Less than seven months later, on April 6, 2009, as Perkovich wrote in a piece for the Guardian,
"President Barack Obama gave a landmark speech in Prague on Sunday
committing the United States to the goal of a world free of nuclear
weapons, and laying out realistic steps to that end."

There is little question that the president has heeded the call.
Speaking to the press on May 19 about the impact of Kissinger and
company, Obama declared, "What they have come together to help
galvanize is a recognition that we do not want a world of continued
nuclear proliferation, and that in order for us to meet the
security challenges of the future, America has to take leadership
in this area."

And indeed, the president has shown leadership. He promised to
negotiate a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with Russia. He
pledged to push for a multilateral Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty
to end the production of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium. The
president also committed to seeking U.S. ratification of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which the Senate had previously
rejected in 1999. The White House also did not dismiss the prospect
of putting anti-missile arms negotiations back on the table, and it
is prepared to accept a treaty proposed by the Chinese and Russians
to "prevent an arms race in outer space."

There is, however, a problem with the president's plan to run
down the road to zero -- namely, that we've been down that road
before, and it did not get us very far. The White House is
resurrecting the traditional instruments of nuclear
nonproliferation and arms control that Moscow and Washington
trotted out during the Cold War -- measures that, by and large,
proved a failure at ever eliminating one nuclear weapon or a single
missile. At best, it could be argued that at times they let each
side take a breather, occasionally slowing down the arms race.

Ronald Reagan -- who, coincidentally, shared the vision of a
world without nuclear weapons -- did the most to turn back the
doomsday clock by breaking all the arms control rules. Among other
things, he insisted, in the long term, on building and deploying
missile defenses -- which eventually led to the U.S. pulling out of
the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in December 2001; and, in the
short term, on modernizing and strengthening U.S. nuclear forces.
Reagan's vision of a world without nuclear weapons was not
dependent on ending the arms race altogether, but rather on driving
the arms race in a new and more benign direction. He called on
scientists to design new weapons to render nuclear weapons useless,
believing that building a new generation of weapons based on new
technologies would prove more effective in doing so than a utopian
vision of a world without war. He understood, first and foremost,
that competition is a permanent element of international relations,
particularly in the enterprise of arms control. The story of how he
sought to use arms control to defeat the Soviet Union, and how he
succeeded, is brilliantly told in two books: "Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear
Weapons," by Paul Lettow (2006), and the even more revealing
"Reagan's Secret War: The Untold Story of His Fight
to Save the World From Nuclear Disaster," by Martin and
Annelise Anderson (2009).

After Reagan, we pretty much went back to business as usual. And
the traditional arms control business didn't work very well. At the
height of the Cold War there were six declared nuclear powers. Now
there are nine. During the Cold War, at least four countries gave
up the quest for nuclear arms voluntarily -- Brazil, South Korea,
South Africa, and Taiwan. Since then, only one has packed it in --
Libya.

Nonproliferation has not worked so well either. Both Iran and
North Korea were signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty. Today, North Korea has an active nuclear weapons program,
and many believe that Iran's uranium enrichment program masks
similar intentions.

Iraq had signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as well.
That did not turn out too well either. The first Gulf War targeted,
among other things, Saddam Hussein's nuclear program, and the 2003
invasion of Iraq grew out of uncertainty over whether that program
had been stopped. Indeed, after the first Gulf War, IAEA inspectors
were stunned to discover the extent of Iraq's uranium-enrichment
program. Chief U.N. inspector Hans Blix acknowledged in his book,
"Disarming Iraq" (2004), that "we suspected Iraq
aimed at a nuclear weapon . . . [T]here could be no confidence that
the three enrichment programs Iraq had by [1991] admitted had
peaceful purposes." It was, in fact, the success of Saddam's
cat-and-mouse games in outwitting the IAEA that made the U.S. so
fearful a decade later that Saddam had covertly rebuilt his
program. In part, war came because the U.S. had no confidence in
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime to stop a nation intent
on getting nuclear arms.

With a track record like this, it is a wonder that anyone would
seriously consider building a strategy to roll back the world's
nuclear arsenal based on a treaty-based regime. In traveling the
road to zero, nonproliferation and arms control should complement a
sound strategy, but they should not be the centerpiece. There has
to be a better way -- and indeed there is.

