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Water exposures in healthcare settings and during healthcare delivery can place patients at risk for infection with water-related organisms and can potentially lead to outbreaks. We aimed to describe Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) consultations involving water-related organisms leading to healthcare-associated infections (HAIs).

Design:

Retrospective observational study.

Methods:

We reviewed internal CDC records from January 1, 2014, through December 31, 2017, using water-related terms and organisms, excluding Legionella, to identify consultations that involved potential or confirmed transmission of water-related organisms in healthcare. We determined plausible exposure pathways and routes of transmission when possible.

Results:

Of 620 consultations during the study period, we identified 134 consultations (21.6%), with 1,380 patients, that involved the investigation of potential water-related HAIs or infection control lapses with the potential for water-related HAIs. Nontuberculous mycobacteria were involved in the greatest number of investigations (n = 40, 29.9%). Most frequently, investigations involved medical products (n = 48, 35.8%), and most of these products were medical devices (n = 40, 83.3%). We identified a variety of plausible water-exposure pathways, including medication preparation near water splash zones and water contamination at the manufacturing sites of medications and medical devices.

Conclusions:

Water-related investigations represent a substantial proportion of CDC HAI consultations and likely represent only a fraction of all water-related HAI investigations and outbreaks occurring in US healthcare facilities. Water-related HAI investigations should consider all potential pathways of water exposure. Finally, healthcare facilities should develop and implement water management programs to limit the growth and spread of water-related organisms.

A self-administered questionnaire was distributed in 2006 to infection control coordinators to gather data on policies and practices related to the provision of the influenza vaccine and on the measurement and reporting of influenza vaccination rates. Descriptive statistics and associations were calculated, and logistic regression was conducted.

Results.

The response rate was 56% (ie, 555 of 996 US hospitals responded to the questionnaire). Weighting accounted for sampling design and nonresponse. Most hospitals provided the influenza vaccine to employees (100%), credentialed medical staff (ie, independent practitioners; 94%), volunteers (86%), and contract staff (83%); provision for students and residents was less frequent (58%). Only 69% of hospitals measured vaccination rates (mean coverage rate, 55%). Most hospitals that measured coverage included employees (98%) in the vaccination rates, whereas contract staff (53%), credentialed medical staff (56%), volunteers (56%), and students and residents (30%) were less commonly included. Among hospitals measuring coverage, 44% included persons for which vaccine was contraindicated, and 51% included persons who refused vaccination. After adjustment for region and size, hospitals with vaccination plans written into policy (odds ratio, 2.0 [95% confidence interval, 1.22–7.67]) or that addressed internally reporting coverage (odds ratio, 4.8 [95% confidence interval, 2.97–7.66]) were more likely to measure coverage than were hospitals without such plans.

Conclusions.

Hospitals vary in terms of the groups of individuals included in influenza vaccination coverage measurements. Standardized measures may improve comparability of hospital-reported vaccination rates. Measuring coverage in a manner that facilitates identification of occupational groups with low vaccination rates may inform development of targeted interventions.

The medical needs of the approximately 1 million persons residing in assisted living facilities (ALFs) continually become more demanding. Moreover, the number of ALF residents is expected to double by 2030. ALFs are not subject to federal oversight; state regulations that govern ALF infection control are variable. In 2005, two outbreaks of acute hepatitis B virus (HBV) infection in ALFs in Virginia were associated with sharing fingerstick devices used in blood glucose monitoring.

Objective.

To characterize infection control practices, determine compliance with guidelines, and identify educational and policy needs in ALFs in Virginia.

Methods.

Following the outbreaks of HBV infection, educational packets were sent to ALFs in Virginia to inform them of infection control guidelines and recommendations regarding glucose monitoring. A follow-up survey consisting of on-site interviews was conducted in a random sample of ALFs. Differences among infection control practices, according to the size and ownership of the ALFs, were assessed.

Results.

Fifty of 155 ALFs in central Virginia were surveyed. Of the 45 ALFs that had used fingerstick devices, 7 (16%) had shared these devices (without cleaning) between residents. Sharing practices for glucose monitoring equipment did not differ by facility size or ownership. Of all 50 ALFs, 17 (34%) did not offer employees HBV vaccine. HBV vaccine was less frequently offered at ALFs that had fewer than 50 residents, compared with ALFs with at least 50 residents (P < .01), and HBV vaccine was less frequently offered at ALFs that were individually owned, compared with those that were not individually owned (P = .02).

