Agentive awareness is the awareness one has of oneself as acting, or as performing a particular action. Theorists distinguish between high-level (e.g., Wegner 2002 ), low-level (e.g., Frith 2007), and integrative approaches (e.g., Pacherie 2008) to explaining this brand of subjective awareness. In this paper, I evaluate the commitment of both low-level and integrative approaches to the claim that the representations involved in sensorimotor control, specifically as described by the comparator model (e.g., Frith 1992), contribute in some significant way to agentive awareness. I examine the main empirical data offered in support of this claim and argue that it does not succeed in establishing a role for sensorimotor states in generating agentive awareness. This helps clear the way for high-level approaches to explaining this phenomenon.

Recommend

Additional Information

ISSN

2154-154X

Print ISSN

0276-2080

Pages

pp. 103-127

Launched on MUSE

2014-09-20

Open Access

No

Project MUSE Mission

Project MUSE promotes the creation and dissemination of essential humanities and social science resources through collaboration with libraries, publishers, and scholars worldwide. Forged from a partnership between a university press and a library, Project MUSE is a trusted part of the academic and scholarly community it serves.