/* * Linux Security Module interfaces * * Copyright (C) 2001 WireX Communications, Inc <chris@wirex.com> * Copyright (C) 2001 Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com> * Copyright (C) 2001 Networks Associates Technology, Inc <ssmalley@nai.com> * Copyright (C) 2001 James Morris <jmorris@intercode.com.au> * Copyright (C) 2001 Silicon Graphics, Inc. (Trust Technology Group) * Copyright (C) 2015 Intel Corporation. * Copyright (C) 2015 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> * Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Techonologies * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or * (at your option) any later version. * * Due to this file being licensed under the GPL there is controversy over * whether this permits you to write a module that #includes this file * without placing your module under the GPL. Please consult a lawyer for * advice before doing this. * */#ifndef __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H#define __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H#include<linux/security.h>#include<linux/init.h>#include<linux/rculist.h>/** * union security_list_options - Linux Security Module hook function list * * Security hooks for program execution operations. * * @bprm_set_creds: * Save security information in the bprm->security field, typically based * on information about the bprm->file, for later use by the apply_creds * hook. This hook may also optionally check permissions (e.g. for * transitions between security domains). * This hook may be called multiple times during a single execve, e.g. for * interpreters. The hook can tell whether it has already been called by * checking to see if @bprm->security is non-NULL. If so, then the hook * may decide either to retain the security information saved earlier or * to replace it. The hook must set @bprm->secureexec to 1 if a "secure * exec" has happened as a result of this hook call. The flag is used to * indicate the need for a sanitized execution environment, and is also * passed in the ELF auxiliary table on the initial stack to indicate * whether libc should enable secure mode. * @bprm contains the linux_binprm structure. * Return 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. * @bprm_check_security: * This hook mediates the point when a search for a binary handler will * begin. It allows a check the @bprm->security value which is set in the * preceding set_creds call. The primary difference from set_creds is * that the argv list and envp list are reliably available in @bprm. This * hook may be called multiple times during a single execve; and in each * pass set_creds is called first. * @bprm contains the linux_binprm structure. * Return 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. * @bprm_committing_creds: * Prepare to install the new security attributes of a process being * transformed by an execve operation, based on the old credentials * pointed to by @current->cred and the information set in @bprm->cred by * the bprm_set_creds hook. @bprm points to the linux_binprm structure. * This hook is a good place to perform state changes on the process such * as closing open file descriptors to which access will no longer be * granted when the attributes are changed. This is called immediately * before commit_creds(). * @bprm_committed_creds: * Tidy up after the installation of the new security attributes of a * process being transformed by an execve operation. The new credentials * have, by this point, been set to @current->cred. @bprm points to the * linux_binprm structure. This hook is a good place to perform state * changes on the process such as clearing out non-inheritable signal * state. This is called immediately after commit_creds(). * * Security hooks for filesystem operations. * * @sb_alloc_security: * Allocate and attach a security structure to the sb->s_security field. * The s_security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is * allocated. * @sb contains the super_block structure to be modified. * Return 0 if operation was successful. * @sb_free_security: * Deallocate and clear the sb->s_security field. * @sb contains the super_block structure to be modified. * @sb_statfs: * Check permission before obtaining filesystem statistics for the @mnt * mountpoint. * @dentry is a handle on the superblock for the filesystem. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @sb_mount: * Check permission before an object specified by @dev_name is mounted on * the mount point named by @nd. For an ordinary mount, @dev_name * identifies a device if the file system type requires a device. For a * remount (@flags & MS_REMOUNT), @dev_name is irrelevant. For a * loopback/bind mount (@flags & MS_BIND), @dev_name identifies the * pathname of the object being mounted. * @dev_name contains the name for object being mounted. * @path contains the path for mount point object. * @type contains the filesystem type. * @flags contains the mount flags. * @data contains the filesystem-specific data. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @sb_copy_data: * Allow mount option data to be copied prior to parsing by the filesystem, * so that the security module can extract security-specific mount * options cleanly (a filesystem may modify the data e.g. with strsep()). * This also allows the original mount data to be stripped of security- * specific options to avoid having to make filesystems aware of them. * @type the type of filesystem being mounted. * @orig the original mount data copied from userspace. * @copy copied data which will be passed to the security module. * Returns 0 if the copy was successful. * @sb_remount: * Extracts security system specific mount options and verifies no changes * are being made to those options. * @sb superblock being remounted * @data contains the filesystem-specific data. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @sb_umount: * Check permission before the @mnt file system is unmounted. * @mnt contains the mounted file system. * @flags contains the unmount flags, e.g. MNT_FORCE. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @sb_pivotroot: * Check permission before pivoting the root filesystem. * @old_path contains the path for the new location of the * current root (put_old). * @new_path contains the path for the new root (new_root). * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @sb_set_mnt_opts: * Set the security relevant mount options used for a superblock * @sb the superblock to set security mount options for * @opts binary data structure containing all lsm mount data * @sb_clone_mnt_opts: * Copy all security options from a given superblock to another * @oldsb old superblock which contain information to clone * @newsb new superblock which needs filled in * @sb_parse_opts_str: * Parse a string of security data filling in the opts structure * @options string containing all mount options known by the LSM * @opts binary data structure usable by the LSM * @dentry_init_security: * Compute a context for a dentry as the inode is not yet available * since NFSv4 has no label backed by an EA anyway. * @dentry dentry to use in calculating the context. * @mode mode used to determine resource type. * @name name of the last path component used to create file * @ctx pointer to place the pointer to the resulting context in. * @ctxlen point to place the length of the resulting context. * @dentry_create_files_as: * Compute a context for a dentry as the inode is not yet available * and set that context in passed in creds so that new files are * created using that context. Context is calculated using the * passed in creds and not the creds of the caller. * @dentry dentry to use in calculating the context. * @mode mode used to determine resource type. * @name name of the last path component used to create file * @old creds which should be used for context calculation * @new creds to modify * * * Security hooks for inode operations. * * @inode_alloc_security: * Allocate and attach a security structure to @inode->i_security. The * i_security field is initialized to NULL when the inode structure is * allocated. * @inode contains the inode structure. * Return 0 if operation was successful. * @inode_free_security: * @inode contains the inode structure. * Deallocate the inode security structure and set @inode->i_security to * NULL. * @inode_init_security: * Obtain the security attribute name suffix and value to set on a newly * created inode and set up the incore security field for the new inode. * This hook is called by the fs code as part of the inode creation * transaction and provides for atomic labeling of the inode, unlike * the post_create/mkdir/... hooks called by the VFS. The hook function * is expected to allocate the name and value via kmalloc, with the caller * being responsible for calling kfree after using them. * If the security module does not use security attributes or does * not wish to put a security attribute on this particular inode, * then it should return -EOPNOTSUPP to skip this processing. * @inode contains the inode structure of the newly created inode. * @dir contains the inode structure of the parent directory. * @qstr contains the last path component of the new object * @name will be set to the allocated name suffix (e.g. selinux). * @value will be set to the allocated attribute value. * @len will be set to the length of the value. * Returns 0 if @name and @value have been successfully set, * -EOPNOTSUPP if no security attribute is needed, or * -ENOMEM on memory allocation failure. * @inode_create: * Check permission to create a regular file. * @dir contains inode structure of the parent of the new file. * @dentry contains the dentry structure for the file to be created. * @mode contains the file mode of the file to be created. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_link: * Check permission before creating a new hard link to a file. * @old_dentry contains the dentry structure for an existing * link to the file. * @dir contains the inode structure of the parent directory * of the new link. * @new_dentry contains the dentry structure for the new link. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @path_link: * Check permission before creating a new hard link to a file. * @old_dentry contains the dentry structure for an existing link * to the file. * @new_dir contains the path structure of the parent directory of * the new link. * @new_dentry contains the dentry structure for the new link. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_unlink: * Check the permission to remove a hard link to a file. * @dir contains the inode structure of parent directory of the file. * @dentry contains the dentry structure for file to be unlinked. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @path_unlink: * Check the permission to remove a hard link to a file. * @dir contains the path structure of parent directory of the file. * @dentry contains the dentry structure for file to be unlinked. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_symlink: * Check the permission to create a symbolic link to a file. * @dir contains the inode structure of parent directory of * the symbolic link. * @dentry contains the dentry structure of the symbolic link. * @old_name contains the pathname of file. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @path_symlink: * Check the permission to create a symbolic link to a file. * @dir contains the path structure of parent directory of * the symbolic link. * @dentry contains the dentry structure of the symbolic link. * @old_name contains the pathname of file. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_mkdir: * Check permissions to create a new directory in the existing directory * associated with inode structure @dir. * @dir contains the inode structure of parent of the directory * to be created. * @dentry contains the dentry structure of new directory. * @mode contains the mode of new directory. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @path_mkdir: * Check permissions to create a new directory in the existing directory * associated with path structure @path. * @dir contains the path structure of parent of the directory * to be created. * @dentry contains the dentry structure of new directory. * @mode contains the mode of new directory. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_rmdir: * Check the permission to remove a directory. * @dir contains the inode structure of parent of the directory * to be removed. * @dentry contains the dentry structure of directory to be removed. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @path_rmdir: * Check the permission to remove a directory. * @dir contains the path structure of parent of the directory to be * removed. * @dentry contains the dentry structure of directory to be removed. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_mknod: * Check permissions when creating a special file (or a socket or a fifo * file created via the mknod system call). Note that if mknod operation * is being done for a regular file, then the create hook will be called * and not this hook. * @dir contains the inode structure of parent of the new file. * @dentry contains the dentry structure of the new file. * @mode contains the mode of the new file. * @dev contains the device number. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @path_mknod: * Check permissions when creating a file. Note that this hook is called * even if mknod operation is being done for a regular file. * @dir contains the path structure of parent of the new file. * @dentry contains the dentry structure of the new file. * @mode contains the mode of the new file. * @dev contains the undecoded device number. Use new_decode_dev() to get * the decoded device number. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_rename: * Check for permission to rename a file or directory. * @old_dir contains the inode structure for parent of the old link. * @old_dentry contains the dentry structure of the old link. * @new_dir contains the inode structure for parent of the new link. * @new_dentry contains the dentry structure of the new link. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @path_rename: * Check for permission to rename a file or directory. * @old_dir contains the path structure for parent of the old link. * @old_dentry contains the dentry structure of the old link. * @new_dir contains the path structure for parent of the new link. * @new_dentry contains the dentry structure of the new link. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @path_chmod: * Check for permission to change DAC's permission of a file or directory. * @dentry contains the dentry structure. * @mnt contains the vfsmnt structure. * @mode contains DAC's mode. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @path_chown: * Check for permission to change owner/group of a file or directory. * @path contains the path structure. * @uid contains new owner's ID. * @gid contains new group's ID. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @path_chroot: * Check for permission to change root directory. * @path contains the path structure. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_readlink: * Check the permission to read the symbolic link. * @dentry contains the dentry structure for the file link. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_follow_link: * Check permission to follow a symbolic link when looking up a pathname. * @dentry contains the dentry structure for the link. * @inode contains the inode, which itself is not stable in RCU-walk * @rcu indicates whether we are in RCU-walk mode. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_permission: * Check permission before accessing an inode. This hook is called by the * existing Linux permission function, so a security module can use it to * provide additional checking for existing Linux permission checks. * Notice that this hook is called when a file is opened (as well as many * other operations), whereas the file_security_ops permission hook is * called when the actual read/write operations are performed. * @inode contains the inode structure to check. * @mask contains the permission mask. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_setattr: * Check permission before setting file attributes. Note that the kernel * call to notify_change is performed from several locations, whenever * file attributes change (such as when a file is truncated, chown/chmod * operations, transferring disk quotas, etc). * @dentry contains the dentry structure for the file. * @attr is the iattr structure containing the new file attributes. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @path_truncate: * Check permission before truncating a file. * @path contains the path structure for the file. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_getattr: * Check permission before obtaining file attributes. * @path contains the path structure for the file. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_setxattr: * Check permission before setting the extended attributes * @value identified by @name for @dentry. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_post_setxattr: * Update inode security field after successful setxattr operation. * @value identified by @name for @dentry. * @inode_getxattr: * Check permission before obtaining the extended attributes * identified by @name for @dentry. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_listxattr: * Check permission before obtaining the list of extended attribute * names for @dentry. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_removexattr: * Check permission before removing the extended attribute * identified by @name for @dentry. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_getsecurity: * Retrieve a copy of the extended attribute representation of the * security label associated with @name for @inode via @buffer. Note that * @name is the remainder of the attribute name after the security prefix * has been removed. @alloc is used to specify of the call should return a * value via the buffer or just the value length Return size of buffer on * success. * @inode_setsecurity: * Set the security label associated with @name for @inode from the * extended attribute value @value. @size indicates the size of the * @value in bytes. @flags may be XATTR_CREATE, XATTR_REPLACE, or 0. * Note that @name is the remainder of the attribute name after the * security. prefix has been removed. * Return 0 on success. * @inode_listsecurity: * Copy the extended attribute names for the security labels * associated with @inode into @buffer. The maximum size of @buffer * is specified by @buffer_size. @buffer may be NULL to request * the size of the buffer required. * Returns number of bytes used/required on success. * @inode_need_killpriv: * Called when an inode has been changed. * @dentry is the dentry being changed. * Return <0 on error to abort the inode change operation. * Return 0 if inode_killpriv does not need to be called. * Return >0 if inode_killpriv does need to be called. * @inode_killpriv: * The setuid bit is being removed. Remove similar security labels. * Called with the dentry->d_inode->i_mutex held. * @dentry is the dentry being changed. * Return 0 on success. If error is returned, then the operation * causing setuid bit removal is failed. * @inode_getsecid: * Get the secid associated with the node. * @inode contains a pointer to the inode. * @secid contains a pointer to the location where result will be saved. * In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero. * @inode_copy_up: * A file is about to be copied up from lower layer to upper layer of * overlay filesystem. Security module can prepare a set of new creds * and modify as need be and return new creds. Caller will switch to * new creds temporarily to create new file and release newly allocated * creds. * @src indicates the union dentry of file that is being copied up. * @new pointer to pointer to return newly allocated creds. * Returns 0 on success or a negative error code on error. * @inode_copy_up_xattr: * Filter the xattrs being copied up when a unioned file is copied * up from a lower layer to the union/overlay layer. * @name indicates the name of the xattr. * Returns 0 to accept the xattr, 1 to discard the xattr, -EOPNOTSUPP if * security module does not know about attribute or a negative error code * to abort the copy up. Note that the caller is responsible for reading * and writing the xattrs as this hook is merely a filter. * * Security hooks for file operations * * @file_permission: * Check file permissions before accessing an open file. This hook is * called by various operations that read or write files. A security * module can use this hook to perform additional checking on these * operations, e.g. to revalidate permissions on use to support privilege * bracketing or policy changes. Notice that this hook is used when the * actual read/write operations are performed, whereas the * inode_security_ops hook is called when a file is opened (as well as * many other operations). * Caveat: Although this hook can be used to revalidate permissions for * various system call operations that read or write files, it does not * address the revalidation of permissions for memory-mapped files. * Security modules must handle this separately if they need such * revalidation. * @file contains the file structure being accessed. * @mask contains the requested permissions. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @file_alloc_security: * Allocate and attach a security structure to the file->f_security field. * The security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first * created. * @file contains the file structure to secure. * Return 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. * @file_free_security: * Deallocate and free any security structures stored in file->f_security. * @file contains the file structure being modified. * @file_ioctl: * @file contains the file structure. * @cmd contains the operation to perform. * @arg contains the operational arguments. * Check permission for an ioctl operation on @file. Note that @arg * sometimes represents a user space pointer; in other cases, it may be a * simple integer value. When @arg represents a user space pointer, it * should never be used by the security module. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @mmap_addr : * Check permissions for a mmap operation at @addr. * @addr contains virtual address that will be used for the operation. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @mmap_file : * Check permissions for a mmap operation. The @file may be NULL, e.g. * if mapping anonymous memory. * @file contains the file structure for file to map (may be NULL). * @reqprot contains the protection requested by the application. * @prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel. * @flags contains the operational flags. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @file_mprotect: * Check permissions before changing memory access permissions. * @vma contains the memory region to modify. * @reqprot contains the protection requested by the application. * @prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @file_lock: * Check permission before performing file locking operations. * Note: this hook mediates both flock and fcntl style locks. * @file contains the file structure. * @cmd contains the posix-translated lock operation to perform * (e.g. F_RDLCK, F_WRLCK). * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @file_fcntl: * Check permission before allowing the file operation specified by @cmd * from being performed on the file @file. Note that @arg sometimes * represents a user space pointer; in other cases, it may be a simple * integer value. When @arg represents a user space pointer, it should * never be used by the security module. * @file contains the file structure. * @cmd contains the operation to be performed. * @arg contains the operational arguments. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @file_set_fowner: * Save owner security information (typically from current->security) in * file->f_security for later use by the send_sigiotask hook. * @file contains the file structure to update. * Return 0 on success. * @file_send_sigiotask: * Check permission for the file owner @fown to send SIGIO or SIGURG to the * process @tsk. Note that this hook is sometimes called from interrupt. * Note that the fown_struct, @fown, is never outside the context of a * struct file, so the file structure (and associated security information) * can always be obtained: container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner) * @tsk contains the structure of task receiving signal. * @fown contains the file owner information. * @sig is the signal that will be sent. When 0, kernel sends SIGIO. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @file_receive: * This hook allows security modules to control the ability of a process * to receive an open file descriptor via socket IPC. * @file contains the file structure being received. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @file_open: * Save open-time permission checking state for later use upon * file_permission, and recheck access if anything has changed * since inode_permission. * * Security hooks for task operations. * * @task_alloc: * @task task being allocated. * @clone_flags contains the flags indicating what should be shared. * Handle allocation of task-related resources. * Returns a zero on success, negative values on failure. * @task_free: * @task task about to be freed. * Handle release of task-related resources. (Note that this can be called * from interrupt context.) * @cred_alloc_blank: * @cred points to the credentials. * @gfp indicates the atomicity of any memory allocations. * Only allocate sufficient memory and attach to @cred such that * cred_transfer() will not get ENOMEM. * @cred_free: * @cred points to the credentials. * Deallocate and clear the cred->security field in a set of credentials. * @cred_prepare: * @new points to the new credentials. * @old points to the original credentials. * @gfp indicates the atomicity of any memory allocations. * Prepare a new set of credentials by copying the data from the old set. * @cred_transfer: * @new points to the new credentials. * @old points to the original credentials. * Transfer data from original creds to new creds * @cred_getsecid: * Retrieve the security identifier of the cred structure @c * @c contains the credentials, secid will be placed into @secid. * In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero. * @kernel_act_as: * Set the credentials for a kernel service to act as (subjective context). * @new points to the credentials to be modified. * @secid specifies the security ID to be set * The current task must be the one that nominated @secid. * Return 0 if successful. * @kernel_create_files_as: * Set the file creation context in a set of credentials to be the same as * the objective context of the specified inode. * @new points to the credentials to be modified. * @inode points to the inode to use as a reference. * The current task must be the one that nominated @inode. * Return 0 if successful. * @kernel_module_request: * Ability to trigger the kernel to automatically upcall to userspace for * userspace to load a kernel module with the given name. * @kmod_name name of the module requested by the kernel * Return 0 if successful. * @kernel_load_data: * Load data provided by userspace. * @id kernel load data identifier * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @kernel_read_file: * Read a file specified by userspace. * @file contains the file structure pointing to the file being read * by the kernel. * @id kernel read file identifier * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @kernel_post_read_file: * Read a file specified by userspace. * @file contains the file structure pointing to the file being read * by the kernel. * @buf pointer to buffer containing the file contents. * @size length of the file contents. * @id kernel read file identifier * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @task_fix_setuid: * Update the module's state after setting one or more of the user * identity attributes of the current process. The @flags parameter * indicates which of the set*uid system calls invoked this hook. If * @new is the set of credentials that will be installed. Modifications * should be made to this rather than to @current->cred. * @old is the set of credentials that are being replaces * @flags contains one of the LSM_SETID_* values. * Return 0 on success. * @task_setpgid: * Check permission before setting the process group identifier of the * process @p to @pgid. * @p contains the task_struct for process being modified. * @pgid contains the new pgid. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @task_getpgid: * Check permission before getting the process group identifier of the * process @p. * @p contains the task_struct for the process. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @task_getsid: * Check permission before getting the session identifier of the process * @p. * @p contains the task_struct for the process. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @task_getsecid: * Retrieve the security identifier of the process @p. * @p contains the task_struct for the process and place is into @secid. * In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero. * * @task_setnice: * Check permission before setting the nice value of @p to @nice. * @p contains the task_struct of process. * @nice contains the new nice value. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @task_setioprio * Check permission before setting the ioprio value of @p to @ioprio. * @p contains the task_struct of process. * @ioprio contains the new ioprio value * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @task_getioprio * Check permission before getting the ioprio value of @p. * @p contains the task_struct of process. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @task_prlimit: * Check permission before getting and/or setting the resource limits of * another task. * @cred points to the cred structure for the current task. * @tcred points to the cred structure for the target task. * @flags contains the LSM_PRLIMIT_* flag bits indicating whether the * resource limits are being read, modified, or both. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @task_setrlimit: * Check permission before setting the resource limits of process @p * for @resource to @new_rlim. The old resource limit values can * be examined by dereferencing (p->signal->rlim + resource). * @p points to the task_struct for the target task's group leader. * @resource contains the resource whose limit is being set. * @new_rlim contains the new limits for @resource. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @task_setscheduler: * Check permission before setting scheduling policy and/or parameters of * process @p based on @policy and @lp. * @p contains the task_struct for process. * @policy contains the scheduling policy. * @lp contains the scheduling parameters. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @task_getscheduler: * Check permission before obtaining scheduling information for process * @p. * @p contains the task_struct for process. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @task_movememory * Check permission before moving memory owned by process @p. * @p contains the task_struct for process. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @task_kill: * Check permission before sending signal @sig to @p. @info can be NULL, * the constant 1, or a pointer to a siginfo structure. If @info is 1 or * SI_FROMKERNEL(info) is true, then the signal should be viewed as coming * from the kernel and should typically be permitted. * SIGIO signals are handled separately by the send_sigiotask hook in * file_security_ops. * @p contains the task_struct for process. * @info contains the signal information. * @sig contains the signal value. * @cred contains the cred of the process where the signal originated, or * NULL if the current task is the originator. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @task_prctl: * Check permission before performing a process control operation on the * current process. * @option contains the operation. * @arg2 contains a argument. * @arg3 contains a argument. * @arg4 contains a argument. * @arg5 contains a argument. * Return -ENOSYS if no-one wanted to handle this op, any other value to * cause prctl() to return immediately with that value. * @task_to_inode: * Set the security attributes for an inode based on an associated task's * security attributes, e.g. for /proc/pid inodes. * @p contains the task_struct for the task. * @inode contains the inode structure for the inode. * * Security hooks for Netlink messaging. * * @netlink_send: * Save security information for a netlink message so that permission * checking can be performed when the message is processed. The security * information can be saved using the eff_cap field of the * netlink_skb_parms structure. Also may be used to provide fine * grained control over message transmission. * @sk associated sock of task sending the message. * @skb contains the sk_buff structure for the netlink message. * Return 0 if the information was successfully saved and message * is allowed to be transmitted. * * Security hooks for Unix domain networking. * * @unix_stream_connect: * Check permissions before establishing a Unix domain stream connection * between @sock and @other. * @sock contains the sock structure. * @other contains the peer sock structure. * @newsk contains the new sock structure. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @unix_may_send: * Check permissions before connecting or sending datagrams from @sock to * @other. * @sock contains the socket structure. * @other contains the peer socket structure. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * * The @unix_stream_connect and @unix_may_send hooks were necessary because * Linux provides an alternative to the conventional file name space for Unix * domain sockets. Whereas binding and connecting to sockets in the file name * space is mediated by the typical file permissions (and caught by the mknod * and permission hooks in inode_security_ops), binding and connecting to * sockets in the abstract name space is completely unmediated. Sufficient * control of Unix domain sockets in the abstract name space isn't possible * using only the socket layer hooks, since we need to know the actual target * socket, which is not looked up until we are inside the af_unix code. * * Security hooks for socket operations. * * @socket_create: * Check permissions prior to creating a new socket. * @family contains the requested protocol family. * @type contains the requested communications type. * @protocol contains the requested protocol. * @kern set to 1 if a kernel socket. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @socket_post_create: * This hook allows a module to update or allocate a per-socket security * structure. Note that the security field was not added directly to the * socket structure, but rather, the socket security information is stored * in the associated inode. Typically, the inode alloc_security hook will * allocate and and attach security information to * sock->inode->i_security. This hook may be used to update the * sock->inode->i_security field with additional information that wasn't * available when the inode was allocated. * @sock contains the newly created socket structure. * @family contains the requested protocol family. * @type contains the requested communications type. * @protocol contains the requested protocol. * @kern set to 1 if a kernel socket. * @socket_socketpair: * Check permissions before creating a fresh pair of sockets. * @socka contains the first socket structure. * @sockb contains the second socket structure. * Return 0 if permission is granted and the connection was established. * @socket_bind: * Check permission before socket protocol layer bind operation is * performed and the socket @sock is bound to the address specified in the * @address parameter. * @sock contains the socket structure. * @address contains the address to bind to. * @addrlen contains the length of address. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @socket_connect: * Check permission before socket protocol layer connect operation * attempts to connect socket @sock to a remote address, @address. * @sock contains the socket structure. * @address contains the address of remote endpoint. * @addrlen contains the length of address. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @socket_listen: * Check permission before socket protocol layer listen operation. * @sock contains the socket structure. * @backlog contains the maximum length for the pending connection queue. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @socket_accept: * Check permission before accepting a new connection. Note that the new * socket, @newsock, has been created and some information copied to it, * but the accept operation has not actually been performed. * @sock contains the listening socket structure. * @newsock contains the newly created server socket for connection. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @socket_sendmsg: * Check permission before transmitting a message to another socket. * @sock contains the socket structure. * @msg contains the message to be transmitted. * @size contains the size of message. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @socket_recvmsg: * Check permission before receiving a message from a socket. * @sock contains the socket structure. * @msg contains the message structure. * @size contains the size of message structure. * @flags contains the operational flags. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @socket_getsockname: * Check permission before the local address (name) of the socket object * @sock is retrieved. * @sock contains the socket structure. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @socket_getpeername: * Check permission before the remote address (name) of a socket object * @sock is retrieved. * @sock contains the socket structure. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @socket_getsockopt: * Check permissions before retrieving the options associated with socket * @sock. * @sock contains the socket structure. * @level contains the protocol level to retrieve option from. * @optname contains the name of option to retrieve. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @socket_setsockopt: * Check permissions before setting the options associated with socket * @sock. * @sock contains the socket structure. * @level contains the protocol level to set options for. * @optname contains the name of the option to set. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @socket_shutdown: * Checks permission before all or part of a connection on the socket * @sock is shut down. * @sock contains the socket structure. * @how contains the flag indicating how future sends and receives * are handled. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @socket_sock_rcv_skb: * Check permissions on incoming network packets. This hook is distinct * from Netfilter's IP input hooks since it is the first time that the * incoming sk_buff @skb has been associated with a particular socket, @sk. * Must not sleep inside this hook because some callers hold spinlocks. * @sk contains the sock (not socket) associated with the incoming sk_buff. * @skb contains the incoming network data. * @socket_getpeersec_stream: * This hook allows the security module to provide peer socket security * state for unix or connected tcp sockets to userspace via getsockopt * SO_GETPEERSEC. For tcp sockets this can be meaningful if the * socket is associated with an ipsec SA. * @sock is the local socket. * @optval userspace memory where the security state is to be copied. * @optlen userspace int where the module should copy the actual length * of the security state. * @len as input is the maximum length to copy to userspace provided * by the caller. * Return 0 if all is well, otherwise, typical getsockopt return * values. * @socket_getpeersec_dgram: * This hook allows the security module to provide peer socket security * state for udp sockets on a per-packet basis to userspace via * getsockopt SO_GETPEERSEC. The application must first have indicated * the IP_PASSSEC option via getsockopt. It can then retrieve the * security state returned by this hook for a packet via the SCM_SECURITY * ancillary message type. * @skb is the skbuff for the packet being queried * @secdata is a pointer to a buffer in which to copy the security data * @seclen is the maximum length for @secdata * Return 0 on success, error on failure. * @sk_alloc_security: * Allocate and attach a security structure to the sk->sk_security field, * which is used to copy security attributes between local stream sockets. * @sk_free_security: * Deallocate security structure. * @sk_clone_security: * Clone/copy security structure. * @sk_getsecid: * Retrieve the LSM-specific secid for the sock to enable caching * of network authorizations. * @sock_graft: * Sets the socket's isec sid to the sock's sid. * @inet_conn_request: * Sets the openreq's sid to socket's sid with MLS portion taken * from peer sid. * @inet_csk_clone: * Sets the new child socket's sid to the openreq sid. * @inet_conn_established: * Sets the connection's peersid to the secmark on skb. * @secmark_relabel_packet: * check if the process should be allowed to relabel packets to * the given secid * @security_secmark_refcount_inc * tells the LSM to increment the number of secmark labeling rules loaded * @security_secmark_refcount_dec * tells the LSM to decrement the number of secmark labeling rules loaded * @req_classify_flow: * Sets the flow's sid to the openreq sid. * @tun_dev_alloc_security: * This hook allows a module to allocate a security structure for a TUN * device. * @security pointer to a security structure pointer. * Returns a zero on success, negative values on failure. * @tun_dev_free_security: * This hook allows a module to free the security structure for a TUN * device. * @security pointer to the TUN device's security structure * @tun_dev_create: * Check permissions prior to creating a new TUN device. * @tun_dev_attach_queue: * Check permissions prior to attaching to a TUN device queue. * @security pointer to the TUN device's security structure. * @tun_dev_attach: * This hook can be used by the module to update any security state * associated with the TUN device's sock structure. * @sk contains the existing sock structure. * @security pointer to the TUN device's security structure. * @tun_dev_open: * This hook can be used by the module to update any security state * associated with the TUN device's security structure. * @security pointer to the TUN devices's security structure. * * Security hooks for SCTP * * @sctp_assoc_request: * Passes the @ep and @chunk->skb of the association INIT packet to * the security module. * @ep pointer to sctp endpoint structure. * @skb pointer to skbuff of association packet. * Return 0 on success, error on failure. * @sctp_bind_connect: * Validiate permissions required for each address associated with sock * @sk. Depending on @optname, the addresses will be treated as either * for a connect or bind service. The @addrlen is calculated on each * ipv4 and ipv6 address using sizeof(struct sockaddr_in) or * sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6). * @sk pointer to sock structure. * @optname name of the option to validate. * @address list containing one or more ipv4/ipv6 addresses. * @addrlen total length of address(s). * Return 0 on success, error on failure. * @sctp_sk_clone: * Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) (i.e. a TCP * style socket) or when a socket is 'peeled off' e.g userspace * calls sctp_peeloff(3). * @ep pointer to current sctp endpoint structure. * @sk pointer to current sock structure. * @sk pointer to new sock structure. * * Security