While death=20
is certain, divorce is not. In this case, the testator anticipated the =
former=20
but did not prepare for the latter. His will=97executed while he was =
married and=20
designating his then-spouse as primary beneficiary=97remained unchanged =
when he=20
died, notwithstanding his divorce some two years earlier. The =
Legislature=20
addressed devises in favor of former spouses by enacting Probate Code =
section=20
69, which provides that if a testator divorces after executing a will,=20
provisions that favor the former spouse must be read as if the former =
spouse=20
predeceased the testator. The question presented here is whether a =
contingent=20
bequest to the testator=92s former stepdaughter is a provision favoring =
his former=20
spouse. We conclude it is not and affirm the court of appeals=92 =
judgment.

I

Background

Marvin and=20
Vicki Nash were married at the time he executed his will in 1994. Vicki =
was=20
named the primary beneficiary, and Shelley Tedder=20
(Vicki=92s daughter and Nash=92s then-stepdaughter) was named contingent =
beneficiary. The relevant provisions of Nash=92s will are set out =
below:

Disposition of=20
Residue

I give,=20
devise and bequeath all of the rest and residue of my estate, of every =
kind and=20
character, real, personal and mixed, but not including any property over =
which I=20
have a power of appointment, unto my beloved wife, VICKI LYNN NASH, in =
fee=20
simple forever, if she survives me by thirty (30) days.

First=20
Alternate Disposition of Residue

In the=20
event that my wife and I die at the same time or in the event that she =
does not=20
survive me by thirty (30) days or in the event that my wife should =
predecease=20
me, then and in either of these events, I give, devise and bequeath all =
of the=20
rest and residue of my estate, of every kind and character, real, =
personal and=20
mixed, but not including any property over which I have a power of =
appointment=20
unto my beloved step-child, SHELLEY RENE TEDDER.

Marvin and=20
Vicki Nash divorced on July 8, 2002. When Nash died on April 29, 2004, =
he had=20
made no changes to the will he executed some ten years earlier. Both =
Vicki Nash=20
and Shelley Tedder survived Marvin Nash.

Nash=92s=20
nephew, Russell Nash, filed an application for independent =
administration,=20
stating that Marvin died intestate and providing the names of Marvin=92s =
two other=20
heirs at law: Marvin=92s brother, Leroy Nash; and Marvin=92s mother, Pat =
Nash.[1] The application stated that =
Nash and=20
Vicki were divorced at the time of Nash=92s death, that Nash never =
adopted Tedder, and that the trial court should therefore =
partition=20
Nash=92s estate among his heirs.

On =
May 25,=20
2004, the trial court granted Russell=92s application and ordered the =
clerk to=20
issue letters of independent administration to Russell. Two days later, =
Tedder opposed Russell=92s application and sought =
to probate=20
Nash=92s will herself. Tedder claimed that =
Nash left a=20
valid will that had never been revoked and that she, as the contingent=20
beneficiary, was the alternate independent executrix. After a hearing, =
the trial=20
court stayed the letters of administration. Russell, Pat, and Leroy Nash =
opposed=20
the probate of Nash=92s will and sought a =
declaratory=20
judgment that Tedder take nothing. The trial =
court=20
admitted Nash=92s will to probate, issued letters testamentary to Tedder, and declared that Tedder=20
was entitled to Nash=92s entire estate.[2] Pat and Leroy Nash appealed. =
The court of=20
appeals reversed the trial court=92s judgment in part, holding that =
Marvin Nash=92s=20
estate descends to his heirs at law because the requisite condition =
precedent=20
for Shelley Tedder to inherit under Nash=92s =
will never=20
occurred. 164 S.W.3d 856, 857. We granted =
Tedder=92s petition for review. 49=20
Tex.=20
Sup. Ct. J. 509 (Apr. 21, 2006).

II

Discussion

Before 1997,=20
Probate Code section 69(a) provided:

(a) If,=20
after making a will, the testator is divorced or the testator=92s =
marriage is=20
annulled, all provisions in the will in favor of the testator=92s former =
spouse,=20
or appointing such spouse to any fiduciary capacity under the will or =
with=20
respect to the estate or person of the testator=92s children, shall be =
null and=20
void and of no effect unless the will expressly provides otherwise.

(a) If,=20
after making a will, the testator is divorced or the testator=92s =
marriage is=20
annulled, all provisions in the will in favor of the testator=92s former =
spouse,=20
or appointing such spouse to any fiduciary capacity under the will or =
with=20
respect to the estate or person of the testator=92s children, must be =
read as=20
if the former spouse failed to survive the testator, and shall be =
null and=20
void and of no effect unless the will expressly provides otherwise.

Tedder contends that the Legislature=92s 1997 =
amendments=20
govern all contingent bequests; that is, that the entire will should be =
read =93as=20
if the former spouse failed to survive the testator.=94 She argues that, =
absent=20
such a construction, the 1997 language adds nothing to the statute, =
which=20
already provided that bequests in favor of a former spouse would be =
=93null and=20
void and of no effect.=94 She also points to Calloway v. Estate of =
Gasser,=20
558 S.W.2d 571, 575-76 (Tex. Civ. =
App.=97Tyler 1977,=20
writ ref=92dn.r.e.), in which=20
the court held that, after divorce, the will should be construed and =
given=20
effect as though the former spouse had predeceased the testatrix, =
=93thereby=20
passing the decedent=92s estate to the contingent beneficiaries.=94 =
Tedder argues that the Legislature=92s 1997 =
amendments were=20
intended to codify Calloway.

