HRNK intern Xiaocheng Ziang was tasked to conduct research
on primary sources reflecting Chinese official and media reactions to the North
Korean nuclear tests conducted in October 2006, May 2009 and February 2013, and
to provide accurate translations of the terminology used. The research
indicates that the Chinese reaction to the first test in October 2006 was the
strongest. Chinese reactions to the recent February 2013 test were not more
forceful than before. The findings of that research are
summarized below.

I. Statements by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

"Prevent" rather than "oppose"
proliferation of nuclear weapons. The word "prevent" might mean China
will offer to do some concrete actions as a response to the DPRK's behavior
rather than just verbally "oppose" the launches.

The recurring statement, "China will continue to make
unremitting efforts to maintain peace and stability in the Northeast Asia
region," was not used in 2013. Some experts believe the absence of this
statement means that China will no longer tolerate the DPRK's aggressive
behavior. It is possible that China will take actions to prevent the DPRK's
nuclear program.

The following three statements detail the differences in word-usage:

1. October 9, 2006: First Test

The Chinese government is resolutely opposed to the nuclear
test by the DPRK.

The DPRK flagrantly conducted the test.

China strongly demands the DPRK to live up to its commitment
to the denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, stop any activity that may
worsen the situation, and return to the Six-Party Talks.

It has been the firm, unshakable and consistent stance of
the Chinese government to realize the denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula
and oppose proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The Chinese government calls for a calm response from all concerned
parties and urges them to keep to a peaceful resolution of the issue through
consultations and dialogues.

China will continue to make unremitting efforts to
maintain peace and stability in the Northeast Asia region.

2. May 25, 2009: Second Test

The Chinese government is resolutely opposed to the nuclear
test by the DPRK.

The DPRK disregarded/ignored（无视）opposition by the international community.

China strongly demands the DPRK to live up to its commitment
to denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, stop any activity that may worsen
the situation, and return to the Six-Party Talks.

China opposes the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

China will continue to make unremitting efforts to maintain
peace and stability in the Northeast Asia region.

3. Feb. 12th, 2013: Third Test

The Chinese government is resolutely opposed to the nuclear
test by the DPRK.

Regardless of opposition by the international community.

Prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons.

China strongly urges the DPRK

II. Top Leaders’ Reactions: Presidents and Foreign Ministers

China's reactions to the third test included phone calls to
the U.S., ROK, as well as a call to the DPRK ambassador. The previous two nuclear
tests only involved two of the three actions.

1. October 9, 2006: First Test

Chinese President Hu Jintao spoke over the telephone with
U.S. President George W. Bush, stating China’s viewpoint and requiring the DPRK
to no longer take aggressive actions that might further aggravate the
situation.

Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing talked over the telephone
with U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, exchanging views on the latest
development of the situation on the Korean peninsula. Li reiterated
China's solemn and just position on the issue as announced in the Foreign
Ministry's statement.

Vice President Xi Jingping expressed strong criticism when
meeting with Director Lee Sung-hui of the ROK Ministry of Defense.

Zhen Zhili, Vice Chairman of the People's Assembly, canceled
a planned official visit to North Korea.

3. February 12, 2013: Third Test

February 12th: Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi calls in the DPRK ambassador Ji
Jae-ryong, lodging official criticism and opposition to the test. Yang says
that China is discontent and strongly against the third test. Yang also requests
the DPRK to stop any actions that might result in a deterioration of the situation.

February 12th: Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi speaks over the
telephone with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry in the evening, exchanging
views on the latest test. Yang reiterated China's solemn and just position on
the issue, calling for a resolution to be sought under the Six-Party Talks.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao at the routine press
conference: (1) International community should not "punish" North
Korea. (Punishment is not the goal, which means China opposes sanctions& does not think sanctions will work.)
(2) Chinese aid to North Korea will not be influenced since it is meant to
improve the livelihoods of North Koreans.

2. Second Test

No information about the press conference on the second test.
There were no routine press conferences during the Chinese New Year holiday
From February the 10th to February the 25th, 2013.

3. February 18, 2013: Third Test (First Press Conference after
the New Year)

On the new UNSC sanctions on North Korea: China is willing
to talk with the UNSC, ROK, and U.S. on nuclear issues in the DPRK. There is NO
direct response on whether China will support U.N. sanctions or not.

IV. Media

1. May 25, 2009: Second Test

High-level communication between China and the DPRK pauses
for a short time.

2009 marks the 60th anniversary of China-DPRK relations,
however, China is unwilling to hold any celebrations at this point.

China highlights control over exporting to North Korea after the second nuclear
test.

China is strongly discontent with the DPRK's second test and
also expresses concerns about radiation influence on the Northeastern residents
in China.

China is said to rethink its foreign policy on the DPRK.

June 13, 2009 People’s Daily: China supports the UNSC's
response to the DPRK's second test.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang says
"sanctions" are not the goal, and political and foreign policy methods
are the only ways to solve the problem.

2. February 12, 2013: Third Test

Due to special editions during the Chinese New Year, People’s
Daily did not publish any commentary on North Korea, but two days later on the
14th, it listed criticism from different countries on the third page.

February 19, 2013 People's Daily: United States makes use of
the DPRK’s third test. Ren Weidong, junior researcher at China Institute of Contemporary International
Relations published an editorial article claiming that the United States
created public panic about the DPRK’s third test.

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The views and opinions expressed here are those of the authors' and not those of any other person, organization, or entity; they are the authors' alone. Specifically, they do not represent the views of the Board of Directors of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) nor necessarily reflect the official policy or position of HRNK.