Sokwanelehttp://www.sokwanele.com
Zimbabwe Civic Action Support Group. Campaigning for freedom and democracy in Zimbabwe.
enWhy Zimbabwe needs to maintain a multi-form land tenure systemhttp://www.sokwanele.com/node/2392
<div class="field field-name-field-story-image field-type-image field-label-hidden"><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><a href="http://www.sokwanele.com/files/story/ruralfarm.jpg"><img src="http://www.sokwanele.com/files/styles/450px-wide/public/story/ruralfarm.jpg" width="450" height="388" alt="" /></a></div></div></div><div class="field field-name-body field-type-text-with-summary field-label-hidden"><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><p><strong><span style="color: #cc0000;">Introduction</span></strong></p>
<p>An important recommendation of the Commission of Inquiry into Land Tenure Systems in Zimbabwe (1994) that I chaired was that Zimbabwe should maintain a multi-form tenure regime. The commission recommended that each tenure instrument be made more secure by explicitly identifying the land rights and ensuring greater continuity of those rights by the holder. Moreover, legal and institutional provisions and capacities can enforce such rights for all land, including land held under customary tenure. In this article I will make recommendations on how to strengthen the multi-form tenure system and discuss how this can be applied to improving land investment and values again in Zimbabwe. Those interested in exploring the principles, theory and practice in securing land rights for sustainable development should read my other article.[1]</p>
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<p><strong><span style="color: #cc0000;">Under what conditions is agricultural land bankable?</span></strong></p>
<p><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Banks and financing institutions look at two main things in financing a farming business: </span><em>viability/profitability</em> and <em>collateral security</em>. Viability or profitability is the first necessary condition for any financing. Farmers with a track record at a bank can continue to get financing without much separate or additional collateral security. If a farmer is making money and his/her business dealings are open to the bank, the bank will increase their <strong>trust</strong> of the farmer and their business over time. Just having a title does not necessarily lead to financing, particularly for new and inexperienced farmers with no track record of farming profitably. Banking is ultimately about trust.This point is crucial to remember in the debate on tenure in Zimbabwe (and Africa generally), as this debate has become quite ideological. In most of industrializing Asia, agricultural growth was maintained at a high level based on small farms with no collateral security because the business environment and economic policies were favourable.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Banks in Zimbabwe are also looking forward to the resolution of disputed land, as discussed in my last article. Government urgently needs to review and update the land administration systems, so that the government and local government systems, the judiciary and the finance sector all have access to one registry and administrative system that is sufficiently accurate, reliable and decentralized to provincial and districts centres, where transactions can be completed and disputes resolved amicably. Tenure security is ultimately about capacity to protect and enforce land rights.</p>
<p><strong><span style="color: #cc0000;">The needs and challenges in reforming tenure</span></strong></p>
<p>Following the Fast Track land reform program, Government is now seeking to improve tenure security for the farmers and allow farmers to use their land holdings as collateral security to raise finance for development and farming operations. The current 99-Year Lease is still inadequate for banking purposes. On the other hand, the Government is sceptical about giving freehold title for the fear that white farmers buying land again may reverse the gains of land reform. So the question is <em>“How does policy arrive at a secure tenure that is bankable whilst at the same time maintaining the gains of land reform?” </em>Bankability and sustainable development issues also apply to all other land tenure instruments in Zimbabwe besides the 99-Year Lease.</p>
<p><strong><span style="color: #cc0000;">A quick look at the current tenure instruments</span></strong></p>
<p>The following are the current tenure instruments in Zimbabwe:</p>
<ul><li><strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Traditional usufruct on State Land</span></strong> for Communal Areas</li>
<li><strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Freehold Title</span></strong> for some Large Scale Commercial and some Small Scale Commercial farms</li>
<li><strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Short-term Leases</span></strong> for some Small Scale Commercial farms, and some Large Scale farms</li>
<li><strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">99 -Year leases</span></strong> for a few so far of the A2 resettlement</li>
<li><strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Offer letters</span></strong> for most A2 resettlement who still hope to qualify for a 99-Year Lease</li>
<li><strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Permits </span></strong>for Model A Old Resettlement and for A1 Fast Track resettlement</li>
</ul><p>The Constitution and the future consolidated land law(s) will have to be clearer for every category of land as to what rights the land occupier will have. <em>Land tenure security can generally be defined as the certainty of continuous use.</em>To secure tenure, land rights for each category of land occupier have to be clear and enforceable. Each tenure regime should enjoy the same 4 categories of rights. What differ are specifics of each of the 4 categories of rights and how that is administered and enforced.</p>
<p>The <span style="text-decoration: underline;">BASKET OF LAND RIGHTS</span> includes:</p>
<ul><li><strong><em>Use rights</em></strong>: rights to grow crops, trees, make permanent improvement, harvest trees and fruits, and so on.</li>
<li><strong><em>Transfer rights</em></strong>: rights to sell, give, mortgage, lease, rent or bequeath</li>
<li><strong><em>Exclusion rights</em></strong>: rights to exclude others from using or transferring</li>
<li><strong><em>Enforcement rights</em></strong>: refer to the legal, judicial, institutional and administrative provisions to guarantee use, transfer, and exclusion rights and to resolve disputes.</li>
</ul><p><strong style="color: #cc0000;">How can all these tenure instruments be made more secure?</strong></p>
<p>Here are my recommendations in strengthening further the current instruments:</p>
<p><strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Traditional usufruct on State Land for Communal Areas:</span></strong></p>
<p>Communal Lands should cease to be State Land and the State should recognise in the constitution and law, the validity of customary rights as follows:</p>
<ul><li><em><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Constitutional provisions:</span></em>The national Constitution should recognise traditional and customary land rights unconditionally. Whosoever enjoys such rights can legally claim them even if they do not hold a formal title, permit, lease, or any piece of paper in order to own and defend those rights. This is because the traditional systems know how to recognise customary rights and adjudicate.</li>
<li><em><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Modernise don’t Westernise customary tenure:</span></em> Customary tenure recognises the same basket of rights and is as secure as any Western title system if its integrity is restored and strengthened. While land registration may be desirable in the long run, this should be carried out in a series of well-considered phases so as to avoid prejudicing those holding customary rights to land. In essence this is process of registering the customary rights, not changing the rules of ownership.</li>
<li><em><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Strengthen capacity of communities to administer and adjudicate:</span></em>Before any system of registration can be affected, it is important to reform the laws and the local administration systems so that they have the capacity to engage and strengthen customary land rights systems. This capacity has to be built all the way down to the community level where traditional systems will continue to play a central role in administering the system. Community level land boards and administrative structures are essential for adjudication and dispute resolution as well as updating the land registers.</li>
<li><em><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Voluntary before systematic registration:</span></em>Once land administration capacity is evident at community level and well integrated and part of the modernized traditional system, then voluntary registration of land can begin. Land registration is costly for government, the community and the land occupier, and it is important for Zimbabwe to avoid systematic land titling, as the costs may outstrip the benefits. Voluntary registration to start with will eventually pave the way for comprehensive systematic titling using the evolutionary principle. GPS and satellite imagery technology has reduced the cost and speed of titling. The social and community processes, however, need time and have to be based on principles of mutual respect, mutual accountability, and mutual benefit between government, traditional communities, and customary land-rights holders in question.</li>
<li><em><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Family Trusts and Foundations:</span></em>In the medium to long run it should be possible to offer a Deed of Grant to the Family Trust or jointly held by spouses for arable and residential land. Inheritance should be with the surviving spouse and then surviving children who can anoint an heir or form a family trust or company.</li>
<li><em><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Common property land</span></em>: For grazing land and other common land the Deed of Grant should be made in the name of a Community Trust or Foundation who will look after the natural resources and pass appropriate by-laws with the power to exclude other communities.</li>
<li><em><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Traditional Councils:</span></em>The Traditional Councils from village to District level should be incorporated into the National Judicial system, including powers to constitute with other local stakeholder representatives, as a Land Board or Local Administrative Court assisted by Government officials from Lands, Justice and Agriculture Ministries.</li>
<li><em><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Tradability:</span></em>Arable and residential land should be tradable legally only between dwellers of communal lands.</li>
<li><em><span style="text-decoration: underline;">No consolidation of land holdings</span></em> should be allowed legally until Zimbabwe has reached a minimum of 50% urban population ratio and until the national unemployment figures are sustainably within single digit percentage range.</li>
<li><em><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Foreigners:</span></em>No sales of customary land to foreigners should be allowed.</li>
</ul><p><strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Freehold Title for some Large Scale Commercial and Small Scale Commercial farms:</span></strong></p>
<p>This tenure tool should be maintained. No sales to foreigners should be allowed. Foreigners should be allowed short to medium term rental leases on land with title deeds.</p>
<p><strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Short-term Leases</span></strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;"> o<strong>n Small Scale Commercial farms:</strong></span></p>
<p>Any leases older than 10 years should be converted to a Deed of Grant without further delay. The Deed should be granted in the name of both spouses. Where the original leaseholders are deceased, then the Deed should be granted in consultation with all surviving children so that either the grant goes to the heir-apparent child and his or her spouse. Alternatively, the surviving family establishes a Family Trust or Company with appointed Trustees or Directors making decisions. This group of farms all started in the colonial period when black ‘master farmers’ where allocated small-scale farms on a short term lease that they could convert to a title (deed of grant). Although all of them had the right to convert to title, most did not.</p>
<p><strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">99-year leases for some of the A2 resettlement:</span></strong></p>
<p>The 99-Year Lease should be strengthened as follows:</p>
<ul><li><strong><em>Compensate previous owner:</em></strong> Quittance will strengthen the 99-Year Lease by avoiding legal contestation. Since government has to compensate for ‘improvements only’, the lease holder should assist government by contributing at least a portion of the value of improvements acquired, as well as through annual rentals, even if initially these are nominal;</li>
<li><strong><em>Include a 10-year sunset clause for land development: </em></strong>The leaseholder should in a maximum of 10 years fulfil State requirements in land improvements (fence, homestead, water, etc.) to be considered a serious landowner and farmer.
<ul><li>If the land holder fails to fulfil this condition in 10 years then the State should repossess the land and offers fair compensation for any improvements;</li>
<li>If the leaseholder wishes to exit before the 10 years then she/he can either sell the lease to the State for the value of improvements or sell it to another qualified A2 beneficiary.</li>
<li><strong><em>Simplify the 99-Year Lease</em></strong> so that collateral rights and State rights have equal recourse at law in foreclosure.</li>
<li><strong><em>Sale of 99-Year leases:</em></strong> Sales should be legal and allowed only between buyers and sellers in the same category of land reform.</li>
<li><strong><em>No consolidation of holdings should be permitted</em></strong> until Zimbabwe is a fully industrial nation.</li>
</ul></li>
</ul><p><strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Offer letters for A2 resettlement:</span></strong></p>
<p>Holders of these should be given the following options:</p>
<ul><li>Apply for a 99-Year lease by going through the process discussed above;</li>
<li>Sell the Offer Letter either to another willing purchaser who qualifies as above;</li>
<li>Sell Offer Letter back to the State for a nominal fee and land to be reallocated on a stricter basis for qualifying.</li>
</ul><p><strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Permits for Model A Old Resettlement and A1:</span></strong></p>
<p>Should be revised as follows:</p>
<ul><li>Deed of Grant for arable and residential land should be given in favour of joint ownership by spouses or a family trust. Inheritance should be with the surviving spouse and then surviving children who can anoint an heir or form a family trust or company.</li>
<li>For grazing land and other common land the Deed of Grant should be made in the name of a Community Trust or Foundation who will look after the natural resources and pass appropriate by-laws with the power to exclude other communities encroaching on their common property.</li>
<li>The system of land administration needs strengthening on similar lines to what I have outlined for Communal Lands so as to pave the way for voluntary and systematic titling and land registration. This can happen sooner for resettlement areas.</li>
</ul><p>If we look at the process of commercialising land, then all resettlement land should be first and communal land last.</p>
<p><span style="color: #cc0000;"><strong>Need for residential land for rural citizens as part of a “Zimbabwean dream”</strong></span></p>
<p>All Zimbabweans deserve to live in a country where there is abundant and affordable food, and that each family has a home. My recommendation is that the Government shifts its policy from emphasising expensive urban housing to encouraging smaller rural settlements. Every Zimbabwe boy and girl at attaining the age of majority should qualify for a land grant from the local community in areas designated as “rural residential areas”. The size can vary from 0.1 to 0.4 of a hectare or so. She or he can apply to any local land board with automatic title. This is also a way of dealing with the gender balance in land, affording young Zimbabweans to own their own piece of land for housing before they get married. Botswana has applied this policy successfully.</p>
<p><strong>This paper is part of the <a href="zimbabwelandseries">Zimbabwe Land Series</a><a href="http://www.sokwanele.com/thisiszimbabwe/archives/7773" title="Zimbabwe Land Series"></a></strong></p>
<hr size="1" /><p>[1] Rukuni M. 1999. Land tenure, governance, and prospects for sustainable development in Africa. Policy Brief #6. Natural Resources policy Consultative Group for Africa. Washington DC. Natural Resources Institute.</p>
</div></div></div>Tue, 17 Jul 2012 10:15:51 +0000Mandivamba Rukuni2392 at http://www.sokwanele.comhttp://www.sokwanele.com/node/2392#comments“I can arrest you” - the Zimbabwe Republic Police and your rightshttp://www.sokwanele.com/i-can-arrest-you
<div class="field field-name-field-story-image field-type-image field-label-hidden"><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><a href="http://www.sokwanele.com/files/story/road-block.jpg"><img src="http://www.sokwanele.com/files/styles/450px-wide/public/story/road-block.jpg" width="336" height="300" alt="" /></a></div></div></div><div class="field field-name-body field-type-text-with-summary field-label-hidden"><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><p><em>[<a href="http://www.sokwanele.com/system/files/Sokwanele-report-i-can-arrest-you.pdf" target="_blank">Read the full report</a> (479k pdf)]</em></p>
<p>In a country where the Rule of Law is no longer operational and the security forces operate with impunity, every citizen is vulnerable. A chance remark in a taxi, at a pub or even at a funeral could lead to arrest and possible incarceration in one of the country’s disgracefully maintained jails. Those who stand up for their rights and join demonstrations or canvass for political parties other than ZANU-PF face possible arrest, severe beatings and torture in custody.</p>
<p>Bribery and corruption have become rampant. In a survey published by Transparency International in 2011, Zimbabwe ranked 154 out of 182 countries in terms of its level of corruption. The ZRP topped the list as the most corrupt institution and stood out as the biggest recipient of bribes among service providers.</p>
<p>This <a href="http://www.sokwanele.com/system/files/Sokwanele-report-i-can-arrest-you.pdf" target="_blank">report</a> focuses on the risk of arrest at the hands of the partisan Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) under the command of Commissioner-General Augustine Chihuri, who has publicly acknowledged his allegiance to ZANU-PF. Chihuri has served as police head since 1993 and his contract has been renewed by President Mugabe 13 times since 1997. Chihuri is a member of Joint Operations Command (JOC), the junta which continues to control Zimbabwe.</p>
<p>The proliferation of roadblocks across Zimbabwe’s appallingly maintained road network has lead to growing frustration among road users due to the inevitable delays and the demands for bribes from increasingly brazen police officers. Although one of the most important roles of a roadblock should be to reduce the number of vehicle accidents, their contribution is seen as questionable – and rather as a money-making racket both for the police force per se and also for individual self-enrichment.</p>
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<p>The controversy surrounding the roadblocks extends beyond bribery and corruption to their more sinister roles during elections: their use as a mechanism for blocking food aid to opposition strongholds, for stopping people injured in election violence from seeking medical help and to prevent opposition officials and activists from canvassing or holding rallies.</p>
