The Memoirs of General Ulysses S. Grant, Part 4. by Ulysses S. Grant

Its easy to link to paragraphs in the Full Text ArchiveIf this page contains some material that you want to link to but you don't want your visitors to have to scroll down the whole page just hover your mouse over the relevent paragraph and click the bookmark icon that appears to the left of it. The address of that paragraph will appear in the address bar of your browser. For further details about how you can link to the Full Text Archive please refer to our linking page.

When I obtained this leave I was at Chattanooga, having gone there againto make preparations to have the troops of Thomas in the southern partof Tennessee co-operate with Sherman's movement in Mississippi. Idirected Thomas, and Logan who was at Scottsboro, Alabama, to keep up athreatening movement to the south against J. E. Johnston, who had againrelieved Bragg, for the purpose of making him keep as many troops aspossible there.

I learned through Confederate sources that Johnston had already sent twodivisions in the direction of Mobile, presumably to operate againstSherman, and two more divisions to Longstreet in East Tennessee. Seeingthat Johnston had depleted in this way, I directed Thomas to send atleast ten thousand men, besides Stanley's division which was already tothe east, into East Tennessee, and notified Schofield, who was now incommand in East Tennessee, of this movement of troops into hisdepartment and also of the reinforcements Longstreet had received. Myobject was to drive Longstreet out of East Tennessee as a part of thepreparations for my spring campaign.

About this time General Foster, who had been in command of theDepartment of the Ohio after Burnside until Schofield relieved him(*21), advised me that he thought it would be a good thing to keepLongstreet just where he was; that he was perfectly quiet in EastTennessee, and if he was forced to leave there, his whole well-equippedarmy would be free to go to any place where it could effect the most fortheir cause. I thought the advice was good, and, adopting that view,countermanded the orders for pursuit of Longstreet.

On the 12th of February I ordered Thomas to take Dalton and hold it, ifpossible; and I directed him to move without delay. Finding that he hadnot moved, on the 17th I urged him again to start, telling him howimportant it was, that the object of the movement was to co-operate withSherman, who was moving eastward and might be in danger. Then again onthe 21st, he not yet having started, I asked him if he could not startthe next day. He finally got off on the 22d or 23d. The enemy fellback from his front without a battle, but took a new position quite asstrong and farther to the rear. Thomas reported that he could not goany farther, because it was impossible with his poor teams, nearlystarved, to keep up supplies until the railroads were repaired. He soonfell back.

Schofield also had to return for the same reason. He could not carrysupplies with him, and Longstreet was between him and the supplies stillleft in the country. Longstreet, in his retreat, would be movingtowards his supplies, while our forces, following, would be recedingfrom theirs. On the 2d of March, however, I learned of Sherman'ssuccess, which eased my mind very much. The next day, the 3d, I wasordered to Washington.

The bill restoring the grade of lieutenant-general of the army hadpassed through Congress and became a law on the 26th of February. Mynomination had been sent to the Senate on the 1st of March and confirmedthe next day (the 2d). I was ordered to Washington on the 3d to receivemy commission, and started the day following that. The commission washanded to me on the 9th. It was delivered to me at the ExecutiveMansion by President Lincoln in the presence of his Cabinet, my eldestson, those of my staff who were with me and and a few other visitors.

The President in presenting my commission read from a paper--stating,however, as a preliminary, and prior to the delivery of it, that he haddrawn that up on paper, knowing my disinclination to speak in public,and handed me a copy in advance so that I might prepare a few lines ofreply. The President said:

"General Grant, the nation's appreciation of what you have done, and itsreliance upon you for what remains to be done in the existing greatstruggle, are now presented, with this commission constituting youlieutenant-general in the Army of the United States. With this highhonor, devolves upon you, also, a corresponding responsibility. As thecountry herein trusts you, so, under God, it will sustain you. Iscarcely need to add, that, with what I here speak for the nation, goesmy own hearty personal concurrence."

To this I replied: "Mr. President, I accept the commission, withgratitude for the high honor conferred. With the aid of the noblearmies that have fought in so many fields for our common country, itwill be my earnest endeavor not to disappoint your expectations. I feelthe full weight of the responsibilities now devolving on me; and I knowthat if they are met, it will be due to those armies, and above all, tothe favor of that Providence which leads both nations and men."

On the 10th I visited the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac atBrandy Station; then returned to Washington, and pushed west at once tomake my arrangements for turning over the commands there and givinggeneral directions for the preparations to be made for the springcampaign.

It had been my intention before this to remain in the West, even if Iwas made lieutenant-general; but when I got to Washington and saw thesituation it was plain that here was the point for the commandinggeneral to be. No one else could, probably, resist the pressure thatwould be brought to bear upon him to desist from his own plans andpursue others. I determined, therefore, before I started back to haveSherman advanced to my late position, McPherson to Sherman's in commandof the department, and Logan to the command of McPherson's corps. Thesechanges were all made on my recommendation and without hesitation. Mycommission as lieutenant-general was given to me on the 9th of March,1864. On the following day, as already stated, I visited General Meade,commanding the Army of the Potomac, at his headquarters at BrandyStation, north of the Rapidan. I had known General Meade slightly inthe Mexican war, but had not met him since until this visit. I was astranger to most of the Army of the Potomac, I might say to all exceptthe officers of the regular army who had served in the Mexican war.There had been some changes ordered in the organization of that armybefore my promotion. One was the consolidation of five corps intothree, thus throwing some officers of rank out of important commands.Meade evidently thought that I might want to make still one more changenot yet ordered. He said to me that I might want an officer who hadserved with me in the West, mentioning Sherman specially, to take hisplace. If so, he begged me not to hesitate about making the change. Heurged that the work before us was of such vast importance to the wholenation that the feeling or wishes of no one person should stand in theway of selecting the right men for all positions. For himself, he wouldserve to the best of his ability wherever placed. I assured him that Ihad no thought of substituting any one for him. As to Sherman, he couldnot be spared from the West.

This incident gave me even a more favorable opinion of Meade than didhis great victory at Gettysburg the July before. It is men who wait tobe selected, and not those who seek, from whom we may always expect themost efficient service.

Meade's position afterwards proved embarrassing to me if not to him. Hewas commanding an army and, for nearly a year previous to my takingcommand of all the armies, was in supreme command of the Army of thePotomac--except from the authorities at Washington. All other generalofficers occupying similar positions were independent in their commandsso far as any one present with them was concerned. I tried to makeGeneral Meade's position as nearly as possible what it would have beenif I had been in Washington or any other place away from his command. Itherefore gave all orders for the movements of the Army of the Potomacto Meade to have them executed. To avoid the necessity of having togive orders direct, I established my headquarters near his, unless therewere reasons for locating them elsewhere. This sometimes happened, andI had on occasions to give orders direct to the troops affected. On the11th I returned to Washington and, on the day after, orders werepublished by the War Department placing me in command of all the armies.I had left Washington the night before to return to my old command inthe West and to meet Sherman whom I had telegraphed to join me inNashville.

Sherman assumed command of the military division of the Mississippi onthe 18th of March, and we left Nashville together for Cincinnati. I hadSherman accompany me that far on my way back to Washington so that wecould talk over the matters about which I wanted to see him, withoutlosing any more time from my new command than was necessary. The firstpoint which I wished to discuss was particularly about the co-operationof his command with mine when the spring campaign should commence. Therewere also other and minor points, minor as compared with the greatimportance of the question to be decided by sanguinary war--therestoration to duty of officers who had been relieved from importantcommands, namely McClellan, Burnside and Fremont in the East, and Buell,McCook, Negley and Crittenden in the West.

Some time in the winter of 1863-64 I had been invited by thegeneral-in-chief to give my views of the campaign I thought advisablefor the command under me--now Sherman's. General J. E. Johnston wasdefending Atlanta and the interior of Georgia with an army, the largestpart of which was stationed at Dalton, about 38 miles south ofChattanooga. Dalton is at the junction of the railroad from Clevelandwith the one from Chattanooga to Atlanta.

There could have been no difference of opinion as to the first duty ofthe armies of the military division of the Mississippi. Johnston's armywas the first objective, and that important railroad centre, Atlanta,the second. At the time I wrote General Halleck giving my views of theapproaching campaign, and at the time I met General Sherman, it wasexpected that General Banks would be through with the campaign which hehad been ordered upon before my appointment to the command of all thearmies, and would be ready to co-operate with the armies east of theMississippi, his part in the programme being to move upon Mobile by landwhile the navy would close the harbor and assist to the best of itsability. (*22) The plan therefore was for Sherman to attack Johnston anddestroy his army if possible, to capture Atlanta and hold it, and withhis troops and those of Banks to hold a line through to Mobile, or atleast to hold Atlanta and command the railroad running east and west,and the troops from one or other of the armies to hold important pointson the southern road, the only east and west road that would be left inthe possession of the enemy. This would cut the Confederacy in twoagain, as our gaining possession of the Mississippi River had donebefore. Banks was not ready in time for the part assigned to him, andcircumstances that could not be foreseen determined the campaign whichwas afterwards made, the success and grandeur of which has resoundedthroughout all lands.

In regard to restoring officers who had been relieved from importantcommands to duty again, I left Sherman to look after those who had beenremoved in the West while I looked out for the rest. I directed,however, that he should make no assignment until I could speak to theSecretary of War about the matter. I shortly after recommended to theSecretary the assignment of General Buell to duty. I received theassurance that duty would be offered to him; and afterwards theSecretary told me that he had offered Buell an assignment and that thelatter had declined it, saying that it would be degradation to acceptthe assignment offered. I understood afterwards that he refused toserve under either Sherman or Canby because he had ranked them both.Both graduated before him and ranked him in the old army. Shermanranked him as a brigadier-general. All of them ranked me in the oldarmy, and Sherman and Buell did as brigadiers. The worst excuse asoldier can make for declining service is that he once ranked thecommander he is ordered to report to.

On the 23d of March I was back in Washington, and on the 26th took up myheadquarters at Culpeper Court-House, a few miles south of theheadquarters of the Army of the Potomac.

Although hailing from Illinois myself, the State of the President, Inever met Mr. Lincoln until called to the capital to receive mycommission as lieutenant-general. I knew him, however, very well andfavorably from the accounts given by officers under me at the West whohad known him all their lives. I had also read the remarkable series ofdebates between Lincoln and Douglas a few years before, when they wererival candidates for the United States Senate. I was then a resident ofMissouri, and by no means a "Lincoln man" in that contest; but Irecognized then his great ability.

In my first interview with Mr. Lincoln alone he stated to me that he hadnever professed to be a military man or to know how campaigns should beconducted, and never wanted to interfere in them: but thatprocrastination on the part of commanders, and the pressure from thepeople at the North and Congress, WHICH WAS ALWAYS WITH HIM, forced himinto issuing his series of "Military Orders"--one, two, three, etc. Hedid not know but they were all wrong, and did know that some of themwere. All he wanted or had ever wanted was some one who would take theresponsibility and act, and call on him for all the assistance needed,pledging himself to use all the power of the government in renderingsuch assistance. Assuring him that I would do the best I could with themeans at hand, and avoid as far as possible annoying him or the WarDepartment, our first interview ended.

The Secretary of War I had met once before only, but felt that I knewhim better.

