Browse by

Atheists As “Other”: Moral Boundaries and Cultural Membership in American Society

Penny Edgell
University of Minnesota

Joseph Gerteis
University of Minnesota

Douglas Hartmann
University of Minnesota Despite the declining salience of divisions among religious groups, the boundary between believers and nonbelievers in America remains strong. This article examines the limits of Americans’ acceptance of atheists. Using new national survey data, it shows atheists are less likely to be accepted, publicly and privately, than any others from a long list of ethnic, religious, and other minority groups. This distrust of atheists is driven by religious predictors, social location, and broader value orientations. It is rooted in moral and symbolic, rather than ethnic or material, grounds. We demonstrate that increasing acceptance of religious diversity does not extend to the nonreligious, and present a theoretical framework for understanding the role of religious belief in providing a moral basis for cultural membership and solidarity in an otherwise highly diverse society.

studied because they lead to social exclusion for ho is like me and who is not? Delivered by Ingenta to : What kind University of Minnesota - Minneapolis of relationship do I have to those who those in marginalized groups, and these disMon, 29 Jan 2007 18:06:57 are different? These are questions about boundtinctions form the basis for social inequality aries, the symbolic distinctions that we make (Epstein 1988; Lamont and Fournier 1992). By along multiple dimensions between ourselves contrast, religious boundaries are often seen by and others. Such distinctions have social implisociologists as a basis for inclusion, forming cations when they are widely recognized and meaningful subcultures and motivating politiaccepted as legitimate dimensions of differcal mobilization of the marginalized (Warner ence, and when they organize access to 1993). Moreover, increasing religious pluralresources and opportunities (Lamont and ism in postwar America has coincided with an Molnár 2002). Symbolic boundaries both ecumenical movement and a decline in the include and exclude—by separating out those salience of the boundaries between particular who do not belong, they draw together those religious groups (Hout and Fischer 2001). who do (Alexander 1992; Taylor 2002). Yet what about the boundary between the Symbolic distinctions drawn along lines of religious and the nonreligious? Do Americans race, gender, sexuality, or social class are often make invidious distinctions (c.f. Epstein 1988) between believers and nonbelievers? If so, what are the bases for these symbolic distinctions? More broadly, what can that tell us about the sources of solidarity in American society and the Direct cor respondence to Penny Edgell, limits of religious acceptance? Department of Sociology, University of Minnesota, 909 Social Sciences, 267 19th Avenue South, In this article, we situate Americans’ attiMinneapolis, MN 55455 (edgell@umn.edu). tudes toward atheists within the literature on Research supported by the Edelstein Family religion in America. The reaction to atheists Foundation as part of the American Mosaic Project has long been used as an index of political and at the University of Minnesota. The authors thank social tolerance. While important, this literature Eric Tranby for his help with statistical analysis does not tell us why there is so strong a reaction and other research support. to such a small, hard to identify, and disorgan-

W

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, 2006, VOL. 71 (April:211–234)

212—–AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

ized category of persons. The broader literawould have called the functional or integrative aspects of religious belief and practice. In priture on the historical connection between relivate life, scholars concentrate on how religion gion and civic life in America sheds more light provides values and a sense of meaning, fosters on the cultural bases for this symbolic exclusion, supportive and caring relationships (Sherkat particularly on assumptions about what and Ellison 1999), and gives “a framework for Americans think they have (or should have) in seeing oneself as a good person and one’s life common. Americans’ views of atheists tell us litas basically good, independent of the success tle about atheists themselves—who they are, that one has in acquiring money, fame, or where they live, or what they are like. We power” (Hart 1986:52). In public life, religious believe, however, that these views reveal a great institutions have been studied for their role in deal about dominant conceptions of national preserving ethnic and subcultural identities (Eck unity as well as fears of moral decline. 2001; Smith 1998), providing the material Using data from a new national survey (2003, resources and social connections that foster N = 2081), we show that Americans draw symsocial capital and civic participation (Herberg bolic boundaries that clearly and sharply exclude 1960; Putnam 2000; Verba, Schlozman, and atheists in both private and public life. From a Brady 1995; Wuthnow 1998) and supporting list of groups that also includes Muslims, recent organized demands for political change or social immigrants, and homosexuals, Americans name justice (Gusfield 1986; Lincoln and Mamiya atheists as those least likely to share their vision 1990; Morris 1984; Warner 1993). In this conof American society. They are also more likely text, religion is framed as both pluralistic and to disapprove of their children marrying atheempowering (Warner 1993:1059), and aspects ists. Using logistic regression models, we show of religion that may be contested or foster that these attitudes are driven by religious affilinequality receive relatively less attention. iation and involvement as well as by social conOne can, text and broader moral outlook. Delivered by Ingenta to : of course, find references to the exclusionary consequences of religious boundWe show not only that atheists are less acceptUniversity of Minnesota - Minneapolis aries in scholarship on American religion—for ed than other marginalized groups but also that 2007 18:06:57 Mon, 29 Jan example, work on the history of anti-Semitism, attitudes toward them have not exhibited the on the anti-Catholic movements of the ninemarked increase in acceptance that has characteenth century (Dolan 1985; Gleason 1980; terized views of other racial and religious Higham 2002; Lipset and Raab 1978), and on minorities over the past forty years. Rather than anti-Muslim violence post 9/11 (Wellman and treating atheists as akin to other out-groups, we Tokuno 2004; Wuthnow 2004). However, in a reveal the unique social and cultural bases society in which religion is voluntary, pluralisunderlying attitudes toward this group, leading tic, and separate from the state, scholars have us to rethink some core assumptions about tended to understand religion as “a fundamenAmericans’ increasing acceptance of religious tal category of identity and association” that is diversity and to consider how the weakening of “capable of grounding both solidarities and internal boundaries between religious groups identities” (Warner 1993:1059), a boundary may heighten awareness of the external boundthat fosters belonging. ary between the religious and the nonreligious. The meta-narrative of scholarship on reliWe argue that attitudes toward atheists clarify gion in American life is woven together from why and how religion forms a basis for solidarity three strands. First, America has historically and collective identity in American life through been a religious nation. Since the mid-nineits historical association with morality and citteenth century there have been consistently high izenship. levels of religious belief, affiliation, and involvement (c.f. Warner 1993), and over our history RELIGIOUS BOUNDARIES AND observers have noted a close connection BELIEFS IN AMERICA between religion and democracy. Alexis de In the context of the modern United States, Tocqueville was moved by the Christian piety social scientists have generally concentrated on of Jacksonian America. “It is religion that gave the inclusive aspect of religious boundaries, birth to the Anglo-American societies.|.|.|. placing at the forefront what Parsons (1951) Christianity .|.|. reigns not only as a philosophy