<p>After explaining the legitimate roles of roadblocks, the report gives advice to citizens on their legal rights and provides recommendations on how to deal with police harassment and implicit or overt requests for bribes.</p>
<p>In a section describing corruption within the ZRP as “endemic”, the report provides examples in a range that includes plundering stolen properties, collusion with bag snatchers, extorting bribes from taxi drivers, demanding bribes at roadblocks, protection rackets, perverting the ends of justice, setting up diamond syndicates and murdering illegal or unlicenced miners for financial gain.</p>
<p>Judges have also criticised police investigations of cases where vital information given to the police by State witnesses has been omitted from formal witness statements produced in court in favour of the defence. Furthermore, ZANU-PF members who have murdered MDC supporters have been freed on bail and remain at liberty.</p>
<p>The evidence of good policing is the absence of crime. It must be subject to the Rule of Law, rather than the wishes of a powerful leader or party. It can intervene in the life of citizens only under limited and carefully controlled circumstances – and it is publicly accountable.</p>
<p>The report explains the differences between <em>civil policing</em> and <em>political policing</em>. It also defines <em>secret</em> <em>policing</em>, where an authoritarian regime uses the police as an agent of political oppression. Citizens within a police state experience restrictions on their mobility, and on their freedom to express or communicate political or other views – which are subject to police monitoring or enforcement.</p>
<p>The police force of Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP), was created by Chapter IX of the (Independence) Constitution of 1979, signed at the Lancaster House Conference. It is governed by the Constitution of Zimbabwe – which has been amended 19 times over the past 33 years – and by the Police Act. The current head of the ZRP, Commissioner-General Augustine Chihuri, has served as police head since 1993 and has had his contract renewed by President Mugabe 13 times since 1997.</p>
<p>The ZRP is bound by many international human rights standards. It is also a member of SARPCCO, a regional professional association which is committed to disseminating best practices and raising the standard of policing, including the respect for human rights.</p>
<p>Not only is the ZRP guilty of perpetrating gross human rights, with many of the victims being opposition activists and supporters, but it is also guilty of abusing its own members. Zimbabweans and the international community were shocked in June 2009 when a secretly filmed two-minute video on You-Tube showed ZRP recruits being beaten while undergoing ‘training’ in Harare. Each recruit was forced to lie down and was then beaten by ‘trainers’ with batons, some more viciously than others, a process reportedly referred to as ‘pay day’.</p>
<p>The concept of “The Rule of Law”, and the differences between <em>“The Rule of Law”</em> and <em>“Rule by Law”</em> are explained, with reference to the Constitution – and to people’s rights according to the Constitution.</p>
<p>The conclusion warns the ZRP that it faces millions of US dollars worth of law suits from political activists and human rights defenders who are claiming compensation for torture, wrongful arrest or abduction. Furthermore, a South African High Court ruled on May 8, 2012 that the South African authorities must investigate Zimbabwean officials who are accused of involvement in torture and crimes against humanity in Zimbabwe.</p>
<p>Today in Zimbabwe, more than three years into the shaky and widely discredited power-sharing arrangement, arrests are escalating, corruption is rampant, human rights violations are rising once more and the Rule of Law has not been restored. All indicators are there to alert Zimbabweans, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the international community that an increasingly desperate and unpopular ZANU-PF is gearing up for the next election.</p>
<p><strong>Accompanying Documents</strong></p>
<p><a href="http://www.sokwanele.com/system/files/legal-assistance.pdf" target="_blank">Legal assistance and information on your rights regarding arrest</a></p>
<p>The Legal Resource Foundation has produced a <a href="http://www.sokwanele.com/node/2389" target="_blank" title="The Law and the Community - Know Your Rights">series of booklets and flyers</a> on knowing your rights on arrest, detention and bail.</p>
</div></div></div>Sun, 15 Jul 2012 19:23:53 +0000Sokwanele2390 at http://www.sokwanele.comhttp://www.sokwanele.com/i-can-arrest-you#commentsThe significance of land compensation for rehabilitation of Zimbabwe’s land sectorhttp://www.sokwanele.com/node/2386
<div class="field field-name-field-story-image field-type-image field-label-hidden"><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><a href="http://www.sokwanele.com/files/story/landcompensation.jpg"><img src="http://www.sokwanele.com/files/styles/450px-wide/public/story/landcompensation.jpg" width="450" height="324" alt="" /></a></div></div></div><div class="field field-name-body field-type-text-with-summary field-label-hidden"><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><p>[If you wish to leave comments on this article please add them to the <a href="http://www.sokwanele.com/thisiszimbabwe/archives/7675#respond">blog post</a>. This paper is part of the <a href="http://www.sokwanele.com/thisiszimbabwe/archives/7773" title="Zimbabwe Land Series">Zimbabwe Land Series</a>]</p>
<p>by Mandivamba Rukuni</p>
<p><strong><span style="color: #cc0000;">Introduction</span></strong></p>
<p>The issue of compensation has been controversial and still represents an area of major disagreement between the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) and the dispossessed farmers, mostly as represented by the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU). In this article I will discuss the nature of the impasse, and I will review the status, legislation, and prospects for resolving the issue and accelerating rehabilitation, investment and productivity. As a general framework for accelerating the rehabilitation of the land sector in Zimbabwe, a number of important activities need to be initiated and completed by government and these include: compensation for land acquired; issuance of legal multi-form tenure instruments for new land occupiers; and reforming the land administration system to allow for better land use planning, management and production. This includes strengthening the dispute resolution systems and requisite capacity for adjudication.</p>
<p>As for the impasse, I will argue for pragmatic solutions. Both government and dispossessed farmers are still experiencing hard times. The government is still under-funded and many former white farmers have become destitute. It is highly unlikely that a perfect solution exists for both government and dispossessed farmers. The time has come for serious proactive engagement in search of lasting solutions.</p>
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<div>
<p><strong><span style="color: #cc0000;">Compensation experience to date</span></strong></p>
</div>
<p>The Fast Track Land Reform Program (FTLRP) was introduced in 2000 and the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) amended the legislation to enable compensation for “improvements only”. In all, 125 farmers accepted the offer before the scheme collapsed because of hyperinflation. The disagreement between the CFU and GoZ has been largely on valuation. The CFU maintains that compensation value should include: land; improvements; interest; and consequential damage. The legal battles between government and farmers on this issue are well covered elsewhere.</p>
<p>Valuations based on existing legislation are estimated at between $1.5 and $2 billion. Valuations along CFU lines are estimated at between $6 and $10 Billion. The difference is huge and a pragmatic way forward in needed. After the formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) in 2009 the scheme was re-introduced and since then Budget Vote 31 has had a small but growing allocation.</p>
<p>In the “Blue Book”, Budget Vote 31 is for the Purchase of Land User Rights (compensation), and allocations are as follows: 2011 (unaudited expenditure to September) = $2,496,873; 2012 = $6,000,000; 2013 = $9,000,000; 2014 = $12,000,000. According to the Ministry of Lands and Rural Resettlement (MLRR), a total of 6,422 farms were acquired, of these 1,250 were valued and 4,962 farms are still to be valued. To date 210 farmers have been compensated since the FTLRF. Individual compensation values vary from about $200,000 to $1.2 million. During this period priority has been given to elderly former farmers over the age of 70.</p>
<p><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><strong>The procedure</strong></span><em>:</em> Compensation is guided mainly by two acts, the Land Acquisition Act Chapter 20:10 and Acquisition of Equipment and Materials Act Chapter 18:23. A valuation report is produced by the MLRR’s Valuations Section and submitted to the Compensation Committee, which is made up of members appointed by the Minister of Lands and comprises Permanent Secretaries for Lands, Finance, Local Government, Agriculture and Labour/Social Services. The committee, according to the Act, determines the amount of compensation payable to the farmer based on the MLRR’s Valuation Section report.</p>
<p>The Valuation Section then invites the farmer to conclude the offer. The farmer may accept or refuse the compensation value offered and has the option to go to the Administrative Court for resolution on the valuation. Farmers also have the option of bringing their own valuers to Court. If an agreement is reached on the compensation value, a contract is signed and the compensation processed. There are two options for paying out the compensation:</p>
<ul><li>OPTION 1: the farmer gets 25% on signing consent forms, 25% payable within a year and the balance within a 5-year period with interest.</li>
<li>OPTION 2: the farmer gets a discounted lump sum amount, calculated at 60% of the total value of the compensation agreed.</li>
</ul><p>The Minister of Lands has made several revisions to the regulations to make these more acceptable to the beneficiary ex-farmers. This includes provision for a lump sum payment; and provision for the farmer to submit a schedule of the actual improvements on the date of eviction, and that schedule can include photography. The outgoing farmer is also required to fulfill the Farm Workers Gratuity Regulations (S16). The Minister also amended these for better interpretation.</p>
<p><span style="color: #cc0000;"><strong>The need for a land acquisition compensation fund</strong></span></p>
<p>The number of compensations can grow rapidly if 2 things happen: a) establish a viable Land Acquisition Compensation Fund; and b) MLRR accelerates the valuation process. I prefer completing the valuations as soon as possible because that provides more meaningful targets for the Fund; and allows for as many agreeable farmers as possible to sign-off on a compensation plan, thereby providing quittance for allotting a legal and viable lease to new occupiers. The other urgency is to provide immediate financial relief to as many former-farmers as possible. I believe that this is the best we will get in the foreseeable future for a ‘willing-seller-willing-buyer’ arrangement on the matter. There may well be as many who will take up the offer as those who will not. Ideally it is important for enough prior (‘without prejudice’ to both side) consultation and analysis to take place between the CFU, the Valuation Consortium (which represents the majority of disposed farmers) and the MLRR’s Valuation Section. It is important to minimize the number of disputes that go to court otherwise that will slow down the process and defeat the whole purpose.</p>
<p>The significance of resolving the issue urgently is imbedded in the legislation that requires “quittance” on the acquired land before a legal lease can be issued to the new land occupier. Quittance is contingent upon compensation, or at least a signed agreement between government and farmer on the terms. This legal requirement makes it urgent that a compensation fund is established by the government soonest to compensate as many farmers as possible on the basis on existing legislation.</p>
<p>Another challenge according to CFU is that farmers in the drier parts of the country are prejudiced by ‘improvements only’ valuations. One solution is to provide for ‘supplementary payments’ in the Fund for special cases such as some properties in Matabeleland, Midlands and Masvingo.</p>
<p><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><strong>The need for flexibility in paying out compensation</strong></span>: Anecdotal evidence suggests that there are several permutations out there in terms of the circumstances that the former white farmers face. For my own argument, however, I have grouped them into 3:</p>
<ol><li>Those who are destitute and/or desperate for financial relief and are willing to explore compensation on the basis or existing legislation;</li>
<li>Those not necessarily desperate but are willing to explore compensation on the basis or existing legislation—some because they want closure and need to move on; some to prioritise the time-value of money and do not mind taking discounted values, and so on;</li>
<li>Those who have decided to hold out for ‘full’ compensation for various combinations of: land; improvements; interest; and consequential damage.</li>
</ol><p>The fund I am proposing would therefore cater for categories 1 and 2 for now and those in 3 would come in later as constitutional and political processes resolve the issue more definitively. My heart goes out mostly to those in category 1 because that is the category most other Zimbabweans are in. A considerable number lost property, assets, and retirement funds and there is nowhere to turn to for compensation. Estimates of a global figure representing those losses are just as colossal as losses by white farmers. It is also politically difficult for government and donors to invest several billion dollars into a few thousand white farmers in a country and continent with millions of poor people. I know that my views here are quite contrary and unpopular with the CFU and others. But quite frankly the country needs a more proactive leadership from both government and organized farmers on this matter. It is better for government and farmers to face donors with a negotiated position than the current huge gulf in positions. Without that negotiated position, then we are left with those in category 3 who should exercise their democratic right of course; ipso facto, those in categories 1 and 2 should have the guts to self-organize and proactively work towards a solution.</p>
<p>My take is that the nation is quite divided on the issue of compensation for land; on land acquired through the FTLRP this divide cuts across political party lines, as well as other class lines. Compensation for land will be accommodated in future constitutions, I believe. It is just that we are still at a point where compensation for land acquired through FTLRP is still highly contested politically, with the exceptions already provided for, including BIPPA land.</p>
<div>
<p><strong><span style="color: #cc0000;">Options for capitalising the fund</span></strong></p>
</div>
<p>In order to capitalize the Fund, we need as many contributors as possible. No one group that can take the whole burden – and there is need to share the burden. I have had opportunity in the last year to discuss the prospects of a compensation fund with various people and various groups including government officials, parliamentarians, donors, and some of the farmers who have explored compensation and/or been compensated. I have learnt a lot from these discussions and what I am presenting here is largely from all these rich contributions.</p>
<p>The following is just an example of how such a fund can be crafted. There are altogether 5 potential contributors to the fund:</p>
<ul><li><strong>National budget</strong>: $9 and $12 million earmarked for 2013 and 2014 respectively; I think government should instead put up say $30 million in 2013 as seed capital; then maintain contributions at that level and higher;</li>
<li><strong>Transfer fees from new A2 land occupier</strong>: This kicks in when the land has quittance, and a transferable bankable lease offered to the new occupier. For argument’s sake, the transfer fee could be equivalent to 30% of ‘improvements’ acquired by the new occupier; occupiers can be offered payment plans for the transfer fee payable to the fund;</li>
<li><strong>Annual ground rent by A2 lease holder</strong>: the lease holder pays annual rent and that goes into the fund;</li>
<li><strong>Donors</strong>: contribute to the fund on behalf of A1 land occupiers; for argument’s sake A1 land constitutes 60% of all compensation estimates and this would translate to say $1 billion; donors could contribute $100 million a year for 10 years into the fund;</li>
<li><strong>Development and investment banks</strong>: capitalize the fund as long term investment into a viable fund with prospects of converting capital to a future Land Bank that I will discuss in a later article.</li>
</ul><p>The order of commitments to the funds will probably be government first, donors next, then lease holders, and finally development and commercial banks. The worst case start -up scenario is that the fund only has $9 million committed by government in 2013. In this case I would then suggest that negotiations on the thousand or so valuations completed to date be concluded as soon as possible. If say 500 (50%) are agreed and signed, then the $13 million is shared among the 500 farmers. The Minister could introduce an Option 3 payment plan that commits payment of interest on capital for those signed up. Some farmers are proposing an alternative plan that each farmer receives a nominal monthly payment of say $1,000 deducted from his/her capital account and accrued interest. The best-case scenario start-up is seed funds from government and donors, totalling say $100 million in 2013, in which case all 3 options for payout can be available from the start. The fund will grow fast from there.</p>
<div>
<p><strong><span style="color: #cc0000;">Conclusions</span></strong></p>
</div>
<p>The issue of compensation is urgent because it is the trigger point for rehabilitation, investment and productivity. This has to be accompanied by issuance of appropriate land rights instruments, with a tradable and fundable 99-year lease. A Land Acquisition Compensation Fund could well be the precursor for re-building the land registry and land administration system and subsequently a Land Bank that becomes a premier investment bank for land development for all sectors as the economy builds up and as the nation attains food security.</p>
</div></div></div>Mon, 02 Jul 2012 06:49:49 +0000Mandivamba Rukuni2386 at http://www.sokwanele.comhttp://www.sokwanele.com/node/2386#commentsZimbabwe Inclusive Government Watch – Issue 40http://www.sokwanele.com/node/2384
<div class="field field-name-body field-type-text-with-summary field-label-hidden"><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><p><img src="/files/images/zigpie_issues40.gif" alt="ZIG breaches May 2012" title="ZIG breaches May 2012" width="250" height="200" style="float: left; padding-right: 20px;" />An analysis of events in Zimbabwe during May demonstrates that President Mugabe and Zanu-PF are gearing up for elections – which could be held later this year but will more likely take place during the first or second quarter of 2013.</p>
<p>The characteristic warning signs are all there, as the articles collected for the month clearly indicate.</p>
<ul><li>Upscaling of violence: The violence perpetrated by Zanu-PF against any perceived threat or opposition is increasing at a worrying rate, with murders once again becoming more gruesome in order to send out a powerful warning to opposition parties;</li>
