BAYER v. MONROE COUNTY CHILDREN & YOUTH SERVICES

The opinion of the court was delivered by: A. RICHARD CAPUTO, District Judge

MEMORANDUM

Presently before the Court are nine separate motions to dismiss
filed by various Defendants. (Docs. 4, 9, 12, 16, 19, 39, 41, 52,
54.) In total, Defendants' motions raise standing issues,
immunity defenses, failure of Plaintiffs to state a cognizable
cause of action, and Defendant Foster Care Division of Monroe
County's (hereinafter Foster Care Division) lack of a separate
legal identity. For reasons set forth below, I will grant five of
the motions to dismiss in their entirety (Docs. 4, 9, 12, 16,
41); I will deny two of the motions (Docs. 19, 54); and I will
grant two of the motions in part and deny them in part (Docs. 39,
52). The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On January 10, 2003, Plaintiffs Bruce and Angela Bayer were
served with a protection order signed by Detective Michael Robson
of the Pocono Mountain Regional Police Department. (Doc. 1 ¶ 42.)
Pursuant to that order, Plaintiffs' minor children were removed
from their home and placed in protective custody with Monroe
County Children and Youth Services (hereinafter MCCYS), while the children's
biological father was investigated on alleged sexual abuse
charges. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 43, 49.) Plaintiffs assert that the
protection order was defective. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 137-42.) On January
14, 2003, MCCYS filed for an emergency petition which was heard
before Judge Margherita P. Worthington on January 16, 2003. (Doc.
1 ¶ 85.) Plaintiffs assert that the protection order was valid
for only 72 hours and that, therefore, the children were
improperly held in protective services at the time of the
petition on January 14, 2003. Id. At the January 16, 2003,
hearing on the petition, Plaintiff Angela upon the advice of her
counsel agreed to continue the hearing until February 20, 2003.
(Doc. 1 ¶ 100.) Plaintiff Angela asserts that she was under
duress when she agreed to the continuance. Id. Pending the
dependancy hearing on February 20, 2003, Judge Worthington
granted custody of the minor children to MCCYS. (Doc. 1 ¶ 102.)
On January 28, 2003, the sexual abuse case against the children's
biological father was deemed unfounded. (Doc. 1 ¶ 125.)
Plaintiffs assert that various Defendants negligently failed to
petition for the children's release from protective services
prior to the dependancy hearing on February 20, 2003. (Doc. 1 ¶¶
125-32.) Plaintiffs further allege that during their placement in
protective custody the Plaintiffs' minor children received
inadequate medical and psychological care. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 152-69.) At
the hearing on February 20, Judge Worthington denied MCCYS'
petition and returned Plaintiffs' minor children to their care.
(Doc. 1 ¶ 160.)

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 18, 2004, Plaintiffs filed, pro se, a two-hundred
(200) page Complaint alleging violations of their civil rights by
raising forty-one (41) claims against thirty-one (31) Defendants. In the Complaint, Plaintiffs assert
the following claims on behalf of themselves and their minor
children:

1. Count I Violation of Civil Rights Under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the
14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States  Procedural Due Process  Seizure of Gabriel

2. Count II Violation of Civil Rights Under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the
4th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
 Unreasonable Search and Seizure  Seizure of
Gabriel

3. Count III Violation of Civil Rights Under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the
14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States  Substantive Due Process

4. Count IV Violation of Civil Rights Under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the
5th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
 Deprivation of Liberty  Detention of Gabriel

5. Count V Violation of Civil Rights Under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the
14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States  Procedural Due Process  Seizure of Pedro

6. Count VI Violation of Civil Rights Under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the
4th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
 Unreasonable Search and Seizure  Seizure of Pedro

7. Count VII Violation of Civil Rights Under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the
14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States  Substantive Due Process

8. Count VIII Violation of Civil Rights Under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the
5th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
 Deprivation of Liberty  Detention of Pedro

9. Count IX Violation of Civil Rights Under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the
14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States  Equal Protection

10. Count X Violation of Civil Rights Under the 8th Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States  Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Inflicted  Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress 11. Count XI Violation of Civil Rights Under the 1st Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States  Abridging the
Freedom of Speech

37. Count XXXVI Damages to Religious Rights Under 1st Amendment of
the Constitution of the United States and Article 1
Section 3 of the Commonwealth Constitution of
Pennsylvania