ATHEISTS AS OTHER—–213

that is adopted after examination, but as a reliinfluence.” A recent report by Public Agenda gion that is believed without discussion,” he summed up its own survey findings this way: “If wrote. “In the United States, Christian sects more Americans were more religious, people vary infinitely . . . but Christianity itself is an believe that crime would go down, families established and irresistible fact” (Tocqueville would do a better job raising their children, and [1992] 2000:405–6). Tocqueville thought that people would be more likely to help each other. Christianity (or at least the dominant Indeed, most Americans fear that the country Protestantism of the era) provided the “habits of would decline if people lost their religious faith” the heart” necessary for good citizenship, draw(Farkas et al. 2001:10). In the Public Agenda ing people out of the private realm of family life poll, 74 percent agreed that “[i]t is a bad idea into vital civic association (Tocqueville [1992] for families to raise children without any reli2000:275ff.; see Weber 1946 for a different gion.” When asked to identify the most imporinterpretation). tant meaning of being religious, 53 percent of Others have concluded that a more ecurespondents said “making sure that one’s behavmenical version of Tocqueville’s thesis still ior and day-to-day actions match one’s faith.” holds true in post–World War II America. The authors conclude that for many Americans According to Herberg’s classic Protestant, “[t]o be religious .|.|. means to be a moral human Catholic, Jew (1960), each of these historic being” (Farkas et al. 2001:10–11). faiths has provided a way of being, and becomThe third strand of the meta-narrative is the ing, a good American. Similarly, in Habits of the argument that increasing religious pluralism Heart (1985) and The Good Society (1991), has coincided with increasing tolerance of reliBellah and his coauthors observed that the gious difference, declines in religiously based Biblical (Judeo-Christian) religions have proprejudice, and processes of assimilation to erode vided a cultural repertoire of citizenship and solmany of the long-standing divisions among idarity. This scholarly tradition argues thatby Ingenta to : Catholics, and Jews (Alwin 1986; Protestants, Delivered religion gives a sense of personal identity and Glock and Stark 1965; Herberg 1960). Declines University of Minnesota - Minneapolis meaning, leading to public engagement and 2007 18:06:57 Mon, 29 Jan in anti-Semitism and anti-Catholic sentiment effective citizenship (see also Glock and Stark mirror the scholarly claim that piety and plu1965; W. L. Warner 1961; R. S. Warner 1993). rality increasingly go hand in hand in American The second strand of the meta-narrative is the life (Gleason 1980; Smith 1993). Indeed, the claim that a religious convergence has occurred idea of a unified “Judeo-Christian” tradition— during the twentieth century, which may be the once considered a radical myth—is now widebasis for the trust that Americans have in those ly accepted by conservatives and liberals alike who are religious. When Caplow and his coauas a core aspect of American culture (Hartmann, thors revisited Muncie, Indiana, in the 1970s to Zhang, and Windschadt, 2005). Taken togethreplicate the Lynds’ earlier Middletown study, er, these three strands of the scholarly literature they found a set of religious ideas and actions weave a story of religion’s declining signifishared across religious groups that they called cance as an exclusionary boundary in American “the common creed” (Caplow, Bahr, and life. Chadwick 1983). More recent quantitative work New divisions became salient at the same suggests that Muncie is, in this regard, unextime that traditional forms of religious prejudice ceptional. Using General Social Survey (GSS) were waning, including a division between libdata, Hout and Fischer (2001) found faith in God erals and conservatives. Most sociologists, howand the regular practice of prayer to be widely ever, argue that America as a whole is not well shared across religious groups in America, along characterized by the image of a monolithic with the belief that there is a strong connection Christian conservative camp or an ongoing between religious faith and personal morality. “war” between liberals and conservatives (see This convergence suggests that religion in DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson 1996). The religeneral—if no longer Christianity in particugious pluralism stemming from immigration lar—is one basis for private and public trust in and globalization is another source of new American society. In the 1998 GSS, only 15 perboundaries. Hout and Fischer (2001), however, cent of respondents agreed that the United States argue that this diversity poses no threat of seri“would be a better country if religion had less ous social conflict, inequality, or intolerance

214—–AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

because of the convergence around a common with the statement “I don’t know whether there set of religious beliefs and practices (or “the is a God and I don’t believe there is any way to common creed”), and because America’s diverse find out.” Taken together, these “skeptics,” as and voluntaristic religious institutions are well Hout and Fischer (2002) call them, make up equipped to absorb diversity without being torn only 7 percent of the population. In fact, only apart by it (c.f. Warner 1993). Also, a “rapidly about 1 percent of Americans self-identify as rising tolerance for (and maybe even prefer“atheist” or “agnostic,” according to Kosmin et ence for) religious difference .|.|. facilitates relial. (2001). This gap may indicate that many gious coalitions on some issues and respect for skeptics do hold some form of religious belief, [the] fellow religious on all issues” (Hout and or it may signal the stigma attached to the atheFischer 2001:4). Similarly, Diana Eck (2001; c.f. ist label. Smith 2002) argues that the expansion of reliWe argue that it is important to understand gious pluralism associated with post-1965 Americans’ attitudes toward atheists even immigration will continue to follow the pattern though they are few in number—and not an that Will Herberg (1960) documented, summaorganized and self-conscious group—and even rized by the phrase e pluribus unum—from though individual atheists are not easily identimany, one (c.f. Wolfe 1999). fied. Our focus is not on mistreatment of atheMore tolerance of religious diversity, howists, but on attitudes that mark them as outsiders ever, does not necessarily mean that the salience in public and private life, that may even desigof religious identity itself is declining. To the nate them as unworthy of full civic inclusion contrary, if acceptance of religious diversity in (c.f. Alexander 1992).1 For our analysis what is the United States is indeed based upon increasimportant is that other Americans respond to ing convergence around a core set of religious “atheist” as a meaningful category. Such a disbeliefs and practices, then this may reinforce tinction is symbolic, but that is not to say it is intolerance of those who reject religion. In suchby Ingenta to : Delivered not “real.” In fact, the contrast between “real” an environment, religious acceptance mayMinnesota - Minneapolis University of be and symbolic is not all that helpful in this case, Mon, 29 Jan driven largely by assumptions that religious 2007 18:06:57 because symbolic boundaries are deeply meanpeople, of whatever faith, are “like me” in two ingful and because symbolic categories motivate ways. In private life, they are understood to be behavior and organize resources (Sewell 1992). moral people, worthy of the trust that is the This understanding draws on a tradition of work basis for close personal relationships. In public on the relational nature of social identities, life, the boundaries that separate religious idenincluding civic and national identity (e.g., tities (for example, evangelical versus mainAlexander 1992; Anderson 1991; Taylor 1989). line Protestant versus Catholic or Jew) are We assess the degree to which atheists repunderstood to be encompassed by and to conresent a symbolic “other” against which some stitute a broader identity—being a good Americans define themselves as good people American. In such a setting, how do Americans and worthy citizens. This allows us to explore view those who reject religion, and what does what attitudes about atheists reveal regarding the that tell us about how Americans view their nature of cultural membership and moral solination and themselves? darity in American society. Do Americans feel that atheists are “like me”? Do they see them as ATHEISTS AS OTHER moral people and good citizens? By any measure, there are not many atheists in America. While about 14 percent of Americans name no religious preference (Hout and Fischer 1 Mistreatment of atheists and atheists’ own per2002; Kosmin, Mayer, and Keysar 2001), most ceptions of their place in American society are beyond of these religious “nones” also say that they the scope of this article. These important topics have believe in God and pray regularly (Hout and perhaps received too little attention from scholars, Fischer 2002). In the 2000 GSS, only about 3 though they receive occasional attention in the poppercent of Americans affirm that “I don’t believe ular media (see Blumer 2004). Scholarly treatment in God,” perhaps the best direct indicator of of atheists is largely historical (see Jacoby 2004; being an atheist, while another 4.1 percent agree Turner 1985; McGrath 2004; and Feldman 2005).

