I'll be disclosing round reports of any round where I didn't only go for my aff. If you have any other questions lmk!

12/6/18

0 - Disclosure

Tournament: idk | Round: Quads | Opponent: Disclosure is Stupid | Judge: TJ FoleyInterpretation: debaters must disclose all broken positions (AC’s, NC’s, K’s, DA’s, CP’s) on the NDCA wiki under their own name and post cites with first three and last three words of all cards read at least 30 minutes before the round.Interpretation: Debaters may not disclose multiple disclosure interpretations with different thresholds of disclosure as their violation. Interpretation: Debaters must disclose their disclosure interpretations.

12/4/18

FEB - Saudi Con

Tournament: IFL State | Round: 1 | Opponent: Lincoln AT | Judge: Max HardtI'm disclosing open source every piece of evidence read in our constructive which paraphrased the evidence. The formatting of the evidence is probably atrocious because google docs destroys verbatim so....

Also, s/o to Ishan and Tej because their AC and 1AR docs really helped me in my successful endeavor to not cut cards on the PF topic.

3/15/19

JANFEB - Internalisms AC

Tournament: Blake | Round: 2 | Opponent: Newark OS | Judge: NigelI affirm. All brackets for clarity. Objectivity as the basis for ethics fails. Two warrants: a) Moral reasoning cannot produce objectively verifiable outcomes for all moral reasoners since their understandings are necessarily internal Coburn:“If criteria encapsulate the kinds of considerations that have in fact been appealed to in criticizing and supporting moral theories, then it is easy to see why it is so dubious that all rational agents will agree about the correct moral theory once they have gone through a process of practical reasoning type M. The central thought is just that judgments about the extent to which a given moral theory satisfies (or fails to satisfy) various of these criteria, and as well as judgments about the weights the different criteria should receive, are bound to reflect facts about the inquirers that do not hold of rational agents qua rational. In other words, such Judgments are bound to be affected by idiosyncratic features of the inquirers, such as their genes constitutions and the physical and cultural environments in which the phenotypic expressions of these genotypes have developed. Think, for example, about the ways the intuitive judgments of members of the humans species differ as one regards right and wrong in various actual and imaginable cases or what the ideal person is like. And must the judgments of rational agents agree about the relative weights ‘conformance utility’ and ‘acceptance utility’ should receive in assessing the extent to which a moral code satisfies the welfare criterion, or when a set of ‘priority rules’ is ‘readily surveyable,’ or whether it is easy to establish that certain principles have been applied correctly? Surely not. In any case, It is easy to conceive of rational beings who differ from us on these matters, and that is all that is required to undermine the claim that there would be agreement among all possible rational agents once they had who undergone a process of practical reason of type M - at least if I am right about the kinds of considerations that would be considered in undergoing such a process.”Coburn, Robert C. “A defense of ethical noncognitivism.” Philosophical Studies, vol. 62, no. 1, April 1991, pp. 67-80.

b) Rule-following is infinitely regressive because rules are inherently arbitrary in the way in which they’re derived. Claims of truth can only be indexed to individual practices. Anscomb on Kripke:What Leibniz says has a particular consequence; I don't know whether he drew it or would have liked it. If what he says is true, an indefinite number of rules should be discoverable for a line passing through all these points in that order; and, given one particular line that so passes through them all, an indefinite number of rules producing it and continuing it in different ways. This sort of fact is of course familiar to Saul Kripke: "Given my past intentions regarding the symbol '+', one and only one answer is dictated as the one appropriate to '68 + 57'. On the other hand, although an intelligence tester may suppose that there is only one possible continuation to the sequence 2, 4, 6, 8, . . ., mathematical and philosophical sophisticates know that an indefinite number of rules (even rules stated in terms of mathematical functions as conventional as ordinary poly- nomials) are compatible with any such a finite initial segment. So if the tester urges me to respond, after 2, 4, 6, 8, . . ., with the unique appropriate next number, the proper response is that no such unique number exists, nor is there any unique (rule determined) infinite sequence that continues the given one" (pp. 17-18). The intelligence tester has arbitrarily fixed on one answer as the correct one. ¶ Kripke goes on to ask: since the process of explaining which functions we mean must eventually stop, with an 'ultimate' functions and rule stipulated "only by a finite number of examples", isn't our procedure is arbitrary after all? "In what sense is my actual computation procedure, following an algorithm that yields '125', more justified by my past instructions than an alternative procedure that would have resulted in '5'?"(p. 18). At this point he has a footnote which opens with: "Few readers ... will by this time be tempted to appeal a determination to 'go on in the same way' as before" (p. 18, n. 13). I think it a pity that he did not actually discuss this. His footnote was concerned principally to say that questions of 'relative' or 'absolute' identity have nothing to do with the matter. But the question "What is going on in the same way?" has everything to do with it. ¶ At the faint risk of being unfair to Leibniz I will attach his name to the point that an infinite number of rules are compatible with, say, an initial segment of a series, for example, 1, 5, 11, 19, 29; or with such as he himself sketches. I don't call it a Wittgenstein point because I don't know if he ever so much as referred to it. (Perhaps sec. 213- "this segment of a series obviously admitted of various interpretations"-is a partial reference to it.)' But since it is true, there is no use in giving a stretch of a series and suggesting that that gives you with mathematical certainty or logical necessity the function to use in developing that series further. I take it that it is this fact that leads Kripke to his account of 'Wittgenstein's sceptical question' as a question whether there is any such fact as "my having an intention to mean one function rather than another by '+ ' " (p. 28). Or again, he speaks of himself as asserting that he definitely means addition by "plus" and insists that in asserting this "I assert that the present meaning I give to '+' determines values for arbitrarily large amounts" (p. 29, n. 21). He invents a name, "quus," for is a function whose values coincide with those of plus up to a point and thereafter are always 5. Given that the previous examples in which I have computed n + m are within the range of coincidence, "The sceptic argues that there is no fact as to what if I meant, whether plus or quus" (p. 39). "There can be no fact as to what I meant by 'plus', or any other word at any time" (p. 21). ¶ This last sentence ends a paragraph. The next begins: "This, then, is the sceptical paradox. When I respond in one way rather than another to such a problem as '68 + 57', I can have no justification for one response rather than another. Since the sceptic who supposes that I meant quus cannot be answered, there is no fact about me that distinguishes between my meaning plus and my meaning quus" (p. 21). ¶ I am not sure whether the "This" at the beginning of this quotation looks backward to the previous sentence or forward to the next one. Perhaps it does not matter, for Kripke has previously said that the questions whether there is 'such a fact' and whether I am justified in giving 125 as the answer are related. "Neither the accuracy of my computation nor of my memory is under dispute. So it ought to be agreed that if I meant plus, then unless I wish to change my usage, I am justified in answering (indeed compelled to answer) '125', not '5'. An answer to the sceptic must satisfy two conditions. First, it must give an account of what fact it is (about my mental state) that constitutes my meaning plus, not quus. But further, there is a condition that any putative candidate for such a fact must satisfy. It must, in some sense, show how I am justified in giving the answer '125' to '68 + 57'" (p. 11). ¶ He has previously said: … I do not simply make an unjustified leap in the dark. I follow directions I previously gave myself that uniquely determine that in this new instance I should say '125'. What are these directions? By hypothesis, I never explicitly told myself I should say '125' in this very instance. Nor can I say that I should simply 'do the same thing I always did,' if this means 'compute according to the rule exhibited by my previous examples'. That rule could just as well have been the rule for quaddition… The idea that quaddition is what I meant, that in a sudden frenzy I have changed my previous usage, dramatizes the problem" (pp. 10-1 1).

Therefore, moral obligations arise from individuals’ internal consideration of right conduct, anything else fails to be motivational. Only internalism is motivational since it is something that has over time become intrinsic to moral judgement Bedke:Similarly, individual psychologies will need mental states that play a role in translating recognitions of moral actions into behavior, thereby contributing their part to the moral practices that enable social cooperation. I propose that first person moral judgments were selected in part to play this role. Moral judgments with some connection to motivational states would be selected for over moral judgments that merely recognize moral situations and obligations without helping to translate those into appropriate motivational states. Consequently, they would have a corresponding nested proper function: a purpose (or proper function) of moral judgments is to motivate individuals to act in accordance with the judgment. Note that purposes correspond to functions selected for, so we do not say that a purpose of moral judgments is to be a part of a wider social practice (that makes it unclear how it functions and why it was selected), but rather that a purpose of moral judgments is one of motivating behavior. This is not to deny the importance of other selected functionings in our moral practices, including the point and purpose of other-directed moral judgments in enforcing moral behaviors, but merely to point out a role (not the role) of first person moral judgments. 14 There are various ways that moral judgments might play a motivational role. One possibility is that moral motivation, when it occurs, comes from moral judgments directly. Bedke, M.S. Dept of Philosophy, University of Arizona “Moral judgment purposivism: saving internalism from amoralism.” Philosophical Studies, 144: 189-209, 2009.

Motivation is a prior question to any ethical claim since any ethic implicitly assumes that an agent will follow it.

Thus, the standard is consistency with internal moral standards. To clarify, the only ethically legitimate actions are those which aren’t externalist. Prefer for 3 additional reasons:1) If reasons are not tailored to the individual than morality becomes alienating, only the AC can tie ethics to specific individuals and their material circumstances Lord: A third motivation for internalism connects to the idea that the purpose of reason ascriptions is to point out a consideration that an agent would be wrong to ignore by her own lights. That might be wrong. But there is a more general, related idea in the background which might well support a form of reasons internalism: the idea that an agent’s normative reasons should be the kinds of things that are tailored for her, which she should not be hopelessly alienated from. If that is right, it’s natural to think that normative reasons must be connected to an agent’s psychology in an appropriate way. (See Railton 1986 for connected discussion about the idea of what is good for a person.) Such a non-alienation idea connects to Kate Manne’s recent defense of internalism, which centers on the idea that normative reasons are tied to the activity of people reasoning together about what to do. Manne considers which attitudes are normatively appropriate in giving genuine advice to an agent about what to do, and, on that basis, argues for a form of internalism. Giving appropriate advice to an agent A, Manne argues, needs to be fundamentally tied to A’s psychology, lest the “advice” simply turn into a form of brow-beating or manipulation. (See Manne 2014. See Smith 1994 for connected discussion about the normative constraints on giving genuine advice.) A fourth important motivation for internalism concerns the epistemology of normative reasons. Consider the facts about psychology at the center of a given internalist view (e.g., facts about what an agent desires, or what would promote those desires). We are arguably capable of learning about such facts through non-mysterious methods— and, moreover, gaining knowledge about them and making reliable judgments about them. Hence, internalism seems to provide a solid foundation for the epistemology of normative reasons. This broad idea gets developed in different ways. For example, Sharon Street argues that the psychology-dependence of ethical facts helps explain our reliability in ethical judgment, including, crucially, our judgments about normative reasons (see Street 2006). As Street (2008) makes clear, she favors a version of psychology-dependence that concerns the agent’s psychology whose normative reasons one is making judgments about—i.e., she favors a kind of reasons internalism, as we are using the terminology here. (See Joshua Schechter’s chapter “Explanatory Challenges in Metaethics” for discussion of the kind of argument at the core of Street’s influential work on this topic, and see Markovits 2014 for discussion of other purported epistemological benefits of internalism. See chapter 9 of Schroeder 2007 for pushback on the idea that internalist views have the sorts of epistemic benefits that theorists such as Street appeal to. The crux of the issue is whether internalism guarantees that we have unproblematic epistemic access to the normative facts given that we have unproblematic access to the relevant psychological facts.)Lord, Errol and Plunkett, David (2017). Reasons Internalism. In Tristram McPherson and David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. Routledge. pp. 324-339.2) External understandings of reasoned judgements only make sense in context of internal deliberation Markovits:2It’s much harder, Williams argues, to understand what it would take for an external reasons statement to be true of an agent. Because if claiming that an agent has a reason to act ϕ amounts to claiming that he would be motivated to act ϕ if he were rational, and if claiming the (p.28) reason is external amounts to claiming that it does not apply to the agent in virtue of any of his existing motivations, then the external reasons theorist must explain how it could be true of the agent that a process of rational deliberation would motivate him to ϕ, despite the fact that, by hypothesis, he need have no existing motivations from which the new motivation to ϕ could be derived. And Williams finds it is hard to imagine a process of rational deliberation that could give rise to a motivation to act, but not by taking any existing motivations as a starting point. Williams considers the possibility that an external reason could explain the action of the agent whose reason it is, provided the agent is rational, by means of the agent’s coming to believe he has the reason to act. Rational agents, after all, will form true beliefs about their reasons, and will be motivated to do as they believe they have reason to do, so if an agent comes to believe an external reason to do x ϕ applies to him, then if he is rational he will be motivated to do x ϕ, regardless of his former motivations. And this, the thought is, is enough to establish the truth of the external reasons claim. An example might make this possibility clearer. The external reasons theorist will want to claim that Jim has a reason to give to charity, say, regardless of whether he has any desire, broadly understood, which might give rise, after procedurally rational deliberation, to a motivation to give to charity. That is to say, Jim has an external reason to give to charity. But if Williams is right about what all reasons claims (including external reasons claims) must mean, then this statement amounts to the claim that Jim would be motivated to give to charity if he were rational, regardless of his actual motivations. How could that be true? The suggestion under consideration is that the external reasons claim is true because, if Jim were rational, he would recognize that he has reason to give to charity, and (because he is rational) this recognition would motivate him to do so (regardless of his prior motivations). But, Williams asks, what would Jim’s “recognition” amount to? If, again, Williams is right about our concept of a reason, it would have to amount to the recognition, on Jim’s part, that he would be motivated (p.29) to give to charity if he were rational (regardless of his existing motivations). It is a true belief in this proposition that is supposed to trigger in the rational Jim a motivation to give to charity. But now we do seem to have put the cart before the horse. After all, we were trying to determine how that proposition could be true. It doesn’t seem to help to say that it can be true, because if it were true, and rational Jim therefore believed it and was motivated accordingly, then it would be true. So, Williams concludes, we can make sense of the idea of a normative reason, which Williams says, just is the idea of a consideration that would motivate a rational agent, only if we accept his version of the internalismt thesis: that an agent can have a reason to perform some action only if he could be motivated to perform it by following a sound deliberative route from his existing ends and motivations. Markovits, Julia. Moral reason. Oxford University Press, 2014.

3) No agent has greater epistemic access to moral truths since morals aren’t verifiable with empirics, thus each person has equal ability to contribute to moral truths and externalism fails Markovits 2: Relatedly, internalism about reasons seems less presumptive than externalism. We should not assume that some of us have special epistemic access to what matters, especially in the absence of any criterion for making such a judgment. It’s better to start from the assumption, as internalism does, that everyone’s ends are equally worthy of pursuit – and correct this assumption only by appealing to standards that are as uncontroversial as possible. According to externalism about reasons, what matters normatively – that is, what we have reason to do or pursue or protect or respect or promote – does not depend in any fundamental way on what in fact matters to us – that is, what we do do and pursue and protect and respect and promote. Some of us happen to be motivated by what actually matters, and some of us are “wrongly” motivated. But externalists can offer no explanation for this supposed difference in how well we respond to reasons – no explanation of why some of us have the right motivations and some of us the wrong ones – that doesn’t itself appeal to the views about what matters that they’re trying to justify. (They can explain why some people have the right motivations by saying, e.g., that they’re good people, but that assumes the truth of the normative views that are at issue.22) A comparison to the epistemic case helps bring out what is unsatisfactory in the externalist position. We sometimes attribute greater epistemic powers to some people than to others despite not being able to explain why they’re more likely to be right in their beliefs about a certain topic. Chicken-sexing is a popular example of this among philosophers. We think some people are more likely to form true beliefs about the sex of chickens than others even though we can’t explain why they are better at judging the sex of chickens. But in the case of chicken-sexing, we have independent means of determining the truth, and so we have independent verification that chicken-sexers usually get things right. Externalism seems to tells us that some of us are better reasons- sensors than others, but without providing the independent means of determining which of us are in fact more reliably motivated by genuine normative reasons (or even that some of us are).Markovits, Julia. Moral reason. Oxford University Press, 2014.And even if implementation matters underneath my ethic, intention outweighs consequences.

1) Action theory:2) Normativity:

I defend the resolution as a general principle and am willing to specify anything it doesn’t in CX like implementation, specific regimes, type of aid etc.

Now Affirm: First, the nature of US military assistance is grounded in externalist notions, its used as a bargaining chip to coerce other actors Sullivan:The United States spends more than eleven billion dollars per year on direct military assistance to foreign governments and substate groups (USAID 2009). The American government expresses a wide variety of goals motivating their use of military assistance as a foreign policy tool. Frequently, US administrations have explicitly linked military aid or arms transfers to a quid-pro-quo expectation of compliance from a government (Sislin 1994). More generally, military assistance is expected to augment US national security by increasing recipient state cooperation with US objectives. According to the State Department’s 2007 Report to Congress: Section 1206(f) of the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act: Security cooperation remains a critical foreign policy tool that allows the United States to advance its national security interests worldwide…. Building partner nation security capacity is one of the most important strategic requirements for the United States to promote international security, advance U.S. interests and prevail in the war against terrorism (1). Sullivan, Patricia L., et al. “US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation.” Foreign Policy Analysis, ISA Semantic Scholar, 2011, pdfs.semanticscholar.org/bf4e/e4125c4d788098a9fc326cb32856b49df5b7.pdf.

Any intentional act means one is complicit with that maxim even if they don’t actively contribute to it Moss:

“Typically, in legal and moral theory, an agent is complicit when they knowingly assist or encourage the harms of others. Through involvement in the harms of others (i.e., harms committed by the primary or principal agents), an secondary agent becomes an accomplice or accessory and, in standard cases, shares some of the liability for the harms done. The harm committed by the secondary agent is usually said to derive from the harm committed by the primary agent. A secondary agent can be complicit in different ways, including by actively conspiring and planning a harm with a principal agent; by simply cooperating with the agent; by encouraging, permitting, or soliciting harm by the agent; or by aiding and abetting the agent (for an extensive discussion of varieties of complicity, see Lepora and Goodin 2013; Kutz 2007; Hart and Honor e 1985). I cannot here go into all of the details concerning the ways in which a secondary agent may be complicit. But there are three main categories we should note in the context of divestment. The first is aiding a principal to cause harm. Here the relationship between the principal and the secondary agent is relatively straightforward. A secondary agent aids a principal agent in cases in which the secondary agent provides some sort of material support or assistance, perhaps in the form of information. The second category of complicity is what we above called influence. A sec- ondary agent can be complicit in a harm by encouraging, soliciting, or inducing another to take a harmful course of action (Kadish 1985). The central idea is that by offering rea- sons for action the secondary agent influences the primary agent and thereby plays a key role in the harm. Using words such as “induce” or “persuade” gives the impression that there is almost a one-on-one interaction between actors. However, as we have seen, there are kinds of indirect action that are not of this form. Setting up treaties or providing subsi- dies are also forms of influence in that they modify the opportunities for action open to the agent in a way that alters the agent’s choices and options. This is particularly relevant to the kind of debates with which we are concerned because it is often institutional struc- tures that have the greatest impact on how a harm is produced. The final category that we should note concerns omissions. Here I will, for brevity’s sake, ignore the philosophical debate about whether omissions are causes and simply note that a widely held view about contributions to harm includes whether one omits or fails to prevent a harm. Were I to omit to give my children their medicine or to turn on the alarm before leaving the bank, I will have plausibly contributed to a harm (Kutz 2007). As important as these issues are, I want to set them aside and focus on what I take to be the two key general features of any account of complicity: what the agent knew or ought to have known about their involvement, and to what degree an agent contributed to the harm or was at risk of doing so. These are what we might call the “knowledge” and “contribution” conditions, and they are critical for the divestment case. To be complicit, a secondary agent must know or should know that their actions are contributing or are likely to contribute to a harm. In the clearest cases, the secondary agent is complicit by sharing or endorsing the principal’s harmful actions. Sharing the purposes of the principal is certainly a blameworthy contribution but one that is too strong a requirement to capture all cases of complicity. All that is plausibly required for liability is that the secondary agent knowingly contributes to the actions of the principal– or is ignorant of them (but should not have been)–and that they know that their action likely contributes to the harm committed by someone else.”Moss, Jeremy. “The morality of divestment.” Law and Policy, vol. 39, no. 4 October 2017. Implications: a and b analytic. And, externalism fails, judgments based on external considerations are not moral judgments because they arise from considerations other than right and wrong Bedke 2:“Consider a distant community very much like our own, but unrelated to our own (perhaps they are on another planet) that developed a very stringent, heavy-handed system of punishment and coercion to keep its citizens in line. The residents of this community are ruled by a single dictator that metes out severe punishments, but only for behaviors that by and large happen to violate our ethical norms. As a result, Individuals in this community generally obey keep their contracts, respect each other’s property, and help those in need because they fear punishment and coercion should they fail to do so. As external observers we would say that their behaviors by and large conform to our ethical norms, though we realize that they are never only motivated by anything other than their own interests and fear of harm to their interests. Let us call this place Amoralsville. So far, there are not even putative moral judgments in this community Amoralsville.”Bedke, M.S. Dept of Philosophy, University of Arizona “Moral judgment purposivism: saving internalism from amoralism.” Philosophical Studies, 144: 189-209, 2009.

Second, authoritarianism is inherently externalist because it involves an external agent imposing a single conception of moral standards on individuals. Rawls:A continuing shared adherence to one comprehensive doctrine can be maintained only by the oppressive use of state power, with all its official crimes and the inevitable brutality and cruelties, followed by the corruption of religion, philosophy, and science. If we say a political society is a community when it is united in affirming one and the same comprehensive doctrine, then the oppressive use of state power with these attendant evils is necessary to maintain political community. Let us call this the fact of oppression. In the society of the Middle Ages, more or less united in affirming the Catholic faith, the Inquisition was not an accident; its suppression of heresy was needed to preserve the shared religious belief. The same holds, we suppose, for any comprehensive philosophical and moral doctrine, even secular ones. A society united on a form of utilitarianism, or on the moral views of Kant or Mill, would likewise require the oppressive sanctions of state power to remain so.Rawls, John. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003.

