Favors
government ownership; advocates government
ownership of some basic industries but not all;
advocates acquiring some industry not currently
under government ownership.

PRO-weak
+l

Accepts some
government ownership but mainly favors more
government regulation; advocates active
regulation of production and marketing
activities of basic industries; advocates
stronger regulation.

NEUTRAL
0

Includes
ambiguous or contradictory positions

CON-weak
-1

Accepts some
government ownership; opposes ownership
spreading to all basic industries; opposes
government acquisition of a given industry not
under government ownership; accepts current
government regulations.

CON-moderate
-3

Opposes
government ownership; opposes ownership in
principle for any basic industry; advocates
returning a given government-owned industry to
private ownership; advocates weaker
regulations

CON-strong
-5

Strongly
opposes government ownership; opposes even
government regulation of production and
marketing activities of industries other than
minimal requirements for health, safety, and
honesty; urges repeal of current
regulations.

Coding Results. The average party in our study
came out somewhat on the leftist side of our scale for
"government ownership of the means of production." This is
confirmed in the positive means for BV501 as reported in
Tables 6.2a and 6.2b (BV501). Perhaps surprisingly, parties
in the first half of our period were slightly more leftist
than those in the second half. While we were able to score
about 90 percent of our parties for BV501, we also failed to
score almost 10 percent. Those that were scored were apt to
be coded with a lower level of confidence, as can be seen in
the relatively low means for AC501. The correlation between
BV501 and AC501, however, was insignificant.

TABLE 6.2a: Mid 1950s: BV5.01 Ownership of the
Means of Production

TABLE 6.2b: Early 1960s: BV5.01 Ownership of the Means
of Production

Basic Variable 5.02: Government
Role in Economic Planning*

The rate of economic growth as an object of concern
throughout the world has generated intense controversy in
many countries over the effect on economic development of
state economic planning versus decentralized
entrepreneurship. The economist Paul Baran has described how
the idea of collective effort, which advances the interests
of society in general over the interests of the selected few
(1957, p. 97), has become the prevailing point of view in
much of the world. Yet the desire to achieve dramatic
increases in the standard of living, as well as to maximize
the public good through collective direction of the
segmental development of the economy, must be balanced
against the inevitable threat to political liberties
implicit in the accretion of governmental power. The
"economic planning" variable attempts to assess a party's
response to this apparent dilemma.