V. I. Lenin

June 22-July 12, 1921

Written: 12 June, 1921 First Published: First published in full as
a pamphlet, Tezisy doklada o taktike R.K.P. na III kongresse
Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala (Theses for a Report of the
Tactics of the R.C.P. at the Third Congress of the Communist
International) in 1921; the speeches and the report in
the book, Tezisy doklada o taktike R.K.P. na III kongresse
Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala. Stenograficheski
otchot (Theses for a Report of the Tactics of the
R.C.P. at the Third Congress of the Communist International,
Verbatim Report) Petrograd, 1922; The Tezisy are
published according to the manuscript; the speech on the Italian
question, the speech in defence of the tactics of the Communist
International, and the report on the tactics of the R.C. P.,
according to the text of the book.
Source: Lenin’s Collected Works, 1st English Edition, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1965, Volume 32, pages 451-498Translated: Yuri SdobnikovTranscription\HTML Markup:David Walters &
R. CymbalaCopyleft: V. I. Lenin Internet Archive (www.marx.org) 2002. Permission is granted to copy and/or distribute this document under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License

1 Theses For A Report On The Tactics Of The R.C.P.

1. The International Position Of The R.S.F.S.R.

The international position of the R.S.F.S.R. at present is
distinguished by a certain equilibrium, which, although
extremely unstable, has nevertheless given rise to a peculiar
state of affairs in world politics.

This peculiarity is the following. On the one hand, the
international bourgeoisie is filled with furious hatred of, and
hostility towards, Soviet Russia, and is prepared at any moment
to fling itself upon her in order to strangle her. On the other
hand, all attempts at military intervention, which have cost the
international bourgeoisie hundreds of millions of francs, ended
in complete failure, in spite of the fact that the Soviet power
was then weaker than it is now and that the Russian landowners
and capitalists had whole armies on the territory of the
R.S.F.S.R. Opposition to the war against Soviet Russia has grown
considerably in all capitalist countries, adding fuel to the
revolutionary movement of the proletariat and extending to very
wide sections of the petty-bourgeois democrats. The conflict of
interests between the various imperialist countries has become
acute, and is growing more acute every day. The revolutionary
movement among the hundreds of millions of oppressed peoples of
the East is growing with remarkable vigour. The result of all
these conditions is that international imperialism has proved
unable to strangle Soviet Russia, although it is far stronger,
and has been obliged for the time being to grant her
recognition, or semi-recognition, and to conclude trade
agreements with her.

The result is a state of equilibrium which, although highly
unstable and precarious, enables the Socialist Republic to
exist—not for long, of course—within the capitalist
encirclement.

2. The International Alignment Of Class Forces

This state of affairs has given rise to the following
international alignment of class forces.

The international bourgeoisie, deprived of the opportunity of
waging open war against Soviet Russia, is waiting and watching
for the moment when circumstances will permit it to resume the
war.

The proletariat in all the advanced capitalist countries has
already formed its vanguard, the Communist Parties, which are
growing, making steady progress towards winning the majority of
the proletariat in each country, and destroying the influence of
the old trade union bureaucrats and of the upper stratum of the
working class of America and Europe, which has been corrupted by
imperialist privileges.

The petty-bourgeois democrats in the capitalist countries, whose
foremost sections are represented by the Second and
Two-and-a-Half Internationals, serve today as the mainstay of
capitalism, since they retain an influence over the majority, or
a considerable section, of the industrial and commercial workers
and office employees who are afraid that if revolution breaks
out they will lose the relative petty-bourgeois prosperity
created by the privileges of imperialism. But the growing
economic crisis is worsening the condition of broad sections of
the people everywhere, and this, with the looming inevitability
of new imperialist wars if capitalism is preserved, is steadily
weakening this mainstay.

The masses of the working people in the colonial and semi
colonial countries, who constitute the overwhelming majority of
the population of the globe, were roused to political life at
the turn of the twentieth century, particularly by the
revolutions in Russia, Turkey, Persia and China. The imperialist
war of 1914-18 and the Soviet power in Russia are completing the
process of converting these masses into an active factor in
world politics and in the revolutionary destruction of
imperialism, although the educated philistines of Europe and
America, including the leaders of the Second and Two-and-a-Half
Internationals, stubbornly refuse to see this. British India is
at the head of these countries, and there revolution is maturing
in proportion, on the one hand, to the growth of the industrial
and railway proletariat, and, on the other, to the increase in
the brutal terrorism of the British, who with ever greater
frequency resort to massacres (Amritsar),[2] public
floggings, etc.

3. The Alignment Of Class Forces In Russia

The internal political situation in Soviet Russia is determined
by the fact that here, for the first time in history, there have
been, for a number of years, only two classes—the
proletariat, trained for decades by a very young, but modern,
large-scale machine industry, and the small peasantry, who
constitute the overwhelming majority of the population.

In Russia, the big landowners and capitalists have not vanished,
but they have been subjected to total expropriation and crushed
politically as a class, whose remnants are hiding out among
Soviet government employees. They have preserved their class
organisation abroad, as émigrés, numbering probably
from 1,500,000 to 2,000,000 people, with over 50 daily
newspapers of all bourgeois and “socialist” (i.e.,
petty-bourgeois) parties, the remnants of an army, and numerous
connections with the international bourgeoisie. These
émigrés are striving, with might and main, to destroy
the Soviet power and restore capitalism in Russia.

4. The Proletariat And The Peasantry In Russia

This being the internal situation in Russia, the main task now
confronting her proletariat, as the ruling class, is properly to
determine and carry out the measures that are necessary to lead
the peasantry, establish a firm alliance with them and achieve
the transition, in a series of gradual stages, to large-scale,
socialised, mechanised agriculture. This is a particularly
difficult task in Russia, both because of her backwardness, and
her extreme state of ruin as a
result of seven years of imperialist and civil war. But apart
from these specific circumstances, this is one of the most
difficult tasks of socialist construction that will confront all
capitalist countries, with, perhaps, the sole exception of
Britain. However, even in regard to Britain it must not be
forgotten that, while the small tenant farmers there constitute
only a very small class, the percentage of workers and office
employees who enjoy a petty-bourgeois standard of living is
exceptionally high, due to the actual enslavement of hundreds of
millions of people in Britain’s colonial possessions.

Hence, from the standpoint of development of the world
proletarian revolution as a single process, the epoch Russia is
passing through is significant as a practical test and a
verification of the policy of a proletariat in power towards the
mass of the petty bourgeoisie.

5. The Military Alliance Between The Proletariat
And The Peasantry In The R.S.F.S.R.

The basis for proper relations between the proletariat and the
peasantry in Soviet Russia was created in the period of 1917-21
when the invasion of the capitalists and landowners, supported
by the whole world bourgeoisie and all the petty-bourgeois
democratic parties (Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks),
caused the proletariat and the peasantry to form, sign and seal
a military alliance to defend the Soviet power. Civil war is the
most intense form of class struggle, but the more intense it is,
the more rapidly its flames consume all petty-bourgeois
illusions and prejudices, and the more clearly experience proves
even to the most backward strata of the peasantry that only the
dictatorship of the proletariat can save it, and that the
Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks are in fact merely the
servants of the landowners and capitalists.

But while the military alliance between the proletariat and the
peasantry was—and had perforce to be—the primary
form of their firm alliance, it could not have been maintained
even for a few weeks without an economic alliance between the
two classes. The peasants received from the workers’ state
all the land and were given protection against the landowners
and the kulaks; the workers have been receiving from the
peasants loans of food supplies until large-scale industry is
restored.

6. The Transition To Proper Economic Relations
Between The Proletariat And The Peasantry

The alliance between the small peasants and the proletariat can
become a correct and stable one from the socialist standpoint
only when the complete restoration of transport and large-scale
industry enables the proletariat to give the peasants, in
exchange for food, all the goods they need for their own use and
for the improvement of their farms. With the country in ruins,
this could not possibly be achieved at once. The surplus
appropriation system was the best measure available to the
insufficiently organised state to maintain itself in the
incredibly arduous war against the landowners. The crop failure
and the fodder shortage in 1920 particularly increased the
hardships of the peasantry, already severe enough, and made the
immediate transition to the tax in kind imperative.

The moderate tax in kind will bring about a big improvement in
the condition of the peasantry at once, and will at the same
time stimulate them to enlarge crop areas and improve farming
methods.

The tax in kind signifies a transition from the requisition of
all the peasants’ surplus grain to regular socialist
exchange of products between industry and agriculture.

7. The Conditions Under Which The Soviet Government Can
Permit Capitalism And Concessions, And The Significance
Thereof

Naturally, the tax in kind means freedom for the peasant to
dispose of his after-tax surplus at his own discretion. Since
the state cannot provide the peasant with goods from socialist
factories in exchange for all his surplus, freedom to trade with
this surplus necessarily means freedom for the development of
capitalism.

Within the limits indicated, however, this is not at all
dangerous for socialism as long as transport and large-scale
industry remain in the hands of the proletariat. On the
contrary, the development of capitalism, controlled and
regulated by the proletarian state (i.e., “state”
capitalism in this sense of the term), is advantageous
and necessary in an extremely devastated and backward
small-peasant country (within certain limits, of course),
inasmuch as it is capable of hastening the immediate
revival of peasant farming. This applies still more to
concessions: without denationalising anything, the
workers’ state leases certain mines, forest tracts,
oilfields, and so forth, to foreign capitalists in order to
obtain from them extra equipment and machinery that will enable
us to accelerate the restoration of Soviet large-scale
industry.

The payment made to the concessionaires in the form of a share
of the highly valuable products obtained is undoubtedly tribute,
which the workers’ state pays to the world bourgeoisie;
without in any way glossing this over, we must clearly realise
that we stand to gain by paying this tribute, so long as it
accelerates the restoration of our large-scale industry and
substantially improves the condition of the workers and
peasants.

8. The Success Of Our Food Policy

The food policy pursued by Soviet Russia in 1917-21 was
undoubtedly very crude and imperfect, and gave rise to many
abuses. A number of mistakes were made in its
implementation. But as a whole, it was the only possible policy
under the conditions prevailing at the time. And it did fulfil
its historic mission: it saved the proletarian dictatorship in a
ruined and backward country. There can be no doubt that it has
gradually improved. In the first year that we had full power
(August 1, 1918 to August 1, 1919) the state collected 110
million poods of grain; in the second year it collected
220 million poods, and in the third year—over 285
million poods.

Now, having acquired practical experience, we have set out, and
expect, to collect 400 million poods (the tax in kind
is expected to bring in 240 million poods). Only when
it is actually in possession of an adequate stock of food will
the workers’ state be able to stand firmly on its own feet
economically, secure the, steady, if slow, restoration of
large-scale industry, and create a proper financial system.

