To paraphrase the quote most often attributed to John Maynard Keynes, I reserve the right to change my mind should new evidence present itself, but so far there is no proof whatsoever of Iranian interference to any significant degree in Bahrain's internal affairs. Certainly Iran is not "responsible" for the recent uprisings in Bahrain.

Needless to say, this view is seldom shared by those on the Arab side of the Gulf. The authorities in Manama, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi in particular have been resolutely maintaining that Iran, via its nefarious Shia religious ties and untold interference by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRGC), has been a major instigator of the unrest in Bahrain, if not the main one.

Whatever their reason for believing the worst about Iran, the reality is that by blaming the Revolutionary Guard and the mullahs in Tehran, they are abdicating responsibility from Bahrain's elite.

Instead of questioning the fundamental premise of minority Sunni rule in Bahrain; the accusations of institutionalised disenfranchisement of the Shia or perennial question of corruption, the blame is instead diverted to the external enemy.

This is not to ignore the very real likelihood that Iran has indeed had agents of the Revolutionary Guard working away in Manama and elsewhere on the Arab side of the Gulf. For example, an Iranian spy ring was recently caught and sentenced in Kuwait and it would seem only logical to note that there are others as yet unfound. Yet there is a sizeable distance between supposing or even finding Iranian agents in, say, Bahrain, and concluding that they are the primary cause of unrest.

For many based in the Gulf the fact that a leader of a political party in Bahrain – Hassan Mushaima of al-Haq – stopped off in Beirut en route to Bahrain, or that media outlets in Iran jingoistically and provocatively stir the pot, is ample evidence for concluding that Iran and its proxies are behind the recent troubles. Add to this the fact that Iran invaded the Tunb and Musa islands in 1971 and it is portrayed as an open and shut case.

Clearly, this hardly amounts to anything approaching solid evidence. A judge would surely deem such factors either plainly irrelevant or at best the most circumstantial of circumstantial evidence. So why do seemingly so many people believe this narrative so readily?

Neither wholly religious, cultural nor political but a mix of all three, the Iranian-Arab dynamic has been framing relations for centuries. This ancient history flavours today's relations. It offers caricatures and readily identifiable traits for each to latch on to.

Tales and accusations of Iranian perfidy, then, snugly fit an expected stereotype. Such notions are fuelled by lazy, nationalistic and resoundingly biased reporting from Arab state-controlled newspapers, which often slavishly take as gospel the lazy, nationalistic and resoundingly biased reporting of Iranian state-controlled newspapers.

Understandably to some degree, minds are made up. Continual barbed rhetoric from Tehran and – at best – an economical relationship with the truth regarding their nuclear programme further tops-up tensions and antipathy.

Moreover, for those in power, one must question as to whether expectations have impacted the kinds of intelligence that the elite receive. Given that there is surely no doubt that the elites, particularly in Abu Dhabi and Riyadh, have a hardline view towards Iran, it seems logical to ask whether in a culture of deference and where ingenuity, initiative and the desire to challenge authority are traits seldom in evidence, the initial intuition and beliefs of the elite are challenged. Or whether, much like with the "dodgy dossier" in the UK in the runup to the Iraq war, the highest echelons are presented with self-reinforcing evidence that they want to hear as opposed to a clear analysis.

Such a pernicious cycle seems highly likely. If it is the case then the vehemence of regional leaders in their anti-Iranian rhetoric makes all the more sense.

There is, of course, another possibility. The elites in question may know perfectly well that the Iranian threat is more rhetorical than it is literal and that the IRGC is not some kind of omnipotent force instigating Bahrain's rioting. Iran, after all, is quite simply the perfect foil for Arab Gulf leaders. Should they wish to close ranks within their key communities, attempt to transfer any aggression on to the comic enemy that is Iran and strive desperately to divert attention away from their own lacking and often unfair domestic policies which are the root cause of the troubles, then foisting a sectarian lens on the issue is the answer.

As noted, the Iranian-Arab dialectic has a rich history that people can instantly and familiarly plug into and the current elite in Iran are practically a parody of an angry, tub-thumping revolutionary Shia leadership: they do half of the work of the Sunni Arab elite for them.

Even if the former scenario is nearer the truth, there is nevertheless still some element of regional Sunni leaders purposefully playing on the Sunni-Shia angle. Yet by continually stoking up such tensions in an attempt to overcome an immediate problem, there is the real and growing risk that this will, like Saudi's epic spending spree, soothe the immediate issues – as seen from the Arab capitals – but inflame issues at a later date.

The key concern is that when the countries and leaders involved want to de-escalate the rhetoric at some stage in the future, they may find themselves hoist by their own sectarian petard. Their choices may be limited and severely narrowed by the poisonous atmosphere that they have whipped up; even though Saudi Arabia, for example, is far from a democracy – especially in a revolutionary age – they are wholly unable to take difficult policy decisions that go largely against the grain of public opinion.