John Foster Dulles’ thinking over the issue of nuclear weapons was inconsistent. He registered strong disapproval on moral grounds of the atomic bombing of Japan and warned of the dangerous precedent ...
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John Foster Dulles’ thinking over the issue of nuclear weapons was inconsistent. He registered strong disapproval on moral grounds of the atomic bombing of Japan and warned of the dangerous precedent the US was setting in using nuclear weapons. Yet, for some years he was an ardent proponent of massive retaliation, which threatened a possible thermonuclear strike in response to conventional aggression. Dulles strove to break down the false distinction between the atom bomb and conventional weapons that was working, he believed, to the Soviets’ military and propaganda advantage. Dulles’ initial legalistic‐moralistic thinking on nuclear weapons clashed sharply with the more bellicose, pessimistic, amoral perspectives he developed in the wake of the Korean invasion. The result was an unwieldy grafting together of the two that contributed significantly to his public and private policy oscillations.Less

John Foster Dulles' Nuclear Schizophrenia

Neal Rosendorf

Published in print: 1999-04-01

John Foster Dulles’ thinking over the issue of nuclear weapons was inconsistent. He registered strong disapproval on moral grounds of the atomic bombing of Japan and warned of the dangerous precedent the US was setting in using nuclear weapons. Yet, for some years he was an ardent proponent of massive retaliation, which threatened a possible thermonuclear strike in response to conventional aggression. Dulles strove to break down the false distinction between the atom bomb and conventional weapons that was working, he believed, to the Soviets’ military and propaganda advantage. Dulles’ initial legalistic‐moralistic thinking on nuclear weapons clashed sharply with the more bellicose, pessimistic, amoral perspectives he developed in the wake of the Korean invasion. The result was an unwieldy grafting together of the two that contributed significantly to his public and private policy oscillations.

This chapter provides a reinterpretation of the Dwight Eisenhower administration's policy toward Vietnam before and after the Geneva Accords of 1954. It illustrates how the imbalance of power created ...
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This chapter provides a reinterpretation of the Dwight Eisenhower administration's policy toward Vietnam before and after the Geneva Accords of 1954. It illustrates how the imbalance of power created the opportunity and therefore the incentive for Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to ignore and effectively undermine the Geneva framework for a settlement through free elections. The chapter also argues that both Eisenhower and Dulles were determined from the start to avoid actual military intervention to save the French. Dulles and Eisenhower rejected both of the proposals from the national security bureaucracy. The Geneva Accords consisted of a cease-fire agreement and a “Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference.” Dulles and Eisenhower had been prepared to let South Vietnam go if Diem could not handle a domestic insurgency and both had assumed that an overt invasion by North Vietnam would be met with a swift U.S. military response under SEATO.Less

Eisenhower and Dulles Exploit U.S. Dominance in Vietnam

Gareth Porter

Published in print: 2005-03-13

This chapter provides a reinterpretation of the Dwight Eisenhower administration's policy toward Vietnam before and after the Geneva Accords of 1954. It illustrates how the imbalance of power created the opportunity and therefore the incentive for Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to ignore and effectively undermine the Geneva framework for a settlement through free elections. The chapter also argues that both Eisenhower and Dulles were determined from the start to avoid actual military intervention to save the French. Dulles and Eisenhower rejected both of the proposals from the national security bureaucracy. The Geneva Accords consisted of a cease-fire agreement and a “Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference.” Dulles and Eisenhower had been prepared to let South Vietnam go if Diem could not handle a domestic insurgency and both had assumed that an overt invasion by North Vietnam would be met with a swift U.S. military response under SEATO.

This chapter tracks the work of one of the most politically influential instruments of 1940s Christian internationalism, the Federal Council of Churches' Commission on a Just and Durable Peace. It ...
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This chapter tracks the work of one of the most politically influential instruments of 1940s Christian internationalism, the Federal Council of Churches' Commission on a Just and Durable Peace. It locates the roots of the commission in the post-Oxford ecumenical network, highlighting the way ecumenical Protestants sought to base their advocacy of a new American internationalism on the norms agreed upon at the recent world conference. Focusing on John Foster Dulles's leadership of the commission, though, the chapter explores how Dulles reconstituted Christian internationalism over time—Americanizing it in the process. As Dulles instrumentalized churches in the service of the nation, his internationalism began to appear more like the messianic nationalism he and his colleagues had spent their energies opposing.Less

