Judgment Text

Ramesh Ranganathan, J.

It is not often that, in an intra-Court appeal preferred against an interlocutory order, that too an order as short as the one in the present case, such an elaborate order is passed by a Division Bench in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The present case necessitates such an elaborate order, as it illustrates the damage which can be caused to a party, who is not even arrayed as a respondent before the Writ Court, by an innocuously couched interim relief which is however sought to be used to deprive him of the property in his possession.

This appeal is preferred, under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, against the order passed by the Learned Single Judge in I.A. No.1 of 2018 in W.P. No.11730 of 2018 dated 17.04.2018. The respondent-writ petitioner filed W.P. No.11730 of 2018 on 29.03.2018 seeking a writ of mandamus to declare the action of the State of A.P, and Krishnapatnam Port Company Ltd (hereinafter called 'KPCL'), in not extending the grace period to them, under the Right to Use Agreement, in order to complete construction of the Cement Grinding Unit, along with the Conveyor Belt, in the land ear-marked and given to the petitioner, and regulated by Krishnapatnam Port, as being illegal, unlawful, arbitrary and unconstitutional. They sought a consequential direction to the respondents therein to extend the time period. By way of interim relief, the respondent-writ petitioner sought a direction to permit them to undertake the approved project, including construction of the conveyor facility, in the ear-marked land given to them at Krishnapatnam, pending disposal of the Writ Petition.

In the interim order under appeal, the Learned Single Judge recorded the submission of Sri D.V.Sitharama Murthy, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the 1st respondent-writ petitioner, the Learned Standing Counsel for KPCL and the Learned Assistant Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the 4th respondent herein (3rd respondent in the Writ Petition), and observed that, on 10.04.2018, an order of status-quo was passed till 15.04.2018; and the Learned Standing Counsel for KPCL had sought time to obtain instructions. The Learned Single Judge granted an interim order as prayed for considering the nature of the project, the submissions made by the Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the 1st respondent-writ petitioner, as the issues raised for consideration in the Writ Petition required detailed examination, and as he was satisfied that a prima-facie case was made out. As a result, the 1st respondent-writ petitioner was permitted to undertake approved projects, including construction of the conveyor facility in the earmarked land given to 1st respondent-writ petitioner at Krishnapatnam, pending disposal of the Writ Petition.

In the order, passed by us in I.A.No.1 of 2018 in W.A.No.657 of 2018 dated 20.06.2018 (in an application filed by the appellant herein seeking leave to prefer an appeal against the interlocutory order passed in I.A.No.1 of 2018 in W.P.No.11730 of 2018 dated 17.04.2018), we examined, in great detail, the appellant’s claim to be in possession of the subject land, and his contention that the respondent-writ petitioner had surreptitiously, and illegally, sought to dispossess him from the subject land under the protection of the interim order under appeal. It would be wholly inappropriate for us, therefore, to re-examine the rival contentions urged, by Learned Senior Counsel on either side, during the hearing of the said I.A.

Facts, to the limited extent necessary, are that the Collector and District Magistrate, Nellore informed the Principal Secretary to the Government, Roads, Transport & Buildings Department, vide letter dated 26.04.2006, that the Deputy Salt Commissioner, Chennai had been requesting that permission be accorded for acquisition of Ac.501.95 of Salt land originally belonging to the Salt Department, and an extent of Ac.241.56 of Government land allotted to the Salt Department for exclusive use by KPCL. While giving the survey number-wise breakup of Acres 241.56, the District Collector further informed that the actual extent of Salt Department land in Krishnapatnam village was 796.9869 acres out of which 21.6380 had been transferred to the State Government, and the remaining land available was 775.3489 acres; the Deputy Salt Commissioner, Chennai had advised that the Salt Commissioner, Jaipur had conveyed his approval for transfer of Salt Department lands at Krishnapatnam to the Government of Andhra Pradesh; the Ministry of Commerce, Government of India had, by their letter dated 19.10.2000, conveyed the sanction of the President of India to transfer Ac.21.038 of Salt Department lands, to the State Government, for providing house sites to poor Girijans and Harijans on payment of market value; and acquisition of lands was not necessary in the present issue. The District Collector requested that the Salt Commissioner may be addressed to recommend, to the Government of India, to accord permission for transfer of the above land in favour of KPCL on payment of the market value of the land, as per rules. The Deputy Salt Commissioner, Chennai informed the appellant, vide letter dated 26.09.2012, that the eleven month lease in his favour had expired on 31.07.2012; the competent authority had decided not to renew the lease; and he should hand over peaceful possession of the land, of an extent of Ac.41.60 cts, to the Salt Factory Officer, Krishnapatnam.

By his notice dated 04.10.2012, the Salt Factory Officer, while enclosing a copy of the letter addressed to the appellant herein by the Deputy Salt Commissioner on 26.09.2012, informed him that it was decided not to renew the lease beyond 31.07.2012. The appellant was directed to be present in the subject premises, and hand over possession of the land of an extent of Ac.41.60 cts, including proportionate incidental area, to the Salt Factory Officer on 26.10.2012 without fail. He was advised to leave the premises in such good order and condition as was consistent with the due performance of the lease, and to remove the entire quantity of salt, and all civil structures, machinery etc at their cost.

The appellant, along with 30 others, filed W.P.No.33436 of 2012 seeking a mandamus to declare the action of the Salt Commissioner, Jaipur, and the Deputy Salt Commissioner, Chennai in not renewing the lease in their favour for manufacturing, excavating and collecting salt in lands over an extent of Ac.338.21 cts situated in various survey numbers of Krishnapatnam village, and the consequential action of the Superintendent of Salt, Chennai in issuing notice dated 04.10.2012, directing them to hand over vacant possession of the aforesaid extents of land to him on 26.10.2012 without paying them compensation, inspite of the recommendations of the Assistant Salt Commissioner, East Godavari in his proceedings dated 14.07.2011, as arbitrary, illegal and contrary to the policy of the Department of Industrial Promotion, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India in proceedings dated 24.01.2012, and contrary to the understanding between the Deputy Salt Commissioner, Chennai and the appellant as reflected in the letters dated 18.05.2006 addressed by the Deputy Salt Commissioner, Chennai to the Salt Commissioner, Jaipur. A consequential direction was sought to the respondents therein to forthwith renew the lease granted in their favour for manufacturing, excavating and collecting salt in the aforesaid lands, or in the alternative grant them adequate compensation in accordance with law.

A Learned Single Judge of this Court passed an interim order, in W.P.No.33436 of 2012 dated 19.10.2012, directing that, with regards the land for which licences were granted earlier in favour of the petitioners therein (one of whom was the appellant herein) for the purpose of manufacturing, excavating and collecting salt in Krishnapatnam village, the respondents should maintain status quo with regards possession for a period of six weeks from the date of the order. This interim order of status quo has been extended thereafter, and is in force as on date.

Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, submitted that, in the light of the order of status quo passed by this Court in W.P. No.33436 of 2012 dated 19.10.2012, the notice dated 04.10.2012, calling upon the appellant to hand over an extent of Ac.41.60 cts to him on 26.10.2012, was not given effect to; and, in view of the interim order of status quo passed by the Learned Single Judge in W.P. No.33436 of 2012 dated 19.10.2012, the respondent-writ petitioners herein had filed an application to implead themselves as respondents in the said Writ Petition.

The respondent-writ petitioner filed W.P. No.36507 of 2017 seeking a mandamus to declare the action of the respondents therein, in conjointly and/or severally interfering with their right in completing the overhead conveyor belt after they were induced to undertake the entire development activity of laying/undertaking a cement grinding unit in the land earmarked and given to them over an extent of Ac.16.00 cts at KPCL as unlawful, arbitrary, unconstitutional and contrary to the purport and effect of the order made in W.P. No.33436 of 2012; and, resultantly, to direct the respondents not to interfere with, but rather enable, the petitioners right to complete the said development works, including construction of the conveyor facility over the said land. The appellant was arrayed as the 4th respondent in W.P. No.36507 of 2017.

In the affidavit dated 30.10.2017, filed in support of W.P. No.36507 of 2017, the Director of Finance of the respondent-writ petitioner company had stated that the appellant (4th respondent therein) was one among the petitioners in W.P.No. 33436 of 2012; he had come to the construction site, and had forcibly stalled construction stating that a status-quo order was passed by this Court in W.P. No.33436 of 2012 dated 19.10.2012, and as such no work could be undertaken; on verification of the case particulars, it was noticed that W.P. No.33436 of 2012 was filed questioning the action of the Salt Department in not renewing the lease granted earlier; the appellant (4th respondent in W.P. No.36507 of 2017, being one of the petitioners in W.P. No.33436 of 2012) had wrongly stated that they had lost their livelihood due to non-renewal of the lease in their favour; in the counter filed by the respondents therein, it was averred that no salt was being manufactured by the salt entrepreneurs, and as such their lease was not renewed; the appellant-4th respondent had given his consent/no objection for the development activities of KPCL in a part of his salt land; this fact was suppressed in W.P. No.33436 of 2012; the reason being that the land was assigned, by KPCL, to the respondent-writ petitioner; in a part of the said leased land, the columns would take approximately around 3000 square feet of land belonging to the appellant-4th respondent; the conveyor belt had to go through the land of the appellant-4th respondent; after KPCL had taken up development of infrastructure and other allied construction in the port premises, the lands, in and around the port, had lost its original condition, and were not suitable for any other purpose; the appellant-4th respondent had stopped manufacture of salt in the said lands for a long time; the respondent-writ petitioner had started construction in the year 2014; the total cost of the project was Rs.1700 crores; the respondent-writ petitioner had invested Rs.1400 crores towards construction and development of the project; they had completed 80% of the work, except laying a conveyor belt passing through a part of the land of the appellant4th respondent; and they had to commence production on or before 31.03.2018.

As noted hereinabove, the respondent-writ petitioner has admitted, in the affidavit filed by them on 30.10.2017 in support of W.P. No.36507 of 2017, that an extent of 3000 square feet of land, required by them for laying columns, belonged to the appellant-4th respondent; the conveyor belt (to be laid over the columns) passed through the land of the appellant-4th respondent; and the respondent-writ petitioner had completed 80% of the work except laying of the conveyor belt passing through a part of the land of the appellant-4th respondent. It was only because columns were required to be laid on the land belonging to the appellant-4th respondent, and the conveyor belt to be laid on these columns was to pass through a part of the land of the appellant-4th respondent, was he arrayed as the 4th respondent in W.P. No.36507 of 2017. No interim order was passed in W.P.No.36507 of 2017, which is still pending on the file of this Court.

Less than five months after W.P. No.36507 of 2017 was filed on 30.10.2017, the respondent-writ petitioner filed W.P. No.11730 of 2018 on 29.03.2018. The interim relief sought in W.P. No.11730 of 2018 is similar both to the interim relief, and the consequential relief, sought in W.P. No.36507 of 2017. In the affidavit filed in support of W.P. No.11730 of 2018, the Director (Finance) of the respondent-writ petitioner company stated that, after obtaining license from the Government of India, KPCL had entered into a 'Right to Use' agreement with the petitioner on 26.03.2014; the scope of the agreement was the designing and construction of a cement grinding facility by the petitioner, including conveyor facilities in the land earmarked and provided to the petitioner by KPCL; the petitioner commenced construction of the cement grinding unit, and had completed 80% of the work costing around Rs.1400 Crores; the remaining part was to erect pillars, admeasuring an extent of 3000 sq. feet, at the ground level towards completion of construction of the conveyor belt; over all, 44 pillars were erected in the land given to the petitioner; the project had to be concluded before 31.03.2018 which included the grace period; in the process of verification of the survey numbers, by the State of Andhra Pradesh, it was observed that an extent of Ac.775.66 cents of land, belonging to the salt department, was under the control of Krishnapatnam Salt Factory; the then District Collector, Nellore had requested the Salt Commissioner to accord permission for acquisition of salt department land; this acquisition, in favour of KPCL was for a public purpose; an extent of Ac.326.52 cents of salt department land, in various survey numbers in Krishnapatnam Salt Factory, was leased out to various salt manufacturers for a period of 20 years; the said lease was granted by the Salt Commissioner in favour of salt manufacturers; the Salt Factory was a Central Government Department functioning under the Ministry of Commerce and Industries, which was the regulatory body having control over manufacture, supply and distribution of salt throughout India; and the Salt Commissioner administers vast extents of land in the Coastal Districts of Andhra Pradesh, and leases it out to private entrepreneurs for the manufacture of salt.

It is further stated in the said Writ affidavit that, on a requisition from the Government of Andhra Pradesh, the Government of India had, vide proceedings dated 26.09.2008, agreed and granted in-principle approval for the proposal of the Government of Andhra Pradesh to transfer lands, vested with the Salt Commissioner in various survey numbers in Krishnapatnam Salt Factory, to the Government of Andhra Pradesh; in view of the proposal, the lease earlier granted by the Salt Commissioner, in favour of salt entrepreneurs, was renewed on a 11 monthly basis every time; it is a specific condition of the lease, granted by the Salt Commissioner, that renewal of the 11 month lease was subject to taking back the land whenever required by the Salt Commissioner; the last renewal period, in favour of salt entrepreneurs (lessees), expired by 31.07.2012; transfer of land by the Salt Commissioner, in favour of the Government of Andhra Pradesh, was accepted keeping in view that the lessees were not manufacturing salt in their lands; the Salt Commissioner had communicated his decision, regarding non-renewal of lease for further period beyond 31.07.2012, to all salt entrepreneurs (lessees); aggrieved thereby, the salt entrepreneurs had approached this Court seeking renewal of their leases or, in the alternative, for grant of compensation; an interim order was passed in W.P.No.33436 of 2012 dated 19.10.2012 directing the respondents therein to maintain statusquo with regards possession; the respondents therein had filed a counter-affidavit and a vacate stay petition and the same was pending.

It is further stated that, while the petitioner was undertaking construction of the conveyor belt which was to be completed in another fortnight, petitioner No.20 in W.P.No.33436 of 2012 (the appellant herein) had come to the construction site in the month of October, 2017 and had forcibly stalled construction stating that an order of status-quo was passed in W.P.No.33436 of 2012 dated 19.12.2012, and no work could be undertaken; the 1st respondent-writ petitioner had filed an application to implead themselves, and to vacate the order of status-quo granted in W.P.No.33436 of 2012; they had also filed W.P.No.36507 of 2017 questioning the action of the respondents, more particularly, KPCL in interfering with their rights; petitioner No.20 in W.P.No.33436 of 2012 had given his consent/no objection, vide letter dated 28.01.2011, for the development activities of KPCL in the salt land; the said consent was suppressed, by petitioner No.20, in W.P.No.33436 of 2012, and an order of status-quo was obtained in W.P.No.33436 of 2012; after KPCL took-up the development of infrastructure, and other allied construction, in the port premises, the lands, in and around the port, had lost its original condition, and were not suitable for any other purposes; the lessees had stopped manufacture of salt in the said lands from a long time; the right of the lessees was limited to the extent of their right for compensation; KPCL had given lease for a period of 30 years with a berth dedicated on a priority basis for transportation of cement, and KPCL was acting as a loading port for transport of cement from the grinding unit to the silos at the jetty; this process could be undertaken only by a dedicated conveyor belt, and then loaded on to the vessel using ship loaders; the vessels would transport the cement to the designated terminals being set up at various places; the total cost of the project, including dedicated vessels, would be approximately Rs.1700 crores; the petitioner started construction in the year 2004, and since then had developed and made construction at the site, and there was no hindrance till date; the petitioner had invested Rs.1400 crores towards construction and development of the project, and had completed 80% of the work except laying of conveyor belt passing through salt lands, which stood transferred to the Government of Andhra Pradesh, and KPCL by the Salt Commissioner; the petitioner had to commence production on or before 31.03.2018 including the grace period, but because of the failure of KPCL, to extend the grace period for reasons best known to it, the petitioner was disabled from continuing their construction activity in pursuance of the 'Right to Use' agreement; the interest and rights of the petitioner were, therefore, prejudiced; the status-quo order passed in W.P.No.33436 of 2012, even as per the Government of Andhra Pradesh and KPCL, was only with regards the right of possession, and not in relation to the nature of the property; the Government of Andhra Pradesh and KPCL contend that they had taken possession from the Salt Commissioner; the Salt Commissioner had stated, in his counter-affidavit in W.P.No.36507 of 2017, that the salt manufacturers/lessees had declined the offer of alternative land, and were insisting for compensation; this sufficiently indicated that the lessees were not in possession; the Government of Andhra Pradesh and KPCL, in consonance with their action of permitting various steps undertaken by the petitioner from 2014, ought to permit the petitioner to continue the said work of installing the pillar or columns, for having an overhead conveyor belt completed; the status-quo order is only to enable the petitioner in W.P.No.33436 of 2012 to continue (or start) salt making business in the event of success in the said Writ Petition; the present efforts of the petitioner would not affect any such rights, as the 1st respondent-writ petitioner would only be constructing supporting pillars for the overhead conveyor belt; and the action of the Government of Andhra Pradesh and KPCL, in failing to extend the period of work for completion of the project, was contrary to the earlier acts and representations, resulting in deprivation of the petitioner’s legitimate rights available under the right to use agreement; and flows from the doctrine of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectations.

