In social psychology, emotional contagion describes the widely observed
phenomenon of one person’s emotions mimicking surrounding
people’s emotions [8]. While it has been observed in humanhuman
interactions, no known studies have examined its existence
in agent-human interactions.

Game-theoretic approaches have been proposed for addressing
the complex problem of assigning limited security resources
to protect a critical set of targets. However, many of the standard
assumptions fail to address human adversaries who security forces
will likely face.

Building upon previous security applications of computational
game theory, this paper presents PROTECT, a gametheoretic
system deployed by the United States Coast Guard
(USCG) in the port of Boston for scheduling their patrols.
USCG has termed the deployment of PROTECT in Boston a
success, and

Stackelberg security games form the backbone of systems like
ARMOR, IRIS and PROTECT, which are in regular use by the
Los Angeles International Police, US Federal Air Marshal Service
and the US Coast Guard respectively.

Many strategic actions carry a ‘contagious’ component beyond
the immediate locale of the effort itself. Viral marketing
and peacekeeping operations have both been observed to have
a spreading effect. In this work, we use counterinsurgency as
our illustrative domain.

Randomized first-mover strategies of Stackelberg games
are used in several deployed applications to allocate
limited resources for the protection of critical infrastructure.
Stackelberg games model the fact that a strategic attacker can
surveil and exploit the defender’s strategy, and randomizat