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Demetrio Muñoz

Capturing value increase
in urban redevelopment
a study of how the economic value increase in urban redevelopment can
be used to finance the necessary public infrastructure and other facilities

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Capturing value increase
in urban redevelopment
A study of how the economic value increase in urban redevelopment
can be used to ﬁnance the necessary public infrastructure
and other facilities

Capturing value increase
in urban redevelopment
A study of how the economic value increase in urban redevelopment
can be used to ﬁnance the necessary public infrastructure
and other facilities

An Academic essay in Management Sciences

Doctoral Thesis
to obtain the degree of doctor
from Radboud University Nijmegen
on the authority of the Rector Magniﬁcus prof. dr. S.C.J.J. Kortmann,
according to the decision of the council of deans
to be defended in public on Monday November 22, 2010
at 13.30 hours
by
Demetrio Muñoz Gielen
Born on May 20, 1970
in Málaga (Spain)

A word of thanks is given here to the OTB Research Institute for the Built Environment (Delft University of Technology), which invested much in making possible this
Doctoral Thesis. Also, thanks are due for ﬁnancial assistance given by the Dutch
government (Habiforum Program Innovative Land Use), and by the Delft Centre for
Sustainable Urban Areas (Delft University of Technology).

There are not enough words to thank to those that helped me to give birth to this research. This book is dedicated to my family, to all those that wisely advised me, and to
those that had the patience to listen. It is dedicated also to Felipe Fernández Córdoba,
Joost Zonneveld, Carles Gascó and Miles Roston for having me helped to ‘make’ this book.
I thank Javier García-Bellido († 2006) for all his inspiration and friendship.

Chapter 1: Introduction: problems in the ﬁnancing of public goals in urban
regeneration in the Netherlands .............................................................1
1.1 Recent history in Dutch land & housing policies: towards more
private involvement ................................................................................ 2
1.2 Problems with ﬁnancing public goals in urban regeneration ................... 5
1.3 Could legally binding land use rules help to improve the ﬁnancing
of public goals? ...................................................................................... 6
1.4 Legitimacy of capturing value increase ................................................... 7
1.5 Formulation of the problem .................................................................... 9
1.6 Research Questions .............................................................................. 11
1.7 The structure of this report .................................................................... 12
1.8 The practical value of this research ....................................................... 13
Chapter 2: Theoretical framework: capturing value increase within policy
networks ...............................................................................................15
2.1 Power and the role of public bodies in policy networks ........................ 16
2.1.1
The Policy network approach to power relationships .............. 17
2.1.2
How to intervene in policy networks: Network management .. 23
2.2 The formal rules governing property rights in land ................................ 24
2.2.1
Restrictions on the exercise of property rights in land ............. 24
2.2.2
The nationalization of development rights in England
and Wales............................................................................... 26
2.2.3
The Netherlands: the debate about splitting development
rights from land ownership ..................................................... 27
2.2.4
The separation of infrastructure provision from property
rights in the Spanish region of Valencia ................................... 30

Introduction: problems in
the ﬁnancing of public goals in
urban regeneration in
the Netherlands

This research project is motivated by the experience nowadays with the regeneration
of urban areas in many Dutch cities. On the one hand, regeneration can and often
does create a signiﬁcant value increase on some of the plots of land: on a particular plot, a new function comes which gives a much higher value to the land, and
although signiﬁcant costs might have to be made on that plot to realize that new
function, there is nevertheless a net value increase. This is the case for example when
developing free market housing or ofﬁce space. On the other hand, there are other
plots of land on which money has to be spent and which either give no returns or
which give a return less than the expenditure: e.g. historic buildings might be renovated and integrated into the new buildings, inhabitants and ﬁrms might be compensated because they must move, some plots might have to keep a public function,
there might be need for new roads and public space, drainage, public buildings and
social housing, etc. In short, urban regeneration involves not only proﬁtable parts
but also unproﬁtable parts that are in the public interest either directly (like parks) or
indirectly because they are necessary for the proﬁtable parts (like sewerage). From
now on, all these unproﬁtable parts, including all possible compensations, are called
‘public infrastructure and facilities’.
When land is in public ownership, the public owner can choose to use the net value
increase to cover (some of) the net costs of public infrastructure and facilities. When
the land is not in public hands, public bodies can nevertheless sometimes require
developers who own the land and beneﬁt from the value increase to pay for the public infrastructure and facilities. Developers might be willing to contribute. However,
there is often disagreement about the size and scope of their contribution. For example, often developers are willing to contribute only to local physical infrastructure
situated within the development site, but not to other necessary compensations or
infrastructure, such as off-site facilities (like access roads to the site, or public build-

2

Introduction

ings located somewhere else). A major problem comes when some developers, the
‘free riders’, are not willing to contribute at all.
In order to understand this situation better, it is necessary to look ﬁrst at the recent
changes in Dutch land and housing policy.

1.1

Recent history in Dutch land & housing policies:
towards more private involvement

The way urban regeneration is organized has changed in the last decennia more or
less parallel to changes in urban development in general. Since the Second World
War, and more or less until the 1980s, Dutch municipalities applied on a huge scale
what was called an ‘active land policy’ (Greef, 1997: 9-17). An active land policy
consists of buying that land that becomes zoned for development, providing the
infrastructure, selling the serviced parcels and bearing the corresponding risks and
eventual proﬁts (Groetelaers, 2004: 20-23). This was applied to development for industrial areas, ofﬁces, and housing. For about four decennia, Dutch municipalities
were the main parties in the market for urban land, which gave them a predominant
position in urban development. This active public intervention was institutionalized
through public land development companies, and almost all municipalities had one.
Table 1 shows the extent to which municipalities were the predominant suppliers of
serviced building plots, in this case for residential use. Housing associations and municipal housing companies bought many of these plots and developed social housing on them. Commercial developers also played an important role, not only buying
some of the plots to build free market housing, but also to build some social housing,
mostly owner-occupied. The central government played an important role by subsidizing and assuming the ﬁnancial risks of both the active land policy of the municipalities and the building of social housing (Korthals Altes, 2007).
Table 1. Serviced building parcels sold for residential use, both in green ﬁeld and urban
regeneration schemes.
Residential parcels sold
by Municipalities (m²)

When regeneration became an important policy goal in the 1970s, this too was carried out in the same way, although with some delay. Municipalities became active
not only on green ﬁeld sites, but also in the existing city, buying, expropriating and
redeveloping large deteriorated urban areas (Verhage & Sluis, 2003: 7-8). This led
to a public predominance in urban regeneration instead of the previously common
public-private partnership formulae (Kreukels & Spit, 1990: 388-389). Especially in
large cities, municipalities bought much property, often deteriorated housing, and
renovated it. For example, the Municipality of Rotterdam bought from 1974 to the
middle of 1984 about 40,000 dwellings, drastically changing the property situation
in certain neighborhoods from predominantly private to predominantly public ownership (Rotterdam, 1985: 18, 26).
At the end of the 1980s this way of working changed, both for greenﬁeld development
and for urban regeneration. Various changes coincided at that time. First, the economic
recession in the 1980s led to an important rise in public expenditures on housing. This
rise led to the need for budgetary cuts. Central government subsidies for public land
development were reduced and those for the development of social housing abolished
(Van der Schaar & Hereijgers, 1991: 183-189; Verhage & Sluis, 2003: 9; Priemus &
Louw, 2003: 371-372; Groetelaers, 2004: 29, 32; Muñoz & Hoekstra, 2008: 202-203).
Second, important changes in housing policy took place at that time, when the central
government introduced in 1989 the housing policy called Volkshuisvesting in de jaren
’90 [Housing policy in the 1990s]. Moving from a policy very much oriented to the
building of social housing, the new housing policy gave market parties a more prominent role in house building. This translated into a diminishing share of social housing
and a rise of free market housing in new urban development. In 1993 housing associations became ﬁnancially autonomous from the central government, consolidating a
more general policy that was meant to situate public bodies in a new role of ‘director
at a distance’. Figure 1 illustrates the changes in house building by showing that since
the 1980s social rented housing has diminished signiﬁcantly its share in new building.

Figure 1. New dwellings for free market for sell and for rent, and for social rented.

4

Introduction

As a consequence of these changes, the role of municipalities and market parties
in urban development changed signiﬁcantly. Municipalities changed the way they
operate on the land market, and now they seek to share the risks with market parties
in public-private partnerships. Also, many municipalities now play a more passive
role, which is called a ‘facilitating’ land policy and which relies mainly on public law
instruments such as the land use plan and building permits1. Most of the municipal
land development companies have disappeared. Market parties, on the other hand,
have increasingly taken over the former role of municipalities on the land market.
Since the rise of free market housing and the increase in housing prices in the 1990s,
the proﬁtability of urban development has increased signiﬁcantly. The increased profit margins, together with the strong position that the control of land gives in the development of a site, have attracted commercial developers to buy land (Groetelaers,
2004: 31-32; Priemus & Louw, 2003: 372). The introduction of the Fourth Memorandum on Spatial Planning Extra (Vinex) at the beginning of the 1990s roughly indicated
the locations for major urban extension. This created the expectation of development
on many greenﬁeld locations, which stimulated developers to buy land there. In
addition, public bodies stopped attempting to buy all the land and made the way
open for developers to do so. Not only commercial developers became interested in
land, the same could be said of housing associations. Corporations traditionally own
much land in urban regeneration sites, especially in social housing districts, but they
became also interested in acquiring land on green-ﬁeld sites (Needham & De Kam,
2004: 2069-2070). Some describe the transition as a shift from a public monopoly
on the land market towards private monopolies (Priemus & Louw, 2003: 369-370).
Municipalities still play an important role in urban development, and there are many
examples of them applying an ‘active’ land policy. What is the situation with urban
regeneration? Probably, active land policy is nowadays more common on greenﬁeld
sites than in urban regeneration, because in the latter land is more expensive and
more difﬁcult to buy. As a consequence, municipalities are less keen to buy land on
regeneration sites than on greenﬁeld sites (Buitelaar et al., 2008: 82, 100), although
there are still many examples of municipalities buying land on regeneration sites.
In any case, active intervention both on greenﬁeld and on regeneration sites has
changed in nature, as municipalities seek private parties with whom to share the
risks. There is an increasing number of municipalities seeking new formulae in which
private parties assume the ﬁnancial risks and the responsibility for the implementation. As municipalities lose the powers they had as landowners, or at least must
share their power with the developers that also control part of the land, they are
increasingly relying on public law instruments such as land use plans and building
1

There is a distinction in European continental law systems between ‘public law’ or ‘administrative
law’ and ‘private law’ or ‘civil law’. The ﬁrst ones regulate the actions of public bodies by which
they impose their actions on others, e.g. expropriation law and planning legislation. Private law
rules regulate obligations between equal actors, no matter whether they are public or private, e.g.
the Civil Code, that sets the rules by which disputes between the actors will be resolved (Verhage,
2002: 160-161; Needham, 2006: 24-25).

Introduction

5

permits, although they often combine these with private law agreements with these
developers. In this way, municipalities are not intervening directly in the urban land
markets, as they did until the 1980s. That is, they are not anymore buying all the land,
providing the infrastructure and assuming all corresponding risks (Korthals Altes &
Groetelaers, 2000). Increasingly, it is the market parties that buy the land, or most of
it, and develop the site.

1.2

Problems with ﬁnancing public goals in urban
regeneration

Dutch municipalities have had high ambitions for their public regeneration schemes,
and it was often possible to realize those when they owned most of the land and had
the ﬁnancial support of the central government. That is now different. If municipalities
want to maintain their ambitions, they experience nowadays several problems. These
concern a wide range of aspects: property rights, economic interests of users and
owners, the expert knowledge available to municipalities, procedures, the cooperation among municipalities, commercial developers and housing associations, lack of
a clear legal framework for negotiations, etc (Kolpron, 2000: 31-53; Verhage & Sluis,
2003: 11; Verhage & Needham, 2003: 20-21; Louw, 2008: 69-71; Van der Putten
et al., 2004; Vrom et al., 2008: 19). Among those problems, the ﬁnancing of public
infrastructure and facilities, i.e. of the unproﬁtable parts, is an important obstacle to
good urban regeneration: this was emphasized in a recent report of an advisory council of the central government (Vrom-raad, 2009: 5). Because of the transition from
the traditional public dominancy in land development to more private involvement,
the ﬁnancing of public infrastructure and facilities has changed. When municipalities own the land and provide the infrastructure, public goals can be paid out of the
proﬁts from selling the plots, possibly complemented with public subsidies. However,
when land is in private hands, municipalities have to work out other ways of ﬁnancing, if they do not want to rely (or want to rely as little as possible) on public subsidies.
The practice shows that it is difﬁcult, in urban regeneration, to agree with landowners/developers the contributions, whether in money or in kind, that they should pay.
As a consequence, a common situation in urban regeneration on privately owned land
is that agreements between municipalities and the landowners are achieved only with
great difﬁculty. Long negotiations hamper development processes, so that targets for
the regeneration of deteriorated Dutch neighborhoods have had to be lowered (Verhage & Sluis, 2003: 11). Another consequence is that public bodies, through subsidizing and/or direct realization, must pay an important share of the unproﬁtable parts.
For an overview of the involvement of Dutch public bodies in the ﬁnancing of public
infrastructure and facilities in urban regeneration, see chapter 7.5. In short, Dutch
public bodies are increasingly confronted with the need for large public subsidies.

6

Introduction

On greenﬁeld sites also the ﬁnancial problems were increasing (Neprom, 2007;
Buitelaar et al., 2008: 18-19; ABF-research, 2008; Rigo, 2008; Vrom-raad, 2008:
11-13). This situation has led to an important legislative modiﬁcation. In 2008, a
chapter dedicated to land development (from now on: Land Development Act) was
introduced into the new Physical Planning Act with the goal of improving both the
public steering of development processes and the ﬁnancing of public infrastructure
and facilities (Vrom et al., 2008: 20). This research studies how this recent legislative
modiﬁcation could be used to improve the situation.

1.3

Could legally binding land use rules help to
improve the ﬁnancing of public goals?

The Dutch Land use Plan (bestemmingsplan), together with the departure from it
(projectbesluit, former vrijstelling ex art. 19.1 WRO) and the Development contributions Plan (Exploitatieplan) introduced in 2008 make it possible to impose a set of
legally binding rules that regulate the use of land and real estate (from now on: binding rules). The owner or user of land is bound to use his land or property in the way
prescribed by the binding rules (unless there are transitional provisions when new
rules come into force). Binding rules delimit development rights or user rights, fulﬁlling a regulatory function. At the same time, binding rules allocate and guarantee
certain rights to the property owner.
In the Netherlands, urban regeneration often involves building something new or
refurbishing something old on a wide variety of sites, e.g. central areas in cities and
towns, monofunctional residential districts, and brownﬁeld sites. This usually requires a modiﬁcation of the binding rules, whether this is for intensifying the actual
use (e.g. more building volume), changing it for another use (e.g. housing instead of
industry), maintaining the existing use (e.g. refurbishing historic buildings), or replacing the existing use with public infrastructure and vice versa (e.g. a park instead of
buildings and vice versa).
Such a modiﬁcation of the binding rules can affect the economic value of the property rights. For example, the value of land in the free market is lower when the site
can be used for industry, than if it can be used for ofﬁces. Another example, very
common in the Netherlands, is the difference in market value of land when it can
be used for social housing, than if it can be used for free market housing. The basic
idea that inspires this research, is that the increase in property values that follows
the modiﬁcation of binding rules could be used to ﬁnance all or at least part of the
unproﬁtable parts, a sort of cross-subsidizing. The necessary modiﬁcation of binding rules could be used in an operational way to achieve this. In short, this research
focuses on how binding rules could be used in a strategic way to improve the ﬁnanc-

Introduction

7

ing of public infrastructure and facilities in Dutch urban regeneration on privately
owned land.
In addition to binding rules under public planning law, we have to consider several
formal rules that rule property rights in land. Furthermore, during data gathering it
became clear that also not-legally binding zoning plans and other policy documents
interact closely with binding rules and are also very relevant for capturing value increase. So this research considers all those formal rules that rule both binding rules
(included the implications for property rights in land) and not-legally binding policy
documents. We call all those formal rules ‘formal rules relevant to zoning’.

1.4

Legitimacy of capturing value increase

The concept ‘capturing value increase’ includes several similar but not identical concepts. Before analysing them, it is important to distinguish among different causes of
value increase. Value increase can be caused ﬁrst by speciﬁc investments, e.g. in infrastructure that improves the accessibility of a speciﬁc site. Secondly, value increase
can be caused by public decisions about land use planning regulations that do not
necessarily cost money, e.g. a modiﬁcation of the land use plan that allows more
lucrative building. And third, value increase can be caused, only and independently
from the ﬁrst and second causes, by the general growth of society, i.e. by the accumulation of multiple decisions and choices of a multitude of anonymous actors in
society (George, 1879: 89-94). For example the value of a house can increase very
fast just because the area becomes fashionable.
But coming back to the meaning of ‘capturing value increase’. In the literature there
are multitude of terms, often meaning similar concepts, often overlapping each other
(Alterman, 2009). Here we deﬁne three concepts that are relevant for this research:
‘cost recovery’, ‘value capturing’ and ‘creaming off plus value’. ‘Cost recovery’ refers
to the recovery, through contributions from private developers, of those costs that are
directly related to the realization of public infrastructure and facilities that beneﬁt
the development. Developers might contribute either by providing infrastructure and
facilities directly, or by paying public bodies for doing so. It is not relevant whether it
is the developer or the municipality that realizes the public infrastructure and facilities, but whether those who beneﬁt actually pay (in kind or in money) or not. ‘Value
capturing’ or ‘value capture’ is the capturing by public bodies that have invested in,
for instance, infrastructure, of the increased property values that are a result of that
investment. Although private parties also might invest in public infrastructure, this
term is generally meant for public investments. It is important to distinguish between
the costs of the public investments, and the increase in value that results from them.
For the costs might be greater, or less, than that value increase. If the costs are less
than the value increase, full cost recovery can take place, leaving some of the value

8

Introduction

increase with the private developers. If the costs are greater than the value increase,
there is no possibility of recouping all the costs. That is, ‘value capturing’ is limited
to recouping the value increase that is the result only of public investments, and this
value increase might be higher or lower than the investments. ‘Value capturing’ excludes thus the recouping of value increase caused by public decisions about land
use planning regulations or by the accumulation of decisions of all the anonymous
community members. ‘Creaming off plus value’ refers to a public body capturing
the increase in value that is a result of any of the three causes: investments in infrastructure, decisions of public bodies, or just the general increase in the demand for
land. ‘Creaming off plus value’ embraces thus the largest possible capturing and is
irrespective of any costs that might have been made (Alterman, 2009: 5-6; Krabben
& Needham, 2008: 4; Needham, 2007: 175-178; Smith & Gihring, 2006: 752; Kruijt,
Needham, Spit, 1990: 32-4; Kruijt & Needham, 1980: 112-3).
A fundamental question is who should receive the value increase that accrues from
any investment, public decision or general economic growth. This relates to the
broader discussion about the contents of the right of land ownership. There are no social systems in which landowners have an absolute freedom to use their property, as
norms and regulations limit property rights. Because norms and regulations are created by society, they reﬂect the prevailing powers and interests (Adams et al., 2001;
Louw, 2008: 71). Translated to the capturing question, two conﬂicting theses exist.
On one side is the thesis of full or conservative liberal ownership, where any value
increase, no matter who or what caused it, belongs to the landowner. An alternative
thesis, to be found also in liberal thinkers, advocates that the value increase belongs
to the community because it is the community after all that is responsible for it. There
is a distinction, based on an analysis of the historic evolution of ownership rights on
land, between the ‘use value’ and the ‘exchange value’ of land. Full/conservative liberal ownership considers that ownership includes both the right to use and the right
to beneﬁt from property (should it be exchanged), which must include the beneﬁt
from the value increase caused by any factor. This deﬁnition of land ownership rights
might be the result of the reinterpretation of the old Roman Quirinian law concept
of property rights, made by the new liberal regimes in the 18th and 19th Centuries
(cfr. García-Bellido, 1993, 1994). The alternative thesis considers that the use value
can be indeed considered as fundamental to individual and social well-being, but
that the exchange value does not (MacIntyre, 1984: 251; Christman, 1994; Krueckeberg, 1995). As Krueckeberg put it, the exchange value of land, “…has always been
subjected to reasonable constraints for the beneﬁt of the entire community and the
society” (1995: 307). These constraints might have been inspired by the concept of
the social function of property (García-Bellido, 1993, 1994; see also chapter 2.3.1).
A common topic in the neo-classical theory of economic rent is the idea of taxing the
value increase of land, which is considered as not being earned by the landowners
because it arises from the general growth of society. The value increase is considered
to be a surplus which, when removed, will not affect output or the price of the product. There is a long tradition of economists proposing such a tax for the beneﬁt of the

Introduction

9

community. Variants of this argument have been advanced by Adam Smith, David
Ricardo, J.S. Mill, Alfred Marshall, A. Pigou and, specially, Henry George (George,
1879: 89-94, 219-241; Prest, 1981: 7-21; Oxley, 2006: 103; Alterman, 2009: 4-5).
In short, there is much normative discussion about which sorts of capturing value
increase are legitimate, and this discussion has crystallized differently in the planning
system of different countries. For example these normative differences have led to different rationales behind instruments for capturing value increase. First there are those
instruments that aim for a direct or ‘pure’ value capturing through direct taxation. The
rationale of this ﬁrst group of instruments is based on the argument that landowners
do not earn the value increase, and that it is the community that deserves it. In other
words, this rationale advocates creaming off the plus value. Other instruments do not
use the ‘unearned value increase rationale’ but are based on the necessity of internalizing the negative impact of urban development, i.e. the need to compensate the
costs that the community must make in order to implement or improve the necessary
public infrastructure. This comes more in the neighbourhood of ‘cost recovery’ and
‘value capturing’. This second rationale might choose for direct taxation of the value
increase (e.g. property taxes, to be taxed periodically or at the moment of development) or for indirect instruments (e.g. land banking, land readjustment and developer
obligations, Alterman, 2009: 3-5, 8-15, 23-24).
This research studies how the use of formal rules relevant to zoning inﬂuences any
of the possible forms of capturing value increase, i.e. not only cost recovery, but also
creaming off plus value. However, when formulating recommendations for the Dutch
practice in chapter 9, the legal limits for capturing value increase in the Netherlands
have served as a departing point. In the Netherlands, cost recovery only is permitted,
excluding any additional capturing of value increase. The rationale here is the second
mentioned: the necessity of internalizing the negative impacts of urban development.
It must be said however that it is not always easy to clearly deﬁne cost recovery because it is not always clear what a negative impact is. Depending on the criteria used
to deﬁne the negative impacts of urban development, cost recovery can include a
narrow or a wide set of contributions. For the legal limits to capturing value increase
in the Netherlands see chapter 7.2, in England see chapter 6.2 and in the Spanish
region of Valencia see chapter 5.3.

1.5

Formulation of the problem

The problem to which this research wants to ﬁnd a solution is formulated as follows:
How could formal rules relevant to zoning be used in the development phase of
comprehensive urban regeneration developments on privately owned land in the
Netherlands in order that the proﬁtable parts ﬁnance the unproﬁtable parts?

10

Introduction

How could formal rules relevant to zoning be used… means that this research wants
to make recommendations for how Dutch public bodies, mainly municipalities,
could use the relevant binding rules (those that might be relevant for the purpose of
this research, which are in The Netherlands the Land use Plan, the departures from it
and the new Development contributions Plan, including its implications for property
rights in land) and other not-binding documents. The recommendations are of two
sorts: the ﬁrst ﬁts within the existing Dutch legal framework, including the new Physical Planning Act and Land Development Act. The second sort of recommendations
implies a modiﬁcation of the legal framework.
… in the development phase of comprehensive urban regeneration developments on
privately owned land in the Netherlands … means that this research looks for recommendations valid only for the development phase of comprehensive urban regeneration developments that are situated on privately owned land. The ‘development
phase’ starts from the original situation and ends at the delivery and the beginning of
the exploitation of the ﬁnal real estate products. ‘Comprehensive urban regeneration
developments’ mean physical interventions in the existing city with dimensions that
cause a notable value increase. They always involve the construction or refurbishing, not only of proﬁtable buildings but also of public infrastructure and facilities.
This deﬁnition excludes other sorts of intervention in the existing city that might also
fall under the category ‘urban regeneration’. For example, those interventions are
excluded that are only meant for the refurbishing of public infrastructure, without
involving at the same time construction or refurbishing of commercial buildings.
‘Situated on private owned land’ means that the land, all or a majority of it, is owned
by non-public bodies, e.g. commercial developers or housing associations and other
non-proﬁt developers. Those comprehensive developments in which land, all or a
majority of it, was already in public hands (i.e. any public development company),
before development started, are not included in this research.
… in order that the proﬁtable parts ﬁnance the unproﬁtable parts means that this research focuses on getting those parties that beneﬁt from development to ﬁnance (all
or at least some of) the unproﬁtable parts, i.e. the public infrastructure and facilities.
A wide range of unproﬁtable elements falls under ‘public infrastructure and facilities’: not only what Ennis (2003: 6-9) understands as ‘physical infrastructure’ (highways, footpaths, water, sewerage, electricity, parking, public transport infrastructure)
and ‘environmental infrastructure’ (landscaping, open space, street furniture, green
space). Other public facilities such as public buildings (schools, health centres, police, etc), social/affordable housing, etc. also fall under ‘public infrastructure and
facilities’. Public infrastructure and facilities can be both on-site (i.e. located within
the development site) and off-site (located outside the development site, or located
on-site but clearly serving a much wider area that the development site only). Also,
any form of compensation that might have to be paid to realize the regeneration
falls under this term. It is clear that with this problem deﬁnition, this research aims
to improve in the Netherlands only a speciﬁc form of capturing value increase: cost

Introduction

11

recovery. This research excludes thus in its ﬁnal recommendations any measure that
might be used in the Netherlands for other forms of capturing value increase that go
beyond cost recovery.

1.6

Research Questions

In order to ﬁnd an answer to the problem as formulated above, three preparatory
research questions need ﬁrst to be answered:
•

Preparatory research question 1: How can those formal rules relevant to zoning
be used in comprehensive urban regeneration developments on privately owned
land?
This question focuses on the variable ‘formal rules relevant to zoning’: how can
they be used, following planning law and in practice? Here we do not try to
make any connection with capturing value increase: that is the subject of preparatory research question 3.

•

Preparatory research question 2: What is the extent of capturing value increase
in comprehensive urban regeneration developments on privately owned land?
This question focuses on the variable ‘capturing value increase’: which public
infrastructure and facilities are paid or realized thanks to the proﬁtable parts of
the development in question? And, are the developments implemented on time,
without delay and following previously established deadlines?

•

Preparatory research question 3: How does the way in which formal rules relevant to zoning are used inﬂuences capturing value increase?
Here we link the answer to question 1 (use of formal rules relevant to zoning) with
the answer to question 2 (degree of capturing value increase). We want to know
if certain ways of using formal rules result in this or that degree of capturing value
increase. Is there a way of using the formal rules that results in market parties
paying all or at least some of the unproﬁtable parts? And to do so without delay?

The main research question uses the ﬁndings of the preparatory questions to work out
recommendations for the Dutch situation:
• How could formal rules relevant to zoning be used in the Netherlands in order
that the proﬁtable parts ﬁnance as much as possible the unproﬁtable parts?
We want to know if certain ways of using formal rules relevant to zoning could
help in the Netherlands to improve cost recovery in urban regeneration on privately owned land. This includes mechanisms for a more efﬁcient plan process
to lower development costs and to leave a larger part of the increased property
values for cost recovery. And how could Dutch public bodies do that without at
the same time delaying the implementation?

12

1.7

Introduction

The structure of this report

In this Chapter 1 I have introduced the motive, context, concepts and goals of this research. In Chapter 2 I will introduce the relevant debates and conceptual frameworks
that rule this research. They helped me ﬁrst to position the goal of this research in the
academic debate in such a way that the ﬁndings were relevant not only for the Dutch
regeneration practice but also for science. In the second place they helped me to
deﬁne and operationalize the research questions, for example, elaborating a causal
model in which I positioned all the variables and the relations between them. In sum,
chapter 2, together with chapter 3, sets out which data I will gather, where I am going
to do it and how I will analyse the ﬁndings. In Chapter 3 I needed to prescribe how
to successfully gather the data and produce valid ﬁndings. Therefore I ﬁrst explain the
general principles of how I will produce ﬁndings with the necessary degree of internal and external validity. This has led to several choices: to focus on case research,
to compare the planning systems of different countries, to a careful selection of cases
and to systematically check the generalizability of the ﬁndings. Second I operationalize the data gathering by deﬁning the independent and dependent variables, by
distinguishing different, speciﬁc, sub-variables and by prescribing which data is used
to answer which research question.
Chapters 4-7 present the gathered data. In Chapter 4 I carry out an exploratory study
of nine Western European countries: besides the Netherlands, also England, Spain/
Valencia, Germany, France, Italy, Flanders, Denmark and Sweden. The goal is to
select those countries that could provide the most interesting ﬁndings for the Netherlands. To select them I ﬁrst offer insight into de use of formal rules relevant to zoning
in these countries, second I position the Dutch rules into this international context,
and ﬁnally I select those countries that will be the subject of in-depth research. In
Chapters 5 to 7 I present the gathered data from the in-depth research in the Spanish
region of Valencia, England and the Netherlands. First I give an introduction of these
countries and their planning systems, including the value capturing legal mechanisms and their limits. Second I present the studied cases. Third I answer research
questions 1 to 3, including an evaluation of how the legal mechanisms affect the
capturing of value increase. These answers form the basis for chapters 8 and 9.
In Chapter 8 I draw conclusions for the academic debate and the theoretical framework set out in chapter 2. Here I use the answers to research questions 1 to 3 to test
the hypotheses. I use all those answers and the results of the hypothesis testing, but
incorporating also speciﬁc knowledge of the Dutch situation (legislation, political
and cultural considerations), to answer in Chapter 9 the main research question: how
could the Dutch government (central and municipal public bodies) use the formal
rules relevant to zoning to improve the capturing of value increase, but at the same
time not delaying urban regeneration.

Introduction

1.8

13

The practical value of this research

Different actors involved in urban regeneration in the Netherlands can use the ﬁndings of this research. This is, all those parties who might bear the responsibility for
redeveloping urban areas, and therefore for ﬁnding ﬁnancial sources to cover the
unproﬁtable parts. These are mainly the municipalities, but also private parties: housing associations and commercial developers, or associations of property owners with
commercial developers, which are in charge of the development.
The ﬁndings are also relevant to the introduction of the new Physical Planning Act
and Land Development Act in the Netherlands. This law (the second is actually a new
chapter included in the ﬁrst) introduced in 2008 the Development contributions plan
and modiﬁed substantially the legal framework for cost recovery. The ﬁndings include recommendations both for how this new legislation could be used to improve
the ﬁnancing of public infrastructure and facilities, and recommendations for further
legislative modiﬁcations.

In this chapter we set out the theoretical framework that we use for investigating the
practical possibilities for improving the capturing of value increase in urban regeneration projects. We do this as follows.
First we look at the role of public bodies in general, and see them as acting in policy
networks. More speciﬁcally, an urban regeneration project can be analyzed as a
policy network in which public bodies try to achieve their goals by interacting with
other parties. Second, we look at one of the most important power resources that
are deployed in the interactions in the urban regeneration policy networks, namely
property rights in land. It is in the nature of urban regeneration projects that this
power resource is always present and cannot be ignored. We investigate the power
that owning a property right in land can give, and how formal rules can affect that.
Third, we look at one aspect in particular of the formal rules which affect how people
in urban regeneration projects exercise their property rights in land. This is the degree
of certainty about future development possibilities that is created by binding rules
and other policy documents, and how this can inﬂuence the behavior of the property
owner and the developer.
Finally, we apply those three sets of insights to the speciﬁc circumstances under
which urban regeneration projects take place. This enables us to work out a causal
model of the factors (including the use of the formal rules relevant to zoning) that
affect the capturing of value increase. The chapter concludes with two hypotheses
derived from this causal model. These are about two speciﬁc changes to the formal
rules relevant to zoning which, it is hypothesized, will improve the capturing of value
increase.

16

2.1

Theoretical framework

Power and the role of public bodies in policy
networks

Capturing value increase in practice, in any of its forms (cost recovery, value capturing or creaming off plus value, see chapter 1.4) can be considered as an outcome of
the interaction, in a network, of those parties involved in the implementation of public planning policies. All of them occupy a certain position within the network, and
each of them pursues its own goals and interacts with the others in order to achieve
them. This interaction is determined by aspects such as the power they might have to
impose on, or to stimulate, others, in order to pursue their own goals. In short, in the
networks that prepare and implement planning policies, different sorts of interactions
might result in different outcomes of captured value increase. Taking into account the
goal of this research, the crucial question is how public bodies could use the formal
rules relevant to zoning to modify these interactions in order to improve the capturing
of value increase.
Literature on policy networks provides some tools to understand how the parties
involved in policy implementation (public bodies, property developers and landowners) interact with each other (Scharpf, 1978; Benson, 1982; Ostrom, 1986; Healey,
1992; Kickert et al., 1997; Klijn, 1997; Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000). The initial allocation of resources inﬂuences the position of public bodies within these networks, and
public bodies have different techniques for intervening that might help to improve
the capturing of value increase.
In the last decennia of the 20th Century, the role of public bodies changed signiﬁcantly. From a situation in which public bodies were supposed to play a dominant role in
policy making and implementation, the practice arose by which private parties began
to gain a more prominent role. In the 1960s and 1970s, the limits became clear of
what is called the Rational Central Rule Model for policy making and implementation processes, according to which the government was supposed to play a dominant
role above the rest of involved parties. At the end of the 1970s, the academic debate
about governmental steering changed in Europe and the United States (Kickert et
al., 1997: 1-8). The critics argued that, under the welfare state, where the Rational
Central Rule Model ruled the relationships of the government with the market, ‘…a
substantial number of governmental policies (…) failed to meet their original targets.
Despite the fact that large-scale policy programmes consumed enormous sums of
money, they often failed to meet expectations, and the results were disappointing.’
Sometimes policies were too ambitious, other times ‘The implementation of policy
seemed to recognize its own dynamics whereupon numerous policy plans broke
down (…). At the end of the 1970s and in the 1980s this led to a pessimistic view of
the government’s abilities to achieve its goals and to inﬂuence social development’
(op. cit.: 4). The decline and collapse of the centrally steered countries in Eastern
Europe at the end of the 1980s reinforced the perceptions of the failures of central

Theoretical framework

17

governmental steering. In the resulting debate about the changing relationship between public bodies and market parties, some critics advocated a total withdrawal of
government steering and a reliance on the market.

2.1.1

The Policy network approach to power relationships

The ‘policy network approach’ can be seen as one of the results of that debate (Kickert et al., 1997: 3). The advocates of this approach position it as an alternative to
the Rational Central Rule Model and to the market orientation approach, a sort of
third way between both (op. cit: 7-8). In their overview of the foundations of the network approach to governance, Klijn and Koppenjan (2000: 136-139) found the ﬁrst
signs of the use of the network concept in policy science in the early 1970s. At that
time, they argue, the network concept was used in the bottom-up approach (Hjern
and Porter, 1981) and the intergovernmental relations literature (Friend et al., 1974;
Scharpf et al., 1978) ‘…to map relation patterns between organisations and to assess
the inﬂuence of these patterns for policy processes.’ These two early proto-network
approaches were inﬂuenced by the interactive policy approach (Allison, 1971; Cohen et al., 1972; Lindblom, 1965; Lindblom and Cohen, 1979) and the interorganizational approach (Levine and White, 1961; Negandhi, 1975; Aldrich, 1979). Kenis
and Schenider (1991: 27-28) place the ﬁrst signs of the use of the network concept
in the 60s and 70s, seeing many aspects of the concept as an input from pluralist
theories of policy making (see e.g. Bentley, 1967; and Truman, 1971; both quoted
in Kenis and Scheinder, 1991: 27). Jordan places the ﬁrst signs even earlier, in the
1950s and 1960s (1990; quoted in Rhodes & Marsh, 1992: 4-5). We could consider
the policy network concept as meso-level, in the sense that it provides a link between
the analysis of the relationship between interest groups and governments regarding
speciﬁc policy decisions (the micro-level of analysis), and the analysis of the distributions of power within contemporary society (the macro-level of analysis, Rhodes
& Marsh, op. cit.: 1). For an overview of literature on policy networks in the United
States and Europe, see Klijn and Koppenjan (op. cit.: 136-139) and Rhodes & Marsh
(op. cit.: 5-10). For an overview of literature in the Netherlands, see Spaans (2002:
34-36). For an extensive review of the literature and a discussion of the theoretical
roots see Klijn (1996 and 1997). Besides being a different way of looking at government and markets, the policy network approach is also a different way of looking at
public management.
In the traditional intra-organizational approach ‘…management consists of three
main activities: setting the goals of the organization (planning), structuring and designing the organization (organizing) and “getting the job done” (leading). Management is a top-down activity based on a clear authority structure (…)’ (Kickert et al.,
1997: 11). The policy network approach advocates an alternative to this hierarchy.
‘In a network situation a single central authority, a hierarchical ordering and a single
organizational goal do not exist’ (ibidem). Table 2 shows the main characteristics of

Theoretical framework

18

the traditional intra-organizational and of the policy network approaches regarding
the style of management.

In the policy network approach, the power relationship between the actors is related
to their interaction in the networks. The idea is that there are some factors that can explain the characteristics of this power relationship. Scharpf (1978: 353, 366) suggests
a structuralist approach as a viable research method for studying inter-organizational
policy making and policy implementation processes. It consists of focussing on the
more stable (structural) factors that facilitate or impede certain types of power relationship between the involved actors. Of course, these structural factors do not fully
determine those interactions, there are also other non-structural factors that may do
so (e.g. consolidated game patterns and the contingent behaviour of individual actors). But the structural factors will at least explain the impossibility or improbability
of certain forms of power relationships, and the feasibility and probability of others.
The ‘structures’ facilitate or hamper certain types of power relationships. This research
follows Scharpf’s recommendation (1978: 354) to focus on resource dependence as
a method to discover the structural factors. From this point of view, there are several
important characteristics of policy networks (Spaans, 2002: 36; Klijn, 1997: 30-33).
2.1.1.1 First characteristic of policy networks: Actors pursue their own goals
and are dependent on each other for realising those goals
Policy networks consist of different actors each of them pursuing its own goals, each
of them following its own strategy. This carries the potentiality of a conﬂict, because
these goals and strategies might diverge. In addition, actors in a network are mutually dependent. Dependence is the reason for the existence of a network. It is very
unlikely that the implementation of public policy of any signiﬁcance can rely on
a single actor (Scharpf, 1978: 347, 350; Benson, 1982: 141, 148; Klijn, 1997: 30;

Theoretical framework

19

Kickert et alii, 1997: 2). As Klijn states, ‘Networks develop and exist because of the
interdependency between actors’ (op. cit.: 31).
The concepts of power, dependence, rules and resources are central here. Following
Giddens (1984: 14-16, 258; see also Verhage, 2002: 158), an agent exercises power
if he or she can ‘…make a difference to a pre-existing state of affairs or course of
events’ (Giddens, 1984: 14). It is possible to categorise the following sorts of power:
economic, politic, affective, and cognitive (Korthals Altes, 1995: 25). Almost all sorts
of power (except maybe affective power, the capability to make others emotionally
dependent) are generated thanks to what Giddens calls ‘resources’. By means of the
control of resources, an actor can inﬂuence the behaviour of others, and by doing so
he ‘makes a difference to a pre-existing state of affairs or course of events’, he exercises power. Thus, power exists thanks to the control of resources. Elias (1971: 84-85;
see also Verhage, 2002: 157) describes dependence relations between persons as
the inverse of power relations. Actor A can exercise power on actor B when B needs
one or more resources controlled by A. If so, A can exercise power on B because B
depends on A. Summarized, the unequal allocation of resources can create dependence, and dependence allows the exercising of power.
The strength of this dependence depends on the importance of the resources, and
on the ‘substitutability’ of the resource, i.e. the ease with which the resources can
be replaced by other resources (Scharpf, 1978: 354-355; see also Klijn, 1997: 31;
Spaans, 2002: 36). Scharpf distinguished different degrees of dependence, related to
the importance and substitutability of the resources (ibidem):
• High dependence: high importance and low substitutability of the resources;
• Low dependence: low importance and low substitutability, or high importance
and high substitutability;
• Independence: low importance and high substitutability.
Further, Scharpf distinguished three types of dependence (op. cit.: 356-358):
• Unilateral dependence: the interest of A in the maintenance of the relationship is
greater that the interest of B. A is the more dependent party, B the dominant one.
B might use this against the weaker party, A, and oblige him to accept interactions that are unattractive for him.
• Mutual dependence or interdependency: both A and B depend on the resources
of the other, and they do not have easily available alternative sources of supply.
• Mutual independence: neither A nor B depends on the resources of the other.
There is no dependency.
Giddens (1984: 258) distinguished two kinds of resources: allocative and authoritative. Allocative resources are the material features of the environment, the means of
material production (technology) and the produced goods. Authoritative resources
refer to the arrangements that create the time-space consuming patterns of societies, the arrangements that organize the interaction of people in societies, and the

Theoretical framework

20

arrangements that create people’s chances of self-development and self-expression,
e.g. to be able to read and write. Healey (1992: 35; see also Verhage, 2002: 159)
elaborates further on this distinction. She speaks of Giddens’ ‘allocative resources’
and ‘authoritative resources’ as ‘resources’ respectively ‘rules’, and introduces a new
sort of resource, ‘ideas’. Using these concepts Healey develops a model to analyse
the power-relationships in urban development processes.
Ostrom (1986: 466-467; see also Verhage, 2002: 160) made a distinction between
‘working rules’ and ‘formal rules’. Working rules are more than formal rules: they are
partly based on the formal rules but also on cultural or social ways of behaviour. Examples of working rules are policy paradigms, the unwritten rules about how people
handle situations, etc. These informal rules can be partly based on formal rules but,
as Verhage states, ‘(…) the rules that govern behaviour of actors are broader than only
the legal regulation.’ (op. cit.: 160). Formal rules are formalised in laws and administrative arrangements, and regulate the interactions between actors by deﬁning rights
and obligations and stating to whom they belong. For example, the Dutch Civil Code
deﬁnes the scope of property rights (how the landowner may use his land) and the
Physical Planning Act and the Housing Act limit these rights (he can only build if the
Land use Plan allows it, and provided he obtains a building permit). Formal rules also
create ‘new’ resources that become necessary, and allocate them to certain actors.
Following the example above, the Physical Planning Act and the Housing Act create
the new resources ‘land use plan’ and ‘building permits’, which can exclusively be
approved by the municipality.

resource distribution

rules

INTERACTIONS

other aspects

behaviour actors

Figure 2. Relation between rules, resources, dependence and power in policy networks.

Thus, the relation between rules, resources, dependency and power is clear: rules
regulate the behaviour of actors and the resource distribution in the network, and this
shapes dependence among the actors. And ﬁnally, dependence shapes the power in-

Theoretical framework

21

teractions between actors. However, this process is more complex, as the interactions
within the framework often shape, consolidating or altering, the rules (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000: 139; Klijn 1997: 33; Benson, 1982: 150-151). Summarized, rules shape the
power interactions, but power interactions also shape the rules. See Figure 2.
2.1.1.2 Second characteristic of policy networks:There is no dominant actor,
and governments are primus inter pares
Giddens said also that ‘…all forms of dependence offer some resources whereby
those who are subordinate can inﬂuence the activities of their superiors.’ He calls this
the ‘dialectic of control’ in social systems (1984: 16). This means that each actor has
at his disposal some resources/rules needed by other actors to achieve their goals,
so that he can inﬂuence their behaviour (Verhage, 2002: 158). If each actor has resources/rules needed by others, there is no actor who has all the resources/rules at his
disposal. There is no actor who can exercise power over all the other actors, because
there is always at least one other actor who has some necessary resources/rules. That
is, there is no actor who can exercise an absolute power over all the other actors. In
fact, the policy network approach applies to the policy ﬁeld the principles of Giddens’ ‘dialectic of control’, when it assumes that various actors have a veto power.
The need to cooperate is central in the policy network approach; policies can only
develop or be implemented when each actor makes his resources available (Scharpf,
1978: 347, 350; Benson, 1982: 141, 148; Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000: 142-144).
Kickert et al. emphasize this: ‘Interdependency is the key word in the network approach. Actors in networks are interdependent because they cannot attain their goals
by themselves, but need the resources of other actors to do so’ (1997: 6).
Public actors occupy a special position, a position that is based on the unique resources that they have and on the democratic legitimization they enjoy. But a clear
starting point in this approach is that ‘…public actors do not play the dominant role
they often are ascribed in other public administration perspectives.’ (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000: 151). ‘It is (…) clear that government cannot reclaim its post-war welfare
state position as the central governing authority in society. The experiences of the
1960s and 1970s have shown that the steering potentials of government are limited
and that it must deal with many other important actors in the policy ﬁelds in which
it operates.’ (Kickert et alii, 1997: 1). Klijn and Koppenjan speak of an ‘… apparently
broad consensus that has developed around the idea that government is actually not
the cockpit from which society is governed and that policy making processes rather
are generally an interplay among various actors…’ (op. cit.: 136). In short, though the
policy network approach recognizes that the government is a special party, a kind of
primus inter pares, the government is not any more the central actor that characterizes
the Rational Central Rule Model, typical in the welfare state of the 1960s and 1970s.
2.1.1.3 Criticisms of the policy network approach
There are criticisms of the policy network approach, namely that it is said to devalue
the status of the public sector (De Bruijn and Ringeling, 1997: 151-157; Rhodes

22

Theoretical framework

1997, quoted in Klijn & Koppenjan 2000: 151-154; Kickert et al., 1997: 170-171;
Marsh & Rhodes, 1992: 263-268; Lowi, 1969: 85-97, 287-297: quoted in Marsh
& Rhodes, op. cit.: 265; Ripley and Franklin 1987, Marin and Mayntz 1991 and
Nelissen 1993: quoted in Kickert et al., ibidem). Compared to the dominant role
that government has in other public administration perspectives, the policy network
approach describes the public sector as being just another of the actors in the network, putting it on the same level as the non-governmental actors and denying it the
possibility of playing an old fashioned dominant role. Thus, the network approach
proposes that government bodies engage in the networks as the only way of successfully elaborating and implementing policies. The criticisms focus on the problems of
democratic legitimacy or accountability that arise when governments cannot play a
dominant role and have to engage in networks. They should not enter into interactions and partnerships with other parties in society because this hinders the fulﬁlment
of the common interest. A government getting involved in networks is not able to
fulﬁl the common interest it should pursue, because the decision making in networks
is non-transparent and uncontrolled.
In a reaction to this criticism, Klijn and Koppenjan warn “…against mixing up the real
world and the theoretical framework that is used to analyse, evaluate and improve
it.” (2000: 151). They argue that it is a fact that the government depends upon other
actors, and that the policy network approach just tries to develop instruments, which
- given that fact - enable the public sector to defend in the actual network context
the public interest and the primacy of politics. As sections 2.1.1.1 and 2.1.1.2 show,
the idea of interdependence in the policy network approach is based on an analysis
of the distribution of resources. It is clear that the policy network approach takes
the starting point that there is always more that one actor who has a ‘veto power’,
because the needed resources are distributed between several actors and there is
no actor who controls all them. Governments depend on other actors because they
do not have all the needed resources, the missing resources belong to other actors,
and these missing resources are not replaceable or if replaceable, this is too costly
and time consuming. Therefore, the collaboration of all the actors who control the
needed resources is indispensable for policy-implementation.
The idea that governments are inevitably dependent can be the subject of criticism,
as e.g. Kofﬁjberg did in a recent study on housing policy networks in the Netherlands.
He argued to have discovered effective ways for public bodies to play a dominant
role (2005: 322-323). Following this line, my research can be seen as a fundamental
criticism of the basic assumption in the Policy network approach, that public bodies
always have to be heavily dependent on other bodies in land development projects.
The conclusions in chapter 8 provide instruments for making public bodies less dependent and allowing them to play a more dominant role, precisely in order to improve the capturing of value increase.

Theoretical framework

2.1.2

23

How to intervene in policy networks: Network
management

Steering the interactions between the actors in policy networks may be necessary.
One of the reasons is that these interactions are complex and there is always a potential conﬂict, since each actor pursues his own goals. Furthermore, because there are
usually actors who have some veto power, the collaboration of all the necessary actors is necessary to obtain outcomes that satisfy all the actors. As Klijn and Koppenjan
put it: ‘Since co-operation and collaboration of goals and interests does not happen
of its own accord, steering of complex games in networks is necessary.’ (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000: 140). The special position of public bodies makes them very suitable
for the role of network manager. They can be a facilitator.
Obviously, the reason why a public body might want to intervene in policy networks
is not only to guarantee that the outcome of policy processes satisfy other actors, but
also to realise its own goals better. In this research we investigate whether the formal
rules relevant to zoning could be used in an operational way to improve cost recovery, i.e. to ﬁnance the unproﬁtable parts with the value increase of land. Translated
into policy network terms, we investigate the possibility of inﬂuencing, through Network management measures, the interactions within the networks and thereby the
outcomes in capturing value increase.
It is possible to distinguish two types of network management: ‘process management’
or ‘game management’, and ‘network constitution’ or ‘network structuring’ (Klijn
& Koppenjan, 2000: 140-142; Klijn 1997: 46-53; O’Toole, 1988: 426-433). Process management tries to inﬂuence the interactions between actors, with the existing
rules and resource distribution as the starting point. This management method is appropriate for inﬂuencing interactions that are already underway. The second network
management method, Network constitution, seeks institutional change. Network
constitution is focused on making structural changes, and one of the ways of doing
this is by changing the rules. This is based on the principle that rules can modify the
distribution of resources and the behaviour of the actors.
In the rest of this chapter, two speciﬁc methods of Network management will be
worked out, both of them involving the rules that public bodies might be able to
modify. Both methods are inspired by two ongoing debates in the planning academic
and professional world. The ﬁrst measure (section 2.2) is inspired by the debate in
the UK, but specially in Spain and the Netherlands, concerning the steering powers
of public bodies in urban development, related to the contents of property rights in
land. It is a clear Network constitution measure: modifying the contents of property
rights that govern the transactions in infrastructure provision. The second measure
(section 2.3) is inspired by the academic debate about the desired level of ﬂexibility
in planning. It also consists of a Network constitution measure that requires however
almost no modiﬁcation of formal rules and is thus feasible in a shorter term: it con-

Theoretical framework

24

cerns the moment in the course of the development process at which public bodies
approve land use prescriptions. Both measures have been analysed in a model that
includes also all other factors that inﬂuence the capturing of increased value (section
2.4). Finally, both measures have been translated into two hypothetical assumptions
(section 2.5).

2.2

The formal rules governing property rights in land

Introduction
The owners of property rights in land1 have a very powerful position in urban regeneration projects, and they can – and do – use that power in the pursuit of their
own goals in such projects. However, the contents of those powers are determined
by formal rules, under both public and private law. In section 2.2.1 we ﬁrst discuss
those rules in general terms. Then in sections 2.2.2-4 we illustrate this with an exposition of the practice and political debate in three countries – England and Wales,
the Netherlands, and Spain – which concern the relationship between formal rules
governing property rights in land and the possibilities for capturing value increase.
The British nationalization of development rights in 1947 forms a clear reference
point in the debate. The discussion in the Netherlands and Spain is certainly relevant
to local academic and professional debate, and the similarities between the debate in
both countries are obvious, e.g. in both countries controversial proposals have been
made to separate development rights from property rights. In 1994 the Spanish region
of Valencia devised an alternative to separation that in fact separated infrastructure
provision from property rights. Today, this innovation has been introduced in almost
all of the remaining 17 Spanish regions.

2.2.1

Restrictions on the exercise of property rights in land

One might think, and actually there are many with a libertarian perspective who do,
that property rights in land give the owner total freedom to decide how to use his
land. The Roman Law concept of ‘dominium’ might best deﬁne what are the contents of such an absolute concept of property. ‘Dominium’ includes all the possible
rights over a thing (thus also land) that one person can own: the right to use it (usus),
the right to the fruits (fructus) and the right to disposal (abusus). However, the reality is that all countries, and certainly any country with a mature legal system, have
issued in the course of history, and still issue, formal rules that restrict the exercise
of property rights in land (Needham, 2006: 1-3, 36-38, 39). Before entering into the
1

Of the variety of possible property rights in land, it is the right of ownership that is at the centre
of attention in this research. There are other possible rights, for example that another person is
authorized to walk on the land, even if he is not the owner of the land, or that another person can
as a tenant use the property to live or work in/on it (cfr. Needham, 2006: 34-36).

Theoretical framework

25

debate in England and Wales, the Netherlands and Spain, let us see ﬁrst how private
and public law can restrict the exercise of property rights in land and how this has
evolved in the history.
The restrictions on the exercise of rights in land can come both from private and from
public law. Private law rules are necessary to regulate how persons deal with each
other with their property rights, i.e. how and what they can sell or buy or limit their
rights. For example, if law (e.g. nuisance law in England and the United States) says
so, one owner cannot use his property in such a way that he could harm a neighbouring owner. Another example is that private law rules whether an owner can or cannot
split off from his freehold property right the right of a building lease and transfer it to
another person. In addition, the owner of the freehold may not enter onto the land
without permission of the owner of the building lease. Thus, restrictions under private
law regulate the normal trafﬁc between persons (Needham, 2006: 43-45).
Restrictions under public law allow state agencies to impose one-sidely restrictions to
the exercise of property rights in land. First, a state agency can impose restrictions on
the use of the right, e.g. if you want to build on your land, you must follow the building
regulations. This ﬁrst sort of restriction attenuates the exercise of rights, but does not
take them away, although if it is permanent that amounts in fact to destroying part of
the right. Second, a state agency may compulsorily take away rights, e.g. expropriating freehold rights of land, or the right to develop it. In this second sort of restriction,
the right is transferred to someone else, usually a state agency (Needham, 2006: 46).
Generally speaking, since the liberal revolutions of the 18th and 19th Centuries we
could summarise the evolution of the restrictions under public law as follows. At
that time, the victorious bourgeoisie of the new liberal regimes rehabilitated (and
reinterpreted) the old Roman Quirinian law’s concept of property rights. The goal
was to guarantee the economic position of the new dominant social class. Up to that
time, the absolute control of land by the bourgeoisie was hindered by medieval attachments and rules. In the liberal reinterpretation, property rights included, as part
of their essential contents, the faculty of doing whatever the owner wants on, under
or above his land. Essential content means that it belongs to the structural or genuine elements of the property right2. If the essential contents become hollowed out,
property becomes seriously harmed. Whatever means that the owner can decide, for
the owned object, the an (whether to do or not to do), the quomodo (how, in which
way, what for), the quantum (how much) and the quando (when). On, under or above
means that the owner can do whatever he wants with the space situated above his
plot (up to the sky), directly on his plot, and under his plot (down to the hell). The

2

The ‘essential contents’ of property rights in land could be identiﬁed, grosso modo, with what in the
Anglo-Saxon legal tradition is called the minimal ‘bundle of rights’ that someone has to own in order
to be regarded as the owner (cfr. Needham, 2006; 34-35, 38-40).

26

Theoretical framework

concept evolved with time showing some parallels with the historic transition of the
Liberal State to the Social and Democratic State. First, the space above and under the
land became public domain. In a second step, rivers, seas, coastal areas, etc. became
also part of the public domain. The owner still controlled the space situated immediately above and under his plot, but not for long. With the transition to the 20th
Century the social function of property appeared. Sanitary (ﬁre and building hygiene)
and social considerations further limited the contents of property rights. The broad
competences of the owner became gradually limited and the exercising of his rights
subjected to obligations. These limits and obligations, which derive from the interests of other individuals, and from public and collective interests, now prevail over
the interests of the owner and have become part of the essential content of property
rights. The owner can enjoy his property only if he/she does so within the legal rules
and prescriptions, and after receiving a public authorization or concession. In other
words, the public administration ﬁxes now the an, the quantum and the quomodo
(cfr. García-Bellido, 1991b: §1; 1993: 176, 179-180, 182; 1994: 130 and following;
Mazzoni, 1990: 32, 34, 99-101, 104-121, 253-257, quoted in García-Bellido, 1993:
179; 1994: 136; Bassols, 1985a: 111-124; and 1985b: 11-24, 115-116: last edition
quoted in García-Bellido, 1993: 179-180).

2.2.2

The nationalization of development rights in England and
Wales

Already in 1909 and 1932, British planning law introduced the rationale of capturing
the unearned value increase of land, without however effectively operationalizing
it. Later on, the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act, following the conclusions of
the 1942 Uthwatt Report, introduced what is called the ‘nationalization of the development rights’ (Booth, 2003: 89-92, 100-101, 105, 109; Cullingworth & Nadin,
2006: 195-197; Alterman, 2009: 4-5, 7, 15-17). The right of ownership was stripped
of one of its partial rights – the right to develop, or the right to change the use of the
land – and this partial right was compulsorily acquired by the state. This meant that
development rights were vested in the state, not in the landowner. No development
could take place without permission of the local planning authority, and then only
on payment of a betterment charge to the Central Land Board (for the right to develop
was owned by the state, and the developer had to pay to use that right). From this it
followed that, if permission was refused, landowners had no right to compensation,
and that if permission was granted, betterment (any increase in the value of land)
was subject to a betterment charge. Landowners owned only the existing use rights
of their land. In case of compulsory acquisition of land, the price to be paid as compensation would be equal to the existing use value, that is, its value excluding any
allowance for future development. The act introduced a scheme of £300 million fund
for payments (intentionally called ‘payments’, and not ‘compensations’) to landowners who could successful claim that their land had some development value before
the introduction of the 1947’s provisions. Some decades later, in 1974 and 1975, the

Theoretical framework

27

Labour government of the time proposed an initiative to nationalise land ownership
(i.e. going a step further and nationalising all rights in land); however, this measure
failed to materialise (Clusa & Mur, 2007: 122-136).
The 1947 Act had signiﬁcant consequences for capturing value increase, as betterment (any increase in the value of land) became the subject of a betterment charge.
From that time onwards, land value taxation has been short-lived and it was ﬁnally
scrapped in 1985 (see chapter 6.2.1). Another important consequence of the 1947
provision is that development plans are not legally binding: someone who wants to
develop does not have the right to do that simply because the application conforms
with the development plan. In other words, the state can impose conditions on the
right to develop, irrespective of the development plan. However, the 1947 Act did
not alter the principle that landowners are the only ones who can develop their land.
Landowners remain, in case planning authorities grant planning permission, the exclusive owner of the right to develop their land. They can exclude others from doing
so. Before being entitled to develop, developers will have to acquire the land or to
agree the availability of land with its owner.

2.2.3

The Netherlands: the debate about splitting development
rights from land ownership

As mentioned in section 1.1, important changes took place in Dutch land and housing policies at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s. The effects of these
changes have been already discussed there: private parties have assumed a more
important role in land development and in housing production, and a shift took place
from predominantly social housing to predominantly free market housing. Another
change was the interest of private parties in buying land long before development
takes place, which was relatively new in the recent history or Dutch urban development. These changes have consequences for the capturing of value increase in urban
regeneration: the ﬁnancing of the public infrastructure and facilities has come under
pressure and development has been delayed signiﬁcantly.
These changes, and their consequences, have been the subject of controversy and
debate. The question has been discussed whether planning law and property rights
offer enough instruments to public bodies to achieve their public goals. Often mentioned public goals concern the delivery of serviced land and the subsequent realisation of building quotas, and the ﬁnancing of public infrastructure and facilities. Other
debated issues, directly related to this discussion, concern the most desirable relationship between public and private actors, and whether municipalities need new
statutory powers to regulate land markets. Probably, the most controversial issue has
been the proposal for a separation of land ownership from development rights (CPB
1999; BCR, 1999; Canoy and Van Ewijk, 1999; Overwater, 1999; Priemus & Louw,
2000, 2003; Vrom-Raad, 2000; Korthals Altes and Groetelaers, 2000).

28

Theoretical framework

2.2.3.1 The debate
There is a certain consensus about the analysis that is brieﬂy set out in sections 1.1
and 1.2. It is clear that the recent changes in land and housing policies do not allow
municipalities to steer urban development in the way they used to do. The discussion however focuses on the question whether or not planning law offers, in the new
context, enough instruments for municipalities to satisfactorily control urban development and its outcomes. Can municipalities sufﬁciently meet their public goals
without performing an old-fashioned active land policy and dominating the land
markets? In other words, without buying the land, providing the infrastructure and
assuming all the corresponding risks?
Priemus and Louw (2003) are sceptical about the effectiveness of public law instruments. For example, they argue that pre-emption powers cannot always prevent developers from buying the land. Also, expropriation is not an easy instrument to use, for
it is expensive, politically sensitive, and not always applicable if the landowners are
willing to develop. The authors carried out a study of the functioning of Dutch land
markets, and found that municipalities complained that the recent changes make it
difﬁcult to implement public planning policies. The most important bottlenecks mentioned by the municipalities are the assembling of land, the overrun of public legal
procedures, and the recovery of costs. Municipalities said that they experienced in
practice difﬁculties in achieving a comprehensive and integral development (Priemus
and Louw, 2000: 6-10). The authors argue that, because land ensures a strong position in urban development, the chances for developers of surviving in the building
market are based not on their abilities to offer a better and cheaper product, but on
their position in the land market. Land is a necessary condition for urban regeneration, and the one who controls it has a monopoly on the supply of buildings in that
particular location. As there are always in a particular urban market a limited number
of suitable sites for building, actually we could talk of an oligopolistic market: in one
urban market, the distribution and use of suitable building sites is controlled by a
limited number of providers, the landowners. Because of the importance of land as
the ‘key’ to urban development, developers tend to pay high prices for acquiring the
land. This leads to high land development costs, costs that have to be recovered in the
public infrastructure and the constructed buildings. The consequence is a diminishing and impoverishment of the public infrastructure and social housing, and of the
quality of the development (Priemus and Louw, 2003). In a recent study of urban
regeneration, Buitelaar et al. conclude that high development costs adversely affect
the quality of public infrastructure. In addition, they conclude that high development
costs stimulate maximisation of the building volume, which ultimately leads to massive buildings and scarce public space (2008: 17-18, 20).
A study conducted by Korthals Altes and Groetelaers (2000) put into perspective the
claim that municipalities have lost their steering powers. In most of the 72 schemes
they studied, the municipality exercised inﬂuence through buying land and/or through
reaching contractual agreements with the developers. From this it is clear that the

Theoretical framework

29

municipalities still retain, through buying land and/or contractual agreements, ways
of inﬂuencing urban development and its outcomes. However, the question remains
unresolved whether this is enough to sufﬁciently meet the public planning goals.
Korthals Altes and Groetelaers take a step further by arguing that the available instruments are indeed sufﬁcient means for preserving the public interest and inﬂuencing
urban development (op. cit.: 43-45). However, Priemus and Louw disagree and are
more pessimistic about the effectiveness of public steering powers (2003: 373-375).
2.2.3.2 The proposal for separating development rights
Some authors argue the need to introduce more competition in the building market
(Priemus and Louw 2000, 2003; CPB, 1999: 11, 21, 39-40; BCR, 1999; Canoy and
Van Ewijk, 1999). In the current situation, they argue, the chances of private actors
are based on their position in the land market, not on their creativity and efﬁciency in
producing good and cheap real state products. Increasingly, private actors are acquiring land in early stages of development processes. The authors argue that this limits
the competition between property developers and harms the public interest in urban
development, including the capturing of value increase.
To introduce more competition between developers, the authors argue that the contents of property rights should be modiﬁed. Currently, property gives to the owner
the right to develop the building prescribed in the binding rules, in the Netherlands
most of the time a land-use plan. If the landowner is able and willing to implement
the land-use plan, expropriation might be difﬁcult. This is called the ‘self-realisation
right’: the owner of the land has the right to develop it in accordance with the landuse plan. This development right spans the whole development process, from infrastructure provision to the building. In other words, property gives to the owner the
exclusive right to develop and build on the respective plot. The authors argue that
separating the development and building rights from the right of land ownership
would stimulate free competition.
Several, similar proposals have been made for separating landownership from development and building rights. Canoy and Van Ewijk (1999: 25) propose an obligatory
public tender for the development of a site. In their proposal, the landowner must
tender the development and building rights on his land. Similarly, Priemus (1996: 32)
and Priemus and Louw (2003: 376-377) propose a modiﬁcation of the Expropriation
Act (Onteigeningswet) to allow expropriation when the landowner does not develop
and build his plot in a ‘competitive manner’. Landowners should be obliged to organize a public tender, and if they do not do so, the municipality would have the
right to expropriate the plot and organize the public tender. From that time onwards,
other reports have included in one or other way the topic of separating development
rights from landownership, for example by analyzing the effects of a possible separation and expropriation of development rights (Needham & Geuting, 2006: 18-19;
Vrom, 2006: 4-5). The topic remains in the spotlights, as shown by the fact that a
governmental advisory commission has recently proposed limiting in some strategic

30

Theoretical framework

areas the self-realization right of landowners by e.g. facilitating expropriation or introducing new forms of compulsory purchase of the land (Vrom-raad, 2009: 41-42).

2.2.4

The separation of infrastructure provision from property
rights in the Spanish region of Valencia

In Spain, the course of the discussion is roughly as follows (Bassols Coma, 1996a,
1996b; Bidagor Lasarte, 1996; García-Bellido, 1991a, 1996; Menéndez Rexach,
1996; Parejo Alfonso, 1996; Perales Madueño, 1996; interview with García-Bellido
in 2005; Muñoz & Korthals Altes, 2007). Since the 19th Century, the difﬁculties faced
by public bodies in ﬁnancing public infrastructure and facilities inspired proposals
and measures that affected the scope of the contents of property rights. Public bodies had neither an efﬁcient legislative framework (expropriation, taxes), nor enough
ﬁnancial resources for the realization of public infrastructure and facilities. As a consequence, buying the land and providing the infrastructure became a considerable
challenge for public bodies.
Ildefonso Cerdá (1815-1876) was a consistent critic of the legislative framework for
urban development. As an alternative, he proposed a formula for distributing between all the involved owners the costs that arise from urban development. Landowners should share the costs through a form of land readjustment. In 1861 a proposal for a town planning act which included Cerda’s approach was submitted before
Parliament in Madrid. However, this proposal did not succeed, and the 1864 Town
Extension Act, which relied on the existing inefﬁcient expropriation legislation, was
passed instead. Cerda’s revolutionary ideas had to wait a century for another chance.
It is not clear whether Cerda’s ideas and proposals inﬂuenced directly the 1956 Act,
but anyway this act included a similar approach. From 1956 onwards, subsequent
planning acts ﬁne-tuned the 1956’s approach in order to facilitate a private ﬁnancing
and implementation of public infrastructure and facilities. From the 70’s onwards,
more fundamental criticism led to more radical proposals and to more audacious
experiments in the deployment of available instruments and in developing new instruments. The Valencian 1994 Act could be considered as one of the most relevant
of these experiments.
In 1956, the Land and Urban Planning Regulatory Act and in 1976 its modiﬁcation
succeeded in introducing a totally new approach: a land readjustment regulation
geared at changing property rights. The regulation makes proﬁting from betterment
conditional on taking responsibility for infrastructure provision. Landowners were,
since then, obliged to provide the infrastructure, organized in joint development
organizations and sharing the costs. As compensation, they could also share the
serviced building plots, i.e. the development proﬁts. To create certainty about the
development proﬁts, municipalities were obliged to approve a legally binding General Land use Plan for the whole municipal territory. This plan delimitated the future

Theoretical framework

31

developable sites, and those to be redeveloped. The detailed character of this general
land use plan, and its strong legal binding status has made Spain a singular case
in the international context (see chapter 4). The land readjustment regulation was
in principle based on voluntary participation, but it also included the possibility of
compulsory readjustment and expropriation. However, the regulation failed to assure
good and enough public infrastructure and facilities. Since the 1980s, critics such
as García-Bellido (1989; 1991b; 1993, 1994) and Parejo Alfonso (1993) advocated
reform, arguing that landowners usually had no background as developers and were
not well equipped to organize development processes. For more details about the
working of the 1956’s land readjustment regulation, see section 5.2.1.
2.2.4.1 The proposal for separating development rights from land-ownership
In García-Bellido’s view, the shortcomings of the 1956’s system were due to a lack
of real and effective liberalization in the production of urban land. He made a proposal for re-shaping the system, giving the development rights to the public bodies
and aiming at improving the functionality of the land markets. García-Bellido’s ideas
were based on a criticism of the historic fundaments of the contemporary concept
of property rights (1989; 1993; 1994). The British 1947 Act, and legal reforms of the
Labour government in 1974 and 1975, which reintroduced the taxation of land values and proposed the nationalization of land, inﬂuenced García-Bellido´s proposals
(Clusa & Mur, 2007: 122-136).
Incomplete evolution of the concept of property rights
We have seen above in section 2.2.1 that thanks to the social function of property, and to sanitary considerations, the broad competences of the owner have been
gradually restricted, and that the public administration nowadays ﬁxes the an, the
quantum and the quomodo. However, García-Bellido argues that the problem is that
the quando (when to use or build upon the property) remained under the control of
the landowner. The realization of the public goals is still dependent on the decision of
the owner to develop his land. Consequently, undesired phenomena, such as speculative retention of land, cannot be avoided. As a reaction to this, since the 1956 Act,
in Spanish planning law the social function has incorporated a new dimension, of an
economic character: owners have also to comply with the obligation to implement
the public infrastructure and facilities within prescribed deadlines. If they do not fulﬁll their duties properly, the municipality can apply compulsory land readjustment
or expropriate the land. However, in practice it was under the 1956’s legislation very
difﬁcult for public bodies to effectively control the quando. Public control instruments were not always effective: for example, expropriation is a very controversial
and politically troublesome instrument. Usually, landowners/developers can wait,
while the public administrations have the goal of delivering large building quotas.
Confronted with the choice between (1) maintaining the requirements but then not
obtaining the collaboration of the private actors, and (2) lowering the requirements
in order to achieve an agreement, many public bodies choose the second alternative
(cfr. García-Bellido, 1993 and 1994).

32

Theoretical framework

The captive market
Together with this analysis that the historic evolution of the concept of property rights
was incomplete, the idea of a captive market is central to García-Bellido’s thought.
Due to restrictive zoning and the natural features of land (each location is unique as
land is not reproducible), land is not a normal production factor or merchandise. Its
reproduction, distribution and use are not subjected to free competition. Property
rights give powers to the owner to use his land and exclude others from doing so.
Others cannot ﬁnd an alternative provider of the land, except of course if they move
to another location, where they will meet the same situation (again an owner who
can exclude them from access to land). In other words, landowners do not need to
compete with others, because they control the most important production factor:
land. They form a monopoly (there is only one supplier) or an oligopoly (there are
only few suppliers) in the land market, the virtual place where the producers of urban
land are supposed to acquire undeveloped land. Competition arises to acquire land,
not to develop it. The strength and survival chances of the supplier in the urban markets are based on his monopolistic or oligopolistic privileges, not on the quality or
other advantages of his buildings. He can wait, without needing to make any investment or effort, and ask the maximal price for his land, absorbing all the residual proﬁt
margins from the building. The legal certainty about future development possibilities,
provided by the obligatory General Land use Plan introduced with the 1956 Act,
reinforces the position of landowners. Suppliers in housing and land markets show
a common strategic behavior: they wait until the various segments of the demanders
(price/quality ratio) are willing to pay the maximum price possible. Even when prices
rise, an important part of the potential supply waits until prices reach even higher
levels (García-Bellido, 1994: 114-115/578-579; Mangada, 1990: 179-180; Martín
Mateo, 1980: 13-18; Roca Cladera, 1992: 13: quoted in García-Bellido, 1993: 191).
Proposal for a real liberalization
García-Bellido proposed an alternative to the above-mentioned liberal interpretation
of property rights (Roca, 2007). He proposed the ‘desaggregated’ or ‘separated property’ (1993, 1994). To improve the functionality of the land markets, it is necessary
that at the same selling point at least two suppliers compete with each other, thus
lowering the price and/or bettering the quality in order to sell more goods. Suppliers can move to other selling points where more scarcity could provide higher proﬁt
rates, provided that there also at least a second supplier can compete with them.
Only the actor who offers the best quality for the lowest price should develop each
location. The community should control the quality of the different proposals and
decide who earns the right to develop.
To formulate his alternative paradigm, García-Bellido uses the ‘dualistic theory’,
which divides property rights in two, separated rights (García-Bellido, 1993: 186187):
a) The right to the non-urban use of land, which belongs to the landowner and allows him/her to use the land for the non-urban functions, e.g. agriculture. In case

Theoretical framework

b)

33

the land becomes rezoned into urban land, the landowner has the obligation to
give freedom to the owner of …
The right to the urban use of land. This right can belong to a different person and
gives this individual the development rights, i.e. the right to provide the infrastructure, to build on the serviced parcels and to use the buildings.

García-Bellido positions his proposal as a logical and inevitable continuation of the
above mentioned historic process of limitation of property rights. He places the dualistic theory as a continuation of the thesis of ius publicista, which is opposed to that
of ius privatista. In the thesis of ius publicista, (b) belongs to the public domain, and
not to the landowner (García-Bellido, 1993: 182; Parejo, 1991: 19-20). Both sorts of
property, (a) and (b), become completely separated. The ﬁrst belongs to the owner
and his successors; the second belongs to the public bodies, which may use it or
transfer it to a market party. After the building is ﬁnished, both rights come together
again and are transmitted together to the successors of the owners. Later, should the
building be demolished and ready for redevelopment, both property rights are again
separated, and the right to the urban use comes again in public hands, which can
decide whether or not to rebuild it, and who can do it. The economic rent generated
in each redevelopment ends thus in public hands (García-Bellido, 1993: 186-188). It
is clear that this proposal is very similar to the nationalization of development rights,
introduced in England and Wales in 1947.
2.2.4.2 The Valencian model: separation of development rights from
landownership?
In the early 1990s, the Ministry of Planning of the social-democratic regional government of Valencia – one of the 17 Spanish regions – was willing to tackle stagnation
and speculation in development processes, and to improve the capturing of value
increase. The aforementioned criticisms inﬂuenced this aim, and García-Bellido became directly involved in the preparations for a new planning act. Each Spanish
region (or ‘autonomous community’) has its own planning legislation (Roca Cladera
and Burns, 2000). The 1978 Spanish Constitution however reserves to the national
government the competence of guaranteeing all Spaniards, regardless of the region
in which they live, an equal level of protection of their property rights. Thanks to this
constitutional principle, the essential contents of property rights became a central
government competence. According to the central planning law, building rights belong to these essential contents of property rights. Regional legislation is therefore unable to remove building rights from the landowner, as García-Bellido’s ﬁrst proposal
aimed to do. The makers of the 1994 Valencian Planning Act (Ley Reguladora de la
Actividad Urbanística, LRAU), therefore, did not change the ownership of building
rights, but devised an alternative. The alternative consisted of introducing important
changes in the land readjustment regulation. The most important change was the
revival of the ﬁgure of urbanizing agent, already introduced in the 1975-6 Planning
Act. Public bodies could choose a developer to provide the infrastructure, without
this developer necessarily owning the land. However, the 1975-6’s novelty did not

34

Theoretical framework

work, because this agent had no security, either about the acquisition of land for the
public infrastructure and facilities, or about the ﬁnancing of it. The Valencian 1994
Act introduced some changes that made this way of development feasible (for more
details about the 1975-76’s and 1994’s innovations, see section 5.2.2).
An important question must be answered: does the Valencia system separate development rights from landownership? Infrastructure provision is a public task in Spain.
Until the passage of the 1956 Land Act, public bodies were active in the implementation of this public task, buying the land and constructing the public infrastructure. In
an attempt to make implementation feasible, the 1956 Land Act assigned the duty of
infrastructure provision to landowners, with legal certainty about building rights as
compensation, but without altering the rule that the ultimate responsibility is public.
Consequently, if landowners do not fulﬁll their duties properly, the municipality can
recover its original power of implementing directly, through compulsory land readjustment or through expropriation. According to the 1956 legislation, therefore, failing to fulﬁll the duty to provide infrastructure could eventually lead to loss of property rights. The Valencian model did not introduce this possibility; it merely made
it practically feasible. The model made compulsory land readjustment the default
procedure for urban development and reinforced the possibility, which had been introduced in the 1975-6 Act, of appointing an urbanising agent – a third party, besides
the municipality and the landowners – as the executor.

2.3

Binding rules which inﬂuence certainty and
ﬂexibility in planning

Introduction
When thinking about the use of binding rules in policy preparation and implementation, one has to think about two important functions. First, binding rules commit the
public body that approves them. This public body might become committed to the
implementation, e.g. promising the needed investments in public infrastructure and
facilities or committing itself to fulﬁl the needed procedures. Second, binding rules
have consequences for the expectations of others about the future development possibilities of land. After all, binding rules regulate the use of land and real estate. The
owner or user of land is bound to use the property in the way prescribed by the binding rules. Binding rules delimit development rights or use rights, and once approved
they also guarantee these rights.
Additionally to those two functions, we need to distinguish between three characteristics of binding rules that affect the certainty that these rules create about urban
development. First, the contents of binding rules, i.e. which commitments and which
use possibilities and obligations do they exactly prescribe. Second, the moment of

Theoretical framework

35

approval of the binding rules, i.e. at what moment in a development process do they
create certainty about the commitments and the future development possibilities and
obligations. The third characteristic is the possibility of modifying the binding rules,
i.e. whether and how the contents of binding rules can be modiﬁed. All three characteristics (contents, moment of approval and possibilities of modiﬁcation) are more or
less regulated in planning law. In some countries binding rules can include a wider
range of obligations than in others, prescribe an earlier approval than in others, and
in the course of the development process public bodies are allowed to modify the
binding rules (or the interpretation of them) more easily than in others. When binding rules include much content and are approved early in the process and cannot be
easily modiﬁed, the certainty is higher than if binding rules include little content and
are approved late in the process and can be easily modiﬁed.
Not all the parties want certainty at all stages in the project. The public body might
want to guarantee beforehand some public goals, but it is also reasonable that a
public body might want to keep some ﬂexibility about how it will commit itself, and
also about how it will handle a planning application. And commercial actors might
prefer that development requirements are known with certainty beforehand, but they
might also want to be able to inﬂuence the content of a plan during the development
process, and to react to changes that arise in the course of time. There are so many
uncertainties in the circumstances surrounding a development process that parties
might want to be able to react to them ﬂexibly.
We make here a link with a lively debate in planning profession about the needed
degree of ﬂexibility in planning: must planning create certainty at early stages of
development processes (ﬁx the future) or be ﬂexible (adapt to circumstances)? Here
we deﬁne ﬂexibility as the room for changes and alterations in the binding rules during the development process. Flexibility was seen as a negative feature in the 1960s
planning practice, whereas the planning profession, at least in the Netherlands and
the UK today, perceives ﬂexibility as a positive way of coping with the challenges of
growing complexity, opportunism, and diversity in cities. The discussion about ﬂexibility contrasts two approaches. On the one hand, planning should be ﬂexible to
facilitate a non-linear and multi-layered decision making system. On the other hand,
when implementation is too ﬂexible, the public sector loses the controlling power
and the private sector inﬂuences the urban development in an incremental (i.e. not
planned) way. But before entering into this discussion, we ﬁrst explain the differences
in planning traditions regarding ﬂexibility.

2.3.1

Plan-led versus development-led planning systems

There are different traditions in planning related to the moment at which, in development processes, binding rules come legally into force. This difference causes different degrees of certainty. Grosso modo there is a distinction between the ‘plan-led’

36

Theoretical framework

tradition, where legally binding land use plans are made before there is contact between public bodies, developers and land owners, and the ‘development-led’ tradition, in which the negotiations with developers and land owners precede the making
of legally binding land use rules. If we deﬁne ﬂexibility in planning as the room for
changes and alterations in the binding rules during the development process, then
the former tradition gives less ﬂexibility than the latter.
The planning literature makes various categorizations of planning systems. Here we
use a categorization based on the legal and administrative systems in which planning
systems operate, for the distinction between plan-led and development-led planning
systems is related to the distinction between the continental and the British system3
(Nadin & Stead, 2008: 38-40). We complement this with Faludi’s analytical distinction between theory A and B (1987), because this distinction connects better to the
data gathering possibilities.
‘Plan-led’ systems are similar to what Faludi deﬁnes as proto-planning theory B. ‘Development-led’ systems, on the other hand, can be compared with Faludi’s protoplanning theory A (1987: 185-192; see Figure 3). Development-led systems characterize the British situation, and plan-led, supposedly, planning in most of the other
countries. In development-led systems, the public authority decides cases on their
merits. The land use plan merely gives an idea of the intentions of the local authority.
As Faludi expresses it for theory A, ‘Zoning then merely expresses guidelines which
the environmental authority gives to itself – for its own convenience so to speak - and
from which it is at liberty to depart’ (p. 186). Faludi calls this the indicative theory of
zoning. In plan-led systems, the land use plan is more important. The local authority ﬁxes the desired environmental outcomes in the land-use plan, which becomes
legally binding. This statutory ﬁxation of the land-uses occurs at the plan production
moment (this is the moment in which the ﬁrst projections are made for development,
and it is indicated with the star on the left in Figure 3), while in development-led systems this occurs at, or shortly before, the development moment (this is the moment
in which local authorities and developers face a speciﬁc proposal for development,
the star on the right in Figure 3). In other words, in plan-led systems the regulations
about the future use possibilities are supposed to become legally binding before
intending developers ﬁnd out whether their intentions conform to the conditions
imposed. Once the developer submits a building application, the local authorities
check whether it ﬁts into the legally binding land-use plan. If it does not, the application should be rejected. Faludi calls this the imperative theory of zoning.
Summarizing, plan-led systems differ from development-led systems in two aspects:
(1) there is in plan-led systems always a legally binding land use plan, and (2) this
plan acquires legal status at an early stage, at the plan production moment.
3

In another approach, planning systems are classiﬁed using a wide set of criteria, such as the distribution
of powers relevant to planning among levels of government, or the maturity of the system.

These differences between the British (development-led) and the plan-led system
seem to be the consequence of historic differences in the juridical systems. Two longstanding legislative traditions are important for understanding this British peculiarity
(Booth, 2003: 4). The ﬁrst is the heavy reliance on judge-made law in the common law
system, where the UK belongs. In common law systems, the judgements of the courts
on individual cases have a more central role than in other law systems (Waldron,
1990: quoted in Booth, 2003: 4). The second legislative tradition that underlies the
discretionary powers of public bodies in British planning is that of procedural fairness.
As Booth states it, ‘The power to decide is legitimated, not by reference to regulation
carrying the force of law, but by the way in which the decision is taken’ (op. cit.: 4).

38

Theoretical framework

The rule of law, central in the plan-led planning system, is held in high regard by
liberal thinkers. Its origins can be found in the struggle of the bourgeoisie against
the arbitrary powers of the king and the administration. In the Middle Ages, law was
found, not made, and authority was fragmented. There was no central legislator that
could guarantee security and certainty. After the Middle Ages, new states with a centralized and professionalized administration worked gradually towards uniﬁcation
and streamlining of the fragmented law. In the 19th Century, the proponents of the
Rechtstaat (literally a ‘state of rights’, but often linked to ‘rule of law’) pleaded for
a state with a constitution, separation of powers, and with individual basic human
rights. The notion of ‘vertical legal certainty’ came to its full development. In this notion, certainty can be found primarily or exclusively in the text of the enacted law.
This led to a central role for legislation, administrative authority based exclusively
on enacted law, and judicial review of administrative action by independent courts.
The translation into the planning system of the principles of the Rechtstaat had major consequences. The land-use plans acquired a statutory character, as a piece of
legislation that regulates the land-uses at the local level. When considering building
applications, the public administration should just check whether or not the application conforms to the zoning map. There should not be any room for discretional
considerations (cfr. Van Gunsteren, 1976: 81-83; Faludi, 1987: 187).
In short, plan-led systems (like the Dutch one) are supposed to provide at early stages
certainty about the future development possibilities. On the other hand, development-led systems (like the British planning system), although there might be some
indicative zoning plans in early stages, are supposed to give less certainty about the
deﬁnite development possibilities.

2.3.2

The arguments for and against certainty and ﬂexibility in
planning

There are various reasons why planning practices move between more or less ﬂexibility (Tasan-Kok, 2008). The planning profession has changed, in line with the changes
already mentioned in section 2.1 about the role of public bodies in policy networks,
from a dominant role to that of primus inter pares. Already in the 1970s, John Friedmann drew the attention of scholars by saying that direct control cannot be the role
of the planner. However, although he emphasized that planning intervention should
be ﬁltered through a series of complex structures and processes (Friedmann, 1973),
he still deﬁned the role of the planner as a guiding/controlling one. Precisely 30
years later, he emphasized the shift in planning from an instrument of control to an
instrument of innovation and action (Friedmann, 2003). This illustrates the shift in the
planning literature, which has implications for ﬂexibility in planning practice as well.
What might have happened during those 30 years is that planning practice incorporated greater ﬂexibility and the loosening of rigid rules (Healey and Williams, 1993).
This requires however some nuance: the trend in professional and academic debate

Theoretical framework

39

has not necessarily resulted in practice in more countries extending developmentled practices, and it seems to coincide with a contradictory trend in which some
development-led countries assume some plan-led practices4.
There are various arguments for and against more or less ﬂexibility in planning practice. Moroni (2007: 146-7, 153), being critical of the current support for ﬂexibility,
claims that continental European planning systems are usually able to guarantee the
certainty of the law due to the strict nature of master plan and zoning ordinances, and
he suggests that ﬂexible planning systems (such as the British development-led system) are unpredictable and unstable as each case is judged on its merits and cannot
be predicted in advance. In the same publication however he advocates that more
ﬂexible (abstract, general and end-independent) rules and actions are needed to deal
with the complexity of the contemporary urban systems (op. cit.: 156). Needham
(2006: quoted in Moroni, 2007) also gives the British system as a case of being too
open to the state administration’s discretion and not meeting the Rule of Law. On the
other hand, he puts certainty in the framework of predictability when he emphasizes
that public authorities do not want to be bound to the principle of predictability. Instead they want to be able to examine plans informally and if necessary change landuse plans to accommodate to unpredictable planning applications. In such circumstances, certainty can be provided to citizens only if strict rules are followed when
the plan is being changed (Needham, 2007b: 186). Thus, plan-makers, especially local governments using public-private partnership instruments, do not want to provide
this kind of strict certainty, for they want to leave some room for negotiation or for
contingencies that might occur during the process of implementation (Buitelaar et al,
2007). Faludi (1986: 185-192) argues that the assumptions underlying the plan-led
system (i.e. planners can predict the nature and quantities of a community’s needs
and convert this quantiﬁcation into an allocation and designation of land uses) are
invalid. Moreover, the idea that economic and political forces in a community will
respond compliantly with these designations and for prescribed uses might be incorrect. At the development moment, the developer may propose something better than
what is already in the land-use plan. Or he/she may offer something that the local
authority really wants, on condition that the municipality change the land-use plan.
Departures from plans are inevitable, all-out commitment to environmental plans
(legally binding land-use plans) is unreasonable, and as a consequence, departures
from the land-use plan in order to adapt it to the circumstances of each development
project are the rule, and not the exception.