The Dulles Commission, the UN, and the Americanization of Christian Internationalism

Michael G. Thompson

Published in print: 2015-11-06

This chapter tracks the work of one of the most politically influential instruments of 1940s Christian internationalism, the Federal Council of Churches' Commission on a Just and Durable Peace. It locates the roots of the commission in the post-Oxford ecumenical network, highlighting the way ecumenical Protestants sought to base their advocacy of a new American internationalism on the norms agreed upon at the recent world conference. Focusing on John Foster Dulles's leadership of the commission, though, the chapter explores how Dulles reconstituted Christian internationalism over time—Americanizing it in the process. As Dulles instrumentalized churches in the service of the nation, his internationalism began to appear more like the messianic nationalism he and his colleagues had spent their energies opposing.

This chapter argues that John Foster Dulles was neither the fanatic that detractors have suggested nor the sole architect of U.S. foreign policy in the 1950s as claimed by his admirers. Dulles and ...
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This chapter argues that John Foster Dulles was neither the fanatic that detractors have suggested nor the sole architect of U.S. foreign policy in the 1950s as claimed by his admirers. Dulles and Dwight D. Eisenhower made foreign policy for the United States together for seven years, during which time they established an effective working relationship. As secretary of state, Dulles was, without doubt, the president's key foreign policy ally, implementer, and emissary. He shaped Eisenhower's policies but never made decisions without consulting the president. As the president trusted his own judgment in military affairs, so Dulles believed he understood diplomacy better than most anyone else. Dulles, however, shared Eisenhower's disinterest in Asia and dismay at having to pay so much attention to China. Both men worried about and were possessed by the burden of ideology and security. Dulles and Eisenhower intended to fight Communism everywhere, but they were also pragmatic statesmen and politicians.Less

Fire, Brimstone, and John Foster Dulles

Nancy Bernkopf Tucker

Published in print: 2012-05-01

This chapter argues that John Foster Dulles was neither the fanatic that detractors have suggested nor the sole architect of U.S. foreign policy in the 1950s as claimed by his admirers. Dulles and Dwight D. Eisenhower made foreign policy for the United States together for seven years, during which time they established an effective working relationship. As secretary of state, Dulles was, without doubt, the president's key foreign policy ally, implementer, and emissary. He shaped Eisenhower's policies but never made decisions without consulting the president. As the president trusted his own judgment in military affairs, so Dulles believed he understood diplomacy better than most anyone else. Dulles, however, shared Eisenhower's disinterest in Asia and dismay at having to pay so much attention to China. Both men worried about and were possessed by the burden of ideology and security. Dulles and Eisenhower intended to fight Communism everywhere, but they were also pragmatic statesmen and politicians.

This book confronts the coldest period of the Cold War—the moment in which personality, American political culture, public opinion, and high politics came together to define the Eisenhower ...
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This book confronts the coldest period of the Cold War—the moment in which personality, American political culture, public opinion, and high politics came together to define the Eisenhower administration's policy toward China. It convincingly portrays Dwight D. Eisenhower's private belief that close relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC) were inevitable and that careful consideration of the PRC should constitute a critical part of American diplomacy. The book argues that the Eisenhower administration's hostile rhetoric and tough actions toward China obscure the president's actual views. Behind the scenes, Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, pursued a more nuanced approach, one better suited to China's specific challenges and the stabilization of the global community. It explores the contradictions between Eisenhower and his advisors' public and private positions. The most powerful chapter centers on Eisenhower's recognition that rigid trade prohibitions would undermine the global postwar economic recovery and push China into a closer relationship with the Soviet Union. Ultimately, the book finds that Eisenhower's strategic thinking on Europe and his fear of toxic, anticommunist domestic politics constrained his leadership, making a fundamental shift in U.S. policy toward China difficult if not impossible. Consequently, the president was unable to engage Congress and the public effectively on China, ultimately failing to realize his own high standards as a leader.Less