</ul><ul><li>Legal harassment: Harassment by the police of any perceived threat or opposition is building up, with cases becoming more elaborate and drawn out, forcing the MDC to devote additional time and limited resources to litigation;</li>
</ul><ul><li>Hate speech: Hate speech is increasingly evident in the state-run media and new radio stations are being licensed to Zanu-PF sympathisers. Excessive airtime is being allocated to Zanu-PF, while opposition parties are denied access;</li>
</ul><ul><li>Disruption of rallies: Zanu-PF is allowed to hold rallies without restriction – which people are forced to attend – while fewer opposition party rallies are approved. Increasingly, opposition rallies are disrupted or broken up completely by Zanu-PF thugs or the police;</li>
</ul><ul><li>Armed forces’ public support for President Mugabe: Senior armed forces officers are making unconstitutional and treasonous statements to their troops and the press in order to intimidate the electorate. On 13 May, The Times (SA) warned that security forces, co-ordinated by Joint Operations Command (JOC) – which brings together army, police and intelligence chiefs – were running covert operations and campaigning underground for President Mugabe and Zanu-PF;</li>
</ul><ul><li>Strengthening the army: Additional recruits are being recruited, despite agreement at Cabinet level that no additional troops are required;</li>
</ul><ul><li>Extending patronage: New sources of patronage are being utilised, in particular mechanisms for drawing in the youth – evidenced by the chaotic indigenisation exercise;</li>
</ul><ul><li>Food as a weapon: Food aid is once again being used as a weapon as there has been a catastrophic crop failure. Opposition party members are either deliberately overlooked and starved, or forced to switch allegiance to Zanu-PF;<span> </span></li>
</ul><p><!--break--></p><p>Added to this, the new constitution-making process is coming under attack from multiple Zanu-PF avenues as they try to seize control of the exercise in order to amend it for their benefit at the ballot.</p>
<p><img src="/files/images/zigline_issues40_560px.gif" alt="ZIG Beaches by party" title="ZIG Beaches by party" width="560" height="132" /></p>
<p>A total of 72 media articles were recorded for this month’s issue of ZIG Watch, each representing a unique breach of the terms of the Global Political Agreement (GPA). Representative statistics were generated by categorising the articles according to the nature of the breach.</p>
<p>The category with the highest number of recorded violations was the harassment of perceived opposition politicians and supporters using drawn-out litigation, with 18 cases logged. This was followed by the category of violence, intimidation, hate speech, threats, abductions and brutality, with 17 instances. The denial of freedom of speech, or the abuse thereof, took third place with 9 cases, while cases of deliberate or consequential economic destabilisation were fourth, totalling 7 cases. Zanu-PF was either responsible for, or involved in, 100% of all breaches recorded.</p>
<p>To complete our report, we have compiled and appended ten articles to represent the month’s media coverage of events in relation to the GPA. The list is neither comprehensive nor exhaustive because of the sheer volume of articles. We invite our readers to review the list of summarised articles, original articles (links provided) and previously captured articles, on the webpage <a href="http://www.sokwanele.com/zigwatch" target="_blank">http://www.sokwanele.com/zigwatch</a> and ask you to share this information with your colleagues and other interested parties.</p>
<p>In the area of litigation, our first article notes the ongoing harassment of beleaguered Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA) leaders Jenni Williams and Magodonga Mahlangu. On 1 May, a magistrate dismissed their application to have a ‘kidnap’ case against them dropped, despite the fact that no-one – including the alleged victim, Emma Mabhena – will ‘confess’ to having been kidnapped! The WOZA leaders have since applied to the High Court to have the case, which is still pending before that court, dropped. The two also applied to be removed from remand on the basis of their High Court challenge, but the application was dismissed. They are to return to court in June.</p>
<p>Legal harassment is not limited to the courts. The MDC-T (Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai’s formation) accused the police of running a crusade to disrupt their election rallies using a variety of excuses. Police have disrupted several MDC-T rallies countrywide during the past few weeks, in some cases arresting supporters. On 11 May, heavily armed police disrupted a party rally – previously sanctioned by police – at Matizha Business Centre in Gutu West. Police claimed the venue had also been booked by Chief Serima. The MDC-T provincial secretary, Tongai Matutu, said armed police invaded the venue that morning, dispersing party supporters and effectively blocking the rally.</p>
<p>The drawn-out case of 29 MDC-T members accused of killing police inspector Petros Mutedza on 28 May last year has still not been resolved. The state has managed to deliberately stop it from coming to trial for almost a year. All 29 accused say they will plead not guilty to charges of murder at the trial, expected to start early June. Police have been silent about the progress of the investigation.</p>
<p>A London-based music presenter with the UK’s BBC broadcaster was arrested in Bulawayo after compering a charity concert on 24 May. Petroc Trelawny was charged with contravening the Zimbabwean Immigration Act by allegedly violating the conditions under which his visitor’s entry certificate had been issued. The arrest took place two days after the Attorney General’s Office had declined to authorise his prosecution.</p>
<p>In the category of violence, intimidation, hate speech, threats, abductions and brutality, our first article records one of the most significant occasions of intra-party violence to have occurred in Zanu-PF for some time. The article, dated 1 May, records the consequences of seething inter-factional discontent following disputed District Co-ordinating Committee (DCC) elections in Nyajena, Masvingo South. Armed police who had to be called in to quell clashes fired shots to disperse the warring parties. Party members also fought running battles at Shumba Primary School, Masvingo South, after supporters of Vice-President Joice Mujuru accused their rivals of manipulating the elections. Supporters pelted each other with stones, injuring several people and damaging school classrooms.</p>
<p>State-controlled media will be called to account for hate speech against President Mugabe’s critics, Prime Minister Tsvangirai said in an article dated 7 May. State-controlled media was using the same strategy as Rwanda’s “Hate radio” which incited the violence that led to the deaths of about a million people in 1994, Tsvangirai said in a World Press Freedom Day address. In the countdown to elections, he said that state-owned television, radio services and newspapers had demonstrated an overt bias towards Zanu-PF. The MDC-T had written letters to media heads protesting biased reporting, selective coverage and the black-out of MDC party activities, with little or no positive response.</p>
<p>Also in the violence category, an article of 14 May relates to the fact that the known murderers of Tonderai Ndira, a prominent MDC youth activist and human rights campaigner, not only remain free – but are openly bragging about their heinous crime and are once again threatening MDC supporters. Ndira was abducted in Mabvuku by armed men on 13 May 2008, but his mutilated body was only found a month later. He had been shot in the heart and had suffered multiple stab wounds. Worse still, his eyes had been gouged out, his tongue cut off and his neck, skull, jaw and knuckles broken, a cruel warning to opposition supporters that they could suffer a comparable fate.</p>
<p>During the month’s visit by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, Justice and Legal Affairs Minister Patrick Chinamasa made it clear that President Mugabe would continue to reject pressure from the international community on human rights issues. He chose to raise the contentious but deflecting topic of gay rights and, in thinly-disguised hate speech, told her that Zimbabwe did not recognise gay rights. He warned that same-sex partners found indulging in homosexual acts would be arrested.</p>
<p>In cases involving the abuse of freedom of speech, Chinamasa defended the stance of partisan army generals, saying they had a right to be involved in politics by virtue of having fought for the liberation of the country. In an interview on 25 May, Chinamasa said that by making political statements, generals were merely pointing out the way they wanted the country to be ruled. “… you cannot deny them the voice to keep this country on course…,” Chinamasa said.</p>
<p>Our final article highlights cases of the deliberate or consequential economic destabilisation of the economy and the country. It reports that platinum mining giant Zimplats risks defaulting on external loan arrangements after the central bank directed local banks to stop providing banking services to the company for defying an order to bring back money currently in off-shore accounts. Zimplats had borrowed from foreign organisations to finance its Phase II expansion, currently underway in Ngezi. The consequences could reportedly be catastrophic for Zimplats’ survival.</p>
<p>—————————————————————————————————-</p>
<p><strong>Court insists WOZA ‘kidnap’ case will continue<br /></strong><strong>SW Radio Africa (ZW): 01/05/2012</strong></p>
<p>A magistrate has dismissed an application by Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA) to have a ‘kidnap’ case against them dropped. WOZA leaders Jenni Williams and Magodonga Mahlangu are facing kidnap and theft charges, despite the alleged victim, Emma Mabhena, strongly denying she was ever kidnapped by the WOZA leaders. The WOZA leaders have since applied to the High Court to have the case dropped, which is still pending before that court. The two also applied to be removed from remand on the basis of their High Court challenge, but a regional magistrate, Godwin Sengweni, last week dismissed this application. They will now return to court in June.</p>
<ul><li>ARTICLE II: DECLARATION OF COMMITMENT</li>
<li>ARTICLE VII : PROMOTION OF EQUALITY, NATIONAL HEALING, COHESION AND UNITY</li>
<li>ARTICLE XIII : STATE ORGANS AND INSTITUTIONS</li>
</ul><p><strong>‘Police on crusade to disrupt MDC rallies’<br /></strong><strong>Zimbabwe Standard, The (ZW): 12/05/2012</strong></p>
<p>MASVINGO – MDC-T has accused the police of embarking on a crusade to disrupt its rallies ahead of elections to be held later this year or in 2013. Police have disrupted several MDC-T rallies countrywide in the past few weeks, and in some cases, MDC-T supporters have been arrested. Yesterday, heavily armed police disrupted a rally organised by the party at Matizha Business Centre in Gutu West, claiming that the venue had also been booked by Chief Serima. MDC-T provincial secretary, Tongai Matutu, said armed police from Gutu, Mpandawana growth point and Chatsworth police station, stormed the venue in the morning, dispersing party supporters, thereby blocking the scheduled rally. Police had sanctioned the rally.</p>
<ul><li>ARTICLE II: DECLARATION OF COMMITMENT</li>
<li>ARTICLE VII : PROMOTION OF EQUALITY, NATIONAL HEALING, COHESION AND UNITY</li>
<li>ARTICLE X : FREE POLITICAL ACTIVITY</li>
<li>ARTICLE XII : FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION</li>
<li>ARTICLE XIII : STATE ORGANS AND INSTITUTIONS</li>
<li>ARTICLE XIV : TRADITIONAL LEADERS</li>
</ul><p><strong>MDC-T members to plead not-guilty in cop murder case<br /></strong><strong>SW Radio Africa (ZW): 17/05/2012</strong></p>
<p>All 29 MDC-T members accused of killing police inspector Petros Mutedza last year will plead not guilty to charges of murder, their lawyer said on Thursday. Defence lawyer Charles Kwaramba said indications from the High Court are that the trial for the ‘Glen View 29’ will probably start early next month. Police in Harare accuse the group of fatally assaulting Mutedza at Glen View 3 Shopping Centre on May 28 last year. Kwaramba said all his clients will deny any involvement in the murder as all have a strong alibi. Police have been silent about the progress of the investigation. There are serious doubts about the quality and scope of the police and prosecution work.</p>
<ul><li>ARTICLE II: DECLARATION OF COMMITMENT</li>
<li>ARTICLE XI : RULE OF LAW, RESPECT FOR THE CONSTITUTION AND OTHER LAWS</li>
<li>ARTICLE XIII : STATE ORGANS AND INSTITUTIONS</li>
</ul><p><strong>BBC presenter slapped with fresh charges in Zim<br /></strong><strong>SW Radio Africa (ZW): 30/05/2012</strong></p>
<p>A London-based music presenter with the UK’s BBC broadcaster, who was arrested in Zimbabwe last week, has been slapped with fresh charges by Zimbabwean authorities. Petroc Trelawny was on Wednesday evening charged with contravening the Zimbabwean Immigration Act, allegedly by violating the conditions under which his visitor’s entry certificate had been issued. The pressing of fresh charges comes two days after the Attorney General’s Office declined to authorise his prosecution. It was hoped that Trelawny would already have returned home after the original case against him was dismissed. He was arrested last week Thursday after compering at a charity concert in Bulawayo.</p>
<ul><li>ARTICLE II: DECLARATION OF COMMITMENT</li>
<li>ARTICLE VII : PROMOTION OF EQUALITY, NATIONAL HEALING, COHESION AND UNITY</li>
<li>ARTICLE XIII : STATE ORGANS AND INSTITUTIONS</li>
</ul><p><strong>Armed police quell Zanu-PF clashes in Masvingo South<br /></strong><strong>SW Radio Africa (ZW): 01/05/2012</strong></p>
<p>Ideological and personal fault lines are growing in Zanu-PF as rival factions gang up against each other following the party’s District Coordinating Committee (DCC) elections nationwide. There were ugly scenes of intra-party violence following another round of disputed DCC elections in Nyajena, Masvingo South. Armed police had to be called in to quell clashes and fired shots to disperse the warring parties. Other party supporters fought running battles at Shumba Primary School in Masvingo South, after members aligned to the Mujuru faction accused their rivals of manipulating the elections. Supporters pelted each other with stones, resulting in several people being injured and damage to the school classrooms with windows shattered.</p>
<ul><li>ARTICLE VII : PROMOTION OF EQUALITY, NATIONAL HEALING, COHESION AND UNITY</li>
<li>ARTICLE XI : RULE OF LAW, RESPECT FOR THE CONSTITUTION AND OTHER LAWS</li>
<li>ARTICLE XVIII : SECURITY OF PERSONS AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE</li>
</ul><p><strong>State media inciting hatred – PM<br /></strong><strong>Daily News (ZW): 07/05/2012</strong></p>
<p>State-controlled media will be called to account for inciting hatred against President Robert Mugabe’s critics, Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai has said. The state-controlled media was using the same strategy as Rwanda’s “Hate radio” which incited the violence that led to the deaths of about a million people there in 1994, the prime minister said in a controversial World Press Freedom Day address. In the months leading up to forthcoming elections, the state-owned Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation’s (ZBC) television and radio services and the government-controlled Zimbabwe Newspapers group have showed overt bias and played megaphone to Zanu-PF. MDC-T has written letters to ZBC and Zimpapers bosses protesting biased reporting, selective coverage and black-out of party activities.</p>
<ul><li>ARTICLE II: DECLARATION OF COMMITMENT</li>
<li>ARTICLE VII : PROMOTION OF EQUALITY, NATIONAL HEALING, COHESION AND UNITY</li>
<li>ARTICLE X : FREE POLITICAL ACTIVITY</li>
<li>ARTICLE XIII : STATE ORGANS AND INSTITUTIONS</li>
<li>ARTICLE XIX : FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND COMMUNICATION</li>
</ul><p><strong>Tonderai Ndira’s ‘killers known and walking scot free’<br /></strong><strong>SW Radio Africa (ZW): 14/05/2012</strong></p>
<p>Fiery MDC-T Youth Assembly secretary-general, Promise Mkwananzi, has disclosed that the people who killed Tonderai Ndira are known and bragging about the heinous crime. Ndira was abducted in Mabvuku by ten armed men early in the morning of 13th May 2008. His body was found a month later. He had been shot in the heart, had multiple stab wounds, his eyes gouged out, his tongue cut off and his neck, skull, jaw and knuckles broken. ‘Tonderai Ndira symbolizes all the victims maimed or murdered for political reason by Zanu-PF. What pains us is that his killers are moving around threatening some of our members that they can still do the same to them.</p>
<ul><li>ARTICLE II: DECLARATION OF COMMITMENT</li>
<li>ARTICLE VII : PROMOTION OF EQUALITY, NATIONAL HEALING, COHESION AND UNITY</li>
<li>ARTICLE X : FREE POLITICAL ACTIVITY</li>
<li>ARTICLE XI : RULE OF LAW, RESPECT FOR THE CONSTITUTION AND OTHER LAWS</li>
<li>ARTICLE XIII : STATE ORGANS AND INSTITUTIONS</li>
<li>ARTICLE XVIII : SECURITY OF PERSONS AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE</li>
</ul><p><strong>Gays are criminals, says Zim minister<br /></strong><strong>Times, The (RSA): 22/05/2012</strong></p>
<p>Zimbabwe’s justice minister has rejected allegations of state-sponsored violence and has vowed not to recognise gay rights after meeting the UN human rights chief yesterday. Patrick Chinamasa said he told UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay that Zimbabwe will arrest same-sex partners found indulging in homosexual acts. Pillay arrived on Sunday in Zimbabwe for a week-long visit, the first by the world rights chief, to assess human rights violations. “We made it clear that in our law homosexual activities are criminalised and that any person who commits homosexual activities will be arrested,” Chinamasa told reporters after meeting Pillay in Harare.</p>
<ul><li>ARTICLE II: DECLARATION OF COMMITMENT</li>
<li>ARTICLE VII : PROMOTION OF EQUALITY, NATIONAL HEALING, COHESION AND UNITY</li>
<li>ARTICLE XIII : STATE ORGANS AND INSTITUTIONS</li>
<li>ARTICLE XVIII : SECURITY OF PERSONS AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE</li>
</ul><p><strong>Generals can meddle in politics – Chinamasa<br /></strong><strong>Zimbabwe Standard, The (ZW): 27/05/2012</strong></p>
<p>JUSTICE and Legal Affairs minister, Patrick Chinamasa, has come out in defence of partisan army generals saying they have a right to meddle in politics by virtue of having fought for the liberation of the country. In an interview just before the departure of visiting UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navanethem Pillay on Friday, Chinamasa said, by making political statements, generals were merely pointing out the way they wanted the country to be ruled. “The army people were liberators and you cannot deny them the voice to keep this country on course, so that there is justification for those who died for the country and those who lie in unmarked graves,” he said.</p>
<ul><li>ARTICLE II: DECLARATION OF COMMITMENT</li>
<li>ARTICLE VII : PROMOTION OF EQUALITY, NATIONAL HEALING, COHESION AND UNITY</li>
<li>ARTICLE X : FREE POLITICAL ACTIVITY</li>
<li>ARTICLE XIII : STATE ORGANS AND INSTITUTIONS</li>
</ul><p><strong>Zimplats in a fix, risks default on payments<br /></strong><strong>Zimbabwe Standard, The (ZW): 27/05/2012</strong></p>
<p>Zimplats risks defaulting on loan arrangements after the central bank directed local banks to stop offering banking services to the company for defying an order to bring back money in off-shore accounts. Zimplats borrowed from foreign organisations to finance its Phase II expansion, currently underway in Ngezi. On Wednesday, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) said the white metal producer had defied its directive … and instructed banks to stop handling any international or cross-border payments for Zimplats. Executives said Zimplats was now in a fix and risked defaulting on loan agreements with foreign lenders. “The revocation of Zimplats’ right to operate off-shore accounts … constitute an event of default … ,” an executive said.</p>
<ul><li>ARTICLE II: DECLARATION OF COMMITMENT</li>
