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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Report to the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate:
June 2012:
Force Structure:
Improved Cost Information and Analysis Needed to Guide Overseas
Military Posture Decisions:
GAO-12-711:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-12-711, a report to the Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate.
Why GAO Did This Study:
In January 2012, DOD issued new strategic guidance on defense budget
priorities, indicating that it must rebalance its overseas force
posture—including the forward stationing of Navy ships in Spain for
ballistic missile defense and the reduction of U.S. Army forces in
Europe—in the face of deficit reduction. Similarly, DOD reported in
its 2011 Global Defense Posture Report to Congress that savings
associated with permanently stationing forces in the United States
rather than overseas are often offset by such factors as increased
rotational costs. Based on direction from the Senate Armed Services
Committee, GAO evaluated the extent to which DOD has (1) conducted
analysis to support recent overseas posture decisions and (2)
developed a process for making posture decisions that align with
strategy and consider costs. GAO assessed two recent posture
initiatives, DOD plans and guidance related to posture, and theater
posture plans from each combatant command.
What GAO Found:
Although the Department of Defense (DOD) has conducted some analysis
to support two recent global posture decisions, the full cost
implications of these decisions are unknown.
* Forward deployment and permanent stationing of U.S. Navy ships in
Rota. The Navy considered three options: (1) deploying ships to the
region from U.S. bases, (2) forward stationing ships and crews
overseas, and (3) deploying ships to the region and rotating crews
from U.S. bases. The Navy concluded that forward stationing ships was
the most efficient option, but GAO found that it did not fully
consider the option to rotate crews from U.S. bases and, in a
classified analysis, it used different assumptions for forward
stationing versus deploying from the United States. These assumptions
could affect the results of the analysis and have long-term cost
implications. GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide states that a
business case or cost-benefit analysis finds the best value solution
by presenting facts and supporting details among competing
alternatives, including the life cycle costs and benefits, and
sensitivity to changes in assumptions. Without an analysis that
controls for differing assumptions or considers factors such as
complete life cycle costs, the long-term costs associated with its
decision to forward station ships will remain unknown.
* Reduction of U.S. Army force structure in Europe. The planned
reductions of U.S. Army forces in Europe will likely save money;
however, decisions that could affect the extent of the savings are
pending. For example, a 2010 Army analysis found $2 billion in savings
over 10 years by returning forces from Germany, but assumed that new
facilities estimated at $800 million would need to be built in the
United States to house them. However, present planned reductions in
overall Army end strength could eliminate the need for new
construction. Further, DOD announced that it will rotate forces from
the United States to Europe, but the nature of the rotations—which
could include significant costs depending on their size and frequency—
has not yet been defined. According to DOD officials, until such
determinations are made, the savings to DOD will remain uncertain.
DOD has taken steps to align posture initiatives with strategy and
cost, but continues to lack comprehensive and consistent cost
estimates of initiatives. DOD’s evolving posture process links
initiatives with defense goals. Stakeholders from key DOD entities
prioritize the initiatives in a voting process based on strategic
criteria; cost is discussed, but not voted on. Furthermore, combatant
commands did not completely and consistently report cost data in their
theater posture plans because of the lack of readily available cost
information. GAO found two primary reasons for this: unclear roles and
responsibilities of key DOD organizations that have access to the cost
data needed to compile and report comprehensive cost estimates and
lack of a standardized format to compile and report cost data from
component commands. Until these cost data are comprehensively compiled
and reported, DOD and congressional decision makers will be unable to
assess the true cost of posture initiatives.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DOD conduct a comprehensive cost analysis
associated with the Navy’s decision to station ships in Rota, assess
options and costs related to rotating forces in Europe, and clarify
roles and responsibilities of key entities to collect cost data on
initiatives. DOD generally agreed with GAO’s recommendations and
identified corrective actions, but additional steps are needed to
fully address GAO’s recommendation that the Navy further assess
options and costs for ballistic missile defense.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-711]. For more
information, contact John Pendleton at (404) 679-1816 or
pendletonj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
The Cost Implications of Evolving Plans for Overseas Presence Are
Uncertain:
DOD Has Taken Steps to Align Posture Initiatives with Strategy and
Cost but Continues to Lack Comprehensive and Consistent Cost Estimates
of Initiatives:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Figures:
Figure 1: Geographic Combatant Command Areas of Responsibility:
Figure 2: National and DOD Guidance, Strategies, and Plans Related to
Global Defense Posture:
Figure 3: Current Port Pier Space at Naval Station Rota:
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
June 6, 2012:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
In January 2012, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued new strategic
guidance on defense budget priorities, indicating that it must
rebalance its forces overseas in the face of the approaching end of a
decade of war, a changing technological and geopolitical landscape,
and the national security imperative of deficit reduction.[Footnote 1]
The same month, the administration announced a renewed strategic focus
on the Asia-Pacific region and an adjustment of U.S. forces in Europe
that included a decrease in permanently stationed forces while
increasing the forces rotated temporarily to maintain presence and
demonstrate commitment. Previously, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense
Review highlighted the importance of periodically assessing and
tailoring global defense posture in light of continued globalization
and enduring transnational threats.[Footnote 2] These recent changes
are the latest in DOD's continuing efforts to do so.
This report is one in a series of GAO reports on DOD's global defense
posture. Since 2006, we have reported on issues related to DOD's
overall global posture strategy and management practices, the military
buildup on Guam, the transformation of Army posture in Europe, and the
establishment of U.S. Africa Command.[Footnote 3] Those reports
contain a number of recommendations to improve DOD's management of
these efforts and to enhance the information that DOD makes available
about them to decision makers in the executive branch and Congress. In
many cases, DOD has agreed with our recommendations and has taken
actions to implement them. A list of these related products is
included at the end of this report.
Congressional committees have also taken several actions in recent
years that emphasize the need for DOD to consider fiscal constraints
in defense planning. For example, the Senate Armed Services Committee
report accompanying a proposed bill for the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 directed DOD to update the
committee on its plans to implement GAO's previous recommendations to
more accurately and comprehensively account for costs related to
theater posture plans.[Footnote 4] The committee report also directed
GAO to assess the methodology and assumptions behind the assertion DOD
made in its 2011 Global Defense Posture Report to Congress that
savings associated with permanently stationing forces in the United
States rather than overseas are often offset by such factors as
increased rotational costs. Consequently, this report examines the
extent to which DOD has (1) conducted an analysis of costs and savings
associated with recent overseas posture decisions and (2) developed a
process for making decisions about global posture initiatives that
align with strategy and consider costs, as well as efforts made by
combatant commands to compile and report comprehensive cost data on
both existing global posture and new initiatives in their theater
posture plans.
