A Royal Canadian Air Force CF-18 Hornet fighter jet pilot from 4 Wing Cold Lake, Alberta walks down the flight line in Kuwait after his first combat mission over Iraq in support of Operation IMPACT on October 30, 2014.Canadian Forces Combat Camera

The Auditor General released his report on the Liberal government’s various plans to buy interim fighter jets, both the failed purchase of Super Hornets and the acquisition of used Australian F-18s. Here are some highlights from the report:

-In 2016, the Government of Canada directed National Defence to have enough fighter aircraft available every day to meet the highest NORAD alert level and Canada’s NATO commitment at the same time. This direction would require National Defence to increase the number of fighter aircraft available for operations by 23%. The new operational requirement came at a time when the Royal Canadian Air Force faced a growing shortage of trained and experienced pilots and technicians. Furthermore, the current fleet of CF-18 aircraft are already over 30 years old, the CF-18 will continue to become more vulnerable, and there are no plans to improve its combat capability.

-To have the number of aircraft needed to meet the new operational requirement, the government focused efforts on increasing the number of aircraft. The government’s original plan was to buy 18 new Super Hornet fighter aircraft, even though National Defence’s analysis indicated that this plan would not help the Royal Canadian Air Force meet the new operational requirement and would make the personnel shortage worse. The government is now planning to buy used fighter aircraft from Australia that are the same age and have the same operational limitations as the CF-18s that the Royal Canadian Air Force are currently flying.

-Over and above existing budgets, National Defence expects to spend almost $3 billion on extending the life of the current fleet and to buy, operate, and maintain the interim aircraft, without a plan to deal with its biggest obstacles to meeting the new operational requirement: a shortage of pilots and the declining combat capability of its aircraft. Although National Defence has plans to address some risks, these investment decisions will not be enough to ensure that it can have the number of aircraft available daily to meet the highest NORAD alert level and Canada’s NATO commitment at the same time.

-We found that Canada’s fighter force could not meet the government’s new operational requirement, which is to have enough aircraft ready each day to meet the highest NORAD alert level and Canada’s NATO commitment at the same time. The fighter force could not meet the requirement because National Defence was already experiencing a shortage in personnel, and the CF-18 was old and increasingly hard to maintain. We also found that the government’s proposed solution of buying interim aircraft will not help solve either the personnel shortage or the aging fleet.

-National Defence’s analysis showed that buying the Super Hornet alone would not allow the Department to meet the new operational requirement. The Department stated that the Super Hornet would initially decrease, not increase, the daily number of aircraft available because technicians and pilots would have to be pulled away from the CF-18s to train on the new aircraft.

-According to National Defence, the Australian purchase would give it more aircraft and spare parts to help manage the CF-18 fleet. However, the purchase will not fix the fundamental weaknesses with the fleet: the aircraft’s declining combat capability and the shortage of personnel. The Australian F/A-18s will need modifications and upgrades to allow them to fly until 2032. These modifications will bring the F/A-18s to the same level as the CF-18s but will not improve the CF-18’s combat capability. In addition, National Defence still does not have enough technicians to maintain and pilots to fly the aircraft.

-In our opinion, purchasing interim aircraft does not bring National Defence closer to consistently meeting the new operational requirement introduced in 2016. Without more technicians and pilots, the effect on fighter force operations will be small.