This essay advances a perspective on the Qur'anic conception of thinking, rationality, and critical reason. It begins with a discussion of the divine signs, the ayat, and the prominent profile that they take in the Qur'anic conception of thinking. This being the principal theme that runs through the whole of this paper, other topics discussed include an identification of the sources of knowledge in the Qur'an, factors that impede rational thinking, and a historical sketch of the golden age of scientific creativity and its eventual decline. A brief section is also devoted to ijtihad and where it fits into the scheme of our analysis on thinking. This is followed by a short comparison of Islamic and Western philosophical perceptions of rationality.

The Islamic notion of 'aql (intellect) embraces the faith dimension of knowledge that is also informed by ethical values. The prevailing reading of the Qur'an on rationality, which I present in the following pages, consists of a coalition of faith and reason which is also cognizant of the metaphysical aspect of reality and the limits therefore of human reason. This may be said to be a dividing line between the Islamic and Western conceptions of rationality, especially in its post-Enlightenment context. Thus it is not accurate to draw a direct parallel between them, as was the case in the Islamic discourse of the colonial period wherein many Muslim writers greatly admired the Western conception of rationality. The twentieth century Islamic discourse has shown awareness of that difference as it began to comprehend the subtleties inherent in the Western lexicon on rationality and its cultural overtones. (1)

1. The Divine Signs (Ayat)

The Qur'an teaches an essential doctrine of the ayat (God's signs in the universe) functioning as pointers to the providential purpose at all levels of creation. Thus it makes frequent references such as la-ayatin li-gawmin ya'gilun (signs for a people who understand--exercise their intellect). This evidential role of the Divine signs entails an accompanying demand placed upon humans to engage in a rational understanding of the ayat and draw conclusions on the discovery of truth and correct guidance.

The human reception of the ayat thus depends ultimately upon the integrity of reason, without which humans would be incapable neither of comprehending the signs nor of responding to their message. The more abundant is an individual's native endowment of reason, the greater is the possibility for him or her to attain a larger magnitude of understanding and a higher level of response.

The nexus between faith and reason thus constitutes the hallmark of intelligent Islamic spirituality, wherein human intellect and emotions are guided toward harmony with one another. The Qur'an repeatedly provokes its reciters to think about the signs of God in the universe and within themselves, to understand God's illustrious presence in them, and ultimately to vindicate the truth. The word ayah and its plural ayat occur in the Qur'an over 400 times, although the whole of the Qur'an introduces itself as a collection of ayat. To quote the Qur'an: We will soon show them Our signs (ayat) in the universe (afaq) and in themselves (anfusihim) so that it becomes clear to them that this [revelation] is indeed the truth. (2) And in the earth there are signs (ayat) for those who seek certitude (al-muqinin)--as also within your own selves. Will you not then see? (3)

God reveals the truth in a variety of ways, some explicit and others by allusion, the latter mainly through the modality of the ayat, in order to provoke and engage the human intellect. The signs of God cannot be readjust off the face of the signs but require thinking and reflection. This is indicated in the phrase "We shall soon show them Our signs ..." which suggests that the signs may not be instantaneously visible to the naked eye. The whole concept of ayat seeks to forge a dynamic relationship between revelation and reason: (Here is) a Book which We have sent dozen to thee ... that you may meditate on its signs, and that men of understanding may reflect. (4) A sign is also a portent and allusion to something other than itself and should not therefore be seen as the final message and purpose of the revelation containing it.

Approximately 750 verses, or nearly one-eighth of the Qur'an, exhort the readers to study nature, history, the Qur'an itself, and humanity at large. The text employs a range of expressions in its appeal to those who listen (yasma'un), those who think (yatafakkarun), those who reflect (yatadabbarun), those who observe (yanzurun), those who exercise their intellect (ya'qilun), those who take heed and remember (yatadhakkarun), those who ask questions (yas'alun), those who develop an insight (yatafaqqahun), and those who know (ya'lamun). (5) These and their derivatives (mostly occurring in the active verbal form) consist essentially of open invocations and encouragement to thinking that is not limited by a methodology or framework. Afala yatadabbarun al-Qur'an (do they not do tadabbur in the Qur'An) (6) ? Tadabbur means concentrated and goal-oriented thinking provoked by the challenge to find something new or to solve a difficult problem. Qur'anic references to thinking and the exercise of intellect occur in conjunction with basically five major themes: belief in the Oneness and munificence of God (tawhid); reflection on the Qur'an; man and the universe; historical precedent; and thinking itself.

References to 'aql (intellect) and its derivatives occur on 49 occasions in the text. The typical Qur'anic expression, ulu'l-albab (those who possess vision and understanding), and its synonym, ulu'l-nuha (people endowed with intellectual abilities) occur 33 times in the text. Such expressions are frequently juxtaposed with the exposition of ayat, such as in the verse this is how God expounds His ayat so that you may reflect over them (7) or in the verse We have indeed shown to you Our ayat, if you would only think about them (8). Repeated references to pondering over the ayat are variously nuanced such that they embrace within their fold the widest spectrum of people who may be endowed with different intellectual abilities and endowments. (9)

Al-Isfahani defines thought (al-fikr) as the power of the mind that facilitates access to knowledge ('ilm). Thinking (al-tafakkur) is the movement of that power which is driven by the intellect (al-'aql), and this can only occur when an initial image of the subject is attainable in the mind of the thinker. Thinking cannot therefore proceed over something of which no image exists in the mind. This can be said of the self of God, for example, as man has no image on which to focus his thought. (10) Man can only think over the attributes of God through the observation of His signs. Broadly speaking, thinking proceeds over the whole of the created universe without any exception; indeed, the Qur'an repeatedly invites such in respect to both the physical and abstract aspects of reality, both in the present and in regards to bygone history that is only perceived by the intellect rather than sense perception. Often the Qur'an gives examples, parables, and narratives of other nations, and then follows them with the reminder, usually addressed to the Prophet, to recount the narratives of the past so that the people may think and reflect over them (11).

A hierarchy of five perceptive-cognitive functions is also suggested, including and extending through sam' (hearing), basar (sight), fikr (thinking), dhikr (remembrance), and yaqin (certainty). (12) Given such a scale of intensified perceptive understanding, the Qur'an propounds the notion of ulul'l-albab, the thoughtful individuals who are possessed of proper understanding and response. 'Aql is thus tied to the cognitive dimension of faith. Significantly, the very term for reason and intelligence in Arabic, al-'aql, has at the core of its basic meaning the practical idea of "restraining" and "binding," that is, of holding one's self back from blameworthy conduct--being an interior self-imposed limit. Qur'an commentators understand thinking (tafakkur, tafkir) as pondering and reflection, which is a mental activity and process, not an outcome. Tafakkur is considered as a form of 'ibadah (worship of God) if it is done with sincerity and good purpose. 'Aql in its Qur'anic conception is also one that conceives the truth, and it is always in search of it. This conception of 'aql precludes one that is rigid, arrogant, and misleading. Some have also drawn the conclusion from the ubiquitous Qur'anic emphasis on thinking that all Muslims must strive to be thinking individuals. (13)

Al-Qaradawi has quoted Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya's (d. 751/1350) own observation as well as some epithetic statements the latter narrated from other leading figures to the effect that "thinking for an hour is better than worship of many years," and another statement that "thinking for an hour is superior to a whole night of prayer." To this Ibn Qayyim added that "thinking is the act of the heart whereas worship is the act of one's limbs, and the former is superior to the latter." The pious caliph 'Umar ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz (d. 101/718) is similarly quoted: "thinking over the bounties of God is the best form of worship". 'Abbas Mahmud al-'Agqad went so far as to say that "thinking-al--tafkir--is an Islamic obligation. Just as God Most High ordered us to worship Him by performing prayer and fasting, He also ordered us to think in numerous verses and in so many different ways, all of which vindicate thinking as one of the cardinal messages of the Qur'an." (14)

The Qur'anic vision of knowledge may be characterized as knowledge that is founded in understanding (fahm) and insight (tafaqquh). This is indicated in the numerous references in the text which encourage rational observation, thought, and reflection on the observable world and the universe beyond. It is knowledge espoused with insight that the Qur'an has visualized in its expression al-tafaqquh fi'l-din, that is, understands the religion, signifying a rational and inquisitive approach to constructing a worldview of Islam. Islam, in other words, advises analytical knowledge and understanding that generate insight rather than a purely dogmatic approach. The two approaches are reflected in the familiar expressions al-iman al-tafsili (faith based on detailed analysis) as opposed to al-iman al-ijmali (undigested and uncomprehended faith). The former is preferred by common acknowledgement of the ulema of all the leading schools and madhhabs. Thus it is declared in a verse: If some individuals from every multitude would devote themselves to the study of religion (li-yatafaqqahu fi'l-din) and admonish their people ... (15). We also note the distinction between thought-based knowledge and transmitted or received knowledge reflected in the twin juristic and hadith-related expressions of 'ilm al-diraya, that is, knowledge based on understanding, and 'ilm al-Tiwaya, that is, report-based and transmitted knowledge. The former is based on understanding and insight (diraya wa tafaqquh) and takes priority over the latter. Whereas 'ilm al-riwaya relies mainly on memory and retention, 'ilm al-diraya is based on cognition, understanding, and analysis. Thus, if there are hadith reports, or any factual reports for that matter, which do not stand to reason and understanding, they would be most likely discounted and abandoned, with the exception only of devotional matters ('ibadat) which are based on faith and submission more than on rational analysis.

Another feature of the Qur'anic vision of thinking is indicated in its emphasis on wisdom and good judgment (hikmah) which signifies the quality of thinking, its regard for values, and its outcome. Wisdom and good judgment can easily be said to be more important than technical know-how and expertise, as it can guide expert knowledge as to its proper application and the attainment of excellence.

The Qur'an mentions hikmah 20 times, and in about ten of these it is immediately preceded by the word kitab, which is a reference to divine scripture--primarily the Qur'an, but also other divinely revealed scriptures. The text thus says with reference to Jesus that God Most High will teach him the Scripture and wisdom (hikmah), the Torah and the Gospel". (16) The juxtaposition of kitab and hikmah is often contextualized by a reference to the sending of prophets who teach the people and guide them with scripture and wisdom (e.g., wa yu'allimuhum al-kitaba wa'l-hikmata) as it is said of the Prophet Muhammad" (17); the descendants of Prophet Abraham (18) and of Luqman (19). The holistic, superior, and indivisible value of hikmah in the Qur'an is underscored in one of its verses to the effect that when God bestows wisdom on someone that person is indeed granted an immense source of goodness (20). To mention hikmah together with the Book evidently means that the Qur'an should be read with wisdom and divorcing the one from the other by taking a totally dogmatic approach to the Qur'an goes against the divine purpose and intention of its revelation. To read the Qur'an in the light of hikmah thus means a comprehensive reading that reaches beyond the obvious meaning of its words to encapsulate the goal and purpose of its message and then also reflection on the ways and means of how its benefits can be realized for the individual and society. (21)

The repeated juxtaposition of the "Book and Hikmah" in the Qur'an led some commentators, such as the Successor Qatadah ibn Di'ama al-Sadusi (d.118 H), Ibn Wahhab, the disciple of Imam Malik (d. 179/795), and the Imam al-Shafi'i (d. 205/ 820) himself to the somewhat unusual observation that "hikmah" is a reference to the Sunna of the Prophet. Many have taken and followed this view; but since the text does not specify such a meaning for hikmah, the word should convey its natural and unqualified meaning as I have depicted in this presentation. Good judgment, insight, balance and avoidance of extremes, the ability to distinguish between truth and falsehood, and procedural accuracy are commonly associated with hikmah and hikmah as such becomes a dimension of evaluative thinking in. its Qur'anic idiom. Besides, when the Qur'an declares that God Most High endowed the Prophets David and Solomon and also the renowned sage Luqman with hikmah, it could not have referred to the Sunna of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), as Sunna as such did not exist in those times. The Qur'anic usage of hikmah reinforces the holistic quality of thinking; hikmah also seeks to forge a close tie between reason and emotion ('aql wa galb) thereby encouraging what is now known as emotional intelligence. This is how the Qur'an and also the Sunna often deliver their messages, for, unlike the modern statutory laws and texts, the Qur'anic guidance, commands, and prohibitions are often espoused with appeals to the heart and mind of their readers. (22)

Al-Isfahani defined hikmah as "the realization of the truth through knowledge and intellect and it is manifested in the performance of benevolent deeds ." (23) According to another definition, "wisdom signifies comprehension of the truth and reality and the ability to avoid corruption in one's quest to attain perfection." (24) Random House Dictionary of the English Language similarly defines wisdom as "knowledge of what is true or right coupled with just judgment as to action." Wisdom is thinking informed by the light of the heart that often leads to action and contemplates its consequences in relationship with other relevant factors. This may strike a note with the renowned hadith in which it is declared that "fearing God is the pinnacle of wisdom (ra's al-hikmati makhafat Allah)." (25) It is presumably for this reason that the great religions of the world have urged the seekers of knowledge to combine it with wisdom. It is wisdom that confers a higher quality on thinking and helps knowledge to be used for the promotion of good giving it meaning and direction.

In an effort to train the individual to enhance his or her quality of thinking, al-Ghazali (d. 505/1111) discusses the two sources of knowledge that Muslim tradition has recognized. One of these is through human teaching and learning (al-ta'allum al-insani) and the other through divine teaching (al-ta'lim al-rabbani). The former is externally transmitted from teacher to student, whereas the latter is conveyed by the Universal Intellect which is superior, more intense, and more effective than human teaching. This knowledge is internally acquired either through revelation (wahy), which is a prerogative of the Prophets, or it is acquired through meditation, thinking, and reflection. Al-Ghazali subscribes to the view that the essence of all knowledge is centred in the inner self of the human person in much the same way as growth potential that is vested in the soil and seed, and it is through teaching that the individual's potential is developed. These two aspects of knowledge, that is, the external and the internal, are complementary to one another. This is because no one can possibly teach or learn from any teacher all the sciences, some of which are learned through teaching but the rest inferred by the reflective thought of the individual. It is therefore important that the avenues of learning remain open both through teaching and through inner reflection, thinking, and illumination. (26) This is another way of saying that all knowledge is acquired and developed through the senses, inner reflection and thinking, both of which partake in natural endowment and development through external transmission and teaching.

Al-Ghazali's views on the internal and external sources of knowledge tended to correspond with those of Ibn Sina (d. 428/1037), but which differed, at least partially, from those of the second/ninth century Ikhwan al-Safa (c. 373/983). All knowledge, according to the latter, is acquired through the senses and none inheres in human nature. Knowledge that is developed through thought and reflection also originate in the senses. The same analysis is extended to the axiomatic knowledge of postulates that are derived and confirmed through the senses. In support of this theory Ikhwan al-Safa have cited the Qur'anic verse: God brought you out of the wombs of your mothers while you knew nothing (27). All knowledge is therefore acquired knowledge, a view which may strike a closer note with some of the modern theories on the subject. (28)

Islamic thought in the middle ages did not admit the ontological distinction between tangible entities that could be sensuously apprehended and entities of a spiritual or subliminal nature. This may be said to be a more sound and realistic view of reality than is allowed for by the modern positivist doctrines of science. Being is manifested at various levels and in several forms, none of which is less real than the other. Arabic thought employed the notions systematized in Stoic theory that divide being into three locations: verbal utterance, psychic representation, and reality--without this last in any sense having exclusive title to Being. Al-Farabi (d. 950 CE) took up this view and assimilated psychic representation to the entities of reason. Others rehearsed this division with the addition of a fourth location, that of Scripture. Reality thus had a four-fold manifestation, depending on whether the subject existed immediately in itself or whether its like was graven in the mind (dhihn, psyche) composed of sounds, which together indicates the psychic representation, or was manifested in characters standing for sound and speech. All four have a basic characteristic in common which is existence (wujud, haqiqah). (29)

The Islamic and Western perceptions of creative and evaluative thinking both recognize this to be a skill that is developed through training and controlled exercise. It is through training and thinking that we adopt new patterns of perceiving reality which we are able to see differently and creatively. It is generally acceded that creative thinking and critical thinking go hand-in-hand and complement one another. Critical thinking means "involving or exercising skilled judgment or observation." Thinking is critical when it evaluates the reasoning behind a decision. Such evaluation must, however, be carried forth in a constructive manner. (30) The purpose of critical thinking is to achieve understanding, evaluate viewpoints, and solve problems. In general, one's thinking is likely to become critical when concrete learning experiences precede abstract thought." This strikes a parallel note, in its Islamic idiom, with thinking that is espoused with hikmah.

The famous yet controverted hadith "The first (being) God created is the intelligence (awwalu ma khalaqa Allahu al-'agla)" sparked prolonged discussions among Muslim thinkers over many centuries over the implications of this statement. Among the issues debated was the priority of reason over revelation and the respective role of each in their mutual inter-dependence. Another issue was whether the disparity among humans in respect of reason also affected the modalities of moral obligation. Some prominent thinkers including Abu Bakr al-Razi (d. 313/925) apparently advocated the primacy of reason over the revelation. This would be properly known as "rationalism," which deems the primacy of reason over revelation. This is different from "rationality" which means treating any issue by using reason without giving reason priority.

II. Sources and Instruments of Knowledge

Commenting on the Qur'anic passage quoted earlier, Muhammad Iqbal observed that the Qur'an regards both anfus (self) and afaq (world) as sources of knowledge. God reveals His signs in inner as well as outer experience. The Qur'an thus opens fresh vistas of knowledge in the domain of man's inner experience. Mystic experience and intuition, then, however unusual and abnormal, must now be regarded as perfectly natural and open to scrutiny like other aspects of human experience. (32) But inner experience is only one source of human knowledge. The outer experience in the Qur'an, Iqbal continues on the same page, unfolds two other sources of knowledge--nature and history, and it is in tapping these sources of knowledge that "the spirit of Islam is seen at its best."

The Qur'an sees the signs of reality in the sun, the moon, the alternation of day and night, the perpetual changes of the winds, the variety of human colors and tongues, and in fact in the whole of nature as revealed to the sense-perception of man. The Muslim's duty is to reflect on these signs and not to pass by them as if he is deaf and blind (cf. al-A'raf. 179), for he who does not see these signs in this life will remain blind to the realities of the life to come. The divine signs are observed through sense-perception using mainly the faculties of hearing, sight, and intellect: Have they not traveled in the land so as to endow their hearts with understanding? (33) The emphasis in this verse is on the faculty of reason and understanding, suggesting that not all of our information about nature comes directly from sensation, for if that were the case we would be no different from animals.

Frequent references to sense-perception as the principal mode of receiving the ayat show the scientific/experimental import of the Qur'an. The Qur'an goes even further to suggest sense perception as the only avenue of knowledge, as the text already reviewed provides: God brought you out of the wombs of your mothers while you knew nothing, and He gave you the hearing and the sight and the heart. (34) Knowledge of the signs is therefore acquired through the use of these faculties. In another verse, the Qur'an praises those who listen to the word and follow the best of it (or make the best possible interpretation thereof) (35). This verse apparently subjects the data of sense-perception to the exercise of intellectual selection. The text also teaches that sense-perception does not perceive all reality: But nay! I swear by that which you see, and that which you do not see (36). Certainty (yaqin) may also be beyond the reach of human intellect, as the human mind may be blurred by the variables of time and space. What is deemed certain today may be uncertain tomorrow.

We also note that according to the teachings of the Qur'an, the universe is dynamic in its origin, finite, and capable of increase. Early Muslim thinkers do not seem to have grasped the Qur'anic emphasis on inductive reasoning and experimentation. It was indeed a slow realization for Muslim thinkers to note "that the spirit of the Qur'an was essentially anti-classical." Putting full confidence in Greek reasoning, Muslim thinkers tried to understand the Qur'an in the light of Greek philosophy, which in the beginning of their careers they had studied with so much enthusiasm.

The substance of Iqbal's analysis on this subject is also upheld by Malik bin Nabi (1905-1973), who understands the creative impulse of the Qur'an as the motivating force behind the efflorescence of science at a time when Muslim thinkers began to grasp the full impact of the Qur'an on experimentation and inductive reasoning. (37)

The dynamic conception of the universe in the Qur'an is also seen by its conception of life as an evolutionary movement in time. History thus constitutes the third source of knowledge in the Qur'an. It is one of the most essential teachings of the Qur'an, as Iqbal has further observed, that nations are collectively judged, and suffer for their misdeeds here and now. The Qur'an thus constantly cites historical instances, and urges upon the reader to reflect on the past and present experiences of mankind:

Already, before your time, have precedents been made. Traverse the earth then and see what has been the end of those who falsify the signs of God! (38)

If a calamity has befallen you, a calamity like it has already befallen others; we alternate the days of successes and reverses among peoples. (39)

And

And among those whom We created are a people who guide others with truth, and in accordance therewith act justly. But as for those who treat Our signs as lies, We gradually bring them down by means of which they know not; and though I lengthen their days, verily My stratagem is effectual. (40)

The Qur'an's interest in history as a source of human knowledge extends farther than mere indication of historical generalizations. "It has given us one of the most fundamental principles of historical criticism." (41) Since accuracy in recording facts is an indispensable condition of history as a science, accuracy depends ultimately on those who report them. The reporter's personal character is thus an important factor in judging his testimony. The Qur'an says O believers! If any iniquitous man comes to you with a report, clear it up at once (42)).

It is the application of the principle embodied in this verse to the reporters of the Prophet's traditions out of which were gradually evolved the canons of historical criticism.

A scientific treatment of history, however, requires a wider experience, a greater maturity of practical reason, and a fuller realization of certain basic ideas regarding the nature of life and time. These are in the main three, and taken together they constitute the foundation of Qur'anic teaching.

(1) The unity of human origin: The Qur'an states: And We have created you all from one breath of life (43). But the perception of life as an organic unity is a slow achievement. Islam sowed the germ of this aspiration and it became a Qur'anic assignment of man to work towards its realization. Notwithstanding the fact that Christianity, long before Islam, brought the message of equality to mankind, the Roman Empire had no more than a general and abstract conception of human unity. On the other hand, the growth of territorial nationalism in Europe has tended to stifle the broad human element in the art and literature of Europe. European colonialism was also inspired by a self-image of superiority. Europe assumed a superior image that non-European peoples could be freely dominated, exploited, and subjugated. (44) It was quite otherwise with Islam. The impulse of Islam was from the outset to make the idea of human unity a living factor in the Muslim experience that was to be taken towards fuller fruition.

(2) A keen sense of the reality of time, and the concept of life as a continuous movement in time: The Qur'anic view of the alternation of day and night as a sign of the ultimate Reality which appears in a fresh glory every moment and the tendency in Muslim metaphysics to regard time as objective--all this constituted the intellectual heritage and ideals of Islam.

