The opinion of the court was delivered by: MARVIN ASPEN, Chief Judge, District

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Following our June 3, 2004 Memorandum Opinion and Order
granting in part and denying in part the Defendants' motion to
dismiss Plaintiff Madison Hobley's ("Hobley") complaint,*fn1
Hobley filed an amended sixteen-count complaint alleging various
federal and state law claims against the City of Chicago and
seven current and former members of the Chicago Police Department
(collectively, "Defendants"). Presently before us is Defendants'
motion to dismiss Counts III, VI, VII, VIII, IX, and X, and
portions of Counts IV, V, XI, XII, and XIII of Plaintiff's
amended complaint. For the reasons stated below, Defendants'
motion to dismiss the amended complaint is granted in part and
denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from Hobley's amended complaint.
For the purposes of a motion to dismiss, we accept all
well-pleaded factual allegations of Hobley's Amended Complaint as
true. Jang v. A.M. Miller & Assocs., 122 F.3d 480, 483 (7th
Cir. 1997). On January 6, 1987, a fire broke out in an apartment building
on the south side of Chicago where Hobley lived with his wife and
son. While he was walking down the hallway to investigate a
sounding fire alarm, a glass partition exploded and prevented him
from returning to his apartment to rescue his family. (Am. Compl.
¶¶ 12, 13.) Blocked by the fire, Hobley was able to crawl out the
back stairway to escape the building. Id. ¶ 14. Ultimately, the
fire claimed the lives of seven people, including Hobley's wife
and son. Upon discovering that he survived the fire and his
family did not, Defendant Officers*fn2 from the Chicago
Police Department ("CPD") immediately concluded Hobley was
responsible for setting the fire, and took Hobley "from his
mother's home less than five hours after he escaped from the
deadly fire." Id. ¶ 16. For the entire next day, Hobley was
interrogated and tortured by detectives of the CPD's Area 2
Violent Crimes Detective Bureau ("Area 2"). Id. ¶ 17.
Defendants Lotito and Dwyer beat Hobley, placed a plastic bag
over his head until he lost consciousness, used racially
offensive language, and threatened Hobley, in an attempt to
coerce Hobley into confessing that he started the fire, but
Hobley refused to confess. (Am. Compl. ¶ 18.)

Because the officers were unable to coerce Hobley into
confessing, they fabricated an oral confession that they claimed
Hobley gave on the day of the fire. Id. ¶ 20. Dwyer
subsequently claimed that he threw away Hobley's written
"confession" because it was supposedly rendered illegible after
coffee spilled on it. Id. ¶ 22. All written documents created
contemporaneously to the interrogation reflect Hobley's denials
of involvement in the crime. Id. ¶ 21.

Hobley alleges one or more of the Defendant Officers conspired
to plant physical evidence at the scene of the crime. A gasoline
can, which had been logged in as evidence in an unrelated crime,
was apparently taken from the CPD's Evidence and Recovered
Property Section, and then "discovered" at Hobley's building fourteen hours after the fire. (Am. Compl. ¶
24.) The planted can indicated no signs of surviving a fire, but
it was nonetheless introduced as the can that was used to start
the fire in Hobley's apartment building. Id. The Defendant
Officers concealed information that the gas can was seized and
then planted in Hobley's apartment building and also deliberately
withheld a fingerprint report issued by the CPD crimes laboratory
following testing conducted on the gasoline can. Id. ¶¶ 25-26.

Defendant Officers also produced two individuals who claimed to
have seen Hobley purchase gasoline on the night of the fire. One
witness was initially uncertain of his identification, and only
after persistent and improper coercion from the Defendant
Officers did the witness state that perhaps Hobley, who he had
seen in a lineup, "favored" the man he saw purchase the gasoline.
Id. ¶ 27. In exchange for testimony implicating Hobley,
Defendant Officers and Defendant Commander Jon Burge apparently
provided "assistance" to a second witness, who faced criminal
problems of his own. (Am. Compl. ¶ 28.) Defendant Officers and
Burge then withheld this information. Defendant Garrity and other
Defendant Officers also falsely reported that Hobley had failed a
polygraph examination. Id. ¶ 29. In his supervisory capacity,
Defendant Burge personally knew about, facilitated, and condoned
this pattern and practice of misconduct. Burge also failed to
stop officers from torturing Hobley. Id. ¶¶ 30-32.

Thereafter, Hobley was convicted of arson and seven counts of
murder, and sentenced to death. Id. ¶ 33. Hobley spent thirteen
years on Death Row and over sixteen years in prison before the
former Governor of Illinois, George Ryan, granted Hobley a full
pardon on grounds of innocence. Hobley was released from prison
on January 10, 2003. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4, 30.)