To determine the extent to which DOD conducted analysis of costs and
savings associated with recent overseas posture decisions, we reviewed
DOD documented cost data and collected additional information by
interviewing officials associated with two major global force posture
initiatives that DOD officials identified to support its conclusion
that cost savings associated with permanently stationing forces in the
United States rather than overseas are often offset by such factors as
increased rotational costs: the stationing of four Navy destroyers in
Rota, Spain, to provide ballistic missile defense for the region and
the reduction of permanently stationed Army forces in Europe. To
determine the extent to which DOD conducted analysis to support the
decision to station four Navy destroyers in Rota, Spain, we analyzed
key documents and briefings provided by the U.S. Navy, U.S. European
Command, and Naval Station Rota; conducted a site visit to Naval
Station Rota; and interviewed officials from the U.S. Navy, Office of
the Chief of Naval Operations; U.S. European Command; U.S. Navy
Europe; and Naval Station Rota. To determine the extent to which DOD
conducted analysis to support Army force structure reductions in
Europe, we conducted a site visit to Germany; reviewed key documents
from U.S. European Command and U.S. Army Europe that describe the
status of planned force structure changes in Europe, including U.S.
European Command's 2010 and 2011 theater posture plans; and
interviewed officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD); OSD Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation; Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); Department of the Army, Program
Assessment and Evaluation Division; U.S. European Command; and U.S.
Army Europe. We also analyzed and assessed cost estimates for several
courses of action associated with the number of Army brigade combat
teams in Europe developed by the U.S. Army, Program Assessment and
Evaluation Division, against our cost estimating criteria to determine
the extent to which Army analysts employed best practices when
developing the estimates.
To determine the extent to which DOD has a process in place for making
decisions about global posture initiatives that aligns with strategy
and considers costs, including progress made by combatant commands to
compile and report comprehensive cost data on existing posture and new
initiatives in their theater posture plans, we evaluated core global
posture strategy documents, current and draft DOD guidance, and other
documentation we collected through interviews with officials from OSD;
the Joint Staff; U.S. European Command and its three service component
commands; U.S. Pacific Command; U.S. Africa Command; the four service
headquarters; OSD Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation; the Office
of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); and the Office of
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics.
We also observed the Joint Staff's November 2011 Posture Review
Seminar and analyzed and evaluated theater posture plans from 2010 and
2011 for each combatant command.
We conducted this performance audit between June 2011 and May 2012 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I
provides a more detailed description of our scope and methodology.
Background:
DOD operates six geographic combatant commands, each with an assigned
area of responsibility (see figure 1). Each geographic combatant
command carries out a variety of missions and activities, including
humanitarian assistance and combat operations, and assigns functions
to subordinate commanders. Each command is supported by a service
component command from each of the services and by a theater special
operations command. The Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force
have key roles in making decisions on where to locate their forces
when they are not otherwise employed or deployed by order of the
Secretary of Defense or assigned to a combatant command. In addition,
the military departments allocate budgetary resources to construct,
maintain, and repair buildings, structures, and utilities and to
acquire the real property or interests in real property necessary to
carry out their responsibilities. Together, the combatant commands and
service component commands develop theater posture plans that seek to
prioritize force structure changes and posture initiatives that will
best meet national security and strategic priorities for a given area
of responsibility.
Figure 1: Geographic Combatant Command Areas of Responsibility:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated world map]
Geographic Combatant Command Areas of Responsibility:
U.S. Africa Command;
U.S. Central Command;
U.S. European Command;
U.S. Northern Command;
U.S. Pacific Command;
U.S. Southern Command.
Source: DOD; Map REsources (map).
[End of figure]
The process for assessing global posture initiatives is managed under
the framework of the Global Posture Executive Council, which consists
of representatives from the military services, the combatant commands,
the Joint Staff, and OSD. The purpose of the Global Posture Executive
Council includes facilitating senior leader posture decision making
and overseeing the assessment and implementation of posture plans. The
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the
Director, Joint Staff, serve as co-chairmen of the council, and its
membership includes senior representatives from both offices, as well
as representatives from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); OSD Cost Assessment and Program
Evaluation; the Joint Staff; the combatant commands; the services; and
others as needed. Subordinate to the Global Posture Executive Council
is the Global Posture Integration Team, which consists of
representatives from each military department who review posture
initiatives from all combatant commands' theater posture plans
included in the annual global posture prioritization process. The
prioritization process itself takes place in a 3-day seminar held in
or around November of each year during which 22 representatives from
organizations that comprise the Global Posture Executive Council come
together to review the posture initiatives proposed in each combatant
command's theater posture plan and prioritize these initiatives based
primarily on how they align with strategic defense guidance. The
prioritized initiatives are then provided to the services to inform
the development of their budgets.[Footnote 5]
A hierarchy of national and defense guidance informs the development
of DOD's global posture. The National Security Strategy, to be issued
by the President at the beginning of each new administration, and
annually thereafter, describes and discusses topics including
worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the United States that
are vital to its national security. The Secretary of Defense then
provides corresponding strategic direction through the National
Defense Strategy and Quadrennial Defense Reviews. Furthermore, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provides guidance to the
military through the National Military Strategy. On specific matters,
such as global defense posture, DOD has also developed new guidance in
numerous documents, principally the 2010 Guidance for the Employment
of the Force--which consolidates and integrates planning guidance
related to operations and other military activities--and the 2010
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan--which implements the strategic
policy direction provided in the Guidance for the Employment of the
Force. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan also tasks combatant
commanders to develop theater campaign, contingency, and posture plans
that are consistent with the Guidance for the Employment of the
Force.[Footnote 6] The theater campaign plan translates strategic
objectives to facilitate the development of operational and
contingency plans, while the theater posture plan provides an overview
of posture requirements to support those plans and identifies major
ongoing and new posture initiatives to address capability gaps,
including current and planned military construction requirements.
Figure 2 illustrates the relationships among these national and DOD
strategic guidance documents.
Figure 2: National and DOD Guidance, Strategies, and Plans Related to
Global Defense Posture:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
National strategies and guidance:
National Security Strategy:
National Defense Strategy:
National Military Strategy:
Guidance for the Employment of the Force:
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan:
Combatant command plans:
Theater Campaign Plans:
Theater Posture Plans:
Source: GAO analysis of National Strategies and Defense guidance.
[End of figure]
We have issued a number of related reports about force structure and
global force posture planning. In February 2011, we reported that U.S.