(3) The merger between religious and secular values: This is a unique feature of Islamic thought which is distinguished by its attempt to bring harmony between them, probably for the first time in history. It was in the state of Madinah that we encounter a clear example where universally proclaimed moral values formed the criteria of political judgment. Political leaders and statesmen were expected to recognize not only the value of efficiency, but also of justice, human dignity, equality, and freedom. In his renowned Philosophy of History, Hegel (1770-1831) recognized that the unity between the secular and the spiritual took place in Islamic society and civilization long before it made any impact in the modern West:

We must therefore regard [the reconciliation between the secular and spiritual] as commencing rather in the enormous contrast between the spiritual religious principles, and the barbarian Real World. For spirit as the consciousness of an inner world is, at tzhe commencement, itself still in the abstract form. All that is secular is consequently given over to rudeness and capricious violence. The Mohammedan principle, the enlightenment of the oriental world, is the first to contravene this barbarism and caprice. We find it developing itself later and more rapidly than Christianity; for the latter needed eight centuries to grow into a political form. (45)

The modern West followed the example of the historical Islamic world in demanding that holders of political power operate under a set of moral rules. But as the modern West harmonized the secular and religious only nationally, the international realm was free to operate under the dynamics of power politics and secular rudeness. This failure was a cause of the senseless violence that claimed over 100 million war victims in the twentieth century. Recognition of the danger of the purely secular politics led to the creation of the United Nations, yet even this effort was undermined by political realists who enjoyed a disproportionate sway among the political pundits of Europe and America.

Safi has rightly noted the irony that contemporary Muslim societies have unfortunately followed a similar course in decoupling the secular and the religious and now find themselves entangled in a crisis of legitimacy. Many Muslim regimes are driven by the logic of power and operate outside the realm of moral correctness. It is alarming to see that this decoupling has impacted the religiously inspired movements, which seem to succumb to the logic of power in their readiness to employ amoral--even immoral--strategies in their fight against political corruption and oppression. (46)

III. Obstacles to Correct Reasoning

The Qur'anic emphasis on pondering over the ayat is also underscored by a set of guidelines to ensure a correct outcome of reflection and thinking over them. The text thus draws attention to a series of exclusions and factors that stand in the way of the proper functioning of intellect:

(1) Pursuit of caprice (hawa) which may consist of love, hatred, pomposity and prejudice that confound impartiality and sound judgment: Have you seen the (predicament of) one who took as his god his own vain desire (hawa) and God left him to stray? (47) And if you follow their desires after the knowledge has come to you, you shall have no guardian OT helper in God. (48) The choice is between two alternatives: caprice (hawa) and guidance (huda); the former evidently obfuscates one's attempt to attain the latter.

(2) Pursuit of conjecture in the face of certitude: And surely conjecture (al-Zann) avails nothing against the truth (al-Haqq). (49) And take not a position on that of which you have no knowledge ('ilm), surely the hearing, the sight and the heart are all accountable. (50) Knowledge and truth stand in contradistinction with the pursuit of Zann. Note that the text says one should not follow Zann until it is established and elevated to the rank of 'ilm. It does not say that one should avoid Zann altogether. In another place, Zann occurs side by side with hawa or that which they themselves desires. (51) This is the kind of Zann that is meant. Knowledge is established by sense-perception that often begins with a measure of speculation and doubt but which is affirmed by the light of reason and conviction. Some commentators maintain that the main context for this guideline is religion: thus it is said that one should not take speculative positions in matters of belief. As for scientific enquiry and pursuit of knowledge, Zann is neither discouraged nor avoidable. (52)

The ultimate purpose of this engagement is to attain the truth. Once the truth is attained, one should then commit oneself to it and observe it: Then what is there beyond the truth--except misguidance? (53) And the word of thy Lord ends with truth and with justice. There shall be no change to His words (54).

(3) Blind imitation of others: The correct exercise of reason in Islam is tied to personal conviction as opposed to indiscriminate following of others, hallowed custom, and precedent. These must be judged in the light of reason and abandoned if found deviant and misleading: The misguided will say, as the Qur'an provides: Nay, we follow the way of our ancestors, even if their ancestors did not know nor were they rightly guided. (55) This was the response that Prophet Abraham and other great prophets received from their detractors, but the text address them again and again that both you and your ancestors were clearly misguided. (56) As we shall presently elaborate, indiscriminate imitation of others is widely held to be the single most damaging cause of the decline of creative thinking among Muslims.

(4) Oppressive Dictatorship: The Qur'an takes to task arrogant dictators and those who support them and follow them. Hence the plea of those who say O our Lord! We obeyed our princes and great men, but they misled us (57) should be of no merit. In a number of other places the text denounces the Pharaoh and Qarun for their oppressive ways who misled their people in rejecting the guidance that was conveyed to them. (58)

IV. Decline of Critical Thinking

I shall not retrace well-documented history that Muslim thinkers were pioneers in the creation of new knowledge. It was due to the impact of the Qur'an that, in contrast to the Greeks who excelled in deductive method of reasoning and logic, Muslim scientists distinguished themselves in inductive and experimental approaches to scientific enquiry. The golden period of Muslim science started around 700 AD and lasted until about 1350 AD. Great thinkers such as Ibn Sina, Jabir ibn Hayyan, Abu Bakr Zakarriya al-Razi, Abu Rayhan al-Biruni, Ibn al-Nafis al-Dimashgi, al-Khawarizmi, and many others have left a rich legacy of contributions to the advancement of sciences in anatomy, medicine, mathematics, astronomy, chemistry, optics, etc. (59)

After the fourteenth century creative thinking began to decline in the Islamic world due to a variety of factors, including the Mongol invasion and burning of Baghdad, the defeat of the Muslim Arabs in Spain and the continuing crusades, the collapse of the Ottoman caliphate, and the ensuing onslaught of European colonialism. The creative impulse of Islamic thought suffered setbacks as a result. Muslims were also beset with many internal problems including the alienation of philosophers, scientists, and thinkers from the theologians, sectarian controversies, and the prevalence of intellectual conservatism and taqlid (imitation of past authority). Philosophy and the sciences fell into a rapid decline while more rigid forms of instruction and narrower curricula prevailed. It was argued that orthodoxy was being threatened and that there was a need to restrain thinkers in order to defend religion. The latitude and diversity of discourse that expanded the scope of religious sciences, kalam, tafsir, hadith, and fiqh gave way to narrower criteria of kufr, bid'ah, and taqlid and the so-called closing of the door of ijtihad (sadd bab al-ijtihad). (60)

More recently, a certain abuse of Islamic authority operated by a dogmatic radicalism has exacerbated the decline of creative thought among Muslims. The situation is not helped by the prevalence of passivity in popular culture concerning the dogmatic excesses of these ardent proponents of taqlid. One of the salient features of this mindset is a certain ignorance of the essential impulse of the Qur'an on creative thought. Malik bin Nabi put it succinctly that the crisis of a civilization and a society at a critical point of its history "is not the paucity of its material objects but the poverty of its ideas". (61)

V. What of Ijtihad?

The Qur'anic appeal to rational thinking and enquiry is not restrained by the methodology of ijtihad. There is, in fact, no clear text on ijtihad in the Qur'an. Ijtihad as a concept originates in the hadith of the Prophet and the practice and precedent of companions. The methodology of ijtihad which is the basic theme of the science of the sources of law (i.e. usul al-fiqh) is itself a product of ijtihad. It seems that the Prophet, peace be on him, also saw ijtihad as a creative impulse rather than engaging in the technicalities of legal reasoning--as the usul al-fiqh later developed in abundance. When the Prophet spoke of ijtihad or when he approved of its application, he seems to have done so in terms of ijtihad qua creative thinking.

One would readily admit that imposing restrictions on thinking, even if it were possible, by cultures and legal traditions could be exaggerated, in which case it would be prone to acquiring negative dimensions. One would not, on the other hand, advocate free thinking that is not limited by some kind of goal-orientation and values. Even the actual process of creative thinking, as earlier noted, is a skill that could be learned and refined by stages to direct it into productive avenues. The liberal tradition of the West tends to impose minimal restrictions on thinking whereas Islam tends to take a more guided approach to creative reasoning. Whereas both the Islamic and Western traditions recognize the authority of reason as a criterion of judgment, the liberal tradition has, unlike Islam, isolated spirituality and faith from the ambit of scientific rationality.

However, the methodology of ijtihad was also influenced in the course of time by a variety of factors, including the political climate, the change of caliphate (khilafah) to monarchy (mulk), Hellenistic thought in relationship to analogy (qiyas) and its syllogistic components, and the rift between the ulema and ruling authorities. (62) Usul al-fiqh and its proposed methodology followed a difficult course and became embroiled in technicality that had adverse consequences for ijtihad. What is needed now is to recapture the purity of this vital concept, to make ijtihad as our principal instrument for originality and healthy adjustment, but also to revise and reform some aspects of the theory of ijtihad itself that are no longer responsive to the prevailing conditions and challenges of our time.

I have elsewhere discussed the theory of ijtihad and its related issues and space here does not permit engagement in detail. (63) Yet I conclude this section by suggesting, however briefly, that the conventional theory of ijtihad needs to be revised and reformed in respect of the need 1) to recognise the validity of collective and consultative ijtihad (ijtihad jama'i) side by side with that of ijtihad by individual scholars; and 2) to allow experts in other fields such as science, economics, and medicine to carry out ijtihad in their respective fields if they are equipped with adequate knowledge of the source evidence of Islam. They may alternatively sit together with, or seek advice from, those learned in Shari'ah.

Ijtihad has in the past been often used as an instrument of diversity and disagreement rather than of unity and consensus. Although disagreement must admittedly be allowed in principle, yet there is a greater need today for unity and consensus. Scholars and learned bodies should not perhaps encourage excessive engagement in diversity of schools and sects but try to find ways that would help to close the gap between them and encourage unity on principles. This may require policy guidelines for different settings and countries, and, if so, that should be reflected in our approaches to ijtihad. Certain guidelines may also be provided by thinkers and leaders to stimulate consensus-oriented ijtihad within the ranks of the judiciary and legislative assemblies.

Ijtihad has in the past been conceived basically as a legal concept and methodology. Our understanding of the source evidence on ijtihad does not specify such a framework for ijtihad. Rather, we think of the original conception of ijtihad as a problem-solving formula for the problems encountered by individual Muslims and the Muslim community. This would confirm our view of the need to broaden the scope of ijtihad to other disciplines beyond the framework of fiqh and usul al-fiqh.

According to a legal maxim of Islamic jurisprudence, there should be no ijtihad in the presence of a clear text of the Qur'an and hadith (la ijtihad ma'al-nass). This maxim should also be revised. This is because of the possibility that the text in question could now be seen in a different light and given a fresh interpretation in a different context. What we are saying is that the legal text may need to be understood first and that by itself may involve ijtihad. Hence ijtihad may not be precluded if it could advance a fresh understanding of the text in the first place.

The persistent decline of critical reason among Muslims is due partly to the notion that the exercise of personal judgment and ijtihad ceased with the epoch-making works of the legists and imams of the past. Added to this is the prevailing mindset that a Muslim should follow one or the other of the established schools of thought and abandon his judgment in favor of interpretations of the earlier centuries whose originators could have no conception of the necessities of the twenty-first century Muslims. Until about 1500 CE, independent ijtihad allowed Muslims and Muslim societies to continually adapt in the face of changing societal conditions and new advances in knowledge. Unfortunately, as Muslim civilization began to weaken about four centuries ago in the face of Western advances, Muslims began to adopt a more conservative stance in an attempt to preserve traditional values and institutions. As a result Muslim thinkers became inclined to view innovation and adaptation negatively. For all the rhetoric and symbolic form of the neo-radicals that tend to dominate the audience of Muslims, the spirit of Islam is often palpably missing from their endeavors, while more than ever ijtihad is needed where women, education, and politics are concerned.

VI. Islam and the West

Scientific rationality essentially reduces intelligence to the level of neural chemistry where mental and behavioral phenomena are understood merely as manifestations of physical processes. It tends to deprive man of his noblest dimensions (faith, love, beauty), separates the soul from the body, and the sensory from the intelligible. In the realm of economics, man is merely a producer and consumer of goods and is moved solely by his individual self-interest. This too is opposed to the Islamic viewpoint which also sees in man morality and transcendent faith.

This physicalist analysis of intelligence is now increasingly being seen as conceptually inadequate. The real question is whether one may admit a human dimension which is autonomous and irreducible to a physical mass. In Moravia's phrase "can one posit something which exists and yet at the same time is non physical? Do the rejection of the soul and the achievements attained by bio and neurosciences oblige us to hold that man is nothing but body?" (64) Recently these have been attempted by some creative thinkers to reconceptualize notions of 'reason' and 'intelligence' along anti-materialistic lines drawing on the experience of older non-Western traditions, or even popular folk conceptions. (65)

Islamic philosophy--which mainly studies purposes, as against science which mainly studies causes--sees, in line with the Qur'anic teaching, the role of objects and events as signs of divine presence and action. Faith is understood by Muslims not as a limitation on science but as its vista for enrichment and perfection. (66)

The variant perspectives of Western philosophy and science are also behind the Western puzzlement why Muslims have not become more secularized. This unwarranted assumption has in the past led to mistaken assessments of Islam and continues to foster genuine misunderstanding concerning the real nature of Islamic religion and intellectual traditions. The misunderstanding is unfortunately not unique to Westerners. For the majority of Muslims today are also woefully uninformed of the depth and scope of their rich heritage on the authoritative validity of reason. Thinking Muslims should work to vindicate the symbiotic relation of faith and reason in their religion and see it as a source of enrichment and contribution of Islam to human understanding and civilization.

VII. Conclusion

This essay advanced a Qur'anic perspective on thinking, which is affirmative in critical and goal-oriented thinking and also provides a set of guidelines that ensures its purity and purpose from negative reductionist influences. The guidelines so provided are also rich in advancing a spiritual dimension with the understanding that thinking which is not informed by morality and faith can lose its direction and purpose and can even become harmful to human welfare. From the Qur'anic vantage point, the sciences of nature should be key to our cognition of the signs of God in the universe. For this may be instrumental in solving individual and social problems without interrupting the cosmic order and the human habitat on earth. The blatant disregard of ethical values in science has weakened scientists' sense of responsibility and contributed to the degradation of the human condition on the globe.

Since thinking is a skill that can be advanced by self-application and training, it is amenable to guidance, bereavement, and enrichment. Universities and institutions of learning in Muslim countries are generally short of resources, and those who have the means still fall short, to their detriment, of nurturing the culture of reading and research among their students and scholars. Centers of higher learning may do well to establish a new order of relationship between the natural sciences and humanities, and between all fields of knowledge and human welfare and also the avenues of benefit to society. The present-day education system is due for a reappraisal in order to instill creative thinking and breadth of vision among students and scholars that is informed by the inter-relatedness of the various disciplines of learning. This could be done, as one observer suggested, "by adding sufficient number of courses in humanities to the science and engineering curricula, by cross-disciplinary interaction and collaboration." (67) The main characteristic of the human sciences, from the Islamic perspective, is that they are not value-free and have to be incorporated within the value system of Islam that is informed by the ethical and human dimension of values.

It is ironic to note, however, that the vast majority of Muslims are wont to rote reading of the Qur'an which is patently vacuous and devoid of thinking. The Qur'an is usually read, committed to memory, and cited for its spiritual merit rather than intellectual stimulation and enrichment. This is evidently not the advice one obtains from the Qur'an itself Al-Qaradawi has rightly observed about the current realities of public education in Muslim countries that "the system relies on memorization and cramming more than it does on comprehension and analysis. A typical weakness of this method is that the memorizer forgets as soon as the exams are over. But if what is learned is founded in understanding and comprehension, its substance will remain in the mind and will not be prone to oblivion so quickly." (68) But the issue that we raise here is well-entrenched and originates in the overall emphasis that most educationists and jurists of earlier times have placed on the study of the Qur'an, hadith and fiqh manuals, often calling attention to words and sentences of the text at the expense of comprehension and analysis. The basic approach to Qur'an studies thus emphasized correct pronunciation and memorization. This repetitive system of learning was particularly pronounced in the context of child education, although it was not confined to this framework as other and more advanced levels of Islamic scholarship also bore the same influence. (69)

Notwithstanding the profound influence of the Qur'an on the thoughts, mores, and cultures of Muslim individuals and societies, thinking by its nature does not lend itself to any predetermined framework and guideline. It seems that the Qur'an also seeks only to provide signs and signposts on thinking, but the subjective and innately individual bent of thinking is often inspired by imagination and insight which cannot be encapsulated by definitions and guidelines. A creative mind is unique by its attributes, and thinking that originates in a learned and upright individual is one of the greatest gifts of creation that can itself fit the description of divine example, or ayah, of God on earth.

It remains to be added though that imaginative thinking has also been sparkled by sources and influences among great Muslim thinkers of other cultures and traditions--just as we note also that the great thinkers of history emerged in all regions, cultures, and religions. The substance of these statements is upheld in a renowned hadith in which the Prophet instructed the Muslims to "seek knowledge, even unto China," and in another hadith that "wisdom is the lost property of the believer; he is entitled to it wherever he finds it." Knowledge and wisdom must therefore be ultimately seen as the shared achievements of humanity, endowed and posited by its outstanding and creative thinkers. This is also known from the fact that the outcomes of creative thinking are often shared and experienced far beyond geographical locales and frontiers--more so perhaps in the age of globalization.

It is hoped that the great thinkers and leaders of humanity make it a part of their agenda and commitment to narrow down the distances and divides between the intellectual and cultural traditions of the world and aspire them to the veritable vision of a shared destiny and wider human fraternity in their deliberations.

(1.) The rough equation that earlier Muslim scholars drew between the Islamic and Western conceptions of reason tended to be oblivious of the categories of reason and the Western critique of reason that divided it into "instrumental reason, critical reason, functional reason, abstract reason, imperialist reason, decentering reason" and the like. For details see Abdelwahab M. Elmessiri, "Features of the New Islamic Discourse," a Cairo conference paper, 1997: http:// www.2lstcenturytrust.org/messiri.doc.

(2.) Ha-Mim: 53.

(3.) Adh-Dhariyat: 20.

(4.) Sad: 29.

(5.) Some commentators have distinguished a total of 30 expressions that revolve around thinking over the ayat. See Abu Bakr al-Razi, Tafsir al-Kabir (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1985), II, 222f.

(46.) Louay Safi, "The Creative Mission of the Muslim Minorities in the West: Synthesizing the Ethos of Islam and modernity," a conference paper presented at Westminster University, London, England February 21, 2004: http://lsinsight.org/articles/Current/MuslimMinorities.htm.

(59.) Cf. Ishfaq Ahmad, "Research and Development Culture in the Islamic World: Past and Present Problems and Future Directions" in Abu Bakr Abdul Majeed et al. (eds.) New Knowledge, Research and Development in the Muslim World (Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Islamic Understanding Malaysia, 2004), 14-15.

(60.) See for a discussion Oliver Leaman, "Institutionalising Research and Development Culture in the Islamic and Non-Islamic World: A Comparative Perspective" in Abu Bakr Majeed, (ed.) New Knowledge, 50-51.

(61.) Malik bin Nabi, Intaj al-Mustashriqin, 26.

(62.) See for details Mohammad Hashim Kamali, "Issues in the Understanding of Jihad and Ijtihad " in Islamic Studies 41 (2002), 623 ff.

(63.) There is a chapter on ijtihad in M. H. Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 1991, 3rd edn. 2003). See also my article "Issues in the Understanding of Jihad and Ijtihad" in Islamic Studies, 41 (2002), 617-635; and "Issues in the Legal Theory and Usul and Prospects for Reform" in Islamic Studies, 40 (2001), 1-21.

(64.) Sergio Moravia. The Enigma of the Mind: The Mind-Body Problem in Contemporary Thought, tr. S. Staton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. First published in Rome, 1986), 4-5.

]]>webmaster@azzron.biz (Super User)Islamization of KnowledgeTue, 14 Aug 2018 00:27:59 +0000Actualization of Islamization of Knowledge: What Role for Islamic Research Libraries?http://i-epistemology.net/subjects/islamization-of-knowledge/item/534-actualization-of-islamization-of-knowledge-what-role-for-islamic-research-libraries.html
http://i-epistemology.net/subjects/islamization-of-knowledge/item/534-actualization-of-islamization-of-knowledge-what-role-for-islamic-research-libraries.html

Introduction

Islam as a religion and a complete way of life enjoins all Muslims not only to seek for knowledge but also to utilize and impart it in accordance with its tenets. Basically, Islam considers knowledge in its entirety as universal, but what matters is its epistemology, methodology and usage. This is why at the early stage of Islam; education aimed not only at the spiritual development of an individual but also his intellectual, emotional, social, economic and physical well being. Consequently, the early scholars of Islam were intellectually sound in all aspects of human life. With the passage of time, however, the urge for Muslims to seek for knowledge declined. This was further compounded by colonialism as a result of which Muslim traditional Islamic institutions were dominated by secularism.

The surge for Islamization of knowledge emerged having realized the gross inadequacies of the western/secular educational system, which aimed only at outward development of individuals. As the move to Islamize knowledge intensified, a lot of problems were confronted which caused bottlenecks to the actualization of the set goals. Now the questions are: what are the purposes of the Islamization of knowledge? What are the problems militating against actualization of the Islamization programme? And most importantly, what roles can Islamic research libraries play in order to ensure the actualization of the Islamization of knowledge? This paper is intended to answer the above questions, and it ends by proffering some suggestions for the actualization of the Islamization project.

Historical Background

Essentially, Islamization of knowledge is as old as Islam itself. This is so because right from the beginning of the revelation received by the Prophet (S.A.W.) Allah (S.W.T.) commanded him to read, to seek for knowledge and to make use of the pen. He said:Read in the name of thy who created, Created man from a clot of blood. Read: and thy Lord is the Most Bounteous, Who teaches (the use of) the pen. Teaches man that which he knew not. (Qur’an 96:1-5)

The above verses presupposed that there was something to be read and acquired in line with Allah’s injunction and there was something to be written. “Knowledge”’ includes science, self knowledge and spiritual understanding.1 Historically this did not only mark the beginning of Islamization of knowledge but also laid the foundation for Librarianship. During the prophet’s lifetime, he devoted his time to spreading the message of the love for knowledge and wisdom. He organized classes in order to teach his companions lessons not only pertaining to the spiritual aspect but also other spheres of life. This was thus beautifully and elaborately described by Ahsan thus:

He (Prophet) organized a national education system and established its various sub-departments for the teaching of languages, commerce and business administration, industrial education and training, agricultural education and research, physical education and defense and strategic studies… This educational system was the first approach of its kind in the history of Arabic Peninsula…In the prophetic educational system various aspects of environmental education (e.g.) irrigation system, agricultural techniques, plantation, range management, pollution as well as corruption were important parts of the curricula of agricultural and religious education. This system functioned effectively, centuries after this death.2

As a result of the prophetic attitude to the spread of knowledge, there was a radical speed in the illumination of intellect, research and thought, among his disciples, which even paved way for the progress of other civilizations.

