This textbook brings together the main developments in non-cooperative game theory from the 1950s to the present. After opening with a number of lively examples, Ritzberger starts by considering the theory of decisions under uncertainty. He then turns to representations of games, first introducing extensive forms and then normal forms. The remainder of the text is devoted to solution theory, going from basic solution concepts like rationalizable strategies, Nash equilibrium, and correlated
equilibrium to refinements of Nash equilibrium.

Foundations of Non-Cooperative Game Theory covers all material relevant for a first graduate course in game theory, plus some issues only touched on by other texts. In particular, this book contains an in-depth discussion of perfect recall and related concepts, including a proof of Kuhn's theorem. It provides an introduction to the Thompson transformations for extensive forms, and a section on the reflection of extensive form structures in normal form games. In addition to the standard material on basic solution concepts, strategy subsets closed under rational behavior are covered, as well as fixed sets under the
best-reply correspondence. Refinements of Nash equilibrium driven by backwards induction in the extensive form or by strategy trembles in the normal form are presented, and strategic stability, the geometry of the Nash equilibrium correspondence, and index theory for Nash equilibrium components are discussed in depth.

Ritzberger provides numerous examples and exercises to aid the reader's understanding, most of which are motivated by applications of game theory in economics. While advanced mathematical machinery is used on occasions, an effort has been made to include as many explanations for formal concepts as possible, making this text an invaluable tool for
teachers, students, and researchers of microeconomics and game theory.

Readership: Teachers and students of advanced undergraduate or first-year graduate courses in game theory; researchers in microeconomics and/or game theory.

Klaus Ritzberger, Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna

"There are some themes that one will not find elsewhere, such as the extensive discussion of the Thompson transformations and normal-form information sets, as well as the treatment of strategic stability and index theory ... the inclusion of these topics will make this textbook particularly attractive for researchers." - Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

"... intended for use in graduate programmes. It will also be very useful for researchers in the field who want to look up some definitions or proofs they do not completely recall, and for those who want to learn about recent developments in game theory." -
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

I. Games and Decisions1: Introducing Games
2: Decisions under UncertaintyII. Game Representations3: Games in Extensive Form
4: Games in Normal FormIII. Solutions of Games5: Solving Games
6: Refined Nash Equilibria

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