Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs

Lisa Bortolotti

Description

Delusions are a common symptom of schizophrenia, dementia and other psychiatric disorders. Though delusion is commonly defined as a false and irrational belief, there is currently a lively debate about whether delusions are really beliefs and indeed, whether they are even irrational.

The book is an interdisciplinary exploration of the nature of delusions. It brings together the psychological literature on the aetiology and the behavioural manifestations of delusions, and the philosophical literature on belief ascription and rationality. The thesis of the book is that delusions are continuous with ordinary beliefs, a thesis that could have not only significant theoretical implications for debates in the philosophy of mind and psychology, but also practical implications for psychiatric classification and the clinical treatment of subjects with delusions.

Based on recent work in philosophy of mind, cognitive psychology and psychiatry, the book offers a comprehensive review of the philosophical issues raised by the psychology of normal and abnormal cognition, defends the doxastic conception of delusions, and develops a theory about the role of judgements of rationality and self-knowledge in belief ascription.

Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs

Lisa Bortolotti

Reviews and Awards

Winner of the American Philosophical Association Book Prize 2011

"Bortolotti's book is an important contribution to our understanding of the nature of beliefs and hence of our understanding of delusions. It shows that psychiatry has a lot to learn from philosophy and no doubt philosophy too can only benefit from dialogue with psychiatrists. There are many original insights in this book." - Femi Oyebode, The British Journal of Psychiatry

"This books offers a significant and successful example of the emerging 'new' analytic philosophy of psychiatry. Methodologically, it exemplifies a fruitful two-way interaction between philosophy and empirical investigation. Empirical results from cognitive sciences and clinical research are used to constrain philosophical assumptions about beliefs and delusions. Rigorous philosophical argumentation is employed to clarify and adjudicate theoretical interpretations of empirical data concerning delusions. This work is surely an obligatory reading for those seriously interested in delusions, beliefs and, more generally, the application of an empirically informed philosophy of mind to psychiatry." - Luca Malatesti, Journal of Applied Philosophy

"Much interesting recent material about delusions has come to us - from philosophers of mind and psychology, from experimental and cognitive psychologists, and from many whose work straddles, and blurs, such disciplinary boundaries. Lisa Bortolotti's book Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs stands out among this material for its clarity, acumen, freshness, and sweep. It is well written and organized, carefully argued, independent and original in its perspective, and fair-minded in its appraisals. It redirects theoretical attention from one, widely accepted paradigm (delusions as irrational beliefs), to another (delusions as disturbances of self knowledge and cognitive authority). And finally, it has the merit of providing lengthy clinical case material sufficient to illustrate the theoretical points made." - Jennifer Radden, Metapsychology Online

"...this is probably one of the best texts of the psychiatry-philosophy blend out there. So if you're interested in the weird and wonderful workings of the mind and have always fancied yourself as an amateur Plato, give it a go." - University of Sheffield Medical School Magazine

"Delusions has great merit, and has really driven the new interdisciplinary research in philosophy of psychiatry. It is a model contribution to this literature for philosophically minded clinicians and clinically minded philosophers, as well as philosophers of mind and naturalistic epistemologists concerned with conditions on belief ascription." - The Philosophical Quarterly