The birth of the Social Credit
Movement in Canada can be fixed at1933, when William Aberhart,
dean and president of the Calgary prophetic bible institute,
offered a program of instruction in social credit at the institute
and promoted study groups and lectures in Alberta province
(Irving, 1959--61). Soon afterwards, other groups arose in various
provinces, and the Douglas credit league (named after major C.H.
Douglas, the British originator of Social Credit Theory) was
formed the same year with headquarters in Toronto (Irving, p.73).
Aberhart's Alberta activity, however, proceeded independently of
the Douglas credit league, and Social Credit study groups in
Alberta were coordinated under a central council at the bible
institute. The movement was proclaimed as strictly educational
until January, 1935, when Aberhart's Social Credit proposals were
rejected at the convention of the united farmers of Alberta, the
governing party in the province (Irving, 120). Soon thereafter,
the central council gave instructions for holding constituency
conventions (Macpherson, 1962--147). Central conventions were held
in Calgary and Edmonton in April, 1935, and the southern and
northern Alberta Social Credit Leagues were formed for the purpose
of contesting the next provincial elections. In the elections that
august, the Social Credit Leagues won 56 of the 63 seats in the
legislature. The astounding electoral success of the Social Credit
Movement in Alberta encouraged the political, but not necessarily
electoral, activities of Social Credit groups elsewhere in Canada.
None, however. Reproduced anything like the early Alberta success.
In Quebec, for example, the Alberta triumph stimulated the
formation of La Ligue du Credit Social de la province du Quebec in
may, 1936, by Louis even, Armand Turpin, and Louis Dugal (Stein,
1973--41). The Ligue was originally conceived as a movement rather
than a political party, and its efforts in the 1940 federal
elections were unrewarding. In 1944, the Union Crediste des
Electeurs, which split from the Ligue, joined with the Social
Credit League of Alberta and six other small provincial movements
to form a Social Credit Association of Canada (Stein, p.56). This
national level Social Credit organization had a shaky existence
(the Union des Electeurs withdrew in 1948), but it survived
throughout our time period as a weak federal expression of the
more vital provincial Social Credit organizations, especially in
Alberta and British Columbia. Although the Social Crediters
campaigned under the New Democracy label for the 1940 federal
election, the party reverted to 'social Credit" for the 1945
election and retained the label in english-speaking Canada
throughout our time period. In French Canada, the Social Credit
movement began as La Ligue du Credit Social de la province du
Quebec. The splinter group, Union Crediste des Electeurs, evolved
into the Union des Electeurs in 1945. Dissident members of the
union, led by Real Caouette, then formed le Ralliement des
Creditistes (Social Credit rally) in 1958. This term was favored
by the Quebec Social Crediters throughout the rest of our
period.

1.03 Organizational
Discontinuity

8, ac9

As discussed under the variable
"national participation," the social credit party at the national
level was essentially a loose organization of members elected to
parliament from areas which were strongly Social Credit in
provincial elections. From 1950 through 1957,the Social Credit
representation in parliament came exclusively from Alberta and
British Columbia--mostly from Alberta. The 1958 elections,
however, returned no Social Credit members to parliament. Then in
1962, the Social Credit representation spurted upwards-- due
mostly to the unprecedented success of Social Credit candidates in
Quebec under le Ralliement des Creditistes. The influx of French
Canadian Social Crediters at the national level has been
interpreted as a major merger with the previously predominantly
english-speaking Canadians in the national Social Credit
Party.