9. The Material Basis Of Socialism And The Plan
For The Electrification Of Russia

A large-scale machine industry capable of reorganising
agriculture is the only material basis that is possible for
socialism. But we cannot confine ourselves to this general
thesis. It must be made more concrete. Large-scale industry
based on the latest achievements of technology and capable of
reorganising agriculture implies the electrification of the
whole country. We had to undertake the scientific work of
drawing up such a plan for the electrification of the
R.S.F.S.R. and we have accomplished it. With the co-operation of
over two hundred of the best scientists, engineers and
agronomists in Russia, this work has now been completed; it was
published in a large volume and, as a whole, endorsed by the
Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets in December
1920. Arrangements have now been made to convene an all-Russia
congress of electrical engineers in August 1921 to examine this
plan in detail, before it is given final government
endorsement. The execution of the first part of the
electrification scheme is estimated to take ten years, and will
require about 370 million man-days.

In 1918, we had eight newly erected power stations (with a total
capacity of 4,757 kw); in 1919, the figure rose to 36 (total
capacity of 1,648 kw), and in 1920, it rose to 100 (total
capacity of 8,699 kw).

Modest as this beginning is for our vast country, a start has
been made, work has begun and is making steady progress. After
the imperialist war, after a million prisoners of war in Germany
had become familiar with modern up-to-date technique, after the
stern but hardening experience of three years of civil war, the
Russian peasant is a different man. With every passing month he
sees more clearly and more vividly that only the guidance given
by the proletariat is capable of leading the mass of small
farmers out of capitalist slavery to socialism.

10. The Role Of “Pure Democracy”, The Second
And Two-And-A-Half Internationals,
The Socialist-Revolutionaries And The Mensheviks As The
Allies Of Capital

The dictatorship of the proletariat does not signify a
cessation of the class struggle, but its continuation in a
new form and with new weapons. This dictatorship is
essential as long as classes exist, as long as the
bourgeoisie, overthrown in one country, intensifies tenfold
its attacks on socialism on an international scale. In the
transition period, the small farmer class is bound to
experience certain vacillations. The difficulties of
transition, and the influence of the bourgeoisie, inevitably
cause the mood of this mass to change from time to
time. Upon the proletariat, enfeebled and to a certain
extent declassed by the destruction of the large-scale
machine industry, which is its vital foundation, devolves
the very difficult but paramount historic task of holding
out in spite of these vacillations, and of carrying to
victory its cause of emancipating labour from the yoke of
capital.

The policy pursued-by the petty-bourgeois democratic
parties, i.e., the parties affiliated to the Second and
Two-and-a-Half Internationals, represented in Russia by the
S.R. (Socialist-Revolutionary) and Menshevik parties, is the
political expression of the vacillations of the petty
bourgeoisie. These parties now have their headquarters and
newspapers abroad, and are actually in a bloc with the whole
of the bourgeois counter-revolution and are serving it
loyally.

The shrewd leaders of the Russian big bourgeoisie headed by
Milyukov, the leader of the Cadet (Constitutional
Democratic) Party, have quite clearly, definitely and openly
appraised this role of the petty-bourgeois democrats, i.e.,
the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. In connection
with the Kronstadt mutiny, in which the Mensheviks,
Socialist-Revolutionaries and whiteguards, joined forces,
Milyukov declared in favour of the “Soviets without
the Bolsheviks” slogan. Elaborating on the idea, he
wrote that the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks
“are welcome to try” (Pravda No. 64,
1921, quoted from the Paris Posledniye Novosti[3]), because upon them devolves the
task of first taking power away from the
Bolsheviks. Milyukov, the leader of the big bourgeoisie, has
correctly appraised the lesson taught by all revolutions,
namely, that the petty-bourgeois democrats are incapable of
holding power, and always serve merely as a screen for the
dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, and a stepping stone to its
undivided power.

The proletarian revolution in Russia again and again
confirms this lesson of 1789-94 and 1848-49, and also what
Frederick Engels said in his letter to Bebel of December 11,
1884.

. . .“Pure democracy . . . when the moment of
revolution comes, acquires a temporary importance . . . as
the final sheet-anchor of the whole bourgeois and even
feudal economy. . . . Thus between March and September 1848
the whole feudal-bureaucratic mass strengthened the liberals
in order to hold down the revolutionary masses. . . . In any
case our sole adversary on the day of the crisis and on the
day after the crisis will be the whole of the reaction which
will group around pure democracy, and this, I think, should
not be lost sight of.” (Published in Russian in
Kommunistichesky Trud[4] No. 360, June
9, 1921, in an article by Comrade V. Adoratsky: “Marx
and Engels on Democracy”. In German, published in the
book, Friedrich Engels, Politisches
Vermächtnis, Internationale Jugend-Bibliothek,
Nr. 12, Berlin, 1920, S. 19.)

N. Lenin

Moscow, Kremlin, June 13, 1921

2.
Speech On The Italian Question
June 28

Comrades, I should like to reply mainly to Comrade
Lazzari. He said: “Quote concrete facts, not
words.” Excellent. But if we trace the development of
the reformist opportunist trend in Italy, what will that be,
words or facts? In your speeches and in the whole of your
policy you lose sight of the fact, which is so important for
the socialist movement in Italy, that not only this trend,
but an opportunist reformist group has existed for quite a
long time. I still very well remember the time when
Bernstein started his opportunist propaganda, which ended in
social-patriotism, in the treason and bankruptcy of the
Second International. We have known Turati ever since, not
only by name, but for his propaganda in the Italian party
and in the Italian working-class movement, of which he has
been a disrupter for the past twenty years. Lack of time
prevents me from closely studying the material concerning
the Italian party; but I think that one of the most
important documents on this subject is a report, published
in a bourgeois Italian newspaper—I don’t
remember which, La Stampa[5] or Corriere
della Sera[6]—of the conference held by
Turati and his friends in Reggio Emilia.[7] I compared that report with the
one published in Avanti![8] Is this not
proof enough? After the Second Congress of the Communist
International, we, in our controversy with Serrati and his
friends, openly and definitely told them what, in our
opinion, the situation was. We told them that the Italian
party could not become a Communist Party as long as it
tolerated people like Turati in its ranks.

What is this, political facts, or again just words? After
the Second Congress of the Communist International we openly
said to the Italian proletariat: “Don’t unite
with the reformists, with Turati.” Serrati launched a
series of articles in the Italian press in opposition to the
Communist International and convened a special conference
of reformists.[9] Was all this mere words? It was
something more than a split: it was the creation of a new
party. One must have been blind not to have seen this. This
document is of decisive importance for this question. All
those who attended the Reggio Emilia conference must be
expelled from the party; they are Mensheviks—not
Russian, but Italian Mensheviks. Lazzari said: “We
know the Italian people’s mentality.” For my
part I would not dare to make such an assertion about the
Russian people, but that is not important. “Italian
Socialists understand the spirit of the Italian people very
well,” said Lazzari. Perhaps they do, I will not argue
about that. But they do not know Italian Menshevism, if the
concrete facts and the persistent refusal to eradicate
Menshevism is anything to go by. We are obliged to say
that—deplorable though it may be—the resolution
of our Executive Committee must be confirmed. A party which
tolerates opportunists and reformists like Turati in its
ranks cannot be affiliated to the Communist
International.

“Why should we change the name of the party?”
asks Comrade Lazzari. “The present one is quite
satisfactory.” But we cannot share this view. We know
the history of the Second International, its fall and
bankruptcy. Do we not know the history of the German party?
And do we not know that the great misfortune of the
working-class movement in Germany is that the break was not
brought about before the war? This cost the lives of twenty
thousand workers, whom the Scheidemannists and the Centrists
betrayed to the German Government by their polemics with and
complaints against the German Communists.[10]

And do we not now see the same thing in Italy? The Italian
party was never a truly revolutionary party. Its great
misfortune is that it did not break with the Mensheviks and
reformists before the war, and that the latter continued to
remain in the party. Comrade Lazzari says: “We fully
recognise the necessity of a break with the reformists; our
only disagreement is that we did not think it necessary to
bring it about at the Leghorn Congress.” But the facts
tell a different story. This is not the first time that we
are discussing Italian reformism. In arguing about this with
Serrati last year, we said: “You won’t mind us
asking why the split in the Italian party cannot be brought
about immediately, why it must be postponed?” What did
Serrati say in reply to that? Nothing. And Comrade Lazzari,
quoting an article by Frossard in which the latter said,
“We must be adroit and clever”, evidently thinks
that this is an argument in his favour and against us. I
think he is mistaken. On the contrary, it is an excellent
argument in our favour and against Comrade Lazzari. What
will the Italian workers say when you are obliged to explain
your conduct and your resignation? What will you tell them
if they declare our tactics to be clever and adroit compared
with the zigzags of the pseudo-Communist Left—the Left
which at times is not even simply Communist and more often
looks like anarchism?

What is the meaning of the tales told by Serrati and his
party about the Russians only wanting everyone to imitate
them? We want the very opposite. It takes more than
memorising communist resolutions and using revolutionary
phrases on every possible occasion. That is not enough, and
we are opposed beforehand to Communists who know this or
that resolution by heart. The mark of true communism is a
break with opportunism. We shall be quite frank and open
with those Communists who subscribe to this and, boldly, in
the conviction that we are right, will tell them:
“Don’t do anything stupid; be clever and
skilful.” But we shali speak in this way only with
Communists who have broken with the opportunists, something
that cannot yet be said about you. I repeat therefore: I
hope the Congress will confirm the resolution of the
Executive Committee. Comrade Lazzari said: “We are in
the preparatory period.” This is absolutely true. You
are in the preparatory period. The first stage of this
period is a break with the Mensheviks, similar to the one we
brought about with our Mensheviks in 1903. The sufferings
the whole of the German working class has had to endure
during this long and weary post-war period in the history of
the German revolution are due to the fact that the German
party did not break with the Mensheviks.

Comrade Lazzari said that the Italian party is passing
through the preparatory period. This I fully accept. And the
first stage is a definite, final, unambiguous and determined
break with reformism. When that is brought about the masses
will side solidly with communism. The second stage is by no
means a repetition of revolutionary slogans. It will be the
adoption of our wise and skilful decisions, which will
always be such, and which will always say: fundamental
revolutionary principles must be adapted to the specific
conditions in the various countries.

