The
City of Franklin, Tennessee (“City”) has filed a
Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 7), to which Floyd and Marion
Beech have filed a Response (Docket No. 9), and the City has
filed a Reply (Docket No. 11). The City has also filed a
Motion for Sanctions (Docket No. 8), to which the Beeches
have filed a Response (Docket No. 10). For the reasons
herein, the court will grant the Motion to Dismiss and deny
the Motion for Sanctions.

This is
the second federal lawsuit and third lawsuit that the Beeches
have filed based on the City of Franklin's failure to
stop Calvin Malone, who is not a defendant in this case, from
operating a barbershop out of his home at or near the corner
of Park Street and 11th Avenue South in Franklin
(“Malone Property”). The Beeches formerly owned a
home at the same corner, across the street from the Malone
Property (“Former Beech Property”). The Malone
Property has a street address and approved driveway outlet on
Park Street, and the Former Beech Property has a street
address and approved driveway outlet on 11th Avenue. Although
they no longer own the Former Beech Property, the Beeches
continue to own other 11th Avenue property. (Docket No. 1
¶¶ 3-5.)

The
Malone Property and Former Beech Property have historically
been zoned GR [General Residential] and are now located
within the City's R-6 Historic Core Residential district.
(Id. ¶ 6.) The Beeches claim that Malone's
operation of a home barbershop on a general
residential/historic core residential property is unlawful.
(Id. ¶¶ 23-24.) At some point, Malone
added to his property a concrete parking area that extended
to an outlet onto 11th Avenue. The Beeches maintain that the
parking area and 11th Avenue outlet are, like the barbershop,
unlawful. (Id. ¶¶ 27-28.) The Beeches have
identified some additional alleged violations related to the
operation of Malone's business in a residential area,
including improper signage, use of improper outdoor lighting,
and the lack of an applicable permit. (Id. ¶
29.)

The
Beeches have repeatedly urged the City to enforce its zoning
laws against Malone, and, while those efforts have yielded
some minor successes-such as a notice of violation against
Malone in 2010 and the City's forcing Malone to remove a
portion of his parking area- the Beeches' efforts have
not been enough to induce the City to end or significantly
curtail Malone's operation of the barbershop or his
maintenance of an unauthorized outlet onto 11th Avenue.
(Id. ¶¶ 30-37, 41.)

Unable
to convince the City to take their preferred course of
action, the Beeches resorted to the courts-the plural, in
this instance, being quite literal. The details of the prior
litigation between the parties are summarized by the Sixth
Circuit in Beech v. City of Franklin, Tennessee, 687
Fed.Appx. 454, 455-56 (6th Cir. 2017) (“Beech
I”). On November 5, 2012, the Beeches filed a suit
for abatement of a nuisance and a writ of mandamus in
Williamson County Chancery Court, naming both the City and
Malone as defendants. Id. at 455. They sought
damages from Malone, an injunction requiring Malone to shut
down his home barbershop, and a writ of mandamus requiring
the City to enforce its laws in the Beeches' preferred
manner. Id. On August 7, 2014, the Beeches moved to
amend their complaint in that case to request damages from
the City and to include allegations that the city
unconstitutionally denied them due process and equal
protection. Id. The Beeches did not, however,
request just compensation for an unconstitutional taking
under the Fifth Amendment. Id. The Chancery Court
did not permit the Beeches to amend their complaint and
granted summary judgment to Malone and the City. Id.

On June
12, 2015, the Beeches filed their first complaint in this
court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, naming only the City
as a defendant. Beech v. City of Franklin, Tenn.,
No. 3:15-cv-00657, Docket No. 1 (M.D. Tenn. June 12, 2015).
That complaint purported to plead one count, under the
heading “CONTINUING VIOLATION BY THE CITY OF FRANKLIN
OF PETITIONERS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO EQUAL PROTECTION
OF THE LAW AND TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.” That count,
however, cited three alleged constitutional violations.
First, the Beeches alleged that the City, by failing to
“properly, regularly, even-handedly and impartially
enforce” its laws, had violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. ¶ 61.
The Beeches next alleged that the City, through the same
conduct, denied the Beeches' “federal rights
guaranteed under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.” Id. ¶ 62. Finally, the
Beeches alleged that the City's “actions
constituted a deliberate taking, under color of law, in
violation of the [Beeches'] federal rights guaranteed
under the [Fifth] Amendment.” Id. ¶ 63.

