In 1902,
Minister of Defence Forrest appointed Major-General Edward
Hutton as the army's first, and only, General Officer
Commanding. Hutton, an imperial officer, had considerable
experience with colonial troops, including having served as
the Commander of the New South Wales military forces from 1893
to 1896.

"The most
essential element in the organisation of the future is to
provide a Military System which shall be elastic, capable of
expansion, and which shall form a carefully constructed
framework into which the fighting material can be fitted when
the emergency arises". Edward
Hutton

Colonel
Henry (Harry) Finn DCM. Hutton's 2nd in Command

Colonel Henry (Harry) Finn DCM (later CB)
(1852-1924) wearing the buttons of the 21st (Empress of India)
Lancers, his British Army regiment, and medal ribbons for the
Afghanistan 1878-80 Medal, Distinguished Conduct Medal, Sudan
1896-97 Medal, and Khedive's Sudan 1896-1905 Medal. The mourning
band on the left arm is probably for the death of Queen
Victoria. In 1899 he accompanied his unit to Newbridge,
Ireland.

Three months later he was offered and accepted
the post of Commandant of the Queensland
Defence Force. He was subsequently offered the post of Commandant
in New South Wales at the rank of brigadier general,
which post he commenced on 1 January 1902. In terms of seniority
he was second in command of the
Commonwealth Military Forces after the arrival in 1902 of
Major General Sir Edward Hutton as general officer commanding.
In 1904 he was granted brevet rank of colonel in the British
Army, and in 1905 he was given local and temporary rank of major
general. In 1907 he was appointed CB on his retirement from the
army.

From FEDERATION
to WORLD WAR 1

On 1 March 190 1,
in accordance with the terms of the Commonwealth's Constitution,
the Governor-General transferred control of the nation's
military forces from the States to the Federal Government. By
this action the Australian Army came into existence.
Technically, the new Australian nation, whose creation predated
the federalisation of the army by two months, was in a state of
war, as it also inherited the military commitments of the
colonial governments that had dispatched troops to South Africa
and China.

However, these
troops were not Australia's real army. They were volunteers who
had answered Britain's call, and had come to the aid of the
Empire, as others before them had assisted the mother country in
Sudan and New Zealand. The proper Australian Army, composed of
permanent forces, militia, and volunteers, who had remained
behind to guard the continent, were soldiers of the former
colonies, and they too passed under federal control.

Reflecting
their disparate origins, these forces were a mix of units
represented by different organisations, terms of engagement,
levels of efficiency, and standards of equipment.

With its assumption of military responsibility, the Commonwealth
Government needed to provide for a continuous defence policy,
the efficient control of the military forces, and to introduce
homogeneous organisation and training` The value in reaching
these goals was simple; a nation's possession of a properly
organised military force in peace would greatly ease the
attainment of the army's objectives in war. Furthermore, an
efficiently trained army would free commanders from the
necessity of devoting their energies upon mobilisation towards
organisation, in lieu of the planning and conduct of operations.

Therefore, a
nation with an army that was ready for war would have a great
advantage over an opponent that still had to organise its units?
During the period from Federation until the outbreak of World
War 1, the government, along with the army's leaders, would
establish the policies and structures that would determine the
Commonwealth's ability to utilise military force until well into
the post World War 11 period.

However,
these years would also reveal a number of enduring impediments
to the development of an efficient force, impediments that would
also have a considerable impact on the future well-being of the
army. This era, therefore, represents a crucial period in the
development of the Australian Army.

The inheritance

It fell to John
Forrest, hastily appointed by Prime Minister Edmund Barton as
the Commonwealth's second Minister for Defence upon the death of
his predecessor after only nine days in office, to begin the
work of creating an efficient military force. Complicating his
task was the absence of a commander-in-chief and the lack of
federal legislation to govern the defence forces. Forrest did
not appoint a General Officer Commanding until the next year,
and Parliament did not pass a Defence Act until 1903. In the
meantime the troops remained subject to the different defence
codes of their respective states, themselves hold-overs of
colonial statutes. The army also subdivided the nation into six
administrative regions called, military districts, one for each
State, under the command of a commandant. Each military district
was named after the State in which it was located. These
regional commands were simply a federalised version of the
former headquarters of the colonial armies. Each military
district was responsible for the command and administration of
the units within its region. With the arrival of a General
Officer Commanding, the commandants of the military districts
became subordinate to his authority.