<li>ARTICLE III : RESTORATION OF ECONOMIC STABILITY AND GROWTH</li>
<li>ARTICLE VII : PROMOTION OF EQUALITY, NATIONAL HEALING, COHESION AND UNITY</li>
<li>ARTICLE XIII : STATE ORGANS AND INSTITUTIONS</li>
</ul></div></div></div>Sun, 01 Jul 2012 10:06:33 +0000Sokwanele2384 at http://www.sokwanele.comChanging the rules of the resettlement game: The descent from developmental to predatory statehttp://www.sokwanele.com/node/2383
<div class="field field-name-field-story-image field-type-image field-label-hidden"><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><a href="http://www.sokwanele.com/files/story/landinvasions_2000.jpg"><img src="http://www.sokwanele.com/files/styles/450px-wide/public/story/landinvasions_2000.jpg" width="450" height="284" alt="" /></a></div></div></div><div class="field field-name-body field-type-text-with-summary field-label-hidden"><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><div>
<p><span style="color: #cc0000;"><strong>Executive Summary</strong></span></p>
</div>
<p>As late as 2008, Reuters, a news agency, would invariably add a phrase to their articles to say that “President Robert Mugabe’s government began seizing white-owned farms to resettle landless blacks.” <sup>[1]</sup> It is quite true that the resettlement programme soon after Independence and during the 1980s did resettle the poor and landless. But, by 2008 the debate had moved decisively towards the need for a land audit to identify those Zimbabweans who had seized multiple farms.</p>
<p>This article looks back on how land policy and the rules of the resettlement game have changed over the last three decades. There was never a dispute about the need to correct the historical imbalance in land distribution. Nor was there any question that land would be acquired from white farmers. What have been contested were the criteria, methods, pace, ambitions and, above all, the laws and rules for acquiring and distributing land. In this paper I examine how the rules changed for acquiring land and for allocating it.</p>
<!--break--><p><span></span></p>
<p>Three trends were evident. The first was that the rules changed from supporting the livelihoods of the poorest families to privileging the richest. The second was that resettlement rules changed from promoting national agricultural production to allocating land regardless of any training, aptitude or farming experience. And third, rules that guaranteed strong property rights gave way to wide state discretion over the possession and use of land.</p>
<p>This paper concludes that Zimbabwe must move towards a just and pro-poor land policy based on secure property rights, land markets, and the rule of law. These are a <em>sine qua non</em> for restoring agricultural productivity, creating employment, and improving rural livelihoods.</p>
<div>
<p><span style="color: #cc0000;"><strong>Intensive and Accelerated Resettlement in the 1980s</strong></span></p>
</div>
<p>In 1980 the twin objectives of the resettlement programme were to resolve the historical imbalance in land ownership and to provide relief from population pressure in overcrowded communal areas. Resettlement was considered essential for the “improvement in the levels of living of the largest and poorest sector of the population of Zimbabwe”.<sup>[2]</sup> The new beneficiaries were to be returning refugees and displaced persons as well as the landless and unemployed. The most important criterion for resettlement was therefore ‘need’.</p>
<p>At Independence, the government was determined that resettlement would not be an extension of subsistence farming. It therefore provided extension advice, infrastructure, and other services to ensure that settler families achieved higher productivity and a better standard of living.<sup>[3]</sup> Meeting these objectives required careful planning, preparation and implementation. Hence, the earliest programmes were known as <em>intensive</em> resettlement. At the time, the government also recognised the role played by commercial agriculture to ensure the nation’s self-sufficiency in food and as an earner of foreign exchange. The acquisition of land for resettlement therefore focussed mainly on commercial land that was not being farmed.</p>
<table border="0" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0"><tbody><tr><td colspan="2" valign="top" width="480">1980 estimate of peasant farming families</td>
<td valign="top" width="74"> </td>
<td valign="top" width="63">780,000</td>
</tr><tr><td valign="top" width="54">Less:</td>
<td valign="top" width="425">Numbers who can be accommodated (based on carrying capacity</td>
<td valign="top" width="74">325,000</td>
<td valign="top" width="63"> </td>
</tr><tr><td valign="top" width="54"> </td>
<td valign="top" width="425">Numbers of families expected to migrate to towns and cities</td>
<td valign="top" width="74">235,000</td>
<td valign="top" width="63"> </td>
</tr><tr><td valign="top" width="54"> </td>
<td valign="top" width="425">Numbers settled to January 1981</td>
<td valign="top" width="74">1,500</td>
<td valign="top" width="63"> </td>
</tr><tr><td valign="top" width="54"> </td>
<td valign="top" width="425">Numbers to be settled to 1984</td>
<td valign="top" width="74">18,000</td>
<td valign="top" width="63"> </td>
</tr><tr><td valign="top" width="54"> </td>
<td valign="top" width="425">Plus a possible</td>
<td valign="top" width="74">15,000</td>
<td valign="top" width="63">594,500</td>
</tr><tr><td valign="top" width="54"> </td>
<td valign="top" width="425"> </td>
<td valign="top" width="74"> </td>
<td valign="top" width="63"> </td>
</tr><tr><td valign="top" width="54"> </td>
<td valign="top" width="425">Excess number of families to be resettled</td>
<td valign="top" width="74"> </td>
<td valign="top" width="63">185,500</td>
</tr></tbody></table><p><span style="font-size: xx-small;">Table 1: Source: The Report of the Riddell Commission of Inquiry (Zimbabwe, 1981)</span></p>
<p>The Riddell Commission’s Report on <em>Incomes, Prices and Conditions of Services</em> in June 1981, however, had far-reaching affects on the scope and ambition of resettlement policy. Based on the number of families living in the communal areas and the carrying capacity of the land, the Commission calculated – as shown in the table above – that 185,000 communal families needed to be resettled.</p>
<p>Making adjustments to this figure, the government planned to spend Z$260m (USD282m) to settle 162,000 families on 9 million hectares in just three years. To meet this ambitious target, an <em>accelerated</em> programme was designed to settle families urgently. Planning procedures were therefore cut to a minimum and only basic infrastructure was provided.<sup>[4]</sup> What remained etched in the minds of government planners for the next two decades, however, was the number of families to be resettled and the amount of land to be acquired in order to correct the historical imbalance in land.</p>
<p>Despite the resettlement programme’s ambitions, the government’s commitment to land redistribution began to wane. As smallholder cotton and maize production surpassed commercial production in the mid-1980s, the government relied more on improved smallholder agricultural production than resettlement to meet its development objectives. In its exasperation to realise productivity gains from poor families that had been resettled, the government decided to include better farmers in the resettlement programme to boost agricultural production, as well as save on the costs of supporting new settlers.<sup>[5]</sup> Thus, by 1985 master farmers were added to the list of those eligible for resettlement. The allocation of land for resettlement was now to be based both on ‘need’ and ‘ability’.</p>
<div>
<p><span style="color: #cc0000;"><strong>A New Land Policy for the 1990s</strong></span></p>
</div>
<p>By the end of the 1980s 52,000 families had been resettled. But this achievement fell well short of the government’s original target. Rather than rethinking, remodelling and improving the implementation of the resettlement programme, the government turned on the commercial farmers. The President called for a “revolutionary land reform programme to distribute land without inhibitions”, stressing that “some farmers had to be made willing to sell their land.”<sup>[6]</sup> In July 1990 the government announced a new National Land Policy to resettle another 110,000 families on an additional 5 million hectares of land to be acquired at a ‘realistic’ price.<sup>[7]</sup></p>
<p>The new land policy also involved changes in the rules for acquiring land. The ‘willing buyer-willing seller’ principle was dropped in favour of designating farms for compulsory acquisition based on prices fixed by bureaucrats. And, contrary to the principles of natural justice, any recourse to the courts would be denied. The new principles of ‘one man–one farm’ and limiting farm sizes according to their agro-ecological region would release many more farms for acquisition in better farming areas. Crucially, however, the new policy laid greater emphasis on identifying, resettling and assisting large-scale black farmers with finance and training. Henceforth, beneficiaries would not necessarily be poor, but those who could ostensibly make best use of the land. The criterion of ‘need’ had now been superseded by that of ‘ability’.</p>
<p>Although the Land Acquisition Act was revamped in 1992 in order to put these policies into effect, the pace of resettlement remained stubbornly slow. Only 2,500 households were resettled, on average, each year between 1990 and 1993.<sup>[8]</sup> Worse, in 1994 the resettlement programme became mired in controversy. It became evident that lease agreements with white leasehold farmers had been cancelled, and that a Tenant Farmer scheme had been launched clandestinely.<sup>[9]</sup> Included in the scheme were farms that had been earmarked for resettlement, but allocated to senior government officials, including ministers, and high-ranking military officers.</p>
<p>The secretive manner in which leases were allocated further deepened concerns in Britain about the process of land reform in Zimbabwe.<sup>[10]</sup> Britain had other worries too. They wanted to support the needy rather than the well resourced, to maintain agricultural production, and to fund a less ambitious resettlement programme based on the ‘willing buyer-willing seller’ principle. When the new Labour government expressed reservation about supporting Zimbabwe’s revised resettlement plans, a frustrated President rekindled the nationalist narrative. He made it plain that he was not pleading with Britain for development assistance, but demanding the monies that Britain had purportedly promised at Lancaster House for land acquisition. As a sovereign state, the President claimed, Zimbabwe could choose how it spent these funds.</p>
<div>
<p><span style="color: #cc0000;"><strong><em>Jambanja</em> and the Seizure of Land after 2000</strong></span></p>
</div>
<p>Following the ruling party’s defeat in a referendum on a draft constitution in February 2000, it moved quickly to secure the rural areas before parliamentary elections scheduled for June 2000. In a process marked by coercion and violence – known as <em>jambanja</em> – thousands of party-sponsored settlers occupied commercial farms in an exercise where the army and state intelligence services played a decisive role.<sup>[11]</sup> Suddenly the established rules for acquiring and allocating land were abandoned in favour of a state-sponsored free-for-all seizure of farmland. The only criterion for allocating land was loyalty to the ruling party and the very fact of occupation itself. Thus, when the Supreme Court found the land programme to be ‘entirely haphazard and unlawful’ in December 2000, it specifically objected to the clear favouritism in distributing land to party supporters.</p>
<p>In June 2001 the government launched <em>People First: Zimbabwe’s Land Reform Programme</em>, otherwise known as the ‘Fast Track Land Reform Programme’. On paper, at least, the main objectives of the 1990 National Land Policy remained intact. The total area of commercial farmland required for resettlement still stood at 8.3 million ha. An A2 resettlement model had been introduced for the participation of black commercial farmers, but the A1 model still catered for poor rural families. What changed was that A2 settlers were no longer required to demonstrate either training or experience in farming; they needed only to show that they had sufficient resources. In fact, neither ‘ability’ nor ‘sufficient resources’ were pre-requisites for resettlement. The only criterion was that one was a Zimbabwean of a particular political stripe who ‘wanted’ land.</p>
<p>In order to allocate land to those who wanted it, the government changed the rules for land acquisition dramatically. After 2002, maximum farm sizes were strictly enforced, and the state was empowered to immediately ‘exercise any right of ownership’ once a farm owner had been issued with a land acquisition order. By 2004, any limit on the number of settlers or the amount of land to be acquired by government was removed. A new array of productive farming enterprises – from plantation crops to agro-industrial properties – became eligible for acquisition. Farm owners could no longer object to their only farm being compulsorily acquired. Then, in 2005, most commercial farms were nationalised, making their owners trespassers on land that most had bought since Independence.</p>
<p>But these rules did not apply to everyone. Politicians, officials and military officers simply ignored the ‘one man-one farm policy’ and any restrictions on farm size. They shamelessly helped themselves to any number of farms, sometimes displacing those settlers who originally invaded the farms. From the ideals of pro-poor land policies and promoting national agricultural productivity, the rules of the resettlement game have been changed – or ignored – to suit the depredations of powerful political players. Agricultural production shrunk significantly, and Zimbabwe has become a perennial food importer.</p>
<div>
<p><span style="color: #cc0000;"><strong>Making land reform work</strong></span></p>
</div>
<p>The GPA calls for those eligible to be allocated land to be considered for selection irrespective of race, gender, religion, ethnicity or political affiliation. This provision may help restore a more equitable and orderly programme of land reform, but it still presupposes the primary role of the state to acquire and allocate land. Elsewhere I have argued that this <em>dirigiste</em> (statist) approach is financially ruinous, administratively unworkable, and inimical to granting the necessary property rights to stimulate agricultural productivity and growth. Any visionary future government should rather concern itself with creating the legal and institutional framework that enables land markets to operate fairly, efficiently and securely, and in which every Zimbabwean can participate freely without fear of dispossession by a predatory state.</p>
<div>
<hr size="1" /><p><sup>[1]</sup> Reuters, 22 May 2008, <em>Zimbabwe farm invasions continue unabated – farmer</em></p>
<p><sup>[2]</sup> Zimbabwe (1982) <em>Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Agricultural Industry</em> under the chairmanship of Prof. Gordon Chavunduka. Government Printers: Salisbury.</p>
<p>[3] Zimbabwe (1982) <em>Transitional National Development Plan 1983–1985</em>. Government Printers: Harare.</p>
<p><sup>[4]</sup> Appendix E, Intensive Resettlement: Policies and Procedures (Zimbabwe, 1985).</p>
<p><sup>[5]</sup> Kinsey, B.H. (1984) <em>The Strategy and Tactics of Agrarian Reform: Resettlement and Land Policy in Zimbabwe</em>. Discussion Paper 136, University of East Anglia: Norwich.</p>
<p><sup>[6]</sup><em>The Herald</em>: 19 August 1989.</p>
<p><sup>[7]</sup> These figures were determined by deducting the 52,000 families already settled from the initial target of 162,000, and by deducting the amount of land already acquired from the 1982 target of 9 million ha.</p>
<p><sup>[8]</sup> Mhishi, S.G. (1995) <em>A Critical Analysis of the Resettlement Programme in Zimbabwe.</em> Zimbabwe Farmers Union / Friedrich Ebert Foundation: Harare</p>
<p><sup>[9]</sup> Tshuma, L. (1997). <em>A matter of (in)justice: law, state and the agrarian question in Zimbabwe.</em> Harare: Sapes Trust.</p>
<p><sup>[10]</sup> ICG (2004) Blood and Soil. <em>International Crisis Group</em>: Brussels</p>
<p><sup>[11]</sup><em>Ibid.</em></p>
<p><strong><span style="color: #2f2e2c; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; line-height: 17px;">This paper is part of the </span><a href="http://www.sokwanele.com/zimbabwelandseries" title="Zimbabwe Land Series" style="color: #cc0000; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-weight: normal; line-height: 17px;">Zimbabwe Land Series</a></strong><span style="color: #2f2e2c; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 17px;"></span></p>
</div>
</div></div></div>Mon, 18 Jun 2012 10:23:59 +0000Dale Doré2383 at http://www.sokwanele.comhttp://www.sokwanele.com/node/2383#commentsThe Poverty Trap – The Economics Of Communal Land Usehttp://www.sokwanele.com/the-poverty-trap
<div class="field field-name-field-story-image field-type-image field-label-hidden"><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><a href="http://www.sokwanele.com/files/story/poverty-trap.jpg"><img src="http://www.sokwanele.com/files/styles/450px-wide/public/story/poverty-trap.jpg" width="450" height="281" alt="" /></a></div></div></div><div class="field field-name-body field-type-text-with-summary field-label-hidden"><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><p>[If you wish to leave comments on this article please add them to the <a href="http://www.sokwanele.com/thisiszimbabwe/archives/7675#respond">blog post</a>. This paper is part of the <a href="http://www.sokwanele.com/thisiszimbabwe/archives/7450" title="Zimbabwe Land Series">Zimbabwe Land Series</a>]</p>
<p>By Dale Doré</p>
<p><strong style="color: #cc0000;">Executive Summary</strong></p>
<p>This paper recounts how the blossoming of smallholder agriculture in the mid-1980s began to fade when unsustainable costs began to mount. It tries to show that no amount of donor funds to support state-driven agricultural development will reduce poverty while households are entrapped in the current system of agriculture. At the system’s core lie the limited rights to land. Without the right to buy, sell, rent or otherwise transfer land, and when land and other natural resources are free for all, the system becomes beset by market failure, perverse incentives, waste and environmental degradation. The paper explains how, under the pressure of population growth, people’s livelihoods and the environment have been systematically decimated. A subsequent paper will show how modifications to the system can, over time, commercialise smallholder agriculture and emancipate rural Zimbabweans from a life of grinding poverty.</p>
<!--break--><p><span> </span></p>
<p><span style="color: #cc0000;"><strong>The rise and fall of smallholder agriculture</strong></span></p>
<p>Hundreds of thousands of poor rural families struggle to subsist on smallholdings in the communal areas, much of it in semi-arid areas with poor soils. At Independence it was estimated that there were nearly three times as many people living in the communal areas than the land could sustain. The Zimbabwe Government therefore prioritised programmes to decongest the communal areas and reduce poverty. These included intensifying agriculture, resettling families, and encouraging families to migrate and settle in towns and cities.</p>
<p>Vindication for Zimbabwe’s agricultural intensification programme seemed to come when national smallholder maize and cotton production surpassed commercial farm production in 1985 and 1986. Rukuni and Eicher (1994) dubbed the country’s success ‘Zimbabwe’s second agricultural revolution’. Yet, by the close of the 1980s the rate of resettlement had slowed to a trickle, the expected migration of households had failed to materialise, and the costs of the smallholder agricultural miracle were being counted.</p>
<p>The problem started when the government offered generous producer prices to support smallholders, which created an oversupply of maize. The Grain Marketing Board (GMB) not only had to pay smallholders above the market price for all their produce, but its maize handling and storage costs soared. Moreover, it had to absorb the heavy costs of expanding its network of maize depots and collection points into areas that were not economically viable. To make matters worse, the government’s decision to subsidise urban maize consumption left the GMB with a burgeoning and unsustainable budget deficit.</p>
<p><img src="/files/images/dore-article3-fig1.gif" /></p>
<p><em>Figure 1: Agricultural marketing losses during the 1980s</em> [Source: Doré (2009)]</p>
<p>The government was suddenly forced to back-track, announce more realistic maize prices, and restrict credit to those who had repaid their loans. Inevitably, smallholder production declined. It turned out that the short-lived rise in smallholder production had been unsustainable and only achieved on the back of unpaid AFC loans and producer subsidies, and at the expense of GMB’s huge deficit. But there was another disturbing feature of the ‘maize miracle’: broad-based poverty reduction had proved illusionary. Research showed that three-quarters of smallholder maize sales came from only 10 percent of smallholder farmers who were located in the better farming areas (Rohrbach<em> et al., </em>1990). Disturbingly, it also “deflected attention from the extensive and consistent reliance of a large proportion of smallholders on public food distribution programmes” (<em>ibid</em>:106).</p>
<p>By the mid-1990s, less and less was heard of efforts to address overcrowding and poverty in the communal areas, and the Rukuni Commission’s recommendations for communal land tenure reforms had been quietly shelved. As the communal areas stagnated as pools of poverty, resources were poured into the politically expedient resettlement programme. By then, the population in the already overcrowded communal areas had swollen to over one million households.</p>
<p><span style="color: #cc0000;"><strong>The perpetuation of poverty</strong></span></p>
<p>As population growth reduced the availability of good arable land, farming households had two basic choices: families could either subdivide their good land into smaller and less viable plots, or they had to look for more marginal land elsewhere.</p>
<p>The first option entailed established farmers subdividing their good land between their married sons. Often this meant that the new farming family had too little land to both produce enough food to eat and market a surplus to earn cash. Without the surplus production, the new smallholder family would struggle to earn additional income to educate their children, maintain their family’s health and, crucially, buy fertilizer for the following year’s crop. In the event of poor weather or drought, the family would not even be able to feed itself. Inevitably, it would be added to the growing list of recipients of international food aid.</p>
<p>When rainfall is erratic, as it was during 2002/03, one in every three Zimbabweans – 5.5 million people – needed food assistance.<sup>1</sup> As a result, Zimbabwe had to import 62 percent of its food requirements. Even when weather conditions improved, such as the 2009/10 season, 1.9 million Zimbabweans remained food insecure and 650,000 communal farmers were supported with agricultural inputs by the international community. The UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) noted that smallholders were “becoming increasingly dependent on emergency aid, losing self-reliance and the capacity to manage their own development in the future.”<sup>2</sup></p>
<p>Consider a household’s second option. Unable to find land locally, a young family decides to look for better opportunities elsewhere. They soon discover that the traditional process of land allocation has been subverted by unscrupulous state and party officials. After paying them for allocating and demarcating marginal land that is unsuitable for cultivation, the family does not have insufficient means to buy fertilizer. Nor is it willing to make risky investments in farm improvements where returns are likely to be limited. A few years after clearing and cultivating the land, the soils are inevitably exhausted. The family then moves on, opening up still more land, setting in motion a debilitating process of deforestation, extensive cultivation and environmental degradation (Lele and Stone, 1989).</p>
<p>This migration into the more marginal, semi-arid communal areas, especially Gokwe, became apparent after the 1982 population census (Zinyama and Whitlow, 1986). Bruce (1990) later showed that the opening up of new areas for cultivation, rather than higher per hectare yields, accounted for almost all increased crop production in the communal areas. During my own research in the 1990s, the same patterns of movement into marginal areas were plainly evident in Uzumba and the Matabeleland forests, as well as Nyaminyami, where the communities own game fences proved no barrier to extensive cultivation. Today, driven by the current political and economic crisis, fragile wildlife habitat in the Cheredzi Conversancy and elsewhere is unlikely to survive the latest wave of land invasions.</p>
<p><span style="color: #cc0000;"><strong>The tragedy of the commons</strong></span></p>
<p>The problem goes much deeper however. As more and more land is used for growing crops, cattle have to survive on ever-dwindling communal pastures. It was estimated, for example, that over a 10-year period the grazing areas had shrunk by 700,000 hectares (World Bank, 1985).</p>
<p>To make matters worse, grazing areas are a communally shared resource where the grazing of livestock is free. This means that each household has an incentive to maximise their own benefit by grazing as many of their livestock as possible. And, conversely, households try to minimize their costs by ‘externalising’ the environmental costs of overgrazing and erosion. Built into the system, therefore, are perverse incentives and processes that quicken the pace towards environmental decline, and which undermines the very resource base on which the livelihoods of families depend (Hardin, 1968).</p>
<p>All this results in what Drinkwater called the cattle paradox: far too many cattle for the available grazing areas, but all too few cattle to meet the households’ requirements for draft power. He observed, for example, that one area was 300 percent <em>over</em>-stocked in terms of its environmental carrying capacity; yet in terms of draught power needs, it was 53 percent <em>under</em>-stocked (Cliffe, 1986). The end result is that cattle – the smallholders most valuable form of capital – are gradually squeezed out of the agricultural system. About 45 percent of households own no cattle at all, and they are reduced to toiling with inefficient hand-held implements.</p>
<p><span style="color: #cc0000;"><strong>The inefficient allocation of productive resources</strong></span></p>
<p>The defining feature of the system is that land cannot be officially bought, sold, rented or transferred. It cannot be owned. Rather, it is an intrinsically ‘free good’ that is acquired by the household for agricultural use. Basic economics tells us that as the price of a good goes down, its demand goes up. Thus, if land is a free good, then demand will be almost limitless and insatiable. Almost everyone will want it. Indeed, custom dictates that every married man is entitled to a free plot of land. But since land – especially good quality land – is in limited supply, the system of traditional land allocation eventually breaks down as households scramble to access whatever land is available.</p>
<p>This situation is bad enough, but the absence of a land market is made even worse by its knock-on effects on the labour and capital markets (collectively known as factor markets). Consider this. When the population grows, a relative scarcity of land develops. The expectation, therefore, is that agricultural production will be intensified by substituting land for labour. However, in the absence of price signals from a land market (which would show the price of land increasing relative to labour) households will continue to demand more land – even in the face of dire land shortages. Moreover, since labour itself becomes relatively cheap (due to the growing population) compared to capital (e.g. farm investments such as equipment and fertiliser), households will have an incentive to apply more labour to land rather than capital. Over time, these factor market distortions gradually squeeze vital capital requirements – especially the use of fertiliser – out of the agricultural system.</p>
<p>But the problem does not stop there. As it is relatively expensive for households to maintain the fertility of their soils, they would rather apply their relatively cheaper labour to clear woodland and open up more marginal land for cultivation. It is this process that sets in motion a system that perpetuates extensive cultivation, leaving in its wake exhausted soils, overgrazed pasture, erosion and silted dams.</p>
<p>Two further points deserve attention. The first is that the infusion of capital into an agricultural system is usually made possible by using land as collateral for loans for pay for farm investments. But, because the communal area farming system does not ascribe any underlying transferable value to land, even this opportunity is denied to the smallholder. The second point is that because land cannot be transferred or rented, the system offers no mechanism through which more efficient farmers can acquire more land. Better farmers are thus unable to consolidate their holdings into larger, more viable units to realise economies of scale and improve their farm income.</p>
<p><span style="color: #cc0000;"><strong>Conclusion</strong></span></p>
<p>In analysing Zimbabwe’s smallholder agricultural system one is reminded of Myrdal’s concept of ‘circular and cumulative causation’. He described this as a process “continuously pressing levels downwards, in which one negative factor is, at the same time, both cause and effect of other negative factors” (1957:11). More recently, this concept was poignantly echoed by Leared: “Both the people and the environment”, he said, “suffer in an incessant spiral of despair” (2009:2).</p>
<p>Campbell and his team concluded “that the current processes of intensification and diversification are not leading people out of the poverty trap in semi-arid regions” where the majority of communal households live (2002:125). By almost any measure, most communal families remain chronically poor and trapped in an inefficient and Malthusian agricultural system. They survive only by the largesse of the international community and at the expense of the taxpayer and the environment.</p>
<p>The challenge is to start formulating a long term strategy of empowering smallholders by land reform programmes that create opportunities, incentives and pathways out of poverty. Land tenure reform that grants farmers stronger, more secure and tradable property rights will the lynch-pin for increased factor productivity, and the commercialisation and transformation of smallholder agriculture. How this can be achieved will be the subject of a subsequent paper.</p>
<p><sup>1</sup> FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Zimbabwe, 19 June 2003.</p>
<p><sup>2</sup><em>The Zimbabwean</em>, ‘UN halves Zim Humanitarian Appeal’, 30 November 2009.</p>
<p><span style="color: #cc0000;"><strong>References</strong></span></p>
<blockquote><p>Bruce, J. W. (1990) <em>Legal Issues in Land Use and Resettlement</em>. Background paper prepared for the World Bank (1991). Mimeograph: Harare.</p>
<p>Campbell, B., Sayer, J., Kozanayi, W., Luckert, M., Mutamba, M. and Zindi, C. (2002) <em>Household livelihoods in semi-arid regions: Options and Constraints.</em> Centre for International Forestry Research, Bogor.</p>
<p>Cliffe, L. (1986) <em>Policy Options for Agrarian Reform in Zimbabwe: A Technical Appraisal</em>. FAO Report: Harare.</p>
<p>Doré, D. (2009) <em>The Recovery and Transformation of Zimbabwe’s Communal Areas.</em> Comprehensive Economic Recovery in Zimbabwe, Working Paper Series No. 4, UNDP: Harare. <a href="http://reliefweb.int/node/321261">http://reliefweb.int/node/321261</a></p>
<p>Hardin G. (1968) The Tragedy of the Commons. <em>Science.</em> 162:1243-4</p>
<p>Lele, U. and S. Stone (1989) <em>Population Pressure, the Environment and Agricultural Intensification.</em> MADIA Discussion Paper 4. World Bank: Washington, D.C.</p>
<p>Leared, H. (2009) <em>Development Beachheads: The case for agricultural hubs as platforms for growth and development in sub-Saharan Africa.</em> A Brenthurst Discussion Paper, Harare.</p>
<p>Myrdal, G. (1957) <em>Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions</em>. Duckworth: London.</p>
<p>Rohrbach, D.D., J. Stack, B. Heddon-Dunkhorst and J. Govereh (1990) Agricultural Growth and National Food Security. Proceedings of the First National Consultative Workshop, Juliasdale. <em>Integrating Food, Nutrition and Agricultural Policy in Zimbabwe</em>. University of Zimbabwe: Harare</p>
<p>Rukuni, M. and C. Eicher (eds) (1994) Zimbabwe’s Agricultural Revolution. University of Zimbabwe: Harare.</p>
<p>World Bank (1985) <em>Zimbabwe: Land Subsector Study</em>. World Bank: Washington D.C.</p>
<p>Zinyama, L.M. and J.R. Whitlow (1986) Changing Patterns of Population Distribution in Zimbabwe. <em>Geojournal</em>. 13(4).</p>
</blockquote>
<hr size="1" /><p><span style="color: #cc0000;"><strong>Rights reserved:</strong></span> Please credit the author of this paper, and Sokwanele, as the original source for all material republished on other websites unless otherwise specified. Please provide a link back to <a href="http://www.sokwanele.com">http://www.sokwanele.com</a></p>
<p>This article can be cited in other publications as follows: Doré, D. (2012) The Poverty Trap – The Economics Of Communal Land Use, 05 June, Zimbabwe Land Series, Sokwanele: <a href="http://www.sokwanele.com/node/2380">http://www.sokwanele.com/node/2380</a></p>
</div></div></div>Tue, 05 Jun 2012 12:35:15 +0000Dale Doré2381 at http://www.sokwanele.comhttp://www.sokwanele.com/the-poverty-trap#commentsZimbabwe Inclusive Government Watch - Issues 38 & 39http://www.sokwanele.com/node/2378
<div class="field field-name-body field-type-text-with-summary field-label-hidden"><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><p style="text-align: left;"><img src="/files/images/zigpie_issues38-39.gif" alt="% cumulative breaches" width="250" height="200" style="float: left; " /></p>
<p style="text-align: left;">"Zimbabwe has just celebrated its 32 years of self-rule, all dominated by one political party and the same 'big man'. It is a country at a crossroad... in dire need of renewal, and that renewal can no longer come from the old-guard nor the party of independence," writes Tapera Kapuya, a Zimbabwean analyst with the National Endowment for Democracy in Australia.</p>
<p>"... The current situation suggests considerable cause for concern for anyone interested in Zimbabwe's democratic transition. The unity government constitutionally comes to an end mid-2013 and elections or another political negotiation, or both, will determine the country's immediate future...," Kapuya says. "For Zanu-PF, the unity government gave it room to breathe, weaken the opposition, and buy time (for) Mugabe has never really shared any power at all.... Zanu-PF has retreated to its liberation war tactics, in particular, reactivating the party's political-military alliance.... It is this political-military alliance that guides Zanu-PF's march into its future."</p>
<p><strong>March</strong></p>
<p><strong></strong>During March, it became increasingly clear that President Mugabe and a significant number of his powerful 'old guard' are driving a call for general elections as early as mid-2012 and are bent on determining when they are held. Mugabe has also threatened to abandon the completion of a draft new Constitution and force through elections under the old 'Lancaster House' Constitution of 1979, which some believe could effectively and irrevocably collapse the Global Political Agreement (GPA), signed in September 2008.</p>
<p>Violence is reported by Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) politicians and NGOs to be on the increase, both in rural and urban areas, to the extent that some MDC MPs cannot safely enter their own constituencies. Zanu-PF's evolving 'parallel administration' is openly seeking support and resources from China and Iran, while diamonds are reportedly being clandestinely siphoned off and sold to build up Zanu-PF's 'war chest'. Indigenisation Minister Saviour Kasukuwere is brazenly admitting that the indigenisation exercise is designed to be a vote-buying exercise to benefit Zanu-PF supporters.</p>
<!--break-->
<p>On the ground, Zanu-PF's entrenched abuse of State apparatus is clearly demonstrated in the current and almost routine banning of numerous MDC rallies and gatherings, and the illegal arrest of their members for attending legitimate private party meetings. The police crackdown on student voices is also escalating. In the rural areas, hijacking of donor food aid by Zanu-PF officials is becoming increasingly commonplace once again, with food being openly denied to many MDC supporters close to starvation. The main causes of the food deficit are drought conditions - mainly in the traditionally drought-prone provinces - and the collapse of commercial agriculture.</p>
<p>In Parliament, Zanu-PF is deliberately blocking debate on any legislation that could potentially strengthen the hand of coalition parties. The allocation of licences to 'free the airwaves' is being blocked by the skewed and delayed allocation of licences.</p>
<p><img src="/files/images/zigline_issues38-39_560px.gif" alt="ZIGwatch graph" title="ZIGwatch graph" width="560" height="140" /></p>
<p>A total of 78 media articles were recorded during March for ZIG Watch, each representing a unique breach of the terms of the GPA. Representative statistics were generated by categorising the articles according to the nature of the breach. <br /><br /> The greatest number of violations involved the category featuring cases of legal harassment of perceived opposition politicians and supporters. This was followed by cases of violence, intimidation, hate speech, threats, abductions and brutality. Next were cases of denial of the right to freedom of speech, or the abuse of freedom of speech, while the fourth highest involved cases of deliberate or consequential economic destabilisation. Zanu-PF was either responsible for, or involved in, all breaches recorded.</p>
<p>Of particular note is the number of cases of legal harassment, at 38.5% of the total, which far outstripped the second highest category of violence and intimidation - at 16.7%. This is clearly owing to the deliberate use of delays and postponements by amenable judges and State prosecutors to drag out cases as long as possible. The strategy is to keep MDC supporters and perceived opponents of Zanu-PF tied up in court or on remand, to curtail their political activities, cripple them financially and systematically demoralise them, thus limiting their effectiveness.</p>
<p>Within the 78 recorded breaches for March are at least 13 different cases of legal harassment. These range from a high-profile murder trial to the clandestine harassment by police of the mainstream Anglican Church in Harare which is being victimised by ex-communicated Anglican bishop Nobert Kunonga, an ardent supporter of President Mugabe.</p>
<p><strong>April</strong></p>
<p><strong></strong>During April, Sokwanele observed a small number of notable changes in the political landscape that may turn out to be significant in the short to medium term. The general chaos and levels of violence, harassment and corruption have not changed but, significantly, President Mugabe's plans to railroad through an early general election have hit a serious snag.</p>
<p>Zanu-PF had been uniting to attack and discredit the Constitutional Parliamentary Select Committee (COPAC)-led process and its new draft Constitution, which could lead to a constitutional crisis. However, in the interim, Zanu-PF's internal political succession issues have escalated over the month at an alarming rate, with severe outbreaks of violence. So serious is the problem that President Mugabe has spoken openly about it in public, and there are indications that he may be changing his stance on early elections to give Zanu-PF time to get its house in order.</p>