ATHEISTS AS OTHER—–215

To date, empirical work on how Americans view nonbelievers (and particularly atheists) has focused on issues of prejudice and political tolerance, rather than cultural membership (Stouffer 1955). In the Public Agenda report cited earlier, 54 percent of respondents said that they would be unlikely to vote for a political candidate who is “open about not believing in God.” In a 1999 Gallup poll, only 49 percent of Americans say that they would be willing to vote for a presidential candidate who is an atheist— compared to 59 percent willing to vote for a homosexual candidate and over 90 percent professing willingness to vote for a female, Jewish, or black candidate. Farkas et al. (2001:100) conclude that widespread political rejection of atheists and others who profess no religion provides a “glaring exception” to the general rule of increasing social tolerance over the last thirty years of the twentieth century. Citing the same Gallup data but reviewing changes from 1937 to 2000, Hout and Fischer (2001) come to a startlingly different conclusion. Because tol-

erance increased for all groups, they report that the overall pattern of tolerance of atheists is not an exception to the general rule. Figure 1, drawn from the same Gallup data on willingness to vote for various presidential candidates, shows that both claims are true. Using this measure, political tolerance toward atheists has indeed moved in the same direction as has tolerance for other groups. Yet Farkas et al. (2001) are also right—the gap in willingness to vote for atheists versus other religious minorities (Catholic or Jewish) is large and persistent. What this literature does not address adequately is why atheists continue to be the least accepted group, despite their small numbers. It is worth pointing out that the only group measured that was less accepted was homosexuals, and yet by 1999 this group was also more tolerated than were atheists. As Loftus (2001) argues, political tolerance for a minority group is distinct from and varies independently of attitudes about the morality of members of that group and from feelings toward members of

Source: Report based on answers to Gallup question, “If your party nominated a generally well-qualified person for president who happened to be (INSERT HERE), would you vote for that person?” Response categories: yes, no, no opinion (data retrieved July 1, 2005 at http://gallup.com/poll/content/print.aspx? ci=3979). The Gallup Organization, Princeton, NJ.

216—–AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

the group. While understanding political tolerdiversity and solidarity in American life with ance is quite important, it is not clear whether particular emphasis on race and religion that research can help us to answer the questions (University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, princiabout boundaries and cultural membership pal investigators Hartmann, Gerteis, and posed at the beginning of this article. Edgell). The research includes a nationally repIn contrast to the political tolerance literature, resentative random-digit dial (RDD) telephone we examine Americans’ willingness to recognize survey (N = 2081) conducted during the sumand accept atheists in both public and private mer of 2003. In addition, in-depth interviews life. We asked people to say whether members and fieldwork were conducted in four U.S. cities of particular minority groups “Share your vision (Los Angeles, Minneapolis-St. Paul, Atlanta, of American society,” a question about public and Boston) by a team of graduate students in acceptance designed to shed light on the questhe summer of 2004. For this article, we also tion of cultural membership that we posed earreview contemporary public discourse on athelier. We also asked about willingness to accept ists in American society. one’s own child marrying someone from a parThe core data for this article are drawn from ticular religious, ethnic, or other minority the telephone survey we designed and fielded group—a private matter. These questions go through the Wisconsin Survey Center. beyond tolerance to capture the importance and Households were randomly selected, then nature of symbolic boundaries and the distincrespondents were randomly chosen within tions that people use to define their own idenhouseholds. The survey, on average, took slighttity and worth. ly more than 30 minutes to complete. We find that out of a long list of ethnic and Additionally, African Americans and Hispanics cultural minorities, Americans are less willing were over-sampled to provide complete data on to accept intermarriage with atheists than with these populations; to facilitate this over-samany other group, and less likely to imagine thatby Ingenta to : Delivered pling, the survey could also be conducted in atheists share their vision of American society. University of Minnesota - Minneapolisrespondent preferred. Our Spanish if the Mon, 29 Jan We find that Americans’ willingness to draw a 2007 18:06:57 response rate, using a calculation that includes boundary that excludes atheists is influenced by only known households, is 36 percent.2 This certain demographic factors that are more genresponse rate compares well to other recent erally associated with levels of tolerance, but it RDD samples. The Council on Market and is also influenced by religious identity and pracOpinion Research (CMOR) maintains an ongotice, by social context and exposure to diversiing study of response rates; this study demonty, and by broader value orientations. We argue strates that in 2003, the year our survey was that atheists provide an important limiting case conducted, the mean response rate for RDD to the general narrative of increasing tolerance telephone surveys was 10.16 percent, although of religious pluralism in the United States, and carefully conducted social science surveys, such that this exception is a useful lens through which as ours, typically have somewhat better rates to understand Americans’ assumptions about (AAPOR 2004). A good point of comparison the appropriate role of religion in both public here is the 2002 American National Election and private life. We find that in private life, Study (ANES), which included a fresh RDD many Americans associate religiosity with sample with a response rate of 35.24 percent, morality and trustworthiness; religion forms a using a calculation that included only known basis for private solidarity and identity (c.f. households. The comparison with the ANES is Warner 1993). In public life, many Americans even more favorable when we consider that they believe now, as in Herberg’s (1960) time, that affirming a religious identity is an important way of “being American,” a basis for citizenship 2 This calculation includes only known houseand a source of a common American identity. DATA AND DESIGN Our data come from the American Mosaic Project, a multi-year, multi-method study of
holds and corrects for the stratified sample to ensure the closest comparison to other RDD surveys, such as the American National Election Study (for full documentation, see http://www.soc.umn.edu/amp/ ampindex.htm).

ATHEISTS AS OTHER—–217

compensated their respondents, while we did about America or understand what it means to be an American citizen in the same way. A posnot. itive answer is thus an indicator of moral soliResponse rate is not the only or even the darity. In the negative answers, symbolic most important indicator of data quality. The boundaries become visible. more important issue is the potential for nonThe second question asked whether the response bias. The few available systematic respondent would approve or disapprove if his treatments of this issue reveal few differences or her child wished to marry a member of each between RDD surveys with higher and lower of a list of groups.4 This item is a standard response rates on key measures when standard measure of group prejudice, with reluctance to sampling and survey techniques are employed accept intermarriage typically interpreted as an (Keeter et al. 2000; Pew Research Center for indicator of underlying intolerance. It was part People and the Press 2004). To investigate nonof a series of questions given in a split-half forresponse bias in our sample, we checked many mat to investigate views of a wider range of of our variables against the same measures in groups within survey time constraints; the item two surveys known to be of high quality, the on intermarriage with atheists was asked of half General Social Surveys (GSS) and the much of our respondents. We interpret it here as a larger Current Population Survey (CPS). Our measure of personal trust and acceptance, an data are quite closely aligned with both. In the evaluation of who is thought to be capable of few instances where our data differ notably being caring and moral, able to make one’s child from the GSS figures, they tend to align more happy, and to treat other family members well. closely with the CPS figures (see Table S1, Online Supplement on ASR Web site). Two items from our survey capture one’s willingness to DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS—ATTITUDES draw boundaries separating oneself from others TOWARD ATHEISTS IN PUBLIC AND in both public and private life. The Delivered by Ingenta to : LIFE first quesPRIVATE tion is akin to the “thermometer” questions University of Minnesota - Minneapolis Mon, 29 Jan We asked about a number of racial, ethnic, and familiar to survey researchers, where respon- 2007 18:06:57 religious groups on both questions. Regarding dents are asked about various groups and asked public boundaries we also asked about two addito rate them on a scale of feelings, from 100 tional groups that have been central to recent, (very warm) to 0 (very cold). Rather than ask controversial public debates—immigrants and about feelings in general, the question we conhomosexuals. Table 1 shows the responses to structed and fielded asked about the degree to these questions, in rank order from the least which members of particular groups share one’s accepted group to the most accepted. For both “vision of America”—the response categories of our measures, atheists are at the very top of were “almost completely agree,” “mostly,” the list of problematic groups. Americans are 3 This question “somewhat,” and “not at all.” less accepting of atheists than of any of the was asked of all respondents. While based on other groups we asked about, and by a wide marstandard measures we designed this item to gin. capture what Lamont and Molnár The next-closest category on both measures (2002:187–88) call “cultural membership.” is Muslims. We expected Muslims to be a lightSomeone who does not share your vision of ning-rod group, and they clearly were. This American society may not value the same things makes the response to atheists all the more striking. For many, Muslims represent a large and mostly external threat, dramatized by the loss of
3 Wording was as follows: “Now I want to read you a list of different groups of people who live in this country. For each one, please tell me how much you think people in this group agree with YOUR vision of American society—almost completely, mostly, somewhat, or not at all?” Note that these groups were posed separately and the order was randomized, so that theoretically each group could have received equally high or low levels of acceptance.