During the reign of the four rightly guided Khalifs, the prophetic legacy of scholarship was perfectly retained. Ali (A.S.) the fourth Caliph emphasized the spread of science and knowledge, culture and intellectual ability as one of the merits to be pursued and achieved by every Muslim government. This legacy was generously guarded and upheld up to the period of the Umayyad and Abbasid Khalifat.

However, with rapid expansion of Islam and influx of foreign culture in Muslim countries, some aspects of un-Islamic practices began to manifest in their institutions and centers of learning. This became more pronounced after the colonization exercise. In fact, after the colonization, the colonialist planted their western style of schools to enhance and perpetuate foreign colonial domination at the expense of the traditional Islamic schools.

In Nigeria, the Islamization of knowledge process began with the Islamic revivalism led by Shaykh Usman dan Fodiyo. In this period, Muslims were enjoined and encouraged to seek knowledge in all aspects of human endeavours. The Jihad leaders themselves were reputed for the profundity of scholarship. They wrote a lot of books on politics, economics, medicine, sociology, astronomy, poetry, etc. To buttress this point further; Mikailu noted that:

The Islamization of knowledge undertaken in Nigeria can be traced to the period of the Sokoto Jihad leaders whose scholarly writings covered such aspects of life as politics, economics and medicines.3 It was also revealed by Aguolu4 that the intellectual works of Sokoto Jihad leaders centered on law, poetry, philosophy and religion. He however observed that French and German imperialism proved highly deleterious to the intellectual and cultural growth of Northern Nigeria in Islamic perspective.

Why Islamization of Knowledge?

Having spent decades in blind adoption of secular/western system of education, and having experienced the adverse consequences of moral degeneration, economic degradation, educational backwardness and intellectual sterility, particularly amongst youths, contemporary Muslim intellectuals realized that there was no alternative to transforming the epistemology and methodology of knowledge to be in consonance with Islamic tenets.

The secular education imparted is observed to be causing a lot of problems rather than solving them as a result of the spiritual vacuum and discord between material and spiritual development. Maidugu5 observes that the contemporary secular educational system has failed in providing the much-needed solution to the multiplicity of problems facing mankind today because they have ignored the value centered nature of human behaviour. Commenting further on the above issue, Baba eloquently sums it up:

Knowledge that is taught in most learning institutions today is fragmented and dualistic in nature. Secularism separates knowledge of science from that of the divine one…In non-religious schools, science and human science subjects are taught as value-free, leaving religious knowledge to be taught only as a residuals subject. Divine knowledge is not developed according to the concept of din. This has resulted in the formation of fragmented worldview and no integration takes place. The effect of this does not only perpetuate secular-oriented human resource development but also the nature of development approaches modeled on the secular and western worldview.6

As the western style of education continues to undermine religion, secularism has not only eaten deep into our cultural heritage but has also been at work in our society today.

Precisely, if one compares the above discussion with what practically obtains in our society today, particularly in the institutions of higher education, one cannot but conclude that as long as we continue to patronize secular educational system, our society will continue to dwell in adverse crises which no human ideology can address. This is because the greatest problems of mankind are not those, which can be solved in any laboratory, nor can they be addressed by any human system of government. As more and more Muslims became aware of the defects of an educational system based on a secular, western prototype, the demand in the light of Islamic educational philosophy and value increased. Having realized the overwhelming effects of the secular system of education, the only solution is to evolve an educational system, which is in conformity with Islamic philosophy as suggested by many scholars. According to Shehu7 the way out of the present predicament is to provide an approach, which does not compromise the fundamentals of Islamic faith in anyway, nor sacrifice its values, ideals, goals and teachings. An approach, which does not retard the intellectual and scholarly progress of Ummah. It should be an approach that is comprehensive and penetrating. This is particularly essential because Islamization of knowledge aims at rectifying existing imbalance to help each pupil attain an overall and balanced development in the physical, spiritual, intellectual, social, emotional and moral domains.

Therefore, the purpose of Islamization of knowledge is to maintain conscience within mankind so that through his thought and social attitudes, man remains faithful to immortal truth as conveyed by the Qur’an and contribute to keep his soul ever pure and participate in the social, economic, political, cultural and moral development of the people. Alwani8 posits that to ensure a balanced understanding of reality, Islamization of knowledge is an epistemological and civilization necessity, not only for the Muslims but for humanity in general. Islamization of knowledge may be considered a solution to the global crises of contemporary thought as it provides a credible and viable response to our vital needs today for its philosophy aims at promoting scholarship with Islamic elements in all disciplines.

Impediments To Actualization Of The Islamization Of Knowledge.

Apparently, there are numerous impediments militating against the actualization of Islamization of knowledge programme. For a clear understanding of the problems, it is pertinent to enumerate and discuss them briefly.

i. Effects of colonialism on Muslims.In all colonized Muslim nations according to Baba9 the colonialist devised well thought-out and well-planned strategy to ensure that the Euro-Christian legacies were well established thereby consigning the traditional Islamic education to deterioration. This was because it was the colonialists’ plan to keep Islamic education out of touch with reality and modernity. They established the so-called secular schools a view to perpetuating not only secular oriented human resource development but also to fashion the developmental approaches to conform with the secular worldview. Consequently, most of those who attended secular schools were brainwashed and corrupted, as their thoughts, attitudes and visions were modeled to be in line with secular worldviews. Having spent most of their lives in this situation therefore, it is very difficult to redirect their minds to see vision and accept the mission of Islamization of knowledge programme wholeheartedly. This is because in the secular school according to Watson:

They have learnt that they must keep any Religious convictions they have firmly under wrap. Only secular conviction can be safely aired because these are presumed to be objective, fair and balanced.10

ii Acute shortage of Islamically oriented educational institutions.

Related to the above, colonialism did not only lead to the stagnation of the traditional Islamic education system, but also led to the corruption, decline and decadence of the Muslim institutions of international repute. For instance, prior to colonialism, Al-Azhar of Egypt, Al-Zaitunah of Tunis, Al Ma’had Al-llmy of Sudan and many others were highly reputable centers of Islamic education. But as time passed by, colonial intrusion westernized and secularized these institutions. Even though these institutions are in Muslim countries today, they are quite comparable with those in the West in terms of moral laxity, godlessness and manifestations of other dehumanizing practices. Today, Muslim world lacks highly reputable Islamically oriented tertiary institutions where researchers in natural sciences, social sciences, medical sciences and other aspects of human knowledge are seriously conducted, tested, certified and implemented. As such, Muslims solely depend on secular education for advancement. They also depend on western curriculum, research findings, technology and medical facilities . Husain and Ashraf emphatically warned that:Unless Muslims scholars get together to create their own schools of Social Sciences and Humanities and rise to challenge the hypothesizing of Western scientists who ignore the operation of the Divine Will in Nature, the time is not far off when Muslim societies will be as ’permissive’ as Western societies are and Islam will be safely preserved only in Book-form in the Qur’an and Hadith.11The longer the Muslims continue to depend on others for their developmental needs, the more the actualization of Islamization of knowledge will continue to be a mirage.

iii Acute shortage of Islamically oriented teachers/researchers.Lack of Islamically well versed and committed teachers, researchers and other professionals in all fields of human endeavours is another problem. Umar12, the Director of the International Institute of Islamic Thought Outreach Department Yola, lamented that Muslims do not have enough Doctors, Muslim nurses, Muslim engineers, Muslim journalists, Muslims lawyers, Muslim judges, Muslim university professionals, accountants, economists, etc. The few Muslim teachers and researchers who are deeply concerned with Islamization of knowledge are workers in secular oriented institutions or research centers. Hence, they do not have enough time to devote to the Islamization programme as a result of their work schedules.

iv. Lack of Islamically oriented curriculum.As there is acute shortage of institutions, teachers and researchers so also there is no well though out, well designed and programmed curriculum which will serve as a basis for the realization of the Islamization of knowledge programme from nursery to tertiary level. As Shehu13 posits that the task of Islamization of knowledge involves all the conventional levels of education right from nursery up to the Universities in order not to subject Muslim children and youth to alien and sometimes atheistic concepts, there is a pressing need to work out goal-oriented curriculum for all levels of education from nursery to tertiary institutions to serve as a guide in the instruction, evaluation and actualization of the task ahead. Unfortunately, however, even in some institutions like Usmanu Danfodiyo University, Sokoto where some Islamically oriented courses were incorporated in the Social and Management Sciences, the National Universities Commission (NUC) Accreditation Committee viewed them as unconventional and thus suggested for a review in order to revert to the so-called conventional ones. Needless to say that the success of any curriculum depends on the availability of Islamically oriented educational institutions, teachers and researchers in all spheres of human endeavour.

v. Dearth of well-equipped Islamically oriented laboratories.This is another impediment militating against the success of the Islamization of knowledge programme. There is dearth of well-equipped laboratories established by Islamization programme, especially in medical and natural sciences. Too much reliance on the West has made Muslims incapable of producing their chemicals and laboratory equipments. There is also a dearth of qualified laboratory scientists capable of ensuring the success of the Islamization of knowledge project.

vi Inadequate FundingInadequate funding is identified by Sulaiman14 as one of the problems militating against the progress and success of the Islamization of knowledge. This problem is not limited to Nigeria only but all over the Muslim world. In fact all other problems stem from this. This is because money is needed to train and employ qualified staff, money is needed to provide laboratories and libraries and money is needed to sponsor and conduct researches.Currently, most of the conferences, seminars or staff training carried out by Islamization of knowledge project were sponsored by individuals or some organizations such as Islamic Education Trust (IET) based at Minna, Nigeria and International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) based in the United States of American. As such, the Islamization of knowledge project lacks adequate financial backing for its actualization. Unless, there is adequate financial support to cater for the needs of the programme, its success will continue to falter. In Nigeria, the degree of acceptance, participation of women, lack of support from the traditional Ulama etc are some of the challenges facing the Islamization of knowledge movement as observed by Mikailu.15

vi. Acute shortage of coordinated library and information services.

Basically, the success of any educational transformation depends on well-planned, well-organized and well-coordinated library services. In short, one of the determining factors of the success of any educational programme is the extent to which it has developed its information systems at various levels to achieve its goals. This is because information is indispensable in human progress and development. In most of the Islamic institutions or centers, their libraries are not accorded the priority they deserve. They are not well stocked with current, relevant and well-researched materials such as textbooks, journals, these and other reference materials in all subjects necessary for the advancement of human knowledge. Where libraries exist their collections are few and narrow in content and coverage.Similarly, there is dearth of professional librarians to man and provide services to scholars and researchers involved in the Islamization of knowledge. Most of those who could be termed as library staff are only those who voluntarily agree to look after the library’s collections. Except in some places, most of the libraries have no full time and qualified staff to make any meaningful contribution to the Islamization programme. Having discussed the impediments to the Islamization of knowledge, now the question is, what roles can the Islamic research library play in order to ensure the actualization of the Islamization of knowledge? The roles are outlined and discussed below:

The Role Of Islamic Research Libraries In The Actualization Of The Islamization Of Knowledge

The specific roles, which Islamic research libraries can play in the realization of Islamization of knowledge are examined below: -

i Conservation of Knowledge

One of the earliest and most fundamental responsibilities of the library is preservation of recorded knowledge. Therefore, it is the duty of Islamic Research Libraries to identify different kinds of materials, acquire, process and organize them for use. Since the most important goal of the Islamization of knowledge is to redirect the existing knowledge to be in line with Islamic philosophy, the library can help greatly in realizing this by rationally and systematically accumulating all kinds of records that embody the ideas and knowledge of the past and present. It is the duty of the library to ensure that whatever findings and discoveries are made, they are acquired, processed, organized and made available to users for Islamization. It is also the duty of the library to jealously and perpetually preserve the Islamized knowledge for the needs of the present and future generations.

ii. Educational Agency.

As stated earlier, for any educational or intellectual revolution to succeed, the services of the library are indispensable. One cannot expect an expedient excellent intellectual revolution without the support of a well-equipped and well-staffed library. Aguolu opines, that “Libraries are the hubs from which all intellectual activities radiate to all academic and research programmes.”16 This is because there is a strong correlation between the adequacy of library collections and success of educational programme. Islamic research libraries must therefore possess rich collections of books, journals, encyclopedias and other types of information resources in all disciplines to be able to meet the information and bibliographic needs of their users.Since Islamization of knowledge aims at all levels of education, libraries could make provision for all levels in order to groom the young generations not only to cope with the demands of the Islamization, but also to meet the challenges of the changing world.

iii. Information Agency.

Information services are very vital for any human progress. It is the duty of Islamic research libraries to ensure that right information in current scientific and technological researches are made available to users at the right time. All libraries are expected to provide an effective information service to users. Ready access to information is indispensable to human advancement. The right information provided when it is needed, and where it is needed, improves the ability of an individual, a business, a government agency, or some other kind of organization to make informed decisions.In essence, current information is needed in order, to abreast oneself with current development in his area. It is the duty of the Islamic research library to scrutinize, refine and sift all kind of information with a view to separating grains from the chaff before it is made available to users.

iv. Agency for Research.

Research is simply a systematic study of a subject with a view to discovering new facts or ideas in order to increase the sum of human knowledge. Through the use of Islamic research libraries services, new knowledge can be discovered and rediscovered, organized and preserved in order to pave way for future researches. Researchers usually commence their study by examining what others have done. Islamic research libraries should provide adequate bibliographical apparatus such as guides to literature, subject bibliographies, abstracting and indexing services, journals, and directories of researches completed or in progress. It is the duty of the research libraries to identify the diverging bibliographic and information requirement of researchers in all disciplines from arts, humanities, social sciences, natural sciences and technology with a view to not only ensuring complete Islamization but also guaranteeing its sustainability. Oli17 suggests that to meet the research needs of the Islamization programme, libraries should continue the powerful Islamic tradition of acquiring and assimilating the existing knowledge and stimulating the creation of new knowledge for advancement of the world Muslim community. This will ultimately lead to the production of relevant textbooks for all levels, scholarly journals, research reports, handbooks and other research and reference materials, which will subsequently pave way for the production and reproduction of new knowledge.

A Cultural Agency.

Culture denotes the ideas, beliefs, customs or ways of life that are accepted by people in a society. In other words, culture is a way of life that incorporates ideological, social, moral and intellectual element peculiar to a particular group of people. The cultural role of Islamic research libraries is very central to the actualization of the Islamization of knowledge programme. The libraries should acquire materials that promote Islamic cultural heritage. They should provide materials to de-colonize the minds of the Muslims, imbuing in them with the love and appreciation of their cultural heritage and giving correct perspective about themselves, their abilities and achievements. The libraries should also assist in understanding and controlling the environment through the provision of appropriate scientific and technological information generated within and outside the Muslim environments. By embarking on a sustained programme for documentation of traditional values, and for promoting new literatures pertinent to Muslims aspirations, the libraries become potent tools for Islamization project. The cultural role of the library is pertinent because Islam has its own worldview of human affairs and Islamic literature naturally will reflect this worldview. What is needed is a totally new and radical approach by Muslim librarians to ensure strict acquisition, preservation and dissemination of materials which are compatible with the dynamic Islamic worldview with a view to restoring the lost glory of Islamic cultural heritage.

vi. Agency for Translation.

One of the greatest contributions the libraries can make is by embarking on translation of materials published in various languages. In the early days of Islam, Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates embarked on aggressive translation of ancient Greek and Roman bequests whether they were secular or theological in order to Islamize and apply it in solving problems. Today, Islamic research libraries can embark on translation of materials published in German, Russian, Chinese, Japanese, French, among other languages, in order to contribute to human knowledge. As the proliferation of all types of records in diverse languages increases, it will be difficult for the researcher with the data in his field. He has to depend considerably upon the libraries to meet his needs. This can only be achieved through embarking on translation services.

In order to ensure most accurate and most reliable translation, there is the urgent need to train multilingual and multidisciplinary, Islamically conscious and committed librarians. There is the urgent need for language training to achieve language proficiency. This is required for ensuring a thorough understanding of the literature that is published in other languages which are vital in the Islamization of knowledge process.

Suggestions for Improvement.

Based on the above discussions, the following suggestions are proffered for improvement.1. All Islamically oriented institutions and research centers should be provided with well-stocked and well-staffed libraries.2. Library staff without relevant qualifications should be sponsored to go for in-service full-time or part-time training locally or overseas.3. Continuing efforts by teachers, researchers and other specialist religious groups to publish materials that adequately take account of religious perspective should be encouraged and supported by religious communities themselves.4. Donation of materials and funds should be solicited from philanthropists, publishers, etc. in order to improve the services of the libraries.5. Library and Information Science should be Islamized with a view to producing Muslim librarians who will contribute significantly to the actualization of Islamization of knowledge programme.

Conclusion.

From the foregoing, it can be seen that during the golden age of Islam, Muslims clearly played a significant role in the growth of intellectual heritage of mankind in all human endeavours. Regrettably however, the contemporary Muslims seem to have been left behind intellectually, scientifically, technologically and economically to the disadvantage of the entire Ummah. In the present situation where information is a vital tool for the economic, scientific and technological development, it is imperative for the Muslim world to pool their resources towards Islamization of knowledge for the benefit of Islam and the progress of Muslims. The Islamic research libraries have a significant role to play in this regard.

This article stems from a concern that the popular perception of the Islamization of knowledge currently in vogue appears to be a gross oversimplification of a much more complex and arduous process and could, therefore, delay rather than hasten the intellectual recovery of the Muslim Ummah. The article attemps to trace the genesis of the problem and then examines some of the Islamization ideas of the IIIT against a background of the ideas of some pioneering scholars. The thrust of the article’s argument is that while there is a case for the Islamization of knowledge, the grains appear to be jumbled with much chaff and there is an urgent need to separate the chaff from the grain and put the whole challenge into perspective. This, it argues is a process which requires the best minds of the Ummah. Some of the issues that may need immediate attention in this respect are also examined, hoping thereby to provoke the thoughts of others and generate a fruitful debate.

This article stems from a concern that the popular perception of the Islamization of knowledge currently in vogue appears to be a gross oversimplification of a much more complex and arduous process and could, therefore, delay rather than hasten the intellectual recovery of the Muslim Ummah. The article attemps to trace the genesis of the problem and then examines some of the Islamization ideas of the IIIT against a background of the ideas of some pioneering scholars. The thrust of the article’s argument is that while there is a case for the Islamization of knowledge, the grains appear to be jumbled with much chaff and there is an urgent need to separate the chaff from the grain and put the whole challenge into perspective. This, it argues is a process which requires the best minds of the Ummah. Some of the issues that may need immediate attention in this respect are also examined, hoping thereby to provoke the thoughts of others and generate a fruitful debate.

Introduction

Some 15 years ago a Muslim professor of education gave a lecture on the ways of evaluating learning to a class in an Islamic university. At the end of the lecture, the professor asked the class, which had all along been listening attentively, if they wished to ask any questions about the lecture. The first, which turned out to be the only, question asked was whether what the professor had just taught them was halal or haram? The poor professor must have found the question depressing in itself, but this, however, is the least of our worries. Admittedly, students of Islamic universities, at least the one in question, are not usually the brightest, for the best are apt to attend secular (or shall we call them non-Islamic) universities, but this is not the point here. Rather, the point here is the encounter between two frames of mind, one nurtured in an Islamic system of education, or what has remained of it, and the other nurtured in the ever pervading Western system of education. The encounter itself is not the problem, but rather what it reveals and indeed what it conceals. It immediately reveals the gulf that exists between these two frames of mind, a gulf which threatens to make any discussion a dialogue of the deaf. But it also conceals Muslim inadequacy in both their own intellectual tradition as in the ubiquitous Western tradition. This encounter actually conceals more than it reveals, but our immediate interest is the gulf this dichotomy has created, the intellectual degeneration it has occasioned and the challenge it poses.

The root of the problem can be traced back a few centuries. Indeed it may all have started with the expulsion of the Muslims from Spain some five centuries ago. We need not debate here whether this expulsion, in 1492, was the cause or the consequence of the problem. Those who believe that it was the consequence, may wish to push the problem half a century earlier when the Renaissance movement first began. Whichever point is taken, it will suffice, for our purpose, to say that from that point onwards Muslims began an intellectual retreat from which they have never returned. It is true the Ottoman Caliphate rose to greatness thereafter and so spread Islam into Europe. Similarly, other states and polities, like the Mughal Empire in India and the Sokoto Caliphate in Hausaland also rose to produce towering scholars. But this scholarship was no longer all encompassing nor was it the pace setter it used to be, so the fact still remains that expulsion from Spain marked the beginning of an intellectual decline from which the Muslims never recovered. Having quit the frontiers of knowledge, Muslims were gradually reduced from being producers of knowledge to being consumers of knowledge. Having absconded from the cutting edge of history, they receded from their position as makers of history to victims of history, where they have since remained. The invasion of Egypt by Napoleon Bonaparte in 1798 represented a significant milestone in this degeneration. In an intellectual encounter at al-Azhar, the French scientists appeared to have had no difficulty in impressing and dumfounding scholars at the great al-Azhar with their scientific displays. Though the Shaykhs of al-Azhar put up a very brave face and Shaykh al-Bakri, very confident in his Islamic faith, even challenged the conjurers, or so he thought they were, this singular act nevertheless shook the Muslim intellectual establishment leaving far reaching consequences in its trail. For al-Jabarti, the Egyptian historian, after visiting, like many of his contemporaries, the Institute set up by Napoleon, with its extensive library and scientific equipment, he wrote a long account of his visit and did not hide his astonishment, concluding his description with the words, “things which minds like ours cannot comprehend”.(1) Perhaps not in so many words, but the gulf, the degeneration and the challenge are all evident.

