5 1. Introduction The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is the oldest regional organization in East Asia. It was established in 1967 by five anti-communist and Western-leaning states: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Brunei joined in After the end of the Cold War, ASEAN s former communist adversaries also joined the Association: Vietnam in 1995, Burma (from 1998 Myanmar) and Laos in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999, meaning that today all Southeast Asian countries (except Timor-Leste, which was separated from Indonesia in 2002) are members of ASEAN. Throughout its first forty years ASEAN worked on the basis of various declarations and documents, but a formal charter was not adopted until the fortieth anniversary summit in November However, the ASEAN countries have developed a set of more or less formalized principles and norms, called the ASEAN way, as a basis for their cooperation, and since the end of the Cold War they have sought to extend the ASEAN normative framework to relations between states in the rest of East Asia. Assessments of ASEAN and its role and significance in East Asia have been highly varied. Until the Asian financial crisis of , many observers and scholars considered ASEAN the most successful international organization among developing countries. That was a view shared not only by observers in the region, but also by several others. ASEAN was a social, economic and political success and represented a far-sighted and sensitive diplomacy that was peaceful and efficient, despite operating under consensus and with full respect for national sovereignty (Martin, 1987; Öjendal, 2004). Michael Leifer, the late British scholar who was a leading expert on Southeast Asian relations, wrote in the late 1980s that ASEAN had become well established as a regional actor and enjoyed widespread international standing (Leifer, 1989: 147). An Australian scholar, Paul Dibb, noted in the mid-1990s that the ASEAN group, which acts together as a united bloc on key issues, has already accrued to itself political influence out of all proportion to any objective measure of its economic, military or political power (Dibb, 1995: 41). Against this, a few Western scholars have long been more skeptical and pointed to the marginal diplomatic role of ASEAN, for instance, in settling the Cambodian conflict in the late 1990s. The notion of an exceptional and benign ASEAN way (or ASEAN spirit ) has also been questioned, as has the assertion that there is a distinctly peaceful Asian and ASEAN approach to security (Buzan, 1995; Segal, ). 5

6 Since the Asian economic crisis and the extensive forest fires in Indonesia in 1997 and 1998, with the resulting haze and health problems in neighboring countries, the lack of any attempt by ASEAN to decide or implement countermeasures have led to less enthusiastic views on ASEAN. Nonetheless a few scholars still see only success in the organization. Thus one Philippine political scientist, Estrella Solidum, has written: With the highest commitment to its goals of peace, freedom, stability, prosperity, rule of law, and security ASEAN has remained vibrant and relevant as the 21 st century has begun (Solidum, 2003: 222). An opposite assessment, however, has become much more widespread among both Western and Southeast Asian scholars and observers. One European scholar has noted that the ASEAN way with its tendency of hiding problems behind euphemisms and symbolic action leaves little time for concerted reaction when the organization is subjected to external shocks. The ASEAN way represents fair weather cooperation which flourishes under the conditions of economic boom (Rüland, 2000: 444). In early 1998 The Economist noted, under the heading The Limits of Politeness, that ASEAN favours carrots over sticks, consensus over breakthrough, camaraderie over formality and process over substance. The ASEAN way no longer works (The Economist,, February 26 th, 1998). A similar observation is that ASEAN did little other than host light-weight summits centered around innumerable games of golf (Kurlantzick, 2002: 21). It has become a widespread view that ASEAN is little better than a lame duck which is unable to deal with serious transnational and international challenges in Southeast Asia. Some scholars strongly criticize ASEAN scholarship for being ASEAN-centric and sharing an exaggerated enthusiasm for ASEAN s practices, a tendency that has been called ASEANology or ASEANthink ( Jones and Smith, 2001, and 2007a). But the specific feature of ASEAN is that it is making process, not progress ( Jones and Smith, 2007b). Think-tanks and academics in Southeast Asia are also increasingly questioning ASEAN s role, suggesting that it needs reinvent and revitalize itself or risk becoming irrelevant. 1 ASEAN s significance beyond Southeast Asia is suggested by the fact that different institutions in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific region have been set up by ASEAN countries since the early 1990s. Most important is the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), established in 1994 with eighteen participants, which now has 27 from the Asia-Pacific region (cf. the appendix) as an attempt to extend the ASEAN way to the rest of East Asia. Attached to ARF is the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), which was founded in 1992 and forms the core of the 1 See especially: Tay, Estanislao and Soesastro (ed.), 2001, pp

