Markey Car Security Report

In a report published Monday, Markey's office has collected the answers from a letter he sent to 20 automakers more than 14 months ago, quizzing them on their cars' and trucks' security and privacy measures. The results, according to the report, show that nearly all modern vehicles have some sort of wireless connection that could potentially be used by hackers to remotely access their critical systems. The company's protections on those connections are "inconsistent and haphazard" across the industry. And in addition to security weaknesses, Markey's survey also found that many auto companies are collecting detailed location data from their cars and often transmitting it insecurely.

Analysis of automobile manufacturers’ efforts

A report written by the staff of Senator Edward J. Markey (D-Massachussetts)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
New technologies in cars have enabled valuable
features that have the potential to improve driver
safety and vehicle performance. Along with these
benefits, vehicles are becoming more connected
through electronic systems like navigation, infotainment, and safety monitoring tools.
The proliferation of these technologies raises
concerns about the ability of hackers to gain access
and control to the essential functions and features
of those cars and for others to utilize information on
drivers’ habits for commercial purposes without the
drivers’ knowledge or consent.
To ensure that these new technologies are not
endangering or encroaching on the privacy of
Americans on the road, Senator Edward J. Markey
(D-Mass.) sent letters to the major automobile
manufacturers to learn how prevalent these technologies are, what is being done to secure them against
hacking attacks, and how personal driving information is managed.1
This report discusses the responses to this letter
from 16 major automobile manufacturers: BMW,
Chrysler, Ford, General Motors, Honda, Hyundai,
Jaguar Land Rover, Mazda, Mercedes-Benz, Mitsubishi, Nissan, Porsche, Subaru, Toyota, Volkswagen
(with Audi), and Volvo. Letters were also sent to
Aston Martin, Lamborghini, and Tesla, but those
manufacturers did not respond.
The responses reveal the security and privacy
practices of these companies and discuss the wide
range of technology integration in new vehicles, data
collection and management practices, and security
measures to protect against malicious use of these
technologies and data. The key findings from these
responses are:
1. Nearly 100% of cars on the market include
wireless technologies that could pose vulnerabilities to hacking or privacy intrusions.
2. Most automobile manufacturers were unaware of or unable to report on past hacking
incidents.
3. Security measures to prevent remote access
to vehicle electronics are inconsistent and
haphazard across all automobile
1.

manufacturers, and many manufacturers did
not seem to understand the questions posed
by Senator Markey.
4. Only two automobile manufacturers were able
to describe any capabilities to diagnose or
meaningfully respond to an infiltration in
real-time, and most say they rely on technologies that cannot be used for this purpose at
all.
5. Automobile manufacturers collect large
amounts of data on driving history and vehicle
performance.
6. A majority of automakers offer technologies
that collect and wirelessly transmit driving
history data to data centers, including
third-party data centers, and most do not
describe effective means to secure the data.
7. Manufacturers use personal vehicle data in
various ways, often vaguely to “improve the
customer experience” and usually involving
third parties, and retention policies – how long
they store information about drivers – vary
considerably among manufacturers.
8. Customers are often not explicitly made aware
of data collection and, when they are, they
often cannot opt out without disabling
valuable features, such as navigation.
These findings reveal that there is a clear lack of
appropriate security measures to protect drivers
against hackers who may be able to take control of a
vehicle or against those who may wish to collect and
use personal driver information.
In response to the privacy concerns raised by
Senator Markey and others, the two major coalitions
of automobile manufacturers recently issued a
voluntary set of privacy principles by which their
members have agreed to abide. These principles
send a meaningful message that automobile
manufacturers are committed to protecting consumer privacy by ensuring transparency and choice,
responsible use and security of data, and accountability. However, the impact of these principles
depend in part on how the manufacturers interpret
them, because (1) the specific ways that transparency

A report written by the staff of Senator Edward J. Markey (D-Massachussetts)

1

will be achieved are unclear and may not be noticed
by the consumer, e.g., text in the user manual,
(2) the provisions regarding choice for the consumer only address data sharing and do not refer to
data collection in the first place, and (3) the guidelines for data use, security, and accountability
largely leave these matters to the discretion of the
manufacturers.
The alarmingly inconsistent and incomplete state
of industry security and privacy practices, along with
the voluntary principles put forward by industry,
raises a need for the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA), in consultation with the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) on privacy issues,
to promulgate new standards that will protect the
data, security and privacy of drivers in the modern
age of increasingly connected vehicles. Such standards should:

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¡¡ Ensure that vehicles with wireless access
points and data-collecting features are
protected against hacking events and security
breaches;
¡¡ Validate security systems using penetration
testing;
¡¡ Include measures to respond real-time to
hacking events;
¡¡ Require that drivers are made explicitly aware
of data collection, transmission, and use;
¡¡ Ensure that drivers are given the option to opt
out of data collection and transfer of driver
information to off-board storage;
Require removal of personally identifiable information prior to transmission, when possible and upon
consumer request.