The significance of the French invasion, which as we know signalled many successive such invasions, was in bringing all these to the fore. It was an encounter between an intellectual tradition that had long rested on its oars and another which having taken its cue and borrowed a lot from the former, had taken the wind out of the former’s sails and overtaken it. This in itself is natural and presents us with no more difficulty than life itself, after all this is what in a way the Islamic intellectual tradition did to others before it. The problem, however, lies in the fact that while the Islamic intellectual tradition developed largely because of and in tune with its religion, the Western intellectual tradition could only do so in spite of and often in defiance of its own religion. The fact that it had to rebel against its own religious tradition to survive and thrive, created a basis for and gave vent to a dichotomy between the religious and the secular, the sacred and the profane, in which the latter seeks to curtail and dominate the former. This tragic development found its way into the Muslim world through a combination of coercion and persuasion. Muhammad Ali who came to power in Egypt not long after the French left, began the policy of sending students to study in the universities of France, a policy which Constantinople (Istanbul) had also began. This was to be continued by generations of Egyptian and Ottoman rulers. This paved the way for the Western system of education with its secular frame of reference, and which gradually, if imperceptibly, supplanted and undermined the Islamic system of education and social morality.

By the late nineteenth century, the dichotomy had taken root in Egypt, and while the scope and vision of Azhar was diminishing in both depth and breadth, the influence of Western trained scholars was growing. Muhammad Abduh had cause to criticise the ulama’ “for their negative attitude towards the modern sciences in spite of the fact that such knowledge had been taught in Moslem madarasahs in the past”.(2) But he also dismissed the Egyptian products of Western education, saying that “these are even more misguided”.(3) The Egyptian government itself was busy replacing the Azhar shaykhs in both the schools as well as the courts with these products of Western education referred to as the Effendi. As one Western scholar sympathetically argued, “the Shaikh-judges ... could be charged with inefficiency and backwardness, with inadaptability to the new social conditions and lack of understanding of the new spirit which was gradually permeating conditions through contact with Europeans. The effendi”, the writer continues, “in spite of his lack of training, was more polished and adaptable and quicker witted than his shaikh colleagues”.(4) In 1892, when Muhammad Shibli Nu’mani, from the Indo-pak sub-continent, visited Cairo, he shared his concerns about this situation with Muhammad Abduh. From his report, he seems to have left dissatisfied with what the Dar al-Ulum in Cairo could offer and certainly unimpressed by the effendis of Egypt.(5) Since then this dilemma has occupied one generation after another and remained unresolved.

Grappling With the Problem I

Muhammad Iqbal, the great thinker and poet, was one towering figure of his generation, who relished reflecting on the flight of the Ummah. He addressed, in prose and poetry, the decline of the Ummah, but his greatest worry and the thing that occupied most of his attention was the intellectual decline. “During the last five hundred years” Iqbal observed, “religious thought in Islam has been practically stationary. There was a time when European thought received inspiration from the world of Islam. The most remarkable phenomenon of modern history, however, is the enormous rapidity with which the world of Islam is spiritually moving towards the West. There is nothing wrong in this movement”, Iqbal believed, “for European culture, on its intellectual side, is only a further development of some of the most important phases of the culture of Islam. Our only fear”, he cautioned, “is that the dazzling exterior of European culture may arrest our movement and we may fail to reach the true inwardness of that culture.”(6) He attempted to reconcile reason and revelation, physics and metaphysics in a way that went beyond al-Ghazali, and in so doing tried to develop an epistemology which would enable Muslims to come to grips with this dichotomy. He argues for example, “No doubt the immediate purpose of the Qur’an in this reflective observation of nature is to awaken in man the consciousness of that of which nature is regarded a symbol .....It is our reflective contact with the temporal flux of things which trains us for an intellectual vision of the non temporal .... The Qur’an opens our eyes to the great facts of change, through the appreciation and control of which alone it is possible to build a durable civilization.”(7)

He further argues:

“Indeed, in view of its function, religion stands in greater need of a rational foundation of its ultimate principles than even the dogmas of science. Science may ignore a rational metaphysics; indeed it has ignored it so far. Religion can hardly afford to ignore the search for a reconciliation of the oppositions of experience and a justification of the environment in which humanity finds itself. ... But to rationalize faith is not to admit the superiority of philosophy over religion. Philosophy, no doubt, has jurisdiction to judge religion, but what is to be judged is of such a nature that it will not submit to the jurisdiction of philosophy except on its own terms”.(8) “Religion is not physics or chemistry seeking an explanation of the nature in terms of causation; it really aims at interpreting a totally different region of human experience - religious experience - the data of which cannot be reduced to the data of any other science. Infact it must be said in justice to religion that it insisted on the necessity of concrete experience in religious life long before science learnt to do so. The conflict between the two is due not to the fact that one is, and the other is not, based on concrete experience. Both seek concrete experience as a point of departure.”(9)

Iqbal’s approach was unconventional and many of his contemporaries may have been uncomfortable about his characteristic boldness, which naturally attracted some criticism. Fazlur Rahman’s worry was not however in Iqbal’s approach but in its content. While admitting that Iqbal’s was the only systematic attempt at a coherent body of metaphysical thought informed by the Qur’an and that Iqbal had certain basic and rare insights into the nature of Islam as an attitude to life, Fazlur Rahman, however, felt that his work “cannot be said to be based on Qur’anic teaching: the structural elements of its thought are too contemporary to be an adequate basis for an ongoing Islamic metaphysical endeavor”.(10) Well, Iqbal’s work like all other human works are not unassailable. Iqbal himself may have looked forward to other minds who could continue to address the issue further and had occasion to complain that the Ummah was not producing minds who “by divine gift or by experience, possess a keen perception of the spirit and destiny of Islam, along with an equally keen perception of the trend of modern history.”(11) The significance of Iqbal’s contributions lie not only in the fact that he gave fresh insight to a perennial problem but also, and more profoundly, because he began a systematic diagnosis, that he began the construction of an epistemology that attempted to abolish a dichotomy which had defied solution.

Another scholar who seems to share much with Iqbal is Seyyed Hossein Nasr. Nasr may not be as unique to his generation as Iqbal was, but he is certainly a cut above many of his fellow Muslim scholars. He has spent the best part of the last half a century waging a solo campaign against Western scientism and humanism as well as against Muslim apathy and complacency. Nasr lives in an age of Islamic movements, but he has chosen to live above their immediate agendas maintaining his long term vision beyond the little principalities the movements seem obsessed with, albeit at great cost. Nasr, a leading authority in Sufism and the philosophy of science, is today, perhaps, the most prolific Muslim scholar around. A great majority of his works revolve around the theme of the dichotomy between the sacred and the profane and the crisis this has generated, or as he would say, the plight of modern man. But in dealing with this very important issue the thrust of Nasr’s contribution has been to restore a unified epistemology in which both physics and metaphysics will not only compliment each other but also, and most importantly, lead to the ultimate reality which is at once absolute and infinite. In his words:

“The sensualist and empirical epistemology, which has dominated the horizon of Western man in the modern period, has succeeded in reducing reality to the world experienced by the external senses, hence limiting the meaning of reality and removing the concept of ‘reality’ as a category pertaining to God. The consequences of this change in the very meaning of reality has been nothing less than catastrophic, ....” The most catastrophic effect being on the self, as he continues to argue, “In a society in which the lower self is allowed to fall by its own weight, in which the Ultimate Self and the way to attain it are forgotten, in which there is no higher principle than the individual self, there cannot but be the highest degree of conflict between limited egos which will claim for themselves absolute rights, usually in conflict with the claims of other egos - rights which belong to the self alone. In such a situation, even the spiritual virtue of charity become[s] sheer sentimentality.”(12)

Grappling With the Problem II

Thoroughly grounded in both the Islamic as well as the Western intellectual tradition, Nasr has always, as he continues to do, made the most severe criticisms against Western epistemology, criticism which cannot be ignored. He continues to warn the West not against refusing Islam but against resisting and opposing the sacred and the consequences of the spiritual crisis that this generates, as of the toll this will take, not on the West alone, but on the whole of humanity. He also cautions the East in general and Muslims in particular against blindly copying the West especially in this era of rapid industrialisation and calls for discernment. “If this discernment is not used”, Nasr warns, ‘Oriental societies will continue to eat the bread crumbs and the refuse left from the banquet table and possibly the “last supper” of the industrialised world’.(13) Nasr’s solution seem to lie in a two pronged attack in which both the Islamic as well as Western epistemology have to be thoroughly revised and restored so that the balance between the sacred and the mundane can be achieved. The significance of Nasr’s efforts lies in the fact that he operates on the frontiers of knowledge and not from the rear and he cannot therefore be ignored by the experts. It is also significant that Nasr’s concern reaches out for humanity as a whole, rather than just Muslim Ummah alone. This may look too ecumenical for some, but it does allows him not only a larger audience but re-establishes Islam’s concern for humanity and, therefore, corrects an impression that contemporary Muslim parochialism has created. His criticism of the West is not because they do not apply Islam but because they pose a danger to the whole of humanity, in echoing this concern Nasr unfolds an aspect of Islam’s message which has been buried in the debris of Muslim past, an aspect which is crucial if Islam is to be a hope for humanity.

Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas is one very interesting contemporary scholar in more ways than one. He has spent the best part of his life time addressing this problem of dichotomy in knowledge. A philosopher, a linguist with a strong Sufi vision and taste, al-Attas has provided an unusual insight into what he will prefer to call westernisation and which to him is the source of secularisation. One of the gravest consequences of secularisation, and the root of our problems as Muslims today, Al-Attas believes, is the loss of Adab, what Nasr calls desacrilisation of knowledge. “The chief characteristic symptoms of loss of Adab within the community”, al-Attas believes, “is the process of levelling.” By levelling he means “the levelling of every one, in the mind and the attitude, to the same level of the leveller. This mental and attitudinal process, which impinges upon action, is perpetrated through the encouragement of false leaders who wish to demolish legitimate authority and valid hierarchy so that they and their like might thrive. This Jahili streak of individualism, of immanent arrogance and obstinacy, as he calls it, led what he calls the Modernist and Reformers of our times, including those who masquerade as Ulama’, to censure “the great ulama of the past and men of spiritual discernment who contributed so much to the knowledge of Islam”. Al-Attas is not saying that the ulama should not be criticised, rather, as he put, “No doubt it is possible to concede that the critics of the great and learned were in the past at least themselves great and learned in their own way, but it is a mistake to put them together on the same level - the more so to place the lesser above the greater in rank as happens in the estimation of our age of greater confusion.”(14)

The solution al-Attas proposes, rather predictably, is a return to what he keeps referring to as adab, but this is not adab as it is widely understood today. Rather, this is an adab which with the Islamization of a large part of the world during the Abbasids period, “was further evolved to extend itself beyond Arab literature and culture to include the human sciences and disciplines of other Muslim peoples, notably the Persians, and even to draw into its ambit the literatures, sciences and philosophies of other civilisations such as the Indian and Greek”. But then as al-Attas admits, “during the Abbasi period also, the restriction of the Islamised meaning of adab, which was in the process of unfolding itself, had begun - no doubt due, among other causes, to the urbanity that prevailed, and the attendant officialdom and bureaucracy”.(15) This may mean that the concept of adab itself, has to first be Islamised. It is under the ambience of this reislamised adab, as it were, that the Islamization of knowledge is to be undertaken. Al-Attas then proceeded to argue that “since in Islam the purpose of seeking knowledge is ultimately to become a good man, as we have described, and not a good citizen of a secular state, the system of education in Islam must reflect man and not the state.” Since the university represents the highest level of learning, designed to reflect the universal, true to his Sufi background, al-Attas believes the university must be a reflection of not just any man but the Universal Perfect Man (al-Insan al-Kamil), which in Islam is realised “only in the sacred person of the holy prophet”.(16) With man at the centre, al-Attas suggested the familiar dual categorisation of fard ayn and fard kifaya and a matching schemata of man, knowledge and the university.(17) While the religious sciences constitute the fard Ayn, the rational intellectual and philosophical sciences constitute the fard kifaya. It is this latter category that apparently needs to be Islamised, each branch, al-Attas insists, “must be imbued with Islamic elements and key concepts ...this process constitutes its Islamization”.(18)

Grappling With the Problem III

Fazlur Rahman is another scholar who cannot be ignored, even though he has not been at the forefront of the debate as his colleagues above, preferring, it seems, to be a detached observer taking liberty to differ with others on a subject which he has always taken to heart. Fazlur Rahman spent a good part of his career addressing the issue of revitalising or rethinking Islamic thoughts very much in the way Iqbal attempted. He seemed to have believed that there was no other short cut and any such efforts are simply escapists, but he was still nonetheless ready to examine them. In his view, all the efforts from the time of Abduh to date fall into two categories. “One approach is to accept modern secular education as it has developed generally speaking in the West and to attempt to “Islamize” it - that is, to inform it with certain key concepts of Islam.” The other approach, combining a variety of developments, “can be summed up by saying that they all represent an effort to combine and integrate the modern branches of learning with the old ones. ... The most important of these experiments are undoubtedly those of al-Azhar of Egypt and the new system of Islamic education introduced in Turkey since the late 1940s.”(19)

In examining both these approaches, Fazlur Rahman did not quarrel so much with the principle as with the methods so far adopted and the results so far realised. In respect of the Islamization of knowledge for example, he says, this can only be really fulfilled if and when “Muslims effectively perform the intellectual task of elaborating an Islamic metaphysics on the basis of the Qur’an”. For, as he argues: “An overall world view of Islam has to be first, if provisionally, attempted if various specific fields of intellectual endeavor are to cohere as informed by Islam”. For the sake of clarity, metaphysics, for him, “is the unity of knowledge and the meaning and orientation this unity gives to life”. To further illustrate his point, he pointed to how Ash’arite theology, wayward as he believes it was, was able to permeate, with remarkably efficiency, intellectual disciplines of Islam, like law, Sufism and even the outlook on history. But today, he observes, while there is no dearth of conferences and books on “Islam and this” and “Islam and that”, which he admitted occasionally contain valuable insights and ingenuity, these feverish activities, as he calls them, are often apologetic and don’t add up to much.(20)

As for the other approach, one of integration, this too, has not worked according to Rahman, “because of the largely mechanical character of instruction and because of juxtaposing the old with the new”. This, for him, is primarily because the whole process of integration has been caught up in a vicious circle: unless adequate teachers are available with minds already integrated and creative, instructions will remain mechanical and sterile, even when the students are good; but on the other hand such teachers cannot be produced on a sufficient scale unless an integrated curriculum is made available. This vicious circle Fazlur Rahman argues, “can be broken only at the first point - if there comes in to being some first-class minds who can interpret the old in terms of the new as regards substance and turn the new into the service of the old as regards ideals. This, then, must be followed by the writing of text books on theology, ethics and so forth.”(21) This vicious circle is further compounded by the peculiar relationship between religion and politics and the pitiable subjugation of the former to the latter. This pernicious phenomena of secularism, as he calls it, brought the secularist to power, who, alienated from Islam, “becomes all the more confirmed in his cynicism about men of religion, the dislocation between their aims and their claims, even though secularism itself may be a child of incurable cynicism about man’s real nature.”(22)

There are of course a number of other scholars who have made significant contributions and who are still doing so on this subject: scholars like Adullahi Smith, a historian of the Sokoto Caliphate; Khurshid Ahmad, Nejattullahi Siddique and Umar Chapra in the field of Islamic economics; Ahmad Ibrahim Umar, Abdul Karim Souroush both in epistemology and the philosophy of science, the relatively younger but promising others like Pervez Manzoor, Ziauddin Sardar and Abdulwahab el-Affendi, who have and still are producing plethora of writing on the subject among others. But since this is not a survey, much less an exhaustive one, we need not detain ourselves further, especially when we shall have cause to refer to some of these efforts in due course. It will suffice for now to say that the four we have examined thus far, with others in their trail, appear to be the pioneers of the current drive for Islamization of knowledge. It may also be said that so far not much has been produce which substantially supersedes the works of these prominent figures. Most of the thoughts and ideas of these pioneers especially in respect of what is popularly called today the Islamization of Knowledge, perhaps with the exception of Seyyed Hossein Nasr, are not as widespread as the works of the latter generation of scholars. It is the IIIT however which recently really popularised the idea, taking it far and wide, not only through its conferences held in many corners of the Muslim world, but also by the numerous writings it has generated on the subject. They have done this essentially by moving the subject from academic circles, where it is discussed in the privacy of ivory towers, to the popular arena thus pushing it on the agenda of the various Islamic groups and movements. It is necessary, therefore, to examine the ideas of the IIIT on this subject.

The Approach of the IIIT

The International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) has in the last one and a half decade or so held several conferences and published a corpus of material on the Islamization of knowledge.(23) This has not only popularised the subject and recruited more people than ever before but it has also raised great hopes and expectations. But for the purpose of our analysis, one of this publications Islamization of knowledge: General Principles and Work Plan is perhaps the most important.(24) Couched in eloquent prose, the book makes for easy and pleasant reading. It is very easy to share the concerns it raises but not the diagnosis, much less the conclusions. The work does not appear to have been informed by the earlier attempts of Iqbal, Nasr, Attas and Fazlur Rahman, and the attempt to identify what it constantly refers to as the ‘malaise’, tends to be more descriptive than analytical. The introduction on page xiii says that “ the plan formulated by the Institute to tackle the crisis of thought in the Muslim world has been based on the conviction that the crisis involves two dimensions: the intellectual thought processes and the estrangement between the Ummah and its legacy”. Chapter One which addresses the problem and tries to identify the malaise of the Ummah, has three sections: A, the Malaise of the Ummah, which is hardly one page and largely a catalogue of complaints of an Ummah which “numbers over a billion people; that its territories are among the most vast and the richest; and that its potential in human, material and geopolitical [resourses] are the greatest ...”.(25) Section B commences on the following page, and addresses ‘Major effects of the Malaise’ and contains a few paragraphs each on ‘Political Character’, ‘Economic Character’, and ‘Cultural Character’. The last section entitled the ‘Core of the Crisis: the Malaise of Thought and Methodology’, similarly has a few paragraphs on each of the issues addressed, ‘The Present State of Education in the Muslim World’ and ‘Lack of Clear Vision’. Here again it seems to be comprised of more complaints: “the colonialists devised a well-thought out and well-planned strategy ... National independence gave the secularist educational system its greatest boost ... today students are cynical lethargic and mistrust all leaders”.(26) Under the entry on ‘lack of vision’ it observes, “that teachers in Muslim universities do not possess the vision of Islam and, therefore, are not driven by its cause is certainly the greatest calamity of Muslim education”.(27) Perhaps, and even after agreeing with all the observations, one will still ask what then is the problem? Admittedly, later in the work there are numerous references to intellectual crisis and methodological problems, but again it is difficult to pin down the problem, or even the crisis much less its core. But failure to pin down the problem is not as dangerous as mistaking the symptoms for the disease. The danger of mistaking symptoms for the disease are too well known and the risks too great to be ignored.

Even if the disease has been established and defined, we still need to go further and deeper to establish its aetiology if we are to succeed at combating it, this is particularly so with diseases which have over the years become deeply conceited and chronic. But here again the attempt does not go deep enough. Mention is made of the Tartar invasion and the Crusaders (p. 23) but then we are suddenly returned to the contemporary period of Kamal Attartuk, (p. 24) a jump of centuries, all of which are crucial in the aetiology of the malaise. True, the major ulama’, particularly the fuqaha, are mentioned but again there doesn’t appear to be any attempt to capture the complex atmosphere under which these methodologies were developed and the intellectual challenges and methodological problems they had to contend with. It thus leaves us uncertain and ill-informed about the genesis of the malaise we wish to remedy.

While the complaints tend to blame the West and some veiled enemies of Islam for all the woes of the Muslim Ummah, the attempts to assure Muslim readers of the capacity of the Ummah to tackle this crisis often, if unwittingly, tend instead to idealise the Ummah. This tacit and perhaps unconscious idealising is further worsened by an apparent reluctance to look at the weaknesses of the Ummah especially those that are likely to pose serious obstacles to any attempt at recovery. The dangers here are perhaps fairly obvious. Idealising tends to conceal weaknesses that need to be considered for the purpose of recovery; it also engenders oversimplification of the task ahead and make people complacent in procuring provisions or to rest on their oars too early, having been oblivious of the gravity of the task and having underestimated the journey. It also tends to raise high and early expectations giving room for early disappointment.

Chapter Five of the work plan, entitled, ‘Agenda of the Institute’, after listing an eight point agenda, proceeds to expound on the stages of the agenda under seven headings. In an earlier paper produced by him at 1982 conference, Faruqi presented the same idea under Section V, ‘The Work Plan’; there, however, five objectives were itemised and 12 steps identified.(28) The latter makes for easier reading while the former is far less precise and rather cumbersome. The first objective in the work plan, for example reads “to create awareness in the Ummah of the crisis of ideas. This involves enlightening the Ummah about the place and methodology of the crisis of Islamic thought in the perspective of its cultural and civilisational existence.” The first objective in Faruqi’s paper reads, “to master the modern disciplines.” Similarly the steps as expounded in both documents, even when they make easy reading, will nevertheless leave the reader wondering what precisely is intended or how exactly it is to be carried out. The steps (whether seven or 12) taken together, from the mastery of modern disciplines to the mastery of Islamic legacy, then a critique of both and a recommendation for the rewriting of modern disciplines along Islamic lines which are then disseminated through the writing of textbooks, reads very much like a dream. Mastering the Islamic legacy may be easy to understand, but how do we really master the modern disciplines? The document does not elaborate upon this, but the impression one gets is that it is as easy as going to a university ( a Western one I suppose) to obtain a doctorate, but certainly this is not mastery of the discipline. So where does the mastery begin? This looks like a gross oversimplification of a very arduous and tedious process which may spread over half a century or so, for before one can hope to master a subject one has to first walk ones way to the frontiers of the discipline. This requires such levels of seriousness, dedication and resources that are simply not on the ground for now.

In setting out the “agenda objectives” the Work Plan has the sagacity to appreciate that “its success does not exclusively depend on the efforts of the Institute” and has therefore invited “every sincere Muslim, indeed, all concerned Islamic organisations struggling to re-establish Islamic order and civilisation” to partake in this “plan for Islamising Knowledge; for reforming the contemporary mode of Islamic thought; for reviving its methodology; and for restoring its dynamic originality, creativity and ability”.(29) Some Muslim individuals and institutions have since responded. A university in Nigeria, for example, recruited a substantial number of graduate assistants for the purpose, but it is difficult to see how someone just grappling to understand the subject itself, much less master it, could Islamise it. Where the Islamization of the disciplines has begun, it has already gone to the ridiculous level of Islamising the English language. One is not sure why English has been chosen for Islamization or how that is going to be done or which language will follow next, perhaps English, French, then German, Russian, Chinese ...? It is amazing how the obvious link between language and society can be so recklessly ignored. Even al-Attas who feels very strongly about languages will not encourage this futility, for he knows only too well that language is nothing but an expression of the culture and world view of a people. As he once observed, “language, thought and reason are closely interconnected and are indeed interdependent in projecting to man his world view or vision of reality”.(30) The IIIT cannot be held responsible for what people make of their objectives; Taha Jabir, a, if not the, leading figure, makes this very clear in a recent paper.(31) But the significance of this paper, which appears to be an update to the Work Plan, is in clarifying the contemporaneous and experimental nature of the scheme, stripping it of what ever finality some may have inferred on it. The Islamization of knowledge school, as he calls it, “is keenly aware of the workings of time on ideas as they pass from stage to stage and mature, and is therefore the first to point out that the “Islamization of knowledge” is not to be understood as a set of axioms, or a rigid ideology or a religious movement”.(32) In fact, he went further by inviting people to make contributions that can enrich this idea. One cannot agree more, but it is by criticism that ideas are enriched and not by praise. In fact it seems necessary to re-examine the whole idea of the Islamization of knowledge not only to separate the chaff from the grain, as it were, but also to put the challenge in perspective. It is in this light, that a few issues are being raised below, for what they are worth.

