1. The case originated in an
application (no. 29182/03) against the
Republic of Croatia lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a
Croatian national, Mr Kadrija Kozlica (“the applicant”), on 8 July
2003.

2. The
applicant was represented by Mr B. Spiz, a lawyer practising in Zagreb.
The Croatian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their
Agent, Mrs Š. Stažnik.

3. On 12
January 2005 the Court decided to communicate the complaint concerning
the length of the proceedings. Applying Article 29 § 3 of the Convention,
it decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application
at the same time.

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

4. The applicant was born in
1938 and lives in Orašje, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

A. Civil proceedings

5. On 25 November 1994 the
applicant brought a civil action against the company V. (“the employer”)
and the insurance company C.O. in the Zagreb Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zagrebu) seeking damages for a work-related
injury in the amount of 96,700 Croatian kunas (HRK).

6. The court held hearings
on 2 June and 30 November 1999 and 21 February 2001.

7. In the period between May
1998 and October 2000 the applicant filed four rush notes urging the
court to schedule a hearing and speed up the proceedings.

8. On 21 February 2001 the
Municipal Court gave judgment dismissing the applicant’s claim. The
applicant appealed on 6 March 2001 to the Zagreb County Court (Županijski sud u Zagrebu).

9. On 26 March 2001 the applicant
applied to be exempted from the court fee for the appeal. Since it was
the Municipal Court that was competent to decide on the applicant’s
request for exemption, the County Court returned the case-file to it
with a view to reaching a decision thereon. A hearing before the Municipal
Court scheduled for 14 January 2003 was adjourned since the applicant
had not received the summons due to his change of address. The next
hearing scheduled for 3 June 2003 was adjourned owing to the illness
of the judge assigned to hear the case. Lastly, a hearing at which the
applicant gave a declaration of his income and assets was held on 13 May
2004. On 24 May 2004 the applicant was served with the decision in his
favour exempting him from the court fee for the appeal. The case-file
was then sent back to the County Court with a view to deciding on the
applicant’s appeal.

10. On 5 April 2005 the County
Court dismissed the appeal. The judgment was served on the applicant
on 25 April 2005. No appeal on points of law (revizija) lay to the Supreme Court against this judgment (see
paragraph 14 below).

B. Proceedings before the Constitutional Court

11. Meanwhile, on 23 July 2002
the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional
Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) complaining about the length
of the civil proceedings.

12. On 17 April 2003 the Constitutional
Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint. It held that the delay
was attributable to the complexity of the case and the applicant’s
conduct. It found that the applicant had contributed to the length of
the proceedings in that he had applied for exemption from the court
fee only after he had appealed against the first-instance judgment.

“(1) The Constitutional Court shall
examine a constitutional complaint whether or not all legal remedies
have been exhausted if the competent court fails to decide a claim concerning
the applicant’s rights and obligations or a criminal charge against
him or her within a reasonable time ...

(2) If a constitutional complaint ...
under paragraph 1 of this section is upheld, the Constitutional Court
shall set a time-limit within which the competent court must decide
the case on the merits...

(3) In a decision issued under paragraph
2 of this section, the Constitutional Court shall assess appropriate
compensation for the applicant for the violation of his or her constitutional
rights ... The compensation shall be paid out of the State budget within
three months from the date a request for payment is lodged.”

B. Amendments to the Civil Procedure Act

14. On 6 November 1999 the
Amendments to the Civil Procedure Act (Zakon o izmjenama i dopunama Zakona o parničnom postupku,
Official Gazette no. 112/1999 of 29 October 1999) entered into force.
They raised the statutory threshold for lodging an appeal on points
of law (revizija) to the Supreme Court from HRK 3,000 to 100,000. That
is to say that, from then on, for such an appeal to be admissible ratione valoris in non-commercial matters, the value of the
subject matter in dispute had to exceed the last-mentioned amount. The
Amendments also provided for their immediate application to pending
proceedings except to those cases in which an appeal on points of law
had already been lodged.

THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF
ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE LENGTH OF THE PROCEEDINGS

15. The applicant complained that the length of
the proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time”
requirement, provided in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads
as follows:

“In the determination of his civil
rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within
a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”

16. The Court considers that
the period to be taken into consideration began on 6 November 1997, the
day after the entry into force of the Convention in respect of Croatia.
However, in assessing the reasonableness of the time that elapsed after
that date, account must be taken of the state of proceedings at the
time. In this connection the Court notes that the proceedings commenced
on 25 November 1994, when the applicant brought his civil action against
the employer and the insurance company C.O. Consequently, they were
already pending for almost three years before the ratification.

17. The case was still pending
on 17 April 2003 when the Constitutional Court gave its decision. On
that date the proceedings had lasted some five and a half years for
two levels of jurisdiction.

