Tehran, YJC. Khadim Hussain analyzes the situations that are likely to befall AfPak after 2014.

Khadim Hussain is political affairs analyst and correspondent. An article by him on Dawn has analyzed the issue of what is likely, according to different factors, to befall the post-2014 AfPak, of which the full text follows.

After reading several pieces in the print media and watching numerous
talk shows on Afghanistan, one reaches the conclusion that we have a
very limited understanding of this region, Afghanistan in particular.

Before deliberating upon the probable scenarios in Afghanistan after
2014 and their implications for Pakistan, it is pertinent to discuss
some of the obstacles that hamper our understanding.

First, our academia in general has made limited effort to understand
our neighbours. How many books have so far been written and published by
our area study centres and Pakistan study centres on Afghanistan, Iran,
India and China?

Then, most of the information on strategic issues regarding our
neighbours is licensed instead of disseminated. This monopolisation of
vital information by the security establishment has perhaps made our
academia unconsciously complacent with respect to our region and
especially Afghanistan. Another reason for this might be the real or
perceived intimidation of the academia by various security agencies.

Second, we tend to look at the region in general and Afghanistan in
particular either from the perspective of insecurity or with a sense of
superiority. This tendency leads us to view everything happening in our
western and eastern neighbourhood through the lens of paranoia.

Having said that, let’s try to imagine three distinct and mutually exclusive scenarios after 2014 in Afghanistan.

a) First, Kabul is overwhelmed by various factions of the Taliban and
insurgents. After the establishment of an emirate in Afghanistan, the
Afghan Taliban ask their cousins in Pakistan to stop fighting against a
state that was instrumental in making the emirate in Afghanistan. The
Pakistani Taliban lay down arms and live happily ever after.

b) The recently established state and security institutions in
Afghanistan, with the support of regional and international
stakeholders, put up fierce resistance against the Taliban onslaught. In
that case, there will be a stalemate between the Taliban and the rest
of Afghanistan.

c) The third scenario takes into consideration the challenges for
peace in Afghanistan and Pakistan, including other states in the region,
and envisions a three-tiered reconciliation process. The challenges
include the process of reconciliation, reconstruction and state building
and the establishment of sustainable political institutions in
Afghanistan.

Despite the overriding desire of several state and non-state entities
in Pakistan to see Kabul overwhelmed by the Afghan Taliban, it seems
improbable that they will storm Kabul the way they did back in 1992. If
there had been even a slight chance of this probability, the Taliban
would have never agreed to peace talks with the US and the Afghan High
Peace Council.

On the other hand, if the current Afghan government had been that
spineless, the US would have never paid heed to its objection to the
Taliban’s Doha office flag or plaque. Moreover, the Pakistani prime
minister would have never sent his envoy to Kabul to appease the Afghan
president if he were no more than a straw man.

If the first scenario, though it seems absolutely improbable, becomes
a reality, its implications for Pakistan might be completely the
opposite of what sections of the state and non-state entities here
assume. Far from being a strategic gain for Pakistan, Kabul under the
Taliban might be this country’s worst nightmare.

The sprawling militant network here might find it a good opportunity
to unleash immense terror on the state and society. If they can fight
for an emirate in Afghanistan, why wouldn’t they go for the same in
Pakistan? It also uncertain whether the Afghan Taliban will de-link from
Al Qaeda.

As for the second scenario, the present deadlock involving the US,
Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Taliban and the non-inclusion of regional
states in the efforts to find a solution to the challenge of peace in
post-2014 Afghanistan indicate a stalemate. In this case, too, Pakistan
will have a tough time. With an ideological and technical network in
Punjab and Sindh and the needed physical infrastructure in Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa and Fata, the militant network might be able to move around
freely in southern and eastern Afghanistan and the adjacent tribal
region in Pakistan.

Keeping in view the confusion in Pakistan’s military and political
establishments with respect to dealing with extremism and terrorism,
observers are of the opinion that some districts of KP earlier occupied
by the Pakistani Taliban and later taken back by the military might see
the resurgence of the militant network. They cite the continuous killing
of members of peace committees in Swat, Buner and Dir districts in this
regard. The Swat, Bajaur and Mohmand chapters of the Tehreek-e-Taliban
Pakistan have already established centres of operations in the Kunar
and Nuristan provinces in southern Afghanistan.

One can observe the expansion of the militant network in Pakistan in
the shape of their ability to strike in Gilgit-Baltistan, Karachi,
Sukkur, Quetta and Kurrum Agency within just one month. Observers also
believe that the militant network has established its foothold in the
suburban areas of south and southwest of Peshawar.

A win-win situation for Pakistan, Afghanistan, regional states, Nato
and the insurgents groups in Afghanistan lies in the third scenario. If
the reconciliation process among the Afghans (internally) and among the
states in the region and international stakeholders is initiated
simultaneously and is in sync with the reconstruction process and the
political institutionalisation of Afghanistan, all stakeholders might
emerge victorious.

This can only happen when all parties to the conflict make efforts at
finding a shared interest in the solution. This cannot be achieved as
long as all parties wish to show the other as the vanquished.