I feel quite honoured because that is one of the arguments I have put forward. As we already know, the elements in the treaty should be included in the law. We could always add new elements through regulations. Not only do we not really have the opportunity to discuss the regulations, but we do not have the opportunity to vote on them. The principles of respect for treaties and of parliamentary democracy are at stake here.

I would like to go back to the issue of exports to the United States. According to the treaty, we have to apply its various aspects in a non-discriminatory way, which should mean that we will apply it to all exports and to all countries.

Two weeks ago, we had representatives here from Global Affairs Canada and they told us that there were examples. I believe that Luxembourg can export to Belgium, or something like that, without taking that into account in its application of the Arms Trade Treaty.

We would certainly take the position that no country should be exempt. The same concerns that we are highlighting with respect to the Canada-U.S. relationship we would have with respect to the Luxembourg-Belgium relationship. The fact that this may be how Belgium and Luxembourg decide to handle their ratification—which we would say is in violation of the spirit of the treaty, the scope of the treaty, and the non-discriminatory provisions of the treaty—does not in any way justify that we, too, should follow in that path and similarly limit the scope of the treaty in terms of how we are implementing it.

I would also argue that the United States, as a global arms power, is hardly comparable to Belgium. Canada is hardly comparable to Luxembourg. Not that this makes a difference—the fact that we are talking about a hugely different scale, nature, and severity of weaponry—but it is a background factor.

It has to be universal. With a country like the United States, whether or not the United States had some good approaches last year or some excellent approaches five years ago, who knows what their approaches will be three months from now, a year from now, or two years from now. The reason we need firm, clear, predictable, binding law around this is that the world changes. Other governments change. Three years from now, it could be disastrous in terms of how the U.S. is handling its arms transfers. We would probably say it's near disastrous right now, but it could get even worse. If we have set up a legislative framework that's not going to apply to that context, then we've started off on the wrong foot.

With your permission, I will answer in English because of the terminology, which is quite technical.

I, of course, associate myself with the comments Alex made, but I would also like to address a section of the treaty that the foreign affairs officials purported to rely on, and that is article 26, which essentially talks about defence co-operation agreements:

This Treaty shall not be cited as grounds for voiding defence cooperation agreements concluded between States Parties to this Treaty.

It is our understanding that this is what the Benelux countries are relying on, that they have a defence co-operation agreement.

I, like Alex, don't agree that this is what it means. It doesn't mean not complying with the treaty; it means using this as an excuse to get out of an agreement. Nonetheless, even if we give them that interpretation, which I don't agree with, it applies only to states parties to the treaty, and the United States is not a state party to the treaty. Canada could not rely on this provision, even if we gave it that interpretation, which I think is an incorrect one. The act very clearly talks about applying the act to all of our exports in a “non-discriminatory manner”, and that is as clear as can be, indicating all of our exports.

I'd like to add a brief comment. You spoke about the study you conducted on the billion dollars' worth of equipment that had disappeared into thin air. Could you send a copy of those documents to the committee?

Could you speak to us briefly about the Canadian Commercial Corporation and its role, which is not clarified in the bill?

Thank you very much for that very important question about the Canadian Commercial Corporation, which increasingly plays a very, very important role as a broker, essentially, between the government and potential exporting countries, and of course played a very central role with respect to the $15-billion Saudi arms deal.

It clearly should be covered. All entities within the country that are involved in the decision to export arms should be brought within the scope of the ATT, and therefore it should be very clear that the Canadian Commercial Corporation—and also the Department of National Defence, because it's not covered under this either—and all entities that are involved at the behest of the Government of Canada in the potential export of arms to another country must be brought within the scope of the Arms Trade Treaty.

With respect to your first point, absolutely. I will highlight that, while we certainly did some work around that concern and issued some public statements, the actual study is from the U.S. Department of Defense's own audit process, so it's obviously a very authoritative source as to what's happening with respect to U.S. arms and weapons.

We thank you very much for your contribution to the arguments in favour of human rights around the world.

We certainly count you as active contributors to Canada's, I guess, reassertion in the world.

Mr. Neve, you started by talking about the important signal that this sends to the world, the gaining of general respect for this treaty, and what Canada's accession to the treaty can demonstrate to the world. That's the view of the government, that in addition to strengthening our arms trade system, our role is to contribute where we can to other countries around the world that need help strengthening their regimes as well.

Canada contributes $1 million to the U.S. trust fund facility supporting states in their accession to the ATT. Could you both talk briefly about the contribution that Canada can make there and about what the signal that Canada's accession to the treaty can relay to other developing nations around the world?

Absolutely. I'm sure we both have a lot to say. As I said in my remarks, we're enthusiastic about Canada's acceding to the treaty for two reasons. First, our arms trade needs this kind of scrutiny and control. This is not theoretical. We know there are cases that have come up of very real concern. Second is exactly the piece you're highlighting, Mr. DeCourcey. It's the concern that the world needs some leadership here and that we do have 92 states on board, which is almost half, but not quite half.

