YPF SOCIEDAD: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating to Proposed CHF300MM Notes------------------------------------------------------------------Moody's Investors Service has assigned a B3 global foreigncurrency rating to YPF Sociedad Anonima's (YPF)'s proposed up toCHF300 million notes due 2019. The proceeds of the notes will beused for capital expenditure and working capital purposes. Theoutlook on the ratings is stable.

RATINGS RATIONALE

YPF's B3 rating is based on the company's status as the largestindustrial corporation and energy company in Argentina withsizeable oil and gas reserves, including large shale resources.YPF's ratings also incorporate Moody's belief that although creditmetrics will deteriorate during 2016, given the adverse operatingenvironment, they will remain strong for the rating category.Moody's will closely monitor the company's ability to adapt to thenew environment, following the 12% decrease in local oil prices inArgentina earlier this year and still uncertain policies for theenergy sector, on top of a rigid cost structure due to theArgentine labor dynamics that impact YPF's cash flow generation.

Since YPF is majority owned and controlled by the Argentinegovernment, its B3 ratings reflect the application of Moody'sjoint default rating methodology for government-related issuers(GRIs). YPF's rating combines its underlying b3 Baseline CreditAssessment (BCA), which expresses a company's intrinsic creditrisk; the B3 local currency rating and stable outlook of theArgentine government; and Moody's view of moderate support fromand high dependence on the sovereign. While YPF is expected toaccount for only a small part of the government's revenue base,the high default dependence reflects the high correlation betweenYPF's credit profile and Argentine economic trends. YPF derivesthe majority of its revenues domestically; also, the company andthe government both share common exposure to foreign exchange raterisk and inflation, to name a few. Moody's assumes a moderatesupport probability by the government to YPF given the closerelationship between the two since the company is majority ownedand controlled by the first. However, the government's ability toprovide support to YPF in case of need is weak, evidenced by itsB3 local currency rating and stable outlook.

Moody's considers YPF's liquidity profile as weak. YPF's cashbalances as of June 30, 2016, were USD 1.0 billion. In July, YPFcollected USD 630 in sovereign bonds related to 2015 subsidies andissued USD 750 million notes. Both events will provide cushion tothe company's liquidity for the remainder of the year vis-a-visthe USD 2.2 billion debt coming due from June 2016 to the end of2017. Much of this amount is owed to local market participantsand Moody's believes that a large portion of it could be rolledover relatively easily. Most of the company's cash is held in USdollars in bank accounts in Argentina. The company hasdemonstrated successful access to both local and internationalmarkets to conduct liability managements; so far in 2016, YPFwould have raised close to USD 2.8 billion in debt, including theproposed issuance. Moody's expects the company to raiseUSD1.5 billion in debt in 2017 in order to finance debt maturitiesand to fund negative free cash flow, despite reducing itsimportant capex program by 25% in 2016. It is yet to be seen howadditional capex cuts could impact YPF's production; however,Moody's believes that past investments in technology and reservereplacement could somewhat mitigate the negative impact in theshort term.

YPF's internal, publicly-stated net leverage target is 1.5x,although this ratio will be higher during 2016 to reach about2.2x, as per Moody's estimates, given lower local oil prices anddelays by the government to pay subsidies. YPF believes it canreverse this trend by cashing in government subsidies as scheduledand passing through inflation and foreign exchange devaluation tofinal prices, but current economic conditions may post resistanceto elevated price increases. For these reasons, Moody's believesthat YPF's leverage will remain above management's target until atleast 2017.

YPF has a weak export profile, as it exports only around 10% ofrevenues per year. The company's foreign currency risk iscurrently high as 77% of its debt, 40% of its capital spending 40%of its operating costs are linked to the US dollar, which comparesto the 40% of the company's revenue generated in US currency. YPFusually holds USD 1 billion in cash but it can easily operate withhalf of that.

YPF's stable outlook assumes that the Argentine government hasincentives to maintain prices of crude and oil products at a levelthat makes it economically attractive for oil companies to investto increase production and reduce the country's dependence onimports of oil products and natural gas.

Continued growth in total production while maintaining strongmargins and relatively low leverage could lead to an upgrade ofYPF's BCA. Over the medium term, an improvement in Argentina's B3rating and continued demonstration of a strong financial trackrecord could result in a ratings upgrade. However, a ratingupgrade will depend on a clearer view of the new government'senergy policies for the next several years and how that couldaffect YPF.

Conversely, YPF's ratings could be downgraded if it is unable tomaintain sufficient liquidity and access to foreign currency inorder to meet its debt service obligations. The ratings couldalso be downgraded if the government of Argentina's B3 rating wereto be downgraded.

YPF is 51% owned by the Argentine government and had revenues ofUSD 15.1 billion and total assets of USD28.2 billion for thetwelve months ending June 30, 2016. During 2015, the companygenerated 96% of its revenues in Argentina; its operations outsideof the country include the United States, Brazil and Chile.

