For political activists in Germany, the G8 summit entailed a
great deal of work in organising blockades and accommodation
for the thousands people who came to protest in Heiligendamm
in June 2007 (80,000 people demonstrated on 2 June in Rostock,
20,000 people remained for a week in camps around Heiligendamm
and 10,000 people took part in peaceful blockades). It also triggered
a large scale secret service and police investigation into political
activist scenes across the country. Anti-terrorist powers were
applied to demonstrators, subjecting them to undercover surveillance,
interception of telecommunications, police raids of homes and
work places and the confiscation of computers and personal data.
Around 2,000 people are said to have been affected by the surveillance.
A series of court rulings have since declared the investigations
unlawful and almost all of the charges have been dropped due
to lack of
evidence. However, their purpose, to collect data on political
activists, disrupt their activities and map their social networks
and activities, has been achieved.

The latest investigation to be dropped due to lack of evidence
concerns 11 anti-fascist activists from Bad Oldesloe who were
subjected to an anti-terrorism investigation under Article 129
and 129a of the Criminal Code (StGB) in the run-up to the G8
summit, and more specifically a house raid on 17 June 2007.

The Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof - BGH) decided
in January this year that a series of investigations launched
by the Federal Public Prosecution (Bundesanwaltschaft - BAW)
against individuals in multiple German cities on grounds of formation
of a terrorist organisation (Article 129a StGB) had no basis.
The BGH passed the cases back to the responsible regional public
prosecution offices to test whether they had merit on grounds
of formation of a criminal
organisation (Article 129 StGB).

In June this year, the Flensburg regional court declared the
raids unlawful and found the accusations under Article 129 to
be without merit, before any charges had been brought. The decision
by the BAWs investigating judge to allow the house raids
was thefore also unlawful. Apart from their houses being raided,
the 11 anti-fascists were subjected to internet and telephone
interception, including the interception of their conversations
with journalists and their lawyers, as well as being tailed and
the surveillance of private homes.

Noteworthy is the complacency surrounding these privacy violations
and the - by now standard - practice of using anti-terrorist
laws to curtail, control and intimidate left-wing political activists
without any evidence of their engaging in criminal activity.

Parliamentary questions have not prompted the government into
justifying these civil liberties infringements as the government's
answer to a question by the Left Party (Die Linke) in parliament
reveals. Several MPs sought clarification as to how, and against
which activists, the anti-terrorist legislation was being used;
how many procedures were initiated on grounds of the "support
and promotion" of a terrorist organisation and whether investigations
had led to any charges and convictions. It appears that the authorities
do not distinguish between the uses of anti-terrorist measures
against Islamic or left-wing activists in their statistics. Nor
do they distinguish between the "support" or "promotion"
of a terrorist organisation and the formation of, or active involvement
in, one. They only collect data separately on its use against
the right-wing scene.

According to the government, 62 procedures were initiated against
Islamic and left-wing groups, specifically against 103 individuals,
and 845 persons were subjected to interception of telecommunications.
In contrast, three procedures were initiated against the right,
with only one person charged; no one on the right had their telecommunications
intercepted.

A closer look at the annual statistics on the use of Germany's
anti-terrorist legislation shows that less than five per cent
of the criminal investigations initiated on grounds of Article
129a StGB led to proceedings, and only one per cent led to charges
brought in court. Alexander Hoffmann, one of the lawyers of the
eleven accused from Bad Oldesloe, argues that:

"Article 129a is a political legal instrument - and is
used accordingly by the Federal Public Prosecution. In this case
also, the Article (as the Flensburg regional court ruling has
now confirmed) served primarily to initiate the surveillance
and criminalisation of unwanted opposition groups and their surroundings."

It was appropriate then that Monika Harms, the Federal Public
Prosecutor (Generalbundesanwältin) who authorised the anti-terrorist
measures to be applied against left-wing activists in the run-up
to G8 summit, won Germany's 2007 Big Brother award in the category
Government Authorities and Administration. The Big
Brother jury gave her the award
for the measures taken against opponents of the G8 summit and
found two aspects particularly dubious and therefore prize worthy:

First, Ms Harms sought approval from judges at the Federal Court
of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof, Germanys appeals court in
cases of civil and criminal law) to carry out systematic postal
surveillance in Hamburg, in search of letters from militant G8
opponents claiming responsibility for an arson attack. As a consequence,
all letters in the affected districts
of Hamburg were inspected for suspicious external features.

Second, Ms Harms gave instructions for body scent samples to
be collected and preserved from G8 opponents suspected of militancy.
This caused investigators to seriously intrude into the private
sphere and individual rights of the people affected.

The application for postal surveillance as well as the order
to gather scent samples were connected to the searches of 40
private homes, offices, cultural centres and internet servers,
under § 129a of the German Criminal Code (StGB), which penalises
joining terrorist groups. This placed leftist groups and globalisation
critics under suspicion of terrorism before the G8 summit even
began. These methods have not led to the uncovering of any terrorist
plots, but rather to widespread state snooping, data registration
and processing. This illicitly gathered information will likely
be used to chart social relations between potential G8 protesters
and their opponents.

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