A report written by the staff of Senator Edward J. Markey (D-Massachussetts)

INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY
Today’s cars and light trucks contain more than
50 separate electronic control units (ECUs), connected through a controller area network (CAN) or other
network (such as Local Interconnect Networks or
Flexray). Vehicle functionality, safety, and privacy all
depend on the functions of these small computers,
as well as their ability to communicate with one
another. They also have the ability to record vehicle
data to analyze and improve performance. On-board
navigation technologies as well as the ability to
integrate mobile devices with vehicle-based technologies have also fundamentally altered the manner in
which drivers and the vehicles themselves can
communicate during the vehicles’ operation.
This new technology has also resulted in an
increased ability to gather driving information. Such
information-gathering abilities can be used by
automobile manufacturers to provide customized
service and improve customer experiences, but in
the wrong hands such information could also be
used maliciously. In particular, wireless technologies
create vulnerabilities to hacking attacks that could
be used to invade a user’s privacy or modify the
operation of a vehicle. Two recent developments
highlight potential threats to both automobile
security and to consumer privacy.
In a 2013 study that was funded by the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), two
researchers demonstrated their ability to connect a
laptop to two different vehicles’ computer systems
using a cable, send commands to different ECUs
through the CAN, and thereby control the engine,
brakes, steering and other critical vehicle
components.2 In their initial tests with a laptop and
two MY2010 vehicles from different manufacturers,
they were able to cause cars to suddenly accelerate,
turn, kill the brakes, activate the horn, control the
2

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headlights, and modify the speedometer and gas
gauge readings.3 More recently in 2014, those same
researchers looked into the hackability of 21
different vehicle models from 10 different
manufacturers, pointing out different levels of
security in each vehicle with respect to wireless entry
points, control points, and the types of computers
than could be compromised.4
Before the researchers went public with their 2013
findings, they shared the results with the manufacturers in the hopes that the companies would
address the identified vulnerabilities. But in response to the public release of the study, both
companies reportedly noted that the researchers
directly, rather than wirelessly, accessed the vehicles’ computer systems, and referred to the need to
prevent remote hacking from a wireless device. What
the companies failed to note is that the DARPA study
built on prior research that demonstrated that one
could remotely and wirelessly access a vehicle’s CAN
bus through Bluetooth connections, OnStar systems,
malware in a synced Android smartphone, or a
malicious file on a CD in the stereo.5
A second, related area of concern relates to the
increasing use of navigation or other technologies
that could be used to record the location or driving
history of those using them. A number of new
services have emerged that permit the collection of
a wide range of user data, providing valuable
information not just to improve vehicle performance,
but also potentially for commercial and law enforcement purposes.6 This concern was highlighted when
it was revealed that Tesla Motors recorded data
during a test drive of one of its vehicles by a reporter
and used data related to the driver’s location, energy
usage, speed, temperature and other control
settings to rebut the reporter’s unfavorable review of

See “Researchers Show How a Car’s Electronics Can Be Taken Over Remotely,” John Markoff, The New York Times,
March 9, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/10/business/10hack.html
http://www.autosec.org/pubs/cars-oakland2010.pdf and http://www.autosec.org/pubs/cars-usenixsec2011.pdf
“Dash is Turning Cars into Futurists, Data-Collecting Machines with an App and a Cheap Plastic Dongle”, Alyson
Shontell, Business Insider, http://www.businessinsider.com/a-tiny-piece-of-hardware-turns-your-vehicle-into-asmart-car-that-talks-and-collect-tons-of-data-2013-8

A report written by the staff of Senator Edward J. Markey (D-Massachussetts)

3

his driving experience.7 Car dealerships and navigation systems providers have also begun to use
“remote disabling”, which enable them to track and
disable vehicles if drivers do not keep up with their
payments8 or if cars have been reported as stolen,
which can raise safety concerns if the vehicles are
disabled during an emergency or when the driver is
left stranded in an unsafe location.
Furthermore, vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) technologies
are emerging as a viable tool for improving active
safety through collision avoidance, and one of the
main unknowns in their development is a robust
communication security system.9 As vehicles
continue to become more integrated with wireless
technology, there are more avenues through which
a hacker could introduce malicious code, and more
avenues through which a driver’s basic right to
privacy could be compromised. These threats
demonstrate the need for robust vehicle security
policies to ensure the safety and privacy of our
nation’s drivers.
In order to better understand the ability of automobile companies to protect the safety and privacy of
drivers, letters were sent to 20 major automobile
manufacturers with questions regarding technology,
security precautions, and privacy policies. The
questions posed were identical for each manufacturer. Responses were received from 16 manufacturers.
Tesla Motors, Aston Martin, and Lamborghini, did not
respond to the letters. Volkswagen and Audi responded with a single letter and are together treated
in the findings as a single responding manufacturer.
Some manufacturers (notably Hyundai and Toyota)
provided detailed, question-by-question responses,
while others (notably Mercedes-Benz and Porsche)
wrote generic statements on their commitments to
security and privacy that were non-responsive to the
questions that were posed.
Recently, and as a result of the questions posed by
Senator Markey, the automobile industry has
acknowledged the deficiencies and inconsistences
between manufacturers in existing practices for

vehicle privacy protections by issuing its own set of
voluntary privacy principles.10 These voluntary
principles were developed and supported by the
Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers and the
Association of Global Automakers, which combined
represent 23 major automobile manufacturers,
including all of the manufacturers that responded to
Senator Markey with the exception of Audi. The
adopted principles include (1) transparency,
(2) choice, (3) respect for context, (4) data minimization, de-identification and retention, (5) data security,
(6) integrity and access, and (7) accountability. The
establishment of these principles, and the agreement to them by 19 manufacturers (including all of
those that responded to Senator Markey’s letter with
the exception of Jaguar Land Rover), represent an
important step forward by the automotive industry.
Through the voluntary principles, the automakers
assure consumers that they will be informed when
data collection occurs and given choices regarding
whether their information can be used for marketing
purposes, companies will not pass on any information to law enforcement without a warrant or court
order, and “reasonable” security measures will be in
place to protect data from falling into the wrong
hands. However, the principles continue to raise a
number of questions regarding how car manufacturers will effectively make their practices transparent
to consumers and provide consumers with rights to
prevent sensitive data collection in the first place,
among other concerns.
The diversity of responses received by Senator
Markey shows that each manufacturer is handling
the introduction of new technology in very different
ways, and for the most part these actions are
insufficient to ensure security and privacy for vehicle
consumers. Individual automaker responses will not
be publicly released due to the proprietary and
security-sensitive nature of some of the responses.
The following sections summarize the major findings
from the analysis of responses conducted by Senator
Markey’s staff.

See “Elon Musk’s Data Doesn’t Back Up His Claims of New York Times Fakery”, Rebecca Greenfield, The Atlantic Wire,
http://www.theatlanticwire.com/technology/2013/02/elon-musks-data-doesnt-back-his-claims-new-york-times-fakery/62149/
and http://www.teslamotors.com/blog/most-peculiar-test-drive

A report written by the staff of Senator Edward J. Markey (D-Massachussetts)

FINDINGS
Finding #1: Nearly 100% of cars on the
market include wireless technologies that
could pose vulnerabilities to hacking or
privacy intrusions.
Wireless technologies in vehicles are becoming
more prevalent as manufacturers have found ways
that they can be used to improve safety, performance, and the driver experience. However, wireless
technologies also require wireless entry points
(WEPs), or ways that vehicle electronics can be
accessed remotely. In 2011 a group of researchers
showed WEPs in automobiles pose vulnerabilities,
and they were able to remotely hack into a vehicle
and exploit these vulnerabilities, including engaging
in location tracking and eavesdropping, and
controlling different features including the locks
and brakes.11
Of the 16 manufacturers that responded to the
letter, 14 provided information on the percentage
of model year (MY) 2013 vehicles and the projected
percentage of MY 2014 vehicles that have WEPs.
Of the 14, 11 indicated that 100% of their vehicles
have WEPs, and some of these manufacturers cited
the federal mandate for tire pressure monitoring
systems (TPMS) as a major contributor. Of the 3 who
did not indicate that all vehicles have WEPs, the
reported percentages of vehicles without WEPs were
low, ranging from 7% to 30% and either stagnant or
decreasing from 2013 to 2014.
These responses show that nearly all vehicles on
the road have at least one WEP, and many vehicles
have several WEPs. These include but may not be
limited to TPMS, Bluetooth, keyless entry, remote
start, navigation, Wi-Fi, cellular/telematics, radio,
and anti-theft systems and features.

