Considered and
decided by Kalitowski, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and Ross, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

ROSS, Judge

A juvenile court adjudicated M.T.L.
delinquent and ordered him to pay restitution after he pleaded guilty to third-degree
burglary. On appeal from the restitution
order, M.T.L. challenges the court’s acceptance of his guilty plea. M.T.L. also argues that the district court
erred by denying his challenge to the restitution request because he failed to
comply with the requirements for submitting his challenging affidavit. M.T.L. asserts that the restitution statute
violates the Equal Protection Clause and the separation of powers doctrine. Because we find that M.T.L. intelligently
pleaded guilty, we deny his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Because M.T.L. failed to contest the
constitutionality of the restitution statute in the district court, the issue is
waived on appeal. Because M.T.L. failed
to meet the statutory requirement for the timely filing of his affidavit
challenging the restitution order, we affirm.

FACTS

The state filed a delinquency petition against M.T.L. in June
2005 alleging that he and J.M.A., another juvenile, broke into a machine shed
in Stearns County and stole various items.
The state charged M.T.L. with two counts of burglary. J.M.A. admitted to police that he and M.T.L.
had broken into the shed and stolen items.
The court arraigned M.T.L., and he pleaded not guilty. At that time, M.T.L., his counsel, and one of
his parents signed a Delinquency Statement of Rights form, which identified the
charges against M.T.L. and explained his right to counsel, his trial rights,
and the consequences of pleading guilty.
The victim met with M.T.L.’s and J.M.A.’s parents, and they agreed to a
list of items that each juvenile would be responsible for returning or
replacing. The items attributed to M.T.L.
were valued at $415 total. J.M.A. repaid
the victim for or returned all the items for which the list made him responsible.

M.T.L. pleaded guilty to one of the burglary charges in
exchange for the state dismissing the other.
M.T.L. acknowledged his understanding of the plea agreement on the
record, acknowledged having read and executed the Delinquency Statement of
Rights form, and confirmed that he had sufficient time to speak with his
attorney. M.T.L. admitted that he
entered the machine shed with J.M.A. without permission and that he stole items
to keep for himself or to sell. The
court found that M.T.L. knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights and provided
a sufficient factual basis for the court to accept the guilty plea, and the
court concluded that M.T.L. committed third-degree burglary based on the plea.

The victim filed a restitution affidavit at a September 12,
2005 disposition hearing that listed $415 worth of items subject to restitution. M.T.L. conceded that he was liable for $130
in restitution, but he argued that the balance was inappropriate and indicated
that he would move for a restitution hearing.
The court adjudicated M.T.L. delinquent, placed him on indefinite
probation with conditions, and ordered him to pay “no less than” $130 in
restitution, pending a restitution hearing.
The state argued that M.T.L. had failed to comply with the procedural requirements
to challenge the restitution request.

On October 6, 2005, M.T.L. filed a request for a hearing
under Minnesota Statutes, section 611A.045 (2004), to challenge the amount of
restitution. The court scheduled the
restitution hearing for January 19, 2006.
On that day, M.T.L. faxed to the court the statutorily required
affidavit to support his challenge to the restitution amount. The state objected because M.T.L.’s affidavit
was untimely. M.T.L. conceded that it was
untimely but claimed that the delay was excusable.

The court denied M.T.L.’s request for a hearing to challenge
the restitution amount because he failed to comply with the statutory timing requirements. The court ordered M.T.L. to pay the full
amount requested in restitution. This
appeal follows.

D E C I S I O N

I

M.T.L. argues that he can withdraw his guilty plea because
the juvenile court failed to comply with the rules of procedure in accepting
his plea. He claims that he did not make
a knowing and intelligent plea because the court did not conduct an
on-the-record inquiry to first determine whether he understood his rights and
the consequences of pleading guilty. M.T.L.
also asserts that the plea was unacceptable because it lacked a factual
basis. M.T.L. makes these arguments for
the first time on appeal.

Ordinarily, this court reviews a district court’s denial of a
motion to withdraw a guilty plea under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Kim v.
State, 434 N.W.2d 263, 266 (Minn. 1989).
The rules of juvenile delinquency procedure permit a juvenile to request
to withdraw a guilty plea at any time in the juvenile court when necessary to
correct a manifest injustice. Minn. R.
Juv. Delinq. P. 8.04, subd. 2(B). M.T.L.
never moved the juvenile court to withdraw his guilty plea. As a general rule, this court
will not decide issues that were not first raised before the district
court. Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 357
(Minn. 1996). Although M.T.L. first
challenges the validity of his guilty plea on direct appeal, we address the
challenge because the record provides a sufficient basis for meaningful
appellate review. SeeState v. Anyanwu, 681
N.W.2d 411, 413 & n.1 (Minn. App. 2004) (holding that defendant could
challenge guilty plea for first time on appeal when based entirely on matters
in record and no material-fact dispute exists).