4

In a comparative study, the European Commission found a double trend in planning practice:
countries operating in rigid plan-led systems tend indeed to incorporate ﬂexibility, but those
operating in development-led systems seek to provide greater certainty (1997: 45).

Theoretical framework

40

2.3.3

Some ﬁnancial aspects of certainty in planning

During the data gathering, some additional aspects of the arguments for and against
certainty became apparent.
The ﬁrst aspect derives from the Ricardian rent theory, in which land price is a result
of the disposal price of the ﬁnal real estate products (Ricardo, 1821). Provided that a
minimum developer’s proﬁt and the development costs are covered, any residual determines the maximum market value of the land. In other words, the price of land in a
free market is the residual value. From this it follows: (1) that certainty about building
possibilities (i.e. the strong expectation that it is possible to build) affects the residual
price of land; and (2) that variations in capturing value increase (i.e. the amount of
obligations to be paid in kind or in money to the public bodies) also affect the residual price of the land, but not the ﬁnal price of the real estate5. A second aspect is
that certainty or uncertainty might affect the negotiating position of the municipality.
If there is much certainty about future building possibilities, municipalities have less
discretion and therefore less room to negotiate. On the contrary, if there is much
uncertainty about what may be developed, the municipality might be able to ask for
more contributions in exchange for creating certainty about building possibilities.
These considerations lead us to the assumption that, when developers have no expectation, or a low expectation, of being able to build, land prices will not rise`
above the level of existing use value. The book value will remain low, and even if
the land is transacted this will be at that low price. When initiating a project, the
developer will bring in the land at a value near the market price in the existing use.
Or, if the developer must buy the land, he will offer to the landowner a price near to
the market price in the existing use. On the contrary, if there is a strong expectation
of development, the developer will bring his land in at a higher book value, or will
pay a price for the land that reﬂects the expected proﬁts. In other words, certainty
that building will be possible will have an inﬂationary effect on the price of land.
This is relevant for capturing value increase, because high initial land prices narrow
the ﬁnancial room of the developer when asked to contribute to public infrastructure
and facilities. Also, certainty about future building possibilities gives the municipality a weaker position in negotiations, which might also be negative for capturing
value increase. The municipality cannot negotiate by allowing building possibilities
(i.e. modifying the binding rules to allow more proﬁtable building possibilities) in
exchange for contributions.
The analysis of the ﬁnancial aspects of certainty leads us to a second assumption.
Namely that when developers are aware in early stages that they are likely to face obligations, they will incorporate them into the ﬁnances of the operation. For example,
5

This theory of land rent contravenes the argument that planning requirements of public bodies might
be responsible for the raising of the price of land (Ball, 1983; quoted in White, 1986: 104-107).

Theoretical framework

41

if the developer already owns the land, he will - when determining the book value of
land, other development costs and his proﬁt margin - consider the obligations to be
paid. If the developer has not yet bought the land, he can agree with the landowner
that the agreed price will be subjected to a deduction for the obligations to be paid. If
there is (at the moment at which developers calculate book price, development costs
and proﬁt margins, and at the moment when developers agree the price with the
landowners) no certainty about the obligations to be paid, developers might make
ﬁnancial calculations that assume maximal proﬁt margins and low obligations. In
other words, if local authorities introduce new obligations too late in the process,
there might be no ﬁnancial room anymore in the developer’s budget (confero RowanRobinson & Lloyd, 1988: 128-130; Campbell et al., 2000: 769-771).
Based on these two assumptions, made during data gathering, we differentiate between two sorts of certainty: certainty about the building possibilities (how much and
what the landowner will be able to build), and certainty about future contributions
(how much the landowner will have to contribute, in kind or in money).

2.4

Model of the causal relationship between formal
rules relevant to zoning and capturing value
increase in urban regeneration

Introduction
In section 2.1 we discussed urban regeneration projects and the outcomes concerning the degree of captured value increase as being the result of the interaction
between different actors, each of them with different goals and different means to
achieve them. We also discussed the basic functioning of these policy networks and
the ways of possibly modifying this functioning in order to improve the capturing of
value increase. In Sections 2.2 and 2.3 we presented two topical discussions in England and Wales, the Netherlands and Spain about the possibly role of formal rules in
improving the capturing of value increase.
Based on these discussions it is possible to develop a model of the inferred causal
relationship between certain ways of using the formal rules relevant to zoning and
the capturing of value increase in urban regeneration projects. The model not only
includes the formal rules relevant to zoning as causality of the degree of captured
value increase, but analyses also the wider complex of causalities. It is the intention
that this model be applicable not just to urban regeneration in England, Spain and
the Netherlands, but also to other countries too. Let us see ﬁrst which activities and
which actors are involved in urban regeneration.

42

2.4.1

Theoretical framework

The activities and the actors in urban regeneration

2.4.1.1 The activities
As already explained in section 1.5, this research focuses on comprehensive urban
regeneration projects located on privately owned land. We mean here physical interventions in the existing city that have the following characteristics:
• They produce a notable value increase due to the rezoning of the land and to the
dimensions of the development area. The value increase derives from the returns
that will accrue from selling the ﬁnal real estate.
• They require the making of important costs for public infrastructure and facilities, costs that cannot be recovered by selling or managing that infrastructure or
those facilities.
• We study only those comprehensive urban regeneration projects that are situated on privately owned land.
Within these projects, we focus on the development phase. The ‘development phase’
starts from the original situation and ends at the delivery and the beginning of the
exploitation of the ﬁnal real estate products. Within this phase, this research focuses
on a speciﬁc phenomenon: the interaction between public bodies making use of
their competences regarding the formal rules relevant to zoning, and the developers/landowners who redevelop the site. The capturing of value increase is one of the
results of this interaction.
2.4.1.2 The actors
To identify the involved actors, we use a combination of two techniques. First is the
‘imperative’ approach, which asks who has an interest in or feels the consequences of
the problem. The second is the ‘positional’ approach, which identiﬁes those actors who
have a formal position in actual policy making (Mitroff, 1983: 33-34). Table 3 summarizes the interests and formal position of the involved actors. This research assumes that
actors pursue their interests rationally within the context of their interactions.
Starting with the imperative approach, we identify ﬁrst the problem-owner (the actor that has a direct interest and that serves as starting point of this research). The
problem-owner is that public body (possibly more than one) that wants to implement
its planning policies (see section 1.2). In order to do that, it might have to subsidize
urban regeneration in order to achieve the desired quality of the regenerated areas.
Although not a problem-owner in that sense, property developers and landowners
also have a direct interest: they have a ﬁnancial interest in the regeneration of the
site, namely proﬁt maximization in the short or long term. However, when considering that proﬁt maximization is also related to the quality of the regenerated areas,
they could also be considered as problem-owners similar to the public body because
problems with the ﬁnancing of public infrastructure and facilities can affect the quality in a negative way. Other directly interested actors are the actual users and inhabitants of the deteriorated areas that are the subject of regeneration: they are mostly

Theoretical framework

43

interested in receiving high compensation for any loss suffered. The future inhabitants, i.e. people who stay in the regenerated area, or new ones, also have a direct
interest because they will use the regenerated urban areas. The interest of the future
inhabitants is similar to that of civic organizations, who are mainly committed to the
physical, social and/or environmental quality of urban regeneration.
Within the public bodies it is possible to distinguish municipalities on the one side
and the ministry of planning of the central government on the other. In Spain and
the Netherlands there are in addition regional, respectively provincial, public bodies that play a relevant role. Besides having a direct interest (always related to the
implementation of their planning policies, and in the Netherlands also because often
they subsidize), these public bodies have also a regulatory role (they are empowered
to elaborate the formal regulations that rule the regeneration). There might be other
national public bodies with some ﬁnancial or political involvement, for example the
ministries of Infrastructure, Finance and Economic Affairs, but usually they have few
or no regulatory responsibilities.

Landowners
- Large companies (see also developers with land) Proﬁt maximizing
- Small owners
Hatched: actors that have a ﬁnal formal responsibility
Transparent: actors without a ﬁnal formal responsibility.

Proﬁt maximizing

44

Theoretical framework

Within the developers it is possible to distinguish between those that have not yet
bought land within the development site and those that have already bought part
or all the land. Within the original landowners there are two sorts: large companies
owning land in regeneration sites (e.g. old ﬁrms, energy and railway companies), and
individual owners-users. Large companies with land can sometimes be regarded as
developers with land, because such companies often have a development department (e.g. public utility companies such as electricity and railway companies often
have such a department). Housing associations and other social housing landlords
are often involved in urban regeneration because they often own land in those locations: they can also be considered as developers if they have a development department.
Of all these actors, the only ones with a ﬁnal formal responsibility (the positional
approach) are:
– Public bodies at the central level: the ministry or department of planning (responsible for policy, planning law and for circulars and directives);
– Public bodies at the regional level: the Dutch provinces (responsible for regional
policy and the application of planning law), and in Spain the regional ministry of
planning (responsible for policy, planning law and for circulars and directives);
– Public bodies at the local level: the municipalities or ‘local planning authorities’
in England (responsible for the local policy and the application of planning law);
– The property developers (they have knowledge and ﬁnancial means);
– The landowners (they control the land).
The other parties have an advisory role (see table 3).

2.4.2

Causalities of the amount of value increase ﬁnally
captured

It is a necessary condition of being able to capture value increase that there is some
value to be captured, that is, that there is an initial proﬁt (or the potential proﬁt) from
the urban regeneration project. ‘Initial proﬁt’ means that the economic value of the
site clearly increases due to the regeneration. If there is, then some of this can – in
principle – be captured by public bodies. However, whether this initial proﬁt translates into a ‘ﬁnal proﬁt’ for the developer that allows him to contribute depends on
the interaction of several variables. We need thus to make a distinction between the
variables that inﬂuence the size of the initial proﬁt, and variables that inﬂuence the
distribution of that initial proﬁt and result in the ﬁnal proﬁt. If for example an initial
positive proﬁt ﬁnally ends in excessive high prices paid for the development land,
or ends in inﬂated development costs, the ﬁnal proﬁt for the developer might be
negative. For both sort of variables, some of them are determined outside the urban
regeneration project (they are context variables) and some are determined inside the
project, either by the physical conditions within the site or by the actions of the various actors in interaction with each other.

Theoretical framework

45

We can identify thus four sets of variables:
A. Context variables that inﬂuence the size of the initial proﬁt;
B. Context variables that inﬂuence the distribution of the initial proﬁt, i.e. the formal rules relevant to zoning;
C. Actions of those directly involved in the project, including those with formal
powers, which inﬂuence the size of the initial proﬁt;
D. Actions of those directly involved in the project, including those with formal
powers, which inﬂuence the distribution of the initial proﬁt.
Together, those variables determine the value increase that is ﬁnally captured for the
beneﬁt of the public infrastructure and facilities in the regeneration project.
Some of the variables under B, C, and D – namely those in bold print – can be deliberately manipulated by public bodies in order to inﬂuence the captured value
increase. But all variables need to be taken into account when explaining a particular case. Some variables inﬂuence the ﬁnal degree of captured value increase more
directly than others. When the causal link goes through other variables, we speak
here of ‘intermediary variables’. We will now discuss each of those sets of variables
separately. Figure 4 gives an overview of all variables, and section 2.4.3 illustrates
them with one of the studied cases.
2.4.2.1 Context variables that inﬂuence the size of the initial proﬁt
(variables A)
A1) Real estate markets
The price of real estate is fundamental for determining the returns and costs:
• Returns: the prices of the ﬁnal ofﬁces, dwellings and other commercial real estate are one of the, if not the most, relevant factor.
• Costs: high prices for the ﬁnished product (the buildings) stimulate higher prices
for acquiring the land and existing properties, as owners tend to ask for their
property the residual value of the land after redevelopment, which is the ﬁnal
value of the real estate minus the costs of capital, workforce, building materials
and knowledge. The price of the land and existing properties can thus be much
higher than the minimum land price, which is the residual value of the land
taking into account only the previous use possibilities. Thus the accounted cost
of the land, i.e. the price of the land that is regarded as one of the costs of the
development (inbrengwaarde in Dutch), can be much higher than the minimum
land cost. The accounted land costs are often one of the largest costs of redeveloping a site. This is one of the main ways in which the initial proﬁt ‘leaks out’,
i.e. in which the initial proﬁt is not available anymore to pay the public infrastructure and facilities. However, this difference between the ‘minimum’ and the
‘accounted’ land costs is actually not only caused by the context variable ‘Real
estate markets’, but also by the context variables A2, B1 and B2 and the actions
of those involved in the project (variables D1.1, D2.1, and probably also D4 and
D5) that inﬂuence the distribution of the initial proﬁt (see under).

46

Theoretical framework

A2) Plan and site features
Another relevant variable is the type, quality and quantity of the land and the previous public infrastructure and buildings that must be removed or refurbished in the
regeneration site. This will have a direct effect on costs of the project (the minimum
costs of acquisition of the properties, demolition of the previous buildings). The presence and type of soil contamination has a direct effect too on the costs of the project.
The location of the site within the urban fabric will affect the development potential
of the site (e.g. ofﬁces with a high or low rental value) and thus the possible returns
from the development.
A3) Markets of workforce and building materials, and ﬁscal regimes
The price of hiring skilled people to draft plans, studies, buildings and infrastructure,
and to build them, is fundamental for the costs. Labour costs can differ from year
to year, from region to region, from country to country. Also, the price of building
materials might change with time and differ between regions and countries. Finally,
differences in ﬁscal regimes can augment or diminish these costs, or the amount of
taxes to be paid, e.g. proﬁt tax, land transfer tax, etc.
2.4.2.2 Context variables that inﬂuence the distribution of the initial proﬁt,
i.e. the formal rules relevant to zoning (variables B)
These are the more stable (structural) factors that facilitate or impede certain types of
power relationships between the involved actors and thus their ability to take possession of a share of the initial proﬁt. They form the independent variable ‘formal
rules relevant to zoning’, on which this research focuses (see chapter 3). In section
2.1.1 and Figure 2 we already introduced these structural factors: they are the rules
that inﬂuence the resource distribution and the behaviour of the actors involved in
urban regeneration projects. In other words, these structural factors, together with
the context variables A, inﬂuence the actions of those directly involved in the project
(variables C and D).
B1) Formal rules about property rights
We have seen earlier in section 2.2 how property rights in land have become weaker,
from the almost unrestrained interpretation of the new liberal regimes in the 18th and
the 19th Centuries to the increasing limitations based on the concept of the social
function of property and other (e.g. sanitary) considerations. However, the landowner
still retains the control over the quando, i.e. when to use or build on his property.
Since the landowner can exclude others not only from deciding when to use or build
on his property, but also from actually using or building on it, he acquires a privileged
position in the urban markets: he is the only one who can provide land, and the only
one who decides when. This power has major consequences for the capturing of
value increase because it inﬂuences decisively the behaviour of the involved actors
(see variable D2). This variable ‘property rights’ embraces formal rules under public
law that might limit property rights, as e.g. the possibility of expropriating land or of
obliging landowners to participate in land readjustment.

Theoretical framework

47

B2) Formal rules about certainty and ﬂexibility in the development terms
We have seen earlier in section 2.3 that certainty or the lack of certainty beforehand
about the deﬁnitive development terms can have major consequences for capturing value increase. This is because certainty inﬂuences greatly the behaviour of the
involved actors (see variable D1). The variable ‘certainty’ embraces e.g. those regulations under public law that limit the costs that can be recovered from the property developers and landowners, because these legal limits determine the possible contents
of binding rules and other plan documents. Also included in this variable is whether
local public bodies can prescribe not only the physical zoning, but also aspects related to the ﬁnancing and implementation of public infrastructure and facilities. Do
binding rules regulate only a desired ﬁnal picture without stating who is responsible
for its implementation, or also the obligations that must be fulﬁlled by the developer?
How far can binding rules go in enumerating obligations? Can they include off-site
infrastructure? Social housing? Also, the variable ‘certainty’ embraces those regulations under public law concerning whether public bodies can condition the approval
of legally binding plans to the developer securing his contributions to the public
infrastructure and facilities. The approval of binding rules containing ﬁnancing and
implementation schedules about developers’ contributions does not automatically
mean that developers are committed to implement them. Additionally, there is the
need of a contractual commitment of the developer.
B3) Formal rules about the procedure of making land-use plans and granting
planning permissions
Planning law might include some guarantees for the handling of development applications, and there are differences between countries in the sort of guarantees and
how hard they might be in practice. Also, there are differences in how long and easy
the procedures are for modifying binding rules. And ﬁnally, there are also differences
in the possibility of approving binding rules gradually, plot by plot. We include these
variables because they might inﬂuence the behaviour of the involved actors (see variable D3) and thus be of importance for the capturing of value increase.
2.4.2.3 Actions of those directly involved in the project, including those with
formal powers, which inﬂuence the size of the initial proﬁt
(variable C)
C1) Deﬁnition of the contents and geographical scope of the plan
At the start of a project, the involved actors must deﬁne the contents of the plan and
the boundaries of the development site. The contents of the plan can be relevant for
the possibility of capturing value increase. For example, depending on how many
buildings the plan includes, the returns can be higher or lower. Also, it is relevant for
the costs how much quality and quantity public bodies pursue for the public infrastructure and facilities, or for the architecture etc., and how high are the contributions that public bodies expect from landowners and developers. More quantity and
quality might imply higher costs. The cases show a struggle here between at one side

48

Theoretical framework

the public bodies, which pursue a large contribution from landowners and developers, and at the other side the landowners and developers, which pursue large public
subsidization. Large contributions might lower the accounted price of the land and/
or narrow the ﬁnal proﬁt of the developer. But at the same time large contributions
relieve the municipality’s budget and/or allow more quality and quantity of public
infrastructure and facilities. And vice versa. Also, the boundary chosen for the plan
area (or geographical scope) of the development site might be relevant, for example
whether it excludes or includes the most proﬁtable or unproﬁtable parts. The deﬁnition of the plan contents and geographical scope is thus one of the most important
steps in urban development because it inﬂuences both the returns and the costs.
2.4.2.4 Actions by those directly involved in the project, including those with
formal powers, which inﬂuence the distribution of the initial proﬁt
(variables D)
D1) How the local public bodies use their formal powers about certainty in the
development terms
The actions of local public bodies making use of their formal powers about certainty
on development terms can inﬂuence the capturing of value increase. These actions
do not inﬂuence the capturing of value increase in a direct way, but through other
variables, or ‘intermediary variables’. That is, the use of these formal powers inﬂuences intermediary variables, which in turn inﬂuence the ﬁnal degree of captured
value increase.
D1.1) Accounted price of land and regular proﬁt margins
On the one hand, if the local public body creates certainty beforehand about future
building possibilities, this has an inﬂuence on the accounted land costs because the
landowner, thanks to his monopolistic-oligopolistic position, is able to successfully
ask a price for his land that internalizes the maximal possible price in the future.
Thus he anticipates the future building possibilities by asking the price that would be
economically reasonable in that future. On the other hand, if the local public body
creates certainty beforehand about which contributions the developer has to deliver,
this can also inﬂuence the accounted land costs, but inversely. When the developer
knows how much these contributions will cost him, he will internalize them into the
price of land in different ways. In case the developer has not yet bought the land, he
will internalize the contributions into the price to be paid to the landowner. In case
the developer has already bought the land, he will internalize the contributions into
the accounted land cost or into the regular proﬁt margin6 he will aim for in the operation. Accounted land costs and regular proﬁt margins are often not deﬁned at the
start of development processes. At that time, developers can often set them higher
6

We are talking here about the ‘normal’ or regular proﬁt margin, i.e. the proﬁt margin that the
developer charges as a kind of normal fee to each operation. This is different than the ‘ﬁnal proﬁt’,
which is additional to this regular proﬁt margin.

Theoretical framework

49

or lower. For example, developers often enter all the land for different development
sites in a common account. Losses and proﬁts are compensated with each other. A
developer confronted with a high contributions package will tend to account the
land for a lower price and accept that this development site will not contribute much
to the losses in other sites. Conversely, a developer confronted with a low contributions package will tend to account the land for a higher price. Regarding regular
proﬁt margins, developers can consider at the beginning of development processes
the size of the proﬁt, which may vary7. Once the accounted land costs and the regular
proﬁt margin have been established, lowering them is usually complicated. Both are
important ‘channels’ through which the initial proﬁt can leak out, leaving less money
over to contribute to the public infrastructure and facilities.
D1.2) Negotiation position
If before the start of the negotiations the local public body has already created certainty about future building possibilities, this public body has lost a powerful negotiation tool. It cannot offer anymore the building possibilities (i.e. to approve new
binding rules or modify the existing ones to allow more building possibilities) as a
medium of exchange. On the other hand, if the local public body has already created certainty about which contributions the developer has to deliver, his negotiation
position will be better as these requirements become the starting point of discussion.
Finally, if the public body openly makes the approval of legally binding plans conditional on the developer securing his contributions to the public infrastructure and
facilities, its position will be stronger than if it does not.
D2) How owners use their property rights
The actions of private bodies using their property rights can inﬂuence the capturing
of value increase. This inﬂuence takes place through other variables, or ‘intermediary
variables’. Property rights inﬂuence these intermediary variables, which in turn inﬂuence the ﬁnal degree of captured value increase.
D2.1) Accounted price of land and inﬂated development costs
Since the control of land gives a monopolistic-oligopolistic position, there arises
competition to acquire the right to control the land. The stimulant for actors to compete for the land is that once acquired, there is no more need to compete. The initial
landowners make a proﬁtable use of this situation. They are in a privileged position compared with the providers of the other production factors (capital, workforce,
building materials and knowledge), thus they are in an ideal negotiating position that
allows them to ask the maximum possible price for their right to control the land. The
consequence is that the price of land in a free market tends to absorb all the proﬁt: it
tends to be the residual value of the land after redevelopment, which is the ﬁnal value
of the real estate minus the costs of capital, workforce, building materials and knowledge. In sum, the privileged position of landowners stimulates the inﬂation of land
7

E.g. in the Netherlands the regular proﬁt margin can differ from roughly 20% to 5%.

50

Theoretical framework

prices from their minimum to their maximum value. This causes high accounted land
costs (i.e. the price at which the land is ‘bought in’ to the accounts of the project),
which reduce the initial proﬁt.
Those owning land can also use their property rights to delay regeneration, which
in turn can have an inﬂationary effect on development costs. Delay might be larger
when ownership is very dispersed because it might be more difﬁcult to assemble all
the needed land. However, it can also be that land is in hands of just one powerful
actor, who can afford to delay more than a multitude of small landowners can. See
below for how owners using their property rights can cause delay. Delay inﬂates
development costs in different ways: ﬁrst because delay might imply more studies,
negotiations, reports, meetings, of public ofﬁcers but also of developers; second because delay implies uncertainties and risks, which can translate into higher reserves
for unforeseen expenses; third, delay might imply higher costs to ﬁnance investments
that cannot be delayed, while the selling of the ﬁnal real estate products might last
longer. High development costs, together with high accounted land costs, jeopardize
the initial proﬁt and leave less money over to pay the public infrastructure and facilities. This leads to higher public subsidizing and/or to lower quality and quantity of
the public infrastructure and facilities.
D2.2) Negotiation position and delay
Since landowners do not feel threatened by other providers of land, they have a powerful negotiation tool. They can wait, without this necessarily damaging their future
negotiation position, as they will retain their monopolistic-oligopolistic position. The
consequence is that delaying development processes becomes a real alternative in
the negotiation strategy of landowners. But why would landowners delay? Because
waiting to develop can be more proﬁtable, as land also has an option value (Turnbull,
2005). If the landowner expects that the price of land could increase in the future,
and he is not in a hurry, it is economically rational to wait. For example, he might
expect that the local public body will ﬁnally lower the requirements, or that with
time the price of land will increase. It is very common that landowners proﬁt from
delay, as land prices often increase (at least during the period of data gathering in this
research). Waiting might be therefore a favourable option (Quigg, 1993; Capozza
and Li, 2002; Ball, 2003: 909).
Note that in this discussion about how landowners might use their property rights
in a particular regeneration project, we are assuming that it is private bodies that
own the land, or at least that the landowners seek economic proﬁt when using their
property rights. Public bodies owning land might choose to act in the same way
as private landowners do, or not. We are ignoring the possibility of a public body
owning land, so the possibility that a public body acts as private landowners is not
relevant here.

Theoretical framework

51

D3) How the local public bodies use their formal powers for the procedure of
approval of land use plans and planning permissions
We might expect that differences in the ﬂexibility of the procedures can have an
effect on regeneration projects. For example, if the local public body can approve
the binding rules gradually, in case negotiations with the developers/landowners of
a plan area do not ﬁnish all at the same time and there are still disagreements with
some of them, the local public body would be able to approve ﬁrst the binding rules
for the plots where the agreements were already concluded, and wait until the other
owners/developers agree. However, the relation between this variable with the ﬁnal
degree of captured value increase is not clear.
D4) How local public and private bodies interact informally
Informal rules, or what Ostrom called ‘working rules’ (1986: 466-467; see also Verhage, 2002: 160), might govern the behaviour of actors, and thus inﬂuence many of
the variables, and thereby inﬂuence in a direct way the capturing of value increase.
For example, the special relationship between housing associations and municipalities in the Netherlands largely inﬂuences the willingness of the associations to assume the costs of public facilities. The same could be said about a possibly special
relationship between a speciﬁc developer and a speciﬁc municipality. Another example in the Netherlands is that local public bodies prefer to reach consensus about
urban development with all the relevant involved parties. This might be partially a
cultural factor, i.e. the importance of consensus in Dutch local decision-making.
However, this might be also the consequence of the above-mentioned limited possibilities of local public bodies to oblige landowners to cooperate. In other words,
the preference of local public to achieve an agreement with the landowners might be
the consequence of how landowners use their property rights, and not (or not exclusively) an ideological preference.
D5) Speciﬁc circumstances
There might be speciﬁc circumstances of the persons involved, or of any other kind,
that can directly inﬂuence the ﬁnal degree of captured value increase. For example
the negotiation abilities of the involved public ofﬁcers or developers, or speciﬁc unforeseen technical problems. Another example, possibly relevant for the tempo of
implementation of realising the public goals, is whether or not public bodies use their
powers to force developers to provide on time the public infrastructure and facilities.
Nothing can be said in general about these speciﬁc circumstances, but when analysing a speciﬁc case we should be aware that they might be present.
2.4.2.4 How the intermediary variables inﬂuence capturing value increase
The discussion above has been summarised in Figure 4. We have distinguished between four sets of variables (A, B, C, D) which in one way or another can affect the
capturing of value increase. However, they do not usually do that directly but by
inﬂuencing certain intermediary variables.

52

Theoretical framework

Variables real estate markets (A1), plan and site features (A2), markets of workforce
and building materials, and ﬁscal regimes (A3) and deﬁnition contents and geographical scope plan (C1) shape together the intermediary variable initial proﬁt. Variables
public bodies using power certainty (D1) and owners using property rights (D2)
shape together intermediary variables accounted land costs, regular proﬁt margins,
inﬂated development costs, negotiation position and delay. The intermediary variable
initial proﬁt, together with intermediary variables accounted land costs, regular proﬁt
margins and inﬂated development costs (which in their turn are inﬂuenced by intermediary variable delay) shape together the intermediary variable ﬁnal proﬁt. The ﬁnal
proﬁt is crucial for the ﬁnal degree of captured value increase because it determines
the ﬁnancial room that the developer has for contributing to public infrastructure and
facilities. For example, if the developer who is negotiating with the municipality has
paid too much for the land and existing properties, or has already internalized a high
land price or regular proﬁt margin into the accounts of the operation, or has already
made too high development costs, whereby the returns are not large enough, he will
not be able and/or willing to contribute much, and vice versa.
Regarding the intermediary variables negotiation position and delay, those are relevant for intermediary variables accounted land costs and regular proﬁt margins. If
landowners do not face disadvantages from waiting, they might use this as a negotiation tool and wait until the municipality lowers the requirements. If municipalities
prescribe the building possibilities before negotiations start, landowners are already
sure about the potential residual value of land and developers about the potential
proﬁt margins. Assuming that the residual value is indeed higher than the previous
value, landowners can thus sell their land for a price higher than its minimum value,
and/or developers can enlarge their regular proﬁt margin, without necessarily having to agree with the municipality. In short, the municipality has less to offer to the
landowners and developers, and is thus in a weak position to require contributions.
Regarding the intermediary variable delay, this is also relevant for intermediary variable inﬂated development costs, as delay can have an inﬂationary effect on the costs
of developing the site. In addition, delay is indirectly negative for capturing value
increase because it implies delay in the realisation of the public infrastructure and
facilities. That is the reason that in the formulation of the research questions of this
research (see section 1.5) it was decided to include delay as one of the aspects to be
taken into account when measuring de degree of captured value increase.
In sum, there are different ways that can lead to the size of the initial proﬁt, to some
or all of this proﬁt leaking away, and thus to the size of the ﬁnal proﬁt. The consequence of the initial proﬁt leaking away is that public bodies might be forced to subsidise more, or to accept fewer and worse public infrastructure and facilities.

Figure 4. Illustration of the modelled causalities that explain the inﬂuence of third variables and formal rules relevant to zoning on capturing
value increase directly but mostly through several intermediary variables.

1. Real Estate markets
2. Plan and site features
3. Workforce and building materials

Context variables influencing size initial profit (A):

INTERACTION AMONG PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ACTORS IN COMPREHESIVE URBAN REGENERATION DEVELOPMENTS

< Phenomenon >

Theoretical framework
53

Theoretical framework

54

2.4.3

Financial analysis of the cases

In the previous section 2.4.2 it has been made clear that although there might be an
initial proﬁt that would allow contributing to public infrastructure and facilities, in
the course of development processes this initial proﬁt might be distributed in such
a way that ﬁnally there is no money left. The money might have ‘leaked out’ to inﬂated land prices or just to high regular and/or ﬁnal proﬁt margins of the developer. It
might also be that the initial proﬁt disappeared before the developer could gain from
it, so he cannot contribute. As De Greef put it, in this way the whole development
process can be regarded as a struggle between the various actors to gain more of the
increased value (1997). In addition, we have also seen that as a result of this struggle, land development costs might increase more than is necessary, diminishing even
more the initial proﬁt from which public infrastructure and facilities can be paid.
In sections 5.5, 6.4 and 7.4 it is explained, for respectively the region of Valencia,
England and the Netherlands, how all the mentioned variables shape the ﬁnal degree
of captured value increase. The ﬁnancial information about the studied cases, as
far as available, has been analyzed. This ﬁnancial analysis uses partially the model
developed by Verhage & Needham (2003: 25-28). The following sections give an example of a ﬁnancial analysis of how the initial proﬁt has leaked away to the involved
actors in the Dutch case Kop van Oost8. For a ﬁnancial analysis of the other cases,
see Annexes 3, 4 and 7.
2.4.3.1 Deﬁnition of costs and returns
First we distinguish the following costs and returns:
LAND COSTS
1. 1a. Minimum land costs: the market value of the land in its current use;
1b. Accounted land costs: the land price that the developer includes into the
calculations9.
DEVELOPMENT COSTS
2. On-site infrastructure provision costs: this includes not only the on-site infrastructure provision works, but also reserved amounts for unexpected expenses,
the overhead costs, possible ‘hidden’ proﬁt margins of the developer, etc. In the
8

The site in the Dutch case ‘Kop van Oost’ (5 ha, Groningen) was no longer in use, and 60% of the
land was owned by the former user, a wood-processing company. In 2000 intermediary Hollestelle
bought the land. After general development terms with the municipality had been negotiated, the
land has been re-sold twice to commercial developers: in 2001 to IBC and in 2002 to Heijmans.
Negotiations with Heijmans crystallised in 2005 in a Development Agreement. The plan was
deﬁnitively approved in 2006, including 430 dwellings, most of them apartments, and about 4,000
m² commercial space. In October 2007 infrastructure provision was ongoing. For more detailed
information see sections 7.3.3 and 7.4.

9

This is similar to the accounting term ‘book value’.

Theoretical framework

3.
4.
5.

6.

7.

55

Netherlands they comprise: Slopen, bouw en woonrijp maken, risico en onvoorzien. It should also include the ﬁnancing costs (interest payments etc.).
Plan preparation costs: the costs of the preparation of plans, studies, etc (Plankosten, or Voorbereiding, toezicht en planontwikkeling).
Soil decontamination costs.
Compensation costs: this includes compensation to existing owners and inhabitants, for removal of activities and residence, demolition of constructions and
buildings, etc.
Additional contributions of the developer: contributions of the developer, in
cash (payments) or in kind (construction or building of public infrastructure and
facilities) to public goals additional to his contributions to the on-site infrastructure provision costs (even if these might serve a wider area than the development
in question), which are already included in (2).
Real Estate development costs: this includes the whole development of the real
estate, thus not only the building costs, but also the preparation of plans (not for
providing the infrastructure but for the building), overhead costs, possible ‘hidden’ proﬁt margins of the developer, etc.

DEVELOPMENT RETURNS
8. Total returns: the total returns accruing from the selling of the real estate (ofﬁces,
dwellings, etc).

2.4.3.2 Deﬁnition of the Initial and the Final proﬁts
INITIAL PROFIT
The value increase that accrued from the regeneration of the site and could have
been initially available to pay public infrastructure and facilities:
8 – [ (1a + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7)not-inﬂated – (those costs of 2-7 subsidised by public
bodies) ]
Here we assume costs 1 till 7 are not inﬂated.
FINAL PROFIT
The proﬁts of the ﬁnal developer:
8 – [ (1b + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7) – (those costs of 2-7 subsidised by public bodies) ]
To this ﬁnal proﬁt must be added the regular proﬁt margin in case the ﬁnal developer
had included such in posting 7.
2.4.3.3 Financial analysis in case Kop van Oost
Let us ﬁrst see in Table 4 the costs and returns in this case:

Theoretical framework

56

Table 4. Costs and returns of Dutch case Kop van Oost
10

LAND COSTS
1) Land costs

1a. Minimum land costs: € 3.6m
At the time of data gathering (2008), the market price for the actual land use
before regeneration (industrial land) in this part of the city was about € 60-70/
m², and the best locations had a price of about € 80-90/m². The developer had
to buy about 4 ha. Thus, the market value of this industrial land in current use,
i.e. the minimum land cost, could not be more than: 40,000 m² X € 90 = €
3,600,000.
1b. Accounted land costs: at least € 12m
€ 12m is the price paid by developer IBC to intermediary Hollestelle in 2001.
Because the last developer Heijmans bought the land in 2002 (as part of IBC),
the price paid by Heijmans was probably higher.

DEVELOPMENT COSTS
2) Infrastructure
provision costs

3) Plan preparation
costs

Ca. € 7m (€ 1.9 m if not inﬂated, paid by the developer) + public subsidies
for infrastructure surrounding the new building (an unknown amount to us)
This € 7m is €368/m² new public space10 (19,000 m², 24% total plan area
of the Land use Plan); or €148/m² total redeveloped land (47,200 m², 59%
total plan area of the Land use Plan). Most probably, these costs include the
ﬁnancial costs of the investments. € 7m is much larger than the equivalent
costs in the region of Valencia, which are of about €100/m² new public space
and would have resulted in € 1.9 million if translated to Kop van Oost, that is
€ 5.1 million lower.
The contrast with the region of Valencia is even larger taking into account that
the ﬁgures in Valencia include the costs of the infrastructure between and in
the wide surroundings of the new buildings. On the contrary, in Kop van Oost
this € 7m includes almost only that public infrastructure situated between the
new buildings, or in the inmediate surrounding (the footpaths). The municipality had to subsidise heavily the wider infrastructure surrounding the new buildings, that is the refurbishing of the Sontweg and the Europaweg, the reparation
of the quay along the canal (about € 0.6m), and about 4,000 m² of new public
space. Most of these works (except the Sontweg) beneﬁt exclusively, or mostly,
the new buildings. The works on the Sontweg also beneﬁt other areas.

Ca. € 90m, paid by the developer
€90m is an estimation given by the ﬁnal developer, Heijmans.

DEVELOPMENT RETURNS
8) Total returns

Ca. € 112m or ca. € 139m
The developer Heijmans estimated the total revenues for the selling of the real
estate to be € 112m, inclusive VAT. Own estimations, based on the actual selling prices of real estate, produce higher ﬁgures, between € 139m and € 189m.
Consulted about this, experts assessed the ﬁrst estimation (€ 139m) as more
realistic (Stauttener & Van Bladel, interview 2008).

10 New public space is the surface that becomes redeveloped and will be used for public uses. Most
of land development costs relate to the construction of public infrastructure and facilities above or
under this surface.

Theoretical framework

57

How large was the Initial proﬁt?
The initial proﬁt in Kop van Oost was, according to the above formula 8 – [ (1a + 2 +
3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7)not-inﬂated – (those costs of 2-7 subsidised by public bodies) ]:
• With the minimum returns (€ 112m) and assuming that costs 1 to 5 are not inﬂated and follow the average costs in Valencia, this is 112 – [ (3,6 + 1.9 + subsidies municipality for infrastructure surrounding new buildings and of central +
0.5 + 0.1625 + 0 + 90) – (subsidies municipality + 0.125) ] = 112 – [ (96.1625 +
subsidies municipality) – (subsidies municipality + 0.125) ] = € 15.9625 million.
• With the maximum returns (€ 139) and assuming that costs 1 to 5 are not inﬂated and follow the average in Valencia, this is 139 – [ (3,6 + 1.9 + subsidies
municipality for infrastructure surrounding new buildings + 0.5 + 0.1625 + 0 +
90) –(subsidies municipality + 0.125) ] = 139 – [ (96.1625 + subsidies municipality) – (subsidies municipality + 0.125) ] = € 42.9625 million.
In this calculation, the Initial proﬁt excludes those necessary investments made
by the developer in public infrastructure and facilities. This was most of costs 2-3
(€ 1.9m), of cost 4 (€ 0.375m) and of cost 5 (€ 162,500,-), in total € 2.4375m. Most
of these € 2.4375m could be considered as necessary for the realisation of what this
research deﬁnes as public infrastructure and facilities (see section 1). If the calculations were to include these investments in public infrastructure and facilities, the
Initial proﬁt would have been:
• € 15.9625m + € 2.4375m = € 18.5 million;
• € 42.9625m + € 2.4375m = € 45.4 million.
In other words, of this larger Initial proﬁt, the developer has spent (assuming that costs
1 to 5 are not inﬂated) € 2.4375m in necessary investments in public infrastructure
and facilities. The rest of the Initial Proﬁt has not been spent on public infrastructure
and facilities, at least not on necessary investments.
What has leaked out of the Initial proﬁt?
We conclude that in case Kop van Oost the Initial proﬁt was large but most of it has
leaked away. This leaked money (i.e. € 15.9625 to € 42.9625 million) has not been
spent on investments necessary for the public infrastructure and facilities. Clearly,
the subsidies of the municipality (an unknown amount for us) and the central government (€ 0.125 million) would have not been necessary if a larger part of the Initial
proﬁt had not leaked away.
Where has the leaked Initial proﬁt gone?
The leaked Initial proﬁt has been consecutively been collected by the following private parties:
•

Inﬂated land costs: Accounted land costs – Minimum land costs = € 8.4 million
+ extra paid by Heijmans to IBC for land (price last land transaction - € 12 m).
The land was subjected to several resellings for a much higher price than the

58

Theoretical framework

price of the use possibilities before regeneration, so the ﬁrst owner, the intermediary Hollestelle and ﬁrst developer IBC have collected each a share of this
leaked Initial proﬁt. Let us see this more in detail:
F
The wood-processing company who initially owned the land: it appropriated a sum equal to the amount paid by intermediary Hollestelle (unknown
to us) minus the minimum land costs (€ 3.6m), minus its development costs
(its capital costs, probably not existing, as the company owned the land for
a while, plus the costs of selling the land);
F
Intermediary Hollestelle who bought the land in 2000: he appropriated a
sum equal to the amount paid to him in 2001 by developer IBC (€ 12m),
minus the price he paid to the wood-processing company (unknown to us),
minus his development costs (his capital costs, probably small as he had
an option to buy the land that allowed him to delay the payment of at least
most of the price, plus the costs of negotiating with the municipality, plus
the costs of selling the land);
F
Developer IBC, who bought the land in 2001: it appropriated a sum equal
to the amount paid in 2002 by developer Heijmans (unknown to us), minus
the price it paid to Hollestelle (€ 12m), minus its development costs (its
capital costs, plus the costs it could have made in preparing plans and negotiating with the municipality, plus the costs of selling the land);
•

Inﬂated land development costs: € 5.1 million
Development costs 2 and 3 might be inﬂated because of the delay in the development process and the risks involved. This money has gone to all those four
private parties involved in the regeneration process. This money went to costs
that might have been avoided in the Spanish region of Valencia. It could also be
that developer Heijmans has hidden here high regular proﬁt margins.

In section 2.1 we considered the power-relationship between public and private bodies in urban regeneration, and said that public bodies need to work with private
bodies in policy networks in order to achieve their goals (including capturing value
increase). We saw also that public bodies might be able to gain a more powerful role
in these policy networks in order to inﬂuence the other actors in the network and so
to improve the capturing of value increase. This can happen through two network
constitutions measures, which are formulated in this research as two hypotheses (informed speculations; Bryman, 2004: 540) about how public bodies can use their
formal powers on rules relevant to zoning for better capturing of value increase.
Whether these hypothesised causalities are found in practice depends, however, not
only on the correctness or otherwise of the hypotheses but also on the strength of all
the other variables that affect the capturing of value increase and which are included
in the model set out above.

The inspiration for the ﬁrst network constitution measure is explained in section 2.2
and concerns the formal contents of the right of property ownership. Splitting development rights from land ownership is assumed to be relevant for capturing value
increase. In an exploratory study in chapter 4 of nine Western European countries
(besides the Netherlands, also England, Spain/Valencia, Germany, France, Italy, Flanders, Denmark and Sweden), no country showed a full splitting, so it was not possible
to do empirical research on such a splitting. However, the study also showed the
singularity of the modiﬁcations in 1994 in the Valencian land readjustment, which
could be considered as a light or indirect form of splitting: in Valencia, infrastructure
provision is in practice separated from the property rights. The generalized application of the model made it possible to collect abundant empirical data about the practical consequences for capturing value increase.
The speculation is that a modiﬁcation of formal rules regarding land ownership could
modify the distribution of resources and the behaviour of actors within policy networks, in such a way that this could shape the sort of dependence, and hence the
power interactions between actors. In other words, temporarily taking over some

60

Theoretical framework

property rights during a land readjustment procedure could improve capturing value
increase. Within the model set out above, the hypothesis is that a modiﬁcation of one
of the context variables (formal rules on property rights, variable B1) could modify
the actions of the involved actors (how private parties use their property rights, variable D2). The ﬁrst hypothesis speculates therefore that:
A speciﬁc form of splitting the property rights on land (separating infrastructure provision from property rights) can modify the power-relationships in the network of actors
involved in urban regeneration, and this can improve capturing value increase.

2.5.2

The second network constitution measure: modifying the
level of certainty about future development terms

The inspiration for the second network constitution measure is explained above in
section 2.3 and concerns whether public bodies create certainty about the future
development terms before the regeneration project starts. Should certainty be created before or after negotiations take place? The degree of certainty depends on the
moment at which it is created, but also on the contents of the plan documents that
create certainty. Are they legally binding or only indicative? Do they regulate only the
physical zoning, or also other socio-economic requirements as for example whether
housing has to be social or free market? During data gathering an additional aspect
became apparent: do binding rules regulate only a desired ﬁnal physical picture
without stating who is responsible for its implementation, or also the obligations and
contributions that must be fulﬁlled by the developer?
Within the model set out above, the hypothesis is that a modiﬁcation of one of the
context variables (formal rules about certainty on development terms, variable B2)
could modify the actions of the involved actors (how the local public bodies use
their formal powers about certainty on development terms, variable D1). The second
hypothesis speculates therefore that:
Creating uncertainty in early stages of development processes about future building
possibilities, and certainty about future contributions, can inﬂuence capturing value
increase in a positive way.

CHAPTER

3
Method

This research studies a ‘phenomenon’: the interaction between municipalities making use of their competences regarding formal rules relevant to zoning1 and the developers/landowners regenerating a site. This is the same phenomenon in all the
studied countries, although there are differences in the features of the phenomenon
in each of the countries, and even in each case2.
We focus on several variables of our phenomenon, meaning by ‘variable’ an attribute
on which our phenomenon varies (Bryman, 2004: 29). Our goal is to know whether
the application of particular sorts of formal rules relevant to zoning (the independent
variable, which includes the variables B of the causal model in section 2.4.2) could
contribute to more effective capturing of value increase (the dependent variable).
We also take account of side effects (or side dependent variables), to one of which
special attention has been paid: the tempo of implementation. The reason for this is
that there might be a conﬂict between on the one hand improving the capturing of
value increase, and on the other a delay in the project (e.g. developers might not be
willing to agree to more contributions). The goal is thus to ﬁnd out which measures
might be positive for capturing value increase without at the same time delaying the
implementation. The ﬁnal goal is to produce knowledge that supports the formulation of recommendations for how Dutch practice could improve the recovery of costs
made for public infrastructure and facilities.
1

‘Formal rules relevant to zoning’ are all those formal rules that rule both binding rules (included the
implications for property rights in land) and not-legally binding policy documents (see section 1.3).

2

Swanborn makes a distinction between the ‘phenomenon’ and the ‘carrier’ who carries the
phenomenon. In this research we use the term ‘case’ meaning what Swanborn actually names
‘carrier’ of the phenomenon. Thus, the carrier or case in this research is a speciﬁc network of people
and institutions that interact with each other in a speciﬁc site, and doing so produce or bear the
phenomenon (1996: 17, 28-29).

Method

64

Taking into account these goals, and also the limitations of data gathering, we made
several choices:
1. First, this research is mainly based on several cases, as it was not possible to
gather data from a large enough sample of cases that would allow a statistical
analysis that would isolate the relationship between the independent and the
dependent variables (see section 3.1).
2. Second, this research needs to produce ﬁndings with a high validity and to avoid
the risk, inherent to case-based research, of producing knowledge, so speciﬁc
that it could not lead to general conclusions and recommendations (see section
3.2). This meant introducing three groups of measures to increase both the internal and the external validity of the ﬁndings:
a) Using the hypothetical-deductive method to empirically test the hypotheses
introduced in chapter 2 in such a way that, if they are found to be valid, they
can be applied to the Netherlands (see section 3.2.1.1);
b) Using variants of the ‘method of difference’ to tackle the risk of third variables, a risk that, following the model in section 2.4, is very high: this meant
for example choosing an international comparison of planning systems and
selecting cases very carefully (see section 3.2.1.2);
c) Using some techniques speciﬁcally to strengthen the external validity of the
ﬁndings, for example using data sources additional to the cases (see section
3.2.2).
Once the method and data gathering have been explained, section 3.3 will focus on
how each research question has been answered.

3.1

Why case research?

The ﬁndings in this research are based on the following sources of data: available
literature, eleven project cases (three/four in each country) and many interviews with
involved persons and relevant experts. Is was however not possible to study sufﬁcient
cases for a statistical analysis of the causal relationship between the independent
variable ‘formal rules relevant to zoning’ and the dependent variable ‘capturing value
increase’. There are two main reasons for this:
1. Urban (re)development projects are not so easy to reproduce in a laboratory as
for example physical, biological or even psychological phenomena. Our phenomenon is an open social system and thus too complex to be ´modulated´ in
an experiment (Swanborn, 1996: 22-24, 38-45);
2. The needed data are usually not fully available nor operational: there is not a list
of all the urban (re)development projects in the country (total population) which
would make possible a random selection of representative projects (sample). And
even if this random selection was possible, there are not enough data available
for all these projects and/or the data are not available in the needed form, be-

Method

65

cause the data are not quantiﬁable, because the projects are too old, or because
very relevant information is not available to the public (this is specially the case
in the Netherlands, and to a lesser extent, in England3), or because there are no
good archives, etcetera. But even if that information had been available, we did
not have the time to study a representative sample (Swanborn 1996, p. 59).

3.1.1

Multiple case design

Therefore, although available literature has been extensively used, this research can
be considered as a case-based one. We applied what the literature calls a ‘multiple
case design’ (N > 1), in Dutch ‘meervoudige case-study’s’ (Yin, 1989; Van Hoesel,
1985: 239; both quoted in Swanborn, 1996: 23), or a ‘cross case display’ design
(Miles en Huberman, 1994: 172-177). Such a research design consists of studying
several cases (four in Valencia, three in England and four in the Netherlands) and
comparing them with each other.
We chose case research not only because of the data gathering limitations. Also, the
case-study method was an appropriate complement to the available literature, which
often does not include up-to-date information about the studied phenomenon. In particular, the answer to Preparatory Research Question 2 in the Netherlands has rested
heavily on cases, as there is not much available data about the degree of captured value increase in Dutch practice. Also, the case-study method was necessary to get the
detailed information about the studied phenomenon, for this required using different
sources, paying attention to many aspects and measuring them at different moments.
This is not possible with a one moment-survey, there was need to be involved more
deeply in the phenomenon by studying some ‘carriers’ of it, i.e. some cases. We studied the development phase, which starts from the original situation and ends at the delivery and the beginning of the exploitation of the ﬁnal real estate products. This went
from the ﬁrst plan documents up to at least the signing of the development agreement,
using a variety of data sources (documents, interviews, visits to the site, etc). Finally,
the case-study method was necessary because there was need to study the cases in
their system, in their natural environment. It is not only that, as already mentioned,
it is not possible to isolate the phenomenon from the context and reproduce it in the
laboratory experiment. In addition, it is not desirable to do so for then we would have
missed the interactions with the context (Swanborn, 1996: 22-24, 38-45).
However, cases have not been studied in a ‘holistic’ way. This research was not
interested in the whole phenomenon, i.e. in a description of all the characteristics
3

An important part of data gathering was collected from the agreements between the involved public
and private parties. While in the Netherlands these agreements are not fully available for the public,
in England and Spain they are. In England the available agreements regard the contributions made
by the developers to the public. In Spain the available agreements have broader contents: besides
the contributions, they also include a detailed calculation of all land development costs.

Method

66

of the phenomenon, but rather in isolating the relevant variables of the phenomenon from the rest of the inﬁnite other aspects or variables that could characterize
the phenomenon (Swanborn, 1996: 11-18, 22-24, 26-28). The relevant variables are
the above-mentioned independent and dependent variables, which are subdivided
into several sub-variables in sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2. Except for the Dutch case De
Funen, all the cases have been studied following the same check lists that were used
in the literature research (see Annex 1). So both literature research and case research
have focussed on the same variables and sub-variables, complementing each other.
De Funen diverges somewhat because it served as pilot study. The deﬁnitive approach
and check-lists are based on the results of this pilot study (Swanborn, 1996: 100).
Cases have been selected as to strengthen the validity of the ﬁndings (see sections
3.2.1.2 and 3.2.2.2). In addition, some other, more practical selection criteria have
been used: those projects have been selected that were available in terms of availability
of archives, willingness of the involved persons to collaborate, visibility of the results,
etc. The American literature speaks here of ‘convenience sample’ (Swanborn, 1996: 59).

3.1.2

Interviews

Interviews have been an important data source. There were of two different sorts:
(1) Speciﬁc interviews, each one being different from the others, meant for ﬁnding
speciﬁc knowledge to ﬁll in the holes in literature and cases; (2) Generic interviews,
meant for obtaining knowledge about the possible causal relationship between the
independent variable and the dependent variable: this sort of interview was used for
answering Preparatory research question 3. The construction of the questionnaire for
the generic interviews has followed a meticulous method (Emans, 2002: 114-160).
All those interviews have the same semi-structured form: all the relevant sub-variables of ‘formal rules relevant to zoning’ were listed that might inﬂuence any of the
sub-variables of ‘capturing value increase’.

3.1.3

Moment of data gathering

The data gathering took place before the international ﬁnancial and economic crisis,
which started in Summer/Autumn of 2008. For Spain, the data gathering took place
before the start at the end of 2007 of the crisis in the Spanish real estate market. This
means that one of the context variables that inﬂuence the size of the initial proﬁt in
urban regenerations projects (real estate markets, variable A1 in the causal model,
see section 2.4.2.1) might be different nowadays (projects are nowadays confronted
with substantially lower returns). For each country, data gathering took place at the
following times (see, for more details, section ‘Sources’):
• Exploratory study of the Netherlands, England, Spain, Germany, France, Italy,
Flanders, Denmark and Sweden: desk research and most of the interviews in the

Method

•

•
•

•

67

Spring of 2006, rest of interviews during 2006, 2007 and beginning 2008.
Region of Valencia: desk research in Summer and Autumn 2006, in situ research
(the cases and most of the interviews) in November and December 2006, and
several interviews during 2007 and 2008;
England: desk research in Winter and Spring 2007, in situ research (the cases and
some interviews) in June 2007, and most of the interviews during 2006 and 2007;
The Netherlands: desk research in 2005, in Summer and Autumn 2007, and
most recent literature in Autumn 2009 and winter 2009-2010; in situ research
beginning of 2005 for case and interviews De Funen, and Winter of 2007-2008
for the rest of cases including the interviews. Some additional interviews have
been made in Autumn 2007 and the Spring and Summer of 2008.
Last uptodate: for important data we have made a last round of data gathering at
the end of 2009 and during 2010.

3.2

The validity of the ﬁndings

A fundamental question in case-based research is whether the ﬁndings are valid.
How trustworthy are they? Central to this question are the concepts of ‘internal validity’, i.e. can the ﬁndings explain the studied cases?; and of ‘external validity’, i.e.
are the ﬁndings generalizable to other cases? (Miles & Huberman, 1994: 278; León
y Montero, 1997: 71-75, 122-124, 136-138; Polit et al., 2001: 192-195; Campbell
& Stanley 1963: quoted in León & Montero: 122 and in Polit et alia: 193). There is
neither a unanimous opinion about how to reach this trustworthiness, nor whether it
is necessary or not to achieve it, and to which degree (Miles and Huberman, 1994;
Myers, 2000; León & Montero, 1997; Swanborn, 1987: 82-83).
It has already been mentioned that the limitations of data gathering made it impossible to produce ﬁndings with the validity that characterizes experimental and statistical research, i.e. that kind of research that has the possibility of totally isolating,
through experiments or through statistical analysis, the studied variables (Swanborn,
1996: 59). In spite of these limitations, this research needs to achieve a certain level
of validity in order to produce good recommendations for the Dutch practice, i.e. to
avoid recommendations that are too case speciﬁc. In this we agree with Miles and
Huberman when they say, referring to this dilemma, that “Although we may acknowledge that ‘getting it all right’ is an unworkable aim, we should (…) try to ‘not get it
all wrong’” (1994: 277).

3.2.1

Internal validity

Internal validity means that the ﬁndings can explain the case projects studied in this
research. We need a reasonable level of internal validity in order to be able to claim,

68

Method

when answering Preparatory Research Question 3 (see section 3.3.3), that we can
infer in the studied cases the causal nature of the relationship between the variable
‘formal rules relevant to zoning’ and the variable ‘capturing value increase’. Only by
obtaining true knowledge about how the former does actually inﬂuence (or not) the
latter in the studied cases is it possible to claim that the ﬁndings are internally valid.
In order to increase the internal validity of the ﬁndings, two methodological strategies
have been applied that reinforce each other: the hypotheses-deductive method and
the method of difference.
3.2.1.1 The hypothetical-deductive method
The ﬁrst methodological strategy is the hypothetical-deductive method (León &
Montero, 1997: 8-21). Both the causal model set out in section 2.4 and the two hypotheses included in section 2.5 speculate about the possible relationship between
variables ‘formal rules relevant to zoning’ and ‘capturing value increase’. We checked
empirically whether these speculations match the real world or not. That is, this research is an empirical testing of the speculations. See chapter 8 for the confrontation
between speculations and ﬁndings.
3.2.1.2 The method of difference
The second methodological strategy is a more classical method: see if differences in
the variable ‘formal rules relevant to zoning’ correspond or not with differences in the
variable ‘capturing value increase’ (León & Montero, 1997: 106-117). This is actually
based on what Mill called in the XIX Century the ‘method of difference’: if a speciﬁc
value of a ﬁrst variable happens in one situation, but not in the other, and both situations are exactly the same except for a second variable, than the second variable is
the cause or the consequence of the differences in the value of the ﬁrst variable (Mill,
1846: quoted in Swanborn, 1994: 239; 1996: 132).
a) The risk of third variables
The main problem to be dealt with when applying the method of difference is the
possibility of third variables, also called ‘alternative independent’, ‘confounding’ or
‘extraneous’ variables. The methodological risk is that the changes in the variable
‘capturing value increase’ are not caused by changes in the variable ‘formal rules
relevant to zoning’, but by another variable, for example any speciﬁcity of the context of the cases (variables A in causal model, see section 2.4.2), or by the contingent
behavior of those involved in the cases (variables C and D). It might look as if changes
in the variable ‘formal rules relevant to zoning’ cause changes in the variable ‘capturing value increase’, but actually both changes are caused by that third variable. In
other words, the correlation between the variables ‘formal rules relevant to zoning’
and ‘capturing value increase’ is spurious, and the ﬁndings might not be relevant for
elaborating recommendations.
b) Measure to assess the role of third variables: list of possibly third variables
To avoid the problem of a ‘spurious’ correlation, this research should check every

Method

69

possible third variable, and assess if that can explain all the correlation between our
variables. This project has pursued this by elaborating a list of possible third variables and assessing their role in each country and case. These possible third variables
were: personal circumstances of the involved persons and political circumstances
(variables D4 and D5), market price of housing (variable A1), and any other possible
third variable named (at our invitation) by the interviewed persons (D5). This has led
to substantial expansion of the initial conclusions about the inferred causal relations.
For example, the cases in England and especially in the Netherlands showed that a
third variable, the ﬁnancial feasibility of the projects, inﬂuences very much the capturing of value increase, which modiﬁed substantially our causal analysis. In addition
this led us to research more deeply into the returns and costs of all the cases, and
thus to include in the analysis the features of the site and the plan (variable A2), the
situation in the markets for workforce and building materials, the ﬁscal regimes (A3),
and the deﬁnition of the contents and boundaries of the plan (C1).
c) Measures to control third variables: limiting the total population of cases and
applying cross-country comparative method
Other measures have been introduced to ‘control’ all or at least as many as possible alternative third variables (León & Montero, 1997: 110-117; Polit et alia, 2001:
188-192). The general principle underlying these measures is to hold the context as
constant as possible, introducing changes only in the variable ‘formal rules relevant
to zoning’, and seeing what happens with the variable ‘capturing value increase’. So
several measures have been introduced to isolate both variables from possible third
variables. These measures are of two sorts: a ﬁrst group aims at holding the context
as similar as possible, and a second group aims at selecting countries that show the
broadest variance in the variable ‘formal rules relevant to zoning’. This combination
is a methodological strategy referred to as ‘most similar systems design’ and is appropriate to uncover causal relationships between two variables (Pierre, 2005: 454-455).
i) Maintaining the context as similar as possible
- Limiting the total population of cases: to minimize the potential variance of third
variables, the total population of possibly cases is limited to those that ﬁt within the
formulation of the problem of this research (see section 1.5). Besides helping to keep
the context constant, this assures also that the cases bear enough information. This is
what Swanborn calls ‘information-rich’ cases (1996: 61), and Miles and Huberman
the ‘intensity’ of cases (1994: 28). We have studied those cases that ﬁt the following
criteria:
F
Urban regeneration schemes;
F
Land is mostly in private hands, i.e. mostly not owned by public bodies;
F
There are public infrastructure and facilities that cost money;
F
Comprehensive development areas of a certain size that involve a notable value
increase;
F
Projects are ﬁnished or quite advanced (at least, the development agreement is
already sealed), and results on captured value increase can already be measured.

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Method

- Cross-country comparative method among relatively similar countries: to further
minimize the potential variance of third variables, those countries have been studied
in which the general political, economical and social context was somewhat similar.
This led ﬁrst to an explorative research of several countries that are likely to have a
similar context to the Dutch. They are, besides the Netherlands, eight other West European countries, all of them EU-members: England, Spain, Germany, France, Italy,
Flanders, Denmark and Sweden. We are aware of the large differences between these
countries, but we are at the same time convinced that these differences are less than
if having chosen countries in other regions or continents.
ii) Cross-country comparative method among countries with broadest variance in independent
variable
Of all these eight countries, those were selected for in-depth research that show the
broadest variation in the variable ‘formal rules relevant to zoning’: these are England
and the Spanish region of Valencia. Both countries could be considered in some
relevant aspects as examples of opposite models (see chapter 4). This choice corresponds with the strategy ‘heterogeneity in the independent variable’ (Swanborn,
1996: 62-64), which consists of maximizing the variation in the variable ‘formal rules
relevant to zoning’. This increased the chances that a possible causal relationship
with the variable ‘capturing value increase’ becomes visible. This makes this research
an international, comparative study that seeks inspiration in other countries in order
to elaborate recommendations for the Dutch government.
d) Measures to control the third variables: selecting innovative cases
The strategy of ‘heterogeneity in the independent variable’, which led to a crosscountry comparative method (see above), has been continued by selecting cases that
might include innovative practices in the way municipalities used the formal rules
relevant to zoning. To ﬁnd out which these cases were, local experts and directly
involved persons have been asked. The innovative practices have been grouped following the same grouping of sub-variables as in Preparatory Research Question 3
(see section 3.3.3).
i) Certainty beforehand about future development possibilities and contributions
(sub-independent variables Where & When)
Cases were selected in which municipalities have used this aspect, whether it was
creating ﬂexibility about the future building possibilities (Valencia: Periodista, Camino and, to a lesser extent, Benalúa; England: Megabowl and part of Temple Quay;
The Netherlands: all cases); or creating certainty about the future contributions (Valencia: all cases; England: Megabowl, Harbourside and part of Temple Quay; The
Netherlands: Kruidenbuurt and Stationskwartier).
ii) Possibly contents of the relevant binding rules (sub-independent variable What)
There are two possibilities: i) In Valencia and England, binding rules can include
affordable housing, and this actually happened in the Valencian cases Guillem and

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71

Periodista and in all the three English cases. In the Netherlands, in principle, binding
rules, under the Physical Planning Act before 1 July 2008, cannot require affordable
housing. However, in practice municipalities might try to ﬁnd a way of doing this.
In case De Funen the municipality included affordable housing in the Development
Agreement, and in Kruidenbuurt affordable housing was included not only in the
agreement, but also in the Explanation (Toelichting) of the Land use Plan. ii) In Valencia and England, binding rules may include a wide range of contributions, including
payments, implementation of public facilities, etc., and this is what happened in all
studied cases. In the Netherlands, the possibilities to include contributions in the
relevant binding rules were limited under the Physical Planning Act in force till 1 July
2008. Two cases have been selected in which the municipality tried to include a wide
range of contributions in the development agreement: Kruidenbuurt and Stationskwartier. The Development contributions Plan, new since 1 July 2008, has introduced
the possibility of including contributions in the binding rules (the Development contributions Plan) also, but this came too late for the data gathering.
iii) Making the Land use Plan conditional on capturing value increase (sub-independent variables
When and What)
In Valencia and England, municipalities can make the approval of the binding rules
conditional on a development agreement that secures the capturing of value increase, which is what actually happened in all the studied cases. Formally, Dutch
municipalities cannot condition the Land use plans to a contractual commitment in
a direct and open way. However, in practice this happens often, as was the case in
all the four studied cases.
iv) Using the land readjustment regulation to oblige developers to compete with other
developers (sub-independent variable Who)
Of the three countries, only in Valencia is there a land readjustment regulation. Almost all urban development there follows this regulation, and this was so in all four
cases. The regulation makes it possible for developers not owning land to be selected
as urbanizing agent. Municipalities can organize a public tender in which more than
one proposal is evaluated. In all the cases there was such a tender, and in Guillem,
Camino and Benalúa, more than one developer competed to be selected as urbanizing agent.
v) Procedural guarantees for the initiative-holders (sub-independent variable How)
These are of three sorts: i) Those cases have been selected in which developers used
legal guarantees to force the procedure of approval (Valencia: Periodista) or they did
not but these guarantees might have been indirectly relevant by limiting the freedom of action of municipalities (Valencia: all the cases; England: Temple Quay and
Harbourside). ii) Binding rules in all three countries can include global land use
regulations that can be detailed afterwards. This could allow an operational use in
the negotiations with landowners. Cases have been selected that included this provision (Valencia: all cases; England: Temple Quay and Harbourside; the Netherlands:

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72

Kruidenbuurt and part of Stationskwartier). iii) Ease of modifying the binding rules:
binding rules in all the three countries can be modiﬁed. Cases have been selected
where the binding rules were modiﬁed (Valencia: Periodista, Camino and Benalúa;
England: Temple Quay and Harbourside; the Netherlands: Kruidenbuurt, Kop van
Oost and Stationskwartier).
e) Measures to control third variables: repeated measurement
Another technique to control possible third variables is to study the phenomenon
before and after a modiﬁcation of only the independent variable ‘formal rules relevant to zoning’, and see what happens with the dependent variable ‘capturing value
increase’. The phenomenon is thus measured at two different moments: before and
after the modiﬁcation of the independent variable, while the rest of the context (the
potential third variables) remain the same, or almost the same. In the Spanish region
of Valencia it was possible to apply this technique: here, in 1994 a new law introduced very important changes in the land readjustment regulations (sub-independent
variable Who), while possible third variables like culture, public policies, ﬁnancial
situation of the municipalities (variables D4 and D5 in causal model) and developments in the real estate markets (variable A1) remained the same. Because there
were no dossiers available of suitable cases in the period before 1995, this research
had to limit the data gathering for Spain for that period to literature and interviews.
For the period after 1995, case-research also was used. In England also it has been
possible to apply this technique: in cases Megabowl and part of Temple Quay, the
Development Agreement was negotiated after the Bristol Local Council approved in
2005 the policy document SPD4. This document created certainty about the future
contributions (sub-independent variables Where and When). The introduction in the
Netherlands of a new Physical Planning Act in 2008 offers in principle similar opportunities, but came too late, as the data gathering ﬁnished before the new Act has
had consequences in practice.
f) Inferring causal relationships
Thanks to all mentioned measures it was possible for us to achieve valid knowledge
about the studied cases. When formulating our conclusions about the causal relationship between the independent and the dependent variables however, we are
however cautious. Instead of claiming that we prove a causal relationship, we claim
that we infer the possibly causal nature of the relationship, i.e. we argue why it seems
reasonable to us that there might be causality in a certain direction (Bryman, 2004:
76, 230-1).

3.2.2

External validity

The other important aspect of the validity of the ﬁndings is the external validity. This
refers to the generalizability of the research ﬁndings to other cases.

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3.2.2.1 How much external validity do we need in case-research?
There is much discussion about the minimum needed level of external validity in
case-research. Is internal validity alone enough to understand how the real world
works? Some authors consider that internal validity is good enough because it proves
that something can happen (León & Montero, 1997: 123-124). Miles and Huberman talk here about ‘analytic induction’ (1994: 146), and Yin about ‘analytic’ or
‘theoretical generalization’ (1989: 21, 44): instead of generalizing to populations or
universes, it is possible to generalize to theoretical propositions, i.e. lending greater
conﬁdence to the hypothesis by testing it against the ﬁndings in the cases. Therefore,
the goal is not to demonstrate the validity of a ﬁnding for the samples not studied,
but to demonstrate that the theoretical assumptions/hypotheses actually work in the
studied cases and are thus reasonably generalizable to the rest of the population of
similar cases. Or, as Niederkoﬂer stated it:
´The case-study investigator’s goal is not to demonstrate the validity of an
argument for statistical populations or universes. Rather, he aims to create and expand rich theoretical frameworks that should be useful in analysing similar cases’ (Niederkoﬂer, 1991: quoted in Swanborn, 1996: 67).
Actually, as Swanborn observes (ibidem), what Yin does is consider the studied case
to be the same as a causal experiment in a laboratory. In experiments, the context
of the studied variables (all possibly third variables) is perfectly controlled, so that
there is no doubt that the ﬁndings are absolutely internally valid. Such ﬁndings allow theoretical statements: the theory is true or not true because the results of the
experiment conﬁrm or deny it, even if only one or several cases were involved. In
other words, in experiments it is possible to control all the differences in the context of all the cases of the total population, and therefore it is possible to reject any
possibly alternative explanation to the ﬁndings. There is thus no need for any ‘representative’ sample of cases because the studied cases are representative enough.
The ﬁndings are thus externally valid, and are also transferable to all the cases in the
total population.
We share the opinion of Swanborn (1996: 67) that cases in social science research
in general, and thus also in this research, are not fully comparable to a laboratory
experiment as Yin implicitly postulates. The application of the above-mentioned hypothetical-deductive method and the measures for controlling all possible alternative
third variables might offer some external validity: we can reasonably expect that
other similar cases also would produce the same or similar results. However, this
is not enough, as we still must face the risk of basing the ﬁndings upon too speciﬁc
cases. What if the studied cases are rarities, extremes within the total population of
cases? Too speciﬁc ﬁndings impede a ceteribus paribus reasoning, because there
are not other similar cases, i.e. cases with comparable circumstances in which the
conclusions would be valid. The ﬁndings would be interesting only for the studied
cases, but neither for the rest of the population nor for the recommendations for the

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74

Dutch practice. In our opinion this research must be able to claim that what happens
in the studied cases is not exceptional and is valid for other cases. Or, if our cases are
exceptional, at least we need to identify the speciﬁc features that make them exceptional. Anyway, whether or not we want our ﬁndings to stand for other cases, or at
least to explain why they are an exception, we need some knowledge about the other
cases in the population, i.e. some knowledge of the context. In other words, there is
need to strengthen the validity of the ﬁndings by means additional to those explained
up to now. The goal is to be able to claim that it is reasonable to expect, or plausible,
that the recommendations would be applicable in other cases.
Table 5. Selection of cases according to the main sorts of urban regeneration projects.

Valencia

England

The Netherlands

Multifunctional central
areas

Guillem de Anglesola and
Periodista Gil Sumbiela

Temple Quay

Stationskwartier

Monofunctional residential
areas

Guillem de Anglesola and
part of Benalúa Sur

(*)

Kruidenbuurt

Old Brownﬁeld sites

Periodista Gil Sumbiela,
Camino Hondo and part of
Benalúa Sur

Megabowl and Harbourside

De Funen and
Kop van Oost

•
•
•

Multifunctional central areas consist of city/town central areas and sites around railway stations.
Monofunctional residential areas consist of districts with a predominant residential use.
Old brownﬁeld sites are derelict sites: business and other sorts of economic-industrial activities; gas and
electricity factories; harbor areas; railway infrastructure; and hospitals, government buildings and military
sites.

(*) It was not possible to ﬁnd a case in England that would ﬁt within this category.

3.2.2.2 How to strengthen the external validity of the ﬁndings
a) Representative cases
A ﬁrst attempt has been made to achieve some general knowledge by selecting cases
that somehow stand for the main sorts of urban regeneration projects in that country.
This leads to a selection of cases that span the range of sorts of urban regeneration
projects that are common in the Netherlands (Kolpron, 2000: 8-31). See chapter 7.1
for an extensive explanation of this categorization, and table 5 for how the studied
cases ﬁt within the categorization. Doing so we avoided the risk of focusing only on
a speciﬁc sort of cases and ignoring other relevant sorts of regeneration schemes.
b) Supplementary sources
To further increase the external validity of the ﬁndings, other sources of more or less
general knowledge have been analyzed:

Method

•
•

75

Data has been sought about other cases. Sometimes there was quite generalizable data available, specially in Valencia and England;
Interviews with experts, who gave information about other cases they know.

The case-based ﬁndings have been positioned within this more general knowledge.
This has allowed assessing the external validity of the ﬁndings from the cases. This
was particularly relevant for the ﬁndings about the third variable ‘development costs’
(initially a third variable that became part of the focus of this research and has been
renamed an ‘intermediary variable’, see ﬁgure 4 in section 2.4.2.4). The ﬁrst ﬁndings
for the Netherlands (that suggested that development costs are much higher there
than in England and, specially, in Valencia) were based on just three cases, as there
were no other available relevant sources. In order to check the validity of these ﬁndings, we approached two Dutch experts. They validated our initial ﬁndings by making
a study of the equivalent development costs in three current Dutch cases and comparing their ﬁndings with the ﬁndings of our three cases.
3.2.2.3 Some examples
By applying these measures, it was possible to assess the speciﬁcity of the ﬁndings,
and whether they could serve or not for the ﬁnal conclusions. Here are several examples:
– In the Valencian cases Guillem and Periodista, the municipality had introduced
social housing in the binding zoning plan, and we concluded that this was an
important cause of the developer ﬁnally realizing social houses. However, after studying statistics about social housing production and interviewing several
experts, it became clear that these cases are more an exception than the rule
(see section 5.5.2.2). Valencian municipalities seem, until recently, not have included much social housing in the binding zoning plans. Does this mean that
the ﬁnding (including social housing in binding zoning plans leads to more realized social housing) was not useful? Not at all, as the ﬁndings were clear that if
municipalities include social housing in binding zoning plan (what is more and
more the case the last couple of years), then this leads to mores social housing
being built.
– In the English case Megabowl the local development plan (a non-legally binding
zoning plan) foresaw no redevelopment of this former bowling alley (see section
6.4.1.1). We concluded that this has had a positive effect for the captured value
increase: due to the complete absence of any building prospective, developers
were not interested in buying the site, which discouraged any price increase
of the land, which in turn left more ﬁnancial room for the owner to contribute
more generously to public infrastructure and facilities, as he indeed did. However, during the interviews it became clear that this case was certainly special,
as another variable was also relevant, of the sort A1 in causal model (see section 2.4.2): the last years other bowling alleys were opened in the city, which
damaged the proﬁtability of the bowling alley in our site and thus lowered its
market value. This played a role in the willingness of the owner to contribute so

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–

–

3.3

generously. Does this mean that the ﬁnding (low certainty about future building
possibilities leads to high capturing value increase) is not valid? We concluded
that the ﬁnding was valid because: 1) the low market value of the bowling alley
might have inﬂuenced the willingness of the owner, but not the lack of interest
of developers in buying the land; and 2) the ﬁnancial outcomes of other urban
regeneration cases (e.g. case Harbourside in England, but also other cases in
Valencia and the Netherlands) also are affected by the fact that the former use in
the site has a low market value (old deteriorated industrial areas, etc).
In the Dutch cases Kruidenbuurt and Stationskwartier, the developer and the
public administration agreed the contributions in early stages of the development process, while in the cases De Funen and Kop van Oost they did not (see
section 7.4.1.1). After consulting additional sources and interviewing several experts, we concluded that the ﬁrst two cases are the exception, and the last two
the rule. It became clear that both in Kruidenbuurt and Stationskwartier there
was a speciﬁcity that explained why contributions were agreed in early stages:
in Kruidenbuurt a special relation between the developer (a housing association) and the municipality, and in Stationskwartier the speciﬁcity of the project
(a semi-public railway company wanting a new railway station), both variables
of the sort D4. Is the ﬁnding (early certainty about contributions is good for
capturing value increase) valid? Yes, because it is clear that if there is certainty,
whatever the reason might be for this, then it results in better capturing. Also, this
led to additional data gathering that led us to conclude that in the Netherlands,
housing associations contribute more to public infrastructure and facilities than
commercial developers because associations always have a special relation with
public bodies and the achievement of public goals, specially in the ﬁeld of social
housing.
Supplementary sources have been very relevant for answering the Preparatory
research question 2. In sections 5.6, 6.5 and 7.5 we explain the degree to which
developers contribute to public infrastructure and facilities. In those sections the
case-based data have been systematically placed against other available studies
(abundant in Spain and England) and against the interviews with many experts
that assessed whether the case-based ﬁndings were representative or not. For
example, in the Netherlands the interviews and a small survey conﬁrmed that
commercial developers do not contribute at all to off-site public infrastructure
and facilities. However, some experts pointed out that, sometimes, there are
some contributions to local funds for off-site infrastructure (see section 7.5).

Answering the Research Questions

In chapters 5 to 7 (chapter 5 for Valencia, 6 for England and 7 for the Netherlands)
ﬁrst a general introduction is given to the studied countries and cases. This general
introduction describes the allocation of competences on planning law and on the

Method

77

making and implementation of planning policy, and describes the different actors
involved in urban development, the policies for urban regeneration, and the legal
framework for capturing value increase. For each case there is given a separate introduction to the development site, to the history of the development and to the current
situation. Additionally, we studied for each case the amount of development costs
and proﬁts, distinguishing between land development costs (land price, infrastructure
provision costs, soil decontamination and compensation costs), real estate development costs and the ﬁnal proﬁts.
Then, we answer three Preparatory Research Questions for each country and case.
These questions are:
• Preparatory research question 1: How can those formal rules relevant to zoning
be used in comprehensive urban regeneration developments on privately owned
land? This focuses on the independent variable ‘formal rules relevant to zoning’.
• Preparatory research question 2: What is the extent of capturing value increase in
comprehensive urban regeneration developments on privately owned land? This
focuses on the dependent variable ‘capturing value increase’.
• Preparatory research question 3: How does the way in which formal rules relevant to zoning are used inﬂuence capturing value increase? This focuses on the
causal relationship among the independent and the dependent variables.
We answered the research questions as follows. The theoretical framework served to
formulate a causal model (see section 2.4.2) and, central to this causal model, two
hypotheses (section 2.5):
1. Hypothesis 1: A speciﬁc form of splitting the property rights on land (separating
infrastructure provision from property rights) can modify the power-relationships
in the network of actors involved in urban regeneration, and this can improve
capturing value increase.
2. Hypothesis 2: Creating uncertainty in early stages of development processes
about future building possibilities, and certainty about future contributions can
inﬂuence capturing value increase in a positive way.
Preparatory research question 1
Using variables B2 and D1 of the causal model and the second hypothesis we saw
that in order to answer Preparatory Research Question 1 we needed information
about three sub-variables (Where, When, What). In addition, using variables B1 and
D2 of the causal model and the ﬁrst hypothesis we saw that we needed a model
of dependence analysis and information about a fourth sub-variable (Who). Finally,
based on variables B3 and D3 of the causal model we realized that we needed information about a ﬁfth sub-variable (How).
Preparatory research question 2
We used a criterion of conformance (i.e. whether the actual spatial development is
according to plan) to answer Preparatory research question 2. We needed informa-

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78

tion about: 1) what are the goals for capturing value increase?; 2) who pays to achieve
those goals?; and 3) is the implementation on time? Using this we deﬁned all the subvariables (sorts of capturing value increase).

how can formal rules relevant to zoning
improve cost recovery in the Netherlands?

Figure 5. Inputs in the detailing and answering of the research questions.

Preparatory research question 3
In order to answer this question we needed to infer the sort of causal relationship
between the independent and the dependent variables. We did so using the model of
dependence analysis (that presupposes the possible causal relationship on the basis
of the allocation of resources) and the method of difference.
Main Research Question
After each preparatory question had been answered for each country in chapters 5
to 7, those answers were used to answer in chapter 9 the Main Research Question:
• Main research question: How could formal rules relevant to zoning be used in
the Netherlands in order that the proﬁtable parts ﬁnance as much as possible the

Method

79

unproﬁtable parts? This focus on elaborating recommendations for the Dutch
practice.
See Figure 5 for an overview of how the different inputs have been used to operationalize the research questions.

3.3.1

Answering Preparatory Research Question 1

Preparatory Research Question 1 is:
How can those formal rules relevant to zoning be used in comprehensive urban
regeneration developments on privately owned land?
To make this question operational for data gathering, the variable ‘formal rules relevant to zoning’ has been divided into ﬁve sub-variables. Four of them are taken
from the causal model (variables B1, B2, D1 and D2), two hypotheses and a model
of dependence analysis. The ﬁfth sub-variable is taken from the causal model alone
(variables B3 and D3).
Causal model (variables B2, D1) + Hypotheses 2 ¼ sub-variables Where, When
and What
The second hypothesis is: Creating uncertainty in early stages of development processes about future building possibilities, and certainty about future contributions can
inﬂuence capturing value increase in a positive way.
This assumption has been translated into several researchable sub-variables of the independent variable. Based on these sub-variables it was possible to elucidate whether there is, or is not, certainty, which type of certainty (about building possibilities or
about contributions), and when (early or later in development processes):
• Where (in which planning documents) are the relevant zoning regulations
brought into force?
• When (in relation to the negotiations) are the relevant zoning regulations approved?
• What are the possibly contents of the relevant zoning regulations?
Causal model (variables B1, D2) + Hypothesis 1 ¼ sub-variable Who
The ﬁrst hypothesis is: A speciﬁc form of splitting the property rights on land (separating infrastructure provision from property rights) can modify the power-relationships
in the network of actors involved in urban regeneration, and this can improve capturing value increase.
This assumption has been translated into one researchable sub-variable of the independent variable. This sub-variable is meant to elucidate whether development rights
belong to the landowner or to the public:

80

•

Method

Who has the right to develop whatever the binding rules (excluding the notlegally binding zoning regulations) prescribe?

However, this sub-variable was not speciﬁc enough to allow data gathering. Therefore, we made it more speciﬁc by investigating who controls the resources that are
needed in each of the transactions in development processes. These transactions are
(Alexander, 2001a; 2001b):
1. Land purchase and assembling;
2. Financing;
3. Land preparation and development;
4. Land disposition;
5. Construction;
6. Property transfer.
Steps 1-4 belong to the infrastructure provision, steps 5 and 6 to the building. Each
of these steps implies transactions of some kind (land, money, property, etc). Urban
regeneration, i.e. developing whatever is prescribed in the binding rules, can only
happen after completing each of these transactions. By analysing who has the control
over each of these transactions, it was possible to discern who has which development right, and whether public law regulations (formal rules such as expropriation
and the Valencian land readjustment regulation) might have restricted the use of
property rights in land. The sub-variable becomes more speciﬁc:
• Who has the control over each of the six transactions in development processes?
Model of dependence analysis ¼ sub-variable Who
However, we needed an analytical model that allowed us to discover who has the
control over each of the six transactions. We therefore developed a dependence
analysis model based on the concepts (explained in section 2.1.1.1) of power, rules,
resources and dependence, and based on the ideas of Healey (1992: 35-38; see also
Verhage 2002: 159) and, specially, Verhage (2002: 161). The model allowed us to
analyse the inﬂuence of public law regulations on the control of resources and how
this inﬂuences power-relationships within policy networks. These are the characteristics of the model:
1. Resources are not only material resources (land and investment capacity), but
also regulatory resources (Land use plan, building permits, etc);
2. Rules are what Ostrom (1986: 466-467) understood under ‘formal rules’: those
formalised in laws and administrative arrangements;
3. Ideas and informal rules have not been included in this model as it was quite
difﬁcult to measure them in an objective way. However they were taken into account in an analysis made of the possible third variables D4 and D5, an analysis
that complements the conclusions of this dependence model (see section 2.4.2).
4. To analyse the strength of the dependence, this research adds the concept of
‘avoidability’ of the dependence. This idea is partly based on Scharpf’s concept
of ‘substitutability’ of the resource that causes the dependence. To us, depend-

Method

5.

81

ence is avoidable when it is possible and feasible for the dependent actor to
achieve his goals without being dependent on a particular actor. A dependence
is not avoidable when it is not possible or, if possible, too costly or politically too
risky to avoid it.
After analysing in each case the distribution of resources and the resulting dependence patterns, the formal rules are analysed that explain why the resources
are distributed as they are.

We used this model to further specify sub-variable Who into several sub-sub-variables:
• Which are the resources (material and regulatory resources) needed for each of
the transactions?
• How are these resources distributed between the involved parties?
• What are the dependence patterns that result from the allocation of resources?
• Are these dependence patterns avoidable?
Causal model (variables B3 and D3) ¼ sub-variable How
Several practical considerations, related to the ﬂexibility of the procedure for preparing and approving binding rules, have helped to make operational the last subvariable in PRQ1:
• How ﬂexible is the procedure of preparing and approving the binding rules (excluded the not-legally binding zoning regulations)?
This has been made more speciﬁc:
– Which guarantees have initiative-holders (the developers who wants to regenerate a site) that the municipality will seriously assess their application?
– How easy or difﬁcult is it to modify the binding rules? Three sub-sub-variables
have been researched: (1) what are the procedural requirements for modifying
(wijziging in Dutch), (2) departing from (vrijstelling) and (3) detailing (uitwerking)
the existing binding rules?
– Can the geographical scope of binding zoning plans be varied according to
the negotiations with different landowners/developers? Three sub-variables have
been researched: (1) the rules for the delimitation of geographical scope of the
plans; (2) whether there is a maximum number of different binding zoning plans
per area; (3) whether municipalities are free to approve as many binding zoning
documents as they wish.
Description problem
Preparatory research question 1 has been answered as a description problem (Swanborn, 1987: 68-70): introducing ﬁrst each country and case, and describing then
what each country and case look like in each of the mentioned sub-variables, i.e.
measuring each sub-variable (see Table 6). For the detailed check-lists that were used
in the data gathering, see Annex 1. The answer consists of statements describing how
formal rules relevant to zoning in the different countries could be used following
planning law, and how they are used in practice.