According to Hobley, the City of Chicago tolerated and even
condoned the "systematic deprivation of due process" by police
officers in Area 2, which resulted in the wrongful convictions of
him and others. Id. ¶ 36. This "policy and practice" was used
to "solve" crimes more expediently and to enhance officers'
personal standing in the Department. Hobley's complaint alleges
that the methodology for depriving criminal suspects of due process was
disturbingly uniform and involved concealing exculpatory
information, planting evidence, manipulating witnesses, and
fabricating incriminating evidence, including extracting false
confessions through coercion and torture. Id. ¶¶ 37-46. There
are up to one hundred victims of this practice, with at least
thirteen ending up with Hobley on Death Row. Id. ¶ 39. With one
exception, all of the victims were African American. (Am. Comp. ¶
43.) All of the accused police officers are white. Id. ¶ 44.
Due process violations by Area 2 police officers have resulted in
reversed convictions, new hearings and trials, and at least a
dozen civil lawsuits. Id. ¶¶ 45-46.

During the relevant time period, the CPD's Office of
Professional Standards (OPS) failed to investigate many of the
allegations of due process violations and rejected approximately
95% of the complaints of abuse that it did investigate. Id. ¶
50. Hobley alleges that the failure of oversight and punishment
is a pattern that continues to the present. (Am. Compl. ¶¶
51-56.) In September of 1990, an OPS Investigator named Goldston
concluded a study of allegations of constitutional violations in
Area 2, finding that a preponderance of evidence indicated that
systematic and methodical abuse had occurred over a ten year
period and that particular command members were aware of and
perpetuated the abuse. Id. ¶¶ 57-58. The Goldston Report
constituted material exculpatory evidence for Hobley, which was
suppressed until 1992, when District Judge Milton Shadur ordered
that the report be unsealed. Id. ¶¶ 60-65. After the release of
the Goldston Report, "re-investigations" were conducted on nine
cases, finding the allegations to be credible and recommending
discipline. However, in 1998, five years after the
re-investigations, then-Police Superintendent Terry Hillard and
his general counsel Thomas Needham made a secret decision to
"shelve" the new OPS findings, thereby clearing all of the
officers. Id. ¶¶ 67-72. These findings were withheld from
Hobley as he litigated his post-conviction petition. (Am. Compl.
¶ 74-77.) Hobley's amended complaint notes that other than Burge,
who was fired, and two other officers who served suspensions, Chicago has never
disciplined any police officer for any of the allegations of
fabricated confessions and has indicated that it will not punish
officers in the future. Id. ¶¶ 78-79.

In alleging damages, Hobley states that he has suffered
enormously, including the loss of freedom and
"almost-unimaginable indignities of prison and Death Row," all
under the specter of an unjust death sentence. Id. ¶ 81. Hobley
seeks compensatory damages, costs, and attorneys' fees, as well
as punitive damages against each of the Defendant Officers in
their individual capacities.

Hobley's amended complaint asserts sixteen counts, including
federal claims brought under § 1983, § 1985(3), the RICO statute,
and several state law claims. Defendants have moved to dismiss
two counts in their entirety and portions of five counts as
time-barred, and they move to dismiss four counts as
insufficiently pled.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) is to decide the adequacy of the complaint,
not the merits of the case. Gibson v. City of Chicago,
910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990). Therefore, a complaint should not be
dismissed "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle
him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
The Seventh Circuit has acknowledged, however, that "[a] litigant
may plead itself out of court by alleging (and thus admitting)
the ingredients of a defense. . . ." U.S. Gypsum v. Indiana Gas
Co., Inc., 350 F.3d 623, 626 (internal citation omitted). In
U.S. Gypsum, the Seventh Circuit specifically cited to Walker
v. Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir. 2002) as "applying this
principle to the period of limitations." See also, e.g.,
Snodderly v. R.U.F.F. Drug Enforcement Task Force, 239 F.3d 892
(7th Cir. 2001) (affirming district court's dismissal of claims
in the complaint as time-barred at the motion to dismiss stage). III. ANALYSIS

The appropriate statute of limitations period for § 1983 claims
is the limitations period for personal injury claims in the state
in which the alleged violation occurred. See Ashafa v. City of
Chicago, 146 F.3d 459, 461 (7th Cir. 1998). In Illinois, this is
two years. Id. Federal law, however, determines when a § 1983
action accrues, which is generally "when a plaintiff knows or has
reason to know of the injury that is the basis for the action."
See Sellers v. Perry, 80 F.3d 243, 245 (7th Cir. 1996).

a. Excessive Force

Count IX, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleges that Hobley
was subjected to excessive force, and specifically, police
torture by Defendants Dwyer and Lotito, which was undertaken
pursuant to the policy and practice of the Chicago Police
Department. Defendants move to dismiss this count as time-barred.
We grant the motion. In our June 3 Order, we dismissed Hobley's excessive force
claim as untimely. Hobley v. Burge, 2004 WL 1243929, *6
(N.D.Ill. June 3, 2004) ("Hobley I"). Our ruling was based upon
the rule in Heck v. Humphrey, which states that if a judgment
for a plaintiff on a § 1983 claim "would necessarily imply the
invalidity of his conviction or sentence," the statute of
limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff's
conviction or sentence has been favorably terminated; but if the
plaintiff's action, even if successful, would not demonstrate the
invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the
plaintiff, the statute of limitations begins to run when the
plaintiff knows or should have known that his constitutional
rights had been violated. 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1992). We held
that Hobley's claims of torture would not necessarily imply the
invalidity of his conviction under Heck because, according to
his own allegations, Hobley did not confess as a result of the
torture; rather, the police fabricated a confession after they
were unable to coerce one from him. Hobley I, 2004 WL 1243929,
at *6. Success on a § 1983 claim of police torture before
Hobley's pardon, therefore, would not have impugned the validity
of his conviction because the police torture was independent of
the confession, i.e., the confession would not have been
nullified by success on the § 1983 action and could still have
been admitted at trial to convict Hobley. Id.

