JANUARY 3, 1929
THE WAR IN THE AIR*
WHILE it was undoubtedly a great misfortune, as well as a
tragedy, that Sir Walter Raleigh should have died after
producing the first volume of "The War in the Air," so
breaking the continuity of the work, the student of history
may congratulate himself that so good a successor as Mr.
Jones should have been found. His task must have been
difficult, not only because he had to succeed one who had
made an excellent start, but also because in many ways it
must be harder to describe actual operations than to write
an introductory volume. His publication had to be, not
a history of the war, but one of a certain arm which took
part in that war. The author had to steer a patli between
giving so little of the general operations that the doings of
the air services would be unintelligible to anyone who had not
taken part in them, and giving so much of the general history
that the book would cease to be a specialist work. Mr.
Jones has steered that course with excellent judgment, and
has given neither too much nor too little of the general
fighting.
Again, the history of the war in the air is largely a
record of technical development, but obviously the work
would have had but a limited value if its scope had been
confined too much to the design rooms at Kingston, Filton
and elsewhere. Again, Mr. Jones is very judicious. He
explains, quite plainly enough for the general reader, yet
not in such elementary style as to irritate flying men, why
it was that the Fokker at one time achieved a mastery in
the air, and how it was that the F.E. (which he wrongly
explains as meaning " Farman Experimental " instead of
" Fighting Experimental ") 2b and the D.H.2 ultimately
mastered it. The public ;it the time knew but little of these
technicalities and of the war between the brains of designers.
To the public an aeroplane was just as aeroplane. Mr.
Jones has explained that there was a good deal more in it
than that.
The development of tactics and strategy in the use of air-
craft is also traced with just the right amount of emphasis.
Tactics in the air date from a Flying Corps order of January
14, 1916, which enjoined formation flying. Its success was
immediate, and on February 7 of that year one of our recon-
naissance machines escorted by three B.E.2c's flew for
53 mins. over the lines, and returned, still in formation, with
14 enemy machines hanging round the flanks and rear.
Still, one rather wonders why the Germans did not show more
enterprise.
It is interesting to note that formation flying was
originally ordered as an expedient " Until the Royal Flying
• Tht War in the Air. Vol. 2. By H. A. (ones. (The Clarendon Pr«s.17s fid.)
Corps are in possession of a machine as good as or better than
the German Fokker."
Air strategy dates from about the same, time, and meant
the practical application of the principle that attack is the
best defence. It sounds simple, but the Air Staff does not
yet dare to carry this principle to its logical conclusion and
dispense with squadrons of fighters from the Air Defences of
Great Britain. Presumably, army reconnaissance aeroplanes
will always need a certain amount of protection, but in
other respects the principle means that all air energies must
be concentrated on damaging the enemy's aerodromes,
forces, and lines of communication. For a long time the
Germans adopted the defensive principle, and used their
aircraft to try to defend points behind their own lines, with
results disastrous to themselves. It was Boelcke who
changed that, and von Richthofen carried on his work.
This volume does not deal only with the Royal Flying
Corps. It gives equal attention to the Royal Naval Air
Service, and recounts much work by that body which is not
generally known. Seaplanes, airships, and kite balloon
receive their due share of attention, as well as land-planes
The volume covers the years 1915 and 1916, and deals
with the air work at Gallipoli, the fighting in Flanders from
Neuve Chapelle to the end of the Somme battles, and then
the work over the North Sea including the famous battle of
Jutland.
The account of Jutland is particularly interesting, though
one rather marvels at the restraint with which the neglect
of aircraft by the navy is recorded. The aircraft carrier
Campania did not accompany the Grand Fleet from Scapa
Flow because, for some extraordinary reason, she did not
receive her orders to sail and did not realise until two and a
half hours afterwards that the Grand Fieet had sailed. She
tried to catch up, but was so far behind that Jellicoe ordered
her to return to Scapa. It is a curious story. But still more
inexplicable is the well-known fact that, though the carrier
Engadine was with the battle cruisers under Beatty, she
was only ordered to send up one seaplane (a Short piloted by
Flight-Lieut. F. J. Rutland) during the battle. Mr. Jones
remarks that the battle's " interest to the student of air power
lies, not in what aircraft did, but in what opportunities of
perhaps vital importance were open for their use." It is
certainly maddening to read of our admirals groping blindly
for the Germans and not using the eyes which were available
for them ; while on the morning of June 1, the Zeppelins
were able to keep von Scheer informed of where the British
were. Consequently the High Seas Fleet was sunk off
Scapa Flow instead of off Tutland.
F. A. DE V. R.
A Russian
" Pusher " : This
motor sledge,
with driver ' s
seat forward and
an enclosed cabin
for the passen-
gers, is fitted
with a Bristol
"Lucifer"
engine.
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