The China Threat : Memories, Myths, and Realities in the 1950s

Nancy Bernkopf Tucker

Published in print: 2012-05-01

This book confronts the coldest period of the Cold War—the moment in which personality, American political culture, public opinion, and high politics came together to define the Eisenhower administration's policy toward China. It convincingly portrays Dwight D. Eisenhower's private belief that close relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC) were inevitable and that careful consideration of the PRC should constitute a critical part of American diplomacy. The book argues that the Eisenhower administration's hostile rhetoric and tough actions toward China obscure the president's actual views. Behind the scenes, Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, pursued a more nuanced approach, one better suited to China's specific challenges and the stabilization of the global community. It explores the contradictions between Eisenhower and his advisors' public and private positions. The most powerful chapter centers on Eisenhower's recognition that rigid trade prohibitions would undermine the global postwar economic recovery and push China into a closer relationship with the Soviet Union. Ultimately, the book finds that Eisenhower's strategic thinking on Europe and his fear of toxic, anticommunist domestic politics constrained his leadership, making a fundamental shift in U.S. policy toward China difficult if not impossible. Consequently, the president was unable to engage Congress and the public effectively on China, ultimately failing to realize his own high standards as a leader.

This chapter discusses Secretary of State John Foster Dulles's fundamental religio-political continuity, which explains his invocation of massive retaliation and the overwhelming violence it ...
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This chapter discusses Secretary of State John Foster Dulles's fundamental religio-political continuity, which explains his invocation of massive retaliation and the overwhelming violence it authorized. His religio-political continuity was a covenantal view of world affairs, by which humanity was bound to a moral law both objectively—in which there was a set of moral principles required to be accepted—and subjectively—in which everyone should feel reverence for the law. The problematic aspects of his outlook, however, were instructive: Dulles had adopted a language of extreme violence, which placed power against power, as well as force against force, thus threatening the extinction of humanity.Less

From Jeremiad to Manifesto : The Rhetorical Evolution of John Foster Dulles’s “Massive Retaliation”

Ned O’Gorman

Published in print: 2012-06-06

This chapter discusses Secretary of State John Foster Dulles's fundamental religio-political continuity, which explains his invocation of massive retaliation and the overwhelming violence it authorized. His religio-political continuity was a covenantal view of world affairs, by which humanity was bound to a moral law both objectively—in which there was a set of moral principles required to be accepted—and subjectively—in which everyone should feel reverence for the law. The problematic aspects of his outlook, however, were instructive: Dulles had adopted a language of extreme violence, which placed power against power, as well as force against force, thus threatening the extinction of humanity.

Chapter 13 examines how the Eisenhower administration handled U.S. foreign policy in east Asia following events such as Black Friday and the Girard case. Eisenhower recognized the need to placate ...
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Chapter 13 examines how the Eisenhower administration handled U.S. foreign policy in east Asia following events such as Black Friday and the Girard case. Eisenhower recognized the need to placate both foreign allies and voters at the same time, since many Americans opposed SOFAs and sought to pass legislation, such as the Bow Amendment, that would prohibit GIs from being tried in foreign courts. In an effort to ease tensions, he approved a plan that would determine the number of Americans living overseas, made plans to withdraw troops from Taiwan and Japan, and considered placing more tactical nuclear weapons abroad to compensate; yet these were all long-term solutions to immediate problems. To preserve integrity, Ike officially decided to hand Girard over to Japan, resulting in a heavy critique of his administration. Though Girard hired attorneys to contest the decision, the Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the U.S. was justified in waiving its jurisdiction. In November, Girard was found guilty by a Japanese court and given a three-year sentence. Despite the ruling, diplomatic immunity and the large number of military personnel abroad still remained important issues in the aftermath.Less

Defending the American Bases of Hegemony

Stephen G. Craft

Published in print: 2015-12-15

Chapter 13 examines how the Eisenhower administration handled U.S. foreign policy in east Asia following events such as Black Friday and the Girard case. Eisenhower recognized the need to placate both foreign allies and voters at the same time, since many Americans opposed SOFAs and sought to pass legislation, such as the Bow Amendment, that would prohibit GIs from being tried in foreign courts. In an effort to ease tensions, he approved a plan that would determine the number of Americans living overseas, made plans to withdraw troops from Taiwan and Japan, and considered placing more tactical nuclear weapons abroad to compensate; yet these were all long-term solutions to immediate problems. To preserve integrity, Ike officially decided to hand Girard over to Japan, resulting in a heavy critique of his administration. Though Girard hired attorneys to contest the decision, the Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the U.S. was justified in waiving its jurisdiction. In November, Girard was found guilty by a Japanese court and given a three-year sentence. Despite the ruling, diplomatic immunity and the large number of military personnel abroad still remained important issues in the aftermath.

