Related Content for this Expert

One of the most anticipated documents of 2014, Russia’s new military doctrine, was signed into law on December 26th. Will it serve as the framework for Russia's adversarial relationship with the West, or a carefully crafted revision that offers opportunities for rapprochement? The participants examined changes in the doctrine, reviewed Russia's military actions in 2014, and provided perspectives on the evolving capabilities of Russia's armed forces. more

What would be the outcome of changing policy and sending military assistance to Ukraine? Would such a step help Ukraine resist the aggression or further escalate the war? How would it change America’s role in the conflict? more

Eurasian geopolitics are more fluid now than they have been for at least a decade. The looming U.S. withdrawal of combat troops from Afghanistan and Russia's uncertain capabilities in the region leave a vacuum for new extra-regional powers to fill. more

January 1998 - One of the key issues in the debate over NATO enlargement is the question of the relationship between NATO and the Baltic states and how an expansion of the alliance would affect Russia's relations with Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. While it is clear that the Baltic states will not be entering NATO anytime soon, it is worth noting that the arguments of those who opposed NATO's enlargement because of its impact on Russia have already been proven wrong. more

Since the Paris and Madrid conferences, which created a NATO-Russia Joint Council and ratified NATO's enlargement, Russia has modified its Baltic policies. Because those policies are widely regarded as a litmus test of Russia's European policy, this modification bears close scrutiny. Although Russian opposition to NATO's enlargement has not declined, the most recent terms Moscow has offered the Baltics, though insufficient to stabilize the region, seem to represent a small but measurable step away from the negative, bullying tone that has characterized much of Russia's Baltic and European policies-and which is still heard, if less strident than before these conferences. This paper attempts to both explain and assess Russia's new Baltic Policy. more

September 2008 - With predictable regularity, Russian officials regularly charge that American missile defenses (10 radars and interceptors) in Poland and the Czech Republic threaten Russian security. They claim that since there is no threat of Iranian missiles (conventional or nuclear), there is no justification for building these systems. Therefore, they can only represent a threat to Russia's vital interests. Since everyone admits that ten such units alone do not constitute that threat, Moscow charges that that these systems are merely the thin edge of the larger program to saturate Central and Eastern Europe with missile defenses to prevent Russia from launching its nuclear weapons in a first strike against a conventional or nuclear attack from the West. That first strike is in accordance with Russia's military doctrine that calls for such strikes to compensate for Russia's conventional inferiority vis-à-vis NATO and the United States. Missile defenses would then deprive Russia of the capability to launch a retaliatory strike or else degrade that capability, leaving Russia vulnerable to all manner of attacks. Because Warsaw and Prague defied Russia's objections and threats by accepting to host these missile defenses they have received numerous equally predictable and regular Russian threats to target them with nuclear and conventional missiles. more

As part of NATO’s and Europe’s continuing and open-ended processes of enlargement and military-political integration, in 1999, NATO presented aspiring members with a Membership Action Plan (MAP) to guide them in their activities preparing their governments and armed forces for membership in NATO. The MAP, if fulfilled according to NATO's requirements and approbation, allegedly would make the aspiring members’ military forces more nearly congruent or interoperable with NATO forces. With this document, NATO has arguably created its own version of the EU's acquis communautaire “against which the Alliance can assess the technical preparations and capacities of the nine MAP partners and judge their readiness for membership.” more

One of the most anticipated documents of 2014, Russia’s new military doctrine, was signed into law on December 26th. Will it serve as the framework for Russia's adversarial relationship with the West, or a carefully crafted revision that offers opportunities for rapprochement? The participants examined changes in the doctrine, reviewed Russia's military actions in 2014, and provided perspectives on the evolving capabilities of Russia's armed forces.

What would be the outcome of changing policy and sending military assistance to Ukraine? Would such a step help Ukraine resist the aggression or further escalate the war? How would it change America’s role in the conflict?

Eurasian geopolitics are more fluid now than they have been for at least a decade. The looming U.S. withdrawal of combat troops from Afghanistan and Russia's uncertain capabilities in the region leave a vacuum for new extra-regional powers to fill.

Since the Paris and Madrid conferences, which created a NATO-Russia Joint Council and ratified NATO's enlargement, Russia has modified its Baltic policies. Because those policies are widely regarded as a litmus test of Russia's European policy, this modification bears close scrutiny. Although Russian opposition to NATO's enlargement has not declined, the most recent terms Moscow has offered the Baltics, though insufficient to stabilize the region, seem to represent a small but measurable step away from the negative, bullying tone that has characterized much of Russia's Baltic and European policies-and which is still heard, if less strident than before these conferences. This paper attempts to both explain and assess Russia's new Baltic Policy.

September 2008 - With predictable regularity, Russian officials regularly charge that American missile defenses (10 radars and interceptors) in Poland and the Czech Republic threaten Russian security. They claim that since there is no threat of Iranian missiles (conventional or nuclear), there is no justification for building these systems. Therefore, they can only represent a threat to Russia's vital interests. Since everyone admits that ten such units alone do not constitute that threat, Moscow charges that that these systems are merely the thin edge of the larger program to saturate Central and Eastern Europe with missile defenses to prevent Russia from launching its nuclear weapons in a first strike against a conventional or nuclear attack from the West. That first strike is in accordance with Russia's military doctrine that calls for such strikes to compensate for Russia's conventional inferiority vis-à-vis NATO and the United States. Missile defenses would then deprive Russia of the capability to launch a retaliatory strike or else degrade that capability, leaving Russia vulnerable to all manner of attacks. Because Warsaw and Prague defied Russia's objections and threats by accepting to host these missile defenses they have received numerous equally predictable and regular Russian threats to target them with nuclear and conventional missiles.

January 1998 - One of the key issues in the debate over NATO enlargement is the question of the relationship between NATO and the Baltic states and how an expansion of the alliance would affect Russia's relations with Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. While it is clear that the Baltic states will not be entering NATO anytime soon, it is worth noting that the arguments of those who opposed NATO's enlargement because of its impact on Russia have already been proven wrong.

As part of NATO’s and Europe’s continuing and open-ended processes of enlargement and military-political integration, in 1999, NATO presented aspiring members with a Membership Action Plan (MAP) to guide them in their activities preparing their governments and armed forces for membership in NATO. The MAP, if fulfilled according to NATO's requirements and approbation, allegedly would make the aspiring members’ military forces more nearly congruent or interoperable with NATO forces. With this document, NATO has arguably created its own version of the EU's acquis communautaire “against which the Alliance can assess the technical preparations and capacities of the nine MAP partners and judge their readiness for membership.”