While
he was incarcerated in the Correctional Institutions Division
of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice
("TDCJ"), former state inmate Phillip Jackson (TDCJ
#01189921) filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging violations of his civil rights. Jackson, who
proceeds pro se and In forma pauperis,
alleges that two prison officials violated his rights under
the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment when they confiscated his wedding ring
and refused to release it to his wife. One defendant has
filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (Dkt. 16). Jackson
has responded (Dkt. 22). Having considered Jackson's
factual allegations and the applicable law, the Court will
dismiss Jackson's claims as time-barred.

I.
BACKGROUND

According
to his complaint, Jackson's wedding ring was confiscated
at the Stringfellow Unit on December 13, 2013 as
non-dangerous contraband under Texas Department of Criminal
Justice Administrative Directive 3.72 (Dkt. 1 at p. 8). At
the time the ring was confiscated, Jackson requested that the
ring be released to his wife, who was scheduled to visit the
following weekend (Dkt. 1 at p. 7). One of the defendants,
Assistant Warden Kenneth Jolley, told Jackson that he would
give the ring to the other defendant, Warden Frankie
Reescano, who was scheduled to work that weekend (Dkt. 1 at
p. 7). Another correctional officer who was present at the
confiscation then "gave [Jackson] disposition of
confiscated offender property papers to allow [Jackson's]
wife to pick up [the] ring" (Dkt. 1 at p. 7).

However,
when Jackson's wife came to visit the following weekend,
Reescano refused to give her the ring (Dkt. 1 at p. 7).
Jackson unsuccessfully sought relief through the TDCJ
grievance process, filing a Step One grievance on December
18, 2013 and a Step Two grievance on March 3, 2014 (Dkt. l-l
at pp. 2, 4). The Step Two grievance was resolved on April 2,
2014 (Dkt. 1-1 at p. 2). Grievance investigation documents
attached to Jackson's complaint indicate that Jackson was
accused of violating prison rules by having his wife bring
him the wedding ring without Jackson's having first
secured the proper ownership and possession paperwork (Dkt.
1-1 at pp. 5-6, 8). The grievance investigation documents go
on to state that the confiscation "was handled according
to policy. The ring was introduced illegally and is
contraband and therefore will not be returned" (Dkt. 1-1
at p. 8).

Jackson
filed a small claims action against these defendants in
Brazoria County justice-of-the-peace court on August 26, 2014
(Dkt. 1-1 at p. 47). The action was dismissed on June 16,
2016 because the defendants were held to be immune from suit
under the Texas Tort Claims Act (Dkt. 1-1 at p. 48). Jackson
then filed this lawsuit on October 3, 2016 (Dkt. 1 at p. 5).
He alleges that Jolley and Reescano violated his rights under
the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment when they confiscated his wedding ring
and refused to release it to his wife (Dkt. 1 at p. 8).

Jolley
has filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) in which he asserts a limitations defense,
invokes qualified immunity, and argues that Jackson's
claims are barred by ths Parratt/Hudson
doctrine[1] (Dkt. 16). In his response, Jackson argues
that the Parratt/Hudson doctrine does not apply
because his "wedding ring was confiscated under the
authority of a prison rule directive" and was not a
"random, unauthorized act by the defendants" (Dkt.
22 at p. 5). Jackson further argues that the statute of
limitations does not bar his suit because his exhaustion of
administrative remedies and pursuit of relief in the state
courts tolled limitations (Dkt. 22 at p. 2). Alternatively,
Jackson argues that there is no applicable statute
of limitations because he seeks injunctive relief (Dkt. 22 at
p. 3).

II.
THE PLRA AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
DEFENSE

The
complaint in this case is governed by the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (the "PLRA"). Upon initial screening of
a prisoner civil rights complaint, the PLRA requires a
district court to scrutinize the claims and dismiss the
complaint, in whole or in part, if it determines that the
complaint "is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted;" or "seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). A reviewing court
may dismiss a complaint for these same reasons "at any
time" where a party, like Jackson, proceeds in forma
pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (mandating
dismissal where the complaint is "frivolous or
malicious, " "fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, " or "seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief). The PLRA
also provides that the court "shall on its own motion or
on the motion of a party dismiss an action" if it is
satisfied that the complaint is "frivolous, malicious,
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). Moreover,
Jolley has filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion asserting a time bar.
"A statute of limitations may support dismissal under
Rule 12(b)(6) where it is evident from the plaintiffs
pleadings that the action is barred and the pleadings fail to
raise some basis for tolling or the like." Jones v.
Alcoa, Inc.,339 F.3d 359, 366 (5th Cir. 2003). A t:me
bar can also be a basis for dismissal as frivolous under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Gonzales v. Wyatt, 157
F.3d 1016, 1019-20 (5th Cir. 1998).

Jackson
proceeds pro se in this case. Courts construe
pleadings filed by pro se litigants under a less
stringent standard of review. Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519 (1972) (per curiam). Under this standard, "[a]
document filed pro se is 'to be liberally
construed, ' Estelle [v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 106 (1976)], and 'a pro se complaint,
however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.'" Erickson v. Pardus,551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007). Nevertheless, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal,556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly,550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (observing that courts
"are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation"). The Supreme Court has
clarified that "a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face."'
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570). "A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678.

III.
THIS COMPLAINT IS UNTIMELY.

Jackson's
claims are time-barred.

a.
The applicable statute of limitations

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The
statute of limitations for a suit brought under 42 U.S.C.
&sect; 1983 is determined by the general statute of
limitations governing personal injury actions in the forum
state. Piotrowski v. City of Houston,237 F.3d 567,
576 (5th Cir. 2001). Texas has a two-year statute of
...

Our website includes the first part of the main text of the court's opinion.
To read the entire case, you must purchase the decision for download. With purchase,
you also receive any available docket numbers, case citations or footnotes, dissents
and concurrences that accompany the decision.
Docket numbers and/or citations allow you to research a case further or to use a case in a
legal proceeding. Footnotes (if any) include details of the court's decision. If the document contains a simple affirmation or denial without discussion,
there may not be additional text.

Buy This Entire Record For
$7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.