THIS MATTER came on for hearing
on December 14, 2001, upon the Petition of Robert Arthur Blount ("Blount" or
"Petitioner") seeking reinstatement of his license and privilege to practice
law in the Commonwealth of Virginia, filed with the Supreme Court of Virginia
on October 6, 2000, and referred by the Court to the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary
Board (the "Board") by letter dated November 28, 2000, for a recommendation.
A hearing was held in Courtroom A of the State Corporation Commission before
a duly convened panel of the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board consisting
of Donna A. DeCorleto (Lay Member), Peter A. Dingman, Roscoe B. Stephenson,
III, Theophlise L. Twitty and William M. Moffet (Chair, presiding).

BLOUNT appeared in person and represented
himself. The Virginia State Bar appeared by its counsel, Barbara Ann Williams.
The proceedings were transcribed by Tracy J. Stroh of Chandler & Halasz,
registered professional reporters. Their address is P. O. Box 9349, Richmond,
VA 23227.

PROCEDURAL FRAMEWORK

This matter came before the Board,
pursuant to Part 6, Section IV, Paragraph 13, Subsection C(4)(g) and Subsection
J, as a petition for reinstatement referred to the Board by the Court. Further,
by letter dated September 17, 2001, the Supreme Court of Virginia advised the
parties that Petitioner would not be required to comply with provisions of Paragraph
13, Subsection J(1) (which would normally require that Petitioner complete certain
continuing legal education requirements and take and obtain a certain score
on the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination prior to the Board
making a recommendation)or K(10) (which would normally require that he post
a bond of $3,500.00 with his petition), prior to a hearing before the Board.

Blount surrendered his license to
practice law on September 10, 1996, by letter addressed to the Clerk of the
Disciplinary System, and his name was stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of
this Commonwealth by order entered September 11, 1996. His resignation was pursuant
to an agreed disposition in each of two disciplinary matters (In the Matter
of Robert A. Blount, VSB Docket No. 95-010-0082; In the Matter of Robert A.
Blount, VSB Docket No. 95-010-2100). At the hearing of these two complaints,
Petitioner agreed to accept a private reprimand in each case and to surrender
his license to practice law after the orders of reprimand were entered so that
at the time he surrendered his license charges would not be pending against
him.

In this procedural setting, the
Board is required to make a recommendation to the Court as to whether Petitioner
has demonstrated "by clear and convincing evidence that he [...] is a person
of honest demeanor and good moral character and possesses the requisite fitness
to practice law". In doing so, the Board gives consideration to as many of the
"Ten Factors" first enunciated In the Matter of Alfred L. Hiss, VSB Docket
No. 83-26 (1984), as are applicable to this situation. The Board finds that
this case is distinguishable from one in which an attorney is suspended from
practice based upon a finding of disability. Petitioner did not raise his medical
condition or disability as a defense or mitigating factor in the two cases which
resulted in private reprimands being imposed immediately prior to his surrender.

At the inception of the hearing,
the Chair required each of the members of the panel, including the Chair, to
state for the record whether any of them were conscious of any personal or financial
interest which would present a conflict of interest in hearing this matter.
Each of the panel members (including the Chair) answered in the negative. Then,
the Chair advised Petitioner and the Bar how the hearing would proceed. Specifically,
they were advised that pursuant to Paragraph 13, Subsection J(1), Petitioner
had the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that he is a person
of honest demeanor and good moral character and that he possesses the requisite
fitness to practice law. Then, both sides were afforded an opportunity to raise
any questions or objections they might have about the procedure as outlined
by the Chair. Neither side had any questions about or objections to the said
procedure.

THE PROCEEDINGS

The parties thereafter presented
their witnesses, their exhibits and their arguments. In his opening statement,
Petitioner asserted that he had surrendered his license because he was, in 1984,
diagnosed as suffering from multiple sclerosis, a disease which he then believed
to be progressive and incurable. As his symptoms worsened in the early 1990's,
he said he began to limit his practice and to pursue the option of a career
in education. He voluntarily resigned in 1996, he asserted, in order to pursue
a career as a teacher, something he had always wished to do. Having found that
career less satisfying than he had hoped, and with his condition substantially
stabilized by a medicine he began taking in 1995, Petitioner stated that he
now desires to return to the practice of law.

