Relator filed a =
divorce action=20
in Harris County on June 24, 2004, which included a request for =
custody=20
of, and support for, her daughter. On October 22, 2004, real =
party=20
James Schoelpple, the child=3Ds maternal =
grandfather, filed=20
an AOriginal Petition in=20
Intervention of Grandparent for Conservatorship and Petition for=20
Grandparent=3Ds Access,@ requesting =
appointment as=20
possessory conservator and possession of and access to the =
child. On=20
November 15, 2004, relator and her then-husband, David Mora, filed =
notices=20
of nonsuit, stating they were attempting to reconcile. The =
trial=20
court signed a dismissal order as to the divorce petition shortly=20
thereafter. On June 15, 2005, relator filed a divorce action =
in=20
Cherokee County,[1] =
but did=20
not disclose the Harris County suit.

Following the =
nonsuit, the=20
Harris County court proceeded on real party=3Ds petition. A =
trial was=20
conducted[2] =
and, on=20
July 14, 2005, an agreed order was entered, granting real party =
access to=20
the child (Aagreed access =
order@).[3] =20
Real party subsequently filed a motion to enforce the agreed =
access order=20
in the Harris County court, and relator filed a motion to dismiss =
for want=20
of jurisdiction. Respondent signed an order denying=20
relator=3Ds motion to dismiss =
on October=20
27, 2006, and relator challenges that order in this mandamus =
proceeding.[4] =

Discussion

In her mandamus =
petition,=20
relator argues the agreed access order is void, contending that =
when she=20
and Mora nonsuited the divorce action, there was no longer a suit =
in which=20
real party could intervene. She asks this court to compel =
respondent=20
to dismiss the agreed access order as void. =20

Mandamus issues only =
to correct=20
a clear abuse of discretion or a violation of a duty imposed by =
law when=20
there is no other adequate remedy at law. See Walker v.=20
Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992) (orig. =
proceeding). If a=20
court issues a void order, the relator need not show it does not =
have an=20
adequate appellate remedy, and mandamus relief is =
appropriate. In=20
re Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Tex. 2000) =
(orig.=20
proceeding).

Further, any party =
may=20
intervene in a suit by filing a pleading, subject to being =
stricken out by=20
the court for sufficient cause on the motion of any party. =
Tex. R.=20
Civ. P. 60; In re D.D.M., 116 S.W.3d at 231. =
AUpon filing of the =
petition, an=20
intervenor becomes a party to the suit for all =
purposes,@ and if a party is =
nonsuited or=20
dismissed, a party=3Ds claim for =
affirmative relief=20
is not prejudiced. In re D.D.M., 116 S.W.3d at=20
231. A claim for affirmative relief is one that allows the=20
intervenor to recover relief despite plaintiff=3Ds abandonment or =
failure to=20
establish a claim. Id. at 232. Section 153.432=20
expressly allows a grandparent to seek access of a grandchild =
independent=20
of a suit for managing conservatorship and, consequently, real=20
party=3Ds request for access, =
as a=20
claim for affirmative relief, survived the nonsuit. See =
Tex.=20
Fam. Code Ann. ' 153.432(b); In re =
D.D.M., 116 S.W.3d at 231.

Conclusion

In sum, relator has =
failed to=20
establish that she is entitled to the requested relief. =
Accordingly,=20
we deny relator=3Ds petition for writ =
of=20
mandamus.

[1]A final divorce decree was signed by the =
Cherokee=20
County court on June 7, 2006.

[2]This court was not furnished with a copy =
of the=20
transcript from the trial.

[3]The agreed access order contains the =
statutory=20
notices required under section 105.006 of the Family Code, =
AContents of a Final Order.@See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. =
' 105.006 (Vernon Supp. 2006). =
Further, it=20
was entered in the case as a default judgment and states, in part, =
that=20
(a) the court had jurisdiction of the case and the parties, (b)=20
Ano other court has continuing, exclusive =
jurisdiction,@ and (c) Aall relief requested in this case and =
not=20
expressly granted is denied.@

[4]Relator also filed a motion to transfer =
the case=20
to Cherokee County, which real party alleges was denied; however, =
relator=20
does not challenge that ruling in this original proceeding. =
See=20
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. ' 155.201 (setting out circumstances for =
mandatory=20
transfer).

[5]A SAPCR is defined in the Family Code as =
follows:=20
A>Suit affecting the parent‑child=20
relationship=3D means a suit filed as provided by this =
title in=20
which the appointment of a managing conservator or a possessory=20
conservator, access to or support of a child, or =
establishment or=20
termination of the parent‑child relationship is =
requested.@Id.' 101.032(a) (Vernon 2002) (emphasis=20
added).

[6]Section 153.432 was amended effective =
September 1,=20
2005 to permit a grandparent to file an original suit to request=20
Apossession of@ or access to a grandchild. See =
Tex.=20
Fam. Code Ann. ' 153.432 (Vernon Supp. 2006). The =
previous=20
version of the statute applies in this case. See=20
id.

[7]Section 102.004(b) was amended effective =
June 1,=20
2005; the amendments apply to original suits filed on that date or =
thereafter. See ' 102.004 historical note (Vernon Supp.=20
2006). The previous version of the statute applies to this=20
case.

[8]In support of her argument, relator =
relies on two=20
cases dealing with the death of a spouse during a pending =
divorce. =20
See Griggs v. Latham, 98 S.W.3d 382 (Tex. App.CCorpus Christi 2003, pet. denied); =
Smelscer v.=20
Smelscer, 901 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. App.CEl Paso 1995, no writ). However, =
those cases=20
are distinguishable because, here, relator is asserting a =
collateral=20
attack on the agreed access order and our review is limited to the =
Harris=20
County court=3Ds jurisdiction to render that =
order. Also,=20
although relator asserts that real party was unable to intervene =
and=20
petition for access within one pleading, she did not cite, nor did =
we=20
find, authority to support that statement. =20