It is much easier to negotiate when you know that you are safe.
Arguably, Reagan would never have signed on to massive nuclear
weapons cuts if he did not have faith that missile defenses would
ultimately work. Additionally, he certainly believed that Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI) forced the Soviets to the negotiating
table -- demonstrating that strong defenses can actually kill,
rather than start, an arms race. In short, Reagan proved that
Mutually Assured Destruction -- or MAD, the strategic concept that
emerged during the 1950s and 60s by which, in order to prevent war,
you have to leave yourself intentionally vulnerable to nuclear
attack by another nuclear power -- really was mad. Further, he
understood that, left with no other option by the Soviet Union, the
U.S. had to compete in the near term, and pursue long term arms
control from a position of strength. Ultimately, Reagan knew that
the assured path to successful arms control was to end the Cold War
on terms favorable to the U.S.

In the post-Cold War world, strategic competition requires the
U.S. to adjust its strategic policy and posture to protect its
security in the context of multiple nuclear powers. Therefore,
nuclear disarmament should start with a solid plan to protect and
defend the United States against nuclear threats -- a policy of
deterrence by denial. That starts with eliminating potential
nuclear non-state threats. Groups as diverse as Aum Shinrikyo (the
religious cult that released sarin gas in the Tokyo subway) and
al-Qaida have tried to obtain nuclear weapon materials. Terrorists
that endanger the U.S. and its allies must be stopped by taking out
their leadership, disrupting their operations, breaking up their
organizations, cutting off their sources of recruiting and funding,
and discrediting their ideas.

Next, the U.S. must lead the effort to destroy the marketplace
of death, thwarting the transfer of weapons, materials, and
technologies. We will never live in a world free of nuclear weapons
if people like A.Q. Khan can set up their own "nuclear weapons
Wal-Marts." As Pakistan's chief nuclear scientist, Khan
participated in a network that shopped nuclear materials to Libya,
Iran, and North Korea, among others. Stopping the A.Q. Khans of the
world is vital.

Proactive efforts, like the proliferation Security Initiative
(PSI) are the right answer. PSI prevents trafficking by relying on
coordinated voluntary, cooperative actions by nation-states. The
initiative relies on existing laws and authorities. Begun in 2003,
according to a 2008 Congressional Research Service report
(.pdf), "[t]he State Department credits PSI with halting 11
WMD-related transfers from 2004 to 2005, and more than two dozen
from 2005 to 2006." Recently, South Korea joined PSI, raising to 96
the number of nations participating. Although this program was a
Bush-era initiative, it continues to be active.

Hunting down bad stuff and bad people, however, is not enough.
At the same time, the U.S. must also demonstrate that it is
prepared to defend itself. A balanced posture would consist of
missile defenses and a credible, modernized nuclear deterrent that
is capable of destroying the means of strategic attack on the U.S.
and its allies, combined with strong conventional forces that can
do everything from root out an insurgency to strike an enemy
missile silo deep inside its own territory.

In that light, recent defense decisions, such as terminating the
production of the F-22, are troubling. The F-22 is meant to be
paired with the F-35 (another modern fighter almost ready to go
into production) to ensure the U.S. has the capability to carry out
serious long-range conventional strikes -- including taking out
nuclear production, storage, and launch facilities -- against just
about anybody. Unfortunately, the Pentagon cut off production at
roughly 60 aircraft less than what the Air Force needs to sustain
the fleet over the long term. The Pentagon also cancelled a new
long-range bomber program. Without long-range conventional strike
options, the ability to deter enemies -- or even better, to
dissuade them from developing weapons to strike the U.S. to begin
with -- decreases dramatically. Conversely, the lack of
conventional options forces the U.S. to rely more, not less, on its
nuclear deterrent.

Likewise, letting the U.S. nuclear arsenal atrophy is not a good
idea. A U.S. arsenal that is dominated by massive megaton, "city
killer" weapons is not very useful unless you are looking for a
doomsday weapon. At the same time, these arms are getting older and
less reliable. As they age, we will have less confidence in the
surety of our deterrent.

Sadly, Washington is letting our nuclear sword rust, based on
the argument that if we refurbish, downsize, and modernize these
weapons, we will encourage others to build nuclear weapons to
counter them. This argument, however, is not borne out by recent
evidence. The U.S. stopped building and modernizing nuclear weapons
at the end of the Cold War, but that example of "responsible
behavior" did not inspire Libya, Syria, Iraq, North Korea, and Iran
to abandon their nuclear ambitions. In contrast, countries like
South Korea and Taiwan gave up their nuclear weapons programs
because they were confident that the U.S. would not abandon their
defense.