Method

82

Table 6. Structure of the answer to P.R.Q.1

Country/sub-variable Introduction
to country

Introduction
to cases

Where

When

What

Who

How

England
Valencia
The Netherlands

3.3.2

Answering Preparatory Research Question 2

Preparatory research question 2 is:
What is the extent of capturing value increase in comprehensive urban regeneration developments on privately owned land?
To make this question operational, the dependent variable ‘capturing value increase’
has been divided into several sub-variables. They are based on the criterion of conformance, which refers to whether spatial development is according to plan (Korthals
Altes, 2006: 97-99). If the goals for capturing value increase included in the zoning
regulations are secured in terms of their ﬁnancing and their realization within the
established deadlines, we could consider that the conformance has been high, and
vice versa. A list of possible goals for capturing value increase has been designed that
covers all possible forms of contributions from developers and takes into account
possible side effects, to one of which special attention has been paid: the tempo of
implementation. That is, Preparatory research question 2 focuses not only on whether
the goals for capturing value increase have been achieved, but also whether this happened on schedule. The sub-variables are:
• Who pays the following capturing value increase goals? [a list of possible contributions from the developer to public infrastructure and facilities]
• Are the capturing value increase goals implemented on time?
However, during data gathering it became clear that it was very difﬁcult to fully apply
the criterion of conformance. The reason is that it was not always possible to discern
what the goals for capturing value increase were, as during the development process,
especially in the Netherlands, these goals changed. It was also not always possible
to discern whether the goals were genuinely set at the beginning of the process, or
were the result of self-censure of public bodies aware of the low chances of obtaining contributions from developers. Nevertheless, when possible we have applied the
criterion of conformance, comparing the results with the initial goals, and in addition
we always measured the degree of captured value increase, following the same list
for all cases and countries. So the measured degree of captured value increase was
sometimes related to the speciﬁc goals of the public bodies, and was always related

Method

83

to the same list for all cases and countries. The differences of measured degree of
captured value increase between cases and countries were large enough for suggesting in Preparatory research question 3 a causal relationship with the independent
variable.
Preparatory research question 2 is also answered as a description problem (Swanborn, 1987: 68-70): describing what each country and case looks like in each of the
mentioned sub-variables, i.e. measuring them (see Table 7). For the detailed checklist, see Annex 1. The answer consists of statements describing which capturing value
increase goals are paid or not by the market parties, and whether this happened on
schedule.
Table 7. Structure of the answer to P.R.Q.2

Country/sub-variable

Capturing value increase goals

Implementation within schedule?

England
Valencia
The Netherlands

3.3.3

Answering Preparatory Research Question 3

Preparatory research question 3 is:
How does the way in which formal rules relevant to zoning are used inﬂuence
capturing value increase?
This question links the answer to P.R.Q.1 (use of formal rules relevant to zoning) with
the answer to P.R.Q.2 (degree of capturing value increase). The goal is to know if
certain ways of using formal rules relevant to zoning in the studied countries could
inﬂuence capturing value increase. Because the goal of this research is to elaborate
recommendations for the Dutch practice, knowledge about this relationship must include knowledge about a possible causality. In other words, this research is interested
in the possibly causal relationship between both variables (see Figure 6).

< independent variable >

< dependent variable >

‘formal rules relevant to zoning’

‘capturing value increase’

Figure 6. This research is interested in nature of the relationship among variables ‘formal rules relevant
to zoning’ and ‘capturing value increase’.

84

Method

Because P.R.Q.3 works with the answers given to P.R.Q.1 and P.R.Q.2, there is no
need of speciﬁc data gathering, except for the generic interviews in which involved
persons were asked about the possible causal relationship (see section 3.1.2). The
answer to P.R.Q.3 argues why the sub-variables of P.R.Q.1 can or cannot inﬂuence
the sub-variables of P.R.Q.2. The sub-variables have been grouped, due to narrative
purposes, into the following:
a) Certainty beforehand about future building possibilities and contributions
(Where and When)
Zoning regulations can create certainty about future use possibilities and contributions before, during or after negotiations with developers take place. Certainty can
be very hard, when it consists of binding rules; less hard, when consisting of nonlegally binding zoning regulations; or not even existing if there is no kind of policy
document.
b) Possibly contents of the relevant binding rules (What)
Binding rules (excluding the not-legally binding zoning regulations) might be useful
in negotiations if local public bodies can include there not only the physical zoning,
but also aspects related to the ﬁnancing and implementation of public infrastructure
and facilities. Do binding rules regulate only a desired ﬁnal picture without stating
who is responsible for its implementation, or also the obligations that must be fulﬁlled by the developer? How far can binding rules go in enumerating obligations?
Can they include off-site infrastructure? Social housing?
c) Making the relevant binding rules conditional on the developer securing the
capturing of value increase (When and What)
Binding rules (excluding the not-legally binding zoning regulations) might be useful
in negotiations if local public bodies can make them conditional on the developer
ﬁnancing and implementing the public infrastructure and facilities. The approval of
binding rules containing these schedules does not automatically mean that developers are committed to develop whatever is foreseen in them. Additionally, the commitment of the developer to secure them is needed.
d) Modulating property rights in land (Who)
The negotiation position of local public bodies may depend on the contents of property rights, more speciﬁcally on the degree to which landowners control all transactions in development processes, and the degree to which public bodies may restrict
the exercise of property rights through public law regulations.
e) Procedure for the preparation and approval of relevant binding rules (How)
Three aspects related to the procedure of binding rules (excluding not-legally binding
zoning regulations) might be relevant for capturing value increase:
• Guarantees to the initiative-holders: when developers undertake the initiative,
there are many uncertainties about the decision of the local public body. Is it go-

Method

•

•

85

ing to assess seriously the application, or not even consider it? This might affect
the negotiation position of developers and local public bodies, and therefore inﬂuence the capturing of value increase. Also, this might affect the risks and costs
that market parties have to deal with, which might also affect the keenness of
market parties to undertake the initiative and contribute to the unproﬁtable parts.
Flexibility to modify existing binding rules: easy and short procedures for modifying the existing binding rules could improve the usability of binding rules in
the negotiations.
Flexibility to determine the plan area of the binding rules accordingly to negotiations with landowners: another important aspect could be whether the size or
geographical scope to which the binding rules apply (i.e. the plan area) could be
adapted in a way that favours negotiating with each individual landowner, without delaying the rest of the process. Can the local public body ﬁrst approve the
binding rules for the plots where the agreements have already been concluded,
and wait until the other owners/developers agree?

The answers to this Preparatory research question 3 are in fact the tested hypotheses,
for example: “if municipalities establish in early stages of development processes
which contributions developers will have to pay/realize, capturing value increase
will improve”. These tested hypotheses (see chapter 8) are the fundaments for answering the Main Research Question in chapter 9.

3.3.4

Answering the Main Research Question

The Main research question is:
How could formal rules relevant to zoning be used in the Netherlands in order
that the proﬁtable parts ﬁnance as much as possible the unproﬁtable parts?
The answer will follow the same grouping of sub-variables as in Preparatory research
question 3 (groups of sub-variables a-e). Based on the ﬁndings of Preparatory research question 3, the Main research question designs speciﬁc recommendations
for the Dutch situation. These recommendations are based on the tested hypotheses,
but incorporating speciﬁc knowledge of the Dutch situation, e.g. legislation, political
and cultural considerations. This results in statements of the type: “if Dutch municipalities want to increase cost recovery in similar urban projects, they should in early
stages specify in Structure Visions (Structuurvisie) their requirements on cost recovery”. Recommendations are divided between those that ﬁt within the actual legal
framework, and those that require a legislative modiﬁcation.

CHAPTER

4

Quick scan: formal rules
relevant to zoning in
Western European countries

As argued in chapter 3.2.1.2, methodological considerations require that this research investigates the situation in several countries. The ﬁrst step is exploratory research in countries that have a similar context to the Netherlands, because studying
countries with a similar context reduces the inﬂuence of third variables. The second
step is to select for in-depth research those countries that show the broadest variation
in the independent variable ‘formal rules relevant to zoning’. The reason is that this
increases the possibilities of producing signiﬁcant ﬁndings.
The exploratory research is of the situation in the Netherlands and eight other Western European countries: Germany, England (part of the UK), Flanders (part of Belgium), France, Sweden, Denmark, Italy, and Spain (focusing mainly on the region of
Valencia). Special attention has been paid to a limited number of variables namely
the ﬁve sub-variables of the independent variable ‘formal rules relevant to zoning’:
Where, When, What, Who and How (see section 3.3.1). The difference between the
exploratory research and the in-depth research lies in the sources (in the exploratory
research only literature and interviews, in the in-depth research also cases), the time
spent, the level of detail, and the number of interviews1.

Sections 4.1-4 present the results of the exploratory research: a cross-national survey
of the main aspects of the formal rules relevant to zoning, summarized in table 8.
Based on the ﬁndings of this exploratory research, in section 4.5 two countries have
been selected that show the broadest variation in the ways formal rules relevant to
zoning are used: these are England and the Spanish region of Valencia. These two
countries and the Netherlands are the subject of in-depth research in chapters 5-7.

4.1

Zoning regulations in the negotiation processes

The position of municipalities in the negotiations with landowners and developers
may vary depending on whether there already exist binding rules or indicative zoning
regulations concerning the development in question.

4.1.1

Are zoning regulations (binding and not-binding) approved
in early stages of development processes?

In several countries, before negotiations start, there are already binding rules concerning the intended development. In Spain and France for example, as a rule, municipalities are obliged to approve binding land-use plans that have to cover the
whole municipal territory (Plan General de Ordenación Urbana respectively Plan Local d’Urbanisme. PLU). However, in France, most of the municipalities have not yet
(January 2007) approved PLUs. Although the old Plan d’Occupation des Sols (POS)
still applies in these cases, there seems to be ﬂexibility regarding projects that do not
ﬁt into it. In Italy also, until recently, municipalities were obliged to approve such a
binding land use plan for the whole municipal territory (Piano regolatore generale
comunale), but this plan is becoming gradually replaced by a new sort of plan, the
Piano Operativo, which usually covers only part of the developable land. In Flanders,
based on legislation of the 60’s, Regional Plans (Gewestplannen) were enacted that
cover most of the territory of Flanders, both built and not-built areas.
These already approved outline land-use plans include land-use regulations with
statutory consequences for the use of the land: they zone land into different uses,
and often also deﬁne the building density (not very common however in the Flemish Gewestplannen). As a rule, these plans do not take account of speciﬁc projects,
they are approved only occasionally, every many so years (except Italy, where the
Piano Operativo is approved more or less each ﬁve years), and they constitute the
existing planning frame before development processes start. Although these plans are
supposed to create legal certainty about the future building possibilities, in practice,
this certainty is often not so strong, at least in France, Italy and Flanders. The reason
is that, when development is near, (1) in France the planning framework might not
always be clear; (2) in Italy the new Piano Operativo no longer covers the whole

Quick scan

89

municipal territory, and (3) in those four countries, these plans very often need to be
detailed, complemented or modiﬁed.
In the other countries, the only planning documents that might say, in the early stages, something about the possible future developments are non-binding zoning plans.
The English Structure/Local/Development plans or the new Local Planning Frameworks, and the Dutch Structuurplan or the new Structuurvisie are good examples of
this. Because these regulations are only indicative, they give no legal certainty about
the future use and building possibilities. Other countries also have similar indicative
plans: the German Flächennutzungsplan, the Swedish översiktsplan and the Danish
Kommuneplan.

4.1.2

Approval of detailed binding rules at the development
moment

When negotiations have been successfully converted into development agreements,
binding land-use plans for speciﬁc areas and in detail are approved. It is possible to
differentiate between the countries according to whether this happens at one time or
in different steps.
In several countries, municipalities approve the detailed legally binding rules in one
step, in one planning document (English Planning Permission, Dutch Bestemmingsplan and Danish Lokalplan). However, in those countries it is possible to approve
ﬁrst an outline version (Outline Planning Permission, Globaal Bestemmingsplan and
‘framework’ Lokalplan), and afterwards approve a detailed version (Full Planning Permission, uitwerking and detailed Lokalplan). Sweden is a case in-between: in the case
of private developments which do not fall within any joint development statutory
formula (see under), municipalities usually approve the detailed binding rules in one
step, the omra°desbestämmelser or the detaljplan. However, in case of joint development formula, binding rules are approved in two steps.
In other countries, binding rules are usually approved in two steps and in two different sorts of planning documents: (1) a binding land-use plan, and (2) a detailed and/
or implementation-oriented planning documents, i.e. a document including not only
the physical zoning, but also or exclusively the arrangements that are necessary for
the implementation. They are the German (1) Bebauungsplan and (2) Umlegungplan
(in case of land readjustment); and the Swedish (1) omra°desbestämmelser/detaljplan, and (2) anläggningsbesluit/exploateringsbeslut (in case of a joint development
statutory formula). Though formally both sorts of documents have to be approved at
different moments, in practice it is not infrequent that the approval takes place simultaneously or close after each other. In this sense, they are similar to the English, Dutch
and Danish binding rules, which are usually approved in just one step. The Netherlands introduced in 2008 the Exploitatieplan, an implementation-oriented document
that in some cases must be approved together with the Bestemmingsplan.

90

Quick scan

Finally, in those countries where there are binding rules before negotiations start (Valencia and all other Spanish regions, France, Italy and Flanders), the phasing seems
to be clearer: the general binding land use plans are already approved in an early
stage, and when the development moment nears it remains only to detail or modify
the general plans for speciﬁc areas, and/or to approve implementation-oriented plans
(the Valencian Programa para el desarrollo de una Actuación Integrada and Proyecto
de Reparcelación, the Italian Piani attuativi/Programma Complesso; the French Plan
d’Lotissement; the Flemish Ruimtelijk Uitvoeringsplan and Verkavelingsplan/vergunning).

4.1.3

Conclusions regarding the place of binding rules in the
negotiation process: Plan-led versus Development-led

In section 2.3.1, a distinction was made, based on Faludi’s categorization of protoplanning theories A and B (Faludi, 1987: 185-192), between plan-led and development-led planning systems. The plan-led system is supposed to characterize planning
systems in most of the countries, and the development-led system the British system.
Summarizing, plan-led systems differ from development-led systems in two aspects:
(1) there is in plan-led systems a legally binding land use plan and (2) this plan acquires legal status at an early stage, at the ‘plan production moment’.
This research supports that categorization in one respect: among the studied countries, only England and all other British constituent countries have no kind of legally
binding land use plan, and in the other countries this is usual. In the UK there is
only one binding land-use document, the Planning Permission. However, regarding
whether the land use plan is approved at an early stage or not (i.e. previous to the
development moment) the results of this study diverge from the categorization. Of the
studied countries, only Spain, France, Italy, and Flanders could be called plan-led,
for only in these countries are there general binding land-use rules approved in early
stages, at the ‘plan production moment’ (this is the moment in which the ﬁrst projections are made for development, and it is indicated with the star on the left side in
Figure 7), before the ‘development moment’ nears (this is the moment in which local
authorities and developers face a speciﬁc proposal for development, star on the right
side in Figure 7). However, as mentioned above, the legal certainty that might be
created by these early zoning plans is in practice not as strong as could be expected,
especially in France, Italy and Flanders.
In the other countries that might appear to have a ‘plan-led’ system, the actual use
of binding land-use plans seems to differ from how it should be according to the
plan-led principle. As a rule, in the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden, and Denmark,
binding land-use rules (whether this is a new land-use plan or a modiﬁcation of it to
include the new building possibilities) are approved only and for the ﬁrst time when
negotiations with developers/landowners have already taken place or, at least, when

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91

ENGLAND

indicative plan
negociations
planning permission
building permit
passage of time

THE NETHERLANDS / GERMANY / SWEDEN / DENMARK

indicative plan
negociations
land use plan or modification of it
building permit

passage of time

SPAIN / ITALY? / FRANCE? / FLANDERS?

general binding land use plan
negociations
detailing or modification general plan
building permit

passage of time

Figure 7. Actual place of zoning regulations (binding and not-binding) in development processes
in several Western European countries.

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92

there is enough certainty about the successful conclusion of those negotiations. In the
Netherlands, the studied cases and several other studies conﬁrm this, and it seems
that this has been the case for a long time. At the beginning of the 1980s, departures
from land use plans were very common, and since then things have not changed
much (Thomas et al., 1983: quoted in Faludi 1987: 116, 185; Bröcking & Geest,
1982; Bosch & Hanemaayer, 1992: both quoted in Buitelaar et al., 2007: 54). So the
binding land-use rules that make new developments possible are approved only after
intending developers have negotiated a content that the municipality wants to approve. In other words, binding land-use rules are in practice approved at, or shortly
before, the ‘development moment’, the same as in the UK. A comparative study of
the European Commission agrees with these ﬁndings. In the 1990’s, when this study
was carried out, most of the countries belonging to the plan-led system showed in
practice similar deviations as in our nine countries (European Commission, 1997:
45-46)

4.2

Contents of binding rules

The utility of binding rules in negotiations might depend on whether they can formally prescribe implemented-oriented requirements, e.g. obligations and deadlines
for the implementation. Further, it might be important whether they can formally
prescribe unproﬁtable uses, e.g. social/affordable housing. Finally, it might be also
important whether municipalities, formally and directly, can make the approval of
the binding plan conditional on a contractual commitment that secures the implementation. Regarding these three aspects, it is possible to make the following
distinctions.

4.2.1

Zoning plans vs. implementation-oriented plans, both
binding

Almost all the countries have legally binding planning documents that are intended to
apply to the implementation. That is, documents that prescribe aspects directly related
with the practical development of an area: temporal regulations (when to start/ﬁnish
development), ﬁnancial regulation or other kind of regulations (who pays what, who
does what). These binding planning documents are the English Planning permission,
the Valencian Programa, the German Umlegungplan, the French Plan d’Lotissement,
the Italian Piani attuativi/Programma Complesso, the Flemish Verkavelingsplan/vergunning and the Swedish anläggningsbeslut and exploateringsbeslut. The English
Planning Permission includes, besides the implementation-oriented regulations, also
the legally binding physical zoning. In Valencia, Germany, France, Italy, Flanders
and Sweden, there is a distinction between these implementation-oriented planning
documents and the land-use plans.

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In contrast, the Netherlands (until 2008) and Denmark have almost no implementation-oriented binding planning documents. The exception is the building permit,
which can include temporal regulations (it expires if the landowner/developer does
not build on time). This means that up to the granting of the building permit, implementation-oriented aspects are as a rule not included in any public law binding planning document; if they are included anywhere, it is only in indicative zoning plans
or in private contracts. In the Netherlands, a legal modiﬁcation in 2008 has changed
this situation, introducing a legally binding implementation-oriented plan, the Development contributions plan (Exploitatieplan).
In summary, most of the countries have not only binding plans that include the physical zoning, but also implementation-oriented binding documents. The Netherlands
(up to 2008) and Denmark could be considered as an exception to this.

4.2.2

Limited vs. broad contents binding rules

Concerning the scope of the possible contents of binding plans, in England the equivalent of the land use plan prescribes the broadest. The Planning Permission includes,
besides the physical zoning, also temporal deadlines, ﬁnancial contributions or other
kind of contributions. The rest of the countries have binding land use plans with a
more limited scope. Land-use plans can include only delimitations of zoning categories, of building envelopes, of social housing as a zoning category, and they can
state, within certain limits, temporal deadlines. In short, in those other countries,
land use plans can include not much more than the physical zoning. The most restricted seem to be the Dutch Bestemmingsplan (up to 2008) and the Danish Lokalplan: both include binding regulations concerning zoning categories and the building envelope, but exclude all other aspects (e.g. deadlines). In the other countries
(and in the Netherlands from 2008 onwards) there are, besides the land use plan,
other implementation-oriented binding planning documents that ‘catch’ the missing
aspects, such as obligations, deadlines, etc. In conclusion, England has binding rules
with the broadest contents, and the Netherlands (up to 2008) and Denmark with the
narrowest contents.

4.2.3

Conditioning the approval of binding rules to securing
implementation

Another important difference between the studied countries is that in some of them
it is possible to condition, in a formal, open and direct way, the approval of the binding rules (the binding document that includes the physical zoning) to a development
agreement between the municipality and the developer/landowner. That is, the binding plan sets out the requirements that must be afterwards agreed, and the deﬁnite
approval of this binding plan is conditional on such an agreement; i.e. the binding

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plan only becomes legally valid after this agreement is signed. This is meant to guarantee the implementation of the binding rules. Such formal and direct conditioning
exists at least in England and Valencia, and Italy shows similar features. In the other
countries this seems not to be possible, formally speaking, although this does not
mean that conditioning does not happen, indirectly and/or informally.
In England and Valencia, a ﬁrst version of the binding rules (Planning permission
respectively Programa) includes the requirements (planning obligations in England,
cargas urbanísticas in Valencia) that must be secured with a Development Agreement
(Planning Agreement respectively Convenio Urbanístico). Only when this agreement
is signed do the binding rules become legally valid. In Italy, a Development Agreement (convenzione) must be signed before the Piano di lottizzazione and the new
Programma Complesso become valid. At least in England and Valencia, the agreements are accessible for the public. Recently, English cities started to allow direct
on-line access to those documents.
In the rest of the countries, it seems not to be possible, formally, to condition planning consent (the approval of binding rules) in a direct and formal way to a contractual commitment to implement the binding rules. Some of them (France, Sweden,
Flanders, and, since 2008, the Netherlands) might be allowed to condition the granting of the building permit or similar to free cession of (some) land or to a contribution
to (some of) the costs. This means that the obligation comes into play only after the
landowner applies for a building permit and accepts the obligations attached to it.
However, this does not imply a contractual obligation to do so, so not fulﬁlling this
obligation can result in the building permit being annulled, but nothing more.
In sum, in England, Valencia and Italy the legally binding land use plan is directly
and formally made conditional on the formalization of a development agreement.
This contract commits the developer to provide the infrastructure, to cede land for
free, to contribute to the infrastructure provision costs, etc. In the other countries, this
conditioning is not possible, at least not in a direct and open way.

4.3

Procedure for the approval of binding rules

The utility of binding rules in negotiations might depend on whether municipalities
are allowed to modify existing binding plans, and whether this requires a simple or
a heavy procedure.
In several countries, when the development moment nears, instead of making a new
land-use plan, it is also possible to follow, for minor modiﬁcations of/departures
from the land-use plans, a much simpliﬁed procedure. A good example of this was
the Dutch vrijstelling under the Physical Planning Act previous to 2008. The German

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95

Baudispens, the French Modiﬁcation, minor deviations in Sweden, the afwijking/
anticipatie in Flanders and departures in Denmark are also similar. In all the studied
countries, if the modiﬁcations of the land-use plan are major, they follow procedures
that are simpler (but still heavy) than the procedure for the approval of a new land
use plan.
In England, a modiﬁcation, however small, of the Planning Permission itself (the binding physical zoning regulations) always needs a new permission. However, the procedure for the modiﬁcation or removal of planning conditions is slightly simpler, and
a modiﬁcation of the planning obligations (implementation terms and contributions),
if voluntarily agreed with the developer, does not require an extensive procedure at
all. In Valencia and in Italy, a modiﬁcation of the General Land use Plan (Plan General de Ordenación Urbana respectively Piano regolatore generale comunale/Piano
Operativo), however small, can only be through processing and approving a detailed
land use plan (Programa respectively piani attuativi/Programma Complessi). A modiﬁcation of these detailed land use plans, however small, can only take place through
processing and approving a new plan, which requires the same procedure.
In many countries, major modiﬁcations of the land use plan, whether this happens
through the simpliﬁed procedure or not, seem to be very common. This is certainly
the case in the Netherlands and France. Spain might form an exception to this. Here,
major modiﬁcations (of the General Land use Plan through detailed land use plans),
such as rezoning non-urban land into urban, do certainly take place but seem not to
be as common in practice as in other countries.
To conclude, minor modiﬁcations through a very simple procedure are possible in
almost all the studied countries. The exceptions are Valencia and in Italy, where even
a minor modiﬁcation of the binding rules requires a heavy procedure: the processing
of a new planning document equivalent to the one that has to be modiﬁed. Regarding major modiﬁcations, in all countries, except in England, such a modiﬁcation of
the binding rules is possible only through a simpler (simpler than the making of a
new Land use Plan), but still heavy, procedure. In England, major modiﬁcation of
planning obligations (realization terms and ﬁnancial regulations), if there is agreement between the developer and the municipality, does not require a heavy procedure at all.

4.4

Binding rules in relation to property rights

The utility of binding rules in the negotiations might depend on the contents of property rights. More speciﬁcally, the degree of control that landowners have over the
transactions in development processes might inﬂuence their negotiating position,
and therefore the feasibility of the municipalities’ value capturing goals.

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4.4.1

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Is infrastructure provision separated from development
rights?

In all the studied countries, ownership rights include the right to build. There is no
case where property rights are fully separated from the right to develop the land.
That is, landowners are the only ones entitled to build on their land, and they can
exclude others from doing so. However, this right acquires a concrete form only after
the law and the binding land-use rules allow the possibility of building on the plot in
question. In other words, binding rules limit the building rights and landowners have
no right to a ´minimum´ amount of building rights. For example, the owner of land
that is zoned as agricultural has no right to transform his land into an urban area.
He acquires the right to do so only if the legally binding land-use regulations state
it, and he is also obliged to exercise his right according to the law and after applying
and obtaining the needed permits. An example of the wide scope that governments
in Europe have for limiting the owner’s right to develop his land is the fact that there
is no room in legal systems for a generous (with respect to the landowner) concept of
‘regulatory takings’, at least as generous as in the United States of America. ‘Regulatory takings’ is the American legal concept that limits governmental regulation on
private property that is deemed to be too onerous (Jacobs, 2008: 52, 67-68, 71-72;
Needham, 2006: 47).
Although it became clear to us that building rights (more or less limited by binding rules) belong to the landowner in all the studied countries, it became also clear
that there are important differences regarding infrastructure provision. These differences made us conclude that in some countries we could speak of a splitting of
infrastructure provision from property rights. We look ﬁrst at the differences in the
formal responsibility for infrastructure provision, i.e. at the question who is formally
responsible for it. In some countries, the law explicitly refers to the infrastructure
provision as something differentiated from the rest of development rights, and labels
it as a ´responsibility´ or a ´task´ of the public bodies, but not of the landowner or
the developer. This happens in Valencia, Germany, France and Sweden. It could be
said that in these countries, the right to provide infrastructure formally belongs to the
municipality. In the other countries, there is neither an explicit mention in the law of
infrastructure provision being a particular component of development rights, nor of
any kind of public priority in this.

4.4.2

Control of transactions in infrastructure provision

Besides the formal responsibility for infrastructure provision, there is the question
of the actual powers of public bodies for the provision of infrastructure. Here also
there are important differences between the studied countries that led us to conclude
that in some of them infrastructure provision is actually split off from property rights.
More speciﬁcally, the question is: who has the development rights in each of the

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97

different steps in development processes? We applied here the model described in
section 3.3.1 to analyse the power/dependency relationships between the involved
actors (municipality, developer, landowners) in each step of the development process. The steps are grouped into those related to infrastructure provision, and those related to building on the serviced plots namely: (1) land purchase and assembling, (2)
ﬁnancing, (3) land preparation and development, (4) land disposition, (5) construction, and (6) property transfer. Steps 1-3 belong to the infrastructure provision, steps
5 and 6 to the building. Each of these steps implies transactions of some kind (land,
money, property, etc). Developing whatever the binding rules prescribe can only
happen after the ﬁrst ﬁve transactions have been completed. By analysing who has
the control over each of these transactions, it was possible to discern who has which
development right. There are no relevant differences between the studied countries in
the building (steps 4 to 6). However, regarding the position of the actors in the transactions involved in infrastructure provision, it is possible to distinguish two groups
of countries:
Dependence on agreement with landowner
In some countries, transactions 1-3 are quite dependent on agreement between the
municipality and the landowners. This seems to be the case in the Netherlands, England, France, Italy, Sweden (for the larger schemes), Flanders and Denmark. As a
rule, if there is no agreement about the purchase and assembly of land and about the
ﬁnancing of the infrastructure provision, municipalities that want things to happen,
have to apply pre-emption, expropriation and/or an a posteriori special tax formula.
In other words, the only way of avoiding dependence on the landowner in steps 1-3
is public land development, or at least public infrastructure provision for private development. By doing this, municipalities get ﬁnancially involved in the development:
they have to lead the process, advance the money to purchase the land and provide
the infrastructure, bear the risks of eventual delay, and possibly not recover all the
costs made. Neither expropriation, nor special taxes are commonly used instruments.
Compulsory land readjustment as alternative to agreement
Besides voluntary agreement (or, in case of disagreement, pre-emption, expropriation
and/or special taxes), Valencian and German municipalities have an alternative that
allows them to obtain all or part of the land and the money needed for the infrastructure provision, namely land readjustment. In this way, and possibly a compulsory
variant of it, Valencian and German municipalities can provide the infrastructure
without depending on the passive or active collaboration of the landowner.
Sweden is an in-between case: Swedish land readjustment is dependent on the collaboration of at least a majority of the landowners, and can be compulsory for a minority
of non-collaborating landowners. Also, land readjustment is meant only for local and
minor facilities in minor greenﬁeld residential schemes. In Flanders a land readjustment instrument is available, but it is not used at all. France also has a land readjustment regulation, but although it is quoted as being applied very often (Karki, 2003:

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69; Turk, 2008: 234), a consulted expert considered it as not really relevant in practice
(Renard, interviews 2006 and 2007). In Italy there is a land readjustment formula
based on civil law that is used very often. In the winter of 2007 a draft of the new Italian national planning act included a statutory, public law version. However, it is based
on the agreement of all the landowners. It is noteworthy that those countries, where
planning law refers to infrastructure provision as a public responsibility or task (Spain,
Germany, Sweden, France), also have a public law land readjustment regulation. It
seems that only in the ﬁrst three of them is the regulation also relevant in practice.
There are important differences between the Valencian, German and Swedish land
readjustment:
1. Public involvement: in the Valencian Reparcelación and the Swedish joint development/land readjustment, the municipality can place on others the task of
providing the infrastructure. In Valencia, municipalities can place this task on
the landowners or on a commercial developer without land, or with only a little
land. In practice these developers, called urbanizing agents, usually own a part
of the land, or act on behalf of landowners, but it is not rare to ﬁnd urbanizing
agents with just a little or even no land. In Sweden, the municipality can place
this task only on the landowners. On the contrary, in the German Umlegung it
is the municipality that provides the infrastructure, advancing the ﬁnance. Only
afterwards do landowners contribute to the costs. Therefore, German municipalities bear the ﬁnancial risks, also of delay;
2. Cost recovery: in the Valencian Reparcelación all the involved costs and needed
land are paid/ceded by the landowners, including money and land for off-site
infrastructure. The German and Swedish municipalities can demand land and
contributions only for the local facilities within the plan, but not for facilities that
serve a wider area. In Germany, the compulsory variant implies that the municipality becomes more involved in the management and can recover a smaller
part of the infrastructure provision costs. German municipalities often do not
recover all the costs made. Swedish municipalities usually recover all the costs
of local facilities.
3. Application: the Valencian readjustment is applied in practically all developments, whether they are greenﬁeld, brownﬁeld, redevelopment, low/high density, small/large areas, etc. The German Umlegung is a widely used (but not
predominant) instrument, especially in city extensions, but also in regeneration
projects in the existing built up areas (Larsson, 1997: 143; Karki, 2003: 69; Turk,
2008: 234). Of the two ways of Swedish joint development/land readjustment,
only the 1973 Joint Facilities Act is applied in practice, and then only in minor
residential schemes in greenﬁeld areas. The 1987 Land Readjustment formula
has not been used very much.
Conclusions
To conclude, there are clear differences in the position of public and private actors in
the transactions that relate to infrastructure provision. As a rule, in the Netherlands,

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England, France, Italy, Sweden (for the larger schemes), Flanders and Denmark, the
transactions that are needed for infrastructure provision are dependent on agreement
between the municipality and the landowners. To avoid this dependence, municipalities have in practice the alternative of pre-emption, expropriation and special a
posteriori tax formulae. Thus, they have to get directly involved in the infrastructure
provision, in ﬁnancial and organizational terms. In Valencia and Germany, besides
pre-emption and expropriation, municipalities can choose land readjustment, eventually compulsory readjustment. In Valencia, municipalities do not need to get directly involved in the development, can place the task on the landowners or on
a commercial developer without land, and do not need to subsidise. In Germany,
municipalities have to get directly involved in the development. In Sweden, in small
residential schemes in greenﬁeld areas, municipalities can apply joint development/
readjustment and place the task on the landowners, but they need agreement with at
least the majority of the landowners.

4.5

Selection of countries

The zoning regulations (binding and not-binding) in nine Western European countries have been compared in order to select those countries which, between themselves and in comparison with the Netherlands, show the broadest variation in the
independent variable ‘formal rules relevant to zoning’ (for the methodological reason, see section 3.2.1.2).
The selected countries are the Spanish region of Valencia and England, countries that
stand somewhat for opposite models. On each sub-variable of the independent variable ‘formal rules relevant to zoning’, the differences were remarkable. (1) Regarding
the place of binding rules in the negotiation processes (Where and When), England
represents the ‘development-led’ planning system model, and Valencia (together
with France, Italy and Flanders) the ‘plan-led’. The Netherlands fall in the middle, for
it is in theory plan-led but does not work as such in practice. (2) Regarding the contents of binding rules (What), the Netherlands (up to 2008), together with Denmark,
have almost no development-oriented binding rules, while England and Valencia do.
Further, the Dutch binding rules, together with the Danish, have the narrowest contents, while England has the broadest. Finally, the approval of the Dutch binding rules
(planning consent) cannot be made, formally and openly, conditional on securing the
implementation, while in England and Valencia this is possible and constitutes the
standard procedure. (3) Regarding the procedure for approval of the binding rules,
in England certain major modiﬁcations are possible with a very simple procedure,
while in the Netherlands and Valencia a heavy procedure is needed. (4) Regarding
the relation between binding rules and property rights, in Valencia the infrastructure
provision is in the planning law explicitly identiﬁed as a public task, while in the
Netherlands and England it is not. Further, in Valencia infrastructure provision can

England

Valencia
(Spain)

No until
2008, yes
after, in separate document

Limited
Limited vs.
broad contents binding
Land-use plan

Implementation-oriented
binding
plans?

Contents binding rules

Broad

Yes, together
with binding land use
document
Broad

Limited,
somewhat

Yes, together Yes, in sepawith detailed rate doculand-use plan ment.

Not really
plan-led

Plan-led, in
transition

General
binding plan
becomes
detailed in
another plan
document.

General
binding land
use plan, but
in transition
to indicative structure
plans

Italy

Flanders

Not really
plan-led

Binding rules
approved for
the ﬁrst time,
but in more
than one
document,
although
often simultaneously

Only avoidable through
land acqui,
land readjustment if agreement majority
landowners
and special
tax.

To the public
bodies

Light procedure

Heavy procedure

No

Sweden

Light procedure

Heavy procedure

No

Denmark

Only avoidable through
land acquisition.

Only avoidable through
land acquisition.

It is not made It is not made
explicit in law explicit in law

Light procedure

Heavy procedure

No

Flanders

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101

102

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be implemented without need of agreement with the landowner, as there is the possibility of compulsory land readjustment. On the contrary, in the Netherlands and
England, infrastructure provision in mainly dependent on agreement with the landowners, and this dependence can only be avoided through major public involvement
(pre-emption, expropriation or a posteriori special tax formulae).
Valencia and England, together with the Netherlands, have become thus the focus of
this research. They will be the subjects of in-depth research in chapters 5-7.

CHAPTER

5

The Spanish region of Valencia

Traditionally, public bodies have aimed in Valencia to ﬁnance the unproﬁtable parts
in urban regeneration with the proﬁtable parts. This aim has been central in the evolution of the Spanish planning system, and has led to conscious efforts to give responsibility to private parties for ﬁnancing and implementing the public infrastructure
and facilities. The ﬁrst successful effort led to the introduction in 1956 by the central
government in Madrid of a land readjustment regulation, meant to oblige landowners
to do that. In 1994 the Valencian regional government introduced important innovations to resolve the serious shortcomings of the 1956 regulation.

Frame 5a
The institutional context: Spain, the region of Valencia, provinces and municipalities
Spain is a decentralized state, with a system of constitutional parliamentary monarchy.
Since the Constitution (Constitución Española) of 1978, seventeen Autonomous Communities (Comunidades Autónomas, from now on ‘regions’) came into being, each of
them with its own parliament and executive power. The decentralization of competences to the regions is such that Spain became de facto a federal state.
The Autonomous Community of Valencia (Comunidad Autónoma de Valencia, CAM,
from now on ‘region of Valencia’) became in 1982 one of the seventeen regions. It
occupies an area of 23,255 Km² (5% of Spain) and had in 2005 4.7m inhabitants
(11% of the Spanish population, at an average density of 200 inhab/Km²). In economic terms is nowadays one of the most dynamic Spanish regions. In the last years,
the tourism industry has experienced a big rise. The region includes three provinces
(Castellón, Valencia and Alicante) and 541 municipalities. The governmental layers (regional government – Generalitat, provincial government – Diputación Provincial, and

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Valencia

municipality–Ayuntamiento) are organized hierarchically: the planning policies and
plans of provinces and municipalities are subordinated to the law, policies and plans of
the regional government. Of these three governmental levels, provinces have the least
competence and weight.
The distribution of competences between Madrid and each of the regions is based on
the principle of symmetrical division of competences. Both the central and the regional
governments produce ‘formal legislation’ (laws) and ‘legislation in a material sense’
(decrees and regulations). There are exhaustive lists of competences, some of them
reserved exclusively for the central government, some of them exclusively for the regional government. But there are also policy ﬁelds in which the central government has
the competence for making ‘basic’ legislation, and the regional government that for developing and detailing this basic legislation. In complex policy ﬁelds such as planning,
central and regional competences are intimately related to each other. Within the planning ﬁeld, Madrid has the exclusive competence for property law, and the competence
to issue basic legislation on common administrative proceedings and environmental
protection. Regions can, within limits, detail and develop this basic legislation. As a
result, Madrid has, for example, important competences for national infrastructure and
the exclusive competence for expropriation law. The region of Valencia has exclusive
competences for practically the rest of planning law (Betancor & García-Bellido, 2001:
88, 90, 92). For a list of legislation, relative to planning, see Annex 2.

Sections 5.1 to 5.3 introduce the context of how public bodies capture the value
increase in urban regeneration in the region of Valencia. Section 5.4 introduces the
studied cases. Section 5.5 describes the working of the formal rules relevant to zoning within the value capturing mechanisms. This is the answer to Preparatory research question 3: how can formal rules relevant to zoning inﬂuence the capturing of
value increase in Valencia? The question has been divided into several sub-questions
that correspond to the sub-variables a-e (for more details about these sub-variables,
see section 3.3.3). Each of the answers to the sub-questions consists of an assessment
of whether the sub-variable can inﬂuence the capturing of value increase. There is
therefore not one single conclusion, but as many conclusions as sub-questions. All
these conclusions have provided the ingredients for the ﬁnal conclusions in chapter
8 and the recommendations for the Dutch practice in chapter 9. Section 5.6 assesses
the degree of actually captured value increase, taking account of the side effects
on the tempo of implementation. Finally, section 5.7 summarizes and makes some
statements about the inferred causalities between formal rules and capturing value
increase. This includes an assessment of the role of third variables.

Valencia

5.1

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Urban regeneration in the region of Valencia

It is possible to differentiate two different urban regeneration policies, or groups of policies, in the region of Valencia. First there are those policies designed at the regional/
national level, oriented basically to the revitalization of historic areas and some other
deteriorated neighborhoods. In the second place, there are those policies designed at
the local level that focus on facilitating the redevelopment of old industrial and ofﬁce
sites into residential areas (Blanc, interview in 2005; Sanchis, interview in 2008).

5.1.1

Revitalization of historic centers and deteriorated
neighborhoods

What characterizes these urban regeneration areas is that landownership is usually
fragmented. Regeneration often has to deal with many landowners, who usually stay
in the regenerated area. Since 1992, the Ministry of Housing of the central government in Madrid, together with the regional Valencian government and the cities of
Valencia and Alicante, have set up in total three revitalization programmes for historic neighborhoods (Áreas de rehabilitación integrada y concertada): one for the
historic center of the City of Valencia (since 1992), the second for the XIXth Century’s
Cabanyal district (since 2004), also in the City of Valencia, and the third for the
historic center of the City of Alicante (since 1993). At the middle of 2008, a fourth
programme was being set up for the XIXth Century’s Ruzafa district in the City of
Valencia. These programmes include two sorts of public investment. The central and
the regional governments give subsidies to the owners for the rehabilitation of their
properties. Alongside these subsidies, the regional government and the municipality intervene directly through refurbishing public infrastructure and facilities. These
programmes could be considered as the most intensive and complete direct public
interventions in urban regeneration in the region of Valencia.
Alongside these, other more modest and numerous programmes have been set up in
the last years (Áreas de rehabilitación). They are meant for the regeneration of other
historic neighborhoods and also of peripheral 1960’s and 1970’s social housing districts. These programmes (about 200 of them) include a combined subsidization:
national and regional subsidies to landowners, and a modest direct municipal public
intervention in refurbishing public infrastructure. Finally, the central and the regional
governments are nowadays setting up new programmes for the demolition and rebuilding of several seriously deteriorated districts.

5.1.2

Rezoning old industrial and ofﬁce sites into residential

Some municipalities, generally at their own initiative, have developed since the end
of the 1990s local policies to facilitate the rezoning (recaliﬁcación) of old industrial

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and ofﬁces sites located within the existing urban areas. Due to urban growth and
economic changes, these sites have often become surrounded by residential and
ofﬁce functions. Rezoning seems a logical step and attracts the interest of property
investors because these sites are located at the heart of large and active markets for
multi-family housing and ofﬁce space. Confronted with numerous proposals from
market parties, some municipalities decided to allow rezoning and regulate it with ad
hoc policy. An important difference between these schemes and those mentioned in
5.1.1, is that these rest exclusively on private initiatives and do not imply any public
expenditure. Here, proﬁts have to pay all the unproﬁtable parts. This research focuses
on this sort of projects, thus the studied cases belong to this sort. For an introduction
to the cases see section 5.4
It seems that at least in larger cities, rezoning has become common in the last years
(Rubio, Montiel, Sanchis, interviews 2006 and 2008). For example, in the city of
Valencia, more than 90% of all locations zoned in the 1988 General land use plan
as industry have been re-zoned into housing and ofﬁce (see Figures 8). And between
50 and 80% of all locations zoned as commercial and recreational (ofﬁces) have
been re-zoned too (Raga, Rubio, interviews in 2006). Three of the four studied cases
correspond to this sort of rezoning: Camino, Periodista and Benalúa1. Regeneration
in these sorts of sites has to deal with many landowners, who tend afterwards to sell
their land to private developers. Municipalities do not usually buy land. However,
landowners do not usually sell immediately, but choose most of the time to participate in the land readjustment (Modrego, 2000).

Frame 5b
General Land Use Plans and Detailed Plans
Municipalities have the competence for making the binding rules at their level. There
are two sorts of relevant binding rules documents at this level: General Municipal
Planning (Planeamiento General Municipal) and Detailed Planning (Planeamiento
de desarrollo) (Parejo & Blanc, 1999: 111-113, 264-286, 317). The General Landuse Plan (Plan General de Ordenación Urbana, PGOU) belongs to the ﬁrst sort and
covers the whole municipal territory. Each municipality must approve one of these
plans, which to be (re-)approved each 5-20 years. The small municipalities have a
simpler form (Normas Subsidiarias). The region approves them deﬁnitively. Detailed
Planning documents are meant for detailing afterwards the approved General Plans
for speciﬁc sites, and they can modify their contents (Betancor & García-Bellido,
2001: 108).
General Plans have a legally binding character, i.e. they have statutory consequences
for the use possibilities of land. Planning law prescribes the contents of General Plans.

1

The fourth case, Guillem, consists of rezoning old deteriorated housing.

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For the whole municipal territory, they must set out the most important zoning rules,
labelled ‘structural binding rules’ (ordenación structural, Parejo & Blanc, 1999: 274277, 287-305):
• Strategic choices: possible building typologies, maximal number of dwellings and
sometimes a maximum ﬂoor space index;
• The ‘classiﬁcation’ or zoning (clasiﬁcación) of the entire territory into: (i) Existing
Urban land (suelo urbano); (ii) Land to be developed in the future, soon or in the
longer term (suelo urbanizable); and (iii) Non-developable land or rural area (suelo
no urbanizable);
• The logical phasing of development;
• Land use designations for the Non-developable land;
• Zoning of land into Building regulation zones (e.g. historic city, urban extension,
area of scattered buildings, etc). The 1999 Standard Building Regulation Order deﬁnes these zones, although municipalities are allowed to modify them or even to
adopt a completely different version;
• Delimitation of sectors (sectores), development sites that have to be detailed afterwards;
• Main public infrastructure and facilities: important leisure centres and the ‘Primary
Network of public facilities’ (Red Primaria de dotaciones públicas: road network,
public facilities and green areas);
• Delimitation of the ‘Redistribution Areas’ (Áreas de reparto) and for each area a
‘Reference Development Allowance’ (Aprovechamiento tipo), a kind of ﬂoor space
index, which forms the basis for the calculation of the building rights of each landowner, see under;
• Regulations regarding public infrastructure and facilities not belonging to the municipality (e.g. highways, railways).
Planning law also prescribes that for Existing Urban land and for Land to be developed
soon, General Plans must also state the complementary zoning rules, labelled ‘detailed
binding rules’ (ordenación pormenorizada, Parejo & Blanc, 1999: 287; Romero, 2002:
234-239, 353-354):
• The alignment of the buildings;
• The ground level of the street (rasante);
• Local public infrastructure and facilities: delimitation of the ‘Secondary Network of
public facilities’ (Red Secundaria de dotaciones públicas);
• What is called the ‘qualiﬁcation’ of land (caliﬁcación), the zoning of the land into
different land use categories: free market housing, affordable/social housing, commercial space (ofﬁce, shops,…), industrial, etc;
• The building volumes;
• Delimitation of the ‘Development Units’ (Unidades de Ejecución), the sites to be
developed in an integrated way.

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For all the studied cases, the General Plan had prescribed not only structural, but also
detailed binding rules: the 1988 General Land use Plan of the City of Valencia for cases
Guillem, Periodista and Camino, and the 1987 General Land use Plan of the City of
Alicante for case Benalúa.
Detailed Plans (Special Plans –Plan Especial, Partial Plans –Plan Parcial, and Urban
Renewal Plans –Plan de Reforma Interior) are meant for speciﬁc sites, and can modify
and must anyway detail, if they are not detailed already, the structural binding rules
contained in the General Planning. The contents of the Urban Renewal Plan are very
similar to those of a Partial Plan. It is not only public agencies who can submit a Partial
Plan and an Urban Renewal Plan, commercial developers can do so also (Betancor &
García-Bellido, 2001: 108).
Municipalities and other public bodies with competences for policy ﬁelds with planning implications (e.g. regional agencies for industry and social housing) can make and
approve provisionally a Special Plan. However, whatever public agency approves the
Special Plan, the region must approve it deﬁnitively. These plans can cover small areas,
all the municipal territory or more than one municipality. They tackle a speciﬁc ﬁeld:
landscape, nature and cultural protection, protection of infrastructure, public facilities,
industrial areas, and affordable and social housing.

SECTORES DE SUELO
URBANIZABLE PROGRAMADO

SECTORES DE SUELO
URBANIZABLE NO PROGRAMADO

PLANO 11.1

PLANO 11.2

ESTUDIO ECONOMICO - FINANCIERO

ESTUDIO ECONOMICO - FINANCIERO

Figures 8. 1988 General Land-use Plan of the City of Valencia, sites zoned to be developed
in the future (soon left, in the longer term right).

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5.2

111

Capturing value increase through the land
readjustment regulation

Urban regeneration is implemented almost always through the Land readjustment
regulation (Reparcelación), which organizes not only the property readjustment,
but also the allocation of costs and proﬁts between the landowners. All the studied
projects apply the readjustment regulation. All the proﬁtable and unproﬁtable parts
are distributed between the landowners. As mentioned, the regulation was introduced in 1956, and in 1994 the region of Valencia introduced some important modiﬁcations.

5.2.1

Landowners lead land readjustment: 1956-1994

Together with the Planning Acts of 1975-6, 1990-92, 1998 and 2007, the planning
act of 1956, issued by the Franco regime, articulates the foundations of the present
Spanish planning system, including that of Valencia nowadays. This system reinforces
the certainty which landowners have about the development possibilities of their
land, through the legally binding General Land Use Plan. This plan zones the entire
municipal territory into urban, developable and non-developable land. Also, this
plan and, in some cases, the Detailed Plan, establishes the exact amount of building
rights that belong to each landowner, giving a very high certainty about the future
building possibilities. Banks accept these building rights as collateral for loans and
mortgages. In market transactions, the price of land tends to incorporate the residual
value of these building rights.

Frame 5c
Calculation of building rights of landowners
The building rights of the landowners are established as follows: the General Plan
delimitates the Redistribution Areas (Áreas de Reparto). Landowners included in a Redistribution Area share the building rights. Also, the General Land Use Plan and, in
some cases, the Detailed Plan, establish a Reference Development Allowance (Aprovechamiento tipo) for each Redistribution Area. This Allowance is a kind of weighted
ﬂoor space index. ‘Weighted’ means that the economic value of land is weighted,
depending on its use (affordable housing, free-market housing, ofﬁce space, shops,
etc) and on its location (along the main road or in a more tranquil and isolated area).
Therefore, the Reference Development Allowance is expressed in units of ‘modal use’
(unidad de aprovechamiento). The weighting is made in two steps: ﬁrst the differences
in value are weighted due to differences in use. Second, in the Land Readjustment
Project (see under), the differences due to the location are weighted.

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The Reference Development Allowance is calculated as follows (Parejo & Blanc, 1999:
296-304; Romero, 2002: 206-219): the total units of modal use (in m² ﬂoor space modal use) are divided by the total area of the Redistribution Area minus the area of existing public infrastructure and facilities that public bodies obtained in the past through
free cession (but not through buying or expropriation). Therefore, the Reference Development Allowance is calculated as follows:
• Building volume expressed in units of ‘modal use’ : (area Redistribution Area - area
of existing public facilities that public bodies obtained previously through free cession) = x m² ﬂoor space modal use / m² land
Example of calculation of the Reference Development Allowance in a Redistribution
Area of 1,000 m² of land of which 100 m² public infrastructure were previously obtained through free cession, and where the General Plan and/or Detailed Plan foresee
a total building volume of 2,000 m² ﬂoor space modal use:
• Reference Development Allowance: 2,000 : (1,000 – 100) = 2.2 m² ﬂoor space
modal use/m² land.
• Example of calculation of building rights of an owner of a parcel of 100 m²: 100 x
2.2 = he has right to 220 m² ﬂoor space modal use.
The Reference Development Allowance was in case Guillem 1.367, in Periodista 1.87,
in Camino 1.6537 and in Benalúa 0.6.

Although the infrastructure provision, also called ‘urbanization’ (urbanización) in
Spain, is still considered a public task, its implementation has become since 1956
both a duty and a right of landowners through the principle of ‘equitable redistribution of beneﬁts, costs and duties’ (redistribución equitativa de beneﬁcios y cargas)
of urban development. Value increase and costs of development are proportionally
distributed between all landowners according to the area of their original property.
Value increase thus serves to compensate landowners for taking responsibility for the
unproﬁtable parts of urban development, i.e. for providing the public infrastructure
and facilities and ceding the needed land.
The planning system speciﬁed several instruments for operationalising this system of
redistributing betterment and costs. The underlying idea was that the readjustment of
the property boundaries and the infrastructure provision had to be organised by all
the landowners themselves, not necessarily giving primacy to an intermediary agent
(e.g. one public or commercial developer owning part/most of the land). The Land
readjustment regulation made this transformation possible without depriving landowners of their ownership. Landowners were obliged to form a joint development organisation (Junta de Compensación), which organised and ﬁnanced the infrastructure
provision through voluntary land readjustment (Sistema de Compensación). After municipal approval was obtained, the Junta arranged the engineering works, provided
the site with the needed public infrastructure, redistributed the resulting parcels and

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infrastructure and, ﬁnally, dissolved itself. The planning system included in addition
two major instruments with which municipalities could intervene directly. First, the
municipality could overrule the landowners and take the lead by providing the infrastructure and applying compulsory land readjustment (Sistema de Cooperación). In
this case, the landowners were obliged to pay the total costs six months in advance
to the municipality. The second instrument was expropriation and implementation of
the plan (Sistema de Expropiación).
Another important component of the system was the introduction in the 1978 Planning Regulation of a set of legal minimal standards for public infrastructure and facilities (Estándares urbanísticos). These legal standards, together with the prescriptions
included in the General Land Use Plan, created certainty about the public infrastructure and facilities to be paid/realized by the landowners. The 1990-92 Act raised
these standards considerably.
The results of the planning system were ambiguous. On the one hand, it succeeded
in one of the main goals of the 1956 Act, which was to organise and ﬁnance the
private implementation of public infrastructure and facilities. On the other hand,
the system clearly failed to assure an efﬁcient (quantitative and qualitative) implementation. As a rule, landowners did not proceed quickly and processes were slow.
The transaction costs associated with organising landowners and developing a plan
could be high (see intermediary variable inﬂated development costs in causal model section 2.4.2). In addition, buying land and waiting was very common, and
speculation in the land market was said to have achieved critical levels. Some have
argued that this is clearly related to the high certainty about future building possibilities that arises after the approval of the General Plans. High accounted land
costs (see intermediary variable accounted land costs) and the costs of organising
landowners and infrastructure provision made development feasible only when
high housing prices allowed high ﬁnal proﬁts or when the quantity and the quality of infrastructure and public facilities (variable A.2) were low. It is argued that
this delayed development processes (intermediary variable delay) and resulted in
poorly serviced building sites, with inferior public infrastructure and facilities and
huge building volumes. Confronted with this failure, public bodies had not used
their legal instruments adequately to intervene directly through compulsory land
readjustment or through expropriation. Compulsory land readjustment entails more
involvement of the municipalities, which had to prepare the plans, organize the
land readjustment, possibly expropriate some owners, and advance some ﬁnancing, bear some ﬁnancial risks, etc. In case of expropriation, compensation includes
part of the market value of the use possibilities of the new land-use plan: this makes
expropriation expensive. Also, compulsory land readjustment and expropriation
remains a politically sensitive matter, especially at the local level (Parejo & Blanc,
1999: 479-480).

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5.2.2

Valencia

The urbanizing agent leads the land readjustment:
1994 - onwards

Since the 1980s, critics such as García-Bellido (1989; 1991b; 1993, 1994) and Parejo
Alfonso (1993) advocated reform of the 1956’s land readjustment regulation. In 1994,
the social-democratic regional government of Valencia, inﬂuenced by this criticism,
approved the Valencian Planning Act (Ley Reguladora de la Actividad Urbanística,
LRAU). The 1994 Act made feasible some novelties previously introduced in 1976.
The 1975-6 Land use and Urban Planning Act introduced an innovation that was
derived from the idea of urbanisme concerté in the French legal reform of 1973. The
innovation consisted of introducing a third party, in addition to the municipality and
the landowner/developer: the urbanising agent (agente urbanizador). This third party
is not required to own land and can be directly appointed by the municipality (public
land development company) or be chosen in a public tender (commercial builder or
developer). After being assigned as concession holder, the urbanising agent assumes
responsibility for the infrastructure provision and for the proportional redistribution
of betterments and costs between the landowners. In theory, therefore, this innovation assigned the task of redistribution and infrastructure provision to the urbanising
agent alone; it was no longer a right and duty of landowners, as had been speciﬁed
in the 1956 Act.
The innovation in the 1975-6 Act did not work. After being appointed by the municipality, urbanising agents needed the voluntary consent of the landowners and
had no guarantee that the municipality would apply compulsory land readjustment
if the landowners did not collaborate. In such cases, urbanising agents would be
obliged to ask the municipality to expropriate, and they would be required to pay
the full market value of the landowner’s building rights. In short, urbanising agents
had to commit themselves to the implementation of a plan without knowing for sure
whether possible difﬁculties with landowners could be resolved within the schedule. Furthermore, agents were likely to be faced with paying high compensation to
landowners. This situation impeded the success of the innovation of 1975-6 (GarcíaBellido, 1993; 1994). Moreover, the possibility of appointing an urbanisation agent
was limited to that part of the land classiﬁed as developable in the future and to those
cases in which the municipality explicitly had decided to follow this formula. It did
open a door, however, by introducing the possibility of public bodies deciding in a
public tender where to place development rights and the possibility of involving a
third party (who is, in principle, not linked at all with landownership) to be responsible for infrastructure provision.
The Valencian 1994 Act made the 1975-6’s innovation feasible. First, the 1994 Act
speciﬁed land readjustment and, if necessary, compulsory land readjustment, as the
default procedure. Urbanising agents therefore knew beforehand that the possible
resistance of landowners could be overruled after proper proceedings. Second, the
Act subjected all developable land (both regeneration in urban land and greenﬁeld

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sites) to this new formula for development. What the 1994 Act actually did was to
generalize the compulsory land readjustment formula, adding the possibility of appointing a third party as implementor. A third important novelty of the 1994 Act is
that it gave guarantees to the initiating parties about the handling of their proposals. This was meant to prevent municipalities from being too discretionary in their
decisions. These three modiﬁcations allowed initiating parties to have a reasonable
idea of their risks and costs, before entering into a public tender. A fourth novelty
was to link the legally binding physical zoning (the Detailed Plan) to the scheduling
of its implementation: Detailed Plans are now accompanied by a new sort of plan,
the Joint Development Programme, which includes all the development-oriented
aspects: calculation of costs, obligations of all parties, and a Development Agreement to secure the ﬁnancing and implementation of the public infrastructure and
facilities.
The 1994 Act was originally an initiative of the social democratic PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español), and the conservative Partido Popular voted against it at the
time of the parliamentary approval in 1994. However, the Partido Popular, after winning the regional elections in 1995, decided to maintain the law. Since then, most
of the other seventeen Spanish regions, although parties with a variety of political
opinions administer them, have introduced the Valencian innovation into their own
planning legislation (Burriel, 2008). In December 2005, the regional government of
Valencia approved, in reaction to criticisms of the 1994 Act, the 2005 Planning Act
(Ley Urbanística Valenciana, LUV)2. This revision modiﬁes some important aspects
of the 1994 Act, which can be summarized in two aspects. First, it reinforces the
procedural guarantees and relieves the obligations on owners in semi-consolidated
areas. Second, it introduces a double-tender procedure: the ﬁrst public tender is for
choosing the urbanising agent. Once selected, the urbanising agent is obliged to
organise a second tender for the public works. The ﬁrst tender follows part of the
European public procurement regulation3; the second follows the entire regulation.
The European Commission did however not agree and has submitted in the summer
of 2008 an appeal to the Court of Justice of the European Union4. In September 2010
the Advocate General of the EU advised to dismiss the Commission’s case (Advocate
General of the European Union, 2010). It is expected that the Court of Justice will
pass judgement at the end of 2010.

2

The European Parliament has played a central role in this criticism by criticizing the urban policy of
the regional Valencian government (Burriel, 2009).

3

Directive 93/37/EC and Directive 2004/18/EC, concerning the coordination of procedures for the
award of public works contracts.

4

Action brought on 9 July 2008 - Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Spain,
(Case C-306/08), (2008/C 223/58).

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Frame 5d
Joint Development Programmes
Under the 1994 Act, where the implementation of a Detailed Plan implies the need
to construct new public infrastructure and facilities, or to refurbish the existing ones,
the plan must be accompanied by a Joint Development Programme (Programa para el
desarrollo de una Actuación Integrada, PAI, also translated sometimes as ‘Integrated
Action Programmes’). The initiating party that submits the Detailed Plan (whether this
is a public or a private party), must also submit the Programme. Municipalities can
choose whether to approve ﬁrst the Detailed Plan and, afterwards, the Programme, or
to approve both documents at the same time. In practice they proceed and approve
both documents at the same time, as part of the same development initiative that has to
be evaluated as a whole. This was the case with all the studied cases, except for a small
part of the plan area in Benalúa. A Programme has also, the same as a Detailed Plan,
a legally binding character. Planning law prescribes its contents, which are divided in
two groups of documents (Parejo & Blanc, 1999: 329-333):
1) Technical Alternative (Alternativa Técnica), that includes the documents with the
physical zoning: (1a) The Detailed Plan that modiﬁes, completes or details the General
Plan; it can also include a Land Readjustment Project (Proyecto de Reparcelación, see
under); (1b) A Provisional or Deﬁnitive Infrastructure Provision Project (Anteproyecto/
Proyecto de Urbanización), which includes a scheme for the public infrastructure, with
a description of those elements that determine the total costs, such as the quality of the
public space, a scheme of the sewerage network, a scheme of the road network and the
other facilities, a description of existing networks (sewerage, water, roads, electricity,
cables), and the feasibility and the costs of connection to the new development (Merlo
& Ribes, 2004: 53-54).
2) Juridical-economic Proposal (Proposición Jurídico-Económica), which includes the
documents with the ﬁnancing and implementation schedules: (2a) The Economic-ﬁnancial Proposal (Proposición Económico-Financiera); (2b) A proposal of Development
Agreement (Convenio Urbanístico). Financing and implementation schedules consist
of the following:
• Infrastructure provision costs: a provisional estimation of these costs, and the allocation of these costs to each landowner, as well the form of payment (in money or
in kind, in building rights);
• Land to be ceded freely;
• Additional contributions: e.g. extra ﬁnancial contributions, building of public facilities, extra contributions for social/affordable housing;
• Deadlines for the submission of the Land Readjustment Project: in the studied cases
within 3 to 5 months after the deﬁnitive approval of the Programme;
• Deadlines for the commencement and completion of the infrastructure provision:
within the legal maximum of 5 years for the completion of the works (three cases),

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or 3 years in case the landowners, organized in an association, become selected as
urbanizing agent (case Camino);
• Deadlines for the building works: of the four studied cases, only one, Camino, included a deadline for the building, in this case for the commencement of the building.
The municipality approves both documents, Alternative and Proposal, and the regional
government intervenes only to approve deﬁnitively the Detailed Plan in case it modiﬁes
the structural binding rules of the General Plan. In practice, the regional government
uses this competence very often, and it is not exceptional that it rejects or requires the
modiﬁcations of the plans. In exceptional situations, the regional government can also
suspend the municipal plan and approve a new plan in its place. Such a measure has
always a temporary character (Parejo & Blanc, 1999: 111-112, 256, 311), and is not
very common in practice.

Anyone can submit a Programme, including a Detailed Plan, to the municipality,
as landownership is not required. The proposal usually follows the provisions of the
General Land Use Plan. If the General Plan is not yet detailed, the Detailed Plan
details it. However, for Existing Urban land, the General Plan is always detailed: i.e.
the General Plan establishes already whether land is meant for residential, industry
or ofﬁces, the maximal building volume, which sites should be redeveloped, building alignments, etc. So in these cases there is no need for Detailed Plans, unless it is
necessary to modify the General Plan.
The municipality can reject the Programme, including the Detailed Plan, or initiate a
formal public tender procedure. After a Programme has been published, anyone can
submit objections or alternative programmes. Candidates negotiate with landowners
to obtain support; they may publish their offers in newspapers and invite landowners to join them. After evaluation and negotiations with the candidates, the Local
Council decides on a deﬁnitive Programme and selects the urbanising agent. Selection criteria are the total infrastructure provision costs, the quality of the plan and
the public infrastructure and facilities, the advantages offered to the municipality, the
price offered to the landowners for their building rights, the support of landowners,
the implementation schedules, and the amount of the bank guarantees. The tender
can be declared void if none of the proposals satisﬁes the municipality, but such decisions must be justiﬁed (Blanc, 2003; Muñoz et al., 2004). Municipalities can grant
concessions to public agencies without public tender. About 30% of all schemes in
the region are developed by public companies, which are dependent on national,
regional or municipal public bodies (ﬁgures from 1994 till 1998, Modrego, 2000).
However, most (from 1994 until 1998: 72%) of the urbanisation projects have been
the result of private initiatives (Modrego, 2000).
After the approval of the Programme, landowners can decide whether they want to
be expropriated or to continue in the development process. If they choose for ex-

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propriation, the municipality is responsible for the expropriation, and the urbanising
agent is obliged to pay the compensation. The urbanising agent (a public agency,
or a private developer selected in the public tender) makes and submits to the municipality an Infrastructure Provision Project and a Land Readjustment Project. These
documents must ﬁt within whatever is prescribed in the General Plan, Detailed Plan
and Programme. After the period of public consultation, the municipality may reject,
amend or approve the documents.

Frame 5e
Procedure for the compulsory land readjustment
Planning law prescribes the following procedure for compulsory land readjustment
(Parejo & Blanc 1999: 454-460):
• Public consultation of the Land Readjustment Project: it is announced generally in
newspapers, and announced individually only to the registered titleholders, that is
those owners that are registered in the Property Register (Registro de la Propiedad).
• Application to the Property Register of a note that certiﬁes who are the titleholders
and which charges exist on the property (certiﬁcado de dominio y cargas). At the
same time, the Register notes the initiation of the readjustment procedure.
• Additional hearing of 10 days in case there turn out to be titleholders that have not
been formally addressed because they were not inscribed in the Property Register.
Also, an additional hearing of 10 days for the affected persons in case of modiﬁcation of the Project.
• During the Public consultation, affected persons can claim compensation from
each other. The owner of the freehold of the land has to compensate the titleholders
of other rights on his property that have to disappear. This may delay the procedure.
• During the Public consultation, owners can also offer to, or demand from, each other shortages and surpluses of building rights (defectos y excesos de aprovechamiento adjudicado). It is not always possible to allocate all the building rights of each
landowner onto a particular building plot. When there are shortages or surpluses,
and it is not possible to divide the new plot between several owners (pro indiviso),
owners have to buy or to sell the remaining rights. The Project proposes a unitary
price for the building rights. If the owners and urbanizing agent do not agree with
this price, the landowners can propose another price.
• Deﬁnitive approval: the Local Council (Pleno del Ayuntamiento) approves deﬁnitively
the Land Readjustment Project. Other public authorities also can approve it deﬁnitively, should they have the competence for expropriating land on the site in question.
• Publication, individual announcement to the affected persons and registration of
the approved Project in the Property Register.
Procedure for the voluntary land readjustment
The procedure for voluntary land readjustment is simpler. The proposal of readjustment
has to be endorsed by all the affected persons (landowners and other titleholders).

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Once the proposal has been submitted, the municipality decides right away: there is no
period of public consultation (Parejo & Blanc, 1999: 461). Most of landowners usually
prefer the voluntary way.

The approval of the Land Readjustment Project and its registration in the Property
Register has important consequences:
• Allocation to each new plot, in accordance with the Detailed Plan, of the building possibilities (volume and use typology) and of the public facilities and infrastructure;
• Automatic modiﬁcation of the property boundaries, with: i) assignment (subrogación) of the old private plots into the new private serviced building plots,
proportionally to the area of the former property and if possible on or nearby the
former property; ii) and transfer to the public domain of the public infrastructure
and facilities and possibly of some serviced building plots. The urbanizing agent,
as concessionaire for the public task of urbanisation, is allowed to occupy the
plots (also the new private plots) to provide the infrastructure.
• The new serviced building plots are charged with the obligation of paying the
corresponding contribution to the infrastructure provision costs, according to
the share in the building rights. Landowners usually pay in instalments during
infrastructure provision. In 2000, more than half of all landowners paid their
contributions in cash (Generalitat Valenciana 2000), although landowners may
also pay in kind (i.e. in building rights). If the landowner does not cooperate, a
part of the building plot, equivalent to the building rights that are necessary to
pay the contribution, is transferred to the urbanizing agent. The remaining building plot goes, free of charge, to the landowner.
• Old rights and charges on the old plots are transferred to the new plots provided
that they are compatible with the new plan. However, when the new plot is
transferred to the urbanizing agent as payment in kind (ﬁnca de garantía), the
land has to be transferred free of old rights and charges. Old rights and charges
that have to disappear have to be compensated by the former landowner.
Finally, the owners of the serviced building plots submit building applications and
the municipality issues as-of-right building permits, according to the General and
Detailed Plans and the building regulations.

5.3

The legal limits for capturing value increase in the
region of Valencia

How far can the required contributions of landowners and developers go? The legal
principles that delimit the scope of the contributions that can be obtained through
land readjustment are described below.

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5.3.1

Valencia

Public share of value increase

Following the Spanish Constitution of 1978, ‘The community shall have a share in
the beneﬁts accruing from the town-planning policies of public bodies’ (section
47). This constitutional principle authorizes municipalities to capture part of the
betterment, on top of the development costs and other charges mentioned below.
In developable areas (e.g. case Benalúa), municipalities had until 2007 the right to
10% of the building rights, and from 2007 onwards between 5 and 15%. Landowners are obliged to cede without any charge to the municipality the serviced building
parcels that are needed to make up this percentage. Note that they are ceding land,
but not building rights, because following planning law these building rights never
belonged to the landowners, but to the municipality. It is also important to note that
the ceded plots do not necessary turn out to be the same percentage, as building
rights refer to the economic value of the new buildings, and not to their land area.
The ceded land may become part of the Municipal Patrimony of Land (Patrimonio
Municipal de Suelo), which is intended for affordable housing and other social purposes.

5.3.2

Value increase as compensation for taking responsibility
for public infrastructure and facilities

As mentioned, the principle of ‘equitable redistribution of beneﬁts, costs and duties’
rules that landowners, in exchange for the building rights, are obliged to pay the infrastructure provision costs and to provide the needed land to the urbanizing agent.
The infrastructure provision costs are called ‘urbanization charges’ (Parejo & Blanc,
1999: 329-333, 409-415, 474-475).

Frame 5f
Infrastructure provision costs, i.e. Urbanization charges (cargas de urbanización)
consist of:
• ‘Urbanization costs’ (costes de urbanización), the costs of preparing plans and technical projects, of damage compensation, and of the civil works for streets, pathways, electricity, public light, planted trees on path and gardens, water and sewage,
gas, telephone, cables, etc;
• ‘Urbanization canon’ (canon de urbanización), a contribution to the costs of off-site
public infrastructure that serves the scheme in question, but has been previously
realized in other schemes;
• Proﬁt margin of the urbanizing agent, which usually charges around 10% of the
‘urbanization costs’;
• Overhead costs, the organizational costs made by the urbanizing agent.

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Besides a contribution to the Urbanization charges, landowners have also to cede free
of charge the land that is needed for public infrastructure and facilities. This includes
not only the civil works, but also other public facilities (such as public schools, sport
installations, kindergartens, parks, municipal ofﬁces, police station) the building and
exploitation costs of which must in principle be paid by the respective public body.
Additionally, on developable land it is also possible to oblige landowners to cede
land situated elsewhere that is needed for off-site infrastructure. In case Benalúa (plan
area 8.2 ha), the landowners had to cede 5.4 ha of land located off-site and meant
for a highway. The building rights of the Redistribution Area of the development site
have to be shared with the ‘off-site’ owners of the land on which this road is located.
These owners receive the same (proportional) share of the building rights as the onsite landowners.
Municipalities are free to agree additional obligations with the urbanizing agent, as
for example the building and exploitation of public facilities, additional contributions
to the municipality, or additional compensation for damages. However, the urbanizing agent cannot charge landowners for this, but must pay from his own resources.
Usually urbanizing agents own an important part of the land, so they are able to pay
these extras from the proﬁts from the development of the real estate. Municipalities
can also agree additional contributions for social housing: this can be in addition, or
not, to the land zoned for social/affordable housing, see under.

5.3.3

Social/affordable housing

Spanish municipalities can, since the 1990 Land Use and Urban Planning Act and its
Refunded Text (deﬁnitive version, after integrating its determinations with other still
ruling regulations) of 1992, zone land for social/affordable housing. The possibility of
zoning land for this was, at that time, a very important novelty in Spanish planning
law, and became the subject of discussion. The Supreme Court of Spain and the jurisprudence considered it very disputable to zone land for affordable housing without
compensating the landowners. Since 1997, the regions have taken over the competences on this matter, by-passing the discussion at the national level. Valencia and
other regions have included this 1992’s novelty in their regional planning legislation
(Burón, 2006: 87). Social/affordable housing is called in Valencia by different names,
depending on whether it is based on the national or the regional social housing legislation: Vivienda con Protección Pública respectively Vivienda Protegida (Fernández
et al, 2003: 91).

Frame 5g
The amount of social/affordable housing built
The building of affordable housing in Spain and Valencia has decreased in the last years

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In 1996, 30% of all new housing in Spain was affordable housing. During the government of the right-wing Partido Popular in the national government (1996-2004), this
ﬁgure dropped signiﬁcantly, to less than 10%. Since 2004, the new social democratic
government of Zapatero and most of the regions have declared affordable housing as
a priority of their planning policy. The Regional Government of Valencia introduced
recently the obligation to build a minimum percentage of 25% affordable housing in
urban land, and 40% in urbanizable areas. Including a legal quota is a recent general trend in Spain, with almost all the regions ﬁxing such minimum percentages. The
Basque Country was the ﬁrst region to do so. In 1994, it included, in municipalities
with more than 7,000 inhabitants, the legal minimum of 20% of affordable housing in
urbanized land and 65% in extension areas. In 2006, it lowered the criterion to municipalities of more than 2,000 inhabitants and increased the quota to 40% respectively
75% (Burón, 2006: 85). In 2007 the government in Madrid approved a new Land Act,
which established a minimum of 20% for the whole country.

Periodista Gil Sumbiela / 0.6 ha

Guillem de Anglesola / 1.2 ha

Camino Hondo del Grao / 5.7 ha

Figure 9. Location of the cases in the city of Valencia.

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The effect of zoning land for affordable housing in the zoning plan is that, later on,
once land readjustment takes place, the serviced building plots are inscribed in the
Property Register as affordable housing. As a consequence, the actual and the future
owners can only develop affordable housing on it. Affordable housing in Spain and
in Valencia receives a subject subsidy from central and regional government in the
form of a subsidy to the mortgage interest and sometimes of a lump-sum subsidy to
the buyer. The price of land for affordable housing is regulated (about € 100-150/m²
ﬂoor space in 2006), much lower than for free-market housing (€ 300-1,100/m² ﬂoor
space, depending on the location). This difference in land price between affordable
and free-market housing is shared between all the landowners through the land readjustment.
Thanks to the regulated low price of land, developing social/affordable housing is a
proﬁtable activity. Proﬁt rates from developing social/affordable might be not large,
but it is a very safe product, for the demand is guaranteed since selling prices of affordable housing are at least 50% and lower than prices for free-market housing.
Both commercial developers and housing cooperatives develop social/affordable
housing. Housing cooperatives (Cooperativas de vivienda) arose as cooperatives of
individual citizens meant for commissioning their own dwelling. In time they became more professionalized and independent from the future occupiers of the affordable dwellings.

5.4

Introduction to the studied cases in the region of
Valencia

In all cases, there was a General Land-use Plan that included binding rules that
prescribed the future development possibilities (see ﬁgures 9 and 10). Before being
allowed to redevelop the site, a Detailed Plan had to be approved. In cases Camino
and Benalúa, the Detailed Plan modiﬁed the structural binding rules in the General
Plan, thus it also had to be approved by the regional government. In Guillem and in
Periodista, the Detailed Plan only detailed and modiﬁed the detailed binding rules of
the General Plan, so in principle there was no need for regional approval. However,
because the General Plans were made before the 1994 Planning Act, regional approval was in any case necessary.
In all the studied cases, new public infrastructure and facilities were needed, so a
Joint Development Programme had to accompany the Detailed Plan and an urbanizing agent had to be selected. In all the cases, the urbanizing agent is a private
party selected in a public tender. Urbanizing agents are most of the time professional
developers, as in Guillem and Periodista. However, sometimes landowners join together and become the urbanizing agent, as in Camino and Benalúa.

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Since the introduction in 1994 of the urbanizing agent, the number of urbanizing
agents without land has increased. They can charge around 10% of the infrastructure
provision costs as proﬁt margin. However, as the cases show, most of the time urbanizing agents not only develop serviced building parcels, but also buy some land
and become developer of the buildings. In Periodista, most landowners sold their
property relatively quickly to the urbanizing agent, before the approval of the Joint
Development Programme. In Guillem, they waited a while and most of them sold at
the time of the land readjustment procedure. In Camino and Benalúa, the land was
already the property of the urbanizing agent (as landowners themselves became the
urbanizing agent).

Benalúa Sur / 8 ha

Figure 10. Location of case ‘Benalúa Sur’ (8 ha) in the city of Alicante.

Here follows a brief introduction to the cases. The rest of the case-based information
has been included in the rest of the chapter.

5.4.1

Guillem de Anglesola, City of Valencia

Urban Regeneration project ‘Guillem de Anglesola’ (1.2 ha, about 125 apartments,
104 units/ha, plus some retail, see ﬁgure 11) is located in the east of the city of Va-

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lencia. It concerns the demolishing of about 50 old and deteriorated housing buildings. The 1988 General Plan foresaw the redevelopment of this old residential area,
located in a densely built up area. The General Plan proposed the construction of a
main road through the site and multi store buildings along that road, with a total
building volume of 15,706 m² ﬂoor space (1, 6 and 7 ﬂoors). In 1999 a commercial developer (Proara Promotores Aragoneses SA) submitted a Joint Development
Programme, including an Urban Renewal Plan. After a public tender in which other
three developers submitted an alternative plan, Proara’s proposal was provisionally
approved in 2003. In 2005, after the signing of the Development Agreement, Proara
was deﬁnitely selected as the urbanizing agent. The Urban Renewal Plan included
in the Programme detailed outline provisions and modiﬁed marginally the already
detailed provisions of the 1988 General Plan. The procedure for land readjustment
began in 2006. In May 2008 works had yet not started. It was expected that the infrastructure provision would be ready no later than 2010.

Figure 11. 2005 Joint Development Program.

There are 49 small parcels in the plan area. Almost all these parcels are owned pro
indiviso by several owners, each of them owner of a ﬂat, so the total number of owners was much higher than 49. The smallest parcel has 26 m², the largest 548 m², and
the average size is 100-200 m². Alongside the plan process, the urbanizing agent
negotiated with the individual owners and acquired land. When the urbanizing agent
submitted the Land Readjustment Project in March 2006, he already owned about
30% of the land.

5.4.2

Periodista Gil Sumbiela, City of Valencia

Urban Regeneration project ‘Periodista Gil Sumbiela’ (0.6 ha, about 100 apartments,
166 units/ha, plus some retail, see ﬁgure 12) is located in the north of the City of

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Valencia. It is located in a densely built up area, and was previously occupied by
a warehouse, some ofﬁce space, some industry and an empty plot. The 1988 General Plan foresaw redevelopment into some residential use, some commercial/recreational, in total 5,556 m² ﬂoor space (1-2 ﬂoors), and some public infrastructure. In
2005, a commercial developer, Prodaemi S.L., with the support of a majority of the
landowners, submitted a Joint Development Programme, including an Urban Renewal Plan. This plan proposed an increase of the building possibilities (from 5,556
to 11,000 m² ﬂoor space; 1-2 to 6 ﬂoors) and rezoning to residential, of which the
majority should be affordable housing. After evaluation and several modiﬁcations,
Prodaemi’s proposal were approved provisionally in 2006, and deﬁnitely in 2007. In
November 2006 it was expected that the infrastructure provision would be ﬁnished
not later than 1012.

Figure 12. 2007 Joint Development Programme.

Property was originally divided among several landowners. The owners of 65% of the
land supported the proposal of Prodaemi. Once the Programme became provisionally approved in July 2006, Prodaemi bought all the land.

5.4.3

Camino Hondo del Grao, City of Valencia

Urban Regeneration project ‘Camino Hondo del Grao’ (5.7 ha, about 465 apartments, 82 units/ha, plus a considerable amount of building space for ofﬁces and
retail, see ﬁgure 13) is located in the east of the City of Valencia. Before redevelopment, the site was used for industry. It includes several old industrial buildings with
a historic-monumental value. The 1988 General Plan foresaw the continuation of
these uses. In 2000, a commercial developer submitted a Joint Development Programme proposing the redevelopment of the location into a residential area. Some
other parties, among them the owners of the majority of the land, organized into an

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Association of Urbanistic Interest (Agrupación de Interés Urbanistico, AIU), and submitted alternative Programmes. Finally, the municipality rejected all the proposals. In
2003 another commercial developer tried again, and two others (among them, again,
the landowners), submitted alternatives. Finally, in 2004, the municipality decided
to choose the Programme of the owners, which became the urbanizing agent. The
Urban Renewal Plan included in the Programme rezones the existing industrial use
into residential and public facilities, and increases the building volume. The regional
government approved it deﬁnitely in 2005, and the Development Contract was formally signed in 2006.

Figure 13. 2005 Joint Development Programme.

The property was initially divided into 18 parcels, owned by seven private landowners, most of them (81% plan area) members of the Association that won the public
tender. The rest of the land belongs to an electric company (0,08%), the railway
company (8%), and the Municipality of Valencia (5%). The municipality owned also
the existing roads and the land that is reserved for the school. Inmuebles Barrera S.A.
was the private landowner with the largest ownership: 32% of the plan area. In 2005
Vallehermoso, one of the national leading commercial developers, bought 59% of
the urbanizing agent (almost 50% of the plan area). In April 2008 another developer,
Coperﬁl Inmobiliaria, has bought most of the land and is in charge of the infrastructure provision, for which the demolition phase had already started at that time.

5.4.4

Benalúa Sur, City of Alicante

Urban Regeneration project ‘Benalúa Sur’ (8 ha, about 600 apartments, 75 units/ha,
plus a considerable amount of building space for ofﬁces and retail, see ﬁgure 14)
is located in the southwest of the City of Alicante. Before redevelopment, the site
included some undeveloped plots, some old and deteriorated housing and several
industrial ﬁrms, of which some were still active. The 1987 General Plan foresaw the

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redevelopment of the site into a new residential area for 735 dwellings, some commercial space and public facilities. In addition, a piece of land located at the outskirts
of the city (5.4 ha) was ascribed to the site. This land is necessary for a new highway
surrounding the city, and its landowners participate in the land readjustment together
with the rest of the landowners. In 1997, the municipality modiﬁed slightly the regulations of the 1987 General plan for this site, reducing the plan area and the number
of dwellings.

Figure 14. 2003 Joint Development Program.

In 1998, Nuevo Sector P.P. 1.2 Benalúa Sur S.L. submitted a Joint Development Programme for the redevelopment of the site that included a Partial Plan. Nuevo Sector was a development company founded by the owners of about 60% of the land.
These owners founded an Association of Urbanistic Interest also. The initiative and
the lead was taken by one of the owners, Urban Programas Urbanos, a consultancy
that had bought about 15% of the land (situated in the ascribed piece of off-site land).
In 2002 Urban Programa Urbanos sold its land and its participation in Nuevo Sector to a developer, Grupo P.R.A.S.A., who became the leading party. After a public
tender in which three other proposals were evaluated, in 2003 the Programme was
provisionally and then deﬁnitely approved. The Development Contract was formally
signed in 2004. The municipality approved the Land Readjustment Project in 2006.
The infrastructure provision works started in 2007.

5.5

How formal rules relevant to zoning in Valencia
can be used

This section describes the working of formal rules relevant to zoning within the value
capturing mechanisms. There are different ways (or sub-variables) in which these rules

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in Valencia can be used in an operational way to improve capturing value increase:
• Creating certainty or uncertainty beforehand about future building possibilities
and contributions;
• Choosing the contents of the relevant binding rules;
• Conditioning the relevant binding rules to securing the capturing of value increase;
• Modulating property rights;
• Using the procedure for the preparation and approval of the relevant binding
rules.
Here follows an assessment of whether each of these sub-variables can affect the
capturing of value increase.

5.5.1

Creating certainty beforehand about future building
possibilities and contributions

Summary of the ﬁndings
It is remarkable about the Valencian planning system that it provides beforehand a
relatively high degree of legal certainty, certainly when compared with England, The
Netherlands and other Western European countries (see section 4.1 for an international comparison). This is mainly due ﬁrst to a wide set of legal minimal standards
for public infrastructure and facilities, established in planning law; second to the
legal duty for municipalities to approve a legally binding General Land-use Plan that
must cover the whole municipal territory; and third to local policy for the modiﬁcation of the General Plan.
Because of these three measures, the main determinants of the economic value of
land are already ﬁxed when the development initiatives take place. There is a very
high level of certainty about both building possibilities and the contributions. Nevertheless, there is some room for ﬂexibility that municipalities can use purposefully,
mainly related to capturing value increase. This ﬂexibility does not diminish the certainty about the minimal building possibilities and contributions, which are already
stated in the legal standards and the General Plan, and which cannot be relaxed.
What happens is that there is some ﬂexibility to augment the building possibilities,
that is, there is some uncertainty about the maximum possibilities. If municipalities
augment the building possibilities, they create at the same time certainty about the
additional contributions. In other words: (1) there is legal certainty about a minimum, both of building possibilities and of contributions; (2) there is some uncertainty
about the possibility of augmenting building possibilities; (3) there is certainty about
additional contributions, in case of augmenting. Table 9 summarizes the level of
certainty, before deﬁnitive negotiations take place, about building possibilities and
contributions.

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Table 9. Level of certainty in the Valencian cases

Certainty about future
building possibilities

Certainty about future
contributions

Guillem, City Valencia

Very high

Very high

Periodista, City Valencia

Very high about min, less about max

Very high

Camino, City Valencia

Very high about min, less about max

Very high

Benalúa, City Alicante

Very high about min, less about max

Very high

The ﬁndings from the studied cases and other sources strongly suggest that uncertainty about the future building possibilities, together with certainty about the future
contributions, might be positive for capturing value increase. Let us now see in detail
whether municipalities create certainty or uncertainty and about what, in what sort
of documents: then we infer the consequences for capturing value increase. Here a
distinction is made between certainty through legal minimal standards and the General Land Use Plan, and certainty through indicative local policy documents meant
for the case that the General Plans are modiﬁed.
5.5.1.1 Creating certainty through the minimal legal standards and the
General Plan
Since 1978, planning law prescribes a wide set of legal minimal standard contributions (Estándares urbanísticos). The 1998 Planning Regulation, which was in force for
the studied cases, differentiates between standards and prescriptive determinations
for residential, commercial/recreational and industrial developments. Also, it differentiates between standards that must be included in the General Land use Plan and
those that must be included in the Detailed Plans, whether in the form of structural
or detailed binding rules.

Frame 5h
Examples of legal minimal standards for residential schemes in the 1998 Regulation
• Minimal public space: depending on the ﬂoor space index of the scheme, different
percentages of minimal public space are given for roads, green areas and public
facilities. E.g. with an f.s.i. of 1 m² ﬂoor space per m² land, at least 63% of the plan
area must be used for public space: 15% for green areas, 20% for public facilities
and 28% for roads. Also, the area for public facilities must be at least 35 m² per 100
m² ﬂoor space.
• Minimal number of plots for public facilities: schemes with more than 8,000 m²
ﬂoor space of residential use must provide at least one plot for public facilities,
which must be situated in the most appropriate location and within an urban context that ﬁts with its function.

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• Minimal parking places: per dwelling, at least one parking place must be provided,
and in case of schemes of more than 10 dwellings, per 10 dwellings an additional
parking place must be provided. At least 50% of these parking places must be situated in or under the buildings, not in the public space.
Example of prescriptive determination for residential schemes in the 1998 Regulation
Municipalities must establish in their General Land use Plan a minimal amount of commercial/recreational uses in residential developments.

