This book tells the story of Cesar Chavez and the United Farm Workers' ground-breaking victory, drawing important lessons from this dramatic tale. Since the 1900s, large-scale agricultural ...
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This book tells the story of Cesar Chavez and the United Farm Workers' ground-breaking victory, drawing important lessons from this dramatic tale. Since the 1900s, large-scale agricultural enterprises relied on migrant labor—a cheap, unorganized, and powerless workforce. In 1965, when some 800 Filipino grape workers began to strike under the aegis of the AFL-CIO, the UFW soon joined the action with 2,000 Mexican workers and turned the strike into a civil rights struggle. They engaged in civil disobedience, mobilized support from churches and students, boycotted growers, and transformed their struggle into La Causa, a farm workers' movement that eventually triumphed over the grape industry's Goliath. Why did they succeed? How can the powerless challenge the powerful successfully? Offering insight from a long-time movement organizer and scholar, the book illustrates how they had the ability and resourcefulness to devise good strategy and turn short-term advantages into long-term gains. The book covers the movement's struggles, set-backs, and successes.Less

Why David Sometimes Wins : Leadership, Strategy and the Organization in the California Farm Worker Movement

Marshall Ganz

Published in print: 2009-05-07

This book tells the story of Cesar Chavez and the United Farm Workers' ground-breaking victory, drawing important lessons from this dramatic tale. Since the 1900s, large-scale agricultural enterprises relied on migrant labor—a cheap, unorganized, and powerless workforce. In 1965, when some 800 Filipino grape workers began to strike under the aegis of the AFL-CIO, the UFW soon joined the action with 2,000 Mexican workers and turned the strike into a civil rights struggle. They engaged in civil disobedience, mobilized support from churches and students, boycotted growers, and transformed their struggle into La Causa, a farm workers' movement that eventually triumphed over the grape industry's Goliath. Why did they succeed? How can the powerless challenge the powerful successfully? Offering insight from a long-time movement organizer and scholar, the book illustrates how they had the ability and resourcefulness to devise good strategy and turn short-term advantages into long-term gains. The book covers the movement's struggles, set-backs, and successes.

From 1900 to 1950, three waves of attempts at organizing farm workers failed to win a single multiyear contract, establish a sustainable farm workers union, or reform the rules governing the farm ...
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From 1900 to 1950, three waves of attempts at organizing farm workers failed to win a single multiyear contract, establish a sustainable farm workers union, or reform the rules governing the farm labor market. At each of those moments, ethnic labor associations, radical networks, and the American Federation of Labor (AFL) were involved, but in competition rather than collaboration. Recognizing their limited ability to challenge growers on their turf, labor leaders learned that no matter how well organized they were locally, they often had to win outside support to make even short-term gains.Less

Beginnings : Immigrants, Radicals, and the AFL (1900–1959)

Marshall Ganz

Published in print: 2009-05-07

From 1900 to 1950, three waves of attempts at organizing farm workers failed to win a single multiyear contract, establish a sustainable farm workers union, or reform the rules governing the farm labor market. At each of those moments, ethnic labor associations, radical networks, and the American Federation of Labor (AFL) were involved, but in competition rather than collaboration. Recognizing their limited ability to challenge growers on their turf, labor leaders learned that no matter how well organized they were locally, they often had to win outside support to make even short-term gains.

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, changes in American political, economic, and social life—and the expectation that the bracero program was in its final days—once again opened a door for organizers ...
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In the late 1950s and early 1960s, changes in American political, economic, and social life—and the expectation that the bracero program was in its final days—once again opened a door for organizers bold enough to try unionizing farm workers. This time, the newly merged AFL-CIO acted first by launching the Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee (AWOC) in 1959. The Teamsters, recently expelled from the AFL-CIO, initiated their attempt in 1961. The fledgling Farm Workers Association (FWA) launched in 1962. The strategies that the leaders of these efforts devised to challenge the power of California growers could hardly have differed more. These strategic differences were not arbitrary. They grew out of real differences among the people who devised the strategy of each organization and how they worked together to do so. In the years 1959 to 1962, these differences in people and processes influenced the launching of three very different organizing attempts, thus shaping their subsequent development.Less

New Opportunities, New Initiatives : AWOC, Teamsters, and the FWA (1959–1962)

Marshall Ganz

Published in print: 2009-05-07

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, changes in American political, economic, and social life—and the expectation that the bracero program was in its final days—once again opened a door for organizers bold enough to try unionizing farm workers. This time, the newly merged AFL-CIO acted first by launching the Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee (AWOC) in 1959. The Teamsters, recently expelled from the AFL-CIO, initiated their attempt in 1961. The fledgling Farm Workers Association (FWA) launched in 1962. The strategies that the leaders of these efforts devised to challenge the power of California growers could hardly have differed more. These strategic differences were not arbitrary. They grew out of real differences among the people who devised the strategy of each organization and how they worked together to do so. In the years 1959 to 1962, these differences in people and processes influenced the launching of three very different organizing attempts, thus shaping their subsequent development.

Between 1963 and 1965, the imminent demise of the bracero program and the gathering momentum of the civil rights movement created new organizing opportunities and new resources for farm worker ...
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Between 1963 and 1965, the imminent demise of the bracero program and the gathering momentum of the civil rights movement created new organizing opportunities and new resources for farm worker organizers. As the farm labor market grew unsettled, the arena of contention shifted from Washington to California and from legislative committees to the fields. Both the AFL-CIO's Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee (AWOC) and the Farm Workers Association (FWA) found they had to respond to these new conditions. In early 1965, both groups were drawn reluctantly into strikes. The difference was that the FWA leaders had the strategic capacity to learn from this experience in ways that the AWOC leadership did not. The FWA leaders actually enhanced their strategic capacity by expanding and diversifying their team. This development set the stage for the radically different ways the two groups would conduct the Delano grape strike beginning in September 1965.Less

A Storm Gathers : Two Responses (1963–1965)

Marshall Ganz

Published in print: 2009-05-07

Between 1963 and 1965, the imminent demise of the bracero program and the gathering momentum of the civil rights movement created new organizing opportunities and new resources for farm worker organizers. As the farm labor market grew unsettled, the arena of contention shifted from Washington to California and from legislative committees to the fields. Both the AFL-CIO's Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee (AWOC) and the Farm Workers Association (FWA) found they had to respond to these new conditions. In early 1965, both groups were drawn reluctantly into strikes. The difference was that the FWA leaders had the strategic capacity to learn from this experience in ways that the AWOC leadership did not. The FWA leaders actually enhanced their strategic capacity by expanding and diversifying their team. This development set the stage for the radically different ways the two groups would conduct the Delano grape strike beginning in September 1965.

On September 8, 1965, 800 Filipino workers organized by Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee (AWOC) struck ten Delano grape growers, demanding a wage of $1.40 an hour plus 25 cents per box. Two weeks later, on September 20, at least as many Mexican workers, organized by the National Farm Workers Association (NFWA), struck an additional ten growers. By the time the rains brought the table grape harvest to an end in November, thirty-two growers had been struck, over 5,000 workers had indicated support for one of the two unions, and a movement began to emerge, intended to achieve the revolution in agriculture. Leaders of both the NFWA and AWOC made tactical choices about how to deal with a grape strike that neither had planned, but they drew upon different strategic capacities. AWOC organizers, operating within a strategic frame focused on local labor markets, targeted the hardcore of the table grape industry, counting on their members' skill and solidarity to provide sufficient leverage to get wages raised. Initially, the NFWA targeted growers based on where its constituency happened to work. However, a more specific target emerged as the experimental process of probing, pushing, and trying a little of this and a little of that continued.Less

The Great Delano Grape Strike (1965–1966)

Marshall Ganz

Published in print: 2009-05-07

On September 8, 1965, 800 Filipino workers organized by Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee (AWOC) struck ten Delano grape growers, demanding a wage of $1.40 an hour plus 25 cents per box. Two weeks later, on September 20, at least as many Mexican workers, organized by the National Farm Workers Association (NFWA), struck an additional ten growers. By the time the rains brought the table grape harvest to an end in November, thirty-two growers had been struck, over 5,000 workers had indicated support for one of the two unions, and a movement began to emerge, intended to achieve the revolution in agriculture. Leaders of both the NFWA and AWOC made tactical choices about how to deal with a grape strike that neither had planned, but they drew upon different strategic capacities. AWOC organizers, operating within a strategic frame focused on local labor markets, targeted the hardcore of the table grape industry, counting on their members' skill and solidarity to provide sufficient leverage to get wages raised. Initially, the NFWA targeted growers based on where its constituency happened to work. However, a more specific target emerged as the experimental process of probing, pushing, and trying a little of this and a little of that continued.