European Command lacks comprehensive cost data in its theater posture
plans and therefore decision makers lack critical information that
could be used to make fully informed posture decisions.[Footnote 7] We
recommended, therefore, that DOD revise its posture planning guidance
to require comprehensive cost estimates of posture costs and provide
for consistent analysis of posture alternatives. In May 2011, we
reported that DOD was transforming the facilities and infrastructure
that support its posture in Asia without the benefit of comprehensive
cost information or an analysis of alternatives and recommended that
DOD develop a business case analysis for its Korea tour normalization
initiative and that it develop comprehensive costs estimates for
posture initiatives in the Pacific as a whole.[Footnote 8] Finally, in
April 2010, we reported that U.S. Africa Command had not yet finalized
decisions related to force presence and structure in Africa, including
the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa at Camp Lemonnier,
Djibouti.[Footnote 9] We recommended that the command complete an
evaluation of the task force and determine its future, to include a
long-term activity assessment, a funding plan, and training guidance.
DOD generally agreed with these recommendations and has taken some
steps to implement them.
The Cost Implications of Evolving Plans for Overseas Presence Are
Uncertain:
Although DOD has conducted some analysis to support recent global
defense posture decisions, the cost implications of these decisions
are unknown. In its 2011 Global Defense Posture Report to Congress,
DOD asserted that cost savings associated with permanently stationing
forces in the United States rather than overseas are offset by other
factors, such as increased costs to periodically rotate forces back to
overseas locations. To support this assertion, OSD identified two
posture initiatives: (1) the forward deployment and permanent
stationing of U.S. Navy ships in Rota, Spain, in support of ballistic
missile defense and (2) the reduction of U.S. Army force structure in
Europe. Based on our review of the analysis behind these two posture
initiatives, we found that the analysis supporting the first was
incomplete and that any analysis of the second cannot be completed
until several basic decisions are made and assumptions defined.
Decision to Forward Station Ships in Europe Could Allow the Navy to
Provide Missile Defense with Fewer Ships, but the Long-Term Costs Are
Not Well Defined:
The Secretary of the Navy recently announced the permanent stationing
of four Aegis-equipped ships in Rota, Spain--two ships in fiscal year
2014 and the other two ships in fiscal year 2015--in order to more
efficiently address the operational requirements associated with the
President's Phased Adaptive Approach for European ballistic missile
defense.[Footnote 10]
The Navy considered and compared three options in order to determine
the most appropriate way to address the operational requirements for
ballistic missile defense in Europe: (1) deploying ships to the region
from U.S. bases, (2) forward stationing ships and crews within the
U.S. European Command area of responsibility, and (3) deploying ships
to the region and rotating crews from U.S. bases. The Navy concluded
that forward stationing ships represented the most efficient and
strategically beneficial of the three options. We reviewed the Navy's
documentation associated with the decision and found two key issues.
First, the Navy did not fully consider the rotational crewing option.
Second, the Navy used different operational assumptions for the
remaining two options and did not control for those differences prior
to comparing the analytical results.
* Limited analysis of the rotational crewing option. The Navy provided
little documentation for its analysis of the option to forward station
ships and rotate crews from U.S. bases--also known as rotational
crewing. This option avoids permanently relocating ship crews and
their families. Navy officials stated that rotational crewing was
undesirable because of its deleterious effect on crew efficiency and
morale. Our previous reports found that the Navy had not developed
comprehensive guidance for implementing rotational crewing initiatives
or a systemic approach for analyzing rotational crewing alternatives
and lessons learned. Moreover, as we reported in 2008, initial Navy
rotational crewing efforts had provided greater forward presence for
Navy ships by eliminating ship transits and maintaining more on-
station time in distant operating areas.[Footnote 11] Therefore, a
rotational crewing approach for this posture decision could
potentially provide a strategically effective and cost-effective
option. However, the Navy provided less analysis of this option than
the other two options, which may have prevented the Navy from
determining the potential operational value of this approach.
* Different operational assumptions not controlled for in analysis of
alternatives. The Navy provided more documentation and analysis for
its comparison of the forward stationing option to the current
approach of U.S.-based deployments to the region. As a result of its
analysis, the Navy concluded that the forward stationing option
requires significantly fewer ships to meet European ballistic missile
defense mission requirements and therefore represents the more
efficient and cost-effective option. However, we found that the Navy
applied different assumptions to the two options and did not
demonstrate that it had controlled for those differences, both of
which could affect the outcome of the analysis.[Footnote 12] Further,
Navy officials did not demonstrate that they had considered the long-
term life cycle effect and associated costs for each forward deployed
ship. Such factors may represent significant costs, without which DOD
may lack the comprehensive analysis needed to determine the most
efficient approach for meeting ballistic missile defense mission
requirements.
GAO's Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide states that a business case
analysis or a cost-benefit analysis seeks to find the best value
solution by linking each alternative to how it satisfies a strategic
objective. This linkage is achieved by developing business cases that
present facts and supporting details among competing alternatives,
including the life cycle costs and quantifiable and nonquantifiable
benefits. Specifically, each alternative should identify (1) relative
life cycle costs and benefits; (2) methods and rationale for
quantifying the life cycle costs and benefits; (3) effect and value of
cost, schedule, and performance trade-offs; (4) sensitivity to changes
in assumptions; and (5) risk factors. Finally, the analysis should be
unbiased, consider all possible alternatives, and be rigorous enough
that independent auditors can review it and clearly understand why a
particular alternative was chosen. DOD guidance regarding economic
analysis similarly encourages the use of sensitivity analysis, a tool
that can be used to determine the extent to which costs and benefits
change or are sensitive to changes in key factors; this analysis can
produce a range of costs and benefits that may provide a better guide
or indicator than a single estimate.[Footnote 13]
In contrast, the Navy's choice to forward station ships in Europe was
informed by cost and strategic factors. The Navy considered a number
of basing options in or near the Mediterranean and developed a
decision matrix that included both strategic and cost factors, such as
the proximity of each site to the planned deployment regions and the
amount of military construction that would be required at each site to
support the ships and their crews. Based on these factors, Navy
officials determined that Naval Station Rota provided the best option.
From a strategic and operational perspective, Naval Station Rota
provides the U.S. Navy with a large maritime port and an associated
airfield close to current and potential future operating areas.
Additionally, since it is a home port for the Spanish Navy and
currently houses Spanish military ships of similar size, there is no
need to expand the port pier space to accommodate the incoming ships.
Figure 3 shows the current port pier space.
Figure 3: Current Port Pier Space at Naval Station Rota:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: DOD.