Conclusions.

Despite outreach and long-standing recommendations, approximately 1 in 6 facilities shared fingerstick devices, and more than one-third of ALFs surveyed were considered noncompliant with federal guidelines (Occupational Safety and Health Administration Bloodborne Pathogens Standard). Public health and licensing agencies should work with ALFs to implement infection control measures and prevent disease transmission.

People wounded during bombings or other events resulting in mass casualties or in conjunction with the resulting emergency response may be exposed to blood, body fluids, or tissue from other injured people and thus be at risk for bloodborne infections such as hepatitis B virus, hepatitis C virus, human immunodeficiency virus, or tetanus. This report adapts existing general recommendations on the use of immunization and postexposure prophylaxis for tetanus and for occupational and nonoccupational exposures to bloodborne pathogens to the specific situation of a mass casualty event. Decisions regarding the implementation of prophylaxis are complex, and drawing parallels from existing guidelines is difficult. For any prophylactic intervention to be implemented effectively, guidance must be simple, straightforward, and logistically undemanding. Critical review during development of this guidance was provided by representatives of the National Association of County and City Health Officials, the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists, and representatives of the acute injury care, trauma, and emergency response medical communities participating in the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Terrorism Injuries: Information, Dissemination and Exchange project. The recommendations contained in this report represent the consensus of US federal public health officials and reflect the experience and input of public health officials at all levels of government and the acute injury response community. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2008;2:150–165)

We identified 38 patients with acute HBV infection occurring between February 2000 and February 2002. The cohort study, limited to the 10 months before outbreak detection, included 91 patients with serologic test results and available charts representing 18 case-patients and 73 susceptible patients. Overall, 67 patients (74%) received at least one injection during the observation period. Case-patients received a median of 14 injections (range, 2-25) versus 2 injections (range, 0-17) for susceptible patients (P < .001). Acute infections occurred among 18 (27%) of 67 who received at least one injection versus none of 24 who received no injections (RR, 13.6; CI95, 2.4-undefined). Risk of infection increased 5.2-fold (CI95, 0.6-47.3) for those with 3 to 6 injections and 20.0-fold (CI95, 2.8-143.5) for those with more than 6 injections. Typically, injections consisted of doses of atropine, dexamethasone, vitamin B12, or a combination of these mixed in one syringe. HBV DNA genetic sequences of 24 patients with acute infection and 4 patients with chronic infection were identical in the 1,500-bp region examined. Medical staff were seronegative for HBV infection markers. The same surface was used for storing multidose vials, preparing injections, and dismantling used injection equipment.

In August 2002, the Oklahoma State Department of Health received a report of six patients with unexplained hepatitis C virus (HCV) infection treated in the same pain remediation clinic. We investigated the outbreak's extent and etiology.

Design, Setting, and Participants:

We conducted a retrospective cohort study of clinic patients, including a serologic survey, interviews of infected patients, and reviews of medical records and staff infection control practices. Patients received outpatient pain remediation treatments one afternoon a week in a clinic within a hospital. Cases were defined as HCV or hepatitis B virus (HBV) infections among patients who reported no prior diagnosis or risk factors for disease or reported previous risk factors but had evidence of acute infection.

Results:

Of 908 patients, 795 (87.6%) were tested, and 71 HCV-infected patients (8.9%) and 31 HBV-infected patients (3.9%) met the case definition. Multiple HCV genotypes were identified. Significantly higher HCV infection rates were found among individuals treated after an HCV-infected patient during the same visit (adjusted odds ratio [AOR], 6.2; 95% confidence interval [CI95], 2.4–15.8); a similar association was observed for HBV (AOR, 2.9; CI95, 1.3–6.5). Review of staff practices revealed the nurse anesthetist had been using the same syringe–needle to sequentially administer sedation medications to every treated patient each clinic day.

Conclusions:

Reuse of needles–syringes was the mechanism for patient-to-patient transmission of HCV and HBV in this large nosocomial outbreak. Further education and stricter oversight of infection control practices may prevent future outbreaks.

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