Finding #2: Most automobile manufacturers
were unaware of or unable to report on past
hacking incidents.
Senator Markey asked each of the manufacturers
to list and describe instances in which they have
been made aware of wireless or non-wireless
infiltration events in their vehicles. Of the 16 manufacturers who responded to the letter, Jaguar Land
Rover, Porsche, and Volkswagen did not respond to
the question in any way. Of the 13 companies who

did address the issue, 12 stated that they had no
knowledge of any reported infiltration events, and
only 1 reported such instances. This company
described the following in detail:
¡¡ An application was developed by a third party
and released for Android devices that could
integrate with a vehicle through the Bluetooth
connection. A security analysis did not
indicate any ability to introduce malicious
code or steal data, but the manufacturer had
the app removed from the Google Play store
as a precautionary measure.
¡¡ Some individuals have attempted to reprogram the onboard computers of vehicles to
increase engine horsepower or torque
through the use of “performance chips”.
Some of these devices plug into the mandated onboard diagnostic port or directly into the
under-the-hood electronics system.

Finding #3: Security measures to prevent
remote access to vehicle electronics are
inconsistent and haphazard across all automobile manufacturers, and many manufacturers did not seem to understand the questions posed by Senator Markey.
Manufacturers were asked how they assess their
security against WEP infiltration, whether they use
third-party testing to verify security, and how they
handle software updates associated with recalls and
service campaigns to ensure that these are done
securely. The questions specifically asked about
vulnerabilities associated with tire pressure monitoring systems, Bluetooth/wireless communications
technologies, Onstar/navigation systems, smart
phone/mobile device integration, web browsers,
electronic control units (ECUs), and vehicle-to-vehicle
communication technologies.
Of the 16 automobile manufacturers that responded to the letter, 13 of them addressed these questions in some way. Chrysler, Mercedes-Benz, and
Mazda did not respond to the question at all, and
five other manufacturers provided general responses
that addressed the question as a whole instead of
providing specific responses to the questions’
sub-parts.

“Researchers Show How a Car’s Electronics Can Be Taken Over Remotely”, John Markoff, The New York Times,
March 9, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/10/business/10hack.html

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A report written by the staff of Senator Edward J. Markey (D-Massachussetts)

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This question seems to have been interpreted
differently by different manufacturers. About half of
the responses described security or encryption
measures for general or specific WEPs that were
more related to ensuring the WEPs were working as
intended but not to ensuring that a security breach
could not occur, and the other half mentioned
procedures used in their development process to
conduct targeted evaluations of their security
measures. The responses revolving around security
and encryption measures varied widely from manufacturer to manufacturer, and included the following:
1. Unique identification numbers and specific
sets of radio-frequency signals;
2. Receptor to determine frequency strength
of sensors to allow for proximity of legitimate
communications;
3. Encrypted codes and dedicated wireless
devices;
4. Encryption, masking, scanning, anomaly
detection, certificates, filtering, firewalls, data
loss prevention, access control, intrusion
detection systems, white listing, fraud detection, zoning, network segregation and proprietary communication tools;
5. Closed systems where the implementations
do not allow the ability for code to be written
without authorized tools;
6. Secure Sockets Layer to encrypt the data of
network connections;
7. Seed-key security to protect against unauthorized access to the ECU.
Automobile security experts consulted by Senator
Markey’s staff said that unique ID numbers and
radio frequencies (responses 1, 2) can be identified
by hackers, that closed system codes (responses 3,
5) have been proven to be re-writable, and seed-key
security (response 7) is easily bypassed.
The other half of the responses named procedures
utilized in the development process that manufacturers use to ensure WEP security, which was more in
line with the wording and intent of the question.
These responses included the following steps:
¡¡ Threat modeling;
¡¡ Penetration testing;
¡¡ Input validation and verification;
¡¡ Virtual testing;
¡¡ Component testing;
¡¡ Physical testing.

