Recognition - Multinational recognition

A multinational approach to recognition has been observable since the
mid-1930s. The Declaration of the Principles of Inter-American Solidarity
and Confederation (1936) proscribed both the recognition of territorial
conquest through violence and the intervention by one state in the
internal or external affairs of another. When it appeared that the Axis
powers might seek to acquire the American possessions of European nations
they had overrun, the Act of Havana (1940) stated that those possessions
would be placed under the provisional administration of the American
republics. In 1943 it was suggested that the countries of the Western
Hemisphere that had declared war or broken relations with the Axis powers
should not, for the duration of the war, recognize governments created by
force in Latin America without prior consultation among themselves.

In the Atlantic Charter (August 1941) the United States and the United
Kingdom declared their desire "to see no territorial changes that
would not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people
concerned," and sought respect for "the right of all peoples
to choose the form of government under which they will live." The
Crimean Charter of the Yalta Conference suggested the admission of
democratic procedures in the determination of governments in countries
liberated from Axis control; those governments should then be recognized
collectively following consultations by the Allied powers. The Charter of
the United Nations states: "All Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state" and
bars from membership any state unwilling to carry out its international
obligations. For example, Francisco Franco's Spain was barred. The
United Nations has thus sought to substitute for unilateral recognition a
collective decision whether a state seeking membership is a
"peace-loving state" able and willing to carry out the
obligations of the charter, hence deserving of recognition. The question
of whether the nationhood of a people is better determined by the United
Nations or by the several states nevertheless remains moot.

In a rare case, an international organization has practiced
nonrecognition. Despite sympathy for Fidel Castro among left-wing Latin
American groups, the Organization of American States condemned
Castro's denial of popular liberty in Cuba, his attempts to make
his island a launching pad for Soviet missiles, and his exporting of
communism to neighboring nations. In 1964 it voted economic sanctions
against him and barred official relations with Havana to all its members,
thereby technically rescinding recognition. Since 1974, however, six major
and several minor Latin American states have violated the ban, and in 1975
the United States relaxed its trade restrictions. Presidents Richard Nixon
and Gerald Ford and their secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, declined to
recognize Castro on terms he proposed, but President Jimmy Carter sought a
rapprochement. The United States in 2000 did not recognize Castro but
permitted the sale to him of foods and medicines and a limited amount of
American tourism to Cuba.

West Germany, strongly supported by the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, tried for many years to avoid a "two-Germany"
concept by threatening economic sanctions and breaking diplomatic
relations with third states that recognized East Germany, which was fully
recognized by the communist world but denied representation in most
international organizations. It was not until September 1974 that the
United States sent an ambassador, John Sherman Cooper, to East Germany.
Both Taiwan and Beijing (capital of the People's Republic of
China), under the Mao Doctrine of 1949, refuse to deal with any third
power that has recognized the other as the government of all of China.
Taiwan maintains that the communist government of Beijing does not enjoy
the support of its people, while Beijing insists that Taiwan is an
inseparable part of Chinese territory. The issue is confused because some
states that recognize Beijing also recognize Taiwan as de facto. Although
some states, like France, broke relations with Taiwan after recognizing
Beijing, the long-held idea that both Chinas could not be represented in
the same international organizations gave way when Beijing was admitted to
the United Nations in 1972, and Taiwan was ejected as a member of its
Security Council.

From 1 October 1949, when the People's Republic of China was
formed, until 1972, the United States refused to recognize it and also
tried to keep it out of the United Nations because it lacked the character
of a "peace-loving" nation, proved unwilling to abide by
international regulations, and might replace Taiwan on the UN Security
Council. Other considerations included U.S. unwillingness to dishonor its
commitments to Taiwan by rescinding recognition; fear that the
"domino theory," starting with Taiwan, would work its way
through Southeast Asia; Chinese intervention in Korea and support for
North Vietnam; the bombing of the islands of Matsu and Quemoy (1958);
Beijing's brutal takeover of Tibet (1959) and attack on India
(1962); the seizure of American property without compensation,
mistreatment of American citizens, and implementation of a "Hate
America" campaign; and the repression of democratic reforms at home
and denial of liberty to its people. Moreover, the dictatorship threatened
to spread communist doctrine by war rather than follow methods of peaceful
coexistence, and its recognition would increase its power and prestige.

Among the reasons for a change of decision were President Nixon's
desire to achieve a historic diplomatic victory; the conclusion that
Taiwan could never recover mainland China; the effective de facto
character of a government controlling some 800 million people; its
military, including atomic power; its serving as a buffer against the
Soviets; the absence in its government of the bribery, graft, and
corruption that had characterized the prerevolutionary Chiang Kai-shek
regime; and its recognition not only by Britain, France, and West Germany
but also by most of the nations of the Third World. With a large number of
"developing" nations in the United Nations that favored
Beijing over Taipei (Taiwan's capital) and were critical of
America's role as the "world's policeman," it
was clear that Beijing would be admitted to the United Nations. By a vote
of 76 to 65 it was admitted on 25 October 1971.

The United States had begun to thaw the frigid Sino-American relations in
1969 by relaxing some trade and travel restrictions. In April 1971,
Beijing invited American Ping-Pong players to visit China. Nixon then
began to gradually abolish all trade restrictions and let it be known that
Beijing would receive him. To this end, he secretly sent his adviser on
national security affairs, Henry Kissinger, to speak with Premier Chou
En-lai and others and arrange for an eight-day presidential visit in late
February 1972. The joint communiqué issued stressed the national
interests of the parties, but Nixon said he would remove his troops from
Taiwan. Chou En-lai predicted that normalization of relations would follow
enlarged contacts. With Sino-American diplomatic relations reestablished,
other nations had to adjust to the new situation. Australia, New Zealand,
Malaysia, and eventually other Southeast Asia states jumped on the
bandwagon. While liaison offices were opened in Beijing and Washington, it
was not until 15 December 1978 that, after several months of secret
meetings, President Jimmy Carter announced that the United States and
China had agreed to establish diplomatic relations on 1 January 1979 and
that they would exchange ambassadors and establish embassies on 1 March.
Further, the United States would maintain commercial and unofficial
relations with Taiwan and sell it materials needed to keep its defenses
operating but would terminate the mutual defense treaty of 1954. While
some in Congress regarded the agreement as "selling Taiwan down the
river" and others as a "historical inevitability,"
China said that returning Taiwan to mainland control would be an
"internal" problem.