Federalist No. 20

Subject: The Insufficiency fo the Present Confederation to Preserve
the Union (Continued From No. 19.)

To the People of the State of New York:

THE United Netherlands are a confederacy of republics, or rather
of aristocracies of a very remarkable texture, yet confirming
all the lessons derived from those which we have already reviewed.

The union is composed of seven coequal and sovereign states,
and each state or province is a composition of equal and independent
cities. In all important cases, not only the provinces but
the cities must be unanimous.

The sovereignty of the Union is represented by the States-General,
consisting usually of about fifty deputies appointed by the
provinces. They hold their seats, some for life, some for six,
three, and one years; from two provinces they continue in appointment
during pleasure.

The States-General have authority to enter into treaties and
alliances; to make war and peace; to raise armies and equip
fleets; to ascertain quotas and demand contributions. In all
these cases, however, unanimity and the sanction of their constituents
are requisite. They have authority to appoint and receive ambassadors;
to execute treaties and alliances already formed; to provide
for the collection of duties on imports and exports; to regulate
the mint, with a saving to the provincial rights; to govern
as sovereigns the dependent territories. The provinces are
restrained, unless with the general consent, from entering
into foreign treaties; from establishing imposts injurious
to others, or charging their neighbors with higher duties than
their own subjects. A council of state, a chamber of accounts,
with five colleges of admiralty, aid and fortify the federal
administration.

The executive magistrate of the union is the stadtholder, who
is now an hereditary prince. His principal weight and influence
in the republic are derived from this independent title; from
his great patrimonial estates; from his family connections
with some of the chief potentates of Europe; and, more than
all, perhaps, from his being stadtholder in the several provinces,
as well as for the union; in which provincial quality he has
the appointment of town magistrates under certain regulations,
executes provincial decrees, presides when he pleases in the
provincial tribunals, and has throughout the power of pardon.

As stadtholder of the union, he has, however, considerable
prerogatives.

In his political capacity he has authority to settle disputes
between the provinces, when other methods fail; to assist at
the deliberations of the States-General, and at their particular
conferences; to give audiences to foreign ambassadors, and
to keep agents for his particular affairs at foreign courts.

In his military capacity he commands the federal troops,
provides for garrisons, and in general regulates military affairs;
disposes of all appointments, from colonels to ensigns, and
of the governments and posts of fortified towns.

In his marine capacity he is admiral-general, and superintends
and directs every thing relative to naval forces and other
naval affairs; presides in the admiralties in person or by
proxy; appoints lieutenant-admirals and other officers; and
establishes councils of war, whose sentences are not executed
till he approves them.

His revenue, exclusive of his private income, amounts to three
hundred thousand florins. The standing army which he commands
consists of about forty thousand men.

Such is the nature of the celebrated Belgic confederacy, as
delineated on parchment. What are the characters which practice
has stamped upon it? Imbecility in the government; discord
among the provinces; foreign influence and indignities; a precarious
existence in peace, and peculiar calamities from war.

It was long ago remarked by Grotius, that nothing but the hatred
of his countrymen to the house of Austria kept them from being
ruined by the vices of their constitution.

The union of Utrecht, says another respectable writer, reposes
an authority in the States-General, seemingly sufficient to
secure harmony, but the jealousy in each province renders the
practice very different from the theory.

The same instrument, says another, obliges each province to
levy certain contributions; but this article never could, and
probably never will, be executed; because the inland provinces,
who have little commerce, cannot pay an equal quota.

In matters of contribution, it is the practice to waive the
articles of the constitution. The danger of delay obliges the
consenting provinces to furnish their quotas, without waiting
for the others; and then to obtain reimbursement from the others,
by deputations, which are frequent, or otherwise, as they can.
The great wealth and influence of the province of Holland enable
her to effect both these purposes.