The Challenge in Perspective

1. Delineation of the Problem

There doesn’t seem to be any problem in agreeing that the Muslim Ummah has a problem, some would say, a very serious one indeed. But there seems to be a problem in pinning it down. Even when we agree that the intellectual crisis is the at the root of the problem and therefore the most important and the most pressing consideration, it seems difficult to agree on the solutions. The Islamization of knowledge is at best one solution among others and for it, or any other solution for that matter, to survive, it has to face the scrutiny of all and sundry, adjusting and evolving, and eventually standing the test of time. In this matter the criticisms are more important than the praises. Praise, it should be pointed out, is particularly dangerous, especially when it comes too early, not only because it gives an idea of early victory and tends to make people rest on their laurels, but also because it sends the mind to sleep. So one should rather look at the problems associated with the Islamization of knowledge, and there are quite a number:

i. The very expression ‘Islamization of knowledge’, raises a number of questions. One can dismiss as cynical the suggestion that it portrays Islam as some kind of detergent that can be sprinkled, as it were, to cleanse knowledge of whatever impurities are thought to have soiled it. But it is certainly confusing for many of us whose limited reading suggests that all knowledge is from Allah, and that it is the intention of the seeker and the ultimate use it is put to, that makes it Islamic or otherwise. With this rather elementary frame of mind one starts wondering if it is knowledge that needs Islamization or the approach and utilisation of knowledge. In any case, knowledge, whether of religion or of nature is nothing more than the data we perceive as we interact with the texts of religion and the text of nature. Muslims, at least, believe that nature is a gift from God, very much like religion, it also comes as a text containing a message. Taha Jabir has simplified the matter when he beautifully explained the idea of two books, one of religion and the other of nature, and the necessity of reading both before we can claim to understand the universe we live in.(33) But while these books are divine, their interpretation and therefore understanding, as Souroush will say, is human and therefore fret with human infallibility. So it seems the best we can do is to Islamise our approach to knowledge, which then shifts our focus from knowledge as such to epistemology.

ii. Of the materials produced on the Islamization of knowledge, it has not been sufficiently demonstrated how exactly this knowledge is to be Islamised. Key concepts are said to be introduced into the disciplines, but it has not been shown how these key concepts will make chemistry different from what it is today, or indeed how sociology or history is going to be different. Admittedly, key Islamic concepts have been introduced into economics and a whole new discipline of Islamic economics is emerging, but even here there remain problems to be resolved.(34) But does that mean we could have an Islamic chemistry as a discipline? How different is it going to be from the chemistry we know? Does the problem we have with chemistry come from chemistry itself or from the chemist? Since chemistry is what the chemists make it to be, the problem is more likely to come from the chemists themselves. In all probability the problem emanates from the mind of the chemist, informed as it is by what Nasr calls a sensualist empirical epistemology. Similarly, the mind of the social scientist is informed and directed by modern humanism as usually understood and associated with the secularising tendencies of the Renaissance. The idea of humanism, as Nasr succinctly puts it, “means ultimately the substituting the “Kingdom of Man” for the ‘Kingdom of God” and making terrestrial man the ultimate and final arbiter and judge of truth and himself the reality which is of highest value.”(35) The problem, it seems, lies not so much with knowledge as knowledge as with the process or the philosophical assumptions that underlines its acquisition and use. Epistemology seems, therefore, to be the problem rather than knowledge as such. The expression ‘Islamization of Knowledge’ could, therefore be misleading in this respect.

iii. Sometimes one cannot help asking how can the Muslims Islamise what they don’t have? Today Muslims are no longer producers of knowledge (even of Islamic religious knowledge), they are only consumers, poor ones at that. The Islamization of knowledge can, therefore, create the impression that all Muslims need really do is to Islamise knowledge that others produce and not produce it themselves, as if the world of knowledge was going to wait for them. Knowledge like time is constantly on the move and waits for no one, in fact with the information explosion, knowledge seems to be moving faster than time itself. Elementary as some of these observations may seem, they appear to have engendered a frightening complacency for which the Islamization of knowledge is becoming an alibi. It tends to cheapen the challenge, lower the gaze, and make Muslims content with “Islamising knowledge”, rather than walking their way to the frontiers, where they once were and excelling as they once did.

iv In redefining or delineating the problem, perhaps Muslims should go back and try to understand the challenge they are trying to respond to. Many will have no difficulty in agreeing that the greatest challenge the Muslim Ummah is facing today is the challenge of knowledge. We are living in a world where knowledge is the greatest capital. It may have actually been so all along. But today, more than ever before, the battle for survival and control is a battle of the brain and as Muslims ought to know, in a battle of the brain nothing will do but the brain. For the purpose of clarity, this is a challenge of knowledge, in the articulate words of al-Attas, “not as against ignorance; but knowledge as conceived and disseminated throughout the world by Western civilisation; knowledge whose nature has become problematic because it has lost its true purpose due to being unjustly conceived, and it has brought about chaos in man’s life instead of, and rather than justice; knowledge which pretends to be real but which is productive of confusion and scepticism, which has elevated doubt and conjecture to the ‘scientific’ rank in methodology and which regards doubt as an eminently valid epistemological tool in the pursuit of truth; knowledge which has, for the first time in history, brought chaos to the Three Kingdoms of Nature; the animal, vegetal and mineral.”(36)

v. Thus the problem at hand is not so much with knowledge as such but the epistemology. Though the sacred-secular dichotomy lies at the roots of epistemological problems, the solution does not end with the taming of the secular to recognise and appreciate the sacred, that, it would appear, is rather where the search for the solution begins. This is not only because, as Fazlur Rahman alluded, what is required is a coherent system which unites the two, a job he said Iqbal had began, but which requires much more work. But also and perhaps more fundamentally because sacred epistemology itself has its problems which must not be ignored. Stagnation in Islamic jurisprudence, fiqh, was nothing but the result of the stagnation of sacred epistemology which, Souroush believes was in turn because of the stagnation of “related disciplines, such as theology and history and the non-existence of some the decisive disciplines, such as sociology and the like”.(37) In addressing sacred epistemology, perhaps needless to add, Muslims must give a fresh and hard look at the assumptions of old, especially regarding the ash‘ariyya and mu’tazila positions, and be prepared to be even more charitable than previous generations, if only because the benefit of hindsight has allowed us to see the prejudices, partialities and political favouritism that went in to the debate and eventually determined its results. What is at hand is not a black and white, cut and dried issue but a complex phenomena. Souroush may have dramatised it when he said “Rationality, prejudice, egoism, truth-seeking, obliviousness, greed, fallibility, partiality, complacency, easy going, acquisitiveness, and the like all have their due share in the science of religion and all influence it in one way or another. True, the revelation is Divine, but what about the interpretation of the revelation?” Put in his other words, what Souroush is saying is that “despite the firm belief of individual believers in their own interpretation of revelation, the caravan of knowledge, inspired with all kinds of complexities and contraries is breaking its way ahead, feeding on the controversies, competitions and cooperations of its members, irrespective of their individual desires and faiths. Our lot” he rested his submission, “is nothing but hope”. This, it must be added, is the hope of Rumi when he said “Naught but hope is possible”.(38) We don’t have to agree with Souroush, in any case, that is not the point in citing him here, the point rather, is to give us a glimpse of the ideas and the minds we shall have to put up with in our efforts to address the challenge of knowledge.

2. The Role of History

Muslims hardly need to be reminded of the significance of history, if only because the Qur’an is replete with it. The Islamization of knowledge being attempted now is in a way what was successfully and remarkably accomplished some ten centuries ago. Even though the context has changed, the issues appear to be the same and the principles are likely to remain the same. It is necessary, therefore, to have recourse to that history if only to avoid the mistakes of the past. Indeed, there are a lot of lessons to be learnt and George Makdisi has captured a number of these in his well researched work, ‘The Rise of Colleges’.(39) This is not the place to recall all these important details, especially when they have been so eloquently put by far more competent minds. But three issues may have to be mentioned even if briefly:

i. While the surge of intellectual activities in the 10th century was triggered by the great influx of the well known translation of Greek works, especially in philosophy and medicine, done during the reign of al-Ma’mun, the activities were sustained by individual scholars, supported by independent waqf and spurred by an atmosphere of scholarship.(40) The craving to learn and the desire to share knowledge combined to sustain a lively intellectual atmosphere which culminated into the formalisation of inaugural lectures in which any subject under the sun was possible. These lectures were often disputations on different subject matters. In 1055, for example, the Imam al-Haramain al-Juwaini, disputed in Baghdad with Abu Ishaq ash-Shirazi and then with Abu Nasr b. as-Sabbagh. “Ibn ‘Aqil, then 16 years of age cited as one of the subjects of disputation Juwaini’s theory of divine knowledge, denying God’s knowledge of the particulars, limiting it to the universal.”(41) In this way the Muslim world took the rest of the world by storm dominating the scene for the next five centuries. Three elements appeared to have been very crucial in this astonishing enterprise: the individual scholar, the waqf institution, and an intellectual freedom which made it possible for scholars to allow their minds full rein. Such disputations provided constant stimulation and presented a constant challenge to the mind, which having been frequently spurred had to marshal and develop its wit and rise to greater intellectual heights. This way great Muslim minds developed and excelled and naturally influenced the world around them.

ii It is these great minds and their works that actually triggered the Renaissance, though once it took off it, rather naturally, imbibed the conflicts in its milieu and acquired a momentum of its own. Acknowledging this influence, and quoting other sources, Makdisi wrote: “The rise of universities was occasioned by a great revival of learning between 1100 and 1200, during which time, ‘there came an influx of new knowledge into Western Europe, partly through Italy and Sicily, but chiefly through the Arab scholars of Spain’. This influx of new knowledge has been described by Western scholarship. It has been detailed in a long list of books dealing mostly with philosophy and science that have been translated from the Arabic into Latin, so that it is generally agreed that Arabic scholarship made its contribution to the ‘great revival of learning’. Makdisi has tried with great success to capture the picture of a scholar from the then Muslim world visiting one of the emerging universities of the West. Far from feeling out of place both the visitor and his hosts will be as comfortable as fish in water.(42) Makdisi has also produced excerpts that vividly conveyed the influence and attraction of the Arabic language among the emerging Western scholars of the time. Understandably so, for it replaced the Greek and Latin as the language of scholarship, so a good knowledge of Arabic became a measure of one’s learning, perhaps in a way that knowledge of English or other European languages are today.(43) Such astonishing influence could not have been exerted if these Muslims scholars were operating from the rear, consuming rather than producing knowledge. This is not to say Muslims cannot rise intellectually to be on a par or even excel others, rather they cannot do it while operating from the rear, when they cannot impress, much less influence anybody.

iii It is important to reflect on some of the internal factors which suffocated learning or clipped intellectual wings and hemmed in the minds of the scholars. Accounts may differ in their detail but most agree that the first casualty was intellectual freedom and the total independence of the scholar. As political authority deteriorated they began to feel insecure and scholars became drawn into conflicts so loosing their independence. Views that could not prove their worth on the intellectual Platform began to take refuge with the court, often insinuating the curtailment of opposing views. Makdisi has brought some of these incidences to light as also an extract of Max van Berchem’s treatise which contains even more detail. “Thanks to the universal role of faqih” observed Berchem, “Sunnism spread into all levels of society. It causes a new spirit to be born, fatal to freedom of conscience, to all seeds of independence, but very useful to the sovereigns”.(44) It is tempting to dismiss this observation but the facts on the ground do not allow it. If it was not true then, it is certainly true today and here lies the relevance of history. Ziauddin Sardar may have had this in mind when he insisted that an Islamic university must be a normative Institution and proceeded to explain, for the avoidance of doubt: “A normative, goal seeking institution is not a ‘politicised’ institution that take sides with this or that political stance. It does not tilt as the universities in the post-Reformation Europe were expected to tilt towards Protestantism or towards Catholicism, or during the time of war they had to tilt against the enemy and all his works ... Or as the universities of the Muslim world and in the West do nowadays, adopt a conservative garb under the conservative board of trustees or of a conservative government is in power ..... A normative academy owes its loyalty only to norms and values that shape its outlooks and goals.”(45) A tall order perhaps, but this is what makes the history even more relevant.

3. The Role of Attitude

Muslims today have, perhaps, one of the lowest literacy rates. Those who are literate among them have the poorest reading culture. Very little publishing activity takes place in the world of Islam today, but the quality, or lack of it as it were, of publications is certainly more disturbing than the quantity. This is certainly ironical for a people whose first word of revelation was the command to read! This negative attitude to reading, an obvious symptom of intellectual decadence, is particularly peculiar to this generation and contrasts sharply with the period when the Ummah produced great minds. When al-Razi in defending himself of an accusation of some intellectual deficiency reported that he wrote some two hundred works or when Ibn Sina informed us that he read all the books available in his time on a particular subject he wanted to master or that he had access to a library and read all the books in the library,(46) Muslims may find all this as strange as science fiction. It is thus easy to agree with Ziauddin Sardar when he says that: “Being a Muslim intellectual is a lonely and tough business. Half of the time, half of your audience do not know what you are talking about; the reminder of the time they are busy undermining everything you stand for and write about”.(47) Mernissi’s research experience was not any better as she discovered that, “What is most striking about museums in Islamic countries, whether in Lahore, Dakar, or Rabat, is the amount of dust on the meagre number of works one finds, and the monastic silence surrounding the few custodians on duty. You almost feel the need”, she continues, “to apologise for disturbing them, and the incredible number of bureaucratic steps required to make a photocopy or buy a reproduction makes you to want to leave empty-handed and go home to fantasize quietly about the past”.(48) Unfortunately it is not only in the museums that dust accumulates, even science and engineering laboratories in many Muslim countries are full of dust. Someone shocked at the sight asked a lecturer how they manage to teach science in the circumstances, and the lecturer retorted that they no longer teach science, they only teach the history of science.

“Since June 1990 the Saudis have signed arms contract with the Pentagon to the tune of $ 30 billion, “roughly equal to the amount spent by the American military on major weapons systems this year”.(49) And yet the country could not defend itself in the Gulf War and had to call in the Americans. “Among the nine largest purchases of arms in the world in 1983, four were Arab states: Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Egypt. What the officials of this states ignore is that the age of fetishism is over, and importing military hardware increases dependence. Power comes from the cultivation of the scientific spirit and participatory democracy”.(50) One would add an annual defence budget is more than enough to finance several defence industries with all the research and personnel development that goes with it. It may be worth noting that after defence, the highest budgetary allocation often goes to the ministry of sports and not education. A country that executed a war for eight years without having to borrow, has, barely five years after that war, amassed a foreign debt of $30 billion with nothing to show for it.(51) One could go on, the list of these follies that underline contemporary Muslim, individual and collective attitudes, seems endless. Suffice it to say that with attitudes like these the Muslim world needs no enemies.

But by far the most devastating of attitudes is the Muslim phobia for ideas. It is perhaps not difficult to understand why monarchs, life presidents or some military dictators would want to get books and magazines censored or the movements in or out of certain people with certain ideas blocked. But it is especially difficult to understand why scholars should fear ideas. It is amazing how nearly a millennium after the fall of Baghdad, people are still being suspected of being mu‘tazilis, perhaps never in the history of humanity has a paranoia been so resilient. To this has now been added the salafi and Sufi labels and the study of aqidah, whatever that means, has been elevated to levels unprecedented in the history of Islam. All manner of institutions have now sprouted to protect this imaginary pet, books have been banned and students of some Islamic universities are literally under constant surveillance lest they read or listen to something that may affect their aqidah. The problem, to be sure, is not so much the obsession with aqidah as the morbid fear of anything new and the futility of it all in the days of CD-ROM and the Internet. Fazlur Rahman, after his nearly exhaustive analysis, concluded that the only way out of the vicious circle the Ummah appear to be caught in is the creation of first class minds, which he quickly added, cannot be produced at will, but could be generated by creating the necessary conditions that could nurture these minds.(52) An atmosphere where minds are insulated from ideas, intimidated to conformity, and denied opportunities to allow their thoughts full rein, is certainly not the place to grow first class minds. It rather provides a fertile soil for the growth of mediocrity, which too often masks as piety, leaving sycophancy as the only means to curry the favour of officials who are too content with their achievements to believe otherwise.

4. The Role of Institutions

The role of waqf Institutions in the development of educational institutions in the early history of Islam has been adequately dealt with by numerous works among them that of Makdisi. Even in the West it has been virtually the same story, understandably so, for a lot of the impetus for development came from the then Muslim world.(53) These works have obviated the need to dwell on the subject and leaves us with only two fairly obvious points to make. Now that they have all but disappeared, ways of resuscitating these must form a component of this drive to respond to the challenge of knowledge. In reviving them, care must be taken to avoid the partisanship which characterised the waqfs of old or even the more dangerous contemporary partisanship of madhhab, Sufi, Salafi or such frivolous creations of the idle, if pious, minds of today.

But there is another role of another institution which we ought not be oblivious of. Like Nasr argued, the science of today does not stand on pure scientific fact alone it has a whole army behind it.(54) The secular epistemology which has created it and under which it thrives has also created a range of institutions that reinforce and protect it and occasionally enforce it. In the rather more blunt words of Abdullahi Smith: “The reason why the new tradition of learning which these (Western) institutions represent, in spite of the way in which they run counter to the grain of human intellectual history ... are so often unquestionably accepted ... is no doubt a function of the enormous material power ... whatever we may say about the moral basis of the human governments of the industrialised world of Western Europe and North America, there is no doubt at all about its colossal power ...”.(55) This is not to suggest that Muslims should raise an army to protect their epistemology, in fact it is to suggest that they should dispense with having any. Ziauddin Sardar, when discussing his idea (or is it dream?) of an Islamic university seems to summarise the point, when he says: “Unlike the western university, which despite being guided in all its endeavours by values which are deliberately hidden, swept under the carpet so that they may not be noticed, an Islamic university boldly states the values and norms which shape its goals and academic work. This is not just a much more honest stance, it is also a less dangerous one”.(56) Ideas, at least we now know, can be far more powerful than sheer physical power, as the collapse of the Berlin wall amply demonstrated.

5. The Link Between the Islamization of Knowledge and the Islamization of Society

There seems to be some kind of cold war between Muslim scholars and Muslim activists. After conceding that Muslim activists, members of contemporary Islamic movements, have helped in stemming the tide of secularism in Muslim countries, Fazlur Rahman, for example, believes that, that was all they have to offer Islam. The greatest weakness of neorivivalism, as he calls the phenomena of Islamic movements, “and the greatest disservice it has done to Islam, is an almost lack of positive effective Islamic thinking and scholarship within its ranks, its intellectual bankruptcy, and its substitution of cliché mongering for serious intellectual endeavor.” “It has often contended,” he proceeded to say, “with a real point, that the learning of the conservative traditional Ulema, instead of turning Muslims towards the Qur’an has turned them away from it. But its own way of turning to the Qur’an has been no more than ... picking upon certain selected issues whereby it could crown itself by distinguishing Muslims from the rest of the world, particularly from the West.”(57) Seyyed Hossein Nasr rarely expresses his reservations and when he has to it comes in some veiled reference but nevertheless strong enough to reveal some anguish. In the preface to his ‘Knowledge and the Sacred’, which were collections of lectures made soon after the Revolution in Iran, he could not hide his brush with the revolutionaries, as he related that, “When the invitation to deliver [the] Gifford lecture first reached us, we were living in the shades of the southern slopes of the majestic Alborz Mountains. Little did we imagine then that the text of the lectures themselves would be written not in the proximity of those exalted peaks but in sight of the green forests and blue seas of the eastern coast of the United States. But man lives in the spirit and not in space and time so that despite all the unbelievable dislocations and turmoil in our personal life during this period, including the loss of our library and the preliminary notes for this work, what appears in the following pages has grown out of the seed originally conceived when we accepted to deliver the lectures.”(58)

Similarly the activists have always held Muslim scholars with some disdain, looking down at their commitment and belittling their seemingly futile research. Even the IIIT, which was started by people who were first known more for their activism than their scholarship, were felt by some activists to have started the Islamization of knowledge as an alibi for not getting involved in political activism. This claim may be difficult to substantiate, at least from the documents of the IIIT, but that it could be made at all is significant enough. In a recently published interview with Taha Jabir, some of the questions asked betray this feeling that because the IIIT concentrates on thoughts it suggests therefore that it sees no value in the activities of Islamic movements.(59) An appreciation of the inextricable link between the Islamization of knowledge and the Islamization of society seems to have been lost, even as many Muslim mujaddids who brought radical changes in their respective societies were first and foremost scholars. It needs also to be appreciated that accessing power is not as difficult as staying in power. Ideas and creativity is what allows systems to last and not prowess. This has been amply demonstrated by Muslim history and is particularly so today. For identification and delineation of the problem and the synthesis of ideas are the domains of the intellectuals. In the words of al-Attas, “to lack of intellectuals is to lack leadership in the following areas of thinking: (1) the posing of the problems; (2) the definition of the problems; (3) the analysis of the problems; and (4) the solution of the problems. Even the posing of the problem is itself an intellectual problem. A society without effective intellectuals will not be in a position to raise problems.”(60) As Zia would argue, “Intellectuals are the only group in any society which systematically and continuously, in sharp contrast to the specialist and the professional, try to see things in wider perspectives, in terms of their interrelations, interactions and totality. This is why intellectuals have been at the forefront of new synthesis and thought. Most of the major changes and reforms in western civilisation, for example, have been brought about by the intellectuals ... And what better evidence of [the] importance of intellectuals and their powerful influences can one give than by simply pointing out [how] the Soviet Union rules in the name of a single intellectual, Karl Marx, who spent most of his time in libraries ...”.(61) But in this same example, we equally find evidence of the co-operation of scholars and activists before reforms can be realised or ideas actualised. The complimentarity of the scholars and the activists hardly needs any further emphasis in an enterprise where none can do without the other and only both can do.