Rushing down the road to zero...

Indeed, rushing down the road to zero without first implementing
a solid "protect and defend" strategy could actually have the
perverse effect of speeding the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
First, if enemies perceive that the U.S. has no defense -- or, at
best, very limited capabilities -- they may actually accelerate
their programs so that they can quickly achieve a real capability
to threaten America.

This could well turn out to be the case with the
administration's current plans for missile defense. Judging current
capabilities adequate to deal with a future long-range Iranian or
North Korean threat, the Pentagon announced plans to scale down
U.S. anti-missile programs. This has the perverse effect of
encouraging both Iran and North Korea to speed up development of
their weapons-delivery systems so that they can represent a
credible challenge to the United States. In fact, the last six
months have seen a flurry of nuclear-capable missile test
activities by both countries.

Second, as the North Korean and Iranian programs demonstrate
real progress, there will be greater demands for illicit trade in
their weapons technologies. North Korea, for example, has done some
pretty effective advertising of late. Their first nuclear test
barely registered. Their latest test looks to be in the
several-kiloton range -- perhaps as big as the weapons that took
out Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In 2006, North Korea's long-range
missile test lasted less than a minute before breaking apart and
falling into the sea. In April 2009, the same missile flew for 15
minutes and traveled about 2,500 miles. In addition, it looks like
the North Korea missile achieved separation of all three stages,
and at least two stages burned effectively without incident.

Third, as weapons technologies proliferate, so does the
likelihood that neighbors will feel they need an independent
nuclear deterrent. Thus, if Iran obtains nuclear missiles, other
nations in the Middle East may feel compelled to field a force as
well, particularly if they don't have comprehensive missile
defenses.

Fourth, if the U.S. drastically cuts its nuclear inventory and
fails to modernize its weapons, it may be faced with the bizarre
reality that it invites a new arms race. Other nations will look at
the small size of the U.S. arsenal and the decaying industrial
infrastructure to produce weapons and rightly conclude that,
without much effort, they could well become a nuclear power in the
same league as the U.S.

Concomitantly, the U.S. should focus its efforts on countries
that want to cooperate with us in making the world more "nuclear
safe," rather than butting heads with intransigents like North
Korea. Odds are there is going to be a lot nuclear energy in the
world's "energy hungry, carbon-free-seeking" future. Managing fuel
cycles, and ensuring that Technology is safeguarded and nuclear
facilities secure and safe, are critical components of achieving a
world free of nuclear weapons.

Fortunately, there is a great model on how to do this. It comes
from the "123 Agreement" that enabled civil nuclear cooperation
between the United States and India after a 30-year break.

Ironically, in 1954, India proposed ending nuclear testing, and
in 1965, New Delhi laid out the principles for a nonproliferation
treaty. The country, however, never signed the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, and in 1974, it tested a nuclear device. India also
developed a robust civil nuclear program, but because it was a
declared nuclear power that was not signatory to the treaty, it
could not receive assistance from other countries in either
developing its civil programs or enhancing safeguards on its
weapons program.

In 2005, the U.S. and India agreed to establish a framework that
would lawfully allow for bilateral cooperation, and two years
later, they produced an agreement. Under the agreement, India
stated it would separate its civil and military nuclear facilities.
All civil nuclear facilities would be placed under the inspection
of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which acts as the
watchdog for compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. For its
part, Washington agreed to work toward engaging in full civil
nuclear cooperation with New Delhi.

Among the provisions of the agreement, India established
guarantees that would ensure that "U.S.-origin" nuclear materials
would not be diverted to Indian weapons programs. Additionally, the
deal established that the U.S. maintained the "right of recapture"
-- in other words, Washington could demand back any U.S.-origin
nuclear fuel or Technology -- in the event of a future Indian
nuclear test.

In addition, India agreed to harmonize its export control lists
-- sensitive materials such as highly enriched uranium, plutonium
or nuclear weapons -- with those of the Missile Technology Control
Regime and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, both of which help to
monitor and prevent the transfer of technologies critical to
nuclear weapons. Closing that gap is key to stopping "would-be A.Q.
Khans" from establishing a "nuclear Craigslist" inside India's
civil nuclear industry.

The importance of the agreement was that it proscribed how the
U.S. could help India safeguard nuclear materials while remaining
in line with Washington's Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
obligations, as well as the Hyde Act of 2006, which specified
requirements for U.S. nuclear policy towards India. Thus, rather
than circumventing and undermining the prohibitions in the treaty,
the U.S. and India worked to help New Delhi become compliant with
the central prohibitions in the treaty intended to help stop the
spread of nuclear weapons.