38. Count XXXVII Abduction

39. Count XXXVIII Deprivation of Familial Rights

40. Count XXXIV Physical Damages

41. Count XXXV Punitive Damages
On November 29, 2004, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint.
(Doc. 2.) The amended complaint consisted of the first five pages
of the original Complaint with a different spelling of a
defendant's name. Plaintiffs then filed an amendment to complaint
(Doc. 3) on December 8, 2004. Both the amended complaint and the
amendment to complaint were stricken per Order dated April 11,
2005. (Doc. 96.) On December 22, 2004, the Plaintiffs were
ordered to retain representation for their minor children within
20 days. (Doc. 14.) No counsel entered an appearance for the
children and they were dismissed from the suit on April 8, 2005.
(Doc. 90.) Defendants President Judge Ronald Vican, Judge
Margherita P. Worthington, David Williamson, Mark Pazuhanich,
District Attorney's Office of Monroe County, Elizabeth Weekes,
Judy Munoz, Colleen Cooper, and Foster Care Division of Monroe
County filed the nine motions to dismiss presently before the
Court. (Docs. 4, 9, 12, 16, 19, 39, 41, 52, 54.) Five of the nine
motions are titled as motions to dismiss the amended complaint.
(Docs. 4, 9, 41, 52, 54.) Because the motions address the
underlying claims in the original Complaint, I will treat four of
the five as motions to dismiss the original Complaint.*fn2
(Docs. 4, 9, 41, 52.) Plaintiff filed briefs in opposition to the
motions to dismiss. These matters are now ripe for disposition.

LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides
for the dismissal of a complaint, in whole or in part, for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Dismissal is appropriate only if, accepting all factual
allegations in the complaint as true and "drawing all reasonable
inferences in the plaintiff's favor, no relief could be granted
under any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the
complaint." Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, Inc. v. Mirage
Resorts Inc., 140 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 1998).

In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court should consider the
allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint
and matters of public record. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v.
White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). The Court may also consider "undisputedly authentic" documents
where the plaintiff's claims are based on the documents and the
defendant has attached a copy of the document to the motion to
dismiss. Id. The Court need not assume that the plaintiff can
prove facts that were not alleged in the complaint, see City of
Pittsburgh v. West Penn Power Co., 147 F.3d 256, 263 (3d Cir.
1998), nor credit a complaint's "bald assertions" or "legal
conclusions." Morse v. Lower Marion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902,
906 (3d Cir. 1997).

When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court's role is
limited to determining whether the plaintiff is entitled to offer
evidence in support of the claims. See Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). The Court does not consider whether the
plaintiff will ultimately prevail. See id. In order to survive
a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must set forth information
from which each element of a claim may be inferred. See Kost v.
Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). The defendant bears
the burden of establishing that the plaintiff's complaint fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Gould
Elecs. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 178 (3d Cir. 2000).

Defendants raise a number of issues in their motions to dismiss
concerning lack of standing. Standing doctrine determines whether
a litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of a dispute or of particular issues. Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-51 (1984) (quoting Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)). The requirement of standing has a core
component that is derived directly from the Constitution and
embraces several judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise
of federal jurisdiciton. Id. at 751. One such limit is the
general prohibition on litigants raising another person's legal
rights. Id. Plaintiffs run afoul of this limitation in two
ways. First, they raise criminal offenses in the Complaint, and
second, they attempt to bring claims on behalf of their minor
children without having secured counsel to represent them.

i. Criminal Offenses

In American jurisprudence "a private citizen lacks a judicially
cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of
another." Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973).
Plaintiffs include counts alleging criminal offenses in their
Complaint. To the degree Plaintiffs are asserting that Defendants
should be charged with these offenses, they have no legally
recognizable interest in Defendants' prosecution. Counts XII
(Conspiracy Against Rights), XIII (Deprivation of Rights Under
Color of Law), XVIII (Oath of Office),*fn3 XIX (Kidnapping 
Federal), XX (Kidnapping  State), XXI (Hostage Taking), XXII
(Endangering the Welfare of a Child  Gabriel), XXIII
(Endangering the Welfare of a Child  Pedro), and XXXIII (Abuse
of Office) of the Complaint will be dismissed for lack of
standing. Count XIV of the Complaint will also be dismissed to
the degree it asserts that Defendants should be charged with
violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq., the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).*fn4