When the National Farm Workers Association (NFWA) affiliated with the AFL-CIO to become the United Farm Workers Organizing Committee (UFWOC), ethnic leaders, radical organizers, and the AFL found ...
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When the National Farm Workers Association (NFWA) affiliated with the AFL-CIO to become the United Farm Workers Organizing Committee (UFWOC), ethnic leaders, radical organizers, and the AFL found themselves on the same team for the first time in California history. Employer reaction to the DiGiorgio victory put the alliance to the test immediately. One consequence of the victory was that it inspired wine grape workers at Perelli–Minetti vineyards near Delano to join the strike. The Teamsters intervened by providing strike breakers, claiming to represent them, and signing a contract behind the UFWOC picket lines. Recognizing that they would become a Teamster “hunting dog,” driving one ranch after another into the Teamsters' sights if they didn't fight back, UFWOC launched a boycott of the company's wines despite the fact that the existence of a Teamster contract could inhibit labor support. By May 1967, it became clear to Perelli–Minetti and the other growers that a Teamster contract could not protect them from a UFWOC boycott. The Teamsters realized that without employer cooperation they could offer UFWOC little competition in the fields. All sides went to mediation, UFWOC suspended the boycott, the Teamsters withdrew from the fight, and Perelli–Minetti transferred the contract to UFWOC. How did affiliation with the AFL-CIO, despite the traditional labor movement's history of failure in the fields, enhance the NFWA's strategic capacity? Why couldn't the Teamsters devise a more effective strategy after their “responsible union” approach failed? When the Teamsters tried to learn from UFWOC by mimicking its tactics, why didn't it work? And how could the new union expand the scope and scale of its operations to be able to consolidate its success, fend off new challenges, and launch new initiatives? The answers can be found again, although at a whole new level, in the capacity to generate effective strategy.Less

Launching a New Union (1966–1967)

Marshall Ganz

Published in print: 2009-05-07

When the National Farm Workers Association (NFWA) affiliated with the AFL-CIO to become the United Farm Workers Organizing Committee (UFWOC), ethnic leaders, radical organizers, and the AFL found themselves on the same team for the first time in California history. Employer reaction to the DiGiorgio victory put the alliance to the test immediately. One consequence of the victory was that it inspired wine grape workers at Perelli–Minetti vineyards near Delano to join the strike. The Teamsters intervened by providing strike breakers, claiming to represent them, and signing a contract behind the UFWOC picket lines. Recognizing that they would become a Teamster “hunting dog,” driving one ranch after another into the Teamsters' sights if they didn't fight back, UFWOC launched a boycott of the company's wines despite the fact that the existence of a Teamster contract could inhibit labor support. By May 1967, it became clear to Perelli–Minetti and the other growers that a Teamster contract could not protect them from a UFWOC boycott. The Teamsters realized that without employer cooperation they could offer UFWOC little competition in the fields. All sides went to mediation, UFWOC suspended the boycott, the Teamsters withdrew from the fight, and Perelli–Minetti transferred the contract to UFWOC. How did affiliation with the AFL-CIO, despite the traditional labor movement's history of failure in the fields, enhance the NFWA's strategic capacity? Why couldn't the Teamsters devise a more effective strategy after their “responsible union” approach failed? When the Teamsters tried to learn from UFWOC by mimicking its tactics, why didn't it work? And how could the new union expand the scope and scale of its operations to be able to consolidate its success, fend off new challenges, and launch new initiatives? The answers can be found again, although at a whole new level, in the capacity to generate effective strategy.