7 so-called track II nonofficial diplomacy. ASEAN Plus Three (APT) (ASEAN plus China, Japan and South Korea) was established in 1996 and then seen by a few member states, especially China and Malaysia, as the beginning of a distinctive pan-east Asian regionalism, especially after the 1997 economic crisis pointed to the need for an institution to coordinate East Asian economies (Stubbs, 2002; Zhang, 2005). Yet, most APT states, especially Japan, prefer a broader Asia-Pacific framework (Hund, 2003). Potentially more important, the first East-Asia Summit (EAS) was held in 2005 and attended by the thirteen APT states plus Australia, India, and New Zealand. EAS was promoted by especially Malaysia and has until now dealt primarily with economic issues. Lastly, there is Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), established in 1989, has 21 members referred to as member economies from all around the Pacific Ocean. The institution is unique in that both China and Taiwan are member economies. The aim of this report is to evaluate the potential and limitations of ASEAN and the ASEAN-sponsored ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as a part of East Asia s composite security architecture. ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum are treated here as security regimes. A security regime is a normative framework (principles and norms) and associated implementing instruments (rules and decision-making procedures) which make it feasible for member states to be restrained in their behavior towards each other in the belief that others will reciprocate even if their relationships are shaped by fear of war and expectations of the use of military power (Blanchard, 2003: 446f.; Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 491-2; Jervis, 1982). A security regime may turn into a security community, meaning that countries do not expect or prepare for the use of military force in their relations with each other. Although there has been no major war between two ASEAN countries since the Association was founded forty years ago except for a few cases of border fighting and a number of tense situations with preparations for military conflicts, the possibility of war among ASEAN members cannot be ruled out (Acharya, 2006; Collins, 2000: ). While ASEAN is not yet a security community, it can be termed a thin, or nascent, security community (Acharya, 1998; Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 491; Emmerson, 2005). The questions to consider in this report are the following: What is the distinctive character of ASEAN as a regional institution? What are the central features of ASEAN and ARF as security regimes? How should ASEAN s normative influence in framing East Asia s security architecture be compared to the role of great powers with influence in the region, especially China and the United States? Do ASEAN and ASEAN-sponsored institutions have the institutional capacity to remove, and possibly reduce, great power rivalry in East Asia s loose security architecture and 7

8 change relations between states in the region in order to turn them into something closer to a security community? The following section, section 2, provides a brief introduction to economic, political and cultural features of East Asia, as well as characteristics of regional institutions in the region and East Asia s security architecture. As a continuation of this, the character of ASEAN as a regional institution is assessed from two angles. First, section 3 presents an overview of ASEAN s origins in the late 1960s and its aims as stipulated in early ASEAN declarations, new initiatives since 2000 and the new ASEAN Charter. Next, in section 4, the normative framework of a distinctive ASEAN way and the interplay with ASEAN practices is considered with a view to how it has evolved since the Association was formed forty years ago. Section 5 looks at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which was established in 1994 on the initiative of the ASEAN countries as a response to uncertainties in the East Asian security context after the end of the Cold War and as an attempt to extend the ASEAN model to other parts of East Asia, thus displaying the Association s aspirations to normative leadership in the region. In the concluding section 6, the institutional capacity of ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum as a part of the overall East Asian security architecture is assessed: what role do ASEAN s aspirations for normative leadership play compared to the structural leaderships of major powers in the East Asian security architecture? 8

