By Tai Wei Lim

Terrorism and Geopolitics in South Asia

2016 has proven to be a busy year thus far for
diplomats of the major world powers as they flew into South Asia’s capitals to
cut deals and cooperate in combating terrorism as well as extending areas of
cooperation with geopolitical implications. The US, China, France and the de
facto dominant power in the region, India, have all been extremely active
recently in shaping the future of the region with summit meetings between their
leaders, and foreign ministers’ gatherings on the subcontinent. This year, as
early as January, France was one of the first major powers to begin big power
diplomacy in South Asia, way before the series of unfortunate and cruel
terrorist attacks that were unleashed in Western Europe in the summer.

French President Francois Hollande was the guest
of honor at India’s Republic Day, the day of independence and pride for India,
the largest and most influential player in the South Asian region. France has
always been known as an independent power, often autonomous in its approach to
world affairs, with its Gaullist geopolitical distance from other non-European
large powers. France has invested its resources substantially into building a
united Europe with its German counterpart and other Western European states to
prevent world wars from happening on the continent again (ironically, this
dream faced the challenge of Brexit this year). When the leaders of the two
countries met, France and India quickly agreed on a common worldview for the
future security of the Indian Ocean, a maritime region that some Indian
nationalists consider as the country’s own backyard. Against the backdrop of a
grand military parade, the two countries appeared to have agreed on engaging in
more naval manoeuvres.

They also agreed to cooperate on counterterrorism
measures. Hollande declared he would strike the Islamic State (IS) harder to
defeat extremism (the IS extremists later struck the French a few months later
on Bastille Day). India faced its own extremist challenge when one of its
air-force bases was attacked by terrorists a little while before Hollande’s
visit. Both countries have faced blitzkrieg simultaneous attacks at a number of
locations (in India’s case Mumbai and the air force facility) in an
IS-preferred pattern that alternated with lone wolf attacks in other countries
recently. The two countries called on Pakistan (a staunch Chinese ally) to
contribute more combat troops to fight terrorism and extremism in the region.

In a pattern that would repeat throughout the
summer of 2016, France cut business deals (involving the advanced jet fighter
Rafale in this case) in India while discussing geopolitics and antiterrorism
measures. Other major powers like the US and China followed suit in a similar
pattern with geopolitical and counterterrorism concerns mixed with economic
business when they dealt with South Asian states a few months later. France’s
deal is significant as India has of late become one of the world’s largest arms
importers and an Indian deal could create a large number of jobs for French
workers and European industries. The French faced stiff competition from
American military subcontractors that offered highly-competitive deals that
apparently included an offer to relocate F-16 manufacturing facilities from the
US to India. This was a move that could change the balance of power since
India’s rival Pakistan uses F-16s as one of its main jet fighters.

In June 2016, another major power, Japan, held a
joint naval exercise with its Indian and US counterparts. Previously, in the
first administration of Japanese PM Abe Shinzo, there was an intention to
establish closer relations with India in an envisioned “arc of democracy” that would
link up all the democratic countries in the Asian region. The annual exercise
was originally a bilateral one between the US and India that started in 1992
and, in 2016, Japan joined for the first time. The combined Indian, American
and Japanese fleet sailed out of a Japanese naval base together. Guided missile
destroyers, aircraft carriers, submarine hunters, and submarines were involved
in this naval exercise that visited the ports of a number of traditional US
allies including the Philippines and South Korea, and also called on ports of traditional
Indian friends including Russia. The other countries that the participants
called on were Vietnam and Malaysia.

If China succeeds in
gearing Yunnan for a southern approach, then it effectively has pincer-like
economic corridors moving into South Asia when paired off with Pakistan in the
north.

In July 2016, another European power made its
move on India, offering a deal that could change the face of maritime
geopolitics in the region. A group of military-industrial complex officials
from Russia visited India in July 2016. Russia offered India joint
developmental opportunities through the Storm aircraft carrier project. India
has aspirations to develop its own nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, given its
ambitions to achieve supremacy or at least some form of dominance in the Indian
Ocean. Russia had previously helped the Indians refurbish an old Soviet carrier
into a usable vessel and they therefore could build on their previous
experiences (both positive exchanges and setbacks) for the next Indian carrier
project.

However, the South Asian giant appears to have
an alternative option which is the possibility of developing this carrier with
the US instead of Russia. The Indians are apparently attracted to US
cooperation due to the American’s aircraft catapult system technology. This is
perceived to be a superior form of aircraft launch technology compared to the
ski-jump type which Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning and British through-deck
cruisers use. Aircraft carriers appear to be a power projection tool of choice for
large powers in Asia. Besides Russian and Indian carrier projects, Japan has
three new helicopter carriers including the Hyuga while China is practising
manoeuvres on its refurbished Ukrainian carrier Liaoning with ambitions of
setting up its own carrier fleet or task force. China is reportedly building
its second carrier.

The summer month of August 2016 ushered in the
de facto hyperpower and another large Asian player to the sub-continent in a
burst of activities. The US is probably the most important player flying into
the region to talk with regional leaders about the challenges of terrorism. US
Secretary of State John Kerry flew into Bangladesh with an eye on cooperation
over anti-terrorist measures. Terrorists in that country had recently killed
foreigners in a café. The US was also concerned with regional affairs related
to the interest of the largest power in that region — India. Kerry was
interested in talking about peace deals in the Kashmiri region, a location in
dispute between India and Pakistan. Currently Kashmir acts as a buffer zone
between the two rival regional powers in South Asia. Recent clashes had taken
place in this buffer zone and the Americans were concerned about human rights
issues related to such tensions. Like the French and the Russians, the US also
had an economic agenda. Kerry hoped to secure more economic cooperation with
his Indian counterparts as he led a group of government officials and Commerce
Secretary to New Delhi.

At about the same time, China renewed its push into
South Asia. Beijing reached out to Nepal based on the One Belt One Road (OBOR)
policy. Some media sources highlighted Nepal’s (governed by Maoist elements in
power) supposed desire to play a new balancing role between China and India.
Besides Nepal, the Foreign Ministers of China and Bhutan met with each other to
talk about future ties and cooperation. Further southeast of the region,
Myanmar’s Foreign Minister also recently visited Beijing to talk about the
stalled dam project and China’s possible mediating role in negotiations between
Myanmar’s government and rebel forces, some of whom are ethnic Chinese or, at
times, have had access to Chinese authorities.

Besides this flurry of activities, there was also
talk about Beijing revitalizing its approach to South Asia through provinces like
Yunnan that share common boundaries. Yunnan is a component of the
Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) initiative. If China succeeds in gearing
Yunnan for a southern approach to South Asia, then it effectively has
pincer-like economic corridors moving into South Asia when paired off with its established
cooperation with Pakistan (a loyal Chinese ally known as “ironclad brother”) in
the north. India, the regional hegemonic power, appears to favor a highway that
can link Kolkata with Yunnan through the BCIM platform. A number of think tank
platforms and trade fairs have emerged to strengthen BCIM potentialities.

In conclusion, South Asia has emerged as an area
of big power rivalry as well as cooperation. It appears counterterrorism
measures are ranking as high as geopolitical agendas in large power diplomacy
in that region. But large powers and their enterprises are pragmatic in mixing
business deals with political talk, with an eye on the lucrative commercial
potential of South Asian states, particularly in the areas of military weapons
sales (directly linked to the geopolitical and counterterrorism aspects), trade
augmentation, and large infrastructure projects.