In addition, Defendants Mark Pazuhanich and the District
Attorney's Office of Monroe County will be dismissed from
Plaintiffs' suit. Plaintiffs' only allegations against these
Defendants is that they failed to criminally prosecute the other
Defendants in Plaintiffs' suit. As stated above, Plaintiffs have
no legally recognizable interest in the criminal prosecution of
the Defendants. Therefore, I will grant the Motion to Dismiss
Amended Complaint Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) on Behalf of
Defendants, Mark Pazuhanich and District Attorney's Office of
Monroe County (Doc. 9).

ii. Children's claims

Non-lawyer parents who proceed pro se may not represent their
children in federal proceedings in the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals. See Collinsgru v. Palmyra Bd. of Educ., 161 F.3d 225,
231 (3rd Cir. 1998) (citing Osei-Afriyie v. Medical College of
Pennsylvania, 937 F.2d 876, 883 (3d Cir. 1991)) ("It is . . .
well-established in this Circuit that the right to proceed pro
se in federal court does not give non-lawyer parents the right
to represent their children in proceedings before a federal
court."). As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has explained,
the purpose of this rule is to protect the interests of the
children: "[I]t is not in the interest of minors or incompetents
that they be represented by non-attorneys. Where they have claims
that require adjudication, they are entitled to trained legal
assistance so their rights may be fully protected."
Osei-Afriyie, 937 F.2d at 883 (citing Meeker v. Kercher, 782 F.2d 153, 154 (10th Cir.
1986)). As stated previously, Plaintiffs were ordered to retain
representation for their children within 20 days of December 22,
2004. (Doc. 14.) No counsel entered an appearance within the 20
days allowed by the Court and the children were dismissed from
the case by Order of the Court dated April 8, 2005. (Doc. 90.) As
such, all claims in the Complaint that address the rights of the
minor children will be dismissed.

b. Uncontested Motion to Dismiss

Defendant Cooper filed a motion to dismiss asserting that
Plaintiffs failed to state a cognizable cause of action against
her. In their response, Plaintiffs acknowledge that they have
failed to state any claims against Defendant Cooper. (Doc. 47.)
As Defendant's motion is uncontested, I will grant the Motion to
Dismiss of Defendant, Colleen Cooper, M.D. Pursuant to F.R.C.P.
12(b)(6) (Doc. 16). All claims against Defendant Cooper will be
dismissed.

c. Not a Separate Entity

Plaintiffs have named both Monroe County and the Foster Care
Division of Monroe County as Defendants. Defendant Foster Care
Division is merely a sub-unit of Monroe County and, therefore,
simplification of the case warrants dismissal of Defendant Foster
Care Division. See Patterson v. Armstrong County Children &
Youth Servs., 141 F. Supp. 2d 512, 542 (W.D. Pa. 2001). As such,
I will grant the Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint Pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) on Behalf of Defendant, Foster Care
Division of Monroe County (Doc. 52) to the degree it seeks
dismissal of Defendant Foster Care Division. The motion will be
denied to the extent it seeks dismissal of the claims against Monroe County.*fn5

d. Absolute Immunity

Immunity gives individuals the ability to perform their tasks
and apply their discretion without fear or threat of retaliation.
See Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 125 (3d Cir. 2001).
Defendants President Judge Vican, Judge Worthington, Williamson,
Pazuhanich, District Attorney's Office of Monroe County, Weekes,
and Munoz argue that they have absolute immunity from suit. For
the reasons set out below, I find that each of the Defendants are
immune.

i. President Judge Ronald Vican & Judge Margherita P.
Worthington

A judge acting in their judicial capacity, within their
jurisdiction, is absolutely immune from suit. Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978). When parties deal with a
judge in their judicial capacity and they perform a function
normally performed by a judge, the judge is entitled to full
immunity for their actions. Id. at 362. First, Plaintiffs
allege that President Judge Vican failed to perform his duties as
President Judge of the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas by not
demanding that Judge Worthington return the Plaintiffs' children.
(Doc. 1 ¶¶ 440-42.) Plaintiffs do not make any other allegations
that involve President Judge Vican. As such, President Judge
Vican is entitled to immunity from Plaintiffs' suit regarding
decisions he made during the performance of his duties as
president judge. All claims against President Judge Vican will be
dismissed. Second, it is uncontested that Judge Worthington acted
within her jurisdiction. Plaintiffs claim only that Judge Worthington was involved in an in camera
meeting, held a side-bar with counsel during proceedings, and
questioned a witness on the stand. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 95, 117, 118.) Such
actions are clearly functions normally performed by a judge. As
such, Judge Worthington is immune from Plaintiffs' suit.
Therefore, I will grant Judicial Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs' Complaint and Amended Complaint (Doc. 12). All claims
against President Judge Vican and Judge Worthington will be
dismissed.