The revolution in Italy will run a different course from
that in Russia. It will start in a different way. How?
Neither you nor we know. The Italian Communists are not
always Communists to a sufficient degree. Did a single
Communist show his mettle when the workers seized the
factories in Italy?[11]] No. At that
time, there was as yet no communism in Italy; there was a
certain amount of anarchism, but no Marxian communism. The
latter has still to be created and the masses of the workers
must be imbued with it by means of the experience of the
revolutionary struggle. And the first step along this road
is a final break with the Mensheviks, who for more than
twenty years have been collaborating and working with the
bourgeois government. It is quite Probable that Modigliani,
whom I was able to watch to some extent at the Zimmerwald
and Kienthal conferences, is a sufficiently astute
politician to keep out of the bourgeois government and to
keep in the centre of the Socialist Party, where he can be
far more useful to the bourgeoisie. But all the theories of
Turati and his friends, all their propaganda and agitation,
signify collaboration with the bourgeoisie. Is this not
proved by the numerous quotations in Gennari’s speech?
Indeed, it is the united front which Turati has already
prepared. That is why I must say to Comrade Lazzari:
“Speeches like yours and like the one which Comrade
Serrati made here do not help to prepare for the revolution,
they disorganise it. “ (Shouts :
“Bravo!” Applause.)

You had a considerable majority at Leghorn. You had 98,000
votes against 14,000 reformist and 58,000 communist
votes. As the beginning of a purely communist movement in a
country like Italy, with its well-known traditions, where
the ground has not been sufficiently prepared for a split,
this vote is a considerable achievement for the
Communists.

This is a great victory and tangible proof of the fact that
the working-class movement in Italy will develop faster than
our movement developed in Russia, because, if you are
familiar with the figures concerning our movement, you must
know that in February 1917, after the fall of tsarism and
during the bourgeois republic, we were still a minority
compared with the Mensheviks. Such was the position after
fifteen years of fierce fighting and splits. Our Right wing
did not grow—and it was not so easy to prevent it from
growing, as you seem to think when you speak of Russia in
such a disparaging tone. Undoubtedly, development in Italy
will proceed quite differently. After fifteen years of
struggle against the Mensheviks, and after the fall of
tsarism, we started work with a much smaller number of
adherents. You have 58,000 communistically minded workers
against 98,000 united Centrists who occupy an indefinite
position. This is proof, this is a fact, which should
certainly convince all those who refuse to close their eyes
to the mass movement of the Italian workers. Nothing comes
all at once. But it certainly proves that the mass of
workers—not the old leaders, the bureaucrats, the
professors, the journalists, but the class that is actually
exploited, the vanguard of the exploited—supports
us. And it proves what a great mistake you made at
Leghorn. This is a fact. You controlled 98,000 votes, but
you preferred to go with 14,000 reformists against 58,000
Communists. You should have gone with them even if they were
not genuine Communists, even if they were only adherents of
Bordiga—which is not true, for after the Second
Congress Bordiga quite honestly declared that he had
abandoned all anarchism and anti-parliamentarism. But what
did you do? You chose to unite with 14,000 reformists and to
break with 58,000 Communists. And this is the best proof
that Serrati’s policy has been disastrous for
Italy. We never wanted Serrati in Italy to copy the Russian
revolution. That would have been stupid. We are intelligent
and flexible enough to avoid such stupidity. But Serrati has
proved that his policy in Italy was wrong. Perhaps he should
have manoeuvred. This is the expression that he repeated
most often when he was here last year. He said: “We
know how to manoeuvre, we do not want slavish
imitation. That would be idiocy. We must manoeuvre, so as to
bring about a separation from opportunism. You Russians do
not know how to do that. We Italians are more skilful at
that sort of thing. That remains to be seen.” And what
is it we saw? Serrati executed a brilliant manoeuvre. He
broke away from 58,000 Communists. And now these comrades
come here and say: “If you reject us the masses will
be confused.” No, comrades, you are mistaken. The
masses of the workers in Italy are confused now, and it will
do them good if we tell them: “Comrades, you must
choose; Italian workers, you must choose between the
Communist International, which will never call upon you
slavishly to imitate the Russians, and the Mensheviks, whom
we have known for twenty years, and whom we shall never
tolerate as neighbours in a genuinely revolutionary
Communist International.” That is what we shall say to
the Italian workers. There can be no doubt about the
result. The masses of workers will follow us. (Loud
approval.)

3
Speech In Defence Of The Tactics Of The Communist International
July 1

Comrades! I deeply regret that I must confine myself to
self-defence. (Laughter.) I say deeply regret,
because after acquainting myself with Comrade
Terracini’s speech and the amendments introduced by
three delegations, I should very much like to take the
offensive, for, properly speaking, offensive operations are
essential against the views defended by Terracini and these
three delegations.[12] If the Congress is not going to
wage a vigorous offensive against such errors, against such
“Leftist” stupidities, the whole movement is
doomed. That is my deep conviction. But we are organised and
disciplined Marxists. We cannot be satisfied with speeches
against individual comrades. We Russians are already sick
and tired of these Leftist phrases. We are men of
organisation. In drawing up our plans, we must proceed in an
organised way and try to find the correct line. It is, of
course, no secret that our theses are a compromise. And why
not? Among Communists, who have already convened their Third
Congress and have worked out definite fundamental
principles, compromises under certain conditions are
necessary. Our theses, put forward by the Russian
delegation, were studied and prepared in the most careful
way and were the result of long arguments and meetings with
various delegations. They aim at establishing the basic line
of the Communist International and are especially necessary
now after we have not only formally condemned the real
Centrists but have expelled them from the Party. Such are
the facts. I have to stand up for these theses. Now, when
Terracini comes forward and says that we must continue the
fight against the Centrists, and goes on to tell how it is
intended to wage the fight, I say that if these amendments
denote a definite trend, a relentless fight against this
trend is essential, for otherwise there is no communism and
no Communist International. I am surprised that the German
Communist Workers’ Party has not put its signature to
these amendments. (Laughter.) Indeed, just listen
to what Terracini is defending and what his amendments
say. They begin in this way: “On page 1, column 1,
line 19, the word ‘majority’ should be
deleted.” Majority! That is extremely dangerous!
(Laughter.) Then further: instead of the words
“’basic propositions’, insert
‘aims’”. Basic propositions and aims are
two different things; even the anarchists will agree with us
about aims, because they too stand for the abolition of
exploitation and class distinctions.

I have met and talked with few anarchists in my life, but
all the same I have seen enough of them. I sometimes
succeeded in reaching agreement with them about aims, but
never as regards principles. Principles are not an aim, a
programme, a tactic or a theory. Tactics and theory are not
principles. How do we differ from the anarchists on
principles? The principles of communism consist in the
establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat and in
the use of state coercion in the transition period. Such are
the principles of communism, but they are not its aim. And
the comrades who have tabled this proposal have made a
mistake.

Secondly, it is stated there: “the word
‘majority’ should be deleted.” Read the
whole passage:

“The Third Congress of the Communist International is
setting out to review questions of tactics under conditions
when in a whole number of countries the objective situation
has become aggravated in a revolutionary sense, and when a
whole number of communist mass parties have been organised,
which, incidentally, in their actual revolutionary struggle
have nowhere taken into their hands the virtual leadership
of the majority of the working class.”

And so, they want the word “majority”
deleted. If we cannot agree on such simple things, then I do
not understand how we can work together and lead the
proletariat to victory. Then it is not at all surprising
that we cannot reach agreement on the question of principles
either. Show me a party which has already won the majority
of the working class. Terracini did not even think of
adducing any example. Indeed, there is no such example.

And so, the word “aims” is to be put instead of
“principles”, and the word
“majority” is to be deleted. No, thank you! We
shall not do it. Even the German party—one of the
best—does not have the majority of the working class
behind it. That is a fact. We, who face a most severe
struggle, are not afraid to utter this truth, but here you
have three delegations who wish to begin with an untruth,
for if the Congress deletes the word “majority”
it will show that it wants an untruth. That is quite
clear.

Then comes the following amendment: “On page 4,
column 1, line 10, the words ‘Open Letter’,
etc., should be deleted.’’[13] I
have already heard one speech today in which I found the
same idea. But there it was quite natural. It was the speech
of Comrade Hempel, a member of the German Communist
Workers’ Party. He said: “The ‘Open
Letter’ was an act of opportunism.” To my deep
regret and shame, I have already heard such views
privately. But when, at the Congress, after such prolonged
debate, the “Open Letter” is declared
opportunist—that is a shame and a disgrace! And now
Comrade Terracini comes forward on behalf of the three
delegations and wants to delete the words “Open
Letter”. What is the good then of the fight against
the German Communist Workers’ Party? The “Open
Letter” is a model political step. This is stated in
our theses and we must certainly stand by it. It is a model
because it is the first act of a practical method of winning
over the majority of the working class. In Europe, where
almost all the proletarians are organised, we must win the
majority of the working class and anyone who fails to
understand this is lost to the communist movement; he will
never learn anything if he has failed to learn that much
during the three years of the great revolution.

Terracini says that we were victorious in Russia although
the Party was very small. He is dissatisfied with what is
said in the theses about Czechoslovakia. Here there are 27
amendments, and if I had a mind to criticise them I should,
like some orators, have to speak for not less than three
hours. . . . We have heard here that in Czechoslovakia the
Communist Party has 300,000-400,000 members, and that it is
essential to win over the majority, to create an invincible
force and continue enlisting fresh masses of
workers. Terracini is already prepared to attack. He says:
if there are already 400,000 workers in the party, why
should we want more? Delete! (Laughter.) He is
afraid of the word “masses” and wants to
eradicate it. Comrade Terracini has understood very little
of the Russian revolution. In Russia, we were a small party,
but we had with us in addition the majority of the Soviets
of Workers’ and Peasants’ Deputies throughout
the country. (Cries : “Quite true!”) Do
you have anything of the sort? We had with us almost half
the army, which then numbered at least ten million men. Do
you really have the majority of the army behind you? Show me
such a country! If these views of Comrade Terracini are
shared by three other delegations, then something is wrong
in the International! Then we must say: “Stop! There
must be a decisive fight! Otherwise the Communist
International is lost.” (Animation.)

On the basis of my experience I must say, although I am
taking up a defensive position (laughter ),
that-the aim and the principle of my speech consist in
defence of the resolution and theses proposed by our
delegation. It would, of course, be pedantic to say that not
a letter in them must be altered. I have had to read many
resolutions and I am well aware that very good amendments
could he introduced in every line of them. But that would be
pedantry. If, nevertheless, I declare now that in a
political sense not a single letter can be altered, it is
because the amendments, as I see them, are of a quite
definite political nature and because they lead us along a
path that is harmful and dangerous to the Communist
International. Therefore, I and all of us and the Russian
delegation must insist that not a single letter in the
theses is altered. We have not only condemned our Right-wing
elements—we have expelled them. But if, like
Terracini, people turn the fight against the Rightists into
a sport, then we must say: “Stop! Otherwise the danger
will become too grave!”

Terracini has defended the theory of an offensive
struggle.[14] In this connection the
notorious amendments propose a formula two or three pages
long. There is no need for us to read them. We know what
they say. Terracini has stated the issue quite clearly. He
has defended the theory of an offensive, pointing out
“dynamic tendencies” and the “transition
from passivity to activity”. We in Russia have already
had adequate political experience in the struggle against
the Centrists. As long as fifteen years ago, we were waging
a struggle against our opportunists and Centrists, and also
against the Mensheviks, and we were victorious not only over
the Mensheviks, but also over the semi-anarchists.