Following our ruling, Hobley amended his complaint, re-pleading
his excessive force claim. Defendants have moved to dismiss this
amended claim on the grounds that it is still time-barred.
Hobley's amended complaint and response to Defendants' motion to
dismiss argues that he now has a timely claim for excessive force
based on a new theory: although Hobley avers that he was tortured
but did not confess (Am. Compl. ¶ 19), a jury in this case might
ultimately find that there was a confession coerced through
police torture, crediting testimony by the Defendants that Hobley
did confess, but also crediting Hobley's testimony that he was
tortured. (Pl.'s Resp., at 2-3.) This possible finding is supported by the key fact, says Hobley, that the Defendants
claimed all the way through Hobley's criminal trial that he had
confessed. Id. at 2. Under such a scenario, Hobley argues, his
excessive force claim would be timely because the allegation of
police torture would invalidate the confession and therefore the
conviction, per Heck.

To find the excessive force claim timely under Hobley's theory,
the court must accept Hobley's pleaded fact that he was tortured
as true, while finding that his pleaded fact that he did not
confess is false. That is not the law. When we accept, as we must
under Jang v. Miller, all of Hobley's well-pleaded facts as
true and draw inferences in Hobley's favor, we accept, as Hobley
pleads, that he was tortured and that he did not confess to the
torture. 122 F.3d at 483. A plaintiff can plead himself out of
court by pleading facts that undermine the allegations set forth
in the complaint. Bennett v. Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516, 519 (7th
Cir. 1998). Under the facts pled in the amended complaint, Hobley
has admitted the ingredients for a statute of limitations defense
with regard to his excessive force claim, and therefore, his
claim must be dismissed as untimely.

It is true, as Hobley asserts, that a motion to dismiss should
not be granted unless "it appears beyond all doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims
which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). However, the court need "not strain to find
inferences favorable to the plaintiff which are not apparent on
the face of the complaint." Coates v. Illinois State Bd. Of
Ed., 559 F.2d 445, 447 (7th Cir. 1977). Hobley's complaint does
not assert the set of facts that he argues would entitle him to
relief. Indeed, his allegations directly contradict the fact-that
the torture coerced the confession-that may entitle him to
relief.*fn3 Even if we were to accept Hobley's theory of pleading and treat
a coerced confession as a possible "fact" that would be found by
a jury, we would still hold that the statute of limitations bars
Hobley's claim for excessive force. In our June 3 Order, we noted
that even assuming that the confession was coerced by police
torture, a successful § 1983 action on excessive force would not
have necessarily implied the invalidity of Hobley's conviction
because there was evidence presented at trial that did not stem
from the police torture, including eyewitness testimony and
physical evidence. Hobley I, 2004 WL 1243929, at *6. This was
an additional reason for holding that Heck's tolling provision
did not apply to Hobley's excessive force claim and that the
statute of limitations had run. Hobley asks us to reconsider this
holding because the decision was based on "the mistaken factual
premise" that there was other evidence implicating Hobley. Hobley
argues that there was no evidence of Plaintiff's guilt, other
than the confession, because all of the other evidence was a
product of Defendants' "complained-of malfeasance." In the
absence of "any other evidence," therefore, Hobley's torture
allegation would have nullified his confession, and therefore,
implied the invalidity of his conviction. However, the "other
evidence" that was used to convict Hobley, although it may have
been a result of truly detestable police conduct, was not a
result of the use of excessive force under Hobley's allegations.
This other evidence, such as the allegedly improperly induced
false testimony of witnesses and planted gas can, would not have
been nullified by a successful § 1983 action challenging the use
of excessive force under Heck. In light of this other evidence,
we cannot conclude that, even assuming an nullified confession,
that his excessive force claim would have necessarily invalidated
his conviction.

Hobley cites two cases, which he argues support his contention
that other fabricated evidence should not prevent an excessive
force claim from being tolled under Heck: Patterson v. Burge,
No. 03-C-4433, 2004 WL 1764520 (N.D. Ill. 2004) and Johnson v. Riverdale,
192 F.Supp.2d 874, 876-77 (N.D. Ill. 2002). Hobley contends that
these cases support the notion that in cases involving coerced
confessions and other evidence, tolling under Heck may apply if
the other evidence is tainted. However, in Johnson, in allowing
tolling under Heck, the court specifically noted that "there
was no evidence other than the coerced confession that could
arguably connnect Johnson to his mother's murder."
192 F.Supp. 2d at 876. In Patterson, the court found that "Patterson's
conviction rested almost entirely on his involuntary confession,
and at most on his involuntary confession plus the coerced
testimony of a 16 year-old girl." 2004 WL 1764520 at *15. The
court noted that the 16 year-old girl's testimony was "procured
by defendants' intimidation and that she recanted that testimony
more than once." Id. As we read the Patterson decision, it
does not, as Hobley suggests, disregard other incriminating
evidence in applying Heck if it has been alleged to be
manipulated; it simply finds on its own facts that the evidence
outside of an invalidated confession would not have been enough
to support a conviction. In Hobley's case, there was enough
evidence outside of the confession, which would have supported a
conviction, and, thus, it is distinguishable.

