Role in National Life

The United States Department of Defense estimated that North
Korea had a million troops under arms for most of the 1980s,
although P'yongyang regularly claimed that it maintained its
armed forces at around 400,000 persons
(see
fig. 14). Given the
closed nature of North Korean society, there was little publicly
available evidence to validate either claim until the research
conducted in 1991 by Nicholas Eberstadt and Judith Banister at
the Harvard University Center for Population and Development
Studies. Their estimates, derived from DPRK population data given
to the UN, suggest that the number of males in the North Korean
armed forces had increased from at least 740,000 in 1975 to over
900,000 in 1980 and 1.2 million in 1986. The estimates also
suggest that more than one out of every five North Korean men
between the ages of sixteen and fifty-four was in the military as
of 1986. If all military men are of the ages conscripts were
thought to serve, that is, ages seventeen to twenty-six, they
would constitute almost half the age group. The armed forces
would have accounted for at least 12 percent of the entire male
population and at least 6 percent of the total population. As a
result of estimated decreases in that age group over the 1990s,
the same size military force will constitute 59 percent of the
conscript age group in the year 2000, and 57 percent in 2005.

Although difficult to quantify, the economic consequences of
such a massive military establishment are staggering. North
Korea's published budget figures, however, are of little use in
estimating the impact of the massive military buildup. Many
analysts dismiss North Korea's military budget figures
completely, while others assume that significant costs related to
defense expenditures are hidden under nondefense budget headings.
Most estimates put the total for military expenditures in the
range of 20 to 25 percent of the gross national product
(GNP--see Glossary)
(see
fig. 15).

Military personnel sometimes are assigned to civilian duty.
For example, troops may be assigned to factories to alleviate
labor shortages. Training seldom is held during planting or
harvesting seasons to allow troops to assist farmers. Much of the
construction of major infrastructure projects is completed by
military engineering units or regular military personnel
mobilized in support of special projects. Military-associated
construction since the 1950s includes such diverse projects as
the Namhng chemical complex, the Sunch'n synthetic fiber
complexes, the P'yongyang-Wnsan and P'yongyang-Kaesng
expressways, the sports complexes for the games of the Thirteenth
World Festival of Youth and Students, various barrages and
lockgates, the Taech'n power station, the 800-kilometer west
coast waterway project, coal mines, cement factories, public
housing and government buildings, tramways, and dams.

The number of troops used for construction projects at any
one time is unknown. During the 1980s, however, construction
became nearly a full-time activity for selected units as result
of civilian labor shortages. In 1986 North Korea announced that
some 150,000 troops had been transferred to domestic construction
projects. A 1987 announcement indicated that 100,000 troops were
active in civilian construction projects. These troops were not
discharged, and some were merely assigned to the projects. Other
troops may have been reassigned to engineering bureaus while they
participated in various projects.

At no time did reassignment to construction work represent a
real reduction in military strength. However, it undoubtedly had
a negative impact on military readiness and capability. Basic
individual skills were maintained, but large unit training was
more likely to deteriorate.

Content
on this web site is provided for informational purposes only. We accept no responsibility
for any loss, injury or inconvenience sustained by any person resulting from information
published on this site. We encourage you to verify any critical information with
the relevant authorities.