[End of figure]
While Naval Station Rota can accommodate the expanded mission, some
costs will be incurred. The infrastructure at Rota was initially
designed to accommodate a much larger contingent of military personnel
and family members than it does currently. Its capacity, according to
Navy officials, is sufficient to accommodate the personnel numbers
expected once the ships, their crews, and the crews' families are
stationed there. As such, although some military construction will be
required, less would be required at Rota than at any of the other
sites in the U.S. European Command area of responsibility that were
considered. Specifically, the Navy estimated it would cost
approximately $33 million for construction of new facilities and
upgrades to existing infrastructure. Further, Naval Station Rota
officials explained, and we observed, that the base currently has
sufficient galley, medical, and housing facilities and that there are
no plans to expand the physical footprint of on-base support
infrastructure. The Navy also considered estimated up-front and
recurring increases in operational and personnel expenses, including
those for additional support personnel and increased utilities costs.
In total, the Navy estimated that it would incur approximately $166
million in up-front military construction, personnel, and maintenance
costs; an annual increase in operations and maintenance; and personnel
costs of approximately $179 million.[Footnote 14]
DOD Will Likely Save Money by Reducing Army Forces and Headquarters in
Europe, but Amount of Savings Depends on Future Decisions:
To save money, and consistent with a shift in strategic emphasis
toward the Asia-Pacific region, the Secretary of Defense announced
plans in January 2012 to reduce U.S. Army forces in Europe. The
announced reductions include the removal of two heavy brigade combat
teams, a corps headquarters, and various combat support and service
support units, and would affect about 10,000 soldiers and their
families. U.S. Army Europe officials told us that the reductions
should be completed by 2015. The department's actions are consistent
with a GAO recommendation in 2010 that DOD consider alternatives for
its European posture plans in part because the Army's analysis
indicated that such a reduction could potentially save $2 billion over
10 years.[Footnote 15] However, several decisions are pending or have
recently been made that could affect the ultimate savings to DOD.
These are as follows:
* Overall Army force structure. The Army's 2010 analysis that found up
to $2 billion in savings over 10 years from returning forces from
Germany also assumed that more than $800 million in military
construction funds would be needed to construct new facilities in the
United States should two brigade combat teams be returned to the
United States.[Footnote 16] However, the Army announced in February
2012 that the 170th brigade combat team stationed in Baumholder,
Germany, and the 172nd brigade combat team stationed in Grafenwoehr,
Germany, will be eliminated from Army force structure in fiscal years
2013 and 2014, respectively, as part of the larger end strength
reductions. Given this force structure reduction, the savings to the
Army and DOD could be billions more because the costs of manning and
equipping two brigade combat teams (with approximately 4,000 personnel
each), among other units, would no longer be incurred. For example,
past GAO work has found that annual compensation costs exceed $125,000
per active duty soldier; removing two brigade combat teams from the
Army would reduce personnel costs by about $1 billion annually.
[Footnote 17] Furthermore, the $800 million assumed in military
construction funds needed to construct new facilities from the 2010
analysis is no longer likely to be needed.
* Consolidation of U.S. Army Europe headquarters functions remaining
in Germany. The consolidation of headquarters for U.S. Army Europe,
5th Signal Command, and a military intelligence brigade in Wiesbaden
permits the closure of communities in Mannheim, Heidelberg, and
Darmstadt. According to U.S. Army Europe, this consolidation effort--
which eliminates 47 sites, 9 schools, and 3 sets of community support
infrastructure[Footnote 18]--will provide an estimated annual
recurring savings of $112 million. The savings from these
consolidations would be in addition to the approximately $2 billion
associated with removing the brigade combat teams from Europe
forecasted by the Army's 2010 analysis.[Footnote 19]
* Potential increase in special operations forces in Europe. In
January 2012, the Secretary of Defense also announced plans to
increase special operations forces stationed in Europe. However, the
type and size of those forces have not yet been determined. Officials
from U.S. Army Europe told us that they are considering locations to
station special operations forces and thereby realize efficiencies
through consolidation, but that they cannot move forward on this until
they know the requirements for the increase in special operations
forces.
* Decision about U.S. Africa Command headquarters location.[Footnote
20] In 2008, DOD formed a new combatant command to focus on Africa.
That command was located in temporary facilities in Stuttgart,
Germany--also home to U.S. European Command--pending decisions about
where to locate it permanently. Initially, DOD had planned to place
the command somewhere in Africa but could not find a suitable location
after encountering resistance from potential African partners. In
2009, GAO recommended that DOD conduct an assessment to determine
where U.S. Africa Command would be permanently located and, until that
time, limit expenditures on temporary headquarters infrastructure.
[Footnote 21] However, these decisions had not been made; officials
from U.S. Africa Command told us in February 2012 that OSD Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluation is conducting a study to assess the
risks and cost implications associated with relocating the
headquarters in the United States that should be completed by mid-2012.
* Rotational force plans. DOD has also announced its intent to
periodically rotate Army forces from the United States to supplement
the two Army brigade combat teams that will remain in Europe and thus
show commitment to European allies. However, according to U.S.
European Command officials, the size and frequency of the rotations--
which could include significant costs--have not yet been defined, and
until there is a determination of the size of the forces that will be
rotated to Europe and the frequency at which they will be rotated, any
estimation of the cost or cost savings will remain uncertain.
According to the Army's 2010 analysis, it would potentially cost the
Army approximately $1 billion over 10 years to rotate two brigade
combat teams to Europe twice per year, which would allow the United
States to maintain its current presence but would offset the savings
garnered by reductions in the overall force structure. However, Army
officials told us that they did not think that rotating entire
brigades was likely and that they were currently examining options,
including rotating smaller formations, such as companies or battalion-
sized elements. The potential rotations will likely have implications
on the final basing plan in Europe as well, as the Army would likely
want to maintain facilities in Europe for rotating forces.
Until the decisions outlined above are made--especially regarding the
plans to rotate forces back to Europe--the full extent of the savings
that will be realized in light of the Secretary of Defense's January
2012 decision to reduce the size of permanently stationed U.S. Army
forces in Europe will remain uncertain. Based on previous GAO and Army
analysis, there is the potential for DOD to save considerably more
than the $2 billion originally estimated in light of DOD's decision to
remove the brigades from the force structure. Looking forward, the
decisions about the size and frequency of Army rotations will be a key
cost driver. Costs will be incurred not only to pay for the rotations,
but assumptions about these rotations will also be used to decide
which Army installations in Europe to retain.