If we had not done this, we would not have been able to
retain power in our hands for three and a half years, or
even for three and a half weeks, and we would not have been
able to convene communist congresses here. “Dynamic
tendencies”, “transition from passivity to
activity”—these are all phrases the Left
Socialist-Revolutionaries had used against us. Now they are
in prison, defending there the “aims of
communism” and thinking of the “transition from
passivity to activity”. (Laughter.) The line
of reasoning followed in the proposed amendments is an
impossible one, because they contain no Marxism, no
political experience, and no reasoning. Have we in our
theses elaborated a general theory of the revolutionary
offensive? Has Radek or anyone of us committed such a
stupidity? We have spoken of the theory of an offensive in
relation to a quite definite country and at a quite definite
period.

From our struggle against the Mensheviks we can quote
instances showing that even before the first revolution
there were some who doubted whether the revolutionary party
aught to conduct an offensive. If such doubts assailed any
Social-Democrat—as we all called ourselves at that
time—we took up the struggle against him and said that
he was an opportunist, that he did not understand anything
of Marxism and the dialectics of the revolutionary party. Is
it really possible for a party to dispute whether a
revolutionary offensive is permissible in general? To find
such examples in this country one would have to go back some
fifteen years. If there are Centrists or disguised Centrists
who dispute the theory of the offensive, they should be
immediately expelled. That question cannot give rise to
disputes. But the fact that-even now, after three years of
the Communist International, we are arguing about
“dynamic tendencies”, about the
“transition from passivity to
activity”—that is a shame and a disgrace.

We do not have any dispute about this with Comrade Radek,
who drafted these theses jointly with us. Perhaps it was not
quite correct to begin talking in Germany about the
theory of the revolutionary offensive when an actual
offensive had not been prepared. Nevertheless the March
action was a great step forward in spite of the mistakes of
its leaders. But this does not matter. Hundreds of thousands
of workers fought heroically. However courageously the
German Communist Workers’ Party fought against the
bourgeoisie, we must repeat what Comrade Radek said in a
Russian article about Hölz. If anyone, even an
anarchist, fights heroically against the bourgeoisie, that
is, of course, a great thing; but it is a real step forward
if hundreds of thousands fight against the vile provocation
of the social-traitors and against the bourgeoisie.

It is very important to be critical of one’s
mistakes. We began with that. If anyone, after a struggle in
which hundreds of thousands have taken part, comes out
against this struggle and behaves like Levi, then he should
be expelled. And that is what was done. But we must draw a
lesson from this. Had we really prepared for an offensive?
(Radek : “We had not even prepared for
defence.”) Indeed only newspaper articles talked of an
offensive. This theory as applied to the March action in
Germany in 1921 was incorrect—we have to admit
that—but, in general, the theory of the revolutionary
offensive is not at all false.

We were victorious in Russia, and with such ease, because we
prepared for our revolution during the imperialist war. That
was the first condition. Ten million workers and peasants in
Russia were armed, and our slogan was: an immediate peace at
all costs. We were victorious because the vast mass of the
peasants were revolutionarily disposed against the big
landowners. The Socialist-Revolutionaries, the adherents of
the Second and the Two-and-a-Half Internationals, were a big
peasant party in November 1917. They demanded revolutionary
methods but, like true heroes of the Second and the
Two-and-a-Half Internationals, lacked the courage to act in
a revolutionary way. In August and September 1917 we said:
“Theoretically we are fighting the
Socialist-Revolutionaries as we did before, but practically
we are ready to accept their programme because only we are
able to put it into effect.” We did just what we
said. The peasantry, ill-disposed towards us in November
1917, after our victory, who sent a majority of
Socialist-Revolutionaries into the Constituent Assembly,
were won over by us, if not in the course of a few
days—as I mistakenly expected and predicted—at
any rate in the course of a few weeks. The difference was
not great. Can you point out any country in Europe where you
could win over the majority of the peasantry in the course
of a few weeks? Italy perhaps? (Laughter.) If it is
said that we were victorious in Russia in spite of not
having a big party, that only proves that those who say it
have not understood the Russian revolution and that they
have absolutely no understanding of how to prepare for a
revolution.

Our first step was to create a real Communist Party so as to
know whom we were talking to and whom we could fully
trust. The slogan of the First and Second congresses was
“Down with the Centrists!” We cannot hope to
master even the ABC of communism, unless all along the line
and throughout the world we make short shrift of the
Centrists and semi-Centrists, whom in Russia we call
Mensheviks. Our first task is to create a genuinely
revolutionary party and to break with the Mensheviks. But
that is only a preparatory school. We are already convening
the Third Congress, and Comrade Terracini keeps saying that
thc task of the preparatory school collsists in hunting out,
pursuing and exposing Centrists and semi-Centrists. No,
thank you! We have already done this long enough. At the
Second Congress we said that the Centrists are our
enemies. But, we must go forward really. The second stage,
after organising into a party, consists in learning to
prepare for revolution. In many countries we have not even
learned how to assume the leadership. We were victorious in
Russia not only because the undisputed majority of the
working class was on our side (during the elections in 1917
the overwhelming majority of the workers were with us
against the Mensheviks), but also because half the army,
immediately after our seizure of power, and nine-tenths of
the peasants, in the course of some weeks, came over to our
side; we were victorious because we adopted the agrarian
programme of the Socialist-Revolutionaries instead of our
own, and put it into effect. Our victory lay in the fact
that we carried out the Socialist-Revolutionary programme;
that is why this victory was so easy. Is it possible that
you in the West can have such illusions? It is ridiculous!
Just compare the concrete economic conditions, Comrade
Terracini and all of you who have signed the proposed
amendments! In spite of the fact that the majority so
rapidly came to be on our side, the difficulties confronting
us after our victory were very great. Nevertheless we won
through because we kept in mind not only our aims but also
our principles, and did not tolerate in our Party those who
kept silent about principles but talked of aims,
“dynamic tendencies” and the “transition
from passivity to activity”. Perhaps we shall be
blamed for preferring to keep such gentlemen in prison. But
dictatorship is impossible in any other way. We must prepare
for dictatorship, and this consists in combating such
phrases and such amendments. (Laughter.)
Throughout, our theses speak of the masses. But, comrades,
we need to understand what is meant by masses. The German
Communist Workers’ Party, the Left-wing comrades,
misuse this word. But Comrade Terracini, too, and all those
who have signed these amendments, do not know how the word
“masses” should be read.

I have been speaking too long as it is; hence I wish to say
only a few words about the concept of
“masses”. It is one that changes in accordance
with the changes in the nature of the struggle. At the
beginning of the struggle it took only a few thousand
genuinely revolutionary workers to warrant talk of the
masses. If the party succeeds in drawing into the struggle
not only its own members, if it also succeeds in arousing
non-party people, it is well on the way to winning the
masses. During our revolutions there were instances when
several thousand workers represented the masses. In the
history of our movement, and of our struggle against the
Mensheviks, you will find many examples where several
thousand workers in a town were enough to give a clearly
mass character to the movement. You have a mass when several
thousand non-party workers, who usually live a philistine
life and drag out a miserable existence, and who have never
heard anything about politics, begin to act in a
revolutionary way. If the movement spreads and intensifies,
it gradually develops into a real revolution. We saw this in
1905 and 1917 during three revolutions, and you too will
have to go through all this. When the revolution has been
sufficiently prepared, the concept “masses”
becomes different: several thousand workers no longer
constitute the masses. This word begins to denote something
else. The concept of “masses” undergoes a change
so that it implies the majority, and not simply a majority
of the workers alone, but the majority of all the
exploited. Any other kind of interpretation is impermissible
for a revolutionary, and any other sense of the word becomes
incomprehensible. It is possible that even a small party,
the British or American party, for example, after it has
thoroughly studied the course of political development and
become acquainted with the life and customs of the non party
masses, will at a favourable moment evoke a revolutionary
movement (Comrade Radek has pointed to the miners’
strike as a good example[15]). You will
have a mass movement if such a party comes forward with its
slogans at such a moment and succeeds in getting millions of
workers to follow it. I would not altogether deny that a
revolution can be started by a very small party and brought
to a victorious conclusion. But one must have a knowledge of
the methods by which the masses can be won over. For this
thoroughgoing preparation of revolution is essential. But
here you have comrades coming forward with the assertion
that we should immediately give up the demand for
“big” masses. They must be challenged. Without
thoroughgoing preparation you will not achieve victory in
any country. Quite a small party is sufficient to lead the
masses. At certain times there is no necessity for big
organisations.

But to win, we must have the sympathy of the masses. An
absolute majority is not always essential; but what is
essential to win and retain power is not only the majority
of the working class—I use the term “working
class” in its West-European sense, i.e., in the sense
of the industrial proletariat—but also the majority of
the working and exploited rural population. Have you thought
about this?
Do we find in Terracini’s speech even a hint at this
thought? He speaks only of “dynamic tendency”
and the “transition from passivity to
activity”. Does he devote even a single word to the
food question? And yet the workers demand their victuals,
although they can put up with a great deal and go hungry, as
we have seen to a certain extent in Russia. We must,
therefore, win over to our side not only the majority of the
working class, but also the majority of the working and
exploited rural population. Have you prepared for this?
Almost nowhere.

And so, I repeat: I must unreservedly defend our theses and
I feel I am bound to do it. We not only condemned the
Centrists but expelled them from the Party. Now we must deal
with another aspect, which we also consider dangerous. We
must tell the comrades the truth in the most polite form
(and in our theses it is told in a kind and considerate way)
so that no one feels insulted: we are confronted now by
other, more important questions than that of attacks on the
Centrists. We have had enough of this question. It has
already become somewhat boring. Instead, the comrades ought
to learn to wage a real revolutionary struggle. The German
workers have already begun this. Hundreds of thousands of
proletarians in that country have been fighting
heroically. Anyone who opposes this struggle should be
immediately expelled. But after that we must not engage in
empty word-spinning but must immediately begin to learn, on
the basis of the mistakes made, how to organise the struggle
better. We must not conceal our mistakes from the
enemy. Anyone who is afraid of this is no revolutionary. On
the contrary, if we openly declare to the workers:
“Yes, we have made mistakes”, it will mean that
they will not be repeated and we shall be able better to
choose the moment. And if during the struggle itself the
majority of the working people prove to be on our
side—not only the majority of the workers, but the
majority of all the exploited and oppressed—then we
shall really be victorious. (Prolonged, stormy
applause.)

4
Report On The Tactics Of The R.C.P.
July 5

Comrades, strictly speaking I was unable to prepare properly
for this report. All that I was able to prepare for you in
the way of systematic material was a translation of my
pamphlet on the tax in kind and the theses on the tactics of
the Russian Communist Party. To this I merely want to add a
few explanations and remarks.