While commanding in West Tennessee we had occasionally heldconversations over the wires, at night, when they were not beingotherwise used. He and General Halleck both cautioned me against givingthe President my plans of campaign, saying that he was so kind-hearted,so averse to refusing anything asked of him, that some friend would besure to get from him all he knew. I should have said that in ourinterview the President told me he did not want to know what I proposedto do. But he submitted a plan of campaign of his own which he wantedme to hear and then do as I pleased about. He brought out a map ofVirginia on which he had evidently marked every position occupied by theFederal and Confederate armies up to that time. He pointed out on themap two streams which empty into the Potomac, and suggested that thearmy might be moved on boats and landed between the mouths of thesestreams. We would then have the Potomac to bring our supplies, and thetributaries would protect our flanks while we moved out. I listenedrespectfully, but did not suggest that the same streams would protectLee's flanks while he was shutting us up.

I did not communicate my plans to the President, nor did I to theSecretary of War or to General Halleck.

March the 26th my headquarters were, as stated, at Culpeper, and thework of preparing for an early campaign commenced.

CHAPTER XLVII.

THE MILITARY SITUATION--PLANS FOR THE CAMPAIGN--SHERIDAN ASSIGNED TOCOMMAND OF THE CAVALRY--FLANK MOVEMENTS--FORREST AT FORT PILLOW--GENERALBANKS'S EXPEDITION--COLONEL MOSBY--AN INCIDENT OF THE WILDERNESSCAMPAIGN.

When I assumed command of all the armies the situation was about this:the Mississippi River was guarded from St. Louis to its mouth; the lineof the Arkansas was held, thus giving us all the North-west north ofthat river. A few points in Louisiana not remote from the river wereheld by the Federal troops, as was also the mouth of the Rio Grande.East of the Mississippi we held substantially all north of the Memphisand Charleston Railroad as far east as Chattanooga, thence along theline of the Tennessee and Holston rivers, taking in nearly all of theState of Tennessee. West Virginia was in our hands; and that part ofold Virginia north of the Rapidan and east of the Blue Ridge we alsoheld. On the sea-coast we had Fortress Monroe and Norfolk in Virginia;Plymouth, Washington and New Berne in North Carolina; Beaufort, Follyand Morris islands, Hilton Head, Port Royal and Fort Pulaski in SouthCarolina and Georgia; Fernandina, St. Augustine, Key West and Pensacolain Florida. The balance of the Southern territory, an empire in extent,was still in the hands of the enemy.

Sherman, who had succeeded me in the command of the military division ofthe Mississippi, commanded all the troops in the territory west of theAlleghanies and north of Natchez, with a large movable force aboutChattanooga. His command was subdivided into four departments, but thecommanders all reported to Sherman and were subject to his orders. Thisarrangement, however, insured the better protection of all lines ofcommunication through the acquired territory, for the reason that thesedifferent department commanders could act promptly in case of a suddenor unexpected raid within their respective jurisdictions withoutawaiting the orders of the division commander.

In the East the opposing forces stood in substantially the samerelations towards each other as three years before, or when the warbegan; they were both between the Federal and Confederate capitals. Itis true, footholds had been secured by us on the sea-coast, in Virginiaand North Carolina, but, beyond that, no substantial advantage had beengained by either side. Battles had been fought of as great severity ashad ever been known in war, over ground from the James River andChickahominy, near Richmond, to Gettysburg and Chambersburg, inPennsylvania, with indecisive results, sometimes favorable to theNational army, sometimes to the Confederate army; but in every instance,I believe, claimed as victories for the South by the Southern press ifnot by the Southern generals. The Northern press, as a whole, did notdiscourage these claims; a portion of it always magnified rebel successand belittled ours, while another portion, most sincerely earnest intheir desire for the preservation of the Union and the overwhelmingsuccess of the Federal armies, would nevertheless generally expressdissatisfaction with whatever victories were gained because they werenot more complete.

That portion of the Army of the Potomac not engaged in guarding lines ofcommunication was on the northern bank of the Rapidan. The Army ofNorthern Virginia confronting it on the opposite bank of the same river,was strongly intrenched and commanded by the acknowledged ablest generalin the Confederate army. The country back to the James River is cut upwith many streams, generally narrow, deep, and difficult to cross exceptwhere bridged. The region is heavily timbered, and the roads narrow,and very bad after the least rain. Such an enemy was not, of course,unprepared with adequate fortifications at convenient intervals all theway back to Richmond, so that when driven from one fortified positionthey would always have another farther to the rear to fall back into.

To provision an army, campaigning against so formidable a foe throughsuch a country, from wagons alone seemed almost impossible. System anddiscipline were both essential to its accomplishment.

The Union armies were now divided into nineteen departments, though fourof them in the West had been concentrated into a single militarydivision. The Army of the Potomac was a separate command and had noterritorial limits. There were thus seventeen distinct commanders.Before this time these various armies had acted separately andindependently of each other, giving the enemy an opportunity often ofdepleting one command, not pressed, to reinforce another more activelyengaged. I determined to stop this. To this end I regarded the Army ofthe Potomac as the centre, and all west to Memphis along the linedescribed as our position at the time, and north of it, the right wing;the Army of the James, under General Butler, as the left wing, and allthe troops south, as a force in rear of the enemy. Some of these latterwere occupying positions from which they could not render serviceproportionate to their numerical strength. All such were depleted tothe minimum necessary to hold their positions as a guard againstblockade runners; where they could not do this their positions wereabandoned altogether. In this way ten thousand men were added to theArmy of the James from South Carolina alone, with General Gillmore incommand. It was not contemplated that General Gillmore should leave hisdepartment; but as most of his troops were taken, presumably for activeservice, he asked to accompany them and was permitted to do so.Officers and soldiers on furlough, of whom there were many thousands,were ordered to their proper commands; concentration was the order ofthe day, and to have it accomplished in time to advance at the earliestmoment the roads would permit was the problem.

As a reinforcement to the Army of the Potomac, or to act in support ofit, the 9th army corps, over twenty thousand strong, under GeneralBurnside, had been rendezvoused at Annapolis, Maryland. This was anadmirable position for such a reinforcement. The corps could be broughtat the last moment as a reinforcement to the Army of the Potomac, or itcould be thrown on the sea-coast, south of Norfolk, in Virginia or NorthCarolina, to operate against Richmond from that direction. In factBurnside and the War Department both thought the 9th corps was intendedfor such an expedition up to the last moment.

My general plan now was to concentrate all the force possible againstthe Confederate armies in the field. There were but two such, as wehave seen, east of the Mississippi River and facing north. The Army ofNorthern Virginia, General Robert E. Lee commanding, was on the southbank of the Rapidan, confronting the Army of the Potomac; the second,under General Joseph E. Johnston, was at Dalton, Georgia, opposed toSherman who was still at Chattanooga. Beside these main armies theConfederates had to guard the Shenandoah Valley, a great storehouse tofeed their armies from, and their line of communications from Richmondto Tennessee. Forrest, a brave and intrepid cavalry general, was in theWest with a large force; making a larger command necessary to hold whatwe had gained in Middle and West Tennessee. We could not abandon anyterritory north of the line held by the enemy because it would lay theNorthern States open to invasion. But as the Army of the Potomac wasthe principal garrison for the protection of Washington even while itwas moving on Lee, so all the forces to the west, and the Army of theJames, guarded their special trusts when advancing from them as well aswhen remaining at them. Better indeed, for they forced the enemy toguard his own lines and resources at a greater distance from ours, andwith a greater force. Little expeditions could not so well be sent outto destroy a bridge or tear up a few miles of railroad track, burn astorehouse, or inflict other little annoyances. Accordingly I arrangedfor a simultaneous movement all along the line. Sherman was to movefrom Chattanooga, Johnston's army and Atlanta being his objectivepoints. (*23) Crook, commanding in West Virginia, was to move from themouth of the Gauley River with a cavalry force and some artillery, theVirginia and Tennessee Railroad to be his objective. Either the enemywould have to keep a large force to protect their communications, or seethem destroyed and a large amount of forage and provision, which they somuch needed, fall into our hands. Sigel was in command in the Valley ofVirginia. He was to advance up the valley, covering the North from aninvasion through that channel as well while advancing as by remainingnear Harper's Ferry. Every mile he advanced also gave us possession ofstores on which Lee relied. Butler was to advance by the James River,having Richmond and Petersburg as his objective.

Before the advance commenced I visited Butler at Fort Monroe. This wasthe first time I had ever met him. Before giving him any order as tothe part he was to play in the approaching campaign I invited his views.They were very much such as I intended to direct, and as I did direct(*24), in writing, before leaving.

General W. F. Smith, who had been promoted to the rank of major-generalshortly after the battle of Chattanooga on my recommendation, had notyet been confirmed. I found a decided prejudice against hisconfirmation by a majority of the Senate, but I insisted that hisservices had been such that he should be rewarded. My wishes were nowreluctantly complied with, and I assigned him to the command of one ofthe corps under General Butler. I was not long in finding out that theobjections to Smith's promotion were well founded.

In one of my early interviews with the President I expressed mydissatisfaction with the little that had been accomplished by thecavalry so far in the war, and the belief that it was capable ofaccomplishing much more than it had done if under a thorough leader. Isaid I wanted the very best man in the army for that command. Halleckwas present and spoke up, saying: "How would Sheridan do?" I replied:"The very man I want." The President said I could have anybody I wanted.Sheridan was telegraphed for that day, and on his arrival was assignedto the command of the cavalry corps with the Army of the Potomac. Thisrelieved General Alfred Pleasonton. It was not a reflection on thatofficer, however, for I did not know but that he had been as efficientas any other cavalry commander.

Banks in the Department of the Gulf was ordered to assemble all thetroops he had at New Orleans in time to join in the general move, Mobileto be his objective.

At this time I was not entirely decided as to whether I should move theArmy of the Potomac by the right flank of the enemy, or by his left.Each plan presented advantages. (*25) If by his right--my left--thePotomac, Chesapeake Bay and tributaries would furnish us an easy haulingdistance of every position the army could occupy from the Rapidan to theJames River. But Lee could, if he chose, detach or move his whole armynorth on a line rather interior to the one I would have to take infollowing. A movement by his left--our right--would obviate this; butall that was done would have to be done with the supplies and ammunitionwe started with. All idea of adopting this latter plan was abandonedwhen the limited quantity of supplies possible to take with us wasconsidered. The country over which we would have to pass was soexhausted of all food or forage that we would be obliged to carryeverything with us.

While these preparations were going on the enemy was not entirely idle.In the West Forrest made a raid in West Tennessee up to the northernborder, capturing the garrison of four or five hundred men at UnionCity, and followed it up by an attack on Paducah, Kentucky, on the banksof the Ohio. While he was able to enter the city he failed to capturethe forts or any part of the garrison. On the first intelligence ofForrest's raid I telegraphed Sherman to send all his cavalry againsthim, and not to let him get out of the trap he had put himself into.Sherman had anticipated me by sending troops against him before he gotmy order.

Forrest, however, fell back rapidly, and attacked the troops at FortPillow, a station for the protection of the navigation of theMississippi River. The garrison consisted of a regiment of coloredtroops, infantry, and a detachment of Tennessee cavalry. These troopsfought bravely, but were overpowered. I will leave Forrest in hisdispatches to tell what he did with them.