9 2. East Asia: A Brief Introduction East Asia is a rising region. Its economic and political importance in world affairs is growing, and the region s new self-confidence is evident. Since the 1970s East Asia has had by far the strongest economic growth of all regions in the world, and it includes some of the world s most dynamic economies. East Asia accounts for nearly a third of the world s population, and since 1970 the region s emerging economies have increased their share of global output from less than 10% to 13% in 1995 to more than 20% today. Three of the ten largest economies in the world are in East Asia: Japan (no. 2), China (no. 4) and South Korea (no. 10). In recent decades, especially since the early 1990s, some of the most populous East Asian countries, like Indonesia, China, South Korea and Taiwan, have reduced absolute poverty markedly and, considered as a whole, East Asia is fast becoming a middle income region (World Development Indicators 2007; World Development Report Regional Highlights: East Asia and the Pacific). Before the Asian financial crisis of there was much talk about Asia s miracle economies, but, as Paul Krugman argued three years before the 1997 crisis (Krugmann, 1994), Asia s miracle is a myth. The remarkable record of East Asian growth has been matched by rapid growth in inputs, in particular high saving ratios and investments in primary education. Whatever the reason, East Asian countries have managed to get the key input factors right. At the same time, it is evident that some countries in East Asia have vulnerable economic and political systems. East Asia is also a very heterogeneous region. Focusing upon three major variables in comparative analyses of political systems political freedom, economic development and culture the chief characteristic of East Asian countries is their diversity. As for political freedom, Freedom House s latest annual survey of the distribution of the sixteen East Asian countries on a freedom rating clearly indicates the most obvious differences between the countries in the region: four are rated as free (Indonesia, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan), five as partly free (Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Timor-Leste (formerly East Timor)), and seven countries as not free (Brunei, Cambodia, China, Laos, Myanmar, North Korea and Vietnam). 2 Also, there are clear economic disparities both between and within East Asian countries. The region encompasses some of the world s richest countries 2 See Freedom in the World 2007,, at (accessed October 19, 2007). The most important recent change in country distribution is that since the military coup in autumn 2006 Thailand has been moved from the free to the not free and then to the partly free group. 9

10 ( Japan, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan) and some of the poorest (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, North Korea and Vietnam). Moreover, while absolute poverty has declined rapidly in major East Asian countries, economic inequalities have increased, particularly in China. 3 Culture plays a prominent and often peculiar role in analyses and debates on developments in Asia. Common features like the centrality of the family, community, respect for education, for the teacher and authority, hard work, thrift, strict discipline and a preference for governance according to moral dictates rather than law have been cited as characteristic of Asian values (Bessho, 1999: 53f.). This may encourage the view that applying a Weberian perspective, with its weight on culture and ideas rather than economic input factors, offers a valuable starting point in the study of the rapid industrialization in East Asia (Hamilton and Kao, 1987). However that may be, especially in the first half of the 1990s, a group of influential East Asian leaders and opinion-makers named the common Asian values mentioned above which distinguish Asia from other civilizations including Western liberal democracies with their demands for human rights as fundamental for East Asia s economic success and what was seen as the region s cooperative approach to security. 4 Sometimes East Asian observers and scholars have expressed the view that, as the rise of East Asia shed its earlier passivity, there would be three centers of world power in the twenty-first century: East Asia, Europe, and North America. The difference between the ascent of East Asia and the decline of Europe was often presented as particularly striking. Asia had at long last started to define itself, and Asian consciousness was coming vigorously to life, animated by workaday pragmatism and the social awakening of a flourishing middle class which exemplified Asian values (Funabashi, 1993: Mahbubani, 1995). Modernization without Westernization was seen as a distinct trait of Asian values (Katzensein, 2000: 355). Moreover, some argued that, by building on dialogue, East Asians had found a distinctively new, culture-based and supposedly superior way of coping with security problems. However, Asian cultures are also very diverse, as many ethnic groups and most of the world s major religions are found among and within Asian states. Focusing on East Asia there is no single set of East Asian values, but a pronounced socio-cultural, linguistic and religious diversity (Kim, 2004: 54f.). To the extent that Confucian- 3 See World Economic Outlook, April 2007, at and Inequality in Asia: Key Indicators 2007,, Asian Development Bank, 2007, at 4 See especially the interview with Singapore s Prime Minister ( ) Lee Kuan Yew (Zakaria, 1994). See also Funabashi, 1993; Kausikan, 1993; Mahbubani,

11 ism is considered basic to East Asian values, the fact that Confucianism is not an immutable mono-tradition and that one should distinguish between Confucianism as a philosophy and as state orthodoxy is ignored (Dupont, 1996; Öjendal, 1998: ). In the same way, the region s history, its colonial experience,and the diversity of political systems in the post-colonial period do contribute to its heterogeneity, since this has left a plurality of historical traditions, internal conflicts, border disputes and maritime conflicts between the countries in East Asia. In particular, a multitude of overlapping claims made by countries bordering the South China Sea have led to conflict situations in the 1990s and may contain the seeds of new conflict situations needing careful management to avoid escalations (Amer, 2002 (a) and (b); Kivimäki, Odgaard, and Tønnesen, 2002). While East Asia is a heterogeneous region, East Asian states have also entered various regional, sub-regional and extra-regional multilateral institutions. The growth in Asian regional institutions has been especially strong in recent decades and has led one scholar to declare that Asian regionalism is an idea whose time has come (Katzenstein, 2000: 361). However, in focusing upon regional multilateral institutions in East Asia, its sub-regions or the broader Asia-Pacific region, it is important to note that they are relatively weak, with no equivalent to the panoply of European-wide institutions like the European Union (EU), with its many-sided functions. Nor is there any equivalent to NATO as a multilateral security organization (Hemmer and Katzenstein, 2002). Moreover, contrary to not only Europe but also North America, regional economic and political institutions in the Asia-Pacific region are not highly legalized in any of the dimensions of obligation, precision and delegation: there are few formal rules and obligations, precisely defined agreements are few compared to general principles, and disputes are managed rather than resolved without delegation to third-party adjudication. This can be related to an Asian predisposition against formal rules and a rejection of all kinds of political union, pooling of sovereignty or supranationality in favor of state-centric international relations. However, developments in the 1990s seem to indicate some movement toward a so-called demanddriven legalization, i.e., functional integration, though compared to economic and political integration in other regions, it is still a minor development (Kahler, 2000; Katzenstein, 1996). Potentially more important, a major change in ASEAN as a regional institution may be in the pipeline with the adoption of an ASEAN Charter in late 2007 (see below). The relatively weak character of multilateral institutions in East Asia must be viewed in connection with the heterogeneous security architecture of the region. One reason 11

12 for this is that there are clear differences between the threat perceptions and security priorities of the states in the region. The region contains two of the world s most dangerous flashpoints the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan Strait and some ASEAN members perceive their partners rather as potential adversaries. Hence, in important respects the security situation of East Asia is more complex, volatile, and potentially unstable than any other region of the world (Kim, 2004: 59). As for the actual prospects of regional peace and stability, scholars have disagreed over this, as in the early 1990s, some predicted dire scenarios about Asia as ripe for rivalry due to the fragmented character of its security architecture, while others have reached a more optimistic conclusion (Friedberg, 1993/94; Ross, 1999). Whatever the consequences for peace and stability, the situation is that scattered across the region are a patchwork of multilateral fora, ad hoc security arrangements and engagement mechanisms, as well as bilateral alliances with the most important extra-regional power, the United States (Ikenberry and Tsuchiyama, 2002). In brief there are at least three types of security order in East Asia: hegemonic, balance of power, and community-based, which overlap in the evolving security architecture in East Asia (Ikenberry and Mastanduno, 2003). The American system of bilateral alliances with Japan, the Philippines, South Korea and Thailand, as well as security ties with Malaysia, Singapore and Taiwan, forms a US-centered hub and spokes hegemonic order. As to the balance of power factor, the rising economic and military power of China and China s strained relations with Japan and Taiwan in particular represent the balance of power characteristics of the East Asian security architecture. Unlike these two power-based security orders, ASEAN and ASEAN-related institutions like the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the track II diplomacy represent a community-based order that may form the basis of an emerging security community in the region to replace the power-based elements. 12

