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Oslo Architecture Triennale 2016: New World Embassy, Rojava: installation view, Oslo City Hall, 2016. Democratic Self-Administration of Rojava & Studio Jonas Staal. Flickr/István Virág. Some rights reserved.The situation of the Kurds
in a drastically changing Middle East has received little attention in
academia and less in the media despite their growing impact on regional and
international politics. The biggest stateless people living in the Middle East
are on the verge of a new status, not only in Iraqi Kurdistan, where a
referendum for independence takes place on September 25, 2017, but also in
Syria and Turkey. Then there are the Iranian Kurds. Their stories and the conditions
they live in are the least known, not only by the international community but
also by fellow-Kurds living in three neighbouring countries, due to an intense
isolation. This week’s short series looks at current political
struggles of the Kurds in four neighbouring countries or in a country that does
not exist on the world map but in the hearts and mind of 40 million
people. Mehmet Kurt, series editor.

In less than a week, the people of Bashur
will go the polls to vote on independence. As the referendum decision has
created ripples through the Middle East and beyond, the reactions of Turkey,
Iran, and Iraq have been predictably hostile. After all, in the last hundred
years since the World War One, these states have repeatedly tried to keep the
Kurds in line through a combination of war, repression, and even attempts at
genocide.

So, one should not be so surprised as they
throw various threats at the KRG now. More interesting, however, is how the
political fractures among Kurdish people and different parts of Kurdistan have
become more manifest. Indeed, we now have at least two Kurdistans: Bashur with
its capitalist modernization and Rojava and its allies with their democratic confederalism.

It is difficult to say how the relation
between these two projects will unfold in the long run. Yet we can say for now
that the tensions in both of them have become more obvious during the
referendum process. If we want the future of Kurdistan to be bright one, we
need to discuss these tensions and how to move beyond them instead of focusing solely
on the question of independence.

One issue the referendum has revealed might
be the Achilles’ hill of democratic confederalism: the tension between the
ideal of transcending the nation-state and Kurds’ century-old desire for their
own state. The adherents of democratic confederalism repeatedly argue that the
Kurds do not need or even want a nation-state. In itself, making such claims is
certainly understandable since political struggle necessitates a defence of the
plausibility of your ideology. Nonetheless, the reality does not exactly match
up to ideals. It seems that many Kurds are simply not ready to abandon the idea
of a state.

Moreover, some of them are quite ready to
equate any criticism based on a rejection of a state paradigm with outright
treason against Kurdistan. This is apparent from how the initial criticisms
from the PKK wing largely fell on deaf ears, or how anyone voicing a no vote is
harshly rebuked. Indeed, even parties like Gorran campaign for “no” not because
they reject states, but because they are against the way the referendum is being
handled.

However, the current atmosphere does not
mean that the political project of the KRG has been affirmed as the ultimate
choice, or that its powerholders are off the hook. The region is suffering,
caught in a mire of political, economic, and social problems. For example, economic
crisis is now manifest for everyone to see. Wages are sporadically or never
paid; electricity and other resources cannot be provided in a regular manner;
production is low; and supermarkets are invaded by products coming from Turkey.
Economic hardships are both caused and aggravated by relations of clientelism
and nepotism. Many are complaining that corruption in key revenues such as oil
are controlled by a handful of powerful people with little public control. On
top of these problems, it is difficult to argue that Bashur has achieved
decolonization. Turkey and Iran exert enormous influence in the region.
Especially the Turkish government has established a certain economic and
political dominion, with its arms reaching many things from oil trade to the construction
to military operations. As people see themselves more
and more as citizens, it will be impossible to sustain a system based on a
combination of state institutions and militia structures.

All of the problems above have their roots
in how power is held in the region. For so long now, the people have not directly
held power in Bashur. Of course, one can immediately make a counter claim and
say that direct democracy is not a must for prosperity and progress, and a
liberal democracy with a functioning state would do as well.

Ignoring many problems of liberal democracies,
we can contend that this counterpoint would have some merit. But here is the
problem that we have in Bashur. Power operates in the region neither through an
overarching and functional liberal state nor through direct democratic
institutions. Instead, Bashur is divided between power groups that essentially
correspond to parties and militias. Different parties control different
regions, employ separate peshmergas, control checkpoints, use resources, and
act as gatekeepers. Moreover, people themselves are deeply divided along party
lines. Largely a heritage from a century-long armed struggle and subsequent
civil war, this situation is extremely inimical to institutionalization or
democratization. It simply cannot be sustained without moving either to a
liberal state or a direct democracy.

The referendum and the nationalist
sentiments it brought to the surface might have slowed down these processes for
now. However, the region is still moving towards a reckoning, as the underlying
conditions will not be magically solved by independence. On the contrary, the
referendum might deepen these problems since an independent state itself will
further the citizenship process in Bashur. In other words, as people see
themselves more and more as citizens, it will be impossible to sustain a system
based on a combination of state institutions and militia structures. Because, simply
put, one cannot have an institutionalized state/democracy on the one hand and a
society based on a militia/party complex on the other. Thus, the current
war-based system of Bashur cannot go on like this.

