCEMENTS: There were the usual number of rumors circulating concerning tentative dates for individual unit stand-downs. The greatest concern was expressed over rumors of the various DEROS criteria that might be put into effect. These rumors did not have any detrimental effect on the capability of the brigade to fulfill its assigned missions.

5. EFFECT OF PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT: The release of this information did more to relieve troop apprehensiveness than any other single act. Once an individual soldier had a target date, the vast majority responded admirably.

A. A thorough review of the personnel posture. This was an area requiring immediate analysis to provide for the early identification, or a quantitative basis, of the number of personnel that would fall into either the redeployment or the DEROS category. Personnel were identified as belonging to one of four groups based on both a 60-day and a 90-day tour curtailment criteria.

(1) GROUP 1 - Personnel to DEROS prior to commencement of stand-down.

(2) GROUP 2 - Personnel who would depart on normal DEROS during stand-down.

(3) GROUP 3 - Personnel who, based on the 60 and/or 90 day curtailment criteria, would DEROS during stand-down.

(4) GROUP 4 - Personnel who would not be eligible for DEROS, but would be redeployed to a new unit.

B. Prior planning was made to identify all special category personnel and determine other special administrative actions requiring out of the ordinary processing. Personnel in these categories included those serving on tour extensions, those with approved extensions not yet commenced, hospitalized personnel, AWOLS's, and those not expected to be present for duty upon completion of stand-down (e.g., emergency leaves, special leaves, etc.). The disposition of these personnel was IAW USARV guidance, and special cases were processed on individual basis.

C. Approximately four weeks prior to stand-down, individual units were required to submit a list of those critical personnel that must remain until the final stages of their stand-down, and a list of those personnel that would be available for release on their first assigned shipping day. The selection of a number of personnel for early release permitted each unit to remove their potential discipline problems in the early stages of stand-down.

7. STAND-DOWN PERIOD:

A. Morale: Morale remained quite high throughout the stand-down period. The major contributing factors were frequent shows, cookouts, sports activities and an increased number of movies. In addition, early shipment of excess personnel eliminated a large number of people that would have otherwise had nothing to do.

B. Discipline: No major disciplinary problems were encountered. Special emphasis was placed on all units for all personnel to cooperate with each other during stand-down to help accomplish the brigade's redeployment mission.

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C. Special Services:

(1) The augmentation of the PX with additional items was a great benefit to all personnel. It provided the opportunity for personnel to purchase high quality items that had previously not been available.

(2) The 2nd Brigade operated a Vung Tau Special R&R Center which was excellent and achieved every goal it was created to accomplish.

(3) Increased funding for bands and shows was a definite asset. The brigade also organized a rock and roll band from its own personnel and scheduled their free performances on a rotation basis.

D. Awards: Units were required to submit all recommendations for service and achievement awards NLT 15 days prior to the first day of their stand-down. Initially, problems arose when the great majority of service and achievement awards were not received in time for presentation prior to many individuals departure from the command. Necessary arrangements were made to forward the awards to the individuals that had departed as the awards were received. The initial delay was occurring in II Field Forces awards section which was not staffed to handle such a large volume of awards. Several of the 2nd Brigade award clerks were placed on temporary duty to II Field Forces to assist in expediting the administrative procedures. The additional assistance provided by 2nd Brigade cleared the way for timely presentation of awards to individuals during the last half of the 2nd Brigade stand-down period.

8. LESSONS LEARNED:

A. Shipment of Personnel During Stand-down:

(1) Observation: It is a benefit to the unit to ship out the maximum number of personnel possible during the early phases of stand-down.

(2) Evaluation: If the equipment is initially prepared for turn-in by the respective units,a small detail can handle the actual turn-in procedures. This greatly reduces the number of personnel within the unit area that do not have a specific job. By keeping a smaller detail continually occupied, it decreases the morale problem caused by inactivity and lessens disciplinary problems.

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(3) Recommendations: Prior to stand-down, unit commanders should identify their critical personnel and plan to release all those who would not have a specific mission or task during stand-down. Several intermediate shipping dates would also enable the unit to ship personnel that they have a need for only at the commencement of stand-down.

B. Turn-In Procedures:

(1) Observation: When turning in equipment from a particular section, i.e. commo, weapons, etc., the section leader should accompany the equipment.

(2) Evaluation: The section leader knows any discrepancies in the equipment and can usually take care of any problems with the turn-ins.

(3) Recommendation: Section leaders should accompany their equipment for turn-in to Keystone.

C. APO Service:

(1) Observation: During the extremely busy period of brigade stand-down there was never more than two individuals on duty at the APO.

(2) Evaluation: One individual on duty handled money orders and the other handled the mailing of packages. There was always a considerable line to mail packages and frequently one had to wait more than an hour to mail a package or even purchase stamps. Also, sometimes an individual would finally arrive at the counter only to be informed that his package was not wrapped properly.

(3) Recommendations: During stand-down period, a minimum of three individuals should be on duty to handle mailing of the large volume of packages. There should also be sample packages available in the APO to illustrate proper procedures of wrapping airmail, registered and insured packages.