4 Wording was as follows: “People can feel differently about their children marrying people from various backgrounds. Suppose your son or daughter wanted to marry [a person in given category]. Would you approve of this choice, disapprove of it, or wouldn’t it make any difference at all one way or the other?”

those with a college degree are somewhat more life in the World Trade Center attacks and the Delivered accepting war in Iraq. By contrast, atheists are a small andby Ingenta to : of atheists than are nonwhite Americans, females, or those with less formal largely silent internal minority.University“someWhen the of Minnesota - Minneapolis Mon, 29 Jan 2007 18:06:57 education. Party affiliation matters, especially what” and “not at all” responses are combined on our intermarriage item. Those in the South for the public acceptance measure, atheists (78.6 and Midwest are also less accepting of atheists percent) and Muslims (77.6 percent) appear in both public and private life than are those in nearly equally problematic—the vast majority the East or West (results not shown). Across all of Americans reject both groups. of these categories, however, rates of nonTables 2a and 2b show the factors correlated acceptance of atheists range from about one in with rejection of atheists. One’s own religious three (34 percent) to three in five (60 percent). identity and involvement shape attitudes toward Are attitudes toward atheists meaningfully atheists. Church attenders, conservative patterned vis-à-vis other out-groups? Using our Protestants, and those reporting high religious public acceptance measure—the degree to saliency are less likely to approve of intermarwhich respondents said that members of a social riage with an atheist and more likely to say that group are in agreement with their own “vision atheists do not share their vision of American of American society”—we calculated the corsociety. It should surprise no one that the lowrelations between responses about atheists and est level of rejection of atheists comes from the other social groups. nonreligious, measured here as those who do not Table 3 reports these correlations, showing go to church, do not claim a religious identity, only those that are above .3 and are statisticaland report that religion is “not at all” salient to ly significant. Across all of the groups we examthem. A notable proportion of even this group, ined, negative attitudes toward atheists are however, does not accept atheists. About 17 correlated with negative views of homosexuals percent of the nonreligious say that atheists do and, for most, Muslims; none of these correlanot at all share their vision of America, while tions is large. We believe this indicates that the about one in ten indicate that they would not boundary being drawn vis-à-vis atheists is symapprove of their child marrying an atheist. bolic, a way of defining cultural membership in Attitudes toward atheists also are related to American life, and not the result of a simple, social location. White Americans, males, and

Source: American Mosaic Project Survey, 2003. Note: All relationships are p ≤ .001 level. Church Attender = attending church monthly or more; Nonreligious = all those who are not church attenders, report low religious saliency, and claim no religious identity.

regression analyses on both of our measures. We irrational unwillingness to tolerate small outuse binary logistic regression instead of ordered groups. logistic regression because we believe that this Again, it is important to note that by calling better captures the conceptual distinction we this rejection “symbolic” we do not mean that Delivered by Ingenta to : want to make, allowing us to identify those who it is “not serious” or “not real.” Cultural of Minnesota - Minneapolis memUniversity bership is so passionately contested because 2007 18:06:57 draw a definite boundary (not at all agree/does Mon, 29 Jan symbolic categories are so dearly held. The parnot approve).5 We include a table with stanallel with homosexuality is instructive. For dardized beta coefficients to examine the relaexample, many Americans believe that homotive size of the effects of different independent sexuals pose a threat to the family and to marvariables on attitudes toward atheists. In these riage, a threat that has increased with the analyses we use weighted data to adjust for our same-sex marriage movement. This is a symstrategy of over-sampling African Americans bolic threat—gay and lesbian activists are not and Hispanics. We impute values for missing lobbying to abolish heterosexual marriage, and cases to the sample mean on all independent no existing heterosexual marriage would be variables except for income, for which we use legally invalidated were the same-sex couple an imputation method (hot-deck) accounting next door to wed. Nonetheless, it is experienced for gender, employment status, age, and eduby many as a real threat because to them the culcation. In the discussion, we also draw on intural meaning of marriage would change if depth interview data from our fieldwork to help same-sex marriage were permitted (c.f. Hull us interpret respondents’ attitudes toward 2006). This is true whether one knows any actual atheists. same-sex couples or not, and regardless of the We include four blocks of variables in our behavior and morality of actual same-sex models: demographics, personal religiosity, couples. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS— MODELING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ACCEPTANCE To explore the effects of different kinds of factors on people’s willingness to draw a strong boundary around atheists, we perform logistic

social context, and political and social values (Table 4). We argue that attitudes toward atheists serve as an index for how one thinks about the importance of personal morality in both private and public life. If so, then social context should affect attitudes toward atheists by shap-

ing one’s experience with religion as a basis for association and civic life. Political and social values should also matter if attitudes toward atheists are embedded within larger worldviews that differently privilege the role of religiously based morality in American life.

“It’s fine for Americans to have different lifestyles and values so long as they all follow the same rules” (1 = SA) “Society’s standards of right and wrong should be based on God’s laws” (1 = SA) Government should guarantee equal treatment of all religions (1 = SA)

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
DEMOGRAPHICS. The demographic variables include age, gender, and race, as well as measures for economic capital (income) and cultural capital (education, father’s education). Studies of prejudice and tolerance suggest that age, gender, and race may all relate to negative attitudes toward minority groups, including atheists (Golebiowska 1999). Economic and cultural capital may influence the drawing of moral boundaries through their shaping of class-based “habitus” (Bourdieu 1984; c.f. Lamont 1992). We treat these demographic variables as controls.

this category (e.g. Assemblies of God, which is a Pentecostal denomination; see Woodberry and Smith 1998). Our items labeled “Biblical Literalism” and “God Determines Life Course” are commonly used measures of attitudes toward religious authority and religious determinism, respectively.