At the time of
transfer, the Australian Army had a strength of just over
29,000. The colonies had divided their forces into three
categories-Permanent, Militia, and Volunteers-a distinction that
the Commonwealth maintained.

Strength
of the Australian Army at Federation, by State

State

Permanent

Militia

Volunteers

Total

New
South Wales

669

5,549

3,493

9,711

Victoria

443

33554

2,602

6,599

Queensland

301

4,053

654

5,008

South
Australia (inc NT)

51

2,949

nil

3,000

Western
Australia

50

nil

2,235

2,285

Tasmania

30

nil

2,377

2,407

Total/s

1,544

16,105

11,361

29,010

The nation had, as well
as these troops, a potential reserve in the form of the rifle
clubs and the school cadet corps. Although they were not an
official part of the defence forces at takeover, they did
formally join the army's establishment with the passage of the
Defence Act 1903. At Federation, the rifle clubs and cadets had
a membership of more than 30,000 and 10,000 respectively.

Establishment
Of cadet corps and rifle clubs, 1901

States

Senior
cadets

Junior
cadets

Rifle
club members

New
South Wales

109

4,242

1,908

Victoria

483

5,259

21,570

Queensland

101

916

4,352

South
Australia (inc NT)

155

nil

2,180

Western
Australia

180

240

nil

Tasmania

nil

216

nil

Total/s

1,028

10,873

30,010

While not forming a part
of the army's organisation, thousands of other Australians were
on active duty with the British Army in South Africa. The
majority of these soldiers had enlisted in units raised by the
colonial governments, and only the final contingent was a
federal matter. In late 1901, Joseph Chamberlain, Britain's
Secretary of State for the Colonies, asked Barton if Australia
could provide further drafts for the empire's war effort.

Within five
months, Australia enlisted and embarked over 4,200 volunteers,
organised into eight battalions of mounted infantry called the
Australian Commonwealth Horse. However, half of the battalions
arrived in Africa after the conclusion of hostilities, and only
two of the eight saw any action.

Thus, while
the Commonwealth Horse were the nation's first truly Australian
military units to serve overseas, their limited experience left
only a minimal mark on the army's history and tradition.

Although
Australia possessed a large military establishment, its quality,
particularly its degree of training and standard of equipment,
was poor. As one of his first acts as Minister for Defence,
Forrest appointed a Federal Military Committee, composed of the
commandants of the military districts, to undertake an
appreciation of Australian defence infrastructure. Their report
revealed severe problems.

Of particular concern
was the low stock of ammunition held by the States, of which the
worst case was Victoria, which had reserves of only 17 rounds
per rifle. By comparison, the Colonial Defence Committee in
London recommended a minimum reserve of 1,000 rounds per rifle.
The field artillery, the military commandants noted, had in its
inventory unserviceable guns, guns without carriages, and
carriages without guns, as well as obsolete ammunition. The
supply of submarine mining stores was out of date, and over the
years the States had followed a haphazard procurement policy, so
that there were few replacement parts.

The organisation of the
services also came under scrutiny. New South Wales was the only
state with an ordnance store depot and a medical department set
up as military units. In Queensland, South Australia, and
Western Australia the local governments had made no provision
for an army service corps, and the last two States did not have
an engineering corps. Last, despite the army's reliance upon
horses for transport, none of the states had a veterinary
department.