DOD Has Taken Steps to Align Posture Initiatives with Strategy and
Cost but Continues to Lack Comprehensive and Consistent Cost Estimates
of Initiatives:
DOD's Process to Prioritize Posture Initiatives Is Improving:
In part to respond to previous GAO recommendations,[Footnote 22] DOD
recognized the need to prioritize initiatives to reflect strategic
goals, has taken steps to align posture initiatives with defense
strategy, and has begun to gather cost information. DOD's evolving
global defense posture process links posture initiatives with defense
goals and prioritizes those initiatives based on strategic and
implementation criteria. Strategic criteria are defined by four focus
areas: enabling crisis response, ensuring access for global posture
enablers, shaping and improving security cooperation, and supporting
contingencies and ongoing operations. Implementation criteria include
such factors as operational flexibility, operational management and
institutional provisions of the force, ease of implementation, and
international relations. Based on our observation of the process, all
posture initiatives submitted by combatant commands in their theater
posture plans are discussed and voted on within the framework of the
strategic and implementation criteria by 22 stakeholders from the
Global Posture Executive Council using electronic voting software
displayed on a projection screen. The result is a list of posture
initiatives ranked in order of strategic priority. During the process,
the stakeholders also discuss the approximate costs associated with
each initiative, but cost is not considered a key factor and is not
voted on. According to DOD officials, this is because costs are
considered both before and after the prioritization process (before by
the combatant command and after by the services in their budget
processes) and because the costs associated with an initiative are
always discussed before voting takes place.
Combatant Commands Reported Some Cost Data in Their 2011 Theater
Posture Plans, but Gaps Remain:
Although the geographic combatant commands are responsible for
reporting cost data on existing global posture, we found that the
combatant commands did not completely and consistently report cost
data in their 2011 theater posture plans. Our prior work has
demonstrated, however, that comprehensive cost information is a key
component in enabling decision makers to set funding priorities,
develop annual budget requests, and evaluate resource requirements at
key decision points.[Footnote 23] Specifically, GAO previously
recommended that DOD should compile and report comprehensive cost data
in the combatant commands' theater posture plans.[Footnote 24] DOD
officials told us that in response to this recommendation, DOD revised
an enclosure in the 2010 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan to direct
the combatant commands to include the following cost data on current
posture in their theater posture plans:
* ongoing, current year, and 5-year planned posture initiatives listed
by title and cost;
* full project costs, that is, construction costs plus furniture,
fixtures, equipment, and any operation and maintenance costs;
* implementation progress (when appropriate); and:
* host nation participation (when appropriate).
Despite this guidance, our review of the 2011 theater posture plans
submitted by the five geographic combatant commands found that though
all of them partially complied with the revised guidance, none met all
the requirements.[Footnote 25] For example, some theater posture plans
included current year cost data but no cost data for the out years.
Additionally, some theater posture plans did not report key cost data,
such as military construction costs or operation and maintenance
costs. Three of the five posture plans did not include implementation
progress for each initiative and did not indicate why this information
was not included.
Additionally, DOD published supplemental guidance in early 2011 that
directs the combatant commands to provide initiative summary sheets
for each new posture initiative in their 2011 theater posture plans.
These summary sheets are used to inform the prioritization process and
include several elements, such as approximate costs broken out by
fiscal year and host nation funding (if known), for each posture
initiative. However, we found that cost data were not consistently
reported in the initiative summary sheets for new posture initiatives
as accurately as possible. Therefore, cost data for new posture
initiatives may not be able to be accurately compared during the
prioritization process. DOD officials told us that in the months
between issuance of the theater posture plans and the prioritization
process, combatant commands have the opportunity to provide updated
cost information for new initiatives.
Based on our analysis as well as remarks from DOD officials involved
in the process, there are two reasons that combatant commands have not
been able to accurately and consistently report cost information for
their posture initiatives. The first is the lack of clarity about
roles and responsibilities. Joint doctrine discussing the components
of a joint force notes the responsibility of service component
commanders to develop program and budget requests that comply with
combatant commander guidance on warfighting requirements and
priorities.[Footnote 26] In addition, the doctrine states that
component commanders will provide a copy of the program submission to
the combatant commander prior to forwarding it to the service
headquarters, and will keep the combatant commander informed of the
status of combatant command requirements while service programs are
under development. However, according to OSD officials, the combatant
commands did not have access to comprehensive cost data that they were
required to compile and report because some of the data are compiled
by service component commands and the military departments. Officials
we interviewed from three combatant commands echoed this sentiment,
explaining that while the combatant command is responsible for
developing mission requirements for its respective region, it is the
military departments that are responsible for developing the budgets
that fund initiatives meant to address mission requirements. OSD
officials told us that in order to address this lack of clarity over
roles and responsibilities, OSD has drafted a DOD instruction
outlining the U.S. global defense posture process, which includes
specific guidance to the combatant commands and military departments
on providing cost data associated with new posture initiatives.
Additionally, OSD officials told us that they are in the process of
promulgating a data call to issue to the military departments and
combatant commands to facilitate determination of the cost of current
overseas posture. Key OSD organizations involved in these efforts
include OSD Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation; the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); and the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. We
were unable to evaluate the instruction, however, because it was under
continuous revision and had not been finalized during the time of our
review.
The second reason that combatant commands have not been able to
accurately and consistently report cost information for their posture
initiatives is the lack of a standardized format with which to report
the information. Current DOD guidance does not provide a standardized
format for the combatant commands to use when requesting information
from service component commands, in order to consistently report the
required cost data for each posture initiative. Accordingly, officials
from U.S. Army Europe and U.S. Air Force Europe stated, for example,
that requests for cost data are either too broad or too vague and that
fulfilling these data requests is labor intensive. Without a
standardized format for reporting cost information associated with
each global posture initiative, decision makers on the Global Posture
Executive Council cannot accurately consider and compare costs
associated with different initiatives.
Conclusions:
By asserting that cost savings associated with decreasing overseas
presence are often offset through costs incurred and operational
impacts elsewhere, DOD has tempered expectations for savings
associated with such reductions. However, in an increasingly
constrained budget era, DOD and congressional decision makers need
precise estimates so that they can more readily balance resources
against strategic requirements. To this end, estimates associated with
global posture decisions should be backed by rigorous analysis based
on information that is as complete and comprehensive as possible. The
potential costs or cost savings that may arise from recent posture
decisions in the U.S. European Command area of responsibility will
remain uncertain without additional analysis. Specifically, the
decision to forward station Aegis-equipped ships at Naval Station Rota
may allow the Navy to meet the ballistic mission with fewer ships
overall but could cost DOD approximately $1 billion over a 5-year
period. And, until a more rigorous analysis of the decision is
conducted, the costs of the other options considered will remain
unknown. Further, costs and cost savings associated with the decision
to reduce Army forces in Europe and adjust the Army's basing footprint
in the region will remain unknown until options related to rotational
forces and their associated costs are identified and assessed.
