This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 004968
SIPDIS
OIG
NOFORN
STATE FOR ISP TEAM SEVEN
DAMASCUS PASS TO DOUGLAS ELLICE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2012
TAGS: ASIG, AMGT, CVIS, JO
SUBJECT: SURVEY OF NON-IMMIGRANT VISA ISSUANCE POLICIES
REF: STATE 154899
Classified By: CONSUL LES HICKMAN, REASON 1.5 (B) AND (D)
1. (U) The following is in response to reftel questions.
A) (S/NF) Law Enforcement and Intelligence Agencies
Represented at Post: ORCA, LEGATT, DIA, (STATE) DS
B) (S/NF) Visas Viper Information Input Process: Potential
submissions are sent to the Visas Viper Coordinator (VVC) who
in turn consults with the Consul. Then the submission is
sent to the DCM in a draft Visas Viper cable for approval.
The DCM either approves the submission or requests more
information to ensure the case meets the guidelines for
submission.
C) (S/NF) Frequency of Meetings: Visas Viper meetings are
held monthly in accordance with State 140282.
D) (S/NF) Visas Viper meetings are chaired by the DCM.
E) (S/NF) Members Are: DCM, VVC, Consular Chief, A/RSO, and
representatives from ORCA, DAO, LEGATT, POL, ECON and FBIS
F) (S/NF) Number of Names Submitted by Agency: In the last
12 months the VVC sent four cables to the Department from
State representatives. ORCA, LEGATT and DAO submit names
through their agencies and slug submissions for INR TIPOFF.
G) (S/NF) Quality/Effectiveness of Washington Visas Viper
Support/Guidance: Post is satisfied with Washington's
guidance and support for our contributions to the program. On
more than one occasion the Department has sent kudos cables
on our submissions. We also believe that timeliness of
responses to Security Advisory Opinions and 00 hits could be
improved.
2. (S/NF) Chief of Mission Oversight of the Process: The
Chief of Mission has designated the DCM to oversee the Visas
Viper activities. The DCM reports to the Chief of Mission
all significant developments concerning the program. The
Front Office has a close and continuing association with the
members of the Visas Viper Committee, through Country Team
meetings and other meetings outside of the Visas Viper
process.
3. (S/NF) The Coordination Process at the Mission Section
Level: Visas Viper representatives routinely consult with
the VVC and Consular Chief concerning all operational issues
of the program. The coordination effectiveness is excellent.
4. (S/NF) Post Officers from other than
Consular/Intelligence/Law Enforcement Involved in the Visas
Viper Program: Post Officers from POL, ECON, DAO and FBIS
participate. POL and ECON track potential terrorist and
terrorist financing issues respectively. DAO has sources of
information appropriate for submission. FBIS and its
monitoring of various information sources is also a good
reference for submissions.
5. (S/NF) Occasions for Intelligence and Law Enforcement
Agencies to Meet with Consular Staff Outside of the Visas
Viper Meetings to Discuss Terrorist Threat Information:
During Country Team and Emergency Action Committee meetings
terrorist threat information is evaluated and reported as
part of our review of the general security environment for
the safety of Mission staff and the American community. Also
ORCA consults with Consular staff directly concerning NIV
applicants (Iraqis in particular) who may have intelligence
value.
6. (S/NF) ORCA Officers in the Consular Section: Not
applicable.
7. (S/NF) Frequency of Hits in CLASS Determined to be
Terrorist Related: Within the last year there were no hits
in CLASS that were terrorist related. It is Post policy for
two Consular Officer to review a potential 00 hit to
determine if it merits a Security Advisory Opinion (SAO). If
two officer agree, then an SAO is sent. In case there is
difficulty with a consensus, the case is brought to the
Consular Chief for a decision prior to sending an SAO.
8. (S/NF) Requests from Mission Officer/Offices to Issue
Visas in Cases Involving Terrorist CLASS Hits: Post did not
have any occasion (within the past two years of Consular
Chief's tenure) when an office, officer, or other
section/agency requested visa issuance for a terrorist CLASS
hit. We are not aware of any terrorist related visa requests
by Mission offices for applicants not found in CLASS.
9. (S/NF) Decision on the Disposition of These Requests and
Review of the Decisions: In the event such a request is made,
the requesting Agency/Section must consult with the Consular
Chief and DCM. If a decision is made to support the visa
issuance, Post would submit an SAO with a recommendation for
issuance under national security or other appropriate
justification.
10. (S/NF) Were Visas Issued to Applicants with Possibly
Disqualifying Information Linking them to Terrorism? All
issued visas cases cleared the CLASS namecheck system in
compliance with Visa Lookout Accountability guidelines. Last
year Post issued a potential CLASS hit. The Consular officer
made a determination that the potential hit was not valid
because the applicant was a female and the CLASS entry was a
male. Subsequent review of the case revealed that the
applicant was an immediate relative of the CLASS entry with
potential terrorist ties. The applicant's visa was revoked
but she attempted to enter the U.S. and INS denied her entry.
In cases where subsequent information is available that
leads to visa ineligibility, Post initiates the revocation of
the visa and makes every attempt to physically cancel the
visa.
11. (S/NF) Does the Consular Section Maintain a Special
Lookout File? All information located in the Consular
Section must be unclassified. There is an A-Z file with Post
information; however, since the files are unclassified this
information would not be terrorist related.
12. (S/NF) Please Provide Additional Comments on How to
Improve the Visas Viper Process: Post agrees that an
effective Visas Viper program is essential. We periodically
bring the program to the attention of the Country Team as a
reminder of the Mission's responsibilities under the program.
BERRY
BERRY