After Talks in Geneva, Iran Will Likely Agree

War Party in a Bind: After Nuclear Talks in
Geneva, Iran Will Likely Agree

The meeting in
Geneva on July 19, between representatives of the 5+1 (U.N.
Security Council permanent members plus Germany) and Iran,
should be heartily welcomed by all those who seek a
diplomatic solution to the hoked-up case against the Islamic
Republic's nuclear energy program, and, thus, an end to the
threat of a new war in the region. Although, as both sides
stressed, no final agreement was struck at the talks, the
fact that they took place at all was significant. The
presence in Geneva, of Undersecretary of State William
Burns, signalled the first time that the U.S. has officially
met with the Iranians since the 1979 revolution, if one
excludes the multilateral gatherings on Afghanistan and on
Iraq. It is highly likely that the Geneva talks will lead to
agreement between the West and Iran.

Yet, the spin in the
establishment press on the event, has been most unhelpful,
often bordering on sabotage. One line had it that, since the
Iranians did not immediately bow down and lisp, "Yes, sir,"
to the call for a freeze on its uranium enrichment
activities, they were rejecting the 5+1's bargaining
position tout court. Others claimed Tehran were only
stalling, in hopes of averting any military aggression until
the U.S. elections in November. Still others seized on
reports of Iranian military maneuvers, conducted prior to
the talks, as "proof" of Tehran's commitment to develop
nuclear weapons to destroy Israel. Regional military
maneuvres by Iran, which came on the heels of Israeli
exercises simulating attacks on the Islamic Republic,
featured the firing of 9 middle-range missiles. In response,
Secretary of State Condi Rice issued usual complaints, and
both presumptive Presidential candidates John McCain and
Barack Obama reiterated that Iran is "a
threat."

Nonetheless, the talks in Geneva did take place,
and should be taken as grounds for optimism -- cautious, to
be sure -- but optimism. There are several reasons for this.
First, the decision to accept negotiations on the basis of
the 5+1 proposal delivered in Iran by Javier Solana on June
14, was taken at the highest level of policy-making in
Tehran, i.e. by Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, Supreme
Leader of the Revolution. All the leading Iranian spokesmen
who signalled assent to the proposal, are answerable to
Khamenei. These include Saeed Jalili, head of the Supreme
National Security Council, and, in that capacity, chief
negotiator on nuclear questions; Gholam-Reza Aghezadeh, head
of the Iranian Atomic Energy Agency, who on June 30 told a
parliamentary committee the decision for talks had been
made; Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki; and, foreign
policy advisor to Khamenei, Ali Akhbar Velayati.

As if to
eliminate any doubts on the matter, Khamenei himself
explicitly endorsed the talks. As reported on his official
website, www.Khamenei.ir on July 16, the Supreme
Leader stated: "The negotiations will proceed successfully
only when the atmosphere of the negotiaitons is not
dominated by threats. Europeans have to pay attention to the
point that it is the Iranian nation that they are
negotiating with. The Iranian nation is a valiant nation
that does not like threats, and is not going to give in to
any threats." Khamenei also expressed his full confidence in
the bodies dealing with the issue, the Supreme National
Security Council which "is in charge of the nuclear issue
and is presided over by the esteemed president. Whatever the
president and the officials in charge of the nuclear issue
say is also approved by all the government officials. And
the heads of the three government branches and my
representatives are pursuing this issue in the Supreme
National Security Council with wisdom and commitment." The
top official said "the red lines of the Iranian nation are
absolutely clear," and will not be crossed. This was a
reference to demands that Iran suspend its enrichment
program completely, in essence, giving it up entirely.

A
second reason for optimism, is that, on the other side, a
"new atmosphere" had been created, which helped leading
Iranian figures to overcome their skepticism. In remarks to
CNN on July 7, Mottaki noted the new atmosphere, saying, "We
believe that the nature of our exchanges, both in format and
in substance, were different than of previous times." He
went on, "So I believe that we are now in a new environment
with a new approaching perspective..." Mottaki also referred
to the upcoming elections in the U.S., as a possible moment
of transition. "We hear new voices in America," he said, "We
see new approaches, and we think that the rational thinkers
in America can, based on these new approaches, see the
reality as it is."

