Monday, March 30, 2015

Panther Development

Panther- the original Model D

If the Tiger seemed immediately promising, the same could
not be said for its intended stablemate. As early as 1938, the Weapons Office
had begun considering replacements for the Panzer III and IV: something along
the same lines, in the 20-ton category with improved armor, armament, and
chassis. A few prototypes were developed in leisurely fashion through 1940. Its
priority remained low in the early days of Operation Barbarossa, when the
Russian heavy tanks appeared sporadically. That began to change as the campaign
progressed. In particular the T-34 was impossible to ignore. Its gun could take
out Panzer IIIs and IVs at more than a thousand yards—ten times the effective
range of the German tanks against the T-34’s comprehensively well-sloped armor.
The Soviet vehicle’s mobility over mud, swamp, and dirt roads was no less
impressive.

On October 5, 1941, Guderian’s 4th Panzer Division
encountered a brigade of T-34s. Not only were the Germans stopped cold; for the
first time in a head-to-head fight at even odds, their losses were
significantly greater. Well before that oft-cited day, however, it was clear in
the panzers that besides upgrading and upgunning an entirely new weapons
system, it was necessary to sustain the synergy of technical and human
superiority on which their effectiveness depended. Continuing to rely on crew
expertise and command skill to compensate for inferior equipment created an
ultimately unsustainable imbalance in a military/political system structurally
vulnerable to attrition and overextension.

Guderian had something his colleagues lacked: enough
influence to demand an inquiry. In late November 1941, a commission of officers
and civilian designers toured the combat zone, examined derelict T-34s, and
evaluated the situation. Guderian recommended copying the T-34—not literally
through reverse engineering but by imitating the essentials. The Weapons Office
replied by citing the problem of producing diesel engines, and by making the
point that copying what existed gave the Soviets an automatic lead for the next
generation. On returning to Berlin, the commission issued contracts to
Daimler-Benz and MAN for a 30-ton tank with a difference.

When the prototypes were completed Hitler favored a Daimler
version resembling the T-34. The Weapons Office supported MAN, in good part
because of a larger turret ring. The soldiers won politically and technically.
Working on the Tiger, Rheinmetall had sought to balance the army’s wish for a
relatively light main armament and Hitler’s insistence on maximum hitting
power. The eventual result was a 75mm L/70 piece developed too late for the
Tigers, but mounted on the MAN chassis just in time to give the Panther the
most ballistically effective tank gun of World War II.

Preproduction was authorized in May 1942; the first of what
were eventually designated Panther Model D reached the proving grounds in
November. Apart from the predictable teething troubles, two fundamental issues
emerged. One was protection. The Panther’s well-sloped frontal armor was 80mm
on the hull and 100mm on the turret. This was a substantial improvement over
the Panzer III and IV, but would it suffice against the weapons likely to be
introduced as a counter? That increase, moreover, was at the expense of side
armor not much better than the Panzer IV. The Panther’s other problem was the
engine. The tank weighed 45 tons. Its Maybach 230 engine delivered a
power-to-weight ratio of 15.5 horsepower per ton: lower than its panzer
predecessors, lower than the T-34, and low enough to seriously strain the
entire drive system.

One difficulty sustained the other. The Panther D’s already
overstrained engine could not take the additional strain of up-armoring. As a
result the tanks were disproportionately vulnerable to a flank shot. On the
other hand, the cadres and crews of a Panther battalion were expected to avert
or solve that kind of tactical problem, especially since the new vehicles were
expected to be assigned to existing, experienced battalions. “Not perfect, but
good enough” was a verdict rendered in the developing crisis of the Eastern
Front. Serial Panther production was authorized in November 1942, with a
projected delivery of 250 delivered by May 1943 and a projected deployment of a
battalion in each panzer division, replacing Panzer IVs.

As a stopgap measure pending the Panthers’ design,
production, and delivery, Guderian’s commission had recommended upgrading the
army’s assault guns. About 120 of the Model IIIF with a 75mm L/43 had entered
service in 1942, prefiguring the assault gun’s development from an infantry
support vehicle into a tank destroyer. As a rule of thumb, the longer a gun,
the less effective its high-explosive round. From the infantry’s perspective,
however, the tradeoff was acceptable, and the Sturmgeschütz IIIG was even more
welcome because of its 75mm L/48 main armament. The effective range of this
adapted Pak 43 was more than 7,000 feet. It could penetrate almost 100mm of 30-degree
sloped armor at half that distance. The IIIG took the original assault gun
design to the peak of its development by retaining the low silhouette and
improving frontal armor to 80mm by bolting on extra plates, all within a weight
of less than 25 tons. The family was completed, ideally at least, with the
addition of a 105mm howitzer version in one of the battalion’s three ten-gun
batteries to sustain the infantry support role.