I think that to explain our Party’s tactics we must
first of all examine the international
situation. We have already had a detailed discussion of
the economic position of capitalism internationally, and
the Congress has adopted definite resolutions on this
subject.[16] I deal with this subject in my
theses very briefly, and only from the political stand
point. I leave aside the economic basis, but I think that in
discussing the international position of our Republic we
must, politically, take into account the fact that a certain
equilibrium has now undoubtedly set in between the forces
that have been waging an open, armed struggle against each
other for the supremacy of this or that leading class. It is
an equilibrium between bourgeois society, the international
bourgeoisie as a whole, and Soviet Russia. It is, of course,
an equilibrium only in a limited sense. It is only in
respect to this military struggle, I say, that a certain
equilibrium has been brought about in the international
situation. It must be emphasised, of course, that this is
only a relative equilibrium, and a very unstable one. Much
inflammable material has accumulated in capitalist
countries, as well as in those countries which up to now
have been regarded merely as the objects and not as the
subjects of history, i.e., the colonies and
semi-colonies. It is quite possible, therefore, that
insurrections, great battles and revolutions may break out
there sooner or later, and very suddenly too. During the
past few years we have witnessed the direct struggle waged
by the international bourgeoisie against the first
proletarian republic. This struggle has been at the centre
of the world political situation, and it is there that a
change has taken place. Inasmuch as the attempt of the
international bourgeoisie to strangle our Republic has
failed, an equilibrium has set in, and a very unstable one
it is, of course.

We know perfectly well, of course, that the international
bourgeoisie is at present much stronger than our Republic,
and that it is only the peculiar combination of
circumstances that is preventing it from continuing the war
against us. For several weeks now, we have witnessed fresh
attempts in the Far East to renew the invasion,[17]
and there is not the slightest doubt that similar attempts
will continue. Our Party has no doubts whatever on that
score. The important thing for us is to establish that an
unstable equilibrium does exist, and that we must take
advantage of this respite, taking into consideration the
characteristic features of the present situation, adapting
our tactics to the specific features of this situation, and
never forgetting that the necessity for armed struggle may
arise again quite suddenly. Our task is still to organise
and build up the Red Army. In connection with the food
problem, too, we must continue to think first of all of our
Red Army. We can adopt no other line in the present
international situation, when we must still be prepared for
fresh attacks and fresh attempts at invasion on the part of
the international bourgeoisie. In regard to our practical
policy, however, the fact that a certain equilibrium has
been reached in the international situation has some
significance, but only in the sense that we must admit that,
although the revolutionary movement has made-progress, the
development of the international revolution this year has
not proceeded along as straight a line as we had
expected.

When we started the international revolution, we did so not
because we were convinced that we could forestall its
development, but because a number of circumstances compelled
us to start it. We thought: either the international
revolution comes to our assistance, and in that case our
victory will be fully assured, or we shall do our modest
revolutionary work in the conviction that even in the event
of defeat we shall have served the cause of the revolution
and that our experience will benefit other revolutions. It
was clear to us that without the support of the
international world revolution the victory of the
proletarian revolution was impossible. Before the
revolution, and even after it, we thought: either revolution
breaks out in the other countries, in the capitalistically
more developed countries, immediately, or at least very
quickly, or we must perish. In spite of this conviction, we
did all we possibly could to preserve the Soviet system
under all circumstances, come what may, because we knew that
we were not only working for ourselves, but also for the
international revolution. We knew this, we repeatedly
expressed this conviction before the October Revolution,
immediately after it, and at the time we signed the
Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty. And, generally speaking, this
was correct.

Actually, however, events did not proceed along as straight
a line as we had expected. In the other big,
capitalistically more developed countries the revolution has
not broken out to this day. True, we can say with
satisfaction that the revolution is developing all over the
world, and it is only thanks to this that the international
bourgeoisie is unable to strangle us, inspite of the fact
that, militarily and economically, it is a hundred times
stronger than we are. (Applause.)

In Paragraph 2 of the theses I examine the manner in which
this situation arose, and the conclusions that must be drawn
from it. Let me add that my final conclusion is the
following: the development of the international revolution,
which we predicted, is proceeding, but not along as straight
a line as we had expected. It becomes clear at the first
glance that after the conclusion of peace, bad as it was, it
proved impossible to call forth revolution in other
capitalist countries, although we know that the signs of
revolution were very considerable and numerous, in fact,
much more considerable and numerous than we thought at the
time. Pamphlets are now beginning to appear which tell us
that during the past few years and months these
revolutionary symptoms in Europe have been much more serious
than we had suspected. What, in that case, must we do now?
We must now thoroughly prepare for revolution and make a
deep study of its concrete development in the advanced
capitalist countries. This is the first lesson we must draw
from the international situation. As for our Russian
Republic, we must take advantage of this brief respite in
order to adapt our tactics to this zigzag line of
history. This equilibrium is very important politically,
because we clearly see that in many West-European countries,
where the broad mass of the working class, and possibly the
overwhelming majority of the population, are organised, the
main bulwark of the bourgeoisie consists of the hostile
working-class organisations affiliated to the Second and the
Two-and-a-Half Internationals. I speak of this in Paragraph
2 of the theses, and I think that in this connection I need
deal with only two points, which were discussed during the
debate on the question of tactics. First, winning over the
majority of the proletariat. The more organised the
proletariat is in a capitalistically developed country, the
greater thoroughness does history demand of us in preparing
for revolution, and the more thoroughly must we win over the
majority of the working class. Second, the main bulwark of
capitalism in the industrially developed capitalist
countries is the part of the working class that is organised
in the Second and the Two-and-a-Half Internationals. But for
the support of this section of the workers, these
counter-revolutionary elements within the working class, the
international bourgeoisie would be altogether unable to
retain its position. (Applause.)

Here I would also like to emphasise the significance of
the movement in the colonies. In this respect we
see in all the old parties, in all the bourgeois and
petty-bourgeois labour parties affiliated to the Second and
the Two-and-a Half Internationals, survivals of the old
sentimental views: they insist on their profound sympathy
for oppressed colonial and semi-colonial peoples. The
movement in the colonial countries is still regarded as an
insignificant national and totally peaceful movement. But
this is not so. It has undergone great change since the
beginning of the twentieth century: millions and hundreds of
millions, in fact the overwhelming majority of the
population of the globe, are now coming forward as
independent, active and revolutionary factors. It is
perfectly clear that in the impending decisive battles in
the world revolution, the movement of the majority of the
population of the globe, initially directed towards national
liberation, will turn against capitalism and imperialism and
will, perhaps, play a much more revolutionary part than we
expect. It is important to emphasise the fact that, for the
first time in our International, we have taken up the
question of preparing for this struggle. Of course, there
are many more difficulties in this enormous sphere than in
any other, but at all events the movement is advancing. And
in spite of the fact that the masses of toilers—the
peasants in the colonial countries—are still backward,
they will play a very important revolutionary part in the
coming phases of the world revolution. (Animated
approval.)

As regards the internal political position of our Republic I
must start with a close examination of class
relationships. During the past few months changes have taken
place in this sphere, and we have witnessed the formation of
new organisations of the exploiting class directed against
us. The aim of socialism is to abolish classes. In the front
ranks of the exploiting class we find the big landowners and
the industrial capitalists. In regard to them, the work of
destruction is fairly easy; it can be completed within a few
months, and sometimes even a few weeks or days. We in Russia
have expropriated our exploiters, the big landowners as well
as the capitalists. They had no organisations of their own
during the war and operated merely as the appendages of the
military forces of the international bourgeoisie. Now, after
we have repulsed the attacks of the international
counter-revolution, organisations of the Russian bourgeoisie
and of all the Russian counter-revolutionary parties have
been formed abroad. The number of Russian émigrés
scattered in all foreign countries may be estimated at one
and a half to two millions. In nearly every country they
publish daily newspapers, and all the parties, landowner and
petty-bourgeois, not excluding the Socialist-Revolutionaries
and Mensheviks, have numerous ties with foreign bourgeois
elements, that is to say, they obtain enough money to run
their own press. We find the collaboration abroad of
absolutely all the political parties that formerly existed
in Russia, and we see how the “free” Russian
press abroad, from the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik
press to the most reactionary monarchist press, is
championing the great landed interests. This, to a certain
extent, facilitates our task, because we can more easily
observe the forces of the enemy, his state of organisation,
and the political trends in his camp. On the other hand, of
course, it hinders our work, because these Russian
counter-revolutionary émigrés use every means at
their disposal to prepare for a fight against us. This fight
again shows that, taken as a whole, the class instinct and
class-consciousness of the ruling classes are still superior
to those of the oppressed classes, notwithstanding the fact
that the Russian revolution has done more than any previous
revolution in this respect. In Russia, there is hardly a
village in which the people, the oppressed, have not been
roused. Nevertheless, if we take a cool look at the state of
organisation and political clarity of views of the Russian
counter-revolutionary émigrés, we shall find that
the class-consciousness of the bourgeoisie is still superior
to that of the exploited and the oppressed. These people
make every possible attempt and skilfully take advantage of
every opportunity to attack Soviet Russia in one way or
another, and to dismember it. It would be very
instructive—and I think the foreign comrades will do
that—systematically to watch the most important
aspirations, the most important tactical moves, and the most
important trends of this Russian counter-revolution. It
operates chiefly abroad, and it will not be very difficult
for the foreign comrades to watch it. In some respects, we
ought to learn from this enemy. These counter-revolutionary
émigrés are very well informed, they are
excellently organised and are good strategists. And I think
that a systematic comparison and study of the manner in
which they are organised and take advantage of every
opportunity may have a powerful propaganda effect upon the
working class. This is not general theory, it is practical
politics; here we can see what the enemy has learned. During
the past few years, the Russian bourgeoisie has suffered a
terrible defeat. There is an old saying that a beaten army
learns a great deal. The beaten reactionary army has learned
a great deal, and has learned it thoroughly. It is learning
with great avidity, and has really made much headway. When
we took power at one swoop, the Russian bourgeoisie was
unorganised and politically undeveloped. Now, I think, its
development is on a par with modern, West-European
development. We must take this into account, we must improve
our own organisation and methods, and we shall do our utmost
to achieve this. It was relatively easy for us, and I think
that it will be equally easy for other revolutions, to cope
with these two exploiting classes.