When a development initiative takes place, there is almost always an approved General Land Use Plan. This was also the situation in all the studied cases: the 1987 Plan
in the city of Alicante (case Benalúa) and the 1988 Plan in the city of Valencia (the
other three cases). A General plan sets out for the whole municipal territory the structural binding rules and, in urban development areas, usually the detailed binding
rules also. That is, the General Plan establishes whether land is meant for residential,
industry or ofﬁces, the maximal building volume, which sites should be redeveloped,
building alignments, and also details of the public infrastructure and facilities which
must be realized, etc. This was also the case in the four studied cases. The 1988
General Plan of the city of Valencia prescribed detailed regulations for the three studied cases in that city. In Guillem and Periodista, the 1988 document prescribed for
example the alignments of the public streets and the apartment buildings (including
the height), and the maximal building volume, 15,468 respectively 5,556 m² ﬂoor
space. In Camino, it prescribed the continuation of the industrial use, added some
commercial use, prescribed a maximal building volume of 72,663 m² ﬂoor space
and delimitated the buildings and public infrastructure. The 1987 General Plan of the
city of Alicante, and its later modiﬁcation in 1997, prescribed detailed regulations
for the case Benalúa, such as the detailed alignments of public infrastructure and
the apartment buildings, and a maximal building volume of 103,670 m² ﬂoor space,
maximal 742 dwellings.
What is the effect of this certainty on capturing value increase? It has not been possible to measure in our cases those effects, because this was the situation in all the
cases and there was no example of the contrary to compare with. However, it seems
reasonable to conclude that municipalities might lose some negotiation room when
creating absolute certainty about the future building possibilities. Also, certainty
about building possibilities might inﬂate the accounted land costs and the regular
and ﬁnal proﬁt margins of the developer (see causal model in section 2.4.2). On the
contrary, uncertainty about future building possibilities might be positive for capturing value increase. This conclusion is based on the fact that the captured value
increase improved in those cases in which municipalities made use of their statutory
potential to deviate from the General Land-use Plan, that is, in cases where municipalities created some uncertainty about additional building possibilities (see below).
After all, the General Plans had already ‘given away’ their treasure (the allocation

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of building possibilities), so landowners and developers were already secure and
able to internalize part of the value increase in the accounted land costs and proﬁt
margins. The municipalities had less to offer, unless additional building was possible.
5.5.1.2 Effects of modifying the General Plan on capturing value increase
The legal framework in Valencia offers the possibility to modify the General Plan.
Detailed Plans can modify the General Plan in different ways: they can rezone one
urban use into another (industrial to housing, industrial to ofﬁce, ofﬁce to housing,
etc - called recaliﬁcación); increase the building volume (aumento de ediﬁcación); or
rezone land from non-developable to developable (agricultural to housing, agricultural to industrial, etc – reclasiﬁcación).
In green-ﬁeld sites municipalities usually follow the provisions of the General Plan
strictly. Re-zoning land from agricultural into an urban use (reclasiﬁcación) was not
a common practice. Up to 1998, statistics show that Detailed Plans re-zoned almost
no agricultural land into land to be developed (Modrego, 2000). That is, whether
land may be developed or not is mainly and ﬁrmly established in the General plans.
From 1998 onwards, there are neither published nor other available ﬁgures. Based on
interviews with several relevant experts, it seems that the situation has not changed
signiﬁcantly (Rubio, Munoz & Canellas, Blanc, Escribano, interviews in 2006 and
2007), although other sources do not agree (Burriel, 2008). The general picture that
arises from the mentioned interviews is that, since 2004, there have been many proposals to re-zone agricultural land into golf courses annex residential schemes, but
most of them seem to have been rejected or are still being processed. This picture
might be compatible with the existence of some well-known examples of approved
re-zonings (Blanc, Escribano, interviews in 2006 and 2007), and the political and social repercussion of these re-zonings might be anyway much higher than the ﬁgures
could justify (cfr. Burriel, 2008). None of the studied cases included such a re-zoning.
In the city of Valencia there seems to be only one case of reclasiﬁcación, in Barrio de
la Torre. Anyway, cases of reclasiﬁcación, if they exist, are irrelevant for urban regeneration because they almost always concern green-ﬁeld developments.
On the contrary, in urban regeneration it seems clear that municipalities often use
this possibility to re-zone one urban use into another and/or to increase the building volume (recaliﬁcación and aumento, Rubio, Montiel, interviews in 2006). In exchange, they ask for more contributions, additional to the legal minimum standards
mentioned above. Modiﬁcations mostly involve the re-zoning of industrial and commercial/recreational space (ofﬁces, shops, etc) into housing. For example, in the city
of Valencia, more than 90% of all locations zoned in the 1988 General plan as industry have been re-zoned into housing and ofﬁce space. Between 50% and 80% of
all locations zoned as commercial/recreational areas have been re-zoned too (Raga,
Rubio, interviews in 2006). In three of the four cases – Periodista, Camino and Benalúa - the Detailed Plan indeed increased the building volume and/or re-zoned the
use of land from one urban use into a more proﬁtable one.

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The uncertainty that this regulatory power to modify the General plan might create
has however been limited: Valencian municipalities usually specify which sorts of
modiﬁcations are possible, and approve criteria about additional contributions, in
case of modiﬁcation. This happens in indicative documents, approved by the Local
Council. The example of the Municipality of Valencia could be representative. At the
end of the 90s, more and more market actors took the initiative to ask for re-zoning.
However, up to 2000 the Municipality of Valencia did not accept them (Raga, interview 2006). In 2000, the municipality decided to make it possible to modify the General Plan so as to rezone land from one urban use to another. In addition, it elaborated several criteria, most of them related to capturing value increase (see Frame 5i).

Frame 5i
Criteria for the modiﬁcation of the General Plan in the Municipality of Valencia
The Municipal Council of Valencia approved on 28 July 2000 several criteria for the
rezoning of one urban use into another (recaliﬁcación), and modiﬁed these criteria in
new resolutions on 22 May 2002 and 30 April 2004:
• Rezoning is only possible in case of old industrial areas or ofﬁce buildings to be
redeveloped into residential areas.
• The rezoning has to improve the urban quality: reducing the total building volume;
or the new residential use must ﬁt better in the neighbourhood; or introducing any
other objective improvement.
• 20% of the total building volume has to be used for commercial/recreational uses,
or for affordable housing.
• Compensation: for each new m² ﬂoor space, landowners have to cede 1 m² land
for public facilities (additional to the minimal obligations already established in the
legal standards and in the General Plan), or 0.5 if the urbanizing agent uses at least
20% of the building volume for affordable housing (before the municipal resolution of 22 May 2002, this was 50%). These m² of land may also be ceded outside
the plan area, or paid in money. Therefore, appraisal of the value of the new ﬂoor
space is based on cadastral values. In Periodista and Camino, the municipality introduced instead an independent appraisal made by the Polytechnic University of
Valencia. The University increased in both cases the value of the new ﬂoor space,
when compared with the cadastral values. As a consequence, the compensation
sum increased notably.
• The resulting housing density in the plan area cannot exceed 75 dwellings/ha.
• If the new dwellings add more than 1,000 inhabitants to the area, landowners have
to cede at least 5,000 m² land for a park (additional to the legal minimal cessions).

In Benalúa, in the City of Alicante, the municipality did something similar. The 1987
General Plan established structural binding rules for this site. However, in 1997 the
Local Council, after a legal judgement against the 1987 Plan, approved the Municipal Criteria, a document that detailed how exactly a future Detailed Plan should

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modify the 1987 General Plan: for example, the exact amount of building volume
and the detailed binding rules. So in fact, although the latter Detailed Plan modiﬁed
the 1987 Plan, actually there was already in 1997 certainty about the modiﬁcation
possibilities.
Neither the 2000 resolution of the Municipality of Valencia, nor the 1997 Municipal
Criteria of Alicante were legally binding for the use of land (the municipality retained
fully discretional powers to decide). However, in both cases the municipality decided
publicly to handle those rules very strictly as evaluation criteria. The cases conﬁrm
this.
Besides those sorts of modiﬁcations that are foreseen in local policy documents,
there are other sorts of modiﬁcations that are less regulated. For example, in the City
of Valencia the second possibility of modiﬁcation (increasing the building volume)
is not covered by formal policy. Asked about this, a public ofﬁcer (Raga, interview
2006) conﬁrmed that there are ‘informal’ criteria for this. ‘Informal’ because they are
not formulated explicitly by the Local Council. In very speciﬁc cases, the public ofﬁcer states, it is possible to increase the building volume.

Frame 5j
The ‘informal’ criteria for increasing the building volume laid down in the General
Plan in the Municipality of Valencia, handled in case Periodista, were these:
• The same as for recaliﬁcación (see frame 5i).
• The urbanizing agent proposed to use 80% of the building volume for affordable
housing;
• The urbanizing agent proposed a building envelope that ﬁts within the surrounding
buildings.

What are the effects on capturing the value increase? The cases conﬁrm the idea that
the possibility of modifying the General Plan (rezoning the land and augmenting
the building volume) may increase the negotiation strength of the municipality. In
addition, it is plausible to conclude that the certainty created about the additional
contributions in case of modiﬁcation inﬂuences the accounted land costs and proﬁt
margins, similar to the effect of the certainty mentioned in the previous section (the
certainty created by the General Plan and the minimal legal standards). In Periodista,
both (possibility of modiﬁcation + certainty about additional contributions) led to
a share of 80% affordable housing in the building, an enlargement of public space
from 1,805 up to 2,597 m², and the payment of a substantial amount to the municipality. In Camino it led to an enlargement of public space and facilities from 16,186
to 38,720 m², the rehabilitation and free cession to the municipality of four old industrial buildings, and the payment of an important amount to the municipality. All
these contributions were additional to the contributions prescribed initially in the

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General Plan and in the legal minimal standards (for a comparison of contributions
in all four cases see section 5.6). It is very plausible that similar effects took place in
other modiﬁcations of the 1988 General Plan of the city of Valencia.

5.5.2

Possible contents of the binding rules

The Spanish 1978 Constitution gives a broad deﬁnition of the goals of public activities in planning: to pursue an adequate environment for the development of the individual, to protect historical and cultural heritage, to ﬁght against speculation in order
to guarantee decent and adequate housing for each Spaniard, and to share a part of
the beneﬁts accruing from public planning. Planning law operationalizes these broad
constitutional goals by allocating many competences to public authorities (Parejo &
Blanc, 1999: 133-138). This might be the reason for the broad range of prescriptions
that can be included in the Valencian binding rules, both prescriptions related to the
physical zoning (Planeamiento Físico), and prescriptions related to the organization
of the implementation (Planeamiento Programático).
Summary of the ﬁndings
There are two sorts of physical zoning prescriptions that seem clearly to have, or
potentially to have, a positive effect on capturing value increase: (1) Planning law
deﬁnes much broader obligations for landowners under the category ‘Land to be
developed’ than under the category ‘Existing Urban Land’. In Land to be developed,
binding rules can include the broadest range of obligations: such as more public
facilities, off-site infrastructure, and a public share of 10% in the building rights. It
seems clear that this leads to higher captured value increase. (2) Planning law opens
the possibility of including in the binding rules prescriptions regarding social/affordable housing. These are of two sorts: ﬁrst, since 1992 municipalities can zone land for
social/affordable housing; second, municipalities and developers can reach agreements about additional social/affordable housing. For the present, these measures
seem not to have been systematically applied. However, the ﬁndings suggest that
they are potentially useful for getting more social/affordable housing built.
Regarding the organization of the implementation, there are three sorts of prescriptions that seem also clearly to have a positive effect on the capturing of value increase: (3) Planning law deﬁnes the possibility of ascribing off-site infrastructure to
the development site in question. Landowners of the off-site land share the building
rights with the owners of the development site, and cede their land freely. Thanks
to this measure, Valencian municipalities have obtained in the last years a very important part of the land needed for main public infrastructure and facilities. (4) Planning law allows municipalities to agree contributions additional to the minimal legal
package. This has clearly provided a signiﬁcant beneﬁt for the public, also for social/
affordable housing. (5) The 1994 Act rearranged the contents of the General and Detailed Plans. The Act included the ﬁnancing and implementation schedules (included

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previously in the General and Detailed Plans), and the agreed additional contributions (included previously in external agreements) into a new sort of document, the
Joint Development Programme. The positive effects of this 1994’s reorganization on
capturing value increase are however unclear, because there seems to be a more
relevant independent sub-variable: this is that the 1994 Act introduced the obligation
of always achieving a Development Agreement to secure the investments and schedules. This was previously an option, not an obligation (see under in section 5.5.3).
The following sections include a detailed assessment of these ﬁve sorts of prescriptions, and how they work within the value capturing mechanisms.
5.5.2.1 Prescriptions related to physical zoning: Zoning land into the class
‘Land to be developed’
Probably the most important function of the General and Detailed Plans is to categorize land into three sorts or ‘classes’: ‘Existing Urban land’, ‘Land to be developed
in the future’, and ‘Non-developable land or rural area’. It seems that municipalities
sometimes categorize as much land as possible into Land to be developed, with the
intention of improving capturing value increase. Owners of Land to be developed
are obliged to pay/realize higher contributions than owners of Existing Urban land:
for example more public facilities, off-site infrastructure and a public share of 10% in
the building rights. The legal criteria for categorizing land are very strict: land that is
already provided with the needed public infrastructure must be classiﬁed as Existing
Urban Land; land that is not yet provided with such infrastructure, and is meant to be,
must be classiﬁed as Land to be developed. However, although these criteria seem
clear, in practice there is some room to draw the line some meters to the right or to
the left. For example, the 1988 General Plan of the city of Valencia classiﬁed as much
land as possible as Land to be developed. This led often, in the periphery of the city,
to drawing the border between Existing Urban land and Land to be developed along
the party walls of existing buildings. The same happened in the 1987 General Plan of
the city of Alicante, for example in case Benalúa.
What was the effect of zoning as much land as possible as Land to be developed?
That there is certainty about more contributions, thus plausibly a lowering inﬂuence
on the accounted land costs and the proﬁt margins of the developer, and a strengthening of the negotiation position of municipalities. In general, developments on Land
to be developed provide higher captured value increase than on Existing Urban land.
That was clearly the case in Benalúa, the only case where land was classiﬁed as Land
to be developed. In Benalúa the municipality receive 17% of all building rights and a
large piece of land for off-site infrastructure. Both advantages are the direct result of
the fact that the site falls under the class Land to be developed.
The strategy of delimiting very strictly the line between Existing Urban land and
Land to be developed might have been more successful in the City of Valencia than
in Alicante. In the City of Valencia, this strategy has been systematically applied in

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the 1988 General Plan, and this has resulted in an improvement of the public space
situated in the urban periphery. All around the city, the new schemes on Land to be
developed of the 1988 General Plan have paid, in the urban periphery existing at
that time, for the green space and other public space in-between the existing buildings (Blanc, interview in 2006, see also ﬁgures 15). However, in the City of Alicante,
where the 1987 General Plan had also drawn the line very strictly, the municipality
seems to have made legally risky delimitations, which has led to delay. For example,
in Benalúa the municipality zoned several parcels as Land to be developed that could
also be considered as Existing Urban land. Landowners took the 1987 municipal
delimitation to the courts, both in case Benalúa and in Playa de San Juan, another
scheme in the city of Alicante. The courts have granted some of the appeals, e.g. in
Benalúa part of the land became an own development site subjected to the lower
contributions regime of Existing Urban land, reducing the area of our development
site from 98,000 to 82,451 m².
5.5.2.2 Prescriptions related to physical zoning: Zoning land for Social/
affordable housing
Before 1992, planning legislation did not allow the zoning of land for social/affordable housing. This changed with the 1992 Refunded Act. Since then, General and
Detailed Plans can establish a minimum percentage of social/affordable housing,
of the total number of dwellings in the plan area. Also, they can establish on which
parcels that housing to be built.
In practice, many General Plans did not zone land for social/affordable housing, because most of them were made before 1992. This is the case in the cities of Valencia
(1988 General Plan) and Alicante (1987). From 1992 onwards, there are no data
available about whether General and Detailed Plans include affordable housing or
not, but following some experts, municipalities, in general, have not done this. This
lack of political will has led to discussion. A widely shared opinion among experts is
that municipalities are not reliable in fulﬁlling the function of guaranteeing enough
social/affordable housing. The only solution, they argue, is to introduce minimal quota in regional planning legislation. This discussion has had consequences in practice.
It seems that in the last years, when housing prices have risen spectacularly and when
the affordability of houses has become a main political issue, municipalities have
begun to zone land for affordable housing. For example, the General Plan of the city
of Castellón de la Plana (2000) has done so (Roger, Blanc, Rubio, Montiel, Muñoz &
Cañellas, Escribano, interviews 2006). One of the four studied projects (Periodista)
included affordable housing in the Detailed Plan (80% of the scheme).
Municipalities can also require contributions for social/affordable housing and include them in the Programmes, contributions that are additional and complementary
to the mentioned legal minimal package and specially zoned land. Additional contributions might include extra cession of land, or a minimum percentage, or the obligation for the landowners to pay their contribution to the infrastructure provision costs

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in building rights, and the obligation for the urbanizing agent to use these building
rights for affordable housing. It seems that municipalities have only recently begun
to do so. Case Guillem included affordable housing in the Programme but not in the
Detailed Plan, and Periodista both in the Programme and in the Detailed Plan.

Figures 15. (1-2) Nou Campanar/Jorge Comín; (3) San Pau; (4-6) Beniferri. These are examples of older
buildings in the former northern urban periphery of the City of Valencia. The green space has been
paid by the new developments on Land to be developed (Copyright Demetrio Muñoz, nov 2006).

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What are the effects for the building of social/affordable housing? Two measures are
evaluated here: (1) the fact that, since 1992, binding rules can zone land for social/
affordable housing; (2) and the fact that municipalities can agree additional contributions regarding social/affordable housing and include them in the Programmes. The
conclusion is that both measures can have a positive effect on the actual realization
of social/affordable houses because they can create certainty about more contributions. Up to recently, municipalities did not use these measures, thus building rates
were inﬂuenced mainly by the housing market: in times of low housing prices, developers seek safer products such as affordable housing. Because from 1998 till circa
2007, housing prices rose spectacularly, the building of social/affordable housing
dropped very signiﬁcantly (see Table 10).

As mentioned, municipalities have now changed their policies and are including
more affordable housing in the binding rules: both by zoning land as affordable housing, and by agreeing additional contributions and including them in the Programmes.
Whether this has been a success is not possible to evaluate here. There are no available statistics about building rates from 2003 onwards. Based on the interviews and
the studied cases, it is possible to conclude however that building of affordable housing is indeed rising. Of the studied cases, only those that included affordable housing

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in the binding rules (Guillem and Periodista) will indeed provide affordable housing. It
seems plausible thus that including affordable housing in binding rules could indeed
lead to more being built (Roger, Blanc, Rubio, Montiel, Escribano, interviews 2006).

Vía Parque (off-site infrastructure

Benalúa Sur / 8 ha

Figure 16. Piece of off-site infrastructure ascribed to the Redistribution Area of Benalúa Sur. The General Land use Plan of 1987 allocated the building rights as follows (the Program modiﬁed these ﬁgures
slightly, e.g. reduced the area of the development site from 98,000 to 82,451 m² of land):
• Area development site: 98,000 m² of land
• Area off-site infrastructure to be included: 54,398 m² of land
• Total Redistribution Area: 98,000 + 54,398 = 152,398 m² of land
• Building volume Redistribution Area/site: 103,950 m² ﬂoor space modal use
• Reference Development Allowance: 103,950 : 152,398 = 0,6 m² ﬂoor space modal use/m² land
• Building right of owner parcel of 100 m² land, whether situated in development site or under
the off-site infrastructure: (100 x 0,6) x 0,9 [10% belongs to the Municipality] = 54 m² ﬂoor
space modal use.

5.5.2.3 Prescriptions related to the organization of the implementation:
Ascribing off-site infrastructure to development sites
In Land to be developed, General Plans can charge infrastructure and facilities with
an off-site function into the development site (sector) in which they are located. Also,

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the General Plan can ascribe a piece of land situated off-site to a particular development site. The owners of the land under the infrastructure or facility (whether situated
or not on the development site) belong to the same Redistribution Area, i.e. they
share the building rights of the development site and, in exchange, cede their land
freely. This seems to be a very common practice. Benalúa, the only case situated on
Land to be developed, does so. The 1987 General Plan of Alicante attached 5.4 ha
of off-site infrastructure (Via Parque) to the Redistribution Area/sector of Benalúa (8.3
ha, see ﬁgure 16). This was part of a wide strategy of ascribing off-site infrastructure
all around the city to those sites to be developed. The 1987 General Plan foresaw an
urban extension area of about 200 ha, and ascribed 37 off-site ha to the land to be
developed in the period 1987-1991 (Benalúa was part of it). For the period 19911994, the General Plan ascribed 15 ha. Similarly, the 1988 General Plan of the city
of Valencia, that foresaw an urban extension of about 700 ha, ascribed to it about 2/3
of all new off-site infrastructure in the city (230 of 350 ha). This led to an average of
about 0.3 m² of off-site land per m² of urban extension area (Roger, Blanc, Escribano,
interviews 2006). When ascribing off-site infrastructure, municipalities take account
of the proﬁtability of the development site (i.e. of the residual value of each scheme).
The goal was that each scheme should bear a proportional part of the off-site infrastructure without compromising its economic feasibility.
What has been the effect of ascribing off-site infrastructure? Probably positive because it creates certainty about more contributions. It seems that Valencian municipalities manage in this way to obtain free most of the land needed for new main public infrastructure and facilities. In general, the interviewed experts and public ofﬁcers
consider that this works well. Case Benalúa and general information about the cities
of Alicante and Valencia conﬁrm this. In case Benalúa, the municipality will receive
for free 5.4 ha of off-site infrastructure. In the city of Valencia, about 230 ha have
been obtained for free since the approval of the 1988 General Plan, for example the
land under the new Cortes Valencianas Avenue and under the new Football stadium
of C.F. Valencia (Roger, Blanc, Escribano, Muñoz & Cañellas, Baño, Raga, interviews
2006).
5.5.2.4 Prescriptions related to the organization of the implementation:
Agreeing additional contributions
Planning law, both before and after the 1994 Act, prescribes the formal possibility of negotiating additional contributions in a Development Agreement: e.g. extra
ﬁnancial contributions, building of public facilities. They are additional to the legal
minimal package of contributions. Extra contributions can include, besides those just
mentioned, contributions for social/affordable housing (see above).
Has the possibility of agreeing additional contributions improved capturing value
increase? It is common that municipalities manage to obtain additional contributions
in this way. Additional contributions are in practice the following (Blanc, Muñoz &
Cañellas, interviews 2006):

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•

•

•
•

Valencia

Building of public facilities (swimming pools, public buildings, etc): this happens, following one expert (Blanc, interview 2006), almost only in the larger
schemes, where these costs do not exceed 8%-12% of the total infrastructure
provision costs. It seems that urbanizing agents often manage to make landowners pay for it. A main difﬁculty with this sort of contribution is that it is not
regulated properly and might therefore disturb the necessary conditions for free
competition (Blanc, Escribano, Baño, interviews 2006). Municipalities often reject additional contributions if it seems difﬁcult to objectively compare different
proposals, and this happens often with the building of public facilities, because
the characteristics of the public buildings to be constructed are not speciﬁed previously. An example is Camino, where the winning urbanizing agent proposed
the rehabilitation and free cession of several historic industrial buildings, but the
municipality had not established a priori any speciﬁcation about this. Another
aspect that might disturb free competition is that urbanizing agents in principle
cannot charge these costs to the landowners. Thus, only those agents that also
own much land, or can manage to charge the landowners anyway, can afford to
make such proposals, and the others cannot compete.
Developing less proﬁtable products: more frequent seems to be that the urbanizing agent commits itself to develop on its land less proﬁtable products with a
high social proﬁtability. For example, a hotel or recreational building, instead of
residential, in a tourist residential scheme.
Financial payments to the municipality, or other kind of extras: this seems also to
happen, e.g. in cases Periodista (€ 1.6m) and Camino (€ 4m).
Additional contributions for social/affordable housing: see above.

In the studied cases, additional contributions were very frequent. In Camino, the urbanizing agent undertook important additional investments for the removal of existing industries, and for the rehabilitation and free cession of several historic industrial
buildings. Also, the municipality will receive almost € 4 million, which is included
in the infrastructure provision costs and will therefore be paid by the landowners. In
Guillem, the urbanizing agent assumed an important part of the infrastructure provision costs, costs that, following planning law, should be paid by the landowners.
Also, the urbanizing agent will pay additional compensation to the existing house
owners. In Periodista, the urbanizing agent will provide some infrastructure outside
the plan area and will pay € 1.6m to the municipality.
This sub-variable (Municipalities can negotiate additional contributions) is a direct
consequence of planning law: planning law prescribed, before and after the 1994 Act,
the formal possibility of negotiating such contributions in a Development Agreement.
Before 1994 these agreements were common, but there were also many zoning plans
approved without an agreement backing them. The 1994 Act has reinforced this subvariable by introducing another sub-variable: Programmes must now include a Development Agreement (see section 5.5.3), which has generalized the use of development
agreements, and increased the total number and amount of additional contributions.

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5.5.2.5 Prescriptions related to the organization of the implementation:
Investment and implementation schedules (before 1994 in General
and Detailed Plans, after 1994 in Joint Development Programme)
and Development Agreements (before 1994 in extern documents,
after 1994 in Programme)
Before the 1994 Act, General Plans included schedules for the public investments.
This occurred in an ‘Action Programme’ (Programa de Actuación) and an ‘EconomicFinancial Study’ (Estudio Económico-Financiero). These documents were exhaustive
studies that foresaw the investments of public bodies (local, provincial, regional and
national public bodies) in the public infrastructure and facilities needed for the implementation of the General plans. For example, the 1988 General Plan of Valencia
foresaw € 1,160m of public investments for the period 1989-19965. The municipality of Valencia would pay € 364m and the other public administrations the rest. The
Economic-Financial Study foresaw a public investment of € 925,558 in case Guillem to construct a broad road, and € 135,227 in Periodista to build a public facility.
In addition to the public investments, General Plans included the schedules within
which landowners were obliged to implement the public infrastructure and facilities
following the voluntary land readjustment procedure.
The 1994 Act introduced some modiﬁcations to this. Since 1994, General Plans can
only contain the ex lege prescription that General Plans foresee the urban expansion of
the municipality for approximately 10 years, and a brief description of the needed public facilities and infrastructure for a longer period. However, this includes neither compulsory implementation schedules, nor does it result in concrete deadlines, although
the validity of the General Plan is indeﬁnite (Parejo & Blanc, 1999: 265-266; Romero,
2002: 340). There might be one exception: in some areas, General Plans can include
rules regarding the logical order of developments (condiciones objetivas de urbanización): detailed objective and technical criteria that have to be fulﬁlled before each
site can be developed. These criteria may result in a logical order of developments, and
are compulsory for the subsequent Joint Development Programmes (Parejo & Blanc,
1999: 267). Regarding ﬁnancial aspects, General Plans no longer include the exhaustive public investment schemes. Only municipalities of more than 50,000 inhabitants
are obliged to include a brief and very general socio-economic assessment of the plan.
Also, General Plans no longer include the implementation schedules for landowners.
Something similar has happened with the Detailed Plans. Before the 1994 Act, Detailed Plans included a ‘Plan of Phases’ (Plan de Etapas) and a ‘Economic-Financial
Study’, which included deadlines for the implementation of the Plan and an assessment of the needed investments and ﬁnancial resources, including the obligatory
schedules for the landowners. Since 1994, Detailed Plans no longer include deadlines or time schedules for their implementation, nor any calculation of investments
or similar items (Romero, 2002: 341-342).
5

Change rate: 166.386 pesetas = 1 euro.

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The 1994 Act created a new sort of plan, the Joint Development Programme, which
includes more or less the same investment and implementation schedules as in the
old General and Detailed plans. This means that since 1994 detailed investment and
implementation schedules appear only after a Programme has been approved, not
before. Another novelty of the 1994 Act is that the Programmes also include, in the
Juridical-economic Proposal, a Development Agreement. Agreements were common
before the 1994 Act, but they were external documents, formally speaking not included in the binding rules. Has the fact that the Programme now includes the schedules and the agreements had any effect on capturing value increase? All available
data, including the cases, suggest that the ﬁnancing and implementation schedules
of the old General and Detailed plans suffered much delay, and that after 1994 this
speeded up greatly. The question, however, is whether the creation of a new sort of
plan document, the Programme, could in it self be the cause of these improvements.
It seems plausible that not the creation of this document as such might be the relevant
variable. Other sub-variables could be relevant here: this is that the 1994 Act introduced the obligation of always achieving a Development Agreement to secure the
investments and schedules (see next section).

5.5.3

Conditioning binding rules on securing capturing value
increase

Summary of the ﬁndings
Before 1994 municipalities could not make the approval of binding rules conditional
on securing the minimal legal package of obligations, but only on securing additional
contributions. Since 1994, municipalities can and must condition the approval of
binding rules on securing all the contributions, both the minimal legal package and
possible additional contributions. This novelty has improved the capturing of value
increase and the tempo of implementation of the public infrastructure and facilities
(cfr. Blanc, interviews in 2008). However, another novelty too has played an important role in this improvement: the introduction of the land readjustment procedure
with the urbanizing agent as leading party (see section 5.5.4).
5.5.3.1 No obligatory Development Agreement before the 1994 Act
Before the 1994 Act, Valencian public bodies were not allowed to openly condition planning consent on a commitment of the developer/landowner to effectively
implement and pay that part of the public infrastructure and facilities that, following
planning law, must be charged to developers/landowners, i.e. the ‘minimal’ legal
package of obligations. Planning consent refers to the approval of a new General
Plan that modiﬁes the previous one, or the approval of a Detailed Plan that modiﬁes
the General Plan, or the approval of a Detailed Plan that just details the General Plan.
However, public bodies were allowed to openly condition planning consent on the
effective implementation and payment of other additional contributions, additional
to the minimal legal package. For example, the legal minimal package included the

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obligation to cede land for primary schools, so agreements could include the obligation to cede land for high schools and universities also. Another common example
was the free cession of historic buildings for their conversion into public facilities.
In practice, Development Agreements were very common, especially in the 1980s,
when many municipalities made General Plans. Alongside the preparation of and
procedures for, for example, the 1987 Plan of Alicante and the 1988 Plan of Valencia,
municipalities required many developers owning land to sign these agreements. Usually, the agreements concerned small plan areas, owned by one developer. After the
approval of these General Plans, the number of these agreements diminished.
5.5.3.2 Obligatory Development Agreement after the 1994 Act
The 1994 Act introduced some important modiﬁcations. First, municipalities were
allowed to condition planning consent not only on securing additional contributions, but also on securing the minimal legal package of obligations. Second, this
was not an option, but a must: municipalities were obliged to ask for a Development
Agreement; otherwise the binding rules are not valid. All the cases illustrate this: the
Development Agreement secured indeed all the public infrastructure and facilities in
all the cases, both the minimal legal package and the additional contributions. Third,
municipalities can now ask for a Development Agreement not only when planning
consent is necessary, but also in those cases in which the binding rules are already
detailed and approved, and provided there is need of investments in public infrastructure and facilities. For example, in case Guillem the 1988 General Plan already
included all the detailed binding rules, and there was in principle no need to approve
new binding rules. However, investment in public infrastructure was necessary, so a
Joint Development Programme annex a Development Agreement were sine qua non
condition before development could start.
In other words, after the 1994 all the public infrastructure and facilities (minimal legal
package and additional contributions) of all developments (those that require planning consent, and those that do not) must be secured through a Development Agreement. The procedure is as follows: the submitted Programme includes a proposed
Development Agreement; once the local council has possibly introduced modiﬁcations and approves the Programme, the municipality asks the selected party to sign
the Agreement. If the local council introduced modiﬁcations (either additional contributions or the result of detailing the provisionally approved Programme), and if as
result of these modiﬁcations the selected Programme becomes substantially modiﬁed
(which in theory cannot happen but is not rare in practice), the winning party can
refuse to sign the Development Agreement and withdraw from the development.
However, refusing is not frequent in practice. In case Camino, the Development
Agreement doubled the initial infrastructure provision costs from € 5 million to € 10
million, and in Periodista it diminished the building volume from 15,757 m2 ﬂoor
space to 11,000, without in either case the developer refusing to sign. The rise of
housing prices in the meantime (variable A1 in causal model section 2.4.2) might
explain why developers agreed to the extra requirements. Once the Agreement is

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signed, the municipality publicises the approval of the Programme, which becomes
at that moment, and not before, legally into force.
These modiﬁcations in 1994 have had important consequences for capturing value
increase. This might have not happen in a direct way, but by inﬂuencing sub-variables
b. The idea is that, not the fact of being able to include contributions in binding rules
seems to be effective, but the fact of being obliged by law to condition planning
consent to securing all contributions. In other words, i) being obliged to condition
binding rules to securing all the contributions reinforces ii) the positive effect of being
able to include certain contributions in binding rules on iii) the negotiation position
of municipalities, the accounted land costs and the proﬁt margins of the developer;
i) might also have a direct positive effect on the speed of the implementation. Before
1995, not all the binding rules were accompanied by a development agreement. If
they existed, such agreements secured only the additional contributions, obligations
that came into force once the developer/landowners had implemented the minimal
legal package. It seems that such agreements augmented the additional contributions, such as providing land for secondary schools and university and historic buildings (Blanc, interviews in 2008). However, what seems clear is that the minimal
legal package of public infrastructure and facilities was not implemented on time:
after all, there was no agreement that secured their ﬁnancing and implementation.
This is the reason that in general the ﬁnancing and implementation schedules made
before the 1994 Planning Act were not effective in practice. In other words, scheduling investments in the General and Detailed Plans without a real engagement of
the investing party may have disadvantages for the speed of implementation of the
public infrastructure and facilities (Romero, 2002: 336, 339; Muñoz & Korthals Altes,
2007). Since the 1994 Act, there is always an agreement that secures all the public
infrastructure and facilities, both the minimal package and the additional obligations.
This may explain the improved effectiveness of the schedules.
This sub-variable (there is since 1994 always a Development Agreement that secures
all the public infrastructure and facilities) is a direct consequence of the 1994 Act.
The act prescribes the formal obligation of adding an Agreement to the Programme,
and broadens the coverage of this agreement to include also the minimal legal package. However, this sub-variable operates together with another sub-variable: the
1994 Act also introduced a new form of land readjustment, with a third party, the
urbanizing agent, as provider of the public infrastructure and facilities (see next
section). This modiﬁed substantially the power relationships because municipalities
have now the power of obliging landowners to cooperate. In sum, both sub-variables (‘formal obligation to secure public infrastructure and facilities’ and ‘modulating property rights’) are likely together to have caused the generalization of the use
of Development Agreements for all schemes and for all public infrastructure and
facilities.

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5.5.4

147

Modulating Property rights

Summary of the ﬁndings
Building rights belong to the landowner, in the region of Valencia and in the rest
of Spain. It has already been explained that infrastructure provision (urbanización)
is considered a public task, and that landowners are obliged since 1956 to implement it, assuming all the unproﬁtable parts. The 1956 Land Readjustment regulation
helped in this, but there was a strong interdependency: local authorities and developers/landowners were mutually dependent because of the distribution of resources.
Authorities have the statutory powers for planning permissions, and developers/landowners have the ﬁnancial means and the land. Looking it from the point of view of
capturing value increase, this interdependency was disadvantageous. It gave to the
developers/landowners the option to wait, and as waiting might bear advantages, the
negotiation space of municipalities deteriorated. The result was that often municipalities lowered the public requirements for infrastructure and facilities, or that often
development processes were delayed, or both. The introduction of the 1994 Act has
had important consequences here. The Act introduced some important modiﬁcations
in the land readjustment regulation that divested landowners from the possibility of
using the option to wait. The modiﬁcations gave Valencian municipalities relatively
large powers for infrastructure provision, compared with England, The Netherlands
and other Western European Countries (for an international comparison, see chapter
4.4). Municipalities are no longer dependent on the landowners to provide the infrastructure, and the consequence has been that municipalities have increased their
requirements. Another consequence has been a signiﬁcant increase of private investments and an acceleration of urban development. Let us see this in more detail.
5.5.4.1 Who owns development rights in Valencia?
There is a distinction between infrastructure provision and the building. As mentioned, the infrastructure provision is a public task. The landowner (before the 1994
Planning Act), or the urbanizing agent (after the 1994 Act), bears as concessionaire
the responsibility to provide the public infrastructure and facilities, and to redistribute
betterment and costs between the landowners. Following national planning law for
the whole of Spain, the right to build belongs to the ‘essence’ of the contents of property rights, and thus belongs to the landowner (see section 2.2.4.2). But this is not an
unlimited right. The law and the binding rules limit these building rights. Landowners
have no right to any kind of ‘minimum’, and they are obliged to apply and obtain the
needed permits. Also, other legislation might even lead to the removal of the building
rights (e.g. expropriation). Once the landowner is authorized to develop on his plot,
and provided that the land has not been expropriated, he is the only one entitled to
build on that plot and he can exclude others from doing so. So we must differentiate
between the right to provide the infrastructure, which belongs to the public, and the
right to build, which remains under the dominium of the landowner.

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Nevertheless, the fact that infrastructure provision is deﬁned as a public task does
not automatically mean that public bodies have all the powers to exercise it. Neither
does it automatically mean that landowners have lost some of the powers over their
property. By analysing who has the control over each of the transactions in infrastructure provision, it has been possible to discern who has which development right
in the infrastructure provision. The steps are: 1) land purchase and assembling, 2)
ﬁnancing and 3) land preparation and development.
5.5.4.2 Mutual dependence of municipalities and landowners before 1994
To analyse the consequences of steps 1-3 in the power-relationship between municipalities and landowners, this research developed and applied a model of dependence analysis (see table 11; for more details of the model, see chapter 3.1.1).
Before the 1994 Act, municipalities depended heavily on the passive consent or active collaboration of the developer/landowner to gather the land (step 1), gather the
ﬁnancial resources (step 2) and develop the land to produce serviced plots (step 3).
The dependence was because the landowner/developer controlled two important
resources: land and investment capacity. Moreover, this dependence was not easily
avoidable. The land readjustment regulation relied on the support and active collaboration of a majority of the landowners: land readjustment took place only when
the owners of at least 60% of the land constituted a joint development organisation,
responsible for the infrastructure provision and redistributing betterment and costs.
If a minority of landowners did not want to collaborate, the joint organisation was
allowed to apply, after municipal approval, compulsory land readjustment. If the
owners of 60% of the land were not even willing to take the initiative, municipalities
could overrule all the landowners and take the lead, applying compulsory land readjustment. Municipalities had the option also to acquire the land, through amicable
agreement, through applying the pre-emption right (derecho de tanteo y retracto), or
through expropriation. Public authorities are allowed in Spain and also in Valencia to
expropriate land not only for the public infrastructure and facilities, but also for private uses, i.e. for housing, ofﬁce space, etc. There is no kind of ‘self-realisation’ right
of the landowner6, who can prevent public authorities from expropriating the land.
In Spain, municipalities are free to choose between land readjustment and expropriation; there is in planning and expropriation law no hierarchy that privileges one
formula before the other. Expropriation was and still is a common way for sectorial
regional and national public bodies to implement their policies (e.g. social housing,
industrial areas). In theory thus, municipalities could avoid the dependence. However, in practice municipalities usually applied neither compulsory land readjustment
nor expropriation, because both meant a direct public involvement, including the
corresponding risks, and were a sensitive matter politically.
On the other hand, the landowner depended on the municipality because of its regulatory powers of approving the binding rules and granting the building permit. This
6

‘Self-realisation’ is a common term in the Netherlands, see section 7.4.4.

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dependence also can be labelled as strong because it is not avoidable, as public bodies are the only actors who can exercise these regulatory powers.

Table 11. Dependence analysis Valencia before 1994 Planning Act.

Municipality depends
on the landowner/
developer

Landowner/developer
depends on
municipality

Dependence because
of land

Dependence because
of investment capacity

Dependence.
Developers/landowners own most of the
land. Dependence is
only avoidable through
public leading in land
readjustment or expropriation. However, both
options were not easy
for municipalities.

Dependence.
Municipalities had in
general not much ﬁnancial resources to invest
in public development,
so the landowners/developers were the only
ones who could invest.

Dependence because
of regulatory resources

Dependence.
The municipality approves the binding
rules. Dependence is
not avoidable.

The consequences in practice of this strong mutual dependency were signiﬁcant.
Landowners had the option of not agreeing with the contributions package or other
requirements of the municipality. Since waiting can bear advantages, it was a favourable option to wait (see variable D2.2 in causal model section 2.4.2). As developers
may not control all the land, and thus depend on other landowners, it took some
time to reach an agreement with all the landowners about the desirable price of land.
Land readjustment was an option only when the owners of more than sixty percent
of the land support the plan. In practice, this was a high threshold. Success depended
on the expectation that, by delaying negotiations, development proﬁts would increase in the future. Municipalities were confronted with developers that were not
willing, and maybe not able, to agree to the required ﬁnancing and implementation
schedules. This affected the negotiating position of the local authorities and thus
capturing value increase, as municipalities were forced to lower the contributions
package if they wanted to reach an agreement. And anyway, this affected the speed of
implementation, as under those circumstances landowners did not proceed quickly
and the development was delayed.
Regarding the effects on the quality of the public infrastructure and facilities, consulted about this, all the interviewed experts, public ofﬁcers, developers and representatives agreed that the ‘old’ land readjustment indeed did not function properly
(Blanc, Roger, Rubio, Montiel, Muñoz, Cañellas, Escribano and Baño, interviews in
2006 and 2007):

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•
•
•

Valencia

Small development sites: sites were too narrow and small, just large enough to
provide infrastructure for a few plots;
Deﬁcient public infrastructure and facilities: schemes included very minimal
packages of public infrastructure; just the least needed to service the plots;
Not real readjustment: most of the time, readjustment followed very much the
will of landowners to receive building plots on their former property. Instead of
following the most suitable parceling, readjustment adapted very much to the
landowners’ interests.

The result, all interviewed agreed, was an irregular, unordered, neither systematic
nor logical urban growth of low quality and with scarce public infrastructure and
facilities. For example, in the city of Valencia, it resulted in the 1980’s in an urban
periphery of low urban quality. It received the name ‘buildings in the onion ﬁeld’
(ediﬁcios en campos de cebolla, see ﬁgures 17): buildings in the middle of deteriorated agricultural land, without proper public infrastructure.

The consequences for the speed of implementation seem also to have been significant. In the 1980’s, with the ﬁrst democratically chosen local governments after
Franco’s dictatorship, many municipalities made General Plans that included high
standards of public facilities and infrastructure. The goal was to reduce the scarcity

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151

of public facilities and infrastructure that was the inheritance of the previous, predemocratic political regime and the inefﬁcient application of the land readjustment
regulation. The General Plans included large contributions from the landowners of
those areas to be developed, and ambitious deadlines for the implementation. However, the implementation of these ambitious plans stagnated. It is clear that the reason
for stagnation was the lack of will of a big enough majority of landowners to develop
their land under the high level of contributions prescribed in the General Plans, regardless of the quality of the plans. A consulted expert considered that these plans,
although ambitious, were ﬁnancially feasible, and that the attitude of the landowners could not be excused by the fact that contributions were impossibly high (Blanc,
interview 2006).
5.5.4.3 No mutual dependence of municipalities and landowners after 1994
After the introduction of the 1994 Act, there is no longer a mutual dependency, as
the possibilities to take the steps 1-3 do not depend anymore on the landowner’s passive consent or active collaboration, nor do municipalities need anymore to take the
lead in land readjustment or to expropriate the land (see table 12). The landowner
still controls two important resources: land and investment capacity. However, the
municipalities now have the possibility of appointing a third party as urbanizing
agent, and do not need to get ﬁnancially involved in order to oblige landowners
to collaborate with land readjustment. Neither are municipalities dependent on the
urbanizing agent, as they can select him in a public tender, or select another one, or
a public company. What remains is that landowners still depend on the municipality, because of its regulatory powers of approving the binding rules and granting the
building permit.
All the studied cases demonstrated in this. The only exception seemed to be case Benalúa, where the municipality seemed to depend very much on the collaboration of
the owners of two ﬂour-mill factories for the development of a small part of the site.
This dependence seems to be of political nature, i.e. the Municipality of Alicante had
in theory legal instruments to override these owners, but this seemed to be politically
not feasible.
The consequences in practice of the modiﬁcations to the land readjustment regulation have strengthened the negotiation position of the municipality, lowered the price
of the land and the proﬁt margins of landowners and developers, and quickened the
tempo of implementation. Positive thus for the capturing of value increase: the available data provide generalizable knowledge about this (Blanc, 1997, 2003; Modrego
2000; Muñoz & Korthals Altes, 2007: 69-73). The Valencian 1994 Act breaks through
the previous pattern of landowners having the option of not sharing in the infrastructure provision and of speculating on better market conditions, by divesting landowners of the option of waiting. Landowners can no longer service the plots whenever
they consider it best. When a developer submits a proposal and the municipality
approves it, the landowners must follow. The consequence was an extraordinary

No dependence.
There is no dependence on the landowners in this
matter. If the municipality selects him as urbanizing agent, he will be able to invest and provide
the infrastructure, while the landowner is obliged
to pay the costs.

Urbanizing agent
depends on
landowner

Dependence, avoidable.
Landowners control the land. However, dependence is avoidable because of the possibility
of applying compulsory land readjustment, if
necessary.

Dependence, avoidable.
Landowners cannot invest and develop without
the urbanizing agent ﬁrst providing the infrastructure. Dependence is avoidable since landowners
may submit an own plan and became them selves
urbanizing agent.

Dependence, not avoidable
Urbanizing agents depend on the municipality to
apply compulsory land readjustment, if necessary.

No dependence.
There is no municipal dependence on the
urbanizing agent in this matter. The municipality
can appoint in a public tender another party as
urbanizing agent, or select right away a public
company as urbanizing agent.

No dependence.
There is no municipal dependence on the
landowners in this matter. The municipality can
appoint a third party, the urbanizing agent, as the
one who invest and provides the infrastructure.

Dependence because of investment and
management capacity

Landowner depends
on Urbanizing agent

Urbanizing agent
depends on
municipality

Municipality depends
on urbanizing agent

Landowner depends
on municipality

Municipality depends Dependence, avoidable.
on the landowners
Landowners have most of the land. However,
dependence is avoidable without much difﬁculty
because of the possibility of applying compulsory
land readjustment, if necessary.

Dependence because of land

Table 12. Dependence analysis Valencia after 1994 Planning Act.

Dependence, not avoidable.
Urbanizing agents cannot provide the infrastructure without being selected as urbanizing agent.
Also, the municipality approves the relevant binding rules. Dependence is not avoidable.

Dependence, not avoidable.
Landowners cannot develop without being selected as urbanizing agent or without the Municipality selecting a third party as urb. agent.
Also, the municipality approves the binding rules.
Dependence is not avoidable.

Dependence because of regulatory resources

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153

increase of public and especially private initiatives, and an acceleration of urban
development. The improvement has not only been quantitative, but affected also the
quality of the public infrastructure and facilities: the hitherto common subdivisions
with a poor quality of infrastructure ceased.
Each of the four studied cases was the result of a private initiative, and the selected
urbanizing agent was also a private party. In three cases a public tender took place
between different proposals (four in Guillem, three in Camino and four in Benalúa).
In three cases (Guillem, Benalúa and Periodista), the private party who ﬁrst took the
initiative (who submitted the ﬁrst Programme) became the selected urbanizing agent.
In all the cases the initiating party had no land or just part of the land, but once selected, often bought land progressively.
The cases conﬁrm that the possibility of selecting as urbanizing agent an ‘external’
developer, not linked to the landownership in the area, was a crucial factor. In Guillem the plan area was owned by hundreds of persons. Also, many of these owners were residents, or rented their property to tenants. It seems impossible that all
these actors would have agreed a voluntary land readjustment. As one interviewed
public ofﬁcer states, the ‘local’ actors were not interested at all in redeveloping the
area (Raga, interview 2006). It seems thus plausible to conclude that the possibility of ‘by-passing’ the landowners has been crucial for this project. Proara bought
land once it had been selected, and when this developer submitted the Land Readjustment Project to the municipality it owned already 30% of the land. Competition seems also to have stimulated the payment of additional contributions: during the tender procedure Proara assumed an important part of the infrastructure
provision costs, while following planning law these costs are for the landowners. Also, Proara will pay additional compensation to the existing house owners.
In Periodista the situation was similar. It seems clear that here also the selection of
an ‘external’ developer (Prodaemi), initially not linked to the landownership in the
area, has been a crucial factor. Several private persons and companies owned the site,
with economic activity in some of the buildings (a printing ofﬁce). Landowners seem
not to have been interested in redeveloping the area themselves, but only in selling
their plots. The whole project came into being only after Prodaemi took the initiative.
Asked about this, the developer stated that before the 1994 Act, developers in the
same position as Prodaemi were regularly confronted with landowners asking very
high prices, higher than the residual value of their plot. Their position was strong because the developer needed a voluntary agreement with all the owners. The 1994 Act
gave developers such as Prodaemi the possibility of avoiding such situations. Competition seems also here to have stimulated additional contributions: Prodaemi will provide some infrastructure outside the plan area and will pay € 1.6m to the municipality.
In Camino the landowners of a majority of the land (about 10 landowners) became
themselves urbanizing agent. However, the ﬁrst initiative was from an external de-

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veloper, not linked to the landownership in the area, who submitted the ﬁrst Programme. Then, other parties, among them the owners, submitted alternative Programmes. Finally, the municipality, after considering in total four proposals, selected
the Programme of the landowners. It seems clear that the possibility of appointing
an external developer, with no land in the area, has been a crucial factor: landowners would never have undertaken such an initiative, or at least this would have been
delayed, if the external developer had not taken the initiative. Competition seems
here also to have stimulated additional contributions: the urbanizing agent assumed
important additional investments in the removal of existing industries, and the rehabilitation and free cession of several historic industrial buildings. Also, the municipality will receive almost € 4 million.
In Benalúa the situation is less clear. On the one hand, the owners of about 60% of
the land joined together and submitted the ﬁrst initiative, and were ﬁnally selected
as urbanizing agent. Thus, in theory the old voluntary land readjustment regulation
would have been enough. On the other hand, the fact is that the development process started only after a small consultancy company, which had only about 15% of
the land, undertook the initiative in early stages. The fact that it could do so without
formally having the support of the other owners may have stimulated these other
owners to join the initiative. The owners might have supported the initiative of the
small consultancy company once they realized that the municipality could ‘by-pass’
them and appoint this small company as urbanizing agent.

5.5.5

Procedure for the preparation and approval of the binding
rules

Summary of the ﬁndings
Municipalities must since 1994 make careful decisions about the development proposals of market parties, and this seems to have stimulated private initiatives and
accelerated urban development. However, the consequences for capturing value increase might have been less favorable. Regarding the ‘procedural’ ﬂexibility of the
binding rules, i.e. the possibilities to modify the binding rules, and to freely determine the geographical scope (the plan area) of the binding rules, the ﬁndings are
less conclusive. The relative difﬁculty in Valencia to modify and determine the geographical scope of the binding rules seems not to be relevant for the degree of private
contributions to the unproﬁtable parts. That is, there seems not to be a clear causality
between this sort of ﬂexibility of the procedures and capturing value increase.
5.5.5.1 Guarantees for the initiative takers
Before the 1994 Act, developers were allowed to submit proposals of Detailed Plans,
and municipalities could in theory not ignore that. To reject the proposal, the local
council had to take a formal decision, otherwise the initiating party could appeal to
the courts. However, it seems that in practice municipalities systematically did not

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fulﬁl these legal prescriptions, and developers went regularly to the judge. Judges
often sentenced against municipalities, but the inconvenience for the developers to
initiate long judicial processes did not compensate the beneﬁts of doing so.
The 1994 Act has given to developers the possibility of initiating the procedure themselves, without having to wait for municipal consent: the developer submits the Programme to the municipality and to an ofﬁce of notary, publishes it, announces it, and
deposits the Programme in that ofﬁce. Anyone can submit objections or alternatives,
but to the ofﬁce of notary and not to the municipality. The procedure is fully organized and paid for by the private initiator. When the public consultation ﬁnishes, the
developer submits the Programme and all the submitted objections and alternatives
to the municipality, which further organizes the procedure and ﬁnally decides about
the proposals. This possibility of ‘private’ public consultation through an ofﬁce of
notary has become a relatively frequent phenomenon: from 1995 until 1998, 25% of
the Programmes followed this procedure (Modrego, 2000: 18, 22). Consulted about
this, a relevant expert considered that, from 1998 onwards, this percentage may have
increased very much (Blanc, interview 2007). ‘Private’ public consultation takes
place more often in large cities than in small ones. Of the four studied cases, only in
Periodista did the developer do this.
How has this novelty of the 1994 Act affected capturing value increase? The interviewed expert considers that the possibility of ‘private’ public consultation has stimulated private parties to undertake initiatives. The reason, the expert insisted, is that the
discretional room of municipalities in the situation previous to the 1994 Planning Act
created many uncertainties that developers had to deal with. Being able to force a
formal procedure has allowed developers to reduce some uncertainties. Municipalities are now obliged to evaluate formally and with publicity whether proposals are
good or not, and to give elaborated arguments. This has increased the transparency
of the municipal decisions and has reduced municipal discretion (Blanc, interview
2007). This might have reduced the development costs, as uncertainty can translate
into higher risks and risks into costs. Also it might have accelerated development
processes, stimulating private parties to submit proposals, and avoiding municipal
hesitation. However, it can have also a negative effect for capturing value increase:
municipalities have now less elbowroom in the negotiations, and this might reduce
contributions additional to the minimal legal package.
5.5.5.2 Inﬂexibility in modifying the existing binding rules
The only way of modifying, departing from or detailing existing binding rules in Valencia is by approving new ones to replace them. There is no simpliﬁed procedure for
this. Departing from the General Land use Plan, no matter how small the departure,
requires the preparation of a new Detailed Plan. For example, in Guillem the General
Plan zoned a small plot for one ﬂoor, while this was technically speaking impossible.
An Urban Renewal Plan covering the whole plan area was necessary to rezone that
small plot into ﬁve ﬂoors. One might argue that this inﬂexibility can worsen the ne-

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gotiation position of municipalities. However, there are no indications that the relative inﬂexibility in modifying binding rules in Valencia has worsened public value
capturing.
5.5.5.3 Inﬂexibility in determining, according to negotiations with landowners, the geographical scope (the plan area) of the binding rules
There are in Valencia rigid legal criteria for the delimitation of plan areas, and these
make it very difﬁcult to negotiate separately with each owner about the conditions for
rezoning. As a result, plan areas have to be of certain dimensions, covering at least
several plots. It is not impossible for a binding plan to cover just one plot. However,
then we are talking about plots of at least 2,000-3,000 m², which fulﬁl detailed legal
criteria. In practice, it seems that municipalities follow the legal criteria very strictly.
There is clearly not much room to negotiate individually with each landowner, although we do not deny that this happens for very speciﬁc cases (although this was
not the case in any of the studied cases). The smallest of the studied cases was Periodista, with a plan area of 0.6 ha and more than ten initial parcels.
This remarkable inﬂexibility of the Valencian binding rules, when compared with
England and The Netherlands, seems however not to have weakened the negotiation
position of the municipality. There is no indication that this sub-variable has inﬂuenced capturing value increase. The reason is that another sub-variable, the modiﬁcations in 1994 to the land readjustment regulation, actually eliminates the need for
an agreement with each individual landowner (see chapter 5.5.4). In other words,
due to the modiﬁcations in 1994 of the land readjustment regulation, this sub-variable (inﬂexibility to size the plan area) has apparently become irrelevant.

5.6

The actual degree of captured value increase in
Valencia

This section focuses on whether the goals for capturing value increase are achieved.
Also, it looks at the actual distribution of costs between the involved parties: who has
paid which public infrastructure and facilities, and possibly some extras? We look
also at whether the capturing value increase goals have been achieved on time. The
main sources of information are the four cases, complemented with other written
sources and interviews with relevant experts. The conclusions are set out in Table 13.
On-site infrastructure provision costs
A basic principle of the Spanish planning system is that urban development can take
place only if the landowners (whether or not they are also the urbanizing agent)
assume all the on-site infrastructure provision costs. Also, the full ownership of the
resulting infrastructure must be ceded free of charge to the municipality. Based on the

About 70% A small part
€0.6m
(1% total value
was already
building plots)
public infra

studied cases and on the interviews with experts, it is possible to conclude that this
is also the case in practice. Only when the municipalities receive building rights they
do contribute to these costs, as any other landowner would. If municipalities must
contribute, they do not usually pay in money but in building rights. In Guillem and in
Periodista, the municipality will not receive building rights, so it does not contribute.
In Camino, the municipality owns about 5% of the land (excl. public infrastructure),
so will contribute 5% of the costs. In Benalúa the municipality does not own land
but receives some of the building rights thanks to legal prerogatives, and thus pays a
contribution. These ﬁndings are generalizable to all comprehensive urban regeneration and greenﬁeld projects on private owned land in the region of Valencia, but not
to projects where public bodies intervene directly (through expropriation, a minority)
nor to very speciﬁc strategic interventions (airports, motorways, railways, etc).
Land needed for on-site public infrastructure and facilities
The mentioned basic principle prescribes also that urban development can take
place only if the landowners provide freely all the land needed for on-site public
infrastructure and facilities. The exception is land that was already on-site public
infrastructure (i.e., if the land is already public, landowners do not have to buy it
and cede it freely). Landowners must cede land not only for roads and public space,
but also for other public facilities, such as schools, sport installations, kindergartens,
parks, municipal ofﬁces, police station, although the building costs of these are, in
principle, paid by the respective public body (see below). The full ownership of the
land is ceded freely to the municipality. Public infrastructure and facilities are standardized in planning law, and between ﬁfty and eighty-ﬁve percent of the total plan
area is used for public infrastructure and facilities. In general these ﬁgures are higher
in greenﬁeld developments than in urban regeneration. In the cases studied this was
between 44% and 79%. These conclusions have the same external validity (generalizability) as the above-mentioned infrastructure provision costs.
On-site public facilities (the buildings)
As mentioned, landowners cede freely the land needed for public facilities, also for
public buildings. The development of these public buildings has, in principle, to be
paid by the respective public body. However, based on the interviews, it seems that
in practice sometimes private parties also pay for the public buildings. All the interviewed experts and representatives of interest groups agree in this. However, precise
ﬁgures are not available. It is also not clear whether the costs are borne mainly by
the landowners or by the urbanizing agent/landowner. Of the cases we studies, only
in Camino will private parties pay for public buildings: the urbanizing agent will
cede freely and rehabilitate several historic industrial buildings which will be used
for public functions.
Land and money for on-site and off-site social/affordable housing
The costs of developing social/affordable housing are mostly borne by the landowners. These landowners bear the costs by providing cheap land, for a regulated price

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of about € 120-150/m² ﬂoor space (ﬁgures of 2006). Because the market price of
serviced building plots for free-market housing is much higher (€ 300-1,100/m² ﬂoor
space, depending on the location) we could speak of a form of subsidizing the land
price, borne by all landowners together. Thanks to this cheap price, commercial or
non-proﬁt developers can develop affordable housing and proﬁt from it. The central and regional governments also ﬁnance a little, through a subject subsidy (to the
buyer) in the form of a subsidy to the mortgage interest and sometimes a lump sum.
In two cases there was affordable housing: in Guillem about 1/3 of the dwellings, in
Periodista most of them. The following ﬁgures show that developing social/affordable housing actually involves a ﬁnancial charge for the landowners. In Guillem the
infrastructure provision costs of the affordable units amount to about € 0.97 million,
and the regulated value of the plots € 0.69 million. The balance of the project will
thus not only bear the difference between the regulated value and the free-market
value, but also a shortage of about € 0.28 million (this is the regulated value minus
the costs). In Periodista infrastructure provision costs amount to about € 3.2 million,
and the regulated price of the plots € 1 million (shortage of about € 2.2 million). The
landowners must in both cases bear these costs, plus their land costs (the price they
paid for the land plus the ﬁnancial costs).
It seems that cases Guillem and Periodista are not representative for practice in the
last decennium. It is clear that since the end of the 90’s, the building of affordable
housing has decreased in Valencia and in the rest of Spain also. In the ﬁrst years of
the 21th Century, less than 10% of all new dwellings were affordable housing (see
section 5.5.2.2). However, in the last years, there is a tendency for this to increase.
Cases Guillem and Periodista could be representative of this tendency.
Land and money for off-site public infrastructure and facilities
Regarding public infrastructure and facilities situated outside the plan area, these
are the ﬁndings. All development sites situated on land classiﬁed as ‘Land to be
developed’ have, since the end of the 80’s, been ascribed a piece of off-site public
infrastructure and facilities situated somewhere else in the municipal territory. The
owners of the land thus ascribed shared the building rights of the development sites
and, in exchange, ceded freely their land. In general, the respective public body
(municipality, provincial, regional or national government) pays the construction of
these off-site public infrastructure and facilities. In case Benalúa, the municipality
obtained thanks to this measure 5.5 ha of land situated far away from the development site. Although there are not available ﬁgures for the whole region, interviews
and some speciﬁc ﬁgures seem to support the generalizability of the ﬁndings in Benalúa. In the cities of Valencia and Alicante, since the end of the 80’s, almost all the
land needed for new main public infrastructure and facilities has been ceded freely.
In Valencia, in total about 230 ha have been ceded freely to the municipality. For
example, the land for the extension of the cemetery and a part of the land for the
new University of Valencia. In the city of Alicante, about 52 ha of land have been

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ceded freely to the municipality through the same system. The examples of these
cities seem to be representative (Roger, Blanc, Raga, Escribano, Muñoz & Cañellas,
Baño, interviews 2006).
There are also cases of public infrastructure and facilities situated within the development site but serving a wider area. Case Guillem includes within the development
site a main road that we consider off-site infrastructure because it serves a much wider area than the development site itself. The landowners will cede freely the land for
this main road. Also, the landowners and the urbanizing agent will pay the construction costs of this road (these costs are included above in the on-site land development
costs). In Camino, landowners contribute to the costs of a road situated alongside the
development site that serves a wider area. Another developer constructed this road
several years ago and claimed a contribution from our development site. In Benalúa
landowners will pay most of the costs of several new pipelines and underground infrastructure that belong to the general system of the city.
Consulted about this, interviewed experts considered that these cases are not unusual: land for main infrastructure serving an area wider but situated within the development site is often ceded freely, and landowners/urbanizing agents often pay
the construction costs also (Roger, Blanc, Rubio, Escribano, interviews 2006). It is
however not clear whether the landowners or the urbanizing agent pay most of the
construction costs in general.
Creaming off plus value
The constitutional principle, that allows municipalities to capture part of the surplus
that arises in urban development (for more details about this principle, see section
5.3.1), materializes in two ways:
First, where there is ‘Land to be developed’, municipalities have the right to 10%
of the building rights. Landowners are obliged to cede freely to the municipality the
serviced building parcels that are needed to build 10% of the total building rights.
Urban regeneration usually takes place on ‘Existing Urban Land’, rather than on
‘Land to be developed’, which means that in urban regeneration municipalities do
not usually proﬁt from this provision. The cases seem to conﬁrm this general picture:
of the four cases, only Benalúa includes ‘Land to be developed’. In general, on ‘Land
to be developed’, it seems that municipalities receive indeed about 10% of the total
building rights. However, although 10% of building rights can in theory turn out to be
more than 10% of the real building volume, this does not seem to happen often. Case
Benalúa, where the municipality has right to the 17% of the building rights, seems
to be an exception. In general, it seems that municipalities often use these building
rights to pay for public infrastructure and public buildings, instead of depositing the
building rights in the Municipal Patrimony of Land, as they in theory should. Case
Benalúa conﬁrms this; here the municipality will use at least an important part of its
17% to pay its share of the infrastructure provision costs.

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Second, sometimes landowners/urbanizing agents pay extra ﬁnancial contributions
to the municipality. There are no available ﬁgures about how often this happens. In
cases Camino and Periodista, the municipality received important contributions in
money.
Tempo of implementation of the capturing value increase goals
Sections 5.5 and 5.6 (so far) have analyzed the working of binding rules and the results on capturing value increase. What are the possible side effects, in particular the
tempo of implementation of the capturing value increase goals? A certain measure
might be good to increase the contribution of developers to public infrastructure
and facilities, but might also delay negotiations. Or vice versa: a certain measure
might not directly increase contributions, but accelerate negotiations and thus help
to realize sooner the public infrastructure and facilities. A distinction has been made
between the situation before and after the introduction of the 1994 Planning Act.
In general, it seems that before the 1994 Act the goals for capturing value increase
aimed at in the binding rules (the public infrastructure and facilities and some creaming off added value) were indeed implemented, but with considerable delay. For
example, the deadlines included in General Plans turned out to be systematically
neglected in practice (Romero, 2002: 336, 339; Muñoz & Korthals Altes, 2007). The
1988 General Plan of the city of Valencia foresaw a total expansion area of 700 ha,
all to be developed within the period 1989-1996. However, in practice, only one
site (Avenida de Francia) was actually developed before 1995. In the city of Alicante,
the 1987 General Plan foresaw a total expansion area of almost 200 ha, all to be
developed within the period 1988-1995. However, in practice, only few sites were
actually developed before 1995 (Gascó, 2006). The same happened with the ﬁnancial schedules prescribed in the General Plan for all the cases, and with the deadlines
prescribed, also in the General Plan, for case Benalúa.
The 1994 Act has had important consequences in practice. General ﬁgures show that
development processes have accelerated very much, both in greenﬁeld and urban regeneration. For example, the process of approving the Detailed Plan (from submitting
the ﬁrst proposal up to the municipal decision) decreased from between three to ﬁve
years before 1994, to between three and seven months in the period between 1994
and 1998. The process from municipal approval to the delivery of serviced building
parcels took an average of 33 months in 1998 (Modrego Caballero, 2000), which was
much longer before. Unfortunately, the regional government stopped collecting data
in 1998. All the indications, however, suggest that development processes between
1998 and 2006 have continued to be very fast (see Gascó 2006 for recent ﬁgures in
the municipality of Alicante).
It seems that the investment and implementation schedules are implemented on time.
These schedules are no longer included in the General Plans, but in the Joint Development Programmes, and they are now always secured in a Development Agree-

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ment. General ﬁgures up to 1998 suggest that the schedules contained in the Programmes are most of the time achieved, without delay (Modrego Caballero, 2000).
These general ﬁgures refer to the deﬁnitive approval of Programmes, not to their
actual implementation. However, it is very plausible that approval of Programmes
implies also their actual implementation. This is because Programmes must include a
Development Agreement that secures the ﬁnancing and investment schedules. Also,
the Agreement must include economic sanctions in case of not fulﬁlling the schedules.
Investments also have increased very much since 1994. A combined effect of acceleration and increase of investments has been an increase in the number of development sites: from an average of forty each year between 1990 and 1994, to 59
in 1995, 135 in 1996, 221 in 1997, and 242 in 19988 (Modrego, 2000; Muñoz &
Korthals Altes, 2007). Although the ﬁgures show an increase in public initiatives (i.e.
public bodies acting as urbanizing agents), most of this increase has been due to private investments (i.e. private parties acting as urbanizing agents). There is no indication that the trend has changed between 1998 and 2006 (see Gascó 2006 for recent
ﬁgures in the municipality of Alicante). The stagnation of urban development that
followed the approval of the ambitious General Plans of the 1980’s has disappeared.
The cities of Valencia and Alicante are good examples: the General Plans of 1988
respectively 1987 have almost all been implemented with high standards of public
facilities and infrastructure. Based on interviews (Raga, Rubio, interviews in 2006), it
is also possible to conclude for at least the city of Valencia that there has been a signiﬁcant increase of private initiatives and an acceleration also in urban regeneration,
mainly concentrated on rezoning former industrial sites into housing.
However, the information collected in January 2010 suggests that, since about 2008,
implementation schedules might be suffering delay:
• In Benalúa infrastructure provision commenced on time, and in January 2010 it
was not yet ﬁnished. The deadline for completion is the summer of 2010. It is
uncertain whether a small part of the plan area, which includes two active industries, will be ﬁnally redeveloped.
• Camino has commenced the infrastructure provision on time: the demolition
of existing buildings started in 2007 and in January 2010 the historic industrial
buildings are being refurbished. However, it is uncertain whether infrastructure
will be ﬁnished before the deadline of Augustus 2011 because the urbanizing
agent (a commercial developer who bought most of the land after the plan was
deﬁnitively approved and the Development Agreement already sealed) went
bankrupt and a bank has taken over the property.
• In Guillem and Periodista, although the urbanizing agents initiated the land readjustment procedure, there are serious delays in the deﬁnitive approval of the
8

The ﬁgure for 1998 is an extrapolation based on real ﬁgures for the 1st trimester, so possible increases
in the 2nd, 3rd and 4th trimesters have not been considered.

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land readjustment. This makes uncertain the achievement of the deadlines for
the completion of infrastructure provision (November 2010 respectively May
2013), especially for Guillem.
These case-base ﬁndings (that since 2008 in some of the cases the infrastructure
provision is being delayed) might be generalizable to other schemes in the region of
Valencia (cfr. Interview with Raga, 2010).

Section 5.5 answered Preparatory research question 3: it inferred the possible causal
relations between the independent variable ‘formal rules relevant to zoning’ and the
dependent variable ‘capturing value increase’. This section summarizes the inferred
causalities. Then it assesses the inﬂuence of possible third variables.

5.7.1

The inferred causalities

The ﬁndings suggest that the following sub-variables can inﬂuence positively or negatively the degree of capturing value increase (see also the causal model in section
2.4.2 and ﬁgure 18):
•

•

•

•

Sub-variable a, Uncertainty about the future building possibilities, together
with Certainty about the future contributions: this seems to lower intermediary
variables accounted land costs, regular proﬁt margins (of the developer) and
strengthen the negotiation position (of the municipality), i.e. positive for capturing value increase;
Sub-variable b, Contents of the binding rules: (1) Zoning land as Land to be
developed-class; (2) Zoning land for social/affordable housing; (3) Ascribing offsite infrastructure to the development site; all three seem to have been positive
for capturing value increase, probably because they have lowered intermediary
variables accounted land costs, regular proﬁt margins (of the developer) and
strengthened negotiation position (of the municipality);
Sub-variable b, Contents of the binding rules: (4) Agreeing additional contributions; it seems to be positive for intermediary variable negotiation position (of
the municipality);
Sub-variable c, Conditioning binding rules to agreement: the 1994’s novelty of
introducing a formal obligation to make the approval of binding rules conditional on securing the public infrastructure and facilities and other possible contributions: this seems to have been positive for capturing value increase, plausibly

through reinforcing the positive effects of sub-variables b on intermediary variables accounted land costs, regular proﬁt margins (of the developer) and negotiation position (of the municipality); and a direct positive effect on intermediary
variable delay;
Sub-variable d, Property rights: the 1994’s modiﬁcations of the land readjustment regulation: this seems to have been positive for both capturing value increase and the tempo of implementation. The causal links works plausibly by
being positive for intermediary variables delay, negotiation position (of the municipality), accounted land costs and regular proﬁt margins (of the developer);
Sub-variable e, Guarantees for those taking initiative: the 1994’s novelty of allowing initiating parties to initiate the procedure: this seems to have been positive for intermediary variables delay and inﬂated development costs, but negative for intermediary variable negotiation position (of the municipality).

The ﬁndings also suggest that the following sub-variables might not affect the degree
of capturing value increase:
• Sub-variable b/Contents of the binding rules: (5) the 1994’s novelty of including
the ﬁnancing and implementation schedules of public infrastructure and facilities in an ad hoc plan document: this seems not to be relevant;
• Sub-variable e, Inﬂexibility in the modiﬁcation/departure/detailing of binding
rules: this seems not to be relevant;
• Sub-variable e, Inﬂexibility in adapting the size of the plan area of the binding
rules according to negotiations with each landowner: this seems not to be relevant.
Sub-variables b/1-4 (contents binding rules), c (Conditioning binding rules to agreement) and d (Property rights) are intimately related to each other. It seems that they
are consecutively and causally related to each other, in an inverse order. The modiﬁcations to property rights introduced in the 1994 Act (sub-variable d) have generalized the use of development agreements (sub-variable c). And this seems to have
stimulated the effectiveness of the contributions included in the binding rules (subvariable b/1-4). See the respective sections for more detail.

5.7.2

Possible third variables

Here the effect of other, possible third, variables is assessed, related ﬁrst to the speciﬁc circumstances in the studied cases (variables D4 and D5 of the causal model in
section 2.4.2), and second to market circumstances (variable A1). The goal is to examine the possibility that the inferred causal relationships turn out to be spurious correlations (see section 3.2.1.2 for more detail about this methodological approach).
Speciﬁc circumstances in the studied cases
In Periodista the developer considers that the quality of the plan has accelerated
implementation because nobody has submitted objections, but this does not seem

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to be a strong argument. Also, the developer says that since the municipality added
extra requirements to the original Programme, he will have to ﬁll the gap with his
own resources. This third variable (having access to own resources to cover an eventual ﬁnancial deﬁcit) might explain part of the success of this project. In Camino the
interviewed developer mentioned a third variable that can delay development. In
the southern part of the plan area, railway wires have to be dismantled. The railway
company belongs to the central government in Madrid, so it could take a long time
to get the needed permits. In Benalúa the developers consider that the slow functioning of the Municipality of Alicante has delayed the process greatly. The interviewed
public ofﬁcer agreed with some of these criticisms, but stated that some delay has
been caused by the developers themselves. It seems also that in Benalúa, appeals to
the courts against the Land Readjustment Project might delay the infrastructure provision. In Guillem the large number of owners, tenants and inhabitants of the houses to
be demolished has delayed the public participation processes of both the Programme
and later on of the Land readjustment Project.
In short, except maybe in Periodista, in none of the cases did the interviewed persons or our analysis of the facts support the idea that speciﬁc aspects (regarding the
involved local politicians, public ofﬁcers or developers, or regarding any other aspect) might have inﬂuenced signiﬁcantly the positive outcomes on the actual degree
of captured value increase. On the other hand, speciﬁc circumstances might have
delayed three of the cases.
Market circumstances
In section 5.5 several causalities have been inferred between some modiﬁcations in
the 1994 Act and the improvement of capturing value increase and the acceleration
of development that has been experienced from 1995 onwards. Some argue that the
changes after 1995 might be more related to the rise in housing prices than to the
1994 Act itself. This third variable, housing prices (variable A1 in causal model section 2.4.2), can affect capturing value increase (because it inﬂuences intermediary
variable ‘Initial proﬁts’ and might thus inﬂuence also ‘Final proﬁt’, in other words,
it creates ﬁnancial room for more contributions) and the speed of implementation
(more proﬁts attract more investments, and remove obstacles). This research concludes however that the inﬂuence of housing prices has not been so signiﬁcant as
to make the inferred causal relationships spurious. In other words, housing prices
might have been relevant third variables, but have not caused all the changes after
1995. Let us see ﬁrst the available general knowledge and second the case-based
ﬁndings.
In the whole region of Valencia, prices of all housing (new & existing stock) and
of new housing decreased in real terms between 1990 and 1997. Only in 1999
did prices begin to increase signiﬁcantly. These ﬁgures are similar in the cities of
Alicante and Valencia (see ﬁgure 19). This recession in housing markets (1990-99)

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coincided with the increase in urban development. So, at least between 1995 and
1998, development processes accelerated and investments grew while real housing prices decreased or increased very modestly, i.e. when the expectations of land
value increases were modest. It is possible to conclude that there is not a direct
causal relationship between changing housing prices and the general acceleration of
development processes and growth of investments, at least in the ﬁrst years after the
introduction of the 1994 Act (Blanc, 1997: 265).

The ﬁndings of the cases ﬁt within this general conclusion. The procedure (submission Programme) of Camino started in 2003, and of Periodista in 2005, when
housing markets in the city of Valencia were already expanding (7% price rise all
housing, above general monetary inﬂation in 1999 and 2000, 9% in 2001, 14% in
2002 and 16% in 2003). However, the procedures for the other two cases started
under less positive expectations. The procedure of Guillem started in May 1999,
the ﬁrst year of signiﬁcant price rise of new housing (7%). The preparation of the
Programme started earlier, in times of a ‘bad’ housing market (1% rise in 1997 and
4% in 1998), and it is not clear whether the developer in Guillem was aware of the
promising future. In the city of Alicante, Benalúa started the procedure in 1998,
when prices of new housing decreased in real terms by 0.4% and prices of all housing increased in real terms by only 2%. Programmes include detailed and quasideﬁnitive investment and implementation schedules, also a draft of Development
Contract, so ﬁnancial feasibility must be clear before submission. The interviewed

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developers insisted that proﬁts at that time were large enough to cover infrastructure provision costs9.
In all four cases, both the interviewed developer and public ofﬁcer agreed that the
projects would have been ﬁnancially feasible also in times of decreasing or modestly
rising housing prices. Moreover, development seems less sensitive to market circumstances since the modiﬁcation in 1994 of the Valencian land readjustment. For the
new regulation has lowered the risks for developers:
• No need to own land: the Valencian formula allows developers to develop without the need of buying (all) the land. Indeed, the initiating developers owned
initially (before municipal approval of the Programme) no land in Periodista and
none in Camino. In Guillem the developer had just a little land, and in Benalúa
the developer consisted of several existing ﬁrms that had owned the land for
a long time and a consultancy company that had bought some land for a low
price. In Camino the selected developer consisted of several existing ﬁrms that
had owned the land for a long time. Thus, initially, the initiating parties had almost no need to invest in acquiring land, only in preparing the Programme.
• Landowners are obliged to contribute to the infrastructure provision costs: thus,
in case of poor market conditions, developers were assured of the ﬁnancing of
the infrastructure provision. Payment of contributions in building rights seems to
follow prudent market appraisals, and in case of expropriation the compensation
is based on the former use of the land, not of the future one: thus, if landowners chose for payment in kind or for expropriation, developers were assured of
building rights for a relatively low price. In case of good market conditions, as
actually happened since 1999 onwards, developers were in a privileged position to buy land and building rights in the area. This is what actually happened,
and in Nov 2006 the four urbanizing agents owned already almost all the land/
building rights.
• The initiating developer commits himself to provide the infrastructure within
the estimated budget, and the landowners pay for it. So he bears the risks only
of exceeding the budget. The costs of plans preparation and of infrastructure
provision are quite predictable, and price rises are around the general monetary
inﬂation.
• In Guillem and Periodista the Programme included 50% respectively 80% affordable housing. Affordable housing is a proﬁtable product and the risk is low,
provided that the developer can acquire the land for an affordable housing-price
9

At the time of data gathering, end of 2006, the prices of new housing in the free market in the City
of Valencia varied from about € 2,000 to 3,000 per m² ﬂoor space, depending on the location.
The average price per m² ﬂoor space in the city of Valencia was in the last trimester of 2006 for
new housing € 2,561 and for second hand housing € 1,932, and the average price for both new
and second hand € 2,058 (Ministerio Vivienda, Base general, consulted at on line site Generalitat
Valenciana, visited on 24 January 2010, http://www.cma.gva.es/ovv_estadisticas). In another source
the average price new and second hand is € 2,003 (Source Colegio de Registradores, in Observatorio
Valenciano de la Vivienda, Informe annual de coyuntura del sistema de indicadores 2008, Informe
nr. 5, April 2009, p. 22).

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(about € 125-150/m² ﬂoor space), which was guaranteed here through the land
readjustment.
In almost all the cases, developers assumed contributions in the course of the planning process, additional to those additional contributions already included in the
Programme as initially submitted. It is likely that this third variable (rising housing
prices) has stimulated the negotiation of these extra contributions after the submission of the Programme and before the sealing of the Development Agreement. For
example, in Benalúa the municipality and the regional government made several
important extra requirements during the long process of approving the Programme.
First the regional government demanded the conservation and rehabilitation of two
old industrial chimneys, which required extra costs and the modiﬁcation of the plan.
Second, the municipality demanded a contribution towards the plan preparation and
off-site infrastructure costs, which initially it was going to pay itself. In Guillem the
municipality introduced after the initial approval of the Programme an extra requirement: the developer had to pay part of the infrastructure provision costs, costs that
following planning law should be paid by the landowners. In Periodista the municipality reduced the building volume and in Camino the municipality doubled the
infrastructure provision costs.
In sum, the increase in housing prices cannot explain on its own why the developers
submitted the Programmes. It might have been an important stimulant, especially in
Periodista and Camino, but the ﬁnancial feasibility of the proposals did not depend
on expanding market circumstances. Furthermore, the increase in housing prices can
explain on their own part of the additional contributions: those extra contributions not
included in the submitted versions of the Programmes and agreed afterwards, during
the procedure and before the sealing of the Development Agreements. Also, the increase in housing prices explains why in Periodista and Camino the developer decided
not to refuse to sign the Development Agreement, despite the fact that the municipality introduced costly modiﬁcations long after the initial approval of the Programme.
Last developments since 2008
It seems however that the bad circumstances in the housing markets since the end of
2007 are stimulating and often forcing developers to delay many urban development
schemes. Many developers have gone into bankruptcy or had no choice other than
to pass over the property to the banks, as case Camino shows. This is a third variable
of the type A1 in causal model section 2.4.2. It seems that many urbanizing agents,
confronted with the bad market circumstances, are trying to delay the implementation (i.e. the achievement of the deadlines included in the Development Agreements)
through delaying the administrative procedure of land readjustment. Although municipalities have powers to force implementation (including a bank guarantee of at
least 7% of the infrastructure provision costs, a guarantee that following planning law
must be included in the Development Agreement), it seems that municipalities are
not fully using them (cfr. interview Raga, 2010). This is third variable D5.

CHAPTER

6
England

In the last decennia, public bodies in England have been seeking a larger involvement from commercial developers in the ﬁnancing of the unproﬁtable parts of comprehensive urban regeneration schemes. An old statutory provision gives, since 1932,
local planning authorities the power to require private contributions towards public
infrastructure and facilities. Since the 1970’s, this provision has been enlarged and
can include nowadays a wide variety of private contributions. Stimulated by the central government, local authorities are developing systematic policy for these contributions.

Frame 6a
The institutional context: United Kingdom, England, the regions and the local public
bodies
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (from now on UK) is a
country made up of four constituent countries: England (50.7m inhabitants), Scotland
(5m), Wales (3m) –the three of which form together Great Britain- and Northern Ireland
(1.7m). The UK is a unitary state with a system of constitutional parliamentary monarchy. Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland each has its own parliament or assembly.
England does not, and is ruled directly by the UK government.
England is subdivided into nine regions. Regions are subdivided into metropolitan
counties (including Greater London), and non-metropolitan counties. Counties are often subdivided into districts or boroughs. This leads sometimes to a double tier of local
government, with a County Council and a District Council (Cullingworth & Nadin,
2006: 64-65). In this case, both the county and the district are Local Planning Authorities (LPA). Other ‘sectoral’ or ad hoc organizations can be Local Planning Authorities

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England

also, such as National Park authorities, Urban Development Corporations and the Urban Regeneration Agency. The City of Bristol, where the studied cases come from, is a
unitary authority, a county with a single-tier governmental structure (a district council),
and therefore only one LPA (Moore, 2005: 26-27, 31-32).
The planning policies of regional and local governmental bodies are subordinated to
the law and policies of the UK government. Subordination of planning legislation is
guaranteed through the ‘parent acts’: the laws of the UK Parliament that delegate legislative powers to other bodies and set out the principles, rules and procedures under
which delegated legislative powers can be exercised. Almost all the UK legislation on
any ﬁeld is made under delegated powers: regulations, orders, directions, rules and
by-laws, all collectively known as ‘Statutory Instruments’ (Williams & Wood, 1994:
67-68).
Subordination of planning policies is guaranteed by the obligation of local and regional authorities to comply with policy guidance of the UK government. Policy guidance consists of policy statements that cannot be considered as legislation: they have
no statutory consequences. However, they are very important in deﬁning and detailing
the way in which planning legislation has to be applied. They reﬂect how the UK government considers that planning legislation should be interpreted and implemented.
Since the UK government plays a quasi-judicial role of arbitration in conﬂicts between
local planning authorities and developers, national policy guidance has a quasi-legislative function. It plays a very important role in practice, and may be referred to in
any judicial review. Also, the policy guidance documents include the results of judicial
scrutiny. There are two sorts of policy guidance documents (Williams & Wood, 1994:
68; Evans & Davoudi, 2005: 25): ‘Circulars’ or ‘Policy Guidance notes’, related to
planning control decisions; and ‘Planning Policy Guidance notes’ (PPGs) and ‘Minerals Policy Guidance notes’ (MPGs), related to the preparation and contents of zoning
plans. Since 2004, PPGs are being gradually replaced by Planning Policy Statements
(PPS).
For a list of relevant legislation and policy guidance, related to planning, see Annex 3.

Sections 6.1 and 6.2 introduce the context in which value increase is captured
in urban regeneration. Section 6.3 introduces the studied cases. Section 6.4 describes the working of formal rules relevant to zoning within the value capturing
mechanisms. This is the answer to Preparatory research question 3: how can formal
rules relevant to zoning inﬂuence the capturing of value increase in England? The
question has been divided into several sub-questions that correspond to the subvariables a-e (for more details about these sub-variables, see section 3.3.3). Each
of the answers to these sub-questions consists of an assessment of whether the subvariable can inﬂuence capturing value increase. There is therefore not a unique
conclusion, but as many conclusions as sub-questions. All these conclusions have

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England

provided the evidence for the ﬁnal conclusions in chapter 8 and the recommendations for the Dutch practice in chapter 9. Section 6.5 assesses the degree of value
increase actually captured, taking account of the side effects on the tempo of implementation. Finally, section 6.6 summarizes the inferred causalities between formal
rules relevant to zoning and capturing value increase: this includes an assessment of
the role of third variables.