"The river was dyed," he says, "with the blood of the slaughtered fortwo hundred yards. The approximate loss was upward of five hundredkilled, but few of the officers escaping. My loss was about twentykilled. It is hoped that these facts will demonstrate to the Northernpeople that negro soldiers cannot cope with Southerners." SubsequentlyForrest made a report in which he left out the part which shockshumanity to read.

At the East, also, the rebels were busy. I had said to Halleck thatPlymouth and Washington, North Carolina, were unnecessary to hold. Itwould be better to have the garrisons engaged there added to Butler'scommand. If success attended our arms both places, and others too,would fall into our hands naturally. These places had been occupied byFederal troops before I took command of the armies, and I knew that theExecutive would be reluctant to abandon them, and therefore explained myviews; but before my views were carried out the rebels captured thegarrison at Plymouth. I then ordered the abandonment of Washington, butdirected the holding of New Berne at all hazards. This was essentialbecause New Berne was a port into which blockade runners could enter.

General Banks had gone on an expedition up the Red River long before mypromotion to general command. I had opposed the movement strenuously,but acquiesced because it was the order of my superior at the time. Bydirection of Halleck I had reinforced Banks with a corps of about tenthousand men from Sherman's command. This reinforcement was wanted backbadly before the forward movement commenced. But Banks had got so farthat it seemed best that he should take Shreveport on the Red River, andturn over the line of that river to Steele, who commanded in Arkansas,to hold instead of the line of the Arkansas. Orders were givenaccordingly, and with the expectation that the campaign would be endedin time for Banks to return A. J. Smith's command to where it belongedand get back to New Orleans himself in time to execute his part in thegeneral plan. But the expedition was a failure. Banks did not get backin time to take part in the programme as laid down. Nor was Smithreturned until long after the movements of May, 1864, had been begun.The services of forty thousand veteran troops, over and above the numberrequired to hold all that was necessary in the Department of the Gulf,were thus paralyzed. It is but just to Banks, however, to say that hisexpedition was ordered from Washington and he was in no way responsibleexcept for the conduct of it. I make no criticism on this point. Heopposed the expedition.

By the 27th of April spring had so far advanced as to justify me infixing a day for the great move. On that day Burnside left Annapolis tooccupy Meade's position between Bull Run and the Rappahannock. Meadewas notified and directed to bring his troops forward to his advance.On the following day Butler was notified of my intended advance on the4th of May, and he was directed to move the night of the same day andget as far up the James River as possible by daylight, and push on fromthere to accomplish the task given him. He was also notified thatreinforcements were being collected in Washington City, which would beforwarded to him should the enemy fall back into the trenches atRichmond. The same day Sherman was directed to get his forces up readyto advance on the 5th. Sigel was in Winchester and was notified to movein conjunction with the others.

The criticism has been made by writers on the campaign from the Rapidanto the James River that all the loss of life could have been obviated bymoving the army there on transports. Richmond was fortified andintrenched so perfectly that one man inside to defend was more thanequal to five outside besieging or assaulting. To get possession ofLee's army was the first great object. With the capture of his armyRichmond would necessarily follow. It was better to fight him outsideof his stronghold than in it. If the Army of the Potomac had been movedbodily to the James River by water Lee could have moved a part of hisforces back to Richmond, called Beauregard from the south to reinforceit, and with the balance moved on to Washington. Then, too, I ordered amove, simultaneous with that of the Army of the Potomac, up the JamesRiver by a formidable army already collected at the mouth of the river.

While my headquarters were at Culpeper, from the 26th of March to the4th of May, I generally visited Washington once a week to confer withthe Secretary of War and President. On the last occasion, a few daysbefore moving, a circumstance occurred which came near postponing mypart in the campaign altogether. Colonel John S. Mosby had for a longtime been commanding a partisan corps, or regiment, which operated inthe rear of the Army of the Potomac. On my return to the field on thisoccasion, as the train approached Warrenton Junction, a heavy cloud ofdust was seen to the east of the road as if made by a body of cavalry ona charge. Arriving at the junction the train was stopped and inquiriesmade as to the cause of the dust. There was but one man at the station,and he informed us that Mosby had crossed a few minutes before at fullspeed in pursuit of Federal cavalry. Had he seen our train coming, nodoubt he would have let his prisoners escape to capture the train. Iwas on a special train, if I remember correctly, without any guard.

Since the close of the war I have come to know Colonel Mosby personally,and somewhat intimately. He is a different man entirely from what I hadsupposed. He is slender, not tall, wiry, and looks as if he couldendure any amount of physical exercise. He is able, and thoroughlyhonest and truthful. There were probably but few men in the South whocould have commanded successfully a separate detachment in the rear ofan opposing army, and so near the border of hostilities, as long as hedid without losing his entire command.

On this same visit to Washington I had my last interview with thePresident before reaching the James River. He had of course becomeacquainted with the fact that a general movement had been ordered allalong the line, and seemed to think it a new feature in war. Iexplained to him that it was necessary to have a great number of troopsto guard and hold the territory we had captured, and to preventincursions into the Northern States. These troops could perform thisservice just as well by advancing as by remaining still; and byadvancing they would compel the enemy to keep detachments to hold themback, or else lay his own territory open to invasion. His answer was:"Oh, yes! I see that. As we say out West, if a man can't skin he musthold a leg while somebody else does."

There was a certain incident connected with the Wilderness campaign ofwhich it may not be out of place to speak; and to avoid a digressionfurther on I will mention it here.

A few days before my departure from Culpeper the Honorable E. B.Washburne visited me there, and remained with my headquarters for somedistance south, through the battle in the Wilderness and, I think, toSpottsylvania. He was accompanied by a Mr. Swinton, whom he presented asa literary gentleman who wished to accompany the army with a view ofwriting a history of the war when it was over. He assured me--and Ihave no doubt Swinton gave him the assurance--that he was not present asa correspondent of the press. I expressed an entire willingness to havehim (Swinton) accompany the army, and would have allowed him to do so asa correspondent, restricted, however, in the character of theinformation he could give. We received Richmond papers with about asmuch regularity as if there had been no war, and knew that our paperswere received with equal regularity by the Confederates. It wasdesirable, therefore, that correspondents should not be privileged spiesof the enemy within our lines.

Probably Mr. Swinton expected to be an invited guest at my headquarters,and was disappointed that he was not asked to become so. At all eventshe was not invited, and soon I found that he was corresponding with somepaper (I have now forgotten which one), thus violating his word eitherexpressed or implied. He knew of the assurance Washburne had given asto the character of his mission. I never saw the man from the day ofour introduction to the present that I recollect. He accompanied us,however, for a time at least.

The second night after crossing the Rapidan (the night of the 5th ofMay) Colonel W. R. Rowley, of my staff, was acting as night officer atmy headquarters. A short time before midnight I gave him verbalinstructions for the night. Three days later I read in a Richmond papera verbatim report of these instructions.

A few nights still later (after the first, and possibly after thesecond, day's fighting in the Wilderness) General Meade came to my tentfor consultation, bringing with him some of his staff officers. Bothhis staff and mine retired to the camp-fire some yards in front of thetent, thinking our conversation should be private. There was a stump alittle to one side, and between the front of the tent and camp-fire.One of my staff, Colonel T. S. Bowers, saw what he took to be a manseated on the ground and leaning against the stump, listening to theconversation between Meade and myself. He called the attention ofColonel Rowley to it. The latter immediately took the man by theshoulder and asked him, in language more forcible than polite, what hewas doing there. The man proved to be Swinton, the "historian," and hisreplies to the question were evasive and unsatisfactory, and he waswarned against further eaves-dropping.

The next I heard of Mr. Swinton was at Cold Harbor. General Meade cameto my headquarters saying that General Burnside had arrested Swinton,who at some previous time had given great offence, and had ordered himto be shot that afternoon. I promptly ordered the prisoner to bereleased, but that he must be expelled from the lines of the army not toreturn again on pain of punishment.

CHAPTER XLVIII.

COMMENCEMENT OF THE GRAND CAMPAIGN--GENERAL BUTLER'S POSITION--SHERIDAN'S FIRST RAID.

The armies were now all ready to move for the accomplishment of a singleobject. They were acting as a unit so far as such a thing was possibleover such a vast field. Lee, with the capital of the Confederacy, wasthe main end to which all were working. Johnston, with Atlanta, was animportant obstacle in the way of our accomplishing the result aimed at,and was therefore almost an independent objective. It was of lessimportance only because the capture of Johnston and his army would notproduce so immediate and decisive a result in closing the rebellion aswould the possession of Richmond, Lee and his army. All other troopswere employed exclusively in support of these two movements. This wasthe plan; and I will now endeavor to give, as concisely as I can, themethod of its execution, outlining first the operations of minordetached but co-operative columns.

As stated before, Banks failed to accomplish what he had been sent to doon the Red River, and eliminated the use of forty thousand veteranswhose cooperation in the grand campaign had been expected--ten thousandwith Sherman and thirty thousand against Mobile.

Sigel's record is almost equally brief. He moved out, it is true,according to programme; but just when I was hoping to hear of good workbeing done in the valley I received instead the following announcementfrom Halleck: "Sigel is in full retreat on Strasburg. He will donothing but run; never did anything else." The enemy had interceptedhim about New Market and handled him roughly, leaving him short sixguns, and some nine hundred men out of his six thousand.

The plan had been for an advance of Sigel's forces in two columns.Though the one under his immediate command failed ingloriously the otherproved more fortunate. Under Crook and Averell his western columnadvanced from the Gauley in West Virginia at the appointed time, andwith more happy results. They reached the Virginia and TennesseeRailroad at Dublin and destroyed a depot of supplies, besides tearing upseveral miles of road and burning the bridge over New River. Havingaccomplished this they recrossed the Alleghanies to Meadow Bluffs andthere awaited further orders.

Butler embarked at Fort Monroe with all his command, except the cavalryand some artillery which moved up the south bank of the James River.His steamers moved first up Chesapeake Bay and York River as ifthreatening the rear of Lee's army. At midnight they turned back, andButler by daylight was far up the James River. He seized City Point andBermuda Hundred early in the day, without loss and, no doubt, very muchto the surprise of the enemy.

This was the accomplishment of the first step contemplated in myinstructions to Butler. He was to act from here, looking to Richmond ashis objective point. I had given him to understand that I should aim tofight Lee between the Rapidan and Richmond if he would stand; but shouldLee fall back into Richmond I would follow up and make a junction of thearmies of the Potomac and the James on the James River. He was directedto secure a footing as far up the south side of the river as he could atas early a date as possible.

Butler was in position by the 6th of May and had begun intrenching, andon the 7th he sent out his cavalry from Suffolk to cut the WeldonRailroad. He also sent out detachments to destroy the railroad betweenPetersburg and Richmond, but no great success attended these latterefforts. He made no great effort to establish himself on that road andneglected to attack Petersburg, which was almost defenceless. About the11th he advanced slowly until he reached the works at Drury's Bluff,about half way between Bermuda Hundred and Richmond. In the mean timeBeauregard had been gathering reinforcements. On the 16th he attackedButler with great vigor, and with such success as to limit verymaterially the further usefulness of the Army of the James as a distinctfactor in the campaign. I afterward ordered a portion of it to join theArmy of the Potomac, leaving a sufficient force with Butler to man hisworks, hold securely the footing he had already gained and maintain athreatening front toward the rear of the Confederate capital.