Petitioner presented the testimony
of Harry New, a semi-retired real estate agent who has known Petitioner for
15 to 25 years in part through their activities on behalf of the Gideon Society
and in part through having employed Blount as an attorney in several real estate
matters prior to Petitioner's resignation from the Bar. Mr. New testified that
he had observed Petitioner to be capable and ethically sound. Petitioner also
called Rev. Samuel E. Hyde who had known Petitioner since the early 1970's and
was familiar with Blount through Blount's representation both of Rev. Hyde and
various religious organizations. Rev. Hyde testified that were Petitioner to
be reinstated as an attorney Rev. Hyde would have no difficulty in employing
him on his own legal matters as he had observed Petitioner's conduct prior to
resignation and had subsequently observed his conduct in teaching constitutional
law and church law to a seminary class and thought him to be able and capable.
Rev. Hyde stated specifically that he has not observed any behavior which he
thought demonstrated cognitive impairment by Petitioner.

Petitioner also testified, asserting
that, as a result of medications he first began taking in the mid-1990's, his
condition has substantially stabilized and he believes he is now capable of
practicing law. He stated that, if reinstated, he would manage his practice
to compensate for the effect of the symptoms of his illness. He would limit
his practice to areas and circumstances less likely to impose stress upon him,
a factor which appeared to aggravate the symptoms of his illness. Petitioner
advised the Board that prior to his surrender of his license, the stress of
two jury trials in one week had caused an exacerbation of his symptoms, rendering
him temporarily blind in one eye and requiring him to be hospitalized. If reinstated,
he said he would seek employment in jobs he believed would involve relatively
low stress, identifying an Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney position as one
such job. In addition, he would limit his practice to an area such as criminal
law which he regarded as less stressful than other areas of the law. Admitting
that he had occasionally had difficulties both as an attorney and in his education
career as a result of an inability to remember names, Petitioner stated that
this problem could be overcome by annotating files with the names of the client
and any witnesses. On cross examination and upon questioning from the panel,
Blount had difficulty, at first, recalling the circumstances of a traffic accident
leading to a suspension of his driver's license, but subsequently explained
it as a minor accident. He also testified that the plea agreement reached during
the 1996 disciplinary hearings was entered into by his attorney without his
knowledge or consent, yet the transcript of the hearing indicates that the specific
terms of the agreement were set out on the record and the Petitioner indicated
on the record that he understood each term of the agreement and agreed to each
term.

The Bar, arguing that Petitioner
remained unfit to practice due to the continuing symptoms of his illness, called
among its witnesses Phyllis Booth, William Roger Hammond and Robert Earl Griffin,
administrators of schools at which Blount has taught since 1995. These witnesses
testified that Blount was not effective as a teacher, at least in part because
of an inability to interact well with students. The witnesses stated that Petitioner
had difficulty maintaining discipline because he could not remember student
names. They stated that he failed to organize adequately, he lost students'
homework assignments and he improperly supervised field trips. They also stated
that he adopted what they considered an unacceptable teaching style and refused
to change when instructed to do so. The Bar called Robert Haddad, a Virginia
Beach attorney who represented one of Blount's former clients in a malpractice
action against Blount stemming from a consumer fraud case pursued by Robert
A. Blount and Associates (Petitioner's firm) during the years 1988 to 1992.
Mr. Haddad testified that, in his opinion, Blount never understood the proper
steps to perfect the client's claim for punitive damages. The malpractice action
was settled with a recovery for the client.

The Bar also called Robert P. Hart,
Ph.D., a clinical psychologist who examined Blount at the Bar's request. Dr.
Hart reported that Petitioner was average to slightly above average in certain
cognitive functions and was average to slightly below average in others, when
compared to all adult males of similar age. Dr. Hart expressed concerns about
Petitioner's adaptive functioning and both observed and reported tendencies
toward denial of the symptoms of his illness and/or under-reporting of such
symptoms. Dr. Hart felt that stress was likely to exacerbate Petitioner's symptoms
and that Petitioner might not have sufficient judgment regarding his illness
to recognize circumstances in which his symptoms might be interfering with his
ability to practice law.

With the agreement of Petitioner,
the Bar and Mrs. Blount, the Petitioner's wife was called as a witness. Mrs.
Blount candidly advised the Board that based upon her observations of her husband
she believes that he does have cognitive deficits, impaired judgment, difficulties
with decision-making and a definite tendency to deny the significance and effect
of his M. S. symptoms on his judgment and thinking. It is her opinion that these
factors impacted Petitioner's ability to practice law prior to his resignation
and would do so again were he reinstated. She noted that Petitioner had made
factual errors in his testimony, incorrectly stating the ages of all three of
his children and the name of the particular school one of his children was attending.

The Board also reviewed 35 exhibits
submitted by the Bar and five exhibits submitted by Petitioner.