At a department wide level, DOD has taken positive steps to develop a
process for prioritizing posture initiatives. Currently, the process
considers, but is not driven by, cost. However, it remains essential
that comprehensive cost information for each initiative be compiled
and reported so that once initiatives are proposed, they can be
adequately prioritized, resourced, and approved. The current process
is hampered by the inconsistency with which cost data are reported;
the lack of clarity on the roles and responsibilities of key OSD
organizations, military departments, combatant commands, and service
component commands in helping to develop these cost estimates; and the
lack of any standardized template with which to report them. Lacking
this information, department and congressional decision makers will be
unable to adequately assess the true cost of global posture
initiatives in the future.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To identify future funding requirements and improve the posture
planning process, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the
following three actions:
* Direct the Secretary of the Navy to conduct a comprehensive analysis
for each course of action the Navy has considered to address mission
requirements for ballistic missile defense in the Mediterranean that
compares all options the Navy considered and either applies consistent
operational assumptions or controls for different operational
assumptions and includes the long-term life cycle costs and annual
operating costs associated with forward stationing.
* Direct the Secretary of the Army to identify and assess options to
rotate forces in Europe and their associated costs, including the
impacts on future basing in Europe.
* Clarify the roles and responsibilities of key OSD organizations, the
military departments, and the service component commands, and
establish a standardized reporting format to include in applicable
guidance for key DOD organizations to use to ensure that cost
information is consistently summarized and reported to inform the
posture planning process.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally agreed
with our recommendations and has already initiated certain actions to
address them. DOD's response acknowledged that conducting analysis
prior to making posture decisions is important, and that the actions
it has taken or plans to take should provide a greater understanding
of the global defense posture process and its consideration of costs.
However, we believe some additional steps are warranted in order to
fully address our recommendations.
In response to our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct
the Secretary of the Navy to conduct a comprehensive analysis for each
course of action the Navy has considered to address mission
requirements for ballistic missile defense in the Mediterranean, that
compares all options the Navy considered and either applies consistent
operational assumptions or controls for different operational
assumptions and includes the long-term life cycle costs and annual
operating costs associated with forward stationing, DOD partially
concurred, but did not identify additional actions to address the
recommendation. Specifically, DOD agreed that analysis should be
conducted prior to making posture decisions, but does not agree that
additional analysis is needed to support the decision to forward
station four ships in Rota, Spain. As discussed in this report, we
acknowledge that the Navy conducted some analysis to support this
decision, including the development and consideration of some
estimated costs, but we found the analysis inconsistent and
incomplete. For example, while the Navy initially stated that it
considered rotational crewing as an option, we found its analysis was
limited when compared to the other options. In its written comments,
DOD identified concerns with this approach, including increased stress
on the crews; however, the analysis supporting the decision did not
include a discussion of these issues. Additionally, we found that the
Navy did not control for the different assumptions used to develop the
ship number requirements associated with the forward stationing and
U.S.-based deployment approaches, which could have altered the results
of the analysis and could represent significant long-term costs. If
the Navy maintains that forward stationing is the most effective and
efficient means to meet the ballistic missile defense requirement in
Europe, DOD would still benefit from determining the life cycle costs
associated with the decision in order to determine its true long-term
costs, which could be significant. While DOD provided onetime capital
costs and average yearly operations and maintenance costs for this
option, it remains unclear whether these are long-term life cycle cost
estimates. Based on our findings and our cost estimating guide that
states that a credible business case analysis should include life
cycle costs as well as quantifiable and nonquantifiable benefits, we
maintain that the Navy, DOD, and Congress would benefit from
additional analysis in order to develop a more comprehensive cost
estimate associated with the decision to forward station ships in Rota.
DOD agreed with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to identify and assess options to
rotate forces in Europe and their associated costs, including the
impacts on future basing in Europe, and stated that certain actions
are ongoing. Specifically, the Army is currently working with U.S.
European Command and various Army components to identify and assess
options for rotating personnel and equipment through Europe for
training and exercises with allies and partners. If fully implemented,
we believe DOD's actions should meet the intent of our recommendation.
DOD also agreed with our recommendation to clarify the roles and
responsibilities of key OSD organizations, the military departments,
and the service component commands, and establish a standardized
reporting format that will be included in applicable guidance for key
DOD organizations to use to ensure that cost information is
consistently summarized and reported to inform the posture planning
process, and stated that certain actions are under way to address
these matters. For example, DOD stated that the department is in the
final stages of approving an instruction on the U.S. Global Defense
Posture Process that will document roles, responsibilities, and
requirements for global posture planning for key OSD organizations,
the Joint Staff, the military departments, and the combatant commands.
The instruction will institutionalize the Global Posture Integration
Team and Global Posture Executive Council to provide formal oversight
of global posture management. Additionally, DOD is in the process of
issuing a data call to the military departments and combatant commands
to help determine the existing infrastructure costs at enduring
overseas installations. Lastly, DOD stated that the Joint Staff issued
supplemental Theater Posture Plan guidance to the combatant commands
in February 2012, including standardized reporting criteria (e.g.,
estimated costs) for future posture initiatives. If they are fully
implemented, we believe DOD's actions should meet the intent of our
recommendation.
The department also provided a number of general and technical
comments that we considered and incorporated, as appropriate. A
complete copy of DODs written comments is reprinted in appendix II.
We are sending a copy of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the
Secretary of the Navy; and the Secretary of the Army. In addition, the
report is available at no charge on the GAO website at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (404) 679-1816 or pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions
to this report are listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
John H. Pendleton:
Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD)
conducted analysis of costs and savings associated with recent
overseas posture decisions, we reviewed DOD documented cost data and
collected additional information by interviewing officials associated
with two major global force posture initiatives: the stationing of
four Navy destroyers in Rota, Spain, to provide ballistic missile
defense for the region and the reduction of permanently stationed Army
forces in Europe. To determine the extent to which DOD conducted
analysis to support the decision to station four Navy destroyers in
Rota, Spain, we analyzed key documents and briefings provided by the
U.S. Navy, U.S. European Command, and Naval Station Rota in order to
assess assumptions, courses of action considered, and cost estimates.
We conducted a site visit to Naval Station Rota to observe existing
capabilities and needs for military construction projects identified
by the Navy. We also collected information by interviewing officials
from the U.S. Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; U.S.