1.04 Leadership
Competition

12, ac6

William Aberhart is widely
recognized as the founder of the social credit party in Canada. In
the same year as its founding in 1935, Aberhart's party won 89
percent of the seats in the Alberta provincial legislative
assembly. His efforts to export Social Credit electoral victories
outside of Alberta were discouraged, however, by a relatively poor
showing in the 1938 saskatchewan provincial elections, and
Aberhart remained primarily provincially oriented (Mallory,
1954--108). Upon Aberhart's death in 1943, E.C. Manning replaced
him as Social Credit leader and premier in Alberta--positions he
held throughout our time period. Neither Aberhart nor Manning ever
served in the federal parliament, where the Social Credit leader
in the house of commons was John H. Blackmore from 1935 to 1944.
While the colorul and charismatic Aberhart was alive, there was
little room for national leadership to be exercised outside of his
person. After his death, a Social Credit association of Canada was
founded in Toronto in 1944, and solon low, treasurer of the
Alberta government under Manning, was elected president (Stein,
1973--46). Low was elected to parliament in the 1945 federal
elections and became national leader of the party both in and out
of parliament. But note that the party's parliamentary delegation
at this time consisted entirely of Alberta representatives. This
was true until 1953, when British Columbia returned four Social
Credit representatives to temper the Alberta character of the
delegation. Low remained as leader until his resignation in 1958,
when Diefenbaker's stunning victory in the prairies wiped out all
social credit representation in parliament. The national
leadership of the party for the next few years is unclear, but
Robert N. Thompson of Alberta was elected president of the Social
Credit association of Canada in Ottawa in 1960 and was elected
national party leader in 1961 in a close vote over Real Caouette
of Quebec (Stein, p.80-82). Thompson assumed leadership of the
Social Credit delegation in parliament after the 1962 elections,
despite the fact that Quebec furnished 26 of the 30 members .
After the end of our time period, leadership of the social Social
Credit Party eventually passed to Real Caouette as the fortunes of
the Social Credit Party remained low in the western provinces.
Thompson himself resigned and became a progressive conservative
(Stein, p.104). Caouette was named leader of the Ralliement
Creditiste-Social Credit rally at a convention in Hull in 1971. By
this time, the parliamentary delegation of Social Creditmembers
was entirely from Quebec.

1.05 Legislative
Instability

Instability is .62,
ac9

Social Credit representation in
parliament has been primarily a reflection of provincial politics
and varied greatly during our time period. At the beginning of the
period, all 10 Social Credit members came from Alberta. In 1953,
four Social Credit members were returned from British Columbia to
join now 11 from Alberta. In 1957, British Columbia sent 6 to
bolster a group of 13 from Alberta. But in 1958, all Social Credit
candidates fell before Diefenbaker's progressive conservative
sweep through the west. The party had no representation in
parliament until 1962, when Alberta and British Columbia barely
recovered two seats each while Quebec, never before a stronghold
of Social Credit strength, voted in an astounding 26 members.

1.06 Electoral
Instability

Instability is .46, ac9
The Social Credit Movement had relatively strong followings
throughout the west and scattered followings in other parts of
Canada, so it always had some appeal outside Alberta and did
better at the polls than its provincial basis might suggest.
Still, it never received more than 12 percent of the vote during
our period and dropped to as low as 2 percent in 1958.

Governmental Status Variables,
2.01-2.07

2.01 Government
Discrimination

0, ac9

There is no evidence that the
Social Credit Party suffered any discrimination in its attempt to
participate in politics. Indeed, the introduction of a single
alternative ballot in British Columbia seems to have led to a
Social Credit government in British Columbia in 1953 (Mallory,
1954--168). It is true that the federal government invalidated a
number of provincial monetary policies enacted by the Alberta
government, but this is judged to be a matter of constitutional
interpretation and not interference with the party's right to
participate in politics.

2.02 Governmental
Leadership

0 out of 7 for 1950-56,
ac9

0 out of 6 for 1957-62,
ac9

The Social Credit Party never
came close to forming a federal government, but it did constitute
the government in Alberta from 1935 throughout the end of our
period and also governed in British Columbia from 1953 through the
end of the period.

2.03 Cabinet
Participation

0 out of 7 for 1950-56,
ac9

0 out of 6 for 1957-62,
ac9

No member of the Social Credit
Party was invited into the federal cabinet.

