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C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 000891
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR PM; EUR/ACE FOR GERRY OBERNDORFER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2018
TAGS: PGOVPRELSOCIPHUMKCORMARRPINRUZ
SUBJECT: DAS KROL'S MEETING WITH UZBEK NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL SECRETARY ATAEV
REF: A. TASHKENT 860
¶B. TASHKENT 879
Classified By: Political Officer Tim Buckley for reasons 1.4 (B,D)
¶1. (C) Summary: On July 25 visiting Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for South and Central Asia George Krol met
with National Security Council (NSC) Secretary Murod Ataev in
Tashkent. Ataev spoke at length about the recent munitions
depot explosion in Kagan, thanking the U.S. government for
preparing a military assistance package while politely
declining offers of humanitarian aid. He also discussed
Uzbek concerns about Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Afghanistan.
He emphasized that intelligence cooperation was very
productive in the pre-Andijon days and he called for renewed
cooperation now that the "dark days" of Andijon are in the
past. Ataev also raised concerns about potential sanctions
due to Uzbekistan's anti-money laundering regime, stating
that the Uzbek side is open to meeting with U.S. and other
officials to assuage concerns. DAS Krol conveyed that the
U.S. wants to take pragmatic steps to engage across the
board, but that Uzbekistan needs to move beyond words to
concrete actions to help overcome its image problem in
Washington. The tone and substance of Ataev's comments
indicates that Uzbekistan is receptive to moving forward on
security cooperation with the U.S., and our challenge will be
to encourage progress in all spheres of our relationship.
End summary.
Kagan Disaster
--------------
¶2. (C) The explosions at the munitions depot in Kagan
(Bukhara Province) were the first issue raised by Ataev. He
characterized this as an emergency situation and "a strong
blow," though he clarified that it was purely accidental and
not a terrorist act. In particular, he said an electrical
fire was the root cause of the blaze, which then spread with
strong winds that were reportedly blowing in the early
morning hours of July 10. He conceded that there were some
roofs and windows damaged as a result of the blasts, but
insisted that property damage was not widespread. Ataev
added that everything is back to normal in Bukhara City. He
thanked DAS Krol for the U.S. Government's willingness to
organize a military assistance package, but he politely
declined offers of humanitarian assistance, and he stated
that resources and facilities in Bukhara have been mobilized
to assist displaced or injured victims. (Note: Ataev's
accounts of the situation in Kagan, including damage reports,
were consistent with what our Defense Attache reported after
his visit to the site on July 18. End note.)
¶3. (C) Ataev noted that Russian officials have told him that
the Kagan facility was the largest depot of its kind still
remaining anywhere in the former Soviet Union, including in
Russia. Ataev said the Government of Uzbekistan had managed
to eliminate 190 tons of ordnance in the past three years,
but "we were physically unable to liquidate it all."
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan
-------------------------
¶4. (C) DAS Krol asked for Ataev's thoughts on the possibility
of another severe winter in neighboring Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan and, like the Foreign Minister in a separate July
25 meeting (septel), Ataev cited corruption as the major
reason for acute problems next door. "They do not think
about the future," he commented, and noted "there are
well-developed family clans" in the corrupt government
structure. "And they say they want investment...in what?
Why would anyone invest there?" he asked rhetorically.
¶5. (C) Again mirroring Foreign Minister Norov, he said "we
end up being villains for closing our border, but it cannot
be otherwise" due to the flow of narcotics. He noted that
725 kilograms was seized just in the past month at road and
rail links on the Tajik border. He added vindictively that
terrorists have entered Uzbek territory in the past with the
help of complicit Tajik officers. He mentioned that
Tajikistan also does not inform the Uzbeks when they do
military maneuvers, forcing Uzbeks to scramble troops; this
contributes to heightened tensions. Ataev said
Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT) is active in the region, and Uzbekistan
remains concerned about terrorist elements crossing from the
neighboring republics. He defended Uzbekistan's tough stance
on border issues, noting that "problems like Nagorno-Karabakh
never happened here."
Afghanistan
-----------
¶6. (C) Ataev noted "the tough situation" in Afghanistan, but
he said Uzbekistan will continue to work with Afghanistan
"even though there are many former Taliban and communist
elements in the government." He recognized Uzbekistan can
play a role in "developing a corridor" which can help promote
Afghanistan's stability and lead to mutually beneficial trade
links. Ataev cited Karimov's July 22 meeting with the
Ambassador, saying "we're ready" to cooperate, and he pointed
to the Termez Air Bridge as a tangible example of
Uzbekistan's support for our goals in Afghanistan. Yet, he
cautioned that "we do not want a repeat of the mistakes of
the USSR." Ataev said Uzbekistan is not ready to help train
any Afghans, as the last time they did so the soldiers ended
up fighting for the mudjaheddin.
Intelligence Cooperation
------------------------
¶7. (C) Ataev noted that previous cooperation with the CIA in
the pre-Andijon days was very productive, and that "exchange
of operational intelligence was very useful during a very
tough period when the Taliban were near our border." He also
mentioned that equipment such as drones were used very
effectively to guarantee Uzbekistan's security, which he
appreciated. He described Andijon as a "tragedy" and "a dark
event" that hurt cooperation, but added that it is now part
of Uzbekistan's history and that it is important not to
repeat it. He suggested that renewed cooperation was welcome
because "there are people on our territory who want
instability," including HT.
Money Laundering
----------------
¶8. (C) At the end of the meeting, Ataev raised the issue of
international pressure on Uzbekistan regarding its anti-money
laundering regime. He expressed surprise by the Financial
Action Task Force (FATF) advisory and said Uzbekistan is
prepared to invite experts to discuss the issue and do
whatever it takes to avoid sanctions. Significantly, he
acknowledged that changes to the law seemed to hurt, and then
he reiterated the standard excuse that people in Uzbekistan
do not trust banks and suspending the law until 2013 will
allow time to build confidence and fine-tune the monitoring
systems so scrutiny does not slow down the economy.
(Comment: It is a good sign that the issue was raised at
this level by the Uzbeks, which demonstrates that it is
firmly on their radar screen. End comment.)
DAS Krol on Engagement
----------------------
¶9. (C) As was the case during a separate meeting with Foreign
Minister Norov (ref B), DAS Krol conveyed the message to
Ataev that the U.S. wants to engage Uzbek society and
government across the board -- security, economic,
governance, and human rights issues -- but that we need to
move past words to concrete actions. DAS Krol noted this was
especially true given Uzbekistan's image problem in
Washington stemming from the Andijon incidents; nonetheless,
he emphasized that although we do not see eye-to-eye on all
issues we do have many common interests to pursue.
Comment:
--------
¶10. (C) This meeting, three days after President Karimov's
well-publicized July 22 meeting with the Ambassador, was an
opportunity for Ataev to press home the message that
Uzbekistan is open to rebuilding cooperation with the United
States in many spheres. Yet, there are still elements within
the Government of Uzbekistan that want to restrict such
cooperation, as evidenced by the reluctance of some circles
of the GOU to allow the Drug Enforcement Administration to
resume activities. Providing military assistance in the
aftermath of the Kagan disaster offers us a chance to take a
major step in building bridges, and if we play our cards
right it could help open up more cooperative endeavors that
meet our national security interests. However, the
Government of Uzbekistan will remain adamant that there are
no problems with corruption or weak anti-money laundering
policies here, so we will need to push for progress in all
spheres of our relationship.
¶11. (U) This telegram has been cleared by DAS Krol.
BUTCHER