The =
Nashes contend that section 69 applies only to =
provisions=20
that favor the former spouse. Because the contingent bequest to Tedder does not favor Marvin Nash=92s former =
spouse, the will=20
must be construed as written. Vicki Nash did not predecease Marvin, so =
the=20
contingent bequest did not become operative, and the estate passes to =
Marvin=20
Nash=92s heirs at law.

The =
language=20
of the pre-1997 versions of section 69 was clear despite the more recent =
phrase=20
added by the Legislature: those provisions in a will that favor a former =
spouse=20
are of no effect. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 519 =
S.W.2d=20
152, 154 (Tex. Civ. App.=96Dallas 1975, writ =
ref=92d) (stating that section 69=92s policy =
objective is to=20
give effect to the testator=92s intentions regarding the disposition of =
his=20
property). The 1997 language=97=93must be read as if the former spouse =
failed to=20
survive the testator=94=97does nothing more than restate the =93null and =
void and of=20
no effect=94 statutory text. Tex. Prob. Code =A7=20
69(a). While we recognize that we should avoid, =
when=20
possible, treating statutory language as surplusage,=20
Sultan v. Mathew, 178 S.W.3d 747, 751 (Tex. 2005), there are =
times when=20
redundancies are precisely what the Legislature intended, see =
In re=20
City of Georgetown, 53 S.W.3d 328, 336 (Tex. 2001) (noting that =
statutory=20
redundancies may mean that =93the Legislature repeated itself out of an =
abundance=20
of caution, for emphasis, or both=94).

Our =
interpretation of section 69 is consistent with the manner in which the =
courts=20
of appeals interpreted section 69 prior to the 1997 amendments. The =
Houston and=20
Eastland courts held that contingent bequests (similar to the one at =
issue here)=20
failed when the former spouse had not actually predeceased the testator, =
despite=20
section 69. See McFarlen v. McFarlen, 536 S.W.2d 590, 591-92 (Tex. Civ. App.=96Eastland 1976, no writ) (noting that =
=93[s]ection 69 . . . merely provides that provisions in =
a will=20
favoring the testator=92s divorced spouse are a nullity, not the entire =
will=94);=20
Volkmer v. Chase, 354 S.W.2d =
611, 615=20
(Tex. Civ. App.=96Houston 1962, writ ref=92dn.r.e.) (holding that contingent bequest in favor of two of =
testator=92s=20
three children failed because contingency=97that former spouse =
predecease=20
testator=97had not occurred). Similarly, in Formby v. Bradley, =
695 S.W.2d=20
782, 783-84 (Tex. App.=96Tyler 1985, writ ref=92dn.r.e.), the Tyler court of appeals held that =
section 69 did=20
not trigger a contingency based on the simultaneous death of the =
testator and=20
his former spouse, so that the appellee (a =
third=20
party) was not entitled to serve as independent executrix. And though in =
Calloway, the Tyler court of appeals held that =
section 69=20
allowed the estate in question to pass to the named contingent =
beneficiaries in=20
the will, the court was careful to distinguish its holding from both =
Volkmerand McFarlen on the case=92s facts. =
Calloway, 558 S.W.2d at 576-77.[3] While Tedder=20
asserts that the 1997 amendments were intended to codify =
Calloway, it is=20
difficult to imagine the Legislature would have waited twenty years to=20
incorporate that holding. As the court of appeals noted, =93[t]he =
Legislature=20
could have revised the Probate Code to require that the entire will be =
read as=20
though the former spouse had predeceased the testator, but it did not do =
so.=94=20
164 S.W.3d at 860 (emphasis omitted).

Because=20
section 69 affects onlythose provisions in a will that favor the =
divorced spouse, the other provisions remain undisturbed. Here, Nash=92s =
will=20
devised all of his property to his (now =
divorced) wife,=20
unless: (1) they died at the same time; (2) she failed to survive him by =
thirty=20
days; or (3) she predeceased him. Only then would Nash=92s property pass =
to=20
Vicki=92s daughter, Shelley Tedder. None of =
those three=20
contingencies has occurred.

III

Conclusion

Probate Code=20
section 69 requires that only those provisions in a will that favor a =
former=20
spouse be read as if she predeceased the testator. The contingent =
bequest to=20
Tedder is not such a provision, and section =
69=92s=20
language does not govern that bequest. Accordingly, Tedder does not take under the will, and Nash=92s =
estate=20
passes according to the laws of descent and distribution. See =
Tex. Prob. Code =
ch. 2. We affirm the =
court of=20
appeals=92 judgment. Tex. =
R. App. P. 60.2(a).

______________________________

Wallace B.=20
Jefferson

Chief Justice=20

OPINION=20
DELIVERED: April 20, 2007

[1] =
Both Pat and=20
Leroy Nash waived their right to be appointed administrators of =
Marvin=92s estate=20
and requested that Russell Nash be appointed as independent=20
administrator.

[2] =
The trial=20
court found that, although a new will had been prepared for Marvin Nash =
in 2003,=20
he did not execute it before he died.

[3] =
The court of=20
appeals noted =93a considerable difference between the wording of the =
wills in=20
those two cases and the wording of the will in the instant case.=94=20
Calloway, 558 S.W.2d at=20
576-77.