The position which General Butler had chosen between the two rivers, theJames and Appomattox, was one of great natural strength, one where alarge area of ground might be thoroughly inclosed by means of a singleintrenched line, and that a very short one in comparison with the extentof territory which it thoroughly protected. His right was protected bythe James River, his left by the Appomattox, and his rear by theirjunction--the two streams uniting near by. The bends of the two streamsshortened the line that had been chosen for intrenchments, while itincreased the area which the line inclosed.

Previous to ordering any troops from Butler I sent my chief engineer,General Barnard, from the Army of the Potomac to that of the James toinspect Butler's position and ascertain whether I could again safelymake an order for General Butler's movement in co-operation with mine,now that I was getting so near Richmond; or, if I could not, whether hisposition was strong enough to justify me in withdrawing some of histroops and having them brought round by water to White House to join meand reinforce the Army of the Potomac. General Barnard reported theposition very strong for defensive purposes, and that I could do thelatter with great security; but that General Butler could not move fromwhere he was, in co-operation, to produce any effect. He said that thegeneral occupied a place between the James and Appomattox rivers whichwas of great strength, and where with an inferior force he could hold itfor an indefinite length of time against a superior; but that he coulddo nothing offensively. I then asked him why Butler could not move outfrom his lines and push across the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad tothe rear and on the south side of Richmond. He replied that it wasimpracticable, because the enemy had substantially the same line acrossthe neck of land that General Butler had. He then took out his penciland drew a sketch of the locality, remarking that the position was likea bottle and that Butler's line of intrenchments across the neckrepresented the cork; that the enemy had built an equally strong lineimmediately in front of him across the neck; and it was therefore as ifButler was in a bottle. He was perfectly safe against an attack; but,as Barnard expressed it, the enemy had corked the bottle and with asmall force could hold the cork in its place. This struck me as beingvery expressive of his position, particularly when I saw the hastysketch which General Barnard had drawn; and in making my subsequentreport I used that expression without adding quotation marks, neverthinking that anything had been said that would attract attention--asthis did, very much to the annoyance, no doubt, of General Butler and, Iknow, very much to my own. I found afterwards that this was mentionedin the notes of General Badeau's book, which, when they were shown tome, I asked to have stricken out; yet it was retained there, thoughagainst my wishes.

I make this statement here because, although I have often made itbefore, it has never been in my power until now to place it where itwill correct history; and I desire to rectify all injustice that I mayhave done to individuals, particularly to officers who were gallantlyserving their country during the trying period of the war for thepreservation of the Union. General Butler certainly gave his veryearnest support to the war; and he gave his own best efforts personallyto the suppression of the rebellion.

The further operations of the Army of the James can best be treated ofin connection with those of the Army of the Potomac, the two being sointimately associated and connected as to be substantially one body inwhich the individuality of the supporting wing is merged.

Before giving the reader a summary of Sherman's great Atlanta campaign,which must conclude my description of the various co-operative movementspreparatory to proceeding with that of the operations of the centre, Iwill briefly mention Sheridan's first raid upon Lee's communicationswhich, though an incident of the operations on the main line and notspecifically marked out in the original plan, attained in its brilliantexecution and results all the proportions of an independent campaign.By thus anticipating, in point of time, I will be able to more perfectlyobserve the continuity of events occurring in my immediate front when Ishall have undertaken to describe our advance from the Rapidan.

On the 8th of May, just after the battle of the Wilderness and when wewere moving on Spottsylvania I directed Sheridan verbally to cut loosefrom the Army of the Potomac, pass around the left of Lee's army andattack his cavalry: to cut the two roads--one running west throughGordonsville, Charlottesville and Lynchburg, the other to Richmond, and,when compelled to do so for want of forage and rations, to move on tothe James River and draw these from Butler's supplies. This move tookhim past the entire rear of Lee's army. These orders were also given inwriting through Meade.

The object of this move was three-fold. First, if successfullyexecuted, and it was, he would annoy the enemy by cutting his line ofsupplies and telegraphic communications, and destroy or get for his ownuse supplies in store in the rear and coming up. Second, he would drawthe enemy's cavalry after him, and thus better protect our flanks, rearand trains than by remaining with the army. Third, his absence wouldsave the trains drawing his forage and other supplies fromFredericksburg, which had now become our base. He started at daylightthe next morning, and accomplished more than was expected. It wassixteen days before he got back to the Army of the Potomac.

The course Sheridan took was directly to Richmond. Before night Stuart,commanding the Confederate cavalry, came on to the rear of his command.But the advance kept on, crossed the North Anna, and at Beaver Dam, astation on the Virginia Central Railroad, recaptured four hundred Unionprisoners on their way to Richmond, destroyed the road and used anddestroyed a large amount of subsistence and medical stores.

Stuart, seeing that our cavalry was pushing towards Richmond, abandonedthe pursuit on the morning of the 10th and, by a detour and anexhausting march, interposed between Sheridan and Richmond at YellowTavern, only about six miles north of the city. Sheridan destroyed therailroad and more supplies at Ashland, and on the 11th arrived inStuart's front. A severe engagement ensued in which the losses wereheavy on both sides, but the rebels were beaten, their leader mortallywounded, and some guns and many prisoners were captured.

Sheridan passed through the outer defences of Richmond, and could, nodoubt, have passed through the inner ones. But having no supports nearhe could not have remained. After caring for his wounded he struck forthe James River below the city, to communicate with Butler and to resthis men and horses as well as to get food and forage for them.

He moved first between the Chickahominy and the James, but in themorning (the 12th) he was stopped by batteries at Mechanicsville. Hethen turned to cross to the north side of the Chickahominy by MeadowBridge. He found this barred, and the defeated Confederate cavalry,reorganized, occupying the opposite side. The panic created by hisfirst entrance within the outer works of Richmond having subsided troopswere sent out to attack his rear.

He was now in a perilous position, one from which but few generals couldhave extricated themselves. The defences of Richmond, manned, were tothe right, the Chickahominy was to the left with no bridge remaining andthe opposite bank guarded, to the rear was a force from Richmond. Thisforce was attacked and beaten by Wilson's and Gregg's divisions, whileSheridan turned to the left with the remaining division and hastilybuilt a bridge over the Chickahominy under the fire of the enemy, forceda crossing and soon dispersed the Confederates he found there. The enemywas held back from the stream by the fire of the troops not engaged inbridge building.

On the 13th Sheridan was at Bottom's Bridge, over the Chickahominy. Onthe 14th he crossed this stream and on that day went into camp on theJames River at Haxall's Landing. He at once put himself intocommunication with General Butler, who directed all the supplies hewanted to be furnished.

Sheridan had left the Army of the Potomac at Spottsylvania, but did notknow where either this or Lee's army was now. Great caution thereforehad to be exercised in getting back. On the 17th, after resting hiscommand for three days, he started on his return. He moved by the wayof White House. The bridge over the Pamunkey had been burned by theenemy, but a new one was speedily improvised and the cavalry crossedover it. On the 22d he was at Aylett's on the Matapony, where helearned the position of the two armies. On the 24th he joined us on themarch from North Anna to Cold Harbor, in the vicinity of Chesterfield.

Sheridan in this memorable raid passed entirely around Lee's army:encountered his cavalry in four engagements, and defeated them in all;recaptured four hundred Union prisoners and killed and captured many ofthe enemy; destroyed and used many supplies and munitions of war;destroyed miles of railroad and telegraph, and freed us from annoyanceby the cavalry of the enemy for more than two weeks.

CHAPTER XLIX.

SHERMAN'S CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA--SIEGE OF ATLANTA--DEATH OF GENERALMCPHERSON--ATTEMPT TO CAPTURE ANDERSONVILLE--CAPTURE OF ATLANTA.

After separating from Sherman in Cincinnati I went on to Washington, asalready stated, while he returned to Nashville to assume the duties ofhis new command. His military division was now composed of fourdepartments and embraced all the territory west of the AlleghanyMountains and east of the Mississippi River, together with the State ofArkansas in the trans-Mississippi. The most easterly of these was theDepartment of the Ohio, General Schofield commanding; the next was theDepartment of the Cumberland, General Thomas commanding; the third theDepartment of the Tennessee, General McPherson commanding; and GeneralSteele still commanded the trans-Mississippi, or Department of Arkansas.The last-named department was so far away that Sherman could notcommunicate with it very readily after starting on his spring campaign,and it was therefore soon transferred from his military division to thatof the Gulf, where General Canby, who had relieved General Banks, was incommand.

The movements of the armies, as I have stated in a former chapter, wereto be simultaneous, I fixing the day to start when the season should befar enough advanced, it was hoped, for the roads to be in a conditionfor the troops to march.

General Sherman at once set himself to work preparing for the task whichwas assigned him to accomplish in the spring campaign. McPherson lay atHuntsville with about twenty-four thousand men, guarding those points ofTennessee which were regarded as most worth holding; Thomas, with oversixty thousand men of the Army of the Cumberland, was at Chattanooga;and Schofield, with about fourteen thousand men, was at Knoxville. Withthese three armies, numbering about one hundred thousand men in all,Sherman was to move on the day fixed for the general advance, with aview of destroying Johnston's army and capturing Atlanta. He visitedeach of these commands to inform himself as to their condition, and itwas found to be, speaking generally, good.

One of the first matters to turn his attention to was that of getting,before the time arrived for starting, an accumulation of suppliesforward to Chattanooga, sufficiently large to warrant a movement. Hefound, when he got to that place, that the trains over the single-trackrailroad, which was frequently interrupted for a day or two at a time,were only sufficient to meet the daily wants of the troops withoutbringing forward any surplus of any kind. He found, however, thattrains were being used to transport all the beef cattle, horses for thecavalry, and even teams that were being brought to the front. He atonce changed all this, and required beef cattle, teams, cavalry horses,and everything that could travel, even the troops, to be marched, andused the road exclusively for transporting supplies. In this way he wasable to accumulate an abundance before the time finally fixed upon forthe move, the 4th of May.

As I have said already, Johnston was at Dalton, which was nearlyone-fourth of the way between Chattanooga and Atlanta. The country ismountainous all the way to Atlanta, abounding in mountain streams, someof them of considerable volume. Dalton is on ground where water drainstowards Atlanta and into one of the main streams rising north-east fromthere and flowing south-west--this being the general direction which allthe main streams of that section take, with smaller tributaries enteringinto them. Johnston had been preparing himself for this campaign duringthe entire winter. The best positions for defence had been selected allthe way from Dalton back to Atlanta, and very strongly intrenched; sothat, as he might be forced to fall back from one position, he wouldhave another to fall into in his rear. His position at Dalton was sovery strongly intrenched that no doubt he expected, or at least hoped,to hold Sherman there and prevent him from getting any further. With aless skilful general, and one disposed to take no risks, I have no doubtthat he would have succeeded.

Sherman's plan was to start Schofield, who was farthest back, a few daysin advance from Knoxville, having him move on the direct road to Dalton.Thomas was to move out to Ringgold. It had been Sherman's intention tocross McPherson over the Tennessee River at Huntsville or Decatur, andmove him south from there so as to have him come into the road runningfrom Chattanooga to Atlanta a good distance to the rear of the pointJohnston was occupying; but when that was contemplated it was hoped thatMcPherson alone would have troops enough to cope with Johnston, if thelatter should move against him while unsupported by the balance of thearmy. In this he was disappointed. Two of McPherson's veterandivisions had re-enlisted on the express provision that they were tohave a furlough. This furlough had not yet expired, and they were notback.

