Most Courteous Sir, -As regards political theories, the
difference which you inquire about between Hobbes and myself,
consists in this, that I always preserve natural right intact, and
only allot to the chief magistrates in every state a right over
their subjects commensurate with the excess of their power over
the power of the subjects. This is what always takes place in
the state of nature.

Again, with regard to the demonstration which I establish
in the appendix to my geometric exposition of Cartesian
principles, namely, that
God can only with great impropriety be
called one or single, I answer that a thing can only be called one
or single in respect of existence, not in respect of
essence. For
we do not conceive things under the category of numbers,
unless they have first been reduced to a common genus. For
example, he who holds in his hand a penny and a crown piece
will not think of the twofold number, unless he can call both the
penny and the crown piece by one and the same name, to wit,
coins or pieces of money. In the latter case he can say that he
holds two coins or pieces of money, inasmuch as he calls the
crown as well as the penny, a coin, or piece of money. Hence, it
is evident that a thing cannot be called one or single, unless
there be afterwards another thing conceived, which (as has been
said) agrees with it. Now, since the
existence of
God is His
essence, and of His
essence we can form no general idea, it is
certain, that he who calls God one or single has no
true idea of
God, and speaks of Him very improperly.

As to the doctrine that figure is
negation and not anything
positive, it is plain that the whole of matter considered
indefinitely can have no figure, and that figure can only
exist in finite
and determinate bodies. For he
who says, that he perceives a figure, merely
indicates thereby, that he conceives a
determinate
thing, and how it is determinate.
This determination, therefore, does not
appertain to the thing according to its being,
but, on the contrary, is its non-being. As then
figure is nothing else than determination, and
determination is
negation, figure, as has been
said, can be nothing but
negation.

The book, which a Utrecht professor wrote
against mine, and which was published after his
death, I saw lying in a bookseller's window.
From the little I then read of it, I Judged it
unworthy of perusal, still less of reply. I,
therefore, left the book, and its author. With
an inward smile I reflected, that the most
ignorant are ever the most audacious and the
most ready to rush into print. The Christians
seem to me to expose their wares for sale like
hucksters, who always show first that which is
worst. The devil is said to be very cunning, but
to my thinking the tricks of these people are in
cunning far beyond his. Farewell.