Analytic.

That outweighs, making neg turns conceptually false: People internally have a motivation against domination by others that restricts their freedom of action – any form of authoritarianism will always be externalist and always ought to be rejected Haidt:The Liberty/oppression foundation, I propose, evolved in response to the adaptive challenge of living in small groups with individuals who would, if given the chance, dominate, bully, and constrain others. The original triggers therefore include signs of attempted domination. Anything that suggests the aggressive, controlling behavior of an alpha male (or 33 Lee 1979, quoted in Boehm 1999, p. 180. 34 The term may have first been used in an 1852 New York Times article about Marx, but Marx and Marxists soon embraced the term, and it shows up in Marx’s 1875 Critique of the Gotha Program. 138 female) can trigger this form of righteous anger, which is sometimes called reactance. (That’s the feeling you get when an authority tells you that you can’t do something, and you feel yourself wanting to do it even more strongly.35) But people don’t suffer oppression in private; the rise of a would-be dominator triggers a motivation to unite as equals with other oppressed individuals to resist, restrain, and in extreme cases kill the oppressor. Individuals who failed to detect signs of domination and respond to them with righteous and group-unifying anger faced the prospect of reduced access to food, mates, and all the other things that make individuals (and their genes) successful in the Darwinian sense.36Haidt, Jonathan. The righteous mind: Why good people are divided by politics and religion. Vintage, 2012.

JANFEB - Layish Affirmative

Second – non-contradiction controls truth value. Lucas: This law is another seemingly obvious point but in practice the Law of Non-Contradiction is the foundation of argumentative validity. The Law of Non-Contradiction makes logic truth preserving so that you’ll never go from a true point and arrive at a false point. Contradiction negates logic, and while true paradox may be something fun which to reflect unless you’re attempting to unite with the godhead by reaching nirvana, contradiction simply has no place in logic. This is not to say that something can’t appear to be self-contradictory and this idea is the basis of a lot of statements of reflection. In the course of debate another definition may become useful: Both a claim and not that claim can’t be true. So, if a statement holds even a teensy-weensy bit of falseness, it must be entirely false.

Analytic: Logic is good.

The standard and role of the ballot is the Categorical Imperative, defined as “the principle that people must always be treated as ends in themselves, never merely as means to the ends of others.”

Prefer additionally:

First, bindingness: End setting is inherent in an obligation so end setting is inescapable. Gewirth :As we have seen, judgments of Moral obligations are categorical and in that what persons morally ought to do sets requirements for them that they cannot rightly evade by consulting their own self- interested desires or variable opinions, ideals, or institutional prac- tices. For moral judgments are critically evaluative of all of these. but such inescapable obligations can’tnot be derived from variable contents. Moreover, ultimate Moral disagreements can only be rationally resolved only if moral obligations are based on necessary contents. For if moral principles are have contingent contents, so that their obligatoriness may vary with the variable desires or opinions of different protagonists, then no finality can be rationally imposed on their differing moral beliefs. To ascertain which among the various possible or actual moral principles are right or correct hence demands that one must adopt a standpoint that is superior to these variable elements, to so that it can be seen to impose rational requirements on them. Such a superior standpoint, to avoid the variability and relativism of the subject matter to which it is addressed, must have a rational necessity of content as well as of form. But how can such contentual necessity be established by reason? To answer this question, the subject matter of morality must be considered; this consideration, being performed through conceptual analysis, is itself a product of reason in the sense of deductive rationality. If there is a subject matter with which all moralities and moral judgments must be concerned directly or indirectly, then this will provide a necessary content for all such judgments. If it can be further shown that this content has certain determinate logical consequences regarding the criteria of moral rightness, then the principle that upholds these criteria will emerge as materially or contentually as well as formally necessary. The subject matter of morality will thus be at least part of the justifications of the supreme moral principle; and since this justifications is contentually necessary, so too will be the moral principle that is its justification. This necessary content of morality is to be found in action and its generic features. For all moral precepts, regardless of their further contents, deal directly or indirectly with how persons ought to act. The specific modes of action required by different moral precepts are, of course, highly variable but all amid these variations, the precepts require actions; and there are certain invariant features that pertain generically to all actions. I shall call these the generic features of action because they characterize the genus or category of action as a whole, as delimited by moral and other practical precepts. Thus. just as action provides the necessary content of all morality, so the generic features provide the necessary content of all action. It will be of the first importance to trace how these features determine the necessities of moral rightness, so that from the ‘is’ of the generic features of action there is logically derivable the ‘ought’ of moral principles and rules. Insofar as these generic features of action constitute the justifications of the supreme principle of morality, they the latter, as their justification, will also have a necessary content. These generic features, in turn, are ascertained by deductive rationality, so that the ultimate justifications of the supreme principle consists in reason. Now just as the concept of reason, which I have confined to deduction and induction, is morally neutral and hence not question- begging, so too the concept of action that is to be used as the basis of the justificatory argument is morally neutral. For since this concept comprises the generic features of all action, it fits all moralities rather than reﬂecting or deriving from any one normative moral position as against any other. How, then, can it be shown that from such morally neutral premises there follow determinate, normatively moral conclu- sions about the necessary content of the supreme principle of moral- ity? This question poses one of the major challenges the present work must meet. The answer consists in showing that, because of its generic features, Action has what I shall call a ‘normative structure,’ in that evaluative and deontic all people’s judgments on the part of agents are logically implicit in it all action; and when these judgments are subjected to certain rational requirements, a certain normative moral principle logically follows from them. To put it otherwise: Any agent. simply by virtue of being an agent, must admit, on pain of self-contradiction, that he ought to act in certain determinate ways. The relation of action to morality bears importantly on the question raised earlier about the correspondence-correlates moral judgments must have if they are to be true by virtue of correspondence. Since action comprises the factual subject matter of moral and other practical precepts, it serves for moral philosophy a function analogous to that which empirical observational data may be held to serve for natural science: that of providing an objective basis or subject matter against which, respectively, moral judgments or rules and empirical statements or laws can be checked for their truth or correctness. It must be emphasized that this function is only analogous: a moral judgment does not become true simply by stating that some action or kind of action is actually performed. As we shall see, it is rather that action, through its generic features and normative structure, It entails certain requirements on persons the part of agents, and moral judgments are only true if insofar as they correspond to these requirements and hence to the normative structure of action. But because action provides the necessary content of moral judgments, these are not left, so far as concerns truth, completely unsupported by relevant objective stan- dards or data. Although the importance of action for moral philoso- phy has been recognized since the ancient Greeks, it has not hitherto been noted that the nature of action enters into the very content and justification of the supreme principle of morality.

Second, self-ownership is forwarded by oneself as the means of discursive exchange. Hence, denial of the right to self-ownership is impossible. Hoppe:Argumentation does not consist of free-floating propositions but is a form of action requiring the employment of scarce means; and that the means which a person demonstrates as preferring by engaging in propositional exchanges are those of private property. For one thing, no one could possibly propose anything, and no one could become convinced of any proposition by argumentative means, if a person’s right to make exclusive use of his physical body were not already presupposed. This It is this recognition of each other’s mutually exclusive control over one’s own body which explains the distinctive character of propositional exchanges that, while one may disagree about what has been said, it is still possible to agree at least on the fact that there is disagreement. It is also obvious that such a property right to one’s own body must be said to be justified a priori, for anyone who tried to justify any norm whatsoever would already have to presupposes the exclusive right of control over his body as a valid norm it. simply in order o say, ‘I propose such and such.’ Anyone disputing this such a right would commit become caught up in a practical contradiction since arguing so would already imply acceptance of the very norm which he was disputing.”Hans-Hermann Hoppe, The Economics and Ethics of Private Property, p. 334

I defend the resolution as a general principle and am willing to specify anything it doesn’t in CX like implementation, specific regimes, type of aid etc.

Now Affirm:

First, intentional contribution to actions that treat others as mere means are, themselves, violations worthy of moral censure. Moss:“Typically, in legal and moral theory, an agent is complicit when they knowingly assist or encourage the harms of others. Through involvement in the harms of others (i.e., harms committed by the primary or principal agents), an secondary agent becomes an accomplice or accessory and, in standard cases, shares some of the liability for the harms done. The harm committed by the secondary agent is usually said to derive from the harm committed by the primary agent. A secondary agent can be complicit in different ways, including by actively conspiring and planning a harm with a principal agent; by simply cooperating with the agent; by encouraging, permitting, or soliciting harm by the agent; or by aiding and abetting the agent (for an extensive discussion of varieties of complicity, see Lepora and Goodin 2013; Kutz 2007; Hart and Honor e 1985). I cannot here go into all of the details concerning the ways in which a secondary agent may be complicit. But there are three main categories we should note in the context of divestment. The first is aiding a principal to cause harm. Here the relationship between the principal and the secondary agent is relatively straightforward. A secondary agent aids a principal agent in cases in which the secondary agent provides some sort of material support or assistance, perhaps in the form of information. The second category of complicity is what we above called influence. A sec- ondary agent can be complicit in a harm by encouraging, soliciting, or inducing another to take a harmful course of action (Kadish 1985). The central idea is that by offering rea- sons for action the secondary agent influences the primary agent and thereby plays a key role in the harm. Using words such as “induce” or “persuade” gives the impression that there is almost a one-on-one interaction between actors. However, as we have seen, there are kinds of indirect action that are not of this form. Setting up treaties or providing subsi- dies are also forms of influence in that they modify the opportunities for action open to the agent in a way that alters the agent’s choices and options. This is particularly relevant to the kind of debates with which we are concerned because it is often institutional struc- tures that have the greatest impact on how a harm is produced. The final category that we should note concerns omissions. Here I will, for brevity’s sake, ignore the philosophical debate about whether omissions are causes and simply note that a widely held view about contributions to harm includes whether one omits or fails to prevent a harm. Were I to omit to give my children their medicine or to turn on the alarm before leaving the bank, I will have plausibly contributed to a harm (Kutz 2007). As important as these issues are, I want to set them aside and focus on what I take to be the two key general features of any account of complicity: what the agent knew or ought to have known about their involvement, and to what degree an agent contributed to the harm or was at risk of doing so. These are what we might call the “knowledge” and “contribution” conditions, and they are critical for the divestment case. To be complicit, a secondary agent must know or should know that their actions are contributing or are likely to contribute to a harm. In the clearest cases, the secondary agent is complicit by sharing or endorsing the principal’s harmful actions. Sharing the purposes of the principal is certainly a blameworthy contribution but one that is too strong a requirement to capture all cases of complicity. All that is plausibly required for liability is that the secondary agent knowingly contributes to the actions of the principal– or is ignorant of them (but should not have been)–and that they know that their action likely contributes to the harm committed by someone else.”Moss, Jeremy. “The morality of divestment.” Law and Policy, vol. 39, no. 4 October 2017.

Analytic about orphans and machetes, hint: it doesn't end well for the orphans.

Analytic this aff ain't util brud.

Second, authoritarian action, defined as the assertion of political coercion without the consent of the governed, by definition fails to recognize the status of persons as ends in themselves. Mikalsen:“This restriction of right to the external sphere is related to the conceptual link between right and coercion. Even if coercion is an impediment to or hindrance of external freedom, right is still analytically connected to an authorization to coerce. Whoever hinders rightful use of freedom does wrong by laying arbitrary constraints on the innate right of some other person, and coercion that prevents such constraints is legitimate, ‘as a hindering of a hindrance to freedom’. It is therefore no surprise that the requirement of a moral motive must be abandoned in the sphere of right. For one thing, if coercion is allowed to reach beyond the external sphere to the internal motivations of people, we seem to have no substantial barrier against paternalistic, not to say authoritarian or totalitarian, intrusions by governments with regard to how one should live lead one’s personal life, how one should think, what one should or desire, etc.16 Moreover, such efforts would also be self-defeating for the simple reason that virtuous action is beyond the reach of possible coercion. Virtuous or moral action implies that what is done is done because one recognizes that it is the right thing to do, so whatever a person does because they are he or she is externally compelled to do so is not a moral action.”Mikalsen, Kjartan Koch. “In defense of Kant’s League of States.” Law and Philosophy, 30:291, 2011.

And, any US military assistance is complicit with authoritarianism.

a, b, and c blippy analytics.

That affirms, US participation in these bad acts is both obvious and intentional. Vine:“To ensure basing access from Central America to Africa, Asia to the Middle East, U.S. officials have repeatedly collaborated with fiercely anti-democratic regimes and militaries implicated in torture, murder, the suppression of democratic rights, the systematic oppression of women and minorities, and numerous other human rights abuses. Forget the recent White House invitations and Trump’s public compliments. For nearly three-quarters of a century, the United States has invested tens of billions of dollars in maintaining bases and troops in such repressive states. From Harry Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower to George W. Bush and Barack Obama, Republican and Democratic administrations alike have, since World War II, regularly showingn a preference for maintaining bases in undemocratic and often despotic states, including Spain under Generalissimo Francisco Franco, South Korea under Park Chung-hee, Bahrain under King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa, and Djibouti under four-term President Ismail Omar Guelleh, to name just four. Many of the 45 present-day undemocratic U.S. base hosts qualify as fully “authoritarian regimes,” according to the Economist Democracy Index. In such cases, American installations and the troops stationed on them are effectively helping block the spread of democracy through in countries like Cameroon, Chad, Ethiopia, Jordan, Kuwait, Niger, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. This pattern of daily support for dictatorship and repression around the world should be a national scandal in a country supposedly committed to democracy. It should trouble Americans ranging from religious conservatives and libertarians to leftists ― anyone, in fact, who believes in the democratic principles enshrined in the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence. After all, one of the long-articulated justifications for maintaining military bases abroad has been that the U.S. military’s presence protects and spreads democracy. Far from bringing democracy to these lands, however, such bases tend to provides legitimacy for and props up undemocratic regimes of all sorts, while often interferesing with genuine efforts to encourage political and democratic reform. The silencing of the critics of human rights abuses in base hosts like Bahrain, which has violently cracked down on pro-democracy demonstrators since 2011, and has left the United States complicit in these states’ crimes. During the Cold War, bases in undemocratic countries were often justified as the unfortunate but necessary consequence of confronting the “communist menace” of the Soviet Union. But here’s the curious thing: in the quarter century, since the Cold War ended with that empire’s implosion, few of those bases have closed. Today, while a White House visit from an autocrat may generate indignation, the presence of such installations in countries run by repressive or military rulers receives little notice at all.”Vine, David. “How U.S. military bases back dictators, autocrats, and military regimes.” The Huffington Post, May 16, 2017.

UV: Vote affirmative if you think its a good idea

12/17/18

NOVDEC - Communities AC

Tournament: Blue Key | Round: 1 | Opponent: idk | Judge: Sabrina CallahanI affirm.All brackets are for clarity. All experiences are validated through how others react to them. Our agency is founded upon relations to others. Neuhouser:The deduction's second theorem (§3) makes one of the Foundations's most original and exciting claims, and it is essential to Fichte's project of showing that rights are necessary conditions of self-consciousness. Its claim is that ascribing to oneself free efficacy (or agency) in the sensible world requires ascribing the same capacity to other rational beings. Fichte argues here that in order for a subject to be conscious of its own agency, it must first find that agency, as an object for its consciousness, in the external world. The thought here appears to be that the subject cannot come to an awareness of itself as practically free simply by seeing the results of its agency in the world, for in order to act freely, it would first have to know itself as free. The subject, then, must learn about its freedom in some other manner; it must somehow experience itself as free prior to any actual instances of its agency. Fichte's claim in §3 is that the only possible solution to this problem is to suppose that external evidence of one subject's agency is provided by another free subject. This occurs through a "summons" that one already formed subject makes to another. The summons is a call to act, a call to realize one's free efficacy, which takes the form of an imperative: You ought to "resolve to exercise your agency" (§3, III). Fichte concludes from this that the freedom of one subject (which includes consciousness of its freedom) requires the existence of others; free individuality is possible only in relation to other subjects, and so intersubjectivity is a necessary condition of self-consciousness. As Fichte sums up his result in the first Corollary to §3: "The human being . . . becomes a human being only among human beings;... it follows that if there are to be human beings, at all, there must be more than one." Frederick Neuhouser: Introduction to Foundations of Natural Right by Johann Fichte. Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Analytic.

And our morals are derived from the community. Shermer:As a social primate species, we modulate our morals with signals from family, friends and social groups with whom we identify because in our evolutionary past those attributes helped individuals to survive and reproduce. We do not just blindly concede control to authorities; instead we follow the cues provided by our moral communities on how best to behave. The power of identification is emphasized in a reinterpretation of Milgram in a 2012 article in Perspectives on Psychological Science by University of St. Andrews psychologist Stephen D. Reicher, University of Queensland psychologist S. Alexander Haslam and University of Exeter psychologist Joanne R. Smith. They call their paradigm “identification-based followership,” noting that “participants' identification with either the experimenter and the scientific community that he represents or the learner and the general community that he represents” better explains the willingness of subjects to shock (or not) learners at the bidding of an authority. At the start of the experiment, subjects identify with the experimenter and his worthy scientific research program, but at 150 volts the subjects' identification begins to shift to the learner, who cries out “Ugh!!! Experimenter! That's all. Get me out of here, please. My heart's starting to bother me. I refuse to go on. Let me out.”Shermer, Michael. "How Communities Shape Our Morals." Scientific American. N.p., 1 Dec. 2012. Web. 06 July 2016.

Thus, the standard is consistency with communitarian principles. That means acting in a way to participate in the communal good by engaging productively in your community. Prefer:

First, rule-following is infinitely regressive because rules are inherently arbitrary in the way in which they’re derived. Claims of truth can only be indexed to social practices. Anscombe on Kripke:What Leibniz says has a particular consequence; I don't know whether he drew it or would have liked it. If what he says is true, an indefinite number of rules should be discoverable for a line passing through all these points in that order; and, given one particular line that so passes through them all, an indefinite number of rules producing it and continuing it in different ways. This sort of fact is of course familiar to Saul Kripke: "Given my past intentions regarding the symbol '+', one and only one answer is dictated as the one appropriate to '68 + 57'. On the other hand, although an intelligence tester may suppose that there is only one possible continuation to the sequence 2, 4, 6, 8, . . ., mathematical and philosophical sophisticates know that an indefinite number of rules (even rules stated in terms of mathematical functions as conventional as ordinary poly- nomials) are compatible with any such a finite initial segment. So if the tester urges me to respond, after 2, 4, 6, 8, . . ., with the unique appropriate next number, the proper response is that no such unique number exists, nor is there any unique (rule determined) infinite sequence that continues the given one" (pp. 17-18). The intelligence tester has arbitrarily fixed on one answer as the correct one. ¶ Kripke goes on to ask: since the process of explaining which functions we mean must eventually stop, with an 'ultimate' functions and rule stipulated "only by a finite number of examples", isn't our procedure is arbitrary after all? "In what sense is my actual computation procedure, following an algorithm that yields '125', more justified by my past instructions than an alternative procedure that would have resulted in '5'?"(p. 18). At this point he has a footnote which opens with: "Few readers ... will by this time be tempted to appeal a determination to 'go on in the same way' as before" (p. 18, n. 13). I think it a pity that he did not actually discuss this. His footnote was concerned principally to say that questions of 'relative' or 'absolute' identity have nothing to do with the matter. But the question "What is going on in the same way?" has everything to do with it. ¶ At the faint risk of being unfair to Leibniz I will attach his name to the point that an infinite number of rules are compatible with, say, an initial segment of a series, for example, 1, 5, 11, 19, 29; or with such as he himself sketches. I don't call it a Wittgenstein point because I don't know if he ever so much as referred to it. (Perhaps sec. 213- "this segment of a series obviously admitted of various interpretations"-is a partial reference to it.)' But since it is true, there is no use in giving a stretch of a series and suggesting that that gives you with mathematical certainty or logical necessity the function to use in developing that series further. I take it that it is this fact that leads Kripke to his account of 'Wittgenstein's sceptical question' as a question whether there is any such fact as "my having an intention to mean one function rather than another by '+ ' " (p. 28). Or again, he speaks of himself as asserting that he definitely means addition by "plus" and insists that in asserting this "I assert that the present meaning I give to '+' determines values for arbitrarily large amounts" (p. 29, n. 21). He invents a name, "quus," for is a function whose values coincide with those of plus up to a point and thereafter are always 5. Given that the previous examples in which I have computed n + m are within the range of coincidence, "The sceptic argues that there is no fact as to what if I meant, whether plus or quus" (p. 39). "There can be no fact as to what I meant by 'plus', or any other word at any time" (p. 21). ¶ This last sentence ends a paragraph. The next begins: "This, then, is the sceptical paradox. When I respond in one way rather than another to such a problem as '68 + 57', I can have no justification for one response rather than another. Since the sceptic who supposes that I meant quus cannot be answered, there is no fact about me that distinguishes between my meaning plus and my meaning quus" (p. 21). ¶ I am not sure whether the "This" at the beginning of this quotation looks backward to the previous sentence or forward to the next one. Perhaps it does not matter, for Kripke has previously said that the questions whether there is 'such a fact' and whether I am justified in giving 125 as the answer are related. "Neither the accuracy of my computation nor of my memory is under dispute. So it ought to be agreed that if I meant plus, then unless I wish to change my usage, I am justified in answering (indeed compelled to answer) '125', not '5'. An answer to the sceptic must satisfy two conditions. First, it must give an account of what fact it is (about my mental state) that constitutes my meaning plus, not quus. But further, there is a condition that any putative candidate for such a fact must satisfy. It must, in some sense, show how I am justified in giving the answer '125' to '68 + 57'" (p. 11). ¶ He has previously said: … I do not simply make an unjustified leap in the dark. I follow directions I previously gave myself that uniquely determine that in this new instance I should say '125'. What are these directions? By hypothesis, I never explicitly told myself I should say '125' in this very instance. Nor can I say that I should simply 'do the same thing I always did,' if this means 'compute according to the rule exhibited by my previous examples'. That rule could just as well have been the rule for quaddition… The idea that quaddition is what I meant, that in a sudden frenzy I have changed my previous usage, dramatizes the problem" (pp. 10-1 1).“Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language” by Saul A. Kripke. Review by: G. E. M. Anscombe (British analytic philosopher who wrote on philosophy of mind, action, language, logic, ethics). Ethics, Vol. 95, No. 2 (Jan., 1985), pp. 342-352.