b. Failure to Intervene

Count X avers that Defendants failed to intervene to prevent
violations of Hobley's constitutional rights. Defendants move to
dismiss this count as time-barred. Because Hobley's original
complaint alleged Defendants' failure to intervene to prevent the
use of excessive force and police torture, we held that the
statute of limitations began to run on this claim at the same
time as the excessive force claim, and, thus, it was similarly
time-barred under Heck. Hobley 1, 2004 WL 1243929, at *6.
Defendants have moved to dismiss Hobley's re-pled failure to
intervene claim, arguing that it is still time-barred because it
is premised on the untimely excessive force claim. Hobley's
amended complaint alleges and his response to the motion to
dismiss clarifies, however, that his re-pled claim relates to the
failure to prevent any of the alleged constitutional violations, including
those occurring post-arrest and through his trial and
appeals.*fn4 (Am. Compl. ¶ 162-63, Pl.'s Resp. at 6.) As
re-pled, the failure to intervene claim does not "admit the
ingredients," for a statute of limitations defense because it now
encompasses timely actions, and it therefore, survives a motion
to dismiss. See U.S. Gypsum, 350 F.3d at 626.

However, to the extent that this claim is premised on the
time-barred excessive force claim, it remains time-barred under
Hobley I. The function of the statutes of limitations is "to
pull the blanket of peace over acts and events which have
themselves already slept for the statutory period, thus barring
proof of wrongs imbedded in time-passed events." Scherer v.
Balkema, 840 F.2d 437, 440 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing In re
Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 591 F.2d 68, 72 (9th Cir.
1979) (quoting Poster Exch., Inc. v. National Screen Serv.
Corp., 517 F.2d 117, 127 (5th Cir. 1975). Having found that
Hobley's claim for excessive force is barred under the statute of
limitations, and that the Heck exception does not apply, it is
logical that the failure to intervene claim to the extent it is
premised on the same actions must be barred, or else the purposes
of the statute of limitations would be nullified.

c. § 1983 Conspiracy

Count IV alleges a § 1983 conspiracy to deprive Hobley of his
constitutional rights, which is alleged to have involved an
agreement to violate the due process rights of criminal suspects.
Count IV further avers that Defendants and others contributed to
the conspiracy to deprive constitutional rights by intentionally
concealing exculpatory information, which would have enabled
Hobley to challenge his conviction. Count V alleges a § 1983
conspiracy between Defendants and OPS to suppress evidence of due process violations. Defendants move to dismiss these two
conspiracy counts to the extent that they are premised on
time-barred excessive force and failure to intervene claims. We
grant the motion.*fn5

In our June 3 Order, we held that Hobley's § 1983 conspiracy
claims based on his timely false arrest and due process claims
are timely, while his conspiracy claims deriving from the
time-barred excessive force and failure to intervene claims are
likewise time-barred. Hobley I, 2004 WL 1243929 at *12. This is
because the accrual of a civil conspiracy claim begins when
"plaintiff becomes aware that he is suffering from a wrong for
which damages may be recovered in a civil action," and thus the
timeliness analysis for accrual of conspiracy actions is the same
as that for the underlying acts. See id. at *8 (citing Wilson
v. Giesen, 956 F.2d 738, 740 (7th Cir. 1992)).

In Hobley's amended complaint, he has re-pled his § 1983
conspiracy claims as conspiracies to "deprive plaintiff's
constitutional rights." His claim alleges an agreement to violate
the due process rights of criminal suspects through concealing
exculpatory information, planting evidence, manipulating
witnesses, and fabricating incriminating evidence, "including but
not limited to the extraction of false confessions through
torture." We agree with the Defendants that Hobley's conspiracy
claims rely in part on his claim of police torture, and we agree
that Hobley may not revive his time-barred excessive force claim
and failure to intervene claim, to the extent that it is still
time-barred, in this manner.

The Seventh Circuit has adopted the rule that "plaintiffs in
civil conspiracy actions [may] recover only for overt acts
alleged to have occurred within the applications limitations
period." See Scherer v. Balkema, 840 F.2d 437, 440 (7th Cir.
1988). In adopting this rule, the Seventh Circuit quoted the
Second Circuit's reasoning in Singleton v. City of New York: [T]he crucial time for accrual purposes is when the
plaintiff becomes aware that he is suffering from a
wrong for which damages may be recovered in a civil
action. To permit him to wait and toll the running of
the statute simply by asserting that a series of
separate wrongs were committed pursuant to a
conspiracy would be to enable him to defeat the
purpose of the time bar, which is to preclude the
resuscitation of stale claims. The existence of a
conspiracy does not postpone the accrual of causes of
action arising out of the conspirators' separate
wrongs. It is the wrongful act, not the conspiracy,
which is actionable, whether that act is labeled as a
tort or a violation of § 1983.