As was pointed out earlier, we have a number of very key players that aren't even considering signing on. A country like Canada has a very respected voice globally on international human rights, but particularly, especially because of the Ottawa treaty, it has a very strong reputation around land mines in particular and the notion of global arms control. Yes, we are a key player here. That's one of the reasons it's been so concerning that four years on we're not yet part of the club.

The ways in which we can work bilaterally with states that aren't on board yet, and the ways in which we can work with states that are on board but don't yet have the laws in place to ensure proper implementation are probably immeasurable. We want Canada, therefore, to be going into this with the best example to the world of what full embrace of the Arms Trade Treaty looks like. For example, you don't exempt from its coverage a country that is responsible for more than half of your arms trade, and you have clear provisions in your law that enact in legislation the mandatory aspects of compliance. We're not suggesting that every single detail needs to be in the act as opposed to the regulations, but there's much improvement that could be seen here.

Is there not legitimacy to the comment made by my colleague Anita around the idea of the nimbleness of regulation to expand, in a quick manner, the need for the minister to take certain other issues into consideration as the world changes? We've seen examples around September 11 where the inability to quickly amend regulation caused a delay in adding certain requirements to decision-making in government.

Is that not an important consideration in all of this? Again, we know that other Westminister systems, like the U.K., New Zealand, and Australia, land these sorts of criteria and these decision-making processes in regulation for that very fact.

We totally agree that there's a role for regulation. We are not at all suggesting that there shouldn't be a regulatory power here. We would absolutely agree that there are many aspects, including further developments that arise after the legislation is passed, that could appropriately be dealt with through regulation.

We're concerned, though, that in essence the legislation is leaving for regulation a clear statutory statement of the central obligation that is involved in ratifying the Arms Trade Treaty. That is this notion of mandatory prohibition with respect to arms transfers that violates the clear provisions in the Arms Trade Treaty. We're told that will be in regulation. We're also told that it may be stated in a way that it's just that these are factors that mandatorily should be taken into account, as Ms. Mason was highlighting, not that it will be a statement of mandatory prohibition.

There's a fundamental difference there. It's that high level that we're looking for in the legislation. Other details around processes, even the specificity of some of the kinds of international human rights violations that should be of concern here, the evolving nature of those as we become aware of new threats and new concerns, absolutely...but we need that key mandatory provision to be in the law.

First of all, thank you very much for your comments. I just want to get an outlook from you from the public health context.

We know that in many cases a lot of these illegal arms are in those places around the world where the rule of law is not there, or there's a conflict. We know that disproportionately the illegal arms trade affects women and girls, and prevents the stabilization of society. With regard to acceding to this Arms Trade Treaty—outside of the issues that you mentioned—how do you think that will impact those societies specifically in making sure that we improve the situation on the ground and we contribute to a post-stabilization in those countries that are going through this specific situation?

The first point I would want to make is that, in this case, we're not talking about illegal arms. We're talking about the damage that legal arms transfers are causing because the strict prohibitions in the Arms Trade Treaty aren't being followed. If we could get the legal trade under much stricter control, and if the legal trade were a much more responsible trade, then it would that much easier to focus in on the illegal arms trade.

I want to go back, if I may, because I think it's important, about what it means for Canada to be back, and what kind of a signal would be sent by Canada acceding to the treaty with a very robust implementing legislation. I recall that Canada played a leadership role in the negotiation of the Rome Statute, which led to establishment in the International Criminal Court. We were rewarded with the first presidency of that court because of the outstanding role that Canada had played.

Robust rules controlling arms exports to ensure that exports are responsible is a clear concomitant to the International Criminal Court in the Rome Statute, given that there was a central role that weapons played in the commission of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and serious human rights violations. It was un-Canadian for us to have been out of this treaty for so long. I would suggest that the expectation is very strong internationally. With the Prime Minister's statement that Canada is back, that means when we accede to this treaty, it's going to be in a manner that Canadians can all be proud of.

Both of my colleagues have raised the issue of regulation. MP DeCourcey raised the issue of the other Westminster-style governments of New Zealand, Australia, and the U.K. How have those three jurisdictions dealt with the issue of mandatory prohibition in their regulations?

To start with, New Zealand didn't put it in the regulations. They have mandatory prohibitions in the act, not in the regulations. With the other two, I don't know, but we can certainly check and provide that.

I would be very surprised if the mandatory obligations were in the regulations. I'm a lawyer, and it's very unusual to have the primary obligation not in your law but in your regulations.

Colleagues, for your information, I'll get the table to do that for you. I'll get you a list of who is mandatory and who relies on regulations to develop the treaty.

I think that wraps it up for both our witnesses. Ms. Mason and Mr. Neve, I want to thank both of you.

Colleagues, we had very good discussions this morning and this afternoon.

We'll call it a day, and we'll see you all on Thursday.

I have a reminder before you go. We'll be starting clause-by-clause study a week from this Thursday, so prepare yourself for that. If there's any information that your chair and/or the table can give you, please feel free to let us know.