RECOMMENDATION

Having considered all of the foregoing,
the Board recommends that the Supreme Court of Virginia deny the Petition. The
Board finds that Petitioner has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that he is a person of honest demeanor and good moral character and possesses
the requisite fitness to practice law, the standard articulated in Paragraph
13, Subsection J(1). The Board considered the Hiss factors, to the extent they
are applicable to this situation. The Hiss factors the Board found to be applicable
and our findings with regard to those factors are set out below:

1. The Petitioner's activities
since disbarment, including, but not limited to, his conduct and attitude during
that period of time. The testimony of Mr. New suggested that Blount
has continued his work with the Gideon Society since his resignation. Rev. Hyde
also indicated that Petitioner has continued to perform valuable services on
behalf of religious organizations. The Bar presented evidence through witnesses
and exhibits indicating that Petitioner's work experience since resignation
had been less than satisfactory; however, there was no evidence that this less
than satisfactory work performance was the result of dishonesty or intentional
misconduct. The Board felt that his poor job performance was a reflection of,
among other things, his cognitive impairment from M. S.

2 The Petitioner's present
reputation and standing in the community. Petitioner did not present
any evidence regarding his general reputation in the community at this time;
however, several of the witnesses did testify that he was a person of honest
demeanor and good moral character.

3. The Petitioner's familiarity
with the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct and his current proficiency
in the law. Petitioner testified that in teaching constitutional
and church law to seminary students and in teaching criminal law to sailors,
through a college extension program, he had remained familiar with developments
in the law. In responding to questions from the panel, Petitioner indicated
he was not familiar with the Rules of Professional Conduct which became effective
January 1, 2000. Thus, the Board does not believe Petitioner established by
clear and convincing evidence that he is familiar with the Rules of Professional
Conduct, nor does it believe that he established by clear and convincing evidence
that he is currently proficient in the law other than possibly in a few limited
areas. However, in light of the Virginia Supreme Court's September 17, 2001
letter to the Board stating that Petitioner did not need to comply with the
CLE requirements or take and pass the Multistate Professional Responsibility
Examination prior to his hearing before the Board, his failure demonstrate his
familiarity with the Rules of Professional Conduct and his failure to demonstrate
his current proficiency in the law were not factors in our decision. Stated
another way, our decision to recommend against reinstatement was made independent
of his failure to prove that he had met this criteria.

4. The Petitioner's sincerity,
frankness and truthfulness in presenting and discussing factors relating to
his disbarment and reinstatement. There were inconsistencies between
Petitioner's testimony about the disciplinary proceedings and the transcript
of that proceedings. There were other aspects of his testimony which were not
consistent with the facts as the Board found them. However, it was the feeling
of the Board that these inaccuracies were a function of the effects of the M.S.
on his memory, rather than any intentional misstatements.

5. The impact upon public
confidence in the administration of justice if the Petitioner's license to practice
law was restored. Due to the particular circumstances of this case,
the Board does not feel that the reinstatement of Petitioner's license would
have an adverse impact upon public confidence in the administration of justice,
if it was established that Petitioner has the requisite fitness to practice
law. However, if he does not, it very well might. Thus, the threshold issue
is, has the Petitioner proven by clear and convincing evidence that he has the
requisite fitness to practice law. In this case, the issue becomes whether he
has suffered cognitive impairment from the effects of M.S. and, if so, whether
that cognitive impairment has impaired him to the extent that he lacks the requisite
fitness to practice law. The Board had hoped that the evidence and the neuropsychological
test results would support a finding that there was no such impairment. Unfortunately,
the Board finds that the Petitioner has not proven by clear and convincing evidence
that he has the requisite fitness to practice law. Rather, the evidence supports
the unfortunate finding that the cognitive impairment the Petitioner suffers
from as a result of M.S. has rendered him lacking the requisite fitness to practice
law. Thus, the Board is compelled to recommend that the Supreme Court of Virginia
deny Petitioner's petition.

As required by Paragraph 13K(10),
the Board finds the cost of the proceeding to be as follows:

Copying $ 207.35

Transcript 1,121.85

Mailing of Notice of Hearing 12.05

Administrative Fee 750.00

Witness Fees(including expert fee)
5,393.75

Total $ 7,485.00

In consideration whereof, it is
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Disciplinary System forward this Order of Recommendation
and the record to the Virginia Supreme Court for its consideration and disposition.
It is further ORDERED that the Clerk of the Disciplinary System forward an attested
copy of this Recommendation Order by certified mail, return receipt requested,
to the Petitioner at his address of record with the Virginia State Bar, 23 Cherbourg
Drive, Newport News 23606, and to Barbara Ann Williams, Bar Counsel, Virginia
State Bar, 707 East Main, Suite 1500, Richmond, Virginia 23219.