Even as the breakthrough with Schenley yielded a host of new opportunities for the National Farm Workers Association (NFWA), it called forth a powerful counterattack from the other Delano growers, ...
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Even as the breakthrough with Schenley yielded a host of new opportunities for the National Farm Workers Association (NFWA), it called forth a powerful counterattack from the other Delano growers, which threatened the union's very survival. The attack challenged the NFWA leaders to quickly master a whole new level of strategic complexity; they needed to consolidate their past gains, even while carrying the fight forward. At the same time, they were competing with another union and battling growers on a far greater scale. The NFWA proved to be up to the task because it had developed the strategic capacity to respond quickly and creatively, expanding the size, scope, and diversity of its operations to enhance its strategic capacity still further. As a result, the NFWA improbably won the first union representation election held among farm workers and delivered the first setback to the alliance between the Teamsters union and California agribusiness, an alliance that was originally forged in the 1930s.Less

Meeting the Counterattack : DiGiorgio, the Teamsters, and UFWOC (1966)

Marshall Ganz

Published in print: 2009-05-07

Even as the breakthrough with Schenley yielded a host of new opportunities for the National Farm Workers Association (NFWA), it called forth a powerful counterattack from the other Delano growers, which threatened the union's very survival. The attack challenged the NFWA leaders to quickly master a whole new level of strategic complexity; they needed to consolidate their past gains, even while carrying the fight forward. At the same time, they were competing with another union and battling growers on a far greater scale. The NFWA proved to be up to the task because it had developed the strategic capacity to respond quickly and creatively, expanding the size, scope, and diversity of its operations to enhance its strategic capacity still further. As a result, the NFWA improbably won the first union representation election held among farm workers and delivered the first setback to the alliance between the Teamsters union and California agribusiness, an alliance that was originally forged in the 1930s.

In the United Farm Workers' (UFW) early years, the accountability to farm workers and supporters was real. They held resources without which the project could not go forward. Competitive ...
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In the United Farm Workers' (UFW) early years, the accountability to farm workers and supporters was real. They held resources without which the project could not go forward. Competitive accountability to the Teamsters kept UFW leaders on task, contesting the Teamsters' turf by organizing workers. But as the UFW freed itself of external competition and came to rely on resources generated internally by highly centralized means, such as direct mail, the failure to create structures that could sustain pluralism, encourage debate, and invite challenge proved to be a disaster. Control over resources at the top and the absence of any intermediate levels of political accountability—districts, locals, or regions—meant that potential challengers could never organize, build a base, or mount a real challenge to incumbents.Less

Epilogue

Marshall Ganz

Published in print: 2009-05-07

In the United Farm Workers' (UFW) early years, the accountability to farm workers and supporters was real. They held resources without which the project could not go forward. Competitive accountability to the Teamsters kept UFW leaders on task, contesting the Teamsters' turf by organizing workers. But as the UFW freed itself of external competition and came to rely on resources generated internally by highly centralized means, such as direct mail, the failure to create structures that could sustain pluralism, encourage debate, and invite challenge proved to be a disaster. Control over resources at the top and the absence of any intermediate levels of political accountability—districts, locals, or regions—meant that potential challengers could never organize, build a base, or mount a real challenge to incumbents.

This chapter details the conflict between domestic workers and guestworkers as the United Farm Workers of America (UFW), with the Florida Rural Legal Services, became involved in a struggle for “the ...
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This chapter details the conflict between domestic workers and guestworkers as the United Farm Workers of America (UFW), with the Florida Rural Legal Services, became involved in a struggle for “the worst jobs in the world.” Florida Rural was working to transform every aspect of farmworkers' lives. Its lawyers sued to gain access to labor camps, to integrate those camps, to get workers transported in buses rather than flatbed trucks, to get any Florida county to set up a Food Stamp program, to get farmworkers paid what they were owed, and to enforce local sanitation and housing ordinances. And although Florida Rural took all sorts of cases—including straight forward divorce and landlord–tenant cases—a great deal of their time would be spent suing on behalf of Caribbean guestworkers who alleged exploitation by sugarcane companies and to prove that domestic workers had been unfairly deprived of those same miserable jobs.Less

Takin’ It to the Courts : Legal Services, the UFW, and the Battle for the Worst Jobs in the World

Cindy Hahamovitch

Published in print: 2011-08-28

This chapter details the conflict between domestic workers and guestworkers as the United Farm Workers of America (UFW), with the Florida Rural Legal Services, became involved in a struggle for “the worst jobs in the world.” Florida Rural was working to transform every aspect of farmworkers' lives. Its lawyers sued to gain access to labor camps, to integrate those camps, to get workers transported in buses rather than flatbed trucks, to get any Florida county to set up a Food Stamp program, to get farmworkers paid what they were owed, and to enforce local sanitation and housing ordinances. And although Florida Rural took all sorts of cases—including straight forward divorce and landlord–tenant cases—a great deal of their time would be spent suing on behalf of Caribbean guestworkers who alleged exploitation by sugarcane companies and to prove that domestic workers had been unfairly deprived of those same miserable jobs.