But, in addition to this class of exploiters, there is in
nearly all capitalist countries, with the exception,
perhaps, of Britain, a class of small producers and small
farmers. The main problem of the revolution now is how to
fight these two classes. In order to be rid of them, we must
adopt methods other than those employed against the big
landowners and capitalists. We could simply expropriate and
expel both of these classes, and that is what we did. But we
cannot do the same thing with the remaining capitalist
classes, the small producers and the petty bourgeoisie,
which are found in all countries. In most capitalist
countries, these classes constitute a very considerable
minority, approximately from thirty to forty-five per cent
of the population. Add to them the petty-bourgeois elements
of the working class, and you get even more than fifty per
cent. These cannot be expropriated or expelled; other
methods of struggle must be adopted in their case. From the
international standpoint, if we regard the international
revolution as one process, the significance of the period
into which we are now entering in Russia is, in essence,
that we must now find a practical solution for the problem
of the relations the proletariat should establish with this
last capitalist class in Russia. All Marxists have a correct
and ready solution for this problem in theory. But theory
and practice are two different things, and the practical
solution of this problem is by no means the same as the
theoretical solution. We know definitely that we have made
serious mistakes. From the international standpoint, it is a
sign of great progress that we are now trying to determine
the attitude the proletariat in power should adopt towards
the last capitalist class—the rock-bottom of
capitalism—small private property, the small
producer. This problem now confronts us in a practical
way. I think we shall solve it. At all events, the
experiment we are making will be useful for future
proletarian revolutions, and they will be able to make
better technical preparations for solving it.

In my theses I tried to analyse the problem of the
relations between the proletariat and the
peasantry. For the first time in history there is a
state with only two classes, the proletariat and the
peasantry. The latter constitutes the overwhelming majority
of the population. It is, of course, very backward. How do
the relations between the peasantry and the proletariat,
which holds political power, find practical expression in
the development of the revolution? The first form is
alliance, close alliance. This is a very difficult task, but
at any rate it is economically and politically feasible.

How did we approach this problem practically? We concluded
an alliance with the peasantry. We interpret this alliance
in the following way: the proletariat emancipates the
peasantry from the exploitation of the bourgeoisie, from its
leadership and influence, and wins it over to its own side
in order jointly to defeat the exploiters.

The Menshevik argument runs like this: the peasantry
constitutes a majority; we are pure democrats, therefore,
the majority should decide. But as the peasantry cannot
operate on its own, this, in practice, means nothing more
nor less than the restoration of capitalism. The slogan is
the same: Alliance with the peasantry. When we say that, we
mean strengthening and consolidating the proletariat: We
have tried to give effect to this alliance between the
proletariat and the peasantry, and the first stage was a
military alliance. The three years of the Civil War created
enormous difficulties, but in certain respects they
facilitated our task. This may-sound odd, but it is
true. The war was not something new for the peasants; a war
against the exploiters, against the big landowners, was
something they quite understood. The overwhelming majority
of the peasants were on our side. In spite of the enormous
distances, and the fact that the overwhelming majority of
our peasants are unable to read or write, they assimilated
our propaganda very easily. This proves that the broad
masses—and this applies also to the most advanced
countries—learn faster from their own practical
experience than from books. In Russia, moreover, learning
from practical experience was facilitated for the peasantry
by the fact that the country is so exceptionally large that
in the same period different parts of it were passing
through different stages of development.

In Siberia and in the Ukraine the counter-revolution was
able to gain a temporary victory because there the
bourgeoisie had the peasantry on its side, because the
peasants were against us. The peasants frequently said,
“We are Bolsheviks, but not Communists. We are for the
Bolsheviks because they drove out the landowners; but we are
not for the Communists because they are opposed to
individual farming.” And for a time, the
counter-revolution managed to win out in Siberia and in the
Ukraine because the bourgeoisie made headway in the struggle
for influence over the peasantry. But it took only a very
short time to open the peasants’ eyes. They quickly
acquired practical experience and soon said, “Yes, the
Bolsheviks are rather unpleasant people, we don’t like
them, but still they are better than the whiteguards and the
Constituent Assembly.” “Constituent
Assembly” is a term of abuse not only among the
educated Communists, but also among the peasants. They know
from practical experience that the Constituent Assembly and
the whiteguards stand for the same thing, that the former is
inevitably followed by the latter. The Mensheviks also
resort to a military alliance with the peasantry, but they
fail to understand that a military alliance alone is
inadequate. There can be no military alliance without an
economic alliance. It takes more than air to keep a man
alive; our alliance with the peasantry could not possibly
have lasted any length of time without the economic
foundation, which was the basis of our victory in the war
against our bourgeoisie. After all our bourgeoisie has
united with the whole of the international bourgeoisie.

The basis of our economic alliance with the peasantry was,
of course, very simple, and even crude. The peasant obtained
from us all the land and support against the big
landowners. In return for this, we were to obtain food. This
alliance was something entirely new and did not rest on the
ordinary relations between commodity producers and
consumers. Our peasants had a much better understanding of
this than the heroes of the Second and the Two-and a-Half
Internationals. They said to themselves, “These
Bolsheviks are stern leaders, but after all they are our own
people.” Be that as it may, we created in this way the
foundations of a new economic alliance. The peasants gave
their produce to the Red Army and received from the latter
assistance in protecting their possessions. This is always
forgotten by the heroes of the Second International, who,
like Otto Bauer, totally fail to understand the actual
situation. We confess that the initial form of this alliance
was very primitive and that we made very many mistakes. But
we were obliged to act as quickly as possible, we had to
organise supplies for the army at all costs. During the
Civil War we were cut off from all the grain districts of
Russia. We were in a terrible position, and it looks like a
miracle that the Russian people and the working class were
able to endure such suffering, want, and privation,
sustained by nothing more than a deep urge for
victory. (Animated approval and applause.)

When the Civil War came to an end, however, we faced a
different problem. If the country had not been so laid waste
after seven years of incessant war, it would, perhaps, have
been possible to find an easier transition to the new form
of alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry. But
bad as conditions in the country were, they were still
further aggravated by the crop failure, the fodder shortage,
etc. In consequence, the sufferings of the peasants became
unbearable. We had to show the broad masses of the peasants
immediately that we were prepared to change our policy,
without in any way deviating from our revolutionary path, so
that they could say, “The Bolsheviks want to improve
our intolerable condition immediately, and at all
costs.”

And so, our economic policy was changed; the tax in
kind superseded the requisitions. This was not invented at
one stroke. You will find a number of proposals in the
Bolshevik press over a period of months, but no plan that
really promised success. But this is not important. The
important thing is that we changed our, economic policy,
yielding to exclusively practical considerations, and
impelled by necessity. A bad harvest, fodder shortage and
lack of fuel—all, of course, have a decisive influence
on the economy as a whole, including the peasant economy. If
the peasantry goes on strike, we get no firewood; and if we
get no firewood, the factories will have to idle. Thus, in
the spring of 1921, the economic crisis resulting from the
terrible crop failure and the fodder shortage assumed
gigantic proportions. All that was the aftermath of the
three years of civil war. We had to show the peasantry that
we could and would quickly change our policy in order
immediately to alleviate their distress. We have always
said—and it was also said at the Second
Congress—that revolution demands sacrifices. Some
comrades in their propaganda argue in the following way: we
are prepared to stage a revolution, but it must not be too
severe. Unless I am mistaken, this thesis was put forward by
Comrade Smeral in his speech at the Congress of the
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. I read about it in the
report published in the Reichenberg Vorwärts[18] There is evidently a Leftist
wing there; hence this source cannot be regarded as being
quite impartial. At all events, I must say that if Smeral
did say that, he was wrong. Some comrades who spoke after
Smeral at this Congress said, “Yes, we shall go along
with Smeral because in this way we shall avoid civil
war.” (Laughter.) If these reports are true,
I must say that such agitation is neither communistic nor
revolutionary. Naturally, every revolution entails enormous
sacrifice on the part of the class making it. Revolution
differs from ordinary struggle in that ten and even a
hundred times more people take part in it. Hence every
revolution entails sacrifices not only for individuals, but
for a whole class. The dictatorship of the proletariat in
Russia has entailed for the ruling class—the
proletariat—sacrifices, want and privation
unprecedented in history, and the case will, in all
probability, be the same in every other country.

The question arises: How are we to distribute this burden of
privation? We are the state power. We are able to distribute
the burden of privation to a certain extent, and to impose
it upon several classes, thereby relatively alleviating the
condition of certain strata of the population.
But what is to be our principle? Is it to be that of
fairness, or of majority? No. We must act in a practical
manner. We must distribute the burdens in such a way as to
preserve the power of the proletariat. This is our only
principle. In the beginning of the revolution the working
class was compelled to suffer incredible want. Let me state
that from year to year our food policy has been achieving
increasing success. And the situation as a whole has
undoubtedly improved. But the peasantry in Russia has
certainly gained more from the revolution than the working
class. There is no doubt about that at all. From the
standpoint of theory, this shows, of course, that our
revolution was to some degree a bourgeois revolution. When
Kautsky used this as an argument against us, we
laughed. Naturally, a revolution which does not expropriate
the big landed estates, expel the big landowners or divide
the land is only a bourgeois revolution and not a socialist
one. But we were the only party to carry the bourgeois
revolution to its conclusion and to facilitate the struggle
for the socialist revolution. The Soviet power and the
Soviet system are institutions of the socialist state. We
have already established these institutions, but we have not
yet solved the problem of economic relations between the
peasantry and the proletariat. Much remains to be done, and
the outcome of this struggle depends upon whether we solve
this problem or not. Thus, the distribution of the burden of
privation is one of the most difficult practical
problems. On the whole, the condition of the peasants has
improved, but dire suffering has fallen to the lot of the
working class, precisely because it is exercising its
dictatorship.

I have already said that in the spring of 1921 the most
appalling want caused by the fodder shortage and the crop
failure prevailed among the peasantry, which constitutes the
majority of our population. We cannot possibly exist unless
we have good relations with the peasant masses. Hence, our
task was to render them immediate assistance. The condition
of the working class is extremely hard. It is suffering
horribly. Those who have more political understanding,
however, realise that in the interest of the dictatorship of
the working class we must make tremendous efforts to help
the peasants at any price. The vanguard of the working
class has realised this, but in that vanguard there are
still people who cannot understand it, and who are too weary
to understand it. They regarded it as a mistake and began to
use the word “opportunism”. They said,
“The Bolsheviks are helping the peasants. The
peasants, who are exploiting us, are getting everything they
please, while the workers are starving.” But is that
opportunism? We are helping the peasants because without an
alliance with them the political power of the proletariat is
impossible, its preservation is inconceivable. It was this
consideration of expediency and not that of fair
distribution that was decisive for us. We are assisting the
peasants because it is absolutely necessary to do so in
order that we may retain political power. The supreme
principle of the dictatorship is the maintenance of the
alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry in order
that the proletariat may retain its leading role and its
political power.

The only means we found for this was the adoption of the tax
in kind, which was the inevitable consequence of the
struggle. This year, we shall introduce this tax for the
first time. This principle has not yet been tried in
practice. From the military alliance we must pass to an
economic alliance, and, theoretically, the only basis for
the latter is the introduction of the tax in kind. It
provides the only theoretical possibility for laying a
really solid economic foundation for socialist society. The
socialised factory gives the peasant its manufactures and in
return the peasant gives his grain. This is the only
possible form of existence of socialist society, the only
form of socialist development in a country in which the
small peasants constitute the majority, or at all events a
very considerable minority. The peasants will give one part
of their produce in the form of tax and another either in
exchange for the manufactures of socialist factories, or
through the exchange of commodities.