6.1

Urban Regeneration in England

There is not a single urban regeneration policy or a set of policies, but different
policy initiatives that have not been designed and implemented in a coherent and
connected way. Instead, the ﬁeld can be characterized as an “…endless experimentation with new and often disconnected initiatives” (Cullingworth & Nadin, 2006:
350). These initiatives are the result of the interaction between central, regional and
local public bodies (op. cit.: 350-392), and can be subdivided into regeneration
policies meant for inadequate housing, and those focusing on the regeneration of
the inner cities.
There is a long tradition of regeneration policies for inadequate housing. The low
quality of a large stock of old housing has been the subject of public intervention
since the nineteenth century, an intervention that has not ceased since then. In the
ﬁrst instance, before and after the 2nd WW it led to clearance (demolishing) and redevelopment of old housing areas. Soon clearance gave way to ‘renewal’, a move
that was characterized by: (1) a gradual shift from individual house improvements to
the improvement of wider areas; and (2) a redeﬁnition of the problem, from building-technical considerations to a broader set of socio-economic and environmental
considerations. In the 1970s these comprehensive area-based and socio-economic
strategies of renewal were reinforced. In the 1980s, while the comprehensive areabased approach was retained, a shift took place to economic considerations, in the
sense of seeking more involvement of private investment (including e.g. the selling of
some affordable housing to its tenants) and bringing implementation considerations
to the fore such as enhancing the role of private parties in investing in regeneration.
Since the end of the 1990s, more attention is being given to improving the buildingtechnical quality of ‘non-decent’ dwellings.
While policy speciﬁcally oriented to improvement of inadequate housing has a long
tradition, speciﬁc policy for inner cities appeared for the ﬁrst time in the 1970s. At
that time, ‘Urban programmes’ funded regeneration interventions. In the 1990s the
‘City Challenge’ and the ‘English Partnerships’ programmes also funded regeneration interventions. For example, in one of the studied cases in this research, case
Harbourside, English Partnership supports the infrastructure provision and soil decontamination works through a cheap loan. Since 1995, Urban and City Challenge

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programmes have been taken over by the ‘Single Regeneration Budget’ (SRB), which
brought together twenty previously separate funding programmes and has been far
more widely applied than previous ones (Booth, 2005: 262).
During the Conservative Government in the 1980s and 1990s, emphasis was given to
the stimulation of private investment, instead of relying exclusively on public funding (Booth, 2005: 259; Verhage, 2005: 220-221). Since the 1990s, emphasis on sustainability considerations is growing. The 1980s saw the introduction of the Urban
Development Corporations (UDC), UK Government agencies with large powers for
plan implementation (through land acquisition) that usurped the local authority’s development control functions (granting of planning permissions). These corporations
have spent most of the public resources available for urban regeneration and have
restructured many degraded old industrial sites in the inner cities. At the end of the
80s criticism arose about these corporations (Booth, 2005: 261), in spite of which the
Labour government has continued them with no structural modiﬁcations but fewer
in number. For example, in case Temple Quay, an UDC and its successor, a regional
regeneration public agency, bought part of the land and played a role in stimulating
the regeneration of this derelict site. Labour created Urban Regeneration Companies
(URC), which operate at the local level but are still dependent on the UK Government. An important difference with the UDCs is that local authorities are heavily
involved in the URCs. The Labour Government that came to power in 1997 brought
forward a raft of new initiatives to attack social exclusion, improve the quality of the
public housing stock and redirect funding through local authorities. One important
novelty in Labour’s approach was the emphasis on more community involvement.
The Single Regeneration Budget (SRB), already existing, and the New Deal for Communities (NDC) programme, created in 1998, became the main instruments for this
enhanced regeneration policy (op. cit.: 262-3; Verhage, 2005: 224).
Urban regeneration in city centres is often confronted with many small private owners, while in brownﬁeld sites, land is often owned by public or private institutions
(Ministry of Defence, health authorities, ex-public companies, private developers,
property investors, etc). Land ownership in Britain is usually freehold ownership,
where the rights in land are held in perpetuity (Williams & Wood, 1994: 122). Private
landowners, if present at early stages, are not often directly involved in the rest of the
development. They do not usually share risks nor participate in the whole operation.
Most of the time they disappear before the start of the project, and their role is limited
to that of provider of the land. Urban regeneration is in general an institutionalized
phenomenon, being the task of public bodies, housing associations and commercial developers rather than private landowners. Regeneration initiatives usually take
place within the framework of the speciﬁc local urban regeneration policy. Local
authorities prescribe their regeneration policies in indicative zoning plans. Once a
planning application has been evaluated within that framework, local authorities issue planning permissions.

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Frame 6b
Indicative and binding plans
At the local level, Local Planning Authorities (LPA) have the competences to prepare
and approve zoning documents, both of an indicative character and with legally binding consequences (Cullingworth & Nadin, 2006: 47, 49, 134, 113-124, 150-151).
Regarding the indicative plans, these can be ad hoc documents, site-speciﬁc, not regulated in planning law. Or they can cover wider areas and be regulated in planning law:
before the 2004 Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act there were ‘Structure plans’,
‘Local plans’ and ‘Unitary development plans’, depending on the sort of LPA. Bristol,
as a unitary authority, approved in 1997 the Bristol Local Plan. Since 2004, these plans
are being gradually replaced by ‘Local development frameworks’, which are made by
the LPA of the lowest tier, i.e. the District Council only instead of both the District and
the County councils. Therefore, counties with a two-tier governmental structure no
longer have two plans, but just one. Local development framework is a non-statutory
term that comprises different documents (Moore, 2005: 31-32): (1) Development plan
documents: Local development scheme, Statement of community involvement, and
Annual monitoring report; (2) Supplementary documents. None of these documents is
legally binding, in the sense that it has direct statutory consequences for the use of land
and real estate. This does not mean, however, that they cannot play an important role
in development control. The Planning Inspectorate, a central public body, approves
deﬁnitively the local development frameworks.
The LPA of the lowest tier has the competences of preparing and approving ‘Planning
Permissions’. Planning permissions include the legally binding land use rules for a
speciﬁc site. They are the only relevant binding rules, following the deﬁnition used in
this research. A planning permission can be detailed or outline. An outline permission
leaves several matters open (mostly design and external appearance aspects) and reserves approval to a later moment.
After a developer submits an application for a planning permission, LPAs have to decide on it within eight weeks (Moore, 2005: 199-213). Applicant and LPA can also
agree another term. LPAs decide whether to grant a planning permission, to impose
planning conditions on it, or to refuse it. In practice, most of the applications are determined within the statutory eight-week period (percentages vary from 65% to 80% of
all applications, Moore, 2005: 201, Williams & Wood, 1994: 73-78).
However, instead of determining a planning application within this period of eight
weeks, LPAs can also decide to negotiate with the developer what the law calls ‘planning obligations’ (and in the literature is also called ‘planning gains’, or ‘planning
contributions’). It is also possible that the developer assumes unilaterally an obligation (an undertaking) (Ratcliffe et alia, 2002: 154). Planning obligations may include
a broader scope of contributions than planning conditions and are therefore more

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relevant for capturing value increase (see, for the possibly scope nowadays, and the
differences between planning conditions and obligations, Frame 6c). In case of negotiations, the granting of planning permissions is made conditional on the signing
of a Planning Agreement that secures the planning obligations. These are the section
106-agreements, so called because the 1990 Town and Country Planning Act included
this statutory provision in section 106: in the 1991 Planning and Compensation Act,
which rules nowadays, this is the new sections 106, 106A and 106B.
The procedure is as follows: the Council approves the permission provisionally including the contributions that it expects from the developer. The approval is made conditional on achieving a Planning Agreement, which secures the planning obligations
included in the provisionally approved document. Then, LPA and developer enter into
negotiations, for which there is no legal maximum time period because we are speaking here of a voluntary negotiation. In a survey of a sample of local authorities taken
between 1987 and 1990, in 80% of such applications it took around one year to seal
the legal agreement (DoE 1992, in Ratcliffe et alia, 2002: 155). Of our cases, Megabowl, the smallest, fell within this average, while in Harbourside and Temple Quay, the
largest cases, the procedure took about two years.
The Secretary of State (SoS) of the central government sanctions planning permissions
deﬁnitively in case they should depart from Development Plans (part of Local Development Framework). The Planning Inspectorate resolves appeals against the decision of
the LPA’s to refuse or impose conditions on planning permissions.

6.2

The legal limits to capturing value increase in
England

In England, the ﬁnancing of the unproﬁtable parts in comprehensive urban regeneration schemes is largely by contributions from developers. These contributions might
be in kind or in money, and they are included in planning permissions as planning
conditions and obligations. This was the case in all the studied projects. How far can
the contributions from landowners and developers go? Here we give the legal principles that rule and delimit those contributions.

6.2.1

Taxing betterment

We already saw in section 2.2.2 that the nationalization of development rights introduced in the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act did not actually affect to the right
of the landowner to develop his land. In other words, the landowner remained the

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only one entitled to develop his land, after of course having obtained all the needed
permits. However, the nationalization had important consequences for capturing
value increase. The landowner lost the right to the increase in value caused by that
development. That right belonged to the state. Therefore, any landowner developing
his land had to pay the state for the use of that right. The consequence was that betterment (any increase in the value of land) was the subject of a betterment charge,
and no development could take place without the payment of a betterment charge
to the Central Land Board. The 1947 Act foresaw in a 100% tax on the betterment.
From that time onwards, taxing development gains has been short-lived because of
a lack of political consensus and because it was often seen as over-complex and not
yielding enough revenue. In 1953, a new Conservative government abolished the
1947´s tax. Similarly, a 40% levy introduced by Labour in 1967 was abandoned by
a Conservative government in 1971. The last major attempt to tax development gains
was the Development Land Tax Act 1976, introduced by a Labour government, a
betterment tax to be levied on increases in land values due to the granting of planning permission. It would apply where land in private ownership was sold to private
development companies. The betterment tax was severely modiﬁed by a Conservative administration that came into power in 1979 and eventually scrapped in 1985
(García-Bellido, 1975; Spaans et alia, 1996: 302-304; Oxley, 2006: 104; Clusa &
Mur, 2007: 124-127; Alterman, 2009: 8, 15-17).
Nowadays there is no betterment tax in the UK. The Barker Review recommended in
2004 the introduction of a ‘Planning-gain Supplement’. The recommendation was that
the two roles fulﬁlled by planning obligations (mitigating the direct impact of development, and sharing part of the windfall gain that accrues from development) should be
separated. The ﬁrst part, planning obligations should be scaled back and restricted to
dealing with the direct impacts of developments. The second part, Planning-gain Supplement, would be used to extract some of the windfall gain to help local authorities
to ﬁnance the facilities currently funded by developers (see Oxley, 2006). The supplement consists of adding to the existing negotiated obligations a charge calculated in
accordance with previously set criteria, whether these criteria are in a development
plan or some other document. The 2004 Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act foresaw the introduction of the Planning-gain Supplement, when its provisions are fully
implemented. This had however not happened yet in the winter of 2009-2010.

6.2.2

Capturing value increase through section 106-agreements

Capturing value increase in practice takes place through negotiation of planning
obligations and conditions (for the contents nowadays of planning obligations and
conditions, and the differences between both, see under Frame 6c). It was the 1932
Town and Country Planning Act that for the ﬁrst time gave to LPAs the power to enter
into planning agreements with landowners for regulating the development or use of
their land. Initially, this provision was not used very much. As Moore stated, “…in

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the 25 years up until 1968, no more than 500 agreements were made. In the 1970s
the situation began to change dramatically, when LPAs saw the statutory provision as
an opportunity for obtaining a ‘planning gain’ for their community (…). In return for
the grant of planning permission, the developer would be expected to enter into an
agreement to provide some public beneﬁt,..” (Moore 2005: 346). The use of section
106-agreements has continued to grow in the last years. The proportion of planning
permissions accompanied by planning agreements, including unilateral undertakings, has risen from 1,5% of all permissions and 26% for major developments in
1997/98, to 6,9% respectively 40% in 2003/04. Major developments are residential
schemes of more than 10 units or carried out on a site having an area of 0.5 ha or
more; or commercial schemes with more than 1,000 m² ﬂoor space or carried out
on a site having an area of one ha or more. Major developments, and the southern
areas of England, usually collect more obligations than minor developments and the
northern part of the country. The proportion of contributions in money has grown in
relation to contributions in kind (Campbell et al., 2001; Department for Communities
and Local Government, 2006: 3-4, 17, 41-42).
Over time, the scope of planning conditions and obligations has increased to include, besides physical infrastructure provision, also environmental, community and
social infrastructure. The use of obligations has evolved from removing physical constraints on development and mitigating direct impacts, to the ameliorating of more
diffuse social, economic and environmental impacts, the provision of community
beneﬁts, and the support of wider policy objectives. In short, there has been a shift
from ‘hard’ to ‘soft’ infrastructure provision: from on-site infrastructure and connections with off-site infrastructure, towards contributions to affordable housing, to offsite public infrastructure and to off-site facilities and other public policy programmes
(Ennis, 1997: 1935-6). This increase is said to be related to the austere ﬁnancial environment within which local authorities must operate (Campbell et al., 2000: 767). It
is expected that in the next years, the planning obligations mechanisms will play an
important role in capturing some of the development proﬁt and using it for investing
back into essential infrastructure (Gallent & Tewdwr-Jones, 2007: 211-213, 257).
Controversy has risen the last years because agreements seem to have enabled local
authorities to agree signiﬁcant contributions from developers that go beyond matters
strictly related to the development in question. This is for example the position of
the Home Building Federation, the representative of the British housing developers
(Whithaker, interview in 2007). Other institutions and experts seem to share this view
to some extent, and much literature and even relevant governmental studies and
reports are inﬂuenced by it (Department for Communities and Local Government,
2006: 6; Barker, 2004: 66; Corkindale, 2004: 13-14). Because of some legally doubtful use, the statutory provision raised both moral and legal issues. A small number
of judgments have been very important in constraining the discretionary freedom
of local planning authorities. In turn, this case law has been ‘repatriated’ into the
planning system through new policy guidance, which focused on preventing abuse.

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Conditions and obligations will be legitimate and lawful only if they are correctly
applied (Booth, 2003: 113-115; Ratcliffe et alia, 2002: 140-159). As Booth states it,
‘the apparently unfettered freedoms contained in sections of the Town and Country
Planning Act have in practice been subject to judicial scrutiny and the limits to discretionary behaviour have been set’ (2003: 4).
Limits to planning conditions
Case law (House of Lords, Newbury DC versus Secretary of State for the Environment, 1981) developed criteria to which planning conditions must comply (Moore,
2005: 286-287):
• They must be imposed for a planning purpose and not for an ulterior one;
• They must fairly and reasonably relate to the development permitted;
• They must not be so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could have imposed them.
Circular 11/95 ampliﬁed and slightly reordered these criteria. Following this Circular,
conditions should be:
• Necessary;
• Relevant to planning;
• Relevant to the development to be permitted;
• Enforceable;
• Precise and reasonable in all other respects
Limits to planning obligations
The 1991 Planning and Compensation Act (Section 106.1) states that obligations can
be agreed:
a) Restricting the development or use of the land in any speciﬁed way;
b) Requiring speciﬁed operations or activities to be carried out in, on, under or over
the land;
c) Requiring the land to be used in any speciﬁed way; or
d) Requiring a sum or sums to be paid to the authority on a speciﬁed date or dates
or periodically.
Circular 05/2005 (Annex B.5) states that Planning Obligations must be:
1. Relevant to planning;
2. Necessary to make the proposed development acceptable in planning terms;
3. Directly related to the proposed development;
4. Fairly and reasonably related in scale and kind to the proposed development;
and
5. Reasonable in all other aspects.
There is discrepancy in the jurisprudence about prerequisites 2 and 3, prerequisites
that were ﬁrst introduced in 1991 (Circular 16/91), and continued in Circulars 1/97
and 05/2005. Several important judgments in the 1980s and 1990s have considered

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it acceptable to lay down obligations that are not necessary to make the proposed
development acceptable in planning terms (prerequisite 2), and obligations that are
not directly related to the development in question (prerequisite 3), as long as prerequisites 1, 4 and 5 are satisﬁed (Moore, 2005: 345-349, 354-357). This leaves the
door open for a wider range of contributions, often located off-site. These contributions could be classiﬁed under the following: training and recruitment initiatives in
the construction sector and possibly other sectors, town centre improvement, public art, countryside management, community forests, contributions to cultural plans,
theatres, museums, etc. (ODPM, 2004b: 16). It is clear that these obligations (neither
necessary to make the development acceptable, nor directly related to the development in question) may be sought or offered. However, the question remains whether
LPAs may impose them.
There are other limits to the scope of obligations. Circular 05/2005 clearly disapproves the use of planning obligations so far as they are only used for collecting the
betterment that results from development: “…planning obligations should never be
used purely as a means of securing for the local community a share in the proﬁts of
development, i.e. as a means of securing a ‘betterment levy’.” (Circular 05/2005,
Planning Obligations, Annex B.7). It is important, however, to remember that governmental Circulars and other policy guidance are not directly legally binding. Their
importance derives from the fact that they incorporate previous case law and that
they serve as evaluation criteria when government resolves appeals against decisions
of LPAs. This means that practice might deviate from the criteria set out here, without
this deviation been necessarily considered as illegal (Moore, 2005: 357). This happens often, as the mentioned example with prerequisites 2 and 3 shows.

6.2.3

Social/affordable housing

Traditionally, social/affordable housing was provided directly by local authorities and
housing associations, and funded by the tenants (through rents) and public subsidies.
Encouraged by the central government, with for examples its Circulars 1991/7 and
1998/6, since the end of the 1980s a shift has taken place. Nowadays developers
are being asked to provide affordable housing within private housing schemes. This
means that developers are being asked to subsidize social/affordable housing with
the proﬁts accruing from the free market housing in the schemes in question (Crook
&Whitehead, 2002: 1259-60). Planning obligations can establish a minimum percentage of affordable housing, or a speciﬁc number of affordable units. Also, planning obligations can determine on which parcels affordable housing has to be built.
It is also possible to include the obligation to make payments for off-site affordable
housing, to be developed elsewhere by somebody else; or to include the obligation
for the developer to provide off-site land; or to himself provide off-site social/affordable housing (Circular 05/2005).

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Frame 6c
Contents of Planning obligations and Planning conditions
As mentioned before, planning obligations go further than planning conditions, and
are the result of negotiations. If a LPA wishes to obtain contributions that go further
than what planning conditions can be, it must enter voluntary negotiations with the
developer. The then agreed contributions are called planning obligations. Planning
conditions and obligations can thus overlap and coexist. Planning obligations can include a broad range of contributions:
1. Contributions in kind, i.e. the obligation for the developer to transfer land free and
to undertake a broad range of investments: provision of services, building of public
buildings, social/affordable housing, bus or railway stations, provision of infrastructure above (roads, surfacing materials, furniture, lighting, etc) and below ground
(sewerage, drainage, cables, pipelines, etc), decontamination of soil, construction
of play areas, demolishing of buildings and constructions, management and maintenance of public open space after its delivery, etc (Moore, 2005: 289, 346, 3512, 359-360; Circular 11/95: Appendix A.23-25, 31, 32, 38-40, 58, 59; Circular
05/2005: Annex B.18).
2. Planning obligations can also include payments in cash to the LPA: e.g. contributions to educational and healthcare facilities, for public transport, for affordable
housing, for training and recruitment programmes, for town centre improvements,
for library facilities, for social and community facilities and payments of compensations (Moore, 2005: 349, 351, 359-360; Circular 05/2005; ODPM, 2004b: Appendices, p. 16, 19).
3. Planning obligations can also include meeting deadlines for the completion of development and the realization/payment of the obligations.
The contents of planning conditions are narrower than planning obligations. Planning
conditions may include the requirement to undertake also investments/contributions
in kind, provided that these actions are not considered as a public function. The construction of sewerage under the site to connect it to the public sewerage system, for
example, is not considered as a public function and may therefore be included in a
planning permission as a planning condition (Moore, 2005: 290-291, 294). Conditions
cannot include payments in cash, but can include deadlines for the completion and for
the commencement of development.

6.3

Introduction to the studied cases in England

The 1997 Bristol Local Plan gave, for all the studied cases, indicative prescriptions.
However, before redevelopment is allowed, one or more planning permissions have
to be granted, and these include the legally binding land use regulations. The plan-

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ning permission has a physical zoning function but can also include implementation
and aspects for capturing value increase. Because in all the cases there was a need
for new or refurbished public infrastructure and facilities, the City of Bristol included
planning conditions in the planning permission and decided in addition to negotiate
planning obligations with the developers. Here follows a brief introduction to the
cases (see ﬁgure 20 for an overview of the cases). The rest of the case-based information has been included in the rest of the sections.

Temple Quay / 7.4 ha
Harbourside / 7.8 ha

Megabowl / 1.3 ha

Figure 20. Location of the cases in the city of Bristol.

6.3.1

Harbourside (Canon’s Marsh), City of Bristol

Urban regeneration project ‘Harbourside/Canon’s Marsh’ (7.8 ha, 45,000 m² apartments, 700 units, 44,000 m² ofﬁce, 30,000 m² leisure and facilities, see ﬁgure 21) is
located in the city centre of Bristol. It forms the last and largest part of the redevelopment of a wider area, also called ‘Harbourside’, which comprises 27 ha of former
dockland and industrial areas. Before redevelopment, the site was largely ﬂat and
contained a number of almost disused industrial installations. The site is one of the
Council’s main priorities for regeneration, and plan preparation has a long history

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(Askew, 1996; Buitelaar, 2007: 89-92). The 1997 Bristol Local Plan and the 1998 Planning Brief Implementation Phase for the Harbourside regeneration (a supplementary
document to the Local Plan) foresaw the redevelopment of the site into a mixed used
area with ofﬁce space, housing and retail. In 1999 a developer (Crest Nicholson PLC)
submitted a ﬁrst application. Both this application and a second one were rejected.
Finally, in 2001, a third application for outline planning permission succeeded. The
permission came deﬁnitively into force in 2003, after negotiations under section 106
ended with the sealing of a Development Agreement. Afterwards, the developer and
the Council negotiated some minor modiﬁcations to the outline planning permission.
The central government regeneration agency English Partnerships supports the redevelopment of the site through cheap loans for the infrastructure.

Figure 21. Plan area development site ‘Harbourside/Canon’s Marsh’ (source: Report Head Bristol
Planning Services to Bristol Local Council Committee 17 October 2001).

At the moment of the signing of the Planning Agreement in 2003, the land was owned
by Secondsite LTD (39% of the site), Transco PLX (9%), Lloyds TSB Bank PLC (9%),
and the City Council of Bristol (several plots and the existing streets, in total 43% of
the site). The infrastructure works commenced in 2004. In June 2007 more than the
half of the development was already completed or under construction, and the ﬁrst
dwellings, ofﬁce space, a hotel and a casino were already occupied and in use. At
that time, Crest Nicholson, the developer, had already bought all the land.

6.3.2

Temple Quay North, City of Bristol

Urban regeneration project ‘Temple Quay’ (7.4 ha, 45,000 m² apartments, 495 units,
61,000 m² ofﬁce, and 7,000 m² leisure and facilities, see ﬁgure 22) is located to the
east of the city centre of Bristol. This area had been for the last years the subject of
redevelopment, most of the time to develop ofﬁce buildings. The site covers former
railway sidings and industry, and is largely ﬂattened and vacant at the moment of

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redevelopment. Only a couple of small buildings and a school remained at that time.
The school has been integrated into the regeneration. The site is one of the Council’s
main priorities for regeneration. The 1997 Bristol Local Plan and the City Centre
Strategy (a supplementary document to the Local Plan) foresaw the redevelopment
of most of the site into a mixed used area with ofﬁce space, housing and retail. During the 1990s, various planning applications have been granted for redevelopment
of the site. However, at least four of these permissions have expired without having
been implemented. The central UK government appointed an Urban Development
Corporation (UDC) for this area. This UDC took over the local competences and
bought part of the land. After the UDC wound down in 1996, The South West of
England Regional Development Agency (SWRDA), a regional public body, took over
that land. In 2001, the SWRDA, together with the developer (Castlemore Securities
Ltd), submitted a planning application to redevelop the site. The planning permission
came deﬁnitively into force in 2003, after negotiations under section 106 ended with
the sealing of a Development Agreement. The infrastructure works commenced in
2004. In June 2007 about one quarter of all building was completed, other plots were
under construction and the infrastructure works for the rest of the site were going on.
At the moment of the submission of the planning application, the land was owned by
Castlemore (47% of the site), another developer (Verclutt, 8%), the SWRDA (25%),
and the City Council of Bristol (the existing school, that has been maintained, 12%;
and the existing streets, 8%).

Figure 22. Plan area development site ‘Temple Quay’ (source: Report Head Bristol Planning Services
to Bristol Local Council Committee 5 June 2002).

6.3.3

Megabowl, City of Bristol

Urban regeneration ‘Megabowl’ (1.3 ha, 13,500 m² apartments, 184 units, 142 units/
ha, see ﬁgure 23) is located in the west of the City of Bristol. The site is within the city,
but is relatively isolated from it by a busy highway. It has been used in the past as a
tram terminus, military barracks, cold store, and for light industrial purposes. Since

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the 1990s up to the start of the redevelopment, it was used as a bowling alley. The
1997 Bristol Local Plan and the 2003 Proposed Alterations to the Bristol Local Plan (a
supplementary document to the Local Plan) foresaw no redevelopment of the site. In
2006, the owner (Tenpin Limited) submitted an application for planning permission
to redevelop the site. The Council granted provisionally the permission at the end of
the same year. Then, Tenpin Limited sold the site to George Wimpey, a commercial
developer. The planning permission came deﬁnitively into force in 2007, after negotiations under section 106 between the Council and George Wimpey ended with the
sealing of a Development Agreement. The demolition works started in June 2007. At
that time the infrastructure provision was expected to start at the end of 2007, and the
building to be completed one year later. The infrastructure provision started indeed
in that year but the works have delayed largely, and in April 2010 the building was
still not completed.

Figure 23. Plan area development site ‘Megabowl’ (source: Report Head Bristol Planning Services to
Bristol Local Council Committee 27 September 2006).

6.4

How formal rules relevant to zoning in England
can be used

This chapter describes the working of formal rules relevant to zoning within the value
capturing mechanisms. There are different ways (or sub-variables) in which these
rules in England can be used in an operational way to improve the capturing of value
increase:
• Creating certainty or uncertainty beforehand about future building possibilities
and contributions;
• Choosing the contents of the relevant binding rules (the planning permission);

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•

Conditioning the relevant binding rules (the planning permission) to securing the
capturing of value increase;
• Modulating property rights;
• Using the procedure for the preparation and approval of the relevant binding
rules (the planning permission).
Here follows an assessment of whether each of these sub-variables can affect the
capturing of value increase.

6.4.1

Creating certainty beforehand about future building possibilities and contributions

Summary of the ﬁndings
The British planning system is not designed to provide certainty beforehand, neither
about future building possibilities, nor about future contributions. However, zoning
plans and supplementary planning guidance often create some certainty, although
this is limited: those two instruments are usually vague, not detailed, and anyway
LPAs can and usually do depart from them, as they are not legally binding.
The general trend is that LPAs are increasing the certainty about future building possibilities given by indicative zoning plans and site-speciﬁc supplementary policy
guidance. In the studied cases, there was some certainty. In cases Harbourside and
about half of Temple Quay, the 1997 Bristol Local Plan created a strong expectation
of being able to redevelop these sites. In the rest of Temple Quay and in the whole
of Megabowl there was no such expectation. Of the three, only in Harbourside did a
site-speciﬁc supplementary planning guidance (the 1998 Planning Brief) create some
detailed certainty about the development possibilities.
Table 14. Level of certainty in the English cases.
Certainty about future building
possibilities

Certainty about future contributions

Harbourside

some

high

Temple Quay

low

Low for 2/3 site, high for renegotiation 1/3 site

Megabowl

none

high

Regarding the obligations to be met, the trend to give more certainty seems clearer.
LPAs are increasingly elaborating obligations policy that acquires the status of supplementary guidance. This was the case in Bristol after the approval in 2005 of SPD4,
a generic policy document about capturing value increase. Thanks to this document,
certainty was high in part of case Temple (the renegotiation in 2007 of the modiﬁcation of the planning permission for about one third of the site) and in case Megabowl.
The 1998 Planning Brief, a site-speciﬁc document, created certainty for Harbourside.

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The uncertainty was the largest in the ﬁrst planning permission for Temple Quay,
which was processed and negotiated in 2001-2003, before the introduction of SPD4.
Table 14 summarizes the level of certainty, before deﬁnitive negotiations took place,
about building possibilities and contributions.
The ﬁndings suggest that uncertainty about the future building possibilities and certainty about future contributions might both be positive for capturing value increase.
This is because they reinforced the negotiating position of the municipality, and because they might have lowered the land price. Let us see in detail what it is that local
authorities create certainty or uncertainty about, in which sort of documents, and
what are the inferred consequences for the captured value increase.
6.4.1.1 Intrinsic uncertainty of the British system, and the recent trend of
creating some certainty through indicative zoning plans and supplementary policy guidance
Before development initiatives appear, there are usually in England non-site speciﬁc
zoning plans with various names: ‘Structure plans’, ‘Local plans’, ‘Unitary development plans’ and, since 2004, ‘Local development frameworks’. In addition, local
authorities can make ad hoc, often site-speciﬁc planning documents that might not
be deﬁned in planning legislation, but receive the status of supplementary policy
guidance. Local authorities have tended in the last years to develop many informal
and formal policy documents and zoning plans that make clearer to themselves and
to applicants how the LPA’s intend to act (Booth, 2003: 12-13).
When considering applications for a planning permission, the 1990 Town and Country Planning Act gives the local authorities broad competences to evaluate them.
When considering applications, authorities ‘shall have regard to the provisions of the
zoning plan (and supplementary planning guidance, red.), so far as material to the
application, and to any other material considerations’ (section 70.2). The courts have
held that the expression ‘shall have regard to the provisions of the zoning plan’ does
not require that the plan should be slavishly adhered to (Moore, 2005: 223, §12.32).
The possibility of considering the zoning plan and the supplementary planning guidance as not determining, and the possibility of having regard to ‘any other material
considerations’, give LPAs much discretion to decide about applications. LPAs have
a certain amount of room to decide each case on its own merits. By refusing applications or by submitting them to planning conditions and obligations, municipalities
may refer to broad principles and ambiguous concepts like ‘amenity’. It is this that
distinguisheds the British planning system from other Western European countries:
it is the genuine representative of the ‘development-led’ planning system, which is
not required to approve beforehand legally binding zoning plans (see, for an international comparison, section 4.1).
LPAs often use this provision to depart from the zoning plans and supplementary
planning guidance (Whitaker, interview 2007). The cases conﬁrm this general state-

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ment. Bristol made use in all three cases of the possibility of departing, although this
happened in different degrees: in Harbourside and Temple the departure was large,
and in Megabowl the departure was the largest. In addition, the cases show that zoning plans and supplementary planning guidance are not always detailed. The 1997
Bristol Local Plan is not a detailed plan: it includes neither the maximal building
volume, nor the amount of each land use, nor the building envelope and alignments,
etc. In Harbourside the 1998 Planning Brief provided additional certainty by specifying the development possibilities and the obligations to be paid; however, this did not
result in detailed prescriptions. It might be that this case-based ﬁnding (zoning plans
and site-speciﬁc supplementary planning guidance are often not detailed) is not an
exception in England. It is clear anyway that planning law does not prescribe that
indicative zoning plans should be detailed.
Thus, there is in the British planning system an intrinsic uncertainty, but local authorities usually create some certainty through indicative zoning plans. Additionally,
there is a clear trend of local authorities increasing the certainty about the future
contributions. It seems that, at least since the late 1990s, English local authorities are
increasingly elaborating policies on planning obligations, policy that has the status
of complementary planning guidance. These policies have clariﬁed the likely obligations that developments have to face, and are in two different forms:
1. Generic non-site speciﬁc policy for all the territory or parts of it, e.g. Bristol’s
Supplementary Planning Document Number 4, SPD4 (‘Achieving Positive Planning through the use of Planning Obligations’), adopted in 2005. This document
was important in case Megabowl and part of Temple Quay.
2. Site-speciﬁc documents for important development sites, e.g. Bristol’s 1998
Planning Brief. This document was important in case Harbourside.
Central government advice has encouraged this trend, and it seems that these moves
are, in part, a response to criticism. The development sector has objected strongly
to the delays associated with negotiating planning agreements, and there is a wide
concern about the lack of accountability of the negotiation process. Nowadays, a
majority of local authorities have enacted, in different ways, formal policy about
planning obligations (Campbell et alii, 2000: 760, 763-764; Department…, 2006:
19-20).
In the studied cases, the situation was varied. In Harbourside there was some certainty at the time of the application procedure and negotiations (March 2001-February 2003). The 1997 Bristol Local Plan zoned the whole site as ‘Major regeneration
area’, with ofﬁces (no speciﬁc building volume), leisure/tourist activities, and housing (about 200 dwellings). In addition, the Council had approved in 1998 a Planning
Brief that speciﬁed the building possibilities (augmenting the number of dwellings to
400) and prescribed the obligations likely to be paid (see frame 6d).

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Frame 6d
The obligations in the 1998 Planning Brief for Harbourside
The 1998 Planning Brief has its ﬁrst version in 1994. The City Council of Bristol approved in that year a Development Framework, and in 1995 a Planning Brief Implementation Phase for the Harbourside regeneration that amended and integrated the
contents of the 1994 document. The 1998 document reviewed and amended the 1995
version, and included for example the following contributions:
• The 1998 document reafﬁrmed the previous requirement, broadly and openly stated by the Council in a ﬁrst planning brief in 1992, following which proﬁts should
‘cross-subsidise the achievement of the essential infrastructure and the Council’s
leisure (…) objectives…’ (p. 13, see also p. 51). ‘Leisure objectives’ include in any
case a ﬁnancial contribution to the construction of a non-commercial leisure facility, situated nearby but outside the plan area in question;
• The 1998 document includes the requirement to comply with local policy documents on affordable housing, making clear that the scheme will have to include
affordable housing, of which a part must be social rented (p. 21).
• The 1998 document makes clear that the developer must provide directly related
infrastructure (the roads and public space within the plan area, p. 51). Further on,
it speciﬁes that e.g. the ‘remediation of contaminated land’ (Appendix I: i) will also
be the responsibility of the developer. It also establishes which development sites
will assume the costs of which infrastructure, and establishes a realization schedule
(Appendix I: ii-viii).

Although the 1998 document did not set down quantities, it seems that it created
enough clarity for the developer to assess, within a certain margin, the ﬁnancial
feasibility of the scheme. Asked whether this choice was related to capturing value
increase, an involved planning ofﬁcer insisted that the goal was indeed to create beforehand enough certainty about the development value and costs. By doing so, the
ofﬁcer said, the chance that developers buy the land for too high a price is reduced
(see sections 2.3.3 and 2.4.2 for more details about the working of the residual land
price mechanisms) So it seems that Bristol created some certainty, about both future
building possibilities and contributions, with the goal of improving capturing value
increase. Nevertheless, this certainty was ﬂexible. As said, the Council could deviate
from both documents, as actually happened several times. For example, during the
negotiations, the Council ﬁrst added the requirement of 30% of affordable housing
and augmented the total number of dwellings from 400 to 700; afterwards it lowered
the requirement of affordable housing.
In Temple Quay the Council chose not to detail the vague determinations of the 1997
Local Plan. No other site-speciﬁc supplementary planning guidance was enacted for
this site at the time of the application procedure and negotiations (May 2001-May
2003). The 1997 Plan established a variety of uses for the site. More than the half

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of the site was designated as ‘regeneration area’, ‘mixed commercial area’, and on
several plots as both ‘new housing site’ and new ‘industrial and warehousing’ at the
same time. However, the rest of the site (something less than the half) was zoned
as ‘Primarily Industrial and warehousing’, or had no designation. This means that
something less than half of the site was not foreseen as being regenerated into residential and ofﬁces. Thus, the certainty about the building possibilities was very low,
both because of the lack of detail in the 1997 Plan, and because this Plan foresaw
regeneration for only half of the site. The same could be said about the certainty
about obligations, because the 1997 Plan said nothing about future contributions. It
could be that the collaboration between the Council and the developer in making a
Masterplan (2000-2003) for the site had created some informal certainty beforehand.
However, the local authority did not formally adopt this document.
There is an exception to the lack of certainty in Temple Quay. In 2007 the developer
decided to apply for a modiﬁcation of part of the planning permission, regarding
blocks ND1-5 (about one third of the site). He applied for an increase in the ofﬁce
space and in the number of dwellings. Modiﬁcation means that planning obligations
will be renegotiated. The Council approved in 2005 the Supplementary Planning
Document Number 4 (SPD4, see frame 6e). This document, that has the status of
supplementary planning guidance, details the obligations to be paid/fulﬁlled in all
schemes in the City of Bristol, most of the time in the form of standard charges. Thus,
since 2005, the SPD4 forms an evaluation criterion for all planning applications in
the city. Thanks to this document, when the developer decided in 2007 to apply for a
modiﬁcation of the planning permission in blocks ND1-5, he had certainty about the
obligations likely to be required. Nevertheless, this certainty is ﬂexible. As said, the
Council can deviate from this document.

Frame 6e
Bristol’s 2005 SPD4 document
The Supplementary Planning Document Number 4 of the City of Bristol (‘Achieving
Positive Planning through the use of Planning Obligations’) establishes standard contributions of the following sorts: affordable housing, educational and recreational facilities, landscape schemes, travel plan initiatives, park and ride facilities, highway
infrastructure works, site speciﬁc measures, economic contribution from new development, areas of public realm, public art, community forest initiative and library facilities. Examples of these standard contributions are:
• Affordable housing: this applies to residential developments of 25 or more dwellings or one hectare or more in size; the developer is required to provide on-site
a percentage of the total number of units, according to local affordable housing
policy (30% in 2007, red.), or exceptionally to pay a sum for off-site provision of
affordable housing;
• Educational facilities: this applies to residential developments of 40 or more dwell

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ings if they generate additional pupil numbers in excess of the capacity of local
schools; the developer is usually required to pay a sum for the provision of off-site facilities, or exceptionally to provide on-site these facilities. Per additional pupil in excess of the local capacity, the developer has to pay a sum: £ 9,136 per school place
in a Nursery or Primary School, £ 14,346 per school place in a Secondary School;
• Landscape schemes: this applies to any development sort; the developer is required
to submit a Landscape Scheme to, and receive written approval from, a competent public body, before commencing development, and to implement it, pay the
maintenance costs during a period of 12 months, and ﬁnally transfer the land to the
municipality free of charge.

In Megabowl the uncertainty about the future building possibilities was very high,
as the Council had never considered regeneration. The 1997 Bristol Local Plan and
the 2003 Proposed Modiﬁcations did not foresee at all the regeneration of the site.
This is called a ‘windfall site’. This uncertainty was reinforced by site-speciﬁc circumstances: the site is isolated by a highway and was in principle not very suitable for
residential use. However, regarding future contributions, the certainty was very high.
This is thanks to the fact that at the time of the application procedure and negotiations (April 2006-April 2007), the SPD4 document already established the obligations to be fulﬁlled. Nevertheless, this certainty was ﬂexible: for example, during
the negotiations, the Council lowered the requirements for social/affordable housing
from 30% to 25%.
The question is now, what have been the results of the level of certainty/uncertainty
for the captured value increase. Here, a distinction is made between certainty about
building possibilities, and certainty about contributions.
6.4.1.2 Effects for capturing value increase of Uncertainty about building
possibilities
In general, it seems that uncertainty about the future building possibilities has improved the capturing of value increase (Claydon and Smith, 1997; Campbell et alii,
2001: 18-19; Whitaker, interview 207). The cases seem to conﬁrm this general conclusion. Case Megabowl provides interesting conclusions. Here, the uncertainty
about the building possibilities was the largest of the three cases, as regeneration of
the site was not foreseen at all. The Council required and obtained what could be
considered a high level of obligations (see section 6.5 for a comparison between the
degree of captured value increase in the three cases). Almost all possible contributions stated in SPD4 that are relevant to this site, were achieved here. This case is
considered within the Council’s planning department as a good example of obtaining
section 106 obligations.
There are two possible explanations for this effect of uncertainty about building possibilities. First, uncertainty may reinforce the negotiation position of LPAs. Both the

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involved planning ofﬁcer and the developer’s agent in Megabowl agree that this uncertainty gave much negotiation room to the Council. This case-based ﬁnding ﬁts
within a general idea, already formulated in variable D1.1 of the causal model of
section 2.4.2: if certainty is high about future building possibilities, LPAs have less to
offer in the negotiations.
Second, uncertainty about building possibilities might have improved capturing value increase for another reason too. For low building expectations might lower the
land price (variable D1.1). In Megabowl, as a consequence of the uncertainty, the
site had not been the subject of speculation: no developer had yet been seriously
interested in buying the land. It was the former owner and user that negotiated the
planning permission and the obligations. This might have been one of the stimuli to
the owner-developer to consider initially a lower land price, that is the residual value
of the land taking into account only the actual use as bowling alley - the minimum
land cost, about 3-4.5 € million - but not including any expectation of urban use.
Thanks to this, the Final proﬁt of the developer was large, giving him much room to
pay (in money and in kind) more contributions than usual. The total development
costs (postings 1-7 in Annex 3), taking into account the minimum land cost, amounted to circa € 20 million, and the total estimated returns about €37m. After agreeing
the contributions, the landowner sold his land to a developer for about € 11 million.
In a scenario in which the expectations for the site are clear beforehand, developers
would most probably have paid a high sum for the land, and this would have reduced
the ﬁnancial room available for contributions. Both in Temple Quay and Harbourside, developers bought land from the former owners for a price presumably higher
than the existing market value of these sites. However, it has not been possible to
say what the price of land there was, for developers were not willing to provide the
needed information.
6.4.1.3 Effects for capturing value increase of Certainty about contributions
In general for England, there is evidence that those local authorities that have standard charges, known beforehand, are able to gain more obligations (in number and
in terms of their economic value). This suggests that standard charges have a positive
effect on the number and economic value of obligations (Department…, 2006: 19,
22, 27-28, 54). The ﬁndings in the cases agree with this general opinion. Capturing
value increase was higher in those cases in which certainty was higher: thus higher
in Megabowl and Harbourside, and lower in the former permission for Temple Quay.
For Temple Quay it seems that the renegotiation in 2007, once the SPD4 document
had been approved, of the planning permission for one third of the site will provide
more obligations than the ﬁrst permission.
There are two possibly explanations for this apparent positive effect of certainty about
contributions: it may ﬁrst reinforce the negotiating position of LPAs, and second lower
the acquisition cost of the land. Regarding the negotiating position: making explicit
policy for obligations means that obligations become material to the determination of

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planning permission. This allows local authorities to successfully refuse those applications that do not fulﬁl the required contributions, and allows them also to subject
the applications to conditions and obligations (Campbell et al., 2000: 773; 2001).
A representative of the English developers considered that local authorities create
strong arguments for possible refusal, and that this provides them with a strong starting point in the negotiations (Whitaker, interview 2007). The cases seem to conﬁrm
this general conclusion: in all three cases, the public ofﬁcers in charge considered
that a strong policy base for requiring planning obligations was very important for
capturing value increase. In Temple Quay, at the time of the negotiations there was
no such strong policy base, and the planning ofﬁcer considered this lack as a crucial
factor that inﬂuenced negatively the obligations. During the renegotiation of part of
the planning permission in August 2007, both the former planning ofﬁcer and the
developer considered that obligations would turn out higher due to the approval in
2005 of SPD4. For example, contributions for library services and for funding car
clubs (intended to lower the need of parking places on street level) were not possible before the approval of SPD4. Also, affordable housing will beneﬁt from SPD4.
The ﬁndings in our cases agree with the ﬁndings of other studies. In a case study in
Newbury, Berkshire, the lack of such an obligations policy seems to have inﬂuenced
capturing value increase negatively (Campbell et al., 2001: 24). In another study of
three projects in London, Weymouth and Liverpool, the researchers came to similar
conclusions (Claydon & Smith, 1997: 2017).
Regarding helping to lower land prices: the cases seem to conﬁrm the positive role of
certainty about contributions. In Megabowl, certainty about a high degree of contributions might have been relevant for lowering the Accounted land costs in two ways.
First in combination with the uncertainty about the building possibilities explained
above: initially the ﬁrst landowner accepted a low ‘book value’ for his land not only
because developers where not interested in buying his land, but probably also because he was aware of the high level of contributions stated in the SPD4-document.
Second, once at the end of 2006 the planning permission was provisionally approved, together with a list of contributions that had to be detailed in a Development
Agreement, the ﬁrst landowner sold his land to a developer. The Development Agreement was not yet sealed, so there still was, in theory, negotiation room. However, the
developer knew he had no choice than to secure in a Development Agreement all
these contributions. The certainty created with the provisional approval of a list of
contributions, based on the SPD4 document, must have played a role here. It seems
very plausible that the price paid for the land (€ 11m) has taken into account the contributions. The fact that this price left ﬁnancial room for all the contributions seems
to conﬁrm this (see Annex 3). In Harbourside, certainty has probably also lowered
the price that the developer had to pay for the land, as developer and landowners
agreed that this price depended on the ﬁnal proﬁt margins. In Temple Quay, it seems
plausible that the lack of certainty has inﬂated the land price. In general, it seems that
once the price paid for land has internalized part of the future urban expectations, it
is difﬁcult to reduce those expectations. Harbourside provides an example: when the

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Council added afterwards the requirement of 30% affordable housing, the developer
argued that he had no more ﬁnancial room to accommodate this contribution in his
budget. The developer was not willing to provide information about the land price,
information that is crucial to accurately evaluate his arguments. However, our own
estimations about the development value and costs in Harbourside show a large difference between the estimated development costs (excluding land price) and returns
(see Annex 3 for a comparison of development costs and proﬁts in the English cases).
This suggests that there may have been enough ﬁnancial room to pay 30% affordable
housing. The problem could have been that the 30%-requirement came too late, in
the sense that the developer and the landowners had already incorporated the full
development surplus in the land price. It was ﬁnally decided that the developer will
build 9% of affordable housing.

6.4.2

Choosing the contents of the binding rules (the planning
permission)

In England, planning law, planning guidance and the jurisprudence make it possible to include a wide range of determinations in planning permissions: not only
physical zoning aspects, but also aspects related to the implementation. For more
details about the possibly contents of planning conditions and obligations see section 6.2.
Summary of the ﬁndings
One of the possibilities is to include the obligation to contribute in kind or in money
social/affordable housing and off-site public infrastructure and facilities. This seems
to have a positive inﬂuence on capturing value increase, especially for the construction and implementation by the developer himself of social/affordable housing
on-site, and of public infrastructure and facilities off-site, but not so much for the
developer constructing or transferring land for social/affordable housing off-site. Another possibility is to include deadlines, but here there are differences in their effectiveness. It is only possible to include in Development Agreements deadlines for the
completion of contributions, but these deadlines are only in force once development
commences. Since it is not possible to include deadlines for the commencement
of development in Development Agreements, when planning permissions include
commencement deadlines, these seem not to be very effective. The consequence is
that many planning permissions are never implemented. However, if development
does start, deadlines for the completion of contributions come into force and seem
to be effective in stable market circumstances. The consequence is that once commenced, and provided market circumstances remain stable, developments and the
related contributions are usually implemented within deadlines. The difference in
effectiveness of commencement and completion deadlines suggests that another
sub-variable and a third variables might be inﬂuential here: the sub-variable is the
possibility of conditioning planning consent to securing the deadlines and contribu-

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tions (see next section 6.4.3), and the third variable are the market circumstances
(variable A2, see causal model in section 2.4.2). Let us see in detail what are the
possible contents of planning permissions, and what are the consequences for capturing value increase.
6.4.2.1 Including social/affordable housing
Planning permissions can include contributions for social/affordable housing, both
on-site and off-site. Circular 06/98 prescribes thresholds for seeking contributions:
usually 25 or more dwellings, or a site larger than one ha, above which there is in
principle the obligation for the developer to provide affordable housing. In Inner
London this is 15 dwellings/0.5 ha (Gurran et al., 2007: 40). It seems clear that in
England, in general, planning obligations are increasingly being used to provide affordable housing. For example, in a survey in 1999 it was found that 78% of LPAs
had speciﬁc affordable housing policies in development plans (Holmans et al, 2000;
quoted in Crook & Whitehead, 2002: 1274). It is possible to conclude that this general trend is also present in Bristol, where the threshold is 25 dwellings, or a site
larger than one hectare rules. Many of the interviewed public ofﬁcers and developers
considered this to be so, and the cases conﬁrm this. The more recent the project is,
the higher the proportion of affordable housing. In cases Temple Quay and Harbourside (planning permissions deﬁnitively valid in 2003), planning agreements stated the
parcels where social/affordable housing has to be built and a minimum percentage
of units: 14% respectively 9%, that are expected to result in about 71 respectively
63 units. In Megabowl (planning permission deﬁnitively valid in 2007), the planning
agreement established the number of affordable units (25%, 46 units). It seems that
other recent applications are negotiating similar requirements as in Megabowl. None
of the studied cases included contributions in money or contributions to off-site affordable housing.
What have been the consequences of the fact that LPAs can include social/affordable
housing in planning permissions? Presumably this statutory power, together with having created certainty about this sort of contribution (see previous section), is helping
to strengthen the LPA’s negotiation position. Also, it must inﬂuence the Accounted
land costs because once such a contribution is included in a planning permission,
developers know it cannot be avoided. The fact is that LPAs are increasingly including social/affordable housing in planning permissions and that the amount of social/
affordable housing being built in England has been increasing since 2004. The studied cases show the positive effect in Bristol too, where the building rates of social/
affordable housing are higher than in the rest of England (see for a comparison of the
results in each case, and ﬁgures for Bristol and England, section 6.5). However, the
minimal threshold (25 dwellings/larger than 1 ha in Bristol) seems to have disadvantages: according to many of the interviewed (public parties and developers) many
developers remain under the threshold, although they could develop more than 25
dwellings. The City of Bristol is currently studying the possibility of lowering this
threshold to about 4-6 dwellings.

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6.4.2.2 Including off-site public infrastructure and facilities
Planning permissions can also include contributions for off-site public infrastructure
and facilities. This might include contributions for off-site social/affordable housing
(just handled above). Presumably this statutory power, together with having created
certainty about this sort of contribution (see previous section), is helping to strengthen both the negotiation position of LPA’s and to lower the accounted land costs.
Regarding contributions in land, it seems not to be very common to include such a
requirement in planning permissions. The ﬁndings in the cases support this: in none
of the three cases did the planning permission include the obligation or the condition to provide land outside the plan area. Regarding contributions for the construction and implementation of public facilities and infrastructure, it seems that in the
last years LPAs are increasingly asking for this sort of obligation. This seems to have
a positive effect in practice, and in the cases the results were varied. Contributions
were larger in Harbourside than in Megabowl and Temple Quay. This seems to be
the result of the decision of the Council in Harbourside to focus on a large monetary
contribution for a leisure facility located outside the development site in question.
6.4.2.3 Including implementation schedules
Planning permissions can also include, as planning conditions or obligations, deadlines for the implementation of public infrastructure and facilities, or for the payment of contributions. Presumably this statutory power is helping, with differing
success, to reinforce the negotiation position of LPA’s and accelerate the realization
of the contributions. There is a distinction between deadlines for the commencement of the development, and deadlines for the completion of development and
contributions.
Deadlines for the commencement of development cannot be included in Planning
Agreements. Since 1968, power has been given to LPAs to impose deadlines within
which the development must start. However, these deadlines can be included only
as planning condition, but not as planning obligations, which means that these deadlines cannot be included in the Planning Agreement. This is because Circular 05/2005
rules that obligations are only meant for mitigation of undesirable aspects of development. And if development has not commenced, there can be no undesirable aspects
to mitigate. In cases Temple Quay and Harbourside (permissions granted in 2003),
planning conditions included a deadline of ﬁve years, and in Megabowl (permission
granted in 2007) three years. If the holder of the planning permission does not start
the development within the deadline, the permission will expire (Moore, 2005: 304305). What are the consequences of not being able to include commencement deadlines in the Planning Agreement? It seems that, in England, commencement deadlines
are not always achieved. Many granted permissions are not used. It is estimated that
in 2003/04, 80% of full planning permissions and 75% of outline planning permissions were actually implemented, and the rest not (Department…, 2006: 43). Asked
about this, two experts considered that this happened more frequently some time

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ago, in the 90’s, and less in recent years (Lyons and Henneberry, interviews in 2007).
The case Temple Quay seems to support the general conclusion that commencement
deadlines are not always fulﬁlled: during the 90’s, various planning applications have
been granted for redevelopment of the site. At least four of these permissions have expired without having been implemented. In cases Temple Quay and Harbourside, the
commencement deadlines for the planning permissions were achieved. At the time of
data gathering in June 2007, in Megabowl development has not yet commenced, but
the deadline had not yet passed. Because not commencing on time would imply the
expiration of the planning application only, there was at that time no certainty about
whether the agreed contributions would ﬁnally be achieved or not.
Deadlines about when parts of the development and the contributions must be completed can be included in Planning Agreements. This is because LPAs can include
these deadlines not only as planning conditions, but also as planning obligations.
However, these deadlines become in force only if and when development commences. Thus, these deadlines are irrelevant until development begins. They were at
the time of data gathering in June 2007 relevant in Temple Quay and Harbourside,
but not in Megabowl (development commenced only later in 2007). It is uncertain
whether, in general, those planning permissions that are commenced are also completed within the deadlines. There are no general ﬁgures to support whether these
deadlines, once activated, are effective or not, but asked about this, two experts
interviewed in 2007 considered that these deadlines are indeed effective. Their argument was that commencement of development involves investments, so once they
are made developers cannot afford to delay (Lyons and Henneberry, interviews in
2007). Our cases however show a more nuanced picture. In two of them, Temple
Quay and Harbourside, development has commenced indeed, and deadlines for
the completion had been so far, in June 2007, achieved. However, the economic
crisis in 2009 seems to affect seriously the building schedules. In at least Megabowl
the completion of the building is having serious delays. The infrastructure provision
stopped at the end of 2007 and in April 2010 the building was not yet completed. At
the beginning of 2010 it is unknown to us whether the building in the other cases has
been completed or not.
Thus, the effectiveness of the deadlines seems to depend not on the fact that they
are included in planning permissions, but partially on the fact that they are secured
in a Planning Agreement, and partially on market circumstances. This suggests that
this sub-variable (possible contents planning permission) inﬂuences only partially the
variable ‘capturing value increase’. That is, there is some risk that the inferred causal
relationship is, partly, spurious. The sub-variable ‘conditioning permission to securing deadlines’ (see next section) and market circumstances (variable A1, see causal
model in section 2.4.2) seem to play the role of third variables because deadlines
are effective only if they are secured and provided that market circumstances do not
change dramatically.

The English planning permission can be made conditional on a contractual agreement (Planning Agreement) with the developer. Initially, the Council approves the
permission provisionally, including the planning conditions and obligations that it
expects from the developer. The deﬁnitive approval of the planning permission happens only after the planning obligations (but not the planning conditions) are secured
in a Planning Agreement. What are the consequences of being allowed to make planning consent conditional on securing the planning obligations, but not on securing
the planning conditions and thus commencement deadlines? The cases (see previous
section) and some interviews suggest that because commencement deadlines cannot
be secured, contributions are often implemented with delay, or not at all. In conclusion, not the fact of being able to include contributions in planning permissions
seems to be effective, but the fact of being able to condition planning consent to securing contributions. With other words, i) being able to condition planning consent
to securing the contributions reinforces ii) the positive effect of being able to include
certain contributions in planning permissions on iii) the negotiation position of LPA’s,
on the Accounted land costs and on the speed of the implementation.

6.4.4

Modulating property rights

Summary of the ﬁndings
The right to develop (i.e. the exclusive right to develop land, once permission has
been granted) belongs in England to the landowner. This, together with the distribution of the other necessary resources in urban regeneration (planning permissions
and ﬁnancial means), creates a strong interdependency between local authorities
and landowners. This interdependency gives to the landowners the option to wait,
which it is often used to contravene local authorities’ requirements, and often leads
to delaying the development.
6.4.4.1 Who owns development rights in England?
The nationalization of development rights might have had consequences for the legal
limits to capturing value increase, as we saw in section 6.2.1. However, this has not
altered the principle that landowners are the only ones that can develop their land.
It is therefore clear that the right to develop belongs exclusively to the landowner.
Planning permission attaches to the land, and not to the developer. Before being
entitled to develop, developers have to acquire the land (Williams & Wood, 1994:
78, Ratcliffe, 2001: 152-153; Cullingworth & Nadin, 2006: 195-197). However, the
landowner is limited in his right to develop, he has no right to any kind of ‘minimum’
and must apply for and obtain the needed permits. Other legislation (e.g. compulsory
purchase) might even lead to removal of his right.

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Infrastructure provision requires several transactions: 1) land purchase and assembling, 2) ﬁnancing, and 3) land preparation and development. By analyzing who has
the control over each of these transactions, it has been possible to discern the extent
to which development rights belong to the landowners.
6.4.4.2 Mutual dependence of local authorities and landowners in England
To analyse the consequences for the power-relationship between municipalities and
landowners of the practical possibilities for controlling transactions 1-3, this research
developed and applied a model of dependence (see table 15; for more details of the
model, see section 3.1.1). In England there is a strong mutual dependence between
municipalities and developers/landowners, so the possibilities in practice for gathering the land (1), gathering the ﬁnancial resources (2), and developing the land to
produce serviced plots (3) depend heavily on the landowner’s passive consent or
active collaboration. This strong mutual dependence is caused by the fact that none
of the actors control all the needed resources, and because the dependence is not
easily avoidable. The landowner controls two important resources - land and investment capacity - and local authorities depend on the landowner because of this. As
a rule, without agreement about the purchase and assembly of land and about the
ﬁnancing of the infrastructure provision, municipalities that want things to happen,
have to compulsorily purchase the land. In other words, the only way of avoiding
dependence on the landowner is public land development, or at least public infrastructure provision. But doing that is not easy: compulsory purchase and public
land development mean a direct public involvement and the assumption of the corresponding ﬁnancial costs and risks. Furthermore, compulsory purchase is a sensitive

Table 15. Dependence analysis England.

Dependence because
of land
LPA depends on the Dependence.
landowner/
Developer/Landowner
developer
owns all the land. Dependence is only avoidable through compulsory
purchase, but this is only
used in exceptional circumstances. Expropriation is considered slow,
expensive and risky.
Landowner/
developer depends
on LPA

Dependence because of
investment capacity

Dependence because of
regulatory resources

Dependence.
The developer was able
to invest in buying the
land and developing
it. Dependence is thus
avoidable only if Bristol
has enough ﬁnancial
means. However, Bristol
did not have the ﬁnancial means.
Dependence.
The LPA grants the
required permissions.
Dependence is not
avoidable.

200

England

matter, politically. On the other hand, the landowner depends on the local authority
because of its regulatory powers to grant the planning permission. This dependence
can also be labelled as strong because it is not avoidable: public bodies are the only
actors who can exercise these regulatory powers.

In all the studied cases, all or most of the land was in private hands. The City of Bristol could have avoided mutual dependence by applying compulsory purchase and
developing the site itself. However, in practice, this instrument is used only in exceptional circumstances in Bristol; only when there is no agreement with a minority
of the landowners and the majority of the landowners support the measure and are
willing to pay the costs of it. An interviewed public ofﬁcer considered compulsory
purchase a slow instrument, expensive and fraught with risk. Besides, Bristol did not
have the ﬁnancial means to develop the sites.
The consequences in practice of this strong mutual dependency were signiﬁcant.
Landowners had the option of not agreeing with the contributions package or other requirements of the municipality. Since waiting can bear advantages, it was a favourable
option to wait (see variable D2.2 in causal model section 2.4.2). As developers may
not control all the land, and thus depend on various landowners, it might take some
time to reach an agreement with all the landowners about the desired price of land.
Success depends on the expectation that, by delaying negotiations, development profits could increase in the future. LPAs might be confronted with landowners/developers
that are not willing to agree with the required ﬁnancing and implementation schedules. This might affect the negotiating position of the local authorities, the accounted
land costs and the proﬁt margins of the developer, and thus capturing value increase.
Authorities might be forced to lower the contributions package if they want to reach
an agreement, allowing landowners to ask a higher price for their land and developers
to enlarge their proﬁt margins. And anyway, this affects the speed of implementation,
as landowners/developers do not proceed quickly and development is delayed.
In at least the cases Harbourside and Temple Quay, the developers were not willing
to agree to the requirements, arguing that they threatened the ﬁnancial feasibility of
the operations. For example, in Harbourside the developer was not willing to agree
to the requirement of 30% social/affordable housing. Finally the developer included
9%. According to a representative of housing developers, in general about 50% of
negotiations do not succeed because LPAs ask too large a contributions package
(Whitaker, interview 2007). Several of the interviewed public ofﬁcers in Bristol argued that contribution packages are determined taking into consideration the ﬁnancial feasibility of schemes; in their view, the delay is caused by the price that the
landowner expects the developer pay for his land, and whether it incorporates the
development value or not. In other words, whether LPAs ‘ask too much’ or not, depends not only on the expected proﬁt margins and the development costs, but also
on the accounted land costs.

England

201

The cases offer some information that suggests that Bristol did not ‘ask too much’,
thus conﬁrming that resistance or acceptance of requirements might have been based
more on the expected land price than on the true feasibility of the operation. In addition, the cases suggest that the expected proﬁt margin (of the developer) might also
have been relevant (see posting 8 in Annex 3 for a calculation of development costs
and proﬁts in the English cases). In Megabowl, the price of the land at the moment of
the planning application was relatively low, about 3-4.5 € million1. This was thanks
to uncertainty about the building possibilities, which had discouraged developers
from buying the land previously. This gave the owner-applicant room to contribute
much more than usual. The total development costs, which included this low land
price and the contributions package, amounted circa € 20 million, and the expected
returns circa € 37 million. In other words, thanks to a minimum land price, a large
package of contributions has not threatened the ﬁnancial feasibility of the scheme.
These ﬁgures suggest that proﬁt margins have been large and an even larger contribution package would have been ﬁnancially feasible (37 – 20 = 17); at least, before
the landowner sold his land to a developer for about € 11 million. In Harbourside
and Temple Quay, developers were reluctant to provide information. Based on own
estimations, it is possible to conclude that there was a signiﬁcant margin between
development costs (excluding the accounted land price, postings 2-7 in Annex 3:
€ 183m in Harbourside and € 133m in Temple) and the total returns (posting 8:
€ 404m respectively € 409m)2. For Harbourside, there is some more evidence that
seems to conﬁrm the idea that Bristol did actually not ask too much and that landowners and developers might have proﬁted from it. Here the deﬁnitive land price was
calculated once planning permission was secured, i.e. after negotiating the contributions. Both the interviewed developer and public ofﬁcer conﬁrmed that landowners
have ﬁnally received a higher price for the land than the initially agreed basic price.
This means that the developer was actually able to contribute more than he did, because he would have been able to pass the costs on to the landowners in the form of
a lower land price. More recently, the City of Bristol has introduced several measures
to improve the insights into the ﬁnancial feasibility of operations; (1) the City is hiring specialist consultants; and (2) developers are required now to submit a viability
appraisal to the Housing Department instead of the Planning Department: this avoids
the duty of publication of such commercially sensitive information. The Housing Department estimates the suitable percentage of affordable housing.

1

This is about € 200-350 per m² of land, for in total 13.104 m² with a bowling alley on it.

2

A very approximate rough calculation is for Harbourside ca. € 2,800 per m² of land (€ 220 : 78,900
m²); and for Temple Quay ca. € 4,180 per m² of land (€ 276m : 66,000 m²).

202

6.4.5

England

Procedure for the preparation and approval of the binding
rules (the planning permission)

Summary of the ﬁndings
It seems that procedural guarantees in England offer developers some valuable tools
to reduce the discretion that LPAs have in determining planning permissions. The
consequences for capturing value increase might have been negative, and the consequences for the speed of implementation are unclear. The relative ﬂexibility to modify planning permissions seems to have positive effects for capturing value increase,
while the possibility of approving ﬁrst outline permissions and afterwards detailed
ones does not. Finally, the ﬂexibility in England to determine the size of the development area seems not to be relevant for capturing value increase.
6.4.5.1 Guarantees for those taking the initiative
In the English planning system there are several legal guarantees for the applicants
of planning permissions. First, local authorities are obliged to decide about planning
applications in a proper fashion. This implies the obligation of publicizing the application and starting the formal procedure. Second, there are strict deadlines within
which local authorities have to determine the applications, deadlines that are moreover usually met in practice. And third, applicants can appeal against a non-determination, or against an unfavorable determination of the LPA, to the Planning Inspectorate, which evaluates the planning merits of LPA’s decisions. Appeals regarding the
legality of the procedures are decided by the courts of law (Williams & Wood, 1994:
67). The effects of these guarantees can be divided into consequences for capturing
value increase, and side effects for the tempo of implementation.
Regarding the consequences for capturing value increase, these may be negative. A
representative of the development industry considered that the right to a proper determination of planning applications, and the right to appeal, might have inﬂuenced
negatively the negotiation position of local authorities because those authorities that
require too many obligations are confronted with the risk of an appeal (Whitaker,
interview 2007). The right to appeal seems to be an important way for developers to
counter those local authorities that are requiring larger contributions. Asked about
this, an expert supported partly this conclusion. Indeed, public ofﬁcers seem to keep
the right to appeal in mind when determining obligations and they seem to follow
the obligations policy guidance strictly in order not to risk losing an appeal. It seems
that the threat of appeals might come not only from the applicant. In competitive situations, especially in retail developments, developers might want to ensure that any
obligation is perfectly respectable and legitimate in order to avoid appeal by other
frustrated competitors. Other developers might seek to appeal against the legitimacy
of the planning gains as a means of trying to frustrate the development (Claydon &
Smith, 1997: 2018). In polemical applications, it may be other parties (civic society,
neighbours,…) that use the argument of illegitimate obligations to impede development (Campbell et alii, 2001: 22-23). However, the expert put the weight of the right

England

203

to appeal into perspective: appeals are expensive and time-consuming, which diminishes their usability for developers (Lyons, interview 2007).
The studied cases seem to support the above-mentioned generalization that the threat
of appeal stimulates local authorities, and possibly developers also, to strictly follow
policy guidance. Local authorities in the studied cases did not risk requiring more
obligations than those strictly based on local policy. In Harbourside the application
in question was the third one, after the Council had already rejected two other applications. An involved public ofﬁcer considered that if this third application were
refused, the applicant would have had a big chance to win an appeal. The developer
conﬁrmed that refusal would deﬁnitely have led to appeal, and that he probably
would have won it. In Temple Quay, Bristol seemed to have already required much
(the transfer of some land for a school), taking account of the poor policy guidance
at the time of the negotiations. Both the public ofﬁcer and the developer considered
that an appeal against a refusal of the application would have had a good chance
of success. In Megabowl the situation was different. Here, the speciﬁc features of
this site (isolated, not foreseen in the 1997 Local Plan) seemingly gave good reasons
for refusing the application, if Bristol had wished to do so. As a consequence, the
Council seemed to have a good negotiation position, as it did not fear an appeal by
the applicant. Also, the Council had a more generous planning guidance (the SPD4
document).
Regarding the consequences for the tempo of implementation, these are not clear.
On the one hand, the representative of the development industry considered that
the right to a proper determination of planning applications, and the right to appeal,
have stimulated developers to submit applications, since they reduce the uncertainties (Whitaker, interview 2007). A consulted expert agreed with this conclusion
(Henneberry, interview 2007). On the other hand, an increasing emphasis by local
authorities on meeting the strict determination deadlines seems to have led since
2001 to an increase in refusals. Some local authorities seem not to be able to evaluate all applications properly within the deadlines. To achieve the legal deadlines, it
appears that some authorities refuse applications that are difﬁcult to evaluate and
can thus lead to not achieving the deadlines. In turn, the increase of refusals seems
to be one of the causes of the increase of appeals (Ofﬁce of the Deputy Prime Minister, 2004a: 5-6, 50). The interviewed representative of the development industry
was in favour of more ﬂexible deadlines, especially for larger applications of more
than 200 dwellings. Instead of the current deadlines, the local authority and the applicant should be obliged to agree an ad hoc schedule that allows a proper assessment of the application. The consulted expert considered that the current legislation
already gives many possibilities for making deadlines more ﬂexible. For example,
developers and councils usually get involved in pre-application consultations that
allow afterwards, once the application has been submitted, a smooth handling of
the application.

204

England

6.4.5.2 Flexibility in modifying the granted planning permission
Modiﬁcation
A modiﬁcation of the planning permission, however minor it might be, requires a
new application, and the full procedure has to be completed again. However, if the
modiﬁcation regards only planning conditions, there is no need to publicize the application. Further, if the modiﬁcation regards only planning obligations, the LPA and
the developer can agree to the modiﬁcation, without extended procedure (Moore,
2005: §§ 11.33-35, 15.80; Circular 05/2005: §A15). The cases suggest that modiﬁcation of the planning permission, conditions and obligations is a relatively ﬂexible
instrument, which can improve the negotiation position of LPAs and thus inﬂuence
positively capturing value increase. In Harbourside the developer submitted in 2003
an application to modify, for several plots, the main aspects of the planning permission granted in that same year. The modiﬁcations followed the full procedure, which
lasted for about one year. These modiﬁcations had positive consequences for capturing value increase, as the Council added some more contributions in money. In 2007
the developer of Temple Quay and the Council entered into negotiations to modify
for one third of the site the planning permission granted in 2003. It seems that renegotiation will lead to some additional contributions.
Detailment
Developers can apply for Outline Planning Permission and detail it afterwards. An
outline permission leaves several matters open (mostly design and external appearance) and reserves approval about them to a later moment. It seems that, up to recently, the subsequent approval of the full planning permission could have consequences for the negotiation position of LPAs and thus for capturing value increase:
LPAs seemed to be able to add new contributions under certain circumstances. However, recent changes in legislation (2004 Act) and in policy guidance seem to have
diminished the discretionary power of local authorities. Applications for outline permissions must now be more detailed than before (Moore, 2005: §10.11, §10.13). The
studied cases seem to support the idea that reserved matters do not signiﬁcantly effect
anymore the negotiation position of LPAs. In Temple Quay and Harbourside, quite
elaborated outline permissions were granted in 2003. Their detailing concerned only
the external appearance of the buildings, landscaping (including detailed design and
layout of public space) and detailed design of routes within the site. These detailed
permissions did not entail any additional contribution.
6.4.5.3 Flexibility to determine the geographical scope (the plan area) of
planning permission according to negotiations with landowners
There is in England much freedom for the applicant to delimit the plan area of planning permissions. In principle it is the applicant that proposes a certain delimitation
of the development area. The applicant can follow, if he wishes, the property boundaries of his plot. In principle this means that the system allows scoping planning
permissions according to the negotiations with each landowners. However, it is the

205

England

applicant that has this freedom, and LPAs have not much freedom here. When considering the application, local authorities can ask applicants to modify the plan area,
but if the applicant does not agree, it might be not easy to refuse the application.
Authorities need then good arguments: e.g. a local zoning plan or planning guidance
that includes a proposal to delimit, or at least enough arguments and criteria for the
new delimitation; or when it is clear that the applicant is submitting small applications in order to develop his land bit by bit, for example to avoid reaching the legal
threshold of 25 dwellings per scheme; or when the proposed plan area jeopardizes
the use of an adjacent plot. Most of the interviewed public ofﬁcers and one of the
interviewed developers considered it difﬁcult, in practice, to refuse planning applications on the ground that the plan area is not appropriately delimited.
Asked about this, an expert considered that, in general, on allocated sites (sites that
are foreseen for regeneration in local planning guidance) local authorities usually delimit the development area beforehand, while on ‘windfall’ sites it is the developers
who usually delimit the development area (Henneberry, interview 2007). The cases
suggest that it is the developer that has in practice the most powers to delimit the
plan area, both on allocated and on windfall sites. In Harbourside (7.9 ha) the 1998
Planning Brief had previously delimited two development areas, but it was the applicant who decided to submit an application for both areas together. In Temple Quay
(7.4 ha) the applicant followed his own criteria to delimit the development areas, in
which property boundaries played a central role. In Megabowl (1.3 ha) it was the applicant who delimited the plan area following his property boundaries.
It seems plausible that this ﬂexibility has helped in the negotiation processes, in
the sense that proposals included only those landowners who are willing to develop. However, since local authorities seem not to have much freedom to decide the
boundaries of the development area, there is no evidence of positive effects for capturing value increase, nor does this seem likely.

6.5

The actual degree of captured value increase in
England

This section is about whether the goals for capturing value increase have been achieved
or not, and about the actual distribution of costs between the involved parties: who has
paid which public infrastructure and facilities, and possibly some extras? We assess
also whether the capturing value increase goals have been achieved on time. The main
sources of information are the studied cases, complemented with other written sources
and interviews with relevant experts. The conclusions are summarized in table 16.

-

65% total
plan area

-

27% total
plan area

20% total
plan area

Part of the
land

-

3% total plan
area

-

3

-

-

Developer
builds small
public building

-

School
(already
existing)

-

20% rent,
5% shared
ownership

4% rent,
10% shared
ownership

4% rent,
5% shared
ownership

Increasing
number
affordable/
social houses

Developer/
landowner
Part of

-

-

-

€ 1.6m
(4% total value
real estate)

€ 5.9m
(1.5% total
value real
estate)

€ 32.5m
(8% total value
real estate)

Important
contributions,
which are
increasing the
last years.

Contributions
off-site public
infrastructure
Public bodies
and facilities

Affordable housing

‘Total value real estate’ are the total returns accruing from the selling of the ﬁnal real estate (thus includes the selling of the new buildings).

White: case in which the developer/landowner contributes the less of the three cases.

Light Grey: case in which the developer/landowner contributes the second of the three cases.

-

12% total
plan area

0.3% total
plan area

Not very often Almost
always

Public body

On-site public buildings
Public body Developer/
landowner

Part of the land Part of the
land

Developer/
landowner

Land for on-site
public buildings

Grey: case in which the developer/landowner contributes the most of the three cases.

On-site infrastructure provision costs
It seems that, in general, all the costs of on-site infrastructure provision are paid by
the developer/landowner. This includes, in principle, compensation costs that might
be payable to existing users. Sometimes the developer does not transfer the legal
ownership of the resulting infrastructure to the local authority, but keeps the legal
ownership for himself. This infrastructure usually has however to remain accessible
for the general public. The system of planning obligations has succeeded in general
in ﬁnancing the on-site infrastructure provision costs (Campbell et alia, 2000 and
2001; Department for Communities and Local Government, 2006). It seems that developers prefer payment in kind to payment in money, because this might be cheaper
for them and because they have more certainty about the delivery of the public facilities. The studied cases support this conclusion: in the three cases, the developer paid
all on-site infrastructure provision costs, almost all in kind.
However, in regeneration schemes, there might be exceptions to the general conclusion. In one of the studied cases, Harbourside, the local authority, which sold to
the developer part of the land, had to pay part of the costs. Furthermore, the central
government regeneration agency English Partnerships issued a cheap loan for the
infrastructure works. In Temple Quay the SWRDA, a regional public development
agency owning about 25% of the land, might have sold its land to the developer
for a low price, a kind of indirect subsidy. Consulted about this, a relevant expert
conﬁrmed that it is not an exception that regeneration schemes encounter additional
land development costs, and that many LPAs and other public bodies still have substantial properties on these sites. It is very common that public bodies use their land
to facilitate development (Henneberry, interview 2007).
Land needed for on-site public infrastructure and facilities
Regarding the land needed for on-site infrastructure provision (excluding the land under the public buildings) the available literature supports the idea that, in general, the
system of planning obligations has succeeded in providing this land free of charge
(Campbell et alia, 2000 and 2001; Department for Communities and Local Government, 2006). However, the cases conﬁrm this general statement only partly. Here the
developer/landowner provides most of the land needed for on-site public infrastructure and facilities, but public bodies provide also an important part of it. Only in
Megabowl did the developer provide all the land. Regarding the legal ownership of
the land, sometimes the developer retains the legal ownership (all the public space
in Megabowl, one ﬁfth of the public space in Harbourside), and sometimes the local
authority receives it free (four ﬁfths of the public space in Harbourside, all the public
space in Temple Quay). Consulted about this, an expert conﬁrmed that it is common
in urban regeneration schemes that public bodies provide part of the needed land
(Henneberry, interview 2007).
Regarding the land needed for public buildings: in Harbourside, the only public
building was a small pavilion occupying 0,3% of the total plan area, and situated

208

England

on council land. In Temple Quay, there was just one public building: a school occupying about 15% of the plan area, of which 15% only one ﬁfth has been ceded
for free by the developer. In Megabowl there were no public buildings in the plan
area. It seems therefore that, at least in the studied cases, developers usually do not
contribute with land for public buildings. Two case studies in the 90’s (Newbury,
Berkshire, 50,000 m² ofﬁce space, planning permission granted in 1999; and Shepton Mallet, Somerset, 360 dwellings, planning permission granted in 1994) show
the same differentiated picture as in our cases: the ofﬁce scheme did not include
contributions in land for on-site public buildings, whereas the housing scheme included a contribution in land meant for a primary school within the site in question.
However, these cases were of greenﬁeld schemes, not regeneration (Campbell et
alii, 2001: 21-33).
On-site public facilities (the buildings)
Only in Harbourside and Temple Quay were there some public buildings. In Harbourside the developer himself will build a small public building. The developer in
Temple Quay has not contributed, either in kind (except some land, see above) or
in money, to the re-building of the existing school. Asked about this, an expert considered that this ﬁnding could be generalized. Usually, neither the developer nor the
respective public departments seem to favour giving to developers the responsibility
for developing the public buildings. Developers usually concentrate on the products
familiar to them. And the public departments responsible for the public buildings
prefer to remain in charge of developing them (Lyons, interview 2007).
Land and money for on-site and off-site social/affordable housing
In 1999/2000, 9,244 affordable units were delivered through planning agreements
in England. In 2000/01 this was 9,227 units, in 2001/02 10,303 units, in 2002/03
12,700 units, and in 2003/04 16,380 units. It is estimated that this would be 15,000/
year by 2005/2006 (ODPM, 2005: 9, 32; Department for Communities and Local
Government, 2006: 33). The proportion of affordable units secured through planning agreement, in relation to the total new affordable units was in 1999/00 21%,
in 2000/01 21%, in 2001/02 32% and in 2002/03 44% (Ofﬁce of the Deputy Prime
Minister, 2005: 9). In general, provision of social/affordable units through planning
obligations seems to work better in greenﬁeld than in regeneration sites, and also
better in the south of the country than in the north. A source however suggests that
affordable units obtained through planning agreements often proﬁt from social housing grants (Crook et al., 2001: in Crook & Whitehead, 2002: 1274-5). The interviews
with public ofﬁcers and developers and the cases suggest that in Bristol in the last
few years, the number of social/affordable housing obtained through planning agreement is increasing, which could explain the relatively good results in this city. The
percentages of new affordable dwellings (whether obtained through planning agreement or not) of the total completed new units are in Bristol higher than the average in
England: in 2003 15% in Bristol and 9% in England, in 2004 23% and 11%, in 2005
5.6% and 11%, and in 2006 22% and 13% (see table 17).

209

England

None of the studied cases included contributions in money for affordable housing;
in all of them, the developer himself developed the affordable units within the site in
question. The more recent the project, the higher the proportion of affordable housing. In cases Temple Quay and Harbourside (planning permissions deﬁnitively valid
in 2003) the proportion was 14% respectively 9%. In Megabowl (2007) 25%. The
following ﬁgures are meant to make clear that developing social/affordable housing
actually involves a ﬁnancial charge to the developers. In Harbourside, the development costs of the affordable units (the costs of serving the land and constructing the
building, excluding the price of land and excluding the planning obligations) amount
to about € 5.5m, and the agreed selling price (to the Registered Social Landlord)
will be about € 4.7m. The developer thus bears not only the difference between the
price for the social landlord and the free-market price of the houses, but also a shortage (returns less costs) of about € 800,000. In Temple Quay this shortage was about
€ 270,000, and in Megabowl about € 650,000. The developers must thus bear these
costs, plus the corresponding accounted land costs and contributions.

Table 17. Completed affordable housing in England and the City of Bristol (all new affordable units,
those obtained through planning agreement and through other ways).

England
Registered Social
Landlord’s units
(% of total completed
new units)

City of Bristol
Local Authority’s units
(% of total completed
new units)

Registered Social
Landlord’s units
(% total completed
new units)

Local Authority’s
units
(% total completed
new units)

1999

17,775 (12.6%)

2000

16,681 (12.3%)

54 (0.0%)
87 (0.1%)

2001

14,502 (11.2%)

160 (0.1%)

2002

13,309 (9.7%)

177 (0.1%)

2003

12,822 (8.9%)

177 (0.1%)

72 (14.8%)

0.0%

2004

16,604 (10.8%)

131 (0.1%)

140 (22.9%)

0.0%

2005

17,535 (11.0%)

182 (0.1%)

99 (5.6%)

0.0%

2006

20,752 (12.9%)

277 (0.2%)

143 (22.3%)

0.0%

Deﬁnitions:
- Affordable housing: those units that are provided to rent (or on shared ownership bases) by Local Authorities or
Registered Social Landlords.
Sources:
- England: Own elaboration, based on P2m/P2Q returns from local authorities, National Housebuilding Council
(NHBC), available on-line on http://www.communities.gov.uk/index.asp?id=1156032, live table 244 ‘Permanent
dwellings completed, by tenure, England, historical calendar year series’, visited on 15 Augustus 2007.
- City of Bristol: Own elaboration, based on P2m returns from local authorities, returns from National Housebuilding Council (NHBC), available on-line on http://www.communities.gov.uk/index.asp?id=1156032, live table 253
‘Starts and completions by district’, visited on 15 Augustus 2007. The available data refer to 2002-2003, 20032004, 2004-2005 and 2005-2006, and are referred in this table respectively as 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006.

210

England

Land and money for off-site public infrastructure and facilities
It seems that developers do not usually contribute land for off-site infrastructure and
facilities, i.e. they do not usually cede land situated outside the development in question (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2006: 9-10). The ﬁndings
in the cases support this: in none of the three cases has the developer provided land
outside the plan area. The situation is different with contributions, both in kind and
in money, for the construction or implementation of off-site public infrastructure and
facilities. These seem to have increased very much in the last years (Campbell et alia,
2000, 2001; Department for Communities and Local Government, 2006). At the end
of the 90’s, obligations regarding off-site infrastructure and facilities were already
very common in England. There is a strong geographical differentiation depending
on the economic prosperity of local authorities: the stronger the economy, the more
the contributions. Thus more in London and the South East than in the North (Campbell et alia, 2000: 764-765, 772; Department…, 2006: 17-18). The cases conﬁrm the
general idea that obligations include nowadays contributions in money for off-site
public infrastructure and facilities. In Harbourside the developer will pay in money a
considerable contribution for a leisure facility, about 8% of the total value of the ﬁnal
real estate. In Temple Quay this will be about 1.5% (for off-site highways, pedestrian
and cycle facilities, educational, social and community facilities and a labour initiative), and in Megabowl about 4% (for off-site pedestrian, cycle and public transport
facilities, training/apprenticeship programme, education, recreational and library facilities).
Creaming off plus value
Insofar as the above mentioned payments for off-site public infrastructure and facilities are not related to the development in question, they might be considered as
creaming off plus value. But, in principle, the English system of planning obligations
is not meant for the local authorities to share the economic rent generated by the
granting of planning permission.
Tempo of implementation of the capturing value increase goals
Sections 6.5 and 6.6 (so far) have analyzed the working of binding rules within the
mechanisms for capturing value increase and the results in practice. Now, possible
side effects are assessed, with special attention given to the tempo of implementation
of the capturing value increase goals.
In section 6.4.2.3 it has been pointed out that planning permissions, in general for
England, do not always succeed in being realised within deadlines. Many planning
permissions are never built, not even commenced. However, until the moment of
data gathering in June 2007, those planning permissions of which the implementation is commenced seem to be completed on time. Since then, probably fuelled by
unstable market circumstances, it seems that building schedules are experiencing
large delays, even if development already commenced. In other words, once and if
development commences, and provided that market circumstances remain stable,

211

England

developers seem to complete the public infrastructure and facilities, including possible payments in money, within time.

Section 6.4 gave an answer to Preparatory research question 3: it inferred the possible causal relations between the independent variable ‘formal rules relevant to
zoning’ and the dependent variable ‘capturing value increase’. This section summarizes ﬁrst the inferred causalities and assesses then the effect of possible third
variables.

6.6.1

The inferred causalities

The ﬁndings suggest that the following sub-variables can inﬂuence positively and/or
negatively the degree of captured value increase (see also the causal model in section
2.4.2 and Figure 24):
• Sub-variable a, Uncertainty about the future building possibilities, together with
Certainty about the future contributions
This seems to have been positive for intermediary variables negotiation position
(of the municipality) and accounted land costs, i.e. positive for capturing value
increase;
• Sub-variable b, Contents planning permissions
(1) Zoning and agreeing social/affordable housing; (2) Including contributions
for off-site public infrastructure and facilities; (3) Including ﬁnancing and implementation schedules; the ﬁrst two seem to have been positive for capturing value
increase, probably because they have been positive for intermediary variables
negotiation position (of the municipality) and Accounted land costs. The third
sub-variable (schedules) seem to be sometimes positive, but sometimes not so
effective, for intermediary variables negotiation position (of the LPAs) and delay;
• Sub-variable c, Conditioning permission to agreement
The possibility of making the approval of planning permission conditional on
securing the public infrastructure and facilities and other possible contributions:
this seems to have been positive for capturing value increase, plausibly through
reinforcing the positive effects of sub-variables b on intermediary variables accounted land costs, regular proﬁt margins (of the developer) the negotiation position (of the municipality) and delay;
• Sub-variable d, property rights
The high interdependency between LPAs and landowners seems to have a
negative effect on intermediary variables negotiation position (of the LPA’s),

accounted land costs, regular proﬁt margins (of the developer) and delay, and
thus a negative effect on capturing value increase;
Sub-variable e, Guarantees for those taking initiative
The right to appeal against the determination or non-determination of planning
applications might be positive or negative for accelerating the tempo of implementation (thus for intermediary variable delay), but anyway negative for intermediary variable negotiation position (of the developer), and thus negative for
capturing value increase;
Sub-variable e, Flexibility in modifying granted planning permissions
The relatively ﬂexibility to modify planning permissions might be positive for
intermediary variable negotiation position (of LPAs) and thus for capturing value
increase.

The ﬁndings also suggest that the following sub-variables might have no effect on any
intermediary variable and/or the degree of captured value increase:
• Sub-variable e, Flexibility in detailing ‘a posteriori’
This seems not to be relevant anymore;
• Sub-variable e, Flexibility to scope the size of the plan area of permissions according to negotiations with each landowner
This seems not to be relevant.
Part of sub-variable b (those contents of permissions that can be secured through an
agreement), and sub-variable c (conditioning permission to agreement) are causally
related to each other, in an inverse order as expressed. Sub-variable c seems to be an
important cause of the effectiveness of those contributions that can be secured in the
agreement (part of sub-variable b).