D. Brigade Ammo Turn-In Point:

(1) Observation: During the final phase out of a unit, it is not uncommon to find occasional smoke grenades, M79 rounds and small arms ammunition. At this critical point of stand-down the unit does not possess the capability to handle the paperwork and transportation necessary to take these items for turn-in at the Long Binh Ammo Point.

(2) Evaluation: Without a simple means of disposing of these items, a unit is quite likely to just overlook them or attempt disposal by a less desirable means.

(3) Recommendations: Brigade should establish an ammo turn-in point to accept small quantities of ammunition and pyrotechnics from units that are in their final phases of stand-down. The unit should be able to turn in these items without any paperwork and brigade should handle the turn-in to Long Binh. This was accomplished mid-way during the stand-down period, and is an excellent suggestion.

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E. Excess Equipment:

(1) Observation: The battalions had accumulated a large quantity of excess prior to notification of stand-down. Most of this excess was obtained from divisional units that stood-down during increment 5.

(2) Evaluation: The excess did not create any problem, once it was identified. All excess was identified early in January and turn-in was initiated.

(3) Recommendation: Identify excess items early and then turn-in excess items with normal turn-in. Do not turn-in any excess item as found on post prior to that item being zeroes on the unit property book.

F. Turn - In to Keystone:

(1) Observation: Keystone requires different forms and entries on most of their paperwork than that accustomed to in normal supply procedures. They also require more forms than the unit is normally subjected to from its own direct support units.

(2) Evaluation: These forms and the way they are required to be prepared are necessary evils. The stand-down unit is actually preparing all of the paperwork that will eventually move a piece of equipment into depot.

(3) Recommendation: A unit must organize a turn-in team to correspond with each section at Keystone. These are:

a. COMMEL team

b. Weapons team

c. QM or TOE team

d. Single items team (includes tracks, wheels, generators).

e. Also organize Ammo, Medical and PLL teams as these classes of supply are handled through separate facilities. These teams then have to visit Keystone and receive briefings from the “workers”. Then, and only the, can a unit avoid the problems with Keystone paperwork. Each team prepares its paperwork, which is monitored and edited by the battalion S-4 section.

G. Unit Stand-down:

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(1) Observation: The early retrograde of all equipment and personnel not required for combat operations to CFJ was especially helpful in the orderly transfer of fire support bases.

(2) Evaluation: The early return of one rifle company to CFJ to begin early stand-down activities proved to be advantageous and substantially reduced the transportation requirements on the first day of stand-down. This company was able to clear its books of virtually all items of equipment prior to the return of the remainder of the battalion which greatly assisted the S-4 in the orderly turn-in of all battalion property.

(3) Recommendation: Whenever possible, early retrograde of one maneuver element is suggested to simplify transportation requirements on the first day of stand-down, and to give the unit an internal shakedown of its Keystone procedures.

H. Interpreters:

(1) Observation: The battalion had assigned to it ARVN interpreters for use by Bravo Company in the RF /PF training program and for combined operations with the remaining rifle companies.

(2) Evaluation: The management of the interpreters leaves much to be desired. They were constantly being reassigned out of the battalion without prior notice, and replacements were failing to report. The predominant attitude of the interpreters was that their job was to be one of little or no exertion with frequent passes. The normal three day passes were stretched into six days and longer, and it wasn't uncommon for the interpreters to leave the fire base without a pass whatsoever. The ability of the interpreters is unquestioned; their reliability and dependability are highly questionable. The AWOL rate among the interpreters has been astounding.

(3) Recommendation: More administrative control over the interpreters must be placed in the hands of the US unit utilizing them. Disciplinary action must be taken to control the AWOL rate.

I. Kit Carson Scouts:

(1) Observation: Kit Carson Scouts were used by the rifle companies during tactical operations and by the S-5 section for gathering intelligence.

(2) Evaluation: Overall, the Kit Carsons were an asset to the battalion. However, the language barrier did pose problems that some degree of formal training at the Chieu Hoi Center might help to reduce.

(3) Recommendation: The Kit Carson Scout Program should be continued but with a higher degree of selection of the Scouts.

The Second Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, the “Warrior Brigade”, traces its history back to the 84th Infantry Division which was constituted 5 August 1917, in the National Army. The unit did not see service in World War I, but, it was credited with campaign participation in the Rhineland, Ardennes-Alsace, and Central Europe during World War II.

After being reorganized and re-designated four times since its conception, the present brigade came into being with its activation on 26 August 1963, in Hawaii. The brigade conducted maneuvers in Okinawa in January 1964 and Hawaii during 1964 and early 1965, before departing for Vietnam in December 1965 and January 1966. The main body of the brigade arrived at Vung Tau on 18 January 1966, and, after a week, moved to Cu Chi in Hau Nghia Province. On 30 January 1966 the brigade launched clearing operations against a well-entrenched enemy. The Second brigade Task Force successfully defeated the stubborn enemy on 5 April 1966, and secured Cu Chi as a base camp. The brigade then formed a blocking force against enemy movement toward Saigon. The Task Force was awarded the valorous Unit Citation for this action.