This brings us to the most difficult problem. It goes
without saying that the tax in kind means freedom to
trade. After having paid the tax in kind, the peasant will
have the right freely to exchange the remainder of his
grain. This freedom of exchange implies freedom for
capitalism. We say this openly and emphasise it. We do not
conceal it in the least. Things would go very hard with us
if we attempted to conceal it. Freedom to trade means
freedom for capitalism, but it also means a new form of
capitalism. It means that, to a certain extent, we are
re-creating capitalism. We are doing this quite openly. It
is state capitalism. But state capitalism in a society where
power belongs to capital, and state capitalism in a
proletarian state, are two different concepts. In a
capitalist state, state capitalism means that it is
recognised by the state and controlled by it for the benefit
of the bourgeoisie, and to the detriment of the
proletariat. In the proletarian state, the same thing is
done for the benefit of the working class, for the purpose
of withstanding the as yet strong bourgeoisie, and of
fighting it. It goes without saying that we must grant
concessions to the foreign bourgeoisie, to foreign
capital. Without the slightest denationalisation, we shall
lease mines, forests and oilfields to foreign capitalists,
and receive in exchange manufactured goods, machinery, etc.,
and thus restore our own industry.

Of course, we did not all agree on the question of state
capitalism at once. But we are very pleased to note in this
connection that our peasantry has been developing, that it
has fully realised the historical significance of the
struggle we are waging at the present time. Ordinary
peasants from the most remote districts have come to us and
said: “What! We have expelled our capitalists, the
capitalists who speak Russian, and now foreign capitalists
are coming!” Does not this show that our peasants have
developed? There is no need to explain to a worker who is
versed in economics why this is necessary. We have been so
ruined by seven years of war that it will take many years to
restore our industry. We must pay for our backwardness and
weakness, and for the lessons we are now learning and must
learn. Those who want to learn must pay for the tuition. We
must explain this to one and all, and if we prove it in
practice, the vast masses of the peasants and workers will
agree with us, because in this way their condition will be
immediately improved, and because it will ensure the
possibility of restoring our industry. What compels us to do
this? We are not alone in the world. We exist in a system
of capitalist states. [19]. . . On one
side, there are the colonial countries, but they cannot help
us yet. On the other side, there are the capitalist
countries, but they are our enemies. The result is a certain
equilibrium, a very poor one, it is true. Nevertheless, we
must reckon with the fact. We must not shut our eyes to it
if we want to exist. Either we score an immediate victory
over the whole bourgeoisie, or we pay the tribute.

We admit quite openly, and do not conceal the fact, that
concessions in the system of state capitalism mean paying
tribute to capitalism. But we gain time, and gaining time
means gaining everything, particularly in the period of
equilibrium, when our foreign comrades are preparing
thoroughly for their revolution. The more thorough their
preparations, the more certain will the victory
be. Meanwhile, however, we shall have to pay the
tribute.

A few words about our food policy. Undoubtedly, it was a bad
and primitive policy. But we can also point to some
achievements. In this connection I must once again emphasise
that the only possible economic foundation of socialism is
large-scale machine industry. Whoever forgets this is no
Communist. We must analyse this problem concretely. We
cannot present problems in the way the theoreticians of the
old school of socialism do. We must present them in a
practical manner. What is modern large-scale industry? It is
the electrification of the whole of Russia. Sweden, Germany
and America have almost achieved this, although they are
still bourgeois. A Swedish comrade told me that in Sweden a
large part of industry and thirty per cent of agriculture
are electrified. In Germany and America, which are even more
developed capitalistically, we see the same thing on a
larger scale. Large-scale machine industry is nothing more
nor less than the electrification of the whole country. We
have already appointed a special commission consisting of
the country’s best economists and engineers. It is
true that nearly all of them are hostile to the Soviet
power. All these specialists will come over to communism,
but not our way, not by way of twenty years of underground
work, during which we unceasingly studied and repeated over
and over again the ABC of communism.

Nearly all the Soviet government bodies were in favour of
inviting the specialists. The expert engineers will come to
us when we give them practical proof that this will
increase the country’s productive forces. It is not
enough to prove it to them in theory; we must prove it to
them in practice, and we shall win these people over to our
side if we present the problem differently, not from the
standpoint of the theoretical propaganda of communism. We
say: large-scale industry is the only means of saving the
peasantry from want and starvation. Everyone agrees with
this. But how can it be done? The restoration of industry on
the old basis will entail too much labour and time. We must
give industry a more modern form, i.e., we must adopt
electrification. This will take much less time. We have
already drawn up the plans for electrification. More than
two hundred specialists—almost to a man opposed to the
Soviet power—worked on it with keen interest, although
they are not Communists. From the standpoint of technical
science, however, they had to admit that this was the only
correct way. Of course, we have a long way to go before the
plan is achieved. The cautious specialists say that the
first series of works will take at least ten
years. Professor Ballod has estimated that it would take
three to four years to electrify Germany. But for us even
ten years is not enough. In my theses I quote actual figures
to show you how little we have been able to do in this
sphere up to now. The figures I quote are so modest that it
immediately becomes clear that they are more of propaganda
than scientific value. But we must begin with
propaganda. The Russian peasants who fought in the world war
and lived in Germany for several years learned how modern
farming should be carried on in order to conquer famine. We
must carry on extensive propaganda in this direction. Taken
by themselves, these plans are not yet of great practical
value, but their propaganda value is very great.

The peasants realise that something new must be
created. They realise that this cannot be done by everybody
working separately, but by the state working as a whole. The
peasants who were prisoners of war in Germany found out what
real cultural life is based on. Twelve thousand kilowatts is
a very modest beginning. This may sound funny to the
foreigner who is familiar with electrification in America,
Germany or Sweden. But he laughs best who laughs last. It
is, indeed, a modest beginning. But the peasants are
beginning to understand that new work must be carried out on
a grand scale, and that this work has already
begun. Enormous difficulties will have to be overcome. We
shall try to establish relations with the capitalist
countries. We must not regret having to give the capitalists
several hundred million kilogrammes of oil on condition that
they help us to electrify our country.

And now, in conclusion, a few words about “pure
democracy”. I will read you a passage from
Engels’s letter to Bebel of December 11, 1884. He
wrote:

“Pure democracy . . . when the moment of revolution
comes, acquires a temporary importance as the extreme
bourgeois party, as which it already played itself off in
Frankfort, and as the final sheet-anchor of the whole
bourgeois and even feudal economy. . . . Thus between March
and September 1848 the whole feudal-bureaucratic mass
strengthened the liberals in order to hold down the
revolutionary masses. . . . In any case our sole adversary
on the day of the crisis and on the day after the crisis
will be the whole of the reaction which will group
around pure democracy, and this, I think, should not be
lost sight of.”

Our approach must differ from that of the theoreticians. The
whole reactionary mass, not only bourgeois, but also feudal,
groups itself around “pure democracy”. The
German comrades know better than anyone else what
“pure democracy” means, for Kautsky and the
other leaders of the Second and the Two-and-a-Half
Internationals are defending this “pure
democracy” from the wicked Bolsheviks. If we judge the
Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, not by
what they say, but by what they do, we shall find that they
are nothing but representatives of petty bourgeois
“pure democracy”. In the course of our
revolution they have given us a classic example of what
“pure democracy” means, and again during the
recent crisis, in the days of the Kronstadt mutiny. There
was serious unrest among the peasantry, and discontent was
also rife among the workers. They were weary and
exhausted. After all, there is a limit to human
endurance. They had starved for three years, but you cannot
go on starving for four or five years. Naturally, hunger has
a tremendous influence on political activity. How did the
Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks behave? They
wavered all the time, thereby strengthening the
bourgeoisie. The organisation of all the Russian parties
abroad has revealed the present state of affairs. The
shrewdest of the leaders of the Russian big bourgeoisie said
to themselves: “We cannot achieve victory in Russia
immediately. Hence our slogan must be: ‘Soviets
without the Bolsheviks.’” Milyukov, the leader
of the Constitutional-Democrats, defended the Soviet power
from the attacks of the Socialist-Revolutionaries. This
sounds very strange; but such are the practical dialectics
which we, in our revolution, have been studying in a
peculiar way, from the practical experience of our struggle
and of the struggle of our enemies. The
Constitutional-Democrats defend “Soviets without the
Bolsheviks” because they understand the position very
well and hope that a section of the people will rise to the
bait. That is what the clever Constitutional-Democrats
say. Not all the Constitutional-Democrats are clever, of
course, but some of them are, and these have learned
something from the French Revolution. The present slogan is
to fight the Bolsheviks, whatever the price, come what
may. The whole of the bourgeoisie is now helping the
Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, who are now the
vanguard of all reaction. In the spring we had a taste of
the fruits of this counter-revolutionary co-operation. [20]

That is why we must continue our relentless struggle against
these elements. Dictatorship is a state of intense war. That
is just the state we are in. There is no military invasion
at present; but we are isolated. On the other hand, however,
we are not entirely isolated, since the whole international
bourgeoisie is incapable of waging open war against us just
now, because the whole working class, even though the
majority is not yet communist, is sufficiently
class-conscious to prevent intervention. The bourgeoisie is
compelled to reckon with the temper of the masses even
though they have not yet entirely sided with communism. That
is why the bourgeoisie cannot now start an offensive against
us, although one is never ruled out. Until the final issue
is decided, this awful state of war will continue. And we
say: “A la guerre comme à la guerre ;
we do not promise any freedom, or any democracy.” We
tell the peasants quite openly that they must choose between
the rule of the bourgeoisie, and the rule of the
Bolsheviks—in which case we shall make every possible
concession within the limits of retaining power, and later
we shall lead them to socialism. Everything else is
deception and pure demagogy. Ruthless war must be declared
against this deception and demagogy. Our point of view is:
for the time being—big concessions and the greatest
caution, precisely because a certain equilibrium has set in,
precisely because we are weaker than our combined enemies,
and because our economic basis is too weak and we need a
stronger one.

That, comrades, is what I wanted to tell you about our
tactics, the tactics of the Russian Communist
Party. (Prolonged applause.)

Endnotes

[1] The Third
Congress was held in Moscow from June 22 to July 12,
1921. Its 605 delegates (291 with voice and vote, and 314
with voice only) represented 103 organisations from 52
countries, namely: 48 Communist Parties, 8 Socialist
Parties, 28 Youth Leagues, 4 syndicalist organisations, 2
opposition Communist Parties (the Communist Workers’
Party of Gemany and the Workers’ Communist Party of
Spain) and 13 other organisations. The 72 delegates from the
Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks were headed by
Lenin.