European Command; U.S. Navy Europe; and Naval Station Rota. To
determine the extent to which DOD conducted analysis to support force
structure reduction of Army brigade combat teams in Europe, we
reviewed key documents from U.S European Command and U.S. Army Europe
describing the status of planned force structure changes in Europe,
including the 2010 and 2011 theater posture plans for U.S. European
Command's area of responsibility. We also collected information by
interviewing officials from Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD),
OSD Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation; the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy; the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense (Comptroller); Department of the Army, Program Assessment and
Evaluation Division; U.S. European Command; and U.S. Army Europe. We
analyzed and assessed cost estimates for multiple courses of action
associated with the number of brigade combat teams in Europe developed
by the U.S. Army, Program Assessment and Evaluation Division, against
GAO's cost estimating criteria to determine the extent to which Army
analysts employed best practices when developing the estimates.
To determine the extent to which DOD developed a process for making
decisions about global posture initiatives that aligns with strategy
and considers costs, as well as efforts made by combatant commands to
compile and report comprehensive cost data on existing global posture
and new posture initiatives in their theater posture plans, we
evaluated core global posture strategy documents; current and draft
DOD guidance; and other documentation we collected through
interviewing with officials from OSD, the Joint Staff, U.S. European
Command and its three service component commands, U.S. Pacific
Command, U.S. Africa Command, the four military service headquarters,
OSD, OSD Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), and the Office of Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. To determine the
extent to which DOD's global posture process includes a consideration
of cost, we observed the Joint Staff's November 2011 Posture Review
Seminar at which officials employed the Global Posture Initiative and
Project Prioritization Process to rank posture initiatives identified
in the combatant commands' respective theater posture plans. We also
analyzed and evaluated theater posture plans from 2010 and 2011 for
each combatant command to determine the extent to which the plans
included comprehensive cost data for each posture initiative. To
identify potential challenges associated with the combatant commands'
directive to compile and report comprehensive cost data, we collected
information through interviews with officials from U.S. European
Command and its service component commands, U.S. Pacific Command, and
U.S. Africa Command.
We conducted this performance audit between June 2011 and May 2012 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Under Secretary of Defense:
Policy:
2000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-2000:
May 29, 2012:
Mr. John Pendleton:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Room 4440B:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Pendleton:
This is the Department of Defense's (DoD) response to the Government
Accountability Office's (GAO) draft report, "Force Structure: Improved
Cost Information and Analysis Needed to Guide Overseas Military
Posture Decisions" — GAO Code 351619/GA0-12-711.
The Department concurs with two recommendations and partially concurs
with one. Clarification and further information are included for each
recommendation on the accompanying pages.
We will work with DoD components to implement these recommendations,
and we look forward to further dialogue with GAO on costing posture
initiatives.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
James N. Miller:
Acting:
[End of letter]
Unclassified:
GAO Draft Report — Dated April 2012:
GAO Code 351619/GAO-12-711:
Force Structure: Improved Cost Information and Analysis Needed to
Guide Overseas Military Posture Decisions:
Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: Direct the Secretary of the Navy to conduct a
comprehensive analysis for each course of action the Navy has
considered to address mission requirements for ballistic missile
defense in the Mediterranean, that compares all options the Navy
considered and either applies consistent operational assumptions or
controls for different operational assumptions and includes the long-
term life-cycle costs and annual operating costs associated with
forward stationing.
DoD Response: Partial Concur. DoD agrees that analysis is required
prior to posture decisions. DoD disagrees that additional analysis is
required to evaluate ballistic missile defense requirements in the
Mediterranean. The Navy conducted extensive analysis comparing options
from both operational and cost perspectives. Calculations for one-time
costs and recurring costs were integral elements of the analyses. The
Navy is implementing the most cost effective option forward basing
ships in Rota to provide ballistic missile defense and to meet the
demand for large surface combatants' presence. The criteria used to
assess each option included: the level of presence generated;
strategic laydown and dispersal; training; port infrastructure; ship
maintenance; personnel costs; quality of life; operational
flexibility; and the number of ships required, and ship scheduling.
The Navy held the operational assumptions constant when comparing the
options of forward basing ships in Rota and basing them stateside.
These included the demand for large surface combatants, the West Coast
distribution of ships, and the employment cycle for ships based
stateside. To identify ship requirements without forward basing in
Rota, the Navy assessed how many U.S.-based ships would be required to
meet the presence level equivalent to that provided by Rota ships. The
effect on force structure of not having ships in Rota would require an
increase of 10 large surface combatants, requiring a one-time capital
cost of $22B (constant FY12 dollars, outside of FYDP). The average
yearly operations and maintenance cost for these ships stateside is
$23M per ship. The average yearly operation and maintenance cost for
ships in Rota is $30M per ship.
The Navy commissioned the Center for Naval Analysis to study the
effects of rotational crewing, and the findings further support Navy's
plan to forward base large surface combatants in Rota. Depending on
the rotational crewing model and operational availability assumptions
used, a crew rotation approach could require an additional two to
twelve large surface combatants to support U.S. European Command
(USEUCOM) demand in the Mediterranean. This corresponds to a one-time
capital cost of $4B-$27B (constant FY12 dollars, outside of FYDP).
Ship operations and maintenance costs were estimated to be similar to
the operations and maintenance costs for ships with a non-rotational
crewing scheme.
A concern with rotational crewing is increased stress on the crews.
Rotated crews deploy multiple times during their employment cycle and
swap ships numerous times, even while in their homeport. An additional
concern is the negative impact of a ship not being "owned" by a single
crew.
The decision to establish a Forward-Deployed Naval Force (FDNF)
consisting of four BMD-capable multi-mission Aegis destroyers to
Europe also took into consideration the increasing global demand for
these assets. In Rota, Spain circumstances permit a cost-effective
FDNF, making it a sound alternative to employing U.S. based rotational
forces or rotational crewing. A FDNF in Rota is the most effective and
efficient means to deliver sea-based BMD-capability to USEUCOM and it
provides the greatest degree of operational responsiveness and
flexibility.
RECOMMENDATION 2: Direct the Secretary of the Army to identify and
assess options to rotate forces in Europe and their associated costs,
including the impacts on future basing in Europe.
DoD Response: Concur. Army is currently working with USEUCOM and
various Army components to identify and assess options for rotating
personnel and equipment through Europe for training and exercises with
allies and partners.
RECOMMENDATION 3: Clarify the roles and responsibilities of key DOD
organizations such as Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, the
military departments, and the service component commands, and
establish a standardized reporting format to include in applicable
guidance for key DOD organizations to use to ensure that cost
information is consistently summarized and reported to inform the
posture planning process.