The principal methodology used in this rating was GlobalIntegrated Oil & Gas Industry published in April 2014.

===========B R A Z I L===========

ANDRADE GUTIERREZ: Fitch Cuts LT Issuer Default Ratings to 'B-'----------------------------------------------------------------Fitch Ratings has downgraded the Long-Term Foreign and LocalCurrency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) of Andrade GutierrezEngenharia S.A. (AGE) to 'B-' from 'B+', as well as its long-termNational Scale rating to 'BB-(bra)' from 'A-(bra)'. These actionsaffect approximately USD500 million of issued debt by AndradeGutierrez International S.A. (AGI) due April 2018, which AGEunconditionally and irrevocably guarantees. The Rating Outlookremains Negative.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The rating downgrades reflect AGE's liquidity deterioration due todifficulties the company has faced in monetizing its receivables,combined with a continued challenging business environment. InBrazil, the adverse macroeconomic scenario, lack of new projects,and more scarce and costly credit lines continue to affect AGE'soperations and credit profile. Abroad, the backlog renewal isimpaired by moderate oil prices, as a large part of the company'sclients are countries that depend on the commodity exports tosupport their infrastructure agenda. In order to protect itsliquidity, AGE has reduced activities on projects that are facingdelays in payments or not progressing as expected due to clients'financial issues.

AGE's ratings are supported by its scale as one of the largestcontractors in Latin America with 34% of revenues generatedabroad. The market value of the AG group investments in CompanhiaEnergetica de Minas Gerais (Cemig; 'A(bra)'/Outlook Negative) andCCR S.A. ('AA(bra)'/Outlook Stable) are also positiveconsiderations, and are estimated at around BRL6.4 billion. Thesigning of the lenience agreement related to the Lava-Jatoscandal, determination of the BRL1 billion fine and the extendedtime to pay it of 12 years were considered as positive, as theyremove uncertainties linked to this process, and potentially allowthe company to participate in more bids for new works.

The Negative Outlook is due to the uncertainties regarding AGE'scapacity to manage its working capital needs that have beenconsuming its liquidity cash rapidly. It also considers thechallenging performance of the Brazilian economy in 2016 and 2017,along with the recovery of oil prices that may continue to limitbacklog renewal. Fitch also expects the more limited and expensiveaccess to debt markets to continue.

Pressured and Concentrated Backlog

Fitch projects that AGE's total backlog will decline 21% in 2016and grow 4% in 2017 in BRL terms. The anemic operating environmenthas resulted in backlog consumption and poses uncertainties as tobacklog replacement capacity. AGE's backlog decreased to BRL22.1billion in March 2016 from BRL25.2 billion in December 2015 andBRL30 billion in December 2014. The adverse macroeconomicconditions and the political crisis have blocked theinfrastructure agenda in Brazil. International backlog renewalremains affected by the moderate oil prices, as a large part ofAGE's international backlog derives from countries that depend onoil exports, such as Venezuela. As for 2017, the scenario mayimprove with the Federal Government agenda for new concessions inBrazil.

AGE's backlog is concentrated in several ways, which pressures itscredit quality. The contract portfolio is exposed to a smallnumber of projects, to public clients, and to countries thatdepend on oil exports. In March 2016, AGE's 10 largest projectsrepresent 73% of its backlog. At the same time, public clients,which tend to have erratic payment behavior, were 89%. Projects incountries known for their oil export dependency, such asVenezuela, Angola, Guinea Equatorial, among others surpasses 60%.Venezuela, which is going through an economic crisis, represents42% of AGE's backlog.

Lenience Agreement Signed

Fitch believes signing the lenience agreement was an importantstep for the group. The deal came at the expense of a BRL1 billionfine to be paid over the next 12 years as well as the applicationof very restricted compliance measures going forward. The companyhas been entitled to participate in public bids and applying toaccess public funding. The agency also expects AGE to resume itscondition to provide services to Petrobras in the short term,which could add projects to its backlog. The lenience agreementpartially mitigates concerns about the company's refinancingcapacity.

Cash Flow Still Pressured

Fitch forecasts that AGE's cash flow from operations (CFFO) willdecline to BRL87 million in 2016, due to negative working capitalof BRL161 million, with negative free cash flow (FCF) of BRL97million in the same year. In the last 12 months (LTM) ended March31, 2016, CFFO of BRL42 million was heavily reduced by BRL667million of working capital needs, while FCF was negative at BRL362million.

"We also expect AGE to have adjusted net leverage of 3.3x in 2016and 1.5x in 2017, the result of BRL290 million and BRL346 millionEBITDA generation, respectively, in the same period." Fitch said.As of the LTM ended March 31, 2016, AGE's adjusted net leveragereached 5.3x. AGE's EBITDA continues to be affected by the weakoperating environment. In March 2016, total adjusted debt reachedBRL2.5 billion, mostly composed of AGI's BRL1.6 billion inoutstanding bonds and working capital lines of BRL685 million.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

-- Backlog falls 20% in Brazil and 6% abroad in USD terms in 2016. It declines 5% domestically and stays flat in foreign markets in 2017 in USD;

-- Net revenues decline 15% in 2016 and 12% in 2017 due to the lack of new contracts;

-- EBITDA margins of 1.5% in Brazil and 10% abroad in 2016, leading to a consolidated margin of 5.7%. As of 2017, domestic margins increase to 2.5% and the international margins returns to historical levels of 12%.