<p>In the business sector, Indigenisation Minister Saviour Kasukuwere continued to cause alarm and despondency to the point of economic destabilisation in his relentless and at times patently illegal drive to seize control of companies owned by foreigners or whites. Local Government Minister Ignatius Chombo exacerbated the level of chaos by obstructing, discrediting or removing elected MDC officials in Local Councils across the country. Defence Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa finally admitted to subverting the legally established process of diamond sales, a fact previously believed, but now confirmed.</p>
<p>A total of 61 media articles were recorded during April for ZIG Watch. As was the case in March, the greatest number of violations involved cases of violence, intimidation, hate speech, threats, abductions and brutality. This was followed closely by cases of legal harassment of perceived opposition politicians and supporters. Cases of deliberate or consequential economic destabilisation shared a joint third place with cases of subversion of legal, or legally established processes. Zanu-PF was either responsible for, or involved in 98.4% of all breaches recorded.</p>
<p>To complete our report, we have compiled and appended ten articles to represent media coverage of events in relation to the GPA during March and April. This list is neither comprehensive nor exhaustive because of the sheer volume of articles. We invite our readers to review the list of summarised articles, original articles (links provided) and previously captured articles, on the webpage <a href="http://www.sokwanele.com/zigwatch" target="_blank">http://www.sokwanele.com/zigwatch</a> and ask you to share this information with your colleagues and other interested parties.<br /><br /> Our first article for March is in the harassment category and retells the painfully long history of efforts to arrange bail for 29 MDC-T members facing charges of murdering a police officer in Glen View. On 19 March the application was postponed for the seventh time. This time the postponement was due to a power blackout in central Harare. The activists now have to wait until 21 March for the hearing to go before Justice Chinembiri Bhunu. Twice during the previous week the hearing was postponed because the Judge reportedly fell sick. Prior to this, Judge Felistas Chitakunye postponed the hearing twice to examine the defence's bail application. When the defence filed for a fresh bail application soon after the group was taken into custody early this month, the hearing was postponed to allow State prosecutors time to make a response.</p>
<p>Armed police officers raided the Harare residence of MDC-T Chief of Staff, Abisha Nyanguwo, at around 5am on 22 March, searching for weapons of war. Nyanguwo's lawyer denied them entry as they did not have a search warrant. Reinforcements arrived with a search warrant, claiming that the raid was in connection with the bombing of Zanu-PF's Gweru offices in December 2011. The search failed to reveal any weapons and no-one was arrested. Police then impounded Nyanguwo's vehicle, alleging that it had been used in the bombing. It is believed that the bombing is another set-up job by Zanu-PF, and that police are trying to manufacture evidence in order to frame Nyanguwo for the supposed 'crime'.</p>
<p>A report dated 2 March indicates that police commissioner-general Augustine Chihuri has involved himself in a legal battle with women activists who claim police are forcing them to remove their underwear in dirty police holding cells, while withholding sanitary wear. It is common practice for those in detention to be forced to wear only one piece of clothing on the upper body, and one on the lower. This forces women in dresses into the dehumanising position of going without underwear, tantamount to violence against women. Lawyers for the women are taking legal action against Chihuri after he admitted to holding female suspects in male prison cells and vowed not to provide sanitary wear for the inmates. The appalling and unsanitary conditions at Harare Central Police Station holding cells are degrading in the extreme and are likely to lead to further outbreaks of disease. In one example, a woman was advised by a male police officer to wipe herself with her bare hands after using the toilet because there was no toilet paper.</p>
<p>The racially-driven indigenisation exercise being championed by Zanu-PF has ironically come to haunt one of its rich and controversial white supporters. In a report dated 11 March, the US$600 million Chisumbanje ethanol project is threatened with collapse as Zanu-PF chefs, including Cabinet ministers, demand free shares in the venture under the guise of indigenisation, after realising its financial potential. The project is a partnership between the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA) and Billy Rautenbach's Green Fuels, Rating and Macdom Investments in a 20-year Build-Operate-and-Transfer arrangement signed in 2009. The greedy politicians are claiming Rautenbach, born in Zimbabwe, but not 'indigenous', has to cede a 51% shareholding to them in accordance with the Indigenisation Act. "He is Zimbabwean, but of the wrong colour," said the source.</p>
<p>Freedom of speech continues to be under assault. In a report dated 23 March, Information Minister Webster Shamu snubbed calls for media reforms, which were allegedly ordered by the principals of the GPA. Prime Minister Tsvangirai told journalists last month he had met with President Mugabe and Deputy President Mutambara, who had agreed to reform the boards of three key media institutions, as the latter had been illegally appointed. They gave Shamu until March 12 to implement changes. Minister Shamu deliberately delayed until now when, according to the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC), he said the boards of the ZBC and Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe (BAZ) are "here to stay" because they were appointed "legally". The third board is that of the Mass Media Trust.</p>
<p>In April's category of violence, intimidation, hate speech, threats, abductions and brutality, the consequences of Zanu-PF's violent and inhumane intimidation of rural villagers are recorded. This is a worrying situation being repeated across the country. In an article dated 1 April, desperate Buhera villagers blamed Zanu-PF officials and war veterans for exposing them to permanent hunger after they chased away two NGOs providing them with food. The long dry spell has hit villagers hard. "If we do not get food soon people might die. The NGOs ran irrigation schemes that sustained us. Now they have gone, most of us are hungry," said a village elder in Chief Nyashanu's area. "The donors worked tirelessly to save us from hunger. I do not have anyone to look after me. The donors used to look after me, but they have gone. Who will look after me?" an elderly villager asked.</p>
<p>The next article, dated 13 April, shows the impunity with which Zanu-PF thugs perpetrate violence - this time in a high-density suburb near Harare. The violent Zanu-PF youth gang, Chipangano that has terrorised residents of Mbare has started campaigning for the party. Innocent residents are being forced to reveal their personal details and are being ordered to vote for Robert Mugabe in the next election. Gang members have been regularly forcing anyone they can find to attend Zanu-PF rallies in the area. In a recent incident on 7 April near Mbare Netball Complex, people with no identity documents had to reveal their personal details to the group, on the promise that Chipangano would approach the Registrar General for 'help' in registering them to vote.</p>
<p>Also in the category of violence, but this time within Zanu-PF, members turned on each other at a party meeting in Nyanga on 26 April to discuss the District Coordinating Committee (DCC) elections. The meeting disintegrated into an all-out brawl, as tensions between rival factions of Zanu-PF came to a head, and scores sustained minor injuries. Riot police were called to separate the warring factions, but no-one was arrested. Skirmishes are common in Zanu-PF politics, but this incident was particularly violent and is significant because it marks an escalation of the showdown between loyalists of Vice President Joice Mujuru and Defence Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa.</p>
<p>The category profiling cases of subversion of legal, or legally established processes includes an article dated 14 April which reports that Finance Minister Tendai Biti (MDC-T) has criticised the manner in which the indigenisation law is being interpreted and applied. He implicitly dismissed the overtures being made by the Minister of Youth Development, Indigenisation and Empowerment, Saviour Kasukuwere, who has threatened to seize substantial shareholding of banks, under the guise of the law. "This act has been misinterpreted...," said Biti, "... [it] says it is the <em>intention</em> to reach ... 51% ownership, so it's discretionary. ....." Kasukuwere has also threatened to nationalise mines, where such provision does not exist in the law.</p>
<p>In a surprising turn of events, Defence Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa has confirmed widespread fears of ongoing military involvement in the country's diamond industry. Mnangagwa told an audience at Midlands State University in Gweru on 25 April that army deals were struck with diamond companies from China, Russia and other nations as part of efforts to counter Western targeted sanctions. He said the trade deals "to a large extent, stabilise industry and eliminate chances of internal economic sabotage." This information may well explain the low receipts from diamond sales as received by the Ministry of Finance.</p>
<p><strong>Bail hearing for 29 MDC-T activists postponed for 7th time<br />SW Radio Africa (ZW): 19/03/2012</strong></p>
<p>The bail hearing for 29 MDC-T members, facing charges of murdering a police officer in Glen View, was on Monday postponed for the seventh time. Monday's postponement was due to a power blackout in central Harare. The activists now have to wait until Wednesday for the hearing to go before Justice Chinembiri Bhunu. Twice last week the hearing was postponed because the Judge fell sick. Before that Judge Felistas Chitakunye postponed the hearing twice to examine the state's response to the defence's bail application. When the defence filed for a fresh bail application, soon after the group was taken into custody early this month, the hearing was postponed to allow state prosecutors time to make a response.</p>
<ul><li>ARTICLE II: DECLARATION OF COMMITMENT</li>
<li>ARTICLE VII : PROMOTION OF EQUALITY, NATIONAL HEALING, COHESION AND UNITY</li>
<li>ARTICLE XIII : STATE ORGANS AND INSTITUTIONS</li>
</ul><p><strong>Police raid senior MDC official's Harare home<br />ZimEye: 22/03/2012</strong></p>
<p>Armed police officers today at around 5am, raided the residence of MDC Chief of Staff, Abisha Nyanguwo in Harare, claiming to search for weapons of war, before they impounded his Isuzu double cab vehicle. Police went to Nyanguwo's house but were denied entry by his lawyer because they did not have a search warrant. Police called for reinforcements and officers from Harare's Law and Order Section arrived with a search warrant, claiming the raid was in connection with the bombing of Zanu-PF's Gweru offices. They searched the house but failed to find any weapons and no-one was arrested. Police then impounded his vehicle on allegations that it had been used to bomb the Gweru offices in December 2011.</p>
<ul><li>ARTICLE II: DECLARATION OF COMMITMENT</li>
<li>ARTICLE VII : PROMOTION OF EQUALITY, NATIONAL HEALING, COHESION AND UNITY</li>
<li>ARTICLE XIII : STATE ORGANS AND INSTITUTIONS</li>
<li>ARTICLE XVIII : SECURITY OF PERSONS AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE</li>
</ul><p><strong>Chihuri sucked in underwear fight<br />Daily News (ZW): 02/03/2012</strong></p>
<p>Police commissioner-general Augustine Chihuri is involved in a fight with women activists who claim police are forcing them to remove their underwear in dirty police holding cells, while withholding sanitary wear. Lawyers for the women are taking legal action against Chihuri after he admitted to holding female suspects in male prison cells and vowed not to provide sanitary wear for the inmates. So appalling are the conditions at Harare Central Police Station holding cells that one of the women taking Chihuri to court says she was advised by a male police officer to use bare hands to clean herself after using the toilet because there was no toilet paper, according to court papers.</p>
<ul><li>ARTICLE II: DECLARATION OF COMMITMENT</li>
<li>ARTICLE VII : PROMOTION OF EQUALITY, NATIONAL HEALING, COHESION AND UNITY</li>
<li>ARTICLE XI : RULE OF LAW, RESPECT FOR THE CONSTITUTION AND OTHER LAWS</li>
<li>ARTICLE XIII : STATE ORGANS AND INSTITUTIONS</li>
<li>ARTICLE XVIII : SECURITY OF PERSONS AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE</li>
</ul><p><strong>Zanu-PF chefs plan to grab ethanol project<br />Zimbabwe Standard, The (ZW): 11/03/2012</strong></p>
<p>The US$600 million Chisumbanje ethanol project is threatened with collapse as Zanu-PF chefs, including Cabinet ministers, demand free shares in the lucrative venture under the guise of indigenisation. "The sharks have realised the potential of the project and their mouths are wide open, ready to pounce," said one of the sources. The project is a partnership between the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA) and Billy Rautenbach's Green Fuels, Rating and Macdom Investments in a 20-year Build-Operate-and-Transfer arrangement signed in 2009. Some politicians claim Rautenbach, born in Zimbabwe, but not indigenous, has to cede 51% shareholding to them in accordance with the Indigenisation Act. "He is Zimbabwean, but of the wrong colour," said the source.</p>
<ul><li>ARTICLE II: DECLARATION OF COMMITMENT</li>
<li>ARTICLE III : RESTORATION OF ECONOMIC STABILITY AND GROWTH</li>
<li>ARTICLE VII : PROMOTION OF EQUALITY, NATIONAL HEALING, COHESION AND UNITY</li>
<li>ARTICLE XIII : STATE ORGANS AND INSTITUTIONS</li>
</ul><p><strong>Information Minister says no to media reforms<br />SW Radio Africa (ZW): 23/03/2012</strong></p>
<p>Information Minister Webster Shamu has snubbed calls for media reforms, which were allegedly ordered by the principals of the GPA. Prime Minister Tsvangirai told journalists last month he had met with Mugabe and Mutambara, who had agreed to reform the boards of three key media institutions, as the latter had been illegally appointed. They gave Shamu until March 12th to implement changes. But Mugabe's spokesman George Charamba caused confusion immediately after the announcement by dismissing the claims, saying no reforms had been agreed to and the boards were legal. Minister Shamu delayed until now, when, according to ZBC, he said the boards of the ZBC and Broadcasting Authority (BAZ) are "here to stay" because they were appointed "legally".</p>
<ul><li>ARTICLE II: DECLARATION OF COMMITMENT</li>
<li>ARTICLE VII : PROMOTION OF EQUALITY, NATIONAL HEALING, COHESION AND UNITY</li>
<li>ARTICLE XIII : STATE ORGANS AND INSTITUTIONS</li>
<li>ARTICLE XIX : FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND COMMUNICATION </li>
</ul><p><strong>NGOs chased away<br />Zimbabwean, The (ZW): 01/04/2012</strong></p>
<p>Desperate Buhera villagers have blamed Zanu-PF officials and war veterans for exposing them to permanent hunger after they chased away two NGOs providing them with food. The long dry spell has hit them hard. "If we do not get food soon people might die. We had irrigation schemes that sustained us with the help of NGOs. Since they have gone, most of us are hungry," said Tonderai Mushavaviri, a village elder in Chief Nyashanu area. "The donors worked tirelessly to save us from hunger. I do not have anyone to look after me. The donors used to look after me, but they have gone. Who will look after me?" said an elderly villager, Stanslaas Taremeredzwa.</p>
<ul><li>ARTICLE II: DECLARATION OF COMMITMENT</li>
<li>ARTICLE VII : PROMOTION OF EQUALITY, NATIONAL HEALING, COHESION AND UNITY</li>
<li>ARTICLE XI : RULE OF LAW, RESPECT FOR THE CONSTITUTION AND OTHER LAWS</li>
<li>ARTICLE XVI : HUMANITARIAN AND FOOD ASSISTANCE</li>
<li>ARTICLE XVIII : SECURITY OF PERSONS AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE</li>
</ul><p><strong>Violent Chipangano gang campaigning for Zanu-PF<br />SW Radio Africa (ZW): 13/04/2012</strong></p>
<p>The violent Zanu-PF youth gang that has terrorised residents of Mbare suburb in Harare has started campaigning for the party, forcing innocent civilians to reveal their personal details and ordering them to vote for Robert Mugabe in the next election. The gang, operating with impunity and the support of top Zanu-PF officials, has been regularly forcing residents, vendors and passers-by to attend Zanu-PF rallies held in the area. The most recent incident occurred last Saturday at Number Five grounds near Mbare Netball Complex, where people with no identity documents were forced to reveal their details to the group, on the promise that Chipangano would approach the Registrar General for help in registering them to vote.</p>
<ul><li>ARTICLE II: DECLARATION OF COMMITMENT</li>
<li>ARTICLE VII : PROMOTION OF EQUALITY, NATIONAL HEALING, COHESION AND UNITY</li>
<li>ARTICLE X : FREE POLITICAL ACTIVITY</li>
<li>ARTICLE XI : RULE OF LAW, RESPECT FOR THE CONSTITUTION AND OTHER LAWS</li>
<li>ARTICLE XVIII : SECURITY OF PERSONS AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE</li>
</ul><p><strong>Zanu-PF</strong> <strong>supporters come to blows in Nyanga<br />SW Radio Africa (ZW): 26/04/2012</strong></p>
<p>A Zanu-PF meeting to discuss the District Coordinating Committee (DCC) elections disintegrated into an all-out brawl on Thursday, as tensions between rival factions came to a head in Nyanga. Scores of people sustained minor injuries. Police in riot gear intervened and managed to separate the warring factions. No one was arrested. While skirmishes are common in Zanu-PF's messy politics, Thursday morning's incident at the Nyanga Country Club appeared to be particularly violent and marks an escalation in the showdown between the political camps of Joice Mujuru and Emmerson Mnangagwa. The reason for the violence was differences of opinion regarding the conduct of the DCC elections.</p>
<ul><li>ARTICLE VII : PROMOTION OF EQUALITY, NATIONAL HEALING, COHESION AND UNITY</li>
<li>ARTICLE X : FREE POLITICAL ACTIVITY</li>
<li>ARTICLE XI : RULE OF LAW, RESPECT FOR THE CONSTITUTION AND OTHER LAWS</li>
<li>ARTICLE XVIII : SECURITY OF PERSONS AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE</li>
</ul><p><strong>Kasukuwere misinterpreting indigenisation law — Biti<br />Zimbabwe Standard, The (ZW): 14/04/2012</strong></p>
<p>Finance minister Tendai Biti has criticised the manner in which the indigenisation law is being interpreted and applied. He implicitly dismissed the overtures being made by the Minister of Youth Development, Indigenisation and Empowerment, Saviour Kasukuwere, who threatened to seize substantial shareholding of banks under the guise of the law. "This act has been misinterpreted. ... this act says it shall be the endeavour of government to ensure that every company in Zimbabwe that is foreign-owned is at least 51%-owned (locally)," said Biti. Said Biti, "The law does not say that every foreign-owned company shall be 51%-owned, ... [it] says it is the intention to reach ... 51% ownership, so it's discretionary. ....."</p>
<ul><li>ARTICLE II: DECLARATION OF COMMITMENT</li>
<li>ARTICLE III : RESTORATION OF ECONOMIC STABILITY AND GROWTH</li>
<li>ARTICLE XI : RULE OF LAW, RESPECT FOR THE CONSTITUTION AND OTHER LAWS</li>
<li>ARTICLE XIII : STATE ORGANS AND INSTITUTIONS</li>
</ul><p><strong>Mnangagwa admits army involvement in diamond trade<br />SW Radio Africa (ZW): 25/04/2012</strong></p>