Analyticc

Second, participating in the community is act of caring for the self, which forces us to think about how we distribute power. Rule based interpretations of obligations doesn’t account for our individual applications. Foucault:

Yes, absolutely. And this is where we must introduce the concept of domination. The analyses I am trying to make bear essentially on relations of power. By this I mean something different from states of domination. Power relations are extremely widespread in human relationships. Now, this means not that political power is everywhere, but that there is in human relationships a whole range of power relations that may come into play among individuals, within families, in pedagogical relationships, political life, and so on. The analysis of power relations is an extremely complex area; one sometimes encounters what may be called situations or states of domination in which the power relations, instead of being mobile, allowing the various participants to adopt strategies modifying them, remain blocked, frozen. When an individual or social group succeeds in blocking a field of power relations, immobilizing them and preventing any reversibility of movement by economic, political, or military means, one is faced with what may be called a state of domination. In such a state, it is certain that practices of freedom do not-exist or exist only unilaterally or are extremely constrained and limited. Thus, I agree with you that liberation is sometimes the political or historical condition for a practice of freedom. Taking sexuality as an example, it is clear that a number of liberations were required vis-it-vis male power, that liberation was necessary from an oppressive morality concerning heterosexuality as well as homosexuality. But this liberation does not give rise to the happy human being imbued with a sexuality to which the subject could achieve a complete and satisfying relationship. Liberation paves the way for new power relationships, which must be controlled by practices of freedom. Yes, in some cases. You have situations where liberation and the struggle for liberation are indispensable for the practice of freedom. With respect to sexuality, for example-and I am not indulging in polemics, because I don't like polemics, I think they are usually futile-there is a Reichian model derived from a certain reading of Freud. Now, in Reich's view the problem was entirely one ofliberation. To put it somewhat schematically, according to him there is desire, drive, prohibition, repression, internalization, and it is by getting rid of these prohibitions, in other words, by liberating oneself, that the problem gets resolved. I think-and I know I am vastly oversimplifying much more interesting and refined positions of many authors-this completely misses the ethical problem of the practice off reedom: How can one practice freedom? With regard to sexuality, it is obvious that it is by liberating our desire that we will learn to conduct ourselves ethically in pleasure relationships with others. Q. You say that freedom must be practiced ethically... M.F. Yes,' for what is ethics, if not the practice of freedom, the conscious rijlechie practice of freedom? Q. In other words, you understand freedom as a reality that is already ethical in itself. M.F. Freedom is the ontological condition of ethics. But ethics is the considered form that freedom takes when it is informed by reflection. Q. Ethics is what is achieved in the search for or the care of the self? M.F. In the Greco-Roman world, the care of the selfwas the mode in which individual freedom-or civic liberty, up to a point-was reflected se riftechie as an ethics. Ifyou take a whole series oftexts going from the first Platonic dialogues up to the major texts of late Stoicism Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, and so on-you will see that the theme of the care of the self thoroughly permeated moral reflection. It is interesting to see that, in our societies on the other hand, at a time that is very difficult to pinpoint, the care of the self became somewhat suspect. Starting at a certain point, being con tion is much more complex, for, with Christianity, achieving one's salvation is also a way of caring for oneself. But in Christianity, salvation is attained through the renunciation of self. There is a paradox in the care of the self in Christianity-but that is another problem I believe that among the Greeks and Romans—especially the Greeks—concern with the self and care of the self were required for right conduct and the proper practice of freedom, in order to know oneself se connaitre —the familiar aspect of the gnothi seauton—as well as to form oneself, to surpass one-self, to master the appetites that threaten to overwhelm one. Individual freedom was very important for the Greeks—contrary to the common-place derived more or less from Hegel that sees it as being of no importance when placed against the imposing totality of the city. Not to be a slave (of another city, of the people around you, of those governing you, of your own passions) was an absolutely fundamental theme. The concern with freedom was an essential and permanent problem for eight full centuries of ancient culture. What we have here is an entire ethics revolving around the care of the self; this is what gives ancient ethics its particular form. I am not saying that ethics is synonymous with the care of the self, but that, in antiquity, ethics as the conscious practice of freedom has revolved around this fundamental imperative: "Take care of yourself" soucie-toi de toi-rnernd. M.F. Certainly. Taking care of oneself requires knowing oneself. Care of the self is, of course, knowledge connaissance of the self—this is the Socratic-Platonic aspect—but also knowledge of a number of rules of acceptable conduct or of principles that are both truths and prescriptions. To take care of the self is to equip oneself with these truths: this is where ethics is linked to the game of truth. In the Platonic current of thought, at least at the end of the Alcibiades, the problem for the subject or the individual soul is to turn its gaze upon itself, to recognize itself in what it is and, recognizing itself in what it is, to recall the truths that issue from it and that it has been able to contemplate;1 on the other hand, in the current of thinking we can broadly call Stoicism, the problem is to learn through the teaching of a number oftruths and doctrines, some of which are fun(Ethics: Subjectivity and Truthdamental principles while others are rules of conduct. You must proceed in such a way that these principles tell you in each situation and, as it were, spontaneously, how to conduct yourself. It is' here that one encounters a metaphor that comes not from the Stoics but from Plutareh: "You must learn the principles in such a constant way that whenever your desires, appetites, and fears awake like barking dogs, the logos will speak like the voice of the master who silences his dogs with a single cry. "2 Here we have the idea ofa logos functioning, as it were, without any intervention on your part; you have become the logos, or the logos has become you. The Greeks problematized their freedom, and the freedom of the individual, as an ethical problem. But ethical in the sense in which the Greeks understood it: ethos was a way ofbeing and ofbehavior. It was a mode of being for the subject, along with a certain way of acting, a way visible to others. A person's ethos was evident in his clothing, appearance, gait, in the calm with which he responded to every event, and so on. For the Greeks, this was the concrete form of freedom; this was the way they problematized their freedom. A man possessed of a splendid ethos, who could be admired and put forward as an example, was someone who practiced freedom in a certain way. I don't think that a shift is needed for freedom to be conceived as ethos; it is immediately problematized as ethos. But extensive work by the self on the self is required for this practice of freedom to take shape in an ethos that is good, beautiful, honorable, estimable, memorable, and exemplary. I think that insofar as freedom for the Greeks signifies nonslavery-which is quite a different definition of freedom from our own-the problem is already entirely political. It is political in that nonslavery to others is a condition: a slave has no ethics. Freedom is thus inherently political. And it also has a political model insofar as being free means not being a slave to oneself and one's appetites, which means that with respect to oneself one establishes a certain relationship of domination, of mastery, which was called arkhe, or power, command What makes it ethical for the Greeks is not that it is care for others. The care of the self is ethical in itself; but it implies complex relationships with others insofar as this ethos of freedom it is also a way of caring for others. This is why it is important for a free man who conducts himself as he should to be able to govern his wife, his children, his household; it is also the art of governing. Ethos also implies a relationship with others, insofar as the care of the self enables one to occupy his rightful position in the city, the community, or interpersonal rela-tionships, whether as a magistrate or a friend. And the care of the self also implies a relationship with the other insofar as proper care of the self requires listening to the lessons of a master. One needs a guide, a counselor, a friend, someone who will be truthful with you. Thus, the problem of relationships with others is present throughout the development of the care of the self.Foucault, Michel, and Paul Rabinow. Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth. New York: New Press, 1997. Print.

I defend the resolution as a general principle and am willing to specify anything it doesn’t in CX like implementation, actor, etc. However, I’ll spec these scenarios for public information to defend an on balance burden, ask in CX for anything else Milligan: "Everybody deserves some modicum of privacy, even president and would-be presidents," says Steve Rabinowitz, who worked in Bill Clinton's White House and is now a media consultant and founder of Bluelight Strategies. But "it doesn't extend to their financial dealings and it doesn't extend to their health and fitness to serve out their term in office."That means the public should know about people's income, charitable giving, debt and business dealings, along with pertinent health information relevant to their ability to serve four years.Milligan, Susan. “Clinton's Pneumonia Flap and the Public Fight Over Privacy.” U.S. News and World Report, U.S. News and World Report, 12 Sept. 2016, www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-09-12/hillary-clinton-pneumonia-flap-highlights-the-public-fight-over-privacy.

I contend that the public’s right to know being valued over candidate privacy is consistent with communitarianism.

First, access to information is key to preventing corruption which undermines communitarianism. Neuman:Citizens and their leaders around the world have long recognized the risk of corruption. Corruption diverts scarce resources from necessary public services, and instead puts it in the pockets of politicians, middlemen and illicit contractors, while ensuring that the poor do not receive the benefits of this “system”. The consequences of corruption globally have been clear: unequal access to public services and justice, reduced investor confidence, continued poverty, and even violence and overthrow of governments. A high level of corruption is a singularly pernicious societal problem that also undermines the rule of law and citizen confidence in democratic institutions. In addition, citizens around the world continue to , struggle to meet their basic needs of food, clothing, and adequate shelter and to exercise their broader socio-economic rights. More than 1.2 billion people world-wide live on less than $1 per day, 1.7 billion are without access to clean water, and 3.3 billion people live without adequate sanitation facilities. Although nearly 150 counties have ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Freedom House finds that 106 countries continue to restrict its citizen’s important civil and political freedoms. Knowledge is power, and transparency is the remedy to the darkness under which corruption and abuse thrives. Neuman, Laura. “Access to Information: A Key to Democracy.” The Carter Center, The Carter Center, Nov. 2002, www.cartercenter.org/documents/1272.pdf.

Openness to others and yourself is a key to justifying our actions to the community. Trenery:How would the type of community which MacIntyre envisages justify ethical judgements? MacIntyre argues that in becoming independent practical reasoners we have to overcome a number of obstacles to self-understanding: for example our limited knowledge and capacity for self-delusion -- and the key to overcoming these obstacles is openness to being questioned by others. In responding to such questioning we try to make ourselves intelligible to others by disclosing just enough of our personal history to provide a context which makes action understandable, and which we explains how we could have come to the type of judgements that underpin that action. In doing this we also make ourselves intelligible to ourselves. Indeed, as MacIntyre points out, the questioning to which we respond is often "how on earth could you do that?" He argues that the only adequate answer will be an account of the good at which we aimed, or an account of our mistaken judgements with respect to that good. In such dialogue, MacIntyre argues that we have to become accountable to others, to treat ourselves as duty bound when challenged to truthfully answer the question as to nature of the good we were pursuing in our actions. Thus within a flourishing community there will be reasons that are accepted as being sufficient and final justifications for the actions taken by an individual. Such justifications are not arbitrary; they are endorsed by the standards of justification that have emerged within that community.Trenery, David. (2014). Alasdair MacIntyre, George Lindbeck and the nature of tradition.

Further deeper involvement and understanding of peers is mutually beneficial to the community. Etzioni:We must continue to move away from pure self-interest and toward the common good. Communitarianism refers to investing time and energy in relations with the other, including family, friends and members of one’s community. The term also encompasses service to the common good, such as volunteering, national service, and politics. Communitarian life is not centered around altruism but around mutuality, in the sense that deeper and thicker involvement with the other is rewarding to both the recipient and the giver. Indeed, numerous studies show that communitarian pursuits breed deep contentment. A study of 50-year-old men shows that those with friendships are far less likely to experience heart disease. Another shows that life satisfaction in older adults is higher for those who participate in community service.Dawes, Simon. “Interview with Amitai Etzioni: A Communitarian Approach to Press Freedom, Privacy and National Security.” Media Theory, History and Regulation, 9 July 2014.

Finally, rights aren’t absolute – we have to allow exceptions to solve for extreme situations. Tomasky 13:No right is absolute. In fact, the Second Amendment arguably has fewer restrictions on it these days than many of the other first 10, and there is and should be no guarantee that things are going to stay that way. In fact, if we’re ever going to be serious about trying to stop this mass butchery that we endure every few months, they cannot. Let’s begin by going down the list and reviewing various limits placed on nearly all the amendments of the Bill of Rights (I thank Doug Kendall of the Constitutional Accountability Center for helping me out here). The First Amendment, of course, guarantees the right to free speech and assembly, and to worship as one pleases. There haven’t been that many restrictions placed on the freedom to worship in the United States, although there is a steady stream of cases involving some local government or school board preventing someone from wearing religious clothing or facial hair or what have you. Sometimes a Christian school or church is denied a zoning permit; but more often it’s the freedom to worship of a minority (Muslim, Sikh, etc.) that is threatened. As for free speech, of course it is restricted. Over the past 50 or so years in a series of cases, courts have placed a number of “time, place, and manner” restrictions on free speech. To restrict speech in general, the government must meet four tests. But this is always being revised and negotiated. Here’s one restriction on the Bill of Rights that I’d wager most conservatives would happily approve of. In 1988, the HHS under Reagan promulgated rules prohibiting a family-planning professional at a clinic that received federal dollars from “promoting” (i.e. telling a woman about) abortion. This was challenged partially on free-speech grounds. In Rust v. Sullivan (1991), the Supreme Court held that these rules did not violate the clinicians’ free-speech rights. So far as I can see, this is still law. It’s just one example from many free-speech restrictions that have been imposed over the years, as you can see here. Let’s skip the Second Amendment for now. The Third Amendment—my personal favorite—proscribes the private quartering of troops. Not so relevant to life today—in fact, the Supreme Court has apparently never considered a Third Amendment challenge. Onward. The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable search and seizure, and of course there are loads of exceptions to this right, the most notable being that whenever an officer of the law has reason to think an imminently dangerous situation exists, s/he may invade a citizen’s privacy. Then there’s the question of the “exclusionary rule,” by which evidence deemed to have been improperly obtained can be excluded as evidence. Jurisprudence on this question goes back 100 years, and this very interesting paper notes that it has been two decades since the court upheld the application of the exclusionary rule in a search-and-seizure case. Since then, the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have ruled six times—every time for the government, i.e., limiting the constitutional protection. (Funny, isn’t it, how many of these other, non-gun limitations on the Bill of Rights are championed by conservatives?) The Fifth Amendment most famously protects against self-incrimination. Kendall notes that there have indeed been almost no restrictions placed on this right—inside the trial courtroom. Outside the courtroom, however, limitations are rife, having to do mostly with circumstances of interrogations and confessions made within them. This amendment also provides for due process, and that means Miranda rights, and again here, we know from recent news stories that not everyone is immediately read them, and we also know that it’s conservatives who have always despised Miranda in the first place and seek to limit or overturn it today. The Sixth Amendment provides the right to counsel and a speedy trial, and here again, our time is witness to a slow watering down of these rights by the court’s conservative majority, as in 2009’s Montejo v. Louisiana. The Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to a trial by jury in civil cases, and this contains a blatant restriction: the court has never “incorporated” this right to apply to states, where the majority of civil cases are tried, so most civil cases don’t include this right. And the Eighth Amendment, against cruel and unusual punishment, has been much contested with respect to issues like juvenile crime. The Ninth and Tenth Amendments don’t enumerate specific rights as such and so aren’t relevant. Now, back to the Second Amendment. I’m sure that pro-gun extremists know very well about Scalia’s famous opinion in Heller (2008), which dramatically expanded gun rights. But even in that decision, Scalia himself said that Second Amendment protections could apply only to weapons “in common use at the time.” Chris Wallace asked Scalia in 2012 about semiautomatic weapons and extended magazines, and he said: “What the opinion Heller said is that it will have to be decided in future cases. What limitations upon the right to bear arms are permissible. Some undoubtedly are, because there were some that were acknowledged at the time. For example, there was a tort called affrighting, which if you carried around a really horrible weapon just to scare people, like a head ax or something, that was I believe a misdemeanor. So yes, there are some limitations that can be imposed.(Michael Tomasky, 05/05/13 4:45 AM ET, “There Are No ‘Absolute’ Rights”, Daily Beast) https://www.thedailybeast.com/there-are-no-absolute-rights

12/4/18

NOVDEC - Deleuze AC

Tournament: Glenbrooks | Round: 7 | Opponent: Greenhill MR | Judge: MelinSubjectivity is the basis for ethics. Ethics tells us what we are obligated to do but that requires a concept of the subject to act upon these obligations. Ethical claims can only be normative if they are derived from the subject’s instability. 2 warrants:

1) The ‘I think’ is not the ‘I am’. The ‘I think’ does not determine the subject – it is merely its capacity. Thinking only affects a subject as a being in time and so is not a transcendent feature. Transcendent subject hood fails because of differentiation through time causes instability. Deleuze:

Temporally speaking - in other words, from the point of view of the theory of time - nothing is more instructive than the difference between the Kantian and the Cartesian Cogito. It is as though Descartes's Cogito operated with two logical values: determination and undetermined existence. The determination (I think) implies an undetermined existence (I am, because 'in order to think one must exist') - and determines it precisely as the existence of a thinking subject: I think therefore I am, I am a thing which thinks. The entire Kantian critique is amounts to objecting against Descartes that it is impossible for determination to bear directly upon the undetermined. The determination ('I think') obviously implies something undetermined ('I am'), but nothing so far tells us how it is that this undetermined is determinable by the 'I think': 'in the consciousness of myself in mere thought I am the being itself although nothing in myself is thereby given for thought.'8 Kant therefore adds a third logical value: the determinable, or rather the form in which the undetermined is determinable (by the deter­ mination). This third value suffices to make logic a transcendental instance. It amounts to the discovery of Difference - no longer in the form of an empirical difference between two determinations, but in the form of a transcendental. Difference between the Determination as such and what it determines; not longer in the form of an external difference which separates, but in the form of an internal. Difference which establishes an a priori relation between thought and being. Kant's answer is well known: the form under which undetermined existence is determinable by the 'I think' is that of time ...9 The consequences of this are extreme: my undetermined existence can be determined only within time as the existence of a phenomenon, of a passive, receptive phenomenal subject appearing within time. As a result, the spontaneity of which I am conscious in the 'I think' cannot be understood as the attribute of a substantial and spontaneous being, but only as the affection of a passive self which experiences its own thought - its own intelligence, that by virtue of which it can say I - being exercised in it and upon it but not by it. Here begins a long and inexhaustible story: I is an other, or the paradox of inner sense. The activity of thought applies to a receptive being, to a passive subject which represents that activity to itself rather than enacts it, which experiences its effect rather than initiates it, and which lives it like an Other within itself. To 'I think' and 'I am' must be added the self - that is, the passive position (what Kant calls the receptivity of intuition); to the determination and the undetermined must be added the form of the determinable, namely time. Nor is 'add' entirely the right word here, since it is rather a matter of establishing the difference and interiorising it within being and thought. It is as though the I were fractured from one end to the other: fractured by the pure and empty form of time. In this form it is the correlate of the passive self which appears in time. Time signifies a fault or a fracture in the I and a passivity in the self, and the correlation between the passive self and the fractured I constitutes the discovery of the transcendental, the element of the Copernican Revolution. Descartes could draw his conclusion only by expelling time, by reducing the Cogito to an instant and entrusting time to the operation of continuous creation carried out by God. More generally, the supposed identity of the I has no other guarantee than the unity of God himself. For this reason, the substitution of the point of view of the 'I' for the point of view of 'God' = than is commonly supposed, so long as the former retains an identity that it owes precisely tt. If the greatest tmttattve of transcendental philosophy was to introduce the form of time into thought as such, then this pure and empty form in turn signifies indissolubly the death of God, the fractured I and the passive self. It is true that Kant did not pursue this initiative: both God and the I underwent a practical resurrection. Even in the speculative domain, the fracture is quickly filled by a new form of identity - namely, active synthetic identity; whereas the passive self is defined only by receptivity and, as such, endowed with no power of synthesis. On the contrary, we have seen that receptivity, understood as a capacity for experiencing affections, was only a consequence, and that the passive self was more profoundly constituted by a synthesis which is itself passive (contemplation ontraction). · The possibility of receiving sensations or impressions follows from this. It is impossible to maintain the Kantian distribution, which amounts to a supreme effort to save the world of representation: here, synthesis is understood as active and as giving rise to a new form of identity in the I, while passivity is understood as simple receptivity without synthesis. The Kantian initiative can be taken up, and the form of time can support both the death of God and the fractured I, but in the course of a quite different understanding of the passive self. In this sense, it is correct to claim that neither Fichte nor Hegel is the descendant of Kant - rather, it is Holderlin, who discovers the emptiness of pure time and, in this emptiness, simultaneously the continued diversion of the divine, the prolonged fracture of the I and the constitutive passion of the self.10 Holderlin saw in this form of time both the essence of tragedy and the adventure of Oedipus, as though these were complementary figures of the same death instinct. Is it possible that Kantian philosophy should thus be the heir of Oedipus? Deleuze, Gilles. Difference and Repitition. Translated by Paul Patton. Hey I recut this one

The aff is a prior condition to any ethical claim - there is no way to negate on any other ethical theory since its binding that no true ethical theory can be inconsistent with the demands of the instability of the subject

2) The subject is engaging in a constant desire changing process through interaction with affect. Semetsky:

Unconscious formations are to be brought into play both because an individual is a desiring machine and the “family drama depends ... on the unconscious social investments that come out in delire” (Deleuze, 1995, p. 20), that is, in a pre- rational, differential and excessive, triadic logic of floating images and disparate meanings inhabiting the Alice’s paradoxical Wonderland. Desire is not a single drive – it is an assembly line of affects and effects; machine is not a mechanical law utilized in the production of some predetermined end imposed by a transcendental subject – instead subjects and objects are themselves differentiated and produced as the outcomes of desiring machines. The unconscious enfolded in subjectivity entails the insufficiency for subjectivity to be interpreted just in terms of the stable identity of the rational and intentional subject, or some ideal authentic self. There is no transcendental subject for Deleuze, it vanishes like the infamous ghost into the unconscious machine, it is nowhere to be found. The unconscious, as yet a-conceptual part of the plane of immanence is always productive and constructive, making subjectivity changing and transient as though forcing it into becoming-other. According to Deleuze, “the intentionality of being is surpassed by the fold of Being, Being as fold” (Deleuze, 1988a, p. 110). In this respect, the unconscious perceptions are implicated as minute, or microperceptions; as such – and le pli, the root of the im-pli-cated, means in French the fold – they are part of the cartographic microanalysis of establishing “an unconscious psychic mechanism that engenders the perceived in consciousness” (Deleuze, 1993, p. 95). The notion of being as fold points toward a subjectivity understood as a process irreducible to universal notions such as totality, unity or any a priori fixed self- identity. As a mode of intensity, subjectivity is capable of expressesing itself in its present actuality neither by means of progressive climbing toward the ultimate truth or the higher moral ideal, nor by “looking for origins, even lost or deleted 19 CHAPTER 1 ones, but setting out to catch things where they were at work, in the middle: breaking things open, breaking words open” (Deleuze, 1995, p. 86). The complexity of subjectivation is related to the complexity of language: there cannot be a single meaning derived from the classical signifier-signified based model, because such description would failto acknowledge the Deleuzean plural and pragmatic subject’s mode of existence as qualitative multiplicity. Subjectivity is always derivative to the expression of thought, and being true to thought is pre- eminent to the production of subjectivity. The fundamental Deleuzean concept of fold contributes to the blurring of boundaries between epistemology, ethics, and psychology: subjectivity expresses itself and through emergence of a new form of content: it becomes other by way of interaction, or the double transformation – as in the aforementioned and oft-cited example of wasp and orchid.