18. The proceedings ended on
25 April 2005 when the judgment of the County Court was served on the
applicant, that is, some two years after the decision of the Constitutional
Court. Thus, in total, the proceedings lasted almost seven and a half
years after the ratification for two levels of jurisdiction.

A. Admissibility

19. The Government invited
the Court to reject the application on the ground that the applicant
had failed to exhaust domestic remedies as required under Article 35 § 1
of the Convention. They maintained that the applicant had not lodged
a second constitutional complaint to the Constitutional Court. The Government
observed that he had already lodged such a complaint on 23 July 2002,
and that the Constitutional Court dismissed it on 17 April 2003. However,
in doing so, that court had examined only the period between the date
of the entry into force of the Convention in respect of Croatia and
the date on which the constitutional complaint had been lodged. Having
regard to the fact that after the filing of the constitutional complaint
on 23 July 2002, the proceedings lasted for another two years and eight
months, to lodge a second constitutional complaint while the proceedings
were still pending would have had reasonable prospects of success since
it would have enabled the Constitutional Court to examine the overall
length of the proceedings, taking into consideration their duration
after its previous decision.

20. The applicant contested
that argument. He argued that it was not justified to require him to
lodge another constitutional complaint when his previous complaint had
been dismissed.

21. The Court finds that the
question of exhaustion of domestic remedies is inextricably linked to
the merits of this complaint. Therefore, to avoid prejudging the latter,
both questions should be examined together. Accordingly, the Court holds
that the question of exhaustion of domestic remedies should be joined
to the merits.

22. The Court further notes that this complaint
is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3
of the Convention. It also notes that it is not inadmissible on any
other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B. Merits

23. The Court observes at the outset that the
applicant availed himself of an effective domestic remedy in respect
of the length of the proceedings – a constitutional complaint (see Slaviček v. Croatia
(dec.), no. 20862/02, ECHR 2002-VII) – and that the Constitutional
Court dismissed his complaint. In these circumstances, the Court is
required to verify whether the way in which the Constitutional Court
interpreted and applied the relevant provisions of the domestic law,
produces consequences that are consistent with the principles of the
Convention, as interpreted in the light of the Court’s case-law (see, mutatis mutandis, Cocchiarella v. Italy
[GC], no. 64886/01, § 82, to be published in ECHR 2006). In doing so,
the Court has to examine the period between the date of the entry into
force of the Convention in respect of Croatia and the date of the Constitutional
Court’s decision (see, by analogy, Cocchiarella v. Italy [GC], cited above, § 103). If the Constitutional
Court’s decision is consistent with Convention principles, the Court
will, when examining the question of exhaustion of domestic remedies,
refrain from dealing with the length of the proceedings subsequent to
that decision. Otherwise, a genuine examination of the total length
after the ratification is warranted.

24. The Court reiterates that the reasonableness
of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances
of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity
of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities
and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many
other authorities, Cocchiarella v. Italy [GC], cited above, § 68; and Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).

25. The Government argued that
the case had been complex and that the length of the proceedings was
primarily attributable to the applicant. In particular, he had applied
for an exemption from the court fee only after having lodged his appeal
and had subsequently failed to notify the Municipal Court of the change
of his address, thereby causing the adjournment of the hearing of 14 January
2003.

26. The applicant replied that
he had sought exemption only from the court fee for the appeal. Consequently,
he could not have done so before he had actually lodged his appeal.
As to the change of his address, he submitted that he had been heard
as a party at the hearing held on 6 June 1999 during which he gave, inter alia, his personal information, including his address
which he had changed some time before that hearing.

27. The Court notes that in
the present case the period examined by the Constitutional Court amounts
to five and a half years (see paragraph 17 above). During that period
there existed two substantial periods of inactivity (from November 1997
to June 1999, and from November 1999 to February 2001) amounting altogether
to almost three years in which no hearings were held. They are solely
attributable to the authorities. Moreover, it took the Municipal Court
more than a year and a half to schedule a hearing concerning the applicant’s
request for exemption from the court fee. The Court therefore cannot
accept the view that the applicant significantly contributed to the
length of the proceedings.

28. Having examined all the material submitted
to it, and having regard to its case-law on the subject, the foregoing
considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that already
in the period which was susceptible to the Constitutional Court’s
scrutiny the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet
the “reasonable time” requirement. It necessarily kept such character
throughout the subsequent period of some two years. In these circumstances,
to ask the applicant to lodge a second constitutional complaint, would
overstretch his duties under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention (see,
for example, Antonić-Tomasović v. Croatia, no. 5208/03, §§ 25-34, 10
November 2005).

29. In conclusion, the Court rejects the Government’s
objection as to the exhaustion of domestic remedies and finds that in
the present case there has been a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
on account of the excessive length of the proceedings.