Moreover, the democratic confederalist
project of Rojava is further highlighting the contradictions in Bashur. The
former espouses direct democratic control and communal economic structures. It thus
offers a deep contrast to the limited control that the people of Bashur wield
over their deepening problems.

The point here is not that democratic
confederalism is fully functional. There are certainly many gaps in the praxis
of Rojava. Yet unlike 15 years ago when democratic confederalism was only a
theoretical possibility, it is now being implemented in reality. The warm
reception of Rojava by the Kurds of Bashur might initially have been about
Kurdish solidarity. In the long run, however, Bashur will be more and more
inspired by what is happening in Rojava.

So, what might the effects of these
longstanding issues be in the long run? Unfortunately, they have the potential
to corrupt the century-old dream of the Kurdish people. It is not difficult to imagine
a future in which Kurdistan is independent but nonetheless not free and
prosperous. History, after all, is full of postcolonial countries which have
substantially failed in achieving their liberatory goals. These examples,
liberations betrayed as Edward Said would say, show us that it is not enough to
achieve nominal independence. Unless a liberation movement transforms
political, economic, and social relations towards an egalitarian, just, and
democratic future, the new system very likely devolves into a graveyard of
ideals and dreams. Oppressed nations have already had enough of these failed
cases. The question now is how Bashur will avoid this fate. In the long run, however, Bashur will be more and more
inspired by what is happening in Rojava.

Measures that could be taken

There are certain steps that could be
taken. First of all, there should be a rigorous twin push towards economic and
political democratization/decolonization. Economic democratization would
require tackling corruption, redirecting revenues of oil and other sources to
infrastructural and social programs, investing in education, moving towards
increased domestic production, and establishing necessary programs for the redistribution
of wealth.

Yet these by themselves do not guarantee
sustained democracy and decolonization. Therefore, there must also be simultaneous
efforts for people to wield real power. The parliament should certainly become
functional again as many others have argued. Yet this is not enough. The people
must directly participate in and control their affairs if the fate of many
other postcolonial countries is to be avoided. New local, regional, and
national committees should be established for execution and control of
economic, political, and social policies. These should be populated by directly
elected and independent civilians.

If the steps above are also reinforced by
social campaigns to encourage people to mobilize, organize, and participate,
Bashur can create the necessary foundations for decolonization and establishing
beneficial relations with the rest of the world. I have no illusions at this
point. Turkey and Iran are formidable countries, not to mention the US and
Russia. It will especially take much effort to shake off the colonizing effects
of Turkey. But why do we even discuss independence if we cannot dare to create
a truly free and democratic country? And what better way to achieve this than
relying on people themselves? Re-energizing the masses and passing the power to
them can give Bashur the necessary resources to move forward. Besides, the
people of Bashur do not even have to look far. Their own sisters and brothers in
Rojava are offering possible solutions and recipes.

On their part, adherents of democratic
confederalism in Rojava and other parts of Kurdistan should be prepared to face
the tensions inherent in their project. Sentiments that powerfully resurfaced
during the referendum process can be looked upon as a learning moment. If
democratic confederalists want to secure the future success of their project,
they need to be able to overcome various tensions stemming from ethnic
sentiments and nationalist desires.

Specifically, potential conflicts between
Kurds’ long desire for a state and the project of the Northern federation;
between nationalism and the ideals of democratic confederalism; between Kurds
and other groups in Rojava; and between Rojava and other parts of Kurdistan
need to be acknowledged and tackled.

It seems to me that women might be the key
element here. Their central position in Rojava and the revolution’s emphasis on
women’s liberation are well-known facts. As an oppressed group cutting through
ethnic and religious line, they have the potential to guide people in
transcending sectarian conflicts and to safeguard democratization and
liberation against destructive tendencies. To the extent that they can keep
their central position as a highly mobilized, democratic, and liberationist
group, women might offer the solutions to our problems. To the extent that they can keep their central position as a highly
mobilized, democratic, and liberationist group, women might offer the solutions
to our problems.

Ultimately, the referendum process has
shown that the Kurds need to stand together. It is true that there are fault
lines among many different groups, and politically there are now more than one
Kurdistan. Still, all the regional states that tower above their Kurdish
components have once again proved how hostile they are to the Kurds.

In such a geopolitical situation, in which
one also cannot easily trust the US or Russia, the Kurds need to rely on their
own strength. For this, dialogue, cooperation, and integration should be
increased through institutions like the KNK. The Kurds indeed have the
potential to guide the peoples of the Middle East towards a better future. Therefore,
their success in solving the problems of the different parts of Kurdistan and
coming together as a unified force of democracy and liberation is important for
us all.

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