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Seven of the manufacturers stated that they use
third-party testing to verify their security measures,
while 5 stated that they do not and 4 did not respond to this part of the question.
Automakers were also asked about the number of
safety recalls and service campaigns issued by the
manufacturers over the five-year period from 20092013 and whether those recalls or service campaigns involved software updates that could be used
to introduce malware. Chrysler, Mercedes-Benz,
Porsche, and Volkswagen did not respond, with the
other 12 companies provided different levels of
detail in their responses. The responses ranged from
27-210 combined recall or campaign events during
that five-year period, with 11-44% of those including
software updates of some kind, all of which were
delivered using a hardwire connection (not over-theair like some mobile phone updates are delivered)
through a dealer or service center.
The manufacturers were also asked about how
they secure this type of software delivery. Each
manufacturer responded with descriptions of how
they provide such software through authorized
dealers with the appropriate tools. Automobile
security experts consulted by Senator Markey’s staff
said that all of the responses are similar in that they
presume a malicious actor could not access or
acquire the technologies that mechanics have. They
state that software updates for systems should be
cryptographically verified by the ECU being updated
in order to effectively prevent intrusions.

Finding #4: Only two automobile manufacturers were able to describe any capabilities to
diagnose or meaningfully respond to an
infiltration in real-time, and most say they
rely on technologies that cannot be used
for this purpose at all.
When asked about how manufacturers are
capable of monitoring electronic systems in real-time
in order to detect and respond to potential intrusions, most of the responses described systems that
can only record information on-board the vehicle.
This means that infiltrations would only come to the
attention of the manufacturer if that data were
manually downloaded by a dealer or service center
at some subsequent date. When asked about how
they would respond to an infiltration, most manufacturers did not respond or mentioned generic security
systems in place. Only two manufacturers described
credible real-time reactions to an intrusion event.
The manufacturers were asked whether they
include technologies to monitor vehicle CAN buses

A report written by the staff of Senator Edward J. Markey (D-Massachussetts)

(the “controller area networks” that manage the
communications among the different electronic
systems in a vehicle) and to monitor WEPs. They
were then asked about how they would respond to
reports or detection of an unauthorized intrusion,
a remote attack, or inadvertent introduction of
malicious code to a WEP. Only eight of sixteen
manufacturers responded to these questions, six of
which claim to do CAN bus monitoring and five of
which claim to be able to detect wireless intrusions.
The other 2 manufacturers who responded to the
question admitted that they do not monitor the CAN
bus, but they are developing systems to do so. Of
the other eight companies, Mercedes-Benz, Nissan,
and Porsche did not respond at all, and five other
manufacturers stated that such information was
confidential.
The responses received varied in level of detail
and in their methods of monitoring CAN buses. The
six manufacturers who claim to monitor CAN buses
cited the following:
1. One manufacturer claimed to have a proprietary system that cannot be disclosed;
2. Two manufacturers claimed that the electronic
control unit (ECU) is equipped with; monitoring systems that can detect unusual signals,
which would alert the manufacturer only if the
data were later retrieved at a service center
or dealership;
3. One manufacturer described a firewall and
watchdog system that shields communication
and recognizes inconsistencies at gateways;
4. One manufacturer listed message authentication, intrusion detection, controller hardening
protection, secure diagnostics, secure gateways, and secure programming;
5. One manufacturer mentioned that seed-key
security is applied to protect vehicles from
unauthorized access, which generates a
random security variable which must be
matched in order to allow communication
access.
Automobile security experts consulted by Senator
Markey’s staff noted that the ECU monitoring
(response 2) and firewall/watchdog systems (response 3) would only check for unusual network
behavior and not detect any problems with the data
itself. An analogy was given to compare it to somebody receiving threatening phone calls, where the
phone company is monitoring the lines to see if
phone calls are getting through, but not checking the
content of the conversations. They also noted that

the seed-key system (response 5) could be bypassed
by malicious actors.
The question of monitoring WEPs for intrusions
received similar responses. Of the eight manufacturers that responded:
1. Four manufacturers mentioned that some of
the features themselves are equipped with
encryption and security technologies;
2. One manufacturer mentioned continuous ECU
monitoring (also above);
3. One manufacturer described the firewall/
watchdog system (also above);
4. One manufacturer described the seed-key
security system (also above);
5. One manufacturer stated that its remote keyless
entry systems can record key code authentication failures.
The encryption and security measures (response
group 1) are not systems that can detect intrusion
events. Automobile security experts consulted by
Senator Markey’s staff have noted that the ECU monitoring (response 2) described simply monitors the
normal functioning of an ECU, the firewall/watchdog
systems (response 3) would only protect against
random outside influences like electromagnetic
frequency interference and not malicious intrusions,
the seed-key system (response 4) can be defeated
by hackers, and the remote keyless entry systems
(response 5) will only protect against people getting
into the car to steal it but will do nothing to prevent
or respond to remote hacking. Also, only 1 of the
systems, the seed-key system, is capable of alerting
the manufacturer in real-time.
Finally, on the question of how the manufacturers
would respond to an intrusion in real-time, six of the
manufacturers did not respond, and six more
responded with vague mentions of security systems
and “taking appropriate actions” such as recalls and
service campaigns that could not be used to respond
in real-time. The other four manufacturers provided
the following responses:
1. One manufacturer claimed that it would
contact the subscriber through the telematics
program to alert them and resolve any
problems;
2. One manufacturer said that it has the ability to
disable certain connected features;
3. One manufacturer claimed that it could place
a vehicle in a “fail-safe” mode that may limit
vehicle operation if malfunctions that could
cause damage occur;