This chapter sets the record straight not merely about the reasons for the American response to the crisis but also about the relationship between the President, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and his ...
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This chapter sets the record straight not merely about the reasons for the American response to the crisis but also about the relationship between the President, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. It views that Eisenhower was a strong President served by a strong Secretary of State. Nevertheless, Dulles in every sense was the executor of policy set by Eisenhower. Eisenhower himself took command during the Suez crisis, but Dulles's racy language and strong statements in press conferences gave the impression, especially to the British, that he rather than the President often took the lead. This chapter contains a detailed analysis of the Aswan Dam negotiations and Dulles's attempt to create an international authority to take the place of the Suez Canal Company.Less

Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Suez Crisis

Robert R. Bowie

Published in print: 1991-02-21

This chapter sets the record straight not merely about the reasons for the American response to the crisis but also about the relationship between the President, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. It views that Eisenhower was a strong President served by a strong Secretary of State. Nevertheless, Dulles in every sense was the executor of policy set by Eisenhower. Eisenhower himself took command during the Suez crisis, but Dulles's racy language and strong statements in press conferences gave the impression, especially to the British, that he rather than the President often took the lead. This chapter contains a detailed analysis of the Aswan Dam negotiations and Dulles's attempt to create an international authority to take the place of the Suez Canal Company.

This chapter discusses the arrival of Eisenhower's Republican administration in the fight to defeat the communists in Indochina and to secure French support for the EDC. John Foster Dulles was the ...
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This chapter discusses the arrival of Eisenhower's Republican administration in the fight to defeat the communists in Indochina and to secure French support for the EDC. John Foster Dulles was the most committed in the Eisenhower administration to see a military victory in Indochina and earn ratification of the EDC. However, it was Stalin's death in March 1953 that broke the deadlock in the French and Vietnam War, and subsequently forced the Eisenhower administration to confront another challenge.Less

A Death in March

Kathryn C. Statler

Published in print: 2007-06-22

This chapter discusses the arrival of Eisenhower's Republican administration in the fight to defeat the communists in Indochina and to secure French support for the EDC. John Foster Dulles was the most committed in the Eisenhower administration to see a military victory in Indochina and earn ratification of the EDC. However, it was Stalin's death in March 1953 that broke the deadlock in the French and Vietnam War, and subsequently forced the Eisenhower administration to confront another challenge.

This chapter describes the formulation and execution of U.S. policy in Laos from 1954 to 1956, when Charles W. Yost served as the American chief of mission in Vientiane. Particular attention is paid ...
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This chapter describes the formulation and execution of U.S. policy in Laos from 1954 to 1956, when Charles W. Yost served as the American chief of mission in Vientiane. Particular attention is paid to the views of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who visited Vientiane in 1955. Offering SEATO protection to the Royal Lao Government (RLG) if it took aggressive military action against the communist-led Pathet Lao in the northern provinces, Dulles and other U.S. officials faced opposition from the French and U.K. governments. The chapter includes biographic sketches of Prince Souvanna Phouma, Prime Minister Katay Don Sasorith, Crown Prince Savang Vatthana and other leading Lao political figures, and it discusses the kingdom's flawed system of parliamentary democracy.Less

The Most Difficult Post in the Entire Foreign Service

William J. Rust

Published in print: 2012-05-15

This chapter describes the formulation and execution of U.S. policy in Laos from 1954 to 1956, when Charles W. Yost served as the American chief of mission in Vientiane. Particular attention is paid to the views of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who visited Vientiane in 1955. Offering SEATO protection to the Royal Lao Government (RLG) if it took aggressive military action against the communist-led Pathet Lao in the northern provinces, Dulles and other U.S. officials faced opposition from the French and U.K. governments. The chapter includes biographic sketches of Prince Souvanna Phouma, Prime Minister Katay Don Sasorith, Crown Prince Savang Vatthana and other leading Lao political figures, and it discusses the kingdom's flawed system of parliamentary democracy.