Mottaki was upbeat about the new
atmosphere, also because Solana had acknowledged the
importance of Iran on the world stage. On June 15, Tehran
Times quoted the Eu foreign policy czar as saying the 5+1
"fully recognize Iran's right to nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes," adding, "We want to have a fully normalized
relationship in all fields, in particular the nuclear
field." He said Iran was "a very important and civilized
country which plays a very important role in the
international arena."

The meeting in Geneva lasted several
hours on July 19. As noted, no concrete breakthrough
agreement occurred. According to reports, the 5+1 group
formally presented the "freeze-for-freeze" proposal that
Solana had offered earlier in oral form to the Iranians, and
the Iranians declined to give an immediate, formal answer.
Thus the skepticism and the press spin. Iran reportedly
delivered a two-page "non-paper" to the 5+1, whose contents
have not been made public. The New York Times on July 22
leaked parts of the non-paper, according to which Tehran
requested three further meetings with Solana and four
meetings at the foriegn ministers' level, beginning after a
halt in sanctions against Iran.

In Geneva, the 5+1 gave
Iran two weeks' time to formulate a final response to their
offer. This was followed by a public statement by Secretary
of State Condi Rice, who complained that Iran was
"meandering" and engaging in "small talk," and added that
either Iran must accept, "or face growing isolation and the
collective response of not just one nation but of all
nations around the world." Furthermore, new military
manuevres were announced. The U.S., France, Britain and
Brazil were to start 10-day exercises off the coast from
Virginia to Florida, "aimed at training for operation in
shallow coastal waters such as the Persian Gulf and the
Strait of Hormuz," according to PressTV
(www.payvand.com/news/08/jul/1216.html).

All that
notwithstanding, the fact is, a high-level U.S. diplomat,
William Burns, took part in the talks. This was a crucial
victory for the Iranians, who have been demanding direct
contact without preconditions. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
was most unusually explicit in his praise for the U.S.
gesture. Speaking on July 23 to a gathering in Yasouj city
in southwestern Iran, he stated: "The U.S. administration
announced it was going to participate in nuclear talks. We
welcomed that. The U.S. representative spoke in a
gentlemanly tone in the meeting. It was positive." According
to an AP wire on July 23, Ahmadinejad said Burns's presence
"was a step towards recognizing the rights of the Iranian
nation, towards justice, towards repairing your image in the
world, towards cleaning 50 years of crimes you committed
against the Iranian nation." Foreign Minister Manuchehr
Mottaki had also characterized the announcement that Burns
would participate, as "a positive development."

In the
view of Iranian sources, the presence of Burns signalled a
victory (at least temporary) of the anti-war forces in
Washington, over the Cheney-led war party. Reports from
Washington have it that Condi Rice dispatched Burns, over
the objections of the vice president. Rice's move was a
political gesture which was generated, however, by a
concerted action on the part of the top brass in the U.S.
military establishment. Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff
Mullen had been to Israel where he was presumably briefed on
the Israeli hawks' blueprint for military attacks against
Iran. Wihout revealing the details of his discussions,
Muller made clear that he would not rubber stamp any such
insane designs. After his talks, he said that opening a
third front in the region was out of the question.

Why
Did Iran Go To Geneva?

The block to direct
talks had been the insistence, on the part of the 5+1, that
Iran {suspend} its uranium enrichment as a precondition,
which Tehran had consistently refused. Now, although the
{written} letter of the 5+1 countries' foreign ministers,
accompanying their proposal, still explicitly said, "Formal
negotiations can start as soon as Iran's enrichment-related
and reprocessing activities are suspended," Solana did make
an {oral} offer to start talks, once Iran had agreed to a
"freeze" on its enrichment activities, at least for the
duration of the negotiations (SeeTrita Parsi, "Reading
Solana in Tehran," www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=43097 and
www.tritaparsi.com). This idea of a freeze, meaning Iran
would continue to enrich but at current levels, had been
discussed informally in the Iranian press, and in most
concrete terms by two prominent Iranians at a conference in
Berlin at the end of June (See my article, "Iranians Float
An Offer the West Should Not Refuse," globalresearch.ca June
19). The virtue of the freeze approach lies in the fact that
it allows both sides to save face: Iran does not submit to
demands to suspend (i.e. halt, even temporarily) its
enrichment, but the other side can argue that Iran is not
expanding its program.