hooks for Infiniband * * @ib_pkey_access: * Check permission to access a pkey when modifing a QP. * @subnet_prefix the subnet prefix of the port being used. * @pkey the pkey to be accessed. * @sec pointer to a security structure. * @ib_endport_manage_subnet: * Check permissions to send and receive SMPs on a end port. * @dev_name the IB device name (i.e. mlx4_0). * @port_num the port number. * @sec pointer to a security structure. * @ib_alloc_security: * Allocate a security structure for Infiniband objects. * @sec pointer to a security structure pointer. * Returns 0 on success, non-zero on failure * @ib_free_security: * Deallocate an Infiniband security structure. * @sec contains the security structure to be freed. * * Security hooks for XFRM operations. * * @xfrm_policy_alloc_security: * @ctxp is a pointer to the xfrm_sec_ctx being added to Security Policy * Database used by the XFRM system. * @sec_ctx contains the security context information being provided by * the user-level policy update program (e.g., setkey). * Allocate a security structure to the xp->security field; the security * field is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_policy is allocated. * Return 0 if operation was successful (memory to allocate, legal context) * @gfp is to specify the context for the allocation * @xfrm_policy_clone_security: * @old_ctx contains an existing xfrm_sec_ctx. * @new_ctxp contains a new xfrm_sec_ctx being cloned from old. * Allocate a security structure in new_ctxp that contains the * information from the old_ctx structure. * Return 0 if operation was successful (memory to allocate). * @xfrm_policy_free_security: * @ctx contains the xfrm_sec_ctx * Deallocate xp->security. * @xfrm_policy_delete_security: * @ctx contains the xfrm_sec_ctx. * Authorize deletion of xp->security. * @xfrm_state_alloc: * @x contains the xfrm_state being added to the Security Association * Database by the XFRM system. * @sec_ctx contains the security context information being provided by * the user-level SA generation program (e.g., setkey or racoon). * Allocate a security structure to the x->security field; the security * field is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_state is allocated. Set the * context to correspond to sec_ctx. Return 0 if operation was successful * (memory to allocate, legal context). * @xfrm_state_alloc_acquire: * @x contains the xfrm_state being added to the Security Association * Database by the XFRM system. * @polsec contains the policy's security context. * @secid contains the secid from which to take the mls portion of the * context. * Allocate a security structure to the x->security field; the security * field is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_state is allocated. Set the * context to correspond to secid. Return 0 if operation was successful * (memory to allocate, legal context). * @xfrm_state_free_security: * @x contains the xfrm_state. * Deallocate x->security. * @xfrm_state_delete_security: * @x contains the xfrm_state. * Authorize deletion of x->security. * @xfrm_policy_lookup: * @ctx contains the xfrm_sec_ctx for which the access control is being * checked. * @fl_secid contains the flow security label that is used to authorize * access to the policy xp. * @dir contains the direction of the flow (input or output). * Check permission when a flow selects a xfrm_policy for processing * XFRMs on a packet. The hook is called when selecting either a * per-socket policy or a generic xfrm policy. * Return 0 if permission is granted, -ESRCH otherwise, or -errno * on other errors. * @xfrm_state_pol_flow_match: * @x contains the state to match. * @xp contains the policy to check for a match. * @fl contains the flow to check for a match. * Return 1 if there is a match. * @xfrm_decode_session: * @skb points to skb to decode. * @secid points to the flow key secid to set. * @ckall says if all xfrms used should be checked for same secid. * Return 0 if ckall is zero or all xfrms used have the same secid. * * Security hooks affecting all Key Management operations * * @key_alloc: * Permit allocation of a key and assign security data. Note that key does * not have a serial number assigned at this point. * @key points to the key. * @flags is the allocation flags * Return 0 if permission is granted, -ve error otherwise. * @key_free: * Notification of destruction; free security data. * @key points to the key. * No return value. * @key_permission: * See whether a specific operational right is granted to a process on a * key. * @key_ref refers to the key (key pointer + possession attribute bit). * @cred points to the credentials to provide the context against which to * evaluate the security data on the key. * @perm describes the combination of permissions required of this key. * Return 0 if permission is granted, -ve error otherwise. * @key_getsecurity: * Get a textual representation of the security context attached to a key * for the purposes of honouring KEYCTL_GETSECURITY. This function * allocates the storage for the NUL-terminated string and the caller * should free it. * @key points to the key to be queried. * @_buffer points to a pointer that should be set to point to the * resulting string (if no label or an error occurs). * Return the length of the string (including terminating NUL) or -ve if * an error. * May also return 0 (and a NULL buffer pointer) if there is no label. * * Security hooks affecting all System V IPC operations. * * @ipc_permission: * Check permissions for access to IPC * @ipcp contains the kernel IPC permission structure * @flag contains the desired (requested) permission set * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @ipc_getsecid: * Get the secid associated with the ipc object. * @ipcp contains the kernel IPC permission structure. * @secid contains a pointer to the location where result will be saved. * In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero. * * Security hooks for individual messages held in System V IPC message queues * @msg_msg_alloc_security: * Allocate and attach a security structure to the msg->security field. * The security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first * created. * @msg contains the message structure to be modified. * Return 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted. * @msg_msg_free_security: * Deallocate the security structure for this message. * @msg contains the message structure to be modified. * * Security hooks for System V IPC Message Queues * * @msg_queue_alloc_security: * Allocate and attach a security structure to the * msq->q_perm.security field. The security field is initialized to * NULL when the structure is first created. * @msq contains the message queue structure to be modified. * Return 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted. * @msg_queue_free_security: * Deallocate security structure for this message queue. * @msq contains the message queue structure to be modified. * @msg_queue_associate: * Check permission when a message queue is requested through the * msgget system call. This hook is only called when returning the * message queue identifier for an existing message queue, not when a * new message queue is created. * @msq contains the message queue to act upon. * @msqflg contains the operation control flags. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @msg_queue_msgctl: * Check permission when a message control operation specified by @cmd * is to be performed on the message queue @msq. * The @msq may be NULL, e.g. for IPC_INFO or MSG_INFO. * @msq contains the message queue to act upon. May be NULL. * @cmd contains the operation to be performed. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @msg_queue_msgsnd: * Check permission before a message, @msg, is enqueued on the message * queue, @msq. * @msq contains the message queue to send message to. * @msg contains the message to be enqueued. * @msqflg contains operational flags. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @msg_queue_msgrcv: * Check permission before a message, @msg, is removed from the message * queue, @msq. The @target task structure contains a pointer to the * process that will be receiving the message (not equal to the current * process when inline receives are being performed). * @msq contains the message queue to retrieve message from. * @msg contains the message destination. * @target contains the task structure for recipient process. * @type contains the type of message requested. * @mode contains the operational flags. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * * Security hooks for System V Shared Memory Segments * * @shm_alloc_security: * Allocate and attach a security structure to the shp->shm_perm.security * field. The security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is * first created. * @shp contains the shared memory structure to be modified. * Return 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted. * @shm_free_security: * Deallocate the security struct for this memory segment. * @shp contains the shared memory structure to be modified. * @shm_associate: * Check permission when a shared memory region is requested through the * shmget system call. This hook is only called when returning the shared * memory region identifier for an existing region, not when a new shared * memory region is created. * @shp contains the shared memory structure to be modified. * @shmflg contains the operation control flags. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @shm_shmctl: * Check permission when a shared memory control operation specified by * @cmd is to be performed on the shared memory region @shp. * The @shp may be NULL, e.g. for IPC_INFO or SHM_INFO. * @shp contains shared memory structure to be modified. * @cmd contains the operation to be performed. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @shm_shmat: * Check permissions prior to allowing the shmat system call to attach the * shared memory segment @shp to the data segment of the calling process. * The attaching address is specified by @shmaddr. * @shp contains the shared memory structure to be modified. * @shmaddr contains the address to attach memory region to. * @shmflg contains the operational flags. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * * Security hooks for System V Semaphores * * @sem_alloc_security: * Allocate and attach a security structure to the sma->sem_perm.security * field. The security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is * first created. * @sma contains the semaphore structure * Return 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted. * @sem_free_security: * deallocate security struct for this semaphore * @sma contains the semaphore structure. * @sem_associate: * Check permission when a semaphore is requested through the semget * system call. This hook is only called when returning the semaphore * identifier for an existing semaphore, not when a new one must be * created. * @sma contains the semaphore structure. * @semflg contains the operation control flags. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @sem_semctl: * Check permission when a semaphore operation specified by @cmd is to be * performed on the semaphore @sma. The @sma may be NULL, e.g. for * IPC_INFO or SEM_INFO. * @sma contains the semaphore structure. May be NULL. * @cmd contains the operation to be performed. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @sem_semop: * Check permissions before performing operations on members of the * semaphore set @sma. If the @alter flag is nonzero, the semaphore set * may be modified. * @sma contains the semaphore structure. * @sops contains the operations to perform. * @nsops contains the number of operations to perform. * @alter contains the flag indicating whether changes are to be made. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * * @binder_set_context_mgr: * Check whether @mgr is allowed to be the binder context manager. * @mgr contains the task_struct for the task being registered. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @binder_transaction: * Check whether @from is allowed to invoke a binder transaction call * to @to. * @from contains the task_struct for the sending task. * @to contains the task_struct for the receiving task. * @binder_transfer_binder: * Check whether @from is allowed to transfer a binder reference to @to. * @from contains the task_struct for the sending task. * @to contains the task_struct for the receiving task. * @binder_transfer_file: * Check whether @from is allowed to transfer @file to @to. * @from contains the task_struct for the sending task. * @file contains the struct file being transferred. * @to contains the task_struct for the receiving task. * * @ptrace_access_check: * Check permission before allowing the current process to trace the * @child process. * Security modules may also want to perform a process tracing check * during an execve in the set_security or apply_creds hooks of * tracing check during an execve in the bprm_set_creds hook of * binprm_security_ops if the process is being traced and its security * attributes would be changed by the execve. * @child contains the task_struct structure for the target process. * @mode contains the PTRACE_MODE flags indicating the form of access. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @ptrace_traceme: * Check that the @parent process has sufficient permission to trace the * current process before allowing the current process to present itself * to the @parent process for tracing. * @parent contains the task_struct structure for debugger process. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @capget: * Get the @effective, @inheritable, and @permitted capability sets for * the @target process. The hook may also perform permission checking to * determine if the current process is allowed to see the capability sets * of the @target process. * @target contains the task_struct structure for target process. * @effective contains the effective capability set. * @inheritable contains the inheritable capability set. * @permitted contains the permitted capability set. * Return 0 if the capability sets were successfully obtained. * @capset: * Set the @effective, @inheritable, and @permitted capability sets for * the current process. * @new contains the new credentials structure for target process. * @old contains the current credentials structure for target process. * @effective contains the effective capability set. * @inheritable contains the inheritable capability set. * @permitted contains the permitted capability set. * Return 0 and update @new if permission is granted. * @capable: * Check whether the @tsk process has the @cap capability in the indicated * credentials. * @cred contains the credentials to use. * @ns contains the user namespace we want the capability in * @cap contains the capability <include/linux/capability.h>. * @audit contains whether to write an audit message or not * Return 0 if the capability is granted for @tsk. * @syslog: * Check permission before accessing the kernel message ring or changing * logging to the console. * See the syslog(2) manual page for an explanation of the @type values. * @type contains the type of action. * @from_file indicates the context of action (if it came from /proc). * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @settime: * Check permission to change the system time. * struct timespec64 is defined in include/linux/time64.h and timezone * is defined in include/linux/time.h * @ts contains new time * @tz contains new timezone * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @vm_enough_memory: * Check permissions for allocating a new virtual mapping. * @mm contains the mm struct it is being added to. * @pages contains the number of pages. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * * @ismaclabel: * Check if the extended attribute specified by @name * represents a MAC label. Returns 1 if name is a MAC * attribute otherwise returns 0. * @name full extended attribute name to check against * LSM as a MAC label. * * @secid_to_secctx: * Convert secid to security context. If secdata is NULL the length of * the result will be returned in seclen, but no secdata will be returned. * This does mean that the length could change between calls to check the * length and the next call which actually allocates and returns the * secdata. * @secid contains the security ID. * @secdata contains the pointer that stores the converted security * context. * @seclen pointer which contains the length of the data * @secctx_to_secid: * Convert security context to secid. * @secid contains the pointer to the generated security ID. * @secdata contains the security context. * * @release_secctx: * Release the security context. * @secdata contains the security context. * @seclen contains the length of the security context. * * Security hooks for Audit * * @audit_rule_init: * Allocate and initialize an LSM audit rule structure. * @field contains the required Audit action. * Fields flags are defined in include/linux/audit.h * @op contains the operator the rule uses. * @rulestr contains the context where the rule will be applied to. * @lsmrule contains a pointer to receive the result. * Return 0 if @lsmrule has been successfully set, * -EINVAL in case of an invalid rule. * * @audit_rule_known: * Specifies whether given @rule contains any fields related to * current LSM. * @rule contains the audit rule of interest. * Return 1 in case of relation found, 0 otherwise. * * @audit_rule_match: * Determine if given @secid matches a rule previously approved * by @audit_rule_known. * @secid contains the security id in question. * @field contains the field which relates to current LSM. * @op contains the operator that will be used for matching. * @rule points to the audit rule that will be checked against. * @actx points to the audit context associated with the check. * Return 1 if secid matches the rule, 0 if it does not, -ERRNO on failure. * * @audit_rule_free: * Deallocate the LSM audit rule structure previously allocated by * audit_rule_init. * @rule contains the allocated rule * * @inode_invalidate_secctx: * Notify the security module that it must revalidate the security context * of an inode. * * @inode_notifysecctx: * Notify the security module of what the security context of an inode * should be. Initializes the incore security context managed by the * security module for this inode. Example usage: NFS client invokes * this hook to initialize the security context in its incore inode to the * value provided by the server for the file when the server returned the * file's attributes to the client. * * Must be called with inode->i_mutex locked. * * @inode we wish to set the security context of. * @ctx contains the string which we wish to set in the inode. * @ctxlen contains the length of @ctx. * * @inode_setsecctx: * Change the security context of an inode. Updates the * incore security context managed by the security module and invokes the * fs code as needed (via __vfs_setxattr_noperm) to update any backing * xattrs that represent the context. Example usage: NFS server invokes * this hook to change the security context in its incore inode and on the * backing filesystem to a value provided by the client on a SETATTR * operation. * * Must be called with inode->i_mutex locked. * * @dentry contains the inode we wish to set the security context of. * @ctx contains the string which we wish to set in the inode. * @ctxlen contains the length of @ctx. * * @inode_getsecctx: * On success, returns 0 and fills out @ctx and @ctxlen with the security * context for the given @inode. * * @inode we wish to get the security context of. * @ctx is a pointer in which to place the allocated security context. * @ctxlen points to the place to put the length of @ctx. * * Security hooks for using the eBPF maps and programs functionalities through * eBPF syscalls. * * @bpf: * Do a initial check for all bpf syscalls after the attribute is copied * into the kernel. The actual security module can implement their own * rules to check the specific cmd they need. * * @bpf_map: * Do a check when the kernel generate and return a file descriptor for * eBPF maps. * * @map: bpf map that we want to access * @mask: the access flags * * @bpf_prog: * Do a check when the kernel generate and return a file descriptor for * eBPF programs. * * @prog: bpf prog that userspace want to use. * * @bpf_map_alloc_security: * Initialize the security field inside bpf map. * * @bpf_map_free_security: * Clean up the security information stored inside bpf map. * * @bpf_prog_alloc_security: * Initialize the security field inside bpf program. * * @bpf_prog_free_security: * Clean up the security information stored inside bpf