The truth about the North Korean space launch

Last week, North Korea finally managed to put an object into
orbit around the Earth after 14 years of trying. The event was
greeted with hysterical headlines, about how the whole thing was a
likely a missile test and most certainly a failure of Western
intelligence. Most of those headlines were completely wrong.

There are many questions yet to be answered about this launch
and what it means. Some of them will take weeks or months to
determine, others may never be answered satisfactorily. But there's
enough information already in the public domain to answer basic
questions about the launch. News flash: most of the initial reports
about it were total misfires.

Was This a Ballistic Missile Test or a Satellite Launch?

Some of the same technologies are needed for long-range missiles
and for space launches -- most notably rocket motors, high
strength-to-weight fuselages, and guidance software. But they're
not the same thing. All evidence points to a satellite launch,
despite headlines likethese.

The goal of a space launch vehicle is to insert payloads into
orbit and to do so they must perform two functions. They must first
lift a payload to a desired altitude above the Earth and then give
that payload enough forward speed to remain in orbit at that
altitude. The final speed required for this is determined by the
altitude and pull of the Earth's gravity. With enough speed, the
payload moves forward equal to the distance it is pulled towards
the Earth by gravity. It moves in an ellipse around the Earth,
continually falling towards the Earth but missing ("free
fall").

Ballistic missiles, on the other hand, have a different goal.
Their objective is to deliver a payload to another spot on the
Earth. To do so, they need to accelerate the payload to a very high
speed, although significantly slower than the space launch vehicle,
and after separation from the rocket, the ballistic missile's
payload follows an elliptical path through space similar to a
satellite. However, the ballistic payload is not in orbit -- part
of its elliptical path is inside the Earth's atmosphere. The
payload coasts along its elliptical path and instead of
"free-falling" around the planet, it re-enters the atmosphere and
impacts a spot on the surface of the Earth.

From a practical perspective, these different goals result in
significant differences in the flight profile of a space launch
versus a ballistic missile launch. Look at the illustration of the
North Korean launch compiled by Dr David Wright. The green trajectory in this
illustration is for a ballistic missile trajectory while the red
and yellow trajectory is for a space launch trajectory. The most
striking difference is in the altitude -- a long-range ballistic
missile actually goes much higher into space than a typical space
launch into low-Earth orbit (LEO), sometimes as high as 1,500
kilometres.

Within these parameters, the North Korean rocket launch was most
certainly a space launch and not a ballistic missile test. This can
be verified by multiple sources before, during and after the
launch. Prior to the launch, North Korea notified international agencies of the splashdown zones
for the first two stages and the payload shroud, as is standard
practice. These splashdown zones corresponded to a space launch trajectory, indicating
beforehand that the North Koreans planned to try and place a
satellite into orbit. During the launch, heat from the rocket was
picked up by constellations of US military infrared satellites in orbit. Tracking of the burn phase
of the launch by those satellites allows the US to verify that it
was on a space launch trajectory. After the launch, remnants of the
first stage were recovered in the pre-announced splash zone by the
South Korean Navy.

Was the Test Illegal Under International Law? The most like answer is yes, but it is not likely
enforceable. Although all countries do have the right to pursue
peaceful exploration and use of outer space, that right is subject
to international law. The United Nations Security Council has
adopted two resolutions -- 1718 and 1874 -- demanding the North
Korea refrain from further launches using ballistic missile
activity. And those resolutions are binding under international law
on countries that are members of the UN. What's less clear is
whether the international community has the tools to enforce these
UNSC resolutions.

UNSC Resolution 1718, adopted on 14 October 2006, levied
sanctions on North Korea as a result of their test of a nuclear
weapon earlier that month. Contained within the text
of the resolution is a demand that North Korea cease
testing and development of its ballistic missile programme. UNSC
Resolution 1874, adopted on 12 June 2009, implemented further
sanctions on North Korea after their second test of a nuclear
weapon in May 2009. It repeats many
of the same prohibitions as Resolution 1718, including a demand
that North Korea not conduct any launch using ballistic missile
technology.

North Korea's position is that it is simply exercising its
rights to peaceful exploration and use of outer space in accordance
with the rights given to all nations under Article I the 1967 Outer
Space Treaty, to which it is a Party. However, the actual
text of the Article is as follows:

Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies,
shall be free for exploration and use by all States without
discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in
accordance with international law, and there shall be free access
to all areas of celestial bodies

The important piece is the phrase "in accordance with
international law." UNSC Resolutions are considered binding
international law on countries that are members of the UN. That
includes North Korea.

However, whether or not the launch was illegal is only part of
the issue. The real crux is what can or will be done about it.
North Korea is gambling that the punishment for violating
international law is further sanctions, which it has shown it can
withstand or manipulate to some degree. It is possible that the
UNSC could authorise stronger measures, including direct military
action by the United States or other countries, in additional UNSC
resolutions. North Korea is betting that the gun it has pointed at South Korea's head, along with the existing
commitments of the American military in Afghanistan and elsewhere,
will deter a military response.

Did the North Koreans Catch Everyone
Napping?
That's what you'd believe if you read reports like these. It's what you'd think if you learned that key Asian policy members of the Obama
Administration were in the middle of a cocktail reception at the
Japanese Ambassador's residence in Washington, DC, when the launch
occurred. But the fact that the North Koreans were preparing to
launch a rocket was of no surprise to anyone. It's only the
specifics of the timing that may have caught some a little
flat-footed. It's highly unlikely that people at the top levels of
the US government and its key allies were surprised.

That's because the launch window was fairly long, between 7am and noon local
Korean time each day from 10 December to 22 December. This launch
window is driven by the orbit that the satellite needs to be placed
into. A satellite orbit is fixed in space relative to the Earth and
so you need to wait until the Earth rotates under the desired
orbital plane before you can launch. The length of the window each
day is based on the desired precision of the final orbit, the
performance of the booster, the weight of the payload, and a number
of other factors.