The politics of stable subjectivity makes critique impossible cause it takes empirical subject features and treats it as a model. It stabilizes habits as empirical, which gives no place for contestation since it is a postulate not a hypothesis. Rolli:

We now arrive at the last point. I have emphasized how immanence can be considered as a profane source of experience that makes sense only in the context of temporal subjectification processes. It does not therefore suffice to posit a pure sensuality or a pure thinking of immanence. Our self and worldly relations are always determined by relations of power. But only on the basis of a scheme of immanent thinking is it possible to really begin to see these determining factors.28 Otherwise an empricial state of affairs-an empirical normality-is hypostatized as a transcendental norm, in such a way that its genetic background and conditions can be considered mere byproducts and ignored. Thus, as long as it is considered a foregone conclusion that a normal human is being has white skin, is of the male gender, middle aged, belongs to a (particular) religion, and so on, then there is no need to ask about the disciplining, sociological, political, and economical processes in recent or past historys that have given rise to that person. From the perspective of immanence, what can be located within power relations-in the sense of the conditions of actualization of immanent structures-thus seems naturally legitimate. Deleuze's philosophy o f immanence is therefore both political as weil as "absolute." Immanent perceptions, sensations, and concepts are just as much immediately determined by social conditions as are the micrological regions of the political as immanent processes of being. Against established power structures that benefit the rich to the detriment of the many, a kind of thinking emerges that relies on immanence and is thereby qualified to inquire into the implicit strategies that motivate all representative forms of life production and empowerment. Such immanent a thinking does not solely aim at unveiling the orders of life that are otherwise presumed to be natural, but is directed towards a model of free associations and free action. Deleuze's temporal ontology of imn1anence thus revealings itself as excluding dejure concentrations of power and thereby making them comprehensible as facts with regard to their causal conditions. It is therefore impossible to tacitly insert transcendence into the corresponding level of immanence, where its power can be played out. It is impossible because the structural characteristic of immanence is a constant transport of difference, so that the syntheses of differential singularities always refer to a particular actuality of immanent structures-and according to Deleuze, it is only on this level that densities and consolidations of power relations are situated. By contrast, the postulates of transcendence, by relying on natural orders and homologies, conceal the power- drenched determination of forms of thinking and action. Although in his early lectures on Kant, Heidegger drew on the dimension of time to expand critical philosophy-and in this regard he was a source of inspiration for Deleuze-his orientation towards the origin of imagination as a medium between understanding and contemplation testifies to a certain natural accordance which in fact renders superfluous any profound analysis of conditioning power relations. Central to Heidegger's discourse is an act of transcendence which assigns the level oE temporal immanence to a self-identical Dasein which overcomes itself. The same problem can be identified in the context of the critique of onto-theology. Here the difficulty has to do with the presumed philosophical "unity" ofbeing and thinking which, according to Heidegger, pre-exists any active or spontaneous activity of thinking and is but the task of thinking to heed.29 In this regard Deleuze can be seen to playoff Nietzsche against Heidegger. For while Nietzsche, with the "will to power," presents a concept of immanence that leaves modern nihilism behind because it radically questions the value of value, Heidegger, in his criticism of Nietzsche, relies on the "proper" (eigentliche) value of a dedicated "experience of being" (5 which backs away from the escalating nihilism of the times. Insofar as Heidegger, faced with the decay of modernity, holds on to a thinking of transcendence, his diagnosis of the present thus remains stuck in resentment. For instead of taking fate (Geschick) into our own hands, we are to let fate follow its course and obey the order that comes from the highest ruler: Being itself.

Rolli, Marc. “Immanence and Transcendence” Bulletin de la Sociite Amincaine de Philosophie de Langue Franfais Volume 14, Number 2, Fall 2004. Did recut this one

Thus, the standard and ROB to be attentive to the instability of the subject. That’s key to education – majoritarian stabilized schooling wrecks thought and is unethical.

Carlin and Wallin: As a social machine through which ‘labour power and the socius as a whole is manufactured’, schooling figures in the production of social territories that already anticipate a certain kind of people (Guattari, 2009, p. 47). And what kind of people does orthodox schooling seek to produce but a ‘molar public’, or, rather, a public regulated in the abstract image of segmentary social categories (age, gender, ethnicity, class, rank, achievement) (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987)? Such an aspiration is intimately wed to the territorializing powers of the State, for as Deleuze and Guattari argue (1983), State power first requires a ‘representational subject’ as both an abstract and unconscious model in relation to which one is taught to desire. As Massumi (2002) writes, ‘the subject is made to be in conformity with the systems that produces it, such that the subject reproduces the system’ (p. 6). Where education has historically functioned to regulate institutional life according to such segmentary molar codes, its modes of production have taken as their teleological goal the production of a ‘majoritarian people’, or, more accurately, a people circuited to their representational self-similarity according to State thought. This is, in part, the threat that Aoki (2005) identifies in the planned curriculum and its projection of an abstract essentialism upon a diversity of concrete educational assemblages (a school, a class, a curriculum, etc.). Apropos Deleuze, Aoki argues that the standardization of education has effectively reduced difference to a matter of difference in degree. That is, in reference to the stratifying power of the planned curriculum, Aoki avers that difference is always-already linked to an abstract image to which pedagogy ought to aspire and in conformity to which its operations become recognizable as ‘education’ per se. Against political action then, orthodox educational thought conceptualizes social life alongside the ‘categories of the Negative’, eschewing difference for conformity, flows for unities, mobile arrangements for totalizing systems (Foucault, 1983, p. xiii). Twisting Deleuze, might we claim that the people are missing in education? That is, where education aspires to invest desire in the production of a ‘majoritarian’ or ‘molar’ public, the prospect of thinking singularities are stayed, not only through the paucity of enunciatory forms and images available for thinking education in the first place, but further, through the organization of the school’s enunciatory machines into vehicles of representation that repeat in molarizing forms of self-reflection, ‘majoritarian’ perspective, and dominant circuits of desiring-investment. Herein, the impulse of standardization obliterates alternative subject formations and the modes of counter-signifying enunciation that might palpate them. Repelling the singular, the ‘majoritarian’ and standardizing impulse of education takes as its ‘fundamental’ mode of production the reification of common sense, or, rather, the territorialization of thought according to that which is given (that which everyone already knows). Figuring in a mode ‘of identification that brings diversity in general to bear upon the form of the Same’, common sense functions to stabilize patterns of social production by tethering them to molar orders of meaning and dominant regimes of social signification (Deleuze, 1990, p. 78). As Daignault argues, in so far as it repels the anomalous by reterritorializing it within prior systems of representation, common sense constitutes a significant and lingering problem in contemporary education (Hwu, 2004). Its function, Daignault alludes apropos Serres, is oriented to the annihilation of difference. Hence, where the conceptualization of ‘public’ education is founded in common sense, potentials for political action through tactics of proliferation, disjunction, and singularization are radically delimited and captured within prior territorialities of use (Foucault, 1983, p. xiii). The problem of this scenario is clear: common sense has yet to force us to think in a manner capable of subtracting desire from majoritarian thought in lieu of alternative forms of organization and experimental expression. In so far as it functions as a vehicle of ‘molarization’, reifying a common universe of reference for enunciation, the school fails to produce conditions for thinking in a manner that is not already anticipated by such referential ‘possibilities’. Hence, while antithetical to the espoused purpose of schooling, the majoritarian impulse of the school has yet to produce conditions for thinking – at least in the Deleuzian (2000) sense whereupon thought proceeds from a necessary violence to those habits of repetition with which thought becomes contracted.

1) Trauma creates new modes of being, it’s a claim that can be backed up historically. Only by embracing a productive view of instability can we ever ground ethics in the material world Headley:

Working with the assumption of ontology as, among other things, the culture's conception of being or existence, Glissant examines the Western ontology of being and existence with regards to matters of identity and community. Glissant calls attention to the fact that, in the West, community and identity have been thought in terms of the logic of filiation. This logic of filiation grounds identity and community in some original event or act such that it is possible to retrace in a linear manner the unbroken historical link between this past act and the present. Both the collective memory of the community, as well as the identity of the individual, is grounded in the logic of linearity. Glissant writes: 'In the Western world the hidden cause . . . of Myth and Epic is filiation, its work setting out upon the fixed linearity of time, always toward a projection, a project. The use of filiation to ground the founding myths of the West, and the complicity of the linearity of time, sustained a philosophical fascination with the ontological One, the unity and totality of the community and the ontological priority of the individual relative to the community. This conception of things was not universal, for Glissant maintains that in other areas of the world, the emphasis was not placed on the One but rather on the All. He writes: In exposing the limitations of the preceding model, Glissant offers an alternative one infused with Deleuzian themes. But his thinking now is located in a novel historical space. Indeed, the attractive originality of Glissant's ontology originates from his working through the historical encounter among the various cultural traditions in the Caribbean. Glissant does not approach this particular mode of being in the world as a phenomenon to be evaded but rather as an occasion for rethinking being. This rethinking is possible in the absence of the filiation model of self and community that dominated in the Western world. Here there is no linearity, there is no One, but rather the ingredients for a morphogenetic emergence for new modes of being. Of course, I am not suggesting that Glissant is engaging in some kind of naïve celebration of human suffering or embracing celebratory victimology. Rather, instead of viewing Antillean reality only through the positivistic lens of hyper-empiricism, Glissant alerts us to the possibility of new forms of being emergent from what are often considered alien or particularistic contexts. The intriguing development regarding Glissant's ontology is that the ontological abyss of slavery, that notorious zone of non-being (the opening discussions found in both Caribbean Discourse and Poetics of Relation), offers the possibility of rethinking existence otherwise than in terms of transparency, totalization, root and so forth. Glissant specifically identifies the plantation as a Deleuzian space in which a vortex of differences of intensity of relationship, inclusion and exclusion, the exchange of foods, gods, ideas, music and language spontaneously gave rise to new modes of being. Glissant rethinks the plantation outside the context of the commodity economy. For he tells us that it is also within the plantation that the meeting of cultures is most clearly and directly observable, though none of the inhabitants had the slightest hint that this was really about a clash of cultures. Glissant wisely avoids imprisoning himself within the cognitive stasis of interpretations that read things only from the perspective of the mainstream. Consequently, he acknowledges the ontological implications of the drama of existence enacted in the Antilles. If, as I stated earlier, his ontology is concerned with questions of agency and subjectivity, of the coming into consciousness of persons existing in conditions of non-being. Glissant offers the plantation as a venue where the expression of subjectivity defiled the forces of ontological degradation. According to Glissant: The plantation is one of the focal points for the development of present day modes of Relation. Within this universe of domination and oppression, of silent or professed dehumanization, forms of humanity stubbornly persisted. Indeed, Glissant claims that the ontological abyss of slavery produced a knowledge that is both specific and yet universally relevant. At the same time, he appreciates the fact that the generalizing universal common to Western thought blinds it to the ontological potential of the slave trade. And so it is the case that the basis of a new ontology, a new understanding of human existence can emerge from this Antillean abyss, yet at the same time it is a knowledge that can be shared, not a knowledge premised upon exceptionalism or for that matter on the apprehension or protection of any transcendental peculiarity. It should be noted that consistent with Glissant's existential ontology, the notion of 'knowledge' is not knowledge in the sense of the discovery of universal truths. Rather, knowledge in this context must be given an existential slant. Consequently, we can argue that the relevant point about the plantation reality is its capacity to generate new concepts. On this score, Glissant shares the Deleuzian insight that, the destiny of philosophical concepts and philosophical positions lies not with the truth or falsity of their claims but with the vistas for thinking and living they open up for us.

2 The way we move past the color line is through a thousand tiny races, which can only be done with an illegible, unstable view of the subject. Saldaha 04:

Every time phenotype makes another machinic connection, there is a stutter. Every time bodies are further entrenched in segregatedion, however brutal, there is needs to be an affective investment of some sort. This is the ruptural moment in which to intervene. Race should not be eliminated, but proliferated, its many energies directed at multiplying racial differences so as to render them joyfully cacophonic. Many in American critical race theory also argue against a utopian transcendence of race, taking from W E B Du Bois and pragmatism a reflexive, sometimes strategically nationalist attitude towards racial embodiment (compare Outlaw, 1996; Shuford, 2001; Winant, 2004). What is needed is an affirmation of race's creativity and virtuality: what race can be. Race need not be about order and oppression, it can be wild, far-from-equilibrium, liberatory. It is not that everyone becomes completely Brownian (or brown!), completely similar, or completely unique. It is just that white supremacism becomes strenuous as many populations start harbouring a similar economic, technological, cultural productivity as whites do now, linking all sorts of bodies with all sorts of wealth and all sorts of ways of life. That is, race exists in its true mode when it is no longer stifled by racism. ––The race-tribe exists only at the level of an oppressed race, and in the name of the oppression it suffers; there is no race but inferior, minoritarian; there is no domi- nant race; a race is defined not by its purity but rather by the impurity conferred upon it by a system of domination. Bastard and mixed-blood are the true names of race'' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980 1987, page 379). In ``A thousand tiny sexes'', Grosz (1994b) follows a well-known passage of Deleuze and Guattari to argue for non-Hegelian, indeed protohuman feminism that utilises lines of flight of the gender assemblage to combat heterosexist patriarchy. ––If we consider the great binary aggregates, such as the sexes or classes, it is evident that they also cross over into molecular assemblages of a different nature, and that there is a double reciprocal dependency between them. For the two sexes imply a multiplicity of molecular combinations bringing into play not only the man in the woman and the woman in the man, but the relation of each to the animal, the plant, etc.: a thousand tiny sexes'' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980 1987, page 213). Similarly, the molecularisation of race would consist in its breaking up into a thousand tiny races. It is from here that cosmopolitanism should start: the pleasure, curiosity, and concern in encountering a multiplicity of corporeal fragments outside of common-sense taxonomies. ––We walk the streets among hundreds of people whose patterns of lips, breasts, and genital organs we divine; they seem to us equivalent and interchangeable. Then something snares our attention: a dimple speckled with freckles on the cheek of a woman; a steel choker around the throat of a man in a business suit; a gold ring in the punctured nipple on the hard chest of a deliveryman; a big raw fist in the delicate hand of a schoolgirl; a live python coiled about the neck of a lean, lanky adolescent with coal-black skin. Signs of clandestine disorder in the uniformed and coded crowds'' (Lingis, 2000, page 142). Machinism against racism builds upon a gradual, fragmented, and shifting sense of corporeal difference, that of course extends far further than the street. Responsibility, activism, and antiracist policy will follow only from feeling and understanding the geographical differentials that exist between many different kinds of bodies: between a Jew and a black soldier, between a woman in the Sahel and a woman in Wall Street, between a Peruvian peasant and a Chinese journalist. A machinic politics of race takes into account the real barriers to mobility and imagination that exist in different places; cosmopolitanism has to be invented, not imposed. It may seem that machinism is as utopian and open ended as Gilroy's transcendent antiracism. It is not, because it is empirical, immanent, and pragmatic. The machinic geography of phenotype shows that racism differs from place to place, and cannot be overcome in any simple way. It shows that white supremacy can subside only by changing the rules of education, or the financial sector, or the arms trade, or the pharmaceutical industry, or whatever. For machinic politics, the cultural studies pre- occupations with apology, recognition, politically correct language and reconsiliation, or else cultural hybridity, pastiche, and ambivalence, threaten to stand in the way of really doing something about the global structures of racism. A thousand tiny races can be made only if it is acknowledged that racism is a material, inclusive series of events, a viscous geography which cannot be `signified away'. Miscegenation, openness to strangers, exoticism in art, and experimentations with whiteness can certainly help. But ultimately cosmpolitanism without critique and intervention remains complacent with its own comfortably mobile position. In a word, ethics encompasses politics, and politics starts with convincing people of race's materiality.

The aff lies at the heart of what it means to address structural violence – macropolitical analysis fails to recognize the affect between individuals and fascism to permeate society. Rather, we must look inward to start our political discussion on how fascism is internalized in the subject through stability.Deleuze and Guattari 80:

It is not sufficient to define bureaucracy by a rigid segmentarity with ¶ compartmentalization of contiguous offices, an office manager in each ¶ segment, and the corresponding centralization at the end of the hall or on ¶ top of the tower. For at the same time there is a whole bureaucratic segmentation, a suppleness of and communication between offices, a bureaucratic ¶ perversion, a permanent inventiveness or creativity practiced even against ¶ administrative regulations. If Kafka is the greatest theorist of bureaucracy, ¶ it is because he shows how, at a certain level (but which one? it is not ¶ localizable), the barriers between offices cease to be "a definite dividing ¶ line" and are immersed in a molecular medium (milieu) that dissolves ¶ them and simultaneously makes the office manager proliferate into ¶ microfigures impossible to recognize or identify, discernible only when ¶ they are centralizable: another regime, coexistent with the separation and ¶ totalization of the rigid segments.I0 We would even say that fascism implies ¶ a molecular regime that is distinct both from molar segments and their centralization. Doubtless, fascism invented the concept of the totalitarian ¶ State, but there is no reason to define fascism by a concept of its own devising: there are totalitarian States, of the Stalinist or military dictatorship ¶ type, that are not fascist. The concept of the totalitarian State applies only ¶ at the macropotical level, to a rigid segmentarity and a particular mode of ¶ totalization and centralization. But fascism is inseparable from a proliferation of molecular focuses in interaction, which skip from point to point, ¶ before beginning to resonate together in the National Socialist State. Rural ¶ fascism and city or neighborhood fascism, youth fascism and war veteran's ¶ fascism, fascism of the Left and fascism of the Right, fascism of the couple, ¶ family, school, and office: every fascism is defined by a micro-black hole ¶ that stands on its own and communicates with the others, before resonating in a great, generalized central black hole.1¶ ' There is fascism when a war ¶ machine is installed in each hole, in every niche. Even after the National ¶ Socialist State had been established, microfascisms persisted that gave it ¶ unequaled ability to act upon the "masses." ¶ Daniel Guerin is correct to say ¶ that if Hitler took power, rather then taking over the German State administration, it was because from the beginning he had at his disposal ¶ microorganizations giving him "an unequaled, irreplaceable ability to ¶ penetrate every cell of society," in other words, a molecular and supple ¶ segmentarity, flows capable of suffusing every kind of cell. Conversely, if ¶ capitalism came to consider the fascist experience as catastrophic, if it preferred to ally itself with Stalinist totalitarianism, which from its point of ¶ view was much more sensible and manageable, it was because the egmentarity and centralization of the latter was more classical and less ¶ fluid. What makes fascism dangerous is its molecular or micropolitical ¶ power, for it is a mass movement: a cancerous body rather than a totalitarian organism. American film has often depicted these molecular focal ¶ points; band, gang, sect, family, town, neighborhood, vehicle fascisms ¶ spare no one. Only microfascism provides an answer to the global question: Why does desire desire its own repression, how can it desire its own ¶ repression? The masses certainly do not passively submit to power; nor do ¶ they "want" to be repressed, in a kind of masochistic hysteria; nor are they ¶ tricked by an ideological lure. Desire is never separable from complex ¶ assemblages that necessarily tie into molecular levels, from ¶ microforma-tions already shaping postures, attitudes, perceptions, ¶ expectations, semiotic systems, etc. Desire is never an undifferentiated ¶ instinctual energy, but itself results from a highly developed, engineered ¶ setup rich in interactions: a whole supple segmentarity that processes ¶ molecular energies and potentially gives desire a fascist determination. ¶ Leftist organizations will not be the last to secrete microfascisms. It's too ¶ easy to be antifascist on the molar level, and not even see the fascist ¶ inside you, the fascist you yourself sustain and nourish and cherish with ¶ molecules both personal and collective.¶ Four errors concerning this molecular and supple segmentarity are to be ¶ avoided. The first is axiological and consists in believing that a little suppleness is enough to make things "better." But microfascisms are what ¶ make fascism so dangerous, and fine segmentations are as harmful as the ¶ most rigid of segments. The second is psychological, as if the molecular ¶ were in the realm of the imagination and applied only to the individual and ¶ interindividual. But there is just as much social-Real on one line as on the ¶ other. Third, the two forms are not simply distinguished by size, as a small ¶ form and a large form; although it is true that the molecular works in detail ¶ and operates in small groups, this does not mean that it is any less coextensive with the entire social field than molar organization. Finally, the qualitative difference between the two lines does not preclude their boosting or ¶ cutting into each other; there is always a proportional relation between the ¶ two, directly or inversely proportional.