2.04 National
Participation

4, ac9

The Social Credit was not only a
regional party, it was primarily a provincial party, holding most
of its parliamentary seats during the first part of our period by
virtue of its strength in Alberta. Its only other seats during the
same time were in British Columbia. In the second part of our
period, the picture shifted abruptly, with Quebec furnishing 26
out of 30 seats won by Social Credit candidates in the 1962
elections. But throughout this period, Social Credit candidates
sought election in other provinces as well. In 1953, 72 Social
Credit candidates were fielded in six provinces. In 1957, it was
115 candidates in 8 provinces, and 82 candidates in 7 provinces in
1958. Finally in 1962, 230 candidates contested seats in every
province of Canada (Beck, 1968--286, 308, 326, 348). So social
credit did not lack for trying. It just was not very successful
outside its special area of appeal in the west (and later,
Quebec).

2.05 Legislative Strength

Strength is .05 for 1950-56, ac9
and .03 for 1957-62, ac9

Social Credit representation in
parliament has been primarily a reflection of provincial politics
and varied greatly during our time period. At the beginning of the
period, all 10 Social Credit members came from Alberta. In 1953,
four Social Credit members were returned from British Columbia to
join now 11 from Alberta. In 1957, British Columbia sent 6 to
bolster a group of 13 from Alberta. But in 1958, all Social Credit
candidates fell before Diefenbaker's progressive conservative
sweep through the west. The party had no representation in
parliament until 1962, when Alberta and British Columbia barely
recovered two seats each while Quebec, never before a stronghold
of Social Credit strength, voted in an astounding 26 members.

2.06 Electoral Strength

Strength is .05 for 1950-56, ac9
and .07 for 1957-62, ac9

The Social Credit Movement had
relatively strong followings throughout the west and scattered
followings in other parts of Canada, so it always had some appeal
outside Alberta and did better at the polls than its provincial
basis might suggest. Still, it never received more than 12 percent
of the vote during our period and dropped to as low as 2 percent
in 1958.

2.07 Outside Origin

8, ac9
The Social Credit Party was founded by William Aberhart, principal
of crescent heights high school from 1915 to 1935, when he founded
the party. Aberhart also was president and dean of the Calgary
prophetic bible institute and won fame throughout the prairie
provinces for his religious broadcasts over radio station CFCN
beginning in 1925 (Irving, 1959--31). His spellbinding appeal over
the radio created a following which he readily converted into
voters after he became involved in Social Credit and plunged into
politics.

Issue Orientation Variables, 5.01-5.15

5.01 Ownership of Means of
Production

-2, ac9

Social Credit never advocated
government ownership in its program of economic reform, even in
its early days when it identified the financiers and moneyed
interests as the enemy. By world war ii, socialism was
specifically attacked by major Douglas himself--the originator of
Social Credit theory--as he developed his conspiracy theory
linking together the Nazis, Jews, Communists , and Socialists in a
world plot against freedom (Macpherson, 1962--206). After the war,
Social Credit spokesmen in Canada became explicitly
Anti-Socialist. W.A.C. Bennett, the Social Credit premier of
British Columbia, defined his party's philosophy simply as "the
opposite of socialism" (Robin, 1967--208). E.C. Manning, Social
Credit premier of Alberta, linked Social Credit philosophy with
"the proven merits of private ownership and competitive individual
enterprise as the keystones of a free and efficient economy"
(Manning, 1967--73). During our period, the party's platforms
regularly supported free enterprise (Carrigan, 1968--233, 287).
Nevertheless, the social credit party accepted the existing degree
of government ownership and did not advocate returning government
activities to private operation.

5.02 Government Role in Economic
Planning

1, ac9

Social Credit theory, being based
on ideas of broad purchasing power, was opposed to restricted
credit and "tight" money policies. Thus, while opposed to
government ownership, Social Credit theory required government
regulation of financial institutions--meaning some degree of
government intervention in the economy. Attempts to license and
control the banks in Alberta in accordance with Social Credit
Theory met with invalidation by the federal government
(Macpherson, 1962--209). Apart from its commitment to certain
aspects of monetary policy, the Social Credit Party opposed
widespread government intervention in the economy.