An upgrade is unlikely in the short term. However, futuredevelopments that may, individually or collectively, lead to apositive rating action include:

-- Recovery in its business profile on a sustainable basis with strengthened backlog replacement capacity;

-- Lower debt service challenges for AGE, which can occur through capital injections, debt refinancing, or asset sale.

LIQUIDITY

Fitch believes AGE's liquidity is under pressure. The company hasnot been able to monetize receivables as expected due to thefinancial deterioration of its clients and prolonged delays toreceive invoices from banks and multilateral agencies. AGE isconsidering selling part of its concessions in order to reinforceits liquidity which has not been considered on Fitch's base case.Access to funding has been restricted by higher cost and shortertenors than before. The main repayment is AGI's USD500 millionbond maturing in April 2018 that has been serviced by AGE.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has downgraded the following ratings:

Andrade Gutierrez Engenharia S.A. (AGE)

-- Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs to 'B-' from 'B+';

-- National long-term rating to 'BB-(bra)' from 'A-(bra)'.

Andrade Gutierrez International S.A. (AGI)

-- USD500 million senior unsecured bonds due April 2018 to 'B- /RR4' from 'B+/RR4'.

JBS SA: Replaces Two Executives While Police Probes J&F for Fraud-----------------------------------------------------------------Luciana Magalhaes and Jeffrey T. Lewis at The Wall Street Journalreport that JBS SA replaced its top two executives as it scramblesto reassure investors that a fraud investigation at a relatedcompany won't disrupt the world's largest protein producer.

JBS said in a note to the market that Jose Batista Junior willtake over as interim chief executive, substituting for his brotherWesley Batista, according to The Wall Street Journal. The companyappointed their father, Jose Batista Sobrinho, who is also thefounder of JBS as chairman to replace his other son, JoesleyBatista, the report relays.

The meat and poultry giant, whose U.S. holdings include poultryproducer Pilgrim's Pride and meat processor Swift & Company, hasbeen under pressure to name new leadership, the report notes. OnSept. 5, Wesley and Joesley Batista were forced to step asidewhile police investigate alleged fraud at a paper-pulp producerowned by the Batista family's investment company, J&FInvestimentos SA, the report discloses.

But analysts said the change has done little to satisfy investors'questions about the extent of the Batista's legal woes or thepotential consequences for JBS at a time of upheaval in Brazil,where political scandals have ensnared some of the country'sbiggest corporate names, said Joao Pedro Brugger, an analyst atLeme Investimentos in Florianopolis, the report relays.

"The main problem is that the investigation could have newdevelopments," Mr. Brugger said.

The two Batista brothers' legal troubles stem from a massivepolice operation launched targeting more than 100 individuals andbusinesses across Brazil, the report relays. Dubbed OperationGreenfield, the probe is aimed at uncovering alleged malfeasanceat four state pension funds that allegedly overpaid for stakes inBrazilian-owned companies, including pulp maker Eldorado BrasilCelulose SA, which is controlled by the Batista's holding company,notes the report.

JBS SA isn't a target of the probe. But Wesley and JoesleyBatista were among more than three dozen Brazilian executivesbarred by a judge from managing any business while policeinvestigate the alleged scam, the report relays.

JBS said that Joesley and Wesley Batista will appeal the courtorder. A J&F spokesman has denied any wrongdoing by the brothersor by Eldorado.

Recent investigations in Brazil into alleged overbilling linked togovernment contracting, including the blockbuster probe centeredon state-run oil company Petroleo Brasileiro S.A or Petrobras,have turned up evidence that some of the funds were used to paybribes and kickbacks to politicians, the report notes.

The Petrobras scandal has soured some investors on firms inBrazil, including JBS, which has cultivated close ties to thegovernment, the report says. Shares of JBS are down nearly 32%over the past year. Brazilian government entities own more thanone-quarter of JBS shares, part of a state strategy that turnedthe meatpacker into a globally competitive player, the reportdiscloses.

According to WSJ, J&F and JBS both face legal issues of their own.Brazil's accounting watchdog, known as the TCU, recently opened aninvestigation into potential "irregularities" regarding a loanfrom state-owned lender Caixa Economica Federal that J&F used tobuy Alpargatas SA, maker of the popular Havaianas brand of flip-flops.

The probe is still in preliminary stages, according to a TCUspokeswoman, who decline to provide more details on the allegedirregularities, the report notes.

J&F declined to comment on the investigation. Caixa in an emailsaid J&F met all its risk-analysis requirements and that it willfully collaborate with the investigation, says The Journal.

