Secret recording of Hitler in Finland.Admits he underestimated Russia.

As a consequence, when the tank’s hatches were closed the crew was “deaf and blind”, as one commander put it in his memoirs. The commander
could not see very much through the often distorted, cloudy glass of the vision ports on his cupola and was reliant on his binocular periscope. The
other crewmen, who had only a single periscope or a narrow vision slit, could see even less.

The Panther, by contrast, had excellent optics including a pair of clear, high quality periscopes for the driver, hull gunner, and loader; a 5x
magnification sight for the gunner; and a panoramic rangefinder sight for the commander. This, coupled with the 360º-view provided by the vision
blocks in the commander’s cupola, gave Panther crews far better situational awareness than T-34-85 crews.

On tank interiors, the German tank was bigger inside. This did matter, especially when it came to crews surviving:

These design flaws were significant – crew survivability was an important factor in the effectiveness of an armoured force. If an experienced crew
could get clear of their disabled tank, they could fight another day. If unable to escape, their experience an
d training would die with them. The packed interior of the T-34-85 meant that a penetrating strike by an AP round usually killed or mortally
wounded most of the crew, and the lack of adequate escape hatches meant that those that did survive often couldn’t get out before the tank caught
fire.

Which brings us to training. What good is a dead tanker crew? A lot of quality training vanishes in an instant. The Germans had a leg up there:

German training:

While not as extensive as the training given to tank crews earlier in the war, instruction for Panther crews was nonetheless excellent. Enlisted
personnel had to pass an intensive four-month program that emphasized on hands-on practice. Every man had to first train as a driver/mechanic,
including lessons in advanced engine maintenance, before moving on to other crew functions. By end of the four-month program each man was
proficient in all crew roles and an expert in his assigned position. Soldiers that had shown promise during this stage were selected for additional
training as NCOs or officers. Follow-up programs were heavy on the tactical theory and lasted between six and nine months.

And while some of the Russian tanker crews had great training, it was a mixed bag. While many of the leaders were experienced and veterans,
that couldn't make up for the enlisted portion:

The quality of training for T-34-85 crews varied considerably. Commanders were typically well-trained graduates of the Red Army’s tank
training schools. They had up to a year’s instruction, which included tactics and theory as well as hands-on practice in driving, gunnery, and
maintenance. Furthermore, many commanders were combat veterans, either from the tank corps or from other branches of the Red Army; they were generally
quick-witted, observant, and fearless.

Training for enlisted men however was of a far lower calibre. Many drivers had no more than a few hours’ practice at the controls and had
never had any instruction in tactical placement. Loaders were equally under-trained, often having had no more than a day’s basic instruction in
how to handle ammunition and operate the breech. Instruction for gun commanders was a little better, but they still lacked hands-on experience
acquiring targets and firing at moving targets. Worse, conditions in many of the tank training regiments were appalling, with constant food shortages
and tyrannical discipline. Loaders sometimes arrived from basic training too malnourished and weak to lift an AP shell.

Now the one area that was literally the Achilles's heel of the Germans was mobility. While technologically superior and using new technologies instead
of tried-and-true, incremental improvements (ex; Russian tanks) -- the German tanks were horribly inefficient. They sucked gasoline at alarming rates.
Because of their over-engineered engines, they tended to require more maintenance and broke down far more often. I'll gladly give the Russians a
point for this one over the Germans:

In theory it could travel 250 km on road with a full tank of fuel, but units in the field quickly found that the actual range was barely half
that. More importantly, the Panther’s drivetrain was so prone to failure that crews often stopped for repairs more often than they stopped for
fuel. By 1944 the typical combat readiness rate of a Panther battalion was around 35 percent (compared to 80–90 percent in most T-34-85
units).

Now, it doesn't matter if your tank can see better and you have better trained crew. If you're outnumbered and in a tank that's not as combat-ready --
you're at a severe tactical disadvantage.

The Russian tanks weren't all smiles though -- as they had some design issues as well:

T-34-85 was a notoriously poorly balanced vehicle. An emergency stop often resulted in the tank pitching violently forward, sometimes driving the
end of its long gun barrel into the mud. This was a major problem because the driver’s viewport allowed him to see “little better than a
newborn kitten” (as one T-34-85 commander put it) and therefore he rarely spotted obstacles in time to safely avoid them. The commander had
slightly better visibility, but the intercom that linked the two positions was prone to static and unexpected squeals of feedback, so crews often
turned it off.

Now let's talk numbers:

Between the beginning of Panther production in spring 1943 and the defeat of Nazi Germany two years later, 6,000 Panther tanks were built.

During the same period 29,400 T-34-85s rolled off Russian assembly lines. This disparity was increased by the low proportion of Panthers that
were operational at any one time due to their poor mechanical reliability.

Note the numerical disparity! And also note how the reliability of the German tanks also cost them some serious battlefield advantages!

The surprising thing? How many Russian tanks could be taken out vs. German tanks and Russia still be declared the winner:

Consequently, an engagement in which a Panther destroyed four or five T-34-85s before being disabled could still be considered, from a strategic
point of view, a Soviet victory. Over the course of the war, the Soviets manufactured 57,000 T-34s (both 76mm and 85mm variants). Of these,
around 45,000 were destroyed in battle – a loss rate of almost 80 percent.