I defend the resolution as a general principle and am willing to specify anything it doesn’t in CX like implementation, actor, etc. However, I’ll spec these scenarios for public information to defend an on balance burden, ask in CX for anything else Milligan:

"Everybody deserves some modicum of privacy, even president and would-be presidents," says Steve Rabinowitz, who worked in Bill Clinton's White House and is now a media consultant and founder of Bluelight Strategies. But "it doesn't extend to their financial dealings and it doesn't extend to their health and fitness to serve out their term in office."That means the public should know about people's income, charitable giving, debt and business dealings, along with pertinent health information relevant to their ability to serve four years.Milligan, Susan. “Clinton's Pneumonia Flap and the Public Fight Over Privacy.” U.S. News and World Report, U.S. News and World Report, 12 Sept. 2016, www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-09-12/hillary-clinton-pneumonia-flap-highlights-the-public-fight-over-privacy.Now Affirm:1) Claims towards privacy is an attempt to protect qualities of an individual; to form an attachment of the self, this entraps the subject in a form of ego-centric stability foreclosed from any affective engagement. Cohen 14:

2) In modernity, the private is presented as a method of insurrection – a place for the self to escape from the pressure of the social, this tendency to retreat in the private doesn’t exclude spheres of social influence. Totalitarian ideology manifests itself through the private sphere by maintaining the illusion of a depoliticized and innocent space. This is the instilment of micro-fascism

Zizek 95:One must therefore take a step further and consider that there is no way to simply step aside from ideology. The private indulgence in cynicism and the obsession with private pleasures are all precisely how totalitarian ideology operates in nonideological everyday life. It is how this life is determined by ideology, how ideology is "present in it in the mode of absence," if we may resort to this syntagma from the heroic epoch of structuralism. The depoliticization of the private sphere in late Socialist societies is "compulsive," marked by the fundamental prohibition of free political discussion; for that reason, such depoliticization always functions as the evasion of what is truly at stake. This accounts for the most immediately striking feature of Kundera's novels: the depoliticized private sphere in no way functions as the free domain of innocent pleasures; there is always something damp, claustrophobic, inauthentic, even desperate, in the characters' striving for sexual and other pleasures. In this respect, the lesson of Kundera's novels is the exact opposite of a naive reliance on the innocent private sphere; the totalitarian socialist ideology vitiates from within the very sphere of privacy to which we take refuge. This insight, however, is far from conclusive. Another step is needed to deal with Kundera's even more ambiguous lesson. Notwithstanding the dampness of the private sphere, the fact remains that the totalitarian situation gave rise to a series of phenomena attested by numerous chronicles of everyday life in the socialist East. In reaction to totalitarian ideological domination, not only a cynical escape into the "good life" of private pleasures took place, but also an extraordinary flourishing of authentic friendship, of paying visits at home, of shared dinners, and of passionate intellectual conversations in closed societies - features which usually fascinated visitors from the West. The problem, of course, is that there is no way to draw a clear line of separation between the two sides; they are the front and the back of the same coin, which is why, with the advent of democracy, they both get lost. It is to Kundera's credit that he does not conceal this ambiguity: the spirit of "Middle Europe" - of authentic friendship and intellectual sociability - survived only in Bohemia, Hungary, and Poland as a form of resistance to totalitarian ideological domination. Perhaps yet another step is to be ventured here; the very subordination to the socialist order brought about a specific enjoyment: not only the enjoyment provided by an awareness that people were living in a universe absolved of uncertainty (since the system possessed, or pretended to possess, an answer to everything), but above all the enjoyment of the very stupidity of the System - a relish in the emptiness of the official ritual, in the worn-out stylistic figures of the predominating ideological discourse.(Slavoj Zizek, International Director of the Birkbeck Institute for the Humanities, president of the Society for Theoretical Psychoanalysis LAW AND THE POSTMODERN MIND: SUPEREGO BY DEFAULT, Cardozo Law Review, 1995, 16 Cardozo L. Rev. 925).

That outweighs, the desire for fascism propagated through the private sphere serves as the root cause of all material violence.Deleuze and Guattari 77:

In point of fact, if desire is the lack of the real object, its very nature as a real entity depends upon an "essence of lack" that produces the fantasized object. Desire thus conceived of as production, though merely the production of fantasies, has been explained perfectly by psychoanalysis. On the very lowest level of interpretation, this means that the real object that desire lacks is related to an extrinsic natural or social production, whereas desire intrinsically produces an imaginary object that functions as a double of reality, as though there were a "dreamed-of object behind every real object," or a mental production behind all real productions. This conception does not necessarily compel psychoanalysis to engage in a study of gadgets and markets, in the form of an utterly dreary and dull psychoanalysis of the object: psychoanalytic studies of packages of noodles, cars, or "thingumajigs." But even when the fantasy is interpreted in depth, not simply as an object, but as a specific machine that brings desire itself front and center, this machine is merely theatrical, and the complementarity of what it sets apart still remains: it is now need that is defined in terms of a relative lack and determined by its own object, whereas desire is regarded as what produces the fantasy and produces itself by detaching itself from the object, though at the same time it intensifies the lack by making it absolute: an "incurable insufficiency of being," an "inability-to-be that is life itself." Hence the presentation of desire as something supported by needs, while these needs, and their relationship to the object as something that is lacking or missing, continue to be the basis of the productivity of desire (theory of an underlying support). In a word, when the theoretician reduces desiring-production to a production of fantasy, he is content to exploit to the fullest the idealist principle that defines desire as a lack, rather than a process of production, of "industrial" production. Clement Rosset puts it very well: every time the emphasis is put on a lack that desire supposedly suffers from as a way of defining its object, "the world acquires as its double some other sort of world, in accordance with the following line of argument: there is an object that desire feels the lack of; hence the world does not contain each and every object that exists; there is at least one object missing, the one that desire feels the lack of; hence there exists some other place that contains the key to desire (missing in this world)."29 If desire produces, its product is real. If desire is productive, it can be productive only in the real world and can produce only reality. Desire is the set of passive syntheses that engineer partial objects, flows, and bodies, and that function as units of production. The real is the end product, the result of the passive syntheses of desire as autoproduction of the unconscious. Desire does not lack anything; it does not lack its object. It is, rather, the subject that is missing in desire, or desire that lacks a fixed subject; there is no fixed subject unless there is repression. Desire and its object are one and the same thing: the machine, as a machine of a machine. Desire is a machine, and the object of desire is another machine connected to it. Hence the product is something removed or deducted from the process of producing: between the act of producing and the product, something becomes detached, thus giving the vagabond, nomad subject a residuum. The objective being of desire is the Real in and of itself.* There is no particular form of existence that can be labeled "psychic reality." As Marx notes, what exists in fact is not lack, but passion, as a "natural and sensuous object." Desire is not bolstered by needs, but rather the contrary; needs are derived from desire: they are counter-products within the real that desire produces. Lack is a counter-effect of desire; it is deposited, distributed, vacuolized within a real that is natural and social. Desire always remains in close touch with the conditions of objective existence; it embraces them and follows them, shifts when they shift, and does not outlive them. For that reason it so often becomes the desire to die, whereas need is a measure of the withdrawal of a subject that has lost its desire at the same time that it loses the passive syntheses of these conditions. This is precisely the significance of need as a search in a void: hunting about, trying to capture or become a parasite of passive syntheses in whatever vague world they may happen to exist in. It is no use saying: We are not green plants; we have long since been unable to synthesize chlorophyll, so it's necessary to eat. . .. Desire then becomes this abject fear of lacking something. But it should be noted that this is not a phrase uttered by the poor or the dispossessed. On the contrary, such people know that they are close to grass, almost akin to it, and that desire "needs" very few things-not those leftovers that chance to come their way, but the very things that are continually taken from them-and that what is missing is not things a subject feels the lack of somewhere deep down inside himself, but rather the objectivity of man, the objective being of man, for whom to desire is to produce, to produce within the realm of the real. The real is not impossible; on the contrary, within the real everything is possible, everything becomes possible. Desire does not express a molar lack within the subject; rather, the molar organization deprives desire of its objective being. Revolutionaries, artists, and seers are content to be objective, merely objective: they know that desire clasps life in its powerfully productive embrace, and reproduces it in a way that is all the more intense because it has few needs. And never mind those who believe that this is very easy to say, or that it is the sort of idea to be found in books. "From the little reading I had done I had observed that the men who were most in life, who were moulding life, who were life itself, ate little, slept little, owned little or nothing. They had no illusions about duty, or the perpetuation of their kith and kin, or the preservation of the State.... The phantasmal world is the world which has never been fully conquered over. It is the world of the past, never of the future. To move forward clinging to the past is like dragging a ball and chain."30 The true visionary is a Spinoza in the garb of a Neapolitan revolutionary. We know very well where lack-and its subjective correlative-come from. Lack (manque)* is created, planned, and organized in and through social production. It is counterproduced as a result of the pressure of antiproduction; the latter falls back on (se rabat sur) the forces of production and appropriates them. It is never primary; production is never organized on the basis of a pre-existing need or lack (manque). It is lack that infiltrates itself, creates empty spaces or vacuoles, and propagates itself in accordance with the organization of an already existing organization of production. The deliberate creation of lack as a function of market economy is the art of a dominant class. This involves deliberately organizing wants and needs (manque) amid an abundance of production; making all of desire teeter and fall victim to the great fear of not having one's needs satisfied; and making the object dependent upon a real production that is supposedly exterior to desire (the demands of rationality), while at the same time the production of desire is categorized as fantasy and nothing but fantasy. There is no such thing as the social production of reality on the one hand, and a desiring-production that is mere fantasy on the other. The only connections that could be established between these two productions would be secondary ones of introjection and projection, as though all social practices had their precise counterpart in introjected or internal mental practices, or as though mental practices were projected upon social systems, without either of the two sets of practices ever having any real or concrete effect upon the other. As long as we are content to establish a perfect parallel between money, gold, capital, and the capitalist triangle on the one hand, and the libido, the anus, the phallus, and the family triangle on the other, we are engaging in an enjoyable pastime, but the mechanisms of money remain totally unaffected by the anal projections of those who manipulate money. The Marx-Freud parallelism between the two remains utterly sterile and insignificant as long as it is expressed in terms that make them introjections or projections of each other without ceasing to be utterly alien to each other, as in the famous equation money = shit. The truth of the matter is that social production is purely and simply desiring-production itself under determinate conditions. We maintain that the social field is immediately invested by desire, that it is the historically determined product of desire, and that libido has no need of any mediation or sublimation, any psychic operation, any transformation, in order to invade and invest the productive forces and the relations of production. There is only desire and the social, and nothing else. Even the most repressive and the most deadly forms of social reproduction are produced by desire within the organization that is the consequence of such production under various conditions that we must analyze. That is why the fundamental problem of political philosophy is still precisely the one that Spinoza saw so clearly, and that Wilhelm Reich rediscovered: "Why do men people fight for their servitude as stubbornly as though it were their salvation?" How can people possibly reach the point of shouting: "More taxes! Less bread!"? As Reich remarks, the astonishing thing is not that some people steal or that others occasionally go out on strike, but rather that all those who are starving do not steal as a regular practice, and all those who are exploited are not continually out on strike: after centuries of exploitation, why do people still tolerate being humiliated and enslaved, to such a point, indeed, that they actually want humiliation and slavery not only for others but for themselves? Reich is at his profoundest as a thinker when he refuses to accept ignorance or illusion on the part of the masses as an explanation of fascism, and demands an explanation that will take their desires into account, an explanation formulated in terms of desire: no, the masses were not innocent dupes; at a certain point, under a certain set of conditions, they wanted fascism, and it is this perversion of the desire of the masses that needs to be accounted for.

NOVDEC - Tarsney AC

Uncertainty about the correct moral theory is inevitable—no individuals will reach a point of agreement about moral truths absent their own perspective. Coburn bracketed for clarity:

“If criteria encapsulate the kinds of considerations that have in fact been appealed to in criticizing and supporting moral theories, then it is easy to see why it is so dubious that all rational agents will agree about the correct moral theory once they have gone through a process of practical reasoning type M. The central thought is just that judgments about the extent to which a given moral theory satisfies (or fails to satisfy) various of these criteria, and as well as judgments about the weights the different criteria should receive, are bound to reflect facts about the inquirers that do not hold of rational agents qua rational. In other words, such Judgments are bound to be affected by idiosyncratic features of the inquirers, such as their genes constitutions and the physical and cultural environments in which the phenotypic expressions of these genotypes have developed. Think, for example, about the ways the intuitive judgments of members of the humans species differ as one regards right and wrong in various actual and imaginable cases or what the ideal person is like. And must the judgments of rational agents agree about the relative weights ‘conformance utility’ and ‘acceptance utility’ should receive in assessing the extent to which a moral code satisfies the welfare criterion, or when a set of ‘priority rules’ is ‘readily surveyable,’ or whether it is easy to establish that certain principles have been applied correctly? Surely not. In any case, It is easy to conceive of rational beings who differ from us on these matters, and that is all that is required to undermine the claim that there would be agreement among all possible rational agents once they had who undergone a process of practical reason of type M - at least if I am right about the kinds of considerations that would be considered in undergoing such a process.”Coburn, Robert C. “A defense of ethical noncognitivism.” Philosophical Studies, vol. 62, no. 1, April 1991, pp. 67-80.

And, the rational moral response to uncertainty is not to take our best guess at the true moral theory but rather to hedge against the risk of moral error. Sepielli:

Similarly, suppose I am deciding between actions A and B. There’s some chance that A is better than B, and an ever so slightly greater chance that B is better than A. I also believe that, if A is better than B, then A is saintly and B is abominable; but if B is better than A, then A is slightly nasty and B is merely okay. Despite the fact that my credence is higher that B is better than A, it still seems as though it’s rational to do A instead, since A’s ‘normative upside’ is so much higher than B’s, and its ‘normative downside’ not nearly as low. Here, then, is a more promising explanation answer: is that I should perform the action with the highest Expected Objective Value (EOV). We get the expected value of an action by multiplying the subjective probability that some practical comparative is true by the objective value of that action if it is true, doing the same for all of the other practical comparatives, and adding up the results. This strategy is sensitive not only to degrees of belief, but also to degrees of value—the relative sizes of the upsides and downsides of actions.Andrew Sepielli (2009). What to Do When You Don't Know What to Do. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4:5-28.

Analytic.

The standard is thus the minimization of moral error, meaning that individuals prioritize the pursuit of adaptive moral beliefs.

Further reason to prefer the standard:1) No individual can reach a point of epistemically valid judgement. Rather, only a systemic means of truth understanding via altering our beliefs in the context of individuals as a whole has a risk of epistemic validity. Markovits:

Relatedly, internalism about reasons seems less presumptive than externalism. We should not assume that some of us have special epistemic access to what matters, especially in the absence of any criterion for making such a judgment. It’s better to start from the assumption, as internalism does, that everyone’s ends are equally worthy of pursuit – and correct this assumption only by appealing to standards that are as uncontroversial as possible. According to externalism about reasons, what matters normatively – that is, what we have reason to do or pursue or protect or respect or promote – does not depend in any fundamental way on what in fact matters to us – that is, what we do do and pursue and protect and respect and promote. Some of us are happen to be motivated by what actually matters, and some of us are “wrongly” motivated. But externalists can offer no explanation for this supposed difference in how well we respond to reasons – no explanation of why some of us have the right motivations and some of us the wrong ones – that doesn’t itself appeal to the views about what matters that they’re trying to justify. (They can explain why some people have the right motivations by saying, e.g., that they’re good people, but that assumes the truth of the normative views that are at issue.22) A comparison to the epistemic case helps bring out what is unsatisfactory in the externalist position. We sometimes attribute greater epistemic powers to some people than to others despite not being able to explain why they’re more likely to be right in their beliefs about a certain topic. Chicken-sexing is a popular example of this among philosophers. We think some people are more likely to form true beliefs about the sex of chickens than others even though we can’t explain why they are better at judging the sex of chickens. But in the case of chicken-sexing, we have independent means of determining the truth, and so we have independent verification that chicken-sexers usually get things right. Externalism seems to tells us that some of us are better reasons- sensors than others, but without providing the independent means of determining which of us are in fact more reliably motivated by genuine normative reasons (or even that some of us are).23 Markovits, Julia. Moral reason. Oxford University Press, 2014.Precludes— epistemic verification precedes our ability to develop an ethic because we can’t generate any theory that condemns morally repugnant acts if we don’t know what those acts are.

2) Past moral error is evidence that we’re at risk of deep error ourselves so we should conclude that even our own strongly held moral convictions might be deeply wrong—only the aff can avoid atrocities Tarsney 17: Thus, whatever population one takes to be the appropriate reference class of competent moral judges, it must be conceded that one’s own moral convictions are far from universally shared within that class, and indeed that one’s own comprehensive set of moral beliefs is almost certainly shared by a tiny fraction of moral judges at best. In addition to these ongoing moral disagreements, the degree to which moral opinion has changed over time should challenge our confidence even in those moral judgments that are widely shared among present-day moral agents. Practices that have been generally accepted or encouraged in many times and places, like slavery, infant exposure, pederasty, and arranged marriage are now widely or universally viewed as morally repugnant, while requirements once seen as stringent, say with respect to personal or familial honor or sexual chastity, have lost their stringency or dropped out of our shared moral code altogether. There are good reasons to regard many of these belief changes as moral progress—we need not be too troubled by our disagreement with our ancestors regarding, say, the permissibility of declining a duel. But reflection on this history should lead us to conclude, by pessimistic induction, that many of our own moral beliefs will likely be seen as absurd and perverse by our own descendants, and likely in some respects that even the most morally reflective among us would be unable to guessTarsney, Christian. “Rationality and Moral Risk: A Moderate Defense of Hedging.”Academia.edu, University of Maryland, 2017, www.academia.edu/34520864/Rationality_and_Moral_Risk_A_Moderate_Defense_of_Hedging.

I defend the resolution as a general principle and am willing to specify anything it doesn’t in CX like implementation, actor, etc. However, I’ll spec these scenarios for public information to defend an on balance burden, ask in CX for anything else Milligan:

"Everybody deserves some modicum of privacy, even president and would-be presidents," says Steve Rabinowitz, who worked in Bill Clinton's White House and is now a media consultant and founder of Bluelight Strategies. But "it doesn't extend to their financial dealings and it doesn't extend to their health and fitness to serve out their term in office."That means the public should know about people's income, charitable giving, debt and business dealings, along with pertinent health information relevant to their ability to serve four years.Milligan, Susan. “Clinton's Pneumonia Flap and the Public Fight Over Privacy.” U.S. News and World Report, U.S. News and World Report, 12 Sept. 2016, www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-09-12/hillary-clinton-pneumonia-flap-highlights-the-public-fight-over-privacy.