By 1977 the United Farm Workers (UFW) had successfully negotiated more than 100 union contracts, recruited a dues-paying membership of more than 50,000, and secured enactment of the California ...
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By 1977 the United Farm Workers (UFW) had successfully negotiated more than 100 union contracts, recruited a dues-paying membership of more than 50,000, and secured enactment of the California Agricultural Labor Relations Act, the only legislative guarantee of farm workers' collective bargaining rights in the continental United States. Why did the UFW succeed at such a daunting task—a task at which other far more powerful organizations had repeatedly failed? This book argues that the UFW succeeded, while the rival AFL-CIO and Teamsters failed, because the UFW's leadership devised a more effective strategy, in fact a stream of effective strategies. The UFW was able to do this because the motivation of its leaders was greater than that of their rivals; they had better access to salient knowledge; and their deliberations became venues for learning. The three elements of strategic capacity—the ability to devise good strategy—are discussed.Less

Introduction : How David Beat Goliath

Marshall Ganz

Published in print: 2009-05-07

By 1977 the United Farm Workers (UFW) had successfully negotiated more than 100 union contracts, recruited a dues-paying membership of more than 50,000, and secured enactment of the California Agricultural Labor Relations Act, the only legislative guarantee of farm workers' collective bargaining rights in the continental United States. Why did the UFW succeed at such a daunting task—a task at which other far more powerful organizations had repeatedly failed? This book argues that the UFW succeeded, while the rival AFL-CIO and Teamsters failed, because the UFW's leadership devised a more effective strategy, in fact a stream of effective strategies. The UFW was able to do this because the motivation of its leaders was greater than that of their rivals; they had better access to salient knowledge; and their deliberations became venues for learning. The three elements of strategic capacity—the ability to devise good strategy—are discussed.

This chapter examines the United Farm Workers Organizing Committee's (UFWOC) 1970 strike in the Salinas Valley and the various groups of UFWOC allies and detractors involved. It first considers the ...
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This chapter examines the United Farm Workers Organizing Committee's (UFWOC) 1970 strike in the Salinas Valley and the various groups of UFWOC allies and detractors involved. It first considers the circumstances that led to the strike before discussing the strike in more detail. In particular, it analyzes the battle between Cesar Chavez's supporters, including farmworkers, and opponents as hundreds of incidents of violence erupted between the UFWOC and Teamsters Union during the strike's initial weeks. It also explores the various tactics employed by growers in response to the strike, the racial violence that erupted, the involvement of women such as Ethel Kennedy and Coretta Scott King, and the unprecedented cooperation seen between Mexican Americans and Mexicans.Less

A Blossoming of Red Flags : The Salinas UFWOC Strike of 1970

Lori A. Flores

Published in print: 2016-01-05

This chapter examines the United Farm Workers Organizing Committee's (UFWOC) 1970 strike in the Salinas Valley and the various groups of UFWOC allies and detractors involved. It first considers the circumstances that led to the strike before discussing the strike in more detail. In particular, it analyzes the battle between Cesar Chavez's supporters, including farmworkers, and opponents as hundreds of incidents of violence erupted between the UFWOC and Teamsters Union during the strike's initial weeks. It also explores the various tactics employed by growers in response to the strike, the racial violence that erupted, the involvement of women such as Ethel Kennedy and Coretta Scott King, and the unprecedented cooperation seen between Mexican Americans and Mexicans.