I'm not sure if you're Russian or not .. but what you're saying about training and weather just isn't true:

Adolf Hitler’s invasion plans called for the Germans to conquer the Soviet Union before the legendary cold could set in, but supply issues and an
unexpectedly spirited resistance combined to stall the advance at Moscow’s doorstep in late-1941. Still clad in their summer uniforms, the
German Wehrmacht had to resort to using newspaper and straw to insulate themselves against subzero temperatures. They soon faced frostbite in
epidemic proportions. Some 100,000 cases were reported by end of 1941, resulting in the amputation of nearly 15,000 limbs.

You think they would have learned from Napoleon, eh? But it wasn't just the troops -- German gear didn't like cold weather. The Russians were on home
turf, fighting in weather they were used to:

The cold also wreaked havoc on Nazi heavy machinery. Tanks and jeeps refused to start, and guns and artillery often froze and failed to fire.
The Soviets were more accustomed to the chill, and used specially designed rifles, skis and camouflage to continue fighting even in some of the
most inhospitable conditions

Russia also allowed women in front-line combat positions:

Nearly one million Soviet women took up arms and served on the front lines of World War II as anti-aircraft gunners, snipers, partisan guerillas and
even fighter pilots.

And Stalin had a "zero quarter given" type standing order -- a fight to the last man edict:

The dictator later upped the ante with July 1942’s famous “Order No. 227,” better known as the “Not One Step Backward!” rule, which
decreed that cowards were to be “liquidated on the spot.” Under this order, any troops who retreated were to be shelled or gunned down by
so-called “blocking detachments”—special units who were positioned behind their own lines and charged with shooting any soldier who tried to
flee.

The Allies gave Russia a lot of aid with the Lend-Lease program during WWII. This helped keep Russia going.

According to research by a team of Soviet historians, the Soviet Union lost a staggering 20,500 tanks from June 22 to December 31, 1941. At the end of
November 1941, only 670 Soviet tanks were available to defend Moscow—that is, in the recently formed Kalinin, Western, and Southwestern Fronts. Only
205 of these tanks were heavy or medium types, and most of their strength was concentrated in the Western Front, with the Kalinin Front having only
two tank battalions (67 tanks) and the Southwestern Front two tank brigades (30 tanks).

Given the disruption to Soviet production and Red Army losses, the Soviet Union was understandably eager to put British armor into action as soon as
possible. According to Biriukov’s service diary, the first 20 British tanks arrived at the Soviet tank training school in Kazan on October 28, 1941,
at which point a further 120 tanks were unloaded at the port of Archangel in northern Russia. Courses on the British tanks for Soviet crews started
during November as the first tanks, with British assistance, were being assembled from their in-transit states and undergoing testing by Soviet
specialists.

The tanks reached the front lines with extraordinary speed. Extrapolating from available statistics, researchers estimate that British-supplied tanks
made up 30 to 40 percent of the entire heavy and medium tank strength of Soviet forces before Moscow at the beginning of December 1941, and certainly
made up a significant proportion of tanks available as reinforcements at this critical point in the fighting. By the end of 1941 Britain had delivered
466 tanks out of the 750 promised.

an engagement in which a Panther destroyed four or five T-34-85s before being disabled could still be considered, from a strategic point of view, a
Soviet victory

This is quite normal. An Army on the defensive will inflict greater losses on an Army on the attack. This was equally true on the Western Front.

You need at the very least 3:1 odds in all areas to succeed in an attack. Sometimes you need 5:1 or even 10:1

and no, the winter had a negligible effect on the war. 100,000 cases of frostbite and 15,000 amputations in an Army nearing the 2 million mark. Hardly
a crippling epidemic.

Then you name Early war losses to demonstrate Soviet deficiency. Ignoring the fact the majority of these tanks were BT-7s and T-26s, and when the
Panzer IIIs came up against the T-34s and KV-1s they were all but invincible. Which is what forced the Germans to develop the Panther in the first
place.

It's true that the high quality engineering of the Germans, in sub zero conditions had its own problems, the precision of the engineering tolerances,
left no leeway as a lot of ordinance just jammed up. Where the often copied pistols and rifles of the quickly produced soviets didn't. Over
engineering had its own problems in practical use. The Kalashnikov works in field conditions better than most of the other stuff, to this day.

I don't mean this in any kind of snidey way but was this ever a mystery? When i was at school (long ago) this was taught as factual history (even had
to do source work). Ergo, at some point this was common knowledge - is this genuinely not the case anymore? Like i say, this isn't an attempt at
rubbish points scoring on my behalf, more genuine confusion that this was a mystery?

For clarity, i should point out i am talking about the decision to invade Romania and the subsequent threat from Russia that this brought. Heck, i am
pretty sure there is even an episode of "The World At War" dedicated to this particular topic.

I don't know, Hitler must have had an Idea on how much Gasoline was required to mount an offensive, I suppose his sideways annexing of Austria was the
start of moving closer to the oilfields all the time. But the Alsace Coal was important as he was turning it into gasoline as well. But he had to
invade France to get it. In fact he had to invade someone to get the resources to mount the next stage.

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