Now Affirm:

First, a right to information is valued over privacy when that information is necessary to render the correct moral decision. Democracy requires informed citizens to make the correct choice, knowledge about candidates is the only way to minimize error in the selection for public office Neuman:Citizens and their leaders around the world have long recognized the risk of corruption. Corruption diverts scarce resources from necessary public services, and instead puts it in the pockets of politicians, middlemen and illicit contractors, while ensuring that the poor do not receive the benefits of this “system”. The consequences of corruption globally have been clear: unequal access to public services and justice, reduced investor confidence, continued poverty, and even violence and overthrow of governments. A high level of corruption is a singularly pernicious societal problem that also undermines the rule of law and citizen confidence in democratic institutions. In addition, citizens around the world continue to , struggle to meet their basic needs of food, clothing, and adequate shelter and to exercise their broader socio-economic rights. More than 1.2 billion people world-wide live on less than $1 per day, 1.7 billion are without access to clean water, and 3.3 billion people live without adequate sanitation facilities. Although nearly 150 counties have ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Freedom House finds that 106 countries continue to restrict its citizen’s impor- tant civil and political freedoms. Knowledge is power, and transparency is the remedy to the darkness under which corruption and abuse thrives. Democracy depends on a knowledgeable citizenry whose access to a broad range of information enables them to participate fully in public life, help determine priorities for public spending, receive equal access to justice, and hold their public officials accountable. When the government and quasi-governmental agencies perform under a veil of secrecy, people are denied the right to know about public affairs, and the press is only able to speculate and subsist on Rumors. Poor public access to information feeds corruption. Secrecy allows back-room deals to determine public spending in the interests of the few rather than the many. Lack of information impedes citizens’ ability to assess the decisions of their leaders, and even to make informed choices about the individuals they elect to serve as their Representatives. Although perhaps most often considered in the fight against corruption, access to information is equally critical for citizens’ capacity to exercise their rights and to uphold the responsibilities and accountability of their leaders. Access to information laws allow individuals and groups to understand the policies with which the government makes determinations relating to health, education, housing and infrastructure projects and the factual basis for such decisions. Armed with such knowledge, citizens around the world are effectuating change that allows them to improve their living standards and better their lives. Increasingly, government and civil society are seeing access to information as the key to fighting corruption and enhancing the public’s capacity to exercise their rights. Presently, there are over 45 countries with access to information laws, with dozens of others on the verge. Unfortunately, the Latin America and Caribbean region lags behind Western Europe, Central and Eastern Europe and ACCESS TO INFORMATION: A KEY TO DEMOCRACY “As a rule, he or she who has the most information will have the greatest success in life” even Asia in the coverage of access to information and implementation. Nevertheless, the trend toward new legislation continues as developed and developing nations, as well as international funding institutes, recognize the importance of strong access to information laws that are appropriately implemented and fully enforced. Reaching this goal is complex, and we hope that the following chapters provide the reader with a number of ideas for ways in which to do so. In Access to Government Information: An Overview of the Issues, a paper originally written for The Carter Center’s Transparency for Growth Conference in 1999, Dr. Alasdair Roberts sets out the international principles that govern many access to information laws. This article, premised on the notion that wholesale secrecy in government is no longer acceptable, includes a discussion about which government institutions should be covered by the law, when is it appropriate for the withholding of information, how costs can be controlled such that full implementation may be a reality, and the best mechanisms for enforcement. Dr. Roberts concludes with a reminder that the effectiveness of the law will only be determined through its use, and he encourages civil society organizations to build internal capacity so that they can take advantage of this important tool. Richard Calland describes the successful use of access to information acts in Africa, Asia, and Eastern European States. Access to Information: How Is It Useful and How Is It Used? Examines cases in which access to information laws have been used to fight discrimination, inform democratic debate, influence policy decisions and ensure the proper flow of vital resources. Through an emphasis on the experiences in other parts of the world, Mr. Calland presents a valuable guide to passage, implementation and enforcement of a vigorous access to information act and a persuasive argument for utilizing “the right to know” approach in developing legislation. The Carter Center, through its work in Jamaica, learned a number of lessons relating to passage and implementation of an access to information act. The Carter Center Access to Information Project: Jamaica Case Study follows the project from its inception in 1999 through the first stages of legislative implementation, chronicling the successes and obstacles that the Jamaican government and civil society faced. I describe the need for political will and broad public debate, as well as the burden shift that occurs from government to civil society once the law is passed and procedures in place. Disreali stated, “as a rule, he or she who has the most information will have the greatest success in life.” Success, if measured as the increase in transparency in government, and thus decrease in corruption, and the citizen’s capacity to exercise her rights, is achievable through the passage, implementation and enforcement of a strong access to information act. Access to information is a cornerstone of democracy. This publication draws on the experiences and talents of many persons. I would like to thank the authors for sharing their knowledge and time with us to make this both a scholarly and practical resource. My colleagues Dr. Shelley McConnell, Daniel Gracia, Amy Sterner and, especially, Dr. Jennifer McCoy Director of the Americas Program assisted greatly in the conceptualization and implementation of this guidebook. Alex Little, a member of The Carter Center’s Conflict Resolution Program, spent his own valuable personal time in creating the layout. Finally, I would like to thank our tireless translators for the Spanish edition of this publication; Paula Colmegna and Dr. David Dye, as well as Americas Program intern Marcela Guerrero for their time in painstakingly assuring that the author’s voice and meaning was heard in the translation.Neuman, Laura. “Acces to Information: A Key to Democracy.” The Carter Center, The Carter Center, Nov. 2002, www.cartercenter.org/documents/1272.pdf.

That outweighs, information about others enables us to understand how power structures function Foucault:Yes, absolutely. And this is where we must introduce the concept of domination. The analyses I am trying to make bear essentially on relations of power. By this I mean something different from states of domination. Power relations are extremely widespread in human relationships. Now, this means not that political power is everywhere, but that there is in human relationships a whole range of power relations that may come into play among individuals, within families, in pedagogical relationships, political life, and so on. The analysis of power relations is an extremely complex area; one sometimes encounters what may be called situations or states of domination in which the power relations, instead of being mobile, allowing the various participants to adopt strategies modifying them, remain blocked, frozen. When an individual or social group succeeds in blocking a field of power relations, immobilizing them and preventing any reversibility of movement by economic, political, or military means, one is faced with what may be called a state of domination. In such a state, it is certain that practices of freedom do not-exist or exist only unilaterally or are extremely constrained and limited. Thus, I agree with you that liberation is sometimes the political or historical condition for a practice of freedom. Taking sexuality as an example, it is clear that a number of liberations were required vis-it-vis male power, that liberation was necessary from an oppressive morality concerning heterosexuality as well as homosexuality. But this liberation does not give rise to the happy human being imbued with a sexuality to which the subject could achieve a complete and satisfying relationship. Liberation paves the way for new power relationships, which must be controlled by practices of freedom. Yes, in some cases. You have situations where liberation and the struggle for liberation are indispensable for the practice of freedom. With respect to sexuality, for example-and I am not indulging in polemics, because I don't like polemics, I think they are usually futile-there is a Reichian model derived from a certain reading of Freud. Now, in Reich's view the problem was entirely one ofliberation. To put it somewhat schematically, according to him there is desire, drive, prohibition, repression, internalization, and it is by getting rid of these prohibitions, in other words, by liberating oneself, that the problem gets resolved. I think-and I know I am vastly oversimplifying much more interesting and refined positions of many authors-this completely misses the ethical problem of the practice off reedom: How can one practice freedom? With regard to sexuality, it is obvious that it is by liberating our desire that we will learn to conduct ourselves ethically in pleasure relationships with others. Q. You say that freedom must be practiced ethically... M.F. Yes,' for what is ethics, if not the practice of freedom, the conscious rijlechie practice of freedom? Q. In other words, you understand freedom as a reality that is already ethical in itself. M.F. Freedom is the ontological condition of ethics. But ethics is the considered form that freedom takes when it is informed by reflection. Q. Ethics is what is achieved in the search for or the care of the self? M.F. In the Greco-Roman world, the care of the selfwas the mode in which individual freedom-or civic liberty, up to a point-was reflected se riftechie as an ethics. Ifyou take a whole series oftexts going from the first Platonic dialogues up to the major texts of late Stoicism Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, and so on-you will see that the theme of the care of the self thoroughly permeated moral reflection. It is interesting to see that, in our societies on the other hand, at a time that is very difficult to pinpoint, the care of the self became somewhat suspect. Starting at a certain point, being con tion is much more complex, for, with Christianity, achieving one's salvation is also a way of caring for oneself. But in Christianity, salvation is attained through the renunciation of self. There is a paradox in the care of the self in Christianity-but that is another problem I believe that among the Greeks and Romans—especially the Greeks—concern with the self and care of the self were required for right conduct and the proper practice of freedom, in order to know oneself se connaitre —the familiar aspect of the gnothi seauton—as well as to form oneself, to surpass one-self, to master the appetites that threaten to overwhelm one. Individual freedom was very important for the Greeks—contrary to the common-place derived more or less from Hegel that sees it as being of no importance when placed against the imposing totality of the city. Not to be a slave (of another city, of the people around you, of those governing you, of your own passions) was an absolutely fundamental theme. The concern with freedom was an essential and permanent problem for eight full centuries of ancient culture. What we have here is an entire ethics revolving around the care of the self; this is what gives ancient ethics its particular form. I am not saying that ethics is synonymous with the care of the self, but that, in antiquity, ethics as the conscious practice of freedom has revolved around this fundamental imperative: "Take care of yourself" soucie-toi de toi-rnernd. M.F. Certainly. Taking care of oneself requires knowing oneself. Care of the self is, of course, knowledge connaissance of the self—this is the Socratic-Platonic aspect—but also knowledge of a number of rules of acceptable conduct or of principles that are both truths and prescriptions. To take care of the self is to equip oneself with these truths: this is where ethics is linked to the game of truth. In the Platonic current of thought, at least at the end of the Alcibiades, the problem for the subject or the individual soul is to turn its gaze upon itself, to recognize itself in what it is and, recognizing itself in what it is, to recall the truths that issue from it and that it has been able to contemplate;1 on the other hand, in the current of thinking we can broadly call Stoicism, the problem is to learn through the teaching of a number oftruths and doctrines, some of which are fun(Ethics: Subjectivity and Truthdamental principles while others are rules of conduct. You must proceed in such a way that these principles tell you in each situation and, as it were, spontaneously, how to conduct yourself. It is' here that one encounters a metaphor that comes not from the Stoics but from Plutareh: "You must learn the principles in such a constant way that whenever your desires, appetites, and fears awake like barking dogs, the logos will speak like the voice of the master who silences his dogs with a single cry. "2 Here we have the idea ofa logos functioning, as it were, without any intervention on your part; you have become the logos, or the logos has become you. The Greeks problematized their freedom, and the freedom of the individual, as an ethical problem. But ethical in the sense in which the Greeks understood it: ethos was a way ofbeing and ofbehavior. It was a mode of being for the subject, along with a certain way of acting, a way visible to others. A person's ethos was evident in his clothing, appearance, gait, in the calm with which he responded to every event, and so on. For the Greeks, this was the concrete form of freedom; this was the way they problematized their freedom. A man possessed of a splendid ethos, who could be admired and put forward as an example, was someone who practiced freedom in a certain way. I don't think that a shift is needed for freedom to be conceived as ethos; it is immediately problematized as ethos. But extensive work by the self on the self is required for this practice of freedom to take shape in an ethos that is good, beautiful, honorable, estimable, memorable, and exemplary. I think that insofar as freedom for the Greeks signifies nonslavery-which is quite a different definition of freedom from our own-the problem is already entirely political. It is political in that nonslavery to others is a condition: a slave has no ethics. Freedom is thus inherently political. And it also has a political model insofar as being free means not being a slave to oneself and one's appetites, which means that with respect to oneself one establishes a certain relationship of domination, of mastery, which was called arkhe, or power, command What makes it ethical for the Greeks is not that it is care for others. The care of the self is ethical in itself; but it implies complex relationships with others insofar as this ethos of freedom it is also a way of caring for others. This is why it is important for a free man who conducts himself as he should to be able to govern his wife, his children, his household; it is also the art of governing. Ethos also implies a relationship with others, insofar as the care of the self enables one to occupy his rightful position in the city, the community, or interpersonal rela-tionships, whether as a magistrate or a friend. And the care of the self also implies a relationship with the other insofar as proper care of the self requires listening to the lessons of a master. One needs a guide, a counselor, a friend, someone who will be truthful with you. Thus, the problem of relationships with others is present throughout the development of the care of the self.Foucault, Michel, and Paul Rabinow. Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth. New York: New Press, 1997. Print.

Second, ethically relevant information in a democracy is key to making ethical progress, it allows us to compare different approaches to decisions Williams:

Also It is important is that we try to help people—again, this includes our own future selves—gain information which is morally relevant. They can hardly be expected to make accurate evaluations of various states of affairs if they are misinformed about what those states of affairs would involve. Questions like ‘‘at what age—or ages, if a gradual process—does a fetus become conscious?’’ or ‘‘are homosexual couples as good at raising children as heterosexual couples are?’’ are largely scientific questions rather than ethical ones, but still clearly important for making sound moral judgments. So we should encourage the studying, and sharing, of this kind of information as well. At the level of social policy, rather than individual action, there are several key ways to encourage ethical and scientific progress of the above sort. One is by promoting education, so that people acquire what information is already known to experts, while learning useful habits of thought for producing more such information. Another is by protecting individual free speech, so that people feel safe in sharing their ideas. Lastly is by allowing other sorts of decisions—e.g., about how people shall live their lives, how they shall interact with other aniimmals, how their cities shall be designed and regulated, etc.—to be made at the individual or local level so that we can compare, at first hand, the results of diverse approaches to these decisions.Evan G. Williams (2013). Promoting Value As Such. _Philosophy and Phenomenological Research_ 87 (2):392-416.

That outweighs, if we’re uncertain what states of affairs have value, we should enhance the capacity of moral agents generally to pursue their own conceptions of the good, i.e. default to liberal freedoms like access to information Williams 2: Our best prospect for making valuable states of affairs more likely to occur is by strengthening the final of the three correlations. Hopefully people are at least somewhat motivated by value judgments which are at least somewhat truth-tracking; if so, then giving people more control over which states of affairs occur—and thus more opportunities to implement their value judgments—should make actually-valuable states of affairs more likely to occur. There are two approaches we can take here. One would be to try to learn what goals the people around us are pursuing and then pursue those same goals ourselves. We want to focus on ones which seem to be motivated by more than mere self-interest, and which are being pursued by people who seem relatively intelligent and well-informed. The second and more interesting approach is to try to provide Rawlsian ‘‘primary goods’’ to people: that is, try to increase their access to information and material resources, improve their health and self-respect, and ensure that they have the freedom to take advantage of these other goods, and so on, so as to increase their likelihood of achieving whatever goals they might pursue. In short, we could build a free and prosperous society. This is something we have reason to do anyway, insofar as we suspect freedom and prosperity to be intrinsically valuable, but my point is that in addition to whatever intrinsic value such a society would possess, it would also be likely to be instrumental to bringing about whatever other valuable states of affairs which people eventually manage to recognize as valuable.Evan G. Williams (2013). Promoting Value As Such. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research_ 87 (2):392-416.Implications: a) Analyticb) Analytic

Finally, rights aren’t absolute – we have to allow exceptions to solve for extreme situations. Tomasky 13:No right is absolute. In fact, the Second Amendment arguably has fewer restrictions on it these days than many of the other first 10, and there is and should be no guarantee that things are going to stay that way. In fact, if we’re ever going to be serious about trying to stop this mass butchery that we endure every few months, they cannot. Let’s begin by going down the list and reviewing various limits placed on nearly all the amendments of the Bill of Rights (I thank Doug Kendall of the Constitutional Accountability Center for helping me out here). The First Amendment, of course, guarantees the right to free speech and assembly, and to worship as one pleases. There haven’t been that many restrictions placed on the freedom to worship in the United States, although there is a steady stream of cases involving some local government or school board preventing someone from wearing religious clothing or facial hair or what have you. Sometimes a Christian school or church is denied a zoning permit; but more often it’s the freedom to worship of a minority (Muslim, Sikh, etc.) that is threatened. As for free speech, of course it is restricted. Over the past 50 or so years in a series of cases, courts have placed a number of “time, place, and manner” restrictions on free speech. To restrict speech in general, the government must meet four tests. But this is always being revised and negotiated. Here’s one restriction on the Bill of Rights that I’d wager most conservatives would happily approve of. In 1988, the HHS under Reagan promulgated rules prohibiting a family-planning professional at a clinic that received federal dollars from “promoting” (i.e. telling a woman about) abortion. This was challenged partially on free-speech grounds. In Rust v. Sullivan (1991), the Supreme Court held that these rules did not violate the clinicians’ free-speech rights. So far as I can see, this is still law. It’s just one example from many free-speech restrictions that have been imposed over the years, as you can see here. Let’s skip the Second Amendment for now. The Third Amendment—my personal favorite—proscribes the private quartering of troops. Not so relevant to life today—in fact, the Supreme Court has apparently never considered a Third Amendment challenge. Onward. The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable search and seizure, and of course there are loads of exceptions to this right, the most notable being that whenever an officer of the law has reason to think an imminently dangerous situation exists, s/he may invade a citizen’s privacy. Then there’s the question of the “exclusionary rule,” by which evidence deemed to have been improperly obtained can be excluded as evidence. Jurisprudence on this question goes back 100 years, and this very interesting paper notes that it has been two decades since the court upheld the application of the exclusionary rule in a search-and-seizure case. Since then, the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have ruled six times—every time for the government, i.e., limiting the constitutional protection. (Funny, isn’t it, how many of these other, non-gun limitations on the Bill of Rights are championed by conservatives?) The Fifth Amendment most famously protects against self-incrimination. Kendall notes that there have indeed been almost no restrictions placed on this right—inside the trial courtroom. Outside the courtroom, however, limitations are rife, having to do mostly with circumstances of interrogations and confessions made within them. This amendment also provides for due process, and that means Miranda rights, and again here, we know from recent news stories that not everyone is immediately read them, and we also know that it’s conservatives who have always despised Miranda in the first place and seek to limit or overturn it today. The Sixth Amendment provides the right to counsel and a speedy trial, and here again, our time is witness to a slow watering down of these rights by the court’s conservative majority, as in 2009’s Montejo v. Louisiana. The Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to a trial by jury in civil cases, and this contains a blatant restriction: the court has never “incorporated” this right to apply to states, where the majority of civil cases are tried, so most civil cases don’t include this right. And the Eighth Amendment, against cruel and unusual punishment, has been much contested with respect to issues like juvenile crime. The Ninth and Tenth Amendments don’t enumerate specific rights as such and so aren’t relevant. Now, back to the Second Amendment. I’m sure that pro-gun extremists know very well about Scalia’s famous opinion in Heller (2008), which dramatically expanded gun rights. But even in that decision, Scalia himself said that Second Amendment protections could apply only to weapons “in common use at the time.” Chris Wallace asked Scalia in 2012 about semiautomatic weapons and extended magazines, and he said: “What the opinion Heller said is that it will have to be decided in future cases. What limitations upon the right to bear arms are permissible. Some undoubtedly are, because there were some that were acknowledged at the time. For example, there was a tort called affrighting, which if you carried around a really horrible weapon just to scare people, like a head ax or something, that was I believe a misdemeanor. So yes, there are some limitations that can be imposed.(Michael Tomasky, 05/05/13 4:45 AM ET, “There Are No ‘Absolute’ Rights”, Daily Beast) https://www.thedailybeast.com/there-are-no-absolute-rights ||

UV: The ROB is to vote for the debater who best interrogates notions of truth by pursuing adaptive moral beliefs. Prefer:

a) The ballot is a constitutive feature of debate- it tells you how the game functions, this means you only have the jurisdiction to determine who the better debater is because that is the goal of debate. Nardin, Terry Nardin, “International Ethics and International Law”. Review of International Studies, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Jan., 1992), pp. 19-30, published by Cambridge University Press. The first thing to observe in considering this objection is that the purposes of a practice are not necessarily the same as the purposes either of those who designed or of those who participate in it. From the standpoint of an umpire supervising a particular game of chess, the paramount consideration governing the play is that it should be in conformity with the rules of chess. If a player makes an illegal move, arguing that it will result in a more intellectually challenging game, the proper response is to ignore the argument and prohibit the move. In other words, the kinds of reasons that are valid within the game are different from those that might be considered by chess federation officials contemplating changes in the rules of the game. From the internal perspective of the player or the umpire, the authority of the rules is absolute Players or umpires may disagree about the interpretation or proper application of the rules, but they may not take the position that a valid, authoritative rule should be set aside. It is also important to distinguish between the intentions that may be embedded in a rule or system of rules and the consequences of observing that rule or participating in the system.

b) The aff’s method of adapting our understandings of truth actively builds a safety net by which genocide is heavily deterred. Pinker:"Though nothing can guarantee that virulent ideologies will not infect a country, one vaccine is an open society in which people and ideas move freely and no one is punished for airing dissenting views, including those that seem heretical to polite consensus. The relative immunity of modern cosmopolitan democracies to genocide and ideological civil war is a bit of support for this proposition. The recrudescence of censorship and insularity in regimes that are prone to large-scale violence is the other side of that coin."Pinker, Steven. The better angels of our nature: Why violence has declined. Vol. 75. New York: Viking, 2011.

c) Understanding moral uncertainty allows us to adapt our beliefs and tailor them towards different conceptions of the good, that’s the only way to check against oppressive ideologies, means the aff is a prerequisite to engaging in mindset shifts like the alternative.

12/4/18

SEPTOCT - Gewirth AC

Prefer because of common usage. Only a functional definition of the term ought aligns with how agents actually use the term. Geach: This sort of example shows that ' good' like ' bad' is essentially an attributive adjective. Even when ' good ' or ' bad’ stands by itself as a predicate, and is thus grammatically predicative, some substantive has to be understood; there is no such thing as being just good or bad, there is only being a good or bad so-and-so. (If I say that something is a good or bad thing, either 'thing' is a mere proxy for a more descriptive noun to be supplied from the context; or else I am trying to use 'good' or 'bad' predicatively, and its being grammatically attributive is a mere disguise. The latter attempt is, on my thesis, illegitimate.) We can indeed say simpliciter 'A is good' or 'A is bad', where 'A' is a proper name; but this is an exception that proves the rule. For Locke was certainly wrong in holding that there is no nominal essence of individuals; the continued use of a proper name 'A' always presupposes a continued reference to an individual as being the same X, where ' X ' is some common noun; and the' X ' expresses the nominal essence of the individual called 'A'. Thus use of the proper name 'Peter Geach' presupposes a continuing reference to the same man; use of 'the Thames' a continuing reference to the same river; and so on. In modern logic books you often read that proper names have no meaning, in the sense of 'meaning' in which common nouns are said to have meaning; or(more obscurely) that they have no 'connotation'. But consider the difference between the understanding that a man has of a conversation overheard in a country house when he knows that 'Seggie' stands for a man, and what he has if he is uncertain whether 'Seggie' stands for a man, a Highland stream, a village, or a dog. In the one case he knows what 'Seggie' means, though not whom; in the other case he does not know what 'Seggie' means and cannot follow the drift of the conversation. Well, then if the common noun ' X ' expresses the nominal essence of the individual called 'A'; if being the same X is a condition whose fulfillment is pre-supposed by our still calling an individual 'A'; then the meaning will be 'A is a good/bad X '. good/bad' simpliciter, of 'A is said e.g. if 'Seggie' stands for a man, 'Seggie is good' said simpliciter will mean 'Seggie is a good man', though context might make it mean 'Seggie is a good deer-stalker', or the like.Geach, P. T. "Good and Evil." Analysis 17.2 (1956): 33-42. Web.

Common usage precludes because a)analytic and b) analytic.

And, the constitutive features of agents is setting ends, justifying non-interference.