13 3. ASEAN: Origin and Aims To understand ASEAN s character as an international organization, it is useful first to emphasize what it is not. ASEAN was never intended to be an organization promoting regional functional integration in the same manner as the European Community (EC) or its successor, the European Union (EU). Nor was ASEAN intended to fulfill a classical state-centric security role, whether as a collective defensive organization, i.e. an alliance in which all member states pledge to assist each other in case of attack from outside, or a collective security organization in which all member states pledge to punish a member who commits an act of aggression (Wolfers, 1959/1962). For the forty years of its existence, ASEAN s aims have been broader and more ambiguous, yet still strongly state-centric. A review of ASEAN s origins and aims as stipulated in early ASEAN documents will demonstrate that. Finally, new initiatives after 2000 to revive the Association and the ASEAN Charter, adopted by the 13 th ASEAN Summit in November 2007, are reviewed. Origin ASEAN s five founding states Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand are all small to medium-sized powers and all, except Thailand, former colonies. The origin of ASEAN lay in Indonesia s konfrontasi with Malaysia, initiated by President Sukarno in 1963 as an undeclared war against the new Federation of Malaysia which had been established with strong support from one of the traditional colonial powers in the region, Great Britain. The confrontation was intended to destabilize Malaysia through limited military action, economic sanctions and propaganda, pursued by Sukarno and backed by the powerful Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), as an attempt to overcome the last vestiges of colonialism. After Sukarno was removed from power and the PKI annihilated in , when about half a million people were killed following a military coup, Indonesia endeavored to mend fences with its neighbors in the wake of the policy of confrontation. As by far the largest country in Southeast Asia, accounting for over half of the total population of the five founder states, Indonesia was a key state in the formation of ASEAN. For the other four members, ASEAN was a device to lock Indonesia into a multilateral structure that would restrain any hegemonic pretensions it might otherwise have had. That is, ASEAN was both a means of reconciliation and an attempt to prevent the recurrence of confrontation by establishing a form of political defense to constrain a potentially menacing neighbor (Emmers, 2003: and 54-60). For ASEAN s 13

14 founders it was an important objective to promote a regional security community (Acharya, 1998: 202-3). For the founding states, ASEAN also made it possible to fight secessionist movements without interference from one s neighbors. Related to this was the fact that ASEAN attempted to create a united front against communist insurgencies by supporting nation-building in the member states. Some insurgencies, however, were externally sponsored by China. Besides, ASEAN s founding members shared a concern for the outcome of the Vietnam War and its effect on the United States commitment to security in Southeast Asia (Leifer, 1996: 10-11). But unlike regional institutions in Western Europe during the Cold War, which also had obvious anti-communist traits, ASEAN was not founded upon a shared commitment to liberal democracy. On the contrary, ASEAN s founding states experienced a retreat from postcolonial liberal democracy, and ASEAN s formation and consolidation can be characterized as an elite-centered and patrimonial regionalism (Acharya, 2003a). Early ASEAN documents ASEAN had no formal charter until one was adopted by the ASEAN Summit in November 2007 (see below). When the institution was founded in August 1967, the five Foreign Ministers signed the Bangkok Declaration, a brief two-page document containing just five articles. The preamble to the Declaration spoke of the existence of mutual interests and common problems among countries of Southeast Asia and how, in the spirit of equality and partnership, they sought to contribute towards peace, progress and prosperity in the region. These words strike the tone of the Declaration. It further reads: in an increasingly interdependent world, the cherished ideals of peace, freedom, social justice and economic well-being are best attained by fostering good understanding, good neighbourliness and meaningful cooperation among the countries of the region already bound together by ties of history and culture; the countries of Southeast Asia share a primary responsibility for strengthening the economic and social stability of the region and ensuring their peaceful and progressive national development, and that they are determined to ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their national identities in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples; 14

15 all foreign bases are temporary and remain only with the expressed concurrence of the countries concerned and are not intended to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence and freedom of States in the area or prejudice the orderly processes of their national development; The most important aims and purposes of the Association were stated as follows: 1. To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region through joint endeavours in the spirit of equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of South-East Asian Nations; 2. To promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter; 3. To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common interest in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields; At the end of the declaration, it was stated that the Association was open to participation by all states in the Southeast Asian region that subscribed to the aforementioned aims, principles, and purposes. The Bangkok declaration ended by stating that: the Association represents the collective will of the nations of South-East Asia to bind themselves together in friendship and cooperation and, through joint efforts and sacrifices, secure for their peoples and for posterity the blessings of peace, freedom and prosperity. (http://www.aseansec.org/3628.htm) A minimum of administrative machinery was established to carry out these aims in the form of an annual meeting of foreign ministers, while special meetings might be convened as required. A Standing Committee was also created to carry at the work of the Association in between the foreign ministers meetings, as well as ad-hoc committees and committees of specialists and officials on specific subjects. Although a national secretariat was set up in each member state, a joint ASEAN secretariat was not established until 1976, when one was set up in Jakarta. 15