There is evidence that North Korea attempted a disinformation
campaign that may have played a role in generating surprise. On 8
December, US intelligence satellites spotted a train carrying rocket components en route from a
missile plant to the launch pad. On 9 December, North Korea stated that it had discovered a problem with
the rocket and it was delaying the launch and extending the window
by nearly a week. The next day, the South Korean government
stated that there was "no sign" of an imminent launch and
another report stated that the rocket had been removed from the pad. That
last statement was provably false at the time -- analysis
of imagery from
commercial remote sensing satellites showed the rocket was still on
the pad. However, the same imagery also indicated possible
maintenance work on the rocket, leading to an assessment from a former US intelligence analyst that a
launch was at least a week out.

To take advantage of this disinformation campaign, it also
appears that North Korea timed the launch to correspond to a
significant gap in coverage of the launch site by imaging
satellites. An analysis done by Marco Langbroek, a Dutch hobbyist
satellite observer, shows that the launch occurred at the end of a one-hour
gap with no coverage by any known American intelligence, Japanese
intelligence, or commercial imaging satellites in LEO. Other
portions of the launch window had at most fifteen minutes between
satellite overflights. This is backed up by a quote from an unnamed
US official, who said they relied too much on overhead satellite imagery
for their warnings about the launch.

Despite this, it is doubtful that the disinformation campaign
was effective on everyone. As anyone in the imagery analysis field
can tell you, LEO imagery satellites have their limitations. They
exist in limited numbers, travel in predictable orbits, can only
observe what's directly underneath them, and have a revisit time
measured in many hours to days. It is relatively simple to either
cease activities when they come overhead, or in some cases, to
actually create a false situation on the ground for them to
capture.

However, these are not the only tools governments like the
United States have at their disposal. While satellites in LEO only
have limited viewing windows, satellites in other orbits can stare
at specific locations for extended periods. Satellites in highly
elliptical Earth orbits (HEO), often called Molniya after the
Soviet satellites that were the first to widely use them, can hang
over a specific part of the Earth for hours at a time as shown in
illustration above. Three satellites spaced out in the same orbit
can monitor a region continuously, with two in the upper part of
the orbit on either side of apogee (red dot number 6 in
gallery pic) and one in the lower part of the orbit
swinging through perigee (red dot number 0 in gallery
pic).

The US has at least two infrared sensors in HEO orbits as part of the
Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS). Open source information
indicates that they are hosted on two classified
satellites, USA 184 and USA 200. The same satellites are
also believed to
carry a signals intelligence payload that can collect
electromagnetic emissions. Observations from amateur satellite
observers indicate that their orbits "hang" over Asia, indicating
that they likely could have been used to monitor the launch site
and observe the launch. An image seen below and right, released by
the US military, is of one of the SBIRS payloads in HEO tracking a
missile launch.

In addition to the SBIRS payloads in HEO, the US has a number of
satellites in geostationary Earth orbit (GEO), orbiting 36,00
kilometres (about 22,000 miles) above the Equator that likely
provided critical data on the North Korean launch. These satellites
orbit around the Earth at the same rate the Earth rotates, giving
the impression that they are "fixed" relative to a particular spot
on the Earth. In the case of the North Korean launch, the US
satellites in GEO collection signals intelligence and electronic
intelligence could have monitored the launch site for preparations
and the infrared
warning satellites would have detected the launch.

The important issue in the case of North Korea is that very few
people have access to the information from these satellites. They
are considered critical to US national security and their very
existence is highly classified, along with any intelligence
products created from the data they collect. Additionally, they are
often stovepiped into different sets of indicators with little
integration between different sources, leading to the possibility
of conflicting conclusions. These factors likely worked in the
North Koreans' favour. Very few within the US government, and no
one outside the US government with the possible exception of close
allies, would have had access to the intelligence from these
satellites. Most governments would have to rely on either
declassified or sanitised intelligence or their own intelligence
sources, and outside observers had to rely on the handful of
commercial imaging satellites for information. It is this last
group, along with lower-level government officials, that fell
victim to the North Korean disinformation campaign, and the
reliance on the media for quotes and information from these sources
created the impression that the North Koreans had fooled
everyone.

Within the US government, top national security officials likely
had access to data sources that were unaffected by North Korean
disinformation. However, it is possible that different intelligence
sources could have been driven conflicting conclusions, leading to
disagreement over what the reality was. This may have played a role
in catching some within the US government off guard.

Comments

At last, a factual and rational analysis of North Korea's latest effort in their space programme. Excellent work, Brian!

Nick Quinn

Dec 19th 2012

What a terrible article, it shows a complete lack of understanding.

Ben

Dec 21st 2012

Yes,.. But North Korea is clearly up to something very evil and bad here ( Like they always are ) ,...Eventually someday soon, they 'will' have Long Range ICBM capabilities ,..and then, we are screwed ,.. What do we do then ?? Right now, we are handling them the entire wrong way with how Obama is doing it and Looking the other way ,.. That is stupid and won't work !! We are sitting by and watching and letting them explode nukes and perform Long range tests of some sort ,..it's stupid and careless on our part ,..Yeah, I know they are a some kind of Puppet of China - So What ?? We show strength and Resolve ,..to the World ,..or we don't deserve Great nation status and worse; We're gonna get a 'Worse' than 911 from these creeps if we don't wise up and watch out !! They are a Crazy proud People who are still Very sore at losing a war to us long ago ,...

Shark

Dec 25th 2012

It wouldn't be that difficult to create a satellite that shoots small nuclear missiles from space. Once the satellite is directly overhead of the United States it could unleash a volley of hell.