Then, again, Sherman had lent Banks two divisions under A. J. Smith, thewinter before, to co-operate with the trans-Mississippi forces, and thiswith the express pledge that they should be back by a time specified, soas to be prepared for this very campaign. It is hardly necessary to saythey were not returned. That department continued to absorb troops tono purpose to the end of the war. This left McPherson so weak that thepart of the plan above indicated had to be changed. He was thereforebrought up to Chattanooga and moved from there on a road to the right ofThomas--the two coming together about Dalton. The three armies wereabreast, all ready to start promptly on time.

Sherman soon found that Dalton was so strongly fortified that it wasuseless to make any attempt to carry it by assault; and even to carry itby regular approaches was impracticable. There was a narrowing up inthe mountain, between the National and Confederate armies, through whicha stream, a wagon road and a railroad ran. Besides, the stream had beendammed so that the valley was a lake. Through this gorge the troopswould have to pass. McPherson was therefore sent around by the right,to come out by the way of Snake Creek Gap into the rear of the enemy.This was a surprise to Johnston, and about the 13th he decided toabandon his position at Dalton.

On the 15th there was very hard fighting about Resaca; but our cavalryhaving been sent around to the right got near the road in the enemy'srear. Again Johnston fell back, our army pursuing. The pursuit wascontinued to Kingston, which was reached on the 19th with very littlefighting, except that Newton's division overtook the rear of Johnston'sarmy and engaged it. Sherman was now obliged to halt for the purpose ofbringing up his railroad trains. He was depending upon the railroad forall of his supplies, and as of course the railroad was wholly destroyedas Johnston fell back, it had to be rebuilt. This work was pushedforward night and day, and caused much less delay than most personswould naturally expect in a mountainous country where there were so manybridges to be rebuilt.

The campaign to Atlanta was managed with the most consummate skill, theenemy being flanked out of one position after another all the way there.It is true this was not accomplished without a good deal of fighting--some of it very hard fighting, rising to the dignity of very importantbattles--neither were single positions gained in a day. On thecontrary, weeks were spent at some; and about Atlanta more than a monthwas consumed.

It was the 23d of May before the road was finished up to the rear ofSherman's army and the pursuit renewed. This pursuit brought him up tothe vicinity of Allatoona. This place was very strongly intrenched, andnaturally a very defensible position. An assault upon it was not thoughtof, but preparations were made to flank the enemy out of it. This wasdone by sending a large force around our right, by the way of Dallas, toreach the rear of the enemy. Before reaching there, however, they foundthe enemy fortified in their way, and there resulted hard fighting forabout a week at a place called New Hope Church. On the left our troopsalso were fortified, and as close up to the enemy as they could get.They kept working still farther around to the left toward the railroad.This was the case more particularly with the cavalry. By the 4th ofJune Johnston found that he was being hemmed in so rapidly that he drewoff and Allatoona was left in our possession.

Allatoona, being an important place, was strongly intrenched foroccupation by our troops before advancing farther, and made a secondarybase of supplies. The railroad was finished up to that point, theintrenchments completed, storehouses provided for food, and the army gotin readiness for a further advance. The rains, however, were falling insuch torrents that it was impossible to move the army by the side roadswhich they would have to move upon in order to turn Johnston out of hisnew position.

While Sherman's army lay here, General F. P. Blair returned to it,bringing with him the two divisions of veterans who had been onfurlough.

Johnston had fallen back to Marietta and Kenesaw Mountain, where strongintrenchments awaited him. At this latter place our troops made anassault upon the enemy's lines after having got their own lines up closeto him, and failed, sustaining considerable loss. But during theprogress of the battle Schofield was gaining ground to the left; and thecavalry on his left were gaining still more toward the enemy's rear.These operations were completed by the 3d of July, when it was foundthat Johnston had evacuated the place. He was pursued at once. Shermanhad made every preparation to abandon the railroad, leaving a strongguard in his intrenchments. He had intended, moving out with twentydays' rations and plenty of ammunition, to come in on the railroad againat the Chattahoochee River. Johnston frustrated this plan by himselfstarting back as above stated. This time he fell back to theChattahoochee.

About the 5th of July he was besieged again, Sherman getting easypossession of the Chattahoochee River both above and below him. Theenemy was again flanked out of his position, or so frightened byflanking movements that on the night of the 9th he fell back across theriver.

Here Johnston made a stand until the 17th, when Sherman's old tacticsprevailed again and the final movement toward Atlanta began. Johnstonwas now relieved of the command, and Hood superseded him.

Johnston's tactics in this campaign do not seem to have met with muchfavor, either in the eyes of the administration at Richmond, or of thepeople of that section of the South in which he was commanding. Thevery fact of a change of commanders being ordered under suchcircumstances was an indication of a change of policy, and that now theywould become the aggressors--the very thing our troops wanted.

For my own part, I think that Johnston's tactics were right. Anythingthat could have prolonged the war a year beyond the time that it didfinally close, would probably have exhausted the North to such an extentthat they might then have abandoned the contest and agreed to aseparation.

Atlanta was very strongly intrenched all the way around in a circleabout a mile and a half outside of the city. In addition to this, therewere advanced intrenchments which had to be taken before a close siegecould be commenced.

Sure enough, as indicated by the change of commanders, the enemy wasabout to assume the offensive. On the 20th he came out and attacked theArmy of the Cumberland most furiously. Hooker's corps, and Newton's andJohnson's divisions were the principal ones engaged in this contest,which lasted more than an hour; but the Confederates were then forced tofall back inside their main lines. The losses were quite heavy on bothsides. On this day General Gresham, since our Postmaster-General, wasvery badly wounded. During the night Hood abandoned his outer lines,and our troops were advanced. The investment had not been relinquishedfor a moment during the day.

During the night of the 21st Hood moved out again, passing by our leftflank, which was then in motion to get a position farther in rear ofhim, and a desperate battle ensued, which lasted most of the day of the22d. At first the battle went very much in favor of the Confederates,our troops being somewhat surprised. While our troops were advancingthey were struck in flank, and their flank was enveloped. But they hadbecome too thorough veterans to be thrown into irreparable confusion byan unexpected attack when off their guard, and soon they were in orderand engaging the enemy, with the advantage now of knowing where theirantagonist was. The field of battle continued to expand until itembraced about seven miles of ground. Finally, however, and beforenight, the enemy was driven back into the city (*26).

It was during this battle that McPherson, while passing from one columnto another, was instantly killed. In his death the army lost one of itsablest, purest and best generals.

Garrard had been sent out with his cavalry to get upon the railroad eastof Atlanta and to cut it in the direction of Augusta. He was successfulin this, and returned about the time of the battle. Rousseau had alsocome up from Tennessee with a small division of cavalry, having crossedthe Tennessee River about Decatur and made a raid into Alabama. Finally,when hard pressed, he had come in, striking the railroad in rear ofSherman, and reported to him about this time.

The battle of the 22d is usually known as the Battle of Atlanta,although the city did not fall into our hands until the 2d of September.Preparations went on, as before, to flank the enemy out of his position.The work was tedious, and the lines that had to be maintained were verylong. Our troops were gradually worked around to the east until theystruck the road between Decatur and Atlanta. These lines were stronglyfortified, as were those to the north and west of the city--all as closeup to the enemy's lines as practicable--in order to hold them with thesmallest possible number of men, the design being to detach an army tomove by our right and try to get upon the railroad down south ofAtlanta.

On the 27th the movement by the right flank commenced. On the 28th theenemy struck our right flank, General Logan commanding, with greatvigor. Logan intrenched himself hastily, and by that means was enabledto resist all assaults and inflict a great deal of damage upon theenemy. These assaults were continued to the middle of the afternoon,and resumed once or twice still later in the day. The enemy's losses inthese unsuccessful assaults were fearful.

During that evening the enemy in Logan's front withdrew into the town.This now left Sherman's army close up to the Confederate lines,extending from a point directly east of the city around by the north andwest of it for a distance of fully ten miles; the whole of this linebeing intrenched, and made stronger every day they remained there.

In the latter part of July Sherman sent Stoneman to destroy therailroads to the south, about Macon. He was then to go east and, ifpossible, release our prisoners about Andersonville. There were painfulstories current at the time about the great hardships these prisonershad to endure in the way of general bad treatment, in the way in whichthey were housed, and in the way in which they were fed. Great sympathywas felt for them; and it was thought that even if they could be turnedloose upon the country it would be a great relief to them. But theattempt proved a failure. McCook, who commanded a small brigade, wasfirst reported to have been captured; but he got back, having inflicteda good deal of damage upon the enemy. He had also taken some prisoners;but encountering afterwards a largely superior force of the enemy he wasobliged to drop his prisoners and get back as best he could with whatmen he had left. He had lost several hundred men out of his smallcommand. On the 4th of August Colonel Adams, commanding a littlebrigade of about a thousand men, returned reporting Stoneman and all buthimself as lost. I myself had heard around Richmond of the capture ofStoneman, and had sent Sherman word, which he received. The rumor wasconfirmed there, also, from other sources. A few days after ColonelAdams's return Colonel Capron also got in with a small detachment andconfirmed the report of the capture of Stoneman with something less thana thousand men.

It seems that Stoneman, finding the escape of all his force wasimpossible, had made arrangements for the escape of two divisions. Hecovered the movement of these divisions to the rear with a force ofabout seven hundred men, and at length surrendered himself and thisdetachment to the commanding Confederate. In this raid, however, muchdamage was inflicted upon the enemy by the destruction of cars,locomotives, army wagons, manufactories of military supplies, etc.

On the 4th and 5th Sherman endeavored to get upon the railroad to ourright, where Schofield was in command, but these attempts failedutterly. General Palmer was charged with being the cause of thisfailure, to a great extent, by both General Sherman and GeneralSchofield; but I am not prepared to say this, although a question seemsto have arisen with Palmer as to whether Schofield had any right tocommand him. If he did raise this question while an action was goingon, that act alone was exceedingly reprehensible.

About the same time Wheeler got upon our railroad north of Resaca anddestroyed it nearly up to Dalton. This cut Sherman off fromcommunication with the North for several days. Sherman responded tothis attack on his lines of communication by directing one upon theirs.

Kilpatrick started on the night of the 18th of August to reach the Maconroad about Jonesboro. He succeeded in doing so, passed entirely aroundthe Confederate lines of Atlanta, and was back again in his formerposition on our left by the 22d. These little affairs, however,contributed but very little to the grand result. They annoyed, it istrue, but any damage thus done to a railroad by any cavalry expeditionis soon repaired.

Sherman made preparations for a repetition of his tactics; that is, fora flank movement with as large a force as could be got together to somepoint in the enemy's rear. Sherman commenced this last movement on the25th of August, and on the 1st of September was well up towards therailroad twenty miles south of Atlanta. Here he found Hardeeintrenched, ready to meet him. A battle ensued, but he was unable todrive Hardee away before night set in. Under cover of the night,however, Hardee left of his own accord. That night Hood blew up hismilitary works, such as he thought would be valuable in our hands, anddecamped.

The next morning at daylight General H. W. Slocum, who was commandingnorth of the city, moved in and took possession of Atlanta, and notifiedSherman. Sherman then moved deliberately back, taking three days toreach the city, and occupied a line extending from Decatur on the leftto Atlanta in the centre, with his troops extending out of the city forsome distance to the right.