Aggrieved by the order passed by the Learned Single Judge, in I.A.No.1 of 2018 in W.P.No.11730 of 2018 dated 17.04.2018, the appellant filed I.A. No.1 of 2018 in W.A. No.657 of 2018 dated 20.06.2018, seeking leave to prefer an appeal there against, contending that, though he was a necessary party to W.P. No.11730 of 2018, he was not arrayed as a respondent therein despite his being arrayed as the 4th respondent in W.P.No.36507 of 2017. In our order, in I.A. No.1 of 2018 in W.A. No.657 of 2018 dated 20.06.2018, we had observed that the notice issued to the appellant, by the Salt Factory Officer, on 04.10.2012 required him to hand over possession of an extent of Ac.41.60 cts of land to the Salt Factory Officer on 26.10.2012; the interim order of status quo was passed in W.P. No.33436 of 2012 on 19.10.2012, a week before the date on which the appellant was required to hand over possession of the subject land to the Salt Factory Officer on 26.10.2012 pursuant to the notice dated 04.10.2012; and there was considerable force in submission of Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy, Learned Senior Counsel, that the appellant was in possession of the subject land over which the respondent-writ petitioners had sought to raise columns and to lay a conveyor belt.

On the contention, urged on behalf of the 1st respondent-writ petitioner, that the appellant had admitted, in his counter-affidavit in W.P.No.36507 of 2017, that he had been dispossessed from the subject land, we had, in our order in I.A. No.1 of 2018 in W.A. No.657 of 2018 dated 20.06.2018, taken note of what the appellant had stated in the said counter-affidavit. The appellant had stated therein that the State of A.P. had addressed a letter to the Salt Commissioner on 06.12.2016 to grant permission to construct a compound wall in the salt land for development of Krishnapatnam Port; in reply the Government of India had, by their letter dated 08.05.2017, informed the Government of A.P. that transfer of the salt lands, of an extent of Ac.775.66 acres in favour of KPCL for development of the Krishnapatnam Port, had not been ordered, and the same would take time to materialize; in the said letter, the Government of India had categorically stated that, until the salt lands were transferred either to the Government of A.P. or to KPCL, third party rights/interests should not be created in the salt lands by allowing construction of a compound wall; and even though no salt lands had been transferred by the Government of India, either to the Government of A.P. or to KPCL, and no permission had been granted to carry out any development activities therein, KPCL appears to have highhandedly encroached on salt lands in an extent of Ac.43.46 cts for the purpose of developing the Krishnapatnam Port.

We had also noted that in the letter dated 22.05.2017, addressed by the Superintendent of Salt, Chennai, it was stated that, after survey of Salt Department land with officials of the Survey Department of the Government of A.P. in Krishnapatnam, the Salt Factory Officer had submitted his report dated 05.05.2017 which showed that the survey commenced on 14.03.2017 and was completed in all respects on 28.03.2017; as per the joint survey, KPCL had encroached upon their land of an extent of 43.46 acres for rail-road corridor etc; and the area of 43.46 acres, encroached by KPCL, fell in the areas leased to the salt manufacturers as detailed in the table therein. The name of the appellant was referred to at Serial No.2 of the table; and the extent of the area encroached on salt department land, leased in the appellant’s favour earlier, was shown therein as 31.66 acres from out of the total encroached extent of 43.46 acres. While the notice issued to the appellant-4th respondent, by the Salt Factory Officer on 04.10.2012, recorded that the total extent of land, in the appellant’s possession, was 41.60 acres, the letter dated 22.05.2017 referred to an extent of Ac.31.66 acres of land, leased in favour of the appellant, having been encroached upon by KPCL; even if it was presumed that KPCL had encroached upon the land leased earlier in the appellant’s favour, before the interim order was passed in W.P. No.33436 of 2012 on 19.10.2012, even then the extent of encroachment by KPCL, of the lands leased earlier in the appellant’s favour, would, prima-facie, only be 31.66 acres as against the total extent of 41.60 acres leased earlier in favour of the appellant, thus leaving an extent of Ac.9.94 cts of the land, leased earlier in the appellant’s favour, un-encroached.

We had also opined that the extent of land in the possession of the appellant, said to have been encroached upon later by KPCL, was reflected in the letter of the Superintendent of Salt, Chennai dated 22.05.2017 as 31.66 acres, the respondent-writ petitioner had, in the affidavit filed by them in support of W.P. No.36507 of 2017 on 30.10.2017, (i.e., more than five months after the letter of the Superintendent of Salt dated 22.05.2017), admitted that columns were being raised on an extent of 3000 square feet of land belonging to the appellant, the conveyor belt had to go through the land of the appellant, and development of the project was almost complete except laying of the conveyor belt passing through a part of the land of the appellant. It did appear, therefore, that the columns raised by the respondent-writ petitioner, and the conveyor belt sought to be laid thereupon on an extent of 3000 square feet of land, was on a part of the un-encroached portion of the land of Ac.9.94 cts in the possession of the appellant.

With regards the consent given by the appellant in his letter dated 28.01.2011, for his land being taken over by KPCL, we had, in our order in I.A.No.1 of 2018 in W.A.No.657 of 2018 dated 20.06.2018, observed that all that the appellant had stated, in the said letter, was that he had no objection regarding developmental activities of KPCL, i.e., to the infrastructure activities of their port proposed to be taken up in the salt land, in a part of his licenced area; he was giving his no objection certificate in the interest of the nation, and also of the project, provided that it did not affect his salt licence; all that the said letter dated 28.01.2011 recorded was the willingness of the appellant to permit KPCL to take up developmental activities on a part of his licenced area; the said letter did not disclose the extent of the area, from out of the total extent of 41.60 cts leased to the appellant, where he was willing to permit KPCL to take up developmental activities; the aforesaid letter was also hedged by the condition that the no objection was subject to the condition that it did not affect the appellant’s salt license; and this letter dated 28.01.2011 did not, prima-facie, justify the respondent-writ petitioner forcibly and high-handedly dispossessing the appellant from the land in his possession.

After taking note of the contents of the counter-affidavit, filed by the Assistant Salt Commissioner in W.P. No.33436 of 2012 dated 27.12.2012, wherein it was stated that all the lands leased to the Salt manufacturers at Krishnapatnam Salt Factory were still in the possession of the salt department, we had, in our order in I.A.No.1 of 2018 in W.A.No.657 of 2018 dated 20.06.2018, observed that this assertion, in the counter-affidavit dated 27.12.2012, was belied by the contents of the earlier notice issued by the Salt Factory Officer on 04.10.2012 whereby the appellant was directed to hand over possession of an extent of Ac.41.60 cts of land on 26.10.2012, even prior to which the interim order of status quo was passed in W.P.No.33436 of 2012 on 19.10.2012; the said counter-affidavit did not disclose when and how possession of the subject land was taken by the Union of India from the appellant; even in the proceedings dated 22.05.2017, issued more than four and half years after the counter-affidavit in W.P.No.33436 of 2012 was filed on 27.12.2012, it was stated that KPCL had encroached upon 43.46 acres of land leased to various Salt manufacturers, including an extent of 31.66 cts leased to the appellant; this meant that an extent of 9.94 acres of unencroached land still remained in the appellant’s possession, belying the vague and unsubstantiated averment in the counteraffidavit of the Assistant Salt Commissioner dated 27.12.2012; and reliance placed by Sri D.V. Sitharamamurthy, Learned Senior Counsel, on such a bald averment in the said counter-affidavit was misplaced. Holding that the appellant was a person aggrieved by the order in I.A. No.1 of 2018 in W.P. No.11730 of 2018 dated 17.04.2018, we had granted leave to the appellant to prefer an appeal against the said order.

While the contentions urged before us earlier by Learned Senior Counsel on either side, during the hearing of I.A.No.1 of 2018 in W.A.No.657 of 2018, are again urged during the hearing of this Appeal, it is wholly unnecessary for us to delve on those issues all over again, as we have already expressed our opinion on such issues. We shall, therefore, confine our examination in this appeal only to such of those contentions which were not urged earlier, as any grievance which Learned Senior Counsel on either side may have against the order passed by us, in I.A.No.1 of 2018 in W.A. No.657 of 2018 dated 20.06.2018, cannot be re-agitated in the present proceedings, and their remedy lies elsewhere.

Before we examine the rival contentions, urged by Learned Senior Counsel on either side, it is necessary to understand the importance of clarity in pleadings, and the requirement of furnishing details in support of such pleas in the affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition as, by vague and bald pleas, the process of the Court can be misused to secure an unjust interim order. It needs no reiteration that the three main principles, which govern the grant or refusal of an interim order, (a) prima facie case; (b) balance of convenience, and (c) irreparable injury, guide the Court in granting interim relief. (Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes v. Erasmo Jack de Sequeira (2012) 5 SCC 370). In determining whether a prima facie case is made out, it is imperative for the Court to carefully analyse the pleadings and the documents on record, and only on that basis should the Court decide whether or not a prima facie case is made out. In the grant and refusal of interlocutory orders, pleadings and documents play a vital role. (Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes (supra).