Prosecutors are also looking at whether or not JBS receivedpreferential treatment from state development bank BNDES, whichhelped finance a string of acquisitions by the meatpacker thatturned it into the world's biggest producer of animal protein, thereport discloses. BNDES owns 20.4% of JBS's shares, while state-owned lender Caixa Economica Federal owns another 6.5% of JBSshares.

Marcos Peixoto, a Sao Paulo-based money manager at investment firmXP Gestao de Recursos, said JBS's close ties to the Braziliangovernment have kept his firm away from the meatpacker, the reportsays. Now, he fears that JBS may have difficulties rolling overdebt and implementing its reorganization plan.

JBS has some BRL18 billion in short term debt to be rolled over inthe next 12 months, according to a report by Banco Bradesco BBI,notes WSJ. The firm has said it is also moving ahead with a bigreorganization plan, to spin off its international business intoan Ireland-based company with shares traded at the NYSE, WSJrelays.

Analysts and investors believe JBS may have difficulty concludingthe restructuring by the end of the year, as expected, says thereport.

JBS's share price dropped 10% on Sept. 5, the day police raidedEldorado's offices and brought in Wesley Batista for questioning.Joesley Batista, who is CEO of J&F, was out of the country the dayof the raid and is scheduled to be questioned by police, thereport notes.

Other firms controlled by J&F are being forced by the court orderto make changes as well, the report says. Eldorado is temporarilyreplacing Joesley and Wesley Batista from their positions aschairman and vice chairman, the report adds. Footwear companyAlpargatas said in a note to the market that two board memberswill take over for the two brothers temporarily, notes the report.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on Aug.16, 2016, S&P Global Ratings downgraded JBS S.A. and JBS USA LLCto 'BB' from 'BB+' on the global scale. S&P also downgraded JBSto 'brAA-' from 'brAA+' on the national scale. In addition, S&Plowered all its issue-level ratings to 'BB' from 'BB+' on bothcompanies. A recovery rating of '3' for the senior secureddebts--indicating a recovery expectation of 70%-90%, in the higherband of the range--and a '4' recovery rating for the unsecureddebts--indicating a recovery expectation of 30%-50%, the higherband of the range--remain unchanged.

JBS SA: Brazilian Judge Permits Executives to Return to Work-------------------------------------------------------------Luciana Magalhaes and Jeffrey T. Lewis at The Wall Street Journalreport that JBS SA's two top executives can return to work as soonas Wednesday, Sept. 14, a judge said, more than a week after thetwo men were suspended from their jobs by a court order.

The judge agreed to let Wesley and Joesley Batista return to workin return for J&F either making a bank deposit of BRL1.5 billion($452 million), or providing other guarantees for the same amount,to pay any potential restitution from the investigation in theevent either or both of the men are charged and found guilty, thereport notes.

J&F has until Oct. 21 to make the deposit or provide thoseguarantees, according to the agreement between J&F andprosecutors, which a judge accepted. If the payment isn't made bythen, Wesley and Joesley Batista's suspensions from theirpositions will be reinstated, the agreement said, the reportrelays.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on Aug.16, 2016, S&P Global Ratings downgraded JBS S.A. and JBS USA LLCto 'BB' from 'BB+' on the global scale. S&P also downgraded JBSto 'brAA-' from 'brAA+' on the national scale. In addition, S&Plowered all its issue-level ratings to 'BB' from 'BB+' on bothcompanies. A recovery rating of '3' for the senior secureddebts--indicating a recovery expectation of 70%-90%, in the higherband of the range--and a '4' recovery rating for the unsecureddebts--indicating a recovery expectation of 30%-50%, the higherband of the range--remain unchanged.

GRUPO OAS: Brazil Court Delays Ruling on Debt Plan for Two Weeks-----------------------------------------------------------------Ana Mano at Reuters reports that a Brazilian state appeals courtpostponed a vote on the legality of several aspects of Grupo OASSA's restructuring plan for at least a couple of weeks, addinguncertainty to efforts by the debt-laden engineering conglomerateto emerge from bankruptcy protection.

The appeals court in Sao Paulo agreed to reconvene as early asOct. 3 to discuss the 19 challenges put forward by a number oflocal and foreign creditors, according to Reuters. Some of thechallenges include lengthy repayment timetables and Grupo OAS'suse of asset sales to favor some creditors, court documentsshowed, the report notes.

The delay adds to uncertainty over Grupo OAS's emergence from apainful restructuring triggered by a harsh recession and thegroup's involvement in a sweeping corruption scandal, the reportrelays. The ongoing delay in the plan has halted the surrender ofOAS's stake in Invepar Investimentos e Participacoes emInfraestrutura SA to creditors, slowing the builder's recovery,the report says.

Some creditors allege they were treated unfairly under terms of arestructuring plan approved late last year by a majority oflenders and the court overseeing Grupo OAS's bankruptcy protectionproceedings, the documents showed, the report discloses.