6.6.2

Possible third variables

Here, possible third variables are assessed, related ﬁrst to the speciﬁc circumstances
in the studied cases (variables D4 and D5 of the causal model in section 2.4.2), and
second to market circumstances (variable A1). The goal is to examine the possibility
that the inferred causal relationships turn out to be spurious (see for more detail section 3.2.1.2).
Speciﬁc circumstances in the studied cases
In Harbourside and Temple Quay two speciﬁc circumstances might have favoured the
capturing of value increase: the size and skills of the teams of public ofﬁcers in charge,
and the intervention of supra local public agencies. Regarding the ﬁrst, in both cases
the interviewed public ofﬁcers were happy about the team of ofﬁcers that had handled the applications. These were large applications, which allowed the constitution
of larger teams with more resources. It seems plausible that this might have inﬂuenced
positively capturing value increase, especially in Temple Quay, where there was no

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good policy base for obligations. In Harbourside, the interviewed developer did not
mention this factor, but another one: in his opinion, the lack of vigorous political
leadership in the Council at that time delayed development. In Megabowl the public
ofﬁcer in charge complained about the lack of resources to handle the application.
Regarding the intervention of supra local public agencies, in Harbourside and Temple
Quay it seems that this intervention has inﬂuenced capturing value increase, by helping to make both projects more proﬁtable. In Harbourside, English Partnership, a central government regeneration agency, supported the regeneration of the site through
a cheap loan for the infrastructure provision. In Temple Quay, the South West of England Regional Development Agency (SWRDA), a regional public body, took over the
land from a Development Corporation in 1996, and since then has stimulated regeneration and might have given an indirect subsidy by selling the land for a low price.
Market circumstances
Another possibly third variable, housing prices, can also affect capturing value increase (variable A1, see causal model in section 2.4.2) and the speed of implementation (because more proﬁts attract more investments, and remove obstacles). This research concludes that the inﬂuence of housing prices has been relevant, inﬂuencing
capturing value increase in a positive way.
Since 1997 housing prices have risen very much (often above 10% each year) above
the general monetary inﬂation. This increase took place in England in general, and
also in the South-West of England and in the City of Bristol, and continued till 2005.
In 2005 and 2006 prices grew more moderately (0% to 5%) above the general monetary inﬂation (see ﬁgure 25). This means that cases Harbourside (application procedure and negotiations: March 2001-February 2003) and Temple Quay (May 2001May 2003) started in a time of splendid expectations about market prices in general,
and speciﬁcally in Bristol: 13% increase above inﬂation in 2000, 17% in 2001, 20%
in 2002 and 13% in 2003. In Megabowl (April 2006-April 2007) the expectations
might have been different, although not necessarily pessimistic: 1,5% increase above
inﬂation in 2005 and 6% in 20064.
4

In 2007 prices in Bristol for new apartments were between € 3,000 to 5,000 per m2 ﬂoor space, or
even more. Because of the unavailability of general statistics of housing prices per square meter ﬂoor
space, we had to support on alternative sources:
• In case Megabowl the developer estimated roughly the total price of the 138 free-market apartments in about € 34 million. As these 138 units were about 10,000 m² ﬂoor space, the average is
about € 3,400/m² ﬂoor space. The prices in Megabowl must be considered however as belonging to a cheaper segment, as this site is relatively isolated and located outside the City Centre
of Bristol. Cases Harbourside and Temple Quay are located in top-locations near by the City
Centre. Therefore, another sources are necessary to give an approximate idea of prices of new
apartments in these two cases:
• In housing scheme Crescent Harbourside Anchor Road, located besides case Harbourside/Cannon’s Marsh, prices of new apartments vary from € 5,000/ m² ﬂoor space to more than € 7,000/ m²
ﬂoor space. Source: own elaboration, based on current selling prices, http://www.smartnewhomes.
com/development/Harbourside/506690/11/gallery.aspx, visited on 22 augustus 2007.

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England

Figure 25. Growth of real prices (minus general monetary inﬂation) dwellings in England,
the South-West and the City of Bristol.

In general it seems clear that the increase in housing prices has played a very important role in all the cases. Almost all the involved persons who were interviewed
considered that price rises in the last years have been of capital importance for the
ﬁnancial feasibility of both cases. In Harbourside high market prices seems to have
created a large surplus between the land price of the previous use (former docks and
industrial area, largely vacant, public parking) and of the future use (housing, ofﬁce
and some others). The developer did not provide information about the land price,
but own estimations suggest that the difference between the development costs (excluding the accounted land price, postings 2-7 in Annex 3), and the returns are very
large 5. In Temple Quay the public ofﬁcer considered that the poor market circumstances in the 90’s were the reason that the four previously granted planning permissions expired without being used. Also, he assessed that the current high prices
created a large surplus between the land price of the previous use (former railway
sidings and industries, largely ﬂattened and vacant) and of the future use (housing,
ofﬁce and some others). Here also, the developer did not provide information about
the land price, but own estimations suggest that the difference between the development costs, and the returns is very large6. In Megabowl the surplus was also large
between the land price of the previous use (the bowling alley) and of the future use
(housing). Here the difference between the development costs and the returns is also
very large.7
5

A very approximate and rough calculation is for Harbourside ca. € 2,800 per m² of land (€ 220m :
78,900 m²).

6

A very approximate rough calculation is for Temple Quay ca. € 4,180 per m² of land (€ 276m :
66,000 m²).

7

A very approximate rough calculation is for Megabowl ca. € 1,600 per m² of land (€ 21m : 13,104 m²)

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England

These large surpluses suggest that the cases would have been feasible with lower
housing prices also. The interviewed developer of Harbourside conﬁrmed that Harbourside was already feasible ten years ago, and that the price rises have provided
the landowners and the developer with proﬁts additional to the initially calculated
proﬁts. The surplus might in any case have stimulated developers to contribute more
generously. A public ofﬁcer considered that the last years many other difﬁcult regeneration sites in Bristol have come up, thanks to the favourable market circumstances.
An interviewed expert also considered, in general terms for England, that price rises
have been one important factor for the ﬁnancial feasibility of many projects. According to this expert, expired planning permissions have diminished in the last years
partly because of this (Henneberry, interview in 2007).

CHAPTER

7

The Netherlands

Chapters 5 and 6 have been about the working of the formal rules relevant to zoning and the results for capturing value increase in urban regeneration in the Spanish region of Valencia and in England. The ﬁndings are meant for some theoretical
reﬂections in chapter 8 and especially for formulating recommendations for the
Dutch practice in chapter 9. But before the reﬂections and recommendations can
be made, it is necessary to examine the working of formal rules in the Netherlands
also. After all, the main goal is to formulate recommendations inspired by the experience in other countries, but taking account of the Dutch planning system and
legislation.
In the Netherlands, at the end of the 1980s important changes took place in land and
housing policies, changes that have modiﬁed the mechanisms for capturing value
increase. Besides the traditional forms of active land policy, public bodies are pursuing nowadays new forms of public-private partnerships to reduce the ﬁnancial risks
involved in urban regeneration. Also, local public bodies are looking for less active
methods of land policy, in which private parties assume the responsibility for implementing the plans and for the corresponding risks. In general it can be said that
public bodies nowadays aim for a larger private involvement in the ﬁnancing of the
unproﬁtable parts in urban regeneration. In 2008 the legislative framework that governs this private involvement was modiﬁed (for more details about these changes in
the Netherlands, see sections 1.1 and 1.2).

Frame 7a
The institutional context: national government, provinces and municipalities
The Netherlands occupies an area of 33.929 km² and has more than 16 million

220

The Netherlands

inhabitants. It is a decentralized, unitary state, with a system of constitutional parliamentary monarchy. There are twelve provinces (provincies) and 431 municipalities
(gemeenten).
The legislative powers on planning law lie primarily with the central government and
parliament. They produce the ‘formal legislation’. Formal legislation can, within certain limits, transfer authority to issue ‘legislation in a material sense’ (decrees and regulations) to the provinces and to the municipalities. Planning and property law and policies of each governmental body are subordinated to the law and policies of the higher
governmental bodies (Needham et al., 1993: 3-7). In practice, however, the autonomy
of provinces and municipalities is important. For a list of relevant legislation, relative
to planning, see Annex 2.

Sections 7.1 and 7.2 introduce the context of how value increase is captured in urban
regeneration. Section 7.3 introduces the studied cases, and section 7.4 the working
of the formal rules relevant to zoning within the value capturing mechanisms. This is
the answer to Preparatory research question 3: how can formal rules relevant to zoning inﬂuence capturing value increase? The question has been divided into several
sub-questions that correspond to the sub-variables a-e (for more details about these
sub-variables, see section 3.3.3). Each of the answers to these sub-questions consists
of an assessment of whether the sub-variable can inﬂuence capturing value increase.
There is therefore not one conclusion, but as many conclusions as sub-questions. All
these conclusions, together with the ﬁndings in Valencia and England, have provided
the ingredients for the ﬁnal conclusions in chapters 8 and 9. Section 7.5 assesses the
results of the actual degree of captured value increase, taking account of the side effects for the tempo of implementation. Finally, section 7.6 summarizes the inferred
causalities between the formal rules relevant to zoning and capturing value increase,
and assesses the role of third variables.

7.1

Urban Regeneration in the Netherlands

Urban regeneration in the Netherlands is an important topic in national and local
planning policies. In general, there is preoccupation that the relative advantages of
urban development on greenﬁeld sites might threaten existing urban areas. Strengthening of existing cities and towns is therefore the goal (Kolpron, 2000: 1-2; Korthals
Altes, 2007: 1498). This has translated into policies for the regeneration of urban
areas and for the stimulation of new building within the boundaries of existing cities, making use of old deteriorated urban sites. The central government has the goal
that 40% of the new housing should be built within the existing cities (Vrom, 2004;
2008). Recently this goal has been lowered to between 25 and 40%: between 20,000
and 40,000 dwellings per year (AZ, 2007: 35; Buitelaar et al., 2008: 12, 34-40).

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221

There are different sorts of urban regeneration sites, each of them with different features and each of them being the subject of speciﬁc urban regeneration policies (Kolpron, 2000: 8-31): multifunctional central areas, monofunctional residential districts
and old brownﬁeld sites.
Multifunctional central areas
Multifunctional central areas consist of central areas and of sites around railway stations. Local urban regeneration policies for both sorts of sites usually focus on improving public and private facilities to better serve the local and regional population
and to attract residential functions. In central areas, the dominant uses are retail,
cafés and restaurants, ofﬁces, public facilities and housing. Property ownership is
very fragmented, with many small owners and some institutional landlords, such as
large retail businesses and stores, investors in real estate, and housing associations.
However, municipalities are often the only substantial party. For the sites around
railway stations, the dominant uses are more or less the same as in central areas, but
related to the transport function of the railway station. Some of these sites - those that
will accommodate the high speed railway - are intended and expected to develop
into centers of stature. These are: Breda, Rotterdam, The Hague, Amsterdam, Utrecht
and Arnhem. These sites are being regenerated nowadays, as the case Stationskwartier
shows for the railway station of Breda. Property patterns are usually less fragmented
than in central areas, with almost always two big landowners, the municipality and
the Dutch Railways.

Frame 7b
Private parties in urban regeneration
In the Netherlands, public or commercial organisations usually control most of the
land, more in urban regeneration than in greenﬁeld development. These institutional agents are public (local governments), private non-proﬁt (housing associations,
woningcorporaties) and/or private commercial (property developers). Former landowners might be present at the beginning of the development, but if present they usually
share neither risks nor do they participate in the operation. Most of the times their role
is limited to that of providers of land. That is, urban redevelopment in the Netherlands
is most of the time the task of institutional agents.
From the 1990s forward, commercial property developers have become important actors in urban regeneration, as the cases De Funen and Kop van Oost show. Commercial
developers commission the development of ofﬁces and dwellings for sale to the ﬁnal
user or to a property investment company. When proﬁt rates increase, developers tend
to augment the proportion of ofﬁces and dwellings developed at their own risk, without
having sold them before commencing the building, and vice versa. Churches, sport
clubs and the like usually commission their own buildings, as do production ﬁrms
(Segeren e.a., 2005: 124). There are very few people that commission their own house.

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The Netherlands

Most of the public facilities (hospitals, homes for the elderly, education, universities,
social housing) are commissioned by non-proﬁt companies with a religious, political
or other kind of social background. These non-proﬁt organizations, previously closely
related to the public administration due to their dependence on public subsidies, have
become the last years more autonomous. The most important non-proﬁt agents in urban regeneration are the housing associations. These social landlords develop social
housing either themselves or they commission property developers to build it for them.
They are the most important property management companies in the country, owning
approximately one third of the Dutch housing stock. Until the 90s, beneﬁting from
strong public subsidies, housing associations were the leaders in housing building.
From 1994 on, since public subsidies diminished, most of them have restructured and/
or fused with others, and have begun to develop, besides social housing, commercial
real estate (Priemus, 1996). This is the case in Kruidenbuurt (Eindhoven), where a social
landlord is developing 45% of the total number of dwellings as social housing, and
the rest as free market housing and some commercial space. In 2005 there were 492
housing associations (Vrom, 2007a: 156).
In the last few years, most of the former public utility companies (energy and water
supply, telecommunication, railways) have become more autonomous or have even
been privatized. Some of them owning land have become important partners in urban
regeneration. Cases De Funen and Stationskwartier are an example of this: here the
Dutch Railways owned most of the land and became the initiating developer.

Monofunctional residential districts
A second category of urban regeneration sites is districts with a predominantly
residential use. Urban regeneration policies here aim to strengthen the residential
use, and therefore provide housing, facilities and public space of good quality. Especially in pre-war districts, this might involve the removal of old factories that are
no longer compatible with housing. In the last few years, the Ministry of Housing,
Planning and Environment has been intensifying its efforts for the regeneration of
56 districts, and more recently a new selection has been made of 40 districts (the
prachtwijken), most of them located in monofunctional residential areas. This research has made a brief survey of these 56 regeneration districts. Based on this, it
is possible to conclude that regeneration takes place predominantly on land owned
by municipalities or housing associations. Regeneration on privately owned land
of any signiﬁcance happens only in a minority of cases and concerns small sites:
shopping centres and/or residential with about 50-100 dwellings (for more details
of this survey, see Annex 5).
It is possible to distinguish between two sorts of monofunctional residential districts,
pre-war and post-war. Pre-war districts are mostly located near or in the multifunctional central areas mentioned above. Many of them have been the subject of regen-

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223

eration twice: ﬁrst physical regeneration from the mid-1970s to 1990 (Korthals Altes,
2007: 1501), and second nowadays again, e.g. case Kruidenbuurt. Property ownership is usually fragmented, even though previous physical regeneration has concentrated property to some extent: municipalities and housing associations have become
the most important landowners. The increased value of the land after re-development
is usually lower than in multifunctional central areas.
After the 2nd WW and until 1970, municipalities and housing associations developed 1.6 million new houses around the existing cities, most of them social housing. The deterioration nowadays in these districts is evident and has led the central
and local governments to initiate and stimulate large regeneration projects. These
post-war districts were built in a systematic way by municipalities and housing associations, supported by central government subsidies. They incorporated many of
the design principles of the Congrès Internationaux d’Architecture Moderne (CIAM).
The main characteristics of these residential districts are monofunctionality, buildings
of repeated morphology located in the middle of much green, low building density,
much road infrastructure, many public facilities and a predominance of social housing. Property ownership is concentrated: municipalities own the public infrastructure and facilities, and sometimes also the land under the dwellings, which is given
in leasehold (erfpacht) to housing associations. Corporations own the majority of
the dwellings and sometimes also the land. In addition, some investors own some
land and buildings (e.g. shopping centres) and there are also some owner-occupiers
(both housing and factories). The increased value of the land after regeneration is
lower than in multifunctional central areas. From 1970 to 1999, another 2.7 million
dwellings were developed, not only around the existing cities, but also around small
suburban towns, especially in the western part of the country. This time more attention was paid to the quality of housing. Generally speaking, the regeneration of these
districts is not yet a policy issue.
Old brownﬁeld sites
A third category of urban regeneration sites is old brownﬁeld sites. It is possible to
distinguish between the following: businesses and other sorts of economic-industrial
activities (case Kop van Oost); gas and electricity factories; harbour areas; railway
infrastructure (cases De Funen and Stationskwartier); and hospitals, government
buildings and military sites. In the whole of the country there are about 23,000 ha
of old business estates that might be the subject of regeneration in the next years
(Buitelaar et al., 2008: 10-11; Gordijn et al., 2007: 5). Regeneration almost always
involves replacing the existing uses with new ones. Property ownership varies but is
in general characterized by the presence of large institutional public or private parties controlling the property: this is certainly the case in the three mentioned cases.
The increased value of the land after regeneration is low when the existing uses are
maintained and higher when replaced by housing and ofﬁces (Korthals Altes, 2007:
1502).

224

7.2

The Netherlands

Capturing value increase and its legal limits in the
Netherlands

In the Netherlands, the ﬁnancing of public infrastructure and facilities, in urban regeneration on privately owned land, is based on contributions from both municipalities and developers. These contributions might be in kind or in money and are usually
agreed in private law development agreements. This was the case in all the studied
projects. These agreements are called here ‘private law’ because they are not regulated in planning law and because they are legally enforceable under private law.
Since the 2008 Physical Planning Act (Wet ruimtelijke ordening) it has been possible,
within certain limits, to impose a contribution without the need of a development
agreement. Frame 7c gives an overview of the binding rules and other planning documents that are relevant for capturing value increase in the Netherlands.

Frame 7c
Indicative plans and the relevant binding rules
At the local level, Dutch municipalities have the competence to prepare and approve
zoning plans, both of an indicative and of a binding character. Regarding the indicative plans, these have no legally binding force, neither for the citizen nor for municipal
planning documents. They are often ad hoc documents, not deﬁned in planning law:
this was the case in all the studied projects. Planning law prescribes only one sort of
indicative plan: Structure Plans (Structuurplan), often used in practice, although not
so much as the ad hoc documents. Two of the four studied schemes included, besides
ad hoc documents, a Structure Plan. Structure Plans might cover the whole municipality or just a part of it (Klaassen, 2000: 85-88), and have been replaced in 2008 by
Structure Visions (Structuurvisie).
Municipalities have also the competence to make and adopt Land-use Plans (Bestemmingsplan), which can cover the whole municipality (although this does not happen
often) or a part of it (happens most frequently: for example, Rotterdam has over 400
Land-use plans, and Nijmegen over 800; Buitelaar et al, 2007: 54). Municipalities
are obliged to cover the territory outside the built-up area with land-use plans, and
since the 2008 Physical Planning Act the whole municipal territory. An important part
of the land use plan has a legally binding character: this is the part that determines
the use possibilities of land and real estate. A land use plan includes an Explanation
(Plantoelichting), a Map (Plankaart), and the Land-use Regulations (Planvoorschriften).
The Regulations contain at least a deﬁnition of the permitted land uses (doeleindenomschrijving), and possibly an Outline Deﬁnition (Beschrijving in Hoofdlijnen). The Map
and the Regulations have a legally binding character, and the Explanation in principle
has not. However, the Explanation might be relevant in those cases in which Map and
Regulations leave room for interpretation (Van Zundert, 1996: 97-98)

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225

A land use plan can be detailed or outline. Article 11.1 of the old Physical Planning
Act, and 3.6 of the 2008 Act, give to the municipality the possibility of stating in the
land-use plan the obligation to add details later. If the municipality states in the landuse plan that it has to be detailed later, it becomes an ‘Outline Land-use plan with
obligation of further elaboration’ (Globaal bestemmingsplan met uitwerkingsplicht). In
such a plan, a part or the whole plan area is given outline binding land-use regulations
(globale bestemmingen). Also, such a plan has to include the rules that will regulate the
detailing. Then, later, the municipality has the obligation to detail, following the rules
given in the plan, the outline regulations up to the detailed level of a normal land-use
plan. Data from 1987 until 1993 show that detailing Outline land-use plans is used
frequently (Van Damme & Verdaas 1996: 79-80). In the cases Stationskwartier and
Kruidenbuurt, the land use plan included outline regulations, covering one small plot
respectively almost all the plan area.
Both the central and provincial governments might freeze or modify the land use plans
of municipalities, and even replace them with their own documents: in practice, this
does not happen often. The central government exercises this control through four
Physical Planning Inspectorates (Inspectie Ruimtelijke Ordening), and the provinces
also have inspectors. Until the 2008 Physical Planning Act, provincial governments
had to approve all land use plans deﬁnitively. Since then, provinces no longer have to
approve them, but they retain the power to intervene.
The Physical Planning Act states deadlines for the procedures for a land-use plan. Previous to the modiﬁcation of the Act in 2008, if there were neither objections nor appeals against the plan, the deﬁnitive approval of the province had to take place within
8 months after publishing the draft land-use plan. If there were objections and/or appeals against the plan, the deﬁnitive approval could extend up to thirteen months. In
general, procedures seem to fall within these terms. Cases De Funen, Kop van Oost (8
months each) and Stationskwartier (12 months) fell within these deadlines, case Kruidenbuurt took a little longer (14 months). The 2008 Act has shortened the deadline.
Nowadays a land use plan must be deﬁnitively approved 12 weeks after the close of
the consultation period.
In urban regeneration, it is possible to approve, instead of a normal land use plan, another similar document: an Urban Renewal Plan (Stadsvernieuwingsplan). None of the
studied cases used this. The 2008 Act gave to provinces and central government also
the competence of making and approving a Land use Plan (Inpassingsplan).
The 2008 Act introduced a new sort of plan, the Development contributions Plan (Exploitatieplan). In case the implementation of a land use plan implies costs for public

226

The Netherlands

infrastructure and facilities, and these are not secured1, the municipality must approve,
together with the land use plan, a Development contributions plan. Both documents
must be processed together. The Development contributions plan must include: a map
with the delimitation of the development site, a description of the infrastructure provision works, and a calculation of the costs, revenues, implementation terms and the
way the costs must be charged among the landowners (exploitatieopzet). In addition, it
can include additional prescriptions related to the public infrastructure, social housing
and parcels meant for owner-occupiers building their own house (Hijmans & Fokkema,
2008: 239-240). The prescriptions of the Development contributions plan are legally
binding when planning applications are judged. All the studied cases fall under the
planning law previous to the 2008 Act, and not one of them included a Development
contributions plan, nor a provincial or national land use plan.
Land use plans of any sort can be departed from. Major departures (vrijstelling/projectbesluit) became a common alternative or complement to the land-use plan (Thomas et al., 1983, quoted in Faludi, 1987: 116, 185; Bosch & Hanemaayer, 1992, quoted in Bregman & Sievers, 2002 and Buitelaar et al., 2007: 54; Bröcking & Geest, 1982,
quoted in Buitelaar et al., ibidem; Van der Ree, 2000: 20, 26). In cases De Funen,
Kruidenbuurt and Kop van Oost, the municipality, together with making a new land
use plan, approved during the procedure also major departures from the old existing
plan for a part of the site, in order to be able to start the works some months before the
completion of the procedure for the new land use plan.

7.2.1

Betterment belongs to the landowner

In the Netherlands, the value increase of land, caused by a change to the permitted
land use in the binding rules (for example from industrial land to residential and ofﬁces), falls to the landowner (Needham, 2007a: 154-155). There is no legal principle
in the Netherlands, as for example in the Spanish 1978 Constitution, which acknowledges the principle of a public share in the value increase generated by public policies or by changes of the binding rules (see section 5.3.1). The British 1947 Town and
Country Planning Act, which nationalized the betterment that accrues from changes
of the binding rules, might serve also as example but has nowadays no real consequences for capturing value increase (see chapter 6.2.1).
However, in general the legislator has the power to make rules about value capturing:
there is no legal obstacle as long as the legislator stays within the boundaries of the
1

The deﬁnition in this research of ‘public infrastructure and facilities’ is broader than those costs that
must be secured. It is difﬁcult however to precisely deﬁne those costs that must be secured because
the 2008 Physical Planning Act does not deﬁne them clearly. They comprise in any case physical
interventions, actions and works and fall anyway within the deﬁnition of public infrastructure and
facilities given in this research.

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227

Dutch General Administrative Act (Algemene wet bestuursrecht) and international
Treaties and Conventions, like the European Convention on Human Rights. However,
only to a limited extent has the legislator used the power to make such legislation.
The new 2008 Physical Planning Act can be considered as one of the few examples
of legislation regulating capturing value increase. Another example is the modiﬁcation in 2004 of the Physical Planning Act to allow municipalities to agree with
developers that the developer pay the compensation for the decrease in economic
value of surrounding properties that are consequence of the approval of a new land
use plan (planschade). The actual legal possibilities for the government to capture
the increased value in case of private development are mainly limited to cost recovery. ‘Cost recovery’ is the recovery, through contributions from private developers,
of those costs that are directly related to the realization of public infrastructure and
facilities that beneﬁt the development. Developers might contribute either by realising this infrastructure and facilities directly, or paying public bodies to do so. This has
not changed with the new 2008 Act. For more details about cost recovery and other
forms of capturing value increase, see section 1.4.

7.2.2

Capturing value increase through private law agreements

In those cases in which municipalities make costs for providing infrastructure, there is
the possibility of making a Development Agreement (Exploitatieovereenkomst) with
the developer in order to recover (some of those) costs. This agreement does not fall
under the mentioned category ‘private law’ because its contents are regulated in the
Physical Planning Act and the Land Development Regulation (Exploitatieverordening). The agreement must be based on the local Land Development Regulation, which
states the conditions and the costs that can be included. The Physical Planning Act
previous to the 2008’s modiﬁcation stated in article 42 some limitations to the costs
that could be included in the local Land Development Regulation (see frame 7d). If
the local government negotiated a higher contribution, which exceeded the limits of
the local Regulation, a judge could rescind the contract. In such a case, the local government had to refund the whole contribution (De Wolff & Muñoz, 2007: 533-534).

Frame 7d
Limitations to costs in local Land Development Regulation previous to 2008 Act
• The ﬁnancial contribution had to be limited to a contribution to the costs of servicing the land. This includes the infrastructure provision directly related to the development in question. The costs of, for example, off-site infrastructure may not be
recovered. Value capturing that exceeds the recovery of the named costs was not
allowed;
• The developer’s contributions in land had to be limited to that land that is needed
for this on-site public infrastructure.

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The situation is different in those cases in which the municipality is not directly involved in providing infrastructure, which is in those cases in which the municipality
incurs no costs for the infrastructure provision. In these cases, municipalities and developers are free to make another sort of Development Agreement (Overeenkomst2),
in which they agree that the developer provides public infrastructure, or affordable
housing, etc. There are fewer limitations to these agreements than to the other sort,
because they are not governed by the Physical Planning Act. In principle, municipality and developer can agree any contribution, also for off-site infrastructure, as long
as the developer himself provides the public infrastructure. However, if contributions
consist of a payment to the municipality for the costs made, the above mentioned
system of the Land Development Regulations, including its limitations, applies.
An important difference with England and Valencia is that planning consent (the approval of the land use plan, or the departure from it, or granting the building permit)
cannot formally be made conditional on a Development Agreement of any sort. With
the ﬁrst sort of agreement, the municipality can ask for contributions in exchange
for providing the infrastructure, but not in exchange for granting a planning consent.
The second sort of agreement must be voluntary. In neither case may the municipality, formally, condition the granting of planning consent on securing investments or
implementation of public infrastructure and facilities.

7.2.3

The 2008’s novelties

In 2008, a new Physical Planning Act, which included a new Land Development
Act (Grondexploitatiewet), and a new Physical Planning Decree (Besluit op de ruimtelijke ordening) came into force. This act introduced important novelties for capturing
value increase (see De Wolff, 2007): (1) they introduce the possibility of imposing on
the landowners a contribution without the need of the municipality itself making the
costs, and without the need for a Development Agreement; and (2) they give more
detail about the sorts of costs that can be imposed to the landowners.
Cost recovery through public law (Development contributions plan)
In case the implementation of a land use plan implies costs for public infrastructure

2

This sort of Development Agreement receive different names, but its contents are not clearly
regulated anywhere, so contracts with the same name can be very different in detailing and
practical consequences. Usually, contracts with outline determinations might receive the name
Intentieovereenkomst, Samenwerkingsovereenkomst or Ontwikkelingsovereenkomst. Contracts with
more detailed determinations use to receive the name Realisatieovereenkomst.

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229

and facilities, and these costs have not been secured3, the municipality must approve
a Development contributions plan together with the land use plan. A Development
contributions plan calculates these costs, and the municipality can make granting
the building permit conditional on a contribution. This is the ﬁrst time that planning
consent (in this case, only the granting of the building permit, not the approval of
the land use plan or departure from it) can be formally made conditional on securing or paying a contribution. When a landowner submits a building application, the
municipality can refuse the building permit if the contribution according to the Development contributions plan for the area has not been secured or paid (De Wolff &
Muñoz, 2007: 535). The new 2008 Physical Planning Decree regulates the costs that
can be included in a Development contributions plan (see frame 7e).

Frame 7e
List of possibly costs in a Development contributions plan
The new 2008 Physical Planning Decree prescribes in articles 6.2.3 to 6.2.6, and
6.2.11 the sorts of costs4 that can be included in a Development contributions plan
(Vrom, 2008: 109-123, 131-139; Klaassen, 2008: 354-362; Baardewijk, 2008: 758759). It is expected that the central government will detail soon some of these articles
(article 6.2.4.g-j, regarding fundamentally the preparation of plans). These are the costs
that can be included in the Development contributions plan:
1a. Public infrastructure within or in the immediate surroundings of the development
site: roads, sewerage, parks, public buildings, etc. Also, in case the new land use
plan diminishes the economic value of surrounding properties, the compensation
costs to the owners (planschade);
2a. Public infrastructure and facilities situated within the plan area, which serve this
and at least another development scheme (bovenwijkse voorzieningen); it is however not clear whether if, when situated outside the plan area, these public infrastructure and facilities can also be considered as bovenwijkse voorzieningen, or
instead as bovenplanse kosten (see under);
3a. Contributions to i) other schemes (bovenplanse verevening) or to ii) investments
somewhere else (bovenplanse kosten): i) refers to contributions to unproﬁtable
schemes run by public or private parties somewhere else within or outside the

3

Costs are ‘secured’ when there is certainty that there is, or will be, ﬁnancial means available to pay
them. This certainty can be created in different ways: i) When there is a development agreement
or any other form of private law contract that commits any party to pay; ii) When any public body
commits itself to subsidy the costs; iii) When the municipality has the land and has calculated
that the proﬁts of selling the land will cover the costs. In this third case, the municipal executive
power (Burgemeester en Wethouders) or the Local Council (Gemeenteraad) must approve those
calculations and include them in the municipal budget.

4

It might be that the Development contributions plan does not include the costs and contributions as
such, i.e. as a sum of money or a contribution. Instead, it can include it as an obligatory prescription
that in fact means that the developer must make a cost or contribution. E.g. the plan can zone land
for social housing, which can cost the developer money.

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municipality; ii) refers to contributions to public infrastructure and facilities situated outside the plan area. Neither i nor ii are necessarily directly related to the development in question. Both sorts of contributions can be a contribution in kind,
(the developer himself might construct the infrastructure or facility), a payment in
money meant for an speciﬁc unproﬁtable scheme or for a speciﬁc infrastructure or
facility, or a payment in money to a fund5 meant for more than one speciﬁc investment. This fund can be used to contribute to both i and ii (confero article 6.13.7
2008 Physical Planning Act; Zundert, 2008: 472; Baardewijk, 2008: 762-763);
4a. Social housing within the plan area: percentage and/or number, location, adscription to allocation rules for the tenants and buyers of social rented housing and
social housing for sale, as long as these allocation rules derive their status from
housing legislation and local regulations (Vrom e.a. 2008: 139; Klaasen, 20092010: chapter 11.3.4, consulted on 11/02/2010; Nijland, interview in 2010);
5a. The land that is needed for all these public infrastructure and facilities: the landowners must be compensated with the market value of their land, and this compensation can be included as a cost in the Development contributions plan.
6.
Green and nature areas (parks, water, etc) that have been lost in the development
site (verloren gegane natuurwaarde, groenvoorzieningen en watervoorzieningen),
which must be compensated with new green areas in or outside the site.

However, not all the costs included in the Development contributions plan can be
charged to the landowners. First, only the costs of construction of the infrastructure
can be charged to the landowners, but not the costs of maintenance and exploitation
of this infrastructure. With other words, it is not possible to charge a contribution
meant for running a public infrastructure for a speciﬁc period of time after ﬁnishing
its construction (Vrom et al, 2008: 111-112). Only maintenance costs of soil decontamination measures might be charged (Nijland, interview in 2010).
Second, during the consideration of the new Land Development Act, the parliament
rejected the possibility of charging for the social facilities (maatschappelijke voorzieningen), using as examples of social facilities educational facilities and social welfare facilities (welzijn). This means that developers cannot be required to contribute
neither to the construction of the buildings, nor to the maintenance and exploitation
of these buildings (thus all costs except the land costs) of social facilities (Van den
Brand, interview 2008).
Third, article 6.13.5 of the 2008 Physical Planning Act establishes the criteria that
govern the degree to which the costs can be charged to the landowners: proﬁt (proﬁjt),
attributability (toerekenbaarheid) and proportionality (proportionaliteit). This means
that several costs cannot be charged to the landowners:
5

In Dutch, the correct term for ‘fund’ is ‘reserve’ because it is called so in the Besluit Beheer en
Verantwoording. However, the popular term is ‘fonds’ (Baardewijk, 2008: 761).

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•
•

•

•

231

The costs of that part of infrastructure serving a wider area, including the land
under the infrastructure, that do not fulﬁl these criteria;
Now (Autumn 2009) there is no unanimity about how strict the three legal criteria should be interpreted when assessing whether the contributions to 3a (other
schemes or public infrastructure and facilities -bovenplanse verevening respectively bovenplanse kosten) can be charged to the landowners. If the criteria are
interpreted very strictly, it is questionable whether these contributions can be
charged to the landowners, as the relation with the development in question
is not direct. Especially the contributions to other schemes would hardly meet
the criteria (confero Van den Brand, interview 2008; Vrom et al, 2008: 115;
Baardewijk, 2008: 759-761; Groot, 2009: 465-466).
It is questionable whether all the costs of refurbishing existing old infrastructure
would meet these criteria. Municipalities might be obliged to assume part of the
costs when the existing infrastructure is old and the respective municipal body
already has reserved some means for its renewal (Vrom et al, 2008: 112; Klaassen, 2008: 358).
Not all the costs of plan preparation (the making of plans and studies, and the
preparation and control of the infrastructure provision) can be charged to the
landowners. A circular (ministeriële regeling) of the central government will provide more details about which of these costs can and cannot be charged (Vrom
et al., 2008: 116-118, 122, 161);

Fourth, regarding those costs that have been already made, these can only be charged
in case the municipality, at the time that the costs were made, did made explicit
in the municipal budget which part of the costs should be charged in the future to
the development in question. If the municipality didn’t, then these costs cannot be
charged, even if they fulﬁl the three legal criteria (Vrom et al, 2008: 115-116).
Fifth, if the calculated proﬁts do not cover the costs included in the Development
contributions plan, the deﬁcit (costs minus proﬁts) cannot be charged to the landowners. If there is a deﬁcit, this might be due to the method of assessment of the
accounted value of the land. Land is included as cost in the Development contributions plan for a price equivalent to the price that should be established in case
of expropriation. This expropriation price follows a residual method of calculation,
which includes the value increase due to rezoning, actually the price of land has to
be assessed taking into account all the proﬁts that will accrue after development, i.e.
all the increased value. This means that the accounted land costs in Development
contributions plans will be much higher than the minimum land costs, so high that
a deﬁcit will be common. With other words, the method of calculation of the land
costs in the Development contributions plans implies that an important part of the
value increase leaks away to the owner. In regeneration sites this problem is worse,
as land prices in previous transactions are usually inﬂated. As the price in previous
transactions serve as complementary sources to the residual method of assessment,
this ﬁnally contributes to inﬂating the accounted land costs large above the minimum

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land costs. In addition, in regeneration sites development costs are often higher due
to the existence of previous installations and buildings, contaminated soil and the
like (variable A2). In short, it is likely that deﬁcits will be common, especially in urban regeneration (Dieperink, 2009: 9-10). In our opinion, the ﬁrst signs after one year
of application of the 2008 Planning Act conﬁrm this conclusion. A recent evaluation
of the ﬁrst results in practice in the ﬁrst year after the introduction of the 2008 Act
conﬁrms this conclusion too (Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving, 2010: 63-64)
Cost recovery through private law (anterior Development Agreement)
There is the possibility that the developer agrees to pay the costs before the approval
of the Development contributions plan. This can be established in what is called an
‘anterior Development Agreement’ (anterieure overeenkomst). If the costs are in that
way secured, the Development contributions plan does not need to be approved. An
anterior agreement may include more contributions than those chargeable to landowners through a Development contributions plan. First, an agreement can secure
the already mentioned costs that can be included in a plan, but not charged to the
landowners. Second, an agreement may secure also some other costs that cannot be
included in a plan. Frame 7f lists both sorts of additional contributions.

Frame 7f
Additional contributions
The following costs cannot be charged to landowners in a Development contributions plan, but may be secured through an anterior Development Agreement (Vrom
et al, 2008: 21-22, 31, 33, 38, 41-42, 45-48, 50, 52, 160; Klaassen, 2008: 379-380;
Baardewijk, 2008: 756-765; Groot, 2009: 464, 465; Nijland, interview in 2010):
1-5b. The costs that can be included in a Development contributions plan, but cannot
be charged to landowners: maintenance and exploitation costs of infrastructure,
those costs that do not meet the three criteria (proﬁt, attributability, proportionality), those that are already made but are not chargeable because such is not
made explicit in the municipal budget, or those costs that are not covered by the
calculated proﬁts. The maintenance and exploitation costs of public buildings
cannot, in principle, be charged because they cannot be considered as belonging to land development (grondexploitatie). It is however not clear if, when the
public buildings are prescribed as a ‘spatial development’ (see under), it is possible or not to agree not only a contribution for its construction, but also for its
maintenance and exploitation (Klaassen, 2009-2010: chapter 11.3.8, consulted
at 11-02-2010; Nijland, interview in 2010). Another open question is whether it
is possible to agree contributions (of any kind: to the construction, maintenance
or exploitation costs) for ‘social facilities’ (Maatschappelijke voorzieningen). At
one side the above-mentioned parliamentary statement, against this possibility,
was in principle meant for the Development contributions plan, but might also
determine the possible contents of an anterior Development Agreement. At the

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4b.

7.

6

233

other side, the 2008 Act and Decree allow municipalities and landowners to
seal a development agreement and do not limit what a contribution for ‘spatial
developments’ might include, so if social facilities are prescribed as ‘spatial development’ there could be the possibility of asking a contribution not only for
their construction, but also for their maintenance and exploitation (cfr. Van den
Brand, interview in 2008; Nijland, interview in 2010) 6.
Additional requirements for social rented housing, additional to those that can
be included in a Development contributions plan (4a). E.g. indications of maximal prices of the dwellings to be sold to the housing associations, allocation
rules even if not derived from housing legislation or local regulation, etc. Also,
additional requirements for social housing for sale, e.g. indications of the maximal selling prices to the buyers in case of no previous regional agreement on
this matter, and allocation rules regarding the selection of the buyers even if not
derived from housing legislation or local regulation.
Contributions to ‘Spatial development’ (ruimtelijke ontwikkeling) situated outside the scheme in question. It is not clear what exactly ruimtelijke ontwikkeling
means. The concept is still vague and might include a large variety of public facilities: e.g. parks, green and recreational areas, water storage works, landscape
works, industrial areas to be regenerated, infrastructure and possibly some sorts
of public buildings (e.g. cultural facilities), and as long as they concern physical
functions related to urban development. The contribution could maybe not only
for the construction of the facility, but also for its maintenance and exploitation.
As mentioned above, it is not clear whether the contributions might concern
‘social facilities’. The contribution can be not only for speciﬁc public facilities,
but also for an unproﬁtable scheme run by private parties.

More speciﬁcally, the legal question is as follows: in Dutch law, private law agreements cannot in
principle include contributions that go further than what public law prescribes for a Development
contributions plan. However, there are exceptions to this (Van Rossum, 2005: 1st to 7th page):
–

In case public law makes explicit that municipality and landowners are allowed to agree
contributions in a development agreement. This is the case here, as articles 6.12.2.a and
6.24.1 Physical Planning Act prescribe that municipalities and landowners can agree, in a
development agreement, contributions for the ‘land development’ (grondexploitatie), this
including also contributions for ‘spatial developments’. This means that it should be possible to
agree contributions for the construction, and maybe also for the maintenance and exploitation
of ‘social facilities’ (maatschappelijke voorzieningen);

–

However, Dutch law also recognizes that there might be an ‘unacceptable contradiction’
(onaanvaardbare doorkruizing in Dutch) with public law in case a development agreement includes
a contribution that goes against the ‘meaning’ of the law (strekking van de publiekrechtelijke
regeling). The ‘meaning’ of a law is for example the intention that the legislative power had
when it approved the law. As in this case the Dutch Parliament explicitly rejected the possibility
of charging landowners with any cost of ‘social facilities’ (except the costs of providing the
land for the social facility), the question remains open whether contributions to social facilities
(construction, maintenance or exploitation) would not imply an ‘unacceptable contradiction’
with public law.

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8.

The Netherlands

Creaming off plus value: in case the municipality enter into agreement with
the landowner to develop his land in such a way that the municipality bears
ﬁnancial risks (because it itself invests in public infrastructure, or buys the land
or part of the land, etc), municipality and landowner can also agree that the
municipality will share the proﬁts. Such an agreement can have a variety of
forms, depending of the nature of the municipal involvement (bouwclaimovereenkomst and publiek-private samenwerkingsovereenkomst). This goes thus
further than cost recovery (Nijland, interview in 2010). As this research aims
only at cost recovery, this possibility of creaming off plus value will be not handled any more in the rest of the sections. However, as it is not precisely clear
what it means that an infrastructure is ‘related’ to the site in question, in practice
there might be ways of creaming off plus value by requiring contributions under
2, 3 and, specially, 7. The boundary between which infrastructure one could
consider as ‘related’ and which not is not easily deﬁned, nor is there agreement
about it.

Actually, bovenplanse verevening, bovenplanse kosten (3a) and ruimtelijke ontwikkelingen (7) are meant for very similar sorts of investments. All three might consist
of a contribution in kind, a payment for a speciﬁc investment, or a payment to a fund
that can be used for several investments. The difference is that 3a might fulﬁl (or not)
the three legal criteria set out above and thus be charged to the landowners through
a Development contributions plan, while ruimtelijke ontwikkelingen will by deﬁnition
never fulﬁl these criteria and thus can only be charged through an anterior Development Agreement.

In short, a municipality can recover more costs in an anterior Development Agreement than through a Development contributions plan. It is uncertain whether the
approval of a Development contributions plan might affect the contents of an already
existing anterior Development Agreement. In principle, the Agreement cannot contradict any of the prescriptions included in the Plan (Vrom et al, 2008: 34; Kluwer,
2008: 132). This means that some of the contributions agreed in the Agreement might
be nulliﬁed in case a Plan becomes approved.
The costs that can be secured in an anterior Development Agreement are greater than
those allowed under the old local Land Development Regulation. In other words,
in those cases in which municipalities themselves provide public infrastructure and
facilities, and they require landowners to contribute, an anterior agreement implies
an enlargement of the possibilities for cost recovery. This might be different when a
municipality does not require any payment in money, but does require that the developer realizes in kind the public infrastructure and facilities. These cases fell before
2008 under the old ‘private law’ Development Agreement (Overeenkomst). It is not
clear whether the possible contributions in the new anterior Development Agreement are greater or not.

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7.3

Introduction to the studied cases in
the Netherlands

In most of the studied cases, indicative plans foresaw regeneration. However, before
regeneration took place, two matters needed to be resolved. First, because in all the
studied cases new public infrastructure and facilities were needed, the municipalities negotiated with the developers about their contribution and sealed one or more
Development Agreements of the second sort mentioned above (overeenkomst)7. And
second, the existing binding rules had to be modiﬁed because they did not foresee
the regeneration of the site: a new land use plan had to be approved, and in some
cases, for some plots, also one or more departures from the existing land use plan.
Here follows a brief introduction to the cases (for an overview, see ﬁgure 26). The rest
of the case-based information has been included in the rest of the chapter.

Kop van Oost, Groningen / 5 ha

De Funen, Amsterdam / 8 ha

Stationskwartier, Breda / 16 ha

Kruidenbuurt, Eindhoven / 17 ha

Figure 26. Location of the cases in the Netherlands.

7

Only in two cases was it possible to read the development agreement, and of them it was possible
only in one to make a copy and keep this copy for later analysis. Based on the indirect evidence, we
conclude however that all of them belong to the private law-sort overeenkomst.

236

7.3.1

The Netherlands

De Funen, Amsterdam

Urban Regeneration project ‘De Funen’ (8 ha, 565 apartments, 70 units/ha, about
2,500 m² ofﬁce space, see ﬁgure 27) is located to the east of the centre of Amsterdam.
At the beginning of the 1980s, the site attracted the attention of the planning department of the Amsterdam Municipality. In 1991, the Structure Plan of Amsterdam, an
indicative zoning plan, proposed the redevelopment of the whole site. At that time,
the site had been abandoned and parts were leased to various tenants (Van Gend &
Loos and others), who used the buildings for warehousing and storage. Initially Dutch
Railways, owner of most of the land, was neither interested in developing the site
nor in selling it to the municipality. This situation remained unchanged until IBC, a
commercial developer, showed an interest. The ﬁrst ad hoc, site-speciﬁc indicative
plan on which the current development is based was approved in 1993 (Nota van
Uitgangspunten ‘Czaar Peterbuurt-Oost’). The existing binding rules did not foresee
regeneration, thus a new Land-Use plan had to be approved, which occurred deﬁnitively in 2000.

Figure 27. Map of 2000 Land use Plan.

The Dutch Railways owned most of the land, the municipality owned some plots and
the existing public space, and some private individuals owned various other plots. In
1997, after signing a Development Agreement with the municipality, Dutch Railways
sold most of its land to the property developer, IBC. In 1999 the municipality signed
a second Development Agreement, this time with IBC. In 2002 Heijmans, another
commercial developer, bought IBC, and in January 2008 Heijmans was still in charge
of the development. At that time implementation was in course and more than the
half of the dwellings were already inhabited.

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7.3.2

Kruidenbuurt Noord, Eindhoven

Urban Regeneration project ‘Kruidenbuurt Noord’ (17 ha, 650 dwellings, single family and apartments, 45 units/ha, plus some ofﬁces, see ﬁgure 28) is located in the
south-east of Eindhoven. The neighbourhood was built in the 1930s. At the end of the
1990s the ﬁrst indicative ad hoc, site-speciﬁc plans were made for regeneration. Of
some 850 existing houses, almost all of them social housing, 750 units have been or
will be demolished, leaving some 100 units untouched. Of the 650 new dwellings,
about 45% will be social housing.
In 1994 the Eindhoven Municipality sold the (freehold rights to the) land under the
social housing to Trudo (Trudo Stichting), a housing association, and since then ownership has been divided. Trudo owns almost all the buildings and the land under
them (50% of the plan area), while the municipality retains ownership of one public
building and a playground (2%) and the public space (39%). The 100 houses that
remain untouched (9% of plan area) are owned privately. Trudo and the municipality sealed a Development Agreement in 2004, and the new Land-Use Plan was approved deﬁnitively in 2005. By November 2007, 189 dwellings had been delivered
and inhabited and 194 dwellings were under construction. Phase 3 is expected to
start at the end of 2009, and phase 4 in 2011.

Figure 28. Map 2005 Land use Plan.

7.3.3

Kop van Oost, Groningen

Urban Regeneration project ‘Kop van Oost’ (5 ha, 430 dwellings, mainly apartments,
about 85 units/ha, plus about 4,000 m² commercial space, see ﬁgure 29) is located
to the east of the centre of Groningen. The site is situated alongside a main road (the
Sontweg) that will become the main connection between the city centre and a future
greenﬁeld scheme, Meerstad. The site used to be occupied by a wood-processing
company and a gas station, but at the time of the development initiative in 2000 the

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site was no longer in use. Only ﬁve dwellings were occupied, and these will not be
demolished but will be accommodated in the regeneration. The Sontweg and a small
road will be refurbished.
In its 1996 Structure Plan, the Groningen Municipality foresaw the redevelopment of
this site as a mixed-use scheme mainly for housing and with some commercial facilities. Negotiations with the developer crystallized in the 2005 Development Agreement. The new land-use plan was deﬁnitively approved in 2006.
The initial property situation, before the development initiative took place, was as
follows: Houtgroup-Pont Eecen owned 60% of the land, the municipality owned
most of the public space (37%), and several private individuals owned the rest (4%).
In 2000 Jaap Hollestelle, an intermediary/property developer, took the initiative to
redevelop the site. He bought the land belonging to the wood-processing company.
After general development terms had been negotiated with the municipality, the land
was resold, ﬁrst in 2001 to property developer IBC, and again in 2002 to Heijmans,
another property developer that had bought IBC. In October 2007, Heijmans was
providing the infrastructure.

Figure 29. Map 2006 Land use Plan.

7.3.4

Stationskwartier, Breda

Urban Regeneration project ‘Stationskwartier’ (16 ha, about 80,000 m² apartments,
650 units, 45 units/ha, plus 140,000 m² ofﬁce space, some shops, a new railway
station and 50,000 m² parking, see ﬁgure 30) is located to the north of the centre of
Breda. The plan area includes the existing Central railway station and its surroundings. The area that will effectively be redeveloped is 14 ha, because about 2.5 ha of
railway land will remain untouched. The station will be completely rebuilt. The exist-

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ing use is mainly related to the railways, but this function has ceased in most of the
plan area. Nowadays there is, besides the railway station and rail tracks, some infrastructure for bus stops, parking places, abandoned land, a small green area and a hotel. There are some buildings (the hotel and station), but most of the area is not built.
Since the 1980s, Breda Municipality has developed indicative plans for the regeneration of the site into a mixed-use scheme for public transport (railways and bus),
housing, ofﬁces and facilities. In 1998, the Dutch national government designated
the site as one of the six ‘New Key Projects’ (Nieuw Sleutelproject, NSP). Key projects
are railways stations to be connected to the high-speed railways network. Both national and provincial governments are involved in the regeneration of the site, for
example, by giving substantial subsidies. Negotiations between the involved parties
(municipality, national and provincial governments, and the main landowner Dutch
Railways) have already crystallized into several development agreements.
The property is divided between Dutch Railways, speciﬁcally NS Vastgoed and NS
Railinfrastrust (together 80% of the plan area), the municipality of Breda (the existing
public space, 11%, and some plots, 5%: in total 16%) and a private developer and a
supermarket (together 3%). The municipality approved the new Land-use plan in May
2007, and in December 2007 the provincial government approved it deﬁnitively. At
the end of 2007, work on infrastructure provision had started on the northern side
of the railway, and delivery of the last buildings is expected sometime in 2016 (cfr.
Krabben & Needham, 2008).

Figure 30. Map 2007 Land use Plan.

7.4

How formal rules relevant to zoning in the
Netherlands can be used

This chapter describes the working in the Netherlands of the formal rules relevant
to zoning within the value capturing mechanisms. There are different ways (or sub-

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variables) in which these rules can be used in an operational way to capture more of
the value increase:
•
•
•
•
•

Creating certainty or uncertainty beforehand about future building possibilities
and contributions;
Choosing the contents of the binding rules;
Making the relevant binding rules conditional on securing capturing value increase;
Modulating property rights;
Using the procedure for the preparation and approval of the binding rules.

Here follows an assessment of whether each of these sub-variables can affect capturing value increase.

7.4.1

Certainty beforehand about future building possibilities
and contributions

Summary of the ﬁndings
Dutch municipalities can and usually do approve in early stages indicative zoning
plans that sketch the future development possibilities. This might be a Structure plan
or an ad hoc document. Binding rules (land use plan or departures from it) are usually
approved after the negotiations with developers have been successfully completed.
In the studied cases, indicative plans created some certainty, or expectations, about
the future building possibilities. However, they created almost no certainty about the
future contributions. The exceptions were Kruidenbuurt and Stationskwartier: here
there was some certainty beforehand about the costs and about who should pay
them. This certainty arose during the plan process, not before, but in any case before
negotiations had led to deﬁnitive development agreements. It seems that speciﬁc
circumstances explain the exceptionality of both cases: in Kruidenbuurt the speciﬁc
circumstance was the special relation between the municipality and the developer, a
housing association; and in Stationskwartier the special nature of the project itself, a
national infrastructure NSP-project. In both cases, municipalities created some certainty about the value capturing goals, namely to limit the public contributions to a
‘lump sum’ in Kruidenbuurt, and probably with more ambitious goals in Stationskwartier. It seems that in ‘normal’ private land schemes (e.g. De Funen and Kop van
Oost), usually there is no certainty at all, beforehand, about the future obligations
(Verdaas and Fokkema, interviews 2007). Table 18 summarizes the level of certainty
in each case.
The ﬁndings suggest that certainty about the future building possibilities may be negative for capturing value increase because it weakens the negotiating position of municipalities and might have an inﬂationary effect on the price of land. In addition, the
ﬁndings suggest a negative effect of uncertainty about future contributions, because

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of the same reasons. Let us see in detail whether public bodies create certainty or
uncertainty about what, in which sort of documents, and what are the inferred consequences for capturing value increase.

Table 18. Level of certainty, before negotiations took place, about building possibilities and
about obligations in the Dutch cases.

Certainty about future building
possibilities

Certainty about future contributions

De Funen, Amsterdam

Some

Very low

Kruidenbuurt, Eindhoven

Some

Some

Kop van Oost, Groningen

Some

None

Stationskwartier, Breda

Some

Some

7.4.1.1 Binding rules are approved after negotiations, so in early stages only
indicative documents give some certainty
No legally binding rules before negotiations
The Dutch planning system is supposed to be ‘plan-led’, in the sense that the land
use plan is supposed to be approved before negotiations take place. However, there
is no legal obligation on municipalities to approve the land use plan beforehand, and
a relatively ﬂexible use is allowed (see frame 7g). In practice this has translated into
the fact that Dutch municipalities, at least when confronted with comprehensive urban regeneration developments, usually wait until the negotiations with developers/
landowners are ﬁnished. When negotiations are ﬁnished and, mostly after a Development Agreement is sealed, municipalities modify the binding rules, that is, they
process and approve a new land-use plan to replace the old one, or they approve a
departure from the old one (interviews with Verdaas and Fokkema, 2007; Vrom et al,
2008: 67). This suggests that, in practice, the Dutch planning system works similarly
to the British ‘development-led’ system, in the sense that binding rules are approved
only after the development initiative has taken place and negotiations have ended
successfully. For details about the distinction between plan-led and development-led
planning systems, see section 2.3.1.
The studied cases support this general conclusion. The municipalities approved the
new binding rules after the negotiations had been completed. They did so because of
the consequences for capturing value increase. Municipalities saw the land use plan
as the ﬁnal phase of the planning process, because land or most of it was in private
hands and municipalities could not steer the process through the ownership of land.
Municipalities waited until some costs had been secured, before approving the land
use plan or departures from it.

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Frame 7g
Flexible legal rules regarding the place of the land use plan in development processes
First, a land use plan or a departure from it can be adapted to the boundaries of the
development. Neither the law nor the jurisprudence establishes general limitations
to the minimum geographical scope (plan area). This can cover a whole municipality
(does not occur very often) or just a few plots (‘postage stamp’ plans –postzegelplan).
Departures cover in practice usually just one or several plots, but also large developments (Bosch & Hanemaayer 1992: quoted in Bregman & Sievers 2002; Van Damme &
Verdaas 1996: 73-78). In other words, municipalities can freely delimit the boundaries
of the plan area. Second, there is no legal prescription that determines when the land
use plan should be approved, in relation to the rest of the development process. There
is no prescription whether it should be approved 5, 10 or X years/weeks before the
development process takes place.

There might be exceptions to this general conclusion. Two experts point out that in
some cases municipalities approve ﬁrst, before the negotiations, an outline land-use
plan with obligation of further detailing. Once the development agreement has been
sealed, they detail the outline plan (De Wolff and Van Zundert, interviews in 2008).
Cases Kruidenbuurt and Stationskwartier show indeed the use of outline land use
plans. However, they were approved after the negotiations had ended successfully.
Only in Stationskwartier did the approval of outline land use regulations for a small
plot (3% of the total plan area) precede the negotiations.
Some certainty through indicative plans
Instead of approving binding rules in early stages, Dutch municipalities usually approve indicative zoning plans. They might be ad hoc for a speciﬁc site, or area, or
they might cover the whole municipal territory or a large part of it. Planning law
regulates one sort of indicative plan, the Structure Plan, which was replaced in 2008
by the Structure Vision. More common are indicative plans with a form, contents
and approval procedure that are not regulated in planning law (e.g. Nota van Uitgangspunten, Stedenbouwkundig Plan/visie, Ontwikkelingsprogramma, Programma
van Eisen, Masterplan¸ etc.). The level of certainty offered by these indicative plans,
whether they are regulated in planning law or not, is limited. This is because (1) they
are not usually very detailed, and (2) because binding plans can and usually do depart from their determinations.
In De Funen several indicative plans have preceded the signing of the ﬁrst Development Agreement in 1997. In 1991 the Structure Plan of Amsterdam foresaw the redevelopment of the whole site, and in 1993 the municipality approved a site-speciﬁc
document (Nota van Uitgangspunten ‘Czaar Peterbuurt-Oost’) that established many
aspects of the future programme (450-500 dwellings, of which 30% social housing, ofﬁces and work-places, the situation of most of the public space –including a park -, and
a list of public facilities and buildings). This means that there was some certainty about

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the future building possibilities. Regarding the future obligations, the 1993 document
determined to some extent the unproﬁtable parts: 30% social housing, a park and
some public buildings. However, it did not say anything about who should pay them.
In Kruidenbuurt several indicative plans have preceded the signing of the Development Agreement in 2004. In 1999 the municipality approved a site-speciﬁc document (Masterplan), which established that 630 to 770 housing units could be built
there. In 2001 the municipality approved another site-speciﬁc plan document (Programma van Eisen), which speciﬁed to some extent the programme: 650 housing
units (of which 300 social houses and 175 ‘middle-expensive’ units), a supermarket
and possibly a public building. This document also vaguely described the public
space. Altogether, this means that there was some certainty about the future building
possibilities. In addition to these two documents, another document has been important: in 2000 the Municipality of Eindhoven and all the housing associations in the
city agreed the ﬁnancial contribution which the municipality would give for urban
regeneration in the city, which included Kruidenbuurt. Following this agreement, the
municipality would contribute € 9 million to the regeneration of Kruidenbuurt, and
the housing association was responsible for the rest of development costs. Thanks
to this document, it has been since 2000 clear what was going to be the municipal
contribution, and that the housing association should pay the rest. Dutch housing
associations and municipalities have in general a close relationship and are used to
sealing such agreements.
In Kop van Oost several indicative plans have preceded the signing of the Development Agreement in 2005. In 1996 the Structure Plan of Groningen foresaw ‘house
and business’ on this site (p. 64), and in 1999 and 2004 other documents conﬁrmed
this zoning, without specifying it very much. In 2004 a plan for a wider area than
the development in question (Eemskanaalzone – verbinding in Stad. Een visie op de
ontwikkeling van de Eemskanaalzone) made this outline zoning more speciﬁc: circa
400 units for the site (p. 40). This means that there was some certainty about the future building possibilities. Regarding the future obligations, there was no certainty at
all, as the mentioned documents speciﬁed neither any speciﬁc unproﬁtable elements
nor any cost allocation principle.
In Stationskwartier several indicative plans have preceded the signing of the Development Agreement in 2006. The municipality of Breda has prepared since the 1980s
plans for the regeneration of the site into a mixed-use scheme for public transport
(railways and bus), housing, ofﬁce and facilities. These plans were revitalized when
the central government designated the site as New Key Project (NSP), initially in
1998, and deﬁnitively in January 2000. This made clear the redevelopment possibilities of the site. In 2003 the municipality and the central government approved the
Masterplan Central Breda (Masterplan Centraal Breda), a document that speciﬁed
the building possibilities: 50,000 m² ﬂoor space for housing, between 400 and 650
units; 20,000 m² ﬂexible, preferably for housing; 80,000 m² for ofﬁce, enlargeable

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up to 120,000 m²; and 8,000 m² for hotel and shops. It deﬁned further the location of
the new railway and bus stations, but it did not deﬁne the public roads and space. In
2005 another important document (Structuurvisie Via Breda Spoorzone 2025) ratiﬁed
the ﬁgures of the 2003 Masterplan. All this together meant that there was some certainty about the future building possibilities. Regarding the future obligations, NSPprojects usually specify a priori development costs and their allocation, because of
the ﬁnancial involvement of the provincial and the central government. It seems that
this was also the case in Stationskwartier: The 2003 Masterplan included a business
case that might have played an important role but that was not available for this research. This document included, according to the interviewed developer and public
ofﬁcers, a rough calculation of the development costs and a proposal for their allocation. So this document gave some certainty about the future obligations, before the
signing of a ﬁrst agreement in 2003 (Planontwikkelingsovereenkomst) and a second
Development Agreement in 2006 (Samenwerkingsovereenkomst, SOK).
The question is, what the results of this certainty have been for capturing value increase. Here, a distinction is made between certainty about building possibilities,
and certainty about contributions.
7.4.1.2 Effects of the certainty about building possibilities: weakening or
strengthening the negotiation position of municipalities
The fact that municipalities used the land use plan as the ﬁnal phase in negotiations
created uncertainty about the future building possibilities. It has not been possible
to measure in our cases the effects of this, because all the cases had done the same
and there was no example of the contrary. However, it seems reasonable to conclude
that this, in general, has strengthened the negotiation positions of municipalities. This
may have inﬂuenced positively capturing value increase. Municipalities had ‘more
to offer’ in the negotiations. In Stationskwartier an interviewed public ofﬁcer considered that using the land use plan as the ﬁnal step had been important to achieve a
good level of capturing value increase. A consulted expert and a representative of the
Dutch developers consider that, in general, this operational use of the land use plan
has improved capturing value increase (Verdaas and Fokkema, interviews 2007). The
representative of the developers considered that, sometimes, this operational use of
the land use plan has allowed public bodies to receive even part of the plus value,
going further than cost recovery (Fokkema, interview 2007).
Despite this initial uncertainty, the cases show that indicative plans created some
certainty about the future building possibilities. In other words, the uncertainty that
follows the practice of approving the binding rules after the negotiations has been
reduced by the certainty created by indicative plans. It has not been possible to
measure the effects of this because all the cases had done the same and there was
no example of the contrary. However, it seems reasonable to conclude that this diminishes somehow the negotiation position of municipalities. Municipalities cannot
easily and credibly refuse to cooperate in the development of the site, so they have

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‘less to offer’. Developers might count on that. In addition, it might have stimulated
the increase of the land price. An interviewed expert suggested that municipalities
might be not aware of these negative effects of creating expectations in the early
stages (Verdaas, interview 2007).
7.4.1.3 Effects of certainty about contributions: lowering land price
Regarding the certainty about future contributions, the studied cases show some differences between those without certainty (De Funen and Kop van Oost) and those
with some certainty (Kruidenbuurt and Stationskwartier). The differences in value
capturing between the four cases are not very large, but Kruidenbuurt and Stationskwartier stand out. Both cases included an important contribution from the developer
to public goals: 45% units for social housing in Kruidenbuurt, the costs of which will
be paid by the developer (a housing association), and a new railways and bus station
in Stationskwartier, the costs of which will mainly be paid with public subsidies, but
the developer (Dutch Railways) pays a minor part and will provide all the needed
land. De Funen also includes social houses (30% of the units), but they seem to be
subsidized by public bodies (for a comparison of the realized value capturing among
the cases, see section 7.5). In general, the interviewed public ofﬁcers and developers
in Kruidenbuurt and Stationskwartier, explicitly or implicitly emphasized that certainty about contributions (the 2000 agreement respectively the 2003 Business case)
has improved capturing value increase. In Kop van Oost, an interviewed developer
suggested that uncertainty about the future obligations has allowed landowners to
‘drain’ most of the value increase by asking a high price for their property. Here land
has been sold three times, and in the second transaction in 2001 the developer paid
about € 12m, which is much higher that the estimated market value of the previous
use (industrial land), about € 3.6m.
A possibly explanation for this apparently positive effect of certainty about future
obligations on value capturing refers to land price mechanisms. Certainty beforehand
about future contributions can help developers to pay the right price for land (for
more details about this economic arguments, see section 2.3.3). This could explain
the low captured value increase in De Funen and Kop van Oost, and the relatively
higher value capturing in Stationskwartier. In these three cases, land has been transferred during the development process. In De Funen and Kop van Oost the price
of land in the transactions was agreed before there was any certainty about future
obligations, before the negotiations thus. This might have increased the price of land.
In Stationskwartier the situation was the opposite: the price of land was agreed once
there was some certainty about future obligations, which might have moderated land
price increases. Kruidenbuurt seems however to be less suitable for this explanation,
as here almost all the land was already in the ownership of the developer, and has not
been transferred. Additionally, it seems plausible to conclude that the higher level of
certainty about future contributions in Stationskwartier and Kruidenbuurt made these
contributions a starting point in the negotiations, reinforcing thus the negotiation
position of the municipality.

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7.4.2

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Choosing the contents of the relevant binding rules

Summary of the ﬁndings
The range of legally binding prescriptions that can be included in the land use plan
and departures from it are remarkably small, when compared with Valencia and England. Planning law and the jurisprudence in the Netherlands have considerably limited the legally binding determinations that land use plans and departures can include:
only physical zoning aspects, and no development-oriented aspects such as contributions and implementation schedules. It is also remarkable that, up to 2008, land use
plans and departures could not require social housing. These limitations seem in the
studied cases to have affected negatively capturing value increase. The 2008 Physical
Planning Act has introduced a new sort of binding plan, the Development contributions plan, which can include development-oriented aspects. Let us see in detail what
are the possibly contents of the land use plan, the departures from it, and the Development contributions plan, and what are the consequences for capturing value increase.
7.4.2.1 Possible contents of the land use plan, before the 2008 Physical
Planning Act
Up to 2008, the Physical Planning Act (article 10.1) and the Physical Planning Decree
(article 12.1.a), together with the judicial scrutiny, had deﬁned the limits of the possible contents of the land-use plan and departures from it. The land-use regulations
had to be directly related to the building and/or the use of the land and the building.
This means that indirect relationships were not allowed, for example that it is allowed
to build only when a road shown in the land-use plan had been constructed (Klaassen, 2000: 107-108). The regulations had also to be ‘spatially relevant’ (ruimtelijk
or planologisch relevant) (Priemus and Louw, 2000: 58-59). These limitations meant
that land use regulations might concern little more than the outline design of the infrastructure and the building (building line, height, width and depth of the building)
and the general zoning (housing, shops, ofﬁces, industry, trafﬁc roads, public parks,
canal, parking place, etc). See frame 7h.

Frame 7h
Limitations to the contents of binding rules before the 2008 Physical Planning Act
Taking account of the mentioned limits, up to 2008, the legally binding parts (the Regulations and the Map) of land use plans and departures from it could not contain the
following aspects (see, among others mentioned below: Needham, 2000):
• Social housing: it was not possible to include social housing (De Groot and Van der
Veen, 2003: 660-661; Van der Ree, 2000: 605-607). Indeed, none of the four studied cases included social housing in the Regulations. In Kruidenbuurt the Explanation did this, but this is the non-legally binding part of the land use plan;
• Obligations: it was not possible to include any kind of ﬁnancial return or contribution in kind, no matter whether they were intended for on-site or off-site infra-

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structure (De Groot and Van der Veen, 2003: 655; De Jong, 1999: 537). For example
it was not possible to require in the land use plan and departures from it that the developer has to pay and/or to construct himself the public infrastructure and facilities.
• Financing and implementation schedules: it was not possible to include temporal
regulations, i.e. when to commence or to ﬁnish development. None of the four
studied cases included deadlines in the Regulations. In Kruidenbuurt and Stationskwartier only the Explanation included some vague deadlines.

In the studied cases (all of which fall under the Physical Planning Act before 2008)
these limitations might have had a negative inﬂuence on the negotiation position of
the municipality, and thus on capturing value increase. In De Funen and Stationskwartier, the municipality included in development agreements requirements that
could not be included in the binding rules: in De Funen implementation schedules,
most of which have not been fulﬁlled, and in Stationskwartier requirements regarding
social housing, which will probably not be fulﬁlled. According to public ofﬁcers in
charge of the legal affairs in both cases, these requirements might have been legally
enforceable if they had been included not only in the agreements but also in the
Regulations of the land use plan.
7.4.2.2 Possibly contents of the land use plan and Development
contributions plan, since 2008
The 2008 Physical Planning Act has added the possibility of including in the land use
plan itself and departures from it regulations regarding social housing, but the other
limitations remain. Articles 3.1.1 and 3.10.3 of the Act allow including in a land use
plan or departures from it land-use regulations regarding the ‘performability’ (uitvoerbaarheid) of their prescriptions8. Article 3.1.2, lid 1 of the 2008 Physical Planning
Decree speciﬁes what are ‘performability’-regulations: regulations regarding the possibility of establishing the percentage (but not the location) of the total dwellings that
must be used for affordable housing (for rent and for sale) and for self-build housing
(Vrom, 2007b; Vrom, 2007c: 6-7)9.
The 2008 Act introduced a new sort of legally binding plan, the Development contributions plan. This includes a calculation of development costs, and can include in
any case the following aspects:
8

Land for social housing and other contributions: it includes a calculation of the
development costs, and rules for the allocation of these costs to each plot. It can
also include a differentiation between social housing for rent, social housing for
sale and free market housing, and can allocate these categories to each plot and
prescribe the number of units. For details about the costs that can be included in
the Development contributions plan, and those that cannot, see section 7.2.3;
Financing and implementation schedules.

In sum, the 2008 Physical Planning Act partly repairs the limited contents of binding
rules in the Netherlands. An interviewed expert said that the possibility of requiring
a certain percentage of social housing in the land use plan will stimulate municipalities to enforce social housing requirements (Verdaas, interview 2007). It seems likely
that a similar positive effect can be expected from the possibility of introducing other
contributions and implementation schedules in the Development contributions plan.

7.4.3

Making binding rules conditional on securing capturing
value increase

As we saw above in section 7.4.1.1, municipalities usually wait until some contributions have been secured before processing and approving the binding rules that make
the intended development possible. It seems as if the approval of the binding rules
was part of the game during the negotiations. Municipalities make clear to developers that some contributions must be secured before the land use plan or departures
from it are approved. However, in the Netherlands the legal room for making the
approval of binding rules conditional on securing capturing value increase is narrower than in Valencia and England. This practice of municipalities is disputable from
a legal point of view because securing contributions from the developer, or ﬁxing
deadlines, cannot be considered as ‘spatially relevant’. Therefore, it is not possible
for the municipality to formally make the approval of the Land use Plan conditional
on achievement of a Development Agreement in which the developer commits itself
to fulﬁl investment and implementation schedules.
Summary of the ﬁndings
There is an alternative way of conditioning that can help to overcome this shortcoming
of the Dutch planning system: conditioning through the economic feasibility or performability (economische uitvoerbaarheid) requirements of the land use plan. The side
effects here is that, after agreement, the land use plan still must follow the complete
procedure (which implies a risk of delay and modiﬁcations), that developers might easily appeal to the judges, and that this alternative makes it very difﬁcult for the municipality to build up a clear public discourse. The new 2008 Act can be used to diminish
to some extend the last two side effects by making a draft of Development contributions plan (but not approving it) to make clear that only an agreement can make the
development economically feasible. This alternative way can help to overcome this

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shortcoming of the Dutch planning system, i.e. it can help to strengthen the negotiation position of the municipality, and thus to better the capturing of value increase. The
other possibility for the municipality is to approve a Development contributions plan
and condition the granting of the building permit (thus not the approval of the Land
use plan) on payment of a contribution. However, this brings many disadvantages: the
municipality might be obliged to advance investments without yet having received all
the contributions, must assume a heavy administrative procedure, bear some cost-increasing risks, and also the risk of delay in case the landowners do not want to apply for
building permit on time. In addition, approving a Development contributions plan involves that the municipality cannot recover all the costs. Let us see this in more detail.
7.4.3.1 Conditioning the land use plan and departures from it indirectly
through the Explanation
The ﬁrst alternative is indirect: contributions can be considered as essential for the
economic feasibility or performability (economische uitvoerbaarheid) of the implementation. The Explanation of land use plans, that part of the document that does not
have a legally binding character, can include considerations related to the feasibility
of the plan: e.g. the conditions that are needed to implement the plan, necessary
contributions, etc. Therefore, if the developer does not agree to make contributions,
the municipality can refuse to initiate the administrative procedure of approval of
the land use plan or departure from it, arguing that implementation is not feasible.
The municipal decision can refer to this paragraph (De Wolff, Van Zundert, Hoekstra,
Van den Brand, interviews 2008). It is very important that the municipality handles
a coherent discourse, which is that negotiations are meant to make feasible the implementation of the land use plan. If as a result of no agreement the plan becomes
unfeasible, the municipality has no other choice than to refuse to initiate the administrative procedure of modiﬁcation of the binding rules.
However, this indirect conditioning through the Explanation might have some negative side effects:
1. Procedural risks: after the sealing of Development Agreement, the land use plan
(or departure from it) must follow the complete procedure, which implies a risk
of delay and modiﬁcations because of objections and appeals. Formally speaking, agreements cannot restrict the room of the Local Council to decide on the
plan. As a consequence, municipalities seal the agreement but might not be able
to avoid modiﬁcations to the land use plan, or to avoid delay. Thus, agreements
are always subjected to the risk, not unthinkable, that the land use plan is later
modiﬁed, or its approval delayed, which can nullify partly or totally the Development Agreement (Vrom et al, 2008: 51). In the studied cases this however did
not seem to be a problem: the land use plans have been processed within the
legal deadlines and without large modiﬁcations;
2. Appeal risks: should a municipality refuse to initiate the administrative procedure of approval of the land use plan or departure from it because the developer
does not agree to contributions and schedules, there is always a risk of an ap-

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peal to the courts (cfr. Gerritsen, 2010: 26). The reason is that this indirect way
of conditioning through the economic feasibility paragraph is not the same as
enumerating, openly, in a municipal decision, the contributions that the developer has to make. Dutch municipalities cannot behave so openly, and need to
properly and carefully argue why implementation is not feasible and thus why
approval is not possible. This is not always easy. If implementation seems feasible, municipalities cannot use this argument of economic feasibility to refuse to
initiate the administrative procedure10, even if developers have not agreed to all
the required contributions11. The introduction of the 2008 Land Development
Act makes a refusal on these grounds even more difﬁcult: as the municipality is
now entitled to make a Development contributions plan, in theory the feasibility can be guaranteed, so the municipality can no longer argue unfeasibility of
the implementation (thus: lack of agreement with the developer) as a reason for
refusing to initiate the administrative procedure;
Credibility of the municipality’s public discourse: a too complex argumentation
can threaten the credibility of the municipality’s public discourse. Because direct
and open conditioning is not allowed, the public discourse might in practice need
to hide some of the ‘real reasons’ for the approval or refusal of land use plans.

7.4.3.2 Conditioning the Land use Plan and departure from it indirectly
through the Development contributions Plan
The 2008 Act created another alternative way of indirect conditioning. If the developer does not voluntarily commit himself to contributions and schedules (e.g. in an
anterior Development Agreement), the municipality can make a draft Development
contributions plan of all needed investments in public infrastructure and facilities. If
the draft makes clear that the municipality cannot recover all the costs through the
Development contributions plan12, municipalities can openly refuse to process and
approve it, arguing that they cannot bear this deﬁcit (Vrom, 2008: 106). The approval
of the Development contributions plan is linked to the approval of the land use plan:
if the approval of this plan implies costs, and these costs are not secured in advance
10 Or if they do, they will risk losing the case if the developer brings it to the courts of justice.
11 A recent sentence illustrates very well how difﬁcult it can be for a Municipality to construct a coherent
discourse: in De Lutte the Municipality achieved a development agreement with a developer who
owned part of the plan area. However, several small landowners refused to pay to the developer
their contribution to the costs. The Municipality refused then to modify the Land use plan for these
speciﬁc landowners, arguing that paying that contribution was necessary to guarantee the economic
feasibility of the Land use plan. However, the judge sentenced against the Municipality with the
argument that the economic feasibility was already guaranteed with the development agreement
that was agreed with the developer [Vz. ABRS 27 January 2010 (De Lutte), nr. 200808233/1/R1].
12 It is already said that Development contributions plans, especially in urban regeneration, have
often a ﬁnancial deﬁcit. This is mainly because all the land is included as cost for a price that
includes the increased value, see section 7.2.3. In other words, the legal rules for the elaboration of a
Development contributions plan ‘create’ a deﬁcit by accounting land for the highest possible price.
While a Development contributions plan must account the land for it highest value, municipality
and developer can freely agree, in an Anteriour Development Agreement, a lower value and thus
make a project feasible that following a plan was not.

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(in a Development Agreement or in any other way13), a Development contributions
plan must be approved. By conditioning the approval of the Development contributions Plan to guarantees that the deﬁcit will be covered, in fact the municipality can
condition the approval of the land use plan to the developer covering this deﬁcit. If
the developer agrees in an anterior Agreement to secure the costs, the municipality
can approve the land use plan without necessarily approving also the Development
contributions plan (cfr. interviews with Van den Brand and Hoekstra, 2008).
This alternative might diminish two of the mentioned side effects. First, the chance
of developers appealing successfully might diminish (side effect 2) because the municipality can better argue the non-feasibility. Second, municipalities can be open
about their decision (side effect 3). However, this alternative might also create a new
side effect: if the developer agrees in an Anterior Development Agreement to secure
only the deﬁcit of the Development contributions plan (i.e. those costs that cannot
be charged to the landowners through this plan), but not those costs that can be
charged to the landowners, municipalities cannot anymore argue economic feasibility to refuse. Namely, the costs that can be charged are theoretically guaranteed, i.e.
landowners are supposed to pay them afterwards, when obtaining a building permit.
Remember that in an Anterior Development Agreement municipality and developer
can agree more contributions than allowed in a Development contributions plan. In
any case, side effect 1 remains: after the sealing of an Anterior Agreement, the land
use plan still has to be processed, which implies the risk of modiﬁcations and delay.
7.4.3.3 Conditioning the building permit directly and openly
The 2008 Act has introduced the possibility of conditioning the building permit in
an open and direct way: if the municipality approves a Development contributions
plan, it is possible now to condition the granting of the building permit on the payment of a contribution. This occurs as follows: the Development contributions plan
calculates the costs that can be charged to the landowners and allocates those costs
to each plot. The building permit is conditional on paying this contribution and on
some requirements about the payment. If payment does not take place, and the developer has not secured the contribution in other ways, the municipality can require
the money, stop the building, and ﬁnally cancel the building permit. However, approving a Development contributions plan has some side effects:
1. Risks:
F
The municipality might be obliged itself to ﬁnance investments in the public
infrastructure in anticipation of collecting the costs later;
13 Costs are ‘secured’ when there is certainty that there is, or will be, ﬁnancial means available to pay
them. This certainty can be created in different ways: i) When there is a development agreement
or any other form of private law contract that commits any party to pay; ii) When any public body
commits to subsidy the costs; iii) When the municipality has the land and has calculated that the
proﬁts of selling the land will cover the costs. In this third case, the municipal executive power
(B&W) or the Local Council (Gemeenteraad) must approve those calculations and include them in
the municipal budget.

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F

2.

The municipality has to prepare the plan following certain guarantees and
checks: this is an important task and implies a risk for the municipality,
such as the risk of appeals against the appraisal and assessment methods
of proﬁts and costs (Vrom, 2008: 33-34; Korthals Altes, 2008: 203). At the
beginning of 2010 many municipalities still are struggling with the lack of
knowledge and skills necessary to make these plans;
F
Landowners have to pay only after applying for the building permit, so if no
one applies to build, the costs will not be recouped, or recouped with delay.
This too implies a ﬁnancial risks for the municipality or any other party in
charge of the public infrastructure and facilities (Vrom, 2008: 28);
F
If the municipality wants to oblige landowners to apply for building permits
following the schedules included in the Exploitation Plan, the only way
of doing that is to use expropriation, which implies the obligation to pay
compensation for the highest market value of the land, which includes the
increased value due to the future use of the land;
F
The approval of a Development contributions plan might nullify some prescriptions of an anterior Development Agreement, as the Agreement cannot
contradict the prescriptions of such a plan (Vrom et al, 2008: 34; Kluwer,
2008: 132). So the Development contributions plan might nullify some contributions agreed in the Agreement.
Not all the costs can be charged to the landowners (for more details see chapter
7.2.3). These include:
F
Costs of maintenance and exploitation of the public infrastructure and facilities;
F
Costs for social facilities;
F
Costs that do not meet the three criteria of proﬁt, attributability and proportionality, such as many costs of infrastructure serving wider areas, and/or
located off-site;
F
A possible deﬁcit (frequent in urban regeneration);
F
Additional costs for social housing, related to requirements that cannot be
included in a Development contributions plan, such as not being able to
prescribe the maximal selling price of social housing for sale in case there is
no regional agreement on this;
F
Costs for ‘Spatial development’ (ruimtelijke ontwikkelingen) situated outside the scheme in question and not necessarily related to it.

7.4.4

Modulating property rights

Summary of the ﬁndings
The right to develop (i.e. the exclusive right to develop land, once permissions have
been granted) belongs in the Netherlands to the landowner. This, together with the
distribution of the other resources which are necessary for urban regeneration, creates a strong interdependency between municipalities and landowners: municipali-

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ties have the statutory powers over binding rules, and landowners have the ﬁnancial
means and the exclusive right to develop the land. This interdependency gives to
the landowners the option to wait, which it is often used to oppose municipalities’
requirements, and often leads to a delay in the development processes.
7.4.4.1 Who owns development rights in the Netherlands?
In the Netherlands, development rights belong, in principle, to the landowner. Although in practice municipalities usually feel responsibility for the infrastructure provision, this is not, as such, regulated by law. Dutch planning law does not explicitly
refer to infrastructure provision as a public task, responsibility or right. The property
rights of landowners are primarily deﬁned in the Civil Code (which, in principle,
gives the owner unlimited rights) and are afterwards limited by the law and the way
that is worked out in binding rules. There is no kind of ‘minimum building right’ for
the landowner. These rules, however, in no way affect the owner’s right to be the only
one entitled to develop whatever the binding rules and the laws foresee on his plot.
This includes both the infrastructure provision and the building. Once the landowner
applies for and obtains the needed permits, the landowner can exclude others from
both providing the infrastructure and building on the land (Needham, 2007a: 152).
By analyzing who has the control over each of the transactions in infrastructure provision, it has been possible to discern the extent to which development rights belong
to the landowners. The transactions are: 1) land purchase and assembling, 2) ﬁnancing and 3) land preparation and development.
7.4.4.2 Mutual dependence of local authorities and landowners in the
Netherlands
To analyse the consequences for the power relationship between municipalities and
landowners of the practical possibilities for controlling transactions 1-3, this research
developed a model of dependence (see table 19; for more details of the model, see
section 3.1.1). There was in all the four Dutch cases studied a mutual dependence
between the involved actors, and this dependence was very strong. It seems that
the possibilities in practice for assembling the land (transaction 1), gathering the
ﬁnancial resources (transaction 2), and indirectly, developing the land to produce
serviced plots (transaction 3) depend heavily on the landowner’s passive consent
or active collaboration. Transactions 1 and 2 are directly dependent on agreement
between the municipality and the developers/landowners, and transaction 3 is also
dependent, but indirectly because it cannot take place without transactions 1 and 2.
This is because none of the actors controls all the needed resources and because the
dependence is not avoidable.
The municipality depends on the landowners
On the one hand, the landowner/developer controls two important resources, land
and investment capacity, which make the municipality dependent on him. In theory
the municipality has some instruments to avoid this dependence: a public pre-emp-

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tion right (voorkeursrecht) to acquire the land (step 1), the Proﬁt Tax (Baatbelasting)
to gather ﬁnancial means (step 2), or expropriation to assembly the land (step 1).
However, these instruments have limitations. The pre-emption implies a dependence
of public bodies on the landowner: pre-emption requires that the landowner wants to
sell his property. The Proﬁt Tax can be applied both in built-up urban areas, whether
the beneﬁtted serviced building parcels are built or not, and also in greenﬁeld developments (Klaassen, 2002: 264-268). This tax however plays a marginal role in
value capturing in the Netherlands: it is rarely used (Groetelaers, 2004: 135; Vrom,
2008: 19). Regarding expropriation, it is only permitted if it is ‘necessary’ (‘noodzakelijk’, former article 79 Compulsory purchase Act before modiﬁcation 2010). If
a landowner is willing to meet the speciﬁcations of the land use plan, and if he is
capable of developing the land, the jurisprudence considers that there is no necessity
to expropriate the land: the landowner can realise the new development himself. This
scenario is called ‘self realisation’ (zelfrealisatie). However, the speciﬁcations of the
land use plan are not always unambiguous (Priemus & Louw, 2003: 371), not in the
last place because such plans can neither include contributions nor ﬁnancing and
implementation schedules. Normally, an agricultural landowner will not be able to
fulﬁl the speciﬁcations. However, if he sells his land to a private developer or a building company, or if he decides to cooperate with such an organisation, the situation
changes. In that case, the appropriate court will decide that there is no necessity for
expropriation. Along other aspects that in practice might hamper expropriation (e.g.
political sensitivities, or procedural risks), the legal criteria that expropriation has to
fulﬁl, and specially the criterion that expropriation is not needed if the landowner
can himself develop the land, has hampered an important number of expropriations.
By declaring that he is capable of and willing to implement the binding rules, the
landowner can avoid expropriation. Actually, it is not common to expropriate land in
the Netherlands for the implementation of land-use plans. Expropriation is used only
in exceptional circumstances, and then for just a few plots. For example, in Breda
(case Stationskwartier), there has been no expropriation of land from developers in
recent years. The new 2008 Physical Planning Act might increase the possibilities for
municipalities to apply expropriation. The new Development contributions plan can
include contributions and ﬁnancing and implementation schedules. This can make
less ambiguous the speciﬁcations under which self realisation can take place, so
landowners who do not apply for building permits (and pay the corresponding contribution) within the schedules included in the Development contributions Plan can
no longer argue that they are willing to implement the plan (Vrom, 2008: 206-207).
Summarizing, as a rule, municipalities that want development to take place but do
not reach an agreement with the landowners (about the purchase and assembly of
land and about the ﬁnancing of the infrastructure provision) have the only alternative
of trying to compulsorily purchase the land and pay for the works.
The landowners depend on the municipality
On the other hand, landowner/developers depend on the municipality because of its

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regulatory powers of approving the binding rules and granting the building permit.
This dependence also can be labelled as strong because it is not avoidable; public
bodies are the only actors who can exercise these regulatory powers.

Table 19. Dependence analysis in the Netherlands.

Municipality depends
on the landowner/
developer

Landowner/developer
depends on
Municipality

Dependence because
of land

Dependence because of Dependence because of
investment capacity
regulatory resources

Developers own most of
the land. Dependence is
only avoidable through
expropriation. However,
expropriation is a rare
instrument, and ‘self
realisation’ gives preference to developer.