To be valid, a plea must be made intelligently, voluntarily,
and accurately. In re Welfare of J.J.R., 648 N.W.2d 739, 742 (Minn. App.
2002). A plea is intelligently and
voluntarily made if the defendant knows and understands the trial rights he is
waiving and the consequences of his plea.
Brown v. State, 449 N.W.2d
180, 182 (Minn. 1989) (stating plea is intelligent if defendant understands
charges, rights being waived, and consequences of guilty plea). A plea is accurately made if it is supported
by a factual basis. J.J.R., 648 N.W.2d at 742.
Before accepting a juvenile’s plea, a court must first determine that
the juvenile understands his trial rights and that there is a factual basis for
the plea under the totality of the circumstances and based on the juvenile’s
statements either on the record or contained in a document signed by the
juvenile and his counsel. Minn. R. Juv.
Delinq. P. 8.04, subd. 1(A), (B).

M.T.L. acknowledged reading and executing the Delinquency
Statement of Rights form, and he confirmed that he understood his rights and
knew that he was waiving the rights explained on the form by pleading
guilty. M.T.L., his counsel, and one of
his parents signed the form. The form
also explained the trial rights afforded to M.T.L. and that the consequence of
pleading guilty included waiving these rights.
M.T.L. confirmed that he had sufficient time to speak with his attorney
before pleading guilty. See Berkow v. State, 573 N.W.2d 91, 95
(Minn. App. 1997) (recognizing presumption that defendant who has consulted
with counsel is aware of constitutional rights), aff’d, 583 N.W.2d 562 (Minn. 1998); State v. Lyle, 409 N.W.2d 549, 552 (Minn. App. 1987) (recognizing
presumption that defendant represented by counsel informed of nature of charges
and of his alternatives). We find that
the court properly determined that M.T.L. pleaded guilty knowingly and
intelligently.

The district court also properly determined that a factual
basis existed to support the plea by M.T.L.’s on-the-record verification of the
facts supporting the elements of third-degree burglary. Contrary to M.T.L.’s claim on appeal, the district
court obtained his on-the-record express acknowledgement of the truth and
accuracy of specific facts constituting the elements of the charged offense. We therefore hold that M.T.L. has failed to
show that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.

II

M.T.L. next argues that the
district court erred by denying his request for a hearing to challenge the restitution
amount. Based on the statutory
requirement for the timely filing of an affidavit to challenge a restitution
request, the argument is unpersuasive.

M.T.L. maintains that the victim’s affidavit was late and
that the timing of M.T.L.’s affidavit should not bar his contest to restitution. We reject both assertions. The victim’s affidavit requesting restitution
was delivered to the court administrator by September 7 and filed with the
court on September 12, 2005, the date of the disposition hearing. Contrary to M.T.L.’s claim, the victim timely
filed his affidavit. See Minn. Stat. § 611A.04,
subd. 1(a) (2004) (indicating that restitution information is timely if it is received
by court administrator at least three business days before sentencing or
dispositional hearing).

The victim-restitution statute puts the burden of pleading
and the initial burden of production on a defendant challenging a restitution
request. Id. § 611A.045, subd. 3 (2004); State v. Thole, 614 N.W.2d 231, 234–35 (Minn. App. 2000). The accused must challenge restitution and
request a hearing within 30 days after receiving written notice of the amount
of restitution requested or within 30 days after sentencing, whichever is
later. Minn. Stat. § 611A.045,
subd. 3(b). He must also produce evidence
challenging the restitution, the evidence must include a detailed sworn
affidavit defining all challenges, and the “affidavit must be served on the
prosecuting attorney and the court at least five business days before the
hearing.” Id., subd. 3(a); see also Thole,
614 N.W.2d at 235 (stating that affidavit is both sole vehicle by which
offender can meet burden of pleading and an essential element of offender’s
burden of production). We construe the
statute’s deadline to be mandatory. Although
M.T.L. filed his request for a hearing on October 6, 2005, he failed to submit
his supporting affidavit (which he provided by facsimile) until January 19,
2006, the date of the restitution hearing. While M.T.L. timely requested the restitution
hearing, he did not timely file his challenging affidavit. Because M.T.L. failed to comply with the
requirements of the statute by not timely filing his affidavit, the district
court neither misread the statute nor abused its discretion by denying M.T.L.’s
request for a hearing on that basis.

III

M.T.L. contends for the first
time on appeal that the victim-restitution statute is unconstitutional because
it infringes on his right to equal protection and violates the separation-of-powers
doctrine. He argues that the statute treats
victims and defendants differently without any rational basis, emphasizing that
while a defendant’s failure to timely file an affidavit precludes his challenge
to restitution, a victim’s failure to timely provide restitution evidence does
not preclude the victim from preserving the request. M.T.L. argues that the statute violates
separation of powers because it prevents the court from considering relevant
evidence to evaluate a victim’s restitution request based on the timely filing
of the offender’s affidavit.

Constitutional challenges to a statute generally may not be
raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Frazier, 649 N.W.2d 828, 839
(Minn. 2002). Because M.T.L. failed to first
raise these constitutional arguments in the district court, the issues are
waived, and we do not reach their merits.