5.03 Redistribution of
Wealth

0, ac7

The Social Credit position is
confusing on redistribution of wealth. On the one hand, the party
was founded during the depression with promises of improving the
lot of the masses by providing purchasing power and curtailing the
profits of financiers, and the widespread distribution of
purchasing power remained a platform plank during our period. On
the other hand, the party consistently called for reduction of
taxes, such as those "which unduly retard development and penalize
individual enterprise" (Carrigan, 1968--287). So redistribution of
wealth was not to be accomplished through taxation.

5.04 Social Welfare

1, ac5

Social welfare proposals received
only modest attention in social credit platforms during our
period. Only the 1957 platform was specific in advocating an
increase in old age pension payments to $100 per month (Carrigan,
1968--233), although platforms proposed home ownership for all.
But these ideas were not stressed.

5.05 Secularization of Society

-2, ac9

The Social Credit Party was, at
the very least, benevolent to religion. Founded by a Baptist
minister operating out of the Calgary Prophetic Bible Institute,
the early Social Credit Movement had distinct fundamentalist
overtones, complete with hymns sung before, during, and after
campaign rallies (Irving, 1959--291). William Aberhart wove
together his evangelical religious doctrine with the arcane
principles of Social Credit theory, asking his followers to accept
his economic theory on faith (Macpherson, 1962--145). Given the
protestant, fundamentalist originsof Social Credit in the western
prairies, it is somewhat ironic that the resurgence of Social
Credit representation in parliament in 1962 came from Catholic
French Canada, where its Quebec originators stressed the affinity
of Social Credit theory and catholic social doctrine (Stein,
1973--47). In any event, the party's 1958 platform promised that
'social Credit will establish Christian Democracy," while in 1962
it recognized the individual "as a divinely-created being with
both spiritual and physical potentials and needs" and regarded
"the sanctity of the home as fundamental to the preservation of
Christian civilization" (Carrigan, 1968--257, 287).

5.06 Support of the
Military

1 for 1st half, ac5

-1 for 2nd half, ac5

The Social Credit platforms did
not discuss defense policy at any length. The 1949 platforms
recognized a need to keep Canada prepared. In 1957, the party
cautioned against inefficiency and waste in the military. By 1962,
the party proposed to "re-design Canada's defence strategy and
military forces to eliminate useless expenditures on forms of
defence obsolete in the light of modern circumstances" (Carrigan,
1968--195, 234, 289). So the party appeared to become less
supportive of the military over time.

5.07 Alignment with East-West
Blocs

-5 for 1st half, ac9

-3 for 2nd half, ac7

The party began our period by
promising full support to nato in its 1949 platform. It ended our
period in 1962 by urging participation in the U.N. "in the role of
an independent nation dedicated to the cause of world peace rather
than as a member nation of any of the several world power blocs,"
although it also promised to work to strengthen Nato only for the
defense of non-aggressor nations (Carrigan, 1968--195, 289). So
the party shifted its position noticeably during the time
period.

5.08 Anti-Colonialism

Ac1

No information

5.09 Supranational
Integration

1, ac9

Social Credit platforms during
the first part of our period specifically endorsed membership in
the commonwealth. Although no reference was made to the
commonwealth during the second part, there is no evidence to
suggest that the party's position changed
significantly.

5.10 National
Integration

-3, ac7

Early Social Credit governments
in Alberta were continually frustrated by federal invalidation of
their financial programs due to dominion authority in the monetary
field. Aberhart's 'strident provincial autonomist stance" fit
easily with the French Canadian nationalism of the Quebec Social
Credit Movement (Stein, 1973--52). But during our time period,
neither the western english wing of the party nor the French
Canadian wing was separationist. In the context of Canadian
politics, the party urged a clearer recognition of provincial
powers, which has been interpreted here as
confederationist.