The Congress discussed the world economic crisis and the new
tasks of the Communist International; the report on the
activity of the Executive Committee of the Communist
International; the Communist Workers’ Party of
Germany, the Italian question; the tactics of the Communist
International the attitude of the Red International Council
of Trade Unions to the Communist International; the struggle
against the Amsterdam International; the tactics of the
R.C.P.(B.); the Communist International and the Communist
youth movement; the women’s movement; the United
Communist Party of Germany, etc.

Lenin directed preparations for and the activities of the
Congress; he was elected its Honorary Chairman; he took part
in drafting all the key resolutions; he gave a report on the
tactics of the R.C.P.(B.); he spoke in defence of the
Communist International’s tactics, on the Italian
question; in the commissions and at the enlarged sittings of
the Executive Committee of the Comintern, and at the
delegates’ meetings. Before and during the Congress,
Lenin met and talked with delegates about the state of
affairs in the Communist Parties.

The Third Congress had a great influence on the formation
and development of young Communist Parties. It paid great
attention to the Comintern’s organisation and tactics
in the new conditions of the world communist movement. Lenin
had to combat the Centrist deviation and
“Leftist” dogmatism, pseudo-revolutionary
“Leftist” cant and sectarianism. As a result,
revolutionary Marxism prevailed over the
“Leftist” danger.

In the history of the world communist movement the Third
Congress is known for the following achievements: it worked
out the basic tactics of the Communist Parties; it defined
the task of winning the masses over to the side of the
proletariat, strengthening working-class unity and
implementing united front tactics. The most important aspect
of its resolutions, Lenin said, was “more careful,
more thorough preparation for fresh and more decisive
battles, both defensive and offensive”.

[2] On April 13,
1919, in Amritsar, an industrial centre in Punjab, India,
British troops fired on a mass meeting of working people who
were protesting against the colonialist reign of
terror. About 1,000 were killed and 2,000 wounded. The
massacre led to popular uprisings in Punjab and other
provinces, which were ruthlessly suppressed by the British
colonialists.

[3]Posledniye
Novosti (The Latest News )—an
émigré daily, the organ of the
counter-revolutionary party of Constitutional-Democrats,
published in Paris from April 1920 to July 1940. Its editor
was P. N. Milyukov.

[4]Kommunistichesky Trud (Communist Labour
)—a daily published by the Moscow R.C.P.(B.)
Committee and the Moscow Soviet of Workers’ and
Peasants’ Deputies from March 18, 1920. On February 7,
1922, it took the name of Rabochaya Moskva
(Workers’ Moscow ); on March 1, 1939,
Moskovsky Bolshevik (Moscow Bolshevik ),
and ever since February 19, 1950, has been appearing as
Moskovskaya Pravda (Moscow Truth ).

[7]The conference
of the reformist wing of the Italian Socialist Party, the
so-called “socialist concentration” group, took
place in Reggio Emilia on October 10-11, 1920. Lenin gave a
detailed characteristic of it in his article, “On the
Struggle Within the Italian Socialist Party”
(Collected Works, Vol. 31, pp. 377-96).

The report on the conference mentioned by Lenin was
published in Corriere della Sera No. 244 and
No. 245, of October 11 and 12, 1920, as well as in
Avanti! No. 245 of October 13, 1920.

[8]Avanti! (Forward! )—a daily, the
Central Organ of the Italian Socialist Party, founded in
Rome in December 1896. During the First World War, it took
an inconsistently internationalist stand, and did not break
with the reformists. In 1926, the paper was closed down by
Mussolini’s fascist government, but continued to
appear abroad. It resumed publication in Italy in 1943.

[9] Lenin
apparently refers to the conference of the
“unitary” group (Serrati, Baratono and others)
in Florence on November 20-21, 1920 which came out against
the break with the reformists and, with this reservation,
for the acceptance of the 21 conditions of affiliation to
the Communist International.

[10] In January
1919, the Ebert-Scheidemann government dismissed the Berlin
police chief, Eichhorn (a Left-wing Independent) who was
very popular with the workers. This sparked off a
workers’ protest demonstration on January 4, the day
following Eichhorn’s retirement, and later a general
strike and an armed uprising to overthrow the
Ebert-Scheidemann government. The Revolutionary Committee of
Action which headed the uprising included some Independents
and Karl Liebknecht and Wilhelm Pieck of the Communist Party
of Germany. The Communist Party considered the uprising
premature, but decided to support the revolutionary mass
movement in every way. Berlin events fired the
proletariat’s revolutionary struggle in the Rheinland,
the Ruhr, Bremen and elsewhere.

Alarmed by the scope of the movement, the Central Committee
of the Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany
started negotiations with the government, who used them for
preparing a counter-revolutionary offensive. On January 11,
its forces, led by Noske, attacked the workers and drowned
their uprising in blood. Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg,
the leaders of the German working class, were arrested and
killed at the height of the counter-revolutionary reign of
terror. Workers’ action in other parts of the country
was fiereely suppressed.

[11] In September
1920, Italian steelworkers occupied their mills on the
initiative of their trade union, which was in conflict with
the association of industrialists. The movement started in
Turin and Milan, then spread through Piedmont and Northern
Italy across the eountry, from the metallurgical industry to
other industries and to agriculture. In Sicily and in other
areas peasants occupied the land. The scope of the movement
jeopardised the capitalist regime, but the reformist leaders
of the Socialist Party and the trade unions, terrified by
the political character of the movement, adopted a decision
to confine it to within the trade unions and prevent it from
developing into a revolution. They also decided to start
negotiations with the industrialists.

This was a hard blow at the Italian workers’ movement
and showed the leaders’ inability to lead the mass
forces. Fascism used the confusion within the working class
to start its armed offensive in Italy.

[12] The
amendments were proposed by the German, Austrian and Italian
delegations to the draft theses on tactics, motioned by the
Russian delegation at the Third Congress of the Comintern.
They were published in German in Moskau, the organ
of the Third Congress.

[13] The Open
Letter (Offenor Brief) of the Central Committee of the
United Communist Party of Germany to the Socialist Party of
Germany, Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany, the
Communist Workers’ Party of Germany and all trade
unions, was published in Die Rote Fahne (The
Red Banner ) on January 8, 1921. The U.C.P.G. called on
all workers, trade unions and socialist organisations to
unite their forces in combating reaction and the
capitalists’ offensive against the working
people’s vital rights. Their programme of joint action
included demands for higher pensions for disabled war
veterans; elimination of unemployment; improvement of the
country’s finances at the expense of the monopolies,
introduction of factory and plant committee control over all
stocks of food, raw materials and fuel restarting of all
closed enterprises; control over sowing, harvesting and
marketing of farm produce by the Peasants’ Councils
together with the agricultural labourers’
organisations; immediate disarming and dissolution of all
bourgeois militarised organisations; establishment of
workers’ self-defence; amnesty of all political
prisoners; immediate re-establishment of trade and
diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia. Lenin said these
tactics were “quite correct” (see
Lenin Miscellany XXXVI, p. 221).

The Right-wing leaders of the organisations to whom the Open
Letter was addressed rejected the proposal for joint action
with the Communists, despite the fact that the workers came
out for a united front of the proletariat.

[14] The
theory of an offensive struggle or “theory of
the offensive” was proclaimed at the Unity Congress of
the Communist Party of Germany and the Left-wing Independent
Social-Democratic Party of Germany in December 1920. It
envisaged that the party should conduct offensive tactics,
regardless of whether there were any objective conditions
for revolutionary activity or whether the working people
supported the Communist Party. The theory found its
followers among the “Leftists” in Hungary,
Czechoslovakia, Italy, Austria, and France, and was one of
the causes of the defeat of the March 1921 uprising in
Germany. But the “Left ists” tried to justify
the mistakes of the Central Committee of the U.C.P.G. The
theses on the March uprising adopted by the U.C.P.G. Central
Committee on April 8, 1921, reiterated that the U.C.P.G. was
always to “follow the line of revolutionary
offensive” and that offensive tactics, “even
when unsuccessful, were a prerequisite of future victory and
the only means for a revolutionary party to win over the
masses”. At the Third Congress of the Comintern the
followers of this theory fought to make it the basis of the
Communist International’s resolutions on
tactics. Lenin proved this theory to be wrong and
adventurous, and the Congress approved his line of patient
preparation and winning over of the majority of the working
class to the side of the communist movement.

[16]
The reference is to the resolution of the Third Congress of
the Communist International, “The International
Situation and Our Tasks”. See Kommunistichesky
Internatsional v dokumentakh. Resheniya, tezisy i
vozzvaniya kongressov Kominterna i plenumov
IKKI. 1919-1932 (The Communist International in
Documents. Resolutions, Theses and Appeals of Congresses of
the Comintern and Plenary Meetings of the Executive
Committee of the Communist International. 1919-1932, Moscow,
1933, pp. 165-80).

[17] On May 26,
1921, in Vladivostok, the whiteguards, supported by the
Japanese interventionists, overthrew the Maritime Regional
Administration of the Far Eastern Republic and established a
regime of bourgeois dictatorship and terror headed by
industrialists, the Merkulov brothers. South Primorye became
a spring-board for continued imperialist intervention in the
Far East.

The Revolutionary People’s Army of the Far Eastern
Republic, under V. K. Blyukher, and later I. P. Uborevich,
defeated the whiteguards, liberating Khabarovsk on February
14, 1922, and Vladivostok on October 25, 1922. Japan had to
withdraw her forces from the Far East. On November 14, 1922,
the People’s Assembly of the Far Eastern Republic set
up the Far East Revolutionary Committee with plenipotentiary
powers to implement the union of the Far East with Soviet
Russia. On November 15, 1922, the Presidium of the
All-Russia Central Executive Committee issued a decree
proclaiming the Far Eastern Republic an inseparable part of
the R.S.F.S.R.

[18] The
Csechoslovak Social-Democratic Party (Left) Congress held in
Prague from May 14 to 16, 1921, was the Inaugural Congress
of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. It was attended by
569 delegates representing more than 350,000 Party
members. The Congress adopted a resolution by acclamation on
affiliation to the Third International. B. Smeral was the
chief rapporteur at the Congress.

Lenin made a thorough study of the material of the Congress
(see Lenin Miscellany XXXVI, pp. 288, 289,
311).

Vorwärts (Forward )—a newspaper
published by the Austrian Left-wing Social-Democrats from
May 1911 in Reichenberg. In 1921, it became the organ of the
Czechoslovak Communist Party (German group).

[19] The verbatim
report then goes on to say (Lenin spoke in German)
“als Glied der Weltwirtschafw”; the
French translation was “comme membre de
l’économie mondiale”, and the English,
“as a member of the world’s economy”. The
text in this volume is taken from Pravda, July 9,
1921, which did not contain these words.