Under the original plan, OAS gave some lenders a 24.5 percentstake it owned in Invepar in lieu for some debts, the reportrelays.

One key challenge to the plan came from a group of local unsecuredcreditors led by Pentagono SA DTVM, which said the repayment termsthey obtained from OAS in the restructuring plan were worse thanthose for foreign creditors such as U.S.-based AureliusInvestments LLC, the report notes.

One of the judges in the three-justice panel asked for a pause tothe ruling, citing the need to further analyze evidence againstthe legality of the plan, the report relays.

Eduardo Munhoz, Grupo OAS's attorney, said the company remainsoptimistic that the panel will drop all the challenges -- whichmight automatically trigger approval of the company's financialreorganization, the report adds.

STATE OF RIO DE JANEIRO: S&P Lowers Global Scale Rating to SD-------------------------------------------------------------S&P Global Ratings said that it lowered its global scale 'CCC-'and national scale 'brCCC-' ratings on the state of Rio de Janeiro(Rio) to SD. At the same time, S&P removed both ratings fromCreditWatch with negative implications, where it placed them onSept. 12, 2016.

On Sept. 9, 2016, the state of Rio de Janeiro missed a $46 milliondebt service payment to the Inter-American Development Bank(IADB). The IADB loan is guaranteed by the sovereign, and S&Pexpects it to fulfill the debt service payment in the followingweeks. However, since the contract of IADB and Rio doesn'tincorporate a stated grace period, according to S&P's criteria,when the contract doesn't incorporate a stated grace period,timely payment means no later than five business days after thedue date for payment (either by the state or by the federalgovernment as guarantor). As the payment wasn't made within fivebusiness days after the due date, S&P considers this to be adefault.

S&P defines selective default ('SD') when an obligor has failed topay one or more of its financial obligations (rated or unrated)when it came due. An 'SD' rating is assigned when S&P believesthat the obligor has selectively defaulted on a specific issue orclass of obligations, but it will continue to meet its paymentobligations on other issues or classes of obligations in a timelymanner.

In addition to IADB, the state of Rio de Janeiro has paymentscoming due in September to other multilateral lending agencies andto Credit Suisse. The state would cure its selective default oncethe missed debt service is paid and if it is current to othercreditors. If the payment is made to the IADB, but Rio hasoutstanding past-due debt service payments, as per S&P's criteriadefines, to other creditors, then the ratings on the state wouldremain at 'SD'. The rating that the state would receive uponemerging from default will depend on S&P's assessment of itswillingness and capacity to continue repaying debt and of itsoverall credit profile.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, theRating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified tovote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey theappropriate level of knowledge and understanding of themethodology applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chairconfirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee bythe primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner andwas sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained therecommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors andcritical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered anddiscussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflectedin the Ratings Score Snapshot above.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity toarticulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed thedraft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarizedin the above rationale and outlook. The weighting of all ratingfactors is described in the methodology used in this ratingaction.

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ASCLETIS (CAYMAN): Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Oct. 3-------------------------------------------------------The creditors of Ascletis (Cayman) Inc. are required to file theirproofs of debt by Oct. 3, 2016, to be included in the company'sdividend distribution.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be includedin the company's dividend distribution.

Zhou Lu is the company's liquidator.

LEKO GROUP: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Oct. 3------------------------------------------------The creditors of Leko Group Holdings Limited are required to filetheir proofs of debt by Oct. 3, 2016, to be included in thecompany's dividend distribution.

LYNX ASIA: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Oct. 12------------------------------------------------The creditors of Lynx Asia Capital Resources Ltd are required tofile their proofs of debt by Oct. 12, 2016, to be included in thecompany's dividend distribution.

PROFESSIONAL CONSULTING: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Oct. 17--------------------------------------------------------------The creditors of Professional Consulting International Limited arerequired to file their proofs of debt by Oct. 17, 2016, to beincluded in the company's dividend distribution.

Q-BLK YUKON: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Oct. 7-------------------------------------------------The creditors of Q-BLK Yukon Fund, Ltd. are required to file theirproofs of debt by Oct. 7, 2016, to be included in the company'sdividend distribution.

SEDACO INC: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Oct. 17-------------------------------------------------The creditors of Sedaco Inc are required to file their proofs ofdebt by Oct. 17, 2016, to be included in the company's dividenddistribution.

VINA LIMITED: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Oct. 12---------------------------------------------------The creditors of Vina Limited are required to file their proofs ofdebt by Oct. 12, 2016, to be included in the company's dividenddistribution.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Ban on Dollar-Only Charges Surprises Big Firms------------------------------------------------------------------Dominican Today reports that business leader Rafael Blanco saidthe Central Bank's announced ban on the use of very-phones whichcharge only in dollars or other foreign currency surprised thebusiness community, because in his view the issue wasn'tpreviously addressed.