DoD Response: Concur. The Department is in the final stages of
approving a Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) on U.S. Global
Defense Posture Process, which will document roles, responsibilities
and requirements for global posture planning for OSD, the Joint Staff,
the Military Departments, and the Combatant Commands. This DoDI
institutionalizes the Global Posture Integration Team and Global
Posture Executive Council to provide formal oversight of global
posture management. Additionally, the Department is issuing a data
call to the Military Departments and Combatant Commands to determine
the existing infrastructure costs at enduring overseas installations.
Lastly, the Joint Staff issued supplemental Theater Posture Plan
guidance to the Combatant Commands in February 2012, including
standardized reporting criteria (e.g., estimated costs) for future
posture initiatives.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
John H. Pendleton, (404) 679-1816 or pendletonj@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Guy LoFaro, Assistant
Director; Robert L. Repasky, Assistant Director; Jennifer Echard;
Joanne Landesman; Stephanie Moriarty; Charles Perdue; Carol Petersen;
Courtney Reid, Analyst in Charge; Michael Shaughnessy; and Grant
Sutton made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Defense Management: Additional Cost Information and Stakeholder Input
Needed to Assess Military Posture in Europe. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-131]. Washington, D.C.: February 3,
2011.
Defense Planning: DOD Needs to Review the Costs and Benefits of Basing
Alternatives for Army Forces in Europe. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-745R]. Washington, D.C.: September
13, 2010.
Defense Infrastructure: Guam Needs Timely Information from DOD to Meet
Challenges in Planning and Financing Off-Base Projects and Programs to
Support a Larger Military Presence. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-90R]. Washington, D.C.: November
13, 2009.
Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and
Information on Construction and Support Costs for Proposed European
Sites. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-771].
Washington, D.C.: August 6, 2009.
Force Structure: Actions Needed to Improve DOD's Ability to Manage,
Assess, and Report on Global Defense Posture Initiatives. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-706R]. Washington, D.C.: July 2,
2009.
Defense Logistics: Navy Needs to Develop and Implement a Plan to
Ensure That Voyage Repairs Are Available to Ships Operating near Guam
when Needed. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-427].
Washington, D.C.: May 12, 2008.
Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Increase Risks for Providing Timely
Infrastructure Support for Army Installations Expecting Substantial
Personnel Growth. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1007]. Washington, D.C.: September
13, 2007.
Defense Infrastructure: Overseas Master Plans Are Improving, but DOD
Needs to Provide Congress Additional Information about the Military
Buildup on Guam. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1015].
Washington, D.C.: September 12, 2007.
Defense Management: Comprehensive Strategy and Annual Reporting Are
Needed to Measure Progress and Costs of DOD's Global Posture
Restructuring. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-852].
Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2006.
Opportunities Exist to Improve Future Comprehensive Master Plans for
Changing U.S. Defense Infrastructure Overseas. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-680R]. Washington, D.C.: June 27,
2005.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] DOD, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st
Century Defense (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 3, 2012).
[2] In DOD's 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, DOD identified global
defense posture as (1) forward stationed and rotationally deployed
forces, capabilities, and equipment; (2) a supporting overseas network
of infrastructure and facilities; and (3) a series of treaty, access,
transit and status-protection agreements and arrangements with allies
and key partners.
[3] GAO, Defense Management: Additional Cost Information and
Stakeholder Input Needed to Assess Military Posture in Europe,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-131] (Washington, D.C.:
Feb. 3, 2011).
[4] See S. Rep. No. 112-26, at 191-92 (2011).
[5] The posture prioritization process focuses on new overseas
military construction-related initiatives identified in the combatant
commands' theater posture plans.
[6] Currently, functional combatant commands and U.S. Northern Command
are not required to submit theater posture plans but provide similar
information in a different format.
[7] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-131].
[8] GAO, Defense Management: Comprehensive Cost Information and
Analysis of Alternatives Needed to Assess Military Posture in Asia,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-316] (Washington, D.C.:
May 25, 2011).
[9] GAO, Defense Management: DOD Needs to Determine the Future of Its
Horn of Africa Task Force, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-504] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15,
2010).
[10] According to DOD's 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report,
the European Phased Adaptive Approach represents DOD's plan to adopt a
new regionally based approach to delivering ballistic missile defense.
The report states that the administration is committed to implementing
the new European Phased Adaptive Approach and sees it as the U.S.
national contribution to a NATO missile defense capability.
[11] GAO, Force Structure: Navy Needs to Fully Evaluate Options and
Provide Standard Guidance for Implementing Surface Ship Rotational
Crewing, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-10]
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 10, 2004), and Force Structure: Ship
Rotational Crewing Initiatives Would Benefit from Top-Level
Leadership, Navy-wide Guidance, Comprehensive Analysis, and Improved
Lessons-Learned Sharing, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-418] (Washington, D.C.: May 29,
2008).
[12] The specifics of the assumptions are classified and are therefore
not included in this report.
[13] See Department of Defense Instruction 7041.3, Economic Analysis
for Decisionmaking, enc. A, attachment 1 (Nov. 7, 1995).
[14] These cost estimates include increases in infrastructure,
personnel, training, and maintenance.
[15] GAO, Defense Planning: DOD Needs to Review the Costs and Benefits
of Basing Alternatives for Army Forces in Europe, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-745R] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 13,
2010).
[16] The 10-year time period identified in the analysis is fiscal
years 2012 through 2021.
[17] The average total compensation per active duty servicemember
includes items such as cash compensation and allowances (basic pay/
housing), noncash benefits (health care/education), and deferred
benefits (retirement pay/veterans affairs health care).
[18] According to DOD officials, examples of community support
infrastructure include post exchanges, health care centers, and
spousal career centers.
[19] U.S. European Command officials told us they are currently
implementing the decision to consolidate bases at Wiesbaden and that
any estimated savings will not be fully realized until the
consolidation effort is complete.
[20] Although this decision pertains to a combatant command, funding
for the installation containing the command's headquarters is included
in the Army's budget.
[21] GAO, Defense Management: Actions Needed to Address Stakeholder
Concerns, Improve Interagency Collaboration, and Determine Full Costs
Associated with the U.S. Africa Command, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-181] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 20,
2009).
[22] GAO, Force Structure: Actions Needed to Improve DOD's Ability to
Manage, Assess, and Report on Global Defense Posture Initiatives,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-706R] (Washington,
D.C.: July 2, 2009).
[23] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-316].
[24] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-131].
[25] We reviewed classified theater posture plans from the five
combatant commands required to submit them--U.S. Africa Command, U.S.
Central Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S.
Southern Command.
[26] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 1, Doctrine for the Armed
Forces of the United States (May 2, 2007) (incorporating change Mar.
20, 2009).
[End of section]
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