Concluding Remarks

Undoubtedly there is a strong case for the Islamization of knowledge. But whether the expression Islamization of knowledge is the appropriate term for what is needed to be done or not, is something that needs to be revisited and re-examined in the light of some of the reservations raised. This is to avoid an oversimplification which may engender naiveté, complacency and mediocrity, so that instead of facing the challenges squarely, the Ummah may end up escaping them. But even more importantly, the problem needs to be defined more precisely; we should be able to identify precisely the problem for which Islamization is the solution. Having defined the problem, the direction must also be mapped out clearly, for, as it has been said, if one does not know to which port one is sailing, no wind is favourable.

Once the problem is pinned down and the direction charted out, it should be easier to begin the journey, long and arduous as it is bound to be. The issues raised here may not themselves be important, what is important is the response they may elicit. Indeed some of these little thoughts have been bared precisely to provoke the thoughts and perhaps the fury of greater minds, who in responding will take the Ummah, along with the rest of humanity, to greater intellectual heights. Needless to say, the Ummah needs these greater minds today more than ever before, and perhaps the best way to access them is to keep our doors open, especially for non-conformist and the not so pious, we may well discover that we have more to learn from them than we thought.

The author graduated in Pharmacy from Ahmadu Bello University Zaria, Nigeria. He did a masters programme in African Studies and later a doctorate in Intellectual History both at the Institute of African and Asian Studies, University of Khartoum, Sudan. At the time this paper was written, worked with Islam in Africa Organisation and taught at the Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Nigeria. He has between 1999 and 2002 served as Special Adviser (Political) to the Vice President of Nigeria and in April 2003 was elected to the Nigerian House of Representatives for a four year term.

11. This was in his Presidential address of All-India Muslim League in December 1930, quoted in Khalid bin Sayeed, Western dominance and political Islam: Challenge and Response, New York, SUNY Press, 1995. P. 34 - 5.

23. This literature is massive and ever growing. It includes the proceedings of the two major conferences: one held in Pakistan in 1982 Published under the tittle, Islam: Source and Purpose of Knowledge, (Herndon, Virginia, 1988), the other under the tittle, Toward Islamization of Disciplines, (Herndon Virginia, 1989). There are a host of other materials in English and Arabic and I suppose some other languages also, including two very important works in Arabic, Kaifa na Ta’amul ma’a al-Sunnah by Yusuf al-Qardawi and Kaifa na Ta’amul ma’a al-Qur’an by Muhammad al-Ghazali.

24. A. Abusulayman, (ed.) Islamization of Knowledge: General Principles and Work Plan, (second edition, revised and expanded) IIIT, Herndon, Virginia, 1989. This appears to be largely the paper of I.R. al-Faruqi titled ‘Islamization of Knowledge: Problems, Principles and Prospective’ with some input from A. Abususlayman’s Paper titled ‘Islamization of knowledge: A new Approach Towards Reform of Contemporary Knowledge’ both delivered at the 1982 conference in Pakistan and published in Islam: Source and Purpose of Knowledge, above.

25. Ibid. P. 1.

26. Ibid. P. 6.

27. Ibid. P. 8.

28. See I.R. al-Faruqi, ‘Islamization of Knowledge: Problems Principle and Prospective’ in Islam: source and Purpose of Knowledge, Pp. 53-62.

29. A. Abusulayman, Islamization of Knowledge: General Principles and Work Plan, P. 57.

30. S.M.N. al-Attas, Islam, Secularism and the Philosophy of the Future, Pp. 42-3.

31. T. J. al-Alwani, ‘The Islamization of Knowledge: Yesterday and Today’, an unpublished paper, (Trans. from the Arabic by Y.T. DeLorenzo), see P. 2. foot note 2. “The Institute in no way considers itself responsible for the work done by these quarters, or for their views.”

39. G. Makdisi, The Rise of Colleges: Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1981.

40. Ibid. P. 79.

41. Ibid. P. 154.

42. “ In the Middle Ages an imaginary intellectual from the world of Islam, say Baghdad, on a visit to the world of scholarship in the Christian West, far from feeling out of his element, would be quite comfortable in his new surroundings. Quite familiar to him will be the colleges of Paris and Oxford, with their scholars and fellows, and their masters and doctors, aided by their assistants, repetitors and servitors. In attending the school lessons and exercises, he would feel at home with the lectures and disputations. Indeed as a visiting scholar, he would expect the courtesy of being invited to engage in a disputation or two, preferably three the usual number for Baghdad ..... the impressive list of technical terms representing the same functions as their Islamic counterparts, ..... all this and more, including the subordination of the literary arts so depressing to Tha‘lab and so eloquently deplored by John of Salisbury.” Ibid. P. 238-9. Makdisi added that, “Of course we have no knowledge of such a visitor to the Christian West: the magnetism of Islamic learning made it so that the thrust of travel was rather eastwards. P. 240.

43.[1] It is particularly interesting that this fashion persisted in spite of the opposition of Mozarab Alvaro of Cordoba, who complained: “My fellow-Christians delight in the poems and romances of the Arabs: they study the works of Muslim theologians and philosophers, not in order to refute them, but to acquire a correct and elegant Arabic style. Where today can a layman be found who reads the Latin commentaries on Holy Scriptures? ..... Alas! the young Christians who are most conspicuous for their talents have no knowledge of any literature or language save the Arabic; they read and study with avidity Arabian books; they amass whole libraries of them at a vast cost ...” Ibid. P. 240.

We hear more and more about 'Islamic science' and 'Islamic economics', and over recent decades, calls for an 'Islamization of knowledge' and for attempts to develop Islamic models for approaching modern science have increasingly been heard. What does this mean and what does it involve for current developments across the Muslim world? Religioscope put these questions to Prof. Farid Alatas.

Syed Farid Alatas is an associate professor in the Department of Sociology, National University of Singapore, where he has been since 1992. He lectured at the University of Malaya in the Department of Southeast Asian Studies prior to his appointment at Singapore. His books include Democracy and Authoritarianism in Indonesia and Malaysia: The Rise of the Post-Colonial State (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997) and Alternative Discourses in Asian Social Science: Responses to Eurocentrism (New Delhi: Sage, 2006), in which he documents various critiques of the state of the social sciences in Asia and critically assesses the prescriptions for alternative discourses that have emerged from these critiques.

Religioscope - In different parts of the world, we have seen in recent years claims that knowledge should be associated with some specific cultural or religious heritage. There are people claiming a Hindu science; there are those claiming an Islamic knowledge - or an Islamic approach to knowledge. In order to see the wider picture, before coming to Islam, could you elucidate the meaning of those different claims to indegenizing or religionizing knowledge?

Farid Alatas - If you put it in the larger context, there has been the consciousness that the Western cultural roots of the social sciences and humanities pose a problem for the development of social sciences in non-Western societies. So people have been thinking about developing new epistemological, metaphysical and cultural bases for the social sciences. This has taken the form of the indigenization of knowledge and the the indigenization of the social sciences; it has also taken the form of the nationalization of the social sciences to make them more in line with national interests in some countries. It has furthermore taken the form of the decolonization of the social sciences to allow them to be informed by local, or national, or indigenous interests - as opposed to colonial interests.

So it has taken various forms. One such form has to do with the Islamization of knowledge. What you have is the critique of Western knowledge in broad terms: it may be at the epistemological level; it may be more at the substantive or empirical level. And there have been various reactions in the non-Western world.

Within the Islamization of knowledge, there are at least two broad perspectives. There is the perspective associated with IIIT (International Institute of Islamic Thought), which was founded by Prof. Ismail Faruqi. It aims at the Islamization of disciplines: those involved speak about Islamic sociology, Islamic economics, Islamic anthropology, etc.

Then you have the other perspective, which is associated with my uncle, Prof. Syed Naquib al-Attas. It is more an approach influenced by the tradition of tasawuf, the Sufi tradition.

I should also mention a third perspective, which is related specifically to the discipline of economics. Before the idea of the Islamization of knowledge emerged, as early as the 1920s or the 1930s, there was already this idea of Islamic economics. In other words, Islam has a specific vision of the economy in terms of its ideals and that suggests a certain way of doing economic science. These Islamic economists have been engaged in developing that field for several decades.

Then the idea of Islamization of knowledge, as I have said, emerged in the 1970s. I would say that the Islamization of disciplines - i.e. the perspective associated with the IIIT - is a more positivist approach that seems to have a more mechanical view of how Islam is related to knowledge. Those concerned seem to approach the matter in terms of individual disciplines, and they imagine the possibility of Islamized disciplines.

I have to admit that very little headway has been made in terms of Islamizing these disciplines. We don't really see an Islamic sociology. It is very difficult to understand what is meant by these Islamized disciplines: they have not been put into practice, and the work that has been done on the Islamization of knowledge according to that perspective tends to be very abstract, and I would even say rather vague.

On the other hand, the approach very much inspired by Sufism does not speak of the Islamization of disciplines, but rather of the Islamization of the perspective that underlies the various disciplines. We are really talking about what my uncle once told me: it is the Islamization of the mind. The way I understand it, the discussion is about the way Islam provides the metaphysical and epistemological basis for knowledge. Those concerned are not interested in creating an Islamic sociology or an Islamic physics, but what they say is that, whatever your discipline, there is a particular metaphysical and epistemological framework that is provided by Islam. What they are doing is working out that framework, which can be fruitfully applied to any disciplines. There is a particular Islamic worldview, which suggests a particular framework.

Religioscope - I remember your quoting a statement by Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas stating that Islamization should be understood as a freeing of knowledge from its interpretations based on secular ideologies and from secular meanings and expressions. So this would be a challenge not only for Islam, but for all believers, including everybody with a metaphysical approach. What then would there be specific to Islam?

Farid Alatas - In general, among all religions, there is the idea of the sacralization of knowledge. Presumably, each religion would have its own perspective on how to sacralize knowledge. As far as Muslims are concerned, I think that one of the things is that, epistemologically speaking, to move away from more secular perspectives, we would have to recognize that there are multiple sources of knowledge. This includes not just reason or sense perperception, but also revelation and intuition.

I think the Sufis really - for example, my uncle himself - talk about the importance of intuition, of ilham, as a source of knowledge. This is one example of how knowledge is sacralized: you recognize the sacred or divine origin of knowledge.

People often misunderstand: they think that the Islamization of knowledge approach amounts to a different way of doing science. But I think the implication of this understanding of knowledge has more to do with the ethics of science and the way in which science is applied - when you think about the divine origins of knowledge or at least the role of the divine in the generation of knowledge and the responsibility that humans have in terms of the application of this knowledge in the world. I think the implications are more in that, rather than the actual doing of the science. As far as the rational scientific aspects of the work are concerned, the work of the physicist, the work of the medical scientist remain the same: we are not creating Islamic medical science or Islamic physics in that sense.

Religioscope - You wouldn't see the need for a specific type of training or school here; it is rather the way each professor and teacher would infuse his own approach with an understanding of the metaphysical?

Farid Alatas - Look at ISTAC (International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization) - the 'old' ISTAC, which was under my uncle - it was created specifically to Islamize knowledge, not only to teach the various branches, but also to provide that metaphysical and epistemololgical basis that should be infused by all scholars and teachers, whatever the discipline.

This understanding of the Islamization of knowledge does not suggest that, in order to do proper Islamic science, you have to conform to some Islamic requirements. While I imagine that the IIIT understanding suggests a more rigid approach - that there are certain areas with a boundary - you must accept certain rules and regulations in order to stay within the orbit of the Islamization of knowledge, whereas the other approach has more to do with your metaphysical and epistemological perspective, which anyway in Islam is so broad that it can encompass a variety of perspectives within the social sciences. With the first approach, there is the idea that there is an Islamic school of economics, there is an Islamic school of sociology: so other schools would by definition be excluded. But the second approach, informed by Sufism, does not lock you into a particular school within any particular discipline.

Religioscope - Could one summarize by saying that there is an approach that is a reaction against knowledge as being Western, and another approach that is a reaction against knowledge as being secular? Obviously, the West and secularism have often gone hand in hand. This would be a reaction against secularism, not any kind of clash of civilizations.

Farid Alatas - Definitely not!

Religioscope - Now, several Islamic universities have been established throughout the world since the 1970s: how far have some of them attempted to implement the Islamization of knowledge in their curricula? How far have they have been successful?

Farid Alatas - There has been very little development along these lines. It is still very much at the level of rhetoric. And I think it is likely to remain that way. The only way in which Islam can be brought into closer alignment with knowledge is if people start to do empirical work. And that takes me to my own understanding of these matters. I think that, rather than to talk about Islamizing knowledge, one should actually look at Islamic traditions as sources of concepts and ideas, and do actual research with that.

For instance, if one is an historian, a sociologist, or an anthropologist, one should look at Al-Biruni, at Ibn Khaldun, at various other thinkers, look at their concepts, look at their theories. The idea is to reconstruct their ideas, and undertake empirical historical research with these ideas. That is the way you make use of the Islamic tradition to contribute to knowledge.

There has been some movement along these lines, but it is a wide open area for new research.

Religioscope - You see the Islamization of knowledge going beyond the idea of decolonizing the mind - it goes much deeper. However, when we look around the world, those different attempts are quite often related to trends evoking 'unfinished decolonization'. In many cases, it has little to do with metaphysical considerations, but more with political ones, and not only in Islam.

Farid Alatas - That is right. Often the discussion on the Islamization of knowledge starts with a critique of the West, and in many cases does not go beyond it, with exceptions here and there. Regarding the work of ISTAC, for instance, they have been elaborating what they understand to be the metaphysical and epistemological basis for knowledge. They are doing it today, and I think there are scholars in other parts of the world who have been making some progress in that area. And in fact you have been seeing more and more literature in the past ten to twenty years that addresses epistemological issues, which would be of use to those who are interested in providing that basis for the social sciences and humanities. But for the most part, the work has been reactionary, reacting to what they see as the problems affecting Western knowledge and talking about the decolonization or dewesternization of knowledge, but not going beyond that in terms of elaborating an alternative.

Religioscope - If I understand your remarks, this approach had some level of success in economics, e.g. Islamic banking, but you see the approach as being doomed in the social sciences.

Farid Alatas - That is a good way to put it! Yes, I do see it as doomed. Where there is great promise is for the revival of thinkers from the classical Islamic tradition and the development of modern reconstructions of its thought, and then doing theoretical and empirical work. But this is rarely done.

I myself am interested in Ibn Khaldun, and I have started to do this. I have actually published in that area [see references below]. I think a lot more can be done, regarding Ibn Khaldun, as well as other such classical thinkers.

It is a great honour for me to be invited to deliver a lecture[1] named for the spiritual father of Pakistan. I thank the organizers, and I hope that my talk will live up to their expectations.

Given Allama Iqbal’s laudable efforts to reformulate the basic theoretical teachings of Islam in a manner that would be appropriate for modern times, I took this lecture as an occasion to reflect on thirty-five years of study of traditional Islamic thought. The questions I asked myself went something like this: Is there anything about traditional Islamic thought that makes it more than a historical curiosity? Is it relevant to the very real and concrete problems that all human beings, not just Muslims, face at the beginning of the twenty-first century? Should Muslims continue the common practice, acquired in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries of ignoring their own tradition of thought in their attempts to reformulate Islamic teachings?

My general answer to these questions is that the tradition of Islamic thought is indeed far more than a mere historical curiosity. It is a valuable repository of profound teachings about the nature of reality and the human predicament. Not only is it relevant to contemporary concerns, it is far more relevant to real human concerns than any of the sciences, technologies and ideologies that occupy the minds of most contemporary intellectuals, Muslim or otherwise. In fact, traditional Islamic thought is so relevant to Muslim attempts to deal with contemporary issues that, if it is not recovered and rehabilitated, authentic Islamic thinking will cease to exist. In other words, there will be no escape from what dominates most of contemporary Islamic thought already, which is warmed over Western ideologies disguised by a veneer of Islamic language.

If genuine Islamic thought ceases to exist, the religion of Islam will no longer be able to function as a real alternative to the flood of modernity. The reason for this is simply that modernity is propelled by a certain type of false thinking. The antidote to false thinking is true thinking and any attempt to reconstruct true thinking from false thinking is doomed to failure. When the foundation is corrupt, the building will also be corrupt.

The only way to think in Islamic terms is to join thought with the transcendent truths from which Islam draws sustenance. This needs to be done not only by having recourse to the guidelines set down in the Qur’an and the Hadith, but also by taking guidance from the great Muslim intellectuals of past, those who employed the Qur’an and the Hadith to clarify the proper role of thought in human affairs.

ThoughtI need to preface my remarks by reminding you of the important role that has been given to thought throughout Islamic history. By “thought” I mean the human ability to be aware of things and to articulate this awareness in concepts and language. For those familiar with the Islamic worldview, it is not too difficult to see that thought has always been considered the single most important component of human life and that it must be attended to before all else.

The principle of the primacy of thought is made explicit in the testimony of Islamic faith, the Shahadah. Tawḥīd or the assertion of God’s unity—which is voiced in the kalimat al-tawḥīd—has no direct relationship with the facts and events of the world. Tawḥīd is essentially a thought, a logical and coherent statement about the nature of reality, a statement that needs to inform the understanding of every Muslim. Moreover, in the Qur’anic vision of things, tawḥīd guides the thinking of all human beings inasmuch as they are true to human nature (fiṭrah). Every prophet came with tawḥīd in order to remind his people of their own true nature. Tawḥīd is the very foundation of intelligence, so much so that God himself declares it as the principle of his understanding. As the Qur’an puts it, “God bears witness that there is no god but He” (3:18).

In this traditional Islamic view of things, thought is far more real than the bodily realm, which is nothing but the apparition of thought. I do not mean to say that the external world has no objective reality, far from it. I mean to say that the universe is born from the consciousness, awareness, and “thought” of the divine and spiritual realms.

It should be obvious that by real “thought” I do not mean simply the superficial activities of the mind, such as reason, reflective thinking, ideation and cogitation. Rather, I mean the very root of human existence, which is consciousness, awareness and understanding. The Islamic intellectual tradition usually referred to this as ‘aql, or “intelligence.” Thought in this sense is a spiritual reality that has being and life by definition. In contrast, the bodily realm is essentially dead and evanescent, despite the momentary appearance of life within it. Intelligence is aware, but things and objects are unaware. Intelligence is active, but things are passive. Intelligence is a living, self-conscious, dynamic reality. In its utmost purity, intelligence is simply the shining light of the living God and that light gives being, life, and consciousness to the universe. Intelligence is the creative command whereby God brought the universe into existence. It is the spirit that God blew into Adam after having moulded his clay, the divine speech that conveys to Adam the names of all things.

In traditional Islamic thinking, it is taken for granted that God is the source of all reality. The universe and all things within it appear from God in stages, just as light appears from the sun by degrees. The spiritual world, which is the realm that the Qur’an calls ghayb or “unseen,” is the realm of life, awareness and intelligence. The bodily world, which the Qur’an calls shahādah or the “witnessed,” is the realm of death, unawareness and unintelligence. The closer a creature is situated to God, the more intense is its light and the more immersed it is in intelligence, consciousness and thought. Thus angels and spirits are vastly more intense in luminosity and intelligence than most inhabitants of the human realm.

In this way of looking at things, what exactly are human beings, who, in Qur’anic terms, were made God’s khalīfah or vicegerent on earth? In brief, people are nothing but their thought. Their awareness and consciousness determine their reality. Their thoughts mould their nature and shape their destiny. The great Persian poet Rūmī reminds us of thought’s primacy in his verses:

Brother, you are this very thought—the rest of you is bones and fibre.If roses are your thought, you are a rose garden, if thorns, you are fuel for the furnace.If rosewater, you will be sprinkled on the neck,if urine, you will be dumped in a hole. [2]

It is human nature to understand that we are nothing but thought and awareness, but we forget it constantly. We are too preoccupied with our daily activities to stop and think. We are too busy to remember God and apply the principle of tawḥīd, which guides all true thought back to the One from which thinking arises. Without the constant reorientation of thought by the remembrance of the One, people can only forget their real nature, which is the intelligence that was taught all the names by God himself.

If thought determines our present situation and our final outcome, what should be the content of thought? Toward what end should thought be directed? The position of the Islamic tradition has always been that thought must be focused on what is real and that there is nothing real in the true sense but God alone. The whole activity of thought must be ordered and arranged so that it begins and ends with God. Moreover, moment by moment, thought must be sustained by the awareness of God. Forgetting God, one needs to recall, is Adam’s sin. In Adam’s case, the sin was quickly forgiven, because Adam immediately remembered. But most people do not remember, especially in modern times and the consequences have been disastrous. As the Qur’an puts, “They forgot God, so God forgot them” (9:67).

True thought, then, accords with the divine spirit that lies at the heart of human awareness. It is the understanding of things as they are. Things can only be understood as they are if one is aware of them in relation to the Creator who sustains them moment by moment. True thought is to see things in relation to God. This is precisely the meaning of tawḥīd. I would like to think that it is thought in this meaning that Iqbal had in mind when he spoke of “Ego” with a capital E.

Rūmī tells us repeatedly about the proper object of thought and he often reminds us that true thought is living intelligence or another kind of vision. Take these verses:

To be human is to see and the rest is only skin.To see is to see the beloved.If your Beloved is not seen, better to be blind.If your Beloved is not the everlasting, better not to have one. [3]

What Rūmī is telling us is that human beings are governed totally by their awareness of goals and desires. Any thought, any vision, any understanding that is not informed and guided by the awareness of God’s overwhelming and controlling reality loses sight of the nature of things and forgets the purpose of human life. The ultimate outcome of such thought can only be catastrophe for the individual, if not for society as a whole.

The Intellectual Tradition In speaking of “traditional Islamic thought” I have in mind that branch of Islamic learning that focused on intelligence, ‘aql, as the source of the universe and the goal of human life. This tradition was called ‘aqlī, “intellectual,” to distinguish it from naqlī, “transmitted.” Intellectual learning includes fields such as philosophy, mathematics, astronomy, natural science and it also embraces a good deal of Sufism and some Kalām. Transmitted learning includes Qur’an, Hadith, jurisprudence and language.

There were four main areas of inquiry that dominated the concerns of Muslim intellectuals. First is metaphysics, or knowledge of the ultimate reality. Second is cosmology, or knowledge of the universe, its origins and its ends. Third is psychology or knowledge of the human soul, its beginnings and its destiny and fourth is ethics or knowledge of the traits of human character that allow for a harmonious and healthy development of the soul.

The various branches of intellectual learning that resembled what we nowadays call “science” focused on various peripheral issues pertaining to cosmology. Most Muslim intellectuals were not interested in such issues per se, but only inasmuch as they could throw light on the primary topics.