II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF
ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION TAKEN ALONE AND IN CONJUNCTION WITH
ARTICLE 14 THEROF

30. The applicant further complained, for the
first time in his written observations dated 19 May 2005, that his right
of access to a court had been infringed because he had been unable to
lodge an appeal on points of law (revizija) owing to the change in legislation governing civil
procedure which had raised the statutory threshold for admissibility
of such an appeal. He also submitted that limiting ratione valoris the right to lodge an appeal on points of law
created inequality before the law and was therefore contrary to Article
14 of the Convention which reads as follows:

“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms
set forth in the Convention shall be secured without discrimination
on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national
minority, property, birth or other status.”

31. The Government submitted that the applicant
was precluded to complain about the violation of his right of access
to a court since this complaint had not been contained in his original
application to the Court. Rather, he had raised it only in his written
observations dated 19 May 2005.

Admissibility

32. The Court considers that in the present case
it can leave open the question whether the applicant has complied with
the six-month requirement. It reiterates that Article 6 of the Convention
does not compel the Contracting States to set up courts of appeal or
of cassation. However, where such courts do exist, the guarantees of
Article 6 must be complied with, for instance in that it guarantees
to litigants an effective right of access to the courts for the determination
of their “civil rights and obligations”. The manner in which Article
6 § 1 applies to courts of appeal or of cassation depends on the special
features of the proceedings concerned and account must be taken of the
entirety of the proceedings conducted in the domestic legal order and
the court of cassation’s role in them; the conditions of admissibility
of an appeal on points of law may be stricter than for an ordinary appeal
(see, inter
alia, Brualla Gómez de la Torre v. Spain, judgment of 19 December
1997, Reports
of Judgments and Decisions 1997-VIII, p. 2956, § 37).

33. The Court notes that the arguments similar
to those put forward by the applicant have been rejected in an earlier
case (see, mutatis mutandis, Brualla Gómez de la Torre v. Spain, cited above) and sees
no reason to reach a different conclusion in the present case. In particular,
the Court considers that increasing the financial threshold for appeals
to the Supreme Court in order to stop that court being overloaded with
cases of lesser importance, was a legitimate aim. Moreover, the solution
adopted in the instant case by the Croatian legislator followed a generally
recognised principle that procedural rules apply immediately to the
pending proceedings (see, mutatis mutandis, Brualla Gómez de la Torre v. Spain, cited above, p. 2956,
§§ 35-36).

34. In the light of the foregoing and having regard
to the proceedings as a whole, the Court considers that the essence
of the applicant’s right of access to a court was not impaired nor
was he discriminated against on that account. It follows that this part
of the application is inadmissible under Article 35 § 3 as manifestly
ill-founded and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.

III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE
13 OF THE CONVENTION

35. The applicant further complained under Article
13 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 6 § 1 that he
had not had an effective remedy in regard to the excessive length of
the proceedings. Article 13 reads as follows:

“Everyone whose rights and freedoms
as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective
remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation
has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”

Admissibility

36. The Court notes that the applicant had at
his disposal an effective domestic remedy to complain about the length
of the proceedings – a constitutional complaint – of which he availed
himself. The mere fact that the outcome of the Constitutional Court
proceedings was not favourable to him does not render the remedy ineffective.

37. It follows that this complaint is inadmissible
under Article 35 § 3 as manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected pursuant
to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.

IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE
41 OF THE CONVENTION

38. Article 41 of the Convention
provides:

“If the Court finds that there has
been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if
the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”

41. The Court does not discern
any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage
alleged; it therefore rejects this claim.

42. As to the non-pecuniary
damage sought, it reiterates the principle enunciated above (see paragraph
23) that if the Constitutional Court’s decision produces consequences
that are inconsistent with the principles of the Convention, the Court
has to examine the total length of the proceedings after the ratification.
In the light of its above findings (see paragraphs 18 and 28), the Court,
ruling on an equitable basis, awards the applicant 3,600 euros (EUR)
in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable
on that amount.

B. Costs and expenses

43. The applicant also claimed
EUR 2,000 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court.

44. The Government contested
the claim.

45. According to the Court’s
case-law, an applicant is entitled to reimbursement of his costs and
expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually
and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to quantum. In the present
case, regard being had to the information in its possession and the
above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of
EUR 1,000 for the proceedings before the Court, plus any tax that may
be chargeable on that amount.

C. Default interest

46. The Court considers it
appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal
lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added
three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

1. Joins to the merits the Government’s objection as to the
exhaustion of domestic remedies and rejects it;

2. Declares the complaint concerning the excessive length of the
proceedings admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;

3. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of
the Convention on account of the excessive length of the proceedings;

4. Holds

(a) that the
respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the
date on which the judgment becomes final according to Article 44 § 2 of
the Convention, the following amounts which are to be converted into
the national currency of the respondent State at a rate applicable at
the date of settlement:

(b) that from
the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple
interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the
marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default
period plus three percentage points;

5. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just
satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing
on 2 November 2006, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.