The one-time redheaded stepchild of the armored force now
had a place at the head table. There had been 19 independent assault gun
battalions in May 1941. In 1943 that number would double. Constantly shifted
among infantry commands, their loyalty was to no larger formation. Continuously
in action, they developed a wealth of specialized battle experience that led
infantry officers to follow the assault gunners’ lead when it came to
destroying tanks and mounting counterattacks. Assault guns cost less than
tanks. Lacking complex revolving turrets, they were easier to manufacture, and
correspondingly attractive in an armaments industry whose workforce skill and
will were declining with the addition of more and more foreign and forced labor
and the repeated combouts of Germans destined for the Wehrmacht.

Albert Speer’s appointment as Minister of Armaments in
February 1942 brought no immediate, revolutionary change to Germany’s war
industry. But Speer had Hitler’s confidence, as much as anyone could ever
possess it. He was an optimist at a time when that was a declining quality at
high Reich levels. He concentrated on short-term fixes: rationalizing
administration, improving use of material, addressing immediate crises. And he
faced a major one in tank production.

In September 1942 Hitler called for the manufacture of 800
tanks, 600 assault guns, and 600 self-propelled guns a month by the spring of
1944. In April 1944 the army’s panzer divisions had fewer than 1,700 of their
total authorized strength of 4,600 main battle tanks: Panthers and Panzer IVs.
That gap could not be bridged by admonitions to take better care of equipment
and report losses more accurately. The long obsolete Panzer II was upgraded
into a state-of-the-art tracked reconnaissance vehicle. But a glamorous
renaming as Luchs, or Lynx, could not camouflage an operational value so
limited that production was canceled after the first hundred. Other resources
were also diverted to the development of a family of tracked and half-tracked logistics
vehicles and increased numbers of armored recovery vehicles, both in their own
ways necessary under Russian conditions. The growing effectiveness of the
Soviet air force led to the conversion or rebuilding of an increasing number of
chassis into antiaircraft tanks with small- caliber armaments. The continued
manufacture of early designs—again necessary to maintain even limited frontline
strength—further impeded production. Between May and December 1942, tank
production actually declined despite constant encouragement and repeated
threats from the Reich’s highest quarters.

One positive result of the slowdown was the ability to
address the Panther’s shortcomings. The original Model D received improved
track and wheel systems. Das Reich received a battalion of them in August, 23rd
Panzer Division in October, and 16th Panzer in December. All played crucial
roles in Army Group South’s fight for survival. The D’s successor, the Model A,
had a new turret with quicker rotation time and a commander’s cupola. Both were
important in the target-rich but high-risk environment of the Eastern Front.
Engine reliability remained a problem, in part because of quality control
difficulties in the homeland, and in part defined by the tank’s low
power-to-weight ratio. Improvements to the transmission and gear systems
nevertheless reduced the number of engine breakdowns. Modifications to the
cooling system cut back on the number of engine fires.

Soft ground, deep mud, and heavy snow continued to put a
premium on driving skill. One Panther battalion reported having to blow up 28
tanks it was unable to evacuate. Fifty-six more were in various stages of
repair. Eleven remained operational. But during the same period Leibstandarte’s
Panther battalion reported only seven combat losses—all from hits to the sides
and rear. Of the 54 mechanical breakdowns, almost half could be ready within a
week. On the whole the improved Panther was regarded as excellent: consistently
able to hit, survive hits, and bring its crews back.

Toward the end of 1943 the High Command began rotating
battalions officially equipped with Panzer IIIs—the old workhorse was still
pulling its load—back to Germany for retraining on Panther Model As. The
reorganized battalions were impressive on paper: 4 companies each of 22 or 17
tanks, plus 8 more in battalion headquarters. First Panzer Division welcomed
its new vehicles in November. Others followed, army and SS, the order depending
on which division could best spare a battalion cadre. By the end of January
1944 about 900 Panther As had reached the Russian front, in complete battalions
or as individual replacements.

As good as they were, the Panthers were a drop in the bucket
compared to the mass of Soviet armor facing them. As compensation the High
Command began considering a Panther II. Beginning as an up-armored Model D,
during 1943 the concept metamorphosed—or better said, metastasized—into a
lighter version of the Tiger. Weighing in at over 50 tons, it was originally
scheduled to enter service in September 1943, but was put on permanent hold in
favor of its less impressive, more reliable forebear.

The Panther’s tank destroyer spin-off was far more
promising. Indeed the Jagdpanther is widely and legitimately considered the
best vehicle of its kind during World War II. An 88mm L/71 gun, well-sloped
armor, and solid cross-country capacity on a 45-ton chassis made the
Jagdpanther a dominant chess piece wherever it appeared. Predictably,
preproduction difficulties and declining production capacity kept its numbers
limited.

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About Me

Mitch Williamson is a technical writer with an
interest in military and naval affairs. He has published articles in
Cross & Cockade International and Wartime magazines. He was
research associate for the Bio-history Cross in the Sky, a book about
Charles 'Moth' Eaton's career, in collaboration with the flier's son,
Dr Charles S. Eaton. He also assisted in picture research for John
Burton's Fortnight of Infamy.
Mitch is now publishing on the WWW various specialist websites combined
with custom website design work.