It is important to understand that tawḥīd is the underlying insight and starting point of the intellectual tradition. It is this that makes it a thorough-going Islamic discipline and not simply a continuation of Greek philosophy. Anyone who has read the great texts of this tradition knows that tawḥīd was self-evident to Muslim intellectuals. It was the very root of their perspective. It allowed them to see from the outset that God is the origin of all things that God is the ultimate destiny of all things and that God is the support and sustenance of all things at every moment.

In this metaphysics of tawḥīd, all true and proper sciences are applications of tawḥīd. Cosmology is the application of tawḥīd to the origin of the universe, psychology is the application of tawḥīd to the becoming of the human soul and ethics is the application of tawḥīd to human character traits and activity.

The primary characteristic of Islamic intellectuality was its unitary vision of things. The various sciences were not understood as separate and independent realms of inquiry, but rather as complementary domains. This meant that the more one investigated the outer world, which is the domain of cosmology, the more light was thrown on the inner world, which is the domain of psychology. In fact, the names that I have employed—“metaphysics, cosmology, psychology and ethics”—do not have exact parallels in the classical Islamic texts and the investigations of these domains tended to be interrelated and intertwined. In all cases, metaphysics was the foundation.

The interrelationship among the domains of intellectual inquiry can be seen clearly in the two realms that I have labelled “cosmology” and “psychology.” It is sometimes thought that the Sufis focused on psychology and the soul’s perfection, but the philosophers were more interested in cosmology and the origins of the universe. In fact, both philosophers and Sufis were deeply interested in both domains. On the philosophical side, this is already apparent in the expression mabda’ wa ma‘ād, “The Origin and the Return.” Both Ibn Sīnā and Mulla Ṣadrā, arguably the two greatest representatives of the philosophical tradition, wrote books by this title.

As Islamic philosophy developed, ma‘ād, or the soul’s return to God became more and more the centre of attention. Those who discussed ma‘ād were not primarily concerned with death after life and the Resurrection. Rather, they wanted to understand and explicate the nature of the human ascent toward God in this world. Moreover, even though metaphysics and cosmology focus on God and the cosmos, both were studied with the aim of understanding the true nature of the human soul. The simple reason for this is that we cannot understand ourselves without understanding God and the universe. Only in terms of a true comprehension of the nature of things can people orient themselves in relation to their ultimate concerns. Only on the basis of a correct orientation can they set out to achieve the goal of human life, which is to be completely human.

In short, the purpose of all the intellectual studies was to prepare the ground for achieving human perfection. Perfection can only be reaching by “returning” to God that is, by traversing the route of the ma‘ād . Traversing the route of the ma‘ād meant going back where one had come from without waiting for this to happen after death. Both philosophers and Sufis were striving to become what it is possible to become in light of our human status as vicegerents of God. To use the expression that was made famous by Ibn ‘Arabī, the goal of human life was to become an insān i kāmil, “a perfect human being.”

Taqlīd and TaḥqīqIn his attempts to reconstruct Islamic thought, Allama Iqbal was much concerned with overcoming taqlīd or “imitation” and with reviving ijtihād, the independent judgment that allows a person to make sound legal decisions on the basis of the Qur’an and the Hadith. But, as Iqbal well knew, the word taqlīd has two opposites in the Islamic sciences. If we are discussing fiqh and the Sharī‘ah, then the opposite of taqlīd is ijtihād. Muslim believers have the duty either to follow someone else’s ijtihād or to be mujtahids themselves. Given the qualifications needed to become a mujtahid, most Muslims over the past few hundred years have held that the gate of ijtihād is closed. Nonetheless, this was not a universal idea and it has certainly been questioned in modern times.

Here, however, I do not want to talk about transmitted learning, but rather intellectual learning. In the intellectual sphere, the opposite of taqlīd is not ijtihād but rather taḥqīq. Taḥqīq has the basic sense of finding out the ḥaqq of things. The word ḥaqq means truth, reality, appropriateness and rightness. It also means responsibility and duty and thus it implies the proper human response to truth and right. Hence, taḥqīq means to understand the truth and the right of something and to put that understanding into practice.

By its very nature, “understanding” is an intensely personal experience, because it is to actualise correct knowledge of something in oneself. As a methodology, taḥqīq was always understood as finding the ḥaqq for oneself and in oneself. No one can truly understand anything by way of taqlīd. A muḥaqqiq is someone who knows things directly and then acts in the appropriate manner on the basis of this direct knowledge. A muḥaqqiq fulfils his responsibility toward God, creation and society on the basis of a verified and realized knowledge, not on the basis of imitating the opinions and activities of others.

In order to understand the difference between the goals of Muslim “intellectuals” properly so called and the goals of those who were experts only in the transmitted learning, we need to keep in mind the difference between ijtihād and taḥqīq. We also need to remember that in matters of transmitted learning, taqlīd was considered the proper path for almost everyone. By contrast, in matters of intellectual learning, taqlīd can at best be the first stage of learning. In intellectual affairs, the goal is always taḥqīq, not taqlīd. In transmitted affairs, it is necessary to accept the Qur’an and the Hadith on faith and it is perfectly legitimate to follow the opinions of the great ulama’. In intellectual learning, seekers could not simply imitate the great intellectuals. Rather, they had to find out for themselves. You can be an ‘ālim on the basis of taqlīd, but not an ‘āqil.

When great Muslims of the past, such as Rūmī or Ghazzālī, criticized taqlīd, they were not criticizing taqlīd in matters of the Sharī‘ah.[4] Rather, they were attacking taqlīd in questions of understanding. You cannot understand God or your own self by quoting the opinions of others, not even if the others be the Qur’an and the Prophet. The only way to understand things is to find out for yourself in yourself—though you certainly need the help of those who already know. In other words, the goal of the intellectual tradition was to allow people to actualise proper thought for themselves, not to follow someone else’s thinking. On the basis of proper thought, people can reach a correct understanding of the objects that pertain strictly to intelligence. The first and most important object of intelligence is tawḥīd, the one truth that underlies every truth. This means that the goal of the intellectual tradition was to understand and actualise tawḥīd first hand, for oneself, not on the basis of taqlīd.

Today, the real disaster that looms over Islamic civilization has little to do with ijtihād and everything to do with taḥqīq. A society without mujtahids can function adequately on the basis of taqlīd, but a society without muḥaqqiqs has surrendered the ground of intelligence. Such a society cannot hope to remain true to its own principles, because it can no longer understand its own principles. What I am saying is that tawḥīd can only be understood through taḥqīq, not through taqlīd and certainly not through ijtihād. Once Muslims lose sight of their own intellectual tradition, they have lost the ability to see with the eye of tawḥīd.

To lose the ability to see with the eye of tawḥīd means to fall into seeing with the eye of shirk. Shirk, as you all know, is the one unforgivable sin, because it is an utter distortion of human perception and understanding a complete corruption of the human fiṭrah, a total obscuration of the intelligence that is innate to every human being. Given that tawḥīd is the primary duty of every Muslim and given that tawḥīd can be defined negatively as “the avoidance of shirk,” it follows that avoiding shirk is the primary duty of every Muslim. And, just as tawḥīd is the first principle of right thinking, so also shirk is the first principle of wrong thinking. In other words, shirk is an intellectual issue, just as tawḥīd is an intellectual issue. Any form of thinking that is not rooted in tawḥīd necessarily participates in shirk.

ScientismIn my title, I mention the “rehabilitation” of Islamic thought. I mean to say that I look upon the authentic intellectual tradition of Islam as suffering from a grave illness. Although a great deal of thinking goes on among contemporary Muslims, most of this thinking—with a few honorable exceptions—is deracinated, which is to say that it has few if any roots in the Islamic tradition itself. Although it frequently calls upon the Qur’an and the Hadith as witness, it is rooted in habits of mind that were developed in the West during the modern period. These habits of mind, if judged by the principles of Islamic thinking, are misguided and wrong-headed. In other words, they are rooted in shirk, not in tawḥīd.

If we accept that traditional Islamic thought is gravely ill, it will be obvious that recovery from the illness demands intensive care. Among other things, recovery will involve a thorough re-evaluation of the nature of intellectual health. It will necessitate careful scrutiny of the great texts of Islamic philosophy and theoretical Sufism and a serious attempt to understand Islamic principles by way of taḥqīq, not taqlīd.

However, before rehabilitation can begin in any real way, the illness must be correctly diagnosed. The diagnosis of an intellectual illness depends upon recognizing error for what it is. The problem here is that the illness is omnipresent, not only in the Islamic world, but also elsewhere. It is so much a part of the way that most people think today that they imagine it to be natural and normal. Like someone suffering from a debilitating disease from childhood, people have lost any sense of what health might involve.

In order to understand the nature of the disease, we need to remember that practically all of us suffer from it, whether or not we are aware of it. The reason for this is that it is a characteristic of modernity (and of “post-modernity” as well). The disease is co-extensive with the worldview that informs modern thought.

It is very difficult to characterize the modern worldview with a single label. One word that has often been suggested is “scientism.” I understand this word to designate the notion that the scientific method and scientific findings are the sole criterion for truth.[5]

Scientism so defined is a belief-system. Like most belief-systems, it has become second nature to its believers. They do not recognize it as a belief-system, because they think it is self-evident truth. Scientism is a basic characteristic of the modern worldview and the contemporary zeitgeist. People see the world and their own psyches in terms of what they have learned in schools, universities and television documentaries. It is taken for granted that the universe as described by science is the real universe. As for religious teachings, these are understood to pertain to ritual and morality, but not to the “real world,” since we have been taught to see the world only with scientistic eyes.

One of the many implications of the scientistic worldview is the common belief that the cosmology and natural sciences discussed in the Islamic intellectual tradition were early stages of the development of what we nowadays call science and that the findings of those early stages of human thought have now been proven to be false. People imagine that modern science has progressed far beyond medieval ideas.

However, there is a basic fallacy in this view of pre-modern science. It is the assumption that the aims and goals of pre-modern science were the same as those of contemporary science. If this were true, then indeed the pre-modern ideas would be incorrect. However, the fact is that the medieval scientists were occupied with a totally different task than that which has occupied modern scientists. In order to understand the Islamic intellectual tradition, it might be better to avoid altogether the use of the word science to designate what they were doing. This word has been pre-empted by the empirical methodologies that characterize the modern period. Instead, we need to recover a term that represents fairly the real goal of Muslim intellectuals.[6]

One possible name for both the methodology and the goal of the intellectual tradition, a name that was commonly used, is ḥikmah or “wisdom.” This word has the advantage of not implying a “scientific” and empirical approach to things and it also has the advantage of being a divine attribute. In English, it makes perfect sense to say that God is “Wise,” but to say that God is a “Scientist” would sound absurd. The English word wisdom and the Arabic word ḥikmah have preserved enough of their ancient meaning to imply both right thought and right activity, both intellectual perfection and moral perfection.

In contrast, modern scientists long ago abandoned any claim that science can help people find the road to right activity, not to speak of moral perfection. The role of science is simply to provide more power over God’s creation. Science does not and cannot address the issue of understanding the true nature of the universe, because the true nature of the universe cannot be understood without reference to the Creator of the universe. Nor can science address the issue of how we are to find the wisdom to use correctly the power that we gain over creation. Using power incorrectly is one definition of ïulm—wrongdoing, injustice, iniquity, tyranny.

Another name that fairly describes the goal of Islamic thought is the already mentioned taḥqīq. The Muslim intellectuals were not trying to contribute to the so-called “progress of science.” Rather, they were trying to develop their own understanding of things. The focus of their attention was not on the practical affairs of this world, but rather on the full actualisation of human intelligence. This demanded not only discovering the ḥaqq of things, but also acting in accordance with the ḥaqq of things, a ḥaqq that can only be determined with reference to the Absolute Ḥaqq, which is God himself. Taḥqīq demands both right thought and right activity, both intellectual perfection and moral perfection.

The Islamic quest for wisdom was always a quest to achieve unity with the divine light or the divine spirit, a light and spirit that was called “intelligence” or “heart.” By the nature of this quest, Muslim intellectuals knew from the outset that everything had come from the One Principle and will return to the One Principle. In other words, tawḥīd informed their vision from beginning to end. Their quest was not to “believe” that God is One, because they already knew that God is one. God’s unity is too self-evident to be called into question, unless someone’s intelligence has become atrophied or stunted. The quest was to understand the implications of God’s unity thoroughly and completely.

In brief, the purpose of searching for wisdom was what we can call “the taḥqīq of tawḥīd.” In other words, it was to verify and realize the truth of tawḥīd for oneself and then to put tawḥīd into practice in all one’s thoughts and activities. The goal was spiritual transformation. This transformation was understood to involve a total conformity with the divine attributes (ṣifāt) and character traits (akhlāq). It was often called ta’alluh, “deiformity” or “being like unto God,” or takhalluq bi akhlāq Allah, “assuming the character traits of God.”

In the Islamic wisdom tradition, tawḥīd was the guide of all efforts. It was both the seed and the fruit of human possibility. It was the seed that was planted in human awareness in order to yield the fruit of perfect understanding and perfect activity. In such a view of things, it was impossible to separate the realms of learning into independent domains. Taḥqīq was a holistic enterprise that yielded a unified vision of things. This unified vision demanded the unity of the human subject with the cosmic object that is, the conformity of the full human soul with the world in all its grandeur. Soul and world were always seen as complementary manifestations of the One, Single Principle, which is God. When God created Adam in His own image, he also created the universe in His own image. Perfect understanding means the ability to see all things in their proper places, which means to see them as divine images and in their relationship to God.

The Reign of TakthīrI said earlier that a certain type of false thinking governs the modern worldview. I suggested that one name for that thinking is “scientism,” and it is false because it makes unwarranted claims. But there is a much deeper reason why the modern worldview is essentially false. In order to explain this, I need to develop a few more implications of tawḥīd.

I said that the loss of tawḥīd is called shirk. I want to suggest now why sciences in its modern sense demands shirk. This is perhaps a startling claim and it will offend many practicing Muslim scientists, not to mention all those Muslims who believe that modern science can be justified by reference to the Prophet’s commands to seek knowledge. Nonetheless, my point needs to be made as starkly as possible. If it is not grasped, there will be no hope for the rehabilitation of the intellectual tradition. The evidence for the claim becomes completely obvious as soon as one understands what the Islamic intellectual tradition was trying to do.

I reminded you that the guiding principle of the Islamic wisdom tradition has been tawḥīd. If this is true, it is not too difficult to see that the guiding principle of modern science and learning is the abandonment of tawḥīd. We can call this abandonment shirk, but I do not want to deny a certain positive content to science. In its common usage, the word shirk is too heavily loaded with negative connotations to have any positive sense. Moreover, I do not want to make a moral or even a religious case against science. Rather, I want to make an intellectual case, in keeping with the tradition from which I am drawing.

So, let me suggest that the guiding principle of modern science and learning can be designated by the word takthīr. Takthīr is the literal opposite of tawḥīd. Tawḥīd means “to make one,” and takthīr means “to make many.” Tawḥīd means “asserting unity,” and takthīr means “asserting multiplicity.” Tawḥīd is to recognize the primacy and ultimacy of the One Reality. It is to acknowledge that everything comes from God, everything returns to God and everything is sustained by God. Takthīr is to declare the primacy and ultimacy of many realities. It is to assert that things have many origins and many destinies and that they are sustained by many different things.

By no means is takthīr inherently false. Rather, it is inherently short-sighted and incomplete. It misses the important points, because it denies implicitly, if not explicitly, the ultimacy of the One Reality that stands beyond all other realities. Once we understand things in terms of tawḥīd, we can understand the origin and destiny of the universe and the human soul and we can also grasp the present status of the world in which we live. Tawḥīd answers the ultimate questions and allows people to orient themselves in terms of the beginning and end of all things. If takthīr is to have any legitimacy, it must be oriented and governed by tawḥīd. Takthīr without tawḥīd can only tell us how things are related to other things, but there can be no unifying vision. A perspective based on takthīr denies implicitly that there is a purpose to existence. It rejects the idea that human aspirations to achieve moral and ethical betterment and to become intellectually and spiritually perfect have any grounding in objective reality.

The Muslim cosmologists were very interested in the issue of takthīr. But, for them, takthīr was a divine attribute. It is God’s activity in bringing the universe into existence. When Muslim intellectuals investigated the mabda’, the Origin of all things, they were explicating the nature of takthir. In effect, they saw God as al-mukaththir, “the One who brings the many into existence.” In contrast, when they discussed psychology, which is the ma‘ād or the return of the soul to God, tawḥīd was the primary issue. Here the question is simply this: How can we, as beings who dwell in multiplicity, unify our vision and activity and thereby return happily and freely to the One Origin, who is the Place of Return?

In short, within the Islamic intellectual tradition, we can understand takthīr as the divine principle that makes multiplicity appear from the One. Tawḥīd is then the complement of takthīr. It designates the divine and human principle that reintegrates the many into the One. One philosopher, for example, tells us that the Universal Intellect is khalifatullah in the Origin, which is to say that multiplicity appears from unity on the basis of the radiance of the divine omniscience. In contrast, human beings are khalifatullah in the Return, which is to say that the human role in the cosmos is to take multiplicity back to the unity from which it arose.[7] This explains why God selected Adam among all creatures to be taught the names. Only by knowing the names of all things can human beings take everything back to God. In other words, human intelligence has the potential to act directly on behalf of God because in its purest form, it is nothing but the living light and spirit of God that was breathed into Adam at his creation.

In brief, the perspective of the Islamic intellectual tradition recognizes both takthīr and tawḥīd. However, takthīr is kept totally subordinate to tawḥīd, which is to say that the many is always and forever governed by the One. The world and all things within it stay in God’s hands and can never leave. The role of takthīr can only be understood in terms of tawḥīd. Once we understand that God created human beings to act as His vicegerent and unify the whole of creation through their spiritual and moral perfection, then we can understand why God brought multiplicity into existence in the first place. Real understanding and real knowledge depend upon grasping the ultimate end of human existence, which corresponds with the ultimate end of creation itself. Moreover, human completion and perfection depend upon acting in conformity with real knowledge.

If the Islamic worldview can be characterized as tawḥīd, the scientific worldview can be characterized as “takthīr without tawḥīd.”[8] I do not have time to present any detailed arguments to support this claim, so let me look simply at the fruit of modern learning, where takthīr is obvious. Take, for example, the ever more specialized nature of the scientific, social and humanistic domains of learning; the disintegration of any coherent vision of human nature in the modern university; the unintelligibility of the individual sciences to any but the experts; and the total incomprehensibility of the edifice of science and learning as a whole. When takthīr rules over human thought, the result can only be analysis, differentiation, distinction, disunity, disharmony, disequilibrium and dissolution. Given that modern science and learning are rooted in the world’s multiplicity, not in God’s unity, their fruit is division and dispersion, not unification and harmony. One of Iqbal’s great insights, which, however, he did not follow up as he might have, is his understanding that modern science yields disunity and dissonance by definition. I quote: [9]

We must not forget that what is called science is . . . a mass of sectional views of Reality. . . . [T]he various natural sciences are like so many vul­tures falling on the dead body of Nature and each running away with a piece of its flesh. Nature as the subject of science is a highly artificial affair and this artificial­ity is the result of that selective process to which science must subject her in the interests of precision.

The reason, modern science wants “precision” is to separate things out from their overall context, a context that can only be properly understood in the light of tawḥīd. Only after a “highly artificial” view of reality has been manufactured can we ignore the objectivity of moral and ethic principles and justify the view that human beings have the right to control God’s creation as they see fit, without the guidance of wisdom. To use power without wisdom is to work ïulm, and ïulm indeed is a key characteristic of modern society. It is this power without wisdom that Lord Acton must have had in mind in his famous dictum, “Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely.”

It is perhaps in the realm of ethics and morality that the power of takthīr becomes most obvious to observers of the modern scene. For the Islamic intellectual perspective, adherence to right activity and actualization of “praiseworthy character traits” (akhlāq-i ḥamīda) is demanded by the objective nature of things. After all, the world is actually and truly a display of the divine attributes and the human soul is actually and in fact made in God’s image. Any human soul that does not actualize the divine character traits—such as wisdom, justice, mercy, compassion, love and forgiveness —has failed in the task of living up to human status. Any methodology that yields an unbridgeable gulf between truth and ethics is ignorance, not knowledge. Such knowledge ignores the ḥaqq of things, the moral demands that the truth of things makes upon us, and so it is occupied with bāṭil, the untrue, the vain, the wrong. Under the reign of takthīr, intelligence and virtue are torn from their roots in God. The net result can only be the dispersal of human excellence in a vast diversity of unrelated realms of endeavor, with no connections to be made between knowing and being, or between science and ethics. The raw power that is accumulated through acquiring instrumental and manipulative knowledge can only result in the downfall of human goodness.

I repeat that the remedy for takthīr is tawḥīd. God made tawḥīd a human imperative because without it, the world can only fall into corruption and ruin. Tawḥīd alone can reverse the natural flow of existence and awareness away from the divine unity into the dispersion and incoherence of multiplicity. Only the free will of human beings, harnessed by divine guidance, can reintegrate the many back into the One.

Takthīr by itself, then, is the process of bringing about multiplicity and disunity. It can only lead to disintegration. It is the direct opposite of tawḥīd. Takthīr is the animating principle of science as we know it today. Let scientists deny this as much as they want. The tree is known by its fruit, not by the claims of the gardener.

The Goal of ThoughtI said that there is a fundamental difference between the Islamic intellectual tradition and modern science and learning. One way to understand this is to see that Muslim intellectuals were striving to achieve a unitary and unified vision of all things by actualising the divine spirit latent in the human soul, a spirit that they often called ‘aql.

In contrast, modern scientists want to achieve an ever more exact and precise understanding of things, one that allows for increased control over the environment, the human body and society. This control, however, is not given over to the fully actualised intelligence of God’s vicegerent on earth—an intelligence that by definition entails the fullness of ethical and moral perfection. Rather, control is surrendered to the passions of the ignorant and forgetful selfhood—what was called nafs or “ego” in the Islamic texts. This is blatantly obvious in the various forms of totalitarian government that have appeared in the modern world, all of which take full advantage of scientific and technological power to beat their subjects into submission. But even “democratic” government, as Plato recognized long ago, can only be the rule of ignorant human passions. It can never be the rule of intelligence.

I want to point out still another characteristic of the Islamic intellectual tradition that places it in stark contrast with modern learning. This has to do with the implications of taḥqīq, some of which have already been discussed. Taḥqīq means to verify and realize things or to give things their ḥaqq in view of the Absolute Ḥaqq that is God himself. In modern Islamic languages, taḥqīq is sometimes used to translate scientific “research.” However, traditional Muslim intellectuals would not have recognized taḥqīq in any forms of modern research. The basic reason for this is that modern research is based essentially upon taqlīd, not upon taḥqīq, which is to say that it always depends wholly on the findings of earlier scientists. In contrast, taḥqīq as understood by the Muslim intellectuals did not accept any intellectual issue on the basis of taqlīd. It was an intensely personal activity that aimed at the discovery of the ḥaqq within the seeker’s own intelligence. That intelligence was understood and indeed experienced, as the supra-individual, transpersonal, universal breath of awareness that was blown into Adam at his creation.

From the point of view of modern science, which is rooted in taqlīd, every seeker of wisdom in the Islamic intellectual tradition was trying to “reinvent the wheel.” But it is precisely the technological application of knowledge, implied in this expression that was not the goal of the quest. Rather, the goal was wisdom and wisdom can only be discovered where it resides. Wisdom resides in living intelligence and ethical activity, nowhere else.

It is a common misinterpretation of Islamic intellectual history to say that Muslim scholars made scientific discoveries, but then they failed to follow up on them, so the torch of learning was passed to the West. But this is to read the empirical methodology and practical goals of modern science back into the intellectual methods and spiritual goals of the wisdom tradition. No, the goal was not to establish a fund of information upon which other scientists could build and from which technologists could draw for practical ends. Rather, the goal was taḥqīq, which is to discover the truth for oneself in oneself. Practical, worldly applications were of relatively little interest. Excessive attention paid to physical welfare and material benefit was considered a sure sign of a failed intellectual. In short, the true seeker of knowledge had another goal, which was to see for himself. The true seeker of knowledge knew that, as Rūmī puts it, “To be human is to see, the rest is skin.” Seeing for oneself is called taḥqīq, and it is to grasp the ḥaqq of things—their truth and reality—and then to put all things in their proper places according to their ḥaqqs.

Rūmī sums up the difference between a muḥaqqiq and a muqallid —between someone who knows for himself and someone who imitates other people in his thinking—in the following verses. He would surely include in the category of childlike muqallids most if not all of those who are called “scientists” in modern times.

A child on the path does not have the thought of Men.His imagination cannot be compared with true taḥqīq.The thought of children is of nurses and milk, raisins and walnuts, crying and weeping. The muqallid is like a sick child, even if he offers subtle arguments and proofs.His profundity in proofs and objections drives him away from true insight.He takes the collyrium of his secret heart and uses it to offer rejoinders. [10]

Rūmī , then, speaks for the whole Islamic intellectual tradition when he says that no one can achieve true and real understanding until he throws away the imitation of others and finds out the truth for himself through taḥqīq.

My conclusion then is simply this: There will be no rehabilitation and revival of Islamic thought until Muslim thinkers put the taḥqīq of tawḥīd back at the centre of their concerns.

[1] The lecture was delivered as the Iqbal Memorial Lecture 2000, under the auspices of the Department of Philosophy, University of the Punjab.

[2] Mathnawī (Nicholson edition), II 277-9.

[3] Ibid., I 1406-7.

[4] In Kīmiyāyi sa‘ādat, Ghazzālī calls teachings learned by way of taqlīd “the mold of truth,” and contrasts this with understanding the truth in itself: “The cause of the veil is that someone will learn the creed of the Sunnis and he will learn the proofs for that as they are uttered in dialectics and debate, then he will give his whole heart over to this and believe that there is no knowledge whatsoever beyond it. If something else enters his heart, he will say, ‘This disagrees with what I have heard, and whatever disagrees with it is false.’ It is impossible for someone like this ever to know the truth of affairs, for the belief learned by the common people is the mold of truth, not the truth itself. Complete knowledge is for the realities to be unveiled from the mold, like a kernel from the shell.” Kīmiyāyi sa‘ādat, edited by H. Khadiw-jam (Tehran: Jibi, 1354/1975), pp. 36-37.

[5] For a good discussion of the errors of scientism, see Huston Smith, Forgotten Truth: The Common Vision of the World’s Religions (New York: Harper Collins, 1976, Lahore: Suhail Academy, 2000).

[6] As is well known, the word science is commonly translated into Islamic languages as ‘ilm, and this would be perfectly legitimate if “science” were understood in its etymological sense, that is, as “knowledge” in the broadest sense of the term. However, strict attention to what is meant by science in the modern world and what was meant by ‘ilm in classical Islamic texts would, I think, lead us to grasp that what goes by the name science today would have been recognized by Muslim intellectuals as systematic ignorance. This is because science ignores, in a careful and methodical fashion, everything that was considered necessary for the true understanding of the nature of things. Instead, it focuses on superficial appearances and outward phenomena.

[8] Even if a “unified field theory” were to be achieved, it would simply show that the “physical” world —that is, the world, not as it is, but rather as it is understood and conceptualized by “physicists”—is governed by unified laws, which no one doubts in any case. But that leaves all the other modern sciences, such as biology, which do not follow “physical” laws, not to mention the social and human sciences. No, takthīr is the guiding principle of modern thought and the only possible way to overcome it is to root oneself in tawḥīd.

]]>webmaster@azzron.biz (Super User)Islamization of KnowledgeTue, 14 Aug 2018 00:16:35 +0000Islamization of Knowledge: A First Step to Integrate and Develop the Muslim Personality and Outlookhttp://i-epistemology.net/subjects/islamization-of-knowledge/item/529-islamization-of-knowledge-a-first-step-to-integrate-and-develop-the-muslim-personality-and-outlook.html
http://i-epistemology.net/subjects/islamization-of-knowledge/item/529-islamization-of-knowledge-a-first-step-to-integrate-and-develop-the-muslim-personality-and-outlook.html

It is hereby necessary for me to emphasize the importance of acquiring knowledge. We should remind ourselves that Prophet Muhammad (SAAS) is asked in the Quran to pray for an increase in knowledge (Rabbi zidni ‘ilman). The Prophet (SAAS), himself has emphasized the value of knowledge and highlighted the importance of acquiring knowledge, both for Muslim men and women. He said, “Acquire knowledge from cradle to grave”. Indeed he stated further that the acquisition of knowledge is a duty imposed on every Muslim man and woman. As a matter of fact, the best life, considered from a Muslim perspective, would thus appear to be the one that is devoted to the acquisition of knowledge, which may be regarded as a sacred religious duty imposed on every Muslim man and woman.

]]>webmaster@azzron.biz (Super User)Islamization of KnowledgeTue, 14 Aug 2018 00:14:25 +0000Islamic Thought in the Modern World: The Need for an Integrated Approachhttp://i-epistemology.net/subjects/islamization-of-knowledge/item/528-islamic-thought-in-the-modern-world-the-need-for-an-integrated-approach.html
http://i-epistemology.net/subjects/islamization-of-knowledge/item/528-islamic-thought-in-the-modern-world-the-need-for-an-integrated-approach.html

The conflict and tensions in the world today have resulted largely form conflicting systems of thought, which in turn provide contradictory stimuli and breed contradictory human motivations and responses – a situation that has brought a serious imbalance in the human behavioral and though patterns. This tendency was particularly marked in countries that came under the political and economic determinism of alien ruling powers. In the lands of Islam, the process started much earlier with the disintegration of Islamic political authority, which weakened the political existence of the Ummah and gradually paved the way for the infiltration of a kind of “foreign thinking” among the ranks of the Muslims.

Islam came to Indonesia through trade, in the form of mysticism. It became an eclectic religion, in which various traditions were blended into a unique form. This form has grown and passed into generations and formed the Sunnite majority of Indonesian people (with Ash’arite and Shafi’ite persuasion) and later was crystallized politically and socially into Nahdhat al-‘Ulama’ (NU), representing the traditional Islam. It is against this traditional Islam as background, that most of the Islamic reforms were launched, and should be understood.

B. THE WAVES OF ISLAMIC REFORM

• Islamic Reform I: Salafi/Wahabi Movement (Muhammadiyyah & Persis)

This traditional Islam has developed over generation, utterly unchallenged. However, under the influences of Wahabi-Salafi movements in Saudi Arabia in the eighteen century, many Indonesia Muslim scholars (‘ulama’) started to question the authenticity of Traditional Islam. They accused it as contained and practiced a number of heresies (bid’ah) and called for a religious reform in the form of purification, that is, “Back to the Origin: the Qur’an and Hadith” by ignoring the very rich and long-standing scientific, intellectual and mystical traditions of Islam. This movement has been crystallized into Muhammadiyyah and PERSIS.

• Islamic Reform II: Abduhism (Harun’s Neo-Mu’tazilism)

In early seventies Prof. Harun Nasution came back to Indonesia from Egypt and McGill, Canada, with a new understanding of Islam. Traditional Islam was accused to have caused Islamic decline and backwardness, since it has upheld fatalistic and anti-rational theological system: Ash’arism. To answer it, he launched a second Islamic reform, especially in educational domain, by proposing a new theology that he borrowed from Abduh, Mu’tazilism, especially in two aspects: rationalism and freedom. Islam asks us to use reason (‘aql). Islam doesn’t contradict the reason. It is with reason we will achieve rational and scientific sciences, and it was with the freedon of choice or free will as thought by Mu’tazilah that we will get progress in life. Later, this reform has created the so called Harun’s Neo-Mu’tazilism.

• Islamic Reform III: Rahmanism: (Nurcholish’s Neo-Modernism)

The third wave of Islamic reform came from those who studied under Prof. Fazlur Rahman of Chicago in early eighties. Again, reacted to the Traditional Islam as background, these students of Fazlur Rahman, known later as Neo-Modernists, criticized the Traditional Islam as having been carried away too far by foreign (non-Muslim) traditions, be it Hellenistic, Hindu-Buddhist or Zoroastrian, that have swing the empirical-scientific spirit of Islam into metaphysical one that caused the decline of scientific enterprise in the Islamic world and obscured the real understanding of Islamic doctrines. According to them, we need a fresh interpretation of Islam, by deducting directly from original sources, the Qur’an and hadith and doing away as much as possible from long traditions adopted by Traditional Islam that has distracted the real understanding and spirit of Islam, which is very modern.

B. CURRENT TRENDS

Before dealing with the issue of Islamization, it is important to have some ideas about current trends of Islamic thought and movement that in a way contributed to our understanding of Islamization of knowledge in Indonesia.

This group originally came from Traditional Islam, with Salafi’s tendency. For them Islam is simple, so it is no use to make it complicated by introducing philosophical and mystical materials. In interpreting religion, they tend to be literal. This group is more political (than intellectual) in their orientation. But they are influential among certain people because of their powerful rhetoric, and persuasion, especially when they reacted so strongly to the Westernization both in politics and culture and to the westernized people who supported modernity. Certain groups, such as Dewan Da’wah, Hizb al-Tahrir, and Jama’ah Islamiyyah might be considered as representative of the Fundamentalist Islam

• Islam Liberal (JIL, ICRP)

Other current trend in Islamic thought is so-called Islam Liberal. This group is actually another reform to the Traditional Islam from within. We can call them “young NU,” since most of their members come from NU background. They criticize the Traditional Islam to be passive and uncritical to their intellectual heritage. We need, according to them, to interpret, even if necessary to criticize, our frozen tradition in entirely new way. Using the methodological weapon (deconstructive, hermeneutic and semiotic approaches, as adopted by the contemporary Arab thinkers, as Hasan Hanafi, Mohammed Arkoun, al-Jabiri, Nasr Abu Zayd), they criticize the Islamic heritage (turath) by way of deconstructing it, without having a deep and comprehensive understanding. They criticize religious tradition and authority to be formidable hindrance to our true understanding of Islam. They actively engage in responding to certain contemporary issues, such human right, feminism, tolerance, and plurality and some controversial religious issues, such as cross-religon and homosexual marriages, having more than one session for hajj rites, and so on. It is represented by: J.I.L (Jaringan Islam Liberal) and ICRP (Indonesian Conference on Religion and Peace).

Although not directly concerned with the Islamization of Knowledge in Indonesia, the presence of Shi’ism in Indonesia, especially through ICAS (Islamic College for Advanced Studies) and ICC (Islamic Cultural Center) Iranian sponsored cultural and educational institutions, is very significant in giving the idea of how the Islamic intellectual tradition has been preserved and developed in Islamic world. By introducing syllabus and lecturers brought directly from Iran, Indonesian people, especially students, can “taste” and engage directly in the living tradition of Islamic philosophy as practiced by Muslim philosophers throughout history. The students don’t have to go to Iran, the capital of Islamic philosophy, in order to know and practice the doctrines of the philosophers and the scientific methods they employed. These institutions have brought the living Islamic tradition into the heartland of this country, and contributing to a direct and comprehensive understanding of the nature of knowledge and the Islamization of it.

C. THE ISLAMIZATION OF KNOWLEDGE

• Islamizaton of knowledge has been understood in different ways due to the differences in concepts and practices by its proponents. Nevertheless, they share the essential belief, that knowledge (especially modern science) needs to be islamized. There are at least 3 schools of thought of the Islamization of knowledge that should be addressed briefly before we talk directly our main topic.

• Schools of Thought of Islamization

Naquib Alatas: ISTAC

We are not really certain, who is the first to formulate or use the term “Islamization of knowledge.” But t is sure that Prof. Naquib Alatas has his own theory of Islamization of knowledge. For him the Islamization is “the liberation of man from magical, mythological, animistic, national culture tradition opposed to Islam, and then from secular control over his reason and his language. To implement it, Islamization of knowledge should undergo two processes; 1. De-westernization, that is, the isolation of key elements and concepts that make up Western culture and civilization from every branch of present-day knowledge. 2. Islamization: the infusion of Islamic elements and key concepts in every branch of relevant present day knowledge. This concept of Islamization of knowledge was realized in an academic institution called ISTAC (International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civlization).

Isma’il Farouqi: IIIT

Isma'il Raji al-Farouqi (d. 1986) also has his own understanding of the Islamization of knowledge. For him, Islamization of knowledge is an effort to redirect knowledge, by providing a new definition, re-organize data, rethink the method of thinking and co-relate the data, and re-evaluate conclusions, Then to re-project the goals in such a way so that these disciplines will enrich the Islamic horizon and give benefits to the Islamic ideals. To implement his ideas, he formulates 12 steps: (1) the mastery of modern sciences and its categories, (2) the survey of these disciplines, (3) the mastery f Islamic science: anthology, (4) the mastery of Islamic scientific heritage: analysis, (5) determining the specifically Islamic relevance to the scientific disciplines, (6) reexamining critically the modern scientific disciplines, (7) critically re-evaluating the Islamic heritage, (8) the survey on the problems faced by Muslim ummah, (9) the survey on the problems faced by mankind, (10) Creative analysis and synthesis, (11) putting back modern-scintific disciplines into Islamic framework in the form of textbooks and (12) the distribution of the Islamized science. To put his ideas and program into actions, Isma'il Farouqi founded the International institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT). as we know it now.

Sayyed Hossen Nasr: Osman Bakar-IAIS (???)

Another great thnker that contrbutes to the idea of Islaamization of knowledge is Prof. Sayyed Hossein Nasr. For him he islamizaton of knowledge can mean “the reassertion of the immutable principles of Islam and their application to methods and fields of knowledge claimed by modern, Western education and learning. But this authentic and contemporary Islamic education will not shun these disciplines, nor would it surrender to the modern theories. Rather, it would conquer these domain and make them its own. According to him, knowledge cannot be separated from sacred science, since everything known always has a profound religious character, for every type of knowledge is created by God. Prof. Nasr;s ideas are spread widely through his works and the works of his devout disciple and close friend, Prof. Osman Bakar of Malaysia. So far as know, there is no specific institution that accommodates or tries to implement Nasr's ideas into real agenda and action. Is it the International Institute of Advanced Islamic Studies (IAIS) of Malaysia? am not sure.

• Types of Islamization of Knowledge in Indonesia

It is crucial to mention that in Indonesia the idea of Islamzation of knowledge is not really understood and duly appreciated, since all Islamic reforms, as descried above, are in favor of modern science Science is needed by modern Muslims as an important condition for making progress and modernization. Science for most of them, science is universal,objective, value free, and even for some “Islamic.” The Islamization of science is not necessary as science is already Islamic. It is against this background that the discourse f Islamization of science, (together with its progress and also problems, resistance and obstacle) be understood.

Integration of Science and Religion (UIN JAKARTA)

The success of Prof. Harun Nasuton's reform has been so great, that we can say the all IAN/UIN come under his influence. Harun was very optimistic about science, He has no problem whatsoever with accepting science, It is beyond his imagination that science, which is universal, neutral, should be Islamized, critically examined, or criticized. This view is clearly reflected in UIN's vew on Islamization of knowledge. The term they used to describe it is the Integration of science and religion. They called their integration as an open and “dialogical” integration, implying the “critical” acceptance of any science, including secular sciences. For them science is basically universal, objective and rational. There is no theological barrier whatsoever to accept the so-called secular science. They don't use the term Islamization of knowledge, as this term, according to the, tends to be exclusive. It is, therefore, contrary to the inclusive attitude that they want to adopt. This type of Islmization is represented by UIN (State Islamic University) Jakarta.

Dewesternization (INSIST & UNISULA)

Another type of the Islamization of knowledge is called “De-westernization and de-secularization. The “De-westernization” is obviously taken by its proponents from Prof. Naquib Alatas' ideas. For them, Islamization of knowledge should begin with “de-westernization” in the sense of the isolation of key elements and concepts that make up Western culture and civilization, from every branch of present-day knowledge.” In their Journal, “Islamia,” they present their severe critics on the Western sciences, as being secular. For them, science is never neutral or value-free. It is always ideologically charged. After this, the infuse the Islamic elements/values and key concepts in every branch of relevant present day knowledge, that they call Islamization. For them it is very important to build a correct world-view, that will illuminate all agenda of the Islamization and its implementation into practice. In Indonesia this type of Islamization is represented by two insttutions: (1) in the form of a research Insittution, i.e. INSIST (Institute for the Study of Islamic Thought and Civilization) Jakarta, and (2) in the form of a formal education institution: UNIISULA (Universitas Sultan Agung) Semarang.

The most popular form of Islammization of knowledge is, however, the so-called “Ayatisasi Ilmu” or Islamic justification of modern science. They firmly believe that modern science fully accords with Islamic doctrines. What we should do, according to them, is not so much to criticize it, but to support or justify it by quoting certain relevant Qur'anic verses or hadiths. By doing this they want to show that Islam, far from being anti-science, is actually for science. Many books have been written with this approaches in many fields, such as biology, mathematics, physics, etc., and many institutions have adopted this type of Islamization of knowledge, including UIN Malang, IPB, ITB and even the Ministry of religious Affar (MoRA).

Scientification of Islam (Kontowjoyo)

There are some other concepts of Islamization of knowledge, although not really pupolar and there is no institutuion to develop its their concepts. One of this is the so-called Scientification of Islam (Mengilmukan Islam). According to iits proponent, Prof. Kuntowjoyo, the term Islamization of knowledge is “reactive,” and thus apologetic, while “Scientification of Islam” is “proactive” implying the acceptance of other party's achievement.” For him, it is the iintention of the subject that should be Islamized, not the scence itself. Scientifcation of Islam, ivolving the objectvicaton. It calls for turning normative postulate of religion into a scientific theory. Religious norms, as human experience, should be constructed as science.

D. NEW RESPONSE

• Islamization of Knowledge (Redefined): Epistemological Integration

Until this point, we can say that in Indnesia, there has been no serious investigation andattempt to Islamize knowledge (or modern science) in the real sense of the word, but by two thinkers, Hidayat Nataatmadja and Mulyadhi Kartanegara. Hdayat Nataatmadja was a rare genius who committed wholly to his ideas and has written a number of very important works related to the Islamization of science. However, his works suffer from serious obscurities and controversy, so only few who understand his ideas, and obiuosly no institution so far i knew, has ever been founded to support his ideas. Prof. Mulyadhi Kartanegara has made attempts in many of his works to deal seriously and redefine the concept of Islamization of knowledge in his own way. There are several points to be addressed:

The word Islam in Islamization should not be taken literal meaning. It simply means that scientific theory or discovery that is produced cannot contradict the essential principles or doctrines of Islam.

Islamization of knowled should be taken into epistemological level, not simply justfication.

Islamization of knowledge is necessary, since many scientific theories blatantly contradict the Islamic prinnciples.

This Islamization is made possible by the fact that science can never be totally objective.

Islamization of knowledge is just one form of the so-called naturalization of knowledge: the attempt by Muslims to adapt foreign science into its own paradigm of world-view.

Islamization of knowledge can take form of integration, that includes the integration of reality, the integration of religious and natural sciences, the integrations of scientific objects, sources, and methods.

Mulyadhi's ideas has been implemented into two academic institutions: CIPSI (Center for Islamic-philosophical Studies and Information) and CIE (center for Islamic Epistemology).

• The implementation of Islamization of knowledge: Research Center: CIPSI

Accroding to Mulyadhi, the Islamization of knowledge cannot in any way effective on in the level of discourse. Therefore, he founded CIPSI to bring his ideas into reality.CIPSI wants to build a new scientific tradition more suitable to Islamic tenets, based on Islamic heritage. To achieve this goal, CIPSI has conducted several steps:

collecting as many as possible Islamic great works (from classic to modern) especially in the fields of philosophy, science, theology and mysticism.

Translating the masterpieces of great Muslim scholars, such as Rasa'il Ikhwan al-Shafa' and al-Syifa; into bahasa Indonesia, as to provide Muslims in Indonesia and southeast Asia, who cannot read Arabic, with original works of great Muslim scholars.

Sorting some important works in specific area, as to provide readings for certain discipline such as psychology and physics from original Islamic works from classical period to the modern one.

Collaborating with other institutions in introducing Islamic materials into the textbooks that are used in high schools of universities.

• Curriculum Reform: CIPSI & UNI

The Islamization of knowledge will not bring good fruits without the Islamizaton of education. Threfore CIPSI has collaborated with the faculty of usuluddin and philosophy, UIN Jakarta to have the so-called “curriculum reform.” UIN has opened several “secular” (non-religious) faculties using and borrowing exactly the same curricula as used in the public or “secular” university. The Curriculum reform manages to answer a big question “what are the significant differences in studying “science” in the Islamic universities and secular universities? To implement this agenda, we --CIPSI and the faculty of Ushuluddin and Philosophy—have planed the following programs:

 to create our own scientific outlook. to create our own educational system to have our own science currculum

To materialize the first point we will conduct several workshops: critical studies on western science critical studies on Islamic science Islamc scentific theories Islamic scientifc methods

to materialize the second ppoint, we will conduct three workshops: philosophy of education psychology of education theories of education

to materialize the third point, we conduct workshop and research: frame of curriculum research of existing curriculum on science writing 4 introductory books. developing our own curriculum