Much has been written about
Tehran's motives for accepting the talks. Some claim Iran
was reacting to threats of military aggression by the U.S.
and/or Israel. But this hypothesis, as Trita Parsi has
elaborated, does not hold water; were Iran to respond this
way to threats, it would have done so much earlier, when the
threats were even more direct. More credible is the
argument, that Iran found the moment propitious, because the
other side appeared to accept, at least in part, its terms.
First and foremost is the idea of the freeze, rather than
suspension. Secondly, the 5+1, at least in the person of
Solana, displayed a new quality of respect regarding Iran.
This factor, which many dismiss as irrelevant, is of utmost
concern to the Iranians, as should be obvious in Khamenei's
remarks cited above.

Find Points of
Agreement

In the run-up to the talks, Iranian
Foreign Minister Mottaki said they should begin on the basis
of the "common points" in the proposals made by the two
sides: the 5+1 proposal presented on June 14 by Solana, and
Iran's earlier "Package for Constructive Negotiations," sent
out on May 13. In other words, instead of rejecting the
proposal because it contained demands unacceptable to Iran,
the Iranian leadership decided to pursue a different method,
putting unacceptable demands on the back burner for the
moment, and focussing on what the two had in common.

The
common points are many. Although they have not been given
the in-depth analysis they deserve in the international
press, at least Russia has taken note. Nicholas Patrochev,
the new Secretary of the Russian Security Council, in a
phone discussions with his Iranian counterpart Jalili on
July 7, said Russia supported the concept that talks should
be resumed on the basis of the common points.

Mottaki had
stated in his letter accompanying Iran's May 13 proposal,
that Iran was "ready to negotiate with the 5+1 Group within
a specific framework on issues of mutual interest." The
proposal itself stressed that "The main outcome of this new
round of negotiations would be agreement on 'collective
commitments' to cooperate on economic, political, regional,
international, nuclear and energy security issues." All
these areas are covered by the 5+1 proposal.

In its
detailed points, the Iranian proposal stressed the need to
pursue "a just peace and democracy in the region" in the
context of "Respect for the rights of nations and their
national interests; Support for the national sovereignty of
states based on democratic methods." Iran also expressed its
readiness to cooperate on bolstering stability in various
parts of the world, including the Middle East, where it
would contribute to a solution to the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict. The 5+1 proposal seems to take this into
consideration, when it says it would "Support Iran in
playing an important and constructive role in international
affairs." The 5+1 Group also gives a nod to respect for
national sovereignty, by stating, "Reaffirmation of the
obligation under the U.N. charter to refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity of [sic] political
independence of any state or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations." This
seems to mark a bit of an improvement over the 2006 document
by the same group, which reportedly "guaranteed" Iran that
no power in Europe would attack it with nuclear weapons
(that is, France or Britain), but made no mention of the
U.S. or Israel; nor did it guarantee that conventional
attacks would be excluded.

This clause leads to another of
Iran's major concerns, i.e. establishing regional security.
The entire thrust of Tehran's document, is that national
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence must be
guaranteed, which means, threats of military aggression or
regime change must be trashed from the agenda. The 5+1
document lists "Support for a conference on regional
security issues" under its political measures. This is
interesting. Iran has been organizing for a regional
security arrangement, in talks with its neighbors, for the
past eight years at least, and has made some headway with
Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iraq and Turkey. Iran's view is that
regional security can only be guaranteed through cooperation
among its constituent nations, emphatically without the
presence of foreign troops, no matter from where.