This chapter completes the examination of the transformation in rural settings of what was once extensive ownership by Mexicans of land in the U.S. Southwest by surveying the miserable state of ...
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This chapter completes the examination of the transformation in rural settings of what was once extensive ownership by Mexicans of land in the U.S. Southwest by surveying the miserable state of housing today for farm workers, a group disproportionately comprised of Latino/as and especially of Latino/a immigrants. Many are young, with no savings that might make possible a home purchase or even a rental security deposit. Their meager incomes lead to precarious housing that has persisted for decades despite federal, state, local, and private efforts to confront failures in ensuring farm workers housing affordability and habitability.Less

Fields of Dreams : Farm Worker Housing

Steven W. Bender

Published in print: 2010-09-29

This chapter completes the examination of the transformation in rural settings of what was once extensive ownership by Mexicans of land in the U.S. Southwest by surveying the miserable state of housing today for farm workers, a group disproportionately comprised of Latino/as and especially of Latino/a immigrants. Many are young, with no savings that might make possible a home purchase or even a rental security deposit. Their meager incomes lead to precarious housing that has persisted for decades despite federal, state, local, and private efforts to confront failures in ensuring farm workers housing affordability and habitability.

This chapter examines the farmworker movement in the Salinas Valley after the termination of the Bracero Program. It first considers the rise of Cesar Chavez and his United Farm Workers Organizing ...
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This chapter examines the farmworker movement in the Salinas Valley after the termination of the Bracero Program. It first considers the rise of Cesar Chavez and his United Farm Workers Organizing Committee (UFWOC) and the lawsuits filed by Salinas farmworkers with the help of the California Rural Legal Assistance. It then explores how the continued importation of braceros in what was supposed to be a post-bracero era affected Salinas's farmworkers, the majority of whom were Mexican Americans. It also discusses the legal actions and victories of Salinas farmworkers against growers who sought to continue importing braceros and prevent their employees from joining the UFWOC. These legal actions and victories, the chapter argues, were evidence of the farmworker movement's revival in the Salinas Valley.Less

The Farmworker Movement in the Post-Bracero Era

Lori A. Flores

Published in print: 2016-01-05

This chapter examines the farmworker movement in the Salinas Valley after the termination of the Bracero Program. It first considers the rise of Cesar Chavez and his United Farm Workers Organizing Committee (UFWOC) and the lawsuits filed by Salinas farmworkers with the help of the California Rural Legal Assistance. It then explores how the continued importation of braceros in what was supposed to be a post-bracero era affected Salinas's farmworkers, the majority of whom were Mexican Americans. It also discusses the legal actions and victories of Salinas farmworkers against growers who sought to continue importing braceros and prevent their employees from joining the UFWOC. These legal actions and victories, the chapter argues, were evidence of the farmworker movement's revival in the Salinas Valley.

The introduction analyzes the competing visual cultures of agribusiness futurism and farm worker futurism in order to theorize what I call campesino modernity, a social formation based in the ...
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The introduction analyzes the competing visual cultures of agribusiness futurism and farm worker futurism in order to theorize what I call campesino modernity, a social formation based in the appropriation of visual technology to project alternate futures or even the possibility of the future as such for the poor and marginalized.Less

Introduction : Farm Workers in the Machine

Curtis Marez

Published in print: 2016-06-01

The introduction analyzes the competing visual cultures of agribusiness futurism and farm worker futurism in order to theorize what I call campesino modernity, a social formation based in the appropriation of visual technology to project alternate futures or even the possibility of the future as such for the poor and marginalized.

This book has emphasized the importance of agriculture-centered communities in the past, present, and future of Latinos in the United States and concludes with an analysis of the farmworker justice ...
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This book has emphasized the importance of agriculture-centered communities in the past, present, and future of Latinos in the United States and concludes with an analysis of the farmworker justice movement in the Salinas Valley from 1970 to the present. It first considers the aftermath of the United Farm Workers Organizing Committee's (UFWOC) 1970 strike before discussing the decline of the UFWOC (renamed the United Farm Workers in 1972) during the early 1980s and how it affected farmworkers not only in California but also throughout the nation. It then looks at the emergence of other important forms of Mexican American protest in Salinas after 1970. Finally, it comments on the debates around immigrants and immigration policy, particularly with respect to undocumented immigrants. The book argues that both Latino and agricultural history must be situated within larger narratives about U.S. immigration, race relations, and politics.Less

Conclusion : The Farmworker Justice Movement, 1970 to the Present

Lori A. Flores

Published in print: 2016-01-05

This book has emphasized the importance of agriculture-centered communities in the past, present, and future of Latinos in the United States and concludes with an analysis of the farmworker justice movement in the Salinas Valley from 1970 to the present. It first considers the aftermath of the United Farm Workers Organizing Committee's (UFWOC) 1970 strike before discussing the decline of the UFWOC (renamed the United Farm Workers in 1972) during the early 1980s and how it affected farmworkers not only in California but also throughout the nation. It then looks at the emergence of other important forms of Mexican American protest in Salinas after 1970. Finally, it comments on the debates around immigrants and immigration policy, particularly with respect to undocumented immigrants. The book argues that both Latino and agricultural history must be situated within larger narratives about U.S. immigration, race relations, and politics.

