Friday, June 5, 2015

On Tuesday this week the airport in Goma was attacked by a group of assailants, who killed at least four soldiers and
apparently tried to make off with a stockpile of ammunition. By morning, rumors
were making the rounds. Was this once again Rwanda, attempting to destabilize
the East? Some pointed out that a large part of Congo’s small air force was
based at Goma airport, making it a strategic target. Others suggested that this
might have been an inside job, a group of army officers trying to steal
ammunition to sell on the black market.

By the next day, the official version had come out: this was
a group of former Mai-Mai, led by a certain Kambale Malonga. He had been
arrested along with around twenty others, thanks to intelligence provided by
the Rwandan government, which was able to trace his cell phone communication
(apparently putting to rest the rumor that the Rwandan government was behind
the coup).

But who is Malonga and why did he carry out the attack?

Malonga has strong rebel credentials: this
is, after all, not the first time he attacked Goma. As he reminded Congolese security
officials during an interrogation, he had attacked the city during the
occupation of the Rwandan government in 1998, and had been supported by Laurent
Kabila––the current president’s father. While he was a
lesser figure among the many Mai-Mai leaders of the time, during the transition
government (2003-2006) he became the leader of a political coalition of ex-fighters called Parti national Mai-Mai (PANAM). That
transitional period was the time in which armed groups cashed in, trying to
transform their military prowess into political positions and cash buyouts.

The problem was, there were only so many positions to go
around, and the Mai-Mai, while frontline fighters for the Kabila governments,
were poorly connected and often lacked formal education. Many fell by the
wayside. It was less than surprising to see, in subsequent years, new
rebellions staffed by the same leaders. Lacking any viable options, they had
gone back to do what they did best.

Malonga was one such example. In a raft of documents
(available here and here) from 2009 to 2014, Malonga complains that he was never given
the positions he asked for, even though he joined the ruling coalition in 2011.

In 2012, after the M23 rebellion was launched with support
from Rwanda, Malonga went back to the bush, founding theUnion
des patriotes pour la paix (UPCP) along with Sikuli Lafontaine and Albert
Kahasha. While these latter two commanders then joined the M23 in August 2012,
Malonga sided with the Congolese army and received (probably modest) support to
fight against the M23. Following the defeat of the M23 in November 2013,
Malonga demobilized, but once again failed to obtain what he perceived as his
just recompense.

So was the Goma airport attack just the latest installation
of Malonga’s use of violence as a means to bargain for power and money?
Perhaps––it would certainly not be surprising, and he readily confessed after
his arrest. But questions still remain: It is unlikely that he would have acted
alone––this kind of attack requires money and manpower. Furthermore, attacking
Goma airport is a poor bargaining tactic. It is too sensitive a target, likely
to embarrass and anger the government to such a degree that they would be
unlikely to reward him with anything. As countless Mai-Mai groups know, the
best way of bargaining is by holding territory, showing you have the capacity
for broader destabilization, while not undermining relationships by attacking
major population centers (poor peasants, however, are fair game). Of course,
the fact that he was so easily arrested and appeared so nonchalantly later also
raises questions.

There are other alternatives. Perhaps this was not a
bargaining tactic, or even a desperate attempt to avenge himself for being
snubbed by the government, but a message sent by others backing him. Much like
is rumored for attacks on the Lubumbashi airport in 2011 and 2012, and feeble
coup attempts in Kinshasa in 2004 and 2013, this attack may have been a way for
politicians to send a warning to the government. Or it could have even been a
cover for government officials trying to steal weapons, or trying to create
hysteria on the eve of elections.

In the Congo, these kinds of dramatic attacks are rarely
what they seem to be. We may know a lot about Malonga, but how much do we know
about his motives?