5.11 Electoral
Participation

5, ac9

The party platform of 1962 even
urged the right to vote at 18 (Carrigan, 1968--290).

5.12 Protection of Civil
rights

0, ac5

Social Credit platforms generally
avoided blanket endorsements of civil rights, and they usually
called for 'selective immigration." party spokesmen for a time
also embraced a conspiracy theory of world domination which
curiously linked Jews and Masons (Irving, 1959--7).

5.13 Interference with Civil
Liberties

-3, ac5

There is no evidence that the
party sought to limit the exercise of civil liberties. Indeed,
freedom of the individual was cited as a cornerstone of its
philosophy.

5.14 / 5.15 US--Soviet Experts
Left-Right Ratings

US Says nothing
Soviets say 1, the most reactionary party. Relies for its support
on the upper bourgeoisie of Canada and the monopolistic circles of
the U.S.A. Which have tremendous capital holdings in Alberta and
British Columbia. In the manner of Goldwater reactionaries and
birchers, the party comes forth with extreme Anti-Communist and
Anti-Soviet positions with respect to international tensions and
strengthening friendly ties with socialist countries .

Goal Orientation Variables, 6.01-6.55

6.00 Open Competition in
the Electoral Process

4, ac9

The Social Credit Party relied
exclusively on open competition in elections to win government
office.

6.01-6.05--2, ac9. The party
commonly advertised its candidates through mass media and selected
appeals, promoted candidates through direct contact, held rallies,
and facilitated its supporters " voting in elections.

6.10 Restricting Party
Competition

0, ac9

The Social Credit Party did not
engage in restricting electoral competition. Despite Social
Credit's control of the Alberta government from 1935 through the
end of our time period, its candidates were frequently contested
by other parties in both provincial and federal elections and
never received a majority of the total votes cast in the federal
elections from 1953 to 1962.

6.11-6.16--0, ac9. There were no
reports in the literature concerning Social Credit use of
restrictive tactics such as harassing opposition workers or
falsifying vote reports.

6.20 Subverting the Political
System

0, ac9

The Social Credit Party did not
employ a subversive strategy.

6.21-6 .26--0, ac9. It also did
not employ any subversive tactics, such as boycotting elections,
leading strikes, or sabotaging government facilities.

6.30 Propagandizing Ideas and
Program

6.31--1, ac8. Propagandization of
Social Credit doctrine was key to its early success in Alberta, as
Aberhart used his regular radio broadcasts creatively in this
manner. Later, Real Caouette made effective use of television to
win supporters (Engelmann and Schwartz, 1975--134-135). But the
party did not own and operate these media facilities. In Quebec,
however, the party operated the important newspaper, "Vers
Demain," and later the periodical "regards" (Stein,
1973--78).

6.32--1, ac9. The party did not,
strictly speaking, operate party schools, but it sponsored
numerous study groups on Social Credit theory.

6.33 --1, ac5. The Social Credit
Party did not regularly assemble to pass resolutions and formulate
platforms, although some campaign documents were issued in the
name of the national organization.

6.34--1, ac5. In the initial
phase of the party in Alberta, there was a flood of publications
about Social Credit theory, many authored by Aberhart. But the
publication program in the west declined along with the importance
of Social Credit theory in the Alberta and British Columbia
parties. In Quebec, where the popularity of Social Credit
principles peaked later, the publication program was more
important in the second half of our period.

6.50 Providing for Welfare of
Party Members

6.51-6.55--0, ac3. There is no
evidence of the Social Credit Party itself performing social
welfare functions during our period. But at the height of Social
Credit enthusiasm in Alberta during the depression, the party
fulfilled social needs for its supporters. Local talent, for
example, frequently provided theatrical and musical entertainment
at its meetings.