The entire journey of a Judge is to discern the truth from the pleadings, documents and arguments of the parties. Truth is the basis of the justice delivery system. (A. Shanmugam v. Ariya Kshatriya Rajakula Vamsathu Madalaya Nandhavana Paripalanai Sangam (2012) 6 SCC 430); Dalip Singh v. State of U.P. (2010) 2 SCC 114). The pleadings must, therefore, set forth sufficient factual details to the extent it reduces the ability to put forward a false or exaggerated claim or defence. Pleadings must inspire confidence and credibility. The Court must carefully examine if false averments, evasive or false denials are introduced, in deciding a case, and insist that those who approach the Court must approach it with clean hands. (A. Shanmugam (supra). Every litigant should state the truth before the Law Court whether it is in the pleadings, affidavits or evidence. Dishonest and unscrupulous litigants have no place, and the ultimate object of the judicial proceedings is to discern the truth, and render justice. It is imperative that pleadings, and all other presentations, before the Court are truthful. (A. Shanmugam (supra).

Litigants, who obtain ex-parte ad-interim orders on the strength of false pleadings, should be adequately punished. No one should be allowed to abuse the process of the Court. (Ramrameshwari Devi v. Nirmala Devi (2011) 8 SCC 249 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 481 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 1). Once the Court discovers falsehood, concealment, distortion, obstruction or confusion in pleadings and documents, the Court should, in addition to full restitution, impose appropriate costs. The Court must ensure that the wrongdoer has no incentive in the temple of justice. As truth is the foundation of justice, no one should be permitted to pollute the stream of justice. It is the bounden obligation of the Court to neutralise any unjust and/or undeserved benefit or advantage obtained by abusing the judicial process. (A. Shanmugam (supra). Bearing these aspects in mind, let us now examine the submissions put forth, by Learned Senior Counsel on either side, under different heads.

I. HAS ANY DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE BEEN PLACED ON RECORD BY RESPONDENT-WRIT PETITONERS TO SHOW THAT THEY HAVE ANY RIGHT OVER THE SUBJECT LANDS?

Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, would submit that no document has been placed on record, by the 1st respondent-writ petitioner, to show that they have any right over salt factory lands, a part of which was leased earlier in favour of the appellant; in its letter dated 03.09.2009, the Government of India had conveyed its approval to KPCL to utilize a small extent of Salt Department land, in Krishnapatnam village, for a period of three years; subsequently, in its letter dated 27.08.2012, the Salt Commissioner, Jaipur had informed KPCL that their request for extension of lease was not accepted by the Government of India; and, by their letter dated 08.05.2017, the Assistant Salt Commissioner, Chennai had informed the Principal Secretary to the Government of Andhra Pradesh, that third party interests should not be created thereupon.

On the other hand Sri D.V.Sitharama Murthy, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the 1st respondent-writ petitioner, would place reliance on the revised concession agreement dated 17.09.2004 between the 1st respondent-writ petitioner and KPCL, and on Clause H of the Right to use Agreement entered into between KPCL and the 1st respondent-writ petitioner on 26.03.2016, to submit that, in terms thereof, the 1st respondent-writ petitioner has been given the right to develop the subject land.

The affidavit, filed by the 1st respondent-writ petitioner in support of W.P.No.11730 of 2018, does not disclose their having any right over the land hitherto leased in favour of the appellant, or to erect concrete pillars and a conveyor belt over it. While referring to the ‘Right to Use’ agreement, all that is stated, in the said affidavit, is that the Government of India had, vide proceedings dated 26.09.2008, granted in principle approval for the proposal of the Government of Andhra Pradesh to transfer land, vested with the Salt Commissioner, to the Government of Andhra Pradesh; the Deputy Salt Commissioner, Chennai had informed the Revenue Divisional Officer, Nellore, vide letter dated 03.09.2009, that the Salt Commissioner, Jaipur had, by his letter dated 25.08.2009, conveyed his approval for KPCL utilising Salt Department land, admeasuring 1.025 acres, for construction of closed conveyer towers, in Salt Department land in R.S. Nos.772 and 440/3-1 of Krishnapatnam, on payment of provisional lease of Rs.85,854/- per annum for a period of three years or the transfer of land admeasuring 775.6657 acres, including this land of 1.05 acres, to the Government of Andhra Pradesh as agreed to by the Government of India vide letter dated 26.09.2008, whichever was earlier, subject to the conditions stipulated therein. The conditions, stipulated in the said letter, included that KPCL should pay a lease amount of Rs.85,854/- per annum for an area of 1.025 acres in advance; they should pay one year’s lease amount as security deposit in advance; no area, other than the leased area, should be utilized by KPCL; the erection of a closed conveyor tower in the leased area should not hinder the manufacture of salt, and should not create any problem in the movement of salt; ownership of land vested with the Central Government (Salt Department); and KPCL would not have any ownership right except enjoyment of the lease.

KPCL had informed the Salt Commissioner, Jaipur, vide letter dated 27.08.2012, that an extent of 1.025 acres was given to them on lease for a period of 3 years from 12.09.2009 to 11.09.2012; they had executed a lease agreement, and had paid the lease money of Rs.85,854/- per annum for three years; due to various technical and administrative problems, they could not complete the project within the scheduled time; the closed conveyor towers were essential for port operations for conveying various material; and the lease period be extended for a further period of three years from 12.09.2012 to 11.09.2015. As is evident from the letter of the Superintendent of Salt dated 22.05.2017, the lease granted to KPCL was not renewed even for the extent of Ac.1.05 cents leased to them earlier, let alone the entire extent of Ac.763.86 cents of land belonging to the Government of India (Salt factory) being transferred to the Government of Andhra Pradesh.

The averment in the affidavit filed in support of W.P. No.11730 of 2018, that the conveyor belt would pass through salt land which stood transferred to the Government of Andhra Pradesh and KPCL by the Salt Commissioner, is not supported by any material on record and, according to Sri C.V.Mohan Reddy, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, is a false plea made only for the purpose of securing interim relief in this Writ Petition.

Pleadings are the foundation of the claims of parties. It is the bounden duty and obligation of the Court to carefully scrutinise, check and verify the pleadings and the documents filed by the parties. If this exercise is carefully carried out, it would focus on the controversy involved in the case, and help the Court in arriving at the truth, and in rendering substantial justice. (Ramrameshwari Devi (supra). In order to render justice, it is necessary to direct the parties to give all details of the pleadings with particulars. (Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes (supra). Insistence on details reduces the ability to put forward a non-existent or a false claim or defence. (Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes (supra). Apart from pleadings, the Court must insist on documentary proof in support of the pleadings. It should examine the pleadings for specificity, as also the supporting material for sufficiency, and then pass appropriate orders. (Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes (supra).

When a point, which is ostensibly a point of law, is required to be substantiated by facts, the party raising the point, if he is the writ petitioner, must plead and prove such facts by evidence which must appear from the writ petition; and, if he is the respondent, from the counter-affidavit. If the facts are not pleaded or the evidence in support of such facts is not annexed to the writ petition or to the counter-affidavit, as the case may be, the Court will not entertain the point. There is a distinction between a pleading under the Code of Civil Procedure, and a Writ Petition or a counter-affidavit. While in a pleading, i.e in a plaint or a written statement, the facts and not evidence are required to be pleaded, in a Writ Petition or in a counter-affidavit not only the facts but also the evidence, in proof of such facts, should be pleaded and annexed to it. (Bharat Singh v. State of Haryana (1988) 4 SCC 534). In pleadings, whenever a person a claims a right to continue in possession of a property, it is necessary for him to plead with specificity about who is the owner, on what date did he entered into possession and in what capacity, and his relationship with the owner etc. He must also give details on what basis he is claiming a right to continue in possession. Unless the pleadings make out a sufficient case, it would not constitute a sufficient claim. (Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes (supra). In the present case, no details are furnished by the 1st respondent-writ petitioner, in their Writ affidavit, as to when and how the land, which admittedly belongs to the Government of India, was transferred to the Government of Andhra Pradesh, and from the Government of A.P. to KPCL, and from KPCL to the petitioner. It does appear that the 1st respondent-writ petitioner has by resorting to false pleas, and under the protection of the interim order secured from this Court on such vague and baseless pleadings, forcibly dispossessed the appellant of the land in his possession, and to have raised pillars on these lands and is proceeding with laying a conveyor belt thereupon.

As Sri D.V.Sitharama Murthy, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the 1st respondent-writ petitioner, would place reliance on the revised concession agreement and the Right to Use agreement, it is necessary to briefly refer to the relevant clauses in both the agreements to ascertain whether or not the respondent-writ petitioner was conferred any right to use the Government of India salt factory lands in the appellant’s possession. Clause 3.4 of the revised concession agreement dated 17.09.2004 relates to land and the submerged area leased, and reads thus:

'the land and submerged area leased by the GoAP to KPCL is indicated in Schedule B. GoAP shall, within 60 (sixty) days from the commencement date, execute in favour of KPCL a valid and binding deed of lease (substantially in form and substance as set out in Schedule D), free from all encumbrances in respect of the land described in Part I of Schedule B already handed over to KPCL.'