All beings implicitly endorse the deontic rights of freedom and wellbeing since these are conditions requisite to setting ends. Adams summarizes Gewirth bracketed for gendered language : By what he calls "the dialectically nec essary method," he proceeds, from within the standpoint of the agent, to try to show that Every agent, by virtue of his tacit commitment to the value and deontic judgments necessarily attributable to every agent, is logically committed to the DPGC. His proof is in four steps. "First," as he himself outlines it, "every agent implicitly makes evaluative judgments about the goodness of his their purposes and hence about the necessary goodness of the freedom and well-being, the that are necessary conditions of his acting to achieve his their purposes. Second, Because of this necessary goodness, every agent implicitly makes a deontic judgment in which he claims that he they have has rights to freedom and well-being. Third, every agent must claim these rights since they have for the sufficient reason that he is a prospective agent who has purposes he they wants to fulfill. so that He they thus logically must accept the general ization that all prospective purposive agents have these rights and to freedom and well-being" (p. 48). From the fact that every agent must acceptance of these generalized rights statement, Gewirth concludes that every agent must, on pain of contradiction, acknowledge certain generic obligations, specifically that "he they ought to refrain from coercing and from harming his recipients interfering with their freedom and well being" and that "he ought to assist them to have freedom and well being whenever they cannot otherwise have these necessary goods and he can help them at no comparable cost to himself" (p. These obligations are summarized in the DPGC: "Every agent logi cally must accept that he ought to act in accord with the generic rights of his recipients as well as of himself."

Analytic.

Thus, the standard is consistency with the right to non-interference.Prefer this standard for two additional reasons.

First, any other type of obligation is escapable because it doesn’t produce a direct contradiction i.e. there’s no clear tension between saying its wrong to do x and doing x because its conceivable, but end setting is inherent in an obligation so end setting is inescapable. Gewirth bracketed for clarity :As we have seen, judgments of Moral obligations are categorical and in that what persons morally ought to do sets requirements for them that they cannot rightly evade by consulting their own self- interested desires or variable opinions, ideals, or institutional prac- tices. For moral judgments are critically evaluative of all of these. but such inescapable obligations can’tnot be derived from variable contents. Moreover, ultimate Moral disagreements can only be rationally resolved only if moral obligations are based on necessary contents. For if moral principles are have contingent contents, so that their obligatoriness may vary with the variable desires or opinions of different protagonists, then no finality can be rationally imposed on their differing moral beliefs. To ascertain which among the various possible or actual moral principles are right or correct hence demands that one must adopt a standpoint that is superior to these variable elements, to so that it can be seen to impose rational requirements on them. Such a superior standpoint, to avoid the variability and relativism of the subject matter to which it is addressed, must have a rational necessity of content as well as of form. But how can such contentual necessity be established by reason? To answer this question, the subject matter of morality must be considered; this consideration, being performed through conceptual analysis, is itself a product of reason in the sense of deductive rationality. If there is a subject matter with which all moralities and moral judgments must be concerned directly or indirectly, then this will provide a necessary content for all such judgments. If it can be further shown that this content has certain determinate logical consequences regarding the criteria of moral rightness, then the principle that upholds these criteria will emerge as materially or contentually as well as formally necessary. The subject matter of morality will thus be at least part of the justifications of the supreme moral principle; and since this justifications is contentually necessary, so too will be the moral principle that is its justification. This necessary content of morality is to be found in action and its generic features. For all moral precepts, regardless of their further contents, deal directly or indirectly with how persons ought to act. The specific modes of action required by different moral precepts are, of course, highly variable but all amid these variations, the precepts require actions; and there are certain invariant features that pertain generically to all actions. I shall call these the generic features of action because they characterize the genus or category of action as a whole, as delimited by moral and other practical precepts. Thus. just as action provides the necessary content of all morality, so the generic features provide the necessary content of all action. It will be of the first importance to trace how these features determine the necessities of moral rightness, so that from the ‘is’ of the generic features of action there is logically derivable the ‘ought’ of moral principles and rules. Insofar as these generic features of action constitute the justifications of the supreme principle of morality, they the latter, as their justification, will also have a necessary content. These generic features, in turn, are ascertained by deductive rationality, so that the ultimate justifications of the supreme principle consists in reason. Now just as the concept of reason, which I have confined to deduction and induction, is morally neutral and hence not question- begging, so too the concept of action that is to be used as the basis of the justificatory argument is morally neutral. For since this concept comprises the generic features of all action, it fits all moralities rather than reﬂecting or deriving from any one normative moral position as against any other. How, then, can it be shown that from such morally neutral premises there follow determinate, normatively moral conclu- sions about the necessary content of the supreme principle of moral- ity? This question poses one of the major challenges the present work must meet. The answer consists in showing that, because of its generic features, Action has what I shall call a ‘normative structure,’ in that evaluative and deontic all people’s judgments on the part of agents are logically implicit in it all action; and when these judgments are subjected to certain rational requirements, a certain normative moral principle logically follows from them. To put it otherwise: Any agent. simply by virtue of being an agent, must admit, on pain of self-contradiction, that he ought to act in certain determinate ways. The relation of action to morality bears importantly on the question raised earlier about the correspondence-correlates moral judgments must have if they are to be true by virtue of correspondence. Since action comprises the factual subject matter of moral and other practical precepts, it serves for moral philosophy a function analogous to that which empirical observational data may be held to serve for natural science: that of providing an objective basis or subject matter against which, respectively, moral judgments or rules and empirical statements or laws can be checked for their truth or correctness. It must be emphasized that this function is only analogous: a moral judgment does not become true simply by stating that some action or kind of action is actually performed. As we shall see, it is rather that action, through its generic features and normative structure, It entails certain requirements on persons the part of agents, and moral judgments are only true if insofar as they correspond to these requirements and hence to the normative structure of action. But because action provides the necessary content of moral judgments, these are not left, so far as concerns truth, completely unsupported by relevant objective stan- dards or data. Although the importance of action for moral philoso- phy has been recognized since the ancient Greeks, it has not hitherto been noted that the nature of action enters into the very content and justification of the supreme principle of morality.

Analytic.

Second, self-ownership and non-interference is forwarded by oneself as the means of discursive exchange. Hence, denial of the right to self-ownership is impossible and the function of any human being is thus to be a self owner. Hoppe bracketed for clarity:Hans-Hermann Hoppe, The Economics and Ethics of Private Property, p. 334Argumentation does not consist of free-floating propositions but is a form of action requiring the employment of scarce means; and that the means which a person demonstrates as preferring by engaging in propositional exchanges are those of private property. For one thing, no one could possibly propose anything, and no one could become convinced of any proposition by argumentative means, if a person’s right to make exclusive use of his physical body were not already presupposed. This It is this recognition of each other’s mutually exclusive control over one’s own body which explains the distinctive character of propositional exchanges that, while one may disagree about what has been said, it is still possible to agree at least on the fact that there is disagreement. It is also obvious that such a property right to one’s own body must be said to be justified a priori, for anyone who tried to justify any norm whatsoever would already have to presupposes the exclusive right of control over his body as a valid norm it. simply in order o say, ‘I propose such and such.’ Anyone disputing this such a right would commit become caught up in a practical contradiction since arguing so would already imply acceptance of the very norm which he was disputing.”

I advocate the rez as a general principle and am willing to specify anything it doesn’t in CX like implementation, type of right, definition of a reporter etc.

Now affirm: First, anonymity is consistent with a principle of non-interference. Disclosing identities renders sources vulnerable and prevents them from setting meaningful ends out of fear of punishment. Reporters are uniquely targeted by the idea of having to give up information on sources, making it less likely for confidential sources to speak if there is any risk that their identity will be revealed. Handman: While the legal duty to answer a subpoena and supply a grand jury or a court with relevant information does not target the press, that legal duty has a particularly devastating effect on reporters' ability to gain the confidence of sources who can provide them with the information crucial to investigating important and newsworthy stories. If potential informants believe that a subpoena can convert the media into "an investigative arm of the government," they will be far less likely to share controversial information."0 Because of their investigative activities, reporters are more likely to be targets of subpoenas."' Sources seek confidentiality usually out of a well-grounded fear of retaliation and will be less likely to provide information if they risk disclosure. Reporters may be forced to decline to print newsworthy items from confidential sources if they believe that courts will not respect the need to preserve confidentiality. Reporters must now also factor in the potential consequences of publishing stories based on information from confidential sources, consequences that currently include substantial fines and jail time. Laura R. Handman, Protection of Confidential Sources: A Moral, Legal, and Civic Duty, 19 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics and Pub. Pol'y 573 (2005).

That outweighs, analytic.

Second, agents approach action based on expectation, many of which are derived from past promises. Breaking said promises denies and agent to send ends or make autonomous decisions. Sources agree to give information based on a guarantee of anonymity, breaking this promise denies their capacity to make self-owning choices. The definition of a confidential source implies a promise between reporter and source to guarantee anonymity US Legal: Confidential Source is a person who provides information to a law-enforcement agency or to a journalist on the express or implied guarantee of anonymity. US Legal, Inc. “USLegal.” Opening Statement Law and Legal Definition | USLegal, Inc., definitions.uslegal.com/c/confidential-source/.

That outweighs: a) Analyticb) Psychologically, humans have a need to keep promises because of their evolutionary preferences like guilt aversion Vanberg: This evidence has led many authors to conclude that promises induce emotional commitments to fulfill contractual obligations, perhaps based on a norm of promise keeping (Braver (1995), Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner (1992), Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004)). A formalization of this idea has been suggested by Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004), who propose a model of social preferences that includes a “taste (...) for keeping one’s word.”1 I will refer to this as the commitment-based explanation for promise keeping. Its defining feature is the notion that agents are directly concerned, not only about the expected consequences of their behavior, but also about its consistency with obligations based on agreements or contracts. An alternative explanation for promise keeping is based on the theory of guilt aversion (Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000), Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007)). This theory assumes that human behavior in various social contexts is affected by a basic disposition to experience guilt when letting down the payoff expectations attributed to others. In a recent paper, Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) argue that such a disposition may account for promise keeping even if people do not actually care about agreements or contracts, per se. According to this explanation, promises are kept because, once given, they cause people to attribute certain payoff expectations to others. I will refer to this as the expectation-based explanation for promise keeping. I will argue that previous experimental evidence does not permit us to distinguish between the commitment-based and expectation-based explanations for promise keeping. To my knowledge, this paper is the first to report on an experiment designed explicitly to distinguish between and test these alternative explanations. The evidence collected demonstrates that the effects of promises cannot be accounted for by changes in payoff expectations. This suggests that people have a preference for keeping promises, per se.Vanberg, Christoph. “WHY DO PEOPLE KEEP THEIR PROMISES? AN EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF TWO EXPLANATIONS.” Econometrica, 2016, Joshi Aff

Third, if reporters do not have the right to protect the identity of confidential sources, confidential sources no longer give information to reporters. Without the promise of not having to reveal confidential sources, reporters will not be able to gain access to information that allows them to set ends constitutive to their function, i.e. reporting on stories Handman: This Essay will reflect on the inherent tension between the legitimate needs of law enforcement and the legitimate needs in a democracy of citizens for information about their government. There are moral, ethical, civic, and legal consequences if reporters can rely on confidential sources only at peril of their own liberty. Such an outcome will greatly reduce the information available to make wise social and political decisions and to be an effective watchdog against government and corporate abuse. The balance set by the First Amendment argues against such a result, albeit at some cost to law enforcement. This Essay argues for a federal shield law to join those of thirty-one states and the District of Columbia to protect journalists from being forced to choose between their obligations to their sources to keep promises of confidentiality, their obligation as citizens to provide evidence for legitimate investigation of unlawful activity, and their obligation as members of the Fourth Estate to inform the public of matters of public concern.Laura R. Handman, Protection of Confidential Sources: A Moral, Legal, and Civic Duty, 19 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics and Pub. Pol'y 573 (2005).

Analytic.

Finally, rights aren’t an absolute – we have to allow exceptions to solve for extreme situations. Tomasky 13:No right is absolute. In fact, the Second Amendment arguably has fewer restrictions on it these days than many of the other first 10, and there is and should be no guarantee that things are going to stay that way. In fact, if we’re ever going to be serious about trying to stop this mass butchery that we endure every few months, they cannot. Let’s begin by going down the list and reviewing various limits placed on nearly all the amendments of the Bill of Rights (I thank Doug Kendall of the Constitutional Accountability Center for helping me out here). The First Amendment, of course, guarantees the right to free speech and assembly, and to worship as one pleases. There haven’t been that many restrictions placed on the freedom to worship in the United States, although there is a steady stream of cases involving some local government or school board preventing someone from wearing religious clothing or facial hair or what have you. Sometimes a Christian school or church is denied a zoning permit; but more often it’s the freedom to worship of a minority (Muslim, Sikh, etc.) that is threatened. As for free speech, of course it is restricted. Over the past 50 or so years in a series of cases, courts have placed a number of “time, place, and manner” restrictions on free speech. To restrict speech in general, the government must meet four tests. But this is always being revised and negotiated. Here’s one restriction on the Bill of Rights that I’d wager most conservatives would happily approve of. In 1988, the HHS under Reagan promulgated rules prohibiting a family-planning professional at a clinic that received federal dollars from “promoting” (i.e. telling a woman about) abortion. This was challenged partially on free-speech grounds. In Rust v. Sullivan (1991), the Supreme Court held that these rules did not violate the clinicians’ free-speech rights. So far as I can see, this is still law. It’s just one example from many free-speech restrictions that have been imposed over the years, as you can see here. Let’s skip the Second Amendment for now. The Third Amendment—my personal favorite—proscribes the private quartering of troops. Not so relevant to life today—in fact, the Supreme Court has apparently never considered a Third Amendment challenge. Onward. The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable search and seizure, and of course there are loads of exceptions to this right, the most notable being that whenever an officer of the law has reason to think an imminently dangerous situation exists, s/he may invade a citizen’s privacy. Then there’s the question of the “exclusionary rule,” by which evidence deemed to have been improperly obtained can be excluded as evidence. Jurisprudence on this question goes back 100 years, and this very interesting paper notes that it has been two decades since the court upheld the application of the exclusionary rule in a search-and-seizure case. Since then, the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have ruled six times—every time for the government, i.e., limiting the constitutional protection. (Funny, isn’t it, how many of these other, non-gun limitations on the Bill of Rights are championed by conservatives?) The Fifth Amendment most famously protects against self-incrimination. Kendall notes that there have indeed been almost no restrictions placed on this right—inside the trial courtroom. Outside the courtroom, however, limitations are rife, having to do mostly with circumstances of interrogations and confessions made within them. This amendment also provides for due process, and that means Miranda rights, and again here, we know from recent news stories that not everyone is immediately read them, and we also know that it’s conservatives who have always despised Miranda in the first place and seek to limit or overturn it today. The Sixth Amendment provides the right to counsel and a speedy trial, and here again, our time is witness to a slow watering down of these rights by the court’s conservative majority, as in 2009’s Montejo v. Louisiana. The Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to a trial by jury in civil cases, and this contains a blatant restriction: the court has never “incorporated” this right to apply to states, where the majority of civil cases are tried, so most civil cases don’t include this right. And the Eighth Amendment, against cruel and unusual punishment, has been much contested with respect to issues like juvenile crime. The Ninth and Tenth Amendments don’t enumerate specific rights as such and so aren’t relevant. Now, back to the Second Amendment. I’m sure that pro-gun extremists know very well about Scalia’s famous opinion in Heller (2008), which dramatically expanded gun rights. But even in that decision, Scalia himself said that Second Amendment protections could apply only to weapons “in common use at the time.” Chris Wallace asked Scalia in 2012 about semiautomatic weapons and extended magazines, and he said: “What the opinion Heller said is that it will have to be decided in future cases. What limitations upon the right to bear arms are permissible. Some undoubtedly are, because there were some that were acknowledged at the time. For example, there was a tort called affrighting, which if you carried around a really horrible weapon just to scare people, like a head ax or something, that was I believe a misdemeanor. So yes, there are some limitations that can be imposed.(Michael Tomasky, 05/05/13 4:45 AM ET, “There Are No ‘Absolute’ Rights”, Daily Beast) https://www.thedailybeast.com/there-are-no-absolute-rights ||

12/4/18

SEPTOCT - Sentimentalisms AC

The standard is consistency with innate moral sentiments. Prefer:First, compliance. Second, Emotive attitudes are the core constituents of action insofar as they govern intending. Analytics a, b, and c. Third, if the rez concerns states obligations, then we look to why the constituents voted government into office since the government is accountable to the interests of the people. And, individual policy preferences are shaped by emotion, not reason. Westen:

“We ultimately found that Reason and knowledge contribute very little to voting. From three studies during the Clinton impeachment era to the disputed vote count of 2000 to people's reactions to Abu Ghraib, we found we could predict somewhere between 80 percent and 85 percent of the time which way people would go on questions of presumed fact from emotions alone. Even with when we gave them empirical data that pushed them one way or the other, that had no impact, or it only hardened their emotionally biased views. Then we followed that up with the brain study that begins the book. How valid is neuroscience for evaluating people's reactions to politicians? The process of interpreting brain scans is closer to the process of interpreting Rorschachs than many of us would like to admit. When you see amygdala activation, that could mean fear. Or it could mean simply arousal. There are surely circuits in the amygdala that are not fear circuits, and so the promise of fMRI for aiding in political campaigns is probably fairly substantial once we actually know the neural signatures of different emotional reactions. But at the present time, we don't have those signatures.”Westen, Drew. "The Brain in the Voting Booth." Http://www.apa.org. N.p., Feb. 2008. Web. 27 Aug. 2014.

Analytic

Fourth, cooperation.

Fifth, our actions lack a representative quality, and thus actions can’t generate a contradiction with reason, only with sentiments. Cohon:The third or Representation argument is different in kind. Hume offers it initially only to show that a passion cannot be opposed by or be contradictory to “truth and reason”; later (T 3.1.1.9), he repeats and expands it to argue that volitions and actions as well cannot be so. It looks as if Hume is about to give another argument to show that reason alone cannot provide a force to resist passion or volition. Yet the Representation Argument is not empirical, and does not talk of forces or impulses. Passions (and volitions and actions), Hume says, do not refer to other entities; they are “original existences,” (T 2.3.3.5), “original facts and realities” (T3.1.1.9), not mental representations of other things. Since Hume here understands representation in terms of copying, he says a passion has no “representative quality, which renders it a copy of any other existence or modification” (T 2.3.3.5). Contradiction to truth and reason, however, consists in “the disagreement of ideas, consider'd as copies, with those objects, which they represent” (ibid.). Therefore, a passion (or volition or action), not having this feature, cannot be opposed by truth and reason. Hume says the argument, as applied to actions, proves two points. First, it shows that actions cannot be reasonable or unreasonable. Secondly, it shows that “reason cannot immediately prevent or produce any action by contradicting or approving of it” (T3.1.1.10). The point here is not merely the earlier, empirical observation that the rational activity of the understanding does not generate an impulse in the absence of an expectation of pain or pleasure. It is a conclusion about the relevance of ratiocination alone to action. Because passions, volitions, and actions have no content suitable for assessment by reason, reason cannot assess prospective motives or actions as rational or irrational, and therefore reason cannot, by so assessing them, create or obstruct them. By contrast, reason can assess a potential opinion as rational or irrational; and by endorsing the opinion, reason will (that is, we will) adopt it, while by contradicting the opinion, reason will destroy our credence in it. The Representation Argument, then, makes a point a priori about the relevance of the functions of the understanding to the generation of actions. Interpreters disagree about exactly how to parse this argument, whether it is sound, and its importance to Hume's project. Rachel Cohon (Albany). “Hume’s Moral Philosophy.” SEP (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-moral/). 2010.

Analytic

And, we judge actions under sentimentalism based on the values displayed in the intent of an action because my standard judges actions by looking at whether or not the intent of an action is consistent with sentiments. Only intent based criteria can function normatively. 1) Action theory: 2) Normativity:

I defend the resolution as a general principle.

Now affirm:

First, the definition of a confidential source implies a promise between reporter and source to guarantee anonymity. US Legal: Confidential Source is a person who provides information to a law-enforcement agency or to a journalist on the express or implied guarantee of anonymity. US Legal, Inc. “USLegal.” Opening Statement Law and Legal Definition | USLegal, Inc., definitions.uslegal.com/c/confidential-source/.

Two implications:A) Analytic.B) Analytic.

Psychologically, humans have a sentiment to keep promises because of their evolutionary preferences like guilt aversion. Vanberg: This evidence has led many authors to conclude that promises induce emotional commitments to fulfill contractual obligations, perhaps based on a norm of promise keeping (Braver (1995), Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner (1992), Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004)). A formalization of this idea has been suggested by Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004), who propose a model of social preferences that includes a “taste (...) for keeping one’s word.”1 I will refer to this as the commitment-based explanation for promise keeping. Its defining feature is the notion that agents are directly concerned, not only about the expected consequences of their behavior, but also about its consistency with obligations based on agreements or contracts. An alternative explanation for promise keeping is based on the theory of guilt aversion (Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000), Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007)). This theory assumes that human behavior in various social contexts is affected by a basic disposition to experience guilt when letting down the payoff expectations attributed to others. In a recent paper, Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) argue that such a disposition may account for promise keeping even if people do not actually care about agreements or contracts, per se. According to this explanation, promises are kept because, once given, they cause people to attribute certain payoff expectations to others. I will refer to this as the expectation-based explanation for promise keeping. I will argue that previous experimental evidence does not permit us to distinguish between the commitment-based and expectation-based explanations for promise keeping. To my knowledge, this paper is the first to report on an experiment designed explicitly to distinguish between and test these alternative explanations. The evidence collected demonstrates that the effects of promises cannot be accounted for by changes in payoff expectations. This suggests that people have a preference for keeping promises, per se.Vanberg, Christoph. “WHY DO PEOPLE KEEP THEIR PROMISES? AN EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF TWO EXPLANATIONS.” Econometrica, 2016, Joshi Aff

Second, individuals have an innate sentiment for protection against abuse of authority. That means reporters need confidentiality to protect themselves from the state. The state is always in an unequal relationship with reporters since they have access to more resources, so confidentiality is key to an equal playing field.