16 The Bangkok declaration reflected the thinking that free and independent states intent on economic, social and cultural nation-building were essential when it came to fighting ethnic or communist insurgencies and realize the peaceful development of all nations in Southeast Asia. In a world marked by interdependence, the developmentally strong states had to be supported by cooperative state-to-state relations rather than attempts to pool sovereignty in international institutions. Any sort of foreign interference or subversion was rejected. Thus in the founding declaration, ASEAN as a security regime was characterized by a normative framework marked by general principles and goals rather than norms for specific standards of behavior. When it came to instruments of implementation, a few institutions were established without any stipulations regarding decision-making procedures. Convergence of political outlook did not mean a ready-made consensus on how to proceed (Leifer, 1989: 21). During ASEAN s first ten years, a number of declarations and agreements reiterated or elaborated on these ideas or gave them a slightly different turn. Three documents in particular have a quasi-constitutional character. First, the 1971 Kuala Lumpur Declaration on Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace and Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), which emphasized respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, endorsed the principles of peaceful coexistence as laid down by the Bandung conference of and stated that the neutralization of Southeast Asia was a desirable objective which should be explored. Besides, the trend towards establishing nuclear-free zones for the purpose of promoting world peace and security was noted but not endorsed outright. Altogether, ZOPFAN expressed a desire for regional autonomy, though since it was constrained by a fear of being abandoned, the Kuala Lumpur Declaration did not represent a true meeting of minds on the part of ASEAN countries (Leifer, 1989: 58ff.; Secondly, in 1976 two documents were signed at the first ever summit meeting of ASEAN leaders held in Bali, Indonesia, when the five anti-communist Southeast Asian countries responded to the victory of communist North Vietnam the year before by registering and attempting to build a specific political identity and purpose. The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) reiterated ASEAN s normative framework: mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations, the right of every state to a national existence free from external interference or coercion, non-interference, peaceful set- 5 The conference, held in Bandung, Indonesia, was attended by 29 Afro-Asian countries and represented the start of the non-aligned movement during the Cold War. 16

17 tlement and renunciation of the threat or use of force. The novelty in the TAC was the establishment of a dispute settlement mechanism, the High Council, to offer its good offices, mediate or recommend other appropriate measures for the prevention or amelioration of disputes among members (http://www.aseansec.org/1217.htm). The adoption of this dispute settlement mechanism is a central feature of the tension between norms and practices in the ASEAN way (cf. below). The other document adopted at the 1976 summit was the ASEAN Concord, which affirmed continued cooperation on a non-asean basis (emphasis added) between the member states in security matters in accordance with their mutual needs and interests. As part of a program of action regarding a framework for ASEAN cooperation, the Concord mentioned ZOPFAN in a rather cautious manner: Immediate consideration of initial steps towards recognition of and respect for the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality wherever possible. However, it was also declared that member states, individually or collectively, shall take active steps for the early establishment of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (http://www.aseansec.org/1649.htm). Besides the basic ASEAN documents adopted throughout the association s first decade, it should be mentioned that during the 1970s and 1980s a number of economic and industrial cooperation projects, as well as preferential trade arrangements, were adopted. However, most of these initiatives made very little progress, and as a scheme of regional economic integration ASEAN plans came to nothing for a long time (Mattli, 1999: 163-6; Jacobson, 1984: ). New initiatives After 2000 various initiatives have been aimed at reviving the Association. A summit in autumn 2003 announced the establishment of an ASEAN Community, founded on economic, security and socio-cultural pillars. This Concord II was largely a statement of intent concerning long-term goals, being standard ASEAN speak. The actual way the ASEAN Community would operate remained unclear, and the policy detail would have to be fleshed out at a later date (Ferguson, 2004; Smith, 2004). In talking about an ASEAN security community, for the first time in the Association s history Concord II pointed to democracy as a goal for the global rather than national level. 6 Among other recent initiatives, the first ASEAN meet- 6 The specific wording is: The ASEAN Security Community is envisaged to bring ASEAN s political and security cooperation to a higher plane to ensure that countries in the region live at peace with one another and with the world at large in a just, democratic and harmonious environment (emphasis added) (http://www.aseansec.org/ htm). 17