Schedule-B of the aforesaid agreement refers to an extent of 269.95 acres of land under the control of the KPCL. It is not in dispute that the entire extent of salt factory land, of an extent of 775.66 acres, belongs to the Government of India, and is distinct and different from the land admeasuring 269.95 acres under the control and custody of KPCL.

Reliance placed by Sri D.V.Sitharama Murthy, Learned Senior, on the Right to Use agreement is also of no avail. All that is stated in the recital portion, i.e in Clause H of the Right to Use agreement, is that KPCL had agreed to give a right of way to the 1st respondent-writ petitioner to construct the extension railway line facility in its premises, as mentioned in Annexure-III of the agreement, on the terms and conditions stated in the agreement. This recital only refers to the land in the premises of KPCL, and not to salt land of an extent of 775.66 acres which belongs to the Government of India, and a part of which was hitherto leased in the appellant’s favour. No documentary evidence has been placed on record to show that KPCL has any right over the subject lands, for it is only if they had any right could they have permitted the 1st respondent-writ petitioner to occupy the said land, raise concrete pillars thereupon, and to lay a conveyer belt over it.

Even otherwise, the material on record does not show the respondent-writ petitioner having been conferred a lease over, or the right to use, the subject land belonging to the Government of India, even by KPCL. We find considerable force in the submission of Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, that, even without a modicum of right over the subject land, the 1st respondent-writ petitioner had forcibly, and under the protection of the interim order under appeal, sought to dispossess the appellant of the lands in his possession.

II. HAS ANY CAUSE OF ACTION ARISEN, AFTER W.P. NO.36507 OF 2017 WAS FILED, JUSTIFYING A SECOND WRIT PETITION i.e., W.P. NO.11730 OF 2018 BEING FILED?

Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, would submit that there was no cause of action for the respondent-writ petitioner to file a second Writ Petition, that too without arraying the appellant as a respondent (though they had arrayed him as the 4th respondent in the earlier Writ Petition i.e., W.P. No.36507 of 2017); and the respondent-writ petitioner’s intention in doing so is only to surreptitiously secure an interim order and, under its protection, to illegally and forcibly encroach on the appellant’s land, erect pillars thereupon and lay a conveyer belt on such pillars.

As noted hereinabove, the relief sought for in W.P.No.36507 of 2017 was for a mandamus to declare the action of the respondents (including the appellant herein) in conjointly and/or severally interfering with the 1st respondent-writ petitioner’s rights in completing the overhead conveyor belt, as arbitrary and illegal. The relief sought for in W.P.No.11730 of 2018 is for a mandamus to declare the action of the Government of Andhra Pradesh and KPCL in failing to extend the time period, more particularly in failing to extend the grace period to them under the ‘Right to Use’ agreement in order to complete construction of the cement grinding unit along with the conveyor belt in the land earmarked and given to the petitioner at Krishnapatnam, as illegal and arbitrary. Though worded differently, the substance of the prayer, in both W.P. No.36507 of 2017 and W.P. No.11730 of 2018, is for a mandamus to the respondents therein not to interfere with the 1st respondent-writ petitioner’s right to complete construction of the conveyor belt in the earmarked land.

As the relief sought in both W.P.No.36507 of 2017 and W.P.No.11730 of 2018 is for a Writ of Mandamus to be issued to the respondents therein, it is necessary to note, albeit in brief, the scope of such a Writ. Mandamus is a high prerogative writ directed to any natural person, corporation or inferior court within the jurisdiction, requiring them to do some particular thing therein specified, and which appertains to their office or duty. Generally 31 speaking, mandamus is a summary writ issued from the proper Court commanding the official or body to which it is addressed to perform some specific legal duty to which the party applying for the writ is entitled of legal right to have performed. (Oriental Bank of Commerce v. Sunder Lal Jain (2008) 2 SCC 280); The Law of Extraordinary Legal Remedies by F.G. Ferris and F.G. Ferris, Jr.).

A writ of mandamus can be granted only in a case where there is a statutory duty imposed upon the officers concerned, and there is failure on the part of such officers to discharge the statutory obligation. The chief function of the Writ is to compel performance of public duties prescribed by statute, and to keep subordinate tribunals and officers exercising public functions within the limit of their jurisdiction. In order that a mandamus may issue to compel the authorities to do something, it must be shown that there is a statute which imposes a legal duty, and the aggrieved party has a legal right under the statute to enforce its performance. (Bihar Eastern Gangetic Fishermen Coop. Society Ltd. v. Sipahi Singh (1977) 4 SCC 145 = AIR 1977 SC 2149); Lekhraj Sathramdas Lalvani v. N.M. Shah, Dy. Custodian cum Managing Officer (AIR 1966 SC 334); Umakant Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar (1973) 1 SCC 485); Union of India v. C. Krishna Reddy (2003) 12 SCC 627); Rai Shivendra Bahadur Dr v. Governing Body of the Nalanda College (AIR 1962 SC 1210); and Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams v. K. Jotheeswara Pillai (2007) 9 SCC 461).

In order that a writ of mandamus may be issued, it must be shown that there is a statute or rule having the force of law which casts a duty on the officials/body concerned (Oriental Bank of Commerce (supra) and the aggrieved party has a legal right under the statute to enforce its performance. (National Textile Corpn. Ltd. v. Haribox Swalram (2004) 9 SCC 786). If there is no statutory or legal basis, for making the claim as indicated in the writ petition, it would not furnish a ground for issuance of a writ of mandamus. (Union of India v. E. Merck (India) (1998) 9 SCC 412); Chairman/MD, Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. v. Sadashib Behera (2005) 2 SCC 396). The writ petitioners have no statutory right nor is any statutory duty cast upon the official respondents, the performance of which may be legally enforced. No writ of mandamus can, therefore, be issued as prayed by the writ petitioners. (National Textile Corpn. Ltd. (supra). As their entitlement, even for grant of the main relief is debatable, the 1st respondent-writ petitioner is disentitled for grant of the interim relief sought for in, and granted by, the order under appeal.

The alleged cause of action, for filing W.P. No.11730 of 2018, is the failure of KPCL to extend the grace period for completion of the project which was to expire by 31.03.2018. By their letter dated 25.03.2018, the 1st respondent-writ petitioner informed KPCL that, as per the contract dated 26.03.2014, the grace period would end by 31.03.2018 and they had, by their letters dated 24.02.2018, 07.03.2018 and 15.03.2018, sought three months grace period to complete the project. Even if the writ petition were to be allowed in its entirety, and a mandamus were to be issued to KPCL to extend the grace period, that would not confer on the 1st respondent-writ petitioner any right to erect concrete pillars and lay a conveyor belt in the land hitherto leased in favour of the appellant and which, on the 1st respondent-writ petitioner’s own admission in W.P. No.36507 of 2017, is in the possession of the appellant. The interim relief sought for by the 1st respondent-writ petitioner in W.P. No.11730 of 2018, to undertake the approved project including construction of the conveyor facility in the earmarked land, travels far beyond the main relief sought for in W.P. No.11730 of 2018, and such an interim relief could not have been granted by the Learned Single Judge, that too at the stage of admission of the Writ Petition, and without assigning reasons.

An interim relief can be granted only in aid of, and as ancillary to, the main relief which may be available to the party on a final determination of his rights. (State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta (1952 SCR 28 : AIR 1952 SC 12); Cotton Corporation of India v. United Industrial Bank Ltd (AIR 1983 SC 1272); The State of A.P. v. M/s.Maheswari Minerals (Judgment in Writ Appeal No.797 of 2016 dated 17.09.2016). The main purpose of passing an interim order is to evolve a workable formula or a workable arrangement to the extent called for by the demands of the situation, only in order that no irreparable injury is occasioned. The Court has to strike a delicate balance after considering the pros and cons of the matter to ensure that larger public interest is not jeopardized thereby. (Siliguri Municipality v. Amalendu Das (1984) 2 SCC 436). Interim orders, which practically give the principal relief sought for in the writ petition, only for the reason that a prima-facie case has been made out, without considering the balance of convenience, the public interest and other considerations, should not be passed. (Asstt. CCE v. Dunlop India Ltd. (1985) 1 SCC 260); State of Rajasthan v. Swaika Properties (1985) 3 SCC 217); Bank of Maharashtra v. Race Shipping & Transport Co. (P) Ltd (1995) 3 SCC 257); M/s.Maheswari Minerals (supra).