632 F.2d 185, 192 (2d Cir. 1980).

This is directly applicable to the present case.*fn6
Hobley's § 1983 conspiracy claims are based on an alleged
conspiracy to "`railroad' criminal suspects," and are supported
by overt acts including: concealing exculpatory information,
planting evidence, manipulating witnesses, and fabricating
incriminating evidence, including extracting false confessions
through torture. Based upon the rule announced in Sherer,
Hobley may not recover for the untimely overt acts of excessive
force by asserting that they are part of series of separate
wrongs in forming a conspiracy.*fn7

Defendants also argue that to the extent that Hobley attempts
to base his conspiracy claims on the experiences of others,
including their coercive interrogations, he has no standing to do
so. Hobley did not respond to this argument. In his response, Hobley agreed
with the Defendants' characterization of his claim as a "massive
conspiracy to frame criminal suspects." (See Pl.'s Resp. at 8.)
His allegations suggest that he does wish to substantiate his
conspiracy claim with the experiences of other criminal suspects.
(See Am. Compl. ¶ 106.) However, it is a basic principle of
standing that a Plaintiff cannot recover for alleged wrongs
suffered by others. See, e.g., Daniels v. Southfort,
6 F.3d 482, 484 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that a plaintiff does not have
standing to complain about the Fourth Amendment injuries to
others) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34
(1978)). This applies equally in the context of § 1983 conspiracy
claims. See, e.g., Russ v. Watts, 190 F.Supp.2d 1094, 1104
(N.D. Ill. 2002). Therefore, we agree with Defendants that to the
extent that Hobley's conspiracy claim is based on the experiences
of other criminal suspects, he has no standing to bring such a
claim.

d. Monell

Count XI*fn8 of Hobley's amended complaint alleges a
Monell claim in that the CPD had a policy and practice which
acquiesced in, encouraged, and facilitated constitutional
violations and withholding exculpatory information. A Monell
claim is an action for municipal liability when alleged
violations occur as a result of city policy or practice. Monell
v. Department of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York,
436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). A Monell claim is brought under § 1983 and
is therefore governed by the accrual rule governing all § 1983
actions that we have previously discussed. See, e.g., Forsythe
v. State, No. 96-C-1151, 1996 WL 111933 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 16,
1996). The plaintiff has two years from the time that the
plaintiff "knows or should know that his or her constitutional
rights have been violated." Wilson, 956 F.2d at 740. The Second
Circuit has held, however, that with respect to a Monell claim,
"a cause of action against a municipality does not necessarily
accrue upon the occurrence of a harmful act, but only later when it is clear, or should be clear, that the
harmful act is the consequence of a county `policy or custom.'"
Pinaud v. County of Suffolk, 52 F.3d 1139, 1157 (2d Cir. 1995).

As applied to Hobley's case, to the extent that he asserts a
Monell claim based on his coercive interrogation, his action
will be deemed to have run from the time of the incident. The
rule announced by the Second Circuit in Pinaud may delay the
accrual of his Monell claim, but it does not avail him.
Hobley's allegations indicate that the Police Department's use of
"systematic abuse" was brought to light in 1992, when the
Goldston Report was unsealed (Am. Compl. ¶ 65), and at the
latest, in 1999, when the findings of investigations into
allegations into police torture were exposed. Id. ¶ 75. In
either case, the statute of limitations of two years has run.
Based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude that to the extent
Hobley's Monell claim is based on excessive force or failure to
intervene to prevent excessive force, it is thus
time-barred.*fn9

e. Equal Protection and Conspiracy to Violate Equal
Protection

Defendants have moved to dismiss Hobley's equal protection
(Count III) and conspiracy to violate equal protection (Count VI)
claims as untimely to the extent that they are premised on
time-barred allegations of excessive force.*fn10 It is
unclear from Hobley's amended complaint if he intends to premise
his equal protection claim on allegations of excessive force, and
Hobley did not respond to this portion of the motion. Like the §
1983 failure to intervene and conspiracy claims discussed above,
an equal protection claim is subject to the same timeliness
analysis that all § 1983 actions are, as well as to the Heck
analysis. See, e.g., Lucien v. Jockish, 133 F.3d 464, 467
(applying the Illinois two year statute of limitations for personal injury suits to plaintiff's §
1983 equal protection claim); Rogers v. Illinois Dep't of
Corrections, 160 F.Supp.2d 972, 977 (applying Heck to a § 1983
equal protection claim). Where there is a series of acts, some of
which are time-barred and some of which are not, a plaintiff may
not assert a § 1983 equal protection claim for the time-barred
allegations. See, e.g., Garrison v. Burke, 165 F.3d 565, 571
(7th Cir. 1999) (evaluating only those alleged actions that were
within the limitations period in assessing a § 1983 equal
protection claim). Based upon our foregoing analysis, to the
extent that his equal protection claim is premised on excessive
force, it is time-barred. To the extent that Hobley's equal
protection claim is premised on timely allegations, it is still
viable.