Evolutionary adaptation has led individuals to form an innate moral sentiment against domination by others that restricts their freedom of action— confidentiality is just an instance of this. Haidt:The Liberty/oppression foundation, I propose, evolved in response to the adaptive challenge of living in small groups with individuals who would, if given the chance, dominate, bully, and constrain others. The original triggers therefore include signs of attempted domination. Anything that suggests the aggressive, controlling behavior of an alpha male (or 33 Lee 1979, quoted in Boehm 1999, p. 180. 34 The term may have first been used in an 1852 New York Times article about Marx, but Marx and Marxists soon embraced the term, and it shows up in Marx’s 1875 Critique of the Gotha Program. 138 female) can trigger this form of righteous anger, which is sometimes called reactance. (That’s the feeling you get when an authority tells you that you can’t do something, and you feel yourself wanting to do it even more strongly.35) But people don’t suffer oppression in private; the rise of a would-be dominator triggers a motivation to unite as equals with other oppressed individuals to resist, restrain, and in extreme cases kill the oppressor. Individuals who failed to detect signs of domination and respond to them with righteous and group-unifying anger faced the prospect of reduced access to food, mates, and all the other things that make individuals (and their genes) successful in the Darwinian sense.36Haidt, Jonathan. The righteous mind: Why good people are divided by politics and religion. Vintage, 2012.Resolves the idea of harmful sentiments – our sentiments act like concepts of liberty, they check back for actions that would restrict other individuals because they themselves react negatively to domination.

That outweighs, the aff defends a negative right that constitutes omission, i.e. restraining the government’s ability to interfere with confidentiality, whereas the negative requires positive government interference. We form strongest sentiments in response to action so neg turns are conceptually false. Spranca:Subjects read scenarios concerning pairs of options. One option was an omis-sion, the other, a commission. Intentions, motives, and consequences were held constant. Subjects either judged the morality of actors by their choices or rated the goodness of decision options. Subjects often rated harmful omissions as less immoral, or less bad as decisions, than harmful commissions. Such ratings were associated with judgments that omissions do not cause outcomes. The effect of commission is not simply an exaggerated response to commissions: a reverse effect for good outcomes was not found, and a few subjects were even willing to accept greater harm in order to avoid action. The "omission bias" revealed in these experiments can be described as an overgeneralization of a useful heu-ristic to cases in which it is not justified. Additional experiments indicated that subjects' judgments about the immorality of omissions and commissions are dependent on several factors that ordinarily distinguish omissions and commissions: physical movement in commissions, the presence of salient alternative causes in omissions, and the fact that the consequences of omissions would occur if the actor were absent or ignorant of the effects of not acting.Mark Spranca, Elisa Minsk, and Jonathan Baron (University of Pennsylvania), “Omission and commission in judgment and choice,” 1991, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 27, 76-105

Finally, rights aren’t an absolute – we have to allow exceptions to solve for extreme situations. Tomasky 13:No right is absolute. In fact, the Second Amendment arguably has fewer restrictions on it these days than many of the other first 10, and there is and should be no guarantee that things are going to stay that way. In fact, if we’re ever going to be serious about trying to stop this mass butchery that we endure every few months, they cannot. Let’s begin by going down the list and reviewing various limits placed on nearly all the amendments of the Bill of Rights (I thank Doug Kendall of the Constitutional Accountability Center for helping me out here). The First Amendment, of course, guarantees the right to free speech and assembly, and to worship as one pleases. There haven’t been that many restrictions placed on the freedom to worship in the United States, although there is a steady stream of cases involving some local government or school board preventing someone from wearing religious clothing or facial hair or what have you. Sometimes a Christian school or church is denied a zoning permit; but more often it’s the freedom to worship of a minority (Muslim, Sikh, etc.) that is threatened. As for free speech, of course it is restricted. Over the past 50 or so years in a series of cases, courts have placed a number of “time, place, and manner” restrictions on free speech. To restrict speech in general, the government must meet four tests. But this is always being revised and negotiated. Here’s one restriction on the Bill of Rights that I’d wager most conservatives would happily approve of. In 1988, the HHS under Reagan promulgated rules prohibiting a family-planning professional at a clinic that received federal dollars from “promoting” (i.e. telling a woman about) abortion. This was challenged partially on free-speech grounds. In Rust v. Sullivan (1991), the Supreme Court held that these rules did not violate the clinicians’ free-speech rights. So far as I can see, this is still law. It’s just one example from many free-speech restrictions that have been imposed over the years, as you can see here. Let’s skip the Second Amendment for now. The Third Amendment—my personal favorite—proscribes the private quartering of troops. Not so relevant to life today—in fact, the Supreme Court has apparently never considered a Third Amendment challenge. Onward. The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable search and seizure, and of course there are loads of exceptions to this right, the most notable being that whenever an officer of the law has reason to think an imminently dangerous situation exists, s/he may invade a citizen’s privacy. Then there’s the question of the “exclusionary rule,” by which evidence deemed to have been improperly obtained can be excluded as evidence. Jurisprudence on this question goes back 100 years, and this very interesting paper notes that it has been two decades since the court upheld the application of the exclusionary rule in a search-and-seizure case. Since then, the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have ruled six times—every time for the government, i.e., limiting the constitutional protection. (Funny, isn’t it, how many of these other, non-gun limitations on the Bill of Rights are championed by conservatives?) The Fifth Amendment most famously protects against self-incrimination. Kendall notes that there have indeed been almost no restrictions placed on this right—inside the trial courtroom. Outside the courtroom, however, limitations are rife, having to do mostly with circumstances of interrogations and confessions made within them. This amendment also provides for due process, and that means Miranda rights, and again here, we know from recent news stories that not everyone is immediately read them, and we also know that it’s conservatives who have always despised Miranda in the first place and seek to limit or overturn it today. The Sixth Amendment provides the right to counsel and a speedy trial, and here again, our time is witness to a slow watering down of these rights by the court’s conservative majority, as in 2009’s Montejo v. Louisiana. The Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to a trial by jury in civil cases, and this contains a blatant restriction: the court has never “incorporated” this right to apply to states, where the majority of civil cases are tried, so most civil cases don’t include this right. And the Eighth Amendment, against cruel and unusual punishment, has been much contested with respect to issues like juvenile crime. The Ninth and Tenth Amendments don’t enumerate specific rights as such and so aren’t relevant. Now, back to the Second Amendment. I’m sure that pro-gun extremists know very well about Scalia’s famous opinion in Heller (2008), which dramatically expanded gun rights. But even in that decision, Scalia himself said that Second Amendment protections could apply only to weapons “in common use at the time.” Chris Wallace asked Scalia in 2012 about semiautomatic weapons and extended magazines, and he said: “What the opinion Heller said is that it will have to be decided in future cases. What limitations upon the right to bear arms are permissible. Some undoubtedly are, because there were some that were acknowledged at the time. For example, there was a tort called affrighting, which if you carried around a really horrible weapon just to scare people, like a head ax or something, that was I believe a misdemeanor. So yes, there are some limitations that can be imposed.(Michael Tomasky, 05/05/13 4:45 AM ET, “There Are No ‘Absolute’ Rights”, Daily Beast) https://www.thedailybeast.com/there-are-no-absolute-rights ||

12/4/18

SEPTOCT - Sentimentalisms AC v2

First, normative theories require internal motivation because their purpose is to form a universal system of mutual restraint upon agents. Neuroscience proves that morality is an internal emotive process. Greene, Joshua Greene, Cognitive Neuroscientist and Philosopher, Ph.D., Postdoctoral fellow in the Department of Psychology and Center for the Study of Brain, Mind and Behavior at Princeton University, “From neural ‘is’ to moral ‘ought:” what are the moral implications of neuaroscientific moral psychology? ” Nature Reviews Neuroscience, Volume 4, October, 2003. As noted above, recent evidence from neuroscience and neighbouring other disciplines indicates that moral judgement is often an intuitive, emotional matter. Although many moral judgements are difficult, much moral judgement is accomplished in an intuitive, effortless way. An interesting feature of many intuitive, effortless cognitive processes is that they are accompanied by a perceptual phenomenology. For example, humans can effortlessly determine whether a given face is male or female without any knowledge of how such judgements are made. When you look at someone, you have no experience of working out whether that person is male or female. You just see that person’s maleness or femaleness. By contrast, you do not look at a star in the sky and see that it is receding. One can imagine creatures that automatically process spectroscopic redshifts, but as humans we do not. All of this makes sense from an evolutionary point of view. We have evolved mechanisms for making quick, emotion-based social judgements, for ‘seeing’ rightness and wrongness, because our intensely social lives favour such capacities, but there was little selective pressure on our ancestors to know about the movements of distant stars. We have here the beginnings of a debunking explanation of moral realism: we believe in moral realism because moral experience has a perceptual phenomenology, and moral experience has a perceptual phenomenology because natural selection has outfitted us with mechanisms for making intuitive, emotion-based moral judgements, much as it has outfitted us with mechanisms for making intuitive, emotion-based judgements about who among us are the most suitable mates. Therefore, we can understand our inclination towards moral realism not as an insight into the nature of moral truth, but as a by-product of the efficient cognitive processes we use to make moral decisions.

Thus, only sentiments can produce internal motivation. Also – outweighs on bindingness; people’s sentiments are formed in relation to other people because emotion is by definition interpersonal.

Second, sentiments are constitutive of action as they govern intending, analytics a, b, and c.

Third, our actions lack a representative quality, and thus actions can’t generate a contradiction with reason, only with sentiments. Cohon:The third or Representation argument is different in kind. Hume offers it initially only to show that a passion cannot be opposed by or be contradictory to “truth and reason”; later (T 3.1.1.9), he repeats and expands it to argue that volitions and actions as well cannot be so. It looks as if Hume is about to give another argument to show that reason alone cannot provide a force to resist passion or volition. Yet the Representation Argument is not empirical, and does not talk of forces or impulses. Passions (and volitions and actions), Hume says, do not refer to other entities; they are “original existences,” (T 2.3.3.5), “original facts and realities” (T3.1.1.9), not mental representations of other things. Since Hume here understands representation in terms of copying, he says a passion has no “representative quality, which renders it a copy of any other existence or modification” (T 2.3.3.5). Contradiction to truth and reason, however, consists in “the disagreement of ideas, consider'd as copies, with those objects, which they represent” (ibid.). Therefore, a passion (or volition or action), not having this feature, cannot be opposed by truth and reason. Hume says the argument, as applied to actions, proves two points. First, it shows that actions cannot be reasonable or unreasonable. Secondly, it shows that “reason cannot immediately prevent or produce any action by contradicting or approving of it” (T3.1.1.10). The point here is not merely the earlier, empirical observation that the rational activity of the understanding does not generate an impulse in the absence of an expectation of pain or pleasure. It is a conclusion about the relevance of ratiocination alone to action. Because passions, volitions, and actions have no content suitable for assessment by reason, reason cannot assess prospective motives or actions as rational or irrational, and therefore reason cannot, by so assessing them, create or obstruct them. By contrast, reason can assess a potential opinion as rational or irrational; and by endorsing the opinion, reason will (that is, we will) adopt it, while by contradicting the opinion, reason will destroy our credence in it. The Representation Argument, then, makes a point a priori about the relevance of the functions of the understanding to the generation of actions. Interpreters disagree about exactly how to parse this argument, whether it is sound, and its importance to Hume's project.Rachel Cohon (Albany). “Hume’s Moral Philosophy.” SEP (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-moral/). 2010.

Analytic

And, we judge actions under sentimentalism based on the values displayed in the intent of an action because my standard judges actions by looking at whether or not the intent of an action is consistent with sentiments. Only intent based criteria can function normatively. 1) Action theory: 2) Normativity:

I defend the resolution as a general principle.

Now affirm:

First, the definition of a confidential source implies a promise between reporter and source to guarantee anonymity. US Legal: Confidential Source is a person who provides information to a law-enforcement agency or to a journalist on the express or implied guarantee of anonymity. US Legal, Inc. “USLegal.” Opening Statement Law and Legal Definition | USLegal, Inc., definitions.uslegal.com/c/confidential-source/.

Two implications:A) Analytic.B) Analytic.

Psychologically, humans have a sentiment to keep promises because of their evolutionary preferences like guilt aversion. Vanberg: This evidence has led many authors to conclude that promises induce emotional commitments to fulfill contractual obligations, perhaps based on a norm of promise keeping (Braver (1995), Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner (1992), Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004)). A formalization of this idea has been suggested by Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004), who propose a model of social preferences that includes a “taste (...) for keeping one’s word.”1 I will refer to this as the commitment-based explanation for promise keeping. Its defining feature is the notion that agents are directly concerned, not only about the expected consequences of their behavior, but also about its consistency with obligations based on agreements or contracts. An alternative explanation for promise keeping is based on the theory of guilt aversion (Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000), Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007)). This theory assumes that human behavior in various social contexts is affected by a basic disposition to experience guilt when letting down the payoff expectations attributed to others. In a recent paper, Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) argue that such a disposition may account for promise keeping even if people do not actually care about agreements or contracts, per se. According to this explanation, promises are kept because, once given, they cause people to attribute certain payoff expectations to others. I will refer to this as the expectation-based explanation for promise keeping. I will argue that previous experimental evidence does not permit us to distinguish between the commitment-based and expectation-based explanations for promise keeping. To my knowledge, this paper is the first to report on an experiment designed explicitly to distinguish between and test these alternative explanations. The evidence collected demonstrates that the effects of promises cannot be accounted for by changes in payoff expectations. This suggests that people have a preference for keeping promises, per se.Vanberg, Christoph. “WHY DO PEOPLE KEEP THEIR PROMISES? AN EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF TWO EXPLANATIONS.” Econometrica, 2016, Joshi Aff

Second, individuals have an innate sentiment for protection against abuse of authority. That means reporters need confidentiality to protect themselves from the state. The state is always in an unequal relationship with reporters since they have access to more resources, so confidentiality is key to an equal playing field.

Evolutionary adaptation has led individuals to form an innate moral sentiment against domination by others that restricts their freedom of action— confidentiality is just an instance of this. Haidt:The Liberty/oppression foundation, I propose, evolved in response to the adaptive challenge of living in small groups with individuals who would, if given the chance, dominate, bully, and constrain others. The original triggers therefore include signs of attempted domination. Anything that suggests the aggressive, controlling behavior of an alpha male (or 33 Lee 1979, quoted in Boehm 1999, p. 180. 34 The term may have first been used in an 1852 New York Times article about Marx, but Marx and Marxists soon embraced the term, and it shows up in Marx’s 1875 Critique of the Gotha Program. 138 female) can trigger this form of righteous anger, which is sometimes called reactance. (That’s the feeling you get when an authority tells you that you can’t do something, and you feel yourself wanting to do it even more strongly.35) But people don’t suffer oppression in private; the rise of a would-be dominator triggers a motivation to unite as equals with other oppressed individuals to resist, restrain, and in extreme cases kill the oppressor. Individuals who failed to detect signs of domination and respond to them with righteous and group-unifying anger faced the prospect of reduced access to food, mates, and all the other things that make individuals (and their genes) successful in the Darwinian sense.36Haidt, Jonathan. The righteous mind: Why good people are divided by politics and religion. Vintage, 2012.Resolves the idea of harmful sentiments – our sentiments act like concepts of liberty, they check back for actions that would restrict other individuals because they themselves react negatively to domination.

Further, since the ascription of rights is simply the acknowledgement that it is good for a person or thing to have a particular claim, there is no restriction on the foundations of such claims. Kelch:“One common, although not necessarily universal, strand in these myriad theoryies is to asserts that there is one foundation for the concept of rights. In other words, one specifiable sort of thing or set of things constitutes the ground on which the profusion of rights lies. This article contends that This obsessive search for one element or one clearly defined set of elements to buttress rights has caused our thoughts to go awry. Instead, properly speaking, legal ‘Rights’ have multifarious grounds and foundations, not one. Any right can appropriately be explained by any number of theories, all of which aid in our understanding of the right in question. As such, we may see The grounding of rights is not as a single solid foundational block, but as a interwoven webs of numerous conceptual strands.”Kelch, Thomas. Professor of law at Whittier Law School. “The role of the rational and the emotive in a theory of animal rights.” Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 27:1, 1999. |

That outweighs, the aff defends a negative right that constitutes omission, i.e. restraining the government’s ability to interfere with confidentiality, whereas the negative requires positive government interference. We form strongest sentiments in response to action so neg turns are conceptually false. Spranca:Subjects read scenarios concerning pairs of options. One option was an omis-sion, the other, a commission. Intentions, motives, and consequences were held constant. Subjects either judged the morality of actors by their choices or rated the goodness of decision options. Subjects often rated harmful omissions as less immoral, or less bad as decisions, than harmful commissions. Such ratings were associated with judgments that omissions do not cause outcomes. The effect of commission is not simply an exaggerated response to commissions: a reverse effect for good outcomes was not found, and a few subjects were even willing to accept greater harm in order to avoid action. The "omission bias" revealed in these experiments can be described as an overgeneralization of a useful heu-ristic to cases in which it is not justified. Additional experiments indicated that subjects' judgments about the immorality of omissions and commissions are dependent on several factors that ordinarily distinguish omissions and commissions: physical movement in commissions, the presence of salient alternative causes in omissions, and the fact that the consequences of omissions would occur if the actor were absent or ignorant of the effects of not acting.Mark Spranca, Elisa Minsk, and Jonathan Baron (University of Pennsylvania), “Omission and commission in judgment and choice,” 1991, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 27, 76-105

Finally, rights aren’t an absolute – we have to allow exceptions to solve for extreme situations. Tomasky 13:No right is absolute. In fact, the Second Amendment arguably has fewer restrictions on it these days than many of the other first 10, and there is and should be no guarantee that things are going to stay that way. In fact, if we’re ever going to be serious about trying to stop this mass butchery that we endure every few months, they cannot. Let’s begin by going down the list and reviewing various limits placed on nearly all the amendments of the Bill of Rights (I thank Doug Kendall of the Constitutional Accountability Center for helping me out here). The First Amendment, of course, guarantees the right to free speech and assembly, and to worship as one pleases. There haven’t been that many restrictions placed on the freedom to worship in the United States, although there is a steady stream of cases involving some local government or school board preventing someone from wearing religious clothing or facial hair or what have you. Sometimes a Christian school or church is denied a zoning permit; but more often it’s the freedom to worship of a minority (Muslim, Sikh, etc.) that is threatened. As for free speech, of course it is restricted. Over the past 50 or so years in a series of cases, courts have placed a number of “time, place, and manner” restrictions on free speech. To restrict speech in general, the government must meet four tests. But this is always being revised and negotiated. Here’s one restriction on the Bill of Rights that I’d wager most conservatives would happily approve of. In 1988, the HHS under Reagan promulgated rules prohibiting a family-planning professional at a clinic that received federal dollars from “promoting” (i.e. telling a woman about) abortion. This was challenged partially on free-speech grounds. In Rust v. Sullivan (1991), the Supreme Court held that these rules did not violate the clinicians’ free-speech rights. So far as I can see, this is still law. It’s just one example from many free-speech restrictions that have been imposed over the years, as you can see here. Let’s skip the Second Amendment for now. The Third Amendment—my personal favorite—proscribes the private quartering of troops. Not so relevant to life today—in fact, the Supreme Court has apparently never considered a Third Amendment challenge. Onward. The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable search and seizure, and of course there are loads of exceptions to this right, the most notable being that whenever an officer of the law has reason to think an imminently dangerous situation exists, s/he may invade a citizen’s privacy. Then there’s the question of the “exclusionary rule,” by which evidence deemed to have been improperly obtained can be excluded as evidence. Jurisprudence on this question goes back 100 years, and this very interesting paper notes that it has been two decades since the court upheld the application of the exclusionary rule in a search-and-seizure case. Since then, the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have ruled six times—every time for the government, i.e., limiting the constitutional protection. (Funny, isn’t it, how many of these other, non-gun limitations on the Bill of Rights are championed by conservatives?) The Fifth Amendment most famously protects against self-incrimination. Kendall notes that there have indeed been almost no restrictions placed on this right—inside the trial courtroom. Outside the courtroom, however, limitations are rife, having to do mostly with circumstances of interrogations and confessions made within them. This amendment also provides for due process, and that means Miranda rights, and again here, we know from recent news stories that not everyone is immediately read them, and we also know that it’s conservatives who have always despised Miranda in the first place and seek to limit or overturn it today. The Sixth Amendment provides the right to counsel and a speedy trial, and here again, our time is witness to a slow watering down of these rights by the court’s conservative majority, as in 2009’s Montejo v. Louisiana. The Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to a trial by jury in civil cases, and this contains a blatant restriction: the court has never “incorporated” this right to apply to states, where the majority of civil cases are tried, so most civil cases don’t include this right. And the Eighth Amendment, against cruel and unusual punishment, has been much contested with respect to issues like juvenile crime. The Ninth and Tenth Amendments don’t enumerate specific rights as such and so aren’t relevant. Now, back to the Second Amendment. I’m sure that pro-gun extremists know very well about Scalia’s famous opinion in Heller (2008), which dramatically expanded gun rights. But even in that decision, Scalia himself said that Second Amendment protections could apply only to weapons “in common use at the time.” Chris Wallace asked Scalia in 2012 about semiautomatic weapons and extended magazines, and he said: “What the opinion Heller said is that it will have to be decided in future cases. What limitations upon the right to bear arms are permissible. Some undoubtedly are, because there were some that were acknowledged at the time. For example, there was a tort called affrighting, which if you carried around a really horrible weapon just to scare people, like a head ax or something, that was I believe a misdemeanor. So yes, there are some limitations that can be imposed.(Michael Tomasky, 05/05/13 4:45 AM ET, “There Are No ‘Absolute’ Rights”, Daily Beast) https://www.thedailybeast.com/there-are-no-absolute-rights ||

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