Interim orders are, ordinarily, made to maintain the status quo so that the ultimate relief to be granted, to the party approaching the Court, may not become futile. (Bihar Public Service Commission v. Shiv Jatan Thakur (Dr) (1994 Supp (3) SCC 220). Interim relief is granted during the pendency of proceeding so that, while granting final relief, the court is not faced with a situation of the relief having become infructuous or that, during the pendency of the proceeding, an unfair advantage has been taken by the party in default or against whom interim relief is sought. The object behind granting interim relief is to maintain the status quo so that the final relief can be appropriately moulded without the party's position being altered during the pendency of the proceedings. (Cotton Corporation of India (supra).

It is settled legal position that, by way of interim relief, the final relief should not be granted till the matter is decided one way or the other, (Mehul Mahendra Thakkar v. Meena Mehul Thakkar (2009) 14 SCC 48); All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam v. Govt. of T.N., (2009) 5 SCC 452), as interlocutory orders are made in aid of final orders and not vice versa. (Shipping Corporation of India Ltd. v. Machado Brothers (2004)11 SCC 168); Kavita Trehan v. Balsara Hygiene Products Ltd (1994) 5 SCC 380); and Pitta Naveen Kumar v. Raja Narasaiah Zangiti (2006) 10 SCC 261). An interim order should not be of such a nature as to result in the writ petition being finally allowed at an interim stage nor should relief be granted, at the interlocutory stage, by which the final relief, which is asked for and is available at the disposal of the matter, is granted. (UPSC v. S. Krishna Chaitanya (2011) 14 SCC 227 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 935 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 890); M/s. Maheswari Minerals (supra).

As the relief sought for, both in W.P. No.36507 of 2017 and W.P. No.11730 of 2018, is to permit the 1st respondent-writ petitioner to complete the conveyor facility (which admittedly passes through the land hitherto leased in favour of the appellant), there does not appear to be any justification in the 1st respondent-writ petitioner filing a second writ petition (i.e., W.P. No.11730 of 2018). That such a Writ Petition was filed, does lend support to the submission of Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy, Learned Senior Counsel, that it was only because no interim relief was granted in W.P. No.36507 of 2017, was W.P. No.11730 of 2018 filed to surreptitiously secure an interim order behind the appellant’s back. It needs no reiteration that a person approaching a superior court must come with clean hands. He should not only not suppress material facts, but should also not take recourse to the legal proceedings over and over again which amounts to an abuse of the process of law. (Udyami Evam Khadi Gramodyog Welfare Sanstha v. State of U.P., (2008) 1 SCC 560); Advocate General, State of Bihar v. M.P. Khair Industries (1980) 3 SCC 311). When examined in the light of the fact that, even if the main relief of extension of the grace period were to be granted, the 1st respondent-writ petitioner would not be entitled for the interim relief sought for in I.A. No.1 of 2018 in W.P. No.11730 of 2018, the submission of Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, that the 1st respondent-writ petitioner’s intention, in seeking such interim relief, is only to illegally and forcibly encroach upon the appellant’s land under the protection of the interim order, has considerable force. We, however, exercise restraint and refrain from expressing any conclusive opinion on merits, since W.P. No.11730 of 2018 is still pending adjudication before the Learned Single Judge.

III. IS FAILURE TO IMPLEAD, THE APPELLANT AS A RESPONDENT IN THE WRIT PETITION, FATAL?

Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, would submit that failure to implead necessary and proper parties in the Writ Petition is a gross abuse of the process of Court; the Writ jurisdiction of this Court was invoked by the respondent-writ petitioner only to surreptitiously secure an interim order; under the protection of the interim order, they had illegally and forcibly encroached on the appellant’s land; and they have erected concrete pillars on the subject land, and have laid a conveyor belt on those pillars.

We had, in our order in I.A.No.1 of 2018 in W.A.No.657 of 2018 dated 20.06.2018, held that the appellant is a person aggrieved, and is entitled for grant of leave to prefer an appeal against the said interim order. The 1st respondent-writ petitioner has secured an interim order behind the applicant’s back, without arraying him as a respondent in the Writ Petition, despite their having arrayed him as the 4th respondent in W.P. No.36507 of 2017 wherein they had sought a similar interim relief i.e., to restrain the respondents therein (including the appellant herein) from interfering with their right to undertake construction of the conveyor belt in the land earmarked and given to them of an extent of Ac.16.00 cents in Krishnapatnam. The interim relief sought for in W.P.No.11730 of 2018 (the order passed in which is now under appeal before us) is to permit the petitioners to undertake the approved project work including construction of the conveyor facility in the earmarked land given to the petitioner at Krishnapatnam. The 1st respondent-writ petitioner had admitted, in the affidavit filed by them in support of W.P.No.36507 of 2017, that the columns sought to be raised would take around 3000 sq. feet of land belonging to the appellant, the conveyor belt had to go through the land of the appellant, 80% of the work had been completed except laying the conveyor belt passing through a part of the land of the appellant, and constructing support pillars for the overhead conveyor belt would not hinder the salt making business of the appellant, that too when the petitioner’s action was confined to an extent of 3000 sq. feet.

The 1st respondent-writ petitioner, in the affidavit filed in support of W.P.No.11730 of 2018, stated that 80% of the work had been completed, and the remaining part is to erect pillars over an extent of 3000 sq. feet at the ground level towards completion of construction of the conveyor belt; and an extent of Ac.326.52 cents of the salt department land, in various survey numbers, was leased to various salt manufacturers for a period of 20 years. The said affidavit also refers to the appellant having objected to the construction of the conveyor belt, to have come to the construction site in the month of October, 2017, and to have forcibly stalled construction stating that an order of status-quo was passed. Despite the aforesaid averments in the writ affidavit, and though they admitted that the work of laying a conveyor belt through salt department land (which they admitted, in W.P. No.36507 of 2017, to be in the appellant’s possession) was yet to be completed, the 1st respondent-writ petitioner has not arrayed the appellant as a respondent in W.P. No.11730 of 2018, and has secured an interim order from this Court behind his back.

As the 1st respondent-writ petitioner has admitted, in their writ affidavit in W.P. No.36507 of 2017, that the appellant had objected to their construction of pillars and a conveyor belt in October, 2017 itself, the contention that, if the appellant had raised these objections earlier, they would have avoided construction in the subject land, and would have chosen an alternative route, does not merit acceptance. In any event, any inconvenience caused to them, would not justify their illegal and high handed act of forcibly dispossessing the appellant from the land which, on the 1st respondent-writ petitioner’s own admission in W.P.No.36507 of 2017, was in his possession.

It does appear, prima-facie, that it is only because they were not granted any interim relief in W.P. No.36507 of 2017, wherein the appellant has been arrayed as the 4th respondent, has the 1st respondent-writ petitioner filed W.P. No.11730 of 2018 behind the appellant’s back, and suppressing relevant and material facts in the affidavit filed in support of W.P. No.11730 of 2018, that they had admitted, in the affidavit filed in support of W.P. No.36507 of 2017, that the concrete towers sought to be raised by them, on which the conveyor belt is sought to be laid, is on an extent of 3000 square feet of land in the appellant’s possession.

Failure of the 1st respondent-writ petitioner to array the appellant as a respondent in W.P. No.11730 of 2018 or to state, in the affidavit filed in support thereof, that the pillars being erected and the conveyor belt sought to be laid thereupon, was on a part of the land leased earlier to the appellant, does support the submission of Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, that the interim order under appeal was obtained by suppressing the aforesaid relevant and material facts. As the appellant herein was arrayed as the 4th respondent in W.P.No.36507 of 2017 and as the very same facts, in so far as erecting concrete pillars and in laying a conveyor belt over the subject land, are reiterated in the present Writ Petition (W.P.No.11730 of 2018), the appellant is undoubtedly a necessary and proper party to the Writ Petition. We find considerable force in the submission of Sri C.V.Mohan Reddy, Learned Senior Counsel, that non-joinder of the appellant, a necessary and proper party to the Writ Petition, as a respondent therein is fatal. We refrain from dismissing the Writ Petition on this ground, since the appeal before us is only against the interlocutory order passed therein.

A prerogative remedy is not available as a matter of course. In exercising its extraordinary power, a writ court will always bear in mind the conduct of the party invoking its jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose complete and full facts or suppresses relevant material, or is otherwise guilty of misleading the Court, the Court may dismiss the action without adjudicating the matter. This rule has been evolved in larger public interest to deter unscrupulous litigants from abusing the process of Court by deceiving it. The very basis of the Writ Jurisdiction rests in the disclosure of true, complete and correct facts. If the material facts are not candidly stated or are suppressed or are distorted, the very functioning of the Writ Court would become impossible. (Prestige Lights Ltd. v. SBI (2007) 8 SCC 449). A party, whose hands are soiled, cannot hold the writ of the Court. (R. v. Kensington Income Tax Commrs. (1917) 1 KB 486); Prestige Lights Ltd. (supra).