In August 2008, the IAEA approved the safeguards proposed by the
United States and India, and the following October, Congress passed
legislation implementing the 123 Agreement. That same month,
President Bush signed it into law, and the U.S. and India formally
accepted the plan.

The U.S.-India agreement -- in conjunction with other U.S.
initiatives to help secure, safeguard or remove highly-enriched
uranium, plutonium or other sensitive materials or technologies in
countries like Libya and the former Soviet Republics -- are
concrete and vital steps in any serious effort to battle
proliferation and make a world without nuclear weapons even
imaginable.

With a strategy focused on protecting and defending the nation,
America can make a difference in the world. In the past, for
example, several nations -- including Brazil, Libya, South Africa,
South Korea, and Taiwan -- have abandoned nuclear weapons programs.
Russia has slashed its weapons inventory, not because of treaties
and negotiations alone, but because the U.S. helped set conditions
that convinced nations not to go nuclear. The U.S. has also worked
with countries to voluntarily safeguard materials, like highly
enriched uranium, or destroy other arms, such as chemical
weapons.

With these sensible measures in place, there is certainly room
at the table to add more sensible nonproliferation and arms control
measures to supplement them. Those initiatives, however, need to be
sensible as well. The U.S. should not adopt a policy of "never
meeting a treaty it didn't like."

Some of the treaties the White House is considering border on
the nonsensical. For example, restricting missile defense is a
patently depraved idea. The notion that a state which has the
capability to defend its citizens against horrific destruction
would bar itself from doing so is immoral. Likewise, a policy of
massive retaliation that would wipe millions of people off the face
of the earth when the government in question has the alternative
option of simply defending itself is wantonly evil.

Another idea whose time clearly has not come is a treaty banning
weapons in space. First of all, space is already weaponized and has
been since the first V-2 rocket hit London during WWII. Second,
space is, in fact, the ultimate high ground and the best option for
defending against missile attacks. Voluntarily relinquishing the
high ground is just bad strategy. Third, it is impossible to
envision what an acceptable definition of "space weapons" to
be banned would be. One could argue, for example, that Google
Earth (which relies on commercial satellite imagery) is a space
weapon. After all, the terrorists who attacked Mumbai used Google
Earth to help plan their assault. Finally, determined enemies won't
respect the treaty, and there will be no way to verify that they
are not cheating until after they attack. The only thing a treaty
banning space weapons will do is to make them a more desirable
option for America's enemies.

Also on the list of what should go to the scrap heap is the
current version of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The
U.S. has not ratified it, and in its present form, it should not.
"Once the CTBT is in force," writes
scholar (and a Heritage Foundation colleague) Baker Spring,
"The United States will be unable to maintain a safe, reliable, and
effective nuclear arsenal without testing, particularly as it faces
new military requirements in the new, post-Cold War world.
Furthermore, as a treaty of unlimited duration, the CTBT will over
time undermine the global stability guaranteed by the U.S. nuclear
deterrent." In turn, our allies will not be able to depend on the
deterrent of an American nuclear umbrella, which could make
conflicts more, not less, likely. "Lastly," Spring adds, "the CTBT
fails the most important arms control test of all: It is neither
effectively verifiable nor enforceable." There will come a time
when the U.S. can and should join a realistic CTBT regime, but
right now that day is far off.

Signing treaties for the sake of signing treaties might make for
good photo opportunities, but it is bad for protecting human
security. Bad treaties, like the Treaty of Versailles that ended
WWI, can help cause wars, rather than prevent them. The
administration would be far better off looking at how to strengthen
the enforcement of treaties and agreements to which it is already a
party -- such as its initiative to bring India closer to compliance
with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the Presidential
Nuclear Initiatives with Russia -- before it runs around signing
new instruments.

The U.S. can and should lead the march on the road to zero. It
is in our own interests to do so. It is unthinkable that the
world's greatest democracy would shirk that responsibility.
Democracy, however, is not a suicide pact. To achieve success we
have to start with the right foundation. Cooperative and
non-cooperative efforts at threat reduction must build on a
strategy that shoulders the responsibility to protect and defend
America, and works with nations that are really interested in
making the world safer and not just aggrandizing their own power.
That's the right prescription for achieving a world without nuclear
weapons.

James Jay Carafanois Senior
Research Fellow in national security policy at The Heritage
Foundation.