SOCIAL CONTEXT AND ASSOCIATIONS. Our context measures do not capture exposure to atheists per se, but instead allow us to examine the effect of general experience with those who are different than one’s self (c.f. Allport 1954). We include measures for distinctive aspects of diversity in one’s environment, including exposure to poverty and religious diversity as measured by both the rate of religious adherence in the surrounding area and the presence of religious RELIGIOSITY. Religious involvement, relidiversity among one’s own network of friends. gious identity, and religious beliefs may also We also explore the effects of one’s self-reportshape reactions to atheists (Wilcox and Jelen ed perception that one “lives in a diverse com1990). We include a scale measure for religious munity.” Finally, we include a measure of involvement, a 14-point scale that combines county-level Democratic voters, since political church attendance, religious saliency, and parand religious identities are intertwined (Hout ticipation in other religious activities (alpha = Delivered and Fischer .79). This measure goes beyond the standard useby Ingenta to : 2002). University of Minnesota - Minneapolis of church attendance to measure religious Mon, 29 Jan 2007 18:06:57 involvement, which has been critiqued by some VALUES. If feelings about atheists indicate a scholars as an inadequate index of involvement more general sense of who can be a good citi(Hinojosa and Park 2004). We also include varizen, a good neighbor, and a worthy member of ables for religious identity (conservative one’s family, then we expect them to be conProtestant and Catholic), based on the RELnected to broad social and political value comTRAD scheme (Steensland et al. 2000). We mitments. We include a measure of self-reported construct our variable “conservative Protestant” social conservatism and of the value one places by including all those denominations that upon diversity as indicators of willingness to Steensland et al. (2000) identify as “evangelirespect different values and moral claims. cal.” We also classify some black Protestant Drawing from the research using atheism as an denominations as “conservative” Protestant. index of tolerance and prejudice generally, we While we agree with Steensland et al. that black expect those who express sympathy for African Protestants are a distinctive religious tradition, Americans also to be less willing to exclude we also agree with Smith (1987) that some atheists, and so we include a measure of this. black church traditions share with the evangelFinally, we believe that feelings about atheical subculture important elements of history, ists may be shaped by beliefs about what draws culture, and belief. 6 We use the label “conserour nation together, including beliefs about the vative Protestant” rather than “evangelical” to appropriate role of religion in society. We connote what we believe to be a broader range include a measure of having a procedural view of religious belief and tradition among those in of democracy (a belief that diversity is not a problem as long as everybody follows the same rules). To capture views of religion’s appropriate role in society, we include a measure of how strongly one believes in the equal treatment of religious groups under the law and a question about whether society’s standards of right and

6 In our initial models, we included an interaction term for black*conservative Protestant, which proved not to be significant, and so was dropped from our final models.

ATHEISTS AS OTHER—–223

wrong should be based on God’s laws. These three measures, taken together, capture the degree to which one understands procedural norms or substantive morality to be foundational for the good society.

identity and involvement shape attitudes toward the nonreligious. Models 3 and 4 show that our social-context measures are related to public rejection of atheists, although they work in different ways. Those living in more Democratic-leaning counties are less likely to reject atheists as not sharing their MODELING PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE vision of America, as are those who reported The analysis of public acceptance of atheists is more religious diversity in their own social netprovided in Table 5. We include the variables disworks. Unexpectedly, so are those who live in cussed earlier in successive blocks in a logistic places with more religious adherents; this relaregression model of our item on whether athetionship is quite small, but it is stable. Those living in poorer and more diverse communities ists share the respondent’s vision of American are more likely to reject atheists; this may be society (1 = “not at all,” 0 = other responses). because in such contexts trust and acceptance As noted previously, we believe that this capare more problematic in general. In our foltures a strong sense of atheists as “other”; lowing discussion, we draw upon in-depth interresponding “not at all” means identifying atheviews to explore this possibility. ists as not sharing in the common cultural memFinally, our measures of social and cultural bership of American society. values clearly shape the public rejection of atheOur initial model shows that women, African ists, controlling for demographic variables, reliAmericans, and older people are more likely to gious belief and involvement, and social context. reject atheists, while those with more education, Those who say that they value diversity in their and whose fathers had more education, are more community (as opposed to merely perceiving accepting of them. Several of these demographic such diversity) and those who hold sympathetDelivered factors are no longer significant once our otherby Ingenta to : ic - Minneapolis University effects of Minnesotaviews of African Americans are less likely to blocks of variables are included, but the Mon, 29 Jan 2007 18:06:57 which may indicate a more genreject atheists, for African Americans and the more educated eral unwillingness to perpetuate any form of continue to be significant, while those with group prejudice or rejection. Similarly, those higher income emerge as less accepting of athewho hold a procedural understanding of democists. In initial models we included an interaction racy (America is strong as long as we all “folterm to investigate whether conservative low the same rules”) are less likely to reject Protestants who are African American are espeatheists, as are those who believe that the govcially likely to reject atheists; this term was not ernment should guarantee equal treatment of all significant and was dropped from final models. religions. Those who have a more substantive In Model 2, four of our measures of relivision of a nation based on common religious giosity are associated with attitudes toward athebelief (society’s laws should be based on God’s ists. Religious involvement, being conservative laws) are more likely to reject atheists. Protestant, biblical literalism, and a belief that God determines the course of our lives all preMODELING PRIVATE ACCEPTANCE dict a lack of public acceptance of atheists. In our final model, three of these effects remain We also regressed the same blocks of predictive significant—religious involvement, religious variables on our measure of private acceptance, determinism, and conservative Protestant, all the respondent’s approval of a child marrying an three of which are reduced by including our atheist. Many of the relationships mirror those cultural values items. Religious identity (confound in our previous analysis of public acceptservative Protestant) and religious determinism ance, but a few stand out as different. A marked influence attitudes toward atheists largely difference is the generally weaker power and because they foster beliefs about the approprisignificance of our demographic factors. In ate role of religion in society. When these items Model 5, women, older people, and blacks are are included, much of the direct effect of one’s more likely to disapprove of their child marryown religious belief and practice disappears, ing an atheist, while those whose fathers had more education are less likely to disapprove. In which helps us to understand how religious