This
obviously flies in the face of U.S.-U.K. plans to maintain
their military presence in the region. The ongoing
tug-of-war between the Nouri al-Maliki government in Iraq
and the U.S., regarding a Status of Forces Agreement,
provides a good reflection of Iranian views on the matter.
All Iran-allied forces in Iraq reject the U.S. proposal for
long-term presence. Not only has al-Maliki demanded a
timetable for withdrawal of foreign troops, but his Iraqi
National Security Advisor Muwafaq al-Rubaie has also said
occupation must end. As quoted by Xinhua on July 9,
al-Rubaie stated, "We will not sign any memorandum of
understanding without specifying a date for the withdrawal
of foreign troops from Iraq." Significantly, he made the
statements from the holy city of Najaf, just after he had
concluded consultations with the supreme authority for
Shi'ites, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. Al-Sistani has
reiterated that any agreement on military forces with the
occupying powers must be subjected to a referendum. Since
then, the U.S. has been forced to pay lip service to
agreement on reduction, if not withdrawal, of forces. On
July 18, after Bush and al-Maliki had conferred on the
matter, the White House made an announcement in language
straddling a fine line between Orwellian Newspeak and
Bushspeak, to the effect that somehow some agreement had
been made. "The president and the prime minister agreed," it
said, "that improving conditions should allow for the
agreements now under negotiation to include a general time
horizon for meeting aspirational goals -- such as the
resumption of Iraqi security control in their cities and
provinces and the further reduction of U.S. combat forces
from Iraq."(1)

Iran's document also calls for discussions
on cooperation on trade and investment, something that is
echoed in the 5+1 paper, which calls for "normalization of
trade and economic relations." The central issue, of course,
is the nuclear program. Here, there are also several areas
of tangential convergence, though not agreement. Iran speaks
of "Establishing enrichment and nuclear fuel production
consortiums in different parts of the world -- including
Iran" and of "Cooperation to access and utilize peaceful
nuclear technology and facilitating its usage by all
states." The 5+1 document does not grant Iran the right to
such a consortium on its territory, but speaks of "Provision
of legally binding nuclear fuel supply guarantees" as well
as "Cooperation with regard to management of spent fuel and
radioactive waste." Sorting out the differences is the task
of negotiations.

What is useful in the 5+1 paper is the
"Support for construction of LWR (Light water reactor) based
on state-of-the-art technology" as well as "Provision of
technological and financial assistance necessary for Iran's
peaceful use of nuclear energy, support for the reusmption
of technical cooperation projects in Iran by the IAEA." Also
useful, and in agreement with Iran's approach, is the
reference to "realizing the objective of a Middle East free
of weapons of mass destruction," which would have
implications for Israel, the one nuclear power in the
region.

If one were to proceed rationally in open-ended
talks, several options might be available. To accomodate
Iran's requirements for guaranteed nuclear fuel supplies,
preferably through the establishment of international
consortia for enrichment facilities in Iran and elsewhere,
the proposals by Thomas Pickering, the MIT group, the
International Crisis Group, and others could be relevant.
For Iran to agree to suspend its enrichment program, a
proposition which is seen by most Iranians as highly
unlikely, the other side would have to go a very, very long
way. It would have to provide air-tight guarantees not only
for secure fuel supplies, but also for the security of Iran,
the inviolability of its borders, respect for its
independence and unlimited sovereignty. Such guarantees
cannot be made on paper, but would have to be forged through
political agreements amounting to endorsement of a regional
security arrangement hammered out by the powers in the
region, without outside interference. This may seem
unthinkable at the moment, but, if the trend towards
sovereignty underway in Iraq is allowed to continue, and if
certain Arab nations in the Persian Gulf were to free
themselves of their paranoia regarding Iran, the currently
unthinkable might become an agenda item
tomorrow.

Obviously, the success of talks with Iran
depends on the position of the U.S. government. If
Washington, under new leadership, were to agree to
normalizing relations with Iran, anything would be
possible.

War Party in a Bind

The war
party in London and Washington has not given up its plans
for destabilizing or attacking Iran, before the Bush-Cheney
mandate ends. More killings inside Iran were reported in
late June-early July, substantiating Seymour Hersh's
revelations of an active operation afoot by U.S.
intelligence groups, to promote ethnic minorities in
assassination operations against Iranian officials. At the
same time, the anti-Iranian terrorist gang MKO had been
reactivated, with a mass demonstration called near Paris
weeks ago. The umbrella group of the MKO, run by Maryam
Rajavi, called for all European governments to follow the
lead of the British House of Lords, who voted to take the
MKO off the list of terrorist organizations. The al-Maliki
government in Iraq has promised it would expel the MKO, as
requested by Iran, but the occupying powers have held up
implementation thus far. Not only: in the first week of
July, the MKO held a conference of anti-Iran groups, at its
Iraqi headquarters in Camp Ashraf.