Mr. Blanco, who said he was speaking as a hotelier and not aspresident of the National Business Council (CONEP), said pricesthroughout Dominican Republic's hotel industry are "normally"expressed in dollars, according to Dominican Today. "Then thecustom to charge the customer in the currency in which theirservice was quoted was established to avoid confusion with theexchange rate's movements."

In that regard, economist Ernesto Selman, quoted bydiariolibre.com.do, said the Central Bank's decision to restrictsomewhat the use of foreign currencies in the country is of greatconcern, since thus far it's been used freely in transactions andin businesses for consumption, savings or investment in local andforeign currency, the report notes.

The Central Bank reported that in recent years has been toincrease the use of sales terminals designated for foreigncurrency to pay a variety of suppliers of goods and services, thereport notes.

"In the interest of protecting the right to free choice bycardholders and avoid unwanted pressures on the exchange rate, theCentral Bank instructed Acquirer Companies to remove of exclusiveTPOS in foreign currency within no later than 90 days," theCentral Bank says on its website, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America onJuly 1, 2016, Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook onthe Dominican Republic's long term issuer and debt ratings topositive from stable. The ratings have been affirmed at B1.

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* JAMAICA: IMF Approves US$39.6MM Disbursement----------------------------------------------The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)completed on September 16, 2016 the thirteenth review of Jamaica'seconomic performance under the program supported by a four-year,SDR 615.38 million (about US$932.3 million at the time ofapproval) arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF)1. Thecompletion of the review enables an immediate disbursement of anamount equivalent to SDR 28.32 million (about US$39.6 million).The Board made the decision based on lapse-of-time procedures,without a formal meeting.2 The EFF arrangement was approved on May1, 2013.

Program implementation is on track. The authorities' continuedcommitment to the demanding reform program even in the fourth yearof the IMF-supported program is commendable. All quantitativeperformance criteria for end-June 2016, as well as the continuousquantitative program targets and structural benchmarks, were met.Domestic confidence indicators are at an all-time high, and thereare improving signs of economic activity, including agriculturalrecovery, strong performance in tourism and manufacturing,increased FDI inflow, and stronger private sector credit growth.Real GDP growth is estimated at 1 percent for FY15/16, and isprojected to reach 1.7 percent in FY16/17. Nevertheless, importantrisks to the program remain.

Higher growth dividends, more job creation, and improved livingstandards will be essential to maintain social support for thereform agenda. Safeguarding growth-enhancing capital spending isessential for employment and job-creation. Assessing bankingsector competition, improving land titling, as well as developingmobile money and agency banking services will help alleviateconstraints to financial inclusion and investment. The rebalancingfrom direct to indirect taxes provides an opportunity to improvecompliance and increase incentives for production and effort. Atthe same time, protecting the poor and vulnerable is a highpriority, which requires developing and implementing a well-designed plan to enhance Jamaica's social protection framework toensure inclusive and equitable growth. Controlling the wage billand reprioritizing public spending to areas where the need ishighest, including by delivering public services cost-effectivelyand efficiently, are vital to support a dynamic private sector.

* * *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America onFeb. 15, 2016, Fitch Ratings has upgraded Jamaica's Long-termforeign and local currency IDRs to 'B' from 'B-' and revised theRating Outlooks to Stable from Positive. In addition, Fitchupgraded Jamaica's senior unsecured Foreign- and Local-Currencybonds to 'B' from 'B-'. The Country Ceiling has been affirmed at'B' and the Short- Term Foreign-Currency IDR affirmed at 'B'.

======================P U E R T O R I C O======================

EUROMODAS INC: Unsecured Creditors to Get 5% Under Exit Plan------------------------------------------------------------General unsecured creditors of Euromodas, Inc., will get 5% oftheir claims under the company's proposed plan to exit Chapter 11protection.

Under the restructuring plan, holders of general unsecured claimsof $50,000 or less, will be paid 5% of their claims on theeffective date of the plan. These creditors will receive cashpayments.

Meanwhile, general unsecured creditors with claims over $50,000,will be paid 5% of their claims through 60 equal consecutivemonthly installments of $467, commencing on the effective date ofthe plan and continuing on the 30th day of the subsequent 59months.

General unsecured creditors assert a total of $1.28 million.

The Debtor will pay creditors from the cash resulting from itsoperations, according to the disclosure statement filed with theU.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico.

A copy of the disclosure statement is available for free athttps://is.gd/b0fCkK

At the time of the filing, the Debtor estimated its assets at$100,000 to $500,000 and debts at $1 million to $10 million.

SECURITY GLOBAL: Hires Cordero as Attorney------------------------------------------Security Global Solutions, Inc., seeks authority from the U.S.Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico to employ NildaM. Gonzalez Cordero, Esq. as attorney to the Debtor.

Security Global requires Cordero to represent and assist theDebtor in carrying out its duties in the bankruptcy case under thebankruptcy code.

Cordero will be paid at these hourly rates:

Nilda M. Gonzalez Cordero $200 Paralegal $75

Cordero will be paid a retainer in the amount of $5,000.

