Okay. Six months ago, the Department of Defense lost 12 members of its family in a senseless act of violence at the Washington Navy Yard. I said at the time that where there are gaps or inadequacies in the department’s security, we’ll find them and we’ll correct them.

And accordingly today, I’m announcing steps DoD is taking to enhance physical security at our installations and improve security clearance procedures responding to lessons learned from this terrible, terrible tragedy. These new measures are based on the recommendations of two reviews that I ordered in the aftermath of the shooting, including an internal review, led by Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence Michael Vickers, and an outside review, led by former Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Stockton, who is with us today, and retired Admiral Eric Olson.

Secretary Mabus, who joins me here this morning, also directed the Department of the Navy to conduct its own reviews of security standards, which complemented our work. I appreciate the hard work and the thorough analysis that went into all of these efforts by all of these people.

The reviews identified troubling gaps in DoD’s ability to detect, prevent, and respond to instances where someone working for us, a government employee, member of our military, or a contractor, decides to inflict harm on this institution and its people.

Terrorism Risk Insurance: Issue Analysis and Overview of Current Program (PDF) Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists) Prior to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, insurance coverage for losses from such attacks was normally included in general insurance policies without specific cost to the policyholders. Following the attacks, such coverage became very […]

Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress (PDF) Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists) On January 26, 2012, senior DOD leadership unveiled a new defense strategy based on a review of potential future security challenges, current defense strategy, and budgetary constraints. This new strategy envisions a smaller, leaner Army that […]

Israel: Background and U.S. Relations (PDF) Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists) Since Israel’s founding in 1948, successive U.S. Presidents and many Members of Congress have demonstrated a commitment to Israel’s security and to maintaining close U.S.-Israel defense, diplomatic, and economic cooperation. U.S. and Israeli leaders have developed close relations based on […]

Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists) While historically the United States has had close relations with Venezuela, a major oil supplier, friction in bilateral relations rose over the past decade under the leftist populist government of President Hugo Chávez, who died in March 2013 after battling cancer […]

Direct Overt U.S. Aid Appropriations for and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002-FY2015 (PDF) Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists) ChartFiled under: business and economics, Congressional Research Service, international relations, military and defense, Pakistan

2013 Military Parent Custody and Visitation Legislation Source: National Conference of State Legislatures Over the last decade, legislation addressing issues facing military parents has become a national trend. With the number of custody and visitation issues among military families growing, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted the Uniform Deployed Parents Custody […]

China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities — Background and Issues for Congress (PDF) Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists) China is building a modern and regionally powerful Navy with a modest but growing capability for conducting operations beyond China’s near-seas region. The question of how the United States should respond […]

2013 Best Practices for Government Libraries Source: LexisNexis From blog post: The 2013 Best Practices for Government Libraries: Managing Evolving Resources: Strategies, Capabilities, and Alternatives is now available in PDF. 2012 and prior years of Best Practices for Government Libraries are all available from the right sidebar here on the Government Info Pro. The e-book […]

Who uses intelligence and why? The short answer is almost everyone and to gain an advantage. While nation-states are most closely identified with intelligence, private corporations and criminal entities also invest in gathering and analyzing information to advance their goals. … There are four communities that use intelligence: the national security community, the homeland security community, the law enforcement community, and the private sector.

Nuclear weapons in the twenty-first century will be tasked with military and policy support missions in a technology environment of digital preeminence. The relationship between nuclear and cyber realms for the purpose of deterrence and other missions requires concept definition and practical demonstration. This study considers the relationship between nuclear and cyber within the context of nuclear arms control, including New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and post–New START options. The future of nuclear-cyber overlap will include challenges to the existing deterrence and nonproliferation regimes from nuclear weapons states in the Middle East and/or South and East Asia, as well as from improving conventional offensive and defensive weapons, including cyber war and antimissile defenses.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) remains one of the United States’ most critical security challenges for many reasons. These include North Korea’s willingness to undertake provocative and destabilizing behavior, including attacks on the Republic of Korea (ROK), its pursuit of nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles, and its willingness to proliferate weapons in contravention of United Nations Security Council Resolutions.

Under Kim Jong Il, DPRK strategy focused on internal security; coercive diplomacy to compel acceptance of its diplomatic, economic, and security interests; development of strategic military capabilities to deter external attack; and challenging the ROK and the U.S.-ROK Alliance. We anticipate these strategic goals will be consistent under North Korea’s current leader, Kim Jong Un.

North Korea fields a large, forward-deployed military that retains the capability to inflict serious damage on the ROK, despite significant resource shortfalls and aging hardware. The DPRK continues to be deterred from conducting large-scale attacks on the ROK primarily due to the strength of the U.S.-ROK Alliance. On a smaller scale, however, the DPRK has demonstrated its willingness to use military provocation to achieve national goals. In 2010, it sank the ROK naval vessel CHEONAN, killing 46 ROK Navy sailors, and shelled Yeonpyeong Island, killing two ROK Marines and two civilians.

North Korea’s continued pursuit of nuclear technology and capabilities and development of intermediate- and long-range ballistic missile programs, as reflected in the December 2012 Taepo Dong-2 missile launch and February 2013 nuclear test, underscore the threat to regional stability and U.S. national security posed by North Korea. These programs, and North Korea’s expressed hostility toward the ROK and proliferation of items prohibited under United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718, 1874, 2087,and 2094, make the DPRK a continued security challenge for the United States and its Allies and partners.

North Korea’s third nuclear test in February 2013 and subsequent announcement of plans to restart and refurbish nuclear facilities at Yongbyon highlight the continued challenge posed by its nuclear programs. The September 19, 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks, and United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718, 1874, 2087, and 2094 call for the complete and verifiable denuclearization of North Korea. Given North Korea’s unwillingness to abide by these commitments, the U.S. Department of Defense will continue to manage the North Korean security challenge through close coordination and consultation with the international community, particularly with our ROK and Japanese Allies.

The United States remains vigilant in the face of North Korea’s continued provocations and steadfast in its commitments to Allies in the region, including the security provided by extended deterrence commitments through the nuclear umbrella and conventional forces.

The body of this Report consists of seven sections, five of which address the Section 215 telephone records program. After this introduction and the executive summary, Part 3 describes in detail how the telephone records program works. To put the present-day operation of the program in context, Part 4 reviews its history, including its evolution from predecessor intelligence activities. An analysis of whether the telephone records program meets applicable statutory requirements follows in Part 5. Part 6 addresses the constitutional issues raised by the telephone records program under both the First and Fourth Amendments. The final section discussing the Section 215 program, Part 7, examines the potential benefits of the program, its efficacy in achieving its purposes, the impact of the program on privacy and civil liberties, and the Board’s conclusions that reforms are needed.

After considering the 215 program, the Report addresses the operations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. That section, Part 8, concludes by proposing an approach that, in appropriate cases, would allow the FISC judges to hear from a Special Advocate. Part 9, the final section of the Report, addresses the issue of transparency, which has been a priority of this Board since it began operations.

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