In this verse the view that the effect-existence is different from the cause-existence is considered and rejected. If the effect-existence is different from the cause-existence is an existent one, then there can be no way one can call the two are different from each other; they have to be the same. To explain, the existence of the pot (which is the effect of clay) cannot be claimed to be different from that of clay (the cause of the pot) and the pot-existence has to be naturally an existent one. The clay-existence alone is what is spoken of pot-existence; there are no two different existence-s.

असद्रूपेण as non-existent सा it भिन्ना is different कार्यसत्ता the effect-existence तया from the cause-existence यदि if तर्हि then सा it न एव never सत्ता existence स्यात् can be असत्त्वात् because it is non-existent एव alone शून्यवत् just as a void.

…..it cannot be existence at all because it is non-existence, asat, just like ‘śūnya’, void, like the hare’s horn. The hypothetical case of a non-existent entity is given a few examples in philosophical discourse such as a barren-woman’s son, a sky-flower, human-horn and the hair of a tortoise. All these examples only convey us that such an object is not to be found anywhere in creation and are only mere words.

The existence of the effect cannot be the like of any non-existent object since such an object itself is not experienced by anyone. The proverbial barren-woman’s son is not admitted to be anyone’s product/effect. We can very well show a child and say ‘this child’s father is a purohita.’ Any relationship, sambandha, say, between a father and a child, is possible only between two existent entities. We cannot strike a relationship with anyone/anything that is non-existent. Hence to hold the effect-existence is that of non-existence is illogical, an impossibility.

प्रध्वंसः annihilation अपि too न not कार्यं effect स्यात् can be तस्य its उत्पत्तेः origin असम्भवात् impossible न not अस्ति existent कारकसम्बन्धः relation to producing some result प्रध्वंसस्य annihilation सुरोत्तमाः O, Best of Gods शून्यवत् just as void निरुपाख्यत्वात् cannot be explained ततो therefore न not अस्ति there जनिक्रिया origination

Can we say that the effect, kāryam, is of the nature of ‘pradhvamsa’, annihilation? The question is based on the acceptance by the nyāya discipline that there is a kind of abhāva, destruction, called ‘pradhvamsābhāva’, posterior non-existence, that is, non-existence post-annihilation. When a pot is destroyed, there is the posterior non-existence of the pot. In the present context, can we admit that the kāryam is of this type? The answer is: No. Since the annihilation, pradhvamsa, cannot originate, utpattiḥ, the kāryam cannot be of this type. In other words, pradhvamsa cannot come into being. We are talking about a kāryam, effect, that is essentially an existent one. So, by no means can we admit of a kāryam that is of the nature of pradhvamsa. There is no ‘kāraka sambandha’ to pradhvamsa. To explain: An existent object, say, clay, can be admitted to produce an effect, pot. There is a kāraka sambandha to clay. Pradhvamsa, being annihilation, non-existent, cannot have such a productive capacity/role. Actually, the situation of pradhvamsa, annihilation, is akin to a void, śūnya, and therefore inexplicable, just as a hare’s horn. Hence, the kāryam, effect, cannot be of this type.

After the objections to the status of ‘kāryam’, effect, have been enumerated and answered, a fresh proposal is advanced: Even if the kāryam is ‘asat’, non-existent (the proponent is arguing for a case of the kāryam being of the nature of non-existence basically), yet there is a difference. The non-existent kāryam is different from the case of a vandhyāputra, barren woman’s son. Hence we can establish the kāryatvam, effecthood, of the effect. This is the proposition, to be explained and rejected in detail in the sequel.

Now, the proposal stated in the earlier verse, 15, is being taken up for consideration. What is that difference (from the case of a vandhyāputra, barren-woman’s-son)?

A. Is it being a relation with the factor?
B. Is it being dependent on the act of being produced?
C. Is it being related with the existence, sattā?

Since the ‘asat’ is devoid of any characteristics, nirviśeṣa, admitting that it is related to any factor is no different from admitting that to a vandhyāputra. A vandhyāputra cannot be admitted to be a product, effect (since the cause, the vandhyā, the barren woman, cannot, by definition, beget a son). Hence the relation has to be with an entity that is endowed with some characteristic and not a nirviśeṣa entity like a vandhyāputra. If it is replied that such a character is this very relation (the relation of the ‘son’ with the barren-woman), then the defect of ātmāśraya, dependent on oneself, will arise: the character of being a factor is dependent on the ‘son’ for being an effect of the vandhyā.

If that character is different from the above-mentioned relation, that character too has to have some specific character to inhere in the asat (since the proponent has admitted the kāryam to be asat). Is that character:

J. the relation that was mentioned before
K. or a different character
L. or a third character

In the case of ‘J’ there is the defect of mutual dependence, anyonyāśrayatvam. ‘The relation of the son with the vandhyā mother’ cannot be admitted since the cause, the mother, is dependent on the ‘son’ the effect, to be the cause, and the son, the effect, has to depend on the cause, the mother, to be the effect. Since nothing unique in the son, the effect, can be demonstrated, which has no dependence with anything other than, outside of, the effect, this is a defect.

In the case of ‘K’, the characteristics of the fourth, etc. have not been admitted, there is the defect of ‘chakrakāpatti’, argument in a circle. It is like in a set of three entities, A, B and C, A depending on B and B on C and C on A. In the case of ‘L’, If the fourth, etc. are admitted, then the defect of anavasthā, infinite regress, cannot be avoided; the series of C being dependent on D, D on E, etc. will go on infinitely.

Therefore, the effect that is non-existent cannot be demonstrated to have a character of relation with the causal factor in any manner. It (the non-existent kāryam) cannot also be admitted to be in any way different from the absolutely non-existing hare’s horn, etc.

जनिक्रियाश्रयत्वं dependence on the act of being produced चेत् if विशेषः difference अस्य its तदा then अपि too तु indeed पूर्वोक्तदोषः the aforementioned defects सम्प्राप्तः accrue तस्य its न not अस्ति exists निवारकः a solution/relief

Now the second alternative suggested in the 16th verse above: ‘B. Is it (the difference) being dependent on the act of being produced?’ is taken up for consideration. Even this difference has to be related with some entity that is asat having a characteristic. Otherwise there will be no difference between a human-horn (non-existent) since even a human-horn will have to be admitted to have a characteristic. [The idea is: no characteristic of any nature can be admitted to such a category consisting of human/hare-horn, vandhyāputra, etc. All characterists/attributes can be said to inhere only in existent entities.] Is such a difference this same ‘act of being produced’ or any other? If it is this alone, then all the defects enumerated in the previous verse such as ‘ātmāśraya’ will repeat in this case too.