Cordero will also be reimbursed for reasonable out-of-pocketexpenses incurred.

To the best of the Debtor's knowledge the firm is a "disinterestedperson" as the term is defined in Section 101(14) of theBankruptcy Code and does not represent any interest adverse to theDebtor and its estates.

No official committee of unsecured creditors has been appointed inthe case.

THAMAR LI: Hires Santiago & Gonzalez as Attorney------------------------------------------------Thamar Li Construction and Rental, Corp., seeks authorization fromthe U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico toemploy The Law Offices of Santiago & Gonzalez Law, LLC as attorneyfor the Debtor.

The Debtor filed a voluntary petition for reorganization pursuantto the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. The Debtor is notsufficiently familiar with the law to able to plan and conduct theproceedings without competent legal counsel.

Nydia Gonzalez Ortiz, Esq., partner in the law firm of The LawOffices of Santiago & Gonzalez Law, LLC, assured the Court thatthe firm is a "disinterested person" as the term is defined inSection 101(14) of the Bankruptcy Code and does not represent anyinterest adverse to the Debtor and its estates.

VERNUS GROUP: Unsecureds to Recover 95% Under Plan--------------------------------------------------Vernus Group Corp. filed with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for theDistrict of Puerto Rico a disclosure statement describing theDebtor's Chapter 11 plan.

Class 1 Non-Insider General Unsecured Claims, estimated at$423,449.55, are impaired under the Plan. The Holders will bepaid in full satisfaction of their claims, as the claims may bereduced and negotiated, or as finally determined by the BankruptcyCourt, 95% of their allowed claims on a pro-rata basis, asfollows: 1) $19,485, representing 5% of Class 1's allowed claims,to be paid from the proceeds of the sale of assets on theEffective Date of the Plan; 2) $120,000, representing 28% of Class1 allowed claims, to be paid from the proceeds of the Sale ofInventory on the later of the Effective Date of the Plan or theclosing on the Sale of Inventory; and 3) $260,000, representing62% of Class 1 allowed claims, to be paid from the proceeds of theavoidance actions on the later of the Effective Date of the Planor the date of collection of the avoidance actions.

Any remaining funds after paying Class 1 allowed claims will alsobe distributed to the General Non-Insider Unsecured Creditors, upto the full satisfaction of their allowed claims on a pro-ratabasis.

The proceeds from the sale of inventory and the avoidance actionsare contingent events whose success affects the estimated recoveryfor Class 1 allowed claims. Moreover, the final dividend to Class1 may be affected by the costs of pursuing the avoidance actionsor by additional post-petition accounts payable.

The Debtor will effect payments of pending administrative expenseclaims on the Effective Date from the proceeds of the sale ofassets. Priority tax claims and other priority claims will bepaid on the Effective Date from the proceeds of the sale ofassets.

Class 1 claims will be paid in full satisfaction of their claims,as the claims may be reduced and negotiated, or as finallydetermined by the Court, 95% of their allowed claims on a pro-ratabasis, as follows: 1) $19,485, representing 5% of Class 1 allowedclaims, to be paid from the proceeds of the sale of assets on theEffective Date of the Plan; 2) $120,000, representing 28% of Class1 allowed claims, to be paid from the proceeds of the sale ofinventory on the later of the Effective Date of the Plan or theclosing on the sale of inventory; and 3) $260,000, representing62% of Class 1 allowed claims, to be paid from the proceeds of theavoidance actions on the later of the Effective Date of the Planor the date of collection of the avoidance actions. The exactamount of payments to holders of Class 1 claims is contingent onthe successful prosecution of the avoidance actions and the saleof inventory. Moreover, the final dividend to Class 1 may beaffected by the costs of pursuing the avoidance actions oradditional postpetition accounts payable.

S&P views the transaction as a distressed exchange. While theexchange would be made at par value, the timing of payments willbe delayed with the extension of the maturity date of the newnotes. Also, S&P views the offer as distressed rather than purelyopportunistic, given the current challenging operating conditionsand the significant upcoming debt maturities that PDVSA faces,which would very likely lead to a conventional default when theexisting notes come due.

PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: Fitch Expects to Rate USD1.7BB Notes 'CCC'------------------------------------------------------------------Fitch Ratings expects to assign a 'CCC/RR4(exp)' rating toPetroleos de Venezuela, S.A.'s (PDVSA) up to USD7.1 billion ofproposed senior secured notes. The company expects to issue thenotes under a voluntary exchange for two bonds with final maturityin 2017: the 8.5% coupon sinking bond with a USD2.05 billionprincipal payment due in November 2016 and November 2017 and theUSD3 billion 5.25% coupon bond due 2017. The new notes will maturein four equal annual instalments between 2017 and 2020, carry an8.5% coupon and will receive a pledge consisting of 50.1% of CitgoHolding, Inc. (Issuer Default Rating [IDR] 'B-'/Outlook Stable), awholly owned subsidiary of PDVSA. Citgo Holdings in turn owns 100%of Citgo Petroleum Corp (IDR 'B'/Outlook Stable). Debt at thesetwo subsidiaries amounted to approximately USD4 billion as ofyear-end 2015.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

PDVSA's credit quality reflects the company's linkage to thegovernment of Venezuela as a state-owned entity, combined withincreased government control over business strategies and internalresources. This underscores the close link between the company'scredit profile and that of the sovereign. PDVSA's cash flowgeneration has historically been significantly affected by thelarge amount of funds transferred to the central government eachyear.