It has more than once happened, that the deficiencies had to
be ultimately collected at the point of the bayonet; a thing
practicable, though dreadful, in a confedracy where one of
the members exceeds in force all the rest, and where several
of them are too small to meditate resistance; but utterly impracticable
in one composed of members, several of which are equal to each
other in strength and resources, and equal singly to a vigorous
and persevering defense.

Foreign ministers, says Sir William Temple, who was himself
a foreign minister, elude matters taken ad referendum, by
tampering with the provinces and cities. In 1726, the treaty
of Hanover was delayed by these means a whole year. Instances
of a like nature are numerous and notorious.

In critical emergencies, the States-General are often compelled
to overleap their constitutional bounds. In 1688, they concluded
a treaty of themselves at the risk of their heads. The treaty
of Westphalia, in 1648, by which their independence was formerly
and finally recognized, was concluded without the consent of
Zealand. Even as recently as the last treaty of peace with
Great Britain, the constitutional principle of unanimity was
departed from. A weak constitution must necessarily terminate
in dissolution, for want of proper powers, or the usurpation
of powers requisite for the public safety. Whether the usurpation,
when once begun, will stop at the salutary point, or go forward
to the dangerous extreme, must depend on the contingencies
of the moment. Tyranny has perhaps oftener grown out of the
assumptions of power, called for, on pressing exigencies, by
a defective constitution, than out of the full exercise of
the largest constitutional authorities.

Notwithstanding the calamities produced by the stadtholdership,
it has been supposed that without his influence in the individual
provinces, the causes of anarchy manifest in the confederacy
would long ago have dissolved it. ``Under such a government,''
says the Abbe Mably, ``the Union could never have subsisted,
if the provinces had not a spring within themselves, capable
of quickening their tardiness, and compelling them to the same
way of thinking. This spring is the stadtholder.'' It is remarked
by Sir William Temple, ``that in the intermissions of the stadtholdership,
Holland, by her riches and her authority, which drew the others
into a sort of dependence, supplied the place.''

These are not the only circumstances which have controlled
the tendency to anarchy and dissolution. The surrounding powers
impose an absolute necessity of union to a certain degree,
at the same time that they nourish by their intrigues the constitutional
vices which keep the republic in some degree always at their
mercy.

The true patriots have long bewailed the fatal tendency of
these vices, and have made no less than four regular experiments
by EXTRAORDINARY ASSEMBLIES, convened for the special purpose,
to apply a remedy. As many times has their laudable zeal found
it impossible to UNITE THE PUBLIC COUNCILS in reforming the
known, the acknowledged, the fatal evils of the existing constitution.
Let us pause, my fellow-citizens, for one moment, over this
melancholy and monitory lesson of history; and with the tear
that drops for the calamities brought on mankind by their adverse
opinions and selfish passions, let our gratitude mingle an
ejaculation to Heaven, for the propitious concord which has
distinguished the consultations for our political happiness.

A design was also conceived of establishing a general tax to
be administered by the federal authority. This also had its
adversaries and failed.

This unhappy people seem to be now suffering from popular
convulsions, from dissensions among the states, and from the
actual invasion of foreign arms, the crisis of their distiny.
All nations have their eyes fixed on the awful spectacle. The
first wish prompted by humanity is, that this severe trial
may issue in such a revolution of their government as will
establish their union, and render it the parent of tranquillity,
freedom and happiness: The next, that the asylum under which,
we trust, the enjoyment of these blessings will speedily be
secured in this country, may receive and console them for the
catastrophe of their own.

I make no apology for having dwelt so long on the contemplation
of these federal precedents. Experience is the oracle of truth;
and where its responses are unequivocal, they ought to be
conclusive and sacred. The important truth, which it unequivocally
pronounces in the present case, is that a sovereignty over
sovereigns, a government over governments, a legislation for
communities, as contradistinguished from individuals, as it
is a solecism in theory, so in practice it is subversive of
the order and ends of civil polity, by substituting VIOLENCE
in place of LAW, or the destructive COERCION of the SWORD in
place of the mild and salutary COERCION of the MAGISTRACY.