2. State Law Claims

a. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Count XII of Hobley's amended complaint alleges a state law
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED).
Defendants move to dismiss this count to the extent that it is
now premised on excessive force and failure to intervene.
Defendants argue that an IIED claim cannot be utilized "as a
vehicle for litigation of his excessive force and failure to
intervene claims," which are untimely. (Def.'s Mot. at 9.) To the
extent that we have held that Hobley's amended failure to
intervene count is now timely, an IIED claim that is premised on
that claim for failure to intervene is similarly timely. To the
extent that Hobley's IIED claim is premised on his time-barred
excessive force and failure to intervene, we agree that it is
similarly time-barred and grant the motion.

In our June 3 Order, we held that Hobley's IIED claim was
timely. Hobley I, 2004 WL 1243929, at *9. This was based on the
fact that courts in our district have consistently held that the
statute of limitations on an IIED claim does not begin to run
until the state criminal proceedings are terminated. See id. at
*9 (citing cases). In each of the cases we cited, the IIED was
found to be timely because it was based on conduct that was the same as that contained in the
plaintiff's timely malicious prosecution claim. See, e.g.,
Bergstrom v. McSweeney, 294 F.Supp. 2d 961, 969 (N.D.Ill. 2003)
("As Bergstrom's intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim incorporates the conduct underlying his malicious
prosecution claim, the cause of action did not accrue until the
state criminal proceedings against him were terminated); Evans
v. City of Chicago, No. 00-7222, 2001 WL 1028401, at *14 (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 6, 2001) (Plaintiff's IIED claim incorporates the same
conduct of the Officers that supports his remaining malicious
prosecution claim and thus accrues at the same time.); Treece v.
Village of Naperville, 903 F.Supp. 1251, 1259 (N.D. Ill. 1995)
("As with malicious prosecution claims, the clock did not start
running on plaintiff's IIED claim until the state criminal
proceedings were terminated."). Like the plaintiffs in these
cases, Hobley has stated a timely claim for malicious
prosecution.

In cases analogous to ours, where a plaintiff has alleged IIED
not only for malicious prosecution but also for events at the
time of arrest, the IIED claim has been held to be timely.
Santiago v. Marquez, No. 97-2775, 1998 WL 160878, at *3 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 31, 1998) ("The intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim, which re-alleges not only the wrongful arrest and
beating but all of the events by which the Police Defendants
sought to cover up the beating up to and including the false
charges and the malicious prosecution, did not accrue . . . until
the state criminal proceedings were terminated in Santiago's
favor."); (N.D. Ill. Sep. 6, 2001); Pierce v. Pawelski, No.
98-3337, 2000 WL 1847778, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 2000)
("Pierce's IIED claim is based not just on the events occurring
on the day of his arrest, but on defendants' participation in his
wrongful prosecution and their allegedly false testimony at
trial. Accordingly, the IIED claim did not accrue until Pierce's
trial concluded and he was acquitted."). These cases did not
address the particular issue in our case of whether the IIED
claim is timely as to all underlying events or only as to the
timely underlying events. Under the logic of these cases,
however, the IIED claim is timely based on conduct underlying the timely
malicious prosecution action.*fn11 We believe that based on
the principles announced in these cases and the purposes of
statute of limitations rules, a plaintiff may not assert untimely
excessive force claims as part of an IIED claim. We agree with
the Defendants that an IIED claim may not be used to resuscitate
time-barred claims, as this would sidestep the purposes of a
statute of limitations rule, which is "to pull the blanket of
peace over acts and events which have themselves already slept
for the statutory period." Scherer v. Balkema, 840 F.2d at 440.

b. State Law Conspiracy

Defendants have moved to dismiss Count XIII, Hobley's state law
claim for civil conspiracy to the extent that it is premised on
untimely excessive force and failure to intervene. We grant the
motion. Hobley's claim for civil conspiracy under state law
alleges "a conspiracy to maliciously prosecute and a conspiracy
to inflict emotional distress via police torture." (Am. Compl. ¶
179.) The timeliness analysis that we described above with
respect to § 1983 conspiracy claims applies with equally to the
state civil conspiracy action. Thus, the timeliness of the state
conspiracy claim depends on the timeliness of the underlying
claim. Because Hobley's IIED claim is time-barred to the extent
that it is premised on his time-barred excessive force claim, the
state conspiracy claim premised on IIED is similarly time-barred
to the extent that it is premised on time-barred excessive force
and failure to intervene. B. Failure to State a Claim

1. RICO and RICO Conspiracy

Counts VII and VIII allege violations of RICO and RICO
conspiracy, respectively, averring that Defendants agreed to and
conducted a pattern of racketeering activity, including
obstructing state and local criminal investigations, committing
perjury, tampering with witnesses and otherwise covering up their
misconduct in working to obstruct justice and procure false
convictions, through the CPD as an enterprise. Defendants move to
dismiss these counts for failure to state a claim. We grant the
motion.

