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Tuesday, April 5, 2016

Coming Out, Tentatively: Syrian Alawites

Residents
walk past posters of slain Syrian soldiers and a poster of Syrian President
Bashar Assad in the city of Tartous. The pictures on the wall are death notices concerning Alawite officers killed fighting the rebels.

A recent headline proclaimed “Syria's Alawites distance themselves from Assad.” The story
refers to a document, reportedly authored by a number of Alawite clergymen,
that seeks to both clarify and redefine the Alawite faith to make it more
suitable for the modern era, while disassociating the Alawite community from
“the ruling political power” in the country. The Alawites constitute a small
and unique Islamic sect, and members of the sect have taken control of
governance in Syria following the April 17, 1970 coup d’état led by Hafiz
Al-Assad, father of the current president Bashar Al-Assad. The sect’s
well-established relationship to the Assad family makes Article 26 of the
document, widely understood to refer to the Assad regime, quite remarkable:

Article (26):
The ruling political power, whoever embodies it, does not represent us nor does
it shape our identity or preserves our safety and reputation. Nor do we, the
Alawites, substantiate it or generate its power. The legitimacy of a regime can
only be considered according to the criteria of democracy and fundamental
rights.

This move, which has drawn plenty
of international media attention, may prove significant on the long run.
However, it is unlikely to make a difference in ending the 5-year long Syrian
conflict or in sealing the fate of Mr. Bashar Al-Assad.

Indeed, though the Arabic
original uses Alawite terms and modes of discourse, the document would appear
too elitist and modern to be the product of the traditional Alawite clergy
system. It would seem to be more aspirational in character
than a reflection of any emerging consensus within the community, or even a
major segment within the community. Indeed, the document itself suggests that
it is largely meant to “liberate” the Alawite community from certain aspects of
its history, as well as its connection to the particular “political power” that
emerged from within its ranks. The very title of the document is quite
suggestive: “Declaration of an Identity Reform.”

The language of the document and
its “certified” English translation seems to suggest that it was authored by a
group of educated persons, likely a group that includes expatriates and members
of the academia exposed to scholarly writing on the history and doctrine of the
Alawite community as well as Syria’s modern history. Alternatively, the document
could have been first authored by a group of educated Alawite expatriates,
working in tandem with academic advisers, before being presented for approval
by a certain group of traditional clergymen.

Considering the British
pronunciation in the certified English version, it is even possible that the
document was composed as part of an exercise supported by an organization such
as Chatham House with funding from the British government. Chatham House has
done similar things before.

But whatever its origins, the
document does seem to represent a schism within the Alawite community,
representing only a small group of educated elites with relatives and contacts
in the West, rather than a large or sizeable movement or trend. Indeed, it is
likely that, for now, only the authors themselves and close circles of family
and friends actually support the statements in the document. As such, it is
probably unlikely that this move will have a major impact on current
developments in the country, especially in regard to the ongoing civil and
proxy war. That said, it could have a more perceptible impact in the
negotiations that follow the end of the civil war and Assad rule.

Importantly, while it is laudable
to reject privileged or protected status and to call for democracy, equality
and secularism, the document fails to mention the Alawites’ role in the
security-military complex. This notable omission suggests that the authors may
support maintaining their status in the current structure, as a mode to
securing and protecting their interests. At this stage, considering the facts
on the ground, these interests are synonymous with territorial holdings and
acquisitions. In other words, the soft partition that the country is currently
witnessing seems to be the way forward, irrespective of what the authors of
this document intend or want.

It should also be noted that the
ability of the Alawites to control and manipulate the security-military complex
has long been a source of tension in the country. Mr. Assad and his henchmen
would not have been able to wage their war against the prodemocracy protesters,
the rebels and their communities without the support of the security-military
complex and its Alawite officers and recruits, not to mention the backing of
the Alawite militias.

The close relationship between
the Alawite community and the security-military complex is a hallmark of modern
Alawite identity. It is not an exaggeration to claim that every Alawite
family is involved in it somehow. If there is going to be a serious conversation
between Alawites and other communities in Syria about their future dynamics and
the future of the country, the Alawite security relationship cannot be ignored.

Alawites
crawling around the grave of Hüseyin Gaz, Turkey. Syrian Alawites are known to have
similar rituals. Such rituals are decried as un-Islamic by most Sunni and Shia
groups.

Still, if this document acquires
broader support within the community, it will mark an important step towards
the establishing of a modern and modernist Alawite identity. This is the first
time in the modern era that Syria’s Alawites sought to differentiate themselves
from other Muslim groups, especially the Shia, and it’s the first time that they
openly tackled some of aspects of their faith long considered controversial by
Sunnis and Shia groups alike.

Article (1):
Alawism, or the Alawite belief, represent a third model of and within Islam.
We, the Alawites, form a separate confession, which is neither textual nor
rational as in the models represented by our Sunni or Shiite brothers. The
character of Alawism, henceforth, may be qualified as Islam's transcendent (or
transcendental) form.

But here too, the document
appears to be aspirational rather than reflecting consensus. By rejecting the
specific Alawite mazloumiya—the sense of grievance and injustice
that Alawites holds against the Sunni majority—the document reflects the
complex history of internecine relations more accurately, but it also goes
against an established consensus within the community. That position is
unlikely to gain popularity soon, and will likely be deemed as an unnecessary
concession if not capitulation.

Article (13):
This declaration relinquishes the definition of Alawites as a persecuted and
oppressed group. Alawites are henceforth defined as am people which had been
inspired by their faith and by their community to resist a dual religious and
political power waged against them during a specific historical period of time.

Rejecting the existence of other
holy books in Alawite tradition endorsing only the Qur’an seems to represent
another stand that will prove hard to accept for most traditional Alawite
clergymen.

Article (33):
The Quran alone is our holy book and a clear reference to our Muslim quality.

On the other hand, the document
rejects the “minority label,” which has often been deployed in a dismissive
manner. While this rejection seems to represent the position of many Alawite
intellectuals, within the context of current Syrian politics, it is in fact
apolitical and counterproductive. Not seeking a privileged status is one thing,
but failing to seek special protections in a society where sectarianism has
been and is bound to be relevant for many decades to come is quite
another.

Article (5):
In this new of era of the Alawites, we from now on repudiate to be labelled or
defined as a minority in Syria. We divest ourselves from the minority status,
with all the hardship but, in equal measure, with all the benefits and privileges
that could be associated with this status. Morally, politically and culturally,
one shall no longer use the term "minority" to define who the
Alawites are and who they are not.

This is where the special
relationship between Alawites and the security-military complex again comes
into play. Are the authors of this document relying on the continuation of this
relationship as a form of protection? If so, and considering the country’s
current state of fragmentation, this would represent—in practice, even if the
words seek to deny it—an endorsement of the soft partition of the country.

Go ahead, patronize me!

About Ammar

Ammar Abdulhamid is a Syrian-American author and pro-democracy activist based in Silver Spring, Maryland. He is the founder of the Tharwa Foundation, a nonprofit dedicated to democracy promotion. His personal website and entries from his older blogs can be accessed here.

The Delirica

The Delirica is a companion blog to the Daily Digest of Global Delirium meant to highlight certain DDGD items by publishing them as separate posts. Also, the Delirica republishes articles by Ammar that appeared on other sites since 2016. Older articles can be found on Ammar's internet archive: Ammar.World