Throughout 1967, 1968, and 1969, the Second Brigade operated throughout the 25th Infantry Division's area of operations, stretching from War Zone C, north of Tay Ninh City, to the outskirts of Saigon during the enemy's Tet offensives of January and February 1968 and 1969. Places such as the Ho Bo Woods, Boi Loi Woods, Iron Triangle, Citadel, Trapezoid, Crescent, and Renegade Woods became well known to the men of the “Warrior Brigade” during that three year period, as was evidenced by the increased security of the population in Hau Nghia, Tay Ninh, and Binh Duong Provinces. The Republic of Vietnam's Pacification Program was greatly strengthened because of the Second Brigade's combat operations.

Early 1970 found the brigade moving to a new area of operations near Bearcat in Bien Hoa Province, east of Saigon, where it remained for a short period. On 7 May 1970, the brigade received orders to move to War Zone C for operations against enemy supply and personnel sanctuaries in Cambodia. With devastating speed, the Second Brigade's maneuver battalions slashed into enemy base camp and training sites in Base Areas 353, 707, and COSVN Headquarters, which were in and around the Fishhook Region of Cambodia. The surprised and unprepared enemy were no match for the men of brigade as they captured tons of food, clothing, and weapons. The Cambodian operation results were successful in depriving the enemy of much needed supplies and ammunition for operations against allied units in Military Region III. The Second Brigade pulled out of Cambodia on 30 June and moved back to its Bien Hoa area of operations and expanded into southern Long Khanh and northern Phuoc Tuy Provinces at the same time. Operations Base Lynch, 12 kilometers south of Xuan Loc, was the forward command post for the Second Brigade from July until early November 1970.

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The brigade's maneuver battalions were the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry; 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry; 4th Battalion (Mechanized), 23rd Infantry; and 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry. Enemy units in the area were the 274 NVA Regiment, 74 NVA Artillery Regiment, 84th Rear Service Group, elements from SR-4 and MR-7, 3rd Battalion, 33rd NVA Regiment, D445 Battalion, and other local force units. The Second Brigade's mission was to destroy these units and provide security for the populace, thus enhancing the Republic of Vietnam's pacification program. Aggressive operations by the brigade decreased enemy forces in the three province area.

The 25th Infantry Division received word on 12 October 1970 to redeploy minus the 2nd Brigade. The “Warrior Brigade” was designated to stay in the Republic and continue operations in the vital three province area east of Saigon. The brigade was re-designated a provisional, separate unit on 8 November and was placed under the operational control of II Field Force, Vietnam. Colonel Joseph R. Ulatoski remained as the Brigade Commander until final redeployment in April 1971. The brigade's forward command post was moved to Xuan Loc with a rear area in the Long Binh complex at Camp Frenzell-Jones. With the 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry replacing the 4th Battalion (Mechanized), 23rd Infantry, the brigade continued aggressive small unit combat operations in the three province area. An extensive training program was instituted by the brigade to up-grade the territorial forces in the area so they could carry on the burden of fighting after American troops were withdrawn. The territorial forces were trained in small unit tactics, weapons employment, and the use of American air support in combat operations. As months passed, the proficiency of the territorial forces increased through the training program and combined operations wit the brigade units. The results of the program were outstanding. The territorial forces became more aggressive and provided the local populace with more security against the guerrillas than they ever had before.

Three major combat operations were undertaken by the brigade from November 1970 through February 1971 - “Yellow-jacket” I, II, and III. These were coordinated operations with the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force and the 18th ARVN Division. They were undertaken to destroy the two major NVA main force units in the area (274 NVA Regiment and 74 NVA Artillery Regiment) as well as cripple the enemy's logistics system which stretched from War Zone D to the area south of Highway QL-1 where the heaviest concentrations of enemy forces were located. The objectives of each operation were met with a high degree of success as the enemy main force units were decimated and unable to launch any sustained offensives against allied units in the “Warrior Brigade's” area of operations. An enemy high point campaign during Tet in January 1971 never materialized because of these aggressive operations.

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The brigade received orders in early 1971 to plan its stand-down and prepare for redeployment from the Republic of Vietnam. Operations were gradually phased down as individual units withdrew from combat; support activities were concurrently reduced. The brigade continued to place emphasis on its mission of destroying the enemy until the last maneuver unit commenced its stand-down. For the professionals of the “Warrior Brigade” - the mobile, hard-striking professionals of Military Region III, has completed its mission in the Republic of Vietnam. The brigade has another proud chapter in its history and has returned the colors to Hawaii. The brigade carries with it the history of more than five years in Vietnam - history of those who served proudly and died gallantry history of famous battles and bitter skirmishes. It will always be remembered that no matter what the mission, the brigade and its men performed proudly, professionally, and never eased the pace. Those who have served with the “Warrior Brigade” know its past - they are part of it. Those who join the brigade in the future will have a glorious and heroic tradition to maintain.