On
August 8, 2016, Judge Todd J. Campbell granted summary
judgment to the City, citing several alternative grounds,
namely that the Beeches' claims were time-barred; they
had failed to establish an unconstitutional policy, practice
or custom; they had failed to establish that Malone's
barbershop was unlawful under the relevant zoning laws; they
had failed to establish any economic impact of the City's
toleration of Malone's business; and the City was immune
to liability under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability
Act. Beech v. City of Franklin, Tenn., No.
3:15-cv-00657, Docket No. 42 at 4-6 (M.D. Tenn. June 12,
2015).

The
Beeches appealed. Instead of ruling on the grounds for
summary judgment that Judge Campbell had identified, the
Sixth Circuit concluded that the Beeches' claims were not
ripe because (1) their takings claim was unripe pursuant to
Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v.
Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985),
because the Beeches had not sought compensation through
Tennessee's procedures and (2) their due process and
equal protection claims were “ancillary to the takings
claim.” Beech, 67 Fed.Appx. at 456 (citing
Peters v. Fair, 427 F.3d 1035, 1037 (6th Cir. 2005);
Bigelow v. Mich. Dep't of Nat. Res., 970 F.2d
154, 158-59 (6th Cir. 1992)). The Sixth Circuit remanded the
case to this court with instructions to dismiss, which the
court did on May 18, 2017. Beech v. City of Franklin,
Tenn., No. 3:15-cv-00657, Docket No. 51 (M.D. Tenn. May
18, 2017).

The
Beeches filed their Complaint in this case on August 11,
2017. (Docket No. 1.) The Complaint is mostly identical to
the prior federal complaint. The Beeches again plead one
count under § 1983 for “CONTINUING VIOLATION BY
THE CITY OF FRANKLIN OF PETITIONERS' CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW AND TO DUE PROCESS OF
LAW.” (Id. at 22.) That count again cites
three constitutional provisions: first the Equal Protection
Clause, then the Due Process Clause, then the Takings Clause,
recycling the prior complaint's language for each.
(Id. ¶¶ 62-64.) The only meaningful
differences between the new complaint and the prior complaint
that either the court or the parties have been able to
identify are that (1) the Beeches now purport, in the
caption, to be asserting their claims both on their own
behalf and on the behalf of all other similarly situated
persons; and (2) the Beeches have added some historical,
political, and demographic background information about the
City and their neighborhood's place within it.
(Id. ¶ 2.) The new information provides an
account of why the City's alleged decision to enforce its
zoning laws more stringently in some neighborhoods than in
others should be understood in the context of the broader
history and current realities of race relations in Franklin.
(Id.)

The
City moved to dismiss the Beeches' claims on September 6,
2017. (Docket No. 7.) The next day, the City filed a motion
seeking Rule 11 sanctions against the Beeches and their
counsel, Scott Williams. (Docket No. 8.) Specifically, the
City asks the court to award the City reasonable expenses and
attorney's fees that it has incurred in this suit and
enjoin the Beeches and Williams from filing any additional
suits against the City arising from the same core facts.
(Id. at 6-7.)

II.
LEGAL STANDARD

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;In
deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
under Rule 12(b)(6), the court will &ldquo;construe the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
accept its allegations as true, and draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the plaintiff.&rdquo; Directv,
Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007);
Inge v. Rock Fin. Corp., 281 F.3d 613, 619 (6th Cir.
2002). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require only that
a plaintiff provide &ldquo;a short and plain statement of the
claim that will give the defendant fair notice of what the
plaintiff&#39;s claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.&rdquo; Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47
(1957). The court must determine only whether “the
claimant is entitled to offer evidence to ...

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