A report written by the staff of Senator Edward J. Markey (D-Massachussetts)

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4. One manufacturer stated that it would have
the option to safely slowdown and immobilize
an impacted vehicle if the vehicle is in motion
at the time of detection.
The first 2 of these responses, contacting through
the telematics program or disabling features, would
not be an effective real-time way to deal with an
ongoing attack, according to automobile security
experts consulted by Senator Markey’s staff. Responses 3 and 4, fail-safe mode and remote slowdown and immobilization, are the only responses
that indicate an ability to immediately respond to
security threats and address the situation for the
drivers who subscribe to their telematics providers.
These three questions and their responses have
revealed that, of the manufacturers who were willing
to respond, only one of them appears to be able to
detect wireless intrusions, and only one or two have
described credible means of responding to such
intrusions in real time.

Finding #5: Automobile manufacturers
collect large amounts of data on driving
history and vehicle performance.
New vehicles are capable of collecting a
tremendous amount of data through a variety of
pre-installed technological systems. Senator
Markey’s letter asked manufacturers about (1) what
types of navigation technology or other technologies
are in their vehicles with the ability to collect driving
history information, (2) what percentage of U.S.
automobiles contain such technologies in MY2013
and MY2014, and (3) what types of information can
be collected. Honda, Porsche, and Mercedes-Benz
did not respond to these questions, and the other
13 manufacturers responded with various levels of
completeness.
The responses to the first question included a
range of navigation, telematics, infotainment,
emergency assist, stolen vehicle recovery, and event
data recording systems that have the ability to record
driving history information. These included branded
products like OnStar and SYNC as well as other
unbranded technologies, collecting a diverse set of
data types that included the following:
¡¡ Geographic location (7 manufacturers),
such as:

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¡¡ Physical location recorded at regular intervals;
¡¡ Previous destinations entered into navigation
system;
¡¡ Last location parked.
¡¡ System settings for event data recorder (EDR)
devices (5 manufacturers), which can
include:
¡¡ Potential crash events, such as sudden
changes in speed;
¡¡ Status of steering angle, brake application,
seat belt use, and air bag deployment;
¡¡ Fault/error codes in electronic systems.
¡¡ Operational data (7 manufacturers), such as:
¡¡ Vehicle speed;
¡¡ Direction/heading of travel;
¡¡ Distances and times traveled;
¡¡ Average fuel economy/consumption;
¡¡ Status of power windows, doors, and locks;
¡¡ Tire pressure;
¡¡ Fuel level;
¡¡ Tachometer reading (engine RPM gauge);
¡¡ Odometer reading;
¡¡ Mileage since last oil change;
¡¡ Battery health;
¡¡ Coolant temperature;
¡¡ Engine status;
¡¡ Exterior temperature and pressure.
While three of the manufacturers who responded
claimed to not record any driving history information,
three others listed all three of the categories above.
The percentages of vehicles that contain such
technologies varied greatly among the manufacturers, with some claiming that almost no vehicles have
them while others claim that all of their vehicle
models do. The percentages are shown in the chart
below, with a median response of 35% of vehicles
from a manufacturer containing technologies that
can collect driving history information. These
percentages either showed slight increases or
stagnation from MY2013-MY2014.

A report written by the staff of Senator Edward J. Markey (D-Massachussetts)

PERCENTAGE OF VEHICLES THAT CAN
RECORD DRIVING HISTORY
100

75

50
35 (median)

25

0

A report written by the staff of Senator Edward J. Markey (D-Massachussetts)

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The two coalitions of manufacturers recently
adopted voluntary privacy principles — namely on
“data minimization, de-identification, and retention”
that attempt to address these concerns. On minimization, this principle states that manufacturers
commit to collecting information “only as needed for
legitimate business purposes”. While this is a good
step forward, limiting themselves to collection “only
as needed for legitimate business purposes” still
raises many questions about the extent to which
companies will continue to collect sensitive information. The principles also do not ensure that consumers will have rights to prevent data collection in the
first place.