Municipalities do not
have ﬁnancial means to
invest, so developers are
only ones who could
invest. Only in Breda
was the municipality
ready to assume some
ﬁnancial risks.
The municipality approves the land-use plan
and departures from it,
and grants the building
permits. Dependence is
not avoidable.

Consequences of the strong mutual dependency
The consequences in practice of this strong mutual dependency are signiﬁcant. Landowners /developers have the option of not agreeing with the contributions package
or other development requirements of the municipality. As developers do not always
control all the land, and thus depend on various landowners, it might take some time
to reach an agreement with all the landowners about the desirable (for the landowners) price of land. This stimulates the raising of the price of land. An agreement with
all the landowners depends on the expectation that by delaying negotiations, proﬁts
for the developer and the price of land could increase in the future. Whether it is the
developer who owns the land and decides to wait, or it is one or more landowners
who decide not to sell to the developer: municipalities might be confronted with
developers that are not willing, and maybe not able, to agree with the required contribution package. This might affect negatively the negotiation position of municipalities, as they might be forced to lower the contributions package if they want to reach
an agreement. Also, this can delay development because negotiations are prolonged.
Let us see in detail the ﬁndings in the cases.
Findings in De Funen (only apartments)
Dutch Railways, the former landowner, negotiated with the Municipality of Amsterdam from the beginning of the 90’s till the signing of an outline Development
Agreement in March 1997. It seems that this semi-autonomous public company had

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chosen several times to wait. During a period of several years, negotiations did not
succeed: the municipality approved in 1994 and 1995 two site-speciﬁc indicative
plans (Stedenbouwkundige Programmas van Eisen), but Dutch Railways rejected
both plans, arguing that they were ﬁnancially not feasible. From 1994 to 1997, the
average national prices of new housing grew in line with or above the general inﬂation, with a peak of 12% above inﬂation in 1996 (see ﬁgure 31 for prices of new
dwellings in the Netherlands, and for all dwellings in the province of North Holland,
where Amsterdam lies). This means that delaying the development had no negative
ﬁnancial consequences for Dutch Railways, also because they had owned the land
for more than 100 years, so there were no ﬁnancial costs of waiting.

Figure 31. Growth of real prices (price increase minus general monetary inﬂation) of dwellings in the
Netherlands and the provinces of North-Holland, North-Brabant and Groningen.

In 1997, after signing the ﬁrst outline Development Agreement, the Dutch Railways
sold most of the land to IBC, a property developer. During the following two years IBC
and the municipality negotiated, and they sealed a second Development Agreement
in September 1999. The average national prices of new housing grew spectacularly
at that time: 2.4% above inﬂation in 1997, 9.1% in 1998 and 6.6% in 1999. According to a public ofﬁcer, Dutch Railways and IBC agreed that IBC would pay the price
and receive formally the land at the moment of starting the building, not before. This
means that besides beneﬁting from general price rises, IBC did not have to pay interest charges until the start of the building works; so waiting was, from an economic
point of view, an interesting option. During the negotiations, the developer seems to

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have been clear that he would not accept hard deadlines. The indicative plans and
the agreements include schedules, but almost none of them has been fulﬁlled, and
the chances to impose them through the courts seem to be low. Two involved public
ofﬁcers considered that if the municipality had had the choice to exclude the developer’s option to wait, the development process might have been faster.
The fourth moment at which the developer clearly seems to have used his option to
wait was the start of the building. Although the developer had building permits for
all the buildings since June 2001, he only started with the ﬁrst buildings in the summer of 2002, and he waited about ﬁve years before starting the buildings in the rest
of the site. The negotiations between IBC and the actual developer, Heijmans, have
played here a clear role. Heijmans bought IBC in the summer of 2002 and decided
to submit new applications to modify the already granted building permits for the
remainder of the buildings, arguing that they were ﬁnancially not feasible. Building
these dwellings started during 2005 and 2006, when average prices had begun to
rise again.
Besides causing delay, it seems plausible that the option to wait has weakened the
negotiation position of the municipality, and thus diminished value capturing. The
Municipality of Amsterdam seemed worried about the tempo of the development.
Many public goals established in the ﬁrst indicative plan of 1993 have ﬁnally not
been included in the Development Agreements of 1997 and 1999. The impression
arises that the municipality has gradually reduced value-capturing requirements during the planning process in order to achieve an agreement with the developer.
Findings in Kruidenbuurt (single-family dwellings and apartments)
Trudo, a social landlord and owner of about the half of the land (the rest was public
space, owned by the Municipality of Eindhoven), negotiated with the municipality
from the second half of the 90’s till 2004. In 1998, intense consultation with the
neighbourhood led to a ﬁrst site-speciﬁc indicative plan. In May 2004, negotiations
ended with the signing of a Development Agreement. From 1997 till 2002, average
prices of all new dwellings in the Netherlands grew spectacularly, with 2000 being
the record year (24% increase above inﬂation). In 2003 and 2004 the increase above
inﬂation in the Netherlands might have been negative, but in the province of NorthBrabant, where Eindhoven lies, the increase was moderated (1% in the Netherlands
and 2.5% in North-Brabant for single family houses, and 0% respectively 1% for
apartments). Moreover, because Trudo had received the land for free in 1994 there
were no interest charges in case of delay. In sum, it seems clear that waiting was,
from an economic point of view, an interesting option. However, we did not ﬁnd
evidence of speciﬁc decisions of Trudo to use its option to wait and delay. Also, it is
not clear whether the option to wait has affected value capturing signiﬁcantly, as the
lump-sum contribution from the municipality (about €10m) was already clear and
agreed in 2000. Thus, since 2000 the room for negotiating contributions was quite
narrow.

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Findings in Kop van Oost (apartments)
In 2000, the property developer Mr. Hollestelle, who had agreed with the former
landowner Houtgroep-Pont Eecen what seems to have been an option to buy the
land, initiated negotiations with the Municipality of Groningen. After the selling of
the land in 2001 (Hollestelle sold the land to IBC), and in 2002 (Heijmans bought
IBC), negotiations ended with the signing of a Development Agreement in June 2005.
In 2001 and 2002, the national average prices of new dwellings increased above
inﬂation by about 6% each year. For apartments in the province of Groningen also,
prices increased above inﬂation during 2003 (4.5%), 2004 (7%) and 2005 (9.5%).
There is not much information available about the price of land, and whether IBC and
Heijmans had to pay interest charges or not, but based on the large price increases
during the negotiation process (2000-2005), it seems reasonable to conclude that
waiting, from an economic point of view, was an interesting option.
The option to wait seems to have delayed the process. During the negotiations between Hollestelle and IBC (about 2000-2001) Hollestelle might have chosen to delay
selling until these negotiations ended. The situation that rose after Heijmans bought
IBC in 2002 is clearer. Heijmans decided to ‘redeﬁne’ the plan, as this developer
used other proﬁt criteria than IBC. This led to the re-making the plans, something
similar to what happened in De Funen. In other words, Heijmans used its option to
wait in order to change the plans (Buitelaar et al., 2008: 58; Interview with Segeren,
2008).
It seems that the option to wait has not only delayed, but also weakened the negotiation position of the municipality and thus lowered capturing value increase. From the
beginning of the negotiations, the developer argued that there was no much ﬁnancial
room in the project, making clear to the municipality that there were not many value
capturing possibilities. The municipality, which has not had access to the ﬁnancial
calculations of the developer, seems to have assumed, in the early stages, that it could
not ask much from the developer. Also, the municipality accepted several reductions
in the costs for public space (Buitenlaar et al., 2008: 113-114). The municipality may
have accepted because it was in a hurry: the site inﬂuences the image of the area,
which is situated between the historic city and the new greenﬁeld scheme Meerstad.
Findings in Stationskwartier (apartments and ofﬁces)
Stationskwartier in Breda is peculiar, compared with the other cases. Here, the Municipality of Breda bought the land from the developer (Dutch Railways), provides
the infrastructure, and sells the land back. The municipality and Dutch Railways were
since the 90’s involved in getting this project accepted; together they lobbied by the
Central Government to get Breda designated as a New Key Project. However, it seems
that serious negotiations between the public bodies and the Dutch Railways only
came after the municipality and the central government had reached an agreement
about the public subsidies in February 2002. In 2003, the municipality approved the
Masterplan Central Breda (Masterplan Centraal Breda), which included a business

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case. Negotiations ended in May 2006 with a deﬁnitive Development Agreement
with Dutch Railways. During the negotiations (2002?-2006), prices of apartments
in North-Brabant, where Breda lies, increased moderately above inﬂation (0% in
2003, 1% in 2004, 1.5% in 2005 and 5% in 2006). There were no interest charges:
Dutch Railways had owned the land for a long time, and the municipality had not yet
bought the land from Dutch Railways. The municipality had bought at that time only
a few small plots. Hence, it seems that waiting was, from the economic point of view,
an interesting option for Dutch Railways. However, in this case it seems that this was
an interesting option for the municipality also, which shares part of the ﬁnancial risks
of the operation and might also proﬁt from higher market prices.
It is not possible to conclude, based on direct evidence, whether the option to wait
has played a signiﬁcant role in delaying the project. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to think that this might have been the case: it seems that the municipality has
aimed to get a share in the proﬁts, and that Dutch Railways has offered some resistance to this. That is, either the developer, or the municipality, or both have used their
option to wait. This could explain the relatively long negotiation process. Another
study of this case includes similar conclusions (Krabben & Needham, 2008: 660).
Besides delay, the option to wait might also have weakened the negotiation position
of the municipality and lowered capturing value increase. It seems reasonable that
the option to wait exercised by Dutch Railways has inﬂuenced the ﬁnal negotiation
results, i.e. that Dutch Railways has got a higher price for its land.
Conclusions
It seems plausible to conclude that the option to wait is exercised often. This was clear
in Kop van Oost, and probable in De Funen and Stationskwartier. Asked about whether these ﬁndings might be exceptional within urban regeneration in the Netherlands,
several experts considered that it is not unusual that landowners exercise their option
to wait and delay development, although they also emphasized that this is not the
only factor causing delay in Dutch urban regeneration (Van den Brand en Hoekstra,
interviews in 2008). The cases suggest that the option to wait may have had important
consequences for the price of the land, the proﬁts of the developer, and the negotiation position of the municipality also. In De Funen and Kop van Oost this was clear.
Exercising the option to wait might have been ﬁnancially advantageous for the landowners and/or the developers, as we have argued. However, there is a second possible explanation, namely a low economic feasibility of the operations: in at least De
Funen and Kop van Oost, the developer objected to municipalities’ requirements,
arguing that they threatened the ﬁnancial feasibility of the operation. According to
this explanation, confronted with too high development costs, developers might have
no other option than to delay (because inﬂated development costs inﬂuence the ﬁnal
proﬁt of developers and thus their possibilities to contribute, see causal model in
section 2.4.2). However, it was not so easy to assess in De Funen and Kop van Oost
whether this was indeed the real reason for delay. To accurately assess the economic

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feasibility, accounted land costs, proﬁt margins of the developer and development
costs, together with the initial proﬁt, should be known. However, information about
this is a sensitive matter, and usually developers do not disclose such information. My
own estimations provided interesting information (for an overview of development
costs and proﬁts in the Dutch cases, see Annex 4). In Kruidenbuurt, according to ﬁgures given by the developer (most of postings 1-7) and by own estimations (posting
8, total returns), it is not clear what the proﬁt margin was. The developer’s ﬁnal proﬁt
might be about €24m, but this excludes a minimum land price (which the developer
did not had to pay because he obtained the land for free in 1994). In Kop van Oost,
according to ﬁgures given by the developer (Heijmans), his ﬁnal proﬁt is very narrow:
€112m minus €110m = €2m. However, my own estimations suggest that there might
be a larger ﬁnal proﬁt, about €29m. This suggests that the developers’ ﬁnancial objections to the municipality’s requirements might not be strong. In Stationskwartier,
according to my own estimations, there is a clear ﬁnal proﬁt for Dutch Railways:
€480/520 minus 350/360m= €120/180m. In other words, this estimation suggests
that the Municipality of Breda could have asked for more contributions for public
infrastructure and facilities.
Both possible explanations of the ﬁndings in the studied cases seem to be generalizable. They largely match with several experts’ view about the general situation in
urban development in the Netherlands. In general, for those cases in which landowners exercise their option to wait, experts give the following possible reasons: (1) it is
a way of counteracting the requirements of municipalities, such as those related to
value capturing. Another source conﬁrms that developers threatening to withdraw
a plan if municipalities do not lower requirements is not exceptional in the Netherlands (Buitelaar et al., 2008: 17, 94-96, 108-110, 112-114); (2) developers expect
higher selling prices if they wait; (3) they expect to sustain the market prices by
rationing the delivery of new dwellings; and (4) it might be handy when confronted
with many projects at the same time. Speciﬁcally for urban regeneration, two additional reasons are mentioned: (5) land is here owned by many landowners, just
some of whom prefer to wait; (6) developers are confronted with higher development
costs, so the ﬁnancial feasibility is insecure (Van den Brand en Hoekstra, interviews
in 2008). An interviewed representative of the developers argued similarly when he
said that development was often delayed because municipalities require too much
(Fokkema, interview 2007).

7.4.5

Procedure for the preparation and approval of binding
rules

Summary of the ﬁndings
The 2008 Physical Planning Act has introduced changes in the guarantees given to
initiators. From 2008 onwards, municipalities are obliged to determine within eight
weeks an application for modiﬁcation of the land use plan. This might affect captur-

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ing value increase. On the one hand, this measure could diminish the freedom of
municipalities in the negotiations, and thus worsen the capturing of value increase.
On the other hand, it could encourage developers to submit more applications, and
accelerate thus the implementation. Regarding the possibilities to modify and detail
the binding rules, and to adapt the geographical scope of the plan area in order to
facilitate the negotiations: this ﬂexibility seems not to affect the capturing of value
increase signiﬁcantly, but might be relevant for the tempo of implementation. Finally,
regarding the possibility of detailing an outline land use plan, this might potentially
offer, in some cases, some negotiation room for municipalities.
7.4.5.1 Guarantees for those taking the initiative
Under the 2008 Act municipalities, more than before, might be now obliged to take
a formal decision about an application to modify the binding rules (verzoek tot bestemmingswijziging), and this must happen within eight weeks (article 3.9 for a modiﬁcation of the land use plan and 3.12 for a departure). The municipality must argue
its decision properly, which means that the decision must be in accordance with
the policy stated in the land use plan and in the Structure Vision, if such document
exists. The municipality can refuse the application within the period of eight weeks;
afterwards he is supposed to have agreed with the application. If the municipality nevertheless refuses after this period the applicant can appeal to the courts. Of
course, the applicant can anyway appeal against the decision of refusing, whether it
has taken place within or after the period of eight weeks. Actually, this is new: before
the 2008 Act appeal was not possible, and now it is. This means that a municipality
cannot ignore such an application, that it is obliged to assess each application, and
cannot reject without a proper argumentation (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal
(2003: 31; Vrom, 2007c: 31-32; Buuren et al, 2009: 116). It is not possible to empirically assess whether the novelty inﬂuenced capturing value increase in the studied
cases, because the cases fell under the previous Physical Planning Act. However, it
seems plausible to conclude that the novelty of the 2008 Act will have some consequences for value capturing. A consulted expert said the following (De Wolff, interview 2008): on the one hand, in some speciﬁc cases, the room to refuse applications
could decrease, and this could weaken the negotiating position of the municipality.
For example, it could be that no proper arguments could be found to refuse an application because the land use plan and/or the Structure Vision already foresee the
development. On the other hand, the novelty might reduce the risks that developers
have to bear, and therefore stimulate development initiatives, which might imply
an acceleration of the development process. There is however no unanimity about
whether this aspect might be relevant (Verdaas, interview in 2008).
7.4.5.2 Flexibility to modify and detail afterwards approved binding rules
There is in the Netherlands the possibility to modify (wijziging) and depart (vrijstelling/projectbesluit) from the land use plan following a shorter procedure than if a
new land use plan must be approved, and there is also the possibility of detailing
afterwards an outline land use plan (uitwerking).

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Modiﬁcation of the land use plan following a short procedure (wijziging)
There is the possibility of modifying the land use plan without having to make and
approve a new one, following a much shorter procedure. This happens as follows:
the land-use plan can prescribe that the municipality can modify it later (article 11.1
of the old Act, article 3.6 new Act). Data from 1987 until 1993 show that this way
of modiﬁcation was used very often (Van Damme & Verdaas 1996: 79-80). It seems
that nowadays this form of modiﬁcation is common too. Cases Kop van Oost and
Stationskwartier included it in their land use plan. Public ofﬁcers in the municipalities of Groningen and Rotterdam conﬁrm that it is still a frequently used instrument
(Interviews with Dollinga and Egberts, 2007).
The land-use plan must then prescribe the limits to the modiﬁcation. Jurisprudence
has developed the criterion that a land-use plan that includes the possibility of modiﬁcation must include also an objective delimitation (objectieve begrenzing) of the
modiﬁcation. The jurisprudence has also deﬁned how far a modiﬁcation can go.
Land uses can be replaced by new ones, or the allowed building volume can be increased, provided that the land-use plan states explicitly the alternative land uses and
volume, and provided that the new land uses and volume do not change signiﬁcantly
the structure of the plan (Van der Ree 2000: 428, 435; Klaasen, 2002: 175, 179; interview with Porrey, 2007; Database Kluwer, 2006)14.
In case Kop van Oost the 2006 land use plan foresees the possibility both of rezoning the land use (rezoning the given residential use into commercial facilities) and of
modifying the building envelop (modifying the given building envelope, relocating
the building sites, and even introducing new buildings, provided that noise nuisance
remains under the legal limits). In case Stationskwartier the 2007 land use plan prescribes several possibilities for modiﬁcation that imply a change of land use: any
given use can be rezoned into constructions as masts, antenna’s, etc, of no more
than 50 meter height. It is possible to make such a construction upon the building,
but also to substitute a building for such a construction. Another possibility, limited
to a speciﬁc plot, is to rezone the given uses housing, ofﬁce space and commercial
facilities into hotel.
However, it seems clear that in the cases, this possibility of modiﬁcation did not lead
to more contributions. The development agreements were already sealed before the
approval of the land use plan. Modiﬁcations of the plan have not led in the studied

14 Examples of this are:
• The municipality of Woensdrecht was able to change the existing land-use from business area
to housing, after the present companies moved to other location [Vz. ABRS 29 May 1995
(Woensdrecht), nr. F01.94.0300];
• Small municipalities that are allowed to build only to accommodate their own population can
use modiﬁcation to re-zone later to housing, when the new housing is needed. This was the case
in the municipalities of Zeevang and Leende [Vz. ABRS 3 April 1997 (Zeevang), nrs. E01.97.0046
and F01.97.0026; ABRS 6 July 1998 (Leende), nr. E01.96.0165].

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263

cases to renegotiations of the contributions. However, this possibility of modiﬁcation
might facilitate implementation, as it creates ﬂexibility to change the programme to
adapt to changing circumstances. This can be important for developers when reacting
to more favourable possibilities during the development process.
Departure from the land use plan following a shorter procedure (vrijstelling/
projectbesluit)
Major departures from the land use plan are possible (following articles 19 and 19a
of the Physical Planning Act previous to 2008, and chapter 3.3 of the new Act), and
are very common in practice. The departure can change substantially the permitted
land uses and building volume. In cases De Funen, Kruidenbuurt and Kop van Oost
the municipalities processed, together with the new land use plan, major departures
from the old land use plan for part of the site: a small plot meant for ofﬁces in De
Funen, and about one quarter of the plan area in Kruidenbuurt and Kop van Oost.
However, the departures did not lead to more contributions, additional to those already agreed in the negotiations that preceded the approval of the new land use plan.
Instead, in Kruidenbuurt and Kop van Oost the departures have accelerated the commencement of the works by about half a year or more. This allowed granting the ﬁrst
building permits without having to wait for the deﬁnitive approval of the new land
use plan. In De Funen this was not clear: the departure was granted on November
2000, while the land use plan was deﬁnitively approved one month earlier. However,
departures can be used in another way than in the studied cases. Instead of being
processed parallel to a new land use plan to anticipate the granting of a building permit, it can be and is often used alone, as a way of allowing the regeneration of the site
without having to approve a new land use plan. It seems reasonable to conclude that
such a use of the legal possibility of departure has similar effects on capturing value
increase as when processing a normal new land use plan (see sections 7.4.1 to 7.4.3).
Detailing the outline Land use Plan (uitwerking)
Land use plans can include outline land use regulations that can be detailed afterwards (Globaal BP met uitwerkingsplicht). The detailing follows a short procedure.
The law15 and the jurisprudence16 delimit the ‘minimum’ contents of the outline landuse regulations and prescribe that the plan must state the objective delimitation (objectieve begrenzing) for the detailing. This means that the detailing must take place
within established limits (Van Zundert 2004: 148; Van der Ree, 2000: 434). As a consequence of these limits, the detailing cannot introduce ‘new’ land-use possibilities,
15 Article 13.2 1985 Physical Planning Decree; Explanatory Memorandum of the 1985 Physical
Planning Act (Tweede Kamer zitting 1955-56, no. 2, p.p. 14-15).
16 KB 19 February 1982 (Norg), in Bouwrecht 1982, p. 511; Afdeling rechtspraak 4 June 1985
(Amsterdam), in Bouwrecht 1985, p. 915; ABRS 9 june 1998 (Amsterdam), in AB 1998, 338, and in
Gst. 1999, 7105/6; Afdeling rechtspraak 4 June 1985 (Amsterdam), in Bouwrecht 1985, p. 915; HR
23 September 1988 (Purmerend), in Bouwrecht 1989, p. 113; KB 1 September 1987 (Rozenburg), nr.
9, in Bouwrecht 1988, p. 31; ABRS 9 june 1998 (Amsterdam), in AB 1998, 338, and in Gst. 1999,
7105/6.

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nor can it exclude any of the possible land-uses prescribed in the outline regulations.
However, it can shift the use possibilities between different plots and is therefore potentially interesting in negotiations with the landowners.
In Kruidenbuurt the land use plan, approved in April 2005, prescribes outline land
use regulations for most of the plan area. The detailing for the ﬁrst half of the site was
approved in January 2007, and affected signiﬁcantly the building possibilities: the
exact number of dwellings, for which the 2005 plan established a minimum number
of 650; the building volume, for which the plan established some elements of the
building envelope, without ﬁxing a maximal number of m²; and some other possibilities. However, detailing has not had consequences for capturing value increase
because the development agreements were already sealed before the approval of the
land use plan. In Stationskwartier the situation is different. Here only 3% of the plan
area is covered by outline land use regulations, which have not been detailed at the
moment of data gathering. The Development Agreement sealed before the approval
of the land use plan did not include the landowners of this part of the plan area. It
is unclear whether detailing will be preceded by negotiations and thus to additional
capturing value increase, but potentially it could offer some negotiation room to the
municipality to ask some contributions to the landowners.
7.4.5.3 Flexibility to adapt the geographical scope (the plan area) of the
binding rules accordingly to negotiations with landowners
It seems that land use plans and departures from them can be quite ﬂexibly adapted
to the negotiation process. Neither the law nor the jurisprudence establishes general
limitations to the minimum size of the plan area, which means that they can be as
small as a speciﬁc plot (Bosch & Hanemaayer 1992: quoted in Bregman & Sievers
2002; Van Damme & Verdaas 1996: 73-78). Also, in principle there is no maximal
number of plots, which means that, if necessary, a plan or departure can be made
for each plot, no matter how many plots they are. The jurisprudence gives no general
criterion for disapproving developments based on different small plans. On the contrary17, the use of many small binding plans is very common. Data from 1987 until
1993 seem to conﬁrm this. In that period, more than 50% of all the land-use plans in
the province of Gelderland were small plans (Van Damme & Verdaas 1996: 76-78).
After 1993 the use of small binding plans has remained very common in practice.
The studied cases refer to larger sites, of at least 5 ha (Kop van Oost). In all of them the
municipality was free to delimitate the plan area. They did so very carefully, following most of the time considerations related to the property boundaries. In general it
seems plausible that this ﬂexibility has helped to facilitate the tempo of implementation, in the sense that proposals included only those landowners willing to develop.

This chapter focuses on whether the capturing value increase goals are achieved or
not and on the distribution of costs between the involved parties: who has paid which
public infrastructure and facilities, and possibly some extras? We look also at whether
the goals have been achieved on time. The main sources of information are the four
cases, complemented with other written sources and interviews with relevant experts. The conclusions are summarized in table 20.
On-site infrastructure provision costs
In all the studied cases, public bodies contributed heavily to on-site infrastructure
provision costs. In De Funen the municipality assumed an important part: the refurbishing of an adjacent road (with a clear, but not exclusive, on-site character), and
part of the public space (parking places and part of a park). The developer paid the
costs of the public space with an exclusive on-site character and the other part of the
park. In Kruidenbuurt the municipality paid about one third of the costs and some
additional costs for public infrastructure situated within the plan area that serves a
wider area. The developer (a housing association) contributed two thirds18. In Kop
van Oost the municipality paid a small part of the public space, and the full costs of
refurbishing a main road situated within the plan area but serving a wider area. The
central government subsidized 25% of the soil decontamination costs, which were
not very high. The developer paid the rest: constructing most of the on-site public
space and possibly paying minor damage compensation to neighbours. In Stationskwartier, subsidies from the municipality, province and central government covered
about two thirds of the costs: the public roads and space within the site, and part of
other on-site infrastructure (soil decontamination, preparation of plans). The developer (Dutch Railways) paid about one third of the costs. The new railway and bus
stations (situated within the plan area, but serving a much wider area) are considered
below.
It seems that, in general, these ﬁndings cannot be considered an exception. Public
bodies in the Netherlands usually contribute heavily, in urban regeneration, to onsite infrastructure. Both a study of the participation of housing associations in 31
regeneration sites (De Kam & Needham, 2001: 69), and a more recent study of eight
cases of private land development in urban regeneration sites (Buitelaar et al., 2008;
Segeren, interview 2008) include similar ﬁndings. Not only the municipality, but
also other governmental levels, contribute heavily, with subsidy programmes (e.g.
Investeringsbudget Stedelijke Vernieuwing). Interviewed experts conﬁrm this (Verdaas and Van Wageningen, interviews 2008). These conclusions coincide with the
recommendation made by the Ministry for Housing, Planning and the Environment
18 And in addition provided new accommodation for all the former inhabitants.

€6m
A minor part 23% total
(5% total value
plan area
real estate)
excl VAT

€ 20-30 m
(4-6% total
value real
estate)

Kop van Oost
Groningen
(total value real
estate € 140 m)

Stationskwartier
Breda
(total value real
estate € 500 m)

27% total
plan area

7% total
plan area

14% total plan none
area

6% total plan none
area, 29% incl
adjacent roads

25% total plan none
area, 36% incl
adjacent roads

Important part none

none

none

none

none

Public body
provides
most of the
land

Public body

none

none

none

none

none

none

none

none

Sometimes

Almost no contribu- none
tions of developers
to public infra/fac
situated outside plan
area, and modest
contribution to infra/
fac situated within
plan area but serving
a wider area.

Contributions off-site Cream off
public infrastructure betterment
and facilities

none

none

45% units
(developer is
housing association)

none

none

none

Minor part of costs,
and most of the land
needed for new
Railways Station
(developer is Dutch
Railways)

none

Eventual
share in
proﬁts.

none

€ 0.5 for public facil- none
ity outside plan area
and small contribution to road within
plan area.

over the allocation of costs in urban regeneration between municipalities, housing
associations, real estate investors, commercial developers and inhabitants owning
their house in de regeneration areas. According to this recommendation, public bodies in urban regeneration should be ﬁnancially responsible for the refurbishing of the
public infrastructure, at least when the public space is old and needs refurbishing to
bring it to current quality standards (Vrom, 2005: 22-23).
Land needed for on-site public infrastructure and facilities
Regarding the land needed for on-site infrastructure provision (excluding the land
needed for public buildings), in the studied cases public bodies provided most, or
an important part, of it (roads, public space). In De Funen the municipality provided
a road at the border but within the plan area of the land use plan, and part of the
park. The developer provided the land for the public space that has a clear on-site
character, and for part of the park. In Kruidenbuurt the municipality provided most
of the needed land, and the developer a minor part. In Kop van Oost the estimation
depends on whether some adjacent roads (situated within but at the borders of the
plan area) are included or not: the municipality provided more than the half of the
needed land if the adjacent roads are included in the calculation, and a minor part
if excluded. In Stationskwartier the municipality provided one third of the land for
on-site infrastructure provision and the developer (Dutch Railways) the other two
thirds. The new railway station is not included here, for this is considered below as
off-site infrastructure. It seems that, in general, these case-based ﬁndings cannot be
considered an exception. Public bodies in the Netherlands, in urban regeneration,
usually provide most or at least an important part of the land that is needed for on-site
public infrastructure. Municipalities usually own land in such areas. Most of the time
this land is former public space, sometimes normal plots. A recent study supports
this, and also that municipalities not only provide former public space, but often also
building plots that were already public or have been bought for the purpose of regeneration (Buitelaar et al., 2008: 82, 100; Segeren, interview 2008). Several experts
conﬁrm this (Segeren, Verdaas and Van Wageningen, interviews 2008). Again, these
conclusions coincide with the principles of allocation of costs recommended by the
Ministry (Vrom, 2005: 21-23). Although that document refers explicitly only to the
costs and not to the land, its general principle that public infrastructure and public
space are the responsibility of public bodies includes the land under them.
In all studied cases the municipality received free the ownership rights over the public infrastructure and the land under it (the land that was not already its property). This
also seems to be a generalizable conclusion, although there are exceptions. There are
cases in which public infrastructure ﬁnally becomes shared ownership of the owners
of the real estate, for example public space situated above parking garages (Segeren
and Verdaas, interviews 2008).
Regarding the land needed for public facilities (the land under the public buildings):
the studied cases do not include public buildings of any kind within the plan area of

268

The Netherlands

the land use plan. It seems that in Stationskwartier in Breda several public bodies will
open an ofﬁce in the new station (court of justice, post ofﬁce). However, this cannot
be considered as capturing value increase because those public bodies will have to
pay the normal commercial price for the ofﬁce space they are planning to use. The
new railway station is considered below. Data from an own survey of 56 urban regeneration districts suggest that these case-based ﬁndings are not an exception when
projects are led by commercial developers (of those districts a minority, see Annex 5).
None of the studied regeneration schemes led by commercial developers on privately
owned land include privately ﬁnanced public buildings. It seems that, in general, in
urban regeneration on privately owned land led by commercial developers in the
Netherlands, this is normal. The land needed for public buildings, if they exist, is usually provided by the respective public body. Again, this matches with the mentioned
recommendation of the Ministry. That document states that in urban regeneration,
public bodies should be responsible for the public buildings. Although no explicit
reference is made to the land under public buildings, it seems clear that the Ministry considers that public bodies are also responsible for acquiring the needed land
(Vrom, 2005: 22, 24). On the other hand, it seems to be common that housing associations contribute to public facilities such as care facilities or other buildings with
a public function, although speciﬁc ﬁgures are not available.
On-site public facilities (the buildings)
This has already been handled above together with the land that is needed for the
public buildings.
Land and money for on-site and off-site social/affordable housing
Of the four studied cases, only Kruidenbuurt and De Funen included social/affordable housing. In Kruidenbuurt the developer, a housing association, will develop
about the half of the total number of units as social dwellings. The developer bears
thus the difference between the price of each unit (bedrijfswaarde) and the free market price. Besides the social rented units, the developer will sell about one quarter of
the dwellings for a maximal selling price of € 240,000 ﬁnal price (price of 1-1-2003,
to be updated each year). However, it is not clear whether this could be considered
as a cost to the developer, as we do not know whether this price (€240,000) is below
the price in the free market. In De Funen the developer builds some social housing
(less than one third of the units). However, here the developer receives an important
public subsidy from the central government, thus it is not clear whether the developer
actually subsidizes the social units, probably not.
The ﬁndings in the mentioned own survey of 56 regeneration districts seem to conﬁrm the exceptionality of case De Funen. None of those schemes that were found to

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269

be located on privately owned land and implemented by commercial developers20
included any social housing. It seems that, in general, in urban regeneration in the
Netherlands, commercial developers neither develop social housing, nor do they
pay the costs of it. Social housing seems to be a task almost exclusively for housing
associations. A recent study of eight urban regeneration cases agrees (Buitelaar et al.,
2008; Segeren, interview 2008). As a consequence, social housing most of the time is
built only in those projects where housing associations or public bodies control (part
of) the land, such as in Kruidenbuurt. This conclusion matches with the mentioned
recommendation of the Ministry. This states that it is the housing association, in urban regeneration, which is ﬁnancially responsible for the deﬁcit that is implied in the
development of social houses (Vrom, 2005: 23).
Land and money for off-site public infrastructure and facilities
Regarding public infrastructure and facilities situated outside the plan area: of the
four studied cases, only in two of them did the developer contribute to this, and then
only modestly. In Kruidenbuurt the developer contributed € 0.5m towards a public
facility situated outside the plan area. In De Funen the developer provided about half
of a park (land and costs of construction) situated outside the plan area of the land
use plan, between the new building and the existing neighbourhood. However, the
land use plan here was delimited very tightly, and actually this park serves clearly
and mainly the new building in the plan area. In general it seems that the conclusion is generalizable that developers in urban regeneration on privately owned land
do not contribute signiﬁcantly to public infrastructure or facilities located outside
the plan area. In the mentioned survey of 56 urban regeneration districts, none of
those projects located on privately owned land and implemented by commercial
developers included contributions for off-site infrastructure, whether this was situated outside or inside the plan area. Kolprom (2000: 31-53) and a recent study of
eight cases (Buitelaar et al., 2008: 90; Segeren, interview 2008) agree with this. Also,
this conclusion seems to ﬁt with the mentioned recommendation of the Ministry.
This does not even mention the possibility of charging the development in question
with public infrastructure located elsewhere. Moreover, that document follows the
principle that public infrastructure is the responsibility of public bodies (see above).
However, it seems also that, sometimes, urban regeneration schemes do contribute to
off-site public infrastructure and facilities with a monetary payment to a fund (Fonds
Bovenwijkse Voorzieningen). Contributions, if they are made, could be between €4.5
and €10 for every square metre of serviced building plot (Van Wageningen, Stauttener, interviews 2008).

20 Hoograven, Vicona, Onixweg 1-3 (in the city of Utrecht); Kanaleneiland/Transwijk, Winkelcentrum
(in Utrecht); Malburgen, Winkelcentrum Drieslag (in Arnhem); Zuilen/Ondiep, winkelcentrum
Rokade (in Utrecht); Heuvel, WSST (in Breda); Presikhaaf, Weldamlaan (in Arnhem). On two
others the situation was doubtful, for land was private owned but will be acquired by a Publicprivate Partnership (Berﬂo Es, in Engelo), or land was only partly private owned (Centrumgebied
Kanaleneiland, in Utrecht)

270

The Netherlands

Regarding public infrastructure and facilities situated within the plan area, but serving a wider area (that is why they are considered here off-site): schemes might include
these in their plan area. In the studied cases this was sometimes clear, sometimes not,
and in any case developers did not contribute much, except in Stationskwartier. In
De Funen a street situated at the border but within the plan area has been refurbished. The developer will not contribute to this. In Kruidenbuurt several streets situated at the borders but within the plan area will be refurbished. The developer will
not contribute signiﬁcantly: the land was already public (the existing roads) and the
municipality will pay most of the costs of refurbishing. In Kop van Oost a street situated at the border but within the plan area will be refurbished. The developer will
not contribute; the municipality provides the land (the existing road) and pays the
refurbishing costs. In Stationskwartier a new street and, especially, the new railway
and bus station will clearly serve a wider area. Most of the costs (not the land) will be
paid with public subsidies. The developer (Dutch Railways) will contribute with a relatively minor amount to the costs of the new railway station, but will provide all the
land needed for this station and most of the land for the new public streets. In short,
in the studied cases, developers pay, if they pay at all, only a small or marginal part
of the costs of the public infrastructure and facilities situated within the plan area that
serve a wider area. Also, public bodies provide most of the needed land, with the exception of Stationskwartier. The mentioned survey of 56 urban regeneration districts
conﬁrms these case-based ﬁndings: the surveyed schemes on privately owned land
and implemented by commercial developers include, at the most, only a little public
space directly related to the scheme. An expert conﬁrmed that in urban regeneration
on privately owned land the contribution of private parties to this is usually modest
(Van Wageningen, interview in 2008). And, again, these conclusions seem to ﬁt with
the mentioned recommendation of the Ministry (Vrom, 2005): public infrastructure
is a responsibility of public bodies.
Creaming off plus value
In the studied cases, public bodies, as such and not as landowners, receive no share
of the proﬁts. The exception might be Stationskwartier, where the municipality bears
some risks in the infrastructure provision and might enjoy some proﬁt. Also, the municipality will obtain the market value of the future use possibilities for its land, which
is about 5-7% of the total plan area. But in general, in case of regeneration schemes
on privately owned land, municipalities do not receive a share in the proﬁts of operations (Segeren, Verdaas and Van Wageningen, interviews in 2008).
Tempo of implementation of the capturing value increase goals
Now we take into account possible side effects, of which special attention has been
given to the tempo of implementation of the capturing value increase goals. In the
studied cases, if land use plans include implementation schedules (Kruidenbuurt and
Stationskwartier), these are very vague and are included in the Explanation, the part
of the plan that is not legally binding. The legally binding parts of land use plans cannot include deadlines for the start or completion of development. In De Funen, Krui-

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271

denbuurt and seemingly also in Stationskwartier, it was the development agreement
(not the Land use plan) that included clear deadlines for the delivery of public infrastructure and facilities. Deadlines, if existing (whether in the not legally binding part
of the land use plans and/or in the development contracts) were or will be sometimes
fulﬁlled (phases 1 and 2 in Kruidenbuurt) and sometimes not (the deadlines for most
of the scheme in De Funen, included in the development agreement). It seems that
in all of the cases there were almost no deadlines that were very hard, in the sense
that delay of start or delivery of development would lead to signiﬁcant sanctions for
the developer. For example, in De Funen the delay was very signiﬁcant, without this
bringing any disadvantages for the developer. An interviewed public ofﬁcer considered in this case that the municipality would not have had much chance to win a legal suit on this point. In Kruidenbuurt the deadlines, included in the agreement, seem
also not very hard. The exception could be Stationskwartier. Based on interviews, it
seems that the deadlines included in the Development Agreement (which was not
available to me) might have legal consequences: the developer will be obliged to
sell his land for a low price if he delays more than two years the acquisition of the
serviced building plots. In short, deadlines, if existing, were not very hard, with the
exception of Stationskwartier.
These case-based ﬁndings seem not to be an exception in urban regeneration in
the Netherlands. Deadlines, if they are made, are very soft, and delay is common.
Schemes in which land use plans have been approved, but in which there are signiﬁcant development delays, are not an exception at all. Also, there are cases known
of development that has never started, or started only after many years of delay and
only after development terms, and sometimes also the land use plan, have been substantially redeﬁned (Segeren, interview 2008). It seems clear that delay is very common in urban regeneration in the Netherlands (Segeren, Van den Brand, Hoekstra,
interviews in 2008).

7.6

Causal relationships between formal rules relevant
to zoning and capturing value increase in
the Netherlands

Section 7.4 gave an answer to Preparatory research question 3: it inferred the possible causal relations between the independent variable ‘formal rules relevant to zoning’ and the dependent variable ‘capturing value increase’. This chapter summarizes
ﬁrst the inferred causalities and then assesses the effect of possible third variables.

272

7.6.1

The Netherlands

The inferred causalities

The ﬁndings suggest that the following sub-variables can inﬂuence positively and/or
negatively the degree of capturing value increase (see also the causal model in section 2.4.2 and ﬁgure 32):
• Sub-variable a, Some Certainty about the future building possibilities, together
with Uncertainty about the future contributions: this might have been negative
for intermediary variables negotiation position (of the municipality) and accounted land costs, and thus negative for capturing value increase;
• Sub-variable b, Contents of binding rules: not being able to include obligations
and implementation schedules seems to have inﬂuenced negatively intermediary variable negotiation position (of the municipality);
• Sub-variable c, Making binding rules conditional on agreement: the indirect
possibilities of conditioning the approval of binding rules to securing public
infrastructure and facilities can be positive for intermediary variable negotiation
position (of the municipality), and thus on capturing value increase. However,
legal limitations to these indirect possibilities have some negative effects;
• Sub-variable d, Property rights: the interdependency between municipalities and
landowners seems to have a negative effect on intermediary variables accounted
land costs (higher costs), regular proﬁt margins (negative for capturing value increase, but positive for the developer), negotiation position (of the municipality),
and delay;
• Sub-variable e, Guarantees for those taking initiative: the obligation, introduced
in 2008, to determine an application within eight weeks might be negative for
intermediary variable negotiation position (of the municipality), but positive for
intermediary variable delay;
• Sub-variable e, Flexibility in modiﬁcation/departure binding rules: (1) the relative ﬂexibility to modify the land use plan (wijziging) seems only to be positive
for intermediary variable delay. (2) The possibility of departing from the existing
land use plan (vrijstelling/projectbesluit), when used as complement to the new
land use plan, can affect positively intermediary variable delay;
• Sub-variable e, Flexibility departing binding rules: the possibility of departing
from the existing land use plan (vrijstelling/projectbesluit), but not as a complement to the new land use plan, can have, the same as sub-variables a, b and c,
a positive effect on intermediary variables accounted land costs and negotiation
position (of the municipality);
• Sub-variable e, Flexibility detailing ‘a posteriori’: it is not clear whether the possibility of approving outline land use regulations and detailing them afterwards
(globale bestemming met uitwerkingsplicht) has consequences for capturing
value increase, but in some cases it might potentially offer some negotiation
room to municipalities. In other words, it might strengthen intermediary variable
negotiation position (of the municipality);
• Sub-variable e, Flexibility to adapt the size of the plan area according to negotiations with each landowner: this might be relevant for intermediary variable delay.

Figure 32. Scheme of the inferred causal relations in the Netherlands between independent variable ‘formal rules relevant to zoning’, the intermediary
variables and the dependent variable ‘capturing value increase’.

< Independent variable >

- Sub-variable e: flexibility sizing plan area

- Sub-variable e: flexibility detailment ‘a posteriori’

- Sub-variable e: flexibility departure
without new land use plan

- Sub-variable e: flexibility modification / departure
parallel to new land use plan

- Sub-variable e: guarantees for those taking initiative

3. Public bodies using powers procedure

2. Owners using property rights (sub-variable d)

- Sub-variable c: indirect conditioning / limits to conditioning

- Sub-variable b: narrow contents binding rules

- Sub-variable a: uncertainty-certainty

1. Public bodies using powers certainly:

Actions influencing distribution initial profit (D):

The Netherlands
273

274

7.6.2

The Netherlands

Possible third variables

Here the effect of other, possible third, variables is assessed, related ﬁrst to the speciﬁc circumstances in the studied cases (variables D4 and D5 of the causal model in
section 2.4.2), second to market circumstances (variable A1) and third to presumed
high development costs (variables A2 and A3). The goal is to investigate the possibility that the inferred causal relationships turn out to be spurious (see section 3.2.1.2
for more detail about this methodological approach).
Speciﬁc circumstances in the studied cases
In Eindhoven, the municipality, at the time of the negotiations about the redevelopment of Kruidenbuurt, was used to implementing the public space itself. Both the interviewed developer and a public ofﬁcer considered that it took some effort to reach
an agreement about how the developer should be allowed to take over this task. This
might have delayed the process.
In two cases, involved parties considered that internal organizational aspects might
have been relevant. This is the case in Kruidenbuurt, where according to both the
developer and a public ofﬁcer, a lack of continuity in the municipal organization delayed the process. In Stationskwartier also the developer named this as a delaying factor. In Stationskwartier an involved public ofﬁcer considered that the employment of
skilled managers in both the central government and in the municipality inﬂuenced
value capturing positively.
In two cases, involved parties considered that a good personal relationship between
the developer and the municipality might have speeded the development process. In
Kruidenbuurt both the developer and a public ofﬁcer considered that the good relationship between both has been relevant. In Kop van Oost, the developer considered
that a good relationship at managerial level might have been of importance.
In Kop van Oost the removal of a gas ﬁlling station was a relevant delaying factor
(interview with Segeren, 2008).
Market circumstances
It has already been considered above that rising housing prices might have stimulated
the use of the option to wait in most of the studied cases. For landowners, waiting was
an interesting option from the economic point of view as the rising of housing prices
translated into risings of the proﬁts (in the form of higher accounted land prices and/
or higher regular and ﬁnal proﬁt margins). Market circumstances, together with the
property rights of landowners, which gave them the option to wait and delay develop-

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275

ment, have thus inﬂuenced largely the behaviour of the landowners and the results
on the ﬁnally captured value increase (for more details see 7.4.4.2) 21.
Financial feasibility
It has already been considered that in urban regeneration schemes some involved
parties perceive the ﬁnancial feasibility as a problem, a problem that might have
stimulated the use of the option to wait in several cases. Some of the involved developers had the wish or the need to undertake time-consuming negotiations to enlarge or ensure ﬁnancial feasibility (see 7.4.4.2). This third variable is mentioned as a
general problem in urban regeneration schemes. In other words, in the Netherlands
in urban regeneration, high land development costs (which consist of the accounted
land costs, the infrastructure provision costs, the plan preparation costs, the soil decontamination costs, the compensation costs and the contributions, see section 2.4.3
for an explanation of these sorts of costs), in combination with a low initial proﬁt,
might cause delay and the lowering of requirements because ﬁnal proﬁts might be
insufﬁcient.

21 In the studied cases, prices for new apartments (which are most of the new buildings) vary from
about € 2,000 to 3,000 per m² ﬂoor space, depending on the location, and maybe even higher in
Amsterdam:
• Kop van Oost, in Groningen: based on the selling brochure of the developer, it was possible to
assess the prices of the apartments to be about € 2,500/m² ﬂoor space.
• Stationskwartier, in Breda: based on the total expected returns given by the developer, it was possible to assess that the prices of the new apartments could be about € 2,000/m² ﬂoor space. This
estimation seems low when compared with prices in the centre of Breda, where Stationskwartier
is located. Prices of new apartments in the centrum of Breda vary from € 2,393/m² in scheme
WSST (arithmetic average of prices of 19 apartments, on-line site consulted on 9/1/08), to
€ 2,555/m² in ‘Aan de kade’ (price of the only apartment to sell when site consulted on 9/1/08),
and € 2,600/m² in ‘Vista Baluarte’ (price of the two apartments to sell when site consulted on
9/1/08).
• De Funen, in Amsterdam: here prices must have been higher, as prices in Amsterdam are signiﬁcantly higher than in Breda and Groningen.
• Kruidenbuurt: it was not possible to obtain prices per m² ﬂoor space.

CHAPTER

8
Conclusions

The goals of this research are two fold. First we want to learn how to use those formal
rules that are relevant to zoning to improve cost recovery in the Netherlands. ‘Formal
rules relevant to zoning’ are all those formal rules for the exercise of both legally
binding rules (e.g. a land use plan), including the implications for property rights in
land, and non-legally binding policy documents. ‘Cost recovery’ refers to the recovery, through contributions from private developers, of those costs that are related to
the realization of public infrastructure and facilities that beneﬁt the development.
Second we want to draw conclusions for the theoretical reﬂections set out in chapter
2, reﬂections that have laid the foundations, together with the deﬁnition of the problem in chapter 1, for the research questions and their operationalization in chapter 3.
The ﬁrst goal (improving cost recovery in the Netherlands) is achieved in chapter 9
in the form of recommendations to be applied in Dutch urban development practice
and legislation. The second goal (theoretical reﬂections) is achieved in this chapter 8.
Both chapters rest on the ﬁndings of chapters 5 to 7.
Chapter 2, based on policy network literature and current debates on property
rights in land and ﬂexibility in planning, developed two speciﬁc methods of ‘Network management’ for inﬂuencing the interactions within the policy networks in
urban regeneration, and for inﬂuencing the outcomes for capturing value increase.
These two methods have been included in a model that explains the various causalities of capturing value increase. The methods have also been formulated as
two hypotheses, which have been tested empirically. The ﬁrst speculates about the
effects on capturing value increase of the deﬁnition of property rights in land and
how this inﬂuences the power relationship between the involved public and private
parties. The second speculates about the effects of the certainty created by binding rules and non-binding policy documents during development processes. In the
causal model a third speculation came up that has also been empirically tested: the

278

Conclusions

assumption that the ﬂexibility in procedures could be relevant for capturing value
increase.
Power in the policy networks
It seems that the ﬁrst two hypotheses might indeed be valid. About the third assumption, it has not been possible to infer clear and generalizable relationships between
ﬂexibility and the results on capturing value increase. The ﬁndings in all countries
suggest that the variables named in the ﬁrst two hypotheses are indeed relevant for
capturing value increase, because they can inﬂuence the interactions within the
policy networks in urban regeneration. Public bodies in England and especially in
Valencia seem, thanks to these tools, to play a role that ﬁts better in the traditional
interorganizational approach than in the policy network approach. In other words,
public bodies manage to play a role which is more central hierarchical than that of a
mere coordinating body.
Municipalities in England and especially in Valencia prescribe beforehand and unilaterally clear requirements and obligations to be fulﬁlled by property developers
and landowners. That is, public bodies set the goals that developers and landowners
must fulﬁl, without previously agreeing this with them. These requirements are the
bottom-line during the negotiations. This results in a high level of captured value
increase. In Valencia, municipalities go further than in England, as the Valencian
municipalities not only set unilaterally the goals, but they have also, thanks to a
compulsory land readjustment regulation, powers to select the developer they prefer, if necessary by-passing the landowners and without the need of buying or expropriating the land.
Criticisms of the policy network approach
These ﬁndings support a ﬁrst conclusion regarding the advocated role of public bodies in the policy network approach. The dominant role of public bodies in urban regeneration, especially in Valencia, clearly does not ﬁt within the role that the policy
network literature gives them, and it undermines some of the basic assumptions of
that literature: that actors are necessarily interdependent, that public bodies must assume a more modest role and cannot be dominant. The ﬁndings suggest that public
bodies in Valencia and, to a lesser extent in England, are clearly not primus inter
pares: on the contrary, they are able to unilaterally set out value capturing goals and
impose their implementation. An important basis for this dominant role is the possibility in Valencia of avoiding mutual dependency between public bodies and developers/landowners. The policy network approach might have insufﬁciently worked
out the basic idea that underlies the role that it advocates for public bodies. This basic
idea is that the government always depends on private actors because these have a
veto power on policy-making and implementation. In Valencia, public bodies can
effectively avoid this veto power through compulsory land readjustment. This ﬁnding
should stimulate a reconsideration of the basic assumptions in the advocated role of
public bodies in urban development.

Conclusions

279

The rest of this chapter summarizes the ﬁndings for each country, compares them and
enumerates the consequences for the theoretical reﬂections. Here we follow the narrative
structure set out in section 3.3.3, which distinguished between the following sub-variables:
1. Certainty beforehand about future building possibilities and contributions;
2. Choosing the contents of the legally binding rules;
3. Making the legally binding rules conditional on the developer securing his contributions;
4. Modulating property rights.

8.1

Certainty beforehand about future building
possibilities and contributions

Binding rules and also indicative policy documents can create certainty about future
building possibilities and about the contributions that developers will have to make.
Certainty can be created before, during, or after negotiations with developers. There
are important differences between the studied countries. Spain and the region of Valencia belong to a group of ‘plan-led countries’, in which there is an important level
of legally binding certainty in early stages of the development process. The Netherlands also belongs theoretically to this plan-led system. However, in practice there is
ﬂexibility, as a consequence of which the Dutch planning system shows similarities
with the ‘development-led’ planning system. In this system, characteristic of the UK,
binding rules are approved after negotiations ﬁnish, not before. This is the practice in
the Netherlands, not only in recent years, but also from at least the early 1980’s. This
deviation of the Dutch system from the theoretical working of the plan-led model (a
model which the Dutch legislation pre-supposes) seems not to be an exception internationally (for a comparison of the Netherlands with other eight Western European
countries, see section 4.1). Let us look at the ﬁndings in Valencia, England and the
Netherlands in more detail:
Certainty about future building possibilities
Municipalities usually create certainty in the early stages, in different degrees, about
the future building possibilities, that is about what the landowner will be able to
build. In Valencia this happens through the approval of general land use plans that
must cover the whole municipal territory. These plans are highly detailed and legally
binding. In the Netherlands and England, municipalities usually approve indicative,
not legally binding plans, which create some certainty. Examples of these documents
in the Netherlands are Nota van Uitgangspunten, Stedenbouwkundig Plan/Visie,
Ont-wikkelingsprogramma, Programma van Eisen, Masterplan, Structuurplan, Structuurvisie, etc; and in England Local Plans, Development Plans, etc. These documents,
besides being of an indicative character, include often much more vague and outline
prescriptions that the Spanish general plans. Within these clear differences, there

280

Conclusions

seems to be however a trend to increase certainty, at least in Valencia and England.
This trend is visible in Valencia since the 1980s and, more recently, in England. Local public bodies tend to increase certainty in order to improve transparency and
accountability in their planning decisions. Based on these ﬁndings, a ﬁrst conclusion
is that part of the literature on comparative planning systems in Europe may not have
distinguished accurately enough the actual differences in this variable between national planning systems, at least with regard to the Spanish versus English and Dutch
systems. This literature has tended to conclude a convergence in this that does not
match our ﬁndings and fundamentally contradicts the literature in Spain, which has
repeatedly claimed the singularity of the Spanish planning system because it offers
in very early stages of development processes a much higher level of certainty about
the development possibilities than any other European country (confero European
Commission, 1997; Nadin & Stead, 2008: 40, 44-45; Comisión de Expertos sobre
Urbanismo, 1996: 31-47; García-Bellido, 1999).
Another conclusion is that more certainty beforehand may result in less public value
capturing. It seems that municipalities that prescribe building possibilities early in the
development process might stimulate land price increases and might lose a valuable
negotiation tool. This seems to lead to less capturing of value increase. However, this
sub variable (certainty about future building possibilities) seems to interact closely
with the following sub variable (certainty about future contributions, see under). Certainty about building possibilities might be negative for capturing value increase, but
if accompanied by certainty about future contributions, it does not necessarily have
to be negative.
Certainty about future contributions
The differences between Valencia, England and the Netherlands are larger when
looking at the certainty beforehand about the future contributions, that is, the certainty about what the landowner will have to contribute to public infrastructure and
facilities. In Valencia there is in the early stages much certainty about future contributions through (1) legal minimal standards for public infrastructure and facilities, (2)
local policy and (3) the approval of legally binding General land use plans. This certainty has certainly enlarged the capturing of value increase compared to before the
introduction of these measures. English municipalities usually create, increasingly
in the last years, some certainty through the approval of (1) site-speciﬁc indicative
plans that establish the contributions for the development in question, and (2) non
site-speciﬁc indicative policy documents about generic public value capturing that
establish standard contributions for the whole municipality. The approval of these
generic documents has been stimulated in recent years by the central British government, and has inﬂuenced the capturing of value increase positively. In the Netherlands, most of the time there is no certainty at all, neither created through legally
binding nor indicative documents. And if there is some certainty, it is limited. In two
of the Dutch cases, the future contributions were clear neither before negotiations
took place, nor before the price of land was established. In the other two Dutch cases

281

Conclusions

there was some certainty, but this was due to exceptional circumstances. This uncertainty seems to lower the extent of captured value increase.

Table 21. Degree of certainty in Valencia, England and the Netherlands

Certainty beforehand about
building possibilities

Certainty beforehand about
contributions

Valencia

Always, much certainty

Always, much certainty

England

Sometimes, some certainty

Sometimes, some certainty

The Netherlands

Always, some certainty

Almost never, and limited certainty

Table 22. Effects certainty on captured value increase.

Certainty beforehand about
contributions

No certainty about future
contributions

Certainty beforehand
+
about building possibilities some capturing value increase

less capturing value increase

No certainty about
++
future building possibilities more capturing value increase

The explanation for the positive effect which certainty has on contributions is three
fold: (1) certainty may reduce the price of land, as developers do indeed take account
of the future contributions when calculating the price to be paid to the landowner,
and lower land prices augment the ﬁnancial room for contributing to public infrastructure and facilities; (2) certainty might also inﬂuence the accounted land costs
(that is, the price at which the land is entered into the accounts for the regeneration
project) and the regular proﬁt margin of the developer. The accounted land cost and
the regular proﬁt margins are often not set at the start of development processes. At
that time, developers often have some room to set them higher or lower. A developer
confronted with a high contributions package will tend to account the land for a
lower price in the accounts, and accept that this development site will not contribute
much to possible losses on other sites. Conversely, a developer confronted with a
low contributions package will tend to account the land for a higher price. Regarding regular proﬁt margins, developers can consider at the beginning of development
process the size of the proﬁt, which may vary from 5% to 20% or more. Once the
price of land and the regular proﬁt margin have been established, lowering them is
usually complicated. (3) A third explanation for the positive effect of certainty on con-

282

Conclusions

tributions is that certainty strengthens the policy base and the moral authority for the
public ofﬁcers to require contributions, so contributions do not need to be introduced
as something new in the negotiations. Tables 21 and 22 summarize the ﬁndings.
Results of testing the 2nd hypothesis
Within the causal model explained in section 2.4.2, the second hypothesis is that
a modiﬁcation of one of the context variables (formal rules about certainty about
development terms, variable B2) could modify the actions of the involved actors
(how the local public bodies use their formal powers about certainty on development
terms, variable D1). The second hypothesis speculates therefore that:
Creating uncertainty in early stages of development processes about future building
possibilities, and certainty about future contributions, can inﬂuence capturing value
increase in a positive way.
The ﬁndings seem to conﬁrm this. In the studied cases, creating certainty or leaving
uncertainty open seems to have had important consequences for the residual price
mechanisms of the land and for the negotiation position of each party. This can be
relevant in the debate in the planning profession about the need for ﬂexibility. This
debate often focuses on the consequences of socio-economic dynamics in planning
practice, and tends to embrace ﬂexibility as the solution for the unpredictability of
these dynamics. Flexibility is advocated as the way of achieving a non-linear and
multi-layered decision-making system. However, the ﬁndings underline the importance of the converse: namely the inﬂuence of planning practice on economic dynamics that are central to the outcome of planning processes. That is, too much ﬂexibility, at least regarding the private contributions, can affect negatively the quality
and quantity of private contributions to public infrastructure and facilities. In sum, the
ﬁndings suggest that there must be a certain level of certainty about contributions, in
order to strengthen the obligations on the private sector for the realization of public
infrastructure.

8.2

Choosing the contents of legally binding rules

Binding plans might be useful in negotiations if the municipality can include in them
not only the physical zoning, but also aspects related to the ﬁnancing and implementation of public infrastructure and facilities. Do binding plans regulate only a desired
ﬁnal picture, without stating who is responsible for its implementation? Or also the
obligations that must be fulﬁlled by the developer? The ﬁndings suggest that this subvariable might be relevant for capturing value increase.
Both in Valencia and England, planning law makes it possible to include in binding
plans a wide range of requirements:

Conclusions

•

283

Social/affordable housing: both in Valencia and England it is possible to prescribe social/affordable housing in the binding plans;
On-site and off-site public infrastructure and facilities: both in Valencia and England it is possible to prescribe the obligation to contribute to on-site and off-site
public infrastructure and facilities. In England, municipalities can also prescribe
contributions for the building, maintenance and exploitation costs of public
buildings, including those of social facilities (for example education and social
services).
Investing and implementation schedules: in both countries, binding plans include schedules and deadlines within which contributions must be made.

•

•

All these possibilities are positive for capturing value increase. In the Netherlands,
until the 2008 Physical Planning Act, none of these requirements could be prescribed
in the binding plans1. After the exploratory research about the Netherlands and another eight Western European countries, we presumed that the fact that, in the Netherlands these requirements could not be prescribed in the binding plans, would be
negative for capturing value increase. The ﬁndings conﬁrm this.
The consequences for the 2nd hypothesis
This ﬁnding can be used to reﬁne the 2nd hypothesis (in black letters the addition):
Creating uncertainty in early stages of development processes about future building
possibilities, and certainty about future contributions (specially if it is possible to
include all the contributions as obligatory in legally binding rules) can inﬂuence
capturing value increase in a positive way.

8.3

Making binding rules conditional on the developer
securing his contributions

The deﬁnition of relevant variables handled at the start of data gathering referred only
to the possible contents of binding plans as a determinant sub-variable. However,
the ﬁndings soon showed that it might be ineffective to do no more than prescribing contributions and temporal deadlines, because their effectiveness depends on
another sub-variable: whether binding plans can be made conditional on sealing a
Development Agreement.

1

The 2008 Act might have introduced some changes, but they came too late for the data gathering
of this research. For an assessment of whether the 2008’s novelties could improve the capturing of
value increase, see section 9.2.

284

Conclusions

The approval of binding plans containing generous value capturing arrangements
and strict deadlines, as such, does not automatically mean that the developers will
indeed implement them. It is important to remember that non-fulﬁlment of arrangements and deadlines may lead to no or almost no sanctions. In order to secure the
implementation, additionally the developer needs to be bound to do that. England
and Valencia belong to a group of countries in which it is possible to condition, in
a formal, open and direct way, the approval of the binding plans to a development
agreement. This happens as follows: ﬁrst the binding plans (Planning Permission in
England, Joint Development Programme in Valencia), including the contributions
and deadlines, are approved, but only provisionally, following extensive procedures.
The municipality then openly conditions the deﬁnite approval of these binding plans
to an agreement that secures these contributions and deadlines. When the agreement is sealed, the municipality, without the need of further procedures, approves
the documents deﬁnitely. If such an agreement is not reached, the binding plans
never come in force. Of the nine studied countries, only Italy seems to show similar
features to Valencia and England (for an international comparison, see section 4.2.3).
This clear and open conditioning seems to have improved the capturing of value
increase, and specially the speed of plan implementation. In Valencia this was very
clear: the generalization of this statutory power since 1994 has signiﬁcantly accelerated urban development.
In practice, Dutch municipalities often condition the Land use plan and departures
from it to securing contributions. However, there is no formal possibility of doing
so in an open and straightforward way, which we think might have a negative inﬂuence: 1) because in the Netherlands, after an agreement has been reached, the Land
use plan must follow an extensive procedure (including public participation), which
means that there is the risk that the plan becomes annulled or seriously modiﬁed; 2)
it implies the risk of the developer appealing to the courts because of an improper
use of statutory powers; and 3) it makes it very difﬁcult for the municipality to follow
an open and transparent public discourse, because an open conditioning might be
illegal (see section 7.4.3.1).
The consequences for the 2nd hypothesis
This ﬁnding can be used to reﬁne the 2nd hypothesis (in black letters the addition):
Creating uncertainty in early stages of development processes about future building possibilities, and certainty about future contributions (specially if it is possible to
include the contributions as obligatory in legally binding rules, and if it is possible
openly and straightforwardly to make the approval of these rules conditional on
a development agreement that secures the contributions) can inﬂuence capturing
value increase in a positive way.

Conclusions

8.4

285

Modulating property rights

Section 2.2 handled the recent debate in the Netherlands and Spain about the possibility of splitting development rights from land ownership. An exploratory study
in section 4.4 of these and another seven Western European countries (England,
Germany, France, Italy, Flanders, Denmark and Sweden) showed that none of them
could split property rights in that way, so there were no possibilities of doing empirical research on this. However, the exploratory study also showed the singularity of
a modiﬁcation in 1994 of the land readjustment regulation in the Spanish region of
Valencia, which could be considered as a light form of splitting. Thanks to this modiﬁed land readjustment regulation, infrastructure provision there is separated from
property rights. Actually, the Valencian 1994’s novelty turned out to be the result of
this very same debate about splitting development rights from land ownership.
Summary of the ﬁndings and the results of testing the 1st hypothesis
These preliminary ﬁndings inspired the ﬁrst hypothesis in this research, which was
about the effects of modifying the formal rules on property rights in land (such as the
Valencian land readjustment does) on the capturing of value increase:
A speciﬁc form of splitting the property rights in land (separating infrastructure provision from property rights) can modify the power-relationships in the network of actors
involved in urban regeneration, and this can improve capturing value increase.
The ﬁndings of the in-depth research in Valencia, England and the Netherlands conﬁrm the hypothesis. The deﬁnition of property rights in England and the Netherlands,
which do not have a land readjustment regulation for urban areas, seems to affect
the capturing of value increase in a negative way. There is a strong interdependency
of local authorities and landowners: authorities have the statutory powers over planning consent, but landowners have the ﬁnancial means and the exclusive right to
develop the land. This interdependency gives to the landowners the option to wait,
which it is often used to combat local authorities’ requirements, and leads frequently
to delaying development processes. In addition, the ﬁndings suggest that interdependency leads to an inefﬁcient and sluggish development process, in which costs
are unnecessary high and different actors manage to appropriate part of the value
increase, this all leading to higher land development costs such as the costs made in
preparing plans and negotiating the terms of development. High land development
costs seem to form an important obstacle for capturing value increase, especially in
the Netherlands.
These ﬁndings suggest some interesting conclusions for the theoretical debate and reﬂections set out in section 2.2. First, however, let us look at the ﬁndings in more detail.

286

Conclusions

Who owns development rights?
We must here differentiate between the right to the economic value that arises from
rezoning land, and the right to develop the rezoned land. The rightful owner of the
economic value that arises from the new use possibilities after the binding zoning
rules have been modiﬁed is different in the studied countries. In England, it is the
public administration that has right to tax this economic value; in Valencia, most of
the value belongs to the landowner, and public bodies have right to a part of it (but
not all); and in the Netherlands, the landowner is the rightful owner of the entire
value (see section 5.3.1 for Valencia, 6.2.1 for England and 7.2.1 for the Netherlands). However, what does not vary, not only in those three countries, but also in
Germany, France, Italy, Flanders, Denmark and Sweden, is that the right to develop
belongs to the landowner. The landowner is always the only one entitled to build on
the land, subject to basic compliance with the zoning regulations and upon obtaining the necessary permits. However, in Spain, Germany, France and Sweden, planning law explicitly refers to the infrastructure provision as something differentiated
from the rest of the development rights. In those countries, infrastructure provision is
a ´responsibility´ or ´task´ of the public bodies, but not of the landowner or the developer. In England, the Netherlands, Flanders, Italy and Denmark, there is in the law
neither an explicit mention of infrastructure provision as a differentiated component
of development rights, nor of a public priority in this.
Differences in dependence between public and private actors
The answer to the question ‘who owns the development rights’ was however not
speciﬁc enough for gathering the empirical data. To make it more speciﬁc, section
3.3.1 developed a model to analyse the power/dependency relationships between
the involved actors (municipality, developer, landowners) in each transaction in development processes. These transactions are those needed for infrastructure provision
namely: 1. land purchase and assembling; 2. ﬁnancing and; 3. land preparation and
development, and those needed for the building on the serviced plots namely: 4. land
disposition; 5. construction and; 6. property transfer. Each of these steps implies transactions of some kind: land, money, property, planning consent, etc. Infrastructure
provision can only take place after resolving at least the ﬁrst three transactions, and
the building after resolving the last three transactions. By analysing who has the control over each of these transactions, it has been possible to discern who has exactly
which development right, and how this could affect the capturing of value increase.
For an exploratory analysis of the nine Western European countries see section 4.4.2.
Regarding the in-depth research in England, Valencia and the Netherlands, there
seem not to be important differences in the position of actors in the transactions
involved in the building (transactions 4 to 6). However, regarding the infrastructure
provision (transactions 1 to 3), there are clear differences in the position of public
and private actors, and these differences lead to different degrees of interdependency.
It is possible to distinguish between England and the Netherlands on the one side,
and Valencia on the other. In England and the Netherlands, as a rule, the transactions

287

Conclusions

that are needed to gather the land (transaction 1), ﬁnd the money (transaction 2) and
provide the infrastructure (transaction 3) are quite dependent on agreement with the
landowners. This is because none of the actors controls all the needed resources.
Municipalities have a monopoly on the regulatory powers for approving the binding
rules, but the landowners/developers control the land and have the investment capacity. This mutual dependence is very strong: as a rule, in the absence of a voluntary
agreement, municipalities have no other alternative than to expropriate/buy the land
and construct the infrastructure, and maybe pay part of the costs with taxes imposed
afterwards. The only way for the municipality to avoid dependence on the landowner
is thus through direct organisational and ﬁnancial public involvement (see Table 23).
Expropriation has not been applied in the studied cases. In Bristol, where the English
cases come from, expropriation is rarely used, only in exceptional circumstances. For
example, in cases where there is disagreement with a minority of the landowners and
the majority of the landowners support a compulsory buy-out of the minority owners’
share and are willing to pay the associated costs. In the Netherlands expropriation
is also exceptional and only justiﬁed if it is ‘necessary’ (noodzakelijk in Dutch). As a
consequence of this, it is often difﬁcult, or even impossible, to expropriate the land
for urban regeneration.

Dependence because
of land
Local public body
Dependence.
depends on the land- Developer/Landowner
owner/developer
owns the land. Dependence is only avoidable
through compulsory
purchase, but this is
only used in exceptional
circumstances. Expropriation is considered
slow, expensive and
risky. In the Netherlands
the ‘necessary’ criterion
gives preference to the
landowners.
Landowner/developer depends on the
local public body

Dependence because
of investment capacity

Dependence
because of regulatory
resources

Dependence.
The developers were
able to invest in buying
the land and developing
it. Dependence was not
avoidable because local
public bodies were not
willing to invest. Only in
the Dutch case of Breda
the municipality was
ready to assume some
ﬁnancial risks.

Dependence.
The public bodies grant
the required permissions
(and in the Netherlands
and Valencia approve
the Land use Plan).
Dependence is not
avoidable.

No dependence.
There is no dependence on the landowners in this
matter. If the municipality selects him as urbanizing agent, he will be able to invest and provide the
infrastructure, while the landowner is obliged to
pay the costs. So actually it is not he who is investing, but the landowners.

Urbanizing agent
depends on landowner

No dependence.
There is no municipal dependence on the urbanizing agent in this matter. The municipality can point
out in a public tender another party as urbanizing
agent, or select right away a public company as
urbanizing agent.

No dependence.
There is no municipal dependence on the landowners in this matter. The municipality can point
out a third party, the urbanizing agent, as the one
who invest and provides the infrastructure.

Dependence, avoidable.
Landowners cannot invest without the urbanizing
agent. Dependence is avoidable since landowners
may submit an own plan to the public tender and
became themselves urbanizing agent.

Dependence, avoidable.
Landowners control the land. However, dependence is avoidable because of the possibility of applying compulsory land readjustment, if necessary.

Dependence, avoidable.
Landowners have most of the land. However,
dependence is avoidable without much difﬁculty
because of the possibility of applying compulsory
land readjustment, if necessary.

Dependence because of investment and management capacity

Landowner
depends on
Urbanizing agent

Urbanizing agent
depends on
Municipality

Municipality
depends on
urbanizing agent

Landowner
depends on
Municipality

Municipality
depends on the
landowners

Dependence because of land

Dependence, not avoidable.
Urbanizing agents cannot provide the infrastructure without being selected as urbanizing agent.
Also, the municipality approves the relevant binding rules. Dependence is not avoidable.

Dependence, not avoidable.
Landowners cannot develop without being selected as urbanizing agent or without the municipality
selecting a third party as urb. agent.
Also, the municipality approves the binding rules.
Dependence is not avoidable.

Before the 1994 Act, the situation in Valencian municipalities was very similar to that
in England and the Netherlands. Even if there was a land readjustment regulation,
this regulation relied on the support and active collaboration of a majority of the
landowners, and the only way of forcing readjustment was through a direct public
organisational involvement.
This changed in 1994. In that year the regional government introduced a new planning law, and since then there is no more mutual dependence (see Table 24). Valencian municipalities can now opt for compulsory land readjustment, without having
to become directly involved. The municipality selects in a public tender the urbanising agent, who may be a public company, the landowners themselves joining in a
company, but most of the time the agent is a commercial developer. Landowners
can choose for voluntary expropriation or can participate in the development. If they
choose expropriation, the urbanising agent pays the compensation and acquires the
land. If they participate, the landowners have to deliver the land needed for public infrastructure and pay to the urbanising agent a proportional share of the land development costs (which consist mainly of the infrastructure provision costs). In exchange,
landowners share the economic value increase: after providing the infrastructure, the
urbanising agent delivers the serviced building parcels to the landowners and transfers the public infrastructure, free of charge, to the municipality. In sum, although
landowners still control land, municipalities can now avoid being dependent on the
landowners, as municipalities can appoint a third party (who does not need to own
the land) as the urbanising agent, and as municipalities do not need to get directly
ﬁnancially involved. Also, the municipalities are not dependent on one particular
urbanising agent, for this agent can be selected through a public tender.
Option to wait is negative for capturing the value increase
One important consequence of mutual dependence is the option to wait. On the one
hand, in Valencia after 1994, because there is no mutual dependence, landowners
do not have the option to wait. On the other hand, in the English and Dutch cases,
due to the mutual dependence, landowners/developers had the option of waiting.
Waiting might be a preferred behaviour as land also has an option value that can be
proﬁtable. When landowners are allowed to wait, it might take some time to reach
an agreement with all the landowners about the price for the land, for the landowners expect that by delaying negotiations, their proﬁts (the accounted land costs, see
ﬁnancial analysis in section 2.4.3) could increase in the future.
In the studied English and Dutch cases, public bodies were often confronted with
landowners who were not willing to agree with the required contributions package.
Often public bodies were forced to lower this package in order to reach agreement.
Also, in several cases in both countries, development processes were delayed after
developers refused to accept the requirements and plans of the municipality, and negotiations about these issues dragged on. In two Dutch cases, the developer decided
to prepare the plans anew, although they were already very advanced, and this de-

290

Conclusions

layed signiﬁcantly. It is no exception in the Netherlands and also in England, that urban regeneration is delayed due to landowners using their option to wait. For example, in the English case Harbourside, in the city of Bristol, the developer was against
the requirement of constructing 30% social/affordable housing, ﬁnally accepting a
9% requirement. A Dutch example is Kop van Oost, in the city of Groningen. Here,
from the beginning of negotiations, the developer argued that there was little ﬁnancial room in the project, thus making it clear to the municipality that there were not
many value-capturing possibilities. The municipality, which did not have access to
the ﬁnancial calculations of the developer, seems in the early stages to have accepted
that it could not ask for large contributions. Also, the municipality accepted several
cost saving changes in the quality of the public space constructed by the developer.
Similarly, Valencian municipalities were confronted before 1994 with landowners
who were not willing to agree with municipal requirements. This affected the capturing of value increase, forcing municipalities to lower the contributions package in order to reach an agreement, this producing irregular, unsystematic and illogical (from
an urban planning point of view) urban growth, distinguished by low quality and
scarce public infrastructure. Development sites were too narrow and too small, just
large enough to provide infrastructure for several plots. Building schemes included
only the bare minimum of public infrastructure. Most of the time, readjustment followed very much the wish of landowners to receive serviced building plots on their
former property. Instead of following a plan for the most suitable parcelling, readjustment followed the landowners’ property boundaries and interests. The urban periphery in the City of Valencia at the end of the 1980’s, which is still visible nowadays, is
a good example. There were large buildings in the middle of deteriorated agricultural
land and no adequate public infrastructure to support them.
The introduction of the 1994 Valencian Act has had large consequences in practice.
Nowadays there is no mutual dependence and landowners do not have the option to
wait. Although compulsory readjustment is not common, it does play an important
role in dissuading landowners from taking actions that may delay development. According to available data, the 1994 Act had a positive effect on capturing the increased
value. The regulation broke through the previous pattern of landowners dragging their
feet, not agreeing to infrastructure provision and speculating on improved market conditions. When a developer submits a proposal and the municipality approves it, landowners must follow suit. The consequence was an extraordinary increase in public
and in private initiatives that resulted in accelerated urban development. The improvement has been both in the quantity and the quality of public infrastructure.
The Valencian cases conﬁrm this general conclusion. For example, in Guillem de
Anglesola, in the city of Valencia, neither the initiating party nor the other three developers who in the public tender submitted alternative plans, were linked to the
landownership in the area. The possibility of selecting a developer without land has
been a crucial factor. As there were hundreds of owners (many of them residents or

Conclusions

291

small landlords), it seems very unlikely that all these actors would have agreed on a
voluntary land readjustment. Therefore, the option to ‘by-pass’ the landowners has
been a crucial factor in redeveloping the site. The landowners and the developer had
to accept the full contributions package, including additional compensation to the
owners of the old deteriorated houses.
Financial feasibility as an explanation of the popularity of the option to wait
There might be at least two different possible motivations for landowners and developers in England and the Netherlands to choose the option to wait. First, there is
the expectation that longer negotiations lead to higher proﬁts (in the form of higher
accounted land costs, or higher regular proﬁt margins, or a higher Final proﬁt, see
ﬁnancial analysis in section 2.4.3), due to housing prices increase over time and/or
reduced contributions. Second, it is possible that municipal requirements endanger
the ﬁnancial feasibility of the operation. According to a representative of a British
housing developers’ umbrella organisation, about half of negotiations in the UK fail
because Local Planning Authorities demand inappropriately large contribution packages (Whitacker, interview 2007). Public ofﬁcers in the studied English cases argued
the contrary and conﬁrmed that contribution packages took into consideration the
ﬁnancial feasibility. An interviewed representative of the Dutch developers’ umbrella
organisation had a similar argument, when he claimed that development is often
delayed because of unreasonably high municipal requirements (Fokkema, interview
2007).
We can discuss this in terms of several third variables in the causal model set out
in section 2.4.2: the real estate markets and the plan and site features determine
how much are the costs (variables A1 and A2), and also relevant is how much and
how good are the public infrastructure and facilities which public bodies pursue,
and how high are the contributions that public bodies expect from landowners and
developers (variable C1). Indirectly the context variables are also relevant that inﬂuence the distribution of the initial proﬁt (variables B): they are relevant because they
inﬂuence the actions of those directly involved in the project (variables D). Table 25
summarizes which are de costs, returns and the ﬁnal balance of regenerating a site.
Section 2.4.3 provides more explanation, and Annexes 3, 4 and 6 give the data for
the studied cases.
Third variables A, B1 and B2 and the actions of those involved in the project (variables D1.1, D2.1, and probably also D4 and D5), together with variable C1 inﬂuence the costs that must be made to redevelop a site: the accounted land costs, the
infrastructure provision costs, the plan preparation costs, the soil decontamination
costs, the compensation costs and the size of the contributions that must be paid/
implemented (costs postings 1-6). In turn, these costs inﬂuence the distribution of the
Initial proﬁt, which in turn inﬂuences the size of the Final proﬁt and thus whether the
landowner/developer is able or not to contribute. It was difﬁcult to empirically assess
in the studied cases the size of the Final proﬁt because of the lack of reliable sources.

1a. Minimum land costs: the market value of the land in its current use;
1b. Accounted land costs: the land price that the developer includes into
the calculations.

2) Infrastructure provi- This includes not only the infrastructure provision works, but also reserved
amounts for unexpected expenses, the overhead costs, eventual ‘hidden’
sion costs
proﬁt margins of the developer, etc. In the Netherlands, they comprise:
Slopen, bouw en woonrijp maken, risico en onvoorzien. It should also
include the ﬁnancial costs.
3) Plan preparation
costs

This includes the costs of the preparation of plans, studies, etc (Plankosten,
or Voorbereiding, toezicht en planontwikkeling).

4) Soil decontamination costs

This includes the costs of decontaminating the land.

5) Compensation costs

This includes compensation to existing owners and inhabitants, for removal
of activities and residence, demolition of constructions and buildings, etc.

6) Additional contribu- This includes the contributions, in cash or in kind (constructions, buildings) to public goals (payments, construction of public infrastructure or
tions of the develpublic buildings, etc) additional to his contributions to the on-site infraoper
structure provision costs (even if they might serve a wider area than the
development in question), which are already included in (2).
7) Real estate develop- This includes the whole development of the real estate, thus not only the
building costs, but also the preparation of plans (not for providing the
ment costs
infrastructure but for the building), overhead costs, possible ‘hidden’ proﬁt
margins of the developer, etc.
8) Total returns

This includes the total returns accruing from the selling of the real estate
(ofﬁce, dwellings, etc).

INITIAL PROFIT

The value increase that accrued from the regeneration of the site and
could have been initially available to pay public infrastructure and facilities: 8 – [ (1a + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7)not-inﬂated – (those costs of 2-7 subsidised by public bodies) ]. Here we assume costs 1 till 7 are not inﬂated.

DEVELOPER’S FINAL
PROFIT

The proﬁts of the ﬁnal developer: 8 – [ (1b + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7) –
(those costs of 2-7 subsidised by public bodies) ]. This proﬁt must be
added to a regular proﬁt margin in case the ﬁnal developer has included a
regular proﬁt in posting 7.

Information about development costs and proﬁts is a sensitive matter, and developers were not willing to disclose it. In the Dutch cases, according to estimates based
on information given by developers, the ﬁnancial margins appear to be very narrow.
However, according to my own estimates (posting 9 in Annex 4) there was room for
higher contributions. For example, according to the developer, in Kop van Oost his
Final proﬁt was very narrow, €2m. However, my own estimates suggest that it may be
much larger, around €29m (see section 2.4.3 for a detailed analysis of case Kop van
Oost). If this was the case, then clearly the developer’s objections to the municipality’s requirements were not justiﬁable from a ﬁnancial point of view. In sum, in the
Dutch cases it is not clear if the Final proﬁt of the last involved developer were so narrow that opposition against the municipal requirements was justiﬁed. The question is
thus: did developers use the option to wait because land development costs were too

Conclusions

293

high, or did they abuse this option in order to increase their proﬁt margins? And: how
does it comes that in the Valencian cases, despite the fact that contributions were
very large, the ﬁnancial feasibility of the operations was not a problem?
In the English cases, following our own estimates, the Final proﬁt margins were bigger
and allowed for greater contributions (see posting 9 in table in Annex 3). Resistance
or acceptance of the requirements was based more on the expected land price (how
much the initial landowner or the developer who bought the land expect to receive
for his/her land, which translates into the accounted land costs of an operation, i.e.
cost posting 1b of Table 25) and the expected proﬁt (how much the developer expects
to proﬁt, i.e. a possible regular proﬁt margin + Final proﬁt) than on the objective ﬁnancial feasibility of the project. For example, in Megabowl, in the city of Bristol, the
initial price of the land was relatively low, about 3-4.5 € million2, due to uncertainty
regarding building possibilities, which had discouraged developers from purchasing
the site in the previous years, and to a heavy competition from other bowling alleys
in the city. This gave the owner-applicant leeway to contribute more than usual.
Differences in infrastructure provision and plan preparation costs
When analyzing the ﬁnancial aspects of the cases, this research provided remarkable
and unexpected ﬁndings that helped to answer the above question. We discovered
large differences in the costs of infrastructure provision and plan preparation in the
three studied countries (postings 2 and 3). These costs are the highest in the Dutch
cases, when compared with those in the English and Valencian cases (for details see
Annex 6, for summary see Table 26): both costs together are in Kruidenbuurt and
Kop van Oost respectively €438 and €368 per m² for new public space, and respectively €158 and €148 per m² total redeveloped land3; in Stationskwartier these costs
are much higher, €1,212/m² new public space and €570/m² total redeveloped land,
which might be explained by the fact that this ﬁgure includes the accounted land
costs, soil decontamination, compensation costs (postings 1, 4 and 5) and probably
contains a hidden proﬁt for the municipality. In the English cases the two costs of
infrastructure provision and plan preparation together are €153/€99, €269/€111 and
€332/€166 per m² new public space/total redeveloped land. In the Valencian cases,
those two costs together are €94/€70, €693/€306, €103/€79 and €94/€744.

2

Calculated at an exchange rate of € 1.5 per £ 1.

3

In our opinion, the most appropriate way of measuring these costs and comparing them with other
cases is relating costs to the ‘new public space’, which is the surface that becomes redeveloped and
will be used for public uses. Most of these costs relate to the construction of public infrastructure
above or under this surface. It can be expected that a case with more public space will have more of
these costs than a case that includes less public space. By comparing costs per m² new public space
the risk diminishes that a case with little public space scores similarly to a case that includes a larger
area of public space.

4

The ﬁgure for the second case is not representative for the entire Valencian region, but the other
three cases are (Fernández & Fernández, 2002: 68-74; Gascó, 2006: 72-76; Raga, interview in
2008).

570

1212

Includes Soil decontamination and compensation costs.

67

102

164

249

1

Includes Accounted land, soil decontamination and compensation costs.

Plan preparation costs are
included in Infrastructure
provision costs

148

368

Stati5

6

€/m² total
redeveloped land

€/m² new
public space

158

438

KvO

29

61

107

222

2

17

24

67

94

3

Three additional Dutch
cases, expert opinion

5

3. Plan
preparation
costs

€/m² total
redeveloped land

2. Infrastructure €/m² new
public space
provision costs

Kruid

Dutch cases

56

111

269

Temp

166

332

Harb

Plan preparation costs are
included in Infrastructure
provision costs

99

153

Mega6

English cases

Table 26. Comparison development costs in the Dutch, English and Valencian cases.

13

17

57

77

Guill

119

269

187

418

Period

Valencian cases

14

18

65

85

Camin

15

19

59

75

Benal

294

Conclusions

Conclusions

295

Two Dutch experts conﬁrmed the generalisability of the ﬁgures from the Dutch cases
to other Dutch regeneration projects, with nuances, by analysing three recent urban
regeneration cases initiated by housing associations (projects 1, 2 and 3 in Table
26 and Annex 6)7. Infrastructure provision and plan preparation costs were together
€352/€231 in Project 1 and €283/€136 in Project 2. Such ﬁgures are not at all exceptional in urban regeneration in the Netherlands. Project 3 (€118/€84) is an exception
to the general conclusion that these costs are much higher in the Netherlands than in
Valencia. Also, the ﬁgures of Projects 1 and 2 suggest that it is not clear whether these
costs are, on average, higher in the Netherlands than in England (Stauttener and Van
Bladel, interviews 2008).
Option to wait has inﬂationary effects on infrastructure provision and plan
preparation costs
A possible explanation for the high cost of infrastructure provision and plan preparation costs in England and the Netherlands is that the option to wait has an inﬂationary
effect on these costs:
• Delay results in additional studies, meetings, etc, increasing the plan preparation
costs. In the Dutch Projects 1 and 2, plan preparation costs are €102/€67 and
€61/29 respectively, in the Valencian cases they are about €18/€14. Unfortunately, it was not possible to specify these costs for the other Dutch and English
cases;
• Delay and the corresponding uncertainties increase the risks, which translate
into higher infrastructure provision costs, e.g. allocating higher reserves for unexpected expenses (risico en onvoorzien in Dutch), and generating higher ﬁnancial costs.
7

A possible criticism to the validity of the data of the second-opinion projects is that they might be
not representative of the total population of urban regeneration projects because of the fact that
they are initiated by housing associations and not by commercial developers. The argument is that
housing associations pursue more quality of the public infrastructure and facilities, thus the ﬁgures
should not be compared with cases ruled by commercial developers. I reject this criticism with three
arguments:
• The three second-opinion projects are used to measure the infrastructure provision and plan
preparation costs (cost postings 2 and 3 in Table 25), but not to measure the ﬁnal quantity and
quality of public infrastructure and facilities;
• The available data of the three second-opinion projects (e.g. the percentage new public space of
the total redeveloped land) do not induce me to think that they might include much more or less
public infrastructure and facilities than cases initiated by commercial developers. Thus there is
in my opinion no reason to think that in the second-opinion projects the infrastructure provision
and plan preparation costs are higher because the housing associations might have built more
public infrastructure and facilities. Case Kruidenbuurt (initiated by a a housing association)
showed also no signiﬁcant differences with the other three Dutch cases (initiated by commercial
developers);
• There might indeed be in the second-opinion projects large differences regarding the building of
social housing and buildings meant for public facilities. I.e. housing associations might indeed
build more social housing and buildings for public facilities than commercial developers do,
as the Dutch cases show. However, this does not invalidate my comparison of infrastructure
provision and plan preparation costs because the costs of social housing and buildings for public
facilities are not included there, but most probably in cost postings 6 or 7 of Table 25.