18 ing of defense ministers took place in the spring of 2006 as part of the aspiration to establish an ASEAN security community by 2020 (Strategic Survey 2007: 390-2). The ministers reaffirmed the goal of the ASEAN security community by stating their intention to bring ASEAN s political and security cooperation to a higher plane to ensure that countries in the region live at peace with one another and with the world at large in a just, democratic and harmonious environment a statement very similar to that adopted as a part of Concord II (cf. above; also aseansec.org/18414.htm). 7 Other major new initiatives are measures to deal with subjects on the new security agenda, i.e., drug-trafficking, human-trafficking, money-laundering, piracy and terrorism. In Southeast Asia, maritime security and effective measures against piracy in the Straits of Malacca, the Straits of Singapore and in the South China Sea are especially important (Blanchard, 2003), but terrorism is also an urgent problem in the region, where thousands of islands offer hiding places that are impassable to traditional police actions. The November 2001 Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism stated that, among other things, national mechanisms to combat terrorism should be strengthened, cooperation among ASEAN law enforcement agencies should be deepened, and information and intelligence exchanges should be enhanced to facilitate the flow of information on terrorists and terrorist organizations (http://www.state. gov/s/ct/rls/other/65902.htm). Following the Bali bombings a year later, ASEAN reiterated its commitment to fighting terrorism and, on the whole, ASEAN has gone along with broad international efforts to combat terrorism. At the same time, it is worth noting that the Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism, signed with the United States in August 2002, included a proviso that the United States and ASEAN both recognized the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states (http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/ot/12428.htm). An ASEAN Charter The potentially most important new initiative is the adoption of an ASEAN Charter at the Association s fortieth anniversary summit held in November The preparation of an ASEAN Charter was initiated two years earlier, at the ASEAN summit in 7 Actually, a meeting of ASEAN defense ministers and senior officials had taken place four years earlier, in Singapore in June It was convened by a European track II organization, the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), but functioned in an official track I mode; cf. Ball, 2004: On the track II diplomacy, see section 5. 18

19 2005, when an Eminent Persons Group (EPG) was established, consisting of elder statesmen and public servants, one from each country, who were asked to consult widely and to recommend bold and visionary ideas for the Charter (http://www. aseansec.org/18040.htm). The EPG submitted its report in December 2006, much of it being a severe criticism of many ASEAN procedures. The summit in January 2007 endorsed the report, although there were clear differences among members on a number of controversial issues (http://www.gov.ph/news/?i=18228). A ten-member drafting committee, known as the High Level Task Force (HLTF), was established to draft the Charter, and a first draft was submitted to the meeting of foreign ministers in July Some of the most controversial suggestions were dropped or toned down, and after more negotiations, the November 2007 summit finally signed an ASEAN Charter (http://www.13thaseansummit.org.sg/asean.index.php/web/documents/ agreements). It will probably take a year before it can enter into force after the last member state has ratified it. The Charter is more comprehensive (17 pages) than the usual, more basic ASEAN documents, and only the most conspicuous stipulations in the light of traditional ASEAN aims and principles will be identified. The first to be mentioned on the following list indicate a confirmation of traditional ASEAN ways, while the later ones indicate a change: respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all member states; non-interference in the internal affairs of member states; respect for the right of every member state to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion, or coercion; decision-making by consultation and consensus; nuclear weapons and all weapons of mass destruction in the region are prohibited; several new decision-making bodies are set up; a human rights body is set up to operate in accordance with the terms of reference to be determined by the Foreign Ministers meeting; ASEAN is accorded a legal identity; adherence to the rule of law, good governance, principles of democracy and constitutional government; respect for fundamental freedoms, the promotion and protection of human rights. The two last-mentioned themes are mentioned three times in the Charter, in the preamble and in the articles on purposes and principles, and they may have the great- 19

20 est potential for transforming ASEAN. However, as other stipulations can clearly be used to check any ambition to change ASEAN ways, it is difficult to imagine that the new Charter, if it is ratified by all members, will result in significant changes without controversy. The Charter may have some potential for increasing ASEAN s coherence and efficiency, but it is also precisely subjects like democracy, fundamental freedoms and human rights that may cause conflicts between the highly divergent political systems in ASEAN. The Association tried hard, and succeeded, in keeping these matters off the agenda throughout its first forty years, which may not be possible in the future. 20

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