The campaign had lasted about four months, and was one of the mostmemorable in history. There was but little if anything in the wholecampaign, now that it is over, to criticise at all, and nothing tocriticise severely. It was creditable alike to the general whocommanded and the army which had executed it. Sherman had on thiscampaign some bright, wide-awake division and brigade commanders whosealertness added a host to the efficiency of his command.

The troops now went to work to make themselves comfortable, and to enjoya little rest after their arduous campaign. The city of Atlanta wasturned into a military base. The citizens were all compelled to leave.Sherman also very wisely prohibited the assembling of the army ofsutlers and traders who always follow in the wake of an army in thefield, if permitted to do so, from trading with the citizens and gettingthe money of the soldiers for articles of but little use to them, andfor which they are made to pay most exorbitant prices. He limited thenumber of these traders to one for each of his three armies.

The news of Sherman's success reached the North instantaneously, and setthe country all aglow. This was the first great political campaign forthe Republicans in their canvass of 1864. It was followed later bySheridan's campaign in the Shenandoah Valley; and these two campaignsprobably had more effect in settling the election of the followingNovember than all the speeches, all the bonfires, and all the paradingwith banners and bands of music in the North.

CHAPTER L.

GRAND MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC--CROSSING THE RAPIDAN--ENTERING THE WILDERNESS--BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS.

Soon after midnight, May 3d-4th, the Army of the Potomac moved out fromits position north Rapidan, to start upon that memorable campaign,destined to result in the capture of the Confederate capital and thearmy defending it. This was not to be accomplished, however, without asdesperate fighting as the world has ever witnessed; not to beconsummated in a day, a week, a month, single season. The lossesinflicted, and endured, were destined to be severe; but the armies nowconfronting each other had already been in deadly conflict for a periodof three years, with immense losses in killed, by death from sickness,captured and wounded; and neither had made any real progressaccomplishing the final end. It is true the Confederates had, so far,held their capital, and they claimed this to be their sole object. Butpreviously they had boldly proclaimed their intention to capturePhiladelphia, New York, and the National Capital, and had made severalattempts to do so, and once or twice had come fearfully near makingtheir boast good--too near for complacent contemplation by the loyalNorth. They had also come near losing their own capital on at least oneoccasion. So here was a stand-off. The campaign now begun was destinedto result in heavier losses, to both armies, in a given time, than anypreviously suffered; but the carnage was to be limited to a single year,and to accomplish all that had been anticipated or desired at thebeginning in that time. We had to have hard fighting to achieve this.The two armies had been confronting each other so long, without anydecisive result, that they hardly knew which could whip.

Ten days' rations, with a supply of forage and ammunition were taken inwagons. Beef cattle were driven with the trains, and butchered aswanted. Three days rations in addition, in haversacks, and fifty roundsof cartridges, were carried on the person of each soldier.

The country over which the army had to operate, from the Rapidan to thecrossing of the James River, is rather flat, and is cut by numerousstreams which make their way to the Chesapeake Bay. The crossings ofthese streams by the army were generally made not far above tide-water,and where they formed a considerable obstacle to the rapid advance oftroops even when the enemy did not appear in opposition. The countryroads were narrow and poor. Most of the country is covered with a denseforest, in places, like the Wilderness and along the Chickahominy,almost impenetrable even for infantry except along the roads. Allbridges were naturally destroyed before the National troops came tothem.

The Army of the Potomac was composed of three infantry and one cavalrycorps, commanded respectively by Generals W. S. Hancock, G. K. Warren,(*27) John Sedgwick and P. H. Sheridan. The artillery was commanded byGeneral Henry J. Hunt. This arm was in such abundance that the fourthof it could not be used to advantage in such a country as we weredestined to pass through. The surplus was much in the way, taking up asit did so much of the narrow and bad roads, and consuming so much of theforage and other stores brought up by the trains.

The 5th corps, General Warren commanding, was in advance on the right,and marched directly for Germania Ford, preceded by one division ofcavalry, under General J. H. Wilson. General Sedgwick followed Warrenwith the 6th corps. Germania Ford was nine or ten miles below the rightof Lee's line. Hancock, with the 2d corps, moved by another road,farther east, directly upon Ely's Ford, six miles below Germania,preceded by Gregg's division of cavalry, and followed by the artillery.Torbert's division of cavalry was left north of the Rapidan, for thetime, to picket the river and prevent the enemy from crossing andgetting into our rear. The cavalry seized the two crossings beforedaylight, drove the enemy's pickets guarding them away, and by sixo'clock A.M. had the pontoons laid ready for the crossing of theinfantry and artillery. This was undoubtedly a surprise to Lee. Thefact that the movement was unopposed proves this.

Burnside, with the 9th corps, was left back at Warrenton, guarding therailroad from Bull Run forward to preserve control of it in case ourcrossing the Rapidan should be long delayed. He was instructed, however,to advance at once on receiving notice that the army had crossed; and adispatch was sent to him a little after one P.M. giving the informationthat our crossing had been successful.

The country was heavily wooded at all the points of crossing,particularly on the south side of the river. The battle-field from thecrossing of the Rapidan until the final movement from the Wildernesstoward Spottsylvania was of the same character. There were someclearings and small farms within what might be termed the battle-field;but generally the country was covered with a dense forest. The roadswere narrow and bad. All the conditions were favorable for defensiveoperations.

There are two roads, good for that part of Virginia, running from OrangeCourt House to the battle-field. The most southerly of these roads isknown as the Orange Court House Plank Road, the northern one as theOrange Turnpike. There are also roads from east of the battle-fieldrunning to Spottsylvania Court House, one from Chancellorsville,branching at Aldrich's; the western branch going by Piney Branch Church,Alsop's, thence by the Brock Road to Spottsylvania; the east branch goesby Gates's, thence to Spottsylvania. The Brock Road runs from GermaniaFord through the battle-field and on to the Court House. AsSpottsylvania is approached the country is cut up with numerous roads,some going to the town direct, and others crossing so as to connect thefarms with roads going there.

Lee's headquarters were at Orange Court House. From there toFredericksburg he had the use of the two roads above described runningnearly parallel to the Wilderness. This gave him unusual facilities,for that country, for concentrating his forces to his right. Theseroads strike the road from Germania Ford in the Wilderness.

As soon as the crossing of the infantry was assured, the cavalry pushedforward, Wilson's division by Wilderness Tavern to Parker's store, onthe Orange Plank Road; Gregg to the left towards Chancellorsville.Warren followed Wilson and reached the Wilderness Tavern by noon, tookposition there and intrenched. Sedgwick followed Warren. He was acrossthe river and in camp on the south bank, on the right of Warren, bysundown. Hancock, with the 2d corps, moved parallel with Warren andcamped about six miles east of him. Before night all the troops, and bythe evening of the 5th the trains of more than four thousand wagons,were safely on the south side of the river.

There never was a corps better organized than was the quartermaster'scorps with the Army of the Potomac in 1864. With a wagon-train thatwould have extended from the Rapidan to Richmond, stretched along insingle file and separated as the teams necessarily would be when moving,we could still carry only three days' forage and about ten to twelvedays' rations, besides a supply of ammunition. To overcome alldifficulties, the chief quartermaster, General Rufus Ingalls, had markedon each wagon the corps badge with the division color and the number ofthe brigade. At a glance, the particular brigade to which any wagonbelonged could be told. The wagons were also marked to note thecontents: if ammunition, whether for artillery or infantry; if forage,whether grain or hay; if rations, whether, bread, pork, beans, rice,sugar, coffee or whatever it might be. Empty wagons were never allowedto follow the army or stay in camp. As soon as a wagon was empty itwould return to the base of supply for a load of precisely the samearticle that had been taken from it. Empty trains were obliged to leavethe road free for loaded ones. Arriving near the army they would beparked in fields nearest to the brigades they belonged to. Issues,except of ammunition, were made at night in all cases. By this systemthe hauling of forage for the supply train was almost wholly dispensedwith. They consumed theirs at the depots.

I left Culpeper Court House after all the troops had been put in motion,and passing rapidly to the front, crossed the Rapidan in advance ofSedgwick's corps; and established headquarters for the afternoon andnight in a deserted house near the river.

Orders had been given, long before this movement began, to cut down thebaggage of officers and men to the lowest point possible.Notwithstanding this I saw scattered along the road from Culpeper toGermania Ford wagon-loads of new blankets and overcoats, thrown away bythe troops to lighten their knapsacks; an improvidence I had neverwitnessed before.

Lee, while his pickets and signal corps must have discovered at a veryearly hour on the morning of the 4th of May, that the Army of thePotomac was moving, evidently did not learn until about one o'clock inthe afternoon by what route we would confront his army. This I judgefrom the fact that at 1.15 P.M., an hour and a quarter after Warren hadreached Old Wilderness Tavern, our officers took off rebel signalswhich, when translated, were seen to be an order to his troops to occupytheir intrenchments at Mine Run.

Here at night dispatches were received announcing that Sherman, Butlerand Crook had moved according to programme.

On discovering the advance of the Army of the Potomac, Lee ordered Hill,Ewell and Longstreet, each commanding corps, to move to the right toattack us, Hill on the Orange Plank Road, Longstreet to follow on thesame road. Longstreet was at this time--middle of the afternoon--atGordonsville, twenty or more miles away. Ewell was ordered by theOrange Pike. He was near by and arrived some four miles east of MineRun before bivouacking for the night.

My orders were given through General Meade for an early advance on themorning of the 5th. Warren was to move to Parker's store, and Wilson'scavalry--then at Parker's store--to move on to Craig's meeting-house.Sedgwick followed Warren, closing in on his right. The Army of thePotomac was facing to the west, though our advance was made to thesouth, except when facing the enemy. Hancock was to move south-westwardto join on the left of Warren, his left to reach to Shady Grove Church.

At six o'clock, before reaching Parker's store, Warren discovered theenemy. He sent word back to this effect, and was ordered to halt andprepare to meet and attack him. Wright, with his division of Sedgwick'scorps, was ordered, by any road he could find, to join on to Warren'sright, and Getty with his division, also of Sedgwick's corps, wasordered to move rapidly by Warren's rear and get on his left. This wasthe speediest way to reinforce Warren who was confronting the enemy onboth the Orange plank and turnpike roads.

Burnside had moved promptly on the 4th, on receiving word that the Armyof the Potomac had safely crossed the Rapidan. By making a night march,although some of his troops had to march forty miles to reach the river,he was crossing with the head of his column early on the morning of the5th. Meade moved his headquarters on to Old Wilderness Tavern, fourmiles south of the river, as soon as it was light enough to see theroad. I remained to hasten Burnside's crossing and to put him inposition. Burnside at this time was not under Meade's command, and washis senior in rank. Getting information of the proximity of the enemy,I informed Meade, and without waiting to see Burnside, at once movedforward my headquarters to where Meade was.

