Entrance/Exit

﻿What are we doing? We're trying to move people from A to B and back again without hurting anyone. We're trying to provide the advertised service no matter what, without jeopardizing anyone's safety, no matter what. If it comes down to a "choice" between those two, then we've pretty much failed at the getgo.

Jeopardy is not risk. We accept risk. We manage risk. However, we can only manage risk with an ongoing strategy of reducing risk. There is no other way to manage risk.

So if a railroad professional takes the position that "everything is safe enough, the engineer/conductor/dispatcher/whatever should just do his/her job according to the rules or not come in to work," a big, critical, vital point has been missed.

Human beings don't have to try to do things deliberately to hurt people to actually hurt people. Human beings kill others while trying to do the right thing. That's one point.

We can prevent a lot of that. That's the other point.

Those who think our train control systems are safe enough, should remember that "token block" systems (British "pass the baton") are safe enough too as long as everybody remembers to observe all the rules. Such systems are safe enough until they aren't. And then it's too late.

Those who think ABS, and ATC and CTC are safe enough should recall that that 40% of the trackage in the rail system of the US, handling what? about 18-20% of the traffic is dark territory. Graniteville ring a bell?

Those who think there's some sort of problem with a whole generation of people, including railroaders, because of "coddling" or regulations or enhanced technology, are ignoring the fact that 30 years ago, rail operations were less safe; and 30 years before that even less safe, so if its a generational problem it might be better to point the finger at earlier generations.

"Fingering the train and engine crews?" Maybe. I've been in the business since 1972. I know the risk of overspeeding at DV on MNR; at Frankford Jct. on the NEC; or in terminals. Everybody in this business has encountered overspeeding, deliberate and "unintentional."

The painful fact is that the locomotive engineers failed to control the speeds of the trains in these three incidents including Hoboken, and in all three incidents the conductors on the trains were oblivious to the speeds and locations of the trains.

It doesn't matter why the locomotive engineer failed to control the speed of the train-- sleep apnea, distraction, cell phone, fight with significant other. It doesn't matter why the train crew didn't take action-- in the bathroom, assisting a passenger, sorting the receipts. None of that matters. All the "reasons" can't change the results, and we're supposed to be about changing results, not simply accumulating reasons.

What does matter is designing and installing systems that reduce the risk of another such incident-- so the next time a locomotive engineer loses "situational awareness" some poor woman standing on the platform; or some student returning home; or some old geezer, about my age, or yours, about my height, or yours, about my weight, or yours, having his 2nd beer in the club car doesn't pay the horrible and totally unnecessary price.

October 7, 2016

If only you could see what I have seen with your eyes-- Roy Batty, Blade Runner