Finding #6: A majority of automakers offer
technologies that collect and wirelessly
transmit driving history data to data centers,
including third-party data centers, and most
do not describe effective means to secure
the data.
Automobile manufacturers store data in a variety
of different ways. Some said that it is only stored
on-board the vehicle and cannot be wirelessly
retrieved, and others described how they wirelessly

transfer all data to a central location (known as
off-board storage). Also, the large majority of the
companies who responded (9 of 11) claimed that
they do contract with third-party companies to
provide the data-collecting features that they offer.
In fact, 3 manufacturers specifically stated they
license third party companies to transmit and store
data associated with the features.
To the question of whether driving history
information is recorded and stored in a vehicle,
12 manufacturers replied that they do store this
information in some of their vehicles (depending on
the features the vehicle is equipped with). Only
1 manufacturer stated that they do not collect such
data, and 3 did not respond. This indicates that an
overwhelming majority of vehicles collect driving
history information.
Of the 12 who said they collect and store driving
history data, 8 stated that they transmit and store
driving history data in a server off-board the
vehicle, while the other 4 stated that they do not.
This reveals that a majority of vehicle manufacturers offer features that not only record but also
transmit driving history wirelessly to themselves or
to third parties.

PERCENTAGE OF AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS THAT
COLLECT AND TRANSMIT DRIVING HISTORY DATA

No
response
Transmit and
store data
off-board

50%

19%

6%

Do not collect data

Collect data
on-board

25%

10

A report written by the staff of Senator Edward J. Markey (D-Massachussetts)

Finally, the security measures of these data
collection systems vary widely by manufacturer, and
in some cases there are none. In the case of
on-board storage, no manufacturer described any
security system to protect that data, and several of
them noted that no security measure is needed
since accessing data would require a hardwire
connection. Regarding security measures to protect
data that is wirelessly transmitted outside the
vehicle, only 6 responses were received. Of those,
5 provided vague responses naming encryption,
passwords, or general IT security practices, and
only 1 specifically mentioned that they designed
their systems to limit the transfer of personally
identifiable information.
The automakers’ voluntary privacy protection
principles include commitments to “respect for
context” and “data security”. The “respect for
context” principle addresses the ways that data are
collected and shared, and it provides a list of
examples to illustrate “reasonable and responsible
ways” that automakers may collect and share data
with both affiliated companies and non-affiliated
entities. These include, among others, providing
subscribed services, conducting research, responding to emergencies and faults, sharing for operational purposes, and complying with lawful government
requests — describing a sweeping suite of practices
and offering no specific guidelines for reducing data
collection and sharing.
The “data security” principle states that the
automakers commit to collecting information
“only as needed for legitimate business purposes”,
which is another positive message toward reducing
unneeded sharing of information. However, this
principle offers no detail as to what may be
included under “legitimate business purposes”,
effectively leaving it open for interpretation by the
coalition members.

Finding #7: Manufacturers use personal
vehicle data in various ways, often vaguely
to “improve the customer experience” and
usually involving third parties, and retention
policies — how long they store information
about drivers — vary considerably among
manufacturers.
A wide array of responses was received regarding
the ways that manufacturers use vehicle history
information. Of the 8 manufacturers that previously
stated that they collect such information, 3 of them
did not respond to this question, with the other five
listing combinations of the following uses:

¡¡ Provide feature functionality;
¡¡ Maintain and improve services;
¡¡ Address vehicle safety concerns;
¡¡ Diagnose and assist with technical issues;
¡¡ Respond when the system senses the vehicle
has been involved in an accident;
¡¡ Fulfill requests for service by customers;
¡¡ Research purposes (analytics and marketing).
Many of these responses are vague and not
well-defined, such as providing feature functionality,
maintaining and improving services, and serving
research purposes. This lack of transparency in
personal vehicle data usage leaves consumers with
little knowledge about how the companies actually
use their data.
Additionally, the letters revealed that 5 of the
8 manufacturers claimed to share this information
with third parties to provide subscriber services. All
of them stated that they do not sell such information,
and 2 specifically mentioned that they do not share
any personally identifiable information. This reveals
that a majority of manufacturers who collect data
share that information with third party companies.
Another question that received a wide range of
responses was about how long driving history data
is retained in the various systems that record and
store them. To this question, four of the twelve
manufacturers did not answer, with the other eight
providing responses that sometimes varied by
feature/technology. These ranged from responses
that information is retained no longer than a year,
to responses that indicate that information is
retained indefinitely.
¡¡ Five manufacturers listed that information is
deleted after a set period of time, ranging
from one to ten years;
¡¡ Three manufacturers replied that there is no
set clear date, with two of them stating that it
can be deleted by users at any time;
¡¡ One manufacturer stated that navigation
information is overwritten when the system
runs out of memory storage space;
¡¡ One manufacturer said that on-board error
information is deleted when the vehicle fault
is cleared.
The new industry-led voluntary privacy principles
include a commitment by automakers to only collect
data “as needed for legitimate business purposes”
and to retain identifiable or personal subscription