It was my plan then, as it was on all other occasions, to take theinitiative whenever the enemy could be drawn from his intrenchments ifwe were not intrenched ourselves. Warren had not yet reached the pointwhere he was to halt, when he discovered the enemy near by. Neitherparty had any advantage of position. Warren was, therefore, ordered toattack as soon as he could prepare for it. At nine o'clock Hancock wasordered to come up to the support of Getty. He himself arrived atGetty's front about noon, but his troops were yet far in the rear.Getty was directed to hold his position at all hazards until relieved.About this hour Warren was ready, and attacked with favorable though notdecisive results. Getty was somewhat isolated from Warren and was in aprecarious condition for a time. Wilson, with his division of cavalry,was farther south, and was cut off from the rest of the army. At twoo'clock Hancock's troops began to arrive, and immediately he was orderedto join Getty and attack the enemy. But the heavy timber and narrowroads prevented him from getting into position for attack as promptly ashe generally did when receiving such orders. At four o'clock he againreceived his orders to attack, and General Getty received orders fromMeade a few minutes later to attack whether Hancock was ready or not.He met the enemy under Heth within a few hundred yards.

Hancock immediately sent two divisions, commanded by Birney and Mott,and later two brigades, Carroll's and Owen's, to the support of Getty.This was timely and saved Getty. During the battle Getty and Carrollwere wounded, but remained on the field. One of Birney's most gallantbrigade commanders--Alexander Hays--was killed.

I had been at West Point with Hays for three years, and had served withhim through the Mexican war, a portion of the time in the same regiment.He was a most gallant officer, ready to lead his command whereverordered. With him it was "Come, boys," not "Go."

Wadsworth's division and Baxter's brigade of the 2d division were sentto reinforce Hancock and Getty; but the density of the interveningforest was such that, there being no road to march upon, they did notget up with the head of column until night, and bivouacked where theywere without getting into position.

During the afternoon Sheridan sent Gregg's division of cavalry to Todd'sTavern in search of Wilson. This was fortunate. He found Wilsonengaged with a superior force under General Rosser, supported byinfantry, and falling back before it. Together they were strong enoughto turn the tables upon the enemy and themselves become aggressive.They soon drove the rebel cavalry back beyond Corbin's Bridge.

Fighting between Hancock and Hill continued until night put a close toit. Neither side made any special progress.

After the close of the battle of the 5th of May my orders were given forthe following morning. We knew Longstreet with 12,000 men was on hisway to join Hill's right, near the Brock Road, and might arrive duringthe night. I was anxious that the rebels should not take the initiativein the morning, and therefore ordered Hancock to make an assault at 4.30o'clock. Meade asked to have the hour changed to six. Deferring to hiswishes as far as I was willing, the order was modified and five wasfixed as the hour to move.

Hancock had now fully one-half of the Army of the Potomac. Wadsworthwith his division, which had arrived the night before, lay in a lineperpendicular to that held by Hill, and to the right of Hancock. He wasdirected to move at the same time, and to attack Hill's left.

Burnside, who was coming up with two divisions, was directed to get inbetween Warren and Wadsworth, and attack as soon as he could get inposition to do so. Sedgwick and Warren were to make attacks in theirfront, to detain as many of the enemy as they could and to takeadvantage of any attempt to reinforce Hill from that quarter. Burnsidewas ordered if he should succeed in breaking the enemy's centre, toswing around to the left and envelop the right of Lee's army. Hancockwas informed of all the movements ordered.

Burnside had three divisions, but one of them--a colored division--wassent to guard the wagon train, and he did not see it again until July.

Lee was evidently very anxious that there should be no battle on hisright until Longstreet got up. This is evident from the fact thatnotwithstanding the early hour at which I had ordered the assault, bothfor the purpose of being the attacking party and to strike beforeLongstreet got up, Lee was ahead in his assault on our right. Hispurpose was evident, but he failed.

Hancock was ready to advance by the hour named, but learning in timethat Longstreet was moving a part of his corps by the Catharpin Road,thus threatening his left flank, sent a division of infantry, commandedby General Barlow, with all his artillery, to cover the approaches bywhich Longstreet was expected. This disposition was made in time toattack as ordered. Hancock moved by the left of the Orange Plank Road,and Wadsworth by the right of it. The fighting was desperate for aboutan hour, when the enemy began to break up in great confusion.

I believed then, and see no reason to change that opinion now, that ifthe country had been such that Hancock and his command could have seenthe confusion and panic in the lines of the enemy, it would have beentaken advantage of so effectually that Lee would not have made anotherstand outside of his Richmond defences.

Gibbon commanded Hancock's left, and was ordered to attack, but was notable to accomplish much.

On the morning of the 6th Sheridan was sent to connect with Hancock'sleft and attack the enemy's cavalry who were trying to get on our leftand rear. He met them at the intersection of the Furnace and Brockroads and at Todd's Tavern, and defeated them at both places. Later hewas attacked, and again the enemy was repulsed.

Hancock heard the firing between Sheridan and Stuart, and thinking theenemy coming by that road, still further reinforced his positionguarding the entrance to the Brock Road. Another incident happenedduring the day to further induce Hancock to weaken his attacking column.Word reached him that troops were seen moving towards him from thedirection of Todd's Tavern, and Brooke's brigade was detached to meetthis new enemy; but the troops approaching proved to be several hundredconvalescents coming from Chancellorsville, by the road Hancock hadadvanced upon, to join their respective commands. At 6.50 o'clock A.M.,Burnside, who had passed Wilderness Tavern at six o'clock, was orderedto send a division to the support of Hancock, but to continue with theremainder of his command in the execution of his previous order. Thedifficulty of making a way through the dense forests prevented Burnsidefrom getting up in time to be of any service on the forenoon of thesixth.

Hancock followed Hill's retreating forces, in the morning, a mile ormore. He maintained this position until, along in the afternoon,Longstreet came upon him. The retreating column of Hill meetingreinforcements that had not yet been engaged, became encouraged andreturned with them. They were enabled, from the density of the forest,to approach within a few hundred yards of our advance before beingdiscovered. Falling upon a brigade of Hancock's corps thrown to theadvance, they swept it away almost instantly. The enemy followed up hisadvantage and soon came upon Mott's division, which fell back in greatconfusion. Hancock made dispositions to hold his advanced position, butafter holding it for a time, fell back into the position that he hadheld in the morning, which was strongly intrenched. In this engagementthe intrepid Wadsworth while trying to rally his men was mortallywounded and fell into the hands of the enemy. The enemy followed up,but made no immediate attack.

The Confederate General Jenkins was killed and Longstreet seriouslywounded in this engagement. Longstreet had to leave the field, not toresume command for many weeks. His loss was a severe one to Lee, andcompensated in a great measure for the mishap, or misapprehensions,which had fallen to our lot during the day.

After Longstreet's removal from the field Lee took command of his rightin person. He was not able, however, to rally his men to attackHancock's position, and withdrew from our front for the purpose ofreforming. Hancock sent a brigade to clear his front of all remnantsthat might be left of Longstreet's or Hill's commands. This brigadehaving been formed at right angles to the intrenchments held byHancock's command, swept down the whole length of them from left toright. A brigade of the enemy was encountered in this move; but itbroke and disappeared without a contest.

Firing was continued after this, but with less fury. Burnside had notyet been able to get up to render any assistance. But it was now onlyabout nine in the morning, and he was getting into position on Hancock'sright.

At 4.15 in the afternoon Lee attacked our left. His line moved up towithin a hundred yards of ours and opened a heavy fire. This status wasmaintained for about half an hour. Then a part of Mott's division andWard's brigade of Birney's division gave way and retired in disorder.The enemy under R. H. Anderson took advantage of this and pushed throughour line, planting their flags on a part of the intrenchments not onfire. But owing to the efforts of Hancock, their success was buttemporary. Carroll, of Gibbon's division, moved at a double quick withhis brigade and drove back the enemy, inflicting great loss. Fightinghad continued from five in the morning sometimes along the whole line,at other times only in places. The ground fought over had varied inwidth, but averaged three-quarters of a mile. The killed, and many ofthe severely wounded, of both armies, lay within this belt where it wasimpossible to reach them. The woods were set on fire by the burstingshells, and the conflagration raged. The wounded who had not strengthto move themselves were either suffocated or burned to death. Finallythe fire communicated with our breastworks, in places. Beingconstructed of wood, they burned with great fury. But the battle stillraged, our men firing through the flames until it became too hot toremain longer.

Lee was now in distress. His men were in confusion, and his personalefforts failed to restore order. These facts, however, were learnedsubsequently, or we would have taken advantage of his condition and nodoubt gained a decisive success. His troops were withdrawn now, but Irevoked the order, which I had given previously to this assault, forHancock to attack, because his troops had exhausted their ammunition anddid not have time to replenish from the train, which was at somedistance.

Burnside, Sedgwick, and Warren had all kept up an assault during allthis time; but their efforts had no other effect than to prevent theenemy from reinforcing his right from the troops in their front.

I had, on the 5th, ordered all the bridges over the Rapidan to be takenup except one at Germania Ford.

The troops on Sedgwick's right had been sent to enforce our left. Thisleft our right in danger of being turned, and us of being cut off fromall present base of supplies. Sedgwick had refused his right andintrenched it for protection against attack. But late in the afternoonof the 6th Early came out from his lines in considerable force and gotin upon Sedgwick's right, notwithstanding the precautions taken, andcreated considerable confusion. Early captured several hundredprisoners, among them two general officers. The defence, however, wasvigorous; and night coming on, the enemy was thrown into as muchconfusion as our troops, engaged, were. Early says in his Memoirs thatif we had discovered the confusion in his lines we might have broughtfresh troops to his great discomfort. Many officers, who had not beenattacked by Early, continued coming to my headquarters even afterSedgwick had rectified his lines a little farther to the rear, with newsof the disaster, fully impressed with the idea that the enemy waspushing on and would soon be upon me.

During the night all of Lee's army withdrew within their intrenchments.On the morning of the 7th General Custer drove the enemy's cavalry fromCatharpin Furnace to Todd's Tavern. Pickets and skirmishers were sentalong our entire front to find the position of the enemy. Some went asfar as a mile and a half before finding him. But Lee showed nodisposition to come out of his Works. There was no battle during theday, and but little firing except in Warren's front; he being directedabout noon to make a reconnoissance in force. This drew some sharpfiring, but there was no attempt on the part of Lee to drive him back.This ended the Battle of the Wilderness.

CHAPTER LI.

AFTER THE BATTLE--TELEGRAPH AND SIGNAL SERVICE--MOVEMENT BY THE LEFTFLANK.

More desperate fighting has not been witnessed on this continent thanthat of the 5th and 6th of May. Our victory consisted in havingsuccessfully crossed a formidable stream, almost in the face of anenemy, and in getting the army together as a unit. We gained anadvantage on the morning of the 6th, which, if it had been followed up,must have proven very decisive. In the evening the enemy gained anadvantage; but was speedily repulsed. As we stood at the close, the twoarmies were relatively in about the same condition to meet each other aswhen the river divided them. But the fact of having safely crossed wasa victory.

Our losses in the Wilderness were very severe. Those of theConfederates must have been even more so; but I have no means ofspeaking with accuracy upon this point. The Germania Ford bridge wastransferred to Ely's Ford to facilitate the transportation of thewounded to Washington.