Model 8, however, the only effect that remains affects public acceptance, highlighting the importance of the social and communal aspects significant is that for age, and it is quite small. of religion for attitudes toward the nonreligious. One’s own religious belief and involvement It is notable that having a conservative affect attitudes toward intermarriage with atheProtestant identity does not emerge as one of the ists; in the final model, those who are the most stronger predictors of attitudes toward atheists religiously involved, conservative Protestants, in our final models, which include specific and those who believe that the course of life is items that measure attitudes toward religion’s determined by God all disapprove of their child role in public life. While much research has marrying an atheist. Social context also matters pointed to the strength of the conservative less for attitudes toward intermarriage, with a Protestant subculture, few studies have consmall effect for those living in a Democratic tained measures that allow one to specify the county and a large effect for those with relimechanisms that link individual participation in giously diverse friendship networks; both are this subculture with broader views of public less likely to disapprove. Cultural values also issues. What matters for public acceptance of matter, with social conservatives and those who atheists—and figures strongly into private believe that society’s standards of right and acceptance, as well—are beliefs about the wrong should be based on God’s laws being appropriate relationship between church and more likely to disapprove of having an atheist state and about religion’s role in underpinning for a son- or daughter-in-law. Those who believe society’s moral order, as measured by our item that the government should guarantee equal on whether society’s standards of right and treatment for all religions, who value diversity wrong should be based on God’s laws. In underin their community, and who believe in procestanding how other Americans view atheists, dural norms of democracy (follow the same being conservative Protestant matters because rules) are less likely to disapprove of their child of beliefs : marrying an atheist. Delivered by Ingenta to that reject the possibility of a secular basis for the good University of Minnesota - Minneapolis society. Mon, 29 Jan 2007 It is worth exploring who our respondents 18:06:57 SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSES AND were thinking of when they reacted to quesINTERPRETATIONS tions about atheists. Where they thinking of the These analyses allow us to begin to identify the 14 percent of Americans who claim no relifactors that predict the symbolic and cultural gious identity or the 7 percent who tell the exclusion of atheists from both public and priGeneral Social Survey that they either do not vate life. To help us interpret the relative strength believe in God or are not sure? Or were they of these factors in shaping acceptance or rejecthinking of the 1 percent who explicitly describe tion of atheists, we recalculated the final modthemselves as atheist or agnostic? els for public and private rejection with Our in-depth interviews shed some light on standardized independent variables, which this. These interviews did not contain any direct allows us to compare directly the size of the questions about atheists because they were effects. Table 7 shows these results. For both designed to gather information on how responmodels, the largest effects are denoted with dents experience diversity in local contexts, footnotes. including neighborhoods and community organThe comparison shows that somewhat difizations, ecumenical groups, and cultural festiferent factors drive the two types of boundaries. vals. Discussion of atheists, however, emerged For our measure of public acceptance, the in some of the interviews in the context of strongest effects are divided between one’s own answers to other questions; the richest of these religious belief and involvement, living in a discussions occurred in the Los Angeles fielddiverse community, and three of our cultural site, and those are the discussions we draw upon values variables. For intermarriage, religious here (see also Wolf-Meyer 2005). involvement is by far the strongest predictor of Respondents had various interpretations of attitudes, and cultural values also have large what atheists are like and what that label means. effects. It makes sense that one’s own religious Those whom we interviewed view atheists in involvement would have the most effect on the two different ways. Some people view atheists measure of private acceptance. It also, though, as problematic because they associate them

with illegality, such as drug use and prostitution—that is, with immoral people who threaten respectable community from the lower end of the status hierarchy. Others saw atheists as rampant materialists and cultural elitists that threaten common values from above—the ostentatiously wealthy who make a lifestyle out of consumption or the cultural elites who think they know better than everyone else. Both of these themes rest on a view of atheists as selfinterested individualists who are not concerned with the common good. One woman, KW, a Republican in her mid60s, told our interviewer that belief in something

transcendent is necessary to move beyond “the me,” the narrowly self-interested consumerism that she sees as rampant. This interview excerpt shows how she linked together the ideas of consumerism, arrogance, atheism, and American identity:
It’s that same arrogance again. I’m an American, I can do anything I want, and to heck with the rest of the world. [Interviewer: Do you see religion fitting into it very well?] These people aren’t very religious, you’ll notice that. There’s a real, “I’m an atheist” attitude among people with major money. You don’t see this nice balance .|.|. I’ll say it again, some religious belief, I don’t care who or what you worship, just something to give you that stability.

228—–AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

perceived to be a problem of self-interest, an excessive individualism that undermines trust and the public good. In this, our respondents draw the same link between religion and the taming of self-interest that Tocqueville wrote Other respondents were also very specific to about over a century ago (Tocqueville [1992] make the link between atheism and those who 2000, see especially volume 2, parts I and II). had no larger concept of the common good. It is important to note that our respondents did One man, DD, a Democrat who is also a pastor not refer to particular atheists whom they had involved in social justice outreach, told our encountered. Rather they used the atheist as a interviewer, symbolic figure to represent their fears about You know, anybody can effect change but it has, those trends in American life—increasing crimmost non-faith-based organizations do it much inality, rampant self-interest, an unaccountable more from the perspective of what’s in it for me, elite—that they believe undermine trust and a and it’s more [a] possible takeover situation, “I’m common sense of purpose. gonna force you to do whatever I want to do” .|.|. In recent public discourse, atheists take on a [I]t’s a healthy faith-based tradition that I always recognize as being fixed in community, and worksimilar symbolic role. We found that the figure ing together, and looking out for the well-being of of the atheist is invoked rhetorically to discuss the other person just as much as myself. the links—or tensions—among religion, morality, civic responsibility, and patriotism. In parAnother respondent, an interior designer very ticular, the association of the atheist with a kind involved in his neighborhood association, of unaccountable elitism has surfaced in recent brought up the issue in a portion of the interview public debates. The civically engaged atheists’ not focused explicitly on religion or the lack awareness of the negative stereotypes of athethereof. Our interviewer asked this man, one of ists has the few Republicans in his community group,by Ingenta to led to the coining of a new term, Delivered “Brights,”: around if he was concerned that the visibility of Minnesota - Minneapolis which to identify and organthe University ize and thus, Christian Right might dismay thoseMon, other- 2007 18:06:57 according to one prominent Bright, who 29 Jan to challenge the association between atheism, wise would identify with Republican values. immorality, and lack of civic commitment. One He responded, of those advocates has gone so far as to claim Only by perception because you know, being a the following:7
Republican, it doesn’t bother me in the least. Yeah, because I would say .|.|.|the prisons aren’t filled with conservative Republican Christians. The prisons are probably filled with people who don’t have any kind of a spiritual or religious core. So I don’t have to worry about .|.|., a conservative Christian, you know, committing a crime against me, chances are. Many of the nation’s clergy members are closet brights, I suspect. We are, in fact, the moral backbone of the nation: brights take their civic duties seriously precisely because they don’t trust God to save humanity from its follies (Dennett 2003).

If you’re going all through life, “I’m an atheist, I don’t believe in anything except the almighty dollar,” this is definitely a destructive attitude and the rest of the world sees it.

In these interviews, the atheist emerges as a culturally powerful “other” in part because the category is multivalent (Turner 1974), loaded with multiple meanings. For all these respondents, atheists represent a general lack of morality, but for some, this lack was associated with criminality and its dangers to safety and public order, while for others the absence of morality was that of people whose resources or positions place them above the common standards of mainstream American life. To put it somewhat differently, atheists can be symbolically placed at either end of the American status hierarchy. What holds these seemingly contradictory views together is that the problem of the atheist was

In a review of the book The Twilight of Atheism, Charlotte Allen (2004) not only associates atheism with totalitarianism but also sees this notion of the “Brights” as particularly troubling because of the intersection of science with big money and the ability to influence public policy. She worries if atheism, “may yet be experiencing a new dawn: a terrifying new alliance with money and power, of a kind even Marx could not have foreseen” (Allen

7 Intellectual and philosophical treatments of athe-

ism often start with the assertion that morality is possible without belief in God, knowing that this is something that is often called into question (Martin 2002; see also Dawkins 2003).