A report written by the staff of Senator Edward J. Markey (D-Massachussetts)

11

information “no longer than they determine necessary for legitimate business purposes”. The intention
of this principle is positive, but these limitations are
subject to the interpretation of the industry and offer
no explicit rules to prevent excessive collection or
retention. Regarding the ways in which data are
used, the coalitions put forth the “respect for
context” principle, which describes a list of “reasonable and responsible ways” that members can use
or share data collected from vehicles. This includes
an important provision that a warrant or court order
is needed if companies are to share geolocation
information with law enforcement. Unfortunately,
however, this broad proclamation provides little
tangible assurances that consumers will not disapprove of the ways in which manufacturers use their
sensitive information.
Additionally, the automakers’ voluntary “choice”
principle specifically requires affirmative consent
from the consumer before sharing sensitive driving
history data, specifically geolocation, biometric, and
driver behavior information, for marketing purposes
or with unaffiliated third parties. However, this
commitment fails to address whether a consumer’s
decision to agree or disagree will affect the functionality of the vehicle or the features that are available
to them. The principles also do not pertain to sharing
(1) non-sensitive data for marketing purposes, and
(2) sensitive data for non-marketing purposes.

Finding #8: Customers are often not explicitly made aware of data collection and, when
they are, they often cannot opt out without
disabling valuable features, such as
navigation.
The primary methods manufacturers use to inform
customers of data collection are by mentioning it in the
owners’ manual or including it in the terms and
conditions of the vehicle sale or specific feature
activation. If a customer actually becomes aware of
data collection and wishes to disable it, they often must
accept a loss of feature functionality, such as GPS.
Of the twelve manufacturers who confirmed that
they do record and store data, three did not respond
to the question on how customers are made aware
of data storage, and one stated that there is no
reason to inform users of on-board storage. The
other eight manufacturers listed combinations of the
following methods of notice:
¡¡ Owners’ manuals;
¡¡ Privacy statements;
¡¡ Terms & Conditions (which must be “accepted”).

12

To the question of whether and how customers can
disable data collection or transmission, four did not
respond. Two manufacturers said that users cannot
disable data collection, two said that they can disable
it, and four stated that it is possible by turning off a
feature or canceling a service subscription.
On the question of whether users (if they are made
aware of data collection) can delete information, six
manufacturers did not respond, five specifically
noted that customers can delete data directly
through the navigation system interface, and one
mentioned that customers can request data deletion
by contacting the service provider.
These responses show that customer awareness
of data collection is primarily distributed within long
written texts such as Terms & Agreement statements
or owner manuals. In the event that customers read
these and are aware of them, they do, in certain
cases, have the ability to delete previously-recorded
data. However, disabling the constant collection of
data often requires disabling valuable vehicle
features or services.
The new voluntary privacy principles from the
manufacturers partially address these concerns with
commitments to “transparency” and “choice”.
Signing members agree to provide consumers “with
ready access to clear, meaningful notices about the
Participating Member’s collection, use, and sharing”
of data. This includes a list of ways that manufacturers can provide these notices, which include “owners’ manuals, on paper or electronic registration
forms and user agreements, or on in-vehicle displays”. Unfortunately, these types of notices likely do
not guarantee an improvement over current practices revealed in the responses to Senator Markey, as
most manufacturers claimed that such notices are
already provided in user manuals and terms &
conditions that must be signed upon purchase.
Regarding choice, the principle states that consumers must give “affirmative consent”, or opt in,
when certain information such as geolocation,
biometrics, or driver behavior is collected or shared
for marketing or with unaffiliated third parties. The
principle does not commit manufacturers to offering
consumers the option to prevent data collection in
the first place or giving consumers the choice to
remove data that have already been collected.
Additionally, consumers who choose not to consent
to data collection may be denied access to valuable
vehicle features. For instance, consent to sharing
geolocation information for marketing purposes may
be the only way for a consumer to turn on the
navigation feature.

A report written by the staff of Senator Edward J. Markey (D-Massachussetts)