This chapter examines the responses of environmentalists and labor unions to California Governor George Deukmejian’s pesticide deregulation efforts in the 1980s. Deukmejian committed himself to ...
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This chapter examines the responses of environmentalists and labor unions to California Governor George Deukmejian’s pesticide deregulation efforts in the 1980s. Deukmejian committed himself to weakening California’s regulatory structure and encountered opposition from unions and the environmental movement, who defended existing regulatory agencies and law and supported new initiatives to better protect public health. This chapter discusses the collaboration among unions and environmental organizations, such as California Rural Legal Assistance, the Sierra Club, and the United Farm Workers (UFW), as they battled Deukmejian, growers, and scientists over pesticides, health, and acceptable risk. It argues that cooperation between the UFW and environmentalists occurred on a limited basis in California during the period 1982–1990.Less

Resisting Rollbacks : California, 1982–1990

Adam Tompkins

Published in print: 2016-03-24

This chapter examines the responses of environmentalists and labor unions to California Governor George Deukmejian’s pesticide deregulation efforts in the 1980s. Deukmejian committed himself to weakening California’s regulatory structure and encountered opposition from unions and the environmental movement, who defended existing regulatory agencies and law and supported new initiatives to better protect public health. This chapter discusses the collaboration among unions and environmental organizations, such as California Rural Legal Assistance, the Sierra Club, and the United Farm Workers (UFW), as they battled Deukmejian, growers, and scientists over pesticides, health, and acceptable risk. It argues that cooperation between the UFW and environmentalists occurred on a limited basis in California during the period 1982–1990.

Chapter Two examines the relationships between the worlds envisioned in UFW film and video, on the one hand, and visions of Cold War geopolitics on the other. Whereas UFW films from the 1970s ...
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Chapter Two examines the relationships between the worlds envisioned in UFW film and video, on the one hand, and visions of Cold War geopolitics on the other. Whereas UFW films from the 1970s connected the union to anti-imperial struggles in the global south, the UFW’s video projects in the 1980s implicitly appealed to U.S. nationalism at a moment of resurgent U.S. imperialism.Less

From Third Cinema to National Video : Visual Technologies and UFW World Building

Curtis Marez

Published in print: 2016-06-01

Chapter Two examines the relationships between the worlds envisioned in UFW film and video, on the one hand, and visions of Cold War geopolitics on the other. Whereas UFW films from the 1970s connected the union to anti-imperial struggles in the global south, the UFW’s video projects in the 1980s implicitly appealed to U.S. nationalism at a moment of resurgent U.S. imperialism.

This chapter explores Mexico's evolution into the world's premier emigrant-sending nation through an analysis of state migration policies, especially the Bracero Program (1942–64). The bilateral ...
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This chapter explores Mexico's evolution into the world's premier emigrant-sending nation through an analysis of state migration policies, especially the Bracero Program (1942–64). The bilateral accord sent more than two million men to labor in American agriculture as seasonal migrants. At the time, it generated widespread opposition in both the United States and Mexico. The chapter illustrates why the Mexican government promoted migration to the United States as a means of achieving human and material progress at home. Focusing on the state of Jalisco, it explains how a guest worker program that undermined conditions for farmworkers in the United States produced beneficial returns for Mexican sending communities, where the Bracero Program fostered a culture of migration that persists to this day.Less

Patronage and Progress : The Bracero Program from the Perspective of Mexico

Michael Snodgrass

Published in print: 2011-02-21

This chapter explores Mexico's evolution into the world's premier emigrant-sending nation through an analysis of state migration policies, especially the Bracero Program (1942–64). The bilateral accord sent more than two million men to labor in American agriculture as seasonal migrants. At the time, it generated widespread opposition in both the United States and Mexico. The chapter illustrates why the Mexican government promoted migration to the United States as a means of achieving human and material progress at home. Focusing on the state of Jalisco, it explains how a guest worker program that undermined conditions for farmworkers in the United States produced beneficial returns for Mexican sending communities, where the Bracero Program fostered a culture of migration that persists to this day.

