Actually, the Battle of Peleliu was the most useless action of the entire lead up to the Philippine campaign. It was allegedly to protect the flank of the invading forces, but it took on a life of its own. Of course, the planners of the Peleliu operation thought it would take only a couple of days to subdue the defenders.

Maybe you are right. While Palau had a good harbor it probably was not worth it. My dad said his ship hauled beer for the officers there shortly after it was taken. Other islands got more logistic cargo.

The US retook Attu Island. How vital was that? But is was US territory. So there is a war morale component of retaking US territory. The US had to win the war of wills back home as well as at the front.

Just a comment on this.

While Attu was hardly the most critical operation of the Pacific War, it did have more benefits than most give it credit for. Once Attu and Kiska were taken, Japan was forced to ship forces to cover all the Kuriles, provide garrisons (which peaked at nearly 100,000 men which were largely taken from China/Manchuria) and then supply those men. It provided easy pickings for US submarines (one in ten men assigned to the Kuriles did not make it there) and allowed raiding by US Navy/AAF pilots (as a part of Operation Wedlock) which forced Japan to keep a fair amount of aircraft in the region (roughly one tenth of their air power). When they held Attu and Kiska, those islands were held with far less men and aircraft than garrisoning the entire Kurile chain.

While Attu was hardly the most critical operation of the Pacific War, it did have more benefits than most give it credit for. Once Attu and Kiska were taken, Japan was forced to ship forces to cover all the Kuriles, provide garrisons (which peaked at nearly 100,000 men which were largely taken from China/Manchuria) and then supply those men. ...

Not sure where you got these numbers from, but they seem to be pretty exaggerated. The US Strategic Bombing Survey used and incorporated interrogations of Japanese officials, and the numbers stated in there are way lower:

"On 5 August 1943 the Japanese Northeast Area Fleet was organized, comprised of the Fifth Fleet and Twelfth Air Fleet. The Commander in Chief, Northeast Area Fleet was charged with the defense of the Kuriles Area and given tactical command of local base forces. An Imperial Headquarters Directive of 30 September 1943 stated, "object of Northeast Area Operations is to smash the oncoming enemy and to defend the Kuriles, Hokkaido, and other integral parts of the Empire. Simultaneously, and insofar as possible, enemy strength in the Aleutians is to be whittled down." Despite the last statement Japan was on the defensive in the Kuriles, and desperately concerned over an amphibious advance from that direction against the Empire. ....[]... An index to the importance which Japan attached to the defense of the Kuriles is indicated in the number of Army troops deployed there. From 14,200 men in late 1943 the garrisons were increased to a total of 41,000 men in mid 1944 and decreased to 27,000 men in 1945. These men were Japan's answer to the threat of United States invasion from the North via the Aleutians. The men were not in action, except in defense against harassing air raids, or against sporadic shore bombardment by light United States naval forces."

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Braedonnal

It provided easy pickings for US submarines (one in ten men assigned to the Kuriles did not make it there)...

The assessment, that these troops were missing (and badly needed) elsewhere and that convoys to the Kuriles were harrassed by submarines, is correct, though:

quote:

ORIGINAL: page 83

"However, they were required to maintain their defensive positions and hence were unavailable for combat assignment elsewhere. Moreover, their supply and movement afforded excellent shipping targets for aggressive United States submarines. This resulted in a heavy loss of ships to Japan as well as a loss at sea of about 10 percent of the total personnel deployed to the islands."

quote:

ORIGINAL: page 83

"In November 1943 an estimated 262 airplanes were in Hokkaido and the Kuriles, in about equal numbers for the Army and Navy. Air activity was confined to defensive fighter patrols and antisubmarine patrols except for a few Attu reconnaissance missions. Also one attack mission against Attu was conducted on 10 October 1943 by naval twin-engined land-based attack planes. Air strength in the Hokkaido-Kuriles Area in the summer of 1944 was approximately 500 planes. By the spring of 1945 practically all air strength had been withdrawn from the Kuriles except for about 18 Army fighter planes on Paramushiro and 12 Navy dive-bombers divided between Shimushu and Etorofu."

quote:

ORIGINAL: Braedonnal

... and allowed raiding by US Navy/AAF pilots (as a part of Operation Wedlock) which forced Japan to keep a fair amount of aircraft in the region (roughly one tenth of their air power).