Autonomy Variables, 7.01-7.05

7.01 Sources of
Funds

1 (sector 04) for 1st half,
ac5

7 for 2nd half, ac5

The score for the first half of
the period is based on the party's experience in Alberta and
British Columbia, where most of its funds were said to come from
business and industry (Paltiel, 1970--66, 69). The score for the
second half is based on the Quebec experience, where most of the
funds appear to have been raised through membership subscriptions
(Paltiel, 71).

7.02 Source of
Members

5, ac9

Membership in the Social Credit
Party was taken out directly. It did not automatically come
through membership in some other social organization.

7.03 Sources of
Leaders

3 (sector 04) for 1st half,
ac6

2 (sectors 03, 04) for 2nd half,
ac6

More attention has been given to
the social composition of the liberals and conservatives in
parliament than the composition of the minor parties. One source
contends that about half of the social credit MLA's in the western
provinces were businessmen (Robin, 1967--206). According to a
survey of Social Credit leaders in Quebec, about 40 percent were
professionals and 30 percent businessmen (Stein,
1973--127).

7.04 Relations with Domestic
Parties

7, ac9

The Social Credit Party did not
enter into coalitions in the national parliament. In the 1956
Quebec provincial elections, however, the Social Credit Union des
Electeurs entered into an agreement to join with the liberal party
in an effort to unseat the union nationale. Solon low, the leader
of the national Social Credit Party criticized the agreement,
which proved ineffective anyway. None of the Creditistes were
elected, and the Union Nationale was overwhelmingly re-elected. In
the 1957 federal election, low organized a Quebec wing of his
Social Credit Party to contest four seats. The Union des Electeurs
did not participate in the election, and it disintegrated
thereafter (Stein, 1973--72-74).

7.05 Relations with Foreign
Organizations

5, ac7
There was a Social Credit secretariat in London which promoted the
theories of Major C.H. Douglas, the originator of Social Credit.
Aberhart's Alberta movement did not affiliate with the London
secretariat, was harassed by orthodox Douglasites who did, and was
disowned by the secretariat before the 1935 election (Irving,
1959--167). The Quebec wing of the party was closer to the London
group and orthodox Douglas thought, even receiving an endorsement
from Douglas himself before the 1948 election (Stein, 1973--68).
Although the London secretariat continued after Douglas" death and
throughout our time period, there is no evidence of organizational
relationships between the Canadian and British movements during
our period.

Organizational Complexity Variables,
8.01-8.07

8.01 Structural
Articulation

3, ac4

Information about the structure
of the national Social Credit Party is very sketchy. There was a
national Social Credit association of Canada which met in
convention from time to time to select a president and a national
leader . But beyond this, there seems to have been in the way of
national organization apart from the caucus of Social Credit
members in parliament.

8.02 Intensiveness of
Organization

5, ac4

Social Credit study groups,
assiduously sown and cultivated throughout Alberta during the
early days of the movement, constituted the basic unit of
structure when the party was founded. It is likely that the
significance of these small groups faded along with the importance
of Social Credit doctrine, and the basic unit of structure seems
to have risen to the level of the poll, which correspondsroughly
to the precinct in the US

8.03 Extensiveness of
Organization

3, ac5

With the exception of 1962, when
Social Credit candidates contested over 80 percent of the federal
seats, Social Credit candidates were absent in about 60 to 70
percent of the federal constituencies (Beck, 1968).

8.04 Frequency of Local Meetings

ac1

No information

8.05 Frequency of National
Meetings

ac1

No information

8.06 Maintaining
Records

1, ac4

No discussion was found of the
national party's maintenance of a research division or extensive
membership lists, and it seems likely that the party did neither
to any extent. There is evidence of some effort in a publishing
program.

8.07 Pervasiveness of
Organization

0, ac5
It appears that the Social Credit Party did not organize any
socio- economic groups to advance its cause nor had it penetrated
any such existing groups to serve the same ends.