ATHEISTS AS OTHER—–229

unless the patriotism of the nonbeliever has effectively been called into question, revealing the tension between the belief that religion provides the basis for morality in American life and the belief in pluralism and freedom of conscience. No matter how we read the President’s remarks, the contrast between those who celebrate “the Brights” and those, like Ashcroft, who emphasize the centrality of faith is stark, and sheds light on why atheism becomes, in the American context, something that is understood and discussed as more than simply a private choice. Williams (1995) has distinguished two competing cultural models of the public good in American society. One is a covenant model that sees society’s welfare as dependent upon individuals having a “right relationship” with God and social institutions that reflect God’s laws. The other is a contract understanding, in which the locus of morality, trust, and accountability are in our relationships to one another and not referential to a higher being or power. Contracts and covenants not only operCivilized individuals, Christians, Jews, and Muslims, all understand that the source of freedomby Ingenta to : ate according to different norms and proceDelivered and human dignity is the Creator. Governments dures, but they also University of Minnesota - Minneapolis imply different ontologies may guard freedom. Governments don’t grant free- 2007 18:06:57different relationships between indiMon, 29 Jan that specify dom. All people are called to the defense of the viduals and the state and different bases for Grantor of freedom, and the framework of freedom belonging and trust. He created. Williams argues that both of these models of Ostensibly intended to unify the nation, the public good are deeply moral and that hisAshcroft’s comments caused controversy torically, in the United States, religious traditions because of their apparent disavowal of nonbehave provided the cultural resources that conlieving Americans. It was an approach many struct both the contract and the covenant undercritics held to be endemic for an administration standing. Originally this religious basis was that had come to power in no small part on the largely Protestant; then it was expanded to the basis of its moral claims and emphasis on faithJudeo-Christian core, and now it is, perhaps, based policy initiatives. The centrality of valuesmore inclusive still, as Hout and Fischer (2001; talk in the 2004 campaign did nothing to lessen c.f. Eck 2001) have pointed out. The basis is still such concerns, to such an extent that in the year religious, however, if not strictly Christian; and following his reelection the president found it while liberal democratic social theory has connecessary to reach out to nonbelievers even at ventionally argued that American democracy the risk of offending his core constituents. On is exceptional because of its religious vitality April 28, 2005, for example, President Bush and the central role of religion in public life, put it like this: “The great thing about America. . . recent developments in Africa, Asia, and Latin is that you should be allowed to worship any way America suggest that a covenantal model— you want. And if you choose not to worship, rather than the secular vision of state-society you’re equally as patriotic as somebody who does worship.”8 This comment makes no sense 2004:51ff). Moreover, it is not only political conservatives who are uncomfortable with atheists. Commentators like Alan Wolfe—himself a professed nonbeliever—have claimed that atheism’s close cousin secularism is a position almost exclusively held by a small, white, professional elite and that the Democratic Party must distance itself from secularists if they want to have any hope of regaining leadership of a country that is deeply religious, and if they want to be authentically responsive to the moral concerns that drive the majority of American voters (see Wolfe 2004, 2005). Nonbelief has come to be not only a lively subject for cultural commentary but also a matter of political rhetoric and debate. In the wake of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, former Attorney General John Ashcroft gave a speech to the National Religious Broadcaster’s Annual Convention on February 19, 2002, in Nashville. Peter Beinart (2002) reported on it in The New Republic. In that speech, Ashcroft says the following:
“There’s nothing more powerful than this country saying you can worship any way you want, or not worship at all” (http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/ 2004/121/51.0.html).

President Bush reiterated this point in an interview with Christianity Today on May 26, 2004:

8

230—–AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

do not correlate perfectly with belief in God. Moreover, acceptance or rejection of atheists is related not only to personal religiosity but also to one’s exposure to diversity and to one’s social and political value orientations. So while our study does shed light on questions of tolerance, we are more interested in what this symbolic boundary tells us about moral solidarity and cultural membership. We believe that attitudes toward atheists tell us more about American society and culture than about atheists themselves, and that our analysis sheds light on broader issues regarding the historic place of religion in underpinning moral order in the United States. If we are correct, then the boundary between the religious and the nonreligious is not about religious affiliation per se. It is about the historic place of religion in American civic culture and the understanding that religion provides CONCLUSION the “habits of the heart” that form the basis of The core point of this article can be stated conthe good society (Bellah et al. 1991, 1985; cisely. Atheists are at the top of the list of groups Tocqueville [1992] 2000). It is about an underthat Americans find problematic in both public standing that Americans share something more and private life, and the gap between acceptance than rules Delivered by Ingenta to : and procedures, but rather that our of atheists and acceptance of other racial and understandings of University of Minnesota - Minneapolis right and wrong and good citreligious minorities is large and persistent. ItJan 2007 18:06:57 also shared (Hartmann and Gerteis izenship are Mon, 29 is striking that the rejection of atheists is so much 2005). To be an atheist in such an environment more common than rejection of other stigmais not to be one more religious minority among tized groups. For example, while rejection of many in a strongly pluralist society. Rather, Muslims may have spiked in post-9/11 America, Americans construct the atheist as the symbolrejection of atheists was higher. The possibiliic representation of one who rejects the basis for ty of same-sex marriage has widely been seen moral solidarity and cultural membership in as a threat to a biblical definition of marriage, American society altogether. Over our history, as Massachusetts, Hawaii, and California have other groups have, perhaps, been subject to simtested the idea, and the debate over the ordinailar moral concerns. Catholics, Jews, and comtion of openly gay clergy has become a central munists all have been figures against which the point of controversy within many churches. In moral contours of American culture and citiour survey, however, concerns about atheists zenship have been imagined. We suggest that were stronger than concerns about homosexutoday, the figure of the atheist plays this role— als. Across subgroups in our sample, negative although we emphasize that this is for continviews of atheists are strong, the differences gent historical and institutional reasons, and being largely a matter of degree. we also emphasize that this is the case regardWe believe that in answering our questions less of the morality and patriotism of actual about atheists, our survey respondents were not, atheists. on the whole, referring to actual atheists they Durkheim ([1893] 1984) argued that the forhad encountered, but were responding to “the mation of solidarity is always predicated on atheist” as a boundary-marking cultural catesymbolic boundaries that designate insiders and gory. Unlike members of some other marginaloutsiders, and that these boundaries are always, ized groups, atheists can “pass”: people are to some extent, about designating those who are unlikely to ask about a person’s religious beliefs worthy of membership as defined against those in most circumstances, and even outward behavwho are not (c.f. Taylor 2002). That is, they are ioral signs of religiosity (like going to church) always about a moral order that defines rela-

relations that grows out of the Western enlightenment—may be more the rule than the exception, at least for the development of democracy on a global scale. If this argument is correct, then those who have a covenant understanding of the public good may see the symbolic figure of the atheist as marking the boundary between those who accept the covenant and those who reject it. For those who hold a contract understanding, religious belief is in theory irrelevant to civic participation and solidarity. Even the contract view, however, rests on underlying assumptions about the morality and trustworthiness that make the contract possible, which may lead to some unease regarding the figure of the atheist, given the association of religion with private morality affirmed by many Americans.