In addition to covert
ops, there has been a good deal of traditional
sabre-rattling, as reported extensively by this website,
among others. Not only did Israel hold massive maneuvres
last month, characterized as preparations for a strike again
Iran, but the U.S. and U.K. also held exercises in the
Persian Gulf. Iran's much-publicized defensive maneuvres,
including the test firing of medium-range missiles,
constituted a logical response, one which could have been
expected by anyone who knows how the Iranians think.

Most
intriguing, and politically decisive, in this picture, is
the question, what does Moscow, under President Medvedev,
think of this entire complex? There have been a couple of
interesting signals in this respect. First, following the
disgusting fiasco of the G-8 meeting in Japan, Secretary of
State Condi Rice sped off to Prague to sign an agreement
with the Czechs on deployment of the radars meant supposedly
to track Iranian missiles. The Russian response had a new
quality. A Foreign Ministry statement issued on July 9,
said, "We will be forced to react not with diplomatic, but
with military-technical methods." At the same time, there
were discussions between Iranian President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad and Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Putin
called Ahmadinejad on July 7to express his "hope that
negotiations about nuclear issue will continue and will
yield clear results which would guarantee the full rights of
the Islamic Republic of Iran," PressTV reported the next
day. ITAR-TASS added that the two had discussed "bilateral
cooperation in the field of transport and military-technical
cooperation." The nuclear plant which Russia has completed
at Bushehr, it has been confirmed, will start operating this
year. And, on July 15, RIA Novosti reported that Gazprom and
the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) signed a memorandum
of cooperation in oil and gas production and transportation.
The deal foresees development of oil and gas fields,
building processing facilities, and transporting oil from
the Caspian to the Gulf of Oman. Finally, on July 23,
Reuters reported that Iran was to receive "an advanced
Russian-made anti-aircraft system by year-end that could
help fend off any preemptive strikes against its nuclear
facilities," according to "senior Israeli defence
sources.

Russia is actively opposing the war party's moves
to target Iran as well as the Russian Federation itself. At
the same time, Moscow is urging Iran to come to an agreement
with the 5+1, and is offering substantial economic and
political support in the process. Unless something
horrendous occurs in the meantime, it can be expected that
Iran will announce agreement with the freeze-for-freeze
proposal made in Geneva, within the two-week timeframe
established. Prof. Hadian-Jazy, a political scientist from
the University of Tehran, who publicly detailed Iran's terms
for such a freeze option at a Berlin conference recently,
told this author on July 23, that he also thought Tehran
would announce agreement after two weeks.

Those who
complain that the Iranians could have said as much in
Geneva, without all the fancy footwork, demonstrate their
utter lack of understanding of how people in the Islamic
Republic think. It has taken almost 30 years for certain
forces in the West (eg. current officials in the Bush-Cheney
administration) to come to terms with the new reality in the
region. Iran's current leaders have not been making
outrageous demands. They have insisted only that they be
treated as equals in any negotiating process, that they be
respected for their civilization stretching back millenia,
that their sovereignty, territorial integrity and
independence be acknowledged in fact as well as words. Now
that this reality seems to have penetrated some of the less
hardened blockheads in Washington, the Iranians may be ready
to do business. All to the benefit of world peace.

1. The
White House statement is eloquent in its ambiguity:
"improving conditions {should} allow for" this and that, but
may in fact not; a "general time horizon" is somewhere
between now and eternity; "aspirational goals" are
presumably things the Iraqi government hopes for, but who
knows whether they will ever come true; "aspirational goals
-- such as the resumption of Iraqi security control....":
"such as" means, "for example," but is not binding; "the
further reduction of U.S. combat forces from Iraq" is a far
cry from withdrawal of all troops, which is what the Iraqis
want. In short, the text commits the U.S. to nothing. The
Iraqis will, therefore, not accept this as a
solution.

*************

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Globalization.

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