This chapter examines the responses of los Protestantes in the US Southwest to the Chicano/a and farm worker movements, illuminating their role in the public arena during the last thirty-five years. ...
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This chapter examines the responses of los Protestantes in the US Southwest to the Chicano/a and farm worker movements, illuminating their role in the public arena during the last thirty-five years. The primary goals are: firstly, to highlight the catalytic ability of a cadre of Chicano/a “mainline” Protestant leaders to move their churches and ecclesial organizations to endorse and support the Chicano/a and farm worker movements in Texas from the 1960s until the early 1980s; and secondly, to examine the three basic responses of Latino/a Protestants to these social justice movements (solidarity, ambivalence and indifference, and opposition). As the Chicano/a Protestants led their church co-faithful into the public struggle of these popular movements, they caused a realignment of loyalties among a number of “mainline” Latino/a Protestants. Ethnic affiliation became as important to them as their denominational affiliation. Additionally, they promoted a theological understanding of the Gospel that embraced the oppressed and viewed the kingdom of God as a goal to strive for in contemporary society.Less

Paul Barton

Published in print: 2005-08-11

This chapter examines the responses of los Protestantes in the US Southwest to the Chicano/a and farm worker movements, illuminating their role in the public arena during the last thirty-five years. The primary goals are: firstly, to highlight the catalytic ability of a cadre of Chicano/a “mainline” Protestant leaders to move their churches and ecclesial organizations to endorse and support the Chicano/a and farm worker movements in Texas from the 1960s until the early 1980s; and secondly, to examine the three basic responses of Latino/a Protestants to these social justice movements (solidarity, ambivalence and indifference, and opposition). As the Chicano/a Protestants led their church co-faithful into the public struggle of these popular movements, they caused a realignment of loyalties among a number of “mainline” Latino/a Protestants. Ethnic affiliation became as important to them as their denominational affiliation. Additionally, they promoted a theological understanding of the Gospel that embraced the oppressed and viewed the kingdom of God as a goal to strive for in contemporary society.

This chapter focuses on twenty-two-year-old Jesus Salas, a college student and the son of a migrant contractor and restaurant owner from Crystal City, Texas. Salas organized a “March on Madison” to ...
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This chapter focuses on twenty-two-year-old Jesus Salas, a college student and the son of a migrant contractor and restaurant owner from Crystal City, Texas. Salas organized a “March on Madison” to bring attention to the problems of Wisconsin's migrant farmworkers. This was the third farmworker march of the year. In March, the fledgling National Farm Workers Association (NFWA) had led a march from Delano, California, to Sacramento, and put the plight of the farmworker on the national agenda. In June, Father Antonio Gonzalez, a Catholic priest whose family annually traveled to the cucumber harvest area of Wautoma, Wisconsin, had led a march of La Casita Farms workers from Starr County, Texas, to the capitol at Austin. The NFWA sponsored these two earlier events with funding from the afl-cio in an effort to build a national farmworkers union.Less

Activism across the Diaspora: The Tejano Farmworker Movement in Wisconsin

Marc Simon Rodriguez

Published in print: 2011-04-18

This chapter focuses on twenty-two-year-old Jesus Salas, a college student and the son of a migrant contractor and restaurant owner from Crystal City, Texas. Salas organized a “March on Madison” to bring attention to the problems of Wisconsin's migrant farmworkers. This was the third farmworker march of the year. In March, the fledgling National Farm Workers Association (NFWA) had led a march from Delano, California, to Sacramento, and put the plight of the farmworker on the national agenda. In June, Father Antonio Gonzalez, a Catholic priest whose family annually traveled to the cucumber harvest area of Wautoma, Wisconsin, had led a march of La Casita Farms workers from Starr County, Texas, to the capitol at Austin. The NFWA sponsored these two earlier events with funding from the afl-cio in an effort to build a national farmworkers union.