In 1902, Forrest appointed
Major-General Edward Hutton as the army's first, and only,
General Officer Commanding. Hutton, an imperial officer, had
considerable experience with colonial troops, including having
served as the commander of the New South Wales military forces
from 1893 to 1896. One of his first tasks was to assess the
equipment held by the army. While he found the materials
available to the garrison force sufficient for static troops, he
observed that what was available for the field force leaves much
to be desired'.

He wrote that in all the
States there was a nearly complete absence of modern infantry
equipment, including the supply of magazine rifles, and that the
ammunition stores were in a seriously defective condition.
Hutton described the materials for the mounted troops and field
artillery as incomplete and unequal to modern demands. Last, he
considered the quantity of supplies available to the field
engineers and field hospital as inadequate. Hutton concluded his
assessment with the warning that troops without efficient and
sufficient arms, ammunition, and equipment are useless for the
purpose for which they exist, and are therefore a mischievous
delusion'.'

The coast defence
system also suffered from grave equipment and infrastructure
deficiencies. Between the six States there were five different
fire-control systems, including two types in New South Wales.
Guns and equipment were in poor condition, and included
unserviceable pieces. A report on the defences at Albany by
Major V.L Beer, the Commanding Officer Western Australian
Artillery, highlighted the gravity of the deficiencies. While he
complimented the garrison on its efficiency, he noted that the
current staff of 40 gunners was only sufficient to man two of
the fort's guns, leaving a further five pieces and two
machine-guns unattended. Furthermore, he observed that the
fort's two Hotchkiss 6-pounders were not yet on permanent
mounts, even though they had been on site for five years.

He also noted that the
reserves of ammunition were inadequate. The government provided
for only 200 rounds for the 6-inch breechloader, and it was
necessary to order replacements from England. Beer also
complained about insufficient uniforms and the unavailability of
cloth to make them. The medical officer submitted a companion
report that highlighted the paucity of the base's reserves of
water. He observed that the capacity of the establishment's
storage tanks was insufficient for the dry season, and that if a
large body of troops were to man the defences, they would
quickly exhaust the water supply?'

The Colonial Defence
Committee also evaluated the coastal defences of Australia in
1901. It concluded that there was far too great a variety of
weapons and mountings, and that in some cases certain guns were
peculiar to individual States, with only two or three pieces in
existence throughout the empire. It went on to observe that many
of the Commonwealth's guns were obsolete, and that they lacked
the range and power to deal with the improved armour and
weaponry of modern cruisers.

The report further pointed
out that the Commonwealth's great number of calibres was a
financial liability, and that it could lower the overall cost of
its ammunition purchases by replacing its non-standard gun
types. Finally, the Colonial Defence Committee also recommended
that the Australian Government construct an arsenal for the
local manufacture of ammunition, and stores to alleviate the
difficulty of obtaining supplies from abroad, especially in time
of war."

In 1902, Hutton
undertook his own study of the garrison artillery, which
confirmed the Colonial Defence Committee conclusions. Hutton
found that of the 185 weapons assigned to coastal defence,
including machine-guns, there were 25 different types. Some were
quite rare, such as the two 10-inch breechloaders in Victoria
and the two 7-inch rifled muzzleloaders in Tasmania. In a
related assessment, Hutton also recommended that Australia
create its own manufacturing department for its defence forces.
He believed it necessary for the Commonwealth to have the
ability to produce its own small arms, guns, and ammunition. He
also thought that such a facility could meet the needs of the
Royal Navy and the future Australian Navy.

The establishment of
the field artillery displayed a similar degree of variety and
antiquity as had the garrison batteries. A 1904 assessment found
that Australia possessed 84 field guns. However, of these, only
the 28 15-pounders and the four 5-inch howitzers were modern,
while the rest consisted of obsolete breechloaders or even older
muzzleloaders. The colonies had made no attempt to standardise
their armaments, and the army inherited eight kinds of calibres,
including some of which there were only two in the nation. By
1904, under Hutton's initiative, the army had taken some steps
to improve the field artillery, and six of the twelve
12.5-pounders that had belonged to Victoria were in England for
conversion to up-to-date 15-pounders."