Although I have suggested on countless occasions that supporting the anti-occupation forces does not entail support for the specific political purview of those doing the fighting, I must admit that the following, from Crooked Timber, made me pause:

Bad news from some newspapers; there are suggestions coming through that Sadr was whiling away the time in Najaf by running a sharia court, complete with executions and mutilations.

The specific allegations about the 20 bodies in Najaf are not what I would call established fact - the bodies might simply be casualties of the fighting, and the fact that the allegations are being made by the Iraqi government undercuts their credibility somewhat given the number of fibs they’ve told about Najaf over the last few weeks - but the general historical sweep is likely to be accurate. When and if Sadr and Sistani are brought into the political process, it is very likely indeed that one of their main priorities will be to introduce sharia courts, and sharia courts execute and mutilate people.

While I recoil somewhat from the implicit suggestion that all sharia courts engage in these practises (its a matter of contex; the sharia courts soon to be made available to Canadian Muslims will presumably not be a source of torture), I think it is self-evident that this is what any theocratic or quasi-theocratic style government in Iraq would do. However, there are a couple of points that need to be made. While most Iraqis support al-Sadr's war against the occupiers, only 2% have expressed an interest in seeing him elected President. Presumably, however, the longer the occupiers stay and the more oppressive the Iraqi interim government becomes, the greater the support will be at elections for religious parties.

[T]he same formations are best placed to mobilise votes and intimidate dissidents, while political parties and civil associations have not had the chance to build up constituencies.

...

What, in any case, does it mean to “apply the shari’a”? We have seen how doubtful it is in the case of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In relation to public law and functions, the shari’a’s indeterminacy makes it a means of arbitrary rule. Its only clear hallmarks (though even these are much disputed) are in the spheres of family and women and of aspects of public morality. These become the fields of display of religious authority.

Although I remain sceptical of those whose stance has always been to support the war and the occupation (pretending, as if they didn't know better, that the Americans intended democracy), especially when they denounce "Islamo-fascists", I fear that if the occupation does not end and democratic elections are not obtained, we on the left will be having to denounce a regime that is almost as brutal as Saddam's - either because Allawi has promulgated martial law, or because Sistani/Sadr have promulgated shari'a law. And, in the background, US troops will be marauding around areas which continue to show any sign of defiance. (The recent assault on Najaf may have taken as many as 1,000 lives. The raids on Fallujah took 600. How long before Basra, Kufa or Sadr City are added to that list of atrocities?)

Those who simply wish to see the resistance crushed fail to understand the reasons for it. As Zubaida puts it:

"One year after the occupation and the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime the great majority of Iraqis are worse off."

Reports indicate that the Sadrist support among the Shi’a resides in the poor slums of Baghdad, especially among the young in Sadr City. This location has always been the centre for radical agitation. It was built, with strong leftist support, in the late 1950s and early 1960s as Madinat al-Thawra or Revolution City by General Abd-al-Karim Qasim, who overthrew the Iraqi monarchy in 1958. It became a stronghold of the Iraqi Communist Party, and was one of the main centres of resistance to the Ba’thist putsch of 1963, occasioning a massacre. Saddam made the area his own as Saddam City, and in 2003 it was re-named Sadr City, after the martyr father Muhammd Sadiq al-Sadr (killed by Saddam in 1999).

There isn't, at the moment, any particular electoral support for al-Sadr. I guess most Iraqis see him as mooching off of his father's reputation (which he is) and attempting to illegitimately collect dues in the dead mujtahid's name (which, again, he is). Even as Iraqis sympathise with the rebellion against a corrupt and autocratic occupation, only his hard-core supporters regard him as a potential political leader. As Milan Rai reports, support for an religious state in Iraq is low, while most thirst for authentic democracy.

He also notes, however, that "Iraq is hungry for democracy. The US has little appetite for such dangerous fare.":

‘[T]he past year has shown that Iraq’s vision of democracy and the projection of American power do not necessarily coexist. The most glaring illustration is in Iraq itself, where the US has been resisting early elections out of fear that radicals, whether Shia or Sunni, would make gains.’ (Roula Khalaf, FT, 23 Mar., p. 21)

Withdraw the troops; free elections now; Iraq for the Iraqis.

Update: Tex links to a story about the same accusations in which it seems that they are likely to be a confection of the Iraqi police. I regret that my cynicism may have temporarily fucked off to the pub.