The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)
makes it unlawful for any person employed by or associated with
any enterprise to conduct the enterprise's affairs through a
pattern of racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). A "pattern
of racketeering activity" is defined as the commission of at
least two of the predicate acts identified in
18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), which includes (A) specified state crimes and (B)
indictable federal offenses under specified federal provisions.
18 U.S.C. 1961(1)(A),(B). Defendants argue that the only
predicate acts that the Plaintiff's allegations can be read to
implicate are those that fall under the federal obstruction of
justice offenses listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B).*fn12 In
order to be actionable, these offenses must be committed in
connection with federal proceedings. See, e.g., Pettiford v.
Sheahan, No. 02-C-1777, 2004 WL 626151, *12 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
Because the alleged activity implicates only a state internal
investigation, the Defendants contend, Hobley fails to
sufficiently allege at least two predicate acts to support a
pattern of racketeering activity. Hobley's complaint specifies that the predicate acts which form
the basis of his RICO and RICO conspiracy claims "include but are
not limited to using their official positions to obstruct state
and local criminal investigations, commit perjury, tamper with
witnesses (including the inducement of witnesses to give false
statements), and otherwise cover up their misconduct in working
to obstruct justice and procure false convictions." (Am. Compl. ¶
143.) His response to Defendant's motion to dismiss clarifies his
position that five predicate acts alleged in the complaint
support his RICO claim: (1) conspiring to plant a gas can at the
scene of the fire to produce false evidence of Plaintiff's guilt;
(2) withholding an exculpatory fingerprint report; (3) coercing a
witness to falsely identify Hobley; (4) physically torturing
Hobley and then fabricating a false confession; and (5)
physically torturing other individuals in an attempt to coerce
false confessions (Pl.'s Resp., p. 14). Hobley claims that these
acts fall under the obstruction of justice offenses prohibited by
18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1), (b)(2), and (c), which relate to
tampering with witnesses or evidence with intent to obstruct "an
official proceeding." He agrees that "official proceeding" means
federal proceeding under these provisions but contends that he
meets the federal proceeding requirement. In support, he states
that Defendants' actions "concealed evidence from people
litigating any number of federal civil lawsuits and federal
habeas petitions brought by Defendants' victims." (Pl.'s Resp.,
p. 14.) In a footnote, Hobley adds that Defendants thwarted an
FBI investigation of allegations of torture of another arrestee
in custody and prevented federal prosecutors from instituting
federal criminal charges through their cover-up of Hobley's and
other victims' cases (Pl.'s Resp. p. 14, n. 6.) These
allegations, however, are not sufficient to satisfy the official
proceeding requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1), (b)(2), and
(c), and therefore we grant the Defendants' motion to dismiss
Hobley's RICO claim as a matter of law.

"Official proceeding" for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1512 is
defined as a proceeding before (a) a judge or court of the United
States, a U.S. Magistrate Judge, a Bankruptcy judge, a judge of
the U.S. Tax Court, a special trial judge of the U.S. Tax Court, a judge
of the United States Court of Federal Claims, or a federal grand
jury; (b) a proceeding before Congress; or (c) a proceeding
before a federal government agency which is authorized by law.
18 U.S.C. § 1515. The potential federal civil lawsuits, federal
habeas petitions, or federal criminal case*fn13 that Hobley
mentions would fit this definition, but that does not end our
inquiry. Although Hobley correctly points out that
18 U.S.C. § 1512 does not require that a federal proceeding be pending or
about to be instituted, it does require that the defendant
feared that a federal proceeding had been or might be
instituted and had a corrupt purpose and intent to undermine,
subvert, or impede the federal proceeding by his actions. See
United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 374 F.3d 281, 298 (5th
Cir. 2004); United States v. Morrison, 98 F.3d 619, 630 (D.D.C.
1996). While the specific allegations that Hobley directs us to
in his complaint-conspiring to plant evidence, withholding a
fingerprint report, coercing a witness to falsely testify, and
fabricating a confession-may support an obstruction of justice
claim, they do so only with respect to Hobley's state criminal
proceedings, and not to any federal proceeding.

That these actions may have had the later effect of concealing
evidence from use in other victims' federal civil lawsuits or
federal habeas petitions does not save Hobley's RICO claim. There
is no allegation that Defendants' purpose and intent in tampering
with the evidence and witness in Hobley's case was to obstruct
these potential later federal proceedings, nor could it be
logically inferred from the allegations in the complaint that it
was. Hobley admits that "[Defendant's] primary objective may have
been to obtain Plaintiff's wrongful conviction [in state court]."
He argues, however, that "to be successful, [Defendants'] scheme had to evade both the
scrutiny of federal prosecutors and the eyes of federal habeas
judges." (Pl.'s Resp. at p. 14.) This merely alleges that some
potential future federal proceedings may have been adversely
effected by Defendants' scheme; it does not allege that
Defendants' scheme was in contemplation of such federal
proceedings and for the purpose of undermining a federal
proceeding.

In order to sufficiently allege a RICO conspiracy, a plaintiff
must sufficiently allege RICO predicate acts. Goren v. New
Vision Int'l Inc., 156 F.3d 721, 732 (7th Cir. 1998). Because we
are dismissing Hobley's RICO claim for failure to sufficiently
allege predicate acts, his RICO conspiracy claim is dismissed for
the same reasons.