Organizational Power Variables, 9.01-9.08

9.01 Nationalization of
Structure

2, ac5

One source notes that the 1960
Social Credit conference in Ottawa " formalized the de facto
decentralization of the national movement" (Stein, 1973 --79).
Another describes the national party as a "paper organization"
even at its peak (Engelmann and Schwartz, 1975--311). Although a
national organ did exist, this assessment of its importance
accounts for the low code on this variable. (see also Van Loon and
Whittington, 1976--263.)

9.02 Selecting the National
Leader

3, ac9

William Aberhart was acclaimed
leader of the Social Credit Leagues in convention in 1935 (Irving,
1959--128). Solon low was elected president of the Social Credit
association of Canada in a Toronto convention in 1944 and
apparently was re-elected in 1946 at Regina. Some time after low's
resignation in 1958, Robert Thompson was elected leader in a close
vote over Real Caouette at the 1961 social credit leadership
convention.

9.03 Selecting Parliamentary
Candidates

3, ac5

In the early days of the Social
Credit Party in Alberta, the selection of parliamentary candidates
was firmly controlled by the party leader, William Aberhart, who
was given the power to select the candidate for each constituency
from a list of three or four nominated by the constituency
association (Irving, 1959--130, 143). No explanation was found of
this practice during our time period, but it is clear that
selection of federal candidates was entirely a provincial matter
(Stein, 1973--79), and the presumption is that other provincial
leaders did not command Aberhart's power of selection. Original
research into the identities of Social Credit M.P.S across
parliaments ("Canada yearbooks," 1935 to 1964) reveals that there
was considerable continuity of members across time, suggesting
that federal candidacy was not simply an honor to be extended and
withdrawn by the party leadership. From 1940 to 1957, about 70 to
80 percent of the Social Credit M.P.S. elected to parliament had
served in the previous parliament.

9.04 Allocating Funds

4, ac8

Two sources note that the
provincial organizations played the major role in raising and
dispensing funds, and they supplied the national organization with
its relatively small operating budget (Stein, 1973--84, and
Paltiel, 1970--67, 69).

9.05 Formulating policy

ac1

No information

9.06 controlling
communications

4, ac6

Provincially controlled
newspapers had an important place in the development of the Social
Credit Movement. In Alberta, the weekly 'social Credit chronicle"
diffused information and doctrine (Irving, 1959--100-101). In
Quebec, "Vers Demain" played much the same role for a longer
period (Stein, 1973--44), while the journal "regards" was
important for the Ralliement des Creditistes in the second half of
our period (Stein, 1973--44, 78). But there was also a national
newspaper, "Canadian Social Crediter" (Stein, 1973--44, 78,
84).

9.07 Administering
Discipline

2, ac5

It appears that disciplinary
action was exercised mainly at the provincial level rather than
the national level.

9.08 Leadership
Concentration

2, ac5Due to the provincial
orientations within the Social Credit Party, the national leader
had rivals for the role of party spokesman. These would certainly
include E.C. Manning, Social Credit Premier of Alberta throughout
our period, and W.A.C. Bennett, Social Credit Premier of British
Columbia from 1953 through the end of our period. At the very end,
this group would also include Real Caouette, deputy leader of the
party and head of the Quebec delegation of Social Credit M.P.S, by
far the largest group within the party.

Coherence Variables, 10.01-10.06

10.01 Legislative Cohesion

ac1

No information

10.02 Ideological
Factionalism

4 for 1st half, ac9

6 for 2nd half, ac9

The Social Credit Party in
Alberta began on an ideological crusade to implement Social Credit
theory in the provincial government. Prohibited by the federal
government from introducing their desired bank controls and
monetary reforms, the Alberta Social Credit Party leaders
contented themselves with other rewards from holding government
office. By 1947, some orthodox Social Crediters on the Alberta
Social Credit board attempted to rekindle interest in the movement
and to criticize the party 's organization (Macpherson,
1962--210-212). Premier Manning purged these orthodox Douglasites
from the board, government, and party, and the party in Alberta
became essentially "a traditional conservative political party"
while the Quebec Social Crediters were themselves becoming more
orthodox (Stein, 1973 --63). During our period, the Quebec wing
was clearly more ideological than the Alberta and British Columbia
groups (Engelmann and Schwartz, 1975--217), and the importance of
the difference increased within the party as the Quebec group grew
in size.