prog. * */unionsecurity_list_options{int(*binder_set_context_mgr)(structtask_struct*mgr);int(*binder_transaction)(structtask_struct*from,structtask_struct*to);int(*binder_transfer_binder)(structtask_struct*from,structtask_struct*to);int(*binder_transfer_file)(structtask_struct*from,structtask_struct*to,structfile*file);int(*ptrace_access_check)(structtask_struct*child,unsignedintmode);int(*ptrace_traceme)(structtask_struct*parent);int(*capget)(structtask_struct*target,kernel_cap_t*effective,kernel_cap_t*inheritable,kernel_cap_t*permitted);int(*capset)(structcred*new,conststructcred*old,constkernel_cap_t*effective,constkernel_cap_t*inheritable,constkernel_cap_t*permitted);int(*capable)(conststructcred*cred,structuser_namespace*ns,intcap,intaudit);int(*quotactl)(intcmds,inttype,intid,structsuper_block*sb);int(*quota_on)(structdentry*dentry);int(*syslog)(inttype);int(*settime)(conststructtimespec64*ts,conststructtimezone*tz);int(*vm_enough_memory)(structmm_struct*mm,longpages);int(*bprm_set_creds)(structlinux_binprm*bprm);int(*bprm_check_security)(structlinux_binprm*bprm);void(*bprm_committing_creds)(structlinux_binprm*bprm);void(*bprm_committed_creds)(structlinux_binprm*bprm);int(*sb_alloc_security)(structsuper_block*sb);void(*sb_free_security)(structsuper_block*sb);int(*sb_copy_data)(char*orig,char*copy);int(*sb_remount)(structsuper_block*sb,void*data);int(*sb_kern_mount)(structsuper_block*sb,intflags,void*data);int(*sb_show_options)(structseq_file*m,structsuper_block*sb);int(*sb_statfs)(structdentry*dentry);int(*sb_mount)(constchar*dev_name,conststructpath*path,constchar*type,unsignedlongflags,void*data);int(*sb_umount)(structvfsmount*mnt,intflags);int(*sb_pivotroot)(conststructpath*old_path,conststructpath*new_path);int(*sb_set_mnt_opts)(structsuper_block*sb,structsecurity_mnt_opts*opts,unsignedlongkern_flags,unsignedlong*set_kern_flags);int(*sb_clone_mnt_opts)(conststructsuper_block*oldsb,structsuper_block*newsb,unsignedlongkern_flags,unsignedlong*set_kern_flags);int(*sb_parse_opts_str)(char*options,structsecurity_mnt_opts*opts);int(*dentry_init_security)(structdentry*dentry,intmode,conststructqstr*name,void**ctx,u32*ctxlen);int(*dentry_create_files_as)(structdentry*dentry,intmode,structqstr*name,conststructcred*old,structcred*new);#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATHint(*path_unlink)(conststructpath*dir,structdentry*dentry);int(*path_mkdir)(conststructpath*dir,structdentry*dentry,umode_tmode);int(*path_rmdir)(conststructpath*dir,structdentry*dentry);int(*path_mknod)(conststructpath*dir,structdentry*dentry,umode_tmode,unsignedintdev);int(*path_truncate)(conststructpath*path);int(*path_symlink)(conststructpath*dir,structdentry*dentry,constchar*old_name);int(*path_link)(structdentry*old_dentry,conststructpath*new_dir,structdentry*new_dentry);int(*path_rename)(conststructpath*old_dir,structdentry*old_dentry,conststructpath*new_dir,structdentry*new_dentry);int(*path_chmod)(conststructpath*path,umode_tmode);int(*path_chown)(conststructpath*path,kuid_tuid,kgid_tgid);int(*path_chroot)(conststructpath*path);#endifint(*inode_alloc_security)(structinode*inode);void(*inode_free_security)(structinode*inode);int(*inode_init_security)(structinode*inode,structinode*dir,conststructqstr*qstr,constchar**name,void**value,size_t*len);int(*inode_create)(structinode*dir,structdentry*dentry,umode_tmode);int(*inode_link)(structdentry*old_dentry,structinode*dir,structdentry*new_dentry);int(*inode_unlink)(structinode*dir,structdentry*dentry);int(*inode_symlink)(structinode*dir,structdentry*dentry,constchar*old_name);int(*inode_mkdir)(structinode*dir,structdentry*dentry,umode_tmode);int(*inode_rmdir)(structinode*dir,structdentry*dentry);int(*inode_mknod)(structinode*dir,structdentry*dentry,umode_tmode,dev_tdev);int(*inode_rename)(structinode*old_dir,structdentry*old_dentry,structinode*new_dir,structdentry*new_dentry);int(*inode_readlink)(structdentry*dentry);int(*inode_follow_link)(structdentry*dentry,structinode*inode,boolrcu);int(*inode_permission)(structinode*inode,intmask);int(*inode_setattr)(structdentry*dentry,structiattr*attr);int(*inode_getattr)(conststructpath*path);int(*inode_setxattr)(structdentry*dentry,constchar*name,constvoid*value,size_tsize,intflags);void(*inode_post_setxattr)(structdentry*dentry,constchar*name,constvoid*value,size_tsize,intflags);int(*inode_getxattr)(structdentry*dentry,constchar*name);int(*inode_listxattr)(structdentry*dentry);int(*inode_removexattr)(structdentry*dentry,constchar*name);int(*inode_need_killpriv)(structdentry*dentry);int(*inode_killpriv)(structdentry*dentry);int(*inode_getsecurity)(structinode*inode,constchar*name,void**buffer,boolalloc);int(*inode_setsecurity)(structinode*inode,constchar*name,constvoid*value,size_tsize,intflags);int(*inode_listsecurity)(structinode*inode,char*buffer,size_tbuffer_size);void(*inode_getsecid)(structinode*inode,u32*secid);int(*inode_copy_up)(structdentry*src,structcred**new);int(*inode_copy_up_xattr)(constchar*name);int(*file_permission)(structfile*file,intmask);int(*file_alloc_security)(structfile*file);void(*file_free_security)(structfile*file);int(*file_ioctl)(structfile*file,unsignedintcmd,unsignedlongarg);int(*mmap_addr)(unsignedlongaddr);int(*mmap_file)(structfile*file,unsignedlongreqprot,unsignedlongprot,unsignedlongflags);int(*file_mprotect)(structvm_area_struct*vma,unsignedlongreqprot,unsignedlongprot);int(*file_lock)(structfile*file,unsignedintcmd);int(*file_fcntl)(structfile*file,unsignedintcmd,unsignedlongarg);void(*file_set_fowner)(structfile*file);int(*file_send_sigiotask)(structtask_struct*tsk,structfown_struct*fown,intsig);int(*file_receive)(structfile*file);int(*file_open)(structfile*file);int(*task_alloc)(structtask_struct*task,unsignedlongclone_flags);void(*task_free)(structtask_struct*task);int(*cred_alloc_blank)(structcred*cred,gfp_tgfp);void(*cred_free)(structcred*cred);int(*cred_prepare)(structcred*new,conststructcred*old,gfp_tgfp);void(*cred_transfer)(structcred*new,conststructcred*old);void(*cred_getsecid)(conststructcred*c,u32*secid);int(*kernel_act_as)(structcred*new,u32secid);int(*kernel_create_files_as)(structcred*new,structinode*inode);int(*kernel_module_request)(char*kmod_name);int(*kernel_load_data)(enumkernel_load_data_idid);int(*kernel_read_file)(structfile*file,enumkernel_read_file_idid);int(*kernel_post_read_file)(structfile*file,char*buf,loff_tsize,enumkernel_read_file_idid);int(*task_fix_setuid)(structcred*new,conststructcred*old,intflags);int(*task_setpgid)(structtask_struct*p,pid_tpgid);int(*task_getpgid)(structtask_struct*p);int(*task_getsid)(structtask_struct*p);void(*task_getsecid)(structtask_struct*p,u32*secid);int(*task_setnice)(structtask_struct*p,intnice);int(*task_setioprio)(structtask_struct*p,intioprio);int(*task_getioprio)(structtask_struct*p);int(*task_prlimit)(conststructcred*cred,conststructcred*tcred,unsignedintflags);int(*task_setrlimit)(structtask_struct*p,unsignedintresource,structrlimit*new_rlim);int(*task_setscheduler)(structtask_struct*p);int(*task_getscheduler)(structtask_struct*p);int(*task_movememory)(structtask_struct*p);int(*task_kill)(structtask_struct*p,structsiginfo*info,intsig,conststructcred*cred);int(*task_prctl)(intoption,unsignedlongarg2,unsignedlongarg3,unsignedlongarg4,unsignedlongarg5);void(*task_to_inode)(structtask_struct*p,structinode*inode);int(*ipc_permission)(structkern_ipc_perm*ipcp,shortflag);void(*ipc_getsecid)(structkern_ipc_perm*ipcp,u32*secid);int(*msg_msg_alloc_security)(structmsg_msg*msg);void(*msg_msg_free_security)(structmsg_msg*msg);int(*msg_queue_alloc_security)(structkern_ipc_perm*msq);void(*msg_queue_free_security)(structkern_ipc_perm*msq);int(*msg_queue_associate)(structkern_ipc_perm*msq,intmsqflg);int(*msg_queue_msgctl)(structkern_ipc_perm*msq,intcmd);int(*msg_queue_msgsnd)(structkern_ipc_perm*msq,structmsg_msg*msg,intmsqflg);int(*msg_queue_msgrcv)(structkern_ipc_perm*msq,structmsg_msg*msg,structtask_struct*target,longtype,intmode);int(*shm_alloc_security)(structkern_ipc_perm*shp);void(*shm_free_security)(structkern_ipc_perm*shp);int(*shm_associate)(structkern_ipc_perm*shp,intshmflg);int(*shm_shmctl)(structkern_ipc_perm*shp,intcmd);int(*shm_shmat)(structkern_ipc_perm*shp,char__user*shmaddr,intshmflg);int(*sem_alloc_security)(structkern_ipc_perm*sma);void(*sem_free_security)(structkern_ipc_perm*sma);int(*sem_associate)(structkern_ipc_perm*sma,intsemflg);int(*sem_semctl)(structkern_ipc_perm*sma,intcmd);int(*sem_semop)(structkern_ipc_perm*sma,structsembuf*sops,unsignednsops,intalter);int(*netlink_send)(structsock*sk,structsk_buff*skb);void(*d_instantiate)(structdentry*dentry,structinode*inode);int(*getprocattr)(structtask_struct*p,char*name,char**value);int(*setprocattr)(constchar*name,void*value,size_tsize);int(*ismaclabel)(constchar*name);int(*secid_to_secctx)(u32secid,char**secdata,u32*seclen);int(*secctx_to_secid)(constchar*secdata,u32seclen,u32*secid);void(*release_secctx)(char*secdata,u32seclen);void(*inode_invalidate_secctx)(structinode*inode);int(*inode_notifysecctx)(structinode*inode,void*ctx,u32ctxlen);int(*inode_setsecctx)(structdentry*dentry,void*ctx,u32ctxlen);int(*inode_getsecctx)(structinode*inode,void**ctx,u32*ctxlen);#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORKint(*unix_stream_connect)(structsock*sock,structsock*other,structsock*newsk);int(*unix_may_send)(structsocket*sock,structsocket*other);int(*socket_create)(intfamily,inttype,intprotocol,intkern);int(*socket_post_create)(structsocket*sock,intfamily,inttype,intprotocol,intkern);int(*socket_socketpair)(structsocket*socka,structsocket*sockb);int(*socket_bind)(structsocket*sock,structsockaddr*address,intaddrlen);int(*socket_connect)(structsocket*sock,structsockaddr*address,intaddrlen);int(*socket_listen)(structsocket*sock,intbacklog);int(*socket_accept)(structsocket*sock,structsocket*newsock);int(*socket_sendmsg)(structsocket*sock,structmsghdr*msg,intsize);int(*socket_recvmsg)(structsocket*sock,structmsghdr*msg,intsize,intflags);int(*socket_getsockname)(structsocket*sock);int(*socket_getpeername)(structsocket*sock);int(*socket_getsockopt)(structsocket*sock,intlevel,intoptname);int(*socket_setsockopt)(structsocket*sock,intlevel,intoptname);int(*socket_shutdown)(structsocket*sock,inthow);int(*socket_sock_rcv_skb)(structsock*sk,structsk_buff*skb);int(*socket_getpeersec_stream)(structsocket*sock,char__user*optval,int__user*optlen,unsignedlen);int(*socket_getpeersec_dgram)(structsocket*sock,structsk_buff*skb,u32*secid);int(*sk_alloc_security)(structsock*sk,intfamily,gfp_tpriority);void(*sk_free_security)(structsock*sk);void(*sk_clone_security)(conststructsock*sk,structsock*newsk);void(*sk_getsecid)(structsock*sk,u32*secid);void(*sock_graft)(structsock*sk,structsocket*parent);int(*inet_conn_request)(structsock*sk,structsk_buff*skb,structrequest_sock*req);void(*inet_csk_clone)(structsock*newsk,conststructrequest_sock*req);void(*inet_conn_established)(structsock*sk,structsk_buff*skb);int(*secmark_relabel_packet)(u32secid);void(*secmark_refcount_inc)(void);void(*secmark_refcount_dec)(void);void(*req_classify_flow)(conststructrequest_sock*req,structflowi*fl);int(*tun_dev_alloc_security)(void**security);void(*tun_dev_free_security)(void*security);int(*tun_dev_create)(void);int(*tun_dev_attach_queue)(void*security);int(*tun_dev_attach)(structsock*sk,void*security);int(*tun_dev_open)(void*security);int(*sctp_assoc_request)(structsctp_endpoint*ep,structsk_buff*skb);int(*sctp_bind_connect)(structsock*sk,intoptname,structsockaddr*address,intaddrlen);void(*sctp_sk_clone)(structsctp_endpoint*ep,structsock*sk,structsock*newsk);#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBANDint(*ib_pkey_access)(void*sec,u64subnet_prefix,u16pkey);int(*ib_endport_manage_subnet)(void*sec,constchar*dev_name,u8port_num);int(*ib_alloc_security)(void**sec);void(*ib_free_security)(void*sec);#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND */#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRMint(*xfrm_policy_alloc_security)(structxfrm_sec_ctx**ctxp,structxfrm_user_sec_ctx*sec_ctx,gfp_tgfp);int(*xfrm_policy_clone_security)(structxfrm_sec_ctx*old_ctx,structxfrm_sec_ctx**new_ctx);void(*xfrm_policy_free_security)(structxfrm_sec_ctx*ctx);int(*xfrm_policy_delete_security)(structxfrm_sec_ctx*ctx);int(*xfrm_state_alloc)(structxfrm_state*x,structxfrm_user_sec_ctx*sec_ctx);int(*xfrm_state_alloc_acquire)(structxfrm_state*x,structxfrm_sec_ctx*polsec,u32secid);void(*xfrm_state_free_security)(structxfrm_state*x);int(*xfrm_state_delete_security)(structxfrm_state*x);int(*xfrm_policy_lookup)(structxfrm_sec_ctx*ctx,u32fl_secid,u8dir);int(*xfrm_state_pol_flow_match)(structxfrm_state*x,structxfrm_policy*xp,conststructflowi*fl);int(*xfrm_decode_session)(structsk_buff*skb,u32*secid,intckall);#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM *//* key management security hooks */#ifdef CONFIG_KEYSint(*key_alloc)(structkey*key,conststructcred*cred,unsignedlongflags);void(*key_free)(structkey*key);int(*key_permission)(key_ref_tkey_ref,conststructcred*cred,unsignedperm);int(*key_getsecurity)(structkey*key,char**_buffer);#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITint(*audit_rule_init)(u32field,u32op,char*rulestr,void**lsmrule);int(*audit_rule_known)(structaudit_krule*krule);int(*audit_rule_match)(u32secid,u32field,u32op,void*lsmrule,structaudit_context*actx);void(*audit_rule_free)(void*lsmrule);#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALLint(*bpf)(intcmd,unionbpf_attr*attr,unsignedintsize);int(*bpf_map)(structbpf_map*map,fmode_tfmode);int(*bpf_prog)(structbpf_prog*prog);int(*bpf_map_alloc_security)(structbpf_map*map);void(*bpf_map_free_security)(structbpf_map*map);int(*bpf_prog_alloc_security)(structbpf_prog_aux*aux);void(*bpf_prog_free_security)(structbpf_prog_aux*aux);#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */};structsecurity_hook_heads{structhlist_headbinder_set_context_mgr;structhlist_headbinder_transaction;structhlist_headbinder_transfer_binder;structhlist_headbinder_transfer_file;structhlist_headptrace_access_check;structhlist_headptrace_traceme;structhlist_headcapget;structhlist_headcapset;structhlist_headcapable;structhlist_headquotactl;structhlist_headquota_on;structhlist_headsyslog;structhlist_headsettime;structhlist_headvm_enough_memory;structhlist_headbprm_set_creds;structhlist_headbprm_check_security;structhlist_headbprm_committing_creds;structhlist_headbprm_committed_creds;structhlist_headsb_alloc_security;structhlist_headsb_free_security;structhlist_headsb_copy_data;structhlist_headsb_remount;structhlist_headsb_kern_mount;structhlist_headsb_show_options;structhlist_headsb_statfs;structhlist_headsb_mount;structhlist_headsb_umount;structhlist_headsb_pivotroot;structhlist_headsb_set_mnt_opts;structhlist_headsb_clone_mnt_opts;structhlist_headsb_parse_opts_str;structhlist_headdentry_init_security;structhlist_headdentry_create_files_as;#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATHstructhlist_headpath_unlink;structhlist_headpath_mkdir;structhlist_headpath_rmdir;structhlist_headpath_mknod;structhlist_headpath_truncate;structhlist_headpath_symlink;structhlist_headpath_link;structhlist_headpath_rename;structhlist_headpath_chmod;structhlist_headpath_chown;structhlist_headpath_chroot;#endifstructhlist_headinode_alloc_security;structhlist_headinode_free_security;structhlist_headinode_init_security;structhlist_headinode_create;structhlist_headinode_link;structhlist_headinode_unlink;structhlist_headinode_symlink;structhlist_headinode_mkdir;structhlist_headinode_rmdir;structhlist_headinode_mknod;structhlist_headinode_rename;structhlist_headinode_readlink;structhlist_headinode_follow_link;structhlist_headinode_permission;structhlist_headinode_setattr;structhlist_headinode_getattr;structhlist_headinode_setxattr;structhlist_headinode_post_setxattr;structhlist_headinode_getxattr;structhlist_headinode_listxattr;structhlist_headinode_removexattr;structhlist_headinode_need_killpriv;structhlist_headinode_killpriv;structhlist_headinode_getsecurity;structhlist_headinode_setsecurity;structhlist_headinode_listsecurity;structhlist_headinode_getsecid;structhlist_headinode_copy_up;structhlist_headinode_copy_up_xattr;structhlist_headfile_permission;structhlist_headfile_alloc_security;structhlist_headfile_free_security;structhlist_headfile_ioctl;structhlist_headmmap_addr;structhlist_headmmap_file;structhlist_headfile_mprotect;structhlist_headfile_lock;structhlist_headfile_fcntl;structhlist_headfile_set_fowner;structhlist_headfile_send_sigiotask;structhlist_headfile_receive;structhlist_headfile_open;structhlist_headtask_alloc;structhlist_headtask_free;structhlist_headcred_alloc_blank;structhlist_headcred_free;structhlist_headcred_prepare;structhlist_headcred_transfer;structhlist_headcred_getsecid;structhlist_headkernel_act_as;structhlist_headkernel_create_files_as;structhlist_headkernel_load_data;structhlist_headkernel_read_file;structhlist_headkernel_post_read_file;structhlist_headkernel_module_request;structhlist_headtask_fix_setuid;structhlist_headtask_setpgid;structhlist_headtask_getpgid;structhlist_headtask_getsid;structhlist_headtask_getsecid;structhlist_headtask_setnice;structhlist_headtask_setioprio;structhlist_headtask_getioprio;structhlist_headtask_prlimit;structhlist_headtask_setrlimit;structhlist_headtask_setscheduler;structhlist_headtask_getscheduler;structhlist_headtask_movememory;structhlist_headtask_kill;structhlist_headtask_prctl;structhlist_headtask_to_inode;structhlist_headipc_permission;structhlist_headipc_getsecid;structhlist_headmsg_msg_alloc_security;structhlist_headmsg_msg_free_security;structhlist_headmsg_queue_alloc_security;structhlist_headmsg_queue_free_security;structhlist_headmsg_queue_associate;structhlist_headmsg_queue_msgctl;structhlist_headmsg_queue_msgsnd;structhlist_headmsg_queue_msgrcv;structhlist_headshm_alloc_security;structhlist_headshm_free_security;structhlist_headshm_associate;structhlist_headshm_shmctl;structhlist_headshm_shmat;structhlist_headsem_alloc_security;structhlist_headsem_free_security;structhlist_headsem_associate;structhlist_headsem_semctl;structhlist_headsem_semop;structhlist_headnetlink_send;structhlist_headd_instantiate;structhlist_headgetprocattr;structhlist_headsetprocattr;structhlist_headismaclabel;structhlist_headsecid_to_secctx;structhlist_headsecctx_to_secid;structhlist_headrelease_secctx;structhlist_headinode_invalidate_secctx;structhlist_headinode_notifysecctx;structhlist_headinode_setsecctx;structhlist_headinode_getsecctx;#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORKstructhlist_headunix_stream_connect;structhlist_headunix_may_send;structhlist_headsocket_create;structhlist_headsocket_post_create;structhlist_headsocket_socketpair;structhlist_headsocket_bind;structhlist_headsocket_connect;structhlist_headsocket_listen;structhlist_headsocket_accept;structhlist_headsocket_sendmsg;structhlist_headsocket_recvmsg;structhlist_headsocket_getsockname;structhlist_headsocket_getpeername;structhlist_headsocket_getsockopt;structhlist_headsocket_setsockopt;structhlist_headsocket_shutdown;structhlist_headsocket_sock_rcv_skb;structhlist_headsocket_getpeersec_stream;structhlist_headsocket_getpeersec_dgram;structhlist_headsk_alloc_security;structhlist_headsk_free_security;structhlist_headsk_clone_security;structhlist_headsk_getsecid;structhlist_headsock_graft;structhlist_headinet_conn_request;structhlist_headinet_csk_clone;structhlist_headinet_conn_established;structhlist_headsecmark_relabel_packet;structhlist_headsecmark_refcount_inc;structhlist_headsecmark_refcount_dec;structhlist_headreq_classify_flow;structhlist_headtun_dev_alloc_security;structhlist_headtun_dev_free_security;structhlist_headtun_dev_create;structhlist_headtun_dev_attach_queue;structhlist_headtun_dev_attach;structhlist_headtun_dev_open;structhlist_headsctp_assoc_request;structhlist_headsctp_bind_connect;structhlist_headsctp_sk_clone;#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBANDstructhlist_headib_pkey_access;structhlist_headib_endport_manage_subnet;structhlist_headib_alloc_security;structhlist_headib_free_security;#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND */#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRMstructhlist_headxfrm_policy_alloc_security;structhlist_headxfrm_policy_clone_security;structhlist_headxfrm_policy_free_security;structhlist_headxfrm_policy_delete_security;structhlist_headxfrm_state_alloc;structhlist_headxfrm_state_alloc_acquire;structhlist_headxfrm_state_free_security;structhlist_headxfrm_state_delete_security;structhlist_headxfrm_policy_lookup;structhlist_headxfrm_state_pol_flow_match;structhlist_headxfrm_decode_session;#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */#ifdef CONFIG_KEYSstructhlist_headkey_alloc;structhlist_headkey_free;structhlist_headkey_permission;structhlist_headkey_getsecurity;#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITstructhlist_headaudit_rule_init;structhlist_headaudit_rule_known;structhlist_headaudit_rule_match;structhlist_headaudit_rule_free;#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALLstructhlist_headbpf;structhlist_headbpf_map;structhlist_headbpf_prog;structhlist_headbpf_map_alloc_security;structhlist_headbpf_map_free_security;structhlist_headbpf_prog_alloc_security;structhlist_headbpf_prog_free_security;#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */}__randomize_layout;/* * Security module hook list structure. * For use with generic list macros for common operations. */structsecurity_hook_list{structhlist_nodelist;structhlist_head*head;unionsecurity_list_optionshook;char*lsm;}__randomize_layout;/* * Initializing a security_hook_list structure takes * up a lot of space in a source file. This macro takes * care of the common case and reduces the amount of * text involved. */#define LSM_HOOK_INIT(HEAD, HOOK) \ { .head = &security_hook_heads.HEAD, .hook = { .HEAD = HOOK } }externstructsecurity_hook_headssecurity_hook_heads;externchar*lsm_names;externvoidsecurity_add_hooks(structsecurity_hook_list*hooks,intcount,char*lsm);#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE/* * Assuring the safety of deleting a security module is up to * the security module involved. This may entail ordering the * module's hook list in a particular way, refusing to disable * the module once a policy is loaded or any number of other * actions better imagined than described. * * The name of the configuration option reflects the only module * that currently uses the mechanism. Any developer who thinks * disabling their module is a good idea needs to be at least as * careful as the SELinux team. */staticinlinevoidsecurity_delete_hooks(structsecurity_hook_list*hooks,intcount){inti;for(i=0;i<count;i++)hlist_del_rcu(&hooks[i].list);}#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE *//* Currently required to handle SELinux runtime hook disable. */#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS#define __lsm_ro_after_init#else#define __lsm_ro_after_init__ro_after_init#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS */externint__initsecurity_module_enable(constchar*module);externvoid__initcapability_add_hooks(void);#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMAexternvoid__inityama_add_hooks(void);#elsestaticinlinevoid__inityama_add_hooks(void){}#endif#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPINvoid__initloadpin_add_hooks(void);#elsestaticinlinevoidloadpin_add_hooks(void){};#endif#endif /* ! __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H */