<p>Defence Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa has confirmed fears of ongoing military involvement in the country's diamond industry, which human rights campaigners have for years linked to abuses in the Chiadzwa diamonds fields. Mnangagwa told an audience at Midlands State University in Gweru that army deals were struck with diamond companies from China, Russia and other nations as part of efforts to counter Western targeted sanctions. He said the trade deals "to a large extent, stabilise industry and eliminate chances of internal economic sabotage." Analyst Clifford Mashiri meanwhile said there is little surprise that China and Russia have been linked to the Zimbabwean army, saying it justifies concerns already raised about their dealings in the local diamond industry.</p>
<ul><li>ARTICLE II: DECLARATION OF COMMITMENT</li>
<li>ARTICLE III : RESTORATION OF ECONOMIC STABILITY AND GROWTH</li>
<li>ARTICLE VII : PROMOTION OF EQUALITY, NATIONAL HEALING, COHESION AND UNITY</li>
<li>ARTICLE XIII : STATE ORGANS AND INSTITUTIONS</li>
</ul></div></div></div>Wed, 30 May 2012 07:09:01 +0000Sokwanele2378 at http://www.sokwanele.comA gendered insight into the lobola debatehttp://www.sokwanele.com/articles/agenderedinsightintotheloboladebate
<div class="field field-name-field-story-image field-type-image field-label-hidden"><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><a href="http://www.sokwanele.com/files/story/lobolacartoon.gif"><img src="http://www.sokwanele.com/files/styles/450px-wide/public/story/lobolacartoon.gif" width="296" height="532" alt="" /></a></div></div></div><div class="field field-name-body field-type-text-with-summary field-label-hidden"><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><p><strong>Introduction</strong></p>
<p>When news of the USD 36 000 bride payment made by Zimbabwe’s Prime Minister, Morgan Tsvangirai broke, a grand debate around the commodification of <em>lobola </em>ensued. Additionally, the reported decision made by the respective families to go ahead with marriage negotiations in the traditionally ‘taboo’ month of November stirred even more emotions among the general public eager to raise debate around whether <em>lobola</em> is being uprooted from its traditional grounding in culture, or whether it is simply evolving to reflect the dynamism of tradition and modern life.</p>
<p>It has been half a year since these conversations took place; and because they were largely couched to feed sensationalist perspectives on the Prime Minister’s private life, they have sadly since died an inconspicuous death.</p>
<p>What remains, however, is the crucial need for Zimbabweans to re-engage in critical debate and interrogation of <em>lobola </em>and the evolutionary role that it has played in the adoption of various roles significant to the status that women acquire and assume in society.</p>
<!--break--><p><span></span></p>
<p><strong>Background to <em>lobola</em></strong></p>
<p>Zimbabwe has three types of recognised marriage unions; the civil union, the registered customary law union and the unregistered customary law union. While each of these unions affords women different levels of legal and social status, the one common thread that binds them to each other is the payment of <em>lobola,</em> which remains of paramount importance to all these unions’ general functionality.</p>
<p>And while <em>lobola</em> is not a legal requirement for couples who have their marriages registered, it is usual practice to first hold a traditional marriage ceremony (involving the payment of <em>lobola</em>) before a marriage is officially registered. This is because, as many legal and social commentators have noted, a Zimbabwean marriage is not merely a union between the two lovers concerned, but also the joining together of the two families involved <sup>1</sup>.</p>
<p>Traditionally, marriage and child-bearing are thought to be the pinnacles of a person’s life. Mbiti (1969: 133)<sup>2</sup> observes that:</p>
<blockquote><p><em>For African peoples, marriage is the focus of existence. It is the point where all the members of a given community meet; the departed, the living and those yet to be born. All the dimensions of time meet here and the whole drama of history of is repeated, renewed and revitalised. </em></p>
</blockquote>
<p>In traditional Ndebele culture, the spiritual ancestors, <em>amadlozi, </em>are consulted and their approval sought during marriage proceedings<sup>3</sup>. And in Shona culture, the <em>lobola</em> procedure involves a range of players within the immediate and extended family who initiate and finalise transactions.</p>
<p><em>Lobola</em> is thus viewed as a socially cohesive practice that maintains equilibrium between the two families by compensating for what is removed from one family – the productive and reproductive potential of a woman – with cash, livestock and other resources deemed suitable to acknowledge this ‘loss’.</p>
<p><strong><em>Lobola</em> in perspective</strong></p>
<p><em>Lobola</em> is, however, understood variously. From one perspective, it can be seen as a noble and respectful gesture wherein the family of the groom shows appreciation for the wealth the prospective bride will bring to their lives; and the void that her absence within her family will create. Yet on the other hand, <em>lobola</em> can be seen as a perpetuation of patriarchy and women’s subordination; the commodification of a woman’s roles and functions in the home.</p>
<p>While the exchange of wealth is intended as a gesture of appreciation to the entire household for having raised the bride, it is apparent from how this wealth is divided that greater emphasis is placed on the transfer of wealth to the father of the groom (who generally receives the bulk of the cash or stock of cattle) with the mother usually being recognised with a small fraction of this wealth through the<em> mombe yohumai or inkomo yohlanga </em>(“motherhood beast”), traditionally considered one of the most important forms of property a woman owns.<sup>4</sup></p>
<p>In some instances, even where a beast is given to the mother of the bride, it may be subsumed under the paternal wealth (without due notification of the bride’s mother). While it can be argued that this wealth represents the collective pool of family resources, it often occurs that inheritance of wealth accrued from <em>lobola </em>is passed down to male members of the family, to the exclusion of the women who play an important role within its acquisition.</p>
<p>As feminist activist, Everjoice Win<sup>5</sup>, observes;</p>
<blockquote><p><em>The myth of what lobola signifies for women is one of the most enduring in Southern Africa, and needs to be shattered. Lobola does not benefit the woman. It benefits the men in her family; brothers, father, uncles. </em></p>
</blockquote>
<p><strong><em>Lobola</em> and sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR)</strong></p>
<p>A wife is expected to be hardworking and respectful to her husband and family-in-law; but arguably, the most important responsibility placed upon her shoulders is to bear children. A woman is supposed to give birth in proportion to the number of cattle that has been paid for her<sup>6</sup>; and if that ‘duty’ is not fulfilled, the woman’s position within the family becomes severely compromised. In fact, she may even be sent back to her parents’ home and a <em>lobola </em>refund demanded.</p>
<p>Alternatively, her husband may be encouraged to take one of her unmarried female relatives as a second wife as compensation for her assumed infertility (generally, it is assumed that the fertility problem lies with the woman). In a perpetuation of the idea of ownership of a woman (by virtue of the exchange of wealth made to guarantee her entry into her husband’s family), the solution for challenges in childbearing is to substitute the bride with another women from her family (usually a sister or niece) who, by association to the bride and <em>lobola </em>process, is seen as the collective property of the marital union.</p>
<p>Win <sup>7</sup> notes;</p>
<blockquote><p><em>Lobola </em>is paid for a woman’s reproductive capacity or loosely translated, it buys her uterus.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In many instances, <em>lobola, </em>is used to buy not only the uterus of the woman being married, but also those of her female relatives who are given no say in the yielding of their own reproductivity.</p>
<p>But the power that <em>lobola</em> can take away from women’s autonomy over their sexual and reproductive health stems deeper; prominent women’s rights lawyer, Sylvia Chirawu<sup>8</sup>, notes that <em>lobola</em> is often viewed as a woman’s perpetual consent to sexual intercourse in that her husband has purchased the right to demand sex from her at any time. Such thinking has exposed many married women to domestic violence, marital rape and HIV infection (wherein the husband may have extra-marital sexual partners, such as a small house, and demand to have unprotected sex with his wife).</p>
<p><strong><em>Lobola</em> and power</strong></p>
<p>Patriarchal power is further amplified in instances where a woman is forced to stay within a marriage by virtue of the payment of <em>lobola.</em> In some cases, a family will refuse for their daughter to return home, even under the worst circumstances of domestic violence, because a ‘price’ has been paid for her. And in other instances, the value of the wealth that has been paid for a wife may be equated to her value as a woman.</p>
<p>For example, a 2011 newspaper article<sup>9</sup> reports of a Bikita woman who was denied a divorce by her local chief due to the ‘sizeable’ <em>lobola</em> (15 cattle and a sum of cash) transacted to her parents for her hand in marriage. The article further mentions that the woman wanted to leave her husband because of his alcoholism but that the chief ruled that she should stay and look after him. The woman is quoted as saying, “It is true my husband loves me. He paid 15 cattle and a hefty sum of money as a bride price to my parents.”</p>
<p>In essence, this woman has lost her decision-making power based on the grounds of a commodified form of ‘love’ that dictates that since much wealth has been paid for her, she has no option but to stay with her man, regardless of how he much suffering he may cause her.</p>
<p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p>
<p>In its oldest traditional form, <em>lobola </em>represented a goodwill exchange between families; a token of appreciation and unity-building. But with the advent of the cash economy, well-meant gifts of exchange have since been replaced by cash. And for many families, particularly amid the trying circumstances of Zimbabwe’s current economic status, the potential wealth that <em>lobola</em> brings provides a financial mainstay.</p>
<p>Because of the large costs usually involved, it is not uncommon to hear of women who assist their grooms in paying the <em>lobola </em>fee. One may then ask: <em>What is the purpose of lobola if the woman to be ‘acquired’ partakes in her own ‘acquisition’? Does such participation allow women to reclaim power over their bodies or does it co-opt them within their own subordination (ie. a woman helps to pay the very bride wealth that takes away her marital decision-making power)? </em></p>
<p>Additionally, dialogue around the significance of <em>lobola</em> and weakening family ties within diasporic communities is essential. As Pasura<sup>10</sup> notes from a study conducted among Zimbabwean couples in the UK, a lack of access to immediate family (for conflict resolution) coupled with multiple social and gendered pressures has led to high divorce rates. Furthermore, living in the diaspora has allowed many Zimbabwean women the space and scope to question hegemonic gendered roles and relations, thus providing them the opportunity to create new gendered identities. The questions follow: <em>What role does lobola have to play amid the evolving dynamics of relationships between and among Zimbabweans abroad? How socially cohesive is the practice among families that are widely dispersed, since in-family arbitration is negated by distance?</em></p>
<p>The <em>lobola</em> debate brings up many complex dynamics that Zimbabweans – facing a variety of evolving circumstances – need to continually interrogate, lest the practice lose it place and esteem within the preservation of the culture of this nation’s peoples.</p>
<p><strong>References</strong></p>
<blockquote><p><sup>1</sup> Gombe, J.M. (1995). The Shona Idiom. Harare, Mercury Press.</p>
<p>Chirawu, S. (2006). Till Death Do Us Part: Marriage, HIV/ AIDS and the Law in Zimbabwe. Washington, bePress Legal Series.</p>
<p><sup>2</sup> Mbiti, J.S. (1969). <span style="text-decoration: underline;">African Religions and Philosophy.</span> London, Heinemann.</p>
<p><sup>3</sup> Nyathi, P. (2001). <span style="text-decoration: underline;">Traditional Ceremonies of AmaNdebele.</span> Gweru, Mambo Presss.</p>
<p><sup>4</sup> (2003) Center for Reproductive Rights: <a href="http://reproductiverights.org/sites/default/files/documents/WOWAA08.pdf">http://reproductiverights.org/sites/default/files/documents/WOWAA08.pdf</a></p>
<p><sup>5</sup> Win, E. (2004). Virginity testing as HIV/AIDS prevention strategy: Clutching at straws. <span style="text-decoration: underline;">Sexuality in Africa Magazine.</span>1(1): 13-14.</p>
<p><sup>6</sup> Chirawu, S. (2006). Till Death Do Us Part: Marriage, HIV/ AIDS and the Law in Zimbabwe. Washington, bePress Legal Series.</p>
<p><sup>7</sup> Win, E. (2004). Virginity testing as HIV/AIDS prevention strategy: Clutching at straws. <span style="text-decoration: underline;">Sexuality in Africa Magazine.</span>1(1): 13-14.</p>
<p><sup>8</sup> Chirawu, S. (2006). Till Death Do Us Part: Marriage, HIV/ AIDS and the Law in Zimbabwe. Washington, bePress Legal Series.</p>
<p><sup>9</sup> Nematiyere, S. (2011). <span style="text-decoration: underline;">Woman wants out – what about lobola?.</span> Online at: <a href="http://www.thezimbabwean.co.uk/news/zimbabwe/54766/woman-wants-out">http://www.thezimbabwean.co.uk/news/zimbabwe/54766/woman-wants-out</a>–what.html</p>
<p><sup>10</sup> Pasura, D. (2010). Regendering the Zimbabwean Diaspora in Britain, in <span style="text-decoration: underline;">Zimbabwe’s Exodus: Crisis, Migration, Survival.</span> Eds. Crush, J. and Tevera, D. Cape Town, SAMP.</p>
</blockquote>
</div></div></div>Thu, 24 May 2012 11:03:21 +0000Sokwanele2377 at http://www.sokwanele.comhttp://www.sokwanele.com/articles/agenderedinsightintotheloboladebate#commentsMy perspective on the on-going preparations for a National Land Audithttp://www.sokwanele.com/Zimbabwe_National_Land_Audit
<div class="field field-name-field-story-image field-type-image field-label-hidden"><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><a href="http://www.sokwanele.com/files/story/zim_satellite_map_large.jpg"><img src="http://www.sokwanele.com/files/styles/450px-wide/public/story/zim_satellite_map_large.jpg" width="450" height="402" alt="" /></a></div></div></div><div class="field field-name-body field-type-text-with-summary field-label-hidden"><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><p>[If you wish to leave comments on this article please add them to the <a href="http://www.sokwanele.com/thisiszimbabwe/archives/7630#respond">blog post</a>. This paper is part of the <a href="http://www.sokwanele.com/thisiszimbabwe/archives/7450" title="Zimbabwe Land Series">Zimbabwe Land Series</a>]</p>
<p>By Mandivamba Rukuni</p>
<p><span style="color: #cc0000;"><strong>Introduction</strong></span></p>
<p>In this article I discuss how the land issue has been handled by the GNU as from its formation in 2009. Although progress towards a National Land Audit (NLA) has been very slow, a significant amount of technical and preparatory work has been completed and continues to happen. I will start by taking a historical approach relating what I know has happened so far. That will include an update on ‘preparatory’ activities for the land audit and my views on the technicalities of such an audit if this has to all add up to the rehabilitation of the land sectors. The need to undertake a National Land Audit (NLA) in Zimbabwe is provided for in the Global Political Agreement (GPA) of 2008 calling for a comprehensive, transparent and non-partisan land audit, for accountability and eliminating multiple farm ownership. Other objectives include fairness in land allocation; ensuring security of tenure; and crafting ways of financing land compensation, as well as other interventions towards greater productivity of land.</p>
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<p><strong><em>Auditing land in Zimbabwe: </em></strong>While the Fast Track Land Reform Programme was underway, the government commissioned three audits – the Utete Commission and the Buka Audit in 2003 and the SIRDC and Ministry of Lands and Rural Resettlement (MLRR) audit in 2006. The SIRDC/MLRR audit covered all eight of the country’s provinces and also benefited from the findings of the earlier audits. The audits unearthed a wide range of issues such as the level of farm take up, vacant plots, double allocation of farms, multiple farm ownership, details of beneficiaries, land utilization, farm structures and equipment, improvements made by the new beneficiaries, land disputes, and illegal consolidation of subdivisions. But many issues remained contentious and unclear. The GPA’s National Land Audit is meant to clarify the situation ‘once and for all’ by verifying and authenticating land records in the country. The NLA will therefore review existing records to verify land categories and ownership. It would provide a comprehensive and accurate assessment of the situation on the ground, allowing for proper land administration moving forward.</p>
<p><span style="color: #cc0000;"><strong>Summary of progress to date</strong></span></p>
<p>There is no doubt that the mood and the dialogue on the NLA has changed significantly since 2009. In 2009 the land issue was burning a lot hotter than is the case in 2012. The land issue is still very much politically sensitive, especially given that it is a key component of the GPA. But the nation continues to move on. There is greater presssure to rehabilitate the land for productivity, investment and economic recovery than just fulfil a political process. A significant proportion of dispossessed white farmers are placing greater emphasis on receiving their compensation than on restitution.</p>
<p>Back in 2009 there was hardly an aspect of the land issue that the GNU partners agreed on. Today there is evidence of convergence (not necessarily agreement) on issues such as the need for secure land rights, compensation (at least for improvements), and the need for more intensive land use planning. There is also an openning up of public dialogue on the land issue with, for instance, the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Land and Agriculture engaging both the public and the civil service. This was not feasible in 2009 when the only major dialogue was an in-house Ministry of Lands policy and strategy session held in Kariba. The donors interested in supporting the GNU on land organised themselves under the auspices of the Multi-Donor Trust Fund administered by the World Bank. The Donor Land Audit Working Group was quite active in 2009 meeting regularly and commissioning a number of studies. But there was no direct engagement with the Government then.</p>
<p>Things started happening a little faster in 2010 when the European Union (EU) Delegation to Zimbabwe offered the MLRR support through the UNDP for a ‘pilot land audit’ covering the sugar growing sector in the south eastern lowveld. The MLRR reviewed the idea and made a counter proposal that instead of a ‘pilot’ focussing on one sector, UNDP draft a methodology for a NLA. This eventually led to the NLA ‘start-up activities’ programme discussed below. But meanwhile the MLRR in 2010 submitted its own proposal to the GNU Cabinet on a NLA framework. That document is unlikely to go public until Cabinet resolves on a way forward. In 2011, however, Cabinet also requested the MLRR to submit proposals for a Land Audit Commission and the Cabinet has now seen both the NLA framework and a proposal for a Commission. A final decision and the way forward, however, is still to come.</p>
<p><strong><em>The </em></strong><strong><em>Start-Up Programme for the National Land Audit</em></strong></p>