296

Conclusions

In short, it is possible not only that high costs explain why developers use their option
to wait and cause delay, but also that delay can increase the costs. However, it does
not seem reasonable to conclude that delay can explain all the differences between
the infrastructure provision and plan preparation costs in the Dutch (between €118
and €438 per m² for new public space, and between €84 and €231 per m² total
redeveloped land) and the Valencian cases (between €94 and €103 per m² for new
public space, and between €70 and €79 per m² total redeveloped land). There might
be many other variables that can explain part of the differences. The complexity of
causalities has been set out in the causal model in section 2.4.2. For example differences in labour costs in the building sector (that might be about 30% higher in the
Netherlands than in Valencia), in construction materials, in ﬁscal regime (variables
belonging to sort A3 in causal model) and conditions of the soil (variable A2) (Stauttener en Van Bladel, interviews 2008). It is plausible to conclude that the option to
wait can explain part of the differences in the infrastructure provision and plan preparation costs, but that there are other, third variables that can also be relevant.
Option to wait might have inﬂationary effects on the accounted land costs
In addition, the option to wait can also have an inﬂationary effect on land prices;
since market parties owning the land can exercise the option to wait, and this puts
them in a strong negotiation position, they would be more interested in acquiring
land, which in turn increases the price of real and expected transactions in the land
markets. This expectation of higher land prices can have the effect of rising the land
price that the developer includes in the ﬁnancial calculations of the operation, i.e.
the accounted land costs. It seems plausible that the accounted land costs are based
on the economic value of the new use possibilities of the land after regeneration,
instead of the previous use possibilities. The ﬁndings in the Dutch cases seem to support this argument: land was often sold for higher prices than the market price in the
former use. In De Funen the landowner sold his land to the developer in 1997 for a
price certainly much higher that the value of the actual use possibilities at that time.
In Kop van Oost the estimated market value of the previous use (industrial land) was
about €3.6m. However, this land was then sold speculatively in 2000, 2001 and in
2002. We know that in 2001 it was sold for around €12m, so when it was sold again
in 2002 the price must have been even higher. Higher accounted land costs inﬂuence
the ﬁnal proﬁt of developers, diminishing their possibilities of contributing.
The option to wait reinforces the effects of the certainty about future building
and contributions and vice versa
The effects of the option to wait might reinforce and be reinforced by another variable: the certainty about future building possibilities and future contributions (variables of the sort B2 and D1 in causal model explained in section 2.4.2, also explained
above in section 8.1). This can happen in two ways:
• The ﬁrst landowner, if he has the power to wait, if there is certainty in early stages
about the building possibilities, and if there is no certainty about the contributions to be made, asks a higher price for his land;

Conclusions

•

297

The developer, if he has the power to wait, and if there is no certainty in early
stages about the contributions to be made, might choose the price of the land
that he accounts in the ﬁnancial calculation, and his regular proﬁt margin, to
appropriate as much value increase as possible. At the start of regeneration processes, developers often have some room to set them higher or lower. Once the
accounted land cost and the regular proﬁt margin have been established, lowering them is usually complicated.

Need of further research to land prices and development costs
The availability of reliable information in the studied cases was low, which did not
allow us to collect important details about the land prices and development costs.
For example, it was not possible to discern to which degree other sorts of costs such
as labour costs in the building sector, in construction materials, in ﬁscal regime (variables belonging to sort A3 in causal model) and conditions of the soil (variable A2)
contribute to the higher infrastructure provision costs in England and the Netherlands. Another example is that it was not possible to discern whether the developer
has indeed inﬂated the price of the land, or whether he included in the infrastructure
provision costs a ‘hidden’ proﬁt margin. Further research should focus on the differences in land prices, infrastructure provision costs and plan preparation costs and
provide more data that could be used to ﬁne-tune the conclusions of this research.
Conclusions for the theoretical debate and reﬂections about property rights
This research sought empirical evidence relevant to the debate and the theoretical reﬂections about separating development rights from property rights in land. The ﬁndings support the assumption that a speciﬁc form of shaping property rights, the Valencian land readjustment regulation, which separates infrastructure provision from the
control of landowners, can improve the capturing of value increase. In addition, the
ﬁndings strongly suggest that in urban regeneration the regulation has a deﬂationary
effect on the costs for providing infrastructure and preparing plans, and possibly also
on the accounted land costs.
This supports the idea that property law in relation to the goal of producing urban
space and housing is not only a matter of rights; it also involves obligations. The
adoption of a combined approach to property rights and duties, through a land readjustment regulation, may help regulate the initiatives taken by landowners and
commercial developers in such a way that they fulﬁl a greater role in the creation
of public infrastructure. It can also help to overcome problems of stagnation in constructing new housing. Here I agree with the advocated role of land readjustment
regulations as an alternative to problems with the traditional forms of land assembly
(voluntary exchange or public intervention in the form of expropriation) in the UK
and the United States of America (Hong & Needham, 2007: xv-xix), while at the
same time the shortcomings of land readjustment regulations should not be forgotten,
if they do not include enforcement mechanisms to avoid the speculative behaviour of
landowners (Muñoz & Korthals Altes, 2007).

298

Conclusions

The ﬁndings are interesting for the Dutch debate. First, they coincide with the position taken by Priemus and Louw, who argue that the increase in private control of the
land since the 1990s has led to inﬂation in accounted land costs and impoverishment
of public infrastructure (2003). A second topic is the dilemma whether Dutch municipalities can or cannot satisfactorily achieve their public goals within the current
legal framework. In this discussion, the concept ‘satisfactorily’ has not been clearly
deﬁned; therefore, it is not possible to say whether the deﬁnition of property rights in
land in the Netherlands results in “satisfactorily accomplished” public goals. However, it is possible to conclude that shaping property rights using a land readjustment
regulation can signiﬁcantly improve the capturing of value increase and accelerate
urban development. That is, it can help to better achieve public goals, because public goals usually concern either the ﬁnance of public infrastructure and facilities, or
the implementation on time of building schemes, or both. Section 9.4 gives speciﬁc
recommendations to Dutch public bodies of how to improve the capturing of value
increase.
For the Spanish debate, the ﬁndings support the critical approach of García-Bellido
and others in the 1990s. In a context of privately owned land and the absence of
public subsidies and of direct public intervention in urban land markets, breaking
the monopolistic/oligopolistic position of landowners is the only way to assure good
quality and adequate quantity of public infrastructure and facilities.

CHAPTER

9

Recommendations for
the Netherlands

One of the goals of this research is to learn how to use formal rules relevant to zoning in order to improve cost recovery in the Netherlands. Chapters 5 to 7 made clear
that formal rules relevant to zoning in the Spanish region of Valencia and in England
differ signiﬁcantly from those in the Netherlands. A comparison between how much
value increase public bodies manage to capture also shows remarkable differences:
in Valencia and England, private parties are more committed in urban regeneration
on private owned land to ﬁnancing and/or realizing unproﬁtable elements (i.e. the
public infrastructure and facilities) than in the Netherlands. This affects not only the
variety of sorts of contributions, but also the total economic value of the contributions.
More captured value increase in Valencia and England than in the Netherlands
The differences mainly involve (see Table 27; for details per country see section 5.6
for Valencia, 6.5 for England, and 7.5 for the Netherlands):
– On-site infrastructure provision costs: in England and Valencia these are mostly
or fully paid by the developers, while in the Netherlands these are ﬁnanced with
large public subsidies;
– Land for on-site public infrastructure: in Valencia this is provided free of charge
by the landowners, while in England and the Netherlands there are much larger
public contributions for providing this land;
– Social housing: in England and Valencia, this is paid to a large extent or almost
fully by the developers, while in the Netherlands this is covered primarily by
municipalities and housing associations;
– Off-site public infrastructure: in England and Valencia, developers contribute
signiﬁcantly (in England primarily with ﬁnancial means while in Valencia primarily with land). On the other hand, in the Netherlands these contributions are
rare;

Heavy
subsidies

Part of the
costs

The
Netherlands

Important
part of the
land

Commercial Public body
developer
provides most
none; hous- of the land
ing association possibly

Part of
the land

White: Country in which the developer/landowner contributes the least out of the three countries.

Table 27. Comparing captured value increase in the Spanish region of Valencia, England and the Netherlands

302

Recommendations

Recommendations

–

303

Creaming off plus value: local public bodies in Valencia cream off a signiﬁcant
share of the increase in economic value, even if they own no land. In England
this does not ofﬁcially take place, but because of the broad deﬁnition of developers’ contributions one might conclude that it does take place; in the Netherlands
this is the case only when the municipality owns the land and/or invests and
shares the risk.

Correlation with formal rules relevant to zoning
We concluded in chapter 8 that, when comparing the three countries, there is a strong
correlation between the captured value increase (the highest in Valencia, lower but
also high in England, and lowest in the Netherlands) and the possibilities offered by
the formal rules relevant to zoning: 1) In England and Valencia, the level of certainty
about future contributions is higher than in the Netherlands (before negotiations start
and developers buy the land); 2) In England and Valencia, binding rules can include
more prescriptions than in the Netherlands; 3) In England and Valencia, it is formally
possible to directly condition the approval of binding rules on the developer securing contributions, while the legal framework in the Netherlands does not provide
this possibility; 4) In Valencia, municipalities can avoid dependency on developers
and landowners thanks to a land readjustment regulation, while in England and the
Netherlands there is no such possibility.
It is also apparent that this is not a perfect correlation: there are other variables that
might also explain part of the differences in the captured value increase. One such
relevant variable is the market price of real estate. This is a context variable of the sort
A1 described in the causal model (see section 2.4.2). When the data was gathered,
housing prices in the English cases were signiﬁcantly higher (€ 3,000-5,000 per m²
ﬂoor space and even more) than prices in the Valencian and Dutch cases (about
€ 2,000-3,000 per m²). This could partly explain why English developers offered more
generous contributions than their Dutch counterparts, but not why Valencian developers, despite similar market prices with the Netherlands, still contributed somewhat
more than the English and much more than the Dutch. Other variables that can also
explain part of the differences in captured value increase are the plan and site features (variable of the sort A1), the markets of workforce and building materials, and
ﬁscal regimes (variable A3), the deﬁnition of the contents and geographical scope of
the plan (variable C1), and speciﬁc circumstances of the involved interactions and
persons (variables D4 and D5).
Recommendations for the Dutch urban regeneration practice
We saw when describing the research problem for this thesis (section 1.5) that Dutch
municipalities usually have high ambitions for their public regeneration schemes,
but, in those cases in which the land is not in public hands, the difﬁculties in ﬁnancing the unproﬁtable parts (i.e. the public infrastructure and facilities) hamper the
actual realization of these ambitions and lead to high public subsidies. The ﬁndings
in this research strongly suggest that this is caused by the fact that in the Netherlands

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the increased value that accrues from regenerating a site often ‘leaks out’. It might
be that developers proﬁt from this, taking possession of an important part of the
value increase, or it might be, optionally or additionally, that the proﬁt margin leaks
to landowners and to unreasonable development costs. Whatever the reason, it is a
fact that Dutch developers do not contribute as much as their English and Valencian
counterparts. It is also clear that this situation in the Netherlands can be explained, to
a large extent, by the differences in the formal rules relevant to zoning.
I do not assert that urban regeneration in the Netherlands always generates enough
value increase to pay all the unproﬁtable parts. Rather, the claim is that, whatever the
value increase, often it is not available to pay the unproﬁtable parts. In order to assess
the magnitude of the problem, and despite the lack of information, I estimated the
ﬁnancial structure of the cases and I concluded that an important part of the value
increase has leaked out. For example, in case Kop van Oost the initial proﬁt of the
operation (i.e. the proﬁt taking into account a non-speculative land price and reasonable, non-inﬂated infrastructure provision and plan preparation costs) could have
been between € 16 and € 43 million. This money has leaked out into speculative
land prices (at least € 8.4 million), probably also into inﬂated infrastructure provision
and plan preparation costs (about € 5 million), and also into a possible large proﬁt for
the developer. These leakages left no room for contributions by the developer to the
public infrastructure and facilities and thus created the need for public subsidisation.
See Table 4 in section 2.4.3 for more details of case Kop van Oost, and Annexes 4
and 6 for details for the other Dutch cases.
It follows that, if it is desired to improve cost recovery in the Netherlands, this could
be achieved by changing aspects of the formal rules relevant to planning. The rest of
this chapter focuses on those rules that allow Valencian and English public bodies
to improve the capturing of value increase, and investigates whether and how they
could be introduced into Dutch practice.
The recommendations seek to answer the main research question, which is the same
as solving the problem addressed by this research, namely: how to improve cost recovery in the Netherlands, by stimulating those parties that proﬁt from development
to ﬁnance the unproﬁtable parts. Some of these proposed recommendations do not
require legal modiﬁcations of Dutch planning law while others do require. This is
almost the same as distinguishing between recommendations implementable in the
short and in the long term. In addition, a ﬁctitious example of an urban regeneration scheme has been used to illustrate the recommendations: Urban Regeneration
in Sturingerland. The example has been inspired by the example used in Vrom et al.
(2008) to illustrate the workings of the new Physical Planning Act, introduced on the
1st of July 2008. My example is the regeneration of an old deteriorated urban area,
which has buildings and streets and is divided into four parcels A-D (see Figure 33). In
the example, the abstract recommendations are made more detailed, adapted to the
speciﬁc circumstances. The example is meant to make the recommendations clearer.

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A

B

C

D

Figure 33. Urban regeneration scheme in Sturingerland.

Structure of this chapter
When enumerating the relevant rules and the subsequent recommendations for
Dutch practice, I follow the narrative structure set out in section 3.3.3 and distinguish
between the following sub-variables:
1. Creating Certainty beforehand about future building possibilities and contributions;
2. Choosing the contents of the legally binding rules;
3. Making the legally binding rules conditional on the developer securing his contribution;
4. Modulating property rights.

9.1

Creating certainty beforehand about future
building possibilities and contributions

Summary of the ﬁndings
Here follows a summary of the ﬁndings that underpin the recommendations. See section 8.1 for more details.
Certainty about future building possibilities
Municipalities in all three countries, in order to improve transparency and accountability in their planning decisions, usually create certainty in early stages and in

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different degrees, about what the landowner will be allowed to build. In the Netherlands, municipalities usually approve indicative, not legally binding plans, and
these indicative plans create some certainty, for example Nota van Uitgangspunten,
Stedenbouwkundig Plan/Visie, Ontwikkelingsprogramma, Programma van Eisen,
Masterplan, Structuurplan, Structuurvisie etc. In England something similar is done,
also through indicative documents; in Valencia this is accomplished through the approval of legally binding General land use plans that must cover the entire territory
of the municipality.
However, the ﬁndings suggest that more certainty beforehand may result in less value
capturing. If municipalities prescribe early on in the development process building
possibilities, it might stimulate land price increases, and municipalities could lose
a valuable negotiation tool. However, certainty about building possibilities is not
necessarily disadvantageous if accompanied by certainty about future contributions
(see below).
Certainty about future contributions
There are large differences in the certainty beforehand about what the landowner
will have to contribute to public infrastructure and facilities. In Valencia in the early
stages there is high certainty about future contributions through (1) legally prescribed
minimum standards, (2) local policy, and (3) the approval of legally binding General
land use plans. English municipalities usually create some certainty through the approval of (1) site-speciﬁc indicative plans that establish the contributions for the development in question, and (2) non site-speciﬁc indicative generic policy documents
that establish standard contributions. In the Netherlands, most of the time there is
no certainty at all, neither through legally binding nor indicative documents, before
negotiations take place, or before the price of the land is determined.
This certainty in Valencia and England has inﬂuenced the capturing of value increase
in a positive way because: 1) it has lowered the price of the land, because if there is
no certainty the developer pays too much for the land and has less ﬁnancial room
to contribute; 2) certainty lowers the price at which the developer accounts the land
in the ﬁnancial calculation of the operation, and the regular proﬁt margin that the
developer aims for; (3) certainty gives the public ofﬁcers a strong policy base to require contributions, which do not need to be introduced as something new during
the course of the negotiations.

9.1.1

Short-term recommendations: create Certainty in
indicative documents

Although creating certainty about future building possibilities might have negative
consequences for public value capturing, this research does not recommend increasing uncertainty. Such a recommendation would not ﬁt within the trend in planning

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307

policy that pursues transparency and predictability about future development sites.
Also, the ﬁndings show that the possible negative effects can be compensated by
creating beforehand certainty about future contributions. Thus, the recommendation
is that Dutch municipalities, before or together with the preparation of indicative
plans, should create certainty about which contributions will be required from developers. The new Structure vision (Structuurvisie) can play a central role in achieving
this goal. In general, it does not seem that this recommendation would encounter
signiﬁcant resistance. The adoption of cost recovery policy documents, of the sort
set out here, ﬁts well within the traditional autonomy of Dutch municipalities, and
within the legal framework. The only objection could be that the preparation of such
documents requires that municipalities better foresee their future needs for public
infrastructure and facilities. Dutch planning is characterized by being vague, open
and ﬂexible in early stages of development processes. Municipalities usually specify
and detail their requirements during the plan process, adapting to the speciﬁc circumstances and needs that arise close to the start of development activities. This is
not compatible with specifying future contributions in the early stages. The following
will provide more details regarding the recommendation.
9.1.1.1 Certainty about what
Section 7.2.3 shows the costs that can legally be included in a Development contributions plan (Exploitatieplan) and designates which portion can be charged to the
landowners. It also shows the costs that can be secured in an anterior Development
agreement (anterieure overeenkomst) and thus charged to the landowners.
The sorts of costs that can be included in the Development contributions plan are
listed in the new 2008 Physical Planning Decree, and not all of them can be charged
to the landowners. This regulatory base itself is, however, not enough for creating
certainty, as developers need to be able to: 1) accurately calculate in an early stage
of the process those costs that can be included in a Development contributions plan;
and 2) which portion they will have to pay in case the municipality approves such
a plan. Table 28 lists the aspects that municipalities should specify in order to make
those calculations possible.
However, not all of these costs can be charged to the landowners. Probably only
part of the costs of refurbishing old existing infrastructure within or in the immediate
surroundings (1a) can be charged, the other part not, and anyway the maintenance/
exploitation costs of this infrastructure, whether refurbished or new, cannot be charged
at all. The construction and maintenance/exploitation costs of social facilities (maatschappelijke voorzieningen, 1a) cannot be charged; part of the costs of infrastructure
serving a wider area (2a) cannot be charged; and probably contributions to other
schemes (3a) too cannot be charged. The already incurred costs most likely cannot
be charged. In addition, if the calculated proﬁts do not cover the full costs, the deﬁcit
cannot be charged to the landowners, regardless whether the costs fulﬁl all the criteria making landowners liable. In regeneration sites this may be frequently the case,

Outline characterization, location and dimensions of roads, sewerage, parks, public buildings, etc. This is needed in
case the development site is big. In smaller sites, there is no need of much infrastructure and the infrastructure that is
needed is easily predictable without the municipality having to prescribe it beforehand. Regarding damage to surrounding property owners, municipalities should make clear that the developer is liable to pay the compensation.

1a. Public infrastructure and facilities within or in the immediate surroundings of the development site,
plus possible damage to surrounding
property owners.
2a. Public infrastructure and facilities serving a wider area (bovenwijkse voorzieningen)
3a. Contributions to (i) other
schemes (bovenplanse verevening)
or to (ii) public infrastructure and
facilities (bovenplanse kosten), not
necessarily related in a direct way to
the development in question.

Because of the confusion regarding the differences between what the 2008 Act calls bovenwijkse voorzieningen,
bovenplanse verevening/kosten and ruimtelijke ontwikkelingen (3 and 7, see under), it is recommended to include a
similar argumentation as for 3a, and include that argumentation in a Structure vision.
Argumentation
The location and characterization of the needed investments, and at least an outline indication of the costs. It is also
necessary to characterize the relation between the investments and the scheme that must contribute. The relationship
between them must be argued, without necessarily having to prove a direct relationship in terms of the three legal
criteria of proﬁt (proﬁjt), causality/attributability (toerekenbaarheid) and proportionality (proportionaliteit).1 In Dutch
terms, the ruimtelijke en functionele samenhang must be argued. It is enough if it is argued why both are related in
‘planning’ terms, i.e. with arguments related to trafﬁc, economic, social issues, etc., but it is not enough just to prescribe that the scheme must contribute. In addition, it must be argued why the investments are in the public interest.
Also an indication of all the schemes that must contribute should be given.
Contributions can be in kind, a payment for a speciﬁc investment, or a payment to a fund. In case of payments to
a fund,2 the goals for the fund must be prescribed, i.e. where is the money going to be spent. This must be done as
detailed as possible, but, in case investments are not yet well deﬁned and decided, an outline of not detailed prescriptions might be enough. However, probably it will not be possible to include the contributions in a Development
contributions plan if the investments: a) are not detailed enough to apply the three legal criteria, or b) have not yet
been spent before the Development contributions plan becomes deﬁnitely closed. The contributions could then only
be included in an anterior Development agreement (see below). Finally, the criteria must be set out following which
the projects must contribute to the fund.

Municipalities should create certainty by specifying the following…

Categories of costs that can be
included in a Development contributions Plan

Table 28. Certainty, to be created by Dutch municipalities about the costs that, in case they ﬁnally approve a Development contributions plan,
would be included in this plan

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1

1

a) Location of the green areas that will disappear and qualiﬁcation of these areas as green area (vegetation or water,
but not for example agricultural land); b) the necessity and the obligation that the projects that are responsible for the
loss must compensate it; and c) the location and outline indications of the costs of creating new areas that replace
the areas lost, in or outside the development site. It is necessary that at least a) and b) are included in any plan of the
central, provincial, regional or municipal governments (e.g. structure visions or land use plans, Vrom e.a, 2008: 47).

In section 1.5 it is said that the goal of this research is to improve cost recovery, not to make it easier for public bodies to cream off the added value. However, the deﬁnition of
which costs fall under ‘cost recovery’ is not undisputed. The same public infrastructure can be considered as related to the development by one person, but at the same time as
going too far by another person. The arguments are on both sizes largely of a normative/ideological character. Especially contributions of the sorts 2, 3 and 7 might be the subject
of discussion.

6. Green/natural areas in the
development site that will be lost
(verloren gegane natuurwaarde,
groenvoorzieningen en watervoorzieningen)

Sources: Vrom et al., 2008: 46-48, 85, 127-128, 153; Zundert, 2008: 472; Baardewijk, 2008: 756-757, 759, 762-763;
Groot, 2009: 464-465.
4a. Social housing within the plan
Minimum percentage and/or minimum number, and the location, of social rented housing and social housing for sale,
area
both in the scheme in question and in a wider area (distribution of social housing between the scheme and all other
schemes in the area) should be speciﬁed. Also, some additional requirements that might have consequences for the
development costs: for social rented housing, allocation rules (as long as these rules derive their status from housing
legislation and local regulations) and requirements about the minimum period of social function and maximal rent
price (e.g. that the landowner must secure in a Development agreement that he/she will maintain the social function
for at least the ﬁrst 10 years); for social housing for sale, rules for the selection of buyers (as long as these rules derive
their status from housing legislation and local regulations), anti-speculation rules, and, provided there is a previous
regional agreement on the matter, the maximum price for sale to individual buyers.
5a. The land needed for all this infra- This is already clear from the above-mentioned.
structure, also for social services

In which document
The 2008 Act prescribes that in order to be included in a Development contributions plan and charged to the landowners, this argumentation must be included in a Structure vision. If the contribution is to be agreed in an anterior
agreement (see below), there is in theory no need to include this argumentation in a Structure vision. However,
because of the confusion about the differences between bovenwijkse voorzieningen (2), bovenplanse verevening/kosten and ruimtelijke ontwikkelingen (7, see below), it is desirable to include the argumentation in a Structure vision. In
case of contribution to a fund, the argumentation, no matter how detailed, should be included in the implementation
paragraph (uitvoeringsparagraaf), to be added to the Vision.

Recommendations
309

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partly because the method of calculation of the land costs include the highest possible price, i.e. a maximal accounted land costs (inbrengwaarde in Dutch) instead of
the minimum land costs (see section 7.2.3 for more details).

Table 29. Certainty to be created by Dutch municipalities, in addition to the costs listed in Table 28,
about the costs that they wish to include in an anterior Development agreement.
Categories of costs that can be Municipalities should create certainty by specifying the following…
included in anterior agreement
1-5b. Those costs that can be
This is already clear if municipalities make clear that all the costs
included in Development con- listed above in Table 28, also those that cannot be charged through
tributions plan but not charged a Development contributions plan, will be charged.
to landowners (see section
7.2.3 for more details)
4b. Additional requirements
for social housing

Requirements that might have consequences for the development
costs: for rented units e.g. allocation rules even if not derived from
housing legislation or local regulation, or indications of maximum
price of the units to be sold to housing associations; for units for
sale e.g. allocation rules regarding the selection of the buyers even
if not derived from housing legislation or local regulation, and in
case of no previous regional agreement on this matter, indications
of maximum selling prices to buyers.

7. Contributions to ‘Spatial
developments’ (ruimtelijke ontwikkelingen) situated outside
the development in question.
The contributions can be for
construction costs, and maybe
also for maintenance and
exploitation costs.

The argumentation should be the same as for contributions to other
schemes or to public infrastructure and facilities (3). The 2008 Act
prescribes that the argumentation must be included in a Structure
vision (Vrom et al., 2008: 46-48).

When instead of approving a Development contributions plan, the municipality
and the developer achieve an anterior Development agreement, it is possible to recover more costs: 1) it is possible to include the not-covered costs mentioned in
previous paragraph; 2) and in addition it is possible to include in the agreement
some other costs that cannot be included in a Development contributions plan. Of
course, ﬁnally there must be enough ﬁnal proﬁt (i.e. proﬁt available to the developer
to allow him to contribute more) to pay all the costs, but with an anterior Development agreement this is easier. The reason is that in this agreement parties have
the freedom to agree a higher or lower accounted land price, while in a Development contributions plan the accounted land price must be the maximum possible
(i.e. the price of the use of the land after regeneration). In other words, while in
a Development contributions plan the accounted land costs must be the value of
the land after regeneration, in a Development agreement it is possible to agree a
value that falls more in the neighbourhood of the land use prior to regeneration.

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311

The recommendation is that municipalities that want to recover more costs should
focus their strategy on signing an anterior Development agreement with the developer. The ﬁrst step is to create certainty about the costs that the municipality wishes
to include in this agreement. This certainty is necessary to allow developers to accurately calculate the development costs and contributions they have to pay in an early
stage of the development process. Table 29 lists which aspects municipalities should
specify in order to make those calculations possible.

EXAMPLE OF URBAN REGENERATION IN STURINGERLAND, Part One
In our ﬁctitious example, the Municipality of Sturingerland has created certainty about
contributions to the costs. These costs cover both those that can be included in a Development contributions plan, and in a Development agreement:
1a. Public infrastructure and facilities within or in the immediate surroundings of the
site (map 1a):
• Roads to be refurbished and a new road to connect to the general road network;
• The sewerage within the plan area, and connection to the general sewerage network;
• A park with a playground for children;
• An estimate of the maintenance/exploitation costs for all this infrastructure and
facilities that should be charged to the developer.
2a: Public infrastructure and facilities serving a wider area (bovenwijkse voorzieningen) (map 2a):
• Road alongside the plan area, which must be refurbished and which serves three
schemes, including the development in question;
• A new sewerage pipeline that connects the general network to this scheme and to
ﬁve other schemes;
• A park that serves the entire district;
• An estimate of the maintenance/exploitation costs of all this infrastructure and facilities that should be charged to the developer.
3a: Contributions to a fund meant for paying investments in off-site schemes and public
infrastructure and facilities not directly related to the development in question (bovenplanse verevening/kosten). These schemes and public infrastructure and facilities are
those prescribed in categories 2 and 7. Also included is the estimate of the maintenance/exploitation costs of this infrastructure and facilities that should be charged to
the developer.
4a: Social housing (map 4):
• A minimum percentage in this part of the city (20% for rent, 20% for sale);
• Indications about location of social housing (in plots along 30 km per hour-roads);

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Recommendations

• Social housing for rent: housing association Z has the competence to select the tenants according to criteria to be agreed with the municipality and based on housing
legislation and housing local regulations, the owner of the houses must maintain
the social function for at least 25 years (15 years more than the legal minimum),
rental price must be X% under the maximum price prescribed in national standard
(in Besluit op de huurtoeslag);
• Social housing for sale: housing association Z has the competence to select the buyers according to criteria to be agreed with the municipality and based on housing
legislation and housing local regulations, the buyer cannot sell the house on the
free market for at least 10 years, and the selling price must be, following a regional
agreement with other municipalities, Y% under the maximum price prescribed by
a national standard (in Besluit beheer sociale-huursector) or in this regional agreement.
6: Four green areas will be lost (verloren gegane natuurwaarde, groenvoorzieningen
en watervoorzieningen), one of which is situated within the development in question
and will be lost, and three outside. Three green areas will be created or refurbished to
compensate this loss (map 6-7). In addition, also included is the estimate of the maintenance/exploitation costs that should be charged to the developer.
4b: Additional requirements for social housing:
• Social housing for rent: housing association Z has the competence to select the
tenants according to criteria to be agreed with the municipality but not based on
housing legislation and housing local regulations. Further, in case housing association Z buys the units from the developer, the maximum selling price is to be set so
that Z does not incur any loss (the bedrijfswaarde);
• Social housing for sale: housing association Z has the competence to select the
buyers according to criteria to be agreed with the municipality but not based on
housing legislation and housing local regulations. Further, in case a regional agreement fails, the selling price must be Y% under the maximum price prescribed by a
national standard (in Besluit beheer sociale-huursector).
7: ‘Spatial developments’ (ruimtelijke ontwikkelingen) situated outside the development in question (map 6-7):
• A district of old social housing that must be regenerated;
• A new International Congress Center;
• Global calculation of the costs of both: € 5 and € 20 million respectively;
• An estimate of the maintenance/exploitation costs of this infrastructure and facilities
that should be charged to the developer;
• The area within which all development schemes will have to contribute to those
spatial developments: besides the development in question, also schemes A-M,
€ 100 per each m² of ﬂoor space.

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Also, it includes ‘spatial developments’ situated within the development in question
but which can only be charged if labelled as ‘spatial developments’ (map 1a):
• School, community centre (buurthuis), social welfare facility (welzijn) and the estimate of the associated maintenance/exploitation costs of this infrastructure and
facilities that should be charged to the developer.

main sewerage

sewerage

community
centre

social
road to be

refurbished

new road
park

school
playground

Map 1a. Public infrastructure and facilities within or in the immediate surroundings of the site in
Sturingerland.

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Recommendations

main sewerage

sewerage

community
centre

social

road to be refurbished

road to be

refurbished

new road
park

school
playground

park

main sewerage

sewerage

Map 2a. Public infrastructure and facilities serving a wider area in Sturingerland
(bovenwijkse voorzieningen).

Map 6 and 7. Contributions to other schemes (bovenplanse verevening/kosten), to ‘Spatial developments’ (ruimtelijke ontwikkelingen), and green areas
that will be lost (verloren gegane natuurwaarden, groen- en watervoorzieningen) in Sturingerland. A to M are the regeneration sites that, in addittion to the
contributions by our site, must also contribute.

A

school

main sewerage

AREA IN WHICH BUILDING SITES MUST CONTRIBUTE

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317

9.1.1.2 Sorts of documents to create certainty: site-speciﬁc document,
generic documents and General zoning plan
Municipalities can create this certainty in different sorts of documents. They can
choose one or several of them depending on the speciﬁc circumstances and many of
the documents can complement each other. The following demonstrates four different possibilities:
Site-speciﬁc documents
It has already been said that Dutch municipalities usually work in early stages of the
development processes towards indicative site-speciﬁc plans that create development expectations. At the same time, municipalities should also include the obligatory contributions in similar site-speciﬁc documents. These site-speciﬁc documents
about contributions can include contribution categories 1 to 7 and should preferably
be included within the site-speciﬁc plans (in the plans or enclosed as an appendix) to
guarantee a simultaneous approval and publication. A possible example is the 1998
Planning Brief that preceded the negotiations in case Harbourside, England. This
document prescribed a contribution for an off-site facility, the obligation to comply
with local social housing policy and to pay the entire on-site infrastructure, including
soil decontamination costs (for more details see frame 6d in chapter 6.4.1.1).
Generic document, integral character
Generic documents are valid for the territory of the entire municipality, a part of it or
for a speciﬁc category of schemes. They include standard contributions (so they do
not necessarily include a map) focussing on all policy ﬁelds (social housing, off-site
infrastructure, social facilities, etc). The standard contributions are applicable to any
development that takes place within the predeﬁned boundaries or categories, for
example, standard contributions for greenﬁeld sites, and other standards for regeneration sites. This can be a policy document (nota), approved alone or together with
the land policy document (nota grondbeleid), or just a decision (besluit) of the Local
Council. An example from abroad is the decision of the Municipality of Valencia in
2004, in which the municipality speciﬁed the contributions that developers should
pay/implement, in addition to the contributions already established in planning legislation, in the rezoning of former industrial or ofﬁces sites into housing (for more
details see frame 5i in chapter 5.5.1.2). Another example is the 2005 SPD4 document
from Bristol, which includes detailed standard contributions for all new developments within the city boundaries (for more details see frame 6e in chapter 6.4.1.1).
Generic document, sectoral character
An alternative to the generic integral document is a document that focuses on speciﬁc policy ﬁelds, like social housing. For example, local social housing policy documents can prescribe standard requirements for social housing (categories 4a and
4b). Other examples include a policy document for public facilities that serve wide
areas (nota bovenwijkse voorzieningen, Vrom, 2008: 121, 128), which can prescribe
categories 2a, 3a, 4a, 4b and 7; and a policy document for long-term investments in

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public infrastructure (meerjarig investeringsplan infrastructuur, op. cit.: 157), which
can prescribe categories 2a, 3a and 7. The sectoral document should be seen as a
second best option: the integral document is preferable because it guarantees that all
contributions in all policy ﬁelds are clear. Relying on sectoral documents carries the
inherent risk of fragmentation and lack of transparency. Both integral and sectoral
generic documents can be complementary, for example an integral document can
summarize and integrate prescriptions from several sectoral documents.
General zoning plans
General zoning plans cover the entire territory of the municipality or a part of it
(without focusing on just one development site), and can include all cost categories. Possibly, they can also incorporate standard charges, meaning that they also
become Generic documents. In Dutch practice there are already many indicative
zoning plans covering the entire territory of the municipality or a large part of it (e.g.
Structuurplan/Structuurvisie), but usually they include only vague prescriptions for
categories 1a, 2a, 3a and 7, and say nothing about the others. Furthermore, these
indicative plans do not usually prescribe who is going to pay/implement the contributions.
9.1.1.3 Indicative Structure vision
Should these sorts of documents (Site-speciﬁc document, Generic documents and
General zoning plan) be of an indicative or a legally binding character? It seems that
indicative plans ﬁt better in the Dutch planning culture and practice: in early stages
of development processes, municipalities usually work with indicative plans, but not
with binding ones. The documents should be binding for the public body that approves them, but not for the use possibilities of the land. This means that the executive body or the Local Council must take into consideration the contents of the plan,
but can also depart from it after proper argumentation. In other words, the documents
should prescribe the development’s basic requirements that must be taken into account as a hard starting point in the negotiations. During the negotiations, municipalities can consider modiﬁcations in order to adapt to speciﬁc circumstances. Another
argument in favour of ﬂexible indicative documents is that a stronger legally binding
character would create the necessity of regulating by law both the contents of the
documents and the approval/adoption procedure (Vrom, 2003: 13).
The 2008 Spatial Planning Act introduced a new sort of indicative document that
may be the ideal document for including any of the mentioned categories of costs
and sorts of documents: the Structure vision (Structuurvisie). The new Act does not
prescribe procedural or formal requirements for this document. Structure visions can
include a broad range of elements: besides the physical zoning, also determinations
regarding the implementation of the development (article 2.1.1 2008 Act). They can
have an outline character, but also contain detailed maps and determinations (Vrom,
2003: 11-13). This means that Site-speciﬁc documents and General zoning plans can
be put in the form of a Structure vision. Also, a Structure vision can focus on one

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319

singular aspect of planning policy, or several aspects, and on how the developments
prescribed in it can be implemented (article 2.1.2). This means that Generic documents can also be shaped as a Structure vision.
The 2008 Act prescribes several direct links between structure visions and cost recovery; for some sorts of costs, it is obligatory to use the Structure vision as a vehicle:
• First, anterior Development agreements can include contributions for ‘spatial
developments’ (category 7, ruimtelijke ontwikkelingen) only if prescribed by the
Structure vision (Vrom et al., 2008: 46-48, 85). Table 29 above shows exactly
what the vision must prescribe;
• Second, a Development contributions plan can include the obligation for the
landowners to contribute to other schemes or to funds meant for investments
outside the site in question (category 3a, bovenplanse verevening/kosten) only
if it is prescribed by a Vision (Vrom et al., 2008: 85). Table 28 gives more details
about what the Vision must prescribe.
• Third, currently confusion exists regarding the differences between ruimtelijke
ontwikkelingen, bovenplanse verevening/kosten and bovenwijkse voorzieningen. Because this confusion will not be resolved until jurisprudence has developed clear criteria, which will take several years, it is highly recommended to
also include the bovenwijkse voorzieningen in a Structure vision, with a similar
argumentation as for ruimtelijke ontwikkelingen and bovenplanse verevening/
kosten (confero Baardewijk, 2008: 759). This will prevent possible surprises in
the courts.
• Fourth, compensation costs for green and nature areas (category 6, verloren gegane natuurwaarde, groen- en watervoorzieningen) can be included in a Development contributions plan only if they are already mentioned as such in a
policy document, such as a Structure vision. Furthermore, this document should
prescribe the necessity of compensation (Vrom et al., 2008: 115).
In short, the Structure vision seems not only to be a logical and handy document.
Also, the new 2008 Physical Planning Act and Decree create the obligation to use it
for capturing value increase, at least for cost categories 3a, 6 and 7 (op. cit.: 84-85,
115). The documents can be reviewed each year, together with the yearly municipal
budget, in order to provide up-to-date calculations of the contributions.

EXAMPLE URBAN REGENERATION IN STURINGERLAND, Part Two
The Municipality of Sturingerland has speciﬁed the future contributions through a set
of documents. Thanks to all these documents, when the Municipality of Sturingerland
initiated the negotiations with the developers, the required contributions were the starting point. Also, the developers who bought parcels B, C and D (see Figure 33) took into
consideration these contributions in the price they agreed with the former landowners.
The documents are:

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Structure vision Sturingerland 2020
A Structure vision covering all regeneration schemes in the city. This document corresponds with the sort General zoning plan and includes cost categories 1a, 2a, 6 and
7, already detailed in the Part One of the example.
Housing Policy Sturingerland 2020
Together with the Vision 2020, the municipality approved a Housing Policy note for the
entire territory of the municipality. This document corresponds to the Generic sectoral
document type and has been added to the 2020 Vision as an appendix. It includes cost
categories 4a and 4b, already detailed in Part One of the example.
Standard charges in implementation paragraph Structure vision Sturingerland 2020
Together with the Vision 2020, the municipality approved some standard charges,
which apply for all developments in the city. This document corresponds with the Generic document type and has been added to the 2020 Vision as part of its implementation paragraph (uitvoeringsparagraaf). It includes several additional prescriptions about
cost category 7, already detailed in Part One of the example: a global calculation of the
costs of all ruimtelijke ontwikkelingen, estimated at € 25 million. When this is divided
by the estimated m² of dwellings and ofﬁce space to be built in the scheme in question
and in schemes A-M, the standard contribution is €100 per m² of ﬂoor space.

9.1.1.4 The central government stimulates municipalities to prepare
Generic documents
There is the risk that expectations of future building possibilities arise quickly and
catch the municipality unprepared or (or even unwilling to prepare) any of the abovementioned sorts of documents. The English experience shows that municipalities do
not always make the necessary efforts. Only after the British central government began to actively stimulate the approval of Generic integral documents, has the number
of municipalities that draft these documents grown signiﬁcantly. The 2005 SPD4 document in Bristol is an example of such an intervention. The Dutch central government
should follow the British example, and stimulate municipalities to do their homework. For example, the central government can stimulate municipalities by preparing
model documents. It is preferable that the central government’s efforts focus on stimulating Generic integral documents, which can be but do not necessarily have to be
integrated in General zoning plans. The advantage of Generic integral documents is
that they guarantee that all developments in the municipality, from very early stages,
start with a reasonable level of certainty about future contributions. Afterwards, once
the development possibilities and the desired contributions are clearer, municipalities can also prepare Site-speciﬁc documents to further specify the contributions. In
this task, the central government should work together with the Association of Netherlands Municipalities (Vereniging Nederlandse Gemeenten), which often produces
model documents for daily use by municipalities.

Recommendations

9.1.2

321

Long-term recommendations: legal modiﬁcations

For the longer term, legal modiﬁcations might be necessary to guarantee that in all
municipalities there is a minimum level of certainty about future contributions. Legal
modiﬁcations must be seen as a second best option, should the above-mentioned
voluntary measures not be widely applied in practice. The legal modiﬁcation can be
accomplished in two ways: ﬁrst by obliging municipalities to prepare Generic integral documents, and second by introducing minimum standard charges in planning
law. These measures may encounter some political resistance. Dutch municipalities
are used to acting very autonomously in determining their planning policy and may
see these measures as interference in their competences.
Stimulating and obliging municipalities to introduce Generic integral documents
As we have seen, the ﬁrst recommendation was to elaborate a model document and
to offer it to municipalities, which can use it freely and do not need to ‘rediscover
the wheel’ on their own. But a model voluntary document is not enough. Article
2.1.2 Physical Planning Act should add the obligation that municipalities approve
a Structure vision speciﬁcally including a Generic integral document, or to include
this document in the implementation paragraph of a broader Structure vision. These
Structure visions must be based on a ﬂexible but also obligatory list of contents, a sort
of index, to be speciﬁed in the Physical Planning Decree in addition to the actual list
of sorts of costs (articles 6.2.3 to 6.2.6). This obligatory index guarantees a certain
level of uniformity among municipalities, and eliminates the danger of municipalities
approving documents that are too vague. This gives to landowners and developers
the certainty that they can expect the same contributions everywhere in the country.

EXAMPLE URBAN REGENERATION IN STURINGERLAND, Part Three
The central government in The Hague is not happy with the progress made by municipalities in elaborating an adequate policy base for cost recovery. Sturingerland, with
its Structure vision 2020 and complementary documents (see example Part Two), is a
positive exception.
Model document
To stimulate municipalities, the central government and the Association of Netherlands Municipalities (VNG) elaborated a model document, based on the experience in
Sturingerland. It is not obligatory to follow this model, but it can help municipalities to
elaborate their own documents.
Obligatory Structure vision about cost recovery, and obligatory national list of contents
The Hague decides to go further. The Parliament introduces in the Physical Planning Act
the obligation for municipalities to approve Structure visions (as a separate document
or in its implementation paragraph) focusing on cost recovery. Also, the Parliament

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introduces in the Physical Planning Decree the minimum topics that such a document
must include, inspired by the documents from Sturingerland. These minimum topics,
which municipalities must ﬁll in, are an elaboration based on these main categories:
- Social Housing (cost categories 4a and 4b);
- Public infrastructure and facilities serving wider areas (cost category 2a);
- Green/natural areas that will be lost (cost category 6);
- Spatial developments (cost category 7).

Introducing legal minimum standard charges and prescriptions
If, despite this legal obligation, there are still many municipalities that have no or have
insufﬁciently elaborated cost recovery documents, the Dutch central government
could consider a second measure: a modiﬁcation in the Physical Planning Decree to
introduce legal minimum standard charges for the entire country. The legal standard
charges could differentiate between different categories of development sites (e.g.
residential, ofﬁces, industrial, urban regeneration, greenﬁeld development). Minimum standard charges prescribed in law have the side effect that they do not leave
much ﬂexibility for adaptation to speciﬁc circumstances. Therefore, legal minimum
standard charges could sometimes refer to outline instead of detailed standards, and
could prescribe the requirement that the municipality must further hammer them
out in detail. Actually, this means a combination of legal minimum standard charges
and the above mentioned obligation for municipalities to ﬁll in an obligatory list of
contents. The Valencian legal standard charges are an example of such a combination. First, they include minimum standard charges, more or less detailed, such as
minimum public space, minimum public buildings and parking places depending
on the land use (residential, industrial, etc). But they also prescribe the obligation for
municipalities to prepare local planning documents that further detail/complement a
predeﬁned set of topics (for more details about Valencian legal standard charges, see
frame 5h in chapter 5.5.1.1).

EXAMPLE URBAN REGENERATION IN STURINGERLAND, Part Four
Despite the measures, there are still many municipalities that have no, or have insufﬁciently elaborated, cost recovery documents. Usually, large cities have good documents, but smaller municipalities do not. An evaluation show that municipalities with
good documents generally obtain good results in practice, while the others show results
that are worse and very varied (sometimes adequate, sometimes very bad) depending
on speciﬁc circumstances (negotiations skills of involved public ofﬁcers, local market
circumstances, quality and commitment of local politicians, etc.).
National detailed standard charges and prescriptions for cost recovery
The central government in The Hague decides to introduce in the Physical Planning
Decree detailed standard charges and prescriptive determinations:

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323

Standard charges (inspired often by the documents of Sturingerland, see Parts One and
Two of the example):
• Spatial developments (ruimtelijke ontwikkelingen, cost category 7): € 100 per each
new m² of ﬂoor space;
• Lost green/natural areas (verloren gegane natuurwaarde, groenvoorzieningen en
watervoorzieningen, cost category 6): applies to all developments, the developer is
required to submit a compensation plan (if there is no document already specifying the compensation locations), to implement compensation green and ﬁnally to
transfer it to the municipality;
• Social housing (cost category 4a): a minimum of 20% rent units and 20% selling
units, taking account of the total m² of ﬂoor space, not the number of units, to prevent developers from constructing social houses that are too small.
Prescriptive determinations, to be detailed by municipalities:
• Public infrastructure and facilities serving wider areas (bovenwijkse voorzieningen,
cost category 2): municipalities must characterize them, prescribe the locations,
calculate the global costs, argue the relationship between the infrastructure and
facilities and the schemes, and prescribe the schemes that beneﬁt and the schemes
that must contribute;
• Spatial developments (cost category 7): municipalities must review the national
standard charge of €100 per m², that serves as a minimum, and prescribe the
schemes that must contribute;
• Green/natural areas to be lost (cost category 6): municipalities must prescribe the
compensation locations, and calculate the global costs.
Thanks to these legal standard charges and prescriptions, the required minimum future
contributions are clear in the Netherlands. These measures have been useful especially
in those small municipalities that had not prepared any, or prepared insufﬁcient, cost
recovery documents.

9.2

Choosing the contents of binding rules

As section 8.2 already showed, being able to include aspects related to the ﬁnancing and implementation of public infrastructure and facilities in binding plans can
have a positive effect on capturing value increase. In Valencia and England, planning
law makes it possible to prescribe in binding rules a wide range of requirements:
contributions to social/affordable housing, contributions to on-site and off-site public
infrastructure and facilities, contributions to social facilities (maatschappelijke voorzieningen), and also the possibility of prescribing investment and implementation
schedules for these contributions.

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Recommendations

In the Netherlands, until the 2008 Physical Planning Act, none of these requirements
could be prescribed in the binding rules, and this had a negative effect on capturing
value increase. The 2008 Physical Planning Act made it possible for the ﬁrst time to
include almost all these requirements. Nowadays, it is possibly to include social/affordable housing both in the Land use plan and the departures from it (a percentage)
and in the Development contributions plan (allocation to the plots and number of
units). It is also possible to introduce implementation schedules and contributions
for most of the on-site infrastructure and for some sorts of off-site infrastructure in the
Development contributions plan. However, two limitations remain:
1. It is still uncertain whether it is possible to prescribe contributions for maintenance/exploitation costs in general, and for construction and maintenance/
exploitation costs of social facilities (maatschappelijke voorzieningen) in particular. The Dutch parliament decided during the deliberation on the 2008 Land
Development Act to exclude the possibility of charging social facilities through
a Development contributions plan. Thus, also after the adoption of the 2008 Act,
Development contributions plans cannot include these contributions, i.e. these
cannot be charged to the landowners. Besides this, it is not clear whether this
parliamentary decision has consequences not only for the Development contributions plan, but also for the contents of anterior Development agreements. If
plans cannot include contributions for social facilities, can agreements? Could
such contributions be required from the developer, or can they result from a unilateral undertaking by the developer (see frame 7f in section 7.2.3)? If developer
and municipality agree to such a contribution in an agreement, this might afterwards be the subject of a legal intervention, in case there is an appeal (Van den
Brand, interview 2008). To make it possible to charge such contributions without
the risk of facing appeals, a section should be added to the list of sorts of costs in
article 6.2.5 of the Physical Planning Decree: “i. Social facilities”.2
2. Many of the costs included in a Development contributions plan cannot be
charged to the landowner (see sections 7.2.3 and 9.1.1.1): parts of the on-site infrastructure, the entire maintenance/exploitation costs, a larger part of the off-site
infrastructure, the entire costs of off-site public investments not directly related
to the development in question, and probably also not the costs that have been
already incurred on the site. To make it possible to charge these costs through
a Development contributions plan, the list of sorts of recoverable costs (articles
6.2.3 up to 6.2.6 2008 of the Physical Planning Decree) should be enlarged.
In addition, nowadays landowners must receive the highest value for their land,
which increases the accounted land costs and thus the probability of a deﬁcit, a
deﬁcit that must be paid by the municipality. To diminish the possibility of a deﬁcit
and lower the accounted land costs, article 6.13.5 of the 2008 Physical Planning
Act, which prescribes that assessment of the value of land must follow expropriation law, should be modiﬁed. Instead of following expropriation law, assessment
should follow the market value based on the land use prior to regeneration.
2

In Dutch: “i. maatschappelijke voorzieningen.”

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325

These are not recommendations that could be introduced in the short term, as this
shortcoming of the Dutch planning system can only be addressed with legislative
modiﬁcation. Relatively speaking, the ﬁrst one is easier to introduce than the second.

EXAMPLE URBAN REGENERATION IN STURINGERLAND, Part Five
A majority in Parliament supports the modiﬁcation of article 6.2.5 of the Physical Planning Decree to make it possible to charge the costs of the building of social facilities to
landowners through a Development contributions plan. As a consequence of this support, anterior Development agreements can now also include contributions to these
costs.
Addition to Structure vision Sturingerland 2020
Thanks to the ﬁrst legal modiﬁcation, the Municipality of Sturingerland is now free to
require a contribution for social facilities. The municipality labels all the social facilities as ‘spatial developments’ in the Vision 2020, and also prescribes in this document
that our scheme and schemes A-M must contribute to all these social facilities. In
total, these encompass 3 schools (one in our scheme), 2 community centres (one in
our scheme) and 2 social welfare facilities (one in our scheme) (see map 6-7). Now
the municipality can motivate and determine properly which part of the costs must be
charged to our scheme.
Addition to Standard Charges in implementation paragraph Structure vision Sturingerland 2020
The municipality includes to the standard charges in the implementation paragraph
of the Structure vision 2020 (see Part Two of the example) another standard charge
regarding social facilities. The costs of all social facilities in the district (the 3 schools, 2
community centres and 2 social welfare facilities) are calculated (€ 20m) and divided
by the estimated number of dwellings and m² of ofﬁce space to be built in our scheme
and in schemes A-M. The resulting standard contributions are set at €1.000 per dwelling and €80 per m² of ﬂoor space for ofﬁces.
The second recommendation (enlarging the list of sorts of recoverable costs and modifying the assessment method of the value of land) seems more difﬁcult to introduce,
as it requires a more profound legal modiﬁcation and is politically sensitive (value of
land). Therefore, it will take more time to harness the necessary support in Parliament,
and to carefully design the best way of modifying the law. Its effects will be illustrated
in Part Ten of this example.
EXAMPLE URBAN REGENERATION IN STURINGERLAND, Part Six
The situation in our scheme in Sturingerland is as follows:

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Recommendations

Costs that can be included in a Development contributions plan, and charged to the
landowners:
– The on-site public infrastructure and facilities, including part of the costs of the social facilities (the land and the building): the school, community centre and social
welfare facility (here we do as if the ﬁrst legal modiﬁcation illustrated in the 5th part
of the example has taken place), and excluding some of the costs of refurbishing the
old roads situated within the plan area, and excluding the entire maintenance and
exploitation costs of any infrastructure or facility (see map 1a).
– That part of the public infrastructure and facilities and of the social facilities that
serve a wider area (see maps 1a and 2a) and satisfy the three legal criteria (proﬁt,
attributability and proportionality): the municipality, thanks to the Structure vision
Sturingerland 2020 (see Part Two of the example) can motivate properly which of
these infrastructure and facilities serve a wider area, and thus which part of the costs
corresponds to our scheme and can thus be charged to the landowners.
– Social housing (20% rented, 20% for sale, see map 4a): the municipality, thanks
to the Housing Policy note Sturingerland 2020 (see Part Two of the example) can
motivate properly this requirement.
The followings costs probably cannot be included in the Development contributions
plan, or can be included but probably cannot be charged to the landowners/developers:
– Some costs of refurbishing the old roads and all the costs of maintaining and exploiting both the public infrastructure and the social facilities (see map 1a);
– The parts of the public infrastructure and facilities (including the social facilities)
that serve a wider area but do not satisfy the three legal criteria (see maps 1a and
2a);
– Part of the costs made by the municipality for the preparation of plans;
– Spatial developments not directly related to this scheme (see map 6-7);
– A deﬁcit in the Development contributions plan: the calculated proﬁts do not cover
the costs, which are very high in this site due to high infrastructure provision costs
and soil decontamination costs, but also due to expensive land (high accounted
land costs). This deﬁcit cannot be charged to the landowners.
The Municipality of Sturingerland has the ambition of lowering the accounted land
costs to achieve a cost-neutral operation, i.e. that the proﬁts pay all the involved costs,
also those that cannot be charged to the developers/landowners in a Development
contributions plan. Therefore, the Municipality has a strong preference for agreeing the
contributions in an anterior Development agreement, instead of approving a Development contributions plan. In a Development agreement, the Municipality and the landowners/developers are free to agree a lower price for the land than in a Development
contributions plan. The Municipality has already calculated that if land is assessed
on its value prior to regeneration, there will be enough ﬁnal proﬁt for the landowner/
developer to pay all the costs.

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327

Additional consideration for preferring an anterior agreement
Besides this economic consideration, there is another reason for the Municipality to
prefer an anterior agreement: the Municipality is facing many development schemes at
the same time, and has no internal capacity to make, approve and implement a Development contributions plan for each scheme.

9.3

Making binding rules conditional on the developer
securing his contributions

Summary of the ﬁndings
As section 8.3 demonstrated earlier, it is necessary to commit the developer to secure
the value capturing arrangements and to the strict deadlines that might have been
included in the binding rules. In England and Valencia it is possible to make, in a
formal, open and direct way, the approval of the relevant binding rules conditional
on a Development agreement. This happens as follows: ﬁrst, the binding rules (Planning Permission in England, Joint Development Program in Valencia), including the
contributions and deadlines, become provisionally approved following an extensive
procedure. The municipality openly conditions the deﬁnite approval to an agreement
that secures these contributions and deadlines. When the agreement is sealed, the
municipality, without the need of further extensive procedures, approves the binding
rules deﬁnitely. If such an agreement is not reached, the binding rules never come
into force. This clear and open conditioning seems to have improved public value
capturing, and specially the speed of plan implementation.
Actual practice in the Netherlands: informal conditioning
In practice, Dutch municipalities also often condition the Land use plan and departures from it on securing contributions; however, they do not have the formal possibility of doing so in an open and straightforward way, as in Valencia and England.
This can have negative side-effects: 1) in the Netherlands municipalities hold back
the approval of the Land use plan until an agreement has been achieved, so after
achieving the agreement the plan must follow an extensive procedure (including
public participation), which means that there is the risk that the Land use plan becomes annulled or seriously modiﬁed; 2) there is the possibility that the developer
appeals to the courts against an improper use of statutory powers; and 3) it makes an
open and transparent public discourse of the municipality very difﬁcult, because an
open conditioning is illegal (see section 7.4.3.1).
Consequences 2008 Physical Planning Act
Since the 2008 Physical Planning Act, Dutch municipalities, provided they approve a
Development contributions plan, can make granting the building permit conditional

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on the payment of contributions. Once the Land use plan and the Development contributions plan have been approved, the developer/landowner can submit an application for a building permit. The novelty is that the municipality can now condition
the building permit on the applicant securing his/her contributions; before 2008 this
was not possible. However, approving a Development contributions plan has some
side effects: municipalities assume some ﬁnancial risks because they are responsible
for the calculations and may need to advance investments; they must put resources
into making the plan and up-dating it yearly; and they must bear the consequences
of delay in case developers/landowners do not apply for the building permit. In addition, not all the costs can be charged to the developers/landowners (for more details
about these side effects see section 7.4.3.3).
Best option: anterior Development agreement
Thus in principle the best option for municipalities, especially in urban regeneration
where the deﬁcit in the Development contributions plan may be large, is to seal an
anterior Development agreement before the approval of the Land use plan, which
assures that contributions and deadlines are secured and no Development contributions plan is needed. Municipalities can thus informally request that developers
sign such an agreement (Vrom et al., 2008: 197). However, the actual practice of
informal conditioning may become more difﬁcult after the 2008 Act. The Act reinforced the obligation for the municipality to take a formal decision (in Dutch terms
besluit) about an application to modify or depart from the Land use plan (article 3.9
for modiﬁcation and 3.12 for departure). If the municipality wishes to refuse the application, this decision must be taken within eight weeks. It is not necessarily so that
the municipality wants to refuse, but the possibility of refusing has a strategic importance: the power to refuse increases the negotiation powers of the municipality. If the
municipality does not refuse within these eight weeks, it is assumed to have agreed
with the application, i.e. to agree to start the formal modiﬁcation/departure procedure. This means that municipalities have eight weeks to decide whether to refuse the
application. Following the Explanatory Memorandum of the 2008 Act, when making
the decision to refuse, municipalities have to justify their decision by referring to the
contents of the Land use plan, and, if existing, of the Structure vision (Tweede Kamer
der Staten-Generaal, 2003: 31). The enforcement-mechanism is that the applicant
has now the possibility to appeal (beroep) against a refusal or a non-determination.
This means that the municipality may be confronted with the following situation: a)
a developer submits an application that involves the need for investments in public
infrastructure and facilities; b) the municipality prefers to secure these investments
through an anterior agreement, so it wants to refuse the application in case the applicant does not want to sign the agreement; c) however, formally speaking, the municipality cannot openly and directly condition the approval of the Land use plan
or departure from it on such an agreement. In other words, the municipality cannot
openly and directly refuse the application with the argument that the applicant does
not want to seal an agreement, but must ﬁnd other arguments in the existing Land use
plan, the Structure vision or other policy documents. If the municipality has already

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329

discussed the application with the developer, and already concluded that its physical
and functional characteristics are acceptable, there is actually little room left to refuse
(Gerritsen, 2010: 26). Thus the municipality should decide within eight weeks and, if
for example the application ﬁts within the Structure vision, or if the municipality has
publicly already agreed to the physical and functional characteristics of the applications, it may be obliged to say “yes” and approve a Development contributions plan.

9.3.1

Short-term recommendation: alternative ways of
conditioning

Although open and straightforward conditioning is not allowed, there are some alternative ways, and the new 2008 Act has added additional possibilities. Here follow
some recommendations for acting on these alternative possibilities, which do not require any legal modiﬁcation. In general, implementation of these recommendations
should not encounter signiﬁcant resistance, because they are a continuation and
reﬁnement of local practice. Nevertheless, these alternative possibilities have some
negative side effects. For this reason I provide in the following section a second group
of recommendations that do require some legal modiﬁcations.
Conditioning through the Explanation of the Land use plan
The ﬁrst alternative is to include in the Explanation (Toelichting) of the draft Land
use plan considerations related to the economic ‘performability’ of the plan (economische uitvoerbaarheid in Dutch): these are the conditions that are needed to implement the plan, the necessary contributions, whether there are enough ﬁnancial
sources, subsidies, etc. Based on this paragraph, the municipality can argue that contributions are necessary for the economic feasibility of the plan. If the contributions
are not secured, the plan is not feasible, and can thus not be approved. This alternative has some negative side effects, very similar to the above mentioned negative side
effects of the practice of informal conditioning:
1. Procedural risks: after the sealing of Development agreement, the Land use plan
(or departure from it) must follow the complete procedure, which implies a risk
of delay and modiﬁcations because of objections and appeals. Formally speaking, agreements cannot restrict the decision-making power of the Local Council.
In Valencia and England, the procedure of approval of the binding plan precedes
the sealing of the agreement, after which there is only a short deﬁnite approval
(see Figure 34). This means that in Valencia and England, parties can seal the
agreement with a high certainty that the zoning plan is not going to be modiﬁed, and that there will be no delay. In the Netherlands, agreements are always
subjected to the possibility that afterwards the Land use plan will be modiﬁed or
its approval will be delayed (Vrom et al.: 51);
2. Appeal risks: if a municipality refuses to approve a Land use plan because the
developer does not secure contributions, there is always a risk of an appeal to
the courts. Indirect conditioning through the Explanation is not the same as enu-

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Recommendations

merating, openly, in a municipal decision, the contributions that the developer
has to secure in exchange for deﬁnite approval of the binding rules. Municipalities in the Netherlands need to properly and carefully argue why implementation
is not feasible and thus why approval is not possible. This is not always easy: if
implementation seems feasible, municipalities cannot refuse, even if developers
have not secured all the contributions (to ‘look like being feasible’ is different
than to ‘be secured’). The introduction of the 2008 Land Development Act added
an additional disadvantage: a Development contributions plan secures in theory
part of the needed contributions, so the municipality might not be able to use
the argument of performability. As demonstrated above, a Development contributions plan is less secure than one may think. In England and Valencia, there is
no need for complex argumentation: planning law establishes that the developer
has to secure the contributions stated in the provisionally approved document,
as a condition for deﬁnitive approval;
Incongruent municipal public discourse: indirect conditioning through the Explanation poses a threat to the credibility of the municipality’s public discourse,
which in practice may need to hide some of the ‘real reasons’ for the approval or
refusal of Land use plans. In England and Valencia, the ‘real reasons’ are publicly
approved by the Local Council, and form the open and transparent criteria for
assessing whether or not to formally approve the binding rules.

Conditioning through the Development contributions plan and proper cost
recovery policy documents
The 2008 Act has introduced a second alternative. After a planning application has
been submitted, which requires the modiﬁcation or departure from the Land use
plan, the municipality can calculate what would be the costs and which part could
be charged to the landowners/developers through a Development contributions plan.
Such a calculation (exploitatieopzet in Dutch) is part of the plan. The municipality
may ask the applicant to perform the calculation, instead of doing it itself. If municipalities apply the recommendations in chapter 9.1 to make and adopt cost recovery
policy documents (site-speciﬁc, generic documents or general zoning plans), they
can properly justify all the related costs for providing public infrastructure and facilities (and, in case the applicant provides the calculations, municipalities can argue
why all the costs must be included). This is especially important for public infrastructure and facilities that go beyond the absolutely necessary on-site infrastructure
provision. That is, the municipalities can adequately defend the statement that the
application involves costs that surpass minimum on-site infrastructure provision, and
also include wider contributions to other public infrastructure and facilities within
and outside the development site in question.

Figure 34. Negotiations, sealing of Development Agreement and approval of legally binding zoning
plan in development processes in Valencia, England and the Netherlands.

These cost recovery policy documents are very important. Without them, the municipality would most probably not be able to calculate and properly argue the costs,
certainly not within the stipulated eight weeks period for responding to applications.
And, in case it is the applicant that must make the calculations, the municipality
would also not be able to properly argue why the applicant should include all those
costs that are not strictly needed for on-site infrastructure provision. It is likely that

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the applicant will consider them as ‘extra’ costs and will not be willing to include
them as part of the costs that must be charged to his plan. In case the calculation
makes clear that the municipality cannot recover all the costs through the Development contributions plan (which is not unthinkable, especially in urban regeneration,
and especially if the costs involve not only minimum infrastructure provision but also
wider contributions), municipalities can openly refuse to process and to approve the
Development contributions plan, arguing that they cannot bear this deﬁcit (Vrom et
al., 2008: 106). This is equivalent to refusing to approve the Land use plan.
This conditioning through the Development contributions plan has some advantages
compared with conditioning through the Explanation in the Land use plan. First, it
reduces the possibility of success of the developers appeal (side effect 2) because the
municipality can better argue the non-feasibility of the project. Second, municipalities can be open about their decision (side effect 3). However, if the developer wants
to secure only the additional costs (but not those costs that can be charged through
a Development contributions plan) municipalities cannot use the argument of economic feasibility to refuse the application. The reason is that the costs that can be
charged are theoretically guaranteed, even if the developer does not want to seal the
agreement: the municipality is expected to approve the Development contributions
plan and landowners/developers are expected to pay these costs when obtaining a
building permit. The municipality must therefore approve a Development contributions plan, which was exactly what it wanted to avoid because of the mentioned
disadvantages, risks and costs of having to approve it. In any scenario, side effect 1
remains: after the sealing of an anterior Agreement, the Land use plan still has to be
processed, which carries with it the risk of modiﬁcations and delay.

EXAMPLE URBAN REGENERATION IN STURINGERLAND, Part Seven
The Municipality of Sturingerland owns parcel A, Developer B owns parcel B, Developer C owns parcel C and Developer D owns parcel D (see Figure 33).
Conditioning the Land use plan through Development contributions plan and proper
cost recovery policy documents
Developer B submitted at moment 0 an application for modiﬁcation of the Land use
plan. The initiative is in line with the urban regeneration policy of Sturingerland, which
is prescribed in the Structure vision 2020 (see Part Two of the example). The municipality decided to stimulate the initiative, but adopting a ‘facilitating’ role, i.e. leaving the
implementation to the developer. The municipality calculated (in an exploitatieopzet)
the costs that can be attributed to the plan through a Development contributions plan.
Thanks to the Structure vision 2020 and its implementation paragraph, the municipality calculated right away the total costs, and motivated them properly. Without these
documents the municipality would not have been able to motivate either the contribution for the public infrastructure and facilities that serve a wider area (the road

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to be refurbished, the sewerage and park), or the contributions for the ‘spatial developments’ (the regeneration of the social housing neighbourhood, the International
Congress Center and the social facilities), or the compensation green areas provided
as a compensation for the lost green areas (four areas, to be compensated with three
new/refurbished ones). It turned out that not all of these costs could be charged to the
landowners through a Development contributions plan (see Part Six of the example).
Further, the proﬁts from selling the real estate would not cover all the chargeable costs
(the costs that can be charged to the landowners) if the land were to be appraised at
the market value with the future use possibilities. In addition to this deﬁcit, there were
signiﬁcant costs that were not secured: the other schemes that were supposed to pay
the facilities serving a wider area and the ‘spatial developments’ had not yet been developed, so their contribution was still uncertain. As the municipality had no ﬁnancial
resources to pay these costs, the municipality was able to properly motivate that the
investments were not secured and thus the Land use plan could not be modiﬁed. In
other words, the municipality was able to properly argue why the application of developer B had to be refused.
The calculations made clear that the proﬁts were large enough to cover all the costs, as
long as the land is not appraised at the full market price with the future use possibilities. The municipality made clear to Developer B that he had to pay all the costs, i.e. to
accept a lower price for the land. Both entered negotiations that ended in Developer B
agreeing with the municipal requirements. Below, this example is worked out in three
alternative scenarios: Ia, Ib and II:
• Scenario Ia: Developer B succeeds in buying all the land for a low price;
• Scenario Ib: Developer B succeeds in buying all the land for a low price and direct
conditioning of the Land use plan is made possible through a legal modiﬁcation;
• Scenario II: Developer B is not successful in buying all the land for a low price (see
section 9.4).
Below, scenario Ia is worked out, while the other scenarios are expanded in subsequent portion.
Scenario Ia: Developer B succeeds in buying all the land for a low price
Developer B succeeded in buying all the land from the Municipality and from Developer C and Developer D for a price that allowed him to pay all the costs, i.e. for a price
lower than the full market price with the future use possibilities. He signed an anterior
Development agreement with the Municipality securing the costs that could not be
charged through a Development contributions plan. However, Developer B refused to
secure the costs that were supposed to be recovered through the Development contributions plan. According to planning law, the Municipality can recover these costs
when granting the building permits. As a consequence, the Municipality could not
refuse the application because these costs were in theory already secured. The Municipality had to approve the Development contributions plan, together with the Land use

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plan, which was displeasing for the local politicians. The Municipality had to advance
the investment for refurbishing the road, the purchase of the land needed for the school,
community centre, park and sport ﬁeld, and also some investments for an infrastructure
that serves a wider area (e.g. refurbishing the adjacent road, and contributions to other
facilities in the district). Also, the municipality had to face more risks: ﬁrst, other parties
submitted appeals against the Land use plan, which had to be modiﬁed and suffered
delay (side effect 1); and second, Developer B delayed his application for a building
permit (because of market circumstances), so ﬁnally the municipality had to deal with
the ﬁnancial costs of the delay.
On the positive side, the Municipality had initially a strong argumentation to refuse
the application, so the risks of appeals against its request to seal an anterior agreement
were lower (side effect 2). That is why developer B agreed to secure at least part of the
costs. Furthermore, the municipality could be open about the real reasons behind accepting or refusing the application (side effect 3).

As shown, short-term recommendations leave some negative side effects unresolved:
even if the municipality successfully seals an anterior Development agreement, the
Land use plan still has to be processed. This carries the risk of modiﬁcation and delay
(side effect 1). Possibly, if the developer is not willing to secure the costs that theoretically can be charged through a Development contributions plan, municipalities
might be obliged to approve the Development contributions plan in any case. It is
already said that this implies some side effects: municipalities might need to assume
risks and part of the costs. To remove these disadvantages, it is recommended to allow in planning law for direct conditioning, similar to how this happens in Valencia
and England. The central government should introduce several legislative modiﬁcations. First, it is necessary to allow contributions to be prescribed in the Land use
plan, instead of only in a Development contributions plan. One paragraph could be
added to article 3.1.2 of the 2008 Physical Planning Decree or to the Physical Planning Act itself:
With regard to economic feasibility, a Land use plan/departure from it
can include requirements related to the implementation of public infrastructure and facilities, and, if necessary, schedules for the realization

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of the works, activities, measures and buildings, and if needed phasing
them in relation to each other.3
Second, to make it possible to make the approval to an agreement conditional, a
sentence should be added to chapter 3.2 of the 2008 Physical Planning Act (for the
procedure of the Land use plan) and to chapter 3.3 (for the departure from it):
When and if the Land use plan or departure from it prescribes requirements related to the performability (requirements about social housing
to rent and to sell, owner-occupied building, sorts of shopping, selling
prices of social dwellings, the realisation of public infrastructure and
facilities, and implementation schedules, red.), the realization of these
requirements must be secured in a development agreement before the
Land use plan or departure are formally approved.4
It is to be expected that these modiﬁcations would encounter some political resistance. Criticisms would be made that municipalities are ‘selling’ planning consent.
The argument might be made that the planning activity of public bodies must take
account only of spatially relevant considerations, and that securing contributions
does not fall under this competence. However, this is misplaced criticism, as the
introduction of the Development contributions plan and the possibility of conditioning granting of building permit to a ﬁnancial contribution has already weakened the
legal argument that only spatially relevant considerations are relevant for assessing
building applications.

URBAN REGENERATION IN STURINGERLAND, Example Part Eight
Scenario Ib: direct conditioning Land use plan through legal modiﬁcation, and Developer B manages to buy all the land for a low price
The Dutch central government, after receiving a lot of complains from municipalities
like Sturingerland, decides to make it legally possible to make the Land use plan conditional on securing contributions.

After Developer B submitted at moment 0 an application for modiﬁcation of the Land
use plan, the Municipality of Sturingerland motivated properly within the period of 8
weeks the contributions that the developer had to face. The municipality enumerated
the requirements, without having to calculate the costs that can be charged through
a Development contributions plan (i.e. without having to make a exploitatieopzet),
which saved much time and effort for the municipality. Initial contacts with Developer
B revealed that he was willing to accept a lower land price and to assume the requirements, which resulted from the fact that developer B managed to agree with the other
landowners a low price for their land (low enough to allow paying the contributions).
The Municipality initiated the procedure for modifying the Land use plan. During the
procedure, the municipality and Developer B negotiated and discussed the requirements, and the Local Executive decided ﬁnally to accept some modiﬁcations to the
original list of requirements because it became clear during the negotiations that this
was necessary in order to make the operation feasible. The Local Council provisionally
approved the modiﬁcation of the Land use plan. This provisionally approved Land use
plan included a list of all the contributions, including the agreed changes. The Land
use plan stated that all these contributions must be secured within one year, otherwise
the plan cannot be deﬁnitely approved. Public consultation had already taken place,
and all parties had already had the chance to make objections and appeals. The Municipality and Developer B negotiated a Development agreement that secured all the
contributions, conscious of the fact there would be no further possibility to object or
appeal against the plan. After the sealing of the Agreement, the Local Council approved
the plan deﬁnitely in a shortened procedure.

9.4

Modulating property rights

Summary of the ﬁndings
Section 8.4 has already explained how the deﬁnition of property rights in England
and the Netherlands (where, contrary to Valencia, there is no land readjustment regulation that modulates the right to provide the infrastructure) seems to hinder the capturing of value increase. In short, these are the conclusions:
• There is in England and the Netherlands a strong interdependency between local
public bodies and landowners and developers: as a rule, the transactions that
are needed to provide the infrastructure are highly dependent on agreement with
the landowners/developers. This is because none of the actors control all the
needed resources: public bodies have the statutory powers for planning consent,
but landowners/developers have the ﬁnancial means and the exclusive right to
develop the land. This interdependency cannot be resolved using expropriation
or the pre-emption right (voorkeursrecht in Dutch), because these instruments
have severe limitations in practice, and they imply a direct organisational and
ﬁnancial involvement of public bodies;

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•

•

•

•

•

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The situation in Valencia has changed radically after the regional government
introduced a new planning law in 1994: since then there is, to provide the infrastructure, no longer any unavoidable mutual dependence between public bodies and landowners. Valencian municipalities can now opt for compulsory land
readjustment, without having to become directly involved. The municipality selects in a public tender the urbanising agent, who may be a public company
or the landowners themselves joining in a company but most of the time is a
commercial developer. Landowners can choose for voluntary expropriation or
can participate in the development. If they choose expropriation, the urbanising agent pays the compensation and acquires the land. But if they decide to
participate, they have to deliver the land needed for public infrastructure and facilities and pay to the urbanising agent a proportional share of the infrastructure
provision, plan preparation, soil decontamination, compensation costs and additional contributions (costs postings 2-6, see ﬁnancial analysis in section 2.4.3).
In exchange, landowners share the economic betterment: after providing the
infrastructure, the urbanising agent delivers the serviced building parcels to the
landowners and transfers the public infrastructure, free of charge, to the municipality. In sum, although landowners still control the land, the mutual dependence is now easily avoidable as municipalities have the possibility to appoint a
third party (who does not necessarily need to own the land) as the urbanising
agent, and do not need to become directly ﬁnancially involved. Also, the municipalities are not dependent on one particular urbanising agent, for he/she can
be selected through a public tender.
The interdependency between public bodies and landowners in England and the
Netherlands gives to the landowners the option to wait, which it is often used
to oppose the requirements set by local public bodies. Specially in the Netherlands, public bodies conclude that they cannot ask too much, which leads to
low capturing of the value increase;
This interdependency frequently leads to delays in the development processes.
Often development is delayed because developers refuse the requirements and
plans of the municipality, and the negotiations about these issues are prolonged.
Also, sometimes the developers do not succeed in buying the land for a reasonable price. Success of the negotiations depends on the developers’ and landowners’ expectations that, by delaying negotiations, their proﬁts (regular proﬁt
margin, included in posting 2, and ﬁnal proﬁt for the developer, posting 9, and
accounted land costs for the landowner, posting 1) would increase.
This interdependency leads to higher accounted land costs (posting 1); market
parties are more interested in acquiring land, as control of the land puts them in
a strong negotiating position, and they are thus ready to pay more for it, which
in turn inﬂates the real and expected market value of land.
In addition, the ﬁndings suggest that interdependency leads to an inefﬁcient and
sluggish development process, in which costs are unnecessarily high and different actors each manage to appropriate part of the value increase. This leads to
higher costs for infrastructure provision (posting 2) and plan preparation (posting

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3); in England and the Netherlands they are very often between 1.5 and 4 times
higher than in Valencia. This can partly explain why Valencian developers, although able to sell the real estate for market prices similar to those in the Netherlands, can contribute much more than the Dutch developers. This can also partly
explain why Valencian developers, although not selling the real estate for market
prices as high as those in England, can contribute similarly or even more than
the English developers. In other words, in England and the Netherlands, inﬂated
infrastructure provision and plan preparation costs seem to form an important
obstacle to capturing value increase.

EXAMPLE URBAN REGENERATION IN STURINGERLAND, Part Ten
Scenario II: Developer B does not manage to buy all the land
After the Municipality of Sturingerland and Developer B agreed that all the costs should
be paid out of proﬁts, (see Part Seven of the example), Developer B started, with the
support of the Municipality, contacts and negotiations with Developers C and D. However, Developers C and D had other goals. Developer C was also positive about the
initiative, but he was neither willing to sell his land (he wants to implement the plan),
nor to be so ‘generous’ as Developer B. He only wants to contribute to the costs that,
according to planning law, can be included in a Development contributions plan and
charged to the landowners. Developer D is truly a ‘free rider’. He wants to implement
the plan, but expects to be able to do so without having to contribute his fair share.
During the contacts and negotiations, the landowners have exercised the option to wait
several times:
• Developer D was from the very beginning not willing to negotiate;
• Developer C was positive about the initiative, but the negotiations were blocked
since he did not accept having to sell his land, nor to pay a full contribution;
• Developer B also exercised the option to wait, ﬁrst, during his negotiations with the
former landowner of parcel B, one year after moment 0. At that time, the Developer
B decided to freeze the negotiations with the municipality (when Developer B took
the initiative at moment 0, he did not own the land). Second, two years later, when
another developer bought Developer B, the new developer B, who paid a very high
price for the land, needed higher proﬁt margins and decided to reconsider the plan.
It is clear that there is a strong mutual dependence between de municipality and landowners B, C and D. The municipality does not even consider the possibility of buying
or expropriating parcels C and D. First, the owners say that they are willing to develop
their land and this hampers expropriation. Second, the Municipality of Sturingerland
does not have the ﬁnancial means to do so. Buying or expropriating land in Sturingerland is something that only happens in very special circumstances, and, if it occurs,
just for few plots.

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The consequences for value capturing are important. The municipality is considering
lowering the requirements (to recover only the costs that can be included in the Development contributions plan and charged to the landowners, but not the additional
costs). In the meantime, the process has suffered delays; ﬁve years after moment 0
(when Developer B, not yet the owner of parcel B, took the initiative) still nothing
has happened, only a lot of deliberation and plan preparation. The price of land has
risen, and Developer C has sold his land to another developer, for a much higher
price than the price in the former use. Also, the costs are growing, costs made by
the municipality (negotiations with Developers B, C and D, some research, negotiations with province about possible subsidies to cover the deﬁcit) and costs made
by Developer B (negotiations with the Municipality and Developers C and D, some
research and ﬁnancial costs derived from the money he had to borrow at year 1 to
buy parcel B).

9.4.1

Short-term recommendation: assessment of ﬁnancial
feasibility

It has already been said that it is often not clear whether the ﬁnal proﬁt of the developers could have allowed for higher contributions. In the studied Dutch cases, there
was little available information, and the developers did not provide much additional
information. In Kop van Oost and Stationskwartier my own estimates suggest that
more contributions would have been feasible. Indirect evidence that there might
have been more ﬁnancial room than argued by the developers is that in De Funen
and Kop van Oost, during or after the negotiations, land was sold several times for
higher prices than the price in the former use.
Municipalities could conduct more research into the proﬁt margins in the early stages
of development processes, and use this information as a clear and transparent starting point in the negotiations with developers. This research should be made together
with the ﬁrst document that creates development expectations, for example in the
recommended site-speciﬁc cost recovery documents mentioned in section 9.1.1.2.
Stationskwartier could serve as an example. Here the municipality calculated the
development costs and proﬁts in a business case attached to the 2003 Masterplan
Centraal Breda, and these calculations served as a starting point in the negotiations,
in which the municipality might have succeed in getting part of the increased value.
Municipalities can ﬁne-tune the calculations as negotiations come nearer. This recommendation is in line with some relevant recent conclusions (Vrom et al., 2008:
41; Vrom-raad, 2009: 5). Another complementary possibility is that developers are
required to submit a calculation of the costs and proﬁts (exploitatieopzet) to the municipality.

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9.4.2

Recommendations

Short-term recommendation: land readjustment through
private law agreements, supported by expropriation and
pre-emption

To avoid the negative consequences of the dependency of municipalities on landowners/developers, it is recommended to work with a speciﬁc contractual formula,
inspired by the Valencian land readjustment model. Commercial developers, acting
as a sort of Valencian urbanizing agent, can agree with landowners that, in exchange
for sharing development proﬁts, they do not use their option to wait. This recommendation is based not only on the Valencian model, but also on the experience
with the preparation for the redevelopment of an industrial site of about 16 ha in
the Municipality of Zevenhuizen-Moerkapelle (Zuidplaspolder, Province of South
Holland). During 2007 and 2008, I was asked to advise how the owners of the ﬁrms
and the land could themselves regenerate their land by involving a commercial developer to play the role of an urbanizing agent. Although this experiment failed, the
experience has served to ﬁne-tune this recommendation (see Annex 7). One of the
conclusions is that Dutch developers are not always comfortable with the role of
urbanizing agent, i.e. of a developer that in principle only proﬁts from land development, but not from the development of the real estate. This experience has led us to
reﬁne the recommendation: to carefully select a property developer who is familiar
with less conservative ways of developing land. A possibility to be seriously taken
into account is to involve a Valencian urbanizing agent, possibly in partnership with
a Dutch developer.
The recommendation is to involve landowners in urban development, thus to involve
them in sharing the land development costs (postings 1 to 7) and the ﬁnal proﬁts
(posting 9). This should provide several advantages: (a) it annuls the need to buy the
land, or at least to buy all the land, as landowners themselves participate in the operation (in Zevenhuizen this could have led to a reduction in the amount of money
that must be borrowed, by at least € 45.5 million); (b) it reduces the risks of delay resulting from landowners, instead of supporting the operation, behaving in an strategic
way (i.e. waiting) to obtain the highest possible price for their land; (c) a and b should
considerably reduce the costs of the operation: there should be no need to buy land
in advance (posting 1), and it should reduce the amounts reserved for unexpected
expenses (posting 2, in Zevenhuizen this could have led to a reduction of about
€ 1.15 million) and the plan preparation costs (posting 3); (d) c should considerably
reduce the ﬁnancial costs (in Zevenhuizen this could have led to a reduction of at
least € 14.3 million), as there is need of less external ﬁnancing. But, how does one
convince landowners to share the risks and the proﬁts?
Plan documents
First, two plan documents must be prepared, which will form the basis for anterior
Development agreements I and II (see under):

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Land use plan (Bestemmingsplan)
The municipality and/or the urbanizing agent must prepare a draft of a Map (Plankaart)
of the Land use plan, detailing the following aspects:
F
The zoning of land uses, building alignments and building envelopes;
F
The volume of the building, per land use.
If detailed prescriptions are not possible, the draft must at least prescribe the minimum building volume and the approximate location of serviced building parcels5.
The goal of these documents is to sufﬁciently support the negotiations around Agreement I (see below): at that time, it must be possible to provide details to the landowner about the serviced building plots and the building volume which he/she can
expect if he/she signs the agreement.
Draft plan infrastructure provision works
This is similar to the Valencian Infrastructure Provision Project (Anteproyecto de Urbanización), and includes: (a) a scheme of the infrastructure, with a description of
those elements that determine the total costs, such as the quality of the public space;
(b) a scheme of the sewerage network; (c) a scheme of the road network and the other
facilities; (d) a description of existing infrastructure networks, and the feasibility and
the costs of connection to the new development. In principle, it is the urbanizing
agent who should prepare this document, as it requires his/her expertise in cost calculations and full commitment to the calculations.
Anterior Development agreement I: urbanizing agent-landowners
The urbanizing agent proposes Agreement I to the landowners. This can be done individually, whereby the developer separately proposes Agreement I to each landowner.
Alternatively, or complementarily, landowners might join an ad hoc organization,
similar to the Valencian Association of Urban Interest (Asociación de Interés Urbanístico), which would deal with the urbanizing agent. In the experiment in Zevenhuizen, landowners have joined in a cooperative (see Annex 7). A combination of both
is possible: the urbanizing agent could deal with both an organization of the majority of landowners and with individual landowners who opt not to join the ad hoc
organization.

5

Before deciding for a detailed or for an Outline Land use plan, one important aspect should be
considered: the degree of detail in a Land use plan can have consequences for the calculation of the
compensation that landowners should receive in case of expropriation of their land. In an Outline
Land use plan, the compensation is an average of the whole plan area (the so-called complexwaarde),
which means that the owner of the land for the proﬁtable construction receives less than in case of
a