LINKAGE TO SOVEREIGN

PDVSA's credit quality is inextricably linked to that of theVenezuelan government. Venezuela's ratings (IDR 'CCC') reflect thesovereign's weakened external reserves, high commodity dependence,rising macroeconomic distortions, limited reduced transparency inofficial data, and continued policy and political uncertainty. Thesovereign's strong repayment record and relatively low debtamortization profile mitigate imminent risks to debt service.PDVSA is fully owned by the government and its transfers havehistorically represented around 45% of the government's revenues.It is of strategic importance to the economic and social policiesof the country, as oil accounts for around 95% of total exports.

LIMITED TRANSPARENCY

The Venezuelan government displays limited transparency in theadministration and use of government-managed funds, as well as infiscal operations, which poses challenges to accurately assessingits fiscal state and the full financial strength of the sovereign.PDVSA also displays similar characteristics, which reinforces thelinkage of its ratings to the sovereign.

UNCERTAIN LEVEL OF TRANSFERS TO GOVERNMENT

Although the excess hydrocarbon prices law eliminates transfers tothe FONDEN national development fund when oil prices are belowUSD55/barrel (bbl), the low level of central government reserveswill require the government to either reduce social expendituresor disregard the law and maintain historical levels of transfersfrom PDVSA. Fitch believes these transfers will continue to takeplace either in the form of royalties, social contributions,dividends or investments. The high level of transfers to thecentral government effectively renders PDVSA's cash flow fromoperations negative.

FOCUS SHIFTS TO RECOVERY

PDVSA's 'CCC' rating suggests a real possibility of default. If arestructuring occurs, Fitch anticipates average recovery forPDVSA's bondholders of 31%-50%, and likely closer to the lower endof the range. While Fitch's recovery analysis yields a highrecovery, the willingness of Venezuela's government to extendconcessions to investors will likely move actual recovery closerto the lower end of the 31% to 50% range. In addition, should oilprices remain depressed, an average recovery may lead toadditional future defaults in order to further reduce obligationsand allow for necessary transfers to the government. The proposedsenior secured notes have also been assigned an 'RR4' averageRecovery Rating as the collateral provided may only marginallyenhance recovery given default, which could still range between31% and 50%.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Linkage to government: PDVSA's ratings assume that implicitsupport from the government, given the company's strategicimportance, would materialize should the company need it.

Slow hydrocarbon price recovery: Fitch assumes West TexasIntermediate crude prices to average approximately USD42 perbarrel in 2016 and to slowly recover to approximately USD65 perbbl in the long term.

Catalysts for a downgrade include a downgrade to Venezuela'sratings, a substantial increase in leverage to finance capitalexpenditures or government spending and a sharp and extendedcommodity price downturn. Although not expected in the short- tomedium-term, catalysts for an upgrade include an upgrade toVenezuela's sovereign rating and/or the company's realindependence from the government.

LIQUIDITY

PDVSA's current liquidity position is believed to be weak as aresult of the current low oil price environment and transfers tothe central government. As of December 2015, PDVSA reported cashof USD5.8 billion, which compared unfavorably with short-term debtof USD6.8 billion. The company's current liquidity position isuncertain given expenditures, transfers to government, andprincipal debt payments that might have driven down liquidity fromthe last reported amount as of year-end 2015. Under Fitch's basecase scenario, which assumes oil prices of USD42/bbl in 2016 andUSD45/bbl in 2017, and investments of USD25 billion annually,PDVSA's liquidity position will continue to deteriorate. Debtamortizations for 2017 are estimated at approximately USD7.2billion, of which USD5.1 billion is capital market debtobligations. The proposed debt issuance could lower 2017 principlepayments by USD1.6 billion. Venezuela's gross internationalreserves have declined by USD4.3 billion to USD12 billion betweenJanuary and June 2016.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch expects to assign the following ratings:

-- USD7 billion of senior secured notes due 2020 'CCC/RR4'.

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Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicativeprices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outsidesources during the prior week we think are reliable. Thosesources may not, however, be complete or accurate. The MondayBond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades. Pricesfor actual trades are probably different. Our objective is toshare information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buyor sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entityaffiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in theissuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies withinsolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on thelatest balance sheets publicly available a day prior topublication. At first glance, this list may look like thedefinitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at historical costnet of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm'sassets. A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet forliabilities that may never materialize. The prices at whichequity securities trade in public market are determined by morethan a balance sheet solvency test.

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