It may be as well here as elsewhere to state two things connected withall movements of the Army of the Potomac: first, in every change ofposition or halt for the night, whether confronting the enemy or not,the moment arms were stacked the men intrenched themselves. For thispurpose they would build up piles of logs or rails if they could befound in their front, and dig a ditch, throwing the dirt forward on thetimber. Thus the digging they did counted in making a depression tostand in, and increased the elevation in front of them. It waswonderful how quickly they could in this way construct defences ofconsiderable strength. When a halt was made with the view of assaultingthe enemy, or in his presence, these would be strengthened or theirpositions changed under the direction of engineer officers. The secondwas, the use made of the telegraph and signal corps. Nothing could bemore complete than the organization and discipline of this body of braveand intelligent men. Insulated wires--insulated so that they wouldtransmit messages in a storm, on the ground or under water--were woundupon reels, making about two hundred pounds weight of wire to each reel.Two men and one mule were detailed to each reel. The pack-saddle onwhich this was carried was provided with a rack like a sawbuck placedcrosswise of the saddle, and raised above it so that the reel, with itswire, would revolve freely. There was a wagon, supplied with atelegraph operator, battery and telegraph instruments for each division,each corps, each army, and one for my headquarters. There were wagonsalso loaded with light poles, about the size and length of a wall tentpole, supplied with an iron spike in one end, used to hold the wires upwhen laid, so that wagons and artillery would not run over them. Themules thus loaded were assigned to brigades, and always kept with thecommand they were assigned to. The operators were also assigned toparticular headquarters, and never changed except by special orders.

The moment the troops were put in position to go into camp all the menconnected with this branch of service would proceed to put up theirwires. A mule loaded with a coil of wire would be led to the rear ofthe nearest flank of the brigade he belonged to, and would be led in aline parallel thereto, while one man would hold an end of the wire anduncoil it as the mule was led off. When he had walked the length of thewire the whole of it would be on the ground. This would be done in rearof every brigade at the same time. The ends of all the wires would thenbe joined, making a continuous wire in the rear of the whole army. Themen, attached to brigades or divisions, would all commence at onceraising the wires with their telegraph poles. This was done by making aloop in the wire and putting it over the spike and raising the pole to aperpendicular position. At intervals the wire would be attached totrees, or some other permanent object, so that one pole was sufficientat a place. In the absence of such a support two poles would have to beused, at intervals, placed at an angle so as to hold the wire firm inits place. While this was being done the telegraph wagons would taketheir positions near where the headquarters they belonged to were to beestablished, and would connect with the wire. Thus, in a few minuteslonger time than it took a mule to walk the length of its coil,telegraphic communication would be effected between all the headquartersof the army. No orders ever had to be given to establish the telegraph.

The signal service was used on the march. The men composing this corpswere assigned to specified commands. When movements were made, theywould go in advance, or on the flanks, and seize upon high points ofground giving a commanding view of the country, if cleared, or wouldclimb tall trees on the highest points if not cleared, and would denote,by signals, the positions of different parts of our own army, and oftenthe movements of the enemy. They would also take off the signals of theenemy and transmit them. It would sometimes take too long a time tomake translations of intercepted dispatches for us to receive anybenefit from them. But sometimes they gave useful information.

On the afternoon of the 7th I received news from Washington announcingthat Sherman had probably attacked Johnston that day, and that Butlerhad reached City Point safely and taken it by surprise on the 5th. Ihad given orders for a movement by the left flank, fearing that Leemight move rapidly to Richmond to crush Butler before I could get there.

My order for this movement was as follows:

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE U. S., May 7, 1864, 6.30 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE, Commanding A. P.

Make all preparations during the day for a night march to take positionat Spottsylvania C. H. with one army corps, at Todd's Tavern with one,and another near the intersection of the Piney Branch and Spottsylvaniaroad with the road from Alsop's to Old Court House. If this move ismade the trains should be thrown forward early in the morning to the NyRiver.

I think it would be advisable in making the change to leave Hancockwhere he is until Warren passes him. He could then follow and becomethe right of the new line. Burnside will move to Piney Branch Church.Sedgwick can move along the pike to Chancellorsville and on to hisdestination. Burnside will move on the plank road to the intersectionof it with the Orange and Fredericksburg plank road, then followSedgwick to his place of destination.

All vehicles should be got out of hearing of the enemy before the troopsmove, and then move off quietly.

It is more than probable that the enemy concentrate for a heavy attackon Hancock this afternoon. In case they do we must be prepared toresist them, and follow up any success we may gain, with our wholeforce. Such a result would necessarily modify these instructions.

All the hospitals should be moved to-day to Chancellorsville.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

During the 7th Sheridan had a fight with the rebel cavalry at Todd'sTavern, but routed them, thus opening the way for the troops that wereto go by that route at night. Soon after dark Warren withdrew from thefront of the enemy, and was soon followed by Sedgwick. Warren's marchcarried him immediately behind the works where Hancock's command lay onthe Brock Road. With my staff and a small escort of cavalry I precededthe troops. Meade with his staff accompanied me. The greatestenthusiasm was manifested by Hancock's men as we passed by. No doubt itwas inspired by the fact that the movement was south. It indicated tothem that they had passed through the "beginning of the end" in thebattle just fought. The cheering was so lusty that the enemy must havetaken it for a night attack. At all events it drew from him a furiousfusillade of artillery and musketry, plainly heard but not felt by us.

Meade and I rode in advance. We had passed but a little way beyond ourleft when the road forked. We looked to see, if we could, which roadSheridan had taken with his cavalry during the day. It seemed to be theright-hand one, and accordingly we took it. We had not gone far,however, when Colonel C. B. Comstock, of my staff, with the instinct ofthe engineer, suspecting that we were on a road that would lead us intothe lines of the enemy, if he, too, should be moving, dashed by at arapid gallop and all alone. In a few minutes he returned and reportedthat Lee was moving, and that the road we were on would bring us intohis lines in a short distance. We returned to the forks of the road,left a man to indicate the right road to the head of Warren's columnwhen it should come up, and continued our journey to Todd's Tavern,where we arrived after midnight.

My object in moving to Spottsylvania was two-fold: first, I did notwant Lee to get back to Richmond in time to attempt to crush Butlerbefore I could get there; second, I wanted to get between his army andRichmond if possible; and, if not, to draw him into the open field. ButLee, by accident, beat us to Spottsylvania. Our wagon trains had beenordered easterly of the roads the troops were to march upon before themovement commenced. Lee interpreted this as a semi-retreat of the Armyof the Potomac to Fredericksburg, and so informed his government.Accordingly he ordered Longstreet's corps--now commanded by Anderson--tomove in the morning (the 8th) to Spottsylvania. But the woods beingstill on fire, Anderson could not go into bivouac, and marched directlyon to his destination that night. By this accident Lee got possessionof Spottsylvania. It is impossible to say now what would have been theresult if Lee's orders had been obeyed as given; but it is certain thatwe would have been in Spottsylvania, and between him and his capital.My belief is that there would have been a race between the two armies tosee which could reach Richmond first, and the Army of the Potomac wouldhave had the shorter line. Thus, twice since crossing the Rapidan wecame near closing the campaign, so far as battles were concerned, fromthe Rapidan to the James River or Richmond. The first failure wascaused by our not following up the success gained over Hill's corps onthe morning of the 6th, as before described: the second, when firescaused by that battle drove Anderson to make a march during the night ofthe 7th-8th which he was ordered to commence on the morning of the 8th.But accident often decides the fate of battle.

Sheridan's cavalry had had considerable fighting during the afternoon ofthe 7th, lasting at Todd's Tavern until after night, with the field hisat the close. He issued the necessary orders for seizing Spottsylvaniaand holding the bridge over the Po River, which Lee's troops would haveto cross to get to Spottsylvania. But Meade changed Sheridan's ordersto Merritt--who was holding the bridge--on his arrival at Todd's Tavern,and thereby left the road free for Anderson when he came up. Wilson,who was ordered to seize the town, did so, with his division of cavalry;but he could not hold it against the Confederate corps which had notbeen detained at the crossing of the Po, as it would have been but forthe unfortunate change in Merritt's orders. Had he been permitted toexecute the orders Sheridan gave him, he would have been guarding withtwo brigades of cavalry the bridge over the Po River which Anderson hadto cross, and must have detained him long enough to enable Warren toreinforce Wilson and hold the town.

Anderson soon intrenched himself--if indeed the intrenchments were notalready made--immediately across Warren's front. Warren was not aware ofhis presence, but probably supposed it was the cavalry which Merritt hadengaged earlier in the day. He assaulted at once, but was repulsed. Hesoon organized his men, as they were not pursued by the enemy, and madea second attack, this time with his whole corps. This time he succeededin gaining a position immediately in the enemy's front, where heintrenched. His right and left divisions--the former Crawford's, thelatter Wadsworth's, now commanded by Cutler--drove the enemy back somedistance.

At this time my headquarters had been advanced to Piney Branch Church.I was anxious to crush Anderson before Lee could get a force to hissupport. To this end Sedgwick who was at Piney Branch Church, wasordered to Warren's support. Hancock, who was at Todd's Tavern, wasnotified of Warren's engagement, and was directed to be in readiness tocome up. Burnside, who was with the wagon trains at Aldrich's on ourextreme left, received the same instructions. Sedgwick was slow ingetting up for some reason--probably unavoidable, because he was neverat fault when serious work was to be done--so that it was near nightbefore the combined forces were ready to attack. Even then all ofSedgwick's command did not get into the engagement. Warren led the lastassault, one division at a time, and of course it failed.

Warren's difficulty was twofold: when he received an order to doanything, it would at once occur to his mind how all the balance of thearmy should be engaged so as properly to co-operate with him. His ideaswere generally good, but he would forget that the person giving himorders had thought of others at the time he had of him. In like manner,when he did get ready to execute an order, after giving most intelligentinstructions to division commanders, he would go in with one division,holding the others in reserve until he could superintend their movementsin person also, forgetting that division commanders could execute anorder without his presence. His difficulty was constitutional andbeyond his control. He was an officer of superior ability, quickperceptions, and personal courage to accomplish anything that could bedone with a small command.

Lee had ordered Hill's corps--now commanded by Early--to move by thevery road we had marched upon. This shows that even early in themorning of the 8th Lee had not yet become acquainted with my move, butstill thought that the Army of the Potomac had gone to Fredericksburg.Indeed, he informed the authorities at Richmond he had possession ofSpottsylvania and was on my flank. Anderson was in possession ofSpottsylvania, through no foresight of Lee, however. Early only foundthat he had been following us when he ran against Hancock at Todd'sTavern. His coming detained Hancock from the battle-field ofSpottsylvania for that day; but he, in like manner, kept Early back andforced him to move by another route.

Had I ordered the movement for the night of the 7th by my left flank, itwould have put Hancock in the lead. It would also have given us an houror earlier start. It took all that time for Warren to get the head ofhis column to the left of Hancock after he had got his troops out oftheir line confronting the enemy. This hour, and Hancock's capacity touse his whole force when necessary, would, no doubt, have enabled him tocrush Anderson before he could be reinforced. But the movement made wastactical. It kept the troops in mass against a possible assault by theenemy. Our left occupied its intrenchments while the two corps to theright passed. If an attack had been made by the enemy he would havefound the 2d corps in position, fortified, and, practically, the 5th and6th corps in position as reserves, until his entire front was passed.By a left flank movement the army would have been scattered while stillpassing the front of the enemy, and before the extreme right had got byit would have been very much exposed. Then, too, I had not yet learnedthe special qualifications of the different corps commanders. At thattime my judgment was that Warren was the man I would suggest to succeedMeade should anything happen to that gallant soldier to take him fromthe field. As I have before said, Warren was a gallant soldier, an ableman; and he was beside thoroughly imbued with the solemnity andimportance of the duty he had to perform.