<p>The MLRR implemented the Start-up activities under the financing agreement between the Ministry of Finance, UNDP and the EU. A total of €423,000 EU-STABEX funds were expended for the activities. The agreement provided for a division of labour between the UNDP and the World Bank (WB) in the implementation of the activities. Activities commenced in June 2010 up to the end of March 2011. An additional USD500,000 of donor support towards technical and expert reviews of land reform issues was also provided for in the agreed work plan of the Analytical Multi-Donor Trust Fund (A-MDTF). The start-up had five outputs and progress to date is as follows:</p>
<p style="padding-left: 30px;">a) <strong><em>Land category verification:</em></strong> The land registry has been updated after reconciling the land transactions that have occurred since the land reform on all types of land. This was the single most important output of the start-up given that the entire A1 land resettlement data was not centrally captured. Data and information was available only at district and provincial levels were the committees responsible for land distribution had transacted. Teams from the MLRR with technical support form UNDP have taken about 18 months to collect and update the land register. A land audit would have been meaningless without this step.<br /> b) <strong>Development of NLA methodology: </strong>A set of data collection instruments were developed and these will need stakeholder input and validation, as well as ground testing before their use (either by the Commssion or the MLRR) when the audit is finally given a go-ahead by Cabinet.<br /> c) <strong>Stakeholder consultations</strong>: This aspect is budgeted for in the programme to allow discussion and input by stakeholdes on the methodology and audit strategy. This is now expected to happen under further preparatory activities;<br /> d) <strong>Regional and international best practices</strong> <strong>on land reform and land audits</strong>: Visits to Brazil and Kenya were undertaken by the MLRR with technical guidance from UNDP and it is expected that this has improved understanding of issues around security of tenure and bankability, as well as addressing land reform issues and land administration;<br /> e) <strong>Review of land policies was planned for but has not yet happened</strong>. The idea is to prepare status and option papers for review by policy makers and stakeholders specifically to cover: security of tenure, compensation to farmers, and land administration.</p>
<p><span style="color: #cc0000;"><strong>What is the relationship between a land audit and comprehensive agrarian reform?</strong></span></p>
<p>The most significant issue on land that Zimbabwe faces is how to proceed with a comprehensive agrarian restructuring. I am generally an optimist myself and believe that this is feasible in the medium to long term. I, however, differ with most on how to characterise the challenge. It is human nature to wish for past pleasures and scenarios such as rebuilding the agrarian sector to more-or-less what it was before 2000, but this, in my opinion is highly unlikely. At the other extreme are those who see the challenge as simply supplying the new farmers with inputs and finance and then the past glory of being a bread-basket re-emerges. My position is not exactly a middle position, but informed by the very radical transformation of the agrarian sector that took place – from one dominated by large farmers to one where the small to medium-scale farms are predominant. It is not good enough to revive the research, extension, agri-finance, and marketing institutions. These have to undergo a corresponding transformation in line with the new agrarian structure. Providing credit to 200,000 or so new small farmers, as an example, is radically different to providing the same service to 4,000 farmers who had a whole era behind them for integrated support by government and the business sector. Research, extension, marketing and other services need to learn how to service new and more numerous farmers with a limited business and banking track record.</p>
<p>I know that in the long run systems will adapt, but it is more strategic to recognise these transformational challenges and design them into recovery programmes.</p>
<p>So how will the land audit assist in all this? My opinion is that more progress will be made with the land audit by anticipating the key strategic issues that either need prior thought and positioning before the audit, or that need answers from the audit. It is common knowledge that part of the resistance to the land audit is because some land beneficiaries fear losing their land if, for instance, they are found to be under-utilising it. If there was sufficient dialogue ahead of the audit providing some policy guidance on the issue, this may reduce the perceived risk. Such policy positions are best arrived at by consulting with the affected groups, providing such clarity as a definition of ‘under-utilisation’ and its various manifestations and therefore the implications for each. The issue of multiple farm ownership, the various forms it takes and implications for each is another example. There are several other more strategic issues which need similar engagement ahead of the audit and these include land tenure, land compensation, and land administration structures and systems.</p>
<p>Zimbabwe has historically had a well defined system of land administration, including cadastral survey records, land registries and surveyors. Due to a lack of investment, these systems have decayed and land records are being lost. The nation urgently needs a state of the art land information system as part of Government’s drive for e-Government and e-Citizenry.</p>
<p><span style="color: #cc0000;"><strong>Conclusions</strong></span></p>
<p> </p>
<p>It is unlikely that a NLA will happen ahead of the Constitution and elections. It is still important for the MLRR, professional and technical actors to continue preparing for the audit, especially given the need for rehabilitation and upgrading production and productivity levels. In the next article I turn to the issue of compensation as part of the rehabilitation process and discuss how these two are closely related in the current legislation. I will explain developments to date and offer options moving forward. The land sectors—agriculture, forestry, wildlife, and the tree and plantation sectors­—will all have greater prospects for growth and development if the compensation issue is fast tracked and practical solutions put on the table, debated and agreed upon.</p>
<p><span style="color: #cc0000;"><strong>References</strong></span></p>
<p>Rukuni M, Nyoni J, and Sithole E (2009) <em>Policy Options For Optimization of the Use of Land for Agricultural Productivity and Production in Zimbabwe.</em> A Report prepared for the ASTRG, MDTF. World Bank.</p>
<p>GoZ, 2006. National A2 Land Audit Report, Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, Harare.</p>
<p>MLRR, 2009. Land Policy Review and Land Audit: Options and Strategy, A Synthesis of the Ministry of Lands and Rural Resettlement Planning Retreat held Carribbea Bay Hotel, Kariba, 11th – 13th June.</p>
<p>Utete C, 2003. “Report of the Presidential Land Review Committee on the implementation of the fast-track land reform programme 2000- 2002″, Harare. Government Printers.</p>
<p>Buka Report, 2003. A Preliminary Audit Report of Land Reform Programme</p>
<p>Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement (MLLRR) and Scientific Industrial Research Centre (SIRDC), 2008. Consolidated National A2 Audit Report, Harare.</p>
<p>Scoones, I., Marongwe, N., Mavedzenge. B., Mahenehene,J., Murimbarimba. andSukume, C. (2010) Zimbabwe’s Land Reform:<em> Myths and Realities, </em>Weaver Press, Harare</p>
</div></div></div>Sun, 20 May 2012 10:37:50 +0000Mandivamba Rukuni2375 at http://www.sokwanele.comhttp://www.sokwanele.com/Zimbabwe_National_Land_Audit#commentsOur ugly secret: abortion in Zimbabwe, illegal but thrivinghttp://www.sokwanele.com/node/2374
<div class="field field-name-field-story-image field-type-image field-label-hidden"><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><a href="http://www.sokwanele.com/files/story/unicefquote.gif"><img src="http://www.sokwanele.com/files/styles/450px-wide/public/story/unicefquote.gif" width="450" height="191" alt="" /></a></div></div></div><div class="field field-name-body field-type-text-with-summary field-label-hidden"><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><p>"Today you're going to cry." The doctor, prodding Grace roughly with his nicotine-stained fingers, is matter-of-fact, there's no malice in his voice. And, afterwards, when she begs him not to let her see the fetus, he's considerate enough to cover it with a paper towel as it lies in a bloody puddle at the end of the examination table, before helping her to her feet. When he returns to the leather armchair in his consulting room, she notices that he doesn't bother to wash his hands before lighting a cigarette, blowing smoke in her direction as she leans over the desk to hand him his money.</p>
<blockquote><p>"Be careful not to tell anyone about this," he says as she turns to leave, his eyes slits through the blue blur of cigarette smoke, "the jails are full of women like you."</p></blockquote>
<p>He was right. That day she did cry. And for many days afterwards. There was clotting and cramps that had her balled up in pain in a corner of the sofa for the next two days, but, mostly, she cried because of the agony of an infection which festered where the doctor's unsterilised equipment had torn at her private parts.</p>
<p>The series of events that led to Grace finding herself in the deserted surgery that late Saturday afternoon once all the regular patients had gone home, is irrelevant. She could have been a teenager who fell pregnant the first time she had sex with her boyfriend. But, as it turned out, she was a mature single mother, unable to face the birth of a third child she had no means of supporting. Whatever her circumstances, Grace, like many other Zimbabwean women, found herself risking her life and her freedom to terminate a pregnancy she believed impossible to sustain.</p>
<p>She is hardly an isolated statistic. According to a report by the UN Children's Fund, Unicef, more than 70 000 illegal abortions are carried out in the country every year, with Zimbabwean women running a 200 times greater risk of dying of abortion complications than their counterparts in South Africa, where the procedure is legal.</p>
<p>Grace was one of the lucky ones. The infection cleared after a series of antibiotics, followed by a D&amp;C. The doctor who treated her for the infection was discreet and, for her, luckily so. A hospital or doctor which treats a woman for complications which have evidently arisen from an abortion, are obliged to report the patient to the police. Both the woman, and the doctor who performed the procedure, can be arrested and sentenced to a minimum of five years imprisonment.</p>
<p>A largely Catholic society, abortion in Zimbabwe is condemned by both the church and the state:</p>
<blockquote><p>"As a Christian, there's no grey area: abortion is murder," said a local priest. "The fetus, from conception, has a life, a soul, and we, as human beings, have no right to kill it."</p></blockquote>
<p>Neither does the law allow for any ambiguity. The termination of a pregnancy, according to the current constitution, is a criminal act, and is dealt with as such. But there are those who believe the law is out-dated and no longer relevant to Zimbabwe's modern society.</p>
<blockquote><p>"If society is to condemn mother/child care, where does it begin to pass judgment?," asked a local advocate for legalising abortion in Zimbabwe. "Does it begin with the woman who aborts a fetus within the "safe" period of 12 weeks; or with the mother who gives birth and dumps the new-born in the cistern of a railway station toilet? Or, perhaps it should begin with a health care programme that does not offer women free access to contraception and sexual education."</p>
<p>"How can the pro-lifers boast that we are protecting the rights of the child, when the newspapers are full of horrendous stories of infanticide and baby dumping? It's obvious there's something very, very wrong," she said.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Norma and Themba are testimony to the resilience of the human body. Early one winter morning, when the babies were around two months old, their mothers – presumably sisters, possibly prostitutes – decided to pack up and leave their squalid one-bedroom shack and seek new opportunities. The babies did not feature in their plans. So, without a word to anyone, the women left them in the apartment, already cleared of all its contents, locked the door behind them, and disappeared. Some time later, neighbours grew concerned by the endless crying coming from the house, and the fact that the women had not been seen going in or coming out for at least two days.</p>
<p>They broke into the house and found the pair, smeared in their own feces and close to starvation. By the time they reached them, little Themba was too tired and weak to cry anymore and was lying completely motionless. The neighbours alerted social welfare which placed the babies in a city orphanage. Today, aged around one year old, the children are doing well. Norma has just taken her first steps, toddling unsteadily along in her baby-grow, arms outstretched to anyone who passes. When you reach down to lift her, she clings to you like she'll never let go. Themba is more reserved, less trusting, but his big, bright eyes follow you wherever you go.</p>
<p>While tragic, the cousins' story is hardly the worst that Mary, who runs the orphanage, has heard. There are, of course, the ones who don't make it, who are dead before they can be rescued, drowned in pit latrines, left to starve in city dustbins. Others who come to the home so emaciated and near to death their abdomens are hollowed out like a kettle drum, their ribs sharp spears protruding from their pathetic chests, eyes too big for their skeletal faces. They've been either abused, neglected or abandoned to within an inch of their lives.</p>
<p>Mary points to the wall, to a "before" and "after" picture of a little boy called Daniel, three years old when he came to them, and weighing just five kilogrammes.</p>
<p>And, as the economic conditions in Zimbabwe worsen, so does the desperation that provides the fuel for these and countless stories like them.</p>
<p>Orphanages in the country, overseen by a struggling social welfare system, are full of children like Daniel, with little or no means to support them.</p>
<blockquote><p>"With no money available locally, we seek most of our funding from outside the country," says Mary, whose institution offers shelter to teenage girls who fall pregnant, largely through incest and rape, and takes in their babies if they feel unable to do so.</p>
<p>"While, in the case of rape and incest, we would not stand in their way if they wanted to terminate the pregnancy, the girls who come to us have all chosen to give birth to their babies, not a single one has chosen to have an abortion. A large number of the girls choose to care for their babies themselves, sometimes not immediately, but after a year or two, when they feel ready, they come back and get them."</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Women who do choose the abortion route say that although a "safe" legal abortion is exorbitant – around $350 – it's still a lot cheaper than the cost of giving birth to a child in a city hospital. And the birth is only the start of the expenses that begin to mount when a baby is born.</p>
<p>There are those who can not afford the "safe" option and resort, instead, to consulting traditional healers.</p>
<p>A concoction of pungent herbs sold by traditional healers plying their wares from a seedy-looking market in one of Zimbabwe's major cities, sells for around US$40 a dose.</p>
<p>A woman posing as a potential customer, was initially told the "medication" would cost her $100 to abort her pregnancy. When she quibbled over the price, the traditional healer she consulted immediately dropped the price to $50, promising "instant, safe results".</p>
<p>When the Termination of Pregnancy Act, in what was then Rhodesia, was amended in 1977, it was, compared to its predecessor, considered positively revolutionary.</p>
<p>The archaic Roman-Dutch common law permitted an abortion to be performed solely to save the life of the pregnant woman. The new law extended the grounds under which a legal abortion could be obtained, permitting the performance of an abortion if its continuation so endangered the life of the woman, or posed a serious threat or permanent impairment to her physical health.</p>
<p>In addition, the grounds covered pregnancies in which there was a serious risk that, if the child was born, it would suffer from a physical or mental defect of such a nature as to be severely handicapped, as well as pregnancies in which there was a reasonable possibility that the fetus had been conceived as a result of unlawful intercourse, including rape, incest or intercourse with a mentally handicapped woman.</p>
<p>But the question which begs answering in all of this is what do women in Zimbabwe want? It's a question legislators and human rights advocates have been grappling with for many years.</p>
<p>The problem, explains a lawyer who specialises in women's issues, is that women aren't speaking up:</p>
<blockquote><p>"Traditionally, in Zimbabwe, women have not been called on to voice their opinions, so the concept of saying what they want is foreign to them," she said. "Human rights organisations will advocate for women's issues, such as the legalisation of abortion, and the government will say, let's ask the women what they want. And, of course, no-one will say a word."</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The issue, she continued, presented a three-pronged dilemma: moral, human right and societal. Few women were going to be brave enough to stand up and be the isolated voice that went against the moral and societal foundations on which the country had been established:</p>
<blockquote><p>"It would be suicide. Instead they choose to stay silent…and then risk a back-street abortion."</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Her viewpoint is backed by a survey on the constitution, carried out recently by an advocacy group.</p>
<p>The results show a very small majority of those interviewed (40%) are in favour of the constitution preserving full rights for women to have an abortion, while a few less (39%) believe it should be preserved only in certain instances, which must be clearly stated by law. Only 19%, however, were completely opposed to the constitution preserving any rights for a woman to have an abortion.</p>
<p>Most telling of all, however, was the fact that, when separated into gender groups, more men than women were in favour of full rights for women to seek an abortion, 46% as opposed to 39%.</p>
<p>But even those who support the legalisation of abortion in Zimbabwe, are watching the situation across the border, in South Africa, very carefully.</p>
<p>The Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act in South Africa was changed in 1997, providing abortion on demand to any woman of any age if she was less than 20 weeks pregnant, with no reasons required. Women were encouraged, but not obliged, to seek pre-abortion counseling, while those under 18 years of age or in a committed relationship were, once again, advised to seek parental consent or consult with their partner, but not obliged to do so.</p>
<p>The result is a woman like Thandi, who has already had three abortions…and is only 17 years old.</p>
<p>The government, which says it is aware of the rampant practice of illegal abortions, claims the only solution is the promotion of safe sex, but a spokesman for the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare admitted this was a huge challenge due to the unavailability of – and cultural resistance to – contraceptives.</p>
<p>Said a local medical practitioner: "In a country where safe, effective and affordable sex education and contraception are not widely-available, we can not suddenly start offering abortions to anyone who wants one, or we run the very real risk of it becoming the birth control method of choice. And that's not something any right-minded person would support," he said.</p>
</div></div></div>Thu, 10 May 2012 18:55:30 +0000Sokwanele2374 at http://www.sokwanele.comhttp://www.sokwanele.com/node/2374#comments