ii. David Williamson  Gaurdian ad litem

When performing certain duties, guardian ad litems are entitled
to absolute judicial immunity. Hughes, 242 F.3d at 127. "A
guardian ad litem would be immune in exercising such functions as
testifying in court, prosecuting custody or neglect petitions,
and making reports and recommendations to the court in which the
guardian acts as an actual functionary or arm of the
court. . . ." Gardener v. Parson, 874 F.2d 131, 146 (3rd Cir.
1989). Plaintiffs assert only that Defendant WIlliamson was
involved in a side-bar, an in camera meeting, and that he failed
to file an emergency petition or follow through with Plaintiffs'
complaints about the children's medical and psychological care
while they were in protective custody. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 117, 118, 126,
205.) As noted earlier, Plaintiffs' minor children have been
dismissed from this suit and Plaintiffs may not assert claims
addressing the rights of the children. Plaintiffs' remaining
allegations clearly pertain to protected functions of a guardian
ad litem. As such, Defendant Williamson is entitled to absolute
immunity.

Defendant Williamson concludes his motion to dismiss by
requesting the Court to impose sanctions on Plaintiffs. Defendant
Williamson has not properly motioned for sanctions against Plaintiffs, and the Court will not impose them
through its own initiative. Under Rule 11(c)(1)(A), if Defendant
Williamson seeks to allege that Plaintiffs have violated Rule 11,
he must do so in a separate motion. See Diamond Triumph Auto
Glass Inc. v. Safelite Glass Corp., 344 F. Supp. 2d 936, 944 n.
6 (M.D. Pa. 2004). Absent a motion for sanctions, Rule 11 allows
sanctions to be imposed against a party through the Court's
inherent power and its own initiative. Circumstances that may
justify sanctions pursuant to a court's inherent power include
"cases where a party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously,
wantonly, or for oppressive reasons. . . ." In re: Prudential
Ins. Co. America Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions,
278 F.3d 175, 189 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.,
501 U.S. 32, 45-46 (1991)). When acting on its own initiative,
however, a district court should first enter an order describing
the specific conduct that it believes will warrant sanctions and
direct the person it seeks to sanction to show cause why
particular sanctions should not be imposed. Martin v. Brown,
63 F.3d 1252, 1264 (3d Cir. 1995). Additionally, the Court may take
Plaintiffs' status as pro se litigants into account when
considering the appropriateness of Rule 11 sanctions. Martin v.
Farmers First Bank, No. 92-6169, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9115, at
*27 (E.D. Pa. July 7, 1993) (citing Vukadinovich v. McCarthy,
901 F.2d 1439, 1445 (7th Cir. 1990); see also Hammond v.
Creative Fin. Planning Org., No. 91-2257, 1992 WL 176404, at *3
(E.D. Pa. July 15, 1992). Taking into account the pro se status
of Plaintiffs, the Court will not impose sanctions on Plaintiffs
through its own initiative. Defendant Williamson's request for
sanctions will be denied. I will grant the remainder of Defendant
Williamson's amended motion to dismiss the Complaint (Doc. 39). I
will deny his original motion to dismiss (Doc. 19) as moot. Lastly, I will deny Defendant Williamson's motion to
dismiss the Plaintiffs' amended complaint (Doc. 54) as moot
pursuant to the Order dated April 11, 2005 (Doc. 96) striking the
Plaintiffs' amended complaint and amendment to complaint (Docs.
2, 3).

iii. Elizabeth Weekes  Counsel

Caseworkers and attorneys who prosecute dependency proceedings
"are entitled to absolute immunity for their actions in
petitioning and in formulating and making recommendations to the
state court. . . ." See Ernst v. Child & Youth Servs. of Chester
County, 108 F.3d 486, 486-88 (3d Cir. 1997). Defendant Weekes
appeared as counsel for Monroe County Children and Youth Services
in the dependency proceedings. Plaintiffs allege only that
Defendant Weekes filed an emergency petition for a dependency
hearing and advocated her client's position in the dependency
proceedings. Therefore, Defendant Weekes is entitled to absolute
immunity. As such, I will grant the Motion to Dismiss Amended
Complaint Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) on Behalf of
Defendant, Elizabeth Weekes (Doc. 4).

