In contemporary philosophy, many attempts were made to rehabilitate the everyday. However, such a reappraisal of the everyday is ambivalent, as it tends to objectify what is profoundly elusive due to its diffuse, ambient character. The two prevailing strategies (the ,celebration‘ of the everyday and the ,critique‘ of the everyday) both miss the everyday because they treat it as a positive entity. Whether by celebrating or by understanding it – in both cases they kill it. This article argues that part of the problem lies in the objectifying bias inherent in these approaches and sketches an alternative phenomenological approach, which suggests that the character of the everydayness first and foremost lies in its ,backgroundness‘ (Hintergründigkeit).

This paper provides an analysis of Merleau-Ponty’s view of philosophical explanation. Some commentators stress his indebtedness to the transcendental tradition, but this influence does not extend to his viewof explanation. I argue that Merleau-Ponty gives up on the transcendental ideal of explanatory completeness, shared by Husserl and Kant. Motivated by a distinctive understanding of transcendental expression, he argues that phenomenological reflection, and the explanations that issue from it, must both have a circular structure if they are to provide a persuasive account of experience. This circular view of phenomenological methodology is further developed in later texts, which stress the openness and incompleteness of both reflection and explanation. Merleau-Ponty’s reliance on the concept of circularity testifies to the increasing importance of Hegel for his viewof phenomenological explanation and philosophical methodology.

In this article, I aim to show how Patocˇka’s work since the 1960 s has reconceptualized the theory of intentionality. Never abandoning the referential character of the intentional relation, the Bohemian philosopher situates intentionality in its original matrix: the world. This change has the effect of moving the cause of appearing from consciousness to the world, framing it as what appears and what makes appear. Intentionality is not only connected to transcendental consciousness; intentions also must be interpreted as lines of force (Kraftlinien) inside the field of appearing. Patocka moreover locates the origin of all intentional theory in the Aristotelian theory of the soul. Patocka thus wants, on the one hand, to overcome the substantialist argument that considers consciousness a permanent presence and, on the other, to move beyond an idealistic conception of consciousness. Movement is the category that allows us to express these aspects of intentionality. Inserting motion into being is a privilege unique to the soul.

Zum Begriff der Synthesis in Husserls "Philosophie der Arithmetik“

In Husserlian scholarship it is common to characterize Husserl’s early analyses in the Philosophy of Arithmetic as an epistemology without a subject. The article questions this reading. First, I introduce the method used by Husserl in his analyses of the concept of number in the Philosophy of Arithmetic. Second, I outline Husserl’s critique of Kant’s conception of synthesis and contrast it with its phenomenological alternative, namely relation theory. Finally, I focus on the product of synthesis, that is, the number, and argue that even if Husserl’s early analyses of the concept of number contains a reference to the subject of synthesis, his theory cannot be regarded as psychologistic.

Eugen Fink and the Aporetic Beginning of Philosophy

The article deals with the question of phenomenological ethics, comparing Husserl’s and Fink’s ways of understanding the phenomenological reduction and thereby the pedagogical tasks of phenomenology, whose existential meaning lies in the “doctrine of freedom” (“Lehre von der Freiheit”), which is in turn closely linked with the problem of the beginning of philosophizing, since the phenomenological reduction presupposes itself. A comparison between Fink’s and Patocka’s views of freedom as transcendence (expressed by the concepts of hermitry and sacrifice), as well as a phenomenological reading of Nietzsche’s transvaluation of values in relation to the educational theme of the Idealbildung, will let us see how Fink’s cosmological philosophy, having its hermeneutic keystone in the phenomenon of play, still has phenomenological features and pedagogical implications, being describable as a phenomenology of freedom, whose idea of freedom as “experiment” or as man’s “self-production” presents interesting analogies with Arendt’s view of action.

Versuch über die positive Qualität des Erkenntnismangels

In this essay, I argue for a realistic understanding of phenomenology, which I claim is the only 0interpretation that allows for a solution to the problem of how what we perceive as an impression of the world is capable of being the foundation of our knowledge. The central point of the argument is the fact that we are conscious of the world and that this intentionality is a primary connection between subject and world. This connection may fall short of guaranteeing an infallible way of acquiring knowledge, but the possibility of failure entails the possibility of success, and thus the reality of the things that are perceived, is guaranteed. I consider the possibility of failing in the effort to acquire knowledge as the positive quality of the deficit of knowledge. This possibility in itself is, however, not the only thing one can claim about knowledge from a phenomenological perspective: The main thesis of this essay is that the connection with thworld is based on the fact that perception and action are the fields of human behaviour in which the failure or success of the acquisition of knowledge is shown.

The Case of Collective Embarrassment

This paper contributes to the current discussion on collective affective intentionality. Very often, affective sharing is regarded as a special feature ofamore general form of we-intentionality being already in place. In contrast to this view, the paper attempts to explicate a more elementary form of affective sharing that does not simply presuppose other forms of we-intentionality, but amounts to a primitive form of we-intentionality of its own. The account presented here draws on two conceptual tools from the broader phenomenological tradition: prereflective we-intentionality on the one hand and atmospheric perception on the other. The central claim is that some instances of affective we-consciousness mainly emerge on the level of unthematic, pre-reflective orientation within one’s environment. The first part of the paper gives an account of this claim, while second part places the account in the broader discussion on collective affective intentionality.

In this paper, I argue that an adequate understanding of Husserl’s late ethics of love requires careful consideration of the Neo-Kantian milieu in Southwest Germany. After discussing some general aspects of the contextualization of Husserl’s phenomenology and, in particular, Husserl’s ethics, I move to consider his transition from an action-centered to a life-centered conception of ethics. I show that this transition is largely indebted to Georg Simmel’s critique of Kant’s practical philosophy. In the second part of the paper, I argue that the problem of the value of individuality (Wertindividualit"t) that defines Emil Lask’s early work on Fichte and Heinrich Rickert’s conception of erotics (Erotik) as an autonomous domain of value is the same problem behind Husserl’s re-conceptualization of ethics around the experience of a personal call issuing from a value affecting the subject in an absolute fashion.