The High Court exercises discretionary and extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. A court of law is also a court of equity. It is, therefore, of utmost necessity that when a party approaches a High Court, he must place all the facts before the Court without reservation. (Prestige Lights Ltd. (supra). A person invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, must come with clean hands, and must make a full and complete disclosure of all material and relevant facts to the Court. Parties are not entitled to choose their own facts to put forward before the Court. The foundational facts should be pleaded enabling the Court to scrutinise the nature and content of the right alleged to have been violated by the authority. (Raj Kumar Soni v. State of U.P., (2007) 10 SCC 635).

If there is suppression of material facts on the part of the applicant, or twisted facts have been placed before the Court, the Writ Court may refuse to entertain the petition and dismiss it without entering into merits of the matter. (Prestige Lights Ltd. (supra). It has been the rule of the court, and one which it is of the greatest importance to maintain, that when an applicant comes to the court to obtain relief on an ex-parte statement he should make a full and fair disclosure of all material facts-facts, not law. He must not misstate the law if he can help it-the court is supposed to know the law. But it knows nothing about the facts, and the applicant must state fully and fairly the facts, and the penalty by which the court enforces that obligation is that if it finds out that the facts have not been fully and fairly stated to it, the court will set aside any action which it has taken on the faith of the imperfect statement. (R. v. Kensington Income Tax Commrs. (supra); Prestige Lights Ltd. (supra).

In the present case, the 1st respondent-writ petitioner has not only failed to disclose their right, if any, to raise any construction over the subject land which, on their own admission (in their affidavit filed in support of W.P.No.36507 of 2017), is in the appellant’s possession, they have also not arrayed the appellant as a respondent in W.P.No.11730 of 2018, though he is a necessary and proper party, evidently in order to secure an interim order behind his back, and because of their failure to secure an interim order in W.P.No.36507 of 2017. As the interim order, in I.A.No.1 of 2018 in W.P.No.11730 of 2018 dated 17.04.2018, was obtained without full, fair and complete disclosure of all relevant and material facts, the interlocutory order under appeal is liable to be set aside on this score.

While the submission of Sri C.V.Mohan Reddy, Learned Senior Counsel, that W.P. No.11730 of 2018, filed by the 1st respondent-writ petitioner, is a gross abuse of the process of the Court has considerable force, we must bear in mind that the present appeal is preferred only against the interim order passed by the Learned Single Judge, and the Writ Petition is still pending adjudication before him. It would be wholly inappropriate for us, while hearing an appeal against an interlocutory order, to conclusively record a finding that the respondent-writ petitioner has abused the process of Court, and thereafter hold that W.P. No.11730 of 2018 is liable to be dismissed on this ground.

IV. HAS THE APPELLANT FAILED TO FURNISH PROOF OF HIS BEING IN POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT LANDS?

Sri D.V.Sitharama Murthy, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the 1st respondent-writ petitioner, would submit that the appellant has not furnished details of the survey numbers of the lands leased in his favour earlier, or those allegedly in their possession; the order of status-quo did not confer any right on the appellant to deny the respondent-writ petitioners their right to erect cement pillars, and to lay a conveyor belt thereupon; and, if the appellant had objected earlier, the 1st respondent-writ petitioner would have avoided construction on the subject land, and would have chosen an alternative route.

In his affidavit filed in I.A. No.1 of 2018 in W.A. No.657 of 2018, seeking leave to appeal, the appellant has stated that he and his forefathers were manufacturing, excavating and collecting salt in about 41.60 acres of land in Sy. No.440/3 and 772 of Krishnapatnam village, from times immemorial. The Superintendent of Salt informed the Deputy Salt Commissioner, Chennai, vide letter dated 22.05.2017, that out of 763.86 acres, available as per the joint survey, KPCL had encroached on an extent of 43.46 acres for the rail-road corridor; and the housing colony for weaker sections occupied 2.53 acres for which pattas had been granted by the Tahsildar during 1975. Details of the 43.46 acres, encroached by KPCL, were furnished in the said letter wherein the extent of encroached area, of the land leased to the appellant, is shown as 31.66 acres in R.S. No.440/3 and 772/P2. It is further stated in the said letter dated 22.05.2017 that KPCL had encroached upon salt department land during 2011-12, despite visits by higher officials to Krishnapatnam Salt Factory; KPCL had not paid the lease money after 11.09.2012 even for the extent of 1.05 acres for which permission had been granted for establishment of a conveyor belt vide Deputy Salt Commissioner, Chennai letter dated 03.09.2009; they had not paid the lease money after 11.09.2012; further renewal of the area was not granted, and was pending at the higher level; and the encroached land should either be transferred to the Government of Andhra Pradesh/KPCL, or KPCL should be evicted from the encroached area of 43.46 acres. A copy of the survey report was forwarded to the Deputy Salt Commissioner.

The appellant’s assertion, in his affidavit, that he was granted lease of an extent of Ac.41.60 cents of land in Survey Nos.440/3 and 772/P2 of Krishnapatnam village, is supported by the letter of the Superintendent of Salt dated 22.05.2017 wherein it is stated that KPCL had encroached upon an extent Ac.31.66 acres of land leased to the appellant in Survey Nos.440/3 and 772/P2 of Krishnapatnam village. The contention that the appellant has not furnished details of the survey numbers of the land, leased in his favour earlier, is therefore not tenable. As has been noted in the order passed by us in I.A.No.1 of 2018 in W.A.No.657 of 2018 dated 20.06.2018, even after exclusion of Ac.31.66 cents of land, leased earlier in the appellant’s favour which is said to have been encroached upon by KPCL, the remaining extent of the lease land, in the appellant’s possession in Survey No.440/3 and 772 of Krishnapatnam village, was an extent of Ac.9.94 cents which, in the light of the admission of the 1st respondent-writ petitioner in W.P. No.36507 of 2017, evidently includes the 3000 square feet of land over which concrete pillars and a conveyor belt is sought to be laid.

V. IS THE APPELLANT’S GRIEVANCE ONLY REGARDING PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION?

Sri D.V. Sitharama Murthy, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-writ petitioner, would submit that the appellant’s grievance is only regarding payment of compensation which has already been determined; and the appellant’s grievance regarding non-payment of compensation can only be agitated against the Government of India, the Government of Andhra Pradesh and KPCL, and not the respondent-writ petitioners.

It does appear that, while extending their lease periodically for a period of 11 months each, lessees of the subject lands, belonging to Krishnapatnam Salt Factory, were offered alternate lands; and instead the lessees had expressed their desire to be paid a compensation package of Rs.5.00 Lakhs per acre. In his letter dated 17.05.2016, the Deputy Commissioner of Salt, Chennai informed the Salt Commissioner, Jaipur that they had 796.9869 acres of land at Krishnapatnam Salt Factory; an extent of 21.468 acres was transferred to the State Government, and the balance land of 775.3489 acres was available with them; there were 101 lessees, and 570.2626 acres were under lease for the manufacture of salt; the lessees were willing to give up the land on payment of compensation mutually arrived at by them with the District Collector; they were not willing to take alternative land in exchange; the lessees had proposed a compensation package of Rs.5 lakhs per acre; he had communicated the views of the Lessees to the District Collector, and had requested that action be initiated, by transfer of land, on payment of the market value of the land as compensation to the affected lessees etc; the District Collector had been requested to furnish the market value along with the proposal for transfer of the land; and they may consider transfer of the land, after receipt of full fledged proposal and market value details from the Collector , Nellore. A similar letter was addressed by the Salt Commissioner to the District Collector on 18.05.2006 for initiation of action for transfer, on condition that compensation to the affected lease holders is paid by the State Government; and market value is fixed by the Government of Andhra Pradesh, at the time of transfer of land, to be paid to the Salt Department.

While the lessees no doubt sought payment of compensation as a condition for their surrendering the leased lands in their possession, the fact remains that no compensation has been paid to them till date; and in view of the interim order of status-quo passed in W.P.No.33436 of 2012 dated 19.10.2012, the Government of India was disabled from evicting the lessees (including the appellant) from the salt factory lands in their possession. While the Government of India may have the right to evict the lessees (including the appellant) from the subject lands in accordance with law, if and after the interim order in W.P. No.33436 of 2012 is vacated or the said Writ Petition is dismissed, the 1st respondent-writ petitioner could not have taken law into its own hands and, under the protection of the interim order obtained surreptitiously from this Court behind the appellant’s back, to forcibly dispossess the appellant from the subject lands.

VI. SHOULD THE APPELLANT BE RELEGATED TO RAISE ALL THESE CONTENTIONS BEFORE THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE?

Sri D.V. Sitharama Murthy, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-writ petitioner, would submit that the Salt Commissioner has filed a counter-affidavit, along with a vacate stay petition in W.P.No.11730 of 2018; and all these contentions, on the merits of the dispute, can be agitated therein.

