This
matter is before the Court upon Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff's sole remaining claim in this action -
a Fourth Amendment false arrest claim filed pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Docket No. 9. Defendant has
contemporaneously filed a supporting Memorandum of Law.
Docket No. 11. As grounds for its Motion, Defendant maintains
that Plaintiff's claim was brought outside the applicable
one year statute of limitations such that it should be
dismissed as time-barred. Docket Nos. 9, 11.

Plaintiff
has filed a Response to Defendant's Motion, arguing that
his Complaint “does in fact allege sufficient facts to
state a cause of action” against Defendant for
“unlawful deprivation of rights and liberties via false
arrest/imprisonment, ” and that his Complaint was
“filed timely and within the time limitations set by
statute.” Docket No. 14.

With
leave of Court (Docket No. 17), Defendant has filed a Reply,
reiterating its contention that Plaintiff was provided legal
process on April 6, 2016 when the judicial commissioner
concluded that there was probable cause for Plaintiff's
arrest, and that under Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S.
394, 388-92 (2007), Plaintiff's claims became time-barred
one year thereafter. Docket No. 18. Defendant notes that
Plaintiff did not file his Complaint until April 10, 2017,
after the limitations period had run, and argues that
Plaintiff has not established that this claims period should
be subject to equitable tolling. Id.

Without
leave of Court, Plaintiff has filed a Sur-Reply, arguing
that, “in order to be bound over by a magistrate or
arraigned on charges one must make an ‘initial
appearance in Court'. A Judicial Commissioner does not
constitute a ‘Court' and therefore cannot
constitute an ‘initial appearance in a
Court'” that would begin the statute of limitations
period. Docket No. 19.

Chief
Judge Crenshaw, in the Memorandum issued with his Order
granting Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma
pauperis, succinctly summarized the factual allegations of
Plaintiff's Complaint as follows:

Plaintiff alleges that at 10:30 p.m. on April 5, 2016, he was
conducting research in the computer lab in the Sarratt
Student Center on Vanderbilt University's campus, which
is open to the general public until 11 p.m. (Doc. No. 1, at
6, 8.) Plaintiff was approached at 10:30 by three Vanderbilt
University police officers who said that a Vanderbilt
employee had recognized him from local news media reports.
The officers asked to see Plaintiff's identification,
then asked him to gather his belongings and step outside,
where they searched his belongings and questioned him about
the news coverage. (Id. at 6.) Despite
Plaintiff's explanation that the media coverage was
“defamatory” and that he had not been
“convicted of the felony, ” at 10:55 p.m. the
officers told Plaintiff to leave the Vanderbilt campus and
never return. Plaintiff began to leave, but before he could,
the officers ordered him to stop and arrested him for
criminal trespassing. (Id. at 6-7.) On April 11,
2016, Plaintiff pleaded not guilty in General Sessions Court;
the charge was dismissed, and Plaintiff was released from
jail at approximately 8 p.m. (Id. at 7-8.) Since
that incident, Plaintiff alleges that Vanderbilt police
officers have intimidated him in areas near the Vanderbilt
campus and have threatened him with arrest “if he does
not find another area of town to frequent.”
(Id. at 8.)

Docket No. 4, p. 3.

In
finding, for purposes of initial review, that Plaintiff
stated a nonfrivolous Fourth Amendment claim that was timely,
[1]
Chief Judge Crenshaw explained:

The Court also finds, again solely for the purpose of initial
review, that Plaintiff's allegation that he was not
arraigned until April 11, 2016, makes his April 10, 2017
Complaint for false arrest/ imprisonment under the Fourth
Amendment timely. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384,
391 (2007) (holding that plaintiff's federal false
arrest/imprisonment claim accrued, and statute of limitations
began to run, on the date that his false imprisonment ended
when the plaintiff appeared in court and was bound over for
trial); Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1)(setting
one-year statute of limitations for actions for false
imprisonment and for actions brought under the federal civil
rights statutes). . . . Accordingly, from the face of the
complaint, it appears that the limitations period for
Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim began to run, not on
April 5 when he was arrested, but on April 11, 2016, when the
charge against him was dismissed and he was released after
his initial court appearance.

Id. at 4-5.

The
threshold issue presently pending before the Court is whether
Plaintiff's limitations period began to run on April 6,
2016, when Plaintiff was bound over for process and the
judicial commissioner concluded there was probable cause for
the arrest and ordered that Plaintiff be taken before the
General Sessions Court to answer the charge, or on April 11,
2016, when Plaintiff was arraigned. In Tennessee, there is a
one-year statute of limitations for claims alleging a
violation of civil rights or personal injury pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. See Tenn. Code Ann. §
28-3-104(a)(1)(B); Laney Brentwood Homes, LLC v. Town of
Collierville, 144 F.Appx. 506, 509 (6th Cir. 2005). The
statute of limitations begins to run “when the
plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is
the basis of the action.” Trzebuckowski v. City of
Cleveland, 319 F.3d 853, 856 (6th Cir. 2003)(quoting
Kuhnle Bros., Inc. v. County of Geauga, 103 F.3d 516
(6th Cir. 1997)).

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;In
Wallace v. Kato, the Supreme Court stated,
&ldquo;Reflective of the fact that false imprisonment
consists of detention without legal process, a false
imprisonment ends once the victim becomes held pursuant
to such process-when, for example, he is bound over by a
magistrate or arraigned on charges.&rdquo; 549 U.S. 384, 390
(2007). The Kato Court continued, &ldquo;If there is
a false arrest claim, damages for that claim cover the time
of detention up until issuance of process or arraignment, but
not more.&rdquo; Id. at 391. The Kato Court
ultimately held: “We conclude that the statute ...

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