Actually, Allied air operations in the Kuriles theater remained to be on a really low level only, which resulted in the Japanese decision to withdraw all but 30 aircraft from the Kuriles, one and a half year later. These planes had been deployed there to bolster against an amphibious invasion on the Kuriles and to maintain a number of anti-submarine sorties:

quote:

ORIGINAL: page 87

"In later stages of the war aircraft maintained a steady though relatively small effort against the Kuriles in order to maintain, in conjunction with submarine patrols and surface ship sweeps, the attrition of shipping and the threat to Japan from the north."

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Braedonnal

When they held Attu and Kiska, those islands were held with far less men and aircraft than garrisoning the entire Kurile chain.

Well, the Japanese garrison on Attu/Kiska peaked at 8,500 men, but the Kuriles required a more dense defense network, because a successful invasion would have opened the door to Hokkaido. Still, initially the Attu/Kiska garrison amounted to ~59.8%, then 20.7% and 31.4% (in spring 1945, when troops from the Kuriles were needed elsewhere) of the troops stationed on the Kuriles.

If the Japs would have needed the islands for an invasion of Alaska, or for strikes even further south, they would have (and should have) placed more troops there. IMHO, it was rather a propaganda move, and - if at all - an operational diversionary move to conceal the deployment at Midway. Whatsoever, Japan did not have the means to use these islands as staging area. The weather hampered supply efforts for the Japanese garrison on the Aleutians, and it also made the US opt out of considering the Northern route for an invasion of the Japanese mainland, though. Later on, Japanese officers argued that the naval escort group (cruisers, carriers, etc.) provided for the Japanese invasion force could have made a difference, if it would have been committed to the operation at Midway instead.

Whatsoever, for the US, the Japanese troops on the Aleutians were rather like a disturbing "mosquito" humping around their neck, than anything else. Due to the weather conditions, with the dense summer fog and winter storms, the Aleutians became a vital playground for the employment of the first airborne radar devices (mounted on US boat seaplanes) in 1942, prior to the Japanese attacks, already, which helped to collect vital experiences regarding navigation and target detection for later use (radar-aided level-bombing in Germany, for example). Clearing the Aleutians rather offered a strategical and political value to win the Russians over for entering the war against Japan:

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ORIGINAL: page 84

"To be mentioned among the intangible results of the Aleutian Campaign was its effect upon the probable participation of Russia in the Pacific War. Russia was an ally of the United States in Europe and a potential ally in the Pacific. The probability of Russia's commencing hostilities against Japan depended in some degree upon the possibility of assistance reaching her by seaborne transport. An air route via Nome was in operation and over it was ferried a large number of lend-lease aircraft. The water route passed through the Aleutians and the Kuriles. In order to facilitate a future entry of Russia into the war against Japan it was necessary to secure this water route, which was done to the extent of expelling the Japanese from the Aleutians and weakening and containing their forces in the Kuriles."

MacArthur, as Frank's bio on him well puts it, was a flawed hero. He made substantial contributions to the war effort, much of what he did from a management perspective that often gets overlooked. He also made some major errors, some of which were not completely his fault (like the beach defense issue) Bear in mind that Mac's role was in the same vein as Ike...a Theater Commander who oversaw grand strategic, decision making, and Theater management. He faced some unique challenges that other similar CO's didn't have to deal with while at the same time, came up with or at least embraced new operational ideas that ended up saving alot of US lives. He was both blessed and cursed by his supporting staff, examples which abound. He did make mistakes and his ego was colossal which did tend to make him magnamonious to himself in victory, and spiteful in defeat. I think after three books on the man that for all too many people, its an issue of seperating the man from his acomplishments. Another way to put it.......like Monty, he was a military figure you either loved or hated. There was no in between.

In regards the PI. IIRC, Mac came up with sound reasons for the invasion touching both the military and political spectrums.....enough that he didn't get much if any fight out of Nimitz. Could they have been bypassed? yes. Either Taiwan or The PI's would serve similar purpose. Its easy to be cynical given Mac's obvious personal motivaiton but FDR was no pushover when it came to potential threats to his own position and he knew that Mac was right.....it was a political necessity to "liberate" the Philippines.

(Speaking from hindsight) Also after WW2 the Philippines became a staunch ally of the US during the cold war. If the US didn't come in to liberate them and severe ties, the (communists) guerillas who were fighting the Japanese could have taken the government as well.