Hobley seeks relief for violation of equal protection under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count III) and conspiracy to deprive equal
protection under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (Count VI). He alleges that
Defendants "actively participated in or personally caused
misconduct in terms of `framing' minority criminal suspects in a
manner designed to secure improper convictions." (Am. Compl. ¶
99.) He further alleges that, "Said misconduct was motivated by
racial animus and constituted purposeful discrimination; it also
affected minorities in a grossly disproportionate manner
vis-a-vis similarly-situated Caucasian individuals." Id. More
specifically, Hobley provides a list of 69 individuals, including
himself, who were alleged victims of serious police misconduct.
Id. ¶¶ 40-41. He contends that all but one of the alleged
victims are African-American, while all the accused police
officers are white. Id. ¶¶ 43, 44.

In their motion to dismiss, Defendants contend that the
Hobley's equal protection claims are deficient. The defendants
argue that, aside from the aforementioned statistics, the
Hobley's pleading makes no "contention that [the] alleged misconduct was motivated
by any animus against [him] because he is African-American."
(Mot. to Dismiss, at 13.) They add that "[i]t is not sufficient
that a defendant's actions are disproportionately carried out
against African-Americans unless the specific misconduct at issue
was motivated by racial animus." The issue before us is therefore
whether Counts III and VI are sufficiently well-pled to survive
dismissal. We hold that they are and, therefore, deny the motion
to dismiss.

"A plaintiff raising a claim under § 1983 alleging racial
discrimination must allege purposeful discrimination." Majerske
v. Fraternal Order of Police, Local Lodge No. 7, 94 F.3d 307,
311 (7th Cir. 1996). A plaintiff raising a claim for conspiracy
to violate equal protection must allege (1) the existence of a
conspiracy, (2) a purpose of depriving a person or class of
persons of [the] equal protection of the laws, (3) an act in
furtherance of the alleged conspiracy, and (4) an injury to [a]
person or property or a deprivation of a right or privilege
granted to U.S. citizens. Id. With respect to a conspiracy to
violate equal protection, the Supreme Court has noted that "in
order to prove a private conspiracy in violation of the first
clause of §§ 1985(3), a plaintiff must show, inter alia . . .
that `some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously
discriminatory animus [lay] behind the conspirators' action.'"
Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 268
(citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971)). The point
of contention is whether Hobley has duly alleged purposeful
discrimination by alleging that Defendants were motivated by
racial animus.

In his pleadings, the Hobley duly claims that the Defendants'
actions were motivated by racial animus. It is true that his
complaint relies primarily on statistics, which are disfavored as
per se evidence of discriminatory intent. Chavez v. Illinois
State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 647-48 (7th Cir. 2001). Ordinarily,
a plaintiff cannot prevail by simply alleging that a defendant's
actions disproportionately affected a protected class, as "[d]isparate
impact alone does not satisfy the pleading requirements for
either § 1983 or § 1985(3)." Majerske, 94 F.3d at 311.

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has recognized that "rare cases
[have arisen where] a statistical pattern of discriminatory
impact demonstrated a constitutional violation" because it led to
the "irresistible" conclusion "that the State acted with a
discriminatory purpose." McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 294
(1987). Assessed merely on the pleadings, the instant case meets
this standard, as the plaintiff contends that "[o]f all the 100
examples of Area 2 police torture cases known to date, all of
this torture was reserved (with only one exception) exclusively
for black suspects, and all of the torturers were white." (Pl's
Resp. at 12.) Accordingly, we find that Hobley has satisfactorily
alleged the element of discriminatory intent.

Insofar as the Hobley's statistics alone do not suffice as
"proof of a constitutional violation," we find that he would
still prevail because he "presents sufficient non-statistical
evidence to demonstrate discriminatory intent." Chavez, at 648.
The plaintiff alleges that he was tortured by white police
officers, who "used racially offensive language" and threatened
him. (Am. Comp. ¶ 18.) "[R]acially derogatory language . . . is
strong evidence of racial animus." DeWalt v. Carter,
224 F.3d 607, 612 (7th Cir. 2000). Hence, we also find that the complaint
has advanced sufficient non-statistical evidence to
satisfactorily allege purposeful discrimination.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion to dismiss is
granted in part and denied in part.

Count IX (excessive force) is dismissed as time-barred. Count
VII (RICO) and Count VIII (RICO conspiracy) are dismissed as
insufficiently pled. We deny the motion to dismiss Counts X
(failure to intervene), IV and V (§ 1983 conspiracy), XI
(Monell), III (equal protection), VI (conspiracy to deprive equal protection), XII (IIED), and XIII (state civil
conspiracy). These counts remain viable claims to the extent
provided in this opinion. However, in light of the fact that this
decision has narrowed the issues upon which Hobley may base his
claims, discovery should be directed at and tailored to the
material issues relevant to the remaining claims. The parties
should work with the supervision of the Magistrate Judge to do
so.

It is so ordered.

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