iv. Judy Munoz  Court Appointed Psychologist

Defendant Munoz was appointed by the Court of Common Pleas of
Monroe County to perform psychological evaluations on Plaintiffs'
minor children. (Doc. 1 ¶ 23.) Plaintiffs assert that Defendant
Munoz was negligent in making her recommendation because she
failed to notice that the children were allegedly mis-medicated,
and that her appointment should not have been made by the court
because the petition before the court was allegedly faulty.
Neither of these allegations destroy the immunity Defendant Munoz
is entitled to as an appointed psychologist performing functions
integral to the judicial process. See Hughes, 242 F.3d at 127. Defendant Munoz
is immune from Plaintiffs' suit and, therefore, I will grant
Defendant Munoz's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) (Doc. 41).

CONCLUSION

Defendants President Judge Vican, Judge Worthington, David
Williamson, Elizabeth Weekes, Judy Munoz, Colleen Cooper, Mark
Pazuhanich, District Attorney's Office of Monroe County, and
Foster Care Division of Monroe County will be dismissed. First,
Plaintiffs have no legally recognizable interest in the
prosecution of criminal offenses and, as such, Plaintiffs have
failed to allege that Defendant Pazuhanich and the District
Attorney's Office of Monroe County violated their rights. In
addition, Defendant Cooper's motion to dismiss is uncontested.
Moreover, Defendant Foster Care Division is merely a sub-unit of
a remaining defendant, Monroe County. And lastly, Defendants
President Judge Vican, Judge Worthington, Williamson, Weekes, and
Munoz are entitled to immunity from suit. As such, I will grant
five of the nine motions to dismiss before the Court in their
entirety (Docs. 4, 9, 12, 16, 41); I will deny two of the motions
(Docs. 19, 54); and I will grant two of the motions in part and
deny them in part (Docs. 39, 52). ORDER

(2) Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint Pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) on Behalf of Defendants, Mark
Pazuhanich and District Attorney's Office of Monroe
County (Doc. 9) is GRANTED. All claims against Mark
Pazuhanich and the District Attorney's Office of
Monroe County are DISMISSED.

(5) Defendant Munoz's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs'
Amended Complaint Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) (Doc. 41)
is GRANTED. All claims against Judy Munoz are
DISMISSED. (6) Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint Pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) on Behalf of Defendant, Foster
Care Division of Monroe County (Doc. 52) is GRANTED
in part and DENIED in part as follows:

(a) Defendant's Motion to Dismiss insofar as it seeks
dismissal of Defendant Foster Care Division of Monroe
County is GRANTED. All claims against Defendant
Foster Care Division of Monroe County are
DISMISSED.

(b) Defendant's request for dismissal of claims
against Monroe County is DENIED.

(7) Amended Motion of Defendant, David Williamson,
Esquire to Dismiss Any and All Claims Raised Against
Defendant, David Williamson, Esquire Pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for Failure
to State a Claim Upon Which Relief May be Granted and
Motion of Defendant, David Williamson, Esquire for
Sanctions Against Plaintiff (Doc. 39) is GRANTED in
part and DENIED in part as follows:

(a) Defendant Williamson's request for sanctions is
DENIED.

(b) Remainder of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is
GRANTED. All claims against Defendant David
Williamson are DISMISSED.

(8) Motion of Defendant, David Williamson, Esquire to
Dismiss Any and All Claims Against Him Pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for Failure
to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can be Granted and
Motion of Defendant, David Williamson, Esquire for
Sanctions Against Plaintiff (Doc. 54) is DENIED as
moot.

(9) Motion of Defendant, David Williamson, Esquire to
Dismiss Paragraphs 118, 122, 126, 205, 279, 315, 322,
323, and 466, Along With Counts XXIX and XXXIII of
Plaintiffs' Complaint Pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for Failure to State a Claim
Upon Which Relief May be Granted and Motion of
Defendant, David Williamson, Esquire for Sanctions
Against Plaintiff (Doc. 19) is DENIED as moot.

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