It is not as if the interim order under appeal was passed in a Writ Petition where the appellant herein was arrayed as a respondent. It is only on his being granted leave to file the appeal, is the appellant now being heard on the validity of the interlocutory order passed in I.A.No.1 of 2018 in W.P.No.11730 of 2018 dated 17.04.2018. The very object of granting leave to appeal is to hear the appellant on the merits of the order under appeal. It would be wholly inappropriate for us, having granted the appellant leave to prefer an appeal, to now relegate him to file an application to implead himself in the Writ Petition, and seek vacation of the interim order along with the Salt Commissioner, who is said to have filed a petition, on behalf of the Government of India, for the interim order to be vacated. This contention also necessitates rejection.

VII. IS THE WRIT PETITION, FILED BY THE 1ST RESPONDENTWRIT PETITONER, MAINTAINABLE?

Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, would submit that no relief has been sought in the Writ Petition either against the Government of India or the Government of Andhra Pradesh; KPCL is not an instrumentality of the State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India; the respondent-writ petitioner was, therefore, not entitled to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India; and the Writ Petition as filed is not maintainable. The public law remedy, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, cannot be sought to enforce rights in the private law realm, as the remedy for such enforcement, ordinarily, is before the Civil Court of competent jurisdiction. While a Writ Petition for enforcement of contractual rights and obligations, against the State or its instrumentalities, may be entertained by the High Court in its discretion, no Writ Petition would lie for enforcement of contractual rights and obligations between two private parties. While the relief sought for in W.P.No.11730 of 2018 is both against the Government of Andhra Pradesh and KPCL, the writ affidavit makes no mention of any contractual arrangement between the Government of Andhra Pradesh and the 1st respondent-writ petitioner. As the 1st respondent-writ petitioner has not based its claim, for grant of relief – either interlocutory or final, on any statute or statutory rule, and only place reliance on certain agreements entered into with KPCL, it is only if KPCL is held to be an instrumentality of the Stat

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e, under Article 12 of the Constitution of India, would this Court be justified in exercising its discretion to entertain the Writ Petition. The writ affidavit neither states that KPCL is an instrumentality of the State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India, nor does it contain details as to how it is. It is for the first time across the Bar, during the hearing of this appeal, has Sri D.V. Sitharama Murthy, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the 1st respondent-writ petitioner, contended that, since KPCL itself is a build, operate and transfer project and has entered into a public – private partnership with the Government of Andhra Pradesh, a Writ would lie against KPCL. While we have our doubts as to whether a Writ Petition would lie against KPCL, and whether it is an instrumentality of the State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India, we refrain from delving on this aspect any further, since W.P.No.11730 of 2018 is still pending adjudication before the Learned Single Judge. VIII. IS THE APPELLANT ENTITLED FOR RESTITUTION IN THESE PROCEEDINGS UNDER CLAUSE 15 OF THE LETTERS PATENT? Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, would submit that this Court should not only direct restitution, but should also direct the 1st respondent-writ petitioner to vacate the said land, and remove the unauthorized and illegal construction i.e the concrete pillars on the appellant’s land and the conveyer belt being laid thereupon; and, in any event, this Court should atleast direct the 1st respondent-writ petitioner not to use the subject land. A party who succeeds ultimately is to be placed in the same position he would have been if the Court had not passed the interim order, (Karnataka Rare Earth v. Senior Geologist, Depot of Mines & Geology (2004) 2 SCC 783), otherwise litigation may turn into a fruitful industry, and unscrupulous litigants may feel encouraged to approach Courts persuading it to pass interlocutory orders favourable to them. If the concept of restitution is excluded, from its application to interim orders, the litigant would stand to gain by swallowing the benefits of an interim order, even though the battle has been lost at the end. This cannot be countenanced. The factor attracting applicability of restitution is not the act of the Court being wrongful or a mistake or error committed by the Court. The test is whether an act of the party in persuading the Court to pass an order, held at the end as not sustainable, has resulted in one party gaining an advantage it would not have otherwise earned, or the other party suffering an impoverishment which it would not have suffered but for the order of the Court and the act of such party. The injury, if any, caused by the act of the Court shall be undone. Any opinion to the contrary would lead to unjust if not disastrous consequences. (South Eastern Coal fields v. State of M.P. (2003) 8 SCC 648); Kalabharati Avertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania (2010) 9 SCC 437). The maxim, 'actus curiae neminem gravabit', means that the act of the Court shall prejudice no one. This maxim is founded upon justice and good sense; and affords a safe and certain guide for the (50 administration of the law. (State of Punjab v. Darshan Singh (2004) 1 SCC 328); Jayalakshmi Coelho v. Oswald Joseph Coelho (2001) 4 SCC 181). The Court is under an obligation to undo the wrong done to a party by the act of the Court. Any undeserved or unfair advantage gained by a party to the proceedings must be neutralized as the institution of litigation cannot be permitted to confer any advantage on a party by the delayed action of the Court. (Kalabharati Avertising37; A.R. Sircar (Dr) v. State of U.P. (1993 Suppl.(2) SCC 734); Shivsankar v. Board of Directors, U.P.SRTC (1995 Suppl (2) SCC 726); Inter College, Arya Nagar Kanpur v. Sree Kumar Tiwary (1997) 4 SCC 388); GTC Industries Limited v. Union of India (1998) 3 SCC 376); and Jaipur Municipal Corporation v. C.L Mishra (2005) 8 SCC 423). No person can suffer from the act of the Court. Any undeserved or unfair advantage gained by a party, in view of the interim order of the Court, must be neutralized. (Ramakrishna Verma v. State of U.P. (1992) 2 SCC 620); Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. ITO (1980) 2 SCC 191); Mahadeo Savlaram Shelke v. Pune Municipal Corporation (1995) 3 SCC 33). The principle of restitution should be fully applied in a pragmatic manner in order to do real and substantial justice. (Ramrameshwari Devi (supra). Consequently dispossession of the appellant from the subject land, the concrete pillars raised thereupon and the conveyor belt being laid over it, under the protection of the interim order under appeal, should, if the writ petition is eventually dismissed, be neutralized, and the respondent-writ petitioner should be directed to make suitable reparation to the appellant herein. While it does appear to us that the 1st respondent-writ petitioner was wholly unjustified in seeking and securing the interlocutory order under appeal, the appellant would be entitled to seek restitution only if, and after, W.P.No.11730 of 2018 is dismissed. While we find considerable force in the submission, urged on behalf of the appellant, that the respondent-writ petitioner had surreptitiously and under the protection of the interim order of this Court, forcibly and illegally dispossessed the appellant of a part of the land in their possession, these are all matters which are required to be considered by the Learned Single Judge when W.P. No.11730 of 2018 is finally heard. It is only if, and after, W.P. No.11730 of 2018 is finally heard and dismissed, can the appellant’s claim for restitution, and to be compensated for the damages suffered by them as a result of the interim order passed by this Court, be examined. As W.P. No.11730 of 2018 was filed not by the appellant, but by the 1st respondent-writ petitioner, it is debatable whether, in such a Writ Petition, the appellant can be granted restitution for any damages suffered by them as a result of the interim order passed in favour of the 1st respondent-writ petitioner. That does not, however, mean that the appellant should left remediless, for we cannot be blind to the fact that, in view of the huge pendency of cases in this Court, W.P.No.11730 of 2018 would not, in the normal course, come up for hearing in the next four to five years. It is stated by Sri C.V.Mohan Reddy, Learned Senior Counsel, that the 1st respondent-writ petitioner has already erected pillars on a part of the land hitherto leased in the appellant’s favour, in view of the interim order passed by this Court in W.P.No.33436 of 2012 dated 19.10.2012. As failure to grant any form of relief would enable the 1st respondent-writ petitioner to complete construction of the conveyor belt, on a part of the land in the appellant’s possession, and over which they have evidently no right, it is necessary to grant some form of protection to the appellant herein from such, prima-facie, high-handed and illegal act of dispossession of the land of the appellant by the 1st respondent-writ petitioner. While leaving it open to the appellant to agitate his claim for restitution to be agitated in independent legal proceedings, if any, instituted by the appellant herein, suffice it if, for a period of six weeks from today, the 1st respondent-writ petitioner is directed not raise any further construction on the subject land including laying a conveyor belt thereupon, or utilize these lands for any purpose. There shall be a direction accordingly. It is open to the appellant, in the meanwhile, to avail his common law remedy of filing a Suit before the competent Civil Court against the 1st respondent-writ petitioner herein, and seek appropriate reliefs. The order under appeal is set aside, and the Writ Appeal is allowed with exemplary costs which we quantify as Rs.25,000/- payable to the appellant by the 1st respondent-writ petitioner. Failure to make payment within four weeks from today would enable the appellant to recover the said amount in accordance with law. It is left open to the appellant to avail such legal remedies, as are available to him in law, to have the 1st respondent-writ petitioner evicted from the subject land from which the appellant appears to have been illegally dispossessed, and to seek other appropriate reliefs. The miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, shall stand closed.