ATHEISTS AS OTHER—–231

tionships of obligation and status and that underpublic arenas, we can reformulate our undergirds a sense of trust (c.f. Wuthnow 1987). standings of other social divisions. For examSymbolic boundaries are effective only in prople, how would we understand racial boundaries moting a sense of solidarity and identity by differently if we asked not only about prejuvirtue of imagining an “other” who does not dice or political tolerance, but also about the culshare the core characteristics imagined to be tural content of what Americans perceive held by those who are legitimate participants in themselves to share with those who are racialthe moral order; the imagined community must ly other (c.f. Becker 1998; Edgell and Tranby have outsiders as well as insiders (Anderson 2004)? What kinds of cultural distinctions des1991). In the United States, the historic place of ignate people as “like me” or “not at all like me” religion in providing moral solidarity is what led across racial categories, and how does that affect Tocqueville ([1992]2000) and Herberg (1960) solidarity, trust, belonging, and identity in difto designate first Protestants, and then Catholics ferent contexts? and Jews, as good Americans. In democratic Some have argued, we believe correctly, that societies, these concerns with moral order may as religious diversity has increased in America, be particularly heightened because citizenship tolerance of small or previously marginalized rests on the assumption of the ability of indireligious groups has also increased. Historically viduals to act responsibly to exercise rights, an this has been the case, for Catholics in the nineability based in character and in capacities of teenth century and Jews in the twentieth, and mind that enable civic action (Bellah et al. 1991; scholars like Eck (2001) and Hout and Fischer Tocqueville [1992] 2000). Alexander (1992) (2001) are probably right that this pattern of argues that the category of the “citizen” is itself increasing tolerance of diverse religious idena moral category that depends for its meaning tities will continue. The work on symbolic on the designation of some persons as morally boundaries and moral order suggests, however, unworthy of it. that the creation of the other is always necessary Delivered by Ingenta to : Theoretically, this implies that in addition to for Minneapolis University of Minnesota -the creation of identity and solidarity. Our understanding where symbolic boundaries are 2007 18:06:57 that attitudes about atheists have Mon, 29 Jan analysis shows drawn, and whether they are positive or neganot followed the same historical pattern as that tive, we also need to understand the cultural for previously marginalized religious groups. It basis for the distinctions made and the content is possible that the increasing tolerance for reliof the categories that our distinctions desiggious diversity may have heightened awareness nate. We also cannot assume that boundaries of religion itself as a basis for solidarity in simply reflect material interests. Instead, we American life and sharpened the boundary must understand how boundaries create and are between believers and nonbelievers in our colcreated by identities that shape perceptions of lective imagination. It is also possible that the interest even as they form the cultural bases of prominence of Christian Right rhetoric in the solidarity. Thus, we must understand the resultpublic realm has played the same role. It is ing cultural landscape that boundaries define, always risky, however, to predict how history including definitions of moral worth and subwill unfold, and it is too soon to say that athestantive claims about identity. It means that if ists will always be a symbolic other in our sociwe want to understand the symbolic logic of ety. Perhaps acceptance of atheists would exclusion, we have to shift our analytical focus increase were a pluralist, contract understandaway from what members of marginalized ing of the public good to gain political and culgroups (the “other”) share, and toward what tural ascendancy. In any case, we believe it is members of those inside the boundary share – vital to continue to analyze the dynamics of and what they imagine themselves to share. symbolic inclusion and exclusion as religious This is why we have focused throughout our diversity continues to increase and as religious analysis not on atheists per se but rather on identities are made salient by both internal what attitudes about atheists reveal regarding developments and by changes in America’s globAmerican society and culture. al relationships. More broadly, our analysis also suggests that We already know that Americans draw if we start asking about the substantive, culturboundaries in private life based on morality. al basis for acceptance into various private and Our findings suggest that moral boundaries are

232—–AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

also drawn in public life, and these findings help us to understand why and how they are drawn. In this case, the symbolic boundaries drawn around atheists help us to understand the problem of moral solidarity in a diverse society. They point to a specific cultural content, and to a specific historical and institutional basis for the intersection of religion, morality, and models of the public and the private good. They shed light on the shared or fractured nature of cultural membership, and also on the content of the culture that is shared. We call for more work that investigates the range and depth of meanings associated with the term “atheist,” how moral worth is linked discursively with citizenship, and how the construction of cultural membership in American society proceeds through the drawing of symbolic boundaries.

young adulthood, the connection of race and sport in midnight basketball leagues, and American pluralism through the lenses of race and religion.

REFERENCES

Alexander, Jeffrey. 1992. “Citizen and Enemy as Symbolic Classif ication: On the Polarizing Discourse of Civil Society.” Pp. 289–308 in Cultivating Differences: Symbolic Boundaries and the Making of Inequality, edited by M. Lamont and M. Fournier. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Allen, Charlotte. 2004. “Believe It.” National Review, September 13, p. 51ff. Allport, Gordon. 1954. The Nature of Prejudice. New York: Addison-Wesley. Alwin, Duane. 1986. “Religion and Parental ChildRearing Orientations: Evidence of a CatholicProtestant Convergence.” American Journal of Sociology 92:412–40. Penny Edgell is Associate Professor in the American Association for Public Opinion Research. Department of Sociology at the University of 2004. Standard Definitions: Final Dispositions of Minnesota. Her research has focused on two dynamCase Codes and Outcome Rates for Surveys. 3d ed. ics in local religious communities: conflict and deciLenexa, KS: American Association for Public sion-making (Congregations in Conflict, Cambridge Opinion Research (AAPOR). University Press 1999), and inclusion and exclusion Anderson, Benedict. 1991. Imagined Communities: along the lines of family form, race, gender, and Reflections on the Origin and Spread of social class (Religion and Family in a Changingby Ingenta to : Delivered Nationalism. New York: Verso. Society, Princeton University Press 2005, and University of Minnesota - Minneapolis Bellah, Robert N., Richard Madsen, William Sullivan, “Making Inclusive Communities: Congregations and 2007 18:06:57 Mon, 29 Jan Ann Swidler, and Steven Tipton. 1985. Habits of the ‘Problem’ of Race,” Social Problems the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in 1998:45(4):451–72). Her recent research examines American Society. Berkeley, CA: University of understandings of racial and religious diversity in the California Press. United States and the formation of family ideals in ———. 1991. The Good Society. New York: Knopf. diverse religious communities. Becker, Penny Edgell. 1998. “Making Inclusive Joseph Gerteis is Assistant Professor of Sociology at Communities: Congregations and the ‘Problem’ of the University of Minnesota. His recent work examRace.” Social Problems 45:451–72. ines the sources and limits of interracial organizing Beinart, Peter. 2002. “Bad Faith.” Beliefnet.com, in the U.S. South of the late nineteenth century and reprint of article in The New Republic, March 25, includes “The Possession of Civic Virtue: Movement 2002. Retrieved September 28, 2005. Narratives of Race and Class in the Knights of Labor, ” (http://www.beliefnet.com/story/102/story_10296_ (American Journal of Sociology, 2002:108(3): 1.html). 580–615) and, with Alyssa Goolsby, “Nationalism in Blumer, Robyn. 2004. “I’m an Atheist—So What?” America: The Case of the Populist Movement” St. Petersburg Times, August 8, p. 6 editorial. (Theory and Society 2005:34(2):197–225). As part Bourdieu, Pierre. 1984. Distinction: A Social Critique of the American Mosaic Project, his current theoof the Judgment of Taste. Translated by Richard retical and empirical work is on issues of diversity Nice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. and solidarity in contemporary America. Bush, George W. 2005. Press Conference of the President. April 28. Washington, DC: The White Douglas Hartmann is Associate Professor of House Office of the Press Secretary. Retrieved Sociology at the University of Minnesota. His interSeptember 28, 2005 (http://www.whitehouse. ests are in the intersections of race and culture in congov/news/releases/2005/04/20050428-9.html). temporary social life. He is coauthor with Stephen Caplow, Theodore, Howard M. Bahr, and Bruce A. Cornell of Ethnicity and Race: Making Identities in Chadwick. 1983. All Faithful People: Change and a Changing World (Pine Forge 1998) and author of Continuity in Middletown’s Religion. Minneapolis, Race, Culture, and the Revolt of the Black Athlete: MN: University of Minnesota Press. The 1968 Olympic Protests and their Aftermath Dawkins, Richard. 2003. “Religion Be Damned.” (University of Chicago Press 2003). Ongoing projects include research on the diverse experiences of Wired, October, issue 11.10. Retrieved September