10.03 Issue Factionalism

ac1

No information

10.04 Leadership
Factionalism

0 for 1st half, ac5

6 for 2nd half, ac9

There seemed to be no contest to
Solon Low's national leadership during the first part of our
period. But after his resignation in 1958, the leadership of the
party resolved mainly into a contest between Robert Thompson of
Alberta and the english-speaking west and Real Caouette of Quebec
and French Canada. In fact, this struggle culminated in the
expulsion of the Ralliement des Creditistes from the Social Credit
association in 1963, after the end of our time period (Stein,
1973--96-97).

10.05 Strategic or Tactical
Factionalism

3 for 1st half, ac5

6 for 2nd half, ac9

This scoring applies mainly to
the Quebec wing of the party, for the western wing settled on a
strategy of contesting both provincial and federal elections much
earlier. In Quebec, however, electoral action was a matter of
controversy as was the proper level of involvement. Le Ralliement
des Creditistes split from the Union des Electeurs in 1958 over
the proper political strategy (Stein, 1973--73-77).

10.06 Party Purges

0, ac5
Premier Manning had carried out a purge of orthodox Douglasites
among Alberta Social Credit officials in 1947 (Stein, 1973--63),
but this was before our time period. Caouette also expelled some
activists from the party in 1963, just after our period (Stein,
1973--95-96). During our period, no large scale expulsions of
party members or leaders appear to have occurred.

Involvement Variables, 11.01-11.06

11.01 Membership
Requirements

3 for 1st half, ac5

3 for 2nd half, ac8

Information found for the western
wing of the party is not very explicit about party membership, but
the Social Credit Party began as a membership party and seems to
have continued as one (Engelmann and Schwartz, 1975--181).
Certainly formal membership and dues were part of La Ligue du
Credit Social de la province du Quebec (Stein, 1973--43), were
integral to the Union des Electeurs, and were employed by the
Ralliement des Creditistes (Paltiel, 1970--70-71).

11.02 Membership Participation

ac2

Insufficient
information

11.03 Material
Incentives

1, ac3

No explicit information was found
on this variable, but it would appear that some form of material
incentives attracted party militants in the west, where Social
Credit government had long held power. Material incentives were
clearly less available in Quebec, where the party had enjoyed
little success during most of our period.

11.04 Purposive
Incentives

2, ac3

No explicit information is
available for Social Credit militants in the west, where the
attraction of Social Credit theory had waned considerably in the
late 1940s. There, Social Credit ideology seems to have been
replaced at least in part by a conservative philosophy. In Quebec,
however, Social Credit was a motivating force well into our time
period. A study of Creditiste leaders in 1967 found that
two-thirds said they joined the party for ideological and economic
reasons (Stein, 1973--133).

11.05 Doctrinism

1, ac7

At the beginning of the Social
Credit Party in Alberta, the writings of William Aberhart on
Social Credit were regarded almost as political and economic
scripture, as befits the religious character of his movement
(Irving, 1959--183). As Social Credit theory waned in the west, it
increased in importance in Quebec, where the writings of major
C.H. Douglas, the originator of the theory, were important, but
Social Credit doctrine was not slavishly pursued.

11.06 Personalism

0, ac4
William Aberhart certainly qualified as a charismatic leader in
the founding of the Social Credit Party (Irving, 1959--258).
Although E.C. Manning, his successor and long-time leader of the
Alberta Social Credit Party, was respected and well-entrenched,
his leadership was probably more instrumentally political rather
than personal. Real Caouette also seems not to have motivated many
Creditiste militants by the force of his person (Stein, 1973--133,
137).