"Plaintiff can rest assured that if any reasonable grounds existed for me to recuse myself from this case, I would have done so, if for no other reason than to avoid spending precious time on such frivolous filings."

Ruling as expected...

"Plaintiff can rest assured that if any reasonable grounds existed for me to recuse myself from this case, I would have done so, if for no other reason than to avoid spending precious time on such frivolous filings."

By way of background, plaintiff is a national leader in the so called “birther” movement,

whose mission is to establish that President Obama is ineligible to serve as President of the United States because he was not born in the United States, as he claims. To that end, Ms. Taitz has been involved in a variety of cases throughout the country, challenging directly or indirectly, President Obama

’

s right to hold office.

See, e.g.

,

Taitz v. Michael Astrue, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration

, RCL-11-402 (D.D.C.);

Liberi v. Taitz

, 759 F. Supp. 2d 573 (E.D. Pa. 2010),

appeal dismissed

, 425 F. App’x 132 (3rd Cir. 2011);

Rhodes v. MacDonald

, 670 F. Supp. 2d 1363 (M. D. Ga. 2009);

Cook v. Good

, 2009 WL 216535 (M.D. Ga. 2009);

Rhodes v. Gates

, 09-cv-0703 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 2009);

Cook v. Simtech, Inc.

, 09-cv-1382 (M.D. Fla. 2009). In her motion, plaintiff asserts that I had a duty to disclose that I was appointed by President Obama and to recuse myself because my appointment by President Obama created an actual conflict of interest in regard to the case.

Id.

at 1

–

2, 12. In addition, Ms. Taitz maintains that recusal was required because I had a pecuniary interest in the outcome of her case.

Id

. at 10, 12. In general, she posits that if Pr

esident Obama’s presidency is not valid, then

my federal judicial appointment would be rendered void and I would lose my judgeship as well as my

“lifetime high salary and benefits.”

Id

. at 11. She explains further,

id.

at 5: “[I]f Judge

Hollander were to order the release of the Social Security number in question and it would

invalid, null and void and his appointment of Judge Hollander would be rendered null and void . . . .

”

In plaintiff

’

s view, my failure to disclose the alleged

conflict constitutes “judicial

misconduct and, possib

ly, treason …

,

” because I have aided “a citizen of Indonesia, Barry

Soebarkah, aka Barry Soe

toro, aka Barry Obama’s use of stolen and fabricated IDs.”

Id

. at 12. Section 455 of Title 28 of the United States Code does not authorize reopening of closed litigation. But, F.R. Civ. P. 60(b) permit

s a party to file a motion to “relieve [the] party … from a final judgment” on a variety of grounds.

Liljeberg v. Health Serv. Acquisition Corp.

, 486 U.S. 847, 863 (1988) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 455

“

does not, on its own, authorize the reopening of closed litigation

”

but that Rule 60(b)

“

provides a procedure whereby, in appropriate cases, a party may be relieved of a final judgment

”

).

See

Katyle v. Penn Nat’l Gaming, Inc.

, 637 F.3d 462, 470 n.4 (4th Cir.) (stating that the federal rules do not do not contain an express provision

for a “motion for reconsideration” of a final judgment

),

cert. denied

, ____ U.S. ____, 132 S. Ct. 115 (2011). In particular, Rule 60(b) allows a party to obtain relief from a final judgment based on: (1)

Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief.