THE
BORDER WITHIN:
THE FUTURE OF THE LESOTHO-SOUTH AFRICAN INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY

Series Editor: Jonathan Crush

Southern African Migration Project

Migration Policy Series No. 26

PLEASE NOTE: Readers are welcome to reproduce
and reference
this article as long as appropriate acknowledgments are given.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

It is impractical to treat Lesotho like any other foreign
country in regulating movement across borders. Until 1963 no
passports were required to enter South Africa from Lesotho, and
it was only the security concerns of the apartheid government
that led to travel documents being required. Following South
Africas transition to democracy, border controls with
Lesotho might reasonably be subject to review. The report argues
that streamlining, integration, and relaxation of immigration
services at the Free State Border posts would not only be less
costly and more cost-effective, but also mutually beneficial for
com-munities and government agencies on both sides of the border.
While Lesotho citizens are covered by the same South African
immigration regulations as those of any other country, in
practice quite different regulations, permits, concessions, and
arrangements are also in place and national policies are often
ignored in accommodation to local realities.

There is an assumption in South Africa that liberalised border
regulation would be to the exclusive benefit of citizens of
neighbouring countries seeking economic advantages to the
detriment of South Africa and South Africans. In the Free State
towns along the Lesotho border, however, South African businesses
would be the major beneficiaries of rationalised border
regulation. More important, the economic development of the
entire Caledon River valley depends upon such rationalisation.

The report thus establishes the principles of bi-lateral
relationship that should underlie management of the border with
Lesotho. Second, it offers a portrait of how the border actually
operates within the context of current immigration regulation and
practice. Third, it reviews the problems that have arisen from
the character and development of that operational context. Four,
it provides a limited set of possible solu-tions to those
problems and alternatives for post operations in specific
relation to the probable costs and benefits of each potential
course of action (or inaction).

In view of the limited period available for the study, the
decision was taken to focus on the two most important posts in
the Free State where cross-border traffic of all kinds is
greatest, Maseru and Ficksburg Bridges. Border officials at both
places argue that border operations ought to be made more
efficient and effective. To this end, they argue for the
commitment of greater, not fewer resources, specifically the
provision of more numerous, better trained staff, physical plant,
and computer technology.

They did not consider how such improvements might generate any
portion of the revenues required to pay for them. Nor had they
considered the possibility that removing immigration officials
from the Lesotho border altogether and redeploying them to other
stations where staffing was more necessary might be the most
cost-effective and rational solution for the DHA.

Lesotho contributes over 40% of the movement of people across
South Africas borders from all neighbouring countries.
Maseru and Ficksburg Bridges handle, by a very great margin, more
travellers than any other border posts with any country. As a
result, thousands of six months concession permits have to be
issued at these posts, drastically reducing the monitoring of
cross border traffic. Only a massive provision of additional
resources would eliminate the necessity for six months
concessions. Junior DHA staff and security guards at the two
posts complain of overwork and poor conditions of pay and
service, and additional resources would be required to address
these problems as well.

A control-oriented policy to operate the posts with even
limited effectiveness would need new resources for the following:
1) A new, larger building with more staff and windows open during
the daylight shifts at Maseru Bridge.
2) Separate windows for South African, Lesotho, and third state
passport holders, and "streams" for goods lorries,
private light vehicles, and pedestrians
3) An end to the 6 months concession system, with every traveller
reporting to immigration at the windows.
4) Electrically charged fencing along the entire Free State
border.
5) More police patrols and road blocks, operated away from the
border posts themselves, where inquiries from officials are anticipated
6) Better training both prior to and during service for all ranks
7) Connections to the central MCS system and the input of data on
people crossing, along with accessibility of police and
immigration records through Pretoria, providing information on
the frequency, nature and pattern of individual crossings.

These changes could only be implemented at enormous additional
expense.

The physical, social, economic, and regulatory conditions in
place at Maseru and Ficksburg Bridges create an environment in
which circumvention of immigration and passport control
regulations for personal gain is greatly facilitated, and
transparent attention to legal responsibilities and procedures is
discouraged. There is no document, permit, regulation, or
procedure required by South Africa at the border that cannot be
obtained, ignored, or circumvented at a price. There is no form
of regulation that would do anything but exacerbate the
environment for corruption without the commitment of very
significant additional resources. In the absence of such an
increased outlay, border control produces border corruption. This
report argues, conversely, that the harmonisation of regulations
among the three services working at the border, the easing of
travel requirements for Lesotho and South African citizens, and
the scaling down of immigration service operations would do much
to reduce or even eliminate this environment for corruption.

Are existing border controls at all effective in controlling
the movement of unauthorized migrants from both Lesotho to South
Africa? Immigration officials say that in practice they are not.
Nor is this simply a result of corruption. Lesotho citizens are
given visitors visas as long as they have valid passports,
and South African identity documents have never been difficult
for them to obtain. Those who really wish to cross without
documents can easily use the river or "jump the fence".

The SAMP surveys reported here demonstrate the great number of
Basotho who have significant regular involvement in South African
society; the difficulty of separating Lesotho nationals from the
rest of South Africas population; and the futility and
waste involved in efforts to keep them out. The data show that a
most of those who cross the border to South Africa go to the
border towns and the neighbouring areas, and soon return to
Lesotho. Most Basotho go to South Africa to purchase goods and
attend to personal matters. Based on the annual statistics from
DHA, large numbers of Basotho go to South Africa for business
purposes and thus help to support the economies of the border
towns. The economies of the border towns are heavily dependant
upon Basotho who buy goods and services. Stringent border
controls would impact negatively on the economic situation in the
border towns. Some 63% of respondents interviewed in a survey of
border-crossers noted that they experienced problems crossing the
border. The problems mentioned by most respondents were long
queues and slow service.

Other complaints included irregular and corrupt procedures,
unfair and hostile attitudes and behaviour on the part of SA
officials, poor facilities, discrimination against black
travellers, overly stringent and inconvenient restrictions on
travel, and favouritism towards certain known individuals.

Asked what should be done to improve border crossing, 47% said
it should be easier for people to get six-month permits. Almost
72% noted that it is not at all likely for someone to be caught
while crossing the border illegally. It is hard to justify the
expenditure on border controls when these have so little effect
on the ability of people to cross the border when and where they
choose. Results of the surveys indicate that the border between
Lesotho and South Africa is a hindrance to movement but that it
is not insurmountable. People are able to cross with or without
documents with little fear of being arrested. They also do not
mind if they are arrested and returned to Lesotho.

There is no official revenue to be derived from passport
control. Stamps, visas, concessions, and permits are graciously
issued without charge. Unfortunately the delays (at times
seemingly deliberate) and inefficiencies at Maseru and Ficksburg
Bridges lead to the collection of significant personal revenue by
officials and those members of the public who assist them, but
these payments do not find their way into the government account.

The attempt to require customs gate passes was found to be
unenforceable at Maseru Bridge, and would not in any case have
brought in significant additional customs or tax revenue. It does
not appear that any increase in the monitoring of customs and tax
regulation would justify the budgetary resources and major
inconvenience to the general travelling public that such
monitoring would incur.

The stamping of every South African citizen and permanent
resident travelling to and from Lesotho has no economic benefits.
With regard to Lesotho nationals, unauthorized immigration,
employment, free use of South African social services, and
criminal activity in general have been cited as reasons why
control of Lesotho passports must be maintained. This report
suggests, however, that immigration and passport control are
entirely ineffective in dealing with these problems, and do not
repay the costs incurred in providing them. Within South Africa,
Lesotho citizens must have study or work permits or labour
contracts in order to legally remain. In brief, it is simply not
worthwhile to maintain border controls for the purpose of
protecting the South African labour market.

Recent statistics indicate that citizens of third states may
use Lesotho and its border posts to obtain entry to and even six
months concessions enabling them to reside illegally in South
Africa. Immigration officials at Maseru Bridge, however, argued
that such persons could be more effectively monitored at South
Africas international airports, if cooperation with Lesotho
officials stationed at Johannesburg International could be
arranged. While SAPS officers emphasised how useful it might be
if computers at passport control had information on wanted
criminals, the legal status of the passport holder, or even on
when and how often a particular person crossed the border, at
present DHA neither collects nor has access to any such
information. Immigration officers merely check whether the
traveller has valid documents. At present 10 percent of
travellers are "spot searched", and of those caught in
violation of the law, 80 percent have valid six months
concessions. Criminals wish to avoid the inconvenience, delay,
and risk of illegal crossing just like everyone else, and
officials of both services noted that the documents of criminals
are most often quite in order.

Rivalries and an underlying lack of coordination among the
public agencies serving at the border emerged when senior police
officers were asked to comment on whether, as at smaller posts,
the SAPS might run all operations, as they did before 1994. If
some of the savings would be given over to them for expanded and
improved services, senior police officers at both Maseru and
Ficksburg Bridges favoured this plan, since they regarded
immigration as of little use in itself. This would allow police
to concentrate on crime control while facilitating the freer and
more productive movement of the ordinary public, and to
coordinate passport, permit, and crime control operations with
the MCS within a single service.

While free movement through the posts might encourage Basotho
to attempt to work illegally, better police services, coordinated
at a higher level, would be a more effective means of dealing
with this. Senior officers at Ladybrand pointed out, however,
that SAPS investigators regularly arrest members of their own
service for taking bribes, and for assisting criminal escapes and
the transport of stolen vehicles and contraband at posts on all
South Africas borders.

If South Africa wished to withdraw immigration services from
the border this could be more than compensated for by increasing
resources and cooperation in policing. This would allow for a
more effective concentration on both undocumented migration and
cross-border crime, as passport control presently does little to
control either one, without inconveniencing the law-abiding
public. Joint patrols for illegal crossing and smuggling along
the river itself might become feasible, along with more effective
cooperative efforts to control the crime syndicates that span the
border. An example is the current close cooperation between the
Lesotho vehicle theft unit and the SAPS. Criminals based in
Lesotho who steal livestock and attack farms in the Free State
use the river to cross and re-cross, and immigration and passport
control at the posts play virtually no role in controlling these
sorts of crime.

The river crossings for the most part connect Free State farms
with Lesotho villages, and most illegal crossings take place
where there is not a formal border post for a considerable
distance, such as between Maseru and Van Rooyens Gate.
Border fencing, where it has not been completely destroyed, has
no practical effect on crime or unauthorized crossing.

Beefing up the SANDF presence on the Free State-Lesotho
border, with its attendant increase in expenditure, is in any
event not what the government or the army desire, and there are
currently plans to close down the SANDF base at Ladybrand
altogether.

Officials of the Lesotho Government might well agree to the
removal of South African DHA services from the border. If the DHA
feels passports must be stamped, all Basotho could be allowed to
get an automatic and free six months concession, which would
provide a stamp and put them in the system twice a year at least.

Virtually every business and professional leader in both
Ladybrand/Manyatseng and Ficksburg/Meqheleng has important
interests, enterprises and associations across the border in
Lesotho. Their activities generate economic development, and
thereby the private employment and public revenue that benefit
government and help pay for border services. According to this
view, DHA operations would be more productive for the region and
the country if they facilitated rather than hindered such
legitimate, taxable economic activity. Eastern Free State
business people believe they could not survive in business
without personal "connections" at the border. Border
service officials, they claim, have turned the border into an
"own income-generating scheme", and that official forms
and procedures are required simply to encourage business to pay
on the spot to circumvent or manipulate them. Business leaders
suggest that passport control might well be abandoned, as it
encourages rather than reduces illegal activity. In any case,
they insist that it is impossible to do business at all without
six months concessions, which ought to be automatic for business
travellers.

They further request that business people on both sides of the
valley should have special permits or a reciprocal bi-national
arrangement, as a good deal of time is wasted at the border. Good
cross-border relations, especially in the form of harmonisation
of legal regulations, reciprocal permissions and agreements, and
better working relationships are desired by businesses on both
sides. The problem of poor bi-lateral relations was particularly
emphasized by black business located in the border townships.
Business people in Ladybrand/Manyatseng and Ficksburg/ Meqheleng
feel that free movement for Lesotho and South Africa citizens
would encourage and promote cross-border economic activity
without cost or disadvantage to South Africa.

Tourism is currently the fastest growing sector of the Eastern
Free State economy. Such growth depends directly upon the
integration of the Eastern Free State and Lesotho into a single
complex of attractions, with routes crossing and re-crossing the
border at various points within a single tour. Rather than
eyesores that delay, obstruct, and spoil the cross-border travel
enjoyment of tourists, the border posts ought to be the gateways
to the pleasures of the valley, with public conveniences,
pleasant settings, and tourist information and fast, friendly
services. The models of post operation need to shift from
movement control to tourist movement incentive and facilitation.

Public transport services are very poorly managed at the
border posts. Lesotho and Free State taxis cannot (officially)
cross the border to deliver passengers to the other side without
a special and expensive (R300 for three months) group-tour
permit. After Lesotho passengers are dropped at the Lesotho side,
they must walk with their baggage across the bridge to the South
Africa post, stand in line at passport control if they have no
six months concession, and then walk again a half a kilometre up
the long hill on the Ladybrand road, where taxis heading to towns
in the Free State and Gauteng are allowed to load.

On the issue of farm labour, it is extremely difficult to
prevent Basotho who have been crossing the river without
documentation for generations from doing so now. They are aware,
conversely, that the permit system can serve positively as a
legal protection, as it prevents farmers who employ Basotho
without permits from simply having them arrested and deported
when the time comes to pay them their small wages. There is
simply no way to prevent the daily casual use of the informal
river and fence crossings visible every few hundred metres along
the entire length of the Free State - Lesotho border.

In conclusion, certain benefits might follow directly from the
reduction or removal of passport control at the posts. The
governments would be able to provide other necessary services in
with physically more manageable and attractive infrastructure in
the same space. South Africa could create a more friendly,
supportive atmosphere among the general public, including valued
business people, tourists, and professionals, as well as ordinary
travellers. Business, agriculture, transport, tourism, cultural
education, and cross-border co-operation could be greatly
enhanced in the Caledon Valley through the easing and
harmonisation of border regulations, leading to economic
development, job creation, increased public revenue and public
services in the border districts.

The first principle underlying maximum utilisation of
resources, increase of revenues, and mutually beneficial
inter-state relations is that Lesotho be accorded particular
status and treatment in border management. This is because of the
tremendous volumes of traffic crossing in both directions at the
border posts, reflecting a high degree of economic and social
integration.

Against this background, the report identifies the following
alternatives:

The system of controls at the Lesotho-South Africa border
posts might be left as they are, but this emerges as the
least desirable option.

The strengthening of the functions and effectiveness of
DHA opera-tions, while providing faster and more
convenient service to the public. This would require
considerable additional expenditure on physical
infrastructure, technology, security, staff numbers and
training, and linkages to regional and national DHA
offices.

While there would be returns in the form of improved control
combined with service to the public, the question must be asked
whether such a result would be worth the investment required to
produce it. There is little gain for South Africa, and much loss
to the people and economy of the border region, in control for
controls sake.

A partial easing and streamlining of border controls
could be instituted, short of the complete free movement
of persons across the border. Separate lines for SA
citizens and permanent residents, Lesotho citizens, third
state citizens, pedestrians, light and heavy (goods and
services) vehicles would not only make sense but seem
necessary if controls are to be retained. Or the
inspection of South African passports might be entirely
foregone, with only foreign passports stamped. Six months
concessions might be issued on demand to anyone who
requested one, to benefit valley residents and visitors
and reduce the corruption that thrives on these
concessions.

Removing DHA operations completely from the Free State
border posts. On balance, the benefits of removing DHA
operations from the four Free State border posts where
they are in place could well outweigh the risks and
disadvantages. This simple, inclusive strategy is an
admission that the busy border posts cannot, in fact, be
efficiently controlled except by the allocation of
additional resources. Little benefit in revenue, crime
control, labour market protection, or local or national
security or interest exists to justify such a strategy.
Removing passport controls would save budgetary
resources. It could also enhance regional public revenue,
social order, and political stability by promoting
tourism, economic development and job creation. And it
would not create any economic or security risk that could
not be better addressed by other agencies, specifically
SAPS and SARS.